

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WORLD HISTORY

1815–1920

BY

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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

A decade ago Professor Fueter attracted the attention of historical scholars all over the world by his admirable *Geschichte der neueren Historiographie* (Munich, 1911). Its worth was quickly recognized by its being translated into French in an enlarged edition with additional material from the hand of the author. The same keen insight, excellent judgment, and great breadth of interest and reading which characterized this History of Modern Historical Writing is also seen in his *Weltgeschichte der letzten hundert Jahre, 1815-1920* (Zürich, 1921). In two respects Professor Fueter is peculiarly well equipped to write a History of the Modern World. Aside from his scholarly historical training, as a Swiss he is able to look down from his neutral heights upon the rest of Europe with singular detachment and impartiality. Rarely have such heated questions as the World War, the Irish question, or the American War of Secession been treated with such succinctness, fairness and understanding. The second advantage which Professor Fueter enjoys is the fact that through various kinds of newspaper work he has come into direct contact with the great problems of the day. The habit of seizing what is vital rather than what is traditional is reflected in this book. He has thrown overboard much that is usually found in histories of the nineteenth century to make room for what he considers more important. Though one may, perhaps, not always completely agree with his account, one can hardly fail to be interested and stimulated by the originality and vigor with which he presents it.

Except for a very few slight corrections or modifications made at the request of the author, the translation adheres, it is hoped, as closely to the German edition as is consistent with readable English. For convenience of reference the chapters are numbered consecutively instead of by "Books" as in the original work.

S. B. F.

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WORLD HISTORY. 1815-1920

INTRODUCTION. THE CONCEPTION OF WORLD HISTORY

WHAT has hitherto been called "universal history" or "world history" (*Weltgeschichte*) has been nothing but a conglomeration. People believed they were writing world history if they articulated together in a formal fashion the events of various continents. Writers have been satisfied with a mere juxtaposition of narratives, when in fact they ought to have shown the interdependence of occurrences taking place in widely separate localities.

The present work has an altogether different purpose. It will attempt to survey the history of the last hundred years from a really universal point of view. It will not aim at a schematic treatment of different continents as of equal importance. A world history which should devote the same attention to the chance happenings of a tribe of African negroes and to the development of the British Empire would be as unworthy of the name as a history of Italy in the nineteenth century which treated in equal detail the Duchy of Parma and the Kingdom of Sardinia. On the contrary, events shall be so selected as to bring into the foreground those which have universal significance; the criterion of importance shall be, not the local, but the universal importance. Europe and the European nations will indeed be given first place; but only those phenomena shall be set forth in detail which have exercised a wide influence beyond old Europe.

A brief exposition like the present is better adapted to this aim than a detailed narrative. If one has to refrain from discussing many interesting details it is all the easier to make clear the major lines of development and the connecting threads in the history of lands and peoples. The outline of the background will stand forth all the more clearly if the number of decorative figures in the foreground of the landscape is restricted to the most significant and essential ones.

The intelligent reader must console himself if a popular and conventional anecdote, or a name dear to him, is either briefly mentioned or passed over entirely. For he will say to himself: What

the present needs above all else is a grasp of history from the standpoint of a world outlook and not a collection of anecdotes. Far too long has the conventional historical instruction in the schools treated the history of Europe as an isolated development. It is high time this should cease. And also from practical reasons. A century and a half ago, when the historians of the *Aufklärung,* or Age of Enlightenment, undertook for the first time to write real universal history, their work was little more than a by-product of speculation in the field of the philosophy of history. Now, in the twentieth century, problems of world politics and world economics are no longer mere academic questions. History must adapt itself to this new situation if it is to be seriously considered as an introduction to political and economic thought. This is particularly true of the period which is to be treated in this book—for reasons which will be explained in the next chapter.

BOOK I

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS—THE POINT OF DEPARTURE

CHAPTER I

THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS AS A PERIOD OF WORLD HISTORY

It has often been said, even by great philosophers, that history simply repeats itself; that, though to a superficial view much changes, and though names and forms vary, nevertheless fundamentally the same driving forces of history remain ever and immutably the same.

This view is mistaken. Naturally certain fundamental problems are always recurring. Human nature has certain needs which must always be satisfied in much the same way. The conflicts which arise from individuals living together and from states existing side by side show kindred traits from century to century. But so soon as the observer raises himself above these identical phenomena of a primitive nature, mighty are the differences which are revealed from century to century and between one quarter of the globe and another. Although the basic principles of human society may alter but little, nevertheless the conditions under which these principles act change greatly. A mere quantitative change in conditions may have enormous consequences. Think, for instance, of the rapidity of communication which we owe to steam. Theoretically, the modern steamship and railway serve the same needs as the sailing-vessel and the ox-cart of olden times; but the possibility of quicker communication with distant parts of the world has brought with it consequences which would make it ridiculous to regard the difference between the present and the past merely as a shortening of the time necessary for the transportation of goods.

Now it is the aim of history to call attention to these changes and shifting conditions, and to consider their consequences. No period is so well adapted to this as the nineteenth century. For in this century there took place one of those great changes which permit us to differentiate one age sharply from another. This change was the spread of European civilization, including European science and knowledge as well as European colonization, over the whole earth. Naturally, here also, one can cite analogies or at least similar phenomena from earlier periods. For instance, there are close resemblances to the conquest of South America by Spain and Portugal

in the sixteenth century. But even if such events of an earlier period seem essentially similar from a superficial point of view, there remains, nevertheless, the great difference which results from the far broader extent of the modern movement. No event of the past century (1815-1920) has exercised so powerful an influence upon the future of mankind—and not least on the European states themselves—as this Europeanization of the world. Compared with this, how slight was the importance for their own age of European colonial policy in previous centuries!

The plan of the present work will, therefore, place in the foreground those events which are connected with this most important development. It will seek first to describe the point of departure—the world as it was in 1815—and then the material and intellectual conditions out of which resulted the conquest of the world by the European nations and by European civilization.

CHAPTER II

THE GEOGRAPHICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE WORLD IN 1815

TO-DAY the world is an economic unit. Economic disasters and great revolutions which occur in one part of the world are quickly felt everywhere else. A hundred years ago it was quite otherwise.

In 1815 the world was still divided into three parts. One of these was virtually isolated from the other two; and these two traded with one another regularly only in certain products.

The part which was virtually isolated and which, because of its isolation, was not at all progressive, was the vast region of Eastern Asia. Here Japan was completely inaccessible to foreigners, and China had opened the door only a crack. Foreign ships were allowed to touch at only one Chinese port (Canton). Even those foreign traders who wanted to export Chinese tea were forbidden to make regular settlements or to travel freely inland. Furthermore, even this limited opportunity was exploited to only a small extent. The direct trade of European nations (especially of the English) was quite unimportant. And although China at that time was still inferior to the European nations in the science of war, the Europeans did not yet think of intervening with an armed hand for the benefit of their traders.

The second division of the world from an economic point of view consisted of Europe and those parts of America settled by Europeans. The third area comprised the numerous remaining regions which had come within the sphere of European colonial influence. In these latter regions Europeans had secured for themselves privileges for exploiting "colonial wares" which could not be produced in Europe at all, or at least only under unfavorable conditions, because of the climate. There was, as yet, no question of settlements to provide for an overflow population (aside from the scattered penal settlements). A surplus population did not yet exist in Europe in 1815. At that time no European nation thought of reserving unoccupied regions outside Europe as places of settlement; even in the case of England, the country in which an excess population first began to appear, the emigration prior to 1825 was altogether insignificant. Europe's

contact with the colonies was limited therefore to the regulation and retention of trade; even if expeditions were made into the interior for commercial purposes, these aimed only at the protection of the commercial settlements on the coast.

Thus the colonial policy of the European nations in 1815 was in theory still the same as during the three preceding centuries. But the wars of the eighteenth century and of the Napoleonic Age had brought a fundamental change in the relative strength of the various nations. While in the earlier periods the various naval powers had waged bitter strife for commercial advantages in the colonies, in 1815 only one great sea power survived. To be sure, remnants of the earlier conditions still existed in the shape of Dutch, French, or Portuguese colonies. But the most dangerous rival of the British colonial empire, the French dominion in Asia and America, had been definitely destroyed and had fallen into the hands of the more powerful competitor. And there was no likelihood that the situation would soon change, because great sea power had been necessary for the conquest of these overseas regions, whose products were so much desired; and in 1815 England alone possessed such sea power. The French navy was gone, the Spanish fleet decayed, and even the Dutch shipping had sunk into insignificance. Any immediate revival of the old rivalry on the sea was out of the question. The only cases in which European nations might extend over new territories outside Europe were cases where there was a land connection, or where sea communication offered only slight difficulties, as in the expansion of Russia over Siberia and Central Asia, the creation by France of a colonial empire in Algeria, or, to a certain extent, the addition of new lands to the South and West by the United States.

England's dominant position was further strengthened by the fact that, true to her policy for four centuries, she refrained from acquiring territory on the continent of Europe. The nation which possessed the only great sea power of the time could, if she desired, also concentrate her whole attention upon an overseas policy, because in Europe she claimed no territory which bordered on a continental military power.

CHAPTER III

THE NEW ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Now it chanced that the only nation which possessed the necessary sea power for extending European authority over the world was also at the same time the nation which first developed the modern industrial system and thereby inaugurated the period of great emigration. In this its own citizens naturally had at first the greatest share. Here we must glance back a little into the past.

In the course of the eighteenth century, the factors which gave the impulse to the rise of the modern factory system, namely, the substitution of power-driven machinery for manual labor and the application of steam to industry, were in part the result of the new scientific speculation which arose in Italy in the second half of the sixteenth century. But, in the main, certain specific needs of the time and the country led to the inventions which were to revolutionize the industrial life of the whole world. Thanks to the unequaled quality of her wool and the wealth of her mines, England had already secured a leading position in the textile and iron industries. This development modified the whole social structure of the country. The lucrative extension of sheep-raising decreased the number of agricultural laborers and furnished industry with an unusually large amount of cheap labor. But at the beginning of the eighteenth century one branch of industry was threatened with destruction. The forests of England which had supplied the fuel for smelting iron and making steel began to be exhausted. Unless the metal industries were to migrate to Sweden or Russia, where forests abounded, coal must be substituted for charcoal. To pump the water from the coal mines, some mechanical contrivance was necessary which could work more effectively than hand-pumps. This led to the invention of the steam engine by James Watt. Soon the new machine began to be applied to other purposes than pumping water from coal mines. In the textile industries steam-driven machinery was soon installed. A few decades later followed the two inventions which placed the steam engine at the service of commerce—the steamship and the railway. About the same time there occurred also in America the invention of the cotton-gin, which placed at

the disposal of English industry a hitherto undreamt-of supply of cotton, for which in turn new uses were discovered.

This introduction of manufacturing on a large scale, known in England as the "Industrial Revolution," taken all in all, was the most important event of the nineteenth century. Thanks to the new means of communication, commerce and industry were now for the first time organized on a really world basis. Hitherto, European trade with the overseas regions had been limited to the importation of luxuries and raw materials which could not be produced in Europe; henceforth food supplies from other parts of the world could be imported more cheaply by the industrialized European nations than they could be raised at home. The industrialization of a country, that is, the employment of propertyless workingmen in factories at the expense of home agriculture and the multiplication of factory employees far beyond what the soil at home would feed, could now be carried on to an extent and with an intensity undreamt-of in former times. Masses of men, who formerly would either have starved or through recurrent under-nourishment have been subject to epidemics and heavy mortality, could now not only live, but even enjoy relative comfort with a lower mortality rate than had ever been heard of before. The importation of food from parts of the world outside Europe, made possible by the new means of transportation, assured not only cheapness but also regularity of supplies, so that local crop failures no longer resulted in famine. Likewise, as there was no longer any geographical limitation upon the exportation of manufactured goods, and as goods could be sold in distant countries, there was nothing to prevent great expansion in manufacturing. The Malthusian theory had declared that population tended constantly to outrun food-supply, and that if the birth-rate were not voluntarily checked, famine or war or some other disaster must keep it within bounds. Now the Malthusian theory—formulated under the influences of the first phases of the industrial change in England—seemed contradicted.

This optimistic view, however, which perhaps reached its height in the second half of the nineteenth century, lost sight of the fact that the solution which it supposed it had found could hold good only for a brief and unusually favorable period. It forgot that the overseas regions could come to the aid of Europe's excess population only so long as these regions themselves remained thinly populated. However, this is not the place to consider in detail the question of overpopulation nor that of the social and political consequences of the rise of an industrial proletariat; these can best be

treated later in the chapter on English History (ch. xiv). Here it need only be pointed out that the new economic organization of trade on a world basis was not merely a cause, but just as much a consequence, of the increase of population which resulted from the Industrial Revolution.

Manufacturing on a large scale, with the aid of steam-power, made far less demands on the strength of the individual worker than had the old manual labor. Children, women, and unskilled workmen could be used to tend many machines just as well as grown men and technically trained workers. Particularly in the first period, prior to the legislation for the protection of children, factory employees became self-supporting while still very young and could begin to raise families. As wages varied arbitrarily and were relatively high when times were good, workingmen became careless and made no effort to limit the number of children, particularly as the children did not have to divide up an inheritance but merely shared in the opportunity to work. Only a few leaders warned the workingmen to keep their families small in order to limit the number of those competing for places to work. And since, in spite of the unhygienic conditions under which the working population for the most part lived, a regular supply of imported food tended to reduce mortality, the population of the industrial countries grew in numbers to an extent which has no parallel in earlier centuries.

It soon appeared that for an amelioration of the evils which arose from this, particularly for the evil of unemployment in normal times, there was but one remedy: emigration. If all the people who lived exclusively by manual labor but were unable to find work at home could move away to thinly settled or unoccupied regions, especially outside Europe, the increase of population which was caused and kept up by the Industrial Revolution could be borne without inconvenience. This was at first the case. After 1815 great areas stood open for settlement, particularly in North America, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, that is, in territories which were not unsuited to white men. Furthermore, the economic situation was such that this emigration of European labor not only relieved the mother country from the burden of feeding those who departed, but also positively contributed to the support of those who remained. Distant lands, which could produce practically no necessaries of life so long as they remained hunting-grounds in the hands of wild native tribes, became in the hands of white settlers great granaries from which the industrial masses of Europe could be fed, and to which the manufactured products of European factories could be

sold. Apparently an equilibrium had been established. Thanks to the new economic organization on a world basis, the enormously increased population of the world could be fed, in fact better fed, than was possible in previous centuries. But this was only a temporary and provisional situation. Scarcely a hundred years had passed before it became evident that the conditions on which the economic equilibrium rested no longer existed; then came to an end, one may say, the Age of the Industrial Revolution and the Expansion of Europeans over the World.

CHAPTER IV

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

The Industrial Revolution which took place in England had as its counterpart in much of the rest of Europe the revolution in property rights and business relations which arose from the spread of the French conception of legal equality. Here also we must glance back into the past.

Up to the end of the eighteenth century, in nearly all the countries of Europe (but less in England) institutions were in existence which aimed to protect the privileged classes who possessed inherited wealth from the competition of new elements struggling upwards from the bottom of society. Almost everywhere the law took care that the families which had secured possession of considerable property (particularly landed property), or of a good government office (one of the most fruitful sources of income in those days), should be enabled to defend their property against competitors from the lower social ranks, even when the latter were more capable and energetic. Various legal privileges reserved a great part of the government offices for members of a definite social class. Various laws took care that the property of the favored families could not be divided, lest individual members of the family might be in danger of being depressed into the ranks of the poor. In general, the legal system worked in such a way that all the landed property of a family passed to the eldest son and was kept together in his hands; the younger sons and daughters were provided for by being given a place in the army, the government, or the church. Usually, therefore, the rank of officer in the army, the lucrative appointments in the government, and the rich ecclesiastical endowments (in which ladies also might share) were reserved for the "nobility," i. e., for the wealthy class. In the city republics the rights of the ruling bourgeois aristocracy were protected in the same way; the rest of the people, whether rich or poor, were excluded from all important positions and often even from the exercise of certain trades; here also election to most of the offices was restricted to the members of a few families, who were thus assured of appointment to offices which they often

could not have won on a basis of ability and free competition. To these privileges must be added that of exemption from taxation for nobility, clergy, and the ruling bourgeois aristocracy, which likewise assured a mighty financial advantage to the favored few.

During the French Revolution this system of privileges was replaced by the principle of legal equality for all. All the limitations which had reserved the numerous places of profit for inheritors of wealth disappeared. Now a commoner could be an army officer, a poor man a justice, and even a very poor man a bishop. Primogeniture was abolished; a law of inheritance was introduced which gave younger and elder children an equal share, so that no family's wealth was protected by the state from being divided up. The privileges of the guilds were set aside, so that the exercise of certain trades was no longer reserved for the benefit of a few families. Separate tribunals for the nobility, with their partiality for the rich, were abolished. Many of the factors which made preferment according to social position possible simply disappeared. The most important examples of this were the secularization of much of the church property, such as the monasteries and other ecclesiastical foundations which served no practical religious purpose, and the cutting down of the revenues of those establishments which were permitted to continue in existence, such as bishoprics. The income of the ecclesiastical offices which survived was now so moderate that even if they had been reserved as formerly for the children of the nobility, they would not have sufficed for their support.

Friends and opponents of the French Revolution have too often judged this system of equality from the standpoint of the city bourgeoisie. In reality, however, its significance is far greater as regards agricultural land in the country districts. Any one who wants to judge the results of the French Revolution must begin with the changes which took place in the condition of the peasants and in the division of the soil.

The principle of equality of inheritance, for evident reasons, is not nearly so important in the case of movable property as in that of real estate. The joint management of a concern by brothers, the provision of compensation for retiring members, the adaptation of an organization to a greater or less number of participants, above all, the expansion of business—these are all matters which are easier to arrange in a commercial or industrial undertaking than in agriculture. In agriculture, particularly if a country is already so thickly populated that it is difficult to enlarge an inherited estate or buy new lands, serious consequences arise from laws compelling

the heirs to share the land equally or make an equivalent provision. Even if some of the heirs withdraw from the land, the situation is no better, since those who remain on the property are heavily burdened financially by the compensation which they have to provide for those who withdraw. Now if there happens to come a natural increase in the population and a decrease in the death rate (as was the case in the nineteenth century as a result of the new means of communication, better hygiene, and long periods of peace), only two alternatives are open to countries already thickly settled: either a subdivision of the land into smaller parcels, with all the technical difficulties in cultivation which this involves, or an artificial limitation of the birth rate (provided, of course, that the law of equal inheritance is not modified). This is the dilemma, as is well known, which the French saw clearly, and solved admirably, at least from an economic point of view, by choosing the second alternative.

If a country avoids the evil consequences of legal equality by such a restriction of population, and remains, so to speak, in the first phase of the revolution, it secures a social structure whose solidity is scarcely equaled by any other form of economic organization. The bulk of the population does not consist of homeless, propertyless workingmen, nor of a crowd of day laborers whose families live physically and mentally almost like cattle under a few great landlords; it consists of a body of peasant proprietors who are hardworking and thrifty, because out of their own experience they know the value of property, and because they labor for themselves and their families and not for absentee landlords.

It has been necessary to examine a little more in detail the historical significance of this idea of "equality," inasmuch as scarcely any other historical event has been so much misrepresented as the proclamation of this principle by the French Revolution. From the outset, amateur philosophers of history have taken special delight in holding it up to reproach, repeating the platitude that Nature herself knows no equality, and that men are never equally endowed at birth. This is undoubtedly true; but, looked at closely, this very fact is an argument, not against, but in favor of the abolition of the pre-revolutionary class privileges. The advantages which the members of the propertied class enjoyed before the Revolution did not give free play to ability, but on the contrary acted as a shield to the incompetent, who could not otherwise have withstood the competition of talented rivals from the lower ranks of society. As to "the rule of the fittest," whatever such an indefinite, theoretical phrase may mean, certainly there was a closer approach to this

Utopian conception under the legal equality introduced by the French Revolution than under the earlier system of privileges for certain families and classes. Historical events have also proved that another theory, by which the privileged classes tried to justify their position, is no longer tenable; namely, the theory that only scions of the nobility possessed the necessary qualities to make good military officers. The very wars of the French Revolution proved this to be nothing but a legend. Every one knows that some of the most successful French generals came from the lower ranks of society; this was the time when it was said that every soldier, even the humblest born, carried a marshal's baton in his knapsack.

Of course the principle of equality in inheritance is open to serious criticism, and the historian would be the last person to assert that there is nothing but good in it. Writers in England, that is, in the country where primogeniture has been retained within certain limits in combination with general freedom of testamentary disposition, have with some justice called attention to the bad effects in France of extreme subdivision of agricultural land. One might add also that a class of independent large landlords can render to the state valuable services which cannot be had easily in any other way. But these are matters which have nothing to do with that favorable recognition of talent which is supposed to have been destroyed by the doctrine of equality. For the innovations of the French Revolution had precisely the result that the man who was poor but talented henceforth need struggle only against the disadvantages due to his poverty, but not against those due to the political and legal privileges of the rich.

More justifiable is another theoretical objection. Little as the historian can endorse in general talk about "the good old times," he must admit that some of the unrest in modern society is to be traced back to this legal equality. When the propertied or ruling classes were protected by all sorts of political privileges, they naturally had less idea of the difficulty of the struggle for existence than later. The rest of the population likewise, being excluded from the enjoyment of sinecures, were more resigned to their fate than later; realizing that they never could stand on an equal footing with their mighty masters, they did not make the attempt. But in the case of this objection also, in view of the great increase in population, one cannot accept unreservedly the statement that legal equality and freedom to exercise a trade have caused the boundless striving for wealth of modern times with all its disturbing consequences.

In the history of the nineteenth century it is of fundamental im-

portance that these "Ideas of the French Revolution" coincided at the outset with "liberal" or even republican forms of government. In itself, the adoption of the kind of equality just described naturally has no inherent connection with a free form of government. Writers have often correctly pointed out that there can be more legal equality under an autocracy than in an aristocratic republic. In Europe before 1789 it was also true that the new ideas came nearer to realization in monarchical than in republican states. "Enlightened Despotism," which in a limited degree aimed at the same things as the French Revolution later, bore its fruits primarily in monarchies. Two events, however, made this no longer true henceforth. The first was the establishment of the United States of America, which for the first time proclaimed the complete equality of all the citizens of the Union. The second was the fact that the monarchy in France proved unable to carry through the reforms which it had inaugurated and which were only completed under the First French Republic. To be sure, a little later the introduction of the new ideas did not depend on the continuance of liberal forms of government; as is well known, the spread in Europe of the new French legal arrangements, so far as it took place, was as much due to the campaigns of Napoleon as to those of the Republic. But the first impression remained the permanent one. It was two republics, the American and the French, which first established legal equality; the example of Napoleon could not be cited to the contrary, because the Corsican Emperor was always regarded as an illegitimate upstart by the representatives of the old political way of thinking.

CHAPTER V

THE "PANIC OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION"

The reason that the same people who regarded Napoleon as an illegitimate ruler were also the people who feared and hated the republican revolutionary movement will become clear only if one takes into consideration the intellectual as well as the material results of the French Revolution.

No event in European history ever caused such a change in the political thought of the ruling classes as did the French Revolution. In this respect even the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century was of less importance. It was the first time that conscious conservatism became a ruling dogma.

To understand this, it is not enough to study merely the history of the French Revolution itself. Much rather must one seek the solution of the problem in the theory according to which the Revolution was explained and in the consequences which were drawn from the course of its progress.

Two ideas were particularly important. The first was the connection which the adherents of the Old Régime thought they saw between the Enlightened Despotism of the eighteenth century and the political revolution. Because some French writers had brilliantly set forth anti-ecclesiastical ideas about the Law of Nature, and because the reformers of French finance did not hesitate to confiscate church property, the ruling classes thought that the real source of revolutionary tendencies was to be sought in the writings of the enlightened philosophers about religion.

The attitude of the ruling classes in church and state toward education and culture therefore became radically altered. While formerly they had welcomed the new intellectual ideas and more than once defended them against the fanaticism of the middle class, henceforth the contrary became the rule. Poets and essayists who in the eighteenth century had been entertained at the courts of princes and given important offices, were now at best merely tolerated and everywhere regarded with suspicion. Henceforth, it was usually only the fine arts which flourished in these states, for the fine arts did not deal with the great problems of the age and showed a preference

for pre-revolutionary forms. Especially in countries where those in control thought they ought to protect themselves against revolutionary attempts, the view prevailed that the state ought to restrict if possible, or at least direct, intellectual movements. The split which took place between the state and culture has continued in many countries to the present day.

This governmental attitude in many states was given its special character by the fact that the "age of innocence" had passed. Rulers might still think it advisable from political motives to uphold the church and religion, and block anti-ecclesiastical movements. But the old naïve faith, such as was still by no means uncommon among rulers of the eighteenth century, could no longer be aroused. The conviction that the wrath of heaven would smite the prince who tolerated heretical beliefs in his territory, the belief in the existence of witches who made compacts with the devil to injure their fellow-men—all these and many other superstitions which had political importance had disappeared forever. The most important teachings of the Age of Enlightenment had gained much greater currency even among people of strong religious faith than in the eighteenth century; at least the statesmen who advocated religion for the people usually did so, not so much from conviction of the innate truth of the church's dogmas, but because the maintenance of the Christian religion seemed to be for the general good. As a famous English statesman was leaving the House of Commons after a strong speech in favor of the claims of the church, he remarked to a colleague: "Well, after all, it's a curious thing that we have both been voting for an extinct mythology."

Perhaps this decline in faith was not after all a great difficulty. Statesmen who urged a religion in which they no longer believed might meet with few practical obstacles; but they could not always hold logically to their policy. Since a training in the new natural sciences was indispensable for industry and war, even conservative statesmen had to approve their advancement. This contradiction was obviated by allowing students of natural science a free hand so long as they stuck closely to their subject, and by persecuting all scholars who tried to draw from their science general conclusions which were incompatible with church dogma.

The second idea which the representatives of the old order regarded as proved by the history of the French Revolution concerned the attitude which the French monarchy had taken toward revolutionary demands. The conservative governments were convinced that it was only the monarch's excessive willingness to yield that

was to blame when the movement went so far. Only by heading off the danger at the outset could success be secured; if the reins were once loosened there would be no stopping until there was a complete upset. This was equivalent to a condemnation of a great part of the work of the Enlightened Despots. Proposals for political reform, which had been discussed calmly before the Revolution and even initiated by royal ministers, were now regarded as unacceptable because they might open the gate to revolution. Even harmless notions now awakened a kind of panicky fear. The only salvation lay in the principle of legitimacy and conservatism, that is, in conserving what existed simply because it existed. Better to preserve what was incomplete than introduce what was new; for who knew whether reform would stop with its first success—whether it would not shove aside what had been treasured from the past?

Naturally this principle was not put completely into practice. Aside from the fact that nearly all office holders had been brought up on the teachings of Enlightened Despotism, the revolutionary wars made it necessary to reorganize so many institutions, both political and non-political, that serious breaches in the existing order were unavoidable. But the principle was not without influence just the same; especially in foreign policy (as will be shown in detail in Book II) there was the very important conviction that governments owed it to their common interest to protect one another against revolutionary conspiracies.

Like every panicky movement, this fear of revolution lasted only a relatively short time in its extreme form. It reached its height after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and during the following years. The panicky feeling was also more sharply marked in those countries where none of the revolutionary demands had been accepted than in those where few had been rejected; for instance, more sharply in Austria than in England or America. On the other hand, the fact must not be overlooked that the effects of these tendencies were visible for a long time afterwards, in fact even up to the present. Here is an intellectual influence which has stamped itself on the whole period.

CHAPTER VI

HUMANITARIANISM

WHILE the political and religious tendencies of the Age of Enlightenment were regarded with disfavor in governmental circles, as a result of the French Revolution, another of its tendencies spread almost without opposition. The humanitarian feeling, the compassion for the suffering of human beings without regard to their race, religion, or social condition, now became a political factor. The attitude of wide groups of people on political questions, both foreign and domestic, was determined by the expectation that the victory of this or that party would advance the cause of humanity. Ministries were not free from this kind of influence; and even if they did not embody it in practical legislation, they did not dare deny the principle that the demands of mankind ought to be given consideration.

Humanitarianism is generally regarded as a child of the eighteenth century. This view is undoubtedly correct so far as its birth is concerned. But its full strength did not develop until the nineteenth century, when there came into power the men who had grown to regard the novelties of the Age of Enlightenment as self-evident truths. In the eighteenth century only a small minority had protested against the horrors of the criminal law, the gruesome execution of witches, slavery, and similar inhuman practices; it was only by forceful measures that reforms in these matters could be effected. But during and after the French Revolution these views came to be shared by all cultivated persons in Europe. They gained greatly in influence from the fact that they were taken up by religious societies. Whereas in the eighteenth century, humanitarian doctrines had been chiefly preached by anti-ecclesiastical or at least non-ecclesiastical groups, and had often been opposed in strictly religious circles, now many religious groups, especially those outside the established church, adopted propaganda for humanitarian laws and reforms as part of their platform. Sects which in the eighteenth century were chiefly concerned with the salvation of souls now turned with even greater zeal to the salvation of society

by prison reform and the abolition of slavery. Naturally the humanitarian movement thereby became far stronger than at a time when it was advocated only by a few aristocratic writers. It had also rid itself of all revolutionary and anti-religious taint.

In this field of humanitarian reform, therefore, there was less of a restoration of old conditions after 1815 than in any other field. Conservative ministries might debate the re-introduction of primogeniture; but they no longer discussed the revival of torture and the barbaric forms of the death penalty. Where barbaric penalties were not actually abolished by law, they were no longer applied in practice. Even humane forms of capital punishment came to be regarded more and more as a terrible penalty which ought not to be imposed except in extreme cases; for instance, in England, the death penalty, which at the beginning of the nineteenth century was still enforced for minor infractions of the law, was now reserved for only the most serious crimes. Condemnation to corporal punishment came now to be regarded as an evidence of a lower civilization, and one of the reasons why Russia was felt to be a barbarous country was the fact that she had done so much less than other countries in the matter of humanitarian reform. In order to realize the tremendous changes in attitude which had taken place one must not forget that the worst excesses of Russian criminal law were really humane in comparison with the horrors, for instance, which still existed in French legal practice in the eighteenth century.

In many ways the new humanitarianism influenced practical politics. To it must be attributed some of the political hostility with which Turkey was regarded in many countries. Its influence was most successful in the abolition of slavery. In this matter the Age of Enlightenment had taken the first step and asserted in the face of ecclesiastical opposition the "natural rights of man." During the French Revolution for the first time a European nation (France) forbade slavery in its colonies. Great Britain soon followed the example of France; in 1807-8 the slave trade was abolished by Act of Parliament. The example of France and England was often followed in the course of the nineteenth century, until finally it had been imitated by all Christian countries. The movement toward the abolition of slavery also affected the relations of European nations with peoples of other races outside of Europe, as, for instance, in the well-known case of Africa.

This struggle against slavery is a particularly characteristic evidence of the power of humanitarianism, inasmuch as it was not at all due to material motives in the ordinary meaning of the word.

In fact, England's abolition of the slave trade was hurtful from the point of view of British commerce; it was justifiable only on idealistic grounds.

BOOK II

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE AGAINST REVOLUTIONARY TENDENCIES

CHAPTER VII

THE SOLIDARITY OF INTERNATIONAL CONSERVATISM

THE Great Powers which had led the struggle against Napoleon had fought not only for an increase of territory, but also for a political principle. Although one of the Allies (Prussia) had been somewhat permeated by French Revolutionary ideas, and another (England) had already adopted many of them, the governments of all the Allies were selfishly interested in many of the institutions of the Old Régime, and the war against France was therefore regarded as a war for eradicating the international revolutionary movement.

It was natural that the Alliance outlasted Napoleon's defeat and banishment. In the first place, the revolutionary movement had not been rooted out. In France itself, which for several decades had been regarded as a hot-bed of subversive tendencies and upon which an almost foreign dynasty had been imposed, the danger of a new outbreak seemed constantly imminent; and each of the Allies was aware that in such an event the consequences would not be limited to France alone. A second motive holding the Allies together was their desire to keep their newly acquired territories. All the Great Powers, except France, emerged from the Napoleonic Wars with large increases of territory, acquired to a slight extent at the expense of France, but mainly at that of little states, like the aristocratic city republics and the bishoprics which were secularized. The best way to preserve these acquisitions was for the coalition which had conquered them to hold together to keep them. Finally, the reorganization which took place at the Congress of Vienna, at least so far as it concerned Europe, had created a balance of power among the large states which was regarded as a guarantee of peace. Now since none of the Great Powers had any inclination for another great war after the Napoleonic upheaval, it was to the interest of them all to conserve the existing balance which had been created at the Congress of Vienna.

With this in view the four greater Allied Powers, Austria, Russia, Prussia and Great Britain, signed a treaty on November 20, 1815,

"for the safety of their governments and for the general peace of Europe," to prevent the possibility that "Revolutionary Principles might again convulse France and endanger the peace of other countries." This had been preceded on September 26, 1815, by the Holy Alliance, which was in keeping with the new religious and political tendencies described above in chapter v; proposed by the Tsar, and then signed by the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, its mystical formulas aimed at the preservation of absolutism at home.

It was characteristic of the new Alliance that it did not at first include France, the feared home of revolutions. Only after a considerable period of probation, and after the withdrawal of the army of occupation which the Great Powers had left in France to secure the execution of the treaty, was France at last, in 1818, admitted to the league for the solidarity of conservatism. Great as was the desire of the Allies to raise the prestige of the government which they had restored in France, still greater was their feeling of anxiety lest some new disturbance might burst forth from France.

It would, of course, be quite incorrect to assume that this principle of the solidarity of conservatism always completely controlled the foreign and domestic policy of the European nations. The old aspirations and sources of agitation had not been suppressed. Even in the six or seven years following the Congress of Vienna, that is, in the period when the policy of international conservatism may be said to have been at its height, there were at work among members of the Alliance tendencies which were in contradiction with the idea of joint action against the forces of revolution. But it would be equally incorrect to deny that the conservative program of those days exerted practical influence. The idea of a common fight against the spirit of revolution acted as a gigantic brake on the wheels of progress.

At this point, in order to avoid repetition later, a theoretical observation may be inserted parenthetically.—There is one conception of history according to which all events may be traced back to ideas; the past, as well as the present, is regarded as being a war of great ideas; struggling groups, like nations or political parties, merely embody general tendencies. Opposed to this first conception, which might be called the idealogical conception of history, stands another, commonly known as the "great man" or "hero" conception; this completely denies the effective influence of such ideas; ideas are merely a bait which must be thrown to the stupid masses; no statesman ever takes their big phrases seriously. A sensible

observer will not admit that either of these extreme conceptions is correct. Certainly the first in its strict sense is untenable. But is a force without effect because opposing forces prevent it from reaching its full development? Does not every joint action unite men or groups, who may also be pursuing their own special aims, and is not their common purpose a reality? Because selfish interests can never be completely gotten rid of, can there be no self-sacrifice for general aims?

This is the point of view from which one ought to judge the attitude of the Conservative Powers after 1815. In the following chapters it will be shown in detail that the feeling of conservative solidarity was most effective in those countries where it harmonized with the special interests of a definite nation or minority; and that in other cases it made itself only partially felt. But this does not mean it did not exert any influence as a distinct independent force.

The fact that conservatism could not triumph completely lay in an uneven distribution of forces, and in a remarkable connection between this circumstance and the new policy of the Allied Powers.

One can understand that the "Panic of the French Revolution," mentioned above in chapter v, was more intense and lasted longer in proportion as nations had rejected more completely the equalitarian and the constitutional doctrines of the Revolution. Similarly the period of anxiety, caused by the paroxysms of the French Revolution, was briefest in the United States of America, and longest in the state which most completely embodied the Old Régime, namely, in Austria. It was likewise quite normal that England should give up sooner than the other Great Powers the idea that the first duty of all states is to combat the peril of revolution. Although in Great Britain, as will be pointed out later in chapter viii, an Old Régime had to defend itself against a revolutionary attack at this time, nevertheless the social reform movement there had little to do with the movement on the Continent; for England had already accomplished in large part what the continental revolutionary party was still striving after. Therefore the English were less inclined to subordinate their own national aims to the solidarity of international conservatism, and the inclination evaporated more rapidly than in the other countries. It was more than a mere accident that of all the leading monarchs (aside from the Pope) the Prince Regent of England was the only one who did not sign the Holy Alliance.

Now an important consequence of Great Britain's cool attitude was the fact that the Conservative Alliance lost the use of the only large navy in the world (see ch. ii). In every case where "rebels

against legitimacy" could be brought to reason only by the aid of a large fleet, the decision whether this should be done depended solely on Great Britain. Considering that the two cases of revolt which were left unsettled by the Congress of Vienna, the Spanish-American and the Greek, depended in last analysis upon sea power, it is easy to see the practical importance of this independent policy of Great Britain.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT STATES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

The most important of the revolutionary movements against which the Conservative Alliance had to stand on the defensive was the War of Independence of the Spanish-American colonies. The roots of the trouble reached far back. The great example of the North American Union—the unheard-of fact that a European colony should wrench itself loose from its mother-country and establish itself successfully as a democratic republic—naturally left a deeper impression in the New World than in Europe (although even here this event was not without a strong influence on the peculiar course of the French Revolution). This was necessarily the case, both because the Spanish colonies had been much worse treated by the mother-country than the English ones, and because Spain, unlike England, did not learn any lesson from the revolt of the Thirteen Colonies. Both these points need a short explanation.

One must begin with economic and social facts. The Spanish-American colonies, in 1776, were much more profitable to Spain than were the English colonies to England. Spain's revenues were dependent on the possession and exploitation of her American colonies in a way which had no parallel in England. Socially also there was a sharp difference. The Spanish colonies contained a large number of more or less independent natives who continued to exist as the lowest social group; but in the wide areas of the North American colonies the remnants of Indian tribes were negligible, and the negro slaves in the Southern states, being unfree, did not count politically. Owing to these conditions, the government of the Spanish colonies was not exercised by and for the whites settled there, but by Spaniards and solely in the interests of the mother-country. No creoles, as white persons born in America were called, were admitted into the colonial government. Not the welfare of the colonists, but the profit of the home government, was aimed at. In conflicts between the creoles and the natives, the Spanish administration took a neutral stand, or was even inclined to protect the descendants of original inhabitants against the claims of the successors of the Con-

quistadors. This attitude of the Spanish government was seen above all in its commercial policy. The trade of the colonies was reserved to Spanish merchants as a matter of principle; even Spanish liberals did not want to abandon this commercial monopoly; it was indispensable for the Spanish revenues.

Furthermore, the revolt of the English colonies in North America brought no change in this Spanish colonial system. As is known and will be pointed out later in the proper place, the revolt of the Thirteen Colonies made a great impression on the English government and led to a complete change in British colonial policy. But in Spain nothing of the kind took place. Although Spanish rulers might well have said to themselves that the example of the United States would certainly awaken similar aspirations in Central and South America, and although it was to be expected that a rising in the Spanish colonies would have at least the moral support of the North American Union, Spain persisted in her traditional attitude.

At first Spain was strong enough to maintain control over her colonies, but there soon came a moment which enabled the creoles to replace the administration of Spain by one of their own. The Napoleonic Wars involved the Spanish (and Portuguese) colonies.

Two circumstances then favored the colonists' struggle for independence. One was that the only nation which was in a position to assist the insurgents was also the very nation which had the greatest interest in the destruction of Spain's old commercial monopoly. Although the English government never appears to have thought of replacing the Spanish monopoly by one of its own, nevertheless it was significant that, thanks to England's leading commercial position, it was the English who would profit most from the establishment of freedom of trade in Central and South America. It also chanced favorably for England that her support of the South American movement for independence coincided with her general war policy; England and the insurgent colonists had the same enemy; Napoleon's elder brother, Joseph Bonaparte, had been set up as King of Spain by England's French enemy.

The second circumstance which aided the colonists lay in these conflicts in Spain itself. So long as the Spanish government was waging a bitter and unsuccessful war in the Peninsula, it was in no position to use force against the creoles.

How necessary was the combination of both factors—British sea power and Spanish-American natives—is proved by the events of 1806-07. The British attempted to secure a position for themselves in the Spanish colonies by attacks on Buenos Aires and Montevideo;

but these expeditions failed completely; they lacked support from the side of the colonists.

Soon afterwards, however, the creoles found a leader and an opportunity enabling them to achieve complete independence, instead of being simply transferred to the colonial empire of another nation. The leader was a prominent representative of the old creole aristocracy, Simon Bolivar of Caracas. Born in 1783, he now stood in the full strength of his manhood. Having absorbed intellectual influences in Europe, and being impressed in the United States by their great example, he resolved in 1809 to free the Spanish colonies. A born hero of freedom, a logical idealist, absolutely unselfish, incomparably energetic, and ahead of his times, he believed it possible to free and unite all the colonies immediately. Without hesitation he also proclaimed the abolition of slavery. He was no great military leader; but he understood how to gather around himself a group of able men, and he never gave up hope even in the darkest hour.

The favorable moment for the colonies to break away came when Napoleon compelled the Spanish King, Charles IV, to abdicate; this left the colonies also without a ruler. For Joseph Bonaparte, who had been set up by the French as the new king, was not recognized anywhere in America; and the legitimate successor, Ferdinand VII, was not in a position to exercise authority. Therefore the creoles established committees, called *juntas,* "to protect the rights of Ferdinand"; only gradually did they dare to proclaim complete independence from Spain, the first instance being in 1811.

This outcome was in fact promoted by the attitude of the revolutionary (anti-French) regency in Spain itself. One would have thought that the liberal politicians who gathered in Cadiz to build up a new Spain would not have adopted the selfish attitude of the Old Régime. But they did. The regency answered various revolutionary acts in Caracas with the severest reprisals and clung fast to the old monopolistic system. This made the breach irreparable.

So long as the war continued in Europe the struggle in America turned mostly in favor of the colonists. To be sure, there were defeats and the easily understood preference of the original inhabitants, or "Indians," for Spanish control continually provided the royalist leaders with new soldiers. But Bolivar and his supporters gained possession of most of the large provinces. Unless troops from Spain intervened, the loss of the colonies by the mother country was a foregone conclusion. On the other hand, it was probable that if the revived Spanish government could send enough troops to America the insurgents would be outmatched.

In this situation everything depended on Great Britain's attitude. And it is an extraordinarily significant evidence of the importance of the new conservative ideas that the English government at first refrained from aiding the colonists. Every English self-interest spoke in favor of intervention to secure the independence of the colonies. England had everything to gain if the former Spanish system of monopoly was replaced by freedom of trade with all nations. But considerations of a general political nature prevented England for a considerable time from favoring the revolutionists. So at first no official support was given by England.

At the outset, therefore, Spain had a free hand. But this profited her little. For what remained of the Spanish fleet sufficed only to transport a few troops, and the Russian vessels which were placed at her disposal in the interests of conservative solidarity proved completely useless. So the revolutionists were able to spread their conquests still further. Chili and Colombia were torn from the royalists. Peru was the only region over which the Spaniards still exercised control. This success of the colonists was partly the result of British (unofficial) assistance. It was due to the English naval hero, Lord Cochrane, who left the British service in 1818 to take command of the newly created Chilian navy, that the Spanish flag was driven completely from the Pacific Ocean. An extensive illegal trade was carried on by British ships with American ports, a trade which naturally furnished the colonists with munitions of war. But five years passed before Great Britain openly took sides with the insurgents. It was not until the "Panic of the French Revolution" (see ch. v) was on the wane that England dared to prefer her own interests above those of the Conservative Alliance. In 1817 England might still seriously debate Spain's request to the Allies for aid against the revolting American colonists and still adopt a passive attitude; but in 1822 at the Congress of Verona, she took a decisive stand when the Conservative Allies wanted to adopt a common policy. Here the British delegate declared that England felt compelled to give a kind of partial recognition to the new governments, that she had entered into negotiations with them, and that definite recognition must eventually follow this first step.

This attitude was strengthened the next year by what might be called a declaration made jointly with the United States. The United States, for reasons easily understood, had recognized the independence of these free South American countries somewhat earlier. This government did not need to have any regard for the European Alliance, which it had never joined, and whose principles

did not harmonize with its own political institutions; nor was it to its interest to support the rule of a great European Power in the New World. So it came about that in October, 1823, Canning, the British Foreign Minister, a typical representative of the younger generation in contrast to the earlier panicky conservatives, notified the French ambassador of England's limited recognition of the new republics; then, on December 2 of the same year, President Monroe sent his famous message to Congress declaring that he would consider any attempt on the part of European Powers to extend their system to the Western Hemisphere, or to interfere in the domestic affairs of American states, as dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States. Two years later, in 1825, England formally recognized the more important states.

This closed the door to every attempt by European Powers to reduce the Spanish colonies to their old subjection; it also destroyed the plans of the French to seek an equivalent in the Spanish colonies for the colonial empire which they had lost in the eighteenth century. A further fortunate circumstance in favor of the colonists was the fact that the Spanish troops destined for America refused to embark, partly because of their own grievances; the hole made in Spanish revenues by the loss of the colonies had already begun to derange the normal working of the Spanish administration (see below, ch. xi).

The interval before recognition by England had not been left unutilized by the creoles. After conquering Ecuador, Bolivar succeeded in overthrowing the last bulwark of Spanish power by conquering Peru, taking definite possession in 1824. From there the movement, which had hitherto been limited to South America, spread also to Central and Spanish North America.

In Mexico, or New Spain as it was then called, the first revolts, which took place at the same time as the risings in South America, were the work of the aborigines, or Indians, and the creoles therefore had at first taken the loyalist side. Not until the Indian revolts had been put down, did the creoles rise. In 1821 one of their generals, Iturbide, declared Mexico an independent Empire; next year he made himself emperor. (His rule lasted only a year; however, it was followed, not by a restoration of Spanish authority, but by an era of pronunciamentos.) This movement gave courage to colonists in Central America; Guatemala deserted Spain in 1821, the same year as Mexico.

In a similar way Brazil became independent. Here the commercial conditions were the same. Portugal exploited her colonies and main-

tained a monopoly like Spain. Here also, aside from the interests of the colonists themselves, it was the interests of British trade which hindered the restoration of the old system. Brazil differed in two respects from the Spanish republics: the new freedom of commerce in 1808 was not introduced by a republican leader, but by the Prince Regent (the later King John VI), who had fled from Lisbon to America; and after the later definite separation from the mother country in 1825-26, Brazil was established as a monarchy, or rather an empire. Quite the same, however, was the part which British sailors played. Lord Cochrane, who had commanded the Chilian fleet, was put at the head of the Brazilian navy after the declaration of independence in 1822. It was chiefly due to him, and to many other British naval heroes who served under him, that the military centers which held to Portugal were captured, and that the Portuguese ships bringing aid were chased away.

The states of Central and South America found it difficult in their new freedom to establish a firm political organization. As the Old Régime had excluded colonists from the administration, they were lacking in political experience. Almost the only people to manage new affairs were the inhabitants of the towns, who were also the people who benefited most by the abolition of the Spanish commercial monopoly. The aborigines, who had rather lost than gained by the revolt, remained indifferent toward these and the later revolutions, except when they were sometimes drawn into feuds by adventurers. Thus the conditions were altogether different from those in North America at the time of the American Revolution; there was also the enormous extent of the territory—the State of Colombia alone was about as large as the original Thirteen Colonies—and the total lack of means of communication. Under these circumstances Bolivar's dream of establishing a federation of the new independent states, which he attempted in a Pan-American congress at Panama in 1824, proved premature; in fact, the newly constituted states could not even preserve themselves from a further splitting up. Other measures which he did accomplish by his idealism, like abolition of slavery (in which he outstripped the action of the United States, but had no success in Brazil) made such a sharp break, however, with the past, that the emancipation of the slaves often turned out to be nominal rather than real. The sudden cessation of all Spanish administration resulted in very unstable conditions, and the lack of an effective public opinion led to many a coup d'état, so that for years rulers rose and fell with astonishing

rapidity—except where thinly veiled military dictatorships were established.

But after all one must not overlook the fact that much of this political insecurity was merely symptomatic of a period of transition. It did not seriously disturb economic development, particularly in the interior, nor did it affect the real significance in world history of this South American struggle for independence. For the European nations the essential importance of this struggle lay in the definite abolition, so far as America was concerned, of the old monopolistic colonial system. European commerce, and later, as the population in Europe increased rapidly, European expansion, found here an open field in which merchants and settlers of various countries could thrive on equal terms. Also, though the emigrants who settled there might be lost to the mother country, still they did not swell the strength of any one of the great rival Powers of Europe.

CHAPTER IX

THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE

QUITE similar were the conditions in the Greek War of Independence. Here also was a movement which some at least of the Great Powers ought to have hailed with joy from the point of view of their foreign policy, yet which they refused to aid because of their regard for the solidarity of international conservatism. The revolt of the Greeks against the legitimate authority of the Turks was an event which embodied two of the objectionable tendencies, the revolutionary and the nationalistic; it was therefore in flat contradiction to the principles of the Conservative Alliance. The only mitigating circumstance was the fact that Turkey, being a non-Christian state, could not be regarded as a regular member of an alliance which liked to lay so much stress on its religious character; though this circumstance, as we shall see, was not without its influence, nevertheless at the outset it was subordinated to the policy of conservatism.

Russia, after pushing forward to the Black Sea under Catherine II, naturally aimed to secure a free outlet to the Mediterranean. Control over Constantinople and at least the Eastern part of the Balkans became henceforth, along with expansion eastward, one of the main aims of Russian foreign policy. To Russians a revolt of their Greek co-religionists against Turkish authority was most welcome. To weaken Turkey was to strengthen Russia. Furthermore, according to opinion at that time, an increase of Greek power would assure the whole of the Balkans to Russia; for the Greek Orthodox Church was still closely unified throughout the Balkans, and the Greek element was everywhere dominant in it, no matter to what nationality its communicants might belong. If a union could once be established between Russia and the head of the Greek Orthodox organization in Constantinople, it was thought the whole Christian population of the Balkans would support Russian policy.

Even during the Napoleonic Wars one of the most important topics in the negotiations between Alexander I and Napoleon had been in regard to Russia's views as to Constantinople. But the Congress of Vienna put an end for a time to such subversive schemes; it also showed the Greeks that they could not expect the Great

Powers to take any initiative in expelling the Turks from Europe. For if Alexander and Napoleon had been unable to agree as to the disposal of the Turkish capital, there was little likelihood of arousing a general crusade in Europe. Theoretical opposition to overthrowing a legitimate ruler perhaps might have been overcome, but not the divergent ambitions of the Great Powers. Austria, after completing with Prussia the partition of Poland, had become more and more a rival of Russia, and opposed every extension of Russian power in the Balkans. England also was little inclined to tolerate Russian expansion, particularly toward the Mediterranean. A Greek rising would threaten the Mediterranean outpost which England had secured by acquiring Corfu and the Ionian Isles during the Napoleonic Wars. So the Greeks were left to win their independence by themselves.

The outlook for an unaided Greek attempt to overthrow Turkish rule was not favorable, but still it was not desperate. It was a case like that of the Dutch against the Spanish in the sixteenth century. The Greeks were as powerless on land against the superior Turkish army, as the Dutch against the Spanish infantry. But like the Dutch, they enjoyed an invulnerable position on the sea. The Turkish government had never raised its navy above mediocrity, and at the beginning of the nineteenth century it was nothing to speak of. Quite otherwise with the Greeks. Greek tradition was upheld even more by the Greek sailors on the Ægean Islands than by the dwellers on the Greek mainland itself. They made little more distinction between honest trade and robbery on the seas than did their ancestors in the time of Odysseus; like the Greeks of old, also, these island Greeks possessed a high degree of seafaring ability, love of liberty, and indomitable energy. As they had never fallen so completely under Turkish subjection, they now formed one of the strongest supports in the War of Independence.

Those who like to generalize about the philosophy of history may see here a specific instance illustrating a general principle: that seafaring people and marines never allow themselves to be subjected to the same kind of despotic treatment as may successfully be used in dealing with land troops. Regular garrison drill, even in time of peace, is impossible on the sea; nor can the individual be so completely treated as a mere machine as in the case of military forces drilled on land. Therefore the naval service has always been regarded as having more of the spirit of freedom than the military, and freedom-loving naval powers have always proved stronger than absolutist governments. Even the reactionary philosophers of Greek

antiquity complained that the shipping trade had hastened "democracy," using the word in its original sense; since that time few are the despotic governments which have accomplished more than mediocre results in naval matters. It is well known how many revolutions have originated with sailors, and how the navy, in contrast to the army, has always defended liberal movements.

Be this as it may, it is certain that the Greeks of the islands formed the core of the opposition to Turkish rule; to them rather than to the Greeks of the mainland is it due that the struggle for independence held out successfully during the critical early years.

On land the situation proved most unfavorable for the Greeks. For centuries, one may even say since the fourth century, B.C., the Greek center of gravity lay, not in Hellas itself, but in Asia Minor. It was essentially as a seafaring and commercial people that the Greeks rose to power. After Athens lost her hegemony, the Greek centers of wealth and often of intellectual activity were the great commercial settlements which had arisen all around the shores of the Mediterranean. Under Turkish rule, this situation had remained unchanged. In fact, when Greek trade began to revive under Turkish protection, after the destruction of Italian commerce at the close of the Middle Ages, it was almost exclusively the "Levantines" who enjoyed it. The rich and cultured Greek was no longer to be found in what had been ancient Hellas, but in places like Smyrna, Constantinople, Chios, and Samos; Hellas itself was largely occupied by half-civilized and semi-independent bands known as Brigands, Klephts, and Palikars.

To secure the independence of their country, the Greeks began to form societies (*Hetairiai*). They hoped to receive substantial aid from Christian peoples in spite of conservative rulers. For public opinion was everywhere undoubtedly on the side of the Greeks, both because of the enthusiasm for ancient Greek civilization and because of the sentiment of the solidarity of Christendom; in fact, many of the statesmen at the Congress of Vienna did not conceal their personal sympathy for the Greek cause.

Among the European Powers, Russia particularly was regarded as the natural ally of Greece. There were reasons for thinking that Russia would lend official connivance and at least give as much surreptitious support as the English had given to the Spanish Americans in their wars of independence. And at first it seemed that this would be the case. The Russian Black Sea port of Odessa was to be the base for the Hetairia. This secret society for the liberation of Greece was founded in October, 1815, by three Phanariots (Greeks

of the rich "lighthouse" or Phanariot quarter in Constantinople). Its leader was one of the Tsar's adjutants, a Greek aristocrat named Alexander Ypsilanti. After their plans had ripened for six years, so that the friends of freedom were ready for revolt, they planned to make a combined attack on Turkey from the North and from the South. Ypsilanti himself took command of the force which was to march from the North through Moldavia (the northern part of modern Rumania). On March 6, 1821, he crossed the Pruth and occupied Bucharest.

Ypsilanti's undertaking, however, rested on two vain hopes. He had counted on getting the Tsar's approval for what he had done. But Alexander I, no matter how much he might personally sympathize with the movement, declared himself opposed to secret conspirators, partly because of his regard for the solidarity of conservatism and partly because of warnings from Austria. Ypsilanti's second disappointment came from the Rumanians. He had summoned this Christian population to rise against the Sultan, thinking that religious motives would outweigh national feelings. He soon learned, like so many others later, that this was a mistake. The Rumanians had no intention of placing themselves under a Greek leader. Serious quarrels soon broke out between Ypsilanti and the Rumanian magnates. Under these circumstances the weak Greek force was left without reinforcements, and was easily destroyed by the Turks in June, 1821. Ypsilanti had to flee to Hungary where he was arrested by the Austrians.

Much greater was the success of the attack from the South, which, to be sure, had the support of the island Greeks. When Demetrius Ypsilanti, Alexander's brother, landed in the Morea, as the ancient Peloponnesus was now called, he was joined by the Palikars and sailor folk of the neighboring islands. The whole Morea was quickly cleared of the Turks, and a pitiless war was waged on Turkish vessels in the Archipelago. The Sultan replied by one of those massacres so often let loose afterwards upon his Christian subjects. In the Phanariot quarter at Constantinople, as well as in other parts of European Turkey, countless Greeks of note (particularly the ecclesiastics who were regarded as the leaders of the Greek nation) were assassinated. Therefore, on January 1, 1822, the Greeks declared their independence and organized a regular government. This only encouraged the Turks to further massacres. Particularly infamous was their general slaughter of the whole population of the island of Chios in 1822. In retaliation the Greeks drove all Turkish vessels from the Ægean.

These massacres were a mistake on Turkey's part; for they almost led to intervention by Russia. But again the conservative solidarity of the Great Powers triumphed under Metternich's leadership. The Tsar finally contented himself merely with breaking off diplomatic relations with Turkey.

In the midst of their difficulties England came to the assistance of the insurgents. Canning, the same minister who had stepped in to help the cause of independence in South America, was now the first representative of a Great Power to recognize the Greeks as belligerents. Two reasons led him to do this. One was the strong pressure of Philhellenism in England which was hard for the younger generation to withstand. The other was the conviction that if the Greeks received only Russian support, their emancipation from Turkey would not result in an independent Greek state, but simply in an extension of the Russian territory. For Tsar Alexander had made no concealment of the fact that he expected autonomous Greece to be a Russian protectorate. An increase of Russia's power in the Balkans was the last thing England wanted to see.

What this attitude of the greatest sea power of the time meant was soon seen. As emphasized above, the Greeks had been able to maintain themselves at first, since they were unconquerable at sea. They were now in danger of losing this advantage. Upon Austria's advice, the Sultan turned to his half-independent subject, Mehemet Ali, the ruler of Egypt. He possessed what his suzerain in Constantinople lacked—a fleet. It was not large, but it would suffice at least for the transportation of troops to the Morea. In February, 1825, a strong Egyptian army under the command of Mehemet Ali's adopted son, Ibrahim Pasha, landed in the south-west corner of the Morea. The Greeks had nothing to match it. In vain they fought most heroically; in vain they defended themselves for fifteen months on the northern shore of the Gulf of Patras at Missolonghi, where they had been joined by Lord Byron. In the summer of 1827 the whole Greek mainland again had to submit to the Turks.

In spite of England's attitude, the situation would have been desperate for the Greeks had not a change come in Russia. On December 1, 1825, a new Tsar and with him a new policy appeared on the scene. Nicholas I was as autocratic as his elder brother, Alexander I, indeed, even more so; but he was at the same time a representative of the younger generation—he was born in 1796, Alexander in 1777—and so had not been brought up in circles which felt such a panicky fear of all revolutionary movements. Somewhat like Canning, he pursued a national Russian, rather than a

conservative Austrian, policy. After extorting from Turkey by the Treaty of Akkerman (1826) the almost complete independence of Serbia and a share of the suzerainty over Rumania, he decided next year to intervene on behalf of Greece. He communicated with England, and both Powers then demanded from the Sultan autonomy for Greece.

Turkey, on the other hand, again appealed to arguments of the Conservative Alliance. But her warning that the Great Powers were undermining the principles of the Holy Alliance and legitimacy by supporting the Greek insurgents, no longer had the same force as a decade earlier. The protectors of Greece, on the contrary, succeeded in extending their alliance so as to include France. By the Triple Alliance of July 6, 1827, England, Russia and France pledged themselves to secure the independence of Greece.

At first the Turks would not yield. But the superior force of the London coalition soon decided the conflict against them. The Allies demanded of Ibrahim Pasha a promise to cease hostilities in the Morea. Then, by accident, a naval engagement developed between the combined Anglo-Franco-Russian fleet and the Egyptian ships at Navarino on the west coast of the Morea; and on October 20, 1827, the Egyptian fleet was totally destroyed.

This blow robbed Turkey of the only navy which she had left, and yet provoked the Sultan to a declaration of war against the Great Powers. As there were now no more naval engagements, only French and Russian troops came into action; the French operated in the Morea; the Russians advanced from the North through the Balkans and on the East toward the Caucasus. As the reorganization of the Turkish army, which was to bring it up toward a European standard, had only just begun, the Allies had an easy time, except for some delays at sieges. The French conquered the whole Morea and also compelled Ibrahim Pasha to evacuate the islands. One Russian army pressed forward past Erzerum to the neighborhood of Trebizond, while the other, for the first time in history, crossed the Balkan Mountains and on August 14, 1829, entered Adrianople without drawing a sword. The Sultan could do nothing but make peace.

As the war had been won as much by the Great Powers as by the Greeks themselves, the direct gains of the latter were not very striking. Greece did not receive the islands on the coast of Asia Minor, nor Crete, nor even the Greek territory in Thessaly, Epirus, and the Ionian Islands. This was all the more grievous inasmuch as the new state was deprived of the financial support of the wealth-

iest members of the Greek race at the very moment when it had to pay the interest on the heavy debt which the war had imposed. Considering the exceedingly difficult position in which the new and incompletely established state was deliberately placed by the Great Powers from its birth, one must regard as unjustified many of the depreciatory judgments passed on it by the public opinion of Europe. Rather will one be astonished at the progress which the restricted country made in spite of the unfavorable circumstances of its birth. Any comparison with the Greece of antiquity is wholly beside the point. For what would the culture of classical Greece have been without the Asiatic Greeks? And were not the true intellectual descendants of the Athenian artizans and sailors to be found in Constantinople and Smyrna rather than on the European mainland, which in the early nineteenth century was largely inhabited by robber bands? In addition to all this, the rivalry of the Great Powers by no means left to the new state, to which they could not refuse independence, an undisturbed development. The general Anglo-Russian antagonism resulting from rivalry for influence in Greece often sharpened Greek domestic political strife; while Greece enjoyed no international authority by herself, it was of little advantage to her that the Great Powers prevented jealous factions from struggling for possession of the kingship by setting up in 1832 as their monarch a foreigner—Prince Otto of Bavaria.

Nevertheless, regarded from the point of view of world history, this elevation of Greece to independence (however little real independence there was about it) was perhaps the most successful provision of the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. All the Christian territories which hitherto had been snatched from Turkey had either been directly annexed by the victorious Great Powers, or constituted merely as protected states. Even in the Treaty of Adrianople this was what Russia did with her conquests; various districts south of the Caucasus Mountains were incorporated into Russia; Serbia, Wallachia and Moldavia were only given autonomy. In Greece, for the first time, a new path was opened. A people freed from Turkish rule was recognized as an independent state. Here was an example, as may easily be understood, which fired all the other Balkan peoples with the ambition to make complete independence the final goal of their efforts. One may say: henceforth the small Balkan nations shared with the Great Powers in the struggle for Constantinople.

The course of the War of Greek Independence gave rise to a circumstance which more than any other greatly prolonged this struggle. A historian ought never to say that a thing is possible which

has never occurred, nor to posit the motives which have led to an action. But he may venture the assertion that the Russians in 1829 would probably have had little military difficulty in taking possession of Constantinople. The Turkish army had proved itself so little able to resist the Russians that it presumably could not have withstood the last decisive blow. Now it appears that the Russian government counted on Turkey's military weakness remaining permanent, and therefore regarded the establishment of a virtual protectorate over the Balkans as more desirable than an occupation of the Turkish capital, since this would naturally have led to serious diplomatic complications. Therefore, she stipulated for herself in the Treaty of Adrianople the right of free navigation of the Black Sea and passage through the Dardanelles, but abstained from demanding military guarantees. Count Nesselrode, who at that time guided Russian foreign policy, declared that such an arrangement better suited Russian interests than excessive conquests or the creation of independent states out of former Turkish territory.

If Russian ministers really thought this, they were certainly fundamentally mistaken. Already, in 1826, the Turkish Government had begun systematically to reform its antiquated army. The Janizary Corps, which had formerly won such great victories simply because it was the only standing army, but which had long since become out of date and undisciplined, was abolished (i.e., massacred). From the two military powers who had steadily sided with Turkey during the Greek War—Austria and Prussia—the Turkish authorities imported experts to train a new Turkish infantry. And this reform did not simply remain on paper like pretty nearly every other effort to modernize Turkey. After a few years the Ottoman Government possessed an army which could cope with the well-drilled and well-equipped armies of Europe. Thus the Greek War of Independence started "the Balkan Question," and at the same time considerably strengthened the Power which naturally would offer the most determined resistance to the emancipation of the peoples of the Balkans.

CHAPTER X

THE CONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE AND ITALY

In contrast to these two movements where the Principle of Conservatism failed to prevail, stand two other movements in which the Alliance of the Great Powers did succeed in enforcing their legitimist demands. It is certainly more than a mere accident that in both these cases only military operations on land had to be employed against the offending states; no negative interference by British sea power, therefore, took place.

The first of these interventions was directed against the liberal movement in Italy.

In scarcely any other country at that time were conditions so complex as in Italy, where the conflict between the existing situation and the Principles of the Revolution cannot be reduced to a simple formula. The contradictory and often overlapping tendencies must, therefore, be explained somewhat more in detail.

Nowhere outside France had the French revolutionary principles of equality (see ch. iv) been so completely put into effect as in the Italian states. Even before the Revolution in France, various Italian governments had initiated social and political reforms advocated by Enlightenment, and, even where this had not been the case, the French armies of occupation under Napoleon had assisted the triumph of French laws. The Code Napoleon had been introduced, the ecclesiastical foundations suppressed, and a modern system of taxation put into effect with equal rights for all classes. In 1815, even in cases where there was a decisive wish to restore the old feudal conditions, the financial changes had been too thoroughgoing for their complete restoration. Moreover, it was not in the interest of the monarchical governments to revive the old exemptions from taxation and the other special prerogatives of noble families. The only exception was the States of the Church whose ecclesiastical government naturally involved preferential treatment of clergy; but even here the economic basis of the Old Régime could not be completely restored.

In Italy, therefore, the struggle against existing conditions was not directed, except in certain cases, against class privileges. The

aim of the revolutionists was rather to put an end to oppression in the intellectual field which the Restoration of 1815 had established.

Certainly nowhere else was the contrast between the existing conditions and those of the French occupation, or even of the preceding period, so great as in Italy, in all matters connected with the Church and theology. There were countries in which the belief that political absolutism was bound up with the suppression of religious enlightenment (see ch. v) was as deeply rooted as in Italy; but nowhere were governments so strongly influenced in their actions by this belief as in the case of the great majority of the Italian states and provinces of that time. Possibly, just because "enlightened ideas" had spread so widely among the upper classes, the political authorities were especially concerned to see to it that revolutionary religious views were not made an opening wedge for liberal agitation in the field of politics. This was also the only field in which one can speak of a regular restoration—a restoration of seventeenth rather than of eighteenth century conditions. Although the reintroduction of primogeniture was scarcely considered, many of the governments undertook a restoration of the monasteries, without, however, being able to give them back their former rich possessions. Almost everywhere education was put under the control of the clergy. The censorship of books was reintroduced. In Rome even the Inquisition was set up again. Every independent intellectual movement was regarded with distrust.

The opposition which arose to this régime, particularly in a part of the city bourgeoisie, now connected itself in a peculiar way with national and to some extent anti-papal tendencies.

The connection between the principles of liberty and nationality is easy enough to understand. The only period in which Italy had nominally, at least, formed a single united national state (the Napoleonic period) had been, at the same time, a period of religious freedom and government by laymen instead of clergy; even if Italians disregarded this fact, they would have seen in the conditions after 1815 that there existed a close inner connection between the two principles. For the foreign state, which now controlled directly or indirectly the Italian princes, and which alone afforded them the power to carry through the principles of ecclesiastical restoration, was at the same time the state which was most obstinately opposed to the idea of Italian nationality. Austria, because of her own internal political interests, was compelled more than any other Great Power to fight against the movement for political revolution. Austria, likewise, unless she wished to lose her Italian provinces (the "Lombardo-

Venetian Kingdom"), must set herself decisively against the Italian national movement. Italians, therefore, who wanted to do away with "priest rule" naturally also had to insist on the expulsion of the Austrians and of the governments which were dependent on Austria.

Still more complicated were the conditions in another connection. What should be the attitude of the Italian national movement toward the ruler of the Papal States? The Papacy, in its organization at that time, was indeed the "enemy of all progress,"—the natural opponent of all efforts which aimed at modern government by laymen instead of by priests, and, if possible, at constitutional forms. But must this be always the case? Was it not conceivable that a pope with modern views, who regarded himself as much an Italian as an ecclesiastical ruler, might make concessions to the political and social principles of the revolution so far as they did not threaten theological dogma? And if this should happen, would it not be a much better solution than a Utopian effort to bring about Italian unity in opposition to the pope? Would not an undertaking which was bound to meet with the opposition of all faithful Catholics rest on an insecure basis, and necessarily involve consequences of a serious moral nature?

It was quite natural that Italian patriots gave different answers to these questions. Many of them, especially those whose feelings were not satisfied with the ordinary program of Enlightenment, inclined to admit the possibility of reforming the States of the Church. This was all the more natural, inasmuch as this idea could not be contradicted by the facts of experience. Such an attempt had never been made; never had a pope ascended the throne of St. Peter who could be regarded as holding modern ideas.

But although the problem did not present itself at that time so sharply as half a century later, nevertheless it already existed, and the historian can say of that period that a resolute champion of intellectual freedom in Italy should not have hesitated to oppose also the Temporal Power of the Papacy.

At any rate, all the currents of the Italian movement for liberty concentrated in an attack on the Church and its privileges. Absolutism itself was objectionable, primarily because it was inclined to support or to protect the claims of the Church. This attitude of the liberals was also strengthened by the fact that modern industry had as yet found scarcely any entrance into Italy; even the great factories which did exist were, for the most part, in the hands of foreigners. Although the absolutistic governments were so patri-

archal and unsatisfactory, they nevertheless did not stand in sharp contradiction with economic life, and they did not have to protect themselves against a rich and powerful bourgeoisie.

This statement is true chiefly for the first decades after 1815. The insurrections which took place at that time were due more to the anxieties of the moment than to the assertion of principles. The first revolutions are particularly interesting because they show how insecure was the rule of native princes who could find support neither from their nobility nor from their troops; and also because it shows how a change in the situation could only be brought about through a combined attack on the power of Austria.

Before further details are given, it may be recalled to memory that the territories which made up the geographical expression of Italy at that time fell into three groups. The first comprised the provinces of Milan and Venetia, the so-called "Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom," which was immediately under Austrian rule. The second group was made up of the middle-sized and smaller states which were ruled by relatives of the Austrian Emperor (Tuscany, Parma, Modena); to these also must be added diminutive Lucca, ruled by a Bourbon prince but united with Tuscany in 1847. Finally there were the three relatively independent middle-sized states—Sardinia (Piedmont, Savoy, and the Island of Sardinia), the States of the Church, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Naples and Sicily). Not only was Italy split up, but there was no single power in the whole peninsula which could in any way stand up as a military power against Austria; the Kingdom of Sardinia, which possessed the strongest army, had purposely been given unfavorable frontiers so that it could not undertake any successful attack upon the territory of Milan.

It has been pointed out that in 1815 there did not exist anywhere in Italy a powerful opposition party. The liberal bourgeoisie, to be sure, rather disapproved the friendliness of the governments toward the Church; but their opposition was not important. Much more dangerous for the moment were the army officers. The period of peace which followed the Napoleonic wars had naturally deprived the growing numbers of this class of opportunities to advance; in many states, also, preference had been given to officers of noble birth, while those who had served under the Napoleonic princes had been dismissed or neglected. The officers of the Napoleonic army therefore leagued themselves with the liberal bourgeoisie. Since there was neither parliamentary life nor freedom of the press their joint efforts could take no other form than that of secret societies.

The most important of these was the *"Carbonari,"* a society which took its name from the "charcoal burners" of Calabria and spread from Naples to the other Italian states. Since they had no legal means of changing the absolutistic form of government, these societies naturally resorted to revolutionary weapons.

The first impulse to revolt came from events in Spain, of which a more detailed account will be given in the next chapter. The success of the Spanish generals who took to politics fired the zeal of their Italian colleagues, particularly in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which was closely connected with Spain. Scarcely had the revolution in Spain triumphed with a single victory when the Neapolitan army rose, demanding a constitution—in fact the very same Spanish Constitution of 1812 which had just been put into force in Spain. The king was powerless before the insurrection. The Spanish Constitution was introduced (July 7, 1820), and sworn to by the Neapolitan monarch. The *Carbonari* took the government in hand. Even the Island of Sicily dared offer no resistance, although it feared that the centralizing plans of the political reformers would put an end to its own special privileges.

But these revolutionary successes stood in too strong contradiction to the Conservative Principles of the Allied Powers for the new régime in Naples to be permanent. The Congress of Troppau, one of the international assemblages which was to fix the common policy of the Allies, discussed the question whether it was not their duty to restore order by military intervention. But in this case, also, the Great Powers were not united. England on this occasion also was opposed to interference; Russia and France proposed a middle course. But the conditions in this Neapolitan case were much less favorable for the revolutionists than those which have already been described in the case of South America and Greece. The Power which had the greatest selfish interest in upholding Conservative Principles was also the Power which was most keenly interested in defending the old conditions in Italy; it was also the Power which was best situated to make a military intervention. The Austrian government succeeded in calling attention to the fact that the Spanish Constitution introduced in Naples contained ultra-liberal principles which went even beyond the French constitution of that day; and so Austria persuaded the two Western Powers (Great Britain and France) to consent at least to action on her part. She had a still greater success from the fact that the Tsar finally gave his direct approval to the principle of intervention. It was at this time that the three Eastern Powers (Austria, Prussia, and Russia) sub-

scribed a declaration which contemplated the application of force against states which were guilty of illegal reforms. As a preliminary step, the king of Naples and the other Italian princes as well, were invited to present themselves at the Congress of the Great Powers (which had removed to Laibach).

King Ferdinand of Naples accordingly came to Laibach and begged the Congress to restore the Old Régime. His request was granted. Austria received the mandate to carry out its execution, the decree being signed by the ambassadors of the other Italian Powers with the exception of the Pope.

This sealed the fate of the Neapolitan revolution. The revolutionary troops offered practically no resistance to the fifty thousand Austrian soldiers, and within a short time the whole kingdom was occupied by Austrians (March 21, 1821). There followed not only the abolition of the revolutionary constitution and the complete restoration of absolutism, but a systematic persecution of all the participants in the revolt, as well as of the *Carbonari* in general; countless persons were condemned to death, to the galleys, or to banishment. The king created a new army; and in order that he might not again be dependent on the favor of his officers, he signed in 1826 a military agreement with the Swiss for thirty years, taking four Swiss regiments into his service.

Not very different was the outcome of the military revolt in Piedmont.

In the Kingdom of Sardinia the government had proceeded more energetically than anywhere else in Italy with the Restoration, or to speak more correctly, with the reversal of the laicizing reforms which had taken place during the period of French occupation. The government did not hesitate at the most unreasonable acts: the Botanical Garden in Turin was destroyed because it had been planted by the French; the use of beautiful avenues was forbidden because they had been constructed at Napoleon's command; and there were many other measures of the same kind. In the army the older pre-Napoleonic tactics were reintroduced; officers who had served under Napoleon were dismissed; and, in general, in appointments preference was again given to persons of noble birth.

In one point, however, the opposition of the army officers in Piedmont differed at the outset from that in Naples. In the relatively large and richly endowed Kingdom of the Two Sicilies the officers had contemplated at first only a reform of their own part of Italy; but in the small and less fruitful Sardinian Kingdom, where the nobility mostly lived in needy circumstances, the revolutionists

had from the outset looked forward to the extension of the rule of Savoy over the whole of Italy. Their aspirations could be fulfilled only if Savoyard officers and politicians had a greater field of activity than was afforded to them by their own poor country. There was also the further consideration that the Sardinian dynasty was the only one of pure Italian descent and was therefore best fitted to stand at the head of a national Italian state.

When, therefore, in the year 1821 (almost a year later than the Neapolitan revolt), a military insurrection broke out at Alessandria in the Kingdom of Sardinia, the rebels not only proclaimed the Spanish Constitution like their brothers in the south, but they also adopted the Italian colors (green, white and red), and proclaimed the restoration of an Italian kingdom which should embrace the whole nation. King and country should be freed from the Austrians, and comrades in Naples protected from oppression.

The revolution in Piedmont, which had many adherents among the students, was also successful at first, so far as Piedmont was concerned. The king, Victor Emmanuel I, abdicated, appointed as his successor his brother, Charles Felix, who was living at Modena, and transferred the regency temporarily to a liberal-minded relative, the Prince of Carignano. But here, also, the Conservative Alliance of the Great Powers interfered. The new king himself, who was in no personal danger, called for help. His call did not fall on deaf ears. Both Austria and Russia at once declared in favor of military intervention. This sealed the fate of the revolution. The army of liberals which had attempted to strike eastward was easily crushed by the Austrians at Novara, and there followed, as in the case of Naples, a restoration with a systematic persecution of those guilty of revolt. In only one point did Austria fail to secure her demands. France refused to have the guilty Prince of Carignano, the presumptive heir to the throne after the childless king, Charles Felix, excluded from his rights of succession, because otherwise the Hapsburg Duke of Modena (a son-in-law of King Victor Emmanuel I) would have become King of Sardinia; that is, Piedmont also would have been subjected to Austrian authority. However, Metternich knew how to bring it about that the guilty prince was compelled to take part in the French expedition to Spain (see the following chapter) in order to atone for his liberal principles; he was also forced to promise that he would never grant his people a constitution.

In the parts of Italy directly dependent on Austria the isolated revolutionary movements had no success at all, as in the case of the

conspiracy of several young liberals in Milan in 1820—famous because one of the prisoners, the young Piedmontese, Silvio Pellico, described his sufferings in an Austrian fortress, the Spielberg, at Brünn, in a book which breathed the noblest spirit of gentleness and which soon became extraordinarily popular. In Modena a number of notable people were arrested who had entered into relations with the Neapolitan revolutionists.

In Italy the Conservative Alliance had triumphed completely in its policy of intervention. On the other hand, it had become clear to every one that a liberal reform in Italy could be accomplished only by the expulsion of the Austrians and the princes dependent on them.

CHAPTER XI

THE CONSERVATIVE INTERVENTION IN SPAIN

In Italy, as has been pointed out, some of the principles of the French Revolution had already been put into practice in the course of the eighteenth century, and others had been introduced during the period of French occupation, and could not be completely nullified. So the Restoration in Italy resulted less in a change in economic conditions than in a revival of the power of the clergy, which limited intellectual freedom on every hand. In Italy the Revolutionary movement was primarily anti-clerical and nationalistic. Quite different were the conditions in Spain.

In Spain French rule had lasted too short a time to introduce legal equality, the secularization of church lands, and other reforms, to the same extent as in Italy. Furthermore, less had been done by the Old Régime in Spain than in the case of Italy to prepare the way for change.

Even in Spain, however, the Enlightened Despotism of the eighteenth century had made some attempts to improve the worst conditions, that is, those which were most harmful from an economic point of view. The system of primogeniture had been somewhat limited (primogeniture in Spain had previously been extended to large classes which elsewhere in Europe would have been regarded as belonging to the bourgeoisie; it had also been considerably favored by the contempt in which all manual labor was held—one of the results of the period when Jews and Moors did all the manual work). But the result of this eighteenth century reform had been very slight. To be sure, many of the larger landed estates which had been kept together by primogeniture had disappeared, and the very large ones had been somewhat reduced in size; but in Andalusia, the rich southern part of Spain and the source of Spanish wealth, large landed estates still prevailed everywhere. The land-owners were, practically without exception, absentee landlords. They had their estates worked by poorly paid day laborers and were unable to raise the capital necessary to improve the soil and the methods of cultivation. Good means of communication, especially canals

which are an absolute necessity where there are few good rivers, technical education, model factories,—all these were lacking. In addition to all this the government, following ancient Castilian tradition, favored cattle-raising at the expense of agriculture, so that the cultivation of the soil was faced with extraordinary difficulties. The industries were altogether insignificant.

All these obstacles to the development of the natural resources of the country became the more oppressive as the population grew. In the second half of the eighteenth century the population appears to have increased rapidly and the means of livelihood (such as serving as mercenary soldiers or settling in America) were no longer considerable. The revolt of the American colonies (see ch. viii) brought the first decisive blow to the Old Régime. That destroyed the very foundation of the government revenues. It struck the government at the moment when it had to provide for extraordinary expenditures. The revenues of the old system would indeed scarcely have sufficed for the war against Napoleon; and now the main source of revenue, which had come from the possession of the American colonies, was drying up. It is no wonder that the Spanish government, in spite of its dislike of French institutions, seriously began to ponder whether it should not lay taxes on the nobility and clergy.

But here a special difficulty arose from the attitude of the population in the matter of religion.

Legal equality, or to put it more accurately, the abolition of exemption from taxation, could not be carried through without disturbing the privileges of the clergy. It was impossible to reform the finances of the state unless the clergy gave up a part of their possessions. For the enlightened politicians of the French Revolution this consideration had been no obstacle; but, while even in France the secularization of church property had not been exactly popular, in Spain any government which attacked the rights of the Church would at least have to reckon on the passive resistance of the population from the very outset. To put it differently: no reform of the Spanish government could take place except in opposition to the will of the mass of the people, particularly of the ignorant population in the country. Persons who would help toward modernizing conditions—the representatives of the city bourgeoisie and intellectual classes—formed only a numerically small fraction of the people. This unfortunate situation was offset only by the fact that the great mass of those who had conservative ideas were neither organized politically nor even, under normal conditions, interested in politics at all. They let their opponents do as they wished, or at least could

not overthrow them unless aided by extraordinary circumstances. So the battle was always fought out between merely small groups; and the governing group at elections always won a majority.

Only in one respect did conditions in Spain resemble those in Italy. The Napoleonic Wars had created a large body of officers who were regarded with an unfriendly eye by the government, and who therefore joined the malcontents among the liberal civilians. This opposition became chronic, because the government lacked the money adequately to pay the troops. The kingdom was therefore constantly placed before a dilemma: either the government followed its natural inclination and clung as tightly as possible to the Old Régime, in which case it lacked money to meet the claims of the insurgent officers; or, on the other hand, it sought to raise new revenues, in which case it was forced to interfere with traditional arrangements. The result was what might have been expected: one compromise followed another; wide-reaching reforms were decreed which were nullified by rebellion, or only partially enforced; there were ineffective hesitating attempts at modernization instead of a real radical change.

One other point must be explained to show the difference between Spain and the other countries. The national movement, which elsewhere, as in Italy for instance, was closely connected with liberalism, was in Spain generally favorable to conservative principles. Aside from the fact that the dominant position of the Church seemed to the Spaniard a national Spanish characteristic, which had been unjustly abandoned by "Frenchifiers" in favor of modern "foreign" institutions, the Old Régime seemed to represent national unity and absolutistic centralization. Regionalism, that is, the possibility that separate regions or provinces might introduce revolutionary reforms which the central government could not approve, became therefore in Spain a demand made by the Liberals rather than by their "servile" opponents.

Spanish intellectuals had taken advantage of the absence of the king and the anarchy of the Napoleonic Wars to put into effect an ultra-liberal constitution—the Constitution of 1812, which had been accepted by the Cortes at Cadiz. But this Constitution, which abolished feudalism and the Inquisition, had been set aside at once by the king, Ferdinand VII, after he returned from the exile in which Napoleon had kept him. Even the Inquisition was reintroduced, and liberal patriots were persecuted in the severest fashion. The nobility, the clergy, and the masses of the people, however, remained loyal to absolutism; but the soldiery and the officers who had once

supported the king against the French now began to go over to the opposition.

The first of the insurrections which showed this union between officers and liberals took place in 1820. The troops were assembled in Cadiz for embarkation to America to suppress the revolting colonies. But the soldiers were badly paid and discontented. A young officer, named Riego, stirred them up to revolt, and at the same time proclaimed the Constitution of 1812. This was the first of the so-called "pronunciamentos" (a Spanish word which may be translated by "proclamations"). It was the first time that revolting officers had aimed not merely at satisfying personal claims, but at bringing about a general political revolution.

The insurrection at once found a following in the two groups which we have indicated as supporters of the reform movement in Spain: the army and the intellectuals of several of the larger provincial towns, particularly in Aragon and Galicia; Corunna, Ferrol, Saragossa, and Barcelona declared in favor of the Constitution, and the troops which had been sent by the government against Riego went over to the side of the insurgents. The king was as helpless as his brother monarchs in Naples and Turin shortly afterwards. He therefore yielded everything which was asked of him, declared himself ready to accept the Constitution, and summoned the Cortes (March 7, 1820). The Inquisition was abolished and the pro-French liberals called back from exile.

The Conservative Alliance of the Great Powers was at first unable to intervene. The Austrians first had to suppress the revolution in Italy. There were also practical difficulties in the way of direct military intervention in Spain. Yet the danger was great. Under the pressure of Spanish example, Portugal also had introduced a liberal constitution. The Spanish king sent a pressing call for help to the Alliance and all his clergy rose up against the liberal innovations. In Catalonia an "Apostolic Army" was formed, which appealed to the people to free the king from the hands of rebellious unbelievers.

At this moment the Allies succeeded in winning the coöperation of the French government, though not exactly of France herself; for France herself had nothing to win through intervention in Spain, and the majority of the French people were decidedly opposed to supporting the Spanish priesthood. But the Bourbon dynasty was allured by two advantages which might come from intervening in Spain: it might rehabilitate itself in the eyes of the Conservative

Great Powers, who still distrusted France as the mother of revolutions; and it might increase its military prestige, because if its intervention was successful, it could point out that it had succeeded where Napoleon had failed.

Accordingly, the French government proposed to the Conservative Great Powers, at the Congress of Verona in October, 1822, that a French expedition should be sent to Spain to overthrow the revolutionary government there. The Congress naturally accepted the proposal with alacrity.

The expedition was scarcely more than a military promenade. Whereas Napoleon had had to fight against the fanaticism of the masses and also against many liberal patriots, now the "Apostolic Army" and a great part of the population stood on the side of the French. The revolutionary government, which had been unable to reform the political system during its brief period of control, and which had at its disposal neither money nor troops, was unable to organize any defense; without striking a blow, it left the capital in company with the king and fled to Cadiz. Here occurred the only real military event of the campaign. The revolutionists tried to make a stand behind the fortifications of the city; but after a siege of three months, when Fort Trocadero, which overlooked Cadiz, had been taken by the French (August 31, 1823), there was no alternative but capitulation. The Old Régime was again restored.

There followed a bloody persecution of the insurgents just as in Italy, only in a still more brutal fashion. Riego was hanged, and many hundred others were beheaded or tortured.

The Holy Alliance had triumphed. But even in Spain the old system could not be completely revived; the Inquisition, for instance, was not restored (although "committees of faith" took its place). Moreover, as has been already noted, the American colonies were definitely lost during the unrest of these last years. This deprived Spain of the means, not only of taking her place as a Great Power, but also of carrying out effective economic reforms after the fashion of the Enlightened Despots.

CHAPTER XII

THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM IN FRANCE

Nowhere is the expression "Restoration" so misleading as in the case of France. Nowhere else was there so slight a revival of the old system. It is no exaggeration to say that, with the exception of the dynasty and some unimportant regulations, nothing was reintroduced which specially belonged to the Old Régime. To such an extent was this the case that most of the conflicts during the Restoration period in France arose from the very fact that certain groups wanted to impose on new France various institutions derived from the old monarchy.

The innovations which distinguished the political and social structure of France in 1815 from France prior to 1789 fall into two groups.

The more important group comprises the changes which were the result of the real Revolution. This includes, above all, the introduction of equality in the division of inheritances, with a rigorous insistence on the lawful portion which must be left to each heir; the abolition of primogeniture and of the large landed estates which went with it; the secularization of the great Church property (there were no longer any rich prelates; the Church was "democratized" financially and socially); and civil equality, that is, the abolition of exemption from taxation and the setting aside of all the privileges which had restricted to members of definite classes all admission to the higher offices in the army and the government.

The second group of innovations dates chiefly from the time of Napoleon. At the time of the Consulate there had been introduced a strictly centralized system of administration which was in part simply a continuation of the methods of the Old Régime; this centralization left scarcely any local self-government in existence and gave to the possessor of supreme power an enormous influence in all the details of local administration.

Both groups of innovations were taken over by the restored Bourbon dynasty completely, the second group, in fact, with secret approval. The significance of these arrangements will be evident

only if they are considered in connection with the social structure of the France of that day.

The secularization of Church lands and the sale of the possessions of the *émigrés* had brought a considerable part of the former large landed estates into the hands of free peasants, and thus greatly favored the intensive cultivation of the soil. Now, for the first time, the productivity of the land could be completely exploited. Although Napoleon had stimulated the manufacture of articles of luxury and export, still, manufacturing on a large scale had remained relatively slight and could not be at all compared with the English factory system. Tillage, viticulture, horticulture, the raising of olives and sugar,—in fact agriculture was everywhere the rule, both on the small farms and on the great estates. Growers of grain could count on a minimum price for their products, thanks to an official sliding-scale, which increased the tax on imported cereals when grain at home was cheap; grain-growing, therefore, like manufacturing, in addition to natural advantages, enjoyed the protection of the state.

The difference between France and England is seen particularly in the fact that France still considerably surpassed her neighbor beyond the Channel in the matter of population. In 1815, France had about 28 million inhabitants, Great Britain about 18 million. The United Kingdom was, therefore, not much more densely populated than France, but since many parts of Great Britain did not enjoy the same richness and variety of products as France, and since there was no opportunity for the development of a large body of small peasant proprietors, the English economic system tended toward manufacturing and the French toward an increase of the peasantry. In fact, if contemporary evidence is not mistaken, owing to the fact that the available land was still not completely exploited, the French peasants were leaving a larger number of descendants than in the last years of the Old Régime.

These conditions were largely reflected in the constitution proclaimed in June, 1814. The right to elect members to the Chamber of Deputies became a privilege of the rich. To be an elector one must pay at least three hundred francs in direct taxes; to be eligible for election, a thousand francs; but there were no qualifications depending on birth or the exercise of a trade, and also no distinction was made between the new wealthy classes of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic age and the nobility of the Old Régime. The members of the Chamber of Peers, or Upper House, were, to be sure, all appointed by the king, but he was not limited in any way in his choice. The legislature therefore represented the wealthy classes,

primarily the large landowners, but it also included many distinguished persons of the Napoleonic period who upheld the spirit of the imperial system of administration. The executive power lay wholly in the hands of the king.

This government would have run almost without friction, except for certain obstacles in its way. First, there was the question of the *émigrés*. The members of the old nobility, who had lost their property through leaving France during the Revolution, desired compensation for their loyalty to the dynasty. But since every change in property relations would have incurred the passionate opposition of the whole nation, the mere suspicion that the monarchy favored this desire would have been very dangerous to itself. The second question was the religious one. In France a part of the royalists were as convinced as the members of their class in other countries that the only sure support of government by conservatives and nobles lay in a strengthening of the influence of the Church; this threatened a sharp limitation of freedom of thought, which naturally drove the intellectuals into the arms of the Opposition.

In view of this situation a great deal depended on the attitude of the king. If he acted in unison with the great majority of property owners and was careful to keep the constitution as it was, he could be certain of the support of most of the influential elements in the country. The great mass of the bourgeoisie and most officials were on his side. On the other hand, if he did as the "Ultras," or extreme royalists, wished, and carried out a real Restoration beyond the terms of the constitution by a partial revival of the privileges of large landowners and clergy, he would have met not only the opposition of the liberal bourgeoisie, but also of the small peasant proprietors; the latter were shut out from active political life, but they did not want the new property relations in any way disturbed. The proletariat was scarcely to be considered. The number of factory employees was still small; furthermore, this class possessed neither the training, the wealth, nor the ability to assert itself independently.

The internal conflict in France was further sharpened by the attitude of the Foreign Powers.

France had to atone for the collapse of the Napoleonic system by a partial loss of sovereignty. Not only was she compelled to give up a considerable territory and to pay what was for those days a large war indemnity (700,000,000 francs in five years), but she had to permit the Great Powers to maintain an army of occupation of 150,000 men until this sum was paid. She was oppressed even more

severely in some respects by the political distrust with which she was regarded abroad. As we have often said, France was looked upon by the Conservative Powers as the real home of all revolutionary tendencies and her political doings must be constantly supervised. Only after a considerable period of probation did the Allies allow her to join their circle.

One would be altogether mistaken, however, in thinking that this supervision meant that the Great Powers were ready to support every action of the French king or every demand of the royalist Ultras. Rather was the contrary the case. The Great Powers, and particularly the leaders of Russian policy, realized that a restoration of the Old Régime was impossible in France. They saw that some concessions must be made to liberal demands and they contented themselves with satisfying the principle of legitimacy by establishing the old dynasty. They wished rather the stability of the new government than a reaction which would have caused new conflicts and so strengthened the revolutionary movement. To be sure, the establishment in France of the Bourbon line, which had come to be regarded by Frenchmen as a foreign dynasty, was primarily their work and they felt a joint responsibility for its defense. But for this very reason they did not wish the French king to identify himself with the plans of the Ultras.

On the contrary, France was expected to prove to the world that legitimacy and constitutional freedom could go together. The French constitution was extraordinarily liberal for those days,—so liberal, in fact, that progressives had nothing to prefer to it except the English constitution, and even this was outmatched by the French so far as the complete introduction of legal equality was concerned. To be sure, political rights were limited to the wealthy classes, the so-called *"pays légal"*; but within these classes, which were not barred to people from below, considerable rights were given to the king's subjects. There existed, for example, the principle of the freedom of the press; in contrast to most of the European states, there was no censorship for periodical publications, although the compulsory preliminary deposit of a guaranty sum (*cautionnement*) amounting to 200,000 francs for founding a new newspaper limited the enjoyment of this right to the well-to-do classes. The army was organized on a popular basis. According to the recruiting law of 1818, the larger part of the army (200,000 men) was to be formed by voluntary enlistment; the remainder (40,000 men) was to be chosen by lot. This method of choosing by lot theoretically affected all classes; but in as much as it was permitted to provide a substi-

tute, the sons of the rich were practically exempted from military service. On the other hand, there were no limitations upon advancement within the army, and promotion was ordinarily secured by rising through the lower ranks (in contrast to the Old Régime where the higher positions had been simply handed over to the upper classes).

It was a fortunate circumstance for the French monarchy that the first king under the Restoration was thoroughly out of sympathy with the aims of the extreme royalists. Louis XVIII, a younger brother of the guillotined Louis XVI, possessed marked intellectual ability, but he was, perhaps for this very reason, quite untouched by the romantic movement of his age and was a true representative of Enlightenment and its common sense. He had no intention of risking his monarchy by a restoration of the lands of the Church and the old nobility. In agreement with his leading minister, Decazes, a statesman who had already served under Napoleon and who was entrusted by the phlegmatic king with the practical direction of affairs, Louis XVIII did not struggle against the Revolution during the first years, when the reaction against the Napoleonic age was most pronounced among the rich classes; on the contrary, his struggle was with the party of the extreme right which controlled the Chamber of Deputies (the so-called *Chambre Introuvable,* "a Chamber the like of which one would not find again," according to the king's own expression). This was the time there arose the expression, *"Plus royaliste que le roi."* But on the whole, the king, with the support of the moderate royalists or *"doctrinaires,"* was successful in his resistance to the Ultras. In vain did the Chamber of Deputies give the government unlimited authority to prosecute those who had been guilty of taking part in the "Hundred Days"; Decazes made only a very limited use of this authority. Napoleon's Concordat with the Pope remained in force, although strongly opposed by some of the extreme royalists. The lands of the clergy were not restored. The state kept control over education. The only concession to the Ultras was the abolition of divorce.

It soon appeared that in all this the government was backed by a majority not only of the country people, but also of the propertied classes. The new Chamber of Deputies, elected in 1816, had a majority of *"doctrinaires."*

The Chamber was moderately royalist, but it was not "independent," as the republican party of that day expressed it. So long as no changes were made in property relations for the benefit of the *émigrés* there was nothing to hinder some concessions desired

by the large landowners. The most important measure of this kind was the attempt to recreate a regular new nobility out of the class of landowners both old and new. This took the approved form of primogeniture. In connection with a Napoleonic decree of 1808 an ordinance of 1817 ordered that no one could be appointed a member of the Chamber of Peers, which contained both life members and hereditary members, unless he had introduced primogeniture into the whole or a part of his estate. To be a "duke" one must have an estate with an income of 30,000 francs; to be a "marquis" or a "count," one of 20,000 francs; to be a "viscount" or a "baron," one of 10,000 francs. An exception was made in favor of the clerical members of the Upper House. This attempt to create a new hereditary nobility met with great approbation; up to the Revolution of 1830, primogeniture was introduced into no less than 440 landed estates in France. On the other hand, the proposal of the Ultras in the *"Chambre Introuvable"* that the electoral qualification be reduced to the payment of 50 francs in taxes was not passed; this proposal rested on the idea that in elections the members of the old nobility could count upon the votes of their peasants.

Public order was now so quickly restored that the allied troops were able to leave France in the autumn of 1818. To be sure, the Conservative Great Powers retained a distrust of France, and even in 1818 did not fail to provide military measures against the possibility of a new revolution. But at any rate their direct supervision had now come to an end.

This peaceful development was soon broken by an unexpected event. It was well known that the moderate attitude of the government depended on the person of Louis XVIII, and that the childless king's younger brother, the Count of Artois, was devoted to romantic tendencies, and was the leader of the Ultras. The assassination of a member of his family resulted in a change in this moderate policy even before the change of rulers took place. On February 13, 1820, the Count's second son, the Duke of Berry, who was thought to be the only person who would perpetuate the Bourbon line, was murdered in front of the Opera House in Paris by one of Napoleon's former soldiers. The murderer declared that he had intended to extinguish the dynasty; but some months later a posthumous son—the later Count of Chambord, or "Henry V"—was born to the murdered duke. Although no connection could be proved between the crime and the political activity of the moderates, nevertheless the Ultras took advantage of the affair to declare that their opponents, even including the minister Decazes himself,

were at least morally responsible for the crime. Louis XVIII now gave up his opposition to his brother's party. The extreme royalists came into power. They used their power primarily in the spirit of those religious and political tendencies which we have described above in the chapter on the Panic of the French Revolution (see ch. v). With the aid of the Jesuits the government tried to transform the system of education. The censorship of the press was introduced again. A new electoral law gave a "double vote" to the large taxpayers (those who paid more than a thousand francs) who were almost exclusively large landlords and mostly members of the old nobility; in this way some 10,000 to 12,000 large landlords controlled the elections to the Chamber of Deputies. So, in 1821, the Ultras secured a majority, and the leading minister was no longer Decazes but Villèle, who had already distinguished himself in 1816 as a leader of the Ultras.

It was now possible for the government in 1823 to undertake that punitive expedition against the revolution in Spain mentioned in the preceding chapter.

With the accession of the Count of Artois, Louis XVIII's younger brother, as Charles X, in 1824, the government was protected against the possibility of any opposition from the side of the king. Its reactionary attitude now tended to unite all the parties of the left (liberals and radicals) into a single group, so that liberal young men, representatives of intellectual idealism, and a part of the bourgeoisie joined together in opposition to the new reactionary policy of the government. Nevertheless, this group formed only a small fraction of the nation and did not incline to revolution by force. It rather demanded merely the loyal application of the constitution. Its slogan was "The Charter of 1814." Isolated revolutionary outbreaks in 1822, after the fashion of the Italian Carbonari, were neither successful nor imitated by others. The ultra-royalist Chamber of 1824 also freed itself from political agitation by extending its own period of office to seven years.

As soon as the new government sought to disturb the conditions of legal equality established by the Revolution the liberal opposition became stronger. In accordance with the new reactionary spirit, the government passed a sacrilege law which, among other things, imposed the death penalty for burglary in a church. Next it was proposed to realize the old desire of the Ultras that the *émigrés* should be given compensation. This was practically identical with the creation of a nobility unconditionally devoted to conservative principles. The government converted the national debt from a five per-cent to

a three per-cent basis, and thus saved for the benefit of émigrés a capital sum reckoned at nearly a billion francs. French bondholders were thus indirectly taxed in order that the nobles who had once fled from France might have the means of buying landed property again. At the same time, also, equally for the benefit of the class of large landowners, a measure was proposed for a further limited kind of primogeniture, in addition to the law of 1817 which established titles for the owners of large estates: landowners who paid at least 300 francs in direct taxes were to be allowed to bequeath a double portion of the inheritance to the eldest son. This proposal, however, was rejected by the Chamber of Peers, in which the officials of the Napoleonic Age retained a majority. The Chamber of Peers also threw out a "Vandal Bill" imposing a crushing tax on books and intended to put an end to the agitation of liberal intellectuals.

So the new government was successful mainly only in its clerical measures. The ecclesiastical *Congrégations* increased rapidly and by the law of mortmain acquired anew considerable property. Teachers were placed under the control of bishops.

This attitude of the Government drove a part of even the propertied classes into opposition. The large manufacturers were discontented because of the favors shown to the old nobility, and the Gallicans and liberal bourgeoisie disapproved of the Government's religious policy. In vain did the Government believe it could secure a favorable turn of public opinion by military successes, therein making the mistake which has frequently been made in French history. The elections to the Chamber of Deputies, which took place soon after the victory at Navarino, resulted in a defeat for the Government. Under these circumstances it made little difference that the Villèle cabinet shortly before had tried, just previously in 1827, to reduce the unmanageable Upper House to obedience by a creation of new peers. No policy remained possible except concession to the Liberals.

Accordingly, as soon as Villèle had resigned, some real liberal measures were undertaken. The seminaries for priests were placed under the *Université*, that is, under the state system of education. In 1828 eight Jesuit colleges were suppressed (the Jesuits were particularly disliked by the Gallicans as being an "international religious Order").

The distrust which the Liberals felt toward the king, however, did not disappear so quickly. They gave only lukewarm support to the new ministry and it soon had to give way to a cabinet formed by

Prince Jules de Polignac, one of the king's intimate friends, who was even more devoted than he to mystical romantic ideas.

There arose at once the difficulty of trying to make this ministry coöperate with the Liberal majority in the Chamber of Deputies. This difficult problem, which is never completely soluble—how a monarch shall exercise an independent right of appointing his ministers and at the same time respect the wishes of the majority in the legislature—now had to be faced in France for the first time since 1814. The situation was complicated by the fact that the king's personal policy was opposed not only by the majority in the legislature, but also by the great majority of his subjects, so that in case of a conflict with the Chamber public opinion would certainly be on the side of the legislature. Moreover he could not count with certainty on the support of the army which, since the time of the Revolution, did not represent any definite social class.

In spite of this, the monarch decided to venture on the struggle. "I would rather saw wood than be a king like the King of England," he said. The Opposition carried on a lively campaign in favor of a change of government, and when the new elections in the summer of 1830 gave them a still more considerable majority than in the previous legislature, the king declared that it was his duty not to yield "like Louis XVI, who by yielding had been overthrown." On July 26, 1830, he published in the official *Moniteur* four ordinances (decrees which were effective without the approval of the legislature): a new electoral law virtually restricted the franchise to large landowners; freedom of the press was abolished; the Chamber just elected was declared dissolved; and elections were ordered for a new Chamber.

But the Opposition Party also now took up the struggle. The fact that the Government had just succeeded in brilliant fashion in dislodging the nest of pirates at Algiers (see below, ch. xvi), made as little impression as the naval victory at Navarino three years earlier. Scarcely had the ordinances appeared when several leaders of the Intellectuals of the younger generation, led by the youthful writer, Adolphe Thiers (who was to prove himself one of the greatest French statesmen in the nineteenth century), issued a proclamation in which they urged resistance to the government. They were soon joined by other elements in the population—former Carbonari, republican workmen, and students. Everywhere in Paris barricades were thrown up. Here the die was cast. Although the barricades afforded some defense, considering the relative inefficiency of the cannon and the crookedness of the Paris streets, nevertheless they

could not have withstood a serious attack by trained troops. But the army, which had no feeling of social solidarity with the ruling class of old landlords and which was recruited from all classes, refused to act, not completely but still in part. From the outset individual regiments began to go over to the side of the people and the loyal Swiss Guard was driven by the insurgents from the Louvre. Soon, on July 29, 1830, there floated from the palace of the Tuileries the Tricolor, the flag of the Revolution and the Napoleonic armies, which had been replaced at the Restoration by the white banner of the Bourbons. In the town hall of Paris a Provisional Government was set up.

The insurrection had not been the work of the Extreme Left; the Opposition derived its chief strength from the discontent of the bourgeoisie and the industrial and commercial classes as well as from the Intellectuals. What they objected to particularly was not the Constitution of 1814, but the fact that the constitution had not been loyally observed by the Ultras. The leaders of the revolution therefore had no thought of a complete overturn, such as the introduction of a democratic republic, but only of a "restoration of the Charter," with guarantees to prevent its being abused either by reactionaries or by radicals. The best way to do this seemed to be to allow the monarchy to continue, but to place on the throne a regent, who, though half legitimist, would be wholly free from legitimist ecclesiastical influence. A suitable candidate existed in the king's distant cousin, Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans. His father, known as "Philip Equality," had already during the French Revolution shown an inclination to new ideas and as a youth had even fought in the Republican armies at Jemappes in 1792. In a manifesto signed by Thiers and Mignet, the Duke was proclaimed king on July 30: "He will accept the Charter as we have always understood it and wished it."

The Duke of Orleans assented at once on July 31. At first, however, he did not bear the title of King, only that of Lieutenant General, because he wished to wait for his formal election by the Chamber, as was necessary. The people quickly decided in his favor. Since practically all the leaders supported him strongly there was nothing for the little group of Republicans to do except to assent also. The legitimist king, Charles X, also quickly perceived that his cause was lost. He still tried to preserve appearances by abdicating voluntarily and by appointing Louis Philippe as regent for his grandson, the nine-year-old Duke of Bordeaux. But the Chamber refused to countenance this subterfuge. After revising the consti-

tution as desired by the Liberal Opposition, it invested Louis Philippe with the royal insignia on August 9. The new monarch, who had already taken a solemn oath to the Charter, called himself "King of the French" instead of "King of France," in order to avoid the hated phraseology of the Old Régime. Shortly afterwards Charles X, who had already fled to Rambouillet on August 1, sailed from Cherbourg and left France forever on August 14.

Although the July Revolution did not result in changes which can in any way be compared with those of the great Revolution of 1789, nevertheless it marked as striking a break as possible away from the conservative principles which were to have been guaranteed by the Holy Alliance. Legitimacy had been rudely disregarded. Although the new king was as much a Bourbon as the fallen monarch, still he possessed no direct claim to the throne. More scandalous was the fact that Louis Philippe did not at all owe his elevation to the fact that he was a Bourbon, but to the will of the people and to a revolution. In the amended Charter that part of the preamble was suppressed which spoke of the Charter as "issued by the king"; the French people were now to be thought of as issuing the Charter and as choosing a prince on the basis of it. France, naturally therefore, withdrew from the Conservative Alliance of the Great Powers.

In home policies there now took place all the changes which had been long demanded by the liberal bourgeoisie. These measures fall into two main groups.

The first group comprises all the regulations which aimed to set aside the favors which had been shown to the large landlords of the old nobility. The Chamber of Peers, to which a large number of royalist landlords had been appointed as a result of the new creations during the last years of the Restoration, now lost precisely these elements because nearly half the members refused to take the oath of allegiance to Louis Philippe; also they were deprived of their hereditary character. In 1835 the creation of new landed estates, based on primogeniture, was forbidden, so that the two Chambers were no longer differentiated from one another by any class distinction; as a matter of fact, henceforth, it was the Chamber of Deputies that enjoyed the whole legislative power. This also was freed more completely from the influence of the old noble families. The electoral qualification was reduced from 300 to 200 francs, and the age qualification was reduced for voters from thirty to twenty-five years, and for deputies from forty to thirty years. The significance of this latter provision lies in the fact that it was the generation which had lived through the Revolution which was devoted to reactionary ideas;

the admission of the younger generation to political life in itself now strengthened the Liberal groups. Finally, the Royal Guards, the only troops who were bound by a feeling of solidarity to defend the monarch, were disbanded. Their place was taken by the National Guard. To this belonged all taxpayers who could furnish their own uniforms.

This last provision is extraordinarily characteristic; it sums up in a word the whole essence of the July Monarchy. The mass of the people, those who had no property or only the most necessary means of subsistence, were still excluded from any participation in political life just as before. But between the propertied bourgeoisie and the really rich classes there was no longer any distinction. This was seen in the membership of the new government. Here were to be found only names of members of the well-to-do classes; the proletarian masses were not represented.

The second group of measures resulting from the July Revolution aimed to set aside all those provisions which had their origin in religious-political romantic doctrines. By these measures the new régime pleased both the Intellectuals and the Liberal bourgeoisie, which had a horror of strengthening the economic power of the church. In the revised constitution there no longer appeared the phrase, "The Roman Catholic religion is the religion of the state." The clergy lost its influence on the government. Freedom of the press was proclaimed and freedom of instruction introduced.

So the classes of the population which had grown economically strong as a result of the great Revolution now had political power in their hands.

CHAPTER XIII

BREACHES IN THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM IN THE OTHER STATES OF EUROPE RESULTING FROM THE JULY REVOLUTION (BELGIUM AND POLAND)

SUCH a severe blow to legitimist principles naturally was not a matter of indifference to the members of the Conservative Alliance. The first decisive act of the anti-revolutionary combination had been the reëstablishment in France of the lawful dynasty, and its chief aim had ever been to watch over France to prevent revolution. Now its efforts had failed in every respect. The legitimist king of France had been put to flight. The Revolution had set up a new ruler and France was no longer a member of the Alliance.

Even this was not all. Among the men who had led the Revolution of July, 1830, there were representatives of the old international Republican propaganda, for whom the king at first, at least, had to show some consideration. There was also the danger that the revolutionary movement might spread into other states, particularly into Italy (as Austria asserted). So when in August of this year the Belgians revolted against the King of Holland, as will soon be explained, it seemed clear that the French July Revolution had created a new source of revolution for all Europe.

But it was less easy to bring about intervention in France than in Naples or Spain. It was impossible to make use of internal conflicts. The Conservative Great Powers would have had to run the risk of a regular war, which none of them really wished, least of all Austria, which was so weak financially. There was also the further difficulty that Great Britain would, under no circumstances, coöperate in intervention. The English government, which had long since abandoned in practice the principles of the Holy Alliance, now made little difficulty in coming to terms with the new régime in France, and on September 1, 1830, recognized it officially. Indeed, it was even to be feared that England would directly oppose a legitimist punitive expedition against Louis Philippe, because military complications would presumably be used by Russia to begin her plan of conquest against Turkey, in direct opposition to British in-

terests. An equally important blow to possible intervention was finally given by the new French king himself. Although Louis Philippe had had to make some nominal concessions to the Republican group, he made it perfectly clear from the outset that personally he had no intention of spreading revolutionary principles beyond the borders of France, after the fashion of the First French Republic. Even within a fortnight after the triumph of the July Revolution, in the middle of August, he officially informed the other European governments that he had undertaken the task of securing the peace of Europe against the horrible devastations of war. The ticklish Belgian question, which might have provoked a conflict with England, was at once arranged so that the possibility of a French invasion and annexation of Belgium seemed out of the question. The following years also showed clearly that of all the governments in France, this government of the bourgeoisie was the least inclined to warlike undertakings. In contrast to the Monarchy of the Restoration, in contrast also to the Second Empire, the July Monarchy never sought to overcome difficulties in home politics by a display of military prestige abroad. In accordance with the economic character of the new political system, the liberal bourgeois rulers were inclined to the same aims in both foreign and home politics: peace and quiet for work and wealth.

This did not prevent the July Monarchy, however, from exercising a great moral influence in considerable parts of Europe, even without the active participation of the responsible members of the government. The victory which had been won in Paris over the legitimist party and the absolutist tendencies of the monarchy, the powerlessness of the Eastern Powers (Austria, Prussia and Russia) in the face of this breach in the Conservative system—all this naturally tended everywhere to arouse hope in the "party of movement" that in other countries also the restored governments would be unable to withstand strong attack. The success of these insurrections varied in proportion to the power which the representatives of the Old Régime exercised. In Italy, so far as insurrections took place at all, as in the States of the Church, in Parma, and in Modena, the revolution collapsed anew through Austria's intervention. Twice Austrian troops entered the States of the Church, where the inhabitants, particularly those in the provinces lying at a distance from Rome, had rebelled against the government of the Church and its notoriously bad administration. The absolutist rule of the Church was restored with slight changes, although the Great Powers had sought some reforms, particularly in the matter of finance. In

Parma and Modena also Austria restored the governments dependent on herself. The hopes of the insurgents had turned toward France, from whose new policy they thought they could expect support; but Louis Philippe, in accord with his whole political attitude, refused all aid and contented himself with the formal occupation of the papal town of Ancona (1832 to 1838). By this he wanted to show that France, without interfering in general in Italian affairs, did not regard Italy as the exclusive domain of the Austrian government.

More successful were the after effects of the July Revolution in Switzerland. Here the privileges of the city bourgeoisie were almost everywhere set aside. Also in several small and middle-sized states in Germany, princes were compelled by the pressure of political demonstrations to grant constitutions.

The two countries in which the July Revolution had the most decisive effect, however, were Belgium and Poland. In both these places its consequences were of great importance in world history.

The Kingdom of the Netherlands created by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, from the standpoint of the European policy of the Great Powers, was not without a purpose. The idea had been to make the territory at the mouth of the Rhine and the Scheldt, which had so often been a cause of discord, particularly between France and England, into a single large state, which would not sink to the position of a mere sphere of influence of one of the Great Powers. Accordingly, the former Austrian (Belgian) provinces were united with the former Dutch provinces into a single state. This kingdom was then entrusted to a descendant of the Orange-Nassau family which had given so many stadholders to the Dutch Republic. But the new state included elements which were too heterogeneous to permit a peaceful development. To be sure, the constitution had provided a certain equality between Belgians and Dutch; the Chamber of Deputies consisted of an equal number of members from the Northern and Southern Provinces; but this really gave an advantage to the Dutch, because their population numbered only two million as against three million Belgians. Furthermore, the government favored the Dutch at every turn. The Senate consisted in large part of Hollanders. Most of the officials came from the Dutch part of the kingdom. But above all, different economic interests divided the two peoples who had been artificially united together. Belgium, an industrial country, inclined toward a protective tariff; Holland, an old commercial country, with equal insistence, favored free trade, and succeeded in winning the king to its side.

Such a clash of interests has long existed in many united states and yet not led to any split. But in the Kingdom of the Netherlands it struck particularly deeply into the consciousness of the people because it was not counteracted by any common national tradition, and also because in addition to the economic conflict, which affected only the upper classes, there were sectarian differences. Between Holland, which was mostly Protestant, and Belgium, which was strictly Catholic, there could be no real feeling of sympathy.

The Dutch government was also blameworthy in that it had too little regard for these delicate conditions. It punished severely the Belgian prelates who, in harmony with the feeling of their clergy, had protested against the constitution. When the whole Belgian Opposition, both Catholics and Liberals, united in a single group (the "Union"), the king would make them no concessions, so that the idea even arose of annexing Belgium to France.

Into this heated atmosphere now fell the news of the victorious revolution in France. There, the work of the Congress of Vienna had been overthrown; why should the same thing not be possible in Belgium? Within a month of the revolution at Paris an insurrection broke out in Brussels on August 25, 1830, following the singing of Auber's revolutionary opera, "Masaniello." The population rose and expelled the Dutch officials. An assembly of Belgian notables despatched delegates to the king at the Hague to present the Belgian grievances. The Dutch government, however, had no intention of making concessions to the rebels, and decided to suppress the insurrection with a bloody hand. The king's second son started for Brussels with an army of ten thousand men, but his advance was checked by the obstinate courage of the revolutionists; after five days' fighting (September 21-26) he was forced to retreat. The revolution had triumphed. On October 4 a Provisional Government proclaimed Belgium an independent state, thus going beyond the original demand for reforms to a complete separation. This proclamation was confirmed by a National Congress on November 18. To indicate that the movement was not at bottom due to revolutionary tendencies it was decided that Belgium should be a monarchy.

Theoretically, the situation here was the same as that in Naples some years before. In both cases, in a small state, the government established by the Great Powers had been overthrown by an unlawful rising of the people. In both cases, again, the question whether the new government could maintain itself depended in last analysis

upon the decision of the European concert, for it was clear that the Belgian insurgents could not successfully defend themselves against the united intervention of the Great Powers. In another connection, to be sure, the situation in Belgium was quite different from that in Naples in 1820. Not only could the Conservative Powers not count upon the coöperation of one Great Power (France), but there was even a danger that this Power might make common cause with the insurgents,—might indeed even take advantage of the opportunity to increase its own territory. A French party was already active in Brussels and was agitating for a more or less veiled annexation by France. In this difficult situation both the independence of Belgium and the peace of Europe were saved by the diplomatic cleverness of the new French monarch. (He had at once recalled from enforced exile the experienced professional diplomatist, Prince Talleyrand, and sent him as ambassador to the government whose attitude was most important, namely to England.) The peace-loving bourgeois government offered as compensation for Belgian independence the promise of its own complete disinterestedness. This plan succeeded completely. So soon as the English government was convinced that France did not intend to take advantage of the Belgian revolution to advance to the mouth of the Scheldt, there was no longer any danger that the British would depart from their policy of non-intervention. In vain did the King of Holland call attention to the treaties of 1814 and warn the Great Powers of their duty to have a care for their observance. In vain were military preparations undertaken by Tsar Nicholas I (the only monarch who could have despatched an army at once). On October 15 France and England signed a convention to exclude any kind of interference by the Great Powers except a peaceful one. Since Great Britain's intervention could not be counted on, the other Powers were compelled to abandon military measures against the Belgian revolutionists. Within a short time Austria and Prussia gave their official approval to a plan of leaving the solution of the Belgian question to a conference of ambassadors in London.

The later agreements were, one may say, merely the logical consequences of this first convention between the two Western Powers. On December 20, 1830, the Conference declared Belgium to be an independent state. Then, chiefly in order to prevent a possible intervention by France, the newly-founded state was declared neutral, and thus prevented from combining with a Great Power. When, in spite of this, the Belgian Congress chose the Duke of Nemours, the second son of Louis Philippe, the latter refused. Thereupon the

Belgians chose a German prince who was in no way connected by blood with the French royal family, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg (June 4, 1831).

As far as the Great Powers were concerned the Belgian question was thus settled for the most part. But not for Holland. William of Orange, the king, refused to recognize the decision of the London Conference, and sought to reconquer Belgium by himself by force of arms. He invaded Belgium and won considerable successes in August, 1831, but the Western Powers did not thereby allow themselves to be shaken in their decision. France secured in London permission to enforce the decision of the Conference by military measures. A French army which thereupon entered Belgium naturally brought the Dutch advance to a standstill. Then, when the Dutch government, notwithstanding considerable concessions which the Powers were ready to make, still refused to give up Belgium and evacuate Antwerp, England and France used force. A British fleet blockaded the Dutch coast, and a French army besieged Antwerp and forced it to surrender in a relatively short time in December, 1831. The passive resistance which Holland still maintained for years (until 1838) against the decisions of the Conference was without practical effect. Belgian independence and neutrality, solemnly guaranteed in 1839 by the five Powers, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia, was already a reality in 1831 and remained such.

The manner in which Belgium secured its separation from Holland, and the fact that the new state was supported by the two liberal western Powers, while the Conservative Powers (Prussia, Russia, and Austria) assumed at first, at least, an unfriendly attitude, naturally made contemporaries regard the dissolution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which the Congress of Vienna had established, as a step forward in the triumphant progress of liberalism. However close to the truth this was, it would nevertheless be a mistake to estimate the historical importance of the Belgian revolution merely from this point of view. For the whole of Europe it was of great importance that the relatively strong Kingdom of the Netherlands was destroyed and replaced by two weak small states. In the second half of the nineteenth century, as disputes between the European Powers were again decided more and more by wars and armaments, it became clearer and clearer that this Belgian Revolution of 1830 had created between France and the new Prussian-German state a kingdom which could exist only with the assistance of the Great Powers. However, there was no actual infringement of the guaran-

teed neutrality until 1914, when Germany opened war against France by marching through Belgium.

The second important result of the July Revolution was the destruction of the state in which part of the Polish people had received a half-independent political organization. In 1795, when the old Polish Republic was totally effaced and the last bits of it partitioned among the three neighboring Great Powers, the Polish nation was destroyed as a factor in politics only in appearance but not in reality. In no country, at that time, was the feeling of nationality so strong as in Poland. It was fostered even by the aristocratic character of the former "Republic." While in other countries it was chiefly the middle class which supported nationalistic tendencies, in the hope that more liberal institutions would be possible in a national state than in tiny despotisms, in Poland the conditions were just reversed. Here the idea of a revival of independence was identical with the restoration of the rule of the old nobility. How could it have been otherwise in a country where there was practically no middle class in existence (except the Jews), and where the peasants, only recently emancipated from serfdom, lived under primitive conditions? In Poland, national autonomy simply meant that interference of foreign bureaucrats, who were independent of the Polish nobility, would cease, and the native magnates would again be given charge of the administration.

Nowhere, therefore, did the national movement rest on such strong economic support as in Poland. In many other countries large landowners gladly took the side of the conservative anti-national movement; in Poland, just the opposite was the case. Here all the landowners, that is, the whole wealth of the country, stood behind the national cause. Any government which should follow the doctrines of the Restoration and seek to favor the aristocratic elements would, in Poland, simply strengthen its own enemies, that is to say, revolution. In general, the governments which had annexed parts of Old Poland recognized this danger; it is well known, for example, that Prussia afforded greater advantages to the agricultural day-laborers in her Polish districts than in the regions where the landlords were of German nationality.

The one exceptional Polish region that existed after 1815 was that part of original ancient Poland which formed the bulk of the genuinely Polish territories added to Russia, the so-called "Congress Poland," with the capital at Warsaw. Tsar Alexander I, thanks to his education by the Swiss, La Harpe, was rather more strongly inclined to liberal ideas than the rulers of Austria and

Prussia, and was also perhaps somewhat influenced by his friendly relations with Polish aristocrats; he was the only one of the three partitioning princes who had taken seriously the decree of the Congress of Vienna by which the three Powers had held out to their Polish subjects the expectation of "representative government and national institutions." Alexander I, supplementing an arrangement which Napoleon had made for the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in 1807, gave the Poles a regular constitution on November 27, 1815. By this, "Congress Poland" acquired not only complete national autonomy but also even parliamentary institutions, that is, more than was enjoyed by the subjects of the three neighboring Great Powers. At the same time Poland was connected with Russia merely by a "personal union"; the Tsar ruled Poland only as a constitutional king. The viceroy, his representative, and the imperial commissioner were the only foreigners (Russians). All the other officials in civil and military service must be Poles. Even the army had its own special uniform. Polish was the only official language. The Roman Catholic clergy in Poland retained their endowments and privileges. Not only did the constitution provide for the establishment of a legislature or Diet, which should meet every two years, with open sessions; but a preponderant influence in both chambers was practically assured to the large landlords, because the right to vote and to be elected was dependent on the payment of a high tax. It was inconceivable that the Russian government would oppose the landowning nobility by any alliance with the peasant population. Still stronger, if possible, was the preference given to the nobility in the creation of judicial and administrative boards.

In spite of all this, the régime established in 1815 did not succeed in becoming popular. From a material point of view there was an undeniable prosperity during the fifteen years that Poland existed. In Lodz there even began to be established large industries which found a profitable market in the purely agrarian districts of Russia. Possibly also the emancipation of the peasants, which had taken place during the French period (1807) and which could not be undone, had a beneficial effect, although the peasants still remained economically dependent upon the landlords as before; at any rate, the population increased by more than a million and a half. The deficit in government revenues disappeared, and the years 1820-1825 even showed a surplus.

But the contrast between small "Congress Poland" and the great Polish state of former times was so striking that the Polish nobles of the new kingdom could not be content with what they had been

given. They regarded their autonomous kingdom simply as a stepping-stone to the restoration of ancient Poland, and were particularly anxious to win back at least a part of the districts which had formerly been annexed by Russia. To be sure, White Russia and the Ukraine were out of the question; but there was the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania lying to the north-east. For centuries, Lithuania had belonged to the Polish Republic. Although it was already evident that the foreign peasant population there was opposed to Polish nationalism, nevertheless the nobles of that region regarded themselves absolutely as a part of the Polish aristocracy and were regarded by their fellow nobles in Congress Poland as brothers in exile. Polish magnates, like Prince Adam Czartoryski, long the trusted friend of Tsar Alexander I, used their position in the Lithuanian educational district of Vilna to win the native population for the Polish cause and so prepare for their later incorporation in Poland.

Even before 1830, therefore, the Russian government had found it necessary to restrict several of the liberties granted by the Constitution of 1815. No actual conflict broke out until the July Revolution in Paris roused enthusiastic hopes in Poland. As a result of the French events, the Revolutionary party, mostly young men and students, the so-called "Reds," got the upper hand over the aristocratic clerical party of opposition (the "Whites") who did not wish to overstep the bounds of legal opposition. The Polish army summoned to service by Nicholas I against France and Belgium now turned against Russian authority. As the whole administration was in Polish hands any local opposition was out of the question. The government buildings in Warsaw were occupied by the students of the Polish military school, and Constantine, the viceroy and elder brother of the Tsar, left the country with his Russian troops in December, 1830.

The "Whites" at first sought to bring about a compromise with the Tsar in order to avoid war. But when St. Petersburg insisted on absolute subjection they were swept away by the "Red" war party, and the fiction was exploded that the revolution was directed merely against the Tsar's representative and not against the Tsar himself. The Polish Diet not only declared that the Romanov dynasty was deposed, but also that Lithuania was indissolubly united with Poland (January, 1831).

Although the Poles had at their disposal considerable troops and the support of the regular administrative machinery, and so were much more favorably situated than, for example, the revolutionists

in Naples or Belgium, still it was clear that in their case also the final decision lay in the hands of the Great Powers. The Polish revolutionists, thanks to their stronger means of support, might be able to maintain themselves for a longer time than insurgents elsewhere; but, unless they were supported by the Great Powers, they could not count on withstanding the overwhelming power of Russia for more than a certain time. The new Polish government therefore despatched official representatives to the Great Powers who had guaranteed the decree of the Congress of Vienna. But though the cause of Polish independence was very popular everywhere (even outside France and England), there was small prospect of help coming from outside. The French government believed it unwise either to risk a war or to compromise itself by protecting an international revolutionary movement, in spite of the very strong pressure of public opinion; it therefore rejected the appeal of the Poles. England, without the support of a Continental Power, was in no position to act against the military forces of Russia; the British cabinet therefore contented itself with the official (and formally correct) reply that the Congress of Vienna had not guaranteed the Polish constitution.

This meant that the war was already lost for the Poles in spite of their heroic courage. Since their army had been the first to mobilize, they did indeed secure some victories at first and occupied some districts on the Lithuanian frontier. But as soon as the Russian army approached in an overwhelming majority—120,000 men against 45,000—the Poles had to retreat to the Vistula. After five bloody battles the Russian armies pressed on to Warsaw. The Russian general offered the insurgents an amnesty and the restoration of the constitution; but in spite of the advice of their military experts the offer was rejected by the "Reds," who had compromised themselves too far. The Russians thereupon bombarded the capital, which soon capitulated in September, 1831. The remnants of the Polish army now fled to foreign lands. Along with them went also many members of the Polish nobility, who settled chiefly in France.

There now happened what the moderate "Whites" had feared when they had opposed the extreme measures of the "Reds." The independence of Poland was totally destroyed. An imperial ukase decreed that henceforth Poland should be incorporated with Russia to form a single nation. The constitution was abolished, and the administration put into the hands of a Russian governor and Russian officials. The Russian language became obligatory for all officials. The University of Warsaw was closed. A military dic-

tatorship was introduced, which was also intended to weaken in the future the economic strength of the Polish magnates. Not only were about three hundred *émigrés* condemned to death, but their lands were confiscated and divided among Russian generals of the Orthodox Greek faith. Virtually nothing of old Poland was left except the Church; and even here were not lacking all sorts of chicanery and despotic interference. All other instruction was put completely under the control of the Russian Minister of Education in 1839. However, Polish opposition was not broken by all these measures. The Russian government did not succeed in destroying the economic strength of the Polish nobility. Not even the feudal privileges of the landlords were taken away. After the death of Nicholas I, in 1855, when the Russians allowed a somewhat looser rein, Polish friends of freedom associated together in an Agricultural Society, which, under cover of non-political activities, really pursued national aims. There resulted another insurrection in 1863, which was followed by a much severer reaction and by the total destruction of all administrative institutions peculiar to Poland. Above all, the lands of the Church were secularized in 1865 and the administration of the Polish Catholic Church was placed under an ecclesiastical board in St. Petersburg. At this time also the peasants were given the ownership of the land which they had been occupying and freed of all servile obligations, so that the Polish nobles lost about half of their existing income. Also Poles were forbidden to acquire land in Poland.

Although these measures, whose decisive effect is still felt to the present day, took place about a generation later, the whole development was already foreshadowed in the years following 1830. It became evident how fundamentally illusory were the hopes of Poles that an autonomous position within the Russian Empire could be used as a stepping-stone toward a restoration of national independence. There remained only one suggestion of Polish independence—the Republic of Cracow, created in 1815. But naturally the hopes which the Kingdom of Poland had awakened could not rest on this tiny free state. Furthermore, in 1836 Cracow was occupied for a short time by the troops of the three protecting Powers, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, and then placed under Austrian police supervision; finally, in 1846, it was completely incorporated in Austria.

So there was nothing left for the Polish patriots to do but look around for help from some other direction. This is the point which gives the Polish insurrections a wider importance in the history of

the nineteenth century than that of mere incidents in the internal development of Russia. After it had once been shown that the Polish friends of independence had nothing to hope from Russia, and that even the Russian revolutionary parties would not assist them, and since Prussia was known to be uncompromisingly opposed to all Polish aspirations, the only possible ally left was Austria. There was the further fact that the Polish landlords had nowhere kept such complete power over the agricultural population as in the Austrian province of Galicia. The national spirit of the Poles in Congress Poland remained as strong as ever, in spite of all the Russian measures of oppression; but, as a political factor, the only Poles of primary importance were now the Galician magnates; and since these exercised a considerable influence on Austrian policy, owing to the political-social composition of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy which will be explained later in detail, these conditions contributed not a little toward sharpening the opposition between Russia and the Danubian monarchy. To the old disputes which related to the Balkans, there were now added elements of conflict resulting from the nationalist and religious policy of the Galician Polish nobility.

But in the early years contemporaries regarded the suppression of the Polish Revolution merely as a defeat of Liberalism. The contrast between Eastern and Western Europe became now more sharply marked than ever. In Belgium not only had the work of the Conservative Congress of Vienna been overthrown, but the newly established kingdom had also been able to adopt a constitution which even surpassed the French in the concessions which it made to liberal demands. In order to vote it was sufficient to pay what, according to the ideas of the time, was a very small tax (forty-two francs). The constitution had expressly proclaimed the responsibility of ministers to the Chamber of Deputies, and this was interpreted to mean that the cabinet must have the support of a majority in the Chamber. Also, the Senate was not appointed by the King, but chosen by the same electors as the Chamber. Freedom of the press, of public meeting, of education, and of religion, was introduced. Even the Church was wholly withdrawn from the supervision of the state (without in general losing any of its privileges). The establishment of the Belgian Kingdom was, from the standpoint of liberal doctrines, an even more complete victory than the setting up of Louis Philippe's government.

In the East it was quite otherwise. Though Tsar Alexander I during his liberal phase may have perhaps played with the idea

of making Poland a model parliamentary state which might even serve as an object lesson for the Russian Empire, and although he also, by creating this kingdom, recognized the justice of the national Polish demands, all these plans were now proved to be Utopian. It was not Poland which served as the model for Russia, but Russian absolutistic institutions which were imposed on Poland. The source from which some kind of free institutions might have spread in Eastern and Central Europe was destroyed.

It was thus that the fate of the Polish rising appeared to contemporaries, and this explains also why, at that time, and for a long time afterwards, the sympathies of liberal circles, without regard for the possible national aspirations of Poland, turned toward the Poles and away from the Russians.

CHAPTER XIV

THE COLLAPSE OF THE OLD RÉGIME IN ENGLAND

The July Revolution, which made so many old institutions on the Continent totter, was also not without its effect north of the English Channel. There, also, it hastened a transformation in existing conditions and gave reformers new zeal. But the Old Régime in England, which was overthrown two years after the events in Paris, was so absolutely different from the conservative systems of government on the Continent that the bloodless English revolution of 1832 deserves special treatment, even if the importance of the nation in which it took place did not make such special treatment inevitable anyway.

"English freedom," which had been so often held up as a model to the continental countries by French reformers in the eighteenth century, in spite of many misconceptions about it by its admirers, was no empty dream. The praises which they bestowed on it were not usually regarded as exaggerated, because the writers who glorified it wrote from the standpoint of the propertied bourgeoisie. The demand for legal equality had been met as completely in England as any representative of the middle class could wish. No English law made any distinction between noble and commoner. No position in the government, the army, or the Church, was reserved for members of a special class. To be sure, in the case of landed property there did exist the system of primogeniture, and peers had certain legal political privileges. But even these privileges did not appear oppressive, and the class which enjoyed them was not closed against others, but was open to any new wealthy person. Although socially also there were certain distinctions in favor of the "Old" nobility, and although scions of distinguished families were given preferences over sons of *parvenus* who had become rich in India, when appointments were made to profitable positions in the government, the army, or the Church, nevertheless there was no legal claim in favor of younger sons of nobility; descendants of rich merchants who had only recently risen in the world often secured the highest appointments. There was besides no question about equality of birth. Daughters of rich middle-class families could marry into the circles of the large landowners without having to fear that their

children would have a legal position inferior to that of the husbands.

Even in the matter of religion, where English legislation least closely approached the ideals of the Revolution, there was no great contrast between English practice and the ideals of Enlightenment,—less at any rate than in almost any other European country in the eighteenth century. Members of any other sect than the two Established Churches were, to be sure, excluded from positions in the government, in administration, and in public instruction; church taxes had to be paid by every one, no matter to what religion he belonged. But these were the only privileges enjoyed by members of the Established Churches. No pressure was exercised by the state upon Dissenters. England had been, and remained, the country of "toleration" in the old technical sense of the word; and at the beginning of the nineteenth century practice went even further than legislation, aside from the fact that government regulations were sometimes vexatiously or maliciously enforced.

In business, manufacturing, and commerce the new revolutionary doctrines also found less to attack than in other countries. To be sure, the old guild regulations still existed, and also some privileged trade corporations, but there was nowhere any trace of oppression. For a long time, thanks partly to the complete pacification of the country accomplished by the Tudors, the textile industry, the most important industry of England next to the metal industries, had grown up in the country districts, beyond the reach of guild regulations; and, when the new factories sprang up with steam machinery and therefore dependent on the coal mines, the new industrial cities near these mines were completely free from the old restrictions. The manufacturer who wanted to modernize his plant was restricted neither by guild regulations nor by the patrician oligarchy in the old town.

Although the English system offered little ground for attack from the standpoint of the "French ideas," and although it had survived unshaken during the storms of the revolutionary period, it was falling into sharper and sharper contradiction with the new economic development of the country. There was, however, no class economically strong which was shut out from the government, as in many states on the Continent, or which was subordinated legally to the capitalists of the older sort. If one disregards the fact that certain noble Catholic families and certain rich Dissenters were unable to share in political life, one may say that Great Britain at that time was a plutocracy with all the advantages of stability which goes with such an organization. An opposition to the existing system by

propertied people was inconceivable; for almost every wealthy person belonged to the favored classes himself. To be sure, there were not lacking divisions within the capitalistic circles. The great landowning aristocracy, thanks to the old franchise system, still dominated in politics over the representatives of the rising factories, and the financial policy of the government was adapted more to the needs of the growers of grain than of manufacturers, but nowhere were real obstacles placed in the way of the new business activities. On the other hand, the ever-increasing class of those without property, particularly the factory workers, was treated as practically almost without legal rights, and with severity. But before any account is given of this class, and of the economic structure of England in general, attention must be called to two circumstances which made possible the survival of so many old-fashioned institutions in the British Isles.

The thing which most differentiated England politically at the beginning of the nineteenth century from the continental countries was what has been misleadingly called "self-government," but which might better be described as "government by local magnates and an absence of independent government bureaucrats." As in the Middle Ages, the exercise of countless activities which elsewhere were in the hands of the state (police, collection of taxes, fixing of wages, etc.) lay in the hands of the rich, particularly outside the towns. They exercised this authority as a matter of honor, but also naturally in the interests of their own class. As almost everywhere else prior to the Revolution, the division of power between the classes was the same in the army as in the civil service; that is, the same propertied classes who as justices of the peace, for example, ruled the agricultural day laborers and the factory workers in their districts, were also those who secured the expensive places in the army; and the same proletarians, from whom were recruited the masses of workmen for the fields and the factories, also furnished the rank and file of the armies. How was it possible that this situation should have been able to survive in England in contrast to the Continent?

No historian can answer this question with a single phrase. Too many factors combined to bring about this phenomenon for any single explanation. But if the observer leaves aside all the less important influences, two reasons of prime importance may be noted.

One reason, which was particularly important after the personal union of England and Scotland in 1603, lay in England's insular position. The pressure for military centralization and for the crea-

tion of a unified body of military officials did not exist in England, so the creation of a bureaucracy was not necessary. No less important, perhaps, was the other reason. The main influence in modernizing administration, that is, in replacing unreliable feudal advisers by dependable state officials, has, as is well known, always been the financial need of the state,—particularly the necessity of making the capital of the citizens quickly available for armaments or for carrying on war. There was no greater obstacle for governments in this than survivals of the "feudal system": the privileges in the matter of taxation enjoyed by the propertied classes and the right of granting taxes enjoyed by the "estates," which were usually identical with the propertied classes. Most of the "reforms" in state administration have arisen from this financial need, and it is well known that financial bankruptcy was the immediate occasion of the French Revolution.

Now, England possessed a double advantage: on the one hand, the revenues of the state could be largely increased without abandoning the old self-government; and, on the other hand, her insular position made it safe for her not to create means for carrying on war. Although there existed countless well-paid sinecures, and although the state revenues were very loosely administered, England was, nevertheless, the most powerful country financially of the time. The soil was more productive of wealth than that of its rivals among the Great Powers, although with the exception of Prussia it was the smallest state in area and population. (Great Britain with Ireland had, at the time, 16,000,000 inhabitants; France, over 27,000,000; Austria, about 23,000,000.) This financial strength depended primarily on the economic prosperity of the British Isles and this economic prosperity could be made available, because the same classes who amassed wealth were also those who enjoyed political power, who were most directly interested in having the state machine function properly, and who therefore, did not try to evade taxation.

The Industrial Revolution (see ch. iii) now enormously accentuated this situation,—the practical rule of the rich based on the exploitation of the poor, who, ever since the rise of the domestic textile industry in the second half of the sixteenth century, could be forced to work and receive wages fixed by the state. The development of industry on a large scale, the lengthening of the hours of labor made possible through steam and water power, the smaller need for physically powerful workers, and the resulting increased employment of women and children in the factories—all these fac-

tors which have been sketched in that chapter—were taking place in England about 1815. The gulf between "the poor" and "the rich" was now enormously widened and the number of the "exploited" extraordinarily increased. In place of separate families who worked scattered through the country, there now grew up whole new cities. The wages of the workers were, in general, not much smaller than formerly, but the living conditions were incomparably worse. Huddled together in primitive, hastily constructed rows of buildings, without care and without education, financially dependent upon the will of the factory owner, who also often represented the authority of the state—such was the life of the mass of population, and the more manufactures increased the more agriculture decreased.

Were there any legal remedies for this? Did the much-praised British constitution afford any possibility that parliamentary legislation might interfere in the interests of humanity, at any rate for the benefit of the unprotected women and children?

Whoever considers the franchise which at that time controlled elections to Parliament can answer this question only in the negative.

The House of Commons, that is, the body which usually determined the make-up and the policy of the executive, was elected mainly by the propertied classes. A majority (467 members) were elected in boroughs where the candidates of the richest landlords of the neighborhood or of the city patricians were almost always chosen without a contest. Many places which had once had the duty or the right of sending members to the House of Commons either no longer existed or had sunk to a few miserable buildings, owing to the extension of sheep-raising at the expense of agriculture. In these "rotten boroughs" and "pocket boroughs," the election of members of Parliament was in practice simply the unquestioned property of the owner of the soil on which the place happened to be. Even in the county elections, in which the small freeholders had a share, the influence of the most powerful local magnate was, in most cases, decisive. This lay partly in the fact that elections were public, and the elector had to have his vote registered publicly. The only really popular elections were those which took place in a few of the great city electoral districts, particularly in the London district of Westminster; because there pressure by landlords was impossible.

The prospect that the new class of factory employees could ever get any considerable number of representatives of their own into the House of Commons was therefore very slight. There remained only three possibilities by which their demands and those of the philanthropists might secure a hearing.

The first possibility was that the class of those who were discontented and shut out from political activity should seek the support of one of the two great parties in order by a combination of strength to drive the opposition party from power. The conditions were not unfavorable for such a combination. For a long time power had shifted back and forth between two groups—the Tories and the Whigs. The two rival parties did not differ from one another through any difference in class interests; they both represented a group of propertied citizens, but their adherents within the electorate were not equally strong. The Whigs were originally a group of higher nobles who were liberal-minded opponents of strong royal power, since it tended to weaken their own strength. They were not exactly loved by the great body of small land owners, who were strongly conservative in religion and politics. These latter belonged, for the most part, to the Tory party, and, thanks to the franchise system of the time, formed a majority of the voters. This naturally had the result that the Whigs gladly inclined toward reforms which would increase the number of those likely to vote for the Whig party, as, for example, the Dissenters in the towns. Indeed, the whole middle class, the manufacturers and large merchants, were more favorably inclined to the Whigs than to the Tories, because the Tories put the interests of agriculture too much in the foreground. Since the old franchise, which antedated the modern factory system, gave privileges to the class of grain producers in the south of England, instead of to the new group of manufacturers in the coal districts in the west, it was reasonable to expect that the Whigs would favor an extension of the suffrage beyond the classes who already enjoyed it. And if a breach were once made in the old exclusive system, workingmen might hope that their wishes would be given more consideration than hitherto. There was the further fact that the panicky fear of political innovations which seized England as a result of the French Revolution had taken much less hold in the enlightened circles of the Whigs than on the feelings of the Tories.

The second possibility lay in the fact that workingmen might combine in organizations and attempt by extra-legal demonstrations and revolutionary attacks to force from their opponents what they could not secure by political means from Parliament as it was then constituted. This method was tried along with the first, but combinations of workingmen, as a result of their precarious financial position, had so little power that the support of one of the two great parties was absolutely indispensable.

A third possibility for the improvement of conditions lay in the

humanitarian movement, which was everywhere growing stronger (see ch. vi). It was precisely in England that the movement was most influential. This was not only due to the strength of religious influences, which were changing, as a result of Enlightenment, more and more into philanthropic channels; nor was it due only to the misery, greater in England than elsewhere, because in no other country did the Industrial Revolution dominate economic life to nearly so great an extent; it was rather on the favorable economic situation that the strength of these humanitarian tendencies in England rested. Although the close of the Napoleonic Wars and the new commercial policy of the Continental states disturbed inexperienced manufacturers in many ways, and resulted in many periods of industrial crisis after 1815, nevertheless the supremacy of British industry was so well established that it could bear financially the luxury, so to speak, of interference in the interests of humanity. The best example of this is the prohibition of the slave-trade shortly before the period of which we are speaking, an act which was bound to injure exclusively British trade, but which was nevertheless passed because the traffic in negroes was repugnant to the newly awakened feeling concerning the rights of man.

At this point some general observations in regard to English economic life may be inserted. At this time, and often afterwards, the English were called a nation of shopkeepers, and their whole policy was interpreted in the light of "commercial interests." Whoever talks in this way neither understands English policy nor knows what a nation of shopkeepers is. The very thing that has made for the strength of Great Britain has been that its people have not devoted themselves exclusively to commerce, as, for instance, the Dutch or the Venetians were compelled to do. Certainly English commerce is not insignificant, and in negotiations with foreign countries a regard for this branch of the nation's activity has certainly played a considerable part. But this was partly due precisely to the fact that British commerce, being relatively the weakest branch of English economic activity, was most in need of state protection. As a matter of fact, at the beginning of the nineteenth century and for centuries earlier, the prosperity of the British Isles had rested more on manufacturing than on commerce, and domestic policy was more determined by care for the interests of growers of grain than of merchants. The very fact that England was not restricted narrowly to one branch of economic activity gave her policy a certain grandeur and made it independent of disturbances in particular branches of economic life.

Much the same thing may be observed as to the condition of internal politics. There, also, the position of the plutocracy was so firmly established that no observer can deny to the system a certain trait of greatness. Freedom of discussion existed to an extent which was unthinkable in any other country. So long as there was no suspicion that revolution was advocated as a fundamental principle, the government did not interfere by force in discussions. Intellectual activity, particularly if it was in the interests of the upper classes, was well paid and generally highly regarded. Even the "abuses" of the old system were often favorable to talent. Gifted and ambitious young men without wealth who gladly put their abilities at the service of a party found it easier even than in France to take part in political life. How many a young man had reached the highest positions in the government by means of a "pocket borough," as the young Whig Macaulay rose to the dignity of cabinet minister and civil governor of India! It was also one of the ancient practices of the British system that service of the state was by no means always poorly paid. Men of talent but not of means were not compelled to renounce a political career because a civilian salary was insufficient to live on unless it were eked out by some side occupation or by forbidden methods of graft. The only name to designate the old English system is "plutocracy."(The word "aristocracy" I shall avoid here and wherever possible; such a conception, which was precise in ancient times, is no longer accurate, since it is applied to modern institutions which are only superficially analogous, and since it is also applied to matters outside the field of politics.) So England at that time may be called a plutocracy; but it would be a mistake to conclude from this that money alone, and not intellectual preëminence also, counted for something and brought results in politics.

At the beginning of the period here treated, in the years immediately following the Congress of Vienna, England was still under the influence of the "Panic of the French Revolution" (see ch. v). The idea of Conservatism as a fundamental principle, which was caused by the reaction from the French Revolution, had already been formulated in England; to this was now added the further fact that the British Empire had been in almost unbroken bitter conflict with the country where the new ideas originated. The revolutionary movement also appeared even more dangerous than thirty years before. The Industrial Revolution had become more widespread in its consequences, and the commercial crises after 1815 had increased

the misery and the discontent of the wage-earners. The neglect of internal affairs, natural during the war, still continued; in fact, it was greater, inasmuch as the upper classes no longer continued the patriotic sacrifice which they had formerly been making (in the shape of the payment of income taxes). The Tories had almost uncontested power.

But now great changes were perceptible, both within the ruling classes and in the new class of industrial workingmen. The Whigs soon lost their fear of any change in the traditional system; they even sought the help of the discontented to drive their opponents from power; and along with them many of the ruling classes desired reforms from humanitarian motives. On the other hand, the workingmen began to combine together by public demonstration and by agitation in the press, in order to make Parliament yield to their wishes.

It is not surprising that the Whigs succeeded sooner than the workingmen; their efforts were less in conflict with the economic interests of the ruling classes than were the workingmen's demands. Accordingly, particularly in the years following 1820, when the younger generation among the Tories had acquired greater influence, there was passed a whole series of reforms in accordance with the French ideas of equality and of humanity. The extraordinarily severe criminal laws were modified and brought nearer to Continental ideals. The penalty for poaching or for stealing a purse was no longer death. The tariff was lowered; above all things, the importation of wheat was permitted when the price stood at sixty-six (instead of eighty) shillings; that is, the profit which grain growers had been extorting from consumers by high bread prices was lowered. The exceptional laws against Protestant Dissenters, such as their exclusion from all public office, were abolished in 1828. In the following year Catholic Emancipation placed the Roman Catholics also on a footing of legal equality.

Many of these innovations were due to the divisions within the Tory party, which often gave the Whigs an opportunity to carry through their plans. But there was still lacking the decisive act which should open the way for radical reform. This did not take place until the workingmen had been able to call attention to their claims more effectively.

Immediately after the Treaty of Vienna there had begun a public agitation against the existing régime. The agitators were made up of workingmen thrown out of employment by the commercial crises. They were led by a few writers of small circumstances who did not

stand in with the plutocracy and who demanded a reform of the existing system "from the roots upwards"—called therefore "Radicals." They adopted "French ideas," particularly the idea of universal suffrage. The ablest journalist in this movement, a peasant's son named Cobbett, reduced the price of his paper to what according to the notions of the time was the extraordinarily low price of twopence, because he wanted "all the wage-earners and workers of England" to be roused for the fight for electoral reform. (For reasons which have been explained, this reform in England would mean a change in the system of government.)

So in 1816 and the following years there were public meetings to protest against the abuses and the misery of the workingmen. The government at first adopted an absolutely unconciliatory attitude. It refused to consider the demands of the demonstrators, and broke up their meetings by military force. Parliament voted strict regulations against "incendiary writings" and their authors.

But the agitation was not put down by such methods, and when, in 1819, a new commercial crisis set in, the revolutionary agitation began anew. This time it had its center in Manchester, that is, in the heart of the new manufacturing district. It was characteristic of the class character of the movement that it aimed particularly at the abolition of the corn laws, as well as at the political measures which have already been mentioned—universal suffrage, the secret ballot, pay for members of Parliament, etc. Since there were practically no independent small peasant proprietors in England, the interests of the consumers were practically identical with those of the poor in the matter of the corn laws. Again the government used troops and broke up a great meeting at Peterloo, near Manchester, which aimed at strengthening the demands of the Radicals. New and greater powers for the suppression of revolutionary agitation were conferred upon those who exercised police jurisdiction, such as the justices of the peace.

It was only gradually, and thanks to the influence of the younger generation, that certain concessions were made. In 1825 Parliament gave the workingmen at least a limited right of combination, although combinations for certain purposes, such as the abolition of piecework, were still forbidden. Their first great success, however, was the reform movement after 1830.

It was, indeed, not the July Revolution alone which led the Opposition to victory. To be sure, the fall of Charles X stirred the discontented elements in England, no less than in other countries. In various industrial centers there were formed political associations of

workingmen, and attempts were made to unite these hitherto scattered organizations into one national trade-union in order to force a minimum wage. But to this revival of agitation there were added two new factors which alone enabled reform to succeed.

One of these was the industrial prosperity which was becoming more and more apparent after the economic readjustment following 1815. The period of sharp alternations between overproduction and unemployment had passed. The opportunity for marketing goods was enormously extended by the use of the steam engine for transportation on land. (In 1825 was opened the first railway for the transportation of goods between Manchester and Liverpool.) English industry could now bear without injury certain burdens and limitations on the freedom with which capital had exploited labor. But at the same time the misery increased, corresponding to the increase in the number of people without the means of livelihood who could be sent to work in the factories and compelled to serve as apprentices. In 1827 it was estimated that almost two million people received state aid. It was less and less possible to ignore the demands of humanity.

The other factor which aided the Radicals came from one of the great middle-class political parties. The Whigs were no longer afraid of joining with the workingmen in order to overthrow the Tories. Monster meetings could now be held undisturbed. There were even threats of violence against manufacturers and opponents of reform; there were even the rumblings of a general insurrection. Under this pressure Parliament at last gave in and accepted the Whig Reform Bill of 1832. This passed the House of Lords, where the rich classes had a larger representation, by a small majority merely, and even then only after the Whig ministry had threatened to force the passage of the bill by the creation of new peers.

There can be no doubt that with the Reform Bill of 1832 the Old Régime in England was definitely set aside. But it would be a decided mistake to think that the bill replaced at once the old plutocratic government by a constitution of a French revolutionary nature, or that it erected a new government from top to bottom. The Reform Bill worked out as one might have expected from the composition of the victorious coalition and the legal form in which the change took place: it was a compromise and indeed a compromise in which the stronger partner, that is, the Whigs, carried away the lion's share of the booty. But this need not blind one to the importance of the fact that a reform in the sacred British constitution had been brought about owing to the demands of Radicals.

The way was now open for further reform, even for the complete adoption of the "French" system, and every reform in the franchise, that is, in the composition of the highest political authority, made the next reform easier. Furthermore, thanks to the bloodless and legal character of the political change, no reactionary tendency survived in active political life. Naturally there were not lacking Tories who were as much opposed to the Reform Bill after 1832 as before, but no practical politician could blink the fact that it would be impossible to restore afterwards what could not be rescued at that time from the attack of the Radicals. Never, therefore, has any attempt been made to go back on the step taken in 1832. The friends of reform had to encounter opponents who did not want to go any further, but never those who made reactionary restoration a part of their program. It is not necessary to explain more fully how much easier this made the task of further political reform.

After these general observations, the most important innovations of the Reform Bill and its consequences may be mentioned.

In the first place, the privileges of the large landowners were decidedly curtailed. To be sure, polling in public remained, but the polls were to be kept open for only two consecutive days. Above all things, the little boroughs in which members had been nominated exclusively by the landowners were now abolished. These "seats" were now redistributed and given particularly to the great cities which had arisen as a result of the Industrial Revolution. Further, the franchise was no longer bound up with possession of the soil (as had hitherto been generally the rule). Although persons who were quite poor and those who had no home of their own did not receive the vote, nevertheless householders who paid a rental of £10 annually were placed on the same footing in the boroughs as owners of houses.

This meant not only a considerable increase in the number of voters (one person in twenty-two instead of one in thirty-two), but also the inclusion of new classes in the ranks of those who exercised political power. The small bourgeoisie and the class of leaseholders now shared in the election to the House of Commons. The cities in the industrial regions of the north and west received parliamentary representation. On the other hand, the majority of the workingmen were still excluded from the franchise. In some towns whose population, owing to economic changes, consisted only of workingmen, the workingmen even lost a political advantage because such decaying boroughs were now deprived of representation in Parliament.

But it would be a mistake to conclude that the Parliament elected

on this new basis was as opposed to reform in favor of the workingmen as the old Parliament. An official investigation brought to light such frightful conditions among the working classes that the government stepped in and in 1833 through Lord Ashley's efforts passed the First Factory Act. Since people still held the doctrine that adults were in a position to look out for themselves, this Factory Act was aimed primarily at the protection of children, who had hitherto been exploited in the most pitiless fashion. Children under the age of ten could now be employed only eight hours a day, children from thirteen to eighteen years of age only twelve hours at the utmost. Night work for children was absolutely forbidden. To watch over these regulations, factory inspectors were created—the first invasion of the unlimited authority which manufacturers had exercised. The so-called truck system was also forbidden, that is, the abuse by which workingmen were paid in goods instead of in cash.

Ten years later this quite inadequate law was followed by another. In addition to children, women were now protected by the state, and the employment of small children was forbidden altogether. The mining law of 1842 put an end to the employment of women and of children under ten years of age in the mines. (It had been discovered that children only five years old were working twelve hours a day in the mines along with convicts.) A law of 1844 forbade the employment of children under nine years in the textile industries, and at the same time introduced compulsory attendance at school. A final step in this movement was the law of 1847, which established everywhere a ten-hour day for women and children. This law was all the more important because, owing to the character of the factory system, many adult male workers also now enjoyed the ten-hour day.

Supplementary to these laws was the Poor Law of 1834, which did away with the discretionary authority of the overseers of the poor, and for the first time placed in power paid officials who were independent of the local aristocracy. A central poor-law board was established which was given compulsory powers against the local magistrates. Similarly, care was taken for the improvement of sanitation and the maintenance of highways (which, in England, had been left to private initiative, as England was a country which was not open to military attack). The number of sinecures which had been parcelled out among the propertied classes was considerably reduced. In the towns the privileges of the "old families" were abolished and all taxpayers enjoyed the same rights (1835). In the

Established Church the bishop's pay was fixed at a definite sum (still very high) and the surplus was put in a fund out of which the hitherto badly paid parsons were to be supported.

All these measures, in accordance with the policy of the Whigs, were compromises. Nothing was overturned anywhere except what was necessary. Crying abuses were done away with, but nowhere was there an attempt at systematic construction. This, in general, gave satisfaction. There was compensation and advantage in that over-hasty changes were avoided, although the workingmen found themselves cheated in the outcome of the reform movement to which they themselves had given the impulse. It has been pointed out that the Parliament elected on the basis of the Reform Bill of 1832 was not wholly untrue to its program and passed a number of laws for the protection of women and children. But practically nothing had been done for the adult male workingmen, and the new franchise gave them no more share in the government than the old. The formation of a labor party or even of a strong radical group in the House of Commons was still as unthinkable as before. The workingmen had the feeling that they had been betrayed by the Whigs and they returned to their old policy of demonstrations. They also began to form purely class organizations. Under the leadership of the cotton manufacturer and philanthropist, Robert Owen, who for a long time had devoted himself to the cause of social reform, there was founded in 1833 (the year after the Reform Bill) the National Consolidated Trades Union. This aimed at "a new moral world" and proclaimed the eight-hour day as part of its program. Parliament was to be forced to give in by a general strike.

But the workingmen were still too poor to carry through such an undertaking. Not only did the manufacturers unite together in an opposing association the same year and agree to lock out all members of the workingmen's association, but the government also denounced Owen's association as an "unlawful conspiracy," and condemned several guilty persons to deportation. The government proved itself stronger than the poorly-paid workingmen, who were not able to carry through their strike. After only a year, the idea of a general strike was dropped as hopeless in 1834.

The result was much the same when shortly afterwards the radical party again began to act with the workingmen. This new phase of the movement is distinguished at bottom from the old only by the fact that, thanks to the intellectuals, the demands of the workingmen were set forth in a precise program called *The People's Charter.* This was the name given to the petition which was drawn up in 1838

and soon presented to Parliament. The *Charter*—whose advocates were known as "Chartists"—true to the principles of radicalism, laid the emphasis on demands of a political nature, that is, upon changes in the composition of Parliament, because it was expected that a Parliament elected by universal suffrage would at once fulfil the wishes of the workingmen (an expectation which was natural in England where there were practically no small peasants).

The agitation was now mainly carried on by the same methods as prior to the Reform Bill, that is, primarily with the aid of mass meetings, demonstrations, and occasionally revolutionary threats. Just as in the earlier period, the strength of the movement rose and fell; when trade was good, the agitation declined. In another connection, on the other hand, times were changed: the new Liberal government of the Whigs, which the Reform Bill had brought into power, did not attempt any measures of suppression.

The success of the Chartists was, however, no greater. The petition for the introduction of universal suffrage, which was presented to Parliament in 1839, was not even discussed by the House of Commons. Threats of violence were ineffective, though some isolated outbreaks did actually take place. The attempt at a general strike, which was to force Parliament to accept the Charter, had no better success (1842). A last effort of the Chartists in 1848, occasioned by the February Revolution in France, was nipped in the bud, partly with the aid of the bourgeoisie who came forward and volunteered as special constables.

Even before this, in 1845, the Trade Unions had separated from the Chartists and adopted a new policy which for a long time constituted the peculiarity of workingmen's conditions in England: agreements with separate employers were reached by means of arbitration or peaceful settlement; and, on the other hand, workingmen abstained from regular political activity and merely sought protective legislation from Parliament. The success of this policy was so great, that for more than a generation the revolutionary socialistic movement came to an end in England. Naïve observers, who thought that they could draw a general conclusion simply from the experience of one generation, believed that English workingmen had some mysterious trait in their character which simply spoiled them altogether for becoming socialists. As a matter of fact, this cessation of socialistic agitation was due to quite other reasons. Here only the most important may be mentioned.

In the first place, the steady growth and prosperity of English industry contributed essentially to an improvement in the condition

of workingmen. The more the market was extended for giant factory production, as a result of technical inventions and increase of purchasing power, due in part to the general increase in population and the establishment of colonies of Europeans (in America),—the more the market was extended in these ways, just so much more could better wages be offered to English workingmen without any misgivings lest the employer would really suffer in his profits. Foreign competition did not exist at all until the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

Thanks to the liberal provisions in the United States for poor immigrants who wanted to work (see below, ch. xv), the English workingman found on the other side of the ocean people of his own language and stamp and was able to rise and become independent without the economic system being in any way changed in his home country. In the 1830's there began to flow into the United States a great stream of English immigrants, which drained out of England precisely the elements which would have actively supported a revolution.

Finally, it must not be overlooked that the English government, after the system of conservatism had been broken in 1832, began to take up perhaps a passive, but by no means a hostile, attitude toward the workingmen. Parliament no longer laid obstacles in their way. Furthermore it did not demand of them any direct sacrifice for the state, such as universal military service. Therefore, so long as economic conditions remained relatively favorable, there could not develop any hatred against the system of government, which, as will be pointed out later (in ch. xxxii), was even ready to make further political concessions.

From the point of view of world history, perhaps this first phase of the English workingmen's movement is of most importance from the influence which it exercised upon the origin and form of international social-democratic doctrines. As is known, Engels and Marx drew their deductions primarily from the reports which were made by English official commissions into the conditions of the factory employees. Now it was quite natural that the critics of the capitalist factory system drew their examples mainly from English conditions; for Great Britain was the only country which had been fundamentally changed in character by the Industrial Revolution. It was also quite natural that they generalized from certain English phenomena, such as the fact that the Whigs as well as the Tories were a plutocratic party; this seems to have given rise to the Marxian phrase, "the reactionary mass." But more than this, certain

specific English conditions were conceived of in a wholly incorrect way, as if they prevailed everywhere. To mention only one misconception: it was maintained that economic development in agriculture tended toward the creation of great landed estates, just as it tended toward large scale production in manufacturing, a view which from the outset was applicable only to England and which involved a disregard of the question as to what attitude Socialism was to take toward a system of small peasant proprietors. Another example, perhaps, is the fact that the problems of military organization and of national defense find little place in the socialistic theory; these were questions which in Great Britain were not live questions, or, to put it more accurately, had no direct connection with the demands of the English workingmen.

. . . .

Finally, it may have helped to bridge over the gap between the workingmen and the upper classes that the reform party at last won a complete victory in the matter of the Corn Laws. Here, in closing the chapter, therefore, an account of this must be given, because it prepared the end of the economic Old Régime in England. Although the tariff on imported grain had been somewhat lowered (see p. 90), it was still in existence. The Corn Laws had two advantages. One benefited a definite class, the owners of the soil, since the tariff guaranteed the growers of grain a minimum profit. The second advantage affected the nation as a whole: the fact that domestic agriculture was protected seemed to make England independent of imported grain in case of war. Both these arguments, but especially the first, were, however, most strenuously combated by a group of manufacturers. It was not permissible, they said, to impose high bread prices on industry and particularly on the workingmen, simply to give a good profit to Tory landlords; as for war, there was no better way of preventing that than by general free trade. How many international conflicts had arisen from disputes about trade and tariffs! If only these restrictions upon international commerce were abolished, they said, then wars in general would become impossible; and then the last reason for the Corn Law system would disappear.

As is evident, the free trade movement did not merely aim at the abolition of the Corn Laws. It aimed at an establishment of a new world order based on peace in general. It naturally had its center, therefore, in Manchester, and the greater part of its advocates were in the circles of large manufacturers and merchants, but not exclusively so. With these classes were associated also numerous repre-

sentatives of liberal, pacifistic ideas. By the side of the chief propagandist in favor of free trade, the idealistically-minded cotton merchant, Richard Cobden, there stood a typical representative of radical doctrines, the Quaker, John Bright. It goes without saying that the Anti-Corn-Law League gradually won the approval of the workingmen, who were the very ones who suffered most directly from the Corn Laws.

Many of the theories of Cobden and his companions may be untenable as general propositions, but one can scarcely deny that they were thoroughly in harmony with economic conditions in Great Britain at that time. Now since the population of England had enormously increased as a result of the Industrial Revolution, the country had scarcely any other choice except to devote itself wholeheartedly to modern industry. To maintain the Corn Laws was to halt halfway; they made food dear without guaranteeing an adequate domestic production of food. If all the restrictions on industry and trade which had been imposed for the advantage of other classes were abolished, then these two branches of economic activity, on which the welfare of the British treasury finally rested, could flourish to their full extent. In addition, there was the uncontested superiority of English manufactured goods, which made competition of foreign factories still impossible; the English manufacturer needed no protective tariff for his products; likewise the English government needed no tariff for revenue, since its other financial resources were sufficiently productive. Finally there was the view, widely prevalent at the time, that the period of great European wars had gone by—that the period of peace, beginning in 1815, was the advent of an age free from war.

Under these circumstances Cobden's agitation was sure of success in the end. The Conservatives, that is the landlord party, sought at first, to be sure, to break the attack of the free-traders by compromises. In opposition to the rigid right wing of his party, the neo-conservative minister, Peel, lowered the tariff on grain in 1842; later he completely abolished the bounties on exports and reduced the duties on imports. But the famine of 1845 showed that the British Isles already had too great a population for even a limited system of protection on grain. The domestic production was no longer sufficient under any conditions.

In addition to this came a hitherto unknown potato rot in Ireland. Even if potatoes could have been used as a complete substitute for wheat, there was no guarantee that they would suffice to feed the population. Thousands died of hunger in Ireland at this

time. After this calamity, it was impossible to delay longer the final act: a majority of the Conservatives did indeed vote to retain the Corn Laws, just as formerly; but a seceding minority was strong enough, in combination with the Liberals, to secure a majority for the cause of free trade in the House of Commons. The Corn Laws were abolished in 1846.

The economic basis of the old Tory Party was thereby definitely destroyed. The Liberal Party of large manufacturers and merchants won the upper hand over the class of large landlords. To be sure, landowners retained their social prestige, but agriculture in England was no longer profitable. The possession of great estates became more and more merely a social luxury for families who drew their wealth from other sources. The military situation in the islands became much more precarious. As population increased and agriculture declined, the ultimate decision in a war with one of the great European Powers would now be determined exclusively by the question whether the British navy could assure the importation of the necessary food supply. By her lack of military preparation, England was forced more and more to adopt a policy of peace in Europe, and to avoid any European war.

But for the moment, the most important problem of English internal policy seemed to have been satisfactorily settled. Only one trouble remained, which, instead of losing its bitterness, became steadily more serious: the Irish question. For the sake of the clearness of the narrative, no account of it is given here, but it will be considered in a separate chapter below (ch. xx). Before this, it is convenient to explain the results of the Industrial Revolution which have been of most importance in world history: the settlement of Europeans outside the old continent, and in this connection the colonial policy of the European nations and its consequences during the first half of the hundred-year period which we are considering.

BOOK III

FROM THE OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO THE NEW

CHAPTER XV

EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

If the over-population of many European countries, which resulted chiefly from the Industrial Revolution and which necessitated the importation of food from abroad, found an outlet during the commercial crises in the first decades of the nineteenth century (as has been pointed out in the preceding chapter in connection with England), this was primarily due to the fact that the United States of America, with its still unsettled areas, offered the immigrant as ideal a land as could be imagined.

The geographical conditions were as favorable as the political ones. The mighty area commonly known as the Mississippi Valley, which, during the first half of the nineteenth century and even down to the 1880's, stood open for settlement, was endowed by Nature with all the advantages which could attract settlers who were without property, but able and industrious. Already Alexis de Tocqueville, the great French writer, in the book which he published in 1835, had recognized clearly the possibilities of westward expansion for the population of the United States. He pictured the Mississippi Valley as the most beautiful home which God had granted to mankind. Especially in the northern parts, that is, where slavery did not exist, the climatic conditions were quite tolerable for Europeans, although the ranges of temperature were sharper than in the corresponding latitudes in Europe. The main things, however, were the exceeding richness of the soil, the climate which was favorable to agricultural development, and the easy accessibility of the region, thanks to the great rivers and the flatness of the land which made the construction of railways very easy. No mention is here made of the wealth of coal and iron, because these were scarcely considered by the immigrants.

Now in the year 1815 the western part of this vast region was not settled at all, and even the part east of the Mississippi only to a very slight extent. There stood at the disposal of European immigrants a region which seemed endlessly available, judging by the rate at which population had grown hitherto. But the fact that this

opportunity could be, and was, used so abundantly was due to the political and social conditions no less than to the geographic.

Let us mention first the less important. One was the circumstance that the immigrants, who in the first decades came chiefly from Great Britain, found the same language, familiar customs, and similar laws; and even those from the central part of Europe found little that was strange in speech and custom. Then there was the fact that complete religious freedom existed; the settler nowhere needed to feel isolated because of his religious faith. But these conditions, however important they might be, were less so than the two decisive factors which first made the United States a regular paradise for fugitives from the economic bonds of Europe.

One of these factors was of a political, the other of an economic, nature.

The political factor consisted in the complete position of equality which was accorded to a colonist after a relatively short residence. He had a position of equality not only as compared with the natives and the older settlers on the newly cleared land, but also with the citizens of the United States in general.

It is necessary to digress a little to make the significance of this fact clear.

Possessors of land which has to be cleared for agriculture have naturally always tried to attract colonists by favorable conditions. Since the soil yields a profit only if it is cultivated, and since no particular motive exists for the hard work of preparing it for agriculture, this must be accomplished by offering rewards. Very often, therefore, colonists have been endowed with extraordinary privileges, even those who have been induced to settle by absolutist governments.

But in all these cases there was one simple calculation at bottom. Governments which forsook a part of the profit from newly-won soil hoped to be richly compensated through the profit which would come from bringing it into cultivation. But who would guarantee that when the work was once accomplished the promises which had had been made as an attraction would be lived up to? The privileges which the ruler had given to colonists were exceptional, and must in the course of time come to be regarded as anomalous. They were also often of merely relative value; they might be preferable to the heavy obligations put upon the ruler's other subjects, but still not sufficient to secure real independence to the colonist.

Now the American system was absolutely different. The United States was the first government in the world to abolish all legal

distinctions among all (white) settlers, so that not even the franchise was dependent upon property; this system of legal equality was then simply extended to the colonized areas in the west. As the Constitution of the United States recognized no distinction between old and new families, nor between landowners and merchants, so there was also no superiority as between the original thirteen colonies and the new states which were to be created. The so-called Ohio or Northwest Ordinance of July 13, 1787, has been called one of the most important laws of the United States (from the point of world history it is perhaps even the most important). It provided that every "territory" (colonial land which was given a provisional status preparatory to full statehood), so soon as it had a definite number of free inhabitants (60,000), should be incorporated into the Union as a state on equal terms with the others. Thus the principle was abandoned that the welfare of colonies ought to be subordinated to that of the mother country; rather was the principle established that colonies which are settled by a people are to be regarded as an extension of the mother country and are to be put on an equal footing with it in every respect.

To this wholly new principle was then added still another: that the law of possession in the newly settled land should be on the basis of small peasant proprietorship. From the outset (1785) Congress decided that the land west of the Alleghanies should not be held on a quit-rent or lease, but sold outright, free of obligations; this provision, which theoretically would have permitted the growth of large estates, was later (1820) made more democratic by lowering the minimum price of the soil and reducing the minimum quantity which should be sold to a single individual. The result was that any man with only a hundred dollars could acquire a half quarter-section (eighty acres) of public land, and even this purchase price, which requires a small sum of hard cash in addition to what must be laid out for buildings and stock, was soon declared no longer necessary. Although the law provided that settlements should take place only on surveyed land, that is, on the basis of a title derived from the state, nevertheless, in the years 1830-1840, a preferential purchase was accorded to the so-called "squatters," that is, persons who had settled on United States lands without any kind of legal formality. A man, therefore, who had cleared a piece of primeval forest could not be dispossessed by a speculator when his work was finished simply on the claim that the speculator had been the first to offer the purchase price for the land to the government. A generation later, the government went further. It has always been in accord-

ance with liberal political conceptions in the United States that industry and ability on the part of settlers shall take precedence over wealth, and the more democracy made its way the more the purchase price of land was lowered. The influence of the plutocratic South, however, steadily prevented taking the last step of giving the land to the settlers without any charge at all. But when the War of Secession took place between North and South, which will be discussed in another connection (in ch. xxiv), consideration for the plantation owners in the slave states was abandoned, and even this principle was given recognition. Scarcely a year after war had been declared, the so-called "Homestead Law" was passed in 1862. This permitted every adult man who was a citizen of the United States, or who expressed the intention of becoming one, to settle simply by paying a small fee. The settler promised to cultivate the soil. If he did this and cultivated his land uninterruptedly for five years, he acquired without cost full possession of his "homestead."

The result of these laws was that the United States attracted into the great Mississippi region not only a large number of industrious farmers, but also a permanent stock of small proprietors who grew up with the soil and who formed the strongest kind of a counterweight to proletarian influences from the manufacturing districts. This development was also favored by the circumstance that because of the enormous extent of vacant ground there were no agricultural day laborers, such as are necessary for farming a large landed estate. The elements in the population which in other countries would have belonged to this class, in America received land of their own. The extraordinary fertility of the soil demanded only a very small outlay of capital at the beginning. The possibility of having complete control over the soil, which resulted from the laws of the Union being extended over the whole territory, and especially from the lack of laborers just mentioned, further brought it about that measures were taken at the outset to provide for the marketing of the products. The period of settlement on a large scale coincides with the introduction of railways in the United States and the federal government quickly paid much attention to this new invention. Enormous areas of public land were provided with highways, canals, and above all with railways. So, one may say, from the very outset, farmers could reckon on a relatively developed transportation system, providing a market for their products. Similar, though perhaps without such great consequences, were the arrangements which the government made for education. The federal government, in fact, in-

sisted in the beginning that a relatively large part of the cleared land should be reserved for the benefit of common and agricultural schools. At first one, and later two, thirty-sixths of each "township" (each block of thirty-six square miles), into which the land was surveyed, had to be reserved for educational purposes. If one considers that the farmers settled almost exclusively on separate farms, instead of being grouped in agricultural villages, and that every small farmer working by himself felt personally responsible for the economic development of his land, then one can easily appreciate the significance of this care for systematic education.

The colonization of the North American continent was thus prepared by the United States in the very best way possible; but the fact that it took place with such unheard-of rapidity was, nevertheless, not due to the Americans themselves. In the first years of the nineteenth century the westward movement beyond the Alleghanies was already relatively strong. Both the farmers of New England and the southern "poor whites" (white inhabitants in the Southern states who had only a very few slaves or none at all) gladly sought the fertile soil or the more favorable conditions of life in the Mississippi Valley. As far as numbers go, this migration was moderate; it suffices to point out that in 1800 the United States had about five million inhabitants. But so soon as the Industrial Revolution, and also the period of peace after 1815, began to show results in an increase of population, there set in an ever-increasing immigration from Europe. Now began to be felt the full force of the circumstance that no other country offered settlers such favorable geographical, social, and political conditions as the United States. The number of European immigrants, which in the decade 1821-1830 numbered 143,000 (scarcely more than in the preceding decade), rose suddenly in the following ten years to almost 600,000. Still more striking was the increase in the next decade, 1841-1850: during this period 713,000 immigrants arrived. The same increasing ratio is seen in the numbers who arrived year by year: 1842 was the first year in which the immigrants numbered more than 100,000, but in 1847 more than 200,000 entered the United States.

It has already been explained why the United States did not experience any difficulties of the kind that most of the European countries faced. It was pointed out that, thanks to the complete legal equality which was assured to the new settlers, there were no fundamental conflicts between them and those who had been already long established; never could the immigrant have the feeling that

his economic interests were sacrificed or subordinated to those of the "mother country." But the complete political Americanization of the immigrant population was favored by still other circumstances. Some of these have been already mentioned, such as the fact that they were provided with land of their own; the school system may have helped to some extent, although it would appear that this influence has often been exaggerated. But there came the accidental advantage to America that the first crowds of settlers were made up of elements which could be fairly easily assimilated. The great majority of the immigrants came naturally from the over-populated countries of Europe in which the propertyless classes were blocked either by the existence of large landed estates or by the fact that the soil was already completely occupied. These were the conditions which prevailed in the 1830's and '40's, primarily in the British Isles, and especially in Ireland. From 1829 to 1879 more than half the immigrants (53 per cent) came from Great Britain and Ireland, and during the first decades of this period the percentage was a good deal larger still. The great majority of the new settlers were therefore at least acquainted in speech and in thought with the older colonists; they quickly felt at home. And though they did not lose their love for their old home, still they thought of themselves primarily as Americans. The second great stream of immigrants which began to flow in the 1850's from Germany (34 per cent of the total immigration in the years 1820-1879) also proved accessible to American influences. In speech and custom they differed from the Yankees more than the settlers from England, yet on the other hand they were attracted still more strongly by certain peculiarly American institutions. Not a few of them had left their Fatherland precisely because they missed there the equality before the law which they found in the United States; especially the numerous immigrants from the eastern provinces of Prussia, who had witnessed the failure of the Liberals to overthrow the power of the Junker landlords, were extraordinarily impressed by the contrast, and as a result were notably contented with the more favorable conditions in America. The same is true of the immigrants from Scandinavia, though their numbers were not large (three per cent); with them the main motive was the fact that the infertile soil of their mother country could not support a large number of inhabitants.

Still it would be a mistake to say that the origin of the immigrants was the dominating factor. It is not impossible that America would have had the same good success with immigrants from other

parts of Europe, for, aside from the beneficial laws, the enormous extent of vacant soil and the general economic organization of the United States were of prime importance. At the time of the great immigration between 1830 and 1860 America was still predominantly an agricultural country; large scale manufacturing was as yet inconsiderable. The immigrant therefore not only had an opportunity to acquire fertile land for almost nothing, but he was not enticed away by the rival attractions afforded by industrial establishments. There had not yet grown up the great factories seeking cheap foreign labor. It was therefore natural and dependent little, if at all, upon the nationality of the immigrants, that in these early decades they did not congregate in the great cities and manufacturing districts as they did later, but settled down on the soil as free peasant proprietors. No impartial judge, therefore, can say it is inconceivable, or even improbable, that in case the Italian immigration had been as large in the years 1830-1860 as it was later (in the years 1903-1906 when it formed 24 per cent of the total immigration), these Italians would not have made just as good farmers as the English, Irish, and Germans. One has only to think of the Argentine Republic, where agricultural colonization has been almost wholly in the hands of the Italians.

Be that as it may, it is a fact that the settlement of the Mississippi region took place under circumstances which were extraordinarily favorable to the United States, and that the rapid growth of the Union as a Great Power is due primarily to the large immigration from Europe. The North American Union of 1800, according to European ideas, was only a small state, if judged by its population of 5,306,000 (the later Belgium at this time had a population of three million); but by the year 1850, that is, before the immigration had passed the high point, the United States had already outstripped states like Prussia and had caught up with Italy (which indeed was only a geographical expression); and at the end of the century she was larger than any of the European countries (without their colonies), except Russia.

These are figures with which every one is familiar. But it has been less generally observed what an important consequence this rapid development had for the internal life of the European nations during the nineteenth century. In connection with English conditions it was pointed out above how the possibility of emigration to America lessened the discontent due to economic crises. The same is true of other countries. The United States was regarded as the Promised Land which gladly received those who were discontented

with their own country. It is naturally incapable of proof, but it is very probable, that the relatively peaceful course which the industrialization of Europe took in the second half of the century is in good part due to the safety valve which America afforded. To this was added the fact that the agricultural development of America made it essentially easier to provide food for the greatly overpopulated countries of Europe; that is, precisely because the immigration from Europe led to the rapid colonization of the United States, Europe had increased supplies of food placed at its disposal. How favorable the conditions were for the new settlers is shown by the fact that the number of those who were discontented or who voluntarily went back to Europe was extraordinarily small. To be sure, people who could not bear hard work and the other hardships of primitive frontier life were winnowed out without mercy. It was natural, also, that European intellectuals did not feel altogether comfortable in the midst of a population which was concentrating its whole effort in developing the soil and which gave little opportunity for urban culture in the European sense of the word. But if a melancholy poet, like Lenau, gladly bade farewell to the uncongenial atmosphere of America, he was simply the exception who proved the rule as to the great majority of the immigrants. This American pioneer territory (in contrast not only to Europe, but also to the older settled parts of America itself) was evidently of such a character that only practical work was highly regarded and achieved success. Because this is often overlooked in Europe, or because these transition conditions have been identified with American life in general, people have been led into the mistake of denying to the inhabitants of the New World any appreciation of spiritual and intellectual values. In his excellent work on "The United States of America," Paul Darmstädter rightly observes: "One can only rightly understand American history in the nineteenth century if he regards the opening up of the continent as the true task of the American people at this period, a task which was so colossal that the people had to concentrate all their strength upon its accomplishment."

There was only one obstacle to the free settlement of Europeans at the beginning of the period of great immigration (1830-1860). This was the slave system in the South. It has been already pointed out that one of the most important laws favoring settlement on homesteads could not be passed until after the secession of the Southern States. The opposition between the North and the South, however, was almost the only serious source of conflict which greatly

influenced the history of the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century. But an account of this conflict and its successful conclusion must be postponed until it can be considered in connection with its significance for world history.

CHAPTER XVI

THE FOUNDING OF A FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE IN NORTH AFRICA

Of a quite different kind, but equally *sui generis* and novel, was the French colonial empire which was founded about the same time in northern Africa. Brought about almost by chance, carried on originally not nearly so systematically by the government as the settlement of the Mississippi Valley, pursued under much more difficult conditions because the land was already occupied,—nevertheless the French colonization in North Africa affords many analogies with America. It stands in no less sharp contrast to the old colonial policy and methods of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries than does the American system of pioneer settlements.

The importance in world history of the French conquest of Algiers and the neighboring lands may be considered under three heads: the abolition of the danger from piracy in the Mediterranean; the creation of a new French colonial empire in the place of the one which had been almost totally destroyed in the eighteenth century; and the extremely novel and on the whole successful attempt to form out of natives and European settlers a new people, unified economically and in part politically, which should not stand in the relation of colonists to the mother country but which should be a part of France itself. This last point will be considered in detail later; the first two points, however, must be explained before the regular narrative begins.

First, as to the question of the "Barbary Pirates."

Economically and politically, as is well known, the northern shores of Africa belong much more to Europe than to Africa. Scarcely anywhere else do the lands around an inland sea form such a definite unity as in the case of the Mediterranean countries. The regions of North Africa which are cut off by the Sahara Desert from the main part of the continent are economically and geographically connected exclusively with the countries of Southern Europe. For centuries, therefore, there has been a close contact between Syria, the Balkan Peninsula, Italy, Spain, and Africa from Egypt to Morocco; even the split into two areas with different religious

creeds resulting from the Mohammedan conquest was not able to put an end to this close connection. Nevertheless it did help to bring about an altogether one-sided kind of separate development. It was natural that after a great Mohammedan empire grew up in Asia Minor and Constantinople, the followers of Islam should join it rather than the Christian nations of Southern Europe, with whom they had formerly been in the closest touch. So it came about that, at the beginning of the period which we are considering, all North Africa, with the exception of Morocco (which, however, did not belong to any European power), stood under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey.

This situation had extraordinarily serious consequences for the Mediterranean countries of Europe. It was not merely that the northern regions of Africa which were in part very fertile, such as Algeria, were withheld from exploitation by Europeans, nor that the harbors best adapted for trade with Northern Africa had been subjected to foreign rule and arbitrary practices; but it was the fact that the African shores, being beyond European control, created conditions which were positively harmful to Southern Europe. From the beginning of the sixteenth century, Mohammedan piratical princes had established themselves not only in Algiers, but also in Tunis and in other lairs along the coast. These pirates laid waste the shores of Spain and Italy and continually endangered the safety of commerce in the Mediterranean. No European traveller who risked embarking in the Levant for Italy or France could be sure that he would not spend the rest of his days in slavery in Algiers. Everywhere along the shores watch-towers had had to be built to warn the fisherfolk of Italy, Spain and France of the approach of the African corsairs. To be sure, the danger was no longer so acute as in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but still there were innumerable cases of robber attacks upon peaceful passenger and merchant vessels. The reader need be only reminded of Hebel's well-known story, "The Clever Merchant" (*Der Listige Kaufherr*), to be convinced that the fear of slavery in Algeria was not a mere fantasy of the imagination on the part of sailors a hundred years ago. Even Napoleon at Elba trembled at the thought of attacks by corsairs.

Now how should this be remedied? Unquestionably the only way to eradicate the evil was a permanent occupation of the places on the coast. Mere demonstrations or bombardments (such, for instance, as was made by the English against Algiers in 1816) were useless. For how could the Dey of Algiers ever seriously assist in

the suppression of his country's chief industry? Supposing permanent occupation was agreed upon, who should be given the task of carrying it out? The country to which the Great Powers would have preferred to give such a mandate, and which was in the best geographical position to carry it out, namely Spain, was in no position to do so. If Spain had been unable to conquer Algiers in the sixteenth century (doubtless largely because the country was deflected from its proper national aims by its connection with the conglomeration of territories under the Hapsburgs), it was now still less in a position to undertake any considerable military expedition (see above, p. 53). Still more impotent were the little Italian states. There remained, therefore, action only by some, or all, of the Great Powers.

But here at first the obstacles loomed larger than the conviction that something ought to be done. Joint intervention by the Great Powers was first rendered impossible through Austria's opposition. Prince Metternich was of the opinion, which was not without justice from the point of view of his own country, that an attack on the nominally Turkish territory of Algiers and Tunis would injure the prestige of Turkey, and would, therefore, indirectly benefit the Balkan policy of Austria's rival, Russia. England was interested in the commerce of the Mediterranean only to a small extent, because, prior to the building of the Suez Canal, the sea-borne trade with India went around the Cape of Good Hope. England, again, like the other powers, was opposed to any increase of the generally feared French state, and therefore refused its approval of any possible French mandate. To all this was added the general necessity for peace after the Napoleonic Wars and the desire to avoid all actions which might disturb the balance of power among the Great Powers which had been established with such difficulty. So it came about that the problem of the Barbary Pirates was indeed often discussed at the congresses of the European Powers, but armed intervention, which was the only way of putting an end to the evil, did not take place. Even the fact that the pirates sometimes extended their depredations to the North Sea brought no change in the political situation. The European Powers contented themselves with unheroic and awkward measures, like demands upon Turkey and the exaction of damages, as a means of checking the seizures made by the pirates.

Now, as to the other influence which the Algerian expedition had on world history: the founding of a new French colonial empire.

France had once equaled, if not surpassed, Great Britain in im-

portance as a colonial power. In North America, as well as in India, considerable regions had once been under French control. These settlements had by no means been without success. Since France, being the country which was then the most densely populated of all the Great Powers, was in a position to send peasants overseas, French Canada, at least, had enjoyed a prosperity which in its way can be matched by little in the old colonial history. But France was not strong enough in the eighteenth century to play the part of a Great Power both on the continent and in the colonies. Such a double policy was bound to fail on account of the weakness of the navy which had determined French foreign policy for a whole century and even under Napoleon. France had to give way everywhere before her rival, England, who often allied herself with France's enemies on the continent (as, for instance, in the Seven Years' War). So one piece after another of the French colonies was lost. Canada came under Great Britain; in India the French retained only a few coast towns, which could not serve as a base for the creation of a French colonial empire; and the vast Louisiana Territory had to be sold by Napoleon to the United States to prevent its falling into the possession of the hated English enemy. Thus, in 1815, the French colonial possessions had shrunk to small remnants on the north coast of South America, in the West Indies, on the Senegal River, and in India. What remained not only was of small importance in itself, but was in no way capable of extension.

There seemed small prospect that France would ever again be a colonial power on a great scale. In her foreign relations she was limited in all military action by the distrust with which she was regarded by the other European Powers. As far as over-population was concerned, she had no need to acquire new territory for settlement. The French Revolution, which had provided the peasants with land and legal equality, had brought so much free soil under intensive cultivation that, as has been already pointed out (p. 58), the French peasants had even less fear than in the eighteenth century of having too large families. And the advantage of colonial possessions in providing raw materials for manufacturing, which was so much emphasized later, was at this time scarcely mentioned. France, little industrialized, would scarcely have allowed herself to be moved in favor of colonial undertakings by such arguments.

So the only motives which remained were military prestige and the desire to banish from the world the scandal of the Barbary Pirates who were so hurtful to French commerce. As will be

pointed out, the Algerian expedition was actually undertaken merely from these motives; any thought of colonization or even of a conquest of the whole area did not exist originally.

The Algerian undertaking is one of those historical events which are greater than their originators could suspect. If any one had asked an experienced historical and political thinker on New Year's Day, 1831, which event in France during the past year appeared to him the most important, he would certainly have answered, "The July Revolution"; and on the basis of what he then knew he certainly could not have answered otherwise. The historian, who has the advantage of looking back on what has happened since, will probably come to a different opinion, and even if he were inclined to attribute to the fall of Charles X an importance equal to that of the conquest of the town of Algiers, he would scarcely dispute that the latter has brought in its train historical consequences as great as the former. The whole foreign policy of France in the last fifty years, and with it the policy of the other European states, has been turned into new paths by the fact that France again became one of the great colonial powers. This was solely due to the expedition against the North African pirates.

Before the consequences of this expedition are explained, the course of the events themselves must be given. First, a few words as to the internal conditions in Algeria and the nature of the country.

In 1815, Algiers, as has been said, was nominally under the Sultan of Turkey, but the connection with Constantinople had always been a loose one, and no change had occurred in this respect hitherto. Economically Algeria was independent of Turkey. The piracy upon which the ruling classes in Algeria lived was no part of Turkish policy and in fact was often inconvenient to Turkey. Practically, appointments in the government in Algiers were made independently of Turkey to suit the Algerians themselves. The main power was exercised by a kind of body of Janizaries, called "Odschaks," whose leaders chose the Dey. The Sultan of Turkey merely confirmed the choice. With the Odschaks the Christian states were unable to come to any peaceful agreement, for they simply lived by piracy. The Turkish Janizaries had often been dangerous to the peace of Europe, because they were personally interested in war; but in the case of the Odschaks, the situation was much worse. Their very existence depended upon piracy. The Turkish government of the time might contemplate annihilating the Janizaries (see above, p. 43), but the Dey of Algiers would have

overthrown the very foundation of the Algerian system of government, if he had attempted to curb the Odschaks. Under these circumstances it was also equally out of the question to attempt to develop the natural wealth of the country. Yet an ordered government and systematic cultivation of the soil afforded the attractive prospect of great profits. About two-thirds of the strip of coast lying north of the plateau region, an area about the size of South Germany, is suited to intensive cultivation. Cereals, vegetables, olives, and grapes grow abundantly. The plateau itself affords excellent pasture for cattle raising and even the grass in the waste stretches to the South proved itself in later decades an excellent material for making paper.

But all this wealth lay unavailable under the rule of the pirates. Highways were lacking; above all things, irrigation systems were lacking. Without these nothing could be done; for the great danger which threatens the cultivation of the soil in Algeria is drouth.

Now, as to the history of the French conquest itself.

The first decision to undertake an expedition against Algiers is to be found in the desire of the French government to make a display of military prestige in order to draw the attention of the public away from domestic troubles. This was the same motive which led to French participation in the Greek War of Independence (see above, p. 64). The government of Charles X evidently believed, as did so many other statesmen within and without France, that it is possible to make people forget the errors of the government at home by military successes—a view with which they can hardly be reproached when one considers how often this mistake has been repeated since then. In no other lands have genuine liberals and intellectuals been so little inclined to allow themselves to be deceived as to the errors of internal policy by military glamour. The First Napoleon was not popular in his day in France; Charles X was not helped by his expedition to Algiers; and under the Third Napoleon the intellectuals with few exceptions remained to the end in opposition. Be that as it may, the government of Charles X decided to achieve an easy triumph for French arms in Africa, and at the same time destroy the home of the pirates.

When this decision had once been reached in Paris, it was easy to find a pretext for intervention. In the commercial relations between France and the Dey, friction had not been lacking. The Algerian government demanded that the French should pay a higher sum for the permission to fish for corals at La Calle, to the east of Bona. It also demanded that two Jewish bankers, who had for-

merly delivered grain to the French Directory, should immediately pay all that they owed. In the negotiations over this matter, an unfortunate diplomatic incident occurred: on April 30, 1827, the Dey of Algiers hit the French consul with the handle of his fly-flapper. A more serious breach of diplomatic etiquette followed. When, upon the request of the consul, some French ships appeared in the bay of Algiers to demand apologies from the Dey, one of the boats bearing the envoys was fired upon on August 3, 1829. Paris at once answered by sending an expedition to Algiers.

The preparations for this expedition, which took place during the last months of Charles X's reign (May to July, 1830), went forward smoothly and rapidly. A large army was landed near the capital, and before a month had passed Dey Hussein had to capitulate. Algiers was occupied and the Dey himself was shipped away to Asia Minor along with his harem, his ministers, and twenty-five hundred Janizaries.

Then the question arose as to what should be done with this land without a ruler. As has been indicated the French originally had no idea of conquest and still less any intention of making Algeria into a French colony. Although, even in the first years, some people insisted that Algeria might become for France what India was to Great Britain, still the government remained hostile to such views. And even if it had wished to lend an ear to the plans of conquest suggested by army officers, it would at first have been frightened by the many obstacles which stood in the way of annexing Algiers. So long as the July Monarchy was not firmly established (see above, p. 70), the new régime could not afford to come into conflict with the peacefully inclined public of France; nor could it come to a breach with England, which, from the outset, very strongly disapproved of this Algerian undertaking by its rival. Nevertheless, events eventually proved themselves stronger than the intentions of the government, and in the course of a few decades Algeria was not only completely conquered by France, but was even settled in part by Frenchmen. Military and economic motives had worked together. The military motive had been decisive in the occupation of the country, and the economic motive in carrying out the settlement and the social reforms.

For the sake of clearness in the narrative these two movements will be considered separately, although they mostly took place at the same time. First, so much as is necessary in regard to the military events.

The original and very beneficial idea had been to put an end to

the piracy along the Algerian shores. This program was at first closely followed. After capturing the town of Algiers, the French did not press on into the interior, but contented themselves with occupying a number of places on the coast, in order to get control of all the little retreats from which the North African corsairs had been accustomed to conduct their attacks in the Mediterranean. But it soon appeared that this was only half the task. The French quickly saw that the places which they occupied would have to be regarded as unsafe unless they got control of the *hinterland,* or adjacent region in the interior. The Kabyle and Khroumir tribes on the plateau had accustomed themselves to the presence of the pirate kings who were of the same Mohammedan religion; but they were unwilling to tolerate Christians in possession of their coasts. The neighborhood of the coast towns was continually attacked by tribes which undertook raids against the French from the region of the plateau. Soon it was a question, not merely of regular robber attacks such as had often taken place in the time of the Dey, but of an organized resistance. The attack was made from both sides: from the west Abd-el-Kader, the Emir of Mascara (southwest of Oran) opened hostilities; from the east, Hadschi Achmed, Bey of Constantine.

The most dangerous and important of these two enemies seemed, at first, to be Hadschi Achmed, because he ruled over the rocky fortress of Constantine, which was regarded as impregnable, and also because he raised a claim to the coast town of Bona, which the French had occupied. So at first the French followed the plan of making concessions to Abd-el-Kader, in order to concentrate their main attack with such moderate forces as they had upon suppressing Hadschi Achmed.

But precisely this policy compelled the French gradually to throw in larger forces. For the two leaders opposed to them were not to be easily overcome; and while in general it was not desirable to leave them wholly alone, such a policy was still less to be thought of after French prestige was at stake on account of defeats due to underestimating the strength of the enemy. This was true of the attack from the west as well as from the east.

Abd-el-Kader, Emir of Mascara, was the kind of military hero that one only meets with in half-civilized regions and in novels. A young man (about twenty-five years old), and a perfect type of Arab, he united all the qualities which go to make up the ideal military leader in the Orient: supple body, light complexion, broad forehead and eagle nose. He was a bold horseman, at the same

time as holy and learned as he was warlike; a poet and a prophet who knew how to interpret the Koran, and who, in spite of his youth, had already made one pilgrimage to Mecca. Scarcely had he ascended the throne on the death of his father, when he summoned all true believers to a "Holy War," and opened hostilities in the neighborhood of Oran.

The French government, which, as has been said, did not want to undertake a regular war, tried at first to come to some friendly agreement with the Emir. They did not suppose they need fear him, because one of his attacks on a coast town shortly before had failed. So, on February 26, 1834, General Desmichels signed a treaty with Abd-el-Kader by which the Emir merely promised to recognize French rule over three coast towns to the west, while the French government recognized Abd-el-Kader as owner of "the whole west,"—that is, accorded him supreme power over various tribes which had hitherto been independent. But the Arab hero did not live up to the terms of the treaty. On the contrary, he extended his robber attacks still further, and even dared to come in person close to the city of Algiers. Becoming ever bolder, on June 28, 1835, he risked an attack upon regular French troops, near Oran. In this he was successful. The little French force was beaten and forced to leave a number of their wounded in the hands of the enemy, who maltreated them most cruelly. This catastrophe now stirred the French government to more energetic action. A regular army was despatched against the Emir's capital at Mascara. Abd-el-Kader was naturally not able to face such an attack. His capital was occupied and in part destroyed. Then the French troops retreated at once to the coast, because for the present they wanted to wage war only to the east.

There, as has been stated, Hadschi Achmed, Bey of Constantine, who had formerly been under the Bey of Algiers, was now seeking to establish an independent kingdom at Bona. Treacherous natives hinted to the French that the Bey's capital could be easily captured. The French commander-in-chief, General Clauzel, put faith in these suggestions and with a small army (8-9,000 men) undertook an advance against Constantine. But the hints of his informers proved absolutely false. The city resisted in a way for which the French were not at all prepared. Soon the French army had to begin to retreat again to the coast. It was only with difficulty that it succeeded in reaching the protecting walls of Bona.

This failure demanded more energetic intervention by the French, if they did not want to risk endangering their occupation of the

coast towns. Once more the French government signed what was for them a very unfavorable treaty with Abd-el-Kader, in order to have peace on the west. At the same time they dismissed Clauzel and organized an army against Constantine which was equipped for a regular siege. Naturally the Mohammedans could not resist such a serious attack. Bravely as the Arabs defended themselves, Constantine was captured after a few days of bombardment on October 13, 1837, and the rule of Hadschi Achmed came to an end.

The conquests in the eastern parts of Algeria were thus made secure. But in the west the enemy still remained. Abd-el-Kader proved himself an increasingly dangerous opponent. He had used the interval of the attack against Constantine to create a small force of soldiers drilled in the European fashion. As has happened so often since then, he united with the kindred folk in Morocco further west. In order to have a base and also a refuge from the French, he had made an alliance with the Sultan of Morocco and become the latter's vassal. With the honored burnous which he received from the Sultan, he was now ready to proclaim a Holy War in an even grander style than before.

Abd-el-Kader used a real or alleged infringement of the Treaty of 1837 as a pretext for declaring war on the French in 1839. Immediately afterwards he made a sudden attack on the village of Mazagran where a hundred or so French riflemen had intrenched themselves. The attack failed, thanks to the heroic defense of the French (February, 1840), but it made a great impression, and there was everywhere the feeling that Abd-el-Kader could be rendered harmless only by being systematically crushed. Now, for the first time, the method of improvised separate actions was replaced by a careful and well thought out plan. The whole military organization and equipment was modified to suit the conditions of African warfare. The new aim was the continuous pursuit of the enemy into all his retreats,—a steady offensive. For this purpose the creation of new troops, *Zouaves* or *Spahis,* was necessary. For these even natives were recruited. The uniform was made more convenient; the little *képi* took the place of the *shako;* the heavy buffalo-leather belts disappeared; and in place of wagons, mules were used. The French officers who had almost all now received a training in Algiers accustomed themselves to a kind of tactics different from what was necessary in Europe. Since it was not intended to undertake wide-reaching strategic operations against the fugitive Kabyles, it mattered little that the intelligence service between the separate corps was very poor, and that every officer went ahead in his own

district on his own hook, without bothering himself about the marching routes of the others. In this way French generals lost the training in operating against an enemy who thought out his plans, as proved fatal in the later wars of Europe, particularly in the War of 1870. Finally, it may be noted that the new Governor, Bugeaud, now had for the first time at his disposal a really large army (about 100,000 men).

With such preparations as these it was not difficult to overcome the natives. Abd-el-Kader was quickly driven out of the region south of Oran where lay his capital, Mascara. Soon the French pressed forward to the high plateau. There, near Taguin, a small body of troops under the Duke d'Aumale captured the Emir's whole *Smala* (the tents and the entire military equipment). The most important towns in the plateau, like Biskra, fell at once into the hands of the victors. A small force even dared to push forward to the Sahara Desert, so that the plateau could be regarded as having been pierced from north to south.

Only one discordant note marred the success. The elusive Abd-el-Kader had again escaped. He had fled into Morocco, a neighboring state which was hardly friendly to the French. Algeria was now troubled by invasions of Moroccan tribes. The Sultan refused to expel Abd-el-Kader. Thereupon the French bombarded the two most important ports in Morocco, Tangier and Mogador. At the same time, General Bugeaud advanced by land. The large but untrained Moroccan army was easily destroyed at the river Isly, which formed the boundary. The Sultan had to give in, although encouraged by the English who were afraid of having the French get a foothold in Morocco. On September 10, 1844, the Moroccan government signed the treaty of Tangier, in which it promised to expel Abd-el-Kader and to recognize French authority over all Algeria within what had been the Turkish boundaries.

After he was thus cut off from any support from Morocco, Abd-el-Kader's fate was regarded as sealed. To be sure, thanks to his superhuman cleverness, the brave chieftain succeeded for three years in evading the French in the mountainous region to the south of his former capital. He even inflicted some bloody attacks upon his enemies. But his situation was hopeless. On December 23, 1847, he begged for mercy and surrendered. He was then interned at Pau, in Southern France; later he moved to Damascus. Algeria could now be regarded as wholly in the control of the French. What followed was more in the nature of police than military measures. In the 1850's they succeeded in bringing even the tribes south of

the plateau and north of the Sahara to recognize French rule. The warlike Kabyles south of the city of Algiers were subdued by MacMahon in 1857. But these undertakings were of secondary importance in comparison with the work of colonization which then began, and which will now be described.

In accordance with the program with which the French had undertaken the expedition against Algiers, the colonization of the land was undertaken very timidly at first. The conditions were far from being so favorable as in America. On the one hand, Algeria was already a settled country; on the other, it was out of the question for the French to force the natives into a position of slavery or serfdom, and make them work for the victors, as the Spanish had once done in South America. The French, who had already forbidden the slave-trade and in 1848 had even abolished negro slavery in Algiers, could not go back to this form of exploitation. A certain difficulty also lay in the fact that France, not being over-populated, would have to hold out relatively large advantages in order to attract Frenchmen to settle in the region.

But it was equally certain that nothing but colonization with generous state support could transform Algeria into a valuable possession. It has already been pointed out that the natural resources of Algeria could not be made available unless public works were undertaken on a large scale. The mere occupation of the coast and the establishment of a few trading establishments, even though provided with privileges favoring French trade, would have brought in practically nothing; the cost would presumably have exceeded the financial returns. The country first had to be put in a condition to yield up its products. And for this, besides settlement by European laborers, state support was necessary.

It was, however, a long time before the French government could make up its mind to this. It was not in accord with Louis Philippe's prudent parsimony to become involved in weary undertakings where profits were uncertain. Adolphe Thiers was almost alone for a long time in advocating expenditures on French colonization. After a governor-generalship had been established in 1834, the Molé ministry finally adopted a compromise in 1838. They renounced the idea of making all Algeria into a French colony at one time. Their program was a gradual occupation, supported by the building of towns and highways. They proclaimed: "France is going to revive Roman Africa."

This program was undertaken at once and carried out systematically. Not only were highways laid down, but a great deal was

done in the way of irrigation and afforestation. It now became possible to exploit the fertility of the soil. The more industrious part of the population, which under the Deys had been scarcely more than an object of exploitation by the state, was now given legal security and could engage in commercial undertakings without being disturbed. The native Jews who had always controlled the trade of the country were raised to French citizenship and given an interest in the rule of the foreigners.

Somewhat later colonization proper was taken up. The government insisted that their efforts for the improvement of agriculture should not benefit the native population merely. European settlers ought to be attracted both to serve as a body of reliable dependents and as centers for spreading European influence.

The undertaking did not seem easy. Neither was there as much land available as in America at that time, nor was it to be expected that a country which first had to be improved by public works would be sought out by classes which were forced to emigrate, that is, by those who had no property.

But the government knew how to overcome these difficulties. In the matter of the land they were aided by circumstances. Through the expulsion of the Dey the government had come into possession of considerable land, altogether about as much as the former Grand Duchy of Baden or the State of Connecticut; these were lands which had been formerly Turkish military colonies and also leased lands in possession of Beys. In addition to these, there were added in the following years numerous estates, confiscated because their owners had participated in insurrections led by Abd-el-Kader and others; and many lands were taken which had no owner or heir.

These state domains were then rounded out through purchases made in the ordinary commercial way or by expropriation, so that they could serve as centers of colonization for the settlers. Settlement then took place by villages as was necessary for safety. The government saw to it that every village formed an independent economic unit. There were not only peasants, but also artisans. The size of the parcels of land which were given to the settlers varied according to their occupation: an artisan received a smaller plot than a tiller of the soil. The more important industries had to be established in each village; black-smithing and carpentry were obligatory occupations. In each village some common land was reserved.

It was more difficult, as has been said, to attract European settlers. Here the government itself had to give assistance. And here also it

accomplished its task to the fullest extent. At first the state took over a considerable part of the initial expenditures. It was the state that built streets in the new villages, saw to it that there was drinking water where Nature did not provide it, and undertook the erection of public buildings and schools. Indeed, it occasionally went further and provided the necessary working capital to concession holders. During the first period (1841-1860), and again later (1871-1883), the soil was placed at the disposal of the colonists without charge. The settler merely undertook to cultivate the land, plant trees and so forth, and settle there for a considerable time (five or nine years). The system was therefore similar to that in America where, however, the conditions in general were much more favorable. As in America, up to 1870 non-French persons were also admitted—numbers of Germans, Italians and Spanish.

Nevertheless, all these efforts, at a time when America stood open to immigrants without limit, would not have succeeded in attracting a sufficient number of settlers to the Algerian soil unless other means had come to the aid of the government. Among these were industrial crises, like that of 1848, when some two thousand workingmen were shipped away from Paris to Algiers. Fortunate, from this point of view, was Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871; numerous Alsatians preferred to emigrate to Africa rather than fall under German rule. But the government found its most regular and, so-to-speak, normal colonization material in the numerous soldiers who, during their long years of war against the natives, had come to regard Algeria as a second home. Noteworthy is the fact that the government took care that these soldiers, who were usually unmarried, should remain Frenchmen, and not become fathers of a mixed race. In the 1840's (that is, at the time when Algeria did not yet afford much attraction to civilians), soldiers who had served out all but two years of their time were sent home for the purpose of choosing and bringing back a French wife. They were then relieved of the remainder of their military service and were given a piece of land with the necessary means for its settlement. Indeed, the government even became to some extent a matrimonial agency. In Toulon there was opened a regular marriage market; soldiers on leave who had been unable to find in their home town any fair companion for life could go to the "Depot for Marriageable Girls" which was established under the chaperonage of the best women in this naval port; there each could choose a wife very quickly. Since the African army did not afford a large enough number of colonists, the French minister of war summoned dis-

banded soldiers who were living in France to go and settle in Algeria.

It is significant that the colonists were able to remain Frenchmen in the full sense of the word. Just as the frontiersmen in the American Middle-West had just as full political rights as the citizens in the older states in the East, so complete political equality was established between Frenchmen who settled in Algeria and those of the mother country. As far back as 1848 the Second Republic divided the colony up into departments on the model of those in France, and gave the colonists the right to elect deputies to the French legislature. Three years later, in 1851, all tariff barriers between Algeria and France were removed. The colony, both politically and economically, was to be simply "an extension of France." Although in the later years of the Second Empire (particularly after 1860) there was a reaction against this liberal régime, the colonists being deprived of their parliamentary franchise and the natives given larger rights, this was merely a brief episode. After 1870 the Third Republic again gave the settlers their franchise. Furthermore, the nationalistic Arab uprising which broke out as a result of the French defeats in Europe, as well as from the change in administrative principles and the favors shown to Jews, had this favorable result for colonization, that large areas of land became available. The lands of the Kabyles who had taken part in the insurrection were confiscated, and their estates, which were among the most fertile in Algeria, could be assigned to new colonists (for example to the Alsatians who have just been mentioned in another connection). The importance of this was seen clearly later when available land began to be rare. The colonists even urged expropriating the lands of the native tribes, but the French government was never willing to adopt such a measure, although the difficulty of extending the land occupied by Europeans was essentially increased by their refusal.

There was one defect, however, which all these regulations had not been able to overcome: the relatively insufficient number of French colonists. The measures of the French Government had resulted in Algeria being gladly sought by settlers from other European countries; but where was France to find the surplus of peasants needed for Algeria? Being a country of frugal, small peasant proprietors, who limited the number of their children in order to prevent a partitioning of inherited land and property, France was not ordinarily in a position to afford settlers for Africa; and other immigrants than peasants could be made use of only exceptionally, as, for instance, in the case of the factory employees sent out

from Paris in 1848, who had not turned out well. Thus the European immigration was by no means insignificant, but it took place almost wholly from countries where large landed estates prevailed and where there was less prudence in the limitation of families than in France; that is, chiefly from Spain, from which three-fifths of the non-French immigrants came, and from southern Italy, which sent two-fifths. The French "immigration" (i. e., new French settlers) consisted almost exclusively of descendants of Frenchmen who had already settled in Algiers. Now the law of 1889, that every one born on French soil is a Frenchman, applied to Algeria also, according to the principle of the legal equality of the two countries. And although the sons of the immigrant Spaniards, (who settled mostly in the western parts of the colony near Oran), and of the Italians (chiefly in the east near Constantine) were thus made legally Frenchmen, nevertheless they did not lose their original national sympathies, especially in the rivalry which arose between Italy and France over the possession of colonial territory in Africa. And in view of Italy's slight possession of territory available for settlement at that time, this circumstance proved of considerable importance in foreign politics.

So it is not easy to form a judgment as to the success of the French colonial experiment in Algeria. From an economic point of view the undertaking has certainly been a success. The export of agricultural products of all sorts, which was very slight before the expedition of 1830, has increased to an extent of which the French may be proud. It is profitable chiefly to France, which has monopolized the shipping trade between Algiers and the mother country, so that the growing prosperity of the colony has also been of advantage to the French merchant marine. The restoration of good order in the interior, which involves a continuance of military rule only in the south, and the building of highways and railways by state support, has permitted the cultivation of regions in which agriculture had not been profitable since the days of the Romans. Piracy has totally disappeared from the Mediterranean. But from the political point of view, these are advantages which have benefited the subjects of other states more than those of France. To be sure, the law declares children of foreigners to be Frenchmen, and one may perhaps see in this an advantageous artificial increase of the French population. But these foreigners have come in such large numbers that it has not been possible to assimilate them, and intervention by foreign states is not absolutely out of the question for all future time.

But aside from this problem, which is not at present acute, the occupation of Algiers by the French has been of the very greatest importance in its influence upon world history and upon the relation of the European states to one another in the second half of the nineteenth century. France has come into a wholly new relation to the other European states by becoming again a colonial power. If she wished tc maintain the external and internal safety of her African possessions, she was obliged to round out her colony, or at least to strengthen it, by spheres of influence in the East and West, so that she would neither have to fear an attack nor be subject to native insurrections that would be supported by tribes of kindred race or religion in Tunis or Morocco. French policy, therefore, came to be opposed by all Powers which had a claim to either of these lands. Indeed, any action looking toward the preservation of the independence of Tunis or Morocco was regarded by France as dangerous to French interests; for here independence meant the possibility that the almost unceasing revolts and "Holy Wars" of Arab tribes in Algeria would be secretly supported by their neighbors. Details in regard to this must be reserved for treatment in another connection (in ch. xxix). But here it may be pointed out that the importance to France of controlling Tunis has for a long time been a determining factor in French relations with Italy; and the necessity of securing Morocco for the sake of Algeria has had a powerful influence on her relations with Great Britain and later with Germany.

The other results of the Algerian expedition can be touched upon only very briefly. The technical military consequences of the colonial wars have already been mentioned (see p. 121). A result of a different kind is the influence which the successful occupation of Algiers later had upon the conquest of the Sudan. There can be no doubt that scarcely anything has contributed so much to the new national spirit which gradually developed in France after the catastrophe of 1870, and to the reawakening of a certain self-confidence and optimism resulting from positive successes accomplished, as the participation in the victorious undertakings which have so extended the bounds of Algeria to the south. All these military events would, however, have been unthinkable if it had not been for the expedition of 1830.

CHAPTER XVII

RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN ADVANCE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN ASIA

RUSSIA'S colonial activity in Asia, at least in the first decades of the period we are treating, was of an altogether different kind. Here the idea of settlement was decidedly subordinate; and many of the conquered regions were in fact little suited to settlement. As for the most important colonial territory, namely Siberia, the preparatory work of conquest had already taken place in earlier centuries; by the end of the eighteenth century the main part of the territory was in the firm possession of the Tsars. Finally, Russia had even less need than France perhaps to find free soil for an excess population.

Nevertheless, the conquering expeditions which Russia undertook about the middle of the nineteenth century and later to round out and extend her Siberian possessions toward Central and Eastern Asia must be considered from the point of view of world history and of the extension of European rule throughout the world. Through coming into conflict with hitherto independent Asiatic empires, of which the greatest was China, the Russians not only extended the territory where Europeans prevailed, but they also gave a practical proof that the Asiatic empires under existing conditions could not possibly offer a permanent resistance to the new forces at the disposal of the European Powers. Asiatics were brought to see that they could make a stand against their oppressors only in case they appropriated as their own the technical improvements which Europe had made. Otherwise, little states would disappear altogether; and great ones, like China, would at least have to consent to humiliating sacrifices. The expeditions of the Russians have contributed to the "Awakening of the Far East" in the same way, though perhaps less publicly, as the English attacks on China, which will be spoken of in the next chapter.

The fact that Russia at that time had no need of free soil for settlement was due to several reasons. The most important of these was that the mother country, European Russia, still had room for an increased population. The Russian empire was so thinly settled,

the cultivation of the soil was of so primitive a nature, and transportation was developed to so slight an extent, that a denser population would not have been harmful, but positively beneficial. A greater number of agricultural laborers would have meant more intensive cultivation of the soil, better means of transportation, and, consequently, increased agricultural production, without the owners of the soil having to pay individually any more for the support of their laboring population. That this is true can be best illustrated by the history of the system of large patrimonial estates in Russia.

One difference in development between Russia and Western and Central Europe is seen in the Russian legislation and custom which never accorded the right of primogeniture to the nobility. In Russia feudalism always remained unknown, and so the old law of inheritance was retained; noble estates (which meant simply all the estates, since only nobles could hold land) were divided equally among male descendants, without the eldest son, or any son, being given a preference. When attempts were made to Europeanize Russia, some Tsars, to be sure, attempted to acclimatize in Russia an exotic growth like primogeniture. Peter the Great made a short-lived attempt of this kind; and, during the time of which we are speaking, Nicholas I made a new effort to establish a land-owning aristocracy on the West European model. A ukase issued in 1845 gave every noble the right to found one or more landed estates based on primogeniture. The Tsar had evidently observed that in Western Europe large landed estates formed the strongest barrier against liberalism. As war against liberalism was his life task, and as he wanted to erect a similar dam in Russia against revolutionary floods for the present and future, he planned the founding of large landed estates with at least two thousand peasants and twelve thousand rubles income. But his scheme had only small success. Russian traditions proved too strong an obstacle. There was lacking the pressure of military necessity, which in Western Europe had formerly given rise to the institution of primogeniture—an institution foreign to Roman, as well as to German, law. Only a few such estates were founded, and there is no evidence that they in any way modified the political development of Russia.

The full significance of this fruitless effort on the part of the autocratic Tsar is seen only when one considers that in spite of it the great estates in Russia have not been divided up into small parcels, nor has the basis been shattered on which the existence of the Russian great seigneurs rests. While in Western and Central Europe the free partition of estates led either to the destruction of large

landed estates or to the impoverishment of the nobility, this was not the result in Russia. This was not due to any artificial attempt to limit the birth rate. Infant mortality even among the leading families in Russia was indeed greater than in other countries of Europe. But even if what seems to be a large percentage of the children died before becoming of age, Russia was far from reaching a "one-son condition," which in other countries of Europe was generally the only way to obviate a dividing up of the paternal inheritance. The reason that large landed estates did not cease to exist lies simply in the fact that there was an enormous extent of territory available in Russia, and that the more intensive cultivation which has been spoken of made it possible for a piece of the paternal inheritance to yield as much as all the family land had formerly produced. "In many parts of the empire," observes A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "the produce of the soil for a long time increased so rapidly that estates were often doubled or trebled in value in twenty or thirty years, indeed, sometimes became even ten times as valuable. It might happen that two or three sons who had divided a paternal inheritance would each become as rich as his father had been when he was at their age."

Clearly Russia had no need to seek out new colonial lands. Only when these conditions are taken into consideration is another institution seen in its right light. One might be inclined to regard serfdom as an obstacle to Russian colonization. One is tempted to say that the lack of excess agricultural labor is due to the fact that Russia in the first half of the nineteenth century had no free peasants; that the *mujik* was bound to the soil and could scarcely get permission to depart from his master's land, leaving it uncultivated, and emigrate to Siberia. But such a way of looking at the matter does not go to the bottom of the question at all. Even if Russia had already been over-populated, one does not see why the landlord should have refused to permit unemployed laborers to emigrate if they paid some compensation in money. That this would have been possible is shown by the fact that there were numerous serfs who plied a trade in the country districts or in the towns instead of cultivating the soil to which they were bound by law. Indeed, it was a common practice to have the obligatory work in the fields (three days a week) replaced by an annual substitute payment in money, the so-called *Obrok*. This practice was particularly common in the less fertile regions; the peasant remained, to be sure, under the authority of his master and could be called back to the fields at any time; meanwhile, however, he devoted himself to some occupation

in the town. Why could not some similar arrangement have been made for the benefit of the serfs who might have wanted to leave Russia, if it had really been over-populated, and seek free soil in Siberia?

Moreover, serfdom and the law forbidding any one to leave Russia without a pass had not even at that time been completely effective in preventing emigration to Siberia. Already forces similar to those which had once encouraged the Puritans in their expedition to New England were driving many peasants to seek out regions beyond the Ural Mountains. Much of the oppression which made life in Russia hard for the individual was unknown in Siberia. Beyond the Ural Mountains there was no recruiting for military service; there was no serfdom; above all, there was no religious compulsion for the unorthodox, because the power of Russian governing boards was often merely nominal, owing to the great distance. It has been asserted that in the case of many Russians the desire to move out east to the land of freedom was so strong that they committed a crime on purpose, in order to be exiled there. At any rate, in 1850 and the following years, the voluntary emigration, at least to the nearer districts, was not insignificant.

The great majority of the immigrants into Siberia, however, were naturally made up of those who were condemned to exile. When one speaks of them one thinks ordinarily of criminals (in part political offenders) condemned to work in the Siberian mines or at other hard labor. One often overlooks the fact that crime was often punished by mere banishment, and that in this case deportation was simply like compulsory settlement. Punishment under these circumstances occasionally might almost be regarded as a favor, and it was beneficial, at any rate, not only to the individual, but to the state as a whole. In fact, a Russian author writing at the time of Nicholas I, though not at all favorably inclined toward the existing régime, had to admit: "Simple exile to Siberia does not frighten people who have no occupation or property. Peasants there receive land in abundance and the country is not everywhere uninhabitable. The harsh treatment during and after transportation alarms only more or less cultivated people," that is, the class which scarcely came into consideration at all as regular colonists. Furthermore, the peasants who were banished to Siberia were treated as free, and often possessed many privileges not enjoyed by people of their class in European Russia; for three years, they were free of taxes; and only after they had been settled for twenty years were they liable to be recruited for military service.

However, up to the middle of the nineteenth century, the settlements had been, on the whole, relatively small. By that time, a firm basis had been laid in Siberia for a Russian peasant population, but, for reasons which have been explained, no intensive colonization had yet taken place. On the other hand, Russian political control had been extended further and further in Siberia, so that the country came to have a greater value as a place for future settlements. Through these great extensions of territory the Russian government succeeded in connecting her Asiatic possessions much more closely with the trading centers of the world than heretofore.

In this connection the conquest of the Amur region, which gave Russia an excellent access to the Pacific Ocean, is especially noteworthy. This extension of Russian territory took place under Count Muraviev, who was governor general of Eastern Siberia after 1847. Scarcely had he been appointed to his post when he proceeded systematically to secure the region by military means and also by the acquisition of the Amur Province, which lay to the south and belonged to China. In 1850 he built the port of Nikolaievsk at the mouth of the Amur. In the following years, he undertook a series of expeditions into Chinese territory, and founded there various towns which should serve as points of support for a Russian occupation. The Chinese Empire, as will be explained in detail in another connection, was too weak at the time to defend itself against such usurpations. In 1858 the Chinese government had to sign the Treaty of Aigun, in which the whole territory north of the Amur was recognized as Russia's. For Russia this success was only the first step in her advance to the Pacific Ocean. Two years later, in 1860, the new acquisition of territory was extended by the Treaty of Peking, which gave to the Tsar the whole Maritime Province from the Amur down to the boundary of Korea. This extended Russian territory so far to the south that the tip of it now lay opposite Japan. Here, at this tip, the Russians constructed a new port, Vladivostok, "The Conqueror of the East," both as a symbol and as a point of departure for the further extension of Russian rule. The fortress projected like a wedge into the sea to the south. This expansion was enlarged further by the acquisition of the Island of Sakhalin, which lay off the Amur territory and was acquired from Japan by purchase or exchange in 1875.

How largely all these annexations had been brought about by the desire to improve Russian transportation and commerce in Siberia is clearly seen from the wording of the two treaties of Aigun and Peking. The Russians were by no means content with the mere

acquisition of territory. They also secured for themselves wide commercial privileges. The navigation of the large rivers of the region was reserved for Russian and Chinese vessels so that the ships of other nations were excluded. Russians acquired the right to travel freely and trade throughout all China. They were freed from tariff duties in Mongolia; caravans could come and go unhindered between Kiakta in Siberia and Tien-Tsin in China. China had to agree to the installation of a permanent Russian embassy in Peking, which was to watch over the execution of these provisions. In Urga, the most important city of Mongolia, a Russian consulate was established.

Somewhat less successful were the Russian attempts to get control of a new approach to Peking from the west. In the Upper Tarim Valley in Turkestan there had arisen in the 1860's the independent state of Kashgaria. This inclined to Russia, in order to have protection from China, from which it had separated itself; it was later, however, again subjected to the Chinese (1877). North of this the Kuldja territory, after likewise revolting from China (1865), finally came completely under Russia (1871). China, however, protested. The Russians felt compelled to hand back at least the eastern part of their new acquisition (1881), but they retained the western part as a new gate for entering China. This was the upper Ili Valley, through which the hordes of Jenghiz Khan had begun their march upon Europe in the Middle Ages.

From an economic point of view, the Russian conquests in Eastern Siberia were the most important gains of territory that the Tsar made in Asia. But as far as area is concerned they were overshadowed by the acquisitions in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Here, by slow and sure advances, the whole, so to speak, of Turkestan was conquered; that is, the whole region between European Russia and Siberia on one side, and Persia and Afghanistan on the other. Thus, with the exception of China, the only two independent states left were Persia and Afghanistan, and these owed their independence merely to the fact that the British as possessors of India were opposed to their absorption by the rival power of Russia.

The Russian wars in this region fall into two series of actions independent of each other. The more romantic, but less important in itself, was that in the west, which led to the complete subjection of the whole Caucasus region. Even at the beginning of the nineteenth century Russia had attained a firm footing south of the Caucasus Mountains and along the eastern shore of the Black Sea. At that time the Tsar of Georgia had made the Tsar of St. Peters-

burg his heir. But the eastern part of the Caucasus region—Daghestan, which lies north of the mountains along the Caspian Sea—was still in the possession of mountain tribes who opposed Russian rule because of their Mohammedan faith. If the Russians wanted to overcome these mountain peoples, they saw that they had a task somewhat similar to that of the French in Algeria, in gaining control over the region of the high plateaus. Here, also, there was a national hero who played the part of Abd-el-Kader. Schamyl, the leader of the mountaineers of Daghestan, like the Algerian prophet, was both a prophet and a warrior. He was full of devices and for a long time could not be captured. It was decades before the Russians destroyed his power. Apparently less efficient than the French in Algeria, the Russian generals spent their efforts for almost thirty years—from 1830 to 1859—in vain attempts to get this bold enemy into their power. Nearly two hundred thousand men had to be sent against him, and still Schamyl always succeeded in escaping. In 1839, the Russians thought they had captured him, when they took the fortress of Akulscho in which he had been shut, but again the leader escaped, and his sister, Fatima, cast herself into the water to escape falling into the hands of the Russians. The Russians even suffered some defeats. In 1842, the Russian army under General Grabbe which tried to capture Schamyl's main fort at Dargo was completely routed in the woods nearby. Dargo was not taken until three years later (1845). Even then Schamyl did not give up the game as lost, but entrenched himself on an inaccessible mountain height where he held out for fourteen years. It was not until 1859 that some Russian volunteers scaled the plateau where he was hidden, drew up after them their comrades by ropes which were fastened to crevices in the rocks, and succeeded in surrounding him. A desperate fight took place. Almost all of his followers were slain. He himself took refuge in a cave. The Russian general started a fire to smoke him out, and Schamyl surrendered. He was treated in the same way as Abd-el-Kader: the Tsar saw to it that he should have a peaceful old age at Kaluga, south of Moscow, until his death on a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1871.

These conquests not only brought the Caucasus completely under control, but enabled the Russians to make strategic use of the regions already won to the south and east. Now, at last, the territories which had been ceded to the Russians either by native princes or by the Sultans of Turkey, were open for military operations (see above, p. 42). Russia's approach to Persia was unhindered, and this empire was further reduced to the position of a vassal

state. The Persians had previously felt the superior force of their Russian neighbors. The wars which had broken out on account of the transfer of Georgia to Russia had led to a series of defeats for Persia, and finally to the treaty of Turcomanchai, by which Persia had to cede the provinces of Erivan and Nakitschivan in the Southern Caucasus. With the exception of the province of Kars, which did not become Russian until 1878, all the territory between the Black and Caspian Seas was now in Russian hands.

Still more wearisome and long drawn out were the wars which established Russian rule over Turkestan. Here the first region to be conquered was that between the Caspian Sea and the Sea of Aral and the lands to the east of the Sea of Aral.

There existed conditions in this region which might be compared with the piracy in North Africa. The vast Steppes between the Ural region (Russian since the eighteenth century) and the kingdoms of Khiva and Bokhara were mostly occupied by nomad peoples who lived by capturing slaves. Every year they were accustomed to ride westward into the Ural region, or even to the Volga, and seize Russian subjects whom they carried away and sold in the slave markets of Khiva or Bokhara. In much the same way the Turcomans of the Steppes to the south plundered the Persians. The only way to get rid of this pest was to occupy the region where the plundering nomads lived. The difficulties, however, were enormous, and infinitely greater than in the case of the Barbary Pirates. Thousands of kilometers of desert lay between Khiva and the nearest Russian city of Orenburg. Not even the passable routes through this wilderness were known. The native rulers used all their power to prevent foreigners from getting access to them. The merchants who dared to risk it were flayed alive or impaled. The difficulty of advance in this region is best shown by the expedition which the governor of Orenburg made in 1839 with a particularly well-equipped corps. Although he had paid especial regard to the great extent of the steppes over which he was to press forward, had collected an enormous number of camels (over ten thousand), and had hired Kirghiz guides, the expedition was a total failure. Almost all the camels, and a considerable part of the men, died of cold, and in 1840 the army had to retreat before reaching its objective at Khiva.

The resources for overcoming this difficulty were not found until about twenty years later. Russian generals in Siberia, who usually went ahead on their own hook and bothered little about the new Anglo-Russian agreement which made Iran and Turkestan a neutral

zone, now sought to attack the kingdom of Khiva from behind. Having found that it was unattackable from the front, they went around the steppes, east of the sea of Aral so as to attack from much further east in the Syr-Darya (Jaxartes) region. They also abandoned all large expeditions and attempts to crush the enemy at a blow, and went forward step by step. First they gained control over the Kirghiz hordes in the regions bordering on Siberia. Then General Perovski founded on the border between Siberia and the Syr-Darya region of Turkestan the fort which bears his name (1853). This became a base from which to make further advances. The Russians were now in a region where they could get food and fodder for their troops.

From this point the conquest of the land took place by regular steps. British protests were ignored, or at most heeded only to the extent that the Russian government dismissed disobedient generals but retained the conquests of war. The first city to fall into the power of the Russians was Holy City of Hasred, known to-day as Turkestan. This resulted from expeditions in 1864 directed from the north to the south and later also to the south west. In this and the following years, Chimkent and Tashkent were captured. These two successes, the second of which gave the largest city in Turkestan to the Russians, were due to General Chernaiev, the "Lion," as he was called by the Turcomans. He was the leader who disregarded the command which his government, owing to English protests, had sent him, and in spite of it occupied Tashkent, paying for his patriotic deed by the loss of his position. No change in Russian policy, however, was brought about by this. General Romanowski, who succeeded the dismissed "Lion," pushed south from Tashkent, after repelling an attack by the Khan of Bokhara. In the following year, 1868, Samarkand fell into the hands of the Russians. So the Russians acquired the great city of the Zarashan region, formerly the capital of Tamerlane, whose grave is still there. The "moral effect" of this success was enormous. The Khan of Bokhara gave up all further resistance. He recognized the Tsar as suzerain and declared that he was ready to pay a large war contribution. On the eastern side the Russians had now pressed forward from Turkestan to the neighborhood of the Afghan frontier, that is, as far as was possible without coming into direct conflict with British claims. For at that time Russia admitted that Afghanistan lay outside her sphere of influence.

Western Turkestan, including Khiva, was still independent. This was precisely the region from which the plundering attacks of the

nomads were made. Then, as ever, it was impossible to come to any terms with the Khan. He refused to deliver up either the Russian or the Persian slaves. But Russia's new conquests now allowed her at last to get the better of these trouble makers. A concentric attack was planned. Khiva was to be approached both from the west and from the north-east. The forces coming from the west, that is, from Orenburg and the Caspian Sea, did not even this time reach their goal, but again suffered terrible losses in camels. On the other hand, the contingent coming from the east, that is, from the east of the Sea of Ural, pressed forward without great difficulty to the capital at Khiva. The Khan had to give in to the Russian demands. Thirty thousand captives were set free, the whole northern territory of the Amu-Darya (Oxus) region was ceded to Russia, and Russian merchants were promised freedom of trade. A Mohammedan insurrection against these concessions was crushed by the Russian army. So Khiva, as well as Bokhara, now became a vassal state of Russia. The country retained only a few troops of its own, and the command over these was given to Russian officers. Henceforth, no one could enter either of these states without a Russian passport (1873).

The only country which remained to be brought into subjection was the strip of territory left between the Caspian Sea and Bokhara. This task also was soon taken in hand by the Russians. There, north of Persia, lived Turcomans, who gained a living in the same way as the nomad tribes of Khiva. They were robber bands of horsemen who hunted down Persian peasants and carried them away as slaves. They had tried to protect themselves against hostile attacks by building forts in their oases.

Ever since 1867 the Russians had tried to conquer the Turcomans, and had succeeded to some extent in driving them back. Their final strongholds, however, were not taken until General Skobelev carried out a systematic campaign against them (1880). His efforts culminated in the capture of the strongly fortified capital Göktepe, where thirty-five thousand Turcomans had entrenched themselves. Skobelev wanted to go further and unite with Afghanistan against British rule in India, but the English got ahead of him with an expedition to Afghanistan (1880), and Skobelev died soon afterwards.

After all these intervening areas had been occupied, Russians finally approached Afghanistan. In 1884-5 they occupied the Merv region and the Oasis of Pendjeh lying to the south of it. Both territories lay east of Persia and within the Afghan zone. The

English government protested and it almost seemed as if war would break out. But on this occasion, also, a peaceful solution was found, as always, because England gave way on the main point: the Russians retained their conquests.

In the eastern parts of Turkestan, in the region between Bokhara and Chinese Turkestan, Russia and England agreed upon a new Russian boundary. After long negotiations the Pamir territory finally fell to Russia in 1895, and could be staked out in such a way that a relatively narrow strip of territory was left to the Afghans between the Russian possessions and the region to the north of India which became British at this time. This barren zone, occupied by Mohammedan warrior tribes, was intended to be a barrier to any great military operations either from the north or from the south.

Thus, at the end of the nineteenth century, with the exception of Persia and Afghanistan, no independent native kingdoms were left in Central Asia. This vast part of the continent had been subjected to two European Great Powers. Persia and Afghanistan retained only a nominal independence, not because they were stronger than Bokhara or Khiva, but simply because neither of the two European rivals was willing to concede this booty to the other. China, too, had suffered a considerable loss of territory to the north. The fate of Asia, almost like that of Turkey, was being determined mainly by the policy of these two European powers, though France finally joined in with England and Russia.

Before any account is given of the consequences of this situation, mention must be made of the European colonial policy which formed both the supplement and the counterpiece to that of Russia in Siberia and Central Asia: the establishment and extension of British power in India.

CHAPTER XVIII

ENGLISH POLICY IN INDIA AND COLONIAL WARS WITH CHINA

While the Russian expeditions in Siberia either led to settlement or prepared the way for it later, British expansion in India was in accordance with colonial policy in the old style. India was not sought out as a place for settlement for an overflow population, nor would such settlement have been conceivable. The land was not vacant, and was hardly suitable as a permanent place of residence for European families. Colonization here could take place only in a purely commercial way. Europeans who settled in India aimed to secure a monopoly of the export of Indian products and the import of European manufactures in exchange. Altogether secondary was any political idea in regard to population, that is, the idea of caring for or improving a propertyless population which was prevented from reaching economic prosperity at home. The number of persons who could profit by this was not very large, nor could one expect permanently to relieve the mother country from over-population by a temporary emigration. Service in the British East India Company afforded an excellent military and political training and Great Britain owes many of her distinguished generals and statesmen to the fact that India gave members of poor families a much wider field of action than was possible at home. But India could not be at all regarded as any place for settlement, such, for instance, as Algeria.

The history of English colonization in India, both before and after 1815, is in accord with these conditions. The British never had any idea of a systematic conquest of the country. Their original purpose, which was adhered to for a long time in principle, was simply to obtain control of the coasts and the more important ports of India in order to get the trade of the peninsula into their hands. The fact that the possessions of the East India Company were extended widely into the interior from Bengal was simply due to the circumstance that the coast places could only be regarded as safe if the native warlike kingdoms were destroyed. A policy of conquest was at first prevented by the character of the British system

of control. India was not exactly a British possession, or to speak more accurately, it was not exactly under English rule. It belonged, so far as it did not consist of states which were nominally or actually independent, to the East India Company. This was a trading corporation which had, to be sure, some powers of government; it maintained its own army and navy and officials, but it did not constitute a state and it did not pursue national aims. The East India Company, which up to 1813 had a monopoly of trade in Asia, was naturally guided in its policy, not by the interests of England, but by those of its stockholders. To shrewd calculating financiers nothing appeared more expensive than warlike expeditions, which, even if successful, resulted in only very moderate immediate gains. However, every extension of territory also brought an increase in the Company's revenues, for the Company usually took over the rights of the deposed native princes and so acquired the latter's land rents. Thus the Company had become a great landowning corporation, and the revenue which it drew from its lands finally exceeded the profits which came from its commerce. But it is easy to see that a good part of the money that came in in this way had to pay the costs of the military conquest of the land.

The East India Company, however, was not the only ruler in India. Competition on the part of other European nations was indeed out of the question after the French attempt in the eighteenth century to establish a colonial empire in India had definitely failed. The French and the Portuguese possessed merely a few modest places along the coast. But the more the East India Company developed, the more the English government began to interfere by appointing the Governors-General of India and by establishing a Board of Control over the Company. This Board of Control was by no means opposed to wide-reaching military operations. They regarded it as desirable to undertake wide conquests, although the newly won territory might be a financial burden. In cases, for instance, where this was the only method of protecting the life and property of British subjects from the plundering raids of neighboring native tribes, the first Marquis of Hastings, who was Governor-General of India in 1816, was given express permission to make such conquests. So in the decades after 1815, before India became a British vice-royalty, and even before the Company's charter had been essentially limited by the state, the East India Company's policy was no longer inspired purely by commercial motives. This change is especially evident in two respects.

The first relates to the policy of territorial expansion. In 1815,

the possessions of the Company were very irregularly distributed over India; though considerable in the northeast (Bengal) and in the south (Madras and Ceylon), in the west they were limited to a few coast towns. The important commercial city of Bombay had no *hinterland*. Moreover, in the northwest was the largest native state, the Mahratta Empire formed of Hindu warriors. This state stretched also far to the east, and gave a point of support to robber bands of Pindaris. These often attacked the British territory of Madras in a fearful fashion. Just as in the case of Algiers or of Khiva, there was no permanent remedy for this, unless the British ceased to limit themselves to merely defensive measures against the native plunderers. Here public safety and conquest coincided.

An occasion for such intervention was afforded by a particularly brutal Pindari raid in 1816, which laid waste northern Madras. The English opened war from the east and the west, and in scarcely half a year (October, 1817-March, 1818) the natives were subdued. The Mahratta army was destroyed, many native princes were deposed, and others were compelled to recognize British suzerainty which placed them under the control of a British "resident." Bombay acquired a *hinterland* immediately dependent on the Company, and all of India with the exception of the Punjab, that is the territory between China and Afghanistan, was brought under either the direct or indirect rule of the East India Company.

The conquests in Burma took place somewhat later. Burmese troops had attacked native princes who stood under British protection; thereupon the Governor-General, Lord Amherst, declared war on Burma. After relatively protracted operations (1824-26), the British army succeeded in compelling the King of Ava to cede his whole Burmese coastal territory with the exception of the central Pegu strip. British control was thus extended over India and Burma up to the frontier of Siam.

The second respect in which a change of policy was evident is seen in the humanitarian and educational activity of the Indian administration. The East India Company as such had no interest in improving the civilization of the native population or in introducing European institutions. On the contrary, it aimed to keep Christian missionaries out in order to avoid unrest. The representatives of the British Government, on the other hand, placed political and social reforms in the foreground. They sought to apply the new humanitarian ideas at least to the most objectionable Indian customs, even where these customs rested on religious beliefs. As early as 1802, Sir Arthur Wellesley, later Duke of Wellington, had

forbidden the practice of throwing children to the sharks or drowning them in the Ganges. In 1829 the British went further still. Governor-General Bentinck forbade widow burning. He expressly declared that religious practices would be tolerated only so far as they did not conflict with the fundamental demands of justice and humanity. In 1832, the Governor-General declared illegal the slave trade between the British districts, and finally, in 1843, slavery was totally forbidden. In education, European methods began to be introduced and a break was made in the traditional Oriental culture; Persian was definitely abolished in 1837 as the language of the law courts, and for it was substituted either English or one of the native dialects.

All these tendencies, however, could not be fully developed so long as the old charter of the East India Company, which had to be periodically renewed, was still in force. The basis for more fundamental reforms was therefore not laid until the Reform Bill of 1832 had overthrown the conservative régime in the mother country (see above, p. 93). It happened that in the next year (1833) the charter had to be renewed. The new Liberal cabinet used this opportunity to give effect to most important demands for modernizing India. As almost always, what was old was not completely swept away, but some compromise was found. Still, as a matter of fact, the East India Company's new charter signified the end of the Company's commercial policy, and virtually brought India into the class of British crown colonies. Henceforth, the Company was little more than a mere agent for the English government. The administration of India had essentially passed over into the hands of the British Government.

The first results of this new relationship were seen in the change of policy adopted toward the territories in the north (Sindh, Punjab, Beluchistan). The Board of Control in London looked further into the future than the directors of the East India Company, and regarded it as necessary to get ahead of Russia. Instead of being content with administering the territories already won, the English government undertook to create a series of buffer states to protect India against a Russian invasion. They inaugurated the policy which was to determine almost exclusively their attitude toward other powers for more than half a century. Henceforth, their chief care was to make their Indian possessions safe against Russia; the main aim of British foreign policy, therefore, was to hinder Russia from becoming too strong, not only in Asia, but also everywhere else.

In order to realize the full significance of this attitude, the reader must keep in mind the forces on each side. England maintained in Europe an army which was small in view of her international relations; and it was only her insular position and her superior fleet which prevented this neglect of armament from bringing about her downfall as a Great Power. In India this military weakness might have much more serious consequences. England's army, which was so small according to European notions, but which had won her battles in India, might indeed suffice to keep the native princes in order; but it was in no position to contend with a European military power. Furthermore, English rule could not depend on her own colonists for defense. India was not at all a settlement colony like Algeria, and no active assistance was to be expected from the natives, if English authority were once threatened. In fact, the numerous native soldiers (Sepoys), out of which the British armies in India were for the most part recruited (in 1857 the proportion of Sepoys to British troops in India was eight to one), could not be regarded as thoroughly reliable. So if Russia, the greatest military power of the time, should succeed in advancing against India, the colony would simply have to be counted as lost. Neither was Great Britain so organized that she could send out an army as strong as Russia's, nor would her superiority at sea be of any advantage in this case. So there was just one thing left to be done: to create dependent states in the border territory between India and the Russian possessions in Asia. These dependent states could bear the first brunt of Russian attack, and make a Russian expedition to India a more difficult affair. It became also part of England's policy to weaken Russia in general, by means of international combinations, of which the alliance with France in the Crimean War is the best known (see below, ch. xxii).

Under these circumstances, one can understand what a great impression was made by Russia's systematic advance in Central and Eastern Asia as described in the preceding chapter. As early as the eighteenth century the East India Company had sought to establish close relations with Persia. Later Napoleon had thought of attacking England by way of Persia. But now the Empire of the Shah had fallen completely under Russian influence, and Persian rulers were being instigated by Russian agents to undertake regular attacks against India. Russia's first attempt was made against Herat in Western Afghanistan. This stronghold lies in an oasis and controls the caravan route from Turkestan to India, but could not venture to make any independent resistance unaided; for the

little principality of Herat was one of the numerous divisions which had survived after the splitting up of the empire of the Great Mogul, and was so small in area that it could not think of venturing into competition with Great Powers. But at this first attempt of Russia's it appeared that the opponents of her policy of expansion in Central Asia could count on British help. The support which the English gave to Herat was indeed quite insignificant, consisting only of a single artillery officer in the service of the East India Company, but this young man conducted the defense of the city so cleverly, and understood so shrewdly how to inspire the garrison with unfailing courage, that the Persian army, in spite of the Russian officers who accompanied it, failed to take the city after a ten months' siege (1838-39), and had to retreat. Herat thereupon was again reëstablished by the English as an independent state, that is, as a buffer between Persia (which was regarded as already lost and under Russian influence) and India (although a part of India which was not British territory).

At the same time the Tsar undertook a similar step against the larger and more important kingdom of Afghanistan. In 1837 the Russians had sent an agent to the Emir there and sought to prepare the way for the same kind of underhand vassal relationship as in Persia. The British in India replied to this by despatching an army of six thousand men to Cabul in order to depose the Emir who was friendly to Russia and to put in his place a pretender who was devoted to themselves and who had fled to India under English protection (1839). The expedition was carried out without difficulty so long as it was merely a question of fighting a way through the country; the British army quickly seized the strongholds and occupied Cabul. But the deposition of the preceding Emir resulted in a general insurrection of the Afghans; they cut off communications with India and destroyed almost to a man the British army in its forced retreat (1842). This blow to British prestige was not left unavenged. The very same year a large army was fitted out and again occupied Cabul. But this time the British did not remain in the city. They were satisfied when the preceding Emir, whom they had released, declared himself to be their ally. So the much feared preponderant influence of Russia over Afghanistan was destroyed, for the moment at any rate.

This precarious success was not the only consequence of the Afghan war. More important was the fact that by it the English were driven to conquer the whole northern part of India, particularly the Indus basin. Communications with Afghanistan were not

regarded as secure so long as the intervening territory between it and British India remained in foreign hands. In fact, it was not possible to control Russian intrigues unless the English became masters of the Punjab. Even during the Afghan war a British contingent in the Sindh region, near the mouth of the Indus, had been severely dealt with (1839).

Accordingly the Governors-General of India took the conquest of these territories systematically in hand. The struggle was not easy. The Punjab was, and is, occupied by the warlike Sikhs, who made a most obstinate resistance to the English. The wars lasted for seven years (1842-49); it was not until 1849 that the British could proclaim the annexation of the Punjab. In 1856 there followed the annexation of the Kingdom of Oudh on the upper Ganges in northeastern India; this included Lucknow, which was regarded, so to speak, as the Brahmin Holy Land. All India was now in possession of the English. The districts which were directly dependent upon the Governors-General formed a ring of territory around the native princes who still exercised a nominal authority. And it seemed likely that the directly dependent lands would be extended still further, as the English claimed to inherit principalities for which there was no legitimate heir, declaring them to be British possessions.

Similarly the British control over Burma was rounded out. There the Kingdom of Pegu, which had once been left under a native ruler, was annexed in 1852. In this way the whole of the territory in India and Burma lying on both sides of the Bay of Bengal came under British control.

But this capstone nearly brought the whole structure to the ground. For a long time the proportion between the East India Company's British troops and the native Sepoys had been a dangerous one. As mentioned already, there were about eight Sepoys to one British soldier. The self-confidence of the Sepoys had been greatly increased during the recent wars. The British had made important concessions to them; many of them who were recruited from the fertile and densely populated territory of Oudh, which had been recently annexed by the British, suddenly acquired in their home territory an unusually privileged position. The unlucky course of the first Afghan campaign had also not been forgotten by the Sepoys. A wound to their religious sensibilities finally threw the spark into the powder magazine. Unfortunately, the new weapon introduced at this time into the Indian army, the so-called Enfield rifle, horrified both the Hindus and Mohammedans. The

cartridges that the soldiers had to bite off were greased with the fat of the cow, which is sacred for the Hindus, and with lard from the pig, which is abhorred by Mohammedans. So, in 1857, the year after the annexation of Oudh, part of the Sepoys mutinied.

The revolt broke out in Delhi, northwest of Oudh. The Sepoys refused to obey their European officers, slew a number of them, and placed a successor to the Great Mogul on the throne. He soon succeeded in capturing Cawnpur in Oudh; the English there were mostly massacred. Rajah Nana Sahib, who had led the mutiny, was able to begin the siege of Lucknow. The whole upper Ganges region for the moment was lost to the British.

But the rebels remained isolated; the Sikhs and the Gurkhas remained true to the British. This sealed the fate of the mutiny. General Havelock was able to make the Punjab his base of operations. From there he quickly re-occupied Delhi, where the Great Mogul committed suicide, and then captured Cawnpur. It was somewhat longer before he was able to regain Lucknow in 1858; but timely reinforcements had been sent into the besieged city. A year later (1859) the whole mutiny could be regarded as suppressed. The speed with which the Sepoy mutiny had been put down was no more remarkable than the consequences which resulted from it. The assassination of British subjects had made an enormous impression in England. Public opinion ascribed the blame to the defective military system and especially to the defective government of the East India Company. The demand for a reform, that is for the transfer of administration from the Company to the British Government, could no longer be resisted. In 1858, the East India Company ceased to rule, the Governor-General became a Viceroy, and the King of England undertook the immediate responsibility for the government of India. A principle already contained in the Company's charter of 1833 was also given increased emphasis: natives, no matter of what race or religion, were to be admitted so far as possible to official positions for which they were fitted. At the same time all the rebels, except those who had been guilty of murdering British subjects, received complete amnesty.

India was now given a special official in London, the Secretary of State for India, whose duties were separated from those of the Colonial Secretary. The expenditures for the country were considerably increased. The Government established numerous schools for the natives, undertook irrigation systems, and constructed a network of railways throughout the country. Vast measures were taken to prevent famine. The promise to admit natives into the

administration was fulfilled to the extent that at least subordinate offices were given exclusively to natives; Indian notables were also admitted into the elective city councils; the higher positions, however, which really controlled the administration, were reserved exclusively for the British until very recently. But to secure appointment to these well-paid offices, persons had to pass a civil service examination in London, which guaranteed the possession of definite knowledge, especially in languages. In contrast with conditions under the East India Company, care was taken that the appointment of high officials should not be made according to seniority; in general, Anglo-Indian Civil Servants were not compelled to come up through the lower grades of the service in India.

The effect of the Sepoy Mutiny is most clearly seen in the reform of the military organization. After it had been shown how dangerous an army was in which the native element predominated, the proportion of European soldiers was materially increased. The artillery, which was important and which could not be improvised by the natives in case of a mutiny, was left wholly in the hands of European troops. In the infantry and the cavalry the proportion of natives to Europeans was to be two to one in Bengal, and three to one in Madras and Bombay. Only subordinate positions in the army were open to natives. Ordinarily the standing army in India was to consist of 80,000 British and 160,000 Sepoys. The success of these changes has been complete; not only has there been no further mutiny of native troops since 1857, but Indian regiments which formerly used to refuse to fight in Burma, because they had a superstitious horror of crossing the ocean, could now be used without fear even on distant fields (such as Africa).

Two problems, however, still remained to be dealt with, both of such a nature that a satisfactory solution was scarcely possible. One concerned the economic structure of the country, the other the population question.

The connection with England resulted in a strict division of labor. India, which had formerly been a flourishing textile manufacturing country according to Oriental notions, became reduced to a country producing chiefly raw materials. Her muslin manufacture could not stand competition with English industries, and was almost ruined. In its place, the cultivation of the soil was strongly stimulated. The financial interests of the British government, which drew one of its most important sources of revenue from the opium monopoly along with the land tax and salt monopoly, tended to coincide with those of the new railway systems, which, for instance.

made advantageous the growing of wheat in the Punjab. The cultivation of tea in Assam rendered the English partially independent of China for one of their favorite luxuries. But it became more and more evident that the too dense population of India could not be fed, and the excellent administration was not one of the least influences which tended to aggravate this evil. The complete pacification of the country, the measures to prevent periodic famines, the amelioration of the barbaric legal practices and religious customs, the introduction of modern means of communication—all these had the result that the population grew beyond measure, without being automatically checked as formerly. Under these circumstances nothing but India's manufactures could have remedied this evil to some extent; and in fact some efforts of this kind were undertaken, but they were very moderate, and employed only a small part of the population. And a great development of Indian textiles was scarcely desirable from the point of view of the English export trade. Only the emigration of numerous coolies to the African or West Indian colonies succeeded in ameliorating a little the evils of Indian overpopulation.

But this refuge did not apply to the upper classes, a circumstance which was all the more serious because their position in the Anglo-Indian state created a difficult problem—the second complicated task which faced the British administration. The opportunity of acquiring European culture, which was liberally afforded by the government, was creating in India a large "educated proletariat," that was much more dangerous than the corresponding groups in Europe; because, although in Europe the number of candidates who had passed an advanced examination, was greater than the number of positions to be filled, in India the prospect of rising to the highest positions in the civil service scarcely existed for the natives at all. On the other hand, these intellectuals, like their European brothers, had become virtually useless for any other practical economic activity, and so formed an evergrowing class of Indian *déclassés*.

The opposition to British rule, which derived its strength chiefly from these groups, also began to assume ever more dangerous forms in another connection, directly as a result of this unlimited opportunity for acquiring a European education. The safety of British rule had rested largely on the fact that hitherto there had been no unified Indian national feeling. In fact, there could not be any, so long as civilization in India rested on religion. The Hindu felt himself further removed from the Mohammedan than from the Eng-

lishman, who usually did not disturb him in his religious practices. The Sepoy Mutiny had been unable to spread, in good part owing to the fact that the Sikhs would not support a revolt led by Nana Sahib, whom they regarded as a Mohammedan. But now precisely this contact with European civilization wakened new ideas among the intellectuals. They were freed from the intellectual bondage of their religious communities, so that Hindus and Mohammedans found themselves standing on the common national foundation of European ideas. Furthermore, in view of the fact that the impartial and absolutely honest justice administered by the English was already regarded as a thorn in the flesh by the hitherto ruling classes, because it protected the lower classes against the traditional exploitation of the rich, it is easy to see that all the advantages which British administration afforded the natives gradually turned against the benefactors, at least so far as concerned the "babus" or Indian university graduates.

Thus was established the Indian Empire, which lasted for more than half a century without any essential modifications. It was merely a change in form when the name "colony" was dropped, and India began to be thought of as a state united to Great Britain through personal union. This was the purpose of the measure by which the "Empire of India" was proclaimed in 1876, and the Queen of England took the title "Empress of India." Since that time King George V and Queen Mary have assumed the imperial dignity formally, and in 1911 the city of Delhi was again raised to the position of imperial capital. The King of England is likewise the successor of the Great Mogul (who also had his capital at Delhi) and no longer stands as the ruler of a subordinate people.

Much more important for the future than these external changes is the fact that England by her control of India was led into a new political policy in regard to Eastern Asia, and was provoked into one of the most important events of the nineteenth century—the Europeanizing of the Far East.

The partial transfer of political power from the East India Company to the British government in 1833 had influenced relations with China. The Company had permission, as is well known, to carry on trade in Canton—the sole Chinese port open to trade—though only at definite times and under strictly regulated conditions. Now in 1834, when the commercial agents of the Company were replaced in Canton by the official representatives of the British government, and when the British envoy, Lord Napier, desired to be received on equal terms by the governor of Canton, a conflict arose.

The Chinese government declared that they had provided only for the admission of commercial agents, and the viceroy refused to enter into any relations whatever with Napier. In 1834 the English representative, who had no forces at hand, thereupon withdrew to the neighboring Portuguese settlement of Macao.

In spite of this, the English government at first refrained from forcible measures. To Lord Napier's complaints, it replied that it wanted to restore commercial relations only by friendly means. Possibly this policy would have lasted a long time if the English cabinet had not been compelled to regard the special wishes of the Indian administration.

Since the end of the seventeenth century opium smoking had developed in China. The new luxury had spread so rapidly and caused such disastrous results that it was forbidden in 1729 except for medical purposes and later, at the end of the eighteenth century, forbidden altogether. This prohibitory legislation stood in direct conflict with the interests of the East India Company, which had a monopoly of the opium trade in India. Since it was impossible to get the Chinese prohibition annulled, much smuggling went on by way of Canton. The smuggling business increased more and more, even after the political power was half transferred from the East India Company to the British Government. Further inducement to increasing the prohibited importation of opium into China lay in the fact that in 1830 the cultivation of the poppy plant in India was permitted to every one, which naturally materially increased the supply of goods to be smuggled. Over this matter quarrels arose between the Chinese government and the British representatives. The Chinese sought to destroy the smuggling by force, that is, by confiscating the opium. The English government demanded compensation (1839). In order to give force to its demands the London cabinet despatched a number of ships and troops to China. As the Chinese still refused to give in, reinforcements were sent out and a number of coast towns were occupied without great difficulty. Finally, the British forces advanced up the Yang-tse River as far as Nanking. The Chinese government perceived that further opposition was hopeless, and in scarcely a week their delegates signed with the British the Treaty of Nanking (1842).

The Treaty of Nanking marks the opening of political relations between China and Europe. The Middle Kingdom, which shortly before had only admitted the envoys of European Powers like despised slaves, now had to concede to the English equality of treatment and in many respects even superiority. After a supplementary

treaty of 1843, the English received the exclusive right to punish subjects of their own who committed crimes on Chinese soil. England was assured the most-favored-nation treatment. In another treaty it was stipulated that British goods should pay no higher transit duties than those already in existence. These commercial privileges were all the more important in that the Treaty of Nanking gave to the English full possession of the island of Hong-Kong (at the entrance to Canton), and five other coast towns (including Shanghai) were also opened to trade. In addition, China had to pay a considerable war indemnity, to grant an amnesty to all Chinese who had dealt with the British government, and to promise expressly that Chinese officials would treat the British on a footing of equality.

This was the way in which the opium question was solved at first. But it was more than fifteen years before the Chinese government was ready to recognize officially the importation of opium; not until 1858 did it agree to the collection of an import duty. But since importation in the principal ports was practically controlled by the English, the smuggling could not be stopped, and trade statistics show that from 1845 the importation of opium steadily increased. India, which marketed the greater part of its opium in China, believed its profits secure; and nothing was left for the Chinese to do except to plant the poppy themselves in a steadily increasing quantity, unless they wanted to let the "foreign devils" have all the profit.

The Opium War had still another result of enormous importance for world history. Now for the first time there was established direct and untrammeled trade between Europe and Asia. The Far East was opened to exploitation by the trade and modern factory production of European countries, backed by all the new means of communication made possible by modern inventions. It was evident that the old means of defense were inadequate to check this new invasion. The giant state of China, which for centuries had never had to fear attack from any of its neighbors, and which had felt secure in its self-sufficiency, was now compelled by a relatively small military force to open its doors to a trade that it recognized as hurtful to itself. The despised foreigners, Russians and English, had not only forced China to cede important territories, but had also received the right to interfere in her internal financial policies. All this had taken place without the sufferer having been guilty of any barbaric act which could have given Europeans good grounds for interference. In China there were neither robber bands nor pirates rendering neighboring territories unsafe. The country desired nothing

but to be left in peace. Nevertheless, the invasion had taken place. Europeans no longer permitted a market to be closed against themselves, and they had the military force to impose their will even on their strongest opponent in Eastern Asia.

The reaction, to be sure, was not long in coming. Peoples whose political organization was too different from that of Europe to permit their inferiority in fighting strength to be quickly remedied, had indeed little prospect of being able to avoid exploitation by Europeans. On the other hand, the nations of Eastern Asia were too advanced politically not to try to adapt their institutions successfully to those of Europe.

The first case of this kind will be explained in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XIX

THE FIRST EUROPEANIZATION OF A NON-EUROPEAN PEOPLE (JAPAN)

THE Chinese Empire was so vast and its power was still so great, in spite of the commercial concessions wrung from it by Europeans, that the Treaty of Nanking and similar agreements which followed with England and other European nations made no catastrophic impression upon the organization of the state, and in fact passed almost unnoticed by considerable parts of the Empire. There followed, to be sure, a few small reforms in the nature of an adaptation to European customs, but all such efforts left the structure of the Old Régime untouched. It was quite otherwise with the little neighbor for whom it was a question of life or death whether she could so make herself over as to resist European armies.

Japan had sought to secure herself from interference by foreign states in much the same way as China, or if possible, even more strictly, so that she was shut off completely from foreign countries. She was an example of an isolated state with a pure civilization of its own. All commercial relations with foreign countries were forbidden; the only trade permitted was that along the coast. Foreigners were admitted into only one harbor (Nagasaki). Even there they could only land on an artificial island and had to submit to humiliating ceremonies; and the only foreigners tolerated were the Chinese and the Dutch, who were harmless both from a political and military point of view.

Japan had no need to make any change, either within or without the country, so long as no European Great Power became interested in Eastern Asia. The only state which in earlier centuries might have forced an opening of the country, namely China, desired no commercial relations with foreigners; and it woud not have accorded with the modern pacifistic policy of the Middle Kingdom to use military force against a peaceful neighbor.

Even at the end of the eighteenth century a few far-sighted Japanese had recognized that, owing to the extension of European ocean commerce, danger was approaching from the fact that Japan's

military equipment was wholly inadequate judged by European standards. Even at that time, a Japanese reformer arose who urged that at least defense against foreign ships be modernized. He insisted that the coasts ought to be fortified and the law forbidding foreign trade be repealed. But his program was much too premature. The man who proposed these innovations was thrown into prison and his efforts were ruined. Practically none of his suggestions were carried out, except that some attention was given to the defense of the coasts. Even the cruel treatment of foreign ships was not given up, although Japanese might well have feared foreign countries would use this as an argument for intervening. Even in 1825, the Japanese government ordered that every foreign ship should be fired upon forthwith; it was not until 1842 (that is, after the Opium War) that the law was modified so that an exception should be made at least in favor of vessels in distress.

The first serious attack on this system was made when the English war against China ended with the defeat of a great power which had hitherto been regarded as unconquerable. Reformers could point to this as a warning which any one ought to understand. In a petition to the Shogun, the highest authority in the country, they declared that Japan would suffer the same fate as China unless she changed her armament.

Important as these demands may have been in preparing public opinion for the later revolution, the foreign warning was still not sufficient to bring about a change. The Japanese first had to realize in their own country what military weakness meant in the eyes of the European Great Powers before their *Ancien Régime* could be overthrown. To be sure, in some respects, their military system was modernized; the government imported guns from the Netherlands, and, in a very limited way, trained troops in the European fashion. It also intended to continue these efforts. It listened attentively to the warnings of the Dutch that it would be better to open the harbors voluntarily, while this was still possible, without waiting to be forced to do so by the Europeans.

The decisive impulse which led Japan to abandon her isolation policy came in the end from a nation which was not a European power. Japan was too distant and too poor to have the European Great Powers take such an interest in her as they did in China. It was otherwise with the United States. The inhospitable attitude of the Japanese government toward foreign vessels affected American shipping particularly. It often happened that American whaling ships were driven onto the Japanese coast. The greater proximity

made commercial relations more attractive than in the case of Europe. So it happened that in 1846 an American admiral desired admission; when his request was refused, the government at Washington discussed sending an expedition against Japan.

Then in 1848, as a result of the war with Mexico, the United States acquired California and the harbor of San Francisco. Her interest in the opening of Japan became greater than ever. She was no longer content with platonic requests. In 1853 Commodore Perry appeared in the Bay of Yedo (now Tokio) with four warships and requested the Mikado, the nominal ruler of Japan, to open his harbors. At the same time he handed to the Japanese government as a gift two hitherto unknown examples of modern science,—models of the telegraph and the railway.

In this first visit Perry succeeded only in having his letter handed to the Mikado, though this was contrary to Japanese law. The means at his disposal did not permit him to go further. He therefore returned the following year (1854), but with twice as many warships and four thousand soldiers on board. The Japanese, who saw foreign steamers and guns for the first time, quickly perceived that they must yield. They decided first to make concessions in order to avoid a military conflict and thus gain time to reorganize themselves. So Perry succeeded in having two harbors opened to foreign trade, in having the tariff for American goods placed at a very low rate, and in establishing an American consul who should exercise jurisdiction over Americans.

Thus Japan had to make essentially the same concessions as China; and these were made, not to the Americans alone, but to all the other European nations, for the treaty with Perry in 1854 served as a model for numerous others. In the following years similar treaties were made with Russia, Great Britain, Holland, and France. Three harbors were finally opened to trade. The tariff was declared applicable to all Europeans. The European Powers received the right not only to establish consuls with their own jurisdiction, but also to be represented by ministers to the Shogun.

Japan seemed to have fallen into a position of greater dependence than China. But the country had made these concessions, as has been said, only in order to gain time to Europeanize her organization undisturbed. Consequently, she set to work to adapt her military system, which hitherto had been wholly neglected, to European standards. This movement was essentially aided by the course of the so-called Second Opium War in China (1858-60), which showed, even more clearly than the First, the weakness of the East Asiatic

states compared with Europe, and also the serious consequences for a state which did not adopt European methods.

The thing which gives the revolution in Japan world historic importance was not merely the fact that her military institutions were modernized, as also happened finally in China, but that the whole social and political organization of the nation was revolutionized. The main interest, therefore, does not lie in the less important technical innovations which Japan copied from Europe after 1854 (she engaged military instructors from Holland, received a steamer from the Dutch as a gift, and established an iron foundry), but in the fundamental transformation of the constitution of the state. But before this change is described, a brief account must be given of the *Ancien Régime* in Japan.

The mountainous Japanese islands, where only fifteen per cent of the soil is fit for cultivation, had always remained a relatively poor country. Neither in industry nor in intellectual life had the Japanese shown such an independent and wide development as the Chinese. While the giant empire of China had always devoted itself to the arts of peace, Japan had remained under the domination of the warrior class. Although in other respects Chinese culture had been slavishly copied (to such an extent that Japanese writers even wrote their books in the Chinese language), in military matters Japan had by no means modeled herself after her great neighbor. Nominally, to be sure, the Japanese population was divided into the same classes as the Chinese: there was the division into scholars, peasants, artisans, and merchants; but in Japan "scholars" meant the feudal nobility, the Samurai or warrior caste. There was no merchant code of honor as in China; notions of honor were of a feudal nature and were derived from loyalty to the overlord.

The most powerful of these feudal overlords, the Shogun, was the actual ruler of the country. The nominal emperor, or Mikado, lived a totally secluded shadow existence in Kioto; he was carefully watched by the Shogun and was powerless against him because he controlled only insignificant possessions. The Shogun in Yedo (Tokio), on the other hand, was the richest man in the country. He did not rule exactly in coöperation with the other great feudal lords (Daimios), but with the help of his own vassals.

All the power in general lay in the hands of this hereditary aristocracy. The 268 Daimios, who had about 400,000 armed servants (Samurai) in their pay, controlled all financial and political power. But in spite of their military veneer their warlike spirit had departed. The long years when Japan was threatened by no enemy

had allowed soldier virtues to decay. Knowing nothing of business and brought up according to strict etiquette, the Daimios lived an idle existence, whether on their country estates or at the court of the Shogun. The Samurai were still equipped with armor and swords, but modern weapons were scarcely known. There were not even the beginnings of a navy.

Now if the Japanese wished to create a defensive system of a European nature, their first task was to break the privileges of the military caste. The most natural way to do this seemed to be to restore the old empire by endowing the Mikado again with the political power, as he had become merely an object of religious veneration, and by playing him off against the Daimios.

The Europeans themselves aided the reformers in Japan. Since the high Japanese officials, being feudal lords, were the most decided opponents of every innovation, such as opening of the ports, the Americans had at the very outset appealed to the Mikado, and later British diplomats adopted the same policy. So it was the Opposition Party itself which helped bring it about in 1867 that power was restored to the new Mikado, Mutsu-Hito, who died in 1912.

When Mutsu-Hito ascended the throne he turned out to be a monarch who was ready to undertake the reforms advocated by the Europeans and the Japanese and even by a part of the magnates themselves. Old Japan was quickly transformed. In this same year (1867) the last Shogun had to resign, and the next year the Japanese government began to make voluntarily the concessions which the Europeans shortly before had been wringing from them by interfering in their affairs. Ports were opened, ambassadors were admitted to direct intercourse with his Imperial Majesty, and the royal residence was transferred to Yedo which was now named Tokio; thus the Mikado henceforth lived at the former seat of the Shoguns. In 1869 the Mikado took an oath to the constitution.

The most important change was the abolition of the old feudal system. The execution of the treaties which had been made before 1868 had been rendered possible only by the fact that the Mikado had allied himself with the foreigners against the conservative part of the Japanese nobility; a permanent modernization of Japan could only be brought about if the sworn adherents of the Old Régime were rendered powerless forever. Accordingly, in the years 1871-75 the Mikado's enlightened despotism put a complete end to feudalism; the nobles were either pensioned or bought off. The clans were dissolved. Local government was handed over to prefects after

the French fashion. In imitation also of Napoleon I's government, an advisory senate was established at the Mikado's side. The warrior caste of Samurai was completely abolished, and in its place universal military service was introduced (1873). In the preceding year (1872), as a necessary forerunner to it, compulsory education was adopted. Banks and stock-companies were established like those of Europe.

Going beyond these economic and political measures, the new government even dared to deal with religion. In 1858 the Americans had secured by treaty freedom of worship for their citizens. Now Japan, of her own accord, went further and annulled all the edicts which had been made against Christianity. Buddhism and Shintoism were no longer to be regarded as religions of the state (1880). Distinctly Christian institutions, like Sunday rest and the Gregorian calendar, received official sanction. Foreigners of other religions were called in considerable numbers as teachers in the new state schools, particularly in the universities. English was made obligatory as the language for students. The proposition was even considered of introducing a simplified English as the language of daily life.

The New Era was particularly manifest in the field of education. The state overlooked no means by which the people could be made quickly acquainted with European science and technical progress. The system of education was put under state supervision. Four universities and several technical schools were established, modeled on those of Europe. Travelling fellowships were provided for teachers who wanted to seek the fountains of knowledge in Europe. In all this there was no question of slavish imitation, at least not in the branches of knowledge which were not of a technical or scientific nature. Thus, the religious instruction of European schools was replaced by general ethics, and by courses in jurisprudence in the secondary schools.

The speed with which this Asiatic people without, so to speak, any preparation understood how to assimiliate all the inherited acquisitions of European culture must ever remain one of the most astonishing facts in world history. Scarcely had a decade passed when Japan was able to use against another East Asiatic state the very methods which the European countries had adopted only a little while before against her. The Emperor of Korea, that is the ruler of the peninsula which lies directly opposite Japan, was afraid that his country might be contaminated by the example which Mutsu-Hito had given; in 1873, therefore, he had broken off rela-

tions with the "renegades" in Tokio; and two years later a Japanese warship was fired at from a fort on the Korean coast. Thereupon, Japan immediately despatched a fleet and compelled the Emperor to sign a treaty opening a number of Korean ports to foreign trade. This was exactly a repetition of the step which the Americans had taken in dealing with the Japanese in 1853.

The Japanese were no longer afraid to attack the mightier power of China. In numbers they were much weaker than the Chinese, the population of Japan being about one-tenth that of China. But this disadvantage was more than equalized by the training which the Japanese army and navy had received. While the Japanese forces had been fundamentally modernized, the Chinese had left their armaments on the old basis. To be sure, a number of European officers had been employed in China after 1860 and some war vessels had been built on European models, but the change was not so thorough-going as in Japan, where every remnant of the old military conditions disappeared, after the last resistance of the Samurai had been absolutely crushed by the newly trained European troops. Even the right of carrying two swords, which had formerly distinguished Samurai from other people, was now taken away. Officers, to be sure, were still appointed to a large extent from the nobility; but membership in a class was no longer sufficient; training in a technical school was necessary. This training was put into the hands of foreign experts, French in 1866, but German after 1885.

What could China oppose to this military equipment? Japan's intervention in Korea was in a sense an invasion of Chinese rights, because Korea, according to Chinese views, was under the suzerainty of Peking. In 1876 Japan annexed the Liu-kiu islands lying south of her. China protested strongly, but had to give in without striking a blow.

A military conflict between the two countries was henceforth inevitable. It would also decide whether Eastern Asia would be permanently Europeanized or not. China clung to the hope of being able to destroy her troublesome neighbor without having to Europeanize her own military system. It seemed possible so to increase China's naval forces as to secure an undisputed superiority over Japan. If the Mikado could be taught a lesson in this way a reaction was sure to follow in Japan. Japan was not a rich country; the enormous military expenditures were a heavy burden for her population, and if it should turn out that in spite of them the Japanese army was not superior to the Chinese forces, the Japanese reform movement was bound to collapse quickly.

Such was the reasoning of the Chinese statesmen whose intellectual and political leader was Li-Hung-Chang. The Chinese wished that the coming struggle for Korea should take place quickly, and they made their preparations for it. But the Old Régime in China, which was not adapted to war, least of all to a war against modern European weapons, proved itself incapable of taking in hand even the naval reforms demanded by Li-Hung-Chang. It was not money and men that were lacking, but energy; and there was no strong central government to guide the careless provincial governors in a strict, uniform policy. China's natural superiority in resources of all sorts could not be made available.

So it came about that the Japanese triumphed by land and by sea in the war which broke out over Korea (1894-95). The immediate occasion of the war came from the fact that the Japanese sank a Chinese transport which was carrying troops to Korea. When hostilities began the Chinese warships were larger and more numerous than those of Japan, but the crews lacked European training and the advantages of recent technical inventions. The Japanese ships had greater speed, their officers had been trained by British experts, and their crews had also been given excellent drill. So the Japanese were able to win the war at sea before their land-armies came into action, and to these the Chinese could then oppose no equivalent force.

Without the Chinese navy being able to prevent it, the Japanese landed troops in Korea and drove the Chinese out of the peninsula. They were soon able to extend their operations further west toward the Gulf of Pe-chili and Peking, and to advance into Manchuria, where they captured the Chinese naval bases of Ta-lien-wan and Port Arthur. Then they gained a firm footing on the opposite coast in Shantung by storming Wei-hai-wei, which controls the entrance to the Gulf of Pe-chili from the south as Port Arthur controls it from the north. The entrance to Peking now stood open, and the Japanese were already preparing to land another army in order to advance from Taku (the port of the Chinese capital) against the city of Peking. There was nothing to stop them. All the Chinese war vessels had either been destroyed or fallen into the hands of the Japanese.

The Chinese government then saw that its cause was lost and declared itself ready to make peace. On April 17, 1895, the Peace of Shimonoseki was signed. This satisfied all the claims of the Japanese. The independence of Korea was recognized; that is, China abandoned her suzerain rights and handed the country over

to Japanese influence. The Liao-tung Peninsula, with Port Arthur at its southern point, as well as Formosa and the Pescadores Islands, were ceded to Japan. China paid a large war indemnity, and as a pledge of payment left Wei-hai-wei in the hands of the enemy. She also accorded Japan various commercial privileges.

It will be pointed out in another connection (see below, ch. xxx), how Japan was deprived by the European Powers of a considerable part of the fruits of her victory. At this point we can only make clear the importance which the Japanese success had for world history. This importance was not affected by the fact that a number of the European Powers checked Japan for the moment. The war had shown that an Eastern Asiatic country could so completely appropriate European methods of conducting war as to accomplish as great results as their teachers. It was evident that China would soon follow Japan's example, and that the time was coming to an end when European powers could regard Eastern Asia as a booty to be divided up among themselves at will. The yellow races themselves would soon have something to say, and, at any rate, the European Powers would have to share their claims with the new power of Japan. An English author rightly observed, "If Li-Hung-Chang and his system had triumphed and if Mutsu-Hito had been defeated in the war with China, one might have expected that the Far East would have been partitioned among the European and American Powers without delay."

All this was now avoided through the victories of Japan, and one of the first causes of dispute between the Japanese and the European Powers was Japan's demand that the integrity of China be respected. But the consequences of this dispute, which eventually led to war between Japan and Russia, will be treated, as has been said, in another connection. Here attention can be called only to the consequences which Japan's progress had for Japan herself in her relations with foreign powers.

About the same time as the war with China, Japan succeeded in setting aside the treaties which she had been compelled to sign in her time of weakness and which had restricted the Empire of the Rising Sun to the position of a second-rate state. Japan was now able to bring about a revision of her commercial treaties. She secured the same freedom in fixing her tariff rates as European states. The low import duties which had been established for the benefit of foreign merchants were abolished. A final step in this direction was the annulment of special consular jurisdiction for foreigners (1899) Foreigners now had to seek justice in Japanese courts of law in the

same way as in European countries; this was aided by the fact that in 1898 a Japanese civil code was put into force, modeled after the new German civil code; in 1880 a modern criminal code, drawn up by a Frenchman, had also been adopted.

Finally, it meant a complete break with tradition that the Mikado gave his country a constitution on the European model in 1889. To be sure, a regular parliamentary system was not introduced. The constitution was patterned after that of Prussia. Of the two chambers, the House of Peers was composed of nobles appointed by the Emperor for life. The House of Representatives was not elected by universal suffrage; the franchise was dependent upon the payment of a land tax of about seven dollars and a half. The cabinet was not dependent for power upon a majority in the House of Representatives. But if one considers that, according to the notions of Old Japan, the Mikado was descended from the gods, and that the government had formerly been exclusively in the hands of irresponsible feudal princes, he will see that the revolution was significant enough. A complete adoption of the system of parliamentary government would also have been opposed to the social structure of the country. The Japanese had, indeed, attempted to introduce European manufacturing on a large scale. In 1872, when the first railways were built, coal mines were opened and cotton and silk mills established. But they had not resulted in developing a well-to-do middle class as in Western Europe. The population of the extraordinarily densely settled islands remained poor. The great mass of the farmers gained a scanty living by rice culture, and the military development of the country was chiefly noticeable in the increase in the cost of living which it caused. So it was natural that the descendants of the former warrior nobility, even after they had lost their privileges, retained a privileged position. They were the persons who were usually appointed as prefects and ministers, and these representatives of the large landed estates often paid little attention to the members of the House of Representatives. Also the introduction of local self-government in 1899 turned out chiefly to the advantage of the landlords. Similarly the officers in the army and navy came in large part from the nobility. But this did not alter the fundamentally important fact which resulted from Europeanization,—the establishment of a strong central government upon whose favor even the nobles were dependent.

After Japan had gone so far, it could be only a question of time when China also would Europeanize herself. From the outset, one might say, if this change could have been brought about with-

out endangering the unity of the enormous empire, the European Powers would have found in the Middle Kingdom a still more dangerous rival than in Japan, not only because of the vast extent of the country, but also in view of the great efficiency of the people. The Chinese had always given evidence of an intellectual ability which was quite strikingly different from that of the Japanese. Now if the inhabitants of the Land of the Rising Sun had been able within such an astonishingly short time to prove pupils who were beginning to surpass their teachers,—what were the Europeans soon to expect from the Chinese?

CHAPTER XX

THE OUTCOME OF AN ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION IN EUROPE. (THE HISTORY OF IRELAND IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY)

The history of Ireland, since 1815, is so closely connected with the general population problems which determined the new colonial policy in the nineteenth century, and has developed in so peculiar a fashion, that it is best considered at this point; furthermore, the older history of Ireland offers a remarkable contrast to modern attempts at colonization. It is also desirable to explain the development of Irish conditions apart from those of England. Though events in Ireland are so often and so decisively interwoven with English history, nevertheless neither can the history of Ireland be rightly understood if it is given merely piecemeal in the narrative of English events, nor can its fundamental importance for the development of Great Britain be correctly seen.

For centuries, ever since England became a powerful state at rivalry with France, it has been Ireland's fate to be held in a dependent position by the neighboring stronger and richer kingdom for strategic reasons, without the English Crown, however, being able actually to subdue the whole country. It was vital to England not to allow this close-lying island to fall under the control of France or to be occupied by French troops; yet any colonization by English citizens, which was the only way of making the country really a part of England, was out of the question. The Emerald Isle, little suited to agriculture, and consisting almost wholly of pasture lands, was at an early time sufficiently populated in view of conditions existing there. There was no land vacant in such a way that it could be occupied and divided among colonists. The English government, therefore, contented itself, at first, with merely occupying the little territory around Dublin, the so-called "Pale," which at least might protect England against a direct attack. Even this measure was satisfactory only from a military point of view; the parts which had been settled by the Norman nobles had been quickly Celticized under the influence of the overwhelming native population. From the middle of the sixteenth

century the relations between the nominally subject Irish population and the English Crown had grown much worse, as it had proved impossible to extend the Protestant Reformation to the Celtic parts of the island. This relation between British and Irish threatened to become even more bitter, because it was anticipated that the stricter rule of the Tudors would put an end to the liberty of the Irish chieftains; to this was then added religious hatred, which made the breach irrevocable. It was out of the question to think of incorporating the Irish population into the English system of government. If the English Crown wanted to make the island indisputably obedient, the only way to do it was to drive out the natives by force, and to settle Scots and English in their place. This accordingly was the method which was employed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the Tudors and earlier Stuarts, and with a special brutality by Cromwell. The Irish were driven out of a considerable part of the island (especially in the east); their land was given to English and Scots, mostly in the shape of large landed estates.

But though this "settlement" was often carried through without consideration for the Irish, it did not succeed in its purpose at all. On the contrary, it created one difficulty more. At first it was naturally impossible to destroy the native population altogether, or even to drive it away completely from the regions which were assigned to British settlers. The bitterness between Anglo-Saxon settlers and Irish natives continued just as before. Still further complications were added. Ireland no longer formed a unit as formerly. It was occupied by two populations who were sharply divided by clashing religious creeds. Furthermore, the interests of the Anglo-Saxon settlers were often not wholly identical with those of the English in the mother country; so that here also groups were often opposed, and even from the English point of view one claim often demanded as much attention as another. Particularly complicated were the conditions in 1800,—again under the fear of a French invasion,—when Ireland was formally united with Great Britain and the Dublin Parliament was dissolved; this gave Ireland's representatives a seat and voice in the English Parliament itself.

It is well known with what bitter satire Swift exposed the misery of the Irish people during the first half of the eighteenth century. Since then, conditions had grown no better. The continuance of peace, and still more the restoration of good order brought by the English government with a cessation of the former clan feuds, had

allowed the population to grow greatly, without any corresponding increase in the means of livelihood. As Ireland was less well situated than England, because it was little suited to agriculture, so it happened also that she could not make the same transition into a great manufacturing state. Ireland possessed only a little inferior coal and a scanty supply of wood, so that the considerable amounts of iron could not be used. Manufactures had been allowed to develop only to an extent that would not injure English manufacturing, and Irish Catholics were often excluded from employment in factories. The Irish lacked also the capital to develop new industries. In short, Ireland suffered all the disadvantages of the English system of large landed estates; these disadvantages were further sharpened by national and religious hatreds, by the smaller productivity of the soil (the population lived largely on potatoes and milk), and by the absence of large industries, which in England and Scotland saved from destruction the population which could no longer be nourished from the soil.

The result was that a large emigration, or rather an internal migration, of labor took place earlier than in other countries. Even at the beginning of the eighteenth century many poor Irish became migratory laborers, going later to England for agricultural employment. Conditions in Ireland were so different from those in England that at the Union in 1800 it was impossible simply to transfer the English system to the neighboring island. Nevertheless, English institutions remained in force, and, under the changed conditions, were much more oppressive to the Irish Catholics than to their coreligionists in England.

In England the Catholic Church was merely tolerated and tithes had to be paid to the established Protestant Church by every individual, no matter to what religion he belonged. But in England, where Catholics formed only a small part of the population and by no means the poorest part, this privilege of the Established Church was of much less importance than in Ireland. Here the mass of the natives, who were Catholic almost without exception, beside having to support their own religion, to which the state contributed nothing, had also to pay taxes to support the foreign clergy of the Anglican Church. Since 1832 tithes were no longer collected from the pasture land, that is from the large estates in the hands of the English landlords, whereas the tilled land, that is the farms of the poor people, were left to bear the burden. Also the regulation by which all public activity, such as sitting on juries and appointment to city offices, was reserved for Protestants, naturally bore much harder in

Ireland than in England. From a purely political point of view, on the other hand, the Irish Catholics were somewhat better off than their religious brethren in England. The Irish parliament, during the last years of its existence, had taken advantage of the state of war with France to get a number of the exceptional laws against Catholics annulled; the English government did not dare to revive the old régime. Irish Catholics could vote for members of the English House of Commons, but they could not be elected to it. They might vote, but their representatives must be Protestants, and the franchise was much lower than in England, so low, in fact, that all peasants, so to speak, could vote. Also the number of representatives in the House of Commons assigned to Ireland once for all in 1800 was not small; they numbered 100, whereas Scotland, for example, was represented by only 45 members. In 1800 and afterwards, therefore, Ireland exercised a considerable influence in the English Parliament.

One point peculiar to Irish economic life has not been mentioned: the so-called "absenteeism" of the landlords. In England large landed estates prevailed; but there the lord usually lived on his estate. The Irish gentry, on the other hand, spent the larger part of their existence in London or Dublin. They were, therefore, dependent upon receiving rent from their estates, and neither had they any personal contact with their tenants nor were they inclined to forego a temporary profit from their estates in order to draw a larger rent later. Rightly does M. J. Bonn observe, "If the Irish landlord (that is, the landowner of English origin) had seriously aimed at the improvement of agriculture, he ought to have lived in the midst of his tenants. Either he ought to have cultivated his estate on a large scale basis, employing and training the small tenants as day laborers, or he ought to have been content to receive his rents in the form of produce of the soil. In either case he would have had to live primarily from the produce of his estate and he would only have had to make small outlays in money. The cash profits from his estate he would have paid out in the shape of wages or used for improvements. If he preferred leasing his land, he would have had to leave the cash profits from the leased land to the leaseholders and content himself with payments in kind and services. In this case the tenant could have saved capital and would have had an inducement to more intensive agriculture."

In all this, be it observed, there was no clash of nationalities in the modern sense of the word. In preceding centuries, to be sure, the English government had attempted by force to supplant Irish

customs and even the Irish language by that of England. But such efforts had ceased long ago, because they had very little point. To be sure, Gaelic had survived among a part of the population in the purely Irish districts of the west; but a majority of the inhabitants had learned English, and even adopted it to such an extent that they had completely forgotten the Irish dialects. The complaints of the Irish never rested on attacks against their language; so far as Gaelic was still a living language, no obstacles were placed in its way by the English government. Ireland's grievances were wholly of a religious and social character.

So long as the laws against Roman Catholics were still in force in England (see above, p. 90), Irish agitation was chiefly directed to religious questions. Here their first leader was the Catholic barrister O'Connell, who founded the Catholic League in 1823 and sought the abolition of the laws against his Catholic brothers in England. O'Connell was the first Catholic who was elected to the House of Commons (1828), and it was apparently thanks to his election that in the following year (1829) Catholic Emancipation was passed in England.

This brought little advantage to Ireland, for, at the same time, the electoral qualification, which was extraordinarily low according to English conceptions, was increased in Ireland about five-fold, so that the poor Irish peasants were now excluded from the franchise. Thus the Irish farmers lost their former privilege, and since they formed a much more numerous part of the population than the farmers in England they were relatively worse off than the latter.

The Reform Bill of 1832 (see above, p. 92) made no direct change in conditions in Ireland; it was of importance only in that it broke the rigid conservatism of the Old Régime and so prepared the way for reforms. The English workingman's movement scarcely touched Ireland at all, since the country was so little industrialized; Irish Chartist leaders like O'Connell and O'Brien spent their energies in England. In Ireland, as ever, the Church problem stood in the forefront; here agitation could work freely, now that the Catholics had been given political and legal equality. Daniel O'Connell, a great orator and political organizer, to whom the Catholics owed in good part the removal of the religious restrictions, understood how to gather about himself all the aspirations of the Irish. He united into a single party the mass of the Irish peasants who had hitherto remained apart from political life; this party aimed at religious as well as social reform, or rather at both at once, since disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Ireland would at the same time

bring economic relief to the Catholic farmers. It was not O'Connell's idea to replace the Protestant Church by a Catholic one; for he wished to deprive the English government of all ecclesiastical influence. He merely wanted freedom and equality for the Irish Church, that is, simply the abolition of all the privileges enjoyed by the Anglicans. Previous to 1832 he had even dallied with the plan of securing this by a return to the conditions before 1800. He founded a league for home rule in Ireland, which should bring about a repeal of the Act of Union made at the beginning of the century. But after 1832 he cherished exclusively the aim of improving the condition of the Irish Catholic population within the existing political organization.

His most important demand was the abolition of the tithes, that is, of the taxes for the support of the Protestant Church. In this connection the Irish for the first time began to adopt the revolutionary tactics of open opposition to the law, which have been so often imitated since then. The Irish Catholics refused to pay the tithes. A number of tithe proctors were murdered. Instead of £104,000 only £12,000 were collected. In the face of this opposition the English ministry gave way. It would not, indeed, hear of a complete abolition of the tithes; but, according to its usual practice, it sought to arrange a compromise. First, the number of Anglican bishoprics in Ireland was decreased (from 22 to 12), and the taxes for the maintenance of the church buildings were abolished, which considerably reduced the payments which Irish Catholics had to make. Later, payment of tithes was transferred from the tenants to the landlords, that is, from the Irish to the English. At the same time a poor-law with public support for the needy was introduced. But the Irish regarded these concessions merely as partial. Their agitation was helped by the fact that during their struggle for the abolition of the tithes they had been able for the first time to exercise a decisive influence on the parliamentary situation. By his skill in organization, O'Connell had succeeded in forming such a strong group about himself in the House of Commons that the majority, and hence the decision as to which of the two English parties should control, was dependent upon his will. O'Connell at that time assured control to the Liberals by uniting with them against the High Church Tories.

Just because the Irish question was apparently primarily a religious one, the Irish had little hope except from the Whigs, since the Tories stood even more strongly in defense of the privileges of the Anglican Church than for the maintenance of the landlord sys-

tem. The conflict, therefore, became much more bitter when the Conservatives again came to power in 1841. O'Connell returned to his effort to secure the repeal of the Act of Union of 1800, and began an agitation like that of the Chartists. Monster meetings were held demanding autonomy for Ireland, that is, a restoration of the Catholic government in the island.

This movement found extraordinarily favorable soil in the increasing misery of the Irish people. Since 1800 the population of Ireland had been continuing to increase without any corresponding means for its support being afforded by the establishment of new industries or by a more intensive cultivation of the soil. In 1825 the population of Ireland was 6,000,000; in 1836, 7,760,000; in 1841, 8,770,000; the average density of the population per square mile in 1840 was 93; that is, it was almost as high as in England (105), which had industries and was much more fertile; three times as high as in Scotland (33), which, however, was largely hilly; and higher than the average of the three countries put together (86); it was also much higher than fertile France (62), or Germany (61). The misery of the people grew in proportion to this increase in their numbers. The soil was divided up into tiny parcels; the farmers lived in miserable huts without windows, often along with the cattle, and clothed only in rags; and they subsisted ordinarily only on potatoes and water. In short, there was unquestionably terrible suffering. The official commission of inquiry was the last to deny these facts. The only question was how they should be remedied.

The Irish naturally laid the blame on the landlords and particularly on the insecurity of their tenancy. How could one expect the peasant to labor to improve his land if, at any moment, he might be evicted by the landlord, and have to leave the soil he had been cultivating without being paid any compensation for the improvements which he had made? The tenant ought, at least, to be guaranteed against summary eviction without compensation for his improvements.

Justifiable as many of these demands were, one must not overlook the fact that they were only one of the roots of the evil. This is clear from all the reforms which have since taken place, which have gone far beyond the first demands of the Irish. It was also clear to contemporaries at that time. Lord Dufferin, one of the largest landlords in Ireland, wrote in 1869, that the tenants of the excessively divided soil would never be economically better off, even if they were regarded as tenants for life. "The rents of Ireland are

comparatively low: to transfer, therefore, the power of exaction created by competition from the landlord, against whose interest it is to enforce it, and to hand it over to the tenant, who will never fail to enforce it, would hardly be a change to the better. Yet you will hear the same person who would vehemently denounce a landlord for insisting on a rack-rent, detail with complacency the enormous sums of money which some one has obtained for his tenant-right from a successor to his farm, whom he has skinned by the process and left stranded for life on the barren acres. From the foregoing considerations it is apparent that competition is an irrepressible force; if stifled in one direction, it will burst out in another."

Thus the conditions were such that even if the Irish had secured all their demands these alone would not have improved the situation. But they did not even secure all of these. To be sure, O'Connell stirred up a great agitation; mass meetings, where a quarter of a million people were supposed to have come together, voted for the restoration of the Irish parliament (1843). But the movement broke down when the government resorted to force. O'Connell was declared by a Protestant jury guilty of an attempt at conspiracy, and although the penalty was not imposed, his health was impaired, and he withdrew from political life. The situation in Ireland, however, demanded ever more insistently some remedy. To all the existing suffering there was now added a new calamity. The potato rot suddenly appeared in Europe. No country suffered so much from it as Ireland, where the very means of existence began to fail. Thousands died of hunger.

This was not one of the least reasons which determined the English moderate Conservative prime minister, Peel, to abolish the Corn Laws (see above, p. 99). Since one could no longer count on potatoes, grain again became, as formerly, an indispensable food. The English government went further still. By concessions of a different kind it sought to win the Irish, or at least to undermine the Irish movement. O'Connell's withdrawal from public life had had dangerous results. The great leader had always made use of legal methods and had worked hand in hand with the Catholic clergy, which would give no support to revolutionary methods. But now there had arisen a "Young Ireland" party which wanted to abandon this policy. It was composed of young lovers of freedom to whom religious ideas were foreign and who laid all their emphasis on democratic social demands, as in the case of the victorious February Revolution in Paris a little later in 1848 (see ch. xxi).

They broke off, so far as they were concerned, all connections with the clergy, and played with the idea of fighting for Ireland's independence with weapons in their hands, if need be.

The English government naturally sought the support of the priests against this new movement. Peel did not disdain to break with the system which had given state support only to the Protestant Church; he granted from the English treasury to Maynooth College, the seminary for Irish Catholic priests, the sum of £26,000 instead of only £900. He brought it about that in the future the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland could also legally receive permanent bequests. In addition to Dublin University, which was strictly Protestant, there were founded three new colleges, which were neutral in religion and therefore open to Catholics. But practically nothing was done in regard to agrarian conditions. Peel had indeed sent a commission of inquiry to Ireland, and brought in a bill which was intended to guarantee to the peasants greater security of tenure and compensation for improvements of the land; but the law was thrown out in the House of Lords in 1848, thanks to the opposition of the Irish landlords. Under these circumstances there was only one remedy,—the remedy which had already been followed with success in England and for which the way had been prepared so excellently by legislation in the United States (see above, ch. xv), namely emigration. The Irish began to leave their country in great numbers, some going to England and Scotland, but many more to America. Perhaps never since the world began have such a vast number of people changed their homes at one time. In 1845, the last year before the terrible famine which began in 1846 and continued through 1847, the population of Ireland numbered about 8,300,000; it had fallen in 1851 to less than 6,600,000; that is, in the course of six years it declined a million and a half, or more than a fifth. The suffering was so great that many of the emigrants died on shipboard, or soon after their arrival in America, from bodily weakness.

Since then this movement has gone on almost unbroken. The enormous figures of the first years were naturally never equaled again; but still the emigration was always so considerable that the population of Ireland has steadily declined ever since. In 1881 it numbered only 5,100,000; in 1891, 4,700,000; and in 1901, 4,456,000. To be sure, this decline is not exclusively due to emigration. Since the peasantry are somewhat better off and the civilization of the people has improved, the earlier unlimited natural increase has been limited even in Ireland. Taken absolutely the

number of emigrants has, perhaps, declined, but so also has the birthrate.

This great shift in population has had consequences in the development of the Irish question which are by no means limited to social conditions in Ireland itself. In the first place, the unheard-of rapidity with which the Mississippi Valley was settled was brought about by nothing so much as the Irish immigration. Then the Irish movement for independence acquired a support which it had never known before: the large masses of Irish who settled in America remained true to their former home. The Irish in America could work up to prosperity quickly, and give aid to their countrymen whom they had left in the Emerald Isle. In America revolutionary plans could be laid without disturbance from the English government; America cared nothing about these intrigues; in fact, many Americans rather favored them, owing to their old grudges against England, and the compact groups of Irish voters formed an important political factor. Thus the Irish problem is closely connected with the colonial history of the nineteenth century.

For the moment, this emigration did not relax essentially the tension in political life in Ireland. The island was so frightfully over-populated that the flight of masses in the years after 1846 resulted in an economic improvement; similar famines have never occurred since then. But the agrarian and social difficulties were not removed for those who remained in Ireland. The English government attempted some further palliative measures. Only one of their proposals, however, was carried through: the Encumbered Estates Act of 1849, passed to facilitate the sale of properties which were too heavily encumbered with mortgages. The tenants received no guarantee against eviction; just as before, they could be driven off the soil, and they then contented themselves with acts of vengeance. On the other hand, "Young Ireland" made some regular attempts at rebellion. In 1848, when revolution triumphed in France, the Irish Nationalists sent the Provisional Government in Paris a memorial asking for support. But the English government answered this new attempt to ally with France by coercion laws; a hundred and eighteen of the leaders were arrested. The armed rebellion was suppressed and the leaders deported.

Though political agitation in Ireland was paralyzed for a time in this way, it did not put an end to the Irish movement. The authority of the English government did not extend to America; from there a new nationalist society was organized in Ireland. Since open opposition to the English government was impossible, it took the

form of a secret society called the "Fenians," a name taken from one of the old Irish legends. They continued the "Young Ireland" policy, that is, they pursued revolutionary and republican aims, unsupported by religion; they wanted to found an Irish republic by means of armed rebellion. The leaders hoped to get the necessary troops from Irish soldiers who had been in arms during the Civil War in America, and also from Irishmen who had been in English military service.

But these projects did not rest on any sound basis. To be sure, the English government could not crush the heart of the revolutionary party; though the secret printing press of the Fenian newspaper in Ireland was confiscated and the leaders of the movement arrested (1865), the organization still remained untouched in the United States. But in spite of all their efforts the Fenians accomplished only some isolated and fruitless acts of violence. The reckless attempt to attack England by way of Canada failed, as was to be expected; the Irish forces who invaded Canada from the United States were driven back without much difficulty (1866). No better success attended a number of Irish American soldiers who landed in Ireland and attempted to rouse a general rebellion. In England itself, the Fenians limited themselves to more or less fantastic plots: one group attempted to seize the arsenal at Chester; another blew up a prison in London to aid the flight of Fenians imprisoned there (1867).

All these crimes, to be sure, had the result that public opinion in England was again drawn to the Irish question. Those who had thought that the emigration and the coercion measures of the last decade had established quiet in Ireland were now convinced that this was not so, and that no improvement in conditions could be brought about except by reforms undertaken by the state. It was the great Liberal minister, Gladstone, who undertook to translate these convictions into law. Like his predecessors, he did not start by making concessions to the republican Nationalists, but sought to win the peasants and clergy.

First he abolished the hated privileges of the Anglican Church in Ireland. The Church was disestablished; persons who did not belong to it no longer had to pay tithes to it. Its enormous lands were partly taken for other purposes; many of its domains were assigned to the other churches,—to the Catholics and Presbyterians; other domains were devoted to the support of hospitals and asylums. The Anglican Church still remained very rich; but after 1871 it was nothing but a private corporation.

In 1870 Gladstone passed the Irish Land Act for the benefit of tenants: tenants were protected against arbitrary eviction, and so enjoyed the same tenant-rights as the Protestants in Ulster; henceforth landlords could not evict them, except by giving them compensation for disturbance and for improvements made on the land.

At the same time, a Peace Preservation Act was passed which placed Ireland under exceptional laws; by this the English government hoped to hold revolutionary groups in check.

These measures were far from solving the Irish question; but at any rate they brought quiet for some years. The Catholic clergy was now satisfied. The failure of the last effort at rebellion had shown that nothing was to be accomplished by opera-bouffe revolutions. But before a decade had passed the movement flamed up anew. Under existing conditions the Land Act of 1870 afforded the tenants insufficient protection. So long as the amount of land was so restricted and the number of peasants so large, it was impossible to prevent landlords from taking advantage of their stronger position, so long as their right of possession remained untouched. And the law had not dared to take this extreme step.

This last concession was at length forced from the English Parliament by the new tactics of the Irish opposition.

The Irish party at first refrained from revolutionary methods and aims. They no longer worked for a rebellion, although they did not object to criminal acts by individuals. They no longer demanded the establishment of an Irish republic, but merely Home Rule for Ireland, with a parliament and an administration of their own. This was to be secured, not by illegal means, but by a grant from the English Parliament according to the forms of law.

The first difficulty which the Irish party met with lay in the character of English parliamentary life. The influence and power necessary to pass these unpopular measures was possessed only by the two large parties which shared parliamentary power, but not by the little Irish group which could never get a majority in the House of Commons. Favorable party situations or sensational events in Ireland might for a brief time bring about an alliance between the Irish members and one of the ruling parties; but ordinarily the English Parliament could not only reject, but even ignore, Irish grievances.

The man who determined to put an end to this was Charles Stewart Parnell, who may be regarded, next to O'Connell, as the

second great organizer of the Irish movement. By birth Parnell did not belong really to the Irish. He was a Protestant landlord in the Irish county of Witlow, and by position and religion belonged to the Protestant English landlords. But in conviction he was wholly on the side of the Irish, and he had grown up in a family which nourished irreconcilable hatred against England. By using new parliamentary tactics, he now planned to compel the English House of Commons to discuss and fulfil Irish demands. He intended to make it practically impossible to govern Ireland from England and from the standpoint of the large English parties.

This result could not be reached in any normal fashion. The Irish group in the House of Commons formed a hopelessly small minority, and it was out of the question for him to think of changing the opinions of his opponents. But the liberal rules of procedure in the English Parliament, which dated from a time when the members (who were not professional politicians) had no great interest in lengthening or shortening the sessions, made it possible for a very few members to block parliamentary activity. There was no means of restricting the length of time that a member might speak; any member could propose an amendment to every word of a proposed law; he could demand a vote on every amendment; he could propose an adjournment after every vote; he could demand to know whether a quorum was present, and so forth. If there were present a number of members who were systematically intent on "obstruction," the majority had no legal means of stopping them.

Even the English parties had occasionally used this means, when one of them was in the minority, in order to prevent the passage of measures which were particularly objectionable. Now under Parnell's leadership the Irish adopted these tactics systematically. They not only arranged among their members coöperation by which one endless speech should follow another, but they obstructed the activity of the English Parliament in general. They intended that the English legislative machine should be absolutely prevented from working until it listened to Ireland's grievances. In 1877 harmless measures which had nothing to do with Ireland, such as a law in regard to South Africa, were subjected, as we should say, to "sabotage." There were sessions which lasted for more than forty-eight hours. It has been reckoned that in one single session, one Irish member spoke five hundred times and another three hundred and sixty-nine times. So great was the scandal that the House of

Commons finally authorized the presiding officer, or speaker, to expel from the hall members who systematically attempted obstruction.

But success at first was on Parnell's side. He had succeeded in bringing the Irish question again to the forefront of public interest; at the same time the Irish movement had again found a leader around whom it could rally. Success came quickly. What was left of the Fenians in Europe and America now joined Parnell. Parnell made a great propagandist tour through the United States, was received by Irish patriots there as the official representative of their cause, and collected over $360,000.

At the same time Parnell joined with the party of the Irish tenants. A former Fenian had founded the "Land League," which aimed to protect tenants from eviction by the landlords. The aims of the League were: (1) that no tenant should be evicted so long as he paid his rent, (2) that he should be free to sell his tenant-right, and (3) that the landlord should not be able to fix a higher rent than was fair. These were the three aims which were known as "the three F's": "fixity of tenure," "free sale," and "fair rent." The Irish tenants were thus to be transformed into free peasant proprietors, who would have full control over their land except that they would have to pay the lord a definite but moderate rent. Parnell advised the members of the League to force landlords to make these concessions by passive resistance. If a tenant was evicted, he was advised to stick on his ground just the same, and leave the landlord to force him out with the aid of the police. He was told that he could reckon on the support of the League. Furthermore, members of the League showed their common interest with evicted tenants by declaring that none of themselves would take the place of the evicted tenant.

Such were the conditions in 1880 when the open parliamentary struggle in regard to Home Rule began. The Liberals at that time had again secured a majority in the House of Commons; that is, the party was again in power which wanted to satisfy the Irish as far as possible. In addition to former concessions the new ministry was ready to give the Irish tenant financial support from the state in economic transactions. The ministry brought in a law by which henceforth a tenant who was evicted was to be compensated by the state, the amount of compensation to be fixed by a special agrarian commission. But the Irish opposition party, which had just indicated its preference for extreme measures by choosing Parnell as its president, declared that these concessions were inadequate; in fact,

every improvement in the situation of the Irish tenants would weaken the pressure for Home Rule. The party demanded the complete abolition of landlordism and of large landed estates in Ireland, and the granting of national independence. Following the revolutionary tactics of Parnell, they did not hesitate to adopt against their opponents a regular system of terror. Not only were frequent attacks made upon landlords, but there was invented the method which has made famous throughout the world the name of the unhappy Captain Boycott. By this method the Land League broke off all communications with their opponents: no Irishmen might speak with a person who had been outlawed by the League; no workingman or servant could take a position with him; no dealer would sell him anything; in short the enemy was "boycotted," to use the word which came into practice from the first victim against whom it was applied in November, 1880.

By this means the Land League at first accomplished its purpose. The condition of the Irish landlords became unbearable. It even came about that a deputation of one hundred and five landlords betook themselves to the English Lord-Lieutenant at Dublin and begged him for protection, at the same time requesting him, however, to keep their names secret so that they might not be delivered over to the vengeance of the members of the League.

But how could the British government give security of person and property in the face of such an organization as Parnell's Land League? The Liberal Ministry, indeed, did secure the passage of a coercion law for Ireland; and Irish obstruction in the House of Commons was gotten rid of by the adoption of new rules under which a qualified majority could put an end to debate. Also, several leaders of the Irish movement were arrested; but all this availed nothing, since the Irish clung as closely to their radical demands as before. Equally without avail were the efforts to improve the economic condition of the tenants. In vain did the Gladstone ministry bring in a bill according to which the fixing of the rent was no longer to lie in the hands of the landlords but in those of a special impartial court which should fix rents for fifteen years. In vain also did he advocate that the state should use government money to help poor tenants buy land of their own. A "national convention" of the Land League in 1881 declared, in spite of this, that Ireland's only salvation lay in putting an end to "foreign rule" by granting Home Rule.

The demands of the two parties now stood in such sharp opposition that no peaceful solution was possible. However much Glad-

stone wished to make concessions to the Irish, there were two points on their program to which he would not consent: the tearing up of the connection between England and Ireland, and an interference with the rights of property. Even an attack on the leader of the Irish had no success: the English government might indeed arrest Parnell; but he gave out orders that no more rents were to be paid so long as the British cabinet adopted terrorism; he declared that military power would be helpless before the passive resistance of the whole people. So the situation was worse than before. Equally without effect was the Government's declaration in 1881 that the Land League was dissolved. Its activity continued under another name, or the agitation was transferred to England where the law did not apply.

The ministry soon realized this, and made a compromise with the Irish leaders whom it had just arrested. The imprisoned men were set free again and the ministry promised not to demand a full payment of the rents which were in arrears.

For the moment, the situation seemed to be somewhat less critical. But then a group of Irish extremists interfered. In spite of his revolutionary aims, Parnell had always advocated a somewhat statesmanlike moderation, and in general had refrained from attacks on people's life. He knew that nothing would so stir up English public opinion as crimes of this kind. But for this very reason he was regarded by the hotheads of the party as not going far enough. He was reproached with adopting a weak compromise policy by a group of revolutionists who called themselves the "Invincibles" and who held the traditions of the Fenians; Ireland, they said, must be freed by armed revolution. When these politicians saw that the situation was becoming somewhat more peaceful, they determined to make all reconciliation impossible by a crime.

On May 6, 1882, in broad daylight, they murdered in Phoenix Park, Dublin, two distinguished persons, the Secretary for Ireland and the Under-Secretary, who, even from the Irish standpoint, were guilty of nothing except representing English rule in Ireland. The English government could only answer this crime, which created enormous excitement in England, by proclaiming martial law in Ireland and by establishing courts which were not composed of jurymen, that is, which were not subject to attempts at intimidation by the local populace. But the Irish extremists thereupon extended their field of activity still further, making use of the fact that they could organize secret societies undisturbed in the United States. They undertook a terrorist campaign after the Russian

fashion against the English government in England itself. Dynamite was to be their chief weapon of destruction. There were explosions in an office occupied by an English minister and in the Parliament Buildings at London, but without fatalities, as it chanced.

One cannot say that these tactics were crowned with success. Even if one assumes that these crimes made the English Liberals more inclined to concessions to Ireland, the fact nevertheless remains that the brutal violence of the Irish extremists roused an irreconcilable opposition in England, which was horrified at the idea of yielding to the movement. Gladstone's party of Liberals, indeed, still stood on the side of the Irish, but it found it increasingly difficult to meet the opposition within its own ranks.

For the moment, the Irish succeeded only in persuading the Conservatives, who were the party in power, to refrain from renewing the coercion measures. The Liberals, on the other hand, promised to give them as much independence as was compatible with the unity of the British Empire. Since this did not satisfy the Home Rulers, Parnell advised the voters to vote neither for the Liberals nor the Conservatives. His advice was justified by the result in 1885, inasmuch as the Liberals, though they had a majority over the Conservatives in the new House of Commons, were reduced to a minority if the Irish made a coalition with the Conservatives. Gladstone, therefore, had to bargain with the Irish; being the leading English minister, he adopted their demand for Home Rule, but this led to a split in his own party. A section of the Liberals believed, probably incorrectly, that establishment of Home Rule in Ireland would be nothing more or less than the first step toward complete separation; since they were unwilling to support this attack upon the "union" of the two countries, they seceded and formed a special group within the party known as the "Liberal Unionists." Among their leaders was the man who later became so famous as colonial secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, Member of Parliament for Birmingham.

The secession of this group became final when Gladstone laid his Home Rule Bill before Parliament. The Liberal prime minister intended to give the Irish complete Home Rule with a parliament and executive of their own; only in matters which concerned both countries was the decision of the English cabinet to be decisive. This secession of the right wing of the Liberals was not the only result of Gladstone's proposed Home Rule Bill. Public opinion in England was very much opposed to his plan of separating Ireland and England; and it was opposed also by the party of the English settlers in Ireland. The Protestants in Ulster, which was largely

settled by English colonists, feared that they would be handed over to a Catholic majority, and therefore joined together in protest and founded an Anti-Home Rule League. They even began to arm and declare that they would rather die with arms in their hands than allow themselves to be ruled by an Irish Parliament. They called themselves "Orangemen," in memory of William of Orange who once had restored English rule in Ireland after driving out the Stuart king, James II.

This united opposition compelled Gladstone to drop the Home Rule Bill in 1886. A majority in the House of Commons voted against it, and when the prime minister appealed to the people by dissolving Parliament and calling for a new election, the result was a disaster for the Liberal party. The Conservatives, who had fought the election on the issue of the unity of the empire, won such a majority that they were independent of any coalition between Gladstonians and Home Rulers.

Naturally, the Home Rule plan was thus dead for the moment. In Ireland open war broke out again between the landlords and the tenants. The Government did, indeed, try to interfere in favor of the farmers; but it was unwilling to touch property rights and so the interference lacked practical effect. Little could be accomplished merely by voluntary sales of land by landlords. The landlords were not a little burdened by the extraordinarily high taxes for the support of the poor, which was one of the results of the over dense population. "The landlord's position was tolerable only," writes Bonn, "where he was able to pay taxes and interest without depending on his rents, that is, on hard cash from his land." Toward the end of the 1870's, when improved communications shortened transportation between Europe and the overseas countries, and when the price of agricultural products began greatly to fall, the obligations of the landlords no longer permitted them either to reduce the rents or to make improvements. To induce them to make financial concessions to the tenants it was not enough to appeal to humanity, or to their own interests, which they understood well enough; compulsion had to be used; and since the Conservative government had no idea of doing this, Parnell's party undertook to do it. In 1886 the Land League compelled peasants to cease paying rents to landlords who did not accept the rents fixed by the official land commission. On the contrary, the tenants of every landlord were to form a company to which they would pay the rents and which would then negotiate in their name with the landlord. The English government declared this plan illegal, but the Land League again replied with passive

resistance: tenants who were evicted refused to leave their land; landlords had to drive them out by using the police. In Ulster there was even civil war on a small scale. Juries refused to convict the leaders of the Irish movement. In the House of Commons the Home Rulers, who were allied with Gladstone's followers, again adopted obstruction, so that there finally had to be applied "guillotine methods" of the American sort, which made it possible to fix beforehand the date on which a debate should close.

In spite of this, the ministry proceeded in the direction of making concessions. A land law was passed which was intended to transform Irish tenants into peasant proprietors. But the conflict went on just the same, so that the Government finally had to declare the Land League a menace to the state and arrested its leaders as common criminals.

At this moment, the crisis was relieved somewhat for a short time owing to two new factors. One of these was the split which took part among the Irish Nationalists; the other was the attitude of the Catholic Church.

Since the days of "Young Ireland" and the Fenians, the Irish opposition had not depended on religious support, although it had drawn a good part of its strength from the antipathy with which Irish Catholics regarded Protestant landlords. In spite of this the clergy and the politicians had hitherto worked in harmony together. Now a change came: the terrorist tactics of the Land League and the use of dynamite in the Russian fashion were ways of fighting which the Catholic Church could not officially tolerate. So in 1888 the Pope issued an encyclical condemning the Land League's so-called "plan of campaign." This meant that henceforth the Irish clergy had to refuse their support to Parnell's party. Furthermore, Parnell was compromised personally in 1890 by being charged with adultery; though this affair caused only small excitement in Ireland itself, the scandal was all the greater among the Puritanically-minded Liberals of England. The Scotch-English Dissenters, Presbyterians, Methodists, and Quakers, who formed the basis of the old Liberal party which had remained true to Gladstone, declared that they would break off all relations with the Irish Nationalists if they kept this adulterer as their leader, and Gladstone himself broke off openly with Parnell. The Irish party was thus embarrassed; some of the party, in order to keep up their connection with Gladstone's followers, chose a new leader; but a minority remained true to Parnell. The anti-Parnell majority was also supported by the clergy who, as one may imagine, had never been much inclined

toward Parnell who was a Protestant. So the Irish party, which had hitherto formed a solid organization, split into two groups which were most bitterly hostile to one another: the anti-Parnellites, who had the mass of the voters behind them and worked with relatively peaceful means; and Parnell's party, which no longer had to exercise any restraint on itself and which included the extreme revolutionary Nationalists. When Parnell died soon afterwards in 1891, the party still remained split for a time.

Meanwhile political conditions in England brought it about that the Liberals under Gladstone again came to office in 1892. This time his party succeeded in securing in the House of Commons a majority in favor of their leader's Home Rule bill, although it was somewhat emasculated as compared with the earlier measure. It was adopted there after a debate lasting eighty days. But it did not became a law after all. The Upper House, in which the landlords and the Anglican Church was much more strongly represented than in the House of Commons, had been scarcely affected at all by the change in feeling which had taken place in voters in Scotland and Ireland. So the House of Lords rejected the bill by a large majority of 419 to 40. Gladstone thereupon resigned. For the moment his Irish policy could not be realized. The Liberals perceived that they could not undertake radical reforms in Ireland until they had revised the English constitution,—by putting an end to the equality between the Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament.

Still, this did not mean that in the meantime reform legislation for Ireland was wholly neglected. Though the Conservatives were unwilling to agree to Home Rule, they attempted to satisfy the Irish people in another way. They adopted the old policy of the Liberals: the Irish Nationalists were to be deterred from pursuing their effort to break up the unity of the empire by improvements which were to be made in the material welfare of the Irish population. How serious the situation was is seen by the fact that the Conservatives, although the party representing order, did not hesitate at serious interferences with the rights of property. In 1903 the Conservative majority in the English Parliament passed a new land act for Ireland. This aimed at transferring from the landlords to the tenants within a reasonable time all the salable land in Ireland. The state advanced money at two and three-fourths per cent interest to the tenants to enable them to buy the land. The sale was arranged by an official land commission so that there was no possibility of the landlord's taking advantage of the tenants. In contrast to England, where the government never interfered in the relations between landlord and tenant

and where the laws favored the maintenance of large estates, the Irish peasants were now given favorable treatment. The English government supported their efforts to make themselves self-supporting by placing at their disposal no less than £100,000,000 for the purchase of land.

It would have been contrary to Irish policy for the Home Rulers to cease agitation after this. Far from declaring themselves satisfied by the Land Purchase Act, which they had supported, they regarded this merely as a partial concession. Now, as before, they continued to demand an Irish Parliament and a responsible Irish ministry. But it was only after ten years of struggle and after the reform in the House of Lords demanded by the Liberals (the limitation of the House of Lords to a mere suspensive veto) that they were able to carry through their purpose. In 1912 the Upper House was deprived of its hitherto unlimited veto, and in 1914 the new Home Rule Bill was adopted. Its bitterest opponents were now no longer the Unionists and the Conservatives, but the Protestant English settlers in Ulster. The Ulsterites adopted Irish methods and threatened civil war. But the majority in the House of Commons, nevertheless, held fast to their plan, which, moreover, provided for a transition period during which Ulster would not be subjected to an Irish Home Rule government. This Home Rule Bill would have gone into effect if the European war had not broken out in the summer of 1914. This suspended the application of Home Rule, and when the war was over circumstances had so changed that a new law was regarded as necessary.

The Irish problem thus belongs to the many unsolved questions which the last century has left for the future. Any settlement of the conflict between the claims of England and the Irish Nationalists which shall even be partially satisfactory seems more difficult than ever. No matter how far one might make concessions, political and social, to the Irish opposition, all these reforms could not get rid of the fundamental economic difficulty due to a large population settled upon an insufficient soil. To be sure, the great emigration has improved conditions essentially. There has been no repetition of the famine of the 1840's, and the living conditions of the Irish tenant have considerably improved. But this has made the struggle even more dangerous for England: the stronger the Irish Nationalists are economically, the better they are able to oppose English rule. On the other hand, the plan of making Ireland into a half sovereign state within the British Commonwealth of Nations and of thus taking the first step toward setting aside the abnormal

suzerainty of Great Britain over the overseas Dominions (see ch. xxxi) is apparently bound to fail on account of the Ulster problem. Because the English justly feel that there is no limit to the aims and methods of Irish agitators, who allege that the British government is responsible for things for which it is not to blame—for these very reasons, the English hesitate to hand over men oi their own race and religion to the spiteful rule of Irish Nationalists. The Protestant Anglo-Saxon province of Ulster is the only one which has hitherto managed to settle the land question satisfactorily; and not one of the least reasons for this is the fact that, in contrast to the purely Irish districts, it has been able to develop large manufactures in modern fashion. Ought this region to be allowed to fall under the control of a majority which is hostile to it, and which, economically at least, is in a more primitive state of civilization? The very fact that the Irish refuse to accept a compromise which would withdraw Ulster from their control, and insist instead upon ruling the whole island, is another fact which makes the English government seriously hesitate. This attitude on the part of the Irish seems to show that they have no intention of allowing the Orangemen in Ulster to enjoy their special advantages. Among the Irish now there is an extreme republican party, the so-called Sinn Fein, which has triumphed over the Nationalists who favored Home Rule.

Be that as it may, events during the World War showed that Ireland must be regarded by the British Government as a land which cannot be looked upon as forming a single permanent unit with Great Britain, like Scotland. In England and Scotland, universal military service was introduced during the war, but not in Ireland. This was not due to the fact that the Irish sympathized with England's enemies. The attempt made by the Irish extremist, Sir Roger Casement, to rouse a rebellion against England with German help resulted, in 1916, in a merely insignificant local success. And there were not lacking numerous Irish volunteers. But in the English government there evidently prevailed the feeling that it would not be safe to put Irish patriotism and self-sacrifice to too severe a test. Though the Irish had no desire to exchange British rule in favor of some vassal relation to Germany, still their inclination toward Great Britain was not so great that they could have been compelled to fight for her. And it is not to be forgotten that this system of universal military service was just as strange for England as for Ireland. Here again was a case in which Ireland was given privileged treatment.

BOOK IV

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE FORMATION OF NEW NATIONAL STATES IN EUROPE

CHAPTER XXI

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE

The July Monarchy (ch. xii) had satisfied all the wishes of the French middle class by whom and for whom the Great Revolution of 1789 had been made. Any restoration of the Ancien Régime, with its privileges for inherited wealth and for the clergy, was henceforth forever out of the question. Practically unlimited freedom of thought prevailed; neither schools nor writers were subjected to ecclesiastical influence any longer. At the head of the administration stood statesmen who knew how to care skilfully for the welfare of the bourgeoisie. In foreign politics, they avoided war and only continued the struggle in Algiers because no other course was possible; and in internal affairs they devoted their careful attention to the economic progress of the country. And this attention was richly rewarded. Never before had France been able so completely to develop her natural resources for creating wealth as during the reign of Louis Philippe. Neither external nor internal obstacles any longer stood in the way of unlimited economic activity. The intensive cultivation of the fertile soil was assured by the mass of small peasants whose number was correctly proportioned to what the soil could produce. Manufacturing, protected against foreign competition by protective tariffs, could appropriate unchecked the results of the "Industrial Revolution"; everything aided it: the excellent technical training which was afforded by the state and was free from all clerical control; and the systematic building of railways as a result of the law of 1842. Guizot, who is rightly regarded as the embodiment of this régime and who was at the head of the Foreign Office, was only speaking the truth when he once assured the Chamber of Deputies, "Let us not talk about our country having to conquer territory, to wage great wars, to undertake bold deeds of vengeance. If France is prosperous, if she remains free, rich, peaceful, and wise, we need not complain if we exercise only a small influence in the world abroad."

The bourgeoisie who had made the July Revolution were certainly thoroughly pleased with it. How indeed could they have refused their approval to a government which, from their point of

view, was regarded as an actual paradise, and which also satisfied all their old demands as to the form of government? The ideal of the middle class had been reached: order, peace, quiet, the exclusion of the Church from government, intellectual liberty, and the possibility for every industrious and ambitious young man with some property to rise in the world. The administration was in the hands of honest, industrious, cultured men. Ministries were formed correctly according to the parliamentary system, and so the bourgeoisie had an opportunity to share in politics.

But this government had three groups of opponents. The clergy was opposed to this system which was built up on a Voltairean basis. By the overthrow of Charles X they had lost the preponderant position which they had enjoyed before 1830. The so-called "University of France," which centralized all instruction and placed it under the supervision of the state, was retained by the July Monarchy, but the clergy were excluded from it. Now, when the clergy perceived that the cause of the Legitimists who followed the older Bourbon line overthrown in 1830 was hopeless, they sought to win back their former influence upon education through freedom of instruction. Their newspapers no longer appealed to the throne. They merely desired that clerical teachers should be given the same permission to conduct schools as was given to teachers officially approved by the state. To secure this, the clerical opposition began a very vigorous campaign against the "University," accusing it of systematically corrupting the youth. Then they turned their attack against the government, which would not yield, but which instead closed several Jesuit institutions in 1845. A large part of public opinion was thus made hostile to Louis Philippe's government. To be sure, the attacks of the clerical press made small impression upon the bourgeoisie, who, for the most part, were followers of Voltaire, like the king himself; and even when the government itself wanted to make concessions, the Chamber of Deputies flatly opposed them. On the other hand, these attacks by religious agitators left deep traces outside the *pays légal,* that is, among the classes of the people who were not represented in the Chamber of Deputies, especially among the rural population.

The second group opposed to the government were the workingmen. The proletariat had no representation at all in the Chamber of Deputies, and yet they stood in no less need of protection than their fellow-workingmen in England. The exploitation of human labor due to machinery aroused in France the sympathy of a much smaller part of the population than in Great Britain. It was not

until 1815, much later therefore than in England, that the iron and steel industries had begun really to develop in France and much the same was true of the textile industries. It was not until 1840 that any reports were published in France concerning the injuries to health resulting from the factory system. The main industry of France, now as before, was the growing of grain and the making of wine. The happy results of the French Revolution were clearest here. As the large landed estates had been broken up in considerable parts of France, there grew up a class of small peasant proprietors, who were able to acquire a high standard of living for themselves and to produce more food for the industrial population of the cities. The birth-rate declined somewhat, but so, also, did the death-rate. The wheat harvest increased steadily from the Restoration to 1848; the same was true of barley, corn, potatoes, and so forth; 1846 has been called a "famine year," but the harvest yield of this year was larger than the annual average of the Restoration era.

Although the factory system affected only a relatively small part of the population, this did not make the condition of those who were affected any better. Among the classes who had no legal means of improving their condition there began to develop a bitter revolutionary feeling. One ought to read the classic reports which Heinrich Heine wrote from Paris at that time (1842) to the "Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung"—perhaps the cleverest newspaper correspondence which has ever been written. "Everything is as quiet as a winter's night after a new fall of snow. But in the silence you hear continually dripping, dripping, the profits of the capitalist, as they steadily increase. You can actually hear them piling up—the riches of the rich. Sometimes there is the smothered sob of poverty, and often, too, a scraping sound, like a knife being sharpened." And in another passage Heine prophesies more in detail: "To-day, when I visited some of the factories in the Faubourg Saint-Marceau and discovered there what kind of reading matter was being spread among the workingmen, who are the most powerful element among the lower classes, I thought of Sancho's proverb, 'Tell me what you have sown to-day, and I will predict to you what you will reap to-morrow.' For here in the workshops I found several new editions of speeches by old Robespierre, Marat's pamphlets at two sous a copy, Cabet's *History of the Revolution,* Cormenin's poisonous little works, and Buonarroti's *Babeuf's Doctrine and Conspiracy*—all writings which smell of blood. The songs which I heard them singing seemed to have been composed in Hell and had a chorus

of the wildest excitement. Really, people in our gentle walks of life can form no idea of the demonic note which runs through these songs. One must hear them with one's own ears, for example, in those enormous workshops where the metals are worked and where the half-naked, defiant figures keep time to their songs with the mighty blows which their great iron hammers strike upon the ringing anvil. . . . Sooner or later the harvest which will come from this sowing in France threatens to be a republican outbreak."

This last observation is particularly important; for it points to the circumstance which was to lead the social movement to success —at least for a moment. If the French workingmen had stood alone, they could hardly have accomplished anything but a fruitless attempt at insurrection. It is probable that their agitation would have aimed at less than the Chartist movement. They lacked leaders and politicians who could have successfully expressed their aspirations to the political authorities.

But leaders of this kind were now provided by the government of Guizot through his neglect of the so-called *capacités*—persons of intellectual capacity but not of property.

So the third group of persons opposed to the government was made up of the young intellectuals, the men who had carried on the spiritual traditions of the Great Revolution, and who had never become thoroughly reconciled to the July Revolution. They had regarded the deposition of Charles X merely as a step forward. Their republican ideals were not satisfied by the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe, which put control into the hands of the wealthy middle-class. At first the opposition of this group was insignificant, because almost all of the intellectual leaders of the younger generation who had prepared the way for the July Revolution had been given office under the new government. But the more the new régime became solidified, the greater became the gulf between it and the republican idealists. The government devoted its attention almost exclusively to material aims; it was not at all inclined to endanger the prosperity of the country for the sake of humanitarian reforms or idealistic motives. The administration became more and more a closed caste. Since there was no longer any strong opposition within the *pays légal,* and since the voters held to the same materialistic aims as the ministry, the *capacités* had no means of taking part in political life. The government had no need of the support of these able intellectuals and writers. Its only concern was to retain its majority in the Chamber of Deputies; to do this it had only to grant concessions to persons whose material in-

terests coincided with the government's policy, that is, to the wealthy bourgeois. Many of the deputies themselves were also government officials, financially dependent upon the government; others could be won over by being given a share in public works and so forth. Why should a government have bothered itself about groups who possessed no political power under the existing franchise? Particularly as this system was benefiting the country no less than the ruling bourgeoisie? By 1840 the ministry had acquired a stability hitherto unknown; the general well-being was improving, and there prevailed, as Heine had once observed, "the greatest quiet." There were not lacking some scandals, but the fact that guilty ministers who had been making money by graft were strictly punished in the courts showed that the government was not inclined to tolerate dishonest practices. In scarcely any other government have there been so few cases of "corruption," using the word in the ordinary, though not in a rigorously ethical, sense, as in that of the puritanical doctrinaire, Guizot.

But, as has been said, this system had nothing to offer to the steadily increasing class of idealistically-minded intellectuals in France. In fact, it seemed to them to be the very enemy of progress, if one regards the improvement of the condition of the Fourth Estate as one of the tasks of the time. As had been the case in England a little while before, the opposition was convinced that what was needed most of all was a change in the franchise. They believed that the government would only pay attention to the demands of the workingmen when the property qualification for voting had been done away with, and the wealthy middle-class thus deprived of its monopoly of seats in the Chamber of Deputies. "Electoral and parliamentary reform" became the slogan of the republican party. In 1843 a formal fusion took place between the republicans and the socialists, when the leaders of both groups founded a joint newspaper, "Réforme." Among its influential editors were both socialists, like Louis Blanc, and partisans of political democracy, like Ledru-Rollin and Godefroy Cavaignac. Their program had quite a socialistic tinge. It was drawn up by Louis Blanc and contained such phrases as the following: "Formerly workingmen were slaves; now they are wage earners; they must be elevated to the rank of partners (*associés*). It is the duty of the state to bring about industrial reforms which will enable the workingmen to reach this position. Citizens able to work have a right to work. Only a democratic system of government can bring this about. No government is democratic unless it rests on the sovereignty of

the people and universal suffrage, and gives realization to the formula, *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*."

At first, therefore, this party of liberal opposition set up merely political demands. They insisted that officials ought no longer to be members of the Chamber of Deputies, that the franchise qualification ought to be reduced to a hundred francs, and that the *capacités* ought not to be restricted by any property qualification, that is, that even intellectuals without property ought to be eligible to the Chamber of Deputies.

But all these demands were met with an absolute refusal both by the government and by the majority in the Chamber. Thereupon, the opposition, following English example, determined to arrange giant demonstrations on the part of people not represented in Parliament. A national petition, which set forth the reforms demanded by the liberal socialistic group, was to be signed by thousands of persons and presented to the government. In order to win support for this there was organized in 1847 the so-called "banquet campaign": banquets were held everywhere at which speakers for the opposition (including also some moderate liberals) set forth the need for a revision of the constitution and asked for signatures to the petition. At these banquets purely political and socialistic desires were intermingled, or rather the political reform was represented as being the first step toward social reform. In July, 1847, at one of these banquets in Paris, a health was drunk to the improvement of the workingmen's condition. Other speakers glorified the Great French Revolution in the way that Heine had already noticed, and led cheers for the National Convention of 1793.

The government, however, declared that it would not allow itself to be intimidated by this agitation outside Parliament. "The ministry will not yield one step," it was said in the Chamber in January, 1848. The authorities even went further. They determined to put an end to the movement altogether, and forbade the "reform banquet" which was to be held in Paris on February 22. This led to the outbreak of revolution. At first there were only some harmless demonstrations in which students and workingmen took part; but soon, on February 23, 1848, barricades began to be thrown up in the workingmen's districts in Paris. The government thereupon called out the National Guard; but this was hostile to Guizot's government and made demonstrations in favor of reform. Louis Philippe then began to feel that his system was tottering. He forced Guizot to resign and promised to form a new ministry favoring reform (February 23).

The cause of reform seemed to be victorious and assured of a further peaceful development. But on the evening of this same day occurred an unfortunate incident. In the very heart of Paris, on the Boulevard des Capucines, gunshots were exchanged between the promenading masses of people and a number of troops who were standing guard outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The troops killed twenty-three of the crowd and wounded thirty others. Among the dead were women and children. General rage seized the people. They cheered for a republic, and on the next day all Paris was filled with barricades. Louis Philippe now intended to make further concessions than on the night before; he accepted a ministry composed of men from the opposition in the Chamber, and promised a new election. But these concessions came too late. The leaders of the insurrection declared that he deserved the same fate as his predecessor, Charles X. The King abdicated in favor of his grandson, and fled from the Tuileries. The crowd thronged into the palace and demolished the throne. The Chamber at first attempted to give effect to the wish of the fallen monarch and proclaimed his grandson, the Count of Paris, as king. But the crowd pressed into the Chamber, crying, "Down with the monarchy!" The republican deputies used this opportunity to establish a provisional republican government. This government then fused with one which had already been formed by republican politicians at the Hôtel de Ville in Paris. With the enthusiastic approval of the people of Paris, the Republic was proclaimed on February 24, 1848.

As one sees, the February Revolution in Paris was exclusively an urban socialistic movement. The country people who had indirectly shared so much in the July Revolution and whose interests would have been so severely injured by a reëstablishment of the old Restoration Monarchy and landlord nobility had neither taken part in this revolution nor did they even regard it with any real sympathy. In many respects their opinions were directly opposed to those of the new men who had assumed power. This was particularly true in the matter of religion: the revolutionary leaders were hostile to the Church, believing at best in a kind of humanitarian pantheism; but the French peasant of that day still clung closely to his religion. So the new government, from the outset, did not harmonize with the will of the majority of the people. It was composed of representatives of tendencies which had triumphed in the February Revolution. In it were leaders of the republican opposition under Louis Philippe, like Ledru-Rollin and Dupont de l'Eure. The socialistic movement was also represented by some socialist

republicans put forward at the Hôtel de Ville, of whom the best known was Louis Blanc.

At first, however, there was general enthusiasm in the country. No class, except the higher bourgeoisie, had any real enthusiasm for Louis Philippe's government. The clergy, as has been shown, had no reason to grieve for the government which had fallen, and the liberty-trees which were planted in the villages were blessed by the priests. Furthermore, the new government had no intention of replacing the former class-rule of the bourgeoisie by a new class-rule in favor of the Fourth Estate. The members of the Provisional Government were honest democrats and held fast to their ideals, even when these seemed to benefit their opponents. They probably cradled themselves in illusions as to the political views of the majority of Frenchmen; but even if they had known the real feeling in France, they would not have renounced their convictions. They therefore arranged at once for the election of a national constituent assembly on the basis of universal suffrage, thus handing over the sovereign parliamentary authority to the peasants and not to the intellectuals and workingmen who had brought about the revolution. At the same time, unlimited freedom of the press and of public meeting was introduced, and the ranks of the National Guard were thrown open to all citizens, even to workingmen. The decrees of the National Convention abolishing slavery in the French colonies were renewed.

Thus the great mass of the citizens who had hitherto been excluded from political life, and who, in good part, had insufficient education, now acquired at one stroke a share in political and military power; as E. Driault says, they now had "the ballot and the gun." Newspapers developed enormously (the stamp tax being abolished), and were read by wide groups of people. Workingmen took part in political debates and joined the National Guard by thousands, so that its membership increased in a few weeks from fifty thousand to two hundred thousand. But in accordance with the social structure of France, the citizens who were admitted to this new political activity belonged much more to the peasant than to the proletarian class.

From the government's point of view, this was all the more dangerous, inasmuch as the socialistic ministers, who had had to be included as a concession to radicalism, were not at all inclined to leave the people time to become accustomed to the new conditions. The socialistic demands which Louis Blanc set forth, such as "the right to work," were to be realized at once. Although a majority

of the Provisional Government consisted of Republicans, who believed that political reforms were sufficient, and who held fast to the tricolor, they were compelled, nevertheless, to make concessions to their radical comrades; the latter had hoisted the red flag and gave the republican government the appearance of favoring a social revolution. They supported a measure which appeared to meet a demand formerly made by Louis Blanc, and organized National Workshops (*Ateliers Nationaux*). They recognized the "right to work,"—the duty of the state to furnish employment to every citizen. They also created a Labor Commission, led by two prominent socialist ministers. This commission heard delegates from various branches of industry and economists of various views; it voted in favor of a ten-hour day "in view of the fact that too much manual labor ruins the health of the workingman and destroys the dignity of man by preventing him from developing his intellectual possibilities." The antagonism which existed within the Provisional Government came to light more sharply in this incident than in any other. The republicans wanted to use this occasion to prove the impracticability of the socialist theories, and made only a pretense of accepting Louis Blanc's demands. The Labor Commission was given no real power, and the "National Workshops" were so organized by the minister of commerce, Marie, that they were bound to be a fiasco. Instead of giving work to the unemployed in workshops supported by the state, and instead of taking into consideration the workingman's particular aptitude, as Louis Blanc had desired, the republican minister had about 100,000 laborers set to work digging in the Champs de Mars in Paris. They were also given military organization which made them more dangerous still. But the worst of it was that this expensive experiment, in which the laborers cost much and produced nothing, came at a period of economic depression. The revolution had naturally caused a commercial crisis and the income of the state had somewhat declined. Now, in addition to the ordinary expenditures, there was added the outlay for the National Workshops. The government was compelled to increase the taxes by about one-half, adding an extra tax of forty-five centimes for every franc paid in taxes. This aroused the first serious irritation among the peasants who had the feeling that they had to raise money so that workingmen who produced nothing might receive pay.

So the popularity of the republic declined quickly, particularly among the masses who had been recently admitted to the vote and who were not yet trained for responsible participation in politics. Soon other incidents took place which created an unfavorable im-

pression in the republic, because they seemed to show that the only salvation against the socialist danger was the strong hand of a military dictatorship.

The National Constituent Assembly which met on May 4 was very far from being socialistic. As it represented the people who had just expressed themselves through the new universal suffrage it contained very few supporters of Louis Blanc: of its 900 members, about 800 belonged to the republican party, and were opposed to social revolution. In the Executive Committee, which was established in place of the Provisional Government, not a single socialist was given a seat; in it, beside Ledru-Rollin, Lamartine, Arago, and other decided Republicans, there sat the Minister of Commerce, Marie, who had tried to destroy the National Workshops by what we should nowadays call "sabotage." But this attitude on the part of the Executive Committee caused an open conflict. The workingmen believed that they had been deceived, and attempted an insurrection. On May 15 a great crowd pressed into the hall of the Assembly, declared it dissolved, and proclaimed a purely socialist government, of which Blanc and Blanqui were members. But the insurrection failed. The National Guard dispersed it. Blanqui, among others, was arrested, and Louis Blanc fled into exile. Thereupon the minister, Marie, ventured to declare the National Workshops abolished (June 21). But the labor movement was not crushed by this. After Marie had rudely turned away a deputation which came to protest against the closing of the National Workshops, a regular insurrection broke out. The methods of the February Revolution were used again, but this time only by members of the Fourth Estate. In the eastern districts of Paris and in other parts of the city occupied by the poor, barricades were thrown up. A body of 70,000 workingmen united under the cry, "Liberty or Death!" So great was the danger that the committee established by the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, and all executive power was placed in the hands of Cavaignac, the Minister of War. A military dictatorship had to be established in order to suppress the workingmen's insurrection (June 24, 1848).

Naturally, there could be no doubt as to the outcome of the struggle; the workingmen could not hold out against a regular military attack. Nevertheless, great efforts were necessary before the government troops were able to reconquer the parts of the city occupied by their opponents. The troops were able to advance only step by step, and at the cost of heavy sacrifices. A number of generals were killed. But on June 26 the entrance to the Saint

Antoine suburb, the real workingmen's quarter, was finally forced. The rest of the workingmen's army, 11,000 men, surrendered to the victor.

How severe the struggle had been is shown by the fact that after the suppression of the insurrection, peaceful conditions were not restored at once. It appeared necessary to leave the executive power for the time being in General Cavaignac's hands, and in Paris the state of siege was continued until the end of 1848. For newspapers a cautionary deposit of money was again required; many failed because they were unable to raise the large sum demanded. Whoever had taken part in the last revolt could be summarily deported; about 4,000 persons were arrested and packed off to the colonies. No amnesty was proclaimed for others not punished.

Henceforth, the Republic had to reckon with the unrestrained hatred of the socialists, without being able to acquire the good will of the conservative elements. For the majority of the population did not think that the government had mastered the insurrection quickly. They only remembered the unheard-of phenomenon of a "red" revolt, and got the impression that nothing but a military dictatorship could prevent a return of those terrible days.

The idealistic republicans also made the mistake of giving into the hands of their numerous opponents the very weapons to cause their own fall. On November 12, 1848, the National Assembly adopted the new constitution which gave the president an altogether extraordinary amount of power. As in the United States, the president was to be chosen for a four-year term and to appoint his own cabinet. The executive power was therefore wholly independent of the single chamber which was given legislative power. True to the old republican program, the constitution also emphasized the duty of the state to care for general education, for the establishment of equality between workingmen and employers, and for the provision of opportunities to work, so far as was possible.

So far, indeed, little objection could be made to the new constitution from a republican point of view. The fact that the president, as in America, was made independent of the changing parties in the legislature, might even be regarded as an advantage, since in this way the executive would give the republic greater stability. But as conditions then were, the election of the president ought, at least, to have been in the hands of the legislature, the only body which was thoroughly in favor of the republic. This was also the view of distinguished parliamentary leaders. One of them, Jules Grévy, even went so far as to wish to give the legislature not only

the right to elect, but also to recall, the president. But here again the fatal voice of the poet, Lamartine, carried the day; just as he had attempted to discredit Louis Philippe's government, by his grotesque phrase, "France is bored"—as if it were the duty of those in authority to entertain the people with theatrical phrases or with useless warlike undertakings,—so now the poet again threw a new phrase into the discussion which did not fail to produce a great effect upon the republican idealists. After he had explained that it was in accordance with the principles of democracy for the president to be chosen directly by the people, he added, "God and the people must decide. We must leave something to Providence." This decided the matter. Not even the limiting clause was approved that no member of a family which had formerly reigned in France could be elected president. The Assembly decided, by 602 votes to 211, that the president should be chosen on the same basis of universal suffrage, on which it, itself, had been elected.

What this meant was soon evident. In addition to conditions which gave the French president a wholly different position from the American one—a centralized administration and a large army at his unlimited disposal—there was added the peculiarity already mentioned, that the masses of the people, who had hitherto been excluded from the suffrage, were unable to make a choice among the candidates on the basis of real political experience. They easily voted, therefore, for a candidate who had done practically nothing to deserve election, but who bore a familiar name. This was the Bonapartist pretender, the nephew of Napoleon I; named Louis after his father, the former King of Holland, he had already attracted general attention by his adventures during Louis Philippe's reign.

Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, born in 1808, was by inheritance the legitimate claimant to the Napoleonic imperial throne. Twice under Louis Philippe he had attempted to make himself successor to his famous uncle. Both times the undertaking had failed, under circumstances which were simply ridiculous, so ridiculous in fact, that the imperial pretender was thought of as scarcely more than an inexperienced dreamer. The first time, when he attempted to overthrow the July Monarchy by a military insurrection in Strasburg, he was easily arrested and shipped off to America (1836). Four years later, when the pretender landed from England and tried to seize Boulogne, he was again taken prisoner. He was condemned by a court to life-long imprisonment. He spent six years under arrest in the fortress of Ham until 1846, when he succeeded in escaping to England disguised as a workman (the name of the stone-

mason, Badinguet, whose overalls he borrowed, clung to him as a nickname long afterwards). Scarcely had the February Revolution broken out in France when he returned to Paris and at once opened an active political propaganda. His popularity grew rapidly. At by-elections for the National Assembly in the summer of 1848 he was elected in no less than five departments, including Corsica. He had the great advantage that he had not compromised himself with any party, and so had on his side all the opponents of the new Republican government, who preferred an unknown person to politicians who were disliked. Moreover, the hazy humanitarian socialistic ideas which he had developed in his previous writings may have won for him some of the socialists, who had not broken wholly with the February Republic. So at the election on December 10, 1848, Louis Napoleon won an enormous majority in the popular election. Those who voted for him included both the peasants and the anxious bourgeois who saw in him the only savior from the "reds," many workingmen who had learned to hate the republican government, and also many republicans who disliked Cavaignac's military dictatorship. General Cavaignac, who had triumphed over the Paris workingmen in the fighting at the barricades in the July Days, was the only other candidate who had any chance of success against the Bonapartist prince. He received, in fact, nearly a million and a half votes, while Ledru-Rollin got only 370,000, and Lamartine only 18,000. But Cavaignac's vote was all the smaller when one considers that Louis Napoleon was elected by no less than nearly five and a half million votes.

On December 20, Louis Napoleon took the oath to the Constitution, and in doing so expressly condemned any attempt to change the form of government by illegal methods. But he began at once his policy of uniting all the conservative elements into a *bloc* which should prepare the way to the throne for him as the preserver of order. The panic of the socialist revolution had drawn together the conservative groups which had hitherto been so hostile to one another: many republicans even approached the standpoint of the Orleanists who supported the July Monarchy; Legitimists who supported the older Bourbon line, clericals, and Orleanists, all faced by the common danger which threatened property and religion, which was regarded as the protector of property, now joined together in a great "Party of Order." The president at once declared himself of the same mind. He even allowed a conflict to take place with the republican majority in the Assembly. Quite characteristically he first made concessions to the neo-conservative party in a religious

matter. Under the influence of the February Revolution in Paris, reformers had risen in revolt in the Papal States and proclaimed a Roman Republic. It would have been wholly in accord with the attitude of the new, free-thinking, democratic government in France, if French troops had supported this movement which could not succeed without aid from the outside, and the National Assembly passed a vote in favor of such action. But the president paid no attention to this vote. He knew that the "Party of Order" would never pardon any weakening of the Pope's authority. He therefore sent an army to Italy under General Oudinot, with orders to support, not the Roman Republic, but the Pope; and he carried through his purpose. In vain did republican leaders, Jules Grévy and Ledru-Rollin, insist that the president ought to be impeached for disregarding the vote of the National Assembly. The Assembly did not dare to go to such lengths, and Pope Pius IX was able to return to Rome under the protection of French troops, and so restore at once his old system of government in 1849.

Louis Napoleon took a still more decisive step when the new elections for the Legislative Assembly gave a majority to the groups on which he was resting for support. The Constituent Assembly had naturally been dissolved after it had accomplished its task of making a constitution for the country. In 1849 the new elections for the Legislative Assembly gave anti-republican tendencies full opportunity to express themselves. Under the panicky impression caused by the socialist insurrection, for which the republicans were held responsible, a complete change had taken place in the electorate. Of the 750 deputies elected to the Legislative Assembly about 500 belonged to the "Party of Order"; barely a third of the deputies, therefore, represented the party which had had the majority in the National Constituent Assembly.

Under these circumstances any opposition in the Legislative Assembly to the president's Roman policy had much less chance of success than in the Constituent Assembly. In vain did Ledru-Rollin again insist that the president ought to be impeached; in vain did he appeal to Article V of the constitution, which expressly forbade the use of French troops in the suppression of the liberty of another people. His proposal was voted down. Two days later Ledru-Rollin answered by stirring up a demonstration in one of the eastern suburbs of Paris, but this disturbance, in which several hundred National Guards and workingmen took part, was easily suppressed by the military authorities, and only served as a legal pretext for breaking up the republican organization. Ledru-Rollin had to flee to London;

other leaders were arrested; the republican newspapers were suppressed; and Paris was placed under martial law.

The way was now open for a new reactionary policy. In 1850 two decisive laws were passed which marked not only a departure from the ideals of 1848, but even a retrogression to the period before 1830.

Louis Philippe's government had differed from that which preceded it before 1830 largely in that it had withdrawn public education wholly from the control of the Church (see above, p. 190). Laymen who were essentially Voltairean in their way of thinking had been given charge of public instruction. Although the bourgeoisie had not experienced any new convictions of religious truth, they now determined on political grounds to place the youth again under the influence of the clergy. Their idea was that a strengthening of religious influences was the only way to secure protection against the socialist ideas in favor of social revolution. As M. Falloux said, when introducing the new education law, "Lay teachers have made the principles of social revolution popular in the most distant hamlets." It was therefore necessary, he said, "to rally around religion in order to strengthen the foundations of society against those who want to divide up property." The Legislative Assembly agreed with him, and so in 1850 was passed the so-called "Falloux Law" which again introduced clerical supervision over the schools. The "University" was divided into eighty-six departmental academies, at the head of which were rectors who were elected from outside the "University"; that is, they were chosen from ecclesiastical institutions and were placed under the direction of the prefect and the bishop. The higher schools (*collèges*) were supervised by an administrative council which was usually presided over by the bishop. Teachers in primary schools were placed under the local priest and had to teach the Roman Catholic Catechism.

Another old wish of the clerical party was also satisfied, inasmuch as instruction in all grades was now made "free," that is, open to any one. The religious "congregations" were now able to enter into unchecked competition with the public schools, and ecclesiastical schools of every kind quickly sprang from the ground everywhere. The bourgeoisie, who were anxious that the coming generation should be protected from the dangerous doctrines threatening the system of private property, could now not only send their children unconcernedly to public schools; they could also send them to religious educational institutions which devoted themselves directly to combatting the doctrines of social revolution.

The second law in favor of the new conservative tendency was the electoral law of May 31, 1850. The "Falloux Law" of March 25 had indeed roused some fear among the people at large, and some by-elections had indicated a slight strengthening of the republican feeling. To prevent a revival of socialist opposition in the Legislative Assembly the electoral law was changed. The Legislative Assembly was not able, and perhaps did not wish, completely to do away with universal suffrage; but it determined to exclude the workingmen in good part from it. The new law declared that henceforth in order to vote one must have resided three years in the same district and have one's name inscribed on the list of taxpayers. These were conditions which were easily met by the peasants, who were regarded as a conservative element and were therefore gladly protected by the Legislative Assembly in their political privileges. The workingmen, on the other hand, could only meet these conditions to a slight extent, and so it came about that some three million citizens, chiefly workingmen, were robbed of their share in choosing the legislature. The formation of a socialist party in the legislature was therefore out of the question. Perhaps even more important was the fact that the French chamber had now shown that an extension of the suffrage may not only work in the direction of conservatism, but may even be a regular protecting wall against revolutionary tendencies.

But this "reactionary" electoral law contributed essentially to the downfall of the legislature. The Republican and Socialist opposition feared the new régime would be nothing but a poor imitation of the July Monarchy, or worse, because the rule of the bourgeoisie would be strengthened by placing education in the control of the clergy.

The president, who was aiming at personal power and also at more or less hazy humanitarian ideals, made use of this discontent in the Republican and Socialist groups to pose as the true friend of the people in opposition to the Legislative Assembly. He proceeded systematically toward restoring the Empire by manipulating public opinion and by subjecting the army and the administration to his control. He got rid of the Orleanists whom he had at first had to take into his cabinet out of regard for the feeling in the Legislative Assembly. He removed generals from office who opposed the Bonapartist propaganda in the army. He asked the Legislative Assembly to repeal the new electoral law and introduce again complete universal suffrage; and when it rejected his request by a small majority he declared, "When I wanted to do good by improving the condition

of the lower classes of the people, the Legislative Assembly refused to coöperate with me."

The only problem which remained for him was whether it would be possible to restore the monarchy in some legal way, that is, whether public opinion, which was favorable to Louis Napoleon, could compel the Legislative Assembly to submit to his wishes. This was what the president at first attempted. Two things especially must be accomplished if he wanted to introduce personal government again. He must be provided with sufficient revenues to maintain a court, and the clause in the constitution which declared the president ineligible for reëlection at the expiration of his four-year term must be repealed. The president and his party attempted to secure both these things in the legislature; but both were rejected, though with relatively small majorities. The proposal for increasing his "endowment" by 1,800,000 francs was refused by a vote of 386 to 294. The more important proposal, revising the constitution so that the president could be reëlected, secured on July 26, 1851, an absolute majority in the Legislative Assembly, but not the three-fourths majority required by the constitution.

Besides this the president was faced by the further difficulty that he had no legal means of appealing to the people against the legislature. The constitution, like that of America on which it was modeled, had created the executive and legislative powers co-equal (an arrangement which has often brought a political deadlock in the United States); it withheld from him the right to dissolve the Assembly and order new elections. If he wanted to make himself "democratic autocrat" there was nothing for him to do but use force.

Accordingly, he soon used force. With the aid of the army and the police, the president succeeded in carrying out smoothly the *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851. The chief leaders of the Republican and Orleanist parties, like Cavaignac and Thiers, were arrested and thrown into prison, and the legislative hall was occupied by soldiers. One of the president's natural brothers, named Morny, was made minister of the interior, so that Louis Napoleon at once had all the prefects in his control. The *coup d'état* took place under the guise of saving the republic. The president not only declared in his proclamation that it was his intention to overthrow the men who had already ruined two monarchies, to nullify their plots against the republic, and to appeal from them to the only sovereign whom he recognized, namely to "the people"; but he also placed before this people for popular vote *(plébiscite)* the draft of a new con-

stitution which repealed several reactionary decisions of the Legislative Assembly (particularly the limitation of universal suffrage), and which also extended the president's term of office for ten years more. But the Republicans naturally did not allow themselves to be deceived by these words. Although deprived in good part of their leaders, they organized themselves for resistance and appealed, according to the constitution, to the supreme court (*Haute-Cour*) to condemn the president's high treason. The court met, acknowledged the apparent guilt of the offender and invited him to defend himself. A "Committee of Resistance," consisting of men like Victor Hugo, Hippolyte Carnot, and Jules Favre, posted up placards calling people to rise in armed revolt against Louis Napoleon who had made himself an outlaw. The opposition succeeded in winning over several hundred workingmen to their side. Once more the eastern suburbs of Paris were torn up for barricades.

This defensive action against Louis Napoleon did not seem altogether hopeless. Both in Paris and in the provinces the *coup d'état* met with lively disapproval and the first attack on the barricades had relatively little success. If the president had been willing or able to use no more means than stood at the disposal of Charles X or Louis Philippe, his *coup d'état* would probably have failed; but, in contrast to the preceding monarchs, he had the army firmly in his grasp and he was not afraid to make a thorough and, if need be, brutal use of it. Louis Napoleon had the troops attack the barricades and clear the Grands Boulevards with frightful fusillades. Although there was no organized resistance here, the troops opened a systematic fire on the crowds and neighboring houses, and the streets were covered with the bodies of old men, women and children. In the provinces the president went ahead in the same way; after several local attempts at revolt, he placed thirty-two departments under martial law and established military commissions with discretionary power which were given authority to condemn all suspicious persons by a kind of court-martial.

"Suspicious persons" were not only those opponents of the new régime who were suspected of armed opposition, but, in general, all persons who favored by conviction a republican form of government. So it came about, that although the opposition to the *coup d'état* was quite limited, no less than 100,000 persons were arrested; 1545 were exiled, or fled voluntarily, like Victor Hugo. About 10,000 were deported to Algiers and 239 to Cayenne. More than 5,000 were placed under official surveillance and about 3,000 interned in France itself. The republican party, as such, was de-

stroyed; there were still some republicans, but they were unable to act in common.

Thus Louis Napoleon appealed from the intellectual élite, who had hitherto been in control, to the masses of the bourgeois, who were worried about the safety of their property. Shortly afterwards, as he had promised, the *plébiscite* was held (December 14, 1851). It showed that the president had not acted against the wishes of the majority of the population: the new constitution was approved by about seven and a half million votes to 650,000. But the conflict between the intellectual, influential classes and the *coup d'état* government still continued, and doubtless contributed eventually to the fall of the Second Empire. For no matter how much the president, and later emperor, attempted to win public opinion by military glory and by increasing the prestige of France abroad, French intellectuals, who are probably less likely to be blinded by military glamor than those of any other country, remained steadily hostile to him. Even the French Academy adopted a decidedly unfriendly attitude down to the end of the Second Empire. The brutal treatment of innocent bystanders on December 4, and the equally brutal procedure against the intellectual leaders of France, was never pardoned by his opponents.

At first, Louis Napoleon was in full possession of power in both foreign and domestic matters. What the constitution of 1848 had denied to him was now granted by the new one of 1852, adopted by the people upon his proposal. It differed primarily from the preceding one in that it sharply limited the powers of the legislative body, which had formerly been coördinate with the president; and at the same time it extended the authority of the president and also (theoretically, at least) that of the people. The president, who henceforth was to be elected for ten years, was made sole executive; he appointed all officials, signed all treaties, and had the right to declare war and proclaim martial law. The Legislative Assembly, which was reduced in membership by two-thirds, could only discuss laws which were laid before it by the president, and so lost all power of initiative. By its side there was established a Senate whose members were appointed for life by the president; this body had the task of preserving the constitution. The president was responsible neither to this nor to the Legislative Assembly, but merely to the people. This did not mean, however, that the electorate was given a regular share in the government by anything like a referendum. The share which the people had in politics was limited to the extent that voters might vote "aye" or "no" in the so-called *plébiscites*

whenever the president laid any measure before them for decision, such as the adoption of a new constitution, or the making of war or peace. Elections to the Legislative Assembly were still to be by universal suffrage; however, the president had the right to propose official candidates and thus influence the elections very strongly.

After this first step, it was a mere formality for the president to complete his imitation of the First Napoleon by assuming shortly afterwards the imperial title, and by declaring the imperial dignity hereditary in his family. After the first elections to the Legislative Assembly, which took place under the system of official candidates, had given him an overwhelming majority (the opposition got only three seats), he sought to allay the fears that he would take up his uncle's war policy by declaring in his Bordeaux speech, "L'Empire, c'est la paix,"—"The Empire means peace, my conquests must be of an economic nature." After all this, the Senate decided to lay before the French people a *plébiscite* as to whether the Empire should be restored. This resulted in an enormous majority in favor of the proposal (7,839,000 ayes to 253,000 noes). Accordingly, on December 2, 1852, on the anniversary of the *coup d'état,* the new Emperor took his seat in the Tuileries, the old palace of the kings.

The Emperor's peace pronouncement was more than a mere phrase. Although he was drawn into military adventures more than once, for reasons which will be explained in another connection, he by no means forgot the peaceful economic activity which he had promised in his Bordeaux speech to undertake. And in contrast to Louis Philippe's government, he sought, as far as possible, to look out for the interests not only of the upper bourgeoisie but also of the peasants, the workingmen and other consumers. The *Crédit Foncier* was established; agricultural societies were multiplied; the construction of railways was greatly pushed; rivers were improved so that the harvests should not be injured by floods; forests were planted; and swamps were drained. All this was of advantage to the workingmen, for all these extended undertakings needed a large supply of labor. In addition to the activities mentioned, one of the most important in this connection was the systematic rebuilding of the capital, which was begun in 1854 under Baron Haussmann, the prefect of the Seine. At one stroke Paris was transformed from an old-fashioned city into a modern capital. The narrow, crooked streets disappeared; great buildings were laid out with plenty of space in front of them; and broad approaches led to the railway stations. This was done not only in the interests of hygiene and to

give employment to workingmen, but also, in case of rebellion, to make easier the movement of troops. The construction of countless new railway lines, the establishment of better overseas trade-routes, the consolidation of the French rule in Algiers (see p. 124),—all this aided the development of industry under the new régime. Still the Emperor by no means favored exclusively the interests of the great manufacturers as the July Monarchy had done. How little this was the case is shown especially clearly in the so-called free-trade treaty which he signed with Great Britain on January 22, 1860, in which one of the negotiators was the well-known free-trader, Cobden. By this France renounced all her prohibitory regulations against foreign imports. In their place were established import duties which were not to be more than thirty per cent *ad valorem*. In return, France received the right to export to England free of any duty various products, chiefly agricultural, and English duties upon French wines and spirits were lowered. This was an innovation which could only have been brought about by the fact that the Chamber of Deputies did not have to be consulted; now, as before, protectionists controlled the legislature, and numerous French manufacturers regarded the treaty as a misfortune for the country; but the Emperor ignored the legislature, and, as a matter of fact, the commercial treaty resulted in the foreign trade of France increasing in ten years from three to eight million francs.

But though this material prosperity naturally made a great impression, the opposition of the intellectuals and the numerous idealists, as has already been indicated, was not overcome. Its spokesman, the *Journal des Débats*, expressed their feelings when it declared, "Man does not live by bread alone; and all is not for the best in the world simply because the price of cattle and government revenues are rising." These people could not forgive the Imperial Régime either its illegal origin or its suppression of all free intellectual life. The government, always afraid of opposition, undertook, in alliance with the church, a spy system of extraordinary rigor. In the years before 1860 persons were arrested for expressions which they had used even in private conversation. Newspapers could be summarily suppressed or suspended by government authority. No new newspaper could be established except by the express permission of the government. Teachers in the "University" might be dismissed at any time. The dangerous professorships of history and philosophy were altogether abolished. All political agitation was rendered impossible. Newspapers were allowed

to publish only the official reports of the sessions of the Chamber. Electoral campaign meetings, and even the publication of party platforms, were forbidden.

The government was quite aware that there was an unyielding opposition in the country. So it was driven more and more to seek the support of those forces which it regarded as the only sure support of its authority, namely the army, the clergy, and the commercial circles who were glad to be free of having to bother with politics and of the danger of socialistic uprisings. How correct the government was, was seen at once as soon as it modified its oppressive system after 1860: Paris, the intellectual center of France, chose exclusively opposition candidates in 1863.

The situation which developed at that time had an importance which extended far beyond France itself. While the fact that a military dictatorship appeared to be the only means of holding down the socialist revolutionary movement exercised a great influence on the political thought of all Europe, the new dynasty's close connection with the army also led to a complete change in foreign policy. Emperor Napoleon III (as he called himself, since he regarded the Duke of Reichstadt, the great Napoleon's little son, who had never actually ruled, as "Napoleon II,") believed it necessary to give the army an opportunity to distinguish itself; and he also wished to win, as far as possible, the support of public opinion in France by a display of "prestige." The national policy of his predecessors was replaced by a dynastic policy of his own. In place of the pacific policy of the July Monarchy which had suited so excellently the economic structure and geographical expansion of France, and, in fact, France's position among the European states, there now followed a period of military adventures and fruitless warlike activities. Napoleon III did not begin wars of conquest; even from victorious wars he scarcely expected any increase of French territory. Usually he championed the aspirations of other nations, whose interests either did not touch, or were even in direct conflict with, those of France. He allowed himself to be influenced either by general sentimental considerations or by the hope of acquiring for France (empty) diplomatic distinction, which would reconcile the hostile elements in his country to the imperial régime.

One of the most important results of this changed attitude on the part of the French government was a fundamental alteration in the relations of the European states to one another. The period of peace following the Congress of Vienna came to an end. In place of small wars of limited extent (like that in Belgium), or of colonial

wars, conflicts between the Great Powers began again. The most important of these struggles took place in Italy. But before an account is given of them a resumé must first be given of the great war which marked the beginning of this new era, and also of the Civil War in America, which made clearer than anything else the change in the political views of Europe.

CHAPTER XXII

THE CRIMEAN WAR. RUSSIA AND THE EASTERN QUESTION

NAPOLEON III quickly secured recognition from the other Great Powers. Although a Bonapartist government in France was in direct contradiction with the Treaties of 1815 and 1818, still the other Great Powers made no serious opposition to the Second Empire. For reasons to be described in the next chapter, they felt they had a common interest with the conservative régime victorious in France; they hailed with joy the establishment of a monarchy instead of a republic on the Seine, especially a republic tinged with socialism. But the legitimist principles, which had been advocated by the Conservative Alliance of the Eastern Powers since 1815, were not to be shoved aside all at once. Napoleon III was indeed recognized as a *de facto* ruler, but he was not treated on terms of equality. When he wished to marry, all the princely families of Europe, even including Bernadotte's Swedish dynasty, refused the hands of their daughters, so in January, 1853, the French emperor married Eugénie de Montijo, who came from an old and respectable but not princely family in Spain.

Nicholas I, Tsar of Russia, was the ruler who was most cool to Napoleon III. He had always regarded himself as the peculiar defender of legitimacy. Shortly before this he had reaffirmed his attitude by destroying the revolutionary Hungarian republic (which was scarcely to be justified from a purely Russian standpoint). Nicholas now refused to address Napoleon as "Mon Frère," which is the usual form in which legitimate princes address one another.

If Napoleon wanted to make himself count with the other Powers, the best way to do it naturally seemed to be by a stroke against Russia. Furthermore, the French emperor could at the same time show his good will toward his clerical adherents in France, if he was able to stand forth as the defender of Roman Catholicism against the Russian schismatics. A struggle with Russia, particularly a military one, was hardly in the interests of the French na-

tion. France did not care if her new ruler was snubbed in international etiquette. But Napoleon was guided by dynastic interests, as has already been pointed out, and if he held to these, war with Russia was perhaps advisable.

Such an undertaking seemed particularly favorable, from a military point of view as well as for reasons of prestige, if it could be carried out in conjunction with some other Great Power. For evident reasons England was the only possible ally. England was naturally hostile to Russia, and had become increasingly so, as Russian and English interests clashed more sharply in Asia (see ch. xvii). The English court had fewer scruples to overcome, and the British government had been the first to recognize the French Empire. Finally, England was also in a position, being the only great naval power of the age, to afford better support to the French land army than any other country.

The Eastern Question, that is, the question which European Power should secure control over Constantinople, had become essentially less favorable to Russia since the end of the War of Greek Independence. From her defeats at that time Turkey had learned her lesson, and had been reorganizing her army according to European models and under the direction of European instructors. The "Straits Convention" of 1841 had declared the Bosphorus neutral and closed it to all ships of war, particularly to those of Russia. If Russia wanted to retain free exit into the Mediterranean in case of war, she was compelled to make preparations to break through by force; with this in mind, she had been building a mighty fortress and naval port on the Crimean Peninsula at Sebastopol. There was danger that Russia might possibly get ahead of Turkey with her war preparations before the Sultan at Constantinople had organized sufficient defenses to free him from his dependence on St. Petersburg.

Russia herself, during the last decades, had been using her vast natural resources for greater and greater military preparations. Although she did not look forward to conquests in Europe, and although her soldiers were chiefly used in suppressing revolutions and in preserving existing conditions, still Nicholas I devoted most of his attention to military matters. While his elder brother, Alexander, had toyed with liberal political ideas, his interests were exclusively devoted to the creation of a strong army and navy. He felt that the existence of his government, and indeed of conservative legitimist principles in Europe in general, were bound up with Russia's strong military force.

It is not to be denied that he accomplished his purpose with

astonishing success. The corruption and inefficiency of Russian administration have become proverbial in Western Europe, but the facts brand this view as wholly false in many respects. Certainly, many of the stories are true, which have been told by Russians as much as by others, of the bribery and inefficiency of Russian officials. But only a superficial moralist will lay great weight on these stories. If one wants to regard the matter critically and historically, one must first of all see whether these delinquencies, which naturally took place, actually hindered the working of the Russian state machinery, and rendered abortive the aims toward which Russian policy was directed. On this point the only answer that can be given is that they did not. Though a great deal of corruption took place, and though state funds were often squandered by officials, nevertheless the efficiency of the Russian army and of Russian foreign policy scarcely suffered at all thereby. One simply has to remember the account given above (in ch. xvii) of Russia's expansion in Central Asia, and one will admit that it would be difficult to find any other state which could have carried out these tasks better.

The error of the current view largely rests on the fact that people are accustomed to think of policy and administration as being dependent on natural resources. But just as a business man who has only a little capital must proceed quite differently from a firm which has millions in reserve, so it is also in the life of nations. Russia was in the position of a millionaire with an enormous income, who does not need to worry if his agents line their own pockets to some extent. In spite of corruption, Russian revenues were always sufficient, and Russian finance was more solid than that of other states less favored by Nature, which pursued foreign policies not in harmony with their weak economic basis.

Furthermore, in the Russian civil service there were by no means lacking persons who may be compared in patriotic self-sacrifice, zeal and intelligence with the bureaucrats of other countries. To be sure, it became evident, step by step, that the centralized military administrative system which had been artificially transplanted to Russia from the West demanded for its successful action a much more advanced state of civilization and a less primitive economic system than existed in Russia. The Russian Empire, made up almost wholly of peasants, in which only a few cities were little more than large villages, in which a great part of the peasants were serfs under the practically unlimited power of landlords, and in which there was lacking both a strong city middle-class as well as free peasant

proprietors,—such a country did not sufficiently possess the elements necessary to keep the complicated state machine at St. Petersburg working satisfactorily in all its detailed administrative parts. Too many of the officials in its service were lacking in the necessary knowledge and desired honesty. But the system still gave honest men opportunities for service in a much larger degree than has generally been admitted, and what the Russian government accomplished, both at home and abroad, shows clearly that these opportunities were largely made use of. To be sure, it was unfortunate that the "Panic of the French Revolution," augmented by the officers' revolt of 1825 (the so-called Decembrist Revolution) which aimed at the introduction of a constitution, lasted longer in Russia than any other states; and, as a result, capable officials, who were naturally inclined to western liberalism, were persecuted by the system of suspicion, and, as far as possible, pushed to one side. But, on the other hand, the civil service was less a monopoly of the nobility than in many of the other feudalistic states of Central Europe. Since there did not exist in Russia proper, as has already been pointed out, a system of large landed estates based on primogeniture, younger sons of the nobility were placed under no economic necessity of being put into the civil or military service, even when they were not fitted for it; it was otherwise, however, in the German Baltic provinces of Russia, where estates were entailed; from this region, therefore, there have come an unusually large number of Russian higher officials. Naturally, also, the nobility were prominent in the administration and in the army, because the necessary economic and social qualifications were harder to find in the other social classes in Russia. But the nobility were not really privileged as such; and aristocracy based on service everywhere dominated over aristocracy based on birth. The nobility (that is, the landlords, since only nobles could acquire land) were at the same time the industrial class in Russia. To be sure, Russia did not have the necessary conditions for the introduction of modern industry. The relatively thinly settled soil, with its enormous mineral deposits and with the great stretches of land in the south so excellent for grain growing, was at that time only prepared to produce raw materials, and these formed the larger part of her exports. But the government, by prohibitive measures against the importation of those products which could be manufactured in Russia itself, had tried since 1822 to develop native Russian industries; and since the nobility had the right to establish factories on their own soil and even to inscribe themselves among the "merchants of the first guild,"

they were able to engage in industrial as well as commercial undertakings. Thus, modest home industries had been developed.

Although Nicholas I had taken so much care of the army, and although during his reign the military element dominated the civil administration, still he never thought of making war against his two neighbors on the west. Austria and Prussia were both too valuable as bulwarks of absolutism, he thought, for him to attack them; and also, at that time and for a long time afterwards, there were no grounds for war against them. It was part of his policy, too, to keep his subjects as far as possible from any contact with the foreign nations of Europe: to go abroad, in his day, one had to have the Tsar's personal permission; an attempt to emigrate might be punished by exile to Siberia; foreign books and newspapers were admitted only with difficulty, and all foreigners were watched by the police. Now a war with the states of the west would only have increased this contact with European civilization, which he so much feared. But after Nicholas I had suppressed the Hungarian revolution in 1849, and thereby made Austria indebted to him, he believed the moment had come to put an end to the reorganization of the Turkish defensive measures which were growing steadily more threatening; the time had come to establish Russia's supremacy in the Balkans.

The Tsar naturally expected that he would only have to deal with one opponent, England. He therefore first sought to arrange the matter in a friendly way. He proposed to England a partition of the empire of the "Sick Man," as he called the Sultan: in the Balkans a number of independent states would be created under Russian protection; Great Britain would have Egypt and Crete; and Constantinople would not be Russian territory exactly, but only be occupied by Russia "provisionally." But the English government was unwilling to give Russia access to the Mediterranean and declined the proposal.

Parallel with these negotiations, conflicts had been taking place in regard to the Holy Places in Palestine. Here the claims of the Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox monks were opposed to one another. Since the former were under the protection of France, the French government also was involved. Russia sought to use this opportunity to compel Turkey to yield to her the right to protect all Greek Orthodox Christians throughout the Turkish empire. But owing to the pressure of the British ambassador in Constantinople, Turkey rejected this demand. Russia thereupon broke off diplomatic relations with Turkey in 1853.

Both sides then tried the plan of making military demonstrations. The Tsar occupied the Rumanian Principalities with an army, and England and France sent their fleets through the Dardanelles; since this was contrary to the convention of 1841, Russia protested. Great Britain replied that Russia had already broken the peace by her occupation of Rumania. On November 4, 1853, Turkey declared war on Russia. So far, it was not at all inevitable that these events should result in a European war; it was conceivable that the war might this time also have been merely a local one. But the Great Powers which were hostile to Russia, particularly Napoleon III, who at that time was trying to translate his dynastic policy of prestige into action, did not want to let the opportunity pass of putting an end once for all to the danger which threatened Constantinople through Russia's possession of a navy in the Black Sea. When the Russian fleet sailed out shortly after Turkey's declaration of war, and annihilated the Turkish fleet at Sinope on November 30, 1853, the Powers believed the favorable occasion had come for intervening on behalf of Turkey. A combined Anglo-French force sailed into the Black Sea, and the Russian vessels were compelled to withdraw to Sebastopol. The Tsar thereupon broke off relations with the two Western Powers. The latter then demanded the evacuation of the Rumanian Principalities. When the Tsar rejected this demand also, they declared war on him (March 27, 1854).

Since Russia did not want war, there were no serious military operations at first. In order to deprive his enemies of any pretext for an attack, the Tsar even withdrew his Russian troops from the Rumanian Principalities, and had them occupied by Austrian troops, so that no land attack against them was possible. But the Allies raised new demands, such as the neutralization of the Black Sea, and therefore continued the war.

Naval operations, which alone were possible at first, took place in both the Baltic and the Black Sea. Though the Anglo-French attacks on the Aland Islands and on Kronstadt were of no great importance, their expedition against the naval port of Sebastopol on the Crimean Peninsula developed into an enormous undertaking. Their purpose here was the total destruction of this stronghold, in order to deprive Russia of her Black Sea base for attack against Constantinople.

The operation proved much more difficult than any one had anticipated. Thanks to their naval superiority, the Allies were able to land their troops smoothly on the Crimean Peninsula north of Sebastopol (30,000 French, 20,000 English, and 7,000 Turks).

Shortly afterwards, by their victory on the Alma (September 20, 1854), they were able to fight their way from the landing point down to the fortress of Sebastopol. But the battle had been such a costly one for the victors, and Sebastopol appeared to be so well fortified, that the Allies did not dare to try to take it by storm. Instead they began a regular siege.

The Russians made splendid use of this delay. Defensive works of enormous strength were built. The entrance to the bay on the southern shore of which Sebastopol lies was blocked by sinking ships, so that the city could not be reached by the Allied naval guns. The siege dragged along in an extraordinarily slow manner. The besiegers were attacked by cholera which caused fearful losses in their ranks. The Russians were able to bring up a relieving army which compelled the Allies to fight battles at Balaklava and Inkerman, which further reduced their forces. It was only their control at sea which saved the Allied troops from a catastrophe.

From the point of view of world history it is important to note how the contingents of the various nations performed their military tasks. Here, for the first time, it became evident that the English administration was not equal to the demands of a campaign against a great European Power. In courage and bravery the English troops were in no way inferior to their French allies; but the English government lacked the training and centralized administration necessary for affording proper support and sufficient provisions. Not only did English regiments often have to be saved by the French on the field of battle, but the frightful winter which the Allies unexpectedly had to spend in the Crimea deprived the British of half their troops, owing to the deficient transportation system. So great was the scandal that it overthrew the British ministry. More important than these temporary consequences, however, was the fact that the Continent now saw for the first time since 1815 how weak Great Britain was from a military point of view.

The Allies therefore gladly accepted offers of reinforcements which were made to them from various sides. The Austrian government's plan of uniting with them against the Russians was not carried out, to be sure, because it was opposed by Prussia, Russia's natural ally. But Turkey placed a new army corps at their disposal, and the King of Sardinia, under Cavour's energetic leadership (see below, ch. xxv), gladly seized the opportunity to take part in the war and so place himself in a position of equality with the other two great states of the west. The government at Turin undertook to send 15,000 Piedmontese troops to the Crimea, on January 26, 1855.

With the aid of these and other reinforcements, the Allies finally succeeded in taking Sebastopol. To be sure, it cost a series of murderous attacks; but finally, on September 9, 1855, after several frightful reverses, the fortress was taken; that is, the Russians evacuated the city after destroying everything.

But the Russian army itself was not destroyed; in fact, in another theater of war, in the Caucasus, the Russians even won an important success in taking the fortified position of Kars on November 27, 1855. But the French concluded there was nothing more to be gained. Napoleon had secured what he wanted: his prestige was increased and Russian pride was humiliated. In vain did the English government desire to continue hostilities. But as the French had little to gain from the expedition against the Crimea from the outset, so now Napoleon had little to expect personally through a continuation of the war. Therefore peace negotiations were opened. On Russia's side the decision for peace was made easier by the death of Nicholas I on March 2, 1855. He had been the irreconcilable enemy of the French usurper; his son and successor, Alexander II, was not hindered by any personal motives of prestige from adopting a conciliatory attitude.

The Peace Congress, as was natural under the circumstances, met at Paris in February, 1856. This was the first great international assemblage since the Congress of Vienna. It was at the same time an official sign that the era which began in 1815 had come to an end. In addition to the old Great Powers, including France and Turkey, the Kingdom of Sardinia also was admitted to a seat in the Congress, in accordance with the purpose which Cavour had had in sending Piedmontese troops to help in the Crimean War. The terms reached on March 30, 1856, corresponded with the demands which the Allies had made upon Russia before the attack on Sebastopol. The victors put into the treaty of peace provisions desired by Great Britain which gave Turkey guarantees against Russian attack. The Powers undertook to respect the integrity of the Turkish Empire; the Black Sea was neutralized, so that no state might have naval ship-yards or war-ships on it; the navigation of the Danube was declared free and open to all nations, and placed under the supervision of an international commission; and the two Rumanian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were recognized as autonomous.

This last provision was carried out in such a way, thanks chiefly to Napoleon's influence, that the Rumanians were able to unite into a single state in 1859, in spite of Turkey's opposition. Russia

lost her monopoly of protecting Greek Orthodox Rumanians, and her path to Constantinople was now barred by a practically independent state. Rumania no longer stood under the influence of Russia, but was placed under the general Concert of Europe. This was a situation which had many analogies with the establishment of the Greek Kingdom in 1829 (p. 42).

But it would be a mistake to regard the Crimean War merely as a phase in the development of the Eastern Question. Such a view would be all the more incorrect, inasmuch as the limitation placed on Russia at the Congress of Paris remained in force only so long as the victors in the Crimean war, especially France, possessed the power to stand behind the execution of the terms of the treaty. So far as the Near East was concerned, the Crimean war only resulted in postponing Russia's advance against Constantinople for two decades, and in creating a united Rumania. Much more important were the general results of the war.

One of the first and most important of these general results was the putting an end to Great Britain as a military factor in European politics. It had been shown that her great economic development and her political evolution, which was so happy in general, had not been accompanied by any corresponding growth in her military strength; in fact, that many of the peculiarities of the British constitution, like the absence of bureaucracy on the French model, made Great Britain almost unable to compete in military matters with the Continental Powers. This did not exactly mean a real endangering of Great Britain's safety; although her position was not so favorable as at the beginning of the century, since the extraordinarily great increase of her population made it possible to starve her out by a blockade, nevertheless the English navy and merchant marine were still so superior to those of the other European Powers, that any naval attack upon her was regarded as out of the question. Also, a state with such solid economic strength as England could never be ignored. But the fact had been proved that England was in no position to interfere effectively in wars on the mainland. The statesmen of the continent now realized that they could carry on their wars without having to reckon on English intervention, particularly so long as their operations were limited to land warfare.

The Crimean War also opened an era of great wars in Europe, after a period of nearly thirty years of peace following the Congress of Vienna. This was less due to the fact that "the ice was broken," as people said, than to the fact that Russia, which was the strongest protector of conservatism, had lost a part of her military prestige

through her campaign in the Crimea. The Russian Empire could no longer be regarded as invincible; her warnings that the old order must be upheld lost force.

Finally, on Russia herself the Crimean War exercised a powerful influence. In her foreign relations, wholly contrary to her natural interests, she was forced into a hostile attitude toward a state with which she had no fundamental grounds for conflict, namely toward France; and, as a result, she was drawn more closely than ever to Prussia. Henceforth, Russia had a real interest in the downfall of the French Empire, an event which alone could enable her to regain her former position in the Black Sea.

No less important, at least for the moment, were the changes which took place in Russia's internal condition as a result of her defeat in the Crimea. Formerly, Russia's absolutist military bureaucracy had often been credited with Russia's success in foreign policy; but now this halo had disappeared. People dared openly to blame the all-powerful bureaucrats, or "tchinovniks," for the unhappy outcome of the war; their corruption and follies were held to be responsible. The cry for reforms, particularly for a control over the bureaucracy and a lessening of the censorship of the press, became louder and louder; moreover, the so-called *intelligentsia*, composed of nobles and students with academic training and chiefly represented in St. Petersburg, even demanded the introduction of liberal institutions like a constitution.

The new Tsar, Alexander II, was not disinclined to yield to these wishes. He limited the censorship, and permitted people to journey abroad. But his most important reform was the abolition of serfdom.

The liberals had long demanded that the Russian people, too, should be raised to the rank of a real nation by being given personal liberty. Hitherto, nine-tenths of the cultivable land in Russia had belonged to the vast domains which were in the possession of the great nobility or the state. On these domains lived 47,000,000 serfs, who were bound to the soil and forced either to serve in the household of their lord or to cultivate his soil (though some were also allowed to become artisans or traders in the towns). The nobility were naturally opposed to putting an end to these conditions which often actually differed from slavery only in name, and in which the person of the serf was completely at the lord's disposal. But the Tsar remained firm, and in the famous ukase of February 19, 1861, he declared serfdom totally abolished. On the crown lands the serfs were either made tenants on a long lease, or were raised to free

peasant proprietors who were to pay for their land over a long period of time. The other domains were divided: one part remained in the possession of the lord, and the other was handed over to the peasants on condition that they pay a definite sum in compensation over a period of years. The state advanced four-fifths of the capital necessary for these payments.

The Russian peasant thus became not only personally free, but also an owner of land. Great stretches of land, to be sure, were not given to individual owners, but were handed over to the village communities, the so-called *mirs;* but even these were later divided up on the basis of individual private property. The great landed estates of the earlier period did not, however, wholly disappear. They were not done away with until the Bolshevist Revolution, but alongside of them there now existed free peasant village communities.

Tsar Alexander was not content with this reform only. Although he refused to introduce popular government even in the limited form which was customary in Prussia, he nevertheless granted the right of local self-government within definite limits to the great and small land owners. Thus, he broke with the system of autocratic bureaucracy. The *mirs* were placed under assemblies composed of the heads of households; above them were the district and provincial assemblies, known as *zemstvos,* composed of delegates of the nobility (or great landlords), of the clergy, and of the *mirs;* besides administrative functions these *zemstvos* also participated in the creation of the lower courts of law. They formed a preliminary training school for parliamentary life.

At the same time, more freedom was introduced into the universities. They were given richer endowments and the right to elect their own professors. The number of students increased enormously. Many teachers even held socialistic views.

Thus, though much of the ancient régime still survived in Russia, nevertheless, as a result of the Crimean War, the country had definitely entered upon an era of liberal reforms.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE PANIC OVER SOCIALISM AFTER THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

In the last chapter an example was given of the way in which the February Revolution and its consequences influenced European politics. We have seen how it smoothed Napoleon's path to the imperial throne, and thereby opened the era of great wars which did not come to an end until 1870. One would only half understand these events, however, if one did not also consider the enormous intellectual consequences which resulted from the French events of 1848.

It almost seems to be an historical law that most men are willing to learn lessons only from most recent history. Only what they themselves, or possibly their fathers, have intensely experienced, seems to avail them as a guide for their own future. Moreover, it continually happens that two things are regarded as inseparably connected with one another, simply because they chanced to have happened at the same time. To this category belong two conclusions which were drawn from the events of 1848 and 1849 by large circles of hitherto liberally-minded persons. In the first place, all "progressively-minded" bourgeois politicians, at least in countries which were somewhat industrialized, were given a terrible fright by observing that the Fourth Estate had dared to take part in government and even to put into practice some of their doctrines, which had hitherto been laughed at as merely theoretical, like "the right to work." The intrusion of such socialistic elements into government office seemed to many to be inseparably connected with the abolition of bourgeois customs, of order, and even of civilization in general; so political measures which gave the Fourth Estate any rights were now regarded with the very greatest suspicion, even if they ought to have been approved from the standpoint of liberal theory. This panicky fear was still further increased by observing that the February Revolution had come into existence through a combination of Republicans and Socialists: whoever mentioned republic or even democracy was now regarded as advocating anarchy and communism. Constitutional liberalism might still be the aim of all

honest citizens as heretofore; but if it could not defend itself against the destructive attack of the "reds," then indeed absolutism, or even a military dictatorship after the style of Napoleon, ought be chosen as the lesser evil!

It is noteworthy that this fear of the Socialist Movement, which amounted to a horror of all liberal reforms, had by no means its strongest effect on the class which was most directly threatened, namely the manufacturers. At least a great part of the intellectuals were just as strongly affected; they were afraid of a rule by the barbarian masses of the people, and they were also often trembling for the security of their little middle-class incomes. Like Schopenhauer, they might be little satisfied with the attitude of the old conservative system; but did not this system, even with all its bigotry, at least guarantee the preservation of good order? Even so honest and idealistic a statesman as the English free-trader, Cobden, believed that the régime of Napoleon III, with all its defects, was still better than "the anarchy of Utopians, Anarchists, and Babblers," which Napoleon had put an end to.

A few political thinkers, indeed, had sufficiently freed themselves from fear to draw from the example of France another, and apparently directly contradictory, lesson: a republic, according to them, was indeed dangerous; but could not some of the radical demands be turned to conservative uses? Had not the elections under the Second French Republic and Napoleon's *plébiscites* shown that a republic, or even parliamentary government with monarchical forms, might be best opposed through the adoption of apparently revolutionary arrangements like universal suffrage? Was not the real "people," they asked, often less revolutionary than middle-class idealists?

This is not the place to examine these theories, which, as is known, were chiefly represented by Disraeli and Bismarck. Here we can only observe that this drawing of analogous conclusions can only claim to hold good so far as the social conditions are the same as those in France, that is, where the majority of the population is not composed of factory operatives or agricultural day laborers, but of peasants living on their own property. Only in such a case is an appeal to the interests of private property likely to find a hearing among the masses.

In this connection, however, it should be stated that in France itself this "realistic" conception of the intellectuals had less influence on the ruling authorities than in other countries. On the other hand, as far as literature is concerned, the abandonment of

liberal notions was particularly notable in France. The new "realism" in literature, which differed from its predecessors in that it aimed to criticize and make fun of the exaggerations and ideals of romanticism, has found its classic expression in a French work of art—in Flaubert's *Madame Bovary* (1857); but nowhere else, as already stated, did there persist such a strong opposition to this "realistic" way of thinking.

In another respect, however, it was only in France that the influence of the February Revolution reached its fullest development. This was the change in the attitude toward religion on the part of the bourgeoisie, who had hitherto been liberal. The capitalist middle-class now passed through the same kind of conversion of spirit as did the nobility after the French Revolution of 1789. They did not, indeed, revert to the old dogmas; but they thought it necessary to renounce Voltaireanism, outwardly at least, because their expectation had not been fulfilled that the masses could be held in check by religion, even when the upper classes were not true to it. To be sure, no true religious conversion took place; but they gave up their opposition to having the schools placed under the Church.

This new religious attitude differs chiefly from the somewhat analogous situation after 1815 in two respects.

One of these respects was the new alliance between the Papacy and most of the Catholic governments, the most important exception naturally being the Kingdom of Sardinia (see below, ch. xxv). After the Restoration in 1815 the state had undertaken to advance the demands of religion; but it had had no intention of renouncing its own political rights in regard to the Church, or of giving the Catholic Church, as an organization, any kind of direct political influence. The conservative governments were favorably inclined toward religion; but they remained "Gallican" (in France) and "Josephist" (in Austria). Now the Revolution of 1848 awakened in the governments and the bourgeoisie the conviction that this policy did not suffice. The struggle against religious unbelief, which threatened property rights, must be carried on more systematically, they thought; they ought no longer to oppose the Pope's word of command nor the coöperation of bodies independent of the state. To the Pope and the bishops there was given almost complete freedom from state control. The "Ultramontane" parties, which had often grown up in opposition to the state ecclesiastical control, were now allowed unchecked activity. This change in France has already been mentioned (p. 203), but it was much the same in the other great states. In the Prussian Constitution of 1850 the government renounced its

right of supervision and control over the Catholic clergy, and even handed over religious instruction in the primary schools to them. The Austrian government went somewhat further in the Concordat of 1855, which completed the measures begun in 1850 for putting an end to "Josephism" (the subjection of the Catholic Church in the country to state control). The *Placet* was abolished, and instead the clergy was given the right to supervise the schools and the censorship of books.

Pope Pius IX on his side showed his gratitude by pronouncing liberal revolutionary theories to be erroneous and forbidden by the Church. This attitude found its classic expression in the "Syllabus of Modern Errors" which the Pope issued with his Encyclical of December 8, 1864. This declared emphatically that society must be built up again on the basis of legitimate order, now that Catholic civilization had been weakened (note the sequence) by Lutheranism, Jansenism, Voltaireanism, and Socialism. The "Syllabus" therefore declared erroneous not only numerous liberal principles which related directly to church matters like the right to freedom of worship, but also many of the fundamental demands of liberalism in general.

Of still greater practical importance was the establishment of an unlimited supreme power within the Catholic Church which took place a little later. It had always been a matter of dispute whether definitions of dogma could be made by the Pope alone, or whether they had to be confirmed by the sanction of the Church, represented in ecclesiastical assemblies or councils. This was also a dispute between the authority of the national churches and that of the Pope: since the bishops, who formed the overwhelming majority at councils, were inevitably more or less dependent upon the state governments, the exclusion of councils from control was equivalent to putting an end to what was left of the influence exercised by governments upon the central authority of the Catholic Church.

In this dispute the Pope won a complete victory. On December 8, 1854, he promulgated the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary, without being authorized thereto by a council. Having thus tested his authority, he issued in 1868 a call to a Vatican Council at which was to be officially confirmed the new dogma of "Papal Infallibility," that is, the doctrine that the Pope alone, without the approval of the Church, possesses in the definition of matters of faith the same infallibility which Christ gave to the Church. The council met on December 8, 1869. It was characteristic that, in contrast to former times, no temporal ruler was represented at it. From the beginning the Holy Father had at his

disposal a majority of the votes, thanks to the presence of a great number of Italian bishops and of bishops *in partibus infidelium;* the opposition, composed chiefly of German, Austrian, and French bishops, had altogether scarcely a seventh of the votes. The decisive *Constitutio de Ecclesia* was voted on July 18, 1870, before the occupation of Rome by Italian troops compelled the Pope to adjourn the council indefinitely on October 20; this suspension of the assembly is still officially in force.

Thus the Catholic Church, also, as a bulwark against the international socialist movement, had been able to strengthen itself as an international organization superior to national governments; it offered itself as an ally, indeed, to the conservative states, but it was more independent of conservative governments than had hitherto been the case.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE WAR OF SECESSION IN THE UNITED STATES

NOTHING, perhaps, shows so clearly the change in public opinion mentioned in the last chapter as the attitude assumed by the governing classes in Europe toward the war over slavery in North America. If ever humanity made a demand which was endorsed not only by all Liberals, but also by a great part of the Conservatives, it was the demand for the abolition of slavery, at least in countries occupied by whites. Governments which in other matters yielded to revolutionary desires very unwillingly, in this question were willing to make concessions. Not even the fact that the abolition of the slave trade and of slavery involved considerable sacrifices prevented England, for example, from completely emancipating the slaves on the sugar plantations in the British West Indies in 1834. Everywhere it was regarded as a disgrace that slavery was still tolerated in the United States of America,—the only great country in the world occupied by whites, with the exception of large parts of Brazil, where slavery still existed.

One would have supposed, accordingly, that when the war against slavery broke out in America, it would have been greeted with joy by public opinion in Europe, and especially in the two countries which had taken the lead in suppressing slavery, namely in Great Britain and France. It is astonishing that this was not the case, and yet one can understand the reason. All those groups which had been driven by the revolutions of 1848 into a panicky anxiety about a republican form of government, took the side of the slaveholders. They almost had the effect, by their attitude, of prolonging the continuance of slavery in the United States.

From the time of the first settlements in America climatic conditions had brought it about that the southern colonies had an altogether different economic structure from those in the North. The South was the region where tobacco, rice, and cotton were cultivated on a large scale; it was the region where the planters used negro labor exclusively. With the exception of certain outlying districts, not only was slave labor prevalent, but the plantations were wide in extent. There was lacking any considerable group of towns-

people or peasants; in fact with a few exceptions, there were no large cities in the South. Small proprietors were extraordinarily few in number. The mass of the population as early as the eighteenth century in the most southern colonies, was largely made up of negro slaves, the slaves greatly outnumbering the whites. Above the slaves stood an aristocracy of plantation owners, who possessed wide estates, which they had cultivated by the blacks.

Even at that time, cultivation of wide estates had many advantages, which were all the greater as the plantations were extended. At the close of the eighteenth century this extension of large plantations at the expense of smaller ones increased in an unexpected fashion. After the mechanical inventions in England had developed enormously the means of using cotton, an American, Eli Whitney, invented in 1793 the so-called cotton gin, a machine which facilitated the separation of the seeds from the cotton wool. Slavery, which was beginning to decline, now acquired an altogether new importance. Cotton production increased very rapidly: in 1791, before the invention of the cotton gin, it amounted to two million pounds; in 1801, to forty million; and in 1826 to more than three hundred and thirty million pounds. New land was continually being brought under cultivation. Since the overseas slave traffic had been stopped through England's efforts, there arose in parts of the southern states, where the cultivation of cotton was not profitable on account of climatic conditions, as in Virginia, an interest in slavery, because it was possible to breed slaves there who could always be easily sold in the Cotton States. All efforts for the emancipation of the slaves were now hopeless, although before this there had been a strong movement for the abolition of slavery even in some of the slave states like Virginia.

The more slavery was extended in the south, the more firmly it became established and the more evident became the contrast between the slave states and the free states in the North. In the northern states, where the cultivation of cotton was impossible, slavery was formally abolished at the beginning of the century under the influence of the new humanitarian movement; the descendants of slaves were given a position of legal equality. The districts of the North and the South differed sharply in their economic interests. This need not necessarily have led to an economic conflict. In fact, the cotton industry in New England, just beginning in a modest way, derived a direct advantage from cotton growing in the South. Still, economic differences did exist. The most important of these related to the tariff question: the infant indus-

tries in the North wanted protective tariffs; but the South, interested in the free export of its raw products, and still more in the free importation of foreign manufactures, was naturally inclined toward free trade. But these differences never centered on the question whether slavery should be totally abolished; they merely had the result of making the South anxious that control in the Union should not fall into the hands of the protectionist North; the North, on the other hand, strove to secure control over Congress. Owing to the Constitution of the United States this conflict was now sharpened by the question of the admission of new states. The free states were more thickly settled than those in the South and they also had a larger representation in the House of Representatives; for in the apportionment of representatives three whites were counted as equal to five blacks. The only way in which the South could prevent itself from being outvoted by the North was by its influence in the Senate where each state was represented by two senators without regard to the population of the state.

Since some northern senators who were indifferent in regard to slavery usually associated themselves with the senators from the South who were unanimously in favor of slavery, the South usually had a majority in the Senate. Thanks to this majority it was able to bring it about for a long time that it suffered no disadvantage in the proportion between the slave and free states. In 1820, the Southerners even succeeded in passing the Missouri Compromise, which forbade slavery north of the line 36° 30′, but admitted the territory of Missouri to the Union as a slave state although it lay north of this line.

This victory was all the more important for the South, quite aside from the political considerations just mentioned, in view of the fact that cotton growing demanded ever wider and wider territory. Cultivation by slave labor in the South was exceedingly exhausting to the soil, and fresh land was therefore continually necessary. The desire for new soil was so great that it even led to the only war of conquest which the Union fought before it was completely settled. The northern part of Mexico, known as Texas, had been filling up since the beginning of the nineteenth century with immigrants from the United States, who were naturally chiefly from the South. In 1836 these Americans made use of internal troubles in Mexico to separate from it and declare Texas an independent republic. This independence, however, was merely a first step toward annexation by the United States. This again sharpened the conflict in regard to slavery, which meanwhile had been increasing: the northern states

feared that the slave states would be strengthened. Finally, in 1845, when the Democratic presidential candidate had been elected, after expressly stating that he favored the annexation of Texas, Texas was adopted into the Union as one of the states. But Mexico declared that she had never recognized the independence of Texas and that she regarded its annexation by the United States as an infringement of her territory. She therefore broke off diplomatic relations with her larger neighbor to the north. Soon afterwards, in 1846, an incident led to a formal declaration of war on the part of the United States.

In view of the anarchy in Mexico, the outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion. Although the Americans had to improvise an army and commissariat in great part, and although they could scarcely have been able to meet an army organized in the European fashion, still their forces were infinitely superior to those of Mexico. Furthermore, on this occasion also, they were able to use their navy, and at once took possession of the important California territory. On land, Mexico was attacked both from the north and from the Gulf of Mexico; the main American army, under General Winfield Scott, advanced from Vera Cruz to the Mexican capital and seized it on September 14, 1847. The Mexican republic had to yield. On February 2, 1848, it signed the treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo, by which it not only gave up Texas but also Northern California and New Mexico.

In this way the United States acquired definitely not only Texas, but also a firm foothold on the Pacific Ocean, since the Bay of San Francisco was included in Northern California. This was all the more important inasmuch as a little while before this, in 1846, they had secured by a treaty with Great Britain the southern part of the Oregon territory, which had hitherto been disputed between Great Britain and the United States. The United States now stretched in a broad belt from east to west, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. By a lucky chance, it also happened that as soon as California fell from the hands of the indolent Mexicans into those of the Americans, rich deposits of gold were discovered there on January 24, 1848, at the Sacramento River. This discovery at once resulted in a surprisingly quick development of this region.

While the South had apparently scored a success by the annexation of Texas, the real situation was changing more and more to her disadvantage. It was of relatively small importance that California, contrary to expectations, was not adapted to slave cultivation. The discovery of gold had drawn a laboring population from all terri-

tories into the region, and this population naturally wanted to be protected from the competition of slave labor; they at once drew up in 1849 a draft constitution forbidding slavery. On the other hand, it was of decisive importance that there was beginning to spread a new and purely humanitarian agitation which was independent of the economic and political conflict between the North and the South, and which was to put an end not only to the political power of the South, but to the institution of slavery altogether.

About twenty years before this time there had arisen an apostle in favor of the emancipation of the slaves, who can best be compared with the old Puritan leaders. He was one of those personalities who perhaps embodied more clearly than any other that change from religious to humanitarian motives which took place in the nineteenth century. It was no mere chance that his birth, in 1805, took place in the very center of American Puritanism, the State of Massachusetts. This man was William Lloyd Garrison. Garrison, a self-educated man, differed from other enthusiasts for freedom of that time, whose ideas he shared in general, by the fact that he combined with an enthusiastic desire to aid the Greeks a propaganda in favor of social and ethical reforms which at that time had relatively few advocates. From his youth, for instance, he had abstained from alcohol, and he founded the first prohibition newspaper in the United States. He was won over to the cause of emancipation of the slaves by a Quaker, one of the sect that had long opposed slavery. With this man he published an Abolitionist weekly in Baltimore. Quite characteristically he at once began to advocate a radical solution of the slavery question. His Quaker friend wanted to bring about emancipation step by step, and thought of settling negroes outside the United States. But Garrison demanded that the negroes should be given immediately all the rights of free citizens. Slavery, he said, was a sin in itself and with sin no compromise ought to be made.

It is a sign of his courage that he began his activities in Baltimore, Maryland, one of the main markets for the traffic in slaves. In various ways he was made to suffer for his attacks on the slaveholders. Soon he had to transfer his agitation to Boston, and there he founded, in 1831, a newspaper known as the *Liberator*. Its motto was, "Our country is the world—our countrymen are mankind," and its exclusive aim was the abolition of slavery. In the following year, he founded at Boston The New England Anti-Slavery Society, which in 1833 was enlarged into The American Anti-Slavery Society.

At first his agitation gathered only a small minority of the population in the Puritan New England states. Opposed to him were nearly all the business people and manufacturers; many good American patriots, who feared that a dissolution of the Union might result from emphasizing the slavery question; and also many peaceful Abolitionists who did not approve of Garrison's reckless policy and radical proposals. But the uncompromising teacher was not frightened by this nor by the attacks of mobs which once even set fire to the Abolitionist meeting-place in Philadelphia in 1838 and also to an orphan asylum for negro children. In spite of all the opposition, his movement made great progress. Leading politicians at first were scarcely moved by it, but aside from them the number of his adherents steadily increased. This was shown by the mass of petitions which were presented to Congress asking at least for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, which meant in Washington. In 1836 the House of Representatives, by the so-called "gag rule," voted not to discuss such petitions at all any more. How far individual Abolitionists were ready to go is best illustrated by the fact that some of them from Massachusetts and Ohio even demanded the dissolution of the Union. By 1840 the Anti-Slavery Society is supposed to have numbered between 150,000 and 200,000 members.

On ground thus prepared there now arose the struggle over the question of how slavery was to be treated in the districts acquired from Mexico. Once more political leaders succeeded in avoiding an open conflict by adopting a compromise. By the "Compromise of 1850" it was agreed that California should be admitted to the Union as a free state, but that in the other territories in question the population itself should be allowed to decide in regard to slavery. In the city of Washington the slave trade was abolished, though not slavery itself. On the other hand, a concession was made to the South which soon proved a very dangerous gift. This was the sharpening of the Fugitive Slave Law: federal officials were now bound to pursue slaves who fled into states where slavery was forbidden; in identifying the fugitives a summary procedure was adopted which gave no adequate protection against arbitrary arrest. People in the North who had hitherto been able to ignore slavery now had their attention called to the fact that they were living in a slave-holding community. The Abolitionists often opposed the execution of the law by force. How greatly this Fugitive Slave Law aroused public opinion in the northern states is evident from the fact that it gave the impulse to the writing of the most powerful book against slavery in America: *Uncle Tom's Cabin,* by Harriet Beecher Stowe, which

appeared in 1852, owes its origin directly to the story of the saving of a fugitive slave.

Tension was drawn tighter by the so-called Dred Scott case. Owing to the peculiarities of the Constitution of the United States it had happened that the Supreme Court had never decided the question whether the Missouri Compromise, excluding slavery from definite territories by an Act of Congress, was constitutional or not. A case now arose of a Missouri slave, named Dred Scott, who had been taken into free territory and afterwards sold to a citizen of a slave-holding state. The negro thereupon appealed to a federal court and maintained that he had become a free citizen by reason of his residence in a free state. But the Supreme Court finally rejected his appeal on the ground that a slave cannot be a citizen of the United States. The Court went further and expressed the opinion in 1857 that Congress had not even the right to forbid slavery in the territories at all, for slaves were to be regarded as property, the protection of which was imposed on Congress by the Constitution. Thus, at a stroke, all that had been won by the anti-slavery movement seemed jeopardized. No further progress could be made except by an amendment of the Constitution to which the southern states would never voluntarily agree.

Gradually, therefore, the view gained ground more and more that it was unavoidably necessary to use force to compel the South to give up at least its efforts for extending slavery further. The existing political parties, to be sure, used all their power to prevent such a solution. They wanted neither a breach in the Union nor a dissolution of the existing political organizations, which were by no means divided along the lines of North and South. But acts of violence committed by Southerners to influence voting in their favor in the new territories in the West—acts of violence which in some places amounted to civil war—roused feeling everywhere to such an extent, especially in the North, that the old party dictation lost its power. In place of the Whigs, who wanted to smooth over the slavery question by political compromises, there arose in the North a new political party, the Republicans, who took an uncompromising attitude at least on the question of slavery in the territories. At first the Republicans were in a minority in the Union, but this was due to the fact that they could not win at once all the states in the North. The majority of the northern states, however, soon became Republican, and thenceforth it was merely a question of time when the control of the Union would be transferred to the hands of the anti-slavery party, for the representatives of the free states had a

majority both in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, and as soon as the Republicans got control of both these bodies the slaveholding party would be outvoted.

This was what soon threatened to happen. In the presidential election of 1860, the Republican candidate, Abraham Lincoln, won all the free states with the exception of New Jersey, and received therefore a majority of the electoral votes. Thus the President, though not the majority in Congress, became Republican. The Southerners now believed that they ought not to delay longer. There was no place for them any longer within the Union. If they wanted to protect slavery from abolition the only way to do so seemed to be to found a new republic of their own. On December 20, 1860, a convention called for this purpose in South Carolina was the first to pronounce in favor of secession from the Union. Her example was quickly followed by six other southern states. In February, 1861, the seceding states formed a new political body, the Confederate States of America. Its constitution in general was modeled after that of the Constitution of the United States, but slavery was expressly protected against interference by the central government and the introduction of protective tariffs was forbidden.

Secession, as such, was still not a cause for war. The question of whether the states of the Union did not have the right to leave, just as freely as to join, the Union had never been decided. Aside from this disputed but unsettled constitutional question, it was contrary to all American traditions to use force as a means of compulsion against an obstinate community. President Lincoln expressly declared that the Union would not assail the South, but war broke out nevertheless, because the Confederates seized by force a federal fort claimed by the North. So it was the South which opened military operations, April 12, 1861. The North, also, now believed that they must delay no longer, and on April 15 the President issued his call for seventy-five thousand state militia for the suppression of rebellion. This act united the whole South; of the eight southern states which had hitherto not joined in secession, four (Virginia, in part) left the Union and joined the Confederacy. The capital of the Confederacy was soon fixed at Richmond, Va. The president was Jefferson Davis, former senator from Mississippi.

To understand the course of the war and the importance of a possible intervention from Europe it is necessary to make clear the character of the forces on each side.

In latent power, the northern states were greatly superior to those of the South, and it was therefore a mathematical certainty that the

North would win, unless they ended the war prematurely because of some unfortunate defeats, or unless they were deprived of their natural superiority by the interference of foreign powers. The North had a much greater reserve in man-power, for the number of inhabitants in the northern states was altogether much greater than in the South (twenty-two million in the North as against nine million in the South). Furthermore, the great mass of negroes in the South could not be exactly regarded as proper material out of which to make soldiers. Then, also, the North possessed a superiority in the matter of machinery which amounted almost to a monopoly. In the South every effort had been directed toward the production of raw materials; commerce and industry had been left wholly undeveloped; even the cotton was practically not manufactured at all. If grain and meat had to be imported into the South from the North before the war, one can imagine how it was in the case of manufactured goods. The most important consequence of this was the fact that the control of the sea from the outset belonged to the North. The North possessed both the ships and also the means for building a navy, and was, therefore, in a position from the beginning to blockade the southern ports and prevent the profitable exportation of cotton as well as the importation of European military supplies. At the start, to be sure, some of the forts and arsenals in the southern states, which had belonged to the Union, passed into the hands of the Confederacy; this provided arms at first, but later these could only be replaced with difficulty, because the South had no steel industries.

Over against these disadvantages, however, the South had certain advantages which at least enabled it to delay the triumph of the North. Though the armies and steamers of the North were able to advance more rapidly along railways and rivers owing to their better technical equipment, the Confederates, on the other hand, controlled a solid, well-rounded territory and had the "inner line"; their armies did not have to march such long distances, nor to operate often in thinly-settled areas, as did the Northern armies. Though the North could depend on much larger reserves of men, the South had a much larger number of specially trained military officers. Not only had the military academy at West Point usually been more largely attended by Southerners, but the control over slaves had, perhaps, afforded an excellent training school for military command. The South was also especially favored by the chance that its armies were placed under the command of General Robert E. Lee, perhaps the ablest military leader in the nineteenth century,

since the time of Napoleon. With chivalrous qualities and personally no friend to slavery Lee, however, was scarcely a typical representative of the Southern planters. He did not come from the more pronounced plantation region, like the cotton states of South Carolina or Georgia, but from Virginia, where a true aristocratic civilization had always been able to boast many more representatives than the regular Southern states.

Thanks to these advantages, the South was actually able to defend its lost cause for a long time; so long, in fact, that there arose for the North the question of a premature abandonment of the war, and for Europe the question of intervention. If people in the North had generally hoped to overcome the South quickly, they were soon disillusioned in the first years of the struggle. The North intended to attack the southern states from three directions. The main theater of war was to be northern Virginia; here a crushing advance was to be made upon the enemy's capital at Richmond. The second offensive was to be carried out along the Mississippi from the north toward the south; if this succeeded the Confederates could not only be driven back from the north and the west, but their whole territory lying west of the Mississippi would be cut off from their main body. The third line of attack by the North was to be by way of the sea and aimed mainly at blockading the Southern ports against Europe. The first year of the war (1861) resulted unsuccessfully for the northern armies, both in Virginia and on the Mississippi. The defeat which the Union troops met at Bull Run in Virginia on July 21, 1861, was particularly disheartening. On the other hand, the navy gave a good account of itself from the outset; it captured two of the most important forts on the coasts of North and South Carolina.

Everything now depended on the attitude which Europe would assume toward the war. It had become apparent that the North, in spite of all its energy, and its enormous superiority in supplies, could not win the war until it had spent a long time in organizing a military system; and meanwhile it was possible for foreign countries to intervene effectively. This was what the southern states undoubtedly counted upon. Two motives for this were brought forward, one financial and the other political. The financial or economic motive lay in the fact that European factories, particularly in the two countries which might have become allies of the Confederacy, namely England and France, could not get along without Southern cotton. The political motive lay in the fact that all the capitalists of Europe, and also the opponents of democracy who were so numerous after

1848, had a feeling of common interest with the Southerners; they wanted nothing better than the downfall of the Union and the creation of a free-trade slaveholding state.

These considerations were not so far from the point; but in the end it fell out otherwise. The Confederates had not realized that a deep odium attached to slavery after all, and that however much their European sympathizers might close their eyes to the horrors of the plantation system in America, an open support of the slave states could only be undertaken with the approval of a solid public opinion. This did not exist in England. Aside from the fact that humanitarian arguments had not lost all their force, the British workingmen felt that their interests were no less bound up with the much-abused northern states than were those of the manufacturers with the slaveholders; so the English workingmen were opposed to any declaration in favor of the South. In vain did the friends of the Confederacy try all methods of persuasion to convince the workingmen of Lancashire, the center of the English textile industry, that the workingmen would be no less injured than their employers if the factories should have to be closed for lack of American cotton. The suffering workingmen would not allow any decision in favor of slavery to be wrung from them. As a result, the English Liberal Government, and consequently the French also, were hindered from any regular intervention in favor of the South.

But though no regular intervention took place, the attitude which the European states took toward the North was neither one of friendliness nor of strict neutrality. This showed itself in two respects which had an influence for a long time. The first was the systematic manipulation of public opinion in a way unfavorable to the cause of the North. An effort was made to stamp out the idea that the great American democracy had gone to war from idealistic motives. Economic differences were given as the cause of the conflict: the war was represented as originating from the jealousy of the plebeian masses in the North toward the aristocratic civilization of the South. This conception prevailed for a long time, although it was wholly contrary to the facts. Commercial and political differences did exist between the North and the South, particularly in the matter of the protective tariff, as has been mentioned, but certainly no one in the North would have ever gone to war because of these differences, especially as they were usually decided in favor of the North. Moreover the whole movement for emancipation in America had not come mainly from people who could be regarded as economic

rivals of the plantation owners; on the contrary, the politicians and manufacturers of the North had tried, up to the last moment, to prevent the outbreak of open war. Industry and capital in the North enjoyed a great advantage from the one-sided production of the South; they had a splendid market for their raw materials and manufactures and they could buy their cotton at a lower price than would ever have been possible if slavery had not existed. If they had been really moved by economic motives, the northern states, ought, on the contrary, to have championed the maintenance of slavery. In reality it was indignation at the disregard of the rights of man and at the all too frequent acts of cruelty which was the determining factor with the North. Any one who reads the correspondence of intellectual American leaders in those years, especially those from the New England states, will always discover how deep was the feeling of shame at this disgrace, unworthy of a free country, which gnawed at the heart of humane individuals in the North. In general, the attitude of the South also is not to be wholly explained on economic grounds. Proud Southerners who were not attached to slavery by any strong economic interests were often embittered by the numerous exaggerations and the unjust generalizations of which the Abolitionist agitators were guilty, and also by the Abolitionist habit of always attributing to the worst motives various regulations which the South regarded as indispensable disciplinary measures.

To the defenders of privilege in Europe, America had always been a thorn in the flesh. Even at the time of the Congress of Vienna, at an evening gathering at the house of the Austrian reactionary writer, Gentz, horror had been expressed when an eye-witness told of conditions in the United States—"of a free state whose development affords the unbelievable, indeed frightful, example of a common citizen exercising as much power and influence as we here in Europe are accustomed to associate only with nobility and kings." And now one was expected to admit that these Republicans would shed their blood in an idealistic humanitarian cause!

A living contradiction to these notions was furnished by the President of the United States who held its fate in his hands during the war and who embodied the typical qualities of the North as did Lee those of the South. Abraham Lincoln, whose election to the presidency had decided the South to secede, was born in the wilds of Kentucky of "poor whites," as white persons who had no slaves were called in the South. He grew up in needy circumstances in Illinois, whither his father had moved. He was a regular self-made and

self-educated man; he had tried all sorts of trades before he settled down as a lawyer, which he did primarily in order to devote himself to politics. He was a man of altogether extraordinary gifts, possessed an unerringly sound understanding of men, and was honesty itself. In the case of no other statesman, perhaps, is personality reflected so directly and so sympathetically in public speeches as in the case of Lincoln. These masterpieces of good, popular eloquence show not only a man who is self-reliant, sympathetic, and full of humor, but one who is an honest thinker throughout. No sophistical phrases, no attempts to win a cheap triumph by irrelevancies, mar these utterances, in which modern eloquence has perhaps reached its highest level. Lincoln's combination of popular sympathetic feeling with his clear recognition of essentials, without allowing himself to be confused by the details of a bookish education, constitute the greatness of the man; in a certain degree they formed the very basis on which the persistence of the North rested in spite of defeats. Great will-power and tenderness of feeling were blended harmoniously together in Lincoln.

Along with this manipulation of public opinion, Europe attempted also to give direct assistance to the Southern states. It has been pointed out that the military inferiority of the South rested chiefly on the weakness of the Confederacy on the sea. It was just here that the English government now permitted aid to be given by its own subjects. It permitted privateers to be built and armed in England for the benefit of the Confederate States. These privateers did great damage to the shipping of the North and rendered partly ineffective the blockade of the Southern ports. From a legal point of view this action was all the more objectionable since Great Britain did not venture to recognize the Confederacy as an independent state, although the question was once discussed in the House of Commons; moreover she was supporting a party which, from the point of view of the North, must be regarded as one of rebellion. The case of France was somewhat different. Napoleon III, in fact, held back somewhat more than England. Nevertheless, he took advantage of the division in the Union to disregard the Monroe Doctrine, and landed French troops in Mexico where an empire under Archduke Maximilian was set up. The French Emperor expressly declared that he wanted to prevent an extension of the influence of the Union over America.

But all these measures did not suffice to turn the outcome of the war in favor of the South. The superiority of the North was much too great to be seriously threatened by a few blockade runners,

Thanks to capable leadership, the South was able to prolong the war, but it could not win it. So the fate of secession was sealed slowly but surely.

As to the main outline of the course of the war: in the original theater of operations along the Potomac in the east, between the two capitals of Washington and Richmond, the Union troops could make no progress against Lee, although the Confederate army, in view of its numerical weakness, could likewise undertake no decisive advance to occupy territory in the North. At sea the struggle was quickly decided in favor of the North. Thus the real fighting was concentrated in the Mississippi valley. Here the Northern states had all the advantage, owing to their better naval equipment, the Union having more than seventy-five armored vessels. Excellent new inventions, like the *Monitor,* which were afterwards imitated in the armor-turreted ships of Europe, quickly made the North superior to the Southern forces. Union troops attacked the Southern positions on the Mississippi from two directions. From the north, General Grant advanced, conquering Kentucky and Tennessee, and then moving down the river in 1862 as far as Fort Vicksburg. At the same time, the mouth of the Mississippi, with New Orleans, was taken from the water side. Admiral Farragut compelled the city to capitulate on April 25, and then pushed up the river to Port Hudson, two hundred miles south of Vicksburg. The Southern states to the west of the Mississippi were therefore cut off from the rest of the Confederacy, except for the relatively small strip between the two forts.

On the other hand, in the East, in spite of many bloody battles, the situation remained essentially unchanged. It became clear that the war, however good the prospects for the North might be, was still likely to last a long time. In view of this, President Lincoln undertook to induce the Southern states to give up the war by weakening their *morale.* On September 22, 1862, he issued a proclamation stating that all the slaves in the South would be declared free in seceding states which did not return to their allegiance by January, 1863.

This ultimatum, however, had no direct success, though it was of the greatest importance later on; since the Union in accordance with it declared all slaves free on January 1, 1863, and since the war ended with the defeat of the Confederacy, it was impossible to repudiate this act; for the moment, the proclamation also was of importance in the Union's relationship with foreign countries. It had now been officially stated that the war really meant securing

emancipation for the slaves, although its outbreak, strictly speaking, had not had anything to do with the slavery question; the Emancipation Proclamation made it clear that the Northern states had really taken arms to give freedom to the Southern blacks.

The year 1863 passed in much the same way as the preceding year. Again the operations in the eastern theater of war remained indecisive. Lee, who had pressed forward in a bold advance far toward the North and threatened Philadelphia, was checked at Gettysburg and forced to a retreat which was carried out in splendid fashion. But the armies of the North were able to maintain themselves on the defensive, and during the winter took about the same positions as the year before. On the Mississippi, on the other hand, the North was able to extend its successes. After two months' siege, Vicksburg, on the east bank of the Mississippi, finally fell into General Grant's hands. With this fort the Confederates lost also their best army in the west under General Pemberton; it had been shut into Vicksburg by Grant and fell into his power on July 5, 1863. Immediately afterwards, on July 8, Port Hudson surrendered; this had checked the advance of Northern troops from New Orleans, but now Union troops controlled the whole Mississippi. The Confederacy had lost Texas, Arkansas, and the greater part of Louisiana; these territories were now outside the field of military operations; henceforth, there was nothing but a guerilla warfare in the region west of the Mississippi River.

Union forces were now able to attack the main army of the South under Lee, not only from the north but also from the west and even from the south. The year 1864 was taken up with the execution of this grandly conceived plan. Grant, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Northern armies after his successes on the Mississippi, reserved for himself the direct attack upon Lee. His subordinate, Sherman, who commanded the army of the southwest, or Tennessee army, was given the task of invading the Confederacy, marching from the Mississippi into the Confederate States and attacking the enemy from behind. Sherman in a bold march carried out his orders exactly as they had been given to him. While in the North Grant was held in check by the superior strategy of Lee and was able to make no progress in spite of bloody battles and of a two-to-one superiority in numbers, Sherman on the other hand, invaded Georgia on September 2, 1864, captured Atlanta, the largest arsenal of the Confederates, and then pressed forward in a southeasterly direction to the Atlantic Ocean, without concerning himself about the Confederate army of the west. After a short siege,

Sherman captured and occupied Savannah on December 20. This meant that the greater part of the Southern states was lost to the Confederacy. Lee was narrowed down to a small area and could be attacked by Union forces from the north as well as from the south. At the same time, the last armored ships of the Confederates were destroyed, so that all hope of aid from overseas disappeared.

Nevertheless, the South was still unwilling to give in. It counted on the war-weariness of the North. For in the North, also, the extraordinarily bloody battles had demanded great sacrifices. It was not only in the South that the last man had been summoned for service, so that at the close of the war every man between the ages of seventeen and fifty was liable to service; the decision had even been taken, though it was not carried out, of enrolling negroes as soldiers; the North had also had to resort to conscription in 1863, and this measure had led to draft riots in several places. The war debts of the North no less than in the South had risen to enormous figures. In their convention in 1864, the Northern Democrats declared that after four years of fruitless war an end ought to be put to hostilities.

But the people of the Union would not give ear to such "defeatist" sentiments. In November, 1864, after Lincoln had been nominated for the presidency, he was elected by the voters in twenty-two out of twenty-five states, although he had expressly stated that he was in favor of continuing the war to a victorious end. The war accordingly was continued and soon led, as was to be expected, to the defeat of the South.

To be sure, Lee's strategic genius succeeded in postponing the downfall for some months. Attacked at the same time by Grant and by Sherman, he succeeded in escaping toward the west. But his fate was sealed. The North cut off all the railways from him so that, without being exactly defeated, he had to surrender on April 9, 1865. Shortly afterwards, Johnston, commanding the Confederate army of the west, also surrendered. The conditions were very liberal, considering that secession was regarded as rebellion. No private property was confiscated, the officers and men of the Southern states were released on their word of honor; the president and vice-president of the Confederacy, as well as some of the officials, were, to be sure, imprisoned, but they were later released without a single one of them being legally condemned. Even Lee, who had been greeted at his surrender in chivalrous fashion by Grant, was left wholly unmolested.

The results of the war may be chiefly considered from three points of view. First as to the economic consequences.

As a result of the proclamation of September, 1862, slavery was abolished in all the warring states of the South, without any compensation for the owners. The same thing happened in most of the other states, and finally Congress, by an amendment to the constitution on January 31, 1865, provided that slavery was abolished throughout the territory of the Union. The Southern planters had already suffered extraordinarily as a result of the operations of war. The fighting had been carried on almost exclusively in their territory; wide areas had been systematically laid waste; their exports were cut off; and their war currency and war bonds were worthless. Now, in addition, the plantation owners lost their human labor material, and received no compensation. Many negroes made use of their new freedom merely to roam around in laziness. A change for the better seemed all the more impossible, as many landowners did not have enough cash to pay negroes regularly.

But it soon became evident that the advantages coming from rich harvests were not wholly impossible simply because of difficulties due to lack of capital. Where people could not pay negroes in cash, they gave them a parcel of land in return for a part of the raw produce, and though the production of cotton declined in the first years after the war, nevertheless, by 1870, it had again reached the production of 1860, and since then has exceeded it. It was also now possible for whites to maintain themselves as workingmen by the side of the blacks in the South. Production was less one-sided. Industries and mining grew up along with agriculture. The economic catastrophe which it was predicted would follow the emancipation of the slaves did not take place, although emancipation was accomplished under the most unfavorable circumstances imaginable.

Much more complicated and more permanent in its consequences was the question as to what was to be the relation between the whites and the negroes who had been given legal equality. In the regular Southern states the negroes were in a large majority, and if the principle of equality before the law was strictly adhered to, this meant that the government would fall into the hands of a mass of negroes who had just emerged from slavery and were in no way trained for the exercise of political rights. The southern whites attempted to prevent this from happening by special laws. They decided, for instance, that negroes should not be allowed to buy or lease land, that every negro must be in service to a white, that colored vagabonds should be set to forced labor, and so forth. These

provisions, in addition to the excited feeling which naturally prevailed in the North immediately after the war, caused bad blood and Congress determined to interfere. The situation was extraordinarily intensified by the unfortunate circumstance that President Lincoln, when the war was scarcely over, was assassinated on April 14, 1865. Lincoln would have possessed the authority to convince the North that certain concessions must be made to the South, but his successor, the Vice-President, Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, who had been nominated as a concession to the Southerners loyal to the Union, did not command the same general confidence.

Congress, therefore, in spite of a presidential veto, took up the cause of the freed negroes and insisted that the former Confederate states should not be admitted again with full privileges to membership in the Union until they had agreed to the amendments of the Constitution, which among other things forbade any limitation of the franchise on the grounds of race. At the same time, the territory of the Southern States was placed under the command of Union military officials who were to see to it that the new elections were carried out on the basis of the legal equality of all men, with the exception of some whites who had compromised their rights by fighting

These "reconstruction laws" were put into effect and brought it about that all the Southern States finally accepted the amendments to the Constitution, so that by January 30, 1871, all the states were again represented in Congress. But this had not been accomplished without all sorts of abuses occurring. In the South it caused especial bitterness that disreputable politicians from the North, called "carpet-baggers," exploited the political inexperience of the negroes in order to get themselves elected to offices which permitted them to line their own pockets with public monies. This unnatural government could not be permanent. Officially, the South indeed could not revert to its earlier policy of publicly excluding the negro. Likewise Southerners could not think of reintroducing slavery in some disguised form, as had been their intention at first; but though the negro was free and remained free, he was again deprived of his legal political rights. At first the Southern whites sought to do this by means of secret societies of which the best known is the so-called Ku Klux Klan. These organizations attempted to terrorize the negroes in all sorts of ways and frighten them from exercising their political rights. When Congress stepped in and even permitted the federal troops to be used in suppressing the secret organizations, the whites resorted to somewhat more harmless methods with which

they secured their ends a little more slowly but none the less surely. Although in the minority, the whites succeeded by 1877 in winning back their control over all the Southern States. They have retained this domination uninterruptedly ever since.

This was all the easier for them because the more the war became a thing of the past, the more the North became somewhat indifferent toward the condition of the negroes in the South. In 1877 this indifference was publicly manifested further by the withdrawal of federal troops from the South. However, as has been said, any return to the slavery of former times was out of the question. But the negro problem was not solved. Little as the negro in general might care for the exercise of political rights, there remained the contradiction between his official political rights and his actual treatment, especially his treatment in social relations, quite aside from the fact that the so-called "lynch law," tolerated by the government, was used almost exclusively against negroes, and that those who employed it were never brought to justice. Even economic improvement has not altogether helped the negro: for while the domination of the whites is threatened by the lazy negro who has no property, what they really fear is the businesslike negro with property. White workingmen too do not like the competition of negroes working for less wages. When negroes recently have appeared in the North as competitors of the whites, violent scenes have taken place, as bad as those in the South. If one considers also that in the case of a war, which is very rare to be sure, the same duties are demanded of the negroes as of the whites, without their being given, however, quite the same rights, one must admit that the nineteenth century has left few problems so difficult to solve as the question of the colored people in the United States.

As a political consequence of these conditions, it may be further noted that the whites of the South belonged almost without exception to the Democratic Party, because it was the Republican Party which carried out measures for the protection of the slaves. The Democrats have thereby secured not only a firm hold on the "Solid South," but their attitude of opposition to capitalism has been distinctly increased.

The third result of the happy outcome of the War of Secession is seen in the changed attitude of the United States in foreign affairs. States which believed that they could get some advantage from the division of the Union had to content themselves with actually making concessions to the American republic, which was really not weakened by the war, but actually unexpectedly consolidated in its

power. Scarcely was the Civil War ended, when the United States demanded of France the withdrawal of the French troops which had been supporting Emperor Maximilian's rule in Mexico since 1864. Napoleon III could do nothing but yield to this demand. In the early part of 1867, he recalled the army under Bazaine, and the Austrian Archduke whom he had set up was captured shortly afterwards by the opposition party in Mexico and shot on June 19, 1867. The Monroe Doctrine was again restored to vigor.

Negotiations with Great Britain lasted somewhat longer. The United States demanded compensation for the losses which their trade had suffered through the privateers which had been fitted out in England, especially for the losses caused by the *Alabama*. England finally consented to submit the question to arbitration. Arbitrators sitting at Geneva awarded the United States as compensation the sum of fifteen and a half million dollars, which was thereupon paid by England—one of the first cases in which a conflict between great nations has been settled by arbitration, and in this respect of permanent influence on the later relations between Great Britain and the United States.

CHAPTER XXV

THE FOUNDING OF A LIBERAL NATIONAL STATE IN ITALY

ANTI-LIBERALISM had suffered a decisive defeat in America. There the attempt to found a republic based on a feudal system of agriculture had failed. The hated Union had not suffered shipwreck, but had come out of the War of Secession strengthened and economically more powerful than ever before. The complete defeat of the South had put an end to the danger that the United States would have to adopt armaments. America was lost to the cause of anti-democratic militarism.

About the same time, liberalism was winning a decisive victory in Italy. Here, indeed, it was not so much the representatives of an aristocratic economic system who were beaten, as the defenders of the view that the privileges of the Church ought to be protected for the sake of preserving the existing order of things.

The reader will perhaps remember (see ch. x) the unhappy condition in which Italy found herself in the first half of the nineteenth century. The greater part of the peninsula was directly or indirectly under foreign control, which also meant the control of those opposed to intellectual liberty. In Central Italy there were the States of the Church, which, owing to their inner organization, could not be won over to liberal reforms, perhaps not even to well-ordered government. There was no hope of a change for the better. The Great Power which dominated over Italy was far too strong to be overthrown by the Italians themselves.

Such was the situation in 1848. The revolutions which broke out in Austria at that time, as a result of the February Revolution in Paris, raised for a moment the hope that Hapsburg military supremacy had come to an end. When Metternich's government collapsed in Vienna, the patriots in the Austrian parts of Italy revolted everywhere; the people attacked the Austrian troops in Milan, and compelled the Austrian governor, Radetzky, to withdraw from the city. In Venice a republic was proclaimed with Daniel Manin at the head as president. The King of Sardinia thought he ought to make use of the opportunity; so he invaded Milan and pressed

forward as far as the Mincio. He rejected French assistance; this was the time when he used the well-known phrase, *"l'Italia farà da se."* Charles Albert, the king, even received support from the King of Naples and the Pope, and succeeded in defeating Radetzky and in driving him back as far as the Adige on May 29, 1848.

But this success was only momentary. Radetzy received reinforcements, the Pope and the King of Naples withdrew, and the Austrian Field Marshal was able to inflict a crushing defeat on the Piedmontese at Custozza, July 24. Milan was again occupied by Austrian troops.

But in the following year, there was again a revival of the liberal movement. The republican revolt in Hungary had triumphed, and this seemed to give the Italian patriots new hope, but the Italian princes would no longer coöperate. Ferdinand, King of the Two Sicilies, suppressed with great bloodshed the revolt in Messina, and was nicknamed "Re Bomba," because of the way he bombarded the city. Pius IX fled before revolution, and in the place of the papal government, there was set up a democratic republic, at the head of which stood the ablest man among the Italian revolutionists, the Genoese, Mazzini. On February 9, 1849, Garibaldi, the brave leader of volunteer troops from Nice, was given command over the Roman army. In Tuscany also the grand duke was driven out and a republic proclaimed. All this finally induced the King of Sardinia to try his luck once more, and again he invaded the Milanese territory, but was completely defeated by Radetzky at Novara. Charles Albert therefore abdicated, and his son and successor, Victor Emmanuel II, signed a treaty of peace with Austria, August 6, 1849. In this he renounced Lombardy, and undertook to pay a large war indemnity. There was one notable concession, however, which the Austrians could not wring from him: he refused to annul the liberal constitution which his father had granted the kingdom on February 8, 1848, although the Austrians intimated that they would give up the demand for the indemnity if he would annul it. So Piedmont retained her liberal institutions, the foundation on which Cavour shortly afterwards was to build up his policy.

The old régime was now reëstablished everywhere. The restoration of the Pope's authority in Rome by French aid has already been mentioned in another connection (p. 202). Sicily, and especially Palermo, was again subjected completely to the authority of the Neapolitan kings. Particularly important was the fact that Austria, after overthrowing the Hungarian Republic with Russian help, was now able to restore her predominant position in Northern and Cen-

tral Italy. Austrian troops brought back the former rulers into Modena and Tuscany again. In Venice the republic was overthrown after an heroic defense on August 29, 1849. The former conditions seemed restored more permanently than ever.

In reality, these events had simply taught the Italian patriots and lovers of liberty that nothing could be done against Austria's power by the methods hitherto pursued. The man who above all others saw this clearly was the Piedmontese minister of commerce, Count Cavour, then forty years of age and perhaps the greatest statesman of the nineteenth century. He perceived that the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy and the creation of an Italian national state must be brought about in a different way.

The methods which he adopted differed from those of his predecessors chiefly in three respects. So far as possible, he created an efficient army; he broke off completely the alliance with the Church, in order to make sure of the coöperation of all liberal elements; and he no longer disdained to appeal to the support of a foreign Great Power, even if he should have to purchase it by making territorial sacrifices.

In order to accomplish his purposes, he began, in 1850, a thoroughgoing transformation of the Sardinian state in the direction of liberalism. At the very time when other states were making political concessions to the Papacy (see p. 225), he had the Piedmontese government issue a law by which the legal privileges of the clergy were abolished. He terminated the Concordat with the Holy See; and henceforth pious gifts in mortmain had to receive the sanction of the state. The archbishop of Turin, who protested against this law, was imprisoned for a month in the citadel of Turin. In the Chamber of Deputies the government put an end to the traditional alliance with the clerical right, and secured the election to the presidency of the Chamber of the leader of the left center, a decided liberal. This was the beginning of the so-called *Connubio,* the alliance of the Piedmontese government with the liberals, or, one might say, with the anti-clericals, for, in Italy, liberalism had been determined primarily by church politics; owing to the conquests of the French under Napoleon I, and also to the reforms made by the Italians themselves, equality before the law, at least outside the Papal States, existed in a far higher degree in Italy than in other regions under Austrian rule. "What the nobility is to Germany, the priest caste is to Italy," an Italian remarked at the time to a German historian. At any rate, the unification of Italy was only to be accomplished if the patriots were willing to put an end to the claims of the Papacy.

This policy of Cavour also made his military reforms easier. For it was not enough to reorganize the army according to the Prussian model. He had also to provide an increase in the revenues of the state, and this could only be brought about by interfering with the privileges of the clergy. Cavour not only sought to stimulate Genoese shipping by commercial treaties; he wanted also to impose taxes on church lands and above all things to abolish the monasteries, which had become useless. In spite of energetic papal protests, he succeeded in doing this. Out of about 600 monasteries in the kingdom, 334 were secularized. Cavour was able to force the feudalistic senate to approve this measure only by threatening to resign (1855). The well-being of the country was now systematically improved. Railways and canals were constructed. With the help of his new financial resources, the fortresses were modernized, arsenals were built, and the army was increased.

Along with these measures, Cavour proceeded to bring about the third point in his new program,—the alliance with a foreign Great Power. It happened that he could not have found a helper more to his liking than the man ruling in France at the time. The French people, to be sure, had not the slightest interest in supporting an Italian national movement against Austria; there were no grounds for hostility between France and Austria; nor was it an advantage for France to build up a rival Great Power on the Mediterranean. This was the thought which had guided Louis Philippe and Guizot, and they had done nothing to aid the Italian cause. But Napoleon III put dynastic above national considerations. Intervention in the quarrel between Sardinia and Austria would give an opportunity further to increase the military prestige of the Second Empire. The Bonapartist family had a traditional fondness for Italy. Napoleon I had shown an inclination to Italy which can not be wholly explained on political grounds, and the same was true of his nephew. From the first years of his government, he pursued a policy of raising Italy to the rank of a Great Power. Later on, his efforts may have been somewhat stimulated by the attempt which an Italian conspirator, Orsini, made to kill him with a bomb in 1858. Orsini wanted to take vengeance on Napoleon because he regarded him as responsible for the failure of the Italian revolution of 1848; he conjured the emperor to come to Italy's aid.

Napoleon yielded to the wishes of the Italian patriots, although from the very beginning this placed him in a very embarrassing position. Italian unity, as desired by the Italians, meant the abolition of the Papal States; and how could a prince who rested so

much for support on the Holy See as did Napoleon give his approval to this? From the outset, he could only accept a part of the Italian nationalist program: he could support Cavour's aggression only to the extent that the Temporal Power of the Papacy was not jeopardized. In other words, he was helping to enlarge a state with which he must eventually come into a life and death struggle. He was creating a force which might crush himself.

A fantastic ruler like Napoleon, who had at his disposal the best armies of Europe, was exactly the right kind of a man to be Cavour's accomplice. The Piedmontese statesman had at once recognized that he must first do something to place Napoleon under obligations to himself. This is the explanation of Sardinia's alliance with France and England during the Crimean war, which has already been mentioned in another connection (see page 218). By this Cavour also established cordial relations with England, where public opinion was more or less on the side of Italian liberals, particularly on account of English disapproval of the misrule in the Papal States.

A regular offensive alliance between Sardinia and France against Austria was concluded in 1858. Napoleon III, who was then under the vivid impression made by Orsini's attempt on his life, invited Cavour to a confidential interview at Plombières, where all the details for an attack against Austria were agreed upon. Here, for the first time, Napoleon attempted to reach a compromise between the claims of Savoy and those of the Pope. It was agreed that Italy should be "free from the Alps to the Adriatic"; the kingdom of Victor Emmanuel II should be enlarged by depriving Austria of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom and also by seizing a part of the Papal States. A further extension of the Sardinian boundary toward the south, with a complete abolition of the Papal States, was not anticipated. Prince Napoleon, a son of King Jerome of Westphalia and a cousin of the Emperor's, was to marry a daughter of the King of Sardinia, which he did in 1859.

Accordingly, in 1859, when the war actually broke out, Cavour was not afraid, following his program, to ally with revolutionary elements. Just as he had already maintained relations with republican revolutionists like Garibaldi and with Hungarian rebels, so now he had the newspapers of Turin openly urge Austrian soldiers in Lombardy and Venetia to desert. When Austria, exasperated by his continual provocations, opened hostilities, Napoleon declared on May 3, 1859, that he would hasten to the aid of the Italians. How decisive his support was is shown by the whole course of the war. The French auxiliary army was not only numer-

ically much stronger than the Piedmontese force (about twice as strong), but it made possible the great battles (particularly that of Magenta to the west of Milan on June 4), which freed the whole of Lombardy as far as the Mincio. However, it should be mentioned that, at the same time, Garibaldi on the north drove back the Austrians toward Como.

The Austrians, who had withdrawn into the so-called "Quadrilateral" formed by the fortresses of Peschiera, Verona, Mantua and Legnago, and had received reinforcements there, took up a strongly fortified position on the hills near Solferino south of Peschiera. After a bitter struggle, the Franco-Sardinian army, which was numerically somewhat weaker, succeeded on June 24, 1859, in driving the Austrians back and in crossing the Mincio. King Victor Emmanuel was already contemplating an attack upon Venetia.

But at this moment, the Emperor of the French withdrew from the undertaking. He had an interview with Francis Joseph at Villafranca, where preliminaries of peace were drawn up. Whatever may have been the motives which made him take this step—perhaps he thought the costs of a campaign against an Austrian army which defended itself so obstinately were out of proportion to the advantages which would accrue to France; perhaps he was afraid that Piedmontese ambitions would go too far; possibly he was inspired with fear by Prussia's mobilization—at any rate, whatever may have been his motives, he returned to Paris with his troops, and this simply put an end to the campaign. The peace of Zürich, which was signed shortly afterwards on November 10, 1859, handed over to Sardinia Lombardy, but not Venetia.

At the same time, the alliance which Cavour had made with Italian liberalism now bore fruit. Venetia, to be sure, under Austrian protection, could not be attacked. But in the weaker Italian principalities there took place everywhere national revolts which led to their alliance with Sardinia. In Tuscany, Parma, and Modena, the princes were driven out, and the papal officials in the Legations (Bologna) fared no better. In harmony with the liberal principles of the Sardinian government, Cavour did not directly annex these liberated territories, but everywhere asked the people to vote as to annexation to Sardinia. The *plébiscites* resulted in overwhelming majorities in favor of annexation; in Emilia, for instance, there were 426,000 ayes, to 756 noes. This procedure was also adopted when Napoleon, who had not opposed this extension of Piedmont, demanded compensation for France. The treaty of Turin, of March 23, 1860, providing for the cession of Savoy and Nice to France, was

first laid before the populations in question for their approval, and not carried out until the people had voted in favor of it, likewise by an extraordinarily large majority. Accordingly, when Victor Emmanuel opened the "National Parliament" at Turin on April 2, 1860, no distinction was made between the deputies from the old and the newly-acquired Sardinian provinces.

The next point to be attacked was Southern Italy, as Rome did not at first come into consideration. Officially, indeed, Cavour could not participate in any such undertaking. But he at least secured it an unhampered execution. In the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies there still prevailed an unlimited absolutism, and the new king, Francis II, who had succeeded his father, Ferdinand II, "King Bomba," in 1859, held fast to his absolutism, in spite of Napoleon's warning. Now that Sardinia had become the center not only of an Italian national state, but also of liberalism represented by a parliamentary anti-clerical organization, this was a dangerous proceeding on the part of Francis II. Representatives of autocracy could no longer count on Austrian help, and patriots now had before their eyes a definite aim,—union with Sardinia along the same lines accomplished in North Central Italy. Revolutionary committees were formed everywhere, and in April, 1860, an insurrection broke out in Sicily.

This insurrection was quickly supported from the outside. Cavour, as has been mentioned, did not dare to give the insurrection official aid, but he allowed an international expedition for the liberation of Southern Italy to be organized directly under his eyes. The old hero of liberty, Garibaldi, formed a volunteer force in Genoa (on Sardinian soil), consisting mainly of Italians, but also including revolutionists from other countries, Hungarians and especially Frenchmen, like Maxime du Camp and Alexander Dumas, Père. The whole expedition was like an international crusade against absolutism. A red shirt was the symbol which was adopted by "The Thousand" as they set out.

Without any interference from the Sardinian fleet, "The Thousand" embarked from Genoa and landed in safety in Sicily. They were received with enthusiasm by the population. They easily dispersed the royal garrison troops in Calatafimi and Milazzo, and soon had the whole of Sicily in their hands with the exception of Messina. Upon representations from France, Cavour requested Garibaldi to stop at this point; but Garibaldi took no notice of the request, and crossed over to the mainland. He soon won the whole Kingdom of Naples. "The Thousand" entered the capital on Sep-

tember 7, 1860, without shedding blood, and the King shut himself up with the remainder of his troops in Gaeta.

After the undertaking had resulted so successfully, Cavour believed that he ought not to hold back any longer. With a half-authorization from Napoleon he sent the Piedmontese army from the north to aid Garibaldi's troops. The Sardinian forces invaded the States of the Church, defeated the papal army, and occupied Ancona. Here another popular vote was taken, and here, also, there was an overwhelming majority in favor of annexation to Piedmont, the Marches voting 134,000 to 1200, and Umbria 97,000 to 380. Connections with Naples were now established by land and King Victor Emmanuel II was able to ride into Naples in triumph by Garibaldi's side (November 7, 1860). The operations against Gaeta were carried out by the Sardinian troops in such a way that Garibaldi and his volunteers were more and more pushed into the background. Garibaldi himself was given no political position, so that his feelings were hurt, and he retired to his rocky island of Caprera. However, neither he nor the republicans made any serious opposition to Victor Emmanuel's kingdom.

The capture of Gaeta and Messina was now merely a question of time. Shortly afterwards, these two last supports of Bourbon rule fell, and the royal family fled on a French ship into exile. Naples and Sicily also voted practically unanimously for annexation to Sardinia. Victor Emmanuel could now take the final step of proclaiming himself King of Italy. In the whole of the peninsula, Venetia and the curtailed States of the Church were the only territories which still remained beyond his authority. The establishment of the Kingdom was completed in the month of May, 1861, by an act of parliament. The Italian problem was now solved except for the States of the Church and Venetia. At the time of his death, on June 6, 1861, shortly after the proclamation of the Italian Kingdom, Cavour's aim in life had been largely attained.

Of the two territorial problems still to be solved, the Roman one was the most complicated. It was evident that an Italian national state without Rome would be a torso. On the other hand, international religious reasons made it undesirable completely to abolish the States of the Church. Furthermore, the Papacy was unyielding in matters of domestic politics. Moderate Italian patriots would have perhaps been satisfied if the Papacy had been willing to join in a liberal alliance with the Italian Kingdom; but for this it was necessary that the Pope should make his state as liberal as the Italian Kingdom, and this was precisely what the Pope re-

fused to do. Although Napoleon advised the Holy Father to yield to the demand for modern reforms, the Curia refused to enter into any kind of a bargain. Pius IX declared expressly, "We can make no concessions" (*"Non possumus"*).

The French, however, did not withdraw their protecting hand from the States of the Church, and at first the Italian government did not dare to interfere. The task of freeing Rome again remained to be done by the revolutionary party. Again Garibaldi collected his army of volunteers. But the government did not give it support. On the contrary, King Victor Emmanuel sent troops against the liberal hero, who was advancing against Rome from Calabria; the Sardinian troops met Garibaldi at Aspromonte, and dispersed his little force (1862). The Papacy then went further and emphasized its dogmatic opposition to liberalism in the so-called "Syllabus" (see p. 226). After this a compromise was no longer possible. For the moment the Italian government seemed to give up its Roman ambition. It removed the capital to Florence, which was intended to indicate that at present it did not intend to make Rome the capital of Italy.

The Italian government could now devote all the greater energy to the acquisition of Venetia. The attack which Prussia was about to make upon Austria (see ch. vii) offered the most favorable opportunity for this. With Napoleon's assistance, Italy signed on April 8, 1866, an offensive alliance with Prussia against Austria, good for three months. In accordance with this, as soon as Prussia opened hostilities, Italian troops entered Venetia, while Garibaldi again sought to penetrate into the Tyrol with his volunteers. Fortune, however, did not favor the Italians, who in this war lacked French support. The army under La Marmora was checked and completely defeated on June 24, 1866, at Custozza by the Austrians under Archduke Albert. But the Austrians were unable to take advantage of their victory. Shortly after Custozza they were terribly defeated by the Prussians at Königgrätz, and the Austrian troops had to be withdrawn from Venetia to defend Vienna against the advancing Prussians. Italian troops occupied the territory abandoned by Austria. They now hoped for more, and even wanted to win back Trieste and the possessions in Istria which had formerly belonged to Venice. But their fleet was crushed at Lissa by the Austrian navy under Admiral Tegetthoff on July 20, 1866. In the Peace of Prague of October 3, 1866, Italy was only given Venetia; for form's sake Austria ceded the province to Napoleon who then handed it over to Italy. This annexation was also confirmed

by a *plébiscite* in which only 69 persons voted to remain under Austria, while 647,000 favored annexation to Italy.

So only the Roman question still remained unsettled. How long would France be in a position to protect the curtailed States of the Church from Italy's attack? The Pope himself possessed no means for his own defense, and the Italian government had remained throughout true to Cavour's program. It retained its connection with the liberal revolutionary groups and refused to make to the Church concessions in political matters which would have injured the Italian national movement. In view of a conflict with Prussia, Napoleon believed that he ought to rely for support more than ever upon the clerical party in France, which was attacking Italy in the bitterest fashion. Veuillot, its best-known representative writer, even demanded that Italy ought to be made again "a geographical expression," as in the days of Metternich.

Napoleon, however, needed all his troops in France, and was compelled to recall the French garrison from Rome. The Italian government also had made some objections to this French garrison. Scarcely had Rome been deprived of French protection, when Garibaldi took advantage of the fact. Unchecked by the Italian government, he collected a volunteer army of sixty thousand men, and in 1867 marched with it from Florence against Rome. But Napoleon had no intention of letting matters take their course. He despatched from Toulon two divisions which arrived at Rome just in time to save the States of the Church from destruction. The Garibaldians had just defeated the Papal army, when they were driven back in turn by the murderous fire of the French artillery. Garibaldi had to retreat to Florence. *"Les chassepots ont fait merveille,"* wrote one of the French generals to Napoleon (November 3, 1867), a phrase which the Italians remembered a long time against the French.

This made it clear that Italy could never secure Rome so long as the French were in a position to oppose the abolition of the Pope's Temporal Power. Even the modifications in the French government in the direction of liberalism, which were then being considered, promised no change in the attitude of France toward the Roman question; for the representatives of the tradition of the July Monarchy, as was expressed at the time by their spokesman, Thiers, were just as energetically opposed as the clerical party to Italy's annexation of Rome, because they were opposed to the growth of a dangerous rival Great Power south of the Alps.

But Nemesis soon overtook this French policy; since France—

and even French liberals—had tried to prevent what was inevitable, and what, from an Italian point of view, was necessary, France found no support in Italy when the Franco-Prussian war broke out. All the projects for an Austro-Italian alliance with France came to nothing, because the French Emperor had not been willing to give Rome to the Italians—a step which Austria herself would not have opposed. The crushing defeat to the French at Sedan resulted in French statesmen failing to secure what had been their chief aim in Italy. The day after the battle, the French garrison was recalled from Rome and this sealed the fate of the city. The Italian government at once despatched an army under General Cadorna, who occupied the new capital on September 21, 1870, while the Pope withdrew into the Vatican. This annexation also was ratified by the people by an overwhelming majority of 130,000 to 1500.

United Italy thus acquired her natural capital. The work of unification could be regarded as complete, except for several districts with an Italian population, like the Trentino, Trieste, and the coast towns of Istria and the Adriatic, which remained under Austrian rule because of Italy's lack of success in the war of 1866. Liberal Italian patriots believed that they had all the greater claim to this "Italia Irredenta," inasmuch as they appealed, not to the right of conquest, but to the freely expressed wish of the population. Here was a diplomatic difficulty which became evident as soon as Italy wished to join Austria in opposition to France on account of the North African question (see below, ch. xxix); it revived again very actively when a new cause of difficulty arose between Italy and Austria-Hungary owing to their rival ambitions in the Balkans.

During the following years, however, this difficulty was less important than two other questions. One of these was the religious-political one. Pope Pius IX could not be forced to give up his attitude of persistent opposition on account of loss of his temporal power. In vain did the Italian government offer him, in the so-called "Law of Guarantees" in 1871, considerable financial and political advantages, if he would actually recognize the Italian Kingdom. In vain did the "Law of Guarantees" allow the Pope to remain as a sovereign prince in the Vatican, and give him an unlimited right in appointing Italian bishops and a civil list of three and a quarter million francs. The Pope regarded the "invaders" as excommunicate, and declared that, being a "prisoner," he could not leave the Vatican. He refused to recognize the Italian kingdom and to accept the civil list offered to him. Pious Catholics were

not allowed to recognize Italian rule in Rome as legal. Theoretically at least, there was still a danger that the Papal States might be restored; this was a project which Catholic politicians who opposed the Italian government often played with after 1870. A part of the voters refused to take part in Italian elections, because this had been forbidden by the Pope in his encyclical, *"Non Expedit"* (to have taken part in Italian elections would have been tantamount tc an indirect recognition of the revolutionary kingdom). Otherwise, religious-political relations were practically arranged in the way the Italian government wished. The policy of secularizing monastic and ecclesiastical property, which had been introduced by Cavour, was now carried out in the Papal States, so that in the years 1868 to 1873 the whole operation realized more than five hundred million francs for the government. At the same time, the appointment of bishops by the Pope was tacitly recognized by the government.

The government's greatest difficulty lay in the matter of finance. To have kept up an army and navy of the size wished by Cavour was far beyond the natural resources of the Sardinian government; and the same was true of the new Italian Kingdom, if it wanted to play the part of a Great Power along with the other members of the European Concert. The natural resources of the country could only be insufficiently exploited. The necessary means of communication were lacking, and the soil was not properly divided, particularly in the south. Another obstacle may have lain in the lack of education, especially in the territories which had formerly belonged to the Pope and to Naples. In many regions, particularly in the former Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, order had first to be restored by force of arms, and plundering had to be stopped, before a well-regulated administration could be set up. All this could be accomplished in the course of time, and was, in fact, acccomplished in good part. But this did not increase the state revenues sufficiently to cover the military expenditures. Furthermore, as a consequence of the German victories in 1870, which resulted in the introduction of universal military service in Italy, the cost of armaments was still further increased. Manufacturing for export on a large scale could not be created in a day. The modern factory system had only been introduced to a slight extent in Italy, and the lack of coal also proved a serious obstacle, preventing the Italians from devoting an energetic attention to this source of wealth. Finally, it was difficult to bring about many reforms, and particularly perhaps the most important, such as the breaking-up of the great landed estates, because up to

1882 the right to vote was dependent upon the payment of a land-tax and this excluded the great mass of the peasant tenants from the franchise. And the ministry had to pay heed to the majority in the Chamber of Deputies.

Thus the new kingdom had to pass through a difficult period of transition, whose social and political consequences are evident even to the present day. How Italy sought to play the part of a Great Power and a colonizing country, in spite of her difficulties, will be explained in a later chapter.

CHAPTER XXVI

GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE

About the same time that Italy was changed from a "geographical expression" to a unified military state and was beginning to play a part in international politics, a similar change was taking place in the north. There also national ambition resulted in the creation of a new Great Power, which was destined to play a much greater part in the history of the world than Italy. But just because the analogy between Italy and Prussia is so striking, it is desirable to call attention to the great differences which existed between them, quite aside from those which happened to result from differences in personality of the leaders. We may leave out of consideration here the final result and the steps by which unity was achieved, and merely compare briefly the conditions at the outset.

At first sight conditions in Germany seemed to be more favorable in every respect than in Italy. In good part directly, and to a greater extent indirectly, Italy was under the rule of a foreign Great Power, and was without protection against interference by foreign governments. Germany, to be sure, included three small territories (Holstein, Hanover and Luxemburg) which were connected by personal union with foreign states; but the administration was nowhere in the hands of foreigners, and it was wholly out of the question for foreign Great Powers to interfere in German relations by force of arms. This was prevented by the fact that Germany included two of the most powerful great states of the period, which would have opposed any intervention, whereas Italy was composed of a number of helpless little states which scarcely possessed the rudiments of an army. Italy, moreover, was merely a geographical expression; the bond of nationality was of a purely intellectual nature. German states, on the other hand, were held together in the "German Confederation," which, loose as it was, still afforded a certain unity as against foreign powers. The members of the Confederation promised mutual protection to one another, and were forbidden to make any alliance directed against its safety. The people in the states of the Confederation were assured certain, though limited,

rights throughout its whole territory, and there was a common political tradition, which was wholly lacking in Italy. The German Confederation of 1815 was indeed in no wise the legal successor of the old Holy Roman Empire, but there was a general feeling of continuity, which was evident in such superficial circumstances as the fact that Austria, which in recent centuries had almost always provided the emperors in the old empire, now had the presidency in the Confederation.

But this relatively powerful position which the Confederation enjoyed through the inclusion of the two Great Powers was precisely the thing which proved an obstacle to its further development. It was natural that Austria and Prussia, only a part of whose territories were included within the Confederation, should pursue an independent policy and be more intensely interested in their own aims than in the national aspirations of German patriots. They were, to be sure, strong enough to nip in the bud any foreign attack on Germany, but they were not inclined to subordinate their own particular interests to the general good of Germany as a whole; in fact, they were not inclined to advance the development of the Confederation, unless this development was of particular benefit to their own country. From the point of view of those German patriots who wanted to raise Germany herself to the position of a Great Power, in spite of the dual rivalry between Austria and Prussia, it was not a problem simply of uniting the smaller states together as in Italy, but rather of subjecting them to one or other of the two Great Powers in Germany. Furthermore, the rivalry between the two Great Powers must be ended either by the expulsion of one of them from the Confederation, or by its reduction to the position of a middle-sized state. To be sure, these alternatives were not clearly seen by any one at the time; in fact, almost all of those who wanted to bring about a closer union of the German states hoped that a compromise might be found which would solve the existing Austro-Prussian rivalry; but in reality conditions were such that no compromise solution was possible.

In this connection it is noteworthy that German national aspirations were particularly lively in the small states. Subjects of the two Great Powers naturally prided themselves primarily on being either Prussians or Austrians, and felt little need of supporting the ardent aspirations toward the creation of a new Great Power in Germany. But subjects of the little states were not content with the limited activity afforded to them at home, nor with membership in a Confederation which counted for little internationally in the

eyes of foreigners; they could not help feeling the impotency of the German Confederation and were natural representatives of the "imperial idea." In general these people at first formed only small groups. At that time and long afterwards, there was only one form of national feeling which held all classes in Germany together, and this was hatred toward France. Even where the desire for a new state and for the abolition of local boundaries in favor of a national unified state was weak or not developed at all, there existed an extraordinarily strong hostility to France. And it was very important later on that this feeling was not least strong among people who politically might have been called friends of French thought, namely among the liberals.

An intelligent view of German history up to 1870 can only be acquired by observing, not the German Confederation as a whole with all its weaknesses in organization, but the two Great Powers who determined its direction and later development. The historian must turn his chief attention to the Power whose history was to decide the fate of Germany, namely to Prussia. Austria can best be treated by itself except so far as it has to be considered as a foil to Prussia. The other German states scarcely need be considered at all.

In speaking of Prussia one must make another distinction. The kingdom consisted at that time, as is well known, of two separated parts: Prussia proper in the east (which for the sake of convenience is usually called the "East Elbian territory"), and the newly-acquired Rhineland in the west. Of these two it was the East Elbian territory which dominated both. This was the nucleus or original territory from which Prussia proper had developed. Whoever wants to understand Prussian history, and recent German history in general, must begin with this region.

This East Elbian territory had a wholly peculiar structure. Considerable cities with trade and industry in the modern sense were rare. Most of the towns consisted of settlements of a petty local character, usually with a strong proportion of Jews. There was lacking, therefore, a strong middle-class. This condition was more marked in the country districts. Here there prevailed exclusively the system of large landed estates, though not everywhere in such a pronounced form as in Ireland, for instance; but still the population was sharply divided into two classes: baronial landlords (*Rittergutsbesitzer*) and agricultural day-laborers, without there being any free peasantry between them. The landlords or "Junkers" were the only economically strong element in the country, because

there were no large manufacturers. They exercised an almost unlimited authority in the open country; and as there were few large cities they met with almost no rival opposition.

The Prussian system of large landed-estates, as is always the case, existed only by reason of the fact that the State took care of certain members in each family of the nobility. The relative infertility of great stretches of the East Elbian territory made the nobles less able than elsewhere to provide adequate support for younger sons who did not take over the estate. So the State had to come to their support and look out for sons who were excluded from the patrimonial inheritance through primogeniture or the system of entails. For the nobility, therefore, it was a question of their very existence that their families should possess, if not a monopoly, at least a privileged position in appointments to higher positions in the army and civil service.

The noble families believed that they had all the better claim, inasmuch as, owing to the conditions under which they lived, they believed that they alone were fit to fill these positions. Accustomed to see about themselves "common people," living in a primitive way as uneducated agricultural day-laborers, they easily came to the idea that the state was not only bound to assure their economic existence, but that it could not get along without them in general, particularly as regards military service. In this connection, it is not impossible that this idea was still further strengthened by another peculiarity of East Elbian agrarian conditions which has often been cite with praise. Observers who have investigated economic political conditions from the point of view of morality have often emphasized the fact that the East Elbian landlord was much superior to the English landlord in Ireland or the owners of great estates in Spain, in that he lived and worked on his estate himself, and did not merely spend the income from it in the city. This is doubtless true; "absenteeism" was unusual in Prussia, although it may be a question whether it was not economic necessity, resulting from the relatively small productiveness of the estates, which made the Junker remain in the country. But, from a political point of view, this circumstance was not without danger. Landlords in other countries who spent a part of their life in the larger cities came in contact with new currents of thought, and came into immediate touch with men of capacity among the upper bourgeoisie and "intelligentsia." But in Prussia the Junkers were too often acquainted only with members of their own class and with the agricultural day-laborers who were dependent upon them. Even their acquaintance

with foreign countries may have been limited by this life of isolation.

However, this was not the chief peculiarity of the Prussian State. In the eighteenth century Prussia was by no means the only state in which large landed property was favored through the exemption from taxation, through a monopolization of all the government offices, and through the exclusion of burghers from the possession of extensive agricultural lands. What gave Prussia in the nineteenth century her peculiar structure was, in the first place, the disproportion between her natural resources and her ambition to play a rôle as a Great Power; and, in the second place, the extraordinarily interesting changes which took place in her institutions after the catastrophe at Jena in 1806.

Let us take the first point. Practically all the conditions were lacking which might enable Prussia to take a place as a military Great Power alongside of the other European Powers. The land was not naturally rich either in population or resources; nor did it possess highly developed industries or a large merchant-marine, like other small states, which might have made up for its territorial weakness. If, in spite of this, Prussia was determined as far as possible to stand up beside other states more favored by Nature, it was necessary for her to strain her powers to the very utmost. The concentration of all her efforts for the support of an army, severe thrift to cover the cost of military expenditures out of proportion to the natural resources of the country, the union of all authority at a central point in order to make sure that none of the meager revenues were lost,—all these conditions were indispensable if Prussia was to play the rôle of a Great Power as she wished to do. It presupposed also the creation of a bureaucracy dependent on the monarch, which should take the place of the old feudal patriarchal administration and bring about a uniform development of the revenues of the State for the general good, that is for the army. Already in the eighteenth century, therefore, there had been formed by the side of the privileged landlord class a new body of administrators directed by the king or at least by a central authority; these administrators could oppose the privileges of the nobility whenever the rôle of the State as a Great Power demanded it.

But even with all these measures, Nature was scarcely to be overcome. Some observers may become very enthusiastic over the fact that here the marvel of creating a state in spite of all unfavorable conditions was accomplished simply by human energy. But the shrewder judge, applying political and economic tests, will not over-

look the dangers of an artificial creation of this kind. However much the Prussian government accomplished, and however powerful the proud structure of the new State appeared externally, it rested on a dangerously small foundation. The State had been wholly fashioned with a view to war, and yet was economically much too weak to carry on war during a long period on its own resources. It will be recalled that Frederick the Great was able to bring the Seven Years' War successfully to a close only because of financial support from England and his alliance with British sea-power in general; and even then the odds were often very seriously against him. Still more notable, perhaps, is the very unusual financial burden which the Napoleonic Wars imposed on Prussia. In comparison with other great states like Austria, Prussia had taken part only a relatively short time in the wars of this period. In the final decisive conflict she had had only a subordinate economic and military part, if one compares what she did, with what Great Britain or Russia accomplished. She had also come out of the Napoleonic Wars with an extraordinarily large increase of territory, having been enlarged not only by a piece of former Poland, but also by a part of Saxony and the Rhineland. Nevertheless, the kingdom was crippled financially to such an extent that for several decades she had to abandon her warlike ambitions. She could not even undertake her natural aim of establishing a direct connection between the East Elbian nucleus and the Rhineland by conquering the Kingdom of Hanover and the Electorate of Hesse.

The second factor which created modern Prussia was the catastrophe at Jena. One must bear in mind the contrast between Prussia's earlier powerful position and her later collapse, perhaps without parallel in all history, to understand how this event exercised an almost revolutionary influence. The fact that the Prussian army was thrown back head over heels by Napoleon was not the decisive thing. The Emperor of the French had inflicted crushing defeats on other opponents often enough without causing such an inner collapse. But besides the loss of military prestige, it had been shown that the artificially created Prussian structure was no longer able to offer any resistance when times had changed. At a single blow, the creation of many decades collapsed in a panic as soon as the halo of military invincibility disappeared. If Prussian patriots wished to prevent the repetition of such a disaster there was nothing left for them to do except to adopt some of the "French ideas." To be sure, the old bases of government did not need to be abandoned altogether; for unless Prussia made use of all her re-

sources, she could never compete with the other great states; but the whole population, and not merely the nobility and bureaucracy, must be drawn into the active service of the State; the towns and the middle-class must be something more than mere tax-payers.

Accordingly, after 1806, reform legislation, combining the old and the new, was carried out in a way to evoke admiration. With the aid of several non-Prussian statesmen, like Stein and Hardenberg, whose interests were not bound up with those of the Prussian landlords, there was adopted so much of the French Revolution idea of equality as was possible without exactly destroying the privileged position of the landlords. The king allowed the nobility to keep their favored position in the army and administration, but he put an end to their monopoly, so far as it still existed; but at the same time he compelled them to help pay the increased costs of the State.

The most important of these reforms was certainly that which dealt with the army. The Prussian army of the eighteenth century had not differed essentially from those of other countries. Officers were appointed from families of the native nobility, while the soldiers consisted in good part of non-Prussian mercenaries, who were often recruited by improper means. This army had been defeated by French troops in which there were neither privileges due to birth nor recruits who were not French. Chiefly under the influence of a Hanoverian, Scharnhorst, this French system was now introduced in Prussia, at least in principle. The monopolization of military office by the nobility was done away with, to the extent that henceforth positions of command were given to burghers, and even (during the war against Napoleon) to Jews. It was decided that henceforth promotion should take place according to ability and bravery. Recruiting outside Prussia was to cease. Instead, the whole male population, including all nobles and townspeople who had hitherto been exempt from military service, were now to be given military training. Beside the standing army, there was created a "reserve," consisting of all young men; this was an extension of the Napoleonic system of conscription, but differed chiefly from it in that, owing to the limited area of the Prussian state, all young men were to be given military training. Humiliating military punishments in the army were abolished, because now members of the upper classes were also to serve as common soldiers.

The system of universal military service, which was legally decreed on September 3, 1814, after it had already been introduced in practice, might easily have had the dangerous consequence that the

Prussian army might become, as in France, an instrument of democracy and have destroyed the controlling influence enjoyed by the landlord nobility. But this possibility, at least in times of peace, was prevented by favoring the appointment of nobles as officers in such a way that they possessed a majority of the positions, especially in the higher places of command. The common people, particularly the descendants of argricultural laborers, remained practically prevented from rising to be officers. In this way the Prussian government, in spite of the relatively small number of its population (about ten and a half million in 1815), succeeded in using the whole of the male population, thus being able to create as strong an army as more populous states. But, at the same time, it avoided the danger which might have arisen from the introduction of legal equality in the army.

Many analogies with this military innovation are seen in the "Town Ordinance" of 1808. The previous exclusion of the middle-class in the towns from the army and local administration had reduced the townspeople to complete passivity as regards the state, a circumstance which contributed not a little to the collapse at Jena. According to French principles, it would have been natural to remedy this situation by giving the middle-class some share in the government, or at least in administration, by creating some form of representative government or at least advisory councils. But if the government had gone as far as this it would have limited the existing authority of the baronial landlords. The government, therefore, rejected such an innovation and limited its reform at first to the towns, leaving the country districts, containing the great class of agricultural laborers, wholly out of consideration. The burghers in the towns were given a share in local government, but not in the central government of the state. In the towns there was introduced a uniform civil law, somewhat like the French equality before the law. Citizens chose from their midst representatives who formed a city council which in turn elected a magistrate as executive head. All this, to be sure, was done under the supervision of the government, which, for instance, had to confirm the election of the magistrate. But in spite of this the law certainly gave to the town councils greater authority than was the case under Napoleon's system of prefects, particularly at first; in 1831 and 1853 the government assumed a somewhat wider supervision. It was also thoroughly characteristic that nothing like this was done for the country districts; there the authority of the nobles was limited neither by village nor district organizations; for such an innovation would have

disturbed the very foundation of the Prussian system of government.

On the other hand, it must also be added that, in spite of this, the condition of the agricultural population was notably improved by the reform legislation. To be sure, the reformers did not exactly dare to abolish completely the system of entails, and primogeniture continued; but at least they made it possible to put an end to an entail. On the other hand, the feudal limitations on personal freedom were abolished in a thorough-going fashion. Serfdom was done away with. Feudal dues disappeared, as in France; the separation of classes into separate castes ceased; henceforth, in Prussia, as in France or England, a burgher might acquire land in the country, and a noble might take up a profession. To be sure, the nobility still retained great privileges, which were all the more important, inasmuch as the landlords were so much more powerful economically than the agricultural laborers. The Junkers still retained their baronial courts and their control over the rural police just as before. Nevertheless, a considerable approach was made to the "revolutionary" principle of legal equality, which appeared to have transformed Prussia into a modern political structure, at least in comparison with the other states of Eastern Europe.

Other measures aimed chiefly at increasing the revenues of the state. The government even thought of putting an end to the exemption of noble estates from taxation; it at least brought it about that taxes were more equitably distributed. All that was left of large ecclesiastical estates was confiscated. This secularization brought in a great deal to the crown, particularly in Silesia. In order to improve trade and the well-being of the middle-class, freedom in choosing occupations was introduced, after the manner in France. Hardenberg even issued an edict which was intended to be a first step in removing the economic subjection under which the agricultural population suffered (1811); but this, like the similar Russian decree for the emancipation of the serfs, remained ineffective.

What gave particular significance to this adoption of "French ideas" was the fact that the government could make use of an extraordinarily efficient civil service, owing to the traditions and social system of the country. Owing to political and economic conditions, men who did not belong to the land-owning nobility and yet who craved more than a mere shopkeeper's existence, entered the Prussian government service gladly. A political career, as well as influence through the press, was out of the question in Prussia; in a state where neither parliament nor freedom of the press existed,

a field of activity was offered in government civil service. Furthermore, there was scarcely as yet any great industry or commerce to act as a rival in attracting persons away from a career as government officials. The wider activities in which the Prussian State was engaging, in comparison with other German territories, and the many new opportunities which resulted from the fact that the territory of the State had been more than doubled,—all this attracted many gifted men from non-Prussian regions. Thus, the King of Prussia acquired a staff of executive officials dependent upon himself whose interests were not bound up with that of any other existing class.

This class of civil servants, as was natural in this age, and as was also the case in the other German states, had been reared completely in the ideas of Enlightened Despotism. From this they had drawn their energy and their reckless conviction of the necessity of creating a new state in accordance with the progressive tendencies of the eighteenth century. But from it they had also drawn the conviction that all initiative ought to come "from above"; and that the common people, like minors unable to act in their own interest, ought never to have an independent part in government and administration. To this people belonged, in their opinion, not only the so-called "uneducated masses," but also every one who had not passed through the bureaucratic school and also the members of the professional, industrial, and commercial classes.

Here was the point where the ideas of the nobility and the bureaucracy coincided. The interests of the two classes, in general, were often opposed to one another. More than once did the tendency of the bureaucracy to extend state authority and increase state revenues bring them into conflict with the nobles, who were defending their privileges. But both classes were agreed that no third power should be allowed to rise by their side.

All this will only be completely clear if one considers also the influence of religious conditions. The nucleus territory of East and West Prussia, from which the Prussian kingdom had developed, was Protestant, and this had two important consequences. One of these was of a political nature. There never existed in Prussia any such independent church organization as had always acted as a check upon the omnipotence of the State in absolutistic Roman Catholic countries. The Protestant Church, like all other corporations in Prussia, stood unconditionally subject to the authority of the State and of the classes controlling the State, like the nobility in the rural districts. The educative value of institutions half independent of

the State—educative for rulers and ruled alike—did not exist; and it is well known that not only was the Catholic Church always regarded in Prussia as a foreign body, but also that the ruling authorities in Prussia have never shown so clearly their incapacity for dealing with independent organizations as in their dealing with the Roman Catholic Church.

For the moment, however, the other consequence was more important. The very fact that the direction of the Church was identical with that of the State resulted in a relatively greater intellectual freedom. To be sure, Protestantism clung as closely as Catholicism to unchanging creeds. But the Protestant State Church lacked the power to enforce its creeds, because the statesmen who possessed the authority were too strongly influenced by the ideas of Enlightenment not to allow them free rein. In theory, Prussia was naturally no less imbued with reaction against the "Revolutionary Enlightenment" than the other conservative states, but the liberally-minded officials who had charge of education in Prussia, as in the other Protestant parts of Germany, extended much more broadly the bounds of what was permitted, than did statesmen who were under Catholic influence. Education, indeed, was strictly supervised, and everything which smacked of revolution was systematically forbidden. But there was no such anxious exclusion of all new ideas as was the case, for instance, in Catholic Austria. Although newspapers and books were sharply supervised, the government at least allowed the university authorities a relatively free contact with new intellectual currents.

In order to make this clear a few words must be said about the peculiar position of the German, and particularly the Protestant, universities in the nineteenth century.

The rôle which the German universities had originally played did not differ from that of universities in other countries, and they had not enjoyed any greater freedom. But in the eighteenth century, through the foundation of the University of Göttingen in 1737, a complete change was brought about. The Electorate of Hanover was at that time, as is well known, connected with England by a personal union, and it was therefore possible to transplant to German soil English liberal ideas. The most important of these was academic freedom; books did not have to be approved by officials before being printed. Furthermore, all religious and political pressure was removed. As a result, the University of Göttingen soon enjoyed an extraordinary prosperity, and in the second half of the eighteenth century became in Germany the center of science and

learning. But the influence of the new university soon extended far beyond the limits of Hanover. Competition compelled other German governments to give their professors greater freedom. So gradually the German universities were transformed into those institutions familiar in the nineteenth century as places for scientific study. Though they were dependent upon the state, and more or less strictly controlled, and though admission to the faculty was strictly supervised by the state, nevertheless teachers were no longer bound to a prescribed textbook, nor forced to subscribe to a definite creed.

This relative freedom was all the more notable in that it formed in general, in Germany, the only exception to government interference with intellectual life. Academic freedom was allowed, because natural resources could not be fully developed without scientific knowledge, and also because the consequences of university education did not penetrate down to the lower classes. It had in fact come about that there was an almost complete separation between persons of academic training and the "common people," to which almost the whole middle-class belonged. As there was no independent political writing and no large reading public interested in political and economic questions as in England or France, it came about that academic people primarily wrote merely for one another. This enhanced, on one hand, the narrowness of their work, but, on the other hand, gave them great freedom in expression. This was one of the main reasons of the poor "isolated life" of a German, of which Goethe once complained to Eckermann.

Being the only places where political discussion was relatively free, the universities assumed an extraordinary position in the political life of the time. In Austria the authorities were thoroughly consistent in excluding from the universities everything that was new, in degrading, for instance, so dangerous a subject as history to the rank of a despised subordinate study, which indeed would be better not taught at all. But the other governments did not dare, as has been said, to go so far as this. It had, however, the result that "reactionary" measures of the time were chiefly directed against the upper schools.

But before these measures are discussed, a few words must be said about conditions in Austria. They illustrate the point that Prussia can only be understood in contrast to Austria.

Although the principles of Enlightened Despotism had not remained unknown in government circles in Austria, and although a series of reforms had taken place in accordance with it in the

eighteenth century, nevertheless the Austrian state was in many respects the precise opposite of Prussia. This was due mainly to her greater internal strength. A state of Austria's size, with nearly double as many inhabitants as Prussia and with a correspondingly larger area including some of the most fertile parts of Europe,—such a state could adopt the rôle of a Great Power "naturally," that is, without extraordinary efforts and without a concentration of all its powers upon the army and finance. Austria could suffer in military and financial matters with an ease only equaled by France. Neither the numerous defeats which her armies had suffered during the Napoleonic Wars, nor the bankruptcy of 1814, could destroy the country's moral credit or lead to such a catastrophe as that which followed Jena in Prussia.

Austria, therefore, did not need to reform her system to such an extent as Prussia. The "old régime" organization continued, with all its clumsiness and petty detail. There was no regular cabinet and no regular centralized administration. The privileges of the nobility continued untouched. The nobles were exempted from military service and from the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts. They possessed a monopoly of authority on their estates and in the high places of the government. The peasantry were not only subject to the jurisdictional authority of the landlords, but also had to pay feudal dues. In the various political assemblies of estates (*Landstände*), which still existed, only the nobility were represented, along with a few of the towns at most; and the right of assessing the taxes, which in Bohemia, for instance, belonged to these assemblies, was used in such a way that the peasants had to pay much higher taxes on their land than did the lords. Nothing was done to stimulate the industrial activity of the middle-class. Commerce lay almost exclusively in the hands of the Jews. Professional life was not developed, because educational institutions were lacking. Industry was able to maintain a miserable existence merely owing to the brutal prohibitive tariffs against foreign manufactures, which, however, were ineffective, owing to the active smuggling which went on. To be sure, one must not overlook the fact that there was here no need for free trade. The fertile country did not need to depend upon revenues from export trade, and perhaps the very fact that there was no manufacturing on a large scale, and consequently no great excess population, brought it about that Austria still preserved her old reputation as a land in which living was cheap, abundant and good. It was due to these relatively easy conditions of life that only a negative attention was

given to intellectual matters. Political discussions were harmful only because they would mislead people into being discontented with their pleasant enjoyment of life, and set them instead to thinking about their political rights. Every change in the old system rightly seemed dangerous, because it would have disturbed the happy economic adjustment, and would therefore eventually have brought about more wide-reaching changes. Therefore the government forbade all political discussion in general. The censorship was exceedingly strict; even a book like "The Restoration of Constitutional Law," by Ludwig von Haller, a romantic, conservative patrician of Berne, could not be sold in Austria. To print a political pamphlet in Austria was unthinkable. All societies, even harmless pleasure meetings of literary persons, were forbidden, because they might have given occasion for political discussion. One could only journey abroad by permission, so that personal contact with foreign ideas was forbidden as far as possible. A very highly developed secret police even watched over opinions which were expressed in private life. The universities were managed in the old fashion just like schools.

This exclusion of everything new was still further strengthened by the Roman Catholic character of the State. In itself the Roman Catholic Church was scarcely less dependent upon the State than the Protestant Church in Prussia, but it has already been pointed out above that the Catholic clergy were less inclined to make compromises with modern civilization than were the Protestants. The schools were now completely under the clergy, and even the students had to attend mass. Non-Catholics were merely tolerated and had no access to public office.

But the burdensomeness of Austria's system of repression was lessened, not only on account of the natural wealth of the country, but also on account of the naturally peaceful character of her foreign policy. Essentially Austria was not organized on a pacifist basis. The maintenance of an efficient army could not be neglected (although it did not equal modern trained armies like those of France and Prussia), because the system of primogeniture made it necessary to provide for the younger sons of the nobility by giving them places in the army. But here also the government's policy was merely conservative. The state was already rounded out territorially, and therefore not driven, like Prussia, by ambitions to unite separated territories by conquest. In view of the opposition which she faced, particularly in Italy, Austria could regard it as an advantage if only she were able to protect from attack what she

already possessed. Any ambitions for territorial extension existed at most only in connection with Turkish territory in the Balkans; but even here Austria did not intend to interfere by force of arms. Thus she could keep her army within relatively limited bounds, avoid excessive military expenditures, and, in contrast to the purely continental power of Prussia, develop a fleet which was by no means inconsiderable. All this sufficed to preserve the external position of the monarchy for almost half a century. On the other hand, Austria refrained from all offensive wars and did not even interfere in the Russo-Turkish struggles, though Prince Metternich, in view of his conservative principles, would have liked to interfere against the Greeks in their fight for independence.

After this discussion, one can see in what respects Prussia differed mainly from her later rival. I say from her later rival, for in the generation after the Congress of Vienna, Prussia was not in a position to take up a struggle with Austria for control in Germany. To be sure, Prussia had laid the foundation of her military system; but the consequences of the Napoleonic period in this state to which Nature had been so niggardly were felt for several decades, so that for the time being Prussia was forced to follow a policy of peace. Nothing is more characteristic of this than the fact that universal military service, which could produce in Prussia an army equal in size to the armies of the other great states, was not fully carried out for financial reasons. Although the population grew steadily, the number of men who were summoned for military service remained the same; in 1860, only 40,000 out of 65,000 liable to military service actually served under the colors.

And yet the thing which is characteristic about what has been called "Prussian militarism" is the fact that institutions and views, which in other countries have been advocated merely by a single class or profession, have been in Prussia transferred to the whole people. In itself there is little which is original in Prussian military conceptions. A number of old military views are perhaps particularly accentuated in it, and they are carried out more rigidly to their logical consequences than in other armies. But one has only to look at the quite similar rules of the Jesuit Order to see that the Spanish officer of the sixteenth century had the same ideas as to the necessity of discipline and "corpse-like obedience" as the Prussian military officers of the nineteenth century. What was new and of importance in Prussia was rather the fact that these principles now became a part of the thought of a whole people. As every one was a soldier, so it went without saying that every one had the feelings

of a soldier, and must obey like a soldier. Therefore an altogether extraordinary attention was given to the education of the people. For they furnished the men who would be in actual service for what in those days was regarded as only a short period of time, and yet who must be instilled forever with a definite military way of thinking. It was in this spirit that the press and higher education had to be influenced. It was in this spirit above all else that the civil service was administered, in order that in his daily life the subject should always learn to think in a military way.

This is not the place to consider what may be the evil consequences of such a militarization of all public life, or, to speak more accurately, to what extent the direction of all State activity toward military aims and the subordination of all State work to military purposes makes the representatives of the State unfit to fulfil non-military tasks. Here it is merely possible to mention the fact. It may also be pointed out how harmoniously this system fitted in with all the other institutions in Prussia. Universal military service itself was indeed a consequence of the smallness of the state, and of its determination, nevertheless, to rival the Great Powers; but when once this disproportionately large military machine had been created, it offered an excellent support to the nobility, and harmonized wonderfully with other institutions which deprived citizens of all initiative, including initiative in politics.

From the point of view of world history, the period of German history between 1815 and 1848 offers little of importance. Important events in foreign politics were rare. The conflicts of the two great states (particularly Austria) with the middle-sized, and little, states,—conflicts which related to the censorship of the press, the supervision of the universities and student societies, and the introduction of liberal constitutions,—these conflicts were without great significance; and even if gains in a liberal direction had been made in the smaller states, they would have been of little importance so long as the two great German states remained conservative. Much more important for the future were the changes which, at this period, were gradually taking place in economic conditions.

The long period of peace, together with the improvements in the means of communication which were beginning in Germany, resulted in a large increase in the population, which at first was offset by only a small emigration. This new situation gradually brought about the development of manufacturing on a large scale. Beginning with the 1830's, the mining and textile industries began to increase slowly in Germany. Just as in England, there took place

a shift in the population from the wooded regions to the coal districts; but, in comparison with England, the changes which took place in these matters were indeed very modest; but still, as a period of preparation, these years are very significant.

These changes also influenced politics. Whereas, in the earlier period, the demand for the union of the German states into a new empire had come chiefly from liberal youthful idealists, with romantic patriotic feelings and with a hatred toward France, now practical arguments began to be used more and more, urging the necessity of putting an end to the "small states system," which interfered with commerce. Henceforth, it was primarily an economic demand which insisted on a uniform commercial policy and the abolition of all internal obstacles to trade and all vexatious local regulations.

Now it was decisive that of the two great states, without whose coöperation such reforms could not be carried out, Prussia alone showed herself favorable toward these new considerations.

This was evident to every one through her founding of the Tariff Union *(Zollverein)*.

The fact that Prussia favored these ideas for a uniform tariff policy for all Germany rested in part, at any rate, on geographical grounds. Unlike Austria, Prussia did not form a solid territory, with what might be called a natural boundary. She consisted of two separated areas, inclosed numerous non-Prussian territories ("enclaves"), and had a very inconvenient and extended boundary, more than seven thousand kilometers long. Thus, Prussia had a motive for simplification and also for uniting with the other states, which was lacking in Austria.

But besides this motive, there were others. Prussia was just as much inclined toward innovations for the benefit of the State, as Austria was conservative in the true sense of the word. It was easy and in harmony with her ambitions for increasing the economic power of the kingdom for Prussia to introduce a uniform, low tariff in place of the sixty-seven tariff systems which existed in Prussia in 1815. Her commercial policy also differed from that of Austria in very important respects. As has been said, Austria adhered to a prohibitive tariff system, and did not want economic relations to be disturbed in any way by contact with the outside world. Prussia, on the other hand, had no such scruples, and also possessed as yet no factories which the government thought ought to be protected. The tariff, therefore, which Prussia proposed was very simple, and, for that period, quite low: a tariff of ten percent *ad valorem* for im-

ported goods in general, twenty percent for colonial products. The tariff had the advantage that the collection of duties required only a relatively small number of officials. Furthermore, it was easy to make tariff agreements with other countries, inasmuch as the Prussian tariff system did not aim at the protection of special Prussian industries.

Soon after the adoption of the tariff in 1818, Prussian officials began to try to secure the adhesion of other states in the German Confederation. It was not difficult to win over the little central German principalities, which formed complete or nearly complete "enclaves," as the states totally surrounded by Prussian territory were called. In these states, also, the cost of collecting duties had been very high in proportion to the amount collected so long as they insisted on having their own tariff system; but as Prussia offered to share the income from tariff duties on a per capita basis, these states gained very considerably by adopting the Prussian tariff system. The first prince to join the Tariff Union was the Duke of Schwarzburg-Sondershausen in 1819, and a number of other small princes, who were in a similar position, followed his example. In 1828 it was possible to secure the first adhesion of a state in South Germany, the Grand Duchy of Hesse (Hesse-Darmstadt.) This was not accomplished without difficulties, and Prussia had to make various concessions to secure the adhesion of Hesse, such as allowing Hesse to have her own customs officials. But Prussia was glad to make this "poor bargain," as it was called, because she hoped to win other states by it, and this hope was fulfilled. Meanwhile the central German states, especially those which feared annexation by Prussia, like Hanover, Brunswick, and Saxony, and also the South German states (with the exception of Baden) had also made *Zollvereins* of their own. But the tariff union which Prussia had so cleverly made with the Grand Duchy of Hesse put an end for the most part to these local or "particularistic" unions. Thus, Electoral Hesse (Hesse-Cassel) joined the Prussian *Zollverein* in 1831, giving Prussia a direct connection with South Germany and causing the central German *Zollverein* to collapse. In 1833 the Bavarian-Württemberg *Zollverein* also broke down and these states joined the Prussian union, which after 1834 was known as the "German Commercial and Tariff Union." By 1841 there remained outside of the Union only a few small states like the Hanseatic towns and the states which were most afraid of Prussia like Hanover, Brunswick, Oldenburg, and Mecklenburg. But in the years 1841-52 most of these were also won over as Prussia agreed to adopt several lower

tariff schedules. Hesitating governments were won over more easily by the fact that the tariff agreements were not perpetual, but were signed merely for a short period of years; it always, therefore, seemed possible to withdraw in case Prussia should use their adhesion to the Tariff Union for political purposes. But the financial returns proved to be so favorable that the agreements were always renewed,—in 1853 for a period of twelve years.

Austria, on the other hand, was wholly opposed to the idea. As a result, about the middle of the nineteenth century, unity in economic matters at least had been accomplished under Prussian leadership in a large part of Germany, without Austria having any part in it.

But before any account is given of the corresponding political and military union, the events of 1848, which in many respects transformed Prussia, must first be mentioned.

One preliminary observation must be made. The history of the following years, especially the developments in Prussia, would be incomprehensible if one were to conclude from what has been said that the advocates of national unity were moved merely by economic motives. On the contrary, it is significant that the very persons who from class interests most emphasized the need of unifying Germany's economic policy were also the persons who were insisting on political liberty. The opposition of manufacturers and merchants to landowners and the tendencies which they represented in Prussia was strong; people wanted legal equality just as much as a modernization of economic life. But since the idea was current that Prussia was no less willing to adopt the one than the other, these persons generally took the side of Prussia, hoping indeed to secure both aims together.

In Prussia itself the conflict within the wealthy classes was very marked. Hostile to the old Prussian system, with its privileges for the landowners and the bureaucracy, were the western provinces, which were reproached by the eastern provinces and by the government with being "democratic"; these were the provinces in which French civil law was in force and in which the government had to create an artificial nobility for definite electoral purposes. The large towns also were everywhere hostile to the privileged position of the nobility. Hostile, furthermore, were the industrial regions in the east, like Silesia and Saxony. These groups all doubtless supported the effort to establish the *Zollverein,* but they were no less zealous in advocating liberal political reforms. The history of the following years is chiefly filled with the conflict which the Prus-

sian government carried on against these groups but which resulted in their ultimate victory.

The demand for liberal reforms, especially for the introduction of a constitution and parliamentary government, reached back in Prussia to a period before 1848.

Although the King of Prussia had promised in 1815 to create a representative legislature, and although the German Act of Confederation made obligatory "a constitution based on a system of estates," Prussia had nothing of the kind until 1823, and even then only "Provincial Estates" which were merely advisory and representative of the old feudal division of the population into classes. In these Provincial Estates, whose meetings were secret, the Prussian nobility naturally had the majority, owing to the nature of the Prussian State: the nobility had 278 representatives, the burghers 182, and the peasants 124. Only tax-payers could vote, only possessors of property could be elected, so that members of the liberal professions, like physicians or lawyers, could only be elected in case they also happened to be landowners. But this arrangement proved unsatisfactory when the State had to turn to the public to borrow money to satisfy its new financial needs. To be sure, by 1828, the frugal government had managed to change the deficit into a surplus; but the limited state revenues did not suffice to finance great undertakings, like the building of railways,—which on purely military grounds could not be neglected. Furthermore, it had been expressly promised in 1820 that no new loans would be made without the consent of the Estates, and in 1842 the "United Committees" of the Provincial Estates had refused to assume the responsibility for such a loan. Therefore a royal order of February 3, 1847, finally summoned, as a provisional measure, the "United Diet," or united meeting of the Provincial Estates, which was to have the right of granting new taxes. But the United Diet was no more yielding than the United Committees. It demanded at least that the assembly should meet periodically, and it refused to grant the money for railway construction.

In the midst of this conflict arrived the news of the February Revolution in Paris. This encouraged a part of the opposition in Prussia to emphasize their demands more strongly. In the large cities especially, in which agitation was active, but in which the bourgeoisie proper took no part, the groups of revolutionists were composed almost exclusively of young persons and of a few laboring men. The country districts and the army were wholly unaffected; in fact, the army officers, who had the greatest interest in conserv-

ing the existing order of things, were down-right opposed to the movement, and the agricultural laborers in the East Elbian provinces were much too dependent upon their lords and too passive politically to make common cause with the liberals in the towns. Fundamentally, it was less a struggle of liberals against monarchy than an opposition of towns and manufacturers against large landlords and their privileges. Since the latter were the stronger, the insurrection was destined to fail from the very start. The king, as weak intellectually as physically, was indeed ready to make some concessions, and on March 8, 1848, consented to periodic meetings of the Diet, almost before a petition for this had been drawn up. In a proclamation on March 18 he also promised a constitutional system for all Germany. But at this point the military authorities interfered, and attacked the burghers in Berlin, who replied by throwing up barricades in the city. The king was unwilling to take sides unconditionally with the army and ordered the troops to withdraw from the city. His brother, the later Emperor William I, who was especially opposed by the people as being the pronounced representative of the claims of the officers, had to leave Prussia and flee to England.

For the moment revolution triumphed. The king had to promise a constitution which included universal suffrage among other things. But the "National Assembly" which soon met in Prussia was wholly powerless from the outset. Opposed to it were all the solidly established powers in the state: the army, the bureaucracy, and the king. Its decisions had only a momentary validity. Though it was dominated, not by radicals, but by moderate liberals, jurists, and professors, and though it voted to abolish what was left of the authority of the landlords and to place local administration everywhere under elected boards in place of the Junkers, and though it demanded a responsible ministry,—still all this did not result in any permanent change. After sitting for seven months the National Assembly was dispersed by the military authorities. The king then issued a new constitution of his own on December 5, 1848. The revolution had thus triumphed to the extent that the Old Régime was changed at least in certain forms, and a constitution was introduced. But as in the case of the reform legislation after the battle of Jena, it was here less a question of the complete adoption of liberal reforms than of a mere adaptation of them, in which care was taken that the privileges of the classes which had hitherto ruled should not be essentially restricted.

New, indeed, was the creation of a parliamentary assembly and the constitutional principle that the House of Representatives

(*Abgeordnetenhaus*) must give its approval for new taxes. But the authority of the assembly did not go beyond this and all administration remained exclusively dependent upon the king as heretofore. Furthermore, the king took care, so far as possible, to prevent any effective parliamentary opposition to the privileged position of the large landowners. He did not dare to abolish universal suffrage, but he modified it in such a way that the rich, who in the eastern provinces were the nobles, secured a preponderant influence: in 1849 he issued a new electoral law which divided the voters into three classes according to the taxes they paid, in such a way that each of the three classes paid one-third of the taxes. Each class chose the same number of electors, so that the rich were far more strongly represented than the poor. Moreover, voting was done in public, the voter announcing his vote orally, before it was written down. Voters who were financially dependent were therefore liable to pressure from the government or from the nobles. Finally, in 1854, a House of Lords (*Herrenhaus*) was organized by the side of the House of Representatives, and representation in it was given almost exclusively to the nobility and the members of the royal family; part of the members were hereditary, but the greater part were appointed for life by the king, mainly from the ranks of the nobility.

This constitution, which remained in force until 1918, is historically of the greatest importance. It not only made possible in the 1850's and later the carrying out of a number of "reactionary" measures, but it also had the result that later, when Prussia united the other states into the German Empire, the largest and most influential state possessed a parliament which was thoroughly plutocratic in its organization, and so prevented any possibility of the empire's changing in the direction of liberalism.

At this point it is possible to speak only of the immediate consequences of Prussia's triumph over revolution. To be sure, all the measures which had been passed during the revolutionary days, were not wholly undone by the administration; but for the most part the privileges of the nobility were restored. The system of entails was immediately revived in 1852, the landlords were again given control over police, and the attempts to reorganize the provincial administration were interrupted.

Much more important were two developments which took place without the active interference of the State. One of these, which related to the attitude of the ruling classes in Prussia toward the idea of German unity, will be discussed in the next chapter in connection

with the history of the national movement. The other may be touched upon here. This was the unusually large and sudden emigration which began to take place as a result of the disillusionment over the failure to secure liberal reforms in the matter of political equality, and which tended to preserve the East Elbian provinces from the danger of revolution for a long time to come. It is not possible, so far as I know, to prove directly by statistics that the masses who left Germany at that time to seek political freedom and a home of their own in the United States came mainly from the eastern provinces of Prussia; however, it is not a question of the absolute number of emigrants to America, but rather whether a relatively larger percentage did not leave the somewhat thinly settled eastern provinces of Prussia as compared with the other parts of Germany. It is a fact that the density of population in the eastern provinces of Prussia increased so slowly between 1840 and 1900, although there was no artificial limitation of the birth-rate during the earlier decades, that the density there in 1900 was less than that in South Germany in 1840. In Mecklenburg, where the social and political conditions are similar to Prussia, the figures are still more unfavorable. Even if the actual number of emigrants from the thickly-settled territories of South and Northwest Germany had been the same as from the agricultural regions of the Northeast, it is clear that the agricultural provinces of Eastern Prussia would have suffered very much more severely on a percentage basis. It is probably safe to assert that the same thing happened there in the country districts as happened in English industry in the 1830's and 40's: it was precisely the energetic and intelligent members of the population who had no property who emigrated, because it was difficult for them to rise at home. The result was that the danger of revolutionary movements was essentially diminished. Naturally, all these "emigrants" did not go to America; many simply moved into the towns, but the social and political consequences were the same. There was no longer any danger of a rising of the agricultural proletariat against the landlords. To appreciate correctly the emigration figures, it must also be observed that even the decidedly agrarian provinces of Prussia were not wholly in the hands of large landlords. Cautiously as the State had undertaken measures to establish independent peasant proprietors, the measures had not been wholly without effect, and so only a part of the agricultural population was forced to emigrate to America or to the towns in order to secure a wholly independent position for themselves.

It must also be borne in mind that when the emigration from Ger-

many to the United States suddenly assumed enormous proportions in the 1850's, this was certainly in most cases not due to disillusionment over the failure of political ideals, but rather to material necessity and a feeling of hopelessness. In general, this was naturally observable not only in the regions of large landed estates, but also in other thickly settled districts, and perhaps even in the regions which were becoming slightly industrialized. But it was in the East Elbian provinces particularly, where there were no factories, that the political influence of emigration was mainly felt.

At the same time a revolutionary change was taking place in the Old Régime in Austria. The details of this must be left until later; here only so much can be said as is necessary to make clear the conflict with Prussia to be treated in the next chapter.

The March Revolution of 1848 which broke out in Vienna almost at the same time as in Berlin also ended in failure. In Vienna too the government and the army remained masters of the situation. But no more than in Prussia was there simply a complete restoration of the previous system. A number of reforms were permanent. The feudal dues which had been abolished, the inequality in taxation, and the administration of the provinces by the nobility, were not established again. The old patriarchal government gave way to a stricter supervision by a central authority. The cabinet began really to function and not simply to let things take their course and avoid innovations. Austria approached, one may say, to the Prussian system. Furthermore, the State needed economic changes: this was the age of great railway construction. A new policy was also adopted in regard to religious matters. Attention has already been called above (see p. 226) to the Concordat of 1855, which meant an official break with "Josephism,"—with the state church of the Metternich period; Catholicism again became the state religion. Similar measures, to be sure, had taken place in Prussia where, for instance, the public schools were placed under the clergy and where the court party and the Junkers sought to use religion as a support in the struggle against liberalism. But, it must be repeated, such efforts meant quite a different thing on Protestant soil from what they did in Catholic countries. With numerous Protestant friends which Prussia had among the nationalists in Germany, Austria's alliance with the Roman Catholic Church was a much stronger influence than the Prussian monarch's union with Protestant orthodoxy.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA; PRUSSIA'S CONQUEST OF GERMANY

THE decades after 1815 in Germany were characterized by the fact that Prussia and Austria worked hand in hand. Not only was Prussia prevented from taking an independent military course, owing to various reasons which have been mentioned, but she also held back because her government adhered to conservative legitimist doctrines of which she regarded Austria, next to Russia, as the principal protector. Frederick William III, who died in 1840, once observed in the Political Testament which he made in 1827 for his successor, "Russia, Prussia, and Austria should never separate from one another. Their coöperation is to be regarded as the keystone of the great European alliance." After 1840 this attitude changed somewhat. To be sure, the new king remained true to legitimist principles and rejected the possibility of any conflict with Austria. But a younger generation of Prussian politicians and military officers had no such scruples. They did not care if legitimacy was interfered with so long as Prussia might in this way strengthen her position as a Great Power. In a certain sense, therefore, they approached the point of view of the liberals who wanted German unity. Like the latter, they shared the view that Prussia with only sixteen million inhabitants in 1848 could maintain her position as a Great Power only in case she joined the other German states to herself, and then she would be able to assume a still greater position in the world. This naturally was the same thing as saying that Prussia must take up the struggle with Austria; for it was out of the question that the Austrian state would voluntarily consent to a reorganization of the German Confederation which should relegate her to second place.

It was not until 1848 that the conflict between the two Powers came sharply to the surface; then at least it became clear in the "Greater Germany" (*grossdeutch*) plan for German unity with the inclusion of Austria, and the "Smaller Germany" (*kleindeutsch*) plan for unification under Prussia without Austria.

Such a struggle was one of the conditions of the new Prussian policy. The other condition, and perhaps the more important one, lay in the change which had taken place in international relations.

In any attack on Austria before 1848, for which Prussia by herself was scarcely strong enough, Prussia could have counted only upon Russia's support; for various reasons, therefore, such an attack would have seemed a dangerous matter. But now Napoleon III's policy had created for Austria a powerful new opponent,—in fact, two opponents, if one considers the Kingdom of Sardinia which was being reconstructed with Napoleon's assistance. This created an international situation which after the middle of the century gave a prospect of success to a Prussian war against Austria.

This last point has already been touched upon several times and therefore needs no further consideration here. But the change in Germany itself must be briefly considered.

As to general conditions—the large increase in population, the beginnings of industrialism, and the development of transportation—enough has already been said. It has also been pointed out how all these changes seemed to render necessary the economic and political unity of Germany. But the events of the year 1848 showed also that such a union could only take place with the approval of the Great Powers, and that the question of the best form of bringing it about reduced itself to the alternative as to which of the two German Great Powers should take over the leadership of it.

When the February Revolution had triumphed in Paris and liberals in Germany were daring to advance their demands more energetically, something of a panic seized the German governments. Although at bottom their authority, at least in the larger states, was scarcely endangered, the princes felt paralyzed by the unusual situation and made unheard-of concessions. The Frankfort Diet, which represented the sovereigns of the German Confederation, adopted the colors of the forbidden *Burschenschaften,* the German student societies, which stood for nationalism and liberalism. It also sanctioned the demands of the liberals that a German parliament should be summoned to sit in place of the Frankfort Diet. Accordingly, a National Assembly was elected on the basis of universal suffrage throughout all Germany, including even the parts of Prussia which did not belong to the German Confederation. It met at Frankfort and among its members were all the leaders of the liberal opposition, many of whom were professors or writers; as there had been no opportunity for real parliamentary life in Germany, universities and pamphlets, though severely censored, had

afforded the only forums free for political discussion. About a third of the Assembly could be regarded as republican.

After this National Assembly had established a provisional government with an "imperial administrator" in the person of the Austrian Archduke John, it began to discuss "fundamental rights." This action has often been criticized, but perhaps unjustly. It was naturally an illusion, due probably to the political inexperience of most of the members, that the Frankfort Parliament imagined that it could pass anything more than paper decrees in opposition to a firmly-established military state like Prussia, especially as the Parliament had not the slightest military force at its disposal. But if they counted on exercising anything more than mere moral influence it was not so foolish to begin by setting forth the minimum rights which should be enjoyed by every German in the federation. If these decrees, which were intended to abolish all legal inequalities and class privileges and establish the independence of the courts and freedom of occupations and of the press,—if these decrees had really been carried out, then the local particularistic opposition which was especially strong in Germany against a unification of Germany by Prussia would have been destroyed; the privileges of definite classes which encouraged the nobles and officers in Prussia to maintain an opposition against the national movement would no longer have had any point. But the National Assembly in St. Paul's Church at Frankfort had, as has been said, no military force at its disposal to translate its decrees into acts. The Great Powers ignored its decisions, and in September, 1848, the Assembly even had to be protected by Prussian and Austrian troops against a little republican insurrection.

More important for the later period was the fact that the question of Austria's attitude to the unification of Germany was made clear for the first time. Was it possible to include a country like Austria, composed of many nationalities, in a single political organization which should have a purely national character and whose members should have equal rights? There was the greatest doubt as to this. Austria, in fact, rejected a compromise proposal that she should join the new federation merely with her purely German territory. So, after a small majority (267 to 263) had decided on the establishment of a hereditary empire, the King of Prussia was chosen Emperor on March 28, 1849, by 290 votes. But as this would mean that Austria would have to come under the tutelage of her rival, the Austrian government, on April 5, recalled her deputies from the Frankfort Parliament.

On the other hand, Frederick William IV, the legitimist King of Prussia, did not dare to accept the imperial crown which was offered to him by a revolutionary Assembly. He declared that he could make no decision without the voluntary approval of the other crowned heads in Germany, and therefore rejected the proffered crown on April 28.

The two Great Powers, after suppressing meanwhile a number of republican revolts in Saxony, Baden and elsewhere, then sought to bring about a closer form of confederation by way of negotiations among the governments. But all proposals came to nothing owing either to Prussia's or to Austria's opposition. So finally in 1850 the old Diet of the Confederation had to be recalled to Frankfort, and Prussia had to give up her attempt to make a separate union with the smaller states.

Austria was not altogether displeased with this situation: she desired no enlargement of Germany, and she again controlled the presidency in the Confederation. It was otherwise with Prussia. Her backing-down before Austrian wishes was regarded as a humiliation. People saw that Prussia's union of Germany could only take place as a result of a triumphant struggle over Austria; so Prussia began to make preparation for such a war.

At first, however, there was a brief pause in the conflict. So long as Frederick William IV, with his romantic legitimist notions, directed the government of Prussia, an immediate open struggle with Austria was not to be thought of. Not only was it necessary to make military preparations for the civil war in Germany, but the foreign policy which had hitherto been pursued had to be abandoned. Prussia's relations to other states must no longer be determined by the principles of conservative solidarity. Alliances must be made with revolutionary governments and even with revolutionary parties. In short, to use a new word which was becoming current, the government must act according to the principles of *Realpolitik,*—a policy of opportunism which aims by shrewd calculation of actual forces to secure practical success in politics. This word, which has often been misunderstood, can only be seen in its real meaning if it is contrasted with the maxims of legitimist solidarity which were represented at that time by the court party in Prussia.

So it was not until 1858 that Prussia could begin to realize her purposes; in that year the king became completely insane and was removed from the government, and later died in 1861. His place was taken by his younger brother, William, a man who hitherto had been exclusively interested in military matters; he had nothing of

his brother's political idealism and thought of himself only as a Prussian. He also had the advantage that he had not been educated as an heir to the throne and therefore understood thoroughly at least one profession, namely the army. Though one could not expect from him any comprehension of far-seeing plans, still there was no fear that he would adopt any of the doctrinaire notions with which his elder brother had blocked the aims of the war party and of the "red reactionary," Bismarck. In general, in all matters where the maintenance of his personal authority was concerned the new king was as unyielding as his brother.

After the group which had opposed war with Austria as a matter of principle had thus been deprived of its support, the Prussian government proceeded as rapidly as possible with military preparations. It could only hope to beat Austria if its army was enlarged and the number of its professional officers increased. Ever since 1820 the number of young men called annually to the colors had remained the same and the number of regiments had not been increased. This was no longer to be the case according to a proposal which was laid before the Prussian legislature in 1860. The number of annual recruits was to be increased by about one-half—from 40,000 to 63,000—and the peace strength of the army was also to be considerably increased. No more exemptions from military service were to be allowed. On the other hand, men were to be allowed to leave the *Landwehr* at the age of thirty-two instead of forty, so that in case of war the first brunt of the fighting would fall chiefly upon the younger men. To carry out this reform, its chief advocate, Albert von Roon, was appointed minister of war on December 5, 1859.

The Prussian legislature was asked to assent to the army reform, because it involved an increase of taxation of nine and a half million talers. A part of the expense, however, was to be met by increasing the land tax; but this proposal displeased the landlords in the Upper House as much as the great increase in the standing army—from about 230,000 to 450,000—displeased the liberals, who formed a strong group in the House of Representatives. This opposition party felt that the increase in the army could be accomplished at a materially lower expenditure if the term of service was again reduced to two years instead of three, though the king regarded three years' service as unconditionally necessary to instil an enduring soldierly spirit into the men. The increase in the number of officers simply meant that it was easier to make provision for the Junkers.

The opposition was so great that the government adopted a subter-

fuge. It asked for a grant of nine million talers merely for one year (1860-61), as a "temporary" military arrangement. In this form the government's proposal was adopted almost unanimously. But the government ignored from the outset the clause which declared that the increase in the army was only temporary. It proceeded to organize permanent regiments. It is noteworthy that in so doing the government met with the approval of the large landowners and was thus assured of support at least in the House of Lords. This was shown clearly by the fact that the Upper House even accepted in 1861 the increase in the land tax to which it had hitherto been steadily opposed.

But all this naturally did not put an end to the party conflict in the legislature; it merely postponed it. This was all the more serious for the government, as the parliamentary situation became by no means more favorable after 1860; a "German Progressive Party in Prussia" was formed in 1861 which aimed at a thoroughgoing modernization of the Prussian state, including the abolition of the privileges of the land-owners, the separation of church and state, and the reform of the House of Lords. In 1862 this party had a majority in the lower house and was supported not only by the great cities and the industrial districts in the west, but also by those in the east, like Silesia and Saxony. The lower house demanded that the government lay before it a detailed budget, in order to prevent the government from finding the money for the increase of the army by roundabout methods, such as the paring down of other items. Thereupon the legislature was dissolved. But the new elections of May, 1862, strengthened, instead of weakening, the Progressive Party, and an open constitutional conflict was unavoidable.

To carry on this conflict, the government needed at its head a man who would not hesitate to take upon himself the odium of defying the constitution and of championing the king's prerogative in the chamber regardless of all else. Such a man was found in Bismarck, "a young conservative," who had hitherto been employed chiefly in diplomatic positions, but who became the head of the ministry in the fall of 1862. This was an official declaration of war, so to speak, against the legislature; the "constitutional conflict" had begun.

The new minister-president was a typical representative of the *realpolitik* which had been developing among the younger generation of Prussian conservatives. To be sure, like every considerable personality, he was not merely an exponent of the prevailing views of his class; but in all essentials he did not differ from the political

views of his fellow Junkers which have been described in another connection. Like them, he believed that the people were incapable of looking out for their political interests themselves; like them, he had only a slight practical acquaintance with the political life of Western Europe; he had never stayed in England and he had been to France only on brief diplomatic missions; like them, also, in a struggle with intellectual forces, he knew no appeal but to force; he never knew rightly how to estimate the effect of compulsory state measures against the Catholic Church or the Socialists. With modern economic problems he was never really acquainted, and later he was never able to see the importance of modern colonial policy. On the whole, he was not a creative statesman, if one means by this a far-seeing political thinker who pushes aside all old forces in order to make place for a new structure capable of further development. He was more clever, more logical, more opportunist than the other Junkers of his class; but in his way of thinking he did not essentially differ from them.

It was, therefore, not surprising that Bismarck's appointment as minister-president was greeted with a storm of disapproval by all Liberals in Germany, and not the least by those who were friendly to Prussia, and hoped for the development of a new liberalism in this northern Power. This was all the more natural as no one could foresee at that time Bismarck's real importance; even those who regarded it as an illusion that it might be possible for "Prussia to merge in Germany,"—the illusion that the dominating classes in Prussia would make any renunciation for the sake of national ideals—and who were therefore inclined to see the only means for the unification of Germany in a participation of Prussian Conservatives in a war against Austria—even such persons could never have suspected what skill and diplomacy was possessed by the new Prussian minister-president. To be sure, Bismarck had already been active for a considerable time in the diplomatic service; but of what he had accomplished as ambassador naturally nothing was known to the public. And it was in the field of diplomacy that Bismarck's real strength or even genius lay. Provided with a clear knowledge of foreign relations which was almost infallible where it dealt with states which were politically akin to Prussia, like Russia and Austria, free from any exaggeration of his own power and the blindness of thinking himself invincible, free also from all scruples and especially from any fear of allying himself with revolutionary movements abroad, Bismarck proved himself to be a born artist in the management of foreign affairs. He had at his disposal all the means

provided by the old as well as the new diplomacy, where he was much less afraid of pursuing untrodden paths than in matters of domestic politics.

Bismarck, one may say, was so strongly imbued with the diplomatic way of looking at things, that he regarded the conflicts of parties and social classes as struggles for power which could only be solved by the use of force. Compromise and coöperation he regarded as impossible: one single authority must be supreme. He therefore rejected any attempt by way of compromise to persuade the Prussian House of Representatives to give a provisional assent to the military law, and instead resorted to the "gap theory." The Prussian constitution, he said, had a gap in it, because it made no provision for the case in which the crown and the legislature failed to come to an agreement in regard to the budget, and yet the machinery of government could not be left at a standstill; this gap must be filled out of the monarch's unlimited power; the king, therefore, had the right to expend monies even without the approval of the legislature. The conflict was thus narrowed down to the alternative whether the king or the legislature was to be the determining factor in Prussia.

The "constitutional conflict" followed. The House of Representatives refused, as before, to approve the government budget; whereupon Bismarck had the financial estimates voted by the House of Lords, and ignored the protests of the House of Representatives.

When the government no longer feared to set aside the constitution, it had won in the conflict, at least for the moment, because all agencies of power, such as the army and the administrative system, were in the hands of the government and enabled it to collect taxes without consent of parliament. All these powers were now used to the fullest extent. At elections the government set up official candidates; liberal-minded officials were forced to conform; liberty of the press was virtually done away with; liberal town mayors who had been elected were replaced by government commissioners; and the presentation of petitions was punished by fines.

At the same time that Bismarck was thus rendering the Progressives and popular majority ineffective in their opposition to the increase of the army, he was also making systematic diplomatic preparations for war against Austria. Such a war could only succeed for Prussia if it were certain that none of the European Great Powers would intervene. A war which would last a long time could scarcely turn out to the advantage of Prussia, in view of the numerical inferiority of the Prussian reserves and the financial weakness of the

country. The only possibility of ending it quickly lay in Prussia's having to deal with only a single Great Power, namely Austria. The international situation was already as favorable as possible; and it was taken advantage of by the Prussian minister-president with the greatest skill. England, since the Crimean War, scarcely counted any longer as a military Power; Bismarck was convinced, and moreover had tested his conviction in a harmless case, that Great Britain was unable to intervene with military force—that is, in the only way which would be effective. Russia, likewise, had been driven back by the Western Powers in the foolish dynastic war waged by Napoleon III and England in the Crimea; moreover, Bismarck had earned the gratitude of the Tsar by emphasizing the common interests of Prussia and Russia in the war against Polish independence, and had delivered over to the Russian authorities Polish rebels who fled to Prussia in 1863 (see p. 79). Under these circumstances it was the Emperor of the French who was the most dangerous possible opponent. The European balance of power which had existed hitherto would be seriously disturbed to the disadvantage of other Powers who remained in their old position, if one of the Great Powers, like Prussia, should enlarge its territory; and it was to be expected that Napoleon III would not consent to such an enlargement of Prussia unless he were promised compensations in favor of France, somewhat similar to the arrangement with Italy in 1860 (see p. 253). The Prussian government, therefore, had to appear to be not opposed in theory, at any rate, to some such arrangement for compensation, and had to give Napoleon III the impression that he could accomplish his aim without having to resort to arms. Bismarck carried on this tantalizing game with France in a masterly way; and he was supported in it by the unquestioned superiority at that time of the Prussian army administration, so far as concerned rapidity of mobilization. This made it extraordinarily difficult, from a military technical point of view, for Napoleon to intervene in a war between Prussia and Austria. Last among all these preparatory measures was the alliance with Italy, for whose support in war Bismarck held out the prospect of the acquisition of Venetia.

The first steps toward the territorial enlargement of Prussia and the triumph over Austria took place in 1863 in the first year after the outbreak of the constitutional conflict in Prussia: Prussia made an effort to acquire Schleswig-Holstein, which had hitherto been connected with Denmark, or at least the important harbor of Kiel; and also to test whether Great Britain would really dare to inter-

fere on the continent in behalf of the small Powers threatened by Prussia.

The formal occasion which caused the Danish War of 1864 arose from a complicated question in regard to rules of inheritance and constitutional law which need not be described here. It is sufficient to state that the provinces of Schleswig and Holstein, like Hanover formerly, had been under the rule of a foreign prince, the king of Denmark, and that Holstein, but not Schleswig, had hitherto belonged to the German Confederation. When Christian IX came to the throne of Denmark in 1863, a German prince, the Duke of Augustenburg, proclaimed himself as duke of Schleswig-Holstein under the name "Frederick VIII." The Frankfort Diet thereupon let Holstein be occupied by Saxon troops. Prussia and Austria also demanded that Schleswig be occupied and actually proceeded to occupation in spite of a decree to the contrary by the Diet and in spite of warnings from England. They knew that this would mean war with Denmark, but they let war take place in 1864. The war could only have turned out favorably for the much weaker forces of Denmark in case the Great Powers—especially England, which had promised her protection in a more or less binding way—should interfere in her favor against the two powerful German states. This possibility was not wholly out of the question, inasmuch as Prussia, lacking a navy, could not think of attacking Copenhagen or the Danish Islands, but had to limit her military operations to the Danish peninsula. Thus Denmark possessed a nucleus of impregnable territory, and could, if given assistance by the friendly Great Powers, prolong the war. But she received no such support; Great Britain, in view of her weak military organization, offered nothing but advice, which naturally made no impression upon Bismarck. So, after the Prussian-Austrian troops had quickly occupied the Danish peninsula, Denmark was soon compelled to make peace. The only fighting of great importance was the attack on the Düppel trenches in Schleswig, opposite the island of Alsen, on April 18, 1864. On October 30, 1864, Denmark ceded to Austria and Prussia her rights to the duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg.

The future fate of the duchies was not in any way fixed formally by this cession. Prussia, however, offered the prince of Augustenburg a choice merely between a half or a complete annexation of the territory to Prussia, being willing to recognize him as ruler over Schleswig-Holstein only in case he made Kiel into a Prussian naval station, signed with Prussia a military and naval agreement, and joined the *Zollverein*. The prince, in fact, almost accepted these

demands unconditionally, but Bismarck used certain arguments to get rid of him and the decision in regard to the two duchies then lay wholly in the hands of the two possessory powers which were in actual occupation—Prussia and Austria.

As to these two Powers, Prussia naturally wished to annex the duchies, but Austria opposed this. Austria, which could not annex these territories directly to herself, wanted them erected into an independent state as a member of the German Confederation. After a provisional division of the territories, by which Austria received Holstein in the south and Prussia Schleswig in the north, a struggle took place between the two populations in the duchies themselves, inasmuch as each Power stirred up an agitation in its own interests.

War was in danger of breaking out. But Moltke, the chief of the Prussian general staff, was of the correct opinion that Prussia, by herself, was too weak to wage war with Austria and that an alliance with Italy must first be sought. This accordingly was arranged: on April 8, 1866, Bismarck signed with Italy an offensive alliance against Austria to last three months; by this Italy hoped to acquire Venetia, and Prussia German lands of equal value. At the same time, both states began to arm, which led in turn to military preparations in Austria. The direct provocation to war finally came from Prussia who occupied Holstein and thereby broke her former provisional agreement with Austria. Austria thereupon demanded the mobilization of the army of the Confederation, and her demand was adopted by a small majority in the Diet. Prussia thus found herself at war with Austria and with the German Confederation on June 14, 1866.

However, not all the German states obeyed the vote of the Diet. Especially in North Germany almost all the little states held back, that is, they practically took Prussia's side and Prussia only had to deal with a coalition between Austria and the middle-sized German states.

The course of the war now showed for the first time what an advantage the Prussian army possessed owing to its more speedy mobilization and its more systematic preparation. It was able at the outset to carry the war into the enemy's territory and to attack Austria before she was really armed. In the war with the middle-sized German states it was also of advantage to Prussia that she carried on the war without regard for any one, while the states on the other side entered unwillingly into a German "civil war." Such a moral hesitation was also felt by a part of the population in Prussia, but owing to the pressure of the military system it was

unable to make itself effective. With the exception of Saxony, the middle-sized German states also refused to join their troops to those of Austria. The result of all this was that not even the defeat of the Italian army at Custozza could prevent the complete victory of the Prussian forces.

The decisive battle took place against the army of Austrians and Saxons. The Austrians were under the command of General Benedek and took a strong position in northern Bohemia. There they were attacked by the Prussians who had approached by three different lines of march, were numerically stronger, and, thanks to the needle gun, were better armed. After hard fighting, known as the battle of Sadowa or Königgrätz, on July 3, 1866, the Austrians were routed. Their defeat amounted to a catastrophe. The only Austrian army able to fight was destroyed and the road to Vienna lay open to the Prussians. Not only a military collapse but the fall of the monarchy itself was threatened, since Bismarck had established relations at the beginning of the war with the Hungarian insurgents who had revolted against Austria in 1849, and since he now invited the Czechs also to revolt from Vienna after he had occupied their territory.

From the German Confederation Austria could expect no help, because in Germany Prussia's advance had been equally successful. The battle with the Hanoverians at Langensalza on June 27 had turned out indeed to the advantage of the Hanoverians; but in view of the numerical superiority of the Prussian forces, the Guelf army had to capitulate soon afterwards, on June 29. After the battle of Sadowa Prussian troops marched into Bavaria as far as Würzburg and Nuremberg. Nassau was occupied, and also the Free City of Frankfort, which had to pay a large war contribution of 25,000,000 gulden. The army of the Confederation was also defeated, and the Diet of the Confederation, which had moved to Augsburg, was disbanded.

As a result Austria was ready to sign an early peace, and asked the French emperor for his mediation. It was offered at once; but Napoleon III, who was not in a position to support his intervention and desires by force of arms, merely secured a success in a few superficial formalities. On the whole, Bismarck succeeded in carrying through completely all of his wishes, although not exactly those desired by the war party and the king. Bismarck wished to make it easy for Austria to sign peace quickly, so that the Great Powers, France and Russia, would have no time to intervene. Preliminaries of peace, therefore, were signed at Nikolsburg on July 26, before the

Prussian government was officially informed of the Russian proposal to call a congress or of the French request for compensation.

In these preliminaries of peace with Austria, Prussia secured all the demands for which she had been struggling against Austria since 1848. Austria withdrew from the German Confederation, which was now dissolved, and gave her consent to the founding of a northern and a southern federation; this meant that she handed Germany over to Prussia's leadership. Austria also ceded to Prussia all her claims to Schleswig-Holstein, and gave her assent to Prussia's annexations in North Germany consisting of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, Frankfort, and some slight districts of Hesse-Darmstadt and Bavaria; but she succeeded in preserving from seizure the territory of her only wholly loyal ally, namely Saxony. Austria herself lost only Venetia, which was ceded to Italy. Furthermore, considerable war contributions were levied upon the German states.

The final peace between Austria and Prussia, which was signed soon afterwards at Prague, on August 23, 1866, virtually confirmed these conditions without change. The demands for compensation which Napoleon III had made in the meanwhile were not directly refused by Bismarck but merely treated in a dilatory fashion and then finally ignored; Napoleon III had wanted some compensation in territories on the left bank of the Rhine or in Belgium. Bismarck yielded to the French Emperor on only two points in the treaty, both of which were polite but valueless gestures: one of these was the article which assured an "international independent existence" to the South German Confederation which was to be established; the other promised that the northern districts of Schleswig should be united with Denmark if they should express their wish to this effect in a plébiscite.

The first provision was valueless because no South German Confederation was actually established; it could not take place because Prussia had already in August, 1866, signed a secret "offensive and defensive alliance" with the South German states; this was published in 1867, and in case of war placed the full war strength of the South German states at the disposal of Prussia and even under the supreme command of the King of Prussia. This offensive and defensive alliance between the South German princes and Prussia meant that the South German states were put under Prussian military leadership. The other valueless provision, which was contained in Article V of the Peace of Prague and which promised a popular vote in Schleswig, was never carried out; it was probably regarded from the outset merely as decorative, judging by the fact

that the "northern districts" spoken of in the text were nowhere in the treaty precisely defined geographically. Moreover, such a plébiscite would have been in direct contrast to the procedure followed by Prussia in annexing her other new territories: all her annexations were made merely on the basis of the right of the victor, and often in pronounced opposition to the wishes of the population. In many of the newly-won territories this procedure of Prussia's gave rise at once to a party of systematic opposition.

This was at first a matter of domestic German concern, but in 1871 it led to an international conflict which has been of extraordinary importance up to the present. It is therefore necessary, at this point, to add a few observations of a general nature in regard to this controversy which has often been only half thought through.

The problem in fact is not so simple as the supporters of the Prussian theory have often thought. It is beyond doubt that the procedure which Prussia followed in annexing Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, and the other territories was in itself nothing new; it was in accordance with principles which have been practiced by states since the most ancient times, and in fact was applied without concern by all the states in 1815. But historic parallels only carry complete conviction when the comparison goes deeper than a consideration of mere rough superficial points. The transfer of one country to another by annexation meant something quite different in the nineteenth century from what it had meant in former times, and was in much sharper contradiction with general political conceptions then than formerly.

Let us take the last point first. It is clear that in an age when subjects are permitted to have a say in regard to the introduction of the new taxes, new laws, and so forth, the idea of handing them over to a foreign state without consulting them appears much more objectionable than in earlier ages when the modern conception of political rights was unknown. Furthermore, one might suppose that the theory of plébiscites, thanks to its frequent application in Italy and France, might have become a part of European constitutional law. Whoever sinned against it was introducing again a procedure which had come to be regarded as out of date.

But more important, perhaps, is another point. In former centuries the transfer of one state to another had usually interfered very little with the life of the individual. In many cases this change has simply meant that the local authorities who had hitherto held power were dismissed and their rights transferred to new officials. Economic conditions and legal relationships remained unchanged.

What difference did it make to a peasant if a town incorporated the territory of his feudal lord? The services and payments which he had to make were in no way altered. It should be remembered that usually there was not even freedom of trade between the different territories which were gradually brought together under a common ruler; in most cases the old tariff laws remained in force so that there was no change in the daily life of the individual. The conditions which existed in Alsace before the French Revolution are known to every one, but it is less well known that these conditions were by no means at all exceptional.

But what a contrast this affords to the consequences which resulted from annexations in the nineteenth century! Even here, in various fields such as that of religion and law, it was possible for the annexed provinces to keep a part of the old arrangements. But, on the other hand, incorporation in a new territory meant for the individual personal burdens and duties, which made it seem natural that he ought to be asked to give his approval to this change as well as to other important innovations. Among these one need be reminded only of universal military service, which was at once put into practice by Prussia in all her new territories. This had the result that a population, which had perhaps been annexed against its will, not only had to endure the new situation, but even had to defend it with its own blood. Whatever one may believe in theory as to plébiscites, it can scarcely be denied that there was something altogether new in this application of the right of the victor and that, though it can perhaps be defended on its own merits, it cannot be justified by an appeal to the practices of earlier ages.

The undesirability of this return to the earlier method of making annexations was increased by the fact that the state which was doing it was not offering to its new subjects even a liberal parliamentary form of government. The opposition of the Progressives in Prussia had not only proved itself ineffective, but it had dealt a blow to liberal principles for a long time to come in the judgment of the public. The splendid military victories and the large conquests which Prussia had won were made possible only by the fact that the government had disregarded the constitution and ignored the right of the legislature to approve the budget. It was not the House of Representatives, but the members of the Junker party, who had been proved to be right by the outcome of later events. This did not mean, necessarily, that the old ideals of Liberalism needed to be completely buried; it must still be the task of the Liberals, as before, to strive for internal political reforms and reduce the administrative

authority of the large landowners in favor of the civilian bureaucracy, but the Liberals must not carry their opposition to the point of opposing the government's military demands or its leadership in foreign affairs; such an opposition would be as useless as unpatriotic.

There was the further consideration that, after the events of 1866, friends of the unification of Germany were unable to accomplish their purpose except by adhering unconditionally to Prussia and Prussian policy. All plans for making a real federal state in Germany, or for having "Prussia merge itself in Germany," had proved abortive; all attempts at securing a reform of the German Confederation in any peaceful manner had failed. The only solution possible was by force of arms and with the aid of the authorities who dominated Prussia. Therefore even the capitalistic circles, who were interested in national unification in economic matters but who had hitherto opposed the preponderant influence of the large landowners, began to swing away from the Liberal Opposition and form a new party known as the National Liberals—a group of voters who on internal questions still held fast to their liberal principles but who in foreign affairs unconditionally supported the government. This party now acquired a majority in the House of Representatives in Prussia. The Progressive Party, on the other hand, was now largely deserted by the voters who naturally could only make their influence felt so far as was possible under the plutocratic "three-class system of voting."

An outward expression of this party change was seen on September 3, 1866, after the war with Austria and the German Confederation, when the Prussian House of Representatives formally voted, by the large majority of 230 to 75, an indemnity for the disregard of the constitution. This was the first time that the National Liberals separated from the Progressives.

The vote was perhaps inevitable; but it had wide-reaching consequences, both for Prussian politics and for German politics in general, which its advocates perhaps did not expect. The fact that the Liberals had abandoned their opposition to the military policy of the government in a state which was completely founded on a military basis and which had almost no need of a parliament except to approve military expenditures meant that the Liberals had put out of their hands the only weapon with which they could exercise a pressure on the government. The king had expressly declared that his procedure during the constitutional conflict had been an unavoidable necessity and that in similar circumstances he would

again always act as he had done. If the Liberals approved this conception of the constitution they condemned themselves henceforth to impotency. This is naturally not the place to discuss the question whether the absolutist system represented by the king, or whether a parliamentary system, was more advantageous from the Prussian standpoint. It is only necessary to make clear the point that from this moment Liberalism was henceforth dead as a decisive factor in Prussia and in Germany. The government might make use of it for its own purposes when it wanted to make a breach in the privileges of the nobility and the clergy in the interests of the government; but Liberalism was never able again to develop an effective initiative of its own. Likewise, a parliamentary career was no longer a thing to be thought of. The bureaucracy, whose prerogatives and privileges were protected by the government, formed a solid front; even if a Liberal were admitted to the ministry he did not have the power to carry out his wishes. Naturally, this then had the further consequence that gifted young men, who in other countries went into politics, in Prussia and later in Germany sought out other careers, preferring to devote their lives to the growing commercial, industrial, or banking opportunities rather than to the profession of politics. This change did not come at once; even after 1866 the illusion still prevailed for a while that in spite of all this the ideals of the Liberals might find expression in internal politics—that there would be a *"freisinnige Verwaltung,"* a "liberal and open-minded administration," as it was stated in the National Liberal party platform; and the competition from the professions, just mentioned, was not so strong at first. But the more this illusion vanished and the greater the opportunities became in trade and manufacturing, the more this development became accentuated.

After Prussia had destroyed all the middle-sized states in North Germany which had opposed her in the War of 1866, nothing stood in the way any longer of a union of the other states in a federation dominated by Prussia. The new constitution for this was drawn up in such a way that the Prussian system of government was transferred to all North Germany. The North German Federation of 1867 was essentially nothing more than an enlarged Prussia. Prussia received the presidency in the Federation and appointed at will the Federal Chancellor. The creation of a Federal Cabinet with a parliamentary system of government was expressly rejected. Prussia, as Federal President, was given the military and diplomatic powers, including the right to declare war; the king of Prussia was federal commander-in-chief and appointed the ambassadors. The army was

placed completely under Prussia's authority. All laws had to receive the approval of the king of Prussia. The Reichstag, as the federal parliament was called, had merely the right, as in Prussia, to vote the budget and new laws. Above it was the Federal Council (*Bundesrat*), in which the state governments were represented, but in which Prussia possessed seventeen votes of a total of forty-three, so that no change in the constitution was possible without her consent, as a two-thirds majority was necessary. The only respect in which the Federation differed from the Prussian system was that in elections to the Reichstag universal suffrage was introduced. By this Bismarck hoped to play off the masses of the people against the opposition of the particularist conservative circles in the annexed provinces, especially in Hanover, where the nobility supported the "Guelfs." On the other hand, there arose at the outset a number of "protesting" representatives in the Reichstag who protested on principle against their districts being joined to Prussia. These "Irreconcilables" were made up of Hanoverians, Danes, and Poles (who after the dissolution of the German Confederation now for the first time really belonged to Germany).

Beside military and diplomatic matters, the central government in the main was given control only over such matters as had to do with commerce and communications, i.e., with public utilities, whose diversity and decentralization had been most severely criticized by those interested in industry and trade; thus, tariff, postal, and coinage matters were dealt with by the federal government. In general, on the other hand, existing political institutions, like the state legislatures, were left in existence; however, the rights of the individual states as opposed to those of the federal government were not really defined, so that it was not impossible that the authority and activity of the Federation might be extended later. The army was organized on the Prussian model in every respect, and the training of the troops was put in the hands of Prussian officers. The flag adopted was based on the Prussian black-and-white flag by adding to it a strip of red.

If ever the much-abused phrase "transition stage" is applicable, it was applicable in this case: no one had any doubt that the North German Federation was merely a provisional arrangement. Within Germany its relation to the South German States was regulated only in a very primitive form by the military treaties of 1866; outside Germany the question of the compensation which France was to receive on account of Prussia's enlargement was still undetermined. The most natural solution appeared to be to settle both questions at

the same time by a war with France, which would both put an end to the possibility of any cessions of territory to the French and also lead to the complete adhesion of South Germany to the North German Federation dominated by Prussia.

This appeared to be all the more necessary, because feeling in the South had by no means been inclined to submit to Prussia. In the "tariff parliament," which was made up of deputies from the South sitting with members of the Reichstag and which had to adapt the *Zollverein* to the new political conditions, a feeling of hostility to Prussia had prevailed among the representatives of the South. In Würtemberg and Bavaria the antagonism to the Prussian military system had been very marked, and there had even been a movement for cutting down the army expenditures and for the introduction of the Swiss militia system. In the North, also, there was no little discontent with the new military burdens which had resulted in an increase of the taxes hitherto unknown. Even the landlords began to realize the disadvantages of great armaments. All these complaints might be overcome by a victorious and profitable war.

On the other side, the French government was also interested in war. Although Napoleon III was not at all a conqueror by nature and the prospect of a few small extensions of French territory would not under any circumstances be worth the cost of a war—although France, therefore, had much less to expect from a successful military struggle than had Prussia—nevertheless, to a system of government which was so dependent upon prestige as was France at that time, a war seemed necessary if she was to retain her preponderant position among the European Powers, or even if she was to preserve the European balance of power. This French feeling gained strength from Austria's policy at that time. The Hapsburg Empire naturally did not regard its expulsion from Germany as final; though it had been compelled to yield in 1866 to a coalition of Prussia and Italy, there was the possibility that an alliance with France, and possibly with Italy also, might undo what had been done. But all these plans could only succeed in case France kept her military equipment at least on a par with that of Prussia; and Austria would not consent to a regular alliance with France because Italy, owing to the French support of papal rule in Rome, refused to ally with France.

Whatever one may think of this policy of the French, it was most unpardonable from their own point of view that Napoleon III's government did not develop its military equipment in proportion to its political ambitions. All French calculations were senseless unless the French army could make a stand against that of Prussia. Now

in this matter the French military circles were under a complete illusion. To be sure, the arguments showing a superiority of the French army were not all incorrect. French generals possessed a practical experience which could not be matched by their opponents; French infantry which had been trained in actual war, was undoubtedly superior to that of Germany in quality; and part of the French artillery was more modern than that of Prussia. France could also bring forward a navy to which her enemy had practically nothing to oppose. On the other hand, the French military leaders had nothing to equal the methodical, "scientific," preparation for war in Prussia. The French system of mobilization, advance to the frontier, and independent action of individual generals by "improvisation" was not so scandalously bad as was often asserted afterwards; it was simply the military system of the old school, and with it the French had fought a series of brilliant victories, not only in their colonies, where victory was to be expected, but also in the wars with the Austrians in Italy. But against Prussian methods it was thoroughly antiquated. The thing which was almost inconceivably careless was that the French army administration, which had witnessed the events of 1866, was blind to the innovations in the Prussian system of conducting war. A Prussian field-marshal, Prince Frederick Charles, who had taken a leading part in the war of 1866, had remarked in regard to this campaign, "We have no battle generals. . . . It is our military organization, and not the genius or talent of any leader, which has given us victory in 1864 and 1866." Even if one does not regard this remark as literally true, it is, nevertheless, beyond question that it was the "organization" which was chiefly responsible for the victories in those years, because it was possible for Prussia, by means of her quicker mobilization, to begin the attack before the enemy was really prepared for war. It should have been the duty of the French military experts to draw their conclusions from these facts and to modernize the French military organization in the same fashion, or else to have avoided altogether a war for which France was inadequately prepared.

As is well known, the opposite happened. To what extent personal reasons, like the sickness of Napoleon III who took chief command, were to blame for this is uncertain. But it is a fact that only a few civilians, like Thiers, recognized, to some extent, how little the French army was in a position to undertake war with Prussia.

Again one must admire the diplomatic skill with which Bismarck

directed Prussian policy before the war. Prussia had a greater interest in the war than France, and the desire for it was certainly as strong in Berlin as in Paris. But Bismarck nevertheless understood how to make public opinion think that France was really responsible for the war. From a practical point of view this was of the greatest importance. This would not only have a quieting effect on the other Great Powers, who would have been inclined to regard Prussia as the disturber of the peace of Europe in view of the recent wars; but it would be also of decisive importance in securing the adhesion of South Germany. To be sure, the South German states, under any circumstances, were obligated by treaty to take part in the war. But the carrying out of this obligation would be made considerably easier if the war could be represented as an act of self-defense on Germany's part. It was at this point that France made one of her greatest blunders. Frenchmen were aware only that the population in South Germany had a feeling of strong antagonism toward Prussia; they were blind to the fact that the feeling of hatred toward France, which had been long nourished, was much stronger than the antipathy toward Prussia, and that this feeling was bound to become stronger the more Germany was regarded as the party which was attacked.

The course of events was briefly as follows. After the negotiations to compensate France for Prussia's enlargement had had no success, there arose, in 1870, the incident of the Hohenzollern Candidacy. A revolution had broken out in Spain in 1868, and the Spanish government thought of electing Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern as king. Bismarck favored this plan for the advancement of one of the King of Prussia's relatives. But in France objection was taken to this "disturbance of the European balance of power," and France made a threatening declaration. The candidacy of Prince Leopold was thereupon withdrawn by the Prince's father. The incident seemed closed, but the French government, in order to gain the prestige of a diplomatic victory, went further and requested from King William I a definite promise that he would never in the future permit the candidacy of a Hohenzollern prince for the throne of Spain. The king refused to make this promise and declined to receive again the French ambassador, Benedetti.

This matter would scarcely have had any further importance if Bismarck had not immediately published it through the newspapers to the whole world. This announcement of the affront which was supposed to have been given to the French ambassador on July 13,

1870, at Ems, where the King of Prussia was staying for his health, was calculated as a blow to the French policy of winning prestige, without exactly provoking France to war.

The blow had the effect which Bismarck apparently had expected. The French cabinet informed the legislature of the events at Ems and of Prussia's official notification to the cabinets of Europe of King William's refusal to Benedetti. The French Legislative Assembly and Senate were overwhelmingly in agreement with the French ministry that no further attempt at conciliation ought to be made, and voted the credits for the army and navy; in the small minority who spoke against a declaration of war were Thiers and Gambetta. As great, if not greater, was the enthusiasm for war in Germany. Even in South Germany all opposition collapsed and mobilization began everywhere. Finally, on July 19, 1870, the French issued a declaration of war—but only against Prussia.

For the outcome of the war much the same factors were decisive as in 1866. The German troops advanced according to a well-prepared plan and were able to attack with their full strength before the French could send more than a few regiments to the frontier. From the outset, therefore, the French had to fight on the defensive and await the enemy in their own territory. How much they suffered from their antiquated methods, especially from their defective intelligence department and the wholly inadequate connection between the different army corps, has already been suggested. It must also not be forgotten that domestic politics complicated the situation. Now was seen the tragic result of the fact that the Napoleonic régime, although it had just been modified in the direction of liberalism, still rested essentially on prestige. The government did not dare to recall its troops in time from the frontier after it recognized the superiority of Prussia's preparation. It was afraid that such an admission of its own weakness would lead to the overthrow of the dynasty; it thus lost the only opportunity which it might have had to adapt its antiquated organization to some extent at least to the enemy's advance in a way which might possibly have lengthened the war and made foreign intervention possible.

So the war was decided in an unbelievably short time. After the first skirmishes on August 2, the Germans attacked two French armies on August 4-6 and drove them back, the Alsatian army, being driven back to Châlons after battles at Weissenburg, Wörth, and Fröschweiler, and the second army on the Rhine under Napoleon being forced to retreat to Metz after the Germans had stormed the heights of Spichern. As a result of this, within scarcely four days,

foreign countries regarded France's cause as lost; Italy, which had hitherto been hesitating, signed a treaty with England in which both states pledged themselves to neutrality; Great Britain had already declared her own neutrality on July 19. Russia, from the beginning, had adopted a benevolent attitude toward Germany and threatened to intervene against Austria in case Austria should support France. In Paris the Ollivier ministry, which had declared war, was overthrown.

Less successful for the Germans were the later battles. The bloodiest ones of the war, Borny on August 14, Mars-la-Tour on August 17, and Gravelotte and St. Privat on August 18, may even be regarded as defensive successes for the French. But from a strategic point of view, victory remained with the Prussians. The best French army under Bazaine was cut off from its line of retreat to the west and had to retire into Metz, where it was shut in by the Germans and rendered immobile. Napoleon III himself, however, managed to escape in time to Verdun.

Out of the remnants of MacMahon's army, which had been driven out of Alsace, together with auxiliary troops of inferior quality, the French now formed a new army which was to relieve Bazaine from the north. It was only very unwillingly that MacMahon undertook the task, because he well knew how little was to be expected from his improvised army; but the minister of war had warned him that Napoleon's retreat to Paris would result in the outbreak of revolution. So MacMahon began to advance. But his worst fears were more than fulfilled. The Germans succeeded in shutting him in at Sedan; in spite of furious attacks the French were unable to free themselves. So on September 2, 1870, the French army, including Napoleon III, had to surrender.

This practically decided the war. France no longer had any trained army and only an inadequate equipment in artillery, and therefore had to buy arms abroad—in England. France, however, did not give her cause up for lost, and maintained a heroic resistance. Her armies accomplished deeds which, in view of the unfavorable conditions, can only be regarded as marvelous. But regarded from a military point of view, the continuation of the war was hopeless from the outset.

In spite of the haste with which new armies had been created and all men between the ages of twenty and forty-one recruited, it was impossible for the French to make use of the relatively favorable position in which they found themselves directly after Sedan. The situation was more favorable for the French then

than later, inasmuch as a great part of the German troops were still detained in front of the unconquered French fortresses. While two German armies marched toward Paris after Sedan, the third German army was occupied with the siege of Metz, and considerable German contingents were also held in front of the other French fortresses like Strasbourg. Strasbourg did not surrender till September 27; and Bazaine, in Metz, did not capitulate until October 27, when compelled by hunger. The new French armies, however, were not able to begin operations until October, and even then, in the judgment of competent French officers, their training had been inadequate. Their attacks, which lasted from October, 1870, to January, 1871, were therefore without success; an eastern army under Bourbaki, which was to have advanced from the Free County of Burgundy and cut off the communications of the Germans, was forced, on February 1, 1871, to retreat behind the Swiss frontier. Paris, which had been bombarded since December 27, had to surrender on January 24, on account of lack of food, after all attempts to relieve it had failed.

The hopelessness of the French situation made any active intervention by foreign Powers impossible. After Napoleon had been taken prisoner, a Republic was proclaimed in Paris and the other cities, and a Government of National Defense was formed on September 4, 1870; its most important member was Gambetta, a leader of the Liberal Opposition under Napoleon III. It had been hoped that the proclamation of a Republic would result in a speedier peace; Prussian official proclamations had emphasized the fact that Germany was not making war upon the French people but only upon the Emperor, Napoleon. But the French insisted, as a condition of peace, that they should not cede any territory. Bismarck, however, demanded an extraordinarily large indemnity and the cession of Alsace; these conditions, as well as the difficulty of provisioning Paris which was being besieged, caused all the negotiations to fail; not even an armistice was signed. The French, furthermore, received no support from abroad, in spite of the fact that in many countries sympathy which had at first been against France had swung over to her side. Only volunteers, like Garibaldi who wished to express his gratitude for French assistance in the Italian War of Liberation, hastened to the aid of France; but all foreign governments kept out of the war which they regarded as hopeless. Russia took advantage of the war to annul, on her own authority and as her compensation for Prussia's increase in power, the limitations which had been imposed upon her after the Crimean War: on October 31,

1870, she claimed again complete political liberty in the Black Sea (see p. 219). So France was left to face victorious Germany unaided, and after her military efforts had proved unsuccessful she had to accept virtually all the conditions which were imposed upon her by the Prussian government; the only point in which she did not have to yield was the giving up of Belfort.

Preliminaries of peace were signed at Versailles on February 26, 1871, and were identical, in the main, with the final treaty of peace signed at Frankfort on May 10. The most important provisions were the cession of all of Alsace and a part of Lorraine, the payment of five billion francs as a war indemnity, and the obligation on the part of both France and Germany to give each other the most-favored-nation treatment in tariff matters.

Before the importance of this treaty is analyzed more closely mention must be made of the change which took place in the character of one of the signatories. The war which all Germans had waged together successfully side by side made it possible to reach quickly the result at which weary negotiations had been aiming shortly before: the South German states declared their adhesion to Prussia's North German Federation. The extension of the Federation took place in the form of treaties with the individual states: Württemberg and Bavaria had to be allowed to retain considerable rights, such as special military privileges, indirect taxes, and postal and telegraph systems of their own. Shortly before the last and relatively strongest South German state—Bavaria—expressed its approval by legislative vote to these innovations, on January 21, 1871, an official proclamation had been made of the new name which was to be given to the Federation: on January 18, in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, the "German Empire" had been solemnly proclaimed in place of the North German Federation, and the king of Prussia had been raised to "German Emperor." This meant that the national unity of Germany could be regarded as accomplished, and that she might claim the position of a Great Power which people had come to think of as being connected with the former Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. Otherwise, no essential changes were made in the Constitution of the North German Federation; in spite of various concessions of a formal nature, all the real prerogatives remained in the hands of the Prussian king who was now German emperor. Equally important was the fact that the constitutions of the individual states were left unchanged, so that Prussia with its dominating influence retained as before its House of Representatives chosen by "the three-class system," its

House of Lords, and its ministry which was independent of the legislature; the result of this was to exclude any possibility of a transformation of the imperial constitution in the direction of liberalism.

The treaty of peace itself was in its content not very different from the treaties of 1866, but it had far wider consequences, because it struck at international relations and involved a change not merely in Germany, but in the whole continent of Europe. The question of the self-determination of peoples was renewed in a new and a very much sharper form than in 1866; while in 1866 Prussia had annexed only territories which had already belonged to the German Confederation and in which a part of the population, at least, favored the new régime, in the case of Alsace-Lorraine an integral part of a foreign country was annexed against the general wish of its inhabitants and against the solemn protests of its official representatives, both in the French National Assembly at Bordeaux and in the Reichstag of Berlin. To be sure, Thiers, France's representative at the peace negotiations, had been able to secure a provision by which individual Alsatians might "opt" or choose in favor of France. But this provision of the peace treaty was interpreted in such a way by the German administration in 1872 that every Alsatian who "opted" for France had to leave the country; he was thus made to choose simply between accepting German citizenship and exile. Furthermore, in the case of the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, the annexed peoples were not joined to a country which gave the citizens political rights similar to what they had already possessed, as was done, for instance, for the Hanoverians who became Prussian citizens; on the contrary, they became part of a state which gave its members a much smaller share in the government and administration than had been the case in France at any time since the Revolution. The Alsatians, also, did not even acquire the right of local autonomy which was enjoyed by the citizens of the other states of the Empire, like Baden, but were made into an "Imperial Territory" (*Reichsland*) and were mainly ruled from Berlin by means of a governor-general. Finally, a considerable part of the Imperial Territory did not even form part of Germany from a nationalist point of view, inasmuch as the population spoke French —but in practice this was the least important point. So it came about, as calm statesmen outside Prussia had already foreseen in 1871, that an "Alsatian question" developed, which was not merely a local dispute, but was an international conflict which was important as a matter of principle; the Alsatian desire for liberty, or at

least for autonomy, coincided with the French desire for a restoration of the old frontiers, and both together proclaimed to all the world the contrast between the conception of the State which was held in Germany and that which was held by the Western Powers.

In still another respect the Treaty of Frankfort had an importance which extended far beyond the special case which the treaty dealt with. This was the provision in regard to the so-called war indemnity; I say "so-called," because the five billion francs which France had to pay to victorious Germany covered much more than the mere costs of the war. By making this war indemnity an unheard-of amount according to the conception of those days, Bismarck had intended so to weaken France that she would lose her position as a Great Power; he wanted to make her "impotent to make alliances." On the other hand, he intended that the war should appear as a profitable affair for the German Empire, the German states, and the German military leaders and statesmen who had conducted the war. Only a part of the money was used to cover the costs of the war. A considerable remainder was devoted to building up the imperial navy, to the construction of a new Reichstag building, to the postoffice administration, and so forth; and also to large gifts, totaling fifteen million francs, to Bismarck, Moltke, Roon, and the others. Thus, the poorer state had acquired by war the means for developing its power and its transportation system through the help given it by the enemy—a circumstance which psychologically was of enormous importance in the estimation in which war was held.

This side of the indemnity payment must be emphasized all the more, because Bismarck was not at all successful in the political calculation which we have just mentioned. It soon became clear how superficial it is to judge the wealth of a country according to unessential things like density of population, the balance of trade, military success, and so forth. The natural wealth of the country, the wise limitation in the increase of population, a general frugality and industriousness, which result from the prevalence of small peasant proprietors and from a relatively small proportion of industrial proletarians in the whole population, a disinclination for speculation, and a preference for safe investments, which is also a result of stable population conditions—all these things made it possible for the French to pay the five billions within an unbelievably short period, namely, by September 5, 1873. The Germans, therefore, had to evacuate the French territories, which they had occupied as a guarantee, much earlier than Bismarck really wished.

In addition to these changes, which are directly connected with the treaty of peace itself, the outcome of the Franco-Prussian War also modified Europe fundamentally in other respects, only the most important of which can be touched upon here.

In the first place, the Prussian system was so far adopted over the whole continent that universal military service was introduced everywhere. The burdens of militarism increased enormously: armies grew to a size, which even aside from the increase of population, would have been regarded as unthinkable at an earlier time; the so-called peace strength was now often as large as what had been the war strength formerly. The system of borrowing money for unproductive purposes now became general for the first time. What had formerly been regarded as exceptional in ordinary times and as normal only in time of war now became the rule and a matter of course: this was the borrowing of money for sterile military expenditures which would have to be paid back by posterity, a practice which was made inevitable by the enormously increased costs of "an armed peace"; this also involved similar practices in other branches of the budget. Furthermore, the number of citizens who were withdrawn from economically productive work increased disproportionately, for it was not possible any longer to fill up the army ranks by improvisation. The bonds between the individual and the State were drawn much closer; the State was compelled to give a much more careful attention than formerly to the development of the individual than had hitherto been the case anywhere outside of Prussia. Language and school questions which had been regarded as important only by small circles were now dealt with by governments as matters of prime importance in which the State must take a hand. The question of the language to be used for command in the army, for example, had hitherto been merely an internal military question in cases where there was a mixed population; now it became a national problem. The heavy personal obligation which universal military service laid upon every individual was in itself a regular training in national exclusiveness; whoever dedicated his life in this way to his country believed that he had a right to lay claim to special advantages from foreigners. A severe blow was given to the idea of "world citizenship" (*Weltburgertum*), that is, the enjoyment of a larger citizenship and freedom beyond the limits of one's own state.

This increase of armies and this extension of military obligations over the whole population, however, made people regard war much more seriously than heretofore. For the individual, as for the state,

the stakes of war became indescribably greater—for the individual because wars were no longer fought by professional soldiers, and for the state because the normal state revenues no longer sufficed to cover even the military expenditures in time of peace, to say nothing of their inadequacy for a long war. The Franco-Prussian War was followed, therefore, by relatively longer periods of peace among the Great European Powers. The only wars which took place were colonial wars, or wars like the Russo-Turkish War and the Spanish-American War, which could be conducted by Great Powers with a part of their military resources and were not really vital struggles for the very existence of the country. It was natural that the country which had been able to avoid the introduction of universal military service, owing to its insular position, was easily able to concentrate all its resources upon colonial wars of this kind; and it is also easy to understand why the British Empire, being behind the other Great Powers in military matters, as a result of this transformation in Europe in which it did not take part, was especially interested in the maintenance of peace on the Continent and always sought by peaceful means as far as possible to come to an understanding with Powers with whom its colonial aims came into conflict.

But just because a war between two or more European Great Powers on the Continent could turn out favorably for the victor, only in case the war was a short one, it was of the highest consequence that the two wars to which Prussia owed her leading position in Europe had come to an end so quickly and smoothly. People were too often inclined to draw the conclusion from this that the same thing would always happen in the future; people calculated, not only upon certain victory, but also upon the possibility, which was very unlikely, that a new war could be made to more than cover its costs as was the case in 1870. It would lead us too far afield to indicate in detail the false conclusions on which these calculations rested. But two points may be mentioned. The first is that the numerical advantage which Prussia had formerly derived from her system of universal military service was now equalized to the extent that other states placed their whole population under arms in the same way. Furthermore, the art of rapid mobilization was easily copied in other states to such a point that there could never be in the first days of a war such unequal combats as took place in 1866 and 1870. In the second place, the two wars just mentioned were altogether exceptional in the fact that in both cases the party which had naval superiority had not been able to make any use of this superiority: Austria had not been able to counteract her defeat

at Sadowa by her naval victory at Lissa; and the French navy had not been able to make its superiority effective against Prussia, because the war had been practically decided in the first month; the navy remained virtually intact. According to an old but by no means praiseworthy habit, people were inclined to draw conclusions from recent experiences alone, and to overlook former wars, like the Napoleonic wars and the War of Secession in America, both of which were decided in good part by the superiority which one side had upon the sea.

Of the further consequences of the Franco-Prussian War, only one more can be mentioned—the effect on the new position of affairs in Eastern Europe.

Without attempting to decide whether it is true that Austria desired the War of 1870, the historian may at least maintain with certainty that it was this German victory over France which first definitely destroyed all Austria's plans for winning back again in any way her position within Germany. The two German Powers which had been rivals now became allies. The result of this was that Austria, which never contemplated an overseas colonial policy, now directed her expansionist plans exclusively toward the East,—toward the Balkans. Her conflict with Russia, which had already existed for a long time in a mild form, now became acute, and dominated the whole policy of Eastern Europe and in many respects also that of Central Europe. From being a Conservative Power, Austria had become an aggressive one; and, though the Franco-Prussian War may have resulted in outwardly peaceful conditions for a few decades in Western Europe, in Eastern Europe it had caused a condition of latent war which ultimately resulted in a complete new grouping of the European Powers.

BOOK V

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

CHAPTER XXVIII

NEW ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

From a theoretical point of view there was nothing new in the economic conditions which were created in the last quarter of the nineteenth century by the economic organization of industry on a world basis; by this is meant not merely the exchange of goods between nations, but above all things the dependence of the most important European nations upon food and raw materials imported from overseas. These economic conditions merely brought to a logical close, one may say, the development which had begun in England at the close of the eighteenth century in connection with the Industrial Revolution. But already the very extension of this movement had given it an altogether changed significance. It also became involved with other tendencies which still further changed its character. In the following pages these changes will be briefly outlined.

The extraordinary increase in population, which in its modern proportions occurred at first only in the industrial centers of Great Britain, now not only took place in similar proportions in other equally industrialized countries; but in these the ratio of population to agricultural land and to food-supply was relatively more serious, because the existing population was greater to begin with. Population increased to an extent unparalleled in the history of the world (with the exception of countries whose population was increased by immigration). In Great Britain, in 1800, there were 16,200,000 persons; in 1900, 41,600,000. The figures for the other countries in 1800 and in 1900 run as follows: Germany, 21 and 56.3 million; Italy, 18.1 and 32.4; Austria-Hungary, 23.1 and 45.4; European Russia, 38.8 and 111.3 million. The total population of Europe in 1800 has been estimated at 180 million; in 1910 it numbered 450 million; that is, in 110 years it had multiplied just two and a half times.

These figures, however, can be rightly appreciated only when considered in connection with the enormous settlements of population in regions outside Europe. The increase in Europe was not only accompanied, it was in fact only made possible, by a great emigration into pretty nearly every corner of the world fit for habitation

by whites. It was this emigration which helped to swell the population of the United States from 5.3 million in 1800 to 77.1 million in 1900. The increase of population in Europe was in fact conditioned upon this emigration, because it was only by the productivity of the whites in these thinly settled regions outside Europe that there could be supplied the food which Europe more and more needed. Now toward the end of the nineteenth century came the first symptom indicating that this temporary situation might possibly come to an end before long. In the United States not only was the vacant land largely occupied, but the former surplus of products, particularly of wheat, was needed to feed the population at home. There were, to be sure, still great areas, particularly in South America, in which the saturation point had not been reached. And in other parts of the world, particularly in Australia and New Zealand, the stationary character of the population assured for the future a surplus product which stood at the disposal of Europe; and technical inventions, like the refrigeration of meat, enabled food to be transported even over so great a distance as that between Australia and Europe. But in both these cases of South America and Australia, the situation would remain as it was only so long as there was no immigration from Europe. Therefore, although the European industrial countries, in return for the products of their factories, might be fed forever from regions outside Europe (and parts of Russia), nevertheless they would no longer have an outlet for excess population such as had existed for all Europe up to about 1890. In densely populated countries, therefore, the necessaries of life became dearer, because they were scarcer in proportion to the population; and at the same time the competition for foreign markets, and also for colonies affording the necessary raw materials for manufacturing, became more intense—became, to speak more accurately, a veritable struggle for existence. It was no longer a question of exporting manufactured goods simply for profit; industrial states were compelled to export their products as a means of securing food for their overgrown population.

Attention must be called to a circumstance which still further aggravated this overpopulation. In addition to new factors, like steam transportation, which enabled inland and partially barren countries to increase their population beyond the natural limits, there was now added modern hygiene. To be sure, no sharp dividing line between the past and the present can be drawn in this matter. Every one knows that important measures to protect life, like vaccination, antedate the nineteenth century. But in connection with

the development of the natural sciences, which now for the first time completely emancipated themselves from theology and which were increasingly fostered by industrial employers because of their practical value, and along with the humanitarianism which attributed a new value to human life, there took place about the middle of the nineteenth century many discoveries which furnished medicine, surgery, and sanitation with new tools and resources. Like the new sources of food-supply, all these factors tended to lower the death-rate. For instance, there was Lister's antiseptic treatment, Pasteur's researches in bacteriology, and the Semmelweiss treatment for the prevention of puerperal fever. Everywhere it was recognized to be the duty of the state to make use of these discoveries in fulfilling its functions, one of the most important of which was now regarded as the preservation of human life. Urban building was nearly revolutionized; the most minute hygienic regulations were laid down, affecting the planning and construction of private houses and especially of hospitals. To realize the decrease in the death-rate due to all these factors, one has only to look at the statistics of infant mortality a century or more ago. Formerly it was not uncommon for two-thirds of the children to die young. Even at the beginning of the nineteenth century the infant mortality in Russia somewhat exceeded 27 per cent. But even this figure is unusually favorable compared with earlier periods. And the countries which have made the most progress in this respect, like Scandinavia, Switzerland, England, and France, have succeeded in saving about 90 per cent of the children under one year of age.

Never perhaps in history did people live so improvidently, so carelessly as to the inevitable results of their behavior, as the industrial peoples of Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century. The undreamed-of progress in all technical matters so completely overthrew former conceptions of what was possible that even the very conditions of human physical existence seemed to have altered. To be sure, not all peoples were of this opinion, nor did all need to be. Nations which had a sense of responsibility toward posterity, or which, being made up of peasant proprietors not dependent on the state, counted their resources carefully, like the French, the North Americans (particularly in the Eastern States), the Australians, and the New Zealanders—all these nations had already taken thought in the nineteenth century to secure comparative stability in their population. Others, like the English or the Russians, still had so much unoccupied land at their disposal, either in Europe or in the colonies, that the necessity of limiting the "natural" increase of

population, now possible with all the modern inventions, was not so evident. In the case of still other nations, a decrease in the birth-rate was beginning to be noticed. But this decrease was insufficient to counteract the decrease in the death-rate.

As a result of these various conditions, the luxuries of life became cheaper, and modern comforts due to invention and technical progress came within the reach of every one; but the ordinary necessaries of life became dearer and more difficult to secure. Characteristic of this situation is the fact that the problem of housing and land became almost the greatest social problem. Though food production could not possibly keep pace with the increase of population, nevertheless, thanks to modern transportation, which was always improving, and to thinly settled areas overseas, this difficulty could still be solved; international agreement within certain limits was possible. But nothing like this was possible in the housing problem; here the effects of overpopulation and modern hygiene made themselves felt more keenly than in the food question. While the state tended greatly to increase the cost of building by its sanitary regulations, real estate became a monopoly in the hands of a few private persons who, in view of great demand, were able to raise prices to exorbitant rates.

These were the circumstances which lay at the basis of that "unrest" which has been so often and not unjustly complained of. They made more difficult the struggle for existence by the professional classes, often attributed by dilettante writers to a change in intellectual conditions. In contrast with the past, this was now felt by the middle classes, and even by a part of the well-to-do. The situation was particularly hard for young people of ability but little property. The relative increase in the number of elderly people, due to hygienic discoveries for prolonging life, often blocked the path of the young. Noteworthy in this connection is the great lengthening—in contrast even with conditions at the beginning of the nineteenth century—of the period of professional education, without, however, any certainty of finding after it all a place which would even pay the expenses of the years of training. The rise of the well-equipped poor was thus made extraordinarily difficult. Any one who was able to wait a long time for a place, and did not have to begin to earn his living at an early age, had pretty nearly a monopoly of the occupations which were regarded as socially desirable. Naturally the rich have always had a better chance, and before the French Revolution (see p. 11 f.) they were favored by many political privileges. But whereas at that time the number of applicants for

office did not exceed the number of positions vacant in at all the same proportion as later, the outlook for a gifted and energetic man was then somewhat greater than more recently. This circumstance, more than perhaps any other, has recently created in wide circles a gloomy feeling of hopelessness, which may have had no small importance as a psychological foundation for the development of a war spirit.

One circumstance has not yet been mentioned which has sharpened the economic conflict between nations. This is the new struggle for markets.

It has been pointed out above in another connection (see p. 96 f.) that in England the problem arising from the Industrial Revolution was never given a carefully considered solution. The dangers which arose from the exploitation of the workers, from the dependence on foreign food-supply, and from the social condition of the laboring classes, were lessened, but never removed. What had been accomplished was due mainly to favoring circumstances; emigration was possible on a wide scale, and steam transportation made possible the importation of an unlimited food-supply. Moreover, after the first critical years were passed, the income from exported manufactures was so large and steady that workingmen could be safely allowed tolerable living conditions and sometimes even an increase in wages. At least as late as 1870 the English large-scale textile and steel industries were practically without a rival; the artistically superior products of France were supplementary rather than competitive. Up to this time England and France had taken the lead in industrial technique. They had made, or turned to practical account, virtually all the discoveries of the first half of the nineteenth century. So England had come to be regarded proverbially on the Continent as a satiated, somewhat indolent, rich nation.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, this situation began to change more and more for the worse. It would be misleading to speak of the "decadence" of English manufacturing, or to assume a falling off in English exports. The change consisted rather in the fact that several great industries began to compete with those of England in the markets of the world. This competition, as compared with that of the earlier period, was felt more in the new articles of export rather than in the old English staple products. The new industrial countries, in so far as they did not enjoy the same favorable situation which England had formerly had, were forced from the outset to deal with a competitor. At first France retained her leading position in all articles in which

artistic taste and delicacy of manufacture played an important part. Then America, having ceased to be a colonial country importing manufactures and exporting raw materials, and having become a country of great industries competing in world markets, hit upon the important practice of "standardization" (the making of goods according to a few but complete types); "standardized" goods could be manufactured very cheaply because all the goods of one type were uniform. Though this practice is best suited to young countries with identical needs and a uniform social structure, like the United States and analogous colonial territories such as Canada or Australia, it can be successfully adopted for many articles in differently situated countries. More worth considering at this point is the rise of German manufacturing on a large scale, for it was involved much more closely than the English or American with political and military factors, was much more fostered by the State, and therefore has exercised a deeper influence on the history of Germany.

As late as the middle of the nineteenth century, there did not exist a single large factory in Germany. As compared with England, raw materials in Germany were very inadequately developed; in 1850, Germany mined only seven hundred-weight of coal per capita, England, forty-three; the figures for pig-iron were 30 pounds for Germany, as compared with 160 for England. In 1859, Germany produced 5,000 tons of steel, while what England merely exported was double that amount. From 1859 onwards the increase of population, as well as the patriotic movement (involving gun-making in the metal industries), led to a more intensive activity. How this had increased among the German states the need for economic unity has been pointed out above (p. 277). This need had been satisfied by the political changes in 1866 and 1871. Thus one obstacle to industrial development was cleared away.

But this was not all. The new German Empire could not draw upon rich natural resources any more than its predecessor, the Prussian Kingdom, without disturbing its dominant position in foreign politics. Now, as previously, though to a lesser degree, Germany's economic resources did not harmonize with her powerful position in international politics. To be sure, Germany as a whole was not so niggardly provided by Nature as the old Prussian Kingdom; but the economic foundation was, and remained, too small for the excessive political superstructure, particularly as the population steadily grew larger and larger. This difficulty was further sharpened by the extraordinary devotion to military matters which Germany inherited

from Prussia. Too large a part of the population was withdrawn from productive work for military and administrative duties in a country which was not adapted by Nature to bear the cost of enormous armaments. The two evils went together: the burden of excessive armaments and the application of large resources to uneconomic ends. Futhermore, owing to the prevalence in Prussia of large landed estates no serious progress could be made with agricultural reforms, such as the establishment of small farmers on the soil.

Now what was the attitude of the German government toward these difficulties? A completely satisfactory solution was not possible; for human energy and cleverness could not wholly offset Nature's niggardliness. But a strong will and skill can at least ameliorate the consequences of unfavorable conditions. This task was undertaken with great adroitness by the governing classes of Germany. They used the military and political situation of their country in such a way as to compensate to some extent their disadvantageous position. In the first place, as has often been asserted, the fact that the whole population, including the civil service, was accustomed to military discipline, made easier the organization of large industries under single management, since employers and laborers were already intellectually prepared for submission to one central authority. More important than this assertion (the truth of which it is difficult to prove) was the growth of a "learned proletariat" to an extent unequaled in any other country; this was created through the exclusion of the middle classes and the intellectuals from political office and through military regulations which put a premium on higher education (like the privilege of serving only one year in the army for those who were able to pass an educational test). This provided the cheap and easy supply of scientifically and technically trained labor needed in industry. The German economist, Sombart, was certainly correct when he wrote in 1903: "The political backwardness in which the German nation still finds itself is not one of the least influences which have determined the peculiar character of our people. We are still to-day governed in a half absolutistic fashion. We, or at any rate, the members of our middle class, still do not enjoy what exists in constitutional countries, namely, the possibility of a political career. But, so far as I can see, this has all the more favorable result for our economic life. With us there is no large diversion of talent into the field of politics, as in other countries. Neither the rich, nor what is more important, the talented, men of the middle class are withdrawn from economic life to devote themselves to politics. They

remain to place their abilities at the service of industry as directors, engineers, chemists and so forth."

This explains the characteristic which distinguishes German large-scale production from that of all its competitors: its systematic support from science, with the emphasis on "systematic"; for this is the word which best describes the essence of German experimental investigation in the service of industry and the State. For the most part, the great discoveries of "happy genius," like submarines, machine-guns, aeroplanes, telephones, phonographs, wireless telegraphy and so forth, have been made outside Germany (especially in France). But these discoveries have usually been more systematically developed in Germany than elsewhere. Germany was one of the Great Powers where proper laboratories and financial support were provided by industrial plants and by the State.

This stimulation of manufacturing was a much more vital question for the German Empire than for other states. What could pay for the ever increasing cost of armaments, what could pay even for the food of the ever increasing population (hailed with joy as potential soldiers), if not the exported manufactures? A reduction in expenditure for the army was regarded as tantamount to an abandonment by the Empire of the preponderance won in Europe in 1870, and by the ruling classes of their preponderance in Germany.

As a matter of fact, German manufacturers succeeded by these means in establishing themselves beside their competitors in the markets of the world, and even in acquiring a monopoly in certain products—especially in the chemical trades. From an earlier period of inferiority German trade also had developed a kind of affable adaptability which enabled manufacturers to meet more quickly the wishes of their customers, than did their rivals. Equally important too, was the fact that the German government used the army, whose costs had in good part been paid by exported manufactures, as a lever for securing valuable marketing opportunities for these same German manufactures in the shape of favorable commercial treaties and so forth. Thus was created an extraordinarily effective system of mutual support. Its only defect lay in the extreme uncertainty of the bases on which it rested, namely on a continued expansion of German exports, and on the irresistibility of German threats of war.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA

THE economic factors sketched in the preceding chapter gave a new value to the possession of colonial territory. Although about the middle of the nineteenth century the view had prevailed, and not least in countries like England which possessed most colonies, that overseas possessions were nothing but a costly burden for the mother country, now opinion went so far to the opposite extreme as to assert that the control over regions outside Europe, suitable for settlement and providing raw materials, was indispensable for a great industrial country. It was regarded as a great advantage for an over-populated country to be able to settle its citizens in a territory where they would not have to break their political connection with the land of their birth. It also seemed desirable to possess overseas territories which were occupied by fellow countrymen to whom the products of home industries could be more readily sold.

Another motive was the desire to secure raw materials for manufactures. Now that the industries of the Great Powers had entered upon the competitive stage with each other, a wholly new importance attached to the possibility of obtaining from one's own colonies, perhaps at lower cost on account of state aid, the necessary materials which were to be worked up by manufacturing. An industry which could draw its raw materials from politically dependent colonies was believed to have an advantage over its rivals.

Though this new situation might be explained by the new policy which England, for instance, adopted toward colonial possessions, the attitude of all Europe toward colonial matters was further altered by the fact that by 1870 two new Great Powers had arisen which likewise wanted their share in the extension of European rule in other continents.

Germany and Italy regarded themselves, not without reason, as being at a disadvantage. At the period when the other nations were gaining great colonial empires, they either did not exist or were occupied with their own unification. Not only had sea-faring

nations like the Dutch and the English made extensive conquests, but great colonial regions had been acquired by the French in Algeria and by the Russians in Central and Eastern Asia. Now Germany and Italy, finding that they had been left far behind at the start in the race for colonial territory, had to look about to see whether they could build up colonial empires in regions which had not been occupied by their more fortunate rivals.

Important in its consequences was the circumstance that, though the earth had not yet been completely divided up as far as concerned regions which produced raw materials, there was, on the other hand, relatively little territory left which was adapted to settlement by the white man. Nearly all this kind of territory had been occupied by other nations, particularly by the English and the French, and, in a different fashion, by the republics of North and South America. Almost the only exceptions were the strips of territory in North Africa, like Tunis and Morocco, and some parts of Turkey in Asia. If the belated states wanted to catch up with their rivals who were ahead in the colonial race, they believed they could only do so by force; that is, by war or by threats of war. Since the British colonies were fairly well populated, the two Powers who were seeking land for settlement purposes turned their attention primarily in the direction of the French colonies.

It can scarcely be denied that, of these two states, it was Italy which from the outset saw more clearly the goal in view and chose its means more cleverly. To be sure, it may have partly been due to her relatively weak military force that Italy steadily took care to avoid coming into open conflict with any other Great Power. As compared with Germany, Italy could point to a much larger emigration of valuable labor; she perhaps had even greater reason for retaining the political bond between her emigrant sons and the mother country, and she certainly adapted her foreign policy more consistently to this end and never failed to see the importance of colonial policy. The same cannot be said of Germany. Her colonial acquisitions, to be sure, measured merely by their area, were more important than those of Italy. Thanks to the military pressure which she could exert, she could secure from other countries concessions which Italy could not think of. But the effects on her foreign policy of this kind of pressure were not always well considered; Germany's foreign policy in Europe was not modified as it should have been in view of her new colonial aims.

The responsibility for this lies largely with the statesman who at that time ruled German policy autocratically; or, to speak more

correctly, it lies rather with the system which he represented—the system which reserved to a single man and a single class a monopoly in the management of foreign relations. While a younger generation, particularly men in large business circles, favored the acquisition of commercial colonies, Bismarck stuck to his old principle of opposing "colonies on the French model"; such commercial plans, which were so completely beyond his economic horizon and so contrary to his purely Continental traditions as an Old Prussian squire, he regarded only with hesitation and fundamental disinclination. As is most clearly seen in the memoirs which he wrote at the end of his life, he never had a real interest in the problems of naval and colonial policy, nor indeed in the tasks of the future which were facing Germany as a result of her growing population and industrialization. Understanding at bottom only the kindred governments of Russia and Austria, but not the more liberal parliamentary countries of the West, he never realized what France and England owed to their colonial system. To be sure, it was under him that Germany made her first colonial acquisitions; but neither in domestic nor foreign politics were the traditions of the Prussian system of government suited to the new task.

For the sake of a better bird's-eye view of recent colonial history the following narrative has been divided into three chapters—the partition of Africa, the struggle for Asia and the islands of the Pacific Ocean, and the rise of the British Empire in its modern form, together with the development of the foreign policy of the United States. In itself no one of these chapters deserves precedence over the others; the reason for treating Africa first is simply that it was in Africa that one can see most clearly the rivalry of the European Powers.

The interior of Africa was virtually untouched by European rule up to about the middle of the nineteenth century (1865). The coastal regions, to be sure, were largely in the hands of the old trading nations—Portuguese, Dutch, English and French. But in only two places did European rule extend deep into the interior: in the north in French Algeria, and in the south in English Cape Colony with its Boer prolongation. These two colonial conquests were not due to a special "African" policy, but served, at least originally, the same commercial purposes as the occupation of the coast districts. Cape Colony was important for England's commerce with India; the conquest of Algiers was intended to put an end to the nuisance of piracy in the Mediterranean. No one at that time

thought of any systematic exploration of the interior, or *hinterland;* and the rather few places in which white men could be settled in large numbers had not yet attracted attention.

Even in the period immediately following, the old ideas prevailed at first. The occupation of Egypt is in many respects the counterpart of the acquisition of Cape Colony; less regard was paid to the advantage which might come from the territory itself than to the importance which the whole region had for the trade with India.

Egypt, after the time of the Napoleonic expedition, became a semi-independent state. An Albanian officer, named Mehemet Ali, raised himself to the position of an independent pasha, and organized an army and navy of his own. With the aid of his new forces he conquered the Egyptian Sudan, including Khartum, and proved so much more powerful than the Sultan at Constantinople, that the latter was only saved from destruction by the Powers of Europe.

Mehemet Ali was one of the first oriental princes who consciously and systematically strove to introduce European (especially French) civilization and technical knowledge into his country. Large irrigation works were built by French engineers in order better to distribute the fruitful waters of the Nile. What was perhaps more important, Mehemet Ali introduced new crops, particularly cotton, and thereby gave his country an exceedingly valuable article of export. But this all took place after the fashion of an oriental enlightened despotism. There was lacking the middle class which guarantees continuity in economic life. The fellaheen remained poorer and more oppressed than ever. As there was no limit to the pasha's power of squandering money, the expenditures of the court regularly exceeded the revenues, no matter how much the latter might be increased.

The situation was somewhat better, to be sure, under Said, Mehemet Ali's son and third successor, who ruled from 1854 to 1863. Said recognized the right of private ownership among his Egyptian subjects though hitherto the Pasha had owned all the land. He dismissed a part of the soldiery in order to reduce expenditures. He sought much more definitely than his father to promote the prosperity of his country by economic measures. But even in his case everything depended on him personally; and so he had to turn to foreigners to aid him in carrying out his reforms.

From the outset the foreigners belonged chiefly to the two nations which had the greatest interest in the development of North Africa and the route to India, namely, France and England. An English company built the first railroad from Alexandria to Cairo.

A French engineer, De Lesseps, founded, mainly with French capital, the company which planned to build the Suez Canal.

Although the Sultan at Constantinople, influenced by the English against the French, had not given his approval, De Lesseps began the long and difficult excavations in 1859. Said supported him eagerly, put 25,000 fellaheen a month at his service, and gave him the necessary lands for nothing. In his honor the newly constructed city at the mouth of the Canal was named Port Said. When he died, the new Pasha, Ismail, under English influence, put great difficulties in the way of the French, and even canceled the concessions promised by his predecessor. The English government early declared that for the defense of India it would be compelled to seize Egypt in case the canal was built. But in spite of this, De Lesseps succeeded by untiring energy in continuing his undertaking, and in 1869 the canal was finished. It proved of great advantage mainly to the French, Italian and Austrian ports in the Mediterranean, which now took over a large part of the European trade with Asia and Australia.

Said's thrifty administration was only an episode in Egyptian history. His successor, Ismail, (1863-1879) again acted as if the riches of Egypt were inexhaustible. However, he used the resources which the economic prosperity of the land put at his disposal to give his country greater independence and to Europeanize it further along the lines which Mehemet Ali had laid down. He bought from the Sultan of Turkey the right to bear the title of Khedive, or sovereign; to make commercial treaties of his own; to increase his army at his pleasure; and to introduce primogeniture for the ruler's family. His government took possession of rich lands in Upper Egypt and ordered the introduction of sugar-cane and the erection of sugar refineries. In Cairo arose a European Quarter. Many occidental officials (mostly Frenchmen) were appointed. The Capitulation System, which gave special rights and privileges to Europeans, was restricted. Mixed courts, that is, courts composed of Egyptian natives and Europeans living in Egypt, were instituted for trying Europeans.

But all these innovations were beyond the financial resources of his country. In ten years the Egyptian debt increased eightfold—from 250 million to two billion francs. Ismail's credit was exhausted and he could borrow only at ruinous rates of interest. At that time (1875) the Khedive decided he must sell the 200,000 shares in the Suez Canal Company which he happened to own. Disraeli quickly seized the opportunity to buy the shares for Eng-

land and so secure a direct influence in the administrative board of the canal company. This money also was quickly spent by Ismail, and the next year he began to default in the payment of his obligations.

Egypt was now placed under European guardianship. The European governments took up the cause of the creditors and established an international commission which should see to it that out of the revenues of the Egyptian government the first payments should be the interest on the debt. The commission consisted at first, in 1876, of a Frenchman, an Italian, and an Austrian, that is, of representatives of the nations which had the largest share in the trade of the Mediterranean; later, representatives of Great Britain (1877) and of Germany and Russia (1885) were added. Furthermore, however, the whole financial administration of Egypt was placed, in 1876, under special control, in fact, under two Controllers-General, one Frenchman and one Englishman. France, after her prestige had been weakened by the Franco-Prussian War, found it necessary to keep on good terms with England; though she had formerly enjoyed a preponderant position in the Nile region, she now agreed to this "Anglo-French Condominium."

The Controllers-General now virtually took the whole government into their own hands. They quickly discovered that the alleged Europeanization of the administration had not put an end to the Khedive's former autocratic methods in finance, and that the peasant population (the fellaheen) were still plundered in the old fashion. They demanded, therefore, a fundamental reform—that the Khedive be content with a "civil list," or fixed revenue for the expenses of his court and administration. Ismail consented and in 1878 even appointed two of the commissioners as his ministers. But a reform of Egyptian administration was bound to meet with dangerous opposition. Certain as it was that the fellaheen, who had been exploited for centuries, would profit by an impartial and economical government, it was equally certain that a limitation upon the Khedive's financial power would injure the pockets of Egyptian notables. The military and civil officials who were dismissed as superfluous roused the people to revolts against the government of the European commissioners. Ismail used this unrest to pose as a defender of Islam. He dismissed his European ministers in 1879 and formed a purely Egyptian cabinet.

The Dual Control Powers then succeeded in having the Sultan remove Ismail. His son and successor, Tewfik, thereupon reëstablished the Dual-Control boards. But this did not silence the agita-

tion of the Mohammedan notables against European interference. The Egyptian party compelled the Khedive to appoint a new cabinet in which their leader became minister of war. The army was enlarged and purified of its pro-European elements, and the authority of the Controllers-General was no longer heeded (1882).

A proposition for a joint Anglo-French intervention, mainly urged by one of the most active and important Frenchmen of the time, Gambetta, failed through the opposition of the cautious French Chamber of Deputies which objected to all colonial wars. All that took place at first was merely a naval demonstration at Alexandria and an international conference at Constantinople. In Egypt itself, however, actual attacks were made by natives on Christians and a number of Europeans were massacred in Alexandria. In spite of this the French government refused to join with the British in intervening, and even recalled their ships. The British admiral thereupon bombarded Alexandria and occupied it with marines (1882).

The latent conflict now broke into open war. The Egyptian minister of war threatened to destroy the Suez Canal. At this the English advanced to the canal (after the French Chamber had again refused to join with them) and seized it. They also occupied Cairo. The Egyptian army was destroyed; its leader, the minister of war, Arabi Bey, was captured and banished to Ceylon.

Out of the British occupation now arose the Egyptian "provisional arrangement"—which was to last for decades. The English did not proceed to annex the territory. They did not even interfere with Egyptian institutions. They merely replaced the only force which could have offered opposition to Europeans, namely the Egyptian army, by a military organization dependent on themselves. The Egyptian army was reorganized under the leadership of a British general, or "Sirdar," and a standing English force of five to six thousand men, paid out of the Egyptian budget, was stationed in the country. The joint Anglo-French control was now at an end (1883).

This was the beginning of the Anglo-French tension which was to last twenty years. Henceforth French diplomacy strove to compel the rival British to leave the land which they had occupied provisionally. The efforts, however, were in vain. All that France could bring about was a European conference which neutralized the Suez Canal, so that, in case of war, it could not be closed. This tension was not officially ended until the Anglo-French agreement of 1904. But before this is described, it is necessary to look at the situation in North-West Africa; because the Entente of 1904 depended as much upon what

had been taking place in the western, as in the eastern, part of North Africa.

As France's desire for influence in Egypt was mainly a consequence of her occupation of Algeria, so her new policy of extending French occupation over the regions to the west, south and east of Algeria was also a natural continuation of a series of events which began in 1830. To the French in Algeria it was important that the nearest powerful Mohammedan country, Egypt, should be in the hands of a friendly or dependent state; it was still more important, in fact absolutely indispensable for the safety of the colony, that the immediate border territories should be thoroughly subjected. In Egypt a compromise arrangement with one of the other Great Powers was conceivable; but in Tunis and Morocco any kind of condominium would vitally interfere with French colonial policy in Africa.

The first question which arose was the annexation of the region lying to the east of Algeria. The Bey of Tunis, who was nominally subordinate to the Sultan of Turkey like the Bey of Algiers formerly, was a less dangerous neighbor for Europeans than the former piratical princes of Algeria. Not only was there no piracy at Tunis, but Europeans were admitted with relative freedom. As compared with Algiers formerly, Tunisia had a somewhat larger percentage of fixed, non-nomadic inhabitants, peasants and merchants; in addition there had come a considerable number of European settlers, chiefly from Italy and Malta, but also a number of French capitalists. The foreigners lived under the Capitulations System and were under the jurisdiction of their own consuls.

There were not lacking, however, grounds for intervention. The Bey of Tunis, like the Khedive of Egypt, could not live within his income. He was compelled to borrow considerable sums from European capitalists, and only the pressure of a control by the Great Powers could persuade him to pay the interest regularly. Furthermore, he either could not, or would not, prevent robber bands in his country from making raids upon French Algeria; for this there seemed to be no remedy except occupation by a European Power.

As to the raids, France was the only power directly interested; but the French were also largely concerned in a solution of the financial question. So it was natural that the French should cast their eyes toward Tunis. But a French conquest of the country was directly opposed to the views of other Great Powers. Great Britain had not been pleased when the French got a foothold in North Africa (see above, p. 118), and now supported the Sultan's rights

of sovereignty. Still more dangerous was Italy's opposition. If Italy wanted to pursue a colonial policy at all, Tunis was naturally her first objective. The land of the Beys had already attracted a considerable number of Italian settlers. It stood right at the door of the newly-created Italian Kingdom. And it offered much more favorable economic opportunities than Tripoli, which lay further to the east. Italy therefore insisted from the first that she at least be treated on an equal footing with her two rivals. As in the similar case of Egypt later (see p. 330), when an international commission for controlling the collection of the Tunisian revenues was established, one Italian was given a place on the Council along with a Frenchman and Englishman (1865-1870). But soon afterwards, Italy's position grew less favorable. In 1878 Great Britain gave up her untenable position in favor of France, and henceforth Italy stood alone in opposition to her more powerful French rival. The first result of this was that the Bey favored the less dangerous Italian state at the expense of France; in railway concessions, for example, he granted more to the Italians than to the French. But this very circumstance drove the French to take the last step of converting Tunis into a French protectorate.

A new attack on the Algerian frontier by a mountain tribe of Khroumirs furnished the pretext for intervention. The Bey refused to help the French punish the robbers. Thereupon a French division marched into Tunis and occupied the Khroumir territory. The Bey appealed to Europe for help; but no Power (not even Italy) would, or could, interfere. So, after his capital had been occupied by the French, he had to sign the Treaty of Bardo, recognizing a French protectorate.

As in the case of Algeria earlier, there occurred a revolt of the Mohammedan tribes to the south of the new protectorate. But the French easily suppressed it, and from this time (1881) remained in undisturbed possession. The eastern frontier of Algeria was thus definitely secured.

The development which then took place in Tunis has many analogies with that in Algeria, with the single exception that the rule of the native prince—the Bey—continued as a matter of formality (somewhat as in Egypt and partly as in India). But the real government lies in the hands of a French resident, and the real military power is exercised by French troops stationed in the country. Economic prosperity also has developed along the same lines as in Algeria; numerous roads and railways have been built by the French. The budget, which under the Bey regularly closed with a deficit, now

shows just as regularly a surplus. But as far as the European population is concerned the French are at the same disadvantage as in Algiers. Tunis is much less suited than Algeria to the one kind of French immigration which is most important, namely that of French peasants. No subdivision of the soil has taken place. Furthermore, the Italian settlers in Tunis are about three times as numerous as the French, who are preponderant only in wealth; the Italians are active as laborers and not as small proprietors.

Between France and Italy the annexation of Tunis caused an estrangement which lasted nearly a generation. Italy now turned her back completely on France. She joined with Germany and Austria, which had been allied since 1879, in forming the "Triple Alliance" (May 20, 1882). The Italian government was not able to secure from Austria an express promise of support for Italian Mediterranean projects. But in Rome there evidently existed the hope that henceforth Italy could pursue her colonial aims in opposition to France with more success. Significant in this connection also is the fact that a special declaration was attached to the Triple Alliance Treaty stating that under no circumstances could the treaty be regarded as directed against Englnd.

At the same time Italy began to increase her armaments, which had not been possible after 1870 on account of her unsatisfactory financial condition (see above, p. 259), and initiated on the Red Sea a colonial policy of her own. The account of these events, however, must be postponed; at this point it is more convenient to explain the progress of the undertakings which have transformed the originally tiny colony of Algiers into the center of a mighty colonial empire.

There were two tasks confronting the French government in Algeria. One, in general the more important, was the counterpart to the subjection of Tunis; it was the occupation of Morocco, which, as an independent neighboring state, was more dangerous to the safety of the French colonists in Algeria than Tunis had been. But as this could not be undertaken at once because of England's opposition, the French after 1880 devoted their energies to the other task.

This was the further extension of the southern frontier of Algeria, already advanced into the Sahara Desert, so that it should come into touch with the French settlement at the mouth of the Senegal River on the West Coast of Africa. This work was undertaken from both extremities. From the colony of Senegal, which in 1815, like nearly all the other European possessions in Africa,

had consisted merely of a narrow strip of coast, the French pressed up the Senegal River into the interior until they finally reached the Niger (1883). Everywhere military posts were established. Leaving the Niger, they pushed on eastwards to Lake Chad (1898). They had already captured Timbuctoo, the capital of the region (1894). By 1898 the French had reached a point south of the Sahara lying somewhat further east than Tunis. All of these conquests, however, would have remained incomplete if a sure connection had not been established with French Guinea. This also was brought about by systematic advances and political agreements. After the Ivory Coast *hinterland* had come in good part into French hands, the whole Ivory Coast itself fell to France by a friendly arrangement with England (1892), though hitherto the French had had nothing but insignificant settlements there. A second connection with the Guinea Coast was created by the fact that the negro military kingdom of Dahomey, whose ruler had often maltreated French traders, was destroyed and annexed by the French. The French Sudan Empire now comprised a solid area of over two million square kilometers, with free access to the sea in the south and west as well as in the north.

Finally, thanks to the bravery of their explorers and the energy of their generals, the French succeeded even in uniting their newly-founded Congo colony with their possessions in the Sudan. Under Major Marchand they pressed on, passing what was then the German Kamerun territory, north-eastwards as far as Uganda (1896-98); after a convention of 1899 England recognized their right to expand over the Wady region; this was definitely brought under subjection in 1901 and established a direct connection between the Chad region and the whole Sudan.

This last advance, however, threatened again to sharpen the still unrelieved tension over Egypt. The military expedition under Marchand had in fact pushed eastwards to the White Nile and taken possession of a little place called Fashoda. But the French and English governments both remained true to their policy of avoiding war, and the affair was settled when the French ministry recalled Marchand's detachment. France even went further, and, in a convention which may be regarded as foreshadowing the later Entente, expressly renounced all her claims to the Upper Nile; that is, she recognized indirectly British supremacy in Egypt.

In order to understand this, the story of the extension of British power over the Egyptian Sudan may here be briefly told. Mehemet Ali (see p. 328) had already planned the conquest of the Upper

Nile region, and under Ismail the conquest had been accomplished. The whole Egyptian Sudan, up to the great lakes, was brought under Egyptian administration. This innovation resulted in many difficulties: Sudanese negroes were sometimes set over European officials, and native slave-dealers were disquieted lest the Europeans wanted to check their business. The discontent became much more serious when in Egypt itself a Mohammedan party began to oppose the supremacy of the Europeans (see above, p. 330). At the moment when Arabi Bey was stirring up revolt against the English and the French, there arose among the Sudanese a native who proclaimed himself the "Mahdi"—Prophet or Messiah—who would win for Islam supreme power throughout the world. The Mahdi formed a religious brotherhood, whose members the English called "dervishes," organized an army, and overthrew the Egyptian administration in the Sudan. An Egyptian army which was sent against him was destroyed. General Gordon who came up from Cairo to suppress the movement was besieged with his Egyptian garrison in Khartum. After holding out for a year during 1884-85 the town was taken and Gordon was murdered. In spite of this tragic occurrence, which roused great indignation in England, Great Britain at that time was so occupied with other cares that she did not at once attempt to recover her position. Moreover, the British occupation of the Nile region was still regarded by many in England as provisional; as such, it did not imply any duty to occupy the *hinterland* in the Sudan.

Not until 1897, after Egypt had become more and more a real British possession, did the English authorities seriously prepare a campaign against the Mohammedan fanatics in the Upper Nile region. With the aid of carefully-laid railways a much quicker advance could be made this time than in the case of the unfortunate expedition led by Gordon. As soon as a considerable force of trained troops with European firearms opposed the dervishes, their resistance naturally collapsed. On September 2, 1898, the Sirdar of Egypt, General Kitchener, captured Omdurman on the White Nile, the stronghold of the Mahdi. Shortly afterwards the town of Khartum fell into the hands of the Anglo-Egyptian troops. The "Calif" who had succeeded the Mahdi fled into the desert, where after long wanderings with his chiefs he was finally slain by the English a year later.

It happened that in Khartum General Kitchener received news of Marchand's occupation of Fashoda. He therefore went over on a little steamer and hoisted his Egyptian flag opposite the French

tricolor. The way in which this incident was settled has already been told. It may be added that the English, in order to obliterate the memory of this painful incident, have wiped out the name "Fashoda" from their maps, so that the village where the historic meeting took place is now called "Kodok."

France did not have to wait long for compensation. For a long time and for more insistent reasons than in the case of Tunis, France had sought to secure control over Morocco. The south-eastern part of this country was the starting-point for all the Mohammedan revolts which had caused unrest in Algeria. The French had already taken advantage of the extension of their power in the Sudan to establish some military posts in Southern Oran, in order to check this danger, but her further efforts to subdue Morocco had always failed on account of England's opposition. England had also often sent arms to the Sherif, or Sultan, and had helped train Moroccan troops. In English eyes, however, Morocco had lost much of its value since the opening of the Suez Canal; and although the foreign trade of Morocco was almost exclusively in English and French hands, the English government preferred to make secure its communications with India by getting firm hold of Egypt rather than to prolong its conflict with France in Egypt and Morocco. Accordingly, in 1904, there took place the famous Convention or "Entente" which definitely put an end to the differences between England and France over their colonial policies in North Africa. France agreed to cease demanding England's withdrawal from Egypt; in return, England accorded France full freedom of action in Morocco. It was a fine example of the way peacefully-inclined Great Powers can settle their disputes; the diplomatic battle was fought out without the accompaniment of military threats, increased armaments, and warlike demonstrations.

The events just narrated may be regarded in a certain sense as a continuation of the old Hellenistic-Roman Mediterranean policy. On the other hand, the policy of the European states toward Africa which began about 1870—the regular partition of Africa—was something altogether new. It differed essentially from the old policy in that it was not confined to the North African coast, which after all is a part of Europe geographically, nor to the strips of coast occupied by European traders; on the contrary it aimed at the systematic control and exploitation by Europeans of the whole interior of the Dark Continent. A natural result of this new movement was the increase in the number of states participating in

African politics. Hitherto the occupation of African territory had been confined either to states which were interested in Africa on account of their own Mediterranean position—like France, and, to a slight extent, Spain—or which sought points of support for their trade with India and Eastern Asia—like Portugal, England and Holland. But now the competition for territory in the Dark Continent was taken up by states which were driven merely by the desire to share in the plunder—like Germany and, indirectly, Belgium.

Italy's case was peculiar. Her interests rested primarily on her position as a Mediterranean Power. Her late entrance into the race for Africa was due solely to the fact that she had become unified as a Great Power later than France; it was not due to any new conception of the value of Africa. Italy's African policy accordingly followed its own bent; it is not to be regarded as a part of the general European action. Austria-Hungary also, in spite of her large Mediterranean interests, took no part at all in the partition of Africa, doubtless on account of her internal political situation; Austrian expansion gravitated exclusively toward the Balkans.

The first impulse toward a European settlement of the African question was a humanitarian one. The journeys into the interior of Africa by explorers of different nations had disclosed the existence of an extensive slave-trade. The exportation of negro slaves to America, to be sure, had completely ceased since England put her foot down; but the export to Asia was still flourishing. On the east coast of Africa there were great slave depots in which traders, mostly Arabs, bought their wares for further sale in Asia. One of the main reasons the negro chiefs were in continual war with one another was that their tribesmen were captured and sold. The slave-trade had assumed such proportions that some European observers even feared that Africa would be depopulated. Without considering whether such a thing was possible, this much can be stated with certainty: the slave traffic as it was then carried on in Africa entailed a disproportionately large loss of human life. Negroes captured in war who were too weak or too old to be sold as slaves were simply murdered; and many died of exhaustion as they were being driven down to the coast to be sold.

Many philanthropic societies were founded in Europe to put an end to this inhuman traffic. They wanted the European Powers to intervene. But it soon became evident that nothing but a permanent occupation by Europeans could accomplish anything. Of how little avail were mere proclamations had just been shown in the case of the Egyptian conquest of the Upper Nile during the years 1869-

1875: these were supposed to put an end to the slave-trade in the Egyptian Sudan; in reality the traffic still continued under the Khedive's administration.

At first a semi-official European arrangement was attempted. Leopold II, King of the Belgians, along with De Lesseps, the constructor of the Suez Canal, and Cardinal Lavigerie, the Primate of Africa, founded in 1876 the "International African Association." Its aim was the exploration of Central Africa as well as the suppression of the slave-trade there. It began its task with great energy. It provided Henry M. Stanley, who had just explored the Congo River, with means for establishing a series of military posts in the Congo region. Various places in the neighborhood of Lake Tanganyika were fortified as places of refuge from the slave dealers. This barred the great slave route from the Zambesi in the South to Khartum on the Upper Nile.

But national rivalries soon arose within the Association. The nations which already owned colonies in the neighborhood (like Great Britain, France, and Portugal) feared they would lose a valuable *hinterland*. And at any rate they were not inclined to concede a free access to the sea to the new Belgian colonial state, as one might call it. Moreover Germany, which hitherto possessed no colonies in Africa, laid claim to a part of the Dark Continent. Bismarck knew how to bring it about that a European conference should meet in Berlin in 1885, in which the Great Powers of Europe systematically laid down the principles and prepared the way for the partition of Africa.

The Conference dissolved the International Association, but this did not mean that Leopold's work was undone. The diplomatists recognized that a Congo state, lying in the middle of the continent, would furnish as good a buffer as the rival European countries could wish. They therefore allowed Leopold's new creation to exist under the name of "The Congo Free State." But its administration did not remain international. It was the personal property of the King of the Belgians, but it had no connection with the Belgian state (until later when Leopold II bequeathed it to Belgium). The Congo Free State was also given an uninterrupted access to the ocean, inasmuch as the navigation of the Congo and the Niger was declared free to all nations—on the analogy of the Rhine and Danube agreements. The new conquests in the French Congo (see p. 335) were given international recognition, and equal trading privileges in the whole Congo region were thus assured to all nations.

The Berlin Conference also laid down for the future some funda-

mental principles of a general nature: all the Powers agreed to suppress the slave-trade; henceforth, every annexation of African soil must be officially notified to the Powers; and no annexations were to be recognized unless accompanied by effective occupation.

Now began the era of great annexations. The prevailing motive was no longer necessity or security, but the feeling that without colonies a Great Power was incomplete, especially in the case of the two Powers which had hitherto had no share in the colonization of Africa. In 1884-5 Germany took possession of Togoland and the Kameruns on the Gulf of Guinea, of the economically worthless South West Africa—where later some diamonds were discovered—and of the more promising German East African Territory to the east of the Belgian Congo. Bismarck's dismissal gave a new freedom to German colonial policy. As several of Germany's recent acquisitions conflicted with British claims, Germany and England signed an agreement in 1890 dividing between themselves the lands of the Sultan of Zanzibar. England took the island of Zanzibar and the Northern continental part which connected the Upper Nile region directly with the Indian Ocean, and Germany received the Southern part. As compensation for other claims, Germany also received from England the island of Heligoland, thanks to which the English had hitherto been able to control the entrance to the Elbe at Hamburg. For England the treaty was unfavorable to the extent that it destroyed for the present her purpose of establishing an unbroken colonial Empire in Africa reaching from the Cape to Cairo. To be sure, it was now possible to protect the Egyptian Sudan from any threat of danger from Germany, just as it was protected against a French advance; but between the English possessions in the Sudan and in South Africa, there was now shoved a barrier in the shape of the German and Belgian colonies. In this respect England's position in Africa was much less favorable than that of France.

France further extended her African possessions by conquering the island of Madagascar. This also was a blow to British claims. The English had often supported the native population in their resistance to French efforts at annexation. In 1868, the English even succeeded in converting to Anglicanism Ranawalo II, Queen of the Hovas, so that British influence had seemed assured.

However, the quarrels between the Hovas and the French colonists on Reunion Island (or Île Bourbon) did not cease any more than the conflicts with the French traders on Madagascar itself. After bombarding the coast several times, the French received in 1885 the right to maintain a French resident with a military guard in the

capital, Tananarivo, as well as to occupy a number of coast districts. This veiled protectorate was the first step toward annexation. The Queen of the Hovas at the time, Ranawalo III, used her liberty to maintain direct diplomatic relations not only with Great Britain as before, but also with the United States. The French therefore sent an ultimatum in 1894. French public opinion had recently become much more favorable to colonial undertakings and the Chamber of Deputies without difficulty granted money for decisive action when the ultimatum was rejected. Under these circumstances, French success was certain. Although the 15,000 French troops who were landed on the west coast of Madagascar suffered terribly from fever, Tananarivo was captured with almost no serious opposition in 1895, and the Queen recognized the French protectorate. But as she or her officials, in spite of this, tried to stir up rebellion against the French, Madagascar was changed from a protectorate into an out-and-out French colony. Here also slavery was abolished as one of the results of European rule.

The check which the English had suffered through the creation of German East Africa was all the more bitter in that shortly before the conclusion of the Zanzibar Agreement they had begun a new advance from South Africa which seemed to bring them considerably nearer their goal of uniting Cape Town and Cairo. The Portuguese had retained as remnants from the age of their bold voyages of discovery two relatively large stretches of land on the east and west coasts of Africa—Angola on the west, and Mozambique on the east. Portugal now considered the possibility of uniting these two regions into an unbroken whole by converting the Zambesi territory into a Portuguese colony. Such a scheme would have completely cut off Cape Colony from Northern Africa. The British therefore compelled Portugal to abandon her plan. The weak little country had to give its consent to the Convention of August 20, 1890, which established the British in the Zambesi territory. Under the leadership of Cecil Rhodes the new British territory was quickly brought under English subjection and the warlike tribes of Matabeleland were conquered by his companion, Dr. Jameson. The railway which ran inland from Cape Town was at once extended almost to the Zambesi; but its completion was prevented on the one hand by the existence of German East Africa, and on the other by the opposition of the French, who refused their consent to the transfer of a strip of land in the Belgian Congo west of Lake Tanganyika.

The disputes between the Great Powers were not completely set-

tled by these various agreements. Between Germany and Great Britain, to be sure, there were no longer any serious grounds of conflict, but between Germany and France there developed an opposition which in many respects was much more dangerous. Germany seemed to oppose on principle France's efforts to round out her African colonial empire and render it secure; in particular Germany opposed the "Tunification" of Morocco after England in 1904 had withdrawn her opposition. But before an account is given of these matters, something must be said of Italian policy in Africa.

Italy's policy of conquest in Africa is peculiar in the respect that it affords the only case in history in which a native African state succeeded in successfully evading European control. The Empire of Abyssinia (with only the apparent exception of the negro Republic of Liberia) was the only really independent state in Africa at the close of this new colonial period. It owed its independence not only to the jealousy of European states toward one another, but also to its own real power.

The Christian Empire of Abyssinia for centuries had been torn by internal feuds. The "Ras"—local rulers—were in almost continual strife with the "Negus" or supreme ruler, to whom they often paid only nominal obedience. The country also was virtually unknown to Europeans and these civil wars had attracted little attention in Europe. Only once had the English felt compelled to intervene, when Negus Theodore II arrested and imprisoned an English consul in 1862. Great Britain despatched an expedition and succeeded in winning the support of the Ras. The Negus was defeated and in 1868 committed suicide in his fortress of Magdala, whereupon the English withdrew their troops. They were content to have restored British prestige. Moreover, they believed that the country could only be conquered by a large number of troops and that the cost would be more than it would be worth.

From the 'eighties onward it was not England but Italy which had most to do with Abyssinia. In 1885 an Italian colony had been established at Massowah on the Red Sea near the Abyssinian frontier. This settlement was often troubled by the Negus John, and some Italian troops were completely routed. Italy therefore entered into close relations with Menelek, who was Ras of Shoa and a rival claimant for the position of Negus. Through his support Italy tried to secure a firm foothold in Abyssinia and an agreement was signed in which Menelek, in return for recognition by Italy, was supposed to recognize an Italian protectorate. By this Treaty of Ucciali of May 22, 1889, Italy agreed to recognize Menelek as

"King of Kings" or "Negus of Ethiopia"; Menelek on his side made the concession that he would negotiate with European Powers only through the mediation of Italy. He also gave commercial privileges, and agreed to have coins stamped in Italy and to order munitions. An Ethiopian coin was struck which bore the image of the King of Italy and the inscription, "Italy protects Ethiopia." On October 11, 1889, Italy officially notified the other Powers that she had assumed a protectorate over Abyssinia.

These arrangements were extended by a further Italian occupation of African territory. Hitherto, the Italians had only taken a piece of land on the Red Sea; now followed the occupation of territory in East Africa on the Indian Ocean. In 1891 the Italians signed a convention with England which separated their claims from the British possessions in Somaliland. The whole *hinterland* as far as the region of the Upper Nile was recognized as an Italian sphere of influence. Italy seemed to have laid the foundation for a great African colonial empire, and for a share in the struggle for the possession of the Egyptian Sudan.

But the Italian statesman, Crispi, the chief promoter of these colonial undertakings, had reckoned without his Ethiopian ally. Menelek succeeded in getting his own sovereignty recognized by the successor of Negus John. This restored the unity of Ethiopia, and Menelek no longer needed to lean on the Italians. He had himself solemnly crowned and sent a direct notification of the fact to all the Powers. When Italy complained that this infringed the Treaty of Ucciali, Menelek on May 11, 1893, declared the treaty at an end altogether. So war began.

The Italian attack was led by General Baratieri from Massowah as a base. The Italians first had to deal with the Ras of Tigré, Menelek's former rival. He was beaten in a series of brilliant engagements and had to flee to Menelek in 1895. After his most dangerous rival had thus been overthrown, Menelek took courage. He summoned his people to a national war against the invaders, and soon had under his banners some 150,000 men, so it was said, against about 20,000 Italians. The result came quickly. One Italian column was annihilated; another had to capitulate; and an even worse fate overtook the main force under General Baratieri himself. In spite of the enemy's overwhelming superiority in numbers, the Italian General was unwilling to leave Abyssinian territory and prepared to fight at Adowa. The result was a catastrophe. One Italian general was taken captive, two others were killed, the retreat took on a panicky character, and about 4,000 Italians, together

with all the artillery, fell into the hands of the Negus on March 1, 1896.

The blow was so crushing that Baratieri was court-martialed, but acquitted. Crispi had to resign. More important was the fact that the Italians were unable to attempt any military recovery. Although their army was reformed at Massowah they had to consent to negotiate, and on October 26, 1896, signed the Peace of Addis-Ababa, in which they officially abandoned the Treaty of Ucciali. Italy had to recognize the absolute independence of "Ethiopia," as Abyssinia was now called. Though the Italians retained the colony of Massowah, they had to give up their dream of an East African Colonial Empire which was to balance that of France in the West. They therefore made their next colonial attempt at a different point. But as this took place in connection with the Morocco trouble the latter must first be explained.

Attention has been called to the fact that it was absolutely necessary for France to exercise a control over the administration of Morocco. So long as Mohammedan tribes from the Moroccan territory could disturb Algeria, the security of the French colony was always in danger. But hitherto French attempts to get control over Morocco had always failed on account of England's opposition. Now in 1904 the Entente with England seemed to open the way: the only country which had opposed French supremacy in Morocco recognized French rights there in return for the French recognition of British claims in Egypt. But events at once showed that France was rid of one rival only to raise up another in its place which was more dangerous both from a military and a political point of view. The German Empire raised belated objections to the French aspirations and succeeded in strengthening the Sultan of Morocco in his refusal of French demands. The Anglo-French Convention was held by Germany to be not binding internationally because it had not been officially notified to the other Powers (see p. 340); and at least it ought to be recognized that all European Powers should be accorded equal rights in Morocco. These views were given striking publicity by the German Kaiser's visit to the Moroccan port of Tangier on March 31, 1905. William II declared on this occasion that the object of his visit was to make it publicly known that he was determined to safeguard efficaciously German interests in Morocco; and that he looked upon the Sultan as an absolutely independent sovereign.

This amounted to an official proclamation by Germany that she would absolutely oppose the establishment of a French protectorate

over Morocco. The opposition between the two countries showed itself with an intensity hitherto unequaled in the history of the partitioning of Africa. On the one side was France, which believed that she must guard her great colonial possession from troublesome interference from an independent Morocco or even from German settlements in the country which, as was feared, would be only too easily used at every opportunity to support rebellions against the French. On the other side was the German Empire, which could only maintain her military system and support her excessively swollen population, now numbering sixty millions as against forty millions in 1870, with the aid of her steadily increasing exports; Germany, therefore, believed that she must lay claim to every sort of territory which was still available, in order to provide for her industries. The opposition was still further intensified by the fact that France's new enemy was no longer a state like Great Britain, which avoided in principle any conflict with Great Powers on the Continent out of regard for her own military weakness; on the contrary, France's new enemy was the leading military state of the age, which never hesitated to appeal to the sword by threatening the possibility of war.

The effect of this new turn in Moroccan affairs was enormous in France. It was felt that the military inferiority from which France had suffered in respect to her eastern neighbor since 1870 was now to be exploited not only in European matters, but also in the colonial affairs of North Africa from which Bismarck had always stood aloof.

So this interference on Germany's part produced an impression which long outlasted the immediate episode. For the moment it was not difficult to settle the question at issue, because France gave way in all essential points to Germany's demands: Delcassé, the French minister of foreign affairs, who had refused to abandon France's privileges in Morocco as a matter of principle, had to resign on June 6, 1905, because his colleagues in the Cabinet and the Chamber of Deputies would not support him. France and Germany then signed, on September 28, 1905, an agreement which provided for the internationalization and independence of various branches of the Moroccan administration. This agreement was then laid before an international conference which met shortly afterward, from January to April, 1906, in the Spanish town of Algeciras opposite Gibraltar. Here, also, the German view prevailed completely. Moreover, the very fact that the Moroccan question was placed before an international assembly attended by the European Powers, the United States, and Morocco, was in itself a success for German diplomacy. France, who believed she had a right to claim a priv-

ileged position in Morocco because of her Entente settlement with England in 1904, and because of earlier agreements with Morocco, had to agree to a Franco-Spanish police force and a Moroccan bank which were to be placed under international control, in spite of France's overwhelming financial interests in the region; the chief inspector of the police force was to be a Swiss. In all financial matters, such as the granting of contracts for public works, no one nation was to be given an advantage over others.

But this settlement soon proved unsatisfactory. The native population committed various acts of violence against French subjects in Morocco. Against these acts the international police force, which was never really organized, was powerless. The French, therefore, occupied the town of Ujda on the Algerian frontier, and in 1907 the port of Casablanca was occupied by Spanish troops. At the same time the French advised the establishment of Franco-Spanish protective military detachments in place of the police force, but this proposal was rejected owing to the opposition of the German government.

The Moroccan conflict therefore remained still unsettled. The opposition soon flamed up anew. Aside from the fact that France and Germany could not agree upon the interpretation of the economic clauses of the Algeciras agreement, the internal anarchy in Morocco made French military intervention more necessary than ever. The Sultan of Morocco, Muley Hafid, was threatened by native rebellious tribes who were also making attacks upon the French. France therefore sent a military expedition to the Moroccan capital of Fez, and restored order there; as soon as this had been accomplished, in May and June, 1911, the troops immediately began their retreat. At the same time Spain occupied the port of Larasch on the west coast, because of an earlier agreement.

Germany regarded this advance of the French as a breach of the Algeciras Act, and replied to it by a military demonstration. The gunboat *Panther* was sent to Agadir on the south-west coast of Morocco on July 1, 1911. This was intended as an official proclamation of German claims either to a part of Morocco, or to some other piece of French colonial territory. After long negotiations, during which England at first took a stand against Germany's excessive demands, an agreement was signed on November 4, 1911, by which Germany declared she was ready to recognize French political control over Morocco in return for the cession of considerable French territories in the Congo region. By this agreement, France acquired the right to occupy by military force all points in Morocco

which she deemed necessary for public safety, and also the right to represent the Sultan in his foreign relations. This satisfied the chief complaints of the French. On the other hand, it was agreed that the French Protectorate over Morocco should not be used for the economic advantage of France exclusively; in commercial matters, and in the granting of contracts for public works, no distinction was to be made between nations. The Congo territory which France ceded to Germany amounted to 275,000 square kilometers.

Even this Moroccan arrangement, however, did not wholly clear up the situation. France, on her side, possessed within her Protectorate only limited rights; even the foreign consular courts, for example, remained in existence. On the other hand, it was to be expected that Germany would insist by threats of war, if necessary, that every extension of French authority should be paid for by further cessions of French colonial territory. The time had now come which has already been alluded to: Africa was so completely divided between the European Powers that henceforth, if one country attempted to extend its colonial possessions, it could only do so at the expense of one of the other European Powers. In practice, this situation found expression in the fact that the most powerful military state threatened to rob its less powerful neighbor of a part of its colonies: in Central Africa, especially, it was seeking to establish a connection between the German colonies in the East and West and round them out toward the North. So there developed here inflammable matter of the most dangerous kind—dangerous primarily because it was due to economic causes and because Germany at that time regarded her own continued economic expansion as absolutely necessary if she was to retain longer the position of hegemony which she had hitherto enjoyed (see p. 324). How completely Germany had planned for the acquisition of French colonial territory is seen in the fact that in the decisive days at the end of July, 1914, the German government expressly refused to give Great Britain any kind of a guarantee in favor of the integrity of the French colonies in case of war; in other words, she announced at the outset her purpose of annexing, in whole or in part, French colonial territory after she had won the war.

A curious chain of circumstances now brought it about that one of the Powers on which Germany had thought she could count was no longer on her side, but on that of her enemy; and this was also a result of colonial aspirations in Africa. After Italy's attack against Abyssinia had failed so disastrously, the only region left to which Italian colonial policy could turn was Turkish territory, a remnant

which still remained free from European control between French Tunis and the virtually English possession of Egypt. The Italians now aspired to the conquest of Tripoli. This was especially the case in the fall of 1911, when the Franco-German negotiations over Morocco made it clear that under no circumstances would Italy be able to acquire anything in North West Africa. As early as 1901 and 1903, France and Italy had mutually guaranteed to each other their interests in Morocco and Tripoli; was this, therefore, not the right moment for Italy to foreclose her mortgage?

But how would such an undertaking harmonize with Italy's membership in the Triple Alliance, to say nothing of the possible reproaches which might be made to her on the score of the unattractiveness and barrenness of a region which, not without reason, had hitherto been neglected by the Powers? Would Italy not have to go over to the other coalition of Powers, if she wanted to take possession of a Turkish province? Were not her two allies the most determined protectors of the integrity of the Turkish Empire, which they would not allow to be weakened on account of their opposition to Russia?

Italy realized all this and had prepared herself for the situation some time before by refusing to defend the interests of her official allies during the Algeciras conference. It was quite logical that Italy, who had originally joined the Triple Alliance mainly out of regard for her African policy, should now join the other coalition, after it had become clear that her African policy could be better pursued in alliance with France and Russia than with Germany and Austria. But in spite of this Italy at first preserved an intermediate position. She deserted the principles of the Triple Alliance, but since her partners declared that they agreed to this under certain reservations, she did not break with them.

It was under these curious circumstances that the Tripolitan War took place. The main military operations were almost wholly limited to the region which Italy wanted to acquire. Any attacks on Turkish territory in the Balkans, which would have struck Turkey in her most vulnerable spot,—like the attack upon Prevesa in Epirus which had been counted upon so much—had to be renounced or broken off, because Austria-Hungary was unwilling under any circumstances to allow any change in the Balkan situation.

The official reason given as the cause of the war was that the Turkish government in Tripoli, in spite of Italian complaints, had continually put difficulties in the way of Italian settlers. An Italian ultimatum therefore demanded permission to occupy the Tripolitan

territory. When this was refused, Italy declared war on September 29, 1911.

The Turks had not expected this step, and, thanks to the surprise nature of the attack, the first phase of the Italian operations was highly successful. Within fourteen days all five of the chief ports in Tripolitania were occupied by Italian troops. Already the Italian Chamber of Deputies began to discuss the cabinet proposal that the newly-conquered land, which was now given the ancient designation of "Libya," should be declared annexed to Italy. But the resistance of the enemy was by no means broken. The hostility of the native Mohammedan population to Christian rule found a stronger support in Tripoli than in Algiers. The Turks succeeded in getting modern guns to Tripoli, with which to arm the Arabs; they also despatched a corps of officers under Enver Bey to organize a defensive war against the invaders. The only thing that was lacking to them was an adequate heavy artillery. In general, however, Turkish tactics soon proved very dangerous, and it was not long before the Italian government considerably increased its troops and burdened its budget with very heavy military expenditures. The Turks did succeed, at times, in restricting the Italians to the possession of the five ports; and although the Italians succeeded in reconquering some of the oases near the coast, all their further advances against the desert tribes met with insuperable difficulties. After half a year of fighting the war seemed likely to drag on endlessly. This at first gave the advantage to the Turks, who had not been able to do much except send munitions to the fighting forces.

Under these circumstances, it occurred to the Italians to bring the war to an end in another region. If they could not attack the Arab tribes in the Tripolitan deserts, why should not Turkey be compelled to yield by attacks on her vulnerable points, especially as the Italians were absolutely superior at sea? The Italians therefore attempted a number of such attacks: the bombardment of several ports in the Red Sea, November, 1911, to January, 1912; a naval demonstration against Beirut on February 24, 1912; and attacks on the Dardanelles, in April and July, 1912. But here it became very clear how greatly Italy was hampered by her membership in the Triple Alliance. She had been denied any attack on the Balkans, as has just been stated, because of the opposition of her allies. Any effective attack upon Syria was not possible, because here the interests of Italy came into conflict with those of France and England, who had no reason to show any regard for a member of the opposing coalition. So, of all Italy's efforts, the

only one of permanent consequence was her occupation of Rhodes and the dozen neighboring islands known as the "Dodecanese"; these gave Italy an important mortgage in hand when it came to peace negotiations.

The occupation of Rhodes was also the decisive step. The Turkish government now perceived that a continuation of the war would only result in further losses of territory, and declared that she was ready for official peace negotiations in Lausanne; and as Turkey was now threatened by the Balkan League and its first victories, she consented to the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on October 18, 1912. This satisfied Italy's claims for the most part. Not only was Italy's conquest of Tripolitania virtually recognized by Turkey, but the Italians were allowed to keep the islands in the Ægean until the last Turkish officer had left Tripoli. The Sultan of Turkey retained only his religious sovereignty over the ceded territories, a concession which could only have serious consequences for Italy in case Turkey was able to support her demands with military measures; so Italy naturally came to be opposed to the maintenance of the Turkish power in its existing extent.

In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, Italy did not judge it wise to break with either of the two coalitions of allied Powers. Scarcely was the Peace of Lusanne signed, when she gave her consent on December 5, 1912, to a further renewal of the Triple Alliance. Her allies had to recognize expressly her sovereignty over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Italy was thus free to join, according to circumstances, whichever coalition promised her greater assistance in her policy of expansion in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, it was clear that the Triple Alliance could only be permanent in case Austria-Hungary held strictly to the agreement, repeated in the new text of the Triple Alliance treaty, by which Italy and Austria-Hungary were to act in common and upon a footing of equality in the Balkans. As Italy had been forced to submit to painful limitations in her war with Turkey out of regard for Austria's Balkan policy, she would hold fast to the Alliance only so long as her Austrian partner refrained from independent action in the Balkans. This was one of the main reasons why the Alliance was denounced prematurely by Italy.

The African colonial policy of the European Great Powers—the partition of Africa among themselves—had at first resulted in a more or less easy division, but had then come to exercise a dominating influence upon the relation of the Powers to one another in Europe, where opposing interests were becoming sharper and sharper.

It became increasingly difficult to satisfy new Powers with all that they wanted, when the African territory had already been wholly divided up, without seriously injuring old legal owners. Not in vain had Africa been Europeanized; it now became the battle-field and the military objective of European armies.

CHAPTER XXX

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. II: ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA

In Asia the new character of European colonial policy was no less evident than in Africa. In Asia also there was an increase in the number of the Powers who were trying to acquire colonial possessions. To those nations which had been seeking to maintain or extend traditional interests were now added others which were pursuing a colonial policy simply for its own sake. And in Western and Central Asia the result was much the same as in Africa: at the end of the period there survived no really independent states, that is, native states, which did not exist either by the grace or the jealousy of the Great Powers of Europe. Very different, on the contrary, was the case in Eastern Asia. Here took place on a great scale what had happened in Africa only in the Abyssinian region: one native state succeeded by its own power in triumphantly opposing European pressure, and another, though defenseless at first, was at least strong enough to proceed to Europeanize its resources and political organization.

Of the territorial acquisitions made by European Powers which did not take part in the partition of Asia in the first half of the nineteenth century, the most important were those of France.

French colonial policy in Eastern Asia in its beginnings reaches back to the time of the Second Empire, when it was little more than a matter of prestige. The "Emperor" of Annam put to death some Christian missionaries in 1858 and refused to make amends. Thereupon Napoleon III despatched an expedition and the Asiatic prince had to cede his southern provinces, including Saigon; these constituted French Cochin-China in 1862. This proceeding made such an impression in the region that the neighboring King of Cambodia, who felt threatened by the more powerful ruler of Siam, put himself under French protection; and in 1867 those of his provinces which lay next to Cochin-China were cut off and annexed to the French colony.

Cochin-China in itself was not of great value. And if the French had hoped to acquire a part of the South China trade, the hope

vanished when the bold explorations of two French officers made it certain that the Mekong River, which empties into the sea through Cochin-China, was not navigable. They found that for the China trade the only suitable river was the Red River, or Song-Ka, which empties into the sea through Tongking, far to the north of Cochin-China.

Here in Tongking began the really new colonial policy of France, dictated by modern commercial motives. French merchants established some settlements in Tongking and sought to exploit the new trade route. But they found a cool reception among the officials of Annam. An unfortunate incident occurred: French officers seized fortified places near the mouth of the Song-Ka, and in doing so were killed in 1873. The French government at the moment was not inclined toward an aggressive colonial policy. It refrained from reprisals and contented itself with the Treaty of Saigon of 1874, by which the Emperor of Annam promised to open Tongking to French trade and even recognized an indefinite kind of French protectorate.

But in practice this treaty proved worthless. The ruler of Annam could disregard his promises the more easily from the fact that nominally he stood under Chinese suzerainty and was encouraged more or less officially by China to oppose the foreigners, so that the situation of the French merchants in Tongking was exceedingly precarious. Trade on the Song-Ka was out of the question. In addition to all this, a French detachment, which had seized the fortress of Hanoi on the Song-Ka in order to secure respect for the treaty, was ambushed by bands known as "Black Flags," and annihilated in 1883.

Thereupon the French Government decided to intervene in Tongking in earnest. A regular expedition was fitted out. From this moment there was no longer any question of serious resistance either by Annam or by China. The new Emperor of Annam signed the Treaty of Hué by which he recognized a French protectorate. China gave way soon afterwards, after her troops, along with the "Black Flags," had been chased out of the Tongking territory; and on May 11, 1884, Li-Hung-Chang signed in his country's name the Treaty of Tien-Tsin, by which the Chinese promised to recall the rest of their troops from the fortified places in Tongking and to recognize the French protectorate over both Tongking and Annam.

China's signature, however, as it seems, was only a sham. French troops occupying the northern part of Tongking met with difficulties, as Chinese troops blocked the way. Therefore the French decided

to strike a blow against China itself and secure guarantees that the treaty would be observed. They began a campaign which was splendidly conducted and lasted seven months during 1884-85. The French army destroyed the Chinese arsenal of Fuchau, 32 kilometers from the coast in Fukien Province, blockaded the island of Formosa off the coast, and occupied the Pescadores Islands which lie between Formosa and the mainland. Then the French decreed a rice-blockade against the Gulf of Pechili, i.e., against Peking; North China, which was accustomed to import its rice supply from the southern provinces by sea, was to be starved into submission. Two Chinese cruisers which tried to break through the blockade were torpedoed. At the same time an effort was made to clear the Chinese troops completely out of Tongking.

Although in this last operation the Chinese won some considerable successes—which led to the overthrow of the Ferry ministry which had begun the war—the general military situation was such that China had no alternative but to yield. A second time a treaty was signed at Tien-Tsin on June 9, 1885, which not only confirmed the treaty of the preceding year, but which also conceded to the French freedom of trade in the southern provinces of China.

France thus acquired final control over Tongking and Annam. But how little the French at that time realized the importance of colonial possessions is shown by the fact that the credits asked by the government for the occupation of Tongking in accordance with the treaty were voted by the Chamber of Deputies only by the narrow majority of 274 to 270 (December, 1885).

But within a decade public opinion in France changed and unreservedly supported the extension and safeguarding of the colonies in Eastern Asia. At first the various territories were consolidated for technical administrative reasons; Annam, Cambodia, Tongking and Cochin-China were united under "The General Government of Indo-China." Then the connections between the different parts, especially between Tongking in the north and Cambodia in the south, were improved by bringing the whole course of the Mekong under French control. The King of Siam, who held important positions on the river at two points, was compelled by the Treaty of October 3, 1893, to cede the whole left bank to the French, and to promise not to erect any fortifications within 25 kilometers of the right or west bank. In 1896 the English, who by the occupation of Burma had become neighbors of the French, recognized the rights of the French on the Mekong where the river touched British territory. Finally, in 1907, some southern provinces occupied by Siam

were annexed, so that French Indo-China formed a solid and well-rounded economic whole. The independence of Siam—which lay between English and French territory in somewhat the same way as Afghanistan lay between British and Russian—was mutually guaranteed by both Powers.

During the same period European nations were acquiring possessions in Oceanica, though they are of less importance in world history. The islands of the Pacific in themselves were much easier to conquer than the Asiatic territories; but because of their subordinate economic importance, at first at any rate, they had hardly attracted the attention of the European Powers. In 1843 the French proclaimed a protectorate over Tahiti, and in 1853 they annexed New Caledonia, to be a penal settlement like that of the original English settlement in Australia. Later annexations in the Pacific took place largely to satisfy the whites in Australia, who feared not without reason that their peaceful existence would be threatened if other Great Powers besides England made extensive conquests. Therefore the Australians continually urged London to extend more widely the area of British rule.

The new era of British annexations began in 1875 with England's occupation of the Fiji Islands. The Australian province of Queensland also desired the annexation of New Guinea; but the British Government at first declined. Only after Germany had annexed a part of the island did the English step in; New Guinea was then divided in 1886 between Germany, Holland and Great Britain. In the following years, a systematic partitioning of the islands of the Pacific took place, and the process has been going on in detail up to the most recent times. Many groups of islands were split up after the fashion of New Guinea—the Samoan Islands, for instance, between Germany and the United States, and the New Hebrides under a joint Anglo-French "control." Here in the Pacific the same thing took place as in Africa, only on a smaller scale; the Europeanization of the world was extended to Oceanica.

Of far greater importance was the first collision which took place between one of the Great Powers of Europe and one of the Europeanized nations of Eastern Asia.

China's military weakness, which had been revealed in the Tongking war, was soon afterwards again made evident in her war with Japan (see p. 161 f.). Japan's victory was so crushing that the Great Powers of Europe did not allow her to make full use of it: they not only compelled her to forego some of her conquests, but com-

pensated themselves at China's expense. Thus Russia secured from China the right to lease Port Arthur and to extend the Trans-Siberian Railway across Manchuria. France received similar concessions, and also an important port in South China. Great Britain received Wei-hai-wei opposite Port Arthur. Germany occupied Kiaochau in the Shantung Peninsula. Italy alone had her demands refused. Everywhere the foreigners began to construct railways for which China had to grant concessions.

Then a national Chinese reaction against the "Foreign Devils" began. This time the movement took place mainly, not in the South as formerly, but in the northern provinces which had felt most severely the political and commercial invasion of the European nations. The members of the secret societies who wanted to fight the Europeans were known as "Boxers," and they received underhand support from the Chinese Government, especially after 1898, when the Dowager Empress, Tsu-Hsi, seized the power from the young Emperor Kwang-Su, who wanted to introduce reforms after the Japanese fashion.

The Boxer movement broke out in the early summer of 1900. Connections between Tien-Tsin and Peking were cut in June, many Christians were murdered in Peking, and the European Legations were besieged and partly destroyed. The German ambassador was one of those killed. But the senseless revolt quickly collapsed. An international army was sent up from Tien-Tsin and relieved the Legations without great difficulty, so that China had to renew the concessions made to the European Powers and also pay a heavy indemnity.

The Europeans then took up the penetration of China with redoubled zeal. But it soon appeared that they had to reckon with a new opponent who was more dangerous than China.

Of all the European nations Russia had the greatest interest in getting a firm footing in Eastern Asia. As the population in Russia rapidly increased, Siberia gained an undreamt-of importance as colonial land. Russian peasants had migrated there in large numbers, and though they settled mostly in Western Siberia, it became increasingly important to make sure of the East. Siberia must be brought into close contact with the mother country and with the trade of the world; care must be taken so that Russia's overwhelming military force could be available for use in the Far East against China and Japan. These ideas found most definite expression in the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was begun in 1891 and completed ten years later. This mighty strategic

undertaking, which connected Moscow with Port Arthur as well as with Vladivostok, not only made it possible to forward large masses of troops in brief time to the Chinese frontier, but also stimulated to a large degree the immigration into Siberia. The products of the Siberian mines and farms and the tea of China could now be transported cheaply to the markets of Europe.

It was easy to carry on this policy which concentrated, so to speak, all Russia's imperialistic tendencies on Eastern Asia, so long as it touched China only, but the Russians went ahead with just as little regard for the existing and future aspirations of the Japanese. They tried to occupy the harbor of Masampo in Southern Korea, and threatened to bring the Korean Peninsula under their influence. They intended not only to deprive Japan of Korea (see p. 162), but also to cut off, as far as possible, all connection between Japan and China. With this in view they fortified strongly their naval base at Port Arthur.

But Japan had no intention willingly to allow this to take place. Now that she had Europeanized her military organization, she felt equal in power to the great nations of Europe and she knew also that henceforth her policy of expansion would not have the whole European concert opposed to her. England, the old rival of Russian policy in Asia, had signed an alliance with Japan in 1902 and this had disrupted the harmony among the European Powers. The Tokio government therefore demanded of Russia that she recognize the independence both of Korea and Manchuria, that is, of the two territories which the Russians were intending to treat as their sphere of influence. Just like the European states, Japan also could insist that her own excess population needed Korea, both as a place for colonial settlement and as a market for Japanese manufactured goods.

When the Russians merely gave evasive answers, Japan suddenly opened war a few months later. On February 9, 1904, without warning, she torpedoed at Port Arthur several of the best Russian ships in the Pacific.

The war which began in this way lasted eighteen months and resulted in one defeat after another for the Russians. As in the case of the war with China earlier (see p. 161), Japan at once showed herself unquestionably superior at sea. Again it was evident that an absolutistic state was unable to accomplish naval results which were worth much of anything (see p. 37). On April 11, 1904, the Russian flagship *Petropavlovsk* was torpedoed, and thereafter the Japanese were in absolute control of the sea.

On land the Japanese quickly drove the Russians out of Korea and forced them back into Manchuria beyond the Yalu River which separates Manchuria and Korea. This was followed in September, 1904, by the Russian defeat at Liao-Yang. Port Arthur was then shut in and, being without reinforcements, had to surrender on January 2, 1905, after a siege of seven months. This set free more Japanese troops for service in Manchuria, where the Japanese armies were now able to concentrate and defeat the Russians in a fourteen days' battle at the Mukden, which was followed by the siege of the city of Mukden in March, 1905. The Japanese victories were incomplete only to the extent that the Russian army was able to withdraw in orderly fashion and take up new positions further north from which the Japanese were unable to dislodge them.

In spite of this, the situation was most unfavorable to the Russians. They had lost altogether, or in large part, both the territories for which they had risked war with Japan, and they had no hope of reconquering them. They therefore decided to make one desperate effort—to use the Baltic fleet which had been despatched around the world to help the armies in Manchuria; but the effort was in vain. The fleet was totally destroyed by the Japanese on May 30, 1905, near Tsu-shima Island in the Straits of Korea.

Under these circumstances the Russians gladly accepted President Roosevelt's offer of mediation. Negotiations were opened at Portsmouth in the United States and led to the signing of a treaty of peace on September 5, 1905. By this treaty Russia had to give up all her intentions against Japan. She resigned to her opponent the protectorate over Korea and ceded Port Arthur and the southern half of the Island of Sakhalin. Furthermore, she agreed to evacuate Manchuria, which was to be given back to China and to be open to the trade of all nations.

Aside from these territorial agreements the Peace of Portsmouth marks a turning point in the history of the world. It was the first time that a non-European Power had proved herself superior in war to a European Great Power. It had been shown that the pupil might be more powerful than his teacher. It had been proved that European states, which had enjoyed a superiority due to the fact that they had gotten a start in technical inventions, might be easily overtaken by peoples of another race, and that the rule over the world which Europeans had established in the nineteenth century rested on a much more precarious basis than had hitherto been supposed. In many regions the triumph of the Japanese acted as a stimulus toward imitation of Europeans. It also strengthened

greatly the opposition to the tendency of Europeans to exploit non-European peoples. In comparison with these results all other consequences were quite subordinate, even such as the effects at home which the defeat of the Russian armies had upon the constitutional development of the Tsar's empire (see ch. xxxiii).

It was in China that the lessons to be drawn from the Russo-Japanese war were most quickly turned to effect. The reactionary nationalistic "Boxer" tendencies disappeared completely. The government itself now undertook to Europeanize China. It abolished the old system of examinations for civil officials which rested on a literary humanistic basis. Torture and penalties involving mutilation of the body were done away with. Even private practices, like the foot-binding of women of the upper class, were forbidden. Obstacles were no longer placed in the way of building railroads and establishing schools. Japanese teachers were engaged and numerous Chinese were sent to Europe to complete their education. As in the case of Japan, there followed at the same time a Europeanization of the system of government, that is, a reform in a liberal direction. In 1906 the government sent a commission to Europe to study the various forms of political institutions, and when this returned and made its report, the Dowager Empress, as regent, announced the issue of a constitution for China.

But however progressive the Manchu dynasty professed to be in appearance, it soon appeared that it was not able, or perhaps did not desire, to carry out a real Europeanization of the country. A situation in which a foreign warrior tribe ruled the country was only tolerable so long as the Manchus were able to protect the empire against outsiders. Now the Manchus had shown themselves unable to prevent the intrusion of Europeans. Furthermore, it was in direct contradiction with European political notions that the supreme government should be conducted without any participation by Chinese natives, especially as it was in the hands of a foreign tribe which was of a lower civilization. It was not to be expected, therefore, that under these circumstances the Manchus would honestly assist in modernizing China when this would threaten at the same time their own authority. In vain did the government urge intermarriage between Manchus and Chinese—by which the ruling race, as such, would have ceased to exist. In vain did it issue liberal announcements. In 1908 the Dowager Empress and her son, who was a minor, suddenly died within twenty-four hours of one another and in 1912 the Manchu dynasty was definitely overthrown. China became a republic with Yuan-shi-kai as Provisional President.

This transformation of China into a republic was merely the last step in a movement which had begun after the death of the Dowager Empress. In 1909, as a preparation for a future parliamentary form of government, provincial assemblies had been established. In 1910 a national assembly consisting chiefly of officials was called together, which, in turn, demanded the immediate calling of a national Chinese parliament. This demand was conceded in 1912, and in 1913 there came together the first parliament, which confirmed the Provisional President in his office. But this did not bring about any regular functioning of the new political institutions, for the president's first act was to exclude his opponents from parliament and to dissolve the assembly. Since that time, China has been unable to emerge from the revolutionary stage and yet the process of Europeanization has not been undone. These results are closely connected with the size and organization of the Chinese empire, which differs so much from Japan. Japan is a relatively small territory with a unified population; there it was merely a question of replacing the rule of a caste by that of the old national imperial system; but the gigantic area of the Chinese empire includes sharp contrasts. It had been held together hitherto merely by the rule of a foreign dynasty. As soon as this was overthrown the question arose as to which part of the empire could assume the leadership. At once rival struggles broke out between the provinces, especially between those of the North and the South. The wealth of China lies more in the southern provinces, which lead in trade and industry, than in the region around Peking, which had become the capital mainly for military reasons. The South was therefore not at all inclined to subordinate itself to the control of the North which could only justify its claim by the fact that it possessed the capital. Out of this question arose rebellion and one civil war after another, and this is essentially the situation at the moment at which these lines are being written.

The future of the Middle Kingdom is not clear. At the present moment, one can merely say that China's economic strength and productivity have been scarcely weakened by all this political confusion. The people of China have developed their economic life to a high point which, in its way, can scarcely be matched, and they have done this by their own initiative and without having to follow the directions of a central government. Therefore disturbances in the functioning of the central governmental machine have less serious consequences than would be the case in other countries.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. III: THE ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRES

THE most novel and modern colonial policy is that which has been pursued during the last half century by the two Anglo-Saxon empires, Great Britain and the United States. A wholly new type of federal state has been created by the British. A commonwealth which has wholly given up the old traditional forceful methods, it scarcely deserves the name of a political state, and yet in the end it has proven to be firmer than many another organization which is held together by force of arms. It is the purpose of this chapter briefly to describe this new phenomenon. The order followed will be to give an account first of the growth of the British Empire, then of the new world policy of the United States, and finally of the relations which have been established between these two empires.

It must be expressly noted, especially as concerns the British Empire, that naturally only the so-called self-governing colonies or "Dominions" will be considered, that is, only the outlying colonies which are overwhelmingly settled by white men. For reasons which are evident, these are the only regions which can be regarded as sharing in the new "imperial" policy. In this chapter, therefore, I shall wholly leave out of account the colonies which are inhabited mainly by non-Europeans; the essential facts in regard to these have already been given in other connections (see ch. xviii for India, and chs. xxix-xxx for observations in regard to the British acquisitions in Central Africa and the Pacific).

Let us take first British colonial policy, that is, England's relation to the settlements which have been made by white men outside Europe.

The history of these relations is dominated by one single event: the revolt of the Thirteen Colonies gave a warning which could not be ignored by any English government. The demand of England which led to the revolt was that the colonies should bear their part of the military expenditures raised for the common interest. The Americans, however, had opposed this with the claim that as free

men they ought not to be called upon to pay taxes which had been voted, not by themselves, but by the Parliament at London. With the aid of the French this claim was triumphantly maintained and led to the loss of what was at that time the most important colony of white settlers.

This had the result that other colonies in an analogous position were granted greater constitutional rights: in 1791, shortly after the revolt of the Thirteen Colonies, Canada was given a constitution. England renounced completely the earlier and, in itself, natural principle that obligations and rights ought to correspond to one another. Gradually she granted the colonies all the rights of self-government, even the right of having commercial policies of their own which might possibly be directed against the mother country; but in spite of this she also assumed, as before, all the military burdens, especially the burden of defense upon the sea.

This was an altogether peculiar relationship. The citizen of the Dominions enjoyed all the advantages which come from belonging to a Great Power; the British fleet and British power protected him and his interests, but in return he himself did not have to assume the slightest obligation. He did not even have to contribute to the limited military taxes demanded of the inhabitants of the mother country. He was privileged in every respect: not only was he free from a financial burden, but he was spared all the difficult problems which arise in a liberally governed state from the union of the military and civil administrations.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that about the middle of the nineteenth century, when the more advanced colonies began to pursue a tariff policy of their own—Canada introduced a protective tariff in 1859—there developed in England, especially in strongly Liberal circles, a strong movement in favor of complete separation of the colonies. Since the colonies no longer adapted themselves to the wishes of the mother country, and no longer had regard for her interests—why should the connection which had become merely formal be continued any longer? Why should England assume duties and secure no services in return? Would not the connection due to the community of speech, of customs, and of political thought make itself just as strongly felt if the last remnants of the earlier dependence were done away with, leaving the colonies and the mother country to stand side by side as independent states with equal rights?

This view, however, never prevailed, and events have proved that it was not well grounded. It is precisely this virtually complete

freedom, in fact this privileged position which England has given her colonies, which has kept alive and untroubled the feeling of attachment which emigrant children have toward the mother country. It is this which has taught them really to prize their membership in the British Empire. And, since the mother country never used compulsion, the Dominions, at least in large part, have ever been ready in time of need to give voluntary assistance on a wide scale. The correct treatment of colonies, the correct procedure in those questions of imperial policy which affect the particular interests of special regions in different and often contradictory ways, was and remains a difficult matter for the English government. It has often demanded almost superhuman political tact and an extraordinary adaptability in making political compromises, but the positive advantage which has resulted to England, be it noted on the other side, is the fact that any idea of an armed uprising (like that, for instance, of the Thirteen Colonies) has never since been considered in the British colonies. The mother country has been spared the need of any kind of military preparations and burdens to prevent uprisings, at least in the regions occupied by Anglo-Saxons.

The development of the Dominions themselves has been dependent in the nineteenth century mainly on population conditions in Europe, and in a lesser degree on economic events, such as the discovery of gold in Australia, which have attracted to the colonies other persons than those who have been driven there through the pressure of excess population. This was of importance for the future; it increased essentially the preponderance of an English element among the immigrants. It has been pointed out above that the European country which prior to 1850 was chiefly compelled to send a part of its population overseas was Great Britain, which by that time had become an industrial country. The settlers who went out to South Africa and Australia were of English descent; as a result not only were new colonies, like New Zealand, prevailingly English from the outset, so that immigrants from other nations were assimilated by the dominant race, but also even colonies which originally were not made up mainly of an English population, like the Dutch in the Cape Colony, or the French in Canada, acquired a strongly English stamp.

In the first half of the nineteenth century the European emigration to the English colonies was still so slight in comparison with the stream of emigrants which flowed into the United States that the Australian continent could still be used as a penal settlement. Though an English immigration into South Africa began as early

as 1819, free colonists did not settle in Australia until 1828, nor in New Zealand until the years 1839-41. The sending of convicts to New South Wales was not limited until 1840, and did not cease completely until 1851; in Van Diemen's Land it did not cease until 1853. As late as 1849 the territory of West Australia, which was less favorably adapted to colonists, still asked for the sending out of convicts.

Shortly after this, however, occurred an event which attracted great numbers of free white settlers to Australia. In 1851 the first gold was discovered and there began on a large scale that movement to the fifth continent which, as far as a good part of its area is concerned, is much less favorable for agriculture than Canada or even New Zealand. The number of inhabitants in the colony of Victoria rose from 77,000 in 1851 to 731,000 twenty years later. It was not until 1870 that the number of immigrants sharply declined. The country was then so thickly settled that it could not easily absorb a large stream of people without property; as there were no regular "poor" in Australia, such new immigrants would have been a danger for the people already settled there. They would have remained proletarians and would have tended to depress the relatively high wages of the workingmen who had settled there earlier. Furthermore, occupations like cattle and sheep raising, which formed the main support of the Australians, need only a relatively small population. If the population had become much denser the Australians would have been less able to support themselves by their profitable exports, which had been made possible by the invention of refrigeration for transporting meat and other food products to Europe.

The workingmen especially therefore were strongly opposed to immigration, and since 1873 nothing has been done to stimulate it. For the growing population itself, care was particularly taken in Australia that the large landed estates, so far as they had survived from the time of the first settlements, should be divided up more or less voluntarily. In the 1860's and '70's, legislation in many of the colonies had attempted to stimulate agriculture and the development of small peasant proprietors; then in the 1890's all the colonial governments in Australia attacked directly large estates and made possible the compulsory dividing-up of large lands. This was most energetically done in New Zealand, where somewhat the same climatic conditions exist as in England and where the country is therefore particularly well suited for the extension of agriculture. At the beginning of the twentieth century four times as much land was

cultivated as in 1870; sugar, wheat, and fruits could be exported in considerable quantities. This prosperous development was powerfully supported by the building of railways, largely undertaken by the governments, which brought the interior into direct connection with the ports of the country.

Though the country was large, the natural increase of population was so limited that even modern France scarcely shows a smaller increase in population. The Australians, and still more, perhaps, the New Zealanders began to take care to preserve that satisfactory condition of economic equilibrium which secures to every one who wants to work an adequate livelihood, and which also prevents both excessive wealth and wretched poverty. The problem, indeed, was not simple in its solution. It is only in theory that states exist in isolation, and only a Utopian can construct a community which is rationally organized according to its own desires. In practice, the higher the standard of living rises, the greater is the danger that foreigners will come in who will work for less and underbid the natives. In Australia and New Zealand these dangerous foreigners were the neighboring East Asiatics and particularly the intelligent and industrious Chinese. At first, so long as there was a lack of labor supply, Chinese and Hindu coolies were imported by the Australians themselves, but when whole masses of Chinese began to enter the country after the first discoveries of gold, the Australians began to adopt their first defensive measures: ship owners who imported Chinese had to pay a special tax from 1855 to 1861. This law, and others like it, were, however, not prohibitive, and remained in force only so long as the gold fever lasted. It was not until later, in the 1880's, that stricter measures were adopted. The Chinese were then excluded from work in the mines and from naturalization, and in 1888 had to pay a heavy poll-tax. Later, from 1897 to 1899, the example of the southern states in the American Union was adopted in various Australian states and in New Zealand: immigrants had to show an "evidence of education" which in practice resulted in a complete exclusion of "undesirables." What had formerly been merely the expression of class interests, now became a national ideal. It was no longer merely the workingmen who desired the exclusion of cheap labor; all the rest of the population insisted on keeping the land pure of elements which, on account of their foreign unassimilable character, might easily be an obstacle to the democratic development of the country. How strongly this feeling permeates all classes is best seen in the fact that since 1905 the Australians have preferred the lesser evil

of attracting white settlers again. Though competition from whites may be ever so unwelcome, it is still far less dangerous than that of the Chinese!

Military considerations have also had an influence. Was it not conceivable that some day China or some other Asiatic power would no longer tolerate the exclusion of its children and would try to compel the Australians by force to give up laws which were hostile to Asiatics? Against an actual attack, the colonies were, for the present, protected by British power, but even England was not always free in her attitude, and so Australia finally had to give a welcome to new settlers who, as far as race interests were concerned, would have a feeling of solidarity with the old colonists.

Under these circumstances, the connection with the mother country gained new importance, both positively and negatively; positively, in so far as protection by England assumed new importance; and negatively in so far as the colonies wished to be in a position to defend their own interests themselves, whenever their attitude should happen to be in contradiction with the imperial policy directed from London. England made no opposition to this. On the contrary, the more the colonies developed their military resources, which, however, were quite limited, the more the mother country loosened her connection with them and did away with practically everything which served as a reminder of her control over the members of the Empire.

Thus, at present, there are no longer any "imperial troops" in the Dominions. Even the execution of laws for the protection of natives, which in a way have formed a natural prerogative of the mother country, has been put into the hands of the colonial governments. The possibility of appealing from colonial courts to a supreme court in London has been partly put an end to, and partly so limited that the right must be regarded as virtually obsolete. Even in diplomatic relations the colonies have acquired a position of equality and the right to make treaties. Since 1877 it has been an established principle that the colonies may or may not, as suits them, adopt commercial treaties which have been made by the Imperial Government; in 1900 this principle was extended to all international agreements. No control is even exercised by London to ensure freedom of movement from one colony to another; the Dominions are free in the management of their immigration questions, and Australia and Canada have the right to exclude a British subject from entering their country merely on the grounds that he appears to be "undesirable."

In spite of this, or because of it, the British Empire has held solidly together. The feeling of unity and the realization of the advantages of political connection with Great Britain have been strong enough to make up for the lack of a federal organization. It was also a great advantage that not only were the language and customs everywhere the same, but also the political institutions. If one considers how greatly the unification of the German lands was hindered by the variety of political ideals from Prussian East Elbian territory to the South German states; or if one recalls what a great obstacle to the continuance of the union resulted from the existence of slavery in the southern states of America, then one can easily judge what an advantage the British Dominions have enjoyed through the fact that their political institutions have everywhere rested upon the same modern democratic basis. No colony has ever been compelled for the sake of unity to give up the liberal institutions and forms which it loves. On the contrary, the connection between the Dominions has resulted in reforms which have been introduced in one colony being adopted soon in another. Even the mother country herself, which, for reasons easy to understand, has retained more traces than the Dominions of her pre-revolutionary political organization, shows an increasing tendency, as time goes on, to copy political innovations from her colonies. An example of this is the spread of woman's suffrage. Women were first given equal political rights with men in New Zealand in 1893; during the following decade woman's suffrage spread through all the Australian states and about fifteen years later, in 1918, it became law in Great Britain likewise.

Gradually also the mother country ceased to oppose in any way the union into a federal commonwealth of colonies which were geographically close together. From the standpoint of Machiavellian doctrine it would have been quite natural to keep the individual colonies as isolated politically as possible, in order to make it easier to control them; and in Canada, at least, England originally pursued this plan, although the separation into two provinces which was made in 1791 aimed primarily at protecting the weaker Anglo-Saxon population from being outvoted by the French. But whatever may have been the attitude of the London government at first, here, also, it later adopted a policy of trustfulness and liberty instead of suspicious calculations. Canada was later united again in 1840; in 1867 Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were added; and the whole federation was given the name of "Dominion of Canada." Similarly no obstacles were placed in the way of the Australian states when,

after long negotiations, they were united into a federal commonwealth in 1900.

This policy of federal organization and liberty was even applied in South Africa, where national differences and a war which had scarcely ended might have made the experiment seem especially dangerous.

In order rightly to understand this one must go back a little in the narrative.

When the English acquired Cape Colony as the result of the Revolutionary wars, she gained possession of a colony which was of great importance in view of her connection with India, and one which was at the same time largely settled by white men. But the population was not of English nationality. It was almost exclusively composed of planters of Dutch and French descent—Boers—who had forced the native population into a condition of semi-slavery, and who had taken the privileged position of a ruling race. The English occupation now disturbed these patriarchical conditions. The Boers determined therefore to escape from this new situation by emigrating, and, since the territory north of Cape Colony was still vacant and unclaimed by any European state, an emigration took place lasting more than twenty years, without interference, at any rate, by any European Powers. The first of these "Treks" or migrations took place in 1836, and led to the establishment of the Orange State. Other Boers later attempted to establish a colony in Natal; but since their settlement approached the sea and might have been dangerous to the ocean route to India they were soon pursued by the British; as the Boers wanted to remain independent they pushed further inland toward the northwest beyond the Vaal river and founded the "Transvaal" State (1845-1852).

The founding of these states took place just at the time when the Liberal movement in England which placed little value on colonial possessions had reached its height; and furthermore, since the Boers had settled exclusively in the interior of the country where the British were not yet at all interested, the English government had no objection to recognizing the two new states, the Transvaal Republic in 1852 and the Orange Free State in 1854.

But this attitude of toleration came to an end when the new colonial policy began to develop, when Africa began to be systematically partitioned, and when the interior of the Continent began to be marked off into European spheres of influence. Even before this the Boers had been interfered with in various ways. Diamonds had been discovered in 1871 at Kimberley in the Orange Free State;

these diamond fields had to be ceded by the Republic to the English in return for some compensation. Then, in 1877, the Boers made a new advance toward the Indian Ocean, but were driven back by the war-like Kaffir tribes. The British government took advantage of this opportunity to proclaim the annexation of the Transvaal at Pretoria, the capital of the territory. At the same time, also, the British took up the war with the Zulus, whom the Boers had not been able to overcome, and after considerable efforts brought it to an end. It was in the course of this undertaking that Napoleon III's only son, who had enlisted with the English as a volunteer, was killed by Zulu spears on June 1, 1879.

Immediately after the annexation of the Transvaal a number of the Boers had begun a new Trek northwards into the region of Portuguese East Africa. But even those who remained behind were unwilling to submit to British rule. Under their three leaders, Pretorius, Joubert, and Krüger, a revolt broke out, which, thanks to a number of successful battles on the border of Natal, including especially one at Majuba Hill on February 27, 1881, turned out wholly in favor of the Boers. England had to give in and by the treaty of August 3, 1881, recognized anew the independence of the two Boer republics, though with a reservation as to British suzerainty. A new treaty of February 27, 1884, in return for certain concessions of territory, limited Great Britain's authority still further, so that the British merely had control over the foreign relations of the republics.

Perhaps this situation would have lasted a long time if the Boer republics had not discovered an unexpected source of wealth. Not long after the treaty of 1884 extraordinarily rich gold fields were discovered in the so-called "Rand" south of Pretoria in the Transvaal, whereupon hordes of people from every possible country in Europe flocked to the spot. The new city of Johannesburg, south of Pretoria, shot up out of the ground. There developed a large colony of foreigners, or "Uitlanders" as they were called by the Boers, whose interests were not at all in harmony with those of the Boers. Being treated as foreigners more or less without rights, and yet compelled to pay heavy taxes over the expenditure of which they had no control, the Uitlanders finally united in the "Transvaal National Union" in order to secure equality of political rights, and especially representation in the "Raad" or legislature. At the end of 1895 a regular revolt was planned in Johannesburg. Dr. Jameson, the friend of Cecil Rhodes, who was president of the English Chartered Company, to which the Kimberley diamond fields belonged,

led a raid which was to aid the revolt in Johannesburg. But he was taken prisoner near Krugersdorp, and the rising in Johannesburg itself was easily suppressed.

But this by no means put an end to the trouble; on the contrary, it made it more acute. At first the British government more or less officially supported the rebels, because it imposed a merely nominal fine on Dr. Jameson who had been pardoned and handed over by Krüger, the President of the Transvaal. It also seemed as if the conflict between the Boers and the British might be taken advantage of by other Powers as an excuse for interference; the German Emperor, William II, did indeed send an official congratulatory telegram to President Krüger after his victory over Jameson. All this took place at the moment when the British government was feeling disturbed at Russia's increase of power in Asia and was consequently more inclined than ever to find a kind of compensation in Africa by new acquisitions which would establish a closer connection between her possessions there.

England's interference consisted in supporting officially the interests of the Uitlanders. Negotiations took place, but reached no satisfactory conclusion. The English High Commissioner demanded, but without success, that Uitlanders should be given political rights after five years' residence. Then the British began to move troops to Cape Colony. The Boers thereupon despatched an ultimatum to England, and when this remained unanswered, opened war on October 11, 1899, by invading Natal and Cape Colony.

The Boers had opened hostilities before the British were at all prepared, so that they won all the victories at the outset. After invading Natal and Cape Colony, they laid siege to Ladysmith, Mafeking and Kimberley, and inflicted numerous defeats on the British. But the difference in power and resources was too great for them really to win a complete victory; moreover, the Boer element in Cape Colony remained thoroughly loyal.

However, it took much longer to suppress the Boers than had been expected. Even after the arrival of the first reinforcements under an experienced general, Redvers Buller, in November, 1899, when the British forces were able to take the offensive, they again suffered at first a series of very serious defeats. But this only had the effect of rousing the British government and also the British colonies to still greater efforts. Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener were sent out to take command, and large bodies of troops were transported to South Africa. It was also of decisive importance that the rivalry between the European Powers, and also British naval superiority,

made it impossible for any of the European countries to think of intervening.

The new military offensive conducted by Lord Roberts quickly resulted in one success after another: the besieged towns were relieved; Cronje's Boer army near Paardeberg in the Orange Free State was forced to surrender on February 28, 1900; and Bloemfontein, the capital, was occupied, as were also Johannesburg and Pretoria in the Transvaal. The war could now be officially regarded as ended. This was the idea which the British expressed by annexing the Orange Free State in May, 1900, and the Transvaal Republic in the following September.

But the Boers were still not willing to admit that they were beaten. Aided by the vast extent and mountainous character of their territory, they were able to prolong the war for two years more. Their fighting force consisted only of a few thousand men; but thanks to the skill of their generals, Botha, De Wet, and Delarey, they always succeeded again and again in escaping from the pursuit of the British. But this guerilla war was hopeless so long as no European Power intervened, and there was less prospect of this than ever. Furthermore, the English more and more adapted their military measures to meet the peculiar conditions of warfare in South Africa. They hemmed the Boers in by lines of blockhouses and brought their women and children together in concentration camps. These measures and the desolation caused by the war finally compelled the "bitter-enders" to give up their struggle for freedom. They accepted the British conditions, and by the Treaty of Pretoria of May 31, 1902, both Boer republics gave up their claim to independence. The Boers promised henceforth to be loyal British subjects.

On their side the British promised to grant the Boers extensive political rights and to help them in the work of reconstruction on their farms. This promise was completely lived up to, and it is mainly thanks to this liberal policy toward an enemy who had just been suppressed in a bloody war that the annexation of the Boer states differs so sharply from other annexations which have resulted from compulsion by force of arms. As early as 1906 the Transvaal was given self-government; and the Orange Colony was accorded the same privilege in 1907. Soon afterwards all the South African colonies were united into a single federation—the Union of South Africa of 1910, a state in which both races, British and Boers, were guaranteed complete equality. Even in the matter of the capital, both groups were given equal treatment: Cape Town remains the

legislative capital, where the Union Parliament has its sessions, while Pretoria, with the administrative offices, is the capital of the executive government. So it was brought about that the former citizens of the Boer republics enjoy the same political privileges in the new community as the rest of the whites, and they take an equally active part in the strictly parliamentary system of government as their former enemies. Only the colored natives are in an inferior political position. There are a great number of these and they constitute a serious problem. It is their presence, primarily, which distinguishes South Africa from Canada or Australia. But this problem cannot be considered here, as it belongs less to history than to current politics.

This solution, however, has naturally not wholly put an end to the opposition between the two "races" of Boer and British, any more than did the granting of political equality between the French and the Anglo-Saxons in Canada. Nevertheless, one may say that any idea of a violent restoration of their former autonomy has completely disappeared in the Boer states. Boers like Botha, who fought most bitterly against the British in the years 1900-1902, have more than once proved themselves thoroughly loyal citizens.

It only remains to take a brief look at Canada. So long as the great mass of European immigrants could still be absorbed by the United States, and as Australia and South Africa attracted chiefly gold seekers, Canada possessed relatively little importance from the point of view of the new colonial policy. It was not until the last third of the nineteenth century that the situation changed. Then, after the Missouri Valley had been settled, Canada realized that she might become the heir of the United States and attract agricultural colonists. Hitherto, it was almost exclusively Eastern Canada which had been settled, and even there the population was relatively sparse. Now the government systematically set to work to open up the great territories in the West. It used the same methods that the United States had employed, except that the government took a much more active part. Thus Canada not only adopted the land acts of the United States in 1872 (see p. 105 ff.), but gave state support to railway construction, after private enterprise had proved insufficient. This was all the more important as nothing but the construction of a great railway line from east to west could overcome the difficulty resulting from the existence of an extensive, barren area north of Lake Superior. But the construction of a railway made it possible to connect the old provinces in Eastern Canada with the new settlement territory in the West, which was extraordinarily favor-

able for raising wheat. These measures had a marked success. A considerable number of farmers began to settle in the western states; quite characteristically not a few of them came from the United States where vacant land was already becoming restricted. Here also the Anglo-Saxon element prevailed, so that the assimilation of the newcomers took place quite easily. In the East, on the other hand, manufacturing on a large modern scale gradually developed. Here the soil was no longer sufficient for supporting the growing population and it was therefore easier for the factories to secure labor, and the factories also found a good market in the growing region in the West. This resulted in a decided protective tariff system, so that Canada lays more stress on commercial independence than do any of the other British colonies.

Everywhere we see that the more the Dominions developed, the more they adopted an independent policy and defended their own interests against those of the mother country. It has been already pointed out that the English government put no obstacles in their way. From a formal point of view, the connection between the colonies and England was merely a very loose one and it seemed all the more possible that ultimately a complete separation might take place, as the population in the colonies at least did not feel the need for reviving imperial unity. Nevertheless, the colonial governments were not blind to the existence of common interests whose protection the Dominions were not able to look out for merely by action on their own part. The idea of creating a regular permanent imperial government could not be discussed at once. But it was possible, at least, to bring about voluntary meetings to talk over general lines of policy. The most natural form of these appeared to be a conference of all the colonial prime ministers. Such a conference took place, for the first time, in London, in 1887. It was at first scarcely more than an experiment and was for the purpose merely of exchanging ideas. It was not immediately raised to the position of a permanent institution. Seven years went by before the next meeting took place in 1894; as a concession to Canada this conference met in the Canadian capital at Ottawa. Soon these two meetings led to a further step: the question of preferential tariffs was discussed, and as a result the English Parliament removed the legal limitations which had hitherto restricted the colonies in tariff matters (see p. 366). At the third conference in 1902, which again met in London, it was decided that this new institution should meet regularly every four years. At the meeting in 1906 it adopted officially the title "Imperial Conference."

These meetings at first had no executive power, but their discussions nevertheless were of the greatest practical importance. It was a matter of primary importance that the problem of imperial defense was continually discussed. This attracted general attention to this subject, and the Dominions became aware that the existing system of voluntary military support which had been given by all the large colonies in the South African War would not be adequate any more in the long run. In 1902 the various Dominions declared that in the future they would contribute annually a certain amount toward the cost of the imperial navy. Some of them, like Canada and Australia, even proceeded to the building of fleets of their own.

This development found its final expression in the World War. Nothing was better suited to emphasize the community of interests between the mother country and the Dominions than this war. The military operations were extended over the whole world, including the Seven Seas. Parts of the British Empire were open to attack from the German colonies in South Africa or in the Pacific. Moreover, a victory of Germany's military power threatened to limit, if not completely to destroy, the political freedom of the British colonies. All these things showed most clearly how completely the fate of the Dominions was bound up with that of the mother country. Although all the colonies did not introduce universal military service after the fashion of Great Britain, nevertheless they all gave great military support on their own initiative. Their representatives were soon united in a regular "Imperial War Council," and in the treaty of peace with Germany the Dominions (and also India) figure, so to speak, as Powers on an equal footing with the mother country. But even here, as a matter of form, everything is not so simple: the Dominions are mentioned neither as members of a federal state nor as wholly independent states. But still their diplomatic independence has now been recognized in an international document, and at the same time their feeling of inseparable connection with the mother country has been so greatly increased by their common efforts and experiences that they will never oppose on principle the creation of an imperial government. The Dominions are also directly interested in imperial policy through the acquisition of new colonial territories, and even if no external changes in the relations between Great Britain and her Dominions should take place, one can foresee that in the future the colonies will conduct their negotiations more and more on the basis of friendly mutual concessions even in economic matters.

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The colonial policy of the United States is in many ways analogous to that of Great Britain. Here also the government aimed at avoiding the danger of creating dependent territories or regular subject lands. The inhabitants of the new territories were accorded the same political rights as the citizens of the old states. In theory this principle was never abandoned, but its execution has met with considerable difficulties where it was a question of dealing with foreign races and especially with colored populations. These difficulties, however, were recognized at the outset. This was the reason the United States refrained so long from making any colonial acquisitions. It was also the reason that President Cleveland, in 1893, declined to annex the Hawaiian Islands.

But this traditional policy could no longer be maintained when the economic structure of the United States had been changed as a result of the westward movement to the Pacific Ocean. America was no longer a land producing merely raw materials and food. She had developed an export trade on a large scale and she was striving, like her European competitors, for new markets, and also for points of support for her commerce. At first it was natural for her to look out at least for good order in neighboring territories where weak and inefficient governments hindered the Americans from exploiting the territory economically.

The West Indies, where Spain retained a remnant of her once large colonial empire, was the region which most closely touched American interests. In Cuba, the most important of these possessions, American citizens had invested considerable capital, but were deprived of their profits by the almost continual revolts waged by Cuban patriots against Spanish authority. Nevertheless, the United States at first refrained from all intervention. No change of attitude was even brought about by the horrible measures of repression which were adopted by the Spaniards and which roused a powerful public opinion in the United States. But in 1897, when the anti-intervention administration of the Democrats gave way to a Republican administration under McKinley, America began to interfere in the Cuban revolt which had then been going on for two years. The Washington government demanded that Spain abandon the horrible methods which it had adopted to suppress the rebellion. The Spaniards yielded so far as to give the Cubans large autonomy, but this did not put an end to the revolt. Then it happened, apparently by accident, that the battleship *Maine,* which had been sent to Havana to protect American interests, was sunk by an explosion. In America the Spanish government was regarded as responsible for

this, and President McKinley demanded that Spain should at once abandon hostilities against the Cubans who were fighting for freedom. Shortly after that, on April 19, 1898, Congress decided to recognize the independence of the island and to demand the withdrawal of the Spanish troops.

This decision was naturally equivalent to a declaration of war against Spain. As one might expect from the superiority of the American navy, the war resulted in a series of victories for the United States. First, a Spanish fleet was destroyed in the Pacific at Manila on May 1, 1898. Then, on July 3, the main Spanish fleet was defeated at Santiago in a battle in which only one American lost his life. This decided the war, for though the American land army was insignificant it was now impossible for the Spaniards to send reinforcements to their colonies. So the Americans were able without great difficulty to take Santiago in Cuba, to occupy the Island of Porto Rico, and, on August 13, 1898, to seize Manila in the Philippines with the assistance of the natives who were in rebellion. On the preceding day an armistice was signed, as Spain had been seeking peace ever since July. Peace was eventually signed at Paris on December 10, 1898. Spain had to give up her claim to Cuba and to cede to the United States Porto Rico, the Philippines, and the Island of Guam, which lies in the Pacific to the east of the Philippines. Spain made special opposition to ceding the Philippines which had not been conquered at all, but the Americans settled this matter by agreeing to make a consolation payment of twenty million dollars to Spain for the Philippine Islands.

The new problem which faced the United States was how to regulate the relation which the territories ceded by Spain should have to the Union. Now for the first time the Americans had acquired territories which did not lie on the continent and which were inhabited by a population of a wholly different sort politically. Should the system of political equality be applied to these colonies?

The answer given varied according to circumstances. As far as Cuba was concerned a solemn promise had been made, and so from the outset there could be no question of annexing this island. As Congress had promised, Cuba was made an independent republic and American troops left the island in 1902, as soon as the new state had been established. However, the Cubans had to give certain guarantees for the protection of American economic interests. The United States retained, among other things, some naval stations, a control over Cuban finance, and a right to intervene under certain circumstances. The Cubans also were not to allow interference by

any other Power. In 1906 when new disorders took place in the island, American troops were landed and a citizen of the United States was set up as governor-general. This occupation lasted until 1909. Thus, a semi-protectorate was established by the United States in Cuba without Cuba being incorporated, however, into the Union.

In Porto Rico, on the other hand, matters were regulated quite according to British precedent—not the precedent of the Dominions, but that of the crown colonies. The island was not treated as an integral part of the American Union but as a dependent territory. In 1900 a constitution was issued which gave the President of the United States the right to appoint the executive officials and the members of the upper house of the legislature.

Both these territorial acquisitions—to which might be added San Domingo, over which the United States assumed a protectorate by a treaty in 1905—belonged within the natural sphere of American expansion and did not meet with any regular opposition from the peoples concerned. The acquisition of the Philippines, on the other hand, meant a complete break in the traditional policy of the United States. In this case annexation took place against the wish of the population, and as to the manner in which it took place, it corresponded exactly with the new East Asiatic policy which the great states of Europe were adopting. Like the Europeans, the Americans possessed considerable commercial interests in the Far East, and were all the more anxious to secure a point of support there as it was at this very time that the European Powers were beginning to partition China (see p. 356), though the Americans refused, on principle, to make territorial acquisitions at China's expense. Therefore, the Americans held fast to the Philippines, in spite of strong opposition in America itself when it became clear that the native population would first have to be suppressed by force; to have given up the islands would have practically meant handing them over to Germany or Japan. America continued in this policy when Aguinaldo, formerly the ally of the Americans, prolonged a rebellion which had been stirred up in 1899 and which made it necessary, finally, to send out an army of seventy thousand men. On the other hand, the Americans never gave up their idea of educating the Filipinos in course of time for self-government. In fact they put this idea into practice with British rapidity: as early as 1907 a legislature was called together, made up of inhabitants who only a little while before had been hostile. On August 29, 1916, the United States gave the islands complete autonomy.

In the case of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, in 1898, the United States went even further. This territory was incorporated into the Union at once in 1900, so that the Constitution of the United States extends to the islands, and in matters of commerce they are in a position of equality with the states in the Union. Small extensions of the American colonial possessions resulted from the acquisition of Tutuila and other Samoan Islands in 1900, and the island of St. Thomas in the West Indies which was purchased from Denmark in 1916.

Much more important than these acquisitions, however, was the completion of the Panama Canal. This event can best be discussed in connection with the history of Anglo-American relations.

Scarcely any other circumstance is so instructive in the history of the foreign policy of Anglo-Saxons as the relation between Great Britain and the United States. Here, opposite one another, stood two Great Powers between whom there was little political sympathy, and America had never wholly forgotten the hostile attitude of the governing classes in England during the War of Secession. Between the two countries also lay many serious sources of irritation—the rivalry of their navies, the competition with which American industry threatened that of England, and the danger that Canada might some day be absorbed by her larger neighbor. But in spite of all this, it appears that not only have none of these causes of irritation led to war between these unmilitaristic states, but they have not even applied military pressure like threats of war. Differences may arise and sharp words may be exchanged, but it has never been necessary to rattle the sword to make one of the parties finally give way. The idea of a settlement by war disappeared so completely, that the boundary of Canada, though the question of fortifying it during the War of Secession was discussed in England, has been finally left without any fortifications at all, just like the boundary of an inland village.

However, it must be said that the credit for this peaceful development belongs mainly to England which ultimately always gave way. This was particularly noticeable in connection with the negotiations in regard to the Panama Canal.

In 1850, at a time when the United States had scarcely gained a foothold on the Pacific Ocean and had few colonies in the West, she signed the so-called Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with Great Britain. By this both Powers undertook not to exercise any exclusive control over a canal which should be built at Panama. They also guar-

anteed the neutrality of the canal and forbade the establishment of fortified positions in its neighborhood.

England, therefore, had a formal right to oppose a canal which should be exclusively under American control. Nevertheless, the more the United States began to be a World Power, the more the feeling spread in America that the canal ought to be a purely American undertaking. The question became acute when the French Panama Company, which had been founded by De Lesseps, the great engineer who built the Suez Canal, collapsed. The opportunity seemed now to have come for America to take the matter wholly in her own hands, and, in 1901, the United States did actually succeed in persuading England to a new agreement, the "Hay-Pauncefote Treaty," which gave the Americans absolute control over the canal.

The United States accordingly made full use of the treaty without interference from England, and even without the trouble with Colombia involving British intervention. The Republic of Colombia, which owned the canal territory, refused to cede the necessary strip of land six miles wide, and take ten million dollars in payment for it, because the Republic hoped to squeeze a higher sum out of the United States. The Americans helped themselves by arranging a wholly bloodless "revolution," somewhat in light-opera fashion, in the Colombian province of Panama. As a result of this, Panama declared herself to be an independent republic, and as such ceded the canal strip to the United States in 1903. The work of digging the canal was then undertaken by the American government with great skill in organization. Thanks to the discovery, a little while before, that malarial fever was caused by the Anopheles mosquito, measures could be taken to prevent the great loss of life which this had hitherto caused. The canal was completed in 1914, and officially opened in 1915.

Another incident was the Venezuelan affair. When the English government came into conflict with Venezuela in regard to the boundary of their colony in Guiana in 1895, the United States insisted on diplomatic intervention, basing her claim on the Monroe Doctrine. In this case, also, England gave way, in spite of the suddenness of the American demand, and submitted the point at issue to arbitration. Even at that time the idea of a general treaty of arbitration between the two countries was discussed, but President Cleveland's plan came to nothing in 1897, on account of the opposition in the American Senate, in which the necessary two-thirds majority could not be secured for the treaty. Nevertheless, the rela-

tions between England and the United States became steadily more friendly. During the Spanish-American War, England observed a benevolent neutrality, and in 1903 she gave her approval to a settlement of the question of the boundary between Alaska and Canada which was very favorable for the United States.

It has been out of events of this kind that the Anglo-Saxon world has developed in a way which is in such marked contrast to the system of armed peace prevailing on the Continent of Europe. The more armaments and military threats increase and become serious there, so much more marked is the peaceful or rather unmilitary character of British and American foreign relations. More characteristic than the arbitration treaties or even the regular substitution of diplomatic or judicial decisions instead of war, has been the absence in these two countries of all armaments which could be used for offensive purposes; and also the absence of all military preparedness which could result in a sudden attack, or easily lead to a "preventive" war. Both Powers have armies which might be regarded, one might say, as non-existent, both in comparison with the armies of the other European Powers and in view of their own latent resources. Both have only the kind of navies which can be used solely for defense and not in coöperation with great armies. Neither Power has universal military service, nor a militarized system of education, nor pressure by militarists upon the civil authorities. In both, this peaceful attitude toward other Powers coincides with democratic political institutions. The idea has therefore grown up that the government of the people itself acts as a guarantee against a policy of aggression. On the basis of their practical experience both countries are convinced that every conflict can be settled through the goodwill of the parties concerned, without having to appeal to arms. Occasional warlike operations against smaller states or semi-barbarous peoples have naturally not been avoidable, but such wars have been conducted without disturbing the normal life of the population and without demanding the whole powers of the state. They naturally, therefore, are not at all to be compared with the kind of wars between Great Powers which are feared in Europe.

However, people of insight in both states perceived that the Anglo-Saxon world could retain its "unmilitaristic organization" only so long as it did not run the danger of being attacked by one of the great European Powers which was armed to the teeth. But these people were not numerous, and their warnings were not heeded. It was not until this danger became a very practical one that both states roused themselves to save their political ideals for the future.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT AND THE ATTITUDE OF GOVERNMENTS TOWARD IT

In the first half of the nineteenth century measures for the protection of industrial workers, aside from those which were wholly unpolitical and due merely to philanthropic motives, were a part of the liberal movement of the time. They formed the left wing of liberalism. In demanding universal suffrage, bourgeois idealists and representatives of the working classes found themselves on common ground (see p. 194); but about the middle of the century a change began to take place. In the new policy pursued by workingmen the idea began to be given up that it would ever be possible to restore a harmony of interests between capital and labor merely by laws for the protection of workingmen. The view was wholly rejected that the misery of the working-classes could be prevented by humanitarian measures. It was becoming more evident than ever that the tendency of modern manufacturing on a large scale was to make it impossible for workingmen to rise to the class of property-owners or to gain a livelihood in a business of their own. Owing to this, the conviction gained ground that here were two classes whose interests could never be harmonized with one another. It was therefore the task of the workingmen to unite in organizations of their own and to form a party based on class lines which should oppose all the other "bourgeois" parties. They believed that in certain questions they might, however, coöperate with other parties. Since it was the aim of the "proletarian" or "communistic" movement to get control over the state, it was quite in accordance with the interests of the workingmen, they believed, to act in common with the "left" (or radical) liberals, who were also aiming to secure universal suffrage; for since the proletarians formed the majority in a country, this would bring about the overthrow of the rule of the capitalists. In theory, however, the proletarians believed that they ought to fight all other organizations than their own, as being "the great reactionary mass."

This program was first formulated in 1847 in the *Communist*

Manifesto by a German, Karl Marx. One of the points in which it differed most from the previous socialistic movements was that it abandoned nationalistic limitations on the workingmen. As religious zealots used to put the claims of their religious party above the interests of their country, so these new socialists regarded the world no longer as divided into national states but into economic classes, and the victory of their class was more important than the future of their country. "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" This is the phrase which rings through the *Communist Manifesto* and sounds clearly the international character of the new socialist movement.

Accordingly, an international organization was founded. In 1864 the International Workingmen's Association was established at London. Though various splits in it occurred later, there always remained a bond between the various Socialist-democratic or Collectivist parties in different countries. But as a matter of fact, this International Association never acquired great practical importance. What Socialists have actually accomplished has been due almost exclusively to the efforts of the party in separate countries.

At any rate, it is only the successes of the socialist movement within the existing states which are of any historical importance. Here, indeed, Socialism has had a tremendous influence. It is scarcely saying too much to insist that the question of Socialism and its demands has dominated the internal policy of the states in Western and Central Europe during the last fifty years. At any rate, it has influenced it more strongly than any other single thing.

But here it is impossible even to summarize the history of Socialism in all the great states of Europe. It is only possible to indicate a few typical developments and at the same time consider the course of events in the largest countries.

For one kind of development the course of events in France is most noteworthy.

It will be recalled that one of the main factors which led to the establishment of the Second Empire was the fear of Socialism. A republican form of government and liberalism—especially liberalism with an anti-clerical tinge—had become objects of suspicion to the bourgeoisie as presaging a communistic subversion of society. To them, absolutism supported by the church seemed to be the only means of salvation against a social revolution (see p. 203). Now when the military collapse of Bonapartism at Sedan again opened the way for the establishment of a Republic on September 4, 1870, the question arose as to how the classes interested in the existing system of property rights would reconcile themselves to the bug-

bear of a Republic. Would a Republic be able to survive when large groups of people were convinced that it meant the beginning of anarchy and the rule of the proletarian masses?

Men of insight, like the great statesman, Adolphe Thiers, who was now chosen "Chief of the Executive Power," recognized at once that a Republic was the only form of government for the new France, but that this Republic must give solid guarantees against any change in property rights if it was to survive. The two phrases which Thiers coined at that time characterized the situation perfectly: "The Republic is the form of government which divides us least"; and, "The Republic can only survive if it is conservative."

But it was very difficult to make these views prevail. In the National Assembly at Bordeaux, which had been elected for the purpose of making peace with Germany, the so-called reactionaries, or Monarchists of various kinds, had a majority over the Republicans of 400 to 350. The Assembly refused to go on record in any way as favoring on principle a republican form of government.

An event which took place a little while afterwards had a peculiar influence in reviving more strongly than ever in France and elsewhere the old panicky fear of radical republican and socialist tendencies.

The long siege of Paris had left the population of the capital extraordinarily excited against the government. Revolutionary idealists found fault with those in authority for not declaring a revolutionary war as in former times and leading them against the enemy. The irritation was still further increased by the reactionary attitude of the National Assembly which, on March 20, 1871, had moved from Bordeaux to Versailles, near Paris. People feared a restoration of the monarchy.

Now it happened that the artillery of Paris had had to be moved to the industrial quarter of Montmartre on the occasion of the entrance of the German troops. There and in other suburbs of a similar kind, like Belleville and La Villette, a central committee had been formed from revolutionary groups in the National Guard (see p. 196), which was like a revolutionary government. The legal government at Versailles therefore wanted to get the cannon out of this dangerous neighborhood. But in doing this, trouble developed. The revolutionists declared that the cannon were their property and on March 18 they shot down the two officers who were to have brought the guns away. Thereupon an insurrection broke out almost everywhere in Paris and the government officials fled to Versailles.

The revolutionary government which was now established in Paris

was not exactly a socialist organization in the new sense of the word, but a curious mixture of extreme Republican and idealistic Socialist institutions. On the one hand, the governing body of ninety persons, known as the "Commune" adopted the red flag as the sign and symbol of their socialist demands. But on the other hand, they favored a federated republican constitution and desired that every commune should have autonomy.

From a military point of view the fate of the insurrection was hopeless from the outset. The only prospect of success would have been for the other communes to have followed the example of Paris. But it was only in a very few industrial towns like Saint-Étienne, Limoges, and Marseilles that "communes" were formed, and these were very short lived. However, the Parisians succeeded in maintaining themselves for an extraordinarily long period. At the beginning they even undertook an offensive against Versailles. But as soon as a regular army could be formed from the prisoners of war who were released from Germany, MacMahon was given command, the "Communards" were driven back on the defensive, and Paris was besieged a second time. The siege lasted two months. On May 31, 1871, after a week of street fighting, the legal government again gained control of the capital.

Although this socialist civil war made an enormous impression everywhere, the permanent influence which the Commune exerted was connected with another circumstance. The conflict between the government troops and the revolutionists was not conducted according to the regular rules of war, because the Commune had not been recognized as a belligerent. This resulted in frightful reprisals being inflicted on the rebels. Captured Communard leaders were shot down without trial. The Communards, on their side, when they saw their cause was lost, took vengeance by setting fire to public buildings like the Ministry of Finance, the Hôtel de Ville, and the Tuileries. Hostages whom they had in their hands, including magistrates and higher clergy, were simply murdered.

These acts of rage and destruction, in which at least 6,500 persons are officially said to have lost their lives, left such an impression as has rarely resulted from any single event. All opponents of republican ideals, including a large number of cultured people who had trembled at the fate of the artistic monuments of Paris, believed shudderingly that they had personally experienced the proof that a triumph of extreme republican tendencies would only result in the destruction of civilization and subversion of society. The Parisian Communards had expressly appealed to the example of the

French Revolution, and among other things they had again introduced the republican calendar. Could there be any better argument for the conclusion that the poison of revolution would ultimately lead to the general dissolution of society?

It was almost a wonder that the anti-republican movement did not triumph in France. Nevertheless, the wonder actually took place. To be sure, those who had taken part in the Commune were very severely punished. No less than 7,500 guilty persons were deported to New Caledonia. In 1873 the National Assembly also brought about Thiers's resignation, and a ministry was chosen in which the three monarchist parties were represented and which adopted as its motto the restoration of *"ordre moral"* which had been shattered by the radicals. But the restoration of the monarchy failed, aside from personal reasons, owing to the religious question. The Legitimists and Orleanists did indeed unite in 1873 by means of the so-called "fusion"; they both agreed to support the representative of the older Bourbon line, the Count of Chambord ("Henry V"), with the understanding that he should be succeeded by the Orleanist grandson of Louis Philippe. But when the question of the flag was discussed, a dispute arose. The pious Count of Chambord declared that he would hold fast to the old white flag handed down to him by his ancestors. The Orleanists, forming the "right center," wanted to keep the tricolor; they were all the more unwilling to give in on the question of the flag because the adoption of the white flag would have generally been regarded as a sign of the restoration of clerical rule. After the experiences of the Second Empire, public opinion was by no means inclined to tolerate this nor were the Intellectuals. Some regard, also, had to be paid to the feeling in the country. Reactionary forces began to get the upper hand in the administration. Republican officials were removed and statues of Republicans disappeared from the town halls. The clergy began to assume more and more influence. In 1875 they were allowed to undertake higher education and establish universities of their own. The more these reactionary and clerical tendencies showed themselves, the more public opinion in France shifted toward the left. A thing that contributed greatly to this was Gambetta's agitation. During the war of 1870 he had proved himself to be a great organizer. He had traveled over all of France, everywhere urging that the Republic must be a real Republic, that is, that a new social class should be admitted to political control.

The result of all this was that in 1875 the National Assembly, on a vote in regard to the title of the head of the government, decided

by a majority of one only in favor of a Republic. At the same time, constitutional laws were passed, making the Republic as much like the July Monarchy as possible. The president was to be elected for a term of seven years and could be reëlected; thus he might be transformed into a constitutional king. In the election of senators, small communes had the same rights as large ones, which gave an advantage to the large landowners. But all this merely delayed the victory of democracy; it could not permanently prevent it. In spite of all these precautionary measures, the Chamber of Deputies, elected by direct and universal suffrage, finally arrogated supreme authority to itself. This gave the control of the state not to property owners as heretofore, but to the masses of the people who had been excluded by previous constitutions from a share in the government. It also gave France for the first time a really stable constitution. The era of political revolutions now ceased. No economic group any longer possessed an artifically preponderant position. No interference with intellectual freedom could again be attempted. So disappeared the main cause which had formerly led to revolutions in France. The new régime has lasted down to the present moment —much longer than any previous government since 1789.

The democratic theory on which the government is based was again shown in 1877 when the reactionary President, in coöperation with the reactionary Senate, dissolved the Chamber of Deputies. This was the occasion when Gambetta gathered the Republican hosts with the slogan, *"Le cléricalisme, voilà l'ennemi."* The phrase appealed to the small property owners and the peasants. The Republican parties again carried the election. Their influence was so strong that they also soon gained a majority in the Senate.

All the logical changes were now made which have been comprised in the idea of a Republican form of government ever since the establishment of the United States (see p. 15). Freedom of meeting was introduced. There was also unlimited freedom of the press, and after 1881 no more preliminary deposits were demanded. In 1882 it was decided to make attendance at school obligatory. All the schools were "laicized," that is, were made non-sectarian, and great attention was given to more advanced education for girls. The granting of higher academic degrees was reserved to the State and could no longer take place in ecclesiastical institutions. Thus Napoleon III's decree of 1850, which gave the clergy control over education, was completely undone.

Other measures aimed at decentralization and at the same time at the political education of the people. The election of mayors of

communes, with the exception of Paris, was left to the communal councils, the powers of the mayors themselves were enlarged, and the sessions of the communal councils were made public. Representation in the Senate was based on population and the small communes lost their privileged position. A special concession was made to the lower classes in 1884 by the law which made possible the establishment of *"syndicats,"* or trade unions, free from government interference. This law was at once taken advantage of very widely.

Thus it became possible for even the Socialist Party, which wanted to secure political power by means of democratic institutions, to support the Republic and work in coöperation with it. Furthermore, the Socialists were no longer excluded from taking part in the government by any special laws. As they naturally could never get control in a country where small property owners and peasants dominated, no obstacles were placed in their way to check their political activity. One of their leaders (Millerand) was a member of a "bourgeois" cabinet as early as 1899. The large group of Socialists in the Chamber of Deputies, led by Jaurès, formed a part of the "government bloc." In 1906 a Socialist (Viviani) even became minister of labor in Clemenceau's cabinet, and in 1909 another socialist (Briand) actually became prime minister. It was not until the development of Socialism of the Left or Syndicalism that coolness developed between the Republican "bloc" and a part of the Socialists, namely those who wanted to abandon constitutional political methods altogether. The rise of this Syndicalism may be dated from the founding of the General Confederation of Labor about 1896. But splits in the Socialist groups by no means resulted in the anti-republican and anti-socialistic clerical "Right" securing a preponderance again. The republic was so firmly established in France that it no longer had to depend upon the support of the Socialists of the Left.

It had become so strong that even the new nationalistic attacks by the Right were wholly unsuccessful. In the years 1887-89 the reactionary parties, aided by a popular general named Boulanger, attempted to set up a militarist government by means of a *coup d'état* and by plébiscites after the fashion of Napoleon III. This government was eventually to prepare the way for a war of revenge against Germany, but France, which was becoming more and more pacifist in its attitude, refused to support the parties favoring revenge. Boulanger's followers were terribly defeated at the polls in 1889 and Boulanger himself, sentenced to deportation, fled to Brussels where he committed suicide in 1891. Somewhat later the

Republican party gained a similar victory over the clerical-royalist group which had been seeking to build up a kind of rival government in the army. The form it took was the affair about a Jewish artillery captain named Dreyfus. In 1894 he had been banished for life to the Devil's Island in French Guiana because he was supposed to have betrayed military secrets to Germany. Military officers like Colonel Picquart, who later in 1896 expressed belief in his innocence, were subjected to military discipline. But the friends of the condemned man did not let the matter rest. The most notable Republican Socialist leaders like Clemenceau and Jaurès, as well as writers like Zola and Anatole France, insisted most energetically that Dreyfus was innocent. Equally energetic in opposition to them stood the army, the Church, and various royalist intellectuals like Brunetière and Lemaître. The conflict was a very bitter one, but it ultimately resulted in bringing the case before the Court of Cassation. Though a new judgment was pronounced against Dreyfus he was nevertheless pardoned by the President of the Republic. Later he was even restored to his position in the French army with the rank of major. More important still was the fact that the army was now reorganized from top to bottom and the exclusive authority of the nationalistic General Staff was broken. The supreme authority in the army henceforth was in the hands of the civil authorities.

The Republic had emerged so successfully from this trial of strength that it now even dealt a final blow to the political power of the Church, and proceeded to bring about a separation of Church and State.

The first assault was made on the great religious orders known as the Congregations. Every association in France had to have an authorization from the State. The Congregations in most cases had not secured this. In spite of this, not only had they been tolerated, but they had even kept a great part of education in France in their hands, although this was contrary to Ferry's School Law (see p. 386), which had remained on paper. In 1901 the Law of Associations, so far as the matter of principle was concerned, now brought a change. In general, freedom of association was introduced, but religious communities were to be formed only by special permission, and the members of the unauthorized religious orders were excluded from giving instruction in the schools. Congregations like the Assumptionists, who refused to obey this regulation, were expelled from France.

Waldeck-Rousseau, who was prime minister when this law was

adopted, proceeded with great moderation in its execution. But it was otherwise with his successor, Combes. He represented much sharper anti-clerical ideas, perhaps just because he had originally been trained for the priesthood in a Catholic seminary. He attacked the educational institutions of the forbidden religious orders much more vigorously, and finally, in 1904, excluded even the authorized Congregations from public teaching. Soon the government went still further and extended their war to the secular clergy. A dispute with the papacy about the appointment of bishops finally led to the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Paris and the Vatican. Then, in 1905, the Concordat, which Napoleon I had signed in 1801, was declared null, and the Church was wholly separated from the State. The Republic declared that it would no longer support religious communities in the future. The property of such religious associations, after it had been inventoried by the State, was to be handed over to new *associations cultuelles* which were to be formed. Similar regulations were to be applied to the Protestant and Jewish churches.

Thus it was planned to establish a free church and a free state, and these plans of the government were accepted by the Protestants and the Jews. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, under Pope Pius X, allowed an open conflict to develop. The Pope forbade the clergy to found the *associations cultuelles* provided for by the law. His aim was evidently to make the Church appear like a martyr which had been robbed of everything and to rouse public opinion in France which had hitherto been fairly indifferent. But the French government, and especially Briand, who became minister of education in the Clemenceau cabinet in 1906, parried this move with as much skill as moderation. The law was carried out as gently as possible, but still without losing sight of its real purpose.

Thus, the Third French Republic succeeded in carrying out this part of its program unhindered, and thereby gave a splendid new proof of its stability, and belied as groundless the fear that anarchy was beginning. Its strength was also soon shown by the French attitude in foreign politics. Ever since 1870 France had been without a single friend or ally, as Bismarck had wished. France was separated from England, and later from Italy also, by colonial rivalries; any connection with Russia ran counter to political ideals on both sides. Russia also regarded the support of Republican France as quite an inadequate substitute for the support which Bismarck's government had given Russian policy against Austria in the Balkans. But in the course of twenty years conditions had altered. The great

prosperity of France and the wise economic policy of her population had given an incomparable importance to financial association with a country which had become "the banker of Europe." France was the only country in Europe which had not become excessively industrialized and filled with a surplus population; stable political conditions and the resulting policy of peace made it possible to exploit the rich soil to an ever larger extent; the population, however, was kept down to about the same numbers, so that France was not only independent of foreign countries for its food supply, but it even had food to export from its own abundance. The frugal and industrious population conserved so carefully what they had gained that they had more money to lend to foreign nations than other countries which outwardly appeared to be more prosperous.

It was in 1888 that Russia was able to place her first loan in Paris. Two years later, when Bismarck was compelled to resign partly because he would not support Austria-Hungary at Russia's expense in the Near East, the plan for a Franco-Russian alliance took more definite form. The Russo-German "reinsurance treaty" was not renewed; in its place an alliance was made between Russia and France in 1891, and in the next year this was followed by a military convention between the two countries. The Radical Socialist republic had associated itself on a footing of equality with one of the three Powers which was regarded as the protector of absolutism. In 1891, the French navy visited Kronstadt and the Tsar had to listen to the Marseillaise with bared head. In 1893, the Russian fleet returned this visit, and in 1896, the new Tsar, Nicholas II, personally visited France, being the first crowned head to do so since 1870. France had now acquired the guarantee which had hitherto been lacking that Russia would come to her support in case of an attack from Germany.

At the same time, the Third French Republic had been acquiring a great colonial empire, unequaled by that of the Old Régime; in spite of many superficial defects, which undoubtedly existed and caused complaint, it was clear that no other country had so satisfactory a position and future prospects as France thirty or forty years after the creation of the Third Republic. One may also say that at that time the French people had renounced all further political ambitions. The idea of pacifism had penetrated the leaders of the governing parties and the greater part of the state system of education; many teachers even advocated anti-militarism openly. France had reached the position of a people who wished only to be left

in peace by others without desiring anything from them. To be sure, the reactionary parties, which were excluded from a share in the government, still nourished nationalistic aims, but with the exception of a small group of Intellectuals their agitation fell on deaf ears, and it was noteworthy that even a considerable number of politicians who had formerly been in favor of a monarchy had "rallied" to the Republic.

In England the course of events was less dramatic, but ended at the same goal.

The Reform Act of 1832 (see p. 92 f.) had not increased the political rights of the working class essentially, if at all. The workingmen's condition, however, had been fundamentally improved by the State, and the possibility of emigration to America had provided the proper balance between the supply of population and the possibility of employment. But the workingmen had no real share in drawing up the laws for their own protection, and therefore they began anew an agitation for electoral reform and for a larger representation of workingmen in the House of Commons. In 1866 they were again agitating definitely for universal suffrage.

This time it was easier to overcome the opposition of Parliament than in 1832, and a number of monster meetings sufficed to make the House of Commons adopt the Reform Act of 1867. Even this, however, did not do away with all the inequalities in the existing distribution of seats; the large cities were still at a considerable disadvantage; but since in the towns every man was given a vote who paid £10 rent for lodgings yearly and had resided there for a year, practically all workingmen were enfranchised. This increased the English electorate by more than a million voters, the greater part of whom belonged to the laboring class.

Supported by the strength of the radical party which developed from this electoral reform, Gladstone's new Liberal ministry (1868-74) now carried through a number of innovations which still further limited the former plutocratic individualistic system. In 1870 education was for the first time made compulsory and special taxes were collected for the support of schools. In 1872 the secret ballot was introduced, which at last freed the electors from pressure by the rich. In 1871 trade unions were officially recognized. Finally, the practice of purchasing offices in the army was abolished; when the House of Lords rejected this democratic measure, Gladstone put an end to the existing practice in 1871 by a simple ordinance resting on the royal prerogative.

What a position the workingmen had thus acquired in political life is best seen by the fact that henceforth both the old political parties began to make efforts to secure their favor.

Hitherto, all reforms for the benefit of the industrial proletariat—but not for the agricultural laborers for whom scarcely anything had been done,—had been brought about by the Liberal Party, the old Whigs. The Conservatives or Tories had always opposed them, because an extension of the suffrage, which was the necessary condition for social legislation, meant also a limitation of the dominating influence of the large landowners. Now they perceived that they would finally be completely pushed to the wall if they persisted in their old attitude of opposing the demands of the workingmen; or, to be more correct, one of their leaders perceived this. This leader was an "outsider" who, thanks to his foreign origin, was better able to grasp the situation than men who had been brought up exclusively amid Tory ideas. Disraeli, or as he was known after 1876, Lord Beaconsfield, coming from a family of converted Jews, by his extraordinary tenacity and intelligence had been able to overcome all the difficulties which were at first placed in the way of his political activity, and had become the intellectual leader of the Conservative Party. He now formulated the program of the Tories by which they defeated the Liberals in the election of 1874. He reproached the Whigs with being no more than a clique of a few large families who would never really champion the well-being of the masses. The weakening of the authority of State and Church, aimed at by the Liberals, was not, he said, in the interests of the people. But it was to be the task of the Conservative Party, with the aid of State and Church, to improve the working classes; the Conservatives, he said, were fundamentally the true people's party.

These were ideas, as one sees, which strongly recalled those of Napoleon III, and in fact were inspired by him, only that the adoption of them did not rest on an illegal act like the *coup d'état*. At any rate, Disraeli succeeded in winning to his side the workingmen who had been disillusioned by Gladstone's compromise legislation, and the Conservatives now began for the first time to undertake social and political reforms. As prime minister, Disraeli replaced the law of 1871 by another which established complete equality between employers and employees, and allowed workingmen to use "peaceful means" in carrying on a strike. Employment of children under ten years in factories was wholly forbidden and all factories employing women were limited to a ten-hour working day.

These concessions in turn stirred the Liberals to make greater

concessions. First, they abandoned more completely than hitherto the principle of non-interference by the state; one of their leaders, Joseph Chamberlain, the radical mayor of Birmingham and formerly a large employer of labor, municipalized a great number of public utilities which had previously been in the hands of private persons; the example which he set in the "Birmingham System" was imitated in many other towns. Then the Liberals went further in the extension of the suffrage than Disraeli had proposed a few years before. The Liberals now urged that even agricultural laborers, who were relatively numerous in England on account of the large landed estates, should be allowed to participate in electing the House of Commons. The Reform Act of 1884-85 accordingly abolished all inequalities between rural and urban districts by extending the borough franchise to the counties; henceforth, any one who rented lodgings for which he paid £10 a year had the vote. At a single stroke the electors jumped in number from 3,221,000 to 5,700,000; it was mainly the rural districts and villages which benefited by this act. The counties were divided into electoral districts of equal size and many little boroughs lost their right of being represented. The practical effect of the law was to give the vote to all industrial workers and also to all the agricultural laborers who were better off and who did not live with their employers.

Hand in hand with this reform went a change in English local government. All extensions of the suffrage were merely half measures so long as local government remained in the hands of rural magnates like the justices of the peace. Chamberlain, who joined the Tories as a "Liberal Unionist," because he believed in maintaining the union of England and Ireland (see p. 181), persuaded the Conservatives to adopt changes in local administration and give some political influence to the non-propertied classes. Parliament undertook to create new districts in the counties; in every county, local administration, with the right to levy taxes, was given to a county council elected for three years by all the tax-payers, so that after 1888 the justices of the peace retained only their judicial authority. In 1894 town councils, elected by all the tax-payers, were also established in the towns, so that the rule of the squires came to an end. These town and county councils were also given extensive powers, so that in many places regular "community socialism" was introduced.

Since then Conservative ministries have merely resulted in postponing, but no longer in preventing, further changes in the democratic direction. The Tory Party has sought to distract the atten-

tion of the country from problems at home by "imperialistic undertakings" like the Boer War; but such means have merely meant at best a delay for a few years. In spite of them the Liberals have succeeded in carrying out three important reforms.

The first of these reforms was in regard to the House of Lords. Now that the House of Commons had come really to represent the people and was no longer dominated by landlords and distinguished families, the contrast between it and the House of Lords had been becoming more and more marked. The House of Lords had become a regular class body which by its ecclesiastical-aristocratic veto had several times been able to defeat measures against landed property passed by the House of Commons, as in the case of measures relating to Ireland (see p. 184 f.). The Liberals therefore began to consider whether the Upper House ought not to be either abolished or at least fundamentally changed; "mend or end the House of Lords" was the motto which had been adopted by the radicals since 1894.

The conflict again became acute in 1909 when the House of Lords rejected the Liberal budget brought in by the Asquith ministry, chiefly because the Lords would not consent to the tax on landed property contained in the budget. In the new election which then took place one of the campaign cries was, "Abolition of the Lords' veto." The Liberals won the election, and their ministry brought in resolutions wholly abolishing the right of veto by the House of Lords in financial matters and in other matters making the veto merely suspensive in its effect for two years. The House of Lords at first took a rebellious attitude; but when threatened with a creation of new peers it finally gave way and passed the resolution by a small majority.

After the opposition of the Upper House had been broken in this way other Liberal reforms could be undertaken. Among these, was the disestablishment of the church in Wales, where the greater part of the population belonged to sects, like the Methodist; this measure was important as a matter of principle because, according to the intention of the Liberals, it was to be the first step toward a separation of church and state in England itself. Other measures were the introduction of laws for insurance against old age, sickness, and unemployment.

Thus the pillars of the half plutocratic régime established by the compromise of 1832 had completely collapsed when the World War broke out in 1914. Great Britain had already followed the example of her colonies to such an extent that prior to the reform of the House of Lords, some leaders of the Conservative-Unionist party

actually proposed that in cases of serious conflict between the Upper and Lower Houses an appeal should be made to the people by way of a referendum, after the American or Swiss fashion. And finally when, in the course of the war, the last step was taken toward imitating the democratic ideals already prevailing in the colonies and equal political rights were granted to women, this step made practically no change in the relative position and power of the two great political parties. The same is true as to the appointment of Socialist leaders as members of the cabinet. The transformation of the Old Régime had already gone so far that the Reform Act of 1832, perhaps even that of 1867, must be regarded as having had more important consequences than the measures passed in the most recent decades.

The most marked contrast to this method of adapting political conditions to meet social demands is furnished by Prussia and Germany, the main lines of whose policy are as characteristic for Eastern Europe as are the methods of France and England for the West and the South.

In Germany also the government had to deal with Socialism. Since the middle of the nineteenth century and the first beginnings of manufacturing on a large scale, German workingmen had begun to form organizations, and the more Germany strove to overtake France and especially England in the lead which they enjoyed, the greater grew the membership in these organizations.

What attitude should the government adopt toward them? Evidently no solution like that in France and England was possible. Any participation of the Socialists in the government, whether of the whole Empire or of the individual States, was impossible because the citizens as such, i. e. the legislatures, were practically denied any real share in the administration and government of the country. Moreover, there was lacking any strong democratic party corresponding to the radical groups in France and England—any party of idealistic intellectuals and small bourgeois who were friendly toward the common people and who would have favored equal political rights for the Socialists simply on grounds of liberalism. The progressive parties in Germany had become powerless for ever as a result of the unfortunate outcome (for them) of the constitutional conflict in Prussia, and the two parties which were regarded as supporters and sharers in the government's policy represented principles which were most sharply opposed to the demands of the Social Democrats: the Conservatives representing landed estates and the authority of the

church, were as hostile to the Socialist program as were the National Liberals, composed of the large manufacturers and imperialistic intellectuals (see p. 299 ff.).

Any concessions in the form of granting political rights were therefore not to be thought of. The only way of softening the fury of the Socialist attack was for the government to grant the workingmen certain material advantages and at the same time to interest them in favor of the continued existence of the existing régime.

This is the program which was adopted, though not immediately after the war of 1870. The first decade after the founding of the Empire showed, to be sure, a steady growth in the Socialist Party; but it was still so weak and small that it could at first be ignored. In this transition period, therefore, there was a struggle of a different kind—a struggle between the State and the claims of the Church.

In Prussia as elsewhere the Revolution of 1848 had led to the making of concessions to the Catholic Church. The Church, formerly regarded with distrust, and gladly tormented by the all-powerful State as the only surviving independent organization, had acquired complete independence in 1850. The government prized the influence of the Church which seemed to assure the education of the people as obedient citizens, and had placed elementary education under ecclesiastical control, just as was done in France at about the same time. After 1870, however, the panicky fear of revolution disappeared. At the same time the opposition of the Catholics proved to be more and more an obstacle to all efforts aiming at strengthening the authority and power of the government. The Catholic political party, known as the "Center," was neither a class party nor was it nationalistic. Among its leaders were men like Windthorst, a "Guelf," who championed the interests of the Hanoverian provinces annexed by Prussia, or men who defended the Catholic Poles from attempts to Germanize them. The conflict became very acute through the "Old Catholic" movement, which arose as a protest against the Vatican Council (see p. 226 f.). The Roman Catholic bishops forbade the employment of Old Catholics in educational institutions and refused to sanction marriages between Old Catholics.

The only way of dealing with this conflict was to place the State in control of all school and civil religious matters. In coöperation with the National Liberals, who always favored an extension of state and imperial control in order to simplify professional life, the Prussian-German government succeeded in carrying out a part at least of its program, in spite of sharp opposition from the king and

the nobility who were interested in keeping up ecclesiastical control over education. A complete laicization of the schools was not, indeed, carried out; even the Prussian law of education issued in 1906 included the principle of sectarian education, because the children of dissenters and of non-sectarian parents were forced to go to sectarian schools. But lay inspectors were put at the side of the ecclesiastical school supervisors; civil marriage was introduced in Prussia in 1874, and into the whole Empire in 1875; the Jesuits were forbidden to reside in Germany, and in 1872 diplomatic relations with the Vatican were broken off.

Much less successful was the attempt to subject the Catholic Church itself to the authority of the State. In the years 1873-75, by the so-called "May Laws," the Prussian government attempted to transform bishops and priests into mere state officials. The State was to supervise the seminaries for priests; bishops and priests were to be compelled to study at state universities; the independence of the Church was abolished; and the monasteries were dissolved.

The Prussian government in all this policy stood on a very narrow basis for support. Not only did its measures of force, though so often effective hitherto, prove unavailing against an organization like the Catholic Church; but neither the sequestration of property nor the threat of imprisonment which was held over the heads of several bishops succeeded in reducing the Church to submission. Furthermore, the Junkers, who were the real ruling group in Prussia, gave the government only a half-hearted support; in the Prussian House of Lords a strong opposition developed against the *Kulturkampf,* or "War for the defense of modern civilization," as it was called by a Liberal surgeon named Virchow. Bismarck had to pay for the support of the National Liberals with concessions which threatened to deal a severe blow to the power of the nobility in internal politics. In 1872, the reform of the administration which had been promised since 1814 was carried out, and by a creation of new peers laws were forced through the Upper House which deprived the feudal nobility of their control of the courts and the police.

But this unnatural alliance between Bismarck and the National Liberals soon went to pieces. It left, however, several permanent results. A number of measures were carried through to secure uniformity in commercial and legal matters: the Empire was given a uniform system of coinage adapted from the Prussian *taler,* an Imperial Bank, and a uniform legal procedure. But even at that time, Bismarck opposed, on principle, all efforts of the National Liberals to make the administration, including foreign and domestic

policy, dependent upon the representatives of the people in the Reichstag.

The result was that the National Liberals, on their side, refused their consent to proposals which might have narrowed still further the already more or less limited share which the legislature had in legislation. The National Liberals refused to consent to a number of indirect taxes, such as a large increase in the tariff which was intended at the same time as protection to German industry, simply because this would have rendered the Reichstag's control over the budget illusory. Bismarck therefore joined again with the Conservatives and made an agreement with the Center which put an end to the *Kulturkampf*. In 1880, he had the Prussian Diet give the government power to dispense with the "May Laws," and nothing further remained except a formal revocation of the decrees. In 1882 Bismarck went so far as to restore diplomatic relations with the Vatican, but at the same time he ceased making any further reforms in the Prussian administration.

The government's new power and its renewed alliance with the parties of the Right now bore fruit in the conflict with the Social Democrats. This conflict could not be carried on without giving offense to the Liberals; and as the government had assured itself again of support from the Catholic party, any successful opposition on the part of the Left was out of the question. It was also fortunate for the government that in May and June, 1878, two attempts on the life of Emperor William I were made by Socialists who, however, were not acting in the name of the party. The Reichstag was thereupon dissolved and under the impression made by these two attempts the Liberals lost their majority at the new election.

The new Reichstag then adopted without delay, on October 21, 1878, the government measure directed against the dangerous aims of the Social Democrats: all Socialistic societies, meetings, and publications were forbidden; the German governments were given the right to declare the lesser state of siege, which made it possible for them to expel at will all persons suspected of Socialism. The law was very strictly administered: 1400 publications were suppressed, 900 persons were expelled from Germany, and 1500 thrown into prison. Whatever was left of the Social Democratic organization, which grew out of a union of Socialist Parties in 1875, had to conceal itself under harmless names or meet in secret. The conventions of the party had to be held abroad, mostly in Switzerland or Denmark.

But it was clear that methods like these could by no means put an end to the Socialist movement. This was at once seen from the

fact that the number of persons who voted the Socialist ticket steadily increased, in spite of the anti-Socialist law which remained in force until 1890. Therefore the government turned to other measures.

The new program for combatting Socialism was first officially announced in an imperial message in November, 1881, which promised to work for the "positive improvement of the well-being of the workingmen." It was carried out during the years 1883 to 1889 by laws introducing compulsory insurance for workingmen against sickness, accident, incapacity, and old age. By insurance against old age, all workingmen and other insured classes, like maid servants and shop clerks, were to receive an old age pension after completing their seventieth year, even though they were not incapacitated; this amounted, on the average, to 150 marks ($35) a year. A number of protective laws were also passed: in 1891 children were forbidden to work in factories until they had completed the compulsory education, and for women a ten-hour work day was introduced. Finally, after 1890, the anti-Socialist law was not renewed.

To this policy the German government held fast down to 1914. The leading principle of the government was to make no kind of political concessions, either to the Socialists or to the Liberal parties of the Left, but, by promoting the economic prosperity of those who were excluded from participation in politics, to interest them in the autocratic system of government, and to divert their attention from "impracticable" political demands.

It was easiest to carry out this program with the aid of the National Liberals, which was the party of the large manufacturers. Though the National Liberals might often have friction with the government, because in cases where their interests did not harmonize with those of the government, the government was more inclined to listen to the wishes of the large landlords forming the Conservative and Catholic parties than to the requests of the manufacturers, nevertheless their well-being was looked out for so excellently in general that they gave up the last remnants of their former opposition. How could they have been vexed with a régime which excluded workingmen from all influence in the government; which appointed to military and civil positions only persons who could not be reproached with any Socialistic or even really Liberal inclinations; which was ready at any time to use force to prevent strikes by means of an army which was well-disciplined and commanded by officers drawn exclusively from Conservative circles; and which was able to force favorable trade agreements with foreign countries by means of its military preponderance?

Similarly, the intellectual classes were also won over without great difficulty. The government, especially in Prussia, was very strict in its selection of the persons admitted to its monopolistic institutions. No Social Democrat was permitted to occupy a professorial chair. Only exceptionally was an investigator who had made himself suspicious by expressing liberal sentiments appointed to state educational institutions. A social and political writer like Karl Bücher was "impossible" for Prussian universities, because he had once been the editor of a progressive newspaper like the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. On the other hand, to intellectuals who were not rejected for political reasons, the government offered a pleasant and in many respects a privileged position, with safety against disturbance through violence or strikes. For military reasons, however, the State could not neglect the sciences which had a technical application, and it was especially concerned that all instruction which was destined to mold future soldiers should be carried on by men who were thoroughly in sympathy with the ruling authorities. Why then, should German professors and scholars envy their French, English and Italian colleagues the intellectual freedom which was granted to them? In these countries members of all political parties and even pronounced Socialists were given university positions.

In this way Germany became the El Dorado of capitalists and unpolitical men of learning—the state to which the rich in other countries, who were being pressed by the attack of the Socialist movement, turned with longing as to their ideal—the land on the existence of which depended the preservation of order in Europe. This was the opinion not only of Germans themselves, but of foreign scholars, who feared that the Socialist flood would bring about the destruction of all culture and good manners which was associated with good order in Europe.

These views, however, grew less frequent when it became evident what the results of this system were for Germany itself and for the rest of the world. This militarization of intellectual life, this struggle of the almighty government machinery against all cultural movements which threatened to weaken the ruling political and military system, this impoverishment of all intellectual life with the exception of the technical sciences—these were all things to which foreign countries might be fairly indifferent. But it was a very serious matter to them that in foreign relations the German economic system was becoming increasingly dependent upon a steady increase of exports. It has already been pointed out (see p. 324) that the large increase in population, which had been stimulated for military

reasons, was making Germany ever more and more dependent economically upon foreign countries, as she herself was not a land richly endowed by Nature. This fact, as well as the unusually large and almost steadily increasing expenditures for military purposes, and after 1897-98 for the navy also, created such a burden on living conditions in Germany that it was to be feared that in time she might cease to be able to compete in foreign markets—at any rate, when it was no longer possible to force favorable commercial agreements by military threats or to secure a monopoly in a number of products by conquering the foreign regions which produced the raw materials. From this point of view the German political and economic system affected directly the interests and rights of other countries. From the point of view of German internal politics, also, there was the fact that, in case of a further burdening of living conditions with perhaps a reduction in the opportunities for work, the discontent of the workingmen might increase to such an extent that revolutionary movements, hitherto very weak, could no longer be kept within bounds by armed force.

As a matter of fact, the Social Democratic movement had by no means been kept in check by the decrees issued for the protection of workingmen, however much the government might boast of the beneficial effects of this social legislation. In actual political life the effect of this social legislation was scarcely noticeable. Even if legislative bodies in Germany had enjoyed control over the executive, the growth of the Socialist vote could not have made itself completely felt owing to the unfair arrangement of electoral districts in the two legislative assemblies which were of most importance—the Prussian Diet and the Imperial Reichstag. As a result of the shift of population from the country to the city, the rural districts had come to have an extraordinary advantage over the towns, where most of the workingmen lived, so that the Social Democrats had not nearly as many representatives as they deserved according to the number of votes they cast. This was also true of the Reichstag which was elected by universal suffrage and not by the "three-class system" as in Prussia. Hitherto the government had succeeded in preventing revolts of workingmen by material concessions as well as by armed force, but it was a question how long material concessions could still be made in view of the fact that the persecuted party did not soften at all in its opposition on principle to the Prussian-German system of government. In a state which owed its origin more or less to war, and was completely prepared for war, there was a strong desire to improve the situation by a new recourse

to arms, which, whether by conquests, or by a war indemnity imposed on the conquered countries, or above all things by economic concessions forced from the conquered foe, would give German industry a trade monopoly in foreign countries and a safer market capable of further extension.

In this different attitude toward Socialism lies the distinction which separates the states in the West, South, and, in part, the North of Europe from those in Central and Eastern Europe. People have often used the word "democracy" to express this distinction; but this word, which had a very precise meaning among the Greeks, has been applied to wholly different modern conditions and used to mean so many different things, that it is best not to use it at all. In reality, the root of the difference lies in the fact that in the one case all social classes have equal political rights and exercise an influence on the government in proportion to their numbers, and neither the church nor the military officers exercise a controlling influence in politics. But in the other case, especially as in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, there exists a government by officials who are dependent on the government,—a government which refuses to coöperate with Socialists and Liberals of the Left and conducts its domestic and foreign policy in accordance with the wishes of the allied large landowners and large manufacturers,—a government, finally, in which the army and the church are given a preponderant influence in public education. This is the line of cleavage. Not only was public opinion so conscious of it that the alliance of France with Russia was often regarded as something monstrous, but it has also been of importance more than once in practical politics. Here we can only mention the service which Imperial Germany did for the Russian government in arresting Russian Socialists and Revolutionists, although Germany's interests, after she chose to support Austria in the Balkans, no longer coincided with those of Russia. It was certainly a sound feeling on the part of Russian Liberals, in contrast with the Tsar's pro-German court circle, that the close connection of the Russian government with Germany, and German influence in general, was regarded as the greatest obstacle to that liberty which they longed for. Much as the two countries differed in their economic organization and in the education of the masses, there were too many analogies between the principles of government in both for an affinity not to have grown up—an affinity, moreover, which was particularly emphasized by the circles who controlled the actual government in Prussia.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND RUSSIA FOR THE BALKANS

An "Eastern Question" had existed for a long time. As early as the eighteenth century, Russia, which had never possessed an access to the sea which was satisfactory in every respect, had attempted to get possession of Constantinople as a surer means of connection with the Mediterranean. For a long time Turkey's existence had depended solely upon the jealousy of the Great Powers toward one another.

But the struggle of the Great Powers against Russia's aspirations had hitherto been rather a European than an Austrian affair. Austria was too much absorbed with other cares—by her struggle to retain possession of her Italian possessions, and later by her conflict with Prussia for leadership in Germany—to be able to oppose armed resistance to Russian ambition. The duty of holding the Russians back from Constantinople had fallen to England in alliance with France, and during the Crimean War these allies had been able to put a halt to Russian efforts at expansion.

A change took place when the Wars of 1866 and 1870 revolutionized international relations in Europe. Austria had now definitely lost her position in Italy and Germany. If she wanted to seek compensation and carry out a policy of conquest like a Great Power, the only region left to her was the Balkan Peninsula, because she had neither the inclination nor the ability to carry on a regular overseas colonial policy. So the Danubian Monarchy concentrated its whole foreign policy upon the Balkans, either to conquer them directly, or to draw them within the sphere of Austrian influence.

But this meant a conflict with Russia. This conflict was not only sharpened by the new political situation, but it was put on a fundamentally new basis. While Austria had formerly been able to rely upon the assistance of the Western Powers, she now had to carry on the struggle all alone so far as these were concerned. France, after 1870, no longer counted as a military Great Power; and Great Britain, which had refused to build up land armaments like those of the Continental countries, no longer formed a counter-

weight which could be effectively opposed to the Russian advance toward the Mediterranean. There was only one power left which could interfere, either to help or to hinder Austria: this was the newly-founded German Empire; on its attitude depended primarily whether the two rival Eastern Powers should come to war over the Balkans or not.

So long as war could be avoided, the expedient was usually adopted which had first been applied in the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece: the territories seized from the Turks were not annexed by any of the Great Powers, but were made into independent states. As in the case of Greece this did not, indeed, solve the problem; it merely postponed its solution. The conflict continued in such a way that the two Great Powers struggled to secure a dominant influence over the new states, which had purposely been left small.

In this connection Austria found herself in many respects at a disadvantage. Little as the Balkan States were inclined toward Russia, they nevertheless stood closer to the Russians than to the Austrians. This was due to their common religion, although the influence of this has often been exaggerated. It was due also to similarities of language; although many people in Austria-Hungary spoke languages akin to those of the Balkan nations, these people belonged to the oppressed nationalities in Austria-Hungary, and hated their German and Magyar rulers, whereas the ruling classes in Russia were believed to be ready to assist all Pan-Slavic aspirations. Finally, the close relationship between the Balkan peoples and Russia rested on social conditions; although this has often not been realized, it has exercised such a strong influence that it must be considered somewhat more in detail here.

With the exception of Rumania and, to some extent, of Albania, where medieval feudal conditions with large landed estates have survived, the class of feudal landlords is unknown. The whole population of Bulgaria and Serbia—the two peoples who dominate in the Balkans—consists of peasants, and there is neither a middle-class nor large landed estates. In this respect, there is no analogy on their part either with Russia or with Austria. But there is a difference: in Austria, especially in the Slavic and Rumanian districts, the system of large landed estates is much more pronounced than in Russia; and the peasants performing agricultural services, who are at the mercy of their feudal landlords, are very often in subjection to representatives of foreign races, like Germans and Magyars. In Austria, also, the feudal landlords are privileged in all sorts of ways, as by the system of primogeniture; but in Russia nothing of

this kind exists. The prosperous development of the Balkan States, therefore, might be a dangerous example for the Slavic nationalities of Austria, but for Russia any such effect was scarcely conceivable.

In order to understand this, a summary sketch may here be given of Austrian history in the nineteenth century.

Austria was one of the few European states which were not transformed by the French Revolution. In contrast to Prussia, her inherited institutions proved capable of withstanding the attack of French armies, so that the compromise between medieval absolutism and enlightened despotism remained as it had been established in the eighteenth century. The only new phenomenon was an anxiety, formerly unknown, as to all new "revolutionary ideas," and this anxiety led to defensive measures which were equaled at the time only in Russia.

The government of Austria lay exclusively in the hands of a bureaucracy which in large part was made up of Germans. Uncontrolled by any public responsibility and without any reasonable system of organization, this bureaucracy did its work with unbelievable slowness and arbitrariness. The budget of this rich country showed regularly a deficit—which was kept secret. This régime was as much in contradiction with the wishes of the Liberals as with the demands of the gradually awakening national feeling on the part of the various populations which had been united under the monarchy. The Liberals as such lived mainly in cities in the German-speaking districts; they wanted a reform of the constitution so that the absolutism of the bureaucracy might be abolished. The nationalistic opposition was most lively in the non-German districts among the Hungarians, Czechs, Croats, and Poles. In these districts a revolutionary opposition was also in favor of federalism in government, in contrast to countries like Italy and Germany where the Liberals desired a centralized national state.

From the outset the national movements in Austria differed according to the social and political organization of the districts. The Magyar movement, which rested on the old Hungarian constitution with its privileges for the nobility, bore an exclusively feudal character; it represented the interests of the large landowners. The same was true of the Polish movement in Austria, especially as concerned Eastern Galicia; here the supporters of nationalism were the feudal landlords. On the other hand, it was quite different in the case of the Czechs and even of the Croats and Serbs: these peoples, so far as they were conscious of their position at all, had been awakened to it by the zealous propaganda of a number of in-

tellectuals; but nothing had been done for their education; here nationalism was mainly represented by the masses of people, and their struggles were directed both against the privileged position of the German elements in the Monarchy and against the privileges of the large landowners.

From this arose a curiously complicated situation, in which the government found it much easier to deal with those nationalities who at least did not want to interfere with the privileged aristocracy in their enjoyment of all the higher positions in the military and civil service, than with those nationalities who were also putting forward democratic demands. It was also true that the German elements in Austria, who might have sympathized with the Czechs and Croats on liberal grounds—since in their own districts there were only a few large landed estates—nevertheless opposed them most violently, because otherwise they would have lost their own privileged position in the government. Furthermore, it is to be noted that the Church, as a large owner of land, gladly put herself on the side of the aristocratic authorities.

This variety of criss-crossing influences, of which we have been able to mention only the most important, made it easy for the Austrian government to maintain itself by continually shifting its policy and making bargains; for it possessed two forces which were wholly dependent upon the government itself and whose very existence was bound up with the survival of the monarchy—two forces which, by their very nature, as in Prussia, were willing to make concessions to the land-owning nobility: these two forces were the bureaucracy and the army.

How the Austrian government had been able to master the revolutionary movement by means of these two forces had been shown for the first time in 1848.

When the February Revolution triumphed in Paris, the Austrian government was panic-stricken. When the mob in Vienna, which included many students, rose in insurrection, Prince Metternich, who had hitherto been all-powerful and who was regarded as the embodiment of absolutism, fell from power; the Emperor granted freedom of the press, permitted the creation of a citizen-guard, and on March 15, 1848, summoned a national assembly. New threats even compelled the ministry to allow this assembly to be elected on the basis of universal suffrage to act as a constitutional convention.

Since Austria, at that time and for long afterwards, still had no large manufactures and was primarily an agricultural country, this proclamation of universal suffrage meant the strengthening, not of

the workingmen, but of the peasants. Accordingly, more than a quarter of the representatives elected to the national convention were farmers. But universal suffrage had also resulted in strengthening the Slavic populations, who made up altogether a numerical majority in the Monarchy; the majority in the convention belonged to the Slavic nationalities. It was due to this fact that the constitutional convention had primarily in mind the abolition of the feudal obligations imposed on the agricultural population, like compulsory labor services. This reform was adopted unanimously and was the most important permanent result of the March Revolution in Vienna.

But in making this reform, the various nationalities by no means forgot their own particular claims. The Czechs in Bohemia demanded that they should have a ministry of their own and that their national language should be put on an equal footing with German. The Hungarians went still further. They insisted on a national government of their own with responsible ministers. The leader of the Liberal Hungarian movement, Kossuth, went so far in his idealism as to have the Hungarian Diet abolish feudal landlord rights and decree equality before the law, which meant putting an end to the exemption from taxation and the monopolization of positions in the government which had been enjoyed by the Magyar nobles. At that time the Hungarians also took a similarly liberal attitude toward the Croats, who formed a part of the Hungarian Kingdom and who had formerly been subjected by the Magyars to efforts at "Magyarization": the Croats were given a "ban," or governor, appointed from their own people, Colonel Jellachich. It was only toward the Serbian demand for autonomy that the Hungarians took an attitude of downright refusal.

The Hapsburg rulers in Vienna had been compelled to yield everywhere at first; but when this panicky fear had passed, they went back on their promises. With the help of the army they succeeded in crushing the revolution and in restoring the absolutistic régime under the form of a military dictatorship. In this they were supported by the Slavs, who were as hostile to the German populace of Vienna and to the Magyars as was the Hapsburg court party itself. The attack against the Hungarians was carried out by none other than the new Ban of Croatia, Jellachich, and Vienna was reconquered for the Hapsburgs by an army from Bohemia and Croatia.

Then, after Emperor Ferdinand had been compelled to abdicate and had been replaced by his nephew, the eighteen-year-old Francis Joseph, the new ruler declared that he was not bound by any of the promises made by his predecessor; he therefore annulled com-

pletely all the measures which the government had promised to the various nationalities at the moment it was under revolutionary pressure.

It was in Hungary that it proved most difficult to carry out this restoration. The Magyars had created an army of their own which had been able to drive the Austrians almost completely out of the country. The Hungarian Diet had deposed the Hapsburg dynasty and made Kossuth their governor. The Austrian government had to call upon the Tsar for help; whereupon a Russian army forced its way into Hungary and compelled the revolutionists to lay down their arms. By 1849 the rule of the Hapsburgs was restored in Hungary. Some Hungarian political leaders were put to death, many were banished, and the old Hungarian constitution was declared annulled.

The Old Régime was now restored in all the other parts of the Hapsburg Monarchy. The constitution was formally revoked and freedom of the press abolished. The administration was strictly centralized and put almost wholly into the hands of Germans. And a concordat was made with the Catholic Church as has been mentioned in another connection (see p. 226).

But this system proved too weak to stand, the moment the Monarchy ceased to derive strength from successes in foreign policy, which alone could have justified such a restoration. In 1859, ten years after the restoration, came the costly campaign in Italy (see p. 253). To this were added financial difficulties. Austria, with her rich mineral and agricultural resources and in spite of her miserable administrative system, had sufficient means to prolong her existence in some way or other under ordinary circumstances; but the revenues were not sufficient to meet the costs of a disastrous war policy. Bankers refused to loan money so long as the financial administration was conducted by an uncontrolled bureaucracy, and in 1860 the government loan was not subscribed. The Emperor called an Imperial Council consisting of thirty-eight notables, almost exclusively large landowners, to help him out of the difficulty. It was in this "Enlarged Council" that the opposition of class interests mentioned above first came clearly to light. The majority, consisting of large landlords from Hungary, Bohemia, and Polish Galicia, wanted a federal system of government, in which each of the nationalities should be given local self-government with the power in the hands of the local nobility; the Germans, on the other hand, wanted a continuance of the strong central power at Vienna, which meant prolonging their own control of the administration.

The Emperor decided at first in favor of the great landlords. Since the Hungarians wished above everything else the restoration of their old constitution, he also made shortly afterwards some concessions to the German party, so that the result was a compromise, in which each of the Austrian lands was given a local Diet, but at the same time there was created a real imperial parliament or Reichsrat, consisting of two houses. The Reichsrat of 1860 was composed of a House of Representatives chosen by the members of the local Diets, which gave an unusually large advantage to the Germans, and of a House of Lords composed mainly of the heads of noble families and ecclesiastical dignitaries.

These concessions to the Germans and to the urban districts were regarded as so excessive by the great landlords and the non-German populations that the new constitution never really came into operation. The Hungarians, who felt that both their class interests and their national interests had equally suffered, were the first to object and refuse to recognize the new constitution. They and the Croats simply refused to elect deputies to the House of Representatives. The Czech and Polish representatives quickly withdrew from the Chamber also, so that there remained merely the representatives of the Germans and of the very small nationalities. At the same time the financial deficit of the state was steadily increasing. The Emperor therefore resorted to his old plan and decided to give way to the landlords and their desire for a federalist system; so the constitution of 1860 was "suspended"—forever.

It was a natural result of these events that the Hapsburg monarchs should seek to make an agreement with the most dangerous opponents of the idea of centralized government, namely with the Hungarian magnates. The Hungarians, who at that time were led by an 1848 Liberal named Deak, favored on principle a compromise. But it was not until the Austrian military defeats in 1866 that the Austrian Emperor was finally induced to go to the point of coming to an agreement with the Magyars. The Austrian government, whose foreign policy at that time was in the hands of a former Saxon minister and enemy of Prussia, Count Beust, was naturally anxious to preserve Austria from the danger of being attacked in the rear by the Hungarians in case of a war of revenge against Prussia. Austria therefore recognized Hungary as an autonomous state with a ministry of its own, and signed the *Ausgleich,* or "Compromise" of 1867.

Austria, which henceforth was known as "Austria-Hungary," now consisted of two states which, besides the common monarch, had only

three other things in common: foreign affairs, the army and navy, and finance; so far as these three things had to be supported financially they were to be managed by three joint ministers. "Commercial matters" were to be managed on the same general principles, but not by joint ministers. The common debt was to be met by a special agreement to be revised every ten years. Above the three imperial ministers of foreign affairs, war, and finance, "Delegations" were set up, consisting of sixty representatives from each of the two halves of the Dual Monarchy; the two Delegations enjoyed equal rights and took the place of the Reichsrat, which was done away with. The old Hungarian constitution was restored.

By this *Ausgleich* the government and the Germans had relieved themselves of pressure from the most powerful nation within the Empire; henceforth, the Hungarians possessed no direct influence on the administration of the Austrian half of the Monarchy known as Cisleithania; but they were now just as much interested in the establishment of a centralized, united, national administration for their own territory as the Germans were for theirs. These two ruling nationalities, Germans and Magyars, henceforth formed a natural alliance against subject nationalities like the Slavs, Rumanians, and Italians.

In Hungary the government remained in the hands of the large landowners. The House of Magnates, or upper branch of the Diet, was still composed as before of hereditary feudal landlords. The franchise for the Chamber of Deputies was indeed made somewhat democratic, and the nobility lost their right of appointing the judges, but elections were by open instead of secret ballot, so that the voters were subject to pressure from landlords. As far as appearances went, a parliamentary system of government had been introduced. Transylvania was completely incorporated into Hungary; Croatia, on the other hand, by a special "Compromise," kept its autonomous administration.

The *Ausgleich* between Austria and Hungary also resulted in the establishment of constitutional government in Austria itself. The half of the Monarchy west of the river Leith was given by the constitutional laws of 1867 a new parliament with responsible ministers and the promise of legal equality for all persons. All citizens were declared capable of holding office, religious toleration was established, the law courts were withdrawn from administrative control, and even some of the concessions made to the church in the Concordat of 1855 were canceled. The different national groups were promised equal treatment in the schools. The system of electing the

Reichsrat by the Provincial Diets was at first retained; but in 1873 it was transferred directly to the electorate who, however, still voted as formerly in four groups consisting of landowners, towns, chambers of commerce, and rural districts. It was not until 1907 that universal and equal suffrage was introduced.

But in spite of all these appearances, the real power remained almost exclusively in the hands of the Emperor or of his court. The Chamber of Deputies was split into so many groups, according to social classes and nationalities, that no parliamentary government majority could be formed. It was therefore possible for the court to create a government coalition out of any groups which it wanted to. Its procedure was something like this: the Emperor could always count on the votes of the landowners and their deputies whose interests were the same as his own, just as was the case in Prussia; with these votes his ministers combined the votes of those parties or nationalities whose support was easiest to obtain for the government measure of the moment; such a ministry held together only until the court decided to adopt a new policy with the support of a new combination of parties.

This system of continual compromise and endless bargaining both with the different nationalities and with the different social groups cannot be described here in detail; not only were the Germans, at the outset, split into several groups which squabbled violently with one another, but so also were the Czechs. It must suffice to state that, of all the parties, the Czechs went furthest in their demands for federalism in government; like the Hungarians, they desired to restore their old kingdom and be united with Austria only in a personal union, recognizing the same monarch.

The most important result of all these struggles, however, was the fact that the direction of the foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy slipped more and more into the hands of the Hungarians. Hungary did not recognize any equality among her different races, even in form: one nationality alone—that of the Magyars—exercised unlimited political authority; one social class, the nobility, dominated the Diet; the aristocratic character of these Magyar rulers drew them close to the Vienna court; how natural it was, therefore, that this powerful, closely organized, Hungarian clique should impose their authority on the Austrian half of the Monarchy, which was split into so many parties and divided by so many tendencies!

This circumstance was also of decisive importance in Austria's relations to the Balkans. So far as Austro-Hungarian policy toward the Balkans was determined primarily by economic considerations,

the interests of the Hungarian landlords proved to be the determining factor.

After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 had relieved Russia of taking France and England into account as far as her policy in the Near East was concerned, the Christian populations of the Balkans, especially in Herzegovina, who had already revolted several times against Turkish oppression, began to have stronger hopes of help from St. Petersburg. Russian consuls stirred up their religious and racial brothers in Bulgaria and Serbia toward a war of independence. The Serbian inhabitants of Herzegovina rose in rebellion against the Turkish officials; they were supported by the Montenegrins, and in 1875 the Serbs in Serbia, who were autonomous, declared that they could not leave their Serbian brethren in the lurch. The Great Powers thereupon compelled the Sultan to withdraw his troops from Herzegovina. For this the Turks avenged themselves not only by individual acts of violence like the murder of the French and German consuls in Salonika in 1876, but also by frightful massacres in Bulgaria, where some villages had taken up arms against Turkey. Serbia thereupon declared war; but her army was too weak to withstand the Turks, and it was only Russia's intervention which forced the Turks to conclude an armistice with the beaten Serbs. The other Great Powers also undertook diplomatic intervention; but the Turks managed to evade all their warnings, though in such a despicable manner that in 1876 the Europeans gave up the defense of the Turkish régime as hopeless.

This meant that for the moment they would give Russia a free hand, and in 1877 the Tsar declared war on Turkey. Two Russian armies advanced against the Turks, the main army through Bulgaria into the Balkans, and a smaller force against Armenia. But victory was not so easy to win as in 1829. The training of Turks by Prussian and Austrian officers had borne fruit, and though the Turkish army was incapable of taking the offensive, nevertheless it understood how to hold the enemy in check most obstinately by good defensive positions. The Turks had made the town of Plevna into a well entrenched camp, and it proved impossible to dislodge them by storming the place. The Russians had to begin a regular siege and seek help from the Rumanian army. In December, 1877, after Plevna had been besieged nearly five months, the place was taken; but the Turks by their defense had so revived the fame of their former heroic exploits in war that the effect of the defense of Plevna had an influence for a long time afterwards. It was not until the

winter that the Russians were able to force the Balkan passes, and in January, 1878, their troops filed past Adrianople.

On March 3, 1878, in order to save their capital at Constantinople, the Turks quickly agreed to sign the treaty of San Stephano, in which they gave up all claims to Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro, raised Bulgaria to the position of a tributary state, and ceded a piece of Armenia to Russia.

Although Russia, in comparison with her enormous achievements during the war, which had cost more than a billion dollars, had received only a small direct advantage from the war, nevertheless, the other Powers stepped in to prevent her from getting too much influence through the founding of a new Balkan state, consisting of an enlarged Bulgaria. Austria mobilized her army and England sent her fleet to Constantinople. Germany, also, stood on their side. As Russia had neither the inclination nor perhaps the means of engaging in war with a European Great Power, she yielded. She consented to lay the treaty of San Stephano for revision before a European Congress which met at Berlin in the summer of 1878.

The result of this Congress was that the concessions imposed on Turkey were essentially cut down. Serbia and Montenegro, to be sure, retained their independence, but the extension of territory assigned to them was reduced. The clause by which Rumania was given the Dobrudscha in compensation for the much richer district of Bessarabia, which was ceded to Russia, was retained; at the same time, a clause was imposed on the Rumanians compelling them to give legal equality to adherents of all religions in Rumania, even including the Jews. The increase of territory which Russia had demanded in Asia Minor was considerably cut down, but the most important point was the way in which the newly-created state of Bulgaria was cut to pieces: northern Bulgaria was permitted to have a prince of its own choosing; southern Bulgaria, or "East Roumelia," was merely placed under a Christian governor; and the whole of Macedonia was restored to Turkish misrule. The other European Great Powers received some direct compensations for the extension of territory which Russia received in Asia Minor. Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the insurrection against Turkish oppression had first broken out, were not assigned to Serbia and Montenegro in accordance with ethnographic principles, but were left by the Congress under the nominal suzerainty of Turkey, and Austria was given the right to occupy and administer them. Russia had purposely never claimed them because she did not want to interfere in the Austrian sphere of influence. Great Britain, which had promised

in a secret treaty to defend Turkey's rights in Asia Minor, received directly from Turkey the right to administer Cyprus in return for the payment of tribute. Finally, at the request of the French, Greece was enlarged by being given part of Thessaly.

These decisions of the Congress of Berlin not only regulated the situation in the Balkans for the moment; they embodied in general the Balkan program of the Great Powers. The Christian populations now knew that the Great Powers, and especially Austria, would never consent to the creation of independent powerful states in the Balkan Peninsula, and also that they would never take determined steps against Turkey. Little was to be hoped for, even from Russia. The Tsar had attempted to carve up European Turkey and to establish in its place independent Christian states; but the other Great Powers had prevented him and he had been forced to give in. Only by exploiting the rivalries among the Great Powers or by allying among themselves would it henceforth be possible for the Balkan states to liberate the other Christian districts and unite them with the nations which had already been formed. Such an alliance seemed more necessary than ever. Now that the Turks had realized how their authority was threatened by the existence of Christian communities in Turkey, their former toleration had often given way to a system of the most terrible persecution and even extermination. But there was no hope that the Great Powers would do anything to prevent this. They had, indeed, imposed on the Sultan promises meant to protect the Christian populations; but since they clung to the principle that European Turkey must continue to exist, they did not dare to adopt any kind of measures which would really compel the Turks to respect the treaties. The frightful massacring of Armenians, which began in 1894, went on undisturbed without the Great Powers troubling themselves about it.

So the Balkan states took their fate in their own hands. First, Bulgaria got possession of East Roumelia, which had been withheld from her by the Congress of Berlin; this was done simply by a military occupation of the country in 1885. This resulted in a war between Bulgaria and Serbia, as the latter wanted to prevent the expansion of her rival. But the Bulgarians were victorious, and Serbia was only saved by Austria, which did not want to see any Balkan state, even Bulgaria, become too strong. But this friendship between Austria-Hungary and Serbia went to pieces when Serbia began to be an economic competitor of Austria and Hungary. In spite of many disorders at court after their emancipation, both Serbia and Bulgaria developed great economic prosperity; the more

Europe became industrialized and its population increased, the greater was the profit which accrued to these two peasant states. It was just because of this that Serbia, at least, came into conflict with Hungary, which exercised a determining influence on the foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy. Since Serbia, in contrast to Bulgaria, had no free access to the sea, she was compelled to export all her hogs through Austria; but now this mode of export began to be restricted as much as possible for the benefit of the Hungarian landlords, and there developed a regular tariff war between Serbia and Austria-Hungary.

Similar advances of the Christian population at Turkey's expense took place further south. The Island of Crete, which had been given a constitution as far back as 1868, had been in almost continual revolt against the Turkish governors, and in 1897 the Christians in the island proclaimed their union with the Greeks on the mainland. The Greeks of the mother country thereupon occupied the island; but the Great Powers stepped in and took possession of the city of Canea; at the same time, Turkey declared war upon Greece. But the Greek army was not at all prepared for this and was put to flight by the Turks near Larissa. Owing to intervention by the Powers the war was brought to a speedy end. Greece lost a number of important strategic points in Thessaly, and had to withdraw her troops from Crete and pay a war indemnity of a million dollars; her finances were therefore placed under European control.

In spite of this, Crete was practically taken from Turkey. The Great Powers compelled the Sultan to withdraw his troops from the island and they set up, as governor-general, a son of the king of Greece. Crete was made autonomous. But this was merely the first step toward complete freedom. In 1904, there began an opposition under the leadership of a native statesman, Venizelos. The Opposition, which wanted to go further than the Greek dynasty, began a war against the cautious governor-general, who finally resigned his post; the Opposition then announced again the union of Crete with Greece.

Meanwhile, changes in the attitude of the Powers toward one another had been taking place, which reacted powerfully on the fate of the Balkan peoples.

The most important of these changes was the wholly different attitude of Germany. In one respect Bismarck had never lost his keenness of judgment; he had never over-estimated the real power at Germany's disposal and had never allowed the economic prosperity of his country to go to his head. One may say that he never

forgot how wonderfully favorable the combinations were to which he owed his quick victories in 1866 and 1870. He realized that they were due to the fact that the other Great Powers not directly interested had not interfered, and he shaped his policy accordingly. Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in his policy toward the Balkans. Although bound by an alliance with Austria, and although he thoroughly favored his ally being drawn away by Balkan interests from political activities in Central Europe, he nevertheless always prevented matters from going so far as to allow this to cause hostility between Germany and Russia. In 1881 he renewed the old friendly understanding between Germany and Russia, and steadily recognized that Russia no less than Austria had claims to a part of the Balkans.

The new generation in Germany was typically represented by Emperor William II, who ascended the throne in 1888 at the age of twenty-nine. He did not recognize these facts as did Bismarck. In 1890 the aged chancellor was dismissed, partly as a result of the young Emperor's shifting to a closer support of Austria in the Near East, and the secret "re-insurance treaty" with Russia was not renewed. Two reasons for this more aggressive and pro-Austrian attitude probably had a determining influence. One of these was the new ruler's inability correctly to appreciate other peoples who were not educated and ruled in the same military fashion as the Germans; this resulted in the conviction that Germany had no need to fear a coalition of other Great Powers, which had been Bismarck's nightmare. The second reason was New Germany's determination to expand and her belief that a welcome field for exploitation was to be found in a Turkey dominated by Germany and protected by German arms. This did not mean that Germany was directly interested in conquest in the Balkans, as was her ally, but it did mean that she was interested in the continued existence of the Turkish Empire and in the weakening of the Balkan nations, so that the policy of the two Central Powers was now virtually one and the same. The German government accepted the risk of turning Russia into a natural enemy by this policy; but she believed that the identity of political ideals in Germany and Russia (see p. 402) would suffice to prevent an actual outbreak of war; she believed that the Tsar's dislike of "democracy" would prove stronger than his anxiety to maintain Russia's position in foreign affairs.

The consequences of this new grouping of the Powers became more evident after 1905, after the close of the Russo-Japanese War (see p. 357 f.).

The defeats which Russia suffered in Eastern Asia in this war seemed to have revealed a military weakness in the Tsar's empire which no one had suspected hitherto. If Russia could not even withstand a relatively small Power like Japan, which had only just equipped herself with European weapons, how would she ever be able to make war against a European Great Power? All Russia's enemies now abandoned their reserved attitude and no longer hesitated to make aggressive moves; even during the war, in 1904, the British had pushed forward in Tibet as far as Lhassa. Within Russia itself it was impossible to hold down the Liberal Opposition any longer. In August, 1905, the Tsar proclaimed the creation of a parliament with advisory powers, known as the "Advisory Duma"; later, in October, 1905, the Duma was given "legislative power." At the same time, freedom of the press, religious toleration, and so forth were proclaimed. The Duma elections of the next year gave the reformers an overwhelming majority. The strongest party in the Duma were the Constitutional Democrats under Miliukov; they were known as the "Cadets," from the Russian name of the letters "C. D." which was the familiar abbreviation for "Constitutional Democrats." The next strongest party was the Group of Toil, representing the peasants; the Extreme Conservatives, on the other hand, were scarcely represented at all. The Duma now demanded control over the executive—more even than was allowed to legislative bodies in Germany. It was therefore dissolved and the government finally succeeded in 1907, by means of a limited franchise, in securing the election of a Third Duma, in which the Octobrist party, consisting of Liberals of the Right, had a majority. But even so, the Tsar had to give his consent to the establishment of parliamentary government, and the way for reforms was now open. The president of the cabinet, Stolypin, who had risen to power through provincial administration, undertook to create free peasant proprietors. In 1910, the peasants were given the right to divide and take as their own the fields which they had been cultivating; the community ownership represented by the *mir* was replaced by private ownership in land. The government regarded it as all the more important to create these new peasant proprietors as a kind of conservative force for the future, because there had recently been a threatening growth of Socialism. The Liberal reforms which had been granted in 1905 had not satisfied the Extreme Left; numerous socialistic revolts had broken out, and there had been strikes by officials, all of which were only put down with bloodshed. Thus the government sought at first to secure support principally from

large landowners and from Conservative-Liberal officials; but later it intended to rest its power on a broader basis.

For the moment, however, in the eyes of her neighbors, Russia seemed to be very seriously weakened by the disorders which accompanied the introduction of constitutional government. But her neighbors overlooked the considerable solid reform in the army and administration which was taking place to remedy the evils which had been laid bare in the war with Japan; so there took place one move after another against Russia's interests in the Balkans.

In 1908 a group who called themselves "Young Turks" and who were opposed to the Sultan's régime took possession of Constantinople. They declared that the anarchy in Macedonia, which had already led to the appointment of foreign military officers—among whom, however, there were no Germans—must necessarily lead to a partitioning of Turkey, unless the tyrannical system which had hitherto existed was done away with.

The Young Turk *coup d'état* succeeded at first, and a Turkish Parliament, elected on the basis of the liberal constitution of 1876, came into being. But the only really practical effect of the revolt of the Young Turks was that it revealed more clearly than ever to the Powers the weakness of the Turkish government. The Powers therefore did not delay in taking advantage of this: it was in July, 1908, that the Young Turks had come into power; in October, Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria declared himself independent, taking the title of Tsar, and Austria-Hungary annexed the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This was a serious blow, not only for Russia, but still more for the Balkan peoples themselves, who now saw, for the first time, that in place of Turkish rule they were not to have independence but the domination of a foreign Great Power. The annexation of the provinces struck most deeply at the claims of Serbia, who now had to regard her Serbian brothers living in Bosnia as lost. But resistance was out of the question. A little state like Serbia could not possibly attack Austria-Hungary, and Russia refrained from all warlike action because Germany declared that the interests of her Austrian ally were her own.

It was doubtful, however, how long the two Central Powers could maintain their control over the Balkans. They were steadily becoming more and more isolated. Italy, no less than Austria, believed that she had claims to the eastern coast of the Adriatic, and her war for the conquest of Tripoli had showed that her interests as a member of the Triple Alliance could not be made to harmonize with

Austria's policy, which aimed at control over Salonica and the Western Balkans. France was the ally of Russia, but not wholly on Russia's side. England's support was uncertain. The situation became most threatening when the Balkan states, whose development was endangered by the pro-Turkish policy of Austria-Hungary and Germany, finally united together under the pressure of common necessity in an offensive alliance against Turkey in the spring of 1912.

It was regarded almost as a wonder that a coalition uniting Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro, could take place. Apparently its success was mainly due to the diplomatic skill of the Greek statesman, Venizelos. It was still more of a wonder that the Central Powers allowed this alliance, which was directed against their policy in Turkey, to take its course at first. The explanation lies in the fact that they greatly over-estimated Turkey's defensive strength; after the Turkish successes in the Greco-Turkish War, and after the training of Turkish troops by German officers, they regarded Turkey's power of resistance as almost invincible. In reality, things turned out exactly the other way. After the Balkan Allies had declared war in October, 1912, Turkey's power collapsed with a speed which was unheard of. The Greeks captured Salonica and Janina in Epirus; the Serbs, after a victory at Kumanovo, occupied Üsküb and the whole of northern Macedonia; the Montenegrins, after a long siege, seized Scutari in Albania. More decisive than anything, however, was the fact that the Bulgarians crushed the Turkish armies at Kirk-Kilisse and Lüle Burgas, so that the remnants of the beaten enemy had to withdraw behind the Tchataldja Lines, a few miles west of Constantinople. With the support of the Serbs, the Bulgarians also succeeded in capturing the strongly fortified city of Adrianople. The Turks had to recognize that they were beaten. In the Treaty of London, May 30, 1913, they gave up all their European territory with the exception of Constantinople and the Dardanelles up to a line running from Enos on the Ægean to Midia on the Black Sea; they also gave up Crete and the other islands in the Ægean Sea.

The Great Powers had not been able to prevent Turkey from being despoiled in this fashion. But the Central Powers were at least able to bring it about that the Balkan states, especially Serbia and Montenegro, which were particularly disliked by Austria for economic and political reasons, were not too much enlarged. Though Serbia had entered the war largely in order to secure free access to the sea and make herself politically and commercially independent of Hungarian oppression, she was now forced to abandon the most

important part of her conquests. At the insistence of Austria and Italy, the Great Powers created an independent principality of Albania, which was placed under a German prince; Serbia lost the coast region on the Adriatic which she had occupied, and received merely the right to have a so-called corridor railway; Montenegro, also, had to give up to the newly created Albanian principality the town of Scutari which she had captured at such cost.

By their intervention the Central Powers accomplished even more than this. Not only were Serbia and Montenegro deprived of a good part of their booty, but as a result of their losses, the harmony among the Balkan states which had only just been brought about, went to pieces again. The plan for dividing the spoils which had been arranged before the war could no longer be carried out, and Serbia therefore demanded compensations elsewhere. Since Bulgaria would not agree to this, the two victorious nations now went to war with one another. But Bulgaria was not at all equal to her enemies; Serbs beat Bulgarians in the Bregnalnitza valley, and Greeks beat them on the Upper Struma. Bulgaria was so weakened that Rumania, which had hitherto stood aloof because she did not border directly on Turkish territory, stepped in, and without striking a blow occupied northern Bulgaria. Even the Turks finally took the offensive again and reconquered Adrianople.

The Peace of Bucharest, on August 10, 1913, confirmed these military developments. Macedonia was divided between Serbia and Bulgaria, the Greek boundary was pushed further eastward, and Rumania received a considerable piece of land which had hitherto belonged to Bulgaria. Furthermore, in the treaty of Constantinople, in September, 1913, Bulgaria ceded Adrianople back to Turkey.

But this only settled the Balkan question for the moment. To be sure, the territories which Turkey had given up were regarded as definitely lost. But in other respects, the situation was nowhere satisfactory. Bulgaria could not reconcile herself to the loss of Macedonia and her own northern districts; and Serbia was, and remained, very indignant at the way she had been forced back from the Adriatic. But all this irritation was at first without practical importance, since the Balkan states were so exhausted by the war that none of them could think of appealing to arms again.

Quite different was the situation in Austria-Hungary. While the difficulties and suffering of these recent wars forced the Balkan states to remain at peace, this very weakness of theirs tempted the neighboring Great Power to speedy interference. It had become evident that Serbia could not be crushed by economic weapons; but

now the situation was all the more favorable for a military attack. Unless Austria-Hungary quickly interfered to nip Serbia's development in the bud, there was danger that before long the Serbian kingdom, which was considerably enlarged and was beginning to have great economic prosperity, might became a dangerous neighbor in view of the Serbian populations in various parts of the Dual Monarchy. The situation in Bosnia appeared especially dangerous: the Austrian government had never been able to break up the system of large landed estates which had survived from the time when the Mohammedans were in control; the Serbs in Bosnia would therefore be looking over with longing eyes to the peasant state of Serbia across the border.

Equally influential was still another consideration. All Austria's acts of interference in the Balkans had met with nothing but empty diplomatic opposition on the part of the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance. France and Russia, though friendly to Serbia and Montenegro, had always ended by leaving them in the lurch when Austria had threatened military action. Great Britain had not put herself completely on the side of Russia and France, even in her diplomacy. Was it not natural to expect that, in case of a new intervention by Austria, Russia and her French ally would remain just as inactive as heretofore? Especially as Austria could again use the German army as a threat, as when she annexed Bosnia.

So Austria decided to attack Serbia in order to reduce the country to impotency once and for all. At first she planned to act in unison with Italy, but in August, 1913, the Italian government refused to coöperate; so Austria could count only on Germany's support.

The final occasion causing the attack was an act of violence all the details of which have not yet been wholly cleared up satisfactorily. On June 28, 1914, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian throne, was murdered by a Bosnian student named Princip at Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. What the murderer's motives were is unknown; but it is certain that the attempt, which was not the first on that day, was carefully prepared beforehand, and that the Austrian police had taken wholly inadequate measures for the protection of the Archduke.

This crime now became the pretext for Austrian measures which aimed to bring about war with Serbia. A murder had taken place which, if it remained unavenged, would ultimately be a danger to all crowned heads; all hesitating persons in Austria were convinced that thoroughgoing measures must be taken once and for all.

Any complicity on the part of the Serbian government in the crime was not proved and was very unlikely; but it was not difficult so to represent the affair that appearances, at least, seemed to be against officials in Belgrade.

Accordingly, on July 23, three weeks after the assassination, Austria took Serbia by surprise with an ultimatum. This was so worded that Serbia could scarcely accept it. Nevertheless, the Serbian government did agree to all Austria's hard conditions with the exception of two points. But Austria wanted war, and therefore the Austrian minister left Belgrade at once on July 25, in spite of Serbia's conciliatory answer. Three days later, on July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary officially declared war on Serbia.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918

Austria-Hungary and also her German ally had certainly expected that the other Great Powers, including Russia, would again leave Serbia in the lurch. They had reckoned that Russia, which had never yet interfered on Serbia's behalf, would consent to see her completely destroyed, and would not only abandon the domination of the Balkans to her old rival without a blow, but would completely lose her position as a Great Power. Though the Balkan states, in spite of the obstacles which the Great Powers had put in the way of their development, had at least been able to maintain a certain independence, owing to the antagonism between Austria and Russia, Germany and Austria now calculated that the Balkan states would henceforth be at the mercy of the expansionist policy of the Central Powers; and they also calculated that Russia would submit to all this and that they could ignore her protests, like those of any small state.

But it turned out otherwise. Russia refused to allow Austria to attack Serbia in this way—and the World War broke out.

Before an account is given of the details of the outbreak of the war, it is necessary to make some general observations.

Whoever wants to study the origin of the war ought not to content himself, as is so often done, with a mere statement of the hostile interests which existed. Disputes between the Great Powers are taking place almost all the time, and there are continually rumors of threatening war; but more is needed than all this to cause a war actually to develop out of these sources of irritation in such a way that no compromise can ultimately be found. The very history of Europe since 1870 shows this clearly: no matter how often friction developed between the Great Powers between 1870 and 1914, it never caused war to break out; it was even possible to settle ticklish questions like the partition of Africa without the Great Powers resorting to arms. Wars have assumed such giant proportions since the introduction of universal military service, and the economic life of the peoples of Europe since the development of

world commerce is so dependent upon the undisturbed functioning of international communications, that no conflict seemed worth a war. In the age of professional armies a war which aimed at the conquest of some border district might seem worth while; and even in recent years some of the colonial wars which were carried out under similar conditions might be justified. But a war between the giant armies of Europe meant a risk which ought to be contemplated only for the sake of a great stake.

One might regard as such a stake the preservation or the acquisition of the military domination of Europe, i.e. "World Power" (*Weltherrschaft*). Just because all states, and especially those which felt themselves weaker in military force, shrank from war, it was of great practical importance to enjoy the prestige of military invincibility. The state which, because of its earlier military achievements and continued armaments, appeared to be sure of victory in a future war, could reap the fruits of war without coming to an actual conflict. Its opponents would simply surrender to its essential demands.

This had been the position of Germany in Europe since 1870. Relying on the successes of 1866 and 1870, on a military organization which was being built up ever more powerfully and which was organized to the last detail, and on a complete militarization of the people through the schools and barracks; relying also on the fact that Germany's more rapid mobilization seemed to make it possible for her to put her enemy at a disadvantage at the outset, if not to overwhelm him quickly,—relying on all this, Germany had been able to support every demand she made by a threat of war, without having to fear anything of the same kind herself (never, so far as is known, has a threat of war been made against the German government). Heavy as were the financial burdens, which the steadily increasing armaments imposed on Germany, they all seemed to be worth while, even from an economic point of view; for a hint at this military organization sufficed to secure from other countries concessions of all sorts, not the least important of which related to commercial and political matters.

It was therefore thoroughly natural that Germany opposed all efforts at the limitation of armaments more consistently than any other state. Why should she be willing to abandon means of exerting pressure, when she had the feeling that she could compete with other countries more richly endowed by Nature, thanks primarily merely to her military organization and armaments?

So all the attempts to lessen the frightful and ever-increasing

burden of armaments in Europe and even to prepare the way for a wide-reaching system of international arbitration failed, owing to the opposition of the German government. When Russia invited all the European states to a conference, to consider means for limiting armaments, and the meeting took place at the Hague in 1899, the real purpose of the conference could not be seriously touched, because the German representatives declared at the outset that their country did not find that armaments were a burden and that they had no intention of limiting their military preparations in any way. The result was that nothing but a half measure providing for the establishment of a permanent court of arbitration at the Hague was accomplished; but it was impossible to make resort to this court compulsory in international disputes; and even this provision for a court was achieved only after long opposition on the part of the German delegates. Only a few states went so far in separate treaties as to bind themselves to submit all disputes to the Hague court, and among the number were not included any of the European military Powers.

Not only had all the efforts to limit the burdens of war in time of peace failed, but it had been made perfectly clear which state was mainly to blame for this. Not only in purely pacifist circles, but in all countries where military expenditures were interfering with social progress, public opinion therefore began to turn more and more against Germany, which even during the last third of the nineteenth century had still enjoyed an increasing popularity as the preserver of "order," protecting the capitalist régime from the threats of Socialism. People began to feel more strongly than ever that the internal policy of all the European Great Powers would be determined in last analysis by whether they could put an end to the pressure for excessive armaments—excessive even as compared with those of the middle of the nineteenth century—which was being imposed by the German military organization. Moreover, this pressure was finally felt not merely on the Continent, but in Great Britain. Germany was seeking to arm herself at sea as well as on land, and the English proposals for limiting naval armaments were summarily rejected in Berlin as had been the proposals which Russia had made in 1899.

The burden of these armaments, the like of which the world had never seen, began gradually to be ever more crushing. The boundless optimism which resulted from the scientific inventions of the second half of the nineteenth century, now began to show its fruit. It was becoming clear even to those who had hitherto closed their

eyes to the simplest facts of political economy that scientific progress had been able to transform things and arrangements which had formerly been luxuries of the rich into cheap articles of comfort for the poor; but it had not been possible, in like manner, to increase the necessaries of life and raw materials needed by the overgrown populations of Europe. Progress in the science of communication had indeed been able to distribute the existing necessaries of life quickly and cheaply, but it could not increase the production at a rate proportionate to the increase in population. From these conditions, there began to develop, about 1905, a steadily-increasing rise in the cost of articles which were necessary for the support of life and for use in industry; and this led to a gradual revolutionizing of all economic relations, especially those concerning the living conditions of the numerous class of persons dependent on a fixed salary. The giant activities of government, commerce, and industry had been built up on the basis of cheap labor, which now threatened to be no longer available. As a result, there arose a kind of nervousness which, together with the fact that the more ambitious elements found it less easy than formerly to emigrate, led to a kind of unrest and discontent, which regarded any change in the general situation, even one involving war, as a happy deliverance. Herein lies a psychological root of the war which was especially strong in Germany and Austria-Hungary; it is significant that in a relatively thinly settled and primarily agricultural country, like France, one does not find this feeling; and in England, at any rate, it was still easy to emigrate to the colonies.

Such was the situation when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. All now depended on whether it would be possible to make Austria retreat from the step which she had taken, by giving her to understand that Russia would not consent to the destruction of Serbia. The way to do this was for England, which was the Power least directly concerned in Balkan conflicts, to undertake the rôle of mediator as quickly as possible and propose an international conference for settling the Austro-Serbian dispute. England did this, but her offer did not meet with a favorable response from the Central Powers. Russia was then compelled to make it clear that she was in earnest in her determination not to allow Serbia to be crushed by Austria. Just as Austria-Hungary had formerly, during the Balkan Wars, supported her demands on Serbia and Montenegro by mobilizing on the Russian frontier, so Russia now ordered mobilization on July 30; moreover, it was "general mobilization" which

she ordered, because she wanted to convince Germany as well as Austria that she was fixed in her determination.

In Vienna the government took the hint. The authorities realized that they had been careless in playing with fire, but that it was not yet too late to prevent the outbreak of a general war; so the Austro-Hungarian government made a semblance of accepting the English proposal for a conference.

At this moment, when Vienna might, perhaps, have saved the situation, Germany stepped in. It is uncertain how far she may have been influenced by the desire in any event to take advantage of her own more rapid mobilization against the Russians. The historian will be inclined to discover another motive of a more general sort. He will call attention to the fact that an influential party in Germany, consisting mainly of the great manufacturers, wanted the war under any circumstances, and he will point out that at this time German policy had reached a turning point. For the first time it had been shown that the threat of the German sword no longer sufficed to compel the other Great Powers to lay down their arms without fighting. What had worked effectively in 1908, was no longer effective. Even in France, where not long before a minister who was not agreeable to the German government had been dismissed upon a demand from Berlin, the fear of Germany was no longer so intense as formerly. Thus, one of the props not only of German foreign policy, but of Germany's whole economic and political system, began to totter. If Germany wanted to recover the position which had been such an advantage to her foreign policy since 1870, the only thing to do was to make the other Great Powers realize anew the superiority of German arms.

So, on August 1, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia, and on August 3, on France, because Germany also wanted to take advantage of her more rapid mobilization against France as well as against Russia. Since, according to the German constitution, the Kaiser could declare war only in case German territory had already been attacked, the German government invented, among other things, the story of an attack by French aviators on Nuremberg. In reality, the French army had been withdrawn ten kilometers from the frontier in order to avoid even any appearance of provocation. Henceforth Germany took the lead in everything. The fact may also be noted that although Austria-Hungary was the indirect instigator of the war and was just as much threatened as Germany by Russia's mobilization, Austria-Hungary at first refrained from all hostile acts

against the Tsar's empire and continued the pacific attitude which she had appeared to adopt at the last minute; it was not until four days after Germany had declared war on Russia that Austria did likewise on August 5.

In Germany the declaration of war was hailed with immense rejoicing and greeted with enthusiasm by all classes of the population; in France, a feeling of sad desperation prevailed, modified at most by the consideration that it would be better that the long-feared blow should take place at once rather than that the people should have to live constantly under the threat of an attack.

Germany had issued her declarations of war on the supposition that the Central Powers would have to deal only with Russia and with France. England, during recent years, had taken so little part in disputes between the Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance, and had paid so little attention to the development of her land army, that any intervention on her part was regarded as very improbable; and, any way, even if it took place, it seemed that it could only be of small importance from a military point of view. But the German authorities here betrayed, for the first time, how biased and mistaken they were, owing to their purely militaristic habit of thought, in judging the real power of other peoples, who were educated and governed according to wholly different principles. In vain did Germany's diplomatic representatives sound warnings. Those in charge of her policy adhered to their conviction that a country which had never assumed the burden of universal military service was too "degenerate" to be able to interfere in a war of the Great Powers on the Continent.

Now came one of the days in England's history which was to decide her destiny. From a business point of view, much, perhaps everything, was in favor of her keeping out of the war. Great wars have always offered neutrals advantages in commerce; and, furthermore, after the war was over there was the prospect of great profits for English industry. The burden of debts which would be imposed on the warring nations would for a long time limit their power of competition. England had already considered protecting herself from the competition of other countries, especially of Germany and of the United States,—a competition which was beginning to be felt in some branches—by simply changing her commercial policy from free trade to the system of protective tariffs and trade agreements which were used everywhere on the Continent; now a war on the Continent would make it unnecessary to adopt such protective measures.

Such shortsighted considerations, however, were more than outweighed by imperative arguments in favor of taking part in the war.

The whole public and private life of England was based on the non-existence of military pressure. What Englishmen prized as their liberty had only been possible of development owing to the fact that military considerations did not dominate either education or government administration. The fact that the English government interfered to a relatively slight degree in the life of the private individual, rested, in last analysis, upon the fact that the citizen was not regarded as a future recruit for the army. This circumstance, which must be regarded as anomalous in Europe, especially since 1870, had only persisted as a result of a certain balance of power which had developed and which made it seem unlikely that an insular country, at any rate, would be subjected to immediate military attack. Now if, as between the two Continental combinations of Powers, victory should fall to the one which had concentrated all its strength on military armaments, England's advantageous position would be gone forever. England also would then have to limit her individual citizens in the liberties of which they were so proud. And not only that. If ever the whole Continent should once fall under the control of a single military power, it was all over with England's independence of action in foreign politics, and in fact with her position as a Great Power. If it had been possible even then, when face to face with an enemy armed to the teeth, to undertake the military training of the whole English people, which had hitherto been steadily rejected, it would have been too late. England would have been forced to obey the dictates of an all-powerful enemy and would have sunk to the rank of a helpless Second-rate Power.

There was also the further consideration, as seemed to be shown by the events of the immediately preceding years, that Germany was one of the Powers which could not be satisfied by concessions and compromises. Great Britain had followed the same policy toward Germany as toward other countries, such as the United States. Everywhere she had tried to come to some sensible agreement on disputed questions. She had never put the slightest obstacles in the way of German commerce and German imports into England, not even where these injured English domestic interests, or where her rival could be charged with "dumping," that is, with underselling abroad, by charging higher prices at home—a practice which the English regarded as "unfair." Even as regards Germany's plans of expansion in Turkey, Great Britain had been ready to make conces-

sions: when the war broke out an agreement was ready for final signing which gave the Germans considerable concessions in Mesopotamia. But now, in their diplomatic notes to England, the Germans seemed to want a part of the French colonies in Africa, or perhaps the whole of the French colonial possessions, and so threatened to upset by means of a European war the agreements which had been reached with such difficulty for partitioning Africa (see above, p. 339 ff.); they were also not willing to promise to respect the neutrality of Belgium, which looked as if they wanted to get a foothold on the Belgian coast. Under these circumstances, the English government, however little they wanted to enter the war, had no alternative but to come as quickly as possible to the help of the weaker party on the Continent: on August 4, England declared war on Germany.

This was a "statesmanlike" decision in the true sense of the word, if one means by this a step which involves heavy burdens for the moment in order to escape greater evils in the future. This was also true in view of the attitude of the English people, which at first, among the lower classes, was almost indifferent. It was really only the intellectuals, who saw further than the masses, who were strongly in favor of war. It was not until 1915, when German Zeppelin airships began to bombard open towns in England, that the British people awoke from their apathy and a real war spirit began to develop.

England's entrance into the war now altered fundamentally the whole military situation for the two Central Empires. The greatest Sea Power of the age was now on the side of their enemies, and it was possible to blockade Germany's coasts. This was all the easier as the German navy from the outset did not, and could not, think of meeting the superior British fleet in open battle; with the exception of scattered raids it remained in port and so left the sea to the British from the beginning. The only exceptions were those German warships which at the outbreak of the war were stationed too far away to be called back in time; these, to be sure, began at once a series of successful attacks on enemy ships and bombarded enemy ports. One German fleet even won a victory over an inferior British fleet on November 1, 1914, at Coronel, off the coast of Chile. But by the end of 1914, nearly all these German vessels had been destroyed; the *Emden,* which had been operating in the Indian Ocean, was destroyed by an Australian cruiser, at Cocos Islands, southwest of Java; the fleet of Admiral von Spee, who had won the victory at Coronel, was destroyed on December 8, at the Falkland

Islands; the *Dresden,* which was the only ship to escape, was finally sunk on March 14, 1915, near the Island of Juan Fernandez off the coast of Chile. The *Goeben* and the *Breslau,* which happened to be in the Mediterranean, managed, to be sure, to escape to Constantinople, where they had an influence on the political situation; but their naval activity was limited to the Black Sea. Thus the Entente was able to control completely communications at sea. Though the Germans and Austrians managed to do great injury to shipping through submarine attacks, still they were never able to send their own ships out upon the ocean.

Less considerable, at first, was the assistance which Great Britain was able to give on land. The little army of 150,000, which was the only one that was ready, evinced in many respects the technical superiority which belongs to professional soldiers. But it was numerically too small to be able to interfere with decisive effect. It was not until later, when the war began to drag out, thanks to the French victory on the Marne, that England was able to come to the aid of her allies with larger masses of troops.

But before these events are narrated, the attitude of the other European Great Power toward the war must be considered.

It is uncertain whether the Central Powers ever reckoned on active help from Italy in their war against Russia and France; it is certain, however, that Italy's coöperation was inconceivable. The Italian people never shared the ideas of conservative solidarity and absolutistic politics which united Germany and Austria; furthermore, any increase in Austria's strength was diametrically opposed to Italy's dearest interests. Austria was the chief obstacle to those Italian aspirations which aimed at reuniting all persons of Italian nationality; Trieste and the Italian Trentino were still under Austrian rule; moreover, it looked as if the Austrian government was trying to favor the Slavic at the expense of the Italian populations in the "Terra Irredenta"—in the Italian unredeemed territories. Equally opposed to Italian interests was the policy of the Dual Monarchy in the Balkans. By her single-handed attack against Serbia, Austria had not only broken the terms of the Triple Alliance, which had been renewed for six years on December 5, 1912, but she was interfering directly with Italy's sphere of influence on the eastern shore of the Adriatic. Accordingly, when Emperor Francis Joseph asked Italy for aid, in accordance with the terms of the Triple Alliance Treaty, the Italian government, on August 3, simply declared its neutrality. This meant, from the very outset, that the French military authorities were given a guarantee against any

fear of attack from the southeast; they could concentrate all their strength against the German invasion.

Meanwhile, the Germans had already begun their attack upon France. Their plan was simple. Since their main, though by no means their only, superiority lay in their speedier mobilization, it was necessary first to conquer France, which in all probability would be able to prepare for war in a shorter time than Russia. On the other hand, the French had protected their eastern frontier by strong fortresses on which German attacks would probably have wasted themselves without effect; in fact, this line of fortresses was never broken, and the German attack on Nancy from August 22 to September 11, 1914, resulted in the first serious failure which the German army met with. The French had not intended to infringe Belgian neutrality, and therefore made only inadequate preparations along this frontier. For these reasons, the German General Staff ignored the neutrality of Belgium which they had only recently promised to respect, and decided to circumvent the French fortifications and attack France through the neutral territory of Belgium. While Luxemburg, which was also neutral, was being occupied, an ultimatum was sent to Belgium, demanding that German troops should be allowed to march through the country; when this was rejected by the Belgians, who had regard for their honor and independence, the Germans, on August 3, began to invade the land.

Trusting to their neutrality, which was guaranteed, the Belgians were not prepared for war, and even if they had devoted all their strength to military matters they would not have been able to stand successfully against a great military state because of the smallness of their country. But the patriotism of the people and their indignation at being attacked by a country which had been regarded with particular sympathy by the ruling classes in Belgium—the Catholic party had a decided dislike for the policy which Combes was pursuing in France—resulted in making the advance of the German troops much less easy than had been expected. Even though the Belgian fortresses were not able to withstand the new Austrian and German guns, it was impossible to break the heroic resistance of the little nation which the Germans had despised. On August 5, Liège was bombarded and fell two days later, though some of the forts held out until August 15. Partly, perhaps, as a result of the indignation which seized the German military authorities because of this resistance, which was unexpected and most dangerous for their plan of attack against France, there now took place a number of acts of violence against the civilian population of Belgium which cannot

be passed over in silence, inasmuch as they were of decisive importance in the further development of the war, and especially upon the participation of other states.

One of the tendencies in the nineteenth century which had been most important and successful in practice was humanitarianism (see ch. vi). From the middle of the century an attempt had been made to extend the movement even to war; the Red Cross had been founded, and wounded men, whether friend or foe, were to be treated with equal care. Later, the movement was taken up again at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907. Detailed regulations were issued for the protection of the civilian population in time of war; collective penalties were forbidden, as well as the employment of cruel weapons. It had been hoped that European countries had reached the point of conducting war in a more humane fashion than had hitherto been the case, or than was still regarded as necessary in dealing with half-savage peoples outside Europe. The conduct of the German troops toward the Belgian, and later in many cases toward the French, civilian population, now showed that this hope was vain. Whole villages and parts of cities were leveled to the ground, and the inhabitants were shot in groups. In justification it was alleged that there had been some firing by *francs-tireurs*, or irregular troops. But even if isolated cases of this kind may have happened, these bloody and terrible collective penalties were contrary both to international agreements and to all feelings of humanity, especially as it could never be proved that there had been any organized attacks by irregular troops. In other countries it made a very bad impression that these acts, which were regarded as those of "barbarians," were not the acts of individuals such as naturally can never be wholly avoided, but had to be regarded as a result of the German militarist system. Episodes like the maltreatment of soldiers in German barracks, or outrages like that at Saverne in 1913, which had hitherto been matters of domestic German concern, now came to be regarded as a danger to the whole world. Even peoples—like many Italians or Americans—who had hitherto looked with unconcealed approval upon the German militarist system because of its "efficiency," now began to perceive what it might mean for them if the principle that military necessity, or what any individual officer regarded as such, was to prevail over all other considerations; and what it meant, if military leaders were to be made responsible for the successful carrying out of their commands, but not for the terrible and prohibited methods which they adopted in carrying them out. Whatever individuals may think of German

conduct in Belgium and Northern France at that time, the German government had given a practical demonstration of their system which had an important effect long afterwards and against which propaganda later could do nothing.

The memory of these deeds was not allowed to die out because similar acts were continually opening people's eyes to these principles adopted by the German military authorities. Here we can only mention the deportation of many Belgians and French, both men and women, to compulsory labor in German factories; the use of poison gases, which took place first on April 22, 1915, and of flame throwers; the destruction of coal mines; the systematic cutting down of fruit trees; the sinking of passenger ships; and many other things of the same kind. All these measures roused indignation in neutral countries; this was all the more the case as many of the acts were apparently not even justified by military necessity. The destruction in Belgium and the occupied parts of France of all the factories which had been able to compete steadily and successfully with German manufactures because of the high quality of their product, and the damaging of French mines which produced the coal for French industry, apparently were only to be explained on the supposition that the large German manufacturers, who had not been one of the least influences toward war, and who to the very last held to their program of the most extensive annexations, wanted to use for their economic advantage that complete power which the German military authorities claimed in the occupied districts, even in regard to private property.

At first, however, everything depended on how events would turn out on the French theater of war.

The French military authorities had not repeated the mistake which in 1870 had led to the disaster at Sedan. In spite of the fact that the German army had already begun an offensive, French mobilization was completed quietly. Partly as a result of this situation, the French suffered from the disadvantage that all the fighting which followed took place on their territory; but they were able to oppose the enemy with an army which was ready to fight. Their first attack, however, was based on a false conclusion. The French General Staff had not only never thought of infringing Belgian neutrality themselves, but they had not expected that the enemy would do so. They moved the main mass of their troops, therefore, toward the eastern frontier, and attempted to take the offensive there, where they supposed the main German force would be. Not only did this undertaking meet with no success, the attack at Saarburg, on August

20, ending after two days' bloody fighting in the retreat of the French, and the advance into Alsace also resulting in the forced withdrawal of the French, who kept in their possession only a small bit of territory around Thann in the southwest; but it also prevented them from opposing any adequate forces to the German armies which were marching in through Belgium. So on August 21-23, after the battle of Charleroi, the French and the English had to begin their retreat from that point, and soon this retreat was extended to the whole French and British front. The operation, however, took place in an orderly fashion and the German success was incomplete to the extent that they did not succeed in crushing even one of the enemy armies as they had done in 1866 and 1870. But the Anglo-French retreat began to be more and more rapid, and it almost seemed as though it would not come to an end before the mountainous territory in the South was reached. The French and English troops were pressed back to the Marne, and the French Government, thinking that Paris was in danger, transferred its seat to Bordeaux on September 3. Then, on September 5, Joffre, the French commander-in-chief, issued his famous order for a counter-attack. The Germans had pressed forward too rapidly, without sufficiently protecting their flanks; in the east, as a result of their fruitless attacks on Nancy, their flanks were as much exposed as in the west, where they had marched to the southeast, past the fortresses of Paris; the Germans were now attacked by the French and the English together—a great impression was made by the attack led by General Gallieni, the military commander of Paris—and after hard fighting were driven back with a speed which at points was like a flight; this was the First Battle of the Marne, September 6-10, 1914. The Germans did not stop their retreat until they had reached positions to the north of the Aisne, where they immediately began, however, to adapt themselves with extraordinary promptness to the new situation. While the operations hitherto had been a "war of movement," like the wars of 1866 and 1870, the Germans now resorted to a "war of positions," such as had prevailed in the American War of Secession. The use of modern quick-firing guns, and especially of machine guns, with which the Germans were at first much better equipped than the Allies, had shown that fighting in the open field resulted in a sacrifice of life which had hitherto never been known; and since the Germans, even after their retreat, could still dig themselves in on French soil, they began to establish a series of trenches which, on the whole, fixed the front line on the western theater of operations down to the close of the war.

The great surprise attack, on which the greatest hopes had been placed, had failed: Paris was not captured; the French army was not destroyed; the communications with England were not even broken. However, it was still possible to accomplish this latter aim, and the German military authorities now devoted themselves to this task with the greatest energy. But before an account is given of this, the other theaters of war must be considered.

It was of decisive importance that the Central Powers, or at any rate Austria-Hungary, were much less successful in the East than in the West. The Russians had been enormously underestimated. Germans who believed that they would have to do with a military system which had suffered such severe blows in the Russo-Japanese War now found themselves completely in error. Since then the defects which had caused those defeats had been remedied by ceaseless activity. No fault was to be found with the Russian equipment, and Russian mobilization took place rapidly and in thoroughly good order. The people were united in spirit, so that the Tsar even dared to impose upon his people during the period of the war complete abstention from alcoholic beverages. The results of these reforms were soon evident, especially in the battles with the Austrian troops. To be sure, the Austrians succeeded in advancing from Galicia into Poland and in defeating the Russians at Krasnik on July 25; but when the Russians came on with their full strength the Austrians suffered a disastrous defeat at Lemberg on September 2. Galicia was now in good part lost to Austria, and the Russians began to advance against Hungary and the passes in the Carpathian Mountains. They also won decisive victories in a second battle in Galicia near Grodek on September 6-13, and in a second battle at Krasnik. By September 22, they were able to begin the bombardment of the Galician fortress of Przemysl.

More successful was the resistance which the Germans made in the north. While the Austrians could not even defend themselves against the Serbs, and in spite of three attacks were driven out of the country each time, the Germans succeeded in beating back the Russian attack with great victories. The Russians had begun their attack on East Prussia on August 7, and by August 20, after successful fights at Gumbinnen, had pressed forward as far as Königsberg. The German Government, which had hitherto devoted its main attention to the French theater of war, was compelled to think about taking defensive measures in the East. In this situation it turned to a leader who had hitherto not been prominent but who was to prove himself just the man for the task of commanding

troops in East Prussia. This was the later commander-in-chief, who at that time was known merely as General Hindenburg. The effects of his appointment were soon seen. On August 26-29 the Russian invading army was given a crushing defeat at Tannenberg and another at the Masurian Lakes on September 6-12. The Russians not only had to clear out of East Prussia, but the Germans were able to prepare a counter-offensive against Russia—an undertaking, however, which was brought to a standstill by a defeat on the Niemen on September 28, and which finally ended with a German defeat at Augustowo on September 29-October 4, so that the Russians were again able to invade East Prussia.

But in the main, the situation in East Prussia had been definitely saved for the Germans, and for a short time they were even able to relieve the Russian pressure on Austria by undertaking, on October 15-27, an advance against Warsaw—which, however, was not successful.

The really decisive events, however, took place on the West Front. At first the Germans had concentrated all their forces on the fight with the French and British armies, and had given little attention to any attempt to occupy the northern coast of France and Belgium. Now that they had failed in their main aim, they attempted at least to cut the communications between England and France. If the coast perhaps as far as Calais were in their possession, they believed, it would be possible to threaten England and to check the reinforcements which England was sending to France. So they began "the race for the sea," and the two front lines were extended northward toward the shores of Flanders.

The real battle was fought out in Belgium. First the Germans reached the sea on October 10, by taking Antwerp. From there they pushed westward along the coast past Zeebrügge, Ostend, and Ghent as far as the Yser. Here and around Ypres the decisive battles took place. The contest was very severe and the battles were extraordinarily bloody. But victory finally fell to the united French, Belgian, and English armies, although not until the Belgians had opened the dykes and flooded the country around the Yser. It was not until November 21 that the battle which had begun on October 19 could be regarded as ended. Although the Allies were much too weak to drive the Germans out of their positions on the Yser, and although the Germans had thus conquered an important naval base on the Belgian coast, which they kept in their hands till the last months of the war, nevertheless, the greater success had been on the side of the Allies. The German advance had failed to reach

Calais or even Dunkirk, and communications between France and England could therefore be maintained as before. Finally, from the point of view of *morale,* it was of considerable importance that through the successful defense of the line of the Yser, a part at least of Belgium did not fall into the hands of the enemy.

Even if one should say that from a purely military point of view the outcome of the First Battle of Ypres was as successful for the Allies as for the Central Powers, there remained the fact that even a merely defensive success on the side of the Entente was equivalent to a victory; because everything which served to prolong the war was to their advantage and to the disadvantage of the Germans.

This is the place to sketch the general military situation as it was at the close of 1914, and at the same time to mention certain events which have not yet been touched upon.

No specialist could fail to see at that time that the Central Powers had lost the war, not "lost" of course in the same sense as it was lost in 1918, but lost in comparison with the expectations with which it had been begun. It was conceivable that individual military successes might still create a military situation which would permit the Central Powers to conclude a treaty of peace without very great territorial or economic losses, possibly even with some small gains. But under no circumstances could the German war aims of August, 1914, be attained. Germany would be lucky if she won back even a part of her former position of power. Her military prestige had suffered severely. Her ability to make military threats, on which her economic expansion had in part rested, would prove in the future slight. Not only had the fear of German military power proved to be exaggerated, but the other Great Powers now realized what they could accomplish by joint action, and they realized also to what purposes the profits of German industry had been applied. Great Britain, which had hitherto laid no obstacles in the way of German trade, had learned her mistake and had entered the ranks of her opponents. Germany had had to assume enormous war costs which, even aside from the almost impossible case that her enemies might have to pay an indemnity, would have placed her industries, which were based on a low cost of living, at a severe disadvantage in competition with neutrals. And how would this weakened Germany, even in case of victory, have been able to defend herself against an economic alliance of the conquered Powers? Nothing but a speedy peace could avert the worst, which was otherwise certainly to be expected, namely, the ruin of the German Empire.

The basis for these statements lies partly in what has been said above concerning the economic tasks of German foreign policy (see p. 324), and partly on a consideration of the reasons which alone had made Prussia's wars in the past economically profitable (see p. 313 f.). In addition a few reasons may be added.

The most important reason for saying that a prolongation of the war would necessarily be harmful to Germany lies in the fact that this meant that the other states would have an opportunity to complete their insufficient military armaments. Naturally, in Germany and Austria, people were not really prepared for a war which would last several years, but their armament was much more thoroughgoing than anywhere else, and their munition industries and the scientific laboratories connected with them were very much more developed than in countries like England or Russia, for instance. It was now possible for the Allies to make up for lost time, to prepare themselves on their side, and to imitate the various inventions with which the German military authorities had surprised them. They could also make serviceable for war their wholly untrained reserves in man-power, as was particularly true in the case of England.

The Entente Powers were also at an advantage in having at their disposal almost unlimited amounts of all the raw materials necessary for making munitions, while the Central Powers, aside from war booty, could only count on a definite quantity which could scarcely be much increased. This was due to the powerful effect of the blockade.

It is disputed which side first began blockading measures. The Germans say that the English took the initiative; but the English, on the contrary, maintain that it was the Germans who, for instance, began by laying mines in front of English harbors and by seizing merchant ships. However that may be, it is a fact that the blockade of the Central Powers at sea was the first to be carried out effectively (with the exception of the Baltic), while the Entente countries, in spite of submarine attacks, never found themselves cut off from their overseas communications. Furthermore, since the conception of contraband of war came to be extraordinarily extended, the blockade was absolute, or at least became so in the course of time, except as to wares imported from neutral territories which bordered on the Central Empires; cotton, for instance, was declared absolute contraband of war by England and France on August 21, 1915.

This automatically put a limit to the expansion of German mili-

tary armaments. The shutting-off of the importation of foodstuffs was without great practical importance, because the German troops were always sufficiently nourished, and the necessary supplies to feed them would grow again. On the other hand, the providing of indispensable metals like copper, or of materials like rubber and oil, was one of the most ticklish tasks for the German military authorities.

Moreover, Germany's position outside of Europe could only grow worse as time went on. A superficial observer might with some reason maintain, that as far as France and Russia were concerned, the year 1914 closed with the advantage on Germany's side; but in the overseas territories the Allies had an advantage, in fact an overwhelming advantage. A number of the German colonies in Africa, like Togoland and Kamerun had been occupied at once, and for the most part conquered. On September 24, 1914, New Guinea had been captured by the Australians. The attempt which the Germans in Southwest Africa made to bring about the separation of South Africa from England by means of a Boer insurrection failed, although a number of Boer leaders who had been famous in the Transvaal wars joined the movement; but the mass of the Boers did not follow them, and by December, 1914, all the rebels had been captured and the insurrection was at an end. Even before this, a counter-offensive had been begun in September. In order to render impossible any renewal of an attempt at rebellion, the South African government determined to seize the German colony itself: Walfisch Bay was occupied on December 25, and Swakopmund on January 14, 1915; and on July 9, 1915, the last German forces in the colony had to surrender.

More noteworthy, perhaps, was Japan's immediate realization that the collapse of Germany's power outside Europe gave her an opportunity to come a step nearer her own aim of expelling European influence from China. On August 15, 1914, the Empire of the Rising Sun addressed an ultimatum to Germany demanding the evacuation of Kiaochau. When this demand was refused, which was natural, Japan declared war on August 23, and on the 27th began the blockade by which she finally took possession of the Kiaochau territory on November 7, 1914. Japan also occupied the Marshall Islands on October 7, 1914.

Of their colonies the Germans thus retained only German East Africa, which, however, had been their most important overseas possession; but it was merely a question of time as to when they would lose even this. For although the German forces undertook a

series of successful expeditions, and although their opponents were too much occupied with operations in Europe to despatch an adequate number of troops at first, the conditions were nevertheless such as would correct themselves in favor of the Entente in case the war continued a long time.

To offset this increase in the number of enemies fighting against her, Germany did succeed in winning one new ally. Turkey herself had scarcely any grounds for entering the war. She still felt very severely her defeats in the Balkan wars; and though of the two coalitions, the one which had declared war against her hereditary Russian enemy stood a little closer to her, nevertheless, her interests were clearly in favor of pursuing a more or less honorable policy of neutrality—her traditional method of playing off one group of Powers against the other. But the German government needed the active coöperation of Turkey in order to strike a blow at English rule over the Suez Canal and over India; therefore, under pressure of the German cruisers, *Goeben* and *Breslau,* which were anchored off Constantinople, the Turkish cabinet had to decide in favor of war. On October 29, 1914, the Turks opened hostilities by bombarding Russian ports on the Black Sea. Great Britain and France were not slow in replying. On November 5, they declared themselves in a state of war with Turkey; the English government annexed Cyprus and then, on December 17, proclaimed a British protectorate over Egypt, thus putting an end to the last formal connection between Turkey and the Nile region. The Khedive was deposed and in his place, as a sign that Turkish sovereignty was completely ended, a "sultan" of their own was placed over the Egyptians. The English were now in a position to undertake systematic preparations against the threatened attack on the Suez Canal.

Against the blockade, also, Germany attempted a counter-measure by proclaiming officially, on February 18, 1915, that the territory around the British Isles was blockaded by submarines. The submarine was a weapon the use of which was difficult to harmonize with existing law in regard to blockades. International law required that the life of sailors on merchant ships be safeguarded when these ships were declared to be good prizes for having cargoes of contraband of war on board; but submarines were not completely equipped, and in many cases not equipped at all, to afford such protection to life; consequently, the British government threatened to make reprisals against Germans who were taken prisoner from submarines. Henceforth, also, lives, and not merely goods, on neutral

ships were in no less danger than those on ships that belonged to the belligerents. But this new weapon, created as a substitute to offset the weakness of the German navy, failed to accomplish its purpose, as it neither produced famine in England nor led to a repeal of the English blockade measures.

The other weapon which the Germans had and which, like submarines, they began to use more and more intensively and systematically, was the working upon the public opinion of enemy countries with a view to compelling the governments to sign a premature treaty of peace. This weapon also was employed as far as possible. At first the German government had devoted itself to a persistent propaganda in neutral countries, the like of which was not employed for a good while by her opponents; this propagandist activity, which had originally been chiefly of an apologetic nature, was now modified by an attempt to convince the enemy nations that their side was the weaker and that they could never win a final victory. And this "defeatist" weapon was not wholly without effect; in Italy, at least, various Socialist groups were not proof against arguments of this kind. But in general, German propaganda did not have as much success as had been expected. Countries which had all the trump cards in their hands were not going to be persuaded to be afraid of their own destruction; so the Germans did not succeed in disturbing the clear insight of the Allies as to the real strength of each side, even though various German military successes might seem ever so serious to non-specialists.

In view of the small prospect that the general situation could ever be any better for Germany through continuing the war, and in view of the circumstance that some of the leading statesmen in Germany were aware of this fact, the question naturally arises why the German government did not conclude peace, even at a sacrifice. The answer probably is to be found in the fact that such an outcome, though it would have given the German people relatively favorable conditions, would have meant the downfall of the hitherto ruling authorities. An "unfavorable peace," meaning by this a peace which definitely deprived Germany of the means of exerting military pressure, to preserve which she had gone to war in 1914, would have meant the overthrow of a government which had begun a useless war. Though hitherto the German people had put their trust unconditionally in the authority of the Government, and had viewed foreign policy only in the light in which they had been told to view it, this was merely due to the effective influencing of public opinion

in the schools and newspapers. Since the days of Bismarck, and especially since the time of the Constitutional Conflict in Prussia (see p. 300), Germans had accustomed themselves to believe, on the basis of their own practical experience, that it was best to put their trust in the government, i.e., in the bureaucracy which was dependent on large manufacturers and landlords, for a correct judgment in regard to foreign policy and military matters. Had not Germany conquered her enemies in war and attained her mighty economic development simply because the autocratic government had shown greater insight than the Opposition, which was made up of misguided representatives of the people? Was it not their patriotic duty for the future also to leave themselves in the hands of this safe leadership?

This view, which more than anything else accounts for the impotency of legislative bodies in Germany, could last only as long as the Empire prospered under this absolutistic leadership; as soon as the system failed to produce satisfactory results, it would no longer be able to defend itself from the attack of the masses, who had hitherto been shut out from participation in government, and especially from the Socialists. The only way of preventing this was to trust, in spite of everything, to the hazardous chance of a favorable outcome of the war by continuing it further, although normally every new year made Germany's economic, and consequently her military, position worse.

How true this was, was shown during the early months of the next year, 1915. At that time the coalition of the Allied Powers acquired a new ally. As early as the fall of 1914, Italy probably decided to take part in the war; at any rate, that was the time when she began wide-reaching preparations. But Italy entered the war, not merely because she would otherwise have weakened her claims to the Italian territories under Austrian control as well as to the Dalmatian coast and Albania, but because a victory of the Central Powers would have imposed still more frightful armaments on Italy and so have ruined her completely. During the winter of 1914-15 negotiations were carried on, and Austria was not opposed in principle to ceding certain districts to Italy; but no agreement could be reached because Austria refused to hand over at once the districts under discussion. Italy would have had to remain neutral merely on the assurance of promises, and this appeared impossible. Supported by a strong popular movement, which was strengthened by the steadily increasing spirit of nationalism and by the sympathies for the En-

tente aroused by horror at Germany's method of waging war, Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary, though not on Germany, on May 23, 1915. Hostilities began within the next few days.

The war between Italy and Austria was a regular war of nationalities, and, on Austria's side especially, it was waged with an energy and passion beyond anything in the Russian and Serbian theaters of war. Nevertheless, this was not the main reason that the Italians, in spite of all their bravery, made such small progress. Half a century before, in ceding Venetia (see p. 256), Austria had kept all the important strategic points, and she now reaped the benefits of this. During 1915 the Austrians were not in a position to take the offensive against Italy; but on the defensive they were practically invincible, and the small gains of territory made by the Italians were won with wholly disproportionate sacrifices. So the military situation, both on the Isonzo and the Trentino front, was at first stationary. This was also true in 1915 on the Western Front, although the French and the English gained a number of important local improvements in their front lines.

Far greater were the changes which took place on the Eastern Front.

Among the enemies of the Central Powers in 1915, Russia was relatively the weakest. No country found it so difficult to overcome her inferiority in the supply of munitions or to develop her reserves in man-power as did Russia at that time. The lack of machinery and large factories, which were only slightly developed in Russia in comparison with the immensity of the empire, and the dearth of scientifically-trained mechanics, prevented Russia from undertaking the giant production of war material as quickly as Germany or the western countries. The inadequate railway system made it far more difficult to transport troops and munitions than was possible with the close net-work of railways in Germany. Germany had somewhat the same advantage over her enemies that the South had in the American War of Secession: she controlled the "inner line," and could move her troops more quickly than the enemy from one theater of war to another.

It is not surprising under these circumstances that in 1915 the Central Powers concentrated almost all their efforts at first on the struggle with the Russian armies.

At the beginning of 1915 the Russians had made considerable progress in Galicia. They had occupied the most important points in the Carpathian Mountains, which enabled them to invade Hungary, and on March 22, 1915, they forced the fortress of Przemysl

to capitulate. But they soon met with a reverse. The Germans came to the help of the Austrians, and in May, thanks to their enormous superiority in munitions and artillery, the armies of the Central Powers were able to break through the strong Russian positions on the Dunajec. The Russians had to retreat eastward in hasty marches, and give up not only a large part of Galicia, but also the passes in the Carpathians. Soon afterwards, on June 3, Przemysl was reconquered by the Germans, and on June 22, Lemberg also. It was not long before the Russians, who had hitherto been conducting an offensive war, now had to defend their own territory. The Central Powers opened a concentric attack from the north and the south on Poland, and the Russians had to abandon enormous areas. On August 5, Warsaw and the fortress of Ivangorod fell into the hands of the Central Powers. This was followed by the fall of fortresses further east, like Novo Georgievsk and Grodno, on September 2. The German-Austrian advance lasted till the end of September, and won for the Central Powers a territory half as large as Germany itself.

This was a great military success, and yet it had failed in its main purpose. The Russian army was neither destroyed nor even demoralized. It had been able to retreat in good order, and by continual and often successful counter-attacks, which however were seldom sustained, it gave evidence that it had not lost its power of fighting. The war on the Eastern Front was by no means ended, and a change might take place at any moment. The Russians now made several changes in command: on September 8, the Tsar personally took over the supreme command, with General Alexeiev as chief-of-staff. However, the Germans were now in a position to withdraw a considerable part of their troops from the Russian theater of war and despatch them to Serbia.

The Austrians had hitherto been unable to get the slightest control over the Serbs. It was the Serbs, rather than the Austrians, who had hitherto been assuming the offensive. Now a change took place. The Central Powers now undertook a great concentric attack upon Serbia, whose destruction had been Austria's original purpose in going to war. In carrying out this operation Turkey's precarious position was a great advantage to the Central Powers. An attack upon Serbia could only be carried out easily in case Bulgaria, which had come out of the Second Balkan War severely reduced in power, joined in the movement. The Central Powers were now able to compel the Sultan to make concessions to Bulgaria which were sufficient to entice the cabinet at Sofia to join their coalition. On July 22,

1915, a preliminary agreement was signed in Constantinople, giving Bulgaria Turkish territory which included the whole length of the Dedeagatsch railway and uninterrupted communications with the Ægean Sea. Thereupon, on September 19, the Bulgarian government ordered general mobilization, and though the Bulgarian declaration of war was dated October 14, the Bulgarian army began to invade Serbia on October 11,—at about the same time the Austrians and Germans began their attack on the north.

This sealed Serbia's fate during the following months. A request for help from Greece based on the Balkan Alliance (see p. 419) was refused on October 12. The Allies, however, did not leave the little country wholly in the lurch. On October 5, an Anglo-French expeditionary force, under Generals Sarrail and Mahon had landed on Greek territory at Salonica upon the invitation of the Greek prime minister, Venizelos, though not upon that of the Greek government as such. This expeditionary force pushed as far north as Nish, but it came too late and was too weak to prevent Serbia's downfall. The Germans and the Austrians, and still more the Bulgarians, pressed forward so rapidly that by the middle of November more than half of Serbia was in the enemy's hands. On November 25, the Serbian government had to retire to Scutari in Albania, and it was followed a few days later by the whole Serbian army. The German government then, on November 28, declared the Balkan campaign officially at an end, and their assertion was scarcely an exaggeration. All Serbia was occupied by enemy troops. The remnants of the Serbian army had been transported to Corfu, and the Anglo-French expeditionary force was compelled to retreat to Salonica. The occupation of Montenegro, also, was merely a question matter of a few weeks: Cettinje was occupied by the Austrians on January 13, 1916, and Scutari ten days later. Thanks to Bulgaria's joining the Central Powers, safer communications with Turkey were also now restored and continued until the fall of 1918.

But still the war in the Balkans could not be regarded as wholly ended. The Allies established themselves in a strong position at Salonica, which was regarded as impregnable owing to reinforcements received by sea; and so not only was Greece kept from the enemy's influence, but the communications between Berlin and Constantinople were continually in danger of being threatened, depending on the changes in the general military situation which might take place. At first, however, there was no immediate danger of this.

The Allies had perceived that the war might be materially shortened if they could succeed in getting Constantinople into their con-

trol. This would restore communications with Russia by way of the Dardanelles and cut off the possibility of a Turkish attack against Egypt. Accordingly, in the spring of 1915, a great Anglo-French expedition was undertaken. First, while the troops were on their way to the east, an attempt was made to force the Straits by a naval attack; but on March 18 this failed completely, and caused the loss of one French and two British warships. About a month later, on April 25-26, the land attack began, but was scarcely more successful. To be sure, the Allies succeeded in disembarking their troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula; but the place had been put into such a good state of defence by the enemy that the landing parties, in spite of the bravery with which they fought and the bloody losses which they sustained, were unable to make any serious advance, and had to resort to the same system of stationary trench warfare as on the Western Front. Even the landing of a second army on August 6 did not improve the situation. So, at the close of 1915, the Allies were compelled to abandon the expedition as hopeless. Between December 8 and January 8 their troops evacuated the Gallipoli Peninsula without disturbance from the Turks. Thenceforth, and until the end of the war, Constantinople remained unthreatened by military operations, with the exception of attacks from airships.

Though the Turks at Gallipoli had given another evidence of their tenacity in holding defensive positions, they could not win any greater success on the offensive than during the Balkan Wars, in spite of the fact that they were supported by German officers and soldiers. Four times between February and August, 1915, they had attempted to attack the Suez Canal; but each time their efforts had collapsed miserably. Turkey's main purpose in entering the war was thus definitely thwarted, and from 1915 onwards it was not the British but the Turks who had to stand on the defensive in Egypt and Arabia. In Mesopotamia, where the English had begun operations at the end of 1914 by occupying Basra on November 21, this was also true, although the Turks won a number of considerable successes in their defensive action. The British expeditionary force which had pushed up the Tigris toward Bagdad was beaten on November 24, 1915, south of the ancient city of Ctesiphon, and forced to retreat to Kut-el-Amara, owing, it seems, mainly to the fact that the communications to the rear had not been properly attended to. Here at Kut-el-Amara the British were shut in by the Turks, and as reinforcements could not be sent in time they were forced to surrender on April 29, 1916.

This Turkish success, however, was of only momentary importance. It simply taught the British that they could do nothing against the Turks by mere raids and improvised attacks; and since it was easy for them to rectify their mistake, there was no doubt as to the ultimate outcome here also, if the war only lasted long enough.

Thus the year 1915 had brought the Central Powers, with the exception of the Russian and Serbian regions, merely defensive successes. This was the period in which the Entente Powers made up for the munitions which they lacked in 1914 and prepared the scientific equipment for future achievements. The most important step in this direction came at the end of the year on December 28, when the British government decided to introduce universal military service in England and Scotland—a decision which at first, on February 10, affected merely unmarried men, but a few months later, on May 25, was extended to married men also.

In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, it fell to Germany to take the initiative in an attack on the Western Front. Germany appears to have perceived at this time the dangers which lay in a prolongation of the war. Although a successful military undertaking could no longer break the superiority of the enemy, the Germans at least wanted to try whether, by breaking through on the French front, they might not cause among the peoples of the Entente countries an illusion of possible defeat. Before the English law for universal military service had accomplished its purpose, the German army on February 21, 1916, began a tremendous attack upon the fortress of Verdun, one of the points in the row of fortresses which, from the outset, they had been unable to take. They secured some initial successes in this attack which was made with unexpected force; but they could not capture either the city or the fortress, although they continued their attacks with extraordinarily large losses until July 1. They were not even able to hold some of the outer forts which they had conquered at first; some of these fell into the hands of the French again during the summer, and the rest were won back by a French counter-offensive in the fall, the operations ending on November 4, 1916. Before this counter-attack took place, the British and French on their side began a great attempt on July 1 to break through the German positions on the Somme. This also failed of its purpose, though it cost very heavy losses. To be sure, the Germans were driven back a considerable distance, but their front was not broken and the Allies did not even succeed in capturing

Bapaume or Péronnes, and their sacrifices were out of all proportion to their gains.

The Battle of the Somme brought into action for the first time new engines of warfare which were characteristic of the new intensive attention which English and French scientists were giving to inventions for military purposes. These were the new armored cars, known as "tanks," invented by an Englishman, and modeled on American motor tractors; they were equipped so as to overcome all obstacles like trenches and barbed wire. Though containing many defects at first, they soon proved extraordinarily useful, in fact indispensable; and they were all the more serviceable to the Entente, inasmuch as the armies of the Central Powers were not able to oppose them with any equivalent force. In general, the year 1916 marks a turning point, because the Allies began to outmatch the enemy in practically all the fields of military technique, beside branches in which they had had more or less of an advantage, as in the case of the French field artillery; they had now caught up with, or even surpassed, the Germans everywhere, as for example, in aviation, in which the Germans had originally shown technical superiority In the same way, there had been an increase in the production of munitions by the Allies.

The Austrian offensive in the southern Tyrol in May, 1916, had turned out as unfortunately as the attack on Verdun. The Austrians, to be sure, had at first won some initial successes; but soon afterwards, on June 12, they had to retreat, and the little towns of Asiago and Arsiero, which they had captured, were again occupied by the Italians on June 25 and 27. The Italians were then able, on their side, to undertake a successful offensive, and on August 8 captured Gorizia, the first large town to fall into their hands. Here also the year 1916 closed with a gain for the Allies, although it was not a very large one.

More varying and more dramatic were the events which were taking place on the Eastern Front. The first months of the year went by fairly quietly, the most important achievements of the Russians being some advances in the Caucasus and in Persia. But on June 4 the new commander-in-chief of the Russian armies in the south, General Brussilov, began a great offensive against the Austrian positions in the Ukraine and in Bukovina. At first the Russians were completely successful; they crushed the Austrians near Luzsk, won victories on the Strypa, and on June 17 captured Czernowitz. Almost the whole of Bukovina was conquered. But

while the southern offensive had developed so successfully, further north, near Kovel and Baranowitschi, the Russians came upon German troops which had been sent to help the Austrians and their advance was brought to a standstill in the second half of June. This reacted on the southern sector, so that there, also, the Russians were unable to make further progress; however, the campaign closed with a decided balance in Russia's favor.

The Russians appeared to have won a still more important advantage by their offensive, inasmuch as Rumania, after long hesitation, finally declared war on Austria on October 27, 1916. But this step, which was due chiefly to the consideration that the Wallachian Kingdom could only successfully lay claim to the Rumanians in Austria-Hungary in case she took part in overthrowing the Dual Monarchy, soon turned out to be a source of embarrassment to the Allies. Rumania was not at all prepared for a war with the great military Powers, and after a few easy victories, due to her surprise attack, she was quickly defeated. The combined German, Austrian and Bulgarian forces speedily occupied all of Wallachia, and between September, 1916, and January, 1917, drove the remnants of the Rumanian army back into Moldavia, so that the economically valuable part of Rumania, with its supplies of grain and oil, fell into the hands of the Central Powers. So Rumania's entrance into the war turned out most unexpectedly to the advantage of the enemy.

The year 1916 is also noteworthy for the only important naval battle which took place.

The German navy was unable to force the British fleet to fight, because the latter held itself in reserve in a safe harbor. In spite of this, the Germans attempted to weaken it by destroying smaller British naval detachments wherever possible. An opportunity of this kind seemed to have come on May 31, 1916. The German High Seas Fleet happened upon a detachment of battle cruisers under Admiral Beatty, near the Skagerrak, west of Jutland. The considerably weaker British force held out successfully until the main British fleet could come up; when this began to take part in the battle, the Germans withdrew, and, thanks to darkness and fog, suffered only relatively small losses.

Judged by its results, this naval battle was perhaps the greatest victory of the whole war. Henceforth, the German High Seas Fleet disappeared from the seas, and the memory of the superiority of the British navy made such a lasting impression on the Germans who took part in the battle that the desperate attempt at the very end

of the war to send the German fleet out again, which meant sending it to certain destruction, is supposed to have given the signal for the German Revolution of November 3, 1918.

At the close of the year 1916 the Central Powers regarded it as necessary to revive the spirits of their own people and at the same time to strengthen the "defeatist" movement among their enemies. On December 12, 1916, the German chancellor made a peace offer expressed in extremely indefinite terms and in a victorious tone. The offer did not meet with the slightest success in the Entente countries; at home in Germany it may, perhaps, have materially strengthened the "determination to hold out," especially after the Allies made known their conditions; these, in general, were less severe than those which the Central Powers were finally compelled to accept in 1919. The Germans never made a specific statement of their peace terms, although the President of the United States, who was supposed to have offered mediation originally at Germany's request, sought to secure such a statement from them in his note of December 18. The reason for this evidently lay in the fact that the announcement of terms which could be discussed would have destroyed the illusions of the German people concerning the military situation; furthermore, the formulation of "reasonable" terms, meaning by this terms which accorded with the actual strength of the two sides at the time, appears to have been made difficult by the fact that the German government was dependent upon the great manufacturers, who wanted annexations of territory. At any rate, up to the end of the war, the German authorities never completely renounced Belgium, although this was demanded by the Entente as the first condition of peace.

The year 1917 also brought no essential changes of importance on the Western Front, in spite of the enormous efforts made. The most notable event was the German evacuation of their positions on the Somme in March and April, in order to evade a new attack by the French and the British. But the later Allied attacks in the West made no essential improvement in the Allied front line, although the French conquered a number of long contested positions by the end of the year.

It was again in the East that the great change took place during this year.

The partial success of Brussilov's offensive had left a feeling of deep depression in Russia. The Liberals were disillusioned in their hopes as to the political situation both at home and abroad. They had expected that the war would free them from the "German

yoke" and from the autocracy which had propped itself up on the dread with which Germany was regarded; but, up to this time, they had not been freed of either the one or the other. The government had not known how to conduct the war successfully, nor had it undertaken political reforms such as the Liberals wished. In fact, many people believed that the pro-German court party in Russia did not want any real victory over Germany at all. The conflict became acute when the government refused to make any concessions to the Duma, which it had been forced to call together on February 27, 1917. On March 3 popular insurrections took place in Petrograd, and as the Tsarist government was unwilling to give way and even declared the dissolution of the Duma on March 11, a regular revolt broke out. As the Petrograd garrison at once took the side of the revolutionists, the Opposition had easy sailing. Within twenty-four hours, on March 12, the Tsarist régime was overthrown, the ministers were arrested, and a Workman's and Soldier's Council, or Soviet, was established. On March 14 there followed the establishment of a regular provisional government under the presidency of Prince Lvov, who belonged to the progressive party, and who represented democratic parliamentary views. On the next day, March 15, the revolutionists succeeded in compelling the Tsar, Nicholas II, to abdicate.

From the outset and even before the revolution, there had existed within the Russian Opposition two tendencies which were sharply opposed to one another: on the one side, a group of intellectuals, democrats, and idealists; and, on the other, the representatives of the masses, who had abandoned democratic ideals and adopted Socialist-revolutionary theories. Owing to the great concessions made to the Liberals, as well as to extraordinarily tolerant administration and legislation, the gulf between these two parties was at first bridged. Capital punishment was abolished, military courts were done away with, and all exiles were permitted to return. The Finnish constitution was ratified and the Poles were promised complete independence. All restrictive regulations against oppressed nationalities and religions were revoked, and universal suffrage, including woman's suffrage, was introduced. A wholly new Russia was supposed to have arisen which would not only put an end to the Tsarist police régime at home but would also conduct with holy zeal a patriotic war abroad.

Before any further account of this Russian revolution is given, it is necessary to note the consequences which the overthrow of Tsardom had in foreign countries.

If one considers the feeling of political solidarity which had hitherto bound together the three Eastern Empires it is easy to understand what an impression was made everywhere by the disappearance of one of these empires from the absolutistic circle. The German government at once felt compelled to promise to grant to its own subjects the demands which had long been made by the Opposition for a reform of the Prussian "three-class system of voting" and for other similar modifications of the existing régime. More important than these proclamations, which remained without effect, was the influence which the Russian revolution had upon the policy of the United States.

The United States was the first country to recognize the new Russian Republic—on March 22. This had a symbolic importance. The fall of Tsardom put an end to one great obstacle which had hitherto stood in the way of America's eventually joining the Allies. American democracy (one may perhaps argue) would never have joined a coalition which included Tsarist Russia among its members. But now this was all changed, and the way was open for the possibility of an alliance, at the very moment when America had to face the question whether it would enter the war or not.

The United States had always represented the view that a blockade-war did not justify any belligerent in disregarding the rules of humanity and international law in regard to neutrals. America, which had put into practice so eagerly the idea of international arbitration, and had already brought about a peaceful union of all the American states, was of the view, and not unjustly, that all such pacifist agreements were worthless if they could be ignored in time of war. And it accorded with their principles and their practice to prevent, above all things, any infringements of the law which endangered not only property but also human life. Therefore the United States, as the most powerful neutral, had issued warnings, even to the Entente Powers, against acting contrary to international agreements, such as the agreements in regard to sending of mail matter; but she adopted a much sharper tone toward the Powers which were guilty of inhuman acts against her own citizens. Most important among these acts was the campaign against merchant ships by German submarines, which often paid no heed to the rules prescribed for the protection of passengers and crews, and even sank ships without giving the passengers any warning. It now happened that a case of this kind involved a considerable number of American citizens. On May 7, 1915, the great English passenger ship *Lusitania,* which was going from New York to Eng-

land, was torpedoed off the Irish coast by a German submarine. A hundred and twenty-four Americans lost their lives. This led to a sharp exchange of notes between Washington and Berlin, May 15-31, 1915. Without reaching any definite result, it still appeared that the German military authorities would henceforth pay somewhat more attention to the rights of neutrals on the seas. But the discussion lasted further. It was also complicated by the fact that the Entente had begun to arm a large number of merchant ships against submarine attack, and Germany requested that she be allowed to sink such vessels, at least, without warning. In the midst of these discussions, in which public opinion in America was by no means unanimous on one side or the other—for the old sharp anti-English feeling still existed—a new incident occurred which gave the dispute another aspect. On March 24, 1916, the French unarmed passenger ship *Sussex,* on which there were several Americans, was torpedoed by a German submarine in the English Channel. The American government thereupon sent an energetic note to Berlin; when it received a merely evasive answer in regard to the *Sussex,* it despatched still another note which had almost the character of an ultimatum. This time public opinion in America was much more unanimous, and the note took a much more energetic tone than the previous ones, little as the President and Congress betrayed any desire to enter the war. The German government now realized the seriousness of the situation and promised in its note of May 4 not to sink without warning any more merchant ships in the future.

This side-tracked the dispute for the moment, but did not really settle it. Germany, for instance, emphasized at the end of her note that she reserved full freedom of action for herself in case the United States was not able to compel Great Britain also to observe the rules of international law. President Wilson, on the other hand, in his last answer, insisted that the promise of the German government could not be made dependent on conditions of this kind.

Such was the situation, when the German government, in the following year, on January 31, 1917, issued an official statement to all neutrals that henceforth it intended to conduct an unrestricted submarine campaign against merchant ships. All merchant ships, even though neutral, which were found in the war zone, which included the seas around Great Britain, France, and Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean, were to be torpedoed by German submarines without warning.

This decision was a desperate attempt, by means of a famine

blockade, to bring to a successful end for the Germans the war which they had not been able to win with their armies; above all else, it was an attempt to compel England, which could not be attacked by armies, to make a premature peace. The submarine weapon was not wholly without prospects of success; but it was an extraordinarily dangerous weapon, and its adoption was due to the feeling prevailing at German Headquarters since 1915, that any chances must be taken. On the basis of President Wilson's previous notes, Germany had to reckon with the danger that the United States also would now intervene in the war. Furthermore, a number of other neutral states, from which the Germans had hitherto been able to import goods to make up for their deficiency in raw materials and food, would suffer such economic injury that further assistance from these sources would necessarily be limited. Finally, the world's supply of means of transport and of wares of which the Central Powers would be in the greatest need, even in case of victory, would be seriously diminished by this submarine warfare; and so the economic misery at the close of the war would be increased, a misery from which an over-populated country like Germany would necessarily suffer most severely.

But all these considerations were thrown to the winds. This was partly due to the wholly false estimates made by the German Navy Department, which again underestimated the enemy's power of resistance and inventive cleverness in devising means to meet the submarine danger.

America's answer was not slow in coming. It was on February 1, 1917, that the unrestricted submarine campaign was to begin; on February 3 the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, and on the next day urged other neutral states to do likewise. This did not yet amount to war, and the other neutral states, so far as they followed America's request at all, were slow in acting upon it; Brazil, for instance, did not break off diplomatic relations with Germany until April 9. But the United States might take the final step at any moment.

It was at this point that the Russian Revolution became an influence in giving a decisive turn to events. Even as late as 1916 America had still been disinclined to take part in the war. President Wilson, who had formerly been a professor of political science and was a typical idealist representing the idea of law in international relations, was a member of the Democratic Party, which included the pacifistic lesser bourgeoisie; he had been reëlected in November, 1916, partly because he had been regarded as being the

candidate of the peace party. From a financial point of view, every argument was against entering the war; it was certain that the American government would have to assume an enormous burden of taxes, as the English and Italians had already done, in case it waged a war for which it had made so little preparation; and these taxes, which would not be compensated by any economic profits, would appear all the more burdensome, because the United States, from the very beginning, had renounced all conquests and even indemnities. The consideration which drove America to war, therefore, was similar to that in the case of England: it was a question of securing for the future that development toward a peaceful relation among nations, for which America had already begun so successfully to pave the way,—a relation which was not based upon threats of war and armaments, universal military service, the building of fortresses and so forth, but which would relieve the United States of the necessity of "militarizing" herself for defence against a European Power. Germany's announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare now seemed to show that here was a Power which would disregard its promises to other states just as inconsiderately as it overstepped humanitarian provisions in favor of neutrals in case of military necessity; an indication of this had recently been given by the German intrigues in Mexico against the United States. In addition to these influences, as has been said, came the fact that Russia had now become one of the free peoples; on April 5 the Congress of the United States declared war on Germany.

America's entrance into the war could not exercise an influence upon military events in Europe at once, except so far as the supplying of American munitions to the Entente countries had to be limited. But from the outset it had an immense "moral" effect: new reserves in man-power and money now stood at the disposal of the Allies; a new power had joined them which could not, under any circumstances, be forced to give in by a country like Germany, which was lacking in sea power. The Americans also made it a matter of honor, when they were once in the war, to carry it on as vigorously as possible, and they improvised an army and navy with enormous energy.

Their achievements were all the more significant inasmuch as the unrestricted submarine campaign turned out to be a complete failure. At first, to be sure, there was a considerable increase in the number of ships sunk. Great Britain was also compelled to do what the Central Powers had done long before—to limit the consumption of food and finally on February 25, 1918, to adopt a system of

rationing it. But in England there was never any food shortage which could be compared with the privation in Germany and Austria, though even this was without great effect on the armies of the Central Powers. Furthermore, means of defense against submarines, like depth bombs and the throwing of artificial smoke screens about vessels, were discovered, which materially lessened their activity. The submarines also proved totally ineffective against ships of war. And of the numerous transports which brought the American troops to Europe, not a single one was sunk; nor were the communications between England and France broken. As an offset to America's entrance into the war, therefore, Germany had risked a venture which proved worthless.

Furthermore, the "moral," and also the actual, support of the United States came to the aid of the Allies at a moment when they were more in need of this support than ever, if the war was not to be indefinitely prolonged. The Russian situation had taken a very different turn from that which the Liberal Opposition had expected. At first, to be sure, events had moved in the main as the Intellectuals had anticipated. They succeeded, on May 5, 1917, in getting a vote of confidence for the Provisional Government from the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils; and when a Socialist, Kerensky, became prime minister on July 22, it might have been hoped that the Extreme Left would support the government thenceforth. The revolutionists also managed, between July 1 and 13, to begin a great offensive in Eastern Galicia, which promised much. But at this moment the military power of Russia collapsed at home.

For a considerable time there had existed within the Russian Social Democratic Party a radical left wing, known as the Bolsheviki or Maximalists, who had abandoned the Marxian doctrine that the proletariat ought to get control over the state by peaceful means. The Bolsheviki represented the principle that nothing but a revolution could bring the rule into the hands of the workingmen, and also that the future state ought not to be organized on a democratic basis, but that political rights should be reserved for the propertyless classes. The advocates of these views had been banished from Russia under the Tsarist régime. The most notable among them was a landowner's son named Ulianov, who came to be called Lenin, apparently because of his residence in Siberia near the river Lena; during almost the whole period of the war, Lenin had been living in Switzerland, and latterly at Zürich. The Provisional Government now opened to these exiles an opportunity to return to Russia; with the aid of the German government, which gladly put at the

disposal of the Russian revolutionists a "sealed" train for crossing German territory, thus preventing them from coming into any contact with the German population and especially with the German Socialists, all these Bolshevist leaders succeeded in getting back to Russia. Lenin himself arrived at Petrograd on April 16, 1917. Scarcely had they reached Russia when they began an extraordinarily active propaganda in favor of their ideals, not only among the people of Russia itself, but in the armies, where the government let them have a free hand.

The thing which was of decisive importance was that they were able to appeal to the feelings of the peasants as well as of the industrial workingmen. To the peasants who would follow them they held out the prospect not only of an end of military service, but also of a division of the great landed estates, for which preparations had been made by the Tsarist government itself, but which could only have been wholly accomplished after a considerable time.

It is no wonder that these enticing arguments found a hearing among the masses who, through the prohibition of alcohol, had been deprived of their most effective means of forgetting their present misery through pleasant illusions, for a few hours at any rate. The discipline in the Russian army collapsed. Many of the peasants deserted their regiments and returned home. The Russian military advance, which had begun so successfully, was changed on July 21 into a retreat which resembled a flight. All attempts of the government to stop the movement proved fruitless; neither the appointment of the minister of war, Kerensky, as prime minister, nor the orders to arrest Lenin, Trotzky—whose real name was Bronstein—and their companions, were able to accomplish anything. Even the appeals of "the old guard" Socialist leaders, like Plechanov, remained unheeded. The Provisional Government finally had no support except from the troops in Petrograd, and on November 7, 1917, even this force was overthrown by a *coup d'état* of the Bolsheviki, who made use of naval troops. Kerensky and the Provisional Government disappeared; their place was taken by the "People's Commissaries," Lenin and Trotzky, representing the Bolsheviki. A counter move by Kerensky on November 13 resulted in failure at Tsarskoe Selo.

It is not possible at this point to discuss the Russian situation, which has not yet reached the end of its development; the later course of the Bolshevist movement in Russia must therefore be passed over here. But the Petrograd *coup d'état* affected the whole military situation, and some account of this must now be given.

The Bolshevist People's Commissaries, upon coming to power, opened negotiations with the Central Powers in order to secure a truce and negotiate a peace. They declared as their conditions: no annexations, no indemnities, and the self-determination of peoples. The Central Powers accepted these conditions, and, on December 15, a separate truce was signed at Brest-Litovsk between Soviet Russia and the Central Empires. Shortly after that, on December 22, peace negotiations were opened.

The peace negotiations were extraordinarily slow, chiefly because the German delegates did not hold to the conditions which they had accepted, but had in view open and secret annexations of Russian territory of enormous extent, without consulting the populations in any way. As the Bolshevists had destroyed the Russian army, they could no longer make any resistance to the enemy's demands; and so finally, on February 24, 1918, they were compelled to accept the German conditions, after Germany had already, on February 9, concluded a separate peace with the Ukraine. The treaty of peace itself was signed on March 3; but before this, as the truce had already terminated, the Germans had again begun their advance, and had occupied Kiev and Narva. The treaty of peace naturally made Rumania's military position untenable; so this country also had to sign a preliminary treaty on March 5, shortly after the conclusion of the treaty with Russia, and on May 7 consented to a final peace treaty at Bucharest. This provided for considerable cessions of territory to Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Central Powers in general, and also converted Rumania into an economic vassal of Germany by a petroleum monopoly and so forth. The only compensation which Rumania received was that she was given a free hand in Bessarabia, which had hitherto belonged to Russia.

It is easy to understand that this withdrawal of Russia from the ranks of the Entente caused a deep depression among her former allies—all the more so, as it was easy to see that the Central Powers would now be able to throw against the Western Front all the military forces which were set free by Russia's desertion. That no "defeatist" collapse took place, in spite of this, is due to the fact, aside from the general reasons already mentioned, that America's help seemed to make up for the loss of the Russian armies. It was also due to the manner in which the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk had been carried on by the Germans and to the contents of the treaties themselves, which destroyed every hope of reaching an acceptable peace. The German government perhaps never made a greater political mistake in the course of the whole war than it did

in imposing on Russia, in contradiction with the conditions at first agreed upon, a treaty which involved such enormous sacrifices of territory and such oppressive economic clauses as did the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The peoples in the Entente countries, even those who held "defeatist" views, now perceived what they would have to expect if they laid down their arms merely in return for general promises; from this moment onwards, the idea of a premature peace was no longer discussed.

The harm which the Germans had done to themselves could never be counteracted, no matter how great were their military efforts; the Entente, which might suffer military reverses at some points, but which could not be overcome, was now more invincible than ever. However, it chanced that the great offensive which the German General Staff undertook against the Anglo-French positions on the Western Front with the aid of the troops withdrawn from Russia failed. The Germans, to be sure, secured a number of very considerable initial successes. They forced the English contingent in the St. Quentin sector to give way, and for a moment, on March 21, 1918, and the following days, it seemed as if they were going to be able to break the connection between the English and French troops. The French, also, had to withdraw and give up Noyon and other places. But this very disaster resulted in the accomplishment of a reform which had long been necessary in the Allied armies, but to which the English had hitherto been steadily opposed: the Western Front was finally put under the command of a single person; General Foch, who had distinguished himself in the Battle of the Marne, and who had been commanding the French armies since May 15, 1917, was now, on March 26, 1918, made commander-in-chief of all the forces of the Allies in France. To be sure, this was far from stopping the German advance; but it did hinder local reverses from developing into a disaster along the whole front, such as had almost been the case in March.

The German offensive lasted until the middle of July. It often met with obstinate and even successful resistance; but in the end the German attack almost always resulted in a gain of ground. Many towns and positions which had come to be regarded as definitely in the possession of the Allies were reconquered by the enemy. The Germans even succeeded for a second time in advancing to the Marne, and on July 15 in crossing it in several places. But here the fortune of war changed. On July 18, the French and the Americans undertook a great offensive between Château-Thierry and Soissons, and drove the enemy systematically back. Not only

on the Marne, but also further north near Albert, the Germans began a general retreat which lasted till August 4.

Guided by the sure hand of Marshal Foch, who had borne this title since August 6, there now followed a systematic advance of French, British and American troops, which drove the Germans out of one position after another, in spite of their obstinate resistance. By the beginning of September they had been driven back to the line from which they had begun their offensive in March.

The Allies soon pressed forward still further. The American troops, which, in view of the critical position in the spring of 1918, had been transported to Europe in great numbers, made the first attack since 1914 which turned out successfully against a strongly-held front position: on September 12-13 they captured the salient of St. Mihiel near Verdun.

The German army was not yet broken in organization. The soldiers still did their duty as conscientiously as ever, and the withdrawal movements took place in a wholly orderly fashion. But it may be surmised that the disastrous result of the last great offensive, which they had hoped would end the war, aroused among the troops a stronger and stronger conviction of the invincibility of the Allies and consequently a certain discouragement. The lack in raw materials for manufacturing munitions, at a time when their former capture of booty had now been changed into severe losses in their own guns, may also have led them to see the serious inferiority of their own military leaders. Nevertheless, the Germans still had an army which was able to threaten the Allies with a war of desperation for a relatively long time.

Whoever thought this, however, had overlooked the fact that Germany was only one link, though the strongest, in a coalition, and that meanwhile this coalition had completely collapsed.

In order to understand this, it is necessary to go back a little in the history of the other theaters of war.

The establishment of the Allied expeditionary corps in Salonica (see p. 446) had turned out to be an excellent speculation. After the Allies had interfered in Greece, they secured control of the Greek fleet, and finally, on June 11, 1917, compelled King Constantine, who had been an out and out adherent of the pro-German policy of neutrality, to leave the country along with the heir to the throne. The Allies thus had at their disposal a territory in their rear which they could trust, and which was now under the direction of the friendly Venizelos, who had become prime minister again on June 26, 1917. Even before these events had taken place, the Allied

troops, in combination with the reorganized Serbian army, had made an attack against the territory occupied by the Bulgarians; on November 18, 1916, this had resulted in the re-conquest of Monastir, that is, of a little Serbian soil. They had also succeeded, on February 18, 1917, in restoring connections with the Italian contingents in Albania, so that Greece was completely cut off from the Central Powers. Now, when the consequences of the severe defeat of the Germans in the Second Battle of the Marne began to exercise a greater influence on the spirits of Germany's allies, the Allied armies in the Balkans were ready to take the offensive against Bulgaria. On September 15, 1918, French, Serbian, English and Greek troops began a combined attack on Bulgaria, which broke the resistance of the enemy in a few days. The Bulgarians fell back in disorderly flight and on September 25, ten days after the attack had begun, they asked for an armistice—the first country in the coalition of the Central Powers to take this step. Their request was granted on September 30; and the agreement amounted to an unconditional surrender. The Bulgarian army had to lay down its arms and deliver its prisoners without receiving a reciprocal right in return; German and Austrian troops and diplomatic representatives were also to be expelled from Bulgaria. Bulgaria thus disappeared from the ranks of the belligerents, and threw herself upon the mercy of the victors, who thereby cut off the connection between Turkey and the Central Powers. A short time afterwards, on October 4, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who had been responsible in good part for the policy of his country, abdicated and handed over the government to his son.

It was now only a question of time before Turkey would be compelled to take the same step. Whereas she had not been able to defend herself against the enemy, even with German help, now she was completely lost, as communications with Berlin were no longer open.

Thanks to their steady methodical work, the British had recovered from their defeat in Mesopotamia and had conquered Palestine from the Turks. In May, 1916, the English auxiliary corps which had arrived too late to relieve Kut-el-Amara (see p. 447), began a long, slow march up the Tigris. The Turks defended themselves bravely, but were driven out of one position after another. The British took Kut-el-Amara on February 24, 1917, entered Bagdad on March 11, Samarra on April 23, and Tekrit on November 5; they also advanced toward the northeast to the frontiers of Persia. The British expedition on the Euphrates was no less successful;

here, under the splendid leadership of General Maude, who was commander-in-chief of the whole Mesopotamian expedition, they won a decisive victory over the Turks at Ramadieh on September 28, 1917.

However, in the course of 1918, military operations in this region began to drag. It was in Palestine that the decisive victory over the Turkish forces was won.

The English first secured control over the desert lying between Egypt and Palestine by defeating the Turks at Katia on the Egyptian frontier on April 23, 1916, driving them out of the region around El Arisch. On December 23, 1916, they captured a strong Turkish position at Maghara on the Syrian frontier. Then they began to build a railway across the desert reaching from the Suez canal to Gaza in Palestine. The Turks had cleverly entrenched themselves at Gaza and succeeded for some time in beating back the attacks of the English in the spring of 1917; but General Allenby, who was entrusted with the command in June, finally overcame the resistance and captured Gaza for the British on November 7, 1917. From this point on, the British advance went forward relatively quickly. Jaffa was captured on November 17, Jerusalem on December 9, and Jericho on February 21, 1918. Later, to be sure, the British met with some reverses, but on September 19, 1918, when they succeeded in bringing about a decisive engagement, victory was wholly on their side. They broke through the Turkish positions on the coast and were able to announce officially that the Turkish armies were destroyed. Within a few days all Palestine was in their hands. In this movement, the English had been supported by forces placed at their disposal by the King of the Hedjaz; this prince, without doubt as a result of an understanding with the British, had revolted against the Turks in June, 1916, founded a kingdom of his own at Mecca, and been recognized for some time as an independent prince; similarly, in Mesopotamia an independent Arabian kingdom had been proclaimed, free from Turkey.

Under these circumstances, even if Bulgaria had not surrendered, the Turks would have perhaps been compelled to make peace. At any rate, scarcely a month later, on October 30, 1918, they also threw themselves upon the mercy of the victorious Allies. They, likewise, had to surrender all their fortresses, including the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, which had been so long contested and which had never fallen into an enemy's hands since the fall of the Byzantine Empire. The Turks had to demobilize their army, hand

over their war vessels, place their railways under the control of the Allies, break off all relations with the Central Powers, and expel all Germans and Austrians from their territory.

Of Germany's three allies, there remained only Austria-Hungary; but this empire also was near its end.

For a long time the Austrian government had seen more clearly than the German that a continuation of the war would mean the downfall of the old system of government, and had sought various means to prevent this disaster, without, however, being able, up to the last moment, to bring themselves to sacrifice Austrian territory to Italy. Germany had always refused her approval, and due to this as much as to the inadequacy of the Austrian proposals, all negotiations with Italy had failed.

The fact that the Austrians were unwilling to make any concessions to the Italians was in part owing to the fact that they regarded themselves as victors over Italy.

After various Italian attacks had failed of great success in the course of 1917, the Austrians, supported by German auxiliary troops, made a great counter-attack in October of this year. Favored, it is said, by the "defeatist" and Socialist influences which prevailed in some of the Italian divisions, the Austrians succeeded in a surprisingly short time in breaking through the enemy positions at Caporetto on October 24, and in pressing forward from here far into Venetian territory. On October 28 they recaptured Gorizia, on the 29th occupied Udine, and on November 9 reached the Piave river. On December 4-6 they also succeeded in advancing in the neighborhood of Asiago.

Henceforth, the Austrians were mostly able to maintain themselves for several months in these conquests, and could thus, like the Germans, carry on the war in the enemy's country. Various Italian attacks only succeeded in unimportant front line gains. The Austrians, however, were also just as unable to advance beyond the front line which they had seized at their first onrush; a great Austrian offensive from the Asiago plateau to the sea, which was launched on June 15, 1918, had failed completely by June 25. The Italians at this time had the support of French and British auxiliary troops.

This situation, when Austria's confidence in a successful outcome had been broken by the defeats of the Germans in France, was a good psychological moment for a new attack by the Allied Powers. On October 24, therefore, the Allies began a great offensive against the Austrian positions in the Trentino and on the middle Piave,

which led, on October 31, after a brave initial resistance of the Austrians, to an Austrian retreat which was like a flight. The Austrians abandoned their positions along the whole front. At the same time, on November 3, the Italians captured the Austrian naval forces at Trieste. Nothing remained for Austria to do except to sign an armistice on November 3, which was equivalent to an unconditional surrender. She not only had to agree to demobilization, but had to put all her railways at the free disposal of the Allied Powers, who thus acquired the right to attack Germany by way of Austria; all German troops had to be removed from Austria-Hungary within fourteen days; and Austria had to renounce reciprocity in regard to the delivery of prisoners and the raising of the blockade.

While this was happening, the old Austrian government had ceased to exist. On October 30, an independent Czecho-Slovak state had been proclaimed at Prague; and on October 31, when the Serbs were approaching Belgrade and threatening to invade Hungary, the Hungarians declared their independence and organized a Hungarian republic. Soon after this a revolution occurred in Vienna, which compelled Emperor Charles to abdicate on November 12, and transformed German-Austria into a republic. Thus Austria fell apart into its national constituent elements. Both the dynasty and the former German-Magyar dual rule over the Slavic nationalities came to an end.

So at last it was only the German armies which still stood in the field, and even these were in a position in which they could only be saved from disaster by a speedy armistice.

Immediately after the American success at St. Mihiel the German government had sought to open peace negotiations, and on September 15, 1918, had offered peace conditions to Belgium. But the offer was naturally rejected, and at the end of the month there began a vast concentric attack upon the Germans from Ypres, Cambrai, and the Argonne—a great simultaneous assault at many points on the front, which prevented the Germans from making any further use of their advantage of the "inner line" by shifting their more or less inadequate reserves from one place to another. Under these circumstances the Allied forces were able to press forward everywhere. On September 27, the English broke through the so-called "Hindenburg Line" on the Cambrai front, capturing St. Quentin on October 1, Armentières on October 3, Cambrai on the 9th, and Laon on the 13th. The Allied offensive from the sea-coast could now be taken up again and resulted in quick successes: Roulers was cap-

tured on October 14, whereupon the Germans began to evacuate the Belgian coasts north of the city as far east as Ostend; by October 19 the Belgians had occupied all the rest of the coast. They then took Ghent, while British forces between the Scheldt and the Sambre pressed forward in the direction of Valenciennes, so that the German positions on the Scheldt were threatened. Ludendorff, Quartermaster General of the German army, who was generally regarded as responsible for the German plans of campaign and especially for the offensive of 1918, had to resign on October 26—an admission that his undertaking had failed.

Parallel with these last battles there had been going on for about a month negotiations toward peace. Five days after Bulgaria's surrender, Germany had turned to the President of the United States with a request for mediation, proposing as a basis President Wilson's message to Congress of January 8, 1918, as well as his later similar declarations. The President thereupon demanded, above all things, that the Germans should put an end to their "illegal and inhuman practices," like submarine warfare and the systematic devastation and plundering of the territories which they were evacuating. He also demanded a change in the German government, so that there should no longer be any autocratic power which could arbitrarily disturb the peace of the world. The German government thereupon promised to give orders to the submarines not to torpedo passenger ships in the future, and in Germany they promised to introduce a parliamentary form of government. The President then laid the German request for peace before the Allied Powers who replied on November 6.

The Allied Governments had a difficult decision to make. The battle on the Sambre, which had begun on November 1, had cut the last important communications between the German troops in the Ardennes and those in Belgium; and this, together with the tremendous advance of the French in the south, had made the positions of the Germans so untenable that they had no alternative but to choose between a hasty retreat back over the German border or the danger of being surrounded,—a disaster like Sedan only on a wider scale. If the Allies, in spite of this, entered upon peace negotiations, they would have to renounce the great final military triumph which could be held up before the eyes of friend and foe afterwards as the complete defeat of the German military power.

But, on the other hand, since the power of resistance of the German armies had not yet been thoroughly broken, there was no deny-

ing that such a triumph would cost a great sacrifice in human life, and that such a final act of glory, which was not absolutely necessary, was not worth the blood which would have to be shed for it. Furthermore, the "Fourteen Points" in President Wilson's message to Congress of January 8, 1918, which had been accepted by Germany, contained many demands which formed part of the program of the Allies, like the handing back of Alsace-Lorraine to France, and the creation of an independent Polish state which should include all regions occupied by Poles even though they formed part of Prussia. And even if all the Allies gave up wide-reaching demands in order to abide by President Wilson's conditions, Germany would suffer a very essential diminution of her territory, especially in the east.

Accordingly, the Allies accepted the proposal transmitted by America, however unpopular it was in many respects. They merely made as reservations to the Fourteen Points two conditions: that the demand for the freedom of the seas should not be accepted in the sense understood by Germany; and that "the restoration of the evacuated districts" mentioned by the President should be understood to mean that "Germany had to make compensation for all damage done to the civil population of the Allies."

The Germans made no objection to these reservations, and on November 7, 1918, requested an armistice. This was granted to them on November 11.

The armistice conditions, which reflected the actual military situation, were milder than those in the three armistices which had preceded. They were, to be sure, an agreement between a victor and a defeated party, and contained numerous one-sided provisions to Germany's disadvantage, such as the delivery of prisoners by one party only, the maintenance of the blockade, the evacuation by Germany of the territory on the left bank of the Rhine, which was occupied by Allied troops. But no general demobilization of the German army was insisted upon; of the war material, only a part had to be handed over, except that all submarines were surrendered; of railway stock only so much was to be restored as had been carried away by the Germans from the occupied territory. An unlimited right of occupation, such as the Allies had insisted upon in dealing with the other three defeated countries, was not required of Germany. Naturally German East Africa, which was the only German colony in which a remnant of German forces had been able to maintain itself, was to be evacuated, and the German government was

to withdraw all its troops from the territories which had formerly belonged to Russia, and to annul the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest.

At the moment when this armistice was signed, the old German government was no longer in existence. On November 3 the naval troops in Kiel had given the signal for revolution, and within a short time the movement had extended over all Germany. It was directed not only against the Kaiser, but also against the federated princes in the German Empire, who were rightly regarded as being identified with the old system. On November 7 a republic was proclaimed in Bavaria; on the 9th the Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, resigned and the revolutionists announced the abdication of Emperor William II, who thereupon fled at once to Holland with the Crown Prince. A Socialist party leader, who under the old régime would not have been allowed to fill even the lowest position in the civil service, now became German Chancellor on November 9. Having reached this point we must halt. What has taken place since can only be judged when it is known how events have turned out. It only remains to note briefly the official conclusion of the war through the treaties of peace.

Naturally, the treaty of peace with Germany was the most important.

The negotiations met with extraordinary difficulties. The coalition of victors had swollen at the close to a host of about thirty countries and their claims collided with one another in many points. The negotiations, therefore, after March 25, 1919, were carried on merely by the heads of the four Great Powers, the "Council of Four," representing Great Britain, France, the United States, and Italy.

Much more serious and complicated was the question of dealing with the economic misery into which the war had plunged Europe.

According to President Wilson's Fourteen Points there could be no question of the victors treating Germany as Germany had treated France in 1871 (see p. 311)—of demanding complete reparation for the costs of war together with money gifts to the military leaders and statesmen of the victorious countries. But even aside from the Fourteen Points, such a demand could not have been carried out. Germany, to be sure, had suffered much less through the war than France, Belgium or Serbia; she had no devastated districts, nor destroyed factories and mines. But Germany, which was not rich by nature, had been severely injured in her export trade by the war, and the finances of the Empire, in which the expendi-

tures even before the war had reached much too high a figure in proportion to the real capital in the country, had been completely ruined by war expenditures; moreover, in order to keep the population in good spirits, the government had not dared to impose appropriate new taxes, as had been done in England and Italy. The population possessed barely enough money to pay even the current expenses of the government, to say nothing of making any regular payments on the war debts. On the other hand, the injured countries, like France, demanded that the defeated enemy should at least make good the damages, which often could not be justified on any military grounds; this was especially the case with France; the economic advantage which she had enjoyed before the war owing to her relatively thinly settled population had now been changed into an economic disadvantage, inasmuch as a million French peasants had fallen and the supply of labor was insufficient. There were many other economic difficulties, which cannot be taken up here, such as the lack of marine transportation facilities due to the submarine warfare, and the abnormally low point to which exchange in the defeated countries had fallen.

It was natural that under these circumstances the French should desire compensation in the form of territory, aside from Alsace which gladly returned to France. All her demands of this kind, however, always failed on account of the opposition of her allies. Instead, the conception of the word "restoration" was extended, and there was placed on Germany the obligation of making yearly reparation payments. It is possible that the settlement of the colonial question was also regarded as a kind of compensation, in place of the complete compensation which could not be made in cash. It was in this matter that those who drew up the treaty of peace departed furthest from President Wilson's program. In order to put an end to conflicts for the possession of colonies, President Wilson had desired an impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, having regard at the same time for the interests of the natives; instead of this the former German colonies were simply partitioned among the allies, to be sure in the form of a mandate under the League of Nations, so that the territories, at least in theory, were to be open to all nations upon the same terms.

The second reason why the American program, deficient as it was in many respects, was not completely carried out, lay in the effort of France to create guarantees for herself against a new attack from Germany. The experiences which France had had with the German government before 1914, as well as her conviction that the German

mentality had not changed since the armistice, resulted in a partial adoption only of measures which were to secure peaceful intercourse among nations in the future. Disarmament, to be sure, was imposed upon Germany, and other states carried through similar measures; Great Britain, for instance, put an end to her universal military service; France, on the other hand, which had only unwillingly adopted the Prussian system of universal military service after 1870, now clung fast to it in order to have protection against her neighbor. On the other hand, as a result of American pressure, a League of Nations was established along with the treaty of peace and as an integral part of it; this was to take up again the old Russian plan for a diminution of armaments and to provide for the application of international means of compulsion against states which rejected arbitration and proceeded directly to war. For the present, however, Germany was to be excluded from the League of Nations until she had given evidence of a changed frame of mind.

In other respects the terms of the treaty of peace do not seriously diverge from the Fourteen Points, and still less from the earlier resolutions of the Entente Powers. There is one demand which was fulfilled almost without exception—the demand that every nationality should acquire its freedom. As applied to Germany, this meant that not only should Poland acquire the parts which had belonged formerly to Austria and Russia, as well as the part which had been taken by Prussia, but also that the Danes in Northern Schleswig, who had been denied the right of self-determination since 1866, should be allowed to decide to what state they should belong. President Wilson's program also included the demand for a free access to the sea for Poland; as the only seaport to be considered, namely Dantzig, had no large Polish population, a compromise was arranged by which the town was made into a free state by itself. Regions where the composition of the population was a matter of dispute acquired in general the right to vote on their future; thus the Allies returned to the system of voting by plébiscites which had been forgotten since 1866.

Hard as these conditions appeared to the Germans—hard mainly because their concessions were rewarded with scarcely any counter concessions—there was nothing for the totally defeated state to do but to accept them. On June 28 the German delegates signed the treaty in the Hall of Mirrors, at the Palace at Versailles, where the German Empire had been proclaimed in 1870. Formal ratification by the Allied Powers took place on January 10, 1920.

For Austria-Hungary the conditions were much severer. She had

made no stipulations in signing the armistice, and, furthermore, two of the newly-created states into which the former Dual Monarchy fell apart—Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia—were the friends of the Allied Powers. Although in general the boundaries were drawn in accordance with the lines of nationality, these pro-Ally states received great concessions in the Treaty of Saint-Germain with Austria, signed on September 10, 1919. Czecho-Slovakia, for instance, was given the part of Bohemia occupied by Germans. It was still less in accordance with the principle of nationality to assign the German Tyrol to Italy, although strategic reasons could be alleged for doing this. The German part of Austria, which was now a republic, but which had formed the relatively poorest part of the monarchy, was not only treated as the legal successor of Old Austria, because of the predominance of German officials, but the little state was also forbidden to join itself to Germany. By the Treaty of the Trianon, of June 4, 1920, peace with Hungary was worked out along the same lines. It is noteworthy, on the other hand, that these treaties contain clauses for the protection of racial minorities: the Powers have the right to prevent the forcible suppression of linguistic groups.

By the Treaty of Neuilly, of November 27, 1919, Bulgaria came out of the war materially reduced in size, and many districts in the southern Balkans which were assigned to Serbia are probably predominantly Bulgarian by race.

Finally, by the Treaty of Sèvres, of August 10, 1920, which has not yet (1922) been ratified, Turkey was destroyed as a Great Power. She was deprived of control over the Straits. The Sultan, to be sure, was allowed to continue his residence in Constantinople, but his military and political authority over the city was taken from him. Great stretches of the Turkish Empire—Syria, the west coast of Asia Minor, Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Arabia—were freed from Turkish control, so that the Sultan retained only a modest empire in the interior of Asia Minor. The expulsion of the Turks from Europe, which had been the dream of Christianity for nearly five hundred years, seemed to have been accomplished, and whatever may happen in the future to Constantinople, and however the question of Russia's attitude to the new régime on the Bosphorus may turn out, the Turkish Empire can never be revived again in its old form.

It would need another whole volume if, at the close of this sketch, one should try to give an account of the consequences which the war has had for Europe and in fact for the whole world. Several

points have been touched upon in the account of the treaties of peace, but aside from these there is so much more to be told that no attempt shall here be made to tell it. Moreover, surmises as to the future do not belong in a historical narrative; only the dilettante and the amateur philosopher of history venture to make prophecies. Attention, therefore, shall be called to only one point which has not yet been mentioned, because it could find no place in the narrative. It concerns the change in agrarian conditions.

That the war resulted in an extension of political rights is not surprising; nor is it to be wondered at that the appeal for manual labor, with the temporary shortage in labor supply, resulted in an improvement in the condition of the workingmen and even in an extension of political rights to women in many countries. The overthrow of the three autocratic monarchies in Central and Eastern Europe had the further natural result that political rights which had hitherto been in large part a matter of privilege in Western and Southern Europe were now extended over nearly the whole continent. But in addition to these changes—and as much in the lands of the victors as in those of the defeated enemy—there now took place a change, which has perhaps more deeply modified the structure of economic life than all the new constitutions and treaties of peace. The war, and the continued crisis in transportation which followed the war, have again suddenly recalled to people's minds, hypnotized for a century by the Industrial Revolution, the fundamental importance of agriculture; and at the same time people have begun to realize the eminent political importance of a system of agriculture based on small peasant proprietors. Russia took the first step by dividing up the large landed estates among the cultivators of the soil. Since then, one state after another has followed her example, and even in Prussia, where the problem was perhaps dealt with most timidly, the political privileges connected with large landed estates have at least been abolished, and the way is open for "internal colonization." But in other states, also, where no forcible interference with private property has taken place, economic power has shifted into a different set of hands. The large landowner in England, who even before the war was scarcely able to manage his estates in the old fashion, has now been compelled in very many cases through the necessity of the age to sell his estate or allow it to be divided up. In France, where small peasant proprietors have strongly prevailed ever since the French Revolution, the new era is indicated by the fact that the peasants have grown rich in contrast to the townspeople, and many estates which were formerly in

the possession of the bourgeoisie have gone over into the hands of the peasantry. Thus, in most countries, the rural districts have acquired an economic preponderance over the towns. Though the progress of science in the nineteenth century ruined agriculture in a good many places, by making it possible to sell foodstuffs imported from abroad at a lower price than domestic products, now it appears that the reverse is about to happen—that agriculture is beginning to act as a check on industry by setting too high a price on the indispensable necessaries of life. Thus the problem which arose from the Industrial Revolution more than a hundred years ago, as to how to feed cheaply the masses of men necessary for manufacturing on a large scale, has now reached a new critical stage; while, on the other hand, the struggle which the French Revolution began against the privileges and domination of large landed property has now for the first time reached a triumphant close in all Europe.

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





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