




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THE WORKS OF WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT

TWENTY-TWO VOLUMES

VOL. XIV

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Montezuma Edition

THE
HISTORY OF THE REIGN
OF THE
EMPEROR

Charles the Fifth

The works of W. H. Prescott

BY

WILLIAM ROBERTSON, D.D.

WITH AN ACCOUNT OF THE EMPEROR'S LIFE AFTER
HIS ABDICATION

BY

ickling
WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT

EDITED BY

WILFRED HAROLD MUNRO

PROFESSOR OF EUROPEAN HISTORY IN BROWN UNIVERSITY

VOL. III

PHILADELPHIA AND LONDON

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY

BOUYAN THE MAGNIFICENT AND BOKALANA

See Page 32 of Vol. IV.



SOLYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT AND ROXALANA

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UNFORTUNATELY for the reputation of Francis I. among his contemporaries, his conduct at this juncture appeared a perfect contrast to that of his rival, as he laid hold on the opportunity afforded him by the emperor's having turned his whole force against the common enemy of Christendom, to revive his pretensions in Italy

and to plunge Europe into a new war. The treaty of Cambray, as has been observed, did not remove the causes of enmity between the two contending princes: it covered up, but did not extinguish, the flames of discord. Francis, in particular, who waited with impatience for a proper occasion of recovering the reputation as well as the territories which he had lost, continued to carry on his negotiations in different courts against the emperor, taking the utmost pains to heighten the jealousy which many princes entertained of his power or designs, and to inspire the rest with the same suspicion and fear. Among others, he applied to Francis Sforza, who, though indebted to Charles for the possession of the duchy of Milan, had received it on such hard conditions as rendered him not only a vassal of the empire, but a tributary dependent upon the emperor. The honor of having married the emperor's niece did not reconcile him to this ignominious state of subjection, which became so intolerable even to Sforza, though a weak and poor-spirited prince, that he listened with eagerness to the first proposals Francis made of rescuing him from the yoke. These proposals were conveyed to him by Maraviglia, or Merveille, as he is called by the French historians, a Milanese gentleman residing at Paris; and soon after, in order to carry on the negotiation with greater advantage, Merveille was sent to Milan, on pretence of visiting his relations, but with secret credentials from Francis as his envoy. In this character he was received by Sforza. But, notwithstanding his care to keep that circumstance concealed,

Charles, suspecting or having received information of it, remonstrated and threatened in such a high tone that the duke and his ministers, equally intimidated, gave the world immediately a most infamous proof of their servile fear of offending the emperor. As Merveille had neither the prudence nor the temper which the function wherein he was employed required, they artfully decoyed him into a quarrel, in which he happened to kill his antagonist, one of the duke's domestics, and, having instantly seized him, they ordered him to be tried for that crime, and to be beheaded. Francis, no less astonished at this violation of a character held sacred among the most uncivilized nations than enraged at the insult offered to the dignity of his crown, threatened Sforza with the effects of his indignation, and complained to the emperor, whom he considered as the real author of that unexampled outrage. But, receiving no satisfaction from either, he appealed to all the princes of Europe, and thought himself now entitled to take vengeance for an injury which it would have been indecent and pusillanimous to let pass with impunity.

Being thus furnished with a pretext for beginning a war on which he had already resolved, he multiplied his efforts in order to draw in other princes to take part in the quarrel. But all his measures for this purpose were disconcerted by unforeseen events. After having sacrificed the honor of the royal family of France by the marriage of his son with Catharine of Medici, in order to gain Clement, the death of that pontiff had deprived him of all the advantages which he

expected to derive from his friendship. Paul, his successor, though attached by inclination to the imperial interest, seemed determined to maintain the neutrality suitable to his character as the common father of the contending princes. The king of England, occupied with domestic cares and projects, declined, for once, engaging in the affairs of the Continent, and refused to assist Francis unless he would imitate his example in throwing off the papal supremacy. These disappointments led him to solicit with greater earnestness the aid of the Protestant princes associated by the league of Smalkalde. That he might the more easily acquire their confidence, he endeavored to accommodate himself to their predominant passion,—zeal for their religious tenets. He affected a wonderful moderation with regard to the points in dispute; he permitted Bellay, his envoy in Germany, to explain his sentiments concerning some of the most important articles, in terms not far different from those used by the Protestants;¹ he even condescended to invite Melancthon, whose gentle manners and pacific spirit distinguished him among the Reformers, to visit Paris, that by his assistance he might concert the most proper measures for reconciling the contending sects which so unhappily divided the Church.² These concessions must be considered rather as arts of policy than the result of conviction; for, whatever impression the new opinions in religion had made on his sis-

¹ Freheri Script. Rer. German., iii. 354, etc.—Sleid., Hist., 178, 183.—Seckend., lib. iii. 103.

² Camerarii Vita Ph. Melancthonis, 12mo, Hag., 1655, p. 12.

ters, the queen of Navarre and duchess of Ferrara, the gayety of Francis's own temper, and his love of pleasure, allowed him little leisure to examine theological controversies.

But soon after he lost all the fruits of this disingenuous artifice by a step very inconsistent with his declarations to the German princes. This step, however, the prejudices of the age, and the religious sentiments of his own subjects, rendered it necessary for him to take. His close union with the king of England, an excommunicated heretic, his frequent negotiations with the German Protestants, but, above all, his giving public audience to an envoy from Sultan Solyman, had excited violent suspicions concerning the sincerity of his attachment to religion. To have attacked the emperor, who on all occasions made high pretensions to zeal in defence of the Catholic faith, and at the very juncture when he was preparing for his expedition against Barbarossa, which was then considered as a pious enterprise, could not have failed to confirm such unfavorable sentiments with regard to Francis, and called on him to vindicate himself by some extraordinary demonstration of his reverence for the established doctrines of the Church. The indiscreet zeal of some of his subjects who had imbibed the Protestant opinions furnished him with such an occasion as he desired. They had affixed to the gates of the Louvre and other public places papers containing indecent reflections on the doctrines and rites of the Popish Church. Six of the persons concerned in this rash action were discovered and seized. The king, in order to avert

the judgments which it was supposed their blasphemies might draw down upon the nation, appointed a solemn procession. The holy sacrament was carried through the city in great pomp; Francis walked uncovered before it, bearing a torch in his hand; the princes of the blood supported the canopy over it; the nobles marched in order behind. In the presence of this numerous assembly, the king, accustomed to express himself on every subject in strong and animated language, declared that if one of his hands were infected with heresy he would cut it off with the other, and would not spare even his own children if found guilty of that crime. As a dreadful proof of his being in earnest, the six unhappy persons were publicly burnt before the procession was finished, with circumstances of the most shocking barbarity attending their execution.³

The princes of the league of Smalkalde, filled with resentment and indignation at the cruelty with which their brethren were treated, could not conceive Francis to be sincere when he offered to protect in Germany those very tenets which he persecuted with such rigor in his own dominions; so that all Bellay's art and eloquence in vindicating his master or apologizing for his conduct made but little impression upon them. They considered, likewise, that the emperor, who hitherto had never employed violence against the doctrines of the Reformers, nor even given them much molestation in their progress, was now bound by the agreement at Ratisbon not to disturb such as had embraced

³ Belcarii Comment. Rer. Gallic., 646.—Sleid., Hist., 175, etc.

the new opinions; and the Protestants wisely regarded this as a more certain and immediate security than the precarious and distant hopes with which Francis endeavored to allure them. Besides, the manner in which he had behaved to his allies at the siege of Cambray was too recent to be forgotten, and did not encourage others to rely much on his friendship or generosity. Upon all these accounts, the Protestant princes refused to assist the French king in any hostile attempt against the emperor. The elector of Saxony, the most zealous among them, in order to avoid giving any umbrage to Charles, would not permit Melancthon to visit the court of France, although that Reformer, flattered, perhaps, by the invitation of so great a monarch, or hoping that his presence there might be of signal advantage to the Protestant cause, discovered a strong inclination to undertake the journey.⁴

But, though none of the many princes who envied or dreaded the power of Charles would second Francis's efforts in order to reduce and circumscribe it, he nevertheless commanded his army to advance towards the frontiers of Italy. As his sole pretext for taking arms was that he might chastise the duke of Milan for his insolent and cruel breach of the law of nations, it might have been expected that the whole weight of his vengeance was to have fallen on his territories. But on a sudden, and at the very commencement, operations of war took another direction. Charles, duke of Savoy, one of the least active and able princes of

⁴ *Camerarii Vita Melan.*, 142, etc., 415.—*Seckend.*, lib. iii. 107.

the line from which he descended, had married Beatrix of Portugal, the sister of the empress. By her great talents she soon acquired an absolute ascendant over her husband; and, proud of her affinity to the emperor, or allured by the magnificent promises with which he flattered her ambition, she formed a union between the duke and the imperial court, extremely inconsistent with that neutrality which wise policy, as well as the situation of his dominions, had hitherto induced him to observe in all the quarrels between the contending monarchs. Francis was abundantly sensible of the distress to which he might be exposed if, when he entered Italy, he should leave behind him the territories of a prince devoted so obsequiously to the emperor that he had sent his eldest son to be educated in the court of Spain, as a kind of hostage for his fidelity. Clement VII., who had represented this danger in a strong light during his interview with Francis at Marseilles, suggested to him, at the same time, the proper method of guarding against it, having advised him to begin his operations against the Milanese by taking possession of Savoy and Piedmont, as the only certain way of securing a communication with his own dominions. Francis, highly irritated with the duke on many accounts, particularly for having supplied the Constable Bourbon with the money that enabled him to levy the body of troops which ruined the French army in the fatal battle of Pavia, was not unwilling to let him now feel both how deeply he resented and how severely he could punish these injuries. Nor did he want several

pretexts which gave some color of equity to the violence that he intended. The territories of France and Savoy lying contiguous to each other, and intermingled in many places, various disputes, unavoidable in such a situation, subsisted between the two sovereigns concerning the limits of their respective property; and, besides, Francis, in right of his mother, Louise of Savoy, had large claims upon the duke, her brother, for her share in their father's succession. Being unwilling, however, to begin hostilities without some cause of quarrel more specious than these pretensions, many of which were obsolete and others dubious, he demanded permission to march through Piedmont in his way to the Milanese, hoping that the duke, from an excess of attachment to the imperial interest, might refuse this request, and thus give a greater appearance of justice to all his operations against him. But, if we may believe the historians of Savoy, who appear to be better informed with regard to this particular than those of France, the duke readily, and with a good grace, granted what it was not in his power to deny, promising free passage to the French troops, as was desired; so that Francis, as the only method now left of justifying the measures which he determined to take, was obliged to insist for full satisfaction with regard to every thing that either the crown of France or his mother Louise could demand of the house of Savoy.⁵ Such an evasive answer as might have been expected being made to this

⁵ Histoire généalogique de Savoye, par Guichenon, 2 tom., fol., Lyon, 1660, i. 639, etc.

requisition, the French army, under the Admiral Brion, poured at once into the duke's territories at different places. The counties of Bressey and Bugey, united at that time to Savoy, were overrun in a moment. Most of the towns in the duchy of Savoy opened their gates at the approach of the enemy; a few which attempted to make resistance were easily taken; and before the end of the campaign the duke saw himself stripped of all his dominions but the provinces of Piedmont, in which there were not many places in a condition to be defended.

To complete the duke's misfortunes, the city of Geneva, the sovereignty of which he claimed and in some degree possessed, threw off his yoke, and its revolt drew along with it the loss of the adjacent territories. Geneva was at that time an imperial city; and, though under the direct dominion of its own bishops and the remote sovereignty of the dukes of Savoy, the form of its internal constitution was purely republican, being governed by syndics and a council chosen by the citizens. From these distinct and often clashing jurisdictions two opposite parties took their rise, and had long subsisted in the state: the one, composed of the advocates for the privileges of the community, assumed the name of *Eignotz*, or confederates in defence of liberty, and branded the other, which supported the episcopal or ducal prerogatives, with the name of *Mamelukes*, or slaves. At length the Protestant opinions, beginning to spread among the citizens, inspired such as embraced them with that bold, enterprising spirit which always accom-

panied or was naturally produced by them in their first operations. As both the duke and bishop were, from interest, from prejudice, and from political considerations, violent enemies of the Reformation, all the new converts joined with warmth the party of the Eignotz; and zeal for religion, mingling with the love of liberty, added strength to that generous passion. The rage and animosity of two factions, shut up within the same walls, occasioned frequent insurrections, which, terminating mostly to the advantage of the friends of liberty, they daily became more powerful.

The duke and bishop, forgetting their ancient contests about jurisdiction, had united against their common enemies, and each attacked them with his proper weapons. The bishop excommunicated the people of Geneva, as guilty of a double crime,—of impiety in apostatizing from the established religion, and of sacrilege in invading the rights of his see. The duke attacked them as rebels against their lawful prince, and attempted to render himself master of the city, first by surprise, and then by open force. The citizens, despising the thunder of the bishop's censures, boldly asserted their independence against the duke; and partly by their own valor, partly by the powerful assistance which they received from the canton of Berne, together with some small supplies, both of men and money, secretly furnished by the king of France, they defeated all his attempts. Not satisfied with having repulsed him, or with remaining always upon the defensive themselves, they now took advantage of the duke's

inability to resist them while overwhelmed by the armies of France, and seized several castles and places of strength which he possessed in the neighborhood of Geneva, thus delivering the city from those odious monuments of its former subjection and rendering the public liberty more secure for the future. At the same time the canton of Berne invaded and conquered the Pays de Vaud, to which it had some pretensions. The canton of Friburg, though zealously attached to the Catholic religion and having no subject of contest with the duke, laid hold on part of the spoils of that unfortunate prince. A great portion of these conquests or usurpations, being still retained by the two cantons, add considerably to their power, and have become the most valuable part of their territories. Geneva, notwithstanding many schemes and enterprises of the dukes of Savoy to re-establish their dominion over it, still keeps possession of its independence, and, in consequence of that blessing, has attained a degree of consideration, wealth, and elegance which it could not otherwise have reached.⁶

Amidst such a succession of disastrous events, the duke of Savoy had no other resource but the emperor's protection, which upon his return from Tunis he demanded with the most earnest importunity; and, as his misfortunes were occasioned chiefly by his attachment to the imperial interest, he had a just title to immediate assistance. Charles, however, was not in a condition to support

⁶ Hist. de la Ville de Genève, par Spon, 12mo, Utr., 1685, p. 99.—Hist. de la Réformation de Suisse, par Rouchat, Gen., 1728, tom. iv. p. 294, etc., tom. v. p. 216, etc.—Mém. de Bellay, 181.

him with that vigor and despatch which the exigency of his affairs called for. Most of the troops employed in the African expedition, having been raised for that service alone, were disbanded as soon as it was finished; the veteran forces under Antonio de Leyva were hardly sufficient for the defence of the Milanese; and the emperor's treasury was entirely drained by his extraordinary efforts against the infidels.

But the death of Francis Sforza, occasioned, according to some historians, by the terror of a French invasion, which had twice been fatal to his family, afforded the emperor full leisure to prepare for action. By this unexpected event the nature of the war and the causes of discord were totally changed. Francis's first pretext for taking arms, in order to chastise Sforza for the insult offered to the dignity of his crown, was at once cut off; but, as that prince died without issue, all Francis's rights to the duchy of Milan, which he had yielded only to Sforza and his posterity, returned back to him in full force. As the recovery of the Milanese was the favorite object of that monarch, he instantly renewed his claim to it; and if he had supported his pretensions by ordering the powerful army quartered in Savoy to advance without losing a moment towards Milan, he could hardly have failed to secure the important point of possession. But Francis, who became less enterprising as he advanced in years, and who was overawed at some times into an excess of caution by the remembrance of his past misfortunes, endeavored to establish his rights by negotiation, not by

arms, and, from a timid moderation, fatal in all great affairs, neglected to improve the favorable opportunity which presented itself. Charles was more decisive in his operations, and, in quality of sovereign, took possession of the duchy as a vacant fief of the empire. While Francis endeavored to explain and assert his title to it by arguments and memorials, or employed various arts in order to reconcile the Italian powers to the thoughts of his regaining footing in Italy, his rival was silently taking effectual steps to prevent it. The emperor, however, was very careful not to discover too early an intention of this kind; but, seeming to admit the equity of Francis's claim, he appeared solicitous only about giving him possession in such a manner as might not disturb the peace of Europe, or overturn the balance of power in Italy, which the politicians of that country were so desirous of preserving. By this artifice he deceived Francis, and gained so much confidence with the rest of Europe that, almost without incurring any suspicion, he involved the affair in new difficulties and protracted the negotiations at pleasure. Sometimes he proposed to grant the investiture of Milan to the duke of Orleans, Francis's second son; sometimes to the duke of Angoulême, his third son: as the views and inclinations of the French court varied, he transferred his choice alternately from the one to the other, with such profound and well-conducted dissimulation that neither Francis nor his ministers seem to have penetrated his real intention; and all military operations were entirely suspended, as if nothing had

remained but to enter quietly into possession of what they demanded.

During the interval of leisure gained in this manner, Charles, on his return from Tunis, assembled the states both of Sicily and Naples; and as they thought themselves greatly honored by the presence of their sovereign, and were no less pleased with the apparent disinterestedness of his expedition into Africa than dazzled by the success which had attended his arms, he prevailed on them to vote him such liberal subsidies as were seldom granted in that age. This enabled him to recruit his veteran troops, to levy a body of Germans, and to take every other proper precaution for executing or supporting the measures on which he had determined. Bellay, the French envoy in Germany, having discovered the intention of raising troops in that country, notwithstanding all the pretexts employed in order to conceal it, first alarmed his master with this evident proof of the emperor's insincerity.⁷ But Francis was so possessed at that time with the rage of negotiation, in all the artifices and refinements of which his rival far surpassed him, that, instead of beginning his military operations and pushing them with vigor, or seizing the Milanese before the imperial army was assembled, he satisfied himself with making new offers to the emperor, in order to procure the investiture by his voluntary deed. His offers were, indeed, so liberal and advantageous that, if ever Charles had intended to grant his demand, he could not have rejected them with decency. He

⁷ Mém. de Bellay, 192.

dexterously eluded them by declaring that until he consulted the pope in person he could not take his final resolution with regard to a point which so nearly concerned the peace of Italy. By this evasion he gained some further time for ripening the schemes which he had in view.

The emperor at last advanced towards Rome, and made his public entry into that city with extraordinary pomp; but, it being found necessary to remove the ruins of an ancient temple of peace in order to widen one of the streets through which the cavalcade had to pass, all the historians take notice of this trivial circumstance, and they are fond to interpret it as an omen of the bloody war that followed. Charles, it is certain, had by this time banished all thoughts of peace, and at last threw off the mask with which he had so long covered his designs from the court of France, by a declaration of his sentiments no less singular than explicit. The French ambassadors having in their master's name demanded a definite reply to his propositions concerning the investiture of Milan, Charles promised to give it next day in presence of the pope and cardinals assembled in full consistory. These being accordingly met, and all the foreign ambassadors invited to attend, the emperor stood up, and, addressing himself to the pope, expatiated for some time on the sincerity of his own wishes for the peace of Christendom, as well as his abhorrence of war, the miseries of which he enumerated at great length, with studied and elaborate oratory; he complained that all his endeavors to preserve the tranquillity of Europe had

hitherto been defeated by the restless and unjust ambition of the French king; that even during his minority he had proofs of the unfriendly and hostile intentions of that monarch; that afterwards he had openly attempted to wrest from him the imperial crown, which belonged to him by a title no less just than natural; that he had next invaded his kingdom of Navarre; that, not satisfied with this, he had attacked his territories, as well as that of his allies, both in Italy and the Low Countries; that when the valor of the imperial troops, rendered irresistible by the protection of the Almighty, had checked his progress, ruined his armies, and seized his person, he continued to pursue by deceit what he had undertaken with injustice; that he had violated every article in the treaty of Madrid, to which he owed his liberty, and as soon as he returned to his dominions took measures for rekindling the war which that pacification had happily extinguished; that when new misfortunes compelled him to sue again for peace at Cambray, he concluded and observed it with equal insincerity; that soon after he had formed dangerous connections with the heretical princes in Germany and incited them to disturb the tranquillity of the empire; that now he had driven the duke of Savoy, a prince married to a sister of the empress, and joined in close alliance with Spain, out of the greater part of his territories; and after injuries so often repeated, and amidst so many sources of discord, all hope of amity or concord became desperate; and, though he himself was still willing

to grant the investiture of Milan to one of the princes of France, there was little probability of that event taking place, as Francis, on the one hand, would not consent to what was necessary for securing the tranquillity of Europe, nor, on the other hand, could he think it reasonable or safe to give a rival the unconditional possession of all that he demanded. "Let us not, however," added he, "continue wantonly to shed the blood of our innocent subjects; let us decide the quarrel man to man, with what arms he pleases to choose, in our shirts, on an island, a bridge, or aboard a galley moored in a river; let the duchy of Burgundy be put in deposit on his part, and that of Milan on mine; these shall be the prize of the conqueror; and, after that, let the united forces of Germany, Spain, and France be employed to humble the power of the Turk and to extirpate heresy out of Christendom. But if he, by declining this method of terminating our differences, renders war inevitable, nothing shall divert me from prosecuting it to such extremity as shall reduce one of us to be the poorest gentleman in his own dominions. Nor do I fear that it will be on me this misfortune shall fall: I enter upon action with the fairest prospect of success; the justice of my cause, the union of my subjects, the number and valor of my troops, the experience and fidelity of my generals, all combine to insure it. Of all these advantages the king of France is destitute; and were my resources no more certain and my hopes of victory no better founded than his, I would instantly throw myself at his feet,

and, with folded hands, and a rope about my neck, implore his mercy.”⁸

This long harangue the emperor delivered with an elevated voice, a haughty tone, and the greatest vehemence of expression and gesture. The French ambassadors, who did not fully comprehend his meaning, as he spake in the Spanish tongue, were totally disconcerted, and at a loss how they should answer such an unexpected invective. When one of them began to vindicate his master's conduct, Charles interposed abruptly, and would not permit him to proceed. The pope, without entering into any particular detail, satisfied himself with a short but pathetic recommendation of peace, together with an offer of employing his sincere endeavors in order to procure that blessing to Christendom; and the assembly broke up in the greatest astonishment at the extraordinary scene which had been exhibited. In no part of his conduct, indeed, did Charles ever deviate so widely from his general character. Instead of that prudent recollection, that composed and regular deportment, so strictly attentive to decorum and so admirably adapted to conceal his own passions, for which he was at all other times conspicuous, he appears on this occasion before one of the most august assemblies in Europe, boasting of his own power and exploits with insolence, inveighing against his enemy with indecency, and challenging him to combat with an ostentatious valor more becoming a champion in romance than the first monarch in Christendom. But the well-known and powerful operation of

⁸ *Mém. de Bellay, 199.—Sandoval, Hist. del Emper., ii. 226.*

continued prosperity, as well as of exaggerated praise, even upon the firmest minds, sufficiently accounts for this seeming inconsistency. After having compelled Solyman to retreat and having stripped Barbarossa of a kingdom, Charles began to consider his arms as invincible. He had been entertained, ever since his return from Africa, with repeated scenes of triumphs and public rejoicings; the orators and poets of Italy, the most elegant at that time in Europe, had exhausted their genius in panegyric on his conduct and merit, to which the astrologers added magnificent promises of a more splendid fortune still in store. Intoxicated with all these, he forgot his usual reserve and moderation, and was unable to restrain this extravagant sally of vanity, which became the more remarkable by being both so uncommon and so public.

He himself seems to have been immediately sensible of the impropriety of his behavior, and when the French ambassadors demanded next day a more clear explanation of what he had said concerning the combat, he told them they were not to consider his proposal as a formal challenge to their master, but as an expedient for preventing bloodshed; he endeavored to soften several expressions in his discourse, and spoke in terms full of respect towards Francis. But, though this slight apology was far from being sufficient to remove the offence which had been given, Francis, by an unaccountable infatuation, continued to negotiate, as if it had still been possible to bring their differences to a period by an amicable composition. Charles, find-

ing him so eager to run into the snare, favored the deception, and, by seeming to listen to his proposals, gained time to prepare for the execution of his own designs.⁹

At last the imperial army assembled on the frontiers of the Milanese, to the amount of forty thousand foot and ten thousand horse; while that of France encamped near Vercelli in Piedmont, being greatly inferior in number, and weakened by the departure of a body of Swiss, whom Charles artfully persuaded the popish cantons to recall, that they might not serve against the duke of Savoy, their ancient ally. The French general, not daring to risk a battle, retired as soon as the imperialists advanced. The emperor put himself at the head of his forces, which the marquis del Guasto, the duke of Alva, and Ferdinand de Gonzago commanded under him, though the supreme direction of the whole was committed to Antonio de Leyva, whose abilities and experience justly entitled him to that distinction. Charles soon discovered his intention not to confine his operations to the recovery of Piedmont and Savoy, but to push forward and invade the southern provinces of France. This scheme he had long meditated, and had long been taking measures for executing it with such vigor as might insure success. He had remitted large sums to his sister, the governess of the Low Countries, and to his brother, the king of the Romans, instructing them to levy all the forces in their power, in order to form two separate bodies, the one to enter France on the side

⁹ Mém. de Bellay, 205, etc.

of Picardy, the other on the side of Champagne, while he, with the main army, fell upon the opposite frontier of the kingdom. Trusting to these vast preparations, he thought it impossible that Francis could resist so many unexpected attacks, on such different quarters, and began his enterprise with such confidence of its happy issue that he desired Paul Jovius, the historian, to make a large provision of paper sufficient to record the victories which he was going to obtain.

His ministers and generals, instead of entertaining the same sanguine hopes, represented to him in the strongest terms the danger of leading his troops so far from his own territories, to such a distance from his magazines, and into provinces which did not yield sufficient subsistence for their own inhabitants. They entreated him to consider the inexhaustible resources of France in maintaining a defensive war, and the active zeal with which a gallant nobility would serve a prince whom they loved, in repelling the enemies of their country; they recalled to his remembrance the fatal miscarriage of Bourbon and Pescara when they ventured upon the same enterprise under circumstances which seemed as certain to promise success; the marquis del Guasto, in particular, fell on his knees and conjured him to abandon the undertaking as desperate. But many circumstances combined in leading Charles to disregard all their remonstrances. He could seldom be brought, on any occasion, to depart from a resolution which he had once taken; he was too apt to underrate and despise the talents of his rival, the king of France,

because they differed so widely from his own; he was blinded by the presumption which accompanies prosperity, and relied, perhaps, in some degree, on the prophecies which predicted the increase of his own grandeur. He not only adhered obstinately to his own plan, but determined to advance towards France without waiting for the reduction of any part of Piedmont, except such towns as were absolutely necessary for preserving his communication with the Milanese.

The marquis de Saluces, to whom Francis had intrusted the command of a small body of troops left for the defence of Piedmont, rendered this more easy than Charles had any reason to expect. That nobleman, educated in the court of France, distinguished by continual marks of the king's favor, and honored so lately with a charge of such importance, suddenly, and without any provocation or pretext of disgust, revolted from his benefactor. His motives to this treacherous action were as childish as the deed itself was base. Being strongly possessed with a superstitious faith in divination and astrology, he believed with full assurance that the fatal period of the French nation was at hand; that on its ruins the emperor would establish a universal monarchy; that therefore he ought to follow the dictates of prudence, in attaching himself to his rising fortune, and could incur no blame for deserting a prince whom Heaven had devoted to destruction.¹⁰ His treason became still more odious by his employing that very authority with which Francis had invested

¹⁰ Mém. de Bellay, 222, a, 246, b.

him, in order to open the kingdom to his enemies. Whatever measures were proposed or undertaken by the officers under his command for the defence of their conquests, he rejected or defeated. Whatever properly belonged to himself as commander-in-chief to provide or perform for that purpose, he totally neglected. In this manner he rendered towns even of the greatest consequence untenable, by leaving them destitute either of provisions, or ammunition, or artillery, or a sufficient garrison; and the imperialists must have reduced Piedmont in as short a time as was necessary to march through it, if Montpezat, the governor of Fossano, had not, by an extraordinary effort of courage and military conduct, detained them almost a month before that inconsiderable place.

By this meritorious and seasonable service he gained his master sufficient time for assembling his forces and for concerting a system of defence against a danger which he now saw to be inevitable. Francis fixed upon the only proper and effectual plan for defeating the invasion of a powerful enemy; and his prudence in choosing this plan, as well as his perseverance in executing it, deserves the greater praise, as it was equally contrary to his own natural temper and to the genius of the French nation. He determined to remain altogether upon the defensive; never to hazard a battle, or even a great skirmish, without certainty of success; to fortify his camps in a regular manner; to throw garrisons only into towns of great strength; to deprive the enemy of subsistence, by laying waste the country before them; and to save

the whole kingdom by sacrificing one of its provinces. The execution of this plan he committed entirely to the Maréchal Montmorency, who was the author of it, a man wonderfully fitted by nature for such a trust,—haughty, severe, confident in his own abilities, and despising those of other men, incapable of being diverted from any resolution by remonstrances or entreaties, and, in prosecuting any scheme, regardless alike of love or of pity.

Montmorency made choice of a strong camp under the walls of Avignon, at the confluence of the Rhone and the Durance, one of which plentifully supplied his troops with all necessaries from the inland provinces, and the other covered his camp on that side where it was most probable the enemy would approach. He labored with unwearied industry to render the fortifications of this camp impregnable, and assembled there a considerable army, though greatly inferior to that of the enemy; while the king with another body of troops encamped at Valence, higher up the Rhone. Marseilles and Arles were the only towns he thought it necessary to defend,—the former in order to retain the command of the sea, the latter as the barrier of the province of Languedoc; and each of these he furnished with numerous garrisons of his best troops, commanded by officers on whose fidelity and valor he could rely. The inhabitants of the other towns, as well as of the open country, were compelled to abandon their houses, and were conducted to the mountains, to the camp at Avignon, or to the inland provinces. The forti-

fications of such places as might have afforded shelter or defence to the enemy were thrown down. Corn, forage, and provisions of every kind were carried away or destroyed; all the mills and ovens were ruined, and the wells filled up or rendered useless. The devastation extended from the Alps to Marseilles, and from the sea to the confines of Dauphiné; nor does history afford any instance among civilized nations in which this cruel expedient for the public safety was employed with the same rigor.

At length the emperor arrived with the van of his army on the frontiers of Provence, and was still so possessed with confidence of success that, during a few days when he was obliged to halt until the rest of his troops came up, he began to divide his future conquests among his officers, and, as a new incitement to serve him with zeal, gave them liberal promises of offices, lands, and honors in France.¹¹ The face of desolation, however, which presented itself to him when he entered the country began to damp his hopes, and convinced him that a monarch who in order to distress an enemy had voluntarily ruined one of his richest provinces would defend the rest with desperate obstinacy. Nor was it long before he became sensible that Francis's plan of defence was as prudent as it appeared to be extraordinary. His fleet, on which Charles chiefly depended for subsistence, was prevented for some time by contrary winds, and other accidents to which naval operations are subject, from approaching the French coast; even

¹¹ Mém. de Bellay, 266, a.

after its arrival it afforded at best a precarious and scanty supply to such a numerous body of troops;¹² nothing was to be found in the country itself for their support; nor could they draw any considerable aid from the dominions of the duke of Savoy, exhausted already by maintaining two great armies. The emperor was no less embarrassed how to employ than how to subsist his forces; for, though he was now in possession of almost an entire province, he could not be said to have the command of it while he held only defenceless towns, and while the French, besides their camp at Avignon, continued masters of Marseilles and Arles. At first he thought of attacking the camp, and of terminating the war by one decisive blow; but skilful officers who were appointed to view it declared the attempt to be utterly impracticable. He then gave orders to invest Marseilles and Arles, hoping that the French would quit their advantageous post in order to relieve them; but Montmorency, adhering firmly to his plan, remained immovable at Avignon, and the imperialists met with such a warm reception from the garrisons of both towns that they relinquished their enterprises with loss and disgrace. As a last effort, the emperor advanced once more towards Avignon, though with an army harassed by the perpetual incursions of small parties of the French light troops, weakened by disease, and dispirited by disasters which seemed the more intolerable because they were unexpected.

During these operations, Montmorency found

¹² Sandoval, ii. 231.

himself exposed to greater danger from his own troops than from the enemy; and their inconsiderate valor went near to have precipitated the kingdom into those calamities which he with such industry and caution had endeavored to avoid. Unaccustomed to behold an enemy ravaging their country almost without control, impatient of such long inaction, unacquainted with the slow and remote but certain effects of Montmorency's system of defence, the French wished for a battle with no less ardor than the imperialists. They considered the conduct of their general as a disgrace to their country. His caution they imputed to timidity; his circumspection, to want of spirit; and the constancy with which he pursued his plan, to obstinacy or pride. These reflections, whispered at first among the soldiers and subalterns, were adopted, by degrees, by officers of higher rank; and as many of them envied Montmorency's favor with the king, and more were dissatisfied with his harsh, disgusting manner, the discontent soon became great in his camp, which was filled with general murmurings, and almost open complaints, against his measures. Montmorency, on whom the sentiments of his own troops made as little impression as the insults of the enemy, adhered steadily to his system; though, in order to reconcile the army to his maxims, no less contrary to the genius of the nation than to the ideas of war among undisciplined troops, he assumed an unusual affability in his deportment, and often explained, with great condescension, the motives of his conduct, the advantages which had already resulted from it,

and the certain success with which it would be attended. At last Francis joined his army at Avignon, which, having received several reinforcements, he now considered as of strength sufficient to face the enemy. As he had put no small constraint upon himself in consenting that his troops should remain so long upon the defensive, it can hardly be doubted but that his fondness for what was daring and splendid, added to the impatience both of officers and soldiers, would at last have overruled Montmorency's salutary caution.¹³

Happily, the retreat of the enemy delivered the kingdom from the danger which any rash resolution might have occasioned. The emperor, after spending two inglorious months in Provence, without having performed any thing suitable to his vast preparations or that could justify the confidence with which he had boasted of his own power, found that, besides Antonio de Leyva and other officers of distinction, he had lost one-half of his troops by diseases or by famine, and that the rest were in no condition to struggle any longer with calamities by which so many of their companions had perished. Necessity, therefore, extorted from him orders to retire; and, though he was some time in motion before the French suspected his intention, a body of light troops, assisted by crowds of peasants, eager to be revenged on those who had brought such desolation on their country, hung upon the rear of the imperialists, and, by seizing every favorable opportunity of attacking them, threw them often into confusion. The road by

¹³ *Mém. de Bellay*, 269, etc., 312, etc.

which they fled—for they pursued their march with such disorder and precipitation that it scarcely deserves the name of a retreat—was strewn with arms or baggage, which in their hurry and trepidation they had abandoned, and covered with the sick, the wounded, and the dead; insomuch that Martin Bellay, an eye-witness of their calamities, endeavors to give his readers some idea of them by comparing their miseries to those which the Jews suffered from the victorious and destructive arms of the Romans.¹⁴ If Montmorency at this critical moment had advanced with all his forces, nothing could have saved the whole imperial army from utter ruin. But that general, by standing so long and so obstinately on the defensive, had become cautious to excess; his mind, tenacious of any bent it had once taken, could not assume a contrary one as suddenly as the change of circumstances required; and he still continued to repeat his favorite maxims, that it was more prudent to allow the lion to escape than to drive him to despair, and that a bridge of gold should be made for a retreating enemy.

The emperor, having conducted the shattered remains of his troops to the frontiers of Milan, and appointed the marquis del Guasto to succeed Leyva in the government of that duchy, set out for Genoa. As he could not bear to expose himself to the scorn of the Italians after such a sad reverse of fortune, and did not choose, under his present circumstances, to revisit those cities through which he had so lately passed in triumph

¹⁴ *Mém. de Bellay*, 316.—Sandoval, *Hist. del Emper.*, ii. 232.

for one conquest and in certain expectation of another, he embarked directly for Spain.¹⁵

Nor was the progress of his arms on the opposite frontier of France such as to alleviate in any degree the losses which he had sustained in Provence. Bellay, by his address and intrigues, had prevailed on so many of the German princes to withdraw the contingent of troops which they had furnished to the king of the Romans that he was obliged to lay aside all thoughts of his intended irruption into Champagne. Though a powerful army levied in the Low Countries entered Picardy, which they found but feebly guarded while the strength of the kingdom was drawn towards the south, yet the nobility, taking arms with their usual alacrity, supplied by their spirit the defects of the king's preparations, and defended Peronne, and other towns which were attacked, with such vigor as obliged the enemy to retire without making any conquest of importance.¹⁶

Thus Francis, by the prudence of his own measures and by the union and valor of his subjects, rendered abortive those vast efforts in which his rival had almost exhausted his whole force. As this humbled the emperor's arrogance no less than it checked his power, he was mortified more sensibly on this occasion than on any other during the course of the long contests between him and the French monarch.

One circumstance alone embittered the joy with which the success of the campaign inspired Francis.

¹⁵ Jovii Histor., lib. xxxv. p. 174, etc.

¹⁶ Mém. de Bellay, 318, etc.

That was the death of the dauphin, his eldest son, a prince of great hopes, and extremely beloved by the people on account of his resemblance to his father. This, happening suddenly, was imputed to poison, not only by the vulgar, fond of ascribing the death of illustrious personages to extraordinary causes, but by the king and his ministers. The count de Montecuculi, an Italian nobleman, cup-bearer to the dauphin, being seized on suspicion and put to the torture, openly charged the imperial generals Gonzago and Leyva with having instigated him to the commission of that crime; he even threw out some indirect and obscure accusations against the emperor himself. At a time when all France was exasperated to the utmost against Charles, this uncertain and extorted charge was considered as an incontestable proof of guilt; while the confidence with which both he and his officers asserted their own innocence, together with the indignation as well as horror which they expressed on their being supposed capable of such a detestable action, were little attended to and less regarded.¹⁷ It is evident, however, that the emperor could have no inducement to perpetrate such a crime, as Francis was still in the vigor of life himself, and had two sons, besides the dauphin, grown up almost to the age of manhood. That single consideration, without mentioning the emperor's general character, unblemished by the imputation of any deed resembling this in atrocity, is more than sufficient to counterbalance the weight of a dubious testimony

¹⁷ *Mém. de Bellay*, 289.

uttered during the anguish of torture.¹⁸ According to the most unprejudiced historians, the dauphin's death was occasioned by his having drunk too freely of cold water after overheating himself at tennis; and this account, as it is the most simple, is likewise the most credible. But if his days were cut short by poison, it is not improbable that the emperor conjectured rightly when he affirmed that it had been administered by the direction of Catharine of Medici, in order to secure the crown to the duke of Orleans, her husband.¹⁹ The advantages resulting to her by the dauphin's death were obvious as well as great; nor did her boundless and daring ambition ever recoil from any action necessary towards attaining the objects which she had in view.

Next year opened with a transaction very uncommon, but so incapable of producing any effect that it would not deserve to be mentioned if it were not a striking proof of the personal animosity which mingled itself in all the hostilities between Charles and Francis, and which often betrayed them into such indecencies towards each other as lessened the dignity of both. Francis, accompanied by the peers and princes of the blood, having taken his seat in the parliament of Paris with the usual solemnities, the advocate-general appeared, and, after accusing Charles of Austria (for so he affected to call the emperor) of having violated the treaty of Cambray, by which he was absolved from the homage due to the crown of France for

¹⁸ Sandoval, *Hist. del Emper.*, ii. 231.

¹⁹ Vera y Zuñiga, *Vida de Carlos V.*, p. 75.

the counties of Artois and Flanders, insisted that, this treaty being now void, he was still to be considered as a vassal of the crown, and, by consequence, had been guilty of rebellion in taking arms against his sovereign; and therefore he demanded that Charles should be summoned to appear in person, or by his counsel, before the parliament of Paris, his legal judges, to answer for this crime. The request was granted; a herald repaired to the frontiers of Picardy and summoned him with the accustomed formalities to appear against a day prefixed. That term being expired, and no person appearing in his name, the parliament gave judgment, "That Charles of Austria had forfeited by rebellion and contumacy those fiefs; declared Flanders and Artois to be reunited to the crown of France;" and ordered their decree for this purpose to be published by sound of trumpet on the frontiers of these provinces.²⁰

Soon after this vain display of his resentment rather than of his power, Francis marched towards the Low Countries, as if he had intended to execute the sentence which his parliament had pronounced, and to seize those territories which it had awarded to him. As the queen of Hungary, to whom her brother the emperor had committed the government of that part of his dominions, was not prepared for so early a campaign, he at first made some progress, and took several towns of importance. But, being obliged soon to leave his army in order to superintend the other operations of

²⁰ *Lettres et Mémoires d'Etat*, par Ribier, 2 tom., Blois, 1666, tom. i. p. 1.

war, the Flemings, having assembled a numerous army, not only recovered most of the places which they had lost, but began to make conquests in their turn. At last they invested Terouenne, and the duke of Orleans, now dauphin by the death of his brother, and Montmorency, whom Francis had honored with the constable's sword as the reward of his great services during the former campaign, determined to hazard a battle in order to relieve it. While they were advancing for this purpose, and within a few miles of the enemy, they were stopped short by the arrival of a herald from the queen of Hungary, acquainting him that a suspension of arms was now agreed upon.

This unexpected event was owing to the zealous endeavors of the two sisters, the queens of France and of Hungary, who had long labored to reconcile the contending monarchs. The war in the Netherlands had laid waste the frontier provinces of both countries, without any real advantage to either. The French and Flemings equally regretted the interruption of their commerce, which was beneficial to both. Charles, as well as Francis, who had each strained to the utmost in order to support the vast operation of the former campaign, found that they could now keep armies on foot in this quarter without weakening their operations in Piedmont, where both wished to push the war with the greatest vigor. All these circumstances facilitated the negotiations of the two queens; a truce was concluded, to continue in force for ten months, but it extended no farther than the Low Countries.²¹

²¹ Mémoires de Ribier, 56.

In Piedmont the war was still prosecuted with great animosity; and though neither Charles nor Francis could make the powerful efforts to which this animosity prompted them, they continued to exert themselves like combatants whose rancor remains after their strength is exhausted. Towns were alternately lost and retaken; skirmishes were fought every day; and much blood was shed, without any action that gave a decided superiority to either side. At last the two queens, determining not to leave unfinished the good work which they had begun, prevailed, by their importunate solicitations, the one on her brother, the other on her husband, to consent also to a truce in Piedmont for three months. The conditions of it were that each should keep possession of what was in his hands, and, after leaving garrisons in the towns, should withdraw his army out of the province, and that plenipotentiaries should be appointed to adjust all matters in dispute by a final treaty.²²

The powerful motives which inclined both princes to this accommodation have been often mentioned. The expenses of the war had far exceeded the sums which their revenues were capable of supplying, nor durst they venture upon any great addition to the impositions then established, as subjects had not yet learned to bear with patience the immense burdens to which they have become accustomed in modern times. The emperor in particular, though he had contracted debts which in that age appeared prodigious,²³ had it not in his power to pay the large arrears long due

²² Mémoires de Ribier, 62.

²³ Ibid., 294.

to his army. At the same time, he had no prospect of deriving any aid in money or men either from the pope or Venetians, though he had employed promises and threats, alternately, in order to procure it. But he found the former not only fixed in his resolution of adhering steadily to the neutrality which he had always declared to be suitable to his character, but passionately desirous of bringing about a peace. He perceived that the latter were still intent on their ancient object of holding the balance even between the rivals, and solicitous not to throw too great a weight into either scale.

What made a deeper impression on Charles than all these was the dread of the Turkish arms, which, by his league with Solyman, Francis had drawn upon him. Though Francis, without the assistance of a single ally, had a war to maintain against an enemy greatly superior in power to himself, yet so great was the horror of Christians, in that age, at any union with infidels, which they considered not only as dishonorable but profane, that it was long before he could be brought to avail himself of the obvious advantages resulting from such a confederacy. Necessity at last surmounted his delicacy and scruples. Towards the close of the preceding year, La Forest, a secret agent at the Ottoman Porte, had concluded a treaty with the sultan, whereby Solyman engaged to invade the kingdom of Naples during the next campaign, and to attack the king of the Romans in Hungary with a powerful army, while Francis undertook to enter the Milanese at the same time with a proper

force. Solyman had punctually performed what was incumbent on him. Barbarossa with a great fleet appeared on the coast of Naples, filled that kingdom, from which all the troops had been drawn towards Piedmont, with consternation, landed without resistance near Taranto, obliged Castro, a place of some strength, to surrender, plundered the adjacent country, and was taking measures for securing and extending his conquests, when the expected arrival of Doria, together with the pope's galleys and a squadron of the Venetian fleet, made it prudent for him to retire. In Hungary the progress of the Turks was more formidable. Mahmet, their general, after gaining several small advantages, defeated the Germans in a great battle at Essek on the Drave.²⁴ Happily for Christendom, it was not in Francis's power to execute with equal exactness what he had stipulated; nor could he assemble at this juncture an army strong enough to penetrate into the Milanese. By this he failed in recovering possession of that duchy; and Italy was not only saved from the calamities of a new war, but from feeling the desolating rage of the Turkish arms, as an addition to all that it had suffered.²⁵ As the emperor knew that he could not long resist the efforts of two such powerful confederates, nor could expect that the same fortunate accidents would concur a second time to deliver Naples and to preserve the Milanese; as he foresaw that the Italian states would not only tax him loudly with

²⁴ Instuanhaffii Hist. Hung., lib. xiii. p. 139.

²⁵ Jovii Hist., lib. xxxv. p. 183.

insatiable ambition, but might even turn their arms against him, if he should be so regardless of their danger as obstinately to protract the war, he thought it necessary, both for his safety and reputation, to give his consent to a truce. Nor was Francis willing to sustain all the blame of obstructing the re-establishment of tranquillity, or to expose himself on that account to the danger of being deserted by the Swiss and other foreigners in his service. He even began to apprehend that his own subjects would serve him coldly if, by contributing to aggrandize the power of the infidels, which it was his duty, and had been the ambition of his ancestors, to depress, he continued to act in direct opposition to all the principles which ought to influence a monarch distinguished by the title of Most Christian King. He chose, for all these reasons, rather to run the risk of disobliging his new ally, the sultan, than, by an unseasonable adherence to the treaty with him, to forfeit what was of greater consequence.

But, though both parties consented to a truce, the plenipotentiaries found insuperable difficulties in settling the articles of a definitive treaty. Each of the monarchs, with the arrogance of a conquerer, aimed at giving law to the other; and neither would so far acknowledge his inferiority as to sacrifice any point of honor or to relinquish any matter of right; so that the plenipotentiaries spent the time in long and fruitless negotiations, and separated after agreeing to prolong the truce for a few months.

The pope, however, did not despair of accom-

plishing a point in which the plenipotentiaries had failed, and took upon himself the sole burden of negotiating a peace. To form a confederacy capable of defending Christendom from the formidable inroads of the Turkish arms, and to concert effectual measures for the extirpation of the Lutheran heresy, were two great objects which Paul had much at heart, and he considered the union of the emperor with the king of France as an essential preliminary to both. To be the instrument of reconciling these contending monarchs, whom his predecessors by their interested and indecent intrigues had so often embroiled, was a circumstance which could not fail of throwing distinguished lustre on his character and administration. Nor was he without hopes that, while he pursued this laudable end, he might secure advantages to his own family, the aggrandizing of which he did not neglect, though he aimed at it with a less audacious ambition than was common among the popes of that century. Influenced by these considerations, he proposed an interview between the two monarchs at Nice, and offered to repair thither in person that he might act as mediator in composing all their differences. When a pontiff of a venerable character, and of a very advanced age, was willing, from his zeal for peace, to undergo the fatigues of so long a journey, neither Charles nor Francis could with decency decline the interview. But, though both came to the place of rendezvous, so great was the difficulty of adjusting the ceremonial, or such the remains of distrust and rancor on each side, that they refused to see

one another, and every thing was transacted by the intervention of the pope, who visited them alternately. With all his zeal and ingenuity, he could not find out a method of removing the obstacles which prevented a final accommodation, particularly those arising from the possession of the Milanese; nor was all the weight of his authority sufficient to overcome the obstinate perseverance of either monarch in asserting his own claims. At last, that he might not seem to have labored altogether without effect, he prevailed on them to sign a truce for ten years, upon the same condition with the former, that each should retain what was now in his possession, and in the mean time should send ambassadors to Rome, to discuss their pretensions at leisure.²⁶

Thus ended a war of no long continuance, but very extensive in its operations, and in which both parties exerted their utmost strength. Though Francis failed in the object that he had principally in view, the recovery of the Milanese, he acquired, nevertheless, great reputation by the wisdom of his measures, as well as the success of his arms, in repelling a formidable invasion; and by keeping possession of one-half of the duke of Savoy's dominions he added no inconsiderable accession of strength to his kingdom. Whereas Charles, repulsed and baffled, after having boasted so arrogantly of victory, purchased an inglorious truce, by sacrificing an ally who had rashly confided too

²⁶ *Recueil des Traités*, ii. 210.—*Relazione di Nicolo Tiepolo del l'Abbocamento di Nizza*, ap. Du Mont, *Corps Diplomatique*, par. ii. p. 174.

much in his friendship and power. The unfortunate duke murmured, complained, and remonstrated against a treaty so much to his disadvantage, but in vain; he had no means of redress, and was obliged to submit. Of all his dominions, Nice, with its dependencies, was the only corner of which he himself kept possession. He saw the rest divided between a powerful invader and the ally to whose protection he had trusted, while he remained a sad monument of the imprudence of weak princes, who, by taking part in the quarrel of mighty neighbors, between whom they happen to be situated, are crushed and overwhelmed in the shock.

A few days after signing the treaty of truce, the emperor set sail for Barcelona, but was driven by contrary winds to the island of St. Margaret, on the coast of Provence. When Francis, who happened to be not far distant, heard of this, he considered it as an office of civility to invite him to take shelter in his dominions, and proposed a personal interview with him at Aigues-mortes. The emperor, who would not be outdone by his rival in complaisance, instantly repaired thither. As soon as he cast anchor in the road, Francis, without waiting to settle any point of ceremony, but relying implicitly on the emperor's honor for his security, visited him on board his galley, and was received and entertained with the warmest demonstrations of esteem and affection. Next day the emperor repaid the confidence which the king had placed in him. He landed at Aigues-mortes with as little precaution, and met with a reception

equally cordial. He remained on shore during the night, and in both visits the two monarchs vied with each other in expressions of respect and friendship.²⁷ After twenty years of open hostilities or of secret enmity, after so many injuries reciprocally inflicted or endured, after having formally given the lie and challenged one another to single combat, after the emperor had inveighed so publicly against Francis as a prince void of honor or integrity, and after Francis had accused him of being accessory to the murder of his eldest son, such an interview appears altogether singular, and even unnatural. But the history of these monarchs abounds with such surprising transitions. From implacable hatred they appeared to pass in a moment to the most cordial reconciliation; from suspicion and distrust, to perfect confidence; and from practising all the dark arts of a deceitful policy, they could assume, of a sudden, the liberal and open manners of two gallant gentlemen.

The pope, besides the glory of having restored peace to Europe, gained, according to his expectation, a point of great consequence to his family by prevailing on the emperor to betroth Margaret of Austria, his natural daughter, formerly the wife of Alexander de' Medici, to his grandson, Octavio Farnese, and, in consideration of this marriage, to bestow several honors and territories upon his future son-in-law. A very tragical event which

²⁷ Sandoval, *Hist.*, vol. ii. 238.—*Relation de l'Entrevue de Charles V. et François I.*, par. M. de la Rivoire.—*Hist. de Langued.*, par. D. D. De Vic et Vaisette, tom. v., *Preuves*, p. 93.

happened about the beginning of the year 1537 had deprived Margaret of her first husband. That young prince, whom the emperor's partiality had raised to the supreme power in Florence upon the ruins of the public liberty, neglected entirely the cares of government, and abandoned himself to the most dissolute debauchery. Lorenzo de' Medici, his nearest kinsman, was not only the companion but director of his pleasures, and, employing all the powers of a cultivated and inventive genius in this dishonorable ministry, added such elegance as well as variety to vice as gained him an absolute ascendant over the mind of Alexander. But while Lorenzo seemed to be sunk in luxury, and affected such an appearance of indolence and effeminacy that he would not wear a sword, and trembled at the sight of blood, he concealed under that disguise a dark, designing, audacious spirit. Prompted either by the love of liberty or allured by the hope of attaining the supreme power, he determined to assassinate Alexander, his benefactor and friend. Though he long revolved this design in his mind, his reserved and suspicious temper prevented him from communicating it to any person whatever; and, continuing to live with Alexander in their usual familiarity, he one night, under pretence of having secured him an assignation with a lady of high rank whom he had often solicited, drew that unwary prince into a secret apartment of his house, and there stabbed him while he lay carelessly on a couch, expecting the arrival of the lady whose company he had been promised. But no sooner was the deed done than, standing astonished, and

struck with horror at its atrocity, he forgot in a moment all the motives which had induced him to commit it. Instead of rousing the people to recover their liberty by publishing the death of the tyrant, instead of taking any step towards opening his own way to the dignity now vacant, he locked the door of the apartment, and, like a man bereaved of reason and presence of mind, fled with the utmost precipitation out of the Florentine territories. It was late next morning before the fate of the unfortunate prince was known, as his attendants, accustomed to his irregularities, never entered his apartment early. Immediately the chief persons in the state assembled. Being induced partly by the zeal of Cardinal Cibo for the house of Medici, to which he was nearly related, partly by the authority of Francis Guicciardini, who recalled to their memory and represented in striking colors the caprice as well as turbulence of their ancient popular government, they agreed to place Cosmo de' Medici, a youth of eighteen, the only male heir of that illustrious house, at the head of the government; though at the same time such was their love of liberty that they established several regulations in order to circumscribe and moderate his power.

Meanwhile, Lorenzo, having reached a place of safety, made known what he had done to Philip Strozzi and the other Florentines who had been driven into exile, or who had voluntarily retired, when the republican form of government was abolished in order to make way for the dominion of the Medici. By them the deed was extolled with

extravagant praises, and the virtue of Lorenzo was compared with that of the elder Brutus, who disregarded the ties of blood, or with that of the younger, who forgot the friendship and favors of the tyrant, that they might preserve or recover the liberty of their country.²⁸ Nor did they rest satisfied with empty panegyrics: they immediately quitted their different places of retreat, assembled forces, animated their vassals and partisans to take arms and to seize this opportunity of re-establishing the public liberty on its ancient foundation. Being openly assisted by the French ambassador at Rome, and secretly encouraged by the pope, who bore no good will to the house of Medici, they entered the Florentine dominions with a considerable body of men. But the persons who had elected Cosmo possessed not only the means of supporting his government, but abilities to employ them in the most proper manner. They levied, with the greatest expedition, a good number of troops; they endeavored by every art to gain the citizens of greatest authority, and to render the administration of the young prince agreeable to the people. Above all, they courted the emperor's protection, as the only firm foundation of Cosmo's dignity and power. Charles, knowing the propensity of the Florentines to the friendship of France, and how much all the partisans of a republican government detested him as the oppressor of their liberties, saw it to be greatly for his interest to prevent the re-establishment of the ancient constitution in Florence. For this reason,

²⁸ *Lettere de' Principi*, tom. iii. p. 52.

he not only acknowledged Cosmo as head of the Florentine state, and conferred on him all the titles of honor with which Alexander had been dignified, but engaged to defend him to the utmost, and, as a pledge of this, ordered the commanders of such of his troops as were stationed on the frontiers of Tuscany to support him against all aggressors. By their aid, Cosmo obtained an easy victory over the exiles, whose troops he surprised in the night-time and took most of the chiefs prisoners; an event which broke all their measures and fully established his own authority. But though he was extremely desirous of the additional honor of marrying the emperor's daughter, the widow of his predecessor, Charles, secure already of his attachment, chose rather to gratify the pope by bestowing her on his nephew.²⁹

During the war between the emperor and Francis, an event had happened which abated in some degree the warmth and cordiality of friendship which had long subsisted between the latter and the king of England. James the Fifth of Scotland, an enterprising young prince, having heard of the emperor's intention to invade Provence, was so fond of showing that he did not yield to any of his ancestors in the sincerity of his attachment to the French crown, and so eager to distinguish himself by some military exploit, that he levied a body of troops with an intention of leading them in person to the assistance of the king of France.

²⁹ Jovii Hist., c. xcvi. p. 218, etc.—Belcarii Comment., lib. xxii. p. 696.—Istoria de' suoi Tempi di Giov. Bat. Adriani Ven., 1587, p. 10.

Though some unfortunate accident prevented his carrying any troops into France, nothing could divert him from going thither in person. Immediately upon his landing he hastened to Provence, but had been detained so long in his voyage that he came too late to have any share in the military operations, and met the king on his return after the retreat of the imperialists. But Francis was so greatly pleased with his zeal, and no less with his manners and conversation, that he could not refuse him his daughter Magdalen, whom he demanded in marriage. It mortified Henry extremely to see a prince of whom he was immoderately jealous form an alliance from which he derived such an accession of reputation as well as security.³⁰ He could not, however, with decency oppose Francis's bestowing his daughter upon a monarch descended from a race of princes the most ancient and faithful allies of the French crown. But when James, upon the sudden death of Magdalen, demanded as his second wife Mary of Guise, he warmly solicited Francis to deny his suit, and, in order to disappoint him, asked that lady in marriage for himself. When Francis preferred the Scottish king's sincere courtship to his artful and malevolent proposal, he discovered much dissatisfaction. The pacification agreed upon at Nice, and the familiar interview of the two rivals at Aigues-mortes, filled Henry's mind with new suspicions, as if Francis had altogether renounced his friendship for the sake of new connections with the emperor. Charles, thoroughly acquainted with the temper of

³⁰ Hist. of Scotland, vol. i. p. 75.

the English king, and watchful to observe all the shiftings and caprices of his passions, thought this a favorable opportunity of renewing his negotiations with him, which had been long broken off. By the death of Queen Catharine, whose interest the emperor could not with decency have abandoned, the chief cause of their discord was removed; so that, without touching upon the delicate question of her divorce, he might now take what measures he thought most effectual for regaining Henry's good will. For this purpose, he began with proposing several marriage-treaties to the king. He offered his niece, a daughter of the king of Denmark, to Henry himself; he demanded the princess Mary for one of the princes of Portugal, and was even willing to receive her as the king's illegitimate daughter.³¹ Though none of these projected alliances ever took place, or perhaps were ever seriously intended, they occasioned such frequent intercourse between the courts, and so many reciprocal professions of civility and esteem, as considerably abated the edge of Henry's rancor against the emperor, and paved the way for that union between them which afterwards proved so disadvantageous to the French king.

The ambitious schemes in which the emperor had been engaged, and the wars he had been carrying on for some years, proved, as usual, extremely favorable to the progress of the Reformation in Germany. While Charles was absent upon his African expedition, or intent on his projects against France, his chief object in Germany was

³¹ *Mém. de Ribier, tom. i. p. 496.*

to prevent the dissensions about religion from disturbing the public tranquillity, by granting such indulgence to the Protestant princes as might induce them to concur with his measures, or at least hinder them from taking part with his rival. For this reason, he was careful to secure to the Protestants the possession of all the advantages which they had gained by the articles of pacification at Nuremberg, in the year 1532;³² and, except some slight trouble from the proceedings of the imperial chamber, they met with nothing to disturb them in the exercise of their religion, or to interrupt the successful zeal with which they propagated their opinions. Meanwhile, the pope continued his negotiations for convoking a general council; and though the Protestants had expressed great dissatisfaction with his intention to fix upon Mantua as the place of meeting, he adhered obstinately to his choice, and issued a bull on the 2d of June, 1536, appointing it to assemble in that city on the 23d of May, the year following; he nominated three cardinals to preside in his name, enjoined all Christian princes to countenance it by their authority, and invited the prelates of every nation to attend in person. This summons of a council, an assembly which, from its nature and intention, demanded quiet times as well as pacific dispositions, at the very juncture when the emperor was on his march towards France and ready to involve a great part of Europe in the confusions of war, appeared to every person extremely unseasonable. It was intimated, however, to all the different

³² Du Mont, Corps Diplom., tom. iv. part ii. p. 138.

courts by nuncios despatched on purpose.³³ With an intention to gratify the Germans, the emperor, during his residence in Rome, had warmly solicited the pope to call a council; but, being at the same time willing to try every art in order to persuade Paul to depart from the neutrality which he preserved between him and Francis, he sent Heldo, his vice-chancellor, into Germany, along with a nuncio despatched thither, instructing him to second all the nuncio's representations and to enforce them with the whole weight of the imperial authority. The Protestants gave them audience at Smalkalde, where they had assembled in a body in order to receive them. But, after weighing all their arguments, they unanimously refused to acknowledge a council summoned in the name and by the authority of the pope alone, in which he assumed the sole right of presiding, which was to be held in a city not only far distant from Germany, but subject to a prince who was a stranger to them and closely connected with the court of Rome, and to which their divines could not repair with safety, especially after their doctrines had been stigmatized in the very bull of convocation with the name of heresy. These and many other objections against the council, which appeared to them unanswerable, they enumerated in a large manifesto which they published in vindication of their conduct.³⁴

Against this the court of Rome exclaimed, as a flagrant proof of their obstinacy and presump-

³³ Pallavic., *Hist. Conc. Trid.*, 113.

³⁴ Sleid., lib. xii. 123, etc.—Seckend., *Com.*, lib. iii. p. 143, etc.

tion, and the pope still persisted in his resolution to hold the council at the time and in the place appointed. But, some unexpected difficulties being started by the duke of Mantua, both about the right of jurisdiction over the persons who resorted to the council, and the security of his capital amidst such a concourse of strangers, the pope, after fruitless endeavors to adjust these, first prorogued the council for some months, and afterwards, transferring the place of meeting to Vicenza, in the Venetian territories, appointed it to assemble on the 1st of May in the following year. As neither the emperor nor the French king, who had not then come to any accommodation, would permit their subjects to repair thither, not a single prelate appeared on the day prefixed, and the pope, that his authority might not become altogether contemptible by so many ineffectual efforts to convoke that assembly, put off the meeting by an indefinite prorogation.³⁵

But, that he might not seem to have turned his whole attention towards a reformation which he was not able to accomplish, while he neglected that which was in his own power, he deputed a certain number of cardinals and bishops, with full authority to inquire into the abuses and corruptions of the Roman court and to propose the most effectual method of removing them. This scrutiny, undertaken with reluctance, was carried on slowly and with remissness. All defects were touched with a gentle hand, afraid of probing too deep or of discovering too much. But even by this

³⁵ F. Paul, 117.—Pallavic., 177.

partial examination many irregularities were detected and many enormities exposed to light, while the remedies which they suggested as most proper were either inadequate or were never applied. The report and resolution of these deputies, though intended to be kept secret, were transmitted by some accident into Germany, and, being immediately made public, afforded ample matter for reflection and triumph to the Protestants.³⁶ On the one hand, they demonstrated the necessity of a reformation in the head as well as the members of the Church, and even pointed out many of the corruptions against which Luther and his followers had remonstrated with the greatest vehemence. They showed, on the other hand, that it was vain to expect this reformation from ecclesiastics themselves, who, as Luther strongly expressed it, piddled at curing warts, while they overlooked or confirmed ulcers.³⁷

The earnestness with which the emperor seemed at first to impress their acquiescing in the pope's scheme of holding a council in Italy alarmed the Protestant princes so much that they thought it prudent to strengthen their confederacy by admitting several new members, who solicited that privilege, particularly the king of Denmark. Heldo, who during his residence in Germany had observed all the advantages which they derived from that union, endeavored to counterbalance its effects by an alliance among the Catholic powers of the empire. This league, distinguished by the name of *holy*, was merely defensive, and, though concluded

³⁶ Sleid., 233.

³⁷ Seck., lib. iii. 164.

by Heldo in the emperor's name, was afterwards disowned by him, and subscribed by very few princes.³⁸

The Protestants soon got intelligence of this association, notwithstanding all the endeavors of the contracting parties to conceal it; and their zeal, always apt to suspect and to dread, even to excess, every thing that seemed to threaten religion, instantly took the alarm, as if the emperor had been just ready to enter upon the execution of some formidable plan for the extirpation of their opinions. In order to disappoint this, they held frequent consultations, they courted the kings of France and England with great assiduity, and even began to think of raising the respective contingents, both in men and money, which they were obliged to furnish by the treaty of Smalkalde. But it was not long before they were convinced that these apprehensions were without foundation, and that the emperor, to whom repose was absolutely necessary after efforts so much beyond his strength in the war with France, had no thoughts of disturbing the tranquillity of Germany. As a proof of this, at an interview with the Protestant princes in Frankfort his ambassadors agreed that all concessions in their favor, particularly those contained in the pacification of Nuremberg, should continue in force for fifteen months; that during this period all proceedings of the imperial chamber against them should be suspended; that a conference should be held by a few divines of each party, in order to discuss the points in controversy, and

³⁸ Seck., lib. iii. 171.—Recueil des Traités.

to propose articles of accommodation which should be laid before the next diet. Though the emperor, that he might not irritate the pope, who remonstrated against the first part of this agreement as impolitic, and against the latter as an impious encroachment upon his prerogative, never formally ratified this convention, it was observed with considerable exactness, and greatly strengthened the basis of that ecclesiastical liberty for which the Protestants contended.³⁹

A few days after the convention at Frankfort, George, duke of Saxony, died; and his death was an event of great advantage to the Reformation. That prince, the head of the Albertine or younger branch of the Saxon family, possessed, as marquis of Misnia and Thuringia, extensive territories, comprehending Dresden, Leipsic, and other cities now the most considerable in the electorate. From the first dawn of the Reformation he had been its enemy as avowedly as the electoral princes were its protectors, and had carried on his opposition not only with all the zeal flowing from religious prejudices, but with a virulence inspired by personal antipathy to Luther, and embittered by the domestic animosity subsisting between him and the other branch of his family. By his death without issue, his succession fell to his brother Henry, whose attachment to the Protestant religion surpassed, if possible, that of his predecessors to Popery. Henry no sooner took possession of his new dominions than, disregarding a clause in George's will, dictated by his bigotry, whereby he be-

³⁹ F. Paul, 82.—Sleid., 247.—Seck., lib. iii. 200.

queathed all his territories to the emperor and king of the Romans if his brother should attempt to make any innovation in religion, he invited some Protestant divines, and among them Luther himself, to Leipsic. By their advice and assistance, he overturned in a few weeks the whole system of ancient rites, establishing the full exercise of the Reformed religion, with the universal applause of his subjects, who had long wished for this change, which the authority of their duke alone had hitherto prevented.⁴⁰ This revolution delivered the Protestants from the danger to which they were exposed by having an inveterate enemy situated in the middle of their territories; and they had now the satisfaction of seeing that the possessions of the princes and cities attached to their cause extended in one great and almost unbroken line from the shore of the Baltic to the banks of the Rhine.

Soon after the conclusion of the truce of Nice, an event happened which satisfied all Europe that Charles had prosecuted the war to the utmost extremity that the state of his affairs would permit. Vast arrears were due to his troops, whom he had long amused with vain hopes and promises. As they now foresaw what little attention would be paid to their demands when by the re-establishment of peace their services became of less importance, they lost all patience, broke out into an open mutiny, and declared that they thought themselves entitled to seize by violence what was detained from them contrary to all justice. Nor was this

⁴⁰ Sleid., 249.

spirit of sedition confined to one part of the emperor's dominions: the mutiny was almost as general as the grievances which gave rise to it. The soldiers in the Milanese plundered the open country without control, and filled the capital itself with consternation. Those in garrison at Goletta threatened to give up that important fortress to Barbarossa. In Sicily the troops proceeded to still greater excesses: having driven away their officers, they elected others in their stead, defeated a body of men whom the viceroy sent against them, took and pillaged several cities, conducting themselves all the while in such a manner that their operations resembled rather the regular proceedings of a concerted rebellion than the rashness and violence of military mutiny. But by the address and prudence of the generals, who, partly by borrowing money in their own name or in that of their master, partly by extorting large sums from the cities in their respective provinces, raised what was sufficient to discharge the arrears of the soldiers, these insurrections were quelled. The greater part of the troops were disbanded, such a number only being kept in pay as was necessary for garrisoning the principal towns and protecting the sea-coasts from the insults of the Turks.⁴¹

It was happy for the emperor that the abilities of his generals extricated him out of these difficulties, which it exceeded his own power to have removed. He had depended, as his chief resource for discharging the arrears due to his soldiers, upon the subsidies which he expected from his

⁴¹ Jovii Histor., lib. xxxvii. 203 c.—Sandoval.—Ferreras, ix. 209.

Castilian subjects. For this purpose he assembled the cortes of Castile at Toledo, and, having represented to them the extraordinary expense of his military operations, together with the great debts in which these had necessarily involved him, he proposed to levy such supplies as the present exigency of his affairs demanded, by a general excise on commodities. But the Spaniards already felt themselves oppressed with a load of taxes unknown to their ancestors. They had often complained that their country was drained not only of its wealth, but of its inhabitants, in order to prosecute quarrels in which it was not interested and to fight battles from which it could reap no benefit, and they determined not to add voluntarily to their own burdens, or to furnish the emperor with the means of engaging in new enterprises, no less ruinous to the kingdom than most of those which he had hitherto carried on. The nobles, in particular, inveighed with great vehemence against the imposition proposed, as an encroachment upon the valuable and distinguishing privilege of their order,—that of being exempted from the payment of any tax. They demanded a conference with the representatives of the cities concerning the state of the nation. They contended that if Charles would imitate the example of his predecessors, who had resided constantly in Spain, and would avoid entangling himself in a multiplicity of transactions foreign to the concerns of his Spanish dominions, the stated revenues of the crown would be fully sufficient to defray the necessary expenses of government. They represented

to him that it would be unjust to lay new burdens upon the people while this prudent and effectual method of re-establishing public credit and securing national opulence was totally neglected.⁴² Charles, after employing arguments, entreaties, and promises, but without success, in order to overcome their obstinacy, dismissed the assembly with great indignation. From that period neither the nobles nor the prelates have been called to these assemblies, on pretence that such as pay no part of the public taxes should not claim any vote in laying them on. None have been admitted to the cortes but the procurators or representatives of eighteen cities. These, to the number of thirty-six, being two from each community, form an assembly which bears no resemblance either in power or dignity or independence to the ancient cortes, and are absolutely at the devotion of the court in all their determinations.⁴³ Thus the imprudent zeal with which the Castilian nobles had supported the regal prerogative in opposition to the claims of the commons during the commotions in the year 1521 proved at last fatal to their own body. By enabling Charles to depress one of the orders in the state, they destroyed that balance to which the constitution owed its security, and put it in his power, or in that of his successors, to humble the other and to strip it gradually of its most valuable privileges.

At that time, however, the Spanish grandees

⁴² Sandoval, Hist., vol. ii. 269.

⁴³ Ibid., 269.—*La Science du Gouvernement*, par M. de Réal, tom. ii. p. 102.

still possessed extraordinary power as well as privileges, which they exercised and defended with a haughtiness peculiar to themselves. Of this the emperor himself had a mortifying proof during the meeting of the cortes at Toledo. As he was returning one day from a tournament, accompanied by most of the nobility, one of the sergeants of the court, out of officious zeal to clear the way for the emperor, struck the duke of Infantado's horse with his baton, which that haughty grandee resenting, drew his sword, beat and wounded the officer. Charles, provoked at such an insolent deed in his presence, immediately ordered Ronquillo, the judge of the court, to arrest the duke. Ronquillo advanced to execute his charge, when the constable of Castile interposing, checked him, claimed the right of jurisdiction over a grandee as a privilege of his office, and conducted Infantado to his own apartment. All the nobles present were so pleased with the boldness of the constable in asserting the rights of their order that, deserting the emperor, they attended him to his house with infinite applauses, and Charles returned to the palace, unaccompanied by any person but the Cardinal Tavera. The emperor, how sensible soever of the affront, saw the danger of irritating a jealous and high-spirited order of men, whom the slightest appearance of offence might drive to the most unwarrantable extremities. For that reason, instead of straining at any ill-timed exertion of his prerogative, he prudently connived at the arrogance of a body too potent for him to control, and sent next morning to the duke of Infantado, offering to

inflict what punishment he pleased on the person who had affronted him. The duke, considering this as a full reparation to his honor, instantly forgave the officer, bestowing on him, besides, a considerable present as a compensation for his wound. Thus the affair was entirely forgotten;⁴⁴ nor would it have deserved to be mentioned, if it were not a striking example of the high and independent spirit of the Spanish nobles in that age, as well as an instance of the emperor's dexterity in accommodating his conduct to the circumstances in which he was placed.

Charles was far from discovering the same condescension or lenity towards the citizens of Ghent, who not long after broke out into open rebellion against his government. An event which happened in the year 1536 gave occasion to this rash insurrection, so fatal to that flourishing city. At that time the queen-dowager of Hungary, governess of the Netherlands, having received orders from her brother to invade France with all the forces which she could raise, she assembled the states of the United Provinces, and obtained from them a subsidy of twelve hundred thousand florins to defray the expense of that undertaking. Of this sum the county of Flanders was obliged to pay a third part as its proportion. But the citizens of Ghent, the most considerable city in that country, averse to a war with France, with which they carried on an extensive and gainful commerce, refused to pay their quota, and contended that, in consequence of stipulations between them and the

⁴⁴ Sandoval, ii. 274.—Ferrerias, ix. 212.—Miniana, 113.

ancestors of their present sovereign, the emperor, no tax could be levied upon them unless they had given their express consent to the imposition of it. The governess, on the other hand, maintained that as the subsidy of twelve hundred thousand florins had been granted by the states of Flanders, of which their representatives were members, they were bound, of course, to conform to what was enacted by them, as it is the first principle in society, on which the tranquillity and order of government depend, that the inclinations of the minority must be overruled by the judgment and decision of the superior number.

The citizens of Ghent, however, were not willing to relinquish a privilege of such high importance as that which they claimed. Having been accustomed under the government of the house of Burgundy to enjoy extensive immunities and to be treated with much indulgence, they disdained to sacrifice to the delegated power of a regent those rights and privileges which they had often and successfully asserted against their greatest princes. The queen, though she endeavored at first to soothe them and to reconcile them to their duty by various concessions, was at last so much irritated by the obstinacy with which they adhered to their claim that she ordered all the citizens of Ghent on whom she could lay hold in any part of the Netherlands to be arrested. But this rash action made an impression very different from what she expected on men whose minds were agitated with all the violent passions which indignation at oppression and zeal for liberty inspire. Less

affected with the danger of their friends and companions than irritated at the governess, they openly despised her authority, and sent deputies to the other towns of Flanders, conjuring them not to abandon their country at such a juncture, but to concur with them in vindicating its rights against the encroachments of a woman who either did not know or did not regard their immunities.

All but a few inconsiderable towns declined entering into any confederacy against the governess: they joined, however, in petitioning her to put off the term for payment of the tax so long that they might have it in their power to send some of their number into Spain, in order to lay their title to exemption before their sovereign. This she granted with some difficulty. But Charles received their commissioners with a haughtiness to which they were not accustomed from their ancient princes, and, enjoining them to yield the same respectful obedience to his sister which they owed to him in person, remitted the examination of their claims to the council of Malines. This court, which is properly a standing committee of the parliament or states of the country, and which possesses the supreme jurisdiction in all matters civil as well as criminal,⁴⁵ pronounced the claim of the citizens of Ghent to be ill founded, and appointed them forthwith to pay their proportion of the tax.

Enraged at this decision, which they considered as notoriously unjust, and rendered desperate on seeing their rights betrayed by that very court

⁴⁵ *Descrittione di tutti i Paesi Bassi di Lud. Guicciardini, Ant., 1571, fol. p. 53.*

which was bound to protect them, the people of Ghent ran to arms in a tumultuary manner, drove such of the nobility as resided among them out of the city, secured several of the emperor's officers, put one of them to the torture, whom they accused of having stolen or destroyed the record that contained a ratification of the privileges of exemption from taxes which they pleaded, chose a council, to which they committed the direction of their affairs, gave orders for repairing and adding to their fortifications, and openly erected the standard of rebellion against their sovereign.⁴⁶ Sensible, however, of their inability to support what their zeal had prompted them to undertake, and desirous of securing a protector against the formidable forces by which they might expect soon to be attacked, they sent some of their number to Francis, offering not only to acknowledge him as their sovereign and to put him in immediate possession of Ghent, but to assist him with all their forces in recovering those provinces in the Netherlands which had anciently belonged to the crown of France and had been so lately reunited to it by the decree of the parliament of Paris. This unexpected proposition, coming from persons who had it in their power to have performed instantly one part of what they undertook, and who could contribute so effectually towards the execution of the whole, opened great as well as alluring prospects to Francis's ambition. The counties of Flanders and Artois were of

⁴⁶ *Mémoires sur la Révolte des Gantois en 1539, par Jean d'Hollander, écrits en 1547, A la Haye, 1747.*—P. Heuter., *Rer. Austr.*, lib. xi. p. 262.—Sandoval, *Histor.*, tom. ii. p. 282.

greater value than the duchy of Milan, which he had so long labored to acquire with passionate but fruitless desire; their situation with respect to France rendered it more easy to conquer or to defend them; and they might be formed into a separate principality for the duke of Orleans, no less suitable to his dignity than that which his father aimed at obtaining. To this the Flemings, who were acquainted with the French manners and government, would not have been averse; and his own subjects, weary of their destructive expeditions into Italy, would have turned their arms towards this quarter with more good will and with greater vigor. Several considerations, nevertheless, prevented Francis from laying hold of this opportunity, the most favorable in appearance which had ever presented itself of extending his own dominions or distressing the emperor. From the time of their interview at Aigues-mortes, Charles had continued to court the king of France with wonderful attention, and often flattered him with hopes of gratifying at last his wishes concerning the Milanese by granting the investiture of it either to him or to one of his sons. But though these hopes and promises were thrown out with no other intention than to detach him from his confederacy with the Grand Seignior, or to raise suspicions in Solyman's mind by the appearance of a cordial and familiar intercourse subsisting between the courts of Paris and Madrid, Francis was weak enough to catch at the shadow by which he had been so often amused, and, from eagerness to seize it, relinquish what must have proved a more sub-

stantial acquisition. Besides this, the dauphin, jealous to excess of his brother, and unwilling that a prince who seemed to be of a restless and enterprising nature should obtain an establishment which, from its situation, might be considered almost as a domestic one, made use of Montmorency, who, by a singular piece of good fortune, was at the same time the favorite of the father and of the son, to defeat the application of the Flemings and to divert the king from espousing their cause. Montmorency, accordingly, represented in strong terms the reputation and power which Francis would acquire by recovering that footing which he had formerly in Italy, and that nothing could be so efficacious to overcome the emperor's aversion to this as a sacred adherence to the truce, and refusing, on an occasion so inviting, to countenance the rebellious subjects of his rival. Francis, apt of himself to overrate the value of the Milanese, because he estimated it from the length of time as well as from the great efforts which he had employed in order to reconquer it, and fond of every action which had the appearance of generosity, assented without difficulty to sentiments so agreeable to his own, rejected the propositions of the citizens of Ghent, and dismissed their deputies with a harsh answer.⁴⁷

Not satisfied with this, by a further refinement in generosity, he communicated to the emperor his whole negotiation with the malecontents, and all that he knew of their schemes and intentions.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ *Mém. de Bellay*, p. 263.—*P. Heuter., Rer. Austr., lib. xi. 263.*

⁴⁸ *Sandoval, Histor., tom. ii. 284.*

This convincing proof of Francis's distinterestedness relieved Charles from the most disquieting apprehensions, and opened a way to extricate himself out of all his difficulties. He had already received full information of all the transactions in the Netherlands, and of the rage with which the people of Ghent had taken arms against his government. He was thoroughly acquainted with the genius and qualities of his subjects in that country; with their love of liberty, their attachment to their ancient privileges and customs, as well as the invincible obstinacy with which their minds, slow, but firm and persevering, adhered to any measure on which they had deliberately resolved. He easily saw what encouragement and support they might have derived from the assistance of France; and, though now free from any danger in that quarter, he was still sensible that some immediate as well as vigorous interposition was necessary in order to prevent the spirit of disaffection from spreading in a country where the number of cities, the multitude of people, together with the great wealth diffused among them by commerce, rendered it peculiarly formidable and would supply it with inexhaustible resources. No expedient, after long deliberation, appeared to him so effectual as his going in person to the Netherlands; and the governess, his sister, being of the same opinion, warmly solicited him to undertake the journey. There were only two routes which he could take,—one by land, through Italy and Germany,—the other entirely by sea, from some port in Spain to one in the Low Countries. But the

former was more tedious than suited the present exigency of his affairs; nor could he, in consistency with his dignity, or even his safety, pass through Germany without such a train, both of attendants and of troops, as would have added greatly to the time that he must have consumed in his journey; the latter was dangerous at this season, and, while he remained uncertain with respect to the friendship of the king of England, was not to be ventured upon unless under the convoy of a powerful fleet. This perplexing situation, in which he was under the necessity of choosing and did not know what to choose, inspired him at last with the singular and seemingly extravagant thought of passing through France, as the most expeditious way of reaching the Netherlands. He proposed in his council to demand Francis's permission for that purpose. All his counsellors joined with one voice in condemning the measure as no less rash than unprecedented, and which must infallibly expose him to disgrace or danger: to disgrace, if the demand were rejected in the manner that he had reason to expect; to danger, if he put his person in the power of an enemy whom he had often offended, who had ancient injuries to revenge, as well as subjects of present contest still remaining undecided. But Charles, who had studied the character of his rival with greater care and more profound discernment than any of his ministers, persisted in his plan, and flattered himself that it might be accomplished not only without danger to his own person, but even without the

expense of any concession detrimental to his crown.

With this view, he communicated the matter to the French ambassador at his court, and sent Granvelle, his chief minister, to Paris, in order to obtain from Francis permission to pass through his dominions, and to promise that he would soon settle the affair of the Milanese to his satisfaction. But at the same time he entreated that Francis would not exact any new promise, or even insist on former engagements, at this juncture, lest whatever he should grant under his present circumstances might seem rather to be extorted by necessity than to flow from friendship or the love of justice. Francis, instead of attending to the snare which such a slight artifice scarcely concealed, was so dazzled with the splendor of overcoming an enemy by acts of generosity, and so pleased with the air of superiority which the rectitude and disinterestedness of his proceedings gave him on this occasion, that he at once assented to all that was demanded. Judging of the emperor's heart by his own, he imagined that the sentiments of gratitude arising from the remembrance of good offices and liberal treatment would determine him more forcibly to fulfil what he had so often promised, than the most precise stipulations that could be inserted in any treaty.

Upon this, Charles, to whom every moment was precious, set out, notwithstanding the fears and suspicions of his Spanish subjects, with a small but splendid train of about a hundred persons. At Bayonne, on the frontiers of France, he was

received by the dauphin and the duke of Orleans, attended by the Constable Montmorency. The two princes offered to go into Spain and to remain there as hostages for the emperor's safety; but this he rejected, declaring that he relied with implicit confidence on the king's honor, and had never demanded, nor would accept of, any other pledge for his security. In all the towns through which he passed, the greatest possible magnificence was displayed; the magistrates presented him the keys of the gates; the prison-doors were set open; and, by the royal honors paid, he appeared more like the sovereign of the country than a foreign prince. The king advanced as far as Chatelherault to meet him; their interview was distinguished by the warmest expressions of friendship and regard. They proceeded together towards Paris, and presented to the inhabitants of that city the extraordinary spectacle of two rival monarchs, whose enmity had disturbed and laid waste Europe during twenty years, making their solemn entry together with all the symptoms of a confidential harmony, as if they had forgotten forever past injuries and would not revive hostilities for the future.⁴⁹

Charles remained six days at Paris; but, amidst the perpetual caresses of the French court, and the various entertainments contrived to amuse or to do him honor, he discovered an extreme impatience to continue his journey, arising as much from an apprehension of danger, which constantly haunted him, as from the necessity of his presence in the Low Countries. Conscious of the disingenuity of

⁴⁹ Thuan., *Hist.*, lib. i. c. 14.—*Mém. de Bellay*, 264.

his own intentions, he trembled when he reflected that some fatal accident might betray him to his rival or lead him to suspect them; and, though his artifices to conceal them should be successful, he could not help fearing that motives of interest might at last triumph over the scruples of honor, and tempt Francis to avail himself of the advantage now in his hands. Nor were there wanting persons among the French ministers who advised the king to turn his own arts against the emperor, and, as the retribution due for so many instances of fraud or falsehood, to seize and detain his person until he granted him full satisfaction with regard to all the just claims of the French crown. But no consideration could induce Francis to violate the faith which he had pledged, nor could any argument convince him that Charles, after all the promises that he had given and all the favors which he had received, might still be capable of deceiving him. Full of this false confidence, he accompanied him to St. Quentin; and the two princes who had met him on the borders of Spain did not take leave of him until he entered his dominions in the Low Countries.

As soon as the emperor reached his own territories, the French ambassadors demanded the accomplishment of what he had promised concerning the investiture of Milan; but Charles, under the plausible pretext that his whole attention was then engrossed by the consultations necessary towards suppressing the rebellion in Ghent, put off the matter for some time. But, in order to prevent Francis from suspecting his sincerity, he still con-

tinued to talk of his resolutions with respect to that matter in the same strain as when he entered France, and even wrote to the king much to the same purpose, though in general terms, and with equivocal expressions, which he might afterwards explain away, or interpret at pleasure.⁵⁰

Meanwhile, the unfortunate citizens of Ghent, destitute of leaders capable either of directing their councils or conducting their troops, abandoned by the French king, and unsupported by their countrymen, were unable to resist their offended sovereign, who was ready to advance against them with one body of troops which he had raised in the Netherlands, with another drawn out of Germany, and a third which had arrived from Spain by sea. The near approach of danger made them, at last, so sensible of their own folly that they sent ambassadors to the emperor, imploring his mercy and offering to set open their gates at his approach. Charles, without vouchsafing them any other answer than that he would appear among them as their sovereign, with the sceptre and the sword in his hand, began his march at the head of his troops. Though he chose to enter the city on the 24th of February, his birthday, he was touched with nothing of that tenderness or indulgence which was natural towards the place of his nativity. Twenty-six of the principal citizens were put to death; a greater number was sent into banishment; the city was declared to have forfeited all its privileges and immunities; the revenues belonging to it were confiscated; its ancient form of

⁵⁰ Mémoires de Ribier, i. 504.

government was abolished; the nomination of its magistrates was vested for the future in the emperor and his successors; a new system of laws and political administration was prescribed;⁵¹ and, in order to bridle the seditious spirit of the citizens, orders were given to erect a strong citadel, for defraying the expense of which a fine of a hundred and fifty thousand florins was imposed on the inhabitants, together with an annual tax of six thousand florins for the support of the garrison.⁵² By these rigorous proceedings, Charles not only punished the citizens of Ghent, but set an awful example of severity before his other subjects in the Netherlands, whose immunities and privileges, partly the effect, partly the cause, of their extensive commerce, circumscribed the prerogative of their sovereign within very narrow bounds, and often stood in the way of measures which he wished to undertake, or fettered and retarded him in his operations.

Charles, having thus vindicated and re-established his authority in the Low Countries, and being now under no necessity of continuing the same scene of falsehood and dissimulation with which he had long amused Francis, began gradually to throw aside the veil under which he had concealed his intentions with respect to the Milanese. At first he eluded the demands of the French ambassadors when they again reminded him of his promises; then he proposed, by way of equivalent

⁵¹ *Les Coutumes et Loix du Comté de Flandres*, par Alex. le Grand, 3 tom. fol., Cambray, 1719, tom. i. p. 169.

⁵² *Haræi Annales Brabantæ*, vol. i. 616.

for the duchy of Milan, to grant the duke of Orleans the investiture of Flanders, clogging the offer, however, with impracticable conditions, or such as he knew would be rejected.⁵³ At last, being driven from all his evasions and subterfuges by their insisting for a categorical answer, he peremptorily refused to give up a territory of such value, or voluntarily to make such a liberal addition to the strength of an enemy by diminishing his own power.⁵⁴ He denied, at the same time, that he had ever made any promise which could bind him to an action so foolish and so contrary to his own interests.⁵⁵

Of all the transactions in the emperor's life, this, without doubt, reflects the greatest dishonor on his reputation.⁵⁶ Though Charles was not extremely scrupulous at other times about the means which he employed for accomplishing his ends, and was not always observant of the strict precepts of veracity and honor, he had hitherto maintained some regard for the maxims of that less precise and rigid morality by which monarchs think themselves entitled to regulate their conduct. But on this occasion the scheme that he formed of deceiving a generous and open-hearted prince, the illiberal and mean artifices by which he carried it on, the insensibility with which he received all the marks of his friendship, as well as the ingratitude with which he requited them, are all equally unbecoming the dig-

⁵³ *Mém. de Ribier*, i. 509, 514.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, i. 519.

⁵⁵ *Mém. de Bellay*, 365, 366.

⁵⁶ *Jovii Hist.*, lib. xxxix. p. 238 a.

nity of his character and inconsistent with the grandeur of his views.

This transaction exposed Francis to as much scorn as it did the emperor to censure. After the experience of a long reign, after so many opportunities of discovering the duplicity and artifices of his rival, the credulous simplicity with which he trusted him at this juncture seemed to merit no other return than what it actually met with. Francis, however, remonstrated and exclaimed, as if this had been the first instance in which the emperor had deceived him. Feeling, as is usual, the insult which was offered to his understanding still more sensibly than the injury done to his interest, he discovered such resentment as made it obvious that he would lay hold on the first opportunity of being revenged, and that a war no less rancorous than that which had so lately raged would soon break out anew in Europe.

But, singular as the transaction which has been related may appear, this year is rendered still more memorable by the establishment of the order of Jesuits; a body whose influence on ecclesiastical as well as civil affairs hath been so considerable that an account of the genius of its laws and government justly merits a place in history. When men take a view of the rapid progress of this society towards wealth and power, when they contemplate the admirable prudence with which it has been governed, when they attend to the persevering and systematic spirit with which its schemes have been carried on, they are apt to ascribe such a singular institution to the superior wisdom of its founder,

and to suppose that he had formed and digested his plan with profound policy. But the Jesuits, as well as the other monastic orders, are indebted for the existence of their order, not to the wisdom of their founder, but to his enthusiasm. Ignatius Loyola, whom I have already mentioned on occasion of the wound which he received in defending Pampeluna,⁵⁷ was a fanatic distinguished by extravagances in sentiment and conduct no less incompatible with the maxims of sober reason than repugnant to the spirit of true religion. The wild adventures and visionary schemes in which his enthusiasm engaged him equal anything recorded in the legends of the Roman saints, but are unworthy of notice in history.

Prompted by this fanatical spirit, or incited by the love of power and distinction, from which such pretenders to superior sanctity are not exempt, Loyola was ambitious of becoming the founder of a religious order. The plan which he formed of its constitution and laws was suggested, as he gave out, and as his followers still teach, by the immediate inspiration of Heaven.⁵⁸ But, notwithstanding this high pretension, his design met at first with violent opposition. The pope, to whom Loyola had applied for the sanction of his authority to confirm the institution, referred his petition to a committee of cardinals. They represented the establishment to be unnecessary as well as

⁵⁷ Vol. ii. book ii. p. 160.

⁵⁸ *Compte rendu des Constitutions des Jésuites au Parlement de Provence*, par M. de Monclar, p. 285.

dangerous, and Paul refused to grant his approbation of it. At last Loyola removed all his scruples by an offer which it was impossible for any pope to resist. He proposed that, besides the three vows of poverty, of chastity, and of monastic obedience, which are common to all the orders of regulars, the members of his society should take a fourth vow of obedience to the pope, binding themselves to go whithersoever he should command for the service of religion, and without requiring any thing from the holy see for their support. At a time when the papal authority had received such a shock by the revolt of so many nations from the Romish Church, at a time when every part of the Popish system was attacked with so much violence and success, the acquisition of a body of men thus peculiarly devoted to the see of Rome, and whom it might set in opposition to all its enemies, was an object of the highest consequence. Paul, instantly perceiving this, confirmed the institution of the Jesuits by his bull, granted the most ample privileges to the members of the society, and appointed Loyola to be the first general of the order. The event hath fully justified Paul's discernment in expecting such beneficial consequences to the see of Rome from this institution. In less than half a century the society obtained establishments in every country that adhered to the Roman Catholic Church; its power and wealth increased amazingly; the number of its members became great; their character as well as accomplishments were still greater; and the Jesuits were celebrated by the friends and dreaded by the enemies of the

Romish faith as the most able and enterprising order in the Church.

The constitution and laws of the society were perfected by Laynez and Aquaviva, the two generals who succeeded Loyola, men far superior to their master in abilities and in the science of government. They framed that system of profound and artful policy which distinguishes the order. The large infusion of fanaticism mingled with its regulations should be imputed to Loyola, its founder. Many circumstances concurred in giving a peculiarity of character to the order of Jesuits, and in forming the members of it not only to take a greater part in the affairs of the world than any other body of monks, but to acquire superior influence in the conduct of them.

The primary object of almost all the monastic orders is to separate men from the world and from any concern in its affairs. In the solitude and silence of the cloister, the monk is called to work out his own salvation by extraordinary acts of mortification and piety. He is dead to the world, and ought not to mingle in its transactions. He can be of no benefit to mankind but by his example and by his prayers. On the contrary, the Jesuits are taught to consider themselves as formed for action. They are chosen soldiers, bound to exert themselves continually in the service of God, and of the pope, his vicar on earth. Whatever tends to instruct the ignorant, whatever can be of use to reclaim or to oppose the enemies of the holy see, is their proper object. That they may have full leisure for this active service, they are totally ex-

empted from those functions the performance of which is the chief business of other monks. They appear in no processions; they practise no rigorous austerities; they do not consume one-half of their time in the repetition of tedious offices.⁵⁹ But they are required to attend to all the transactions of the world, on account of the influence which these may have upon religion; they are directed to study the dispositions of persons in high rank, and to cultivate their friendship;⁶⁰ and by the very constitution as well as genius of the order a spirit of action and intrigue is infused into all its members.

As the object of the society of Jesuits differed from that of the other monastic orders, the diversity was no less in the form of its government. The other orders are to be considered as voluntary associations, in which whatever affects the whole body is regulated by the common suffrage of all its members. The executive power is vested in the persons placed at the head of each convent or of the whole society; the legislative authority resides in the community. Affairs of moment relating to particular convents are determined in conventual chapters; such as respect the whole order are considered in general congregations. But Loyola, full of the ideas of implicit obedience which he had derived from his military profession, appointed that the government of his order should be purely monarchical. A general, chosen for life by depu-

⁵⁹ *Compte rendu par M. de Monclar*, xiii. p. 290.—*Sur la Destruction des Jésuites*, par M. d'Alembert, p. 42.

⁶⁰ *Compte rendu par M. de Monclar*, p. 12.

ties from the several provinces, possessed power that was supreme and independent, extending to every person and to every case. He, by his sole authority, nominated provincials, rectors, and every other officer employed in the government of the society, and could remove them at pleasure. In him was vested the sovereign administration of the revenues and funds of the order. Every member belonging to it was at his disposal; and by his uncontrollable mandate he could impose on them any task or employ them in what service soever he pleased. To his commands they were required not only to yield outward obedience, but to resign up to him the inclinations of their own wills and the sentiments of their own understandings. They were to listen to his injunctions as if they had been uttered by Christ himself. Under his direction, they were to be mere passive instruments, like clay in the hands of the potter, or like dead carcasses, incapable of resistance.⁶¹ Such a singular form of policy could not fail to impress its character on all the members of the order, and to give a peculiar force to all its operations. There is not in the annals of mankind any example of such a perfect despotism, exercised, not over monks shut up in the cells of a convent, but over men dispersed among all the nations of the earth.

As the constitutions of the order vest in the general such absolute dominion over all its members, they carefully provide for his being perfectly informed with respect to the character and abilities

⁶¹ *Compte rendu au Parlement de Bretagne*, par M. de Chalotais, p. 11, etc.—*Compte rendu par M. de Monclar*, pp. 83, 185, 343.

of his subjects. Every novice who offers himself as a candidate for entering into the order is obliged to *manifest his conscience* to the superior, or to a person appointed by him, and, in doing this, is required to confess not only his sins and defects, but to discover the inclinations, the passions, and the bent of his soul. This manifestation must be renewed every six months.⁶² The society, not satisfied with penetrating in this manner into the innermost recesses of the heart, directs each member to observe the words and actions of the novices; they are constituted spies upon their conduct, and are bound to disclose every thing of importance concerning them to the superior. In order that this scrutiny into their character may be as complete as possible, a long novitiate must expire, during which they pass through the several gradations of ranks in the society, and they must have attained the full age of thirty-three years before they can be admitted to take the final vows by which they become *professed* members.⁶³ By these various methods, the superiors, under whose immediate inspection the novices are placed, acquire a thorough knowledge of their dispositions and talents. In order that the general, who is the soul that animates and moves the whole society, may have under his eye every thing necessary to inform or direct him, the provincials and heads of the several houses are obliged to transmit to him regular and frequent reports concerning the members under

⁶² *Compte rendu* par M. de Monclar, p. 121, etc.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 215, 241.—*Sur la Destruction des Jésuites*, par M. d'Alembert, p. 39.

their inspection. In these they descend into minute details with respect to the character of each person, his abilities natural or acquired, his temper, his experience in affairs, and the particular department for which he is best fitted.⁶⁴ These reports, when digested and arranged, are entered into registers kept on purpose that the general may at one comprehensive view survey the state of the society in every corner of the earth, observe the qualifications and talents of its members, and thus choose, with perfect information, the instruments which his absolute power can employ in any service for which he thinks meet to destine them.⁶⁵

As it was the professed intention of the order of Jesuits to labor with unwearied zeal in promoting the salvation of men, this engaged them, of course,

⁶⁴ M. de Chalotais has made a calculation of the number of these reports which the general of the Jesuits must annually receive according to the regulations of the society. These amount in all to 6584. If the sum be divided by 37, the number of provinces in the order, it will appear that 177 reports concerning the state of each province are transmitted to Rome annually. (Compte, p. 52.) Besides this, there may be extraordinary letters, or such as are sent by the monitors or spies whom the general and provincials entertain in each house. (Compte, par M. de Montclar, p. 431; Hist. des Jésuites, Amst., 1761, tom. iv. p. 56). The provincials and heads of houses not only report concerning the members of the society, but are bound to give the general an account of the civil affairs in the country wherein they are settled, as far as their knowledge of these may be of benefit to religion. This condition may extend to every particular, so that the general is furnished with full information concerning the transactions of every prince and state in the world. (Compte, par M. de Monclar, 443; Hist. des Jésuites, tom. iv. p. 58.) When the affairs with respect to which the provincials or rectors write are of importance, they are directed to use ciphers; and each of them has a particular cipher from the general. Compte, par M. de Chalotais, p. 54.

⁶⁵ Compte rendu par M. de Monclar, pp. 215, 439.—Compte rendu par M. de Chalotais, pp. 52, 222.

in many active functions. From their first institution, they considered the education of youth as their peculiar province; they aimed at being spiritual guides and confessors; they preached frequently in order to instruct the people; they set out as missionaries to convert unbelieving nations. The novelty of the institution, as well as the singularity of its objects, procured the order many admirers and patrons. The governors of the society had the address to avail themselves of every circumstance in its favor, and in a short time the number as well as influence of its members increased wonderfully. Before the expiration of the sixteenth century, the Jesuits had obtained the chief direction of the education of youth in every Catholic country in Europe. They had become the confessors of almost all its monarchs,—a function of no small importance in any reign, but, under a weak prince, superior even to that of minister. They were the spiritual guides of almost every person eminent for rank or power. They possessed the highest degree of confidence and interest with the papal court, as the most zealous and able champions for its authority. The advantages which an active and enterprising body of men might derive from all these circumstances are obvious. They formed the minds of men in their youth. They retained an ascendant over them in their advanced years. They possessed, at different periods, the direction of the most considerable courts in Europe. They mingled in all affairs. They took part in every intrigue and revolution. The general, by means of the extensive intelli-

gence which he received, could regulate the operations of the order with the most perfect discernment, and, by means of his absolute power, could carry them on with the utmost vigor and effect.⁶⁶

Together with the power of the order, its wealth continued to increase. Various expedients were devised for eluding the obligation of the vow of poverty. The order acquired ample possessions in every Catholic country; and by the number as well as magnificence of its public buildings, together with the value of its property, movable or real, it vied with the most opulent of the monastic fraternities. Besides the sources of wealth common to all the regular clergy, the Jesuits possessed one which was peculiar to themselves. Under pretext of promoting the success of their missions and of facilitating the support of their missionaries, they obtained a special license from the court of Rome to trade with the nations which they labored to convert. In consequence of this, they engaged in an extensive and lucrative commerce, both in the East and West Indies. They opened warehouses in different parts of Europe, in which they vended their commodities. Not satisfied with trade alone, they imitated the example of other commercial societies,

⁶⁶ When Loyola, in the year 1540, petitioned the pope to authorize the institution of the order, he had only ten disciples. But in the year 1608, sixty-eight years after their first institution, the number of Jesuits had increased to ten thousand five hundred and eighty-one. In the year 1710, the order possessed twenty-four *professed* houses, fifty-nine houses of probation, three hundred and forty residences, six hundred and twelve colleges, two hundred missions, one hundred and fifty seminaries and boarding-schools, and consisted of nineteen thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight Jesuits. Hist. des Jésuites, tom. i. p. 20.

and aimed at obtaining settlements. They acquired possession accordingly of a large and fertile province in the southern continent of America, and reigned as sovereigns over some hundred thousand subjects.⁶⁷

Unhappily for mankind, the vast influence which the order of Jesuits acquired by all these different means has been often exerted with the most pernicious effect. Such was the tendency of that discipline observed by the society in forming its members, and such the fundamental maxims in its constitution, that every Jesuit was taught to regard the interest of the order as the capital object, to which every consideration was to be sacrificed. This spirit of attachment to their order, the most ardent, perhaps, that ever influenced any body of men,⁶⁸ is the characteristic principle of the Jesuits, and serves as a key to the genius of their policy, as well as to the peculiarities in their sentiment and conduct.

As it was for the honor and advantage of the society that its members should possess an ascendant over persons in high rank or of great power, the desire of acquiring and preserving such a direction of their conduct with greater facility has led the Jesuits to propagate a system of relaxed and pliant morality, which accommodates itself to the passions of men, which justifies their vices, which tolerates their imperfections, which authorizes almost every action that the most audacious or crafty politician would wish to perpetrate.

⁶⁷ Hist. des Jésuites, iv. 168-196, etc.

⁶⁸ Compte rendu par M. de Monclar, p. 285.

As the prosperity of the order was intimately connected with the preservation of the papal authority, the Jesuits, influenced by the same principle of attachment to the interests of their society, have been the most zealous patrons of those doctrines which tend to exalt ecclesiastical power on the ruins of civil government. They have attributed to the court of Rome a jurisdiction as extensive and absolute as was claimed by the most presumptuous pontiffs in the Dark Ages. They have contended for the entire independence of ecclesiastics on the civil magistrate. They have published such tenets concerning the duty of opposing princes who were enemies of the Catholic faith, as countenanced the most atrocious crimes and tended to dissolve all the ties which connect subjects with their rulers.

As the order derived both reputation and authority from the zeal with which it stood forth in defence of the Romish Church against the attacks of the Reformers, its members, proud of this distinction, have considered it as their peculiar function to combat the opinions and to check the progress of the Protestants. They have made use of every art and have employed every weapon against them. They have set themselves in opposition to every gentle or tolerating measure in their favor. They have incessantly stirred up against them all the rage of ecclesiastical and civil persecution.

Monks of other denominations have, indeed, ventured to teach the same pernicious doctrines, and have held opinions equally inconsistent with the order and happiness of civil society. But they,

from reasons which are obvious, have either delivered such opinions with greater reserve or have propagated them with less success. Whoever recollects the events which have happened in Europe during two centuries will find that the Jesuits may justly be considered as responsible for most of the pernicious effects arising from that corrupt and dangerous casuistry, from those extravagant tenets concerning ecclesiastical power, and from that intolerant spirit, which have been the disgrace of the Church of Rome throughout that period, and which have brought so many calamities upon civil society.⁶⁹

But, amidst many bad consequences flowing from the institution of this order, mankind, it must be acknowledged, have derived from it some considerable advantages. As the Jesuits made the education of youth one of their capital objects, and as their first attempts to establish colleges for the reception of students were violently opposed by the universities in different countries, it became necessary for them, as the most effectual method of acquiring the public favor, to surpass their rivals in science and industry. This prompted them to cultivate the study of ancient literature with extraordinary ardor. This put them upon various methods for facilitating the instruction of youth; and by the improvements which they made in it they have contributed so much towards the progress of polite learning that on this account they have merited well of society. Nor has the order of Jesuits been successful only in teaching

⁶⁹ Encyclopédie, art. *Jésuites*, tom. viii. 513

the elements of literature: it has produced likewise eminent masters in many branches of science, and can alone boast of a greater number of ingenious authors than all the other religious fraternities taken together.⁷⁰

But it is in the New World that the Jesuits have exhibited the most wonderful display of their abilities and have contributed most effectually to the benefit of the human species. The conquerors of that unfortunate quarter of the globe acted at first as if they had nothing in view but to plunder, to enslave, and to exterminate its inhabitants. The Jesuits alone made humanity the object of their settling here. About the beginning of the last century they obtained admission into the fertile province of Paraguay, which stretches across the southern continent of America, from the east side of the immense ridge of the Andes to the confines

⁷⁰ M. d'Alembert has observed that though the Jesuits have made extraordinary progress in erudition of every species,—though they can reckon up many of their brethren who have been eminent mathematicians, antiquaries, and critics,—though they have even formed some orators of reputation,—yet the order has never produced one man whose mind was so much enlightened with sound knowledge as to merit the name of a philosopher. But it seems to be the unavoidable effect of monastic education to contract and fetter the human mind. The partial attachment of a monk to the interests of his order, which is often incompatible with that of other citizens, the habit of implicit obedience to the will of a superior, together with the frequent return of the wearisome and frivolous duties of the cloister, debase his faculties, and extinguish that generosity of sentiment and spirit which qualifies men for thinking or feeling justly with respect to what is proper in life and conduct. Father Paul of Venice is perhaps the only person educated in a cloister that ever was altogether superior to its prejudices, or who viewed the transactions of men and reasoned concerning the interests of society with the enlarged sentiments of a philosopher, with the discernment of a man conversant in affairs, and with the liberality of a gentleman.

of the Spanish and Portuguese settlements on the banks of the river de la Plata. They found the inhabitants in a state little different from that which takes place among men when they first begin to unite together, strangers to the arts, subsisting precariously by hunting or fishing, and hardly acquainted with the first principles of subordination and government. The Jesuits set themselves to instruct and to civilize these savages. They taught them to cultivate the ground, to rear tame animals, and to build houses. They brought them to live together in villages. They trained them to arts and manufactures. They made them taste the sweets of society, and accustomed them to the blessings of security and order. These people became the subjects of their benefactors, who have governed them with a tender attention resembling that with which a father directs his children. Respected and beloved almost to adoration, a few Jesuits presided over some hundred thousand Indians. They maintained a perfect equality among all the members of the community. Each of them was obliged to labor, not for himself alone, but for the public. The produce of their fields, together with the fruits of their industry of every species, was deposited in common storehouses, from which each individual received every thing necessary for the supply of his wants. By this institution, almost all the passions which disturb the peace of society and render the members of it unhappy were extinguished. A few magistrates, chosen from among their countrymen by the Indians themselves, watched over the public tranquillity

and secured obedience to the laws. The sanguinary punishments frequent under other governments were unknown. An admonition from a Jesuit, a slight mark of infamy, or, on some singular occasion, a few lashes with a whip, were sufficient to maintain good order among these innocent and happy people.⁷¹

But even in this meritorious effort of the Jesuits for the good of mankind the genius and spirit of their order have mingled and are discernible. They plainly aimed at establishing in Paraguay an independent empire, subject to the society alone, and which by the superior excellence of its constitution and police could scarcely have failed to extend its dominions over all the southern continent of America. With this view, in order to prevent the Spaniards or Portuguese in the adjacent settlements from acquiring any dangerous influence over the people within the limits of the province subject to the society, the Jesuits endeavored to inspire the Indians with hatred and contempt of these nations. They cut off all intercourse between their subjects and the Spanish or Portuguese settlements. They prohibited any private trader of either nation from entering their territories. When they were obliged to admit any person in a public character from the neighboring governments, they did not permit him to have any conversation with their subjects, and no Indian was allowed even to enter the house where these

⁷¹ Hist. du Paraguay, par le Père de Charlevoix, tom. ii. 42, etc.— Voyage au Pérou, par Don G. Juan et D. Ant. de Ulloa, tom. i. 540, etc., Par., 4to, 1752.

strangers resided, unless in the presence of a Jesuit. In order to render any communication between them as difficult as possible, they industriously avoided giving the Indians any knowledge of the Spanish or of any other European language, but encouraged the different tribes which they had civilized to acquire a certain dialect of the Indian tongue, and labored to make that the universal language throughout their dominions. As all these precautions, without military force, would have been insufficient to have rendered their empire secure and permanent, they instructed their subjects in the European arts of war. They formed them into bodies of cavalry and infantry, completely armed and regularly disciplined. They provided a great train of artillery, as well as magazines stored with all the implements of war. Thus they established an army so numerous and well appointed as to be formidable in a country where a few sickly and ill-disciplined battalions composed all the military force kept on foot by the Spaniards or Portuguese.⁷²

The Jesuits gained no considerable degree of power during the reign of Charles V., who, with his usual sagacity, discerned the dangerous tendency of the institution, and checked its progress.⁷³ But as the order was founded in the period of which I write the history, and as the age to which I address this work hath seen its fall, the view which I have exhibited of the laws and genius of

⁷² Voyage de Juan et Ant. de Ulloa, tom. i. 549.—Recueil de toutes les Pièces qui ont paru sur les Affaires des Jésuites en Portugal, tom. i. p. 7, etc.

⁷³ Compte rendu par M. de Monclar, p. 312.

this formidable body will not, I hope, be unacceptable to my readers; especially as one circumstance has enabled me to enter into this detail with particular advantage. Europe had observed, for two centuries, the ambition and power of the order. But, while it felt many fatal effects of these, it could not fully discern the causes to which they were to be imputed. It was unacquainted with many of the singular regulations in the political constitution or government of the Jesuits, which formed the enterprising spirit of intrigue that distinguished its members and elevated the body itself to such a height of power. It was a fundamental maxim with the Jesuits, from their first institution, not to publish the rules of their order. These they kept concealed as an impenetrable mystery. They never communicated them to strangers, nor even to the greater part of their own members. They refused to produce them when required by courts of justice;⁷⁴ and, by a strange solecism in policy, the civil power in different countries authorized or connived at the establishment of an order of men whose constitution and laws were concealed with a solicitude which alone was a good reason for excluding them. During the prosecutions lately carried on against them in Portugal and France, the Jesuits have been so inconsiderate as to produce the mysterious volumes of their institute. By the aid of these authentic records the principles of their government may be delineated and the sources of their

⁷⁴ Hist. des Jésuites, tom. iii. 236, etc.—Compte rendu par M. de Chalotais, p. 38.

power investigated with a degree of certainty and precision which previous to that event it was impossible to attain.⁷⁵ But, as I have pointed out the dangerous tendency of the constitution and spirit of the order with the freedom becoming an historian, the candor and impartiality no less requisite in that character call on me to add one observation, that no class of regular clergy in the Romish Church has been more eminent for decency, and even purity, of manners, than the major part of the order of Jesuits.⁷⁶ The maxims of an intriguing, ambitious, interested policy might influence those who governed the society, and might even corrupt the heart and pervert the conduct of some individuals, while the greater number, engaged in literary pursuits or employed in the functions of religion, was left to the guidance of those common principles which restrain men from vice and excite them to what is becoming and laudable. The causes which occasioned the ruin of this mighty body, as well as the circumstances and effects with which it has been attended in the different countries of Europe, though objects extremely worthy the attention of every intelligent observer of

⁷⁵ The greater part of my information concerning the government and laws of the order of Jesuits I have derived from the reports of M. de Chalotais and M. de Monclar. I rest not my narrative, however, upon the authority even of these respectable magistrates and elegant writers, but upon innumerable passages which they have extracted from the constitutions of the order, deposited in their hands. Hospinian, a Protestant divine of Zurich, in his *Historia Jesuitica*, printed A.D. 1619, published a small part of the constitution of the Jesuits, of which by some accident he had got a copy, pp. 13-54.

⁷⁶ *Sur la Destruction des Jésuites*, par M. d'Alembert, p. 55.

human affairs, do not fall within the period of this history.

No sooner had Charles re-established order in the Low Countries than he was obliged to turn his attention to the affairs in Germany. The Protestants pressed him earnestly to appoint that conference between a select number of the divines of each party which had been stipulated in the convention at Frankfort. The pope considered such an attempt to examine into the points in dispute, or to decide concerning them, as derogatory to his right of being the supreme judge in controversy; and, being convinced that such a conference would either be ineffectual by determining nothing or prove dangerous by determining too much, he employed every art to prevent it. The emperor, however, finding it more for his interest to soothe the Germans than to gratify Paul, paid little regard to his remonstrances. In a diet held at Haguenau, matters were ripened for the conference. In another diet assembled at Worms, the conference was begun, Melancthon on the one side, and Eckius on the other, sustaining the principal part in the dispute; but after they had made some progress, though without concluding anything, it was suspended by the emperor's command, that it might be renewed with greater solemnity in his own presence, in a diet summoned to meet at Ratisbon. This assembly was opened with great pomp, and with a general expectation that its proceedings would be vigorous and decisive. By the consent of both parties, the emperor was intrusted with the power of nominating the

persons who should manage the conference, which it was agreed should be conducted, not in the form of a public disputation, but as a friendly scrutiny, or examination into the articles which had given rise to the present controversies. He appointed Eckius, Gropper, and Pflug on the part of the Catholics; Melancthon, Bucer, and Pistorius on that of the Protestants; all men of distinguished reputation among their own adherents, and, except Eckius, all eminent for moderation, as well as desirous of peace. As they were about to begin their consultations, the emperor put into their hands a book, composed, as he said, by a learned divine in the Low Countries, with such extraordinary perspicuity and temper as, in his opinion, might go far to unite and comprehend the two contending parties. Gropper, a canon of Cologne, whom he had named among the managers of the conference, a man of address as well as of erudition, was afterwards suspected to be the author of this short treatise. It contained positions with regard to twenty-two of the chief articles in theology, which included most of the questions then agitated in the controversy between the Lutherans and the Church of Rome. By ranging his sentiments in a natural order and expressing them with great simplicity, by employing often the very words of Scripture or of the primitive fathers, by softening the rigor of some opinions and explaining away what was absurd in others, by concessions sometimes on one side and sometimes on the other, and especially by banishing as much as possible scholastic phrases, those words and terms of art in

controversy which serve as badges of distinction to different sects, and for which theologians often contend more fiercely than for opinions themselves, he at last framed his work in such a manner as promised fairer than any thing that had hitherto been attempted to compose and to terminate religious dissensions.⁷⁷

But the attention of the age was turned with such acute observation towards theological controversies that it was not easy to impose on it by any gloss, how artful or specious soever. The length and eagerness of the dispute had separated the contending parties so completely, and had set their minds at such variance, that they were not to be reconciled by partial concessions. All the zealous Catholics, particularly the ecclesiastics who had a seat in the diet, joined in condemning Gropper's treatise as too favorable to the Lutheran opinion, the poison of which heresy it conveyed, as they pretended, with greater danger, because it was in some degree disguised. The rigid Protestants, especially Luther himself, and his patron, the elector of Saxony, were for rejecting it as an impious compound of error and truth, craftily prepared that it might impose on the weak, the timid, and the unthinking. But the divines, to whom the examination of it was committed, entered upon that business with greater deliberation and temper. As it was more easy in itself, as well as more consistent with the dignity of the Church, to make concessions, and even alterations, with regard to speculative opinions, the discussion whereof is con-

⁷⁷ Goldast., *Constit. Imper.*, ii. p. 182.

fined chiefly to schools, and which present nothing to the people that either strikes their imagination or affects their senses, they came to an accommodation about these without much labor, and even defined the great article concerning justification to their mutual satisfaction. But when they proceeded to points of jurisdiction, where the interest and authority of the Roman see were concerned, or to the rites and forms of external worship, where every change that could be made must be public and draw the observation of the people, there the Catholics were altogether untractable; nor could the Church either with safety or with honor abolish its ancient institutions. All the articles relative to the power of the pope, the authority of councils, the administration of the sacraments, the worship of saints, and many other particulars, did not, in their nature, admit of any temperament; so that, after laboring long to bring about an accommodation with respect to these, the emperor found all his endeavors ineffectual. Being impatient, however, to close the diet, he at last prevailed on the majority of the members to approve of the following recess: "That the articles concerning which the divines had agreed in the conference should be held as points decided, and be observed inviolably by all; that the other articles about which they had differed should be referred to the determination of a general council, or, if that could not be obtained, to a national synod of Germany; and if it should prove impracticable, likewise, to assemble a synod, that a general diet of the empire should be called

within eighteen months, in order to give some final judgment upon the whole controversy; that the emperor should use all his interest and authority with the pope to procure the meeting either of a general council or synod; that in the mean time no innovations should be attempted, no endeavors should be employed to gain proselytes, and neither the revenues of the Church nor the rights of monasteries should be invaded.”⁷⁸

All the proceedings of this diet, as well as the recess in which they terminated, gave great offence to the pope. The power which the Germans had assumed of appointing their own divines to examine and determine matters of controversy, he considered as a very dangerous invasion of his rights; the renewing of their ancient proposal concerning a national synod, which had been so often rejected by him and his predecessors, appeared extremely undutiful; but the bare mention of allowing a diet composed chiefly of laymen to pass judgment with respect to articles of faith was deemed no less criminal and profane than the worst of those heresies which they seemed zealous to suppress. On the other hand, the Protestants were no less dissatisfied with a recess that considerably abridged the liberty which they enjoyed at that time. As they murmured loudly against it, Charles, unwilling to leave any seeds of discontent in the empire, granted them a private declaration in the most ample terms, exempting them from whatever they thought oppressive or in-

⁷⁸ Sleid., 267, etc.—Pallav., lib. iv. c. 11, p. 136.—F. Paul, p. 86.—Seckend., lib. iii. 256.

jurious in the recess, and ascertaining to them the full possession of all the privileges which they had ever enjoyed.⁷⁹

Extraordinary as these concessions may appear, the situation of the emperor's affairs at this juncture made it necessary for him to grant them. He foresaw a rupture with France to be not only unavoidable, but near at hand, and durst not give any such cause of disgust or fear to the Protestants as might force them, in self-defence, to court the protection of the French king, from whom at present they were much alienated. The rapid progress of the Turks in Hungary was a more powerful and urgent motive to that moderation which Charles discovered. A great revolution had happened in that kingdom: John Zapol Scæpus, having chosen, as has been related, rather to possess a tributary kingdom than to renounce the royal dignity to which he had been accustomed, had, by the assistance of his mighty protector Solyman, wrested from Ferdinand a great part of the country, and left him only the precarious possession of the rest. But, being a prince of pacific qualities, the frequent attempts of Ferdinand, or of his partisans among the Hungarians, to recover what they had lost, greatly disquieted him; and the necessity on these occasions of calling in the Turks, whom he considered and felt to be his masters rather than auxiliaries, was hardly less mortifying. In order, therefore, to avoid these distresses, as well as to secure quiet and leisure for cultivating the arts and

⁷⁹ Sleid., 283.—Seckend., 366.—Dumont, *Corps Diplom.*, iv. p. ii. 310.

enjoying amusements in which he delighted, he secretly came to an agreement with his competitor on this condition: that Ferdinand should acknowledge him as king of Hungary, and leave him during life the unmolested possession of that part of the kingdom now in his power, but that upon his demise the sole right of the whole should devolve upon Ferdinand.⁸⁰ As John had never been married, and was then far advanced in life, the terms of the contract seemed very favorable to Ferdinand. But, soon after, some of the Hungarian nobles, solicitous to prevent a foreigner from ascending their throne, prevailed on John to put an end to a long celibacy by marrying Isabella, the daughter of Sigismund, king of Poland. John had the satisfaction before his death, which happened within less than a year after his marriage, to see a son born to inherit his kingdom. To him, without regarding his treaty with Ferdinand, which he considered, no doubt, as void upon an event not foreseen when it was concluded, he bequeathed his crown, appointing the queen and George Martinuzzi, bishop of Waradin, guardians of his son and regents of the kingdom. The greater part of the Hungarians immediately acknowledged the young prince as king, to whom, in memory of the founder of their monarchy, they gave the name of Stephen.⁸¹

Ferdinand, though extremely disconcerted by this unexpected event, resolved not to abandon the kingdom which he flattered himself with having

⁸⁰ Istuanhaffii Hist. Hung., lib. xii. p. 135.

⁸¹ Jovii Hist., lib. xxxix. p. 239, a, etc.

acquired by his compact with John. He sent ambassadors to the queen to claim possession, and to offer the province of Transylvania as a settlement for her son, preparing at the same time to assert his right by force of arms. But John had committed the care of his son to persons who had too much spirit to give up the crown tamely, and who possessed abilities sufficient to defend it. The queen to all the address peculiar to her own sex added a masculine courage, ambition, and magnanimity. Martinuzzi, who had raised himself from the lowest rank in life to his present dignity, was one of those extraordinary men who by the extent as well as variety of their talents are fitted to act a superior part in bustling and factious times. In discharging the functions of his ecclesiastical office he put on the semblance of an humble and austere sanctity. In civil transactions he discovered industry, dexterity, and boldness. During war he laid aside the cassock and appeared on horseback with his scimeter and buckler, as active, as ostentatious, and as gallant as any of his countrymen. Amidst all these different and contradictory forms which he could assume, an insatiable desire of dominion and authority was conspicuous. From such persons it was obvious what answer Ferdinand had to expect. He soon perceived that he must depend on arms alone for recovering Hungary. Having levied for this purpose a considerable body of Germans, whom his partisans among the Hungarians joined with their vassals, he ordered them to march into that part of the kingdom which adhered to Stephen. Martinuzzi, unable to

make head against such a powerful army in the field, satisfied himself with holding out the towns, all of which, especially Buda, the place of greatest consequence, he provided with everything necessary for defence; and in the meantime he sent ambassadors to Solyman, beseeching him to extend towards the son the same imperial protection which had so long maintained the father on his throne. The sultan, though Ferdinand used his utmost endeavors to thwart this negotiation, and even offered to accept of the Hungarian crown on the same ignominious condition of paying tribute to the Ottoman Porte by which John had held it, saw such prospects of advantage from espousing the interests of the young king that he instantly promised him his protection; and, commanding one army to advance forthwith towards Hungary, he himself followed with another. Meanwhile, the Germans, hoping to terminate the war by the reduction of a city in which the king and his mother were shut up, had formed the siege of Buda. Martinuzzi, having drawn thither the strength of the Hungarian nobility, defended the town with such courage and skill as allowed the Turkish forces time to come up to its relief. They instantly attacked the Germans, weakened by fatigue, diseases, and desertion, and defeated them with great slaughter.⁸²

Solyman soon after joined his victorious troops, and, being weary of so many expensive expeditions undertaken in defence of dominions which were not his own, or being unable to resist this

⁸² Istuanhaffii Hist. Hung., lib. xiv. p. 150.

alluring opportunity of seizing a kingdom while possessed by an infant under the guardianship of a woman and a priest, he allowed interested considerations to triumph with too much facility over the principles of honor and the sentiments of humanity. What he planned ungenerously he obtained by fraud. Having prevailed on the queen to send her son, whom he pretended to be desirous of seeing, into his camp, and having at the same time invited the chief of the nobility to an entertainment there, while they, suspecting no treachery, gave themselves up to the mirth and jollity of the feast, a select band of troops, by the sultan's orders, seized one of the gates of Buda. Being thus master of the capital, of the king's person, and of the leading men among the nobles, he gave orders to conduct the queen, together with her son, to Transylvania, which province he allotted to them, and appointing a basha to preside in Buda with a large body of soldiers, annexed Hungary to the Ottoman empire. The tears and complaints of the unhappy queen had no influence to change his purpose, nor could Martinuzzi either resist his absolute or uncontrollable command or prevail on him to recall it.⁸³

Before the account of this violent usurpation reached Ferdinand, he was so unlucky as to have despatched other ambassadors to Solyman with a fresh representation of his right to the crown of Hungary, as well as a renewal of his former overture to hold the kingdom of the Ottoman Porte

⁸³ Istuanhaffii Hist. Hung., lib. xiv. p. 56.—Jovii Hist., lib. xxxix. p. 2476, etc.

and to pay for it an annual tribute. This ill-timed proposal was rejected with scorn. The sultan, elated with success, and thinking that he might prescribe what terms he pleased to a prince who voluntarily proffered conditions so unbecoming his own dignity, declared that he would not suspend the operations of war unless Ferdinand instantly evacuated all the towns which he still held in Hungary and consented to the imposition of a tribute upon Austria in order to reimburse the sums which his presumptuous invasion of Hungary had obliged the Ottoman Porte to expend in defence of that kingdom.⁸⁴

In this state were the affairs of Hungary. As the unfortunate events there had either happened before the dissolution of the diet of Ratisbon or were dreaded at that time, Charles saw the danger of irritating and inflaming the minds of the Germans while a formidable enemy was ready to break into the empire, and perceived that he could not expect any vigorous assistance either towards the recovery of Hungary or the defence of the Austrian frontier unless he courted and satisfied the Protestants. By the concessions which have been mentioned, he gained this point; and such liberal supplies both of men and money were voted for carrying on the war against the Turks as left him under little anxiety about the security of Germany during the next campaign.⁸⁵

Immediately upon the conclusion of the diet the emperor set out for Italy. As he passed

⁸⁴ Istuanhaffii Hist. Hung., lib. xiv. p. 158.

⁸⁵ Sleid., 283.

through Lucca, he had a short intercourse with the pope; but nothing could be concluded concerning the proper method of composing the religious disputes in Germany, between two princes whose views and interests with regard to that matter were at this juncture so opposite. The pope's endeavors to remove the causes of discord between Charles and Francis, and to extinguish those mutual animosities which threatened to break out suddenly into open hostility, were not more successful.

The emperor's thoughts were bent so entirely at that time on the great enterprise which he had concerted against Algiers that he listened with little attention to the pope's schemes or overtures, and hastened to join his army and fleet.⁸⁶

Algiers still continued in that state of dependence on the Turkish empire to which Barbarossa had subjected it. Ever since he, as captain basha, commanded the Ottoman fleet, Algiers had been governed by Hascen-Aga, a renegado eunuch, who by passing through every station in the corsair's service had acquired such experience in war that he was well fitted for a station which required a man of tried and daring courage. Hascen, in order to show how well he deserved that dignity, carried on his piratical depredations against the Christian states with amazing activity, and outdid, if possible, Barbarossa himself in boldness and cruelty. The commerce of the Mediterranean was greatly interrupted by his cruisers, and such frequent alarms given to the coast of Spain that there was a necessity of erecting watch-towers at proper

⁸⁶ Sandoval, Hist., tom. ii. 298.

distances, and of keeping guards constantly on foot, in order to descry the approach of his squadrons and to protect the inhabitants from their descents.⁸⁷ Of this the emperor had received repeated and clamorous complaints from his subjects, who represented it as an enterprise corresponding to his power and becoming his humanity to reduce Algiers, which, since the conquest of Tunis, was the common receptacle of all the freebooters, and to exterminate that lawless race, the implacable enemies of the Christian name. Moved partly by their entreaties, and partly allured by the hope of adding to the glory which he had acquired by his last expedition into Africa, Charles, before he left Madrid, in his way to the Low Countries, had issued orders, both in Spain and Italy, to prepare a fleet and army for this purpose. No change in circumstances since that time could divert him from this resolution or prevail on him to turn his arms towards Hungary; though the success of the Turks in that country seemed more immediately to require his presence there; though many of his most faithful adherents in Germany urged that the defence of the empire ought to be his first and peculiar care; though such as bore him no good will ridiculed his preposterous conduct in flying from an enemy almost at hand, that he might go in quest of a remote and more ignoble foe. But to attack the sultan in Hungary, how splendid soever that measure might appear, was an undertaking which exceeded his power and was not consistent with his interest. To draw

⁸⁷ Jovii Hist., lib. xl. p. 266.

troops out of Spain or Italy, to march them into a country so distant as Hungary, to provide the vast apparatus necessary for transporting thither the artillery, ammunition, and baggage of a regular army, and to push the war in that quarter, where there was little prospect of bringing it to an issue during several campaigns, were undertakings so expensive and unwieldy as did not correspond with the low condition of the emperor's treasury. While his principal force was thus employed, his dominions in Italy and the Low Countries must have lain open to the French king, who would not have allowed such a favorable opportunity of attacking them to go unimproved. Whereas the African expedition, the preparations for which were already finished, and almost the whole expense of it defrayed, would depend upon a single effort, and, besides the security and satisfaction which the success of it must give his subjects, would detain him during so short a space that Francis could hardly take advantage of his absence to invade his dominions in Europe.

On all these accounts, Charles adhered to his first plan, and with such determined obstinacy that he paid no regard to the pope, who advised, or to Andrew Doria, who conjured him not to expose his whole armament to almost unavoidable destruction by venturing to approach the dangerous coast of Algiers at such an advanced season of the year and when the autumnal winds were so violent. Having embarked on board Doria's galleys at Porto-Venere, in the Genoese territories, he soon found that this experienced sailor had not judged

wrong concerning the element with which he was so well acquainted; for such a storm arose that it was with the utmost difficulty and danger he reached Sardinia, the place of general rendezvous. But, as his courage was undaunted and his temper often inflexible, neither the remonstrances of the pope and Doria, nor the danger to which he had already been exposed by disregarding their advice, had any other effect than to confirm him in his fatal resolution. The force, indeed, which he had collected was such as might have inspired a prince less adventurous, and less confident in his own schemes, with the most sanguine hopes of success. It consisted of twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse, Spaniards, Italians, and Germans, mostly veterans, together with three thousand volunteers, the flower of the Spanish and Italian nobility, fond of paying court to the emperor by attending him in his favorite expedition, and eager to share in the glory which they believed he was going to reap; to these were added a thousand soldiers sent from Malta by the order of St. John, led by a hundred of its most gallant knights.

The voyage from Majorca to the African coast was not less tedious or full of hazard than that which he had just finished. When he approached the land, the roll of the sea and the vehemence of the winds would not permit the troops to disembark. But at last the emperor, seizing a favorable opportunity, landed them without opposition, not far from Algiers, and immediately advanced towards the town. To oppose this mighty army, Hascen had only eight hundred Turks, and five

thousand Moors, partly natives of Africa and partly refugees from Granada. He returned, however, a fierce and haughty answer when summoned to surrender. But, with such a handful of soldiers, neither his desperate courage nor consummate skill in war could have long resisted forces superior to those which had defeated Barbarossa at the head of sixty thousand men, and which had reduced Tunis in spite of all his endeavors to save it.

But, how far soever the emperor might think himself beyond the reach of any danger from the enemy, he was suddenly exposed to a more dreadful calamity, and one against which human prudence and human efforts availed nothing. On the second day after his landing, and before he had time for anything but to disperse some light-armed Arabs who molested his troops on their march, the clouds began to gather, and the heavens to appear with a fierce and threatening aspect. Towards evening, rain began to fall, accompanied with a violent wind; and, the rage of the tempest increasing during the night, the soldiers, who had brought nothing ashore but their arms, remained exposed to all its fury, without tents, or shelter, or cover of any kind. The ground was soon so wet that they could not lie down on it; their camp, being in a low situation, was overflowed with water, and they sunk at every step to the ankles in mud; while the wind blew with such impetuosity that to prevent their falling they were obliged to thrust their spears into the ground and to support themselves by taking hold of them. Hascen was too vigilant an officer to allow an enemy in such

distress to remain unmolested. About the dawn of morning he sallied out with soldiers, who, having been screened from the storm under their own roofs, were fresh and vigorous. A body of Italians who were stationed nearest the city, dispirited and benumbed with cold, fled at the approach of the Turks. The troops at the post behind them discovered greater courage, but, as the rain had extinguished their matches and wet their powder, their muskets were useless, and, having scarcely strength to handle their other arms, they were soon thrown into confusion. Almost the whole army, with the emperor himself in person, was obliged to advance before the enemy could be repulsed, who after spreading such general consternation and killing a considerable number of men, retired at last in good order.

But all feeling or remembrance of this loss and danger were quickly obliterated by a more dreadful as well as affecting spectacle. It was now broad day; the hurricane had abated nothing of its violence, and the sea appeared agitated with all the rage of which that destructive element is capable; all the ships, on which alone the whole army knew that their safety and subsistence depended, were seen driven from their anchors, some dashing against each other, some beat to pieces on the rocks, many forced ashore, and not a few sinking in the waves. In less than an hour fifteen ships of war and a hundred and forty transports, with eight thousand men, perished; and such of the unhappy crews as escaped the fury of the sea were murdered without mercy by the Arabs as

soon as they reached land. The emperor stood in silent anguish and astonishment beholding this fatal event, which at once blasted all his hopes of success and buried in the depths the vast stores which he had provided as well for annoying the enemy as for subsisting his own troops. He had it not in his power to afford them any other assistance or relief than by sending some troops to drive away the Arabs and thus delivering a few who were so fortunate as to get ashore from the cruel fate which their companions had met with. At last the wind began to fall, and to give some hopes that as many ships might escape as would be sufficient to save the army from perishing by famine and transport them back to Europe. But these were only hopes: the approach of evening covered the sea with darkness; and, it being impossible for the officers aboard the ships which had outlived the storm to send any intelligence to their companions who were ashore, they remained during the night in all the anguish of suspense and uncertainty. Next day, a boat, despatched by Doria, made shift to reach land, with information that, having weathered out the storm, to which, during fifty years' knowledge of the sea, he had never seen any equal in fierceness and horror, he had found it necessary to bear away with his shattered ships to Cape Metafuz. He advised the emperor, as the face of the sky was still lowering and tempestuous, to march with all speed to that place, where the troops could re-embark with greater ease.

Whatever comfort this intelligence afforded Charles, from being assured that part of his fleet

had escaped, was balanced by the new cares and perplexity in which it involved him with regard to his army. Metafuz was at least three days' march from his present camp; all the provisions which he had brought ashore at his first landing were now consumed; his soldiers, worn out with fatigue, were hardly able for such a march, even in a friendly country; and, being dispirited by a succession of hardships which victory itself would scarcely have rendered tolerable, they were in no condition to undergo new toils. But the situation of the army was such as allowed not one moment for deliberation, nor left it in the least doubtful what to choose. They were ordered instantly to march, the wounded, the sick, and the feeble being placed in the centre; such as seemed most vigorous were stationed in the front and rear. Then the sad effects of what they had suffered began to appear more manifestly than ever, and new calamities were added to all those which they had already endured. Some could hardly bear the weight of their arms; others, spent with the toil of forcing their way through deep and almost impassable roads, sank down and died; many perished by famine, as the whole army subsisted chiefly on roots and berries, or the flesh of horses, killed by the emperor's order and distributed among the several battalions; many were drowned in brooks, which were swollen so much by the excessive rains that in passing them they waded up to the chin; not a few were killed by the enemy, who, during the greatest part of their retreat, alarmed, harassed, and annoyed them night and day. At

last they arrived at Metafuz; and, the weather being now so calm as to restore their communication with the fleet, they were supplied with plenty of provision and cheered with the prospect of safety.

During this dreadful series of calamities the emperor discovered great qualities, many of which a long-continued flow of prosperity had scarcely afforded him an opportunity of displaying. He appeared conspicuous for firmness and constancy of spirit, for magnanimity, fortitude, humanity, and compassion. He endured as great hardships as the meanest soldier; he exposed his own person wherever danger threatened; he encouraged the desponding, visited the sick and wounded, and animated all by his words and example. When the army embarked, he was among the last who left the shore, although a body of Arabs hovered at no great distance, ready to fall on the rear. By these virtues Charles atoned in some degree for his obstinacy and presumption in undertaking an expedition so fatal to his subjects.

The calamities which attended this unfortunate enterprise did not end here; for no sooner were the forces got on board than a new storm arising, though less furious than the former, scattered the fleet, and obliged them, separately, to make towards such ports in Spain or Italy as they could first reach; thus spreading the account of their disasters, with all the circumstances of aggravation and horror which their imagination, still under the influence of fear, suggested. The emperor himself, after escaping great dangers, and being

forced into the port of Bugia in Africa, where he was obliged by contrary winds to remain several weeks, arrived at last in Spain, in a condition very different from that in which he had returned from his former expedition against the infidels.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Carol. V. *Expeditio ad Argyriam, per Nicolaum Villagonem Equitem Rhodium, ap. Scardium, v. ii. 365.*—*Jovii Hist., lib. xl. p. 269, etc.*—*Vera y Zuñiga, Vida de Carlos V., p. 83.*—*Sandoval, Hist., ii. 239, etc.*

BOOK VII

Renewal of Hostilities by Francis—Operations of his Forces—The Emperor's Negotiations with Henry VIII.—Henry's Rupture with France and Scotland—Francis's Negotiations with Solyman—The Campaign in the Low Countries—Solyman invades Hungary—Barbarossa's Descent upon Italy—Maurice of Saxony—The Pope calls a Council at Trent, but is obliged to prorogue it—Diet at Spire—Concessions to the Protestants by the Emperor—His Negotiations with Denmark and England—Battle of Cerisoles—Siege of St. Disier—Peace concluded at Crespy—War between France and England continued—Diet at Worms—The Protestants suspect the Emperor—Death of the Duke of Orleans—The Pope grants the Duchies of Parma and Placentia to his Son—The Council of Trent—The Protestants and the Emperor

THE calamities which the emperor suffered in his unfortunate enterprise against Algiers were great; and the account of these, which augmented in proportion as it spread at a greater distance from the scene of his disasters, encouraged Francis to begin hostilities, on which he had been for some time resolved. But he did not think it prudent to produce as the motives of this resolution either his ancient pretensions to the duchy of Milan or the emperor's disingenuity in violating his repeated promises with regard to the restitution of that country. The former might have been a good reason against concluding the truce of Nice, but was none for breaking it; the latter could not be urged without exposing his own credulity as much as the emperor's want of integrity. A violent and unwarrantable action of one of the imperial generals furnished him with a

reason sufficient to justify his taking arms, which was of greater weight than either of these, and such as would have roused him if he had been as desirous of peace as he was eager for war. Francis, by signing the treaty of truce at Nice without consulting Solyman, gave (as he foresaw) great offence to that haughty monarch, who considered an alliance with him as an honor of which a Christian prince had cause to be proud. The friendly interview of the French king with the emperor in Provence, followed by such extraordinary appearances of union and confidence which distinguished the reception of Charles when he passed through the dominions of Francis to the Low Countries, induced the sultan to suspect that the two rivals had at last forgotten their ancient enmity in order that they might form such a general confederacy against the Ottoman power as had been long wished for in Christendom and often attempted in vain. Charles, with his usual art, endeavored to confirm and strengthen these suspicions, by instructing his emissaries at Constantinople, as well as in those courts with which Solyman held any intelligence, to represent the concord between him and Francis to be so entire that their sentiments, views, and pursuits would be the same for the future.¹ It was not without difficulty that Francis effaced these impressions; but the address of Rincon, the French ambassador at the Porte, together with the manifest advantage of carrying on hostilities against the house of Austria in concert with France, prevailed at length on the sultan not only

¹ Mém. de Ribier, tom. i. p. 502.

to banish his suspicions, but to enter into a closer conjunction with Francis than ever. Rincon returned into France, in order to communicate to his master a scheme of the sultan's for gaining the concurrence of the Venetians in their operations against the common enemy. Solyman, having lately concluded a peace with that republic, to which the mediation of Francis and the good offices of Rincon had greatly contributed, thought it not impossible to allure the senate by such advantages as, together with the example of the French monarch, might overbalance any scruples, arising either from decency or caution, that could operate on the other side. Francis, warmly approving of this measure, despatched Rincon back to Constantinople, and, directing him to go by Venice along with Fregoso, a Genoese exile, whom he appointed his ambassador to that republic, empowered them to negotiate the matter with the senate, to whom Solyman had sent an envoy for the same purpose.² The marquis del Guasto, governor of the Milanese, an officer of great abilities, but capable of attempting and executing the most atrocious designs, got intelligence of the motions and destinations of these ambassadors. As he knew how much his master wished to discover the intentions of the French king, and of what consequence it was to retard the execution of his measures, he employed some soldiers belonging to the garrison of Pavia to lie in wait for Rincon and Fregoso as they sailed down the Po, who murdered them and most of their attendants and seized

² Hist. di Venez. di Paruta, iv. 125.

their papers. Upon receiving an account of this barbarous outrage, committed during the subsistence of a truce, against persons held sacred by the most uncivilized nations, Francis's grief for the unhappy fate of two servants whom he loved and trusted, his uneasiness at the interruption of his schemes by their death, and every other passion, were swallowed up and lost in the indignation which this insult on the honor of his crown excited. He exclaimed loudly against Guasto, who, having drawn upon himself all the infamy of assassination without making any discovery of importance, as the ambassadors had left their instructions and other papers of consequence behind them, now boldly denied his being accessory in any wise to the crime. He sent an ambassador to the emperor, to demand suitable reparation for an indignity which no prince, how inconsiderable or pusillanimous soever, could tamely endure; and when Charles, impatient at that time to set out on his African expedition, endeavored to put him off with an evasive answer, he appealed to all the courts in Europe, setting forth the heinousness of the injury, the spirit of moderation with which he had applied for redress, and the iniquity of the emperor in disregarding this just request.

Notwithstanding the confidence with which Guasto asserted his own innocence, the accusations of the French gained greater credit than all his protestations; and Bellay, the French commander in Piedmont, procured at length, by his industry and address, such a minute detail of the transaction, with the testimony of so many of the parties

concerned, as amounted almost to a legal proof of the marquis's guilt. In consequence of this opinion of the public, confirmed by such strong evidence, Francis's complaints were universally allowed to be well founded; and the steps which he took towards renewing hostilities were ascribed not merely to ambition or resentment, but to the unavoidable necessity of vindicating the honor of his crown.³

However just Francis might esteem his own cause, he did not trust so much to that as to neglect the proper precautions for gaining other allies besides the sultan, by whose aid he might counterbalance the emperor's superior power. But his negotiations to this effect were attended with very little success. Henry VIII., eagerly bent at that time upon schemes against Scotland, which he knew would at once dissolve his union with France, was inclinable rather to take part with the emperor than to contribute in any degree towards favoring the operations against him. The pope adhered inviolably to his ancient system of neutrality. The Venetians, notwithstanding Solyman's solicitations, imitated the pope's example. The Germans, satisfied with the religious liberty which they enjoyed, found it more their interest to gratify than to irritate the emperor; so that the kings of Denmark and Sweden, who on this occasion were first drawn in to interest themselves in the quarrels of the more potent monarchs of the south, and the duke of Cleves, who had a dispute with the emperor about the possession of Gueldres, were the

³ Mém. de Bellay, 367, etc.—Jovii Hist., lib. xl. 268.

only confederates whom Francis secured. But the dominions of the two former lay at such a distance, and the power of the latter was so inconsiderable, that he gained little by their alliance.

But Francis, by vigorous efforts of his own activity, supplied every defect. Being afflicted at this time with a distemper which was the effect of his irregular pleasures and which prevented his pursuing them with the same licentious indulgence, he applied to business with more than his usual industry. The same cause which occasioned this extraordinary attention to his affairs rendered him morose and dissatisfied with the ministers whom he had hitherto employed. This accidental peevishness being sharpened by reflecting on the false steps into which he had lately been betrayed, as well as the insults to which he had been exposed, some of those in whom he had usually placed the greatest confidence felt the effects of this change in his temper, and were deprived of their offices. At last he disgraced Montmorency himself, who had long directed affairs, as well civil as military, with all the authority of a minister no less beloved than trusted by his master; and, Francis being fond of showing that the fall of such a powerful favorite did not affect the vigor or prudence of his administration, this was a new motive to redouble his diligence in preparing to open the war by some splendid and extraordinary effort.

He accordingly brought into the field five armies. One to act in Luxembourg, under the duke of Orleans, accompanied by the duke of Lorraine as his instructor in the art of war. Another,

commanded by the dauphin, marched towards the frontiers of Spain. A third, led by Van Rossem, the marshal of Gueldres, and composed chiefly of the troops of Cleves, had Brabant allotted for the theatre of its operations. A fourth, of which the duke of Vendôme was general, hovered on the borders of Flanders. The last, consisting of the forces cantoned in Piedmont, was destined for the Admiral Annebaut. The dauphin and his brother were appointed to command where the chief exertions were intended and the greatest honor to be reaped; the army of the former amounted to forty thousand, that of the latter to thirty thousand men. Nothing appears more surprising than that Francis did not pour with these numerous and irresistible armies into the Milanese, which had so long been the object of his wishes as well as enterprises, and that he should choose rather to turn almost his whole strength into another direction and towards new conquests. But the remembrance of the disasters which he had met with in his former expeditions into Italy, together with the difficulty of supporting a war carried on at such a distance from his own dominions, had gradually abated his violent inclination to obtain footing in that country, and made him willing to try the fortune of his arms in another quarter. At the same time he expected to make such a powerful impression on the frontier of Spain, where there were few towns of any strength, and no army assembled to oppose him, as might enable him to recover possession of the country of Rousillon, lately dismembered from the French crown, before Charles could bring into

the field any force able to obstruct his progress. The necessity of supporting his ally the duke of Cleves, and the hope of drawing a considerable body of soldiers out of Germany by his means, determined him to act with vigor in the Low Countries.

The dauphin and duke of Orleans opened the campaign much about the same time, the former laying siege to Perpignan, the capital of Roussillon, and the latter entering Luxembourg. The duke of Orleans pushed his operations with the greatest rapidity and success, one town falling after another, until no place in that large duchy remained in the emperor's hands but Thionville. Nor could he have failed of overrunning the adjacent provinces with the same ease, if he had not voluntarily stopped short in this career of victory. But, a report prevailing that the emperor had determined to hazard a battle in order to save Perpignan, on a sudden the duke, prompted by youthful ardor, or moved, perhaps, by jealousy of his brother, whom he both envied and hated, abandoned his own conquest and hastened towards Roussillon, in order to divide with him the glory of the victory.

On his departure, some of his troops were disbanded, others deserted their colors, and the rest, cantoned in the towns which he had taken, remained inactive. By this conduct, which leaves a dishonorable imputation either on his understanding or his heart, or on both, he not only renounced whatever he could have hoped from such a promising commencement of the campaign, but gave

the enemy an opportunity of recovering, before the end of summer, all the conquests which he had gained. On the Spanish frontier, the emperor was not so inconsiderate as to venture on a battle, the loss of which might have endangered his kingdom. Perpignan, though poorly fortified and briskly attacked, having been largely supplied with ammunition and provisions by the vigilance of Doria,⁴ was defended so long and so vigorously by the duke of Alva, the persevering obstinacy of whose temper fitted him admirably for such a service, that at last the French, after a siege of three months, wasted by diseases, repulsed in several assaults, and despairing of success, relinquished the undertaking and retired into their own country.⁵ Thus all Francis's mighty preparations, either from some defect in his own conduct or from the superior power and prudence of his rival, produced no effects which bore any proportion to his expense and efforts, or such as gratified in any degree his own hopes or answered the expectation of Europe. The only solid advantage of the campaign was the acquisition of a few towns in Piedmont, which Bellay gained rather by stratagem and address than by force of arms.⁶

The emperor and Francis, though both considerably exhausted by such great but indecisive efforts, discovering no abatement of their mutual animosity, employed all their attention, tried every expedient, and turned themselves towards every

⁴ Sigonii Vita A. Doriæ, p. 1191.

⁵ Sandoval, Hist., tom. ii. 315.

⁶ Ibid., ii. 318.—Mém. de Bellay, 387, etc.—Ferrerias, ix. 231.

quarter, in order to acquire new allies, together with such a reinforcement of strength as would give them the superiority in the ensuing campaign. Charles, taking advantage of the terror and resentment of the Spaniards upon the sudden invasion of their country, prevailed on the cortes of the several kingdoms to grant him subsidies with a more liberal hand than usual. At the same time he borrowed a large sum from John, king of Portugal, and, by way of security for his repayment, put him in possession of the Molucca Isles in the East Indies, with the gainful commerce of precious spices which that sequestered corner of the globe yields. Not satisfied with this, he negotiated a marriage between Philip, his only son, now in his sixteenth year, and Mary, daughter of that monarch, with whom her father, the most opulent prince in Europe gave a large dower; and, having likewise persuaded the cortes of Aragon and Valencia to recognize Philip as the heir of these crowns, he obtained from them the donative usual on such occasions.⁷ These extraordinary supplies enabled him to make such additions to his forces in Spain that he could detach a great body into the Low Countries and yet reserve as many as were sufficient for the defence of the kingdom. Having thus provided for the security of Spain, and committed the government of it to his son, he sailed for Italy in his way to Germany. But, how attentive soever to raise the funds for carrying on the war, or eager to grasp at any new expedient for that purpose, he was not so inconsiderate as to

⁷ Ferreras, ix. 238, 241.—Jovii Hist., lib. xlii. 298, 6.

accept of an overture which Paul, knowing his necessities, artfully threw out to him. That ambitious pontiff, no less sagacious to discern than watchful to seize opportunities of aggrandizing his family, solicited him to grant Octavio, his grandchild, whom the emperor had admitted to the honor of being his son-in-law, the investiture of the duchy of Milan, in return for which he promised such a sum of money as would have gone far towards supplying all his present exigencies. But Charles, as well from unwillingness to alienate a province of so much value, as from disgust at the pope, who had hitherto refused to join in the war against France, rejected the proposal. His dissatisfaction with Paul at that juncture was so great that he even refused to approve his alienating Parma and Placentia from the patrimony of St. Peter and settling them on his son and grandson as a fief to be held of the holy see. As no other expedient for raising money among the Italian states remained, he consented to withdraw the garrisons which he had hitherto kept in the citadels of Florence and Leghorn; in consideration for which he received a large present from Cosmo de' Medici, who by this means secured his own independence, and got possession of two forts, which were justly called the fetters of Tuscany.⁸

But Charles, while he seemed to have turned his whole attention towards raising the sums necessary for defraying the expenses of the year, had not

⁸ Adriana, *Istoria*, i. 195.—Sleid., 312.—Jovii *Hist.*, lib. xliii. p. 301.—*Vita di Cos. Medici da Baldini*, p. 34.

been negligent of objects more distant, though no less important, and had concluded a league offensive and defensive with Henry VIII., from which he derived, in the end, greater advantage than from all his other preparations. Several slight circumstances, which have already been mentioned, had begun to alienate the affections of that monarch from Francis, with whom he had been for some time in close alliance; and new incidents of greater moment had occurred to increase his disgust and animosity. Henry, desirous of establishing a uniformity in religion in both the British kingdoms, as well as fond of making proselytes to his own opinions, had formed a scheme of persuading his nephew, the king of Scots, to renounce the pope's supremacy, and to adopt the same system of reformation which he had introduced into England. This measure he pursued with his usual eagerness and impetuosity, making such advantageous offers to James, whom he considered as not over-scrupulously attached to any religious tenets, that he hardly doubted of success. His propositions were accordingly received in such a manner that he flattered himself with having gained his point. But the Scottish ecclesiastics, foreseeing how fatal the union of their sovereign with England must prove both to their own power and to the established system of religion, and the partisans of France, no less convinced that it would put an end to the influence of that crown upon the public councils of Scotland, combined together, and, by their insinuations, defeated Henry's scheme at the very moment when he ex-

pected it to have taken effect.⁹ Too haughty to brook such a disappointment, which he imputed as much to the arts of the French as to the levity of the Scottish monarch, he took arms against Scotland, threatening to subdue the kingdom, since he could not gain the friendship of its king. At the same time, his resentment against Francis quickened his negotiations with the emperor, an alliance with whom he was now as forward to accept as the other could be to offer it. During this war with Scotland, and before the conclusion of his negotiations with Charles, James V. died, leaving his crown to Mary, his only daughter, an infant of a few days old. Upon this event Henry altered at once his whole system with regard to Scotland, and, abandoning all thoughts of conquering it, aimed at what was more advantageous as well as more practicable,—a union of that kingdom by a marriage between Edward, his only son, and the young queen. But here, too, he apprehended a vigorous opposition from the French faction in Scotland, which began to bestir in order to thwart the measure. The necessity of crushing this party among the Scots, and of preventing Francis from furnishing them any effectual aid, confirmed Henry's resolution of breaking with France, and pushed him on to put a finishing hand to the treaty of confederacy with the emperor.

In this league were contained, first of all, articles for securing their future amity and mutual defence; then were enumerated the demands which they were respectively to make upon

⁹ Hist. of Scot., vol. i. p. 58, etc.

France; and the plan of their operations was fixed, if he should refuse to grant them satisfaction. They agreed to require that Francis should not only renounce his alliance with Solyman, which had been the source of infinite calamities to Christendom, but also that he should make reparation for the damages which that unnatural union had occasioned; that he should restore Burgundy to the emperor; that he should desist immediately from hostilities, and leave Charles at leisure to oppose the common enemy of the Christian faith; and that he should immediately pay the sums due to Henry, or put some towns in his hands as security to that effect. If within forty days he did not comply with these demands, they then engaged to invade France each with twenty thousand foot and five thousand horse, and not to lay down their arms until they had recovered Burgundy, together with the towns on the Somme, for the emperor, and Normandy and Guienne, or even the whole realm of France, for Henry.¹⁰ Their heralds accordingly, set out with these haughty requisitions; and, though they were not permitted to enter France, the two monarchs held themselves fully entitled to execute whatever was stipulated in their treaty.

Francis, on his part, was not less diligent in preparing for the approaching campaign. Having early observed symptoms of Henry's disgust and alienation, and finding all his endeavors to soothe and reconcile him ineffectual, he knew his temper too well not to expect that open hostilities would

¹⁰ Rymer, xiv. 768.—Herb., 238.

quickly follow upon this cessation of friendship. For this reason, he redoubled his endeavors to obtain from Solyman such aid as might counterbalance the great accession of strength which the emperor would receive by his alliance with England. In order to supply the place of the two ambassadors who had been murdered by Guasto, he sent as his envoy, first to Venice, and then to Constantinople, Paulin, who, though in no higher rank than a captain of foot, was deemed worthy of being raised to this important station, to which he was recommended by Bellay, who had trained him to the arts of negotiation and made trial of his talents and address on several occasions. Nor did he belie the opinion conceived of his courage and abilities. Hastening to Constantinople, without regarding the dangers to which he was exposed, he urged his master's demands with such boldness, and availed himself of every circumstance with such dexterity, that he soon removed all the sultan's difficulties. As some of the bashas, swayed either by their own opinion or influenced by the emperor's emissaries, who had made their way even into this court, had declared in the divan against acting in concert with France, he found means either to convince or silence them.¹¹ At last he obtained orders for Barbarossa to sail with a powerful fleet and to regulate all his operations by the directions of the French king. Francis was not equally successful in his attempts to gain the princes of the empire. The extraordinary rigor with which he thought it

¹¹ Sandoval, *Histor.*, tom. ii. 346.—Jovii *Hist.*, lib. xli. 285, etc., 300, etc.—Brantôme.

necessary to punish such of his subjects as had embraced the Protestant opinions, in order to give some notable evidence of his own zeal for the Catholic faith and to wipe off the imputations to which he was liable from his confederacy with the Turks, placed an insuperable barrier between him and such of the Germans as interest or inclination would have prompted most readily to join him.¹² His chief advantage, however, over the emperor he derived on this, as on other occasions, from the contiguity of his dominions, as well as from the extent of the royal authority in France, which exempted him from all the delays and disappointments unavoidable wherever popular assemblies provide for the expenses of government by occasional and frugal subsidies. Hence his domestic preparations were always carried on with vigor and rapidity, while those of the emperor, unless when quickened by some foreign supply or some temporary expedient, were extremely slow and dilatory.

Long before any army was in readiness to oppose him, Francis took the field in the Low Countries, against which he turned the whole weight of the war. He made himself master of Landrecy, which he determined to keep as the key to the whole province of Hainault, and ordered it to be fortified with great care. Turning from thence to the right, he entered the duchy of Luxembourg, and found it in the same defenceless state as in the former year. While he was thus employed, the emperor, having drawn together an

¹² Seck., lib. iii. 403.

army composed of all the different nations subject to his government, entered the territories of the duke of Cleves, on whom he had vowed to inflict exemplary vengeance. This prince, whose conduct and situation were similar to that of Robert de la Mark in the first war between Charles and Francis, resembled him likewise in his fate. Unable, with his feeble army, to face the emperor, who advanced at the head of forty-four thousand men, he retired at his approach; and the imperialists, being at liberty to act as they pleased, immediately invested Duren. That town, though gallantly defended, was taken by assault, all the inhabitants were put to the sword, and the place itself reduced to ashes. This dreadful example of severity struck the people of the country with such general terror that all the other towns, even such as were capable of resistance, sent their keys to the emperor, and, before a body of French detached to his assistance could come up, the duke himself was obliged to make his submission to Charles in the most abject manner. Being admitted into the imperial presence, he kneeled, together with eight of his principal subjects, and implored mercy. The emperor allowed him to remain in that ignominious posture, and, eying him with a haughty and severe look, without deigning to answer a single word, remitted him to his ministers. The conditions, however, which they prescribed were not so rigorous as he had reason to have expected after such a reception. He was obliged to renounce his alliance with France and Denmark; to resign all his pretensions to the duchy of Gueldres;

to enter into perpetual amity with the emperor and king of the Romans. In return for which, all his hereditary dominions were restored, except two towns, which the emperor kept as pledges of the duke's fidelity during the continuance of the war; and he was reinstated in his privileges as a prince of the empire. Not long after, Charles, as a proof of the sincerity of his reconciliation, gave him in marriage one of the daughters of his brother Ferdinand.¹³

Having thus chastised the presumption of the duke of Cleves, detached one of his allies from Francis, and annexed to his own dominions in the Low Countries a considerable province which lay contiguous to them, Charles advanced towards Hainault and laid siege to Landrecy. There, as the first fruits of his alliance with Henry, he was joined by six thousand English, under Sir John Wallop. The garrison, consisting of veteran troops commanded by De la Lande and Dessé, two officers of reputation, made a vigorous resistance. Francis approached with all his forces to relieve that place; Charles covered the siege; both were determined to hazard an engagement; and all Europe expected to see this contest, which had continued so long, decided at last by a battle between two great armies, led by their respective monarchs in person. But the ground which separated their two camps was such as put the disadvantage manifestly on his side who should venture to attack, and neither of them chose to run that

¹³ Haræi Annal. Brabant., tom. i. 628.—Recueil des Traités, tom. ii. 226.

risk. Amidst a variety of movements in order to draw the enemy into the snare or to avoid it themselves, Francis, with admirable conduct and equal good fortune, threw first a supply of fresh troops, and then a convoy of provisions, into the town, so that the emperor, despairing of success, withdrew into winter quarters,¹⁴ in order to prevent his army from being entirely ruined by the rigor of the season.

During this campaign, Solyman fulfilled his engagements to the French king with great punctuality. He himself marched into Hungary with a numerous army; and, as the princes of the empire made no great effort to save a country which Charles, by employing his own force against Francis, seemed willing to sacrifice, there was no appearance of any body of troops to oppose his progress. He besieged, one after another, *Quinque Ecclesiæ*, *Alba*, and *Gran*, the three most considerable towns in the kingdom of which Ferdinand had kept possession. The first was taken by storm; the other two surrendered; and the whole kingdom, a small corner excepted, was subjected to the Turkish yoke.¹⁵ About the same time, Barbarossa sailed with a fleet of a hundred and ten galleys, and, coasting along the shore of Calabria, made a descent at *Reggio*, which he plundered and burnt; and, advancing from thence to the mouth of the *Tiber*, he stopped there to water. The citizens of *Rome*, ignorant of his destination, and filled with terror, began to fly

¹⁴ *Mém. de Bellay*, 405, etc.

¹⁵ *Istuanhaffii Histor. Hung.*, lib. xv. 167.

with such general precipitation that the city would have been totally deserted, if they had not resumed courage upon letters from Paulin, the French envoy, assuring them that no violence or injury would be offered by the Turks to any state in alliance with the king his master.¹⁶ From Ostia, Barbarossa sailed to Marseilles, and, being joined by the French fleet with a body of land-forces on board, under the count d'Enguien, a gallant young prince of the house of Bourbon, they directed their course towards Nice, the sole retreat of the unfortunate duke of Savoy. There, to the astonishment and scandal of all Christendom, the lilies of France and crescent of Mahomet appeared in conjunction against a fortress on which the cross of Savoy was displayed. The town, however, was bravely defended against their combined force by Montfort, a Savoyard gentleman, who stood a general assault, and repulsed the enemy with great loss, before he retired into the castle. That fort, situated upon a rock, on which the artillery made no impression, and which could not be undermined, he held out so long that Doria had time to approach with his fleet, and the marquis del Guasto to march with a body of troops from Milan. Upon intelligence of this, the French and Turks raised the siege;¹⁷ and Francis had not even the consolation of success, to render the infamy which he drew on himself, by calling in such an auxiliary, more pardonable.

¹⁶ Jovii Hist., lib. xliii. 304, etc.—Pallavic., 160.

¹⁷ Guichenon, Histoire de Savoye, tom. i. p. 651.—Mém. de Bellay, 425, etc.

From the small progress of either party during this campaign, it was obvious to what a length the war might be drawn out between the two princes, whose power was so equally balanced, and who by their own talents or activity could so vary and multiply their resources. The trial which they had now made of each other's strength might have taught them the imprudence of persisting in a war wherein there was greater appearance of their distressing their own dominions than of conquering those of their adversary, and should have disposed both to wish for peace. If Charles and Francis had been influenced by considerations of interest or prudence alone, this, without doubt, must have been the manner in which they would have reasoned. But the personal animosity which mingled itself in all their quarrels had grown to be so violent and implacable that for the pleasure of gratifying it they disregarded everything else, and were infinitely more solicitous how to hurt each other than how to secure what would be of advantage to themselves. No sooner, then, did the season force them to suspend hostilities, than, without paying any attention to the pope's repeated endeavors or paternal exhortations to re-establish peace, they began to provide for the operations of the next year with new vigor, and an activity increasing with their hatred. Charles turned his chief attention towards gaining the princes of the empire, and endeavored to rouse the formidable but unwieldy strength of the Germanic body against Francis. In order to understand the propriety of the steps which he took for that purpose,

it is necessary to review the chief transactions in that country since the diet of Ratisbon, in the year 1541.

Much about the time that assembly broke up, Maurice succeeded his father Henry in the government of that part of Saxony which belonged to the Albertine branch of the Saxon family. This young prince, then only in his twentieth year, had, even at that early period, begun to discover the great talents which qualified him for acting such a distinguished part in the affairs of Germany. As soon as he entered upon the administration, he struck out into such a new and singular path as showed that he aimed from the beginning at something great and uncommon. Though zealously attached to the Protestant opinions, both from education and principle, he refused to accede to the league of Smalkalde, being determined, as he said, to maintain the purity of religion, which was the original object of that confederacy, but not to entangle himself in the political interests or combinations to which it had given rise. At the same time, foreseeing a rupture between Charles and the confederates of Smalkalde, and perceiving which of them was most likely to prevail in the contest, instead of that jealousy and distrust which the other Protestants expressed of all the emperor's designs, he affected to place in him an unbounded confidence, and courted his favor with the utmost assiduity. When the other Protestants, in the year 1542, either declined assisting Ferdinand in Hungary, or afforded him reluctant and feeble aid, Maurice marched thither in person, and ren-

dered himself conspicuous by his zeal and courage. From the same motive, he had led to the emperor's assistance, during the last campaign, a body of his own troops; and the gracefulness of his person, his dexterity in all military exercises, together with his intrepidity, which courted and delighted in danger, did not distinguish him more in the field than his great abilities and insinuating address won upon the emperor's confidence and favor.¹⁸ While by this conduct, which appeared extraordinary to those who held the same opinions with him concerning religion, Maurice endeavored to pay court to the emperor, he began to discover some degree of jealousy of his cousin, the elector of Saxony. This, which proved in the sequel so fatal to the elector, had almost occasioned an open rupture between them; and soon after Maurice's accession to the government they both took arms with equal rage upon account of a dispute about the right of jurisdiction over a paltry town situated on the Moldau. They were prevented, however, from proceeding to action by the mediation of the landgrave of Hesse, whose daughter Maurice had married, as well as by the powerful and authoritative admonitions of Luther.¹⁹

Amidst these transactions, the pope, though extremely irritated at the emperor's concessions to the Protestants at the diet of Ratisbon, was so warmly solicited on all hands, by such as were most devoutly attached to the see of Rome, no less than by those whose fidelity or designs he suspected, to

¹⁸ Sleid., 317.—Seck., lib. iii. 371, 386, 428.

¹⁹ Sleid., 292.—Seck., lib. iii. 403.

summon a general council, that he found it impossible to avoid any longer calling that assembly. The impatience for its meeting, and the expectations of great effects from its decisions, seemed to grow in proportion to the difficulty of obtaining it. He still adhered, however, to his original resolution of holding it in some town of Italy, where, by the number of ecclesiastics, retainers to his court, and depending on his favor, who could repair to it without difficulty or expense, he might influence and even direct all its proceedings. This proposition, though often rejected by the Germans, he instructed his nuncio at the diet held at Spire, in the year 1542, to renew once more; and if he found it gave no greater satisfaction than formerly, he empowered him, as a last concession, to propose for the place of meeting Trent, a city in the Tyrol, subject to the king of the Romans, and situated on the confines between Germany and Italy. The Catholic princes in the diet, after giving it as their opinion that the council might have been held with greater advantage in Ratisbon, Cologne, or some of the great cities of the empire, were at length induced to approve of the place which the pope had named. The Protestants unanimously expressed their dissatisfaction, and protested that they would pay no regard to a council held beyond the precincts of the empire, called by the pope's authority, and in which he assumed the right of presiding.²⁰

The pope, without taking any notice of their objections, published the bull of intimation, named

²⁰ Sleid., 291.—Seck., lib. iii. 283.

three cardinals to preside as his legates, and appointed them to repair to Trent before the 1st of November, the day he had fixed for opening the council. But if Paul had desired the meeting of a council as sincerely as he pretended, he would not have pitched on such an improper time for calling it. Instead of that general union and tranquillity without which the deliberations of a council could neither be conducted with security nor attended with authority, such a fierce war was just kindled between the emperor and Francis as rendered it impossible for the ecclesiastics from many parts of Europe to resort thither in safety. The legates, accordingly, remained several months in Trent; but, as no person appeared there except a few prelates from the ecclesiastical state, the pope, in order to avoid the ridicule and contempt which this drew upon him from the enemies of the Church, recalled them and prorogued the council.²¹

Unhappily for the authority of the papal see, at the very time that the German Protestants took every occasion of pouring contempt upon it the emperor and king of the Romans found it necessary not only to connive at their conduct, but to court their favor by repeated acts of indulgence. In the same diet of Spires in which they had protested in the most disrespectful terms against assembling a council at Trent, Ferdinand, who depended on their aid for the defence of Hungary, not only permitted that protestation to be inserted in the records of the diet, but renewed in their favor all the emperor's concessions at Ratis-

²¹ F. Paul, p. 97.—Sleid., 296.

bon, adding to them whatever they demanded for their further security. Among other particulars, he granted a suspension of a decree of the imperial chamber against the city of Goslar (one of those which had entered into the league of Smalkalde) on account of its having seized the ecclesiastical revenues within its domains, and enjoined Henry, duke of Brunswick, to desist from his attempts to carry that decree into execution. But Henry, a furious bigot, and no less obstinate than rash in all his undertakings, continuing to disquiet the people of Goslar by his incursions, the elector of Saxony and landgrave of Hesse, that they might not suffer any member of the Smalkaldic body to be oppressed, assembled their forces, declared war in form against Henry, and in the space of a few weeks, stripping him entirely of his dominions, drove him as a wretched exile to take refuge in the court of Bavaria. By this act of vengeance, no less severe than sudden, they filled all Germany with dread of their power, and the confederates of Smalkalde appeared, by this first effort of their arms, to be as ready as they were able to protect those who had joined the association.²²

Emboldened by so many concessions in their favor, as well as by the progress which their opinions daily made, the princes of the league of Smalkalde took a solemn protest against the imperial chamber, and declined its jurisdiction for the future, because that court had not been visited or

²² Sleid., 296.—*Commemoratio succincta Causarum Belli, etc., a Smalkaldicis contra Henr. Brunsw. ab. iisdem edita ap. Scardium, tom. ii. 307.*

reformed according to the decree of Ratisbon, and continued to discover a most indecent partiality in all its proceedings. Not long after this they ventured a step farther, and, protesting against the recess of a diet held at Nuremberg, which provided for the defence of Hungary, refused to furnish their contingent for that purpose unless the imperial chamber were reformed and full security were granted them in every point with regard to religion.²³

Such were the lengths to which the Protestants had proceeded, and such their confidence in their own power, when the emperor returned from the Low Countries, to hold a diet which he had summoned to meet at Spires. The respect due to the emperor, as well as the importance of the affairs which were to be laid before it, rendered this assembly extremely full. All the electors, a great number of princes, ecclesiastical and secular, with the deputies of most of the cities, were present. Charles soon perceived that this was not a time to offend the jealous spirit of the Protestants by asserting in any high tone the authority and doctrines of the Church, or by abridging in the smallest article the liberty which they now enjoyed, but that, on the contrary, if he expected any support from them, or wished to preserve Germany from intestine disorders while he was engaged in a foreign war, he must soothe them by new concessions and a more ample extension of their religious privileges. He began, accordingly, with courting the elector of Saxony and landgrave of Hesse, the

²³ Sleid., 304, 307.—Seck., lib. iii. 404, 416.

heads of the Protestant party; and by giving up some things in their favor, and granting liberal promises with regard to others, he secured himself from any danger of opposition on their part. Having gained this capital point, he then ventured to address the diet with greater freedom. He began by representing his own zeal and unwearied efforts with regard to two things most essential to Christendom,—the procuring of a general council in order to compose the religious dissensions which had unhappily arisen in Germany, and the providing some proper means for checking the formidable progress of the Turkish arms. But he observed with deep regret that his pious endeavors had been entirely defeated by the unjustifiable ambition of the French king, who, having wantonly kindled the flames of war in Europe, which had been so lately extinguished by the truce of Nice, rendered it impossible for the fathers of the Church to assemble in council or to deliberate with security, and obliged him to employ those forces in his own defence which with greater satisfaction to himself, as well as more honor to Christendom, he would have turned against the infidels; that Francis, not thinking it enough to have called him off from opposing the Mahometans, had, with unexampled impiety, invited them into the heart of Christendom, and, joining his arms to theirs, had openly attacked the duke of Savoy, a member of the empire; that Barbarossa's fleet was now in one of the ports of France, waiting only the return of spring to carry terror and desolation to the coast of some Christian state; that in such a situation it

was folly to think of distant expeditions against the Turk, or of marching to oppose his armies in Hungary, while such a powerful ally received him into the centre of Europe and gave him footing there. It was a dictate of prudence, he added, to oppose the nearest and most imminent danger first of all, and, by humbling the power of France, to deprive Solymán of the advantages which he derived from the unnatural confederacy formed between him and a monarch who still arrogated the name of Most Christian; that, in truth, a war against the French king and the sultan ought to be considered as the same thing, and that every advantage gained over the former was a severe and sensible blow to the latter. On all these accounts, he concluded with demanding their aid against Francis, not merely as an enemy of the Germanic body or of him who was its head, but as an avowed ally of the infidels and a public enemy to the Christian name.

In order to give greater weight to this violent invective of the emperor, the king of the Romans stood up, and related the rapid conquests of the sultan in Hungary, occasioned, as he said, by the fatal necessity imposed on his brother of employing his arms against France. When he had finished, the ambassador of Savoy gave a detail of Barbarossa's operations at Nice, and of the ravages which he had committed on that coast. All these, added to the general indignation which Francis's unprecedented union with the Turks excited in Europe, made such an impression on the diet as the emperor wished, and disposed most of

the members to grant him such effectual aid as he had demanded. The ambassadors whom Francis had sent to explain the motives of his conduct were not permitted to enter the bounds of the empire; and the apology which they published for their master, vindicating his alliance with Solyman by examples drawn from Scripture and the practice of Christian princes, was little regarded by men who were irritated already, or prejudiced against him to such a degree as to be incapable of allowing their proper weight to any arguments in his behalf.

Such being the favorable disposition of the Germans, Charles perceived that nothing could now obstruct his gaining all that he aimed at but the fears and jealousies of the Protestants, which he determined to quiet by granting everything that the utmost solicitude of these passions could desire for the security of their religion. With this view, he consented to a recess whereby all the rigorous edicts hitherto issued against the Protestants were suspended; a council, either general or national, to be assembled in Germany, was declared necessary in order to re-establish peace in the Church; until one of these should be held (which the emperor undertook to bring about as soon as possible), the free and public exercise of the Protestant religion was authorized; the imperial chamber was enjoined to give no molestation to the Protestants, and when the term for which the present judges in that court were elected should expire, persons duly qualified were then to be admitted as members, without any distinction on account of religion. In return for these extraordinary acts of indulgence,

the Protestants concurred with the other members of the diet in declaring war against Francis, in the name of the empire; in voting the emperor a body of twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse, to be maintained at the public expense for six months, to be employed against France; and at the same time the diet proposed a poll-tax, to be levied throughout all Germany on every person without exception, for the support of the war against the Turks.

Charles, while he gave the greatest attention to the minute and intricate detail of particulars necessary towards conducting the deliberations of a numerous and divided assembly to such a successful period, negotiated a separate peace with the king of Denmark, who, though he had hitherto performed nothing considerable in consequence of his alliance with Francis, had it in his power, however, to make a troublesome diversion in favor of that monarch.²⁴ At the same time, he did not neglect proper applications to the king of England, in order to rouse him to more vigorous efforts against their common enemy. Little, indeed, was wanting to accomplish this; for such events had happened in Scotland as inflamed Henry to the most violent pitch of resentment against Francis. Having concluded with the parliament of Scotland a treaty of marriage between his son and their young queen, by which he reckoned himself secure of effecting the union of the two kingdoms, which had been long desired, and often attempted without success by his predecessors, Mary of Guise, the

²⁴ Du Mont, Corps Diplom., tom. iv. p. ii. p. 274.

queen-mother, Cardinal Beaton, and other partisans of France, found means not only to break off the match, but to alienate the Scottish nation entirely from the friendship of England and to strengthen its ancient attachment to France. Henry, however, did not abandon an object of so much importance; and as the humbling of Francis, besides the pleasure of taking revenge upon an enemy who had disappointed a favorite measure, appeared the most effectual method of bringing the Scots to accept once more of the treaty which they had relinquished, he was so eager to accomplish this that he was ready to second whatever the emperor could propose to be attempted against the French king. The plan, accordingly, which they concerted was such, if it had been punctually executed, as must have ruined France in the first place, and would have augmented so prodigiously the emperor's power and territories as might in the end have proved fatal to the liberties of Europe. They agreed to invade France each with an army of twenty-five thousand men, and, without losing time in besieging the frontier towns, to advance directly towards the interior provinces and to join their forces near Paris.²⁵

Francis stood alone in opposition to all the enemies whom Charles was mustering against him. Solyman had been the only ally who did not desert him; but the assistance which he had received from him had rendered him so odious to all Christendom that he resolved rather to forego all the advantages

²⁵ Herbert, 245.—Mém. de Bellay, 448.

of his friendship than to become on that account the object of general detestation. For this reason he dismissed Barbarossa as soon as winter was over, who, after ravaging the coast of Naples and Tuscany, returned to Constantinople. As Francis could not hope to equal the forces of so many powers combined against him, he endeavored to supply that defect by despatch, which was more in his power, and to get the start of them in taking the field. Early in the spring the count d'Enguien invested Carignan, a town in Piedmont, which the marquis del Guasto, the imperial general, having surprised the former year, considered as of so much importance that he had fortified it at great expense. The count pushed the siege with such vigor that Guasto, fond of his own conquest, and seeing no other way of saving it from falling into the hands of the French, resolved to hazard a battle in order to relieve it. He began his march from Milan for this purpose, and, as he was at no pains to conceal his intention, it was soon known in the French camp. Enguien, a gallant and enterprising young man, wished passionately to try the fortune of a battle; his troops desired it with no less ardor; but the peremptory injunction of the king not to venture a general engagement, flowing from a prudent attention to the present situation of affairs, as well as from the remembrance of former disasters, restrained him from venturing upon it. Unwilling, however, to abandon Carignan when it was just ready to yield, and eager to distinguish his command by some memorable action, he despatched Monluc to court, in order to

lay before the king the advantages of fighting the enemy, and the hopes which he had of victory. The king referred the matter to his privy council; all the ministers declared, one after another, against fighting, and supported their sentiments by reasons extremely plausible. While they were delivering their opinions, Monluc, who was permitted to be present, discovered such visible and extravagant symptoms of impatience to speak, as well as such dissatisfaction with what he heard, that Francis, diverted with his appearance, called on him to declare what he could offer in reply to sentiments which seemed to be as just as they were general. Upon this, Monluc, a plain but spirited soldier, and of known courage, represented the good condition of the troops, their eagerness to meet the enemy in the field, their confidence in their officers, together with the everlasting infamy which the declining of a battle would bring on the French arms; and he urged his arguments with such a lively impetuosity and such a flow of military eloquence as gained over to his opinion not only the king, naturally fond of daring actions, but several of the council. Francis, catching the same enthusiasm which had animated his troops, suddenly started up, and, having lifted his hands to heaven and implored the divine protection, he then addressed himself to Monluc: "Go," says he, "return to Piedmont, and fight in the name of God."²⁶

No sooner was it known that the king had given Enguien leave to fight the imperialists than such

²⁶ Mémoires de Monluc.



THE BATTLE OF CERISOLLES

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General Sherman's Army



was the martial ardor of the gallant and high-spirited gentlemen of that age that the court was quite deserted, every person desirous of reputation or capable of service hurrying to Piedmont, in order to share, as volunteers, in the danger and glory of the action. Encouraged by the arrival of so many brave officers, Enguien immediately prepared for battle; nor did Guasto decline the combat. The number of cavalry was almost equal, but the imperial infantry exceeded the French by at least ten thousand men. They met near Cerisoles, in an open plain, which afforded to neither any advantage of ground, and both had full time to form their army in proper order. The shock was such as might have been expected between veteran troops, violent and obstinate. The French cavalry, rushing forward to the charge with their usual vivacity, bore down everything that opposed them; but, on the other hand, the steady and disciplined valor of the Spanish infantry having forced the body which they encountered to give way, victory remained in suspense, ready to declare for whichever general could make the best use of that critical moment. Guasto, engaged in that part of his army which was thrown into disorder, and afraid of falling into the hands of the French, whose vengeance he dreaded on account of the murder of Rincon and Fregoso, lost his presence of mind, and forgot to order a large body of reserve to advance; whereas Enguien, with admirable courage and equal conduct, supported, at the head of his gens d'armes, such of his battalions as began to yield; and at the same time he ordered

the Swiss in his service, who had been victorious wherever they fought, to fall upon the Spaniards. This motion proved decisive. All that followed was confusion and slaughter. The marquis del Guasto, wounded in the thigh, escaped only by the swiftness of his horse. The victory of the French was complete, ten thousand of the imperialists being slain, and a considerable number, with all their tents, baggage, and artillery taken. On the part of the conquerors, their joy was without alloy, a few only being killed and among these no officer of distinction.²⁷

This splendid action, beside the reputation with which it was attended, delivered France from an imminent danger, as it ruined the army with which Guasto had intended to invade the country between the Rhone and Saone, where there were neither fortified towns nor regular forces to oppose his progress. But it was not in Francis's power to pursue the victory with such vigor as to reap all the advantages which it might have yielded; for though the Milanese remained now almost defenceless, though the inhabitants, who had long murmured under the rigor of the imperial government, were ready to throw off the yoke, though Enguien, flushed with success, urged the king to seize this happy opportunity of recovering a country the acquisition of which had been long his favorite object, yet, as the emperor and king of England were preparing to break in upon the opposite frontier of France with numerous

²⁷ Mém. de Bellay, 429, etc.—Mém. de Monluc.—Jovii Hist., lib. xlv. p. 327, 6.

armies, it became necessary to sacrifice all thoughts of conquest to the public safety, and to recall twelve thousand of Enguien's best troops to be employed in defence of the kingdom. Enguien's subsequent operations were of consequence so languid and inconsiderable that the reduction of Carignan and some other towns in Piedmont was all that he gained by his great victory at Cerisoles.²⁸

The emperor, as usual, was late in taking the field, but he appeared, towards the beginning of June, at the head of an army more numerous and better appointed than any which he had hitherto led against France. It amounted almost to fifty thousand men; and, part of it having reduced Luxembourg and some other towns in the Netherlands before he himself joined it, he now marched with the whole towards the frontiers of Champagne. Charles, according to his agreement with the king of England, ought to have advanced directly towards Paris; and the dauphin, who commanded the only army to which Francis trusted for the security of his dominions in that quarter, was in no condition to oppose him. But the success with which the French had defended Provence in the year 1536 had taught them the most effectual method of distressing an invading enemy. Champagne, a country abounding more in vines than corn, was incapable of maintaining a great army; and before the emperor's approach, whatever could be of any use to his troops had been carried off or destroyed. This rendered it neces-

²⁸ Mém. de Bellay, 438, etc.

sary for him to be master of some places of strength, in order to secure the convoys on which alone he now perceived that he must depend for subsistence; and he found the frontier towns so ill provided for defence that he hoped it would not be a work either of much time or difficulty to reduce them. Accordingly, Ligny and Commercy, which he first attacked, surrendered after a short resistance. He then invested St. Disier, which, though it commanded an important pass on the Marne, was destitute of everything necessary for sustaining a siege. But the count de Sancerre and M. de la Lande, who had acquired such reputation by the defence of Landrecy, generously threw themselves into the town and undertook to hold it out to the last extremity. The emperor soon found how capable they were of making good their promise, and that he could not expect to take the town without besieging it in form. This, accordingly, he undertook; and, as it was his nature never to abandon any enterprise in which he had once engaged, he persisted in it with an inconsiderate obstinacy.

The king of England's preparations for the campaign were complete long before the emperor's; but, as he did not choose, on the one hand, to encounter alone the whole power of France, and was unwilling, on the other, that his troops should remain inactive, he took that opportunity of chastising the Scots, by sending his fleet, together with a considerable part of his infantry, under the earl of Hertford, to invade their country. Hertford executed his commission with vigor, plundered and

burned Edinburg and Leith, laid waste the adjacent country, and re-embarked his men with such despatch that they joined their sovereign soon after his landing in France.²⁹ When Henry arrived in that kingdom, he found the emperor engaged in the siege of St. Disier; an ambassador, however, whom he sent to congratulate the English monarch on his safe arrival on the continent, solicited him to march, in terms of the treaty, directly to Paris. But Charles had set his ally such an ill example of fulfilling the conditions of their confederacy with exactness, that Henry, observing him employ his time and forces in taking towns for his own behoof, saw no reason why he should not attempt the reduction of some places that lay conveniently for himself. Without paying any regard to the emperor's remonstrances, he immediately invested Boulogne, and commanded the duke of Norfolk to press the siege of Montreuil, which had been begun before his arrival, by a body of Flemings, in conjunction with some English troops. While Charles and Henry showed such attention each to his own interest, they both neglected the common cause. Instead of the union and confidence requisite towards conducting the great plan that they had formed, they early discovered a mutual jealousy of each other, which by degrees begot distrust and ended in open hatred.³⁰

By this time Francis had, with unwearied industry, drawn together an army capable, as well

²⁹ History of Scotland, vol. i. p. 90.

³⁰ Herbert.

from the number as from the valor of the troops, of making head against the enemy. But the dauphin, who still acted as general, prudently declining a battle, the loss of which would have endangered the kingdom, satisfied himself with harassing the emperor with his light troops, cutting off his convoys, and laying waste the country around him. Though extremely distressed by these operations, Charles still pressed the siege of St. Disier, which Sancerre defended with astonishing fortitude and conduct. He stood repeated assaults, repulsing the enemy in them all; and, undismayed even by the death of his brave associate De la Lande, who was killed by a cannon-ball, he continued to show the same bold countenance and obstinate resolution. At the end of five weeks he was still in a condition to hold out some time longer, when an artifice of Granvelle's induced him to surrender. That crafty politician, having intercepted the key to the cipher which the duke of Guise used in communicating intelligence to Sancerre, forged a letter in his name, authorizing Sancerre to capitulate, as the king, though highly satisfied with his behavior, thought it imprudent to hazard a battle for his relief. This letter he conveyed into the town in a manner which could raise no suspicion, and the governor fell into the snare. Even then he obtained such honorable conditions as his gallant defence merited, and, among others, a cessation of hostilities for eight days, at the expiration of which he bound himself to open the gates if Francis during that time did not attack the imperial army and throw fresh troops into the

town.³¹ Thus Sancerre, by detaining the emperor so long before an inconsiderable place, afforded his sovereign full time to assemble all his forces, and, what rarely falls to the lot of an officer in such an inferior command, acquired the glory of having saved his country.

As soon as St. Disier surrendered, the emperor advanced into the heart of Champagne; but Sancerre's obstinate resistance had damped his sanguine hopes of penetrating to Paris, and led him seriously to reflect on what he might expect before towns of greater strength and defended by more numerous garrisons. At the same time, the procuring subsistence for his army was attended with great difficulty, which increased in proportion as he withdrew farther from his own frontier. He had lost a great number of his best troops in the siege of St. Disier, and many fell daily in skirmishes, which it was not in his power to avoid, though they wasted his army insensibly, without leading to any decisive action. The season advanced apace, and he had not yet the command either of a sufficient extent of territory or of any such considerable town as rendered it safe to winter in the enemy's country. Great arrears too were now due to his soldiers, who were upon the point of mutinying for their pay, while he knew not from what funds to satisfy them. All these considerations induced him to listen to the overtures of peace which a Spanish Dominican, the confessor of his sister the queen of France, had secretly made to his confessor, a monk of the same order. In conse-

³¹ Brantôme, tom. vi. 489.

quence of this, plenipotentiaries were named on both sides, and began their conferences in Chaussé, a small village near Châlons. At the same time, Charles, either from a desire of making one great final effort against France, or merely to gain a pretext for deserting his ally and concluding a separate peace, sent an ambassador formally to require Henry, according to the stipulation in their treaty, to advance towards Paris. While he expected a return from him, and waited the issue of the conferences at Chaussé, he continued to march forward, though in the utmost distress from scarcity of provisions. But at last, by a fortunate motion on his part, or through some neglect or treachery on that of the French, he surprised first Esperney, and then Château-Thierry, in both which were considerable magazines. No sooner was it known that these towns, the latter of which is not two days' march from Paris, were in the hands of the enemy, than that great capital, defenceless, and susceptible of any violent alarm in proportion to its greatness, was filled with consternation. The inhabitants, as if the emperor had been already at their gates, fled in the wildest confusion and despair, many sending their wives and children down the Seine to Rouen, others to Orleans and the towns upon the Loire. Francis himself, more afflicted with this than with any other event during his reign, and sensible as well of the triumph that his rival would enjoy in insulting his capital as of the danger to which the kingdom was exposed, could not refrain from crying out, in the first emotion of his surprise and sorrow, "How

dear, O my God, do I pay for this crown, which I thought thou hadst granted me freely!"³² but, recovering in a moment from this sudden sally of peevishness and impatience, he devoutly added, "Thy will, however, be done," and proceeded to issue the necessary orders for opposing the enemy, with his usual activity and presence of mind. The dauphin detached eight thousand men to Paris, which revived the courage of the affrighted citizens; he threw a strong garrison into Meaux, and by a forced march got into Ferté, between the imperialists and the capital.

Upon this, the emperor, who began again to feel the want of provisions, perceiving that the dauphin still prudently declined a battle, and not daring to attack his camp with forces so much shattered and reduced by hard service, turned suddenly to the right and began to fall back towards Soissons. Having about this time received Henry's answer, whereby he refused to abandon the sieges of Boulogne and Montreuil, of both which he expected every moment to get possession, he thought himself absolved from all obligations of adhering to the treaty with him, and at full liberty to consult his own interest in what manner soever he pleased. He consented, therefore, to renew the conference which the surprise of Esperney had broken off. To conclude a peace between two princes, one of whom greatly desired and the other greatly needed it, did not require a long negotiation. It was signed at Crespy, a small town near Meaux, on the 18th of September. The chief articles of it

³² Brantôme, tom. vi. 381.

were, that all the conquests which either party had made since the truce of Nice shall be restored; that the emperor shall give in marriage to the duke of Orleans either his own eldest daughter, or the second daughter of his brother Ferdinand; that if he chose to bestow on him his own daughter, he shall settle on her all the provinces of the Low Countries, to be erected into an independent state, which shall descend to the male issue of the marriage; that if he determined to give him his niece, he shall, with her, grant him the investiture of Milan and its dependencies; that he shall within four months declare which of these two princesses he had pitched upon, and fulfil the respective conditions upon the consummation of the marriage, which shall take place within a year from the date of the treaty; that as soon as the duke of Orleans is put in possession either of the Low Countries or of Milan, Francis shall restore to the duke of Savoy all that he now possesses of his territories, except Pignerol and Montmilan; that Francis shall renounce all pretensions to the kingdom of Naples or to the sovereignty of Flanders and Artois, and Charles shall give up his claim to the duchy of Burgundy and county of Charolois; that Francis shall give no aid to the exiled king of Navarre; that both monarchs shall join in making war upon the Turk, towards which the king shall furnish, when required by the emperor and empire, six hundred men-at-arms and ten thousand foot.³³

Besides the immediate motives to this peace,

³³ Recueil des Traités, tom. i. 227.—Belius de Causis Pacis Crepiac in Actis Erudit., Lips., 1763.

arising from the distress of his army through want of provisions, from the difficulty of retreating out of France, and the impossibility of securing winter quarters there, the emperor was influenced by other considerations, more distant, indeed, but not less weighty. The pope was offended to a great degree, as well at his concessions to the Protestants in the late diet as at his consenting to call a council and to admit of public disputations in Germany with a view of determining the doctrines in controversy. Paul, considering both these steps as sacrilegious encroachments on the jurisdiction as well as privileges of the holy see, had addressed to the emperor a remonstrance rather than a letter on this subject, written with such acrimony of language and in a style of such high authority as discovered more of an intention to draw on a quarrel than of a desire to reclaim him. This ill humor was not a little inflamed by the emperor's league with Henry of England, which, being contracted with a heretic excommunicated by the apostolic see, appeared to the pope a profane alliance, and was not less dreaded by him than that of Francis with Solyman. Paul's son and grandson, highly incensed at the emperor for having refused to gratify them with regard to the alienation of Parma and Placentia, contributed by their suggestions to sour and disgust him still more. To all which was added the powerful operation of the flattery and promises which Francis incessantly employed to gain him. Though, from his desire of maintaining a neutrality, the pope had hitherto suppressed his own resentment, had eluded the

artifices of his own family, and resisted the solicitations of the French king, it was not safe to rely much on the steadiness of a man whom his passions, his friends, and his interest combined to shake. The union of the pope with Francis, Charles well knew, would instantly expose his dominions in Italy to be attacked. The Venetians, he foresaw, would probably follow the example of a pontiff who was considered as a model of political wisdom among the Italians; and thus, at a juncture when he felt himself hardly equal to the burden of the present war, he would be overwhelmed with the weight of a new confederacy against him.³⁴ At the same time the Turks, almost unresisted, made such progress in Hungary, reducing town after town, that they approached near to the confines of the Austrian provinces.³⁵ Above all these, the extraordinary progress of the Protestant doctrines in Germany, and the dangerous combination into which the princes of that profession had entered, called for his immediate attention. Almost one-half of Germany had revolted from the established Church; the fidelity of the rest was much shaken; the nobility of Austria had demanded of Ferdinand the free exercise of religion;³⁶ the Bohemians, among whom some seeds of the doctrines of Huss still remained, openly favored the new opinions; the archbishop of Cologne, with a zeal which is seldom found among ecclesiastics, had begun the reformation of

³⁴ F. Paul, 100.—Pallavic., 163.

³⁵ Istuanhaffii Hist. Hung., 177.

³⁶ Sleid., 285.

his diocese; nor was it possible, unless some timely and effectual check were given to the spirit of innovation, to foresee where it would end. He himself had been a witness, in the late diet, to the peremptory and decisive tone which the Protestants had now assumed. He had seen how, from confidence in their number and union, they had forgotten the humble style of their first petitions, and had grown to such boldness as openly to despise the pope, and to show no great reverence for the imperial dignity itself. If, therefore, he wished to maintain either the ancient religion or his own authority, and would not choose to dwindle into a mere nominal head of the empire, some vigorous and speedy effort was requisite on his part, which could not be made during a war that required the greatest exertion of his strength against a foreign and powerful enemy.

Such being the emperor's inducements to peace, he had the address to frame the treaty of Crespy so as to promote all the ends which he had in view. By coming to an agreement with Francis, he took from the pope all prospects of advantage in courting the friendship of that monarch in preference to his. By the proviso with regard to a war with the Turks, he not only deprived Solyman of a powerful ally, but turned the arms of that ally against him. By a private article, not inserted in the treaty, that it might not raise any unseasonable alarm, he agreed with Francis that both should exert all their influence and power in order to procure a general council, to assert its authority, and to exterminate the Protestant heresy out of their

dominions. This cut off all chance of assistance which the confederates of Smalkalde might expect from the French king;³⁷ and, lest their solicitations or his jealousy of an ancient rival should hereafter tempt Francis to forget this engagement, he left him embarrassed with a war against England, which would put it out of his power to take any considerable part in the affairs of Germany.

Henry, possessed at all times with a high idea of his own power and importance, felt in the most sensible manner the neglect with which the emperor had treated him in concluding a separate peace. But the situation of his affairs was such as somewhat alleviated the mortification which this occasioned; for though he was obliged to recall the duke of Norfolk from the siege of Montreuil, because the Flemish troops received orders to retire, Boulogne had surrendered before the negotiations at Crespy were brought to an issue. While elated with vanity on account of this conquest, and inflamed with indignation against the emperor, the ambassadors whom Francis sent to make overtures of peace found him too arrogant to grant what was moderate or equitable. His demands were indeed extravagant and made in the tone of a conqueror: that Francis should renounce his alliance with Scotland, and not only pay up the arrears of former debts, but reimburse the money which Henry had expended in the present war. Francis, though sincerely desirous of peace and willing to yield a great deal in order to attain it, being

³⁷ Seck., lib. iii. 496.

now free from the pressure of the imperial arms, rejected these ignominious propositions with disdain; and, Henry departing for England, hostilities continued between the two nations.³⁸

The treaty of peace, how acceptable soever to the people of France, whom it delivered from the dread of an enemy who had penetrated into the heart of the kingdom, was loudly complained of by the dauphin. He considered it as a manifest proof of the king his father's extraordinary partiality towards his younger brother, now duke of Orleans, and complained that from his eagerness to gain an establishment for a favorite son he had sacrificed the honor of the kingdom and renounced the most ancient as well as valuable rights of the crown. But, as he durst not venture to offend the king by refusing to ratify it, though extremely desirous at the same time of securing to himself the privileges of reclaiming what was now alienated so much to his detriment, he secretly protested, in presence of some of his adherents, against the whole transaction, and declared whatever he should be obliged to do in order to confirm it null in itself and void of all obligation. The parliament of Thoulouse, probably by the instigation of his partisans, did the same.³⁹ But Francis—highly pleased as well with having delivered his subjects from the miseries of an invasion as with the prospect of acquiring an independent settlement for his son at no greater price than that of renouncing conquests to which he had no just

³⁸ Mém. de Ribier, tom. i. p. 572.—Herbert, 244.

³⁹ Recueil des Traités, tom. ii. 235, 238.

claim, titles which had brought so much expense and so many disasters upon the nation, and rights grown obsolete and of no value—ratified the treaty with great joy. Charles, within the time prescribed by the treaty, declared his intention of giving Ferdinand's daughter in marriage to the duke of Orleans, together with the duchy of Milan as her dowry.⁴⁰ Every circumstance seemed to promise the continuance of peace. The emperor, cruelly afflicted with the gout, appeared to be in no condition to undertake any enterprise where great activity was requisite or much fatigue to be endured. He himself felt this, or wished at least that it should be believed; and being so much disabled by this excruciating distemper, when a French ambassador followed him to Brussels in order to be present at his ratification of the treaty of peace, that it was with the utmost difficulty that he signed his name, he observed that there was no great danger of his violating these articles, as a hand that could hardly hold a pen was little able to brandish a lance.

The violence of his disease confined the emperor several months in Brussels, and was the apparent cause of putting off the execution of the great scheme which he had formed in order to humble the Protestant party in Germany. But there were other reasons for this delay; for, however prevalent the motives were which determined him to undertake this enterprise, the nature of that great body which he was about to attack, as well as the situation of his own affairs, made it necessary to

⁴⁰ *Recueil des Traités*, tom. ii. 238.

deliberate long, to proceed with caution, and not too suddenly to throw aside the veil under which he had hitherto concealed his real sentiments and schemes. He was sensible that the Protestants, conscious of their own strength, but under continual apprehensions of his designs, had all the boldness of a powerful confederacy, joined to the jealousy of a feeble faction, and were no less quick-sighted to discern the first appearance of danger than ready to take arms in order to repel it. At the same time, he still continued involved in a Turkish war; and though, in order to deliver himself from this encumbrance, he had determined to send an envoy to the Porte with most advantageous and even submissive overtures of peace, the resolutions of that haughty court were so uncertain that, before these were known, it would have been highly imprudent to have kindled the flames of civil war in his own dominions.

Upon this account, he appeared dissatisfied with a bull issued by the pope immediately after the peace of Crespy, summoning the council to assemble at Trent early next spring, and exhorting all Christian princes to embrace the opportunity that the present happy interval of tranquillity afforded them of suppressing those heresies which threatened to subvert whatever was sacred or venerable among Christians. But, after such a slight expression of dislike as was necessary in order to cover his designs, he determined to countenance the council, which might become no inconsiderable instrument towards accomplishing his projects, and therefore not only appointed ambassadors to

appear there in his name, but ordered the ecclesiastics in his dominions to attend at the time prefixed.⁴¹

Such were the emperor's views, when the imperial diet, after several prorogations, was opened at Worms. The Protestants, who enjoyed the free exercise of their religion by a very precarious tenure, having no other security for it than the recess of the last diet, which was to continue in force only until the meeting of a council, wished earnestly to establish that important privilege upon some firmer basis, and to hold it by a perpetual, not a temporary title. But, instead of offering them any additional security, Ferdinand opened the diet with observing that there were two points which chiefly required consideration,—the prosecution of the war against the Turks, and the state of religion; that the former was the most urgent, as Solyman, after conquering the greatest part of Hungary, was now ready to fall upon the Austrian provinces; that the emperor, who from the beginning of his reign had neglected no opportunity of annoying this formidable enemy, and with the hazard of his own person had resisted his attacks, being animated still with the same zeal, had now consented to stop short in the career of his success against France, that, in conjunction with his ancient rival, he might turn his arms with greater vigor against the common adversary of the Christian faith; that it became all the members of the empire to second those pious endeavors of its head; that therefore they ought without delay to

⁴¹ F. Paul, 104.

vote him such effectual aid as not only their duty but their interest called upon them to furnish; that the controversies about religion were so intricate, and of such difficult discussion, as to give no hope of its being possible to bring them at present to any final issue; that by perseverance and repeated solicitations the emperor had at length prevailed on the pope to call a council, for which they had so often wished and petitioned; that the time appointed for its meeting was now come, and both parties ought to wait for its decrees and submit to them as the decisions of the universal Church.

The popish members of the diet received this declaration with great applause, and signified their entire acquiescence in every particular which it contained. The Protestants expressed great surprise at propositions which were so manifestly repugnant to the recess of the former diet; they insisted that the questions with regard to religion, as first in dignity and importance, ought to come first under deliberation; that, alarming as the progress of the Turks was to all Germany, the securing the free exercise of their religion touched them still more nearly; nor could they prosecute a foreign war with spirit while solicitous and uncertain about their domestic tranquillity; that if the latter were once rendered firm and permanent they would concur with their countrymen in pushing the former, and yield to none of them in activity or zeal. But, if the danger from the Turkish arms were indeed so imminent as not to admit of such a delay as would be occasioned by an

immediate examination of the controverted points in religion, they required that a diet should be instantly appointed, to which the final settlement of their religious disputes should be referred; and that in the mean time the decree of the former diet concerning religion should be explained in a point which they deemed essential. By the recess of Spires it was provided that they should enjoy unmolested the public exercise of their religion until the meeting of a legal council; but, as the pope had now called a council, to which Ferdinand had required them to submit, they began to suspect that their adversaries might take advantage of an ambiguity in the terms of the recess, and, pretending that the event therein mentioned had now taken place, might pronounce them to be no longer entitled to the same indulgence. In order to guard against this interpretation, they renewed their former remonstrances against a council called to meet without the bounds of the empire, summoned by the pope's authority, and in which he assumed the right of presiding, and declared that, notwithstanding the convocation of any such illegal assembly, they still held the recess of the late diet to be in full force.

At other junctures, when the emperor thought it of advantage to soothe and gain the Protestants, he had devised expedients for giving them satisfaction with regard to demands seemingly more extravagant; but, his views at present being very different, Ferdinand, by his command, adhered inflexibly to his first propositions, and would make no concessions which had the most remote tendency

to throw discredit on the council or to weaken its authority. The Protestants, on their part, were no less inflexible; and, after much time spent in fruitless endeavors to convince each other, they came to no agreement. Nor did the presence of the emperor, who upon his recovery arrived at Worms, contribute in any degree to render the Protestants more compliant. Fully convinced that they were maintaining the cause of God and of truth, they showed themselves superior to the allurements of interest or the suggestions of fear; and in proportion as the emperor redoubled his solicitations or discovered his designs, their boldness seems to have increased. At last they openly declared that they would not even deign to vindicate their tenets in presence of a council assembled not to examine but to condemn them, and that they would pay no regard to an assembly held under the influence of a pope who had already precluded himself from all title to act as a judge by his having stigmatized their opinions by the name of heresy and denounced against them the heaviest censures which, in the plenitude of his usurped power, he could inflict.⁴²

While the Protestants with such union as well as firmness rejected all intercourse with the council, and refused their assent to the imperial demands in respect to the Turkish war, Maurice of Saxony alone showed an inclination to gratify the emperor with regard to both. Though he professed an inviolable regard for the Protestant religion, he assumed an appearance of moderation

⁴² Sleid., 343, etc.—Seck., iii. 543, etc.—Thuan., Hist., lib. ii. p. 56.

peculiar to himself, by which he confirmed the favorable sentiments which the emperor already entertained of him, and gradually paved the way for executing the ambitious designs which always occupied his active and enterprising mind.⁴³ His example, however, had little influence upon such as agreed with him in their religious opinions; and Charles perceived that he could not hope either to procure present aid from the Protestants against the Turks, or to quiet their fears and jealousies on account of their religion. But, as his schemes were not yet ripe for execution, nor his preparations so far advanced that he could force the compliance of the Protestants or punish their obstinacy, he artfully concealed his own intentions. That he might augment their security, he appointed a diet to be held at Ratisbon early next year, in order to adjust what was now left undetermined; and previous to it he agreed that a certain number of divines of each party should meet, in order to confer upon the points in dispute.⁴⁴

But, how far soever this appearance of a desire to maintain the present tranquillity might have imposed upon the Protestants, the emperor was incapable of such uniform and thorough dissimulation as to hide altogether from their view the dangerous designs which he was meditating against them. Herman, Count de Wied, archbishop and elector of Cologne, a prelate conspicuous for his virtue and primitive simplicity of manners, though not more distinguished for learning than the other descendants of noble families

⁴³ Seck., iii. 571.

⁴⁴ Sleid., 351.

who in that age possessed most of the great benefices in Germany, having become a proselyte to the doctrines of the Reformers, had begun, in the year 1543, with the assistance of Melancthon and Bucer, to abolish the ancient superstition in his diocese, and to introduce in its place the rites established among the Protestants. But the canons of his cathedral, who were not possessed with the same spirit of innovation, and who foresaw how fatal the levelling genius of the new sect would prove to their dignity and wealth, opposed, from the beginning, this unprecedented enterprise of their archbishop, with all the zeal flowing from reverence for old institutions, heightened by concern for their own interest. This opposition, which the archbishop considered only as a new argument to demonstrate the necessity of a reformation, neither shook his resolution nor slackened his ardor in prosecuting his plan. The canons, perceiving all their endeavors to check his career to be ineffectual, solemnly protested against his proceedings, and appealed for redress to the pope and emperor, the former as his ecclesiastical, the latter as his civil superior. This appeal being laid before the emperor during his residence in Worms, he took the canons of Cologne under his immediate protection, enjoined them to proceed with rigor against all who revolted from the established Church, prohibited the archbishop to make any innovation in his diocese, and summoned him to appear at Brussels within thirty days, to answer the accusations which should be preferred against him.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Sleid., 310, 340, 351.—Seck., iii. 443, 553.

To this clear evidence of his hostile intentions against the Protestant party, Charles added other proofs still more explicit. In his hereditary dominions of the Low Countries he persecuted all who were suspected of Lutheranism with unrelenting rigor. As soon as he arrived at Worms, he silenced the Protestant preachers in that city. He allowed an Italian monk to inveigh against the Lutherans from the pulpit of his chapel, and to call upon him, as he regarded the favor of God, to exterminate that pestilent heresy. He despatched the embassy which has been already mentioned to Constantinople with overtures of peace, that he might be free from any apprehensions of danger or interruption from that quarter. Nor did any of these steps, or their dangerous tendency, escape the jealous observation of the Protestants, or fail to alarm their fears and to excite their solicitude for the safety of their sect.

Meanwhile, Charles's good fortune, which predominated on all occasions over that of his rival Francis, extricated him out of a difficulty from which, with all his sagacity and address, he would have found it no easy matter to have disentangled himself. Just about the time when the duke of Orleans should have received Ferdinand's daughter in marriage, and together with her the possession of the Milanese, he died of a malignant fever. By this event the emperor was freed from the necessity of giving up a valuable province into the hands of an enemy, or from the indecency of violating a recent and solemn engagement, which must have occasioned an immediate rupture with

France. He affected, however, to express great sorrow for the untimely death of a young prince who was to have been so nearly allied to him; but he carefully avoided entering into any fresh discussions concerning the Milanese, and would not listen to a proposal which came from Francis of new-modelling the treaty of Crespy, so as to make him some reparation for the advantages which he had lost by the demise of his son. In the more active and vigorous part of Francis's reign, a declaration of war would have been the certain and instantaneous consequence of such a flat refusal to comply with a demand seemingly so equitable; but the declining state of his own health, the exhausted condition of his kingdom, together with the burden of the war against England, obliged him at present to dissemble his resentment and to put off thoughts of revenge to some other juncture. In consequence of this event, the unfortunate duke of Savoy lost all hope of obtaining the restitution of his territories; and the rights or claims relinquished by the treaty of Crespy returned in full force to the crown of France, to serve as pretexts for future wars.⁴⁶

Upon the first intelligence of the duke of Orleans's death, the confederates of Smalkalde flattered themselves that the essential alterations which appeared to be unavoidable consequences of it could hardly fail of producing a rupture, which would prove the means of their safety. But they were not more disappointed with regard to this than in their expectations from an event which

⁴⁶ Belcarii Comment., 769.—Paruta, Hist. Venet., iv. 177.

seemed to be the certain prelude of a quarrel between the emperor and the pope. When Paul, whose passion for aggrandizing his family increased as he advanced in years and as he saw the dignity and power which they derived immediately from him becoming more precarious, found that he could not bring Charles to approve of his ambitious schemes, he ventured to grant his son Peter Lewis the investiture of Parma and Placentia, though at the risk of incurring the displeasure of the emperor. At a time when a great part of Europe inveighed openly against the corrupt manners and exorbitant power of ecclesiastics, and when a council was summoned to reform the disorders in the Church, this indecent grant of such a principality to a son of whose illegitimate birth the pope ought to have been ashamed, and whose licentious morals all good men detested, gave general offence. Some cardinals in the imperial interest remonstrated against such an unbecoming alienation of the patrimony of the Church; the Spanish ambassador would not be present at the solemnity of his infeoffment; and, upon pretext that these cities were part of the Milanese state, the emperor peremptorily refused to confirm the deed of investiture. But both the emperor and pope being intent upon one common object in Germany, they sacrificed their particular passions to that public cause, and suppressed the emotions of jealousy or resentment which were rising on this occasion, that they might jointly pursue what each deemed to be of greater importance.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Paruta, *Hist. Venet.*, iv. 178.—Pallavic., 180.

About this time the peace of Germany was disturbed by a violent but short irruption of Henry, duke of Brunswick. This prince, though still stripped of his dominions, which the emperor held in sequestration until his differences with the confederates of Smalkalde should be adjusted, possessed, however, so much credit in Germany that he undertook to raise for the French king a considerable body of troops to be employed in the war against England. The money stipulated for this purpose was duly advanced by Francis; the troops were levied; but Henry, instead of leading them towards France, suddenly entered his own dominions at their head, in hopes of recovering possession of them before any army could be assembled to oppose him. The confederates were not more surprised at this unexpected attack than the king of France was astonished at a mean, thievish fraud, so unbecoming the character of a prince. But the landgrave of Hesse, with incredible expedition, collected as many men as put a stop to the progress of Henry's undisciplined forces, and, being joined by his son-in-law Maurice, and by some troops belonging to the elector of Saxony, he gained such advantages over Henry, who was rash and bold in forming his schemes but feeble and undetermined in executing them, as obliged him to disband his army, and to surrender himself, together with his eldest son, prisoners at discretion. He was kept in close confinement, until a new reverse of affairs procured him liberty.⁴⁸

As this defeat of Henry's wild enterprise added

⁴⁸ Sleid., 352.—Seck., iii. 567.

new reputation to the arms of the Protestants, the establishment of the Protestant religion in the Palatinate brought a great accession of strength to their party. Frederic, who succeeded his brother Lewis in that electorate, had long been suspected of a secret propensity to the doctrines of the Reformers, which upon his accession to the principality he openly manifested. But, as he expected that something effectual towards a general and legal establishment of religion would be the fruit of so many diets, conferences, and negotiations, he did not at first attempt any public innovation in his dominions. Finding all these issue in nothing, he thought himself called at length to countenance by his authority the system which he approved of, and to gratify the wishes of his subjects, who by their intercourse with the Protestant states had almost universally imbibed their opinions. As the warmth and impetuosity which accompanied the spirit of reformation in its first efforts had somewhat abated, this change was made with great order and regularity; the ancient rites were abolished, and new forms introduced, without any acts of violence or symptoms of discontent. Though Frederic adopted the religious system of the Protestants, he imitated the example of Maurice, and did not accede to the league of Smalkalde.⁴⁹

A few weeks before this revolution in the Palatinate, the general council was opened, with the accustomed solemnities, at Trent. The eyes of the Catholic states were turned with much expectation towards an assembly which all had considered as

⁴⁹ Sleid., 356.—Seck., iii. 616.

capable of applying an effectual remedy for the disorders of the Church when they first broke out, though many were afraid that it was now too late to hope for great benefits from it, when the malady, by being suffered to increase during twenty-eight years, had become inveterate and grown to such extreme violence. The pope, by his last bull of convocation, had appointed the first meeting to be held in March. But his views and those of the emperor were so different that almost the whole year was spent in negotiations. Charles, who foresaw that the rigorous decrees of the council against the Protestants would soon drive them, in self-defence as well as from resentment, to some desperate extreme, labored to put off its meeting until his warlike preparations were so far advanced that he might be in a condition to second its decision by the force of his arms. The pope, who had early sent to Trent the legates who were to preside in his name, knowing to what contempt it would expose his authority and what suspicions it would beget of his intentions if the fathers of the council should remain in a state of inactivity when the Church was in such danger as to require their immediate and vigorous interposition, insisted either upon translating the council to some city in Italy, or upon suspending altogether its proceedings at that juncture, or upon authorizing it to begin its deliberations immediately. The emperor rejected the two former expedients, as equally offensive to the Germans of every denomination; but, finding it impossible to elude the latter, he proposed that the council should begin with re-

forming the disorders in the Church before it proceeded to examine or define articles of faith. This was the very thing which the court of Rome dreaded most, and which had prompted it to employ so many artifices in order to prevent the meeting of such a dangerous judicatory. Paul, though more compliant than some of his predecessors with regard to calling a council, was no less jealous than they had been of its jurisdiction, and saw what matter of triumph such a method of proceeding would afford the heretics. He apprehended consequences not only humbling but fatal to the papal see if the council came to consider an inquest into abuses as their only business, or if inferior prelates were allowed to gratify their own envy and peevishness by prescribing rules to those who were exalted above them in dignity and power. Without listening, therefore, to this insidious proposal of the emperor, he instructed his legates to open the council.

The first session was spent in matters of form. In a subsequent one it was agreed that the framing a confession of faith, wherein should be contained all the articles which the Church required its members to believe, ought to be the first and principal business of the council, but that at the same time due attention should be given to what was necessary towards the reformation of manners and discipline. From this first symptom of the spirit with which the council was animated, from the high tone of authority which the legates who presided in it assumed, and from the implicit deference with which most of the members followed their

directions, the Protestants conjectured with ease what decisions they might expect. It astonished them, however, to see forty prelates (for no greater number was yet assembled) assume authority as representatives of the universal Church and proceed to determine the most important points of doctrine in its name. Sensible of this indecency, as well as of the ridicule with which it might be attended, the council advanced slowly in its deliberations, and all its proceedings were for some time languishing and feeble.⁵⁰ As soon as the confederates of Smalkalde received information of the opening of the council, they published a long manifesto, containing a renewal of their protest against its meeting, together with the reasons which induced them to decline its jurisdiction.⁵¹ The pope and emperor, on their part, were so little solicitous to quicken or add vigor to its operations, as plainly discovered that some object of greater importance occupied and interested them.

The Protestants were not inattentive or unconcerned spectators of the motions of the sovereign pontiff and of Charles, and they entertained every day more violent suspicions of their intentions, in consequence of intelligence received from different quarters of the machinations carrying on against them. The king of England informed them that the emperor, having long resolved to exterminate their opinions, would not fail to employ this interval of tranquillity which he now

⁵⁰ F. Paul, 120, etc.—Pallavic., 180.

⁵¹ Seck., iii. 602, etc.

enjoyed as the most favorable juncture for carrying his design into execution. The merchants of Augsburg, which was at that time a city of extensive trade, received advice by means of their correspondents in Italy, among whom were some who secretly favored the Protestant cause,⁵² that a dangerous confederacy against it was forming between the pope and emperor. In confirmation of this, they heard from the Low Countries that Charles had issued orders, though with every precaution which could keep the measure concealed, for raising troops both there and in other parts of his dominions. Such a variety of information, corroborating all that their own jealousy or observation led them to apprehend, left the Protestants little reason to doubt of the emperor's hostile intentions. Under this impression, the deputies of the confederates of Smalkalde assembled at Frankfort, and, by communicating their intelligence and sentiments to each other, reciprocally heightened their sense of the impending danger. But their union was not such as their situation required, or the preparations of their enemies rendered necessary. Their league had now subsisted ten years. Among so many members, whose territories were intermingled with each other, and who, according to the customs of Germany, had created an infinite variety of mutual rights and claims by intermarriages, alliances, and contracts of different kinds, subjects of jealousy and discord had unavoidably arisen. Some of the confederates, being connected with the duke of Brunswick, were

⁵² Seck., iii. 579.

highly disgusted with the landgrave on account of the rigor with which he had treated that rash and unfortunate prince. Others taxed the elector of Saxony and landgrave, the heads of the league, with having involved the members in unnecessary and exorbitant expenses by their profuseness or want of economy. The views, likewise, and temper of those two princes, who by their superior power and authority influenced and directed the whole body, being extremely different, rendered all its motions languid, at a time when the utmost vigor and despatch were requisite. The landgrave, of a violent and enterprising temper, but not forgetful, amidst his zeal for religion, of the usual maxims of human policy, insisted that, as the danger which threatened them was manifest and unavoidable, they should have recourse to the most effectual expedient for securing their own safety, by courting the protection of the kings of France and England, or by joining in alliance with the Protestant cantons of Switzerland, from whom they might expect such powerful and present assistance as their situation demanded. The elector, on the other hand, with the most upright intentions of any prince in that age, and with talents which might have qualified him abundantly for the administration of government in any tranquil period, was possessed with such superstitious veneration for all the parts of the Lutheran system, and such bigoted attachment to all its tenets, as made him averse to a union with those who differed from him in any article of faith, and rendered him very incapable of undertaking its

defence in times of difficulty and danger. He seemed to think that the concerns of religion were to be regulated by principles and maxims totally different from those which apply to the common affairs of life; and, being swayed too much by the opinions of Luther, who was not only a stranger to the rules of political conduct, but despised them, he often discovered an uncomplying spirit that proved of the greatest detriment to the cause which he wished to support. Influenced on this occasion by the severe and rigid notions of that Reformer, he refused to enter into any confederacy with Francis, because he was a persecutor of the truth, or to solicit the friendship of Henry, because he was no less impious and profane than the pope himself, or even to join in alliance with the Swiss, because they differed from the Germans in several essential articles of faith. This dissension about a point of such consequence produced its natural effects. Each secretly censured and reproached the other. The landgrave considered the elector as fettered by narrow prejudices unworthy of a prince called to act a chief part in a scene of such importance. The elector suspected the landgrave of loose principles and ambitious views which corresponded ill with the sacred cause wherein they were engaged. But, though the elector's scruples prevented their timely application for foreign aid, and the jealousy or discontent of the other princes defeated a proposal for renewing their original confederacy, the term during which it was to continue in force being on the point of expiring, yet the sense of their common

danger induced them to agree with regard to other points, particularly that they would never acknowledge the assembly of Trent as a lawful council, nor suffer the archbishop of Cologne to be oppressed on account of the steps which he had taken towards the reformation of his diocese.⁵³

The landgrave, about this time, desirous of penetrating to the bottom of the emperor's intentions, wrote to Granvelle, whom he knew to be thoroughly acquainted with all his master's schemes, informing him of the several particulars which raised the suspicions of the Protestants, and begged an explicit declaration of what they had to fear or to hope. Granvelle, in return, assured them that the intelligence which they had received of the emperor's military preparations was exaggerated, and all their suspicions destitute of foundation; that though, in order to guard his frontiers against any insult of the French or English, he had commanded a small body of men to be raised in the Low Countries, he was as solicitous as ever to maintain tranquillity in Germany.⁵⁴

But the emperor's actions did not correspond with these professions of his minister. For, instead of appointing men of known moderation and a pacific temper to appear in defence of the Catholic doctrines at the conference which had been agreed on, he made choice of fierce bigots, attached to their own system with a blind obstinacy that rendered all hope of a reconciliation desperate. Malvenda, a Spanish divine, who took upon

⁵³ Seck., iii. 566, 570, 613.—Sleid., 355.

⁵⁴ Sleid., 356.

him the conduct of the debate on the part of the Catholics, managed it with all the subtle dexterity of a scholastic metaphysician, more studious to perplex his adversaries than to convince them, and intent on palliating error than on discovering truth. The Protestants, filled with indignation as well at his sophistry as at some regulations which the emperor endeavored to impose on the disputants, broke off the conference abruptly, being now fully convinced that in all his late measures the emperor could have no other view than to amuse them, and to gain time for ripening his own schemes.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Sleid., 358.—Seck., iii. 620,

BOOK VIII.

Death of Luther—Hostility of the Emperor towards the Protestants—His Alliances—Diet at Ratisbon—The Emperor's Treaty with the Pope—The Protestants prepare for Defence and seek for Aid—They lose by Inaction—Their first Operations—The Emperor declines Battle—Maurice of Saxony, his Treachery—Separation of the Confederate Army—Rigorous Conduct of the Emperor to those who yielded—Contest between Maurice of Saxony and the Elector—The Pope recalls his Troops—Conspiracy in Genoa—Fiesco, Count of Lavagna

WHILE appearances of danger daily increased, and the tempest which had been so long a gathering was ready to break forth in all its violence against the Protestant Church, Luther was saved, by a seasonable death, from feeling or beholding its destructive rage. Having gone, though in a declining state of health and during a rigorous season, to his native city of Eisleben, in order to compose by his authority a dissension among the counts of Mansfield, he was seized with a violent inflammation in his stomach, which in a few days put an end to his life, in the sixty-third year of his age. As he was raised up by Providence to be the author of one of the greatest and most interesting revolutions recorded in history, there is not any person, perhaps, whose character has been drawn with such opposite colors. In his own age, one party, struck with horror and inflamed with rage when they saw with what a daring hand he overturned everything which they held to be sacred or valued as beneficial, imputed

to him not only all the defects and vices of a man, but the qualities of a demon. The other, warmed with the admiration and gratitude which they thought he merited as the restorer of light and liberty to the Christian Church, ascribed to him perfections above the condition of humanity, and viewed all his actions with a veneration bordering on that which should be paid only to those who are guided by the immediate inspiration of Heaven. It is his own conduct, not the undistinguishing censure or the exaggerated praise of his contemporaries, that ought to regulate the opinions of the present age concerning him. Zeal for what he regarded as truth, undaunted intrepidity to maintain his own system, abilities, both natural and acquired, to defend his principles, and unwearied industry in propagating them, are virtues which shine so conspicuously in every part of his behavior that even his enemies must allow him to have possessed them in an eminent degree. To these may be added, with equal justice, such purity and even austerity of manners as became one who assumed the character of a reformer, such sanctity of life as suited the doctrine which he delivered, and such perfect disinterestedness as affords no slight presumption of his sincerity. Superior to all selfish considerations, a stranger to the elegancies of life, and despising its pleasures, he left the honors and emoluments of the Church to his disciples, remaining satisfied himself in his original state of professor in the university and pastor of the town of Wittemberg, with the moderate appointments annexed to these offices. His extraor-

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dinary qualities were alloyed with no inconsiderable mixture of human frailty and human passions. These, however, were of such a nature that they cannot be imputed to malevolence or corruption of heart, but seem to have taken their rise from the same source with many of his virtues. His mind, forcible and vehement in all its operations, roused by great objects or agitated by violent passions, broke out, on many occasions, with an impetuosity which astonishes men of feebler spirits or such as are placed in a more tranquil situation. By carrying some praiseworthy dispositions to excess, he bordered sometimes on what was culpable, and was often betrayed into actions which exposed him to censure. His confidence that his own opinions were well founded approached to arrogance; his courage in asserting them, to rashness; his firmness in adhering to them, to obstinacy; and his zeal in confuting his adversaries, to rage and scurrility. Accustomed himself to consider every thing as subordinate to truth, he expected the same deference for it from other men; and, without making any allowances for their timidity or prejudices, he poured forth against such as disappointed him in this particular a torrent of invective mingled with contempt. Regardless of any distinction of rank or character when his doctrines were attacked, he chastised all his adversaries indiscriminately with the same rough hand: neither the royal dignity of Henry VIII. nor the eminent learning and abilities of Erasmus screened them from the same gross abuse with which he treated Tetzels or Eckius.

But these indecencies of which Luther was guilty must not be imputed wholly to the violence of his temper: they ought to be charged in part on the manners of the age. Among a rude people, unacquainted with those maxims which, by putting continual restraint on the passions of individuals, have polished society and rendered it agreeable, disputes of every kind were managed with heat, and strong emotions were uttered in their natural language, without reserve or delicacy. At the same time, the works of learned men were all composed in Latin, and they were not only authorized, by the example of eminent writers in that language, to use their antagonists with the most illiberal scurrility, but in a dead tongue indecencies of every kind appear less shocking than in a living language, whose idioms and phrases seem gross because they are familiar.

In passing judgment upon the characters of men, we ought to try them by the principles and maxims of their own age, not by those of another. For, although virtue and vice are at all times the same, manners and customs vary continually. Some parts of Luther's behavior which to us appear most culpable gave no disgust to his contemporaries. It was even by some of these qualities which we are now apt to blame that he was fitted for accomplishing the great work which he undertook. To rouse mankind when sunk in ignorance or superstition, and to encounter the rage of bigotry armed with power, required the utmost vehemence of zeal, as well as a temper daring to excess. A gentle call would neither have reached

nor have excited those to whom it was addressed. A spirit more amiable but less vigorous than Luther's would have shrunk back from the dangers which he braved and surmounted. Towards the close of Luther's life, though without any perceptible diminution of his zeal or abilities, the infirmities of his temper increased upon him, so that he grew daily more peevish, more irascible, and more impatient of contradiction. Having lived to be a witness of his own amazing success, to see a great part of Europe embrace his doctrines, and to shake the foundation of the papal throne, before which the mightiest monarchs had trembled, he discovered, on some occasions, symptoms of vanity and self-applause. He must have been, indeed, more than man, if, upon contemplating all that he actually accomplished, he had never felt any sentiment of this kind rising in his breast.¹

Some time before his death, he felt his strength declining, his constitution being worn out by a prodigious multiplicity of business, added to the labor of discharging his ministerial function with

¹ A remarkable instance of this, as well as of a certain singularity and elevation of sentiment, is found in his last will. Though the effects which he had to bequeath were very inconsiderable, he thought it necessary to make a testament, but scorned to frame it with the usual legal formalities: "Notus sum," says he, "in cœlo, in terra, et inferno: et auctoritatem ad hoc sufficientem habeo, ut mihi soli credatur, cum Deus mihi, homini licet damnabili, et miserabili peccatori, ex paterna misericordia Evangelium filii sui crediderit, dederitque ut in eo verax et fidelis fuerim, ita ut multi in mundo illud per me acceperint, et me pro doctore veritatis agnoverint, spreto banno papæ, cæsaris, regum, principum et sacerdotum, immo omnium dæmonum odio. Quidni, igitur, ad dispositionem hanc, in re exigua, sufficiat, si adsit manus meæ testimonium, et dici possit, Hæc scripsit, D. Martinus Luther, notarius Dei, et testis Evangelii eius." Seck., lib. iii. 651.

unremitting diligence, to the fatigue of constant study, besides the composition of works as voluminous as if he had enjoyed uninterrupted leisure and retirement. His natural intrepidity did not forsake him at the approach of death; his last conversation with his friends was concerning the happiness reserved for good men in a future life, of which he spoke with the fervor and delight natural to one who expected and wished to enter soon upon the enjoyment of it.² The account of his death filled the Roman Catholic party with excessive as well as indecent joy, and damped the spirits of all his followers,—neither party sufficiently considering that his doctrines were now so firmly rooted as to be in a condition to flourish independent of the hand which had first planted them. His funeral was celebrated, by order of the elector of Saxony, with extraordinary pomp. He left several children by his wife, Catherine à Boria, who survived him. Towards the end of the last century there were in Saxony some of his descendants in decent and honorable stations.³

The emperor meanwhile pursued the plan of dissimulation with which he had set out, employing every art to amuse the Protestants and to quiet their fears and jealousies. For this purpose he contrived to have an interview with the landgrave of Hesse, the most active of all the confederates and the most suspicious of his designs. To him he made such warm professions of his concern for the happiness of Germany and of his aversion to all

² Sleid., 362.—Seck., lib. iii. 632, etc.

³ Seck., lib. iii. 651.

violent measures, he denied in such express terms his having entered into any league or having begun any military preparations which should give any just cause of alarm to the Protestants, as seem to have dispelled all the landgrave's doubts and apprehensions and sent him away fully satisfied of his pacific intentions. This artifice was of great advantage, and effectually answered the purpose for which it was employed. The landgrave, upon his leaving Spire, where he had been admitted to this interview, went to Worms, where the Smalkaldic confederates were assembled, and gave them such a flattering representation of the emperor's favorable disposition towards them that they, who were too apt, as well from the temper of the German nation as from the genius of all great associations or bodies of men, to be slow and dilatory and undecisive in their deliberations, thought there was no necessity of taking any immediate measures against danger which appeared to be distant or imaginary.⁴

Such events, however, soon occurred as staggered the credit which the Protestants had given to the emperor's declarations. The Council of Trent, though still composed of a small number of Italian and Spanish prelates, without a single deputy from many of the kingdoms which it assumed a right of binding by its decrees, being ashamed of its long inactivity, proceeded now to settle articles of the greatest importance. Having begun with examining the first and chief point in controversy between the Church of Rome and the Reformers,

⁴ Sleid., Hist., 367, 373.

concerning the rule which should be held as supreme and decisive in matters of faith, the council, by its infallible authority, determined, "That the books to which the designation of *apocryphal* hath been given are of equal authority with those which were received by the Jews and primitive Christians into the sacred canon; that the traditions handed down from the Apostolic age and preserved in the Church are entitled to as much regard as the doctrines and precepts which the inspired authors have committed to writing; that the Latin translation of the Scriptures made or revised by St. Jerome, and known by the name of the *Vulgate* translation, should be read in churches and appealed to in the schools as authentic and canonical." Against all who disclaimed the truth of these tenets anathemas were denounced in the name and by the authority of the Holy Ghost. The decision of these points, which undermined the main foundation of the Lutheran system, was a plain warning to the Protestants what judgment they might expect when the council should have leisure to take into consideration the particular and subordinate articles of their creed.⁵

This discovery of the council's readiness to condemn the opinions of the Protestants was soon followed by a striking instance of the pope's resolution to punish such as embraced them. The appeal of the canons of Cologne against their archbishop having been carried to Rome, Paul eagerly seized on that opportunity both of displaying the extent of his own authority and of teaching the German

⁵ F. Paul, 141.—Pallav., 206.

ecclesiastics the danger of revolting from the established Church. As no person appeared in behalf of the archbishop, he was held to be convicted of the crime of heresy, and a papal bull was issued depriving him of his ecclesiastical dignity, inflicting on him the sentence of excommunication, and absolving his subjects from the oath of allegiance which they had taken to him as their civil superior. The countenance which he had given to the Lutheran heresy was the only crime imputed to him, as well as the only reason assigned to justify the extraordinary severity of this decree. The Protestants could hardly believe that Paul, how zealous soever he might be to defend the established system or to humble those who invaded it, would have ventured to proceed to such extremities against a prince and elector of the empire, without having previously secured such powerful protection as would render his censure something more than an impotent and despicable sally of resentment. They were, of course, deeply alarmed at this sentence against the archbishop, considering it as a sure indication of the malevolent intentions not only of the pope, but of the emperor, against the whole party.⁶

Upon this fresh revival of their fears with such violence as is natural to men roused from a false security and conscious of their having been deceived, Charles saw that now it became necessary to throw aside the mask and to declare openly what part he determined to act. By a long series of artifice and fallacy he had gained so much time

⁶ Sleid., 354.—F. Paul, 155.—Pallav., 224.

that his measures, though not altogether ripe for execution, were in great forwardness. The pope, by his proceedings against the elector of Cologne, as well as by the decree of the council, had precipitated matters into such a situation as rendered a breach between the emperor and the Protestants almost unavoidable. Charles had, therefore, no choice left him but either to take part with them in overturning what the see of Rome had determined, or to support the authority of the Church openly by force of arms. Nor did the pope think it enough to have brought the emperor under a necessity of acting: he pressed him to begin his operations immediately, and to carry them on with such vigor as could not fail of securing success. Transported by his zeal against heresy, Paul forgot all the prudent and cautious maxims of the papal see with regard to the danger of extending the imperial authority beyond due bounds; and in order to crush the Lutherans he was willing to contribute towards raising up a master that might one day prove formidable to himself as well as to the rest of Italy.

But, besides the certain expectation of assistance from the pope, Charles was now secure from any danger of interruption to his designs by the Turkish arms. His negotiations at the Porte, which he had carried on with great assiduity since the peace of Crespy, were on the point of being terminated in such a manner as he desired. Solyman, partly in compliance with the French king, who, in order to avoid the disagreeable obligation of joining the emperor against his ancient ally,

labored with great zeal to bring about an accommodation between them, and partly from its being necessary to turn his arms towards the East, where the Persians threatened to invade his dominions, consented without difficulty to a truce for five years. The chief article of it was, "That each should retain possession of what he now held in Hungary; and Ferdinand, as a sacrifice to the pride of the sultan, submitted to pay an annual tribute of fifty thousand crowns." ⁷

But it was upon the aid and concurrence of the Germans themselves that the emperor relied with the greatest confidence. The Germanic body, he knew, was of such vast strength as to be invincible if it were united, and that it was only by employing its own force that he could hope to subdue it. Happily for him, the union of the several members in this great system was so feeble, the whole frame was so loosely compacted, and its different parts tended so violently towards separation from each other, that it was almost impossible for it on any important emergence to join in a general or vigorous effort. In the present juncture the sources of discord were as many and as various as had been known on any occasion. The Roman Catholics, animated with zeal in defence of their religion proportional to the fierceness with which it had been attacked, were eager to second any attempt to humble those innovators who had overturned it in many provinces and endangered it in more. John and Albert of Brandenburg, as well

⁷ Istuanhaffii Hist. Hung., 180.—Mém. de Ribier, tom. i. 582.

as several other princes, incensed at the haughtiness and rigor with which the duke of Brunswick had been treated by the confederates of Smalkalde, were impatient to rescue him and to be revenged on them. Charles observed with satisfaction the working of those passions in their minds, and, counting on them as sure auxiliaries whenever he should think it proper to act, he found it, in the meantime, more necessary to moderate than to inflame their rage.

Such was the situation of affairs, such the discernment with which the emperor foresaw and provided for every event, when the diet of the empire met at Ratisbon. Many of the Roman Catholic members appeared there in person, but most of the confederates of Smalkalde, under pretence of being unable to bear the expense occasioned by the late unnecessary frequency of such assemblies, sent only deputies. Their jealousy of the emperor, together with an apprehension that violence might perhaps be employed in order to force their approbation of what he should propose in the diet, was the true cause of their absence. The speech with which the emperor opened the diet was extremely artful. After professing, in common form, his regard for the prosperity of the Germanic body, and declaring that, in order to bestow his whole attention upon the re-establishment of its order and tranquillity, he had at present abandoned all other cares, rejected the most pressing solicitations of his other subjects to reside among them, and postponed affairs of the greatest importance, he took notice, with some disapproba-

tion, that his disinterested example had not been imitated, many members of chief consideration having neglected to attend an assembly to which he had repaired with such manifest inconvenience to himself. He then mentioned their unhappy dissensions about religion, lamented the ill success of his past endeavors to compose them, complained of the abrupt dissolution of the late conference, and craved their advice with regard to the best and most effectual method of restoring union to the churches of Germany, together with that happy agreement in articles of faith, which their ancestors had found to be of no less advantage to their civil interest than becoming their Christian profession.

By this gracious and popular method of consulting the members of the diet rather than of obtruding upon them any opinion of his own, besides the appearance of great moderation and the merit of paying much respect to their judgment, the emperor dexterously avoided discovering his own sentiments, and reserved to himself, as his only part, that of carrying into execution what they should recommend. Nor was he less secure of such a decision as he wished to obtain by referring it wholly to themselves. The Roman Catholic members, prompted by their own zeal or prepared by his intrigues, joined immediately in representing that the authority of the council now met at Trent ought to be supreme in all matters of controversy; that all Christians should submit to its decrees as the infallible rule of their faith; and therefore they besought him to exert the power with which

he was invested by the Almighty, in protecting that assembly and in compelling the Protestants to acquiesce in its determinations. The Protestants, on the other hand, presented a memorial, in which, after repeating their objections to the council of Trent, they proposed, as the only effectual method of deciding the points in dispute, that either a free general council should be assembled in Germany, or a national council of the empire should be called, or a select number of divines should be appointed out of each party to examine and define articles of faith. They mentioned the recesses of several diets favorable to this proposition, and which had afforded them the prospect of terminating all their differences in this amicable manner; they now conjured the emperor not to depart from his former plan, and, by offering violence to their consciences, to bring calamities upon Germany the very thought of which must fill every lover of his country with horror. The emperor, receiving this paper with a contemptuous smile, paid no further regard to it. Having already taken his final resolution, and perceiving that nothing but force could compel them to acquiesce in it, he despatched the cardinal of Trent to Rome, in order to conclude an alliance with the pope, the terms of which were already agreed on; he commanded a body of troops, levied on purpose in the Low Countries, to advance towards Germany; he gave commissions to several officers for raising men in different parts of the empire; he warned John and Albert of Brandenburg that now was the proper time of exerting themselves in order

to rescue their ally, Henry of Brunswick, from captivity.⁸

All these things could not be transacted without the observation and knowledge of the Protestants. The secret was now in many hands; under whatever veil the emperor still affected to conceal his designs, his officers kept no such mysterious reserve; and his allies and subjects spoke out his intentions plainly. Alarmed with reports of this kind from every quarter, as well as with the preparations for war which they could not but observe, the deputies of the confederates demanded audience of the emperor, and, in the name of their masters, required to know whether these military preparations were carried on by his command, and for what end, and against what enemy. To a question put in such a tone, and at a time when facts were become too notorious to be denied, it was necessary to give an explicit answer. Charles owned the orders which he had issued, and, professing his purpose not to molest on account of religion those who should act as dutiful subjects, declared that he had nothing in view but to maintain the rights and prerogatives of the imperial dignity, and, by punishing some factious members, to preserve the ancient constitution of the empire from being impaired or dissolved by their irregular and licentious conduct. Though the emperor did not name the persons whom he charged with such high crimes and destined to be the objects of his vengeance, it was obvious that he had the elector of Saxony and landgrave of Hesse in view. Their

⁸ Sleid., 374.—Seck., iii. 658.

deputies, considering what he had said as a plain declaration of his hostile intentions, immediately retired from Ratisbon.⁹

The cardinal of Trent found it no difficult matter to treat with the pope, who, having at length brought the emperor to adopt that plan which he had long recommended, assented with eagerness to every article that he proposed. The league was signed a few days after the cardinal's arrival at Rome. The pernicious heresies which abounded in Germany, the obstinacy of the Protestants in rejecting the holy council assembled at Trent, and the necessity of maintaining sound doctrine, together with good order, in the Church, are mentioned as the motives of this union between the contracting parties. In order to check the growth of these evils, and to punish such as had impiously contributed to spread them, the emperor, having long and without success made trial of gentler remedies, engaged instantly to take the field with a sufficient army, that he might compel all who disowned the council or had apostatized from the religion of their forefathers to return to the bosom of the Church and submit with due obedience to the holy see. He likewise bound himself not to conclude a peace with them during six months without the pope's consent, nor without assigning him his share in any conquests which should be made upon them, and that even after this period he should not agree to any accommodation which might be detrimental to the Church or to the interest of religion. On his part, the pope stipulated

⁹ Sleid., 376.

to deposit a large sum in the Bank of Venice towards defraying the expense of the war; to maintain at his own charge, during the space of six months, twelve thousand foot and five hundred horse; to grant the emperor for one year half of the ecclesiastical revenues throughout Spain; to authorize him, by a bull, to alienate as much of the lands belonging to religious houses in that country as would amount to the sum of five hundred thousand crowns; and to employ not only spiritual censures, but military force, against any prince who should attempt to interrupt or defeat the execution of this treaty.¹⁰

Notwithstanding the explicit terms in which the extirpation of heresy was declared to be the object of the war which was to follow upon this treaty, Charles still endeavored to persuade the Germans that he had no design to abridge their religious liberty, but that he aimed only at vindicating his own authority and repressing the insolence of such as had encroached upon it. With this view, he wrote circular letters, in the same strain with his answer to the deputies at Ratisbon, to most of the free cities and to several of the princes who had embraced the Protestant doctrines. In these he complained loudly, but in general terms, of the contempt into which the imperial dignity had fallen, and of the presumptuous as well as disorderly behavior of some members of the empire. He declared that he now took arms not in a religious but in a civil quarrel; not to oppress any who continued to behave as quiet and dutiful sub-

¹⁰ Sleid., 381.—Pallav., 255.—Du Mont, Corps Diplom., 11.

jects, but to humble the arrogance of such as had thrown off all sense of that subordination in which they were placed under him as head of the Germanic body. Gross as this deception was, and manifest as it might have appeared to all who considered the emperor's conduct with attention, it became necessary for him to make trial of its effect; and such was the confidence and dexterity with which he employed it that he derived the most solid advantages from this artifice. If he had avowed at once an intention of overturning the Protestant Church and of reducing all Germany under its former state of subjection to the papal see, none of the cities or princes who had embraced the new opinions could have remained neutral after such a declaration, far less could they have ventured to assist the emperor in such an enterprise. Whereas by concealing, and even disclaiming, any intention of that kind, he not only saved himself from the danger of being overwhelmed by a general confederacy of all the Protestant states, but he furnished the timid with an excuse for continuing inactive, and the designing or interested with a pretext for joining him, without exposing themselves to the infamy of abandoning their own principles or taking part openly in suppressing them. At the same time, the emperor well knew that if by their assistance he were enabled to break the power of the elector of Saxony and the landgrave, he might afterwards prescribe what terms he pleased to the feeble remains of a party without union, and destitute of leaders, who would then regret, too late, their mistaken confidence in him

and their inconsiderable desertion of their associates.

The pope, by a sudden and unforeseen display of his zeal, had wellnigh disconcerted this plan, which the emperor had formed with so much care and art. Proud of having been the author of such a formidable league against the Lutheran heresy, and happy in thinking that the glory of extirpating it was reserved for his pontificate, he published the articles of his treaty with the emperor, in order to demonstrate the pious intention of their confederacy, as well as to display his own zeal, which prompted him to make such extraordinary efforts for maintaining the faith in its purity. Not satisfied with this, he soon after issued a bull containing most liberal promises of indulgence to all who should engage in this holy enterprise, together with warm exhortations to such as could not bear a part in it themselves to increase the fervor of their prayers and the severity of their mortifications, that they might draw down the blessing of Heaven upon those who undertook it.¹¹ Nor was it zeal alone which pushed the pope to make declarations so inconsistent with the account which the emperor himself gave of his motives for taking arms. He was much scandalized at Charles's dissimulation in such a cause, at his seeming to be ashamed of owning his zeal for the Church, and at his endeavors to make that pass for a political contest which he ought to have gloried in as a war that had no other object than the defence of religion. With as much solicitude, therefore, as the

¹¹ Du Mont, Corps Diplom.

emperor labored to disguise the purpose of the confederacy, did the pope endeavor to publish their real plan, in order that they might come at once to an open rupture with the Protestants, that all hopes of reconciliation might be cut off, and that Charles might be under fewer temptations and have it less in his power than at present to betray the interests of the Church by any accommodation beneficial to himself.¹²

The emperor, though not a little offended at the pope's indiscretion or malice in making this discovery, continued boldly to pursue his own plan, and to assert his intentions to be no other than what he had originally avowed. Several of the Protestant states whom he had previously gained thought themselves justified in some measure by his declaration for abandoning their associates, and even for giving assistance to him.

But these artifices did not impose on the greater and sounder part of the Protestant confederates. They clearly perceived it to be against the Reformed religion that the emperor had taken arms, and that not only the suppression of it but the extinction of the German liberties would be the certain consequence of his obtaining such an entire superiority as would enable him to execute his schemes in their full extent. They determined, therefore, to prepare for their own defence, and neither to renounce those religious truths to the knowledge of which they had attained by means so wonderful, nor to abandon those civil rights which had been transmitted to them by their ances-

¹² F. Paul, 188.—Thuan., Hist., i. 61.

tors. In order to give the necessary directions for this purpose, their deputies met at Ulm, soon after their abrupt departure from Ratisbon. Their deliberations were now conducted with such vigor and unanimity as the imminent danger which threatened them required. The contingent of troops which each of the confederates was to furnish having been fixed by the original treaty of union, orders were given for bringing them immediately into the field. Being sensible at last that, through the narrow prejudices of some of their members and the impudent security of others, they had neglected too long to strengthen themselves by foreign alliances, they now applied with great earnestness to the Venetians and Swiss.

To the Venetians they represented the emperor's intention of overturning the present system of Germany and of raising himself to absolute power in that country by means of foreign force furnished by the pope; they warned them how fatal this event would prove to the liberties of Italy, and that by suffering Charles to acquire unlimited authority in the one country they would soon feel his dominion to be no less despotic in the other; they besought them, therefore, not to grant a passage through their territories to those troops which ought to be treated as common enemies, because by subduing Germany they prepared chains for the rest of Europe. These reflections had not escaped the sagacity of those wise republicans. They had communicated their sentiments to the pope, and had endeavored to divert him from an alliance which tended to render irresistible

the power of a potentate whose ambition he already knew to be boundless. But they had found Paul so eager in the prosecution of his own plan that he disregarded all their remonstrances.¹³ This attempt to alarm the pope having proved unsuccessful, they declined doing anything more towards preventing the dangers which they foresaw; and in return to the application from the confederates of Smalkalde, they informed them that they could not obstruct the march of the pope's troops through an open country but by levying an army strong enough to face them in the field, and that this would draw upon themselves the whole weight of his as well as of the emperor's indignation. For the same reason, they declined lending a sum of money which the elector of Saxony and landgrave proposed to borrow of them towards carrying on the war.¹⁴

The demands of the confederates upon the Swiss were not confined to the obstructing of the entrance of foreigners into Germany: they required of them, as the nearest neighbors and closest allies of the empire, to interpose with their wonted vigor for the preservation of its liberties, and not to stand as inactive spectators while their brethren were oppressed and enslaved. But, with whatever zeal some of the cantons might have been disposed to act when the cause of the Reformation was in danger, the Helvetic body was so divided with regard to religion as to render it unsafe for

¹³ Adriani, *Istoria de' suoi Tempi*, lib. v. p. 332.

¹⁴ Sleid., 381.—Paruta, *Istor. Venet.*, tom. iv. 180.—Lambertus Hortensius de *Bello Germanico*, apud Scardium, vol. ii. p. 547.

the Protestants to take any step without consulting their Catholic associates; and among them the emissaries of the pope and emperor had such influence that a resolution of maintaining an exact neutrality between the contending parties was the utmost which could be procured.¹⁵

Being disappointed in both these applications, the Protestants, not long after, had recourse to the kings of France and England, the approach of danger either overcoming the elector of Saxony's scruples or obliging him to yield to the importunities of his associates. The situation of the two monarchs flattered them with hopes of success. Though hostilities between them had continued for some time after the peace of Crespy, they became weary at last of a war attended with no glory or advantage to either, and had lately terminated all their differences by a peace concluded at Campe, near Ardres. Francis having with great difficulty procured his allies, the Scots, to be included in the treaty, in return for that concession he engaged to pay a great sum which Henry demanded as due to him on several accounts; and he left Boulogne in the hands of the English as a pledge for his faithful performance of that article. But, though the re-establishment of peace seemed to leave the two monarchs at liberty to turn their attention towards Germany, so unfortunate were the Protestants that they derived no immediate advantage from this circumstance. Henry appeared unwilling to enter into any alliance with them but on such conditions as would

¹⁵ Sleid., 392.

render him not only the head but the supreme director of their league,—a pre-eminence which, as the bonds of union or interest between them were but feeble, and as he differed from them so widely in his religious sentiments, they had no inclination to admit.¹⁶ Francis, more powerfully inclined by political considerations to afford them assistance, found his kingdom so much exhausted by a long war, and was so much afraid of irritating the pope by entering into close communion with excommunicated heretics, that he durst not undertake the protection of the Smalkaldic league. By this ill-timed caution, or by a superstitious deference to scruples to which at other times he was not much addicted, he lost the most promising opportunity of mortifying and distressing his rival which presented itself during his whole reign.

But, notwithstanding their ill success in their negotiations with foreign courts, the confederates found no difficulty at home in bringing a sufficient force into the field. Germany abounded at that time in inhabitants; the feudal institutions, which subsisted in full force, enabled the nobles to call out their numerous vassals and to put them in motion on the shortest warning; the martial spirit of the Germans, not broken or enervated by the introduction of commerce and arts, had acquired additional vigor during the continual wars in which they had been employed for half a century, either in the pay of the emperors or the kings of France. Upon every opportunity of entering into service they were accustomed to run

¹⁶ Rymer, xv. 93.—Herbert, 258.

eagerly to arms; and to every standard that was erected, volunteers flocked from all quarters.¹⁷ Zeal seconded on this occasion their native ardor. Men on whom the doctrines of the Reformation had made that deep impression which accompanies truth when first discovered prepared to maintain it with proportional vigor; and among a warlike people it appeared infamous to remain inactive when the defence of religion was the motive for taking arms. Accident combined with all these circumstances in facilitating the levy of soldiers among the confederates. A considerable number of Germans in the pay of France, being dismissed by the king on the prospect of peace with England, joined in a body the standard of the Protestants.¹⁸ By such a concurrence of causes they were enabled to assemble in a few weeks an army composed of seventy thousand foot and fifteen thousand horse, provided with a train of a hundred and twenty cannon, eight hundred ammunition-wagons, eight thousand beasts of burden, and six thousand pioneers.¹⁹ This army, one of the most numerous and undoubtedly the best appointed of any which had been levied in Europe during that century, did not require the united effort of the whole Protestant body to raise it. The elector of Saxony, the landgrave of Hesse, the duke of Wurtemberg, the princes of Anhalt, and the imperial cities of Augsburg, Ulm, and Strasburg, were the only powers which contributed towards this

¹⁷ Seck., lib. iii. 161.

¹⁸ Thuan., lib. i. 68.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 601.—Ludovici ab Avila et Zuniga *Commentariorum de Bel. Germ. lib. duo., Ant., 1550, 12mo, p. 13, a.*

great armament: the electors of Cologne, of Brandenburg, and the count palatine, overawed by the emperor's threats or deceived by his professions, remained neuter. John, marquis of Brandenburg Bareith, and Albert of Brandenburg Anspach, though both early converts to Lutheranism, entered openly into the emperor's service, under pretext of having obtained his promise for the security of the Protestant religion; and Maurice of Saxony soon followed their example.

The number of their troops, as well as the amazing rapidity wherewith they had assembled them, astonished the emperor and filled him with the most disquieting apprehensions. He was, indeed, in no condition to resist such a mighty force. Shut up in Ratisbon, a town of no great strength, whose inhabitants, being mostly Lutherans, would have been more ready to betray than to assist him, with only three thousand Spanish foot, who had served in Hungary, and about five thousand Germans, who had joined him from different parts of the empire, he must have been overwhelmed by the approach of such a formidable army, which he could not fight, nor could he even hope to retreat from it in safety. The pope's troops, though in full march to his relief, had hardly reached the frontiers of Germany; the forces which he expected from the Low Countries had not yet begun to move, and were even far from being complete.²⁰ His situation, however, called for more immediate succor, nor did it seem practicable for him to wait

²⁰ Sleid., 389.—Avila, 8, a.

for such distant auxiliaries, with whom his junction was so precarious.

But it happened fortunately for Charles that the confederates did not avail themselves of the advantage which lay so full in their view. In civil wars the first steps are commonly taken with much timidity and hesitation. Men are solicitous, at that time, to put on the semblance of moderation and equity; they strive to gain partisans by seeming to adhere strictly to known forms; nor can they be brought at once to violate those established institutions which in times of tranquillity they have ever been accustomed to reverence: hence their proceedings are often feeble or dilatory when they ought to be most vigorous and decisive. Influenced by those considerations which, happily for the peace of society, operate powerfully on the human mind, the confederates could not think of throwing off that allegiance which they owed to the head of the empire, or of turning their arms against him, without one solemn appeal more to his candor and to the impartial judgment of their fellow-subjects. For this purpose, they addressed a letter to the emperor and a manifesto to all the inhabitants of Germany. The tenor of both was the same. They represented their own conduct with regard to civil affairs as dutiful and submissive; they mentioned the inviolable union in which they had lived with the emperor, as well as the many and recent marks of his good will and gratitude wherewithal they had been honored; they asserted religion to be the sole cause of the violence which the emperor now meditated against

them, and, in proof of this, produced many arguments to convince those who were so weak as to be deceived by the artifices with which he endeavored to cover his real intentions; they declared their own resolution to risk everything in maintenance of their religious rights, and foretold the dissolution of the German constitution if the emperor should finally prevail against them.²¹

Charles, though in such a perilous situation as might have inspired him with moderate sentiments, appeared as inflexible and haughty as if his affairs had been in the most prosperous state. His only reply to the address and manifesto of the Protestants was to publish the ban of the empire against the elector of Saxony and landgrave of Hesse, their leaders, and against all who should dare to assist them. By this sentence, the ultimate and most rigorous one which the German jurisprudence has provided for the punishment of traitors or enemies to their country, they were declared rebels and outlaws, and deprived of every privilege which they enjoyed as members of the Germanic body; their goods were confiscated, their subjects absolved from their oath of allegiance, and it became not only lawful but meritorious to invade their territories. The nobles and free cities who framed or perfected the constitution of the German government had not been so negligent of their own safety and privileges as to trust the emperor with this formidable jurisdiction. The authority of a diet of the empire ought to have been interposed before any of its

²¹ Sleid., 384.

members could be put under the ban. But Charles overlooked that formality, well knowing that if his arms were crowned with success there would remain none who would have either power or courage to call in question what he had done.²² The emperor, however, did not found his sentence against the elector and landgrave on their revolt from the established Church or their conduct with regard to religion: he affected to assign for it reasons purely civil, and those, too, expressed in such general and ambiguous terms, without specifying the nature or circumstances of their guilt, as rendered it more like an act of despotic power than of a legal and limited jurisdiction. Nor was it altogether from choice, or to conceal his intentions, that Charles had recourse to the ambiguity of general expressions; but he durst not mention too particularly the causes of his sentence, as every action which he could have charged upon the elector and landgrave as a crime might have been employed with equal justice to condemn many of the Protestants whom he still pretended to consider as faithful subjects, and whom it would have been extremely imprudent to alarm or disgust.

The confederates, now perceiving all hopes of accommodation to be at an end, had only to choose whether they would submit without reserve to the emperor's will or proceed to open hostilities. They were not destitute either of public spirit or of resolution to make a proper choice. A few days after the ban of the empire was published, they, accord-

²² Sleid., 386.—Du Mont, *Corps Diplom.*, iv. p. ii. 314.—Pfeffel, *Hist. abrégé du Droit publique*, 168, 736, 158.

ing to the custom of that age, sent a herald to the imperial camp, with a solemn declaration of war against Charles, to whom they no longer gave any other title than that of pretended emperor, and renounced all allegiance, homage, or duty which he might claim, or which they had hitherto yielded to him. But previous to this formality part of their troops had begun to act. The command of a considerable body of men, raised by the city of Augsburg, having been given to Sebastian Schertel, a soldier of fortune, who, by the booty that he got when the imperialists plundered Rome, together with the merit of long service, had acquired wealth and authority which placed him on a level with the chief of the German nobles, that gallant veteran resolved, before he joined the main body of the confederates, to attempt something suitable to his former fame and to the expectation of his countrymen. As the pope's forces were hastening towards Tyrol, in order to penetrate into Germany by the narrow passes through the mountains which run across that country, he advanced thither with the utmost rapidity, and seized Ehrenberg and Cuffstein, two strong castles which commanded the principal defiles. Without stopping a moment, he continued his march towards Inspruck, by getting possession of which he would have obliged the Italians to stop short, and with a small body of men could have resisted all the efforts of the greatest armies. Castlealto, the governor of Trent, knowing what a fatal blow this would be to the emperor, all whose designs must have proved abortive if his Italian auxiliaries

had been intercepted, raised a few troops with the utmost despatch and threw himself into the town. Schertel, however, did not abandon the enterprise, and was preparing to attack the place, when the intelligence of the approach of the Italians, and an order from the elector and landgrave, obliged him to desist. By his retreat the passes were left open, and the Italians entered Germany without any opposition but from the garrisons which Schertel had placed in Ehrenberg and Cuffstein, and these, having no hopes of being relieved, surrendered after a short resistance.²³

Nor was the recalling of Schertel the only error of which the confederates were guilty. As the supreme command of their army was committed, in terms of the league of Smalkalde, to the elector of Saxony and landgrave of Hesse, with equal power, all the inconveniences arising from a divided and co-ordinate authority, which is always of fatal consequence in the operations of war, were immediately felt. The elector, though intrepid in his own person to excess, and most

²³ Seckend., lib. ii. 70.—Adriani, *Istoria de' suoi Tempi*, lib. v. 335.—Seckendorf, the industrious author of the *Commentarius Apologeticus de Lutheranismo*, whom I have so long and safely followed as my guide in German affairs, was a descendant from Schertel. With the care and solicitude of a German who was himself of noble birth, Seckendorf has published a long digression concerning his ancestor, calculated chiefly to show how Schertel was ennobled and his posterity allied to many of the most ancient families in the empire. Among other curious particulars, he gives us an account of his wealth, the chief source of which was the plunder he got at Rome. His landed estate alone was sold by his grandsons for six hundred thousand florins. By this we may form some idea of the riches amassed by the *condottieri*, or commanders of mercenary bands, in that age. At the taking of Rome Schertel was only a captain. Seckend., lib. ii. 73.

ardently zealous in the cause, was slow in deliberating, uncertain as well as irresolute in his determinations, and constantly preferred measures which were cautious and safe to such as were bold or decisive. The landgrave, of a more active and enterprising nature, formed all his resolutions with promptitude, wished to execute them with spirit, and uniformly preferred such measures as tended to bring the contest to a speedy issue. Thus their maxims with regard to the conduct of the war differed as widely as those by which they were influenced in preparing for it. Such perpetual contrariety in their sentiments gave rise, imperceptibly, to jealousy and the spirit of contention. These multiplied the dissensions flowing from the incompatibility of their natural tempers, and rendered them more violent. The other members of the league, considering themselves as independent, and subject to the elector and landgrave only in consequence of the articles of a voluntary confederacy, did not long retain a proper veneration for commanders who proceeded with so little concord; and the numerous army of the Protestants, like a vast machine whose parts are ill compacted and which is destitute of any power sufficient to move and regulate the whole, acted with no consistency, vigor, or effect.

The emperor, who was afraid that by remaining at Ratisbon he might render it impossible for the pope's forces to join him, having boldly advanced to Landshut on the Iser, the confederates lost some days in deliberating whether it was proper to follow him into the territories of the duke of

Bavaria, a neutral prince. When at last they surmounted that scruple and began to move towards his camp, they suddenly abandoned the design, and hastened to attack Ratisbon, in which town Charles could leave only a small garrison. By this time the papal troops, amounting fully to that number which Paul had stipulated to furnish, had reached Landshut, and were soon followed by six thousand Spaniards of the veteran bands stationed in Naples. The confederates, after Schertel's spirited but fruitless expedition, seem to have permitted these forces to advance unmolested to the place of rendezvous, without any attempt to attack either them or the emperor separately, or to prevent their junction.²⁴ The imperial army amounted now to thirty-six thousand men, and was still more formidable by the discipline and valor of the troops than by their number. Avila, commendador of Alcantara, who had been present in all the wars carried on by Charles, and had served in the armies which gained the memorable victory at Pavia, which conquered Tunis, and invaded France, gives this the preference to any military force he had ever seen assembled.²⁵ Octavio Farnese, the pope's grandson, assisted by the ablest officers formed in the long wars between Charles and Francis, commanded the Italian auxiliaries. His brother, the Cardinal Farnese, accompanied him as papal legate; and, in order to give the war the appearance of a religious enterprise, he proposed to march at the head of the

²⁴ Adriani, *Istoria de' suoi Tempi*, lib. v. 340.

²⁵ Avila, 18.

army, with a cross carried before him, and to publish indulgences wherever he came to all who should give them any assistance, as had anciently been the practice in the crusades against the infidels. But this the emperor strictly prohibited, as inconsistent with all the declarations which he had made to the Germans of his own party; and the legate, perceiving, to his astonishment, that the exercise of the Protestant religion, the extirpation of which he considered as the sole object of the war, was publicly permitted in the imperial camp, soon returned in disgust to Italy.²⁶

The arrival of these troops enabled the emperor to send such a reinforcement to the garrison at Ratisbon that the confederates, relinquishing all hopes of reducing that town, marched towards Ingoldstadt on the Danube, near to which Charles was now encamped. They exclaimed loudly against the emperor's notorious violation of the laws and constitution of the empire in having called in foreigners to lay waste Germany and to oppress its liberties. As in that age the dominion of the Roman see was so odious to the Protestants that the name of the pope alone was sufficient to inspire them with horror at any enterprise which he countenanced, and to raise in their minds the blackest suspicions, it came to be universally believed among them that Paul, not satisfied with attacking them openly by force of arms, had dispersed his emissaries all over Germany, to set on fire their towns and magazines and to poison their wells and fountains of water. Nor did this rumor,

²⁶ F. Paul, 191.

which was extravagant and frightful enough to make a deep impression on the credulity of the vulgar, spread among them only: even the leaders of the party, blinded by their prejudices, published a declaration, in which they accused the pope of having employed such antichristian and diabolical arts against them.²⁷ These sentiments of the confederates were confirmed, in some measure, by the behavior of the papal troops, who, thinking nothing too rigorous towards heretics anathematized by the Church, were guilty of great excesses in the territories of the Lutheran states, and aggravated the calamities of war by mingling with it all the cruelty of bigoted zeal.

The first operations in the field, however, did not correspond with the violence of those passions which animated individuals. The emperor had prudently taken the resolution of avoiding an action with an enemy so far superior in number,²⁸ especially as he foresaw that nothing could keep a body composed of so many and such dissimilar members from falling to pieces, but the pressing to attack it with an inconsiderate precipitancy. The confederates, though it was no less evident that to them every moment's delay was pernicious, were still prevented, by the weakness or division of their leaders, from exerting that vigor with which their situation, as well as the ardor of their soldiers, ought to have inspired them. On their arrival at Ingoldstadt they found the emperor in a camp not remarkable for strength, and surrounded only by a slight intrenchment. Before

²⁷ Sleid., 399.

²⁸ Avila, 78, a.

the camp lay a plain of such extent as afforded sufficient space for drawing out their whole army and bringing it to act at once. Every consideration should have determined them to have seized this opportunity of attacking the emperor; and their great superiority in numbers, the eagerness of their troops, together with the stability of the German infantry in pitched battles, afforded them the most probable expectation of victory. The landgrave urged this with great warmth, declaring that if the sole command were vested in him he would terminate the war on that occasion, and decide by one general action the fate of the two parties. But the elector, reflecting on the valor and discipline of the enemy's forces, animated by the presence of the emperor and conducted by the best officers of the age, would not venture upon an action which he thought to be so doubtful as the attacking such a body of veterans on ground which they themselves had chosen, and while covered with fortifications which, though imperfect, would afford them no small advantage in the combat. Notwithstanding his hesitation and remonstrances, it was agreed to advance towards the enemy's camp in battle-array, in order to make a trial whether by that insult, and by a furious cannonade which they began, they could draw the imperialists out of their works. But the emperor had too much sagacity to fall into this snare: he adhered to his own system with inflexible constancy, and, drawing up his soldiers behind their trenches, that they might be ready to receive the confederates if they

should venture upon an assault, calmly waited their approach, and carefully restrained his own men from any excursions or skirmishes which might bring on a general engagement. He rode along the lines, and, addressing the troops of the different nations in their own language, encouraged them not only by his words, but by the cheerfulness of his voice and countenance; he exposed himself in places of greatest danger and amidst the warmest fire of the enemy's artillery, the most numerous that had hitherto been brought into the field by any army. Roused by his example, not a man quitted his ranks; it was thought infamous to discover any symptom of fear when the emperor appeared so intrepid; and the meanest soldier plainly perceived that their declining the combat at present was not the effect of timidity in their general, but the result of a well-grounded caution. The confederates, after firing several hours on the imperialists, with more noise and terror than execution, seeing no prospect of alluring them to fight on equal terms, retired to their own camp. The emperor employed the night with such diligence in strengthening his works that the confederates, returning to the cannonade next day, found that, though they had now been willing to venture upon such a bold experiment, the opportunity of making an attack with advantage was lost.²⁹

After such a discovery of the feebleness or irresolution of their leaders, and the prudence as well as firmness of the emperor's conduct, the con-

²⁹ Sleid., 395, 397.—Avila, 27, a.—Lamb. Hortens., ap. Scard., ii.

federates turned their whole attention towards preventing the arrival of a powerful reinforcement of ten thousand foot and four thousand horse, which the Count de Buren was bringing to the emperor from the Low Countries. But though that general had to traverse such an extent of country, though his route lay through the territories of several states warmly disposed to favor the confederates, though they were apprised of his approach, and, by their superiority in numbers, might easily have detached a force sufficient to overpower him, he advanced with such rapidity and by such well-concerted movements, while they opposed him with such remissness and so little military skill, that he conducted this body to the imperial camp without any loss.³⁰

Upon the arrival of the Flemings, in whom he placed great confidence, the emperor altered in some degree his plan of operations, and began to act more upon the offensive, though he still avoided a battle, with the utmost industry. He made himself master of Neuburg, Dillingen, and Donawert on the Danube; of Nordlingen, and several other towns situated on the most considerable streams which fall into that mighty river. By this he got the command of a great extent of country, though not without being obliged to engage in several sharp encounters, of which the success was various, not without being exposed oftener than once to the danger of being drawn into a battle. In this manner the whole autumn was spent; neither party gained any remarkable

³⁰ Sleid., 403.

superiority over the other, and nothing was yet done towards bringing the war to a period. The emperor had often foretold with confidence that discord and the want of money would compel the confederates to disperse that unwieldy body, which they had neither abilities to guide nor funds to support.³¹ Though he waited with impatience for the accomplishment of his predictions, there was no prospect of that event being at hand. But he himself began to suffer from the want of forage and provisions; even the Catholic provinces being so much incensed at the introduction of foreigners into the empire that they furnished them with reluctance, while the camp of the confederates abounded with a profusion of all necessaries, which the zeal of their friends in the adjacent countries poured in with the utmost liberality and good will. Great numbers of the Italians and Spaniards, unaccustomed to the climate or food of Germany, were become unfit for service through sickness.³² Considerable arrears were now due to the troops, who had scarcely received any money from the beginning of the campaign; the emperor experiencing on this as well as on former occasions that his jurisdiction was more extensive than his revenues, and that the former enabled him to assemble a greater number of soldiers than the latter were sufficient to support. Upon all these accounts, he found it difficult to keep his army in the field; some of his ablest

³¹ Belli Smalkaldici Commentarius Græco sermone scriptus a Joach. Camerario, ap. Freherum, vol. iii. p. 479.

³² Camerar., ap. Freher., 483.

generals, and even the duke of Alva himself, persevering and obstinate as he usually was in the prosecution of every measure, advising him to disperse his troops into winter quarters. But, as the arguments urged against any plan which he had adopted rarely made much impression upon the emperor, he paid no regard to their opinion, and determined to continue his efforts, in order to weary out the confederates, being well assured that if he could once oblige them to separate there was little probability of their uniting again in a body.³³ Still, however, it remained a doubtful point whether his steadiness was most likely to fail or their zeal to be exhausted. It was still uncertain which party, by first dividing its forces, would give the superiority to the other, when an unexpected event decided the contest and occasioned a fatal reverse in the affairs of the confederates.

Maurice of Saxony, having insinuated himself into the emperor's confidence by the arts which have already been described, no sooner saw hostilities ready to break out between the confederates of Smalkalde and that monarch than vast prospects of ambition began to open upon him. That portion of Saxony which descended to him from his ancestors was far from satisfying his aspiring mind; and he perceived with pleasure the approach of civil war, as, amidst the revolutions and convulsions occasioned by it, opportunities of acquiring additional power or dignity, which at other times are sought in vain, present

³³ Thuan., 83.

themselves to an enterprising spirit. As he was thoroughly acquainted with the state of the two contending parties and the qualities of their leaders, he did not hesitate long in determining on which side the greatest advantages were to be expected. Having revolved all these things in his own breast, and having taken his final resolution of joining the emperor, he prudently determined to declare early in his favor, that by the merit of this he might acquire a title to a proportional recompense. With this view, he had repaired to Ratisbon in the month of May, under pretext of attending the diet; and, after many conferences with Charles or his ministers, he, with the most mysterious secrecy, concluded a treaty, in which he engaged to concur in assisting the emperor as a faithful subject, and Charles, in return, stipulated to bestow on him all the spoils of the elector of Saxony, his dignities as well as territories.³⁴ History hardly records any treaty that can be considered as a more manifest violation of the most powerful principles which ought to influence human actions. Maurice, a professed Protestant, at a time when the belief of religion, as well as zeal for its interests, took strong possession of every mind, binds himself to contribute his assistance towards carrying on a war which had manifestly no other object than the extirpation of the Protestant doctrines. He engages to take arms against his father-in-law, and to strip his nearest relation of his honors and dominions. He joins a

³⁴ Haræi Annal. Brabant., vol. i. 638.—Struvii Corp., 1048.—Thuan., 84.

dubious friend against a known benefactor, to whom his obligations were both great and recent. Nor was the prince who ventured upon all this one of those audacious politicians who, provided they can accomplish their ends and secure their interest, avowedly disregard the most sacred obligations and glory in contemning whatever is honorable or decent. Maurice's conduct, if the whole must be ascribed to policy, was more artful and masterly; he executed his plan in all its parts, and yet endeavored to preserve, in every step which he took, the appearance of what was fair and virtuous and laudable. It is probable, from his subsequent behavior, that, with regard to the Protestant religion at least, his intentions were upright; that he fondly trusted to the emperor's promises for its security; but that, according to the fate of all who refine too much in policy and who tread in dark and crooked paths, in attempting to deceive others he himself was in some degree deceived.

His first care, however, was to keep the engagements into which he had entered with the emperor closely concealed; and so perfect a master was he in the art of dissimulation that the confederates, notwithstanding his declining all connections with them and his remarkable assiduity in paying court to the emperor, seemed to have entertained no suspicion of his designs. Even the elector of Saxony, when he marched at the beginning of the campaign to join his associates, committed his dominions to Maurice's protection, which he, with an insidious appearance of friend-

ship, readily undertook.³⁵ But scarcely had the elector taken the field when Maurice began to consult privately with the king of the Romans how to invade those very territories with the defence of which he was intrusted. Soon after, the emperor sent him a copy of the imperial ban denounced against the elector and landgrave. As he was next heir to the former, and particularly interested in preventing strangers from getting his dominions into their possession, Charles required him, not only for his own sake, but upon the allegiance and duty which he owed to the head of the empire, instantly to seize and detain in his hands the forfeited estates of the elector, warning him at the same time that if he neglected to obey these commands he should be held as accessory to the crimes of his kinsman and be liable to the punishment.³⁶

This artifice, which it is probable Maurice himself suggested, was employed by him in order that his conduct towards the elector might seem a matter of necessity but not of choice, an act of obedience to his superior rather than a voluntary invasion of the rights of his kinsman and ally. But, in order to give some more specious appearance to this thin veil with which he endeavored to cover his ambition, he, soon after his return from Ratisbon, had called together the states of his country, and, representing to them that a civil war between the emperor and confederates of Smalkalde was now become unavoidable, desired their advice with

³⁵ Struvii Corp., 1046.

³⁶ Sleid., 391.—Thuan., 84.

regard to the part which he should act in that event. They, having been prepared, no doubt, and tutored beforehand, and being desirous of gratifying their prince, whom they esteemed as well as loved, gave such counsel as they knew would be most agreeable, advising him to offer his mediation towards reconciling the contending parties, but if that were rejected, and he could obtain proper security for the Protestant religion, they delivered it as their opinion that in all other points he ought to yield obedience to the emperor. Upon receiving the imperial rescript, together with the ban against the elector and landgrave, Maurice summoned the states of his country a second time; he laid before them the orders which he had received, and mentioned the punishment with which he was threatened in case of disobedience; he acquainted them that the confederates had refused to admit of his mediation, and that the emperor had given him the most satisfactory declarations with regard to religion; he pointed out his own interest in securing possession of the electoral dominions, as well as the danger of allowing strangers to obtain an establishment in Saxony; and upon the whole, as the point under deliberation respected his subjects no less than himself, he desired to know their sentiments, how he should steer in that difficult and arduous conjecture. The states, no less obsequious and complaisant than formerly, professing their own reliance on the emperor's promises as a perfect security for their religion, proposed that before he had recourse to more violent methods they

would write to the elector, exhorting him, as the best means not only of appeasing the emperor but of preventing his dominions from being seized by foreign or hostile powers, to give his consent that Maurice should take possession of them quietly and without opposition. Maurice himself seconded their arguments in a letter to the landgrave, his father-in-law. Such an extravagant proposition was rejected with the scorn and indignation which it deserved. The landgrave, in return to Maurice, taxed him with his treachery and ingratitude towards a kinsman to whom he was so deeply indebted; he treated with contempt his affectation of executing the imperial ban, which he could not but know to be altogether void by the unconstitutional and arbitrary manner in which it had been issued; he besought him not to suffer himself to be so far blinded by ambition as to forget the obligations of honor and friendship, or to betray the Protestant religion, the extirpation of which out of Germany, even by the acknowledgment of the pope himself, was the great object of the present war.³⁷

But Maurice had proceeded too far to be diverted from pursuing his plan by reproaches or arguments. Nothing now remained but to execute with vigor what he had hitherto carried on by artifice and dissimulation. Nor was his boldness in action inferior to his subtlety in contrivance. Having assembled about twelve thousand men, he suddenly invaded one part of the electoral provinces, while Ferdinand, with an army com-

³⁷ Sleid., 405, etc.—Thuan., 85.—Camerar., 484.

posed of Bohemians and Hungarians, overran the other. Maurice, in two sharp encounters, defeated the troops which the elector had left to guard his country, and, improving these advantages to the utmost, made himself master of all the electorate, except Wittenberg, Gotha, and Eisenach, which, being places of considerable strength and defended by sufficient garrisons, refused to open their gates. The news of these rapid conquests soon reached the imperial and confederate camps. In the former, their satisfaction with an event which it was foreseen would be productive of the most important consequences was expressed by every possible demonstration of joy; the latter was filled with astonishment and terror. The name of Maurice was mentioned with execration, as an apostate from religion, a betrayer of the German liberty, and a contemner of the most sacred and natural ties. Everything that the rage or invention of the party could suggest in order to blacken and render him odious—invectives, satires, and lampoons, the furious declamations of their preachers, together with the rude wit of their authors—were all employed against him; while he, confiding in the arts which he had so long practised, as if his actions could have admitted of any serious justification, published a manifesto containing the same frivolous reasons for his conduct which he had formerly alleged in the meeting of his states and in his letter to the landgrave.³⁸

The elector, upon the first intelligence of Mau-

³⁸ Sleid., 409, 410.

rice's motions, proposed to return home with his troops for the defence of Saxony. But the deputies of the league, assembled at Ulm, prevailed on him at that time to remain with the army, and to prefer the success of the common cause before the security of his own dominions. At length the sufferings and complaints of his subjects increased so much that he discovered the utmost impatience to set out, in order to rescue them from the oppression of Maurice and from the cruelty of the Hungarians, who, having been accustomed to that licentious and merciless species of war which was thought lawful against the Turks, committed, wherever they came, the wildest acts of rapine and violence. This desire of the elector was so natural and so warmly urged that the deputies at Ulm, though fully sensible of the unhappy consequences of dividing their army, durst not refuse their consent, how unwilling soever to grant it. In this perplexity, they repaired to the camp of the confederates at Gien-gen, on the Brenz, in order to consult their constituents. Nor were they less at a loss what to determine in this pressing emergence. But, after having considered seriously the open desertion of some of their allies, the scandalous lukewarmness of others, who had hitherto contributed nothing towards the war, the intolerable load which had fallen of consequence upon such members as were most zealous for the cause or most faithful to their engagements, the ill success of all their endeavors to obtain foreign aid, the unusual length of the campaign, the rigor of the season, together

with the great number of soldiers, and even officers, who had quitted the service on that account, they concluded that nothing could save them but either the bringing the contest to the immediate decision of a battle by attacking the imperial army, or an accommodation of all their differences with Charles by a treaty. Such was the despondency and dejection which now oppressed the party that of these two they chose what was most feeble and unmanly, empowering a minister of the elector of Brandenburg to propound overtures of peace in their name to the emperor.

No sooner did Charles perceive this haughty confederacy, which had so lately threatened to drive him out of Germany, condescending to make the first advances towards an agreement, than, concluding their spirit to be gone or their union to be broken, he immediately assumed the tone of a conqueror, and, as if they had been already at his mercy, would not hear of a negotiation but upon condition that the elector of Saxony should previously give up himself and his dominions absolutely to his disposal.³⁹ As nothing more intolerable or ignominious could have been prescribed, even in the worst situation of their affairs, it is no wonder that this proposition should be rejected by a party which was rather humbled and disconcerted than subdued. But, though they refused to submit tamely to the emperor's will, they wanted spirit to pursue the only plan which could have preserved their independence; and, forgetting that it was the union

³⁹ Hortensius, ap. Scard., ii. 485.

of their troops in one body which had hitherto rendered the confederacy formidable and had more than once obliged the imperialists to think of quitting the field, they inconsiderately abandoned this advantage,—which, in spite of the diversion in Saxony, would still have kept the emperor in awe,—and, yielding to the elector's entreaties, consented to his proposal of dividing the army. Nine thousand men were left in the duchy of Wurtemberg, in order to protect that province as well as the free cities of Upper Germany; a considerable body marched with the elector towards Saxony; but the greater part returned with their respective leaders into their own countries and were dispersed there.⁴⁰

The moment that the troops separated, the confederacy ceased to be the object of terror; and the members of it, who while they composed part of a great body had felt but little anxiety about their own security, began to tremble when they reflected that they now stood exposed singly to the whole weight of the emperor's vengeance. Charles did not allow them leisure to recover from their consternation or to form any new schemes of union. As soon as the confederates began to retire, he put his army in motion, and, though it was now the depth of winter, he resolved to keep the field, in order to make the most of that favorable juncture for which he had waited so long. Some small towns in which the Protestants had left garrisons immediately opened their gates. Nordlingen, Rotenberg, and Hall, imperial cities,

⁴⁰ Sleid., 411.

submitted soon after. Though Charles could not prevent the elector from levying, as he retreated, large contributions upon the archbishop of Mentz, the abbot of Fulda, and other ecclesiastics,⁴¹ this was more than balanced by the submission of Ulm, one of the chief cities of Suabia, highly distinguished by its zeal for the Smalkaldic league. As soon as an example was set of deserting the common cause, the rest of the members became instantly impatient to follow it, and seemed afraid lest others, by getting the start of them in returning to their duty, should on that account obtain more favorable terms. The elector palatine, a weak prince, who, notwithstanding his professions of neutrality, had, very preposterously sent to the confederates four hundred horse, a body so inconsiderable as to be scarcely any addition to their strength, but great enough to render him guilty in the eyes of the emperor, made his acknowledgments in the most abject manner. The inhabitants of Augsburg, shaken by so many instances of apostasy, expelled the brave Schertel out of their city, and accepted such conditions as the emperor was pleased to grant them.

The duke of Wurtemberg, though among the first that had offered to submit, was obliged to sue for pardon on his knees, and, even after this mortifying humiliation, obtained it with difficulty.⁴² Memmingen, and other free cities in the circle of Suabia, being now abandoned by all their former associates, found it necessary to provide for their

⁴¹ Thuan., 88.

⁴² Mém. de Ribier, tom. i. 589.

own safety by throwing themselves on the emperor's mercy. Strasburg and Frankfort-on-the-Main, cities far removed from the seat of danger, discovered no greater steadiness than those which lay more exposed. Thus a confederacy lately so powerful as to shake the imperial throne fell to pieces and was dissolved in the space of a few weeks, hardly any member of that formidable combination now remaining in arms but the elector and landgrave, to whom the emperor, having from the beginning marked them out as victims of his vengeance, was at no pains to offer terms of reconciliation. Nor did he grant those who submitted to him a generous and unconditional pardon. Conscious of his own superiority, he treated them both with haughtiness and rigor. All the princes in person, and the cities by their deputies, were compelled to implore mercy in the humble posture of supplicants. As the emperor labored under great difficulties from the want of money, he imposed heavy fines upon them, which he levied with most rapacious exactness. The duke of Wurtemberg paid three hundred thousand crowns, the city of Augsburg a hundred and fifty thousand, Ulm a hundred thousand, Frankfort eighty thousand, Memmingen fifty thousand, and the rest in proportion to their abilities or their different degrees of guilt. They were obliged, besides, to renounce the league of Smalkalde, to furnish assistance, if required, towards executing the imperial ban against the elector and landgrave, to give up their artillery and warlike stores to the emperor, to admit garrisons into their prin-

cial cities and places of strength, and in this disarmed and dependent situation to expect the final award which the emperor should think proper to pronounce when the war came to an issue.⁴³ But, amidst the great variety of articles dictated by Charles on this occasion, he, in conformity to his original plan, took care that nothing relating to religion should be inserted; and to such a degree were the confederates humbled or overawed that, forgetting the zeal which had so long animated them, they were solicitous only about their own safety, without venturing to insist on a point the mention of which they saw the emperor avoiding with so much industry. The inhabitants of Memmingen alone made some feeble efforts to procure a promise of protection in the exercise of their religion, but were checked so severely by the imperial ministers that they instantly fell from their demand.

The elector of Cologne, whom, notwithstanding the sentence of excommunication issued against him by the pope, Charles had hitherto allowed to remain in possession of the archiepiscopal see, being now required by the emperor to submit to the censures of the Church, this virtuous and disinterested prelate, unwilling to expose his subjects to the miseries of war on his own account, voluntarily resigned that high dignity. With a moderation becoming his age and character, he chose to enjoy truth, together with the exercise of his religion, in the retirement of a private life,

⁴³ Sleid., 411, etc.—Thuan., lib. iv. p. 125.—Mém. de Ribier, tom. i. 606.

rather than to disturb society by engaging in a doubtful and violent struggle in order to retain his office.⁴⁴

During these transactions, the elector of Saxony reached the frontiers of his country unmolested. As Maurice could assemble no force equal to the army which accompanied him, he in a short time not only recovered possession of his own territories, but overran Misnia, and stripped his rival of all that belonged to him, except Dresden and Leipsic, which, being towns of some strength, could not be suddenly reduced. Maurice, obliged to quit the field and to shut himself up in his capital, despatched courier after courier to the emperor, representing his dangerous situation, and soliciting him, with the most earnest importunity, to march immediately to his relief. But Charles, busy at that time in prescribing terms to such members of the league as were daily returning to their allegiance, thought it sufficient to detach Albert, marquis of Brandenburg Anspach, with three thousand men, to his assistance. Albert, though an enterprising and active officer, was unexpectedly surprised by the elector, who killed many of his troops, dispersed the remainder, and took him prisoner.⁴⁵ Maurice continued as much exposed as formerly; and, if his enemy had known how to improve the opportunity which presented itself, his ruin must have been immediate and unavoidable. But the elector, no less slow and dilatory when invested with the sole

⁴⁴ Sleid., 418.—Thuan., lib. iv. 128.

⁴⁵ Avila, 99, 6.—Mém. de Ribier, tom. i. 620.

command than he had been formerly when joined in authority with a partner, never gave any proof of military activity but in this enterprise against Albert. Instead of marching directly towards Maurice, whom the defeat of his ally had greatly alarmed, he inconsiderately listened to overtures of accommodation, which his artful antagonist proposed with no other intention than to amuse him and to slacken the vigor of his operations.

Such, indeed, was the posture of the emperor's affairs that he could not march instantly to the relief of his ally. Soon after the separation of the confederate army, he, in order to ease himself of the burden of maintaining a superfluous number of troops, had dismissed the count of Buren with his Flemings,⁴⁶ imagining that the Spaniards and Germans, together with the papal forces, would be fully sufficient to crush any degree of vigor that yet remained among the members of the league. But Paul, growing wise too late, began now to discern the imprudence of that measure, from which the more sagacious Venetians had endeavored in vain to dissuade him. The rapid progress of the imperial arms, and the ease with which they had broken a combination that appeared no less firm than powerful, opened his eyes at length, and made him not only forget all the advantages which he had expected from such a complete triumph over heresy, but placed in the strongest light his own impolitic conduct in having contributed towards acquiring for Charles such an immense increase of power as

⁴⁶ Avila, 83, 6.—Mém. de Ribier, tom. i. 592.

would enable him, after oppressing the liberties of Germany, to give law with absolute authority to all the states of Italy. The moment that he perceived his error, he endeavored to correct it. Without giving the emperor any warning of his intention, he ordered Farnese, his grandson, to return instantly to Italy with all the troops under his command, and at the same time recalled the license which he had granted Charles of appropriating to his own use a large share of the Church lands in Spain. He was not destitute of pretences to justify this abrupt desertion of his ally. The term of six months during which the stipulations in their treaty were to continue in force was now expired; the league in opposition to which their alliance had been framed seemed to be entirely dissipated; Charles, in all his negotiations with the princes and cities which had submitted to his will, had neither consulted the pope, nor had allotted him any part of the conquests which he had made, nor had allowed him any share in the vast contributions which he had raised. He had not even made any provision for the suppression of heresy or the re-establishment of the Catholic religion, which were Paul's chief inducements to bestow the treasures of the Church so liberally in carrying on the war. These colors, however specious, did not conceal from the emperor that secret jealousy which was the true motive of the pope's conduct. But, as Paul's orders with regard to the march of his troops were no less peremptory than unexpected, it was impossible to prevent their retreat. Charles

exclaimed loudly against his treachery in abandoning him so unseasonably while he was prosecuting a war undertaken in obedience to the papal injunctions, and from which, if successful, so much honor and advantage would redound to the Church. To complaints he added threats and expostulations. But Paul remained inflexible; his troops continued their march towards the ecclesiastical state; and in an elaborate memorial, intended as an apology for his conduct, he discovered new and more manifest symptoms of alienation from the emperor, together with a deep-rooted dread of his power.⁴⁷ Charles, weakened by the withdrawing of so great a body from his army, which was already much diminished by the number of garrisons that he had been obliged to throw into the towns which had capitulated, found it necessary to recruit his forces by new levies before he could venture to march in person towards Saxony.

The fame and splendor of his success could not have failed of attracting such multitudes of soldiers into his service from all the extensive territories now subject to his authority as must have soon put him in a condition of taking the field against the elector; but the sudden and violent eruption of a conspiracy at Genoa, as well as the great revolutions which that event, extremely mysterious in its first appearances, seemed to portend, obliged him to avoid entangling himself in new operations in Germany until he had fully discovered its source and tendency. The form of

⁴⁷ F. Paul, 208.—Pallavic., par. ii. p. 5.—Thuan., 126.

government which had been established in Genoa at the time when Andrew Doria restored liberty to his country, though calculated to obliterate the memory of former dissensions, and received at first with eager approbation, did not, after a trial of near twenty years, give universal satisfaction to those turbulent and factious republicans. As the entire administration of affairs was now lodged in a certain number of noble families, many, envying them that pre-eminence, wished for the restitution of a popular government, to which they had been accustomed; and, though all revered the disinterested virtue of Doria and admired his talents, not a few were jealous of that ascendant which he had acquired in the councils of the commonwealth. His age, however, his moderation, and his love of liberty, afforded ample security to his countrymen that he would not abuse his power, nor stain the close of his days by attempting to overturn that fabric which it had been the labor and pride of his life to erect. But the authority and influence which in his hands were innocent, they easily saw would prove destructive if usurped by any citizens of greater ambition or less virtue. A citizen of this dangerous character had actually formed such pretensions, and with some prospect of success. Giannetino Doria, whom his grand-uncle Andrew destined to be the heir to his private fortune, aimed likewise at being his successor in power. His temper, haughty, insolent, and overbearing to such a degree as would hardly have been tolerated in one born to reign, was altogether insupportable

in the citizen of a free state. The more sagacious among the Genoese already feared and hated him as the enemy of those liberties for which they were indebted to his uncle; while Andrew himself, blinded by that violent and undiscerning affection which persons in advanced age often contract for the younger members of their family, set no bounds to the indulgence with which he treated him,—seeming less solicitous to secure and perpetuate the freedom of the commonwealth than to aggrandize that undeserving kinsman.

But whatever suspicion of Doria's designs, or whatever dissatisfaction with the system of administration in the commonwealth, these circumstances might have occasioned, they would have ended, it is probable, in nothing more than murmurings and complaints, if John Lewis Fiesco, count of Lavagna, observing this growing disgust, had not been encouraged by it to attempt one of the boldest actions recorded in history. That young nobleman, the richest and most illustrious subject in the republic, possessed in an eminent degree all the qualities which win upon the human heart, which command respect or secure attachment. He was graceful and majestic in his person, magnificent even to profusion, of a generosity that anticipated the wishes of his friends and exceeded the expectations of strangers, of an insinuating address, gentle manners, and a flowing affability. But under the appearance of these virtues, which seemed to form him for enjoying and adorning social life, he concealed all the dispositions which mark men out for

taking the lead in the most dangerous and dark conspiracies,—an insatiable and restless ambition, a courage unacquainted with fear, and a mind that disdained subordination. Such a temper could ill brook that station of inferiority wherein he was placed in the republic; and, as he envied the power which the elder Doria had acquired, he was filled with indignation at the thoughts of its descending, like an hereditary possession, to Giannetino. These various passions, preying with violence on his turbulent and aspiring mind, determined him to attempt overturning that domination to which he could not submit.

As the most effectual method of accomplishing this, he thought at first of forming a connection with Francis, and even proposed it to the French ambassador at Rome; and after expelling Doria, together with the imperial faction, by his assistance, he offered to put the republic once more under the protection of that monarch, hoping in return for that service to be intrusted with the principal share in the administration of government. But having communicated his scheme to a few chosen confidants, from whom he kept nothing secret, Verrina, the chief of them, a man of desperate fortune, capable alike of advising and executing the most audacious deeds, remonstrated with earnestness against the folly of exposing himself to the most imminent danger while he allowed another to reap all the fruits of his success, and exhorted him warmly to aim himself at that pre-eminence in his country to which he was destined by his illustrious birth, was called by

the voice of his fellow-citizens, and would be raised by the zeal of his friends. This discourse opened such great prospects to Fiesco, and so suitable to his genius, that, abandoning his own plan, he eagerly adopted that of Verrina. The other persons present, though sensible of the hazardous nature of the undertaking, did not choose to condemn what their patron had so warmly approved. It was instantly resolved, in this dark cabal, to assassinate the two Dorias, as well as the principal persons of their party, to overturn the established system of government, and to place Fiesco on the ducal throne of Genoa. Time, however, and preparations, were requisite to ripen such a design for execution; and, while he was employed in carrying on these, Fiesco made his chief care to guard against everything that might betray his secret or create suspicion. The disguise he assumed was, of all others, the most impenetrable. He seemed to be abandoned entirely to pleasure and dissipation. A perpetual gayety, diversified by the pursuits of all the amusements in which persons of his age and rank are apt to delight, engrossed, in appearance, the whole of his time and thoughts. But amidst this hurry of dissipation he prosecuted his plan with the most cool attention, neither retarding the design by a timid hesitation nor precipitating the execution by an excess of impatience. He continued his correspondence with the French ambassador at Rome, though without communicating to him his real intentions, that by his means he might secure the protection of the French arms if hereafter he

should find it necessary to call them to his aid. He entered into a close confederacy with Farnese, duke of Parma, who, being disgusted with the emperor for refusing to grant him the investiture of that duchy, was eager to promote any measure that tended to diminish his influence in Italy or to ruin a family so implicitly devoted to him as that of Doria. Being sensible that in a maritime state the acquisition of naval power was what he ought chiefly to aim at, he purchased four galleys from the pope, who probably was not unacquainted with the design which he had formed, and did not disapprove of it. Under color of fitting out one of these galleys to sail on a cruise against the Turks, he not only assembled a good number of his own vassals, but engaged in his service many bold adventurers whom the truce between the emperor and Solyman had deprived of their usual occupation and subsistence.

While Fiesco was taking these important steps, he preserved so admirably his usual appearance of being devoted entirely to pleasure and amusement, and paid court with such artful address to the two Dorias, as imposed not only on the generous and unsuspecting mind of Andrew, but deceived Giannetino, who, conscious of his own criminal intentions, was more apt to distrust the designs of others. So many instruments being now prepared, nothing remained but to strike the blow. Various consultations were held by Fiesco with his confidants, in order to settle the manner of doing it with the greatest certainty and effect. At first they proposed to murder the Dorias and

their chief adherents during the celebration of high mass in the principal church; but, as Andrew was often absent from religious solemnities, on account of his great age, that design was laid aside. It was then concerted that Fiesco should invite the uncle and nephew, with all their friends whom he had marked out as victims, to his house, where it would be easy to cut them off at once without danger or resistance; but, as Giannettino was obliged to leave the town on the day which they had chosen, it became necessary likewise to alter this plan. They at last determined to attempt by open force what they found difficult to effect by stratagem, and fixed on the night between the second and third of January for the execution of their enterprise. The time was chosen with great propriety; for, as the doge of the former year was to quit his office, according to custom, on the first of the month, and his successor could not be elected sooner than the fourth, the republic remained during that interval in a sort of anarchy, and Fiesco might with less violence take possession of the vacant dignity.

The morning of that day Fiesco employed in visiting his friends, passing some hours among them, with a spirit as gay and unembarrassed as at other times. Towards evening he paid court to the Dorias with his usual marks of respect, and, surveying their countenance and behavior with the attention natural in his situation, was happy to observe the perfect security in which they remained, without the least forethought or dread of that storm which had been so long a gathering,

and was now ready to burst over their heads. From their palace he hastened to his own, which stood by itself in the middle of a large court, surrounded by a high wall. The gates had been set open in the morning, and all persons, without distinction, were allowed to enter, but strong guards posted within the court suffered no one to return. Verrina, meanwhile, and a few persons trusted with the secret of the conspiracy, after conducting Fiesco's vassals, as well as the crews of his galleys, into the palace in small bodies, with as little noise as possible, dispersed themselves through the city, and, in the name of their patron, invited to an entertainment the principal citizens whom they knew to be disgusted with the administration of the Dorias and to have inclination as well as courage to attempt a change in the government. Of the vast number of persons who now filled the palace, a few only knew for what purpose they were assembled; the rest, astonished at finding, instead of the preparations for a feast, a court crowded with armed men, and apartments filled with the instruments of war, gazed on each other with a mixture of curiosity, impatience, and terror.

While their minds were in this state of suspense and agitation, Fiesco appeared. With a look full of alacrity and confidence, he addressed himself to the persons of chief distinction, telling them that they were not now called to partake of the pleasure of an entertainment, but to join in a deed of valor which would lead them to liberty and immortal renown. He set before their eyes the

exorbitant as well as intolerable authority of the elder Doria, which the ambition of Giannetino, and the partiality of the emperor to a family more devoted to him than to their country, was about to enlarge and to render perpetual. "This unrighteous dominion," continued he, "you have it now in your power to subvert, and to establish the freedom of your country on a firm basis. The tyrants must be cut off. I have taken the most effectual measures for this purpose. My associates are numerous. I can depend on allies and protectors if necessary. Happily, the tyrants are as secure as I have been provident. Their insolent contempt of their countrymen has banished the suspicion and timidity which usually render the guilty quick-sighted to discern, as well as sagacious to guard against, the vengeance which they deserve. They will now feel the blow before they suspect any hostile hand to be nigh. Let us, then, sally forth, that we may deliver our country by one generous effort, almost unaccompanied with danger, and certain of success." These words, uttered with that irresistible fervor which animates the mind when roused by great objects, made the desired impression on the audience. Fiesco's vassals, ready to execute whatever their master should command, received his discourse with a murmur of applause. To many, whose fortunes were desperate, the license and confusion of an insurrection afforded an agreeable prospect. Those of higher rank and more virtuous sentiments durst not discover the surprise or horror with which they were struck at the proposal of an

enterprise no less unexpected than atrocious, as each of them imagined the other to be in the secret of the conspiracy, and saw himself surrounded by persons who waited only a signal from their leader to perpetrate the greatest crime. With one voice, then, all applauded, or feigned to applaud, the undertaking.

Fiesco having thus fixed and encouraged his associates, before he gave them his last orders he hastened for a moment to the apartment of his wife, a lady of the noble house of Cibo, whom he loved with tender affection, and whose beauty and virtue rendered her worthy of his love. The noise of the armed men who crowded the court and palace having long before this reached her ears, she concluded some hazardous enterprise to be in hand, and she trembled for her husband. He found her in all the anguish of uncertainty and fear; and, as it was now impossible to keep his design concealed, he informed her of what he had undertaken. The prospect of a scene so full of horror as well as danger completed her agony; and, foreboding immediately in her mind the fatal issue of it, she endeavored, by her tears, her entreaties, and her despair, to divert him from his purpose. Fiesco, after trying in vain to soothe and to inspire her with hope, broke from a situation into which an excess of tenderness had unwarily seduced him, though it could not shake his resolution. "Farewell!" he cried, as he quitted the apartment: "you shall either never see me more, or you shall behold to-morrow everything in Genoa subject to your power."

As soon as he rejoined his companions, he allotted each his proper station. Some were appointed to assault and seize the different gates of the city, some to make themselves masters of the principal streets or places of strength. Fiesco reserved for himself the attack of the harbor where Doria's galleys were laid up, as the post of chief importance and of greatest danger. It was now midnight, and the citizens slept in the security of peace, when this band of conspirators, numerous, desperate, and well armed, rushed out to execute their plan. They surprised some of the gates, without meeting with any resistance. They got possession of others after a sharp conflict with the soldiers on guard. Verrina, with the galley which had been fitted out against the Turks, blocked up the mouth of the Darsena, or little harbor where Doria's fleet lay. All possibility of escape being cut off by this precaution, when Fiesco attempted to enter the galleys from the shore, to which they were made fast, they were in no condition to make resistance, as they were not only unrigged and disarmed, but had no crew on board except the slaves chained to the oar. Every quarter of the city was now filled with noise and tumult, all the streets resounding with the cry of *Fiesco* and *Liberty*. At that name, so popular and beloved, many of the lower rank took arms, and joined the conspirators. The nobles and partisans of the aristocracy, astonished or affrighted, shut the gates of their houses, and thought of nothing but of securing them from pillage. At last, the noise excited by this scene of violence

and confusion reached the palace of Doria. Giannetino started immediately from his bed, and, imagining that it was occasioned by some mutiny among the sailors, rushed out with a few attendants and hurried towards the harbor. The gate of St. Thomas, through which he had to pass, was already in possession of the conspirators, who, the moment he appeared, fell upon him with the utmost fury and murdered him on the spot. The same must have been the fate of the elder Doria, if Jerome de Fiesco had executed his brother's plan and had proceeded immediately to attack him in his palace; but he, from the sordid consideration of preventing its being plundered amidst the confusion, having forbid his followers to advance, Andrew got intelligence of his nephew's death, as well as of his own danger, and, mounting on horseback, saved himself by flight. Amidst this general consternation, a few senators had the courage to assemble in the Palace of the Republic.⁴⁸ At first, some of the most daring among them attempted to rally the scattered soldiers and to attack a body of the conspirators; but, being repulsed with loss, all agreed that nothing now remained but to treat with the party which seemed to be irresistible. Deputies were accordingly sent to learn of Fiesco what were the concessions with which he would be satisfied, or rather to submit to whatever terms he should please to prescribe.

But by this time Fiesco, with whom they were empowered to negotiate, was no more. Just as he was about to leave the harbor, where every-

⁴⁸ Il Palazzo della Signoria.

thing had succeeded to his wish, that he might join his victorious companions, he heard some extraordinary uproar on board the admiral's galley. Alarmed at the noise, and fearing that the slaves might break their chains and overpower his associates, he ran thither; but, the plank which reached from the shore to the vessel happening to overturn, he fell into the sea, whilst he hurried forward too precipitately. Being loaded with heavy armor, he sunk to the bottom, and perished in the very moment when he must have taken full possession of everything that his ambitious heart could desire. Verrina was the first who discovered this fatal accident, and, foreseeing at once all its consequences, concealed it with the utmost industry from every one but a few leaders of the conspiracy. Nor was it difficult, amidst the darkness and confusion of the night, to have kept it secret until a treaty with the senators should have put the city in the power of the conspirators. All their hopes of this were disconcerted by the imprudence of Jerome Fiesco, who, when the deputies of the senate inquired for his brother, the count of Lavagna, that they might make their proposal to him, replied, with a childish vanity, "I am now the only person to whom that title belongs, and with me you must treat." These words discovered, as well to his friends as to his enemies, what had happened, and made the impression which might have been expected upon both. The deputies, encouraged by this event, the only one which could occasion such a sudden revolution as might turn to their advantage, assumed

instantly, with admirable presence of mind, a new tone, suitable to the change in their circumstances, and made high demands. While they endeavored to gain time by protracting the negotiation, the rest of the senators were busy in assembling their partisans, and in forming a body capable of defending the Palace of the Republic. On the other hand, the conspirators, astonished at the death of a man whom they adored and trusted, and placing no confidence in Jerome, a giddy youth, felt their courage die away, and their arms fall from their hands. That profound and amazing secrecy with which the conspiracy had been concerted, and which had contributed hitherto so much to its success, proved now the chief cause of its miscarriage. The leader was gone; the greater part of those who acted under him knew not his confidants, and were strangers to the object at which he aimed. There was no person among them whose authority or abilities entitled him to assume Fiesco's place or to finish his plan. After having lost the spirit which animated it, life and activity deserted the whole body. Many of the conspirators withdrew to their houses, hoping that, amidst the darkness of the night, they had passed unobserved and might remain unknown. Others sought for safety by a timely retreat; and before break of day most of them fled with precipitation from a city which but a few hours before was ready to acknowledge them as masters.

Next morning everything was quiet in Genoa: not an enemy was to be seen; few marks of the violence of the former night appeared, the con-

spirators having conducted their enterprise with more noise than bloodshed, and gained all their advantages by surprise rather than by force of arms. Towards evening Andrew Doria returned to the city, being met by all the inhabitants, who received him with acclamations of joy. Though the disgrace as well as danger of the preceding night were fresh in his mind, and the mangled body of his kinsman still before his eyes, such was his moderation as well as magnanimity that the decree issued by the senate against the conspirators did not exceed that just measure of severity which was requisite for the support of government, and was dictated neither by the violence of resentment nor the rancor of revenge.⁴⁹

After taking the necessary precautions for preventing the flame which was now so happily extinguished from breaking out anew, the first care of the senate was to send an ambassador to the emperor, to give him a particular detail of what had happened, and to beg his assistance towards the reduction of Montobbio, a strong fort on the hereditary estate of the Fiesci, in which Jerome had shut himself up. Charles was no less alarmed than astonished at an event so strange and unex-

⁴⁹ Thuan., 93.—Sigonii Vita Andreæ Doriæ, 1196.—La Conjurati-
on du Comte de Fiesque, par le Cardinal de Retz.—Adriani, Istorica,
lib. vi. 369.—Folietæ Conjuratio Jo. Lud. Fiesci, ap. Græv. Thes.
Ital., i. 883.—It is remarkable that Cardinal de Retz, at the age of
eighteen, composed a history of this conspiracy, containing such a
discovery of his admiration of Fiesco and his enterprise as renders
it not surprising that a minister so jealous and discerning as Riche-
lieu should be led by the perusal of it to predict the turbulent and
dangerous spirit of that young ecclesiastic. Mém. de Retz, tom. i.
p. 13.

pected. He could not believe that Fiesco, how bold or adventurous soever, durst have attempted such an enterprise but on foreign suggestion and from hope of foreign aid. Being informed that the duke of Parma was well acquainted with the plan of the conspirators, he immediately supposed that the pope could not be ignorant of a measure which his son had countenanced. Proceeding from this to a farther conjecture, which Paul's cautious maxims of policy in other instances rendered extremely probable, he concluded that the French king must have known and approved of the design; and he began to apprehend that this spark might again kindle the flame of war which had raged so long in Italy. As he had drained his Italian territories of troops on account of the German war, he was altogether unprovided for resisting any hostile attack in that country, and on the first appearance of danger he must have detached thither the greatest part of his forces for its defence. In this situation of affairs, it would have been altogether imprudent in the emperor to have advanced in person against the elector until he should learn with some degree of certainty whether such a scene were not about to open in Italy as might put it out of his power to keep the field with an army sufficient to oppose him.

BOOK IX

Francis, jealous of the Emperor, endeavors to form Alliances against him—Death of Francis—The Emperor marches against the Elector of Saxony—Battle of Mulhausen—The Elector taken Prisoner—Charles invests Wittenberg—His ungenerous Treatment of the Elector—Maurice put in Possession of the Electoral Dominions—The Emperor treacherously detains the Landgrave as a Prisoner—His Rigor towards his German Subjects—Ferdinand's Tyranny in Bohemia—Diet at Augsburg—The Council translated from Trent to Bologna—Assassination of the Pope's Son—The Pope's Dread of the Emperor—Contest as to the Place of Session of the Council—Compliance with "The Interim" enforced by the Emperor—The Pope dismisses the Council assembled at Bologna—The Emperor receives his Son Philip in the Low Countries

THE emperor's dread of the hostile intentions of the pope and French king did not proceed from any imaginary or ill-grounded suspicion. Paul had already given the strongest proofs both of his jealousy and enmity. Charles could not hope that Francis, after a rivalry of so long continuance, would behold the great advantages which he had gained over the confederate Protestants, without feeling his ancient emulation revive. He was not deceived in this conjecture. Francis had observed the rapid progress of his arms with deep concern, and, though hitherto prevented, by circumstances which have been mentioned, from interposing in order to check them, he was now convinced that, if he did not make some extraordinary and timely effort, Charles must acquire such a degree of power as would enable him to give law to the rest of Europe.

This apprehension, which did not take its rise from the jealousy of rivalship alone, but was entertained by the wisest politicians of the age, suggested various expedients which might serve to retard the course of the emperor's victories, and to form by degrees such a combination against him as might put a stop to his dangerous career.

With this view, Francis instructed his emissaries in Germany to employ all their address in order to revive the courage of the confederates and to prevent them from submitting to the emperor. He made liberal offers of his assistance to the elector and landgrave, whom he knew to be the most zealous, as well as the most powerful, of the whole body; he used every argument and proposed every advantage which could either confirm their dread of the emperor's designs or determine them not to imitate the inconsiderate credulity of their associates in giving up their religion and liberties to his disposal. While he took this step towards continuing the civil war which raged in Germany, he endeavored likewise to stir up foreign enemies against the emperor. He solicited Solyman to seize this favorable opportunity of invading Hungary, which had been drained of all the troops necessary for its defence, in order to form the army against the confederates of Smalkalde. He exhorted the pope to repair by a vigorous and seasonable effort the error of which he had been guilty in contributing to raise the emperor to such a formidable height of power. Finding Paul, both from the consciousness of his own mistake, and his dread of its consequences,

abundantly disposed to listen to what he suggested, he availed himself of this favorable disposition which the pontiff began to discover, as an argument to gain the Venetians. He endeavored to convince them that nothing could save Italy, and even Europe, from oppression and servitude, but their joining with the pope and him in giving the first beginning to a general confederacy in order to humble that ambitious potentate whom they had all equal reason to dread.

Having set on foot these negotiations in the southern courts, he turned his attention next towards those in the north of Europe. As the king of Denmark had particular reasons to be offended with the emperor, Francis imagined that the object of the league which he had projected would be highly acceptable to him; and, lest considerations of caution or prudence should restrain him from joining in it, he attempted to overcome these by offering him the young queen of Scots in marriage to his son.¹ As the ministers who governed England in the name of Edward VI. had openly declared themselves converts to the opinions of the Reformers, as soon as it became safe upon Henry's death to lay aside that disguise which his intolerant bigotry had forced them to assume, Francis flattered himself that their zeal would not allow them to remain inactive spectators of the overthrow and destruction of those who professed the same faith with themselves. He hoped that, notwithstanding the struggles of faction incident to a minority, and the prospect

¹ Mém. de Ribier, i. 600, 606.

of an approaching rupture with the Scots, he might prevail on them likewise to take part in the common cause.²

While Francis employed such a variety of expedients and exerted himself with such extraordinary activity to rouse the different states of Europe against his rival, he did not neglect what depended on himself alone. He levied troops in all parts of his dominions, he collected military stores, he contracted with the Swiss cantons for a considerably body of men, he put his finances in admirable order, he remitted considerable sums to the elector and landgrave, and took all the other steps necessary towards commencing hostilities on the shortest warning and with the greatest vigor.³

Operations so complicated, and which required the putting of so many instruments in motion, did not escape the emperor's observation. He was early informed of Francis's intrigues in the several courts of Europe, as well as of his domestic preparations; and, sensible how fatal an interruption a foreign war would prove to his designs in Germany, he trembled at the prospect of that event. The danger, however, appeared to him as unavoidable as it was great. He knew the insatiable and well-directed ambition of Solyman, and that he always chose the season for beginning his military enterprises with prudence equal to the valor with which he conducted them. The pope, as he had good reason to believe, wanted not pretexts to justify a rupture, or inclination to begin hostilities. He had already made some discovery

² Mém. de Ribier, i. 635.

³ Ibid., 595.

of his sentiments by expressing a joy altogether unbecoming the head of the Church upon receiving an account of the advantage which the elector of Saxony had gained over Albert of Brandenburg; and, as he was now secure of finding in the French king an ally of sufficient power to support him, he was at no pains to conceal the violence and extent of his enmity.⁴ The Venetians, Charles was well assured, had long observed the growth of his power with jealousy, which, added to the solicitations and promises of France, might at last quicken their slow counsels and overcome their natural caution. The Danes and English, it was evident, had both peculiar reason to be disgusted, as well as strong motives to act against him. But above all he dreaded the active emulation of Francis himself, whom he considered as the soul and mover of any confederacy that could be formed against him; and, as that monarch had afforded protection to Verrina, who sailed directly to Marseilles upon the miscarriage of Fiesco's conspiracy, Charles expected every moment to see the commencement of those hostile operations in Italy of which he conceived the insurrection in Genoa to have been only the prelude.

But, while he remained in this state of suspense and solicitude, there was one circumstance which afforded him some prospect of escaping the danger. The French king's health began to decline. A disease which was the effect of his inconsiderate pursuit of pleasure preyed gradually on his constitution. The preparations for war, as well

⁴ Mém. de Ribier, i. 637.

as the negotiations in the different courts, began to languish, together with the monarch who gave spirit to both. The Genoese during that interval reduced Montobbio, took Jerome Fiesco prisoner, and, putting him to death, together with his chief adherents, extinguished all remains of the conspiracy. Several of the imperial cities in Germany, despairing of timely assistance from France, submitted to the emperor. Even the landgrave seemed disposed to abandon the elector, and to bring matters to a speedy accommodation on such terms as he could obtain. In the meantime, Charles waited with impatience the issue of a distemper which was to decide whether he must relinquish all other schemes in order to prepare for resisting a combination of the greater part of Europe against him, or whether he might proceed to invade Saxony, without interruption or fear of danger.

The good fortune so remarkably propitious to his family that some historians have called it the *star of the house of Austria*, did not desert him on this occasion. Francis died at Rambouillet on the last day of March, in the fifty-third year of his age and the thirty-third of his reign. During twenty-eight years of that time an avowed rivalry subsisted between him and the emperor, which involved not only their own dominions, but the greater part of Europe, in wars which were prosecuted with more violent animosity and drawn out to a greater length than had been known in any former period. Many circumstances contributed to this. Their animosity was founded in

opposition of interest, heightened by personal emulation, and exasperated not only by mutual injuries but by reciprocal insults. At the same time, whatever advantage one seemed to possess towards gaining the ascendant was wonderfully balanced by some favorable circumstance peculiar to the other. The emperor's dominions were of greater extent, the French king's lay more compact: Francis governed his kingdom with absolute power; that of Charles was limited, but he supplied the want of authority by address: the troops of the former were more impetuous and enterprising, those of the latter better disciplined and more patient of fatigue. The talents and abilities of the two monarchs were as different as the advantages which they possessed, and contributed no less to prolong the contest between them. Francis took his resolutions suddenly, prosecuted them at first with warmth, and pushed them into execution with a most adventurous courage; but, being destitute of the perseverance necessary to surmount difficulties, he often abandoned his designs, or relaxed the vigor of pursuit, from impatience, and sometimes from levity. Charles deliberated long, and determined with coolness; but, having once fixed his plan, he adhered to it with inflexible obstinacy, and neither danger nor discouragement could turn him aside from the execution of it. The success of their enterprises was suitable to the diversity of their characters, and was uniformly influenced by it. Francis, by his impetuous activity, often disconcerted the emperor's best-laid schemes; Charles,

by a more calm but steady prosecution of his designs, checked the rapidity of his rival's career and baffled or repulsed his most vigorous efforts. The former, at the opening of a war or of a campaign, broke in upon his enemy with the violence of a torrent, and carried all before him; the latter, waiting until he saw the force of his rival begin to abate, recovered in the end not only all that he had lost, but made new acquisitions. Few of the French monarch's attempts towards conquest, whatever promising aspect they might wear at first, were conducted to a happy issue; many of the emperor's enterprises, even after they appeared desperate and impracticable, terminated in the most prosperous manner. Francis was dazzled by the splendor of an undertaking; Charles was allured by the prospect of its turning to his advantage.

The degree, however, of their comparative merit and reputation has not been fixed either by a strict scrutiny into their abilities for government or by an impartial consideration of the greatness and success of their undertakings; and Francis is one of those monarchs who occupies a higher rank in the temple of fame than either his talents or performances entitle him to hold. This pre-eminence he owed to many different circumstances. The superiority which Charles acquired by the victory of Pavia, and which from that period he preserved through the remainder of his reign, was so manifest that Francis's struggle against his exorbitant and growing dominion was viewed by most of the other powers not only with

the partiality which naturally arises for those who gallantly maintain an unequal contest, but with the favor due to one who was resisting a common enemy and endeavoring to set bounds to a monarch equally formidable to them all. The characters of princes, too, especially among their contemporaries, depend not only upon their talents for government, but upon their qualities as men. Francis, notwithstanding the many errors conspicuous in his foreign policy and domestic administration, was nevertheless humane, beneficent, generous. He possessed dignity without pride, affability free from meanness, and courtesy exempt from deceit. All who had access to him—and no man of merit was ever denied that privilege—respected and loved him. Captivated with his personal qualities, his subjects forgot his defects as a monarch; and, admiring him as the most accomplished and amiable gentleman in his dominions, they hardly murmured at acts of maladministration which in a prince of less engaging dispositions would have been deemed unpardonable. This admiration, however, must have been temporary only, and would have died away with the courtiers who bestowed it; the illusion arising from his private virtues must have ceased, and posterity would have judged of his public conduct with its usual impartiality; but another circumstance prevented this, and his name hath been transmitted to posterity with increasing reputation. Science and the arts had at that time made little progress in France. They were just beginning to advance beyond the limits of Italy, where

they had revived, and which had hitherto been their only seat. Francis took them immediately under his protection, and vied with Leo himself in the zeal and munificence with which he encouraged them. He invited learned men to his court, he conversed with them familiarly, he employed them in business, he raised them to offices of dignity and honored them with his confidence. That order of men, not more prone to complain when denied the respect to which they conceive themselves entitled than apt to be pleased when treated with the distinction which they consider as their due, thought they could not exceed in gratitude to such a benefactor, and strained their invention and employed all their ingenuity in panegyrics. Succeeding authors, warmed with their descriptions of Francis's bounty, adopted their encomiums, and even added to them. The appellation of *father of letters*, bestowed upon Francis, hath rendered his memory sacred among historians; and they seem to have regarded it as a sort of impiety to uncover his infirmities or to point out his defects. Thus Francis, notwithstanding his inferior abilities and want of success, hath more than equalled the fame of Charles. The good qualities which he possessed as a man have entitled him to greater admiration and praise than have been bestowed upon the extensive genius and fortunate arts of a more capable but less amiable rival.

By his death a considerable change was made in the state of Europe. Charles, growing old in the arts of government and command, had now to

contend only with younger monarchs, who could not be regarded as worthy to enter the lists with him who had stood so many encounters with Henry VIII. and Francis I. and come off with honor in all these different struggles. By this event he was eased of all disquietude, and was happy to find that he might begin with safety those operations against the elector of Saxony which he had hitherto been obliged to suspend. He knew the abilities of Henry II., who had just mounted the throne of France, to be greatly inferior to those of his father, and foresaw that he would be so much occupied for some time in displacing the late king's ministers, whom he hated, and in gratifying the ambitious demands of his own favorites, that he had nothing to dread either from his personal efforts or from any confederacy, which this unexperienced prince could form.

But, as it was uncertain how long such an interval of security might continue, Charles determined instantly to improve it; and as soon as he heard of Francis's demise he began his march from Egra on the borders of Bohemia. But the departure of the papal troops, together with the retreat of the Flemings, had so much diminished his army that sixteen thousand men were all he could assemble. With this inconsiderable body he set out on an expedition the event of which was to decide what degree of authority he should possess from that period in Germany; but, as this little army consisted chiefly of the veteran Spanish and Italian bands, he did not, in trusting to them, commit much to the decision of chance; and

even with so small a force he had reason to entertain the most sanguine hopes of success. The elector had levied an army greatly superior in number; but neither the experience and discipline of his troops nor the abilities of his officers were to be compared with those of the emperor. The elector, besides, had already been guilty of an error which deprived him of all the advantage which he might have derived from his superiority in number, and was alone sufficient to have occasioned his ruin. Instead of keeping his forces united, he detached one great body towards the frontiers of Bohemia, in order to facilitate his junction with the malecontents of that kingdom, and cantoned a considerable part of what remained in different places of Saxony, where he expected the emperor would make his first impression, vainly imagining that open towns with small garrisons might be rendered tenable against an enemy.

The emperor entered the southern frontier of Saxony, and attacked Altorf upon the Elster. The impropriety of the measure which the elector had taken was immediately seen, the troops posted in that town surrendering without resistance; and those in all the other places between that and the Elbe either imitated their example or fled as the imperialists approached. Charles, that they might not recover from the panic with which they seemed to be struck, advanced without losing a moment. The elector, who had fixed his headquarters at Meissen, continued in his wonted state of fluctuation and uncertainty. He even became

more undetermined in proportion as the danger drew near and called for prompt and decisive resolutions. Sometimes he acted as if he had resolved to defend the banks of the Elbe and to hazard a battle with the enemy as soon as the detachments which he had called in were able to join him. At other times he abandoned this as rash and perilous, seeming to adopt the more prudent counsels of those who advised him to endeavor at protracting the war, and for that end to retire under the fortifications of Wittemberg, where the imperialists could not attack him without manifest disadvantage, and where he might wait in safety for the succors which he expected from Mecklenburg, Pomerania, and the Protestant cities on the Baltic. Without fixing upon either of these plans, he broke down the bridge at Meissen, and marched along the east bank of the Elbe to Muhlberg. There he deliberated anew, and after much hesitation, adopted one of those middle schemes which are always acceptable to feeble minds incapable of deciding. He left a detachment at Muhlberg to oppose the imperialists if they should attempt to pass at that place, and, advancing a few miles with his main body, encamped there in expectation of the event according to which he proposed to regulate his subsequent motions.

Charles, meanwhile, pushing forward incessantly, arrived, the evening of the twenty-third of April, on the banks of the Elbe, opposite to Muhlberg. The river at that place was three hundred paces in breadth, above four feet in depth, its

current rapid, and the bank possessed by the Saxons was higher than that which he occupied. Undismayed, however, by all these obstacles, he called together his general officers, and, without asking their opinion, communicated to them his intention of attempting next morning to force his passage over the river and to attack the enemy wherever he could come up with them. They all expressed their astonishment at such a bold resolution; and even the duke of Alva, though naturally daring and impetuous, and Maurice of Saxony, notwithstanding his impatience to crush his rival the elector, remonstrated earnestly against it. But the emperor, confiding in his own judgment or good fortune, paid no regard to their arguments, and gave the orders necessary for executing his design.

Early in the morning a body of Spanish and Italian foot marched towards the river, and began an incessant fire upon the enemy. The long, heavy muskets used in that age did execution on the opposite bank, and many of the soldiers, hurried on by a martial ardor in order to get nearer the enemy, rushed into the stream, and, advancing breast-high, fired with a more certain aim and with greater effect. Under cover of their fire, a bridge of boats was begun to be laid for the infantry; and a peasant having undertaken to conduct the cavalry through the river by a ford with which he was well acquainted, they also were put in motion. The Saxons posted in Muhlberg endeavored to obstruct these operations by a brisk fire from a battery which they had erected; but,

as a thick fog covered all the low grounds upon the river, they could not take aim with any certainty, and the imperialists suffered very little; at the same time, the Saxons being much galled by the Spanish and Italians, they set on fire some boats which had been collected near the village, and prepared to retire. The imperialists perceiving this, ten Spanish soldiers instantly stripped themselves, and, holding their swords with their teeth, swam across the river, put to flight such of the Saxons as ventured to oppose them, saved from the flames as many boats as were sufficient to complete their own bridge, and by this spirited and successful action encouraged their companions no less than they intimidated the enemy.

By this time, the cavalry, each trooper having a foot-soldier beside him, began to enter the river, the light-horse marching in front, followed by the men-at-arms, whom the emperor led in person, mounted on a Spanish horse, dressed in a sumptuous habit, and carrying a javelin in his hand. Such a numerous body struggling through a great river, in which, according to the directions of their guide, they were obliged to make several turns, sometimes treading on a firm bottom, sometimes swimming, presented to their companions whom they left behind a spectacle equally magnificent and interesting.⁵ Their courage at last surmounted every obstacle, no man betraying any symptom of fear, when the emperor shared in the danger no less than the meanest soldier. The

⁵ Avila, 115, a.

moment that they reached the opposite side, Charles, without waiting the arrival of the rest of the infantry, advanced towards the Saxons with the troops which had passed along with him, who, flushed with their good fortune, and despising an enemy who had neglected to oppose them when it might have been done with such advantage, made no account of their superior numbers, and marched on as to a certain victory.

During all these operations, which necessarily consumed much time, the elector remained inactive in his camp; and, from an infatuation which appears to be so amazing that the best-informed historians impute it to the treacherous arts of his generals, who deceived him by false intelligence, he would not believe that the emperor had passed the river or could be so near at hand.⁶ Being convinced at last of his fatal mistake by the concurring testimony of eye-witnesses, he gave orders for retreating towards Wittemberg. But a German army, encumbered, as usual, with baggage and artillery, could not be put suddenly in motion. They had just begun to march, when the light troops of the enemy came in view, and the elector saw an engagement to be unavoidable. As he was no less bold in action than irresolute in council, he made the disposition for battle with the greatest presence of mind and in the most proper manner, taking advantage of a great forest to cover his wings, so as to prevent his being

⁶ Camerar., ap. Freher., iii. 493.—Struv., Corp. Hist. Germ., 1047, 1049.

surrounded by the enemy's cavalry, which were far more numerous than his own. The emperor, likewise, ranged his men in order as they came up, and, riding along the ranks, exhorted them, with few but efficacious words, to do their duty. It was with a very different spirit that the two armies advanced to the charge. As the day, which had hitherto been dark and cloudy, happened to clear up at that moment, this accidental circumstance made an impression on the different parties corresponding to the tone of their minds: the Saxons, surprised and disheartened, felt pain at being exposed fully to the view of the enemy; the imperialists, being now secure that the Protestant forces could not escape from them, rejoiced at the return of sunshine as a certain presage of victory. The shock of battle would not have been long doubtful, if the personal courage which the elector displayed, together with the activity which he exerted from the moment that the approach of the enemy rendered an engagement certain and cut off all possibility of hesitation, had not revived in some degree the spirit of his troops. They repulsed the Hungarian light-horse who began the attack, and received with firmness the men-at-arms who next advanced to the charge; but, as these were the flower of the imperial army, were commanded by experienced officers, and fought under the emperor's eye, the Saxons soon began to give way, and, the light troops rallying at the same time and falling on their flanks, the fight became general. A small body of chosen soldiers, among whom the elector had fought in

person, still continued to defend themselves, and endeavored to save their master by retiring into the forest; but, being surrounded on every side, the elector, wounded in the face, exhausted with fatigue, and perceiving all resistance to be vain, surrendered himself a prisoner. He was conducted immediately towards the emperor, whom he found just returned from the pursuit, standing on the field of battle in the full exultation of success, and receiving the congratulations of his officers upon this complete victory, obtained by his valor and conduct. Even in such an unfortunate and humbling situation, the elector's behavior was equally magnanimous and decent. Sensible of his condition, he approached his conqueror without any of the sullenness or pride which would have been improper in a captive; and, conscious of his own dignity, he descended to no mean submission unbecoming the high station which he held among the German princes. "The fortune of war," said he, "has made me your prisoner, most gracious emperor, and I hope to be treated—" Here Charles harshly interrupted him: "And am I then, at last, acknowledged to be emperor? Charles of Ghent was the only title you lately allowed me. You shall be treated as you deserve." At these words he turned from him abruptly with a haughty air. To this cruel repulse the king of the Romans added reproaches in his own name, using expressions still more ungenerous and insulting. The elector made no reply, but, with an unaltered countenance, which discovered neither astonishment nor

dejection, accompanied the Spanish soldiers appointed to guard him.⁷

This decisive victory cost the imperialists only fifty men. Twelve hundred of the Saxons were killed, chiefly in the pursuit, and a greater number taken prisoners. About four hundred kept in a body, and escaped to Wittemberg, together with the electoral prince, who had likewise been wounded in the action. After resting two days on the field of battle, partly to refresh his army, and partly to receive the deputies of the adjacent towns, which were impatient to secure his protection by submitting to his will, the emperor began to move towards Wittemberg, that he might terminate the war at once by the reduction of that city. The unfortunate elector was carried along in a sort of triumph, and exposed everywhere, as a captive, to his own subjects; a spectacle extremely afflicting to them, who both honored and loved him; though the insult was so far from subduing his firm spirit that it did not even ruffle the wonted tranquillity and composure of his mind.

As Wittemberg, the residence, in that age, of the electoral branch of the Saxon family, was one of the strongest cities in Germany, and could not be taken, if properly defended, without great difficulty, the emperor marched thither with the utmost despatch, hoping that, while the consternation occasioned by his victory was still recent, the inhabitants might imitate the example of their

⁷ Sleid., Hist., 426.—Thuan., 136.—Hortensius de Bello German., ap. Scard., vol. ii. 498.—Descrip. Pugnæ Muhlberg., *ibid.*, p. 509.—P. Heuter., Rer. Austr., lib. xii. c. 13, p. 298.

countrymen, and submit to his power as soon as he appeared before their walls. But Sybilla of Cleves, the elector's wife, a woman no less distinguished by her abilities than her virtue, instead of abandoning herself to tears and lamentations upon her husband's misfortune, endeavored by her example, as well as exhortations, to animate the citizens. She inspired them with such resolution that when summoned to surrender they returned a vigorous answer, warning the emperor to behave towards their sovereign with the respect due to his rank, as they were determined to treat Albert of Brandenburg, who was still a prisoner, precisely in the same manner that he treated the elector. The spirit of the inhabitants, no less than the strength of the city, seemed now to render a siege in form necessary. After such a signal victory, it would have been disgraceful not to have undertaken it, though at the same time the emperor was destitute of everything requisite for carrying it on. But Maurice removed all difficulties, by engaging to furnish provisions, artillery, ammunition, pioneers, and whatever else should be needed. Trusting to this, Charles gave orders to open the trenches before the town. It quickly appeared that Maurice's eagerness to reduce the capital of those dominions, which he expected as his reward for taking arms against his kinsman and deserting the Protestant cause, had led him to promise what exceeded his power to perform. A battering-train was, indeed, carried safely down the Elbe from Dresden to Wittemberg; but, as Maurice had not sufficient force to

preserve a secure communication between his own territories and the camp of the besiegers, Count Mansfeldt, who commanded a body of electoral troops, intercepted and destroyed a convoy of provisions and military stores, and dispersed a band of pioneers destined for the service of the imperialists. This put a stop to the progress of the siege, and convinced the emperor that, as he could not rely on Maurice's promises, recourse ought to be had to some more expeditious as well as more certain method of getting possession of the town.

The unfortunate elector was in his hands, and Charles was ungenerous and hard-hearted enough to take advantage of this, in order to make an experiment whether he might not bring about his design by working upon the tenderness of a wife for her husband, or upon the piety of children towards their parent. With this view, he summoned Sybilla a second time to open the gates, letting her know that if she again refused to comply the elector should answer with his head for her obstinacy. To convince her that this was not an empty threat, he brought his prisoner to an immediate trial. The proceedings against him were as irregular as the stratagem was barbarous. Instead of consulting the states of the empire, or remitting the cause to any court which, according to the German constitution, might have legally taken cognizance of the elector's crime, he subjected the greatest prince in the empire to the jurisdiction of a court-martial composed of Spanish and Italian officers, and in which the unrelenting duke of Alva, a fit instrument for any act of

violence, presided. This strange tribunal founded its charge upon the ban of the empire, which had been issued against the prisoner by the sole authority of the emperor and was destitute of every legal formality which could render it valid. But the court-martial, presuming the elector to be thereby manifestly convicted of treason and rebellion, condemned him to suffer death by being beheaded. This decree was intimated to the elector while he was amusing himself in playing at chess with Ernest of Brunswick, his fellow-prisoner. He paused for a moment, though without discovering any symptom either of surprise or terror, and, after taking notice of the irregularity as well as injustice of the emperor's proceedings, "It is easy," continued he, "to comprehend his scheme. I must die because Wittemberg will not surrender; and I shall lay down my life with pleasure, if by that sacrifice I can preserve the dignity of my house and transmit to my posterity the inheritance which belongs to them. Would to God that this sentence may not affect my wife and children more than it intimidates me, and that they, for the sake of adding a few days to a life already too long, may not renounce honors and territories which they were born to possess!"⁸ He then turned to his antagonist, whom he challenged to continue the game. He played with his usual attention and ingenuity, and, having beat Ernest, expressed all the satisfaction which is commonly felt on gaining such victories. After this, he withdrew to his own apartment, that he

⁸ Thuan., i. 142.

might employ the rest of his time in such religious exercises as were proper in his situation.⁹

It was not with the same indifference or composure that the account of the elector's danger was received in Wittemberg. Sybilla, who had supported with such undaunted fortitude her husband's misfortunes while she imagined that they could reach no farther than to diminish his power or territories, felt all her resolution fail as soon as his life was threatened. Solicitous to save that, she despised every other consideration, and was willing to make any sacrifice in order to appease an incensed conqueror. At the same time, the duke of Cleves, the elector of Brandenburg, and Maurice, to none of whom Charles had communicated the true motives of his violent proceedings against the elector, interceded warmly with him to spare his life. The first was prompted to do so merely by compassion for his sister and regard for his brother-in-law. The two others dreaded the universal reproach that they would incur if, after having boasted so often of the ample security which the emperor had promised them with respect to their religion, the first effect of their union with him should be the public execution of a prince who was justly held in reverence as the most zealous protector of the Protestant cause. Maurice, in particular, foresaw that he must become the object of detestation to the Saxons, and could never hope to govern them with tranquillity, if he were considered by them as accessory to the death of his nearest kinsman in

⁹ Struvii Corpus, 1050.

order that he might obtain possession of his dominions.

While they, from such various motives, solicited Charles, with the most earnest importunity, not to execute the sentence, Sybilla and his children conjured the elector, by letters as well as messengers, to scruple at no concession that would extricate him out of the present danger and deliver them from their fears and anguish on his account. The emperor, perceiving that the expedient which he had tried began to produce the effect that he intended, fell by degrees from his former rigor, and allowed himself to soften into promises of clemency and forgiveness if the elector would show himself worthy of his favor by submitting to reasonable terms. The elector, on whom the consideration of what he might suffer himself had made no impression, was melted by the tears of a wife whom he loved, and could not resist the entreaties of his family. In compliance with their repeated solicitations, he agreed to articles of accommodation which he would otherwise have rejected with disdain. The chief of them were, that he should resign the electoral dignity, as well for himself as for his posterity, into the emperor's hands, to be disposed of entirely at his pleasure; that he should instantly put the imperial troops in possession of the cities of Wittemberg and Gotha; that he should set Albert of Brandenburg at liberty without ransom; that he should submit to the decrees of the imperial chamber, and acquiesce in whatever reformation the emperor should make in the constitution of that court; that he should

renounce all leagues against the emperor or king of the Romans, and enter into no alliance for the future in which they were not comprehended. In return for these important concessions, the emperor not only promised to spare his life, but to settle on him and his posterity the city of Gotha and its territories, together with an annual pension of fifty thousand florins, payable out of the revenues of the electorate, and likewise grant him a sum in ready money to be applied towards the discharge of his debts. Even these articles of grace were clogged with the mortifying condition of his remaining the emperor's prisoner during the rest of his life.¹⁰ To the whole Charles had subjoined that he should submit to the decrees of the pope and council with regard to the controverted points in religion; but the elector, though he had been persuaded to sacrifice all the objects which men commonly hold to be the dearest and most valuable, was inflexible with regard to this point; and neither threats nor entreaties could prevail to make him renounce what he deemed to be truth, or persuade him to act in opposition to the dictates of his conscience.

As soon as the Saxon garrison marched out of Wittemberg, the emperor fulfilled his engagements to Maurice; and, in reward for his merit in having deserted the Protestant cause and having contributed with such success towards the dissolution of the Smalkaldic league, he gave him possession of that city, together with all the other

¹⁰ Sleid., 427.—Thuan., i. 142.—Du Mont, Corps Diplom., iv. 11, 332.

towns in the electorate. It was not without reluctance, however, that he made such a sacrifice. The extraordinary success of his arms had begun to operate in its usual manner upon his ambitious mind, suggesting new and vast projects for the aggrandizement of his family, towards the accomplishment of which the retaining of Saxony would have been of the utmost consequence. But, as the scheme was not then ripe for execution, he durst not yet venture to disclose it; nor would it have been either safe or prudent to offend Maurice, at that juncture, by such a manifest violation of all the promises which had seduced him to abandon his natural allies.

The landgrave, Maurice's father-in-law, was still in arms, and, though now left alone to maintain the Protestant cause, was neither a feeble nor contemptible enemy. His dominions were of considerable extent, his subjects animated with zeal for the Reformation; and, if he could have held the imperialists at bay for a short time, he had much to hope from a party whose strength was still unbroken, whose union as well as vigor might return, and which had reason to depend with certainty on being effectually supported by the king of France. The landgrave thought not of anything so bold or adventurous; but, being seized with the same consternation which had taken possession of his associates, he was intent only on the means of procuring favorable terms from the emperor, whom he viewed as a conqueror to whose will there was a necessity of submitting. Maurice encouraged this tame and pacific spirit by

magnifying, on the one hand, the emperor's power, by boasting, on the other, of his own interest with his victorious ally, and by representing the advantageous conditions which he could not fail of obtaining by his intercession for a friend whom he was so solicitous to save. Sometimes the landgrave was induced to place such unbounded confidence in his promises that he was impatient to bring matters to a final accommodation. On other occasions the emperor's exorbitant ambition, restrained neither by the scruples of decency nor the maxims of justice, together with the recent and shocking proof which he had given of this in his treatment of the elector of Saxony, came so full into his thoughts, and made such a lively impression on them, that he broke off abruptly the negotiations which he had begun, seeming to be convinced that it was more prudent to depend for safety on his own arms than to confide in Charles's generosity. But this bold resolution, which despair had suggested to an impatient spirit fretted by disappointments, was not of long continuance. Upon a more deliberate survey of the enemy's power, as well as his own weakness, his doubts and fears returned upon him, and together with them the spirit of negotiating, and the desire of accommodation.

Maurice and the elector of Brandenburg acted as mediators between him and the emperor; and, after all that the former had vaunted of his influence, the conditions prescribed to the landgrave were extremely rigorous. The articles with regard to his renouncing the league of Smalkalde,

acknowledging the emperor's authority, and submitting to the decrees of the imperial chamber, were the same which had been imposed on the elector of Saxony. Besides these, he was required to surrender his person and territories to the emperor, to implore for pardon on his knees, to pay a hundred and fifty thousand crowns towards defraying the expenses of the war, to demolish the fortifications of all the towns in his dominions except one, to oblige the garrison which he placed in it to take an oath of fidelity to the emperor, to allow a free passage through his territories to the imperial troops as often as it shall be demanded, to deliver up all his artillery and ammunition to the emperor, to set at liberty, without ransom, Henry of Brunswick, together with the other prisoners whom he had taken during the war, and neither to take arms himself nor to permit any of his subjects to serve against the emperor or his allies for the future.¹¹

The landgrave ratified these articles, though with the utmost reluctance, as they contained no stipulation with regard to the manner in which he was to be treated, and left him entirely at the emperor's mercy. Necessity, however, compelled him to give his assent to them. Charles, who had assumed the haughty and imperious tone of a conqueror ever since the reduction of Saxony, insisted on unconditional submission, and would permit nothing to be added to the terms which he had prescribed that could in any degree limit the fulness of his power or restrain him from

¹¹ Sleid., 430.—Thuan., lib. iv. 146.

behaving as he saw meet towards a prince whom he regarded as absolutely at his disposal. But, though he would not vouchsafe to negotiate with the landgrave on such a footing of equality as to suffer any article to be inserted, among those which he had dictated to him, that could be considered as a formal stipulation for the security and freedom of his person, he, or his ministers in his name, gave the elector of Brandenburg and Maurice such full satisfaction with regard to this point that they assured the landgrave that Charles would behave to him in the same way as he had done to the duke of Wurtemberg, and would allow him, whenever he had made his submission, to return to his own territories. Upon finding the landgrave to be still possessed with his former suspicions of the emperor's intentions, and unwilling to trust verbal or ambiguous declarations in a matter of such essential concern as his own liberty, they sent him a bond, signed by them both, containing the most solemn obligations that if any violence whatsoever was offered to his person during his interview with the emperor they would instantly surrender themselves to his sons, and remain in their hands to be treated by them in the same manner as the emperor should treat him.¹²

This, together with the indispensable obligation of performing what was contained in the articles of which he had accepted, removed his doubts and scruples, or made it necessary to get over them. He repaired, for that purpose, to the imperial camp at Hall in Saxony, where a circumstance

¹² Du Mont, Corps Diplom., iv. 11, 336.

occurred which revived his suspicions and increased his fears. Just as he was about to enter the chamber of presence, in order to make his public submission to the emperor, a copy of the articles which he had approved of was put into his hands, in order that he might ratify them anew. Upon perusing them, he perceived that the imperial ministers had added two new articles: one importing that, if any dispute should arise concerning the meaning of the former conditions, the emperor should have the right of putting what interpretation upon them he thought most reasonable; the other, that the landgrave was bound to submit implicitly to the decisions of the council of Trent. This unworthy artifice, calculated to surprise him into an approbation of articles to which he had not the most distant idea of assenting, by proposing them to him at a time when his mind was engrossed and disquieted with the thoughts of that humiliating ceremony which he had to perform, filled the landgrave with indignation, and made him break out into all those violent expressions of rage to which his temper was prone. With some difficulty the elector of Brandenburg and Maurice prevailed at length on the emperor's ministers to drop the former article as unjust, and to explain the latter in such a manner that he could agree to it without openly renouncing the Protestant religion.

This obstacle being surmounted, the landgrave was impatient to finish a ceremony which, how mortifying soever, had been declared necessary towards his obtaining pardon. The emperor was

seated on a magnificent throne, with all the ensigns of his dignity, surrounded by a numerous train of the princes of the empire, among whom was Henry of Brunswick, lately the landgrave's prisoner, and now, by a sudden reverse of fortune, a spectator of his humiliation. The landgrave was introduced with great solemnity, and, advancing towards the throne, fell upon his knees. His chancellor, who walked behind him, immediately read, by his master's command, a paper, which contained an humble confession of the crime whereof he had been guilty, an acknowledgment that he had merited on that account the most severe punishment, an absolute resignation of himself and his dominions to be disposed of at the emperor's pleasure, a submissive petition for pardon, his hopes of which were founded entirely on the emperor's clemency; and it concluded with promises of behaving, for the future, like a subject whose principles of loyalty and obedience would be confirmed, and would even derive new force, from the sentiments of gratitude which must hereafter fill and animate his heart. While the chancellor was reading this abject declaration, the eyes of all the spectators were fixed on the unfortunate landgrave; few could behold a prince, so powerful as well as high-spirited, suing for mercy in the posture of a suppliant, without being touched with commiseration, and perceiving serious reflections arise in their minds upon the instability of human grandeur. The emperor viewed the whole transaction with a haughty, unfeeling composure, and, preserving a profound

silence himself, made a sign to one of his secretaries to read his answer; the tenor of which was, that, though he might have justly inflicted on him the grievous punishment which his crimes deserved, yet, prompted by his own generosity, moved by the solicitations of several princes in behalf of the landgrave, and influenced by his penitential acknowledgments, he would not deal with him according to the rigor of justice, and would subject him to no penalty that was not specified in the articles which he had already subscribed. The moment the secretary had finished, Charles turned away abruptly, without deigning to give the unhappy suppliant any sign of compassion or reconciliation. He did not even desire him to rise from his knees, which the landgrave, having ventured to do unbidden, advanced towards the emperor with an intention to kiss his hand, flattering himself that, his guilt being now fully expiated, he might presume to take that liberty. But the elector of Brandenburg, perceiving that this familiarity would be offensive to the emperor, interposed, and desired the landgrave to go along with him and Maurice to the duke of Alva's apartments in the castle.

He was received and entertained by that nobleman with the respect and courtesy due to such a guest; but after supper, while he was engaged in play, the duke took the elector and Maurice aside, and communicated to them the emperor's orders, that the landgrave must remain a prisoner in that place, under the custody of a Spanish guard. As they had not hitherto entertained the

most distant suspicion of the emperor's sincerity or rectitude of intention, their surprise was excessive, and their indignation not inferior to it, on discovering how greatly they had been deceived themselves, and how infamously abused, in having been made the instruments of deceiving and ruining their friend. They had recourse to complaints, to arguments, and to entreaties, in order to save themselves from that disgrace, and to extricate him out of the wretched situation into which he had been betrayed by too great confidence in them. But the duke of Alva remained inflexible, and pleaded the necessity of executing the emperor's commands. By this time it grew late, and the landgrave, who knew nothing of what had passed, nor dreaded the snare in which he was entangled, prepared for departure, when the fatal orders were intimated to him. He was struck dumb at first with astonishment; but, after being silent a few moments, he broke out into all the violent expressions which horror at injustice accompanied with fraud naturally suggests. He complained, he expostulated, he exclaimed; sometimes inveighing against the emperor's artifices as unworthy of a great and generous prince, sometimes censuring the credulity of his friends in trusting to Charles's insidious promises, sometimes charging them with meanness in stooping to lend their assistance towards the execution of such a perfidious and dishonorable scheme; and, in the end, he required them to remember their engagements to his children, and instantly to fulfil them. They, after giving way for a little to the

torrent of his passion, solemnly asserted their own innocence and upright intention in the whole transaction, and encouraged him to hope that as soon as they saw the emperor they would obtain redress of an injury which affected their own honor no less than it did his liberty. At the same time, in order to soothe his rage and impatience, Maurice remained with him during the night, in the apartment where he was confined.¹³

Next morning the elector and Maurice applied jointly to the emperor, representing the infamy to which they would be exposed throughout Germany if the landgrave were detained in custody; that they would not have advised, nor would he himself have consented to, an interview, if they had suspected that the loss of his liberty were to be the consequence of his submission; that they were bound to procure his release, having plighted their faith to that effect and engaged their own persons as sureties for his. Charles listened to their earnest remonstrances with the utmost coolness. As he now stood no longer in need of their services, they had the mortification to find that their former obsequiousness was forgotten, and little regard paid to their intercession. He was ignorant, he told them, of their particular or private transactions with the landgrave, nor was his conduct to be regulated by any engagements into which they had thought fit to enter; though he knew well what he himself had promised, which was not that the landgrave should be

¹³ Sleid., 433.—Thuan., lib. iv. 147.—Struv., Corp. Hist. Germ., ii. 1052.

exempt from all restraint, but that he should not be kept a prisoner during life.¹⁴ Having said this with a peremptory and decisive tone, he put an end to the conference; and they, seeing no probability at that time of making any impression upon the emperor, who seemed to have taken this resolution deliberately and to be obstinately bent on adhering to it, were obliged to acquaint the unfortunate prisoner with the ill success of their endeavors in his behalf. The disappointment threw him into a new and more violent transport of rage, so that, to prevent his proceeding to some desperate extremity, the elector and Maurice promised that they would not quit the emperor until by the frequency and fervor of their intercessions they had extorted his consent to set him free. They accordingly renewed their solicitations a few days afterwards, but found Charles more haughty and intractable than before, and were

¹⁴ According to several historians of great name, the emperor, in his treaty with the landgrave, stipulated that he would not detain him in any prison. But in executing the deed, which was written in the German tongue, the imperial ministers fraudulently substituted the word *ewiger* instead of *einiger*, and thus the treaty, in place of a promise that he should not be detained in *any* prison, contained only an engagement that he should not be detained in *perpetual* imprisonment. But authors eminent for historical knowledge and critical accuracy have called in question the truth of this common story. The silence of Sleidan with regard to it, as well as its not being mentioned in the various memorials which he has published concerning the landgrave's imprisonment, greatly favor this opinion. But as several books which contain the information necessary towards discussing this point with accuracy are written in the German language, which I do not understand, I cannot pretend to inquire into this matter with the same precision wherewith I have endeavored to settle some other controverted facts which have occurred in the course of this history. See Struv., Corp., 1052; Mosheim's Eccles. Hist., vol. ii. pp. 161, 162, Eng. ed.

warned that if they touched again upon a subject so disagreeable, and with regard to which he had determined to hear nothing further, he would instantly give orders to convey the prisoner into Spain. Afraid of hurting the landgrave by an officious or ill-timed zeal to serve him, they not only desisted, but left the court; and, as they did not choose to meet the first sallies of the landgrave's rage upon his learning the cause of their departure, they informed him of it by a letter, wherein they exhorted him to fulfil all that he had promised to the emperor, as the most certain means of procuring a speedy release.

Whatever violent emotions their abandoning his cause in this manner occasioned, the landgrave's impatience to recover his liberty made him follow their advice. He paid the sum which had been imposed on him, ordered his fortresses to be razed, and renounced all alliances which could give offence. This prompt compliance with the will of the conqueror produced no effect. He was still guarded with the same vigilant severity; and being carried about, together with the degraded elector of Saxony, wherever the emperor went, their disgrace and his triumph were each day renewed. The fortitude, as well as equanimity, with which the elector bore these repeated insults, were not more remarkable than the landgrave's fretfulness and impatience. His active, impetuous mind could ill brook restraint; and reflection upon the shameful artifices by which he had been decoyed into that situation, as well as indignation at the injustice with which he was still

detained in it, drove him often to the wildest excesses of passion.

The people of the different cities to whom Charles thus wantonly exposed those illustrious prisoners as a public spectacle were sensibly touched with such an insult offered to the Germanic body, and murmured loudly at this indecent treatment of two of its greatest princes. They had soon other causes of complaint, and such as affected them more nearly. Charles proceeded to add oppression to insult, and, arrogating to himself all the rights of a conqueror, exercised them with the utmost rigor. He ordered his troops to seize the artillery and military stores belonging to such as had been members of the Smalkaldic league, and, having collected upwards of five hundred pieces of cannon, a great number in that age, he sent part of them into the Low Countries, part into Italy, and part into Spain, in order to spread by this means the fame of his success, and that they might serve as monuments of his having subdued a nation hitherto deemed invincible. He then levied, by his sole authority, large sums of money, as well upon those who had served him with fidelity during the war as upon such as had been in arms against him: upon the former, as their contingent towards a war which, having been undertaken, as he pretended, for the common benefit, ought to be carried on at the common charge; upon the latter, as a fine by way of punishment for their rebellion. By these exactions he amassed above one million six hundred thousand crowns,—a sum which appeared prodigious

in the sixteenth century. But so general was the consternation which had seized the Germans upon his rapid success, and such their dread of his victorious troops, that all implicitly obeyed his commands; though at the same time these extraordinary stretches of power greatly alarmed a people jealous of their privileges, and habituated, during several ages, to consider the imperial authority as neither extensive nor formidable. This discontent and resentment, how industriously soever they concealed them, became universal; and the more these passions were restrained and kept down for the present, the more likely were they to burst out soon with additional violence.

While Charles gave law to the Germans like a conquered people, Ferdinand treated his subjects in Bohemia with still greater rigor. That kingdom possessed privileges and immunities as extensive as those of any nation in which the feudal institutions were established. The prerogative of their kings was extremely limited, and the crown itself elective. Ferdinand, when raised to the throne, had confirmed their liberties with every solemnity prescribed by their excessive solicitude for the security of a constitution of government to which they were extremely attached. He soon began, however, to be weary of a jurisdiction so much circumscribed, and to despise a sceptre which he could not transmit to his posterity; and, notwithstanding all his former engagements, he attempted to overturn the constitution from its foundations, that instead of an elective kingdom he might render it hereditary. But the Bohemians

were too high-spirited tamely to relinquish privileges which they had long enjoyed. At the same time, many of them having embraced the doctrines of the Reformers, the seeds of which John Huss and Jerome of Prague had planted in their country about the beginning of the preceding century, the desire of acquiring religious liberty mingled itself with their zeal for their civil rights; and these two kindred passions, heightening, as usual, each other's force, precipitated them immediately into violent measures. They had not only refused to serve their sovereign against the confederates of Smalkalde, but, having entered into a close alliance with the elector of Saxony, they had bound themselves, by a solemn association, to defend their ancient constitution, and to persist until they should obtain such additional privileges as they thought necessary towards perfecting the present model of their government or rendering it more permanent. They chose Caspar Phlug, a nobleman of distinction, to be their general, and raised an army of thirty thousand men to enforce their petitions. But, either from the weakness of their leader, or from the dissensions in a great, unwieldy body, which, having united hastily, was not thoroughly compacted, or from some other unknown cause, the subsequent operations of the Bohemians bore no proportion to the zeal and ardor with which they took their first resolutions. They suffered themselves to be amused so long with negotiations and overtures of different kinds that before they could enter Saxony the battle of Muhlberg was fought, the elector deprived of

his dignity and territories, the landgrave confined to close custody, and the league of Smalkalde entirely dissipated. The same dread of the emperor's power which had seized the rest of the Germans reached them. As soon as their sovereign approached with a body of imperial troops, they instantly dispersed, thinking of nothing but how to atone for their past guilt and to acquire some hope of forgiveness by a prompt submission. But Ferdinand, who entered his dominions full of that implacable resentment which inflames monarchs whose authority has been despised, was not to be mollified by the late repentance and involuntary return of rebellious subjects to their duty. He even heard unmoved the entreaties and tears of the citizens of Prague, who appeared before him in the posture of suppliants and implored for mercy. The sentence which he pronounced against them was rigorous to extremity: he abolished many of their privileges, he abridged others, and new-modelled the constitution according to his pleasure. He condemned to death many of those who had been most active in forming the late association against him, and punished a still greater number with confiscation of their goods, or perpetual banishment. He obliged all his subjects, of every condition, to give up their arms, to be deposited in forts where he planted garrisons; and after disarming his people he loaded them with new and exorbitant taxes. Thus, by an ill-conducted and unsuccessful effort to extend their privileges, the Bohemians not only enlarged the sphere of the royal prerogative,

when they intended to have circumscribed it, but they almost annihilated those liberties which they aimed at establishing on a broader and more secure foundation.¹⁵

The emperor, having now humbled, and, as he imagined, subdued, the independent and stubborn spirit of the Germans by the terror of arms and the rigor of punishment, held a diet at Augsburg, in order to compose finally the controversies with regard to religion, which had so long disturbed the empire. He durst not, however, trust the determination of a matter so interesting to the free suffrage of the Germans, broken as their minds now were to subjection. He entered the city at the head of his Spanish troops, and assigned them quarters there. The rest of his soldiers he cantoned in the adjacent villages; so that the members of the diet, while they carried on their deliberations, were surrounded by the same army which had overcome their countrymen. Immediately after his public entry, Charles gave a proof of the violence with which he intended to proceed. He took possession, by force, of the cathedral, together with one of the principal churches; and, his priests having, by various ceremonies, purified them from the pollution with which they supposed the unhallowed ministrations of the Protestants to have defiled them, they re-established with great pomp the rites of the Romish worship.¹⁶

The concourse of members to this diet was extraordinary: the importance of the affairs con-

¹⁵ Sleid., 408, 419, 434.—Thuan., lib. iv. 129, 150.—Struv., Corp. ii.

¹⁶ Sleid., 435, 437.

cerning which it was to deliberate, added to the fear of giving offence to the emperor by an absence which lay open to misconstruction, brought together almost all the princes, nobles, and representatives of cities who had a right to sit in that assembly. The emperor, in the speech with which he opened the meeting, called their attention immediately to that point which seemed chiefly to merit it. Having mentioned the fatal effects of the religious dissensions which had arisen in Germany, and taken notice of his own unwearied endeavors to procure a general council, which alone could provide a remedy adequate to those evils, he exhorted them to recognize its authority, and to acquiesce in the decisions of an assembly to which they had originally appealed, as having the sole right of judgment in the case.

But the council to which Charles wished them to refer all their controversies had by this time undergone a violent change. The fear and jealousy with which the emperor's first successes against the confederates of Smalkalde had inspired the pope continued to increase. Not satisfied with attempting to retard the progress of the imperial arms by the sudden recall of his troops, Paul began to consider the emperor as an enemy, the weight of whose power he must soon feel, and against whom he could not be too hasty in taking precautions. He foresaw that the immediate effect of the emperor's acquiring absolute power in Germany would be to render him entirely master of all the decisions of the council, if it should continue to meet in Trent. It was dangerous to

allow a monarch so ambitious to get the command of this formidable engine, which he might employ at pleasure to limit or to overturn the papal authority. As the only method of preventing this, he determined to remove the council to some city more immediately under his own jurisdiction and at a greater distance from the terror of the emperor's arms or the reach of his influence. An incident fortunately occurred which gave this measure the appearance of being necessary. One or two of the fathers of the council, together with some of their domestics, happening to die suddenly, the physicians, deceived by the symptoms, or suborned by the pope's legates, pronounced the distemper to be infectious and pestilential. Some of the prelates, struck with a panic, retired; others were impatient to be gone; and, after a short consultation, the council was translated to Bologna, a city subject to the pope. All the bishops in the imperial interest warmly opposed this resolution, as taken without necessity and founded on false or frivolous prettexts. All the Spanish prelates, and most of the Neapolitan, by the emperor's express command, remained at Trent; the rest, to the number of thirty-four, accompanying the legates to Bologna. Thus a schism commenced in that very assembly which had been called to heal the divisions of Christendom; the fathers of Bologna inveighed against those who stayed at Trent, as contumacious and regardless of the pope's authority; while the others accused them of being so far intimidated by the fears of imaginary danger as to remove to

a place where their consultations could prove of no service towards re-establishing peace and order in Germany.¹⁷

The emperor, at the same time, employed all his interest to procure the return of the council to Trent. But Paul, who highly applauded his own sagacity in having taken a step which put it out of Charles's power to acquire the direction of that assembly, paid no regard to a request the object of which was so extremely obvious. The summer was consumed in fruitless negotiations with respect to this point, the importunity of the one and obstinacy of the other daily increasing. At last an event happened which widened the breach irreparably, and rendered the pope utterly averse from listening to any proposal that came from the emperor. Charles, as has been already observed, had so violently exasperated Peter Lewis Farnese, the pope's son, by refusing to grant him the investiture of Parma and Placentia, that he had watched ever since that time, with all the vigilance of resentment, for an opportunity of revenging that injury. He had endeavored to precipitate the pope into open hostilities against the emperor, and had earnestly solicited the king of France to invade Italy. His hatred and resentment extended to all those whom he knew that the emperor favored; he did every ill office in his power to Gonzaga, governor of Milan, and had encouraged Fiesco in his attempt upon the life of Andrew Doria, because both Gonzaga and Doria possessed a great degree of the emperor's

¹⁷ F. Paul, 248, etc.

esteem and confidence. His malevolence and secret intrigues were not unknown to the emperor, who could not be more desirous to take vengeance on him than Gonzaga and Doria were to be employed as his instruments in inflicting it. Farnese, by the profligacy of his life, and by enormities of every kind, equal to those committed by the worst tyrants who have disgraced human nature, had rendered himself so odious that it was thought any violence whatever might be lawfully attempted against him. Gonzaga and Doria soon found among his own subjects persons who were eager, and even deemed it meritorious, to lend their hands in such a service. As Farnese, animated with the jealousy which usually possesses petty sovereigns, had employed all the cruelty and fraud whereby they endeavor to supply their defect of power, in order to humble and extirpate the nobility subject to his government, five noblemen of the greatest distinction in Placentia combined to avenge the injuries which they themselves had suffered, as well as those which he had offered to their order. They formed their plan in conjunction with Gonzaga; but it remains uncertain whether he originally suggested the scheme to them, or only approved of what they proposed and co-operated in carrying it on. They concerted all the previous steps with such foresight, conducted their intrigues with such secrecy, and displayed such courage in the execution of their design, that it may be ranked among the most audacious deeds of that nature mentioned in history. One body of the conspirators surprised, at


mid-day, the gates of the citadel of Placentia, where Farnese resided, overpowered his guards, and murdered him. Another party of them made themselves masters of the town, and called upon their fellow-citizens to take arms in order to recover their liberty. The multitude ran towards the citadel, from which three great guns, a signal concerted with Gonzaga, had been fired; and before they could guess the cause or the authors of the tumult, they saw the lifeless body of the tyrant hanging by the heels from one of the windows of the citadel. But so universally detestable had he become that not one expressed any sentiment of concern at such a sad reverse of fortune, or discovered the least indignation at this ignominious treatment of a sovereign prince. The exultation at the success of the conspiracy was general, and all applauded the actors in it as the deliverers of their country. The body was tumbled into the ditch that surrounded the citadel, and exposed to the insults of the rabble; the rest of the citizens returned to their usual occupations, as if nothing extraordinary had happened.

Before next morning, a body of troops arriving from the frontiers of the Milanese, where they had been posted in expectation of the event, took possession of the city in the emperor's name, and reinstated the inhabitants in the possession of their ancient privileges. Parma, which the imperialists attempted likewise to surprise, was saved by the vigilance and fidelity of the officers whom Farnese had intrusted with the command of the garrison. The death of a son whom, notwithstanding

his infamous vices, Paul loved with an excess of parental tenderness, overwhelmed him with the deepest affliction; and the loss of a city of such consequence as Placentia greatly embittered his sorrow. He accused Gonzaga, in open consistory, of having committed a cruel murder in order to prepare the way for an unjust usurpation, and immediately demanded of the emperor satisfaction for both: for the former, by the punishment of Gonzaga; for the latter, by the restitution of Placentia to his grandson Octavio, its rightful owner. But Charles, who, rather than quit a prize of such value, was willing not only to expose himself to the imputation of being accessory to the crime which had given an opportunity of seizing it, but to bear the infamy of defrauding his own son-in-law of the inheritance which belonged to him, eluded all his solicitations, and determined to keep possession of the city, together with its territories.¹⁸

This resolution, flowing from an ambition so rapacious as to be restrained by no consideration either of decency or justice, transported the pope so far beyond his usual moderation and prudence that he was eager to take arms against the emperor, in order to be avenged on the murderers of his son and to recover the inheritance wrested from his family. Conscious, however, of his own inability to contend with such an enemy, he warmly solicited the French king and the republic of Venice to join in an offensive league against

¹⁸ F. Paul, 257.—Pallavic., 41, 42.—Thuan., iv. 156.—Mém. de Ribier, 59, 67.—Natalis Comitum Histor., lib. iii. p. 64.



HENRY II. OF FRANCE

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Charles. But Henry was intent at that time on other objects. His ancient allies, the Scots, having been defeated by the English, in one of the greatest battles ever fought between these two rival nations, he was about to send a numerous body of veteran troops into that country, as well to preserve it from being conquered as to gain the acquisition of a new kingdom to the French monarchy, by marrying his son, the dauphin, to the young queen of Scotland. An undertaking accompanied with such manifest advantages, the success of which appeared to be so certain, was not to be relinquished for the remote prospect of benefit from an alliance depending upon the precarious life of a pope of fourscore, who had nothing at heart but the gratification of his own private resentment. Instead, therefore, of rushing headlong into the alliance proposed, Henry amused the pope with such general professions and promises as might keep him from any thoughts of endeavoring to accommodate his differences with the emperor, but at the same time he avoided any such engagement as might occasion an immediate rupture with Charles, or precipitate him into a war for which he was not prepared. The Venetians, though much alarmed at seeing Placentia in the hands of the imperialists, imitated the wary conduct of the French king, as it nearly resembled the spirit which usually regulated their own conduct.¹⁹

But, though the pope found that it was not in

¹⁹ *Mém. de Ribier*, ii. 63, 71, 78, 85, 95.—*Paruta*, *Istor. di Venez.*, 199, 203.—*Thuan.*, v. 160.

his power to kindle immediately the flames of war, he did not forget the injuries which he was obliged for the present to endure; resentment settled deeper in his mind and became more rancorous in proportion as he felt the difficulty of gratifying it. It was while these sentiments of enmity were in full force, and the desire of vengeance at its height, that the diet of Augsburg, by the emperor's command, petitioned the pope, in the name of the whole Germanic body, to enjoin the prelates who had retired to Bologna to return again to Trent and to renew their deliberations in that place. Charles had been at great pains in bringing the members to join in this request. Having observed a considerable variety of sentiments among the Protestants with respect to the submission which he had required to the decrees of the council, some of them being altogether intractable, while others were ready to acknowledge its right of jurisdiction upon certain conditions, he employed all his address in order to gain or to divide them. He threatened and overawed the elector palatine, a weak prince, and afraid that the emperor might inflict on him the punishment to which he had made himself liable by the assistance that he had given to the confederates of Smalkalde. The hope of procuring liberty for the landgrave, together with the formal confirmation of his own electoral dignity, overcame Maurice's scruples, or prevented him from opposing what he knew would be agreeable to the emperor. The elector of Brandenburg, less influenced by religious zeal than any prince of that age, was

easily induced to imitate their example in assenting to all that the emperor required. The deputies of the cities remained still to be brought over. They were more tenacious of their principles; and, though everything that could operate either on their hopes or fears was tried, the utmost that they would promise was to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the council, if effectual provision were made for securing to the divines of all parties free access to that assembly, with entire liberty of debate, and if all points in controversy were decided according to Scripture and the usage of the primitive Church. But when the memorial containing this declaration was presented to the emperor, he ventured to put in practice a very extraordinary artifice. Without reading the paper, or taking any notice of the conditions on which they had insisted, he seemed to take it for granted that they had complied with his demand, and gave thanks to the deputies for their full and unreserved submission to the decrees of the council. The deputies, though astonished at what they had heard, did not attempt to set him right, both parties being better pleased that the matter should remain under this state of ambiguity than to push for an explanation which must have occasioned a dispute, and would have led, perhaps, to a rupture.²⁰

Having obtained this seeming submission from the members of the diet to the authority of the council, Charles employed that as an argument to enforce their petition for its return to Trent. But the pope, from the satisfaction which he felt in

²⁰ F. Paul, 259.—Sleid., 440.—Thuan., tom. ii. 155.

mortifying the emperor, as well as from his own aversion to what was demanded, resolved, without hesitation, that this petition should not be granted; though, in order to avoid the imputation of being influenced wholly by resentment, he had the address to throw it upon the fathers at Bologna to put a direct negative upon the request. With this view, he referred to their consideration the petition of the diet, and they, ready to confirm by their assent whatever the legates were pleased to dictate, declared that the council could not, consistently with its dignity, return to Trent unless the prelates who by remaining there had discovered a schismatic spirit would first repair to Bologna and join their brethren, and that even after their junction the council could not renew its consultations with any prospect of benefit to the Church, if the Germans did not prove their intention of obeying its future decrees to be sincere, by yielding immediate obedience to those which it had already passed.²¹

This answer was communicated to the emperor by the pope, who at the same time exhorted him to comply with demands which appeared to be so reasonable. But Charles was better acquainted with the duplicity of the pope's character than to be deceived by such a gross artifice; he knew that the prelates of Bologna durst utter no sentiment but what Paul inspired; and therefore, overlooking them as mere tools in the hands of another, he considered their reply as a full discovery of the pope's intentions. As he could no longer hope

²¹ F. Paul, 250.—Pallav., ii. 49.

to acquire such an ascendant in the council as to render it subservient to his own plan, he saw it to be necessary that Paul should not have it in his power to turn against him the authority of so venerable an assembly. In order to prevent this, he sent two Spanish lawyers to Bologna, who, in the presence of the legate, protested that the translation of the council to that place had been unnecessary and founded on false or frivolous pretexts; that while it continued to meet there it ought to be deemed an unlawful and schismatical conventicle; that all its decisions ought, of course, to be held as null and invalid; and that, since the pope, together with the corrupt ecclesiastics who depended on him, had abandoned the care of the Church, the emperor, as its protector, would employ all the power which God had committed to him, in order to preserve it from those calamities with which it was threatened. A few days after, the imperial ambassador at Rome demanded an audience of the pope, and, in presence of all the cardinals as well as foreign ministers, protested against the proceedings of the prelates at Bologna, in terms equally harsh and disrespectful.²²

It was not long before Charles proceeded to carry these threats, which greatly alarmed both the pope and council at Bologna, into execution. He let the diet know the ill success of his endeavors to procure a favorable answer to their petition, and that the pope, equally regardless of their entreaties and of his services to the Church, had

²² F. Paul, 264.—Pallav., 51.—Sleid., 446.—Goldasti Constit. Imperial., i. 561.

refused to gratify them by allowing the council to meet again at Trent; that, though all hope of holding this assembly in a place where they might look for freedom of debate and judgment was not to be given up, the prospect of it was, at present, distant and uncertain; that, in the meantime, Germany was torn in pieces by religious dissensions, the purity of the faith corrupted, and the minds of the people disquieted with a multiplicity of new opinions and controversies, formerly unknown among Christians; that, moved by the duty which he owed to them as their sovereign and to the Church as its protector, he had employed some divines, of known abilities and learning, to prepare a system of doctrine to which all should conform until a council such as they wished for could be convoked. This system was compiled by Phlug, Helding, and Agricola, of whom the two former were dignitaries in the Romish Church, but remarkable for their pacific and healing spirit; the last was a Protestant divine, suspected, not without reason, of having been gained by bribes and promises to betray or mislead his party on this occasion. The articles presented to the diet at Ratisbon in the year 1541, in order to reconcile the contending parties, served as a model for the present work. But as the emperor's situation was much changed since that time, and he found it no longer necessary to manage the Protestants with the same delicacy as at that juncture, the concessions in their favor were not now so numerous, nor did they extend to points of so much consequence. The treatise contained a com-

plete system of theology, conformable in almost every article to the tenets of the Romish Church, though expressed for the most part in the softest words, or in scriptural phrases, or in terms of studied ambiguity. Every doctrine, however, peculiar to Popery was retained, and the observation of all the rites which the Protestants condemned as inventions of men introduced into the worship of God was enjoined. With regard to two points only, some relaxation in the rigor of opinion, as well as some latitude in practice, were admitted. Such ecclesiastics as had married, and would not put away their wives, were allowed, nevertheless, to perform all the functions of their sacred office; and those provinces which had been accustomed to partake of the cup, as well as of the bread, in the sacrament of the Lord's supper, were still indulged in the privilege of receiving both. Even these were declared to be concessions for the sake of peace, and granted only for a season, in compliance with the weakness or prejudices of their countrymen.²³

This system of doctrine, known afterwards by the name of the *Interim*, because it contained temporary regulations, which were to continue no longer in force than until a free general council could be held, the emperor presented to the diet with a pompous declaration of his sincere intention to re-establish tranquillity and order in the Church, as well as of his hopes that their adopting these regulations would contribute greatly to

²³ F. Paul, 270.—Pallav., ii. 60.—Sleid., 453, 457.—Struv., Corp., 1054.—Goldast., Constit. Imper., i. 518.

bring about that desirable event. It was read in presence of the diet, according to form. As soon as it was finished, the archbishop of Mentz, president of the electoral college, rose up hastily, and, having thanked the emperor for his unwearied and pious endeavors in order to restore peace to the Church, he, in the name of the diet, signified their approbation of the system of doctrine which had been read, together with their resolution of conforming to it in every particular. The whole assembly was amazed at a declaration so unprecedented and unconstitutional, as well as at the elector's presumption in pretending to deliver the sense of the diet upon a point which had not hitherto been the subject of consultation or debate; but not one member had the courage to contradict what the elector had said, some being overawed by fear, others remaining silent through complaisance. The emperor held the archbishop's declaration to be a full constitutional ratification of the Interim, and prepared to enforce the observance of it as a decree of the empire.²⁴

During this diet, the wife and children of the landgrave, warmly seconded by Maurice of Saxony, endeavored to interest the members in behalf of that unhappy prince, who still languished in confinement. But Charles, who did not choose to be brought under the necessity of rejecting any request that came from such a respectable body, in order to prevent their representations, laid before the diet an account of his transactions with the landgrave, together with the motives which had

²⁴ Sleid., 460.—F. Paul, 273.—Pallav., 63.

at first induced him to detain that prince in custody, and which rendered it prudent, as he alleged, to keep him still under restraint. It was no easy matter to give any good reason for an action incapable of being justified; but he thought the most frivolous pretexts might be produced in an assembly the members of which were willing to be deceived and afraid of nothing so much as of discovering that they saw his conduct in its true colors. His account of his own conduct was accordingly admitted to be fully satisfactory, and, after some feeble entreaties that he would extend his clemency to his unfortunate prisoner, the landgrave's concerns were no more mentioned.²⁵

In order to counterbalance the unfavorable impression which this inflexible rigor might make, Charles, as a proof that his gratitude was no less permanent and unchangeable than his resentment, invested Maurice in the electoral dignity, with all the legal formalities. The ceremony was performed with extraordinary pomp, in an open court, so near the apartment in which the degraded elector was kept a prisoner that he could view it from his windows. Even this insult did not ruffle his usual tranquillity; and, turning his eyes that way, he beheld a prosperous rival receiving those ensigns of dignity of which he had been stripped, without uttering one sentiment unbecoming the fortitude that he had preserved amidst all his calamities.²⁶

²⁵ Sleid., 441.

²⁶ Thuan., Hist., lib. v. 176.—Struv., Corp., 1054.—Investitura Mauricii a Mammerano Lucembergo descripta, ap. Scardium, ii. 508.

Immediately after the dissolution of the diet, the emperor ordered the Interim to be published, in the German as well as Latin language. It met with the usual reception of conciliating schemes when proposed to men heated with disputation. Both parties declaimed against it with equal violence. The Protestants condemned it as a system containing the grossest errors of Popery, disguised with so little art that it could impose only on the most ignorant, or on those who, by wilfully shutting their eyes, favored the deception; the Papists inveighed against it as a work in which some doctrines of the Church were impiously given up, others meanly concealed, and all of them delivered in terms calculated rather to deceive the unwary than to instruct the ignorant or to reclaim such as were enemies to the truth. While the Lutheran divines fiercely attacked it on one hand, the general of the Dominicans with no less vehemence impugned it on the other. But at Rome, as soon as the contents of the Interim came to be known, the indignation of the courtiers and ecclesiastics rose to the greatest height. They exclaimed against the emperor's profane encroachment on the sacerdotal function in presuming, with the concurrence of an assembly of laymen, to define articles of faith and to regulate modes of worship. They compared this rash deed to that of Uzzah, who with an unhallowed hand had touched the ark of God, or to the bold attempts of those emperors who had rendered their memory detestable by endeavoring to model the Christian Church according to their pleasure. They even

affected to find out a resemblance between the emperor's conduct and that of Henry VIII., and expressed their fear of his imitating the example of that apostate, by usurping the title as well as jurisdiction belonging to the head of the Church. All, therefore, contended with one voice that as the foundations of ecclesiastical authority were now shaken, and the whole fabric ready to be overturned by a new enemy, some powerful method of defence must be provided, and a vigorous resistance must be made, in the beginning, before he grew too formidable to be opposed.

The pope, whose judgment was improved by longer experience in great transactions, as well as by a more extensive observation of human affairs, viewed the matter with more acute discernment, and derived comfort from the very circumstance which filled them with apprehension. He was astonished that a prince of such superior sagacity as the emperor should be so intoxicated with a single victory as to imagine that he might give law to mankind, and decide even in those matters with regard to which they are most impatient of dominion. He saw that, by joining any one of the contending parties in Germany, Charles might have had it in his power to have oppressed the other, but that the presumption of success had now inspired him with the vain thought of being able to domineer over both. He foretold that a system which all attacked and none defended could not be of long duration, and that, for this reason, there was no need of his interposing in order to hasten its fall; for as soon as the power-

ful hand which now upheld it was withdrawn, it would sink of its own accord, and be forgotten forever.²⁷

The emperor, fond of his own plan, adhered to his resolution of carrying it into full execution. But though the elector palatine, the elector of Brandenburg, and Maurice, influenced by the same considerations as formerly, seemed ready to yield implicit obedience to whatever he should enjoin, he met not everywhere with a like obsequious submission. John, marquis of Brandenburg Anspach, although he had taken part with great zeal in the war against the confederates of Smalkalde, refused to renounce doctrines which he held to be sacred; and, reminding the emperor of the repeated promises which he had given his Protestant allies of allowing them the free exercise of their religion, he claimed, in consequence of these, to be exempted from receiving the Interim. Some other princes, also, ventured to mention the same scruples and to plead the same indulgence. But on this, as on other trying occasions, the firmness of the elector of Saxony was most distinguished and merited the highest praise. Charles, well knowing the authority of his example with all the Protestant party, labored with the utmost earnestness to gain his approbation of the Interim, and, by employing sometimes promises of setting him at liberty, sometimes threats of treating him with greater harshness, attempted alternately to work upon his hopes and his fears. But he was alike regardless of both.

²⁷ Sleid., 468.—F. Paul, 271, 277.—Pallav., ii. 64.

After having declared his fixed belief in the doctrines of the Reformation, "I cannot now," said he, "in my old age, abandon the principles for which I early contended; nor, in order to procure freedom during a few declining years, will I betray that good cause on account of which I have suffered so much, and am still willing to suffer. Better for me to enjoy, in this solitude, the esteem of virtuous men, together with the approbation of my own conscience, than to return into the world with the imputation and guilt of apostasy to disgrace and embitter the remainder of my days." By this magnanimous resolution he set his countrymen a pattern of conduct so very different from that which the emperor wished him to have exhibited to them that it drew upon him fresh marks of his displeasure. The rigor of his confinement was increased; the number of his servants abridged; the Lutheran clergymen who had hitherto been permitted to attend him were dismissed; and even the books of devotion which had been his chief consolation during a tedious imprisonment were taken from him.²⁸ The landgrave of Hesse, his companion in misfortune, did not maintain the same constancy. His patience and fortitude were both so much exhausted by the length of his confinement that, willing to purchase freedom at any price, he wrote to the emperor, offering not only to approve of the Interim, but to yield an unreserved submission to his will in every other particular. But Charles, who knew that, whatever course the landgrave

²⁸ Sleid., 462.

might hold, neither his example nor authority would prevail on his children or subjects to receive the Interim, paid no regard to his offers. He was kept confined as strictly as ever; and, while he suffered the cruel mortification of having his conduct set in contrast to that of the elector, he derived not the smallest benefit from the mean step which exposed him to such deserved censure.²⁹

But it was in the imperial cities that Charles met with the most violent opposition to the Interim. These small commonwealths, the citizens of which were accustomed to liberty and independence, had embraced the doctrines of the Reformation when they were first published, with remarkable eagerness, the bold spirit of innovation being peculiarly suited to the genius of free government. Among them the Protestant teachers had made the greatest number of proselytes. The most eminent divines of the party were settled in them as pastors. By having the direction of the schools and other seminaries of learning, they had trained up disciples who were as well instructed in the articles of their faith as they were zealous to defend them. Such persons were not to be guided by example or swayed by authority; but, having been taught to employ their own understanding in examining and deciding with respect to the points in controversy, they thought that they were both qualified and entitled to judge for themselves. As soon as the contents of the Interim were known, they with one voice joined

²⁹ Sleid., 462.

in refusing to admit it. Augsburg, Ulm, Strasburg, Constance, Bremen, Magdeburg, together with many other towns of less note, presented remonstrances to the emperor, setting forth the irregular and unconstitutional manner in which the Interim had been enacted, and beseeching him not to offer such violence to their consciences as to require their assent to a form of doctrine and worship which appeared to them repugnant to the express precepts of the divine law. But Charles, having prevailed on so many princes of the empire to approve of his new model, was not much moved by the representations of those cities, which, how formidable soever they might have proved if they could have been formed into one body, lay so remote from each other that it was easy to oppress them separately before it was possible for them to unite.

In order to accomplish this, the emperor saw it to be requisite that his measures should be vigorous, and executed with such rapidity as to allow no time for concerting any common plan of opposition. Having laid down this maxim as the rule of his proceedings, his first attempt was upon the city of Augsburg, which, though overawed with the presence of the Spanish troops, he knew to be as much dissatisfied with the Interim as any in the empire. He ordered one body of these troops to seize the gates; he posted the rest in different quarters of the city; and, assembling all the burghesses in the town-hall, he, by his sole absolute authority, published a decree abolishing their present form of government, dissolving all their

corporations and fraternities, and nominating a small number of persons, in whom he vested for the future all the powers of government. Each of the persons thus chosen took an oath to observe the Interim. An act of power so unprecedented as well as arbitrary, which excluded the body of the inhabitants from any share in the government of their own community, and subjected them to men who had no other merit than their servile devotion to the emperor's will, gave general disgust; but, as they durst not venture upon resistance, they were obliged to submit in silence.³⁰ From Augsburg, in which he left a garrison, he proceeded to Ulm, and, new-modelling its government with the same violent hand, he seized such of their pastors as refused to subscribe the Interim, committed them to prison, and, at his departure, carried them along with him in chains.³¹ By this severity he not only secured the reception of the Interim in two of the most powerful cities, but gave warning to the rest what such as continued refractory had to expect. The effect of the example was as great as he could have wished; and many towns, in order to save themselves from the like treatment, found it necessary to comply with what he enjoined. This obedience, extorted by the rigor of authority, produced no change in the sentiments of the Germans, and extended no farther than to make them conform so far to what he required as was barely sufficient to screen them from punishment. The Protestant preachers accompanied those religious rites, the observa-

³⁰ Sleid., 469.

³¹ Ibid., 472.

tion of which the Interim prescribed, with such an explication of their tendency as served rather to confirm than to remove the scruples of their hearers with regard to them. The people, many of whom had grown up to mature years since the establishment of the Reformed religion, and had never known any other form of public worship, beheld the pompous pageantry of the popish service with contempt or horror; and in most places the Romish ecclesiastics who returned to take possession of their churches could hardly be protected from insult, or their ministrations from interruption. Thus, notwithstanding the apparent compliance of so many cities, the inhabitants, being accustomed to freedom, submitted with reluctance to the power which now oppressed them. Their understanding as well as inclination revolted against the doctrines and ceremonies imposed on them; and, though for the present they concealed their disgust and resentment, it was evident that these passions could not always be kept under restraint, but would break out at last in effects proportional to their violence.³²

Charles, however highly pleased with having bent the stubborn spirit of the Germans to such general submission, departed for the Low Countries, fully determined to compel the cities which still stood out to receive the Interim. He carried his two prisoners, the elector of Saxony and landgrave of Hesse, along with him, either because he durst not leave them behind him in Germany, or because he wished to give his countrymen the

³² Mém. de Ribier, ii. 218.—Sleid., 491.

Flemings this illustrious proof of the success of his arms and the extent of his power. Before Charles arrived at Brussels he was informed that the pope's legates at Bologna had dismissed the council by an indefinite prorogation, and that the prelates assembled there had returned to their respective countries. Necessity had driven the pope into this measure. By the secession of those who had voted against the translation, together with the departure of others, who grew weary of continuing in a place where they were not suffered to proceed to business, so few and such inconsiderable members remained that the pompous appellation of a general council could not with decency be bestowed any longer upon them. Paul had no choice but to dissolve an assembly which was become the object of contempt and exhibited to all Christendom a most glaring proof of the impotence of the Romish see. But, unavoidable as the measure was, it lay open to be unfavorably interpreted, and had the appearance of withdrawing the remedy at the very time when those for whose recovery it was provided were prevailed on to acknowledge its virtue and to make trial of its efficacy. Charles did not fail to put this construction on the conduct of the pope; and by an artful comparison of his own efforts to suppress heresy with Paul's scandalous inattention to a point so essential, he endeavored to render the pontiff odious to all zealous Catholics. At the same time, he commanded the prelates of his faction to remain at Trent, that the council might still appear to have a being, and might be ready whenever it

was thought expedient to resume its deliberations for the good of the Church.³³

The motive of Charles's journey to the Low Countries, besides gratifying his favorite passion of travelling from one part of his dominions to another, was to receive Philip, his only son, who was now in the twenty-first year of his age, and whom he had called thither not only that he might be recognized by the states of the Netherlands as heir-apparent, but in order to facilitate the execution of a vast scheme, the object of which, and the reception it met with, shall be hereafter explained. Philip, having left the government of Spain to Maximilian, Ferdinand's eldest son, to whom the emperor had given the princess Mary, his daughter, in marriage, embarked for Italy, attended by a numerous retinue of Spanish nobles.³⁴ The squadron which escorted him was commanded by Andrew Doria, who, notwithstanding his advanced age, insisted on the honor of performing in person the same duty to the son which he had often discharged towards the father. He landed safely at Genoa; from thence he went to Milan, and, proceeding through Germany, arrived at the imperial court in Brussels. The states of Brabant in the first place, and those of the other provinces in their order, acknowledged his right of succession in common form, and he took the customary oath to preserve all their privileges inviolate.³⁵ In all the towns of the Low Countries through which Philip passed, he was received with extraordinary

³³ Pallav., ii. 72.

³⁴ Ochoa, Carolea, 362.

³⁵ Haræi Annal. Brabant., 652.

pomp. Nothing that could either express the respect of the people or contribute to his amusement was neglected; pageants, tournaments, and public spectacles of every kind were exhibited, with that expensive magnificence which commercial nations are fond of displaying when, on any occasion, they depart from their usual maxims of frugality. But amidst these scenes of festivity and pleasure Philip's natural severity of temper was discernible. Youth itself could not render him agreeable, nor his being a candidate for power form him to courtesy. He maintained a haughty reserve in his behavior, and discovered such manifest partiality towards his Spanish attendants, together with such an avowed preference to the manners of their country, as highly disgusted the Flemings, and gave rise to that antipathy which afterwards occasioned a revolution fatal to him in that part of his dominions.³⁶

Charles was long detained in the Netherlands by a violent attack of the gout, which returned upon him so frequently and with such increasing violence that it had broken, to a great degree, the vigor of his constitution. He nevertheless did not slacken his endeavors to enforce the Interim. The inhabitants of Strasburg, after a long struggle, found it necessary to yield obedience; those of Constance, who had taken arms in their own defence, were compelled not only to conform to the Interim, but to renounce their privileges as a free city, to do homage to Ferdinand as archduke

³⁶ Mém. de Ribier, ii. 29.—L'Evesque, Mém. du Card. Granvelle, i. 21.

of Austria, and, as his vassals, to admit an Austrian governor and garrison.³⁷ Magdeburg, Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck were the only imperial cities of note that still continued refractory.

³⁷ Sleid., 474, 491.

BOOK X

The Pope's Schemes against the Emperor—Election of Pope Julius III.—Diet at Augsburg—Schemes of Maurice of Saxony against the Emperor—War upon Magdeburg—Council summoned at Trent—Attempt to obtain the Liberation of the Landgrave—Plan of Charles for procuring the Imperial Crown for his Son, Philip—The Pope and Emperor attempt to recover Parma and Placentia—Octavio makes an Alliance with Henry II. of France—Hostilities between Charles and Henry—Henry protests against the Council—Violence of the Emperor against the Protestants—Siege of Magdeburg by Maurice—Martinuzzi favors the Pretensions of Ferdinand to Hungary—He is assassinated by Order of Ferdinand—Maurice makes a Treaty with Henry II.—He demands once more the Liberty of the Landgrave—He amuses the Emperor, and meanwhile makes Preparation for War—He takes the Field—The Emperor endeavors to gain Time by Negotiation—Maurice takes the Castle of Ehrenberg—The Emperor flies from Inspruck—He liberates the Elector of Saxony—The Council of Trent breaks up—The French attack Strasburg—The Operations of Albert of Brandenburg—Negotiations for Peace at Passau at last successful

WHILE Charles labored with such unwearied industry to persuade or to force the Protestants to adopt his regulations with respect to religion, the effects of his steadiness in the execution of his plan were rendered less considerable by his rupture with the pope, which daily increased. The firm resolution which the emperor seemed to have taken against restoring Placentia, together with his repeated encroachments on the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, not only by the regulations contained in the Interim, but by his attempt to reassemble the council at Trent, exasperated Paul to the utmost, who, with the weakness inci-

dent to old age, grew more attached to his family and more jealous of his authority as he advanced in years. Pushed on by these passions, he made new efforts to draw the French king into an alliance against the emperor;¹ but, finding that monarch, notwithstanding the hereditary enmity between him and Charles, and the jealousy with which he viewed the successful progress of the imperial arms, as unwilling as formerly to involve himself in immediate hostilities, he was obliged to contract his views, and to think of preventing future encroachments, since it was not in his power to inflict vengeance on account of those which were past. For this purpose, he determined to recall his grant of Parma and Placentia, and, after declaring them to be reannexed to the holy see, to indemnify his grandson Octavio by a new establishment in the ecclesiastical state. By this expedient he hoped to gain two points of no small consequence. He, first of all, rendered his possession of Parma more secure; as the emperor would be cautious of invading the patrimony of the Church, though he might seize without scruple a town belonging to the house of Farnese. In the next place, he would acquire a better chance of recovering Placentia, as his solicitations to that effect might decently be urged with greater importunity, and would infallibly be attended with greater effect, when he was considered not as pleading the cause of his own family, but as an advocate for the interest of the holy see. But, while Paul was priding himself on this device as a

¹ Mém. de Ribier, ii. 230.

happy refinement in policy, Octavio, an ambitious and high-spirited young man, who could not bear with patience to be spoiled of one half of his territories by the rapaciousness of his father-in-law, and to be deprived of the other by the artifices of his grandfather, took measures in order to prevent the execution of a plan fatal to his interest. He set out secretly from Rome, and, having first endeavored to surprise Parma, which attempt was frustrated by the fidelity of the governor, to whom the pope had intrusted the defence of the town, he made overtures to the emperor of renouncing all connection with the pope and of depending entirely on him for his future fortune. This unexpected defection of one of the pope's own family to an enemy whom he hated, irritated almost to madness a mind peevish with old age; and there was no degree of severity to which Paul might not have proceeded against a grandson whom he reproached as an unnatural apostate. But, happily for Octavio, death prevented his carrying into execution the harsh resolutions which he had taken with respect to him, and put an end to his pontificate, in the sixteenth year of his administration and the eighty-second year of his age.²

² Among many instances of the credulity or weakness of historians in attributing the death of illustrious personages to extraordinary causes, this is one. Almost all the historians of the sixteenth century affirm that the death of Paul III. was occasioned by the violent passions which the behavior of his grandson excited; that being informed, while he was refreshing himself in one of his gardens near Rome, of Octavio's attempt on Parma, as well as of his negotiations with the emperor by means of Gonzaga, he fainted away, continued some hours in a swoon, then became feverish, and died within three

As this event had been long expected, there was an extraordinary concourse of cardinals at Rome; and, the various competitors having had time to

days. This is the account given of it by Thuanus, lib. vi. 211; Adriani, *Istoria de' suoi Tempi*, lib. vii. 480; and by Father Paul, 280. Even Cardinal Pallavicini, better informed than any writer with regard to the events which happened in the papal court, and when not warped by prejudice or system, more accurate in relating them, agrees with their narrative in its chief circumstances. (*Pallav.*, lib. ii. 74.) Paruta, who wrote his history by command of the senate of Venice, relates it in the same manner. (*Istorici Venez.*, vol. iv. 212.) But there was no occasion to search for any extraordinary cause to account for the death of an old man of eighty-two. There remains an authentic account of this event in which we find none of those marvellous circumstances of which the historians are so fond. The cardinal of Ferrara, who was intrusted with the affairs of France at the court of Rome, and M. d'Urfé, Henry's ambassador in ordinary there, wrote an account to that monarch of the affair at Parma, and of the pope's death. By these it appears that Octavio's attempt to surprise Parma was made on the 20th of October; that next day in the evening, and not while he was airing in the gardens of Monte Cavallo, the pope received intelligence of what he had done; that he was seized with such a transport of passion, and cried so bitterly, that his voice was heard in several apartments of the palace; that next day, however, he was so well as to give an audience to the cardinal of Ferrara, and to go through business of different kinds; that Octavio wrote a letter to the pope, not to Cardinal Farnese his brother, intimating his resolution of throwing himself into the arms of the emperor; that the pope received this on the 21st without any new symptoms of emotion, and returned an answer to it; that on the 22d of October, the day on which the cardinal of Ferrara's letter is dated, the pope was in his usual state of health. (*Mém. de Ribier*, ii. 247.) By a letter of M. d'Urfé, November 5, it appears that the pope was in such good health that on the 3d of that month he had celebrated the anniversary of his coronation with the usual solemnities. (*Ibid.*, 251.) By another letter from the same person, we learn that on the 6th of November a catarrh or defluxion fell down on the pope's lungs, with such dangerous symptoms that his life was immediately despaired of. (*Ibid.*, 252.) And by a third letter we are informed that he died November the 10th. In none of these letters is his death imputed to any extraordinary cause. It appears that more than twenty days elapsed between Octavio's attempt on Parma and the death of his grandfather, and that the disease was the natural effect of old age, not one of those occasioned by violence of passion.

form their parties and to concert their measures, their ambition and intrigues protracted the conclave to a great length. The imperial and French factions strove, with emulation, to promote one of their own number, and had by turns the prospect of success. But as Paul, during a long pontificate, had raised many to the purple, and those chiefly persons of eminent abilities, as well as zealously devoted to his family, Cardinal Farnese had the command of a powerful and united squadron, by whose address and firmness he exalted to the papal throne the Cardinal di Monte, whom Paul had employed as his principal legate in the council of Trent and trusted with his most secret intentions. He assumed the name of Julius III., and, in order to express his gratitude towards his benefactor, the first act of his administration was to put Octavio Farnese in possession of Parma. When the injury which he did to the holy see by alienating a territory of such value was mentioned by some of the cardinals, he briskly replied, "That he would rather be a poor pope, with the reputation of a gentleman, than a rich one, with the infamy of having forgotten the obligations conferred upon him and the promises which he had made."³ But all the lustre of this candor or generosity he quickly effaced by an action most shockingly indecent. According to an ancient and established practice, every pope upon his election considers it as his privilege to bestow on whom he pleases the cardinal's hat which falls to be disposed of by his being invested with the triple

³ Mém. de Ribier.

crown. Julius, to the astonishment of the sacred college, conferred this mark of distinction, together with ample ecclesiastical revenues and the right of bearing his name and arms, upon one Innocent, a youth of sixteen, born of obscure parents, and known by the name of the Ape, from his having been trusted with the care of an animal of that species in the Cardinal di Minte's family. Such a prostitution of the highest dignity in the Church would have given offence even in those dark periods when the credulous superstition of the people emboldened ecclesiastics to venture on the most flagrant violations of decorum. But in an enlightened age, when by the progress of knowledge and philosophy the obligations of duty and decency were better understood, when a blind veneration for the pontifical character was everywhere abated, and one-half of Christendom in open rebellion against the papal see, this action was viewed with horror. Rome was immediately filled with libels and pasquinades, which imputed the pope's extravagant regard for such an unworthy object to the most criminal passions. The Protestants exclaimed against the absurdity of supposing that the infallible spirit of divine truth could dwell in a breast so impure, and called more loudly than ever, and with greater appearance of justice, for the immediate and thorough reformation of a Church the head of which was a disgrace to the Christian name.⁴ The rest of the pope's conduct was of a piece with this first specimen of his dispositions. Having now reached the summit

⁴ Sleid., 492.—F. Paul, 281.—Pallavic., ii. 76.—Thuan., lib. vi. 215.

of ecclesiastical ambition, he seemed eager to indemnify himself by an unrestrained indulgence of his desires for the self-denial or dissimulation which he had thought it prudent to practise while in a subordinate station. He became careless to so great a degree of all serious business that he could seldom be brought to attend to it but in cases of extreme necessity; and, giving up himself to amusements and dissipation of every kind, he imitated the luxurious elegance of Leo, rather than the severe virtue of Adrian, the latter of which it was necessary to display in contending with a sect which derived great credit from the rigid and austere manners of its teachers.⁵

The pope, however ready to fulfil his engagements to the family of Farnese, discovered no inclination to observe the oath which each cardinal had taken when he entered the conclave, that if the choice should fall on him he would immediately call the council to reassume its deliberations. Julius knew by experience how difficult it was to confine such a body of men within the narrow limits which it was the interest of the see of Rome to prescribe, and how easily the zeal of some members, the rashness of others, or the suggestions of the princes on whom they depended, might precipitate a popular and ungovernable assembly into forbidden inquiries as well as dangerous decisions. He wished, for these reasons, to have eluded the obligation of his oath, and gave an ambiguous answer to the first proposals which were made to him by the emperor with regard to

⁵ F. Paul, 281.

that matter. But Charles, either from his natural obstinacy in adhering to the measures which he had once adopted, or from the mere pride of accomplishing what was held to be almost impossible, persisted in his resolution of forcing the Protestants to return into the bosom of the Church. Having persuaded himself that the authoritative decisions of the council might be employed with efficacy in combating their prejudices, he, in consequence of that persuasion, continued to solicit earnestly that a new bull of convocation might be issued; and the pope could not with decency reject that request. When Julius found that he could not prevent the calling of a council, he endeavored to take to himself all the merit of having procured the meeting of an assembly which was the object of such general desire and expectation. A congregation of cardinals, to whom he referred the consideration of what was necessary for restoring peace to the Church, recommended, by his direction, the speedy convocation of a council as the most effectual expedient for that purpose; and, as the new heresies raged with the greatest violence in Germany, they proposed Trent as the place of its meeting, that, by a near inspection of the evil, the remedy might be applied with greater discernment and certainty of success. The pope warmly approved of this advice, which he himself had dictated, and sent nuncios to the imperial and French courts, in order to make known his intentions.⁶

About this time the emperor had summoned a

⁶ F. Paul, 281.—Pallav., ii. 77.

new diet to meet at Augsburg, in order to enforce the observation of the Interim, and to procure a more authentic act of the supreme court in the empire, acknowledging the jurisdiction of the council, as well as an explicit promise of conforming to its decrees. He appeared there in person, together with his son, the prince of Spain. Few electors were present, but all sent deputies in their name. Charles, notwithstanding the despotic authority with which he had given law in the empire during two years, knew that the spirit of independence among the Germans was not entirely subdued, and for that reason took care to overawe the diet by a considerable body of Spanish troops which escorted him thither. The first point submitted to the consideration of the diet was the necessity of holding a council. All the popish members agreed, without difficulty, that the meeting of that assembly should be renewed at Trent, and promised an implicit acquiescence in its decrees. The Protestants, intimidated and disunited, must have followed their example, and the resolution of the diet would have proved unanimous, if Maurice of Saxony had not begun at this time to disclose new intentions, and to act a part very different from that which he had so long assumed.

By an artful dissimulation of his own sentiments, by address in paying court to the emperor, and by the seeming zeal with which he forwarded all his ambitious schemes, Maurice had raised himself to the electoral dignity; and, having added the dominions of the elder branch of the Saxon

family to his own, he was become the most powerful prince in Germany. But his long and intimate union with the emperor had afforded him many opportunities of observing narrowly the dangerous tendency of that monarch's schemes. He saw the yoke that was preparing for his country, and, from the rapid as well as formidable progress of the imperial power, was convinced that but a few steps more remained to be taken in order to render Charles as absolute a monarch in Germany as he had become in Spain. The more eminent the condition was to which he himself had been exalted, the more solicitous did Maurice naturally become to maintain all its rights and privileges, and the more did he dread the thoughts of descending from the rank of a prince, almost independent, to that of a vassal subject to the commands of a master. At the same time, he perceived that Charles was bent on exacting a rigid conformity to the doctrines and rites of the Romish Church, instead of allowing liberty of conscience, the promise of which had allured several Protestant princes to assist him in the war against the confederates of Smalkalde. As he himself, notwithstanding all the compliances which he had made from motives of interest or an excess of confidence in the emperor, was sincerely attached to the Lutheran tenets, he determined not to be a tame spectator of the overthrow of a system which he believed to be founded in truth.

This resolution, flowing from the love of liberty or zeal for religion, was strengthened by political and interested considerations. In that elevated

station in which Maurice was now placed, new and more extensive prospects opened to his view. His rank and power entitled him to be the head of the Protestants in the empire. His predecessor, the degraded elector, with inferior abilities, and territories less considerable, had acquired such an ascendant over the councils of the party; and Maurice neither wanted discernment to see the advantage of this pre-eminence, nor ambition to aim at attaining it. But he found himself in a situation which rendered the attempt no less difficult than the object of it was important. On the one hand, the connection which he had formed with the emperor was so intimate that he could scarcely hope to take any step which tended to dissolve it, without alarming his jealousy and drawing on himself the whole weight of that power which had crushed the greatest confederacy ever formed in Germany. On the other hand, the calamities which he had brought on the Protestant party were so recent, as well as great, that it seemed almost impossible to regain their confidence, or to rally and reanimate a body after he himself had been the chief instrument in breaking its union and vigor. These considerations were sufficient to have discouraged any person of a spirit less adventurous than Maurice's. But to him the grandeur and difficulty of the enterprise were allurements; and he boldly resolved on measures the idea of which a genius of an inferior order could not have conceived, or would have trembled at the thoughts of the danger that attended the execution of them.

His passions concurred with his interest in confirming this resolution; and the resentment excited by an injury which he sensibly felt added new force to the motives for opposing the emperor which sound policy suggested. Maurice, by his authority, had prevailed on the landgrave of Hesse to put his person in the emperor's power, and had obtained a promise from the imperial ministers that he should not be detained a prisoner. This had been violated in the manner already related. The unhappy landgrave exclaimed as loudly against his son-in-law as against Charles. The princes of Hesse required Maurice to fulfil his engagements to their father, who had lost his liberty by trusting to him; and all Germany suspected him of having betrayed to an implacable enemy the friend whom he was most bound to protect. Roused by these solicitations or reproaches, as well as prompted by duty and affection to his father-in-law, Maurice had employed not only entreaties, but remonstrances, in order to procure his release. All these Charles had disregarded; and the shame of having been first deceived and then slighted by a prince whom he had served with zeal as well as success, which merited a very different return, made such a deep impression on Maurice that he waited with impatience for an opportunity of being revenged.

The utmost caution as well as the most delicate address were requisite in taking every step towards this end; as he had to guard, on the one hand, against giving a premature alarm to the emperor, while, on the other, something consid-

erable and explicit was necessary to be done in order to regain the confidence of the Protestant party. Maurice had accordingly applied all his powers of art and dissimulation to attain both these points. As he knew Charles to be inflexible with regard to the submission which he required to the Interim, he did not hesitate one moment whether he should establish that form of doctrine and worship in his dominions; but, being sensible how odious it was to his subjects, instead of violently imposing it on them by the mere terror of authority, as had been done in other parts of Germany, he endeavored to render their obedience a voluntary deed of their own. For this purpose, he had assembled the clergy of his country at Leipsic, and had laid the Interim before them, together with the reasons which made it necessary to conform to it. He had gained some of them by promises, others he had wrought upon by threats, and all were intimidated by the rigor with which obedience to the Interim was extorted in the neighboring provinces. Even Melancthon, whose merit of every kind entitled him to the first place among the Protestant divines, being now deprived of the manly counsels of Luther, which were wont to inspire him with fortitude and to preserve him steady amidst the storms and dangers that threatened the Church, was seduced into unwarrantable concessions, by the timidity of his temper, his fond desire of peace, and his excessive complaisance towards persons of high rank. By his arguments and authority, no less than by Maurice's address, the assembly was prevailed on to

declare "that, in points which were purely indifferent, obedience was due to the commands of a lawful superior." Founding upon this maxim, no less uncontrovertible in theory than dangerous when carried into practice, especially in religious matters, many of the Protestant ecclesiastics whom Maurice consulted proceeded to class among the number of things indifferent several doctrines which Luther had pointed out as gross and pernicious errors in the Romish creed; and, placing in the same rank many of those rites which distinguished the reformed from the popish worship, they exhorted their people to comply with the emperor's injunctions concerning these particulars.⁷

By this dexterous conduct, the introduction of the Interim excited none of those violent convulsions in Saxony which it occasioned in other provinces. But, though the Saxons submitted, the more zealous Lutherans exclaimed against Melancthon and his associates as false brethren, who were either so wicked as to apostatize from the truth altogether, or so crafty as to betray it by subtle distinctions, or so feeble-spirited as to give it up from pusillanimity and criminal complaisance to a prince capable of sacrificing to his political interest that which he himself regarded as most sacred. Maurice, being conscious what a color of probability his past conduct gave to those accusations, as well as afraid of losing entirely

⁷ Sleid., 481, 485.—Jo. Laur. Moshemii Institutionum Hist. Ecclesiasticæ, lib. iv., Helmst., 1755, 4to, p. 748.—J°. And. Schmidii Historia Interimistica, p. 70, etc., Helmst. 1730.

the confidence of the Protestants, issued a declaration containing professions of his zealous attachment to the reformed religion, and of his resolution to guard against all the errors or encroachments of the papal see.⁸

Having gone so far in order to remove the fears and jealousies of the Protestants, he found it necessary to efface the impression which such a declaration might make upon the emperor. For that purpose, he not only renewed his professions of an inviolable adherence to his alliance with him, but, as the city of Magdeburg still persisted in rejecting the Interim, he undertook to reduce it to obedience, and instantly set about levying troops to be employed in that service. This damped all the hopes which the Protestants began to conceive of Maurice in consequence of his declaration, and left them more than ever at a loss to guess at his real intentions. Their former suspicion and distrust of him revived, and the divines of Magdeburg filled Germany with writings in which they represented him as the most formidable enemy of the Protestant religion, who treacherously assumed an appearance of zeal for its interest, that he might more effectually execute his schemes for its destruction.

This charge, supported by the evidence of recent facts, as well as by his present dubious conduct, gained such universal credit that Maurice was obliged to take a vigorous step in his own vindication. As soon as the reassembling of the council of Trent was proposed in the diet, his

⁸ Sleid, 485.

ambassadors protested that their master would not acknowledge its authority unless all the points which had been already decided there were reviewed and considered as still undetermined; unless the Protestant divines had a full hearing granted them and were allowed a decisive voice in the council; and unless the pope renounced his pretensions to preside in the council, engage to submit to its decrees, and to absolve the bishops from their oath of obedience, that they might deliver their sentiments with greater freedom. These demands, which were higher than any that the Reformers had ventured to make, even when the zeal of their party was warmest or their affairs most prosperous, counterbalanced in some degree the impression which Maurice's preparations against Magdeburg had made upon the minds of the Protestants, and kept them in suspense with regard to his designs. At the same time, he had dexterity enough to represent this part of his conduct in such a light to the emperor that it gave him no offence, and occasioned no interruption of the strict confidence which subsisted between them. What the pretexts were which he employed, in order to give such a bold declaration an innocent appearance, the contemporary historians have not explained. That they imposed upon Charles is certain, for he still continued not only to prosecute his plan, as well concerning the Interim as the council, with the same ardor, but to place the same confidence in Maurice with regard to the execution of both.

The pope's resolution concerning the council

not being yet known at Augsburg, the chief business of the diet was to enforce the observation of the Interim. As the senate of Magdeburg, notwithstanding various endeavors to frighten or to soothe them into compliance, not only persevered obstinately in their opposition to the Interim, but began to strengthen the fortifications of their city and to levy troops in their own defence, Charles required the diet to assist him in quelling this audacious rebellion against a decree of the empire. Had the members of the diet been left to act agreeably to their own inclination, this demand would have been rejected without hesitation. All the Germans who favored in any degree the new opinions in religion, and many who were influenced by no other consideration than jealousy of the emperor's growing power, regarded this effort of the citizens of Magdeburg as a noble stand for the liberties of their country. Even such as had not resolution to exert the same spirit admired the gallantry of their enterprise and wished it success. But the presence of the Spanish troops, together with the dread of the emperor's displeasure, overawed the members of the diet to such a degree that, without venturing to utter their own sentiments, they tamely ratified by their votes whatever the emperor was pleased to prescribe. The rigorous decrees which Charles had issued by his own authority against the Magdeburgers were confirmed; a resolution was taken to raise troops in order to besiege the city in form; and persons were named to fix the contingent in men or money to be furnished by each state. At

the same time, the diet petitioned that Maurice might be intrusted with the command of that army; to which Charles gave his consent with great alacrity and with high encomiums upon the wisdom of the choice which they had made.⁹ As Maurice conducted all his schemes with profound and impenetrable secrecy, it is probable that he took no step avowedly in order to obtain this charge. The recommendation of his countrymen was either purely accidental, or flowed from the opinion generally entertained of his great abilities; and neither the diet had any foresight nor the emperor any dread of the consequences which followed upon this nomination. Maurice accepted without hesitation the command to which he was recommended, instantly discerning the important advantages which he might derive from having it committed to him.

Meanwhile, Julius, in preparing the bull for the convocation of the council, observed all those tedious forms which the court of Rome can artfully employ to retard any disagreeable measure. At last, however, it was published, and the council was summoned to meet at Trent on this first day of the ensuing month of May. As he knew that many of the Germans rejected or disputed the authority and jurisdiction which the papal see claims with respect to general councils, he took care, in the preamble of the bull, to assert, in the strongest terms, his own right not only to call and preside in that assembly, but to direct its proceedings; nor would he soften these expressions in

⁹ Sleid., 503, 512.

any degree, in compliance with the repeated solicitations of the emperor, who foresaw what offence they would give and what construction might be put on them. They were censured accordingly with great severity by several members of the diet; but, whatever disgust or suspicion they excited, such complete influence over all their deliberations had the emperor acquired that he procured a recess in which the authority of the council was recognized and declared to be the proper remedy for the evils which at that time afflicted the Church. All the princes and states of the empire, such as had made innovations in religion, as well as those who adhered to the system of their forefathers, were required to send their representatives to the council; the emperor engaged to grant a safe-conduct to such as demanded it, and to secure them an impartial hearing in the council; he promised to fix his residence in some city of the empire in the neighborhood of Trent, that he might protect the members of the council by his presence, and take care that, by conducting their deliberations agreeably to Scripture and the doctrine of the fathers, they might bring them to a desirable issue. In this recess the observation of the Interim was more strongly enjoined than ever; and the emperor threatened all who had hitherto neglected or refused to conform to it with the severest effects of his vengeance if they persisted in their disobedience.¹⁰

During the meeting of this diet a new attempt

¹⁰ Sleid., 512.—Thuan., lib. vi. 233.—Goldasti Constit. Imperiales, vol. ii. 340.

was made in order to procure liberty to the landgrave. That prince, nowise reconciled to his situation by time, grew every day more impatient of restraint. Having often applied to Maurice and the elector of Brandenburg, who took every occasion of soliciting the emperor in his behalf, though without any effect, he now commanded his sons to summon them, with legal formality, to perform what was contained in the bond which they had granted him, by surrendering themselves into their hands to be treated with the same rigor as the emperor had used him. This furnished them with a fresh pretext for renewing their application to the emperor, together with an additional argument to enforce it. Charles firmly resolved not to grant their request; though at the same time, being extremely desirous to be delivered from their incessant importunity, he endeavored to prevail on the landgrave to give up the bond which he had received from the two electors. But, that prince refusing to part with a security which he deemed essential to his safety, the emperor boldly cut the knot which he could not untie, and, by a public deed, annulled the bond which Maurice and the elector of Brandenburg had granted, absolving them from all their engagements to the landgrave. No pretension to a power so pernicious to society as that of abrogating at pleasure the most sacred laws of honor and most formal obligations of public faith had hitherto been formed by any but the Roman pontiffs, who, in consequence of their claim of supreme power on earth, arrogate the right of dispensing with pre-

cepts and duties of every kind. All Germany was filled with astonishment when Charles assumed the same prerogative. The state of subjection to which the empire was reduced appeared to be more rigorous, as well as intolerable, than that of the most wretched and enslaved nations, if the emperor by an arbitrary decree might cancel those solemn contracts which are the foundation of that mutual confidence whereby men are held together in social union. The landgrave himself now gave up all hopes of recovering his liberty by the emperor's consent, and endeavored to procure it by his own address. But, the plan which he had formed to deceive his guards being discovered, such of his attendants as he had gained to favor his escape were put to death, and he was confined in the citadel of Mechlin more closely than ever.¹¹

Another transaction was carried on during this diet, with respect to an affair more nearly interesting to the emperor, and which occasioned likewise a general alarm among the princes of the empire. Charles, though formed with talents which fitted him for conceiving and conducting great designs, was not capable, as has been often observed, of bearing extraordinary success. Its operation on his mind was so violent and intoxicating that it elevated him beyond what was moderate or attainable, and turned his whole attention to the pursuit of vast but chimerical objects. Such had been the effect of his victory over the confederates of Smalkalde. He did not long rest satisfied with the substantial and certain advan-

¹¹ Sleid., 504.—Thuan., lib. vi. 234, 235.

tages which were the result of that event, but, despising these, as poor or inconsiderable fruits of such great success, he aimed at nothing less than at bringing all Germany to an uniformity in religion and at rendering the imperial power despotic. These were objects extremely splendid indeed, and alluring to an ambitious mind: the pursuit of them, however, was attended with manifest danger, and the hope of attaining them very uncertain. But the steps which he had already taken towards them having been accompanied with such success, his imagination, warmed with contemplating this alluring object, overlooked or despised all remaining difficulties. As he conceived the execution of his plan to be certain, he began to be solicitous how he might render the possession of such an important acquisition perpetual in his family, by transmitting the German empire, together with the kingdoms of Spain, and his dominions in Italy and the Low Countries, to his son. Having long revolved this flattering idea in his mind, without communicating it even to those ministers whom he most trusted, he had called Philip out of Spain, in hopes that his presence would facilitate the carrying forward the scheme.

Great obstacles, however, and such as would have deterred any ambition less accustomed to overcome difficulties, were to be surmounted. He had, in the year 1530, imprudently assisted in procuring his brother Ferdinand the dignity of king of the Romans, and there was no probability that this prince, who was still in the prime of life, and

had a son grown up to the years of manhood, would relinquish, in favor of his nephew, the near prospect of the imperial throne, which Charles's infirmities and declining state of health opened to himself. This did not deter the emperor from venturing to make the proposition; and when Ferdinand, notwithstanding his profound reverence for his brother and obsequious submission to his will in other instances, rejected it in a peremptory tone, he was not discouraged by one repulse. He renewed his applications to him by his sister, Mary, queen of Hungary, to whom Ferdinand stood indebted for the crowns both of Hungary and Bohemia, and who, by her great abilities, tempered with extreme gentleness of disposition, had acquired an extraordinary influence over both the brothers. She entered warmly into a measure which tended so manifestly to aggrandize the house of Austria; and, flattering herself that she could tempt Ferdinand to renounce the reversionary possession of the imperial dignity for an immediate establishment, she assured him that the emperor, by way of compensation for his giving up his chance of succession, would instantly bestow upon him territories of very considerable value, and pointed out in particular those of the duke of Wurtemberg, which might be confiscated upon different prettexts. But neither by her address nor entreaties could she induce Ferdinand to approve of a plan which would not only have degraded him from the highest rank among the monarchs of Europe to that of a subordinate and dependent prince, but would have involved both




FERDINAND OF SPAIN, KING OF THE ROMANS

had a son grown up to the years of manhood, would relinquish, in favor of his nephew, the near prospect of the imperial throne, which Charles's infirmities and declining state of health opened to himself. This did not deter the emperor from venturing to make the proposition; and when Ferdinand, notwithstanding his profound reverence for his brother and obsequious submission to his will in other instances, rejected it in a peremptory tone, he was not discouraged by one repulse. He renewed his applications to him by his sister, Mary, queen of Hungary, to whom Ferdinand stood indebted for the crowns both of Hungary and Bohemia, and who, by her great abilities, tempered with extreme gentleness of disposition, had acquired an extraordinary influence over both the brothers. She entered warmly into a measure which tended so manifestly to aggrandize the house of Austria, and, flattering herself that she could tempt Ferdinand to renounce the reversionary possession of the imperial dignity for an immediate establishment, she assured him that the emperor, by way of compensation for his giving up his chance of succession, would instantly bestow upon him territories of very considerable value, and pointed out in particular those of the duke of Wurtemberg, which might be confiscated upon different pretenses. But neither by her address nor entreaties could she induce Ferdinand to approve of a plan which would not only have degraded him from the highest rank among the monarchs of Europe to that of a subordinate and dependent prince, but would have involved both

EFFIG: FERDIN: PRINCIP: ET INFANT: HISPAN:
ARCH: AVSTR: & RO: IMP: AN: ETAT: SVE: XXI:
VICAR:



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him and his posterity in perpetual contests. He was, at the same time, more attached to his children than by a rash concession to frustrate all the high hopes in prospect of which they had been educated.

Notwithstanding the immovable firmness which Ferdinand discovered, the emperor did not abandon his scheme. He flattered himself that he might attain the object in view by another channel, and that it was not impossible to prevail on the electors to cancel their former choice of Ferdinand, or at least to elect Philip a second king of the Romans, substituting him as next in succession to his uncle. With this view, he took Philip along with him to the diet, that the Germans might have an opportunity to observe and become acquainted with the prince in behalf of whom he courted their interest; and he himself employed all the arts of address or insinuation to gain the electors and to prepare them for listening with a favorable ear to the proposal. But no sooner did he venture upon mentioning it to them than they at once saw and trembled at the consequences with which it would be attended. They had long felt all the inconveniences of having placed at the head of the empire a prince whose power and dominions were so extensive: if they should now repeat the folly, and continue the imperial crown, like an hereditary dignity, in the same family, they foresaw that they would give the son an opportunity of carrying on that system of oppression which the father had begun, and would put it in his power to overturn whatever was yet left entire in

the ancient and venerable fabric of the German constitution.

The character of the prince in whose favor this extraordinary proposition was made rendered it still less agreeable. Philip, though possessed with an insatiable desire of power, was a stranger to all the arts of conciliating good will. Haughty, reserved, and severe, he, instead of gaining new friends, disgusted the ancient and most devoted partisans of the Austrian interest. He scorned to take the trouble of acquiring the language of the country to the government of which he aspired; nor would he condescend to pay the Germans the compliment of accommodating himself, during his residence among them, to their manners and customs. He allowed the electors and most illustrious princes in Germany to remain in his presence uncovered, affecting a stately and distant demeanor which the greatest of German emperors, and even Charles himself, amidst the pride of power and victory, had never assumed.¹² On the other hand, Ferdinand, from the time of his arrival in Germany, had studied to render himself acceptable to the people by a conformity to their manners, which seemed to flow from choice; and his son Maximilian, who was born in Germany, possessed in an eminent degree such amiable qualities as rendered him the darling of his countrymen and induced them to look forward to his election as a most desirable event. Their esteem and affection for him fortified the resolu-

¹² Frediman Andreae Zulich *Dissertatio Politico-Historica de Nævvis politicis Caroli V.*, Lips., 1706, 4to, p. 21.

tion which sound policy had suggested, and determined the Germans to prefer the popular virtues of Ferdinand and his son to the stubborn austerity of Philip, which interest could not soften nor ambition teach him to disguise. All the electors, the ecclesiastical as well as secular, concurred in expressing such strong disapproval of the measure that Charles, notwithstanding the reluctance with which he gave up any point, was obliged to drop the scheme as impracticable. By his unseasonable perseverance in pushing it, he had not only filled the Germans with new jealousy of his ambitious designs, but laid the foundation of rivalry and discord in the Austrian family, and forced his brother Ferdinand, in self-defence, to court the electors, particularly Maurice of Saxony, and to form such connections with them as cut off all prospect of renewing the proposal with success. Philip, soured by his disappointment, was sent back to Spain, to be called thence when any new scheme of ambition should render his presence necessary.¹³

Having relinquished this plan of domestic ambition, which had long occupied and engrossed him, Charles imagined that he would now have leisure to turn all his attention towards his grand scheme of establishing uniformity of religion in the empire, by forcing all the contending parties to acquiesce in the decisions of the council of Trent. But such was the extent of his dominions, the variety of connections in which this entangled

¹³ Sleid., 505.—Thuan., 180, 238.—Mém. de Ribier, ii. 219, 281, 314.—Adriani, Istor., lib. viii. 507, 520.

him, and the multiplicity of events to which these gave rise, as seldom allowed him to apply his whole force to any one object. The machine which he had to conduct was so great and complicated that an unforeseen irregularity or obstruction in one of the inferior wheels often disconcerted the motion of the whole, and prevented his deriving from them all the beneficial effects which he expected. Such an unlooked-for occurrence happened at this juncture, and created new obstacles to the execution of his schemes with regard to religion. Julius III., though he had confirmed Octavio Farnese in the possession of the duchy of Parma, during the first effusions of his joy and gratitude on his promotion to the papal throne, soon began to repent of his own generosity, and to be apprehensive of consequences which either he did not foresee or had disregarded while the sense of his obligations to the family of Farnese was recent. The emperor still retained Placentia in his hands, and had not relinquished his pretensions to Parma as a fief of the empire. Gonzaga, the governor of Milan, having, by the part which he took in the murder of the late duke, Peter Ludovico, offered an insult to the family of Farnese which he knew could never be forgiven, had for that reason avowed its destruction, and employed all the influence which his great abilities as well as long services gave him with the emperor, in persuading him to seize Parma by force of arms. Charles, in compliance with his solicitations, and that he might gratify his own desire of annexing Parma to the Milanese, listened to the

proposal; and Gonzaga, ready to take encouragement from the slightest appearance of approbation, began to assemble troops, and to make other preparations for the execution of his scheme.

Octavio, who saw the impending danger, found it necessary for his own safety to increase the garrison of his capital, and to levy soldiers for defending the rest of the country. But, as the expense of such an effort far exceeded his scanty revenues, he represented his situation to the pope, and implored that protection and assistance which was due to him as a vassal of the Church. The imperial minister, however, had already preoccupied the pope's ear, and, by discoursing continually concerning the danger of giving offence to the emperor, as well as the imprudence of supporting Octavio in an usurpation so detrimental to the holy see, had totally alienated him from the family of Farnese. Octavio's remonstrance and petition met, of consequence, with a cold reception; and he, despairing of any assistance from Julius, began to look round for protection from some other quarter. Henry II. of France was the only prince powerful enough to afford him this protection, and, fortunately, he was now in a situation which allowed him to grant it. He had brought his transactions with the two British kingdoms, which had hitherto diverted his attention from the affairs of the continent, to such an issue as he desired. This he had effected partly by the vigor of his arms, partly by his dexterity in taking advantage of the political factions which raged in both kingdoms to such a degree as ren-

dered the councils of the Scots violent and precipitate and the operations of the English feeble and unsteady. He had procured from the English favorable conditions of peace for his allies the Scots; he had prevailed on the nobles of Scotland not only to affiance their young queen to his son, the dauphin, but even to send her into France, that she might be educated under his eye, and had recovered Boulogne, together with its dependencies, which had been conquered by Henry VIII.

The French king, having gained points of so much consequence to his crown and disengaged himself with such honor from the burden of supporting the Scots and maintaining a war against England, was now at full leisure to pursue the measures which his hereditary jealousy of the emperor's power naturally suggested. He listened, accordingly, to the first overtures which Octavio Farnese made him; and, embracing eagerly an opportunity of recovering footing in Italy, he instantly concluded a treaty, in which he bound himself to espouse his cause and to furnish him all the assistance which he desired. This transaction could not long be kept secret from the pope, who, foreseeing the calamities which must follow if war were rekindled so near the ecclesiastical state, immediately issued monitory letters requiring Octavio to relinquish his new alliance. Upon his refusal to comply with the requisition, he soon after pronounced his fief to be forfeited, and declared war against him as a disobedient and rebellious vassal. But, as with his own forces alone he could not hope to subdue

Octavio while supported by such a powerful ally as the king of France, he had recourse to the emperor, who, being extremely solicitous to prevent the establishment of the French in Parma, ordered Gonzaga to second Julius with all his troops. Thus the French took the field as the allies of Octavio, the imperialists as the protectors of the holy see, and hostilities commenced between them, while Charles and Henry themselves still affected to give out that they would adhere inviolably to the peace of Crespy. The war of Parma was not distinguished by any memorable event. Many small rencounters happened, with alternate success; the French ravaged part of the ecclesiastical territories; the imperialists laid waste the Parmesan; and the latter, after having begun to besiege Parma in form, were obliged to abandon the enterprise with disgrace.¹⁴

But the motions and alarm which this war, or the preparations for it, occasioned in Italy, prevented most of the Italian prelates from repairing to Trent on the first of May, the day appointed for reassembling the council; and though the papal legates and nuncios resorted thither, they were obliged to adjourn the council to the first of September, hoping such a number of prelates might then assemble that they might with decency begin their deliberations. At that time about sixty prelates, mostly from the ecclesiastical state, or from Spain, together with a few

¹⁴ Adriani, *Istor.*, lib. viii. 505, 514, 524.—Sleid., 513.—Paruta, p. 220.—*Lettere del Caro scritte al nome del Card. Farnese*, tom. ii. p. 11, etc.

Germans, convened.¹⁵ The session was opened with the accustomed formalities, and the fathers were about to proceed to business, when the abbot of Bellozane appeared, and, presenting letters of credence as ambassador from the king of France, demanded audience. Having obtained it, he protested, in Henry's name, against an assembly called at such an improper juncture, when a war wantonly kindled by the pope made it impossible for the deputies from the Gallican Church to resort to Trent in safety, or to deliberate concerning articles of faith and discipline with the requisite tranquillity; he declared that his master did not acknowledge this to be a general or œcumenic council, but must consider and would treat it as a particular and partial convention.¹⁶ The legate affected to despise this protest; and the prelates proceeded, notwithstanding, to examine and decide the great points in controversy concerning the sacrament of the Lord's supper, penance, and extreme unction. This measure of the French monarch, however, gave a deep wound to the credit of the council at the very commencement of its deliberations. The Germans could not pay much regard to an assembly the authority of which the second prince in Christendom had formally disclaimed, or feel any great reverence for the decisions of a few men, who arrogated to themselves all the rights belonging to the representatives of the Church universal, a title to which they had such poor pretensions.

¹⁵ F. Paul, 268.

¹⁶ Sleid., 518.—Thaun., 282.—F. Paul, 301.

The emperor, nevertheless, was straining his authority to the utmost in order to establish the reputation and jurisdiction of the council. He had prevailed on the three ecclesiastical electors, the prelates of greatest power and dignity in the Church, next to the pope, to repair thither in person. He had obliged several German bishops of inferior rank to go to Trent themselves, or to send their proxies. He granted an imperial safe-conduct to the ambassadors nominated by the elector of Brandenburg, the duke of Wurtemberg, and other Protestants, to attend the council, and exhorted them to send their divines thither, in order to propound, explain, and defend their doctrine. At the same time, his zeal anticipated the decrees of the council; and, as if the opinions of the Protestants had already been condemned, he took large steps towards exterminating them. With this intention, he called together the ministers of Augsburg, and, after interrogating them concerning several controverted points, enjoined them to teach nothing with respect to these contrary to the tenets of the Romish Church. Upon their declining to comply with a requisition so contrary to the dictates of their consciences, he commanded them to leave the town in three days, without revealing to any person the cause of their banishment; he prohibited them to preach for the future in any province of the empire, and obliged them to take an oath that they would punctually obey these injunctions. They were not the only victims to his zeal. The Protestant clergy in most of the cities in the circle of Swabia

were ejected with the same violence; and in many places such magistrates as had distinguished themselves by their attachment to the new opinions were dismissed with the most abrupt irregularity, and their offices filled, in consequence of the emperor's arbitrary appointment, with the most bigoted of their adversaries. The reformed worship was almost entirely suppressed throughout that extensive province. The ancient and fundamental privileges of the free cities were violated. The people were compelled to attend the ministration of priests whom they regarded with horror as idolaters, and to submit to the jurisdiction of magistrates whom they detested as usurpers.¹⁷

The emperor, after this discovery, which was more explicit than any that he had hitherto made, of his intention to subvert the German constitution as well as to extirpate the Protestant religion, set out for Inspruck in the Tyrol. He fixed his residence in that city, as, by its situation in the neighborhood of Trent and on the confines of Italy, it appeared a commodious station whence he might inspect the operations of the council, and observe the progress of the war in the Parmesan, without losing sight of such occurrences as might happen in Germany.¹⁸

During these transactions, the siege of Magdeburg was carried on with various success. At the time when Charles proscribed the citizens of Magdeburg and put them under the ban of the empire, he had exhorted and even enjoined all the neighboring states to take arms against them, as rebels

¹⁷ Sleid., 516, 528.—Thuan., 276.

¹⁸ Sleid., 329.

and common enemies. Encouraged by his exhortations as well as promises, George of Mecklenburg, a younger brother of the reigning duke, an active and ambitious prince, collected a considerable number of those soldiers of fortune who had accompanied Henry of Brunswick in all his wild enterprises, and, though a zealous Lutheran himself, invaded the territories of the Magdeburghers, hoping that by the merit of this service he might procure some part of their domains to be allotted to him as an establishment. The citizens, unaccustomed as yet to endure patiently the calamities of war, could not be restrained from sallying out, in order to save their lands from being laid waste. They attacked the duke of Mecklenburg with more resolution than conduct, and were repulsed with great slaughter. But, as they were animated with that unconquerable spirit which flows from zeal for religion, co-operating with the love of civil liberty, far from being disheartened by their misfortune, they prepared to defend themselves with vigor. Many of the veteran soldiers who had served in the long wars between the emperor and the king of France crowding to their standards under able and experienced officers, the citizens acquired military skill by degrees, and added all the advantages of that to the efforts of undaunted courage. The duke of Mecklenburg, notwithstanding the severe blow which he had given the Magdeburghers, not daring to invest a town strongly fortified and defended by such a garrison, continued to ravage the open country.

As the hopes of booty drew many adventurers to the camp of this young prince, Maurice of Saxony began to be jealous of the power which he possessed by being at the head of such a numerous body, and, marching towards Magdeburg with his own troops, assumed the supreme command of the whole army,—an honor to which his high rank and great abilities, as well as the nomination of the diet, gave him an indisputable title. With this united force he invested the town, and began the siege in form, claiming great merit with the emperor on that account, as, from his zeal to execute the imperial decree, he was exposing himself once more to the censures and maledictions of the party with which he agreed in religious sentiments. But the approaches to the town went on slowly; the garrison interrupted the besiegers by frequent sallies, in one of which George of Mecklenburg was taken prisoner, levelled part of their works, and cut off the soldiers in their advanced posts. While the citizens of Magdeburg, animated by the discourses of their pastors, and the soldiers, encouraged by the example of their officers, endured all the hardships of a siege without murmuring, and defended themselves with the same ardor which they had at first discovered, the troops of the besiegers acted with extreme remissness, repining at everything that they suffered in a service they disliked. They broke out more than once into open mutiny, demanded the arrears of their pay, which, as the members of the Germanic body sent in their contributions towards defraying the expenses of the war sparingly and

with great reluctance, amounted to a considerable sum.¹⁹ Maurice, too, had particular motives, though such as he durst not avow at that juncture, which induced him not to push the siege with vigor, and made him choose rather to continue at the head of an army exposed to all the imputations which his dilatory proceedings drew upon him, than to precipitate a conquest that might have brought him some accession of reputation, but would have rendered it necessary to disband his forces.

At last, the inhabitants of the town beginning to suffer distress from want of provisions, and Maurice finding it impossible to protract matters any longer without filling the emperor with such suspicions as might have disconcerted all his measures, he concluded a treaty of capitulation with the city upon the following conditions: That the Magdeburghers should humbly implore pardon of the emperor; that they should not for the future take arms or enter into any alliance against the house of Austria; that they should submit to the authority of the imperial chamber; that they should conform to the decree of the diet at Augsburg with respect to religion; that the new fortifications added to the town should be demolished; that they should pay a fine of fifty thousand crowns, deliver up twelve pieces of ordnance to the emperor, and set the duke of Mecklenburg, together with their other prisoners, at liberty, without ransom. Next day their garrison marched out, and Maurice took possession of the town with great military pomp.

¹⁹ Thuan., 277.—Sleid., 514.

Before the terms of capitulation were settled, Maurice had held many conferences with Albert, Count Mansfeldt, who had the chief command in Magdeburg. He consulted likewise with Count Heideck, an officer who had served with great reputation in the army of the league of Smalkalde, whom the emperor had proscribed on account of his zeal for that cause, but whom Maurice had, notwithstanding, secretly engaged in his service and admitted into the most intimate confidence. To them he communicated a scheme which he had long revolved in his mind for procuring liberty to his father-in-law the landgrave, for vindicating the privileges of the Germanic body, and setting bounds to the dangerous encroachments of the imperial power. Having deliberated with them concerning the measures which might be necessary for securing the success of such an arduous enterprise, he gave Mansfeldt secret assurances that the fortifications of Magdeburg should not be destroyed, and that the inhabitants should neither be disturbed in the exercise of their religion nor be deprived of any of their ancient immunities. In order to engage Maurice more thoroughly, from considerations of interest, to fulfil these engagements, the senate of Magdeburg elected him their burgrave, a dignity which had formerly belonged to the electoral house of Saxony, and which entitled him to a very ample jurisdiction, not only in the city but in its dependencies.²⁰

²⁰ Sleid., 528.—Thuan., 276.—*Obsidionis Magdeburgicæ Descriptio per Sebast. Besselmeierum*, ap. Scard., ii. 518.

Thus the citizens of Magdeburg, after enduring a siege of twelve months, and struggling for their liberties, religious and civil, with an invincible fortitude, worthy of the cause in which it was exerted, had at last the good fortune to conclude a treaty which left them in a better condition than the rest of their countrymen, whom their timidity or want of public spirit had betrayed into such mean submissions to the emperor. But while a great part of Germany applauded the gallant conduct of the Magdeburghers and rejoiced in their having escaped the destruction with which they had been threatened, all admired Maurice's address in the conduct of his negotiation with them, as well as the dexterity with which he converted every event to his own advantage. They saw with amazement that, after having afflicted the Magdeburghers during many months with all the calamities of war, he was at last, by their voluntary election, advanced to the station of highest authority in that city which he had so lately besieged; that, after having been so long the object of their satirical invectives as an apostate and an enemy to the religion which he professed, they seemed now to place unbounded confidence in his zeal and good will.²¹ At the same time, the public articles in the treaty of capitulation were so perfectly conformable to those which the emperor had granted to the other Protestant cities, and Maurice took such care to magnify his merit in having reduced a place which had defended itself with so much obstinacy, that

²¹ Arnoldi Vita Maurit., apud Menken, ii. 1227.

Charles, far from suspecting anything fraudulent or collusive in the terms of accommodation, ratified them without hesitation, and absolved the Magdeburghers from the sentence of ban which had been denounced against them.

The only point that now remained to embarrass Maurice was how to keep together the veteran troops which had served under him, as well as those which had been employed in the defence of the town. For this, too, he found an expedient with singular art and felicity. His schemes against the emperor were not yet so fully ripened that he durst venture to disclose them and proceed openly to carry them into execution. The winter was approaching, which made it impossible to take the field immediately. He was afraid that it would give a premature alarm to the emperor if he should retain such a considerable body in his pay until the season of action returned in the spring. As soon, then, as Magdeburg opened its gates, he sent home his Saxon subjects, whom he could command to take arms and reassemble on the shortest warning; and at the same time, paying part of the arrears due to the mercenary troops who had followed his standard, as well as to the soldiers who had served in the garrison, he absolved them from their respective oaths of fidelity, and disbanded them. But the moment he gave them their discharge, George of Mecklenburg, who was now set at liberty, offered to take them into his service and to become surety for the payment of what was still owing to them. As such adventurers were accustomed often to

change masters, they instantly accepted the offer. Thus these troops were kept united, and ready to march wherever Maurice should call them; while the emperor, deceived by this artifice, and imagining that George of Mecklenburg had hired them with an intention to assert his claim to a part of his brother's territories by force of arms, suffered this transaction to pass without observation, as if it had been a matter of no consequence.²²

Having ventured to take these steps, which were of so much consequence towards the execution of his schemes, Maurice, that he might divert the emperor from observing their tendency too narrowly, and prevent the suspicions which that must have excited, saw the necessity of employing some new artifice in order to engage his attention and to confirm him in his present security. As he knew that the chief object of the emperor's solicitude at this juncture was how he might prevail with the Protestant states of Germany to recognize the authority of the council of Trent, and to send thither ambassadors in their own name, as well as deputies from their respective churches, he took hold of this predominating passion in order to amuse and to deceive him. He affected a wonderful zeal to gratify Charles in what he desired with regard to this matter; he nominated ambassadors, whom he empowered to attend the council; he made choice of Melancthon and some of the most eminent among his brethren

²² Thuan., 278.—Struv., Corp. Hist. Germ., 1064.—Arnoldi Vita Mauricii, apud Menken, ii. 1227.

to prepare a confession of faith and to lay it before that assembly. After his example, and probably in consequence of his solicitations, the duke of Wurtemberg, the city of Strasburg, and other Protestant states, appointed ambassadors, and divines to attend the council. They all applied to the emperor for his safe-conduct, which they obtained in the most ample form. This was deemed sufficient for the security of the ambassadors, and they proceeded accordingly on their journey; but a separate safe-conduct from the council itself was demanded for the Protestant divines. The fate of John Huss and Jerome of Prague, whom the council of Constance, in the preceding century, had condemned to the flames without regarding the imperial safe-conduct which had been granted them, rendered this precaution prudent and necessary. But, as the pope was no less unwilling that the Protestants should be admitted to a hearing in the council than the emperor had been eager in bringing them to demand it, the legate, by promises and threats, prevailed on the fathers of the council to decline issuing a safe-conduct in the same form with that which the council of Basil had granted to the followers of Huss. The Protestants, on their part, insisted upon the council's copying the precise words of that instrument. The imperial ambassadors interposed, in order to obtain what would satisfy them. Altercations in the form of the writ were proposed; expedients were suggested; protests and counter-protests were taken: the legate, together with his associates, labored to gain their point by

artifice and chicanery; the Protestants adhered to theirs with firmness and obstinacy. An account of everything that passed in Trent was transmitted to the emperor at Inspruck, who, attempting from an excess of zeal, or confidence in his own address, to reconcile the contending parties, was involved in a labyrinth of inextricable negotiations. By means of this, however, Maurice gained all that he had in view: the emperor's time was wholly engrossed, and his attention diverted, while he himself had leisure to mature his schemes, to carry on his intrigues, and to finish his preparations, before he threw off the mask and struck the blow which he had so long meditated.²³

But, previous to entering into any further detail concerning Maurice's operations, some account must be given of a new revolution in Hungary, which contributed not a little towards their producing such extraordinary effects. When Solyman, in the year 1541, by a stratagem which suited the base and insidious policy of a petty usurper rather than the magnanimity of a mighty conqueror, deprived the young king of Hungary of the dominions which his father had left him, he had granted that unfortunate prince the country of Transylvania, a province of his paternal kingdom. The government of this, together with the care of educating the young king,—for he still allowed him to retain that title, though he had rendered it only an empty name,—he committed to the queen and Martinuzzi, bishop of Waradin, whom the late king had appointed joint guardians

²³ Sleid., 526, 529.—F. Paul, 323, 338.—Thuan., 286.

of his son, and regents of his dominions, at a time when these offices were of greater importance. This co-ordinate jurisdiction occasioned the same dissensions in a small principality as it would have excited in a great kingdom; an ambitious young queen, possessed with a high opinion of her own capacity for governing, and a high-spirited prelate, fond of power, contending who should engross the greatest share in the administration. Each had their partisans among the nobles; but as Martinuzzi, by his great talents, began to acquire the ascendant, Isabella turned his own arts against him, and courted the protection of the Turks.

The neighboring bashas, jealous of the bishop's power as well as abilities, readily promised her the aid which she demanded, and would soon have obliged Martinuzzi to have given up to her the sole direction of affairs, if his ambition, fertile in expedients, had not suggested to him a new measure, and one that tended not only to preserve but to enlarge his authority. Having concluded an agreement with the queen, by the mediation of some of the nobles who were solicitous to save their country from the calamities of a civil war, he secretly despatched one of his confidants to Vienna and entered into a negotiation with Ferdinand. As it was no difficult matter to persuade Ferdinand that the same man whose enmity and intrigues had driven him out of a great part of his Hungarian dominions might upon a reconciliation become equally instrumental in recovering them, he listened eagerly to the first overtures

of a union with that prelate. Martinuzzi allured him by such prospects of advantage, and engaged with so much confidence that he would prevail on the most powerful of the Hungarian nobles to take arms in his favor, that Ferdinand, notwithstanding his truce with Solyman, agreed to invade Transylvania. The command of the troops destined for that service, consisting of veteran Spanish and German soldiers, was given to Castalda, marquis de Picadena, an officer formed by the famous marquis de Pescara, whom he strongly resembled both in his enterprising genius for civil business and in his great knowledge in the art of war. This army, more formidable by the discipline of the soldiers and the abilities of the general than by its numbers, was powerfully seconded by Martinuzzi and his faction among the Hungarians. As the Turkish bashas, the sultan himself being at the head of his army on the frontiers of Persia, could not afford the queen such immediate or effectual assistance as the exigency of her affairs required, she quickly lost all hopes of being able to retain any longer the authority which she possessed as regent, and even began to despair of her son's safety.

Martinuzzi did not suffer this favorable opportunity of accomplishing his own designs to pass unimproved, and ventured, while she was in this state of dejection, to lay before her a proposal which at any other time she would have rejected with disdain. He represented how impossible it was for her to resist Ferdinand's victorious arms; that, even if the Turks should enable her to make

head against them, she would be far from changing her condition for the better, and could not consider them as deliverers, but as masters, to whose commands she must submit; he conjured her, therefore, as she regarded her own dignity, the safety of her son, or the security of Christendom, rather to give up Transylvania to Ferdinand, and to make over to him her son's title to the crown of Hungary, than to allow both to be usurped by the inveterate enemy of the Christian faith. At the same time he promised her, in Ferdinand's name, a compensation for herself, as well as for her son, suitable to their rank and proportional to the value of what they were to sacrifice. Isabella, deserted by some of her adherents, distrusting others, destitute of friends, and surrounded by Castaldo's and Martinuzzi's troops, subscribed these hard conditions, though with a reluctant hand. Upon this she surrendered such places of strength as were still in her possession, she gave up all the ensigns of royalty, particularly a crown of gold, which, as the Hungarians believed, had descended from heaven and conferred on him who wore it an undoubted right to the throne. As she could not bear to remain a private person in a country where she had once enjoyed sovereign power, she instantly set out with her son for Silesia, in order to take possession of the principalities of Oppelen and Ratibor, the investiture of which Ferdinand had engaged to grant to her son, and likewise to bestow one of his daughters upon him in marriage.

Upon the resignation of the young king, Mar-

tinuzzi, and, after his example, the rest of the Transylvanian grandees, swore allegiance to Ferdinand, who, in order to testify his grateful sense of the zeal as well as success with which that prelate had served him, affected to distinguish him by every possible mark of favor and confidence. He appointed him governor of Transylvania, with almost unlimited authority; he publicly ordered Castaldo to pay the greatest deference to his opinion and commands; he increased his revenues, which were already very great, by new appointments; he nominated him archbishop of Gran, and prevailed on the pope to raise him to the dignity of a cardinal. All this ostentation of good will, however, was void of sincerity, and calculated to conceal sentiments the most perfectly its reverse. Ferdinand dreaded Martinuzzi's abilities, distrusted his fidelity, and foresaw that, as his extensive authority enabled him to check any attempt towards circumscribing or abolishing the extensive privileges which the Hungarian nobility possessed, he would stand forth, on every occasion, the guardian of the liberties of his country, rather than act the part of a viceroy devoted to the will of his sovereign.

For this reason, he secretly gave it in charge to Castaldo to watch his motions, to guard against his designs, and to thwart his measures. But Martinuzzi, either because he did not perceive that Castaldo was placed as a spy on his actions, or because he despised Ferdinand's insidious arts, assumed the direction of the war against the Turks with his usual tone of authority, and

conducted it with great magnanimity and no less success. He recovered some places of which the infidels had taken possession; he rendered their attempts to reduce others abortive, and established Ferdinand's authority not only in Transylvania, but in the Bannat of Temeswar, and several of the countries adjacent. In carrying on these operations, he often differed in sentiments from Castaldo and his officers, and treated the Turkish prisoners with a degree not only of humanity, but even of generosity, which Castaldo loudly condemned. This was represented at Vienna as an artful method of courting the friendship of the infidels, that by securing their protection he might shake off all dependence upon the sovereign whom he now acknowledged. Though Martinuzzi, in justification of his own conduct, contended that it was impolitic by unnecessary severities to exasperate an enemy prone to revenge, Castaldo's accusations gained credit with Ferdinand, prepossessed already against Martinuzzi, and jealous of everything that could endanger his own authority in Hungary, in proportion as he knew it to be precarious and ill established. These suspicions Castaldo confirmed and strengthened by the intelligence which he transmitted continually to his confidants at Vienna. By misrepresenting what was innocent and putting the worst construction on what seemed dubious in Martinuzzi's conduct, by imputing to him designs which he never formed, and charging him with actions of which he was not guilty, he at last convinced Ferdinand that in order to preserve his

Hungarian crown he must cut off that ambitious prelate. But Ferdinand, foreseeing that it would be dangerous to proceed in the regular course of law against a subject of such exorbitant power as might enable him to set his sovereign at defiance, determined to employ violence in order to obtain that satisfaction which the laws were too feeble to afford him.

He issued his orders accordingly to Castaldo, who willingly undertook that infamous service. Having communicated the design to some Italian and Spanish officers whom he could trust, and concerted with them the plan of executing it, they entered Martinuzzi's apartment early one morning, under pretence of presenting to him some despatches which were to be sent off immediately to Vienna, and, while he perused a paper with attention, one of their number struck him with his poniard in the throat. The blow was not mortal. Martinuzzi started up with the intrepidity natural to him, and, grappling the assassin, threw him to the ground. But, the other conspirators rushing in, an old man, unarmed and alone, was unable long to sustain such an unequal conflict, and sunk under the wounds which he received from so many hands. The Transylvanians were restrained by dread of the foreign troops stationed in their country from rising in arms in order to take vengeance on the murderers of a prelate who had long been the object of their love as well as veneration. They spoke of the deed, however, with horror and execration, and exclaimed against Ferdinand, whom neither grati-

tude for recent and important services nor reverence for a character considered as sacred and inviolable among Christians could restrain from shedding the blood of a man whose only crime was attachment to his native country. The nobles, detesting the jealous as well as cruel policy of a court which upon uncertain and improbable surmises had given up a person no less conspicuous for his merit than his rank, to be butchered by assassins, either retired to their own estates, or, if they continued with the Austrian army, grew cold to the service. The Turks, encouraged by the death of an enemy whose abilities they knew and dreaded, prepared to renew hostilities early in the spring; and, instead of the security which Ferdinand had expected from the removal of Martinuzzi, it was evident that his territories in Hungary were about to be attacked with greater vigor and defended with less zeal than ever.²⁴

By this time, Maurice, having almost finished his intrigues and preparations, was on the point of declaring his intentions openly, and of taking the field against the emperor. His first care, after he came to this resolution, was to disclaim that narrow and bigoted maxim of the confederates of Smalkalde which had led them to shun all connection with foreigners. He had observed how fatal this had been to their cause; and, instructed by their error, he was as eager to court the protection of Henry II. as they had been solicitous

²⁴ Sleid., 535.—Thuan., lib. ix. 309, etc.—Istuanhaffii Hist. Regn. Hungarici, lib. xvi. 189, etc.—Mém. de Ribier, ii. 871.—Natalis Comitum Historia, lib. v. 84, etc.

to prevent the interposition of Francis I. Happily for him, he found Henry in a disposition to listen to the first overture on his part, and in a situation which enabled him to bring the whole force of the French monarchy into action. Henry had long observed the progress of the emperor's arms with jealousy, and wished to distinguish himself by entering the lists against the same enemy whom it had been the glory of his father's reign to oppose. He had laid hold on the first opportunity in his power of thwarting the emperor's designs, by taking the duke of Parma under his protection; and hostilities were already begun not only in that duchy, but in Piedmont. Having terminated the war with England by a peace no less advantageous to himself than honorable for his allies the Scots, the restless and enterprising courage of his nobles was impatient to display itself on some theatre of action more conspicuous than the petty operations in Parma or Piedmont afforded them.

John de Fienne, bishop of Bayonne, whom Henry had sent into Germany under pretence of hiring troops to be employed in Italy, was empowered to conclude a treaty in form with Maurice and his associates. As it would have been very indecent in a king of France to have undertaken the defence of the Protestant Church, the interests of religion, how much soever they might be affected by the treaty, were not once mentioned in any of the articles. Religious concerns they pretended to commit entirely to the disposition of Divine Providence: the only motives assigned

for their present confederacy against Charles were to procure the landgrave liberty, and to prevent the subversion of the ancient constitution and laws of the German empire. In order to accomplish these ends, it was agreed that all the contracting parties should at the same time declare war against the emperor; that neither peace nor truce should be made but by common consent, nor without including each of the confederates; that in order to guard against the inconveniences of anarchy, or of pretensions to joint command, Maurice should be acknowledged as head of the German confederates, with absolute authority in all military affairs; that Maurice and his associates should bring into the field seven thousand horse, with a proportional number of infantry; that towards the subsistence of this army, during the first three months of the war, Henry should contribute two hundred and forty thousand crowns, and afterwards sixty thousand crowns a month, as long as they continued in arms; that Henry should attack the emperor on the side of Lorraine with a powerful army; that if it were found requisite to elect a new emperor, such a person shall be nominated as shall be agreeable to the king of France.²⁵ This treaty was concluded on the fifth of October, some time before Magdeburg surrendered, and the preparatory negotiations were concluded with such profound secrecy that, of all the princes who afterwards acceded to it, Maurice communicated what he was carrying on to two only, John Albert, the reign-

²⁵ *Recueil des Traités*, tom. ii. 258.—Thuan., lib. viii. 279.

ing duke of Mecklenburg, and William of Hesse, the landgrave's eldest son. The league itself was no less anxiously concealed, and with such fortunate care that no rumor concerning it reached the ears of the emperor or his ministers; nor do they seem to have conceived the most distant suspicion of such a transaction.

At the same time, with a solicitude which was careful to draw some accession of strength from every quarter, Maurice applied to Edward VI. of England, and requested a subsidy of four hundred thousand crowns for the support of a confederacy formed in defence of the Protestant religion. But the factions which prevailed in the English court during the minority of that prince, and which deprived both the councils and arms of the nation of their wonted vigor, left the English ministers neither time nor inclination to attend to foreign affairs, and prevented Maurice's obtaining that aid which their zeal for the Reformation would have prompted them to grant him.²⁶

Maurice, however, having secured the protection of such a powerful monarch as Henry II., proceeded with great confidence, but with equal caution, to execute his plan. As he judged it necessary to make one effort more in order to obtain the emperor's consent that the landgrave should be set at liberty, he sent a solemn embassy, in his own name, and in that of the elector of Brandenburg, to Inspruck. After resuming at great length all the facts and arguments upon which they founded their claim, and representing

²⁶ Burnet's Hist. of the Reform., vol. ii., Append., 37.

in the strongest terms the peculiar engagements which bound them to be so assiduous in their solicitations, they renewed the request in behalf of the unfortunate prisoner which they had so often preferred in vain. The elector palatine, the duke of Wurtemberg, the dukes of Mecklenburg, the duke of Deuxponts, the marquis of Brandenburg Bareith, and the marquis of Baden, by their ambassadors, concurred with them in their suit. Letters were likewise delivered to the same effect from the king of Denmark, the duke of Bavaria, and the dukes of Lunenburg. Even the king of the Romans joined in this application, being moved with compassion towards the landgrave in his wretched situation, or influenced, perhaps, by a secret jealousy of his brother's power and designs, which, since his attempt to alter the order of succession in the empire, he had come to view with other eyes than formerly, and dreaded to a great degree.

But Charles, constant to his own system with regard to the landgrave, eluded a demand urged by such powerful intercessors; and, having declared that he would communicate his resolution concerning the matter to Maurice as soon as he arrived at Inspruck, where he was every day expected, he did not deign to descend into any more particular explication of his intentions.²⁷ This application, though of no benefit to the landgrave, was of great advantage to Maurice. It served to justify his subsequent proceedings, and to demonstrate the necessity of employing arms

²⁷ Sleid., 531.—Thuan., lib. viii. 280.

in order to extort that equitable concession which his mediation or entreaty could not obtain. It was of use, too, to confirm the emperor in his security, as both the solemnity of the application, and the solicitude with which so many princes were drawn in to enforce it, led him to conclude that they placed all their hopes of restoring the landgrave to liberty in gaining his consent to dismiss him.

Maurice employed artifices still more refined to conceal his machinations, to amuse the emperor, and to gain time. He affected to be more solicitous than ever to find out some expedient for removing the difficulties with regard to the safe-conduct for the Protestant divines appointed to attend the council, so that they might repair thither without any apprehension of danger. His ambassadors at Trent had frequent conferences concerning this matter with the imperial ambassadors in that city, and laid open their sentiments to them with the appearance of the most unreserved confidence. He was willing at last to have it believed that he thought all differences with respect to this preliminary article were on the point of being adjusted; and, in order to give credit to this opinion, he commanded Melancthon, together with his brethren, to set out on their journey to Trent. At the same time, he held a close correspondence with the imperial court at Inspruck, and renewed on every occasion his professions not only of fidelity but of attachment to the emperor. He talked continually of his intention of going to Inspruck in person; he gave orders to hire a house for him in that city, and to

fit it up with the greatest despatch for his reception.²⁸

But, profoundly skilled as Maurice was in the arts of deceit, and impenetrable as he thought the veil to be under which he concealed his designs, there were several things in his conduct which alarmed the emperor amidst his security, and tempted him frequently to suspect that he was meditating something extraordinary. As these suspicions took their rise from circumstances inconsiderable in themselves, or of an ambiguous as well as uncertain nature, they were more than counterbalanced by Maurice's address; and the emperor would not lightly give up his confidence in a man whom he had once trusted and loaded with favors. One particular alone seemed to be of such consequence that he thought it necessary to demand an explanation with regard to it. The troops which George of Mecklenburg had taken into pay after the capitulation of Magdeburg, having fixed their quarters in Thuringia, lived at discretion on the lands of the rich ecclesiastics in their neighborhood. Their license and rapaciousness were intolerable. Such as felt or dreaded their exactions complained loudly to the emperor, and represented them as a body of men kept in readiness for some desperate enterprise. But Maurice, partly by extenuating the enormities of which they had been guilty, partly by representing the impossibility of disbanding these troops or of keeping them to regular discipline unless the arrears still due to them by the emperor

²⁸ Arnoldi Vita Maurit., ap. Menkin., ii. 1229.

were paid, either removed the apprehensions which this had occasioned, or, as Charles was not in a condition to satisfy the demands of these soldiers, obliged him to be silent with regard to the matter.²⁹

The time of action was now approaching. Maurice had privately despatched Albert of Brandenburg to Paris, in order to confirm his league with Henry and to hasten the march of the French army. He had taken measures to bring his own subjects together on the first summons; he had provided for the security of Saxony while he should be absent with the army; and he held the troops in Thuringia, on which he chiefly depended, ready to advance on a moment's warning. All these complicated operations were carried on without being discovered by the court at Inspruck, and the emperor remained there in perfect tranquillity, busied entirely in counteracting the intrigues of the pope's legate at Trent, and in settling the conditions on which the Protestant divines should be admitted into the council, as if there had not been any transaction of greater moment in agitation.

This credulous security in a prince who, by his sagacity in observing the conduct of all around him, was commonly led to an excess of distrust, may seem unaccountable, and has been imputed to infatuation. But, besides the exquisite address with which Maurice concealed his intentions, two circumstances contributed to the delusion. The gout had returned upon Charles soon after his

²⁹ Sleid., 549.—Thuan., 339.

arrival at Inspruck, with an increase of violence; and, his constitution being broken by such frequent attacks, he was seldom able to exert his natural vigor of mind or to consider affairs with his usual vigilance and penetration; and Granvelle, bishop of Arras, his prime minister, though one of the most subtle statesmen of that or perhaps of any age, was on this occasion the dupe of his own craft. He entertained such a high opinion of his own abilities, and held the political talents of the Germans in such contempt, that he despised all the intimations given him concerning Maurice's secret machinations or the dangerous designs which he was carrying on. When the duke of Alva, whose dark suspicious mind harbored many doubts concerning the elector's sincerity, proposed calling him immediately to court to answer for his conduct, Granvelle replied, with great scorn, that these apprehensions were groundless, and that a drunken German head was too gross to form any scheme which he could not easily penetrate and baffle. Nor did he assume this peremptory tone merely from confidence in his own discernment: he had bribed two of Maurice's ministers, and received from them frequent and minute information concerning all their master's motions. But through this very channel, by which he expected to gain access to all Maurice's counsels, and even to his thoughts, such intelligence was conveyed to him as completed his deception. Maurice fortunately discovered the correspondence of the two traitors with Granvelle, but, instead of punishing them for their

crime, he dexterously availed himself of their fraud, and turned his own arts against the bishop. He affected to treat these ministers with greater confidence than ever; he admitted them to his consultations; he seemed to lay open his heart to them; and, taking care all the while to let them be acquainted with nothing but what it was his interest should be known, they transmitted to Inspruck such accounts as possessed Granvelle with a firm belief of his sincerity as well as good intentions.³⁰ The emperor himself, in the fulness of security, was so little moved by a memorial, in the name of the ecclesiastical electors, admonishing him to be on his guard against Maurice, that he made light of this intelligence; and his answer to them abounds with declarations of his entire and confident reliance on the fidelity as well as attachment of that prince.³¹

At last Maurice's preparations were completed, and he had the satisfaction to find that his intrigues and designs were still unknown. But, though now ready to take the field, he did not lay aside the arts which he had hitherto employed; and by one piece of craft more he deceived his enemies a few days longer. He gave out that he was about to begin that journey to Inspruck of which he had so often talked, and he took one of the ministers whom Granvelle had bribed, to attend him thither. After travelling post a few stages, he pretended to be indisposed by the fatigue of the journey, and, despatching the sus-

³⁰ Melvil's Memoirs, fol. edit., p. 12.

³¹ Sleid., 535.

pected minister to make his apology to the emperor for this delay and to assure him that he would be at Inspruck within a few days, he mounted on horseback, as soon as this spy on his actions was gone, rode full speed towards Thuringia, joined his army, which amounted to twenty thousand foot and five thousand horse, and put it immediately in motion.³²

At the same time he published a manifesto, containing his reasons for taking arms. These were three in number: that he might secure the Protestant religion, which was threatened with immediate destruction; that he might maintain the constitution and laws of the empire, and save Germany from being subjected to the dominion of an absolute monarch; that he might deliver the landgrave of Hesse from the miseries of a long and unjust imprisonment. By the first, he roused all the favorers of the Reformation, a party formidable by their zeal as well as numbers, and rendered desperate by oppression. By the second, he interested all the friends of liberty, Catholics no less than Protestants, and made it their interest to unite with him in asserting the rights and privileges common to both. The third, besides the glory which he acquired by his zeal to fulfil his engagements to the unhappy prisoner, was become a cause of general concern, not only from the compassion which the landgrave's sufferings

³² Melv., Mem., p. 13. These circumstances concerning the Saxon ministers whom Granvelle had bribed are not mentioned by the German historians; but, as Sir James Melvil received his information from the elector palatine, and as they are perfectly agreeable to the rest of Maurice's conduct, they may be considered as authentic.

excited, but from indignation at the injustice and rigor of the emperor's proceedings against him. Together with Maurice's manifesto, another appeared in the name of Albert, marquis of Brandenburg Culmbach, who had joined him with a body of adventurers whom he had drawn together. The same grievances which Maurice had pointed out are mentioned in it, but with an excess of virulence and animosity suitable to the character of the prince in whose name it was published.

The king of France added to these a manifesto in his own name, in which, after taking notice of the ancient alliance between the French and German nations, both descended from the same ancestors, and after mentioning the applications which, in consequence of this, some of the most illustrious among the German princes had made to him for his protection, he declared that he now took arms to re-establish the ancient constitution of the empire, to deliver some of its princes from captivity, and to secure the privileges and independence of all the members of the Germanic body. In this manifesto, Henry assumed the extraordinary title of *protector of the liberties of Germany and of its captive princes*; and there was engraved on it a cap, the ancient symbol of freedom, placed between two daggers, in order to intimate to the Germans that this blessing was to be acquired and secured by force of arms.³³

Maurice had now to act a part entirely new; but his flexible genius was capable of accommodating itself to every situation. The moment

³³ Sleid., 549.—Thuan. lib. x. 339.—Mém. de Ribier, ii. 371.
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he took arms, he was as bold and enterprising in the field as he had been cautious and crafty in the cabinet. He advanced by rapid marches towards Upper Germany. All the towns in his way opened their gates to him. He reinstated the magistrates whom the emperor had deposed, and gave possession of the churches to the Protestant ministers whom he had ejected. He directed his march to Augsburg, and as the imperial garrison, which was too inconsiderable to think of defending it, retired immediately, he took possession of that great city, and made the same changes there as in the towns through which he had passed.³⁴

No words can express the emperor's astonishment and consternation at events so unexpected. He saw a great number of the German princes in arms against him, and the rest either ready to join them or wishing success to their enterprise. He beheld a powerful monarch united with them in close league, seconding their operations in person, at the head of a formidable army, while he, through negligence and credulity, which exposed him no less to scorn than to danger, had neither made nor was in condition to make any effectual provision either for crushing his rebellious subjects or resisting the invasion of the foreign enemy. Part of his Spanish troops had been ordered into Hungary against the Turks; the rest had marched back to Italy, upon occasion of the war in the duchy of Parma. The bands of veteran Germans had been dismissed, because he was not able to pay them, or had entered into Maurice's

³⁴ Sleid., 555.—Thuan., 342.

service after the siege of Magdeburg; and he remained at Inspruck with a body of soldiers hardly strong enough to guard his own person. His treasury was as much exhausted as his army was reduced. He had received no remittances for some time from the New World. He had forfeited all credit with the merchants of Genoa and Venice, who refused to lend him money, though tempted by the offer of exorbitant interest. Thus Charles, though undoubtedly the most considerable potentate in Christendom, and capable of exerting the greatest strength, his power, notwithstanding the violent attack made upon it, being still unimpaired, found himself in a situation which rendered him unable to make such a sudden and vigorous effort as the juncture required and was necessary to have saved him from the present danger.

In this situation, the emperor placed all his hopes on negotiating; the only resource of such as are conscious of their own weakness. But, thinking it inconsistent with his dignity to make the first advances to subjects who were in arms against him, he avoided that indecorum by employing the mediation of his brother Ferdinand. Maurice, confiding in his own talents to conduct any negotiation in such a manner as to derive advantage from it, and hoping that by the appearance of facility in hearkening to the first overture of accommodation he might amuse the emperor and tempt him to slacken the activity with which he was now preparing to defend himself, readily agreed to an interview with Ferdi-

nand, in the town of Lintz in Austria; and, having left his army to proceed on its march under the command of the duke of Mecklenburg, he repaired thither.

Meanwhile, the king of France punctually fulfilled his engagements to his allies. He took the field early, with a numerous and well-appointed army, and, marching directly into Lorraine, Toul and Verdun opened their gates at his approach. His forces appeared next before Metz, and that city, by a fraudulent stratagem of the Constable Montmorency, who, having obtained permission to pass through it with a small guard, introduced as many troops as were sufficient to overpower the garrison, was likewise seized without bloodshed. Henry made his entry into all these towns with great pomp; he obliged the inhabitants to swear allegiance to him, and annexed those important conquests to the French monarchy. He left a strong garrison in Metz. From thence he advanced towards Alsace, in order to attempt new conquests, to which the success that had hitherto attended his arms invited him.³⁵

The conference at Lintz did not produce any accommodation. Maurice, when he consented to it, seems to have had nothing in view but to amuse the emperor; for he made such demands, both in behalf of his confederates and their ally the French king, as he knew would not be accepted by a prince too haughty to submit at once to conditions dictated by an enemy. But, however firmly Maurice adhered during the negotiation to

³⁵ Thuan., 349.

the interests of his associates, or how steadily soever he kept in view the objects which had induced him to take arms, he often professed a strong inclination to terminate the differences with the emperor in an amicable manner. Encouraged by this appearance of a pacific disposition, Ferdinand proposed a second interview at Passau on the twenty-sixth of May, and that a truce should commence on that day and continue to the tenth of June, in order to give them leisure for adjusting all the points in dispute.

Upon this, Maurice rejoined his army on the ninth of May, which had now advanced to Gudelfingen. He put his troops in motion next morning; and, as sixteen days yet remained for action before the commencement of the truce, he resolved during that period to venture upon an enterprise the success of which would be so decisive as to render the negotiations at Passau extremely short and entitle him to treat upon his own terms. He foresaw that the prospect of a cessation of arms, which was to take place so soon, together with the opinion of his earnestness to re-establish peace, with which he had artfully amused Ferdinand, could hardly fail of inspiring the emperor with such false hopes that he would naturally become remiss, and relapse into some degree of that security which had already been so fatal to him. Relying on this conjecture, he marched directly at the head of his army towards Inspruck, and advanced with the most rapid motion that could be given to so great a body of troops. On the eighteenth he arrived at Fiessen, a post of great

consequence, at the entrance into the Tyrolese. There he found a body of eight hundred men, whom the emperor had assembled, strongly intrenched, in order to oppose his progress. He attacked them instantly, with such violence and impetuosity that they abandoned their lines precipitately, and, falling back on a second body posted near Ruten, communicated the panic terror with which they themselves had been seized, to those troops; so that they likewise took to flight, after a feeble resistance.

Elated with this success, which exceeded his most sanguine hopes, Maurice pressed forward to Ehrenberg, a castle situated on a high and steep precipice, which commanded the only pass through the mountains. As this fort had been surrendered to the Protestants at the beginning of the Smalkaldic war, because the garrison was then too weak to defend it, the emperor, sensible of its importance, had taken care at this juncture to throw into it a body of troops sufficient to maintain it against the greatest army. But a shepherd, in pursuing a goat which had strayed from his flock, having discovered an unknown path by which it was possible to ascend to the top of the rock, came with this seasonable piece of intelligence to Maurice. A small band of chosen soldiers, under the command of George of Mecklenburg, was instantly ordered to follow this guide. They set out in the evening, and, clambering up the rugged track with infinite fatigue as well as danger, they reached the summit unperceived; and at an hour which had been agreed on, when Maurice began

the assault on the one side of the castle, they appeared on the other, ready to scale the walls, which were feeble in that place, because it had been hitherto deemed inaccessible. The garrison, struck with terror at the sight of an enemy on a quarter where they had thought themselves perfectly secure, immediately threw down their arms. Maurice, almost without bloodshed, and, which was of greater consequence to him, without loss of time, took possession of a place the reduction of which might have retarded him long and have required the utmost efforts of his valor and skill.³⁶

Maurice was now only two days' march from Inspruck; and, without losing a moment, he ordered his infantry to advance thither, having left his cavalry, which was unserviceable in that mountainous country, at Fiessen, to guard the mouth of the pass. He proposed to advance with such rapidity as to anticipate any accounts of the loss of Ehrenberg, and to surprise the emperor, together with his attendants, in an open town incapable of defence. But, just as his troops began to move, a battalion of mercenaries mutinied, declaring that they would not stir until they had received the gratuity which, according to the custom of that age, they claimed as the recompense due to them for having taken a place by assault. It was with great difficulty, as well as danger, and not without some considerable loss of time, that Maurice quieted this insurrection, and prevailed on the soldiers to follow him to a place where he

³⁶ Arnoldi Vita Maurit., 123.

promised them such rich booty as would be an ample reward for all their services.

To the delay occasioned by this unforeseen accident the emperor owed his safety. He was informed of the approaching danger late in the evening, and, knowing that nothing could save him but a speedy flight, he instantly left Inspruck, without regarding the darkness of the night, or the violence of the rain which happened to fall at that time; and, notwithstanding the debility occasioned by the gout, which rendered him unable to bear any motion but that of a litter, he travelled by the light of torches, taking his way over the Alps by roads almost impassable. His courtiers and attendants followed him with equal precipitation, some of them on such horses as they could hastily procure, many of them on foot, and all in the utmost confusion. In this miserable plight, very unlike the pomp with which Charles had appeared during the five preceding years as the conqueror of Germany, he arrived at length with his dejected train at Villach in Carinthia, and scarcely thought himself secure even in that remote, inaccessible corner.

Maurice entered Inspruck a few hours after the emperor and his attendants had left it; and, enraged that the prey should escape out of his hands when he was just ready to seize it, he pursued them some miles; but, finding it impossible to overtake persons to whom their fear gave speed, he returned to the town, and abandoned all the emperor's baggage, together with that of his ministers, to be plundered by the soldiers; while he

preserved untouched everything belonging to the king of the Romans, either because he had formed some friendly connection with that prince, or because he wished to have it believed that such a connection subsisted between them. As there now remained only three days to the commencement of the truce (with such nicety had Maurice calculated his operations), he set out for Passau, that he might meet Ferdinand on the day appointed.

Before Charles left Inspruck, he withdrew the guards placed on the degraded elector of Saxony whom during five years he had carried about with him as a prisoner, and set him entirely at liberty, either with an intention to embarrass Maurice by letting loose a rival who might dispute his title to his dominions and dignity, or from a sense of the indecency of detaining him a prisoner while he himself ran the risk of being deprived of his own liberty. But that prince, seeing no other way of escaping than that which the emperor took, and abhorring the thoughts of falling into the hands of a kinsman whom he justly considered as the author of all his misfortunes, chose rather to accompany Charles in his flight, and to expect the final decision of his fate from the treaty which was now approaching.

These were not the only effects which Maurice's operations produced. It was no sooner known at Trent that he had taken arms than a general consternation seized the fathers of the council. The German prelates immediately returned home, that they might provide for the safety of their respec-

tive territories. The rest were extremely impatient to be gone; and the legate, who had hitherto disappointed all the endeavors of the imperial ambassadors to procure an audience in the council for the Protestant divines, laid hold with joy on such a plausible pretext for dismissing an assembly which he had found it so difficult to govern. In a congregation held on the twenty-eighth of April, a decree was issued proroguing the council during two years, and appointing it to meet at the expiration of that time, if peace were then re-established in Europe.³⁷ This prorogation, however, continued no less than ten years, and the proceedings of the council when reassembled in the year 1562 fall not within the period prescribed to this history.

The convocation of this assembly had been passionately desired by all the states and princes in Christendom, who, from the wisdom as well as piety of prelates representing the whole body of the faithful, expected some charitable and efficacious endeavors towards composing the dissensions which unhappily had arisen in the Church. But the several popes by whose authority it was called had other objects in view. They exerted all their power or policy to attain these, and by the abilities as well as address of their legates, by the ignorance of many of the prelates, and by the servility of the indigent Italian bishops, acquired such influence in the council that they dictated all its decrees, and framed them, not with an intention to restore unity and concord to the Church,

³⁷ F. Paul, 353.

but to establish their own dominion, or to confirm those tenets upon which they imagined that dominion to be founded. Doctrines which had hitherto been admitted upon the credit of tradition alone, and received with some latitude of interpretation, were defined with a scrupulous nicety and confirmed by the sanction of authority. Rites which had formerly been observed only in deference to custom supposed to be ancient were established by the decrees of the Church and declared to be essential parts of its worship. The breach, instead of being closed, was widened and made irreparable. In place of any attempt to reconcile the contending parties, a line was drawn with such studied accuracy as ascertained and marked out the distinction between them. This still serves to keep them at a distance, and, without some signal interposition of Divine Providence, must render the separation perpetual.

Our knowledge of the proceedings of this assembly is derived from three different authors. Father Paul, of Venice, wrote his history of the Council of Trent while the memory of what had passed there was recent and some who had been members of it were still alive. He has exposed the intrigues and artifices by which it was conducted with a freedom and severity which have given a deep wound to the credit of the council. He has described its deliberations and explained its decrees with such perspicuity and depth of thought, with such various erudition and such force of reason, as have justly entitled his work to be placed among the most admired historical

compositions. About half a century thereafter, the Jesuit Pallavicini published his history of the council, in opposition to that of Father Paul, and, by employing all the force of an acute and refining genius to invalidate the credit or to confute the reasonings of his antagonist, he labors to prove, by artful apologies for the proceedings of the council, and subtile interpretations of its decrees, that it deliberated with impartiality and decided with judgment as well as candor. Vargas, a Spanish doctor of laws, who was appointed to attend the imperial ambassadors at Trent, sent the bishop of Aras a regular account of the transactions there, explaining all the arts which the legate employed to influence or overawe the council. His letters have been published, in which he inveighs against the papal court with that asperity of censure which was natural to a man whose situation enabled him to observe its intrigues thoroughly, and who was obliged to exert all his attention and talents in order to disappoint them. But whichever of these authors an intelligent person takes for his guide, in forming a judgment concerning the spirit of the council, he must discover so much ambition as well as artifice among some of the members, so much ignorance and corruption among others, he must observe such a large infusion of human policy and passions, mingled with such a scanty portion of that simplicity of heart, sanctity of manners, and love of truth, which alone qualify men to determine what doctrines are worthy of God and what worship is acceptable to him, that he will find it no easy

matter to believe that any extraordinary influence of the Holy Ghost hovered over this assembly and dictated its decrees.

While Maurice was employed in negotiating with the king of the Romans at Lintz, or in making war on the emperor in the Tyrol, the French king had advanced into Alsace as far as Strasburg; and, having demanded leave of the senate to march through the city, he hoped that by repeating the same fraud which he had practised at Metz he might render himself master of the place and by that means secure a passage over the Rhine into the heart of Germany. But the Strasburghers, instructed and put on their guard by the credulity and misfortune of their neighbors, shut their gates, and, having assembled a garrison of five thousand soldiers, repaired their fortifications, razed the houses in their suburbs, and determined to defend themselves to the utmost. At the same time they sent a deputation of their most respectable citizens to the king, in order to divert him from making any hostile attempt upon them. The electors of Treves and Cologne, the duke of Cleves, and other princes in the neighborhood, interposed in their behalf, beseeching Henry that he would not forget so soon the title which he had generously assumed, and, instead of being the deliverer of Germany, become its oppressor. The Swiss cantons seconded them with zeal, soliciting Henry to spare a city which had long been connected with their community in friendship and alliance.

Powerful as this united intercession was, it

would not have prevailed on Henry to forego a prize of so much value, if he had been in a condition to have seized it. But in that age the method of subsisting numerous armies at a distance from the frontiers of their own country was imperfectly understood, and neither the revenues of princes nor their experience in the art of war were equal to the great and complicated efforts which such an undertaking required. The French, though not far removed from their own frontier, began already to suffer from scarcity of provisions, and had no sufficient magazines collected to support them during a siege which must necessarily have been of great length.³⁸ At the same time, the queen of Hungary, governess of the Low Countries, had assembled a considerable body of troops, which, under the command of Martin de Rossem, laid waste Champagne and threatened the adjacent provinces of France. These concurring circumstances obliged the king, though with reluctance, to abandon the enterprise. But, being willing to acquire some merit with his allies by this retreat which he could not avoid, he pretended to the Swiss that he had taken the resolution merely in compliance with their request;³⁹ and then, after giving orders that all the horses in his army should be led to drink in the Rhine, as a proof of his having pushed his conquest so far, he marched back towards Champagne.

While the French king and the main army of the confederates were thus employed, Albert of

³⁸ Thuan., 351, 352.

³⁹ Sleid., 557.—Brantôme, tom. vii. 39.

Brandenburg was intrusted with the command of a separate body of eight thousand men, consisting chiefly of mercenaries who had resorted to his standard rather from the hope of plunder than the expectation of regular pay. That prince, seeing himself at the head of such a number of desperate adventurers, ready to follow wherever he should lead them, soon began to disdain a state of subordination, and to form such extravagant schemes of aggrandizing himself as seldom occur, even to ambitious minds, unless when civil war or violent factions rouse them to bold exertions by alluring them with immediate hopes of success. Full of these aspiring thoughts, Albert made war in a manner very different from the other confederates. He endeavored to spread the terror of his arms by the rapidity of his motions as well as the extent and rigor of his devastations; he exacted contributions wherever he came, in order to amass such a sum of money as would put it in his power to keep his army together; he labored to get possession of Nuremberg, Ulm, or some other of the free cities in Upper Germany, in which, as a capital, he might fix the seat of his power. But, finding these cities on their guard and in a condition to resist his attacks, he turned all his rage against the popish ecclesiastics, whose territories he plundered with such wanton and merciless barbarity as gave them a very unfavorable impression of the spirit of that reformation in religion with zeal for which he pretended to be animated. The bishops of Bamberg and Wurzburg, by their situation, lay particularly exposed to his ravages:

he obliged the former to transfer to him, in perpetuity, almost one-half of his extensive diocese, and compelled the latter to advance a great sum of money in order to save his territories from ruin and desolation. During all those wild sallies, Albert paid no regard either to Maurice's orders, whose commands as generalissimo of the league he had engaged to obey, or to the remonstrances of the other confederates, and manifestly discovered that he attended only to his own private emolument, without any solicitude about the common cause, or the general objects which had induced them to take arms.⁴⁰

Maurice, having ordered his army to march back into Bavaria, and having published a proclamation enjoining the Lutheran clergy and instructors of youth to resume the exercise of their functions in all the cities, schools, and universities from which they had been ejected, met Ferdinand at Passau on the twenty-sixth day of May. As matters of the greatest consequence to the future peace and independence of the empire were to be settled in this congress, the eyes of all Germany were fixed upon it. Besides Ferdinand and the imperial ambassadors, the duke of Bavaria, the bishops of Saltzburg and Aichstadt, the ministers of all the electors, together with deputies from most of the considerable princes and free cities, resorted to Passau. Maurice, in the name of his associates, and the king of the Romans, as the emperor's representative, opened the negotiation. The princes who were present, together with the

⁴⁰ Sleid., 561.—Thuan., 357.

deputies of such as were absent, acted as intercessors or mediators between them.

Maurice, in a long discourse, explained the motives of his own conduct. After having enumerated all the unconstitutional and oppressive acts of the emperor's administration, he, agreeably to the manifesto which he had published when he took arms against him, limited his demands to three articles: that the landgrave of Hesse should be immediately set at liberty; that the grievances in the civil government of the empire should be redressed; and that the Protestants should be allowed the public exercise of their religion without molestation. Ferdinand and the imperial ambassadors discovering their unwillingness to gratify him with regard to all these points, the mediators wrote a joint letter to the emperor, beseeching him to deliver Germany from the calamities of a civil war, by giving such satisfaction to Maurice and his party as might induce them to lay down their arms; and at the same time they prevailed upon Maurice to grant a prolongation of the truce for a short time, during which they undertook to procure the emperor's final answer to his demands. This request was presented to the emperor in the name of all the princes of the empire, Popish as well as Protestant, in the name of such as had lent a helping hand to forward his ambitious schemes, as well as of those who had viewed the progress of his power with jealousy and dread. The uncommon and cordial unanimity with which they concurred at this juncture in enforcing Maurice's demands, and in recommend-

ing peace, flowed from different causes. Such as were most attached to the Roman Catholic Church could not help observing that the Protestant confederates were at the head of a numerous army, while the emperor was but just beginning to provide for his own defence. They foresaw that great efforts would be required of them, and would be necessary on their part, in order to cope with enemies who had been allowed to get the start so far and to attain such formidable power. Experience had taught them that the fruit of all these efforts would be reaped by the emperor alone, and the more complete any victory proved which they should gain, the faster would they bind their own fetters and render them the more intolerable. These reflections made them cautious how they contributed a second time by their indiscreet zeal to put the emperor in possession of power which would be fatal to the liberties of their country. Notwithstanding the intolerant spirit of bigotry in that age, they chose rather that the Protestants should acquire that security for their religion which they demanded, than, by assisting Charles to oppress them, to give such additional force to the imperial prerogative as would overturn the constitution of the empire. To all these considerations the dread of seeing Germany laid waste by a civil war added new force. Many states of the empire already felt the destructive rage of Albert's arms; others dreaded it; and all wished for an accommodation between the emperor and Maurice, which they hoped would save them from that cruel scourge.

Such were the reasons that induced so many princes, notwithstanding the variety of their political interests and the opposition in their religious sentiments, to unite in recommending to the emperor an accommodation with Maurice, not only as a salutary but as a necessary measure. The motives which prompted Charles to desire it were not fewer or of less weight. He was perfectly sensible of the superiority which the confederates had acquired through his own negligence; and he now felt the insufficiency of his own resources to oppose them. His Spanish subjects, disgusted at his long absence, and weary of endless wars which were of little benefit to their country, refused to furnish him any considerable supply either of men or money; and although by his address or importunity he might have hoped to draw from them at last more effectual aid, that, he knew, was too distant to be of any service in the present exigency of his affairs. His treasury was drained; his veteran forces were dispersed or disbanded, and he could not depend much either on the fidelity or courage of the new-levied soldiers whom he was collecting. There was no hope of repeating with success the same artifices which had weakened and ruined the Smalkaldic league. As the end at which he aimed was now known, he could no longer employ the specious pretexts which had formerly concealed his ambitious designs. Every prince in Germany was alarmed and on his guard; and it was vain to think of binding them a second time to such a degree as to make one part of them instruments to enslave the other. The spirit of a confederacy

whereof Maurice was the head, experience had taught him to be very different from that of the league of Smalkalde; and, from what he had already felt, he had no reason to flatter himself that its counsels would be as irresolute or its efforts as timid and feeble. If he should resolve on continuing the war, he might be assured that the most considerable states in Germany would take part against him; and a dubious neutrality was the utmost he could expect from the rest. While the confederates found full employment for his arms in one quarter, the king of France would seize the favorable opportunity, and push on his operations in another, with almost certain success. That monarch had already made conquests in the empire, which Charles was no less eager to recover than impatient to be revenged on him for aiding his malecontent subjects. Though Henry had now retired from the banks of the Rhine, he had only varied the scene of hostilities, having invaded the Low Countries with all his forces. The Turks, roused by the solicitations of the French king, as well as stimulated by resentment against Ferdinand for having violated the truce in Hungary, had prepared a powerful fleet to ravage the coasts of Naples and Sicily, which he had left almost defenceless by calling thence the greatest part of the regular troops to join the army which he was now assembling.

Ferdinand, who went in person to Villach, in order to lay before the emperor the result of the conferences at Passau, had likewise reasons peculiar to himself for desiring an accommoda-

tion. These prompted him to second with the greatest earnestness the arguments which the princes assembled there had employed in recommending it. He had observed, not without secret satisfaction, the fatal blow that had been given to the despotic power which his brother had usurped in the empire. He was extremely solicitous to prevent Charles from recovering his former superiority, as he foresaw that ambitious prince would immediately resume, with increased eagerness, and with a better chance of success, his favorite scheme of transmitting that power to his son, by excluding his brother from the right of succession to the imperial throne. On this account he was willing to contribute towards circumscribing the imperial authority, in order to render his own possession of it certain. Besides, Solyman, exasperated at the loss of Transylvania, and still more at the fraudulent arts by which it had been seized, had ordered into the field an army of a hundred thousand men, which, having defeated a great body of Ferdinand's troops and taken several places of importance, threatened not only to complete the conquest of the province, but to drive them out of that part of Hungary which was still subject to his jurisdiction. He was unable to resist such a mighty enemy; the emperor, while engaged in a domestic war, could afford him no aid; and he could not even hope to draw from Germany the contingent, either of troops or money, usually furnished to repel the invasions of the infidels. Maurice, having observed Ferdinand's perplexity with regard to this last point, had offered, if peace

were re-established on a secure foundation, that he would march in person with his troops into Hungary against the Turks. Such was the effect of this well-timed proposal that Ferdinand, destitute of every other prospect of relief, became the most zealous advocate whom the confederates could have employed to urge their claims, and there was hardly anything that they could have demanded which he would not have chosen to grant rather than have retarded a pacification to which he trusted as the only means of saving his Hungarian crown. When so many causes conspired in rendering an accommodation eligible, it might have been expected that it would have taken place immediately. But the inflexibility of the emperor's temper, together with his unwillingness at once to relinquish objects which he had long pursued with such earnestness and assiduity, counterbalanced for some time the force of all the motives which disposed him to peace, and not only put that event at a distance, but seemed to render it uncertain. When Maurice's demands, together with the letter of the mediators at Passau, were presented to him, he peremptorily refused to redress the grievances which were pointed out, nor would he agree to any stipulation for the immediate security of the Protestant religion, but proposed referring both these to the determination of a future diet. On his part, he required that instant reparation should be made to all who during the present war had suffered either by the licentiousness of the confederate troops or the exactions of their leaders.

Maurice, who was well acquainted with the

emperor's arts, immediately concluded that he had nothing in view by these overtures but to amuse and deceive; and therefore, without listening to Ferdinand's entreaties, he left Passau abruptly, and, joining his troops, which were encamped at Mergentheim, a city in Franconia, belonging to the knights of the Teutonic order, he put them in motion and renewed hostilities. As three thousand men in the emperor's pay had thrown themselves into Frankfort-on-the-Main, and might from thence invest the neighboring country of Hesse, he marched towards that city and laid siege to it in form. The briskness of this enterprise, and the vigor with which Maurice carried on his approaches against the town, gave such an alarm to the emperor as disposed him to lend a more favorable ear to Ferdinand's arguments in behalf of an accommodation. Firm and haughty as his nature was, he found it necessary to bend, and signified his willingness to make concessions on his part, if Maurice, in return, would abate somewhat of the rigor of his demands. Ferdinand, as soon as he perceived that his brother began to yield, did not desist from his importunities until he prevailed upon him to declare what was the utmost that he would grant for the security of the confederates. Having gained this difficult point, he instantly despatched a messenger to Maurice's camp, and, imparting to him the emperor's final resolution, conjured him not to frustrate his endeavors for the re-establishment of peace, or, by an unseasonable obstinacy on his side, to disappoint the wishes of all Germany for that salutary event.

Maurice, notwithstanding the prosperous situation of his affairs, was strongly inclined to listen to this advice. The emperor, though overreached and surprised, had now begun to assemble troops, and, however slow his motions might be while the first effects of his consternation remained, he was sensible that Charles must at last act with vigor proportional to the extent of his power and territories, and lead into Germany an army formidable by its numbers, and still more by the terror of his name as well as the remembrance of his past victories. He could scarcely hope that a confederacy composed of so many members would continue to operate with union and perseverance sufficient to resist the consistent and well-directed efforts of an army at the absolute disposal of a leader accustomed to command and to conquer. He felt already, although he had not hitherto experienced the shock of any adverse event, that he himself was the head of a disjointed body. He saw from the example of Albert of Brandenburg how difficult it would be, with all his address and credit, to prevent any particular member from detaching himself from the whole, and how impossible to recall him to his proper rank and subordination. This filled him with apprehensions for the common cause. Another consideration gave him no less disquiet with regard to his own particular interests. By setting at liberty the degraded elector, and by repealing the act by which that prince was deprived of his hereditary honors and dominions, the emperor had it in his power to wound him in the most tender part. The efforts

of a prince beloved of his ancient subjects, and revered by all the Protestant party, in order to recover what had been unjustly taken from him, could hardly have failed of exciting commotions in Saxony which would endanger all that he had acquired at the expense of so much dissimulation and artifice. It was no less in the emperor's power to render vain all the solicitations of the confederates in behalf of the landgrave. He had only to add one act of violence more to the injustice and rigor with which he had already treated him; and he had accordingly threatened the sons of that unfortunate prince that if they persisted in their present enterprise, instead of seeing their father restored to liberty, they should hear of his having suffered the punishment which his rebellion had merited.⁴¹

Having deliberated upon all these points with his associates, Maurice thought it more prudent to accept of the conditions offered, though less advantageous than those which he had proposed, than again to commit all to the doubtful issue of war.⁴² He repaired forthwith to Passau, and signed the treaty of peace; of which the chief articles were, that before the twelfth day of August the confederates shall lay down their arms and disband their forces; that on or before that day the landgrave shall be set at liberty and conveyed in safety to his castle of Rheinfels; that a diet shall be held within six months, in order to deliberate concerning the most proper and effectual

⁴¹ Sleid., 571.

⁴² Sleid., Hist., 563, etc.—Thuan., lib. x. 359, etc.

method of preventing for the future all disputes and dissensions about religion; that in the meantime neither the emperor nor any other prince shall, upon any pretext whatever, offer any injury or violence to such as adhered to the Confession of Augsburg, but allow them to enjoy the free and undisturbed exercise of their religion; that, in return, the Protestants shall not molest the Catholics, either in the exercise of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction or in performing their religious ceremonies; that the imperial chamber shall administer justice impartially to persons of both parties, and Protestants to be admitted indiscriminately with the Catholics to sit as judges in that court; that if the next diet should not be able to terminate the disputes with regard to religion, the stipulations in the present treaty in behalf of the Protestants shall continue forever in full force and vigor; that none of the confederates shall be liable to any action on account of what had happened during the course of the war; that the consideration of those encroachments which had been made, as Maurice pretended, upon the constitution and liberties of the empire, shall be remitted to the approaching diet; that Albert of Brandenburg shall be comprehended in the treaty, provided he shall accede to it and disband his forces before the twelfth of August.⁴³

Such was the memorable treaty of Passau, that overturned the vast fabric in erecting which Charles had employed so many years and had exerted the utmost efforts of his power and pol-

⁴³ Recueil des Traités, ii. 261.


icy; that annulled all his regulations with regard to religion, defeated all his hopes of rendering the imperial authority absolute and hereditary in his family, and established the Protestant Church, which had hitherto subsisted precariously in Germany, through connivance or by expedients, upon a firm and secure basis. Maurice reaped all the glory of having concerted and completed this unexpected revolution. It is a singular circumstance that the Reformation should be indebted for its security and full establishment in Germany to the same hand which had brought it to the brink of destruction, and that both events should have been accomplished by the same arts of dissimulation. The ends, however, which Maurice had in view at those different junctures seem to have been more attended to than the means by which he attained them; and he was now as universally extolled for his zeal and public spirit as he had lately been condemned for his indifference and interested policy. It is no less worthy of observation that the French king, a monarch zealous for the Catholic faith, should employ his power in order to protect and maintain the Reformation in the empire, at the very time when he was persecuting his own Protestant subjects with all the fierceness of bigotry, and that the league for this purpose, which proved so fatal to the Romish Church, should be negotiated and signed by a Roman Catholic bishop. So wonderfully doth the wisdom of God superintend and regulate the caprice of human passions and render them subservient towards the accomplishment of his own purposes.

Little attention was paid to the interests of the French king during the negotiations at Passau. Maurice and his associates, having gained what they had in view, discovered no great solicitude about an ally whom perhaps they reckoned to be overpaid for the assistance which he had given them by his acquisitions in Lorraine. A short clause which they procured to be inserted in the treaty, importing that the king of France might communicate to the confederates his particular pretensions or causes of hostility, which they would lay before the emperor, was the only sign that they gave of their remembering how much they had been indebted to him for their success. Henry experienced the same treatment which every prince who lends his aid to the authors of a civil war may expect. As soon as the rage of faction began to subside, and any prospect of accommodation to open, his services were forgotten, and his associates made a merit with their sovereign of the ingratitude with which they abandoned their protector. But how much soever Henry might be enraged at the perfidy of his allies, or at the impatience with which they hastened to make their peace with the emperor at his expense, he was perfectly sensible that it was more his interest to keep well with the Germanic body than to resent the indignities offered him by any particular members of it. For that reason he dismissed the hostages which he had received from Maurice and his associates, and affected to talk in the same strain as formerly concerning his zeal for maintaining the ancient constitution and liberties of the empire.


The following table shows the population of the United States in 1790, 1800, 1810, 1820, 1830, 1840, 1850, 1860, 1870, 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000. The population of the United States has increased steadily over the years, from approximately 4 million in 1790 to over 300 million in 2000. The growth rate has been particularly rapid in the latter half of the 20th century, due to immigration and a high birth rate.

Year	Population (Approximate)
1790	4,000,000
1800	5,300,000
1810	7,200,000
1820	9,600,000
1830	12,900,000
1840	17,000,000
1850	22,300,000
1860	31,300,000
1870	39,300,000
1880	50,500,000
1890	63,000,000
1900	76,200,000
1910	92,000,000
1920	106,000,000
1930	123,000,000
1940	137,000,000
1950	152,000,000
1960	179,000,000
1970	203,000,000
1980	226,000,000
1990	249,000,000
2000	281,000,000

The population of the United States has continued to grow, with an estimated population of approximately 310 million in 2010. The growth rate is expected to continue, with the population projected to reach approximately 400 million by 2050. This growth is primarily driven by immigration and a high birth rate, particularly among Hispanic and African American populations.



1870





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