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VOLUME II.

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DOMESTIC CHAPLAIN TO THE RIGHT HON. THE COUNTESS OF ROTHES.

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TO THE RIGHT REV. FATHER IN GOD,

W. I. TROWER, D.D.,

LATE LORD BISHOP OF GIBRALTAR, AND FORMERLY BISHOP OF GLASGOW AND GALLOWAY.

My dear Lord,

In one of our conversations last summer, you were kind enough to express an interest in this publication, and to favour me with some valuable hints on my own share in it. It gives me therefore great pleasure to inscribe your honoured name on the first page of this volume.

I avail myself of this public opportunity of endorsing, on my own account, the high opinion which has long been entertained of your excellent volumes on "*The Epistles*" and "*The Gospels.*"

Recalling to mind, as I often do, our pleasant days at Pennycross and Mannamead, I remain, my dear Lord, very faithfully yours,

PETER HOLMES.

Mannamead, *March* 10, 1870.

PREFACE.

THIS volume contains all Tertullian's *polemical* works (placed in his second volume by Oehler, whose text we have followed), with the exception of the long treatise *Against Marcion*, which has already formed a volume of this series, and the *Adversus Judæos*, which, not to increase the bulk of the present volume, will appear among the Miscellaneous Tracts.

For the scanty facts connected with our author's life, and for some general remarks on the importance and the style of his writings, the reader is referred to the Introduction of our translation of the *Five Books against Marcion.*

The treatises which comprise this volume will be found replete with the vigorous thought and terse expression which always characterize Tertullian.

Brief synopses are prefixed to the several treatises, and headings are supplied to the chapters: these, with occasional notes on difficult passages and obscure allusions, will, it is hoped, afford sufficient aid for an intelligent perusal of these ancient writings, which cannot fail to be interesting alike to the theologian and the general reader,—full as they are of reverence for revealed truth, and at the same time of independence of judgment, adorned with admirable variety and fulness of knowledge, genial humour, and cultivated imagination.

P. H.

CONTENTS.

QUINTUS SEPTIMIUS FLORENS TERTULLIANUS

ON

PRESCRIPTION AGAINST HERETICS.[1]

CHAP. I.—*Introductory. Heresies must exist, and even abound; they are a probation to faith.*

THE character of the times in which we live is such as to call forth from us even this admonition, that we ought not to be astonished at the heresies [which abound];[2] neither their existence ought to surprise us, for it was foretold that they should come to pass;[3] nor the fact that they subvert the faith of some, for their final cause is, by affording a trial to faith, to give it also the opportunity of being "approved."[4] Groundless, therefore, and inconsiderate is the offence of the many[5] who are scandalized by the very fact that heresies prevail to such a degree. How great [might their offence have been],

[1] [Of the various forms of the title of this treatise, *de Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, *de Præscriptionibus Hæreticorum*, *de Præscriptionibus adversus Hæreticos*, the first is adopted by Oehler after the oldest authorities, such as the Liber Agobardinus and the Codex Paterniacensis (or Selestadiensis), and the Editio Princeps of Rhenanus. The term *præscriptio* is a legal one, meaning a "*demurrer*," or formal objection. The genitive *hæreticorum* is used in an objective sense, as if *adversus hæreticos*. Tertullian himself, in *de Carne Christi*, ii., says, "Sed plenius ejusmodi præscriptionibus adversus omnes hæreses alibi jam usi sumus." The title therefore means, "On the Church's Prescriptive Rule against Heresies of all kinds."]

[2] Istas.

[3] [Matt. vii. 15, xxiv. 4, 11, 24; 1 Tim. iv. 1–3; 2 Pet. ii. 1.]

[4] [1 Cor. xi. 19.]

[5] Plerique ["the majority"].

if they had not existed![1] When it has been determined that a thing must by all means be, it receives the [final] cause for which it has its being. This secures the power through which it exists, in such a way that it is impossible for it not to have existence.

CHAP. II.—*Analogy between fevers, which destroy the body, and heresies, which ruin the soul. Heresies not to be wondered at: their strength is derived from the weakness of men's faith; but, for all that, they have not the truth. Simile of pugilists and gladiators in illustration of this truth.*

Taking the similar case[2] of fever, which is appointed a place amongst all other deadly and excruciating issues [of life] for destroying man, we are not surprised either that it exists, for there it is; or that it consumes man, for that is the purpose of its existence. In like manner, with respect to heresies, which are produced for the weakening and the extinction of faith, since we feel a dread because they have this power, we should first dread the fact of their existence; for as long as they exist, they have their power; and as long as they have their power, they have their existence. But still fever, as being an evil both in its cause[3] and in its power, as all know, we rather loathe than wonder at, and to the best of our power guard against, not having its extirpation in our power. Heresies, however, which bring with them eternal death and the heat of a stronger fire, some men prefer wondering at for possessing this power, instead of avoiding their power when they have the means of escape. But [heresies] would have no power, if [men] would cease to wonder that they have such power. For it either happens that, while men wonder, they fall into a snare, or, because they are ensnared, they cherish their surprise, as if heresies were so powerful because of some truth which belonged to them. It would no doubt be a wonderful thing that evil should have

[1] [The Holy Ghost having foretold that they should exist. (Rigalt.)]
[2] [Denique has in Tertullian sometimes the meaning of *proinde*.]
[3] Causam ["purpose," "final cause"].

any force of its own, were it not that heresies are strong in those persons who are not strong in faith. In a combat of boxers and gladiators, generally speaking, it is not because a man is strong that he gains the victory, or loses it because he is not strong, but because he who is vanquished was a man of no strength; and indeed this very conqueror, when afterwards matched against a really powerful man, actually retires crest-fallen from the contest. In precisely the same way, heresies derive such strength as they have from the infirmities of individuals—having no strength whenever they encounter a really powerful faith.

CHAP. III.—*Weak people fall an easy prey to heretical teachers. Heresy, moreover, derives strength from the general frailty of mankind. Eminent men have fallen from faith: Saul, David, Solomon. The unique constancy of Christ: true religion consists in following His example.*

It is usual, indeed, with persons of a weaker character, to be so built up [in confidence] by certain individuals who are caught by heresy, as to topple over into ruin themselves. How comes it to pass, [they ask], that this woman or that man, who were the most faithful, the most prudent, and the most approved[1] in the church, have gone over to the other side? Who that asks such a question does not in fact reply to it himself, to the effect that men whom heresies have been able to pervert[2] ought never to have been esteemed prudent, or faithful, or approved? This again is, I suppose, an extraordinary thing, that one who has been approved should afterwards fall back? Saul, who was good beyond all others, is afterwards subverted by envy.[3] David, a good man "after the Lord's own heart,"[4] is guilty afterwards of murder and adultery.[5] Solomon, endowed by the Lord with all grace and wisdom, is led into idolatry by women.[6] For to the Son of God alone was it reserved to persevere to the last without

[1] Usitatissimi ["most experienced"].
[2] Demutare.
[3] [1 Sam. xviii. 8, 9.]
[4] [1 Sam. xiii. 14.]
[5] [2 Sam. xi.]
[6] [1 Kings xi. 4.]

sin.[1] But what if a bishop, if a deacon, if a widow, if a virgin, if a doctor, if even a martyr, have fallen from the rule [of faith], will heresies on that account appear to possess[2] the truth? Do we prove the faith[3] by the persons, or the persons by the faith? No one is wise, no one is faithful, no one excels in dignity,[4] but the Christian; and no one is a Christian but he who perseveres even to the end.[5] You, as a man, know any other man from the outside appearance. You think as you see. And you see as far only as you have eyes. But, says [the Scripture], "the eyes of the Lord are lofty."[6] "Man looketh at the outward appearance, but God looketh at the heart."[7] "The Lord [beholdeth and] knoweth them that are His;"[8] and "the plant which [my heavenly Father] hath not planted, He rooteth up;"[9] and "the first shall," as He shows, "be last;"[10] and He carries "His fan in His hand to purge His threshing-floor."[11] Let the chaff of a fickle faith fly off as much as it will at every blast of temptation, all the purer will be that heap of corn which shall be laid up in the garner of the Lord. Did not certain of the disciples turn back from the Lord Himself[12] when they were offended? Yet the rest did not therefore think that they must turn away from following Him;[13] but because they knew that He was the Word of Life, and was come from God,[14] they continued in His company to the very last, after He had gently inquired of them whether they also would go away.[15] It is a comparatively small thing,[16] that certain men, like Phygellus, and Hermogenes, and Philetus, and Hymenæus, deserted His apostle:[17] the betrayer of Christ was himself one of the apostles. We are surprised at seeing His churches forsaken by some men, although the things which we suffer after the example of Christ Himself, show

[1] [Heb. iv. 15.] [2] Obtinere. [3] Fidem ["The Creed"].
[4] Major. [5] [Matt. x. 22.] [6] [Jer. xxxii. 19.]
[7] [1 Sam. xvi. 7.] [8] [2 Tim. ii. 19.] [9] [Matt. xv. 13.]
[10] [Matt. xx. 16.] [11] [Matt. iii. 12.] [12] [John vi. 66.]
[13] A vestigiis ejus. [14] [John i. 1, vi. 68, and xvi. 30.]
[15] [John vi. 67.] [16] Minus.
[17] [2 Tim. i. 15, ii. 17; 1 Tim. i. 20.]

us to be Christians. "They went out from us," says [the apostle], "but they were not of us. If they had been of us, they would no doubt have continued with us."[1]

CHAP. IV.—*We should, therefore, heed well the warnings against heresy given us in the New Testament, nor be disturbed at its existence. Sundry passages adduced, which foretell heresy. These warnings imply the possibility of men's falling into heresy.*

But let us rather be mindful of the sayings of the Lord, and of the letters of the apostles; for they have both told us beforehand that there shall be heresies, and have given us, in anticipation, warnings to avoid them; and inasmuch as we are not alarmed because they exist, so we ought not to wonder that they are capable of doing that, on account of which they must be shunned. The Lord teaches us that many "ravening wolves shall come in sheep's clothing."[2] Now, what are these sheep's clothings but the external surface of the Christian profession? Who are the ravening wolves but those deceitful senses and spirits which are lurking within to waste the flock of Christ? Who are the false prophets but deceptive predictors of the future? Who are the false apostles but the preachers of a spurious gospel?[3] Who also are the Antichrists, both now and evermore, but the men who rebel against Christ?[4] Heresies, at the present time, will no less rend the church by their perversion of doctrine, than will Antichrist persecute her at that day by the cruelty of his attacks,[5] except that persecution makes even martyrs, [but] heresy only apostates. And therefore "heresies must needs be in order that they which are approved might be made manifest,"[6] both those who remained stedfast under persecution, and those who did not wander out of their way[7] into heresy. For [the apostle] does not mean[8] that those per-

[1] [1 John ii. 19.] [2] [Matt. vii. 15.]
[3] Adulteri evangelizatores ["the spurious preachers of the gospel"].
[4] Hoc [*scil.* "tempore"].
[5] [Oehler's "persecutionem" ought of course to be "persecutionum."]
[6] [1 Cor. xi. 19.] [7] Exorbitaverint. [8] Juvat.

sons should be deemed *approved* who exchange their creed for heresy; although they contrariously interpret his words to their own side, when he says in another passage, "Prove all things; hold fast that which is good;"[1] as if, after proving all things amiss, one might not through error make a determined choice of some evil thing.

CHAP. V.—*Heresy, no less than schism and dissension, disapproved by St. Paul, who speaks of the necessity of heresies happening, not as a good, but in the will of God, who would turn them into salutary trials for training and approving the faith of Christians.*

Moreover, when he blames dissensions and schisms, which undoubtedly are evils, he immediately adds *heresies* likewise. Now, that which he subjoins to evil things, he of course confesses to be itself an evil; and all the greater, indeed, because he tells us that his belief of their schisms and dissensions was grounded on his knowledge that "there must be heresies also."[2] For he shows us that it was owing to the prospect of the greater evil that he readily believed the existence of the lighter ones; and so far indeed was he from believing, in respect of evils [of such a kind], that heresies were good, that his object was to forewarn us that we ought not to be surprised at temptations of even a worse stamp, since (he said) they tended "to make manifest all such as were approved;"[3] in other words, those whom they were unable to pervert.[4] In short, since the whole passage[5] points to the maintenance of unity and the checking of divisions, inasmuch as heresies sever men from unity no less than schisms and dissensions, no doubt he classes heresies under the same head of censure as he does schisms also and dissensions. And by so doing, he makes those to be "not approved," who have fallen into heresies; more especially when with reproofs he exhorts[6] men to turn away from such, teaching them that they should "all speak and think the selfsame thing,"[7] the very object which heresies do not permit.

[1] [1 Thess. v. 21.] [2] [1 Cor. xi. 19.] [3] [1 Cor. xi. 18.]
[4] Depravare. [5] Capitulum. [6] Objurget. [7] [1 Cor. i. 10.]

CHAP. VI.—*St. Paul on heresy and the treatment of heretics: why these are self-condemned. In heresy is self-will; whilst faith is submission of our will to the divine authority. The heresy of Apelles.*

On this point, however, we dwell no longer, since it is the same [St.] Paul who, in his Epistle to the Galatians, counts "heresies" among "the sins of the flesh,"[1] who also intimates to Titus, that "a man who is a heretic" must be "rejected after the first admonition," on the ground that "he that is such is perverted, and committeth sin, as a self-condemned man."[2] Indeed, in almost every epistle, when enjoining on us [the duty] of avoiding false doctrines, he sharply condemns[3] heresies. Of these the practical effects[4] are false doctrines, called in Greek "*heresies*,"[5] a word used in the sense of that *choice* which a man makes when he either teaches them [to others],[6] or takes up with them [for himself].[7] For this reason it is that he calls the heretic "self-condemned," because he has himself chosen that for which he is condemned. We, however, are not permitted to cherish any object[8] after our own will, nor yet to make choice of that which another has introduced of his private fancy. In the Lord's apostles we possess our authority; for even they did not of themselves choose to introduce anything, but faithfully delivered to the nations [of mankind] the doctrine[9] which they had received from Christ. If, therefore, even "an angel from heaven should preach any other gospel" [than theirs], he would be called accursed[10] by us. The Holy Ghost had even then foreseen that there would be in a certain virgin [called] Philumene[11] an angel

[1] [Gal. v. 20.] [2] [Tit. iii. 10, 11.] [3] Taxat.
[4] Opera. [5] [Αἱρέσεις.] [6] Instituendas.
[7] Suscipiendas. [8] Nihil [any *doctrine*].
[9] Disciplinam [including both the principles and practice of the Christian religion]. [10] Anathema. [See Gal. i. 8.]
[11] [Concerning Philumene, see below, chap. xxv.; Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* v. 13; Augustine, *de Hæres.* chap. xlii.; Jerome, *Epist. adv. Ctesiph.* (*Works*, ed. Ben.) iv. 477, and in his Commentary on Galatians, ii. See also Tertullian, *Against Marcion* (Clark's transl.), p. 139.]

of deceit, "transformed into an angel of light,"[1] by whose miracles and illusions[2] Apelles was led [when] he introduced his new heresy.

CHAP. VII.—*Pagan philosophy the parent of heresies. The connection sketched between the deflections from the Christian faith of sundry heretics and the old systems of pagan philosophy. Tertullian repudiates all such perversions of truth with indignation.*

These are "the doctrines" of men and "of demons,"[3] produced for itching ears of the spirit of this world's wisdom: this the Lord called "foolishness,"[4] and "chose the foolish things of the world" to confound even philosophy itself. For [philosophy] it is which is the material of the world's wisdom, the rash interpreter of the nature and the dispensation of God. Indeed[5] heresies are themselves instigated[6] by philosophy. From this source came the Æons, and I know not what infinite forms,[7] and the trinity of man[8] in the system of Valentinus, who was of Plato's school. From the same source came Marcion's better god, with all his tranquillity; he came of the Stoics. Then, again, the opinion that the soul dies is held by the Epicureans; while the denial of the restoration of the body is taken from the aggregate school of all the philosophers; also, when matter is made equal to God, then you have the teaching of Zeno; and when any doctrine is alleged touching a god of fire, then Heraclitus comes in. The same subject-matter is discussed over and over again[9] by the heretics and the philosophers; the same arguments[10] are involved. Whence comes evil? Why is it permitted? What is the origin of man? and in what way does he come? Besides the question which Valentinus has very lately proposed—Whence comes God? Which

[1] [2 Cor. xi. 14.] [2] Præstigiis. [3] [1 Tim. iv. 1.]
[4] [1 Cor. iii. 18 and 25.] [5] Denique. [6] Subornantur.
[7] Formæ. ["*Ideæ*" (Oehler).]
[8] [See Tertullian's treatises, *adversus Valentinum*, xxvi., and *de Anima*, xxi.; also Epiphanius, *Hær.* xxxi. 23.]
[9] Volutatur. [10] Retractatus.

he settles with the answer: From *enthymesis* and *ectroma!*[1] Unhappy Aristotle! who invented for these men dialectics, the art of building up and pulling down; an art so evasive in its propositions,[2] so far-fetched in its conjectures, so harsh in its arguments, so productive of contentions—embarrassing[3] even to itself, retracting everything, and really treating of[4] nothing! Whence spring those "fables and endless genealogies,"[5] and "unprofitable questions,"[6] and "words which spread like a cancer?"[7] From all these, when the apostle would restrain us, he expressly names *philosophy* as that which he would have us be on our guard against. Writing to the Colossians, he says, "See that no one beguile you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, and contrary to the wisdom of the Holy Ghost."[8] He had been at Athens, and had in his interviews [with its philosophers] become acquainted with that human wisdom which pretends to know the truth, whilst it only corrupts it, and is itself divided into its own manifold heresies, by the variety of its mutually repugnant sects. What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the Academy and the Church? what between heretics and Christians? Our instruction comes from "the porch of Solomon,"[9] who had himself taught that "the Lord should be sought in simplicity of heart."[10] Away with[11] all attempts to produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic composition! We want no curious disputation

[1] ["De enthymesi;" for this word Tertullian gives *animationem* (in his tract against Valentinus, ix.), which seems to mean, "the mind in operation." (See the same treatise, x. xi.) With regard to the other word, Jerome (on Amos iii.) adduces Valentinus as calling Christ ἔκτρωμα, that is, *abortion*.]

[2] Sententiis. [3] Molestam.

[4] Tractaverit [in the sense of *conclusively settling*].

[5] [1 Tim. i. 4.] [6] [Tit. iii. 9.] [7] [2 Tim. ii. 17.]

[8] [Col. ii. 8. The last clause, "præter providentiam Spiritus Sancti," is either Tertullian's reading, or his gloss of the apostle's οὐ κατὰ Χριστόν —"not after Christ."]

[9] [Because in the beginning of the church the apostles taught in Solomon's porch, Acts iii. 5.]

[10] [Wisdom of Solomon, i. 1.] [11] Viderint.

after possessing Christ Jesus, no inquisition after enjoying the gospel! With our faith, we desire no further belief. For this is our palmary faith, that there is nothing which we ought to believe besides.

CHAP. VIII.—*Christ's word, "Seek, and ye shall find," no warrant for heretical deviations from the faith. All Christ's words are for us, although at first addressed to Jews; not indeed specific commands meant for us, but rather principles to be applied by us.*

I come now to the point which [is urged both by our own brethren and by the heretics]. Our brethren adduce [it] as a pretext for entering on curious inquiries,[1] and the heretics insist on it for importing the scrupulosity [of their unbelief].[2] It is written, they say, "Seek, and ye shall find."[3] Let us remember at what time the Lord said this. I think it was at the very outset of His teaching, when there was still a doubt felt by all whether He were the Christ, and when even Peter had not yet declared Him to be the Son of God, and John [Baptist] had actually ceased to feel assurance about Him.[4] With good reason, therefore, was it then said, "Seek, and ye shall find," when inquiry was still to be made of Him who was not yet become known. Besides, this [was said] in respect of the Jews. For it is to them that the whole matter[5] of this reproof[6] pertains, seeing that they had [a revelation] where they might seek Christ. "They have," says He, "Moses and Elias,"[7]—in other words, the law and the prophets,—which preach Christ; as also in another place He says plainly, "Search the Scriptures, in which ye expect [to find] salvation; for they testify of me;"[8] —which will be the meaning of "Seek, and ye shall find." For it is clear that the next words also apply to the Jews:

[1] Curiositatem.
[2] Scrupulositatem ["hair-splitting"].
[3] [Matt. vii. 7.]
[4] [See our translation of the *Anti-Marcion*, iv. 18 (p. 248), and Tertullian's treatise, *de Bapt.* x.]
[5] Sermo.
[6] Suggillationis.
[7] [Luke xvi. 29.]
[8] [John v. 39.]

"Knock, and it shall be opened unto you."[1] The Jews had formerly been in covenant with[2] God; but being afterwards cast off on account of their sins, they began to be[3] without God. The Gentiles, on the contrary, had never been in covenant with God; they were only as "a drop from a bucket," and "as dust from the threshing-floor,"[4] and were ever outside the door. Now, how shall he who was always outside knock at the place where he never was? What door does he know of, when he has passed through none, either by entrance or ejection? Is it not rather he who is aware that he once lived within and was thrust out, that [probably] found the door and knocked thereat? In like manner, "Ask, and ye shall receive,"[5] is suitably said[6] to one who was aware from whom he ought to ask,—by whom also some promise had been given; that is to say, "the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob." Now, the Gentiles knew nothing either of Him, or of any of His promises. Therefore it was to Israel that he spake when He said, "I am not sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel."[7] Not yet had He "cast to the dogs the children's bread;"[8] not yet did He charge them to "go into the way of the Gentiles."[9] It is only at the last that He instructs them to "go and teach all nations, and baptize them,"[10] when they were so soon to receive "the Holy Ghost, the Comforter, who should guide them into all the truth."[11] And this, too, makes towards the same conclusion. If the apostles, who were ordained[12] to be teachers to the Gentiles, were themselves to have the Comforter for their teacher, far more needless[13] was it to say to us, "Seek, and ye shall find," to whom was to come, without research,[14] our instruction[15] by the apostles, and to the apostles themselves by the Holy Ghost. All the Lord's sayings, indeed, are set forth for all men;

[1] [Matt. vii. 7.] [2] Penes.
[3] [Or, "were for the first time."] [4] [Isa. xl. 15.]
[5] [Matt. vii. 7.] [6] Competit. [7] [Matt. xv. 24.]
[8] [Ver. 26.] [9] [Matt. x. 5.] [10] [Matt. xxviii. 19.]
[11] [John xvi. 13.] [12] Destinati.
[13] Multo magis vacabat. [14] Ultro. [15] Doctrina.

through the ears of the Jews have they passed on to us. Still most of them were addressed to [Jewish] persons;[1] they therefore did not constitute instruction properly designed[2] for ourselves, but [rather] an example.[3]

CHAP. IX.—*The research which Christ enjoins on us is after definite truth. When we have discovered this, we should be content to rest in it.*

I now purposely[4] relinquish this ground of argument. Let it be granted, that the words, "Seek, and ye shall find," were addressed to all men [equally]. Yet even here one's aim is[5] carefully to determine[6] the sense of the words[7] consistently with[8] [that reason],[9] which is the guiding principle[10] in all interpretation. [Now] no divine saying is so unconnected[11] and diffuse, that its *words* only are to be insisted on, and their *connection* left undetermined. But at the outset I lay down [this position], that there is some one, and therefore definite, thing taught by Christ, which the Gentiles are by all means bound to believe, and for that purpose to "seek," in order that they may be able, when they have "found" it, to believe. However,[12] there can be no indefinite seeking for that which has been taught as one only definite thing. You must "seek" until you "find," and believe when you have found; nor have you anything further to do but to keep what you have believed, provided you believe this besides, that nothing else is to be believed, and therefore nothing else is to be sought, after you have found and believed what has been taught by Him who charges you to seek no other thing than that which He has

[1] In personas [*Judæorum* (Oehler).]

[2] Proprietatem admonitionis.

[3] ["That is, not a specific command" primarily meant for us, "but a principle" to be applied by us (Dodgson).]

[4] Sponte. [5] Expetit. [6] Certare.

[7] Sensus. [8] Cum. [9] [See Oehler's note.]

[10] Gubernaculo. [See Irenæus, ii. 46, for a similar view (Rigalt.). Surely Dodgson's version, if intelligible in itself even, incorrectly represents Tertullian's sense.]

[11] Dissoluta. [12] Porro.

taught. When, indeed, any man doubts about this, proof will be forthcoming,[1] that we have in our possession[2] that which was taught by Christ. Meanwhile, such is my confidence in our proof, that I anticipate it, in the shape of an admonition to certain persons, not "to seek" anything beyond what they have believed—that this is what they ought to have sought, how to avoid[3] interpreting, "Seek, and ye shall find," without regard to the rule of reason.

CHAP. X.—*One has succeeded in finding definite truth, when he believes. We are not to be always seeking, because heretical wits are always offering many things for vain discussion.*

Now the reason of this saying is comprised in three points: in the matter, in the time, in the limit.[4] In the matter, so that you must consider *what it is* you have to seek; in the time, *when* you have to seek; in the limit, *how long*. What you have "to seek," then, is that which Christ has taught;[5] [and you must go on seeking] of course for such time as you fail to find,[6]—until indeed you find[7] it. But you have succeeded in finding[8] when you have believed. For you would not have believed if you had not found; as neither would you have sought except with a view to find. Your object, therefore, in seeking [was] to find; and your object in finding [was] to believe. All further delay for seeking and finding you have prevented[9] by believing. The very fruit of your seeking has determined for you this limit. This boundary[10] has He set for you Himself, who is unwilling that you should believe anything else than what He has taught, or, therefore, even seek for it. If, however, because so many other things have been taught by one and another, we are on that account bound to go on seeking, so long as we are able to find anything, we must [at that rate] be ever seeking, and never believe anything at all. For where shall be the

[1] Constabit.
[2] Penes nos.
[3] Ne.
[4] In modo.
[5] [This is "*the matter*."]
[6] ["The time."]
[7] ["The limit."]
[8] Invenisti.
[9] Fixisti ["determined"].
[10] Fossam.

end of seeking? where the stop[1] in believing? where the completion in finding? [Shall it be] with Marcion? But even Valentinus proposes [to us the maxim], "Seek, and ye shall find." [Then shall it be] with Valentinus? Well, but Apelles, too, will assail me with the same quotation; Hebion also, and Simon, and all in turn, have no other argument wherewithal to entice me, and draw me over to their side. Thus I shall be nowhere, and still be encountering[2] [that challenge], "Seek, and ye shall find," precisely as if I had no resting-place;[3] as if [indeed] I had never found that which Christ has taught—that which ought[4] to be sought, that which must needs[5] be believed.

CHAP. XI.—*After we have believed, search should cease; otherwise it must be endless, or rather must end in a denial of what we have believed, for there is no other object proposed for our faith. Tertullian emphatically disclaims all restless and empty seeking.*

There is impunity in erring, if there is no delinquency; although indeed to err is itself an act of delinquency.[6] With impunity, I repeat, does a man ramble,[7] when he [purposely] deserts nothing. But yet, if I have believed what I was bound to believe, and then afterwards think that there is something new to be sought after, I of course expect that there is something else to be found, although I should by no means entertain such expectation, unless it were because I

[1] Statio ["resting-place"]. [2] Dum convenero.

[3] [This is the rendering of Oehler's text, "et velut si nusquam." There are other readings of this obscure passage, of which we add the two most intelligible. The *Codex Agobardinus* has, "et velim si nunquam;" that is, "and I would that I were nowhere," [with no fixed belief—in such wise as never to have had the truth; not, as must now be, to have forfeited it. (Dodgson).] This seems far-fetched, and inferior to the reading of Pamelius and his MSS.: "et velint me sic esse nusquam"—or (as Semler puts it) "velint sic nusquam;" *i.e.* "and they [the heretics] would wish me to be nowhere"—without the fixed faith of the Catholic. This makes good sense.]

[4] Oportet.

[5] Necesse est. [Observe these degrees of obligation.]

[6] Quamvis et errare delinquere est. [7] Vagatur.

either had not believed, although I apparently had become a believer, or else have ceased to believe. If I thus desert my faith, I am found to be a denier thereof. Once for all I would say, No man seeks, except him who either never possessed, or else has lost [what he sought]. The old woman [in the Gospel][1] had lost one of her ten pieces of silver, and therefore she sought it;[2] when, however, she found it, she ceased to look for it. The neighbour was without bread, and therefore he knocked; but as soon as the door was opened to him, and he received the bread, he discontinued knocking.[3] The widow kept asking to be heard by the judge, because she was not admitted; but when her suit was heard, thenceforth she was silent.[4] So that there is a limit both to seeking, and to knocking, and to asking. "For to every one that asketh," says He, "it shall be given, and to him that knocketh it shall be opened, and by him that seeketh it shall be found."[5] Away with the man[6] who is ever seeking because he never finds; for he seeks there where nothing can be found. Away with him who is always knocking because it will never be opened to him; for he knocks where there is none [to open]. Away with him who is always asking because he will never be heard; for he asks of one who does not hear.

CHAP. XII.—*There is, to be sure, a proper seeking after divine knowledge, which will never be out of place or excessive; but it is always within the Rule of Faith.*

As for us, although we must still seek, and *that* always, yet where ought our search to be made? Amongst the heretics, where all things are foreign[7] and opposed to our own verity, and to whom we are forbidden to draw near? What slave looks for food from a stranger, not to say an enemy of his master? What soldier expects to get bounty and pay from kings who are unallied, I might almost say hostile—unless forsooth he be a deserter, and a runaway,

[1] Anus illa. [2] [Luke xv. 8.] [3] [Luke xi. 5.]
[4] [Luke xviii. 2, 3.] [5] [Luke xi. 9.] [6] Viderit.
[7] Extranea.

and a rebel? Even that old woman[1] searched for the piece of silver within her own house. It was also at his neighbour's door that the persevering assailant kept knocking. Nor was it to a hostile judge, although a severe one, that the widow made her appeal. No man gets instruction[2] from that which tends to destruction.[3] No man receives illumination from a quarter where all is darkness. Let our "seeking," therefore, be in that which is our own, and from those who are our own, and concerning that which is our own,—that, and only that,[4] which can become an object of inquiry without impairing the rule of faith.

CHAP. XIII.—*Summary of the Creed, or Rule of Faith. No questions ever raised about it by believers, but only by the restless minds of heretics, to encourage and to perpetuate thought independent of Christ's teaching.*

Now, with regard to this rule of faith—that we may from this point[5] acknowledge what it is which we defend—it is, you must know, that which prescribes the belief that there is one only God, and that He is none other than the Creator of the world, who produced all things out of nothing through His own Word, first of all sent forth;[6] that this Word is called His Son, [and,] under the name of God, was seen "in divers manners" by the patriarchs, heard at all times in the prophets, at last brought down by the Spirit and Power of the Father into the Virgin Mary, was made flesh in her womb, and, being born of her, went forth as Jesus Christ; thenceforth He preached the new law and the new promise of the kingdom of heaven, worked miracles; having been crucified, He rose again the third day; [then] having ascended[7] into

[1] [Although Tertullian calls her "anus," St. Luke's word is γυνή, not γραῦς.]

[2] Instrui potest.

[3] Unde destruitur.

[4] Idque duntaxat.

[5] Jam hinc.

[6] Primo omnium demissum. [Literally, "sent down." See on this *procession of the Son of God* to create the world, Bishop Bull's *Defence of the Nicene Creed, etc.*, by the translator of this work, pp. 445 and following.]

[7] Ereptum [having been taken away].

the heavens, He sat at the right hand of the Father; sent instead of Himself[1] the Power of the Holy Ghost to lead such as believe; will come with glory to take the saints to the enjoyment of everlasting life and of the heavenly promises, and to condemn the wicked to everlasting fire, after the resurrection of both these classes shall have happened, together with the restoration of their flesh. This rule, as it will be proved, was taught by Christ, and raises amongst ourselves no other questions than those which heresies introduce, and which make men heretics.

CHAP. XIV.—*We should be content with the Rule of Faith. Curiosity ought not to range beyond it. Such restless curiosity, the feature of heresy, is never gratified; nor in fact does it ever get definite knowledge wherein to rest.*

So long, however, as its form exists in its proper order, you may seek and discuss as much as you please, and give full rein to[2] your curiosity, in whatever seems to you to hang in doubt, or to be shrouded in obscurity. You have at hand, no doubt, some learned[3] brother gifted with the grace of knowledge, some one of the experienced class, some one of your close acquaintance who is curious like yourself; although with yourself, a seeker, he will, after all,[4] be quite aware[5] that it is better for you to remain in ignorance, lest you should come to know what you ought not, because you have acquired the knowledge of what you ought to know.[6]

[1] Vicariam.

[2] Omnem libidinem effundas ["pour out the whole desire for"].

[3] Doctor [literally, "teacher." See Eph. iv. 11; also above, chap. iii.].

[4] [This seems to be the more probable meaning of *novissime* in this rather obscure sentence. Oehler treats it adverbially as "postremo," and refers to a similar use of the word below in chap. xxx. Dr. Routh (and, after him, the translator in *The Library of the Fathers* [Tertullian, p. 448]) makes the word a noun, "thou newest of novices," and refers to Tertullian's work, *against Praxeas*, chap. xxvii., for a like use. This seems to us too harsh for the present context.]

[5] Sciet.

[6] [See 1 Cor. xii. 8.]

"Thy faith," He says, "hath saved thee"[1]—not [observe] your skill[2] in the Scriptures. Now, faith has been deposited in the rule; it has a law, and (in the observance thereof) salvation. Skill,[2] however, consists in curious art, having for its glory simply the readiness that comes from knack.[3] Let such curious art give place to faith; let such glory yield to salvation. At any rate, let them either relinquish their noisiness,[4] or else be quiet. To know nothing in opposition to the rule [of faith], is to know all things. [Suppose] that heretics were not enemies to the truth, [suppose] that we were not forewarned to avoid them, [yet] what sort of conduct would it be to agree with men who do themselves confess that they are still seeking? For if they are still seeking, they have not as yet [of course] found anything amounting to certainty; and therefore, whatever they seem for a while[5] to hold, they betray their own scepticism,[6] whilst they continue seeking. You, therefore, who seek after their fashion, looking to those who are themselves ever seeking, a doubter to doubters, a waverer to waverers, must needs be "led, blindly by the blind, down into the ditch."[7] But when, for the sake of deceiving us, they pretend that they are still seeking, in order that they may palm[8] their essays[9] upon us by the suggestion of an anxious sympathy,[10]—when, in short (after gaining an access to us), they proceed at once to insist on the necessity of our inquiring into such points as they were in the habit of advancing, then it is high time for us in moral obligation[11] to repel[12] them, so that they may know that it is not Christ, but themselves, whom we disavow. For since they are still seekers, they have no fixed tenets yet;[13] and being not fixed in tenet, they have not yet believed; and being not yet believers, they are not Christians. But even though they have their tenets and their belief, they still say that inquiry is necessary in order to

[1] [Luke xviii. 42.] [2] Exercitatio. [3] De peritiæ studio.
[4] Non obstrepant. [5] Interim. [6] Dubitationem.
[7] [Matt. xv. 14.] [8] Insinuent. [9] Tractatus.
[10] [Or, "by instilling an anxiety into us" (Dodgson).]
[11] Jam debemus. [12] Refutare. [13] Nondum tenent.

discussion.[1] Previous, however, to the discussion, they deny what they confess not yet to have believed, so long as they keep it an object of inquiry. When men, therefore, are not Christians even on their own admission,[2] how much more [do they fail to appear such] to us! What sort of truth is that which they patronize,[3] when they commend it to us with a lie? Well, but they actually[4] treat of the Scriptures, and recommend [their opinions] out of the Scriptures! To be sure they do.[5] From what other source could they derive arguments concerning the things of the faith, except from the records of the faith?

CHAP. XV.—*Heretics not to be allowed to argue out of the Scriptures. The Scriptures, in fact, do not belong to them.*

We are therefore come to [the gist of] our position; for at this point we were aiming, and for this we were preparing in the preamble of our address [which we have just completed],—so that we may now join issue on the contention to which our adversaries challenge us. They put forward[6] the Scriptures, and by this insolence[7] of theirs they at once influence some. In the encounter itself, however, they weary the strong, they catch the weak, and dismiss waverers with a doubt. Accordingly, we oppose to them this step above all others, of not admitting them to any discussion of the Scriptures.[8] If in these lie their resources, before they can use them, it ought to be clearly seen to whom belongs the possession of the Scriptures, that none may be admitted to the use thereof who has no title at all to the privilege.

CHAP. XVI.—*Apostolic sanction to this exclusion of heretics from the use of the Scriptures. Heretics, according to the apostle, are not to be disputed with by believers, as on equal terms, but to be admonished.*

I might be thought to have laid down this position to

[1] Ut defendant. [2] Nec sibi sunt. [3] Patrocinantur. [4] Ipsi.
[5] Scilicet. [6] Obtendunt. [7] Audacia.
[8] De Scripturis. [But as this preposition is often the sign of the

remedy distrust in my cause,[1] or from a desire of entering on the contest[2] in some other way, were there not reasons on my side, especially this, that our faith owes deference[3] to the apostle, who forbids us to enter on "questions," [or] to lend our ears to new-fangled statements,[4] [or] to consort with a heretic "after the first and second admonition,"[5] not, [be it observed,] after discussion. [For] discussion he has inhibited in this way, by designating "*admonition*" as the purpose of dealing with a heretic, and the "first" one too, because he is not a Christian; in order that he might not, after the manner of a Christian, seem to require correction again and again, and "before two or three witnesses,"[6] seeing that he ought to be corrected, for the very reason that he is not to be disputed with; and in the next place, because a controversy over the Scriptures can, clearly,[7] produce no other effect than help to upset either the stomach or the brain.

CHAP. XVII.—*Heretics, in fact, do not use, but only abuse, Scripture, which they either mutilate or distort. Uselessness of discussion with heretics: there is no common ground between them and you.*

Now this heresy of yours[8] does not receive certain Scriptures; and whichever of them it does receive, it perverts by means of additions and diminutions, for the accomplishment of its own purpose; and such as it does receive, it receives not in their entirety; but even when it does receive any up to a certain point[9] as entire, it nevertheless perverts even these by the contrivance of diverse interpretations. Truth is just as much opposed by an adulteration of its meaning as it is by a corruption of its text.[10] Their vain presumptions must needs refuse to acknowledge the [writings] whereby

instrument in Tertullian, this phrase may mean "*out of*" or "*by means of* the Scriptures." (See the last chapter).]

[1] De consilio diffidentiæ.

[2] Constitutionis ["prima causarum conflictio,"—a term of the law courts].

[3] Obsequium. [4] [1 Tim. vi. 3, 4.] [5] [Tit. iii. 10.]

[6] [Matt. xviii. 16.] [7] Plane [ironical]. [8] Ista hæresis.

[9] Aliquatenus. [10] Stilus.

they are refuted. They rely on those which they have falsely put together, and which they have selected, because of[1] their ambiguity. Though most skilled[2] in the Scriptures, you will make no progress,[3] when everything which you maintain is denied on the other side, and whatever you deny is [by them] maintained. As for yourself, indeed, you will lose nothing but your breath, [and] gain nothing but vexation from their blasphemy.

CHAP. XVIII.—*Great evil ensues to the weak in faith from any discussion out of the Scriptures; nor does conviction ever come to the heretic from such a process.*

But with respect to the man for whose sake you enter on the discussion of the Scriptures,[4] with the view of strengthening him when afflicted with doubts, [let me ask], will it be to the truth, or rather to heretical opinions that he will lean? Influenced by the very fact that he sees you have made no progress, whilst the other side is on an equal footing[5] [with yourself] in denying and in defence, or at any rate on a like standing,[6] he will go away confirmed in his uncertainty[7] by the discussion, not knowing which side to adjudge heretical. For, no doubt, they too are able[8] to retort these things on us. It is indeed a necessary consequence that they should go so far as to say that adulterations of the Scriptures, and false expositions thereof, are rather introduced by ourselves, inasmuch as they, no less than we,[9] maintain that truth is on their side.

CHAP. XIX.—*Appeal, in discussion of heresy, lies not to the Scriptures. The Scriptures in fact belong only to those who believe, or have the Rule of Faith.*

Our appeal, therefore, must not be made to the Scriptures; nor must controversy be admitted on points in which victory will either be impossible,[10] or uncertain, or not certain

[1] ["De" has often the sense of "propter" in our author.]
[2] [Literally, "O most skilled."]
[3] Quid promovebis.
[4] [Or, "from the Scriptures."]
[5] Æquo gradu.
[6] Statu certe pari.
[7] Incertior.
[8] Habent.
[9] Proinde.
[10] Nulla.

enough.[1] But even if a discussion from the Scriptures[2] should not turn out in such a way as to place both sides on a par, [yet] the natural order of things would require that this point should be first proposed, which is now the only one which we must discuss: "With whom lies that very faith to which the Scriptures belong?[3] From what [original Giver], and through whom, and when, and to whom, has been handed down that rule,[4] by which men become Christians?" For wherever it shall be manifest that the true Christian rule and faith shall be, *there* will likewise be the true Scriptures and expositions thereof, and [indeed] all the Christian traditions.

CHAP. XX.—*Christ first delivered the faith. The apostles spread it; they founded churches as the depositories thereof. The faith, therefore, is only shown to be apostolic, which descended from the apostles, through apostolic churches.*

Christ Jesus our Lord (may He bear with me a moment in thus expressing myself!), whosoever He is, of what God soever He is the Son, of what substance soever He is man and God, of what faith soever He is the teacher, of what reward soever He is the Promiser, did, whilst He lived on earth, Himself declare what He was, what He had been, what the Father's will was which He was administering, what the duty of man was which He was prescribing; [and this declaration He made,] either openly to the people, or privately to His disciples, of whom He had chosen the twelve chief ones to be at His side,[5] and whom He destined to be the teachers of the nations. Accordingly, after one of these had been struck off, He commanded the eleven others, on His departure to the Father, to "go and teach [all] nations, who were to be baptized into the Father, and into the Son,

[1] Parum certa.

[2] Conlatio scripturarum [or, "a polemical comparison of the Scriptures"].

[3] Quibus competat fides ipsa cujus sint Scripturæ.

[4] Disciplina.

[5] [Mark iv. 34.]

and into the Holy Ghost."[1] Immediately, therefore, did the apostles, whom this designation indicates as "*the sent*," [proceed to execute their mission]. Having, on the authority of a prophecy, which occurs in a psalm of David,[2] chosen Matthias by lot as the twelfth, into the place of Judas, they obtained the promised power of the Holy Ghost for the gift of miracles and of utterance; and after first bearing witness to the faith in Jesus Christ throughout Judæa, and founding churches [there], they next went forth into the world and preached the same doctrine of the same faith to the nations [thereof]. They then in like manner founded churches in every city, from which all the other churches, one after another, derived the tradition of the faith,[3] and the seeds of doctrine, and are every day deriving them,[4] that they may become churches. Indeed, it is on this account only that they will be able to deem themselves apostolic, as being the offspring of apostolic churches. Every sort of thing[5] must necessarily revert to its original for its classification.[6] Therefore the churches, although they are so many and so great, comprise but the one primitive church, [founded] by the apostles, from which they all [spring]. In this way all are primitive, and all are apostolic, whilst they are all proved to be one, in [unbroken] unity, by their peaceful communion,[7] and title of brotherhood, and bond[8] of hospitality,—privileges[9] which no other rule directs than the one tradition of the selfsame mystery.[10]

CHAP. XXI.—*All doctrine true which comes through the church from the apostles, who were taught by God through Christ. All opinion which has no such divine origin and apostolic tradition to show, is prejudged* IPSO FACTO *to be false.*

From this, therefore, do we draw up our rule. Since the Lord Jesus Christ sent the apostles to preach, [we prescribe]

[1] [Matt. xxviii. 19.]
[2] [Ps. cix. 8; comp. with Acts i. 15–20.]
[3] Traducem fidei.
[4] Mutuantur ["borrowing"].
[5] Omne genus.
[6] Censeatur [or, "for its origin"].
[7] Communicatio pacis.
[8] Contesseratio.
[9] Jura ["rights"].
[10] [That is, of the faith, or Christian creed.]

that no others ought to be received as preachers than those whom Christ appointed; for "no man knoweth the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal Him."[1] Nor does the Son seem to have revealed Him to any other than the apostles, whom He sent forth to preach—that, of course, which He revealed to them. Now, what that was which they preached — in other words, what it was which Christ revealed to them—can, as I must here likewise prescribe, properly be proved in no other way than by those very churches which the apostles founded in person, by declaring the gospel to them directly themselves, both *vivâ voce*, as the phrase is, and subsequently by their epistles. If, then, these things are so, it is in the same degree[2] manifest that all doctrine which agrees with the apostolic churches—those wombs[3] and original sources of the faith—must be reckoned for truth, as undoubtedly containing that which the [said] churches received from the apostles, the apostles from Christ, [and] Christ from God; whereas all doctrine must be prejudged[4] as false[5] which savours of contrariety to the truth of the churches and apostles of Christ and God. It remains, then, that we demonstrate whether this doctrine of ours, of which we have now given the rule, has its origin[6] in the tradition of the apostles, and whether all other [doctrines] do not *ipso facto*[7] proceed from falsehood. We hold communion with the apostolic churches because our doctrine is in no respect different [from theirs]. This is [our] witness of truth.

CHAP. XXII.—*Attempt to invalidate this Rule of Faith rebutted. The apostles were safe transmitters of the truth. They were sufficiently taught it at first, and they were faithful and honest in the transmission.*

But inasmuch as the proof is so near at hand,[8] that if it were at once produced there would be nothing left to be dealt with, let us give way for a while to the opposite side, if they think that they can find some means of invalidating

[1] [Matt. xi. 27.] [2] Perinde. [3] Matricibus.
[4] Præjudicandam. [5] De mendacio. [6] Censeatur.
[7] Ex hoc ipso ["from this very circumstance"]. [8] Expedita.

this rule, just as if no proof were forthcoming from us. They usually tell us that the apostles did not know all things. [Herein] they are impelled by the same madness, whereby they turn round to the very opposite point,[1] and declare that the apostles certainly knew all things, but did not deliver all things to all persons,—in either case exposing Christ to blame for having sent forth apostles who had either too much ignorance, or too little simplicity. What man, then, of sound mind can possibly suppose that they were ignorant of anything, whom the Lord ordained to be masters [or teachers],[2] keeping them, as He did, inseparable [from Himself] in their attendance, in their discipleship, in their society, to whom, "when they were alone, He used to expound" all things[3] which were obscure, telling them that "to them it was given to know those mysteries"[4] which it was not permitted the people to understand. Was anything withheld from the knowledge of Peter, who is called "the rock on which the church should be built,"[5] who also obtained "the keys of the kingdom of heaven,"[6] with the power of "loosing and binding in heaven and on earth?"[7] Was anything, again, concealed from John, the Lord's most beloved disciple, who used to lean on His breast,[8] to whom alone the Lord pointed Judas out as the traitor,[9] [and] whom He commended to Mary as a son in His own stead?[10] Of what could He have meant those to be ignorant, to whom He even exhibited His own glory with Moses and Elias, and the Father's voice, moreover, from heaven?[11] Not as if He thus disapproved[12] of all the rest, but because "by three witnesses must every word be established."[13] After the same fashion[14] they too, [I suppose,] were ignorant to whom, after His resurrection also, He vouchsafed, as they were journeying together, "to expound all the Scriptures."[15] No doubt[16] He had once said,

[1] Susum rursus convertunt.
[2] Magistros.
[3] [Mark iv. 34.]
[4] [Matt. xiii. 11.]
[5] [Matt. xvi. 18.]
[6] [Ver. 19.]
[7] [Ver. 19.]
[8] [John xxi. 20.]
[9] [John xiii. 25.]
[10] [John xix. 26.]
[11] [Matt. xvii. 1–8.]
[12] Reprobans.
[13] [Deut. xix. 15, and 2 Cor. xiii. 1.]
[14] Itaque [ironical].
[15] Luke xxiv. 27.]
[16] Plane.

"I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot hear them now;" but even then He added, "When He, the Spirit of truth, shall come, He will lead you into all truth."[1] He [thus] shows that there was nothing of which they were ignorant, to whom He had promised the future attainment of all truth by help of the Spirit of truth. And assuredly He fulfilled His promise, since it is proved in the Acts of the Apostles that the Holy Ghost did come down. Now they who reject that [book of] Scripture[2] can neither belong to the Holy Spirit, seeing that they cannot acknowledge that the Holy Ghost has been sent as yet to the disciples, nor can they pretend to claim to be a church themselves[3] who positively have no means of proving when, and with what infant-nursing,[4] this body was established. Of so much importance is it to them not to have any proofs for the things which they maintain, lest along with them there be introduced damaging exposures[5] of those things which they mendaciously devise.

CHAP. XXIII.—*The apostles were not ignorant. The heretical pretence of St. Peter's imperfection as an apostolic medium, because he was rebuked by St. Paul. Explanation of this case. St. Peter was not rebuked for error in teaching.*

Now, with the view of branding[6] the apostles with some mark of ignorance, they put forth the case of Peter and them that were with him having been rebuked by Paul. "Something therefore," they say, "was wanting in them." [And this they allege,] in order that they may from this construct that other position of theirs, that a fuller knowledge may possibly have afterwards come over [the apostles], such as fell to the share of Paul when he rebuked those who preceded him [in the apostleship]. I may here say to those who

[1] [John xvi. 12, 13.]

[2] [See Tertullian's *Anti-Marcion*, iv. 5, and v. 2 (*Trans.* pp. 187 and 377).]

[3] Nec ecclesiam se dicant defendere.

[4] Incunabulis ["swaddling-clothes].

[5] Traductiones.

[6] Suggillandam.

reject *The Acts of the Apostles:* "It is first necessary that you show us who this Paul was,—both what he was before he was an apostle, and how he became an apostle,"—so very great is the use which they make of him in respect of other questions also. It is true that he tells us himself that he was a persecutor before he became an apostle;[1] still this is not enough for any man who examines before he believes, since even the Lord Himself did not bear witness of Himself.[2] But let them believe without the Scriptures, if their object is to believe contrary to the Scriptures.[3] Still they should show, from the circumstance which they allege of Peter's being rebuked by Paul, that Paul added yet another form of the gospel besides that which Peter and the rest had previously set forth. But the fact is,[4] having been converted from a persecutor to a preacher [of the gospel], he is introduced as one of the brethren to brethren, by brethren—to them, indeed, by men who had put on faith from the apostles' hands. Afterwards, as he himself narrates, he "went up to Jerusalem for the purpose of seeing Peter,"[5] because of his office, no doubt,[6] and by right of a common belief and preaching. Now they certainly would not have been surprised at his having become a preacher instead of a persecutor, if his preaching were of something contrary; nor, moreover, would they have "glorified the Lord,"[7] because Paul had presented himself as an adversary to Him. They accordingly even gave him "the right hand of fellowship,"[8] as a sign of their agreement with him, and arranged amongst themselves a distribution of office, not a diversity of gospel, so that they should severally preach not a different gospel, but [the same], to different persons,[9]—Peter to the circumcision, Paul to the Gentiles. Forasmuch, then, as Peter was rebuked because, after he had lived with the Gentiles, he proceeded to separate himself from their company out of respect for persons, the fault surely was one of conversation, not of preaching.[10] For it does not appear

[1] [Gal. i. 13.] [2] [John v. 31.] [3] Ut credunt contra Scripturas.
[4] Atquin. [5] [Gal. i. 18.] [6] Scilicet. [7] [Gal. i. 24.]
[8] [Gal. ii. 9.] [9] [The same verse.]
[10] [Vers. 12, 13. See also *Anti-Marcion*, iv. 3 (*Trans.* p. 182).]

from this, that any other God than the Creator, or any other Christ than [the son] of Mary, or any other hope than the resurrection, was announced [by him].

CHAP. XXIV.—*St. Peter's further vindication. St. Paul was not at all superior to St. Peter in teaching. Nothing was imparted to the former in "the third heaven," to enable him to add to the faith,—however foolishly the heretics may boast of him, as if they had, forsooth, been favoured with some of the secrets imparted to him in paradise.*

I have not the good fortune,[1] or, as I must rather say,[2] I have not the unenviable task,[3] of setting apostles by the ears.[4] But, inasmuch as our very perverse cavillers obtrude the rebuke in question for the set purpose of bringing the earlier[5] doctrine into suspicion, I will put in a defence, as it were, for Peter, to the effect that even Paul said that he was "made all things to all men—to the Jews a Jew," to those who were not Jews, as one who was not a Jew—"that he might gain all."[6] Therefore it was according to times and persons and causes that they used to censure certain practices, which they would not hesitate themselves to pursue, in like conformity to times and persons and causes; just [for instance] as if Peter too had censured Paul, because, whilst forbidding circumcision, he actually circumcised Timothy himself. Never mind[7] those who pass sentence on apostles! It is a happy fact that Peter is on the same level with Paul in the very glory[8] of martyrdom. Now, although Paul was carried away even to the third heaven, and was caught up to paradise,[9] and heard certain revelations there, yet these [communications] cannot possibly seem to have qualified him for [teaching] another doctrine, seeing that their very nature was such as to render them communicable to no human being.[10] If, however, that unspeakable mystery[11] did leak

[1] Non mihi tam bene est. [2] Immo.
[3] Non mihi tam male est. [4] Ut committam.
[5] Superiorem ["that which Peter had preached"].
[6] [1 Cor. ix. 20, 22.] [7] Viderint. [8] Et in martyrio.
[9] [2 Cor. xii. 4.] [10] Nulli hominum. [11] Nescio quid illud.

out,[1] and become known to any man, and if any heresy affirms that it does itself follow the same, [then] either Paul must be charged with having betrayed the secret, or some other man must actually[2] be shown to have been afterwards "caught up into paradise," who had permission to speak out plainly what Paul was not allowed [even] to mutter.

CHAP. XXV.—*The apostles did not keep back any of the deposit of doctrine which Christ had entrusted to them. St. Paul openly committed his whole doctrine to Timothy.*

But there is, as we have said,[3] the same madness, in their allowing indeed that the apostles were ignorant of nothing, and preached not any [doctrines] which contradicted one another, but at the same time insisting that they did not reveal all [their doctrines] to all men, for that they proclaimed some openly and to all the world, whilst they disclosed others [only] in secret and to a few, because Paul addressed even this expression to Timothy: "O Timothy, guard that which is entrusted to thee;"[4] and again: "That good thing which was committed unto thee keep."[5] What is this deposit? Is it so secret as to be supposed to characterize[6] a new doctrine? or is it a part of that charge of which he says, "This charge I commit unto thee, son Timothy?"[7] and also of that precept of which he says, "I charge thee in the sight of God, who quickeneth all things, and before Jesus Christ, who witnessed a good confession under Pontius Pilate, that thou keep this commandment?"[8] Now, what is [this] commandment, and what is [this] charge? From the preceding and the succeeding contexts, it will be manifest that there is no mysterious[9] hint darkly suggested in this expression about [some] far-fetched[10] doctrine, but that a warning is rather given against receiving any other [doctrine] than that which [Timothy] had heard from [Paul] himself, and (as I take it) publicly: "Before many wit-

[1] Emanavit. [2] Et. [3] [Above, in chap. xxii.]
[4] [1 Tim. vi. 20.] [5] [2 Tim. i. 14.]
[6] Ut alterius doctrinæ deputetur. [7] [1 Tim. i. 18.]
[8] [1 Tim. vi. 13.] [9] Nescis quid. [10] Remotiore.

nesses" is his phrase.[1] Now, if they refuse to allow that the church is meant by these "many witnesses," it matters nothing, since nothing could have been secret which was produced "before many witnesses." Nor, again, must the circumstance of his having wished him to "commit these things to faithful men, who should be able to teach others also,"[2] be construed into a proof of there being some occult gospel. For, when he says "these things," he refers to the things of which he is writing at the moment. In reference, however, to occult subjects, he would have called them, as being absent, "*those things*," not "*these things*," to one who had a joint knowledge of them with himself.[3]

CHAP. XXVI.—*The apostles in fact did in all cases teach the whole truth to the whole church. There was no reservation, or partial communication to favourite friends.*

Besides which, it must have followed, that, for the man to whom he committed the ministration of the gospel, he would add the injunction that it be not ministered in all places,[4] and without respect to persons,[5] in accordance with the Lord's saying, "Not to cast one's pearls before swine, nor that which is holy unto dogs."[6] Openly did the Lord speak,[7] without any intimation of a hidden mystery. He had Himself commanded that, "whatsoever they had heard in darkness" and in secret, they should "declare in the light and on the house-tops."[8] He had Himself foreshown, by means of a parable, that they should not keep back in secret, fruitless of interest,[9] a single pound, that is, one word of His. He used Himself to tell them that a candle was not usually "pushed away under a bushel, but placed on a candlestick," in order to "give light to all who are in the house."[10] These things the apostles either neglected, or failed to understand, if they fulfilled them not, by concealing any portion of the light, that is, of the word of God and the mystery of Christ. Of

[1] [2 Tim. ii. 2.]
[2] [2 Tim. ii. 2.]
[3] Apud conscientiam.
[4] Passim.
[5] Inconsiderate.
[6] [Matt. vii. 6.]
[7] [John xviii. 20.]
[8] [Matt. x. 27.]
[9] [Luke xix. 20-24.]
[10] [Matt. v. 15.]

no man, I am quite sure, were they afraid,—neither of Jews nor of Gentiles in their violence;[1] with all the greater freedom, then, would they certainly preach in the church, who held not their tongue in synagogues and public places. Indeed they would have found it impossible either to convert Jews or to bring in Gentiles, unless they "set forth in order"[2] that which they would have them believe. Much less, when churches were advanced in the faith, would they have withdrawn from them anything for the purpose of committing it separately to some few others. Although, even supposing that among intimate friends,[3] so to speak, they did hold certain discussions, yet it is incredible that these could have been such as should bring in some other rule of faith, differing from and contrary to that which they were proclaiming through the catholic churches,[4]—as if they spoke of one God in the church, [and] another at home, and described one substance of Christ publicly, [and] another secretly, and announced one hope of the resurrection before all men, [and] another before the few; although they themselves, in their epistles, besought men that they would all speak one and the same thing, and that there should be no divisions and dissensions in the church,[5] seeing that they, whether Paul or others, preached the same things. Moreover, they remembered [the words]: "Let your communication be yea, yea; nay, nay; for whatsoever is more than this cometh of evil;"[6] so that they were not to handle the gospel in a diversity of treatment.

CHAP. XXVII.—*Well, granted that the apostles transmitted the whole doctrine of truth, may not the churches have been unfaithful or capricious on their part in handing it on? Inconceivable that this can have been the case, as the heretics are apt to object.*

Since, therefore, it is incredible that the apostles were

[1] [Literally, "the violence of neither Jew nor Gentile."]

[2] [Luke i. 1.]

[3] Domesticos.

[4] Catholice [or, "which they were bringing before the public in a catholic way"].

[5] [1 Cor. i. 10.]

[6] [Matt. v. 37.]

either ignorant of the whole scope of the message which they had to declare,[1] or failed to make known to all men the entire rule of faith, let us see whether, while the apostles proclaimed it, perhaps, simply and fully, the churches, through their own fault, set it forth otherwise than the apostles had done. All these suggestions of distrust[2] you may find put forward by the heretics. They bear in mind how the churches were rebuked by the apostle: "O foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched you?"[3] and, "Ye did run so well; who hath hindered you?"[4] and how the epistle actually begins: "I marvel that ye are so soon removed from Him, who hath called you as His own in grace, to another gospel."[5] That they likewise [remember], which was written to the Corinthians, that they "were yet carnal," who "required to be fed with milk," being as yet "unable to bear strong meat;"[6] who also "thought that they knew somewhat, whereas they knew not yet anything, as they ought to know."[7] When they raise the objection that the churches were rebuked, let them suppose that they were also corrected; let them also remember those [churches], concerning whose faith and knowledge and conversation the apostle "rejoices and gives thanks to God," which nevertheless, even at this day, unite with those which were rebuked in the privileges of one and the same institution.

CHAP. XXVIII.—*The one tradition of the faith, which is found substantially alike in the churches everywhere, a good proof that the transmission has been true and honest in the main.*

Grant, then, that all have erred; that the apostle was mistaken in giving his testimony; that the Holy Ghost had no such respect to any one [church] as to lead it into truth, although sent with this view by Christ,[8] and for this asked of the Father that He might be the teacher of truth;[9] [grant

[1] Plenitudinem prædicationis. [2] Scrupulositatis. [3] [Gal. iii. 1.]
[4] [Gal. v. 7.] [5] [Gal. i. 6.]
[6] [1 Cor. iii. 1, and foll.] [7] [1 Cor. viii. 2.] [8] [John xiv. 26.]
[9] [John xv. 26.]

also] that He, the Steward of God, the Vicar of Christ, neglected His office, permitting the churches for a time to understand differently, [and] to believe differently, what He Himself was preaching by the apostles,—is it likely that so many churches, and they so great, should have gone astray into one and the same faith? No casualty distributed among many men issues in one and the same result. Error of doctrine in the churches must necessarily have produced various issues. When, however, that which is deposited among many is found to be one and the same, it is not the result of error, but of tradition. Can any one, then, be reckless[1] enough to say that they were in error who handed on the tradition?

CHAP. XXIX.—*The truth not indebted to the care of the heretics; it had free course before they appeared.* PRIORITY *of the church's doctrine a mark of its truth.*

In whatever manner error came, it reigned of course[2] only as long as there was an absence of heresies. Truth had to wait for certain Marcionites and Valentinians to set it free. During the interval the gospel was wrongly[3] preached; men wrongly believed; so many thousand thousands were wrongly baptized; so many works of faith were wrongly wrought; so many miraculous gifts,[4] so many spiritual endowments,[5] were wrongly set in operation; so many priestly functions, so many ministries,[6] were wrongly executed; and, to sum up the whole, so many martyrs wrongly received their crowns! Else, if not wrongly done, and to no purpose, how comes it to pass that the things of God were on their course before it was known to what God they belonged? that there were Christians before Christ was found? that there were heresies before true doctrine? But [this is impossible]; for in all cases truth precedes its copy, the likeness succeeds the reality. Absurd enough, however, is it, that heresy should be deemed to have

[1] Audeat. [2] Utique [ironical]. [3] Perperam.
[4] Virtutes ["potestatem edendi miracula" (Oehler).]
[5] Charismata.
[6] Ministeria. [Another reading has *mysteria*, "mysteries" or "sacraments."]

preceded its own prior doctrine, even on this account, because it is that [doctrine] itself which foretold that there should be heresies against which men would have to guard! To a church which possessed this [true] doctrine, it was written—yea, the [true] doctrine itself writes to its own church—"Though an angel from heaven preach any other gospel than that which we have preached, let him be accursed."[1]

CHAP. XXX.—*Comparative* LATENESS *of heresies. Marcion's heresy. Some personal facts about him. The heresy of Apelles. Character of this man; Philumene; Valentinus; Nigidius, and Hermogenes.*

Where was Marcion *then*, that shipmaster of Pontus, the zealous student of Stoicism? Where was Valentinus *then*, the disciple of Platonism? For it is evident that those men lived not so long ago,—in the reign of Antoninus, for the most part,[2]—and that they at first were believers in the doctrine of the Catholic Church, in the Church of Rome under the episcopate of the blessed Eleutherus, until (on account of their ever restless curiosity, with which they even infected the brethren) they were more than once expelled,—Marcion, indeed, with the two hundred sesterces which he had brought into the church,[3]—and, when banished at last to a permanent excommunication, they scattered abroad the poisons of their doctrines. Marcion afterwards, indeed, professed repentance, and agreed to the conditions granted to him—that he should receive reconciliation if he restored to the church all the others whom he had been training for perdition: he was prevented, however, [from the completion of his recovery] by death. It was indeed[4] necessary that there should be heresies;[5] and yet it does not follow from that necessity, that heresies are a good thing. As if it has not been necessary also that there should be evil! It was even necessary that the Lord should be betrayed; but woe to the traitor![6] So that no man may from this [necessity] defend heresies. If

[1] [Gal. i. 8.] [2] Fere.
[3] [See *adv. Marcion*, iv. 4 (*Trans.* p. 184).]
[4] Enim [profecto (Oehler).] [5] [1 Cor. xi. 19.] [6] [Mark xiv. 21.]

we must likewise touch the descent[1] of Apelles, he is far from being "one of the old school,"[2] like his instructor and moulder, Marcion; he rather forsook the continence of Marcion, by resorting to the company of a woman, and withdrew to Alexandria, out of sight of his most abstemious[3] master. Returning therefrom, after some years, unimproved, except that he was no longer a Marcionite, he clave[4] to another woman, the maiden Philumene (whom we have already[5] mentioned), who herself afterwards became an enormous prostitute. Having been imposed on by her vigorous spirit,[6] he committed to writing "*the revelations*" which he had learned of her. Persons are still living who remember them, —their own actual disciples and successors,—who cannot therefore deny the lateness of their date. But, in fact, by their own works they are convicted, even as the Lord said.[7] For since Marcion separated the New Testament from the Old, he is [necessarily] subsequent to that which he separated, inasmuch as it was only in his power to separate what was [previously] united. Having then been united previous to its separation, the fact of its subsequent separation proves the subsequence also of the man who effected the separation. In like manner Valentinus, by his different expositions and acknowledged[8] emendations, makes these changes on the express ground of previous faultiness, and therefore demonstrates the difference[9] of the documents. These corrupters of the truth we mention as being more notorious and more public[10] than others. There is, however, a certain man[11]

[1] Stemma. [The reading of the *Cod. Agobard.* is "stigma," which gives very good sense.]

[2] Vetus.

[3] Sanctissimi. [This may be an *ironical* allusion to Marcion's repudiation of marriage.]

[4] Impegit. [5] [In chap. vi. above.]

[6] Energemate. [Oehler defines this word, "vis et efficacia dæmonum, quibus agebatur."]

[7] [Matt. vii. 16.] [8] [Sine dubio.]

[9] Alterius fuisse. [One reading is *anterius; i.e.* "demonstrates the *priority*" of the book he alters.]

[10] Frequentiores. [11] Nescio qui.

named Nigidius, and Hermogenes, and several others, who still pursue the course[1] of perverting the ways of the Lord. Let them show me by what authority they come! If it be some other God they preach, how comes it that they employ the things and the writings and the names of that God against whom they preach? If it be the same God, why treat Him in some other way? Let them prove themselves to be new apostles![2] Let them maintain that Christ has come down a second time, taught in person a second time, has been twice crucified, twice dead, twice raised! For thus has the [true] apostle described [the order of events in the life of Christ]; for thus, too, is He[3] accustomed to make His apostles—to give them, [that is], power besides of working the same miracles which He worked Himself.[4] I would therefore have their mighty deeds also brought forward; except that I allow their mightiest deed to be that by which they perversely vie with the [true] apostles. For whilst they used to raise men to life from the dead, these consign men to death from their living state.

CHAP. XXXI.—*Truth first, falsehood afterwards, as its perversion. Christ's parable shows this; which puts the sowing of the good seed before the adulteration thereof by the useless tares.*

Let me return, however, from this digression[5] to discuss[6] the priority of truth, and the comparative lateness[7] of falsehood, deriving support for my argument even from that parable which puts in the first place the sowing by the Lord of the good seed of the wheat, but introduces at a later stage the adulteration of the crop by His enemy the devil

[1] Ambulant. [2] [Compare *de Carne Christi*, chap. ii.]

[3] [Christ; so Routh.]

[4] [We add Oehler's reading of this obscure passage: "Sic enim apostolus descripsit, sic enim apostolos solet facere, dare præterea illis virtutem eadem signa edendi quæ et ipse."]

[5] Ab excessu.

[6] Disputandam. [Another reading has *deputandam*, *i.e.* "to attribute."]

[7] Posteritatem.

with the useless weed of the wild oats. For herein is figuratively described the difference of doctrines, since in other passages also the word of God is likened unto seed. From the actual order, therefore, it becomes clear, that that which was first delivered is of the Lord and is true, whilst that is strange and false which was afterwards introduced. This sentence will keep its ground in opposition to all later heresies, which have no consistent quality of kindred knowledge[1] inherent in them—to claim the truth as on their side.

CHAP. XXXII.—*None of the heretics claim succession from the apostles. New churches still apostolic, because their faith is that which the apostles taught and handed down. The heretics challenged to show any apostolic credentials.*

But if there be any [heresies] which are bold enough to plant themselves in the midst of the apostolic age, that they may thereby seem to have been handed down by the apostles, because they existed in the time of the apostles, we can say: Let them then produce the original records[2] of their churches; let them unfold the roll of their bishops, running down in due succession from the beginning in such a manner that their first distinguished[3] bishop shall be able to show for his ordainer and predecessor some one of the apostles or of apostolic men,—a man, moreover, who continued stedfast with the apostles. For this is the manner in which the apostolic churches transmit[4] their registers:[5] as the church of Smyrna, which records that Polycarp was placed therein by John; as also the church of Rome, which makes Clement to have been ordained in like manner by Peter. In exactly the same way the other churches likewise exhibit [their several worthies], whom, as having been appointed to their episcopal places by apostles, they regard as transmitters of the apostolic seed. Let the heretics con-

[1] Nulla constantia de conscientia ["no conscientious ground of confidence" (Dodgson).]

[2] Origines ["the originals" (Dodgson).]

[3] Ille. [A touch of irony occurs in the phrase "primus ille episcopus."]

[4] Deferunt.

[5] Fastos.

trive[1] something of the same kind. For after their blasphemy, what is there that is unlawful for them [to attempt]? But should they even effect the contrivance, they will not advance a step. For their very doctrine, after comparison with that of the apostles, will declare, by its own diversity and contrariety, that it had for its author neither an apostle nor an apostolic man; because, as the apostles would never have taught things which were self-contradictory, so the apostolic men would not have inculcated teaching different from the apostles, unless they who received their instruction from the apostles went and preached in a contrary manner. To this test, therefore, will they be submitted for proof[2] by those churches, who, although they derive not their founder from apostles or apostolic men (as being of much later date, for they are in fact being founded daily), yet, since they agree in the same faith, they are accounted as not less apostolic because they are akin in [apostolic] doctrine.[3] Then let all the heresies, when challenged by our church to these two[4] tests, offer their proof of how they deem themselves to be apostolic. But in truth they neither are so, nor are they able to prove themselves to be what they are not; nor are they admitted to peaceful relations and communion by such churches as are in any way connected with apostles, inasmuch as they are in no sense themselves apostolic because of their diversity as to the mysteries of the faith.[5]

CHAP. XXXIII.—*Present heresies already condemned in Scripture; being the seedlings of the tares which were noticed by the sacred writers. This descent of later heresy from the primitive is traced out briefly in several instances.*

Besides all this, I add a review of the doctrines themselves,

[1] Confingant.

[2] Probabuntur. [Another reading is *provocabuntur*, "will be challenged."]

[3] Pro consanguinitate doctrinæ

[4] [That is, the succession of bishops from the apostles, and the identity of doctrine with the apostolic.]

[5] Sacramenti.

which, existing as they did in the days of the apostles, were both exposed and denounced by the said apostles. For by this method they will be more easily reprobated,[1] when they are detected to have been even then in existence, or at any rate to have been seedlings[2] of the [tares] which then were. Paul, in his first epistle to the Corinthians, sets his mark on certain who denied and doubted the resurrection.[3] This opinion was the especial property of the Sadducees.[4] A part of it, however, is maintained by Marcion and Apelles and Valentinus, and all other impugners of the resurrection. Writing also to the Galatians, he inveighs against such men as observe and defend circumcision and the [Mosaic] law.[5] Thus runs Hebion's heresy. Such also as "forbid to marry" he reproaches in his instructions to Timothy.[6] Now, this is the [heretical] teaching of Marcion and his follower Apelles. [The apostle] directs a similar blow[7] against those who said that "the resurrection was past already."[8] Such an opinion did the Valentinians assert of themselves. When again he mentions "endless genealogies,"[9] one also recognises Valentinus, in whose system a certain Æon, whosoever he be,[10] of a new name, and that not one only, generates of his own grace[11] Sense and Truth; and these in like manner produce of themselves Word[12] and Life, while these again afterwards beget Man and the Church. From these primary eight[13] ten other Æons after them spring, and then the twelve others arise with their wonderful names, to complete the mere story of the thirty Æons. The same apostle, when disapproving of those who are "in bondage to elements,"[14] points us to some dogma of Hermogenes, who introduces matter as having no beginning,[15] and then compares it with God, who has no beginning.[16] By thus making the mother of the elements a goddess, he has it in his power "to be in bondage" to a

[1] Traducentur. [2] Semina sumpsisse. [3] [1 Cor. xv. 12.]
[4] [Comp. Tertull. *de Resur. Carnis*, xxxvi.] [5] [Gal. v. 2.]
[6] [1 Tim. iv. 3.] [7] Æque tangit. [8] [2 Tim. ii. 3.]
[9] [1 Tim. i. 4.] [10] Nescio qui. [11] Charite.
[12] Sermonem. [13] De qua prima ogdoade. [14] [Gal. iv. 9.]
[15] Non natam [literally, "as being unbegotten"]. [16] Deo non nato.

being which he puts on a par with[1] God. John, however, in the Apocalypse is charged to chastise those "who eat things sacrificed to idols," and "who commit fornication."[2] There are even now another sort of Nicolaitans. Theirs is called the Gaian[3] heresy. But in his epistle he especially designates those as "Antichrists" who "denied that Christ was come in the flesh,"[4] and who refused to think that Jesus was the Son of God. The one dogma Marcion maintained; the other, Hebion.[5] The doctrine, however, of Simon's sorcery, which inculcated the worship of angels,[6] was itself actually reckoned amongst idolatries and condemned by the Apostle Peter in Simon's own person.

CHAP. XXXIV.—*No early controversy respecting the Divine Creator; no second god introduced at first. Heresies alike condemned by the* SENTENCE *of Holy Scripture, and the* SILENCE *of it.*

These are, as I suppose, the different kinds of spurious doctrines, which (as we are informed by the apostles themselves) existed in their own day. And yet we find amongst so many various perversions of truth, not one school[7] which raised any controversy concerning God as the Creator of all things. No man was bold enough to surmise a second god. More readily was doubt felt about the Son than about the Father, until Marcion introduced, in addition to the Creator, another god of goodness only; [and] Apelles made the Creator of some nondescript[8] glorious angel, who belonged to the superior God, [and who was also, according to him,] the god of the law and of Israel, affirming that he was fire;[9] [whilst] Valentinus disseminated his Æons, and traced the sin of one Æon[10] to the production of God the Creator. To none,

[1] Comparat. [2] [Rev. ii. 14.]
[3] Gaiana. [So Oehler; the common reading being "*Caiana.*"]
[4] [1 John iv. 3.] [5] [Comp. Epiphanius, i. 30.]
[6] [Referred to perhaps in Col. ii. 18.] [7] Institutionem.
[8] Nescio quem. [9] Igneum ["consisted of fire"].
[10] ["The *ectroma*, or fall of Sophia from the Pleroma, from whom the Creator was fabled to be descended" (Dodgson).]

forsooth, except these, nor prior to these, was revealed the truth of the Divine Nature; and they obtained this especial honour and fuller favour from the devil, we cannot doubt,[1] because he wished even in this respect to rival God, that he might succeed, by the poison of his doctrines, in doing himself what the Lord said could not be done—making "the disciples above their Master."[2] Let the entire mass[3] of heresies choose, therefore, for themselves the times when they should appear, provided that the *when* be an unimportant point; allowing, too, that they be not of the truth, and (as a matter of course[4]) that such as had no existence in the time of the apostles could not possibly have had any connection with the apostles. If indeed they had then existed, their names would be extant,[5] with a view to their own repression likewise. Those [heresies] indeed which did exist in the days of the apostles, are condemned in their very mention.[6] If it be true, then, that those heresies, which in the apostolic times were in a rude form, are now found to be the same, only in a much more polished shape, they derive their condemnation from this very circumstance; or if they were not the same, but arose afterwards in a different form, and merely assumed from them certain tenets, then, by sharing with them an agreement in their teaching,[7] they must needs partake in their condemnation, by reason of the above-mentioned definition,[8] of lateness of date, meeting us on the very threshold.[9] Even if they were free from any participation in condemned doctrine, they would stand already judged[10] on the mere ground of time, being all the more spurious because they were not even named by the apostles. Whence we have the firmer assurance, that these were [the heresies] which even then[11] were announced as about to arise.

[1] Scilicet. [2] [Luke vi. 40.] [3] Universæ.
[4] Utique. [5] Nominarentur et ipsæ.
[6] Nominatione [*i.e.* by the apostles]. [7] Prædicationis.
[8] Fine. [9] Præcedente. [10] Præjudicarentur.
[11] [*i.e.* in the days of the apostles, and by their mouth.]

CHAP. XXXV.—*Let the heretics maintain their claims by a definite and intelligible evidence: this is the only method of solving their questions. The Catholics appeal always to evidence traceable to apostolic sources.*

Challenged and refuted by us according to these definitions, let all the heresies boldly on their part also advance similar rules to these against our doctrine, whether they be later than the apostles or contemporary with the apostles, provided they be different from them; provided also they were, by either a general or a specific censure, precondemned by them. For since they deny the truth of [our doctrine], they ought to prove that it also is heresy, refutable by the same rule as that by which they are themselves refuted; and at the same time to show us where we must seek the truth, which it is by this time evident has no existence amongst them. Our system[1] is not behind any in date; on the contrary, it is earlier than all; and this fact will be the evidence of that truth which everywhere occupies the first place. The apostles, again, nowhere condemn it; they rather defend it,—a fact which will show that it comes from themselves.[2] For that doctrine which they refrain from condemning, when they have condemned every strange opinion, they show to be their own, and on that ground too they defend it.

CHAP. XXXVI.—*The apostolic churches are the very voice of the apostles. Let the heretics go and examine their apostolic claims; in each case they are indisputable. The Church of Rome doubly apostolic; its early eminence and excellence. Heresy, as perverting the truth, is connected therewith.*

Come now, you who would indulge a better curiosity, if you would apply it to the business of your salvation, run over the apostolic churches, in which the very thrones[3] of the apostles are still pre-eminent in their places,[4] in which

[1] Res.

[2] Indicium proprietatis ["a proof of its being their own"].

[3] Cathedræ.

[4] Suis locis præsident.

their own authentic writings[1] are read, uttering the voice and representing the face of each of them severally. Achaia is very near you, [in which] you find Corinth. Since you are not far from Macedonia, you have Philippi [there; and there too] you have the Thessalonians. Since you are able to cross to Asia, you get Ephesus. Since, moreover, you are close upon Italy, you have Rome, from which there comes even into our own hands the very authority [of apostles themselves].[2] How happy is its church, on which apostles poured forth all their doctrine along with their blood! where Peter endures a passion like his Lord's! where Paul wins his crown in a death like John's![3] where the Apostle John was first plunged, unhurt, into boiling oil, and thence remitted to his island-exile! See what she has learned, what taught, what fellowship has had with even [our] churches in Africa! One Lord God does she acknowledge, the Creator of the universe, and Christ Jesus [born] of the Virgin Mary, the Son of God the Creator, and the Resurrection of the flesh; the law and the prophets she unites in one volume[4] with the writings of evangelists and apostles, from which she drinks in her faith: this she seals with the water [of baptism], arrays with the Holy Ghost, feeds with the eucharist, cheers with martyrdom,[5] and against such a discipline thus [maintained] she admits no gainsayer. This is the discipline which I no longer say foretold that heresies should come, but from[6] which they proceeded. However, they were not of her, because they were opposed to her.[7] Even the rough

[1] Authenticæ. [This much disputed phrase may refer to the *autographs* or the Greek *originals* (rather than the Latin translations), or full *unmutilated* copies (as opposed to the garbled ones of the heretics). The second sense is probably the correct one.]

[2] [Compare our *Anti-Marcion*, iv. 5, p. 186.]

[3] [The Baptist's.]

[4] Miscet.

[5] [We have taken Oehler's hint in favour of "martyrio." The usual reading "martyrium" (meaning "she exhorts to martyrdom") is stiff, and unsuited to the context.]

[6] De.

[7] [Or, "they were not of *it*, because they were opposed to *it*," *i.e.* the discipline or teaching.]

wild-olive arises from the germ[1] of the fruitful, rich, and genuine[2] olive; also from the seed[3] of the mellowest and sweetest fig there springs the empty and useless wild-fig. In the same way heresies, too, come from our plant,[4] although not of our kind; [they come] from the grain of truth,[5] but, owing to their falsehood, they have only wild leaves to show.[6]

CHAP. XXXVII.—*Heretics, not being Christians, but rather perverters of Christ's teaching, may not claim the Christian Scriptures. These are a deposit, committed to and carefully kept by the church.*

Since this is the case, in order that the truth may be adjudged to belong to us, "as many as walk according to the rule," which the church has handed down from the apostles, the apostles from Christ, [and] Christ from God, the reason of our position is clear, when it determines that heretics ought not to be allowed to challenge an appeal to the Scriptures, since we, without the Scriptures, prove that they have nothing to do with the Scriptures. For as they are heretics, they cannot be Christians, because it is not from Christ that they get that which they pursue of their own mere choice, and from the pursuit incur and admit the name of heretics.[7] Thus, not being Christians, they have acquired[8] no right to the Christian Scriptures; and it may be very fairly said to them, "Who are you? When and whence did you come? As you are none of mine, what have you to do with that which is mine? Indeed, Marcion, by what right do you hew my wood? By whose permission, Valen-

[1] Nucleo. [2] Necessariæ.

[3] Papavere. ["Ego cum aliis *papaver ficus* interpretor de seminalibus ficus, non de ipso fructu" (Oehler).]

[4] Frutice.

[5] [We again follow Oehler's hint, who would like to read "de grano veritatis." The texts are obscure, and vary much here.]

[6] Silvestres.

[7] ["That is, in following out their own choice (*αἵρεσις*) of opinions, they both receive and admit the name of *heretics*," *αἱρετικοί*, "self-choosers" (Dodgson).]

[8] Capiunt.

tinus, are you diverting the streams of my fountain? By what power, Apelles, are you removing my landmarks? This is my property. Why are you, the rest, sowing and feeding here at your own pleasure? This [I say] is my property. I have long possessed it; I possessed it before you. I hold sure title-deeds from the original owners themselves, to whom the estate belonged. I am the heir of the apostles. Just as they carefully prepared their will and testament, and committed it to a trust, and adjured [the trustees to be faithful to their charge],[1] even so do I hold it. As for you, they have, it is certain, always held you as disinherited, and rejected you as strangers—as enemies. But on what ground are heretics strangers and enemies to the apostles, if it be not from the difference of their teaching, which each individual of his own mere will has either advanced or received in opposition to the apostles?"

CHAP. XXXVIII.—*Harmony of the church and of the Scriptures. Variance of heretics from the Scriptures, which they have tampered with, and mutilated, and altered, to suit their views. Catholics, on the contrary, need never to change the Scriptures, which always testify for them.*

There, then, must the corruption both of the Scriptures and the expositions thereof be regarded as existing where diversity of doctrine is found. On those whose purpose it was to teach differently, lay the necessity of differently arranging the instruments of doctrine.[2] They could not possibly have effected their diversity of teaching in any other way than by having a difference in the means whereby they taught. As in their case, corruption in doctrine could not possibly have succeeded without a corruption also of its instruments, so to ourselves also integrity of doctrine could not have accrued, without integrity in those means by which doctrine is managed. Now, what is there in our Scriptures which is contrary to us? What of our own have we intro-

[1] [Compare 1 Tim. v. 21, and vi. 13; 2 Tim. ii. 14, and iv. 1–4.]

[2] [By the *instrumenta doctrinæ*, he here means the writings of the New Testament.]

duced, that we should have to take it away again, or else add to it, or alter it, in order to restore to its natural soundness anything which is contrary to it, and contained in the Scriptures?[1] What we are ourselves, that also the Scriptures are, [and have been] from the beginning.[2] Of them we have our being, before there was any other way, before they were interpolated by you. Now, inasmuch as all interpolation must be believed to be a later process, for the express reason that it proceeds from rivalry (which is never in any case previous to nor home-born[3] with that which it emulates), it is as incredible to every man of sense that we should seem to have introduced any corrupt text into the Scriptures, existing, as we have been, from the very first, and being the first, as it is that they have not in fact introduced it, who are both later in date and opposed [to the Scriptures]. One man perverts the Scriptures with his hand, another their meaning by his exposition. For although Valentinus seems to use the entire volume,[4] he has none the less laid violent hands on the truth, only with a more cunning mind and skill[5] than Marcion. Marcion expressly and openly used the knife, not the pen, since he made such an excision of the Scriptures as suited his own subject-matter.[6] Valentinus, however, abstained from such excision, because he did not invent Scriptures to square with his own subject-matter, but adapted his matter to the Scriptures; and yet he took away more, and added more, by removing the proper meaning of every particular word, and adding fantastic arrangements of things which have no real existence.[7]

[1] [We add the original of this sentence, which is obscured by its terseness: "Quid de proprio intulimus, ut aliquid contrarium ei et in Scripturis deprehensum detractione vel adjectione vel transmutatione remediaremus?"]

[2] [That is, teaching the same faith and conversation (De la Cerda).]

[3] Domestica. [4] Integro instrumento. [5] Callidiore ingenio.

[6] [That is, cutting out whatever did not fall in with it (Dodgson).]

[7] Non comparentium rerum.

CHAP. XXXIX.—*The arts of what St. Paul calls "spiritual wickednesses" displayed, in no dissimilar manner, both out of the writings of pagan authors, and in the doctrines of the heretics. Holy Scripture especially liable to heretical manipulation. It afforded to heretics material for their heresies, just as Virgil has been the groundwork of literary plagiarisms of different purport from the original.*

These were the ingenious arts of "spiritual wickednesses,"[1] wherewith we also, my brethren, may fairly expect to have "to wrestle," as necessary for faith, that the elect may be made manifest, [and] that the reprobate may be discovered. And therefore they possess influence, and a facility in thinking out and fabricating[2] errors, which ought not to be wondered at as if it were a difficult and inexplicable process, seeing that in profane writings also an example comes ready to hand of a similar facility. You see in our own day, composed out of Virgil,[3] a story of a wholly different character, the subject-matter being arranged according to the verse, and the verse according to the subject-matter. In short,[4] Hosidius Geta has most completely pilfered his tragedy of "*Medea*" from Virgil. A near relative of my own, among some leisure productions[5] of his pen, has composed out of the same poet "*The Table of Cebes*." On the same principle, those [poetasters] are commonly called *Homerocentones*, "collectors of Homeric odds and ends," who stitch into one piece, patchwork fashion, works of their own from the lines of Homer, out of many scraps put together from this passage and from that [in miscellaneous confusion]. Now, unquestionably, the Divine Scriptures are more fruitful in resources of all kinds for this sort of facility. Nor do I risk contradiction in saying[6] that the very Scriptures were even arranged by the will of God in such a manner as to furnish materials for heretics,

[1] [See Eph. vi. 12, and 1 Cor. xi. 18.]
[2] Instruendis.
[3] [Oehler reads ex Vergilio, although the *Codex Agobard.* has ex Virgilio.]
[4] Denique.
[5] Otia.
[6] Nec periclitor dicere.

inasmuch as I read that "there must be heresies,"[1] which there cannot be without the Scriptures.

CHAP. XL.—*No difference in the spirit of idolatry and of heresy. Satan imitated and distorted, in the rites of idolatry, the divine institutions of the older Scriptures, just as he has corrupted the Christian Scriptures by the perversions of the various heretics.*

The question will arise, By whom is to be interpreted[2] the sense of the passages which make for heresies? By the devil, of course, to whom pertain those wiles which pervert the truth, and who, by the mystic rites of his idols, vies even with the essential portions[3] of the sacraments of God.[4] He, too, baptizes some—that is, his own believers and faithful followers;[5] he promises the putting away[6] of sins by a laver [of his own]; and if my memory still serves me, Mithra there, [in the kingdom of Satan,] sets his marks on the foreheads of his soldiers; celebrates also the oblation of bread, and introduces an image of a resurrection, and before a sword wreathes a crown.[7] What also must we say to [Satan's] limiting his chief priest[8] to a single marriage? He, too, has his virgins; he, too, has his proficients in continence. Suppose now we revolve in our minds the superstitions of Numa Pompilius, and consider his priestly offices and badges and privileges, his sacrificial services, too, and the instruments and vessels of the sacrifices themselves, and the curious rites of his expiations and vows: is it not clear to us that the

[1] [1 Cor. xi. 19.]

[2] ["Interpretur" is here a passive verb.]

[3] Res.

[4] Sacramentorum divinorum. [The form, however, of this phrase seems to point not only to the *specific sacraments* of the gospel, but to the *general mysteries* of our religion.]

[5] [Compare Tertullian's treatises, *de Bapt.* v.; *de Corona*, last chapter.]

[6] Expositionem.

[7] ["Et sub gladio redimit coronam" is the text of this obscure sentence, which seems to allude to a pretended *martyrdom*. Compare Tertullian's tract, *de Corona*, last chapter.]

[8] [The *Flamen Dialis*. See Tertullian's tract, *ad Uxorem*, i. 7.]

devil imitated the well-known[1] moroseness of the Jewish law? Since, therefore, he has shown such emulation in his great aim of expressing, in the concerns of his idolatry, those very things of which consists the administration of Christ's sacraments, it follows, of course, that the same being, possessing still the same genius, both set his heart upon,[2] and succeeded in, adapting[3] to his profane and rival creed the very documents of divine things and of the Christian saints[4] —his interpretation from their interpretations, his words from their words, his parables from their parables. For this reason, then, no one ought to doubt, either that "spiritual wickednesses," from which also heresies come, have been introduced by the devil, or that there is any real difference between heresies and idolatry, seeing that they appertain both to the same author and the same work that idolatry does. They either pretend that there is another god in opposition to the Creator, or, even if they acknowledge that the Creator is the one only God, they treat of Him as a different being from what He is in truth. The consequence is, that every lie which they speak of God is (in a certain sense) a sort of idolatry.

CHAP. XLI.—*Animadversions on the* CONDUCT *of heretics: its frivolity, worldliness, and irregularity in all ecclesiastical arrangements. The wantonness, too, of their women is notorious.*

I must not omit an account of the conduct[5] also of the heretics—how frivolous it is, how worldly, how merely human, without seriousness, without authority, without discipline, as suits their creed. To begin with, it is doubtful who is a catechumen, and who a believer; they have all access alike, they hear alike, they pray alike—even heathens, if any such happen to come among them. "That which is holy they will cast to the dogs, and their pearls," although (to be sure) they are not real ones, "they will fling to the swine."[6]

[1] Illam. [2] Gestiit. [3] Attemperare.
[4] [*i.e.* the Scriptures of the New Testament.] [5] Conversationis.
[6] [See Matt. vii. 6.]

Simplicity they will have to consist in the overthrow of discipline, attention to which on our part they call *finery*.[1] Peace also they huddle up[2] anyhow with all comers; for it matters not to them, however different be their treatment of subjects, provided only they can conspire together to storm the citadel of the one only Truth. All are puffed up, all offer you knowledge. Their catechumens are perfect before they are full-taught.[3] The very women of these heretics, how wanton they are! For they are bold enough to teach, to dispute, to enact exorcisms, to undertake[4] cures—it may be even to baptize.[5] Their ordinations, [too,] are carelessly administered,[6] capricious, changeable.[7] At one time they put *novices* in office; at another time, men who are bound to some secular employment;[8] at another, persons who have apostatized from us, to bind them by vainglory, since they cannot by the truth. Nowhere is promotion easier than in the camp of rebels, where the mere fact of being there is a foremost service.[9] And so it comes to pass that to-day one man is their bishop, to-morrow another; to-day he is a deacon who to-morrow is a reader; to-day he is a presbyter who to-morrow is a layman. For even on laymen do they impose the functions of priesthood.

CHAP. XLII.—*The work and object of the heretics is to pull down and to destroy, not to edify and elevate. Heretics do not adhere even to their own traditions; in their perpetual restlessness, they harbour dissent even from their own founders.*

But what shall I say concerning the ministry of the word, since they make it their business not to convert the heathen, but to subvert our people? This is rather the glory which

[1] Lenocinium. ["Pandering" is Archdeacon Dodgson's word.]
[2] Miscent. [3] Edocti. [4] Repromittere.
[5] [Compare Tertullian's tract, *de Bapt.* i.; *de Veland. Virg.* viii.]
[6] Temerariæ.
[7] [They were constantly changing their ministers. It was a saying of the heretics, "Alius hodie episcopus, cras alius" (Rigalt.).]
[8] Sæculo obstrictos. [9] Promereri est.

they catch at, to compass the fall of those who stand, not the raising of those who are down. Accordingly, since the very work which they propose to themselves comes not from the building up of their own society, but from the demolition of the truth, they undermine our edifices, that they may erect their own. Only deprive them of the law of Moses, and the prophets, and the divinity of the Creator, and they have not another objection to talk about. The consequence is, that they more easily accomplish the ruin of standing houses than the erection of fallen ruins. It is only when they have such objects in view that they show themselves humble and bland and respectful. Otherwise they know no respect even for their own leaders. Hence it is that schisms seldom happen among heretics, because, even when they exist, they are not obvious.[1] Their very unity, however,[2] is schism. I am greatly in error if they do not amongst themselves swerve even from their own regulations, forasmuch as every man, just as it suits his own temper, modifies the traditions he has received after the same fashion as the man who handed them down did, when he moulded them according to his own will. The progress of the matter is an acknowledgment at once of its character and of the manner of its birth. That was allowable to the Valentinians which had been allowed to Valentinus; that was also fair for the Marcionites which had been done by Marcion—even to innovate on the faith, as was agreeable to their own pleasure. In short, all heresies, when thoroughly looked into, are detected harbouring dissent in many particulars even from their own founders. The majority of them have not even churches.[3] Motherless, houseless, creedless, outcasts, they wander about in their own essential worthlessness.[4]

[1] Non parent. [2] Enim.

[3] [Hence the saying, "Wasps make combs, so Marcionites make churches" (see our *Anti-Marcion*, p. 187); describing the strangeness and uselessness of the societies, not (as Gibbon said) their number (Dodgson).]

[4] Sua in vilitate. [Another reading, pronounced corrupt by Oehler, has "quasi sibi latæ vagantur," *q.d.* "All for themselves, as it were, they wander," etc. (Dodgson).]

CHAP. XLIII.—*The loose company preferred by heretics. The effect of their teaching is godlessness of life, the very opposite of catholic truth, the tendency of which is to promote the fear of God, both in religious ordinances and practical life.*

It has also been a subject of remark, how extremely frequent is the intercourse which heretics hold with magicians, with mountebanks, with astrologers, with philosophers; and the reason is,[1] that they are men who devote themselves to curious questions. "Seek, and ye shall find," is everywhere in their minds. Thus, from the very nature of their conduct, may be estimated the quality of their faith. In their discipline we have an index of their doctrine. They say that God is not to be feared; therefore all things are in their view free and unchecked. Where, however, is God not feared, except where He *is* not? Where God is not, there truth also is not. Where there is no truth, then, naturally enough, there is also such a discipline as theirs. But where God is, there exists "the fear of God, which is the beginning of wisdom."[2] Where the fear of God is, there is seriousness, an honourable and yet thoughtful[3] diligence, as well as an anxious carefulness and a well-considered admission [to the sacred ministry],[4] and a safely-guarded[5] communion, and promotion after good service, and a scrupulous submission [to authority], and a devout attendance,[6] and a modest gait, and a united church, and God [in] all things.

[1] Scilicet. [2] [Ps. cxi. 10; Prov. i. 7.]

[3] Attonita [as if in fear that it might go wrong (Rigalt.)].

[4] [In contrast to the opposite fault of the heresies exposed above.]

[5] Deliberata [where the character was *well weighed* previous to admission to the eucharist].

[6] Apparitio [the duty and office of an *apparitor*, or attendant on men of higher rank, whether in church or state].

CHAP. XLIV.—*Heresy lowers respect for Christ, and even destroys all fear of His great judgment. A boldly ironical exposure of the tendency of heretical teaching on this solemn article of the faith. In his conclusion, Tertullian states that the present treatise has the character of an introduction to certain other anti-heretical works of his.*

These evidences, then, of a stricter discipline existing among us, are an additional proof of truth, from which no man can safely turn aside, who bears in mind that future judgment, when "we must all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ,"[1] to render an account of our faith itself before all things. What, then, will they say who shall have defiled it with the adultery of heretics, even the virgin [faith] which Christ committed to them? I suppose they will allege that no injunction was ever addressed to them by Him or by His apostles concerning depraved[2] and perverse doctrines assailing them,[3] or about their avoiding and abhorring the same. [Christ and His apostles, I suppose,] will acknowledge[4] that the blame rather lies with themselves and their disciples, in not having given us previous warning and instruction! They[5] will, besides, add a good deal respecting the high authority of each doctor of heresy,—how that these mightily strengthened belief in their own doctrine; how that they raised the dead, restored the sick, foretold the future, that so they might deservedly be regarded as apostles. As if this caution were not also in the written record: that many should come who were to work even the greatest miracles, in defence of the deceit of their corrupt preaching. So, forsooth, they will deserve to be forgiven! If, however, any, being

[1] [2 Cor. v. 10.] [2] Scævis. [3] Futuris.

[4] [It seems to us, that this is the force of the strong irony, indicated by the "credo," which pervades this otherwise unintelligible passage. Dodgson's version seems untenable: "Let them (the heretics) acknowledge that the fault is with themselves rather than with those who prepared us so long beforehand."]

[5] [Christ and His apostles, as before, in continuation of the strong irony.]

mindful of the writings and the denunciations of the Lord and the apostles, shall have stood firm in the integrity of the faith, I suppose *they* will run great risk of missing pardon, when the Lord answers: I plainly forewarned you that there should be teachers of false doctrine in my name, as well as that of the prophets and apostles also; and to my own disciples did I give a charge, that they should preach the same things to you. But as for you, it was not, of course, to be supposed[1] that you would believe me! I once gave the gospel and the doctrine of the said rule [of life and faith] to my apostles; but afterwards it was my pleasure to make considerable changes in it! I had promised a resurrection, even of the flesh; but, on second thoughts, it struck me[2] that I might not be able to keep my promise! I had shown myself to have been born of a virgin; but this seemed to me afterwards to be a discreditable thing![3] I had said that He was my Father, who is the Maker of the sun and the showers; but another and better father has adopted me! I had forbidden you to lend an ear to heretics; but in this I erred! Such [blasphemies], it is possible,[4] do enter the minds of those who go out of the right path,[5] and who do not defend[6] the true faith from the danger which besets it. On the present occasion, indeed, our treatise has rather taken up a general position against heresies, [showing that they must] all be refuted on definite, equitable, and necessary rules, without[7] any comparison with the Scriptures. For the rest, if God in His grace permit, we shall prepare answers to certain of these heresies in separate treatises.[8] To those who may devote their leisure in reading through these [pages], in the belief of the truth, be peace, and the grace of our God Jesus Christ for ever.

[1] [This must be the force of a sentence which is steeped in irony: "Scilicet cum vos non crederetis." We are indebted to Oehler for restoring the sentence thus.]

[2] Recogitavi. [3] Turpe. [4] Capit. [5] Exorbitant. [6] Cavent.

[7] [This sense comes from the "repellendas" and the "a collatione Scripturarum."]

[8] Specialiter. [He did this, indeed, in his treatises against Marcion, Hermogenes, the Valentinians, Praxeas, and others.]

THE TREATISE

OF

QUINTUS SEPTIMIUS FLORENS TERTULLIANUS

AGAINST

HERMOGENES.

CONTAINING AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE OPINION OF THE LATTER, THAT "MATTER IS ETERNAL."

CHAP. I.—*The opinions of Hermogenes, when tested by the prescriptive rule of antiquity, found to be heretical. Those opinions not derived from Christianity, but from heathen philosophy. Some of the tenets mentioned.*

WE are accustomed, for the purpose of shortening argument,[1] to lay down the rule against heretics of the *lateness* of their date.[2] For in *as* far as by our rule, priority is given to the truth, which also foretold that there would be heresies, in *so* far must all later opinions be prejudged as heresies, being such as were, by the more ancient rule of truth, predicted as [one day] to happen. Now, the doctrine of Hermogenes has this[3] taint of novelty. He is, in short,[4] a man [living] in the world at the present time; by his very nature a heretic, and turbu-

[1] Compendii gratia.

[2] [This is the criterion prescribed in the *Præscript. Hæret.* xxxi. xxxiv., and often applied by Tertullian. See our *Anti-Marcion*, pp. 3, 119, 184, 469.]

[3] [The "*tam* novella" is a relative phrase, referring to the fore-mentioned *rule*.]

[4] Denique.

lent withal, who mistakes loquacity for eloquence, and supposes impudence to be firmness, and judges it to be the duty of a good conscience to speak ill of individuals.[1] Moreover, he despises God's law in his painting,[2] maintaining repeated marriages;[3] alleges the law of God in defence of lust,[4] [and yet] despises it in respect of his art.[5] He falsifies by a twofold process—with his cautery and his pen.[6] He is a thorough adulterer, both doctrinally and carnally, since he is rank indeed with the contagion of your marriage-hacks,[7] and has also failed in cleaving to the rule of faith as much as the apostle's own Hermogenes.[8] However, never mind the man, when it is his doctrine which I question. He does not appear to acknowledge any other Christ as Lord,[9] though he holds Him in a different way; but by this difference in his faith he really makes Him another being,—nay, he takes from Him everything which is God, since he will not have it that He made all things of nothing. For, turning away from Christians to the philosophers, from the Church to the Academy and the Porch, he learned there from the Stoics how to place Matter [on the same level] with the Lord, just as if it too had existed ever both unborn and unmade,

[1] Maledicere singulis.

[2] [Probably by painting idols (Rigalt.; and so Neander).]

[3] [It is uncertain whether Tertullian means to charge Hermogenes with defending *polygamy*, or only *second marriages*, in the phrase *nubit assidue*. Probably the latter, which was offensive to the rigorous Tertullian; and so Neander puts it.]

[4] [Quoting Gen. i. 28, "Be fruitful and multiply" (Rigalt).]

[5] [Disregarding the law when it forbids the representation of idols (Rigalt.).]

[6] Et cauterio et stilo. [The former instrument was used by the encaustic painters for *burning in* the wax colours into the ground of their pictures (Westropp's *Handbook of Archæology*, p. 219). Tertullian charges Hermogenes with using his encaustic art to the injury of the Scriptures, by practically violating their precepts in his artistic works; and with using his pen [stilus] in corrupting the doctrine thereof by his heresy.]

[7] [By the *nubentium contagium*, Tertullian, in his Montanist rigour, censures those who married more than once.]

[8] [2 Tim. i. 15.]

[9] [Thus differing from Marcion.]

having no beginning at all nor end, out of which, according to him,[1] the Lord afterwards created all things.

CHAP. II.—*Hermogenes, after a perverse induction from mere heretical assumptions, concludes that God created all things out of pre-existing Matter.*

Our very bad painter has coloured this his primary shade absolutely without any light, with such arguments as these: He begins with laying down the premiss,[2] that the Lord made all things either out of Himself, or out of nothing, or out of something; in order that, after he has shown that it was impossible for Him to have made them either out of Himself or out of nothing, he might thence affirm the residuary proposition that He made them out of something, and therefore that that something was Matter. He could not have made all things, he says, of Himself; because whatever things the Lord made of Himself would have been parts of Himself; but[3] He is not dissoluble into parts,[4] because, being the Lord, He is indivisible, and unchangeable, and always the same. Besides, if He had made anything out of Himself, it would have been something of Himself. Everything, however, both which was made and which He made, must be accounted imperfect, because it was made of a part, and He made it of a part; or if, again, it was a whole which He made, who is a whole Himself, He must in that case have been at once both a whole, and yet not a whole; because it behoved Him to be a whole, that He might produce Himself,[5] and yet not a whole, that He might be produced out of Himself.[6] But this is a most difficult position. For if He were in existence, He could not be made, for He was in existence already; if, however, He were not in existence, He could not make, because He was a nonentity. [He maintains,] moreover, that He who always exists, does not *come into* existence,[7] but exists for ever and ever. He

[1] [The force of the subjunctive, "ex qua *fecerit*."]
[2] Præstruens.
[3] Porro.
[4] In partes non devenire.
[5] Ut faceret semetipsum.
[6] Ut fieret de semetipso.
[7] Non fieri.

accordingly concludes that He made nothing out of Himself, since He never passed into such a condition[1] as made it possible for Him to make anything out of Himself. In like manner, he contends that He could not have made all things out of nothing—thus: He defines the Lord as a being who is good, nay, very good, who must will to make things as good and excellent as He is Himself; indeed it were impossible for Him either to will or to make anything which was not good, nay, very good itself. Therefore all things ought to have been made good and excellent by Him, after His own condition. Experience shows,[2] however, that things which are even evil were made by Him: not, of course, of His own will and pleasure; because, if it had been of His own will and pleasure, He would be sure to have made nothing unfitting or unworthy of Himself. That, therefore, which He made not of His own will, must be understood to have been made from the fault of something, and that is from Matter, without a doubt.

CHAP. III.—*Tertullian, in opposition to an argument of Hermogenes, contends that, while* GOD *is a title eternally applicable to the Divine Being,* LORD *and* FATHER *are only relative appellations, not eternally applicable. An inconsistency in the argument of Hermogenes pointed out.*

He adds also another point: that as God was always God, there was never a time when God was not also Lord. But[3] it was in no way possible for Him to be regarded as always Lord, in the same manner as He had been always God, if there had not been always, in the previous eternity,[4] a something of which He could be regarded as evermore the Lord. So he concludes[5] that God always had Matter co-existent with Himself as the Lord thereof. Now, this tissue[6] of his I shall at once hasten to pull abroad. I have been willing to set it out in form to this length, for the information of those who are unacquainted with the subject, that they may know that his other arguments likewise need only be[7] under-

[1] Non ejus fieret conditionis. [2] Inveniri. [3] Porro.
[4] Retro. [5] Itaque. [6] Conjecturam. [7] Tam . . . quam.

stood to be refuted. We affirm, then, that the name of *God* always existed with Himself and in Himself—but not eternally so the *Lord*. Because the condition of the one is not the same as that of the other. God is the designation of the substance itself, that is, of the Divinity; but Lord is [the name] not of substance, but of power. I [maintain] that the substance existed always with its own name, which is God; [the title] Lord was afterwards added, as the indication indeed[1] of something accruing. For from the moment when those things began to exist, over which the power of a Lord was to act, [God,] by the accession of that power, both became Lord and received the name thereof. Because God is in like manner a Father, and He is also a Judge; but He has not always been Father and Judge, merely on the ground of His having always been God. For He could not have been the Father previous to the Son, nor a Judge previous to sin. There was, however, a time when neither sin existed with Him, nor the Son; the former of which was to constitute the Lord a Judge, and the latter a Father. In this way He was not Lord previous to those things of which He was to be the Lord. But He was only to become Lord at some future time: just as He became the Father by the Son, and a Judge by sin, so also did He become Lord by means of those things which He had made, in order that they might serve Him. Do I seem to you to be weaving arguments,[2] Hermogenes? How neatly does Scripture lend us its aid,[3] when it applies the two titles to Him with a distinction, and reveals them each at its proper time! For [the title] *God*, indeed, which always belonged to Him, it names at the very first: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth;"[4] and as long as He continued making, one after the other, those things of which He was to be the Lord, it merely mentions God. "And *God* said," "and *God* made," "and *God* saw;"[5] but nowhere do we yet find the *Lord*.

[1] Scilicet.
[2] Argumentari [in the sense of *argutari*].
[3] Naviter nobis patrocinatur.
[4] [Gen. i. 1.]
[5] [Gen. i. 3, etc.]

But when He completed the whole creation, and especially man himself, who was destined to understand His sovereignty in a way of special propriety, He is then designated[1] Lord. Then also [the Scripture] added the name *Lord:* "And the Lord God ['Deus *Dominus*'] took the man, whom He had formed;"[2] "And the Lord God commanded Adam."[3] Thenceforth He, who was previously God only, is the *Lord*, from the time of His having something of which He might be the Lord. For to Himself He was always God, but to all things was He only then God, when He became also Lord. Therefore, in *as* far as [Hermogenes] shall suppose that Matter was eternal, on the ground that the Lord was eternal, in *so* far will it be evident that nothing existed, because it is plain that the Lord [as such] did not always exist. Now I mean also, on my own part,[4] to add a remark for the sake of ignorant persons, of whom Hermogenes is an extreme instance,[5] and actually to retort against him his own arguments.[6] For when he denies that Matter was born or made, I find that, even on these terms, the title *Lord* is unsuitable to God in respect of Matter, because it must have been free,[7] when by not having a beginning it had not an author. The fact of its past existence it owed to no one, so that it could be a subject to no one. Therefore ever since God exercised His power over it, by creating [all things] out of Matter, although it had all along experienced God as its Lord, yet Matter does, after all, demonstrate that God did not exist in the relation of Lord to it,[8] although all the while He was really so.[9]

[1] Cognominatur [as if by way of *surname*, "Deus *Dominus*"].

[2] [Gen. ii. 15.] [3] [Gen. ii. 16.] [4] Et ego.

[5] Extrema linea. [Rhenanus sees in this phrase a slur against Hermogenes, who was an artist. Tertullian, I suppose, meant that Hermogenes was extremely ignorant.]

[6] Experimenta.

[7] Libera [and so not a possible *subject* for the Lordship of God].

[8] [Matter having, by the hypothesis, been *independent of God*, and so incapable of giving Him any title to Lordship.]

[9] Fuit hoc utique. [In Hermogenes' own opinion, which is thus shown to have been contradictory to itself, and so absurd.]

CHAP. IV.—*Hermogenes gives divine attributes to* MATTER, *and so makes two gods.*

At this point, then, I shall begin to treat of Matter, how that, [according to Hermogenes],[1] God compares it with Himself as equally unborn, equally unmade, equally eternal, set forth as being without a beginning, without an end. For what other estimate[2] of God is there than eternity? What other condition has eternity than to have ever existed, and to exist yet for evermore by virtue of its privilege of having neither beginning nor end? Now, since this is the property of God, it will belong to God alone, whose property it is—of course[3] on this ground, that if it can be ascribed to any other being, it will no longer be the property of God, but will belong, along with Him, to that being also to which it is ascribed. For "although there be that are called gods" in name, "whether in heaven or in earth, yet to us there is but one God the Father, of whom are all things;"[4] whence the greater reason why, in our view,[5] that which is the property[6] of God ought to be regarded as pertaining to God alone, and why (as I have already said) that should cease to be such a property, when it is shared by another being. Now, since He is God, it must necessarily be a unique mark [of this quality],[7] that it be confined to One. Else, what will be unique and singular, if that is not which has nothing equal to it? What will be principal, if that is not which is above all things, before all things, and from which all things proceed? By possessing these He is God alone, and by His sole possession of them He is One. If another also shared in the possession, there would then be as many gods as there were possessors of these attributes of God. Hermogenes, therefore, introduces two gods: he introduces Matter as God's equal. God, however, must be One, because that is God which is supreme; but nothing else can be supreme than that which is unique; and that cannot possibly be

[1] [Quod, with the subjunctive comparet.]
[2] Census.
[3] Scilicet.
[4] [1 Cor. viii. 5.]
[5] Apud nos.
[6] [The property of being eternal.]
[7] Unicum sit necesse est.

unique which has anything equal to it; and Matter will be equal with God when it is held to be[1] eternal.

CHAP. V.—*Hermogenes coquets with his own argument, as if rather afraid of it. After investing Matter with divine qualities, he tries to make it somehow inferior to God.*

But God is God, and Matter is Matter. As if a mere difference in their names prevented equality,[2] when an identity of condition is claimed for them! Grant that their nature is different; assume, too, that their form is not identical,—what matters it so long as their absolute state have but one mode?[3] God is unborn; is not Matter also unborn? God ever exists; is not Matter, too, ever existent? Both are without beginning; both are without end; both are the authors of the universe—both He who created it, and the Matter of which He made it. For it is impossible that Matter should not be regarded as the author[4] of all things, when the universe is composed of it. What answer will he give? Will he say that Matter is not then comparable with God as soon as[5] it has something belonging to God; since, by not having total [divinity], it cannot correspond to the whole extent of the comparison? But what more has he reserved for God, that he should not seem to have accorded to Matter the full amount of the Deity?[6] He says in reply, that even though this is the prerogative of Matter, both the authority and the substance of God must remain intact, by virtue of which He is regarded as the sole and prime Author, as well as the Lord of all things. Truth, however, maintains the unity of God in such a way as to insist that whatever belongs to God Himself belongs to Him alone. For so will it belong to Himself if it belong to Him alone; and therefore it will be impossible that another god should be admitted, when it is permitted to no other being to possess anything of God. Well, then, you say, we ourselves at that rate possess nothing of God. But indeed we do, and shall continue to do—only it is from Him that we receive it, and not from ourselves. For

[1] Censetur. [2] Comparationi. [3] Ratio.
[4] Auctrix. [5] Statim si. [6] Totum Dei.

we shall be even gods, if we shall deserve to be among those of whom He declared, "I have said, Ye are gods,"[1] and, "God standeth in the congregation of the gods."[2] But this comes of His own grace, not from any property in us, because it is He alone who can make gods. The property of Matter however, he[3] makes to be that which it has in common with God. Otherwise, if it received from God the property which belongs to God,—I mean its attribute[4] of eternity,—one might then even suppose that it both possesses an attribute in common with God, and yet at the same time is not God. But what inconsistency is it for him[5] to allow that there is a conjoint possession of an attribute with God, and also to wish that what he does not refuse to Matter should be, after all, the exclusive privilege of God!

CHAP. VI.—*Tertullian exposes the shifts to which Hermogenes is reduced, who deifies Matter, and yet is unwilling to hold him equal with the Divine Creator.*

He declares that God's attribute is still safe to Him, of being the only God, and the First, and the Author of all things, and the Lord of all things, and being incomparable to any—qualities which he straightway ascribes to Matter also. He is God, to be sure. God shall also attest the same; but He has also sworn sometimes by Himself, that there is no other God like Him.[6] Hermogenes, however, will make Him a liar. For Matter will be such a God as He—being unmade, unborn, without beginning, and without end. God will say, "I am the first!"[7] Yet how is He the first, when Matter is co-eternal with Him? Between co-eternals and contemporaries there is no sequence of rank.[8] Is, then, Matter also the first? "I," says the Lord, "have stretched out the heavens alone."[9] But indeed He was not alone, when that likewise stretched them out, of which He

[1] [Ps. lxxxii. 6.] [2] [Ver. 1.] [3] [Hermogenes.]
[4] Ordinem [or "course"].
[5] Quale autem est ["how comes it to pass that"].
[6] [Isa. xlv. 23.] [7] [Isa. xli. 4, xliv. 6, xlviii. 12.]
[8] Ordo. [9] [Isa. xliv. 24.]

made the expanse. When he asserts the position that Matter was [eternal], without any encroachment on the condition of God, let him see to it that we do not in ridicule turn the tables on him, that God similarly was eternal without any encroachment on the condition of Matter—the condition of Both being still common to Them. The position, therefore, remains unimpugned[1] both in the case of Matter, that it did itself exist, only along with God; and that God existed alone, but with Matter. It also was first with God, as God, too, was first with it; it, however, is not comparable with God, as God, too, is not to be compared with it; with God also it was the Author [of all things], and with God their Sovereign. In this way [he proposes that God] has something, and yet not the whole, of Matter. For Him, accordingly, Hermogenes has reserved nothing which he had not equally conferred on Matter, so that it is not Matter which is compared with God, but rather God who is compared with Matter. Now, inasmuch as those qualities which we claim as peculiar to God—to have always existed, without a beginning, without an end, and to have been the First, and Alone, and the Author of all things—are also compatible to Matter, I want to know what property Matter possesses different and alien from God, and hereby special to itself, by reason of which it is incapable of being compared with God? That Being, in which occur[2] all the properties of God, is sufficiently predetermined without any further comparison.

CHAP. VII.—*Tertullian holds his opponent to his theory, in order that he may expose its absurdity on Hermogenes' own principles.*

When he contends that matter is less than God, and inferior to Him, and therefore diverse from Him, and for the same reason not a fit subject of comparison with Him, who is a greater and superior Being, I meet him with this prescription, that what is eternal and unborn is incapable of any diminution and inferiority, because it is simply this which makes even God to be as great as He is, inferior and subject

[1] Salvum ergo erit. [2] Recensentur.

to none—nay, greater and higher than all. For, just as all things which are born, or which come to an end, and are therefore not eternal, do, by reason of their exposure at once to an end and a beginning, admit of qualities which are repugnant to God—I mean diminution and inferiority, because they are born and made—so likewise God, for this very reason, is unsusceptible of these accidents, because He is absolutely unborn,[1] and also unmade. And yet such also is the condition of Matter.[2] Therefore, of the two Beings which are eternal, as being unborn and unmade—God and Matter—by reason of the identical mode of their common condition (both of them equally possessing that which admits neither of diminution nor subjection—that is, the attribute of eternity), we affirm that neither of them is less or greater than the other, neither of them is inferior or superior to the other; but that they both stand on a par in greatness, on a par in sublimity, [and] on the same level of that complete and perfect felicity of which eternity is reckoned to consist. Now we must not resemble the heathen in our opinions; for they, when constrained to acknowledge God, insist on having other deities below Him. The Divinity, however, has no degrees, because it is unique; and if it shall be found in Matter—as being equally unborn and unmade and eternal—it must be resident in both alike,[3] because in no case can it be inferior to itself. In what way, then, will Hermogenes have the courage to draw distinctions; and thus to subject matter to God, an eternal to the Eternal, an unborn to the Unborn, an author to the Author? seeing that it dares to say, I also am the first; I too am before all things; and I am that from which all things proceed; equal we have been, together we have been—both alike without beginning, without end; both alike without an Author, without a God.[4] What God, then, is He who subjects me to a contempo-

[1] Nec natus omnino.

[2] [Of course, according to Hermogenes, whom Tertullian is refuting with an *argumentum ad hominem*.]

[3] Aderit utrobique.

[4] [That is, having no God superior to themselves.]

raneous, co-eternal power? If it be He who is called God, then I myself, too, have my own [divine] name. Either I am God, or He is Matter, because we both are that which either of us is. Do you suppose, therefore, that he[1] has not made Matter equal with God, although, forsooth, he pretends it to be inferior to Him?

CHAP. VIII.—*To disquiet Hermogenes the more, Tertullian shows him that, on his own principles, he is even making Matter, on the whole, superior to God.*

Nay more,[2] he even prefers Matter to God, and rather subjects God to it, when he will have it that God made all things out of Matter. For if He drew His resources from it[3] for the creation of the world, Matter is already found to be the superior, inasmuch as it furnished Him with the means of effecting His works; and God is thereby clearly subjected to Matter, of which the substance was indispensable to Him. For there is no one but requires that which he makes use of;[4] no one but is subject to the thing which he requires, for the very purpose of being able to make use of it. So, again, there is no one who, from using what belongs to another, is not inferior to him of whose property he makes use; and there is no one who imparts[5] of his own for another's use, who is not in this respect superior to him to whose use he lends his property. On this principle,[6] Matter itself, no doubt,[7] was not in want of God, but rather lent itself to God, who was in want of it—rich and abundant and liberal as it was—to one who was, I suppose, too small, and too weak, and too unskilful, to form what He willed out of nothing. A grand service, verily,[8] did it confer on God in giving Him means at the present time whereby He might be known to be God, and be called Almighty—only that He is no longer Almighty, since He is not powerful enough for this, to produce all things out of nothing. To be sure,[9] Matter bestowed somewhat on itself also—even to get its own

[1] [Hermogenes.] [2] Atquin etiam. [3] Ex illa usus est.
[4] De cujus utitur. [5] Præstat. [6] Itaque.
[7] Quidem. [8] Revera. [9] Sane.

self acknowledged with God as God's co-equal, nay more, as His helper; only there is this drawback, that Hermogenes is the only man that has found out this fact, besides the philosophers—those patriarchs of all heresy.[1] For the prophets knew nothing about it, nor the apostles thus far, nor, I suppose, even Christ.

CHAP. IX.—*In pursuance of his object of exposing the absurdity of his opponent's principles, Tertullian presses him with sundry inevitable but intolerable conclusions from his principles.*

He cannot say that it was as its Lord that God employed Matter for His creative works, for He could not have been the Lord of a substance which was co-equal with Himself. Well, but perhaps it was a title derived from the will of another[2] which he enjoyed—a precarious holding, and not a lordship,[3] and *that* to such a degree, that[4] although Matter was evil, He yet endured to make use of an evil substance, owing, of course, to the restraint of His own limited power,[5] which made Him impotent to create out of nothing, not in consequence of His power; for if, as God, He had at all possessed power over Matter, which He knew to be evil, He would first have converted it into good—as its Lord and the good God—that so He might have a good thing to make use of, instead of a bad one. But being undoubtedly good, only not the Lord withal, He, by using such power[6] as He possessed, showed the necessity He was under of yielding to the condition of Matter, which He would have amended if He had been its Lord. Now this is the answer which must be given to Hermogenes when he maintains that it was by virtue of His Lordship that God used Matter—even of His non-possession of any right to it, on the ground, of course, of His

[1] [They are so deemed by Tertullian in his *de Præscript. Hæret.* c. vii.]

[2] [We have rather paraphrased the word "precario"—"obtained by prayer."]

[3] Dominio [opposed to "precario"].

[4] Ideo . . . . ut.

[5] Mediocritatis.

[6] Tali [*i.e.* "potestate"].

not having Himself made it. Evil then, on your terms,[1] must proceed from [God] Himself, since He is—I will not say the Author of evil, because He did not form it, but—the permitter thereof, as having dominion over it.[2] If indeed Matter shall prove not even to belong to God at all, as being evil, it follows,[3] that when He made use of what belonged to another, He used it either on a precarious title[4] because He was in need of it, or else by violent possession because He was stronger than it. For by three methods is the property of others obtained,—by right, by permission, by violence; in other words, by lordship, by a title derived from the will of another,[5] by force. Now, as lordship is out of the question, Hermogenes must choose which [of the other methods] is suitable to God. Did He, then, make all things out of Matter, by permission, or by force? But, in truth, would not God have more wisely determined that nothing at all should be created, than that it should be created by the mere sufferance of another, or by violence, and that, too, with[6] a substance which was evil?

CHAP. X.—*Tertullian shows to what straits Hermogenes absurdly reduces the Divine Being. He does nothing short of making Him the Author of evil.*

Even if Matter had been the perfection of good,[7] would it not have been equally indecorous in Him to have thought of the property of another, however good, [to effect His purpose by the help of it]? It was, therefore, absurd enough for Him, in the interest of His own glory, to have created the world in such a way as to betray His own obligation to a substance which belonged to another—and that even not good. Was He then, asks [Hermogenes], to make all things out of nothing, that so evil things themselves might be attributed

[1] Jam ergo [introducing an *argumentum ad hominem* against Hermogenes].

[2] Quia dominator.

[3] Ergo.

[4] Aut precario ["as having begged for it"].

[5] Precario. [See above, note 2, p. 67.]

[6] [*De* is often in Tertullian the sign of an instrumental noun.]

[7] Optima.

to His will? Great, in all conscience,[1] must be the blindness of our heretics which leaves them to argue in such a way that they either insist on the belief of another God supremely good, on the ground of their thinking the Creator to be the author of evil, or else they set up Matter with the Creator, in order that they may derive evil from Matter, not from the Creator. And yet there is absolutely no god at all that is free from such a doubtful plight, so as to be able to avoid the appearance even of being the author of evil, whosoever he is that—I will not say, indeed, has made, but still—has permitted evil to be made by some author or other, and from some source or other. Hermogenes, therefore, ought to be told[2] at once, although we postpone to another place our distinction concerning the mode of evil,[3] that even he has effected no result by this device of his.[4] For observe how God is found to be, if not the Author of, yet at any rate the conniver at,[5] evil, inasmuch as He, with all His extreme goodness, endured evil in Matter before He created the world, although, as being good, and the enemy of evil, He ought to have corrected it. For He either was able to correct it, but was unwilling; or else was willing, but, being a weak God, was not able. If He was able, and yet unwilling, He was Himself evil, as having favoured evil; and thus He now opens Himself to the charge of evil, because even if He did not create it, yet still, since it would not be existing if He had been against its existence, He must Himself have then caused it to exist, when He refused to will its non-existence. And what is more shameful than this? When He willed that to be which He was Himself unwilling to create, He acted in fact against His very self,[6] inasmuch as He was both willing that that should exist which He was unwilling to make, and unwilling to make that which He was willing

[1] Bona fide. [2] Audiat. [3] De mali ratione.

[4] Hac sua injectione. [See our *Anti-Marcion*, iv. i. (p. 176), for this word.]

[5] Assentator. [Fr. Junius suggests "adsectator" of the stronger meaning "promoter;" nor does Oehler object.]

[6] Adversum semetipsum.

should exist. As if what He willed was good, and at the same time what he refused to be the Maker of was evil. What He judged to be evil by not creating it, He also proclaimed to be good by permitting it to exist. By bearing with evil as a good instead of rather extirpating it, He proved Himself to be the promoter thereof; criminally,[1] if through His own will—disgracefully, if through necessity. God must either be the servant of evil or the friend thereof, since He held converse with evil in Matter—nay more, effected His works out of the evil thereof.

CHAP. XI.—*Hermogenes makes great efforts to remove evil from God to Matter; but Tertullian shows how he fails to do this consistently with his own argument.*

But, after all,[2] by what proofs does Hermogenes persuade us that Matter is evil? For it will be impossible for him not to call that evil to which he imputes evil. Now we lay down this principle,[3] that what is eternal cannot possibly admit of diminution and subjection, so as to be considered inferior to another co-eternal Being. So that we now affirm that evil is not even compatible with it,[4] since it is incapable of subjection, from the fact that it cannot in any wise be subject to any, because it is eternal. But inasmuch as, on other grounds,[5] it is evident that what is eternal as God is the highest good, whereby also He alone is good—as being eternal, and therefore good—as being God, how can evil be inherent in Matter, which (since it is eternal) must needs be believed to be the highest good? Else if that which is eternal prove to be also capable of evil, this [evil] will be able to be also believed of God to His prejudice;[6] so that it is without adequate reason that he has been so anxious[7] to remove evil from God; since evil must be compatible with an eternal Being, even by being made compatible with Matter, [as Hermogenes makes it.] But, as the argument now stands,[8] since what is eternal can be deemed evil, the evil must prove

[1] Male [in reference to His alleged complicity with *evil*].
[2] Et tamen. [3] Definimus. [4] Competere illi. [5] Alias.
[6] Et in Deum credi. [7] Gestivit. [8] Jam vero.

to be invincible and insuperable, as being eternal; and in that case[1] it will be in vain that we labour "to put away evil from the midst of us;"[2] in that case, moreover, God vainly gives us such a command and precept; nay more, in vain has God appointed any judgment at all, when He means, indeed,[3] to inflict punishment with injustice. But if, on the other hand, there is to be an end of evil, when the chief thereof, the devil, shall "go away into the fire which God hath prepared for him and his angels"[4]—having been first "cast into the bottomless pit;"[5] when likewise "the manifestation of the children of God"[6] shall have "delivered the creature"[7] from evil, which had been "made subject to vanity;"[8] when the cattle restored in the innocence and integrity of their nature[9] shall be at peace[10] with the beasts of the field, when also little children shall play with serpents;[11] when the Father shall have put beneath the feet of His Son His enemies,[12] as being the workers of evil,—if in this way an *end* is compatible with evil, it must follow of necessity that a *beginning* is also compatible with it; and Matter will turn out to have a beginning, by virtue of its having also an end. For whatever things are set to the account of evil,[13] have a compatibility with the condition of evil.

CHAP. XII.—*Tertullian changes his mode in the controversy. He now accepts the premises of Hermogenes, in order to show into what confusion they lead him.*

Come now, let us suppose Matter to be evil, nay, very evil, by *nature* of course, just as we believe God to be good, even very good, in like manner by *nature*. Now nature must be regarded as sure and fixed, just as persistently fixed in evil in the case of Matter, as immoveable and unchangeable in

[1] Tum. [2] [1 Cor. v. 13.]
[3] Utique [with a touch of irony, in the *argumentum ad hominem*.]
[4] [Matt. xxv. 41.] [5] [Rev. xx. 3.] [6] [Rom. viii. 19.]
[7] [Rom. viii. 21.] [8] [Rom. viii. 20.]
[9] Conditionis ["creation"]. [10] Condixerint.
[11] [Isa. xi. 6.] [12] [Ps. cx. 1.] [13] Male deputantur.

good in the case of God. Because, as is evident,[1] if nature admits of change from evil to good in Matter, it can be changed from good to evil in God. Here some man will say, Then will "children not be raised up to Abraham from the stones?"[2] Will "generations of vipers not bring forth the fruit of repentance?"[3] And "children of wrath" fail to become sons of peace, if nature be unchangeable? Your reference to such examples as these, my friend,[4] is a thoughtless[5] one. For things which owe their existence to birth—such as stones and vipers and human beings—are not apposite to the case of Matter, which is unborn; since their nature, by possessing a beginning, may have also a termination. But bear in mind[6] that Matter has once for all been determined to be eternal, as being unmade, unborn, and therefore supposably of an unchangeable and incorruptible nature; and this from the very opinion of Hermogenes himself, which he alleges against us when he denies that God was able to make [anything] of Himself, on the ground that what is eternal is incapable of change, because it would lose—so the opinion runs[7]—what it once was, in becoming by the change that which it was not, if it were not eternal. But as for the Lord, who is also eternal, [he maintained] that He could not be anything else than what He always is. Well, then, I will adopt this definite opinion of his, and by means thereof refute him. I blame Matter with a like censure, because out of it, evil though it be—nay, very evil—good things have been created, ay, "very good" ones: "And God saw that they were good, and God blessed them"[8]—because, of course, of their very great goodness; certainly not because they were evil, or very evil. Change is therefore admissible in Matter; and this being the case, it has lost its condition of eternity; in short,[9] its beauty is decayed in death.[10] Eternity, however, cannot be lost, because it cannot be eternity, except by reason of its immunity from loss.

[1] Scilicet. [2] [Matt. iii. 9.] [3] [Vers. 7, 8.]
[4] O homo. [5] Temere. [6] Tene.
[7] Scilicet. [8] [Gen. i. 21, 22.] [9] Denique.
[10] [That is, of course, by its own natural law.]

For the same reason also it is incapable of change, inasmuch as, since it is eternity, it can by no means be changed.

CHAP. XIII.—*Tertullian takes up another ground of his opponent, that Matter has some good in it, and exhibits its absurdity.*

Here the question will arise, How creatures were made good out of it,[1] which were formed without any change at all?[2] How occurs the seed of what is good, ay, very good, in that which is evil, nay, very evil? Surely a good tree does not produce evil fruit,[3] since there is no God who is not good; nor does an evil tree yield good fruit, since there is not Matter except what is very evil. Or if we were to grant him that there is some germ of good [in it], then there will be no longer a uniform nature [pervading it], that is to say, one which is evil throughout; but instead thereof [we now encounter] a double nature, partly good and partly evil; and again the question will arise, whether, in a subject which is good and evil, there could possibly have been found a harmony for light and darkness, for sweet and bitter? So again, if qualities so utterly diverse as good and evil have been able to unite together,[4] and have imparted to Matter a double nature, productive of both kinds of fruit, then no longer will absolutely[5] good things be imputable to God, just as evil things are not ascribed to Him, but both qualities will appertain to Matter, since they are derived from the property of Matter. At this rate, we shall owe to God neither gratitude for good things, nor grudge[6] for evil ones, because He has produced no work of His own proper character.[7] From which circumstance will arise the clear proof that He has been subservient to Matter.

[1] [Matter.]

[2] [*i.e.* in their nature, Matter being evil, and they good, on the hypothesis.]

[3] [Matt. vii. 18.]

[4] Concurrisse.

[5] Ipsa.

[6] Invidiam.

[7] Ingenio.

CHAP. XIV.—*Tertullian pushes his opponent into a dilemma.*

Now, if it be also argued, that although Matter may have afforded Him the opportunity, it was still His own will which led Him to the creation of good creatures, as having detected[1] what was good in matter—although this, too, be a discreditable supposition[2]—yet, at any rate, when He produces evil likewise out of the same [Matter], He is a servant to Matter, since, of course,[3] it is not of His own accord that He produces this too, having nothing else that He can do than to effect creation out of an evil [stock][4]—unwillingly, no doubt, as being good; of necessity, too, as being unwilling; and as an act of servitude, because from necessity. Which, then, is the worthier thought, that He created evil things of necessity, or of His own accord? Because it was indeed of necessity that He created them, if out of Matter; of His own accord, if out of nothing. For you are now labouring in vain when you try to avoid making God the Author of evil things; because, since He made all things of Matter, they will have to be ascribed to Himself, who made them, just because[5] He made them. Plainly the interest of the question, whence He made all things, identifies itself with [the question], whether He made all things out of nothing; and it matters not whence He made all things, so that He made all things thence, whence most glory accrued to Him.[6] Now, more glory accrued to Him from a creation of His own will than from one of necessity; in other words, from a creation out of nothing, than from one out of Matter. It is more worthy to believe that God is free, even as the Author of evil, than that He is a slave. Power, whatever it be, is more suited to Him than infirmity.[7] If we thus even admit that matter had nothing good in it, but that the Lord produced whatever

[1] Nactus. [2] Turpe. [3] Utique.
[4] Ex malo. [5] Proinde quatenus.
[6] [We subjoin the original of this sentence: "Plane sic interest unde fecerit ac si de nihilo fecisset, nec interest unde fecerit, ut inde fecerit unde eum magis decuit."]
[7] Pusillitas.

good He did produce of His own power, then some other questions will with equal reason arise. First, since there was no good at all in Matter, [it is clear] that good was not made of Matter, on the express ground indeed that Matter did not possess it. Next, if [good was] not [made] of Matter, it must then have been made of God; if not of God, then it must have been made of nothing. For this is the alternative, on Hermogenes' own showing.[1]

CHAP. XV.—*Tertullian presses his opponent so closely as to be able to rescue from his floundering the truth, that God made all things from nothing.*

Now, if good was neither produced out of matter, since it was not in it, evil as it was, nor out of God, since, according to the position of Hermogenes, nothing could have been produced out of God, it will be found that good was created out of nothing, inasmuch as it was formed of none—neither of Matter nor of God. And if good was formed out of nothing, why not evil too? Nay, if anything was formed out of nothing, why not all things? Unless indeed it be that the divine might was insufficient for the production of *all* things, though it produced a something out of nothing. Or else if good proceeded from evil matter, since it issued neither from nothing nor from God, it will follow that it must have proceeded from the conversion of Matter contrary to that unchangeable attribute which has been claimed for [it, as] an eternal being.[2] Thus, in regard to the source whence good derived its existence, Hermogenes will now have to deny the possibility of such. But still it is necessary that [good] should proceed from some one of those sources from which he has denied the very possibility of its having been derived.

[1] Secundum Hermogenis dispositionem.

[2] Contra denegatam æterni conversionem. [Literally, "Contrary to that convertibility of an eternal nature which has been denied [by Hermogenes] to be possible." It will be obvious why we have, in connection with the preceding clause, preferred the equivalent rendering of our text. For the denial of Hermogenes, which Tertullian refers to, see above, chap. xii.]

Now if evil be denied to be of nothing for the purpose of denying it to be the work of God, from whose will there would be too much appearance of its being derived, and be alleged to proceed from Matter, that it may be the property of that very thing of whose substance it is assumed to be made, even here also, as I have said, God will have to be regarded as the Author of evil; because, whereas it had been His duty[1] to produce all good things out of Matter, or rather good things simply, by His identical attribute of power and will, He did yet [not only] not produce all good things, but even [some] evil things—of course, either willing that the evil should exist if He was able to cause their non-existence, or not being strong enough to effect that all things should be good, if being desirous of that result, He failed in the accomplishment thereof; since there can be no difference whether it were by weakness or by will that the Lord proved to be the Author of evil. Else what was the reason that, after creating good things, as if Himself good, He should have also produced evil things, as if He failed in His goodness, since He did not confine Himself to the production of things which were simply consistent with Himself? What necessity was there, after the production of His proper work, for His troubling Himself about Matter also by producing evil likewise, in order to secure His being alone acknowledged as good from His good, and at the same time[2] to prevent Matter being regarded as evil from [created] evil? Good would have flourished much better if evil had not blown upon it. For Hermogenes himself explodes the arguments of sundry persons who contend that evil things were necessary to impart lustre to the good, which must be understood from their contrasts. This, therefore, was not the ground for the production of evil; but if some other reason must be sought for the introduction thereof, why could it not have been introduced even from nothing,[3] since the very same reason would excul-

[1] Debuisset protulisse.

[2] [This clumsy expedient to save the character of both God and Matter was one of the weaknesses of Hermogenes' system.]

[3] Cur non et ex nihilo potuerit induci?

pate the Lord from the reproach of being thought the author of evil, which now excuses [the existence of] evil things, when He produces them out of Matter? And if there is this excuse, then the question is completely[1] shut up in a corner, where they are unwilling to find it, who, without examining into the reason itself of evil, or distinguishing how they should either attribute it to God or separate it from God, do in fact expose God to many most unworthy calumnies.[2]

CHAP. XVI.—*By a series of dilemmas, Tertullian shows that Hermogenes cannot escape from the orthodox conclusion.*

On the very threshold,[3] then, of this doctrine,[4] which I shall probably have to treat of elsewhere, I distinctly lay it down as my position, that both good and evil must be ascribed either to God, who made them out of Matter; or to Matter itself, out of which He made them; or both one and the other to both of them together,[5] because they are bound together—both He who created, and that out of which He created; or [lastly], one to One, and the other to the Other,[6] because after Matter and God there is not a third. Now if both should prove to belong *to God*, God evidently will be the author of evil; but God, as being good, cannot be the author of evil. Again, if both are ascribed *to Matter*, Matter will evidently be the very mother of good;[7] but inasmuch as Matter is wholly evil, it cannot be the mother of good. But if both one and the other should be thought to belong to Both together, then in this case also Matter will be comparable with God; and both will be equal, being on equal terms allied to evil as well as to good. Matter, however, ought not to be compared with God, in order that it may not make two gods. If, [lastly,] one be ascribed to One, and the other to

[1] Ubique et undique.

[2] Destructionibus. ["Ruin of character" is the true idea of this strong term.]

[3] Præstructione. [The notion is of the *foundation* of an edifice; here = "preliminary remarks" (see our *Anti-Marcion*, v. 5, p. 390).]

[4] Articuli.

[5] Utrumque utrique.

[6] Alterum alteri.

[7] Boni matrix.

the Other—that is to say, let the good be God's, and the evil belong to Matter—then, on the one hand, evil must not be ascribed to God, nor, on the other hand, good to Matter. And God, moreover, by making both good things and evil things out of Matter, creates [them] along with it. This being the case, I cannot tell how Hermogenes[1] is to escape from my conclusion; for he supposes that God cannot be the author of evil, in what way soever He created evil out of Matter, whether it was of His own will, or of necessity, or from the reason [of the case]. If, however, He is the author of evil, who was the actual Creator, Matter being simply associated [with Him] by reason of its furnishing Him with substance,[2] you now do away with the cause[3] of [your] introducing Matter. For it is not the less [true], that it is by means of Matter that God shows Himself the author of evil, although Matter has been assumed [by you] expressly to prevent God's seeming to be the author of evil. Matter being therefore excluded, since the cause of it is excluded, it remains that God, without doubt, must have made all things out of nothing. Whether evil things were amongst them we shall see, when it shall be made clear what are evil things, and whether those things are evil which you at present deem to be so. For it is more worthy of God that He produced even these of His own will, by producing them out of nothing, than from the predetermination of another,[4] [which must have been the case] if He had produced them out of Matter. It is liberty, not necessity, which suits the character of God. I would much rather that He should have even willed to create evil of Himself, than that He should have lacked ability to hinder its creation.

[1] [The usual reading is "Hermogenes." Rigaltius, however, reads "Hermogenis," of which Oehler approves; so as to make Tertullian say, "I cannot tell how I can avoid the opinion of Hermogenes, who," etc. etc.]

[2] Per substantiæ suggestum.

[3] Excusas jam causam. [Hermogenes held that Matter was eternal, to exclude God from the authorship of evil. This "*causa*" of Matter he was now illogically evading. (Excusare = ex, causa, "to cancel the cause.")]

[4] De præjudicio alieno.

CHAP. XVII.—*Tertullian expounds the truth of God's work in creation. You cannot depart in the least from it, without landing yourself in an absurdity.*

This rule is required by the nature of the One-only God,[1] who is One-only in no other way than as the sole God; and in no other way sole, than as having nothing else [co-existent] with Him. So also He will be first, because all things are after Him; and all things are after Him, because all things are by Him; and all things are by Him, because they are of nothing: so that reason coincides with the Scripture, which says: "Who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been His counsellor? or with whom took He counsel? or who hath shown to Him the way of wisdom and knowledge? Who hath first given to Him, and it shall be recompensed to him again?"[2] Surely none! Because there was present with Him no power, no material, no nature which belonged to any other than Himself. But if it was with some [portion of Matter][3] that He effected His creation, He must have received from that [Matter] itself both the design and the treatment of its order, as being "the way of wisdom and knowledge." For He had to operate conformably with the quality of the thing, and according to the nature of Matter, not according to His own will; in consequence of which He must have made[4] even evil things suitably to the nature not of Himself, but of Matter.

CHAP. XVIII.—*A eulogy on the Wisdom and Word of God, by which God made all things of nothing.*

If any material was necessary to God in the creation of the world, as Hermogenes supposed, God had a far nobler and more suitable one in His own wisdom[5]—one which was not to be gauged by the writings of[6] philosophers, but to be learnt from the words of[6] prophets. This alone, indeed, knew the mind of the Lord. For "who knoweth the things

[1] Unici Dei. [2] [Rom. xi. 34, 35; comp. Isa. xl. 14.]
[3] De aliquo. [4] Adeo ut fecerit. [5] Sophiam suam scilicet.
[6] Apud.

of God, and the things in God, but the Spirit, which is in Him?"[1] Now His wisdom is that Spirit. This was His counsellor, the very way of His wisdom and knowledge.[2] Of this He made all things, making them through It, and making them with It. "When He prepared the heavens," so says [the Scripture[3]], "I was present with Him; and when He strengthened above the winds the lofty clouds, and when He secured the fountains[4] which are under the heaven, I was present, compacting these things[5] along with Him. I was He[6] in whom He took delight; moreover, I daily rejoiced in His presence: for He rejoiced when He had finished the world, and amongst the sons of men did He show forth His pleasure."[7] Now, who would not rather approve of[8] this as the fountain and origin of all things—of this as, in very deed, the Matter of all Matter, not liable to any end,[9] not diverse in condition, not restless in motion, not ungraceful in form, but natural, and proper, and duly proportioned, and beautiful, such truly as even God might well have required, who requires His own and not another's? Indeed, as soon as He perceived It to be necessary for His creation of the world, He immediately creates It, and generates It in Himself. "The Lord," says the Scripture, "possessed[10] me, the beginning of His ways for the creation of His works. Before the worlds He founded me; before He made the earth, before the mountains were settled in their places; moreover, before the hills He generated me, and prior to the depths was I begotten."[11] Let Hermogenes then confess that the very Wisdom of God is declared to be born and created, for the especial reason that we should not suppose that there is

[1] [1 Cor. ii. 11.] [2] [Isa. xl. 14.]

[3] [Or the "inquit" may indicate the very words of "Wisdom."]

[4] Fontes. [Although Oehler prefers Junius' reading "montes," he yet retains "fontes," because Tertullian (in ch. xxxii. below) has the unmistakeable reading "fontes" in a like connection.]

[5] Compingens. [6] Ad quem [the expression is masculine].

[7] [Prov. viii. 27–31.] [8] Commendet.

[9] ["Non fini subditam" is Oehler's better reading than the old "sibi subditam."]

[10] Condidit ["created"]. [11] [See Prov. viii.]

any other being than God alone who is unbegotten and uncreated. For if that, which from its being inherent in the Lord[1] was of Him and in Him, was yet not without a beginning,—I mean[2] His wisdom, which was then born and created, when in the thought of God It began to assume motion[3] for the arrangement of His creative works,—how much more impossible[4] is it that anything should have been without a beginning which was extrinsic to the Lord![5] But if this same Wisdom is the Word of God, in the capacity[6] of Wisdom, and [as being He] without whom nothing was made, just as also [nothing] was set in order without Wisdom, how can it be that anything, except the Father, should be older, and on this account indeed nobler, than the Son of God, the only-begotten and first-begotten Word? Not to say that[7] what is unbegotten is stronger than that which is born, and what is not made more powerful than that which is made. Because that which did not require a Maker to give it existence, will be much more elevated in rank than that which had an author to bring it into being. On this principle, then,[8] if evil is indeed unbegotten, whilst the Son of God is begotten ("for," says God, "my heart hath emitted my most excellent Word"[9]), I am not quite sure that evil may not be introduced by good, the stronger by the weak, in the same way as the unbegotten is by the begotten. Therefore on this ground Hermogenes puts Matter even before God, by putting it before the Son. Because the Son is the Word, and "the Word is God,"[10] and "I and my Father are one."[11] But after all, perhaps,[12] the Son will patiently enough submit to having that preferred before Him, which [by our heretic] is made equal to the Father!

[1] Intra Dominum. [2] Scilicet. [3] Cœpit agitari.
[4] Multo magis non capit. [5] Extra Dominum. [6] Sensu.
[7] Nedum. [8] Proinde.
[9] [On this version of Ps. xlv. 1, and its application by Tertullian, see our *Anti-Marcion* (p. 66, note 5).]
[10] [John i. 1.] [11] [John x. 30.] [12] Nisi quod.

CHAP. XIX.—*Tertullian follows Hermogenes in an appeal to the history of creation. True meaning of the term* "BEGINNING," *which the heretic curiously wrests to an absurd sense.*

But I shall appeal to the original document[1] of Moses, by help of which they on the other side vainly endeavour to prop up their conjectures, with the view, of course, of appearing to have the support of that authority which is indispensable in such an inquiry. They have found their opportunity, as is usual with heretics, in wresting the plain meaning of certain words. For instance, the very "*beginning*,"[2] when God made the heaven and the earth, they will construe as if it meant something substantial and embodied,[3] to be regarded as Matter. We, however, insist on the proper signification of every word, [and say] that *principium* means beginning, —being a term which is suitable to represent things which begin to exist. For nothing which has to come into being is without a beginning, nor can this its commencement be at any other moment than when it begins to have existence. Thus *principium*, or beginning, is simply a term of inception, not the name of a substance. Now, inasmuch as the heaven and the earth are the principal works of God, and since, by His making them first, He constituted them in an especial manner the beginning of His creation, before all things else, with good reason does the Scripture preface [its record of creation] with the words, "In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth;"[4] just as it would have said, "At last God made the heaven and the earth," if God had created these after all the rest. Now, if the beginning is a substance, the end must also be material. No doubt, a substantial thing[5] may be the beginning of some other thing which may be formed out of it; thus the clay is the beginning of the vessel, and the seed is the beginning of the plant. But

[1] Originale instrumentum [which may mean "the document which treats of the origin of all things"].

[2] Principium.

[3] Corpulentum.

[4] [Gen. i. 1.]

[5] Substantivum aliquid.

when we employ the word beginning in this sense of *origin*, and not in that of *order*, we do not omit to mention also the name of that particular thing which we regard as the origin of the other. On the other hand,[1] if we were to make such a statement as this, for example, "In the beginning the potter made a basin or a water-jug," the word beginning will not here indicate a material substance (for I have not mentioned the clay, which is the beginning [in this sense]), but only the *order* of the work, meaning that the potter made the basin and the jug first, before anything else—intending afterwards to make the rest. It is, then, to the order of the works that the word beginning has reference, not to the origin of their substances. I might also explain this word *beginning* in another way, which would not, however, be inapposite.[2] The Greek term for beginning, which is *'APXH*, admits the sense not only of priority of order, but of power as well; whence princes and magistrates are called *'APXONTEΣ*. Therefore in this sense too, *beginning* may be taken for princely authority and power. It was, indeed, in His transcendent authority and power, that God made the heaven and the earth.

CHAP. XX.—*Meaning of the phrase* "IN THE BEGINNING." *Tertullian connects it with the Wisdom of God, and elicits from it the truth that the creation was not out of pre-existent matter.*

But in proof that the Greek word means nothing else than beginning, and that *beginning* admits of no other sense than the *initial* one, we have that [Being][3] even acknowledging such a beginning, who says: "The Lord possessed[4] me, the beginning of His ways for the creation of His works."[5] For since all things were made by the Wisdom of God, it follows that, when God made both the heaven and the earth *in principio*—that is to say, in the beginning—He made them in His Wisdom. If, indeed, beginning had a *material* signification, the Scripture would not have informed us that God

[1] De cetero. [2] Non ab re tamen. [3] Illam . . . quæ.
[4] Condidit ["created"]. [5] [Prov. viii. 22.]

made so and so *in principio*, at the beginning, but rather *ex principio*, of the beginning; for He would not have created *in*, but *of*, matter. When Wisdom, however, was referred to, it was quite right to say, in the beginning. For it was in Wisdom that He made all things at first, because by meditating and arranging His plans therein,[1] He had in fact already done [the work of creation]; and if He had even intended to create out of matter, He would yet have effected His creation when He previously meditated on it and arranged it in His Wisdom, since It[2] was in fact the beginning of His ways: this meditation and arrangement being the primal operation of Wisdom, opening as it does the way to the works by the act of meditation and thought.[3] This authority of Scripture I claim for myself even from this circumstance, that whilst it shows me the God who created, and the works He created, it does not in like manner reveal to me the source from which He created. For since in every operation there are three principal things, He who makes, and that which is made, and that of which it is made, there must be three names mentioned in a correct narrative of the operation—the person of the maker, the sort of thing which is made,[4] [and] the material of which it is formed. If the material is not mentioned, while the work and the maker of the work are both mentioned, it is manifest that He made the work out of nothing. For if He had had anything to operate upon, it would have been mentioned as well as [the other two particulars].[5] In conclusion, I will apply the Gospel as a supplementary testimony to the Old Testament. Now in this there is all the greater reason why there should be shown the material (if there were any) out of which God made all things, inasmuch as it is therein plainly revealed by whom He made all things. "In the beginning was the Word"[6]—that is, the same beginning, of course, in which God made the heaven and the earth,[7]—"and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. All things were made by Him, and

[1] In qua ["in Wisdom"].
[2] [Wisdom.]
[3] De cogitatu.
[4] Species facti.
[5] Proinde.
[6] [John i. 1.]
[7] [Gen. i. 1.]

without Him nothing was made."[1] Now, since we have here clearly told us who the Maker was, that is, God, and what He made, even all things, and through whom He made them, even His Word, would not the order of the narrative have required that the source out of which all things were made by God through the Word should likewise be declared, if they had been in fact made out of anything? What, therefore, did not exist, the Scripture was unable to mention; and by not mentioning it, it has given us a clear proof that there was no such thing: for if there had been, the Scripture would have mentioned it.

CHAP. XXI.—*Tertullian meets a retort of his opponents, and shows how superfluous it is that Scripture should in so many words tell us that the world was made of nothing.*

But, you will say to me, if you determine that all things were made of nothing, on the ground that it is not told us that anything was made out of pre-existent Matter, take care that it be not contended on the opposite side, that on the same ground all things were made out of Matter, because it is not likewise expressly said that anything was made out of nothing. Some arguments may, of course,[2] be thus retorted easily enough; but it does not follow that they are on that account fairly admissible, where there is a diversity in the cause. For I maintain that, even if the Scripture has not expressly declared that all things were made out of nothing—just as it abstains [from saying that they were formed] out of Matter—there was no such pressing need for expressly indicating the creation of all things out of nothing, as there was of their creation out of Matter, if that had been their origin. Because, in the case of what is made out of nothing, the very fact of its not being indicated that it was made of any particular thing shows that it was made of nothing; and there is no danger of its being supposed that it was made of anything, when there is no indication at all of what it was made of. In the case, however, of that which is made out of something, unless the very fact

[1] [John i. 1–3.] [2] Plane.

be plainly declared, that it was made out of something, there will be danger, until[1] it is shown of what it was made, first of its appearing to be made of nothing, because it is not said of what it was made; and then, should it be of such a nature[2] as to have the appearance of having certainly been made of something, there will be a similar risk of its seeming to have been made of a far different material from the proper one, so long as there is an absence of statement of what it was made of. Then, if God had been unable to make all things of nothing, the Scripture could not possibly have added that He had made all things of nothing: [there could have been no room for such a statement,] but it must by all means have informed us that He had made all things out of Matter, since Matter must have been the source; because the one case was quite to be understood,[3] if it were not actually stated, whereas the other case would be left in doubt unless it were stated.

CHAP. XXII.—*This conclusion confirmed by the usage of Holy Scripture in its history of the creation. Hermogenes in danger of the "woe" pronounced against adding to Scripture.*

And to such a degree has the Holy Ghost made this the rule of His Scripture, that whenever anything is made out of anything, He mentions both the thing that is made and the thing of which it is made. "Let the earth," says He, "bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit after its kind, whose seed is in itself, after its kind. And it was so. And the earth brought forth grass, and herb yielding seed after its kind, and the tree yielding fruit, whose seed was in itself, after its kind."[4] And again: "And God said, Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creatures that have life, and fowl that may fly above the earth through the firmament of heaven. And it was so. And God

[1] Dum ostenditur [which Oehler and Rigalt. construe as "donec ostendatur." One reading has "dum *non* ostenditur," "so long as it is not shown"].

[2] Ea conditione. [3] In totum habebat intelligi. [4] [Gen. i. 11, 12.]

created great whales, and every living creature that moveth, which the waters brought forth abundantly, after their kind."[1] Again afterwards: "And God said, Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle, and creeping thing, and beasts of the earth after their kind."[2] If therefore God, when producing other things out of things which had been already made, indicates them by the prophet, and tells us what He has produced from such and such a source[3] (although we might ourselves suppose them to be derived from some source or other, short of nothing;[4] since there had already been created certain things, from which they might easily seem to have been made); if the Holy Ghost took upon Himself so great a concern for our instruction, that we might know from what everything was produced,[5] would He not in like manner have kept us well informed about both the heaven and the earth, by indicating to us what it was that He made them of, if their original consisted of any material substance, so that the more He seemed to have made them of nothing, the less in fact was there as yet made, from which He could appear to have made them? Therefore, just as He shows us the original out of which He drew such things as were derived from a given source, so also with regard to those things of which He does not point out whence He produced them, He confirms [by that silence our assertion] that they were produced out of nothing. "In the beginning," then, "God made the heaven and the earth."[6] I revere[7] the fulness of His Scripture, in which He manifests to me both the Creator and the creation. In the gospel, moreover, I discover a Minister and Witness of the Creator, even His Word.[8] But whether all things were made out of any underlying Matter, I have as yet failed any-

[1] [Gen. i. 20, 21.] [2] [Ver. 24.]

[3] Quid unde protulerit [properly a double question = "what He produced, and whence?"].

[4] Unde unde . . . dumne.

[5] Quid unde processerit [properly a double question = "what was produced, and whence?"].

[6] [Gen. i. 1.] [7] Adoro ["reverently admire"]. [8] [John i. 3.]

where to find. Where such a statement is written, Hermogenes' shop[1] must tell us. If it is nowhere written, then let it fear the *woe* which impends on all who add to or take away from [the written word].[2]

CHAP. XXIII.—*Tertullian pursues his opponent to another passage of Scripture, and exposes the absurdity of his interpretation thereof.*

But he draws an argument from the following words, where it is written: "And the earth was without form, and void."[3] For he resolves[4] the word *earth* into Matter, because that which is made out of it is the earth. And to the word *was* he gives the same direction, as if it pointed to what had always existed unbegotten and unmade. It was *without form*, moreover, *and* void, because he will have Matter to have existed shapeless and confused, and without the finish of a maker's hand.[5] Now these opinions of his I will refute singly; but first I wish to say to him, by way of general answer: We are of opinion that Matter is pointed at in these terms. But yet does the Scripture intimate that, because Matter was in existence before all, anything of like condition[6] was even formed out of it? Nothing of the kind. Matter might have had existence, if it so pleased—or rather if Hermogenes so pleased. It might, [I say,] have existed, and yet God might not have made anything out of it, either as it was unsuitable to Him to have required the aid of anything, or at least because He is not shown to have made anything out of Matter. Its existence must therefore be without a cause, you will say. Oh, no! certainly[7] not without cause. For even if the world were not made out of it, yet a heresy has been hatched therefrom; and a specially impudent one too, because it is not Matter which has produced the heresy, but the heresy has rather made Matter itself.

[1] Officina.
[2] [Rev. xxii. 18, 19.]
[3] [Gen. i. 2.]
[4] Redigit in.
[5] Inconditam [we have combined the two senses of the word].
[6] Tale aliquid.
[7] Plane [ironical].

CHAP. XXIV.—"EARTH" *does not mean* "MATTER," *as Hermogenes would have it.*

I now return to the several points[1] by means of which he thought that Matter was signified. And first I will inquire about the terms. For we read only of one of them, *Earth;* the other, namely *Matter*, we do not meet with. I ask, then, since Matter is not mentioned in Scripture, how the term earth can be applied to it, which marks a substance of another kind? There is all the greater need why mention should also have been made of Matter, if this has acquired the further sense of Earth, in order that I may be sure that Earth is one and the same name as Matter, and so not claim the designation for merely one substance, as the proper name thereof, and by which it is better known; or else be unable (if I should feel the inclination) to apply it to some particular species of Matter, instead, indeed,[2] of making it the common term[3] of all Matter. For when a proper name does not exist for that thing to which a common term is ascribed, the less apparent[4] is the object to which it may be ascribed, [the more] capable will it be of being applied to any other object whatever. Therefore, even supposing that Hermogenes could show us the *name*[5] Matter, he is bound to prove to us further, that the same object has the *surname*[6] Earth, in order that he may claim for it both designations alike.

CHAP. XXV.—*The curious assumption of Hermogenes, that there are* TWO EARTHS *mentioned in the history of the creation, refuted.*

He accordingly maintains that there are two earths set before us in the passage in question: one, which God made

[1] Articulos. [2] Nec utique. [3] Communicare.

[4] [We have construed Oehler's reading: "Quanto non comparet" (*i.e.*, by a frequent ellipse of Tertullian, "quanto *magis* non comparet"). Fr. Junius, however, suspects that instead of "quanto" we should read "quando:" this would produce the sense, "since it is not apparent to what object it may be ascribed," etc.]

[5] Nominatam. [6] Cognominatam.

in the beginning; the other being the Matter of which God made the world, and concerning which it is said, "And the earth was without form, and void."[1] Of course, if I were to ask, to which of the two earths the name *earth* is best suited,[2] I shall be told that the earth which was made derived the appellation from that of which it was made, on the ground that it is more likely that the offspring should get its name from the original, than the original from the offspring. This being the case, another question presents itself to us, whether it is right and proper that this earth which God made should have derived its name from that out of which He made it? For I find from Hermogenes and the rest of the *Materialist* heretics,[3] that while the one earth was indeed "without form, and void," this one of ours obtained from God in an equal degree[4] both form, and beauty, and symmetry; and therefore that the earth which was created was a different thing from that out of which it was created. Now, having become a different thing, it could not possibly have shared with the other in its name, after it had declined from its condition. If *earth* was the proper name of the [original] Matter, this world of ours, which is not Matter, because it has become another thing, is unfit to bear the name of earth, seeing that that name belongs to something else, and is a stranger to its nature. But [you will tell me] Matter which has undergone creation, that is, our earth, had with its original a community of name no less than of kind. By no means, [is my reply]. For although the pitcher is formed out of the clay, I shall no longer call it clay, but a pitcher; so likewise, although *electrum*[5] is compounded of gold and silver, I shall yet not call it either gold or silver, but electrum. When there is a departure from the nature of anything, there is likewise a relinquishment of its name

[1] [Gen. i. 2.]

[2] Quæ cui nomen terræ accommodare debeat. [This is literally a double question, asking about the fitness of the name, and to which earth it is best adapted.]

[3] [He means those who have gone wrong on the eternity of *matter*.]

[4] Proinde.

[5] [A mixed metal, of the colour of *amber*.]

—with a propriety which is alike demanded by the designation and the condition. How great a change indeed from the condition of that earth, which is Matter, has come over this earth of ours, is plain even from the fact that the latter has received this testimony to its goodness in Genesis, "And God saw that it was good;"[1] while the former, according to Hermogenes, is regarded as the origin and cause of all evils. Lastly, if the one is Earth because the other is, why also is the one not Matter as the other is? Indeed, by this rule both the heaven and all creatures ought to have had the names of *Earth* and *Matter*, since they all consist of Matter. I have said enough touching the designation Earth, by which he will have it that Matter is understood. This, as everybody knows, is the name of one of the elements; for so we are taught by nature first, and afterwards by Scripture, except it be that credence must be given to that Silenus who talked so confidently in the presence of king Midas of another world, according to the account of Theopompus. But the same author informs us that there are also several gods.

CHAP. XXVI.—*Tertullian with admirable terseness sets forth the method observed in the history of the creation, in reply to the perverse interpretation of Hermogenes.*

We, however, have but one God, and but one earth too, which in the beginning God made.[2] The Scripture, which at its very outset proposes to run through the order thereof, tells us as its first information that it was created; it next proceeds to set forth what sort of earth it was.[3] In like manner with respect to the heaven, it informs us first of its creation—"In the beginning God made the heaven:"[4] it then goes on to introduce its arrangement; how that God both separated "the water which was below the firmament from that which was above the firmament,"[5] and called the firmament heaven,[6]—the very thing He had created in the

[1] [Gen. i. 31.] [2] [Gen. i. 1.]

[3] Qualitatem ejus [unless this means "*how* He made it," like the "qualiter fecerit" below].

[4] [Gen. i. 1.] [5] [Gen. i. 7.] [6] [Ver. 8.]

beginning. Similarly it [afterwards] treats of man: "And God created man, in the image of God made He him."[1] It next reveals how He made him: "And [the Lord] God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul."[2] Now this is undoubtedly[3] the correct and fitting mode for the narrative. First comes a prefatory statement, then follow the details in full;[4] first the subject is named, then it is described.[5] How absurd is the other view of the account,[6] when even before he[7] had premised any mention of his subject, *i.e.* Matter, without even giving us its name, he all on a sudden promulged its form and condition, describing to us its quality before mentioning its existence,—pointing out the figure of the thing formed, [but] concealing its name! But how much more credible is our opinion, which holds that Scripture has only subjoined the arrangement of the subject after it has first duly described its formation and mentioned its name! Indeed, how full and complete[8] is the meaning of these words: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth; but[9] the earth was without form, and void,"[10]—the very same earth, no doubt, which God made, and of which the Scripture had been speaking at that very moment.[11] For that very "*but*"[12] is inserted into the narrative like a clasp,[13] [in its function] of a conjunctive particle, to connect [the two sentences indissolubly together]: "*But* the earth." This word carries back the mind to that earth of which mention had just been made, and binds the sense thereunto.[14] Take away this "but,"

[1] [Gen. i. 27.] [2] [Gen. ii. 7.] [3] Utique. [4] Prosequi.

[5] Primo præfari, postea prosequi; nominare, deinde describere. [This properly is an *abstract* statement, given with Tertullian's usual terseness: "First you should ('decet') give your preface, then follow up with details; first name your subject, then describe it."]

[6] Alioquin.

[7] [Hermogenes, whose view of the narrative is criticised.]

[8] Integer. [9] Autem. [10] [Gen. i. 1, 2.]

[11] Cum maxime edixerat.

[12] [The "autem" of the note just before this.]

[13] Fibula. [14] Alligat sensum.

and the tie is loosened; so much so that the passage, "But the earth was without form, and void," may then seem to have been meant for any other earth.

CHAP. XXVII.—*Tertullian dexterously exposes some hair-splitting use of words in which his opponent had indulged.*

But you next raise your eyebrows, and toss back your head, and beckon with your finger, in characteristic disdain,[1] and say: There is the "*was*," looking as if it pointed to an eternal existence,—making its subject, of course, unbegotten and unmade, and on that account worthy of being supposed to be Matter. Well now, for my own part, I shall resort to no affected protestation,[2] but simply reply that "*was*" may be predicated of everything—even of a thing which has been created, which was born, which once was not, and which is not [your] Matter. For of everything which has being, from whatever source it has it, whether it has it by a beginning or without a beginning, the word "*was*" will be predicated from the very fact that it exists. To whatever thing the first tense[3] of the verb is applicable for *definition*, to the same will be suitable the later form[4] of the verb, when it has to descend to *relation*. "Est" (it is) forms the essential part[5] of a definition, "erat" (it was) of a relation. Such are the trifles and subtleties of heretics, who wrest and bring into question the simple meaning of the commonest words. A grand question it is, to be sure,[6] whether "the earth *was*," which was made! The real point of discussion is, whether "being without form, and void," is a state which is more suitable to that which was created, or to that of which it was created, so that the predicate (*was*) may appertain to the same thing to which the subject (*that which was*) also belongs.[7]

[1] [Implied in the emphatic "tu."]

[2] Sine ullo lenocinio pronunciationis.

[3] Prima positio [the first inflection perhaps, *i.e. the present tense*].

[4] Declinatio [the past tense]. [5] Caput. [6] Scilicet.

[7] [This seems to be the meaning of the obscure passage, "Ut ejusdem sit *Erat* cujus et quod erat."]

CHAP. XXVIII.—*A curious inconsistency in Hermogenes exposed. Certain expressions in the history of creation vindicated in the true sense as opposed to Hermogenes.*

But we shall show not only that this condition[1] agreed with this earth of ours, but that it did not agree with that other [insisted on by Hermogenes]. For, inasmuch as pure Matter was thus subsistent with God,[2] without the interposition indeed of any element at all (because as yet there existed nothing but itself and God), it could not of course have been invisible. Because, although [Hermogenes] contends that darkness was inherent in the substance of Matter, a position which we shall have to meet in its proper place,[3] yet darkness is visible even to a human being (for the very fact that there is the darkness is an evident one), much more is it so to God. If indeed it[4] had been invisible, its quality would not have been by any means discoverable. How, then, did Hermogenes find out[5] that that substance was "without form," and confused and disordered, which, as being invisible, was not palpable to his senses? If this mystery was revealed to him by God, he ought to give us his proof. I want to know also, whether [the substance in question] could have been described as "void." That certainly is "void" which is imperfect. Equally certain is it, that nothing can be imperfect but that which is made; it is imperfect when it is not fully made.[6] Certainly, you admit. Matter, therefore, which was not made at all, could not have been imperfect; and what was not imperfect was not "void." Having no beginning, because it was not made, it was also unsusceptible of any void-condition.[7] For this void-condition is an accident of beginning. The earth, on the contrary, which was made, was deservedly called "void." For as soon as it was made, it had the condition of being imperfect, previous to its completion.

[1] Habitum. [2] Deo subjacebat. [3] [See below, ch. xxx.] [4] [Matter.]
[5] ["Compertus est" is here a deponent verb.] [6] Minus factum.
[7] Rudimento. [Tertullian uses the word "rudis" (unformed) for the scriptural term ["void"]; of this word "rudimentum" is the abstract.]

CHAP. XXIX.—*The gradual development of cosmical order out of chaos in the creation, beautifully stated by Tertullian.*

God, indeed, consummated all His works in a due order; at first He paled them out,[1] as it were, in their unformed elements, and then He arranged them[2] in their finished beauty. For He did not all at once inundate light with the splendour of the sun, nor all at once temper darkness with the moon's assuaging ray.[3] The heaven He did not all at once bedeck[4] with constellations and stars, nor did He at once fill the seas with their teeming monsters.[5] The earth itself He did not endow with its varied fruitfulness all at once; but at first He bestowed upon it being, and then He filled it, that it might not be made in vain.[6] For thus says Isaiah: "He created it not in vain; He formed it to be inhabited."[7] Therefore after it was made, and while awaiting its perfect state,[8] it was "without form, and void:" "void" indeed, from the very fact that it was without form (as being not yet perfect to the sight, and at the same time unfurnished as yet with its other qualities);[9] and "without form," because it was still covered with waters, as if with the rampart of its fecundating moisture,[10] by which is produced our flesh, in a form allied with its own. For to this purport does David say:[11] "The earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof; the world, and all that dwell therein: He hath founded it upon the seas, and on the streams hath He established it."[12] It was when the waters were withdrawn into their hollow abysses that the dry land became conspicuous,[13] which was hitherto covered with its watery envelope. Then it forthwith becomes "visible,"[14] God saying, "Let the

[1] Depalans. [2] Dedicans ["disposed" them].
[3] Solatio lunæ [a beautiful expression!].
[4] Significavit. [5] Belluis. [6] In vacuum [void].
[7] [Isa. xlv. 18.] [8] Futura etiam perfecta.
[9] De reliquo nondum instructa. [10] Genitalis humoris.
[11] Canit ["sing," as the Psalmist].
[12] [Ps. xxiv. 1.] [13] Emicantior.
[14] ["Visibilis" is here the opposite of the term "invisibilis," which Tertullian uses for the Scripture phrase "without form."]

water be gathered together into one mass,[1] and let the dry land appear."[2] "*Appear*," says He, not "*be made*." It had been already made, only in its invisible condition it was then waiting[3] to appear. "Dry," because it was about to become such by its severance from the moisture, but yet "land." "And God called the dry land *Earth*,"[4] not Matter. And so, when it afterwards attains its perfection, it ceases to be accounted void, when God declares, "Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed after its kind, and according to its likeness, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit, whose seed is in itself, after its kind."[5] Again: "Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle, and creeping things, and beasts of the earth, after their kind."[6] Thus the divine Scripture accomplished its full order. For to that, which it had at first described as "without form [invisible], and void," it gave both visibility and completion. Now no other Matter was "without form [invisible], and void." Henceforth, then, Matter will have to be visible and complete. So that I must[7] see Matter, since it has become visible. I must likewise recognise it as a completed thing, so as to be able to gather from it the herb bearing seed, and the tree yielding fruit, and that living creatures, made out of it, may minister to my need. Matter, however, is nowhere;[8] but the Earth is here, confessed to my view. I see it, I enjoy it, ever since it ceased to be "without form [invisible], and void." Concerning it most certainly did Isaiah speak when he said, "Thus saith the Lord that created the heavens, He was the God that formed the earth, and made it."[9] The same earth for certain did He form, which He also made. Now how did He form[10] it? Of course by saying, "Let the dry land appear."[11] Why does He command it to appear, if

[1] In congregatione una.
[2] [Gen. i. 9.]
[3] Sustinebat [*i.e.* expectabat (Oehler)].
[4] [Gen. i. 10.]
[5] [Ver. 11.]
[6] [Ver. 24.]
[7] Volo.
[8] [He means, of course, the theoretic "Matter" of Hermogenes.]
[9] [Isa. xlv. 18.]
[10] Demonstravit ["make it visible." Tertullian here all along makes *form* and *visibility* synonymous].
[11] [Gen. i. 9.]

it were not previously invisible? [His purpose was] also, that He might thus prevent His having made it in vain, by rendering it visible, and so fit for use. And thus, throughout, proofs arise to us that this earth which we inhabit is the very same which was both created and formed[1] by God, and that none other was "without form, and void," than that which had been created and formed. It therefore follows that the sentence, "Now the earth was without form, and void," applies to that same earth which God mentioned separately along with the heaven.[2]

CHAP. XXX.—*Another passage in the sacred history of the creation, skilfully released from the mishandling of Hermogenes.*

The following words will in like manner apparently corroborate the conjecture of Hermogenes, "And darkness was upon the face of the deep, and the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters;"[3] as if these blended[4] substances presented us with arguments for his massive pile [of Matter].[5] Now, so discriminating an enumeration of certain and distinct elements [as we have in this passage], which severally designates "darkness," "the deep," "the Spirit of God," "the waters," forbids the inference that anything confused or (from such confusion) uncertain is meant. Still more, when He ascribed to them their own places,[6] "darkness *on the face of* the deep," "the Spirit *upon the face of* the waters," He repudiated all confusion in the substances; and by demonstrating their separate position,[7] He demonstrated also their distinction. Most absurd, indeed, would it be that Matter, which is introduced to our view as "without form," should have its "formless" condition maintained by so many words indicative of form,[8] without any intimation of what that confused body[9] is, which must of course be supposed to be

[1] Ostensam ["manifested" (see note 10, p. 96)].
[2] Cum cælo separavit [Gen. i. 1].
[3] [Gen. i. 2.]
[4] Confusæ.
[5] Massalis illius molis.
[6] Situs.
[7] Dispositionem.
[8] Tot formarum vocabulis.
[9] Corpus confusionis.

unique,[1] since it is without form.[2] For that which is without form is uniform; but even [3] that which is without form, when it is blended together [4] from various component parts,[5] must necessarily have one outward appearance;[6] and it has not any appearance, until it has the one appearance [which comes] from many parts [combined].[7] Now Matter either had those specific parts [8] within itself, from the words indicative of which it had to be understood—I mean "darkness," and "the deep," and "the Spirit," and "the waters"—or it had them not. If it had them, how is it introduced as being "without form?" [9] If it had them not, how does it become known? [10]

CHAP. XXXI.—*A further vindication of the Scripture narrative of the creation, against a futile view of Hermogenes.*

But this circumstance, too, will be caught at, that Scripture meant to indicate of the heaven only, and this earth of yours,[11] that God made it in the beginning, while nothing of the kind [is said] of the above-mentioned specific parts; [12] and therefore that these, which are not described as having been made, appertain to unformed Matter. To this point [13] also we must give an answer. Holy Scripture would be sufficiently explicit, if it had declared that the heaven and the earth, as the very highest works of creation, were made by God, possessing of course their own special appurtenances,[14] which might be understood to be implied in these highest works themselves. Now the appurtenances of the heaven and the earth, made then in the beginning, were the darkness, and the deep, and the spirit, and the waters. For the depth and the darkness underlay the earth. Since the deep was under the earth, and the darkness was over the deep,

[1] Unicum. [2] Informe. [3] Autem.
[4] Confusum. [5] Ex varietate. [6] Unam speciem.
[7] Unam ex multis speciem. [8] Istas species.
[9] Non habens formas. [10] Agnoscitur.
[11] Ista [the earth, which has been the subject of contention].
[12] Speciebus. [13] Scrupulo [doubt or difficulty].
[14] Suggestus ["Hoc est, apparatus, ornatus" (Oehler)].

undoubtedly both the darkness and the deep were under the earth. Below the heaven, too, lay the spirit[1] and the waters. For since the waters were over the earth, which they covered, whilst the spirit was over the waters, both the spirit and the waters were alike over the earth. Now that which is over the earth, is of course under the heaven. And even as the earth brooded over the deep and the darkness, so also did the heaven brood over the spirit and the waters, and embrace them. Nor, indeed, is there any novelty in mentioning only that which contains, as pertaining to the whole,[2] and understanding that which is contained as included in it, in its character of a portion.[3] Suppose now I should say the city built a theatre and a circus, but the stage[4] was of such and such a kind, and the statues were on the canal, and the obelisk was reared above them all, would it follow that, because I did not distinctly state that these specific things[5] were made by the city, they were therefore not made by it along with the circus and the theatre? Did I not, indeed, refrain from specially mentioning the formation of these particular things, because they were implied in the things which I had already said were made, and might be understood to be inherent in the things in which they were contained? But this example may be an idle one, as being derived from a human circumstance; I will take another, which has the authority of Scripture itself. It says that "God made man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul."[6] Now, although it here mentions the nostrils,[7] it does not say that they were made by God; so again it speaks of skin[8] and bones, and flesh and eyes, and sweat and blood, in subsequent passages,[9] and yet it never intimated that they

[1] [It will be observed that Tertullian applies the "spiritus" to the *wind* as a creature.]

[2] Qua summale. [3] Qua portionale. [4] Scena.

[5] Has species. [6] [Gen. ii. 7.]

[7] [Both in the quotation and here, Tertullian read "faciem" where we read "nostrils."]

[8] Cutem [another reading has "costam," rib].

[9] [See Gen. ii. 21, 23, iii. 5, 19, iv. 10.]

had been created by God. What will Hermogenes have to answer? That the human limbs must belong to Matter, because they are not specially mentioned as objects of creation? Or are they included in the formation of man? In like manner, the deep and the darkness, and the spirit and the waters, were [as] members of the heaven and the earth. For in the bodies the limbs were made, in the bodies the limbs too were mentioned. No element but what is a member of that element in which it is contained. But all elements are contained in the heaven and the earth.

CHAP. XXXII.—*The account of the creation in Genesis is a general one. It is, however, corroborated by many other passages of the Old Testament, which give account of specific creations. Further cavilling of Hermogenes confuted.*

This is the answer I should give in defence of the Scripture before us, for seeming here to set forth[1] the formation of the heaven and the earth, as if [they were] the sole bodies [made]. It could not but know that there were those who would at once in the bodies understand their several members also, and therefore it employed this concise mode of speech. But, at the same time, it foresaw that there would be stupid and crafty men, who, after paltering with the virtual meaning,[2] would require for the several members a word descriptive of their formation too. It is therefore because of such persons, that [Scripture] in other passages teaches us of the creation of the individual parts. You have Wisdom saying, "But before the depths was I brought forth,"[3] in order that you may believe that the depths were also "brought forth"—that is, created—just as we create sons also, though we "bring them forth." It matters not whether the depth was made or born, so that a beginning be accorded to it, which [however] would not be, if it were subjoined[4] to matter. Of darkness, indeed, the Lord Himself by Isaiah says, "I formed the light, and I created darkness."[5] Of the

[1] Quatenus hic commendare videtur.
[2] Dissimulato tacito intellectu.
[3] [Prov. viii. 24.]
[4] Subjecta.
[5] [Isa. xlv. 7.]

wind[1] also Amos says, "He that strengtheneth the thunder,[2] and createth the wind, and declareth His Christ[2] unto men;"[3] thus showing that that wind was created which was reckoned with the formation of the earth, which was wafted over the waters, balancing and refreshing and animating all things: not (as some suppose) meaning God Himself by *the spirit*,[4] on the ground that "God is a Spirit,"[5] because the waters would not be able to bear up their Lord; but He speaks of that spirit of which the winds consist, as He says by Isaiah, "Because my spirit went forth from me, and I made every blast."[6] In like manner the same Wisdom says of the waters, "Also when He made the fountains strong, things which[7] are under the sky, I was fashioning[8] them along with Him."[9] Now, when we prove that these particular things were created by God, although they are only mentioned in Genesis, without any intimation of their having been made, we shall perhaps receive from the other side the reply, that these were made, it is true,[10] but out of Matter, since the very statement of Moses, "And darkness was on the face of the deep, and the spirit of God moved on the face of the waters,"[11] refers to Matter, as indeed do all those other Scriptures here and there,[12] which demonstrate that the separate parts were made out of Matter. It must follow, then,[13] that as earth consisted of earth, so also depth consisted of depth, and darkness of darkness, and the wind and waters of wind and waters. And, as we said above,[14] Matter could not have been without form, since it had specific parts, which were formed out of it—although as separate things[15]—unless, indeed, they were not separate, but were the very same with those out of which they came. For it is really impossible that those specific

[1] De spiritu. [This shows that Tertullian took "*the Spirit*" of Gen. i. 2 in the inferior sense.]

[2] [So also the Septuagint.]

[3] [Amos iv. 13.]

[4] [The "wind."]

[5] [John iv. 24.]

[6] Flatum ["breath;" so LXX. of Isa. lvii. 16].

[7] Fontes, quæ.

[8] Modulans.

[9] [Prov. viii. 28.]

[10] Plane.

[11] [Gen. i. 2.]

[12] In disperso.

[13] Ergo [Tertullian's answer].

[14] [Ch. xxx., towards the end.]

[15] Ut et aliæ.

things, which are set forth under the same names, should have been diverse; because in that case[1] the operation of God might seem to be useless,[2] if it made things which existed already; since that alone would be a creation,[3] when things came into being, which had not been [previously] made. Therefore, to conclude, either Moses then pointed to Matter when he wrote [the words]: "And darkness was on the face of the deep, and the spirit of God moved on the face of the waters;" or else, inasmuch as these specific parts [of creation] are afterwards shown in other passages to have been made by God, they ought to have been with equal explicitness[4] shown to have been made out of the Matter which, [according to you,] Moses had previously mentioned;[5] or else, [finally,] if Moses pointed to those specific parts, and not to Matter, I want to know where Matter has been pointed out [at all].

CHAP. XXXIII.—*Tertullian's statement of the true doctrine concerning Matter, and its relation to God's creation of the world.*

But although Hermogenes finds it amongst his own colourable pretences[6] (for it was not in his power to discover it in the Scriptures of God), it is enough for us, both that it is certain that all things were made by God, and that there is no certainty whatever that they were made out of Matter. And even if Matter had [previously] existed, we must have believed that it had been really made by God, since we maintained [no less] when we held the rule of faith to be,[7] that nothing except God was uncreated.[8] Up to this point there is room for controversy, until Matter is brought to the

[1] Jam. [2] Otiosa.

[3] Generatio [creation in the highest sense of matter issuing from the maker. Another reading has "generosiora essent," for our "generatio sola esset," meaning that "those things would be nobler which had not been made," which is obviously quite opposed to Tertullian's argument].

[4] Æque. [5] Præmiserat.

[6] Colores. [See our "Anti-Marcion," p. 217, where the word *pretension* should stand instead of *precedent*.]

[7] Præscribentes. [8] Innatum [see above, note 3].

test of the Scriptures, and fails to make good its case.[1] The conclusion of the whole is this: I find that there was nothing made, except out of nothing; because that which I find was made, I know did not [once] exist. Whatever[2] was made out of something, has its origin in something made: for instance, out of the ground was made the grass, and the fruit, and the cattle, and the form of man himself; so from the waters were produced the animals which swim and fly. The original fabrics[3] out of which such creatures were produced I may call their *materials*,[4] but then even these were created by God.

CHAP. XXXIV.—*There is a presumption that all things were created by God out of nothing afforded by the ultimate reduction of all things to nothing. Scriptures proving this reduction vindicated from Hermogenes' charge of being merely figurative.*

Besides,[5] the belief that everything was made from nothing will be impressed upon us by that ultimate dispensation of God which will bring back all things to nothing. For "the very heaven shall be rolled together as a scroll;"[6] nay, it shall come to nothing along with the earth itself, with which it was made in the beginning. "Heaven and earth shall pass away,"[7] says He. "The first heaven and the first earth passed away,"[8] "and there was found no place for them,"[9] because, of course, that which comes to an end loses locality. In like manner David says, "The heavens, the works of Thine hands, shall themselves perish. For even as a vesture shall He change them, and they shall be changed."[10] Now to be changed is to fall from that primitive state which they lose whilst undergoing the change. "And the stars too shall

[1] Donec ad Scripturas provocata deficiat exhibitio materiæ.

[2] Etiamsi quid. [3] Origines.

[4] Materias. [There is point in this use of the plural of the controverted term *materia*.]

[5] Ceterum.

[6] [Isa. xxxiv. 4; Matt. xxiv. 29; 2 Pet. iii. 10; Rev. vi. 14.]

[7] [Matt. xxiv. 35.] [8] [Rev. xxi. 1.]

[9] [Rev. xx. 11.] [10] [Ps. cii. 25, 26.]

fall from heaven, even as a fig-tree casteth her green figs[1] when she is shaken of a mighty wind."[2] "The mountains shall melt like wax at the presence of the Lord;"[3] that is, "when He ariseth to shake terribly the earth."[4] "But I will dry up the pools;"[5] and "they shall seek water, and they shall find none."[6] Even "the sea shall be no more."[7] Now if any person should go so far as to suppose that all these passages ought to be spiritually interpreted, he will yet be unable to deprive them of the true accomplishment of those issues which must come to pass just as they have been written. For all figures of speech necessarily arise out of real things, not out of chimerical ones; because nothing is capable of imparting anything of its own for a similitude, except it actually be that very thing which it imparts in the similitude. I return therefore to the principle[8] which defines that all things which have come from nothing shall return at last to nothing. For God would not have made any perishable thing out of what was eternal, that is to say, out of Matter; neither out of greater things would He have created inferior ones, to whose character it would be more agreeable to produce greater things out of inferior ones—in other words, what is eternal out of what is perishable. This is the promise He makes even to our flesh, and it has been His will to deposit within us this pledge of His own virtue and power, in order that we may believe that He has actually[9] awakened the universe out of nothing, as if it had been steeped in death,[10] in the sense, of course, of its previous non-existence for the purpose of its coming into existence.[11]

CHAP. XXXV.—*Contradictory propositions advanced by Hermogenes respecting Matter and its qualities.*

As regards all other points touching Matter, although there

[1] Acerba sua ["grossos suos" (Rigalt.). So our marginal reading].
[2] [Rev. vi. 13.] [3] [Ps. xcvii. 5.] [4] [Isa. ii. 19.] [5] [Isa. xlii. 15.]
[6] [Isa. xli. 17.] [7] Etiam mare hactenus [Rev. xxi. 1].
[8] Causam. [9] Etiam. [10] Emortuam.
[11] In hoc, ut esset. [Contrasted with the "non erat" of the previous sentence, this must be the meaning, as if it were "ut fieret."]

is no necessity why we should treat of them (for our first point was the manifest proof of its existence), we must for all that pursue our discussion just as if it did exist, in order that its non-existence may be the more apparent, when these other points concerning it prove inconsistent with each other, and in order at the same time that Hermogenes may acknowledge his own contradictory positions. Matter, says he, at first sight seems to us to be incorporeal; but when examined by [the light of] right reason, it is found to be neither corporeal nor incorporeal. What is this right reason of yours,[1] which declares nothing right, that is, nothing certain? For, if I mistake not, everything must of necessity be either corporeal or incorporeal (although I may for the moment[2] allow that there is a certain incorporeality in even substantial things,[3] although their very substance is the body of particular things); at all events, after the corporeal and the incorporeal there is no third [state]. But if it be contended[4] that there is a third state discovered by this right reason of Hermogenes, which makes Matter neither corporeal nor incorporeal, [I ask,] Where is it? what sort of thing is it? what is it called? what is its description? what is it understood to be? This only has his reason declared, that Matter is neither corporeal nor incorporeal.

CHAP. XXXVI.—*Other absurd theories respecting Matter and its incidents exposed by Tertullian in an ironical strain.* MOTION *in Matter. Hermogenes' conceits respecting it.*

But see what a contradiction he next advances[5] (or perhaps some *other* reason[6] occurs to him), when he declares that Matter is partly corporeal and partly incorporeal. Then must Matter be considered [to embrace] both conditions, in order that it may not have either? For it will be corporeal and incorporeal in spite of[7] the declaration of that antithesis,[8]

[1] Ista. [2] Interim. [3] De substantiis duntaxat.
[4] Age nunc sit. ["But grant that there is this third state."]
[5] Subicit. [6] [Other than "*the right reason*" above named.]
[7] Adversus.
[8] [The original, "Adversus renuntiationem reciprocationis illius," is

which is plainly above giving any reason for its opinion, just as that "other reason" also was. Now, by the corporeal part of Matter, he means that of which bodies are created; but by the incorporeal part [of Matter], he means its uncreated[1] motion. If, says he, [Matter] were simply a body, there would appear to be in it nothing incorporeal, that is, [no] motion; if, on the other hand, it had been wholly incorporeal, no body could be formed out of it. What a peculiarly right[2] reason have we here! Only if you make your sketches as right as you make your reason, Hermogenes, no painter would be more stupid[3] than yourself. For who is going to allow you to reckon *motion* as a moiety of *Matter*, seeing that it is not a substantial thing, because it is not corporeal, but an accident (if indeed it be even that) of a substance and a body? Just as action[4] is, and impulsion, just as a slip is, or a fall, so is motion. When anything moves even of itself, its motion is the result of impulse;[5] but certainly it is no part of its substance in your sense,[6] when you make motion the incorporeal part of matter. All things, indeed,[7] have motion—either of themselves as animals, or of others as inanimate things; but yet we should not say that either a man or a stone was both corporeal and incorporeal because they had both a body and motion: [we should say] rather

an obscure expression. Oehler, who gives this reading in his edition, after the *editio princeps*, renders the term "reciprocationis" by the phrase "negative conversion" of the proposition, that Matter is corporeal and incorporeal (*q.d.* "Matter is neither corporeal nor incorporeal"). Instead, however, of the reading "reciprocationis," Oehler would gladly read "rectæ rationis," after most of the editions. He thinks that this allusion to "the right reason," of which Hermogenes boasted, and of which the absurd conclusion is exposed in the context, very well suits the sarcastic style of Tertullian. If this the general reading be adopted, we must render the whole clause thus: "For it will be corporeal and incorporeal, in spite of the declaration of that *right reason* [of Hermogenes], which is plainly enough above giving any reason," etc. etc.]

[1] Inconditum. [See above, ch. xviii., in the middle. Notwithstanding the absurdity of Hermogenes' idea, it is impossible to translate this word "*irregular*," as it has been proposed to do by Genoude.]

[2] Rectior. [3] Bardior. [4] Actus [being driven].

[5] Actus ejus est motus. [6] Sicut tu. [7] Denique.

that all things have one form of simple[1] corporeality, which is the essential quality[2] of substance. If any incorporeal [incidents] accrue to them, as actions, or passions, or functions,[3] or desires, we do not reckon these as parts of the things. How then does he contrive to assign an [integral] portion of Matter to *motion*, which does not pertain to substance, but to a certain condition[4] of substance? Is not this incontrovertible?[5] Suppose you had taken it into your head[6] to represent matter as immoveable, would then the immobility seem to you to be a moiety of its form? [Certainly not.] Neither, in like manner, could motion. But I shall be at liberty to speak of motion elsewhere.[7]

CHAP. XXXVII.—*Tertullian further plies his opponent with ironical dilemmas respecting Matter, and sundry moral qualities fancifully attributed to it.*

I see now that you are coming back again to that reason, which has been in the habit of declaring to you nothing in the way of certainty. For just as you introduce to our notice Matter as being neither corporeal nor incorporeal, so you allege of it that it is neither good nor evil; and you say, whilst arguing further on it in the same strain: "If it were good, seeing that it had ever been so, it would not require the arrangement of itself by God;[8] if it were naturally evil, it would not have admitted of a change[9] for the better, nor would God have ever applied to such a nature any attempt at arrangement of it, for His labour would have been in vain." Such are your words, which it would have been well if you had remembered in other passages also, so as to have avoided any contradiction of them. As, however, we have already treated to some extent of this ambiguity of good and evil touching Matter, I will now reply to the only proposition and argument of yours which we have before us. I shall not stop to repeat my opinion, that it was your bounden duty to have said for certain that Matter was either good or bad,

[1] Solius. [2] Res. [3] Officia. [4] Habitum.
[5] Quid enim? [6] Si placuisset tibi. [7] [See below, ch. xli.]
[8] Compositionem Dei. [9] Non accepisset translationem.

or in some third condition; but [I must observe] that you have not here even kept to the statement which you chose to make before. Indeed, you retract what you declared—that Matter is neither good nor evil; because you imply that it is evil when you say, "If it were good, it would not require to be set in order by God;" so again, when you add, "If it were naturally evil, it would not admit of any change for the better," you seem to intimate[1] that it is good. And so you attribute to it a close relation[2] to good and evil, although you declared it to be neither good nor evil. With a view, however, to refute the argument whereby you thought you were going to clinch your proposition, I here contend: If Matter had always been good, why should it not have [still] wanted a change for the better? Does that which is good never desire, never wish, never feel able to advance, so as to change its good for a better? And in like manner, if [Matter] had been by nature evil, why might it not have been changed by God as the more powerful Being, as able to convert the nature of stones into children of Abraham?[3] Surely by such means you not only compare the Lord with Matter, but you even put Him below[4] it, since you affirm that[5] the nature of Matter could not possibly be brought under control by Him, and trained to something better. But although you are here disinclined to allow that Matter is by nature evil, yet in another passage you will deny having made such an admission.[6]

CHAP. XXXVIII.—*Other speculations about Matter and some of its adjuncts, advanced by Hermogenes, shown to be absurd; for instance, its alleged infinity.*

My observations touching the *site*[7] of Matter, as also concerning its *mode*,[8] have one and the same object in view—to meet and refute your perverse positions. You put Matter

[1] Subostendis. [2] Affinem. [3] [Matt. iii. 9.]
[4] Subicis. [5] [This is the force of the subjunctive verb.]
[6] Te confessum. [7] De situ.
[8] [Oehler here restores the reading "quod et de *modo*," instead of "de *motu*," for which Pamelius contends. Oehler has the MSS. on his side,

below God, and thus, of course, you assign a place to it below God. Therefore Matter is local.[1] Now, if it is local, it is within locality; if within locality, it is bounded[2] by the place within which it is; if it is bounded, it has an outline,[3] which (painter as you are in your special vocation) you know is the boundary to every object susceptible of outline. Matter, therefore, cannot be infinite, which, since it is in space, is bounded by space; and being thus determinable by space, it is susceptible of an outline. You, however, make it infinite, when you say: "It is on this account infinite, because it is always existent." And if any of your disciples should choose to meet us by declaring your meaning to be that Matter is infinite in time, not in its corporeal mass,[4] still what follows will show that [you mean] corporeal infinity [to be an attribute of Matter], that it is in respect of bulk immense and uncircumscribed. "Wherefore," say you, "it is not fabricated as a whole, but [in] its parts."[5] In bulk, therefore, is it infinite, not in time. And you contradict yourself[6] when you make [Matter] infinite in bulk, and at the same time ascribe place to it, including it within space and local outline. But yet at the same time I cannot tell why God should not have entirely formed it,[7] unless it be because He was either impotent or envious. I want therefore to know the moiety of that which was not wholly formed [by God], in order that I may understand what kind of thing the entirety was. It was only right that God should have made it known as a model of antiquity,[8] to set off the glory of His work.

and Fr. Junius, who interprets "*mode*" here to mean "mass or quantity." Pamelius wishes to suit the passage to the preceding context (see ch. xxxvi.); Junius thinks it is meant rather to refer to what follows, by which it is confirmed.]

[1] In loco.

[2] Determinatur.

[3] Lineam extremam.

[4] Modo corporis [or, "bulk"].

[5] Nec tota fabricatur, sed partes ejus. [This perhaps means: "It is not its entirety, but its parts, which are used in creation."]

[6] Obduceris [here a verb of the middle voice].

[7] [In reference to the opinion of Hermogenes above mentioned, "Matter is not fabricated as a whole, but in its parts."]

[8] Ut exemplarium antiquitatis.

CHAP. XXXIX.—*These latter speculations shown to be contradictory to the first principles respecting Matter, formerly laid down by Hermogenes.*

Well, now, since it seems to you to be the correcter thing,[1] let Matter be circumscribed[2] by means of changes and displacements; let it also be capable of comprehension, since (as you say) it is used as material by God,[3] on the ground of its being convertible, mutable, and separable. For its changes, you say, show it to be separable. And here you have swerved from your own lines,[4] which you prescribed respecting the person of God, when you laid down the rule that God made it not out of His own self, because it was not possible for Him to become divided,[5] seeing that He is eternal and abiding for ever, and therefore unchangeable and indivisible. Since Matter, too, is estimated by the same eternity, having neither beginning nor end, it will be unsusceptible of division of change, for the same reason that God also is. Since it is associated with Him in the joint possession of eternity, it must needs share with Him also the powers, the laws, and the conditions of eternity. In like manner, when you say, "All things simultaneously throughout the universe[6] possess portions of it,[7] that so the whole may be ascertained from[8] its parts," you of course mean to indicate those parts which were produced out of it, and which are now visible to us. How then is this possession [of Matter] by all things throughout the universe effected—that is, of course, from the very beginning[9]—when the things which are now visible to us are different in their condition[10] from what they were in the beginning?

[1] Rectius. [2] Definitiva. [3] Ut quæ fabricatur, inquis, a Deo.
[4] Lineis. [Tertullian often refers to Hermogenes' profession of painting.]
[5] In partes venire. [6] Omnia ex omnibus.
[7] [*i.e.* of Matter.] [8] Dinoscatur ex.
[9] Utique ex pristinis. [10] Aliter habeant.

CHAP. XL.—*Shapeless Matter, in its rough primeval block, an incongruous origin for God's beautiful* COSMOS. *Hermogenes does not mend his argument by supposing that only a portion of Matter was used in the creation.*

You say that Matter was reformed for the better[1]—from a worse condition, of course; and [thus] you would make the better a copy of the worse. Everything was in confusion, but now it is reduced to order; and would you also say, that out of order disorder is produced? No one thing is the exact mirror[2] of another thing; that is to say, it is not its co-equal. Nobody ever found himself in a barber's looking-glass look like an ass[3] instead of a man; unless it be he who supposes that unformed and shapeless Matter answers to Matter which is now arranged and beautified in the fabric of the world. What is there now that is without form in the world, what was there once that was formed[4] in Matter, that the world is the mirror of Matter? Since the world is known among the Greeks by a term denoting *ornament*,[5] how can it present the image of unadorned[6] Matter, in such a way that you can say the whole is known by its parts? To that whole will certainly belong even the [portion] which has not yet become formed; and you have already declared that the whole [of Matter] was not used as material [in the creation].[7] It follows, then, that this rude, and confused, and unarranged portion cannot be recognised in the polished, and distinct, and well-arranged [parts of creation], which indeed can hardly with propriety be called parts of Matter, since they have quitted[8] its condition, by being separated from it in the transformation they have undergone.

[1] In melius reformatam. [2] Speculum. [3] Mulus.
[4] Speciatum [εἰδοποιηθέν, "arranged in specific forms"].
[5] Κόσμος. [6] Inornatæ [*unfurnished* with forms of beauty].
[7] Non totam eam fabricatam. [8] Recesserunt a forma ejus.

CHAP. XLI.—*By sundry quotations from Hermogenes, Tertullian shows how uncertain and vague are his speculations respecting motion in Matter, and the material qualities of good and evil.*

I come back to the point of *motion*,[1] that I may show how slippery you are at every step. Motion in Matter was disordered, and confused, and turbulent. This is why you apply to it the comparison of a boiler of hot water surging over. Now how is it, that in another passage another sort of motion is affirmed by you? For when you want to represent Matter as neither good nor evil, you say: "Matter, which is the substratum [of creation],[2] possessing as it does motion in an equable impulse,[3] tends in no very great degree either to good or to evil." Now if it had this equable impulse, it could not be turbulent, nor be like the boiling water of the caldron; it would rather be even and regular, oscillating indeed of its own accord between good and evil, but yet not prone or tending to either side. It would swing, as the phrase is, in a just and exact balance. Now this is not unrest; this is not turbulence or inconstancy;[4] but rather the regularity, and evenness, and exactitude of a motion, inclining to neither side. If it oscillated this way and that way, and inclined rather to one particular side, it would plainly in that case merit the reproach of unevenness, and inequality, and turbulence. Moreover, although the motion [of Matter] was not prone either to good or to evil, it would still, of course, oscillate between good and evil; so that from this circumstance too it is obvious that Matter is contained within certain limits,[5] because its motion, while prone to neither good nor evil, since it had no natural bent either way, oscillated from either between both, and therefore was contained within the limits of the two. But you, in fact, place both good and evil in a local habitation,[6] when you

[1] [From which he has digressed since ch. xxxvi.]
[2] Subjacens materia.
[3] Æqualis momenti motum.
[4] Passivitas.
[5] Determinabilem.
[6] In loco facis ["you localise"].

assert that motion in Matter inclined to neither of them. For Matter which was local,[1] when inclining neither hither nor thither, inclined not to the places in which good and evil were. But when you assign locality to good and evil, you make them corporeal by making them local, since those things which have local space must needs first have bodily substance. In fact,[2] incorporeal things could not have any locality of their own except in a body, when they have access to a body.[3] But when Matter inclined not to good and evil, it was as corporeal or local [essences] that it did not incline to them. You err, therefore, when you will have it that good and evil are substances. For you make substances of the things to which you assign locality;[4] but you assign locality when you keep motion in Matter poised equally distant from both sides.[5]

CHAP. XLII.—*Tertullian pursues his search after inconsistencies in the opinions of Hermogenes respecting the divine qualities of Matter.*

You have thrown out all your views loosely and at random,[6] in order that it might not be apparent, by too close a proximity, how contrary they are to one another. I, however, mean to gather them together and compare them. You allege that motion in Matter is without regularity,[7] and you go on to say that Matter aims at a shapeless condition, and then, in another passage, that it desires to be set in order by God. Does that, then, which affects to be without form, want to be put into shape? Or does that which wants to be put into shape, affect to be without form? You are unwilling that God should seem to be equal to Matter; and then again you say that it has a common condition[8] with God. "For it is impossible," you say, "if it has nothing in

[1] In loco. [2] Denique.

[3] Cum corpori accedunt [or, "when they are added to a body"].

[4] Loca ["places;" one to each].

[5] Cum ab utraque regione suspendis [equally far from good and evil].

[6] Dispersisti omnia. [7] Inconditum. [8] Communionem.

common with God, that it can be set in order by Him." But if it had anything in common with God, it did not want to be set in order,[1]—being, forsooth, a part of the Deity through a community of condition; or else even God was susceptible of being set in order[1] by Matter, by His having Himself something in common with it. And now you herein subject God to necessity, since there was in Matter something on account of which He gave it form. You make it, however, a common attribute of both of them, that they set themselves in motion by themselves, and that they are ever in motion. What less do you ascribe to Matter than to God? There will be found all through a fellowship of divinity in this freedom and perpetuity of motion. Only in God motion is regular,[2] in Matter irregular.[3] In both, however, there is equally the attribute of Deity—both alike having free and eternal motion. At the same time, you assign more to Matter, to which belonged the privilege of thus moving itself in a way not allowed to God.

Chap. xliii.—*Other discrepancies exposed and refuted respecting the evil in Matter being changed to good.*

On the subject of motion I would make this further remark. Following the *simile* of the boiling caldron, you say that motion in Matter, before it was regulated, was confused,[4] restless, incomprehensible by reason of excess in the commotion.[5] Then again you go on to say, "But it waited for the regulation[6] of God, and kept its irregular motion incomprehensible, owing to the tardiness of its irregular motion." Just before you ascribe commotion, here tardiness, to motion. Now observe how many slips you make respecting the nature of Matter. In a former passage[7] you say, "If Matter were naturally evil, it would not have admitted of a change for the better; nor would God have ever applied to it any attempt at arrangement, for His labour would have been in vain." You therefore concluded your two opinions, that

[1] Ornari ["to be adorned"].
[2] Composite.
[3] Incondite.
[4] Concretus.
[5] Certaminis.
[6] Compositionem ["arrangement"].
[7] [See above, ch. xxxvii.]

Matter was not by nature evil, and that its nature was incapable of being changed by God; and then, forgetting them, you afterwards drew this inference: "But when it received adjustment from God, and was reduced to order,[1] it relinquished its nature." Now, inasmuch as it was transformed to good, it was of course transformed from evil; and if by God's setting it in order it relinquished[2] the nature of evil, it follows that its nature came to an end;[3] now its nature was evil before the adjustment, but after the transformation it might have relinquished that nature.

CHAP. XLIV. — *Curious views respecting God's method of working with Matter exposed by Tertullian. Discrepancies in the heretic's opinion about God's local relation to Matter.*

But it remains that I should show also how you make God work. You are plainly enough at variance with the philosophers; but neither are you in accord with the prophets. The Stoics maintain that God pervaded Matter, just as honey the honeycomb. You, however, affirm that it is not by pervading Matter that God makes the world, but simply by appearing, and approaching it, just as beauty affects[4] a thing by simply appearing, and a loadstone by approaching it. Now what similarity is there in God forming the world, and beauty wounding a soul, or a magnet attracting iron? For even if God appeared to Matter, He yet did not wound it, as beauty does the soul; if, again, He approached it, He yet did not cohere to it, as the magnet does to the iron. Suppose, however, that your examples are suitable ones. Then, of course,[5] it was by appearing and approaching to Matter that God made the world, and He made it when He appeared and when He approached to it. Therefore, since He had not made it before then,[6] He had neither appeared nor approached to it. Now, by whom can it be believed that God had not appeared to Matter—of the same nature as it even was owing to its eternity? Or that He had been at a

[1] Ornata.
[2] Cessavit a.
[3] Cessavit.
[4] Facit quid decor.
[5] Certe.
[6] Retro.

distance from it—even He whom we believe to be existent everywhere, and everywhere apparent; whose praises all things chant, even inanimate things and things incorporeal, according to [the prophet] Daniel?[1] How immense the place, where God kept Himself so far aloof from Matter as to have neither appeared nor approached to it before the creation of the world! I suppose He journeyed to it from a long distance, as soon as He wished to appear and approach to it.

CHAP. XLV.—*Conclusion. Contrast between the statements of Hermogenes and the testimony of Holy Scripture respecting the creation; that creation out of nothing, not out of Matter.*

But it is not thus that the prophets and the apostles have told us that the world was made by God merely appearing and approaching Matter. They did not even mention any Matter, but [said] that Wisdom was first set up, the beginning of His ways, for His works.[2] Then that the Word was produced, "through whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made."[3] Indeed, "by the Word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all their hosts by the breath of His mouth."[4] He is the Lord's right hand,[5] indeed His two hands, by which He worked and constructed [the universe]. "For," says He, "the heavens are the works of Thine hands,"[6] wherewith "He hath meted out the heaven, and the earth with a span."[7] Do not be willing so to cover God with flattery, as to contend that He produced by His mere appearance and simple approach so many vast substances, instead of rather forming them by His own energies. For this is proved by Jeremiah when he says, "God hath made the earth by His power, He hath established the world by His wisdom, and hath stretched out the heaven by His understanding."[8] These are the energies by the stress

[1] [Dan. iii. 21.] [2] [Prov. viii. 22, 23.] [3] [John i. 3.]
[4] Spiritu Ipsius ["by His Spirit." See Ps. xxxiii. 6].
[5] [Isa. xlviii. 13.] [6] [Ps. cii. 25.]
[7] [Isa. xl. 12 and xlviii. 13.] [8] [Jer. li. 15.]

of which He made this universe.[1] His glory is greater if He laboured. At length on the seventh day He rested from His works. Both one and the other were after His manner. If, on the contrary,[2] He made this world simply by appearing and approaching it, did He, on the completion of His work, cease to appear and approach it any more? Nay rather,[3] God began to appear more conspicuously and to be everywhere accessible[4] from the time when the world was made. You see, therefore, how all things consist by the operation of that God who "made the earth by His power, who established the world by His wisdom, and stretched out the heaven by His understanding;" not appearing merely, nor approaching, but applying the almighty efforts of His mind, His wisdom, His power, His understanding, His word, His Spirit, His might. Now these things were not necessary to Him, if He had been perfect by simply appearing and approaching. They are, however, His "invisible things," which, according to the apostle, "are from the creation of the world clearly seen by the things that are made;"[5] [they are no parts] of a nondescript[6] Matter, but they are the sensible[7] evidences of Himself. "For who hath known the mind of the Lord,"[8] of which [the apostle] exclaims: "O the depth of the riches both of His wisdom and knowledge! how unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out!"[9] Now what clearer truth do these words indicate, than that all things were made out of nothing? They are incapable of being found out or investigated, except by God alone. Otherwise, if they were traceable or discoverable in Matter, they would be capable of investigation. Therefore, in *as* far as it has become evident that Matter had no prior existence (even from this circumstance, that it is impossible[10] for it to have had such an existence as is assigned to it), in *so* far is it proved that all things were made by God out of nothing. It must be

[1] [Ps. lxiv. 7.]
[2] Aut si.
[3] Atquin.
[4] Ubique conveniri.
[5] [Rom. i. 20.]
[6] Nescio quæ.
[7] Sensualia.
[8] [Rom. xi. 34.]
[9] [Ver. 33.]
[10] Nec competat.

admitted, however,[1] that Hermogenes, by describing for Matter a condition like his own—irregular, confused, turbulent, of a doubtful and precipitate and fervid impulse—has displayed a specimen of his own art, and painted his own portrait.

[1] Nisi quod.

THE TREATISE

OF

QUINTUS SEPTIMIUS FLORENS TERTULLIANUS

AGAINST

THE VALENTINIANS;

IN WHICH THE AUTHOR GIVES A CONCISE ACCOUNT OF, TOGETHER WITH SUNDRY CAUSTIC ANIMADVERSIONS ON, THE VERY FANTASTIC THEOLOGY OF THE SECT. THIS TREATISE IS PROFESSEDLY TAKEN FROM THE WRITINGS OF JUSTIN, MILTIADES, IRENÆUS, AND PROCULUS.

CHAP. I.—*Introductory. Tertullian compares the heresy to the old Eleusinian mysteries, the votaries of which systems are alike in preferring concealment of error and sin to proclamation of truth and virtue.*

THE Valentinians, who are no doubt a very large body of heretics—comprising as they do so many apostates from the truth, who have a propensity for fables, and no discipline to deter them [therefrom]—care for nothing so much as to obscure[1] what they preach, if indeed they [can be said to] preach who obscure [their doctrine]. The officiousness with which they guard their doctrine is an officiousness which betrays their guilt.[2]

[1] Occultant.

[2] [We are far from certain whether we have caught the sense of the original, which we add, that the reader may judge for himself, and

Their disgrace is proclaimed in the very earnestness with which they maintain their religious system. Now, in the case of those Eleusinian mysteries, which are the very heresy of Athenian superstition, it is their secrecy that is their disgrace. Accordingly, they previously beset all access to their body with tormenting conditions;[1] [and] they require a long initiation before they enrol [their members],[2] even instruction during five years for their perfect disciples,[3] in order that they may mould[4] their opinions by this suspension of full knowledge, and apparently raise the dignity of their mysteries in proportion to the craving for them which they have previously created. Then follows the duty of silence. Carefully is that guarded, which is so long in finding. All the divinity, however, lies in their secret recesses:[5] there are revealed [at last] all the aspirations of the fully initiated,[6] the entire mystery of the sealed tongue, the symbol of virility. But this allegorical representation,[7] under the pretext of nature's reverend name, obscures a real sacrilege by help of an arbitrary symbol,[8] and by [empty] images obviates[9] the reproach of falsehood![10] In like manner, the heretics who are now the object of our remarks,[11] the Valentinians, have formed Eleusinian dissipations[12] of their own, consecrated by a profound silence, having nothing of the heavenly in them but their mystery.[13] By the help of the sacred names and titles and arguments of true religion, they have fabricated the vainest and foulest figments for men's pliant liking,[14] out

at the same time observe the terseness of our author: "Custodiæ officium conscientiæ officium est, confusio prædicatur, dum religio asseveratur."]

[1] Et aditum prius cruciant.
[2] Antequam consignant.
[3] Epoptas [see Suidas, *s.v.* Ἐπόπται].
[4] Ædificent.
[5] Adytis.
[6] Epoptarum.
[7] Dispositio.
[8] Patrocinio coactæ figuræ.
[9] Excusat.
[10] ["Quid enim aliud est simulachrum nisi falsum?" (Rigalt.)]
[11] Quos nunc destinamus.
[12] Lenocinia.
[13] Taciturnitate.
[14] Facili caritati. [Oehler, after Fr. Junius, gives, however, this phrase a subjective turn thus: "by affecting a charity which is easy to them, costing nothing."]

of the affluent suggestions of Holy Scripture, since from its many springs many [errors] may well emanate. If you propose to them inquiries sincere and honest, they answer you with stern[1] look and contracted brow, and say, "The subject is profound." If you try them with subtle questions, with the ambiguities of their double tongue they affirm a community of faith [with yourself]. If you intimate to them that you understand [their opinions], they insist on knowing nothing themselves. If you come to a close engagement with them, they destroy your own fond hope of a victory over them by a self-immolation.[2] Not even to their own disciples do they commit a secret before they have made sure of them. They have the knack of persuading men before instructing them; although truth persuades by teaching, but does not teach by first persuading.

CHAP. II.—*These heretics brand the Christians as simple persons. Tertullian accepts the charge, and eulogizes simplicity out of the Scriptures.*

For this reason we are branded[3] by them as simple, and as being merely so, without being wise also; as if indeed wisdom were compelled to be wanting in simplicity, whereas the Lord unites them both: "Be ye therefore wise as serpents, and simple as doves."[4] Now if we, on our parts, be accounted foolish because we are simple, does it then follow that they are not simple because they are wise? Most perverse, however, are they who are not simple, even as they are most foolish who are not wise. And yet, [if I must choose], I should prefer taking[5] the [latter] condition for the lesser fault; since it is perhaps better to have a wisdom which falls short in quantity, than that which is bad in quality[6]—better to be in error than to mislead. Besides, the

[1] Concreto.
[2] Sua cæde.
[3] Notamur.
[4] [Matt. x. 16.]
[5] [In the original the phrase is put *passively:* "malim eam partem meliori sumi vitio."]
[6] [How terse is the original! "minus sapere quam pejus."]

face of the Lord[1] is patiently waited for by those who "seek Him in simplicity of heart," as says the very Wisdom—not of Valentinus, but—of Solomon.[2] Then, again, infants have borne[3] by their blood a testimony to Christ. [Would you say] that it was children who shouted "Crucify Him"?[4] They were neither children nor infants; in other words, they were not simple. The apostle, too, bids us to "become children again" towards God,[5] "to be as children in malice" by our simplicity, yet as being also "wise in our practical faculties."[6] At the same time, with respect to the order of development in Wisdom, I have admitted[7] that it flows from simplicity. In brief, "the dove" has usually served to figure Christ; "the serpent," to tempt Him. The one even from the first has been the harbinger of divine peace; the other from the beginning has been the despoiler of the divine image. Accordingly, simplicity alone[8] will be more easily able to know and to declare God, [whereas] wisdom alone will rather do Him violence,[9] and betray Him.

CHAP. III. — *The folly of this heresy, which dissects and mutilates the Deity, contrasted with the simple wisdom of true religion. To expose the absurdities of the Valentinian system is all that is wanted to destroy it.*

Let, then, the serpent hide himself as much as he is able, and let him wrest[10] all his wisdom in the labyrinths of his obscurities; let him dwell deep down in the ground; let him worm himself into secret holes; let him unroll his length through his sinuous joints;[11] let him tortuously crawl, though not all at once,[12] beast as he is that skulks the light. Of

[1] Facies Dei. [2] [Wisd. of Sol. i. 1.]
[3] Litaverunt ["consecrated"].
[4] [Tertullian's words are rather suggestive of sense than of syntax: "Pueros vocem qui crucem clamant?"]
[5] Secundum Deum ["according to God's will"].
[6] [1 Cor. xiv. 20, where Tertullian renders the ταῖς φρεσί (A.V. "understanding") by "sensibus."]
[7] Dedi. [8] [*i.e.* without wisdom.] [9] Concutere.
[10] Torqueat. [11] Per anfractus. [12] Nec semel totus.

our dove, however, how simple is the very home!—always in high and open places, and facing the light! As the symbol of the Holy Spirit, it loves the [radiant] east, that figure of Christ.[1] Nothing causes truth a blush, except only being hidden; because no man will be ashamed to give ear thereto. [No man will be ashamed] to recognise Him as God whom nature has already commended to him, whom he already perceives in all His works,[2]—Him indeed who is simply, for this reason, imperfectly known; because man has not thought of Him as only one, because he has named Him in a plurality [of gods], and adored Him in other [forms]. Yet,[3] to induce oneself to turn from this multitude of deities to another crowd,[4] to remove from a familiar authority to an unknown one, to wrench oneself from what is manifest to what is hidden, is to offend faith on the very threshold. Now, even suppose that you are initiated into the entire fable, will it not occur to you that you have heard something very like it from your fond nurse[5] when you were a baby, amongst the lullabies she sang to you[6] about the towers of Lamia, and the horns of the sun?[7] Let, however, any man approach the subject from a knowledge of the faith which he has otherwise learned, as soon as he finds so many names of Æons, so many marriages, so many offsprings, so many exits, so many issues, felicities [and] infelicities of a dispersed and mutilated Deity, will that man hesitate at once to pronounce

[1] [By this remark it would seem that Tertullian read sundry passages in his Latin Bible similarly to the subsequent Vulgate version. For instance, in Zech. vi. 12, the prophet's words, הִנֵּה־אִישׁ צֶמַח שְׁמוֹ ("Behold the Man, whose name is the BRANCH"), are rendered in the Vulgate, "Ecce Vir *Oriens* nomen ejus." Similarly in Zech. iii. 8, "Servum meum adducam ORIENTEM." (Compare Luke i. 78, where the Ἀνατολὴ ἐξ ὕψους ("the day-spring from on high") is in the same version "*Oriens* ex alto.")]

[2] [Or, perhaps, "whom it (nature) feels in all its works."]

[3] Alioquin.

[4] [Alioquin a turba eorum et aliam frequentiam suadere; which perhaps is best rendered, "But from one rabble of gods to frame and teach men to believe in another set," etc.]

[5] A nutricula.

[6] Inter somni difficultates.

[7] [These were child's stories at Carthage in Tertullian's days.]

that these are "the fables and endless genealogies" which the inspired apostle[1] by anticipation condemned, whilst these seeds of heresy were even then shooting forth? Deservedly, therefore, must they be regarded as wanting in simplicity, and as merely prudent, who produce such fables not without difficulty, and defend them only indirectly, who at the same time do not thoroughly instruct those whom they teach. This, of course, shows their astuteness, if their lessons are disgraceful; their unkindness, if they are honourable. As for us, however, who are the simple folk, we know all about it. In short, this is the very first weapon with which we are armed for our encounter; it unmasks[2] and brings to view[3] the whole of their depraved system.[4] And in this we have the first augury of our victory; because even merely to point out that which is concealed with so great an outlay of artifice,[5] is to destroy it.

CHAP. IV.—*The heresy traceable to Valentinus, a restless but able man. Many schismatical leaders of the school are mentioned; none of them, except one, show respect to the man whose name designates the entire school.*

We know, I say, most fully their actual origin, and we are quite aware why we call them Valentinians, although they affect to disavow their name. They have departed, it is true,[6] from their founder, yet is their origin by no means destroyed; and even if it chance to be changed, the very change bears testimony to the fact. Valentinus had expected to become a bishop, because he was an able man both in genius and eloquence. Being indignant, however, that another obtained the dignity by reason of a claim which confessorship[7] had given him, he broke with the church of the true faith. Just like those [restless] spirits which, when roused by ambition, are usually inflamed with the desire of revenge, he applied himself with all his might[8] to exterminate

[1] Apostoli spiritus [see 1 Tim. i. 4]. [2] Detectorem.
[3] Designatorem. [4] Totius conscientiæ illorum.
[5] Tanto impendio. [6] Enim. [7] Martyrii. [8] Conversus.

the truth; and finding the clue[1] of a certain old opinion, he marked out a path for himself with the subtlety of a serpent. Ptolemæus afterwards entered on the same path, by distinguishing the names and the numbers of the Æons into personal substances, which, however, he kept apart from God. Valentinus had included these in the very essence of the Deity, as senses and affections of motion. Sundry bypaths were then struck off therefrom, by Heracleon and Secundus and the magician Marcus. Theotimus worked hard about "the images of the law." Valentinus, however, was as yet nowhere, and still the Valentinians derive their name from Valentinus. Axionicus at Antioch is the only man who at the present time does honour[2] to the memory of Valentinus, by keeping his rules[3] to the full. But this heresy is permitted to fashion itself into as many various shapes as a courtezan, who usually changes and adjusts her dress every day. And why not? When they review that spiritual seed of theirs in every man after this fashion, whenever they have hit upon any novelty, they forthwith call their presumption a revelation, their own perverse ingenuity a spiritual gift; but [they deny all] unity, [admitting only] diversity.[4] And thus we clearly see that, setting aside their customary dissimulation, most of them are in a divided state, being ready to say (and that sincerely) of certain points of their belief, "This is not so;" and, "I take this in a different sense;" and, "I do not admit that." By this variety, indeed, innovation is stamped on the very face of their rules; besides which, it wears all the colourable features of ignorant conceits.[5]

[1] Semitam.
[2] Consolatur.
[3] Regularum [the particulars of his system].
[4] Nec unitatem, sed diversitatem [scil. appellant].
[5] Colores ignorantiarum.

CHAP. V.—*Many eminent Christian writers have carefully and fully refuted the heresy: these Tertullian proposes to follow as his own guides.*

My own path, however, lies along the original tenets[1] of their chief teachers, not with the self-appointed leaders of their promiscuous[2] followers. Nor shall we hear it said of us from any quarter, that we have of our own mind fashioned our own materials, since these have been already produced, both in respect of the opinions and their refutations, in carefully written volumes, by so many eminently holy and excellent men, not only those who have lived before us, but those also who were contemporary with the heresiarchs themselves: for instance Justin, philosopher and martyr; Miltiades, the sophist[3] of the churches; Irenæus, that very exact inquirer into all doctrines; our own Proculus, the model[4] of chaste old age and Christian eloquence. All these it would be my desire closely to follow in every work of faith, even as in this particular one. Now if there are no heresies at all, but what those who refute them are supposed to have fabricated, then the apostle who predicted them[5] must have been guilty of falsehood. If, however, there are heresies, they can be no other than those which are the subject of discussion. No writer can be supposed to have so much time on his hands[6] as to fabricate materials which are already in his possession.

CHAP. VI.—*Tertullian, although writing in Latin, proposes to retain the Greek names of the Valentinian emanations of the Deity. He does not propose to discuss the heresy, but only to expose it—and this with the raillery which its absurdity merits.*

In order, then, that no one may be blinded by so many outlandish[7] names, collected together, and adjusted at plea-

[1] Archetypis. [2] Passivorum.
[3] [In a good sense, from the elegance of his style.] [4] Dignitas.
[5] [1 Cor. xi. 19.] [6] Otiosus. [7] Tam peregrinis.

sure,[1] and of doubtful import, I mean in this little work, wherein we merely undertake to propound this [heretical] mystery, to explain in what manner we are to use them. Now the rendering of some of these [names] from the Greek so as to produce an equally obvious sense of the word, is by no means an easy process: in the case of some others, the genders are not suitable; while others, again, are more familiarly known in their Greek form. For the most part, therefore, we shall use the Greek names; their meanings will be seen on the margins of the pages. Nor will the Greek be unaccompanied with the Latin [equivalents]; only these will be marked in lines above, for the purpose of explaining[2] the personal names, rendered necessary by the ambiguities of such of them as admit some different meaning. But although I must postpone all discussion, and be content at present with the mere exposition [of the heresy], still, wherever any scandalous feature shall seem to require a castigation, it must be attacked[3] by all means, if only with a passing thrust.[4] Let the reader regard it as the skirmish before the battle. It will be my drift to show how to wound[5] rather than to inflict deep gashes. If in any instance mirth be excited, this will be quite as much as the subject deserves. There are many things which deserve refutation in such a way as to have no gravity expended on them. Vain and silly topics are met with especial fitness by laughter. Even the truth may indulge in ridicule, because it is jubilant; it may play with its enemies, because it is fearless.[6] Only we must take care that its laughter be not unseemly, and so itself be laughed at; but wherever its mirth is decent, there it is a duty [to indulge it]. And so at last I enter on my task.

[1] Compactis. [2] Ut signum hoc sit.
[3] [Or "stormed," perhaps; "expugnatio" is the word.]
[4] Delibatione transfunctoria. [5] Ostendam vulnera. [6] Secura.

CHAP. VII.—*The first eight emanations, or Æons, called the Ogdoad, are the fountain of all the others. Their names and descent recorded.*

Beginning with Ennius,[1] the Roman poet, he simply spoke of "the spacious saloons[2] of heaven,"—either on account of their elevated site, or because in Homer he had read about Jupiter banqueting therein. As for [our] heretics, however, it is marvellous what storeys upon storeys,[3] and what heights upon heights, they have hung up, raised, [and] spread out as a dwelling for each several god of theirs. Even our Creator has had arranged for Him the saloons of Ennius in the fashion of private rooms,[4] with chamber piled upon chamber, and assigned to each god by just as many staircases as there were heresies. The universe, [in fact], has been turned into "rooms to let."[5] Such storeys of the heavens you would imagine to be detached tenements in some happy isle of the blessed,[6] I know not where. There the god even of the Valentinians has his dwelling in the attics. They call him indeed, as to his essence, *Αἰῶν τέλειος* (*Perfect Æon*), but in respect of his personality *Προαρχή* (*Before the Beginning*), and *Ἡ Ἀρχή* (*The Beginning*), and sometimes Bythos (Depth),[7] a name which is most unfit for one who dwells in the heights above! They describe him as unbegotten, immense, infinite, invisible, and eternal; as if, when they describe him to be such as we know that he ought to be, they straightway prove him to be a being who may be said to have had such an existence even before all things else. I indeed insist upon[8] it that he is such a being; and there is

[1] Primus omnium.
[2] Cœnacula ["dining halls"].
[3] Supernitates supernitatum.
[4] Ædicularum.
[5] Meritorium.
[6] [This is perhaps a fair rendering of "Insulam Feliculam credas tanta tabulata cœlorum, nescio ubi." "Insula" is sometimes "a detached house." It is difficult to say what "Felicula" is; it seems to be a diminutive of Felix. It occurs in Arrian's *Epictetica* as the name of a slave.]
[7] [We follow Tertullian's mode of designation all through. He, for the most part, gives the Greek names in Roman letters, but not quite always.]
[8] Expostulo. ["I postulate as a first principle."]

nothing which I detect in beings of this sort more obvious, than that they who are said to have been before all things—things, too, not their own—are found to be behind all things. Let it, however, be granted that this Bythos of theirs existed in the infinite ages of the past in the greatest and profoundest repose, in the extreme rest of a placid and, if I may use the expression, stupid divinity, such as Epicurus has enjoined upon us. And yet, although they would have him be alone, they assign to him a second person in himself and with himself, Ennoea (*Thought*), which they also call both Charis (*Grace*) and Sige (*Silence*). Other things, as it happened, conduced in this most agreeable repose to remind him of the need of by and by producing out of himself the beginning of all things. This he deposits in lieu of seed in the genital region, as it were, of the womb of his Sige. Instantaneous conception is the result: Sige becomes pregnant, and is delivered, of course in silence; and her offspring is Nus (Mind), very like his father and his equal in every respect. In short, he alone is capable of comprehending the measureless and incomprehensible greatness of his father. Accordingly he is even called the Father himself, and the Beginning of all things, and, with great propriety, Monogenes (*The Only-begotten*). And yet not with absolute propriety, since he is not born alone. For along with him a female also proceeded, whose name was Veritas[1] (*Truth*). But how much more suitably might Monogenes be called Protogenes (*First-begotten*), since he was begotten first! Thus Bythos and Sige, Nus and Veritas, are alleged to be the first fourfold team[2] of the Valentinian set [of gods],[3] the parent stock and origin of them all. For immediately when[4] Nus received the function of a procreation of his own, he too produces out of himself Sermo (*the Word*) and Vita (*the Life*). If this latter existed not previously, of course she existed not in Bythos. And a pretty absurdity would it be, if *Life* existed not in God! However, this offspring also produces fruit, having for its

[1] [Tertullian is responsible for this *Latin* word amongst the Greek names. The strange mixture occurs often.]

[2] Quadriga. [3] Factionis. [4] Ibidem simul.

mission the initiation of the universe and the formation of the entire Pleroma: it procreates Homo (*Man*) and Ecclesia (*the Church*). Thus you have an Ogdoad, a double Tetrad, out of the conjunctions of males and females—the cells[1] (so to speak) of the primordial Æons, the fraternal nuptials of the Valentinian gods, the simple originals[2] of heretical sanctity and majesty, a rabble[3]—shall I say of criminals[4] or of deities?[5]—at any rate, the fountain of all ulterior fecundity.

CHAP. VIII.—*The names and descent of other Æons; first half a score, then two more, and ultimately a dozen besides. These thirty constitute* THE PLEROMA. *But why be so capricious as to stop at thirty?*

For, behold, when the second Tetrad—Sermo and Vita, Homo and Ecclesia[6]—had borne fruit to the Father's glory, having an intense desire of themselves to present to the Father something similar of their own, they bring other issue into being[7]—conjugal of course, as the others were[8]—by the union of the twofold nature. On the one hand, Sermo and Vita pour out at a birth a half-score of Æons; on the other hand, Homo and Ecclesia produce a couple more, so furnishing an equipoise to their parents, since this pair with the other ten make up just as many as they did themselves procreate. I now give the names of the half-score whom I have mentioned: Bythios (*Profound*) and Mixis (*Mixture*), Ageratos (*Never old*) and Henosis (*Union*), Autophyes (*Essential Nature*) and Hedone (*Pleasure*), Acinetos (*Immoveable*) and Syncrasis (*Commixture*), Monogenes (*Only-begotten*) and Macaria (*Happiness*). On the other hand, these will make up the number twelve [to which I have also referred]: Paracletus (*Comforter*) and Pistis (*Faith*), Patricas (*Paternal*) and Elpis (*Hope*), Metricos (*Maternal*) and

[1] Cellas. [2] Census. [3] Turbam.
[4] Criminum. [5] Numinum.
[6] [We everywhere give Tertullian's own names, whether of Greek form or Latin. On their first occurrence we also give their English sense.]
[7] Ebulliunt. [8] Proinde conjugales.

Agape (*Love*), Ainos (*Praise*)[1] and Synesis (*Intelligence*), Ecclesiasticus (*Son of Ecclesia*) and Macariotes (*Blessedness*), Theletus[2] (*Perfect*) and Sophia (*Wisdom*). I cannot help[3] here quoting from a like example what may serve to show the import of these names. In the schools of Carthage there was once a certain Latin rhetorician, an excessively cool fellow,[4] whose name was Phosphorus. He was personating a man of valour, and wound up[5] with saying, "I come to you, excellent citizens, from battle, with victory for myself, with happiness for you, full of honour, covered with glory, the favourite of fortune, the greatest of men, decked with triumph." And forthwith his scholars begin to shout for the school of Phosphorus, φεῦ[6] [ah!] Are you a believer in[7] Fortunata, and Hedone, and Acinetus, and Theletus? Then shout out your φεῦ for the school of Ptolemy.[8] This must be that mystery of the Pleroma, the fulness of the thirty-fold divinity. Let us see what special attributes[9] belong to these numbers—four, and eight, and twelve. Meanwhile with the number thirty all fecundity ceases. The generating force and power and desire of the Æons is spent.[10] As if there were not still left some strong rennet for curdling numbers![11] As if no other names were to be got out of the page's hall![12] For why are there not sets of fifty and of a hundred procreated? Why, too, are there no comrades and boon companions[13] named [for them]?

[1] [Of this name there are two forms—Αἶνος (*Praise*) and Ἀεινοῦς (*Eternal Mind*).]

[2] [Or Τελετός (Teletus). Another form of this Æon's name is Φιλητός (*Philetus = Beloved*). Oehler always reads Theletus.]

[3] Cogor.

[4] Frigidissimus.

[5] Cum virum fortem peroraret . . . inquit.

[6] [Tertullian's joke lies in the equivocal sense of this cry, which may mean either admiration and joy, or grief and rage.]

[7] Audisti [interrogatively].

[8] [See above, chap. iv.]

[9] Privilegia.

[10] Castrata.

[11] Tanta numerorum coagula.

[12] [The *pædagogium* was either the place where boys were trained as pages (often for lewd purposes), or else the boy himself of such a character.]

[13] [Oehler reads "hetæri (ἑταῖροι) et syntrophi." Another reading,

CHAP. IX.—*Other capricious features in the system. The Æons unequal in attributes. The superiority of Nus; the vagaries of Sophia restrained by Horos. Grand titles borne by this last power.*

But, further, there is an "acceptance[1] of persons," inasmuch as Nus alone among them all enjoys the knowledge of the immeasurable Father, joyous and exulting, while they of course pine in sorrow. To be sure, Nus, so far as in him lay, both wished and tried to impart to the others also all that he had learnt about the greatness and incomprehensibility of the Father; but his mother, Sige, interposed—she who (you must know) imposes silence even on her own beloved heretics;[2] although they affirm that this is done at the will of the Father, who will have all to be inflamed with a longing after himself. Thus, while they are tormenting themselves with these internal desires, while they are burning with the secret longing to know the Father, the crime is almost accomplished. For of the twelve Æons which Homo and Ecclesia had produced, the youngest by birth (never mind the solecism, since Sophia (Wisdom) is her name), unable to restrain herself, breaks away without the society of her husband Theletus, in quest of the Father, and contracts that kind of sin which had indeed arisen amongst the others who were conversant with Nus, but had flowed on to this [Æon],[3] that is, to Sophia; as is usual with maladies which, after arising in one part of the body, spread abroad their infection to some other limb. The fact is,[4] under a pretence of love to the Father, she was overcome with a desire to rival Nus, who alone rejoiced in the knowledge of the Father.[5] But when Sophia, straining after impossible aims, was disappointed of her hope, she is both overcome with difficulty, and

supported by Rigaltius, is "stercciæ," instead of the former word, which gives a very contemptuous sense, suitable to Tertullian's irony.]

[1] Exceptio.

[2] [Tertullian has, above, remarked on the silent and secret practices of the Valentinians (see chap. i.).]

[3] In hunc derivaret. [4] Sed enim. [5] De Patre.

racked with affection. [Thus] she was all but swallowed up by reason of the charm and toil [of her research],[1] and dissolved into the remnant of [his] substance;[2] nor would there have been any other alternative for her than perdition, if she had not by good luck fallen in with Horos (*Limit*). He too had considerable power. He is the foundation of the great[3] universe, and, externally, the guardian thereof. To him they give the additional names of Crux (*Cross*), and Lytrotes (*Redeemer*), and Carpistes (*Emancipator*).[4] When Sophia was thus rescued from danger, and tardily persuaded, she relinquished further research after the Father, found repose, and laid aside all her excitement,[5] [or] Enthymesis [*Desire*], along with the passion which had come over her.

CHAP. X. — *Another account of the strange aberrations of Sophia, and the restraining services of Horos; Sophia was not herself, after all, ejected from the Pleroma, but only her* ENTHYMESIS.

But some dreamers have given another account of the aberration[6] and recovery of Sophia. After her vain endeavours, and the disappointment of her hope, she was, I suppose, disfigured with paleness and emaciation, and that neglect of her beauty which was natural to one who[7] was deploring the denial of the Father,—an affliction which was no less painful than his loss. Then, in the midst of all this sorrow, she by herself alone, without any conjugal help, conceived and bare a female offspring. Does this excite your surprise? Well, even the hen has the power of being

[1] Præ vi dulcedinis et laboris.

[2] [It is not easy to say what is the meaning of the words, "Et in reliquam substantiam dissolvi." Rigaltius renders them: "So that whatever substance was left to her was being dissolved." This seems to be forcing the sentence unnaturally. Irenæus (according to the Latin translator) says: "Resolutum in universam substantiam," "Resolved into his (the Father's) general substance," i. 2, 2.]

[3] Illius.

[4] [So Grabe; but "*Reaper*," according to Neander.]

[5] Animationem. [6] Exitum. [7] Uti quæ.

able to bring forth by her own energy.[1] They say, too, that among vultures there are only females, which become parents alone. At any rate, she was a mother without aid from a male, and she began at last to be afraid that her end was even at hand. She was all in doubt about the treatment[2] of her case, and took pains at self-concealment. Remedies [could] nowhere [be found]. For where, then, should we have tragedies and comedies, from which to borrow the process of exposing what has been born without connubial modesty? While the thing is in this evil plight, she raises her eyes, and turns them to the Father. Having, however, striven in vain, as her strength was failing her, she falls to praying. Her entire kindred also supplicates in her behalf, and especially Nus. Why not? What was the cause of so vast an evil? Yet not a single casualty[3] befell Sophia without its effect. All her sorrows operate. Inasmuch as all that conflict of hers contributes to the origin of Matter. [Her] ignorance, [her] fear, [her] distress, become substances. Hereupon the Father by and by, being moved, produces in his own image, with a view to these [circumstances],[4] the Horos whom we have mentioned above; [and this he does] by means of Monogenes Nus, a male-female [Æon], because there is this variation of statement about the Father's[5] sex. They also go on to tell us that Horos is likewise called Metagogeus, that is, "a conductor about," as well as Horothetes (*Setter of Limits*). By his assistance they declare that Sophia was checked in her illicit courses, and purified from all evils, and thenceforth strengthened [in virtue], and restored to the conjugal state: [they add] that she indeed remained within the bounds[6] of the Pleroma, but that her Enthymesis, with the accruing[7] Passion, was banished by Horos, and crucified and cast out from the Pleroma,—even

[1] [Comp. Aristotle, *Hist. Anim.* vi. 2; Pliny, *H. N.* x. 58, 60.]

[2] Ratione.

[3] Exitus.

[4] In hæc [in relation to the case of Sophia].

[5] [Above, in chap. vii., we were told that Nus, who was so much like the Father, was himself called "Father."]

[6] In censu.

[7] Appendicem.

as they say, "*Malum, foras!*" [Evil, avaunt!] Still, that was a spiritual essence, as being the natural impulse of an Æon, although without form or shape, inasmuch as it had apprehended nothing, and therefore was pronounced to be an infirm and feminine fruit.[1]

CHAP. XI.—*The profane account given of the origin of Christ and the Holy Ghost sternly rebuked by Tertullian. An absurdity respecting the attainment of the knowledge of God ably exposed.*

Accordingly, after the banishment of the Enthymesis, and the return of her mother Sophia to her husband, the [illustrious] Monogenes, the Nus,[2] released indeed from all care and concern of the Father, in order that he might consolidate all things, and defend and at last fix the Pleroma, and so prevent any concussion of the kind again, once more[3] emits a new couple,[4] Christ and the Holy Spirit. I should suppose the coupling of two males to be a very shameful thing, or else the Holy Spirit must be a female, and so the male is discredited[5] by the female. One divinity is assigned in the case of all these, to procure a complete adjustment among the Æons. Even from this fellowship in a common duty two schools actually arise, two chairs,[6] and, to some extent,[7] the inauguration of a division in the doctrine of Valentinus. It was the function of Christ to instruct the Æons in the nature of their conjugal relations[8] (you see what the whole thing was, of course!), and how to form some guess about the Unbegotten,[9] and to give them the capacity of generating within themselves the knowledge of the Father; it being impossible to catch the idea of him, or comprehend him, or, in short, even to enjoy any perception of him, either by the eye or the

[1] [Literally, "infirm fruit and a female," *i.e.* "had not shared in any male influence, but was a purely female production." See our *Irenæus*, i. 9.]

[2] Ille nus.
[3] Iterum (above).
[4] Copulationem.
[5] Vulneratur.
[6] Cathedræ.
[7] Quædam.
[8] Conjugiorum.
[9] Innati conjectationem.

ear, except through Monogenes (the Only-begotten). Well, I will even grant them what they allege about knowing the Father, so that they do not refuse us [the attainment of] the same. I would rather point out what is perverse in their doctrine, how they were taught that the incomprehensible part of the Father was the cause of their own perpetuity,[1] whilst that which might be comprehended of him was the reason[2] of their generation and formation. Now by these several positions[3] the tenet, I suppose, is insinuated, that it is expedient for God not to be apprehended, on the very ground that the incomprehensibility of His character is the cause of perpetuity; whereas what in Him is comprehensible is productive, not of perpetuity, but rather of conditions which lack perpetuity—namely, nativity and formation. The Son, indeed, they make capable of comprehending the Father. The manner in which He is comprehended, the recently produced Christ fully taught them. To the Holy Spirit, however, belonged the special gifts, whereby they, having been all set on a complete par in respect of their earnestness to learn, should be enabled to offer up their thanksgiving, and be introduced to a true tranquillity.

CHAP. XII.—*The strange jumble of the Pleroma, the frantic delight of the members thereof, their joint contribution of parts for the formation of* JESUS, *set forth by Tertullian with humorous irony.*

Thus they are all on the self-same footing in respect of form and knowledge, all of them having become what each of them severally is; none being a different being, because they are all what the others are.[4] They are all turned into[5] Nuses, into Homos, into Theletuses;[6] and so in the case of the

[1] Perpetuitatis [*i.e.* "what was unchangeable in their condition and nature"].

[2] Rationem [perhaps "the means"].

[3] Hac dispositione.

[4] Nemo aliud quia alteri omnes.

[5] Refunduntur.

[6] [The reader will, of course, see that we give a familiar English plural to these names, as better expressing Tertullian's irony.]

females, into Siges, into Zoes, into Ecclesias, into Fortunatas, so that Ovid would have blotted out his own Metamorphoses if he had only known our larger one in the present day. Straightway they were reformed and thoroughly established, and being composed to rest from the truth, they celebrate the Father in a chorus[1] of praise in the exuberance of their joy. [The Father] himself also revelled[2] in the glad feeling; of course, because his children and grandchildren sang so well. And why should he not revel in absolute delight? Was not the Pleroma freed [from all danger]? What ship's captain[3] fails to rejoice even with indecent frolic? Every day we witness the uproarious ebullitions of sailors' joys.[4] Therefore, as sailors always exult over the reckoning they pay in common, so do these Æons enjoy a similar pleasure, one as they now all are in form, and, as I may add,[5] in feeling too. With the concurrence of even their new brethren and masters, Christ and the Holy Spirit, they contribute into one common stock the best and most beautiful thing with which they are severally adorned. Vainly, as I suppose. For if they were all one by reason of the above-mentioned thorough equalization, there was no room for the process of a common reckoning,[6] which for the most part consists of a pleasing variety. They all contributed the one good thing, which they all were. There would be, in all probability, a formal procedure[7] in the mode or in the form of the very equalization in question. Accordingly, out of the donation which they contributed[8] to the honour and glory of the Father, they jointly fashion[9] the most beautiful constellation of the Pleroma, and its perfect fruit, Jesus. Him they also surname[10] Soter (*Saviour*) and Christ, and Sermo (*Word*) after his ancestors;[11] and lastly Omnia (*All Things*),

[1] Concinunt. [2] Diffundebatur. [3] Nauclerus ["pilot"].
[4] [Tertullian lived at a seaport at Carthage.]
[5] Nedum. [6] Symbolæ ratio. [7] Ratio.
[8] Ex ære collaticio. [In reference to the common *symbola*, Tertullian adds the proverbial formula, "quod aiunt" (as they say).]
[9] Compingunt. [10] Cognominant.
[11] De patritis. [Irenæus' word here is πατρωνυμικῶς ("*patronymice*").]

as formed from a universally culled nosegay,[1] [like] the jay of Æsop, the Pandora of Hesiod, the bowl[2] of Accius, the honey-cake of Nestor, the miscellany of Ptolemy. How much nearer the mark, if these idle title-mongers had called him Pancarpian, after certain Athenian customs.[3] By way of adding external honour also to their wonderful puppet, they produce for him a body-guard of angels of like nature. If this be their mutual condition, it may be all right; if, however, they are consubstantial with Soter (for I have discovered how doubtfully the case is stated), where will be his eminence when surrounded by attendants who are co-equal with himself?

CHAP. XIII.—*First part of the subject, touching the constitution of the Pleroma, briefly recapitulated. Transition to the other part, which our author says is like "a play outside the curtain."*

In this series, then, is contained the first emanation of Æons, who are alike born, and are married, and produce offspring: there are the most dangerous fortunes of Sophia in her ardent longing for the Father, the most seasonable help of Horos, the expiation of her Enthymesis and accruing Passion, the instruction of Christ and the Holy Spirit, their tutelar reform of the Æons, the piebald ornamentation of Soter, the consubstantial retinue[4] of the angels. All that remains, according to you, is the fall of the curtain and the clapping of hands.[5] What remains, in my opinion, however, is, that

[1] Ex omnium defloratione. [2] Patina.

[3] [Alluding to the olive-branch, ornamented with all sorts of fruits (compare our "Christmas tree"), which was carried about by boys in Athens on a certain festival (White and Riddle).]

[4] Comparaticium antistatum. [The latter word Oehler explains, "ante ipsum stantes;" the former, "quia genus eorum comparari poterat substantiæ Soteris" (so Rigaltius).]

[5] [The reader will see how obviously this is meant in Tertullian's "Quod superest, inquis, vos valete et plaudite." This is the well-known allusion to the end of the play in the old Roman theatre. See Quintilian, vi. 1, 52; comp. Horace, *A. P.* 155. Tertullian's own parody

you should hear and take heed. At all events, these things are said to have been played out within the company of the Pleroma, the first scene of the tragedy. The rest of the play, however, is beyond the curtain—I mean outside of the Pleroma. And yet if it be such within the bosom of the Father, within the embrace of the guardian Horos, what must it be outside, in free space,[1] where God did not exist?

CHAP. XIV.—*The adventures of Achamoth outside the Pleroma. The mission of Christ in pursuit of her. Her longing for Christ. Horos' hostility to her. Her continued suffering.*

For Enthymesis, or rather Achamoth—because by this inexplicable[2] name alone must she be henceforth designated—when in company with the vicious Passion, her inseparable companion, she was expelled to places devoid of that light which is the substance of the Pleroma, even to the void and empty region of Epicurus, she becomes wretched also because of the place of her banishment. She is indeed without either form or feature, even an untimely and abortive production. Whilst she is in this plight,[3] Christ descends from[4] the heights, conducted by Horos, in order to impart form to the abortion, out of his own energies, the form of substance only, but not of knowledge also. Still she is left with some property. She has restored to her the odour of immortality, in order that she might, under its influence, be overcome with the desire of better things than belonged to her present plight.[5] Having accomplished His merciful mission, not without the assistance of the Holy Spirit, Christ returns to the Pleroma. It is usual out of an abundance of things[6]

to this formula, immediately after, is: "Immo quod superest, inquam, vos audite et proficite."]

[1] In libero [which may be, however, "beyond the control of Horos"].

[2] Ininterpretabili.

[3] [Tertullian's "Dum ita rerum habet" is a copy of the Greek οὕτω τῶν πραγμάτων ἐχουσα.]

[4] Deflectitur a. [5] Casus sui. [6] Rerum ex liberalitatibus.

for names to be also forthcoming. Enthymesis came from action;[1] whence Achamoth came is still a question; Sophia emanates from the Father, the Holy Spirit from an angel. She entertains a regret for Christ immediately after she had discovered her desertion by him. Therefore she hurried forth herself, in quest of the light of Him Whom she did not at all discover, as He operated in an invisible manner; for how else would she make search for His light, which was as unknown to her as He was Himself? Try, however, she did, and perhaps would have found Him, had not the self-same Horos, who had met her mother so opportunely, fallen in with the daughter quite as unseasonably, so as to exclaim at her *IAO!* just as we hear the cry "Porro Quirites" ["Out of the way, Romans!"], or else "Fidem Cæsaris!" ["By the faith of Cæsar!"], whence (as they will have it) the name *IAO* comes to be found in the Scriptures.[2] Being thus hindered from proceeding further, and being unable to surmount[3] the Cross, that is to say, Horos, because she had not yet practised herself in the part of Catullus' *Laureolus*,[4] [and] given over, as it were, to that passion of hers in a manifold and complicated mesh, she began to be afflicted with every impulse thereof, with sorrow,—because she had not accomplished her enterprise, with fear,—lest she should lose her life, even as she had lost the light, with consternation, [and] then with ignorance. But not as her mother [did she suffer this], for *she* was an Æon. Hers, however, was a worse suffering, considering her condition; for another tide of emotion still overwhelmed her, even of conversion to the

[1] De actia fuit.

[2] [It is not necessary, with Rigaltius, to make a difficulty about this, when we remember that Tertullian only refers to a silly conceit of the Valentinians touching the origin of the sacred name.]

[3] [Or does "nec habens *supervolare* crucem" mean, "being unable to *elude* the cross?" As if Tertullian meant, in his raillery, to say, that Achamoth had not the skill of the player who played the part of Laureolus. Although so often suspended on the gibbet, he had of course as often escaped the real penalty.]

[4] [A notorious robber, the hero of a play by Lutatius Catullus, who is said to have been crucified.]

Christ, by Whom she had been restored to life, and had been directed[1] to this very conversion.

CHAP. XV.—*Strange account of the origin of* MATTER, *from the various affections of Achamoth. The waters from her tears; light from her smile.*

Well, now, the Pythagoreans may learn, the Stoics may know, Plato himself [may discover], whence Matter, which they will have to be unborn, derived both its origin and substance for all this pile of the world,—[a mystery] which not even the renowned[2] Mercurius Trismegistus, master [as he was] of all physical philosophy, thought out.[3] You have just heard of "Conversion," one element in the "Passion" [we have so often mentioned]. Out of this the whole life of the world,[4] and even that of the Demiurge himself, our God, is said to have had its being. Again, you have heard of "sorrow" and "fear." From these all other created things[5] took their beginning. For from her[6] tears flowed the entire mass of waters. From this circumstance one may form an idea of the calamity[7] which she encountered, so vast were the kinds of the tears wherewith she overflowed. She had salt tear-drops, she had bitter, and sweet, and warm, and cold, and bituminous, and ferruginous, and sulphurous, and even[8] poisonous, so that the Nonacris exuded therefrom which killed Alexander; and the river of the Lyncestæ[9] flowed from the same source, which produces drunkenness; and the Salmacis[10] was derived from the same source, which renders men effeminate. The rains of heaven Achamoth whimpered forth,[11] and we on our part are anxiously employed in saving up in our cisterns the very wails and tears of another. In

[1] Temperata. [2] Ille. [3] Recogitavit.

[4] ["Omnis anima hujus mundi" may, however, mean "every living soul." So Bp. Kaye, *On Tertullian*, p. 487.]

[5] Cetera. [6] [Achamoth's.]

[7] Exitum. [8] Utique.

[9] [These two rivers, with their peculiar qualities, are mentioned by Pliny, *H. N.* ii. 103.]

[10] [Ovid, *Metam.* iv. 286.] [11] Pipiavit.

like manner, from the "consternation" and "alarm" [of which we have also heard], bodily elements were derived. And yet amidst so many circumstances of solitude, in this vast prospect of destitution, she occasionally smiled at the recollection of the sight of Christ, and from this smile of joy light flashed forth. How great was this beneficence of Providence, which induced her to smile, and all that we might not linger for ever in the dark! Nor need you feel astonished how[1] from her joy so splendid an element[2] could have beamed upon the world, when from her sadness even so necessary a provision[3] flowed forth for man. O illuminating smile! O irrigating tear! And yet it might now have acted as some alleviation amidst the horror of her situation; for she might have shaken off all the obscurity thereof as often as she had a mind to smile, even not to be obliged to turn suppliant to those who had deserted her.[4]

CHAP. XVI.—*Achamoth purified from all impurities of her "passion" by the Paraclete, acting through Soter or Jesus, who out of the above-mentioned impurities arranges Matter, separating its evil from the better qualities.*

She, too, resorts to prayers, after the manner of her mother. But Christ, Who now felt a dislike to quit the Pleroma, appoints the Paraclete as his deputy. To her, therefore, he despatches Soter [*the Saviour*][5] (who must be the same as Jesus, to whom the Father imparted the supreme power over the whole body of the Æons, by subjecting them all to him, so that "by him," as the apostle says, "all things were created"[6]), with a retinue and cortege of contemporary angels, and (as one may suppose) with the dozen fasces. Hereupon Achamoth, being quite struck with the pomp of his approach, immediately covered herself with a veil, moved at first with a dutiful feeling of veneration and modesty;

[1] Qui.
[2] [As light.]
[3] Instrumentum [water is meant].
[4] [Christ and the Holy Spirit (Oehler).]
[5] [Another title of the Paraclete.]
[6] [Col. i. 16.]

but afterwards she surveys him calmly, and his prolific equipage.[1] With such energies as she had derived from the contemplation, she meets him with the salutation, *Κύριε, χαῖρε* ["Hail, Lord"]! Upon this, I suppose, he receives her, confirms and conforms her in knowledge, as well as cleanses[2] her from all the outrages of Passion, without, however, utterly severing them, with an indiscriminateness like that which had happened in the casualties which befell her mother. For such vices as had become inveterate and confirmed by practice he throws together; and when he had consolidated them in one mass, he fixes them in a separate body, so as to compose the corporeal condition of Matter, extracting out of her inherent, incorporeal passion such an aptitude of nature[3] as might qualify it to attain to a reciprocity of bodily substances,[4] which should emulate one another, so that a twofold condition of the substances might be arranged; [one] full of evil through its faults, [the other] susceptible of passion from conversion. This will prove to be Matter, which has set us in battle array against Hermogenes, and all others who presume to teach that God made all things out of Matter, not out of nothing.

CHAP. XVII.—*Achamoth in love with the angels. Tertullian's protest against the lascivious features of Valentinianism. Achamoth becomes the mother of three natures.*

Then Achamoth, delivered at length from all her evils, wonderful to tell,[5] goes on and bears fruit with greater results. For, warmed with the joy of so great an escape from her unhappy condition, and at the same time heated with the actual contemplation of the angelic luminaries (one is ashamed [to use such language], but there is no other way of expressing one's meaning), she, during the emotion, somehow became personally inflamed with desire[6] towards them, and at once grew pregnant with a spiritual conception, at the

[1] Fructiferumque suggestum.
[2] Expumicat.
[3] Habilitatem atque naturam. [We have treated this as an hendiadys.]
[4] Æquiparantias corpulentiarum.
[5] Ecce.
[6] Subavit et ipsa.

very image which the violence of her joyous transport, and the delight of her prurient excitement, had imbibed and impressed upon her. She at length gave birth to an offspring, and then there arose a leash of natures,[1] from a triad of causes,—one material, arising from her passion; another animal, arising from her conversion; the third spiritual, which had its origin in her imagination.

CHAP. XVIII. — *Blasphemous opinion concerning the origin of the* DEMIURGE, *supposed to be the Creator of the universe.*

Having become a better proficient[2] in practical conduct by the authority which, we may well suppose,[3] accrued to her from her three children, she determined to impart form to each of the natures. The spiritual one, however, she was unable to touch, inasmuch as she was herself spiritual. For a participation in the same nature has, to a very great extent,[4] disqualified like and consubstantial beings from having superior power over one another. Therefore[5] she applies herself solely to the animal nature, adducing the instructions of Soter[6] [for her guidance]. And first of all [she does] what cannot be described, and read, and heard of, without an intense horror at the blasphemy thereof: she produces this God of ours, the God of all except of the heretics, the Father and Creator,[7] and King of all things, which are inferior to him. For from him do they proceed. If, however, they proceed from him, and not rather from Achamoth, or if only secretly from her, without his perceiving her, he was impelled to all that he did, even like a puppet[8] which is moved from the outside. In fact, it was owing to this very ambiguity about the personal agency in the works which were done, that they coined for him the mixed name of Metropator (*Motherly Father*),[9]

[1] Trinitas generum.
[2] Exercitior.
[3] Scilicet.
[4] Fere.
[5] Eo animo.
[6] [See above, chap. xvi.]
[7] Demiurgum.
[8] Et velut sigillario. ["*Sigillarium* est νευρόσπαστον" (Oehler).]
[9] [The Father acting through and proceeding from his Mother.]

whilst his other appellations were distinctly assigned according to the conditions and positions of his works: so that they call him *Father* in relation to the animal substances to which they give the place of honour[1] on his right hand; whereas, in respect of the material substances which they banish[2] to his left hand, they name him *Demiurgus;* whilst [his title] *King* designates his authority over both classes, [nay], over the universe.[3]

CHAP. XIX.—*Palpable absurdities and contradictions in the system respecting Achamoth and the Demiurge.*

And yet there is not any agreement between the propriety of the names and that of the works, from which all the names are suggested; since all of them ought to have borne the name of her by whom the things were done, unless after all[4] it turn out that they were not made by her. For, although they say that Achamoth devised these forms in honour of the Æons, they yet[5] transfer this [work] to Soter as its author, when they say that he[6] operated through her, so far as to give her the very image of the invisible and unknown Father—that is, the image which was unknown and invisible to the Demiurge; whilst he[7] formed this same Demiurge in imitation[8] of Nus the son [of Propator];[9] and whilst the archangels, who were the work of the Demiurge, resembled the other Æons. Now, when I hear of such images of the three, I ask, do you not wish me to laugh at these pictures of their most extravagant painter? At the female Achamoth, a picture of the Father? At the Demiurge, ignorant of his mother, much more so of his father? At the picture of Nus, ignorant of his father too, and the minister-

[1] Commendant. [2] Delegant.
[3] Communiter in universitatem. [4] Jam. [5] Rursus.
[6] [This is the force of the "qui" with the subjunctive verb.]
[7] Soter. [8] Effingeret.
[9] [There seems to be a relative gradation meant among these *extra-Pleroma* beings, as there was among the Æons of the Pleroma; and, further, a relation between the two sets of beings—Achamoth bearing a relation to Propator, the Demiurge to Nus, etc.]

ing angels, facsimiles of their lords? This is painting a mule from an ass, and sketching Ptolemy from Valentinus.

CHAP. XX.—*The Demiurge works away at creation, as the drudge of his mother Achamoth, in ignorance all the while of the nature of his occupation.*

The Demiurge, therefore, placed as he was without the limits of the Pleroma in the ignominious solitude of his eternal exile, founded a new empire—this world [of ours]—by clearing away the confusion and distinguishing the difference between the two substances which severally constituted it,[1] the animal and the material. Out of incorporeal [elements] he constructs bodies, heavy, light, erect[2] and stooping, celestial and terrene. He then completes the sevenfold stage of heaven itself, with his own throne above all. Whence he had the additional name of Sabbatum from the hebdomadal nature of his abode; his mother Achamoth, too, had the title Ogdoada, after the precedent of the primeval Ogdoad.[3] These heavens, however, they consider to be intelligent,[4] and sometimes they make angels of them, as indeed they do of the Demiurge himself; as also [they call] Paradise the fourth archangel, because they fix it above the third heaven, of the power of which Adam partook, when he sojourned there amidst its fleecy clouds[5] and shrubs.[6] Ptolemy remembered perfectly well the prattle of his boyhood,[7] that apples grew in the sea, and fishes on the tree; after the same fashion, he assumed that nut-trees flourished in the skies. The Demiurge does his work in ignorance, and therefore perhaps he is unaware that trees ought to be planted only on the ground. His mother, of course, knew all about it: how is it, then, that she did not suggest the fact, since she was

[1] Duplicis substantiæ illius disclusæ.

[2] Sublimantia.

[3] Ogdoadis primogenitalis [what Irenæus calls "the first-begotten and primary Ogdoad of the Pleroma" (see our *Irenæus*, vol. i. p. 21; also above, chap. vii.)].

[4] Noëros.

[5] Nubeculas.

[6] Arbusculas.

[7] Puerilium dicibulorum.

actually executing her own operation? But whilst building up so vast an edifice for her son by means of those works, which proclaim him at once to be father, god, and king before the conceits of the Valentinians, why she refused to let them be known to even him,[1] is a question which I shall ask afterwards.

CHAP. XXI.—*The vanity as well as ignorance of the Demiurge. Absurd results from so imperfect a condition.*

Meanwhile you must believe[2] that Sophia has the surnames of Earth and of Mother—"Mother-Earth," of course—and (what may excite your laughter still more heartily) even Holy Spirit. In this way they have conferred all honour on that female, I suppose even a beard, not to say other things. Besides,[3] the Demiurge had so little mastery over things,[4] on the score,[5] you must know,[6] of his inability to approach spiritual essences, [constituted as he was] of animal elements, that, imagining himself to be the only being, he uttered this soliloquy: "I am God, and beside me there is none else."[7] But for all that, he at least was aware that he had not himself existed before. He understood, therefore, that he had been created, and that there must be a creator of a creature of some sort or other. How happens it, then, that he seemed to himself to be the only being, notwithstanding his uncertainty, and although he had, at any rate, some suspicion of the existence of some creator?

CHAP. XXII.—*Origin of* THE DEVIL, *in the criminal excess of the sorrow of Achamoth. The Devil, called also* MUNDITENENS, *actually wiser than the Demiurge, although his work!*

The odium felt amongst them[8] against the devil is the more excusable,[9] even because the peculiarly sordid character

[1] ["Sibi" here must refer to the secondary agent of the sentence.]
[2] Tenendum.
[3] Alioquin.
[4] Adeo rerum non erat compos.
[5] Censu.
[6] Scilicet.
[7] [Isa. xlv. 5, xlvi. 9.]
[8] Infamia apud illos.
[9] Tolerabilior.

of his origin justifies it.[1] For he is supposed by them to have had his origin in that criminal excess[2] of her[3] sorrow, from which they also derive the birth of the angels, and demons, and all wicked spirits. Yet they affirm that the devil is the work of the Demiurge, and they call him Munditenens[4] (*Ruler of the World*), and maintain that, as he is of a spiritual nature, he has a better knowledge of the things above than the Demiurge, an animal being. He deserves from them the pre-eminence which all heresies provide him with.

CHAP. XXIII.—*The relative positions of the Pleroma, the region of Achamoth, and the creation of the Demiurge. The addition of* FIRE *to the various elements and bodies of nature.*

Their most eminent powers, moreover, they confine within the following limits, as in a citadel. In the most elevated of all summits presides the tricenary Pleroma,[5] Horos marking off its boundary line. Beneath it, Achamoth occupies the intermediate space for her abode,[6] treading down her son. For under her comes the Demiurge in his own Hebdomad, or rather the Devil, [sojourning] in this world in common with ourselves, formed, as has been said above, of the same elements and the same body, out of the most profitable calamities of Sophia; inasmuch as, [if it had not been for these], our spirit would have had no space for inhaling and ejecting[7] air—that delicate vest of all corporeal creatures, that revealer of all colours, that instrument of the seasons—if the sadness of Sophia had not filtered it, just as her fear did the animal existences, and her conversion the Demiurge himself. Into all these elements and bodies fire was fanned. Now, since they have not as yet explained to us the original sensation

[1] Capit ["capax est," nimirum "infamiæ" (Fr. Junius)].
[2] Ex nequitia.
[3] [Achamoth's.]
[4] [Irenæus' word is Κοσμοκράτωρ; see also Eph. vi. 12.]
[5] [Above, in chap. viii., he has mentioned the Pleroma as "the fulness of the thirtyfold divinity."]
[6] Metatur.
[7] Reciprocandi.

of this[1] in Sophia, I will on my own responsibility[2] conjecture that its spark was struck out of the delicate emotions[3] of her [feverish grief]. For you may be quite sure that, amidst all her vexations, she must have had a good deal of fever.[4]

CHAP. XXIV.—*The formation of* MAN *by the Demiurge; human flesh not made of the ground, but of a nondescript philosophic substance.*

Such being their conceits respecting God, or, if you like,[5] the gods, of what sort are their figments concerning man? For, after he had made the world, the Demiurge turns his hands to man, and chooses for him as his substance not any portion of "the dry land," as they say, of which alone we have any knowledge (although it was, at that time, not yet dried by the waters becoming separated from the earthly residuum, and only afterwards became dry), but of the invisible substance of that matter, which philosophy indeed dreams of, from its fluid and fusible composition, the origin of which I am unable to imagine, because it exists nowhere. Now, since fluidity and fusibility are qualities of liquid matter, and since everything liquid flowed from Sophia's tears, we must, as a necessary conclusion, believe that muddy earth is constituted of Sophia's eye-rheums and viscid discharges,[6] which are just as much the dregs of tears as mud is the sediment of waters. Thus does the Demiurge mould man as a potter does his clay, and animates him with his own breath. Made after his image and likeness, he will therefore be both material and animal. A fourfold being! For in respect of his "image," he must be deemed clayey,[7] that is to say, material, although the Demiurge is not composed of matter; but as to his "likeness," he is animal, for such, too, is the Demiurge. You have two [of his constituent elements]. Moreover, a coating of flesh was, as they allege, afterwards placed over the clayey substra-

[1] [Fire.] [2] Ego. [3] Motiunculis.
[4] Febricitasse. [5] Vel. [6] Ex pituitis et gramis.
[7] Choicus.

tum, and it is this tunic of skin which is susceptible of sensation.

CHAP. XXV.—*An extravagant way of accounting for the communication of the spiritual nature to man. It was furtively managed by Achamoth, through the unconscious agency of her son.*

In Achamoth, moreover, there was inherent a certain property of a spiritual germ, of her mother Sophia's substance; and Achamoth herself had carefully severed off [the same quality], and implanted it in her son the Demiurge, although he was actually unconscious of it. It is for you to imagine[1] the industry of this clandestine arrangement. For to this end had she deposited and concealed [this germ], that, whenever the Demiurge came to impart life to Adam by his inbreathing, he might at the same time draw off from the vital principle[2] the spiritual seed, and, as by a pipe, inject it into the clayey nature; in order that, being then fecundated in the material body as in a womb, and having fully grown there, it might be found fit for one day receiving the perfect Word.[3] When, therefore, the Demiurge commits to Adam the transmission of his own vital principle,[4] the spiritual man lay hid, [although] inserted by his breath, and at the same time introduced into the body, because the Demiurge knew no more about his mother's seed than about herself. To this seed they give the name of Ecclesia (*the Church*), the mirror of the church above, and the perfection[5] of man; tracing this [perfection] from Achamoth, just as they do the animal nature from the Demiurge, the clayey material of the body [they derive] from the primordial substance,[6] the flesh from Matter. So that you have a new Geryon here, only a fourfold [rather than a threefold] monster.

CHAP. XXVI.—*The three several natures—the material, the animal, and the spiritual, and their several destinations.*

[1] Accipe. [2] Anima derivaret. [3] Sermoni perfecto.
[4] Traducem animæ suæ. [5] Censum.
[6] [Or, the substance of Ἀεχήν.]

The strange Valentinian opinion about the structure of the Saviour's nature.

In like manner they assign to each of them a separate end.[1] To the material, that is to say the carnal [nature], which they also call "the left-handed," they assign undoubted destruction; to the animal [nature], which they also call "the right-handed," a doubtful issue, inasmuch as it oscillates between the material and the spiritual, and is sure to fall at last on the side to which it has mainly gravitated. As regards the spiritual, however, [they say] that it enters into the formation of the animal, in order that it may be educated in company with it and be disciplined by repeated intercourse with it. For the animal [nature] was in want of training even by the senses: for this purpose, accordingly, was the whole structure of the world provided; for this purpose also did Soter [*the Saviour*] present Himself in the world—even for the salvation of the animal [nature]. By yet another arrangement they will have it that He, in some prodigious way,[2] clothed Himself with the primary portions[3] of those substances, the whole of which He was going to restore to salvation; in such wise that He assumed the spiritual nature from Achamoth, whilst He derived the animal [being], Christ, afterwards from the Demiurge; His corporal substance, however, which was constructed of an animal nature (only with wonderful and indescribable skill), He wore for a dispensational purpose, in order that He might, in spite of His own unwillingness,[4] be capable of meeting persons, and of being seen and touched by them, and even of dying. But there was nothing material assumed by Him, inasmuch as *that* was incapable of salvation. As if He could possibly have been more required by any others than by those who were in want of salvation! And all this, in order that by severing the condition of our flesh from Christ they may also deprive it of the hope of salvation!

[1] Exitum.

[2] Monstruosum illum.

[3] Prosicias induisse. [Irenæus says, "Assumed the first-fruits," τὰς ἀπαρχάς.]

[4] Ingratis.

CHAP. XXVII.—*The Christ of the Demiurge, sent into the world* BY *the Virgin, not* OF *her; He found in her, not a mother, but only a passage or channel. Jesus descended upon Christ, at His baptism, like a dove; but, being incapable of suffering, He left Christ to die on the cross alone.*

I now adduce[1] [what they say] concerning Christ, upon whom some of them engraft Jesus with so much licence, that they foist into Him a spiritual seed together with an animal *inflatus*. Indeed, I will not undertake to describe[2] these incongruous crammings,[3] which they have contrived in relation both to their men and their gods. Even the Demiurge has a Christ of His own—His natural Son. An animal, in short, produced by Himself, proclaimed by the prophets—His position being one which must be decided by prepositions; in other words, He was produced *by means of* a virgin, rather than *of* a virgin! On the ground that, having descended into the virgin rather in the manner of a passage through her than of a birth by her, He came into existence *through* her, not *of* her—not experiencing a mother in her, but nothing more than a way. Upon this same Christ, therefore [so they say], Jesus descended in the sacrament of baptism, in the likeness of a dove. Moreover, there was even in Christ accruing from Achamoth the condiment of a spiritual seed, in order of course to prevent the corruption of all the other stuffing.[4] For after the precedent of the principal Tetrad, they guard him with four substances—the spiritual one of Achamoth, the animal one of the Demiurge, the corporeal one which cannot be described, and that of Soter, or, in other phrase, the columbine.[5] As for Soter (*Jesus*), he remained in Christ to the last, impassible, incapable of injury, incapable of apprehension. By and by, when it came to a question of capture, he departed from him during the examination before Pilate. In like manner, his mother's seed did not admit of being injured, being equally exempt

[1] Reddo. [2] Nescio quæ. [3] Fartilia.
[4] Farsura. [5] [That which descended like a dove.]

from all manner of outrage,[1] and being undiscovered even by the Demiurge himself. The animal and carnal Christ, however, does suffer after the fashion[2] of the superior Christ, who, for the purpose of producing Achamoth, had been stretched upon the cross, that is, Horos, in a substantial though not a cognizable[3] form. In this manner do they reduce all things to mere images—Christians themselves being indeed nothing but imaginary beings!

CHAP. XXVIII.—*The Demiurge cured of his ignorance by the Saviour's advent, from whom he hears of the great future which was in store for himself.*

Meanwhile the Demiurge, being still ignorant of everything, although he will actually have to make some announcement himself by the prophets, but is quite incapable of even this part of his duty (because they divide authority over the prophets[4] between Achamoth, the Seed, and the Demiurge), no sooner heard of the advent of Soter (*the Saviour*) than he runs to him with haste and joy, with all his might, like the centurion in the Gospel.[5] And being enlightened by him on all points, he learns from him also of his own prospect how that he is to succeed to his mother's place. Being thenceforth free from all care, he carries on the administration of this world, mainly under the plea of protecting the church, for as long a time as may be necessary and proper.

CHAP. XXIX.—*The three natures again adverted to. They are all exemplified amongst men; for instance, by Cain, and Abel, and Seth.*

I will now collect from different sources, by way of conclusion, what they affirm concerning the dispensation[6] of the whole human race. Having at first stated their views as to [man's] threefold nature—which was, however, united in one[7] in the case of Adam—they then proceed after him to divide it [into three] with their especial characteristics, find-

[1] Æque insubditivam.
[2] In delineationem.
[3] Agnitionali.
[4] Prophetiale patrocinium.
[5] [Matt. viii. 5, 6.]
[6] De dispositione.
[7] Inunitam.

ing opportunity for such distinction in the posterity of Adam himself, in which occurs a threefold division as to moral differences. Cain, and Abel, and Seth, who were in a certain sense the sources of the human race, become the fountainheads of just as many qualities[1] of nature and essential character.[2] The material nature,[3] which had become reprobate for salvation, they assign to Cain; the animal nature, which was poised between divergent hopes, they find[4] in Abel; the spiritual, pre-ordained for certain salvation, they store up[4] in Seth. In this way also they make a twofold distinction among souls, as to their property of good and evil—according to the material condition derived from Cain, or the animal from Abel. Men's spiritual state they derive, over and above the other conditions,[5] from Seth adventitiously,[6] not in the way of nature, but of grace,[7] in such wise that Achamoth infuses it[8] among superior beings like rain[9] into good souls, that is, those who are enrolled in the animal class. Whereas the material class—in other words, those which are bad souls—they say, never receive the blessings of salvation;[10] for that nature they have pronounced to be incapable of any change or reform in its natural condition.[11] This grain, then, of spiritual seed is modest and very small when cast from her hand, but under her instruction[12] increases and advances into full conviction, as we have already said;[13] and the souls, on this very account, so much excelled all others, that the Demiurge, even then in his ignorance, held them in great esteem. For it was from their list that he

[1] Argumenta. [2] Essentiæ.

[3] Choicum ["the clayey"]. [Having the doubtful issues, which arise from freedom of the will (Oehler).]

[4] Recondunt [or, "discover"]. [5] Superducunt.

[6] De obvenientia. [7] Indulgentiam.

[8] [The "quos" here relates to "spiritalem statum," but, expressing the *sense* rather than the grammatical propriety, refers to the plural idea of "good souls" (Oehler).]

[9] Depluat. [10] Salutaria.

[11] [We have tried to retain the emphatic repetition, "inreformabilem naturæ naturam."]

[12] Eruditu hujus. [13] [Above, in ch. xxv.]

had been accustomed to select men for kings and for priests; and these even now, if they have once attained to a full and complete knowledge of these foolish conceits of theirs,[1] since they are already naturalized in the fraternal bond of the spiritual state, will obtain a sure salvation, nay, one which is on all accounts their due.

CHAP. XXX.—*The lax and dangerous views of this sect respecting good works. These are unnecessary to the spiritual man!*

For this reason it is that they neither regard works[2] as necessary for themselves, nor do they observe any of the calls of duty, eluding even the necessity of martyrdom on any pretence which may suit their pleasure. For this rule, [they say], is enjoined upon the animal seed, in order that the salvation, which we do not possess by any privilege of our state,[3] we may work out by right[4] of our conduct. Upon us, who are of an imperfect nature,[5] is imprinted the mark of this [animal] seed, because we are reckoned [as sprung] from the loves of Theletus,[6] and consequently as an abortion, just as their mother was. But *woe* to us indeed, should we in any point transgress the yoke of discipline, should we grow dull in the works of holiness and justice, should we desire to make our confession anywhere else, I know not where, and not before the powers of this world at the tribunals of the chief magistrates![7] As for them, however, they may prove their nobility by the dissoluteness[8] of their life and their diligence[9] in sin, since Achamoth fawns on them as her own; for she, too, found sin no unprofitable pursuit. Now it is held amongst them, that, for the purpose of honouring the celestial marriages,[10] it is necessary to con-

[1] Istarum nœniarum.
[2] Operationes ["the doing of (good) works"].
[3] [As, forsooth, we should in the *spiritual* state.]
[4] Suffragio.
[5] [Being animal, not spiritual.]
[6] [See above, ch. ix. x.]
[7] [See *Scorpiace*, ch. x.]
[8] Passivitate.
[9] ["Diligentia" may mean "proclivity" (Rigalt).]
[10] Of the Æons.

template and celebrate the mystery always by cleaving to a companion, that is, to a woman; otherwise [they account any man] degenerate, and a bastard[1] to the truth, who spends his life in the world without loving a woman or uniting himself to her. Then what is to become of the eunuchs whom we see amongst them?

CHAP. XXXI.—*At the last day great changes take place amongst the Æons as well as among men. How Achamoth and the Demiurge are affected then. Tertullian's irony on the subject.*

It remains that we say something about the end of the world,[2] and the dispensing of reward. As soon as Achamoth has completed the full harvest of her seed, and has then proceeded to gather it into her garner, or, after it has been taken to the mill and ground to flour, has hidden it in the kneading-trough with yeast until the whole be leavened, then shall the end speedily come.[3] Then, to begin with, Achamoth herself removes from the middle region,[4] from the second stage to the highest, since she is restored to the Pleroma; she is immediately received by that paragon of perfection[5] Soter, as her spouse of course, and they two afterwards consummate[6] new nuptials. This must be the spouse of the Scriptures,[7] the Pleroma of espousals (for you might suppose that the Julian laws[8] were interposing, since there are these migrations from place to place). In like manner, the Demiurge, too, will then change the scene of his abode from the celestial Hebdomad[9] to the higher regions, to his mother's now vacant saloon[10]—by this time knowing her, without however seeing her. [A happy coincidence!] For if he had

[1] Nec legitimum ["not a lawful son"].
[2] De consummatione.
[3] Urgebit.
[4] [See above, ch. xxiii.]
[5] Compacticius ille.
[6] Fient.
[7] [Query, the holy Scriptures, or the writings of the Valentinians?]
[8] [Very severe against adultery, and even against celibacy.]
[9] [In ch. xx. this "scenam de Hebdomade cælesti" is called "cælorum septemplicem scenam" ("the sevenfold stage of heaven").]
[10] Cœnaculum. [See above, ch. vii.]

caught a glance of her, he would have preferred never to have known her.

CHAP. XXXII.—*Tertullian continues his indignant irony, as he exposes the Valentinian fable about the judicial treatment of mankind at the last judgment, especially noting the immorality of the doctrine.*

As for the human race, its end will be to the following effect:—To all which bear the earthy[1] and material mark there accrues an entire destruction, because "all flesh is grass,"[2] and amongst these is the soul of mortal man, except when it has found salvation by faith. The souls of just men, that is to say, our souls, will be conveyed to the Demiurge in the abodes of the middle region. We are duly thankful; we shall be content to be classed with our god, in whom lies our own origin.[3] Into the palace of the Pleroma nothing of the animal nature is admitted — nothing but the spiritual swarm of Valentinus. There, then, the first process is the despoiling of men themselves, that is, men within the Pleroma.[4] Now this despoiling consists of the putting off of the souls in which they appear to be clothed, which they will give back to their Demiurge as they had obtained[5] them from him. They will then become wholly intellectual spirits —impalpable,[6] invisible[7]—and in this state will be readmitted invisibly to the Pleroma—stealthily, if the case admits of the idea.[8] What then? They will be dispersed amongst the angels, the attendants on Soter. As sons, do you suppose? Not at all. As servants, then? No, not even so. Well, as phantoms? Would that it were nothing more! Then in what capacity, if you are not ashamed to tell us? In the capacity of brides. Then will they end[9] their Sabine rapes with the sanction of wedlock. This will be the guerdon of the spiritual, this the recompense of their faith! Such fables have their use. Although but a Marcus or a Gaius,[10] full-

[1] Choicæ ["clayey"].
[2] [Isa. xl. 6.]
[3] [See above, in ch. xxiv.]
[4] Interiores.
[5] Averterant.
[6] Neque detentui obnoxii.
[7] Neque conspectui obnoxii.
[8] Si ita est [or, "since such is the fact"].
[9] Claudent.
[10] [But slaves, in fact.]

grown in this flesh of ours, with a beard and such like proofs [of virility], it may be a stern husband, a father, a grandfather, a great-grandfather (never mind what, in fact, if only a male), you may perhaps in the bridal-chamber of the Pleroma—I have already said so tacitly[1]—even become the parent by an angel of some Æon of high numerical rank.[2] For the right celebration of these nuptials, instead of the torch and veil, I suppose that secret fire is then to burst forth, which, after devastating the whole existence of things, will itself also be reduced to nothing at last, after everything has been reduced to ashes; and so their fable too will be ended.[3] But I, too, am no doubt a rash man, in having exposed so great a mystery in so derisive a way: I ought to be afraid that Achamoth, who did not choose to make herself known even to her own son, would turn mad, that Theletus would be enraged, that Fortune[4] would be irritated. But I am yet a liege-man of the Demiurge. I have to return after death to the place where there is no more giving in marriage, where I have to be clothed upon rather than to be despoiled,—where, even if I am despoiled of my sex, I am classed with angels—not a male angel, nor a female one. There will be no one to do aught against me, nor will they then find any male energy in me.

CHAP. XXXIII.—*These remaining chapters are an appendix to the main work. In this chapter Tertullian notices a difference among sundry followers of Ptolemy, a disciple of Valentinus.*

I shall now at last produce, by way of finale,[5] after so long

[1] [This parenthetic clause, "tacendo jam dixi," perhaps means, "I say this with shame," "I would rather not have to say it."]

[2] [The common reading is, "Onesimum Æonem" (an Æon called Onesimus, in supposed allusion to Philemon's Onesimus). But this is too far-fetched. Oehler discovers in "Onesimum" the corruption of some higher number ending in "esimum."]

[3] [This is Oehler's idea of "et nulla jam fabula." Rigaltius, however, gives a good sense to this clause: "All will come true at last; there will be no fable."]

[4] [The same as *Macariotes*, in ch. viii. above.] [5] Velut epicitharisma.

a story, those points which, not to interrupt the course of it, and by the interruption distract the reader's attention, I have preferred reserving to this place. They have been variously advanced by those who have improved on[1] the doctrines of Ptolemy. For there have been in his school "disciples above their master," who have attributed to their Bythus two wives —Cogitatio (*Thought*) and Voluntas (*Will*). For Cogitatio alone was not sufficient wherewith to produce any offspring, although from the two wives procreation was most easy to him. The former bore him Monogenes (*Only-Begotten*) and Veritas (*Truth*). Veritas was a female after the likeness of Cogitatio; Monogenes a male, bearing a resemblance to Voluntas. For it is the strength of Voluntas which procures the masculine nature,[2] inasmuch as she affords efficiency to Cogitatio.

CHAP. XXXIV.—*Tertullian briefly alludes to other varying opinions among the Valentinians respecting the Deity. This he does with characteristic raillery.*

Others of purer mind, mindful of the honour of the Deity, have, for the purpose of freeing him from the discredit of even single wedlock, preferred assigning no sex whatever to Bythus; and therefore very likely they talk of "this deity" in the neuter gender rather than "this god." Others again, on the other hand, speak of him as both masculine and feminine, so that the worthy chronicler Fenestella must not suppose that an hermaphrodite was only to be found among the good people of Luna.

CHAP. XXXV.—*Yet more discrepancies! Just now the sex of Bythus was an object of dispute; now his rank comes in question. Absurd substitutes for Bythus criticised by Tertullian.*

There are some who do not claim the first place for Bythus, but only a lower one. They put their Ogdoad in the foremost rank; itself, however, derived from a Tetrad, but under different names. For they put Pro-arche (*Before the Be-*

[1] Emendatoribus. [2] Censum.

ginning) first, Anennœtos (*Inconceivable*) second, Arrhetos (*Indescribable*) third, Aoratos (*Invisible*) fourth. Then after Pro-arche they say Arche (*Beginning*) came forth and occupied the first and the fifth place; from Anennœtos came Acataleptos (*Incomprehensible*) in the second and the sixth place; from Arrhetos came Anonomastos (*Nameless*) in the third and the seventh place; from Aoratos[1] came Agennetos (*Unbegotten*) in the fourth and the eighth place. Now by what method he arranges this, that each of these Æons should be born in two places, and that, too, at such intervals, I prefer to be ignorant of than to be informed. For what can be right in a system which is propounded with such absurd particulars?

CHAP. XXXVI.—*Tertullian here notices some more respectable theories in the heresy; but bad is the best of Valentinianism.*

How much more sensible are they who, rejecting all this tiresome nonsense, have refused to believe that any one Æon has descended from another by steps like these, which are really neither more nor less *Gemonian;*[2] but that on a given signal[3] the eightfold emanation, of which we have heard,[4] issued all at once from the Father and His Ennœa (*Thought*),[5]—that it is, in fact, from His mere motion that they gain their designations. When, as they say, He thought of producing offspring, He on that account gained the name of FATHER. After producing, because the issue which He produced was true, He received the name of *Truth.* When He wanted Himself to be manifested, He on that account was announced as *Man.* Those, moreover, whom He preconceived in His thought when He produced them, were then designated *the Church.* As man, He uttered His *Word;* and so this [Word] is His first-begotten Son, and to the

[1] [Tertullian, however, here gives the Latin synonyme, *Invisibilis.*]

[2] [The "Gemonian steps" on the Aventine led to the Tiber, to which the bodies of executed criminals were dragged by hooks, to be cast into the river.]

[3] Mappa, quod aiunt, missa [a proverbial expression].

[4] Istam.

[5] [See above, ch. vii.]

Word was added *Life*. And by this process the first Ogdoad was completed. However, the whole of this tiresome story is utterly poor and weak.

CHAP. XXXVII.—*Other theories about the origin of the Æons and creation, very turgid and ridiculous, stated and condemned.*

Now listen to some other buffooneries[1] of a master who is a great swell among them,[2] and who has pronounced his *dicta* with an even priestly authority. They run thus: There comes, says he, before all things Pro-arche, the inconceivable, and indescribable, and nameless, which I for my own part call Monotes (*Solitude*). With this was associated another power, to which also I give the name of Henotes (*Unity*). Now, inasmuch as Monotes and Henotes—that is to say, Solitude and Union—were only one being, they produced, and yet not in the way of production,[3] the intellectual, innascible, invisible beginning of all things, which human language[4] has called Monad (*Solitude*).[5] This has inherent in itself a consubstantial force, which it calls Unity.[6] These powers, accordingly, Solitude or Solitariness, [and] Unity or Union, propagated all the other emanations of Æons.[7] Wonderful distinction, to be sure! Whatever change Union and Unity may undergo, Solitariness and Solitude is profoundly supreme. Whatever designation you give the power, it is one and the same.

CHAP. XXXVIII.—*Diversity in the opinions of Secundus, as compared with the general doctrine of Valentinus.*

Secundus is a trifle more human, as he is briefer: he divides the Ogdoad into a pair of Tetrads, a right hand one

[1] [Oehler gives good reasons for the reading "ingenia circulatoria," instead of the various readings of other editors.]

[2] Insignioris apud eos magistri.

[3] Non proferentes. [Another reading is "non proserentes" (not generating).]

[4] Sermo. [5] [Or, Solitariness.] [6] [Or, Union.]

[7] [Compare our Irenæus, i. 11, 3 (trans. p. 47).]

and a left hand one, [one] light and [the other] darkness. Only he is unwilling to derive the power which apostatized and fell away[1] from any one of the Æons, but from the fruits which issued from their substance.

CHAP. XXXIX.—*Their diversity of sentiment affects the very central doctrine of Christianity, even the person and character of the Lord Jesus. This diversity vitiates every gnostic school.*

Now, concerning even the Lord Jesus, into how great a diversity of opinion are they divided! One party form Him of the blossoms of all the Æons.[2] Another party will have it that He is made up only of those ten whom *the Word* and *the Life*[3] produced;[4] from which circumstance the titles of the Word and the Life were suitably transferred to Him. Others, again, that He rather sprang from the twelve, the offspring of *Man* and *the Church*;[5] and therefore, they say, He was designated "Son of man." Others, moreover, maintain that He was formed by *Christ* and *the Holy Spirit*, who have to provide for the establishment of the universe,[6] and that He inherits by right His Father's appellation. Some there are who have imagined that another origin must be found for the title "Son of man;" for they have had the presumption to call the Father Himself *Man*, by reason of the profound mystery of this title: so that what can you hope for more ample concerning faith in that God, with whom you are now yourself on a par? Such conceits are constantly cropping out[7] amongst them, from the redundance of their mother's seed.[8] And so it happens that the doctrines which have grown up amongst the Valentinians have already extended their rank growth to the woods of the Gnostics.

[1] [Achamoth.]
[2] [See above, ch. xii.]
[3] [The Æons *Sermo* and *Vita*.]
[4] [See above, ch. vii.]
[5] [See above, ch. viii.]
[6] [See above, ch. xiv.]
[7] Superfruticant.
[8] [Achamoth is referred to.]

THE TREATISE

OF

QUINTUS SEPTIMIUS FLORENS TERTULLIANUS

ON

THE FLESH OF CHRIST.[1]

[THIS WAS WRITTEN BY OUR AUTHOR IN CONFUTATION OF CERTAIN HERETICS WHO DENIED THE REALITY OF CHRIST'S FLESH, OR AT LEAST ITS IDENTITY WITH HUMAN FLESH—FEARING THAT, IF THEY ADMITTED THE REALITY OF CHRIST'S FLESH, THEY MUST ALSO ADMIT HIS RESURRECTION IN THE FLESH; AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THE RESURRECTION OF THE HUMAN BODY AFTER DEATH.]

CHAP. I.—*Tertullian states the general purport of this work; the heretics, Marcion, Apelles, and Valentinus, wishing to impugn the doctrine of the Resurrection, deprive Christ of all capacity for such a change by denying His flesh.*

THEY who are so anxious to shake that belief in the resurrection which was firmly settled[2] before the appearance of our modern Sadducees,[3] as even to deny that the expectation thereof has any relation whatever to the flesh, have great cause for be-

[1] [In his work *On the Resurrection of the Flesh* (chap. ii.), Tertullian refers to this tract, and calls it "De Carne Domini adversus quatuor hæreses:" the four heresies being those of Marcion, Apelles, Basilides, and Valentinus. Pamelius, indeed, designates the tract by this fuller title instead of the usual one, "De Carne Christi."]

[2] Moratam.

[3] [The allusion is to Matt. xxii. 23; comp. *de Præscr. Hæret.* 33 (Fr. Junius).]

setting the flesh of Christ also with doubtful questions, as if it either had no existence at all, or possessed a nature altogether different from human flesh; [for they cannot but be apprehensive] that, if it be once determined that [Christ's flesh] was human, a presumption would immediately arise in opposition to them, that that flesh must by all means rise again, which has already risen in Christ. Therefore we shall have to guard our belief in the resurrection[1] from the same armoury, whence they get their weapons of destruction. Let us examine our Lord's bodily substance, for about His spiritual nature all are agreed.[2] It is His flesh that is in question. Its verity and quality are the points in dispute. Did it ever exist? whence was it derived? and of what kind was it? If we succeed in demonstrating it, we shall lay down a law for our own resurrection. Marcion, in order that he might deny the flesh of Christ, denied also His nativity, or else he denied His flesh in order that he might deny His nativity; because, of course, he was afraid that His nativity and His flesh bore mutual testimony to each other's reality, since there is no nativity without flesh, and no flesh without nativity. As if indeed, under the prompting of that licence which is ever the same in all heresy, he too might not very well have either denied the nativity, although admitting the flesh,—like Apelles, who was first a disciple of his, and afterwards an apostate,—or, while admitting both the flesh and the nativity, have interpreted them in a different sense, as did Valentinus, who resembled Apelles both in his discipleship and desertion [of Marcion]. At all events, he who represented the flesh of Christ to be imaginary was equally able to pass off His nativity as a phantom; so that the virgin's conception, and pregnancy, and child-bearing, and then the whole course[3] of her infant too, would have to be regarded as putative.[4] [These facts pertaining to the nativity

[1] [Tertullian's phrase is "carnis vota"—the future prospects of the flesh.]

[2] Certum est.

[3] Ordo.

[4] Τῷ δοκεῖν haberentur. [This term gave name to the "Docetic" errors.]

of Christ] would escape the notice of the same eyes and the same senses as failed to grasp the full idea[1] of His flesh.

CHAP. II.—*Marcion would blot out the records of Christ's nativity, and is indignantly rebuked by Tertullian for so startling a heresy.*

Clearly enough is the nativity announced by Gabriel.[2] But what has he to do with the Creator's angel?[3] The conception in the virgin's womb is also set plainly before us. But what concern has he with the Creator's prophet, Isaiah?[4] He[5] will not brook delay, since *suddenly* [without any prophetic announcement] did he bring down Christ from heaven.[6] "Away," says he, "with that eternal plaguey taxing of Cæsar, and the scanty inn, and the squalid swaddling-clothes, and the hard stable.[7] We do not care a jot for[8] that multitude of the heavenly host which praised their Lord at night.[9] Let the shepherds take better care of their flock,[10] and let the wise men spare their legs so long a journey;[11] let them keep their gold to themselves.[12] Let Herod, too, mend his manners, so that Jeremy may not glory over him.[13] Spare also the babe from circumcision, that he may escape the pain thereof; nor let him be brought into the temple, lest he burden his parents with the expense of the offering;[14] nor let him be handed to Simeon, lest the old man be saddened at the point of death.[15] Let that old woman also hold her tongue, lest she should bewitch the child."[16] After such a fashion as this, I suppose you have had, O Marcion, the hardihood of blotting out the original records [of the history] of Christ, that His flesh may lose the proofs of its reality. But, prithee, on what grounds [do you do

[1] Opinio.
[2] [Luke i. 26–38.]
[3] [This is said in opposition to Marcion, who held the Creator's angel, and everything else pertaining to him, to be evil.]
[4] [A reference to Isa. vii. 14.]
[5] [Marcion.]
[6] [See also our *Anti-Marcion*, p. 190 (iv. 7).]
[7] [Luke ii. 1–7.]
[8] Viderit.
[9] [Luke ii. 13.]
[10] [Luke ii. 8.]
[11] [Matt. ii. 1.]
[12] [Matt. ii. 11.]
[13] [Matt. ii. 16–18, and Jer. xxxi. 15.]
[14] [Luke ii. 22–24.]
[15] [Luke ii. 25–35.]
[16] [Luke ii. 36–38.]

this]? Show me your authority. If you are a prophet, foretell us a thing; if you are an apostle, open your message in public; if a follower of apostles,[1] side with apostles in thought; if you are only a [private] Christian, believe what has been handed down to us: if, however, you are nothing of all this, then (as I have the best reason to say) cease to live.[2] For indeed you are already dead, since you are no Christian, because you do not believe that which by being believed makes men Christians,—nay, you are the more dead, the more you are not a Christian; having fallen away, after you had been one, by rejecting[3] what you formerly believed, even as you yourself acknowledge in a certain letter of yours, and as your followers do not deny, whilst our [brethren] can prove it.[4] Rejecting, therefore, what you [once] believed, you have completed the act of rejection by now no longer believing: the fact, however, of your having ceased to believe has not made your rejection of the faith right and proper; nay, rather,[5] by your act of rejection you prove that what you believed previous to the said act was of a different character.[6] What you believed to be of a different character, had been handed down just as [you believed it]. Now[7] that which had been handed down was true, inasmuch as it had been transmitted by those whose duty it was to hand it down. Therefore, when rejecting that which had been handed down, you rejected that which was true. You had no authority for what you did. However, we have already in another treatise availed ourselves more fully of these prescriptive rules against all heresies. Our repetition of them here after that [lengthy treatise] is superfluous,[8] when we ask the reason why you have formed the opinion that Christ was not born.

[1] Apostolicus. [2] Morere. [3] Rescindendo.

[4] [Compare our *Anti-Marcion*, i. 1 (p. 3), iv. 4 (p. 185), and *de Præscr. Hær.* c. xxx.

[5] Atquin. [6] Aliter fuisse. [7] Porro.

[8] Ex abundanti.

CHAP. III.—*Christ's nativity was both possible and becoming; Tertullian shows that the heretical opinion of Christ's* APPARENT *flesh was deceptive and dishonourable to God, even on Marcion's principles.*

Since[1] you think that this lay within the competency of your own arbitrary choice, you must needs have supposed that being born[2] was either impossible for God, or unbecoming to Him. With God, however, nothing is impossible but what He does not will. Let us consider, then, whether He willed to be born (for if He had the will, He also had the power, and was born). I put the argument very briefly. If God had willed not to be born, it matters not why, He would not have presented Himself in the likeness of man. Now who, when he sees a man, would deny that he had been born? What [God] therefore willed not to be, He would in no wise have willed the seeming to be. When a thing is distasteful, the very notion[3] of it is scouted; because it makes no difference whether a thing exist or do not exist, if, when it does not exist, it is yet assumed to exist. It is of course of the greatest importance that there should be nothing false [or pretended] attributed to that which really does not exist.[4] But, say you, His own consciousness [of the truth of His nature] was enough for Him. If any supposed that He had been born because they saw Him as a man, that was their concern.[5] Yet with how much more dignity and consistency would He have sustained the human character on the supposition that He was truly born; [for] if He were not born, He could not have undertaken the said character without injury to that consciousness of His which you on your side attribute to [His] confidence of being able to sustain, although not born, the character of having been born even against His own consciousness![6] Why, I want

[1] Quatenus. [2] Nativitatem. [3] Opinio.

[4] [If Christ's flesh was not real, the pretence of it was wholly wrong.]

[5] Viderint homines.

[6] [It did not much matter (according to the view which Tertullian attributes to Marcion) if God did practise deception in affecting the

to know,[1] was it of so much importance, that Christ should, when perfectly aware what He really was, exhibit Himself as being that which He was not? You cannot express any apprehension that,[2] if He had been born and truly clothed Himself with man's nature, He would have ceased to be God, losing what He was, while becoming what He was not. For God is in no danger of losing His own state and condition. But, say you, I deny that God was truly changed to man in such wise as to be born and endued with a body of flesh, on this ground, that a being who is without end is also of necessity incapable of change. For being changed into something else puts an end to the former state. Change, therefore, is not possible to a Being who cannot come to an end. Without doubt, the nature of things which are subject to change is regulated by this law, that they have no permanence in the state which is undergoing change in them, and that they come to an end from thus wanting permanence, whilst they lose that in the process of change which they previously were. But nothing is equal with God; His nature is different[3] from the condition of all things. If, then, the things which differ from God, [and] from which God differs, lose what existence they had whilst they are undergoing change, wherein will consist the difference of the Divine Being from all other things except in His possessing the contrary faculty to theirs,—in other words, that God can be changed into all conditions, and yet continue just as He is? On any other supposition, He would be on the same level with those things which, when changed, lose the existence they had before; whose equal, of course, He is not in any other respect, as He certainly is not in the changeful issues[4] [of their nature]. You have sometimes read and

assumption of a humanity which He knew to be unreal. Men took it to be real, and that answered every purpose. God knew better; and He was, moreover, strong enough to obviate all inconveniences of the deception by His unfaltering fortitude, etc. All this, however, seemed to Tertullian to be simply damaging and perilous to the character of God, even from Marcion's own point of view.

[1] Edoce.

[2] Non potes dicere *ne*, etc.

[3] Distat.

[4] In exitu conversionis.

believed that the Creator's angels have been changed into human form, and have even borne about so veritable a body, that Abraham even washed their feet,[1] and Lot was rescued from the Sodomites by their hands;[2] an angel, moreover, wrestled with a man so strenuously with his body, that the latter desired to be let loose, so tightly was he held.[3] Has it, then, been permitted to angels, which are inferior to God, after they have been changed into human bodily form,[4] nevertheless to remain angels? and will you deprive God, their superior, of this faculty, as if Christ could not continue to be God, after His real assumption of the nature of man? Or else, did those angels appear as phantoms of flesh? You will not, however, have the courage to say this; for if it be so held in your belief, that the Creator's angels are in the same condition as Christ, then Christ will belong to the same God as those angels do, who are like Christ in their condition. If you had not purposely rejected in some instances, and corrupted in others, the Scriptures which are opposed to your opinion, you would have been confuted in this matter by the Gospel of John, when it declares that the [Holy] Spirit descended in the body[5] of a dove, and sat upon the Lord.[6] When the said Spirit was in this condition, He was as truly a dove as He was also a spirit; nor did He destroy His own proper substance by the assumption of an extraneous substance. But you ask what becomes of the dove's body, after the return of the Spirit back to heaven, and similarly in the case of the angels. Their withdrawal was effected in the same manner as their appearance had been. If you had seen how their production out of nothing had been effected, you would have known also the process of their return to nothing. If the initial step was out of sight, so was also the final one. Still there was solidity in their bodily substance, whatever may have been the force by which the body became visible. What is written cannot but have been.

[1] [Gen. xviii.] [2] [Gen. xix.] [3] [Gen. xxxii.]

[4] [See below in chap. vi. and in the *Anti-Marcion*, iii. 9 (*Trans.* p. 136).]

[5] Corpore. [6] [Matt. iii. 16.]

CHAP. IV.—*God's honour in the incarnation of His Son vindicated; Marcion's disparagement of human flesh inconsistent as well as impious. Christ has cleansed the flesh. The "foolishness" of God is most wise.*

Since, therefore, you do not reject the assumption of a body[1] as impossible or as hazardous to the character of God, it remains for you to repudiate and censure it as unworthy of Him. Come now, beginning from the nativity itself, declaim[2] against the uncleanness of the generative elements within the womb, the filthy concretion of fluid and blood, of the growth of the flesh for nine months long out of that very mire. Describe the womb as it enlarges[3] from day to day,—heavy, troublesome, restless even in sleep, changeful in its feelings of dislike and desire. Inveigh now likewise against the shame itself of a woman in travail,[4] which, however, ought rather to be honoured in consideration of that peril, or to be held sacred[5] in respect of [the mystery of] nature. Of course you are horrified also at the infant, which is shed into life with the embarrassments which accompany it from the womb;[6] you likewise, of course, loathe it even after it is washed, when it is dressed out in its swaddling-clothes, graced with repeated anointing,[7] smiled on with nurse's fawns. This reverend course of nature,[8] you, O Marcion, [are pleased to] spit upon; and yet, in what way were you born? You detest a human being at his birth; then after what fashion do you love anybody? Yourself, of course, you had no love of, when you departed from the church and the faith of Christ. But never mind,[9] if you are not on good terms with yourself, or even if you

[1] Corporationem.

[2] [Compare similar passages in the *Anti-Marcion*, iii. 1 and iv. 21 (*Trans.* pp. 141, 264).]

[3] Insolescentem. [4] Enitentis. [5] Religiosum.

[6] Cum suis impedimentis profusum. [7] Unctionibus formatur.

[8] Hanc venerationem naturæ. [Compare Tertullian's phrase, "Illa sanctissima et reverenda opera naturæ," in the *Anti-Marcion*, iii. 11 (p. 141).]

[9] Videris.

were born in a way different from other people. Christ, at any rate, has loved even that man who was condensed in his mother's womb amidst all its uncleannesses, even that man who was brought into life out of the said womb, even that man who was nursed amidst the nurse's simpers.[1] For his sake He came down [from heaven], for his sake He preached, for his sake "He humbled Himself even unto death—the death of the cross."[2] He loved, of course, the being whom He redeemed at so great a cost. If Christ is the Creator's [Son], it was with justice that He loved His own [creature]; if He comes from another god, His love was excessive, since He redeemed a being who belonged to another. Well, then, loving man He loved his nativity also, and his flesh as well. Nothing can be loved apart from that through which whatever exists has its existence. Either take away nativity, and then show us [your] man; or else withdraw the flesh, and then present to our view the being whom God has redeemed—since it is these very conditions[3] which constitute the man whom God has redeemed. And are *you* for turning these conditions into occasions of blushing to the very creature whom He has redeemed, [censuring them], too, as unworthy of Him who certainly would not have redeemed them had He not loved them? Our birth He reforms from death by a second birth from heaven;[4] our flesh He restores from every harassing malady; when leprous, He cleanses it of the stain; when blind, He rekindles its light; when palsied, He renews its strength; when possessed with devils, He exorcises it; when dead, He reanimates it,—then shall *we* blush to own it? If, to be sure,[5] He had chosen to be born of a wolf, or a sow, or a cow, and were to preach the kingdom of heaven invested with the body of a beast either

[1] Per ludibria nutritum. [Compare the phrase just before, "smiled on with nurse's fawns"—"blanditiis deridetur." Oehler, however, compares the phrase with Tertullian's expression in the *Anti-Marcion*, iv. 21 ("puerperii spurcos, anxios, *ludicros exitus*").]

[2] [Phil. ii. 8.]

[3] Hæc [*i.e.* man's *nativity* and his *flesh*].

[4] [Literally, "by a heavenly regeneration."]

[5] Revera.

wild or tame, your censure (I imagine) would have instantly met Him with this demurrer: "This is disgraceful for God, and this is unworthy of the Son of God, and simply foolish." For no other reason than because one thus judges. It *is* of course "foolish," if we are to judge God by our own conceptions. But, Marcion, consider well this Scripture, if indeed you have not erased it: "God hath chosen the foolish things of the world, to confound the wise."[1] Now what are those foolish things? Are they the conversion of men to the worship of the true God, the rejection of error, the whole training in righteousness, chastity, mercy, patience, and innocence? These things certainly are not "foolish." Inquire again, then, of what things he spoke, and when you imagine that you have discovered what they are, will you find anything to be so "foolish" as believing in a God that has been born, and that of a virgin, and of a fleshly nature too, who wallowed in all the before-mentioned humiliations of nature? But some one may say, "These are not the foolish things; they must be other things which God has chosen to confound the wisdom of the world." [Well, be it so.] And yet, according to the world's wisdom, it is more easy to believe that Jupiter became a bull or a swan, than that Christ really became a man, if we listen to Marcion.

CHAP. V.—*Christ truly lived and died in human flesh; an eloquent description of the incidents of His human life on earth, and refutation of Marcion's* DOCETIC *parody of the same.*

There are, to be sure, other things also quite as "foolish" [as the birth of Christ], which have reference to the humiliations and sufferings of God. Or else, let them call a crucified God "wisdom." But Marcion will apply the knife[2] to this [doctrine] also, and even with greater reason. For which is more unworthy of God, which is more likely to raise a blush of shame, that [God] should be born, or that He should

[1] [1 Cor. i. 27.]

[2] Aufer, Marcion. [Literally, "Destroy this also, O Marcion."]

die? that He should bear the flesh, or the cross? be circumcised, or be crucified? be cradled, or be coffined?[1] be laid in a manger, or in a tomb? [Talk of "wisdom!"] You will show more of *that* if you refuse to believe this also. But, after all, you will not be "wise" unless you become a "fool" to the world, by believing "the foolish things of God." Have you, then, cut away[2] all sufferings from Christ, on the ground that, as a mere phantom, He was incapable of experiencing them? We have said above that He might possibly have undergone the unreal mockeries[3] of an imaginary birth and infancy. But answer me at once, you that murder truth: Was not God really crucified? And, having been really crucified, did He not really die? And, having indeed really died, did He not really rise again? Falsely did Paul[4] "determine to know nothing amongst us but Jesus and Him crucified;"[5] falsely has he impressed upon us that He was buried; falsely inculcated that He rose again. False, therefore, is our faith also. And all that we hope for from Christ will be a phantom. O thou most infamous of men, who acquittest of all guilt[6] the murderers of God! For nothing did Christ suffer from them, if He really suffered nothing at all. Spare the whole world's one only hope, thou who art destroying the indispensable dishonour of our faith.[7] Whatsoever is unworthy of God, is of gain to me. I am safe, if I am not ashamed of my Lord. "Whosoever," says He, "shall be ashamed of me, of him will I also be ashamed."[8] Other matters for shame find I none which can prove me to be shameless in a good sense, and foolish in a happy one, by my own contempt of shame. The Son of God was crucified; I am not ashamed because men must needs be ashamed [of it]. And the Son of God died; it is by all means to be believed, because it is absurd.[9] And He

[1] Educari an sepeliri. [2] Recidisti. [3] Vacua ludibria.
[4] [Paul was of great authority in Marcion's school.]
[5] [1 Cor. ii. 2.] [6] Excusas.
[7] [The humiliation which God endured, so indispensable a part of the Christian faith.]
[8] [Matt. x. 33, Mark. viii. 38, and Luke ix. 26.] [9] Ineptum.

was buried, and rose again; the fact is certain, because it is impossible. But how will all this be true in Him, if He was not Himself true—if He really had not in Himself that which might be crucified, might die, might be buried, and might rise again? [I mean] this flesh suffused with blood, built up with bones, interwoven with nerves, entwined with veins, [a flesh] which knew how to be born, and how to die, human without doubt, as born of a human being. It will therefore be mortal in Christ, because Christ is man and the Son of man. Else why is Christ man and the Son of man, if he has nothing of man, and nothing from man? Unless it be either that man is anything else than flesh, or man's flesh comes from any other source than man, or Mary is anything else than a human being, or Marcion's man is [as] Marcion's god.[1] Otherwise Christ could not be described as being man without flesh, nor the Son of man without any human parent; just as He is not God without the Spirit of God, nor the Son of God without having God for His father. Thus the nature[2] of the two substances displayed Him as man and God,—in one respect born, in the other unborn; in one respect fleshly, in the other spiritual; in one sense weak, in the other exceeding strong; in one sense dying, in the other living. This property of the two states—the divine and the human—is distinctly asserted[3] with equal truth of both natures alike, with the same belief both in respect of the Spirit[4] and of the flesh. The powers of the Spirit[4] proved Him to be God, His sufferings attested the flesh of man. If His powers were not without the Spirit,[4] in like manner, were not His sufferings without the flesh. If His flesh with its sufferings was fictitious, for the same reason was the Spirit false with all its powers. Wherefore halve[5] Christ with a lie? He was

[1] [That is, imaginary and unreal.]

[2] Census ["the origin"].

[3] Dispuncta est.

[4] [This term is almost a technical designation of the *divine nature* of Christ in Tertullian. (See our translation of the *Anti-Marcion*, p. 247, note 7.)]

[5] Dimidias.

wholly the truth. Believe me, He chose rather to be born, than in any part to pretend—and that indeed to His own detriment—that He was bearing about a flesh hardened without bones, solid without muscles, bloody without blood, clothed without the tunic [of skin],[1] hungry without appetite, eating without teeth, speaking without a tongue, so that His word was a phantom to the ears through an imaginary voice. A phantom, too, it was of course after the resurrection, when, showing His hands and His feet for the disciples to examine, He said, "Behold and see that it is I myself, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have;"[2] without doubt, hands, and feet, and bones are not what a spirit possesses, but [only] the flesh. How do you interpret this statement, Marcion, you who tell us that Jesus comes only from the most excellent God, who is both simple and good? See how He [rather] cheats, and deceives, and juggles the eyes of all, and the senses of all, as well as their access to and contact with Him! You ought rather to have brought Christ down, not from heaven, but from some troop of mountebanks; not as God besides man, but simply as a man, a magician; not as the High Priest of our salvation, but as the conjurer in a show; not as the raiser of the dead, but as the misleader[3] of the living,—except that, if He were a magician, He must have had a nativity!

CHAP. VI. — *The doctrine of Apelles refuted, that Christ's body was of sidereal substance, not born; but nativity and mortality are correlative circumstances, and in Christ's case His death proves His birth.*

But certain disciples[4] of the heretic of Pontus, compelled to be wiser than their teacher, concede to Christ real flesh, without effect, however, on[5] their denial of His nativity. He might have had, they say, a flesh which was not at all born. So we have found our way "out of a frying-pan," as the

[1] [See his *Adv. Valentin.* chap. 25.]

[2] [Luke xxiv. 39.]

[3] Avocatorem.

[4] He has Apelles mainly in view.

[5] Sine præjudicio tamen. ["Without prejudice to their denial, etc."]

proverb runs, "into the fire,"[1]—from Marcion to Apelles. This man, having first fallen from the principles of Marcion into [an intercourse with] a woman, in the flesh, and afterwards shipwrecked himself, in the spirit, on the virgin Philumene,[2] proceeded from that [time][3] to preach that the body of Christ was of solid flesh, but without having been born. To this angel, indeed, of Philumene, the apostle will reply in tones like those in which he even then predicted him, saying, "Although an angel from heaven preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed."[4] To the arguments, however, which have been indicated just above, we have now to show our resistance. They allow that Christ really had a body. Whence was the material of it, if not from the same sort of thing as[5] that in which He appeared? Whence came His body, if His body were not flesh? Whence came His flesh, if it were not born? Inasmuch as that which is born must undergo this nativity in order to become flesh. He borrowed, they say, His flesh from the stars, and from the substances of the higher world. And they assert it for a certain principle, that a body without nativity is nothing to be astonished at, because it has been permitted to angels to appear even amongst ourselves in the flesh without the intervention of the womb. We admit, of course, that such facts have been related. But then, how comes it to pass that a faith which holds to a different rule borrows materials for its own arguments from the faith which it impugns? What has it to do with Moses, who has rejected the God of Moses? Since the God is a different one, everything belonging to him must be different also. But let the heretics always use the Scriptures of that God whose world they also enjoy. The fact will certainly recoil on them as a witness to judge

[1] [The Roman version of the proverb is "out of the lime-kiln into the coal-furnace."]

[2] [See Tertullian, *de Præscr. Hæret.* c. xxx.]

[3] Ab eo [or, "from that *event* of the carnal contact." A good reading, found in most of the old books, is *ab ea*, that is, Philumene].

[4] [Gal. i. 8.]

[5] Ex ea qualitate in qua

them, that they maintain their own blasphemies from examples derived from *Him*.[1] But it is an easy task for the truth to prevail without raising any such demurrer against them. When, therefore, they set forth the flesh of Christ after the pattern of the angels, declaring it to be not born, and yet flesh for all that, I should wish them to compare the causes, both in Christ's case and that of the angels, wherefore they came in the flesh. Never did any angel descend for the purpose of being crucified, of tasting death, [and] of rising again from the dead. Now, since there never was such a reason for angels becoming embodied, you have the cause why they assumed flesh without undergoing birth. They had not come to die, therefore they also [came not] to be born. Christ, however, having been sent to die, had necessarily to be also born, that He might be capable of death; for nothing is in the habit of dying but that which is born. Between nativity and mortality there is a mutual contract. The law[2] which makes us die is the cause of our being born. Now, since Christ died owing to the condition which undergoes death, but that undergoes death which is also born, the consequence was—nay, it was an antecedent necessity—that He must have been born also,[3] by reason of the condition which undergoes birth; because He had to die in obedience to that very condition which, because it begins with birth, ends in death.[4] It was not fitting for Him not to be born, under the pretence[5] that it was fitting for Him to die. But the Lord Himself at that very time appeared to Abraham amongst those angels without being born, and yet in the flesh without doubt, in virtue of the before-mentioned diversity of cause. You, however, cannot admit this, since you do not receive that Christ, who was even then rehearsing[6] how to converse with, and liberate, and judge the human race, in the habit of a flesh which as yet was not born, because it did not yet mean to die until both its nativity and mortality

[1] Ipsius [the Creator]. [2] Forma.
[3] Aeque. [4] Quod, quia nascitur, moritur. [5] Pro.
[6] Ediscebat. [Compare a fine passage of Tertullian on this subject in our *Anti-Marcion*, p. 112, note 10.]

were previously [by prophecy] announced. Let them, then, prove to us that those angels derived their flesh from the stars. If they do not prove it because it is not written, neither will the flesh of Christ get its origin therefrom, for which they borrowed the precedent of the angels. It is plain that the angels bore a flesh which was not naturally their own; their nature being of a spiritual substance, although in some sense peculiar to themselves, corporeal; and yet they could be transfigured into human shape, and for the time be able to appear and have intercourse with men. Since, therefore, it has not been told us whence they obtained their flesh, it remains for us not to doubt in our minds that a property of angelic power is this, to assume to themselves bodily shape out of no material substance. How much more, you say, is it [within their competence to take a body] out of some material substance? That is true enough. But there is no evidence of this, because Scripture says nothing. Then, again,[1] how should they who are able to form themselves into that which by nature they are not, be unable to do this out of no material substance? If they become that which they are not, why cannot they [so] become out of that which is not? But that which has not existence when it comes into existence, is [made] out of nothing. This is why it is unnecessary either to inquire or to demonstrate what has subsequently become of their[2] bodies. What came out of nothing, came to nothing. They, who were able to convert *themselves* into flesh, have it in their power to convert *nothing itself* into flesh. It is a greater thing to change a nature than to make matter. But even if it were necessary [to suppose] that angels derived their flesh from some material substance, it is surely more credible that it was from some earthly matter than from any kind of celestial substances, since it was composed of so palpably terrene a quality that it fed on earthly aliments. Suppose that even now a celestial [flesh][3] had fed on earthly aliments, although it was not itself earthly, in the same way that earthly flesh actually fed on celestial aliments, although

[1] Ceterum. [2] [The angels'.]

[3] Sidera. [Drawn, as they thought, from the stars.]

it had nothing of the celestial nature (for we read of manna having been food for the people: "Man," says [the Psalmist], "did eat angels' bread"[1]), yet this does not once infringe the separate condition of the Lord's flesh, because of His different destination. For One who was to be truly a man, even unto death, it was necessary that He should be clothed with that flesh to which death belongs. Now that flesh to which death belongs is preceded by birth.

CHAP. VII.—*A full explanation given of the Lord's question about His mother and His brethren, in answer to the cavils of Apelles and Marcion, who support their denial of Christ's nativity by it.*

But whenever a dispute arises about the nativity, all who reject it as creating a presumption in favour of the reality of Christ's flesh, wilfully deny that God Himself was born, on the ground that He asked, "Who is my mother, and who are my brethren?"[2] Let, therefore, Apelles hear what was our answer to Marcion in that little work, in which we challenged his own [favourite] gospel to the proof, even that the material circumstances of that remark [of the Lord's] should be considered.[3] First of all, nobody would have told Him that His mother and brethren were standing outside, if he were not certain both that He had a mother and brethren, and that they were the very persons whom he was then announcing,—who had either been known to him before, or were then and there discovered by him; although heretics[4] have removed this passage from the gospel, because those who were admiring His doctrine said that His supposed father, Joseph the carpenter, and His mother Mary, and His brethren, and His sisters, were very well known to them. But it was with the view of tempting Him, that they had mentioned to Him a mother and brethren which He did not possess. The Scripture says nothing of this, although it is not in other instances silent when anything was done against Him by way of temptation. "Behold,"

[1] [Ps. lxxviii. 24.] [2] [Matt. xii. 48; Luke viii. 20, 21.]
[3] [See our *Anti-Marcion*, iv. 19 (*Trans.* pp. 252–255).]
[4] [Literally, "heresies."]

it says, "a certain lawyer stood up, and tempted Him."[1] And in another passage: "The Pharisees also came unto Him, tempting Him." Who[2] was to prevent its being in this place also indicated that this was done with the view of tempting Him? I do not admit what you advance of your own apart from Scripture. Then there ought to be suggested[3] some occasion[4] for the temptation. What could they have thought to be in Him which required temptation? The question, to be sure, whether He had been born or not? For if this point were denied in His answer, it might come out on the announcement of a temptation. And yet no temptation, when aiming at the discovery of the point which prompts the temptation by its doubtfulness, falls upon one so abruptly, as not to be preceded by the question which compels the temptation whilst raising the doubt. Now, since the nativity of Christ had never come into question, how can you contend that they meant by their temptation to inquire about a point on which they had never raised a doubt? Besides,[5] if He had to be tempted about His birth, this of course was not the proper way of doing it,—by announcing those persons who, even on the supposition of His birth, might possibly not have been in existence. We have all been born, and yet all of us have not either brothers or mother. He might with more probability have had even a father than a mother, and uncles more likely than brothers. Thus is the temptation about His birth unsuitable, for it might have been contrived without any mention of either His mother or His brethren. It is clearly more credible that, being certain that He had both a mother and brothers, they tested His divinity rather than His nativity, whether, when within, He knew what was without; being tried by the untrue announcement of the presence of persons who were not present. But the artifice of a temptation might have been thwarted thus: it might have happened that He knew that those whom they were announcing to be "standing without," were in fact absent by the stress either of sickness, or of business, or a

[1] [Luke x. 25.] [2] [Literally, "nobody prevented its being, etc."]
[3] Subesse. [4] Materia. [5] Eo adicimus etiam.

journey which He was at the time aware of. No one tempts [another] in a way in which he knows that he may have himself to bear the shame of the temptation. There being, then, no suitable occasion for a temptation, the announcement that His mother and His brethren had actually turned up[1] recovers its naturalness. But there is some ground for thinking that [Christ's] answer denies His mother and brethren for the present, as even Apelles might learn. "The Lord's brethren had not yet believed in Him."[2] So is it contained in a Gospel which was published before Marcion's time; whilst there is at the same time a want of evidence of His mother's adherence to Him, although the Marthas and the other Marys were in constant attendance on Him. In this very passage, indeed, their unbelief is evident. Jesus was teaching the way of life, preaching the kingdom of God, [and] actively engaged in healing infirmities of body and soul; but all the while, whilst strangers were intent on Him, His very nearest relatives were absent. By and by they turn up, and keep outside; but they do not go in, because, forsooth, they set small store[3] on that which was doing within; nor do they even wait,[4] as if they had something which they could contribute more necessary than that which He was so earnestly doing; but they prefer to interrupt Him, and wish to call Him away from His great work. Now, I ask you, Apelles, or will you, Marcion, please [to tell me], if you happened to be at a stage play, or had laid a wager[5] on a foot race or a chariot race, and were called away by such a message, would you not have exclaimed, "What are mother and brothers to me?"[6] And did not Christ, whilst preaching and manifesting God, fulfilling the law and the prophets, [and] scattering the darkness of the long preceding age, justly employ this same form of words, in order to strike the unbelief of those who stood outside, or to shake off the im-

[1] Supervenissent.
[2] [John vii. 5.]
[3] Non computantes scilicet.
[4] Nec sustinent saltem.
[5] Contendens ["videlicet sponsionibus" (Oehler)].
[6] [Literally, "Who is my mother, and who are my brethren?" (Christ's own words).]

portunity of those who would call Him away from His work? If, however, He had meant to deny His own nativity, He would have found place, time, and means for expressing Himself very differently,[1] and not in words which might be uttered by one who had both a mother and brothers. When denying one's parents in indignation, one does not deny [their existence], but censures [their faults]. Besides, He gave others the preference; and since He shows their title to this favour—even because they listened to the word [of God]—He points out in what sense He denied His mother and His brethren. For in whatever sense He adopted as His own those who adhered to Him, in that did He deny as His[2] those who kept aloof from Him. Christ also is wont to do to the utmost that which He enjoins on others. How strange, then, would it certainly[3] have been, if, while he was teaching others not to esteem mother, or father, or brothers, as highly as the word of God, He were Himself to leave the word of God as soon as His mother and brethren were announced to Him! He denied His parents, then, in the sense in which He has taught us to deny ours—for God's work. But there is also another view of the case: in the abjured mother there is a figure of the synagogue, as well as of the Jews in the unbelieving brethren. In their person Israel remained outside, whilst the new disciples who kept close to Christ within, hearing and believing, represented the Church, which He called mother in a preferable sense and a worthier brotherhood, with the repudiation of the carnal relationship. It was in just the same sense, indeed, that He also replied to that exclamation [of a certain woman], not denying His mother's "womb and paps," but designating those as more "blessed who hear the word of God."[4]

[1] [The *alius* is a genitive, and must be taken with *sermonis*.]
[2] Abnegavit ["repudiated"].
[3] [Force of the indicative *quale erat*.]
[4] [Luke xi. 27, 28. See also our *Anti-Marcion*, p. 292.]

CHAP. VIII.—*Apelles and his followers, displeased with our earthly bodies, attributed to Christ a body of a purer sort,—how Christ was "heavenly" even in His earthly flesh.*

These passages alone, in which Apelles and Marcion seem to place their chief reliance, when interpreted according to the truth of the entire uncorrupted gospel, ought to have been sufficient for proving the human flesh of Christ by a defence of His birth. But since Apelles' precious set[1] lay a very great stress on the shameful condition[2] of the flesh, which they will have to have been furnished with souls tampered with by the fiery author of evil,[3] and so unworthy of Christ; and because they on that account suppose that a sidereal substance is suitable for Him, I am bound to refute them on their own ground. They mention a certain angel of great renown as having created this world of ours, and as having, after the creation, repented of his work. This indeed we have treated of in a passage by itself; for we have written a little work in opposition to them, [on the question] whether one who had the spirit, and will, and power of Christ for such operations, could have done anything which required repentance, since they describe the [said] angel by the figure of "the lost sheep." The world, then, must be a wrong thing,[4] according to the evidence of its Creator's repentance; for all repentance is the admission of fault, nor has it indeed any existence except through fault. Now, if the world[5] is a fault, as is the body, such must be its parts—faulty too; so in like manner must be the heaven and its celestial [contents], and everything which is conceived and produced out of it. And "a corrupt tree must needs bring forth evil fruit."[6] The flesh of Christ,

[1] Isti Apelleiaci.

[2] Ignominiam.

[3] Ab igneo illo præside mali [see Tertullian's *de Anima*, xxiii.; *de Resur. Carn.* v.; *Adv. Omnes Hæres.* vi.].

[4] Peccatum.

[5] [*Mundus* is here the universe or entire creation.]

[6] [Matt. vii. 17.]

therefore, if composed of celestial elements, consists of faulty materials, sinful by reason of its sinful origin;[1] so that it must be a part of that substance which they disdain to clothe Christ with, because of its sinfulness,—in other words, our own. Then, as there is no difference in the point of ignominy, let them either devise for Christ some substance of a purer stamp, since they are displeased with our own, or else let them recognise this too, than which even a heavenly substance could not have been better. We read in so many words:[2] "The first man is of the earth, earthy; the second man is the Lord from heaven."[3] This passage, however, has nothing to do with any difference of substance; it only contrasts with the once[4] "earthy" substance of the flesh of the first man, Adam, the "heavenly" substance of the spirit of the second man, Christ. And so entirely does the passage refer the celestial man to the spirit and not to the flesh, that those whom it compares to Him evidently become celestial—by the Spirit, of course—even in this "earthy" flesh. Now, since Christ is heavenly even in regard to the flesh, they could not be compared to Him, who are not heavenly in reference to their flesh.[5] If, then, they who become heavenly, as Christ also was, carry about an "earthy" substance of flesh, the conclusion which is affirmed by this fact is, that Christ Himself also was heavenly, but in an "earthy" flesh, even as they are who are put on a level with Him.[6]

CHAP. IX.—*The characteristics of Christ's flesh perfectly natural, like our own. None of the supernatural features which the heretics ascribed to it discoverable, on a careful view.*

We have thus far gone on the principle, that nothing which is derived from some other thing, however different it may be from that from which it is derived, is so different as not to suggest the source from which it comes. No material substance is without the witness of its own original, however

[1] Censu. [2] Plane. [3] [1 Cor. xv. 47.]
[4] Retro. [5] Secundum carnem. [6] Ei adæquantur.

great a change into new properties it may have undergone. There is this very body of ours, the formation of which out of the dust of the ground is a truth which has found its way into Gentile fables; it certainly testifies its own origin from the two elements of earth and water,—from the former by its flesh, from the latter by its blood. Now, although there is a difference in the appearance of qualities (in other words, that which proceeds from something else is in development[1] different), yet, after all, what is blood but red fluid? what is flesh but earth in an especial[2] form? Consider the respective qualities,—of the muscles as clods; of the bones as stones; the mamillary glands as a kind of pebbles. Look upon the close junctions of the nerves as propagations of roots, and the branching courses of the veins as winding rivulets, and the down [which covers us] as moss, and the hair as grass, and the very treasures of marrow within our bones as ores[3] of flesh. All these marks of the earthy origin were in Christ; and it is they which obscured Him as the Son of God, for He was looked on as man, for no other reason whatever than because He existed in the corporeal substance of a man. Or else, show us some celestial substance in Him purloined from the Bear, and the Pleiades, and the Hyades. Well, then, [the characteristics] which we have enumerated are so many proofs that His was an earthy flesh, as ours is; but anything new or anything strange I do not discover. Indeed it was from His words and actions only, from His teaching and miracles solely, that men, though amazed, owned Christ to be man.[4] But if there had been in Him any new kind of flesh miraculously obtained [from the stars], it would have been certainly well known.[5] As the case stood, however, it was actually the ordinary[6] condition of His terrene flesh which made all things else about Him wonderful, as when they said, "Whence hath this man this wisdom and these mighty works?"[7] Thus spake even they who despised His out-

[1] Fit. [2] Sua. [3] Metalla.
[4] Christum hominem obstupescebant. [5] Notaretur.
[6] Non mira. [7] [Matt. xiii. 54.]

ward form. His body did not reach even to human beauty, to say nothing of heavenly glory.[1] Had the prophets given us no information whatever concerning His ignoble appearance, His very sufferings and the very contumely He endured bespeak it all. The sufferings attested His human flesh, the contumely proved its abject condition. Would any man have dared to touch even with his little finger the body [of Christ], if it had been of an unusual nature;[2] or to smear His face with spitting, if it had not invited it[3] [by its abjectness]? Why talk of a heavenly flesh, when you have no grounds to offer us for your celestial theory?[4] Why deny it to be earthy, when you have the best of reasons for knowing it to be earthy? He hungered under the devil['s temptation]; He thirsted with the woman of Samaria; He wept over Lazarus; He trembles at death (for "the flesh," as He says, "is weak"[5]); at last, He pours out His blood. These, I suppose, are celestial marks! But how, I ask, could He have incurred contempt and suffering in the way I have described, if there had beamed forth in that flesh of His aught of celestial excellence? From this, therefore, we have a convincing proof that in it there was nothing of heaven, because it must be capable of contempt and suffering.

CHAP. X.—*The allegation of another class of heretics refuted, —that Christ's flesh was of a finer texture, composed of soul,* ANIMALIS.

I now turn to another class, who are equally wise in their own conceit. They affirm that the flesh of Christ is composed of soul,[6] that His soul became flesh, so that His flesh is soul; and as His flesh is of soul, so is His soul of flesh. But here, again, I must have some reasons. If, in order to save

[1] [Compare Isa. liii. 2. See also our *Anti-Marcion*, pp. 153, 154.]
[2] Novum [made of the stars]. [3] Merentem.
[4] [Literally, "why you suppose it to be celestial."]
[5] [Matt. xxvi. 41.]
[6] Animalem ["etherialized; of a finer form, differing from gross, earthy matter" (Neander)].

the soul, Christ took a soul within Himself, because it could not be saved except by Him having it within Himself, I see no reason why, in clothing Himself with flesh, He should have made that flesh one of soul,[1] as if He could not have saved the soul in any other way than by making flesh of it. For while He saves *our* souls, which are not only not of flesh,[2] but are even distinct from flesh, how much more able was He to secure salvation to that soul which He took Himself, when it was also not of flesh? Again, since they assume it as a main tenet,[3] that Christ came forth not to deliver the flesh, but only our soul, how absurd it is, in the first place, that, meaning to save only the soul, He yet made it into just that sort of bodily substance which He had no intention of saving! And, secondly, if He had undertaken to deliver our souls by means of that which He carried, He ought, in that soul which He carried, to have carried our [soul], one (that is) of the same condition as ours; and whatever is the condition of our soul in its secret nature, it is certainly not one of flesh. However, it was not our soul which He saved, if His own was of flesh; for ours is not of flesh. Now, if He did not save our soul on the ground that it was a soul of flesh which He saved, He is nothing to us, because He has not saved our soul. Nor indeed did it need salvation, for it was not our soul really, since it was, on the supposition,[4] a soul of flesh. But yet it is evident that it has been saved. Of flesh, therefore, it was not composed, and it was ours; for it was our [soul] that was saved, since that was in peril [of damnation]. We therefore now conclude that as in Christ the soul was not of flesh, so neither could His flesh have possibly been composed of soul.

CHAP. XI.—*The opposite extravagance exposed, which invested Christ with a soul composed of flesh—corporeal, though invisible; Christ's soul, like ours, was distinct from flesh, though clothed in it.*

But we meet another argument of theirs, when we raise the question why Christ, in assuming a flesh composed of

[1] Animalem. [2] Non carneas. [3] Præsumant. [4] Scilicet.

soul, should seem to have had a soul that was made of flesh? For God, they say, desired to make the soul visible to men, by enduing it with a bodily nature, although it was before invisible; of its own nature, indeed, it was incapable of seeing anything, even its own self, by reason of the obstacle of this flesh, so that it was even a matter of doubt whether it was born or not. The soul, therefore [they further say], was made corporeal in Christ, in order that we might see it when undergoing birth, and death, and (what is more) resurrection. But yet, how was this possible, that by means of the flesh the soul should demonstrate itself[1] to itself or to us, when it could not possibly be ascertained that it would offer this mode of exhibiting itself by the flesh, until the thing came into existence to which it was unknown,[2] that is to say, the flesh? It received darkness, forsooth, in order to be able to shine! Now,[3] let us first turn our attention to this point, whether it was requisite that the soul should exhibit itself in the manner contended for;[4] and next [consider] whether their previous position be[5] that the soul is wholly invisible—[inquiring further] whether this invisibility is the result of its incorporeality, or whether it actually possesses some sort of body peculiar to itself. And yet, although they say that it is invisible, they determine it to be corporeal, but having somewhat that is invisible. For if it has nothing invisible, how can it be said to be invisible? But even its existence is an impossibility, unless it has that which is instrumental to its existence.[6] Since, however, it exists, it must needs have a something through which it exists. If it has this something, *it* must be its body. Everything which exists is a bodily existence *sui generis*. Nothing lacks bodily existence but that which is non-existent. If, then, the soul has an invisible body, He who had proposed to make it[7] visible would certainly have done His work better[8] if He had made that part of it which was accounted invisible, visible; be-

[1] Demonstraretur [or, "should become apparent"].
[2] Cui latebat. [3] Denique. [4] Isto modo.
[5] An retro allegent. [6] Per quod sit. [7] Eam [the soul].
[8] Dignius [*i.e.* "in a manner more worthy of Himself"].

cause then there would have been no untruth or weakness in the case, and neither of these flaws is suitable to God. [But as the case stands in the hypothesis], there is *untruth*, since He has set forth the soul as being a different thing from what it really is; and there is *weakness*, since He was unable to make it appear[1] to be that which it is. No one who wishes to exhibit a man covers him with a veil[2] or a mask. This, however, is precisely what has been done to the soul, if it has been clothed with a covering belonging to something else, by being converted into flesh. But even if the soul is, on their hypothesis, supposed[3] to be incorporeal, so that the soul, whatever it is, should by some [mysterious] force of the reason[4] be quite unknown, only not be a body, then in that case it were not beyond the power of God—indeed it would be more consistent with His plan—if He displayed[5] the soul in some new sort of body, different from that which we all have in common, one of which we should have quite a different notion,[6] [being spared the idea that][7] He had set His mind on[8] making, without an adequate cause, a visible soul instead of[9] an invisible one—a fit incentive, no doubt, for such questions as they start,[10] by their maintenance of a human flesh for it.[11] Christ, however, could not have appeared among men except as a man. Restore, therefore, to Christ His faith; [believe] that He who willed to walk the earth as man exhibited even a soul of a thoroughly human condition, not making it of flesh, but clothing it with flesh.

CHAP. XII.—*The true functions of the soul; Christ assumed it in His perfect human nature, not to reveal and explain it, but to save it; its resurrection with the body assured by Christ.*

Well, now, let it be granted that the soul is made apparent

[1] Demonstrare. [2] Cassidem. [3] Deputetur.
[4] Aliqua vi rationis [or, "by some power of its own condition"].
[5] Demonstrare. [6] Notitiæ. [7] Ne.
[8] Gestisset. [9] Ex. [10] Istis.
[11] In illam [perhaps "*in it*," as if an ablative case, not an unusual construction in Tertullian].

by the flesh,[1] on the assumption that it was evidently necessary[2] that it should be made apparent in some way or other, that is, as being incognisable to itself and to us: there is still an absurd distinction in this [hypothesis], which implies that we are ourselves separate from our soul, when all that we are is soul. Indeed,[3] without the soul we are nothing; there is not even the name of a human being, only that of a carcase. If, then, we are ignorant of the soul, it is in fact the soul that is ignorant of itself. Thus the only remaining question left for us to look into is, whether the soul was in this matter so ignorant of itself that it became known in any way it could.[4] The soul, in my opinion,[5] is sensual.[6] Nothing, therefore, pertaining to the soul is unconnected with sense,[7] nothing pertaining to sense is unconnected with the soul.[8] And if I may use the expression for the sake of emphasis, I would say, "*Animæ anima sensus est*"—"Sense is the soul's very soul." Now, since it is the soul that imparts the faculty of perception[9] to all [that have sense], and since it is itself that perceives the very senses, not to say properties, of them all, how is it likely that it did not itself receive sense as its own natural constitution? Whence is it to know what is necessary for itself under given circumstances, from the very necessity of natural causes, if it knows not its own property, and what is necessary for it? To recognise this indeed is within the competence of every soul; it has, I mean, a practical knowledge of itself, without which knowledge of itself no soul could possibly have exercised its own functions.[10] I suppose, too, that it is especially suitable that man, the only rational animal, should have been furnished with such a soul as would make him the rational animal, itself being pre-eminently rational. Now, how can that soul

[1] Ostensa sit. [2] Si constiterit. [3] Denique.
[4] Quoquo modo. [5] Opinor.
[6] Sensualis ["endowed with sense"].
[7] Nihil animale sine sensu. [8] Nihil sensuale sine anima.
[9] [We should have been glad of a shorter phrase for "sentire" ("to use sense"), had the whole course of the passage permitted it.]
[10] Se ministrare.

which makes man a rational animal be itself rational if it be itself ignorant of its own rationality, being ignorant of its own very self? So far, however, is it from being ignorant, that it knows its own Author, its own Master, and its own condition. Before it learns anything about God, it names the name of God. Before it acquires any knowledge of His judgment, it professes to commend itself to God. There is nothing one oftener hears of than that there is no hope after death; and yet what imprecations or deprecations does not [the soul] use according as the man dies after a well or ill spent life! These reflections are more fully pursued in a short treatise which we have written, "*On the Testimony of the Soul.*"[1] Besides, if the soul was ignorant of itself from the beginning, there is nothing it could[2] have learnt of Christ except its own quality.[3] It was not its own form that it learnt of Christ, but its salvation. For this cause did the Son of God descend and take on Him a soul, not that the soul might discover itself in Christ, but Christ in itself. For its salvation is endangered, not by its being ignorant of itself, but of the word of God. "The life," says He, "was manifested,"[4] not the soul. And again, "I am come to save the soul." He did not say, "to explain"[5] it. We could not know, of course,[6] that the soul, although an invisible essence, is born and dies, unless it were exhibited corporeally. We certainly were ignorant that it was to rise again with the flesh. This is the truth which it will be found was manifested by Christ. But even this He did not manifest in Himself in a different way than in some Lazarus, whose flesh was no more composed of soul[7] than his soul was of flesh.[8] What further knowledge, therefore, have we received of the structure[9] of the soul which we were ignorant of before? What invisible part was there belonging to it which wanted to be made visible by the flesh?

[1] [See especially chap. iv.]
[2] Debuerat.
[3] Nisi qualis esset.
[4] [1 John i. 2.]
[5] Ostendere; [see Luke ix. 56.]
[6] Nimirum.
[7] Animalis.
[8] Carnalis.
[9] Dispositione.

CHAP. XIII.—*The flesh and the soul both fully and unconfusedly contained in Christ's human nature.*

The soul became flesh that the soul might become visible.[1] Well, then, did the flesh likewise become soul that the flesh might be manifested?[2] If the soul is flesh, it is no longer soul, but flesh. If the flesh is soul, it is no longer flesh, but soul. Where, then, there is flesh, and where there is soul, it has become both one and the other.[3] Now, if they are neither in particular, although they become both one and the other, it is, to say the least, very absurd, that we should understand the soul when we name the flesh, and when we indicate the soul, explain ourselves as meaning the flesh. All things will be in danger of being taken in a sense different from their own proper sense, and, whilst taken in that different sense, of losing their proper one, if they are called by a name which differs from their natural designation. Fidelity in names secures the safe appreciation of properties. When these properties undergo a change, they are considered to possess such qualities as their names indicate. Baked clay, for instance, receives the name of pitcher.[4] It retains not the name which designated its former state,[5] because it has no longer a share in that state. Therefore, also, the soul of Christ having become flesh,[6] cannot be anything else than that which it has become; nor can it be any longer that which it once was, having become indeed[7] something else. And since we have just had recourse to an illustration, we will put it to further use. Our pitcher, then, which was formed of the clay, is one body, and has one name indicative, of course, of that one body; nor can the pitcher be also called clay, because what it once was, it is no longer. Now that which is no longer [what it was] is also not an inseparable

[1] Ostenderetur [or, "that it might prove itself soul"].
[2] [Or, "that it might show itself flesh."]
[3] Alterutrum ["no matter which"].
[4] Testæ. [5] Generis.
[6] [Tertullian quotes his opponent's opinion here.]
[7] Scilicet [in reference to the *alleged* doctrine].

property.[1] And the soul is not an inseparable property. Since, therefore, it has become flesh, the soul is a uniform solid body; it is also a wholly incomplex being,[2] and an indivisible substance. But in Christ we find the soul and the flesh expressed in simple unfigurative[3] terms; that is to say, the soul is called soul, and the flesh, flesh; nowhere is the soul termed flesh, or the flesh, soul; and yet they ought to have been thus [confusedly] named if such had been their condition. [The fact, however, is] that even by [Christ] Himself each substance has been separately mentioned by itself, conformably, of course, to the distinction which exists between the properties of both, the soul by itself, and the flesh by itself. "*My soul*," says He, "is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death;"[4] and "the bread that I will give is *my flesh*, [which I will give] for the life[5] of the world."[6] Now, if the soul had been flesh, there would have only been in Christ the soul composed of flesh, or else the flesh composed of soul.[7] Since, however, He keeps the species distinct, the flesh and the soul, He shows them to be two. If two, then they are no longer one; if not one, then the soul is not composed of flesh, nor the flesh of soul. For the soul-flesh, or the flesh-soul, is but one; unless indeed He even had some other soul apart from that which was flesh, and bare about another flesh besides that which was soul. But since He had but one flesh and one soul,—that "soul which was sorrowful, even unto death," and that [flesh which was the] "bread given for the life of the world,"—the number is unimpaired[8] of two substances distinct in kind, thus excluding the unique species of the flesh-comprised soul.

CHAP. XIV.—*Christ took not on Him an angelic nature, but the human; for it was men, not angels, whom He came to save.*

But Christ, they say, bare[9] [the nature of] an angel. For

[1] Non adhæret. [2] Singularitas tota. [3] Nudis.
[4] [Matt. xxvi. 38. (Tertullian's quotation is put interrogatively.)]
[5] ["The salvation" (salute) is Tertullian's word.]
[6] [John vi. 51.] [7] [Above, chap. x. (beginning).]
[8] Salvus. [9] Gestavit.

what reason? The same which induced Him to become man? Christ, then, was actuated by the motive which led Him to take human nature. Man's salvation was the motive, the restoration of that which had perished. Man had perished; his recovery had become necessary. No such cause, however, existed for Christ's taking on Him the nature of angels. For although there is assigned to angels also perdition in "the fire prepared for the devil and his angels,"[1] yet a restoration is never promised to them. No charge about the salvation of angels did Christ ever receive from the Father; and that which the Father neither promised nor commanded, Christ could not have undertaken. For what object, therefore, did He bear the angelic nature, if it were not [that He might have it] as a powerful helper[2] wherewithal to execute the salvation of man? The Son of God, in sooth, was not competent alone to deliver man, whom a solitary and single serpent had overthrown! There is, then, no longer but one God, but one Saviour, if there be two to contrive salvation, and one of them in need of the other. But was it His object indeed to deliver man by an angel? Why, then, come down to do that which He was about to expedite with an angel's help? If by an angel's aid, why [come] Himself also? If He meant to do all by Himself, why have an angel too? He has been, it is true, called "the Angel of great counsel," that is, a messenger, by a term expressive of official function, not of nature. For He had to announce to the world the mighty purpose of the Father, even that which ordained the restoration of man. But He is not on this account to be regarded as an angel, as a Gabriel or a Michael. For the Lord of the vineyard sends even His Son to the labourers to require fruit, as well as His servants. Yet the Son will not therefore be counted as one of the servants because He undertook the office of a servant. I may, then, more easily say, if such an expression is to be hazarded,[3] that the Son is actually an angel, that is, a messenger, from the Father, than that there is an angel in the Son. Forasmuch, however, as it has been declared concerning the Son

[1] [Matt. xxv. 41.] [2] Satellitem. [3] Si forte.

Himself, "Thou hast made Him a little lower than the angels,"[1] how will it appear that He put on the nature of angels if He was made lower than the angels, having become man, with flesh and soul as the Son of man? As "the Spirit[2] of God," however, and "the Power of the Highest,"[3] can He be regarded as lower than the angels,—He who is verily God, and the Son of God? Well, but as bearing human nature, He is so far made inferior to the angels; but as bearing angelic nature, He to the same degree loses that inferiority. This opinion will be very suitable for Ebion,[4] who holds Jesus to be a mere man, and nothing more than a descendant of David, and not also the Son of God; although He is, to be sure,[5] in one respect more glorious than the prophets, inasmuch as he declares that there was an angel in Him, just as there was in Zechariah. Only it was never said by Christ, "And the angel, which spake within me, said unto me."[6] Neither, indeed, was that familiar phrase of all the prophets, "Thus saith the Lord," [ever used by Christ]. For He was Himself the Lord, who openly spake by His own authority, prefacing His words with the formula, "Verily, verily, *I* say unto you." What need is there of further argument? Hear what Isaiah says in emphatic words, "It was no angel, nor deputy, but the Lord Himself who saved them."[7]

CHAP. XV.—*The Valentinian figment of Christ's flesh being of a spiritual nature, examined and refuted out of Scripture.*

Valentinus, indeed, on the strength of his heretical system, might consistently devise a spiritual flesh for Christ. Any one who refused to believe that that flesh was human might pretend it to be anything he liked, forasmuch as (and this remark is applicable to all [heretics]), if it was not human, and was not born of man, I do not see of what substance

[1] [Ps. viii. 5.]

[2] [For this designation of the *divine* nature in Christ, see our *Anti-Marcion*, p. 247, note 7.]

[3] [Luke i. 35.] [4] Hebioni. [5] Plane. [6] [Zech. i. 14.]

[7] [Isa. lxiii. 9.]

Christ Himself spoke when He called Himself man and the Son of man: "But now" [says He] "ye seek to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth;"[1] and "The Son of man is Lord of the Sabbath-day."[2] For it is of Him that Isaiah writes: "A man of suffering, and acquainted with the bearing of weakness;"[3] and Jeremiah: "He is a man, and who hath known Him?"[4] and Daniel: "Upon the clouds [He came] as the Son of man."[5] The Apostle Paul likewise says: "The man Christ Jesus is the one Mediator between God and man."[6] Also Peter, in the Acts of the Apostles, speaks of Him as verily human [when he says], "Jesus Christ was a man approved of God among you."[7] These passages alone ought to suffice as a prescriptive[8] testimony in proof that Christ had human flesh derived from man, and not spiritual, and that His flesh was not composed of soul,[9] nor of stellar substance, and that it was not an imaginary flesh; [and no doubt they would be sufficient] if heretics could only divest themselves of all their contentious warmth and artifice. For, as I have read in some writer of Valentinus' wretched faction,[10] they refuse at the outset to believe that a human and earthly substance was created[11] for Christ, lest the Lord should be regarded as inferior to the angels, who are not formed of earthly flesh; whence, too, it would be necessary that, if His flesh were like ours, it should be similarly born, not of the Spirit, nor of God, but of the will of man. Why, moreover, should it be born, not of corruptible [seed], but of incorruptible? Why, again, since His flesh has both risen and returned to heaven, is not ours, being like His, also taken up at once? Or else, why does not His flesh, since it is like ours, return in like manner to the ground, and suffer dissolution? Such objections even the heathen used constantly to bandy about.[12] Was the Son of God reduced to such a depth of degradation? Again, if He rose

[1] [John viii. 40.] [2] [Matt. xii. 8.] [3] [Isa. liii. 3 (Sept.).]
[4] [Jer. xvii. 9 (Sept.).] [5] [Dan. vii. 13.] [6] [1 Tim. ii. 5.]
[7] [Acts ii. 22.] [8] Vice præscriptionis.
[9] Animalis. [10] Factiuncula. [11] Informatam.
[12] Volutabant [see Lactantius iv. 22].

again as a precedent for our hope, how is it that nothing like it has been thought desirable [to happen] to ourselves?[1] Such views are not improper for heathens; and they are fit and natural for the heretics too. For, indeed, what difference is there between them, except it be that the heathen, in not believing, do believe; while the heretics, in believing, do not believe? Then, again, they read: "Thou madest Him a little less than angels;"[2] and they deny the lower nature of that Christ who declares Himself to be, "not a man, but a worm,"[3] who also had "no form nor comeliness, but His form was ignoble, despised more than all men, a man in suffering, and acquainted with the bearing of weakness."[4] Here they discover a human being mingled with a divine one, and so they deny the manhood. They believe that He died, and maintain that a being which has died was born of an incorruptible substance;[5] as if, forsooth, corruptibility[6] were something else than death! But our flesh, too, ought immediately to have risen again. Wait a while. Christ has not yet subdued His enemies, so as to be able to triumph over them in company with His friends.

CHAP. XVI.—*Christ's flesh in nature the same as ours, only sinless; the difference between* CARNEM PECCATI *and* PECCATUM CARNIS: *it is the latter which Christ abolished. The flesh of the first Adam, no less than that of the second Adam, not received from human seed, although as entirely human as our own, which is derived from it.*

The famous Alexander,[7] too, instigated by his love of disputation in the true fashion of heretical temper, has made himself conspicuous against us; he will have us say that Christ put on flesh of an earthly origin,[8] in order that He

[1] De nobis probatum est [or perhaps, "has been proved to have happened in our own case"].

[2] [Ps. viii. 6 (Sept.).] [3] [Ps. xxii. 6.] [4] [Isa. liii. 3 (Sept.).]

[5] Ex incorruptela. [6] Corruptela.

[7] [Although Tertullian dignifies him with an "ille," we have no particulars of this man.]

[8] Census.

might in His own person abolish sinful flesh.[1] Now, even if we did assert this as our opinion, we should be able to defend it in such a way as completely to avoid the extravagant folly which he ascribes to us in making us suppose that the very flesh of Christ was in Himself abolished as being sinful; because we mention our belief [in public],[2] that it is sitting at the right hand of the Father in heaven; and we further declare that it will come again from thence in all the pomp[3] of the Father's glory: it is therefore just as impossible for us to say that it is abolished, as it is for us to maintain that it is sinful, and so made void, since in it there has been no fault. We maintain, moreover, that what has been abolished in Christ is not *carnem peccati*, "sinful flesh," but *peccatum carnis*, "sin in the flesh,"—not the material thing, but its condition;[4] not the substance, but its flaw;[5] and [this we aver] on the authority of the apostle, who says, "He abolished sin in the flesh."[6] Now in another sentence he says that Christ was "in the likeness of sinful flesh,"[7] not, however, as if He had taken on Him "the likeness of the flesh," in the sense of a semblance of body instead of its reality; but he means us to understand likeness to the flesh which sinned,[8] because the flesh of Christ, which committed no sin itself, resembled that which had sinned,—resembled it in its nature, but not in the corruption it received from Adam; whence we also affirm that there was in Christ the same flesh as that whose nature

[1] [So Bp. Kaye renders "*carnem* peccati."]

[2] [We take the *meminerimus* to refer to "the creed."]

[3] Suggestu. [4] Naturam. [5] Culpam.

[6] ["Tertullian, referring to St. Paul, says of Christ: 'Evacuavit peccatum in carne;' alluding, as I suppose, to Romans viii. 3. But the corresponding Greek in the printed editions is *κατέκρινε τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐν τῇ σαρκί* ('He condemned sin in the flesh'). Had Tertullian a different reading in his Greek MSS., or did he confound Romans viii. 3 with Romans vi. 6, *ἵνα καταργηθῇ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας* ('that the body of sin might be destroyed')? Jerome translates the Greek *καταργέω* by 'evacuo,' c. xvi. See *Adv. Marcionem*, ver. 14. Dr. Neander has pointed out two passages in which Tertullian has 'damnavit' or '*damnaverit* delinquentiam in carne.' See *de Res. Carnis*, 46; *de Pudicitiâ*, 17." —Bp. KAYE.]

[7] [Also in Rom. viii. 3.] [8] Peccatricis carnis.

in man is sinful. In the flesh, therefore, [we say] that sin has been abolished, because in Christ that same flesh is maintained without sin, which in man was not maintained without sin. Now, it would not contribute to the purpose of Christ's abolishing sin in the flesh, if He did not abolish it in that flesh in which was the nature of sin, nor [would it conduce] to His glory. For surely it would have been no strange thing if He had removed the stain of sin in some better flesh, and one which should possess a different, even a sinless, nature! Then, you say, if He took our flesh, Christ's was a sinful one. Do not, however, fetter with mystery a sense which is quite intelligible. For in putting on our flesh, He made it His own; in making it His own, He made it sinless. A word of caution, however, must be addressed to all who refuse to believe that our flesh was in Christ on the ground that it came not of the seed of a human father;[1] let them remember that Adam himself received this flesh of ours without the seed of a human father. As earth was converted into this flesh of ours without the seed of a human father, so also was it quite possible for the Son of God to take to Himself[2] the substance of the selfsame flesh, without a human father's agency.[3]

CHAP. XVII.—*The similarity of circumstance as to the derivation of their flesh between the first and the second Adam well drawn out. An analogy also pleasantly traced between Eve and the Virgin Mary.*

But, leaving Alexander with his syllogisms, which he so perversely applies in his discussions, as well as with the hymns of Valentinus, which, with consummate assurance, he interpolates as the production of some respectable[4] author, let us confine our inquiry to a single point—Whether Christ received flesh from the virgin?—that we may thus arrive at a certain proof that His flesh was human, if He derived its substance from His mother's womb, although we are at once furnished with clear evidences of the human character

[1] Viri.
[2] Transire in ["to pass into"].
[3] Sine coagulo.
[4] Idonei.

of His flesh, from its name and description as that of a man, and from the nature of its constitution, and from the system of its sensations, and from its suffering of death. Now, it will first be necessary to show what previous reason there was for the Son of God's being born of a virgin. He who was going to consecrate a new order of birth, must Himself be born after a novel fashion, concerning which Isaiah foretold how that the Lord Himself would give the sign. What, then, is the sign? "Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son."[1] Accordingly, a virgin did conceive and bear "Emmanuel, God with us."[2] This is the new nativity; a man is born in God. And in this man God was born, taking the flesh of an ancient race, without the help, however, of the ancient seed, in order that He might reform it with a new seed, that is, in a spiritual manner, and cleanse it by the removal of all its ancient stains. But the whole of this new birth was prefigured, as was the case in all other instances, in ancient type, the Lord being born as man by a dispensation in which a virgin was the medium. The earth was still in a virgin state, reduced as yet by no human labour, with no seed as yet cast into its furrows, when, as we are told, God made man out of it into a living soul.[3] As, then, the first Adam is thus introduced to us, it is a just inference that the second Adam likewise, as the apostle has told us, was formed by God into a quickening spirit out of the ground,—in other words, out of a flesh which was unstained as yet by any human generation. But that I may lose no opportunity of supporting my argument from the name of Adam, why is Christ called Adam by the apostle, unless it be that, as man, He was of that earthly origin? And even reason here maintains the same conclusion, because it was by just the contrary[4] operation that God recovered His own image and likeness, of which He had been robbed by the devil. For it was while Eve was yet a virgin, that the ensnaring word had crept into her ear which was to build the edifice of death. Into a virgin's soul, in like manner, must be introduced that Word

[1] [Isa. vii. 14.]
[2] [Matt. i. 23.]
[3] [Gen. ii. 7.]
[4] Æmula.

of God which was to raise the fabric of life; so that what had been reduced to ruin by this sex, might by the selfsame sex be recovered to salvation. As Eve had believed the serpent, so Mary believed the angel.[1] The delinquency which the one occasioned by believing, the other by believing effaced. But [it will be said] Eve did not at the devil's word conceive in her womb. Well, she at all events conceived; for the devil's word afterwards became as seed to her that she should conceive as an outcast, and bring forth in sorrow. Indeed she gave birth to a fratricidal devil; whilst Mary, on the contrary, bare one who was one day to secure salvation to Israel, His own brother after the flesh, and the murderer of Himself. God therefore sent down into the virgin's womb His Word, as the good Brother, who should blot out the memory of the evil brother. Hence it was necessary that Christ should come forth for the salvation of man, in that condition [of flesh] into which man had entered ever since his condemnation.

CHAP. XVIII.—*A very perspicuous statement of the mystery of the assumption of our perfect human nature by the Second Person of the blessed Trinity, here called* (*as often*) "THE SPIRIT."

Now, that we may give a simpler answer, it was not fit that the Son of God should be born of a human father's seed, lest, if He were wholly the Son of a man, He should fail to be also the Son of God, and have nothing more than "a Solomon" or "a Jonas,"[2]—as Ebion[3] thought we ought to believe concerning Him. In order, therefore, that He who was already the Son of God—of God the Father's seed, that is to say, the Spirit—might also be the Son of man, He only wanted to assume flesh, of the flesh of man,[4] without the seed of a man;[5] for the seed of a man was unnecessary[6] for One who had the seed of God. As, then, before His birth of the virgin, He was able to have God for His Father

[1] [Literally, "Gabriel."]
[2] [Matt. xii. 41, 42.]
[3] De Hebionis opinione.
[4] Hominis.
[5] Viri.
[6] Vacabat.

without a human mother, so likewise, after He was born of the virgin, He was able to have a woman for His mother without a human father. He is thus man with God, in short, since He is man's flesh with God's Spirit[1]—*flesh* [I say] without seed from man, *Spirit* with seed from God. Forasmuch, then, as the dispensation of [God's] purpose[2] concerning His Son required that He should be born[3] of a virgin, why should He not have received of the virgin the body which He bore from the virgin? Because, [forsooth], it is something else which He took from God, for "the Word," say they, "was made flesh."[4] Now this very statement plainly shows what it was that was made flesh; nor can it possibly be that[5] anything else than the Word was made flesh. Now, whether it was of the flesh that the Word was made flesh, or whether it was so made of the [divine] seed itself, the Scripture must tell us. As, however, the Scripture is silent about everything except what it was that was made [flesh], and says nothing of that from which it was so made, it must be held to suggest that from something else, and not from itself, was the Word made flesh. And if not from itself, but from something else, from what can we more suitably suppose that the Word became flesh than from that flesh in which it submitted to the dispensation?[6] And [we have a proof of the same conclusion in the fact] that the Lord Himself sententiously and distinctly pronounced, "that which is born of the flesh is flesh,"[7] even because it is born of the flesh. But if He here spoke of a human being simply, and not of Himself, [as you maintain], then you must deny absolutely that Christ is man, and must maintain that [human nature] was not suitable to Him. And then He adds, "That which is born of the Spirit is spirit,"[8] because God is a Spirit, and He was born of God. Now this description is

[1] [As we have often observed, the term *Spiritus* is used by Tertullian to express the *Divine Nature* in Christ (*Anti-Marcion*, p. 247, note 7).]

[2] Dispositio rationis.

[3] Proferendum.

[4] [John i. 14.]

[5] Nec periclitatus quasi.

[6] [Literally, "in which it became (flesh)."]

[7] [John iii. 6.]

[8] [John iii. 6.]

certainly even more applicable to Him than it is to those who believe in Him. But if this passage indeed apply to Him, then why does not the preceding one also? For you cannot divide their relation, and adapt this to Him, and the previous clause to all other men, especially as you do not deny that Christ possesses the two substances, both of the flesh and of the Spirit. Besides, as He was in possession both of flesh and of Spirit, He cannot possibly, when speaking of the condition of the two substances which He Himself bears, be supposed to have determined that the Spirit indeed was His own, but that the flesh was not His own. Forasmuch, therefore, as He is of the Spirit, He is God the Spirit, and is born of God; just as He is also born of the flesh of man, being generated in the flesh as man.

CHAP. XIX.—*Christ, as to His divine nature (as "the Word of God"), became flesh, not by carnal conception, "the will of the flesh and of man," but by the will of God. Christ's divine nature, of its own accord, descended into the virgin's womb.*

What, then, is the meaning of this passage, "Born[1] not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God?"[2] I shall make more use of this passage after I have confuted those who have tampered with it. They maintain that it was written thus [in the plural],[3] "*Who were born*, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God," as if designating those who were before mentioned as "believing in His name," in order to point out the existence of that mysterious seed of the elect and spiritual which they appropriate to themselves.[4] But how can this be, when all who believe in the name of the Lord are, by reason of the common principle of the human race, born of blood,

[1] [Tertullian reads this in the singular number, "natus est."]

[2] [John i. 13.]

[3] [We need not say that the mass of critical authority is against Tertullian, and with his opponents, in their reading of this passage.]

[4] [He refers to the Valentinians. See our translation of his tract against them, chap. xxv., etc.]

and of the will of the flesh, and of man, as indeed is Valentinus himself? The expression is in the singular number, as referring to the Lord, "He was born of God." And very properly, because Christ is the Word of God, and with the Word the Spirit of God, and by the Spirit the Power of God, and whatsoever else appertains to God. As flesh, however, He is not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of man, because it was by the will of God that the Word was made flesh. To the flesh, indeed, and not to the Word, accrues the denial of the nativity which is natural to us all as men,[1] because it was as flesh that He had thus to be born, and not as the Word. Now, whilst the passage actually denies that He was born of the will of the flesh, how is it that it did not also deny [that He was born] of the substance of the flesh? For it did not disavow the substance of the flesh when it denied His being "born of blood," but only the matter of the seed, which, as all know, is the warm blood as converted by ebullition[2] into the *coagulum* of the woman's blood. In the cheese, it is from the coagulation that the milky substance acquires that consistency,[3] which is condensed by infusing the rennet.[4] We thus understand that what is denied is the Lord's birth after sexual intercourse (as is suggested by the phrase, "the will of man and of the flesh"), not [His nativity] from a woman's womb. Why, too, is it insisted on with such an accumulation of emphasis, that He was not born of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor [of the will] of man, if it were not that His flesh was such that no man could have any doubt on the point of its being born from sexual intercourse? Again, although denying His birth from such cohabitation, the passage did not deny that He was born of [real] flesh; it rather affirmed this, by the very fact that it did not deny His birth in the flesh in the same way that it denied His birth from sexual intercourse. Pray, tell me, why the Spirit of God[5] descended into a woman's womb at all, if He did not do so for the purpose of partaking of flesh from the womb. For He could have

[1] Formalis nostræ nativitatis. [2] Despumatione. [3] Vis.
[4] Medicando. [5] [*i.e.* The Son of God.]

become *spiritual* flesh[1] without such a process,—much more simply, indeed, without the womb than in it. He had no reason for enclosing Himself within one, if He was to bear forth nothing from it. Not without reason, however, did He descend into a womb. Therefore He received [flesh] therefrom; else, if He received nothing therefrom, His descent into it would have been without a reason, especially if He meant to become flesh of that sort which was not derived from a womb, that is to say, a spiritual one.[2]

CHAP. XX.—*Christ born* OF *a virgin, of her substance. A detail of the physiological facts of His real and exact birth of a human mother, as suggested by certain passages of Scripture.*

But to what shifts you resort, in your attempt to rob the syllable "EX" ["OF"][3] of its proper force as a preposition, and to substitute another for it in a sense not found throughout the Holy Scriptures! You say that He was born *through*[4] a virgin, not *of*[5] a virgin, and *in* a womb, not *of* a womb, because the angel in the dream said to Joseph, "That which is born in her" (not of her) "is of the Holy Ghost."[6] But the fact is, if he had meant "of her," he must have said "in her;" for that which was of her, was also in her. The angel's expression, therefore, "in her," has precisely the same meaning as the phrase "of her." It is, however, a fortunate circumstance that Matthew also, when tracing down the Lord's descent from Abraham to Mary, says, "Jacob begat Joseph the husband of Mary, *of whom* was born Christ."[7] But Paul, too, silences these critics[8] when he says, "God sent forth His Son, made of a woman."[9] Does he mean *through* a woman, or *in* a woman? Nay more, for the sake of greater emphasis, he uses the word "*made*" rather than *born*, although the use of the latter expression would have been

[1] [Which is all that the heretics assign to Him.]
[2] [Such as Valentinus ascribed to Him. (See above, c. xv.)]
[3] [Indicating the *material* or *ingredient*, "out of."]
[4] Per. [5] Ex. [6] [Matt. i. 20.]
[7] [Matt. i. 16.] [8] Grammaticis. [9] [Gal. iv. 4.]

simpler. But by saying "*made*," he not only confirmed the statement, "The Word was made flesh,"[1] but he also asserted the reality of the flesh which was made of a virgin. We shall have also the support of the Psalms on this point,—not the "Psalms" indeed of Valentinus the apostate, and heretic, and Platonist, but the Psalms of David, the most illustrious saint and well-known prophet. He sings to us of Christ, and through his voice Christ indeed also sang concerning Himself. Hear, then, Christ the Lord speaking to God the Father: "Thou art He that didst draw[2] me out of my mother's womb."[3] Here is the first point. "Thou art my hope from my mother's breasts; upon Thee have I been cast from the womb."[4] Here is another point. "Thou art my God from my mother's belly."[5] Here is a third point. Now let us carefully attend to the sense of these passages. "Thou didst draw me," He says, "out of the womb." Now what is it which is *drawn*, if it be not that which adheres, that which is firmly fastened to anything from which it is drawn in order to be sundered? If He clave not to the womb, how could He have been drawn from it? If He who clave thereto was drawn from it, how could He have adhered to it, if it were not that, all the while He was in the womb, He was tied to it, as to His origin,[6] by the umbilical cord, which communicated growth to Him from the matrix? Even when one strange matter amalgamates with another, it becomes so entirely incorporated[7] with that with which it amalgamates, that when it is drawn off from it, it carries with it some part of the body from which it is torn, as if in consequence of the severance of the union and growth which the constituent pieces had communicated to each other. But what were His "mother's breasts" which He mentions? No doubt they were those which He sucked. Midwives, and doctors, and naturalists, can tell us, from the nature of women's breasts, whether they usually flow at any other time than

[1] [John i. 14.] [2] Avulsisti. [3] [Ps. xxii. 9.]
[4] [Vers. 9, 10.] [5] [Ver. 10.] [6] [*i.e.* of His flesh.]
[7] Concarnatus et convisceratus ["united in flesh and internal structure"].

when the womb is affected with pregnancy, when the veins convey therefrom the blood of the lower parts[1] to the *mamilla*, and in the act of transference convert the secretion into the nutritious[2] substance of milk. Whence it comes to pass that during the period of lactation the monthly issues are suspended. But if the Word was made flesh of Himself without any communication with a womb, no mother's womb operating upon Him with its usual function and support, how could the lacteal fountain have been conveyed [from the womb] to the breasts, since [the womb] can only effect the change by actual possession [of the proper substance]? But it could not possibly have had blood for transformation into milk, unless it possessed the causes of blood also, that is to say, the severance [by birth][3] of its own flesh [from the mother's womb]. Now it is easy to see what was the novelty of Christ's being born of a virgin. It was simply this, that [He was born] of a virgin in the real manner which we have indicated, in order that our regeneration might have virginal purity,—spiritually cleansed from all pollutions through Christ, who was Himself a virgin, even in the flesh, in that He was [born] of a virgin's flesh.

CHAP. XXI.—*The Word of God did not become flesh except in the virgin's womb and of her substance; through His mother He is descended from her great ancestor David, and is described both in the Old and in the New Testaments as "the fruit of David's loins."*

Whereas, then, they contend that the novelty [of Christ's birth] consisted in this, that as the Word of God became flesh without the seed of a human father, so there should be no flesh of the virgin mother [assisting in the transaction], why should not the novelty rather be confined to this, that His flesh, although not born of seed, should yet have proceeded from flesh? I should like to go more closely into this discussion. "Behold," says he, "a virgin shall conceive in the womb."[4] [Conceive] what? I ask. The Word of

[1] Sentinam illam inferni sanguinis.
[2] Lactiorem.
[3] Avulsionem.
[4] [Isa. vii. 14; Matt. i. 23.]

God, of course, and not the seed of man, and in order, certainly, to bring forth a son. "For," says he, "she shall bring forth a son."[1] Therefore, as the act of conception was her own,[2] so also what she brought forth was her own also, although the cause of conception[3] was not. If, on the other hand, the Word became flesh of Himself, then He both conceived and brought forth Himself, and the prophecy is stultified. For in that case a virgin did *not* conceive, and did *not* bring forth; since whatever she brought forth from the conception of the Word, is not her own flesh. But is this the only statement of prophecy which will be frustrated?[4] Will not the angel's announcement also be subverted, that the virgin should "conceive in her womb and bring forth a son?"[5] And will not in fact every scripture which declares that Christ had a mother? For how could she have been His mother, unless He had been in her womb? But then He received nothing from her womb which could make her a mother in whose womb He had been.[6] Such a name as this[7] a strange flesh ought not [to assume]. No flesh can speak of a mother's womb but that which is itself the offspring of that womb; nor can any be the offspring of the said womb if it owe its birth solely to itself. Therefore even Elisabeth must be silent although she is carrying in her womb the prophetic babe, which was already conscious of his Lord, and is, moreover, filled with the Holy Ghost.[8] For without reason does she say, "And whence is this to me that the mother of my Lord should come to me?"[9] If it was not as her son, but only as a stranger that Mary carried Jesus in her womb, how is it she says, "Blessed is the fruit of thy womb?"[10] What is this fruit of the womb, which received not its germ from the womb, which had not its root in the womb, which belongs not to her whose is the womb, and which is no doubt the real fruit of the womb—even Christ? Now, since He is the blossom of the stem which

[1] [See the same passages.]
[2] Ipsius.
[3] Quod concepit [or, "what she conceived"].
[4] Evácuabitur.
[5] [Luke i. 31.]
[6] [An objection.]
[7] [The rejoinder.]
[8] [Luke i. 41.]
[9] [Ver. 43.]
[10] [Ver. 42.]

sprouts from the root of Jesse; since, moreover, the root of Jesse is the family of David, and the stem of the root is Mary descended from David, and the blossom of the stem is Mary's son, who is called Jesus Christ, will not He also be the fruit? For the blossom is the fruit, because through the blossom and from the blossom every product advances from its rudimental condition[1] to perfect fruit. What then? [These heretics] deny to the fruit its blossom, and to the blossom its stem, and to the stem its root; so that the root fails to secure[2] for itself, by means of the stem, that special product which comes from the stem, even the blossom and the fruit; for every step indeed in a genealogy is traced from the latest up to the first, so that it is now a well-known fact that the flesh of Christ is inseparable,[3] not merely from Mary, but also from David through Mary, and from Jesse through David. "This fruit," therefore, "of David's loins," that is to say, of his posterity in the flesh, God swears to him that "He will raise up to sit upon his throne."[4] If "of David's loins," how much rather is He of Mary's loins, by virtue of whom He is in "the loins of David?"

CHAP. XXII.—*Holy Scripture in the New Testament (even in its very first verse) testifies to Christ's true flesh, in virtue of which He is incorporated in the human stock of David, and Abraham, and Adam.*

They may, then, obliterate the testimony of the devils which proclaimed Jesus the son of David; but whatever unworthiness there be in this testimony, that of the apostles they will never be able to efface. There is, first of all, Matthew, that most faithful chronicler[5] of the Gospel, because the companion of the Lord; for no other reason in the world than to show us clearly the fleshly original[6] of Christ, he thus begins [his Gospel]: "The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the son of David, the son of Abraham."[7] With a nature issuing from such fontal sources, and an

[1] Eruditur. [2] Quominus vindicet. [3] Adhærere.
[4] [Ps. cxxxii. 11; also Acts ii. 30.] [5] Commentator.
[6] Originis carnalis [*i.e.* "origin of the flesh of"]. [7] [Matt. i. 1.]

order gradually descending to the birth of Christ, what else have we here described than the very flesh of Abraham and of David conveying itself down, step after step, to the very virgin, and at last introducing Christ, — nay, producing Christ Himself of the virgin? Then, again, there is Paul, who was at once both a disciple, and a master, and a witness of the selfsame Gospel; as an apostle of the same Christ, also, he affirms that Christ "was made of the seed of David, according to the flesh,"[1]—which, therefore, was His own likewise. Christ's flesh, then, is of David's seed. Since He is of the seed of David in consequence of Mary's flesh, He is therefore of Mary's flesh because of the seed of David. In what way soever you torture the statement, He is either of the flesh of Mary because of the seed of David, or He is of the seed of David because of the flesh of Mary. The whole discussion is terminated by the same apostle, when he declares Christ to be "the seed of Abraham." And if of Abraham, how much more, to be sure, of David, as a more recent [progenitor]! For, unfolding the promised blessing upon all nations in the person[2] of Abraham, "And in thy seed shall all nations of the earth be blessed," he adds, "He saith not, And to seeds, as of many; but as of one, And to thy seed, which is Christ."[3] When we read and believe these things, what sort of flesh ought we, and can we, acknowledge in Christ? Surely none other than Abraham's, since Christ is "the seed of Abraham;" none other than Jesse's, since Christ is the blossom of "the stem of Jesse;" none other than David's, since Christ is "the fruit of David's loins;" none other than Mary's, since Christ came from Mary's womb; and, higher still, none other than Adam's, since Christ is "the second Adam." The consequence, therefore, is that they must either maintain that those [ancestors] had a spiritual flesh, that so there might be derived to Christ the same condition of substance, or else allow that the flesh of Christ was not a spiritual one, since it is not traced from the origin[4] of a spiritual stock.

[1] [Rom. i. 3; 2 Tim. ii. 8.]
[2] In nomine [or, "for the sake of"].
[3] [Gal. iii. 8, 16.]
[4] Censetur.

CHAP. XXIII.—*Simeon's* "SIGN *that should be contradicted," applied to the heretical gainsaying of the true birth of Christ. Tertullian grasps one of the heretics' paradoxes, and turns it in support of catholic truth.*

We acknowledge, however, that the prophetic declaration of Simeon is fulfilled, which he spoke over the recently-born Saviour:[1] "Behold, this [child] is set for the fall and rising again of many in Israel, and for a sign that shall be spoken against."[2] The sign [here meant] is that of the birth of Christ, according to Isaiah: "Therefore the Lord Himself shall give you *a sign:* behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a son."[3] We discover, then, what the sign is which is to be spoken against—the conception and the parturition of the Virgin Mary, concerning which these sophists[4] say: "She a virgin and yet not a virgin bare, and yet did not bear;" just as if such language, if indeed it must be uttered, would not be more suitable even for ourselves to use! For "she bare," because she produced offspring of her own flesh, and "yet she did not bear," since she produced Him not from a husband's seed; she was "a virgin," so far as [abstinence] from a husband went, and "yet not a virgin," as regards her bearing a child. [There is not, however, that parity of reasoning which the heretics affect; in other words] it does not follow that for the reason "she did not bear,"[5] she who was "not a virgin" was "yet a virgin," even because she became a mother without any fruit of her own womb. But with us there is no equivocation, nothing twisted into a double sense.[6] Light is light; and darkness, darkness; yea is yea; and nay, nay; "whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil."[7] She who bare [really] bare; and although she was a virgin when she conceived, she was a wife[8] when she brought forth [her son]. Now, as a wife, she was under the very law of "opening the

[1] [Literally, "Lord."] [2] [Luke ii. 34.] [3] [Isa. vii. 14.]
[4] Academici isti ["this school of theirs"].
[5] [*i.e.* "Because she produced not her son from her husband's seed."]
[6] Defensionem. [7] [Matt. v. 37.] [8] Nupsit.

womb,"[1] wherein it was quite immaterial whether the birth of the male was by virtue of a husband's co-operation or not;[2] it was the same sex[3] that opened her womb. Indeed, hers is the womb on account of which it is written of others also: "Every male that openeth the womb shall be called holy to the Lord."[4] For who is really holy but the Son of God? Who properly opened the womb but He who opened *a closed one?*[5] But it is marriage which opens the womb in all cases. [The virgin's womb], therefore, was especially[6] opened, because it was especially closed. Indeed[7] she ought rather to be called not a virgin than a virgin, becoming a mother at a leap, as it were, before she was a wife. And what must be said more on this point? Since it was in this sense that the apostle declared that the Son of God was born not of a virgin, but "of a woman," he in that statement recognised the condition of the "opened womb" which ensues in marriage.[8] We read in Ezekiel of "a heifer[9] which brought forth, and still did not bring forth." Now, see whether it was not in view of your own future contentions about the womb of Mary, that even then the Holy Ghost set His mark upon you in this passage; otherwise[10] He would not, contrary to His usual simplicity of style [in this prophet], have uttered a sentence of such doubtful import, [especially] when Isaiah says, "She shall conceive and bear a son."[11]

CHAP. XXIV.—*Tertullian descries in various passages of prophetical Scripture divine strictures on various heretics, who assail the true doctrine of the one Lord Jesus Christ, both God and man.*

For when Isaiah hurls denunciation against our very

[1] Nupsit ipsa patefacti corporis lege.
[2] De vi masculi admissi an emissi.
[3] [*i.e.* "The male."]
[4] [Ex. xiii. 2; Luke ii. 23.]
[5] Clausam [*i.e.* a virgin's].
[6] Magis.
[7] Utique.
[8] Nuptialem passionem.
[9] [Epiphanius (*Hær.* xxx. 30) quotes from the apocryphal Ezekiel this passage: Τέξεται ἡ δάμαλις, καὶ ἐρούσιν—οὐ τέτοκεν. So Clem. Alex. *Stromata*, vii. 756. (Oehler.)]
[10] Ceterum.
[11] [Isa. vii. 14.]

heretics, especially in his "Woe to them that call evil good, and put darkness for light,"[1] he of course sets his mark upon those amongst you[2] who preserve not in the words they employ the light of their true significance, [by taking care] that the *soul* should mean only that which is so called, and the *flesh* simply that which is confest to our view, and *God* none other than the One who is preached.[3] Having thus Marcion in his prophetic view, he says, "I am God, and there is none else; there is no God beside me."[4] And when in another passage he says, in like manner, "Before me there was no God,"[5] he strikes at those inexplicable genealogies of the Valentinian Æons. Again, there is an answer to Ebion in the Scripture: "Born,[6] not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." In like manner, in the passage, "If even an angel of heaven preach unto you any other gospel than [that which] we [have] preached unto you, let him be anathema,"[7] he calls attention to the artful influence of Philumene,[8] the virgin friend of Apelles. Surely he is antichrist who denies that Christ has come in the flesh.[9] By declaring that His flesh is simply and absolutely true, and taken in the plain sense of its own nature, [the Scripture] aims a blow at all who make distinctions in it.[10] In the same way, also, when it defines the very Christ to be but one, it shakes the fancies of those who exhibit a multiform Christ, who make Christ to be one being and Jesus another,—representing one as escaping out of the midst of the crowds, and the other as detained by them; one as appearing on a solitary mountain to three companions, clothed with glory in a cloud, the other as an ordinary man holding intercourse with all;[11] one as magnanimous, but the other as timid; lastly, one as suffering death, the other as risen again, by means of which event they maintain a resur-

[1] [Isa. v. 20.] [2] Istos. [3] Prædicatur.
[4] [Isa. xlv. 5.] [5] [Isa. xlvi. 9.]
[6] [John i. 13. Tertullian's quotation is, as usual, in the singular, "*natus.*"]
[7] [Gal. i. 8.] [8] [Comp. *de Præscr. Hæret.* c. xxx.]
[9] [1 John iv. 3.] [10] Disceptatores ejus. [11] Ceteris passivum.

rection of their own also, only in another flesh. Happily, however, He who suffered "will come again from heaven,"[1] and by all shall He be seen, who rose again from the dead. They too who crucified Him shall see and acknowledge Him; that is to say, His very flesh, against which they spent their fury, and without which it would be impossible for Himself either to exist or to be seen; so that they must blush with shame who affirm that His flesh sits in heaven void of sensation, like a sheath only, Christ being withdrawn from it; as well as those who [maintain] that His flesh and soul are just the same thing;[2] or else that His soul is all that exists,[3] but that His flesh no longer lives.

CHAP. XXV.—*Conclusion. By proving the reality of the flesh which was truly born, and died, and rose again, this treatise forms a preface to the other work, "On the Resurrection of the Flesh."*

But let this suffice on our present subject; for I think that by this time proof enough has been adduced of the flesh in Christ having both been born of the virgin, and being human in its nature. And this discussion alone might have been sufficient, without encountering the isolated opinions which have been raised from different quarters. We have, however, challenged these opinions to the test, both of the arguments which sustain them, and of the Scriptures which are appealed to,—and this we have done *ex abundanti;* so that we have, by showing what the flesh of Christ was, and whence it was derived, also predetermined the question, against all objectors, of what that flesh was not. The resurrection, however, of our own flesh will have to be maintained in another little treatise, and so bring to a close this present one, which serves as a general preface, and which will pave the way [for the approaching subject], now that it is plain what kind of body that was which rose again in Christ.

[1] [Acts i. 11.] [2] Tantundem. [3] Tantummodo.

A TREATISE

ON

THE RESURRECTION OF THE FLESH,

BY

QUINTUS SEPTIMIUS FLORENS TERTULLIANUS.

THE HERETICS AGAINST WHOM THIS WORK IS DIRECTED, WERE THE SAME WHO MAINTAINED THAT THE DEMIURGE, OR THE GOD WHO CREATED THIS WORLD AND GAVE THE MOSAIC DISPENSATION, WAS OPPOSED TO THE SUPREME GOD. HENCE THEY ATTACHED AN IDEA OF INHERENT CORRUPTION AND WORTHLESSNESS TO ALL HIS WORKS—AMONGST THE REST, TO THE FLESH OR BODY OF MAN; AFFIRMING THAT IT COULD NOT RISE AGAIN, AND THAT THE SOUL ALONE WAS CAPABLE OF INHERITING IMMORTALITY.[1]

CHAP. I.—*The doctrine of the resurrection of the body brought to light by the gospel; the faintest glimpses of something like it occasionally met with in heathenism; inconsistencies of pagan teaching.*

THE resurrection of the dead is the Christian's trust.[2] By it we are believers. To the belief of this [article of the faith] truth compels us—that truth which God reveals, but the crowd derides, which supposes that nothing will survive after death. And yet they do honour[3] to their dead, and *that* too in the most expensive way according to their bequest, and with the

[1] [See Bp. Kaye, *On Tertullian*, p. 256. A full examination of the tenets of these Gnostic heretics occurs in our author's *Treatise against Marcion*. An able review of Tertullian's line of thought in this work on the resurrection occurs in Neander's *Antignostikus* (Bohn's translation, ii. 478–486).]

[2] Fiducia.

[3] Parentant.

daintiest banquets which the seasons can produce,[1] on the presumption that those whom they declare to be incapable of all perception still retain an appetite.[2] But [let the crowd deride]: I on my side must deride it still more, especially when it burns up its dead with harshest inhumanity, only to pamper them immediately afterwards with gluttonous satiety, using the selfsame fires to honour them and to insult them. What piety is that which mocks [its victims] with cruelty? Is it sacrifice or insult [which the crowd offers], when it burns its offerings to those it has already burnt?[3] But the wise, too, join with the vulgar crowd in their opinion sometimes. There is nothing after death, according to the school of Epicurus. After death all things come to an end, even death itself, says Seneca to like effect. It is satisfactory, however, that the no less important philosophy of Pythagoras and Empedocles, and the Platonists, take the contrary view, and declare the soul to be immortal; affirming, moreover, in a way which most nearly approaches [to our own doctrine],[4] that the soul actually returns into bodies, although not the same bodies, and not even those of human beings invariably: thus Euphorbus is supposed to have passed into Pythagoras, and Homer into a peacock. They firmly pronounced the soul's renewal[5] to be in a body,[6] [deeming it] more tolerable to change the quality [of the corporeal state] than to deny it wholly: they at least knocked at the door of truth, although they entered not. Thus the world, with all its errors, does not ignore the resurrection of the dead.

CHAP. II.—*The Jewish Sadducees were a link between the pagan philosophers and the heretics on this doctrine, the fundamental importance of which is asserted. The* SOUL *fares better than the* BODY, *in heretical estimation, as to its future state. Its extinction, however, was held by one Lucan.*

Since there is even within the confines of God[']s church][7]

[1] Pro temporibus esculentorum. [2] Etiam desiderare.
[3] Cum crematis cremat.
[4] Adhuc proxime ["Christianæ scilicet doctrinæ" (Oehler)].
[5] Recidivatum. [6] Corporalem. [7] Apud Deum.

a sect which is more nearly allied to the Epicureans than to the prophets, an opportunity is afforded us of knowing[1] what estimate Christ forms of the [said sect, even the] Sadducees. For to Christ was it reserved to lay bare everything which before was concealed: to impart certainty to doubtful points; to accomplish those of which men had had but a foretaste; to give present reality to the objects of prophecy; [and] to furnish not only by Himself, but actually in Himself, certain proofs of the resurrection of the dead. It is, however, against other Sadducees that we have now to prepare ourselves, but still partakers of their doctrine. For instance, they allow a moiety of the resurrection; that is, simply of the soul, despising the flesh, just as they also do the Lord of the flesh Himself. No other persons, indeed, refuse to concede to the substance of the body its recovery from death,[2] than the heretical inventors of a second deity. Driven then, as they are, to give a different dispensation to Christ, so that He may not be accounted as belonging to the Creator, they have achieved their first error in [the article of] His very flesh; contending with Marcion and Basilides that it possessed no reality; or else holding, after the heretical tenets of Valentinus, and according to Apelles, that it had qualities peculiar to itself. And so it follows that they shut out from all recovery from death that substance of which they say that Christ did not partake, confidently assuming that it furnishes the strongest presumption against the resurrection, since the flesh is already risen in Christ. Hence it is that we have ourselves previously issued our volume ON THE FLESH OF CHRIST; in which we both furnish proofs of its reality,[3] in opposition to the idea of its being a vain phantom; and claim for it a human nature without any peculiarity of condition—such a nature as has marked out Christ to be both man and the Son of man. For when we prove Him to be invested with the flesh and in a bodily condition, we at the same time refute heresy, by establishing the rule that no other being than the Creator must be believed to be God, since we show that Christ, in whom God

[1] Sciemus. [2] Salutem. [3] Eam solidam.

is plainly discerned, is precisely of such a nature as the Creator promised that He should be. Being thus refuted touching God as the Creator, and Christ as the Redeemer of the flesh, they will at once be defeated also on the resurrection of the flesh. No procedure, indeed, can be more reasonable. And we affirm that controversy with heretics should in most cases be conducted in this way. For due method requires that conclusions should always be drawn from the most important premises, in order that there be a prior agreement on the essential point, by means of which the particular question under review may be said to have been determined. Hence it is that the heretics, from their conscious weakness, never conduct discussion in an orderly manner. They are well aware how hard is their task in insinuating the existence of a second god, to the disparagement of the Creator of the world, who is known to all men naturally by the testimony of His works, who is before all others in the mysteries [of His being],[1] and is especially manifested in the prophets;[2] then, under the pretence of considering a more urgent inquiry, namely man's own salvation—a question which transcends all others in its importance—they begin with doubts about the resurrection; for there is greater difficulty in believing the resurrection of the flesh than the oneness of the Deity. In this way, after they have deprived the discussion of the advantages of its logical order, and have embarrassed it with doubtful insinuations[3] in disparagement of the flesh, they gradually draw their argument to the reception of a second god after destroying and changing the very ground of our hopes. For when once a man is fallen or removed from the sure hope which he had placed in the Creator, he is easily led away to the object of a different hope, whom however of his own accord he can hardly help suspecting. Now it is by a discrepancy in the promises that a difference of gods is insinuated. How many do we thus see drawn into the net, vanquished on the resurrection of

[1] In sacramentis.

[2] In prædicationibus ["in the declarations of the prophets"].

[3] Scrupulis.

the flesh, before they could carry their point on the oneness of the Deity! In respect, then, of the heretics, we have shown with what weapons we ought to meet them. And indeed we have already encountered them in treatises severally directed against them: on the one only God and His Christ, in our work against Marcion;[1] on the Lord's flesh, in our book against the four heresies,[2] for the special purpose of opening the way to the present inquiry: so that we have now only to discuss the resurrection of the flesh, [treating it] just as if it were uncertain in regard to ourselves also, that is, in the system of the Creator.[3] Because many persons are uneducated; still more are of faltering faith, and several are weak-minded: these will have to be instructed, directed, strengthened, inasmuch as the very oneness of the Godhead will be defended along with the maintenance of our doctrine.[4] For if the resurrection of the flesh be denied, [that prime article of the faith] is shaken; if it be asserted, that is established. There is no need, I suppose, to treat of the soul's safety; for nearly all the heretics, in whatever way they conceive of it, certainly refrain from denying *that*. We may ignore a certain Lucan,[5] who does not spare even this part of our nature, which he follows Aristotle in reducing to dissolution, and substitutes some other thing in lieu of it. Some third nature it is which, according to him, is to rise again, neither soul nor flesh; in other words, not man, but a bear perhaps—for instance, Lucan himself.[6] Even he[7] has received from us a copious notice in our book on the entire

[1] [See books ii. and iii. of our *Anti-Marcion*.]

[2] [He means the *De Carne Christi*.]

[3] [Tanquam penes nos quoque incerta, id est penes Creatorem. This obscure clause is very variously read. One reading, approved by Fr. Junius, has: "Tanquam penes nos incertum, dum sit quoque certum penes Creatorem," *q. d.*, "As a subject full of uncertainty as respects ourselves, although of an opposite character in relation to the Creator;" whatever that may mean.]

[4] Hoc latere.

[5] [Compare *Adv. Omnes Hæreses*, c. vi.]

[6] [Varro's words help us to understand this rough joke: "*Ursi Lucana origo*," etc. (*De Ling. Lat.* v. 100).]

[7] Iste [rather his *subject* than his person].

condition of the soul,[1] the especial immortality of which we there maintain, whilst we also both acknowledge the dissolution of the flesh alone, and emphatically assert its restitution. Into the body of that work were collected whatever points we elsewhere had to reserve from the pressure of incidental causes. For as it is my custom to touch some questions but lightly on their first occurrence, so I am obliged also to postpone the consideration of them, until the outline can be filled in with complete detail, and the deferred points be taken up on their own merits.

CHAP. III.—*Some truths held even by the heathen, who, however, were more often wrong both in religious opinions and in moral practice. The heathen not to be followed in their ignorance of the Christian mystery; the heretics perversely prone to follow them.*

One may no doubt be wise in the things of God, even from one's natural powers, but only in witness to the truth, not in maintenance of error; [only] when one acts in accordance with, not in opposition to, the divine dispensation. For some things are known even by nature: the immortality of the soul, for instance, is held by many; the knowledge of our God is possessed by all. I may use, therefore, the opinion of a Plato, when he declares, "Every soul is immortal." I may use also the conscience of a nation, when it attests the God of gods. I may, in like manner, use all the other intelligences of our common nature, when they pronounce God to be a judge. "God sees," [say they]; and, "I commend you to God."[2] But when they say, "What has undergone death is dead," and, "Enjoy life whilst you live," and, "After death all things come to an end, even death itself;" then I must remember both that "the heart of man is ashes,"[3] according to the estimate of God, and that the very "wisdom of the world is foolishness," [as the inspired word] pronounces it to be.[4] Then, if even the heretic seek

[1] [*i.e.* the *De Anima.*]
[2] [Compare the *De Test. Anim.* ii., and *De Anim.* xlii.]
[3] [Isa. xliv. 20.] [4] [1 Cor. i. 20, iii. 19.]

refuge in the depraved thoughts of the vulgar, or the imaginations of the world, I must say to him: Part company with the heathen, O heretic! for although you are all agreed in imagining a God, yet, while you do so in the name of Christ, so long as you deem yourself a Christian, you are a different man from a heathen: give him back his own views of things, since he does not himself learn from yours. Why lean upon a blind guide, if you have eyes of your own? Why be clothed by one who is naked, if you have put on Christ? Why use the shield of another, when the apostle gives you armour of your own? It would be better for him to learn from you to acknowledge the resurrection of the flesh, than for you from him to deny it; because if Christians must needs deny it, it would be sufficient if they did so from their own knowledge, without any instruction from the ignorant multitude. He, therefore, will not be a Christian who shall deny this doctrine which is confessed by Christians; denying it, moreover, on grounds which are adopted by a man who is not a Christian. Take away, indeed, from the heretics the wisdom which they share with the heathen, and let them support their inquiries from the Scriptures alone: they will then be unable to keep their ground. For that which commends men's common sense is its very simplicity, and its participation in the same feelings, and its community of opinions; and it is deemed to be all the more trustworthy, inasmuch as its definitive statements are naked and open, and known to all. Divine reason, on the contrary, lies in the very pith and marrow of things, not on the surface, and very often is at variance with appearances.

CHAP. IV.—*Heathens and heretics alike in their vilification of the flesh and its functions. The ordinary cavils against the final restitution of so weak and ignoble a substance.*

Hence it is that heretics start at once from this point,[1] from which they sketch the first draft of their dogmas, and afterwards add the details, being well aware how easily men's minds are caught by its influence, [and actuated] by that

[1] [Of the resurrection of the body.]

community of human sentiment which is so favourable to their designs. Is there anything else that you can hear of from the heretic, as [also] from the heathen, earlier in time or greater in extent? Is not [their burden] from the beginning and everywhere an invective against the flesh—against its origin, against its substance, against the casualties and the invariable end which await it; unclean from its first formation of the dregs of the ground, uncleaner afterwards from the mire of its own seminal transmission; worthless,[1] weak, covered with guilt, laden with misery, full of trouble; and after all this record of its degradation, dropping into its original earth and the appellation of a corpse, and destined to dwindle away even from this[2] loathsome name into none henceforth at all—into the very death of all designation? Now you are a shrewd man, no doubt: will you then persuade [yourself], that after this flesh has been withdrawn from sight, and touch, and memory, it can never be rehabilitated from corruption to integrity, from a shattered to a solid state, from an empty to a full condition, from nothing at all to something—the [devouring] fires, and the waters of the sea, and the maws of beasts, and the crops of birds, and the stomachs of fishes, and time's own great paunch[3] itself, of course yielding it all up again? Shall the same flesh which has fallen to decay be so expected to recover, as that the lame, and the one-eyed, and the blind, and the leper, and the palsied shall come back again, although there can be no pleasure in returning to their old condition? Or shall they be whole, and so have to fear exposure to such sufferings? What, in that case, [must we say] of the consequences of [resuming] the flesh? Will it again be subject to all its present wants, especially meats and drinks? Shall we have with our lungs to float [in air or water],[4] and suffer pain in our bowels, and with organs of shame to feel no shame, and with all our limbs to toil and labour? Must there again be ulcers, and wounds, and fever, and gout, and once more the wishing to die? Of course these will be the longings incident on the recovery of the flesh, only the repe-

[1] Frivolæ. [2] Isto. [3] Gula. [4] Natandum pulmonibus.

tition of desires to escape out of it. Well now, we have [stated] all this in very subdued and delicate phrases, as suited the character of our style; but [would you know] how great a licence of unseemly language these men actually use, you must test them in their conferences, whether they be heathens or heretics.

CHAP. V.—*Tertullian, in reply, adduces some considerations eulogistic of the flesh: it was created by God: the body of man was, in fact, previous to his soul.*

Inasmuch as all uneducated men, therefore, still form their opinions after these common-sense views, and as the falterers and the weak-minded have a renewal of their perplexities occasioned by the selfsame views; and as the first battering-ram which is directed against ourselves is that which shatters the condition of the flesh, we must on our side necessarily so manage our defences, as to guard, first of all, the condition of the flesh, their disparagement of it being repulsed by our own eulogy. The heretics, therefore, challenge us to use our rhetoric no less than our philosophy. Respecting, then, this frail and poor, worthless body, which they do not indeed hesitate to call evil, even if it had been the work of angels, as Menander and Marcus are pleased to think, or the formation of some fiery being, equally an angel, as Apelles teaches, it would be quite enough for securing respect for the body, that it had the support and protection of even a secondary deity. The angels, we know, rank next to God. Now, whatever be the supreme God of each heretic, I should not unfairly derive the dignity of the flesh likewise from Him to whom was present the will for its production. For, of course, if He had not willed its production, He would have prohibited it, when He knew it was in progress. It follows, then, that even on their principles the flesh is equally the work of God. There is no work but belongs to Him who has permitted it to exist. It is indeed a happy circumstance, that most of their doctrines, including even the harshest, accord to our God the entire formation of man. How mighty He is, you know full well, who believe that

He is the only God. Let, then, the flesh begin to give you pleasure, since the Creator thereof is so great. But, you say, even the world is the work of God, and yet "the fashion of this world passeth away,"[1] as the apostle himself testifies; nor must it be predetermined that the world will be restored, simply because it is the work of God. And surely if the universe, after its ruin, is not to be formed again, why should a portion of it be? You are right, if a portion is on an equality with the whole. But we maintain that there is a difference. In the first place, because all things were made by the Word of God, and without Him was nothing made.[2] Now the flesh, too, had its existence from the Word of God, because of the principle,[3] that here should be nothing without that Word. "Let us make man,"[4] said He, before He created him, and added, "with our hand," for the sake of his pre-eminence, that so he might not be compared with the rest of creation.[5] And "God," says [the Scripture], "formed man."[6] There is undoubtedly a great difference in the procedure, springing of course from the nature of the case. For the creatures which were made were inferior to him for whom they were made; and they were made for man, to whom they were afterwards made subject by God. Rightly, therefore, had the creatures which were thus intended for subjection, come forth into being at the bidding and command and sole power of the [divine] voice; whilst man, on the contrary, destined to be their lord, was formed by God Himself, to the intent that he might be able to exercise his mastery, being created by the Master [the Lord Himself]. Remember, too, that man is properly called *flesh*, which had a prior occupation in man's designation: "And God formed man the clay of the ground."[7] He now became man, who was hitherto clay. "And He breathed upon his face the breath of life, and man (that is, the clay) became a living soul; and God placed the man whom He had formed in the garden."[8] So that man was clay at first, and only afterwards [man]

[1] [1 Cor. vii. 31.] [2] [John i. 3.] [3] Formam.
[4] [Gen. i. 26.] [5] Universitati. [6] [Gen. i. 27.]
[7] Limum de terra [Gen. ii. 7]. [8] [Gen. ii. 7, 8.]

entire. I wish to impress this on your attention, with a view to your knowing, that whatever God has at all purposed or promised to man, is due not to the soul simply, but to the flesh also; if not arising out of any community in their origin, yet at all events by the privilege [possessed by the latter] in its name.[1]

CHAP. VI.—*It is not the lowliness of the material, but the dignity and skill of the Maker, which must be remembered, in gauging the excellence of the flesh. Christ partook of our flesh.*

Let me therefore pursue the subject before me—if I can but succeed in vindicating for the flesh as much as was conferred on it by Him who made it, glorying as it even then was, because that poor paltry material, clay, found its way into the hands of God, whatever these were, happy enough at merely being touched by them. But why [this glorying]? Was it that,[2] without any further labour, the clay had instantly assumed its form at the touch of God? The truth is,[3] a great matter was in progress, out of which the creature under consideration[4] was being fashioned. So often then does it receive honour, as often as it experiences the hands of God, when it is touched by them, and pulled, and drawn out, and moulded into shape. Imagine God wholly employed and absorbed in it—in His hand, His eye, His labour, His purpose, His wisdom, His providence, and above all, in His love, which was dictating the lineaments [of this creature]. For, whatever was the form and expression which was then given to the clay [by the Creator], Christ was in His thoughts as one day to become man, because the Word, too, was to be both clay and flesh, even as the earth was then. For so did the Father previously say to the Son: "Let us make man in our own image, after our likeness."[5] And God made man, that is to say, the creature which He moulded and fashioned; after the image of God (in other words, of Christ) did He make him. And the Word was

[1] [It having just been said that *flesh* was man's prior designation.]
[2] Quid enim si. [3] Adeo. [4] Ista. [5] [Gen. i. 26.]

God also, who being[1] in the image of God, "thought it not robbery to be equal to God."[2] Thus, that clay which was even then putting on the image of Christ, who was to come in the flesh, was not only the work, but also the pledge and surety, of God. To what purpose is it to bandy about the name *earth*, as that of a sordid and grovelling element, with the view of tarnishing the origin of the flesh, when, even if any other material had been available for forming man, it would be requisite that the dignity of the Maker should be taken into consideration, who even by His selection of His material deemed it, and by His management made it, worthy? The hand of Phidias forms the Olympian Jupiter of ivory; worship is given [to the statue], and it is no longer regarded as a god [formed] out of a most silly animal, but as the world's supreme Deity—not because of the bulk of the elephant, but on account of the renown of Phidias. Could not therefore the living God, the true God, purge away by His own operation whatever vileness might have accrued to His material, and heal it of all infirmity? Or must this remain [to show] how much more nobly man could fabricate a god, than God could form a man? Now, although the clay is offensive [for its poorness], it is now something else. What I possess is flesh, not earth, even although of the flesh it is said: "Dust [earth] thou art, and unto dust [earth] shalt thou return."[3] In these words there is the mention of the origin, not a recalling of the substance. The privilege has been granted [to the flesh] to be nobler than its origin, and to have its happiness aggrandized by the change wrought in it. Now, even gold is earth, because of the earth; but it remains earth no longer after it becomes gold, but is a far different substance, more splendid and more noble, though coming from a source which is comparatively faded and obscure. In like manner, it was quite allowable for God that He should clear the gold of our flesh from all the taints, as you deem them, of its [native] clay, by purging the original substance of its dross.

[1] Constitutus. [2] [Phil. ii. 6.] [3] [Gen. iii. 19.]

CHAP. VII.—*The earthy material of which flesh is created was wonderfully improved by God's manipulation; and by the addition of the soul in man's constitution became the chief work in the creation.*

But perhaps the dignity of the flesh may seem to be diminished, because it has not been actually manipulated by the hand of God, as the clay was [at first]. Now, when God handled the clay for the express purpose of the growth of flesh out of it afterwards, it was for the flesh that He took all the trouble. But I want you, moreover, to know at what time and in what manner the flesh flourished into beauty out of [its] clay. For it cannot be, as some will have it, that those "coats of skins"[1] which Adam and Eve put on when they were stripped of paradise, were really themselves the forming of the flesh out of clay,[2] because long before that Adam had already recognised the flesh which was in the woman as the propagation of his own substance ("This is now bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh"[3]), and the very taking of the woman out of the man was supplemented with flesh; but it ought, I should suppose, to have been made good with clay, if Adam was still clay. The clay, therefore, was obliterated and absorbed into flesh. When [did this happen]? At the time that man became a living soul by the inbreathing of God—by the breath indeed which was capable of hardening clay into another substance, as into some earthenware, so now into flesh. In the same way the potter, too, has it in his power, by tempering the blast of his fire, to modify his clayey material into a stiffer one, and to mould one form after another more beautiful than the original substance, and now possessing both a kind and name of its own. For although the Scripture says, "Shall the clay say to the potter?"[4] that is, Shall man [contend] with God? although the apostle speaks of "earthen vessels,"[5] he refers to man, who was originally clay. And the vessel is the flesh, because [this was made] of clay by the breath of the divine

[1] [Gen. iii. 31.] [2] [A Valentinian notion.] [3] [Gen. ii. 23.]
[4] [Rom. ix. 20.] [5] [2 Cor. iv. 7.]

afflatus; and it was afterwards clothed with "the coats of skins," that is, with the cutaneous covering which was placed over it. So truly is this the fact, that if you withdraw the skin, you lay bare the flesh. Thus, that which becomes a spoil when stripped off, was a vestment as long as it remained laid over. Hence the apostle, when he calls circumcision "a putting off [or spoliation] of the flesh,"[1] affirmed the skin to be a coat or tunic. Now this being the case, you have both the clay made glorious by the hand of God, and the flesh more glorious still by His breathing upon it, by virtue of which the flesh not only laid aside its clayey rudiments, but also took on itself the ornaments of the soul. You surely are not more careful than God, that *you* indeed should refuse to mount the gems of Scythia and India and the pearls of the Red Sea in lead, or brass, or iron, or even in silver, but should set them in the most precious and most highly-wrought gold; or, again, that you should provide for your finest wines and most costly unguents the most fitting vessels; or, on the same principle, should find for your swords of finished temper scabbards of equal worth; whilst *God* must consign to some vilest sheath the shadow of His own soul, the breath of His own Spirit, the operation of His own mouth, and by so ignominious a consignment secure, of course, its condemnation. Well, then, has He placed, or rather inserted and commingled, it with the flesh? Yes; and so intimate is the union, that it may be deemed to be uncertain whether the flesh bears about the soul, or the soul the flesh; or whether the flesh acts as *apparitor* to the soul, or the soul to the flesh. It is, however, more credible that the soul has service rendered to it,[2] and has the mastery,[3] as being more proximate in character to God.[4] This circumstance even redounds to the glory of the flesh, inasmuch as it both contains an essence nearest to God's, and renders itself a partaker of [the soul's] actual sovereignty. For what enjoyment of nature is there, what produce of the world, what relish of the elements, which is not imparted to the soul by means of the body? How can it be otherwise? Is

[1] [Col. ii. 11.] [2] Invehi. [3] Dominari. [4] [John iv. 24.]

it not by its means that [the soul] is supported by the entire apparatus of the senses—the sight, the hearing, the taste, the smell, the touch? Is it not by its means that it has a sprinkling of the divine power, there being nothing which it does not effect by its faculty of speech, even when it is only tacitly indicated? And speech is the result of a fleshly organ. The arts come through the flesh; through the flesh also effect is given to the mind's pursuits and powers; all work, too, and business and offices of life, are accomplished by the flesh; and so utterly are the living acts of the soul the work of the flesh, that for the soul to cease to do living acts, would be nothing else than sundering itself from the flesh. So also the very act of dying is a function of the flesh, even as the process of life is. Now, if all things are subject to the soul through the flesh, their subjection is equally due to the flesh. That which is the means and agent of your enjoyment, must needs be also the partaker and sharer of your enjoyment. So that the flesh, which is accounted the minister and servant of the soul, turns out to be also its associate and co-heir. And if all this in temporal things, why not also in things eternal?

CHAP. VIII.—*Christianity, by its provision for the flesh, has put on it the greatest honour. The privileges of our religion in closest connection with our flesh, which also bears a large share in the duties and sacrifices of religion.*

Now, such remarks have I wished to advance in defence of the flesh, from a general view of the condition of our human nature. Let us now consider its special relation to Christianity, and see how vast a privilege before God has been conferred on this poor and worthless substance. It would suffice to say, indeed, that there is not a soul that can at all procure salvation, except it believe whilst it is in the flesh, so true is it that the flesh is the very condition on which salvation hinges. And since the soul is, in consequence of its salvation, chosen to the service of God, it is the flesh which actually renders it capable of such service. The flesh, indeed, is washed, in order that the soul may be cleansed;

the flesh is anointed, that the soul may be consecrated; the flesh is signed [with the cross], that the soul too may be fortified; the flesh is shadowed with the imposition of hands, that the soul also may be illuminated by the Spirit; the flesh feeds on the body and blood of Christ, that the soul likewise may fatten on [its] God. They cannot then be separated in their recompense, when they are united in their service. Those sacrifices, moreover, which are acceptable to God—I mean conflicts of the soul, fastings, and abstinences, and the humiliations which are annexed to such duty—it is the flesh which performs again and again[1] to its own especial suffering. Virginity, likewise, and widowhood, and the modest restraint in secret on the marriage-bed, and the one only adoption[2] of it, are fragrant offerings to God paid out of the good services of the flesh. Come, tell me what is your opinion of the flesh, when it has to contend for the name of Christ, dragged out to public view, and exposed to the hatred of all men; when it pines in prisons under the cruellest privation of light, in banishment from the world, amidst squalor, filth, and noisome food, without freedom even in sleep, for it it is bound on its very pallet and mangled in its bed of straw; when at length before the public view it is racked by every kind of torture that can be devised, and when finally it is spent beneath its agonies, struggling to render its last turn for Christ by dying for Him—upon His own cross many times, not to say by still more atrocious devices of torment. Most blessed, truly, and most glorious, must be the flesh which can repay its Master Christ so vast a debt, and so completely, that the only obligation remaining due to Him is, that it should cease [by death] to owe Him more—all the more bound [even then in gratitude], because set free [for ever].

CHAP. IX.—*God's love for the flesh of man, as developed in the grace of Christ towards it. The flesh the best means of displaying the bounty and power of God.*

To recapitulate, then: Shall that very flesh, which the Divine Creator formed with His own hands in the image of

[1] Instaurat. [2] Una notitia ejus [= monogamia].

God; which He animated with His own *afflatus*, after the likeness of His own vital vigour; which He set over all the works of His hand, to dwell amongst, to enjoy, and to rule them; which He clothed with His sacraments and His instructions; whose purity He loves, whose mortifications He approves; whose sufferings for Himself He deems precious; —[shall that flesh, I say], so often brought near to God, not rise again? God forbid, God forbid, [I repeat], that He should abandon to everlasting destruction the labour of His own hands, the care of His own thoughts, the receptacle of His own Spirit,[1] the queen of His creation, the inheritor of His own liberality, the priestess of His religion, the champion of His testimony, the sister of His Christ! We know by experience the goodness of God; from His Christ we learn that He is the only God, and the very good. Now, as He requires from us love to our neighbour after love to Himself,[2] so He will Himself do that which He has commanded. He will love the flesh which is, so very closely and in so many ways, His neighbour—[He will love it], although infirm, since His strength is made perfect in weakness;[3] although disordered, since "they that are whole need not the physician, but they that are sick;"[4] although not honourable, since "we bestow more abundant honour upon the less honourable members;"[5] although ruined, since He says, "I am come to save that which was lost;"[6] although sinful, since He says, "I desire rather the salvation of the sinner than his death;"[7] although condemned, for says He, "I shall wound, and also heal."[8] Why reproach the flesh with those conditions which wait for God, which hope in God, which receive honour from God, which He succours? I venture to declare, that if such casualties as these had never befallen the flesh, the bounty, the grace, the mercy, [and indeed] all the beneficent power of God, would have had no opportunity to work.[9]

[1] Afflatus. [2] [Matt. xxii. 37–40.] [3] [2 Cor. xii. 9.]
[4] [Luke v. 31.] [5] [1 Cor. xii. 23.] [6] [Luke xix. 10.]
[7] [Ezek. xviii. 23.] [8] [Deut. xxxii. 39.] [9] Vacuisset.

CHAP. X.—*Holy Scripture magnifies the flesh, as to its nature and its prospects.*

You hold to the scriptures in which the flesh is disparaged; receive also those in which it is ennobled. You read whatever passage abases it; direct your eyes also to that which elevates it. "All flesh is grass."[1] Well, but Isaiah was not content to say only this; but he also declared, "All flesh shall see the salvation of God."[2] They notice God when He says in Genesis, "My Spirit shall not remain among these men, because they are flesh;"[3] but then He is also heard saying by Joel, "I will pour out of my Spirit upon all flesh."[4] Even the apostle ought not to be known for any one statement in which he is wont to reproach the flesh. For although he says that "in his flesh dwelleth no good thing;"[5] although he affirms that "they who are in the flesh cannot please God,"[6] because "the flesh lusteth against the Spirit;"[7] yet in these and similar assertions which he makes, it is not the *substance* of the flesh, but its *actions*, which are censured. Moreover, we shall elsewhere[8] take occasion to remark, that no reproaches can fairly be cast upon the flesh, without tending also to the castigation of the soul, which compels the flesh to do its bidding. However, let me meanwhile add that in the same passage Paul "carries about in his body the marks of the Lord Jesus;"[9] he also forbids our body to be profaned, as being "the temple of God;"[10] he makes our bodies "the members of Christ;"[11] and he exhorts us to exalt and "glorify God in our body."[12] If, therefore, the humiliations of the flesh thrust off its resurrection, why shall not its high prerogatives rather avail to bring it about?—since it better suits the character of God to restore to salvation what for a while He rejected, than to surrender to perdition what He once approved.

[1] [Isa. xl. 7.] [2] [Isa. xl. 5.] [3] [Gen. vi. 3 (Sept.).]
[4] [Joel iii. 1.] [5] [Rom. viii. 18.] [6] [Rom. viii. 8.]
[7] [Gal. v. 17.] [8] [Below, in ch. xvi.] [9] [Gal. vi. 17.]
[10] [1 Cor. iii. 16.] [11] [1 Cor. vi. 15.] [12] [Ver. 20.]

CHAP. XI.—*The power of God fully competent to effect the resurrection of the flesh.*

Thus far touching my eulogy of the flesh, in opposition to its enemies, who are, notwithstanding, its greatest friends also; for there is nobody who lives so much in accordance with the flesh as they who deny the resurrection of the flesh, inasmuch as they despise all its discipline, while they disbelieve its punishment. It is a shrewd saying which the Paraclete utters concerning these persons by the mouth of the prophetess Prisca: "They are carnal,[1] and yet they hate the flesh." Since, then, the flesh has the best guarantee that could possibly accrue for securing to it the recompense of salvation, ought we not also to consider well the power, and might, and competency[2] of God Himself, whether He be so great as to be able to rebuild and restore the edifice of the flesh, which had become dilapidated and blocked up,[3] and in every possible way dislocated?—whether He has promulgated in the public domains of nature any analogies to convince us of His power in this respect, lest any should happen to be still thirsting for the knowledge of God, when faith in Him must rest on no other basis than the belief that He is able to do all things? You have, no doubt, amongst your philosophers men who maintain that this world is without a beginning or a maker. It is, however, much more true, that nearly all the heresies allow it an origin and a maker, and ascribe its creation to our God. Firmly believe, therefore, that He produced it wholly out of nothing, and then you have found the knowledge of God, by believing that He possesses such mighty power. But some persons are too weak to believe all this at first, owing to their views about Matter. They will rather have it (after the philosophers), that the universe was in the beginning made by God out of underlying matter. Now, even if this opinion could be held in truth, since He must be acknowledged to have produced in His re-formation of matter far different substances and far

[1] Carnes. [2] Licentiam.

[3] [Oehler explains "devoratum" by "interceptum."]

different forms from those which Matter itself possessed, I should maintain, with no less persistence, that He produced these things out of nothing, since they absolutely had no existence at all previous to His production of them. Now, where is the difference between a thing's being produced out of nothing or out of something, if so be that what existed not comes into being, when even to have had no existence is tantamount to having been nothing? The contrary is likewise true; for having once existed amounts to having been something. If, however, there *is* a difference, both alternatives support my position. For if God produced all things whatever out of nothing, He will be able to draw forth from nothing even the flesh which had fallen into nothing; or if He moulded other things out of matter, He will be able to call forth the flesh too from somewhere else, into whatever [abyss] it may have been engulphed. And surely He is most competent to re-create who created, inasmuch as it is a far greater work to have produced than to have reproduced, to have imparted a beginning than to have maintained a continuance. On this principle, you may be quite sure that the restoration of the flesh is easier than its first formation.

CHAP. XII.—*An eloquent statement of some analogies in nature which corroborate the resurrection of the flesh.*

Consider now those very analogies of the divine power [to which we have just alluded]. Day dies into night, and is buried everywhere in darkness. The glory of the world is obscured in the shadow of death; its entire substance is tarnished with blackness; all things become sordid, silent, stupid; everywhere business ceases, and occupations rest. And so over the loss of the light there is mourning. But yet it again revives, with its own beauty, its own dowry, its own sun, the same as ever, whole and entire, over all the world, slaying its own death, night—opening its own sepulchre, the darkness—coming forth the heir to itself, until the night also revives—it, too, accompanied with a retinue of its own. For the stellar rays are rekindled,

which had been quenched in the morning glow; the distant groups of the constellations are again brought back to view, which the [day's] temporary interval had removed out of sight. Readorned also are the mirrors of the moon, which her monthly course had worn away. Winters and summers return, as do the springtide and autumn, with their resources, their routines, their fruits. Forasmuch as earth receives its instruction from heaven to clothe the trees which had been stripped, to colour the flowers afresh, to spread the grass again, to reproduce the seed which had been consumed, and not to reproduce them until consumed. Wondrous method! from a defrauder to be a preserver; in order to restore, it takes away; in order to guard, it destroys; that it may make whole, it injures; and that it may enlarge, it first lessens. [This process], indeed, renders back to us richer and fuller blessings than it deprived us of—by a destruction which is profit, by an injury which is advantage, and by a loss which is gain. In a word, I would say, all creation is instinct with renewal. Whatever you may chance upon, has already existed; whatever you have lost, returns again without fail. All things return to their former state, after having gone out of sight; all things begin after they have ended; they come to an end for the very purpose of coming into existence again. Nothing perishes but with a view to salvation. The whole, therefore, of this revolving order of things bears witness to the resurrection of the dead. In His works did God write it, before He wrote it in the Scriptures; He proclaimed it in His mighty deeds earlier than in His inspired words. He first sent Nature to you as a teacher, meaning to send Prophecy also as a supplemental instructor, that, being Nature's disciple, you may more easily believe Prophecy, and without hesitation accept [its testimony], when you come to hear what you have seen already on every side; nor doubt that God, whom you have discovered to be the restorer of all things, is likewise the reviver of the flesh. And surely, as all things rise again for man, for whose use they have been provided—but not for man except for his flesh also—how happens it that [the flesh] itself can perish

utterly, because of which and for the service of which nothing comes to nought?

CHAP. XIII. — *Tertullian, from his view of a verse in the ninety-second Psalm, makes the phœnix a symbol of the resurrection of our bodies.*

If, however, all nature but faintly figures our resurrection; if creation affords no sign precisely like it, inasmuch as its several phenomena can hardly be said to die so much as to come to an end, nor again be deemed to be reanimated, but only re-formed; then take a most complete and unassailable symbol of our hope, for it shall be an animated being, and subject alike to life and death. I refer to the bird which is peculiar to the East, famous for its singularity, marvellous from its posthumous life, which renews its life in a voluntary death; its dying day is its birthday, for on it it departs and returns; once more a phœnix where just now there was none; once more himself but just now out of existence; another, yet the same. What can be more express and more significant for our subject; or to what other thing can such a phenomenon bear witness? God even in His own Scriptures says: "[The righteous] shall flourish like the phœnix;"[1] that is, shall flourish or revive, from death, from the grave—to teach you to believe that a bodily substance may be recovered even from the fire. Our Lord has declared that we are "better than many sparrows:"[2] well, if not better than many a phœnix too, it were no great thing. But must men die once for all, while birds in Arabia are sure of a resurrection?

CHAP. XIV.—*A sufficient cause for the resurrection of the flesh occurs in the future judgment of man, which will take cognisance of the works of the body no less than of the soul.*

Such, then, being the outlines of the divine energies which

[1] [Δίκαιος ὡς φοίνιξ ἀνθήσει (Sept.), Ps. xcii. 12,—"like a palm-tree" (A. V.). We have here a characteristic way of Tertullian's quoting a scripture which has even the least bearing on his subject.]

[2] [Matt. x. 33.]

God has displayed as much in the parables [of nature] as in His spoken word, let us now approach His very edicts and decrees, since this is the division which we mainly adopt in our subject-matter. We began with the dignity of the flesh, whether it were of such a nature that when once destroyed it was capable of being restored. Then we pursued an inquiry touching the power of God, whether it was sufficiently great to be habitually able to confer this restoration on a thing which had been destroyed. Now, if we have proved these two points, I should like you to inquire into the [question of] cause, whether it be one of sufficient weight to claim the resurrection of the flesh as necessary and as conformable in every way to reason; because there underlies this demurrer: the flesh may be quite capable of being restored, and the Deity be perfectly able to effect the restoration, but a cause for such recovery must needs pre-exist. Admit then a sufficient one, you who learn of a God who is both supremely good as well as just [1]—supremely good from His own [character], just in consequence of ours. For if man had never sinned, he would simply and solely have known God in His superlative goodness, from the attribute of His nature. But now he experiences Him to be a just God also, from the necessity of a cause; still, however, retaining under this very circumstance His excellent goodness, at the same time that He is also just. For, by both succouring the good and punishing the evil, He displays His justice, and at the same time makes both processes contribute proofs of His goodness, whilst on the one hand He deals vengeance, and on the other dispenses reward. But with Marcion [2] you will have the opportunity of more fully learning whether this be the whole character of God. Meanwhile, so perfect is our [God], that He is rightly Judge, because He is the Lord; rightly the Lord, because the Creator; rightly the Creator, because He is God. Whence it happens that that heretic, whose name I know not, holds that He properly is not a Judge, since He

[1] [He here refers to Marcion.]

[2] [He here refers his reader to what he has written against Marcion, especially in his books i. and ii.]

is not Lord; properly not Lord, since He is not the Creator. And so I am at a loss to know how He is God, who is neither the Creator, which God is; nor the Lord, which the Creator is. Inasmuch, then, as it is most suitable for [the great Being who is] God, and Lord, and Creator, to summon man to a judgment on this very question, whether he has taken care or not to acknowledge and honour his Lord and Creator, this is just such a judgment as the resurrection shall achieve. The entire cause, then, or rather necessity of the resurrection, will be this, namely, that arrangement of the final judgment which shall be most suitable to God. Now, in effecting this arrangement, you must consider whether the divine censure superintends a judicial examination of the two natures of man—both his soul and his flesh. For that which is a suitable object to be judged, is also a competent one to be raised. Our position is, that the judgment of God must be believed first of all to be plenary, and then absolute, so as to be final, and therefore irrevocable; to be also righteous, not bearing less heavily on any particular part; to be moreover worthy of God, being complete and definite, in keeping with His great patience. Thus it follows that the fulness and perfection of the judgment consists simply in representing the interests of the entire human being. Now, since the entire man consists of the union of the two natures, he must therefore appear in both, as it is right that he should be judged in his entirety; nor, of course, did he pass through life except in his entire state. As therefore he lived, so also must he be judged, because he has to be judged concerning the way in which he lived. For life is the cause of judgment, and it must undergo investigation in as many natures as it possessed when it discharged its vital functions.

CHAP. XV.—*As the flesh is a partaker with the soul in all human conduct, so will it be in the recompense of eternity.*

Come now, let our opponents sever the connection of the flesh with the soul in the affairs of life, that they may be emboldened to sunder it also in the recompense of life. Let

them deny their association in acts, that they may be fairly able to deny also their participation in rewards. The flesh ought not to have any share in the sentence, if it had none in the cause of it. Let the soul alone be called back, if it alone went away. But [nothing of the kind ever happened]; for the soul alone no more departed from life, than it ran through alone the course from which it departed—I mean this present life. Indeed, the soul alone is so far from conducting [the affairs of] life, that we do not withdraw from community with the flesh even our thoughts, however isolated they be, however unprecipitated into act by means of the flesh; since whatever is done in man's heart is done by the soul in the flesh, and with the flesh, and through the flesh. The Lord Himself, in short, when rebuking our thoughts, includes in His censure this aspect of the flesh, [man's heart], the citadel of the soul: "Why think ye evil in your hearts?"[1] and again: "Whosoever looketh on a woman, to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart."[2] So that even the thought, without operation and without effect, is an act of the flesh. But if you allow that the faculty which rules the senses, and which they call *ΗΓΕΜΟΝΙΚΟΝ* [the leading power], has its sanctuary in the brain, or in the interval between the eyebrows, or wheresoever the philosophers are pleased to locate it, the flesh will still be the thinking place of the soul. The soul is never without the flesh, as long as it is in the flesh. There is nothing which the flesh does not transact in company with the soul, when without it it does not exist. Consider carefully, too, whether the thoughts are not administered by the flesh, since it is through the flesh that they are distinguished and known externally. Let the soul only meditate some design, the face gives the indication—the face being the mirror of all our intentions. They may deny all combination in acts, but they cannot gainsay their co-operation in thoughts. Still they enumerate *the sins* of the flesh; surely, then, for its sinful conduct it must be consigned to punishment. But we, moreover, allege against them *the*

[1] [Matt. ix. 4.] [2] [Matt. v. 28.]

virtues of the flesh; surely also for its virtuous conduct it deserves a future reward. Again, as it is the soul which acts and impels us in all we do, so it is the function of the flesh to render obedience. Now we are not permitted to suppose that God is either unjust or idle. Unjust, [however, He would be], were He to exclude from reward [the flesh], which is associated in good works; and idle, were He to exempt it from punishment, when it has been an accomplice in evil deeds: whereas human judgment is deemed to be the more perfect, when it discovers the agents in every deed, and neither spares [the guilty] nor begrudges [the virtuous] their full share of either punishment or praise with the principals who employed their services.

CHAP. XVI.—*The heretics called the flesh "the vessel of the soul," in order to destroy the responsibility of the body. Tertullian turns their cavil upon them, and shows the flesh to be a sharer in human actions.*

When, however, we attribute to the soul authority, and to the flesh submission, we must see to it that [our opponents] do not turn our position by another argument, by insisting on so placing the flesh in the service of the soul, that it be not [considered as] its servant, lest they should be compelled, if it were so regarded, to admit its companionship [to the soul]. For they would argue that servants and companions possess a discretion in discharging the functions of their respective offices, and a power over their will in both relations: in short, [they would claim to be] men themselves, and therefore [would expect] to share the credit with their principals, to whom they voluntarily yielded their assistance; whereas the flesh had no discretion, no sentiment in itself, but possessing no power of its own of willing or refusing, it, in fact, appears to stand to the soul in the stead of a vessel, as an instrument rather than a servant. The soul alone, therefore, will have to be judged [at the last day] pre-eminently as to how it has employed the vessel of the flesh; the vessel itself, of course, not being amenable to a judicial award: for who condemns the cup if any man has mixed

poison in it? or who sentences the sword to the beasts, if a man has perpetrated with it the atrocities of a brigand? Well, now, we will grant that the flesh is innocent, in so far as bad actions will not be charged upon it: what, then, is there to hinder its being saved on the score of its innocence? For although it is free from all imputation of good works, as it is of evil ones, yet is it more consistent with the divine goodness to deliver the innocent. A beneficent man, indeed, is bound to do so: it suits then the character of the Most Bountiful to bestow even gratuitously such a favour. And yet, as to the cup, I will not take the poisoned one, into which some certain death is injected, but one which has been infected with the breath of a lascivious woman,[1] or of Cybele's priest, or of a gladiator, or of a hangman: then I want to know whether you would pass a milder condemnation on it than on the kisses of such persons? One indeed which is soiled with our own filth, or one which is not mingled to our own mind, we are apt to dash to pieces, and then to increase our anger with our servant. As for the sword, which is drunk with the blood of the brigand's victims, who would not banish it entirely from his house, much more from his bedroom, or from his pillow, from the presumption that he would be sure to dream of nothing but the apparitions of the souls which were pursuing and disquieting him for lying down with [the blade which shed] their own blood? Take, however, the cup which has no reproach on it, and which deserves the credit of a faithful ministration, it will be adorned by its drinking-master with chaplets, or be honoured with a handful of flowers. The sword also which has received honourable stains in war, and has been thus engaged in a better manslaughter, will secure its own praise by consecration. It is quite possible, then, to pass decisive sentences even on vessels and on instruments, that so they too may participate in the merits of their proprietors and employers. [Thus much do I say] from a desire to meet even this argument, although there is a failure in the example, owing to the diversity in the nature of the objects. For

[1] ["Frictricis" is Oehler's reading.]

every vessel or every instrument becomes useful from without, consisting as it does of material perfectly extraneous to the substance of the human [owner or employer]; whereas the flesh, being conceived, formed, and generated along with the soul from its earliest existence in the womb, is mixed up with it likewise in all its operations. For although it is called "a vessel" by the apostle, such as he enjoins to be treated "with honour,"[1] it is yet designated by the same apostle as "the outward man,"[2]—that clay, of course, which at the first was inscribed with the title of . . . a man, not of a cup or a sword, or any paltry vessel. Now it is called a "*vessel*" in consideration of its capacity, whereby it receives and contains the soul; but "*man*," from its community of nature, which renders it in all operations a servant and not an instrument. Accordingly, in the judgment it will be held to be a servant (even though it may have no independent discretion of its own), on the ground of its being an integral portion of that which possesses such discretion, and is not a mere chattel. And although the apostle is well aware that the flesh does nothing of itself which is not also imputed to the soul, he yet deems the flesh to be "*sinful;*"[3] lest it should be supposed to be free from all responsibility by the mere fact of its seeming to be impelled by the soul. So, again, when he is ascribing certain praiseworthy actions to the flesh, he says, "[Therefore] glorify and exalt God in your body,"[4]—being certain that such efforts are actuated by the soul; but still he ascribes them to the flesh, because it is to it that he also promises the recompense. Besides, neither rebuke, [on the one hand], would have been suitable to it, if free from blame; nor, [on the other hand], would exhortation, if it were incapable of glory. Indeed, both rebuke and exhortation would be alike idle towards the flesh, if it were an improper object for that recompense which is certainly received in the resurrection.

[1] [1 Thess. iv. 4.]
[2] [2 Cor. iv. 16.]
[3] [Rom. viii. 3.]
[4] [1 Cor. vi. 20.]

CHAP. XVII.—*The flesh will be associated with the soul in enduring the penal sentences of the final judgment.*

Every uneducated[1] person who agrees with our opinion will be apt to suppose that the flesh will have to be present at the [final] judgment even on this account, because otherwise the soul would be incapable of suffering pain or pleasure, as being incorporeal; for this is the common opinion. We on our part, however, do here maintain, and in a special treatise on the subject prove, that the soul is corporeal, possessing a peculiar kind of solidity in its nature, such as enables it both to perceive and suffer. That souls are even now susceptible of torment and of blessing in Hades, though they are disembodied, and notwithstanding their banishment from the flesh, is proved by the case of Lazarus. I have no doubt given to my opponent room to say: Since, then, the soul has a bodily substance of its own, it will be sufficiently endowed with the faculty of suffering and sense, so as not to require the presence of the flesh. No, no, [is my reply]: it will still need the flesh; not as being unable to feel anything without the help of the flesh, but because it is necessary that it should possess such a faculty along with the flesh. For in *as* far as it has a sufficiency of its own for action, in *so* far has it likewise a capacity for suffering. But the truth is, in respect of action, it labours under some amount of incapacity; for in its own nature it has simply the ability to think, to will, to desire, to dispose: for fully carrying out the purpose, it looks for the assistance of the flesh. In like manner, it also requires the conjunction of the flesh to endure suffering, in order that by its aid it may be as fully able to suffer, as without its assistance it was not fully able to act. In respect, indeed, of those sins, such as concupiscence, and thought, and wish, which it has a competency of its own to commit, it at once[2] pays the penalty of them. Now, no doubt, if these were alone sufficient to constitute absolute desert, without requiring the addition of *acts*, the soul would wholly suffice in itself to encounter the full respon-

[1] Simplicior. [2] Interim.

sibility of the judgment, being to be judged for those things in the doing of which it alone had possessed a sufficiency. Since, however, acts too are indissolubly attached to deserts; since also acts are ministerially effected by the flesh, it is no longer enough that the soul apart from the flesh be requited with pleasure or pain for what are actually works of the flesh, although it has a body [of its own], although it has members [of its own], which in like manner are insufficient for its full perception, just as they are also for its perfect action. Therefore, as it has acted in each several instance, so proportionably does it suffer in Hades, being the first to taste of judgment, as it was the first to induce to the commission of sin; but still it is waiting for the flesh, in order that it may through the flesh also compensate for its deeds, inasmuch as it laid upon the flesh the execution of its own thoughts. This, in short, will be the process of that judgment which is postponed to the last great day, in order that by the exhibition of the flesh the entire course of the divine vengeance may be accomplished. Besides, [it is obvious to remark], there would be no delaying to the end of that doom which souls are already tasting in Hades, if it was destined for souls alone.

CHAP. XVIII.—*Scripture phrases and passages clearly assert* "THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD;" *the force of this very phrase explained as indicating the prominent place of the flesh in the general resurrection.*

Thus far it has been my object by prefatory remarks to lay a foundation for the defence of all the Scriptures which promise a resurrection of the flesh. Now, inasmuch as [this verity] is supported by so many just and reasonable considerations—I mean the dignity of the flesh itself,[1] the power and might of God,[2] the analogous cases in which these are displayed,[3] as well as the good reasons for the judgment, and the need thereof[4]—it will of course be only right and proper that the Scriptures should be understood in the sense suggested by such authoritative considerations, and not after the

[1] [As stated in ch. v.–ix.]
[2] [See ch. xi.]
[3] [As stated in ch. xii. and xiii.]
[4] [See ch. xiv.–xvii.]

conceits of the heretics, which arise from infidelity solely, because it is deemed incredible that the flesh should be recovered from death and restored to life; not because [such a restoration] is either unattainable by the flesh itself, or impossible for God to effect, or unsuitable to the [final] judgment. Incredible, no doubt, it might be, if it had not been revealed in the word of God;[1] except that, even if it had not been thus first announced by God, it might have been fairly enough assumed, that the revelation of it had been withheld, simply because so many strong presumptions in its favour had been already furnished. Since, however, [the great fact] is proclaimed in so many inspired passages, that is so far a dissuasive against understanding it in a sense different from that which is attested by such arguments as persuade us to its reception, even irrespective of the testimonies of revelation. Let us see, then, first of all, in what title this hope of ours is held out to our view.[2] There is, I imagine, one divine edict which is exposed to the gaze of all men: it is RESURRECTIO MORTUORUM.[3] These two words are prompt, decisive, clear. I mean to take these very terms, discuss them, and discover to what substance they apply. As to the word "RESURRECTIO," whenever I hear of its impending over a human being, I am forced to inquire what part of him has been destined to *fall*, since nothing can be expected to rise again, unless it has first been prostrated. It is only the man who is ignorant of the fact that the flesh falls by death, that can fail to discover that it stands erect by means of life. Nature pronounces God's sentence: "Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return."[4] Even the man who has not heard the sentence, sees the fact. No death but is the ruin of our limbs. This destiny of the body the Lord also described, when, clothed as He was in its very substance, He said, "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up again."[5] For He showed to what belongs [the incidents of] being destroyed, thrown down, and kept down—even to

[1] Divinitus.
[2] Proscripta.
[3] ["The Resurrection of the Dead."]
[4] [Gen. iii. 19.]
[5] [John ii. 19.]

that to which it also appertains to be lifted and raised up again; although He was at the same time bearing about with Him "a soul that was trembling even unto death,"[1] but which did not fall through death, because even the Scripture informs us that "He spoke of His body."[2] So that it is the flesh which falls by death; and accordingly it derives its name, *a cadendo cadaver*.[3] The soul, however, has no trace of a *fall* in its designation, as indeed there is no mortality in its condition. Nay, it is the soul which communicates its ruin to the body, when it is breathed out of it, just as it is also destined to raise it up again from the earth when it shall re-enter it. That cannot fall which by its entrance raises; nor can that droop which by its departure causes ruin. I will go further, and say that the soul does not even fall into sleep along with the body, nor does it with its companion even lie down in repose. For it is agitated in dreams, and disturbed: it might, however, rest, if it lay down; and lie down it certainly would, if it fell. Thus, that which does not fall even into the likeness of death, does not succumb to the reality thereof. Passing now to the [other] word "MORTUORUM," I wish you to look carefully, and see to what substance it is applicable. Were we to allow, under this head, as is sometimes held by the heretics, that the soul is mortal, so that being mortal it shall attain to a resurrection; this would afford a presumption that the flesh also, being no less mortal, would share in the [same] resurrection. But our present point is to derive from the proper signification of this word an idea of the destiny which it indicates. Now, just as the term *resurrection* is predicated of that which falls—that is, the flesh—so will there be the same application of the word *dead*, because what is called "the resurrection of the dead" indicates the rising up again of that which is fallen down. We learn this from the case of Abraham, the father of the faithful, a man who enjoyed close intercourse with God. For when he requested of the sons of Heth a spot to bury

[1] [Matt. xxvi. 38.] [2] [John ii. 21.]

[3] ["*Corpse from falling.*" This, of course, does not show the connection of the words, like the Latin.]

Sarah in, he said to them, "Give me the possession of a burying-place with you, that I may bury my dead,"[1]—meaning, of course, her flesh; for he could not have desired a place to bury her soul in, even if the soul is to be deemed mortal, and even if it could bear to be described by the word "*dead*." Since, then, this word indicates the body, it follows that when "the resurrection of the dead" is spoken of, it is the rising again of [men's] bodies that is meant.

CHAP. XIX. — *The sophistical sense put by heretics on the phrase* RESURRECTION *of* THE DEAD, *as if it meant the moral change of a new life.*

Now this consideration of the phrase in question, and its signification—besides maintaining, of course, the true meaning of the important words—must needs contribute to this further result, that whatever obscurity our adversaries throw over the subject under the pretence of figurative and allegorical language, the truth will stand out in clearer light, and out of uncertainties certain and definite rules will be prescribed. For some, when they have alighted on a very usual form of prophetic statement, generally expressed in figure and allegory, though not always, distort into some imaginary sense even the most clearly described doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, alleging that even death itself must be understood in a spiritual sense. They say that that which is commonly supposed to be death is not really so,—namely, the separation of body and soul: it is rather the ignorance of God, by reason of which man is dead to God, and is not less buried in error than he would be in the grave. Wherefore that also must be held to be the resurrection, when a man is reanimated by access to the truth, and having dispersed the death of ignorance, and being endowed with new life by God, has burst forth from the sepulchre of the old man, even as the Lord likened the scribes and Pharisees to "whited sepulchres."[2] Whence it follows that they who have by faith attained to the resurrection, are with the Lord after they have once put Him on in their baptism. By such

[1] [Gen. xxiii. 4.] [2] [Matt. xxiii. 27.]

subtlety, then, even in conversation have they often been in the habit of misleading our brethren, as if they held a resurrection of the dead [as well as we]. Woe, say they, to him who has not risen in the present body; for they fear that they might alarm their hearers if they at once denied the resurrection. Secretly, however, in their minds they think this: Woe betide the simpleton who during his present life fails to discover the mysteries of heresy; since this, in their view, is the resurrection. There are, however, a great many also, who, claiming to hold a resurrection after the soul's departure, maintain that going out of the sepulchre means escaping out of the world, since in their view the world is the habitation of the dead—that is, of those who know not God; or they will go so far as to say that it actually means escaping out of the body itself, since they imagine that the body detains the soul, when it is shut up in the death of a worldly life, as in a grave.

CHAP. XX.—*Figurative senses have their foundations in literal fact: besides, the allegorical style is by no means the only one found in the prophetic Scriptures, as alleged by the heretics.*

Now, to upset all conceits of this sort, let me dispel at once the preliminary idea on which they rest—their assertion that the prophets make all their announcements in figures of speech. Now, if this were the case, the figures themselves could not possibly have been distinguished, inasmuch as the verities would not have been declared, out of which the figurative language is stretched. And, indeed, if all are figures, where will be that of which they are the figures? How can you hold up a mirror for your face, if the face nowhere exists? But, in truth, all are not figures, but there are also literal statements; nor are all shadows, but there are bodies too: so that we have prophecies about the Lord Himself even, which are clearer than the day. For it was not figuratively that the Virgin conceived in her womb; nor in a trope did she bear Emmanuel, that is, Jesus, God with us.[1]

[1] [Isa. vii. 14; Matt. i. 23.]

Even granting that He was figuratively to take the power of Damascus and the spoils of Samaria,[1] still it was literally that He was to "enter into judgment with the elders and princes of the people."[2] For in the person of Pilate "the heathen raged," and in the person of Israel "the people imagined vain things;" "the kings of the earth" in Herod, and the rulers in Annas and Caiaphas, "were gathered together against the Lord, and against His anointed."[3] He, again, was "led as a sheep to the slaughter, and as a sheep before the shearer," that is, Herod, "is dumb, so He opened not His mouth."[4] "He gave His back to scourges, and His cheeks to blows, not turning His face even from the shame of spitting."[5] "He was numbered with the transgressors;"[6] "He was pierced in His hands and His feet;"[7] "they cast lots for His raiment;"[8] "they gave Him gall, and made Him drink vinegar;"[9] "they shook their heads, and mocked Him;"[10] "He was appraised by the traitor in thirty pieces of silver."[11] What figures of speech does Isaiah here give us? What tropes does David? What allegories does Jeremiah? Not even of His mighty works have they used parabolic language. Or else, were not the eyes of the blind opened? did not the tongue of the dumb recover speech?[12] did not the relaxed hands and palsied knees become strong,[13] and the lame leap as an hart?[14] No doubt we are accustomed also to give a spiritual significance to these statements of prophecy, according to the analogy of the physical diseases which were healed by the Lord; but still they were all fulfilled literally: thus showing that the prophets foretold both senses, except that very many of their words can only be taken in a pure and simple signification, and free from all allegorical obscurity; as when we hear of the down-

[1] [Isa. viii. 4.] [2] [Isa. iii. 13.] [3] [Ps. ii. 1, 2.]
[4] [Isa. liii. 7.] [5] [Isa. l. 6 (Sept.).] [6] [Isa. liii. 12.]
[7] [Ps. xxii. 17.] [8] [Ver. 18.]
[9] [Ps. lxix. 22. Tertullian only briefly gives the sense in two words (et potus amaros).]
[10] [Ps. xxii. 8.] [11] [Zech. xi. 12.] [12] [Isa. xxxv. 5.]
[13] [Ver. 3.] [14] [Ver. 6.]

fall of nations and cities, of Tyre and Egypt, and Babylon and Edom, and the navy of Carthage; also when they foretell Israel's own chastisements and pardons, its captivities, restorations, and at last its final dispersion. Who would prefer affixing a metaphorical interpretation to all these events, instead of accepting their literal truth? The realities are involved in the words, just as the words are read in the realities. Thus, then, [we find that] the allegorical style is not used in all parts of the prophetic record, although it occasionally occurs in certain portions of it.

CHAP. XXI.—*No mere metaphor in the phrase* RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD. *In proportion to the importance of eternal truths, is the clearness of their scriptural enunciation.*

Well, if it occurs occasionally in certain portions of it, you will say, then why not in that phrase [*Resurrectio Mortuorum*, of which we have been speaking], where the resurrection might be spiritually understood? There are several reasons why not. First, what must be the meaning of so many important passages of Holy Scripture, which so obviously attest the resurrection of the body, as to admit not even the appearance of a figurative signification? And, indeed, [since some passages are more obscure than others], it cannot but be right—as we have shown above[1]—that uncertain statements should be determined by certain ones, and obscure ones by such as are clear and plain; else there is fear that, in the conflict of certainties and uncertainties, of explicitness and obscurity, faith may be shattered, truth endangered, and the Divine Being Himself be branded as inconstant. Then arises the improbability that the very mystery on which our trust wholly rests, on which also our instruction entirely depends, should have the appearance of being ambiguously announced and obscurely propounded, inasmuch as the hope of the resurrection, unless it be clearly set forth on the side both of punishment and reward, would fail to persuade any to embrace a religion like ours, exposed

[1] [See ch. xix.]

as it is to public detestation and the imputation of hostility to others. There is no certain work where the remuneration is uncertain. There is no real apprehension when the peril is only doubtful. But both the recompense of reward, and the danger of losing it, depend on the issues of the resurrection. Now, if even those purposes of God against cities, and nations, and kings, which are merely temporal, local, and personal in their character, have been proclaimed so clearly in prophecy, how is it to be supposed that those dispensations of His which are eternal, and of universal concern to the human race, should be void of all real light in themselves? The grander they are, the clearer should be their announcement, in order that their superior greatness might be believed. And I apprehend that God cannot possibly have ascribed to Him either envy, or guile, or inconsistency, or artifice, by help of which evil qualities it is that all schemes of unusual grandeur are litigiously promulgated.

CHAP. XXII.—*The Scriptures forbid our supposing either that the resurrection is already past, or that it takes place immediately at death; our hopes and prayers point to the last great day as the period of its accomplishment.*

We must after all this turn our attention to those scriptures also which forbid our belief in such a resurrection as is held by your "*Animalists*" (for I will not call them "*Spiritualists*"[1]), that it is either to be assumed [as taking place] now, as soon as men come to the knowledge of the truth, or else that it is accomplished immediately after their departure from this life. Now, forasmuch as the seasons of our entire [blessed] hope have been fixed in the Holy Scripture, and since we are not permitted to place the accomplishment thereof, as I apprehend, previous to Christ's coming, our prayers are directed towards[2] the end of this world, to the passing away thereof at the great day of the Lord—of

[1] [For the opinions of those Valentinians who held that Christ's flesh was composed of soul or of spirit—a refined, etherial substance—see Tertullian's *De Carne Christi*, c. x.–xv.]

[2] Suspirant in.

His wrath and vengeance—the last day, which is hidden [from all], and known to none but the Father, although announced beforehand by signs and wonders, and the dissolution of the elements, and the conflicts of nations. I would turn out the words of the prophets, if the Lord Himself had said nothing (except that prophecies were the Lord's own word); but it is more to my purpose that He by His own mouth confirms [their statement]. Being questioned by His disciples when those things were to come to pass which He had just been uttering about the destruction of the temple, He discourses to them first of the order of Jewish events until the overthrow of Jerusalem, and then of such as concerned all nations up to the very end of the world. For after He had declared that "Jerusalem was to be trodden down of the Gentiles, until the times of the Gentiles should be fulfilled"[1]—meaning, of course, those which were to be chosen of God, and gathered in with the remnant of Israel—He then goes on to proclaim, against this world and dispensation (even as Joel had done, and Daniel, and all the prophets with one consent[2]), that "there should be signs in the sun, and in the moon, and in the stars, distress of nations with perplexity, the sea and the waves roaring, men's hearts failing them for fear, and for looking after those things which are coming on the earth."[3] "For," says He, "the powers of heaven shall be shaken; and then shall they see the Son of man coming in the clouds, with power and great glory. And when these things begin to come to pass, then look up, and lift up your heads, for your redemption draweth nigh."[4] He spake of its "drawing nigh," not of its being present already; and of "those things beginning to come to pass," not of their having happened: because when they have come to pass, then our redemption shall be at hand, which is said to be approaching up to that time, raising and exciting our minds to what is then the proximate harvest of our hope. He immediately annexes a parable of this in "the trees which are tenderly sprouting

[1] [Luke xxi. 24.]
[2] [Joel iii. 9–15; Dan. vii. 13, 14.]
[3] [Luke xxi. 25, 26.]
[4] [Vers. 26–28.]

into a flower-stalk, and then developing the flower, which is the precursor of the fruit."[1] "So likewise ye," [He adds], "when ye shall see all these things come to pass, know ye that the kingdom of heaven is nigh at hand."[2] "Watch ye, therefore, [and pray] always, that ye may be accounted worthy to escape all those things, and to stand before the Son of man;"[3] that is, no doubt, at the resurrection, after all these things have been previously transacted. Therefore, although there is a sprouting in the acknowledgment of all this mystery, yet it is only in the actual presence of the Lord that the flower is developed and the fruit borne. Who is it, then, that has aroused the Lord, now at God's right hand, so unseasonably and with such severity to "shake terribly" (as Isaiah[4] expresses it) "that earth," which, I suppose, is as yet unshattered? Who has thus early put "Christ's enemies beneath His feet" (to use the language of David[5]), making Him more hurried than the Father, whilst every crowd in our popular assemblies is still with shouts consigning "the Christians to the lions?"[6] Who has yet beheld Jesus descending from heaven in like manner as the apostles saw Him ascend, according to the appointment of the [two] angels?[7] Up to the present moment they have not, tribe by tribe, smitten their breasts, looking on Him whom they pierced.[8] No one has as yet fallen in with Elias;[9] no one has as yet escaped from Antichrist;[10] no one has as yet had to bewail the downfall of Babylon.[11] And is there now anybody who has risen again, except the heretic? *He*, of course, has already quitted the grave of his own corpse—although he is even now liable to fevers and ulcers; he, too, has already trodden down his enemies—although he has even now to struggle with the powers of the world. And as a matter of course, he is already a king

[1] [Luke xxi. 29, 30; Matt. xxiv. 32.]
[2] [Luke xxi. 31; Matt. xxiv. 33.]
[3] [Luke xxi. 36.]
[4] [Isa. ii. 19.]
[5] [Ps. cx. 1.]
[6] [Compare *The Apology*, xl.; *De Spect.* xxvii.; *De Exhort. Cast.* xii.]
[7] [Acts i. 11.]
[8] [Zech. xii. 10; comp. John xix. 37.]
[9] [Mal. iv. 5.]
[10] [1 John iv. 3.]
[11] [Rev. xviii. 2.]

—although he even now owes to Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's.[1]

CHAP. XXIII.—*Sundry passages of St. Paul, which speak of a spiritual resurrection, compatible with the future resurrection of the body, which is even assumed in them.*

The apostle indeed teaches, in his Epistle to the Colossians, that we were once dead, alienated, and enemies to the Lord in our minds, whilst we were living in wicked works;[2] that we were then buried with Christ in baptism, and also raised again with Him through the faith of the operation of God, who hath raised Him from the dead.[3] "And you, [adds he], when ye were dead in sins and the uncircumcision of your flesh, hath He quickened together with Him, having forgiven you all trespasses."[4] And again: "If ye are dead with Christ from the elements of the world, why, as though living in the world, are ye subject to ordinances?"[5] Now, since he makes us spiritually dead—in such a way, however, as to allow that we shall one day have to undergo a bodily death, —so, considering indeed that we have been also raised in a like spiritual sense, he equally allows that we shall further have to undergo a bodily resurrection. In so many words[6] he says: "Since ye are risen with Christ, seek those things which are above, where Christ sitteth at the right hand of God. Set your affection on things above, not on things on the earth."[7] Accordingly, it is in our mind that he shows that we rise [with Christ], since it is by this alone that we are as yet able to reach to heavenly objects. These we should not "seek," nor "set our affection on," if we had them already in our possession. He also adds: "For ye are dead"—to your sins, he means, not to yourselves—"and your life is hid with Christ in God."[8] Now that life is not yet apprehended which is hidden. In like manner John says:

[1] [Matt. xxii. 21.] [2] [Col. i. 21.]
[3] [Col. ii. 12.] [4] [Ver. 13.]
[5] [Ver. 20. (The last clause in Tertullian is, "Quomodo sententiam fertis?")]
[6] Denique. [7] [Col. iii. 1, 2.] [8] [Ver. 3.]

"And it doth not yet appear what we shall be: we know, however, that when He shall be manifest, we shall be like Him."[1] We are far indeed from being already what we know not of; we should, of course, be sure to know it if we were already [like Him]. It is therefore the contemplation of our blessed hope even in this life by faith [that he speaks of],—not its presence nor its possession, but only its expectation. Concerning this expectation and hope Paul writes to the Galatians: "For we through the Spirit wait for the hope of righteousness by faith."[2] He says "we wait for it," not we are in possession of it. By the righteousness of God, he means that judgment which we shall have to undergo as the recompense [of our deeds]. It is in expectation of this for himself that the apostle writes to the Philippians: "If by any means," says he, "I might attain to the resurrection of the dead. Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect."[3] And yet he had believed, and had known all mysteries, as an elect vessel and the [great] teacher of the Gentiles; but for all that he goes on to say: "I, however, follow on, if so be I may apprehend that for which I also am apprehended of Christ."[4] Nay, more: "Brethren," [he adds], "I count not myself to have apprehended: but this one thing [I do], forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press toward the mark for the prize of blamelessness,[5] whereby I may attain it;" meaning the resurrection from the dead in its proper time. Even as he says to the Galatians: "Let us not be weary in well-doing: for *in due season* we shall reap."[6] Similarly, concerning Onesiphorus, does he also write to Timothy: "The Lord grant unto him that he may find mercy in that day;"[7] unto which day and time he charges Timothy himself "to keep what had been committed to his care, without spot, unrebukeable, until the appearing of the

[1] [1 John iii. 2.] [2] [Gal. v. 5.] [3] [Phil. iii. 11, 12.] [4] [Ver. 12.]

[5] [Vers. 13, 14. In the last clause Tertullian reads τῆς ἀνεγκλήσεως (blamelessness, or purity) instead of τῆς ἄνω κλήσεως ("our high calling").]

[6] [Gal. vi. 9.] [7] [2 Tim. i. 18.]

Lord Jesus Christ: which in His times He shall show, who is the blessed and only Potentate, the King of kings and Lord of lords,"[1] speaking of [Him as] God. It is to these same times that Peter in the Acts refers, when he says: "Repent ye therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out, when the times of refreshing shall come from the presence of the Lord; and He shall send Jesus Christ, which before was preached unto you: whom the heaven must receive until the times of restitution of all things, which God hath spoken by the mouth of His holy prophets."[2]

CHAP. XXIV.—*Other passages quoted from St. Paul, which categorically assert the resurrection of the flesh at the final judgment.*

The character of these times learn, along with the Thessalonians. For we read: "How ye turned from idols to serve the living and true God, and to wait for His Son from heaven, whom He raised from the dead, even Jesus."[3] And again: "For what is our hope, or joy, or crown of rejoicing? Are not even ye in the presence of our Lord God, Jesus Christ, at His coming?"[4] Likewise: "Before God, even our Father, at the coming of the Lord Jesus Christ, with the whole company of His saints."[5] He teaches them that they must "not sorrow concerning them that are asleep," and at the same time explains to them the times of the resurrection, saying, "For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus shall God bring with Him. For this we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that we which are alive and remain unto the coming of our Lord, shall not prevent them that are asleep. For the Lord Himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God; and the dead in Christ shall rise first: then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air; and so

[1] [1 Tim. vi. 14, 15, 20.] [2] [Acts iii. 19–21.]
[3] [1 Thess. i. 9, 10.] [4] [1 Thess. ii. 19. Some MSS. omit "God."]
[5] [1 Thess. iii. 13.]

shall we ever be with the Lord."[1] What archangel's voice, [I wonder], what trump of God is now heard, except it be, forsooth, in the entertainments of the heretics? For, allowing that the word of the gospel may be called "the trump of God," since it was still calling men, yet they must at that time either be dead as to the body, that they may be able to rise again; and then how are they alive? Or else caught up into the clouds; and how then are they here? "Most miserable," no doubt, as the apostle declared them, are they "who in this life only" shall be found to have hope:[2] they will have to be excluded, while they are with premature haste seizing that which is promised after this life; erring concerning the truth, no less than Phygellus and Hermogenes.[3] Hence it is that the Holy Ghost, in His greatness, foreseeing clearly all such interpretations as these, suggests [to the apostle], in this very epistle of his to the Thessalonians, [the following words]: "But of the times and the seasons, brethren, there is no necessity for my writing unto you. For ye yourselves know perfectly, that the day of the Lord cometh as a thief in the night. For when they shall say, 'Peace,' and 'All things are safe,' then sudden destruction shall come upon them."[4] Again, in the second [epistle] he addresses them with even greater earnestness: "Now I beseech you, brethren, by the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, and by our gathering together unto Him, that ye be not soon shaken in mind, nor be troubled, either by spirit, or by word," that is, [the word] of false prophets, "or by letter," that is, [the letter] of false apostles, "as if from us, as that the day of the Lord is at hand. Let no man deceive you by any means. [For that day shall not come], unless indeed there first come a falling away," he means indeed of this present empire, "and that man of sin be revealed," that is to say, Antichrist, "the son of perdition, who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God or religion; so that he sitteth in the temple of God, affirming that he is God. Remember ye not, that when I was with you, I used

[1] [1 Thess. iv. 13–17.]
[2] [1 Cor. xv. 19.]
[3] [2 Tim. i. 15.]
[4] [1 Thess. v. 1–3.]

to tell you these things? And now ye know what detaineth, that he might be revealed in his time. For the mystery of iniquity doth already work; only he who now hinders must hinder, until he be taken out of the way."[1] What obstacle is there but the Roman state, the falling away of which, by being scattered into ten kingdoms, shall introduce Antichrist upon [its own ruins]? "And then shall be revealed the wicked one, whom the Lord shall consume with the spirit of His mouth, and shall destroy with the brightness of His coming: [even him] whose coming is after the working of Satan, with all power, and signs, and lying wonders, and with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish."[2]

CHAP. XXV.—*St. John, in the Apocalypse, equally explicit in asserting the same great doctrine.*

In the Revelation of John, again, the order of these times is spread out to view, which "the souls of the martyrs" are taught to wait for beneath the altar, whilst they earnestly pray to be avenged and judged:[3] [taught, I say, to wait], in order that the world may first drink to the dregs the plagues that await it out of the vials of the angels,[4] and that the city of fornication may receive from the ten kings its deserved doom,[5] and that the beast Antichrist with his false prophet may wage war on the church of God; and that, after the casting of the devil into the bottomless pit for a while,[6] the blessed prerogative of the first resurrection may be ordained from the thrones;[7] and then again, after the consignment of him to the fire, that the judgment of the final and universal resurrection may be determined out of the books.[8] Since, then, the Scriptures both indicate the stages of the last times, and concentrate the harvest of the Christian hope in the very end of the world, it is evident, either that all which God promises to us receives its accomplishment then, and thus what the heretics pretend about a resurrection here falls to

[1] [2 Thess. ii. 1–7.] [2] [2 Thess. ii. 8–10.] [3] [Rev. vi. 9, 10.]
[4] [Rev. xvi.] [5] [Rev. xviii.] [6] [Rev. xx. 2.]
[7] [Vers. 4–6.] [8] [Vers. 12–14.]

the ground; or else, even allowing that a confession of the mystery [of divine truth] is a resurrection, that there is, without any detriment to this view, room for believing in that which is announced for the end. It moreover follows, that the very maintenance of this spiritual resurrection amounts to a presumption in favour of the other bodily resurrection; for if none were announced for that time, there would be fair ground for asserting only this purely spiritual resurrection. Inasmuch, however, as [a resurrection] is proclaimed for the last time, it is proved to be a bodily one, because there is no spiritual one also then announced. For why make a second announcement of a resurrection of only one character, that is, the spiritual one, since this ought to be undergoing accomplishment either now, without any regard to different times, or else then, at the very conclusion of all the periods? It is therefore more competent for us even to maintain a spiritual resurrection at the commencement of [a life of] faith, who acknowledge the full completion thereof at the end of the world.

CHAP. XXVI.—*Even the metaphorical descriptions of this subject in the Scriptures point to the bodily resurrection, which is the only sense which secures their consistency and dignity.*

To a preceding objection, that the Scriptures are allegorical, I have still one answer to make—that it is open to us also to defend the bodily character of the resurrection by means of the language of the prophets, which is equally figurative. For consider that primeval sentence which God spake when He called man *earth;* saying, "Earth thou art, and to earth shalt thou return."[1] In respect, of course, to his fleshly substance, which had been taken out of the ground, and which was the first to receive the name of man, as we have already shown,[2] does not this passage give one instruction to interpret in relation to the *flesh* also whatever of wrath or of grace God has determined for the earth, because, strictly speaking, the earth is not exposed to His judgment,

[1] [Gen. iii. 19.] [2] [See above, ch. v.]

since it has never done any good or evil? "Cursed," no doubt, it was, for it drank the blood [of man];[1] but even this was as a figure of homicidal flesh. For if the earth has to suffer either joy or injury, it is simply on man's account, that *he* may suffer the joy or the sorrow through the events which happen to his dwelling-place, whereby he will rather have to pay the penalty which, simply on his account, even the earth must suffer. When, therefore, God even threatens the earth, I would prefer saying that He threatens the flesh: so likewise, when He makes a promise to the earth, I would rather understand Him as promising the flesh; as in that passage of David: "The Lord is King, let the earth be glad,"[2]—meaning the flesh of the saints, to which appertains the enjoyment of the kingdom of God. Then he afterwards says: "The earth saw, and trembled; the mountains melted like wax at the presence of the Lord,"—meaning, no doubt, the flesh of the wicked; and [in a similar sense] it is written: "For they shall look on Him whom they piereed."[3] If indeed it will be thought that both these passages were pronounced simply of the element earth, how can it be consistent that it should shake and melt at the presence of the Lord, at whose royal dignity it before exulted? So again in Isaiah, "Ye shall eat the good of the land,"[4] the expression means the blessings which await the flesh when in the kingdom of God it shall be renewed, and made like the angels, and waiting to obtain the things "which neither eye hath seen, nor ear heard, and which have not entered into the heart of man."[5] Otherwise, how vain that God should invite men to obedience by the fruits of the field and the elements of this life, when He dispenses these to even irreligious men and blasphemers; on a general condition once for all made to man, "sending rain on the good and on the evil, and making His sun to shine on the just and on the unjust!"[6] Happy, no doubt, is faith, if it is to obtain gifts which the enemies of God and Christ not only use, but even abuse, "worshipping the creature itself in opposition to the

[1] [Gen. iv. 11.] [2] [Ps. xcvii. 1.] [3] [Zech. xii. 10.]
[4] [Isa. i. 19.] [5] [1 Cor. ii. 9.] [6] [Matt. v. 45.]

Creator!"[1] You will reckon, [I suppose], onions and truffles among earth's bounties, since the Lord declares that "man shall not live on bread alone!"[2] In this way the Jews lose heavenly blessings, by confining their hopes to earthly ones, being ignorant of the promise of heavenly bread, and of the oil of God's unction, and the wine of the Spirit, and of that water of life which has its vigour from the vine of Christ. On exactly the same principle, they consider the special soil of Judæa to be that very holy land, which ought rather to be interpreted of the Lord's flesh, which, in all those who put on Christ, is thenceforward the holy land; holy indeed by the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, truly flowing with milk and honey by the sweetness of His assurance, truly Judæan by reason of the friendship of God. For "he is not a Jew which is one outwardly, but he who is one inwardly."[3] In the same way it is that both God's temple and Jerusalem [must be understood], when it is said by Isaiah: "Awake, awake, O Jerusalem! put on the strength of thine arm; awake, as in thine earliest time,"[4] that is to say, in that innocence which preceded the fall into sin. For how can words of this kind of exhortation and invitation be suitable for that Jerusalem which killed the prophets, and stoned those that were sent to them, and at last crucified its very Lord? Neither indeed is salvation promised to any one land at all, which must needs pass away with the fashion of the whole world. Even if anybody should venture strongly to contend that paradise is the holy land, which it may be possible to designate as the land of our first parents Adam and Eve, it will even then follow that the restoration of paradise will seem to be promised to the flesh, whose lot it was to inhabit and keep it, in order that man may be recalled thereto just such as he was driven from it.

Chap. xxvii.—*Certain metaphorical terms explained of the resurrection of the flesh.*

We have also in the Scriptures *robes* mentioned as alle-

[1] [Rom. i. 25.]
[2] [Matt. iv. 4.]
[3] [Rom. ii. 28, 29.]
[4] [Isa. li. 9 (Sept.).]

gorizing the hope of the flesh. Thus in the Revelation of John it is said: "These are they which have not defiled their clothes with women,"[1]—indicating, of course, virgins, and such as have become "eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake."[2] Therefore they shall be "clothed in white raiment,"[3] that is, in the bright beauty of the unwedded flesh. In the gospel even, "the wedding garment" may be regarded as the sanctity of the flesh.[4] And so, when Isaiah tells us what sort of "fast the Lord hath chosen," and subjoins a statement about the reward of good works, he says: "Then shall thy light break forth as the morning, and thy garments[5] shall speedily arise;"[6] where he has no thought of cloaks or stuff gowns, but means the rising of the flesh, which he declared the resurrection of, after its fall in death. Thus we are furnished even with an allegorical defence of the resurrection of the body. When, then, we read, "Go, my people, enter into your closets for a little season, until my anger shall pass away,"[7] we have in the closets graves, in which they will have to rest for a little while, who shall have at the end of the world departed this life in the last furious onset of the power of Antichrist. Why else did He use the expression *closets*, in preference to some other receptacle, if it were not that the flesh is kept in these closets or cellars salted and reserved for use, to be drawn out thence on a suitable occasion? It is on a like principle that embalmed corpses are set aside for burial in mausoleums and sepulchres, in order that they may be removed therefrom when the Master shall order it. Since, therefore, there is consistency in thus understanding the passage (for what refuge of little closets could possibly shelter us from the wrath of God?), [it appears that] by the very phrase which he uses, "Until His anger pass away,"[7]

[1] [Rev. iii. 4 and xiv. 4.]
[2] [Matt. xix. 12.]
[3] [Rev. iii. 5.]
[4] [Matt. xxii. 11, 12.]
[5] [There is a curious change of the word here made by Tertullian, who reads ἰμάτια instead of ἰάματα, "thy health," or "healings," which is the word in the Sept.]
[6] [Isa. lviii. 8.]
[7] [Isa. xxvi. 20.]

which shall extinguish Antichrist, he in fact shows that after that indignation the flesh will come forth from the sepulchre, in which it had been deposited previous to the [bursting out of the] anger. Now out of the closets nothing else is brought than that which had been put into them, and after the extirpation of Antichrist shall be busily transacted [the great process of] the resurrection.

Chap. xxviii.—*Prophetic things and actions, as well as words, attest this great doctrine.*

But we know that prophecy expressed itself by things no less than by words. By words, and also by deeds, is the resurrection foretold. When Moses puts his hand into his bosom, and then draws it out again dead, and again puts his hand into his bosom, and plucks it out living,[1] does not this apply as a presage to all mankind?—inasmuch as those three signs[2] denoted the threefold power of God: when it shall, first, in the appointed order, subdue to man the old serpent, the devil,[3] however formidable; then, secondly, draw forth the flesh from the bosom of death;[4] and then, at last, shall pursue all blood [shed] in judgment.[5] On this subject we read in the writings of the same prophet, [how that] God says: "For your blood of your lives will I require of all wild beasts; and I will require it of the hand of man, and of his brother's hand."[6] Now nothing is required except that which is demanded back again, and nothing is thus demanded except that which is to be given up; and that will of course be given up, which shall be demanded and required on the ground of vengeance. But indeed there cannot possibly be punishment of that which never had any existence. Existence, however, it will have, when it is restored in order to be punished. To the flesh, therefore, applies everything which is declared respecting the blood, for without the flesh there cannot be blood. The flesh will be raised up in order that the blood may be punished. There are, again, some statements [of Scripture] so plainly made as to be free from all

[1] [Ex. iv. 6, 7.] [2] [Ex. iv. 2–9.] [3] [Comp. vers. 3, 4.]
[4] [Comp. vers. 6, 7.] [5] [Comp. ver. 9.] [6] [Gen. ix. 5.]

obscurity of allegory, and yet they strongly require[1] their very simplicity to be interpreted. There is, for instance, that passage in Isaiah: "I will kill, and I will make alive."[2] Certainly His making alive is to take place after He has killed. As, therefore, it is by death that He kills, it is by the resurrection that He will make alive. Now it is the flesh which is killed by death; the flesh, therefore, will be revived by the resurrection. Surely if killing means taking away life from the flesh, and its opposite, reviving, amounts to restoring life to the flesh, it must needs be that the flesh rise again, to which the life, which has been taken away by killing, has to be restored by vivification.

Chap. xxix.—*Ezekiel's vision of the dry bones quoted.*

Inasmuch, then, as even the figurative portions of Scripture, and the arguments of facts, and some plain statements [of Holy Writ], throw light upon the resurrection of the flesh (although without specially naming the very substance), how much more effectual for determining the question will not those passages be which indicate the actual substance of the body by expressly mentioning it! Take Ezekiel: "And the hand of the Lord," says he, "was upon me; and the Lord brought me forth in the Spirit, and set me in the midst of a plain which was full of bones; and He led me round about them in a circuit: and, behold, there were many on the face of the plain; and, lo, they were very dry. And He said unto me, Son of man, will these bones live? And I said, O Lord God, Thou knowest. And He said unto me, Prophesy upon these bones; and thou shalt say, Ye dry bones, hear the word of the Lord. Thus saith the Lord God to these bones, Behold, I bring upon you the breath [of life], and ye shall live: and I will give unto you the spirit, and I will place muscles over you, and I will spread skin upon you; and ye shall live, and shall know that I am the Lord. And I prophesied as the Lord commanded me: and while I prophesy,

[1] Sitiant.

[2] [Isa. xxxviii. 12, 13, 16. The very words, however, occur not in Isaiah, but in 1 Sam. ii. 6, Deut. xxxii. 39.]

behold there is a voice, behold also a movement, and bones approached bones. And I saw, and behold sinews and flesh came up over them, and muscles were placed around them; but there was no breath in them. And He said unto me, Prophesy to the wind, son of man, prophesy and say, Thus saith the Lord God, Come from the four winds, O breath, and breathe in these dead men, and let them live. So I prophesied to the wind, as He commanded me, and the spirit entered into the bones, and they lived, and stood upon their feet, strong and exceeding many. And [the Lord] said unto me, Son of man, these bones are the whole house of Israel. They say themselves, Our bones are become dry, and our hope is perished, and we in them have been violently destroyed. Therefore prophesy unto them, [and say], Behold, even I will open your sepulchres, and will bring you out of your sepulchres, O my people, and will bring you into the land of Israel: and ye shall know how that I the Lord opened your sepulchres, and brought you, O my people, out of your sepulchres; and I will give my Spirit unto you, and ye shall live, and shall rest in your own land: and ye shall know how that I the Lord have spoken and done these things, saith the Lord."[1]

CHAP. XXX.—*This vision interpreted by Tertullian of the resurrection of the bodies of the dead.* [*In speaking of this passage of Ezekiel, Tertullian falls into a chronological error: he supposes* (*in his ch.* xxxi.) *that Ezekiel prophesied before the captivity.*]

I am well aware how they torture even this prophecy into a proof of the allegorical sense, on the ground that by saying, "These bones are the whole house of Israel," He made them a figure of Israel, and removed them from their proper literal condition; and therefore [they contend] that there is here a figurative, not a true prediction of the resurrection, for [they say] the state of the Jews is one of humiliation, in a certain sense dead, and very dry, and dispersed over the plain of the world. Therefore the image of a resurrection is

[1] [Ezek. xxxvii. 1-14.]

allegorically applied to their state, since it has to be gathered together, and recompacted bone to bone (in other words, tribe to tribe, and people to people), and to be reincorporated by the sinews of power and the nerves of royalty, and to be brought out as it were from sepulchres, that is to say, from the most miserable and degraded abodes of captivity, and to breathe afresh in the way of a restoration, and to live thenceforward in their own land of Judæa. And what is to happen after all this? They will die, no doubt. And what will there be after death? No resurrection from the dead, of course, since there is nothing of the sort here revealed to Ezekiel. Well, but the resurrection is elsewhere foretold: so that there will be one even in this case, and they are rash in applying this [passage] to the state of Jewish affairs; or even if it do indicate a different recovery from the resurrection which we are maintaining, what matters it to me, provided there be also a resurrection of the body, just as there is a restoration of the Jewish state? In fact, by the very circumstance that the recovery of the Jewish state is prefigured by the reincorporation and reunion of bones, proof is offered that this event will also happen to the bones [themselves]; for the metaphor could not have been formed from bones, if the same thing exactly were not to be realized in them also. Now, although there is a sketch of the true thing in its image, the image itself still possesses a truth of its own: it must needs be, therefore, that that must have a prior existence for itself, which is used figuratively to express some other thing. Vacuity is not a consistent basis for a similitude, nor does nonentity form a suitable foundation for a parable. It will therefore be right to believe that the bones are destined to have a rehabiliment of flesh and breath, such as it is [here] said they will have, by reason indeed of which their renewed state could alone express the reformed condition of Jewish affairs, which is pretended to be the meaning of this passage. It is, however, more characteristic of a religious spirit to maintain the truth on the authority of a literal interpretation, such as is required by the sense of the inspired passage. Now, if this vision had reference to the condition of the

Jews, as soon as He had revealed to him the position of the bones, He would at once have added, "These bones are the whole house of Israel," and so forth. But immediately on showing the bones, He interrupts the scene by saying somewhat of the prospect which is most suited to bones; without yet naming Israel, He tries the prophet's own faith: "Son of man, can these bones ever live?" so that he makes answer: "O Lord, Thou knowest." Now God would not, you may be sure, have tried the prophet's faith on a point which was never to be a real one, of which Israel should never hear, [and] in which it was not proper to repose belief. Since, however, the resurrection of the dead was indeed foretold, but Israel, in the distrust of his great unbelief, was offended at it; and, whilst gazing on the condition of the crumbling grave, despaired of a resurrection; or rather, did not direct his mind mainly to it, but to his own harassing circumstances,—therefore God first instructed the prophet (since he, too, was not free from doubt), by revealing to him the process of the resurrection, with a view to his earnest setting forth of the same. He then charged the people to believe what He had revealed to the prophet, telling them that they were themselves, though refusing to believe their resurrection, the very bones which were destined to rise again. Then in the concluding sentence He says, "And ye shall know how that I the Lord have spoken and done these things," intending of course to do that of which He had spoken; but certainly not meaning to do that which He had spoken of, if His design had been to do something different from what He had said.

CHAP. XXXI.—*Other passages out of the prophets applied to the resurrection of the flesh.*

Unquestionably, if the people were indulging in *figurative* murmurs that their bones were become dry, and that their hope had perished—plaintive at the consequences of their dispersion—then God might fairly enough seem to have consoled their *figurative* despair with a *figurative* promise. Since, however, no injury had as yet alighted on the people

from their dispersion, although the hope of the resurrection had very frequently failed amongst them, it is manifest that it was owing to the perishing condition of their bodies that their faith in the resurrection was shaken. God, therefore, was rebuilding the faith which the people were pulling down. But even if it were true that Israel was then depressed at some shock in their existing circumstances, we must not on that account suppose that the purpose of revelation could have rested in a parable: its aim must have been to testify a resurrection, in order to raise the nation's hope to even an eternal salvation and an indispensable restoration, and thereby turn off their minds from brooding over their present affairs. This indeed is the aim of other prophets likewise. "Ye shall go forth," [says Malachi], "from your sepulchres, as young calves let loose from their bonds, and ye shall tread down your enemies."[1] And again, [Isaiah says]: "Your heart shall rejoice, and your bones shall spring up like the grass,"[2] because the grass also is renewed by the dissolution and corruption of its seed. In a word, if it is contended that the figure of the rising bones refers properly to the state of Israel, why is the same hope announced to all nations, instead of being limited to Israel only, of reinvesting those osseous remains with bodily substance and vital breath, and of raising up their dead out of the grave? For the language is universal: "The dead shall arise, and come forth from their graves; for the dew which cometh from Thee is medicine to their bones."[3] In another passage [it is written]: "All flesh shall come to worship before me, saith the Lord."[4] When? When the fashion of this world shall begin to pass away. For He said before: "As the new heaven and the new earth, which I make, remain before me, saith the Lord, so shall your seed remain."[5] Then also shall be fulfilled what is written afterwards: "And they shall go forth" (namely, from their graves), "and shall see the carcases of those who have transgressed: for their worm shall never die, nor shall their fire be quenched; and they shall be a spectacle

[1] [Mal. iv. 2, 3.] [2] [Isa. lxvi. 14.] [3] [Isa. xxvi. 19.]
[4] [Isa. lxvi. 23.] [5] [Ver. 22.]

to all flesh"[1] (even to that which, being raised again from the dead and brought out from the grave, shall adore the Lord for this great grace).

CHAP. XXXII.—*Even unburied bodies will be raised again: whatever befalls them, God will restore them again. Jonah's case quoted in illustration of God's power.*

But, that you may not suppose that it is merely those bodies which are consigned to tombs whose resurrection is foretold, you have it declared in Scripture: "And I will command the fishes of the sea, and they shall cast up the bones which they have devoured; and I will bring joint to joint, and bone to bone." You will ask, Will then the fishes and other animals and carnivorous birds be raised again, in order that they may vomit up what they have consumed, on the ground of your reading in the law of Moses, that blood is required of even all the beasts? Certainly not. But the beasts and the fishes are mentioned in relation to the restoration of flesh and blood, in order the more emphatically to express the resurrection of such bodies as have even been devoured, when redress is said to be demanded of their very devourers. Now I apprehend that in the case of Jonah we have a fair proof of this divine power, when he comes forth from the fish's belly uninjured in both his natures—his flesh and his soul. No doubt the bowels of the whale would have had abundant time during three days for consuming and digesting [Jonah's] flesh, quite as effectually as a coffin, or a tomb, or the gradual decay of some quiet and concealed grave; only that he wanted to prefigure even those beasts [which symbolize] especially the men who are wildly opposed to the [Christian] name, or the angels of iniquity, of whom blood will be required by the full exaction of an avenging judgment. Where, then, is the man who, being more disposed to learn than to assume, more careful to believe than to dispute, and more scrupulous of the wisdom of God than wantonly bent on his own, when he hears of a divine purpose respecting sinews and skin, and nerves and bones, will

[1] [Isa. lxvi. 24.]

forthwith devise some different application of these words, as if all that is said of the substances in question were not naturally intended for man? For either there is here no reference to the destiny of man—in the gracious provision of the kingdom [of heaven], in the severity of the judgment-day, in all the incidents of the resurrection; or else, if there is any reference to his destiny, the destination must necessarily be made in reference to those substances of which the man is composed, for whom the destiny is reserved. Another question I have also to ask of these very adroit transformers of bones and sinews, and nerves and sepulchres: Why, when anything is declared of the soul, do they not interpret *the soul* to be something else, and transfer it to another signification?—since, whenever any distinct statement is made of a *bodily* substance, they will obstinately prefer taking any other sense whatever, rather than that which the name indicates. If things which pertain to the body are figurative, why are not those which pertain to the soul figurative also? Since, however, things which belong to the soul have nothing allegorical in them, neither therefore have those which belong to the body. For man is as much body as he is soul; so that it is impossible for one of these natures to admit a figurative sense, and the other to exclude it.

CHAP. XXXIII.—*So much for the prophetic Scriptures. In the Gospels, Christ's parables, as explained by Himself, have a clear reference to the resurrection of the flesh.*

This is evidence enough from the prophetic Scriptures. I now appeal to the Gospels. But here also I must first meet the same sophistry as advanced by those who contend that the Lord, like [the prophets], said everything in the way of allegory, because it is written: "All these things spake Jesus in parables, and without a parable spake He not unto them,"[1] that is, to the Jews. Now the disciples also asked Him, "Why speakest Thou in parables?"[2] And the Lord gave them this answer: "Therefore I speak unto them in parables: because they seeing, see not; and hearing, they

[1] [Matt. xiii. 34.] [2] [Ver. 10.]

hear not, according to the prophecy of Esaias."[1] But since it was to the Jews that He spoke in parables, it was not then to all men; and if not to all, it follows that it was not always and in all things parables with Him, but only in certain things, and when addressing a particular class. But He addressed a particular class when He spoke to the Jews. It is true that He spoke sometimes even to the disciples in parables. But observe how the Scripture relates such a fact: "And He spake a parable unto them."[2] It follows, then, that He did not usually address them in parables; because if He always did so, special mention would not be made of His resorting to this mode of address. Besides, there is not a parable which you will not find to be either explained by the Lord Himself, as that of the sower, [which He interprets] of the management of the word of God;[3] or else cleared by a preface from the writer of the Gospel, as in the parable of the arrogant judge and the importunate widow, [which is expressly applied] to earnestness in prayer;[4] or capable of being spontaneously understood,[5] as in the parable of the fig-tree, which was spared awhile in hopes of improvement—an emblem of Jewish sterility. Now, if even parables obscure not the light of the gospel, how unlikely it is that plain sentences and declarations, which have an unmistakeable meaning, should signify any other thing than their literal sense! But it is by such declarations and sentences that the Lord sets forth either the last judgment, or the kingdom, or the resurrection: "It shall be more tolerable," He says, "for Tyre and Sidon in the day of judgment [than for you]."[6] And, "Tell them that the kingdom of God is at hand."[7] And again, "It shall be recompensed to you at the resurrection of the just."[8] Now, if the mention

[1] [Matt. xiii. 13; comp. Isa. vi. 9.]

[2] [See Luke vi. 39; comp. with ver. 20, and other places, especially in this Gospel.]

[3] [See Luke viii. 11.] [4] [See Luke xviii. 1.]

[5] [Such cases of obvious meaning, which required no explanation, are referred to in Matt. xxi. 45 and Luke xx. 19.]

[6] [Matt. xi. 22.] [7] [Matt. x. 7.] [8] [Luke xiv. 14.]

of these events (I mean the judgment-day, and the kingdom of God, and the resurrection) has a plain and absolute sense, so that nothing about them can be pressed into an allegory, neither should those statements be forced into parables which describe the arrangement, and the process, and the experience of the kingdom [of God], and of the judgment, and of the resurrection. On the contrary, things which are destined for the body should be carefully understood in a bodily sense,—not in a spiritual sense, as having nothing figurative in their nature. This is the reason why we have laid it down as a preliminary consideration, that the bodily substance both of the soul and of the flesh is liable to the recompense, which will have to be awarded in return for the co-operation of the two natures, that so the corporeality of the soul may not exclude the bodily nature of the flesh by suggesting a recourse to figurative descriptions, since both of them must needs be regarded as destined to take part in the kingdom, and the judgment, and the resurrection. And now we proceed to the special proof of this proposition, that the bodily character of the flesh is indicated by our Lord whenever He mentions the resurrection, at the same time without disparagement to the corporeal nature of the soul,—a point which has been actually admitted but by a few.

Chap. xxxiv.—*Christ plainly testifies to the resurrection of the entire man, not in his soul only, without the body.*

To begin with the passage where He says that He is come "[to seek and] to save that which is lost."[1] What do you suppose that to be which is lost? Man, undoubtedly. The entire man, or only a part of him? The whole man, of course. In fact, since the transgression which caused man's ruin was committed quite as much by the instigation of the soul from concupiscence as by the action of the flesh from actual fruition, it has marked the entire man with the sentence of transgression, and has therefore made him deservedly amenable to perdition. So that he will be wholly saved, since he has by sinning been wholly lost. Unless it be true

[1] [Luke xix. 10.]

that the sheep [of the parable] is a "lost" one, irrespective of its body; then its recovery may be effected without the body. Since, however, it is the bodily substance as well as the soul, making up the entire animal, which was carried on the shoulders of the Good Shepherd, we have here unquestionably an example how man is restored in both his natures. Else how unworthy it were of God to bring only a moiety of man to salvation—and almost less than that; whereas the munificence of princes of this world always claims for itself the merit of a plenary grace! Then must the devil be understood to be stronger for injuring man, ruining him wholly? and must God have the character of comparative weakness, since He does not relieve and help man in his entire state? The apostle, however, suggests that "where sin abounded, there has grace much more abounded."[1] How, in fact, can he be regarded as saved, who can at the same time be said to be lost—lost, that is, in the flesh, but saved as to his soul? Unless, indeed, [their argument] now makes it necessary that the soul should be placed in a "lost" condition, that it may be susceptible of salvation, on the ground that that is properly saved which has been lost. We, however, so understand the soul's immortality as to believe it "lost," not in the sense of destruction, but of punishment, that is, in hell. And if this is the case, then it is not the soul which salvation will affect, since it is "safe" already in its own nature by reason of its immortality, but rather the flesh, which, as all readily allow, is subject to destruction. Else, if the soul is also perishable [in this sense], in other words, not immortal—the condition of the flesh—then this same condition ought in all fairness to benefit the flesh also, as being similarly mortal and perishable, since that which perishes the Lord purposes to save. I do not care now to follow the clue of our discussion, so far as to consider whether it is in one of his natures or in the other that perdition puts in its claim on man, provided that salvation is equally distributed over the two substances, and makes him its aim in respect of them both. For observe,

[1] [Rom. v. 20.]

in which substance soever you assume man to have perished, in the other he does not perish. He will therefore be saved in the substance in which he does not perish, and yet obtain salvation in that in which he does perish. You have [then] the restoration of the entire man, inasmuch as the Lord purposes to save that part of him which perishes, whilst he will not of course lose that portion which cannot be lost. Who will any longer doubt of the safety of both natures, when one of them is to obtain salvation, and the other is not to lose it? And, still further, the Lord explains to us the meaning of the thing when He says: "I came not to do my own will, but the Father's, who hath sent me."[1] What, I ask, is that will? "That of all which He hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day."[2] Now, what had Christ received of the Father but that which He had Himself put on? Man, of course, in his texture of flesh and soul. Neither, therefore, of those parts which He has received will He allow to perish; nay, no considerable portion—nay, not the least fraction, of either. If the flesh be, [as our opponents slightingly think], but a poor fraction, then the flesh is safe, because not a fraction [of man is to perish]; and no larger portion is in danger, because every portion of man is in equally safe keeping with Him. If, however, He will not raise the flesh also up at the last day, then He will permit not only a fraction of man to perish, but (as I will venture to say, in consideration of so important a part) almost the whole of him. But when He repeats His words with increased emphasis, "And this is the Father's will, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on Him, may have eternal life: and I will raise him up at the last day,"[3]—He asserts the full extent of the resurrection. For He assigns to each several nature that reward which is suited to its services: both to the flesh, for by it the Son was "seen;" and to the soul, for by it He was "believed on." Then, you will say, to them was this promise given by whom Christ was "seen." Well, be it so; only let the same hope flow on from them to us! For if to them who saw, and

[1] [John vi. 38.] [2] [Ver. 39.] [3] [Ver. 40.]

therefore believed, such fruit then accrued to the operations of the flesh and the soul, how much more to us! For more "blessed," says Christ, "are they who have not seen, and yet have believed;"[1] since, even if the resurrection of the flesh must be denied to *them*, it must at any rate be a fitting boon to [us, who are] the more blessed. For how could we be blessed, if we were to perish in any part of us?

CHAP. XXXV.—*Explanation of what is meant by* THE BODY, *which is to be raised again; not the corporeality of the soul.*

But He also teaches us, that "He is rather to be feared, who is able to destroy both body and soul in hell," that is, the Lord alone; "not those which kill the body, but are not able to hurt the soul,"[2] that is to say, all human powers. Here, then, we have a recognition of the natural immortality of the soul, which cannot be killed by men; and of the mortality of the body, which may be killed: [whence we learn] that the resurrection of the dead is a resurrection of the flesh; for unless it were raised again, it would be impossible for the flesh to be "killed in hell." But as a question may be here captiously raised about the meaning of "the body" [or "the flesh"], I will at once state that I understand by the human body nothing else than that fabric of the flesh which, whatever be the kind of material of which it is constructed and modified, is seen and handled, and sometimes indeed killed, by men. In like manner, I should not admit that anything but cement and stones and bricks form the *body* of a wall. If any one imports into our argument some body of a subtle, secret nature, he must show, disclose, and prove to me that that identical body is the very one which was slain by human violence, and then [I will grant] that it is of such a body that [our scripture] speaks. If, again, the body [or corporeal nature] of the soul[3] is cast in my teeth, it will only be an idle subterfuge! For since both substances are set before

[1] [John xx. 29.] [2] [Matt. x. 28.]

[3] [Tertullian supposed that even the soul was in a certain sense of a corporeal essence.]

us [in this passage, which tells us] that "body and soul" are destroyed in hell, a distinction is obviously made between the two; and we are left to understand the body to be that which is tangible to us, that is, the flesh, which, as it will be destroyed in hell — since it did not "rather fear" being destroyed by God—so also will it be restored to life eternal, since it preferred to be killed by human hands. If, therefore, any one shall violently suppose that the destruction of the soul and the flesh in hell amounts to a final annihilation of the two substances, and not to their penal treatment (as if they were to be consumed, not punished), let him recollect that the fire of hell is eternal—expressly announced as an everlasting penalty; and let him then admit that it is from this circumstance that this never-ending "killing" is more formidable than a merely human murder, which is only temporal. He will then come to the conclusion that substances must be eternal, when their penal "killing" is an eternal one. Since, then, the body after the resurrection has to be killed by God in hell along with the soul, we surely have sufficient information in this fact respecting both the issues [which await it], namely the resurrection of the flesh, and its eternal "killing." Else it would be most absurd if the flesh should be raised up and destined to "the killing in hell," in order to be put an end to, when it might suffer such an annihilation [more directly] if not raised again at all. A pretty paradox,[1] to be sure, that an essence must be refitted with life, in order that it may receive that annihilation which has already in fact accrued to it! [But Christ], whilst confirming us in the selfsame hope, adds the example of "the sparrows"—how that "not one of them falls to the ground without the will of God."[2] [He says this], that you may believe that the flesh which has been consigned to the ground, is able in like manner to rise again by the will of the same God. For although this is not allowed to the sparrows, yet "we are of more value than many sparrows,"[3] for the very reason that, when fallen, we rise again. He affirms, lastly, that "the very hairs of our head are all num-

[1] Scilicet. [2] [Matt. x. 29.] [3] [Ver. 31.]

bered,"[1] and in the affirmation He of course includes the promise of their safety; for if they were to be lost, where would be the use of having taken such a numerical care of them? Surely the only use lies [in this truth]: "That of all which the Father hath given to me, I should lose none,"[2] —not even a hair, as also not an eye nor a tooth. And yet whence shall come that "weeping and gnashing of teeth,"[3] if not from *eyes and teeth?*—even at that time when the body shall be slain in hell, and thrust out into that outer darkness which shall be the suitable torment of the eye. He also who shall not be clothed at the marriage feast in the raiment of good works, will have to be "bound hand and foot,"—as being, of course, raised in his body. So, again, the very reclining at the feast in the kingdom of God, and sitting on Christ's thrones, and standing at last on His right hand and His left, and eating of the tree of life: what are all these but most certain proofs of a bodily appointment and destination?

CHAP. XXXVI.—*Christ's refutation of the Sadducees, and affirmation of our doctrine.*

Let us now see whether [the Lord] has not imparted greater strength to our doctrine in breaking down the subtle cavil of the Sadducees. Their great object, I take it, was to do away altogether with the resurrection, for the Sadducees in fact did not admit any salvation either for the soul or the flesh;[4] and therefore, taking the strongest case they could for impairing the credibility of the resurrection, they adapted an argument from it in support of the question which they started. Their specious inquiry concerned the flesh, whether or not it would be subject to marriage after the resurrection; and they assumed the case of a woman who had married seven brothers, so that it was a doubtful point to which of them she should be restored.[5] Now, let the purport both of

[1] [Matt. x. 30.] [2] [John vi. 39.]
[3] [Matt. viii. 12, xiii. 42, xxii. 13, xxv. 30.]
[4] [Compare Tertullian's *De Præscript. Hæret.* c. xxxiii.]
[5] [Matt. xxii. 23–32; Mark xii. 18–27; Luke xx. 27–38.]

the question and the answer be kept steadily in view, and the discussion is settled at once. For since the Sadducees indeed denied the resurrection, whilst the Lord affirmed it; since, too, [in affirming it], He reproached them as being both ignorant of the Scriptures—those, of course, which had declared the resurrection—as well as incredulous of the power of God, though, of course, effectual to raise the dead, and lastly, since He immediately added the words, "Now, that the dead are raised,"[1] [speaking] without misgiving, and affirming the very thing which was being denied, even the resurrection of the dead before Him who is "the God of the living,"—[it clearly follows] that He affirmed this verity in the precise sense in which they were denying it; that it was, in fact, the resurrection of the two natures of man. Nor does it follow, [as they would have it], that because Christ denied that men would marry, He therefore proved that they would not rise again. On the contrary, He called them "the children of the resurrection,"[2] in a certain sense having by the resurrection to undergo a birth; and after that they marry no more, but in their risen life are "equal unto the angels,"[3] inasmuch as they are not to marry, because they are not to die, but are destined to pass into the angelic state by putting on the raiment of incorruption, although with a change in the substance which is restored to life. Besides, no question could be raised whether we are to marry or die again or not, without involving in doubt the restoration most especially of that substance which has a particular relation both to death and marriage—that is, the flesh. Thus, then, you have the Lord affirming against the Jewish heretics what is now encountering the denial of the Christian Sadducees—the resurrection of the entire man.

CHAP. XXXVII.—*Christ's assertion about the unprofitableness of the flesh explained consistently with our doctrine.*

He says (it is true) that "the flesh profiteth nothing;"[4]

[1] [Luke xx. 37.]
[2] [Ver. 36.]
[3] [Ver. 36.]
[4] [John vi. 63.]

but then, as in the former case, the meaning must be regulated by the subject which is spoken of. Now, because they thought His discourse was harsh and intolerable, supposing that He had really and literally enjoined on them to eat his flesh, He, with the view of ordering the state of salvation as a spiritual thing, set out with the principle, "It is the spirit that quickeneth;" and then added, "The flesh profiteth nothing,"—meaning, of course, to the giving of life. He also goes on to explain what He would have us to understand by *spirit:* "The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life." In a like sense He had previously said: "He that heareth my words, and believeth on Him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation, but shall pass from death unto life."[1] Constituting, therefore, His word as the life-giving principle, because that word is spirit and life, He likewise called His flesh by the same appellation; because, too, the Word had become flesh,[2] we ought therefore to desire Him in order that we may have life, and to devour Him with the ear, and to ruminate on Him with the understanding, and to digest Him by faith. Now, just before [the passage before us], He had declared His flesh to be "the bread which cometh down from heaven,"[3] impressing on [His hearers] constantly under the figure of necessary food the memory of their forefathers, who had preferred the bread and flesh of Egypt to their divine calling.[4] Then, turning His subject to their reflections, because He perceived that they were going to be scattered from Him, He says: "The flesh profiteth nothing." Now what is there to destroy the resurrection of the flesh? As if there might not reasonably enough be something which, although it "profiteth nothing" itself, might yet be capable of being profited by something else. The spirit "profiteth," for it imparts life. The flesh profiteth nothing, for it is subject to death. Therefore He has rather put the two propositions in a way which favours our belief: for by showing what "profits," and what "does not profit," He has

[1] [John v. 24.]
[2] [John i. 14.]
[3] [John vi. 51.]
[4] [John vi. 31, 49, 58.]

likewise thrown light on the object which receives as well as the subject which gives the "profit." Thus, [in the present instance, we have] the Spirit giving life to the flesh which has been subdued by death; for "the hour," says He, "is coming, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live."[1] Now, what is "the dead" but the flesh? and what is "the voice of God" but the Word? and what is the Word but the Spirit,[2] who shall justly raise the flesh which He had once Himself become, and *that* too from death, which He Himself suffered, and from the grave, which He Himself once entered? Then again, when He says, "Marvel not at this: for the hour is coming, in which all that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and shall come forth; they that have done good, to the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation,"[3]—none will after such words be able to interpret the dead "that are in the graves" as any other than the bodies of the flesh, because the graves themselves are nothing but the resting-place of corpses: for it is incontestable that even those who partake of "the old man," that is to say, sinful men—in other words, those who are dead through their ignorance of God (whom our heretics, forsooth, foolishly insist on understanding by the word "graves"[4])—are plainly here spoken of as having to come from their graves for judgment. But how are graves to come forth from graves?

CHAP. XXXVIII.—*Christ, by raising the dead, attested in a practical way the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh.*

After the Lord's *words*, what are we to think of the purport of His *actions*, when He raises dead persons from their biers [and] their graves? To what end did He do so? If it was only for the mere exhibition of His power, or to afford the temporary favour of restoration to life, it was really no

[1] [John v. 25.]

[2] [The divine nature of the Son. See our *Anti-Marcion*, pp. 129, 247 (note 7).]

[3] [John v. 28, 29.]

[4] [Compare c. xix. above.]

great matter for Him to raise men to die over again. If, however, as was the truth, it was rather to put in secure keeping men's belief in a future resurrection, then it must follow from the particular form of His own examples, that the said resurrection will be a bodily one. I can never allow it to be said that the resurrection of the future, being destined for the soul only, did then receive these preliminary illustrations of a raising of the flesh, simply because it would have been impossible to have shown the resurrection of an invisible soul except by the resuscitation of a visible substance. They have but a poor knowledge of God, who suppose Him to be only capable of doing what comes within the compass of their own thoughts; and after all, they cannot but know full well what His capability has ever been, if they only make acquaintance with the writings of John. For unquestionably he, who has exhibited to our sight the martyrs' hitherto disembodied souls resting under the altar,[1] was quite able to display them before our eyes rising without a body of flesh. I, however, for my part prefer [believing] that it is impossible for God to practise deception (weak as He only could be in respect of artifice), from any fear of seeming to have given preliminary proofs of a thing in a way which is inconsistent with His actual disposal of the thing; nay more, from a fear that, since He was not powerful enough to show us a sample of the resurrection without the flesh, He might with still greater infirmity be unable to display [by and by] the full accomplishment of the sample in the selfsame substance [of the flesh]. No example, indeed, is greater than the thing of which it is a sample. Greater, however, it is, if souls with their body are to be raised as the evidence of their resurrection without the body, so as that the entire salvation of man [in soul and body] should become a guarantee for only the half, [the soul]; whereas the condition in all examples is, that that which would be deemed the less—I mean the resurrection of the soul only—should be the foretaste, as it were, of the rising of the flesh also at its appointed time. And therefore, according to our

[1] [Rev. vi. 9–11.]

estimate of the truth, those examples of dead persons who were raised by the Lord were indeed a proof of the resurrection both of the flesh and of the soul,—a proof, in fact, that this gift was to be denied to neither substance. Considered, however, as examples only, they expressed all the less significance—[less, indeed], than Christ will express at last—for they were not raised up for glory and immortality, but only for another death.

CHAP. XXXIX.—*Additional evidence afforded to us in the Acts of the Apostles.*

The Acts of the Apostles, too, attest[1] the resurrection. Now the apostles had nothing else to do, at least among the Jews, than to explain[2] the Old Testament and confirm[3] the New, and above all, to preach God in Christ. Consequently they introduced nothing new concerning the resurrection, besides announcing it to the glory of Christ: in every other respect it had been already received in simple and intelligent faith, without any question as to what sort of resurrection it was to be, and without encountering any other opponents than the Sadducees. So much easier was it to deny the resurrection altogether, than to understand it in an alien sense. You find Paul confessing his faith before the chief priests, under the shelter of the chief captain,[4] among the Sadducees and the Pharisees: "Men and brethren," he says, "I am a Pharisee, the son of a Pharisee; of the hope and resurrection of the dead I am now called in question by you,"[5]—referring, of course, to the nation's hope; in order to avoid, in his present condition as an apparent transgressor of the law, being thought to approach to the Sadducees in opinion on the most important article of the faith—even the resurrection. That belief, therefore, in the resurrection which he would not appear to impair, he really confirmed in the opinion of the Pharisees, since he rejected the views of the Sadducees, who denied it. In like manner, before Agrippa

[1] [Tertullian always refers to this book by a *plural* phrase.]
[2] Resignandi.
[3] Consignandi.
[4] Sub tribuno.
[5] [Acts xxiii. 6.]

also, he says that he was advancing "none other things than those which the prophets had announced."[1] He was therefore maintaining just such a resurrection as the prophets had foretold. He mentions also what is written by "Moses" touching the resurrection of the dead; [and in so doing] he must have known that it would be a rising in the body, since requisition will have to be made therein of the blood of man.[2] He declared it then to be of such a character as the Pharisees had admitted it, and such as the Lord had Himself maintained it, and such too as the Sadducees refused to believe it—such refusal leading them indeed to an absolute rejection of the whole verity. Nor had the Athenians previously understood Paul to announce any other resurrection.[3] They had, in fact, derided his announcement; but they would have indulged no such derision if they had heard from him nothing but the restoration of the soul, for they would have received *that* as the very common anticipation of their own native philosophy. But when the preaching of the resurrection, of which they had previously not heard, by its absolute novelty excited the heathen, and a not unnatural incredulity in so wonderful a matter began to harass the simple faith with many discussions, then the apostle took care in almost every one of his writings to strengthen men's belief of this [Christian] hope; pointing out that there was such a hope, and that it had not as yet been realized, and that it would be in the body,—a point which was the especial object of inquiry, and, what was besides a doubtful question, not in a body of a different kind from ours.

CHAP. XL.—*Sundry passages of St. Paul which attest our doctrine rescued by Tertullian from the perversions of heresy.*

Now it is no matter of surprise if arguments are captiously taken from the writings of [the apostle] himself, inasmuch as there "must needs be heresies;"[4] but these could not be, if the Scriptures were not capable of a false interpretation.

[1] [Acts xxvi. 22.]
[2] [Gen. ix. 5, 6.]
[3] [Acts xvii. 32.]
[4] [1 Cor. xi. 19.]

Well, then, heresies finding that the apostle had mentioned two "men"—"the inner man," that is, the soul, and "the outward man," that is, the flesh—awarded salvation to the soul or inward man, and destruction to the flesh or outward man, because it is written [in the Epistle] to the Corinthians: "Though our outward man decayeth, yet the inward man is renewed day by day."[1] Now, neither the soul by itself alone is "man" (it was subsequently implanted in the clayey mould to which the name *man* had been already given), nor is the flesh without the soul "man" (for after the exile of the soul from it, it has the title of corpse). Thus the designation *man* is, in a certain sense, the bond between the two closely united substances, under which designation they cannot but be coherent natures. As for the inward man, indeed, the apostle prefers its being regarded as the mind and heart[2] rather than the soul;[3] in other words, not so much the substance itself, as the savour of the substance. Thus when, writing to the Ephesians, he spoke of "Christ dwelling in their inner man," he meant, no doubt, that the Lord ought to be admitted into their senses.[4] He then added, "in your hearts by faith, [rooted and grounded] in love,"—making "faith" and "love" not substantial parts, but only conceptions of the soul. But when he used the phrase "in your hearts," seeing that these are substantial parts of the flesh, he at once assigned to the flesh the actual "inward man," which he placed in the heart. Consider now in what sense he alleged that "the outward man decayeth, while the inward man is renewed day by day." You certainly would not maintain that he could mean that corruption of the flesh which it undergoes from the moment of death, in its appointed state of perpetual decay; but [the wear and tear] which for the name of Christ it experiences during its course of life before and until death, in harassing cares and tribulations as well as in tortures and persecutions. Now the inward man will have, of course, to be renewed by the suggestion of the Spirit, advancing by faith and holiness day after day, *here* in this life, not *there* after the resurrection, where our renewal is

[1] [2 Cor. iv. 16.] [2] Animum. [3] Animam. [4] [Eph. iii. 17.]

not a gradual process from day to day, but a consummation once for all complete. You may learn this, too, from the following passage, where [the apostle] says: "For our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory; while we look not at the things which are seen," that is, our sufferings, "but at the things which are not seen," that is, our rewards: "for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal."[1] For the afflictions and injuries wherewith the outward man is worn away, he affirms to be only worthy of being despised by us, as being light and temporary; preferring those eternal recompenses which are also invisible, and that "weight of glory" which will be a counterpoise for the labours in the endurance of which the flesh here suffers decay. So that the subject in this passage is not that corruption which [the heretics] ascribe to the outward man in the utter destruction of the flesh, with the view of nullifying the resurrection. So also he says elsewhere: "If so be that we suffer with Him, that we may be also glorified together; for I reckon that the sufferings of the present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory that shall be revealed in us."[2] Here again he shows us that our sufferings are less than their rewards. Now, since it is through the flesh that we suffer with [Christ]—for it is the property of the flesh to be worn by sufferings—to the same flesh belongs the recompense which is promised for suffering with Christ. Accordingly, when he is going to assign afflictions to the flesh as its especial liability—according to the statement he had already made—he says, "When we were come into Macedonia, our flesh had no rest;"[3] then, in order to make the soul a fellow-sufferer with the body, he adds, "We were troubled on every side; without were fightings," which of course warred down the flesh, "within were fears," which afflicted the soul.[4] Although, therefore, the outward man decays—not in the sense of missing the resurrection, but of enduring tribulation—it will be under-

[1] [2 Cor. iv. 17, 18.]
[2] [Rom. viii. 17, 18.]
[3] [2 Cor. vii. 5.]
[4] [Same verse.]

stood from this [scripture] that it is not exposed to its suffering without the inward man. Both, therefore, will be glorified together, even as they have suffered together. Parallel with their participation in troubles, must necessarily run their association also in rewards.

Chap. xli.—*The "dissolution of our tabernacle" consistent with the resurrection of our bodies.*

It is still the same sentiment which he follows up in the passage in which he puts the recompense above the suffering: "For we know," he says, "that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens;"[1] in other words, owing to the fact that our flesh is undergoing dissolution through its sufferings, we shall be provided with a home—in heaven. He remembered the award [which the Lord assigns] in the Gospel: "Blessed are they who are persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven."[2] Yet, when he thus contrasted the recompense of the reward, he did not deny the flesh's restoration; since the recompense is due to the same substance to which the dissolution is attributed,—that is, of course, the flesh. Because, however, he had called the flesh "*a house*," he wished elegantly to use the same term in his comparison of the ultimate reward; promising to the very house which is being dissolved through suffering a better house through the resurrection (just as the Lord also promises us many mansions as of a house in His Father's home;[3] although this may possibly be understood of the domicile of this world, on the dissolution of whose fabric an eternal abode is promised in heaven, inasmuch as the following context, having a manifest reference to the flesh, seems to show that these preceding words have no such reference): for the apostle makes a distinction, when he goes on to say, "For in this we groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven, if so be that being clothed we shall not be found naked;"[4] which means, before we put off the garment

[1] [2 Cor. v. 1.]
[2] [Matt. v. 10.]
[3] [John xiv. 2.]
[4] [2 Cor. v. 2, 3.]

of the flesh, we wish to be clothed with the celestial glory of immortality. Now the privilege of this favour awaits those who shall at the coming of the Lord be found in the flesh, and who shall, owing to the oppressions of the time of Antichrist, deserve by an instantaneous death,[1] which is accomplished by a sudden "change," to become qualified to join the rising saints; as he writes to the Thessalonians: "For this we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that we which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord shall not prevent them which are asleep. For the Lord Himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God: and the dead in Christ shall rise first: then we too shall ourselves be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air: and so shall we ever be with the Lord."[2]

CHAP. XLII.—*Death changes, without destroying, our mortal bodies. Remains of the giants noticed.* †

It is the transformation these shall undergo which he explains to the Corinthians, when he writes: "We shall all indeed rise again (though we shall not all undergo the transformation) in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump"—for none shall experience this change but those only who shall be found in the flesh. "And the dead," he says, "shall be raised, [and] we shall be changed." Now, after a careful consideration of this appointed order, you will be able to adjust what follows to the preceding sense. For when he adds, "This corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality,"[3] this will assuredly be that house from heaven, with which we so earnestly desire to be clothed upon, whilst groaning in this our present body, —meaning, of course, over this flesh in which we shall be surprised at last; because he says that we are burdened whilst in this tabernacle, which we do not wish indeed to be stripped of, but rather to be [in it] clothed over, in such a

[1] Compendio mortis. [Compare our *Anti-Marcion* for the same thoughts and words, v. 12 (p. 432).]

[2] [1 Thess. iv. 15–17.]

[3] [1 Cor. xv. 51–53.]

way that mortality may be swallowed up of life, that is, by putting on over us whilst we are transformed that vestiture which is from heaven. For who is there that will not desire, while he is in the flesh, to put on immortality, and to continue his life by a happy escape from death, through the transformation which must be experienced instead of it, without encountering too that *Hades* which will exact the very last farthing?[1] Notwithstanding, he who has already traversed *Hades* is destined also to obtain the change after the resurrection. For from this circumstance it is that we definitively declare that the flesh will *by all means* rise again, and, from the change that is to come over it, will assume the condition of angels. Now, if it were merely in the case of those who shall be found in the flesh that the change must be undergone, in order that mortality may be swallowed up of life—in other words, that the flesh [be covered] with the heavenly and eternal raiment—it would either follow that those who shall be found in death would not obtain life, deprived as they would then be of the material and (so to say) the aliment of life, that is, the flesh; or else these also must needs undergo the change, that in them too mortality may be swallowed up of life, since it is appointed that they too should obtain life. But, you say, in the case of the dead, mortality is already swallowed up of life. No, not in all cases, certainly. For how many will most probably be found of men who had just died—so recently put into their graves, that nothing in them would seem to be decayed? For you do not of course deem a thing to be decayed unless it be cut off, abolished, and withdrawn from our perception, as having in every possible way ceased to be apparent. There are the carcases of the giants of old time, it will be obvious enough that they are not absolutely decayed, for their bony frames are still extant. We have already spoken of this elsewhere.[2] For instance,[3] even lately in this very city,[4] when they were sacrilegiously laying the foundations of the Odeum on a good many ancient graves, people were horror-stricken to discover,

[1] [Comp. Matt. v. 26, and see Tertullian's *De Anima*, xxxv.]
[2] [*De Anim.* c. li.] [3] Sed [for "scilicet"]. [4] [Carthage.]

after some five hundred years, bones which still retained their moisture, and hair which had not lost its perfume. It is certain not only that bones remain indurated, but also that teeth continue undecayed for ages—both of them the lasting germs of that body which is to sprout into life again in the resurrection. Lastly, even if everything that is mortal in all the dead shall then be found decayed—at any rate consumed by death, by time, and through age,—is there nothing which will be "swallowed up of life,"[1] nor by being covered over and arrayed in the vesture of immortality? Now, he who says that mortality is going to be swallowed up of life has already admitted that what is dead [is not destroyed] by those other [before-mentioned devourers]. And verily it will be extremely fit that all shall be consummated and brought about by the operations of God, [and] not by the laws of nature. Therefore, inasmuch as what is mortal has to be swallowed up of life, it must needs be brought out to view in order to be so swallowed up; [needful] also to be swallowed up, in order to undergo the ultimate transformation. If you were to say that a fire is to be lighted, you could not possibly allege that what is to kindle it is sometimes necessary [and] sometimes not. In like manner, when he inserts the words, "If so be that being unclothed[2] we be not found naked"[3] —referring, of course, to those who shall not be found in the day of the Lord alive and in the flesh—he did not say that they whom he had just described as unclothed or stripped, were naked in any other sense than meaning that they should be understood to be reinvested with the very same substance they had been divested of. For although they shall be found naked when their flesh has been laid aside, or to some extent sundered or worn away (and this condition may well be called *nakedness*), they shall afterwards recover it again, in order that, being reinvested with the flesh, they may be able also to have put over that the supervestment of immortality;

[1] [2 Cor. v. 4.]

[2] Exuti. [Tertullian read ἐκδυσάμενοι, instead of the reading of nearly all the MS. authorities, ἐνδυσάμενοι.]

[3] [2 Cor. v. 3.]

for it will be impossible for the outside garment to fit except over one who is already dressed.

CHAP. XLIII.—*No disparagement of our doctrine in St. Paul's phrase, which calls our residence in the flesh "an absence from the Lord."*

In the same way, when he says, "Therefore we are always confident, and fully aware, that while we are at home in the body we are absent from the Lord; for we walk by faith, not by sight,"[1] it is manifest that in this statement there is no design of disparaging the flesh, as if it separated us from the Lord. For there is here pointedly addressed to us an exhortation to disregard this present life, since we are absent from the Lord as long as we are passing through it—walking by faith, not by sight; in other words, in hope, not in reality. Accordingly he adds: "We are indeed confident and deem it good rather to be absent from the body, and present with the Lord;"[2] in order, that is, that we may walk by sight rather than by faith, in realization rather than in hope. Observe how he here also ascribes to the excellence of martyrdom a contempt for the body. For no one, on becoming absent from the body, is at once a dweller in the presence of the Lord, except by the prerogative of martyrdom,[3] whereby [the saint] gets at once a lodging in Paradise, not in *Hades*. Now, had the apostle been at a loss for words to describe the departure from the body? Or does he purposely use a novel phraseology? For, wanting to express our temporary absence from the body, he says that we are strangers, absent from it, because a man who goes abroad returns after a while to his home. Then he says even to all: "We therefore earnestly desire to be acceptable unto God, whether absent or present; for we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ Jesus."[4] If all of us, then all of us wholly; if wholly, then our inward man and outward too—that is, our bodies no less than our souls. "That every one," as he goes on to say, "may

[1] [2 Cor. v. 6, 7.]
[2] [Ver. 8.]
[3] [Comp. his *De Anima*, c. lv.]
[4] [2 Cor. v. 9, 10.]

receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad."[1] Now I ask, how do you read this passage? Do you take it to be confusedly constructed, with a transposition[2] of ideas? Is the question about what things will have to be received by the body, or the things which have been already done in the body? Well, if the things which are to be borne by the body are meant, then undoubtedly a resurrection of the body is implied; and if the things which have been already done in the body are referred to, [then the same conclusion follows]: for of course the retribution will have to be paid by the body, since it was by the body that the actions were performed. Thus the apostle's whole argument from the beginning is unravelled in this concluding clause, wherein the resurrection of the flesh is set forth; and it ought to be understood in a sense which is strictly in accordance with this conclusion.

CHAP. XLIV.—*Sundry other passages of St. Paul explained in a sentence confirmatory of our doctrine.*

Now, if you will examine the words which precede the passage where mention is made of the outward and the inward man, will you not discover the whole truth, both of the dignity and the hope of the flesh? For, when he speaks of the "light which God hath commanded to shine in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of the Lord in the person of Jesus Christ,"[3] and says that "we have this treasure in earthen vessels,"[4] meaning of course the flesh, which is meant—that the flesh shall be destroyed, because it is "an earthen vessel," deriving its origin from clay; or that it is to be glorified, as being the receptacle of a divine treasure? Now if that true light, which is in the person of Christ, contains in itself life, and that life with its light is committed to the flesh, is that destined to perish which has life entrusted to it? Then, of course, the treasure will perish also; for perishable things are entrusted to things which are themselves perishable, which is like putting new wine into

[1] [2 Cor. v. 10.]
[2] Per hyperbaton.
[3] [2 Cor. iv. 6.]
[4] [Ver. 7.]

old bottles. When also he adds, "Always bearing about in our body the dying of [the Lord] Jesus Christ,"[1] what sort of substance is that which, after [being called] the temple of God, can now be also designated the tomb of Christ? But why do we bear about in the body the dying of the Lord? In order, as he says, "that His life also may be manifested."[2] Where? "In the body." In what body? "In our mortal body."[3] Therefore in the flesh, which is mortal indeed through sin, but living through grace—how great a grace you may see when the purpose is, "that the life of Christ may be manifested in it." Is it then in a thing which is a stranger to salvation, in a substance which is perpetually dissolved, that the life of Christ will be manifested, which is eternal, continuous, incorruptible, and already the life of God? Else to what epoch belongs that life of the Lord which is to be manifested in our body? It surely is the life which He lived up to His passion, which was not only openly shown among the Jews, but has now been displayed even to all nations. Therefore that life is meant which "has broken the adamantine gates of death and the brazen bars of *Hades*,"[4]—a life which thenceforth has been and will be ours. Lastly, it is to be manifested in the body. When? After death. How? By rising in our body, as Christ also [rose in His]. But lest any one should here object, that the life of Jesus has even now to be manifested in our body by the discipline of holiness, and patience, and righteousness, and wisdom, in which the Lord's life abounded, the most provident wisdom of the apostle inserts this purpose: "For we which live are alway delivered unto death for Jesus' sake, that His life may be manifested in our mortal body."[5] In us, therefore, even when dead, does he say that this is to take place in us. And if so, how is this possible except in our body after its resurrection? Therefore he adds in the concluding sentence: "Knowing that He which raised up [the Lord] Jesus, shall raise up us also with Him,"[6] risen as He is already from the dead. But perhaps "*with* Him"

[1] [2 Cor. iv. 10.] [2] [Ver. 10.] [3] [Ver. 10.]
[4] [Ps. cvii. 16.] [5] [2 Cor. iv. 11.] [6] [Ver. 14.]

means "*like* Him:" well then, if it be *like* Him, it is not of course without the flesh.

CHAP. XLV.—"*The old man*" *and* "*the new man*" *of St. Paul explained.*

But in their blindness they again impale themselves on the point of the old and the new man. When the apostle enjoins us "to put off the old man, which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts; and to be renewed in the spirit of our mind; and to put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness,"[1] [they maintain] that by here also making a distinction between the two substances, [and applying] the old one to the flesh and the new one to the spirit, he ascribes to the old man—that is to say, the flesh—a permanent corruption. Now, if you follow the order of the substances, the soul cannot be the new man because it comes the later of the two; nor can the flesh be the old man because it is the former. For what fraction of time was it that intervened between the [creative] hand of God and His *afflatus*? I will venture to say, that even if the soul was a good deal prior to the flesh, by the very circumstance that the soul had to wait to be itself completed, it made the other[2] really the former. For everything which gives the finishing stroke and perfection to a work, although it is subsequent in its mere order, yet has the priority in its effect. Much more is that prior, without which preceding things could have no existence. If the flesh be the old man, when did it become so? From the beginning? But Adam was wholly a new man, and of that new man there could be no part an old man. And from that time, ever since the blessing which was pronounced upon man's generation,[3] the flesh and the soul have had a simultaneous birth, without any calculable difference in time; so that the two have been even generated together in the womb, as we have shown in our *Treatise on the Soul*.[4] Contemporaneous in the womb, they are also temporally identical in their birth. The two are

[1] [Eph. iv. 22–24.]
[2] [The flesh.]
[3] [Gen. i. 28.]
[4] [See ch. xxvii.]

no doubt produced by human parents[1] of two substances, but not at two different periods; rather they are so entirely one, that neither is before the other [in point of time]. It is more correct [to say], that we are either entirely the old man or entirely the new, for we cannot tell how we can possibly be anything else. But the apostle mentions a very clear mark of the old man. For "put off," says he, "concerning the former conversation, the old man;"[2] [he does] not [say], concerning the seniority of either substance. It is not indeed the flesh which he bids us to put off, but the works which he in another passage shows to be "works of the flesh."[3] He brings no accusation against men's bodies, of which he even writes as follows: "Putting away lying, speak every man truth with his neighbour: for we are members one of another. Be ye angry, and sin not: let not the sun go down upon your wrath: neither give place to the devil. Let him that stole steal no more: but rather let him labour, working with his hands [the thing which is good], that he may have to give to him that needeth. Let no corrupt communication proceed out of your mouth, but that which is good for the edification of faith, that it may minister grace unto the hearers. And grieve not the Holy Spirit of God, whereby ye are sealed unto the day of redemption. Let all bitterness, and wrath, and anger, and clamour, and evil-speaking, be put away from you, with all malice: but be ye kind one to another, tender-hearted, forgiving one another, even as God in Christ hath forgiven you."[4] Why, therefore, do not those who suppose the flesh to be the old man, hasten their own death, in order that by laying aside the old man they may satisfy the apostle's precepts? As for ourselves, we believe that the whole of faith is to be administered *in* the flesh, nay more, *by* the flesh, which has both a mouth for the utterance of all holy words, and a tongue to refrain from blasphemy, and a heart to avoid all irritation, and hands to labour and to give; while we also maintain that as well the old man as the new has relation to the difference of moral

[1] [We treat "homines" as a nominative, after Oehler.]
[2] [Eph. iv. 22.] [3] [Gal. v. 19.] [4] [Eph. iv. 25–32.]

conduct, and not to any discrepancy of nature. And just as we acknowledge that that which according to its former conversation was "the old man" was also corrupt, and received its very name in accordance with "its deceitful lusts," so also [do we hold] that it is "the old man in reference to its former conversation,"[1] and not in respect of the flesh through any permanent dissolution. Moreover, it is still unimpaired in the flesh, and identical [in that nature, even when it has become "the new man"]; since it is of its sinful course of life, and not of its corporeal substance, that it has been divested.

CHAP. XLVI.—*It is "the works of the flesh," not the* SUBSTANCE *of the flesh, which St. Paul always condemns.*

You may notice that the apostle everywhere condemns the works of the flesh in such a way as to appear to condemn the flesh; but no one can suppose him to have any such view as this, since he goes on to suggest another sense, even though somewhat resembling it. For when he actually declares that "they who are in the flesh cannot please God," he immediately recalls the statement from an heretical sense to a sound one, by adding, "But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit."[2] Now, by denying them to be in the flesh who yet obviously were in the flesh, he showed that they were not living amidst the works of the flesh, and therefore that they who could not please God were not those who were in the flesh, but only those who were living after the flesh; whereas they pleased God, who, although existing in the flesh, were yet walking after the Spirit. And, again, he says that "the body is dead;" but it is "because of sin," even as "the Spirit is life because of righteousness."[3] When, however, he thus sets life in opposition to the death which is constituted in the flesh, he unquestionably promises the life of righteousness to the same state for which he determined the death of sin. But unmeaning is this opposition which he makes between the "life" and the "death," if the life is not there where that very thing is to which he opposes it—even

[1] [Eph. iv. 22.] [2] [Rom. viii. 8, 9.] [3] [Ver. 10.]

the death which is to be extirpated of course from the body. Now, if life thus extirpates death from the body, it can accomplish this only by penetrating thither where that is which it is excluding. But why am I resorting to knotty arguments,[1] when the apostle treats the subject with perfect plainness? "For if," says he, "the Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, He that raised up Jesus from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you;"[2] so that even if a person were to assume that the soul is "the mortal body," he would (since he cannot possibly deny that the flesh is this also) be constrained to acknowledge a restoration even of the flesh, in consequence of its participation in the selfsame state. From the following words, moreover, you may learn that it is the works of the flesh which are condemned, and not the flesh itself: "Therefore, brethren, we are debtors, not [to the flesh], to live after the flesh: for if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die; but if ye, through the Spirit, do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live."[3] Now (that I may answer each point separately), since salvation is promised to those who are living in the flesh, but walking after the Spirit, it is no longer the flesh which is an adversary to salvation, but the working of the flesh. When, however, this operativeness of the flesh is done away with, which is the cause of death, the flesh is shown to be safe, since it is freed from the cause of death. "For the law," says he, "of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death,"[4] —that, surely, which he previously mentioned as dwelling in our members.[5] Our members, therefore, will no longer be subject to the law of death, because they cease to serve that of sin, from [both] which they have been set free. "For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and through[6] sin condemned sin in the flesh"[7]—not

[1] Nodosius. [2] [Rom. viii. 11.] [3] [Vers. 12, 13.]
[4] [Ver. 2.] [5] [Rom. vii. 17, 20, 23.]
[6] Per delinquentiam [see the *De Carne Christi*, xvi.].
[7] [Rom. viii. 3.]

the flesh in sin, for the house is not to be condemned with its inhabitant. He said, indeed, that "sin dwelleth in our body."[1] But the condemnation of sin is the acquittal of the flesh, just as its non-condemnation subjugates it to the law of sin and death. In like manner, he called "the carnal mind" first "death,"[2] and afterwards "enmity against God;"[3] but he never predicated this of the flesh itself. But to what then, you will say, must the carnal mind be ascribed, if it be not to the [carnal] substance itself? I will allow your objection, if you will prove to me that the flesh has any discernment of its own. If, however, it has no conception of anything without the soul, you must understand that the carnal mind must be referred to the soul, although ascribed sometimes to the flesh, on the ground that it is ministered to for the flesh and through the flesh. And therefore [the apostle] says that "sin dwelleth in the flesh," because the soul by which sin is provoked has its temporary lodging in the flesh, which is doomed indeed to death, not however on its own account, but on account of sin. For he says in another passage also: "How is it that you conduct yourselves as if you were even now living in the world?"[4] where he is not writing to dead persons, but to those who ought to have ceased to live after the ways of the world.

CHAP. XLVII.—*St. Paul, all through, promises eternal life to the body.*

For that must be living after the world, which, as the old man, he declares to be "crucified with Christ,"[5] not as a bodily structure, but as moral behaviour. Besides, if we do not understand it in this sense, it is not our bodily frame which has been transfixed [at all events], nor has our flesh endured the cross of Christ; but the sense is that which he has subjoined, "that the body of sin might be made void,"[6] by an amendment of life, not by a destruction of the sub-

[1] [Rom. vii. 20.] [2] [Rom. viii. 6.] [3] [Ver. 7.]
[4] [Col. ii. 20.] [5] [Rom. vi. 6.]
[6] Evacuetur [καταργηθῇ. A. V. *destroyed* (deprived of all activity), Rom. vi. 6].

stance, as he goes on to say, "that henceforth we should not serve sin;"[1] and that we should believe ourselves to be "dead with Christ," in such a manner as that "we shall also live with Him."[2] On the same principle he says: "Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be dead indeed."[3] To what? To the flesh? No, but "unto sin."[4] Accordingly as to the flesh they will be saved—"alive unto God in Christ Jesus,"[5] through the flesh of course, to which they will not be dead; since it is "unto sin," and not to the flesh, that they are dead. For he pursues the point still further: "Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey it, and that ye should yield your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin: but yield ye yourselves unto God, as those that are alive from the dead"—not simply alive, but as alive from the dead—"and your members as instruments of righteousness."[6] And again: "As ye have yielded your members servants of uncleanness, and of iniquity unto iniquity, even so now yield your members servants of righteousness unto holiness; for whilst ye were the servants of sin, ye were free from righteousness. What fruit had ye then in those things of which ye are now ashamed? For the end of those things is death. But now, being made free from sin, and become servants to God, ye have your fruit unto holiness, and the end everlasting life. For the wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord."[7] Thus throughout this series of passages, whilst withdrawing our members from unrighteousness and sin, and applying them to righteousness and holiness, and transferring the same from the wages of death to the donative of eternal life, he undoubtedly promises to the flesh the recompense of salvation. Now it would not at all have been consistent that any rule of holiness and righteousness should be especially enjoined for the flesh, if the reward of such a discipline were not also within its reach; nor could even

[1] [Rom. vi. 6. Tertullian's reading, literally, is, "that thus far (and no further) we should be servants of sin."]

[2] [Ver. 8.] [3] [Ver. 11.] [4] [Ver. 11.]

[5] [Ver. 11.] [6] [Vers. 12, 13.] [7] [Vers. 19–23.]

baptism be properly ordered for the flesh, if by its regeneration a course were not inaugurated tending to its restitution; the apostle himself suggesting this idea: "Know ye not, that so many of us as are baptized into Jesus Christ, are baptized into His death? We are therefore buried with Him by baptism into death, that just as Christ was raised up from the dead, even so we also should walk in newness of life."[1] And that you may not suppose that this is said merely of that life which we have to walk in the newness of, through baptism, by faith, the apostle with superlative forethought adds: "For if we have been planted together in the likeness of Christ's death, we shall be also in the likeness of His resurrection."[2] By a figure we die in our baptism, but in a reality we rise again in the flesh, even as Christ did, "that, as sin has reigned in death, so also grace might reign through righteousness unto life eternal, through Jesus Christ our Lord."[3] But how so, unless equally in the flesh? For where the death is, there too must be the life after the death, because also the life was first there, where the death subsequently was. Now, if the dominion of death operates only in the dissolution of the flesh, in like manner death's contrary, life, ought to produce the contrary effect, even the restoration of the flesh; so that, just as death had swallowed it up in its strength, it also, after this mortal was swallowed up of immortality, may hear the challenge pronounced against it: "O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?"[4] For in this way "grace shall there much more abound, where sin once abounded."[5] In this way also "shall strength be made perfect in weakness,"[6]—saving what is lost, reviving what is dead, healing what is stricken, curing what is faint, redeeming what is lost, freeing what is enslaved, recalling what has strayed, raising what is fallen; and this from earth to heaven, where (as the apostle teaches the Philippians) "we have our citizenship,[7] from whence also we look for our Saviour Jesus Christ, who shall

[1] [Rom. vi. 3, 4.] [2] [Ver. 5.] [3] [Rom. v. 21.]
[4] [1 Cor. xv. 55.] [5] [Rom. v. 20.] [6] [2 Cor. xii. 9.]
[7] Municipatum.

change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto His glorious body"[1]—of course after the resurrection, because Christ Himself was not glorified before He suffered. These must be "the bodies" which he "beseeches" the Romans to "present" as "a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God."[2] But how a *living* sacrifice, if these bodies are to perish? How a *holy* one, if they are profanely soiled? How *acceptable to God*, if they are condemned? Come, now, tell me how that passage [in the Epistle] to the Thessalonians—which, because of its clearness, I should suppose to have been written with a sunbeam—is understood by our heretics, who shun the light of Scripture: "And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly." And as if this were not plain enough, it goes on to say: "And may your whole body, and soul, and spirit be preserved blameless unto the coming of the Lord."[3] Here you have the entire substance of man destined to salvation, and *that* at no other time than at the coming of the Lord, which is the key of the resurrection.

CHAP. XLVIII.—*Sundry passages in the great chapter of the resurrection of the dead explained in defence of our doctrine.*

But "flesh and blood," you say, "cannot inherit the kingdom of God."[4] We are quite aware that this too is written; but we have intentionally reserved the objection [founded on this passage] until now, in order that we may in our last assault overthrow it (although our opponents place it in the front of the battle), after we have removed out of the way all the questions which are auxiliary to it. However, they must contrive to recall to their mind even now our preceding [arguments], in order that the occasion which originally suggested this passage may assist our judgment in arriving at its meaning. The apostle, as I take it, having set forth for the Corinthians the details of their church discipline, had summed up the substance of his own gospel, and of their belief in an exposition of the Lord's death and resurrection, for the purpose of deducing therefrom the rule

[1] [Phil. iii. 20, 21.]
[2] [Rom. xii. 1.]
[3] [1 Thess. v. 23.]
[4] [1 Cor. xv. 50.]

of our hope, and the groundwork thereof. Accordingly he subjoins this statement: "Now if Christ be preached that He rose from the dead, how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead? If there be no [resurrection of the dead], then Christ is not risen: and if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God; because we have testified of God that He raised up Christ, whom He raised not up, [if so be that the dead rise not]. For if the dead rise not, then is not Christ raised: and if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain, because ye are yet in your sins, and they which have fallen asleep in Christ are perished."[1] Now, what is the point which he evidently labours hard to make us believe throughout this passage? The resurrection of the dead, you say, which was denied: he certainly wished it to be believed on the strength of the example which he adduced — the Lord's resurrection. Certainly, you say. Well now, is an example borrowed from different circumstances, or from like ones? From like ones, by all means, is your answer. How then did Christ rise again? In the flesh, or not? No doubt, since you are told that He "died according to the Scriptures,"[2] and "that He was buried [according to the Scriptures],"[3] no otherwise than in the flesh, you will also allow that it was in the flesh that He was raised from the dead. For the very same body which fell in death, and which lay in the sepulchre, did also rise again; [and it was] not so much Christ in the flesh, as the flesh in Christ. If, therefore, we are to rise again after the example of Christ, who rose in the flesh, we shall certainly not rise according to that example, unless we also shall ourselves rise again in the flesh. "For," he says, "since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead."[4] [This he says] in order, on the one hand, to distinguish the two authors—Adam of death, Christ of resurrection; and, on the other hand, to make the resurrection operate on the same substance as the death, by comparing the authors themselves under the designation "*man*." For if "as in

[1] [1 Cor. xv. 12–18.] [2] [Ver. 3.] [3] [Ver. 4.] [4] [Ver. 21.]

Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive,"[1] their vivification in Christ must be in the flesh, since it is in the flesh that arises their death in Adam. "But every man in his own order,"[2] because of course [it will be] also [every man] in his own body. For the *order* will be arranged severally, on account of the individual merits. Now, as the merits must be ascribed to the body, it must needs follow that the order also should be arranged in respect of the bodies, that it may be in relation to their merits. But inasmuch as "some are also baptized for the dead,"[3] we will see whether there be a good reason for this. Now it is certain that they adopted this [practice] with such a presumption as made them suppose that the vicarious baptism [in question] would be beneficial to the flesh of another in anticipation of the resurrection; for unless it were a bodily [resurrection], there would be no pledge secured by this process of a corporeal baptism. "Why are they then baptized for the dead,"[4] he asks, unless the bodies rise again which are thus baptized? For it is not the soul which is sanctified by the baptismal bath:[5] its sanctification comes from the "answer."[6] "And why," he inquires, "stand we in jeopardy every hour?"[7] —meaning, of course, through the flesh. "I die daily,"[8] [says he]; that is, undoubtedly, in the perils of the body, in which "he even fought with beasts at Ephesus,"[9]—even with those beasts which caused him such peril and trouble in Asia, to which he alludes in his second epistle to the same church [of Corinth]: "For we would not, brethren, have you ignorant of our trouble which came to us in Asia, that we were pressed above measure, above strength, insomuch that we despaired even of life."[10] Now, if I mistake not, he enumerates all these particulars in order that, in his unwillingness to have his conflicts in the flesh supposed to be useless, he may induce an unfaltering belief in the resurrection of the flesh. For useless must that conflict be deemed [which is sustained

[1] [1 Cor. xv. 22.] [2] [Ver. 23.] [3] [Ver. 29.]
[4] [Ver. 29.] [5] Lavatione. [6] [Comp. 1 Pet. iii. 21.]
[7] [1 Cor. xv. 30.] [8] [Ver. 31.] [9] [Ver. 32.]
[10] [2 Cor. i. 8.]

in a body] for which no resurrection is in prospect. "But some man will say, How are the dead to be raised? And with what body will they come?"[1] Now here he discusses the qualities of bodies, whether it be the very same, or different ones, which men are to resume. Since, however, such a question as this must be regarded as a subsequent one, it will in passing be enough for us that the resurrection is determined to be a bodily one even from this, that it is about the quality of *bodies* that the inquiry arises.

CHAP. XLIX.—*The same subject continued. What does the apostle exclude from the dead? Certainly not the substance of the flesh.*

We come now to the very gist[2] of the whole question: What are the substances, and of what nature are they, which the apostle has disinherited of the kingdom of God? The preceding statements give us a clue to this point also. He says [here]: The first man is of the earth, earthy—that is, made of dust, that is, Adam; the second man is from heaven[3]—that is, the Word of God, which is Christ, in no other way, however, *man* (although "from heaven"), than as being Himself flesh and soul, just as a human being is, just as Adam was. Indeed, in a previous passage He is called "the second Adam,"[4] deriving the identity of His name from His participation in the substance, because not even Adam was flesh of human seed, in which Christ is also like him.[5] "As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy; and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly."[6] *Such* [does he mean] in substance? or first of all in training, and afterwards in the dignity and worth which that training aimed at acquiring? Not in substance, however, by any means will the earthy and the heavenly be separated, designated as they have been by the apostle once for all, as *men*. For even if Christ were the only true "heavenly," nay, super-celestial

[1] [1 Cor. xv. 35.] [2] Ad carnem et sanguinem revera.
[3] [1 Cor. xv. 47.] [4] [Ver. 45.]
[5] [See Tertullian's *De Carne Christi*, ch. xvi.] [6] [1 Cor. xv. 48.]

Being, He is still man, as composed of body and soul; and in no respect is He separated from the quality of "earthiness," owing to that condition of His which makes Him a partaker of both substances. In like manner, those also who after Him are heavenly, are understood to have this celestial quality predicated of them not from their present nature, but from their future glory; because in a preceding sentence, which originated this distinction respecting difference of dignity, there was shown to be "one glory in celestial bodies, and another in terrestrial ones,"[1]—"one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars: for even one star differeth from another star in glory,"[2] although not in substance. Then, after having thus premised the difference in that worth or dignity which is even now to be aimed at, and then at last to be enjoyed, the apostle adds an exhortation, that we should both here in our training follow the example of Christ, and there attain His eminence in glory: "As we have borne the image of the earthy, let us also bear the image of the heavenly."[3] We have indeed borne the image of the earthy, by our sharing in his transgression, by our participation in his death, by our banishment from Paradise. Now, although the image of Adam is here borne by us in the flesh, yet we are not exhorted to put off the flesh; but if not the flesh, it is the conversation, in order that we may then bear the image of the heavenly in ourselves,—no longer indeed [the image] of God, and no longer [the image] of a Being whose state is in heaven; but after the lineaments of Christ, by our walking here in holiness, righteousness, and truth. And so wholly intent on the inculcation of moral conduct is he throughout this passage, that he tells us we ought to bear the image of Christ in this flesh of ours, and in this period of instruction and discipline. For when he says "*let us bear*" in the imperative mood, he suits his words to the present life, in which man exists in no other substance than as flesh and soul; or if it is another, even the heavenly, substance to which this faith [of ours] looks forward, yet the promise is made to that [substance] to which

[1] [1 Cor. xv. 40.] [2] [Ver. 41.] [3] [Ver. 49.]

the injunction is given to labour earnestly to merit its reward. Since, therefore, he makes the image both of the earthy and the heavenly consist of moral conduct—the one to be abjured, and the other to be pursued—and then consistently adds, "For this I say" (on account, that is, of what I have already said, because the conjunction "*for*" connects what follows with the preceding words), "that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God,"[1]—he means the flesh and blood to be understood in no other sense than the before-mentioned "image of the earthy;" and since this is reckoned to consist in "the old conversation,"[2] which old conversation receives not the kingdom of God, therefore flesh and blood, by not receiving the kingdom of God, are reduced to the [life of the] old conversation. Of course, as the apostle has never put the substance for the works [of man], he cannot use such a construction here. Since, however, he has declared of men which are yet alive in the flesh, that they "are not in the flesh,"[3] meaning that they are not living in the works of the flesh, you ought not to subvert its form nor its substance, but only the works done in the substance [of the flesh], alienating us from the kingdom of God. It is after displaying to the Galatians these pernicious works that he professes to warn them beforehand, even as he had "told them in time past, that they which do such things should not inherit the kingdom of God,"[4] even because they bore not the image of the heavenly, as they had borne the image of the earthy; and so, in consequence of their old conversation, they were to be regarded as nothing else than flesh and blood. But even if the apostle had abruptly thrown out the sentence that flesh and blood must be excluded from the kingdom of God, without any previous intimation of his meaning, would it not have been equally our duty to interpret these two substances as the old man abandoned to mere flesh and blood—in other words, to eating and drinking, one feature of which would be to speak against the faith of the resurrection: "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die."[5] Now, when the

[1] [1 Cor. xv. 50.] [2] [See Eph. iv. 22.] [3] [Rom. viii. 9.]
[4] [Gal. v. 21.] [5] [1 Cor. xv. 32.]

apostle parenthetically inserted this, he censured flesh and blood because of their enjoyment in eating and drinking.

Chap. L.—*In what sense "flesh and blood" are excluded from the kingdom of God.*

Putting aside, however, all interpretations of this sort, which criminate the works of the flesh and blood, it may be permitted me to claim for the resurrection these very substances, understood in none other than their natural sense. For it is not the resurrection that is directly denied to flesh and blood, but the kingdom of God, which is incidental to[1] the resurrection (for there is a resurrection of judgment[2] also); and there is even a confirmation of the general resurrection of the flesh, whenever a special one is excepted. Now, when it is clearly stated what the condition is to which the resurrection does not lead, it is understood what that is to which it does lead; and, therefore, whilst it is in consideration of [men's] merits that a difference is made in their resurrection by their conduct in the flesh, and not by the substance thereof, it is evident even from this, that flesh and blood are excluded from the kingdom of God in respect of their sin, not of their substance; and although in respect of their natural condition[3] they will rise again for the judgment, because they rise not for the kingdom. Again, I will say, "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God;"[4] and justly [does the apostle declare this of them, considered] alone and in themselves, in order to show that the Spirit is still needed [to qualify them] for the kingdom.[5] For it is "the Spirit that quickeneth" [us] for the kingdom of God; "the flesh profiteth nothing."[6] There is, however, something else which can be profitable thereunto, that is, the Spirit; and through the Spirit, the works also of the Spirit. Flesh and blood, therefore, must in every case rise again, equally, in their proper quality. But they to whom it is

[1] Obvenit.
[2] [A. V. "*damnation*," John v. 29.]
[3] Forma.
[4] [1 Cor. xv. 50.]
[5] [This must be the meaning of the dative "illi."]
[6] [John vi. 63.]

granted to enter the kingdom of God, will have to put on the power of an incorruptible and immortal life; for without this, [or] before they are able to obtain it, they cannot enter into the kingdom of God. With good reason, then, flesh and blood, as we have already said, by themselves fail to obtain the kingdom of God. But inasmuch as "this corruptible (that is, the flesh) must put on incorruption, and this mortal (that is, the blood) must put on immortality,"[1] by the change which is to follow the resurrection, it will, for the best of reasons, happen that flesh and blood, after that change and investiture,[2] will become able to inherit the kingdom of God—but not without the resurrection. Some will have it, that by the phrase "flesh and blood," because of its rite of circumcision, Judaism is meant, which is itself too alienated from the kingdom of God, as being accounted "the old or former conversation," and as being designated by this title in another passage of the apostle also, who, "when it pleased God to reveal to him His Son, to preach Him amongst the heathen, immediately conferred not with flesh and blood," as he writes to the Galatians,[3] [meaning by the phrase] the circumcision, that is to say, Judaism.

CHAP. LI.—*The session of Jesus in His incarnate nature at the right hand of God a guarantee of the resurrection of our flesh.*

That, however, which we have reserved for a concluding argument, will now stand as a plea for all, and for the apostle himself, who in very deed would have to be charged with extreme indiscretion, if he had so abruptly, as some will have it, and (as they say) blindfold, and so indiscriminately, and so unconditionally, excluded from the kingdom of God, and indeed from the court of heaven itself, all flesh and blood whatsoever; since Jesus is still sitting there at the

[1] [1 Cor. xv. 53.]

[2] [We have kept this word to suit the last Scripture quotation; but Tertullian's word, both here and in the quotation, is "devorata," swallowed up.]

[3] [See i. 15, 16.]

right hand of the Father,[1] man, yet God—the last Adam,[2] yet the primary Word—flesh and blood, yet purer than ours —who "shall descend in like manner as He ascended [into heaven]," [3] the same both in substance and form, as the angels affirmed,[4] so as even to be recognised by those who pierced Him.[5] Designated, as He is, "the Mediator [6] between God and man," He keeps in His own self the deposit of the flesh which has been committed to Him by both parties—the pledge and security of its entire perfection. For as "He has given to us the earnest of the Spirit," [7] so has He received from us the earnest of the flesh, and has carried it with Him into heaven as a pledge of that complete entirety which is one day to be restored to it. Be not disquieted, O flesh and blood, with any care; in Christ you have acquired both heaven and the kingdom of God. Otherwise, if they say that you are not in Christ, let them also say that Christ is not in heaven, since they have denied you heaven. Likewise "neither shall corruption," says he, "inherit incorruption." [8] [This he says], not that you may take flesh and blood to be corruption, for they are themselves rather the subjects of corruption,—I mean through death, since death does not so much corrupt, as actually consume, our flesh and blood. But inasmuch as he had plainly said that the works of the flesh and blood could not obtain the kingdom of God, with the view of stating this with accumulated stress, he deprived corruption itself—that is, death, which profits so largely by the works of the flesh and blood —from all inheritance of incorruption. For a little afterwards, he has described what is, as it were, the death of death itself: "Death," says he, "is swallowed up in victory. O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory? The sting of death is sin"—here is the *corruption;* "and the strength of sin is the law" [9]—that other law, no doubt, which

[1] [Mark xvi. 19.] [2] [1 Cor. xv. 45.] [3] [Acts i. 9.]
[4] [Ver. 10.] [5] [Zech. xii. 10; John xix. 37; Rev. i. 7.]
[6] [1 Tim. ii. 5. (Tertullian's word is "sequester," the guardian of a deposit.)]
[7] [2 Cor. v. 5.] [8] [1 Cor. xv. 50.] [9] [1 Cor. xv. 54–56.]

he has described "in his members as warring against the law of his mind,"[1]—meaning, of course, the actual power of sinning against his will. Now he says in a previous passage [of our Epistle to the Corinthians], that "the last enemy to be destroyed is death."[2] In this way, then, it is that corruption shall not inherit incorruption; in other words, death shall not continue. When and how shall it cease? In that "moment, that twinkling of an eye, at the last trump, when the dead shall rise incorruptible."[3] But what are these, if not they who were corruptible before—that is, our bodies; in other words, our flesh and blood? And we undergo the change. But in what condition, if not in that wherein we shall be found? "For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality."[4] What mortal is this but the flesh? what corruptible but the blood. Moreover, that you may not suppose the apostle to have any other meaning, in his care to teach you, and that you may understand him seriously to apply his statement to the flesh, when he says "*this* corruptible" and "*this* mortal," he utters the words while touching the surface of his own body.[5] He certainly could not have pronounced these phrases except in reference to an object which was palpable and apparent. The expression indicates a bodily exhibition. Moreover, a corruptible body is one thing, and corruption is another; so a mortal body is one thing, and mortality is another. For that which suffers is one thing, and that which causes it to suffer is another. Consequently, those things which are subject to corruption and mortality, even the flesh and blood, must needs also be susceptible of incorruption and immortality.

CHAP. LII.—*From St. Paul's analogy of* THE SEED *we learn that the body which died will rise again, garnished with the appliances of eternal life.*

Let us now see in what body he asserts that the dead will come. And with a felicitous sally he proceeds at once to

[1] [Rom. vii. 23.] [2] [1 Cor. xv. 26.] [3] [Ver. 52.] [4] [Ver. 53.]
[5] Cutem ipsam. [Rufinus says that in the church of Aquileia they

illustrate the point, as if an objector had plied him with some such question. "Thou fool;" says he, "that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die."[1] From this example of the *seed* it is then evident that no other flesh is quickened than that which shall have undergone death, and therefore all the rest of the question will become clear enough. For nothing which is incompatible with the idea suggested by the example can possibly be understood; nor from the clause which follows, "That which thou sowest, thou sowest not the body which shall be,"[2] are you permitted to suppose that in the resurrection a different body is to arise from that which is sown in death. Otherwise you have run away from the example. For if wheat be sown and dissolved in the ground, barley does not spring up. Still it is not[3] the very same grain in kind; nor is its nature the same, or its quality and form. Then whence [comes it], if it is not the very same? For even the decay is [a proof of] the thing itself, since it is [the decay] of the actual [grain]. Well, but does not the apostle himself suggest in what sense it is that "the body which shall be" is not the body which is sown, even when he says, "But bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain; but God giveth it a body as it pleaseth Him?"[4] [Gives it] of course to the grain which he says is sown bare. No doubt, you say. Then the grain is safe enough, to which God has to assign a body. But how safe, if it is nowhere in existence, if it does not rise again, if it rises not again its actual self? If it rises not again, it is not safe; [and] if it is not even safe, it cannot receive a body from God. But there is every possible proof that it is safe. For what purpose, therefore, will God give it "a body, as it pleases Him," even when it already has its own "bare" body, unless it be that in its resurrection it may be no longer bare? That therefore will be additional matter which is placed over the [bare] body; nor is that at all de-

touched their persons when they recited the clause of the creed which they rendered "the resurrection of *this* body."]

[1] [1 Cor. xv. 36.]

[2] [Ver. 37.]

[3] [An objection of the opponent.]

[4] [Vers. 37, 38.]

stroyed on which the superimposed matter is put,—nay, it is increased. That, however, is safe which receives augmentation. The truth is, it is sown the barest grain, without a husk to cover it, without a spike even in germ, without the protection of a bearded top, without the glory of a stalk. It rises, however, out of the furrow enriched with a copious crop, built up in a compact fabric, constructed in a [beautiful] order, fortified by cultivation, and clothed around on every side. These are the circumstances which make it another body from God, to which it is changed not by abolition, but by amplification. And to every seed [God] has assigned its own body[1]—not, indeed, its own in the sense of its primitive body—in order that what it acquires from God extrinsically may also at last be accounted its own. Cleave firmly then to the example, and keep it well in view, as a mirror of what happens to the flesh: believe that the very same [flesh] which was once sown [in death], will bear fruit [in resurrection-life]—the same in essence, only more full and perfect; not another, although reappearing in another form. For it shall receive in itself the grace and ornament which God shall please to spread over it, according to its merits. Unquestionably it is in this sense that he says, "All flesh is not the same flesh;"[2] meaning not to deny a community of substance, but a parity of prerogative, —reducing the body to a difference of honour, not of nature. With this view he adds, in a figurative sense, certain examples of animals and heavenly bodies: "There is one flesh of man" (that is, servants of God, but really human), "another flesh of beasts" (that is, the heathen, of whom the prophet actually says, "Man is like the senseless cattle"[3]), "another flesh of birds" (that is, the martyrs which essay to mount up to heaven), "another of fishes" (that is, those whom the water of baptism has submerged).[4] In like manner does he take examples from the heavenly bodies: "There is one glory of the sun" (that is, of Christ), "and another glory of the moon" (that is, of the church), "and

[1] [1 Cor. xv. 38.]
[2] [Ver. 39.]
[3] [Ps. xlix. 20 (Sept.).]
[4] [1 Cor. xv. 39.]

another glory of the stars" (in other words, of the seed of Abraham). "For one star differeth from another star in glory: so there are bodies terrestrial as well as celestial" (Jews, that is, as well as Christians).[1] Now, if this language is not to be construed figuratively, it was absurd enough for him to make a contrast between the flesh of mules and kites, as well as the heavenly bodies and human bodies; for they admit of no comparison as to their condition, nor in respect of their attainment of a resurrection. Then at last, having conclusively shown by his examples that the difference was one of glory, not of substance, he adds: "So also is the resurrection of the dead."[2] How so? In no other way than as differing in glory only. For again, predicating the resurrection of the same substance, and returning once more to [his comparison of] the grain, he says: "It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body."[3] Now, certainly nothing else is raised than that which is sown; and nothing else is sown than that which decays in the ground; and it is nothing else than the flesh which is decayed in the ground. For this was the substance which God's decree demolished, "Earth thou art, and to earth shalt thou return;"[4] because it was taken out of the earth. And it was from this circumstance that the apostle borrowed his phrase of the flesh being "sown," since it returns to the ground, and the ground is the grand depository for seeds which are meant to be deposited in it, and again sought out of it. And therefore he confirms the passage afresh, by putting on it the impress [of his own inspired authority], saying, "For so it is written;"[5] that you may not suppose that the "being sown" means anything else than "thou shalt return to the ground, out of which thou wast taken;" nor that the phrase "for so it is written" refers to any other thing than the flesh.

[1] [1 Cor. xv. 41.] [2] [Ver. 42.] [3] [Vers. 42–44.]
[4] [Gen. iii. 19.] [5] [1 Cor. xv. 45.]

CHAP. LIII.—*Not the soul, but the natural body which died, is that which is to rise again. The resurrection of Lazarus commented on. Christ's resurrection, as* THE SECOND ADAM, *guarantees our own.*

Some, however, contend that the *soul* is "the natural [or animate] body,"[1] with the view of withdrawing the *flesh* from all connection with the risen body. Now, since it is a clear and fixed point that the body which is to rise again is that which was sown [in death], they must be challenged to an examination of the very fact itself. Else let them show that the soul was sown after death; in a word, that it underwent death,—that is, was demolished, dismembered, dissolved in the ground, nothing of which was ever decreed against it by God: let them display to our view its corruptibility and dishonour [as well as] its weakness, that it may also accrue to it to rise again in incorruption, and in glory, and in power.[2] Now in the case of Lazarus, [which we may take as] the palmary instance of a resurrection, the flesh lay prostrate in weakness, the flesh was almost putrid in the dishonour [of its decay], the flesh stank in corruption, and yet it was as *flesh* that Lazarus rose again—with his soul, no doubt. But that soul was incorrupt; nobody had wrapped it in its linen swathes; nobody had deposited it in a grave; nobody had yet perceived it "stink;" nobody for four days had seen it "sown." Well, now, this entire condition, this whole end of Lazarus, the flesh indeed of all men is still experiencing, but the soul of no one. That substance, therefore, to which the apostle's whole description manifestly refers, of which he clearly speaks, must be both the natural [or animate] body when it is sown, and the spiritual body when it is raised again. For in order that you may understand it in this sense, he points to this same conclusion, when in like

[1] What in our version is rendered "*a natural body*," is St. Paul's σῶμα ψυχικόν, which the heretics held to be merely a periphrasis for ψυχή. We have rendered Tertullian's phrase *corpus animale* by "animate body," the better to suit the argument.]

[2] [1 Cor. xv. 42, 43.]

manner, on the authority of the same passage of Scripture, he displays to us "the first man Adam as made a living soul."[1] Now since Adam was the first man, since also the flesh was man prior to the soul,[2] it undoubtedly follows that it was the flesh that became the living soul. Moreover, since it was a bodily substance that assumed this condition, it was of course the natural [or animate] body that became the living soul. By what designation would they have it called, except that which it became through the soul, except that which it was not previous to the soul, except that which it can never be after the soul, but through its resurrection? For after it has recovered the soul, it once more becomes the natural [or animate] body, in order that it may become a spiritual body. For it only resumes in the resurrection the condition which it once had. There is therefore by no means the same good reason why the *soul* should be called the natural [or animate] body, which the *flesh* has for bearing that designation. The flesh, in fact, was a body before it was an animate body. When the flesh was joined by the soul,[3] it then became the natural [or animate] body. Now, although the soul is a corporeal substance,[4] yet, as it is not an animated body, but rather an animating one, it cannot be called the animate [or "natural"] body, nor can it become that thing which it produces. It is indeed when the soul accrues to something else that it makes that thing animate; but unless it so accrues, how will it ever produce animation? As therefore the flesh was at first an animate [or natural] body on receiving the soul, so at last will it become a spiritual body when invested with the spirit. Now the apostle, by severally adducing this order in Adam and in Christ, fairly distinguishes between the two states, in the very essentials of their difference. And when he calls Christ "the last Adam,"[5] you may from this circumstance discover how strenuously he labours to establish

[1] [Compare ver. 45 with Gen. ii. 7.]

[2] [See this put more fully above, c. v., near the end.] [3] Animata.

[4] [See the *De Anima*, v.–ix., for a full statement of Tertullian's view of the soul's corporeality.]

[5] [1 Cor. xv. 45.]

throughout his teaching the resurrection of the flesh, not of the soul. Thus, then, the first man Adam was flesh, not soul, and only afterwards became a living soul; and the last Adam, Christ, was Adam only because He was man, and only man as being flesh, not as being soul. Accordingly the apostle goes on to say: "Howbeit that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterward that which is spiritual,"[1] as in the case of the two Adams. Now, do you not suppose that he is distinguishing between the natural body and the spiritual body in the same flesh, after having already drawn the distinction therein in the two Adams, that is, in the first man and in the last? For from which substance is it that Christ and Adam have a parity with each other? No doubt it is from their flesh, although it may be from their soul also. It is, however, in respect of the flesh that they are both man; for the flesh was man prior [to the soul]. It was actually from it that they were able to take rank, so as to be deemed—one the first, and the other the last man, or Adam. Besides, things which are different in character are only incapable of being arranged in the same order when their diversity is one of substance; for when it is a diversity either in respect of place, or of time, or of condition, they probably do admit of classification together. Here, however, they are called first and last, from the substance of their [common] flesh, just as afterwards again the first man [is said to be] of the earth, and the second of heaven;[2] but although He is "of heaven" in respect of the spirit, He is yet man according to the flesh. Now since it is the flesh, and not the soul, that makes an order [or classification together] in the two Adams compatible, so that the distinction is drawn between them of "the first man becoming a living soul, and the last a quickening spirit,"[3] so in like manner this distinction between them has already suggested the conclusion that the distinction is due to the flesh; so that it is of the flesh that these words speak: "Howbeit that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterward that which is spiritual."[4] And thus,

[1] [1 Cor. xv. 46.] [2] [Ver. 47.] [3] [Ver. 45.] [4] [Ver. 46.]

too, the same [flesh] must be understood in a preceding passage: "That which is sown is the natural body, and that which rises again is the spiritual body; because that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural: since the first Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam a quickening spirit."[1] It is all about man, [and] all about the flesh because about man. What shall we say then? Has not the flesh even now [in this life] the spirit by faith? so that the question still remains to be asked, how it is that the animate [or natural] body can be said to be sown? Surely the flesh has received even here the spirit—but [only its] "earnest;"[2] whereas of the soul [it has received], not the earnest, but the full possession. Therefore it has the name of *animate* [or natural] body, expressly because of the higher substance of the soul [or *anima*], in which it is sown, destined hereafter to become, through the full possession of the spirit which it shall obtain, the spiritual body, in which it is raised again. What wonder, then, if it is more commonly called after the substance with which it is fully furnished, than after that of which it has yet but a sprinkling?

CHAP. LIV.—*Death "swallowed up of life." Meaning of this phrase in relation to the resurrection of the body.*

Then, again, questions very often are suggested by occasional and isolated terms, just as much as they are by connected sentences. Thus, because of the apostle's expression, "that mortality may be swallowed up of life"[3]—in reference to the flesh—they wrest the word *swallowed up* into the sense of the actual destruction of the flesh; as if we might not speak of ourselves as swallowing bile, or swallowing grief, meaning that we conceal and hide it, and keep it within ourselves. The truth is, when it is written, "This mortal must put on immortality,"[4] it is explained in what sense it is that "mortality is swallowed up of life"—even whilst, clothed with immortality, it is hidden and concealed, and contained within it, not as consumed, and destroyed, and lost. But

[1] [1 Cor. xv. 44, 45.]
[2] [2 Cor. i. 22, v. 5, and Eph. i. 14.]
[3] [2 Cor. v. 4.]
[4] [1 Cor. xv. 53.]

death, you will say in reply to me, at this rate, must be safe, even when it has been swallowed up. Well, then, I ask you to distinguish words which are similar in form according to their proper meanings. Death is one thing, and mortality is another. It is one thing for death to be swallowed up, and another thing for mortality to be swallowed up. Death is incapable of immortality, but not so mortality. Besides, as it is written that "this mortal must put on immortality,"[1] how is this possible when it is swallowed up of life? But how is it swallowed up of life, [in the sense of destroyed by it], when it is actually received, and restored, and included in it? For the rest, it is only just and right that death should be swallowed up in utter destruction, since it does itself devour with this same intent. Death, says the apostle, has devoured by exercising its strength, and therefore has been itself devoured in the struggle ["swallowed up in victory"[2]]. "O death, where is thy sting? O death, where is thy victory?"[3] Therefore life, too, as the great antagonist of death, will in the struggle swallow up for salvation what death, in its struggle, had swallowed up for destruction.

CHAP. LV.—*The change of a thing's condition is not the destruction of its substance. The application of this principle to our subject.*

Now although, in proving that the flesh shall rise again, we *ipso facto* prove that no other [flesh] will partake of that resurrection than that which is in question, yet insulated questions and their occasions do require even discussions of their own, even if they have been already sufficiently met. We will therefore give a fuller explanation of the force and the reason of a change which [is so great, that it] almost suggests the presumption that it is a different flesh which is to rise again; as if, indeed, so great a change amounted to utter cessation, and a complete destruction of the former self. A distinction, however, must be made between a *change*, however great, and everything which has the character of *destruction*. For undergoing change is one thing, but being

[1] [1 Cor. xv. 53.] [2] [Ver. 54.] [3] [Ver. 55.]

destroyed is another thing. Now this distinction would no longer exist, if the flesh were to suffer such a change as amounts to destruction. Destroyed, however, it must be by the change, unless it shall itself persistently remain throughout the altered condition which shall be exhibited in the resurrection. For precisely as it perishes, if it does not rise again, so also does it equally perish even if it does rise again, on the supposition that it is lost[1] in the change. It will as much fail of a future existence, as if it did not rise again at all. And how absurd is it to rise again for the purpose of not having a being, when it had it in its power not to rise again, and so lose its being—because it had already begun its non-existence! Now, things which are absolutely different, as mutation and destruction are, will not admit of mixture and confusion; in their operations, too, they differ. One destroys, the other changes. Therefore, as that which is destroyed is not changed, so that which is changed is not destroyed. To perish is altogether to cease to be what a thing once was, whereas to be changed is to exist in another condition. Now, if a thing exists in another condition, it can still be the same thing itself; for since it does not perish, it has its existence still. A change, indeed, it has experienced, but not a destruction. A thing may undergo a complete change, and yet remain still the same thing. In like manner, a man also may be quite himself in substance even in the present life, and for all that undergo various changes—in habit, in bodily bulk, in health, in condition, in dignity, and in age—in taste, business, means, houses, laws and customs—and still lose nothing of his human nature, nor so to be made another man as to cease to be the same; indeed, I ought hardly to say another man, but another thing. This form of change even the Holy Scriptures give us instances of. The hand of Moses is changed, and it becomes like a dead one, bloodless, colourless, and stiff with cold; but on the recovery of heat, and on the restoration of its natural colour, it is again the same flesh and blood.[2] Afterwards the face of the same Moses is changed,[3] with a

[1] [Subducitur.] [2] [Ex. iv. 6, 7.] [3] [Ex. xxxiv. 29, 35.]

brightness which eye could not bear. But he was Moses still, even when he was not visible. So also Stephen had already put on the appearance of an angel,[1] although they were none other than his human knees[2] which bent beneath the stoning. The Lord, again, in the retirement of the mount, had changed His raiment for a robe of light; but He still retained features which Peter could recognise.[3] In that same scene Moses also and Elias gave proof that the same condition of bodily existence may continue even in glory—the one in the likeness of a flesh which he had not yet recovered, the other in the reality of one which he had not yet put off.[4] It was as full of this splendid example that Paul said: "Who shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto His glorious body."[5] But if you maintain that a transfiguration and a conversion amounts to the annihilation of any substance, then it follows that "Saul, when changed into another man,"[6] passed away from his own bodily substance; and that Satan himself, when "transformed into an angel of light,"[7] loses his own proper character. Such is not my opinion. So likewise changes, conversions, and reformations will necessarily take place to bring about the resurrection, but the substance [of the flesh] will still be preserved safe.

CHAP. LVI.—*The procedure of the last judgment, and its awards, only possible on the identity of the risen body with our present flesh.*

For how absurd, and in truth how unjust, and in both respects how unworthy of God, for one substance to do the work, and another to reap the reward: that this flesh of ours should be torn by martyrdom, and another wear the crown; or, on the other hand, that this flesh of ours should wallow in uncleanness, and another receive the condemnation! Is it not better to renounce all faith at once in the hope of the resurrection,[8] than to trifle with the wisdom and justice of

[1] [Acts vi. 15.] [2] [Acts vii. 59, 60.] [3] [Matt. xvii. 2–4.]
[4] [Ver. 3.] [5] [Phil. iii. 21.] [6] [1 Sam. x. 6.]
[7] [2 Cor. xi. 14.] [8] [With Marcion.]

God?[1] Better that Marcion should rise again than Valentinus. For it cannot be believed that the mind, or the memory, or the conscience of existing man is abolished by putting on that change of raiment which immortality and incorruption supplies; for in that case all the gain and fruit of the resurrection, and the permanent effect[2] of God's judgment both on soul and body,[3] would certainly fall to the ground. If I remember not that it is I who have served Him, how shall I ascribe glory to God? How sing to Him "the new song,"[4] if I am ignorant that it is I who owe Him thanks? But why is exception taken only against the change of the flesh, and not of the soul also, which in all things is superior to the flesh? How happens it, that the selfsame soul which in our present flesh has gone through all life's course, which has learnt the knowledge of God, and put on Christ, and sown the hope of salvation in this flesh, must reap its harvest in another flesh of which we know nothing? Verily that must be a most highly favoured flesh, which shall have the enjoyment of life at so gratuitous a rate! But if the soul is not to be changed also, then there is no resurrection of the soul; nor will it be believed to have itself risen, unless it has risen some different thing.

CHAP. LVII.—*Our bodies, however mutilated before or after death, shall recover their perfect integrity in the resurrection. Illustration of the enfranchised slave.*

We now come to the most usual cavil of unbelief. If, they say, it be actually the selfsame substance which is recalled [to life] with all its form, and lineaments, and quality, then why not with all its other characteristics? Then the blind, and the lame, and the palsied, and whoever else may have passed away with any conspicuous mark, will return again with the same. What now is the fact, although you in the greatness of your conceit[5] thus disdain to accept from God so vast a grace? Does it not happen that, when you now admit the salvation of only the soul, you ascribe it to

[1] [With Valentinus.] [2] Statu. [3] Utrobique.
[4] [Rev. v. 9, xiv. 3.] [5] Qualiscunque.

men at the cost of half their nature? What is the good of believing in the resurrection, unless your faith embraces the whole of it? If the flesh is to be repaired after its dissolution, much more will it be restored after some violent injury. Greater cases prescribe rules for lesser ones. Is not the amputation or the crushing of a limb the death of that limb? Now, if the death of the whole person is rescinded by his resurrection, what must we say of the death of a part of him? If we are changed for glory, how much more for integrity, [or the recovery of our entire person]! Any loss sustained by our bodies is an accident to them, but their entirety is their natural property. In this condition we are born. Even if we become injured in the womb, this is loss suffered by what is already a human being. Natural condition[1] is prior to injury. As life is bestowed by God, so is it restored by Him. As we are when we receive it, so are we when we recover it. To nature, not to injury, are we restored; to our state by birth, not to our condition by accident, do we rise again. If God raises not men entire, He raises not the dead. For what dead man is entire, although he dies entire? Who is without hurt, that is without life? What body is uninjured, when it is dead, when it is cold, when it is ghastly, when it is stiff, when it is a corpse? When is a man more infirm, than when he is entirely infirm? When more palsied, than when quite motionless? Thus, for a dead man to be raised again, amounts to nothing short of his being restored to his entire condition,—lest he, forsooth, be still dead in that part in which he has not risen again. God is quite able to re-make what He once made. This power and this unstinted grace of His He has already sufficiently guaranteed in Christ; and has displayed Himself to us [in Him] not only as the restorer of the flesh, but as the repairer of its breaches. And so the apostle says: "The dead shall be raised incorruptible" [or unimpaired].[2] But how so, unless they become entire, who have wasted away either in the loss of their health, or in the long decrepitude of the grave? For when he propounds the two clauses, that "this

[1] Genus.

[2] [1 Cor. xv. 52.]

corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality,"[1] he does not repeat the same statement, but sets forth a distinction. For, by assigning *immortality* to the repealing of death, and *incorruption* to the repairing of the wasted body, he has fitted one to the raising and the other to the retrieval [of the body]. I suppose, moreover, that he promises to the Thessalonians the integrity of the whole substance of man.[2] So that for the great future there need be no fear of blemished or defective bodies. Integrity, whether the result of preservation or restoration, will be able to lose nothing more, after the time that it has given back to it whatever it had lost. Now, when you contend that the flesh will still have to undergo the same sufferings, if the same flesh be said to have to rise again, you rashly set up nature against her Lord, and impiously contrast [her] law against [His] grace; as if it were not permitted the Lord God both to change nature, and to preserve her, without subjection to a law. How is it, then, that we read, "With men these things are impossible, but with God all things are possible;"[3] and again, "God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise?"[4] Let me ask you, if you were to manumit your slave (seeing that the same flesh and soul will remain to him, which once were exposed to the whip, and the fetter, and the stripes), will it therefore be fit for him to undergo the same old sufferings? I trow not. He is instead thereof honoured with the grace of the white robe, and the favour of the gold ring, and the name and tribe as well as table of his patron. Give, then, the same prerogative to God, by virtue of such a change, of reforming our condition, not our nature, by taking away from it all sufferings, and surrounding it with safeguards of protection. Thus our flesh shall remain even after the resurrection—so far indeed susceptible of suffering, as it is the flesh, and the same flesh too; but at the same time impassible, inasmuch as it has been liberated by the Lord for the very end and purpose of being no longer capable of enduring suffering.

[1] [1 Cor. xv. 53.]
[2] [1 Thess. iv. 13–17 and v. 23.]
[3] [Matt. xix. 26.]
[4] [1 Cor. i. 27.]

CHAP. LVIII.—*From this perfection of our restored bodies will flow the consciousness of undisturbed joy and peace.*

"Everlasting joy," says Isaiah, "shall be upon their heads."[1] Well, there is nothing eternal until after the resurrection. "And sorrow and sighing," continues he, "shall flee away."[2] The angel echoes the same to John: "And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes;"[3] from the same eyes indeed which had formerly wept, and which might weep again, if the loving-kindness of God did not dry up every fountain of tears. And again: "God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death,"[4] and therefore no more corruption, it being chased away by incorruption, even as death is by immortality. If sorrow, and mourning, and sighing, and death itself, assail us from the afflictions both of soul and body, how shall they be removed, except by the cessation of their causes, that is to say, the afflictions of flesh and soul? where will you find adversities in the presence of God? where, incursions of an enemy in the bosom of Christ? where, attacks of the devil in the face of the Holy Spirit?—now that the devil himself and his angels are "cast into the lake of fire."[5] Where now is necessity, and what they call fortune or fate? What plague awaits the redeemed from death, after their eternal pardon? What wrath is there for the reconciled, after grace? What weakness, after their renewed strength? What risk and danger, after their salvation? That the raiment and shoes of the children of Israel remained unworn and fresh for the space of forty years;[6] that in their very persons the exact point[7] of convenience and propriety checked the rank growth of their nails and hair, so that any excess herein might not be attributed to indecency; that the fires of Babylon injured not either the mitres or the trousers of the three brethren, however foreign such dress might be to the Jews;[8] that Jonah was swallowed

[1] [Isa. xxxv. 10.] [2] [Ver. 10.] [3] [Rev. vii. 17.]
[4] [Rev. xxi. 4.] [5] [Rev. xx. 10, 13–15.] [6] [Deut. xxix. 5.]
[7] Justitia. [8] [Dan. iii. 27.]

by the monster of the deep, in whose belly whole ships were devoured, and after three days was vomited out again safe and sound;[1] that Enoch and Elias, who even now, without experiencing a resurrection (because they have not even encountered death), are learning to the full what it is for the flesh to be exempted from all humiliation, and all loss, and all injury, and all disgrace—translated as they have been from this world, and from this very cause already candidates for everlasting life;[2]—to what faith do these notable facts bear witness, if not to that which ought to inspire in us the belief that they are proofs and documents of our own future integrity [and perfect resurrection]? For, to borrow the apostle's phrase, these were "figures of ourselves;"[3] and they are written that we may believe both that the Lord is more powerful than all natural laws about the body, and that He shows Himself the preserver of the flesh the more emphatically, in that He has preserved for it its very clothes and shoes.

CHAP. LIX.—*Our flesh will in the resurrection become capable, without losing its essential identity, of bearing the changed conditions of eternal life, whether for weal or woe.*

But, you object, the world to come bears the character of a different dispensation, even an eternal one; and therefore, you maintain, that the non-eternal substance of this life is incapable of possessing a state of such different features. This would be true enough, if man were made for the future dispensation, and not the dispensation for man. The apostle, however, in his epistle says, "Whether it be the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come; all are yours:"[4] and he here constitutes us heirs even of the future world. Isaiah gives you no help when he says, "All flesh is grass;"[5] and in another passage, "All flesh shall see the salvation of God."[6] It is the issues of men, not their substances, which he distinguishes. But who does not hold

[1] [Jonah i. 17, ii. 10.]
[2] [Gen. v. 24; 2 Kings ii. 11.]
[3] [1 Cor. x. 6.]
[4] [1 Cor. iii. 22.]
[5] [Isa. xl. 7.]
[6] [Ver. 5.]

that the judgment of God consists in the twofold sentence, of salvation and of punishment? Therefore it is that "all flesh is grass," which is destined to the fire; and "all flesh shall see the salvation of God," which is ordained to eternal life. For myself, I am quite sure that it is in no other flesh than my own that I have committed adultery, nor in any other flesh am I striving after continence. If there be any one who bears about in his person two instruments of lasciviousness, he has it in his power, to be sure, to mow down [1] "the grass" of the unclean flesh, and to reserve for himself only that which shall see the salvation of God. But when the same prophet represents to us even nations sometimes estimated as "the small dust of the balance," [2] and as "less than nothing, and vanity," [3] and sometimes as about to hope and "trust in the name" [4] and arm of the Lord, are we at all misled respecting the Gentile nations [by the diversity of statement]? Are some of them to turn believers, and are others accounted dust, from any difference of nature? Nay, rather Christ has shone as the true light on the nations within the ocean's limits, and from the heaven which is over us all.[5] Why, it is even on this earth that the Valentinians have gone to school for their errors; and there will be no difference of condition, as respects their body and soul, between the nations which believe and those which do not believe. Precisely, then, as He has put a distinction of state, not of nature, amongst the same nations, so also has He discriminated their flesh, which is one and the same substance in those nations, not according to their material structure, but according to the recompense of their merit.

[1] Demetere.

[2] [Isa. xl. 15.]

[3] [Ver. 17. Tertullian's word is "*spittle*," which the LXX. uses in the fifteenth verse for the "dust" of the Hebrew Bible.]

[4] [Isa. xlii. 4 (Sept.); quoted from the LXX. by Christ in Matt. xii. 21, and by St. Paul in Rom. xv. 12.]

[5] [Tertullian here alludes to some conceits of the Valentinians, who put men of truest nature and fit for Christ's grace outside of the ocean-bounded earth, etc.]

CHAP. LX.—*All the characteristics of our bodies—their sex, their various limbs, etc.—will be retained, whatever change of functions these may have; of which point, however, we are no judges. Analogy of the repaired ship.*

But behold how persistently they still accumulate their cavils against the flesh, especially against its identity, deriving their arguments even from the functions of our limbs: on the one hand saying that these ought to continue permanently pursuing their labours and enjoyments, as appendages to the same corporeal frame; and on the other hand contending that, inasmuch as the functions of the limbs shall one day come to an end, the bodily frame itself must be destoyed, its permanence without its limbs being deemed to be as inconceivable, as that of the limbs themselves without their functions! What, they ask, will then be the use of the cavity of our mouth, and its rows of teeth, and the passage of the throat, and the branch-way of the stomach, and the gulf of the belly, and the entangled tissue of the bowels, when there shall no longer be room for eating and drinking? What more will there be for these members to take in, masticate, swallow, secrete, digest, [and] eject? Of what avail will be our very hands, and feet, and all our labouring limbs, when even all care about food shall cease? What purpose can be served by loins, conscious of seminal secretions, and all the other organs of generation in the two sexes, and the laboratories of embryos, and the fountains of the breasts, when concubinage, and pregnancy, and infant nurture shall cease? In short, what will be the use of the entire body, when the entire body shall become useless? In reply to all this, we have then already settled the principle that the dispensation of the future state ought not to be compared with that of the present world, and that in the interval between them a change will take place; and we now add the remark, that these functions of our bodily limbs will continue to supply the needs of this life up to the moment when life itself shall pass away from time to eternity, as the natural body gives place to the spiritual, until "this mortal puts on

immortality, and this corruptible puts on incorruption:"[1] so that when life shall itself become freed from all wants, our limbs shall then be freed also from their services, and therefore will be no longer wanted. Still, although liberated from their offices, they will be yet preserved for judgment, "that every one may receive the things done in his body."[2] For the judgment-seat of God requires that man be kept entire. Entire, however, he cannot be without his limbs, of the substance of which, not the functions, he consists; unless, forsooth, you will be bold enough to maintain that a ship is perfect without her keel, or her bow, or her stern, and without the solidity of her entire frame. And yet how often have we seen the same ship, after being shattered with the storm and broken by decay, with all her timbers repaired and restored, gallantly riding on the wave in all the beauty of a renewed fabric! Do we then disquiet ourselves with doubt about God's skill, and will, and rights? Besides, if a wealthy shipowner, who does not begrudge money merely for his amusement or show, thoroughly repairs his ship, and then chooses that she should make no further voyages, will you contend that the old form and finish is still not necessary to the vessel, although she is no longer meant for actual service, when the mere safety of a ship requires such completeness irrespective of service? The sole question, therefore, which is enough for us to consider here, is whether the Lord, when He ordains salvation for man, intends it for his flesh; whether it is His will that the selfsame flesh shall be renewed. [If so], it will be improper for you to rule, from the inutility of its limbs in the future state, that the flesh will be incapable of renovation. For a thing may be renewed, and yet be useless [from having nothing to do]; but it cannot be said to be useless if it has no existence. If, indeed, it has existence, it will be quite possible for it also not to be useless [it may possibly have something to do]; for in the presence of God there will be no idleness.

[1] [1 Cor. xv. 53.] [2] [2 Cor. v. 10.]

CHAP. LXI.—*Tertullian goes fully into the details of our bodily sex, and of the functions of our various members, apologizing for the necessity which heresy imposed on him of hunting up all its unblushing cavils.*

Now you have received your mouth, O man, for the purpose of devouring your food and imbibing your drink: why not, however, for the higher purpose of uttering speech, so as to distinguish yourself from all other animals? Why not rather for preaching [the gospel of] God, that so you may become even His priest and advocate before men? Adam indeed gave their several names to the animals, before he plucked the fruit of the tree; before he ate, he prophesied. Then, again, you received your teeth for the consumption of your meal: why not rather for wreathing your mouth with suitable defence on every opening thereof, small or wide? Why not, too, for moderating the impulses of your tongue, and guarding your articulate speech from failure and violence? Let me tell you, [if you do not know], that there are toothless persons in the world. Look at them, and ask whether even a cage of teeth be not an honour to the mouth. There are apertures in the lower regions of man and woman, by means of which they gratify no doubt their animal passions; but why are they not rather regarded as outlets for the cleanly discharge of natural fluids? Women, moreover, have within them receptacles where human seed may collect; but are they not designed for the secretion of those sanguineous issues, which their tardier and weaker sex is inadequate to disperse? For even details like these require to be mentioned, seeing that [our heretics] single out what parts of our bodies may suit them, handle them without delicacy, and, as their whim suggests, pour torrents of scorn and contempt upon the natural functions of our members, for the purpose of upsetting the resurrection, and making us blush over their cavils; not reflecting that before the functions cease, the very causes of them will have passed away. There will be no more meat, because no more hunger; no more drink, because no more thirst; no more concubinage, because

no more child-bearing; no more eating and drinking, because no more labour and toil. Death, too, will cease; so there will be no more need of the nutriment of food for the defence of life, nor will [mothers'] limbs any longer have to be laden [with the pains of parturition] for the replenishment of our race. But even in the present life there may be cessations of their office for our stomachs and our generative organs. For forty days Moses[1] and Elias[2] fasted, and lived upon God alone. For even so early was the principle consecrated: "Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God."[3] See here faint outlines of our future strength! We even, as we may be able, excuse our mouths from food, and withdraw our sexes from union. How many voluntary eunuchs are there! How many virgins espoused to Christ! How many, both of men and women, whom nature has made sterile, with a structure which cannot procreate! Now, if even here on earth both the functions and the pleasures of our members may be suspended, with an intermission which, like the dispensation itself, can only be a temporary one, and yet man's safety is nevertheless unimpaired, how much more, when his salvation is secure, and especially in an eternal dispensation, shall we not cease to desire those things, which even here below we are not unaccustomed to check our longings for!

CHAP. LXII.—*Our destined likeness to the angels in the glorious life of the resurrection.*

To this discussion, however, our Lord's declaration puts an effectual end: "They shall be," says He, "equal unto the angels."[4] As by not marrying, because of not dying, so, of course, by not having to yield to any like necessity of our bodily state; even as the angels, too, sometimes were "equal unto" men, by eating and drinking, and submitting their feet to the washing of the bath—having clothed themselves in human guise, without the loss of their own intrinsic nature. If therefore angels, when they became as

[1] [Ex. xxiv. 8.]
[2] [1 Kings xix. 8.]
[3] [Deut. viii. 3; Matt. iv. 4.]
[4] [Luke xx. 36; Matt. xxii. 30.]

men, submitted in their own unaltered substance of spirit to be treated as if they were flesh, why shall not men in like manner, when they become "equal unto the angels," undergo in their unchanged substance of flesh the treatment of spiritual beings, no more exposed to the usual solicitations of the flesh in their angelic garb, than were the angels once to those of the spirit when encompassed in human form? We shall not therefore cease to continue in the flesh, because we cease to be importuned by the usual wants of the flesh; just as the angels ceased not therefore to remain in their spiritual substance, because of the suspension of their spiritual incidents. Lastly, Christ said not, "They shall be angels," in order not to repeal their existence as men; but He said, "They shall be equal unto the angels [*ἰσάγγελοι*]," that He might preserve their humanity unimpaired. When He ascribed an angelic likeness to the flesh,[1] He took not from it its proper substance.

CHAP. LXIII.—*Conclusion of the treatise. The resurrection of the flesh in its absolute identity and perfection. Belief of this had become weak, but Tertullian hopes for its refreshing restoration under the influences of the Paraclete.*

And so the flesh shall rise again, wholly in every man, in its own identity, in its absolute integrity. Wherever it may be, it is in safe keeping in God's presence, through that most faithful "Mediator between God and man, [the man] Jesus Christ,"[2] who shall reconcile both God to man, and man to God; the spirit to the flesh, and the flesh to the spirit. Both natures has He already united in His own self; He has fitted them together as bride and bridegroom in the reciprocal bond of wedded life. Now, if any should insist on making the soul the bride, then the flesh will follow the soul as her dowry. The soul shall never be an outcast, to be had home by the bridegroom bare and naked. She has her dower, her outfit, her fortune in the flesh, which shall accompany her with the love and fidelity of a foster-

[1] Cui. [2] [1 Tim. ii. 5.]

sister. But suppose the flesh to be the bride, then in Christ Jesus she has in the contract of His blood received His Spirit as her spouse. Now, what you take to be her extinction, you may be sure is only her temporary retirement. It is not the soul only which withdraws from view. The flesh, too, has her departures for a while—in waters, in fires, in birds, in beasts; she may seem to be dissolved into these, but she is only poured into them, as into vessels. And should the vessels themselves afterwards fail to hold her, escaping from even these, and returning to her mother earth, she is absorbed once more, as it were, by its secret embraces, ultimately to stand forth to view, like Adam when summoned to hear from his Lord and Creator the words, "Behold, the man is become as one of us!"[1]—thoroughly "knowing" by that time "the evil" which she had escaped, "and the good" which she has acquired. Why, then, O soul, should you envy the flesh? There is none, after the Lord, whom you should love so dearly; none more like a brother to you, which is even born along with yourself in God. You ought rather to have been by your prayers obtaining resurrection for her: her sins, whatever they were, were owing to you. However, it is no wonder if you hate her; for you have repudiated her Creator.[2] You have accustomed yourself either to deny or change her existence even in Christ[3]—corrupting the very Word of God Himself, who became flesh, either by mutilating or misinterpreting the Scripture,[4] and introducing, above all, apocryphal mysteries [and] blasphemous fables.[5] But yet Almighty God, in His most gracious providence, by "pouring out of His Spirit in these last days, upon all flesh, upon His

[1] [Gen. iii. 22.]

[2] [In this apostrophe to the soul, he censures Marcion's heresy.]

[3] [Compare the *De Carne Christi*.]

[4] [See the *De Præscript. Hæret.* ch. xxxviii., for instances of these diverse methods of heresy. Marcion is mentioned as the *mutilator* of Scripture, by cutting away from it whatever opposed his views; Valentinus as the *corrupter* thereof, by his manifold and fantastic interpretations.]

[5] [See the *Adv. Valentinianos*.]

servants and on His handmaidens,"[1] has checked these impostures of unbelief and perverseness, reanimated men's faltering faith in the resurrection of the flesh, and cleared from all obscurity and equivocation the ancient Scriptures [of both God's Testaments[2]] by the clear light of their [sacred] words and meanings. Now, since it was "needful that there should be heresies, in order that they which are approved might be made manifest;"[3] since, however, these heresies would be unable to put on a bold front without some countenance from the Scriptures, it therefore is plain enough that the ancient Holy Writ has furnished them with sundry materials for their evil doctrine, which very materials indeed [so distorted] are refutable from the same Scriptures. It was fit and proper, therefore, that the Holy Ghost should no longer withhold the effusions of His gracious light upon these inspired writings, in order that they might be able to disseminate the seeds [of truth] with no admixture of heretical subtleties, and pluck out from it their tares. He has accordingly now dispersed all the perplexities of the past, and their self-chosen allegories and parables, by the open and perspicuous explanation of the entire mystery, through the new prophecy, which descends in copious streams from the Paraclete. If you will only draw water from His fountains, you will never thirst for other doctrine: no feverish craving after subtle questions will again consume you; [but] by drinking in evermore the resurrection of the flesh, you will be satisfied with the refreshing draughts.

[1] [Joel ii. 28, 29; Acts ii. 17, 18.]

[2] [We follow Oehler's view here, by all means.]

[3] [1 Cor. xi. 19.]

A TREATISE

BY

QUINTUS SEPTIMIUS FLORENS TERTULLIANUS

IN OPPOSITION TO

PRAXEAS;

IN WHICH HE DEFENDS, IN ALL ESSENTIAL POINTS, THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY TRINITY.

THE ERROR OF PRAXEAS APPEARS TO HAVE ORIGINATED IN ANXIETY TO MAINTAIN THE UNITY OF GOD; WHICH, HE THOUGHT, COULD ONLY BE DONE BY SAYING THAT THE FATHER, SON, AND HOLY GHOST WERE ONE AND THE SAME. HE CONTENDED, THEREFORE, ACCORDING TO TERTULLIAN, THAT THE FATHER HIMSELF DESCENDED INTO THE VIRGIN, WAS BORN OF HER, SUFFERED, AND WAS IN A WORD JESUS CHRIST. FROM THE MOST STARTLING OF THE DEDUCTIONS FROM PRAXEAS' GENERAL THEORY, HIS OPPONENTS GAVE HIM AND HIS FOLLOWERS THE NAME OF *PATRIPASSIANS;* FROM ANOTHER POINT IN HIS TEACHING THEY WERE CALLED *MONARCHIANS.*

CHAP. I.—*Satan's wiles against the truth: how on this occasion they take the form of the* PRAXEAN *heresy. Some account of the publication of this heresy by its author.*

IN various ways has the devil rivalled and resisted the truth. Sometimes his aim has been to destroy the truth by defending it. He maintains that there is one only Lord, the Almighty Creator of the world, in order that out of this [doctrine of the] unity he may fabricate a heresy. He says that the Father Himself came down into the Virgin['s womb], was Himself born of her, Himself suffered, indeed was Himself Jesus Christ. Here the [old] serpent has fallen out with himself, since,

when he tempted Christ after John's baptism, he approached Him as "the Son of God;" surely intimating that God had a Son, even on the testimony of the very Scriptures, out of which he was at the moment forging his temptation: "If thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread."[1] Again: "If thou be the Son of God, cast thyself down from hence;[2] for it is written, He shall give His angels charge concerning thee" — referring, no doubt, to the Father['s command]—"and in their hands they shall bear thee up, that thou hurt not thy foot against a stone."[3] Or perhaps, after all, he was only reproaching the Gospels with a lie, saying in fact: "Away with Matthew; away with Luke! [Why heed their words?] In spite of them, [I declare] that it was God Himself that I approached; it was the Almighty Himself that I tempted face to face; and it was for no other purpose than to tempt Him that I approached Him. If, on the contrary, it had been [only] the Son of God, most likely I should never have condescended to deal with Him." However, he is himself a liar from the beginning,[4] and whatever man he instigates in his own way; as, for instance, Praxeas. For *he* was the first to import into Rome from Asia this kind of heretical pravity, a man in other respects of restless disposition, and above all inflated with the pride of confessorship simply and solely because he had to bear for a short time the annoyance of a prison; on which occasion, even "if he had given his body to be burned, it would have profited him nothing," not having the love of God,[5] whose very gifts he has resisted and destroyed. For after the Bishop of Rome[6] had acknowledged the prophetic gifts of Montanus, Prisca, and Maximilla, and, in consequence of the acknowledgment, had bestowed his peace[7] on the churches of Asia and Phyrgia, *he*, by importunately urging false accusations against the prophets themselves and their churches, and insisting on the authority of the bishop's predecessors in the see, com-

[1] [Matt. iv. 3.] [2] [Ver. 6.] [3] [Ps. xci. 11.]
[4] [John viii. 44.] [5] [1 Cor. xiii. 3.] [6] [Probably Victor.]
[7] [Had admitted them to communion.]

pelled him to recall the pacific letter which he had issued, as well as to desist from his purpose of acknowledging the [said] gifts. By this, Praxeas did a twofold service for the devil at Rome: he drove away prophecy, and he brought in heresy; he put to flight the Paraclete, and he crucified the Father. Praxeas' tares had been moreover sown, and had produced their fruit here also,[1] while many were asleep in their simplicity of doctrine; but these tares actually seemed to have been plucked up, having been discovered and exposed by him whose agency God was pleased to employ. Indeed, [Praxeas] had deliberately resumed his old [true] faith, teaching it after his renunciation of error; and there is his own handwriting in evidence remaining among the carnally-minded,[2] in whose society the transaction then took place; afterwards nothing was heard of him. We indeed, on our part, subsequently withdrew from the carnally-minded on our acknowledgment and maintenance of the Paraclete. But the tares [of Praxeas] had then everywhere shaken out their seed, which having lain hid for some while, with its vitality concealed under a mask, has now broken out with fresh life. But again shall it be rooted up, if the Lord will, even now; but if not now, in the day when all bundles of tares shall be gathered together, and along with every other stumbling-block shall be burnt up with unquenchable fire.[3]

CHAP. II.—*Tertullian fully sets forth the catholic doctrine of the Trinity and Unity, which is sometimes called the Divine Economy, or Dispensation of the Personal Relations of the Godhead.*

In the course of time, then, the Father forsooth was born, and the Father suffered,—God Himself, the Lord Almighty,

[1] ["The connection renders it very probable that the '*hic quoque*' of this sentence forms an antithesis to Rome, mentioned before; and that Tertullian expresses himself as if he had written from the very spot where these things had transpired. Hence we are led to conclude that it was *Carthage*."—NEANDER, *Antignostikus*, ii. 519, note 2, Bohn.]

[2] [On the designation *Psychici*, see our *Anti-Marcion*, p. 263, note 5.]

[3] [Matt. xiii. 30.]

whom in their preaching they declare to be Jesus Christ. We, however, as we indeed always have done (and more especially since we have been better instructed by the Paraclete, who leads men indeed into all truth), believe that there is one only God, but under the following dispensation, or *οἰκονομία*, as it is called, that this one only God has also a Son, His Word, who proceeded [1] from Himself, by whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made. Him [we believe] to have been sent by the Father into the Virgin, and to have been born of her—being both Man and God, the Son of Man and the Son of God, and to have been called by the name of Jesus Christ; [we believe] Him to have suffered, died, and been buried, according to the Scriptures, and, after He had been raised again by the Father and taken back to heaven, to be sitting at the right hand of the Father, [and] that He will come to judge the quick and the dead; who sent also from heaven from the Father, according to His own promise, the Holy Ghost, the Paraclete,[2] the sanctifier of the faith of those who believe in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost. That this rule of faith has come down to us from the beginning of the gospel, even before any of the older heretics, much more before Praxeas, [a pretender] of yesterday, will be apparent both from the lateness of date [3] which marks all heresies, and also from the absolutely novel character of our new-fangled Praxeas. In this principle also we must henceforth find a presumption of equal force against all heresies whatsoever—that whatever is first is true, whereas that is spurious which is later in date.[4] But keeping this prescriptive rule inviolate, still some opportunity must be given for reviewing [the statements of heretics], with a view to the instruction and protection of divers persons; were it only that it may not seem that each perversion [of the truth] is condemned with-

[1] [The church afterwards applied this term exclusively to the Holy Ghost.]

[2] [The "Comforter."]

[3] [See our *Anti-Marcion*, p. 119, n. 1.]

[4] [See his *De Præscript.* xxix.]

out examination, and simply prejudged;[1] especially in the case of this heresy, which supposes itself to possess the pure truth, in thinking that one cannot believe in One Only God in any other way than by saying that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are the very selfsame Person. As if in this way also one were not All, in that All are of One, by unity (that is) of substance; while the mystery of the *οἰκονομία* [or dispensation] is still guarded, which distributes the Unity into a Trinity, placing in their order[2] the three [Persons]—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost: three, however, not in condition,[3] but in degree;[4] not in substance, but in form; not in power, but in aspect;[5] yet of one substance, and of one condition, and of one power, inasmuch as He is one God, from whom these degrees and forms and aspects are reckoned, under the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.[6] How they are susceptible of number without division, will be shown as our treatise proceeds.

CHAP. III.—*Tertullian deals with sundry popular fears and prejudices, and rescues the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity from these misapprehensions.*

The simple, indeed, (I will not call them unwise and unlearned,) who always constitute the majority of believers, are startled at the *οἰκονομία* [or dispensation of the Three in One], on the ground that their very rule of faith withdraws them from the world's plurality of gods to the one only true God; not understanding that, although He is the one only God, He must yet be believed in with His own *οἰκονομία*. The numerical order and distribution of the Trinity they assume to be a division of the Unity; whereas the Unity which derives the Trinity out of its own self is so far from being destroyed, that it is actually supported by it. They

[1] [Tertullian uses similar precaution in his argument elsewhere. See our *Anti-Marcion*, pp. 3 and 119.]

[2] Dirigens. [3] Statu. [4] [See *The Apology*, ch. xxi.] [5] Specie.

[6] [See Bull's *Def. Fid. Nic.* (translated by the translator of this work), p. 202.]

are constantly throwing out against us that we are preachers of two gods and three gods, while they take to themselves pre-eminently the credit of being worshippers of the One God; just as if the Unity itself with irrational deductions did not produce heresy, and the Trinity rationally considered constitute the truth. We, say they, maintain the *Monarchy* [or, "sole government" of God].[1] And so, as far as the sound goes, do even Latins (and ignorant ones too) pronounce the word in such a way that you would suppose their understanding of the *μοναρχία* [or *Monarchy*] was as complete as their pronunciation of the term. Well, then, Latins take pains to pronounce the *μοναρχία* [or *Monarchy*], while Greeks actually refuse to understand the *οἰκονομία* [or *Dispensation of the Three in One*]. As for myself, however, if I have gleaned any knowledge of either language, I am sure that *μοναρχία* [or *Monarchy*] has no other meaning than single and individual[2] rule; but for all that, this monarchy does not, because it is the government of one, preclude him whose government it is, either from having a son, or from having made himself actually a son to himself,[3] or from ministering his own monarchy by whatever agents he will. Nay more, I contend that no dominion so belongs to one only, as his own, or is in such a sense singular, or is in such a sense a monarchy, as not also to be administered through other persons most closely connected with it, and whom it has itself provided as officials to itself. If, moreover, there be a son belonging to him whose monarchy it is, it does not forthwith become divided and cease to be a monarchy, if the son also be taken as a sharer in it; but it is as to its origin equally his, by whom it is communicated to the son; and being his, it is quite as much a monarchy [or "sole empire"], since it is held together by two who are so inseparable.[4] Therefore, inasmuch as the Divine Monarchy also is administered by so many legions and hosts of angels, according as it is written, "Thousand thousands ministered unto Him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before

[1] [So Bp. Kaye, *On Tertullian*, p. 499.]
[2] Unicum.
[3] [This was a notion of Praxeas. See ch. x.]
[4] Tam unicis.

Him;"[1] and since it has not from this circumstance ceased to be the rule of one (so as no longer to be a monarchy), because it is administered by so many thousands of powers; how comes it to pass that God should be thought to suffer division and severance in the Son and in the Holy Ghost, who have the second and the third places assigned to them, and who are so closely joined with the Father in His substance, when He suffers no such [division and severance] in the multitude of so many angels? Do you really suppose that Those, who are naturally members of the Father's own substance, pledges of His love,[2] instruments of His might, nay, His power itself and the entire system of His monarchy, are the overthrow and destruction thereof? You are not right in so thinking. I prefer your exercising yourself on the meaning of the thing rather than on the sound of the word. Now you must understand the overthrow of a monarchy to be *this*, when another dominion, which has a framework and a state peculiar to itself (and is therefore a rival), is brought in over and above it: when, [for instance,] some other god is introduced in opposition to the Creator, as in the opinions of Marcion; or when many gods are introduced, according to your Valentinuses and your Prodicuses. Then it amounts to an overthrow of the Monarchy, since it involves the destruction of the Creator.

CHAP. IV.—*The Unity of the Godhead and the supremacy and sole government of the Divine Being ("the Monarchy") not at all impaired by the catholic doctrine.*

But as for me, who derive the Son from no other source but from the substance of the Father, and [represent Him] as doing nothing without the Father's will, and as having received all power from the Father, how can I be possibly destroying the Monarchy from the faith, when I preserve it in the Son just as it was committed to Him by the Father? The same remark [I wish also to be formally] made by me with respect to the third degree [in the Godhead], because I

[1] [Dan. vii. 10.]

[2] ["Pignora" is often used of *children* and *dearest relations*.]

believe the Spirit [to proceed] from no other source than from the Father through the Son. Look to it then, that it be not *you* rather who are destroying the Monarchy, when you overthrow the arrangement and dispensation of it, which has been constituted in just as many names as it has pleased God [to employ]. But it remains so firm and stable in its own state, notwithstanding the introduction into it of the Trinity, that the Son actually has to restore it entire to the Father; even as the apostle says in his epistle, concerning the very end of all: "When He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; for He must reign till He hath put all enemies under His feet;"[1] following of course the words of the Psalm: "Sit Thou on my right hand, until I make Thine enemies Thy footstool."[2] "When, however, all things shall be subdued to Him, (with the exception of Him who did put all things under Him,) then shall the Son also Himself be subject unto Him who put all things under Him, that God may be all in all."[3] We thus see that the Son is no obstacle to the Monarchy, although it is now administered by[4] the Son; because with the Son it is still in its own state, and with its own state will be restored to the Father by the Son. No one, therefore, will impair it, on account of admitting the Son [to it], since it is certain that it has been committed to Him by the Father, and by and by has to be again delivered up by Him to the Father. Now, from this one passage of the epistle of the [inspired] apostle, we have been already able to show that the Father and the Son are two [separate Persons], not only by the mention of their separate names as Father and the Son, but also by the fact that He who delivered up the kingdom, and He to whom it is delivered up—and in like manner, He who subjected [all things], and He to whom they were subjected —must necessarily be two different Beings.

[1] [1 Cor. xv. 24, 25.]
[2] [Ps. cx. 1]
[3] [1 Cor. xv. 27, 28.]
[4] Apud.

CHAP. V.—*The evolution of the Son or Word of God from the Father by a divine procession, illustrated by the operation of the human thought and consciousness.*

But since they will have the Two to be but One, so that the Father shall be deemed to be the same as the Son, it is only right that the whole question respecting the Son should be examined, as to whether He exists, and who He is, and the mode of His existence. Thus shall the truth itself [1] secure its own sanction [2] from the Scriptures, and the interpretations which guard [3] them. There are some who allege that even Genesis opens thus in Hebrew: "In the beginning God made for Himself a Son." [4] As there is no ground for this, I am led to other arguments derived from God's own dispensation,[5] in which He existed before the creation of the world, up to the generation of the Son. For before all things God was alone—being in Himself and for Himself universe, and space, and all things. Moreover, He was alone, because there was nothing external to Him but Himself. Yet even not then was He alone; for He had with Him that which He possessed in Himself, that is to say, His own Reason. For God is rational, and Reason was first in Him; and so all things were from Himself. This Reason is His own Thought [or Consciousness],[6] which the Greeks call λόγος, by which term we also designate Word [or Discourse];[7] and therefore it is now usual with our people, owing to the mere simple interpretation of the term, to say that the Word[8] was in the beginning with God; although it would be more suitable to regard Reason as the more ancient; because God had not Word[9] from the beginning, but He had Reason[10] even before the beginning; because also Word itself consists of Reason, which it thus proves to have been the prior existence

[1] Res ipsa. [2] Formam, or shape. [3] Patrocinantibus.
[4] [See St. Jerome's *Quæstt. Hebr.* in Genesim, ii. 507.]
[5] ["Dispositio" means "mutual relations in the Godhead." See Bp. Bull's *Def. Fid. Nicen.* [translation], p. 516.]
[6] Sensus ipsius. [7] Sermonem. [8] Sermonem.
[9] Sermonalis. [10] Rationalis.

as being its own substance.[1] Not that this distinction is of any practical moment. For although God had not yet sent [out] His Word,[2] He still had Him within Himself, both in company with and included within His very Reason, as He silently planned and arranged within Himself everything which He was afterwards about to utter[3] through His Word. Now, whilst He was thus planning and arranging with His own Reason, He was actually causing that to become Word which He was dealing with in the way of Word [or Discourse].[4] And that you may the more readily understand this, consider first of all, from your own self, who are made "in the image and likeness of God,"[5] for what purpose it is that you also possess reason in yourself, who are a rational creature, as being not only made by a rational Artificer, but actually animated out of His substance. Observe, then, that when you are silently conversing with yourself, this very process is carried on within you by your reason, which meets you with a word at every movement of your thought, at every impulse of your conception. Whatever you think, there is a word; whatever you conceive, there is reason. You must needs speak it in your mind; and while you are speaking, you admit speech as an interlocutor with you, involved in which there is this very reason, whereby, while in thought you are holding converse with your word, you are [by reciprocal action] producing thought by means of that converse with your word. Thus, in a certain sense, the word is a second [person] within you, through which in thinking you utter speech, and through which also, [by reciprocity of process,] in uttering speech you generate thought. The word is itself a different thing from yourself. Now how much more fully is all this transacted in God, whose image and likeness even you are regarded as being, inasmuch as He has reason within Himself even while He is silent, and involved in that

[1] [*i.e.*, "Reason is manifestly prior to the Word, which it dictates" (Bp. Kaye, p. 501).]

[2] Sermonem.

[3] [Dicturus. Another reading is "daturus," about to give.]

[4] Sermone.

[5] [Gen. i. 26.]

Reason His Word! I may therefore without rashness first lay this down [as a fixed principle], that even then before the creation of the universe God was not alone, since He had within Himself both Reason, and, inherent in Reason, His Word, which He made second to Himself by agitating it within Himself.

CHAP. VI.—*The Word of God is also "the Wisdom" of God. The going forth of Wisdom to create the universe, according to the divine plan.*

This power and disposition[1] of the Divine Intelligence[2] is set forth also in the Scriptures under the name of Wisdom [Σοφία]; for what can be better entitled to the name of Wisdom[3] than the Reason or the Word of God? Listen therefore to Wisdom herself, constituted in the character of a Second Person: "At the first the Lord created me as the beginning of His ways, with a view to His own works, before He made the earth, before the mountains were settled; moreover, before all the hills did He beget me;"[4] that is to say, He created and generated me in His own intelligence. Then, again, observe the distinction between them implied in the companionship of Wisdom with the Lord. "When He prepared the heaven," says [Wisdom], "I was present with Him; and when He made His strong places upon the winds, which are the clouds above; and when He secured the fountains, [and all things] which are beneath the sky, I was by, arranging all things with Him; I was by, in whom He delighted; and daily, too, did I rejoice in His presence."[5] Now, as soon as it pleased God to put forth into their respective substances and forms the things which He had planned and ordered within Himself, in conjunction with His Wisdom's Reason and Word, He first put forth the Word Himself, having within Him His own inseparable Reason and Wisdom, in order that all things might be made through Him through whom they had been planned and disposed, yea, and already made, so far forth as [they were] in the

[1] ["Mutual relations in the Godhead."] [2] Sensus.
[3] Sapientius. [4] [Prov. viii. 22–25.] [5] [Prov. viii. 27–30.]

mind and intelligence of God. This, however, was still wanting to them, that they should also be openly known, and kept permanently in their proper forms and substances.

CHAP. VII.—*The Son, although (according to the imperfection of human thought and language) liable to be deemed a mere attribute by being designated* WORD *and* WISDOM, *shown to be a personal Being.*

Then, therefore, does the Word also Himself assume His own form and glorious garb,[1] [His own] sound and vocal utterance, when God says, "Let there be light."[2] This is the perfect nativity of the Word, when He proceeds forth from God—*formed*[3] by Him first to devise and think out [all things] under the name of Wisdom ("The Lord created [or formed[4]] me as the beginning of His ways"[5]); then afterwards *begotten*, to carry all into effect ("When He prepared the heaven, I was present with Him"[6]). Thus does He make Him equal to Him: for by proceeding from Himself He became His first-begotten Son, because begotten before all things;[7] and His only-begotten also, because alone begotten of God, in a way peculiar to Himself, from the womb of His own heart,—even as the Father Himself testifies: "My heart," says He, "hath emitted my most excellent Word."[8] [The Father] took pleasure evermore in Him, who equally rejoiced with a reciprocal gladness in the Father's presence: "Thou art my Son, to-day have I begotten Thee;"[9] even before the morning star did I beget Thee. The Son likewise acknowledges the Father, speaking in His own person, under the name of Wisdom: "The Lord formed Me as the beginning of His ways, with a view to His own works; before all the hills did He beget Me."[10] For if indeed Wisdom in this passage seems to say that She was created by the Lord with a view to His works, and to accomplish His ways, yet proof

[1] Ornatum. [2] [Gen. i. 3.] [3] Conditus. [4] Condidit.
[5] [Prov. viii. 22.] [6] [Ver. 27.] [7] [Col. i. 15.]
[8] [Ps. xlv. 1. See this reading, and its application, fully discussed in our note 5, p. 66, of the *Anti-Marcion*.]
[9] [Ps. ii. 7.] [10] [Prov. viii. 22, 25.]

is given in another Scripture that "all things were made by the Word, and without Him was there nothing made;"[1] as, again, in another place [it is said], "By His word were the heavens established, and all the powers thereof by His Spirit"[2]—that is to say, by the Spirit [or Divine Nature] which was in the Word: [thus] is it evident that it is one and the same power which is in one place described under the name of Wisdom, and in another passage under the appellation of the Word, which was initiated for the works of God,[3] which "strengthened the heavens;"[4] "by which all things were made,"[5] and "without which nothing was made."[6] Nor need we dwell any longer on this point, as if it were not the very Word Himself who is spoken of under the name both of Wisdom and of Reason, and of the entire Divine Soul and Spirit. He became also the Son of God, and was begotten when He proceeded forth from Him. Do you then, [you ask,] grant that the Word is a certain substance, constructed by the Spirit and the communication of Wisdom? Certainly I do, [is my answer.] But you will not allow Him to be really a substantive being, by having a substance of His own; in such a way that He may be regarded as an objective thing and a person, and so be able (as being constituted second to God [the Father]) to make two, the Father and the Son, God and the Word. For, you will say, what is a word, but a voice and sound of the mouth, and (as the grammarians teach) air when struck against,[7] intelligible to the ear, but for the rest a sort of void, empty, and incorporeal thing. I, on the contrary, contend that nothing empty and void could have come forth from God, seeing that it is not put forth from that which is empty and void; nor could that possibly be devoid of substance which has proceeded from so great a substance, and has produced such mighty substances: for all things which were made through Him, He Himself [personally] made. How could it be, that He Himself is nothing, without whom nothing was made? How could He who is empty have made things which are solid, and He who is

[1] [John i. 3.] [2] [Ps. xxxiii. 6.] [3] [Prov. viii. 22.] [4] [Ver. 28.]
[5] [John i. 3.] [6] [John i. 3.] [7] Offensus.

void have made things which are full, and He who is incorporeal have made things which have body? For although a thing may sometimes be made different from him by whom it is made, yet nothing can be made by that which is a void and empty thing. Is that Word of God, then, a void and empty thing, which is called the Son, who Himself is designated God? "The Word was with God, and the Word was God."[1] It is written, "Thou shalt not take God's name in vain."[2] This for certain is He "who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God."[3] In what form of God? Of course he means in some form, not in none. For who will deny that God is a body, although "God is a Spirit"?[4] For Spirit has a bodily substance of its own kind, in its own form.[5] Now, even if invisible things, whatsoever they be, have both their substance and their form in God, whereby they are visible to God alone, how much more shall that which has been sent forth from His substance not be without substance! Whatever, therefore, was the substance of the Word that I designate a Person, I claim for it the name of *Son;* and while I recognise the Son, I assert His distinction as second to the Father.

CHAP. VIII.—*Though the Son or Word of God emanates from the Father, He is not (like the emanations of Valentinus) separable from the Father, nor is the Holy Ghost separable from either. Illustrations from nature.*

If any man from this shall think that I am introducing some προβολή—that is to say, some prolation[6] of one thing out of another, as Valentinus does when he sets forth Æon from Æon, one after another—then this is my first reply to

[1] [John i. 1.] [2] [Ex. xx. 7.] [3] [Phil. ii. 6.] [4] [John iv. 24.]

[5] [This doctrine of the soul's corporeality in a certain sense is treated by Tertullian in his *De Resurr. Carn.* xvii., and *De Anima*, v. By Tertullian, *spirit* and *soul* were considered identical. See our *Anti-Marcion*, p. 451, note 4.]

[6] ["The word προβολή properly means anything which proceeds or is sent forth from the substance of another, as the fruit of a tree or the rays of the sun. In Latin it is translated by *prolatio*, *emissio*, or *editio*, or what we now express by the word *development*. In Tertullian's

you: Truth must not therefore refrain from the use of such a term, and its reality and meaning, because heresy also employs it. The fact is, heresy has rather taken it from Truth, in order to mould it into its own counterfeit. Was the Word of God put forth or not? Here take your stand with me, and flinch not. If He was put forth, then acknowledge that the true doctrine has a prolation [or προβολή]; and never mind heresy, when in any point it mimics the truth. The question now is, in what sense each side uses a given thing, and the word which expresses it. Valentinus divides and separates his prolations [or προβολαί] from their Author, and places them at so great a distance from Him, that the Æon does not know the Father: he longs, indeed, to know Him, but cannot; nay, he is almost swallowed up and dissolved into the rest of matter.[1] With us, however, the Son alone knows the Father,[2] and has Himself unfolded "the Father's bosom."[3] He has also heard and seen all things with the Father; and what He has been commanded by the Father, that also does He speak.[4] And it is not His own will, but the Father's, which He has accomplished,[5] which He had known most intimately, even from the beginning. "For what man knoweth the things which be in God, but the Spirit which is in Him?"[6] But the Word was formed by the Spirit, and (if I may so express myself) the Spirit is the body of the Word. The Word, therefore, is both always in the Father, as He says, "I am in the Father;"[7] and is always with God, according to what is written, "And the Word was with God;"[8] and never separate from the Father, or other than the Father, since "I and the Father are one."[9] This will be the προβολή [or prolation] taught by the truth,[10] the guardian of the

time, Valentinus had given the term a material signification. Tertullian, therefore, has to apologize for using it, when writing against Praxeas, the forerunner of the Sabellians" (Newman's *Arians*, ii. 4; reprint, p. 101).]

[1] [See *Adv. Valentin.* cc. xiv. xv.]
[2] [Matt. xi. 27.]
[3] [John i. 18.]
[4] [John viii. 26.]
[5] [John vi. 38.]
[6] [1 Cor. ii. 11.]
[7] [John xiv. 11.]
[8] [John i. 1.]
[9] [John x. 30.]
[10] [Literally, "of the truth."]

Unity, wherein we declare that the Son is a prolation from the Father, without being separated from Him. For God sent forth the Word, as the Paraclete also declares, just as the root puts forth the tree, and the fountain the river, and the sun the ray. For these are προβολαί [or emanations] of the substances from which they proceed. I should not hesitate, indeed, to call the tree the son or offspring of the root, and the river of the fountain, and the ray of the sun; because every original source is a parent, and everything which issues from the origin is an offspring. Much more is [this true of] the Word of God, who has actually received as His own peculiar designation the name of *Son*. But still the tree is not severed from the root, nor the river from the fountain, nor the ray from the sun; nor, indeed, is the Word separated from God. Following, therefore, the form of these analogies, I confess that I call God and His Word—the Father and His Son—*two*. For the root and the tree are distinctly two things, but correlatively joined; the fountain and the river are also two forms, but indivisible; so likewise the sun and the ray are two forms, but coherent ones. Everything which proceeds from something else must needs be second to that from which it proceeds, without being on that account separated. Where, however, there is a second, there must be two; and where there is a third, there must be three. Now the Spirit indeed is third from God and the Son; just as the fruit of the tree is third from the root, or as the stream out of the river is third from the fountain, or as the apex of the ray is third from the sun. Nothing, however, is alien from that original source whence it derives its own properties. In like manner the Trinity, flowing down from the Father through intertwined and connected steps, does not at all disturb the *Monarchy*, [or oneness of the divine empire;] whilst it at the same time guards the state of the *Economy*, [or dispensation of the divine tripersonality.[1]]

[1] [See above, ch. ii.]

CHAP. IX.—*The catholic Rule of Faith expounded in some of its points, especially in the unconfused distinction of the several Persons of the Blessed Trinity.*

Bear always in mind that this is the rule of faith which I profess; by it I testify that the Father, and the Son, and the Spirit are inseparable from each other, and so will you know in what sense this is said. Now, observe, my assertion is that the Father is one, and the Son one, and the Spirit one, and that They are distinct from Each Other. This statement is taken in a wrong sense by every uneducated as well as every perversely disposed person, as if it predicated a diversity, in such a sense as to imply a separation among the Father, and the Son, and the Spirit. I am, moreover, obliged to say this, when (extolling the *Monarchy* at the expense of the *Economy*) they contend for the identity of the Father and Son and Spirit, that it is not by way of diversity that the Son differs from the Father, but by distribution: it is not by division that He is different, but by distinction; because the Father is not the same as the Son, since they differ one from the other in the mode of their being.[1] For the Father is the entire substance, but the Son is a derivation and portion of the whole,[2] as He Himself acknowledges: "My Father is greater than I."[3] In the Psalm His inferiority is described as being "a little lower than the angels."[4] Thus the Father is distinct from

[1] ["Modulo," in the sense of dispensation or economy. See Oehler and Rigault on *The Apology*, c. xxi.]

[2] ["In his representations of the distinctions (of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity), Tertullian sometimes uses expressions which in after-times, when controversy had introduced greater precision of language, were studiously avoided by the orthodox. Thus he calls the Father the whole substance, the Son a derivation from or portion of the whole" (Bp. Kaye, *On Tertullian*, p. 505). After Arius the language of theology received greater precision; but as it is, there is no doubt of the orthodoxy of Tertullian's doctrine, since he so firmly and ably teaches the Son's *consubstantiality* with the Father—equal to Him and inseparable from Him.]

[3] [John xiv. 28.]

[4] [Ps. viii. 5.]

the Son, being greater than the Son, inasmuch as He who begets is one, and He who is begotten is another; He, too, who sends is one, and He who is sent is another; and He, again, who makes is one, and He through whom the thing is made is another. Happily the Lord Himself employs this expression of the person of the Paraclete, so as to signify not a division or severance, but a disposition [of mutual relations in the Godhead]; for He says, "I will pray the Father, and He shall send you another Comforter . . . . even the Spirit of truth,"[1]—thus making the Paraclete distinct from Himself, even as we say that the Son is also distinct from the Father; so that He showed a third degree in the Paraclete, as we believe the second degree is in the Son, by reason of the order observed in the *Economy*. Besides, does not the very fact that they have the distinct names of *Father* and *Son* amount to a declaration that they are distinct in personality?[2] For, of course, all things will be what their names represent them to be; and what they are and ever will be, that will they be called; and the distinction indicated by the names does not at all admit of any confusion, because there is none in the things which they designate. "Yes is yes, and no is no; for what is more than these, cometh of evil."[3]

CHAP. X.—*The very names of* FATHER *and* SON *prove the personal distinction of the Two. They cannot possibly be identical, nor is their identity necessary to preserve the divine* "MONARCHY."

So it is either the Father or the Son, and the day is not the same as the night; nor is the Father the same as the Son, in such a way that Both of them should be One, and One or the Other should be Both,—an opinion which the most conceited "Monarchians" maintain. He Himself, they say, made Himself a Son to Himself. Now a Father makes a Son, and a Son makes a Father;[4] and they who thus become reciprocally related out of each other to each other

[1] [John xiv. 16.] [2] Aliud ab alio. [3] [Matt. v. 37.]
[4] [As correlatives, one implying the existence of the other.]

cannot in any way by themselves simply become so related to themselves, that the Father can make Himself a Son to Himself, and the Son render Himself a Father to Himself. And the relations which God establishes, them does He also guard. A father must needs have a son, in order to be a father; so likewise a son, to be a son, must have a father. It is, however, one thing to have, and another thing to be. For instance, in order to be a husband, I must have a wife; I can never myself be my own wife. In like manner, in order to be a father, I have a son, for I never can be a son to myself; and in order to be a son, I have a father, it being impossible for me ever to be my own father. And it is these relations which make me [what I am], when I come to possess them: I shall then be a father, when I have a son; and a son, when I have a father. Now, if I am to be to myself any one of these relations, I no longer have what I am myself to be: neither a father, because I am to be my own father; nor a son, because I shall be my own son. Moreover, inasmuch as I ought to *have* one of these relations in order to *be* the other; so, if I am to be both together, I shall fail to be one while I possess not the other. For if I must be myself my son, who am also a father, I now cease to have a son, since I am my own son. But by reason of not having a son, since I am my own son, how can I be a father? For I ought to *have* a son, in order to be a father. Therefore I am not a son, because I have not a father, who makes a son. In like manner, if I am myself my father, who am also a son, I no longer have a father, but am myself my father. By not having a father, however, since I am my own father, how can I be a son? For I ought to have a father, in order to be a son. I cannot therefore be a father, because I have not a son, who makes a father. Now all this must be the device of the devil—this excluding and severing one from the other—since by including both together in one under pretence of the "*Monarchy*," he causes neither to be held and acknowledged, so that He is not the Father, since indeed He has not the Son; neither is He the Son, since in like manner He has not the Father: for while He is the Father,

He will not be the Son. In this way they hold the *Monarchy*, but they hold neither the Father nor the Son. Well, but "with God nothing is impossible."[1] [True enough]; who can be ignorant of it? Who also can be unaware that "the things which are impossible with men are possible with God?"[2] "The foolish things also of the world hath God chosen to confound the things which are wise."[3] We have read it all. Therefore, they argue, it was not difficult for God to make Himself both a Father and a Son, contrary to the condition of things among men. For a barren woman to have a child against nature was no difficulty with God; nor was it for a virgin to conceive. Of course nothing is "too hard for the Lord."[4] But if we choose to apply this principle so extravagantly and harshly in our capricious imaginations, we may then make out God to have done anything we please, on the ground that it was not impossible for Him to do it. We must not, however, because He is able to do all things, suppose that He has actually done what He has not done. But we must inquire *whether He has really done it.* God could, if He had liked, have furnished man with wings to fly with, just as He gave wings to kites. We must not, however, run to the conclusion that He did this because He was able to do it. He might also have extinguished Praxeas and all other heretics at once; it does not follow, however, that He did, simply because He was able. For it was necessary that there should be both kites and heretics; it was necessary also that the Father should be crucified.[5] In one sense there will be something difficult even for God —namely, that which He has not done—not because He could not, but because He would not, do it. For with God, to be willing is to be able, and to be unwilling is to be unable; all that He has willed, however, He has both been able to accomplish, and has displayed His ability. Since, therefore, if God had wished to make Himself a Son to Himself, He had it in His power to do so; and since, if He

[1] [Matt. xix. 26.]
[2] [Luke xviii. 27.]
[3] [1 Cor. i. 27.]
[4] [Gen. xviii. 14.]
[5] [An ironical reference to a great paradox in the Praxean heresy.]

had it in His power, He effected [His purpose], you will then make good your proof of His power and His will [to do even this] when you shall have proved to us that He actually did it.

CHAP. XI.—*The identity of the Father and the Son, as Praxeas held it, shown to be full of perplexity and absurdity. Many Scriptures quoted in proof of the distinction of the Divine Persons of the Trinity.*

It will be your duty, however, to adduce your proofs out of the Scriptures as plainly as we do, when we prove that He made His Word a Son to Himself. For if He calls Him Son, and if the Son is none other than He who has proceeded from [the Father] Himself, and if the Word has proceeded from [the Father] Himself, He will then be the Son, and not Himself from whom He proceeded. For [the Father] Himself did not proceed from Himself. Now, you who say that the Father is the same as the Son, do really make the same Person both to have sent forth from Himself (and at the same time to have gone out from Himself as) that Being which is God. If it was possible for Him to have done this, He at all events did not do it. You must bring forth the proof which I require of you—one like my own; that is, [you must prove to me] that the Scriptures show the Son and the Father to be the same, just as on our side the Father and the Son are demonstrated to be distinct; I say *distinct*, but not *separate*:[1] for as on my part I produce the words of God Himself, "My heart hath emitted my most excellent Word,"[2] so you in like manner ought to adduce in opposition to me some text where God has said, "My heart hath emitted Myself as my own most excellent Word," in such a sense that He is Himself both the Emitter and the Emitted, both He who sent forth and He who was sent forth, since He is both the Word and God. I bid you also observe,[3] that on

[1] Distincte, non divise.

[2] [For this version of Ps. xlv. 1, see our *Anti-Marcion*, p. 66, note 5.]

[3] Ecce.

my side I advance the passage where the Father said to the Son, "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten Thee."[1] If you want me to believe Him to be both the Father and the Son, show me some other passage where it is declared, "The Lord said unto Himself, I am my own Son, to-day have I begotten myself;" or again, "Before the morning did I beget myself;"[2] and likewise, "I the Lord possessed Myself the beginning of my ways for my own works; before all the hills, too, did I beget myself;"[3] and whatever other passages are to the same effect. Why, moreover, could God, the Lord of all things, have hesitated to speak thus of Himself, if the fact had been so? Was He afraid of not being believed, if He had in so many words declared Himself to be both the Father and the Son? Of one thing He was at any rate afraid—of lying. Of Himself, too, and of His own truth, was He afraid. Believing Him, therefore, to be the true God, I am sure that He declared nothing to exist in any other way than according to His own dispensation and arrangement, and that He had arranged nothing in any other way than according to His own declaration. On your side, however, you must make Him out to be a liar, and an impostor, and a tamperer with His word, if, when He was Himself a Son to Himself, He assigned the part of His Son to be played by another, when all the Scriptures attest the clear existence of, and distinction in, [the Persons of] the Trinity, and indeed furnish us with our Rule [of faith], that He who speaks, and He of whom He speaks, and to whom He speaks, cannot possibly seem to be One and the Same. So absurd and misleading a statement would be unworthy of God, that, when it was Himself to whom He was speaking, He speaks rather to another, and not to His very self. Hear, then, other utterances also of the Father concerning the Son by the mouth of Isaiah: "Behold my Son, whom I have chosen; my beloved, in whom I am well pleased: I will put my Spirit upon Him, and He shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles."[4] Hear also what He says to the Son: "Is

[1] [Ps. ii. 7.]
[2] [In allusion to Ps. cx. 3 (Sept.).]
[3] [In allusion to Prov. viii. 22.]
[4] [Isa. xlii. 1.]

it a great thing for Thee, that Thou shouldest be called my Son, to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the dispersed of Israel? I have given Thee for a light to the Gentiles, that Thou mayest be their salvation to the end of the earth."[1] Hear now also the Son's utterances respecting the Father: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because He hath anointed me to preach the gospel unto men."[2] He speaks of Himself likewise to the Father in the Psalm: "Forsake me not, until I have declared the might of Thine arm to all the generation that is to come."[3] Also to the same purport in another Psalm: "O Lord, how are they increased that trouble me!"[4] But almost all the Psalms which prophesy of[5] the person of Christ, represent the Son as conversing with the Father—that is, [represent] Christ [as speaking] to God. Observe also the Spirit speaking of the Father and the Son, in the character of[6] a third Person: "The Lord said unto my Lord, Sit Thou on my right hand, until I make Thine enemies Thy footstool."[7] Likewise in the words of Isaiah: "Thus saith the Lord to the Lord[8] mine Anointed."[9] Likewise, in the same prophet, He says to the Father respecting the Son: "Lord, who hath believed our report, and to whom is the arm of the Lord revealed? We brought a report concerning Him, as if He were a little child, as if He were a root in a dry ground, who had no form nor comeliness."[10] These are a few testimonies out of many; for we do not pretend to bring up all the passages of Scripture, because we have a tolerably large accumulation of them in the various heads of our subject, as we in our several chapters call them in as our witnesses in the fulness of their dignity and authority. Still, in these few quotations the distinction of [Persons in] the Trinity is clearly set forth. For there is the Spirit Himself who speaks, and the Father to whom He speaks, and the Son of whom He speaks. In

[1] [Isa. xlix. 6.] [2] [Isa. lxi. 1 and Luke iv. 18.]
[3] [Ps. lxxi. 18.] [4] [Ps. iii. 1.] [5] Sustinent.
[6] Ex. [7] [Ps. cx. 1.]
[8] [Tertullian read Κυρίῳ instead of Κύρῳ, "Cyrus."]
[9] [Isa. xlv. 1.] [10] [Isa. liii. 1, 2.]

the same manner, the other passages also establish each one of several Persons in His special character—addressed as they in some cases are to the Father or to the Son respecting the Son, in other cases to the Son or to the Father concerning the Father, and again in other instances to the [Holy] Spirit.

CHAP. XII.—*Other quotations from Holy Scripture adduced in proof of the plurality of Persons in the Godhead.*

If the number of the Trinity also offends you, as if it were not connected in the simple Unity, I ask you how it is possible for a Being who is merely and absolutely One and Singular, to speak in plural phrase, saying, "Let us make man in our own image, and after our own likeness;"[1] whereas He ought to have said, "Let me make man in my own image, and after my own likeness," as being a unique and singular Being? In the following passage, however, "Behold, the man is become as one of us,"[2] He is either deceiving or amusing us in speaking plurally, if He is One only and singular. Or was it to the angels that He spoke, as the Jews interpret the passage, because these also acknowledge not the Son? Or was it because He was at once the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, that He spoke to Himself in plural terms, making Himself plural on that very account? Nay, it was because He had already His Son close at His side, as a second Person, His own Word, and a third Person also, the Spirit in the Word, that He purposely adopted the plural phrase, "Let *us* make;" and, "in *our* image;" and, "become as one *of us*." For with whom did He make man? and to whom did He make him like? [The answer must be], the Son on the one hand, who was one day to put on human nature; and the Spirit on the other, who was to sanctify man. With these did He then speak, in the Unity of the Trinity, as with His ministers and witnesses. In the following text also He distinguishes among the Persons: "So God created man in His own image; in the image of God created He him."[3] Why say "image of God?" Why

[1] [Gen. i. 26.] [2] [Gen. iii. 22.] [3] [Gen. i. 27.]

not "His own image" merely, if He was only one who was the Maker, and if there was not also One in whose image He made man? But there was One in whose image God was making man, that is to say, Christ's image, who, being one day about to become Man (more surely and more truly so), had already caused the man to be called His image, who was then going to be formed of clay—the image and similitude of the true and perfect Man. But in respect of the previous works of the world what says the Scripture? Its first statement indeed is made, when the Son has not yet appeared: "And God said, Let there be light, and there was light."[1] Immediately there appears the Word, "that true light, which lighteth man on his coming into the world,"[2] and through Him also came light upon the world.[3] From that moment God willed creation to be effected in the Word, Christ being present and ministering unto Him; and [so] God created. And God said, "Let there be a firmament, . . . and God made the firmament;"[4] and God also said, "Let there be lights [in the firmament]; and [so] God made a greater and a lesser light."[5] But all the rest of the created things did He in like manner make, who made the former ones—I mean the Word of God, "through whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made."[6] Now if He too is God, according to John, [who says,] "The Word was God,"[7] then you have two Beings — One that commands that the thing be made, and the Other that [executes the order, and] creates. In what sense, however, you ought to understand Him to be another, I have already explained, on the ground of Personality, not of Substance—in the way of distinction, not of division. But although I must everywhere hold one only substance in three coherent and inseparable [Persons], yet I am bound to acknowledge, from the necessity of the case, that He who issues a command is different from Him who executes it. For, indeed, He would not be issuing a command if He

[1] [Gen. i. 3.] [2] [John i. 9.] [3] Mundialis lux.
[4] [Gen. i. 6, 7.] [5] [Gen. i. 14, 16.] [6] [John i. 3.]
[7] [John i. 1.]

were all the while doing the work Himself, while ordering it to be done by the second.[1] But still He did issue the command, although He would not have intended to command Himself, if He were only one; or else He must have worked without any command, because He would not have waited to command Himself.

CHAP. XIII.—*The force of sundry passages of Scripture illustrated in relation to the plurality of Persons and unity of substance. There is no polytheism here, since* THE UNITY *is insisted on as a remedy against polytheism.*

Well then, you reply, if He was God who spoke, and He was also God who created, at this rate, one God spoke and another created; [and thus] two Gods are declared. If you are so venturesome and harsh, reflect a while; and that you may think the better and more deliberately, listen to the psalm in which Two are described as God: "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever; the sceptre of Thy kingdom [is a sceptre of righteousness]. Thou hast loved righteousness, and hated iniquity: therefore God, even Thy God, hath anointed Thee [or made Thee His Christ]."[2] Now, since He here speaks to God, and affirms that God is anointed by God, He must have affirmed that Two are God, by reason of the sceptre's royal power. Accordingly, Isaiah also says to the Person of Christ: "The Sabæans, men of stature, shall pass over to Thee; and they shall follow after Thee, bound in fetters; and they shall worship Thee, because God is in Thee: for Thou art our God, yet we knew it not; Thou art the God of Israel."[3] For here too, by saying, "God is in Thee," and "Thou art God," he sets forth Two who were God: [in the former expression, "*in Thee*," he means] in Christ, and [in the other he means] the Holy Ghost. That is a still grander statement which you will find expressly made in the Gospel: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God."[4] There was One "who was," and there was another "with whom"

[1] Per eum.
[2] [Ps. xlv. 6, 7.]
[3] [Isa. xlv. 14, 15 (Sept.).]
[4] [John i. 1.]

He was. But I find in Scripture the name LORD also applied to them Both: "The Lord said unto my Lord, Sit Thou on my right hand."[1] And Isaiah says this: "Lord, who hath believed our report, and to whom is the arm of the Lord revealed?"[2] Now he would most certainly have said *Thine Arm*, if he had not wished us to understand that the Father is Lord, and the Son also is Lord. A much more ancient testimony we have also in Genesis: "Then the Lord rained upon Sodom and upon Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven."[3] Now, either deny that this is Scripture; or else [let me ask] what sort of man you are, that you do not think words ought to be taken and understood in the sense in which they are written, especially when they are not expressed in allegories and parables, but in determinate and simple declarations? If, indeed, you follow those who did not at the time endure the Lord when showing Himself to be the Son of God, because they would not believe Him to be the Lord, then [I ask you] call to mind along with them the passage where it is written, "I have said, Ye are gods, and ye are children of the Most High;"[4] and again, "God standeth in the congregation of gods;"[5] in order that, if the Scripture has not been afraid to designate as gods human beings who have become sons of God by faith, you may be sure that the same Scripture has with greater propriety conferred the name of the Lord on the true and one-only Son of God. Very well! you say, I shall challenge you to preach from this day forth (and that, too, on the authority of these same Scriptures) two Gods and two Lords, consistently with your views. God forbid, [is my reply.] For we, who by the grace of God possess an insight into both the times and the occasions of the Sacred Writings, especially we who are followers of the Paraclete, not of human [teachers], do indeed definitively declare that *Two* Beings are God, the Father and the Son, and, with the addition of the Holy Spirit, even *Three*, according to the principle of the [divine] economy, which introduces *number*,

[1] [Ps. cx. 1.] [2] [Isa. liii. 1.] [3] [Gen. xix. 24.]
[4] [Ps. lxxxii. 6.] [5] [Ver. 1.]

in order that the Father may not, as you perversely infer, be Himself believed to have been born and to have suffered, which it is not lawful to believe, forasmuch as it has not been so handed down. That there are, however, two Gods or two Lords, is a statement which at no time proceeds out of our mouth: not as if it were untrue that the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, and each is God; but because in earlier times Two were actually spoken of as God, and two as Lord, that when Christ should come He might be both acknowledged as God and designated as Lord, being the Son of Him who is both God and Lord. Now, if there were found in the Scriptures but one Personality of Him who is God and Lord, Christ would justly enough be inadmissible to the title of God and Lord: for [in the Scriptures] there was declared to be none other than One God and One Lord, and it must have followed that the Father should Himself seem to have come down [to earth], inasmuch as only One God and One Lord was ever read of [in the Scriptures]; and His entire *Economy* would be involved in obscurity, which has been planned and arranged with so clear a foresight [in His providential dispensation] as matter for our faith. As soon, however, as Christ came, and was recognised by us as the very Being who had from the beginning[1] caused plurality[2] [in the Divine Economy], being the *second* from the Father, and with the Spirit the *third*, and Himself declaring and manifesting the Father more fully [than He had ever been before], the title of Him who is God and Lord was at once restored to the Unity [of the Divine Nature], even because the Gentiles would have to pass from the multitude of their idols to the One Only God, in order that a difference might be distinctly settled between the worshippers of One God and the votaries of polytheism. For it was only right that Christians should shine in the world as "children of light," adoring and invoking Him who is the One God and Lord as "the light of the world." Besides, if, from that perfect knowledge[3] which assures us that the title of God and Lord is suitable

[1] Retro. [2] Numerum. [3] Conscientia.

both to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost, we were to invoke [a plurality of] gods and lords, we should quench our torches, and we should become less courageous to endure the martyr's sufferings, from which an easy escape would everywhere lie open to us, as soon as we swore by [a plurality of] gods and lords, as sundry heretics do, who hold more gods than One. I will therefore not speak of gods at all, nor of lords, but I shall follow the apostle; so that if the Father and the Son are alike to be invoked, I shall call the Father "*God*," and invoke Jesus Christ as "*Lord*."[1] But when Christ alone [is mentioned], I shall be able to call Him "*God*," as the same apostle says: "Of whom is Christ, who is over all, God blessed for ever."[2] For I should give the name of "*sun*" even to a sunbeam, considered in itself; but if I were mentioning the sun from which the ray emanates, I certainly should at once withdraw the name of sun from the mere beam. For although I make not two suns, still I shall reckon both the sun and its ray to be as much two things and two forms[3] of one undivided substance, as God and His Word, as the Father and the Son.

CHAP. XIV.—*The natural* INVISIBILITY *of the Father, and the* VISIBILITY *of the Son (as witnessed in many passages of the Old Testament), are arguments of their distinctness.*

Moreover, there comes to our aid, when we insist upon the Father and the Son as being *Two*, that regulating principle which has determined God to be invisible. When Moses in Egypt desired to see the face of the Lord, saying, "If therefore I have found grace in Thy sight, manifest Thyself unto me, that I may see Thee and know Thee,"[4] [God] said, "Thou canst not see my face; for there shall no man see me, and live:"[5] in other words, he who sees me shall die. Now we find that God has been seen by many persons, and yet that no one who saw Him died [at the sight]. [The truth is], they saw God according to the faculties of men, but

[1] [Rom. i. 7.] [2] [Rom. ix. 5.] [3] Species.
[4] [Ex. xxxiii. 13.] [5] [Ver. 20.]

not in accordance with the full glory of the Godhead. For the patriarchs are said to have seen God (as Abraham and Jacob), and the prophets (as, for instance, Isaiah and Ezekiel), and yet they did not die. Either, then, they ought to have died, since they had seen Him—for [the sentence runs], "No man shall see God, and live;" or else, if they saw God, and yet did not die, the Scripture is false in stating that God said, "If a man see my face, he shall not live." Either way, the Scripture misleads us, when it makes God invisible, and when it produces Him to our sight. Now, then, He must be a different Being who was seen, because of one who was seen it could not be predicated that He is invisible. It will therefore follow, that by Him who is invisible we must understand the Father in the fulness of His majesty, while we recognise the Son as visible by reason of the dispensation of His derived existence;[1] even as it is not permitted us to contemplate the sun, in the full amount of his substance which is in the heavens, but we can only endure with our eyes a ray, by reason of the tempered condition of this portion which is projected from him to the earth. Here some one on the other side may be disposed to contend that the Son is also invisible as being the Word, [and] as being also the Spirit;[2] and, while claiming one nature for the Father and the Son, to affirm that the Father is rather One and the Same [Person] with the Son. But the Scripture, as we have said, maintains their difference by the distinction it makes between the Visible and the Invisible. They then go on to argue to this effect, that if it was the Son who then spake to Moses, He must mean it of Himself that His face was visible to no one, because He was Himself indeed the invisible Father in the name of the Son. And by this means they will have it that the Visible and the Invisible are one and the same, just as the Father and the Son are the same; [and this they maintain,] because in a preceding passage, before He had refused [the sight of] His face to Moses, the Scripture informs us that "the Lord spake face to face with Moses, even as a

[1] Pro modulo derivationis.

[2] [Spiritus here is the divine nature of Christ.]

man speaketh unto his friend;"[1] just as Jacob also says, "I have seen God face to face."[2] Therefore the Visible and the Invisible are one and the same; and both being thus the same, it follows that He is invisible as the Father, and visible as the Son. As if the Scripture, according to our exposition of it, were inapplicable to the Son, when the Father is set aside in His own invisibility. We declare, however, that the Son also, considered in Himself [as the Son], is invisible, in that He is God, and the Word and Spirit of God; but that He was visible before [the days of] His flesh, in the way that He says to Aaron and Miriam, "And if there shall be a prophet amongst you, I will make myself known to him in a vision, and will speak to him in a dream; not as with Moses, with whom I shall speak mouth to mouth, even apparently (that is to say, in truth), and not enigmatically" (that is to say, in image);[3] as the apostle also expresses it, "Now we see through a glass, darkly [or enigmatically], but then face to face."[4] Since, therefore, He reserves to some future time His presence and speech face to face with Moses —a promise which was afterwards fulfilled in the retirement of the mount [of transfiguration], when, as we read in the Gospel, "Moses appeared talking with Jesus"[5]—it is evident that in early times it was always in a glass, [as it were,] and an enigma, in vision and dream, that God, I mean the Son of God, appeared—to the prophets and the patriarchs, as also to Moses indeed himself. And even if the Lord did possibly[6] speak with him face to face, yet it was not as man that he could behold His face, unless indeed it was in a glass, [as it were,] and by enigma. Besides, if the Lord so spake with Moses, that Moses actually discerned His face, eye to eye,[7] how comes it to pass that immediately afterwards, on the same occasion, he desires to see His face,[8] which he ought not to have desired, because he had already seen it? And how, in like manner, does the Lord also say that His face

[1] [Ex. xxxiii. 11.] [2] [Gen. xxxii. 30.] [3] [Num. xii. 6–8.]
[4] [1 Cor. xiii. 12.] [5] [Mark ix. 4; Matt. xvii. 3.]
[6] Si forte. [7] Cominus sciret.
[8] [Comp. ver. 13 with ver. 11 of Ex. xxxiii.]

cannot be seen, because He had shown it, if indeed He really had, [as our opponents suppose.] Or what is that face of God, the sight of which is refused, if there was one which was visible to man? "I have seen God," says Jacob, "face to face, and my life is preserved."[1] There ought to be some other face which kills if it be only seen. Well, then, was the Son visible? [Certainly not,[2]] although He was the face of God, except only in vision and dream, and in a glass and enigma, because the Word and Spirit [of God] cannot be seen except in an imaginary form. But, [they say,] He calls the invisible Father His face. For who is the Father? Must He not be the face of the Son, by reason of that authority which He obtains as the begotten of the Father? For is there not a natural propriety in saying of some personage greater [than yourself], That man is my face; he gives me his countenance? "My Father," says [Christ], "is greater than I."[3] Therefore the Father must be the face of the Son. For what does the Scripture say? "The Spirit of His person is Christ the Lord."[4] As therefore Christ is the Spirit of the Father's person, there is good reason why, in virtue indeed of the unity, the Spirit of Him to whose person He belonged—that is to say, the Father—pronounced Him to be His "face." Now this, to be sure, is an astonishing thing, that the Father can be taken to be the face of the Son, when He is His head; for "the head of Christ is God."[5]

[1] [Gen. xxxii. 30.]

[2] [Involved in the "nunquid."]

[3] [John xiv. 28.]

[4] [Lam. iv. 20. Tertullian reads, "Spiritus personæ *ejus* Christus Dominus." This varies only in the pronoun from the Septuagint, which runs, Πνεῦμα προσώπου ἡμῶν Χριστὸς Κύριος. According to our A. V., "The breath of our nostrils, the anointed of the Lord" (or, "our anointed Lord"), allusion is made, in the destruction of Jerusalem by the Babylonians, to the capture of the king—the last of David's line, "as an anointed prince." Comp. Jer. lii. 9.]

[5] [1 Cor. xi. 3.]

CHAP. XV. — *New Testament passages quoted, attesting the same truth of the Son's visibility contrasted with the Father's invisibility.*

If I fail in resolving this article [of our faith] by passages which may admit of dispute[1] out of the Old Testament, I will take out of the New Testament a confirmation of our view, that you may not straightway attribute to the Father every possible [relation and condition] which I ascribe to the Son. Behold, then, I find both in the Gospels and in the [writings of the] apostles a visible and an invisible God [revealed to us], under a manifest and personal distinction in the condition of both. There is a certain emphatic saying by John: "No man hath seen God at any time;"[2] meaning, of course, at any previous time. But he has indeed taken away all question of time, by saying that God had never been seen. The apostle confirms this statement; for, speaking of God, he says, "Whom no man hath seen, nor can see;"[3] because the man indeed would die who should see Him.[4] But the very same apostles testify that they had both seen and "handled" Christ.[5] Now, if Christ is Himself both the Father and the Son, how can He be both the Visible and the Invisible? In order, however, to reconcile this diversity between the Visible and the Invisible, will not some one on the other side argue that the two statements are quite correct: that He was visible indeed in the flesh, but was invisible before [His appearance in] the flesh; so that He who as the Father was invisible before the flesh, is the same as the Son who was visible in the flesh? If, however, He is the same who was invisible before the incarnation, how comes it that He was actually seen in ancient times before [coming in] the flesh? And by parity of reasoning, if He is the same who was visible after [coming in] the flesh, how happens it that He is now declared to be invisible by the apostles? [How, I repeat, can all this be], unless it be that *He* is one, who anciently was visible only in mystery and

[1] Quæstionibus. [2] [John i. 18.] [3] [1 Tim. vi. 16.]
[4] [Ex. xxxiii. 20; Deut. v. 26; Judg. xiii. 22.] [5] [1 John i. 1.]

enigma, and became more clearly visible by His incarnation, even the Word who was also made flesh; whilst *He* is another whom no man has seen at any time, [being] none else than the Father, even Him to whom the Word belongs? Let us, in short, examine who it is whom the apostles saw. "That," says John, "which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the Word of life."[1] Now the Word of life became flesh, and was heard, and was seen, and was handled, because He was flesh who, before [He came in] the flesh, was "the Word in the beginning with God" the Father,[2] and not the Father with the Word. For although the Word was God, yet was He with God, because He is God of God; and being joined to the Father, is with the Father.[3] "And we have seen His glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father;"[4] that is, of course, [the glory] of the Son, even Him who was visible, and was glorified by the invisible Father. And therefore, inasmuch as he had said that the Word of God was God, in order that he might give no help to the presumption of the adversary, [which pretended] that he had seen the Father Himself, [and] in order to draw a distinction between the invisible Father and the visible Son, he makes the additional assertion, *ex abundanti* as it were: "No man hath seen God at any time."[5] What God does he mean? The Word? But he has already said: "[Him] we have seen and heard, and our hands have handled the Word of life." Well, [I must again ask,] what God does he mean? It is of course the Father, with whom was the Word, the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, and has Himself declared Him.[6] He was both heard and seen, and, that He might not be supposed to be a phantom, was actually handled. Him, too, did Paul behold; but yet he saw not the Father. "Have I not," he says, "seen Jesus [Christ our Lord]?"[7] Moreover, he expressly called

[1] [1 John i. 1.]
[2] [John i. 1, 2.]
[3] Quia cum Patre apud Patrem.
[4] [John i. 14.]
[5] [1 John iv. 12.]
[6] [John i. 18.]
[7] [1 Cor. ix. 1.]

Christ God, saying: "Of whom are the fathers, and of whom as concerning the flesh Christ came, who is over all, God blessed for ever."[1] He shows us also that the Son of God, which is the Word of God, is visible, because He who became flesh was called Christ. Of the Father, however, he says to Timothy: "Whom none among men hath seen, nor indeed can see;" and he accumulates the description in still ampler terms: "Who only hath immortality, and dwelleth in the light which no man can approach unto."[2] It was of Him, too, that he had said in a previous passage: "Now unto the King eternal, immortal, invisible, to the only God;"[3] so that we might apply even the contrary qualities to the Son Himself—mortality, accessibility—of whom [the apostle] testifies that "He died according to the Scriptures,"[4] and that "He was seen by himself last of all,"[5]—by means, of course, of the light which was accessible, although it was not without imperilling his sight that he experienced that light.[6] [A like danger to which also befell] Peter, and John, and James, [who confronted not the same light] without risking the loss of their reason and mind; and if they, who were unable to endure the glory of the Son,[7] had only seen the Father, they must have died then and there: "For no man shall see God, and live."[8] This being the case, it is evident that He was always seen from the beginning, who became visible in the end; and that He, [on the contrary,] was not seen in the end who had never been visible from the beginning; and that accordingly there are two—the Visible and the Invisible. It was the Son, therefore, who was always seen, and the Son who always conversed with men, and the Son who has always worked by the authority and will of the Father; because "the Son can do nothing of Himself, but what He seeth the Father do"[9]—"do," that is, in His mind and thought.[10] For the Father acts by mind and thought; whilst the Son, who is in the Father's mind

[1] [Rom. ix. 5.] [2] [1 Tim. vi. 16.] [3] [1 Tim. i. 17.]
[4] [1 Cor. xv. 3.] [5] [Ver. 8.] [6] [Acts xxii. 11.]
[7] [Matt. xvii. 6; Mark ix. 6.] [8] [Ex. xxxiii. 20.]
[9] [John v. 19.] [10] In sensu

and thought,[1] gives effect and form to what He sees. Thus all things were made by the Son, and without Him was not anything made.[2]

CHAP. XVI. — *Early manifestations of the Son of God, as recorded in the Old Testament; rehearsals of His subsequent incarnation.*

But you must not suppose that only the works which relate to the [creation of the] world were made by the Son, but also whatsoever since that time has been done by God. For "the Father who loveth the Son, and hath given all things into His hand,"[3] loves Him indeed from the beginning, and from the very first has handed all things over to Him. Whence it is written, "From the beginning the Word was with God, and the Word was God;"[4] to whom "is given by the Father all power in heaven and on earth."[5] "The Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment to the Son"[6]—from the very beginning even. For when He speaks of all power and all judgment, and says that all things were made by Him, and all things have been delivered into His hand, He allows no exception [in respect] of time, because they would not be *all things* unless they were *the things of all time*. It is the Son, therefore, who has been from the beginning administering judgment, throwing down the haughty tower, and dividing the tongues, punishing the whole world by the violence of waters, raining upon Sodom and Gomorrah fire and brimstone, as the LORD from the LORD. For He it was who at all times came down to hold converse with men, from Adam on to the patriarchs and the prophets, in vision, in dream, in mirror, in dark saying; ever from the beginning laying the foundation of the course [of His dispensations], which He meant to follow

[1] [The reading is, "in Patris sensu;" another reading substitutes "sinu" for "sensu;" *q.d.* "the Father's bosom."]

[2] [John i. 3.]

[3] [John iii. 35. Tertullian reads the last clause (according to Oehler), "in sinu ejus," *q.d.* "to Him who is in His bosom."]

[4] [John i. 1.] [5] [Matt. xxviii. 18.] [6] [John v. 22.]

out to the very last. Thus was He ever learning even as God to converse with men upon earth, being no other than the Word which was to be made flesh. But He was thus learning [or rehearsing], in order to level for us the way of faith, that we might the more readily believe that the Son of God had come down into the world, if we knew that in times past also something similar had been done.[1] For as it was on our account [and for our learning] that these events are described in the Scriptures, so for our sakes also were they done—[even *ours*, I say], "upon whom the ends of the world are come."[2] In this way it was that even then He knew full well what human feelings and affections were, intending as He always did to take upon Him man's actual component substances, body and soul, making inquiry of Adam (as if He were ignorant),[3] "Where art thou, Adam?"[4]—repenting that He had made man, as if He had lacked foresight;[5] tempting Abraham, as if ignorant of what was in man; offended with persons, and then reconciled to them; and whatever other [weaknesses and imperfections] the heretics lay hold of [in their assumptions] as unworthy of God, in order to discredit the Creator, not considering that these [circumstances] are suitable enough for the Son, who was one day to experience even human sufferings — hunger and thirst, and tears, and actual birth and real death, and in respect of such a dispensation "made by the Father a little less than the angels."[6] But the heretics, you may be sure, will not allow that those things are suitable even to the Son of God, which you are imputing to the very Father Himself, when you pretend[7] that He made Himself less [than the angels] on our account; whereas the Scripture informs us that He who was made less was so affected by another, and not Himself by Himself. What, again, if He was *One* who was "crowned with glory and honour," and He *Another* by whom He was so crowned,[8]—the Son, in fact,

[1] [See our *Anti-Marcion*, p. 112, note 10.]
[2] [Comp. 1 Cor. x. 11.]
[3] [See the treatise, *Against Marcion*, ii. 25.]
[4] [Gen. iii. 9.]
[5] [Gen. vi. 6.]
[6] [Ps. viii. 6.]
[7] Quasi.
[8] [Ps. viii. 6.]

by the Father? Moreover, how comes it to pass, that the Almighty Invisible God, "whom no man hath seen nor can see; He who dwelleth in light unapproachable;"[1] "He who dwelleth not in [temples] made with hands;"[2] "from before whose sight the earth trembles, and the mountains melt like wax;"[3] who holdeth the whole world in His hand "like a nest;"[4] "whose throne is heaven, and earth His footstool;"[5] in whom is every place, but Himself is in no place; who is the utmost bound of the universe;—how happens it, I say, that He [who, though] the Most High, should yet have walked in paradise towards the [cool of the] evening, in quest of Adam; and should have shut up the ark after Noah had entered it; and at Abraham's tent should have refreshed Himself under an oak; and have called to Moses out of the burning bush; and have appeared as "the fourth" in the furnace of the Babylonian monarch (although He is there called the Son of man),—unless all these events had happened as an image, as a mirror, as an enigma [of the future incarnation]? Surely even these things could not have been believed even of the Son of God, unless they had been given us in the Scriptures; possibly also they could not have been believed of the Father, even if they had been given in the Scriptures, since these men bring *Him* down into Mary's womb, and set Him before Pilate's judgment-seat, and bury Him in the sepulchre of Joseph. Hence, therefore, their error becomes manifest; for, being ignorant that the entire order of the divine administration has from the very first had its course through the Son['s agency], they believe that the Father Himself was actually seen, and held converse with men, and worked, and was athirst, and suffered hunger (in spite of the prophet who says: "The everlasting God, [the Lord, the Creator of the ends of the earth,] shall never thirst at all, nor be hungry;"[6] much more, shall neither die at any time, nor be buried!), and therefore that it was uniformly one God, even the Father, who at all times did Himself the things which were really done [by Him] through the agency of the Son.

[1] [1 Tim. vi. 16.] [2] [Acts xvii. 24.] [3] [Joel ii. 10; Ps. xcvii. 5.]
[4] [Isa. x. 14.] [5] [Isa. lxvi. 1.] [6] [Isa. xl. 28.]

CHAP. XVII.—*Sundry august titles, descriptive of Deity, applied (not, as Praxeas would have it, only to the Father, but) to the Son.*

They more readily supposed that the Father acted in the Son's name, than that the Son acted in the Father's; although the Lord says Himself, "I am come in my Father's name;"[1] and even to the Father He declares, "I have manifested Thy name unto these men;"[2] whilst the Scripture likewise says, "Blessed is He that cometh in the name of the Lord,"[3] that is to say, the Son in the Father's name. And as for the Father's names, God Almighty, the Most High, the Lord of hosts, the King of Israel, the "One that is," we say (for so much do the Scriptures teach us) that they belonged suitably to the Son also, and that the Son came under these designations, and has always acted in them, and has thus manifested them in Himself to men. "All things," says He, "which the Father hath are mine."[4] Then why not His names also? When, therefore, you read of Almighty God, and the Most High, and the God of hosts, and the King of Israel, and the "One that is," consider whether the Son also be not indicated by these designations, who in His own right is God Almighty, in that He is the Word of Almighty God, and has received power over all; is the Most High, in that He is "exalted at the right hand of God," as Peter declares in the Acts;[5] is the Lord of hosts, because all things are by the Father made subject to Him; is the King of Israel, because to Him has especially been committed the destiny of that nation; and is likewise "the One that is," because there are many who are called Sons, but *are not*. As to the point maintained by them, that the name of Christ belongs also to the Father, they shall hear [what I have to say] in the proper place. Meanwhile, let this be my immediate answer to the argument which they adduce from the Revelation of John: "I am the Lord which is, and which was, and which is to come,

[1] [John v. 43.] [2] [John xvii. 6.] [3] [Ps. cxviii. 26.]
[4] [John xvi. 15.] [5] [Acts ii. 22.]

the Almighty;"[1] and from all other passages which in their opinion make the designation of Almighty God unsuitable to the Son. As if, indeed, *He which is to come* were not almighty; whereas even the Son of the Almighty is as much almighty as the Son of God is God.

CHAP. XVIII.—*The designation of the One God in the prophetic Scriptures, while intended as a protest against heathen idolatry, does not preclude the correlative idea of the Son of God. The Son is in the Father.*

But what hinders them from readily perceiving this community of the Father's titles in the Son, is the statement of Scripture, whenever it determines God to be but One; as if the selfsame Scripture had not also set forth Two both as God and Lord, as we have shown above.[2] Their argument is: Since we find Two and One, therefore Both are One and the Same, both Father and Son. Now the Scripture is not in danger of requiring the aid of any one's argument, lest it should seem to be self-contradictory. It has a method of its own, both when it sets forth one only God, and also when it shows that there are Two, Father and Son; and is consistent with itself. It is clear that the Son is mentioned by it. For, without any detriment to the Son, it is quite possible for it to have rightly determined that God is only One, to whom the Son belongs; since He who has a Son ceases not on that account to exist,—Himself being One only, that is, on His own account, whenever He is named without the Son. And He is named without the Son whensoever He is defined as the principle [of Deity] in the character of "its first Person," which had to be mentioned before the name of the Son; because it is the Father who is acknowledged in the first place, and after the Father the Son is named. Therefore "there is one God," the Father, "and without Him there is none else."[3] And when He Himself makes this declaration, He denies not the Son, but says that there is no other God; and the Son is not different from the Father. Indeed, if you only look carefully at the contexts

[1] [Rev. i. 8.] [2] [See above, ch. xiii.] [3] [Isa. xlv. 5.]

which follow such statements as this, you will find that they nearly always have distinct reference to the makers of idols and the worshippers thereof, with a view to the multitude of false gods being expelled by the unity of the Godhead, which nevertheless has a Son; and inasmuch as this Son is undivided and inseparable from the Father, so is He to be reckoned as being in the Father, even when He is not named. The fact is, if He had named Him expressly, He would have separated Him, saying in so many words: "Beside me there is none else, *except my Son*." In short, He would have made His Son actually another, after excepting Him from others. Suppose the sun to say, "I am the Sun, and there is none other besides me, except my ray," would you not have remarked how useless was such a statement, as if the ray were not itself reckoned in the sun? He says, then, that there is no God besides Himself in respect of the idolatry both of the Gentiles as well as of Israel; nay, even on account of our heretics also, who fabricate idols with their words, just as the heathen do with their hands; that is to say, they make another God and another Christ. When, therefore, He attested His own unity, the Father took care of the Son's interests, that Christ should not be supposed to have come from another God, but from Him who had already said, "I am God, and there is none other beside me,"[1] who shows us that He is the only God, but in company with His Son, with whom "He stretcheth out the heavens alone."[2]

CHAP. XIX.—*The Son in union with the Father in the creation of all things. This union of the Two in co-operation is not opposed to the true unity of God, but only to Praxeas' identification theory.*

But this very declaration of His they will hastily pervert into an argument of His *singleness*. "I have," says He, "stretched out the heaven alone." Undoubtedly *alone* as regards all other powers; and He thus gives a premonitory evidence against the conjectures of the heretics, who maintain that the world was constructed by various angels and

[1] [Isa. xlv. 5, 18, xliv. 6.] [2] [Isa. xliv. 24.]

powers, who also make the Creator Himself to have been either an angel or some subordinate agent sent to form external things, such as the constituent parts of the world, but who was at the same time ignorant [of the divine purpose]. If, now, it is in this sense that He stretches out the heavens alone, how is it that these heretics assume their position so perversely, as to render inadmissible the singleness of that Wisdom which says, "When He prepared the heaven, I was present with Him?"[1]—even though the apostle asks, "Who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been His counsellor?"[2] meaning, of course, to except that wisdom which was present with Him.[3] In Him, at any rate, and with Him, did [Wisdom] construct the universe, He not being ignorant of what she was making. "Except Wisdom," however, is a phrase of the same sense exactly as "except the Son," who is Christ, "the Wisdom and Power of God,"[4] according to the apostle, who only knows the mind of the Father. "For who knoweth the things that be in God, except the Spirit which is in Him?"[5] Not, observe, *without* Him. There was therefore One who caused God to be not alone, except "alone" from all other [gods]. But [if we are to follow the heretics], the Gospel itself will have to be rejected, because it tells us that all things were made by God through the Word, without whom nothing was made.[6] And if I am not mistaken, there is also another passage in which it is written: "By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the hosts of them by His Spirit."[7] Now this Word, the Power of God and the Wisdom of God, must be the very Son of God. So that, if [He did] all things by the Son, He must have stretched out the heavens by the Son, and so not have stretched them out alone, except in the sense in which He is "alone" [and apart] from all other gods. Accordingly He says, concerning the Son, immediately afterwards: "Who else is it that frustrateth the tokens of the liars, and maketh diviners mad, turning

[1] [Prov. viii. 27.] [2] [Rom. xi. 34.] [3] [Prov. viii. 30.]
[4] [1 Cor. i. 24.] [5] [1 Cor. ii. 11.] [6] [John i. 3.]
[7] [Ps. xxxiii. 6.]

wise men backward, and making their knowledge foolish, and confirming the words[1] of His Son?"[2]—as, for instance, when He said, "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased; hear ye Him."[3] By thus attaching the Son to Himself, He becomes His own interpreter in what sense He stretched out the heavens alone, meaning *alone with His Son*, even as He is one with His Son. The utterance, therefore, will be in like manner the Son's, "I have stretched out the heavens alone,"[4] because *by the Word* were the heavens established.[5] Inasmuch, then, as the heaven was prepared when Wisdom was present in the Word, and since all things were made by the Word, it is quite correct to say that even the Son stretched out the heaven alone, because He alone ministered to the Father's work. It must also be He who says, "I am the First, and to all futurity I AM."[6] The Word, no doubt, was before all things. "In the beginning was the Word;"[7] and in that beginning He was sent forth[8] by the Father. The Father, however, has no beginning, as proceeding from none; nor can He be seen, since He was not begotten. He who has always been alone could never have had order or rank. Therefore, if they have determined that the Father and the Son must be regarded as one and the same, for the express purpose of vindicating the unity of God, that unity of His is preserved intact; for He is one, and yet He has a Son, who is equally with Himself comprehended in the same Scriptures. Since they are unwilling to allow that the Son is [a distinct Person], second from the Father, lest, being thus second, He should cause two Gods to be spoken of, we have shown above[9] that Two are actually described in Scripture as God and Lord. And to prevent their being offended at this fact, we give a reason why they are not said to be two Gods and two Lords, but that they are two as Father and Son; and this not

[1] [Isa. xliv. 25.]
[2] [On this reading, see our *Anti-Marcion*, p. 270, note 9.]
[3] [Matt. iii. 17.] [4] [Isa. xliv. 24.] [5] [Ps. xxxiii. 6.]
[6] [Isa. xli. 4 (Sept.).] [7] [John. i. 1.] [8] Prolatus.
[9] [See ch. xiii.]

by severance of their substance, but from the dispensation wherein we declare the Son to be undivided and inseparable from the Father,—distinct in degree, not in state. And although, when named apart, He is called God, He does not thereby constitute two Gods, but one; and that from the very circumstance that He is entitled to be called God, from His union with the Father.

CHAP. XX.—*The Scriptures relied on by Praxeas to support his heresy but few: they are mentioned by Tertullian.*

But I must take some further pains to rebut their arguments, when they make selections from the Scriptures in support of their opinion, and refuse to consider the other points, which obviously maintain the rule of faith without any infraction of the unity of the Godhead, and with the full admission[1] of the Monarchy. For as in the Old Testament Scriptures they lay hold of nothing else than, "I am God, and beside me there is no God;"[2] so in the Gospel they simply keep in view the Lord's answer to Philip, "I and my Father are one;"[3] and, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father; and I am in the Father, and the Father in me."[4] They would have the entire revelation of both Testaments yield to these three passages, whereas the only proper course is to understand the few statements in the light of the many. But in their contention they only act on the principle of all heretics. For, inasmuch as only a few testimonies are to be found [making for them] in the general mass, they pertinaciously set off the few against the many, and assume the later against the earlier. The rule, however, which has been from the beginning established for every case, gives its prescription against the later [assumptions], as indeed it also does against the fewer.

[1] Sonitu.
[2] [Isa. xlv. 5.]
[3] [John x. 30.]
[4] [John xiv. 9, 10.]

CHAP. XXI.—*In this and the four following chapters Tertullian proceeds to show, by a minute analysis of St. John's Gospel, that the Father and Son are constantly spoken of as distinct Persons.*

Consider, therefore, how many passages present their prescriptive authority to you in this very Gospel before this inquiry of Philip, and previous to any discussion on your part. And first of all there comes at once to hand the preamble of John to his Gospel, which shows us what He previously was who had to become flesh. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God: all things were made by Him, and without Him was nothing made."[1] Now, since these words may not be taken otherwise than as they are written, there is without doubt shown to be One who was from the beginning, and also One with whom He always was: one the Word of God, the other God (although the Word is also God, but [God] regarded as the Son of God, not as the Father); One through whom were all things, Another by whom were all things. But in what sense we call Him "*Another*" we have already often described. In that we call Him Another, we must needs imply that He is not identical—not identical indeed, yet not as if separate; *Other* by dispensation, not by division. He, therefore, [who] became flesh was not the very same as He from whom the Word came. "His glory was beheld—the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father;"[2] not, [observe,] as of the Father. He "declared" [what was in] "the bosom of the Father alone;"[3] the Father did not [divulge the secrets of] His own bosom. For this is preceded by another statement: "No man hath seen God at any time."[4] Then, again, when He is designated by John [the Baptist] as "the Lamb of God,"[5] He is not [described as Himself the same with Him]

[1] [John i. 1–3.] [2] [John i. 14.]

[3] Unius sinum Patris. [Another reading makes: "He alone (unus) declared," etc. See John i. 18.]

[4] [John i. 18, first clause.] [5] [John i. 29.]

of whom He is the beloved [Son]. He is, no doubt, ever the Son of God, but yet not He Himself of whom He is the Son. This [divine relationship] Nathanael at once recognised in Him,[1] even as Peter did on another occasion: "Thou art the Son of God."[2] And He affirmed Himself that they were quite right in their convictions; for He answered Nathanael: "Because I said, I saw thee under the fig-tree, therefore dost thou believe?"[3] And in the same manner He pronounced Peter to be "blessed," inasmuch as "flesh and blood had not revealed it to him"—that he had perceived the Father—"but the Father which is in heaven."[4] By asserting all this, He determined the distinction which is between the two Persons: that is, the Son then on earth, whom Peter had confessed to be the Son of God; and the Father in heaven, who had revealed to Peter the discovery which he had made, that Christ was the Son of God. When He entered the temple, He called it "His Father's house,"[5] [speaking] as the Son. In His address to Nicodemus He says: "So God loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life."[6] And again: "For God sent not His Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through Him might be saved. He that believeth on Him is not condemned; but he that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only-begotten Son of God."[7] Moreover, when John [the Baptist] was asked what he happened [to know] of Jesus, he said: "The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into His hand. He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him."[8] Whom, indeed, did He reveal to the woman of Samaria? Was it not "the Messias which is called Christ?"[9] And so He showed, of course, that He was not the Father, but the Son; and elsewhere He is

[1] [John i. 49.] [2] [Matt. xvi. 16.] [3] [John i. 50.]
[4] [Matt. xvi. 17.] [5] [John ii. 16.] [6] [John iii. 16.]
[7] [John iii. 17, 18.] [8] [John iii. 35, 36.] [9] [John iv. 25.]

expressly called "the Christ, the Son of God,"[1] and not the Father. He says, therefore, "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent me, and to finish His work;"[2] whilst to the Jews He remarks respecting the cure of the impotent man, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work."[3] "My Father and I"—these are the Son's words. And it was on this very account that "the Jews sought the more intently to kill Him, not only because He broke the Sabbath, but also because He said that God was His Father, thus making Himself equal with God. Then indeed did He answer and say unto them, The Son can do nothing of Himself, but what He seeth the Father do; for what things soever He doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise. For the Father loveth the Son, and showeth Him all things that He Himself doeth; and He will also show Him greater works than these, that ye may marvel. For as [the Father] raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth them, even so the Son also quickeneth whom He will. For the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son, that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father. He that honoureth not the Son, honoureth not the Father, who hath sent the Son. Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that heareth my words, and believeth on Him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation, but is passed from death unto life. Verily I say unto you, that the hour is coming, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God; and when they have heard it, they shall live. For as the Father hath eternal life in Himself, so also hath He given to the Son to have eternal life in Himself; and He hath given Him authority to execute judgment also, because He is the Son of man"[4]—that is, according to the flesh, even as He is also the Son of God through His Spirit.[5] Afterwards He goes on to say: "But I have greater witness than that of John; for the works which the Father hath given me to finish—those very works bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me. And the Father Himself,

[1] [John xx. 31.] [2] [John iv. 34.] [3] [John v. 17.]
[4] [John v. 19–27.] [5] [*i.e.* His divine nature.]

which hath sent me, hath also borne witness of me."[1] But He at once adds, "Ye have neither heard His voice at any time, nor seen His shape;"[2] thus affirming that in former times it was not the Father, but the Son, who used to be seen and heard. Then He says at last: "I am come in my Father's name, and ye have not received me."[3] It was therefore always the Son [of whom we read] under the designation of the Almighty and Most High God, and King, and Lord. To those also who inquired "what they should do [to work the works of God],"[4] He answered, "[This is the work of God], that ye believe on Him whom He hath sent."[5] He also declares Himself to be "the bread which the Father sent from heaven;"[6] and adds, that "all that the Father gave Him should come to Him, and that He Himself would not reject them,[7] because He had come down from heaven not to do His own will, but the will of the Father; and that the will of the Father was that every one who saw the Son, and believed on Him, should obtain the life [everlasting], and the resurrection [at the last day]. No man indeed was able to come to Him, except the Father attracted him; whereas every one who had heard and learnt of the Father came to Him."[8] He goes on then expressly to say, "Not that any man hath seen the Father;"[9] thus showing us that it was through the Word of the Father that men were instructed and taught. Then, when many departed from Him,[10] and He turned to the apostles with the inquiry whether "they also would go away,"[11] what was Simon Peter's answer? "To whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of [eternal] life, and we believe that Thou art the Christ."[12] [Tell me now, did they believe] Him to be the Father, or the Christ of the Father?

[1] [John v. 36, 37.] [2] [Ver. 37.] [3] [Ver. 43.]
[4] [John vi. 29.] [5] [Ver. 30.] [6] [Ver. 32.]
[7] [The expression is in the neuter collective form in the original.]
[8] [John vi. 37–45.] [9] [Ver. 46.] [10] [Ver. 66.]
[11] [Ver. 67.] [12] [Ver. 68.]

CHAP. XXII.—*Sundry passages of St. John quoted, to show the distinction between the Father and the Son; even Praxeas' classic text ("I and my Father are one") shown to be against him.*

Again, whose doctrine does He announce, at which all were astonished?[1] Was it His own or the Father's? So, when they were in doubt among themselves whether He were the Christ (not as being the Father, of course, but as the Son), He says to them: "You are not ignorant whence I am; and I am not come of myself, but He that sent me is true, whom ye know not; but I know Him, because I am from Him."[2] He did not say, Because I myself am He; and, I have sent mine own self: but His words are, "He hath sent me." When, likewise, the Pharisees sent men to apprehend Him, He says: "Yet a little while am I with you, and [then] I go unto Him that sent me."[3] When, however, He declares that He is not alone, and uses these words, "but I and the Father that sent me,"[4] does He not show that there are Two—Two, and yet inseparable? Indeed, this was the sum and substance of what He was teaching them, that they were inseparably Two; since, after citing the law when it affirms the truth of two men's testimony,[5] He adds at once: "I am one who am bearing witness of myself; and the Father [is another], who hath sent me, and beareth witness of me."[6] Now, if He were one—being at once both the Son and the Father—He certainly would not have quoted the sanction of the law, which requires not the testimony of one, but of two. Likewise, when they asked Him where His Father was,[7] He answered them, that they had known neither Himself nor the Father; and in this answer He plainly told them of *Two*, whom they were ignorant of. Granted that "if they had known Him, they would have known the Father also,"[8] this certainly does not imply that He was Himself both Father and Son; but that,

[1] [See John vii. *passim.*]
[2] [Vers. 28, 29.]
[3] [Ver. 33.]
[4] [John viii. 16.]
[5] [Ver. 17.]
[6] [Ver. 18.]
[7] [Ver. 19.]
[8] [Ver. 19.]

by reason of the inseparability of the Two, it was impossible for one of them to be either acknowledged or unknown without the other. "He that sent me," says He, "is true; and I am telling the world those things which I have heard of Him."[1] And the Scripture narrative goes on to explain in an exoteric manner, that "they understood not that He spake to them concerning the Father,"[2] although they ought certainly to have known that the Father's words were [uttered] in the Son, because they read in Jeremiah, "And the Lord said to me, Behold, I have put my words in thy mouth;"[3] and again in Isaiah, "The Lord hath given to me the tongue of learning, that I should understand when to speak a word in season."[4] In accordance with which, [Christ] Himself says: "Then shall ye know that I am He, and that I am saying nothing of my own self; but that, as my Father hath taught me, so I speak, because He that sent me is with me."[5] This also amounts to a proof that they were Two, [although] undivided. Likewise, when upbraiding the Jews in His discussion with them, because they wished to kill Him, He said, "I speak that which I have seen with my Father, and ye do that which ye have seen with your father;"[6] "but now ye seek to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth which I have heard of God;"[7] and again, "If God were your Father, ye would love me, for I proceeded forth and came from God"[8] (still they are not hereby separated, although He declares that He proceeded forth [from the Father]. Some persons indeed seize the opportunity afforded them in these words [to propound their heresy of His separation]; but His coming out from God is like the ray's procession from the sun, and the river's from the fountain, and the tree's from the seed); "I have not a devil, but I honour my Father;"[9] again, "If I honour myself, my honour is nothing: it is my Father that honoureth me, of whom ye say, that He is your God: yet ye have not known Him, but I know Him; and if I should say, I know Him not, I shall be a liar like unto you;

[1] [John viii. 26.] [2] [Ver. 27.] [3] [Jer. i. 9.]
[4] [Isa. l. 4.] [5] [John viii. 28, 29.] [6] [Ver. 38.]
[7] [Ver. 40.] [8] [Ver. 42.] [9] [Ver. 49.]

but I know Him, and keep His saying."[1] But when He goes on to say, "[Your father] Abraham rejoiced to see my day; and he saw it, and was glad,"[2] He certainly proves that it was not the Father that appeared to Abraham, but the Son. In like manner He declares, in the case of the man [born] blind, "that He must do the works of the Father [which had sent Him];"[3] and after He had given the man sight, He said to him, "Dost thou believe in the Son of God?" Then, upon the man's inquiring who *He* was, He proceeded to reveal Himself to him as that Son [of God] whom He had announced to him as the right object of his faith.[4] In a later passage He declares that He is known by the Father, and the Father by Him;[5] adding that He was so wholly loved by the Father, that He was laying down His life, because He had received this commandment from the Father.[6] When He was asked by the Jews if He were the very Christ[7] (meaning, of course, the Christ of God; for to this day the Jews expect not the Father Himself, but the Christ of God, it being nowhere said that the Father will come as the Christ), He said to them, "I am telling you, and yet ye do not believe: the works which I am doing in my Father's name, they actually bear witness of me."[8] Witness of what? Of that very thing, to be sure, of which they were making inquiry—whether He were the Christ of God. Then, again, concerning His sheep, and [the assurance] that no man should pluck them out of His hand,[9] He says, "My Father, which gave them to me, is greater than all;"[10] adding immediately, "I and my Father are one."[11] Here, then, they take their stand, too infatuated, nay, too blind, to see in the first place that there is in this passage an intimation of Two Beings—"*I and my Father;*" then that there is a plural predicate, "*are*," inapplicable to one person only; and lastly, that [the predicate terminates in an abstract, not a personal noun]—"we are one *thing*" (*Unum*),

[1] [John viii. 54, 55.] [2] [Ver. 56.] [3] [John ix. 4.]
[4] [Vers. 35–38.] [5] [John x. 15.] [6] [Vers. 15, 17, 18.]
[7] [Ver. 24.] [8] [Ver. 25.] [9] [Vers. 26–28.]
[10] [Ver. 29.] [11] [Ver. 30.]

not "one person" (*Unus*). For if He had said "one Person," He might have rendered some assistance to their opinion. *Unus*, no doubt, indicates the singular number; but [here we have a case where] "Two" are still the subject in the masculine gender. He accordingly says *Unum*, a neuter term, which does not imply singularity of number, but unity of essence, likeness, conjunction, affection on the Father's part, who loves the Son, and submission on the Son's, who obeys the Father's will. When He says, "I and my Father are one" [in essence]—*Unum*—He shows that there are Two, whom He puts on an equality and unites in one. He therefore adds to this very statement, that He "had showed them many works from the Father," for none of which did He deserve to be stoned.[1] And to prevent their thinking Him deserving of this fate, as if He had claimed to be considered as God Himself, that is, the Father, by having said, "I and my Father are One," representing Himself as the Father's divine Son, and not as God Himself, He says, "If it is written in your law, I said, Ye are gods; and if the Scripture cannot be broken, say ye of Him whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world, that He blasphemeth, because He said, I am the Son of God? If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not; but if I do, even if ye will not believe me, still believe the works; and know that I am in the Father, and the Father in me."[2] It must therefore be by the works that the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father; and so it is by the works that we understand that the Father is one [with the Son]. All along did He therefore strenuously aim at this conclusion, that while they were of one power and essence, they should still be believed to be Two; for otherwise, unless they were believed to be Two, the Son could not possibly be believed to have any existence at all.

[1] [John x. 32.] [2] [Vers. 34-38.]

CHAP. XXIII.—*More passages from the same Gospel in proof of the same portion of the Catholic Faith. Tertullian repudiates Praxeas' taunt of worshipping two Gods.*

Again, when Martha in a later passage acknowledged Him to be the Son of God,[1] she no more made a mistake than Peter[2] and Nathanael[3] had; and yet, even if she had made a mistake, she would at once have learnt the truth: for, behold, when about to raise her brother from the dead, the Lord looked up to heaven, and, addressing the Father, said —as the Son, of course: "Father, I thank Thee that Thou always hearest me; it is because of these crowds that are standing by that I have spoken [to Thee], that they may believe that Thou hast sent me."[4] But in the trouble of His soul, [on a later occasion,] He said: "What shall I say? Father, save me from this hour: but for this cause is it that I am come to this hour; only, O Father, do Thou glorify Thy name"[5]—in which He spake as the Son. [At another time] He said: "I am come in my Father's name."[6] Accordingly, the Son's voice was indeed alone sufficient, [when addressed] to the Father. But, behold, with an abundance [of evidence][7] the Father from heaven replies, for the purpose of testifying to the Son: "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased; hear ye Him."[8] So, again, in that [asseveration], "I have both glorified, and will glorify again,"[9] how many Persons do you discover, obstinate Praxeas? Are there not as many as there are voices? You have the Son on earth, you have the Father in heaven. Now this is not a separation; it is nothing but the divine dispensation. We know, however, that God is in the bottomless depths, and exists everywhere; but then it is by power and authority. We are also sure that the Son, being indivisible from Him, is everywhere with Him. Nevertheless, in the Economy [or Dispensation] itself, the Father willed

[1] [John xi. 27.] [2] [Matt. xvi. 16.] [3] [John i. 49.]
[4] [John xi. 41, 42.] [5] [John xii. 27, 28.] [6] [John v. 43.]
[7] [Or, "by way of excess."] [8] [Matt. xvii. 5.]
[9] [John xii. 28.]

that the Son should be regarded[1] as on earth, and Himself in heaven; whither the Son also Himself looked up, and prayed, and made supplication of the Father; whither also He taught us to raise ourselves, and pray, "Our Father, which art in heaven," etc.,[2]—although, indeed, He is everywhere present. This [heaven] the Father willed to be His own throne; while He made the Son to be "a little lower than the angels,"[3] by sending Him down to the earth, but meaning at the same time to "crown Him with glory and honour,"[4] even by taking Him back to heaven. This He now made good to Him when He said: "I have both glorified [Thee], and will glorify [Thee again]." The Son offers His request from earth, the Father gives His promise from heaven. Why, then, do you make liars of both the Father and the Son? If either the Father spake from heaven to the Son when He Himself was the Son on earth, or the Son prayed to the Father when He was Himself the Son in heaven, how happens it that the Son made a request of His own very self, by asking it of the Father, since the Son was the Father? Or, on the other hand, how is it that the Father made a promise to Himself, by making it to the Son, since the Father was the Son? Were we even to maintain that they are two separate gods, as you are so fond of throwing out against us, it would be a more tolerable assertion than the maintenance of so versatile and changeful a God as yours! Therefore it was that in the passage before us the Lord declared to the people present: "Not on my own account has this voice addressed me, but for your sakes,"[5] that these likewise may believe both in the Father and in the Son, severally, in their own names and persons and positions. "Then again, Jesus exclaims, and says, He that believeth on me, believeth not on me, but on Him that sent me;"[6] because it is through the Son that men believe in the Father, while the Father also is the authority whence springs belief in the Son. "And he that seeth me, seeth Him that sent me."[7] How so? Even because, [as He afterwards declares,]

[1] [Or, "held" (haberi).] [2] [Matt. vi. 9.] [3] [Ps. viii. 5.]
[4] [Same ver.] [5] [John xii. 30.] [6] [John xii. 44.] [7] [Ver. 45.]

"I have not spoken from myself, but the Father which sent me: He hath given me a commandment what I should say, and what I should speak."[1] For "the Lord God hath given me the tongue of the learned, that I should know when I ought to speak"[2] the word which I actually speak. "Even as the Father hath said unto me, so do I speak."[3] Now, in what way these things were said to Him, the evangelist and beloved disciple John knew better than Praxeas; and therefore he adds concerning his own meaning: "Now before the feast of the passover, Jesus knew that the Father had given all things into His hands, and that He had come from God, and was going to God."[4] Praxeas, however, would have it that it was the Father who proceeded forth from Himself, and had returned to Himself; so that what the devil put into the heart of Judas was the betrayal, not of the Son, but of the Father Himself. But for the matter of that, things have not turned out well either for the devil or the heretic; because, even in the Son's case, the treason which the devil wrought against Him contributed nothing to his advantage. It was, then, the Son of God, who was in the Son of man, that was betrayed, as the Scripture says afterwards: "Now is the Son of man glorified, and God is glorified in Him."[5] Who is here meant by "God?" Certainly not the Father, but the Word of the Father, who was in the Son of man—that is, in the flesh, in which Jesus had been already glorified by [the divine] power and word. "And God," says He, "shall also glorify Him in Himself;"[6] that is to say, the Father shall glorify the Son, because He has Him within Himself; and even though prostrated to the earth, and put to death, He would soon glorify Him by His resurrection, and making Him conqueror over death.

CHAP. XXIV.—*On St. Philip's conversation with Christ.* "HE THAT HATH SEEN ME, HATH SEEN THE FATHER," *explained in an anti-Praxean sense.*

But there were some who even then did not understand.

[1] [John xii. 49.] [2] [Isa. l. 4.] [3] [John xii. 50.]
[4] [John xiii. 1, 3.] [5] [Ver. 31.] [6] [Ver. 32.]

For Thomas, who was so long incredulous, said: "Lord, we know not whither Thou goest; and how can we know the way? Jesus saith unto him, I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father, but by me. If ye had known me, ye would have known the Father also: but henceforth ye know Him, and have seen Him."[1] And now we come to Philip, who, roused with the expectation of seeing the Father, and not understanding in what sense he was to take "seeing the Father," says: "Show us the Father, and it sufficeth us."[2] Then the Lord answered him: "Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip?"[3] Now whom does He say that they ought to have known?—for this is the sole point of discussion. Was it as the Father that they ought to have known Him, or as the Son? If it was as the Father, Praxeas must tell us how Christ, who had been so long time with them, could have possibly ever been (I will not say understood, but even) supposed to have been the Father. He is clearly defined to us in all the Scriptures—in the Old Testament as the Christ of God, in the New Testament as the Son of God. In this character was He anciently predicted, in this was He also declared even by Christ Himself; nay, by the very Father also, who openly confesses Him from heaven as His Son, and as His Son glorifies Him. "This is my beloved Son;" "I have glorified Him, and I will glorify Him." In this character, too, was He believed on by His disciples, and rejected by the Jews. It was, moreover, in this character that He wished to be accepted by them whenever He named the Father, and gave preference to the Father, and honoured the Father. This, then, being the case, it was not the Father whom, after His lengthened intercourse with them, they were ignorant of, but it was the Son; and accordingly the Lord, while upbraiding [Philip] for not knowing Himself who was the object of their ignorance, wished Himself to be acknowledged indeed as that [Being] whom He had reproached them for being ignorant of after so long a time—in a word, as the Son. And now it may be seen in what

[1] [John xiv. 5–7.] [2] [Ver. 8.] [3] [Ver. 9.]

sense it was said, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father,"[1]—even in the same in which it was said in a previous passage, "I and my Father are one."[2] Wherefore? Because "I came forth from the Father, and am come [into the world];"[3] and, "I am the way: no man cometh unto the Father, but by me;"[4] and, "No man can come to me, except the Father draw him;"[5] and, "All things are delivered unto me by the Father;"[6] and, "As the Father quickeneth [the dead], so also doth the Son;"[7] and again, "If ye had known me, ye would have known the Father also."[8] For in all these passages He had shown Himself to be the Father's Commissioner,[9] through whose agency even the Father could be seen in His works, and heard in His words, and recognised in the Son's administration of the Father's words and deeds. The Father indeed was invisible, as Philip had learnt in the law, and ought at the moment to have remembered: "No man shall see God, and live."[10] So he is reproved for desiring to see the Father, as if He were a visible Being, and is taught that He only becomes visible in the Son from His mighty works, and not in the manifestation of His person. If, indeed, He meant the Father to be understood as the same with the Son, by saying, "He who seeth me seeth the Father," how is it that He adds immediately afterwards, "Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me?"[11] He ought rather to have said: "Believest thou not that I am the Father?" With what view else did He so emphatically dwell on this point, if it were not to clear up that which He wished men to understand—namely, that He was the Son? And then, again, by saying, "Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me,"[12] He laid the greater stress on His question on this very account, that He should not, because He had said, "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father," be supposed to be the Father; because

[1] [John xiv. 9.] [2] [John x. 30.] [3] [John xvi. 28.]
[4] [John xiv. 6.] [5] [John vi. 44.] [6] [Matt. xi. 27.]
[7] [John v. 21.] [8] [John xiv. 7.] [9] Vicarium.
[10] [Ex. xxxiii. 20.] [11] [John xiv. 10.] [12] [John xiv. 11.]

He had never wished Himself to be so regarded, having always professed Himself to be the Son, and to have come from the Father. And then He also set the conjunction of the two Persons in the clearest light, in order that no wish might be entertained of seeing the Father as if He were separately visible, and that the Son might be regarded as the representative of the Father. And yet He omitted not to explain how the Father was in the Son, and the Son in the Father. "The words," says He, "which I speak unto you, are not mine,"[1] because indeed they were the Father's words; "but the Father that dwelleth in me, He doeth the works."[2] It is therefore by His mighty works, and by the words of His doctrine, that the Father who dwells in the Son makes Himself visible—even by those [words and works] whereby He abides in Him, and also by Him in whom He abides; the special properties of Both the Persons being apparent from this very circumstance, that He says, "I am in the Father, and the Father is in me."[3] Accordingly He adds: "Believe—" What? That I am the Father? I do not find that it is so written, but rather, "that I am *in* the Father, and the Father in me; or else believe me for my works' sake;"[4] meaning those works by which the Father manifested Himself to be in the Son, not indeed to the sight of man, but to his intelligence.

CHAP. XXV. — *The Paraclete, or Holy Ghost, also distinct from the Father and the Son as to their personal existence, though one and inseparable from them as to their divine nature. Other quotations out of St John's Gospel.*

What follows Philip's question, and [the Lord's] whole treatment of it, to the end of [John's] Gospel, continues to furnish us with statements of the same kind, distinguishing the Father and the Son, with the properties of each. Then there is the Paraclete [or Comforter] also, which He promises to pray for to the Father, and to send from heaven after

[1] [John xiv. 10.]
[2] [Same ver.]
[3] [Same ver.]
[4] [Ver. 11.]

He had ascended to the Father. [He is called] "another Comforter," indeed;[1] but in what way He is *another* we have already shown.[2] "He shall receive of mine," says Christ,[3] just as [Christ] Himself received of the Father's. Thus the connection of the Father in the Son, and of the Son in the Paraclete [or Comforter], produces three coherent Persons, [who are yet distinct] One from Another. These Three are one [essence[4]], not one [Person[5]], as it is said, "I and my Father are One,"[6] in respect of unity of substance, not singularity of number. Run through the whole [Gospel], and you will find that He whom you believe to be the Father (described as acting for the Father, although you, for your part, forsooth, suppose that "the Father, being the husbandman,"[7] must surely have been on earth) is once more recognised by the Son as in heaven, when, "lifting up His eyes thereto,"[8] He commended His disciples to the safe keeping of the Father.[9] We have, moreover, in that other Gospel a clear revelation [of the Son's distinction from the Father], "My God, why hast Thou forsaken me?"[10] and again, [in the third Gospel,] "Father, into Thy hands I commend my spirit."[11] But even if [we had not these passages, we meet with satisfactory evidence] after His resurrection and glorious victory over death. Now that all the restraint of His humiliation is taken away, He might, if possible, have shown Himself as the Father to so faithful a woman [as Mary Magdalene] when she approached to touch Him, out of love, not from curiosity, nor with Thomas' incredulity. [But not so.] Jesus saith unto her, "Touch me not, for I am not yet ascended to my Father; but go to my brethren" (and even in this He proves Himself to be the Son; for if He had been the Father, He would have called them His *children* [instead of His *brethren*]), "and say unto them, I ascend unto my Father and your Father, and to my God and your God."[12] [Now, does this mean, I ascend] as the

[1] [John xiv. 16.] [2] [See above, ch. xiii.] [3] [John xvi. 14.]
[4] Unum. [5] Unus. [6] [John x. 30.]
[7] [John xv. 1.] [8] [John xvii. 1.] [9] [John xvii. 11.]
[10] [Matt. xxvii. 46.] [11] [Luke xxiii. 46.] [12] [John xx. 17.]

Father to the Father, and as God to God? Or as the Son to the Father, and as the Word to God? Wherefore also does this Gospel, at its very termination, intimate that these things were ever written, if it be not, to use its own words, "that ye might believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God?"[1] Whenever, therefore, you take any of the statements of this Gospel, and apply them to demonstrate the identity of the Father and the Son, supposing that they serve your views therein, you are contending against the definite purpose of the Gospel. For these things certainly are not written that you may believe that Jesus Christ is the Father, but the Son.

CHAP. XXVI.—*A brief reference to the Gospels of St. Matthew and St. Luke, proving their agreement with St. John, in respect to the distinct personality of the Father and the Son.*

In addition to Philip's conversation, and the Lord's reply to it, the reader will observe that we have run through John's Gospel. [We have done so to show] that many other passages of a clear purport, both before and after that chapter, are only in strict accord with that single and prominent statement, which must be interpreted agreeably to all other places, rather than in opposition to them, and indeed to its own inherent and natural sense. I will not here largely use the support of the other Gospels, which confirm our belief by the Lord's *nativity:* it is sufficient to remark that He who had to be born of a virgin is announced in express terms by the angel himself as "the Son of God:" "The Spirit of God shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee; therefore also the Holy Thing that shall be born of thee shall be called *the Son of God*."[2] On this passage even they will wish to raise a cavil; but truth will prevail. Of course, they say, the Son of God is God, and the power of the Highest is the Most High. And they do not hesitate to insinuate[3] what, if it had been true, would

[1] [John xx. 31.] [2] [Luke i. 35.] [3] Inicere.

have been written. Whom was he[1] so afraid of as not plainly to declare, "God shall come upon thee, and the Highest shall overshadow thee?" Now, by saying "the Spirit of God" (although the Spirit of God [is God]), and by not directly naming God, he wished that portion[2] of the whole [Godhead] to be understood, which was about to retire into the designation of "the Son." The Spirit of God in this passage must be the same [as the] Word. For just as, when John says, "The Word was made flesh,"[3] we understand the Spirit also in the mention of the Word; so here, too, we acknowledge the Word likewise in the name of the Spirit. For both the Spirit is the substance of the Word, and the Word is the operation of the Spirit, and the Two are One [and the same].[4] Now John must mean *One* when he speaks of Him as "having been made flesh," and the angel *Another* when he announces Him as "about to be born," if the Spirit is not the Word, and the Word the Spirit. For just as the Word of God is not actually He whose [Word] He is, so also the Spirit (although He is called God) is not actually He whose [Spirit] He is said to be. Nothing which belongs to something else is actually the very same thing as that to which it belongs. Clearly, when anything proceeds from a personal subject,[5] and so belongs to him, since it comes from him, it may possibly be such in quality exactly as the personal subject himself is from whom it proceeds, and to whom it belongs. And thus the Spirit is God, and the Word is God, because proceeding from God, but yet is not actually the very same as He from whom He proceeds.

[1] [*i.e.* the angel of the annunciation.]

[2] [On this not strictly defensible term of Tertullian, see Bp. Bull's *Defence of the Nicene Creed*, book ii. ch. vii. sec. 5 (pp. 199, 200).]

[3] [John i. 14.]

[4] ["The selfsame Person is understood under the appellation both of *Spirit* and *Word*, with this difference only, that He is called 'the Spirit of God,' so far as He is a Divine Person, . . . and 'the Word,' so far as He is the Spirit in operation, proceeding with sound and vocal utterance from God to set the universe in order."—Bp. Bull, *Def. Nic. Creed*, p. 535 (translation).]

[5] Ex ipso.

Now that which is God of God, although He is an actually existing thing,[1] yet He cannot be God Himself[2] [exclusively], but so far God as He is of the same substance as God Himself, and as being an actually existing thing, and as a portion of the Whole. Much more will "the power of the Highest" not be the Highest Himself, because It is not an actually existing thing, as being Spirit—in the same way as the *wisdom* [of God] and the *providence* [of God] is not God: these [attributes] are not substances, but the accidents of the particular substance. Power is incidental to the Spirit, but cannot itself be the Spirit. These things, therefore, whatsoever they are—[I mean] the Spirit of God, and the Word and the Power—having been conferred on the [blessed] Virgin, that which is born of her is the Son of God. This He Himself, in those other Gospels also, testifies Himself to have been from His very boyhood: "Wist ye not," says He, "that I must be about *my Father's* business?"[3] Satan likewise knew Him to be this in his temptations: "Since Thou art *the Son of God*."[4] This, accordingly, the devils also acknowledge Him to be: "We know Thee, who Thou art, the [Holy] *Son of God*."[5] His "*Father*" He Himself adores.[6] When acknowledged by Peter as "the Christ [*the Son*] of God,"[7] He does not deny [the relation]. He exults in spirit when He says to the Father, "I thank Thee, *O Father*, because Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent."[8] He, moreover, affirms also that to no man is the Father known, but to *His Son;*[9] and promises that, as *the Son of the Father*, He will confess those who confess Him, and deny those who deny Him, before His Father.[10] He also introduces a parable of the mission to the vineyard of the Son (not the Father), who was sent after so many

[1] Substantiva res.

[2] Ipse Deus [*i.e.* God so wholly as to exclude by identity every other person].

[3] [Luke ii. 49.]

[4] [Matt. iv. 3, 6.]

[5] [Mark i. 24; Matt. viii. 29.]

[6] [Matt. xi. 25, 26; Luke x. 21; John xi. 41.]

[7] [Matt. xvi. 17.]

[8] [Matt. xi. 25.]

[9] [Matt. xi. 27; Luke x. 22.]

[10] [Matt. x. 32, 33.]

servants,[1] and slain by the husbandmen, and avenged by the Father. He is also ignorant of the last day and hour, which is known to the Father only.[2] He awards the kingdom to His disciples, as He says it had been appointed to Himself by the Father.[3] He has power to ask, if He will, legions of angels from the Father for His help.[4] He exclaims that God had forsaken Him.[5] He commends His spirit into the hands of the Father.[6] After His resurrection He promises in a pledge to His disciples that He will send them the promise of His Father;[7] and lastly, He commands them to baptize into the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, not into a unipersonal God.[8] And indeed it is not once only, but three times, that we are immersed into the Three Persons, at each several mention of Their names.

CHAP. XXVII.—*Tertullian having proved the distinction of the Father and the Son, now proceeds (in pursuit of the subterfuges of Praxeas) to prove the distinction of the two natures, which were, without confusion, united in the person of the Son.*

But why should I linger over matters which are so evident, when I ought to be attacking points on which they seek to obscure the plainest proof? For, confuted on all sides on the distinction between the Father and the Son, which we maintain without destroying their inseparable union—as [by the examples] of the sun and the ray, and the fountain and the river—yet, by help of [their conceit of] an indivisible number, [with issues] of two and three, they endeavour to interpret this [distinction] in a way which shall nevertheless tally with their own opinion: so that, all in one Person, they distinguish two, Father and Son, understanding the Son to be flesh, that is man, that is Jesus; and the Father to be spirit, that is God, that is Christ. Thus they, while contending that the Father and the Son are one and the same, do in fact begin by dividing them rather than uniting them.

[1] [Matt. xxi. 33–41.] [2] [Matt. xxiv. 36.] [3] [Luke xxii. 29.]
[4] [Matt. xxvi. 53.] [5] [Matt. xxvii. 46.] [6] [Luke xxiii. 46.]
[7] [Luke xxiv. 49.] [8] Non in unum.

For if Jesus is one, and Christ is another, then the Son will be different from the Father, because the Son is Jesus, and the Father is Christ. Such a *monarchy* as this they learnt, I suppose, in the school of Valentinus, making two—Jesus and Christ. But this conception of theirs has been, in fact, already confuted in what we have previously advanced, because the Word of God or the Spirit of God is also called the power of the Highest, whom they make the Father; whereas these relations[1] are not themselves the same as He whose relations they are said to be, but they proceed from Him and appertain to Him. However, another refutation awaits them on this point of their heresy. See, say they, it was announced by the angel: "Therefore that Holy Thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God."[2] Therefore, [they argue,] as it was the flesh that was born, it must be the flesh that is the Son of God. Nay, [I answer,] this is spoken concerning the Spirit of God. For it was certainly of the Holy Spirit that the virgin conceived; and that which He conceived, she brought forth. That, therefore, had to be born which was conceived and was to be brought forth; that is to say, the Spirit, whose "name should be called Emmanuel, which, being interpreted, is, God with us."[3] Besides, the flesh is not God, so that it could not have been said concerning it, "That Holy Thing shall be called the Son of God," but only that Divine Being who was born in the flesh, of whom the psalm also says, "Since God became man in the midst of it, and established it by the will of the Father."[4] Now what Divine Person was born in it? The Word, and the Spirit which became incarnate with the Word by the will of the Father. The Word, therefore, is incarnate; and this must be the point of our inquiry: How the Word became flesh,—whether it was by having been transfigured, as it were, in the flesh, or by having really clothed Himself in flesh. Certainly it was by a real clothing of Himself in flesh. For the rest, we must needs believe God to be unchangeable, and incapable of form, as being

[1] Ipsæ. [2] [Luke i. 35.] [3] [Matt. i. 23.]
[4] [Tertullian's version of Ps. lxxxvii. 5.]

eternal. But transfiguration is the destruction of that which previously existed. For whatsoever is transfigured into some other thing ceases to be that which it had been, and begins to be that which it previously was not. God, however, neither ceases to be what He was, nor can He be any other thing than what He is. The Word is God, and "the Word of the Lord remaineth for ever,"—even by holding on unchangeably in His own proper form. Now, if He admits not of being transfigured, it must follow that He be understood in this sense to have become flesh, when He comes to be in the flesh, and is manifested, and is seen, and is handled by means of the flesh; since all the other points likewise require to be thus understood. For if the Word became flesh by a transfiguration and change of substance, it follows at once that Jesus must be a substance compounded of[1] two substances—of flesh and spirit,—a kind of mixture, like *electrum*, composed of gold and silver; and it begins to be neither gold (that is to say, spirit) nor silver (that is to say, flesh),—the one being changed by the other, and a third substance produced. Jesus, therefore, cannot at this rate be God, for He has ceased to be the Word, which was made flesh; nor can He be Man incarnate, for He is not properly flesh, and it was flesh which the Word became. Being compounded, therefore, of both, He actually is neither; He is rather some third substance, very different from either. But the truth is, we find that He is expressly set forth as both God and Man; the very psalm which we have quoted intimating [of the flesh], that "God became Man in the midst of it, He therefore established it by the will of the Father,"—certainly in all respects as the Son of God and the Son of Man, being God and Man, differing no doubt according to each substance in its own especial property, inasmuch as the Word is nothing else but God, and the flesh nothing else but Man. Thus does the apostle also teach respecting His two substances, saying, "who was made of the seed of David;"[2] in which words He will be Man and Son of Man. "Who was declared to be the Son of God, according to the Spirit;"[3] in which

[1] Ex. [2] [Rom. i. 3.] [3] [Ver. 4.]

words He will be God, and the Word — the Son of God. We see plainly the twofold state, which is not confounded, but conjoined in One Person—Jesus, God and Man. Concerning Christ, indeed, I defer what I have to say.[1] [I remark here], that the property of each nature is so wholly preserved, that the Spirit[2] on the one hand did all things in Jesus suitable to Itself, such as miracles, and mighty deeds, and wonders; and the Flesh, on the other hand, exhibited the affections which belong to it. It was hungry under the devil's temptation, thirsty with the Samaritan woman, wept over Lazarus, was troubled even unto death, and at last actually died. If, however, it was only a *tertium quid*, some composite essence formed out of the Two substances, like the *electrum* [which we have mentioned], there would be no distinct proofs apparent of either nature. But by a transfer of functions, the Spirit would have done things to be done by the Flesh, and the Flesh such as are effected by the Spirit; or else such things as are suited neither to the Flesh nor to the Spirit, but confusedly of some third character. Nay more, on this supposition, either the Word underwent death, or the flesh did not die, if so be the Word was converted into flesh; because either the flesh was immortal, or the Word was mortal. Forasmuch, however, as the two substances acted distinctly, each in its own character, there necessarily accrued to them severally their own operations, and their own issues. Learn then, together with Nicodemus, that "that which is born in the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is Spirit."[3] Neither the flesh becomes Spirit, nor the Spirit flesh. In one [Person] they no doubt are well able to be co-existent. Of them Jesus consists—Man, of the flesh; of the Spirit, God—and the angel designated Him as "the Son of God,"[4] in respect of that nature, in which He was Spirit, reserving for the flesh the appellation "Son of Man." In like manner, again, the apostle calls Him "the Mediator between God and Men,"[5] and so affirmed His participation of both substances. Now,

[1] [See next chapter.] [2] [*i.e.* Christ's divine nature.]
[3] [John iii. 6.] [4] [Luke i. 35.] [5] [1 Tim. ii. 5.]

to end the matter, will you, who interpret the Son of God to be flesh, be so good as to show us what the Son of Man is? Will He then, I want to know, be the Spirit? But you insist upon it that the Father Himself is the Spirit, on the ground that "God is a Spirit," just as if we did not read also that there is "the Spirit of God;" in the same manner as we find that as "the Word was God," so also there is "the Word of God."

CHAP. XXVIII.—*Christ is not the Father, as Praxeas said: the inconsistency of this opinion, no less than its absurdity, exposed. The true doctrine of Jesus Christ according to St. Paul, who agrees with other sacred writers.*

And so, most foolish heretic, you make *Christ* to be the Father, without once considering the actual force of this name, if indeed Christ is a name, and not rather a surname, or designation; for it signifies "Anointed." But Anointed is no more a proper name than Clothed or Shod; it is only an accessory to a name. Suppose now that by some means Jesus were also called Vestitus [*Clothed*], as He is actually called Christ from the mystery of His anointing, would you in like manner say that Jesus was the Son of God, and at the same time suppose that *Vestitus* was the Father? Now then, concerning Christ, if Christ is the Father, the Father is an Anointed One, and receives the unction of course from another. Else if it is from Himself that He receives it, then you must prove it to us. But we learn no such fact from the Acts of the Apostles in that ejaculation of the church to God, "Of a truth, Lord, against Thy Holy Child Jesus, whom Thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles [and the people of Israel] were gathered together."[1] These then testified both that Jesus was the Son of God, and that being the Son, He was anointed by the Father. Christ therefore must be the same as Jesus who was anointed by the Father, and not the Father, who anointed the Son. To the same effect are the words of Peter: "Let all the house of Israel know assuredly that God hath made that same Jesus,

[1] [Acts iv. 27.]

whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ," that is, *Anointed*.[1] John, moreover, brands that man as "a liar" who "denieth that Jesus is the Christ;" whilst on the other hand he declares that "every one is born of God who believeth that Jesus is the Christ."[2] Wherefore he also exhorts us to believe in the name of His [the Father's] Son Jesus Christ, that "our fellowship may be with the Father, and with His Son Jesus Christ."[3] Paul, in like manner, everywhere speaks of "God the Father, and our Lord Jesus Christ." When writing to the Romans, he gives thanks to God through our Lord Jesus Christ.[4] To the Galatians he declares himself to be "an apostle not of men, neither by man, but through Jesus Christ and God the Father."[5] You possess indeed all his writings, which testify plainly to the same effect, and set forth Two—God the Father, and our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of the Father. [They also testify] that Jesus is Himself the Christ, and under one or the other designation the Son of God. For precisely by the same right as both names belong to the same Person, even the Son of God, does either name alone without the other belong to the same Person. Consequently, whether it be the name Jesus which occurs alone, Christ is also understood, because Jesus is the Anointed One; or if the name Christ is the only one given, then Jesus is identified with Him, because the Anointed One is Jesus. Now, of these two names [JESUS CHRIST], the former is the proper one, which was given to Him by the angel; and the latter is only an adjunct, predicable of Him from His anointing,—thus suggesting the proviso that Christ must be the Son, not the Father. How blind, to be sure, is the man who fails to perceive that by the name of Christ some other God is implied, if he ascribes to the Father this name of Christ! For if Christ is God the Father, when He says, "I ascend unto my Father and your Father, and to my God and your God,"[6] He of course shows plainly enough that there is above Himself another Father and another God. If, again, the Father is Christ, *He* must

[1] [Acts ii. 36.] [2] [See 1 John ii. 22, iv. 2, 3, and v. 1.]
[3] [1 John i. 3.] [4] [Rom. i. 8.] [5] [Gal. i. 1.] [6] [John xx. 17.]

be some other Being who "strengtheneth the thunder, and createth the wind, and declareth unto men His Christ."[1] And if "the kings of the earth stood up, and the rulers were gathered together against [the Lord, and against] His Christ,"[2] that Lord must be another Being, against whose Christ were gathered together the kings and the rulers. And if, to quote another passage, "Thus saith the Lord to my Lord Christ,"[3] the Lord who speaks to the Father of Christ must be a distinct Being. Moreover, when the apostle in his epistle prays, "That the God of our Lord Jesus Christ may give unto you the spirit of wisdom and of knowledge,"[4] He must be other [than Christ], who is the God of Jesus Christ, the bestower of spiritual gifts. And once for all, that we may not wander through every passage, He "who raised up Christ from the dead, and is also to raise up our mortal bodies,"[5] must certainly be, as the quickener, different from the dead Father,[6] or even from the quickened Father, if Christ who died is the Father.

CHAP. XXIX.—*It was Christ that died. The Father is incapable of suffering either solely or with another. Blasphemous conclusions spring from Praxeas' premises.*

Silence! Silence on such blasphemy. Let us be content with saying that Christ died, the Son of the Father; and [let this suffice], because the Scriptures have told us so much. For even the apostle, to his declaration—which he makes not without feeling the weight of it—that "Christ died," immediately adds, "according to the Scriptures,"[7] in order that he may alleviate the harshness of the statement by the authority of the Scriptures, and so remove offence from the reader. Now, although when two substances are alleged to

[1] [Amos iv. 13 (Sept.).] [2] [Ps. ii. 2.]

[3] [Here Tertullian read τῷ Χριστῷ μου Κυρίῳ, instead of Κύρῳ, "to Cyrus," in Isa. xlv. 1.]

[4] [Eph. i. 17.] [5] [Rom. viii. 11.]

[6] [From this deduction of the doctrine of Praxeas, that the *Father must have suffered* on the cross, his opponents called him and his followers *Patripassians.*]

[7] [1 Cor. xv. 3.]

be in Christ—namely, the divine and the human—it plainly follows that the divine nature is immortal, and that which is human is mortal, it is manifest in what sense he declares "Christ died"—even in the sense in which He was flesh and Man and the Son of Man, not as being the Spirit and the Word and the Son of God. In short, since he says that it was *Christ* (that is, the Anointed One) that died, he shows us that that which died was the nature which was anointed; in a word, the flesh. Very well, say you; since we on our side affirm our doctrine in precisely the same terms which you use on your side respecting the Son, we are not guilty of blasphemy against the Lord God, for we do not maintain that He died after the divine nature, but only after the human. Nay, but you do blaspheme; because you allege not only that the Father died, but that He died the death of the cross. For "cursed are they which are hanged on a tree,"[1]—a curse which, after the law, is compatible to the Son (inasmuch as "Christ has been made a curse for us,"[2] but certainly not the Father); since, however you convert Christ into the Father, you are chargeable with blasphemy against the Father. But when we assert that Christ was crucified, we do not malign Him with a curse; we only reaffirm[3] the curse pronounced by the law:[4] nor indeed did the apostle utter blasphemy when he said the same thing as we.[5] Besides, as there is no blasphemy in predicating of the subject that which is fairly applicable to it; so, on the other hand, it is blasphemy when that is alleged concerning the subject which is unsuitable to it. On this principle, too, the Father was not associated in suffering with the Son. [Our heretics], indeed, fearing to incur direct blasphemy against the Father, hope to diminish it by this expedient: they grant us so far that the Father and the Son are Two; adding that, since it is the Son indeed who suffers, the Father is only His fellow-sufferer. But how absurd are they even in this conceit! For what is the meaning of "fellow-suffering," but

[1] [Gal. iii. 13.]
[2] [Same ver.]
[3] Referimus [or, "recite and record"].
[4] [Deut. xxi. 23.]
[5] [Gal. iii. 13.]

the endurance of suffering along with another? Now if the Father is incapable of suffering, He is incapable of suffering in company with another; otherwise, if He can suffer with another, He is of course capable of suffering. You, in fact, yield Him nothing by this subterfuge of your fears. You are afraid to say that He is capable of suffering whom you make to be capable of fellow-suffering. Then, again, the Father is as incapable of fellow-suffering as the Son even is of suffering under the conditions of His existence as God. Well, but how could the Son suffer, if the Father did not suffer with Him? [My answer is], The Father is separate from the Son, though not from [Him as] God. For even if a river be soiled with mire and mud, although it flows from the fountain identical in nature with it, and is not separated from the fountain, yet the injury which affects the stream reaches not to the fountain; and although it is the water of the fountain which suffers down the stream, still, since it is not affected at the fountain, but only in the river, the fountain suffers nothing, but only the river which issues from the fountain. So likewise the Spirit of God,[1] whatever suffering it might be capable of in the Son, yet, inasmuch as it could not suffer in the Father, [the fountain of the Godhead,] but only in the Son, it evidently could not have suffered, as the Father, [that which was open to it to suffer in the Son.] But it is enough for me that the Spirit of God suffered nothing as the Spirit of God,[2] since all that It suffered It suffered in the Son. It was quite another matter for the Father to suffer with *the Son in the flesh*. This likewise has been treated by us. Nor will any one deny this, since even we are ourselves unable to suffer for God, unless the Spirit of God be in us, who also utters by our instrumentality[3] whatever pertains to our own conduct and suffering; not, however, that He Himself suffers in our suffering, only He bestows on us the power and capacity of suffering.

[1] [That is, the divine nature in general in this place.]

[2] Suo nomine.

[3] De nobis.

CHAP. XXX.—*How the Son was "forsaken" by the Father upon the cross. The true meaning thereof fatal to Praxeas; as are the resurrection of Christ, His ascension, session at the Father's right hand, and mission of the Holy Ghost.*

However, if you persist in pushing your views further, I shall find means of answering you with greater stringency, and of meeting you with the exclamation of the Lord Himself, so as to challenge you with the question, What is your inquiry and reasoning about *that?* You have Him exclaiming in the midst of His passion: "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?"[1] Either, then, the Son suffered, being "forsaken" by the Father, and the Father consequently suffered nothing, inasmuch as He forsook the Son; or else, if it was the Father who suffered, then to what God was it that He addressed His cry? But this was the voice of flesh and soul, that is to say, of man—not of the Word and Spirit, that is to say, not of God; and it was uttered so as to prove the impassibility of God, who "forsook" His Son, so far as He handed over His human substance to the suffering of death. This verity the apostle also perceived, when he writes to this effect: "If the Father spared not His own Son."[2] This did Isaiah before him likewise perceive, when he declared: "And the Lord hath delivered Him up for our offences."[3] In this manner He "forsook" Him, in *not sparing* Him; "forsook" Him, in *delivering Him up.* In all other respects the Father did not forsake the Son, for it was into His Father's hands that the Son commended His spirit.[4] Indeed, after so commending it, He instantly died; and as the Spirit[5] remained with the flesh, the flesh cannot undergo the full extent of death [in corruption and decay]. For the Son, therefore, to die, amounted to His being forsaken by the Father. The Son, then, both dies and rises again, according to the Scriptures.[6]

[1] [Matt. xxvii. 46.] [2] [Rom. viii. 32.]
[3] [This is the sense rather than the words of Isa. liii. 5, 6.]
[4] [Luke xxiii. 46.] [5] [*i.e.* the divine nature.] [6] [1 Cor. xv. 3, 4.]

It is the Son, too, who ascends to the heights of heaven,[1] and also descends to the inner parts of the earth.[2] "He sitteth at the Father's right hand"[3]—not the Father at His own. He is seen by Stephen, at his martyrdom by stoning, still sitting at the right hand of God,[4] where He will continue to sit, until the Father shall make His enemies His footstool.[5] He will come again on the clouds of heaven, just as He appeared when He ascended into heaven.[6] Meanwhile He has received from the Father the promised gift, and has shed it forth, even the Holy Spirit—the Third Name in the Godhead, and the Third Degree of the Divine Majesty; the Declarer of the One "Monarchy" [of God], but at the same time the Interpreter of the "Economy," to every one who hears and receives the words of the new prophecy;[7] and "the Leader into all truth,"[8] such as is in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, according to the mystery of the doctrine of Christ.

CHAP. XXXI.—*Retrograde character of the heresy of Praxeas. The doctrine of the Blessed Trinity constitutes the great difference between Judaism and Christianity.*

But, [to conclude, there is in this doctrine of yours a likeness] to the Jewish faith, of which this is the substance—so to believe in One God as to refuse to reckon the Son besides Him, and after the Son the Spirit. Now, what difference would there be between us and them, if there were not this distinction [which you are for breaking down]? What need would there be of the gospel, which is the substance of the New Covenant, laying down (as it does) that the Law and the Prophets lasted until John [the Baptist], if thenceforward the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are not both believed in as Three, and as making One Only God? God was pleased to renew His covenant with man in such a way as that His Unity might be believed in, after a new

[1] [John iii. 13.]
[2] [Eph. iv. 9.]
[3] [Mark xvi. 19; Rev. iii. 21.]
[4] [Acts vii. 55.]
[5] [Ps. cx. 1.]
[6] [Acts i. 11; Luke xxi. 37.]
[7] [Tertullian was now a Montanist.]
[8] [John xvi. 13.]

manner, through the Son and the Spirit, in order that God might now be known openly,[1] in His proper Names and Persons, who in ancient times was not plainly understood, though declared through the Son and the Spirit. Away, then, with[2] those "Antichrists who deny the Father and the Son." For they deny the Father, when they say that He is the same as the Son; and they deny the Son, when they suppose Him to be the same as the Father, by assigning to Them things which are not [Theirs], and taking away from Them things which are [Theirs]. But "whosoever shall confess that [Jesus] Christ is the Son of God" (not the Father), "God dwelleth in him, and he in God."[3] We believe not the testimony of God in which He testifies to us of His Son. "He that hath not the Son, hath not life."[4] And that man has not the Son, who believes Him to be any other than the Son.

[1] Coram. [2] Viderint. [3] [1 John iv. 15.] [4] [1 John v. 12.]

NOTES

ON SUNDRY

DOCTRINAL STATEMENTS OF TERTULLIAN.

(*From Bishop Kaye's Account of the Writings of Tertullian.*)

"IN order to explain his meaning [on the doctrine of the blessed Trinity], Tertullian borrows illustrations from natural objects. The three Persons of the Trinity stand to each other in the relation of the root, the shrub, and the fruit; of the fountain, the river, and the cut from the river; of the sun, the ray, and the terminating point of the ray. For these illustrations he professes himself indebted to the Revelations of the Paraclete. In later times, divines have occasionally resorted to similar illustrations for the purpose of familiarizing the doctrine of the Trinity to the mind; nor can any danger arise from the proceeding, so long as we recollect that they are illustrations, not arguments—that we must not draw conclusions from them, or think that whatever may be truly predicated of the illustration, may be predicated with equal truth of that which it was designed to illustrate.

"'Notwithstanding, however, the intimate union which subsists between the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, we must be careful,' says Tertullian, 'to distinguish between their Persons.' In his representations of this distinction he sometimes uses expressions which in after times, when controversy had introduced greater precision of language, were studiously avoided by the orthodox. Thus he calls the Father the whole substance—the Son a derivation from or portion of the whole."—(Pp. 504–506.)

After showing that Tertullian's opinions were generally coincident with the orthodox belief of the Christian church on the great subject of the Trinity in Unity, Bp. Kaye goes on to say: "We are far from meaning to assert that expressions may not occasionally be found which are capable of a different interpretation, and

which were carefully avoided by the orthodox writers of later times, when the controversies respecting the Trinity had introduced greater precision of language. Pamelius thought it necessary to put the reader on his guard against certain of these expressions; and Semler has noticed, with a sort of ill-natured industry (we call it *ill-natured industry*, because the true mode of ascertaining a writer's opinions is, not to fix upon particular expressions, but to take the general tenor of his language), every passage in the Tract against Praxeas in which there is any appearance of contradiction, or which will bear a construction favourable to the Arian tenets. Bp. Bull also, who conceives the language of Tertullian to be explicit and correct on the subject of the pre-existence and the consubstantiality, admits that he occasionally uses expressions at variance with the co-eternity of Christ. For instance, in the Tract against Hermogenes (ch. iii. compared with ch. xviii.), we find a passage in which it is expressly asserted that there was a time when the Son was not. Perhaps, however, a reference to the peculiar tenets of Hermogenes will enable us to account for this assertion. That heretic affirmed that matter was eternal, and argued thus: 'God was always God, and always Lord; but the word Lord implies the existence of something over which He was Lord. Unless, therefore, we suppose the eternity of something distinct from God, it is not true that He was always Lord.' Tertullian boldly answered, that God was not always Lord; and that in Scripture we do not find Him called Lord until the work of creation was completed. In like manner, he contended that the titles of *Judge* and *Father* imply the existence of *sin*, and of a *Son*. As, therefore, there was a time when neither sin nor the Son existed, the titles of Judge and Father were not at that time applicable to God. Tertullian could scarcely mean to affirm (in direct opposition to his own statements in the Tract against Praxeas) that there was ever a time when the λόγος, or *Ratio*, or *Sermo Internus*, did not exist. But with respect to *Wisdom* and *the Son* [*Sophia* and *Filius*] the case is different. Tertullian assigns to both a beginning of existence: Sophia was created or formed in order to devise the plan of the universe; and the Son was begotten in order to carry that plan into effect. Bp. Bull appears to have given an accurate representation of the matter, when he says that, according to our author, the Reason and Spirit of God, being the substance of the Word and Son, were co-eternal with God; but that the titles of Word and Son were not strictly applicable until the former had been emitted to arrange, and the latter begotten to execute, the work of creation. Without, therefore, attempting to explain, much less to defend, all Tertullian's expressions and reasonings,

we are disposed to acquiesce in the statement given by Bp. Bull of his opinions [*Defence of the Nicene Creed*, sec. iii. ch. x. (p. 545 of the Oxford translation)]: 'From all this it is clear how rashly, as usual, Petavius has pronounced that, "*so far as relates to the eternity of the Word, it is manifest that Tertullian did not by any means acknowledge it.*"' To myself, indeed, and as I suppose to my reader also, after the many clear testimonies which I have adduced, the very opposite is manifest, unless indeed Petavius played on the term *the Word*, which I will not suppose. For Tertullian does indeed teach that the Son of God was made, and was called the Word [*Verbum* or *Sermo*] from some definite beginning, *i.e.* at the time when He went out from God the Father with the voice, 'Let there be light,' in order to arrange the universe. But, for all that, that he really believed that the very hypostasis which is called the Word and Son of God is eternal, I have, I think, abundantly demonstrated." [The whole of Bp. Bull's remark is worth considering; it occurs in the translation just referred to, pp. 508–545.]—(Pp. 521–525.)

"In speaking also of the Holy Ghost, Tertullian occasionally uses terms of a very ambiguous and equivocal character. He says, for instance [*Adversus Praxean*, c. xii.], that in Gen. i. 26 God addressed the Son, His Word (the Second Person in the Trinity), and *the Spirit in the Word* (the Third Person of the Trinity). Here the distinct personality of the Spirit is expressly asserted; although it is difficult to reconcile Tertullian's words, 'Spiritus in Sermone,' with the assertion. It is, however, certain both from the general tenor of the Tract against Praxeas, and from many passages in his other writings [for instance, *Ad Martyres*, iii.], that the distinct personality of the Holy Ghost formed an article of Tertullian's creed. The occasional ambiguity of his language respecting the Holy Ghost is perhaps in part to be traced to the variety of senses in which the term '*Spiritus*' is used. It is applied generally to God, for 'God is a Spirit' [*Adv. Marcionem*, ii. 9]; and for the same reason to the Son, who is frequently called 'the Spirit of God,' and 'the Spirit of the Creator' [*De Oratione*, i.; *Adv. Praxean*, xiv. xxvi.; *Adv. Marcionem*, v. 8; *Apolog.* xxiii.; *Adv. Marcionem*, iii. 6, iv. 33]. Bp. Bull likewise [*Defence of the Nicene Creed*, i. 2], following Grotius, has shown that the word '*Spiritus*' is employed by the fathers to express the divine nature in Christ."—(Pp. 525, 526.)

A TREATISE ON THE SOUL,

BY

QUINTUS SEPTIMIUS FLORENS TERTULLIANUS.

IN THIS TREATISE WE HAVE TERTULLIAN'S SPECULATIONS ON THE ORIGIN, THE NATURE, AND THE DESTINY OF THE HUMAN SOUL. THERE ARE, NO DOUBT, PARADOXES STARTLING TO A MODERN READER TO BE FOUND IN IT, SUCH AS THAT OF THE SOUL'S CORPOREITY; AND THERE ARE WEAK AND INCONCLUSIVE ARGUMENTS. BUT AFTER ALL SUCH DRAWBACKS (AND THEY ARE NOT MORE THAN WHAT CONSTANTLY OCCUR IN THE MOST RENOWNED SPECULATIVE WRITERS OF ANTIQUITY), THE READER WILL DISCOVER MANY INTERESTING PROOFS OF OUR AUTHOR'S CHARACTER FOR ORIGINALITY OF THOUGHT, WIDTH OF INFORMATION, FIRM GRASP OF HIS SUBJECT, AND VIVACIOUS TREATMENT OF IT, SUCH AS WE HAVE DISCOVERED IN OTHER PARTS OF HIS WRITINGS. IF HIS SUBJECT PERMITS TERTULLIAN LESS THAN USUAL OF AN APPEAL TO HIS FAVOURITE HOLY SCRIPTURE, HE STILL MAKES ROOM FOR OCCASIONAL ILLUSTRATION FROM IT, AND WITH HIS CHARACTERISTIC ABILITY; IF, HOWEVER, THERE IS LESS OF THIS SACRED LEARNING IN IT, THE TREATISE TEEMS WITH CURIOUS INFORMATION DRAWN FROM THE SECULAR LITERATURE OF THAT EARLY AGE. OUR AUTHOR OFTEN MEASURES SWORDS WITH PLATO IN HIS DISCUSSIONS ON THE SOUL, AND IT IS NOT TOO MUCH TO SAY THAT HE SHOWS HIMSELF A FORMIDABLE OPPONENT TO THE GREAT PHILOSOPHER.[1]

CHAP. I. — *It is not to the philosophers that we resort for information about the soul — Socrates could give no certain knowledge about it—but to God.*

HAVING discussed with Hermogenes the single point of the origin of the soul, so far as his assumption led me, that the soul consisted rather in an adaptation[2] of matter than of the inspiration[3] of God, I now turn to the other questions incidental

[1] See Bp. Kaye, *On Tertullian*, pp. 199, 200.

[2] Suggestu. [3] Flatu ["the breath"].

to the subject; and [in my treatment of these] I shall evidently have mostly to contend with the philosophers. In the very prison of Socrates they skirmished about the state of the soul. I have my doubts at once whether the time was an opportune one for their [great] master — [to say nothing of the place], although *that* perhaps does not much matter. For what could the soul of Socrates then contemplate with clearness and serenity? The sacred ship had returned [from Delos], the hemlock draft to which he had been condemned had been drunk, death was now present before him: [his mind] was, as one may suppose,[1] naturally excited[2] at every emotion; or if nature had lost her influence, it must have been deprived of all power of thought.[3] Or let it have been as placid and tranquil as you please, inflexible, in spite of the claims of natural duty,[4] at the tears of her who was so soon to be his widow, and at the sight of his thenceforward orphan children, yet his soul must have been moved even by its very efforts to suppress emotion; and his constancy itself must have been shaken, as he struggled against the disturbance of the excitement around him. Besides, what other thoughts could any man entertain who had been unjustly condemned to die, but such as should solace him for the injury done to him? Especially would this be the case with that glorious creature, the philosopher, to whom injurious treatment would not suggest a craving for consolation, but rather the feeling of resentment and indignation. Accordingly, after his sentence, when his wife came to him with her effeminate cry, O Socrates, you are unjustly condemned! he seemed already to find joy in answering, Would you then wish me justly condemned? It is therefore not to be wondered at, if even in his prison, from a desire to break the foul hands of Anytus and Melitus, he, in the face of death itself, asserts the immortality of the soul by a strong assumption such as was wanted to frustrate the wrong [they had inflicted upon him]. So that all the

[1] Utique.
[2] Consternata.
[3] Externata. ["Externatus = ἐκτὸς φρενῶν. Gloss. Philox.]
[4] Pietatis.

wisdom of Socrates, at that moment, proceeded from the affectation of an assumed composure, rather than the firm conviction of ascertained truth. For by whom has truth ever been discovered without God? By whom has God ever been found without Christ? By whom has Christ ever been explored without the Holy Spirit? By whom has the Holy Spirit ever been attained without the mysterious gift of faith?[1] Socrates, as none can doubt, was actuated by a different spirit. For they say that a demon clave to him from his boyhood—the very worst teacher certainly, notwithstanding the high place assigned to it by poets and philosophers—even next to, nay, along with the gods themselves. The teachings of the power of Christ had not yet been given—[that power] which alone can confute this most pernicious influence of evil that has nothing good in it, but is rather the author of all error, and the seducer from all truth. Now if Socrates was pronounced the wisest of men by the oracle of the Pythian demon, which, you may be sure, neatly managed the business for his friend, of how much greater dignity and constancy is the assertion of the Christian wisdom, before the very breath of which the whole host of demons is scattered! This wisdom of the school of heaven frankly and without reserve denies the gods of this world, and shows no such inconsistency as to order a "cock to be sacrificed to Æsculapius;"[2] no new gods and demons does it introduce, but expels the old ones; it corrupts not youth, but instructs them in all goodness and moderation; and so it bears the unjust condemnation not of one city only, but of all the world, in the cause of that truth which incurs indeed the greater hatred in proportion to its fulness: so that it tastes death not out of a [poisoned] cup almost in the way of jollity; but it exhausts it in every kind of bitter cruelty, on gibbets and in holocausts.[3] Meanwhile, in the still gloomier prison of the world amongst your Cebeses and

[1] Fidei sacramento.

[2] [The allusion is to the *inconsistency* of the philosopher, who condemned the gods of the vulgar, and died offering a gift to one of them.]

[3] Vivicomburio.

Phædos, in every investigation concerning [man's] soul, it directs its inquiry according to the rules of God. At all events, you can show us no more powerful expounder of the soul than the Author thereof. From God you may learn about that which you hold of God; but from none else will you get this knowledge, if you get it not from God. For who is to reveal that which God has hidden? To that quarter must we resort in our inquiries whence we are most safe even in deriving our ignorance. For it is really better for us not to know a thing, because He has not revealed it to us, than to know it according to man's wisdom, because *he* has been bold enough to assume it.

CHAP. II.—*If one were to betake himself to the wisdom of the philosophers, or even of the physicians, who are supposed to know much of the nature of man, he would be confused amidst the perplexing varieties of opinion. The Christian has sure and simple knowledge concerning the subject before us.*

Of course we shall not deny that philosophers have sometimes thought the same things as ourselves. The testimony of truth is the issue thereof. It sometimes happens even in a storm, when the boundaries of sky and sea are lost in confusion, that some harbour is stumbled on [by the labouring ship] by some happy chance; and sometimes in the very shades of night, through blind luck alone, one finds access to a spot, or egress from it. In nature, however, most conclusions are suggested, as it were, by that common intelligence wherewith God has been pleased to endow the soul of man. This intelligence has been caught up by philosophy, and, with the view of glorifying her own art, has been inflated (it is not to be wondered at that I use this language) with straining after that facility of language which is practised in the building up and pulling down of everything, and which has greater aptitude for persuading men by speaking than by teaching. She assigns to things their forms and conditions; sometimes makes them common and public, sometimes appropriates them to private use; on certainties she capriciously

stamps the character of uncertainty; she appeals to precedents, as if all things are capable of being compared together; she describes all things by rule and definition, allotting diverse properties even to similar objects; she attributes nothing to the divine permission, but assumes as her principles the laws of nature. I could bear with her pretensions, if only she were herself true to nature, and would prove to me that she had a mastery over nature as being associated with its creation. She thought, no doubt, that she was deriving her mysteries from sacred sources, as men deem them, because in ancient times most authors were supposed to be (I will not say godlike, but) actually gods: as, for instance, the Egyptian Mercury,[1] to whom Plato paid very great deference;[2] and the Phrygian Silenus, to whom Midas lent his long ears, when the shepherds brought him to him; and Hermotimus, to whom the good people of Clazomenæ built a temple after his death; and Orpheus; and Musæus; and Pherecydes, the master of Pythagoras. But why need we care, since these philosophers have also made their attacks upon those writings which are condemned by us under the title of Apocryphal,[3] certain as we are that nothing ought to be received which does not agree with the true system of prophecy, which has arisen in this present age;[4] because we do not forget that there have been false prophets, and long previous to them fallen spirits, which have instructed the entire tone and aspect of the world with cunning knowledge of this [philosophic] cast? It is, indeed, not incredible that any man who is in quest of wisdom may have gone so far, as a matter of curiosity, as to consult the very prophets; [but be this as it may], if you take the philosophers, you would find in them more diversity than agreement, since even in their agreement their diversity is discoverable. What-

[1] [Mentioned below, c. xxxiii.; also *Adv. Valent.* c. xv.]

[2] [See his *Phædrus*, c. lix. (p. 274); also Augustin, *De Civ. Dei*, viii. 11; Euseb. *Præp. Evang.* ix. 3.]

[3] [Or *spurious;* not to be confounded with our so-called *Apocrypha*, which were in Tertullian's days called *Libri Ecclesiastici.*]

[4] [Here is a touch of Tertullian's Montanism.]

ever things are true [in their systems], and agreeable to prophetic wisdom, they either recommend as emanating from some other source, or else perversely apply[1] in some other sense. This process is attended with very great detriment to the truth, when they pretend that it is either helped by falsehood, or else that falsehood derives support from it. The following circumstance must needs have set ourselves and the philosophers by the ears, especially in this present matter, that they sometimes clothe sentiments which are common to both sides, in arguments which are peculiar to themselves, but contrary in some points to our rule and standard of faith; and at other times defend opinions which are especially their own, with arguments which both sides acknowledge to be valid, and occasionally conformable to their system of belief. The truth has, at this rate, been well-nigh excluded by the philosophers, through the poisons with which they have infected it; and thus, if we regard both the modes of coalition [which we have now mentioned], and which are equally hostile to the truth, we feel the urgent necessity of freeing, on the one hand, the sentiments held by us in common with them from the arguments of the philosophers, and of separating, on the other hand, the arguments which both parties employ from the opinions of the same philosophers. [And this we may do] by recalling all questions to God's inspired standard, with the obvious exception of such simple cases as, being free from the entanglement of any preconceived conceits, one may fairly admit on mere [human] testimony; because plain evidence of this sort we must sometimes borrow from opponents, when our opponents have nothing to gain from it. Now I am not unaware what a vast mass of literature the philosophers have accumulated concerning the subject before us, in their own commentaries thereon—what various schools of principles there are, what conflicts of opinion, what prolific sources of questions, what perplexing methods of solution. Moreover, I have looked into Medical Science also, the sister (as they say) of Philosophy, which claims as her function to cure the body, and

[1] Subornant.

thereby to have a special acquaintance with the soul. From this circumstance she has great differences with her sister, pretending as the latter does to know more about the soul, through the more obvious treatment, as it were, of her in her domicile [of the body]. But never mind all this contention between them for pre-eminence! For extending their several researches on the soul, Philosophy, on the one hand, has enjoyed the full scope of her genius; while Medicine, on the other hand, has possessed the stringent demands of her art and practice. Wide are men's inquiries into uncertainties; wider still are their disputes about conjectures. However great the difficulty of adducing proofs, the labour of producing conviction is not one whit less; so that the gloomy Heraclitus was quite right, when, observing the thick darkness which obscured the researches of the inquirers about the soul, and wearied with their interminable questions, he declared that he had certainly not explored the limits of the soul, although he had traversed every road [in her domains]. To the Christian, however, but few words are necessary for the clear understanding of the whole subject. But in the few words there always arises certainty to him; nor is he permitted to give his inquiries a wider range than is compatible with their solution; for "endless questions" the apostle forbids.[1] It must, however, be added, that no solution may be found by any man, but such as is learned from God; and that which is learned of God is the sum and substance of the whole thing.

CHAP. III.—*Heresies the offspring of philosophy. Varieties and uncertainties of philosophy. Tertullian defines the soul's origin out of the simple words of Scripture.*

Would to God that no "heresies had been ever necessary, in order that they which are approved may be made manifest!"[2] We should then be never required to try our strength in contests about the soul with philosophers, those patriarchs of heretics, as they may be fairly called.[3] The

[1] [1 Tim. i. 4.] [2] [1 Cor. x. 19.]
[3] [Compare Tertullian's *Adv. Hermog.* c. viii.]

apostle, so far back as his own times, foresaw, indeed, that philosophy would do violent injury to the truth.[1] This admonition [about false philosophy] he was induced to offer after he had been at Athens, had become acquainted with that *loquacious* city,[2] and had there had a taste of its huckstering wiseacres and talkers. In like manner is the treatment of the soul according to the sophistical doctrines of men which "mix their wine with water."[3] Some of them deny the immortality of the soul; others affirm that it is immortal, and something more. Some raise disputes about its substance; others about its form; others, again, respecting each of its several faculties. One school of philosophers derives its state from various sources, while another ascribes its departure to different destinations. [The various schools reflect the character of their masters], according as they have received their impressions from the dignity[4] of Plato, or the vigour[5] of Zeno, or the equanimity[6] of Aristotle, or the stupidity[7] of Epicurus, or the sadness[8] of Heraclitus, or the madness[9] of Empedocles. The fault, I suppose, of the divine doctrine lies in its springing from Judæa[10] rather than from Greece. Christ made a mistake, too, in sending forth fishermen to preach, rather than the sophist. Whatever noxious vapours, accordingly, exhaled from philosophy, obscure the clear and wholesome atmosphere of truth, it will be for Christians to clear away, both by shattering to pieces the arguments which are drawn from the principles of things—I mean those of the philosophers—and by opposing to them the maxims of heavenly wisdom—that is, such as are revealed by the Lord; in order that both the pitfalls wherewith philosophy captivates the heathen may be removed, and the means employed by heresy to shake the faith of Christians may be repressed. We have already decided one point in our controversy with Hermogenes, as we said at the begin-

[1] [Col. ii. 8.] [2] Linguatam civitatem. [Comp. Acts xvii. 21.]
[3] [Isa. i. 22.] [4] Honor.
[5] Vigor. [Another reading has "rigor" (σκληρότης), harshness.]
[6] Tenor. [7] Stupor. [8] Mœror.
[9] Furor. [10] [Isa. ii. 3.]

ning of this treatise, when we claimed the soul to be formed by the breathing[1] of God, and not out of matter. We relied even there on the clear direction of the inspired statement which informs us how that "the Lord God breathed on man's face the breath of life, so that man became a living soul"[2]—by that inspiration of God, of course. On this point, therefore, nothing further need be investigated or advanced by us. It has its own treatise,[3] and its own heretic. I shall regard it as my introduction to the other branches of the subject.

CHAP. IV.—*In opposition to Plato, Tertullian affirms that the soul was created, and originated at birth.*

After settling the origin of the soul, its condition or state comes up next. For when we acknowledge that the soul originates in the breath of God, it follows that we attribute a beginning to it. This Plato, indeed, refuses to assign to it, for he will have the soul to be unborn and unmade.[4] We, however, from the very fact of its having had a beginning, as well as from the nature thereof, teach that it had both birth and creation. And when we ascribe both birth and creation to it, we have made no mistake: for being *born*, indeed, is one thing, and being *made* is another,—the former being the term which is best suited to living beings. When distinctions, however, have places and times of their own, they occasionally possess also reciprocity of application among themselves. Thus, the being made admits of being taken in the sense of being brought forth;[5] inasmuch as everything which receives *being* or *existence*, in any way whatever, is in fact generated. For the maker may really be called the parent of the thing that is made: in this sense Plato also uses the phraseology. So far, therefore, as concerns our belief in the souls being made or born, the opinion of the philosopher is overthrown by the authority of prophecy[6] even.

[1] Flatu.
[2] [Gen. ii. 7.]
[3] Titulus.
[4] [See his *Phædrus*, c. xxiv. (p. 245).]
[5] Capit itaque et facturam provenisse poni.
[6] [Or, "inspiration."]

CHAP. V.—*Tertullian adduces certain reasons for holding, with the Stoics, that the soul has a corporeal nature.*

Suppose one summons a Eubulus to his assistance, and a Critolaus, and a Zenocrates, and on this occasion Plato's friend Aristotle. They may very possibly hold themselves ready for stripping the soul of its corporeity, unless they happen to see other philosophers opposed to them in their purpose—and this, too, in greater numbers—asserting for the soul a corporeal nature. Now I am not referring merely to those who mould the soul out of manifest bodily substances, as Hipparchus and Heraclitus [do] out of fire; as Hippon and Thales [do] out of water; as Empedocles and Critias [do] out of blood; as Epicurus [does] out of atoms, since even atoms by their coherence form corporeal masses; as Critolaus and his Peripatetics [do] out of a certain indescribable *quintessence*,[1] if that may be called a body which rather includes and embraces bodily substances;—but I call on the Stoics also to help me, who, while declaring almost in our own terms that the soul is a spiritual essence (inasmuch as breath and spirit are in their nature very near akin to each other), will yet have no difficulty in persuading [us] that the soul is a corporeal substance. Indeed, Zeno, defining the soul to be a spirit generated with [the body],[2] constructs his argument in this way: That substance which by its departure causes the living being to die is a corporeal one. Now it is by the departure of the spirit, which is generated with [the body], that the living being dies; therefore the spirit which is generated with [the body] is a corporeal substance. But this spirit which is generated with [the body] is the soul: it follows, then, that the soul is a corporeal substance. Cleanthes, too, will have it that family likeness passes from parents to their children not merely in bodily features, but in characteristics of the soul; as if it were out of a mirror of [a man's] manners, and faculties, and affections, that bodily likeness and unlikeness are caught and

[1] Ex quinta nescio qua substantia. [Comp. Cicero's *Tuscul.* i. 10.]
[2] Consitum.

reflected by the soul also. It is therefore as being corporeal that it is susceptible of likeness and unlikeness. Again, there is nothing in common between things corporeal and things incorporeal as to their susceptibility. But the soul certainly sympathizes with the body, and shares in its pain, whenever it is injured by bruises, and wounds, and sores: the body, too, suffers with the soul, and is united with it (whenever it is afflicted with anxiety, distress, or love) in the loss of vigour which its companion sustains, whose shame and fear it testifies by its own blushes and paleness. The soul, therefore, is [proved to be] corporeal from this intercommunion of susceptibility. Chrysippus also joins hands in fellowship with Cleanthes, when he lays it down that it is not at all possible for things which are endued with body to be separated from things which have not body; because they have no such relation as mutual contact or coherence. Accordingly Lucretius says:[1]

> "Tangere enim et tangi nisi corpus nulla potest res."
> "For nothing but body is capable of touching or of being touched."

[Such severance, however, is quite natural between the soul and the body]; for when the body is deserted by the soul, it is overcome by death. The soul, therefore, is endued with a body; for if it were not corporeal, it could not desert the body.

CHAP. VI.—*Tertullian attempts (it may be thought frivolously) to upset the arguments of the Platonists for the soul's incorporeality.*

These conclusions the Platonists disturb more by subtilty than by truth. Every body, they say, has necessarily either an animate nature[2] or an inanimate one.[3] If it has the inanimate nature, it receives motion externally to itself; if the animate one, internally. Now the soul receives motion neither externally nor internally: not externally, since it has not the inanimate nature; nor internally, because it is itself

[1] [*De Nat. Rer.* i. 305.]
[2] Animale ["having the nature of soul"]. [3] Inanimale.

rather the giver of motion to the body. It evidently, then, is not a bodily substance, inasmuch as it receives motion neither way, according to the nature and law of corporeal substances. Now, what first surprises us here, is the unsuitableness of a definition which appeals to objects which have no affinity with the soul. For it is impossible for the soul to be called either an animate body or an inanimate one, inasmuch as it is the soul itself which makes the body either animate, if it be present to it, or else inanimate, if it be absent from it. That, therefore, which produces a result, cannot itself be the result, so as to be entitled to the designation of an animate thing or an inanimate one. The soul is so called in respect of its own substance. If, then, that which is the soul admits not of being called an animate body or an inanimate one, how can it challenge comparison with the nature and law of animate and inanimate bodies? Furthermore, since it is characteristic of a body to be moved externally by something else, and as we have already shown that the soul receives motion from some other thing when it is swayed (from the outside, of course, by something else) by prophetic influence or by madness, therefore I must be right in regarding that as bodily substance which, according to the examples we have quoted, is moved by some other object from without. Now, if to receive motion from some other thing is characteristic of a body, how much more is it so to impart motion to something else! But the soul moves the body, all whose efforts are apparent externally, and from without. It is the soul which gives motion to the feet for walking, and to the hands for touching, and to the eyes for sight, and to the tongue for speech—a sort of internal image which moves and animates the surface. Whence could accrue such power to the soul, if it were incorporeal? How could an unsubstantial thing propel solid objects? But in what way do the senses in man seem to be divisible into the corporeal and the intellectual classes? They tell us that the qualities of things corporeal, such as earth and fire, are indicated by the bodily senses—of touch and sight; whilst [the qualities] of incorporeal things — for instance, bene-

volence and malignity—are discovered by the intellectual faculties. And from this [they deduce what is to them] the manifest conclusion, that the soul is incorporeal, its properties being comprehended by the perception not of bodily organs, but of intellectual faculties. Well, [I shall be much surprised] if I do not at once cut away the very ground on which their argument stands. For I show them how incorporeal things are commonly submitted to the bodily senses—sound, for instance, to the organ of hearing; colour, to the organ of sight; smell, to the olfactory organ. And, just as in these instances, the soul likewise has its contact with[1] the body; not to say that the incorporeal objects are reported to us through the bodily organs, for the express reason that they come into contact with the said organs. Inasmuch, then, as it is evident that even incorporeal objects are embraced and comprehended by corporeal ones, why should not the soul, which is corporeal, be equally comprehended and understood by incorporeal faculties? It is thus certain that their argument fails. Among their more conspicuous arguments will be found this, that in their judgment every bodily substance is nourished by bodily substances; whereas the soul, as being an incorporeal essence, is nourished by incorporeal aliments—for instance, by the studies of wisdom. But even this ground has no stability in it, since Soranus, who is a most accomplished authority in medical science, affords us an answer, when he asserts that the soul is even nourished by corporeal aliments; that in fact it is, when failing and weak, actually refreshed oftentimes by food. Indeed, when deprived of all food, does not the soul entirely remove from the body? Soranus, then, after discoursing about the soul in the amplest manner, filling four volumes with his dissertations, and after weighing well all the opinions of the philosophers, defends the corporeality of the soul, although in the process he has robbed it of its immortality. For to all men it is not given to believe the truth which Christians are privileged to hold. As, therefore, Soranus has shown us from facts that the soul is nourished by corporeal aliments,

[1] Accedit.

let the philosopher [adopt a similar mode of proof, and] show that it is sustained by an incorporeal food. But the fact is, that no one has ever been able to quench this man's[1] doubts and difficulties about the condition of the soul with the honey-water of Plato's subtle eloquence, nor to surfeit them with the crumbs from the minute nostrums of Aristotle. But what is to become of the souls of all those robust barbarians, which have had no nurture of philosopher's lore indeed, and yet are strong in untaught practical wisdom, and which, although very starvelings in philosophy, without your Athenian academies and porches, and even the prison of Socrates, do yet contrive to live? For it is not the soul's actual substance which is benefited by the aliment of learned study, but only its conduct and discipline; such aliment contributing nothing to increase its bulk, but only to enhance its grace. It is, moreover, a happy circumstance that the Stoics affirm that even the arts have corporeality; since at that rate the soul too must be corporeal, since it is commonly supposed to be nourished by the arts. Such, however, is the enormous preoccupation of the philosophic mind, that it is generally unable to see straight before it. Hence [the story of] Thales falling into the well.[2] It very commonly, too, through not understanding even its own opinions, suspects a failure of its own health. Hence [the story of] Chrysippus and the hellebore. Some such hallucination, I take it, must have occurred to him, when he asserted that two bodies could not possibly be contained in one: he must have kept out of mind and sight the case of those pregnant women who, day after day, bear not one body, but even two and three at a time, within the embrace of a single womb. One finds likewise, in the records of the civil law, the instance of a certain Greek woman who gave birth to a quint[3] of children, the mother of all these at one parturition, the manifold parent of a single brood, the prolific producer from a single womb, who,

[1] [We follow Oehler's view of this obscure passage, in preference to Rigaltius'.]

[2] [See Tertullian's *Ad Nationes* (our translation), ii. 4.]

[3] Quinionem.

guarded by so many bodies—I had almost said, a people—was herself no less than the sixth person! The whole creation testifies how that those bodies which are naturally destined to issue from bodies, are already [included] in that from which they proceed. Now that which proceeds from some other thing must needs be second to it. Nothing, however, proceeds out of another thing except by the process of generation; but then they are two [things].

Chap. vii.—*Tertullian attempts to prove the soul's corporeality out of the Gospels.*

So far as the philosophers are concerned, we have said enough. As for our own teachers, indeed, our reference to them is *ex abundanti*—a surplusage of authority: in the Gospel itself they will be found to have the clearest evidence for the corporeal nature of the soul. In hell the soul of a certain man is in torment, punished in flames, suffering excruciating thirst, and imploring from the finger of a happier soul, for his tongue, the solace of a drop of water.[1] Do you suppose that this end of the blessed poor man and the miserable rich man is only imaginary? Then why the name of Lazarus in this narrative, if the circumstance is not in [the category of] a real occurrence? But even if it is to be regarded as imaginary, it will still be a testimony to truth and reality. For unless the soul possessed corporeality, the image of a soul could not possibly contain a figure of a bodily substance; nor would the Scripture feign a statement about the limbs of a body, if these had no existence. But what is that which is removed to Hades[2] after the separation of the body; which is there detained; which is reserved until the day of judgment; to which Christ also, on dying, descended? I imagine it is the souls of the patriarchs. But wherefore [all this], if the soul is nothing in its subterranean abode? For *nothing* it certainly is, if it is not a bodily substance. For whatever is incorporeal is incapable of being kept and guarded in any way; it is also exempt from either punishment or refreshment. That must be a

[1] [Luke xvi. 23, 24.]

[2] Ad inferna.

body, by which punishment and refreshment can be experienced. Of this I shall treat more fully in a more fitting place. Therefore, whatever amount of punishment or refreshment the soul tastes in Hades, in its prison or lodging,[1] in the fire or in Abraham's bosom, it gives proof thereby of its own corporeality. For an incorporeal thing suffers nothing, not having that which makes it capable of suffering; else, if it has such capacity, it must be a bodily substance. For in *as* far as every corporeal thing is capable of suffering, in *so* far is that which is capable of suffering also corporeal.[2]

CHAP. VIII.—*Other Platonist arguments for the soul's incorporeal nature considered by our author.*

Besides, it would be a harsh and absurd proceeding to exempt anything from the class of corporeal beings, on the ground that it is not exactly like the other constituents of that class. And where individual creatures possess various properties, does not this variety in works of the same class indicate the greatness of the Creator, in making them at the same time different and yet like, amicable yet rivals? Indeed, the philosophers themselves agree in saying that the universe consists of harmonious oppositions, according to Empedocles' [theory of] friendship and enmity. Thus, then, although corporeal essences are opposed to incorporeal ones, they yet differ from each other in such sort as to amplify their species by their variety, without changing their genus, remaining all alike corporeal; contributing to God's glory in their manifold existence by reason of their variety; so various, by reason of their differences; so diverse, in that some of them possess one kind of perception, others another; some feeding on one kind of aliment, others on another; some, again, possessing visibility, while others are invisible; some being weighty, others light. They are in the habit of

[1] Diversorio.

[2] [Compare *De Resur. Carnis*, xvii. There is, however, some variation in Tertullian's language on this subject. In his *Apol.* xlviii. he speaks as if the soul could not suffer when separated from the body. See also his *De Testimonio Animæ*, ch. iv. (Bp. Kaye).]

saying that the soul must be pronounced incorporeal on this account, because the bodies of the dead, after its departure from them, become heavier, whereas they ought to be lighter, being deprived of the weight of a body—since the soul is a bodily substance. But what, says Soranus [in answer to this argument], if men should deny that the sea is a bodily substance, because a ship out of the water becomes a heavy and motionless mass? How much truer and stronger, then, is the soul's corporeal essence, which carries about the body, which eventually assumes so great a weight with the nimblest motion! Again, even if the soul is invisible, it is only in strict accordance with the condition of its own corporeality, and suitably to the property of its own essence, as well as to the nature of even those beings to which its destiny made it to be invisible. The eyes of the owl cannot endure the sun, whilst the eagle is so well able to face his glory, that the noble character of its young is determined by the unblinking strength of their gaze; while the eaglet, which turns away its eye from the sun's ray, is expelled from the nest as a degenerate creature! So true is it, therefore, that to one eye an object is invisible, which may be quite plainly seen by another,—without implying any incorporeality in that which is not endued with an equally strong power [of vision]. The sun is indeed a bodily substance, because it is [composed of] fire; the object, however, which the eagle at once admits the existence of, the owl denies, without any prejudice, nevertheless, to the testimony of the eagle. There is the selfsame difference in respect of the soul's corporeality, which is (perhaps) invisible to the flesh, but perfectly visible to the spirit. Thus John, being "in the Spirit" of God,[1] beheld plainly the souls of the martyrs.[2]

CHAP. IX.—*Tertullian states that the soul's corporeity was a mystery revealed by the Paraclete to a Montanist sister: particulars of the alleged communication.*

When we aver that the soul has a body of a quality and

[1] [Rev. i. 10.] [2] [Rev. vi. 9.]

kind peculiar to itself, in this special condition of it we shall be already supplied with a decision respecting all the other accidents of its corporeity; how that they belong to it, because we have shown it to be a body, but that even they have a quality peculiar to themselves, proportioned to the special nature of the body [to which they belong]; or else, if any accidents [of a body] are remarkable in this instance for their absence, then this, too, results from the peculiarity of the condition of the soul's corporeity, from which are absent sundry qualities which are present to all other corporeal beings. And yet, notwithstanding all this, we shall not be at all inconsistent if we declare that the more usual characteristics of a body, such as invariably accrue to the corporeal condition, belong also to the soul—such as form[1] and limitation; and that triad of dimensions[2]—I mean length, and breadth, and height—by which philosophers gauge all bodies. What now remains but for us to give the soul a figure?[3] Plato refuses to do this, as if it endangered the soul's immortality.[4] For everything which has figure is, according to him, compound, and composed of parts;[5] whereas the soul is immortal; and being immortal, it is therefore indissoluble; and being indissoluble, it is figureless: for if, on the contrary, it had figure, it would be of a composite and structural formation. He, however, in some other manner frames for the soul an effigy of intellectual forms, beautiful for its just symmetry and tuitions of philosophy, but misshapen by some contrary qualities. As for ourselves, indeed, we inscribe on the soul the lineaments of corporeity, not simply from the assurance which reasoning has taught us of its corporeal nature, but also from the firm conviction which divine grace impresses on us by revelation. For, seeing that we acknowledge spiritual *charismata*, or gifts, we too have merited the attainment of the prophetic gift, although coming after John [the Baptist]. We have now amongst us a sister whose lot it has been to be favoured with sundry gifts of revelation, which she expe-

[1] Habitum.

[2] Illud trifariam distantivum [Τριχῶς διαστηματικόν (Junius)].

[3] Effigiem. [4] [See his *Phædo*, pp. 105, 106.] [5] Structile.

riences in the Spirit by ecstatic vision amidst the sacred rites of the Lord's day in the church: she converses with angels, and sometimes even with the Lord; she both sees and hears mysterious communications;[1] some men's hearts she understands, and to them who are in need she distributes remedies. Whether it be in the reading of the Scriptures, or in the chanting of psalms, or in the preaching of sermons, or in the offering up of prayers, in all these religious services matter and opportunity are afforded to her of seeing visions. It may possibly have happened to us, whilst this sister of ours was rapt in the Spirit, that we had discoursed in some ineffable way about the soul. After the people are dismissed at the conclusion of the sacred services, she is in the regular habit of reporting to us whatever things she may have seen in vision (for all her communications are examined with the most scrupulous care, in order that their truth may be probed). "Amongst other things," says she, "there has been shown to me a soul in bodily shape, and a spirit has been in the habit of appearing to me; not, however, a void and empty illusion, but such as would offer itself to be even grasped by the hand, soft and transparent and of an etherial colour, and in form resembling that of a human being in every respect." This was her vision, and for her witness there was God; and the apostle most assuredly foretold that there were to be "spiritual gifts" in the church.[2] Now, can you refuse to believe this, even if indubitable evidence on every point is forthcoming for your conviction? Since, then, the soul is a corporeal substance, no doubt it possesses qualities such as those which we have just mentioned, amongst them the property of *colour*, which is inherent in every bodily substance. Now what colour would you attribute to the soul but an etherial transparent one? Not that its substance is actually the ether or air (although this was the opinion of Æneside-mus and Anaximenes, and I suppose of Heraclitus also, as some say of him), nor transparent light (although Heraclides of Pontus held it to be so). "Thunder-stones,"[3] indeed, are not of igneous substance, because they shine with ruddy

[1] Sacramenta. [2] [1 Cor. xii. 1–11.] [3] Ceraunias gemmis.

redness; nor are beryls composed of aqueous matter, because they are of a pure wavy whiteness. How many things also besides these are there which their colour would associate in the same class, but which nature keeps widely apart! Since, however, everything which is very attenuated and transparent bears a strong resemblance to the air, such would be the case with the soul, since in its material nature[1] it is wind and breath, [or spirit]; whence it is that the belief of its corporeal quality is endangered, in consequence of the extreme tenuity and subtilty of its essence. Likewise, as regards the figure of the human soul from your own conception, you can well imagine that it is none other than the human form; indeed, none other than the shape of that body which each individual soul animates and moves about. This we may at once be induced to admit from contemplating man's original formation. For only carefully consider, after God hath breathed upon the face of man the breath of life, and man had consequently become a living soul, surely that breath must have passed through the face at once into the interior structure, and have spread itself throughout all the spaces of the body; and as soon as by the divine inspiration it had become condensed, it must have impressed itself on each internal feature, which the condensation had filled in, and so have been, as it were, congealed in shape, [or stereotyped]. Hence, by this densifying process, there arose a fixing of the soul's corporeity; and by the impression its figure was formed and moulded. This is the inner man, different from the outer, but yet one in the twofold condition.[2] It, too, has eyes and ears of its own, by means of which Paul must have heard and seen the Lord;[3] it has, moreover, all the other members of the body, by the help of which it effects all processes of thinking, and all activity in dreams. Thus it happens that the rich man in hell has a tongue, and poor [Lazarus] a finger, and Abraham a bosom.[4] By these features, also, the souls of the martyrs under the altar are distinguished and known. The soul,

[1] Tradux.
[2] Dupliciter unus.
[3] [2 Cor. xii. 2–4.]
[4] [Luke xvi. 23, 24.]

indeed, which in the beginning was associated with Adam's body, which grew with its growth, and was moulded after its form, proved to be the germ both of the entire substance [of the human soul], and of that [part of] creation.

CHAP. X.—*The* SIMPLE *nature of the soul is asserted by Tertullian, who here agrees with Plato; the identity of the spirit and the soul.*

It is essential to a firm faith, to declare with Plato[1] that the soul is simple; in other words, uniform and uncompounded; simply, that is to say, in respect of its substance. Never mind men's artificial views and theories, and away with the fabrications of heresy![2] Some maintain that there is within the soul a natural substance—the spirit—which is different from it:[3] as if to have life—the function of the soul—were one thing; and to emit breath—the alleged[4] function of the spirit—were another thing. Now it is not in all animals that these two functions are found; for there are many which only live, but do not breathe, in that they do not possess the organs of respiration—lungs and windpipes.[5] But of what use is it, in an examination of the soul of man, to borrow proofs from a gnat or an ant, when the great Creator in His divine arrangement has allotted to every animal organs of vitality suited to its own disposition and nature, so that we ought not to catch at any conjectures from comparisons of this sort? Man, indeed, although organically furnished with lungs and windpipes, will not on that account be proved to *breathe* by one process, and to *live* by another;[6] nor can the ant, although defective in these organs, be on that account said to be without respiration, as if it lived and that was all. For by whom has so clear an insight into the works of God been really attained, as to entitle him to assume that these

[1] [See his *Phædo*, p. 80; *Timæus*, § 12, p. 35 (Bekker, pp. 264, 265).]

[2] [We have here combined two readings, *effigies* (Oehler's) and *hæreses* (the usual one).]

[3] Aliam. [4] [This is the force of the subjunctive *fiat*.] [5] Arterias.

[6] Aliunde spirabit, aliunde vivet. ["In the nature of man, life and breath are inseparable" (Bp. Kaye).]

organic resources are wanting to any living thing? There is that Herophilus, the well-known surgeon, or [as I may almost call him] butcher, who cut up no end of persons,[1] in order to investigate the secrets of nature, who ruthlessly handled[2] human creatures to discover [their form and make]: I have my doubts whether he succeeded in clearly exploring all the internal parts of their structure, since death itself changes and disturbs the natural functions of life, especially when the death is not a natural one, but such as must cause irregularity and error amidst the very processes of dissection. Philosophers have affirmed it to be a certain fact, that gnats, and ants, and moths have no pulmonary or arterial organs. Well, then, tell me, you curious and elaborate investigator of these mysteries, have they eyes for seeing withal? But yet they proceed to whatever point they wish, and they both shun and aim at various objects by processes of sight: point out their eyes to me, show me their pupils. Moths also gnaw and eat: demonstrate to me their mandibles, reveal their jaw-teeth. Then, again, gnats hum and buzz, nor even in the dark are they unable to find their way to our ears:[3] point out to me, then, not only the noisy tube, but the stinging lance of that mouth of theirs. Take any living thing whatever, be it the tiniest you can find, it must needs be fed and sustained by some food or other: show me, then, their organs for taking into their system, digesting, and ejecting food. What must we say, therefore? If it is by such instruments that life is maintained, these instrumental means must of course exist in all things which are to live, even though they are not apparent to the eye or to the apprehension by reason of their minuteness. You can more readily believe this, if you remember that God manifests His creative greatness quite as much in small objects as in the very largest. If, however, you suppose that God's wisdom has no capacity for forming such infinitesimal corpuscles, you can still recognise His greatness, in that He has furnished even to the smallest animals the functions of life, although in the absence of the suitable organs,—securing to them the power

[1] Sexcentos. [2] Odit. [3] Aurium cæci.

of sight, even without eyes; of eating, even without teeth; and of digestion, even without stomachs. Some animals also have the ability to move forward without feet, as serpents, by a gliding motion; or as worms, by vertical effort; or as snails and slugs, by their slimy crawl. Why should you not then believe that respiration likewise may be effected without the bellows of the lungs, and without arterial canals? You would thus supply yourself with a strong proof that the spirit or breath is an adjunct of the human soul, for the very reason that some creatures lack breath, and that they lack it because they are not furnished with organs of respiration. You think it possible for a thing to live without breath; then why not suppose that a thing might breathe without lungs? Pray, tell me, what is it to breathe? I suppose it means to emit breath from yourself. What is it not to live? I suppose it means not to emit breath from yourself. This is the answer which I should have to make, if "to breathe" is not the same thing as "to live." It must, however, be characteristic of a dead man not to respire: to respire, therefore, is the characteristic of a living man. But to respire is likewise the characteristic of a breathing man: therefore also to breathe is the characteristic of a living man. Now, if both one and the other could possibly have been accomplished without the soul, to breathe might not be a function of the soul, but merely to live. But indeed to live is to breathe, and to breathe is to live. Therefore this entire process, both of breathing and living, belongs to that to which living belongs—that is, to the soul. Well, then, since you separate the spirit (or breath) and the soul, separate their operations also. Let both of them accomplish some act apart from one another—the soul apart, the spirit apart. Let the soul live without the spirit; let the spirit breathe without the soul. Let one of them quit men's bodies, let the other remain; let death and life meet and agree. If indeed the soul and the spirit are two, they may be divided; and thus, by the separation of the one which departs from the one which remains, there would accrue the union and meeting together of life and of death. But such a union never will accrue: there-

fore they are not two, and they cannot be divided; but divided they might have been, if they had been [two]. Still two things may surely coalesce in growth. But the two in question never will coalesce, since to live is one thing, and to breathe is another. Substances are distinguished by their operations. How much firmer ground have you for believing that the soul and the spirit are but one, since you assign to them no difference; so that the soul is itself the spirit, respiration being the function of that of which life also is! But what if you insist on supposing that the day is one thing, and the light, which is incidental to the day, is another thing, whereas day is only the light itself? There must, of course, be also different kinds of light, as [appears] from the ministry of fires. So likewise will there be different sorts of spirits, according as they emanate from God or from the devil. Whenever, indeed, the question is about soul and spirit, the soul will be [understood to be] itself the spirit, just as the day is the light itself. For a thing is itself identical with that by means of which itself exists.

CHAP. XI.—*"Spirit" is a term expressive of an operation of the soul, not of its nature. It is to be carefully distinguished from the Spirit of God. Abuse of the term by Hermogenes and the Valentinians.*

But the nature of my present inquiry obliges me to call the soul spirit or breath, because to breathe is ascribed to another substance. We, however, claim this [operation] for the soul, which we acknowledge to be an indivisible simple substance, and therefore we must call it spirit in a definitive sense—not because of its condition, but of its action; not in respect of its nature, but of its operation; because it *respires*, and not because it is spirit in any especial sense.[1] For to blow or breathe is to respire. So that we are driven to describe, by [the term which indicates this respiration—that is to say] *spirit*—the soul which we hold to be, by the propriety of its action, breath. Moreover, we properly and especially insist on calling it breath [or spirit], in opposition

[1] Proprie ["by reason of its nature"].

to Hermogenes, who derives the soul from matter instead of from the *afflatus* or breath of God. He, to be sure, goes flatly against the testimony of Scripture, and with this view converts breath into spirit, because he cannot believe that the [creature on which was breathed the] Spirit of God fell into sin, and then into condemnation; and therefore he would conclude that the soul came from matter rather than from the Spirit or breath of God. For this reason, we on our side, even from that passage, maintain the soul to be breath and not the spirit, in the scriptural and distinctive sense of the spirit; and here it is with regret that we apply the term spirit at all in the lower sense, in consequence of the identical action of respiring and breathing. In that passage, the only question is about the natural substance; to respire being an act of nature. I would not tarry a moment longer on this point, were it not for those heretics who introduce into the soul some spiritual germ which passes my comprehension: [they make it to have been] conferred upon the soul by the secret liberality of her mother Sophia (*Wisdom*), without the knowledge of the Creator.[1] But [Holy] Scripture, which has a better knowledge of the soul's Maker, or rather God, has told us nothing more than that God breathed on man's face the breath of life, and that man became a living soul, by means of which he was both to live and breathe; at the same time making a sufficiently clear distinction between the spirit and the soul,[2] in such passages as the following, wherein God Himself declares: "My Spirit went forth from me, and I made the breath of each. And the breath of my Spirit became soul."[3] And again: "He giveth breath unto the people that are on the earth, and Spirit to them that walk thereon."[4] First of all there comes the [natural] soul, that is to say, the breath, to the people that are on the earth,—in other words, to those who act carnally in the flesh; then afterwards comes the Spirit to those who walk thereon,—that is, who subdue the works

[1] [See the tract *Adv. Valentin.* c. xxv.]
[2] [Compare *Adv. Hermog.* xxxii. xxxiii.; also Irenæus, v. 12, 17.]
[3] [Tertullian's reading of Isa. lvii. 16.] [4] [Isa. xlii. 5.]

of the flesh; because the apostle also says, that "that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, [or in possession of the natural soul,] and afterward that which is spiritual."[1] For, inasmuch as Adam straightway predicted that "great mystery of Christ and the church,"[2] when he said, "This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh; therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife, and they two shall become one flesh,"[3] he experienced the influence of the Spirit. For there fell upon him that ecstasy, which is the Holy Ghost's operative virtue of prophecy. And even the evil spirit too is an influence which comes upon a man. Indeed, the Spirit of God not more really "turned Saul into another man,"[4] that is to say, into a prophet, when "people said one to another, What is this which is come to the son of Kish? Is Saul also among the prophets?"[5] than did the evil spirit afterwards turn him into another man—in other words, into an apostate. Judas likewise was for a long time reckoned amongst the elect [apostles], and was even appointed to the office of their treasurer; he was not yet the traitor, although he was become fraudulent; but afterwards the devil entered into him. Consequently, as the spirit neither of God nor of the devil is naturally planted with a man's soul at his birth, this soul must evidently exist apart and alone, previous to the accession to it of either spirit: if thus apart and alone, it must also be simple and uncompounded as regards its substance; and therefore it cannot respire from any other cause than from the actual condition of its own substance.

CHAP. XII.—*Difference between* ANIMUS (*the mind*) *and* ANIMA (*the soul*), *and the relation between them.*

In like manner the mind also, or *animus*, which the Greeks designate *NOTΣ*, is taken by us in no other sense than as indicating that faculty or apparatus[6] which is inherent and implanted in the soul, and naturally proper to it, whereby it acts, whereby it acquires knowledge, and by the possession of

[1] [1 Cor. xv. 46.] [2] [Eph. v. 31, 32.] [3] [Gen. ii. 24, 25.]
[4] [1 Sam. x. 6.] [5] [1 Sam. x. 11.] [6] Suggestum.

which it is capable of a spontaneity of motion within itself, and of thus appearing to be impelled by the mind, as if it were another substance, as is maintained by those who determine the soul to be the moving principle of the universe[1]— the god of Socrates, Valentinus' "only-begotten" of his father[2] *Bythus*, and his mother *Sige*. How confused is the opinion of Anaxagoras! For, having imagined the mind to be the initiating principle of all things, and suspending on its axis the balance of the universe; affirming, moreover, that the mind is a simple principle, unmixed, and incapable of admixture, he mainly on this very consideration separates it from all amalgamation with the soul; and yet in another passage he actually incorporates it with[3] the soul. This [inconsistency] Aristotle has also observed; but whether he meant his criticism to be constructive, and to fill up a system of his own, rather than destructive of the principles of others, I am hardly able to decide. As for himself, indeed, although he postpones his definition of the mind, yet he begins by mentioning, as one of the two natural constituents of the mind,[4] that divine principle which he conjectures to be impassible, or incapable of emotion, and thereby removes from all association with the soul. For whereas it is evident that the soul is susceptible of those emotions which it falls to it naturally to suffer, it must needs suffer either by the mind or with the mind. Now if the soul is by nature associated with the mind, it is impossible to draw the conclusion that the mind is impassible; or again, if the soul suffers not either by the mind or with the mind, it cannot possibly have a natural association with the mind, with which it suffers nothing, and which suffers nothing itself. Moreover, if the soul suffers nothing by the mind and with the mind, it will experience no sensation, nor will it acquire any knowledge, nor will it undergo any emotion through the agency of the mind, as they maintain it will. For Aristotle makes even the senses passions, or states of emotion. And rightly too. For to

[1] [Comp. *The Apology*, c. xlviii.; August. *De Civ. Dei*, xiii. 17.]
[2] [Comp. *Adv. Valentin.* vii.]
[3] Addicit.
[4] Alterum animi genus.

exercise the senses is to suffer emotion, because to suffer is to feel. In like manner, to acquire knowledge is to exercise the senses, and to undergo emotion is to exercise the senses; and the whole of this is a state of suffering. But we see that the soul experiences nothing of these things, in such a manner as that the mind also is not affected by the emotion, by which, indeed, and with which, all is effected. It follows, therefore, that the mind is capable of admixture, in opposition to Anaxagoras; and passible or susceptible of emotion, contrary to the opinion of Aristotle. Besides, if a separate condition between the soul and mind is to be admitted, so that they be two things in substance, then of one of them, emotion and sensation, and every sort of taste, and all action and motion, will be the characteristics; whilst of the other the natural condition will be calm, and repose, and stupor. There is therefore no alternative: either the mind must be useless and void, or the soul. But if these affections may certainly be all of them ascribed to both, then in that case the two will be one and the same, and Democritus will carry his point when he suppresses all distinction between the two. The question will arise how two can be one—whether by the confusion of two substances, or by the disposition of one? We, however, affirm that the mind coalesces with[1] the soul, —not indeed as being distinct from it in substance, but as being its natural function and agent.[2]

CHAP. XIII.—*Arguments to illustrate the soul's supremacy.*

It next remains to examine where lies the supremacy; in other words, which of the two is superior to the other, so that that with which the supremacy clearly lies shall be the essentially superior substance;[3] whilst that over which this essentially superior substance shall have authority shall be considered as the natural functionary of the superior substance. Now who will hesitate to ascribe this entire authority to the soul, from the name of which the whole man has received his own designation in common phraseology? How many *souls*, says the rich man, do I maintain? not how many

[1] Concretum. [2] Substantiæ officium. [3] Substantiæ massa.

minds? The pilot's desire, also, is to rescue so many *souls* from shipwreck, not so many minds; the labourer, too, in his work, and the soldier on the field of battle, affirms that he lays down his soul [or life], not his mind. Which of the two has its perils or its vows and wishes more frequently on men's lips—the mind or the soul? Which of the two are dying persons, said to have to do with the mind or the soul? In short, philosophers themselves, and medical men, even when it is their purpose to discourse about the mind, do in every instance inscribe on their title-page[1] and table of contents,[2] "*De Anima*" ["*A Treatise on the Soul*"]. And that you may also have God's voucher on the subject, it is the soul which He addresses; it is the soul which He exhorts and counsels, to turn the mind and intellect to Him. It is the soul which Christ came to save; it is the soul which He threatens to destroy in hell; it is the soul [or life] which He forbids being made too much of; it is His soul, too [or life], which the good Shepherd Himself lays down for His sheep. It is to the soul, therefore, that you ascribe the supremacy; in *it* also you possess that union of substance, of which you perceive the mind to be the instrument, not the ruling power.

CHAP. XIV.—*The soul, which is really a simple and indivisible substance, has been variously divided by the philosophers; this division is not a material dissection, but an enumeration of the soul's faculties.*

Being thus single, simple, and entire in itself, it is as incapable of being composed and put together from external constituents, as it is of being divided in and of itself, inasmuch as it is indissoluble. For if it had been possible to construct it and to destroy it, it would no longer be immortal. Since, however, it is not mortal, it is also incapable of dissolution and division. Now, to be divided means to be dissolved; and to be dissolved, means to die. Yet [philosophers] have divided the soul into parts: Plato, for instance, into two; Zeno, into three; Panætius, into five or six; Soranus, into seven; Chrysippus, into as many as eight; and Apollo-

[1] Faciem operis. [2] Fontem materiæ.

phanes, into as many as nine; whilst certain of the Stoics have found as many as twelve parts in the soul. Posidonius makes even two more than these: he starts with two leading faculties of the soul,—the *directing* faculty, which they designate ἡγεμονικόν; and the *rational* faculty, which they call λογικόν,—and ultimately subdivided these into seventeen[1] parts. Thus variously is the soul dissected by the different schools. Such divisions, however, ought not to be regarded so much as parts of the soul, as powers, or faculties, or operations thereof, even as Aristotle himself has regarded some of them as being. For they are not portions or organic parts of the soul's substance, but functions of the soul—such as those of motion, of action, of thought, and whatsoever others they divide in this manner; such, likewise, as the five senses themselves, so well known to all—seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, smelling. Now, although they have allotted to the whole of these respectively certain parts of the body as their special domiciles, it does not from that circumstance follow that a like distribution will be suitable to the sections of the soul; for even the body itself would not admit of such a partition as they would have the soul undergo. But of the whole number of the limbs one body is made up, so that the arrangement is rather a concretion than a division. Look at that very wonderful piece of organic mechanism by Archimedes,—I mean his hydraulic organ, with its many limbs, parts, bands, passages for the notes, outlets for their sounds, combinations for their harmony, and the array of its pipes; but yet the whole of these details constitute only one instrument. In like manner the wind, which breathes throughout this organ at the impulse of the hydraulic engine, is not divided into separate portions from the fact of its dispersion through the instrument to make it play: it is whole and entire in its substance, although divided in its operation. This example is not remote from [the illustration of] Strato, and Æenesidemus, and Heraclitus: for these philosophers maintain the unity of the soul, as diffused over

[1] [This is Oehler's text; another reading has *twelve*, which one would suppose to be the right one.]

the entire body, and yet in every part the same.[1] Precisely like the wind blown in the pipes throughout the organ, the soul displays its energies in various ways by means of the senses, being not indeed divided, but rather distributed in natural order. Now, under what designations these energies are to be known, and by what divisions of themselves they are to be classified, and to what special offices and functions in the body they are to be severally confined, the physicians and the philosophers must consider and decide: for ourselves, a few remarks only will be proper.

CHAP. XV.—*The soul's supreme principle of vitality and intelligence. Conflicting views of the philosophers as to its character and seat in man. Tertullian places it in the heart.*

In the first place, [we must determine] whether there be in the soul some supreme principle of vitality and intelligence[2] which they call "the ruling power of the soul"—*τὸ ἡγεμονικόν*; for if this be not admitted, the whole condition of the soul is put in jeopardy. Indeed, those men who say that there is no such directing faculty, have begun by supposing that the soul itself is simply a nonentity. One Dicæarchus, a Messenian, and amongst the medical profession Andreas and Asclepiades, have thus destroyed the [soul's] directing power, by actually placing in the mind the senses, for which they claim the ruling faculty. Asclepiades rides rough-shod over us with even this argument, that very many animals, after losing those parts of their body in which the soul's principle of vitality and sensation is thought mainly to exist, still retain life in a considerable degree, as well as sensation: as in the case of flies, and wasps, and locusts, when you have cut off their heads; and of she-goats, and tortoises, and eels, when you have pulled out their hearts. [He concludes], therefore, that there is no especial principle or power of the soul; for if there were, the soul's vigour and strength could not continue when it was removed with its domiciles [or corporeal organs]. However, Dicæarchus has several authorities against him—and philosophers too—Plato, Strato, Epi-

[1] Ubique ipsa. [2] Sapientialis.

curus, Democritus, Empedocles, Socrates, Aristotle; whilst in opposition to Andreas and Asclepiades [may be placed their brother] physicians Herophilus, Erasistratus, Diocles, Hippocrates, and Soranus himself; and better than all others, there are our Christian authorities. We are taught by God concerning both these questions—viz. that there is a ruling power in the soul, and that it is enshrined[1] in one particular recess of the body. For, when one reads of God as being "the searcher and witness of the heart;"[2] when His prophet is reproved by His discovering to him the secrets of the heart;[3] when God Himself anticipates in His people the thoughts of their heart,[4] "Why think ye evil in your hearts?"[5] when David prays, "Create in me a clean heart, O God,"[6] and Paul declares, "With the heart man believeth unto righteousness,"[7] and John says, "By his own heart is each man condemned;"[8] when, lastly, "he who looketh on a woman so as to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart,"[9]—then both points are cleared fully up, that there is a directing faculty of the soul, with which the purpose of God may agree; in other words, a supreme principle of intelligence and vitality (for where there is intelligence, there must be vitality), and that it resides in that most precious part[10] of our body to which God especially looks: so that you must not suppose, with Heraclitus, that this sovereign faculty of which we are treating is moved by some external force; nor with Moschion,[11] that it floats about through the whole body; nor with Plato, that it is enclosed in the head; nor with Zenophanes, that it culminates in the crown of the head; nor that it reposes in the brain, according to the opinion of Hippocrates; nor around the basis of the brain, as Herophilus thought; nor in the membranes thereof, as Strato and

[1] Consecratum.
[2] [Wisd. i. 6.]
[3] [Prov. xxiv. 12.]
[4] [Ps. cxxxix. 23.]
[5] [Matt. ix. 4.]
[6] [Ps. li. 12.]
[7] [Rom. x. 10.]
[8] [1 John iii. 20.]
[9] [Matt. v. 28.]
[10] In eo thesauro.
[11] [Not Suidas' philosopher of that name, but a renowned physician mentioned by Galen and Pliny (Oehler).]

Erasistratus said; nor in the space between the eyebrows, as Strato the physician held; nor within the enclosure[1] of the breast, according to Epicurus: but rather, as the Egyptians have always taught, especially such of them as were accounted the expounders of sacred truths;[2] in accordance, too, with that verse of Orpheus or Empedocles:

"Namque homini sanguis circumcordialis est sensus."[3]

"Man has his [supreme] sensation in the blood around his heart."

Even Protagoras[4] likewise, and Apollodorus, and Chrysippus, entertain this same view, so that [our friend] Asclepiades may go in quest of his goats bleating without a heart, and hunt his flies flitting without their heads; and let all those [worthies], too, who have predetermined the character of the human soul from the condition of brute animals, be quite sure that it is themselves rather who are alive in a heartless and brainless state.

CHAP. XVI.—*The soul's* RATIONAL *and* IRRATIONAL *parts; the former of God, the latter not really an integral part at all, but a foreign accretion (from the devil) after the fall of man. The* IRASCIBLE *and* CONCUPISCIBLE *elements of the rational soul.*

That position of Plato's is also quite in keeping with the faith, in which he divides the soul into two parts—the rational and the irrational. To this definition we take no exception, except that we would not ascribe this twofold distinction to the nature [of the soul]. It is the rational element which we must believe to be its natural condition, impressed upon it from its very first creation by its Author, who is Himself essentially rational. For how should that be other than rational, which God produced on His own prompting; nay more, which He expressly sent forth by His own *afflatus* or breath? The irrational element, however, we must

[1] Lorica.

[2] [The Egyptian *hierophants.*]

[3] [The original, as given in Stobæus, *Eclog.* i. p. 1026, is this hexameter: Αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα.]

[4] [Or probably that *Praxagoras* the physician who is often mentioned by Athenæus and by Pliny (Pamel.).]

understand to have accrued later, as having proceeded from the instigation of the serpent—the very achievement of [the first] transgression—which thenceforward became inherent in the soul, and grew with its growth, assuming the manner by this time of a natural development, happening as it did immediately at the beginning of nature. But, inasmuch as the same Plato speaks of the rational element only as existing in the soul of God Himself, if we were to ascribe the irrational element likewise to the nature which our soul has received from God, then the irrational element will be equally derived from God, as being a natural production, because God is the author of nature. Now from the devil proceeds the incentive to sin. All sin, however, is irrational: therefore the irrational proceeds from the devil, from whom sin proceeds; and it is extraneous to God, to whom also the irrational is an alien principle. The diversity, then, between these two elements arises from the difference of their authors. When, therefore, Plato reserves the rational element [of the soul] to God alone, and subdivides it into two departments—the *irascible*, which they call *θυμικόν*, and the *concupiscible*, which they designate by the term *ἐπιθυμητικόν* (in such a way as to make the first common to us and lions, and the second shared between ourselves and flies, whilst the rational element is confined to us and God)—I see that this point will have to be treated by us, owing to the facts which we find operating also in Christ. For you may behold this triad of qualities in the Lord. There was the *rational* element, by which He taught, by which He discoursed, by which He prepared the way of salvation; there was moreover *indignation* in Him, by which He inveighed against the scribes and the Pharisees; and there was the principle of *desire*, by which He so earnestly desired to eat the passover with His disciples.[1] In our own cases, accordingly, the irascible and the concupiscible elements of our soul must not invariably be put to the account of the irrational [nature], since we are sure that in our Lord these elements operated in entire accordance with reason. God will be angry, with perfect reason, with

[1] [Luke xxii. 15.]

all who deserve His wrath; and with reason, too, will God desire whatever objects and aims are worthy of Himself. For He will show indignation against the evil man, and for the good man will He desire salvation. To ourselves even does the apostle allow the concupiscible quality. "If any man," says he, "desireth the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work."[1] Now, by saying "a good work," he shows us that the desire is a reasonable one. He permits us likewise to feel indignation. How should he not, when he himself experiences the same? "I would," says he, "that they were even cut off which trouble you."[2] In perfect agreement with reason was that indignation which resulted from his desire to maintain discipline and order. When, however, he says, "We were formerly the children of wrath,"[3] he censures an irrational irascibility, such as proceeds not from that nature which is the production of God, but from that which the devil brought in, who is himself styled the lord or "master" of his own class, "Ye cannot serve two *masters*,"[4] and has the actual designation of "father:" "Ye are of your *father* the devil."[5] So that you need not be afraid to ascribe to him the mastery and dominion over that second, later, and deteriorated nature [of which we have been speaking], when you read of him as "the sower of tares," and the nocturnal spoiler of the crop of corn.[6]

CHAP. XVII.—*The fidelity of the senses, which Plato and others impugned, vindicated by Tertullian, who appeals to Christ Himself as a witness of their truth.*

Then, again, we encounter the question [as to the veracity] of those five senses which we learn with our A, B, C; since from this source even there arises some support for our heretics. They are the faculties of seeing, and hearing, and smelling, and tasting, and touching. The fidelity of these senses is impugned with too much severity by the Platonists,[7] and according to some by Heraclitus also, and

[1] [1 Tim. iii. 1.] [2] [Gal. v. 12.] [3] [Eph. ii. 3.]
[4] [Matt. vi. 24.] [5] [John vi. 44.] [6] [Matt. xiii. 25.]
[7] Academici.

Diocles, and Empedocles; at any rate, Plato, in the *Timæus*, declares the operations of the senses to be irrational, and vitiated[1] by our opinions or beliefs. Deception is imputed to the sight, because it asserts that oars, when immersed in the water, are inclined or bent, notwithstanding the certainty that they are straight; because, again, it is quite sure that that distant tower with its really quadrangular contour is round; because also it will discredit the fact of the truly parallel fabric of yonder porch or arcade, by supposing it to be narrower and narrower towards its end; and because it will join with the sea the sky which hangs at so great a height above it. In the same way, our hearing is charged with fallacy: we think, for instance, that that is a noise in the sky which is nothing else than the rumbling of a carriage; or, if you prefer it[2] the other way, when the thunder rolled at a distance, we were quite sure that it was a carriage which made the noise. Thus, too, are our faculties of smell and taste at fault, because the selfsame perfumes and wines lose their value after we have used them awhile. On the same principle our touch is censured, when the identical pavement which seemed rough to the hands is felt by the feet to be smooth enough; and in the baths a stream of warm water is pronounced to be quite hot at first, and beautifully temperate afterwards. Thus, according to them, our senses deceive us, when all the while *we* are [the cause of the discrepancies, by] changing our opinions. The Stoics are more moderate in their views; for they do not load with the obloquy of deception every one of the senses, and at all times. The Epicureans, again, show still greater consistency, in maintaining that all the senses are equally true in their testimony, and always so—only in a different way. It is not our organs of sensation that are at fault, but our opinion. The senses only experience sensation, they do not exercise opinion; it is the soul that *opines*. They separated opinion from the senses, and sensation from the soul. Well, but whence comes opinion, if not from the

[1] Coimplicitam ["entangled" or "embarrassed." See the *Timæus* pp. 27, 28].

[2] Vel.

senses? Indeed, unless the eye had descried a round shape in that tower, it could have had no idea that it possessed roundness. Again, whence arises sensation, if not from the soul? For if the soul had no body, it would have no sensation. Accordingly, sensation comes from the soul, and opinion from sensation; and the whole [process] is the soul. But further, it may well be insisted on that there is a something which causes the discrepancy between the report of the senses and the reality of the facts. Now, since it is possible, [as we have seen,] for phenomena to be reported which exist not in the objects, why should it not be equally possible for phenomena to be reported which are caused not by the senses, but by reasons and conditions which intervene, in the very nature of the case? If so, it will be only right that they should be duly recognised. The truth is, that it was the water which was the cause of the oar seeming to be inclined or bent: out of the water, it was perfectly straight in appearance [as well as in fact]. The delicacy of the substance or medium which forms a mirror by means of its luminosity, according as it is struck or shaken, by the vibration actually destroys the appearance of the straightness of a right line. In like manner, the condition of the open space which fills up the interval between it and us, necessarily causes the true shape of the tower to escape our notice; for the uniform density of the surrounding air covering its angles with a similar light obliterates their outlines. So, again, the equal breadth of the arcade is sharpened or narrowed off towards its termination, until its aspect, becoming more and more contracted under its prolonged roof, comes to a vanishing point in the direction of its farthest distance. So the sky blends itself with the sea, the vision becoming spent at last, which had maintained duly the boundaries of the two elements, so long as its vigorous glance lasted. As for the [alleged cases of deceptive] hearing, what else could produce the illusion but the similarity of the sounds? And if the perfume afterwards was less strong to the smell, and the wine more flat to the taste, and the water not so hot to the touch, their original strength was after all found in the

whole of them pretty well unimpaired. In the matter, however, of the roughness and smoothness of the pavement, it was only natural and right that limbs like the hands and the feet, so different in tenderness and callousness, should have different impressions. In this way, then, there cannot occur an illusion in our senses without an adequate cause. Now if special causes, [such as we have indicated,] mislead our senses, and (through our senses) our opinions also, then we must no longer ascribe the deception to the senses, which follow the specific causes of the illusion, nor to the opinions we form; for these are occasioned and controlled by our senses, which only follow the causes. Persons who are afflicted with madness or insanity, mistake one object for another. Orestes in his sister sees his mother; Ajax sees Ulysses in the slaughtered herd; Athamas and Agave descry wild beasts in their children. Now is it their eyes or their phrenzy which you must blame for so vast a fallacy? All things taste bitter, in the redundancy of their bile, to those who have the jaundice. Is it their taste which you will charge with the physical prevarication, or their ill state of health? All the senses, therefore, are disordered occasionally, or imposed upon, but only in such a way as to be quite free of any fault in their own natural functions. But further still, not even against the specific causes and conditions themselves must we lay an indictment of deception. For, since these physical aberrations happen for stated reasons, the reasons do not deserve to be regarded as deceptions. Whatever ought to occur in a certain manner is not a deception. If, then, even these circumstantial causes must be acquitted of all censure and blame, how much more should we free from reproach the senses, over which the said causes exercise a liberal sway! Hence we are bound most certainly to claim for the senses truth, and fidelity, and integrity, seeing that they never render any other account of their impressions than is enjoined on them by the specific causes or conditions which in all cases produce that discrepancy which appears between the report of the senses and the reality of the objects. What mean you,

then, O most insolent Academy? You overthrow the entire condition of human life; you disturb the whole order of nature; you obscure the good providence of God Himself: for the senses of man which God has appointed over all His works, that we might understand, inhabit, dispense, and enjoy them, [you reproach] as fallacious and treacherous tyrants! But is it not from these that all creation receives our services? Is it not by their means that a second form is impressed even upon the world?—so many arts, so many industrious resources, so many pursuits, such business, such offices, such commerce, such remedies, counsels, consolations, modes, civilisations, and accomplishments of life! All these things have produced the very relish and savour of human existence; whilst by these senses of man, he alone of all animated nature has the distinction of being a rational animal, with a capacity for intelligence and knowledge—nay, an ability to form the Academy itself! But Plato, in order to disparage the testimony of the senses, in the *Phædrus* denies (in the person of Socrates) his own ability to know even himself, according to the injunction of the Delphic oracle; and in the *Theætetus* he deprives himself of the faculties of knowledge and sensation; and again, in the *Phædrus* he postpones till after death the posthumous knowledge, as he calls it, of the truth; and yet for all he went on playing the philosopher even before he died. We may not, I say, we may not call into question the truth of the [poor vilified] senses,[1] lest we should, even in Christ Himself, bring doubt upon[2] the truth of their sensation; lest perchance it should be said that He did *not* really "behold Satan as lightning fall from heaven;"[3] that He did *not* really hear the Father's voice testifying of Himself;[4] or that He was deceived in touching Peter's wife's mother;[5] or that the fragrance of the ointment which He afterwards smelled was different from that which He accepted for His burial;[6] and that the taste of the wine was different from that which He

[1] Sensus istos.
[2] Deliberetur.
[3] [Luke x. 18.]
[4] [Matt. iii. 17.]
[5] [Matt. viii. 15.]
[6] [Matt. xxvi. 7-12.]

consecrated in memory of His blood.[1] On this false principle it was that Marcion actually chose to believe that He was a phantom, denying to Him the reality of a perfect body. Now, not even to His apostles was His nature ever a matter of deception. He was truly both seen and heard upon the mount;[2] true and real was the draught of that wine at the marriage of [Cana in] Galilee;[3] true and real also was the touch of the then believing Thomas.[4] Read the testimony of John: "That which we have seen, which we have heard, which we have looked upon with our eyes, and our hands have handled, of the Word of life."[5] False, of course, and deceptive must have been that testimony, if the witness of our eyes, and ears, and hands be by nature a lie.

CHAP. XVIII.—*Plato's difference between the intellect and the senses suggested certain errors to the Gnostics. Whatever the difference be, either in their mode of operation or the objects with which they are conversant, they are alike functions of the soul, and equally useful in the attainment of knowledge.*

I turn now to the department of our intellectual faculties, such as Plato has handed it over to the heretics, distinct from our bodily functions, having obtained the knowledge of them before death.[6] He asks in the *Phædo*, What, then, [do you think] concerning the actual possession of *knowledge?* Will the body be a hindrance to it or not, if one shall admit it as an associate in the search after knowledge? I have a similar question to ask: Have the faculties of their sight and hearing any truth and reality for human beings or not? Is it not the case, that even the poets are always muttering against us, that we can never hear or see anything for certain? He remembered, no doubt, what Epicharmus the comic poet had said: "It is the mind which sees, the mind

[1] [Matt. xxvi. 27, 28; Luke xxii. 19, 20; 1 Cor. xi. 25.]
[2] [Matt. xvii. 3–8.]
[3] [John ii. 1–10.]
[4] [John xx. 27.]
[5] [1 John i. 1.]
[6] [Said ironically, as if rallying Plato for inconsistency between his theory here and the fact.]

that hears—all else is blind and deaf." To the same purport he says again, that that man is the wisest whose mental power is the clearest; who never applies the sense of sight, nor adds to his mind the help of any such faculty, but employs the intellect itself in unmixed serenity when he indulges in contemplation for the purpose of acquiring an unalloyed insight into the nature of things; divorcing himself with all his might from his eyes and ears, and (as one must express himself) from the whole of his body, on the ground of its disturbing the soul, and not allowing it to possess either truth or wisdom, whenever it is brought into communication with it. We see, then, that in opposition to the bodily senses another faculty is provided of a much more serviceable character, even the powers of the soul, which produce an understanding of that truth whose realities are not palpable nor open to the bodily senses, but are very remote from men's everyday knowledge, lying in secret—in the heights above, and in the presence of God Himself. For Plato maintains that there are certain invisible substances, incorporeal, celestial,[1] divine, and eternal, which they call *ideas*, that is to say, [archetypal] forms, which are the patterns and causes of those objects of nature which are manifest to us, and lie under our corporeal senses: the former, [according to Plato,] are the actual verities, and the latter the images and likenesses of them. Well, now, are there not here gleams of the heretical principles of the Gnostics and the Valentinians? It is from this philosophy that they eagerly adopt the difference between the bodily senses and the intellectual faculties,—a distinction which they actually apply to the parable of the ten virgins: making the five foolish virgins to symbolize the five bodily senses, seeing that these are so silly and so easy to be deceived; and the wise virgins to express the meaning of the intellectual faculties, which are so wise as to attain to that mysterious and supernal truth, which is placed in the pleroma. [Here, then, we have] the mystic original of the ideas of these heretics. For in this philosophy lie both their Æons and their

[1] Supermundiales [" placed above this world "].

genealogies. Thus, too, do they divide sensation, both into the intellectual powers from their spiritual seed, and the sensuous faculties from the animal, which cannot by any means comprehend spiritual things. From the former germ spring invisible things; from the latter, visible things which are grovelling and temporary, and which are obvious to the senses, placed as they are in palpable forms.[1] It is because of these views that we have in a former passage stated as a preliminary fact, that the mind is nothing else than an apparatus or instrument of the soul,[2] and that the spirit is no other faculty, separate from the soul, but is the soul itself exercised in respiration; although that influence which either God on the one hand, or the devil on the other, has breathed upon it, must be regarded in the light of an additional element.[3] And now, with respect to the difference between the intellectual powers and the sensuous faculties, we only admit it so far as the natural diversity between them requires of us. [There is, of course, a difference] between things corporeal and things spiritual, between visible and invisible beings, between objects which are manifest to the view and those which are hidden from it; because the one class are attributed to sensation, and the other to the intellect. But yet both the one and the other must be regarded as inherent in the soul, and as obedient to it, seeing that it embraces bodily objects by means of the body, in exactly the same way that it conceives incorporeal objects by help of the mind, except that it is even exercising sensation when it is employing the intellect. For is it not true, that to employ the senses is to use the intellect? And to employ the intellect amounts to a use of the senses?[4] What indeed can sensation be, but the understanding of that which is the object of the sensation? And what can the intellect or understanding be, but the seeing of that which is the object understood? Why adopt such excruciating means of torturing simple knowledge and crucifying the truth? Who can show me the sense which does not understand the object

[1] Imaginibus.
[2] [See above, c. xii.]
[3] [Above, c. xi.]
[4] Intelligere sentire est.

of its sensation, or the intellect which perceives not the object which it understands, in so clear a way as to prove to me that the one can do without the other? If corporeal things are the objects of sense, and incorporeal ones objects of the intellect, it is the *classes* of the objects which are different, not the domicile or abode of sense and intellect; in other words, not the soul [*anima*] and the mind [*animus*]. By what, in short, are corporeal things perceived? If it is by the soul,[1] then the mind is a sensuous faculty, and not merely an intellectual power; for whilst it understands, it also perceives, because without the perception there is no understanding. If, however, corporeal things are perceived by the soul, then it follows that the soul's power is an intellectual one, and not merely a sensuous faculty; for while it perceives it also understands, because without understanding there is no perceiving. And then, again, by what are incorporeal things understood? If it is by the mind,[2] where will be the soul? If it is by the soul, where will be the mind? For things which differ ought to be mutually absent from each other, when they are occupied in their respective functions and duties. It must be your opinion, indeed, that the mind is absent from the soul on certain occasions; for [you suppose] that we are so made and constituted as not to know that we have seen or heard something, on the hypothesis[3] that the mind was absent at the time. I must therefore maintain that the very soul itself neither saw nor heard, since it was at the given moment absent with its active power—that is to say, the mind. The truth is, that whenever a man is out of his mind,[4] it is his soul that is demented—not because the mind is absent, but because it is a fellow-sufferer [with the soul] at the time.[5] Indeed, it is the soul which is principally affected by

[1] [Oehler has "anima;" we should rather have expected "animo," which is another reading.]

[2] ["Animo" this time.]

[3] [Subjunctive verb, "fuerit."]

[4] Dementit.

[5] [The opposite opinion was held by Tertullian's opponents, who distinguished between the mind and the soul. They said, that when a

casualties of such a kind. Whence is this fact confirmed? It is confirmed from the following consideration: that after the soul's departure, the mind is no longer found in a man: it always follows the soul; nor does it at last remain behind it alone, after death. Now, since it follows the soul, it is also indissolubly attached to it; just as the understanding is attached to the soul, which is followed by the mind, with which the understanding is indissolubly connected. Granted now that the understanding is superior to the senses, and a better discoverer of mysteries, what matters it, so long as it is only a peculiar faculty of the soul, just as the senses themselves are? It does not at all affect my argument, unless the understanding were held to be superior to the senses, for the purpose of deducing from the allegation of such superiority its separate condition likewise. After thus combating their alleged difference, I have also to refute this question of superiority, previous to my approaching the belief [which heresy propounds] in a superior god. On this point, however, of a [superior] god, we shall have to measure swords with the heretics on their own ground.[1] Our present subject concerns the soul, and the point is to prevent the insidious ascription of a superiority to the intellect or understanding. Now, although the objects which are touched by the intellect are of a higher nature, since they are spiritual, than those which are embraced by the senses, since these are corporeal, it will still be only a superiority in the *objects*—as of lofty ones contrasted with humble—not in the *faculties* of the intellect against the senses. For how can the intellect be superior to the senses, when it is these which educate it for the discovery of various truths? It is a fact, that these truths are learned by means of palpable forms; in other words, invisible things are discovered by the help of visible ones, even as the apostle tells us in his epistle: "For the invisible things of Him are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made;"[2]

man was out of his mind, his mind left him, but that his soul remained. (Lactantius, *De Opif.* xviii.; *Instit. Div.* vii. 12; La Cerda).]

[1] [See his treatise, *Against Marcion.*]

[2] [Rom. i. 20.]

and as Plato too might inform our heretics: "The things which appear are the image[1] of the things which are concealed from view,"[2] whence it must needs follow that this world is by all means an image of some other: so that the intellect evidently uses the senses for its own guidance, and authority, and mainstay; and without the senses truth could not be attained. How, then, can a thing be superior to that which is instrumental to its existence, which is also indispensable to it, and to whose help it owes everything which it acquires? Two conclusions therefore follow from what we have said: (1) That the intellect is not to be preferred above the senses, on the [supposed] ground that the agent through which a thing exists is inferior to the thing itself; and (2) that the intellect must not be separated from the senses, since the instrument by which a thing's existence is sustained is associated with the thing itself.

CHAP. XIX.—*The intellect coeval with the soul as to its origin in the human being. Tertullian takes an example from Aristotle, meant to contravene his position, and by a bold* ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM *converts it into evidence favourable to his own views.*

Nor must we fail to notice those writers who deprive the soul of the intellect even for a short period of time. [They do this] in order to prepare the way of introducing the intellect—and the mind also—at a subsequent time of life, even at the time when intelligence appears in a man. They maintain that the stage of infancy is supported by the soul alone, simply to promote vitality, without any intention of acquiring knowledge also, because not all things have knowledge which possess life. Trees, for instance, to quote Aristotle's example,[3] have vitality, but have not knowledge; and [with him agrees] every one who gives a share to all animated beings of the animal substance, which, according to our view, exists in man alone as his special property,—not because it is the work of God, which all other creatures are likewise,

[1] Facies.

[2] [*Timæus*, pp. 29, 30, 37, 38.]

[3] [His *De Anima*, ii. 2, 3.]

but because it is the breath of God, which this [human soul] alone is, which we say is born with the full equipment of its proper faculties. Well, let them meet us with the example of the trees: we will accept their challenge, [nor shall we find in it any detriment to our own argument:] for it is an undoubted fact, that whilst trees are yet but twigs and sprouts, and before they even reach the sapling stage, there is in them their own proper faculty of life, as soon as they spring out of their native beds. But then, as time goes on, the vigour of the tree slowly advances, as it grows and hardens into its woody trunk, until its mature age completes the condition which nature destines for it. Else what resources would trees possess in due course for the inoculation of grafts, and the formation of leaves, and the swelling of their buds, and the graceful shedding of their blossom, and the softening of their sap, were there not in them the quiet growth of the full provision of their nature, and the distribution of this life over all their branches for the accomplishment of their maturity? Trees, therefore, have ability or knowledge; and they derive it from whence they also derive vitality—that is, from the one source of vitality and knowledge which is peculiar to their nature, and *that* from the infancy which they, too, begin with. For I observe that even the vine, although yet tender and immature, still understands its own natural business, and strives to cling to some support, that, leaning on it, and lacing through it,[1] it may so attain its growth. Indeed, without waiting for the husbandman's training, without an espalier, without a prop, whatever its tendrils catch, it will fondly cling to,[2] and embrace with really greater tenacity and force by its own inclination than by your volition. It longs and hastens to be secure. Take also ivy-plants, never mind how young: I observe their attempts from the very first to grasp objects above them, and, outrunning everything else, to hang on to the highest thing, preferring as they do to spread over walls with their leafy web and woof rather than creep on the ground and be trodden under by every foot that likes to crush them. On the other hand, in the

[1] Innixa et innexa. [2] Amabit.

case of such trees as receive injury from contact with a building, how do they hang off as they grow and avoid what injures them! You can see that their branches were naturally meant to take the opposite direction, and can very well understand the vital instincts[1] of such a tree from its avoidance of the wall. It is contented [if it be only a little shrub] with its own insignificant destiny, which it has in its foreseeing instinct thoroughly been aware of from its infancy, only it still fears even a ruined building. On my side, then, why should I not contend for these wise and sagacious natures of trees? Let them have vitality, as the philosophers permit it; but let them have knowledge too, although the philosophers disavow it. Even the infancy of a log, then, may have an intellect [suitable to it]: how much more may that of a human being, whose soul (which may be compared with the nascent sprout of a tree) has been derived from Adam as its root, and has been propagated amongst his posterity by means of woman's generative organs, to which it has been entrusted for transmission, and thus has sprouted into life with all its natural apparatus, both of intellect and of sense! I am much mistaken if the human person, even from his infancy, when he saluted life with his infant cries, does not testify to his actual possession of the faculties of sensation and intellect by the fact of his birth, vindicating at one and the same time the use of all his senses—that of seeing by the light, that of hearing by sounds, that of taste by liquids, that of smell by the air, that of touch by the ground. This earliest voice of infancy, then, is the first effort of the senses, and the initial impulse of mental perceptions.[2] There is also the further fact, that some persons understand this plaintive cry of the infant to be an augury of affliction in the prospect of our tearful life, whereby from the very moment of birth [the soul] has to be regarded as endued with prescience, much more with intelligence. Accordingly, by this intuition[3] the babe knows his mother, discerns the nurse, and even

[1] Animationem. [The possession and use of an "anima."]
[2] Intellectuam.
[3] Spiritu. [The mental instinct, just mentioned.]

recognises the waiting-maid; refusing the breast of another woman, and the cradle that is not his own, and longing only for the arms to which he is accustomed. Now from what source does he acquire this discernment of novelty and custom, if not from instinctive knowledge? How does it happen that he is irritated and quieted, if not by help of his initial intellect? It would be very strange indeed that infancy were naturally so lively, if it had not mental power; and naturally so capable of impression and affection, if it had no intellect. But [we hold the contrary]: for Christ, by "accepting praise out of the mouth of babes and sucklings,"[1] has declared that neither childhood nor infancy is without sensibility,[2]—the former of which states, when meeting Him with approving shouts, proved its ability to offer Him testimony;[3] while the other, by being slaughtered, for His sake of course, knew what violence meant.[4]

CHAP. XX.—*The soul, as to its nature, is uniform; but its faculties are variously developed according to circumstances—of birth, health, education, condition of life. These varieties are not specific, but only accidental.*

And here, therefore, we draw our conclusion, that all the natural properties of the soul are inherent in it as parts of its substance; and that they grow and develope along with it, from the very moment of its own origin at birth. Just as Seneca says, whom we so often find on our side:[5] "There are implanted within us the seeds of all the arts and periods of life. And God, our Master, secretly produces our mental dispositions;" that is, from the germs which are implanted and hidden in us by means of infancy, and these are the intellect: for from these our natural dispositions are evolved. Now, even the seeds of plants have one form in each kind, but their development varies: some open and expand in a healthy and perfect state, while others either improve or degenerate, owing to the conditions of weather and soil, and

[1] [Ps. viii. 2; Matt. xxi. 16.]
[2] Hebetes.
[3] [Matt. xxi. 15.]
[4] [Matt. ii. 16–18.]
[5] Sæpe noster.

from the appliance of labour and care; also from the course of the seasons, and from the occurrence of casual circumstances. In like manner, the soul may well be[1] uniform in its seminal origin, although multiform by the process of nativity.[2] And here local influences, too, must be taken into account. It has been said that dull and brutish persons are born at Thebes; and the most accomplished in wisdom and speech at Athens, where in the district of Colythus[3] children speak —such is the precocity of their tongue—before they are a month old. Indeed, Plato himself tells us, in the *Timæus*, that Minerva, when preparing to found her great city, only regarded the nature of the country which gave promise of mental dispositions of this kind; whence he himself in *The Laws* instructs Megillus and Clinias to be careful in their selection of a site for building a city. Empedocles, however, places the cause of a subtle or an obtuse intellect in the quality of the blood, from which he derives progress and perfection in learning and science. The subject of national peculiarities has grown by this time into proverbial notoriety. Comic poets deride the Phrygians for their cowardice; Sallust reproaches the Moors for their levity, and the Dalmatians for their cruelty; even the apostle brands the Cretans as "liars."[4] Very likely, too, something must be set down to the score of bodily condition and the state of the health. Stoutness hinders knowledge, but a spare form stimulates it; paralysis prostrates the mind, a decline preserves it. How much more will those accidental circumstances have to be noticed, which, in addition to the state of one's body or one's health, tend to sharpen or to dull the intellect! It is sharpened by learned pursuits, by the sciences, the arts, by experimental knowledge, business habits, and studies; it is blunted by ignorance, idle habits, inactivity, lust, inexperience, listlessness, and vicious pursuits. Then, besides these influences, there must perhaps[5] be added the supreme powers. Now

[1] Licebit. [2] Fetu.

[3] [Tertullian perhaps mentions this "demus" of Athens as the birthplace of Plato (Oehler).]

[4] [Tit. i. 12.] [5] Si et alia.

these are the supreme powers: according to our [Christian] notions, they are the Lord God and His adversary the devil; but according to men's general opinion about providence, they are fate and necessity; and about fortune, it is man's freedom of will. Even the philosophers allow these distinctions; whilst on our part we have already undertaken to treat of them, on the principles of the [Christian] faith, in a separate work.[1] It is evident how great must be the influences which so variously affect the one nature of the soul, since they are commonly regarded as separate "*natures*." Still they are not different species, but casual incidents of one nature and substance—even of that which God conferred on Adam, and made the mould of all [subsequent ones]. Casual incidents will they always remain, but never will they become specific differences. However great, too, at present is the variety of men's manners, it was not so in Adam, the founder of their race. But all these discordances ought to have existed in him as the fountainhead, and thence to have descended to us in an unimpaired variety, if the variety had been due to nature.

CHAP. XXI.—*Tertullian combats the Valentinian notion of the immutable determination of a man's character by the nature of the seed infused into his soul, and shows that, according as his free-will actuates an individual, so may his character change.*

Now, if the soul possessed this uniform and simple nature from the beginning in Adam, previous to so many mental dispositions [being developed out of it], it is not rendered multiform by such various development, nor by the triple[2] form predicated of it in "*the Valentinian trinity*" (that we may still keep the condemnation of that heresy in view), for not even this nature is discoverable in Adam. What had he that was spiritual? Is it because he prophetically declared

[1] [Tertullian wrote a work *De Fato*, which is lost. Fulgentius, p. 561, gives a quotation from it.]

[2] [*i.e.* the carnal, the animal, and the spiritual. Comp. *Adv. Valentin.* XXV., and *De Resur. Carnis*, lv.]

"the great mystery of Christ and the church?"[1] "This is bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called Woman. Therefore shall a man leave his father and mother, and he shall cleave unto his wife; and they two shall be one flesh."[2] But this [gift of prophecy] only came on him afterwards, when God infused into him the ecstasy, or spiritual quality, in which prophecy consists. If, again, the evil of sin was developed in him, this must not be accounted as a *natural* disposition: it was rather produced by the instigation of the [old] serpent—as far from being incidental to his nature as it was from being *material* in him, for we have already excluded belief in "Matter."[3] Now, if neither the spiritual element, nor what the heretics call the material element, was properly inherent in him (since, if he had been created out of matter, the germ of evil must have been an integral part of his constitution), it remains that the one only original element of his nature was what is called the *animal* [the principle of vitality, the soul], which we maintain to be simple and uniform in its condition. Concerning this, it remains for us to inquire whether, as being called natural, it ought to be deemed subject to change. [The heretics whom we have referred to] deny that nature is susceptible of any change,[4] in order that they may be able to establish and settle their threefold theory, or "trinity," in all its characteristics as to the several natures; because "a good tree cannot produce evil fruit, nor a corrupt tree good fruit; and nobody gathers figs of thorns, nor grapes of brambles."[5] If so, then "God will not be able any longer to raise up from the stones children unto Abraham; nor to make a generation of vipers bring forth fruits of repentance."[6] And if so, the apostle too was in error when he said in his epistle, "Ye were at one time darkness, [but now are ye light in the Lord;]"[7] and, "We also were by nature children of wrath;"[8] and, "Such were some of you,

[1] [Eph. v. 32.]
[2] [Gen. ii. 23, 24.]
[3] [See *Adv. Hermog.* xiii.]
[4] [See *Adv. Valentin.* xxix.]
[5] [Luke vi. 43, 44.]
[6] [Matt. iii. 7–9.]
[7] [Eph. v. 8.]
[8] [Eph. ii. 3.]

but ye are washed."[1] The statements, however, of holy Scripture will never be discordant with truth. A corrupt tree will never yield good fruit, unless the better nature be grafted into it; nor will a good tree produce evil fruit, except by the same process of cultivation. Stones also will become children of Abraham, if educated in Abraham's faith; and a generation of vipers will bring forth the fruits of penitence, if they reject the poison of their malignant nature. This will be the power of the grace of God, more potent indeed than nature, exercising its sway over the faculty that underlies itself within us—even the freedom of our will, which is described as *αὐτεξούσιος* [of independent authority]; and inasmuch as this faculty is itself also natural and mutable, in whatsoever direction it turns, it inclines of its own nature. Now, that there does exist within us naturally this independent authority [*τὸ αὐτεξούσιον*], we have already shown in opposition both to Marcion[2] and to Hermogenes.[3] If, then, the natural condition has to be submitted to a definition, it must be determined to be twofold—there being the category of the born and the unborn, the made and the not-made. Now that which has received its constitution by being made or by being born, is by nature capable of being changed, for it can be both born again and re-made; whereas that which is not-made and unborn will remain for ever immoveable. Since, however, this state is suited to God alone, as the only Being who is unborn and not-made (and therefore immortal and unchangeable), it is absolutely certain that the nature of all other existences which are born and created is subject to modification and change; so that if the threefold state is to be ascribed to the soul, it must be supposed to arise from the mutability of its accidental circumstances, and not from the appointment of nature.

[1] [1 Cor. vi. 11.]

[2] [See our *Anti-Marcion*, ii. 5–7.]

[3] [In his work against this man, entitled *De Censu Animæ*, not now extant.]

CHAP. XXII.—*A recapitulation of what has been advanced on the subject of the soul; its definition.*

Hermogenes has already heard from us what are the other natural faculties of the soul, as well as their vindication and proof; whence it may be seen that the soul is rather the offspring of God than of matter. The names of these faculties shall here be simply repeated, that they may not seem to be forgotten and passed out of sight. We have assigned, then, to the soul both that freedom of the will which we just now mentioned, and its dominion over the works of nature, and its occasional gift of divination, independently of that endowment of prophecy which accrues to it expressly from the grace of God. We shall therefore now quit this subject of the soul's disposition, in order to set out fully in order its various qualities.[1] The soul, then, we define to be sprung from the breath of God, immortal, possessing body, having form, simple in its substance, intelligent in its own nature, developing its powers in various ways, free in its determinations, subject to the changes of accident, in its faculties mutable, rational, supreme, endued with an instinct of presentiment, evolved out of one [archetypal soul]. It remains for us now to consider how it is developed out of this one original source; in other words, whence, and when, and how it is produced.

[1] [Tertullian had shown that "the soul is the breath or *afflatus* of God," in ch. iv. and xi. above. He demonstrated its "*immortality*" in ch. ii.–iv., vi., ix., xiv.; and he will repeat his proof hereafter, in ch. xxiv., xxxviii., xlv., li., liii., liv. Moreover, he illustrates the soul's "*corporeity*" in ch. v.–viii.; its "endowment with *form or figure*," in ch. ix.; its "*simplicity* in substance," in ch. x. and xi.; its "inherent *intelligence*," in ch. xii.; its varied development, in ch. xiii.–xv. The soul's "*rationality*," "*supremacy*," and "instinctive *divination*," Tertullian treated of in his treatise *De Censu Animæ* against Hermogenes (as he has said in the text); but he has treated somewhat of the soul's "rational nature" in the sixteenth chapter above: in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters he referred to the soul's "supremacy or *hegemony*;" whilst we have had a hint about its "*divining* faculty," even in infants, in ch. xix. The propagation of souls from the one archetypal soul is the subject of the chapter before us, as well as of the five succeeding ones (La Cerda).]

CHAP. XXIII.—*The opinions of sundry heretics concerning the* ORIGIN *of the human soul. Tertullian is sorry to say that these opinions originate ultimately from Plato.*

Some suppose that they came down from heaven, with as firm a belief as they are apt to entertain, when they indulge in the prospect of an undoubted return thither. Saturninus, the disciple of Menander, who belonged to Simon's sect, introduced this opinion: he affirmed that man was made by angels. A futile, imperfect creation at first, weak and unable to stand, he crawled upon the ground like a worm, because he wanted the strength to maintain an erect posture; but afterwards having, by the compassion of the Supreme Power (in whose image, which had not been fully understood, he was clumsily formed), obtained a slender spark of life, this roused and righted his imperfect form, and animated it with a higher vitality, and provided for its return, on its relinquishment of life, to its original principle. Carpocrates, indeed, claims for himself so extreme an amount of the supernal qualities, that his disciples set their own souls at once on an equality with Christ (not to mention the apostles); and sometimes, when it suits their fancy, even give them the superiority—deeming them, forsooth, to have partaken of that sublime virtue which looks down upon the principalities that govern this world. Apelles tells us that our souls were enticed by earthly baits down from their supercelestial abodes by a fiery angel, Israel's God and ours, who then enclosed them firmly within our sinful flesh. The hive of Valentinus fortifies the soul with the germ of *Sophia*, or Wisdom; by means of which germ they recognise, in the images of visible objects, the stories and Milesian fables of their own Æons. I am sorry from my heart that Plato has been the caterer to all these heretics. For in the *Phædo* he imagines that souls wander from this world to that, and thence back again hither; whilst in the *Timæus* he supposes that the children of God, to whom had been assigned the production of mortal creatures, having taken for the soul the germ of immortality, congealed around it a mortal body,—thereby indicating that

this world is the figure of some other. Now, to procure belief in all this—that the soul had formerly lived with God in the heavens above, sharing His *ideas* with Him, and afterwards came down to live with us on earth, and whilst here recollects the eternal patterns of things which it had learnt before — he elaborated his new formula, *μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις*, which means that "learning is reminiscence;" implying that the souls which come to us from thence forget the things amongst which they formerly lived, but that they afterwards recall them, instructed by the objects they see around them. Forasmuch, therefore, as the doctrines which the heretics borrow from Plato are cunningly defended by this kind of argument, I shall sufficiently refute the heretics if I overthrow the argument of Plato.

CHAP. XXIV.—*Plato's inconsistency exposed, who, at the very time that he makes the soul self-existent, placing it almost on an equality with God, yet supposes it capable of forgetting what passed in a previous state.*

In the first place, I cannot allow that the soul is capable of a failure of memory; because he has conceded to it so large an amount of divine quality as to put it on a par with God. He makes it *unborn*, which single attribute I might apply as a sufficient attestation of its perfect divinity; he then adds that the soul is immortal, incorruptible, incorporeal —since he believed God to be the same—invisible, incapable of delineation, uniform, supreme, rational, and intellectual. What more could he attribute to the soul, if he wanted to call it God? We, however, who allow no appendage to God [in the sense of equality[1]], by this very fact reckon the soul as very far below God: for we suppose it to be born, and hereby to possess something of a diluted divinity and an attenuated felicity, as the breath [of God], though not His spirit; and although immortal, as this is an attribute of divinity, yet for all that passible, since this is an incident of a born condition, and consequently from the first capable of deviation from perfection and right,[2] and by consequence

[1] Nihil Deo appendimus. [2] Exorbitationis.

susceptible of a failure in memory. This point I have discussed sufficiently with Hermogenes.[1] But it may be further observed, that if the soul is to merit being accounted a god, by reason of all its qualities being equal to the attributes of God, it must then be subject to no passion, and therefore to no loss of memory; for this defect of oblivion is as great an injury to that of which you predicate it, as memory is the glory thereof, which Plato himself deems the very safeguard of the senses and intellectual faculties, and which Cicero has designated the treasury of all the sciences. Now we need not raise the doubt whether so divine a faculty as the soul was capable of losing memory: the question rather is, whether it is able to recover afresh that which it has lost. I could not decide whether that, which ought not to have lost memory, if it once incurred the loss, would be powerful enough to recollect itself. Both alternatives, indeed, will agree very well with my soul, but not with Plato's. In the second place, my objection to him will stand thus: [Plato,] do you endow the soul with a natural competency for understanding those well-known *ideas* of yours? Certainly I do, will be your answer. Well, now, no one will concede to you that the knowledge, [which you say is] the gift of nature, of the natural sciences can fail. But the knowledge of the sciences fails; the knowledge of the various fields of learning and of the arts of life fails; and so perhaps the knowledge of the faculties and affections of our minds fails, although they seem to be inherent in our nature, but really are not so: because, as we have already said,[2] they are affected by accidents of place, of manners and customs, of bodily condition, of the state of a man's health—by the influences of the Supreme Powers, and the changes of man's free-will. Now the instinctive knowledge of natural objects never fails, not even in the brute creation. The lion, no doubt, will forget his ferocity, if surrounded by the softening influence of training; he may become, with his beautiful mane, the plaything of some Queen Berenice, and lick her cheeks with his

[1] [In his, now lost, treatise, *De Censu Animæ.*]

[2] [Above, in ch. xix. xx.]

tongue. A wild beast may lay aside his habits, but his natural instincts will not be forgotten. He will not forget his proper food, nor his natural resources, nor his natural alarms; and should the queen offer him fishes or cakes, he will wish for flesh; and if, when he is ill, any antidote be prepared for him, he will still require the ape; and should no hunting-spear be presented against him, he will yet dread the crow of the cock. In like manner with man, who is perhaps the most forgetful of all creatures, the knowledge of everything natural to him will remain ineradicably fixed in him,—but this alone, as being alone a natural instinct. He will never forget to eat when he is hungry; or to drink when he is thirsty; or to use his eyes when he wants to see; or his ears, to hear; or his nose, to smell; or his mouth, to taste; or his hand, to touch. These are, to be sure, the senses, which philosophy depreciates by her preference for the intellectual faculties. But if the natural knowledge of the sensuous faculties is permanent, how happens it that the knowledge of the intellectual faculties fails, to which the superiority is ascribed? Whence, now, arises that power of forgetfulness itself which precedes recollection? From long lapse of time, he says. But this is a shortsighted answer. Length of time cannot be incidental to that which, according to him, is unborn, and which therefore must be deemed most certainly eternal. For that which is eternal, on the ground of its being unborn, since it admits neither of beginning nor end of time, is subject to no *temporal* criterion. And that which time does not measure, undergoes no change in consequence of time; nor is long lapse of time at all influential over it. If time is a cause of oblivion, why, from the time of the soul's entrance into the body, does memory fail, as if thenceforth the soul were to be affected by time? for the soul, being undoubtedly prior to the body, was of course not irrespective of time. Is it, indeed, immediately on the soul's entrance into the body that oblivion takes place, or some time afterwards? If immediately, where will be the long lapse of the time which is as yet inadmissible in

the hypothesis?[1] Take, for instance, the case of the infant. If some time afterwards, will not the soul, during the interval previous to the moment of oblivion, still exercise its powers of memory? And how comes it to pass that the soul subsequently forgets, and then afterwards again remembers? How long, too, must the lapse of the time be regarded as having been, during which the oblivion oppressed the soul? The whole course of one's life, I apprehend, will be insufficient to efface the memory of an age which endured so long before the soul's assumption of the body. But then, again, Plato throws the blame upon the body, as if it were at all credible that a born substance could extinguish the power of one that is unborn. There exist, however, among bodies a great many differences, by reason of their rationality, their bulk, their condition, their age, and their health. Will there then be supposed to exist similar differences in obliviousness? Oblivion, however, is uniform and identical. Therefore bodily peculiarity, with its manifold varieties, will not become the cause of an effect which is an invariable one. There are likewise, according to Plato's own testimony, many proofs to show that the soul has a divining faculty, as we have already advanced against Hermogenes. But there is not a man living, who does not himself feel his soul possessed with a presage and augury of some omen, danger, or joy. Now, if the body is not prejudicial to divination, it will not, I suppose, be injurious to memory. One thing is certain, that souls in the same body both forget and remember. If any corporeal condition engenders forgetfulness, how will it admit the opposite state of recollection? Because recollection, after forgetfulness, is actually the resurrection of the memory. Now, how should not that which is hostile to the memory at first, be also prejudicial to it in the second instance? Lastly, who have better memories than little children, with their fresh, unworn souls, not yet immersed in domestic and public cares, but devoted only to those studies the acquirement of which is itself a reminiscence? Why, indeed, do we not all of us recollect in an equal degree, since we are equal in our

[1] [Or, "which has been too short for calculation."]

forgetfulness? But this is true only of philosophers! But not even of the whole of them. Amongst so many nations, in so great a crowd of sages, Plato, to be sure, is the only man who has combined the oblivion and the recollection of ideas. Now, since this main argument of his by no means keeps its ground, it follows that its entire superstructure must fall with it,—namely, that souls are supposed to be unborn, and to live in the heavenly regions, and to be instructed in the divine mysteries thereof; moreover, that they descend to this earth, and here recall to memory their previous existence, for the purpose, of course, of supplying to our heretics the fitting materials for their systems.

CHAP. XXV.—*Tertullian refutes, by an elaborate description of the physiology of pregnancy, the notion that the soul is introduced into the human subject with its earliest breath after birth.*

I shall now return to the cause of this digression, in order that I may explain how all souls are derived from one, when and where and in what manner they are produced. Now, touching this subject, it matters not whether the question be started by the philosopher, by the heretic, or by the crowd. Those who profess the truth care nothing about their opponents, especially such of them as begin by maintaining that the soul is not conceived in the womb, nor is formed and produced at the time that the flesh is moulded, but is impressed from without upon the infant before his complete vitality, but after the process of parturition. They say, moreover, that the human seed having been duly deposited *ex concubiter* in the womb, and having been by natural impulse quickened, it becomes condensed into the mere substance of the flesh, which is in due time born, warm from the furnace of the womb, and then released from its heat. [This flesh] resembles the case of hot iron, which is in that state plunged into cold water; for, being smitten by the cold air [into which it is born], it at once receives the power of animation, and utters vocal sound. This view is entertained by the Stoics, along with Ænesidemus, and occasion-

ally by Plato himself, when he tells us that the soul, being quite a separate formation, originating elsewhere and externally to the womb, is inhaled[1] when the new-born infant first draws breath, and by and by exhaled[2] with the man's latest breath. We shall see whether this view of his is merely fictitious. Even the medical profession has not lacked its Hicesius, to prove a traitor both to nature and his own calling. These gentlemen, I suppose, were too modest to come to terms with women on the mysteries of childbirth, so well known to the latter! But how much more is there for them to blush at, when in the end they have the women to refute them, instead of commending them! Now, in such a question as this, no one can be so useful a teacher, judge, or witness, as the sex itself which is so intimately concerned. Give us your testimony, then, ye mothers, whether yet pregnant, or after delivery (let barren women and men keep silence), —the truth of your own nature is in question, the reality of your own suffering is the point to be decided. [Tell us, then,] whether you feel in the embryo within you any vital force[3] other than your own, with which your bowels tremble, your sides shake, your entire womb throbs, and the burden which oppresses you constantly changes its position? Are these movements a joy to you, and a positive removal of anxiety, as making you confident that your infant both possesses vitality and enjoys it? Or, should his restlessness cease, your first fear would be for him; and he would be aware of it within you, since he is disturbed at the novel sound; and you would crave for injurious diet,[4] or would even loathe your food—all on his account; and then you and he, [in the closeness of your sympathy,] would share together your common ailments—so far that with your contusions and bruises would he actually become marked,—whilst within you, and even on the selfsame parts of the body, taking to himself thus peremptorily[5] the injuries of his mother! Now, whenever a livid hue and redness are incidents of the blood, the blood will not be without the vital principle,[6] or soul; or when

[1] ["Inhaled" is Bp. Kaye's word for *adduci*, "taken up."]
[2] Educi. [3] Vivacitas. [4] Ciborum vanitates. [5] Rapiens. [6] Anima.

disease attacks the soul or vitality, [it becomes a proof of its real existence, since] there is no disease where there is no soul or principle of life. Again, inasmuch as sustenance by food, and the want thereof, growth and decay, fear and motion, are conditions of the soul or life, he who experiences them must be alive. And, so, he at last ceases to live, who ceases to experience them. And thus by and by infants are still-born; but how so, unless they had had life? For how could any die, who had not previously lived? But sometimes by a cruel necessity, whilst yet in the womb, an infant is put to death, when lying awry in the orifice of the womb he impedes parturition; and kills his mother, if he is not to die himself. Accordingly, among surgeons' tools there is a certain instrument, which is formed with a nicely-adjusted flexible frame for opening the *uterus* first of all, and keeping it open; it is further furnished with an annular blade,[1] by means of which the limbs within the womb are dissected with anxious but unfaltering care; its last appendage being a blunted or covered hook, wherewith the entire *fœtus* is extracted[2] by a violent delivery. There is also [another instrument in the shape of] a copper needle or spike, by which the actual death is managed in this furtive robbery of life: they give it, from its infanticide function, the name of ἐμβρυοσφάκτης, the slayer of the infant (which was of course alive). Such apparatus was possessed both by Hippocrates, and Asclepiades, and Erasistratus, and Herophilus, that dissector of even adults, and the milder Soranus himself, who all knew well enough that a living being had been conceived, and pitied this most luckless infant state, which had first to be put to death, to escape being tortured alive! Of the necessity of such harsh treatment I have no doubt even Hicesius was convinced, although he imported their soul into infants after birth from the stroke of the frigid air, because the very term for soul, forsooth, in Greek answered to such a refrigeration![3] Well, then, have the barbarian and Roman

[1] Anulocultro.

[2] [Or, "the whole business (totum facinus) is despatched."]

[3] [So Plato, *Cratylus*, p. 399, c. 17.]

nations received souls by some other process, [I wonder;] for they have called the soul by another name than ψυχή? How many nations are there who commence life[1] under the broiling sun of the torrid zone, scorching their skin into its swarthy hue? Whence do they get their souls, with no frosty air to help them? I say not a word of those well-warmed bed-rooms, and all that apparatus of heat which ladies in childbirth so greatly need, when a breath of cold air might endanger their life. But in the very bath almost a babe will slip into life, and at once his cry is heard! If, however, a good frosty air is to the soul so indispensable a treasure, then beyond the German and the Scythian tribes, and the Alpine and the Argæan heights, nobody ought ever to be born! But the fact really is, that population is greater within the temperate regions of the East and the West, and men's minds are sharper; whilst there is not a Sarmatian whose wits are not dull and humdrum. The minds of men, too, would grow keener by reason of the cold, if their souls came into being amidst nipping frosts; for as the substance is, so must be its active power. Now, after these preliminary statements, we may also refer to the case of those who, having been cut out of their mother's womb, have breathed and retained life—your Bacchuses[2] and Scipios.[3] If, however, there be any one who, like Plato,[4] supposes that two souls cannot, more than two bodies could, co-exist in the same individual, I, on the contrary, could show him not merely the co-existence of two souls in one person, as also of two bodies in the same womb, but likewise the combination of many other things in natural connection with the soul —for instance, of demoniacal possession; and *that* not of one only, as in the case of Socrates' own demon; but of seven spirits, as in the case of the Magdalene;[5] and of a legion in number, as in the Gadarene.[6] Now one soul is naturally more susceptible of conjunction with another soul, by reason of the identity of their substance, than an evil spirit is, owing

[1] Censentur.
[2] Liberi aliqui.
[3] [See Pliny, *H. N.* vii. 9.]
[4] [See above, ch. x.]
[5] [Mark xvi. 9.]
[6] [Mark vi. 1-9.]

to their diverse natures. But when the same philosopher, in the sixth book of *The Laws*, warns us to beware lest a vitiation of seed should infuse a soil into both body and soul from an illicit or debased concubinage, I hardly know whether he is more inconsistent with himself in respect of one of his previous statements, or of that which he had just made. For he here shows us that the soul proceeds from human seed (and warns us to be on our guard about it), not, [as he had said before,] from the first breath of the new-born child. Pray, whence comes it that from similarity of soul we resemble our parents in disposition, according to the testimony of Cleanthes,[1] if we are not produced from this seed of the soul? Why, too, used the old astrologers to cast a man's nativity from his first conception, if his soul also draws not its origin from that moment? To this [nativity] likewise belongs the inbreathing of the soul, whatever that is.

CHAP. XXVI.—*Scripture, which alone offers clear knowledge on the questions of the philosophers, is opposed in its facts and suggestions to the theories which we have been controverting.*

Now there is no end to the uncertainty and irregularity of human opinion, until we come to the limits which God has prescribed. I shall at last retire within our own lines and firmly hold my ground there, for the purpose of proving to the Christian [the soundness of] my answers to the Philosophers and the Physicians. Brother [in Christ], on your own foundation[2] build up your faith. Consider the wombs of the most sainted women instinct with the life within them, and their babes which not only breathed therein, but were even endowed with prophetic intuition. See how the bowels of Rebecca are disquieted,[3] though her child-bearing is as yet remote, and there is no impulse of [vital] air. Behold, a twin offspring chafes within the mother's womb, although she has no sign as yet of the twofold nation. Possibly we might have regarded as a prodigy the contention

[1] [See above, ch. v.]

[2] [Of the Scriptures.]

[3] [Gen. xxv. 22, 23.]

of this infant progeny, which struggled before it lived, which had animosity previous to animation, if it had simply disturbed the mother by its restlessness within her. But when her womb opens, and the number of her offspring is seen, and their presaged condition known, we have presented to us a proof not merely of the [separate] souls of the infants, but of their hostile struggles too. He who was the first to be born was threatened with detention by him who was anticipated in birth, who was not yet fully brought forth, but whose hand only had been born. Now if he actually imbibed life, and received his soul, in Platonic style, at his first breath; or else, after the Stoic rule, had the earliest taste of animation on touching the frosty air; what was the other about, who was so eagerly looked for, who was still detained within the womb, and was trying to detain [the other] outside? I suppose he had not yet breathed when he seized his brother's heel;[1] and was still warm with his mother's warmth, when he so strongly wished to be the first to quit the womb. What an infant! so emulous, so strong, and already so contentious; and all this, I suppose, because even now full of life! Consider, again, those extraordinary conceptions, which were more wonderful still, of the barren woman and the virgin: these women would only be able to produce imperfect offspring against the course of nature, from the very fact that one of them was too old to bear seed, and the other was pure from the contact of man. If there was to be bearing at all in the case, it was only fitting that they should be born without a soul, [as the philosopher would say,] who had been irregularly conceived. However, even these have life, each of them in his mother's womb. Elizabeth exults with joy, [for] John had leaped in her womb;[2] Mary magnifies the Lord, [for] Christ had instigated her within.[3] The mothers recognise each their own offspring, being moreover each recognised by their infants, which were therefore of course alive, and were not souls merely, but spirits also. Accordingly you read the word of God which was spoken to Jeremiah, "Before I formed thee in the belly,

[1] [Gen. xxv. 26.] [2] [Luke i. 41–45.] [3] [Luke i. 46.]

I knew thee."[1] Since God forms us in the womb, He also breathes upon us, as He also did at the first creation, when "the Lord God formed man, and breathed into him the breath of life."[2] Nor could God have known man in the womb, except in his entire nature: "And before thou camest forth out of the womb, I sanctified thee."[3] Well, was it then a dead body at that early stage? Certainly not. For "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living."

CHAP. XXVII.—*Both soul and body are conceived, and formed, and perfected, in their elemental substance simultaneously.*

How, then, is a living being conceived? Is the substance of both body and soul formed together at one and the same time? Or does one of them precede the other in natural formation? We indeed maintain that both are conceived, and formed, and perfected simultaneously, as well as born together; and that not a moment's interval occurs in their conception, so that a prior place can be assigned to either.[4] Judge, in fact, of the incidents of man's earliest existence by those which occur to him at the very last. As death is defined to be nothing else than the separation of body and soul,[5] life, which is the opposite of death, is susceptible of no other definition than the conjunction of body and soul. If the severance happens at one and the same time to both substances by means of death, so the law of their combination ought to assure us that it occurs simultaneously to the two substances by means of life. Now we allow that life begins with conception, because we contend that the soul also begins from conception; life taking its commencement at the same moment and place that the soul does. Thus, then, the processes which act together to produce separation by death, also combine in a simultaneous action to produce life. If we assign priority to [the formation of] one of the natures, and a subsequent time to the other, we shall have further to determine the precise times of the semination, according to the condition and rank of each. And that being so, what

[1] [Jer. i. 5.] [2] [Gen. ii. 7.] [3] [Jer. i. 5.]
[4] [Comp. *De Resurr. Carnis*, xlv.] [5] [So Plato, *Phædo*, p. 64.]

time shall we give to the seed of the body, and what to the seed of the soul? Besides, if different periods are to be assigned to the seminations then arising out of this difference in time, we shall also have different substances.[1] For although we shall allow that there are two kinds of seed—that of the body and that of the soul—we still declare that they are inseparable, and therefore contemporaneous and simultaneous in origin. Now let no one take offence or feel ashamed at an interpretation of the processes of nature which is rendered necessary [by the defence of the truth]. Nature should be to us an object of reverence, not of blushes. It is lust, not natural usage, which has brought shame on the intercourse of the sexes. It is the excess, not the normal state, which is immodest and unchaste: the normal condition has received a blessing from God, and is blest by Him: "Be fruitful, and multiply, [and replenish the earth.]"[2] Excess, however, has He cursed, in adulteries, and wantonness, and chambering.[3] Well, now, in this usual function of the sexes which brings together the male and the female in their common intercourse, we know that both the soul and the flesh discharge a duty together: the soul supplies desire, the flesh contributes the gratification of it; the soul furnishes the instigation, the flesh affords the realization. The entire man being excited by the one effort of both natures, his seminal substance is discharged, deriving its fluidity from the body, and its warmth from the soul. Now if *the soul* in Greek is a word which is synonymous with *cold*,[4] how does it come to pass that the body grows cold after the soul has quitted it? Indeed (if I run the risk of offending modesty even, in my desire to prove the truth), I cannot help asking, whether we do not, in that very heat of extreme gratification when the generative fluid is ejected, feel that somewhat of our soul has gone from us? And do we not experience a faintness and prostration along with a dimness of sight? This, then, must be the soul-producing seed, which arises at once from the out-drip of the soul, just as that fluid is the body-pro-

[1] Materiæ.
[2] [Gen. i. 28.]
[3] Lupanaria.
[4] [See above, c. xxv.]

ducing seed which proceeds from the drainage of the flesh. Most true are the examples of the first creation. Adam's flesh was formed of clay. Now what is clay but an excellent moisture, whence should spring the generating fluid? From the breath of God first came the soul. But what else is the breath of God than the vapour of the spirit, whence should spring that which we breathe out through the generative fluid? Forasmuch, therefore, as these two different and separate substances, the clay and the breath, combined at the first creation in forming the individual man, they then both amalgamated and mixed their proper seminal rudiments in one, and ever afterwards communicated to the human race the normal mode of its propagation, so that even now the two substances, although diverse from each other, flow forth simultaneously in a united channel; and finding their way together into their appointed seed-plot, they fertilize with their combined vigour the human fruit out of their respective natures. And inherent in this human product is his own seed, according to the process which has been ordained for every creature endowed with the functions of generation. Accordingly from the one [primeval] man comes the entire outflow and redundance of men's souls—nature proving herself true to the commandment of God, "Be fruitful, and multiply."[1] For in the very preamble of this one production, "Let us make man,"[2] man's whole posterity was declared and described in a plural phrase, "Let *them* have dominion over the fish of the sea," etc.[3] And no wonder: in the seed lies the promise and earnest of the crop.

Chap. xxviii.—*The Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls sketched and censured.*

What, then, by this time means that ancient saying, mentioned by Plato,[4] concerning the reciprocal migration of souls; how they remove hence and go thither, and then return hither and pass through life, and then again depart from this life, and afterwards become alive from the dead? Some will have it that this is a saying of Pythagoras;

[1] [Gen. i. 28.] [2] [Ver. 26.] [3] [Ver. 26.] [4] [*Phædo*, p. 70.]

Albinus[1] supposes it to be a divine announcement, perhaps of the Egyptian Mercury. But there is no divine saying, except of the one true God, by whom the prophets, and the apostles, and Christ Himself declared their grand message. More ancient than Saturn a good deal (by some 900 years or so), and even than his grandchildren, is Moses; and he is certainly much more divine, recounting and tracing out, as he does, the course of the human race from the very beginning of the world, indicating the several births [of the fathers of mankind] according to their names and their epochs; giving thus plain proof of the divine character of his work, from its divine authority and word. If, indeed, the sophist of Samos is Plato's authority for the eternally revolving migration of souls out of a constant alternation of the dead and the living states, then no doubt did the famous Pythagoras, however excellent in other respects, for the purpose of fabricating such an opinion as this, rely on a falsehood, which was not only shameful, but also hazardous. Consider it, you that are ignorant of it, and believe with us. He feigns death, he conceals himself underground, he condemns himself to that endurance for some seven years, during which he learns from his mother, who was his sole accomplice and attendant, what he was to relate for the belief of the world concerning those who had died since his seclusion;[2] and when he thought that he had succeeded in reducing the frame of his body to the horrid appearance of a dead old man, he comes forth from the place of his concealment and deceit, and pretends to have returned from the dead. Who would hesitate about believing that the man, whom he had supposed to have died, was come back again to life? especially after hearing from him facts about the recently dead,[2] which he evidently could only have discovered in Hades itself! Thus, that men are made alive after death, is rather an old statement. But what if it be rather a recent one also? The truth does not desire antiquity, nor does falsehood shun novelty. This notable saying I hold to be plainly false, though ennobled by antiquity.

[1] [A Platonic philosopher.]

[2] De posteris defunctis.

How should that not be false, which depends for its evidence on a falsehood? How can I help believing Pythagoras to be a deceiver, who practises deceit to win my belief? How will he convince me that, before he was Pythagoras, he had been Æthalides, and Euphorbus, and the fisherman Pyrrhus, and Hermotimus, to make us believe that men live again after they have died, when he actually perjured himself afterwards as Pythagoras? In proportion as it would be easier for me to believe that he had returned once to life in his own person, than so often in the person of this man and that, in the same degree has he deceived me in things which are too hard to be credited, because he has played the impostor in matters which might be readily believed. Well, but he recognised the shield of Euphorbus, which had been formerly consecrated at Delphi, and claimed it as his own, and proved his claim by signs which were generally unknown. Now, look again at his subterranean lurking-place, and believe his story, if you can. For, as to the man who devised such a tricksty scheme, to the injury of his health, fraudulently wasting his life, and torturing it for seven years underground, amidst hunger, idleness, and darkness—with a profound disgust for the mighty sky—what reckless effort would he not make, what curious contrivance would he not attempt, to arrive at the discovery of this famous shield? Suppose now, that he found it in some of those hidden researches; suppose that he recovered some slight breath of report which survived the now obsolete tradition; suppose him to have come to the knowledge of it by an inspection which he had bribed the beadle to let him have,—we know very well what are the resources of magic skill for exploring hidden secrets: there are the *catabolic* spirits, which floor their victims;[1] and the *paredral* spirits, which are ever at their side[2] to haunt them; and the *pythonic* spirits, which entrance them by their divination and ventriloquistic[3] arts. For was

[1] [From καταβάλλειν, to knock down.]

[2] [From πάρεδος, sitting by one.]

[3] [From πυθωνικός, an attribute of *Pythius* Apollo; this class were sometimes called ἐγγαστρίμυθοι, ventriloquists.]

it not likely that Pherecydes also, the master of our Pythagoras, used to divine, or I would rather say rave and dream, by such arts and contrivances as these? Might not the self-same demon have been in him, who, whilst in Euphorbus, transacted deeds of blood? But lastly, why is it that the man, who proved himself to have been Euphorbus by the evidence of the shield, did not also recognise any of his former Trojan comrades? For they, too, must by this time have recovered life, since men were rising again from the dead.

CHAP. XXIX.—*The Pythagorean doctrine rebutted on the ground of its own first principle, that living men are formed from dead ones.*

It is, indeed, manifest that dead men are formed from living ones; but it does not follow from that, that living men are formed from dead ones. For from the beginning the living came first in the order of things, and therefore also from the beginning the dead came afterwards in order. But these proceeded from no other source except from the living. The living had their origin in any other source [you please] than in the dead; whilst the dead had no source whence to derive their beginning, except from the living. If, then, from the very first the living came not from the dead, why should they afterwards [be said to] come from the dead? Had that original source, whatever it was, come to an end? Was the form or law thereof a matter for regret? Then why was it preserved in the case of the dead? Does it not follow that, because the dead came from the living at the first, therefore they always came from the living? For either the law which obtained at the beginning must have continued in both of its relations, or else it must have changed in both; so that, if it had become necessary for the living afterwards to proceed from the dead, it would be necessary, in like manner, for the dead also not to proceed from the living. For if a faithful adherence to the institution was not meant to be perpetuated in each respect, then contraries cannot in due alternation continue to be re-formed from contraries. We, too, will on our side adduce against you certain

contraries, of the born and the unborn, of vision [1] and blindness, of youth and old age, of wisdom and folly. Now it does not follow that the unborn proceeds from the born, on the ground that a contrary issues from a contrary; nor, again, that vision proceeds from blindness, because blindness happens to vision; nor, again, that youth revives from old age, because after youth comes the decrepitude of senility; nor that folly [2] is born with its obtuseness from wisdom, because wisdom may possibly be sometimes sharpened out of folly. Albinus has some fears for his [master and friend] Plato in these points, and labours with much ingenuity to distinguish different kinds of contraries; as if these instances did not as absolutely partake of the nature of contrariety as those which are expounded by him to illustrate his great master's principle—I mean, life and death. Nor is it, for the matter of that, true that life is restored out of death, because it happens that death succeeds [3] life.

CHAP. XXX.—*Further refutation of the Pythagorean theory; an interesting picture of the state of contemporary civilisation.*

But what must we say in reply to what follows? For, in the first place, if the living come from the dead, just as the dead proceed from the living, then there must always remain unchanged one and the selfsame number of mankind, even the number which originally introduced [human] life. The living preceded the dead, afterwards the dead issued from the living, and then again the living from the dead. Now, since this process was evermore going on with the same persons, therefore they, issuing from the same, must always have remained in number the same. For they who emerged [into life] could never have become more nor fewer than they who disappeared [in death]. We find, however,

[1] Visualitatis.

[2] Insipientiam. ["Imbecility" is the meaning here, though the word takes the more general sense in the next clause.]

[3] Deferatur.

in the records of the Antiquities of Man,[1] that the human race has progressed with a gradual growth of population, either occupying different portions of the earth as aborigines, or as nomade tribes, or as exiles, or as conquerors—as the Scythians in Parthia, the Temenidæ in Peloponnesus, the Athenians in Asia, the Phrygians in Italy, and the Phœnicians in Africa; or by the more ordinary methods of emigration, which they call *ἀποικίαι* or *colonies*, for the purpose of throwing off redundant population, disgorging into other abodes their overcrowded masses. The aborigines remain still in their old settlements, and have also enriched other districts with loans of even larger populations. Surely it is obvious enough, if one looks at the whole world, that it is becoming daily better cultivated and more fully peopled than anciently. All places are now accessible, all are well known, all open to commerce; most pleasant farms have obliterated all traces of what were once dreary and dangerous wastes; cultivated fields have subdued forests; flocks and herds have expelled wild beasts; sandy deserts are sown; rocks are planted; marshes are drained; and where once were hardly solitary cottages, there are now large cities. No longer are [savage] islands dreaded, nor their rocky shores feared; everywhere are houses, and inhabitants, and settled government, and civilised life. What most frequently meets our view [and occasions complaint], is our teeming population: our numbers are burdensome to the world, which can hardly supply us from its natural elements; our wants grow more and more keen, and our complaints more bitter in all mouths, whilst Nature fails in affording us her usual sustenance. In very deed, pestilence, and famine, and wars, and earthquakes have to be regarded as a remedy for nations, as the means of pruning the luxuriance of the human race; and yet, when the hatchet has once felled large masses of men, the world has hitherto never once been alarmed at the sight of a restitution of its dead coming back to life after their millennial exile.[2] But such

[1] [A probable allusion to Varro's work, *De Antiqq. Rerum Humanarum.*]

[2] [An allusion to Plato's notion that, at the end of a thousand years,

a spectacle would have become quite obvious by the balance of mortal loss and vital recovery, if it were true that the dead came back again to life. Why, however, is it after a thousand years, and not at the moment, that this return from death is to take place, when, supposing that the loss is not at once supplied, there must be a risk of an utter extinction, as the failure precedes the compensation? Indeed, this furlough of our present life would be quite disproportioned to the period of a thousand years; so much briefer is it, and on that account so much more easily is its torch extinguished than rekindled. Inasmuch, then, as the period which, on the hypothesis we have discussed, ought to intervene, if the living are to be formed from the dead, has not actually occurred, it will follow that we must not believe that men come back to life from the dead [in the way surmised in this philosophy].

CHAP. XXXI.—*Further exposure of the transmigration theory; inextricable embarrassments incidental to it.*

Again, if this recovery of life from the dead take place at all, individuals must of course resume their own individuality. Therefore the souls which animated each several body must needs have returned separately to their several bodies. Now, whenever two, or three, or five souls are re-enclosed (as they constantly are) in one womb, it will not amount in such cases to life from the dead, because there is not the separate restitution which individuals ought to have; although at this rate, [no doubt,] the law of the primeval creation is signally kept,[1] by the production still of several souls out of only one! Then, again, if souls depart at different ages of human life, how is it that they come back again at one uniform age? For all men are imbued with an *infant* soul at their birth. But how happens it that a man who dies in old age returns to life as

such a restoration of the dead took place. See his *Phædrus*, p. 248, and *De Republ.* x. p. 614.]

[1] Signatur. [Rigaltius reads "singulatur," after the *Codex Agobard.*, as meaning, "The *single* origin of the human race is in principle maintained," etc.]

an infant? If the soul, whilst disembodied, decreases thus by retrogression of its age, how much more reasonable would it be, that it should resume its life with a richer progress in all attainments of life after the lapse of a thousand years! At all events, it should return with the age it had attained at its death, that it might resume the precise life which it had relinquished. But even if, at this rate, they should reappear the same evermore in their revolving cycles, it would be proper for them to bring back with them, if not the self-same forms of body, at least their original peculiarities of character, taste, and disposition, because it would be hardly possible [1] for them to be regarded as the same, if they were deficient in those characteristics by means of which their identity should be proved. [You, however, meet me with this question]: How can you possibly know, you ask, whether all is not a secret process? may not the work of a thousand years take from you the power of recognition, since they return unknown to you? But I am quite certain that such is not the case, for you yourself present Pythagoras to me as [the restored] Euphorbus. Now look at Euphorbus: he was evidently possessed of a military and warlike soul, as is proved by the very renown of the sacred shields. As for Pythagoras, however, he was such a recluse, and so unwarlike, that he shrank from the military exploits of which Greece was then so full, and preferred to devote himself, in the quiet retreat of Italy, to the study of geometry, and astrology, and music — the very opposite to Euphorbus in taste and disposition. Then, again, the Pyrrhus [whom he represented] spent his time in catching fish; but Pythagoras, on the contrary, would never touch fish, abstaining from even the taste of them as from animal food. Moreover, Æthalides and Hermotimus had included the bean amongst the common esculents at meals, while Pythagoras taught his disciples not even to pass through a plot which was cultivated with beans. I ask, then, how the same souls are resumed, which can offer no proof of their identity, either by their disposition, or habits, or living? And now, after all, [we find that] only four souls

[1] Temere.

are mentioned as recovering life[1] out of all the multitudes of Greece. But limiting ourselves merely to Greece, as if no transmigrations of souls and resumptions of bodies occurred, and *that* every day, in every nation, and amongst all ages, ranks, and sexes, how is it that Pythagoras alone experiences these changes into one personality and another? Why should not I too undergo them? Or if it be a privilege monopolized by philosophers—and Greek philosophers only, as if Scythians and Indians had no philosophers—how is it that Epicurus had no recollection that he had been once another man, nor Chrysippus, nor Zeno, nor indeed Plato himself, whom we might perhaps have supposed to have been Nestor, from his honeyed eloquence?

CHAP. XXXII.—*Empedocles increased the absurdity of Pythagoras'* METEMPSYCHOSIS, *by developing the* METENSOMATOSIS, *or posthumous change of men into various animals.*

But the fact is, Empedocles, who used to dream that he was a god, and on that account, I suppose, disdained to have it thought that he had ever before been merely some hero, declares in so many words: "I once was Thamnus, and a fish." Why not rather a melon, seeing that he was such a fool; or a cameleon, for his inflated brag? It was, no doubt, as a fish [and a queer one too!] that he escaped the corruption of some obscure grave, when he preferred being roasted by a plunge into Ætna; after which accomplishment there was an end for ever to his μετενσωμάτωσις, or putting himself into another body—[fit only now for] a light dish after the roast-meat. At this point, therefore, we must likewise contend against that still more monstrous presumption, that in the course of the transmigration beasts pass from human beings, and human beings from beasts. Let [Empedocles'] Thamnuses alone. Our slight notice of them in passing will be quite enough: [to dwell on them longer will inconvenience us,] lest we should be obliged to have recourse to raillery and laughter instead of serious instruction.

[1] Recensentur.

Now our position is this: that the human soul cannot by any means at all be transferred to beasts, even when they are supposed to originate, according to the philosophers, out of the substances of the elements. Now let us suppose that the soul is either fire, or water, or blood, or spirit, or air, or light; we must not forget that all the animals in their several kinds have properties which are opposed to the respective elements. There are the cold animals which are opposed to fire—water-snakes, lizards, salamanders, and what things soever are produced out of the rival element of water. In like manner, those creatures are opposite to water which are in their nature dry and sapless; indeed, locusts, butterflies, and chameleons rejoice in droughts. So, again, such creatures are opposed to blood which have none of its purple hue, such as snails, worms, and most of the fishy tribes. Then opposed to spirit are those creatures which seem to have no respiration, being unfurnished with lungs and windpipes, such as gnats, ants, moths, and minute things of this sort. Opposed, moreover, to air are those creatures which always live under ground and under water, and never imbibe air — things of which you are more acquainted with the existence than with the names. Then opposed to light are those things which are either wholly blind, or possess eyes for the darkness only, such as moles, bats, and owls. These examples [have I adduced], that I might illustrate my subject from clear and palpable natures. But even if I could take in my hand the "atoms" of Epicurus, or if my eye could see the "numbers" of Pythagoras, or if my foot could stumble against the "ideas" of Plato, or if I could lay hold of the "entelechies" of Aristotle, the chances would be, that even in these [impalpable] classes I should find such animals as I must oppose to one another on the ground of their contrariety. For I maintain that, of whichsoever of the beforementioned natures the human soul is composed, it would not have been possible for it to pass for new forms into animals so contrary to each of the separate natures, and to bestow an origin by its passage on those beings, from which it would have to be excluded and rejected rather than to be admitted

and received, by reason of that original contrariety which we have supposed it to possess,[1] and which commits the bodily substance receiving it to an interminable strife; and then again by reason of the subsequent contrariety, which results from the development inseparable from each several nature. Now it is on quite different conditions[2] that the soul of man has had assigned to it [in individual bodies[3]] its abode, and aliment, and order, and sensation, and affection, and sexual intercourse, and procreation of children; also [on different conditions has it, in individual bodies, received especial] dispositions, as well as duties to fulfil, likings, dislikes, vices, desires, pleasures, maladies, remedies—in short, its own modes of living, its own outlets of death. How, then, shall that [human] soul which cleaves to the earth, and is unable without alarm to survey any great height, or any considerable depth, and which is also fatigued if it mounts many steps, and is suffocated if it is submerged in a fish-pond,—[how, I say, shall a soul which is beset with such weaknesses] mount up at some future stage into the air in an eagle, or plunge into the sea in an eel? How, again, shall it, after being nourished with generous and delicate as well as exquisite viands, feed deliberately on, I will not say husks, but even on thorns, and the wild fare of bitter leaves, and beasts of the dung-hill, and poisonous worms, if it has to migrate into a goat or into a quail? — nay, it may be, feed on carrion, even on human corpses in some bear or lion? But how indeed [shall it stoop to this], when it remembers its own [nature and dignity]? In the same way, you may submit all other instances to this criterion of incongruity, and so save us from lingering over the distinct consideration of each of them in turn. Now, whatever may be the measure and whatever the mode of the human soul, [the question is forced upon us,] what it will do in far larger animals, or in very diminutive ones? It must needs be, that every individual body of whatever size is filled up by the soul, and that the

[1] Hujus. [2] Alias.

[3] [This is the force of the objective nouns, which are all put in the *plural* form.]

soul is entirely covered by the body. How, therefore, shall a man's soul fill an elephant? How, likewise, shall it be contracted within a gnat? If it be so enormously extended or contracted, it will no doubt be exposed to peril. And this induces me to ask another question: If the soul is by no means capable of this kind of migration into animals, which are not fitted for its reception, either by the habits of their bodies or the other laws of their being, will it then undergo a change according to the properties of various animals, and be adapted to their life, notwithstanding its contrariety to human life—having, in fact, become contrary to its human self by reason of its utter change? Now the truth is, if it undergoes such a transformation, and loses what it once was, the human soul will not be what it was; and if it ceases to be its former self, the *metensomatosis*, or adaptation of some other body, comes to nought, and is not of course to be ascribed to the soul which will cease to exist, on the supposition of its complete change. For only then can a soul be said to experience this process of the *metensomatosis*, when it undergoes it by remaining unchanged in its own [primitive] condition. Since, therefore, the soul does not admit of change, lest it should cease to retain its identity; and yet is unable to remain unchanged in its original state, because it fails then to receive contrary [bodies],—I still want to know some credible reason to justify such a transformation as we are discussing. For although some men are compared to the beasts because of their character, disposition, and pursuits (since even God says, "Man is like the beasts that perish"[1]), it does not on this account follow that rapacious persons become kites, lewd persons dogs, ill-tempered ones panthers, good men sheep, talkative ones swallows, and chaste men doves, as if the selfsame substance of the soul everywhere repeated its own nature in the properties of the animals [into which it passed]. Besides, a substance is one thing, and the nature of that substance is another thing; inasmuch as the substance is the special property of one given thing, whereas the nature thereof may possibly belong to

[1] [Ps. xlix. 20.]

many things. Take an example or two. A stone or a piece of iron is the substance: the hardness of the stone and the iron is the nature of the substance. Their hardness combines objects by a common quality; their substances keep them separate. Then, again, there is softness in wool, and softness in a feather: their natural qualities are alike, [and put them on a par;] their substantial qualities are not alike, [and keep them distinct.] Thus, if a man likewise be designated a wild beast or a harmless one, there is not for all that an identity of soul. Now the similarity of nature is even then observed, when dissimilarity of substance is most conspicuous: for, by the very fact of your judging that a man resembles a beast, you confess that their soul is not identical; for you say that they *resemble* each other, not that they are the *same*. This is also the meaning of the word of God [which we have just quoted]: it likens man to the beasts in nature, but not in substance. Besides, God would not have actually made such a remark as this concerning man, if He had known him to be in substance only bestial.

CHAP. XXXIII.—*The pretence of* A JUDICIAL RETRIBUTION *in this migration of human souls into various animals refuted with clever and amusing raillery.*

Forasmuch as this doctrine is vindicated even on the principle of judicial retribution, on the pretence that the souls of men obtain as their partners the kind of animals which are suited to their life and deserts,—as if they ought to be, according to their several characters, either slain in criminals destined to execution, or reduced to hard work in menials, or fatigued and wearied in labourers, or foully disgraced in the unclean; or, again, on the same principle, reserved for honour, and love, and care, and attentive regard in characters most eminent in rank, and virtue, and usefulness, and tender sensibility,—I must here also remark, that if souls undergo a transformation, they will actually not be able to accomplish and experience the destinies which they shall deserve; and the aim and purpose of judicial recompense will be brought

to nought, as there will be wanting the sense and consciousness of merit and retribution. And there must be this want of consciousness, if souls lose their condition; and there must ensue this loss, if they do not continue in one stay. But even if they should have permanency enough to remain unchanged until the judgment,—a point which Mercurius Ægyptius recognised, when he said that the soul, after its separation from the body, was not dissipated back into the soul of the universe, but retained permanently its distinct individuality, "in order that it might render," to use his own words, "an account to the Father of those things which it has done in the body;"—[even supposing all this, I say,] I still want to examine the justice, the solemnity, the majesty, and the dignity of this reputed judgment of God, and see whether human judgment has not too elevated a throne in it—exaggerated in both directions, in its office both of punishments and rewards, too severe in dealing out its vengeance, and too lavish in bestowing its favour. What do you suppose will become of the soul of the murderer? [It will animate], I suppose, some cattle destined for the slaughter-house and the shambles, that it may itself be killed, even as it has killed; and be itself flayed, since it has fleeced others; and be itself used for food, since it has cast to the wild beasts the ill-fated victims whom it once slew in woods and lonely roads. Now, if such be the judicial retribution which it is to receive, is not such a soul likely to find more of consolation than of punishment, in the fact that it receives its *coup de grâce* from the hands of most expert practitioners—is buried with condiments served in the most piquant styles of an Apicius or a Lurco, is introduced to the tables of your exquisite Ciceros, is brought up on the most splendid dishes of a Sylla, finds its obsequies in a banquet, is devoured by respectable [mouths] on a par with itself, rather than by kites and wolves, so that all may see how it has got a man's body for its tomb, and has risen again after returning to its own kindred race—exulting in the face of human judgments, if it has experienced them? For these barbarous sentences of death consign to various wild beasts, which are selected

and trained even against their nature for their horrible office, the criminal who has committed murder, even while yet alive; nay, hindered from too easily dying, by a contrivance which retards his last moment in order to aggravate his punishment. But even if his soul should have anticipated by its departure the sword's last stroke, his body at all events must not escape the weapon: retribution for his own crime is yet exacted by stabbing his throat and stomach, and piercing his side. After that he is flung into the fire, that his very grave may be cheated.[1] In no other way, indeed, is a sepulture allowed him. Not that any great care, after all, is bestowed on his pyre, so that other animals light upon his remains. At any rate, no mercy is shown to his bones, no indulgence to his ashes, which must be punished with exposure and nakedness. The vengeance which is inflicted among men upon the homicide is really as great as that which is imposed by nature. Who would not prefer the justice of the world, which, as the apostle himself testifies, "beareth not the sword in vain,"[2] and which is an institute of religion when it severely avenges in defence of human life? When we contemplate, too, the penalties awarded to other crimes—gibbets, and holocausts, and sacks, and harpoons, and precipices—who would not think it better to receive his sentence in the courts of Pythagoras and Empedocles? For even the wretches whom they will send into the bodies of asses and mules to be punished by drudgery and slavery, how will they congratulate themselves on the mild labour of the mill and the water-wheel, when they recollect the mines, and the convict-gangs, and the public works, and even the prisons and black-holes, terrible in their idle, do-nothing routine? Then, again, in the case of those who, after a course of integrity, have surrendered their life to the Judge, I likewise look for rewards, but I rather discover punishments. To be sure, it must be a handsome gain for good men to be restored to life in any animals whatsoever! Homer, so dreamt Ennius, remembered that he was

[1] [Or, "that he may be punished even in his sepulture."]

[2] [Rom. xiii. 4.]

once a peacock; however, I cannot for my part believe poets, even when wide awake. A peacock, no doubt, is a very pretty bird, pluming itself, at will, on its splendid feathers; but then its wings do not make amends for its voice, which is harsh and unpleasant; and there is nothing that poets like better than a good song. His transformation, therefore, into a peacock was to Homer a penalty, not an honour. The world's remuneration will bring him a much greater joy, when it lauds him as the father of the liberal sciences; and he will prefer the ornaments of his fame to the graces of his tail! But never mind! let poets migrate into peacocks, or into swans, if you like, especially as swans have a respectable voice: in what animal will you invest that righteous hero Æacus? In what beast will you clothe the chaste and excellent Dido? What bird shall fall to the lot of Patience? what animal to the lot of Holiness? what fish to that of Innocence? Now all creatures are the servants of man; all are his subjects, all his dependants. If by and by he is to become one of these creatures, he is by such a change debased and degraded—he to whom, for his virtues, images, statues, and titles are freely awarded as public honours and distinguished privileges,—he to whom the senate and the people vote even sacrifices! Oh, what judicial sentences for gods to pronounce, as men's recompense after death! They are more mendacious than any human judgments; they are contemptible as punishments, disgusting as rewards; such as the worst of men could never fear, nor the best desire; such, indeed, as criminals will aspire to, rather than saints,—the former, that they may escape more speedily the world's stern sentence,—the latter, that they may more tardily incur it. How well, [forsooth,] O ye philosophers, do you teach us, and how usefully do you advise us, that after death rewards and punishments fall with lighter weight! whereas, if any judgment awaits souls at all, it ought rather to be supposed that it will be heavier at the conclusion of life than in the conduct[1] thereof, since nothing is more complete than that which comes at the very last—nothing, more-

[1] In administratione.

over, is more complete than that which is especially divine. Accordingly, God's judgment will be more full and complete, because it will be pronounced at the very last, in an eternal irrevocable sentence, both of punishment and of consolation, [on men whose] souls are not to transmigrate into beasts, but are to return into their own proper bodies. And all this once for all, and on "that day, too, of which the Father only knoweth;"[1] [only knoweth,] in order that by her trembling expectation faith may make full trial of her anxious sincerity, keeping her gaze ever fixed on that day, in her perpetual ignorance of it, daily fearing that for which she yet daily hopes.

CHAP. XXXIV.—*The worst effect of these vagaries of the philosophers was, that they stimulated some profane corruptions of Christianity; the miserable profanity of* SIMON MAGUS *severely condemned.*

No tenet, indeed, under cover of any heresy has as yet burst upon us, embodying any such extravagant fiction as that the souls of human beings pass into the bodies of wild beasts; but yet we have deemed it necessary to attack and refute this conceit, as a consistent sequel to the preceding opinions, in order that Homer in the peacock might be got rid of as effectually as Pythagoras in Euphorbus; and in order that, by the demolition of the *metempsychosis* and *metensomatosis* by the same blow, the ground might be cut away which has furnished no inconsiderable support to our heretics. There is the [infamous] Simon of Samaria in the Acts of the Apostles, who chaffered for the Holy Ghost: after his condemnation by *Him*, and a vain remorse that he and his money must perish together,[2] he applied his energies to the destruction of the truth, as if to console himself with revenge. Besides the support with which his own magic arts furnished him, he had recourse to imposture, and purchased a Tyrian woman of the name of Helen out of a brothel, with the same money which he had offered for the Holy Spirit,—a traffic worthy of the wretched man. He

[1] [Mark xiii. 32.] [2] [Acts viii. 18–21.]

actually feigned himself to be the Supreme Father, and further pretended that the woman was his own primary conception, wherewith he had purposed the creation of the angels and the archangels; that after she was possessed of this purpose she sprang forth from the Father and descended to the lower spaces, and there anticipating the Father's design had produced the angelic powers, which knew nothing of the Father, the Creator of this world; that she was detained a prisoner by these from a [rebellious] motive very like her own, lest after her departure from them they should appear to be the offspring of another being; and that, after being on this account exposed to every insult, to prevent her leaving them anywhere after her dishonour, she was degraded even to the form of man, to be confined, as it were, in the bonds of the flesh. Having during many ages wallowed about in one female shape and another, she became the notorious Helen who was so ruinous to Priam, and afterwards to the eyes of Stesichorus, whom she blinded in revenge for his lampoons, and then restored to sight to reward him for his eulogies. After wandering about in this way from body to body, she, in her final disgrace, turned out a viler Helen still as a professional prostitute. This wench, therefore, was the lost sheep, upon whom the Supreme Father, even Simon, descended, who, after he had recovered her and brought her back—whether on his shoulders or loins I cannot tell—cast an eye on the salvation of man, in order to gratify his spleen by liberating them from the angelic powers. Moreover, to deceive these he also himself assumed a visible shape; and feigning the appearance of a man amongst men, he acted the part of the Son in Judea, and of the Father in Samaria. O hapless Helen, what a hard fate is yours between the poets and the heretics, who have blackened your fame sometimes with adultery, sometimes with prostitution! Only her rescue from Troy is a more glorious affair than her extrication from the brothel. There were a thousand ships to remove her from Troy; a thousand pence were probably more than enough to withdraw her from the stews! Fie on you, Simon, to be so tardy in

seeking her out, and so inconstant in ransoming her! How different from Menelaus! As soon as he has lost her, he goes in pursuit of her; she is no sooner ravished than he begins his search; after a ten years' conflict he boldly rescues her: there is no lurking, no deceiving, no cavilling. I am really afraid that he was a much better "Father," who laboured so much more vigilantly, bravely, and perseveringly, about the recovery of his Helen!

CHAP. XXXV. — *The equally profane opinions of* CARPOCRATES, *another offset from the Pythagorean dogmas, stated and confuted.*

However, it is not for you alone, [Simon,] that the transmigration philosophy has fabricated this story. Carpocrates also makes equally good use of it, who was a magician and a fornicator like yourself, only he had not a Helen.[1] And why should he not? since he asserted that souls are reinvested with bodies, in order to ensure the overthrow by all means of divine and human truth. For, [according to his miserable doctrine,] this life became consummated to no man until all those blemishes which are held to disfigure it have been fully displayed in its conduct; because there is nothing which is accounted evil by nature, but simply as men think of it. The transmigration of human souls, therefore, into any kind of heterogeneous bodies, he thought by all means indispensable, whenever any depravity whatever had not been fully perpetrated in the early stage of life's passage. Evil deeds (one may be sure) appertain to life. Moreover, as often as the soul has fallen short as a defaulter in sin, it has to be recalled to existence, until it "pays the uttermost farthing,"[2] thrust out from time to time into the prison of the body. To this effect does he tamper with the whole of that allegory of the Lord which is extremely clear and simple in its meaning, and ought to be from the first understood in its plain and natural sense. Thus our "adversary" [therein mentioned[3]]

[1] [For Carpocrates, see Irenæus, i. 24; Eusebius, *H. E.* iv. 7; Epiphan. *Hær.* 27.]

[2] [Matt. v. 26.]

[3] [Ver. 25.]

is the heathen man, who is walking with us along the same road of life which is common to him and ourselves. Now "we must needs go out of the world,"[1] if it be not allowed us to have conversation with them. He bids us, therefore, show a kindly disposition to such a man. "Love your enemies," says He, "pray for them that curse you,"[2] lest such a man in any transaction of business be irritated by any unjust conduct of yours, and "deliver thee to the judge" of his own [nation[3]], and you be thrown into prison, and be detained in its close and narrow cell until you have liquidated all your debt against him.[4] Then, again, should you be disposed to apply the term "adversary" to the devil, you are advised by the [Lord's] injunction, "while you are in the way with him," to make even with him such a compact as may be deemed compatible with the requirements of your true faith. Now the compact you have made respecting him is to renounce him, and his pomp, and his angels. Such is your agreement in this matter. Now the friendly understanding you will have to carry out must arise from your observance of the compact: you must never think of getting back any of the things which you have abjured, and have restored to him, lest he should summon you as a fraudulent man, and a transgressor of your agreement, before God the Judge (for in this light do we read of him, in another passage, as "the accuser of the brethren,"[5] or saints, where reference is made to the actual practice of legal prosecution); and lest this Judge deliver you over to the angel who is to execute the sentence, and *he* commit you to the prison of hell, out of which there will be no dismissal until the smallest even of your delinquencies be paid off in the period before the resurrection.[6] What can be a more fitting sense than this? What a truer interpretation? If, however, according to Carpocrates, the soul is bound to the commission of all sorts

[1] [1 Cor. v. 10.] [2] [Luke vi. 27.] [3] [Matt. v. 25.]
[4] [Ver. 26.] [5] [Rev. xii. 10.]
[6] Morâ resurrectionis. [For the force of this phrase, as apparently implying the doctrine of *purgatory*, and an explanation of Tertullian's teaching on this point, see Bp. Kaye on *Tertullian*, pp. 328, 329.]

of crime and evil conduct, what must we from his system understand to be its "adversary" and foe? I suppose it must be that better mind which shall compel it by force to the performance of some act of virtue, that it may be driven from body to body, until it be found in none a debtor to the claims of a virtuous life. This means, that a good tree is known by its bad fruit—in other words, that the doctrine of truth is understood from the worst possible precepts. I apprehend[1] that heretics of this school seize with especial avidity the example of Elias, whom they assume to have been so reproduced in John [the Baptist] as to make our Lord's statement sponsor for their theory of transmigration, when He said, "Elias is come already, and they knew him not;"[2] and again, in another passage, "And if ye will receive it, this is Elias, which was for to come."[3] Well, then, was it really in a Pythagorean sense that the Jews approached John with the inquiry, "Art thou Elias?"[4] and not rather in the sense of the divine prediction, "Behold, I will send you Elijah" the Tisbite?[5] The fact, however, is, that their metempsychosis, or transmigration theory, signifies the recall of the soul which had died long before, and its return to some other body. But Elias is to come again, not after quitting life [in the way of dying], but after his translation [or removal without dying]; not for the purpose of being restored to the body, from which he had not departed, but for the purpose of revisiting the world from which he was translated; not by way of resuming a life which he had laid aside, but of fulfilling prophecy,—really and truly the same man, both in respect of his name and designation, as well as of his unchanged humanity. How, therefore, could John be Elias? You have your answer in the angel's announcement: "And he shall go before the people," says he, "in the spirit and power of Elias"—not (observe) in his soul and his body. These substances are, in fact, the natural property of each individual; whilst "the spirit and power" are bestowed as external gifts by the grace of God, and so may be transferred

[1] Spero. [2] [Matt. xvii. 12.] [3] [Matt. xi. 14.]
[4] [John i. 21.] [5] [Mal. iv. 5.]

to another person according to the purpose and will of the Almighty, as was anciently the case with respect to the spirit of Moses.[1]

CHAP. XXXVI.—*Tertullian returns from his digression, and proceeds to discuss the main points of his own subject—on the sexes of the human race.*

For the discussion of these questions we abandoned, if I remember rightly, ground to which we must now return. We had established the position that the soul is seminally placed in man, and by human agency, and that its seed from the very beginning is uniform, as is that of the soul also, to the race of man; [and this we settled] owing to the rival opinions of the philosophers and the heretics, and that ancient saying mentioned by Plato [to which we referred above].[2] We now pursue in their order the points which follow from them. The soul, being sown in the womb at the same time as the body, receives likewise along with it its sex; and this indeed so simultaneously, that neither of the two substances can be alone regarded as the cause of the sex. Now, if in the semination of these substances any interval were admissible in their conception, in such wise that either the flesh or the soul should be the first to be conceived, one might then ascribe an especial sex to one of the substances, owing to the difference in the time of the impregnations, so that either the flesh would impress its sex upon the soul, or the soul upon the sex; even as Apelles (the heretic, not the painter[3]) gives the priority over their bodies to the souls of men and women, as he had been taught by Philumena, and in consequence makes the flesh, as the later, receive its sex from the soul. They also who make the soul supervene after birth on the flesh predetermine, of course, the sex of the previously formed soul to be male or female, according to [the sex of] the flesh. But the truth is, the seminations of the two substances are inseparable in point of time, and their effusion is also one and the same, in consequence of

[1] [Num. xii. 2.]

[2] [In ch. xxviii. at the beginning.]

[3] [See above, ch. xxiii.]

which a community of gender is secured to them; so that the course of nature, whatever that be, shall draw the line [for the distinct sexes]. Certainly in this view we have an attestation of the method of the first two formations, when the male was moulded and tempered in a completer way, for Adam was first formed; and the woman came far behind him, for Eve was the later formed. So that her flesh was for a long time without specific form (such as she afterwards assumed when taken out of Adam's side); but she was even then herself a living being, because I should regard her at that time in soul as even a portion of Adam. Besides, God's *afflatus* would have animated her too, if there had not been in the woman a transmission from Adam of his soul also as well as of his flesh.

CHAP. XXXVII.—*On the formation and the state of the* FŒTUS *in the womb, and its relation with the subject of this treatise.*

Now the entire process of sowing, forming, and completing the human embryo in the womb is no doubt regulated by some power, which ministers herein to the will of God, whatever may be the method which it is appointed to employ. Even the superstition of Rome, by carefully attending to these points, imagined the goddess *Alemona* to nourish the fœtus in the womb; as well as [the goddesses] *Nona* and *Decima*, called after the most critical months of gestation; and *Partula*, to manage and direct parturition; and *Lucina*, to bring the child to the birth and light of day. We, on our part, believe the angels to officiate herein for God. The embryo therefore becomes a human being in the womb from the moment that its form is completed. The law of Moses, indeed, punishes with due penalties the man who shall cause abortion, inasmuch as there exists already the rudiment of a human being,[1] which has imputed to it even now the condition of life and death, since it is already liable to the issues of both, although, by living still in the mother, it for the most part shares its own state with the mother. I must also

[1] Causa hominis.

say something about the period of the soul's birth, that I may omit nothing incidental in the whole process. A mature and regular birth takes place, as a general rule, at the commencement of the tenth month. They who theorize respecting numbers, honour the number ten as the parent of all the others, and as imparting perfection to the human nativity. For my own part, I prefer viewing this measure of time in reference to God, as if implying that the ten months rather initiated man into the ten commandments; so that the numerical estimate of the time needed to consummate our natural birth should correspond to the numerical classification of the rules of our regenerate life. But inasmuch as birth is also completed with the seventh month, I more readily recognise in this number than in the eighth the honour of a numerical agreement with the sabbatical period; so that the month in which God's image is sometimes produced in a human birth, shall in its number tally with the day on which God's creation was completed and hallowed. Human nativity has sometimes been allowed to be premature, and yet to occur in fit and perfect accordance with an *hebdomad* or sevenfold number, as an auspice of our resurrection, and rest, and kingdom. The *ogdoad*, or eightfold number, therefore, is not concerned in our formation;[1] for in the time it represents there will be no more marriage.[2] We have already demonstrated the conjunction of the body and the soul, from the concretion of their very seminations to the complete formation of the *fœtus*. We now maintain their conjunction likewise from the birth onwards; in the first place, because they both grow together, only each in a different manner suited to the diversity of their nature—the flesh in magnitude, the soul in intelligence—the flesh in material condition, the soul in sensibility. We are, however, forbidden to suppose that the soul increases in substance, lest it should be said also to be capable of diminution in substance, and

[1] [The *ogdoad*, or number *eight*, mystically representing "*heaven*," where they do not marry.]

[2] [Beyond the *hebdomad* comes the resurrection, on which see Matt. xxii. 30.]

so its extinction even should be believed to be possible; but its inherent power, in which are contained all its natural peculiarities, as originally implanted in its being, is gradually developed along with the flesh, without impairing the germinal basis of the substance, which it received when breathed at first into man. Take a certain quantity of gold or of silver—a rough mass as yet: it has indeed a compact condition, and one that is more compressed at the moment than it will be; yet it contains within its contour what is throughout a mass of gold or of silver. When this mass is afterwards extended by beating it into leaf, it becomes larger than it was before by the elongation of the original mass, but not by any addition thereto, because it is extended in space, not increased in bulk; although in a way it is even increased when it is extended: for it may be increased in form, but not in state. Then, again, the sheen of the gold or the silver, which when the metal was only in block was inherent in it no doubt really, but yet only obscurely, shines out in developed lustre. Afterwards various modifications of shape accrue, according to the feasibility in the material which makes it yield to the manipulation of the artisan, who yet adds nothing to the condition of the mass but its configuration. In like manner, the growth and developments of the soul are to be estimated, not as enlarging its substance, but as calling forth its powers.

CHAP. XXXVIII.—*On the growth of the soul; its maturity coincident with, and analogous to, the maturity of the flesh in man.*

Now we have already[1] laid down the principle, that all the natural properties of the soul which relate to sense and intelligence are inherent in its very substance, and spring from its native constitution, but that they advance by a gradual growth through the stages of life, and develope themselves in different ways by accidental circumstances, according to men's means and arts, their manners and customs, their local situations, and the influences of the Supreme

[1] [See above, in ch. xx.]

Powers;[1] but in pursuance of that aspect of the association of body and soul which we have now to consider, we maintain that the *puberty* of the soul coincides with that of the body, and that they attain both together to this full growth at about the fourteenth year of life, speaking generally,—the former by the suggestion of the senses, and the latter by the growth of the bodily members; and [we fix on this age] not because, as Asclepiades supposes, reflection then begins, nor because the civil laws date the commencement of the real business of life from this period, but because this was the appointed order from the very first. For as Adam and Eve felt that they must cover their nakedness after their knowledge of good and evil, so we profess to have the same discernment of good and evil from the time that we experience the same sensation of shame. Now from the before-mentioned age [of fourteen years] sex is suffused and clothed with an especial sensibility, and concupiscence employs the ministry of the eye, and communicates its pleasure to another, and understands the natural relations between male and female, and wears the fig-tree apron to cover the shame which it still excites, and drives man out of the paradise of innocence and chastity, and in its wild pruriency falls upon sins and unnatural incentives to delinquency; for its impulse has by this time surpassed the appointment of nature, and springs from its vicious abuse. But the strictly natural concupiscence is simply confined to the desire of those aliments which God at the beginning conferred upon man. "Of every tree of the garden," He says, "ye shall freely eat;"[2] and then again to the generation which followed next after the flood He enlarged the grant: "Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you; behold, as the green herb have I given you all these things,"[3]—where He has regard rather to the body than to the soul, although it be in the interest of the soul also. For we must remove all occasion from the caviller, who, because the soul apparently wants aliments, would insist on the soul's being from this circumstance deemed mortal, since it is sustained by meat and drink, and after a time loses

[1] [See above, in ch. xxiv.] [2] [Gen. ii. 16.] [3] [Gen. ix. 3.]

its vigour when they are withheld, and on their complete removal ultimately droops and dies. Now the point we must keep in view is not merely which particular faculty it is which desires these [aliments], but also for what end; and even if it be for its own sake, still the question remains, Why this desire, and when felt, and how long? Then again there is the consideration, that it is one thing to desire by natural instinct, and another thing to desire through necessity; one thing to desire as a property of being, another thing to desire for a special object. The soul, therefore, will desire meat and drink—for itself indeed, because of a special necessity; for the flesh, however, from the nature of its properties. For the flesh is no doubt the house of the soul, and the soul is the temporary inhabitant of the flesh. The desire, then, of the lodger will arise from the temporary cause and the special necessity which his very designation suggests,—with a view to benefit and improve the place of his temporary abode, while sojourning in it; not with the view, certainly, of being himself the foundation of the house, or himself its walls, or himself its support and roof, but simply and solely with the view of being accommodated and housed, since he could not receive such accommodation except in a sound and well-built house. [Now, applying this imagery to the soul,] if it be not provided with this accommodation, it will not be in its power to quit its dwelling-place, and for want of fit and proper resources, to depart safe and sound, in possession, too, of its own supports, and the aliments which belong to its own proper condition,—namely immortality, rationality, sensibility, intelligence, and freedom of the will.

CHAP. XXXIX.—*The evil spirit has marred the purity of the soul: the very birth of the soul surrounded by his ruinous influences.*

All these endowments of the soul which are bestowed on it at birth are still obscured and depraved by the malignant being who, in the beginning, regarded them with envious eye, so that they are never seen in their spontaneous action, nor are they administered as they ought to be. For to what

individual of the human race will not the evil spirit cleave, ready to entrap their souls from the very portal of their birth, at which he is invited to be present in all those superstitious processes which accompany childbearing? Thus it comes to pass that all men are brought to the birth with idolatry for the midwife, whilst the very wombs that bear them, still bound with the fillets that have been wreathed before the idols, declare their offspring to be consecrated to demons: for in parturition they invoke the aid of Lucina and Diana; for a whole week a table is spread in honour of Juno; on the last day the fates of the horoscope[1] are invoked; and then the infant's first step on the ground is sacred to the goddess Statina. After this does any one fail to devote to idolatrous service the entire head of his son, or to take out a hair, or to shave off the whole with a razor, or to bind it up for an offering, or seal it for sacred use—in behalf of the clan, of the ancestry, or for public or for private devotion? On this principle of early possession it was that Socrates, while yet a boy, was found by the spirit of the demon. Thus, too, is it that to all persons their *genii* are assigned, which is only another name for *demons*. Hence in no case (I mean of the heathen, of course) is there any nativity which is pure of idolatrous superstition. It was from this circumstance that the apostle said, that when either of the parents was sanctified, the children were holy;[2] and this as much by the prerogative of the [Christian] seed as by the discipline of the institution [by baptism and Christian education]. "Else," says he, "were the children unclean" by birth:[3] as if he meant us to understand that the children of believers were designed for holiness, and thereby for salvation; in order that he might by the pledge of such a hope give his support to matrimony, which he had determined to maintain in its integrity. Besides, he had certainly not forgotten what the Lord had so definitively stated: "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God;"[4] in other words, he cannot be holy.

[1] Fata scribunda.
[2] [1 Cor. vii. 14.]
[3] [Same ver.]
[4] [John iii. 5.]

CHAP. XL.—*The flesh or body of man only ancillary to the soul in the commission of evil.*

Every soul, then, by reason of its birth, has its nature in Adam until it is born again in Christ; moreover, it is unclean all the while that it remains without this regeneration;[1] and because unclean, it is actively sinful, and suffuses even the flesh (by reason of their conjunction) with its own shame. Now although the flesh is sinful, and we are forbidden to walk in accordance with it,[2] and its works are condemned as lusting against the spirit,[3] and men on its account are censured as carnal,[4] yet the flesh has not such ignominy on its own account. For it is not of itself that it thinks anything or feels anything for the purpose of advising or commanding sin. How should it, indeed? It is only a ministering thing, and its ministration is not like that of a servant or familiar friend—animated and human beings; but rather that of a vessel, or something of that kind: it is body, not soul. Now a cup may minister to a thirsty man; and yet, if the thirsty man will not apply the cup to his mouth, the cup will yield no ministering service. Therefore the *differentia*, or distinguishing property, of man by no means lies in his earthy element; nor is the flesh the human person, as being some faculty of his soul, and a personal quality; but it is a thing of quite a different substance and different condition, although annexed to the soul as a chattel or as an instrument for the offices of life. Accordingly the flesh is blamed in the Scriptures, because nothing is done by the soul without the flesh in operations of concupiscence, appetite, drunkenness, cruelty, idolatry, and other works of the flesh,—operations, I mean, which are not confined to sensations, but result in effects. The emotions of sin, indeed, when not resulting in effects, are usually imputed to the soul: "Whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after, hath already in his heart committed adultery with her."[5] But what has the flesh alone, without the soul, ever done in opera-

[1] [Rom. vi. 4.] [2] [Gal. v. 16.] [3] [Ver. 17.]
[4] [Rom. viii. 5.] [5] [Matt. v. 28.]

tions of virtue, righteousness, endurance, or chastity? What absurdity, however, it is to attribute sin and crime to that substance to which you do not assign any good actions or character of its own! Now the party which aids in the commission of a crime is brought to trial, only in such a way that the principal offender who actually committed the crime may bear the weight of the penalty, although the abettor too does not escape indictment. Greater is the odium which falls on the principal, when his officials are punished through his fault. He is beaten with more stripes who instigates and orders the crime, whilst at the same time he who obeys such an evil command is not acquitted.

CHAP. XLI.—*Notwithstanding the depravity of man's soul by original sin communicated to him by natural birth, there is yet left in it a basis whereon divine grace can work for its recovery from the fall by spiritual regeneration.*

There is, then, besides the evil which supervenes on the soul from the intervention of the evil spirit, an antecedent, and in a certain sense natural, evil which arises from its corrupt origin. For, as we have said before, the corruption of our nature is another nature having a god and father of its own, namely the author of [that] corruption. Still there is a portion of good in the soul, of that original, divine, and genuine good, which is its proper nature. For that which is derived from God is rather obscured than extinguished. It can be obscured, indeed, because it is not God; extinguished, however, it cannot be, because it comes from God. As therefore light, when intercepted by an opaque body, still remains, although it is not apparent, by reason of the interposition of so dense a body; so likewise the good in the soul, being weighed down by the evil, is owing to the obscuring character thereof, either not seen at all, its light being wholly hidden, or else only a stray beam is there visible where it struggles through by an accidental outlet. Thus some men are very bad, and some very good; but yet the souls of all form but one genus: even in the worst there is something good, and in the best there is something bad. For God alone is with-

out sin; and the only man without sin is Christ, since Christ is also God. Thus the divinity of the soul bursts forth in prophetic forecasts in consequence of its primeval good; and being conscious of its origin, it bears testimony to God [its author] in exclamations such as: *Good God! God knows!* and *Good-bye!*[1] Just as no soul is without sin, so neither is any soul without seeds of good. Therefore, when the soul embraces the faith, being renewed in its second birth by water and the power from above, then the veil of its former corruption being taken away, it beholds the light in all its brightness. It is also taken up [in its second birth] by the Holy Spirit, just as in its first birth it is embraced by the unholy spirit. The flesh follows the soul now wedded to the Spirit, as a part of the bridal portion—no longer the servant of the soul, but of the Spirit. O happy marriage, if in it there is committed no violation of the nuptial vow!

CHAP. XLII.—*As introductory to the consideration of* DEATH, *he proposes to discuss the subject of* SLEEP, *the mirror of death.*

It now remains [that we discuss the subject] of death, in order that our subject-matter may terminate where the soul itself completes it; although Epicurus, indeed, in his pretty widely known doctrine, has asserted that death does not appertain to us. That, says he, which is dissolved lacks sensation; and that which is without sensation is nothing to us. Well, but it is not actually death which suffers dissolution and lacks sensation, but the human person who experiences death. Yet even *he* has admitted suffering to be incidental to the being to whom action belongs. Now, if it is in man to suffer death, which dissolves the body and destroys the senses, how absurd to say that so great a susceptibility belongs not to man! With much greater precision does Seneca say: "After death all comes to an end, even [death] itself." From which position of his it must needs follow that death will appertain to its own self, since itself comes to an end; and much more to man, in the ending of whom amongst the "*all*," itself also ends. Death, [says Epicurus,] belongs not to us; then at

[1] Deo commendo. [Compare Tertullian's tract *De Test.* c. ii.]

that rate, life belongs not to us. For certainly, if that which causes our dissolution have no relation to us, that also which compacts and composes us must be unconnected with us. If the deprivation of our sensation be nothing to us, neither can the acquisition of sensation have anything to do with us. The fact, however, is, he who destroys the very soul, [as Epicurus does,] cannot help destroying death also. As for ourselves, indeed, [Christians as we are,] we must treat of death just as we should of the posthumous life and of some other province of the soul, [assuming] that we at all events belong to death, if it does not pertain to us. And on the same principle, even *sleep*, which is the very mirror of death, is not alien from our subject-matter.

CHAP. XLIII.—*Sleep is a natural function in our human life: this shown both by other considerations, and by the testimony of Scripture.*

Let us therefore first discuss the question of sleep, and afterwards in what way the soul encounters[1] death. Now sleep is certainly not a supernatural thing, as some philosophers will have it be, when they suppose it to be the result of causes which appear to be above nature. The Stoics affirm sleep to be "a temporary suspension of the activity of the senses;"[2] the Epicureans define it as an intermission of the animal spirit; Anaxagoras and Xenophanes as a weariness of the same; Empedocles and Parmenides as a cooling down thereof; Strato as a separation of the [soul's] connatural spirit; Democritus as the soul's indigence; Aristotle as the interruption[3] of the heat around the heart. As for myself, I can safely say that I have never slept in such a way as to discover even a single one of these conditions. Indeed, we cannot possibly believe that sleep is a weariness; it is rather the opposite, for it undoubtedly removes weariness, and a person is refreshed by sleep instead of being fatigued. Besides, sleep is not always the result of fatigue; and even when it is, the fatigue continues no longer. Nor can I allow

[1] Decurrat.

[2] [So Bp. Kaye, p. 195.]

[3] Marcorem ["the decay"].

that sleep is a cooling or decaying of the animal heat, for our bodies derive warmth from sleep in such a way that the regular dispersion of the food by means of sleep could not so easily go on if there were too much heat to accelerate it unduly, or cold to retard it, if sleep had the alleged refrigerating influence. There is also the further fact that perspiration indicates an over-heated digestion; and digestion is predicated of us as a process of concoction, which is an operation concerned with heat and not with cold. In like manner, the immortality of the soul precludes belief in the theory that sleep is an intermission of the animal spirit, or an indigence of the spirit, or a separation of the [soul's] connatural spirit. The soul perishes if it undergoes diminution or intermission. Our only resource, indeed, is to agree with the Stoics, by determining the soul to be a temporary suspension of the activity of the senses, procuring rest for the body only, not for the soul also. For the soul, as being always in motion, and always active, never succumbs to rest,—a condition which is alien to immortality: for nothing immortal admits any end to its operation; but sleep is an end of operation. It is indeed on the body, which is subject to mortality, and on the body alone, that sleep graciously bestows[1] a cessation from work. He, therefore, who shall doubt whether sleep is a natural function, has the dialectical experts calling in question the whole difference between things natural and supernatural—so that what things he supposed to be beyond nature he may, [if he likes,] be safe in assigning to nature, which indeed has made such a disposition of things, that they may seemingly be accounted as beyond it; and so, of course, all things are natural or none are natural, [as occasion requires.] With us [Christians], however, only that can receive a hearing which is suggested by contemplating God, the Author of all the things which we are now discussing. For we believe that nature, if it is anything, is a reasonable work of God. Now reason presides over sleep; for sleep is so fit for man, so useful, so necessary, that were it not for it, not a soul could provide agency for recruiting the body, for restoring

[1] Adulatur.

its energies, for ensuring its health, for supplying suspension from work and remedy against labour, and for the legitimate enjoyment of which day departs, and night provides an ordinance by taking from all objects their very colour. Since, then, sleep is indispensable to our life, and health, and succour, there can be nothing pertaining to it which is not reasonable, and which is not natural. Hence it is that physicians banish beyond the gateway of nature everything which is contrary to what is vital, healthful, and helpful to nature; for those maladies which are inimical to sleep—maladies of the mind and of the stomach—they have decided to be contrariant to nature, and by such decision have determined as its corollary that sleep is perfectly natural. Moreover, when they declare that sleep is not natural in the lethargic state, they derive their conclusion from the fact that it is natural when it is in its due and regular exercise. For every natural state is impaired either by defect or by excess, whilst it is maintained by its proper measure and amount. That, therefore, will be natural in its condition which may be rendered non-natural by defect or by excess. Well, now, what if you were to remove eating and drinking from the conditions of nature? for in them lies the chief incentive to sleep. It is certain that, from the very beginning of his nature, man was impressed with these instincts [of sleep].[1] If you receive your instruction from God, [you will find] that the fountain of the human race, Adam, had a taste of drowsiness before having a draught of repose; slept before he laboured, or even before he ate, nay, even before he spoke; in order that men may see that sleep is a natural feature and function, and one which has actually precedence over all the natural faculties. From this primary instance also we are led to trace even then the image of death in sleep. For as Adam was a figure of Christ, Adam's sleep shadowed out the death of Christ, who was to sleep a mortal slumber, that from the wound inflicted on His side might, in like manner [as Eve was formed], be typified the church, the true mother of the living. This is why sleep is so salutary, so rational,

[1] [Gen. ii. 21.]

and is actually formed into the model of that death which is general and common to the race of man. God, indeed, has willed (and [it may be said in passing] that He has, generally, in His dispensations brought nothing to pass without such types and shadows) to set before us, in a manner more fully and completely than Plato's example, by daily recurrence the outlines of man's state, especially concerning the beginning and the termination thereof; thus stretching out the hand to help our faith more readily by types and parables, not in words only, but also in things. He accordingly sets before your view the human body stricken by the friendly power of slumber, prostrated by the kindly necessity of repose, immoveable in position, just as it lay previous to life, and just as it will lie after life is past: there it lies as an attestation of its form when first moulded, and of its condition when at last buried—awaiting the soul in both stages, in the former previous to its bestowal, in the latter after its recent withdrawal. Meanwhile the soul is circumstanced in such a manner as to seem to be elsewhere active, learning to bear future absence by a dissembling of its presence for the moment. We shall soon know the case of Hermotimus. But yet it dreams in the interval. Whence then its dreams? The fact is, it cannot rest or be idle altogether, nor does it confine to the still hours of sleep the nature of its immortality. It proves itself to possess a constant motion; it travels over land and sea, it trades, it is excited, it labours, it plays, it grieves, it rejoices, it follows pursuits lawful and unlawful; it shows what very great power it has even without the body, how well equipped it is with members of its own, although betraying at the same time the need it has of impressing on some body its activity again. Accordingly, when the body shakes off its slumber, it asserts before your eye the resurrection of the dead by its own resumption of its natural functions. Such, therefore, must be both the natural reason and the reasonable nature of sleep. If you only regard it as the image of death, you initiate faith, you nourish hope, you learn both how to die and how to live, you learn watchfulness, even while you sleep.

CHAP. XLIV.—*The story of* HERMOTIMUS, *and its relation to the argument; the sleeplessness of the Emperor* NERO. *There is no separation of the soul from the body until death.*

With regard to the case of Hermotimus, they say that he used to be deprived of his soul in his sleep, as if it wandered away from his body like a person on a holiday trip. His wife betrayed the strange peculiarity. His enemies, finding him asleep, burnt his body, as if it were a corpse: when his soul returned too late, it appropriated (I suppose) to itself the guilt of the murder. However, the good citizens of Clazomenæ console poor Hermotimus with a temple, into which no woman ever enters, because of the infamy of this wife. Now why this story? In order that, since the vulgar belief so readily holds sleep to be the separation of the soul from the body, credulity should not be encouraged by this case of Hermotimus. It must certainly have been a much heavier sort of slumber: one would presume it was the nightmare, or perhaps that diseased languor which Soranus suggests in opposition to the nightmare, or else some such malady as that which the fable has fastened upon Epimenides, who slept on some fifty years or so. Suetonius, however, informs us that Nero never dreamt, and Theopompus says the same thing about Thrasymedes; but Nero at the close of his life did with some difficulty dream after some excessive alarm. What indeed would be said, if the case of Hermotimus were believed to be such that the repose of his soul was a state of actual idleness during sleep, and a positive separation from his body? You may conjecture it to be anything but such a licence of the soul as admits of flights away from the body without death, and that by continual recurrence, as if habitual to its state and constitution. If indeed such a thing were told me to have happened at any time to the soul—resembling a total eclipse of the sun or the moon—I should verily suppose that the occurrence had been caused by God's own interposition (for it would not be unreasonable for a man to receive ad-

monition from the Divine Being either in the way of warning or of alarm, as by a flash of lightning, or by a sudden stroke of death); only it would be much the more natural conclusion to believe that this process should be by a dream, because if it must be supposed to be, [as the hypothesis we are resisting assumes it to be,] not a dream, the occurrence ought rather to happen to a man whilst he is wide awake.

CHAP. XLV.—*On* DREAMS, *as an incidental effect of the soul's activity; the* ECSTATIC *state; Adam's ecstasy.*

We are bound to expound at this point what is the opinion of Christians respecting dreams, as incidents of sleep, and as no slight or trifling excitements of the soul, which we have declared to be always occupied and active owing to its perpetual movement, which again is a proof and evidence of its divine quality and immortality. When, therefore, rest accrues to human bodies, it being their own especial comfort, the soul, disdaining a repose which is not natural to it, never rests; and since it receives no help from the limbs of the body, it uses its own. Imagine a gladiator without his instruments or arms, and a charioteer without his team, but still gesticulating the entire course and exertion of their respective employments: there is the fight, there is the struggle; but the effort is a vain one. Nevertheless the whole procedure seems to be gone through, although it evidently has not been really effected. There is the act, but not the effect. This power we call *ecstasy*, in which the sensuous soul stands out of itself, in a way which even resembles madness.[1] Thus in the very beginning sleep was inaugurated by ecstasy: "And God sent an ecstasy upon Adam, and he slept."[2] The sleep came on his body to cause it to rest, but the ecstasy fell on his soul to remove rest: from that very circumstance it still happens ordinarily (and from the order results the nature of the case) that sleep is combined with ecstasy. In fact, with

[1] [We had better give Tertullian's own succinct definition: "Excessus sensûs et amentiæ instar."]

[2] [Gen. ii. 21.]

what real feeling, and anxiety, and suffering do we experience joy, and sorrow, and alarm in our dreams! Whereas we should not be moved by any such emotions, by what would be the merest fantasies of course, if when we dream we were masters of ourselves, [unaffected by ecstasy.] In these dreams, indeed, good actions are useless, and crimes harmless; for we shall no more be condemned for visionary acts of sin, than we shall be crowned for imaginary martyrdom. But how, you will ask, can the soul remember its dreams, when it is said to be without any mastery over its own operations? This memory must be an especial gift of the ecstatic condition of which we are treating, since it arises not from any failure of healthy action, but entirely from natural process; nor does it expel mental function—it withdraws it for a time. It is one thing to shake, it is another thing to move; one thing to destroy, another thing to agitate. That, therefore, which memory supplies betokens soundness of mind; and that which a sound mind ecstatically experiences whilst the memory remains unchecked, is a kind of madness. We are accordingly not said to be mad, but to dream, in that state; to be in the full possession also of our mental faculties,[1] if we are at any time. For although the power to exercise these faculties[2] may be dimmed in us, it is still not extinguished; except that it may seem to be itself absent at the very time that the ecstasy is energizing in us in its special manner, in such wise as to bring before us images of a sound mind and of wisdom, even as it does those of aberration.

CHAP. XLVI.—*The subject of* DREAMS *and* VISIONS *continued: their diversity of character; differently appreciated. Epicurus thought very lightly of them, but they were generally most highly valued. Eminent instances of dreams.*

We now find ourselves constrained to express an opinion about the character of the dreams by which the soul is excited. And when shall we arrive at the subject of death? And on such a question I would say, When God shall

[1] Prudentes. [2] Sapere.

permit: that admits of no long delay which must needs happen at all events. Epicurus has given it as his opinion that dreams are altogether vain things; [but he says this] when liberating the Deity from all sort of care, and dissolving the entire order of the world, and giving to all things the aspect of merest chance, casual in their issues, fortuitous in their nature. Well, now, if such be the nature of things, there must be some chance even for truth, because it is impossible for it to be the only thing to be exempted from the fortune which is due to all things. Homer has assigned two gates to dreams,[1]—the *horny* one of truth, the *ivory* one of error and delusion. For, they say, it is possible to see through horn, whereas ivory is untransparent. Aristotle, while expressing his opinion that dreams are in most cases untrue, yet acknowledges that there is some truth in them. The people of Telmessus will not admit that dreams are in any case unmeaning, but they blame their own weakness when unable to conjecture their signification. Now, who is such a stranger to human experience as not sometimes to have perceived some truth in dreams? I shall force a blush from Epicurus, if I only glance at some few of the more remarkable instances. Herodotus[2] relates how that Astyages, king of the Medes, saw in a dream issuing from the womb of his virgin daughter a flood which inundated Asia; and again, in the year which followed her marriage, he saw a vine growing out from the same part of her person, which overspread the whole of Asia. The same story is told prior to Herodotus by Charon of Lampsacus. Now they who interpreted these visions did not deceive the mother when they destined her son for so great an enterprise, for Cyrus both inundated and overspread Asia. Philip of Macedon, before he became a father, had seen imprinted on the pudenda of his consort Olympias the form of a small ring, with a lion as a seal. He had concluded that an offspring from her was out of the question (I suppose because the lion only becomes once a father), when Aristodemus or Aristophon happened to conjecture that nothing of an un-

[1] [See the *Odyssey*, xix. 562, etc.]

[2] [See i. 107, etc.]

meaning or empty import lay under that seal, but that a son of very illustrious character was portended. They who know anything of Alexander recognise in him the lion of that small ring. Ephorus writes to this effect. Again, Heraclides has told us, that a certain woman of Himera beheld in a dream Dionysius' tyranny over Sicily. Euphorion has publicly recorded as a fact, that, previous to giving birth to Seleucus, his mother Laodice foresaw that he was destined for the empire of Asia. I find again from Strabo, that it was owing to a dream that even Mithridates took possession of Pontus; and I further learn from Callisthenes that it was from the indication of a dream that Baraliris the Illyrian stretched his dominion from the Molossi to the frontiers of Macedon. The Romans, too, were acquainted with dreams of this kind. From a dream Marcus Tullius [Cicero] had learnt how that one, who was yet only a little boy, and in a private station, who was also plain Julius Octavius, and personally unknown to [Cicero] himself, was the destined Augustus, and the suppressor and destroyer of [Rome's] civil discords. This is recorded in the Commentaries of Vitellius. But visions of this prophetic kind were not confined to predictions of supreme power; for they indicated perils also, and catastrophes: as, for instance, when Cæsar was absent from the battle of Philippi through illness, and thereby escaped the sword of Brutus and Cassius, and then although he expected to encounter greater danger still from the enemy in the field, he quitted his tent for it, in obedience to a vision of Artorius, and so escaped [the capture by the enemy, who shortly after took possession of the tent]; as, again, when the daughter of Polycrates of Samos foresaw the crucifixion which awaited him from the anointing of the sun and the bath of Jupiter.[1] So likewise in sleep revelations are made of high honours and eminent talents; remedies are also discovered, thefts brought to light, and treasures indicated. Thus Cicero's eminence, whilst he was still a little boy, was foreseen by his nurse. The swan

[1] [See an account of her vision and its interpretation in Herodot. iv. 124.]

from the breast of Socrates soothing men, is his disciple Plato. The boxer Leonymus is cured by Achilles in his dreams. Sophocles the tragic poet discovers, as he was dreaming, the golden crown, which had been lost from the citadel of Athens. Neoptolemus the tragic actor, through intimations in his sleep from Ajax himself, saves from destruction the hero's tomb on the Rhoetean shore before Troy; and as he removes the decayed stones, he returns enriched with gold. How many commentators and chroniclers vouch for this phenomenon? There are Artemon, Antiphon, Strato, Philochorus, Epicharmus, Serapion, Cratippus, and Dionysius of Rhodes, and Hermippus—the entire literature of the age. I shall only laugh, if indeed I ought to laugh at all, at the man who fancied that he was going to persuade us that Saturn dreamt before anybody else; which we can only believe if Aristotle, [who would fain help us to such an opinion,] lived prior to any other person. Pray forgive me for laughing. Epicharmus, indeed, as well as Philochorus the Athenian, assigned the very highest place among divinations to dreams. The whole world is full of oracles of this description: there are the oracles of Amphiaraus at Oropus, of Amphilochus at Mallus, of Sarpedon in the Troad, of Trophonius in Bœotia, of Mopsus in Cilicia, of Hermione in Macedon, of Pasiphäe in Laconia. Then, again, there are others, which with their original foundations, rites, and historians, together with the entire literature of dreams, Hermippus of Berytus in five portly volumes will give you all the account of, even to satiety. But the Stoics are very fond of saying that God, in His most watchful providence over every human institution, gave us dreams amongst other preservatives of the arts and sciences of divination, as the especial support of the natural oracle. So much for the dreams to which credit has to be ascribed even by ourselves, although we must interpret them in another sense. As for all other oracles, at which no one ever dreams, what else must we declare concerning them, than that they are the diabolical contrivance of those spirits who even at that time dwelt in the eminent persons themselves, or aimed at reviving

the memory of them as the mere stage of their evil purposes, going so far as to counterfeit a divine power under their shape and form, and, with equal persistence in evil, deceiving men by their very boons of remedies, warnings, and forecasts,—the only effect of which was to injure their victims the more they helped them; while the means whereby they rendered the help withdrew them from all search after the true God, by insinuating into their minds ideas of the false one? And of course so pernicious an influence as this is not shut up nor limited within the boundaries of shrines and temples: it roams abroad, it flies through the air, and all the while is free and unchecked. So that nobody can doubt that our very homes lie open to these diabolical spirits, who beset their human prey with their fantasies not only in their chapels, but also in their chambers.

CHAP. XLVII.—*Dreams variously classified: notwithstanding the variety of some of them, Tertullian admits that some are God-sent, as for instance were the dreams of Nebuchadnezzar; some dreams neither demoniacally nor divinely inspired, but simply products of nature.*

We declare, then, that dreams are inflicted on us mainly by demons, although they sometimes turn out true and favourable to us. When, however, with the deliberate aim after evil, of which we have just spoken, they assume a flattering and captivating style, they show themselves proportionately vain, and deceitful, and obscure, and wanton, and impure. And no wonder that the images partake of the character of the realities. But from God—who has promised, indeed, "to pour out the grace of the Holy Spirit upon all flesh, and has ordained that His servants and His handmaids should see visions as well as utter prophecies"[1]—must all those visions be regarded as emanating, which may be compared to the actual grace of God, as being honest, holy, prophetic, inspired, instructive, inviting to virtue, the bountiful nature of which causes them to overflow even to the profane, since God, with grand impartiality, "sends His showers and sun-

[1] [Joel iii. 1.]

shine on the just and on the unjust."[1] It was indeed by an inspiration from God that Nebuchadnezzar dreamt his dreams;[2] and almost the greater part of mankind get their knowledge of God from dreams. Thus it is that, as the mercy of God superabounds to the heathen, so the temptation of the evil one encounters the saints, from whom he never withdraws his malignant efforts to steal over them as best he may in their very sleep, if unable to assault them when they are awake. The third class of dreams will consist of those which the soul itself apparently creates for itself from an intense application to special circumstances. Now, inasmuch as the soul cannot dream of its own accord (for even Epicharmus is of this opinion), how can it become to itself the cause of any vision? Then must this class of dreams be abandoned to the action of nature, reserving for the soul, even when in the ecstatic condition, the power of enduring whatever incidents befall it? Those, moreover, which evidently proceed neither from God, nor from diabolical inspiration, nor from the soul, being beyond the reach as well of ordinary expectation, usual interpretation, or the possibility of being intelligibly related, will have to be ascribed in a separate category to what is purely and simply the ecstatic state and its peculiar conditions.

CHAP. XLVIII.—*Causes and circumstances of dreams; what treatment best contributes to efficient dreaming.*

They say that dreams are more sure and clear when they happen towards the end of the night, because then the vigour of the soul emerges, and heavy sleep departs. As to the seasons of the year, dreams are calmer in spring, since summer relaxes, and winter somehow hardens, the soul; while autumn, which in other respects is trying to health, is apt to enervate the soul by the lusciousness of its fruits. Then, again, as regards the position of one's body during sleep, one ought not to lie on his back, nor on his right side, nor so as to wrench[3] his intestines, as if their cavity were reversely stretched: a palpitation of the heart would ensue, or else a

[1] [Matt. v. 45.] [2] [Dan. ii. 1, etc.] [3] Conresupinis.

pressure on the liver would produce a painful disturbance of the mind. But however this be, I take it that it all amounts to ingenious conjecture rather than certain proof (although the author of the conjecture be no less a man than Plato);[1] and possibly all may be no other than the result of chance. But, generally speaking, dreams will be under control of a man's will, if they be capable of direction at all; for we must now examine what *opinion* on the one hand, and *superstition* on the other, have to prescribe for the treatment of dreams, in the matter of distinguishing and modifying different sorts of food. As for the *superstition*, we have an instance when fasting is prescribed for such persons as mean to submit to the sleep which is necessary for receiving the oracle, in order that such abstinence may produce the required purity; while we find an instance of the *opinion* when the disciples of Pythagoras, in order to attain the same end, reject the bean as an aliment which would load the stomach, and produce indigestion. But the three brethren, who were the companions of Daniel, being content with pulse alone, to escape the contamination of the royal dishes,[2] received from God, besides other wisdom, the gift especially of penetrating and explaining the sense of dreams. For my own part, I hardly know whether fasting would not simply make me dream so profoundly, that I should not be aware whether I had in fact dreamt at all. Well, then, you ask, has not sobriety something to do in this matter? Certainly it is as much concerned in this as it is in the entire subject: if it contributes some good service to superstition, much more does it to religion. For even demons require such discipline from their dreamers as a gratification to their divinity, because they know that it is acceptable to God, since Daniel (to quote him again) "ate no pleasant bread" for the space of three weeks.[3] This abstinence, however, he used in order to please God by humiliation, and not for the purpose of producing a sensibility and wisdom for his soul previous to receiving communication by dreams and visions,

[1] [See his *Timæus*, c. xxxii. p. 71.]
[2] [Dan. i. 8–14.]
[3] [Dan. x. 2.]

as if it were not rather to effect such action in an ecstatic state. This *sobriety*, then, [in which our question arises,] will have nothing to do with exciting ecstasy, but will rather serve to recommend its being wrought by God.

CHAP. XLIX. — *The allegation considered, that infants and some barbarian tribes never dream. No soul naturally exempt from dreams.*

As for those persons who suppose that infants do not dream, on the ground that all the functions of the soul throughout life are accomplished according to the capacity of age, they ought to observe attentively their tremors, and nods, and bright smiles as they sleep, and from such facts understand that they are the emotions of their soul as it dreams, which so readily escape to the surface through the delicate tenderness of their infantine body. The fact, however, that the African nation of the Atlantes are said to pass through the night in a deep lethargic sleep, brings down on them the censure that something is wrong in the constitution of their soul. Now either report, which is occasionally calumnious against barbarians, deceived Herodotus,[1] or else a large force of demons of this sort domineers in those barbarous regions. Since, indeed, Aristotle remarks of a certain hero of Sardinia that he used to withhold the power of visions and dreams from such as resorted to his shrine for inspiration, it must lie at the will and caprice of the demons to take away as well as to confer the faculty of dreams; and from this circumstance may have arisen the remarkable fact [which we have mentioned[2]] of Nero and Thrasymedes only dreaming so late in life. We, however, derive dreams from God. Why, then, did not the Atlantes receive the dreaming faculty from God, because there is really no nation which is now a stranger to God, since the gospel flashes its glorious light through the world to the ends of the earth? Could it then be that rumour deceived Aristotle, or is this caprice still the way of demons? [Let us take any view of the case], only

[1] [Who mentions this story of the *Atlantes* in iv. 184.]

[2] [In ch. xliv.]

do not let it be imagined that any soul is by its natural constitution exempt from dreams.

CHAP. L.—*On* DEATH. *All must die, in spite of the absurd opinion of Epicurus and the profane conceits of the heretic Menander; even Enoch and Elijah are reserved for death.*

We have by this time said enough about sleep, the mirror and image of death; and likewise about the occupations of sleep, even dreams. Let us now go on to consider the cause of our departure hence—that is, the appointment and course of death—because we must not leave even it unquestioned and unexamined, although it is itself the very end of all questions and investigations. According to the general sentiment of the human race, we declare death to be "the debt of nature." So much has been settled by the voice of God;[1] such is the contract with everything which is born: so that even from this the frigid conceit of Epicurus is refuted, who says that no such debt is due from us; and not only so, but the insane opinion of the Samaritan heretic Menander is also rejected, who will have it that death has not only nothing to do with his disciples, but in fact never reaches them. He pretends to have received such a commission from the secret power of One above, that all who partake of his baptism become immortal, incorruptible, and instantaneously invested with resurrection-life. We read, no doubt, of very many wonderful kinds of waters: how, for instance, the vinous quality of the stream intoxicates people who drink of the Lyncestis; how at Colophon the waters of an oracle-inspiring fountain[2] affect men with madness; how Alexander was killed by the poisonous water from Mount Nonacris in Arcadia. Then, again, there was in Judea before the time of Christ a pool of medicinal virtue. It is well known how the poet has commemorated the marshy Styx as preserving men from death; although Thetis had, in spite of the preservative, to lament her son. And for the matter of that, were Menander himself to take a plunge into this famous

[1] [Gen. ii. 17.]

[2] [Scaturigo dæmonica.]

Styx, he would certainly have to die after all; for you must come to the Styx, placed as it is by all accounts in the regions of the dead. Well, but what and where are those blessed and charming waters which not even John Baptist ever used in his preministrations, nor Christ after him ever revealed to His disciples? What was this wondrous bath of Menander? He is a comical fellow, I ween.[1] But why [was such a font] so seldom in request, so obscure, one to which so very few ever resorted for their cleansing? I really see something to suspect in so rare an occurrence of a sacrament to which is attached so very much security and safety, and which dispenses with the ordinary law of dying even in the service of God Himself, when, on the contrary, all nations have "to ascend to the mount of the Lord and to the house of the God of Jacob," who demands of His saints in martyrdom that death which He exacted even of His Christ. No one will ascribe to magic such influence as shall exempt from death, or which shall refresh and vivify life, like the vine by the renewal of its condition. Such power was not accorded to the great Medea herself—over a human being at any rate, if allowed her over a silly sheep. Enoch no doubt was translated,[2] and so was Elijah;[3] nor did they experience death: it was postponed, [and only postponed,] most certainly: they are reserved for the suffering of death, that by their blood they may extinguish Antichrist.[4] Even John underwent death, although concerning him there had prevailed an ungrounded expectation that he would remain alive until the coming of the Lord.[5] Heresies, indeed, for the most part spring hurriedly into existence, from examples furnished by ourselves: they procure their defensive armour from the very place which they attack. The whole question resolves itself, in short, into this challenge: Where are to be found the men whom Menander himself has baptized? whom he has

[1] [It is difficult to say what Tertullian means by his "comicum credo." Is it a playful parody on the heretic's name, the same as the comic poet's (Menander)?]

[2] [Gen. v. 24; Heb. xi. 5.]

[3] [2 Kings ii. 11.]

[4] [Rev. xi. 3.]

[5] [John xxi. 23.]

plunged into his Styx? Let them come forth and stand before us—those apostles of his whom he has made immortal? Let my [doubting] Thomas see them, let him hear them, let him handle them—and he is convinced.

CHAP. LI.—*Death entirely separates the soul from the body, although some have supposed that in certain cases souls have adhered to the body after death; some curious cases mentioned and commented on.*

But the operation of death is plain and obvious: it is the separation of body and soul. Some, however, in reference to the soul's immortality, on which they have so feeble a hold through not being taught of God, maintain it with such beggarly arguments, that they would fain have it supposed that certain souls cleave to the body even after death. It is indeed in this sense that Plato, although he despatches at once to heaven such souls as he pleases,[1] yet in his *Republic*[2] exhibits to us the corpse of an unburied person, which was preserved a long time without corruption, by reason of the soul remaining, as he says, unseparated from the body. To the same purport also Democritus remarks on the growth for a considerable while of the human nails and hair in the grave. Now, it is quite possible that the nature of the atmosphere tended to the preservation of the above-mentioned corpse. What if the air were particularly dry, and the ground of a saline nature? What, too, if the substance of the body itself were unusually dry and arid? What, moreover, if the mode of the death had already eliminated from the corpse all corrupting matter? As for the nails, since they are the commencement of the nerves, they may well seem to be prolonged, owing to the nerves themselves being relaxed and extended, and to be protruded more and more as the flesh fails. The hair, again, is nourished from the brain, which would cause it endure for a long time as its secret aliment and defence. Indeed, in the case of living persons themselves, the whole head of hair is copious or scanty in proportion to the exuberance of the brain. You have medical men [to

[1] [See below, ch. liv.] [2] [Ch. x. p. 614.]

attest the fact]. But not a particle of the soul can possibly remain in the body, which is itself destined to disappear when time shall have abolished the entire scene on which the body has played its part. And yet even this partial survival of the soul finds a place in the opinions of some men; and on this account they will not have the body consumed at its funeral by fire, because they would spare the small residue of the soul. There is, however, another way of accounting for this pious treatment, not as if it meant to favour the relics of the soul, but as if it would avert a cruel custom in the interest even of the body; since, being human, it is itself undeserving of an end which is also inflicted upon murderers. The truth is, the soul is indivisible, because it is immortal; [and this fact] compels us to believe that death itself is an indivisible process, accruing indivisibly to the soul, not indeed because it is immortal, but because it is indivisible. Death, however, would have to be divided in its operation, if the soul were divisible into particles, any one of which has to be reserved for a later stage of death. At this rate, a part of death will have to stay behind for a portion of the soul. I am not ignorant that some vestige of this opinion still exists. I have found it out from one of my own people. I am acquainted with the case of a woman, the daughter of Christian parents,[1] who in the very flower of her age and beauty slept peacefully [in Jesus], after a singularly happy though brief married life. Before they laid her in her grave, and when the priest began the appointed office, at the very first breath of his prayer she withdrew her hands from her side, placed them in an attitude of devotion, and after the holy service was concluded restored them to their lateral position. Then, again, there is that well-known story among our own people, that a body voluntarily made way in a certain cemetery, to afford room for another body to be placed near to it. If, as is the case, similar stories are told amongst the heathen, [we can only conclude that] God everywhere manifests signs of His own power—to His own people for their comfort, to strangers for a testimony unto them. I would indeed much

[1] Vernaculam ecclesiæ.

rather suppose that a portent of this kind happened from the direct agency of God than from any relics of the soul: for if there were a residue of these, they would be certain to move the other limbs; and even if they moved the hands, this still would not have been for the purpose of a prayer. Nor would the corpse have been simply content to have made way for its neighbour: it would, besides, have benefited its own self also by the change of its position. But from whatever cause proceeded these phenomena, which you must put down amongst signs and portents, it is impossible that they should regulate nature. Death, if it once falls short of totality in operation, is not death. If any fraction of the soul remain, it makes a living state. Death will no more mix with life, than will night with day.

CHAP. LII.—*All kinds of death, extraordinary or ordinary, are really a violence to nature, arising from sin, which is itself an intrusion upon nature as God created it.*

Such, then, is the work of death—the separation of the soul from the body. Putting out of the question fates and fortuitous circumstances, it has been, according to men's views, distinguished in a twofold form—the ordinary and the extraordinary. The ordinary they ascribe to nature, exercising its quiet influence in the case of each individual decease; the extraordinary is said to be contrary to nature, happening in every violent death. As for our own views, indeed, we know what was man's origin, and we boldly assert and persistently maintain that death happens not by way of natural consequence to man, but owing to a fault and defect which is not itself natural; although it is easy enough, no doubt, to apply the term *natural* to faults and circumstances which seem to have been (though from the emergence of an external cause[1]) inseparable to us from our very birth. If man had been directly appointed to die as the condition of his creation,[2] then of course death must be imputed to nature. Now, that he was not thus appointed to die, is proved by the very law which made his condition

[1] Ex accidentia. [2] In mortem directo institutus est.

depend on a warning, and death result from man's arbitrary choice. Indeed, if he had not sinned, he certainly would not have died. That cannot be nature which happens by the exercise of volition after an alternative has been proposed to it, and not by necessity—the result of an inflexible and unalterable condition. Consequently, although death has various issues, inasmuch as its causes are manifold, we cannot say that the easiest death is so gentle as not to happen by violence [to our nature]. The very law which produces death, simple though it be, is yet violence. How can it be otherwise, when so close a companionship of soul and body, so inseparable a growth together from their very conception of two sister substances, is sundered and divided? For although a man may breathe his last for joy, like the Spartan Chilon, while embracing his son who had just conquered in the Olympic games; or for glory, like the Athenian Clidemus, while receiving a crown of gold for the excellence of his historical writings; or in a dream, like Plato; or in a fit of laughter, like Publius Crassus,—yet death is much too violent, coming as it does upon us by strange and alien means, expelling the soul by a method all its own, calling on us to die at a moment when one might live a jocund life in joy and honour, in peace and pleasure. That is still a violence to ships: although far away from the Capharean rocks, assailed by no storms, without a billow to shatter them, with favouring gale, in gliding course, with merry crews, they founder amidst entire security, suddenly, owing to some internal shock. Not dissimilar are the shipwrecks of life,—the issues of even a tranquil death. It matters not whether the vessel of the human body goes with unbroken timbers or shattered with storms, if the navigation of the soul be overthrown.

CHAP. LIII.—*Lingering death dismisses the soul more slowly than a sudden death; but the entire soul (being indivisible) remains to the last act of vitality, not being ever partially or fractionally withdrawn from the body.*

But where at last will the soul have to lodge, when it is

bare and divested of the body? We must certainly not hesitate to follow it thither, in the order of our inquiry. We must, however, first of all fully state what belongs to the topic before us, in order that no one, because we have mentioned the various issues of death, may expect from us a special description of these, which ought rather to be left to medical men, who are the proper judges of the incidents which appertain to death, or its causes, and the actual conditions of the human body. Of course, with the view of preserving the truth of the soul's immortality, whilst treating this topic, I shall have, on mentioning death, to introduce phrases about dissolution of such a purport as seems to intimate that the soul escapes by degrees, and piece by piece; for it withdraws [from the body] with all the circumstances of a decline, seeming to suffer consumption, and suggests to us the idea of being annihilated by the slow process of its departure. But the entire reason of this phenomenon is in the body, and arises from the body. For whatever be the kind of death [which operates on man], it undoubtedly produces the destruction either of the matter, or of the region, or of the passages of vitality: of the matter, such as the gall and the blood; of the region, such as the heart and the liver; of the passages, such as the veins and the arteries. Inasmuch, then, as these parts of the body are severally devastated by an injury proper to each of them, even to the very last ruin and annulling of the vital powers—in other words, of the ends, the sites, and the functions of nature—it must needs come to pass, amidst the gradual decay of its instruments, domiciles, and spaces, that the soul also itself, being driven to abandon each successive part, assumes the appearance of being lessened to nothing; in some such manner as a charioteer is assumed to have himself failed, when his horses, through fatigue, withdraw from him their energies. But this assumption applies only to the circumstances of the despoiled person, not to any real condition of suffering. Likewise the body's charioteer, the animal spirit, fails on account of the failure of its vehicle, not of itself—abandoning its work, but not its vigour—languishing

in operation, but not in essential condition — bankrupt in solvency, not in substance—because ceasing to put in an appearance, but not ceasing to exist. Thus every rapid death—such as a decapitation, or a breaking of the neck,[1] which opens at once a vast outlet for the soul; or a sudden ruin, which at a stroke crushes every vital action, like that inner ruin apoplexy—retards not the soul's escape, nor painfully separates its departure into successive moments. Where, however, the death is a lingering one, the soul abandons its position in the way in which it is itself abandoned. And yet it is not by this process severed in fractions: it is slowly drawn out; and whilst thus extracted, it causes the last remnant to seem to be but a part of itself. No portion, however, must be deemed separable, because it is the last; nor, because it is a small one, must it be regarded as susceptible of dissolution. Accordant with a series is its end, and the middle is prolonged to the extremes; and the remnants cohere to the mass, and are waited for, but never abandoned by it. And I will even venture to say, that the last of a whole is the whole; because while it is less, and the latest, it yet belongs to the whole, and completes it. Hence, indeed, many times it happens that the soul in its actual separation is more powerfully agitated with a more anxious gaze, and a quickened loquacity; whilst from the loftier and freer position in which it is now placed, it enunciates, by means of its last remnant still lingering in the flesh, what it sees, what it hears, and what it is beginning to know. In Platonic phrase, indeed, the body is a prison,[2] but in the apostle's it is "the temple of God,"[3] because it is in Christ. Still, [as must be admitted,] by reason of its enclosure it obstructs and obscures the soul, and sullies it by the concretion of the flesh; whence it happens that the light which illumines objects comes in upon the soul in a more confused manner, as if through a window of horn. Undoubtedly, when the soul, by the power of death, is released from its

[1] [We have made Tertullian's "cervicum messis" include both these modes of instantaneous death.]

[2] [*Phædo*, p. 62, c. 6.] [3] [1 Cor. iii. 16, vi. 19; 2 Cor. vi. 16.]

concretion with the flesh, it is by the very release cleansed and purified: it is, moreover, certain that it escapes from the veil of the flesh into open space, to its clear, and pure, and intrinsic light; and then finds itself enjoying its enfranchisement from matter, and by virtue of its liberty it recovers its divinity, as one who awakes out of sleep passes from images to verities. Then it tells out what it sees; then it exults or it fears, according as it finds what lodging is prepared for it, as soon as it sees the very angel's face, that arraigner of souls, the Mercury of the poets.

CHAP. LIV.—*Whither does the soul retire when it quits the body? Various opinions of philosophers stated on this point, all more or less absurd. The* HADES *of Plato.*

To the question, therefore, whither the soul is withdrawn, we now give an answer. Almost all the philosophers, who hold the soul's immortality, notwithstanding their special views on the subject, still claim for it this [eternal condition], as Pythagoras, and Empedocles, and Plato, and as they who indulge it with some delay from the time of its quitting the flesh to the conflagration of all things, and as the Stoics, who place only their own souls, that is, the souls of the wise, in the mansions above. Plato, it is true, does not allow this destination to all the souls, indiscriminately, of even all the philosophers, but only of those who have cultivated their philosophy out of love to boys. So great is the privilege which impurity obtains at the hands of philosophers! In his system, then, the souls of the wise are carried up on high into the ether: according to Arius,[1] into the air; according to the Stoics, into the moon. I wonder, indeed, that they abandon to the earth the souls of the unwise, when they affirm that even these are instructed by the wise, so much their superiors. For where is the school where they can have been instructed in the vast space which divides them? By what means can the pupil-souls have resorted to their teachers, when they are parted from each other by so distant

[1] [An Alexandrian philosopher in great repute with the Emperor Augustus.]

an interval? What profit, too, can any instruction afford them at all in their posthumous state, when they are on the brink of perdition by the universal fire? All other souls they thrust down to Hades, which Plato, in his *Phædo*,[1] describes as the bosom of the earth, where all the filth of the world accumulates, settles, and exhales, and where every separate draught of air only renders denser still the impurities of the seething mass.

CHAP. LV.—*The Christian idea of the position of* HADES; *the blessedness of* PARADISE *immediately after death; the privilege of the martyrs, whose death, being a novel one, deserved especial honour.*

By ourselves the lower regions [of Hades] are not supposed to be a bare cavity, nor some subterranean sewer of the world, but a vast deep space in the interior of the earth, and a concealed recess in its very bowels; inasmuch as we read that Christ in His death spent three days in the heart of the earth,[2] that is, in the secret inner recess which is hidden in the earth, and enclosed by the earth, and superimposed on the abysmal depths which lie still lower down. Now although Christ is God, yet, being also man, "He died according to the Scriptures,"[3] and "according to the same Scriptures was buried."[4] With the same law of His being He fully complied, by remaining in Hades in the form and condition of a dead man; nor did He ascend into the heights of heaven before descending into the lower parts of the earth, that He might there make the patriarchs and prophets partakers of Himself.[5] [This being the case], you must suppose Hades to be a subterranean region, and keep at arm's length those who are too proud to believe that the souls of the faithful deserve a place in the lower regions.[6] These persons, who are "servants above their Lord, and disciples above their Master,"[7] would no doubt spurn to receive the comfort of the resurrection, if they must expect it in Abraham's bosom.

[1] [*Phædo*, pp. 112–114.]
[2] [Matt. xii. 40.]
[3] [1 Cor. xv. 3.]
[4] [Ver. 4.]
[5] [1 Pet. iii. 19.]
[6] [See Irenæus, *adv. Hæres.* v. (last chapter).]
[7] [Matt. x. 24.]

But it was for this purpose, say they, that Christ descended into hell, that we might not ourselves have to descend thither. Well, then, what difference is there between heathens and Christians, if the same prison awaits them all when dead? How, indeed, shall the soul mount up to heaven, where Christ is already sitting at the Father's right hand, when as yet the archangel's trumpet has not been heard by the command of God,[1]—when as yet those whom the coming of the Lord is to find on the earth, have not been caught up into the air to meet Him at His coming,[2] in company with the dead in Christ, who shall be the first to arise?[3] To no one is heaven opened; the earth is still safe for him, I would not say it is shut against him. When the world, indeed, shall pass away, then the kingdom of heaven shall be opened. Shall we then have to sleep high up in ether, with the boy-loving worthies of Plato; or in the air with Arius; or around the moon with the Endymions of the Stoics? No, but in Paradise, you tell me, whither already the patriarchs and prophets have removed from Hades in the retinue of the Lord's resurrection. How is it, then, that the region of Paradise, which as revealed to John in the Spirit lay under the altar,[4] displays no other souls as in it besides the souls of the martyrs? How is it that the most heroic martyr Perpetua on the day of her passion saw only her fellow-martyrs there, in the revelation which she received of Paradise, if it were not that the sword which guarded the entrance permitted none to go in thereat, except those who had died in Christ and not in Adam? A new death for God, even the extraordinary one for Christ, is admitted into the reception-room of mortality, specially altered and adapted to receive the new-comer. Observe, then, the difference between a heathen and a Christian in their death: if you have to lay down your life for God, as the Comforter[5] counsels, it is not in gentle fevers and on soft beds, but in the sharp pains of martyrdom: you must take up the cross and bear it after your Master, as He has Himself instructed you.[6] The sole key to unlock Paradise is your own life's

[1] [1 Cor. xv. 52 and 1 Thess. iv. 16.] [2] [1 Thess. iv. 17.]
[3] [Ver. 16.] [4] [Rev. vi. 9.] [5] Paracletus. [6] [Matt. xvi. 24.]

blood.[1] You have a treatise by us, "*De Paradiso*" [on Paradise], in which we have established the position that every soul is detained in safe keeping in Hades until the day of the Lord.

CHAP. LVI.—*On the Homeric view of the soul's detention from Hades owing to the body's being unburied; Tertullian's refutation of this and of another notion, that souls, when prematurely separated from the body, had to wait for admission into Hades until their days were fulfilled.*

There arises the question, whether this takes place immediately after the soul's departure from the body; whether some souls are detained for special reasons in the meantime here on earth; and whether it is permitted them of their own accord, or by the intervention of authority, to be removed from Hades[2] at some subsequent time? Even such opinions as these are not by any means lacking persons to advance them with confidence. It was believed that the unburied dead were not admitted into the infernal regions before they had received a proper sepulture; as in the case of Homer's Patroclus, who earnestly asks for a burial of Achilles in a dream, on the ground that he could not enter Hades through any other portal, since the souls of the sepulchred dead kept thrusting him away.[3] We know that Homer exhibited more than a poetic licence here; he had in view the rights of the dead. Proportioned, indeed, to his care for the just honours of the tomb, was his censure of that delay of burial which was injurious to souls. [It was also his purpose to add a warning], that no man should, by detaining in his house the corpse of a friend, only expose himself, along with the deceased, to increased injury and trouble, by the irregularity[4] of the consolation which he nourishes with pain and grief. He has accordingly kept a twofold object in view in picturing the complaints of an unburied soul: he wished to maintain honour to the dead by promptly attending to their funeral, as well as

[1] [The souls of the martyrs were, according to Tertullian, at once removed to Paradise (Bp. Kaye, p. 249).]

[2] Ab inferis. [3] [*Iliad*, xxiii. 72, etc.] [4] Enormitate.

to moderate the feelings of grief which their memory excited. But, after all, how vain is it to suppose that the soul could bear the rites and requirements of the body, or carry any of them away to the infernal regions! And how much vainer still is it, if injury be supposed to accrue to the soul from that neglect of burial which it ought to receive rather as a favour! For surely the soul which had no willingness to die might well prefer as tardy a removal to Hades as possible. It will love the undutiful heir, by whose means it still enjoys the light. If, however, it is certain that injury accrues to the soul from a tardy interment of the body—and the gist of the injury lies in the neglect of the burial—it is yet in the highest degree unfair, that that should receive all the injury to which the faulty delay could not possibly be imputed, for of course all the fault rests on the nearest relations of the dead. They also say that those souls which are taken away by a premature death wander about hither and thither until they have completed the residue of the years which they would have lived through, had it not been for their untimely fate. Now either their days are appointed to all men severally, and if so appointed, I cannot suppose them capable of being shortened; or if, notwithstanding such appointment, they may be shortened by the will of God, or some other powerful influence, then [I say] such shortening is of no validity, if they still may be accomplished in some other way. If, on the other hand, they are not appointed, there cannot be any residue to be fulfilled for unappointed periods. I have another remark to make. Suppose it be an infant that dies yet hanging on the breast; or it may be an immature boy; or it may be, once more, a youth arrived at puberty: suppose, moreover, that the life in each case ought to have reached full eighty years, how is it possible that the soul of either could spend the whole of the shortened years here on earth after losing the body by death? One's age cannot be passed without one's body, it being by help of the body that the period of life has its duties and labours transacted. Let our own people, moreover, bear this in mind, that souls are to receive back at the resurrection the self-

same bodies in which they died. Therefore our bodies must be expected to resume the same conditions and the same ages, for it is these particulars which impart to bodies their especial modes. By what means, then, can the soul of an infant so spend on earth its residue of years, that it should be able at the resurrection to assume the state of an octogenarian, although it had barely lived a month? Or if it shall be necessary that the appointed days of life be fulfilled here on earth, must the same course of life in all its vicissitudes, which has been itself ordained to accompany the appointed days, be also passed through by the soul along with the days? Must it employ itself in school studies in its passage from infancy to boyhood; play the soldier in the excitement and vigour of youth and earlier manhood; and encounter serious and judicial responsibilities in the graver years between ripe manhood and old age? Must it ply trade for profit, turn up the soil with hoe and plough, go to sea, bring actions at law, get married, toil and labour, undergo illnesses, and whatever casualties of weal and woe await it in the lapse of years? Well, but how are all these transactions to be managed without one's body? Life [spent] without life? But [you will tell me] the destined period in question is to be bare of all incident whatever, only to be accomplished by merely elapsing. What, then, is to prevent its being fulfilled in Hades, where there is absolutely no use to which you can apply it? We therefore maintain that every soul, whatever be its age on quitting the body, remains unchanged in the same, until the time shall come when the promised perfection shall be realized in a state duly tempered to the measure of the peerless angels. Hence those souls must be accounted as passing an exile in Hades, which people are apt to regard as carried off by violence, especially by cruel tortures, such as those of the cross, and the axe, and the sword, and the lion; but we do not account those to be violent deaths which justice awards, that avenger of violence. So then, you will say, it is all the wicked souls that are banished in Hades. [Not quite so fast, is my answer.] I must compel you to determine [what you mean by Hades], which of its two regions,

the region of the good or of the bad. If you mean the bad, [all I can say is, that] even now the souls of the wicked deserve to be consigned to those abodes; if you mean the good, why should you judge to be unworthy of such a resting-place the souls of infants and of virgins, and[1] those which, by reason of their condition in life, were pure and innocent?

CHAP. LVII.—*The arts of* MAGIC *and* SORCERY *only apparent in their effects: they have no real power over disembodied souls. God alone can raise the dead.*

It is either a very fine thing to be detained in these infernal regions with the *Aori*, or souls which were prematurely hurried away; or else a very bad thing indeed to be there associated with the *Biaeothanati*, who suffered violent deaths. I may be permitted to use the actual words and terms with which magic rings again, that inventor of all these odd opinions — with its Ostanes, and Typhon, and Dardanus, and Damigeron, and Nectabis, and Berenice. There is a well-known popular bit of writing,[2] which undertakes to summon up from the abode of Hades the souls which have actually slept out their full age, and had passed away by an honourable death, and had even been buried with full rites and proper ceremony. What after this shall we say about magic? Say, to be sure, what almost everybody says of it—that it is an imposture. But it is not we Christians only whose notice this system of imposture does not escape. We, it is true, have discovered these spirits of evil, not, to be sure, by a complicity with them, but by a certain knowledge which is hostile to them; nor is it by any procedure which is attractive to them, but by a power which subjugates them that we handle [their wretched system]—that manifold pest of the mind of man, that artificer of all error, that destroyer of our salvation and

[1] [We have treated this particle as a conjunction; but it may only be an intensive particle introducing an explanatory clause: "*even* those which were pure," etc.]

[2] Litteratura.

our soul at one swoop.[1] In this way, even by magic, which is indeed only a second idolatry, wherein they pretend that after death they become demons, just as they were supposed in the first and literal idolatry to become gods (and why not? since the gods are but dead things), the before-mentioned *Aori* and *Biaeothanati* are actually invoked,—and not unfairly,[2] if one grounds his faith on this principle, that it is clearly credible for those souls to be beyond all others addicted to violence and wrong, which with violence and wrong have been hurried away by a cruel and premature death, and which would have a keen appetite for reprisals. Under cover, however, of these souls, demons operate, especially such as used to dwell in them when they were in life, and who had driven them, in fact, to the fate which had at last carried them off. For, as we have already suggested,[3] there is hardly a human being who is unattended by a demon; and it is well known to many, that premature and violent deaths, which men ascribe to accidents, are in fact brought about by demons. This imposture of the evil spirit lying concealed in the persons of the dead, we are able, if I mistake not, to prove by actual facts, when in cases of exorcism [the evil spirit] affirms himself sometimes to be one of the relatives[4] of the person possessed by him, sometimes a gladiator or a bestiarius,[5] and sometimes even a god; always making it one of his chief cares to extinguish the very truth which we are proclaiming, that men may not readily believe that all souls remove to Hades, and that they may overthrow faith in the resurrection and the judgment. And yet for all that, the demon, after trying to circumvent the bystanders, is vanquished by the pressure of divine grace, and sorely against his will confesses all the truth. So also in that other kind of magic, which is supposed to bring up from Hades the souls

[1] [Oehler takes these descriptive clauses as meant of *Satan*, instead of being synonymes of *magic*, as the context seems to require.]

[2] Æque. [3] [Above, in ch. xxxix.]

[4] Aliquem ex parentibus.

[5] [One who fought with wild beasts in the public games, only without the weapons allowed to the gladiator.]

now resting there, and to exhibit them to public view, there is no other expedient of imposture ever resorted to which operates more powerfully. Of course, why a phantom becomes visible, is because a body is also attached to it; and it is no difficult matter to delude the external vision of a man whose mental eye it is so easy to blind. The serpents which emerged from the magicians' rods, certainly appeared to Pharaoh and to the Egyptians as bodily substances. It is true that the verity of Moses swallowed up their lying deceit.[1] Many attempts were also wrought against the apostles by the sorcerers Simon and Elymas,[2] but the blindness which struck [them] was no enchanter's trick. What novelty is there in the effort of an unclean spirit to counterfeit the truth? At this very time, even, the heretical dupes of this same Simon [Magus] are so much elated by the extravagant pretensions of their art, that they undertake to bring up from Hades the souls of the prophets themselves. And I suppose that they can do so under cover of a lying wonder. For, indeed, it was no less than this that was anciently permitted to the Pythonic [or ventriloquistic] spirit[3]—even to represent the soul of Samuel, when Saul consulted the dead, after [losing the living] God.[4] God forbid, however, that we should suppose that the soul of any saint, much less of a prophet, can be dragged out of [its resting-place in Hades] by a demon. We know that "Satan himself is transformed into an angel of light"[5]—much more into a man of light—and that at last he will "show himself to be even God,"[6] and will exhibit "great signs and wonders, insomuch that, if it were possible, he shall deceive the very elect."[7] He hardly[8] hesitated on the before-mentioned occasion to affirm himself to be a prophet of God, and especially to Saul, in whom he was then actually dwelling. You must not imagine that he who produced the phantom was one, and he who consulted it was another; but that it was one and the same spirit, both in the sorceress and

[1] [Ex. vii. 12.]
[2] [Acts viii. 9, xiii. 8.]
[3] [See above in ch. xxviii.]
[4] [1 Sam. xxviii. 6–16.]
[5] [2 Cor. xi. 14.]
[6] [2 Thess. ii. 4.]
[7] [Matt. xxiv. 24.]
[8] Si forte.

in the apostate [king], which easily pretended an apparition of that which it had already prepared them to believe as real —[even the spirit] through whose evil influence Saul's heart was fixed where his treasure was, and where certainly God was not. Therefore it came about, that he saw him through whose aid he believed that he was going to see, because he believed him through whose help he saw. But we are met with the objection, that in visions of the night dead persons are not unfrequently seen, and that for a set purpose.[1] For instance, the Nasamones consult private oracles by frequent and lengthened visits to the sepulchres of their relatives, as one may find in Heraclides, or Nymphodorus, or Herodotus;[2] and the Celts, for the same purpose, stay away all night at the tombs of their brave chieftains, as Nicander affirms. Well, we admit apparitions of dead persons in dreams to be not more really true than those of living persons; but we apply the same estimate to all alike—to the dead and to the living, and indeed to all the phenomena which are seen. Now things are not true because they appear to be so, but because they are fully proved to be so. The truth of dreams is declared from the realization, not the aspect. Moreover, the fact that Hades is not in any case opened for [the escape of] any soul, has been firmly established by the Lord in the person of Abraham, in His representation of the poor man at rest and the rich man in torment.[3] No one, [he said,] could possibly be despatched from those abodes to report to us how matters went in the nether regions,—a purpose which, [if any could be,] might have been allowable on such an occasion, to persuade a belief in Moses and the prophets. The power of God has, no doubt, sometimes recalled men's souls to their bodies, as a proof of His own transcendent rights; but there must never be, because of this fact, any agreement supposed to be possible between the divine faith and the arrogant pretensions of sorcerers, and the imposture of dreams, and the licence of poets. But yet in all cases of a true resurrection, when the power of God recalls souls to their bodies, either by the agency of prophets, or of Christ, or of apostles,

[1] Non frustra. [2] [In iv. 172.] [3] Luke xvi. 26.

a complete presumption is afforded us, by the solid, palpable, and ascertained reality [of the revived body], that its true form must be such as to compel one's belief of the fraudulence of every incorporeal apparition of dead persons.

CHAP. LVIII.—*In conclusion, he considers some stray points which he had postponed. All souls are kept in Hades until the resurrection, anticipating (in a way suited to their disembodied state) their ultimate misery or bliss.*

All souls, therefore, are shut up within Hades: do you admit this? [It is true, whether] you say yes or no: moreover, there are already experienced there punishments and consolations; and there you have a poor man and a rich. And now, having postponed some stray questions[1] for this part of my work, I will notice them in this suitable place, and then come to a close. Why, then, cannot you suppose that the soul undergoes punishment and consolation in Hades in the interval, while it awaits its alternative of judgment, in a certain anticipation either of gloom or of glory? You reply: Because in the judgment of God its matter ought to be sure and safe, nor should there be any inkling beforehand of the award of His sentence; and also because [the soul] ought to be covered first by its vestment[2] of the restored flesh, which, as the partner of its actions, should be also a sharer in its recompense. What, then, is to take place in that interval? Shall we sleep? But souls do not sleep even when men are alive: it is indeed the business of *bodies* to sleep, to which also belongs death itself, no less than its mirror and counterfeit sleep. Or will you have it, that nothing is there done whither the whole human race is attracted, and whither all man's expectation is postponed for safe keeping? Do you think this state is a foretaste of judgment, or its actual commencement? a premature encroachment on it, or the first course in its full ministration? Now really, would it not be the highest possible injustice,

[1] Nescio quid.

[2] ["Operienda" is Oehler's text; another reading gives "opperienda," *q.d.* "the soul must *wait for* the restored body."]

even[1] in Hades, if all were to be still well with the guilty even there, and not well with the righteous even yet? What, would you have hope be still more confused after death? would you have it mock us still more with uncertain expectation? or shall it now become a review of past life, and an arranging of judgment, with the inevitable feeling of a trembling fear? But, again, must the soul always tarry for the body, in order to experience sorrow or joy? Is it not sufficient, even of itself, to suffer both one and the other of these sensations? How often, without any pain to the body, is the soul alone tortured by ill-temper, and anger, and fatigue, and very often unconsciously, even to itself? How often, too, on the other hand, amidst bodily suffering, does the soul seek out for itself some furtive joy, and withdraw for the moment from the body's importunate society? I am mistaken if the soul is not in the habit, indeed, solitary and alone, of rejoicing and glorying over the very tortures of the body. Look, for instance, at the soul of Mutius [Scævola], as he melts his right hand over the fire; look also at Zeno's, as the torments of Dionysius pass over it.[2] The bites of wild beasts are a glory to young heroes, as on Cyrus were the scars of the bear.[3] Full well, then, does the soul even in Hades know how to joy and to sorrow even without the body; since when in the flesh it feels pain when it likes, though the body is unhurt; and when it likes it feels joy, though the body is in pain. Now if such sensations occur at its will during life, how much rather may they not happen after death by the judicial appointment of God! Moreover, the soul executes not all its operations with the ministration of the flesh; for the judgment of God pursues even simple cogitations and the merest volitions. "Whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart."[4] Therefore, even for this cause it is most fitting that the soul, without at all waiting for the flesh, should be punished for what

[1] [This "etiam" is "otium" in the Agobardine MS., a good reading; *q.d.* "a most iniquitous *indifference* to justice," etc.]

[2] [Comp. *The Apology*, last chapter.]

[3] [Xen. *Cyropæd.* p. 6.]

[4] [Matt. v. 28.]

it has done without the partnership of the flesh. So, on the same principle, in return for the pious and kindly thoughts in which it shared not the help of the flesh, shall it without the flesh receive its consolation. Nay more,[1] even in matters done through the flesh the soul is the first to conceive them, the first to arrange them, the first to authorize them, the first to precipitate them into acts. And even if it is sometimes unwilling to act, it is still the first to treat the object which it means to effect by help of the body. In no case, indeed, can an accomplished fact be prior to the mental conception[2] thereof. It is therefore quite in keeping with this order of things, that that part of our nature should be the first to have the recompense and reward to which they are due on account of its priority. In short, inasmuch as we understand "the prison" pointed out in the Gospel to be Hades,[3] and as we also interpret "the uttermost farthing"[4] to mean the very smallest offence which has to be atoned for there before the resurrection,[5] no one will hesitate to believe that the soul undergoes in Hades some compensatory discipline, without prejudice to the full process of the resurrection, when the recompense will be administered through the flesh besides. This point the Paraclete has also pressed home on our attention in most frequent admonitions, whenever any of us has admitted the force of His words from a knowledge of His promised spiritual disclosures. And now at last having, as I believe, encountered every human opinion concerning the soul, and tried its character by the teaching of [our holy faith], we have satisfied the curiosity which is simply a reasonable and necessary one. As for that which is extravagant and idle, there will evermore be as great a defect in its information, as there has been exaggeration and self-will in its researches.

[1] Quid nunc si. [2] Conscientia. [3] [Matt. v. 25.] [4] [Ver. 26.]
[5] Morâ resurrectionis. [See above, on this opinion of Tertullian, in ch. xxxv.]

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