




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"Yet a More Excellent Way."

AN ESSAY

on the

THEORY AND PRACTICE

of the

CHRISTIAN RELIGION

By

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“How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when I consider how many great and extraordinary men have gone before me in the like design, yet I am not without some hopes—upon the consideration that the largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who is short-sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped far better eyes.”

—Bishop Berkeley.

PART I.

The Theory.

CHAPTER I.

The Sensible Service of Christianity.

Every Sunday the highways and byways of Christendom are thronged with people going to church. About everybody goes to church more or less often. The man or woman who never goes to church is rare. Few, perhaps, go every Sunday, but almost any Sunday finds a large part of the people going.

Why do people go to church?

Because they find some profit in going, of course. In providing the church to go to, Christianity renders people a sensible service, by which I mean a service appreciated by the people themselves as such. The church to go to is plainly the efficient implement, so to speak, to a valued purpose, else the people would not make the use of it we find them making.

On the first face of it, going to church is a religious proceeding.

Religion, in the general and objective sense, holds always, I suppose, the purpose to effect a harmony of will between God and man; to make God's will to be man's will. In a word, atonement, that is, at-one-ment, is the purpose common to all religions. It is in their several methods of bringing about the atonement that religions differ. Each religion has its own peculiar method of making man to be at one with God, and back of the method its peculiar theory of the relation of man to God.

The theory back of the Christian method, if I understand it, embraces these three fundamental doctrines, namely: The doctrine of man's inevitable depravity, holding that we fall into sin, that is, into God's disfavor, in spite of all we may do, and that such sin, prior to the coming of Jesus Christ, was inexpiable, to the end that we could not possibly be at one with God; the doctrine of vicarious expiation, holding that the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, while rendering us none the less inevitably sinful, expiated our sin in general, in such measure as to leave the completion of our atonement within the compass of our own power; and, finally, the doctrine of completed satisfaction in virtue of expiatory activities by ourselves in our own behalf.

I use the term activities in a large sense. For instance, I would call believing an activity, and the faith whereby man is justified according to some, an expiatory activity. For this faith is an act of the mind in some degree voluntary, as every exhortation to faith implies.

There is no uniformity of practice among Christians to determine what these expiatory activities are; in answer to the question, What must a man do, precisely, in consummation of his atonement made possible by the sacrifice of Jesus Christ? various answers are heard; it is in answering this question that Christianity breaks up into sects. But it is enough for our present purpose to observe that going to church is one of these activities. It is, *prima facie*, as we were just now saying, a religious and a Christian proceeding.

Are we, then, permitted to say at once that the sensible service which Christianity plainly renders

the people in providing them a church to go to is a religious service?

Obviously, we have yet to look at this proceeding of going to church in another aspect. We need to know something of the intent with which people go to church, before we decide what is the sensible service rendered by Christianity in providing the church to go to. Before we may say that the sensible service, the service which the people themselves appreciate as such, is a religious service, we need be assured that the proceeding of going to church is actuated by a religious purpose; specifically, the purpose to expiate sin, as our brief view of the Christian theory will perhaps serve to make clear.

What is it that the people have come out for to see, or hear, or feel?

Is their purpose, which the church to go to is being made to serve, a religious purpose?

We need attempt no fine analysis. The motives of the multitude we find going to church concern us only in their general character. It is not what they are, particularly, but whether or not they are derived from the desire to be at one with God, that has to do with our present inquiry.

CHAPTER II.

The Church Diverting.

In a house of Christian worship where there were sittings for 1,500, fewer than fifty souls met, on a certain Sabbath evening, to hear the sermon of instruction and the anthems of praise.

The pastor and the trustees agreed that something had to be done, at once; it did not pay to hold services of that sort for the benefit of such a small congregation. The pastor proposed, since the people would not come to the church, that the church go to the people. Specifically, he was for having the Sunday evening services in the chief theater of the town; he would make them as informal as possible, with bright orchestral music, a broad sermon, but short, and touching everyday affairs, and no collection. He felt assured that people would attend such services.

Some of the trustees had their doubts. They thought it would be better to discontinue evening services. But they did not insist. They were willing that the pastor have his own way.

The trial seemed amply to vindicate the pastor's wisdom. The first time services were held in the theater, 2,000 souls attended.

People found a use in going to church in the theater which they did not find in going to church in the temple. Going to church in the theater yielded them a sensible profit which going to church in the temple did not yield. Christianity, providing in both cases the church to go to, rendered a sensible service in the

one case which it did not render in the other. Otherwise, there would be no such disparity in the numbers of the two congregations.

What was this sensible service? Particularly, was it a religious service?

What was done before the congregation in the theater would seem at first glance to be about what would have been done before a congregation in the temple. There was music, some prayers and a sermon. The prayers and the sermon were precisely what they would have been in the temple. The music was furnished in part by the regular choir, and in part by the orchestra of the theater.

The surroundings were not very different. There were frescoed ceilings, carved wainscotings, hammered brass chandeliers, a flood of soft light over all here in the theater, just as there in the temple. Things are a bit tawdrier, here, it may be; doubtless they cost less money. But, after all, they are not very different.

Yet there is certainly enough difference, by reason of one thing and another, to provide the element of novelty. Nobody may doubt that there is novelty here; and novelty is diverting. Shifting the services of worship from the accustomed temple to the unaccustomed theater, and providing a new feature or two, like the orchestral music, the pastor causes these services of worship to become a means of diversion.

And does not this tell the whole story?

It happens that a lesser offering of diversion suffices to attract people of a Sunday. Diversions which they might quite neglect any other day, people embrace eagerly on Sunday.

Sunday is likely to be a dull day for those ordinarily busy; it is a day of rest and rest soon gets to be burdensome. A man sleeps as late as he can Sunday morning. He succeeds in spending half his forenoon in bed, perhaps. When he can sleep no more, he gets him a Sunday newspaper, and with it manages to fill his time until dinner, which he does not eat very early, naturally enough. The Sunday dinner is probably the heaviest meal of the week, and the most elaborate. The man dispatches it in a leisurely way, and by the time he has finished, the afternoon is well along. Now the torpor of digestion, or indigestion, overtakes him, and he is enabled to doze away some hours. Or, if the weather is fine, he may walk out.

But evening is likely to find him quite at the end of his resources. He has still several long hours of idleness before him. He is in the thoroughly rested condition that makes further rest intolerable. In this extremity he has recourse to the churches.

The man looks up the church announcements in his newspaper. He finds that several of the churches promise unusual features.

He reads that a certain pastor will tell what he thinks of the municipal government, sparing nobody. Another pastor will preach about dancing, as high society dances. Another will discuss the story of Jonah and the whale, giving his reasons for not believing it.

In one church the experiment of employing pretty young women as ushers will be tried for the first time. In another, communion will be with individual cups, a new thing; the people there are afraid of swallowing microbes from the common cup. One choir is to be augmented by the voice of a famous

opera singer. Another choir has been enlarged into a chorus, and will offer a service of song, the sermon being altogether dispensed with.

Finally, the man discovers, services of worship are going to be held in the chief theater of the town. The seats will be free; there will be no collection; the orchestra of the house will assist with the music.

He goes to church in the theater. His ennui drives him to go to church somewhere. The theater services seem to him to offer the best refuge from his ennui. They promise the best means of whiling away the hours of the evening.

Nothing could be farther from this man's mind, probably, than the conscious thought of God. It is with no purpose of taking advantage of the religious offices of Christianity that he goes to church. He goes to church in the theater when he would not think of going to church in the temple; yet did he go in order to expiate his sin, and with that end in view, he would make no such distinction between going here and going there. It cannot be in the possession of a religious purpose, of the purpose to please God, that the man neglected the church last Sunday, when it was the temple, while he uses it today, when it is the theater. It is no religious use that he makes of Christianity's implements. These implements serve him sensibly, but with a worldly service.

There are a good many of the character of this man in the congregation of 2,000. Exclude all of his character, and you have but few, perhaps, beyond the congregation of fifty.

We hear it complained that the secularization of the Sabbath keeps people away from church. Once Sunday was a perfectly empty day, except for re-

ligious activities. There were no implements provided to any save a religious purpose, except as they might serve another purpose incidentally. But now it has come to pass that implements are provided on Sunday about as they are provided any other day, that is, to almost any purpose men may have. Once people might go to church or do nothing. Now they have a wider choice. They may golf or play tennis or go to the play, or they may go to church. At once the temples are deserted.

The secularization of the Sabbath would seem to be the occasion rather than the cause of the people staying away from church. Were the implements to ostensibly worldly purposes to be withheld from the people, it is not unlikely that they would go to church; but simply to deprive them of the alternative of doing that which is more diverting than going to church would not be to make them have a use for the religious offices of Christianity. If the secularization of the Sabbath keeps people away from church; if the people are kept away from church by being permitted to do those things which in comparison with going to church are simply more diverting, and not in the remotest way comparable as religious activities, it goes to show that the sensible service of Christianity, in any case, and no matter how great it may be, is not a religious service. If it were a religious service, people would not neglect the church to golf or play tennis. The opportunity to do a more diverting thing would not keep away from church the man bent on doing an expiatory thing, a thing pleasing in the sight of God. The religious purpose is lacking; the sensible service cannot be a religious service.

Compare the sumptuous temple yonder with the old meeting-houses of New England, which you have heard your fathers and mothers tell about. Why the change? You answer when you ask yourself how many people would go to church if the only church to go to were the old-fashioned meeting-house, with its torturesome seats and its long services. The church has become luxurious for the same reason that the pastor holds his services of worship in the theater; that is, in order to get people to come to church. Innovation has little by little put the modern temple in the place of the old-fashioned temple; and the thought behind the innovation (an unconscious thought, I suppose) has been the thought to make the church an implement to a purely worldly purpose, a means of diversion. The thought stands confessed in that the moment an innovation has lost its novelty, and thus its power to divert, still further innovation has been devised, and put in practice, until we have worship of such forms and appurtenances that our grandfathers would hardly recognize it for worship at all.

The religious purpose is lacking; the old meeting-house was as effective an implement to a religious purpose as the most gorgeous temple is; there was no call for innovation except as the people lost the religious purpose.

But in offering the means of diversion the church has done nothing in itself unworthy; the diversion is always wholesome. And by these means it has brought a great many people within its precincts, its sphere of influence, who would otherwise stand aloof, and never come in contact with the church at all.

Here, for example, is a young man who came to church the first time simply in order to listen to the singing of a certain prima donna. The next Sunday the prima donna did not sing, but the young man was there. In fact, he has ever since been going to church regularly; and not only that, he now engages in other activities which Christianity proposes for expiation: he joins in prayer; he participates in the communion, he is become what is called a member of the church. These other activities in which he now engages are not to be reckoned diverting, yet he engages in them of his own motion; to engage in them serves some valued purpose of his; the implement to some valued purpose of his the church supplies in providing the place and the occasion for prayer and communion; and it cannot be the purpose of diversion.

It is possible that he who came to hear the prima donna sing encountered, by the way, something which startled him into a consciousness of his relation to God; something which set him to thinking of God, to the end that he came back the next Sunday with a view to pleasing God, and to the profit of his soul. That is to say, it is possible that the church, by means of the innocent devices it uses to bring people to it, is enabled to touch these people, or some of them at least, with a religious purpose, and to make them have a religious use for the implements it offers.

CHAPTER III.

The Social Rendezvous.

I quote the Rev. Dr. John Watson, a Christian clergyman who has become widely celebrated under the pen name of Ian Maclaren.

"As I write," says Dr. Watson, "the appeal of a Young Men's Christian Association to its members lies on the table before me. I copy it verbatim:

"Do Not Forget

- 'The next social,
- 'The next candy-pull,
- 'The next entertainment,
- 'The next song service,
- 'The next gospel meeting,
- 'The next meeting of the debating club,
- 'The next chicken-pie dinner,
- 'The next date when you ought to make the secretary happy with your cash.'

"This remarkable list of operations, combining evangelistic zeal, creature comforts and business shrewdness, requires no commentary; the items give us a convincing illustration of an up-to-date religious institution—a veritable hustler of a Y. M. C. A.

"Perhaps one department of the work requires a word of explanation; there may be some persons who

have given considerable attention to Christian agencies, and yet whose researches may not have come across a candy-pull. This agency, if that be the correct word, is a party of young men and women who meet for the purpose of pulling candy, and, in the case of the co-operation of the sexes, is said to be a very engaging employment. It may be that candy-pulling on the part of the Y. M. C. A. is confined to one sex, and is therefore shorn of half its attractions, but one clings to the idea that in these days of 'pleasant' religious evenings the young men would not be left to their own company.

"The Christian church and the Y. M. C. A. are of course very different institutions, and the latter is free from any traditions of austere dignity, but one is not surprised to find that the church has also been touched with the social spirit, and is also doing her best to make religion entertaining. One enters what is called a place of worship and imagines that he is in a drawing-room. The floor has a thick carpet, there are rows of theater chairs, a huge organ fills the eye, a large bouquet of flowers marks the minister's place; people come in with a jaunty air and salute one another cheerily; hardly one bends his head in prayer; there is a hum of gossip through the building.

"A man disentangles himself from a conversation and bustles up to the platform, without clerical garb of any kind, as likely as not in layman's dress. A quartette advance, and, facing the audience, sing an anthem to the congregation, which does not rise, and later they sing another anthem, also to the congregation. There is a prayer, and a reading from Holy Scripture, and a sermon which is brief and bright.

Among other intimations the minister urges attendance at the Easter supper, when, as mentioned in a paper in the pews, there will be oysters and meat—turkey, I think—and ice cream. This meal is to be served in the ‘church parlor.’

“No sooner has the benediction been pronounced, which has some original feature introduced, than the congregation hurries to the door, but, although no one can explain how it is managed, the minister is already there shaking hands, introducing people, ‘getting off good things,’ and generally making things ‘hum.’ One person congratulates him on his talk—new name for sermon—and another says it was fine.”

Were you to look in on the candy-pull of which Dr. Watson speaks, you would doubtless find a lot of young people having what they term a rattling good time. Here the strong social instinct is being highly gratified, and always in an innocent, proper way, of course.

The young man who goes to the candy-pull and has a good time there, discovers in the Y. M. C. A. a thing of sensible use to him. It proves itself to be worth something to him from the worldly (I do not mean pecuniary) point of view; it helps him to be happy, and thereby it renders him a great and sensible worldly service. The young man who goes to the candy-pull and enjoys himself is bound by a consideration of his own worldly interest to this Y. M. C. A.

If he goes to the social, the entertainment, the chicken-pie dinner, at each of these he probably has a good time, too, and in an entirely wholesome way that leaves no memory to reproach his manhood. All these are purely social affairs; they do not profess to be anything else. Nothing is attempted to be done

at any of them except to provide proper means to the gratification of the social instinct.

If he goes to the song service and the gospel meeting and the debating club, he does not have such a good time, perhaps, in a social way; these affairs are ostensibly religious or intellectual, and not intended primarily to gratify the social instinct. But they are not unenjoyable even to a young man without religious purpose. They are bright and breezy and brief; they are never permitted to become tedious. And, moreover, there is always the plentiful admixture of the social element; even here the young men and their company meet and mingle about as they might at an evening party.

In all these operations, then, the young man finds more or less to answer to appetences not religious; particularly the social appetite.

The Y. M. C. A. leaves us in no doubt at all as to its main purpose. Its main purpose is to get men to engage in the expiatory activities proposed by the Christian church; to get them to be faithful members of the church. So we find the young man who has enjoyed the candy pull and all the other operations, strongly impelled, on considerations altogether apart from religion, and regardless of any religious purpose in himself, to become a member of the church. It is natural for him to identify himself with the Y. M. C. A. and thus to share in its general purposes and aspirations. He is placed under an obligation to join the church. And if he joins the church, what does he encounter?

Dr. Watson gives us a pretty good idea.

He is treated as a guest, and made much of in a social way by desirable people, people whom he might

not hope to meet otherwise, as likely as not. The pastor is the urbane host, and he is assisted by leading members and their families. Of course the young man is gratified. It is a very pleasing experience, at a very small cost of inconvenience to himself.

The church, in itself and in its accredited agencies, is a social rendezvous. The Y. M. C. A. is but one of many church societies working to the same end in the same way, namely, to the end of inducing men and women to engage in Christian expiatory activities, by making these activities incidental to the gratification of the social instinct; or, as Dr. Watson pithily puts it, they are engaged in making the practice of religion pleasant. There are church societies for young and old, for men and women, for youths and maidens, for little boys and little girls; societies for this ostensible purpose and societies for that; their name is legion, for their number is great.

Perhaps I suggest too bluntly the worldly nature of the motive which prompts this young man we are considering to become a member of the church. He will tell you, with perfect honesty, that he has experienced a genuine access of religious feeling, and that he is a member of the church because of that feeling, and not in order to avail himself of the social agencies. He is conscious of being drawn to the church, and he sees his motives as he says, but it will hardly do to take his word as final proof that he has indeed come into a religious purpose.

The fact appears only when we ask what would become of the church membership if these social agencies were to be entirely dispensed with. There is not a pastor, I suppose, who would undertake to hold his membership under such a condition. It is by being a

social rendezvous that the church is in its body kept together and renewed. It is the societies that maintain the membership. By means of the societies old members are retained and new members are added. Were there no societies, the membership would at once fall off.

Whoever makes use of these social agencies of the church, and is sensibly served thereby, comes into a sentiment of friendliness for the church and all its purposes, which naturally wears the look, even to himself, of a genuine religious appetite. He is unconscious of any worldly motive. The worldliness of his motive is not disclosed unless he asks himself in all seriousness how long he would remain a member of the church were there no social agencies for him to use.

There are other valued purposes which Christianity is being made to serve, some of them, perhaps, less becoming in themselves than the two we have mentioned, which are doubtless the most important, as being the two which possess the great majority of those who find a use for the church. But of all the purposes which Christianity is being made to serve, I think we are justified in saying that the most of them are, equally with these two, worldly purposes. The sensible service of Christianity, the service by reason of which people have a use for it, is not, then, a religious service. If the church were capable of being used only in the pursuance of a religious purpose, it would not be much used, in our time.

I dare say this conclusion does no great violence to the common understanding of the case.

CHAPTER IV.

The Ancient Church.

We are told that at the end of the first century following the birth of Christ there were some 300,000 Christians in the world. Of course this is mostly a guess. All that is certain is that there were a good many Christians after the lapse of a century from the foundation of the religion. To be sure, in comparison with the 600 millions who are called Christians now, 300,000 seems a small number, but the bare comparison is hardly fair. In the first place, the 300,000 were confined to a small part of the earth's surface, whereas the 600 millions are spread over the entire globe. Again, the 600 millions include many who are Christians only in the sense that they are not specifically anything else, while living in communities where Christianity is the religion most largely practiced; whereas, of the 300,000, since they lived in communities where Christianity was not yet the chief religion, all were of necessity professing Christians.

But the exact number of the early Christians does not matter. The fact remains, in any case, that Christianity, in the course of a century, had come to render a sensible service to men. Men had come to have a use for it.

What was the sensible service of Christianity in the first century? In particular, did the church serve men then as it serves them now, namely, with a worldly service, for the most part?

A worldly service waits on worldly circumstances, it is plain. Conditions might easily be such that there could not possibly be any worldly profit in making use of the implements of the church. As conditions are with us, to make use of these implements costs a man little or nothing in a worldly way, to be offset against the worldly profit derived. But the cost of making use of the implements of the church might become such, in virtue of other conditions, as to wipe out any possible worldly profit, thus to leave the church unable to render a sensible worldly service.

It becomes pertinent to ask, then, how much it cost the man of the first century, in a worldly way, to make use of the implements of the church; to identify himself as a Christian, in other words.

We have the church annals telling us it cost a man a great deal, often as much as his life, and always grievous penalties; and these annals, it seems to me, are supported by the probabilities. That secular history makes almost no mention of any distresses the early Christians were made to suffer by reason of their being Christians is not much to the contrary; the silence of history is not necessarily significant of the absence of fact to record. It is not inconceivable that the political powers desired to conceal the facts; and they were assuredly in a position to have their will done by such men as were in the business of writing secular history. While the church annals are not altogether above the imputation of exaggeration, the failure of secular history to confirm them is not seriously discreditable.

Gibbon, a master at building a complete narrative out of scattered straws of evidence, is of the opinion that the Christians were not on the whole much per-

secuted. I have great respect for his opinion, of course, and yet it seems to me he has here let a certain prejudice, whereby he was loth to allow that there was any great virile principle in Christianity, to lead him unjustifiably to attribute the undeniable spread of the religion to the mere lack of resistance, to the easy tolerance, of the Romans.

“It is not easy to conceive,” says Gibbon, speaking of the probable attitude of the magistrates toward the Christians, “from what motives a spirit of persecution could introduce itself into the Roman councils. The magistrates could not be actuated by a blind though honest bigotry, since the magistrates were themselves philosophers; and the school of Athens had given laws to the senate. They could not be impelled by ambition or avarice, as the temporal and the ecclesiastical powers were united in the same hands. The pontiffs were chosen among the most illustrious of the senators; and the office of supreme pontiff was constantly exercised by the emperors themselves.”

I submit that the effect of uniting the functions of priest and magistrate in one person, of identifying in any way the temporal with the ecclesiastical power, is far from leading to official tolerance of religious dissent or nonconformity. On the contrary, such union and identification are hardly less than certain to make magistrates intolerant of religious nonconformity, regardless of their own religious sentiment.

It is not to be thought that Queen Elizabeth of England was a very religious woman, or that it was devotion to her faith, as a faith, that made her the intolerant sovereign she was. The intolerance of her sister Mary might be ascribed to religious zeal, since Mary seems to have been a pious woman. But Eliza-

beth was not pious, and still she was about as intolerant as Mary.

We have been frankly told that the Church of England, in behalf of which Elizabeth's intolerance was exhibited, expressed less a religious aspiration of the nation than a political aspiration. As far as religion was concerned, the English were not particularly discontented with the old practice. But the time had come when England would assert her national selfhood; and the circumstance of Catholic France, the chief reproach to her independence, made the assertion of national, that is, political selfhood involve the assertion of religious selfhood, so to speak. Since France, the foe, was Catholic, it was necessary for England to be not Catholic.

The queen, to whom it largely fell to give England a place all her own among nations, was but languidly religious, if religious at all, but she was fervently patriotic, for, with her Tudor notions of royalty, patriotism was no less robust a sentiment than selfishness. She was the state. She was not at all the sovereign to hang an heretic as such; but she was the sort of a sovereign to pursue a traitor with relentless fury.

And while the Catholic in England might be a good man, a good neighbor, who rendered unto everyone his due, his religious nonconformity was necessarily an affront to the throne, now become the seat of spiritual authority; there was a denial of its temporal sway in his denial of its spiritual sway, inasmuch as these two were inextricably interwoven; heresy was treason.

The effect of giving her scepter at once a temporal and a spiritual character was to impart to Elizabeth, an indifferent if not a scotter, the aspect of an ex-

treme bigot. I see no reason to suppose that the magistrates of Rome were otherwise affected by their being likewise the priests of the prevailing religion.

While it is not easy for us to decide just how much general authority the magistrates gained by being priests, it is apparent at a glance that immemorial usage alone would make it seem a very serious thing to propose to divest the magistrates of their sacerdotal character. And the Christian who should identify himself a Christian would in effect thereby propose nothing less.

The Christian was ready to render unto Cæsar the things that were Cæsar's, and that in itself implied a reservation. While Cæsar might not expect to have rendered unto him the things that were God's, he would certainly expect, according to the ancient and established practice, that the things which were God's should be rendered to God through him, through the magistrates in their sacerdotal character. The Christian in Rome might be as good a citizen or subject as the Catholic in England, and quite as vainly, as to removing the plain implication of his nonconformity. He might even be a better neighbor than any pagan near him, giving the public law less trouble to regulate his ordinary relations, and still he could not help but be a traitor. The temporal warp and the ecclesiastical woof were not to be separated one from the other, and the fabric of authority remain. Thus the Roman, at least, would be likely to reason.

I can find no great force in Gibbon's argument that because the Romans had been tolerant of the religion of peoples conquered by them they were therefore probably tolerant of Christianity; that because they admitted to their pantheon all manner of foreign gods

they could have taken no violent exception to the unknown God of Paul. The analogy does not hold. It was one thing to permit the distant Druids to worship in their ancient groves in peace, even after their inhospitable lands had been included by the arms of the senate and the Roman people; it was quite another to suffer the progress of a vigorous and mysterious heresy at the very heart of the empire. It was one thing to bring the Egyptian Isis to Rome and give her place with her consins german Venus and Minerva; it was another thing to indulge the worship of the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob, the jealous God who commanded that there be had no other God before him.

It is true that magistrates of the patriotic temper of Brutus were not common in the golden age of Rome. We may safely assume, I suppose, that most magistrates were venal and indifferent to the welfare of the state. But that would hardly alter the case, as far as the Christians were concerned. If a magistrate were a Brutus, his patriotic spirit would constrain him to be very harsh with the dissenting Christians. If he were venal, on the other hand, it was the authority of his office which was his stock in trade, and Christianity was in derogation of this. That which he was bartering away, Christianity threatened to cheapen.

Gibbon himself testifies to the ill look which Christianity, as an association, merely, was likely to wear in the eyes of the magistrates.

"The extent and duration of this spiritual conspiracy," says the historian, "seemed to render it every day more deserving of his (the magistrate's) animadversion. We have already seen that the active and

successful zeal of the Christians had insensibly diffused them through every province and almost every city of the empire. The new converts seemed to renounce their family and country, that they might connect themselves in an indissoluble band of union with a peculiar society, which everywhere assumed a different character from the rest of mankind. Their gloomy and austere aspect, their abhorrence of the common business and pleasures of life, and their frequent predictions of impending calamities inspired the pagans with the apprehension of some danger which would arise from the new sect, the more alarming as it was the more obscure."

It was with extreme disfavor, Gibbon further informs us, that the Roman civil polity regarded "any association among its subjects." It was the tendency of government to discourage such associations; and at least one good reason is not far to seek.

We learn that at the time Augustus was emperor, half the population of Rome were slaves. And they were slaves of a peculiarly unsubmitive sort. In a large part, captives taken in battle, the proud warriors of the nations Rome had conquered, men in many instances wont rather to be served than to serve, their condition was of course immensely irritating to them; of course they were desperately ready to revolt. Romance has made Spartacus a familiar figure, and Spartacus in disposition, if not in prowess, was representative, I suppose, of a large class among the slaves of Rome. It was as if a mine were laid under the civil and social state, and certainly the patrician Roman, the magistrates and all who were concerned to preserve the state, were well aware of their danger.

There had been more than one servile uprising to admonish them. More than once had the legions been recalled from the frontiers and the business of making more slaves to whip back into submission those already in bondage. Nor had the legions always found the task easy. It was even to be believed that the slaves in order to have prevailed lacked nothing except concert of action; that the safety of Rome depended on keeping the slaves from getting together. Once, we read, a law was proposed providing that slaves wear a distinctive garb; it was instantly rejected for fear of the consequences should the slaves be thus apprised of their numbers.

Christianity drew its first adherents, we may safely say, from the poorest classes. That would be the natural order. For innovation, simply as innovation, answers to an aspiration of the poor, whereas it excites the distrust of those whose prosperity binds them to the existing state. Very likely all the early Christians were poor. Very likely the magistrate, observing the growing numbers of the new sect, took notice that the conspiracy, as Gibbon calls it, was a conspiracy of the poorest people. Many of them were slaves, and those who were not slaves were clients, persons who, though nominally free, were scarcely less abjectly dependent, in fact, than bondmen; for by this time the once proud title of free citizen of Rome, to which the clients for the most part might lay claim under the law, was but a name. The clients looked to the patrons for everything, and if they were not as restive as the slaves it was only because they had less spirit; their position was scarcely less of the sort to move men of spirit to resentment and revolt.

It was by no means inconceivable that clients and slaves one day make common cause against their common oppressors, the rich. And here were clients and slaves, the poor of Rome, joining together in a mysterious association. Would the average magistrate, himself one of the wealthy if not of the patrician class, be likely to view all this with philosophical equanimity?

The often quoted letter from Pliny the younger to the Emperor Trajan, in which the former, being a magistrate, asks to be instructed as to the proper way of dealing with the Christians, whom he represents as being numerous and obstinate in their religious dissent; and the letter of Trajan in reply, in which it is set out that the Christians are undoubtedly malefactors in virtue of their nonconformity, but which counsels a certain moderation in imposing penalties on them,—what do these show?

Assuredly not all that Gibbon seems to think, namely, that the policy of the law was a policy of indulgence.

They show that the law had no policy whatever as to the penalty due the Christians, and nothing further. They show that as late as the reign of Trajan, that is, at the very end of the first century, the matter of penalties was left altogether to the choice of the magistrates. The law made no doubt that nonconformity was a grave misdemeanor; but it left the magistrate to punish as he pleased; he might be as rigorous as he chose, and still be within the law. These letters lead to no such conclusion as that the law secured the Christians to be tolerantly treated, unless we assume that all magistrates were Plinys and Trajans, which is

of course absurd. If these wise and humane men found persecution not to their liking, they were but two among thousands of magistrates of another sort.

The magistrate in general would not be likely to find in his own nature any obstacle to the harshest proceeding. Though he had imbibed of the softening philosophy of Athens, he still found it in his heart to be cruel. Luxury had indeed changed the Roman character; in some respects it had made it a character less rough and bristling. The austere virtues which gave Roman cruelty some elements of the sublime, these were what the Roman had lost; the cruelty remained. A generation whose chief sport was in the bloodshed of the arena was not likely to shrink from the infliction of penalties which every selfish consideration advised, to say nothing of such remnants of patriotic or religious zeal as might still survive.

I feel quite confident that it cost a man a great deal, in a worldly way, to be known as a Christian in the first century. It cost him so much, indeed, that the sensible service which Christianity clearly rendered in those days could not possibly have been a worldly service. The worldly cost of being a Christian, of making use of the implements offered by the church, was sufficient to offset and wipe out any possible worldly profit that might accrue. The service was esteemed valuable regardless of worldly conditions; it was an unworldly service.

CHAPTER V.

The Decay of Faith.

When I have asked why it is that the people of the first century found a use for the church in its religious offices, whereas the people now find little or none, I have been assured that the decay of faith is to blame. The faith was stronger in people 1,900 years ago than it is now.

Faith is thus the name given to the affection of mind whereby he who has it finds a use for the church in its religious offices. Faith is that which gives men the appetite, or is itself the appetite, to which the church in its religious aspect makes answer.

But why are men less strong in the faith than they were 1,900 years ago?

If we go to some secluded and forgotten nook where they still cut their grain with a sickle and thresh it out with a flail, there we find the people using the church in its religious offices. They are pious. They pray, they praise, all with a religious purpose, all with a view to pleasing God and rendering themselves acceptable in His sight. They have the faith.

But if we go into the busy town, where material progress shows its newest fruits, we find few pious people. The church is there, with its implements. Its gorgeous temples are everywhere to be seen. And its implements are used. Thousands join in the prayer and praise, but not with a view to pleasing

God. They use the church, but not in its religious offices. If in the town there is now and then a pious man, a man of whom it may not be doubted that he prays and praises in order to please God, he is some simple or retired soul, who, for lack of capacity or contact, is not a participant in the spirit of the age. These people have not the faith.

Is it not suggested that the decay of faith is the effect of material progress, of civilization?

We teach the children faith. Taking them in hand when their minds are most open to suggestion, we give them this appetite that shall make them have a use for the church in its religious offices. We bring them up pious. But of the children thus educated, we are told that the girls stand by the church more steadfastly than the boys.

Why should that be?

When boys grow up, they mingle in affairs. They go out into the world and come inevitably in contact with the spirit of the age; they get to think the age-thought, in spite of themselves; the thought that keeps pace in its modes with material progress. Girls marry when they grow up, and retire each to a little artificial world of her own, a species of cloister, where she is insulated from contact with the spirit of the age.

Have we not again the suggestion that material progress kills the faith?

Moreover, it chances that girls are just now coming to decline the artificial, insulated life. Even when they marry, they often insist on mingling in affairs, in the natural world. And the cry goes up that even the women are deserting the church.

Faith, that is, the evangelical or saving faith which we are considering, is hardly to be defined as the mere assent to the three fundamental doctrines of Christianity. Mere assent would not amount to an appetite such as a man need have in order to find a use for the church in its religious offices. A man might assent to the proposition that we are unacceptable in the sight of God, in ourselves; to the proposition that Jesus Christ vicariously expiated our sin in such measure as to leave it within our power to complete our atonement; and to the proposition that our acceptability in God's sight waits finally on certain activities engaged in by ourselves in our own behalf; to all these he might assent and still have no impulse to make use of the religious offices of the church. Unless the man is in such a frame of mind that he cares to be at one with God, he is not impelled to take measures to effect his atonement, that is, he is not impelled to make use of the religious offices of the church.

In order to a saving faith, there need be added to assent another element of sentiment. What is it?

The conventional theology makes answer, when it describes the man of saving or evangelical faith as a God-fearing man. Until a man fears God he has not the appetite which makes him find a use for the church in its religious offices.

Of course there are different degrees of fear. The intensest degree, we may say, is dread; less intense is reverence; still less intense, respect; least intense, perhaps, regard. It is plain that the intenser a man's fear the stronger his faith. The man who should stand in dread of God would be far more strongly im-

pelled to make use of the church in its religious offices than the man having no more than a regard for God. And who should have not so much fear of God even as might be described as regard, he would not be impelled to make religious use of the church, no matter though he did assent to the three cardinal doctrines.

The Calvinists of the Commonwealth are pointed to as being men of great faith; that they were such I suppose there is no reasonable doubt. The Puritans who came to America were of these, and as pious as any. Here they became active in affairs. They led in business enterprise. From the beginning their stock have exhibited in themselves the fruits of material progress at its forwardest. Not only has the age-thought been theirs, but they have perhaps been the first to think it.

They, if anybody, should show the effect of material progress on the faith. What do they show?

Of the sons of Puritans, some are still Calvinists, but is their faith the robust faith of the Baxters and the Bunyans? Just now they are revising their confession, the Westminster confession, framed 250 years ago to voice the creed of the original English Calvinists. The Westminster confession implies a belief in certain things which present day Calvinists do not believe in. It is maintained, to be sure, that the implications are fortuitous and never intended. But after all the Westminster confession stands as the deliberate declaration by the fathers of their belief, and it will hardly be pretended that the revised confession expresses more exactly the belief of the fathers. The old confession expresses the old belief; the new confession expresses the new. The one voices the creed of the fathers, the other the creed of the sons, and to

whatever extent the new confession differs from the old, it discovers an altered faith.

Does it much differ?

Each of these confessions paints a portrait of God, and the portrait of the old confession is that of a far more fearsome God, I believe we must all admit, than is the portrait of the new. It may be that only here and there an obscure line has been limned out by revision, but the effect is none the less markedly softening. The elect infant clause in the old confession contributes in its implications, be these fortuitous or not, to the portrait as a whole and to its general character of fearsomeness. The elimination of that clause certainly effects no inconsiderable amendment of the ensemble.

And since the altered faith has found its expression in the less fearsome portrait, is it not fairly to be thought that the sons have not the fear of God as the fathers had it? Is their fear not the fear of less degree?

Not all the sons of Puritans are Calvinists. Some of them call themselves Liberals, and utterly deny the Westminster portrait of God. No modification can make the old portrait acceptable to them. They have their creeds, each painting a portrait of God, but the portrait of a very unfearsome God, so to speak, as compared with the Westminster portrait.

Finally, there are sons of Puritans, and not a few, who are infidels. They do not believe in God at all. It may be that they assent in a negative way, to Christian doctrine, but their assent has nothing in it to cause them to have any religious use for the church.

Have we not here something which looks very like the fear of God decaying progressively through its

various degrees of dread, reverence, respect, regard, and finally becoming extinct, and all concomitantly with material progress?

The famous pastor of a famous church has doubted the truth of the story of Jonah and the whale. He avers that it has no rightful place in the Holy Writ; he would cast it out.

This process of amending the Scriptures, sometimes called the higher criticism, is essentially the process of the revision of the Westminster confession, particularly as to the circumstances which give it occasion. Anything like a literal interpretation of the Scriptures gives us the picture of a terrible God, a God suitable enough to answer the appetite of him who should dread God, but revolting to him whose fear of God has deteriorated, if you please, from dread to mere respect or regard. The higher criticism, if I understand it, is actuated by a religious and a constructive purpose; it would make God to appear estimable rather than terrible, with the thought that whereas men are no longer in dread of God, they are yet capable of esteeming Him, provided He seems worthy of esteem, and out of esteem to be desirous of pleasing Him. It would prune away those details of the accepted portrait which confuse the main outline, and tend to make God out a capricious and humanly-minded deity, thus to leave the portrait of such a God as men may obey out of respect. Equally with revision, it seems to me, the higher criticism confesses the altered faith, and altered in the gradual loss of the fear of God.

And the higher criticism is altogether a modern thing. It has come along with material progress.

To come at the matter more in the a priori way, what should we expect the effect of material progress to be on the fear of God, the necessary element of evangelical faith?

Suppose that man and the ox are, for the moment, precisely equal with respect of their fear of the thunderbolt; by which I mean that man and the ox have equally the desire to live rather than to die, whence springs the fear, ultimately, and that the menace of death in the thunderbolt is equally patent to the senses of both, to the end that both take fright at once, and together seek the refuge that first offers, which is, say, a tree.

How long do they remain equal?

They cease to be equal forthwith, by reason of the difference in their faculties. Their experience is identical. But because of man's peculiar faculties, this experience begins at once to modify his fear of the thunderbolt, whereas the ox' fear is not in the least modified.

The experience modifies man's desire to live rather than to die. Whereas this desire was had by him at first, supposing he had it on terms of equality with the ox, in the form of an instinct, it presently becomes a conscious sentiment and in the natural course of events is intensified; for the experience of self-conscious man gives every day new value to life and makes it all the time more to be desired in preference to death.

Then, too, man's understanding of the menace in the thunderbolt is modified by experience. The menace is amplified. Whereas before man did not take fright until the storm was fairly upon him, he now

takes fright when the black clouds begin to gather, or even when the winds set persistently from a certain quarter, and while yet the ox grazes contentedly in the meadow.

Man's fear of the thunderbolt, from having been no more than the ox' fear, becomes a larger and larger fact in his life. The thought of the menace in the thunderbolt is with him more and more to oppress him. Instead, now, of waiting until the storm is upon him before he seeks refuge, as does the ox, and as he himself used to do, he begins to think about a refuge at the first gathering of the clouds, or sooner. He no longer seeks a refuge impulsively, but after reflection.

The ox equally with the man sees the tree struck by the thunderbolt and shattered. Very likely he is for the moment equally terrified by the spectacle. Nevertheless, when another storm bursts upon him, the ox still seeks refuge under the tree; he still acts on impulse, seeking the refuge that first offers. But man, on the other hand, has reflected by the time that another storm bursts, and the impulse in him to seek the refuge that first offers is checked by the thought that the first refuge, namely, the tree, has proved no refuge at all.

Whereas the ox gives the thunderbolt no thought until the storm bursts, and then seeks refuge under a tree, man reflects on the knowledge supplied by experience, debates what he shall do when the storm comes, and when it comes has recourse to some new refuge. He shuns the tree, and seeks refuge elsewhere.

But each refuge, as he has recourse to it, is subjected to the test of experience as to its adequacy;

and one after another the refuges prove inadequate. Man draws nearer and nearer to the awful thought that there is no refuge from the thunderbolt. His fear intensifies; it becomes a dominant sentiment, haunting his thoughts by day and his dreams by night.

Hereupon he finds himself in the possession of the peculiarly human frame of mind ordinarily called the fear of God; the primary religious appetite.

Man's desire to live is stronger than ever, for conscious experience has made life worth more to him. His fear of the thunderbolt is stronger than ever, in that his conscious experience has brought him to the verge of despairing of any refuge from the menace of death which it holds. As refuge after refuge offered by his physical environment proves inadequate, his thought is thrown out beyond the physical and the sensible. He welcomes the idea of an unseen being who controls the thunderbolt and gives it direction. For the only alternative, as yet, is the frightful conception of a thunderbolt guided by chance. The fear of the thunderbolt becomes the fear of God, by the assignment of the control of the thunderbolt to God.

The primary appetite calls for a God who may be propitiated, for behind it is still the man's consuming anxiety to find a refuge from the thunderbolt. It calls for a definition of the things pleasing to God, in order that man, by recourse to these, may win God's favor, thus to avert the thunderbolt from himself.

Man naturally begins with imagining God to be very like himself in the matter of likes and dislikes. He first conceives of a gross, anthropomorphic deity, who is propitiated as men are propitiated, by the

gift of something good to eat, say, or by obsequious rites and ceremonies. The man newly become religious offers up to God the choicest spoils of the chase, in order that God, thus put in good humor, may be pleased not to direct the thunderbolt against him.

But this refuge which religion offers, like the tree to which man fled in the first instance, cannot escape the test of experience as to its adequacy. Sooner or later experience proves it to be inadequate. Sooner or later it will be forced in on the man that the haunch of prime venison offered up to the deity is doing nothing to avert the thunderbolt.

Whither is he to turn, now?

Behind him, in the physical world, his experience has tested refuge after refuge and found them all inadequate. But in the unseen world, only a single refuge has been tested; it has been found inadequate, but others offer. For the man has only to amend his notion of that which is pleasing to God, and a new refuge promises. Because this refuge has failed (such would be the course of his thought) it does not necessarily follow that there is no God directing the thunderbolt; it follows, merely, that I have failed to offer to God that which is truly pleasing to Him.

Thus, still in his search for a refuge from the thunderbolt, man departs from his first idea of God, and passes, perforce, to the idea of a deity less like himself, less gross, less anthropomorphic. For his experience shows him that God is after all not like men or He would be pleased and propitiated with the gift of things which men deem good. He relinquishes the definition of God in his own image, a precise defi-

niton, and conceives a vaguer notion which becomes ever more vague, as each notion is proved inadequate by experience. Finally he may attribute to the deity hardly more than existence unqualified; he is acquainted with no form of being with which he may, in the light of his experience, identify God.

The refuges of theology proving one after another inadequate, the man comes again to the verge of the desperate thought that there is no avoiding the thunderbolt, except as chance favors. All that now stands between him and such a thought is the ultimate theology, as we might call it, proposing a God all but inaccessible, so far removed is He from the nature of mankind.

It is now that there comes in naturally the thought of the future life, which is simply the attempt to deny the menace of the thunderbolt, the attempt to believe that death is after all not a thing to be dreaded.

The plain effect of this thought of the future life, provided a man really thinks it and is thoroughly possessed of it, is to provide a refuge from the menace of the thunderbolt, not only complete, but permanent. For now the sacrifices and devotions proposed in propitiation of God are not to be tested as to their adequacy by temporal experience, since they are directed, not to the saving of man's life in the flesh, but to the improvement of his condition in the hereafter, and how far adequate they are to such a purpose, temporal experience can never disclose.

And plainly, too, whatever of possessing force and vigor the wish may give to the thought, is given to this thought of a future life. It is man's last resort,

as it appears. His notion of the deity has been refined until God is regarded by him as all but non-entity. Another step, and the deity is denied; and with the denial of the deity all hope is gone, and with hope, peace. On the one hand is the belief in the future life; on the other is the wretchedness of despair. Man is prone to believe.

But the fear of death is not easily to be dismissed. Whatever else death may be, it is certainly the end of life in the flesh, an end of carnal gratification, an end of life, in short, as men ordinarily think of life. The normal human being would rather live than die, and by that he means to live as now he lives, with all his fleshly sensibilities. Nothing that man can imagine in the way of bliss apart from the carnal sense is sufficient to compensate him for the loss of the delights of the present life. The fear of death will not be dismissed, except, perhaps, for the moment. If it is ever banished at all it soon comes back, to haunt the peace which the promise of immortality has bestowed.

Hitherto science, meaning the sum of knowledge which is the fruit of conscious experience, has been in its effect destructive, if I may so speak. The refuges from the thunderbolt, promising one by one, have been proved inadequate and illusory by experience, and there remains to man the scientific understanding destructive of the promise, that is, of the prior thought that they were refuges. But in the extremity to which man has now come, wherein he is in danger of losing the peace which religious faith has bestowed, in this extremity science becomes, as it were, constructive.

The thunderbolt still obtrudes itself on man's notice; it remains a thing of the profoundest interest to him. In the continual exercise of his faculties, his science comes at length to include some understanding of the thunderbolt. He begins dimly to perceive that the thunderbolt is not hurled capriciously, but obeys certain fixed laws. He gets to know these laws a little, and there at once springs up the confidence that he may know them more, perhaps that he may know them wholly; and, knowing them, that he may take measures to avoid the menace that has oppressed him. That is, science itself finally proposes a refuge.

The best devices that science has yet offered do not serve, I believe, certainly to avert the thunderbolt under all circumstances, but in having a degree of adequacy, demonstrable by experience, the refuge of science is more to the purpose than any refuge offered by religion; it gives man a larger and more lasting sense of peace and security. The effect is that man looks to science, now, to save him from the menace of death and, as his experience widens, ever more confidently.

He has no use for his religion now. The appetite to which religion has answered with its definitions of God, its proposal of the means whereby God may be propitiated, and its promise of a future life, this appetite is gone. The man fears God no more, for there is now no menace in his environment the fear of which he may transfer to God. If he still fears he looks to science for his refuge. If he falls sick, he summons doctors and takes medicines, with the thought that science will save his life. It is only as

death certainly impends that he turns to religion. Man in his health and strength, man at the apex of civilization, he has nothing of the fear of God.

The material progress of which all this is the fruit, is irresistible. We look into the nook where grain is reaped with a sickle and threshed with a flail and we behold a happy, contented people. In the throbbing town our eyes are oppressed with the sight of a careworn, restless people, full of strife; people who know no peace with their ambitions; people who battle with each other unceasingly by day and by night lie awake to devise wherewith they may battle the more effectively tomorrow. We exclaim that the last state of man is worse than the first; but we know it is inevitable; it is civilization.

To say that the faith has failed and that this is why people found a religious use for the church 1,900 years ago, yet find none now, is to make the religious usefulness of the church to wait on an appetite which is not only decadent but hopelessly decadent. It is to say that the church has outlived its religious usefulness.

This is an unwelcome conclusion. Is there no escape from it?

CHAPTER VI.

Pagan Piety.

We have assumed that Christianity as offered to the pagan Roman was substantially the Christianity taught today, and that the pagan embraced it because he was strong in the fear of God.

Is this reckoning rightly with the fear of God?

Every God-fearing man has always his religion, as a matter of necessity. There are no irreligious moments with him, for only in religion has he peace of mind. Man becomes irreligious only as he loses the fear of God.

Whatever religion a God-fearing man has he identifies as the true religion. For while he identifies it as such, consciously, by reference to certain intuitive notions of the nature of the deity, these intuitive notions are themselves the effect of prepossession; unconsciously, the religion fixes the intuitive notions to conform to its own peculiarities. Whatever peculiar marks the religion has, these are the marks of true religion.

The God-fearing Christian has no doubt of the truth of Christianity. There appear certain evidences which are to him conclusive. He finds in himself the intuitive notion that true religion is monotheistic; Christianity is monotheistic; therefore Christianity is the true religion as against any polytheistic religion. His argument is sound enough

as far as he alone is concerned, but it manifestly has no universal validity. The major premise, his intuitive notion, is a matter of prepossession; he has it because Christianity, his religion, is monotheistic.

How would the God-fearing pagan argue?

He has his intuitive notion, too, supplying him the major premise; but with him it is the notion that true religion is polytheistic. For his notion is likewise the effect of prepossession; he has it because his religion is polytheistic.

That is to say, the evidences which confirm the God-fearing Christian in his faith would have no such force with the God-fearing pagan. In all that Christianity differed from paganism it necessarily wore to the God-fearing pagan the aspect not of truth but of error. It shocked his intuitive notion of the nature of the deity, since this was the effect of prepossession. And the intenser his fear of God, and the stronger the primary appetite in him, the firmer would be the prepossession, the clearer his intuitive notion, and the more violent the shock Christianity, in its peculiarities, must occasion. In short, the pagan was unfavorable to the reception of Christianity in proportion as he was strong in the fear of God. Whatever fear of God he had stood as an obstacle in the way of his conversion.

Of course it is possible for even a strong prepossession to be overcome. I have been told that the pagan's prepossession was overcome by signs and wonders vouchsafed in behalf of Christianity.

Would not the miracles of Christ and the apostles strike the scales from the God-fearing pagan's eyes?

To you and me, doubtless, a miracle would seem a manifestation of divine power. Were you and I

to see water changed into wine, or loaves and fishes multiplied until the scant meal of one bountifully fed a multitude, we should be likely to conclude that the person working these things had divine power, was divine or divinely commissioned, provided, of course, the circumstances were such as to preclude all possibility of fraud. Such a reversal of the natural order at the bidding of Christ would leave us in no doubt that Christ was all he claimed to be.

But would miracles have equal force with the God-fearing pagan?

The God-fearing man, as I hope I have shown, is not likely to have any definite idea of a natural order. Indeed, the fear of God fairly contradicts a natural order. To the mind which refers all phenomena alike to the special dispensation of God, there appears no natural order. To suggest a natural order to a God-fearing man is to suggest necessity for God, something quite inconceivable with him. Divest yourself, if you can, of the notion of a natural order which thoroughly possesses you, and a miracle loses its force. The changing of water into wine is not in itself more wonderful, more indicative of divine power operating, than the changing of an acorn into an oak. It seems wonderful to us, a miracle, because we have the notion of a natural order.

To put the case bluntly, miracles are cheap with a people genuinely God-fearing.

There was the record of an immense number of pagan prodigies. The gods of Olympus were not idle; they were forever going out of their way to do something to startle men. And a false prodigy is about as likely to impress a people full of the fear of God as is any other, unless the imposture is very

glaring indeed. It is easy to say that all the prodigies recorded by the pagans were fraudulent or imaginary. But if the pagan of the first century were possessed of the primary religious appetite, it is by no means certain that the miracles of Christ appeared to him more genuine. For example, not far from the time that Christ was working his wonders in Judaea the statues at Rome were turning their faces because of a crushing defeat of the imperial legions at the hands of Hermann. Now, taking it that the wonders of Christ did not consist with the wonder of the statues, to the end that he who should believe in the former must pronounce the latter false, and vice versa, however plain it may seem to us that the water was actually changed into wine, while the statues either did not turn their faces, or turned them by artifice, we may not say that a God-fearing pagan would look at the matter in the same light. On the contrary, it is at least probable that he would decide in favor of his own old gods; he would pronounce the miracle at Canaë a fraud, rather than the miracle at Rome, did it become necessary to choose which was false and which true.

In a word, the prepossession might be expected to save itself.

But we are reminded that paganism had no Christ. And what was Christ to the pagan, supposing Christ was taught to him as he is taught to us?

A vicarious sacrifice, in mankind's behalf; truly a thing likely to attract him who should fear God and be convinced of his own unworthiness.

But atonement by vicarious sacrifice was no new thing to the pagan. Christianity was not by any means the first religion to propose the exceeding effi-

cacy of a voluntary sacrifice of human life in the expiation of a general sin. Indeed, the doctrine and the practice were common to all the old religions. In these very times of which we are speaking, we are told that it was not unusual for commanders of Roman armies to offer up their lives in voluntary sacrifice, at the altar, in order to placate the wrath of the gods, manifested by auguries unpropitious of victory, and due to some general offense. The pagan had not to go to Christianity to find the comfort of vicarious atonement.

Nor would the especial merit of Christ's sacrifice be likely to appear to the God-fearing pagan. He would be likely, I think, to regard the sacrifice of this lowly Nazarene as a species of trifling with God; it would seem to him presumptuous to expect the sacrifice of a victim so unillustrious to avail in expiation of the sin of all mankind. The doctrine of universal atonement would be likely in itself to stagger the pagan; if the blood of kings, or imperators, barely sufficed to expiate the particular fault of a particular nation, or army, as he was accustomed to believing, what manner of man was he, whose blood should expiate the general fault of all mankind?

To tell the pagan hereupon that Christ was God, would be to resolve a riddle with a riddle yet more puzzling. If Christ was God (so the pagan would reply) very well; that disposes of all questions as to his merit as a sacrifice. But what reason have I to believe that Christ was God?

It strikes me that a pagan strong in the fear of God would identify God by precisely the marks that Christ conspicuously lacked, namely, the marks of material pomp and pageantry. He was not at all

used to associating divinity with humility. It was the manifestation of overwhelming power that revealed the deity to him. To tell him that the son of a carpenter of Galilee, who had lived all his life in abject poverty and died at last between two thieves, was God were to tax further a credulity already overtaxed.

With the fact that the pagan was converted to Christianity before our eyes, and not to be denied, what are we to say?

That the pagan had not the fear of God; if he had had the fear of God he would have remained a pagan. The fact of his conversion stands in itself as evidence that he had not the fear of God.

Moreover, on considerations wholly apart from these, it becomes probable that the people among whom Christianity gained its first converts were not strongly possessed of the primary appetite.

The Romans were progressive and in a measure scientific. They had given themselves not a little to investigation. Their science was barren, from our point of view, for the reason that they had not learned the value of the inductive processes which we use. Nevertheless, these men had the genuine scientific spirit. Their theories, puerile in the extreme, are puerile by reason of the insufficiency of the data on which they are based, and not because of any defect of independence of thought. It was a queer natural order which they taught, but it was a natural order. Nothing could be more absurd, possibly, than the Ptolemaic theory of the solar system, which made the earth the center, and fixed the sun and the planets at the ends of invisible cranks. But the Ptolemaic theory at least assigns the movements

of the planets to fixed laws, making them no longer the toys of a capricious deity. The mind which proposed or accepted the Ptolemaic theory was not the mind to fathom the causes behind the thunderbolt, or to discover the laws governing its courses, but it was equally not the mind to think of the thunderbolt as the weapon of the wrathful Jupiter, or to be set to inventing propitiatory sacrifices by the manifestation of the thunderbolt's awful power. The ancients knew next to nothing of electricity. I do not know that they ever associated in the remotest way the thunderbolt with electricity; but for all that they were sufficiently scientific, I am sure, to have ceased to be moved to a fear of God by the thunderbolt.

"All religion," said the elder Pliny, "is the offspring of necessity, weakness and fear."

Cicero wondered how two augurs could meet without laughing at each other.

The poets of the early empire are forever bringing in gods and goddesses, but their manner of treatment indicates about as much regard for the dwellers in Olympus as do the lines of the English poets in the times when classical allusions in poetry were popular; they seem to mention the deities not out of reverence, but rather because the divine doings lent themselves nicely to poetic handling. And poets in a great degree voice popular thought, in any age; their posture of mind is somewhat common. The poetry of the golden age of Rome does not suggest a pious people.

We read that the pontiffs, who had the care of the public worship, were very busy in these days of the first emperors inventing new forms and ceremonies. I know not what could be more plainly indic-

ative of a decay of the primary religious appetite. Paganism was in the position of our own Christianity; in order to be of any use to the people, in order not to be wholly neglected, it had to offer implements available to worldly purpose; hence the diverting rites and ceremonies, the festivals which were sensuous orgies.

Our assumption, then, seems on the whole not to be justified. The pagan was not strong in the fear of God. It was not because of his fear of God that he embraced Christianity, but for some other reason.

Whither now are we led?

CHAPTER VII.

Semper Idem?

The alternative is obvious. It is the church that has changed, not the people. The people 1,900 years ago were about what the people are now, with respect of general religious sentiment. The church served sensibly and religiously in the first century, whereas its only sensible service now is a worldly service, because it offered a service then which it does not offer now. We are devoid of the fear of God, and therefore find no religious use for the church; but the ancients, likewise devoid of the fear of God, found nevertheless a religious use for the church. The church in their time appealed to a sentiment other than the fear of God; it answered to a religious appetite other than that which we are calling the primary appetite.

I am not unaware that these are bold proposals. What I say is equal to saying that Christianity is in fact indifferent whether men fear God or not, though its prayer is always for God-fearing men. It seems like atheism to talk of letting the fear of God go as a thing of no importance, when that sentiment has stood for ages as the mark, in its outward manifestation, of the man redeemed by the blood of Christ.

But, after all, is there of necessity any affront in this to the truths of revelation?

It is a matter of explicit revelation that Christ died in behalf of men; that his death inured in some way to the advantage of mankind. But is it a matter of explicit revelation that his death profited mankind in that he was a sacrifice propitiatory of the wrath of God against men? Is the doctrine of vicarious atonement even a fair implication of revelation? Does not the doctrine of vicarious atonement, when the circumstances are examined in candor, seem to be a matter rather of the habit of religious belief than of revelation?

There was scarcely a nation of antiquity, if I am rightly informed, which did not in its religion exhibit a conviction of the essential inacceptability of man in the sight of God, and of the extreme efficacy of vicarious sacrifice in expiation of God's anger. The Greeks, the Romans (as we have already observed), the Gauls, and, most important of all, the Jews, held the doctrine of vicarious atonement, and practiced accordingly. It was a common point with all the old religions; it was a habit of belief. We do no violence to the probabilities, I think, if we assign its incorporation into the Christian theology to this habit.

That is, the abandonment of the doctrine of vicarious atonement does not necessarily involve the denial of revelation. We may take it that Christ died in men's behalf otherwise than as a vicarious sacrifice in propitiation of God's wrath, and still be within the revelation. The only violence we do is done to tradition.

I am going to suggest that the doctrine of vicarious atonement, with its necessary antecedent, the

doctrine of inevitable depravity, whereby the Christian practice is conditioned on the fear of God, is no part of the true and original theory of Christianity. It was no part of the Christianity which served the people of the first century; the Christianity which served them proposed a Christ dying for mankind otherwise than in expiation of their offense to God.

How otherwise? What theory other than that which holds the doctrine of vicarious atonement is possible?

CHAPTER VIII.

The Secondary Religious Appetence.

In a certain melodrama the hero, a soldier, is taken prisoner in battle, bound hand and foot, and left alone in a house which is in the range of the cannon. In this predicament his lady love, who has followed him to the wars, finds him, and almost at the moment of her coming upon him, a great hot shell, with fuse sputtering, drops through the roof and down beside them. The woman promptly picks up the shell, carries it in her arms to the window and throws it out. An instant later it explodes with immense effect, but without injuring either the soldier or the lady.

The incident or situation moved the audience deeply. A dramatic critic told me, when I asked him why the people were moved, that it was all a matter of suspense long accumulating and suddenly relieved; an old trick of the playwrights.

But is this all?

Let us suppose that the shell in the play falls through the roof and lies menacingly awhile, but that the fuse goes out of itself, finally. Here is a situation vastly less powerful to stir an audience, as it needs no professional judgment to decide at once. Still there would be the element of suspense, long accumulating and suddenly relieved; for suspense would accumulate while yet the fuse burned, and it would be relieved instantly the fuse went out.

What element have we excluded?

When the woman picks up the shell, as in the situation offered, her act suggests forgetfulness of self. The self would prompt her to flee the place, since it were easy for her to get away from the danger in that way. There is in her act the suggestion of devotion.

In the alternative situation which we have proposed, the situation which is plainly less potent to move, there is no suggestion of devotion. We have excluded any such suggestion.

Is it not the suggestion of devotion that moves?

But suppose another alternative situation. Let the woman pick up the shell, as in the situation offered, but let the fuse go out of itself while she is on her way to the window, to the end that there is no explosion. Here, too, is a weaker situation, as anybody, I think, must admit. Yet here is devotion. If the woman takes the burning shell in her arms, when the thought of self prompts her to run away, this is certainly devoting herself, regardless of results.

If it is the suggestion of devotion that moves, why is the situation without the explosion weaker than the situation with the explosion?

It is evident that the suggestion of devotion waits on the illusion, in any case. Were the spectacle which we are contemplating the spectacle of reality; were the shell iron filled with lyddite; were the man and woman indeed a warrior gone to the wars and his lady love following him, and were their adventures actual adventures, and we were beholders of them all, then, it is apparent, the suggestion of devotion, with the woman taking the lighted shell in her arms, would be equally strong, explosion or no explosion.

But everything is make-believe. The man and woman are not knight and lady, but mere play-actors, and the shell is papier mache. There is no devotion, in fact; and no suggestion of devotion except as there is illusion. And the illusion is manifestly helped by the explosion. The thunderous noise, the flash of light, the falling walls, these lend the air of verisimilitude.

That is, the alternative situation which we are now considering, while it proposes, equally with the situation offered in the play, an act of devotion, lacks elements on which the suggestion of devotion waits, the suggestion to the spectator in the audience. We are still permitted to say that it is the suggestion of devotion which moves.

And it seems to me, on trial, that whatever change I make in the situation, whereby the suggestion of devotion is weakened in any way, weakens the situation, leaving it less potent to move. The suggestion of devotion appears to be the prior fact to the emotion we are observing.

Near me in the theater sits a young girl. It is the first time she has ever seen a play. When the woman picks up the shell down there on the stage, the girl pales, and wrings her hands as in anguish, and when it is all over she weeps violently.

What becomes of the emotion thus manifested? Are the pallor, the wringing of the hands, the tears its final expression? Does it spend itself in these?

It happens that I am well acquainted with the young girl, and am permitted thus to observe her after she has left the theater, the next day in her home and for several days. I see a modification of her habitual demeanor.

I do not know how I can put the case better than to say that this girl has apparently derived an access of good will. Not usually more inconsiderate than young persons in general, perhaps, she is now noticeably readier to defer, less quick to insist on having her own way. This is manifested in her duties about the house, in her play, in everything that she does in association with others. The modification of her habitual demeanor is not large, yet distinctly appreciable.

The girl was herself conscious, she told me, of an effect more than momentary, proceeding from the play and particularly the incident of the shell and the woman, and all that she said in description of this effect tended to confirm the thought that it amounted at last to an access of good will. She said she could not see how anybody could be selfish, thinking of what that woman did; remembering the woman, she could not feel "hateful," to quote her own word.

It was to be observed, too, that the effect the girl derived was a grateful effect. During the play she had wept as if her heart were breaking, as if she were sorely afflicted; but for all that, she would have delighted to see the play again. The thought of its incidents brought tears to her eyes, but she recalled them fondly, nevertheless. This made it evident that the emotion she had evinced was incidental to the gratification of an appetite; there was in her an appetite to which the incident of the woman and the shell made answer.

Years ago there appeared a poem which told the tragic story of one Jim Bludsoe, the pilot of a steamboat on the Mississippi river. Bludsoe was a bad

fellow, by all ordinary standards, a cursing, drunken, profligate rowdy, the roughest of the rough, as selfish as possible, seemingly. But one night, his boat having taken fire in midstream, he ran her ashore, and, by standing resolutely at the wheel, held her there until every passenger had got away in safety; and then he sank down and died at his post because there was not time for him to get away.

I recall how the poem affected me. I was a child at the time, and naturally not given to taking things very seriously, but there was something in this story that laid a strong hold on me. I committed the lines to memory, and used often to repeat them to myself, for as often as I repeated them, while there came a lump in my throat, I felt a grateful glow, a decided sense of satisfaction, on the whole. I was deeply moved.

Here, owing in part to the art of the poet and in part to my own youthful susceptibility, the illusion of reality was, I may say, complete. As often as I told over the story of Jim Bludsoe, in the poet's adroit words and phrases, I saw, as in reality, the burning boat, the affrighted passengers and the heroic pilot. Necessarily, there was for me in this poem a very strong suggestion of devotion. The act of Bludsoe, supposing it a real act, and to all intents and purposes it was real, as far as I was concerned, was such an act as to suggest devotion irresistibly. That it was the suggestion of devotion which moved me, I have not the least doubt, for at once I imagine the action altered in a way to eliminate the suggestion of devotion, the story is spoiled; I cannot think of it moving me at all.

From the memory of my feelings, as they were, and from the direct contemplation of certain shadowy remnants of them which still remain, I do not hesitate to testify that the emotion raised in me by this poem finally resolved itself into an access of good will. I have not the least doubt that had anybody observed me, as I have just now observed the young girl, he would have detected some deviation from my habitual demeanor such as an access of good will should bring about.

Which is to say that I find in my own experience the confirmation of the thought to which my observation of the young girl led me, namely, that the spectacle suggestive of devotion is productive of an access of good will. I dare say anybody else may find like confirmation in his own experience.

The girl is more profoundly affected by the incident of the play, to measure by externals, than are others in the theater. While she weeps, yonder matron merely sighs, and the man of the world over here looks sober for an instant and that is all. Is it that the suggestion of devotion loses its power to move us, as we grow older and more experienced.

Any dramatist will tell you, I think, that such a situation as we have been considering is certain to move an audience generally, let the character of the people be what it will, provided the illusion of reality be made complete. In other words, given the illusion, and there is no failure of the emotion; if you see the action as in reality, you are moved, be you young or old, experienced or inexperienced. If stagecraft were able to make the matron and the man of the world see as in reality, as it is easily

able to make the young girl see, then we should find the matron and the man of the world moved as profoundly as she is. They would hardly in any case express their emotion immediately just as she does, with weeping and wringing their hands; but we might confidently expect that the emotion in its ultimate resolution would amount to the same thing.

The time came when I could tell over the story of Jim Bludsoe to myself, and get almost no effect. Yet I am satisfied that I was not therefore become the less capable of being moved by the suggestion of devotion. It was simply that the suggestion of devotion in the poem had failed; partly because I was become, with advancing years, less susceptible to illusion, and partly because, even had I remained always a child, the art of the poet was not able to keep up the illusion indefinitely. The picture faded until I saw no boat, no flames, no pilot; and then, of course, the suggestion of devotion was gone. Sooner or later the understanding or concept temporarily amplified by the imagination shrinks back to the limits of fact; and there being in fact nothing to suggest devotion, the emotion is no longer raised.

But what of the spectacle of devotion in the real?

I have just been reading in the newspapers about a certain William Phelps, a negro laborer. Phelps and another man were working inside a great steam boiler; somebody carelessly opened a valve and the steam came pouring in on them. Phelps was the first to become aware of their danger, and sprang to the ladder which led to the manhole. But almost at once he drew back and bade his companion go up first. "You've got a family and I'm a single man," said Phelps. The other man got out, almost without

injury, but Phelps was so badly scalded that he died in a few hours, in the frightfullest agony.

I cannot doubt you would be deeply moved were you to encounter such an act as this, getting your understanding of it through your own senses directly, seeing it in the real; were you to be, for instance, one of those who first came to the rescue, and found Phelps dying of his hurt, and heard how it all happened.

Your emotion is at first mostly horror. You are overwhelmed with the thought of a man being scalded until he dies. The extreme agony, the proof of the frightful manner of death, leaves no room for any sentiment save horror, at first. But horror you would equally have, had the man been scalded to death under any circumstances. The peculiar circumstance of the man having been scalded to death in order that another man might live, does not this affect your emotion?

You are sorry the negro is dead; you are particularly sorry that he has died such a death. But his act of standing aside to let his companion go up the ladder first, the act which brought about his death, for this you are not sorry. You are glad, although you do not at once, perhaps, identify your feeling with gladness. And by degrees, the sentiment of sober gladness submerges the other sentiments, even your horror, until the thought of the hideousness of the negro's manner of dying serves only to complete the suggestion of devotion; to argue to you that by as much as it is worse to be scalded to death than it is to die in any other way, by so much more was the man devoted, the more forgetful of self. Insensibly the man in his agony is transfigured and lost in

the hero. And you are not sorry for that which has made a hero.

The newspaper I am reading has an editorial about Phelps. In it his deed is pronounced a deed of moral grandeur. None will deny the fitness of the characterization. And we do not wish of deeds of moral grandeur that they had never been done. We are glad when they are done; not with the gladness of light laughter, for such deeds are mostly tragic, but with the solemn gladness of tears and sighs.

Is it too much to say that in this incident you have found the answer to an appetite of your being?

As to the ultimate resolution of the emotion raised by this incident, I do not see that there can be uncertainty. Any man who should come in contact with one doing as Phelps did, and should go his way without deriving an access of good will, and a sufficient access of good will to be plainly manifested in his conduct, he, I say, would be an unusual man; not at all the average man.

Whether you are the brutal, sordid foreman, or the cold doctor who comes to bind up the negro's burns, or the thoughtless schoolboy who stops to stare, or whomsoever else, you are made better disposed by this spectacle. And it is a spectacle powerfully suggestive of devotion. Here the suggestion is not to be escaped; it waits on none of the illusions of art. To no normal mind could the negro's act fail to suggest devotion.

What is good will?

For such of us as believe there is a God, good will is God's will; it is good will because it is God's will, it is God's will because it is good will.

If from the spectacle suggestive of devotion a man derives an access of good will, then is the spectacle suggestive of devotion a means of bringing man into communion with the will of God; it is a means of inspiring him with God's will; it is a means of putting him in the way of doing God's will. It performs, in a word, a religious service; and the appetence to which it answers, this is a religious appetence.

I propose to call it, for convenience, the secondary religious appetence.

CHAPTER IX.

“Follow Me.”

I quote from the tenth chapter of the gospel of the New Testament, according to St. Luke:

“And behold a certain lawyer stood up, tempting him, and saying, Master, what must I do to possess eternal life?”

“But he said to him: What is written in the law? How readest thou?”

“He answering, said: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbor as thyself.”

“And he said to him: Thou hast answered right; this do, and thou shalt live.”

“But he, willing to justify himself, said to Jesus: And who is my neighbor?”

“And Jesus answering said: A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among robbers, who also stripped him, and having wounded him, went away, leaving him half dead.”

“And it chanced that a certain priest went down the same way; and seeing him, passed by.”

“And in like manner also a Levite, when he was near the place and saw him, passed by.”

“But a certain Samaritan, being on his journey, came near him; and seeing him, was moved with compassion.

“And going up to him, bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine; and setting him upon his own beast, brought him to an inn, and took care of him.

“And the next day he took out two pence, and gave to the host and said: “Take care of him; and whatsoever thou shalt spend over and above, I, at my return, will repay thee.

“Which of these three, in thy opinion, was neighbor to him that fell among the robbers?”

“But he said: He that showed mercy to him. And Jesus said to him: Go, and do thou in like manner.”

I quote again, from writ profane, this time, the comment of a newspaper on the conduct of a certain rich young man who put away his wealth, not to any purpose except simply in order that he might be poor, as if it were wrong to be rich:

“This young man was of more value to the world when he was rich than now when he is poor. We need living men more than dead ones; and by the same token, we need rich men more than poor ones; that is, the poor must be made rich and only themselves can do it. The poor man needs the example of the rich man. He doesn't need anyone to show him how to be poor. He knows how only too well. He needs to be taught not to endure his poverty in the hope of heaven, but to rebel against it. He must be taught not that he offends his maker by wanting, but that he offends him by not wanting. He needs to be made dissatisfied and bound to have. Dying for him, or cutting off one's hand for him cannot help him. He will better his condition only as his wants prod him. Trust him to find the way when they prod sharply enough. The young man would have done

better to show that wealth may be made profitable to the soul. He would better have taught the poor man to expand instead of to become fixed and callous. He could have taught him to see that there is a fair, good world outside of his poverty, and that he should not rest until he gains it; that he should look every appetite of his mind and body squarely and cordially in the face, knowing it to be good; he could have taught the poor man that he was made to rejoice, and that it lies with him to find the material wherewith to do it."

In order to be a good Samaritan in every sense, a man clearly has no need whatever to make himself poor in worldly goods. The good Samaritan of the parable might have been a keen, aggressive man of business; I doubt not that he was such. Anyway, he was a man of substance, since he had the two pence to pay, and credit with the host of the inn. He would have been no better Samaritan, certainly, for being too poor to give his neighbor the succor of which he stood so sorely in need.

The good Samaritan sacrificed self. What he did involved, unavoidably, the denial of self. Self would prompt him to pass by on the other side, as the priest and the Levite had done; when he did as he did, he rejected the promptings of self. So the lawyer whom the Savior bids go and do likewise, is thereby enjoined to the sacrifice of self.

But it is to sacrifice within limits, observe. The lawyer is not told to put away his wealth, by any implication in the Savior's command, although to put away his wealth were to deny self. He is given distinctly to understand, on the contrary, that he

may be all that a good man need be and still be wealthy, giving his best energies to the accumulation of wealth. As long as he does not love himself to the detriment of his neighbor, he fulfills the law, and surely a man may gather wealth unto himself without detriment to his neighbor. Indeed, it often happens that his gathering of wealth to himself operates to the profit of his neighbor.

The comment which I have quoted is fairly in the spirit of the parable. The young man makes a useless sacrifice. He fails of imitating the good Samaritan, denying himself too far, as much as the priest or the Levite who denied himself too little. Because a man is to love himself no more than he loves his neighbor, it does not follow that he is to love himself less than he loves his neighbor. The comment takes its inspiration from the common sense of propriety, I presume, rather than from the parable of the good Samaritan; but that does not matter. If it is on reference to the common sense of propriety that we blame such a sacrifice as the young man has made, it is not for lack of ground for blame in the law as revealed by Moses and affirmed by Christ.

We go back to the gospels. First, Matthew X, 38:
“And he that taketh not up his cross and followeth me is not worthy of me.”

Then Mark VII, 34:

“If any man will follow me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross and follow me.”

Then Luke IX, 23:

“If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily and follow me.”

And finally John XXI, 19:

“Follow me.”

These are the words of Christ, and in them he makes himself the pattern of conduct. Is this to set a pattern precisely equal to the pattern of the good Samaritan?

Christ went about doing good, without pay; he healed the sick, fed the hungry, and gave to the thirsty to drink; and therein he sacrificed self; for self would prompt a man not to do these things, unless he were paid. But the measure of Christ's self-denial far transcended the sacrifice involved in these activities.

Christ was born in the flesh to the wife of a Nazarene carpenter; being God, he might if he chose have been born in the imperial purple. He lived in a wretched hovel; being God, he might have dwelt in the fairest palace of earth. His food was a crust of black bread; being God, he might have eaten a prince's fare off plates of gold. He was under no compulsion save that which his own purpose laid on him. He chose the life of poverty and deprivation; by his own choice he was scourged and mocked and nailed to the cross. The ignominy and agony which he endured he might have avoided by the mere recourse to his divine nature. He nevertheless endured; he avoided nothing.

And the ignominy and agony he might avoid, and still do all the direct good he did. In order to love his neighbor as he loved himself, it was not necessary that he be born a beggar and die a felon. Though he had been born to Caesar's wife and had lived and died as becoms a king, he might still have healed and fed and given to drink. The sacrifice he made when he was born a lowly Nazarene was a use-

less sacrifice, judging him by the pattern of the good Samaritan; and his crucifixion, endured as it was by his own choice, was a useless sacrifice.

Christ's life in the flesh exemplified the completest devotion of the carnal self to sacrifice. Its salient character is sacrifice for its own sake; sacrifice beyond any that is required of a man in order that he love his neighbor as he loves himself and thus fulfill the law.

The pattern of Christ is not the pattern of the good Samaritan.

The injunction to follow Christ is the injunction, it seems to me, to precisely such a sacrifice as that of the young man who put away his riches. I cannot imagine a case more clearly illustrative of the difference there is, as I see it, between the line of conduct enjoined in the parable of the good Samaritan, and the line of conduct enjoined in the command to follow Christ. A man need not put away his wealth in order to do as the good Samaritan did; but unless he put away his wealth, he would not do as Christ did. For after all he keeps his wealth only on the promptings of the carnal self; were he to be divested of the carnal nature, his wealth would be as nothing to him. In keeping his wealth he neglects an opportunity to deny the self; Christ neglected no such opportunity.

We find Christ proposing two different laws of conduct. How is the apparent inconsistency to be reconciled?

As regards the measure of his self-sacrifice, the man who should follow the good Samaritan would not necessarily be all that Christ was, but manifestly, the man who should follow Christ would be all that

the good Samaritan was. The man following Christ would probably not have oil and wine to pour into his neighbor's wounds, or a beast to convey him to the inn, or pence with which to pay for his keep there; nevertheless, though he should be prevented from succoring his neighbor, he would be prevented in no degree by the consideration of self. Had the priest or the Levite stopped and taken compassion on his neighbor, even though he had done nothing for him except bring him a drink of water from the well, provided that were all in his power to do, he would of course fulfill completely the command conveyed in the parable. Sufficiency before the law is plainly a matter of intent and not of positive achievement. Whoever should follow Christ could not, indeed, avoid succoring his neighbor, as far as in him lay; for his neighbor's need would offer the opportunity to sacrifice self, and this he might not neglect.

That is to say, the measure of self-sacrifice involved in following the good Samaritan is included, so to speak, in the larger measure of self-sacrifice involved in the following of Christ.

Now it is in no manner doubtful, I take it, that the parable of the good Samaritan lays down the law for mankind in general. If any man does as the good Samaritan did, we have the Savior's word for it, he is a righteous and a sufficient man, fulfilling the law. A good man may not do less; but more he need not do.

Since the measure of self-sacrifice involved in following the good Samaritan, the smaller measure, is enjoined on mankind at large, the suggestion at once is that the measure of self-sacrifice involved in following Christ, the larger measure and inclusive of

the smaller, is enjoined not on all men, but on some men only.

And who might these some men be, thus commanded to follow Christ, whereas mankind in general were bidden to follow the good Samaritan?

On the occasion of his final appearance in the flesh, after the resurrection, almost the last words of the Savior, according to St. John, are the words: "Follow me." It is no mere recommendation, or exhortation even, that is here spoken, but a command, direct and unequivocal.

And to whom?

To the disciples; to the men he is sending out to teach all the nations. There is nobody present but the disciples.

"And he that taketh not up his cross and followeth me," Christ is reported by St. Matthew as saying, "is not worthy of me."

This is a strong recommendation, certainly; scarcely less forcible, under the circumstances, than a command.

To whom spoken?

To the disciples. Christ is alone with the disciples, here. He is ordaining them apostles, and instructing them in their duties.

St. Luke says:

"And he (Christ) said to all: If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow me."

And St. Mark:

"And calling the multitude together with his disciples, he (Christ) said to them: If any man will follow me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross and follow me."

St. Luke does not make it quite clear that the multitude was or was not present. His use of the word "all" is a bit confusing, to me at least. Just before he seems to say that Christ was speaking to the disciples only, but the multitude was not far away, and it is not unlikely that the word "all" includes the multitude. St. Mark leaves it in no doubt that the multitude was present.

But does Christ hereupon command, or even recommend?

No, he simply declares what a man need do, should it be that man's choice to follow him. It is precisely what you would expect him to say, in the presence of the multitude, provided you take it that he desired to command, not the multitude, but only such of them as should become his disciples, to follow him.

Christ appears very plainly to us as the exemplification of complete devotion of the carnal self to sacrifice. But that, I submit, is because we know that Christ is God. Dismiss the thought that Christ is God, and he no longer stands before us as the exemplification of complete devotion. He stands before us hereupon as a mere man, whose carnal nature with its burden of pain is not voluntarily assumed by him, but is thrust upon him as it is thrust upon you or me or any other man, and retained by him not by his own choice, but under the compulsion that rests on us all; a man who had to suffer what he suffered, enduring the ignominy and agony because he could not avoid them; a man whose brow could not be crowned with thorns or his feet pierced with nails without him being hurt; not God any more, who might, did he chose, rise superior to fleshly pain.

For obviously in order to the exemplification of devotion, the element of choice has to appear. There is no devotion suggested unless the sacrifice is plainly avoidable. And it was only as Christ was God that he had a choice; it is only as we know him to be God that the element of choice appears to us.

To whom did Christ demonstrate his divinity? With whom, as he ascended to heaven, did he leave the knowledge that he was God? Who, in a word, in that day knew what it meant to follow him, and how complete must be the sacrifice which should imitate his own?

The Savior's doings, prior to the crucifixion, could not help but beget a somewhat general belief in his divinity, unless I greatly mistake the temper of the people of that day. Surely those who were at the marriage feast, or who partook of the loaves and fishes miraculously multiplied, or who were themselves healed by the Savior's touch or saw others healed, they were in some measure at least inclined to accept Christ as being God. By these the report of his wonders was doubtless spread, until the people at large were informed, and credibly, to the end that there was in all probability a wide belief in him.

What must have been the effect of the crucifixion on this general belief?

"If thou art God," said the Jews, mocking him, "save thyself!"

In the eyes of the world, of the multitude, the divinity of Jesus was on trial that day. Here was the final test. He is God, they would say who already believed in him, and he will save himself. If he is

God, would say the others, open to conviction yet doubting, he will save himself. The test was fair; it proposed for him to do that which no trick, however adroit, might effect; that which might be brought about only by the special intervention of divine Providence.

He did not save himself. The people saw him beaten with whips, and crowned with thorns, and they saw him wince, by which they knew that he suffered; they heard him cry out for water to slake his thirst; they observed that he bled when the spear pierced his side. He died in agony before their eyes, as any man might die. And the word went abroad, we may be assured, through all the land, that he who had amazed the people with his wonders was dead of the death of a felon at last.

Had Christ saved himself; had unseen hands raised the cross from his shoulders, or brought water to his parched lips; had the nails turned aside and refused to enter his flesh; then would the seal of final proof have been set upon his divinity, and the people would have gone their way believing in him.

But when he did not save himself, is it not certain that the people's faith in him, such as they had, was shattered? How could they believe in him now? How would they be likely to interpret what they had just seen unless as conclusive evidence that Christ was not able to save himself, and was not God? Was not the effect of his previous demonstrations of divine power completely offset by this demonstration of human frailty?

It is perfectly plain to us why Jesus did not save himself. To save himself were to spoil the lesson of

his life. Here was the greatest of his opportunities to deny the self which he had voluntarily assumed. He might not neglect it and remain the exemplification of complete devotion. That he omit the crowning proof of his devotion is unthinkable, to us, but again that is because we know Christ to be God. Before those people might understand, as we do, why he did not save himself, they had to know that he was God. And that knowledge they could not possibly have, under the circumstances. To expect that they would, in the face of all the facts, assume that Christ was indeed God, and on that assumption proceed to discover some reason why he had not saved himself, is to expect too much.

I feel assured that had I been of that multitude which streamed back from Calvary the evening of the day of the crucifixion, I should have said to myself or to my neighbor: "He was not God, inasmuch as he did not save himself." Certainly my faith might not have proved more steadfast under that trial than the faith of the disciples, who were beset with the gravest doubts, knowing not what to think.

He died and was buried, but after three days he rose again.

The resurrection was a miracle of most convincing force. To have seen Christ hang all day on the cross, to have seen him die by inches there, and, when dead, laid away in the tomb, and now to see him alive and in the flesh after three days; certainly no assurance of divine interposition more conclusive than this could be imagined. Nobody to whom such assurance should be vouchsafed could longer doubt that Christ was God. Its force and effect are fairly indicated

in the exclamation of Thomas, the doubter of doubters: "My Lord and my God!"

To whom was this assurance vouchsafed?

To the disciples only. "Not to all the people," as Peter relates to Cornelius, "but to witnesses fore-ordained by God, even to us, who did eat and drink with him after he rose again from the dead."

The multitude had gone away disbelieving. Their faith would have been restored and made complete had the resurrected Jesus appeared to them; but he did not appear to them; he appeared only to his few disciples; it was their faith, and theirs alone, that was restored by this greatest of miracles.

Only to the disciples, then, did Christ demonstrate his divinity. To these few, of all the people of the earth, was it given by him to know that he was God. Only these might see in him the exemplification of the complete devotion of the carnal self to sacrifice. The handful of men he sent out to teach the nations, they knew what it meant to follow him; but nobody else knew.

Of course it was no mere accident that the faith of the multitude was destroyed, while the faith of the disciples was preserved. By the very nature of the case, the consummation reveals precisely the Savior's design. If the multitude went away disbelieving, and none believed except the disciples, as the effect of Christ's activities in the flesh, this comprised the achievement of his whole purpose in being incarnated; what came about was precisely what he wished to come about.

His purpose is made evident otherwise than in the event. During his association with his disciples, he

repeatedly forewarned these of the crucifixion to come, bidding them not to be troubled with the manner of his death, for that he would rise again. He never forewarned the multitude, as I read the gospels. What can be plainer than that the Savior's purpose rendered him solicitous for the faith of the disciples, lest it be shaken, while it leaves him indifferent as to the faith of the multitude? And what does this mean, unless that he intended the disciples alone to know what it meant to follow him?

In the fourteenth chapter of the gospel according to Luke, the Savior is quoted as saying:

“If any man come to me and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brother and sister, yea, and his own life, also, he cannot be my disciple.

“And whosoever doth not carry his cross and come after me, cannot be my disciple.”

This is certainly explicit as to the qualifications of a disciple. Does it specify such qualifications as Christ would exact of all men?

Impossible, I say. Were all men to qualify themselves to be disciples, under this plain definition, the race would be extinct in a generation. The ties that bind father or mother and son, or husband and wife, are indeed carnal ties; but they exhibit the carnal self in its most engaging aspect; they are the fairest fruits of selfishness; they are not only irreproachable but praiseworthy, if the endurance of mankind is to be desired, for they are indispensable if mankind is to endure. To break them as here plainly commanded were to sacrifice the self; but assuredly no such tremendous sacrifice of self is expected of men generally.

This passage seems to have perplexed some at least of the commentators. In the copy of the New Testament before me, this note of explanation is appended:

"The law of Christ does not allow us to hate even our enemies, much less our parents; but the meaning of the text is, that we must be in that disposition of soul, as to be willing to renounce, and part with everything, how near and dear soever it may be to us, that would keep us from following Christ."

But is it a mere willingness to renounce that the Savior enjoins? Is it not plainly the actual renunciation?

The difficulty vanishes, I think, when you take it that Christ uses the word disciple in a narrow sense, and the passage as defining the proper conduct, not for all men, but for some men only.

There is a passage of similar tenor in the tenth chapter of Matthew:

"Do not think that I come to send peace upon earth; I come not to send peace, but the sword.

"For I come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law.

"And a man's enemies shall be they of his own household."

Here the word disciple is not used at all; the application is quite general, as far as the language quoted indicates the application.

Why, if this injunction is intended only for some men, as the disciples, is not some restrictive term used?

Because, I say, on the occasion reported by Luke, Christ is addressing the multitude, and it thereupon becomes needful to limit the application of his admo-

nitions, lest they be taken to heart by those for whom they are not intended, whereas, on the occasion reported by Matthew, he is addressing the disciples alone, instructing them in their apostolic obligations, and there is no need for him to limit the application of his admonitions; they are for all who hear them.

What does it all come to?

In sending them out to teach the nations, Christ gave these disciples of his a particular work to do, a work which he gave to nobody else.

In bidding them to follow him, he commanded them to a particular conduct, as I hope our inquiry has made to appear, a conduct that was not enjoined on anybody else.

Is not the inference fair that the particular conduct is the means to the accomplishment of the particular work? Is it not that in the following of Christ, the disciples are to teach the nations? Is not the following of Christ hereby made the sum and substance of pastoral practice under the New Testament? In a word, is not the following of Christ by his pastors the beginning and the end of the Christian method?

CHAPTER X.

The Word of God.

Goethe makes his Faust, in a moment of pious transport, propose the translation from the Greek into the German of the opening verses of the gospel according to St. John, and sets forth how, at once the doctor gets to work, he encounters difficulties. St. John says that in the beginning was the "logos," and the "logos" was with God, and the "logos" was God; it proves not to be easy to translate this term "logos."

Faust begins with the conventional translation; in the beginning, he says, "was das Wort," the Word; but at once he rejects this term as altogether inadequate. "I cannot estimate the word so highly!" he exclaims. Then he translates, "Im Anfang war der Sinn," that is, "In the beginning was the Thought;" and this does not content him. Then he proposes successively as translations of "logos," die Kraft, or the Force, and die That, the Fact; rejecting each in turn. Here the howling of the dog behind the stove, the devil in disguise as it shortly turns out, diverts the doctor's attention from the gospel according to St. John, and he does not come back to the subject. So we are not informed definitely what Faust, that is, Goethe, thought "logos" meant. But it is perhaps plain that the scholar regarded it as a term of large significance; not to be adequately ren-

dered by "word," unless we read into "word" a sense more extensive than it usually carries.

"In the beginning," says St. John, to quote the gospel as it is usually translated, "was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.

"And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, and we saw his glory, the glory, as it were, of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.

"For the law was given by Moses: grace and truth came by Jesus Christ."

These three verses are all in the first chapter, the majestic eloquence of which has fascinated men in all ages. It is not hard to believe that a momentous message is here delivered.

A word, in the common meaning of the term, is but one of the several means to which mankind have recourse in order to communicate thought; that is, to bring a number of minds into a community of movement, or affection. It is simply the most usual means. The word is not capable of conveying the whole thought, as a general thing, if ever. Perhaps it conveys all conscious thought; it may be that we mean by conscious thought that thought which finds expression in words; as when we say that conscious thought is impossible without language. But still the word leaves a residue of thought unexpressed. It may express enough of the thought to serve every purpose, but if there were no means of communication except the word, there would be a good deal of incommunicable thought.

I have read a book written by an ardent disciple of the composer Wagner wherein the attempt was made to set forth in words the thought expressed

by this great musician's music. The attempt failed, at least as far as I am concerned: it left me with no better notion of the meaning of Wagner's music than I had before. But it gave me a livelier appreciation of the inadequacy of words to express all that we think.

Back of Wagner's music, in the mind of the composer himself, there was a movement or affection which words could not possibly express. This mental movement, this thought was not to be transmitted to other minds without the use of a symbolism other than that of words. It was not possible for Wagner by the use of words, however well chosen, to make other men think what he was thinking. Unless there was provided a new symbolism, a symbolism operative, so to speak, after the word had done its utmost, then must this thought of Wagner's remain uncommunicated to others.

Wagner provided the new symbolism in his music. To the mind capable of feeling its force, it communicates the mental movement of the master. The disciple thinks the thought, for himself, and when he sees most other men not thinking it, he tries to translate it into words, in order to render it generally intelligible. Naturally he fails. Words are still inadequate. Were they adequate, the likelihood is that Wagner's music would never have been composed.

Observe the narrative of the tournament in *Ivanhoe*, how moving it is, how vividly it makes us see in our mind's eye what Scott saw in his; or Macaulay's account of the scene at the opening of the trial of Warren Hastings. These are consummate pictures. But let less gifted artists use these identical

words, these identical formal symbols, and though they have the original as clearly in their minds as had the great romancer or the great historian, they are unable to communicate, as these do, their mental movement or thought to us. Scott and Macaulay make use of a larger symbolism. The ordering of the lines, the adroit alliteration, the rythm, the covert suggestions everywhere all have their part in the conveyance of the thought that is finally conveyed. The pictures are word-pictures; but word-pictures only in the sense that a Turner or a Corot is a paint-picture.

If I understand it, all this is "logos." The logos is any symbol expressive of thought, any symbol which succeeds in conveying thought; not only the word, but any means whatever whereby thought is conveyed from mind to mind. I believe the Greeks so understood it.

I once had occasion to discuss with a clergyman the plans for a proposed cathedral. He was objecting to the plans because they omitted the Gothic arch.

"The Gothic arch appeals very strongly to me," he said. "There is a spiritual uplift about it. I am distinctly conscious of an exaltation when I behold a Gothic arch of large proportions. They say there are sermons in stones; I can testify that there is for me a sermon and a powerful sermon in stones raised in this form. To me it seems a means whereby God speaks directly to man without the intervention of human lips, or of the words invented by man."

The arch is logos.

The clergyman proposes the main idea of the Christian method. It is the idea of conveying God's

thought to man, of affecting the mind of man with the movement approximating as nearly as may be the movement of the Divine Mind, and by means of a symbolism in which the word of tongue or pen has no more than an incidental part at most.

"The Word," says the evangelist, "was made flesh."

And that is to say, Jesus Christ, the son of God and our Savior, is a symbolism. In his earthly life he, too, is *logos*. He was made flesh in order to provide the means of communicating God's thought to men. Being made flesh, he became the exemplification of the complete devotion of the carnal self to sacrifice. Being made flesh, though God still, he afforded the spectacle powerfully suggestive of devotion, and a spectacle to be by his express command perpetuated in the sight of men, in the humility of Christian pastors following devoutly in the way of the cross.

"The law was given by Moses," says John, "but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ."

In a rude age, the mere revelation of the law was enough. When men are possessed of the fear of God, they have but to be told what is the will of God, in order that God's will be done by them. Moses in his time was able to effect an actual communication of God's will to men, simply by revealing the commandments; the anxiety of men in that day to do the will of God, made them ready to hearken to the prophet. But as the ages passed, and men gradually lost the fear of God, thus to be made less anxious to do His will, the authority of the prophet waned, until at last no communication of God's will to men could be effected by the prophet. The prophet might still

tell men what God's will was, but his telling them did not result in God's will actually becoming their will; there was no communication of movement from the divine mind to the human mind.

But with Jesus Christ came grace and truth.

Grace, the English term, is not very definite. The Greek word used by St. John is rather more definite, I think; *charis*, the original of our charity, meaning in its subjective sense (the theological sense, as my dictionary avers) kindness, or good will. With Jesus Christ, then, came the access of good will. And whereas the communication of God's will by the prophet waited on the ardent desire of men to do God's will, and became therefore well-nigh impossible with the primary appetite extinct, the will of God might now, through Jesus Christ, be communicated to men who have no conscious thought of God. The spectacle suggestive of devotion, proposed by the Savior for the instruction of his pastors, and commanded by him to be perpetuated in their imitation of himself, this was to effect the communication of the thought of God to men, even though men should be quite indifferent to God.

We read that the Holy Ghost descended on the disciples, and at once they were endued with the power to speak in many tongues, to converse, in fact, with "men out of every nation under heaven." This passage is commonly taken to mean, I suppose, that a great miracle was performed, and that these men, hitherto unlearned for the most part, were made able to speak in all the languages of the earth, several hundred in number.

What could have been the purpose of such a miracle?

To enable the apostles, it will perhaps be answered, to talk with any man in his own tongue, and thus to convey to him the good tidings of the gospel. But the original apostles, they who were thus visited by the Holy Ghost, seem to have made no use of their power. The majority of them worked in Asia Minor; some went to Europe; some into Africa; it is not likely that any went far beyond the confines of the Roman empire, or penetrated into any country where either the Greek or the Latin was not spoken and understood.

Is it likely that God miraculously endowed these men with the power to speak all languages, and then kept them at work where a single language, or at most two languages, answered all purposes that a hundred languages might?

Again, the gift of many tongues, if it was given, was exclusively the gift of the original apostles. It descended to none of their successors. In the course of years, Christian pastors went among all the nations, but not with the gift of many tongues. They had to learn, by hard labor, to talk with the strange men they encountered.

If the common notion of the meaning of the descent of the Holy Ghost on the apostles is correct, why did not one of these go to China, and tell the Chinese about Christ? Or, if he had not the time, why were not the apostles of later times similarly empowered to speak Chinese? Why is Christ left to wait on the borders of Cathay until his missionaries have mastered the exceedingly difficult language of the people who dwell there?

There suggests itself to me the idea that this descent of the Holy Ghost on the apostles was simply

the inspiration of the fortitude to be vicars of Christ, to follow him in the way of the cross. There was nothing miraculous about it. It was no more than might happen to any man, as well now as 2,000 years ago; no more, perhaps, than actually did happen to that young man who put away his wealth, and was criticized for making a useless sacrifice. The origin of the impulse on which any man should devote himself to the service of God in the imitation of Christ might well be hidden, might well be deemed a mystery, and not inaptly described as the effect of a descent of the Holy Ghost upon him.

The apostles or any others thus inspired, thus fortified to follow Christ, are thereby enabled to speak to all men, regardless of tongues. They are become in themselves logos of universal intelligibility, for the symbolism of Christ is universal in its force. Wherever men are selfish, and that is everywhere, the spectacle suggestive of devotion moves, and brings the will of God into men's hearts. Whether a man be a Greek or a Chinese or a red Indian, confront him with the living Christ, and he gains an access of good will; he comes in a measure into communion with the thought of God.

CHAPTER XI.

St. Paul.

In the thirteenth chapter of his first epistle to the Corinthians, St. Paul writes:

“Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am as a sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal,

“And though I should have prophecy, and should know all mysteries and all knowledge, and though I should have all faith, so that I could move mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing,

“And if I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.”

Charity, then, according to the apostle, is an exceedingly important quality. Without it, he says, he is nothing, no matter though he have eloquence and faith and liberality, all in the greatest measure. Charity is the superlative quality, as Paul sees it.

“Charity” is the commoner English translation of the Greek word used by the apostle. In the new version of the English Testament, the word is translated “love,” which is about equal in sense to “charity” as doubtless understood by the King James translators; in fact, these translators render the term “love” in several passages. But neither charity nor love proposes a definite notion, or in itself gives us to understand precisely what was the superlative quality of which Paul wrote to the Corinthians.

I propose that we look a little into the antecedents of the Greek original, to see if we may not in that way get a more definite grasp of the idea the apostle had in mind.

The word in Greek is *agape* (pronounced in three syllables with the accent on the second). It is not a classical word; that is to say, it is not found in any of the writings left by writers properly Greek. It first occurs, I believe, in the extant texts of the Septuagint version of the Old Testament, thought to have been written about the middle of the third century before Christ. That is, this word was coined, at the earliest, not earlier than about 250 B. C. There seems to me to be some reason to believe that it was in fact coined much later.

I venture to doubt that *agape* was used at all by the seventy scholars who wrote the Septuagint; it was not in the original manuscripts of that work, unless I greatly mistake the evidence.

In the days of the apostles and evangelists, the Septuagint had come to be very highly venerated by the Jews. Distrusted at first, perhaps, by a race justly proud of its own language and literature, it had come to be very generally received by the people among whom the apostles lived and wrote. Inasmuch as the Septuagint was Greek, any Jew who should essay to write in Greek, especially concerning a matter of religion, would be strongly influenced in his choice of words by the usage of the Septuagint.

It is not to be doubted that *agape* was the name of an idea esteemed extremely important to Christians. If Paul's evidence is worth anything, it was a paramount idea, an idea quite essential to the proper understanding of Christianity. Paul did not

mean an idea peculiarly his own, by agape. The idea he meant was an idea which all the apostles had in mind, understanding Christianity as they did.

And if this idea were already named by the usage of the Septuagint, if the Septuagint already called the idea agape, we should find all those who wrote about Christianity using that symbol to designate the idea. Should we not? Each and every apostle had the idea, because it was clearly an essential idea, lacking which his understanding of Christianity would be inadequate. Each and every apostle who should write about Christianity must mention the idea under one name or another. If the name were already fixed as the venerable usage of the Septuagint could not help but fix it, we ought to find agape very often in all the books of the New Testament.

What do we find?

As I make the count, Matthew uses the word once, Mark not at all, Luke once, and John seven times, in his gospel. In the epistles, James does not use the word, Peter uses it four times, John twenty-one times and Paul fifty-five times.

That Matthew, Mark and Luke treat fully of the idea which Paul names agape is not to be doubted; in that they do not describe it by the name agape, I feel assured that agape was not a Septuagint word. That either Paul or John coined the word, their copious use of it, as compared with the sparing use of it by the others, suggests.

As between Paul and John it does not seem hard to decide who should be the original and who the reflex. The critics appear to be agreed that John was the youngest of the apostles and that he proba-

bly survived the others by a number of years. His writings, not only his epistles, but his gospel as well, are distinctly commentative in their attitude, as compared with the three other gospels, which are more in recitative style. It is as if John, being left alone, and observing what his associates had written, undertook to effect a sort of clearing up; to supply the connecting link that should weld into an homogeneous whole the gospels of Matthew, Mark and Luke, and the epistles of Paul. Paul uses the word agape as he might use his own word, his own name for a very important thought. Matthew, Mark, Luke and Peter use it sparingly, as contemporaries might. John uses it only less freely than Paul himself, as a successor might. If agape was not Paul's word, I find myself at loss to account for the way it is used in the New Testament.

To suppose that agape was interpolated in extant texts of the Septuagint is to do no violence to the probabilities. Jerome, in the fourth century after Christ, found the texts of the Septuagint already so corrupt, so replete with emendations and interpolations that he was compelled to abandon his project of making a Latin translation of the Greek Old Testament, and to go back to the original Hebrew for his version. Naturally the texts then existing were not more corrupt than those existing now, particularly when we consider that a thousand years of the 1,500 that have elapsed since Jerome were dark years, when ancient manuscripts were but lightly esteemed.

The motive to the interpolation of agape at once suggests itself. There can be no doubt of the word having been used in the original epistles of Paul;

and when these latter, together with the gospels and the other epistles, were gathered into one volume with the Old Testament, in order to form the Bible, the devout editors, intent on giving to the whole a certain character of uniformity, would be not unlikely to alter here and there; and these alterations would be for the most part in the Old Testament, rather than in the New, since the texts of the former were already corrupt and uncertain, while the texts of the latter were doubtless still the original manuscripts or exact copies thereof. It does not strike me as being unreasonable to suppose that this word *agape*, being such a favorite word with Paul, and Paul the most masterful, as we may say, of the New Testament writers, was put in the Old Testament after Paul's time by some zealous copyist who deemed it desirable that there be an uniformity of phraseology.

So I say that Paul, addressing the Corinthians, used, in *agape*, a noun absolutely new to them. What notion was it likely to convey to these people? What thought might Paul reasonably expect the Corinthians to get from *agape*?

In general, of course, the idea of love. The mind of the Corinthian would be thrown back at once to the verb *agapao*, a verb well known to him, of classical, even Homeric, standing, indeed.

But the Corinthian would look for a particular significance. Here, would he say to himself consciously or unconsciously, is a new word for love; now our language has not been ungenerous in its treatment of the idea of love; it has many specific names for love; let love be of whatever sort, high or low, the love of gods or the love of men, and the Greek has a term accurately descriptive of it; of

course, this man of Tarsus has in mind a love of a new sort, a sort not yet named, or he would not coin this new name for it.

If a Corinthian knowing well the verb *erao*, from long use, should meet for the first time the noun *eros*, he would instantly assign to it the meaning of sexual love. But in that instant his thought would have gone back to the verb, and he would have asked himself in what frame of mind the subject of *erao* was understood to love, and thus he would get at the nature of the peculiar mental affection now first named by *eros*. He did precisely likewise with *agape*. He decided instantly, I dare say, what *agape* meant, but not until he had asked himself in what frame of mind the subject of the familiar *agapao* was understood to love.

How did the Corinthian understand the subject of *agapao* to love?

The usage indicated by the quotations under *agapao* in the common Greek dictionaries gives us no very certain clue. Indeed, *agapao* would seem to have been about equal in force to *phileo*. In John's report of Peter's colloquy with the Savior, after the resurrection, *agapao* and *phileo* are used quite indiscriminately. Nevertheless, I conjecture that *agapao* had its peculiar shade of meaning, with those who, like the Corinthians, were to the manner born.

We find all the New Testament writers using a certain derivative form of *agapao* in a narrow, restricted sense; namely, the verbal adjective *agapetos*. Plainly, the word means beloved, just as the verbal adjective of *phileo* does; but it is never coupled with any noun save a noun meaning son or brother, or one standing in the relation of son or brother. It is not

applied to the general love for any beloved object, as the verbal adjective from *phileo* might be, but only to the object loved as a son or brother is loved. *Agapetos* is the word all the evangelists use in quoting the solemn adjuration of God: "This is my beloved son." It is used many times by Peter and James in their epistles as part of the title with which those whom they addressed are saluted, where *adelphoi*, brothers, is always expressed or understood.

Going back to the other extreme of Greek literature, we find *agapetos* in Homer, and used in a similarly restricted sense. Autenrieth says that *agapetos* never occurs in either the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey* except with *pais*, son, expressed or understood.

That is, *agapetos* had retained a peculiar and narrow signification through at least 2,000 years of use. What was it?

In the Testament at my hand, the word *agapetoi*, so frequent in the epistles of Peter, is translated "dearly beloved," which means, loved with a love that costs something, that involves devotion. What, after all, is the love with which a son or a brother is loved, as distinguished from love of another sort? It is clearly the love of loves that is devoted; it is the love which waits least of all upon the *quid pro quo*.

Paul's passing by the many nouns meaning love, and coining this new noun, fairly put the Corinthians to it, as we may say, to attribute to *agape* a specific meaning; their minds were impelled to search the antecedents of the term, for some shade of peculiar significance; searching thus, it seems to me their minds would seize at once on the thought of devoted

love; they would finally understand Paul to be proposing the mental affection, the frame of mind which we describe by the word devotion. The subjective quality which Paul might fairly expect the Corinthians to identify by his new word agape, was the quality of devotion.

But the apostle does not leave it to uncertain etymological traditions to determine the force of agape. For now he proceeds to define his word by means of synonyms and paraphrases, as exactly as a lexicographer might. Here is Paul's own definition:

“Agape is patient, is kind; agape envieth not, deal-eth not perversely; is not puffed up;

“Is not ambitious, seeketh not her own, is not provoked to anger, thinketh no evil;

“Rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth;

“Beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.”

Figuratively, Paul here describes the conduct of one who should have this agape. It is not agape, of course, who is patient and kind, but he who has agape. And is it not plain that he who should exhibit these external proofs of agape, need be devoted? How might a man be less than entirely forgetful of self, and still do what a man having agape is here described as doing?

We have now to inquire to whom this superlative quality of agape was commended.

To mankind at large, for the good of their souls, it will very likely be answered. But does this appear?

Just at the end of the chapter immediately preceding, Paul writes thus, introducing the subject of agape:

"And God indeed hath set some in the church; first apostles, secondly prophets, thirdly doctors; after that miracles; then the graces of healings, helps, governments, kinds of tongues, interpretations of speeches.

"Are all apostles? Are all prophets? Are all doctors?

"Are all workers of miracles? Have all the grace of healing? Do all speak with tongues? Do all interpret?

"But be zealous for the better gifts. And I show unto you yet a more excellent way."

These verses, as you see at once if you read the twelfth and thirteenth chapters continuously, serve to bring agape into comparison with qualities which nobody will say are at all essential to salvation, or, being had, are in themselves salutary to the soul. It will not be maintained, for instance, that a man need be an apostle or a prophet or a doctor in order to be saved, or that an apostle or a prophet or a doctor is more likely to be saved than any other man who fulfills the law. If Paul were recommending the quality of agape as a means to our salvation, to the salvation, that is, of him who should possess it, he would not thus bring it into direct comparison with qualities which are not a means to salvation, and go to the pains of declaring specifically as he does that it is better than they.

On the other hand, the qualities which Paul compares with agape are precisely the qualities which belonged to the efficient priest or pastor under the old order; the priest of a religion which operated through the primary appetite. To be an apostle,

or a prophet, or a doctor, was to be more able than another man to convey the will of God in the old way, that is oracularly. It was the qualities here indicated that identified a man, in the day of the fear of God, as God's chosen mouthpiece, and gave him authority accordingly.

So the thought suggests itself that agape is commended by Paul, not as a quality for all men to cultivate, but as a quality essential to pastoral efficiency under the new dispensation. It is the quality without which the pastor in Christ, and not the man in his ordinary relations, is as the sounding brass and the tinkling cymbal, though he speak with the tongues of men and of angels.

In the very first of the first chapter of the first epistle to Timothy, that is, directly after the salutation, we read:

“Now the end of the commandment is agape, from a pure heart, and a good conscience and an unfeigned faith.

“From which things some going astray, are turned aside into vain babblings:

“Desiring to be teachers of the law, understanding neither the things they say, nor whereof they affirm.”

Paul is here instructing Timothy in the pastoral duty. Of course it may be that he commends agape to Timothy as something to be by him commended to the people. Yet the passage does not read that way, to me. By those “desiring to be teachers of the law” I take it that the apostle means pastors; it is the turning aside of these that he is concerned about; it is their departing from agape that is mischievous.

Nor is there any intimation that they who turn away from agape jeopard their souls thereby, or do that which is sinful, in itself; they simply fall into vain babblings.

In the sixth chapter of the second epistle to the Corinthians Paul speaks particularly of the qualities of the Christian pastor.

"But in all these things," he says, "let us exhibit ourselves as ministers of God, in much patience, in tribulation, in necessities, in distresses,

"In stripes, in prisons, in seditions, in labors, in watchings, in fastings,

"In chastity, in knowledge, in long-suffering, in sweetness, in the Holy Ghost, in agape unfeigned."

Later, but in the same chapter, Paul specifies more at large what he conceives pastoral qualities to be, saying:

"They are the ministers of Christ, and I am less wise; but I am more; in many more labors, in prisons more frequently, in stripes above measure, in deaths often,

"Of the Jews did I receive five times forty stripes, save one,

"Thrice was I beaten with rods, once I was stoned, thrice I suffered shipwreck, a night and a day I was in the depth of the sea,

"In journeying often, in perils of waters, in perils of robbers, in perils from my own nation, in perils from the gentiles, in perils in the city, in perils in the wilderness, in perils in the sea, in perils from false brethren,

"In labor and painfulness, in much watchings, in hunger and thirst, in fasting often, in cold and nakedness."

Here is a catalogue of the proofs of devotion; trials which, voluntarily undergone, could not fail of making him a spectacle suggestive of devotion. They are the fruits of agape, the quality which endureth all and seeketh not her own. Is it remotely hinted that they make him a better man than the others he mentions? Not at all; simply a better pastor; "they are ministers of Christ, and I am less wise, but I am more."

It is perhaps not insignificant, in this connection, that at once he passes to the explanation of the "more excellent way," and the "better gift," Paul falls into the form of the first person singular. He refers the effect of the quality to himself, and I suppose there is no denying that Paul, as he wrote, was above all else a pastor, "separated to the Gospel of God." He, at least, was concerned with no work save that of carrying the word to all men. It was as to this work that he was as a sounding brass except he had agape.

To be sure, Paul often speaks of this quality of agape in such general terms as, standing by themselves, leave it to be said that the quality is commended to everybody. But here we need bear in mind the possibility, if not the probability, that the epistles were written in the first instance not to all Christians, but to the pastors. It is doubtful if there was any laity, as we understand the term, in Paul's time. The early converts were for the most part pastors, at least in some measure; each of them more or less busy with the work of spreading the gospel, and each of them, therefore, in need of instruction as to the correct pastoral practice. In giving his instructions, therefore, the apostle would not need to

specify always that his directions were for the guidance of pastors; his letters would come to the eyes of pastors only, anyway.

Again, there was no call for instruction of general application. Christ proposed no new general morality. When the lawyer asked him what was the law, and repeated the law of Moses, Jesus assented to it, offering nothing additional. There was nothing for Paul to teach except its method, for its method was all that was new to Christianity. And the method was a matter of concern only to those who were to put it in operation, namely, the pastors.

The form of the epistles indicates that they were intended not for the many but for the few; not that anybody was excluded from reading them, but that their admonitions were not for anybody and everybody to follow. In the salutation with which he begins each epistle Paul invariably, I think, describes those whom he addresses as the "elect." Is it likely that the apostle of the gentiles, he who above all others, perhaps, was filled with the thought of the catholicity of Christianity, who was assured that all men were one day to feel the saving grace that came with Jesus Christ; is it likely that he would address Christians generally, the Christians not only of his own age, but those of the ages to come, as the elect? Writing to all men of all time, he would apply no such limiting term of description. On the other hand, pastors were and are properly to be called elect; chosen of God "before the foundation of the world."

The philosophers at Athens were puzzled by Paul's words, for while the apostle seemed to them to be proposing a new religion of some sort he was all the

time talking of "one raised from the dead." They called him a babbler, but they were enough interested in him to conduct him to the Areopagus, or Hill of Mars, where they bade him speak out and tell them what he had it in his mind to teach; and hereupon Paul proceeds to discourse concerning the nature of the deity.

How does his speech comport with what we have been saying of his notion of Christianity?

"Men of Athens," says Paul, "I perceive that in all things you are very superstitious (or religious).

"For in passing by, and seeing your idols, I found an altar also on which was written: To the Unknown God."

The inscription on the altar, as Paul quotes it in the Greek, was AGNOSTO THEO. We translate the adjective into our word "unknown." But does unknown express all that the Athenian understood?

The usual Greek adjective expressive of the idea of unknown, simply, was, as I gather from the dictionaries I have at hand, agnos, or, in the dative case, as it need be if used here, agnoti. But the agnosto which we have is the dative form of the adjective agnostos. If the altar was to the unknown God, why was not the inscription agnoti theo, instead of agnosto theo? (Written thus with the Roman letters, the forms seem less diverse than they are; for with the Greek letters, the penultimate o in agnoti is omicron, whereas in agnosto it is omega).

If the inscription were poetical, the use of one term rather than the other would signify little or nothing. Because it was hard at best to give lines the proper rhythmic length, the poet was suffered to use quite indiscriminately words otherwise distinct in sense.

But this inscription is not poetry. It is plain prose, comprising only two words, a noun and its qualifying adjective. Of course the adjective was chosen with discrimination. If there was ever any shade of difference between agnos and agnostos, it would be exhibited here.

Plato and Aristotle, my dictionary says, used agnostos as meaning not merely "unknown," but "unknowable." With them it was descriptive of that which not only was not known, but might not be known. Plato was the great religious teacher of the Greeks. It does not seem too much to say that the altar of which Paul speaks was raised on inspiration derived from Plato; the adjective of the inscription—

"For in passing by, and seeing your idols, I found an altar also on which was written: To the Unknown able God.

There is some difference of opinion, in these days, as to whether we should understand Paul to reproach the Athenians for being superstitious, or to praise them for being religious. I venture to say, by the way, that I incline to the former, or older, view. The imputation of superstitiousness rests very naturally on the manifest incongruity of an altar to an unknowable God. An altar presumes an anthropomorphic deity. Sacrifices, libations, worship in any visible form, these are proposed on the theory of a deity with human sensibilities. To proclaim God unknowable, and at once to raise an altar to Him, strikes me as being superstitious indeed.

"What therefore you worship, without knowing it," Paul declares, "that I preach to you."

The Christian God is unknowable, according to Paul. It is not for men to define, in the terms of

their understanding, the deity as Christianity makes it to be.

Quoting as far as he may the very language of the Old Testament prophecies, Paul goes on to say that God, while He has made the world and all that in it is, and is the Lord of Heaven and of earth, nevertheless he is not such a God as dwells in temples, or is served by human hands, as one wanting anything. The apostle thus ascribes specifically to God all the attributes of omnipotence, reaffirms the Old Testament account of creation by the Divine Fiat; but boldly asserts that temples and altars and worship, in a word, all such service as human hands may render, are nothing to God. To conceive God concerned with these things is to set bounds on God's nature in the manner that idols of gold or silver or stone set bounds.

Paul is very careful not to appear an atheist, as easily he might, since he sweeps away about all that had hitherto been thought to make up a religious belief. Not only does he say that God made the world and all that in it is, but he further sets forth that He, although unknowable, is near each of us all the time, and that in Him we live and move and have our being.

All this, of course, makes summary disposition of the old theologies, even the theology of Moses. It is equal to saying of Solomon that he built the temple in vain. That were harsh, and Paul softens the conclusion. He explains that God looks leniently upon the times of ignorance, thus to intimate that the temples and altars and worship of the past were not after all in vain, even though they have not in the least served God, who is not to be served by human

hands as one wanting anything. But henceforth there is another dispensation.

Still as if to do no unnecessary violence to old beliefs, Paul quotes the language of the Psalmist, to say that God has set the day on which he will judge the world in equity, through him whom he has raised from the dead. Paul seems to wish to make it clear that the prophecies of the prophets are to be fulfilled, to the glory of God, albeit in a way not expected of men.

What Paul proposes to the Athenians, then, is a religion without a theology, though by no means without a God; for in his religion theology, that is, the definition of God, becomes the definition of the unknowable, a contradiction in terms. Objectively considered, religion had hitherto been theology and nothing else. The religion that should serve men through the primary appetite was in substance a definition of God, and a proposal of the means whereby God might be served as one wanting anything. When Paul was pressed by the philosophers to expound his religion, he was under a certain constraint to treat the matter from the conventional point of view; that is, he was under a certain constraint to tell the philosophers what Christianity had to do with theology. He was not called upon to enter into any exhaustive explication of the Christian method.

But quite without inconsistency, I submit, Paul might have gone on and declared that the Christian method consisted in the practice of devotion by the pastors. Nothing in this discourse negatives the suggestion that Paul considered a devoted priesthood the sole implement to the Christian purpose. Indeed, what he says about theology is precisely what we

should expect him to say, were it his notion that Christianity was to work on men through the secondary religious appetite; for then men's conscious idea of God would not matter; it would not matter even though they had no idea of God at all.

Paul was successful in his ministry. Why? I have been told it was because he was a great orator and reasoner, a preacher of the utmost power.

We have Paul's own word for it that he was rude in speech. While under ordinary circumstances a man might modestly disclaim great qualities which he actually had, we should hardly expect it of Paul, writing for the instruction of the church, and offering himself, in all humility, after Christ as a pattern. Moreover the connection excludes the suggestion of a modest disclaimer, for, after declaring himself rude in speech, Paul says that he has nevertheless the "gnosis," the *savoir faire*, as we might say.

And is it not inherently improbable that Paul won men to Christianity by the force of his oratory?

The apostle worked among people who knew oratory at its best. Is it easy to believe that a tent-maker speaking the barbarous Hebraic Greek came up out of the provinces and persuaded with his eloquence the men of Athens and Corinth, probably no less fastidious than their fathers whom it had taken a Demosthenes or a Lysias to move? Or, if he did so, that secular history should be utterly silent as to his achievement?

That Paul's words are eloquent, as we read them, nobody will deny. They are worthy all the high praise that has been given them, as literature. But the excellencies, that is, the literary excellencies of the epistles, are due to the translator rather than

the author. This thirteenth chapter of the first Corinthians is indeed beautiful, but it is beautiful with the beauty of majestic English; the majesty is in the translation, not in the original. To the Greek, used to Attic perfection and purity of form, this disquisition in a rude, provincial dialect could hardly have had any very potent literary charm; and as for logical force, it was not likely to impress deeply a generation familiarly acquainted with Aristotle and Plato.

For my own part, I find it easier to believe that Paul succeeded for some other reason than that commonly assigned. I find it easier to believe that he conquered in the sign of the cross. He made himself and his religion sensibly useful to men by following Christ, by denying himself; he made of himself a spectacle suggestive of devotion, and in him men found the answer to be an appetite of theirs. He brought bread to the hungry and water to the thirsty, even as the Master had commanded; not by means of words, of sermons, of incessant harangues, but by means of the subtler and more effective *logos* that Christ had taught him to use.

CHAPTER XII.

Some Modern Testimony.

I have known a Christian pastor who chewed tobacco. He was willing to justify himself.

"We are told," he said, "that if we do unto others as we would be done by, we do enough to fulfill the law. I am thoroughly well assured that in this matter of chewing tobacco, I do as I would be done by. I can think of only two ways in which this practice of mine might do others any harm at all, namely, by way of giving direct offense to others and by way of making me less useful to others. I am certain that I give no direct offense. I always chew privately. Nobody, not even my wife, ever sees me with tobacco in my mouth. As for the practice making me less useful to others, I can say that the contrary is the case; the practice makes me more useful to others. I am a nervous man, naturally, and the sedative of the tobacco is distinctly beneficial. It gives me force to do the things that fall to me to do, the things other men expect me to do."

But, for all this, the pastor had his misgivings.

"I cannot escape the conviction," he said, "that Jesus Christ would not have chewed tobacco."

Of course a man might chew tobacco as this pastor chewed it, and still be a good Samaritan. Supposing that there had been tobacco in the day of the certain man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, who would think it pertinent to ask if the Samaritan

chewed or not, before voting him a good Samaritan? Whether he chewed or not, was he not a sufficient man, the ample pattern for mankind in general? There is no imputing deficient conduct to a man simply because he chews tobacco.

It seems to me this pastor expected a larger self-sacrifice on his own part than he expected on the part of men generally. He reproached himself for doing that which he would not reproach men generally for doing. He declares that what he does is only what a man in the abstract, as it were, may do with entire propriety, yet he confesses misgivings as to the propriety of himself doing it; himself, a man in a particular relation, namely, the relation of pastor.

At a banquet, where smoking is general, a pastor apologizes for lighting a cigar along with the rest.

"The spirit is strong," he says, "but the flesh is weak."

The words were rather lightly spoken; they did not mean much; but as far as they meant anything, they meant that the pastor saw in his lighting a cigar the occasion for an apology. There was in his mind a misgiving, something resembling the thought that it was wrong for him to smoke.

But the pastor would impute no offense to the other men there. For them to smoke was to incur no reproach, to make no occasion for apology. Every man there might be a good man, according to the Savior's definition, for all his smoking.

As far as my observation goes, this attitude toward creature comforts, toward the doing of things which being done exhibit unequivocally the carnal self-indulged, is common to Christian pastors. I cannot say that I have found pastors appreciably less indul-

gent of the carnal self than other good men are, but I have found them apologetically indulgent.

What does it mean, unless it be that there remains in the mind of the pastor some sense of an obligation to especial self-sacrifice?

Nor can it be an exemplary sacrifice. Were it that the pastor holds himself obligated to especial sacrifice in order to be an example, to follow Christ in order to show other men the way, it would have to be that he wishes men generally to follow Christ; that he reprehends any conduct which is not in strict imitation of Christ. It is true pastors are often heard to urge men to be as Christ was, but when we seriously bethink us what a strict imitation of Christ involves, what a complete departure it would necessitate from conduct plainly according with the Savior's own definition of propriety, we are easily persuaded that it is at most only a partial imitation that is recommended.

Sometimes pastors are quite free to admit that they would not have men generally to follow Christ.

Only a little while ago I read in the papers the brief abstract of an address publicly delivered by a pastor in good standing, an orthodox pastor, if you please, who thought "the lamb is made too prominent in Christian teaching." What we want, said the pastor, is men, not lambs; manly men, men with bones in their backs; self assertive men, tenacious of purpose and diligent to achieve things in the great, busy world.

In a word, men indulgent of the carnal self, not the self in its bad aspects, of course, but none the less the self, was what this pastor would have. Christ was the ideal of meekness, enduring all things, deny-

ing the self always and utterly. It was a mistake to propose such an ideal.

The publication of these sentiments made no stir at all, at least no stir that was visible on the surface. Nobody took alarm at such teachings, or, if anybody took alarm, he raised no outcry. If other pastors felt differently they kept very still about it. To all appearances, this pastor had expressed the common thought; pastors would not, if they could, make men generally to be like Christ.

I venture to suggest that in this apologetic attitude of pastors we have the remnant of apostolic tradition. It is the last shred of the sense of duty which actuated pastors in the beginning.

The pastors I have had in mind in this connection thus far have been particularly Protestant pastors. The Protestant church in its very inception disavowed tradition as being a stream wholly corrupt, and studiously turned away from it. Naturally, we should not expect to find a larger remnant of tradition with Protestant pastors for that reason. If any remnant has survived with them it is because zealous scrutiny failed to discover it in order to its casting out.

But the Roman Catholic church, on the contrary, clung to tradition. It held tradition still to be an important source of truth, even after the Protestants had declared it altogether unreliable. The Catholic church has cherished tradition as studiously as the Protestant church has discredited it. Do we find our remnant of tradition any larger with the Catholic pastors?

The Catholic church has a very rigid sacerdotal discipline. The priests are by it commanded to do many things in the way of denying the self which the laity

are not only not commanded to do, but are all but commanded not to do. A bishop where I once lived would not permit his priests to go to the theater, no matter what the nature of the play. Of course it was not in order that they set an example that he forbade them to go, for it is not taught by the Catholic church that going to the theater is wrong for people generally. There are churches which declare theater-going to be wrong, *per se*, but the Catholic church is not one of these. Indeed, the Catholic view is rather that theater-going is in itself a salutary recreation, provided people are moderate and duly attentive to the ordinary proprieties. The bishop imposed on his clergy a sacrifice which he did not impose on the people.

It is a common accusation against the Catholic church that many of its forms and ceremonies look back to heathen originals. When Christianity came first in contact with the heathen it was Catholic, and some choose to believe that all the fruits of that contact are retained in the Catholic practice of to-day. Be that as it may, however largely the Catholics may have drawn from heathen sources in making up their sacerdotal discipline, there seems to be no heathen original for a distinction between priests and people whereby the priests are bound to practice a self-denial which the people are fairly forbidden to practice. The general character of heathen religion, I should say, was rather to permit the priest indulgences which were denied the people. The oracular priest of the old sort was a favored person; he had his fleshpots which the people had not. My own limited reading does not discover that any of the religions with which Christianity could have come in

contact during, say, the first 1,000 years of its existence, enjoined especial self-denial on its priests. Buddhism, it is true, binds its priests to extreme self-denial, but Buddhism, if I understand it, teaches that men save themselves only by self-denial; self-denial is the means of atonement; the self is the obstacle that stands between men and their reunion with God, the pure spirit, and it has to be worn away by slow attrition, as it were. Naturally the priests of such a religion are expected to lead the way; they are expected to deny themselves as conspicuously as possible, but only as patterns, the concrete ideal for the people to follow. I can find nothing in Buddhism which could have suggested to Christians, however open to heathen influence, the idea of a sacrifice by the priests which is not expected of the people, the idea plainly exhibited in the Catholic discipline.

The remnant of tradition is distinctly larger in the historic church, the church which has held to tradition.

But this brings us to a difficulty. Why is there but the merest remnant which we find? How has the tradition been lost, if there was in the beginning such a notion of pastoral duty as I am claiming?

The Christian pastor is honest, able and alert; he is not a hypocrite, nor is he liable to self-deception. What he is now he has been from the beginning — honest, able and alert. There has been a continuous succession of pastors from the original apostles who got their instruction from Christ himself; there never has been a time that there were no pastors. That being the fact, it is a hard thing to say that the original notion of pastoral duty has been lost, except for the remnant of tradition too feeble to affect the pas-

toral practice. Inasmuch as the pastors of to-day do not freely and openly confess it to be their duty to deny themselves in order to exhibit the self denied, does it stand to reason that pastors ever held such a notion?

Considering the Christian pastor in his most general character of any man who has ministered in Christ from the beginning, how is it possible that when he was St. Paul or St. John he deemed it his duty to do that which he now has no thought of doing?

CHAPTER XIII.

The Obdurate Self.

Any healthy man who should undertake to deny the carnal self always and utterly would thereby engage an extremely persistent adversary. In open conflict self is by no means invincible, nor, indeed, if the man be ordinarily manly, even formidable. But no defeat of self is final. However often beaten, the self remains unconquered.

Accordingly, when the ancient pastor gave himself to the following of Christ in the way of the cross, he made of his heart a field of battle, whereon his carnal self operated ceaselessly against the citadel of his resolution.

To direct assault the citadel was quite impregnable, for zeal and faculty were its walls, and these, we may suppose, never yet failed the Christian ministry. But the strife was not a case of somebody else attacking and the pastor defending, but a case of the pastor supplying the forces both of the attack and of the defense. It was an inward combat for the mastery of the pastor's heart; plainly there were elements of the conflict of which he could not possibly be conscious. The citadel was peculiarly liable to insidious approach.

To be sure, it was not without its protections. There were two lines of outworks, so to speak, each independent of the other, and either seemingly adequate to all purposes of defense. Of these the outer

was the traditional understanding of Christ's command to his disciples, while the inner was the understanding of this command to be gained from the written gospels.

How might the foe ever pass these?

To describe the situation less figuratively, this ancient pastor took his resolution on consultation with his notion of his duty. Supposing that he began with being resolved to deny himself utterly, deeming that his duty, the effect would finally be to bring the persistent pressure of the carnal self to bear on his sense of duty, for its modification; and the endurance of his resolution, there being no failure of zeal and faculty, would depend on the steadfastness of his sense of duty against this persistent pressure of the carnal self.

The pastor's *sensé* of duty was a matter, manifestly, of his understanding of Christ's command to his disciples, and it was got, therefore, from two sources, namely, from tradition and from the written gospels. In order that his sense of duty endure, and with it his resolution, in spite of the constant pressure of the carnal self, it was necessary that these sources, separately or together, supply an understanding of Christ's command which was perfectly clear.

We proceed, then, to consider the two sources of the pastor's understanding of Christ's command, to see how far they afford a clear understanding; and first, tradition.

Pastors of the generation of Paul had either seen and heard the Savior himself, or had come in contact with personal disciples of his. They had a clear and sufficient understanding of Christ's command, of course.

Pastors of the generation next following say that of Philemon and Timothy, having been taught their duty by those of the generation of Paul, had a clear understanding, too, roughly speaking. But, though we may not suppose that Philemon's sense of duty was very different from that of Paul, his master, yet even as between Paul and Philemon it might easily happen that there was not an identical sense of duty. In fact, it is not too much to say that there was inevitably a difference. The word which Philemon spoke and exemplified to those who were to come after him was not precisely the word which Paul had spoken and exemplified to him; and those who came after Philemon, though taught by him, failed in their turn of speaking and exemplifying the word precisely as it had been spoken and exemplified to them. Paul spoke and exemplified not the word, but his understanding of the word, which was doubtless as nearly perfect as need be. But Philemon spoke and exemplified likewise not the word, nay, not even Paul's understanding of the word, but his own understanding of Paul's understanding. By no conscious effort, however strenuous, was the unconscious effect of the personal equation, if that be the proper term, to be anticipated or eliminated.

The numbers of the pastors grew in something like geometrical progression. Paul, one, spoke and exemplified his understanding of the word to Timothy and Philemon, two, and these spoke and exemplified each an understanding, slightly varying from the other's, of Paul's understanding, and each to several followers. Thus while as between any two succeeding pastors there might be but an inconsiderable

modification of the sense of duty, there was a rapid accumulation, so to speak, of modification.

But what of the other redoubt?

Had the evangelists written down the unequivocal expression of their own understanding of Christ's command to the pastors, an adequate understanding, doubtless, the failure of tradition would in nowise matter. With the crumbling of the outer wall reliance would be had on the inner, and, if this proved sound, the citadel was still safe; the pastoral sense of duty would be held unaltered from its original, and the pastor would remain in his first resolution.

But candor compels the admission that in order to read any definite meaning into a large part of the gospels heavy drafts have to be made on faith and fancy, uncertain elements with which to fix a permanent understanding. To him who depends on the gospels to give him his only notion of the Christian principle and its operation to the salvation of man, they convey anything but a clear notion.

The minute textual criticism to which the gospels have been subjected has done little or nothing to cure this uncertainty; in a sense it has made it more hopeless, inasmuch as it has removed the possibility of it being due to mere textual error. Scholars have given much attention to the study of the manuscripts of the New Testament that have come down to us from ancient times, comparing and restoring with the utmost care and fidelity, and as a result there is singular agreement as to the correct text. The text of the Greek New Testament, as printed for us, is all but if not quite free from passages that admit substantially different readings. We may be reason-

ably well assured that we have the gospels in about the words of the evangelists. Still the uncertainty of sense remains.

The art of clear writing, which there is no need to say is a most difficult art, is largely, perhaps chiefly, the art of adroit omission. One may have a thought clear in his own mind, and yet when he comes to make a picture of it, with words, in order that others may clearly apprehend it, too, he is but indifferently successful; he is troubled to manage his details. He puts too much in his picture, in his anxiety lest he omit something essential, and, as a result, the main outline is confused.

The evangelists seem to have fallen into some such difficulty; they give us a picture which is clear enough in detail but confused on the whole.

For instance:

"And whilst they were eating, Jesus took the bread; and, blessing, broke and gave to them, and said: Take ye, this is my body.

"And having taken the chalice, giving thanks, he gave it to them. And they all drank of it.

"And he said to them: This is my blood of the New Testament, which shall be shed for many."

Thus St. Mark reports the incident of the last supper. He leaves no doubt as to what took place and what was said. Among those who variously interpret this passage, there is no difference as to the incident itself; the detail stands out quite clearly. The confusion comes in only when we try to give the detail its place in the picture, to determine its relation to the main outline. Here Mark is uncertain. He has failed, and the other evangelists reporting the same incident have likewise failed, to make it plain just

what as to Christ's general purpose the last supper signifies. We are left to guess its meaning, and naturally our guesses are various.

Of few if any of the incidents reported in the gospels may it be said, I suppose, that they are obscurely reported. We are quite definitely informed what Christ did and said on many occasions. But after all we are not given clearly to understand what it all meant. The fact that sincere men, and as able as sincere, have disagreed as to the picture on the whole shows how uncertain it is.

So the inner redoubt proves likewise to be no protection to the citadel. The outer works being passed, the inner interpose no obstacle.

When, hereupon, the carnal self prompts the pastor, as it is forever prompting any healthy man, to do this or that or the other, and the pastor frames the issue before his conscious judgment, asking, Why not? it is plain that the reason why not defaults of appearance. Anyway, nothing in tradition, nothing in the gospels argues why not; for neither tradition nor the gospels argue anything definitely.

His landmarks are gone, and the carnal self presses persistently and insidiously; is it any wonder that the pastor departs from the way of the cross, yet knows it not? Is it any wonder if he comes little by little into a new sense of duty?

CHAPTER XIV.

De Via.

During the first three centuries of the Christian era nobody, as it seems, found occasion to raise a question as to the substance of Christ. If anybody had any doubts on this head he kept them to himself, or, if he expressed them, he attracted no great attention.

But about the year 300 Alexander, bishop of Alexandria, thought it worth his while to make positive affirmation that Christ was of identical substance with God. Arius the presbyter took alarm hereupon and declared Alexander's views dangerous, in their leadings, if not at once, and asserted that Christ was not in substance identical with but merely similar to God.

The doctrine of Arius was denounced as heretical by the council of Nice, but that was by no means the end of it. The presbyter found many to agree with him, especially in the East; and these the decree of the council did not much affect, except to confirm them in their views.

In point of fact, the decree of the council of Nice was a call to battle. Throughout the length and breadth of Christendom pastors sprang to arms, so to speak. The hostile banners of the homo-ousian and the homoiousian were everywhere raised, and under the one or the other the clergy of the world were marshalled.

At first it was a war of words. But the combatants did not stop with verbal arguments when these decided nothing. It was not long until they were hurling at each other anathemas and bulls of excommunication, or, as the flame of hate leaped higher and these men found even the most terrible of spiritual weapons inadequate to their wrath, until resort was had to the sword. We are told that the streets of Alexandria, where the doughtiest champion of the orthodox cause did battle, repeatedly ran with the blood of men fallen in a fight to determine if Christ were God or only like God. And it was not in Alexandria that all the blood was let; the world was filled with carnage by this quarrel. On all hands were altars to Jesus, scarce 300 years dead, already spattered with Christian blood shed in anger by Christian hands.

What is controversy?

A doctor tells me that the germ theory of disease is a matter of fact; it used to be a matter of opinion, but controversy has made it a matter of fact. Practically everybody, he says, now believes in the germ theory.

What the doctor means, then, if we are to be strict in the use of words, is that the germ theory is no longer a matter of several opinions, but a matter of universal opinion; he means matter of universal opinion when he says matter of fact; after all, the germ theory is only matter of opinion. But, nevertheless, granting it is a matter now of universal opinion, the germ theory is become as much a matter of fact, as much truth, if you please, as anything which begins with being a matter of opinion, that is, of several opinions, ever gets to be a matter of fact, or truth.

In the controversy which determined the universal opinion that disease is the work of minute organisms there can be no doubt as to the motive of the parties; they disputed mostly in the pride of opinion, not only the party now held to have been in error, but as well the party now held to have been in the right. Because we loosely speak of the germ theory as a matter of fact, or truth, as it is to all practical intents and purposes the moment it becomes a matter of universal opinion, we do not thereby imply that they who in the beginning proposed and upheld the theory were any more actuated by the love of truth than were they who denied the theory, or the less actuated by pride of opinion. The principles of controversy is the pride of opinion. Divest men of the pride of opinion and controversy, anyway controversy at all violent, is out of the question.

After some centuries of turmoil the Nicene creed became a matter of universal opinion by the extinction of the Arians. The heretics were put out of the way by conversion or more summarily until at last everybody accepted the Nicene creed. This creed becomes matter of fact, or truth, precisely as the germ theory becomes matter of fact, or truth; namely, in virtue of being matter of universal opinion. We have no more right to impute different motives to Arians and Athanasians than to the doctors who stood for the germ theory and the doctors who stood against it. The Athanasians equally with the Arians were actuated by the pride of opinion.

And the pride of opinion is obviously a selfish sentiment, an emanation of carnality. This is not saying that controversy is discreditable. Humanity owes

its most useful universal opinions to controversy; it is altogether a proper activity for mankind in general. But, its basic motive being what it is, controversy is not such an activity as might enlist the energies of a man devoting the self to sacrifice, a man bent on denying himself in order to exhibit the self denied.

In other words, the pastors of the fourth century, in this particular activity which engaged them so largely, did not exhibit the spectacle of the self denied, the spectacle suggestive of devotion. Granting that a thoroughly devoted man could have any opinion as to the substance of Christ, which I very much doubt, certainly no devoted man could possibly go to such lengths in support of his opinion as the followers of Athanasius or Arius went to. Whoever should go to such lengths in the support of his opinion could not possibly appear devoted to the ordinary beholder. Doing as they did, those pastors exhibited the carnal self obtrusively and unequivocally indulged.

It is not open to doubt, as I see the case, that the pastor of the fourth century engaging in the Arian controversy was quite conscientious; he thought he was doing his duty. His sense of duty, then, being such as to permit him to brawl and fight in defense of a mere opinion, it is safe to say his practice in general, as governed by that sense of duty, his practice apart from the controversy, was not of a character to make him a spectacle suggestive of devotion. The pastor of the fourth century did not offer in himself the spectacle suggestive of devotion.

This leaves something to be explained.

I am claiming that the service of Christianity in the beginning, the service which made men to find a

religious use for it, was a service rendered through the secondary religious appetite by pastors devoted to sacrifice and offering in themselves the spectacle suggestive of devotion. Of course, if the pastors of the fourth century were not such spectacles, Christianity was not in the fourth century rendering the service which had made it sensibly useful in the beginning. If the service which I suggest were indeed the service rendered by Christianity in the beginning we should look to see the church neglected, as a religious utility, as soon as the fourth century, if not sooner.

But, as far as we can judge, Christianity had still its sensible religious uses with men in the fourth century.

Just about the time the Arian controversy was fiercest, that is, about the time when the practice of the clergy was least calculated to make them spectacles suggestive of devotion, Julian the Apostate became emperor of Rome. Julian was a soldier of the ancient temper and a man of parts. We may well imagine that he had power, and when we consider that his dearest wish was to restore the worship of the old pagan gods we are left in no reasonable doubt that he made life anything but pleasant for Christians. He was far from being a Tiberius or a Nero, I suppose; he was not merely bloodthirsty. Yet it is quite certain that he persecuted and spared not, resorting to every device that a stern Roman, impelled by what seemed to him a lofty purpose, might think proper.

To what effect?

The succession of this pagan was the signal for a wholesale apostasy; the emperor's cruelties had the

effect of depleting the ranks of the Christians still further; but, after all, a very respectable remnant remained steadfast until a Parthian dart put an end to Julian. Clearly these faithful ones found a use for Christianity, and an unworldly use, or they would not have endured worldly disadvantage as they did. No merely worldly profit might induce them thus to brave the wrath of Cæsar.

If the pastor had already departed from the apostolic practice, how happens it that the church had not fallen into neglect?

CHAPTER XV.

The Dark Ages.

For some years prior to the dawn of the Christian era there had existed throughout the portion of the Roman empire peopled by the historic races, the conditions that make for scientific progress. Peace had reigned; a certain definite order of rights had been maintained by the state, and men were free to engage in the business which tends to the quickening of the individual atom in society. Rome politically was already decadent, for the stern, not to say savage, virtues that had made her politically glorious were lost. Romans had become less a warring and more a working people, and thereby, I have no doubt, a more highly developed people with respect of the ultimate potentialities of the human being. The decline of Rome during the later years of the republic was mostly civic, or, if social, mostly superficial, I should say. The average man, the man of all time, passing for the moment under the name of Roman, was decidedly more of a man in the day of Augustus than in the day of Cincinnatus.

We have already had occasion to notice that the Roman had become scientific in the manner, at least, if not in the matter of his thought, to the end that he was doubtless pretty much devoid of the primary religious appetite. The period of repose to which we have just made reference would naturally be productive of a philosophy more or less common to the people generally wherein the fear of God had no place.

For the moment, then, the world was ready for the religion which waited not on the fear of God, but proposed a means of communion with God in yet a more excellent way.

Only for the moment, however.

The world was at rest, but trembling on the brink of the most profound unrest. Unsuspected of the peaceful and progressive peoples of southern Europe and Asia Minor, a great flood of savagery was collecting on the confines of Scythia, a flood which nothing could long withstand. And when the dykes broke and the deluge came the conditions were speedily changed, and almost as completely as if a new world had been created. A horde of crude, primitive men were thrust out of the northern darkness with a force to which history affords no parallel and precipitated on Rome, there to find their future homes. The Romans could offer no effectual resistance. There was no such thing as thrusting the barbarians back. Had Rome been the Rome of former days it may be that these intruders would have been ground up as between two millstones; but, as it was, the Romans having forgotten the art of fighting in the acquisition of less brutish arts, there was nothing but submission. The invaders had little difficulty in taking possession of the land. The infusion of new elements was soon sufficient to transform the character of the people, and thus it came about that whereas Paul had ministered to a generation devoid of the primary religious appetite, Athanasius ministered to a generation in whom the primary appetite had all the vigor it ever has in crude, simple men.

That is, the conditions which made it impossible for the pastor to serve sensibly and religiously unless

he took up his cross daily and denied himself, the conditions that had confronted him when he was Paul, these had passed away; now that he was Athanasius he might render a sensible and a religious service otherwise than by walking in the steps of Christ. Now he might make Christianity to be what other religions before it had been and himself an oracle to speak the will of God directly, and still be sensibly useful, and in a religious way, to the men of his day, possessed as they were of the fear of God.

Certain changes which the external aspect of the Christian church underwent concurrently with the barbarian incursions, seem to me significant in this connection. Notably, the church became very splendid.

It is Gibbons' opinion that Justinian spent in building St. Sophia a sum equivalent to a million pounds sterling in the historian's time; as much, perhaps, as \$10,000,000 of our money. Twenty tons of silver were used in adorning the sanctuary; the baptismal fonts, the chalices and the hanging lamps were all of pure gold, encrusted with gems of inestimable worth. Nor was St. Sophia the only gorgeous temple. In Constantinople alone Justinian built twenty-five other churches, each resplendent with gilt and porphyry. Other cities were not neglected and other emperors were not idle. Every corner of the empire had its church ambitious to shine with earthly glory, and the ceremonials were in keeping with the temples: rich vestments and sumptuous appointments were the universal order.

Certainly this was not the character of primitive Christianity.

Again, as soon as the sixth century, if not sooner, Christianity was become merely the general name for a lot of ethnic creeds. Not only had the Christian Gaul a different creed from that of the Christian of the distant Caucasus, but the Christian Armenian and the Christian Illyrian, separated by but a few miles of land or water, likewise differed as to their religious faith.

This is departure, too, for in the beginning Christianity was catholic, as far as it went; what it was in Rome it was in Corinth or Ephesus.

What do these changes suggest more than the prevalence in the church of barbarian leadings?

Splendor is precisely the quality that identifies the true religion to the man strong in the fear of God. With him gold and precious stones are the proof of divine favor, the sign manual of the Most High. It is not easy for such a man to think of God leaving His church to languish in poverty. When Christianity became splendid it became the more fit to solace crude men.

Christianity might not easily be at once catholic and barbarian, for the reason that the barbarians were not homogeneous. Goths were settled here, Vandals there and Huns yonder, and Christianity, provided it were being made over to suit the various religious habits of these, would become one thing here, another there, and still another yonder.

Of course these departures from the primitive practice are mostly external; the mere fact of the church becoming more splendid and less catholic does not prove that there had been an essential departure. But, after all, would not such an essential departure

as I am supposing took place be accompanied by just these exterior changes?

From the first of the barbarian incursions to the end of the crusades there ensued a period of about a thousand years, often called the dark ages. It was a period during which men remained crude. The force of the original inundation was a long time spending itself, and, in the meanwhile, the war habit became somewhat fixed. Men got to think of little else but war. All their energies were given to war, directly or indirectly; if flocks were raised and the soil was tilled it was in order merely to clothe and feed the soldier. Men developed, as they could not help but develop, since they were active, but along unnatural lines. The refinements of chivalry left them savages after all. The brute of their nature took on a certain superficial gloss, but in all the attributes which radically differentiate the man from the inferior animal the individual did not grow at all, we may almost say, during the dark ages.

In other words, for a thousand years and upwards the pastors were permitted to serve the people sensibly and religiously through the primary appetite.

But there came an end to the dark ages after awhile. The influences which were keeping men crude could not always withstand the innate tendency to individual expansion. The grotesque ideals of chivalry were presently cast out and in their place came the sentiments of natural ambition, the natural sense of selfhood. Productive industry engaged men's activities, and war, instead of being venerated as the highest calling, became the object of abhorrence.

Of course this was destructive of the primary appetite. Men who strove as men were now getting to

strive could not help but become scientific and forgetful of God. That is, the conditions which for more than a thousand years had permitted Christianity to serve as religions before it had served were passing away again. In place of a generation such as Athanasius had faced, there was presently such a generation again as Paul had faced.

And still, by the test we have already applied, the church was serving sensibly and religiously. In these times the not infrequent persecution of Christians for their religion's sake disclosed the indifference to worldly disadvantage on the part of those under ban, which argues that their religion rendered them a sensible, unworldly service. The fact that persecution was now mostly the persecution of sect by sect, rather than the persecution of all Christians indiscriminately does not affect the general showing of fidelity, the indication that a sensible, unworldly service was still rendered by the church.

Indeed, it is not until within a century, or even less, of our own time, that the church has found itself compelled, in order to have any sensible uses at all with the people, to resort to the familiar devices which make it useful in a worldly way.

We have seen, I hope, how the lapse which took place as early at least as the fourth century need not have borne, in fact, might not be expected to bear, visible fruit until say the fifteenth century. But how came the effect to be postponed until the nineteenth century?

CHAPTER XVI.

The Reformation.

About the time that men were getting to think for themselves again printing was invented, and books went out among the people to engage their thought and give it direction. The first book printed was the Bible, and for a long time almost no book except the Bible was printed. The natural effect was to focus the awakening thought of the people on religious matters quite independently of the sentiment of the fear of God.

We may say that men were fairly under compulsion now to think about something, and since nothing offered but religion they fell into speculation which was in a sense religious. The subjects treated of in the Bible became of necessity the subjects of their thought. It was somewhat, I fancy, as if we, while retaining all our inclination to think, were to be deprived, in some way, of the vast quantity of food for thought which is spread before us by the books we have, excepting only such food for thought as the Bible offers. We should assuredly, in that case, become very profoundly interested in the Scriptures.

It is an easy inference from the known circumstances that the people who lived at the time of the awakening of learning, as it is called, became very profoundly interested in the Scriptures, although at the same time they had pretty much lost the primary religious appetite and their concern with the Scrip

tures as the word of God. They were no longer religious as their fathers had been, but they were interested in religious matters.

They were taken with the spirit of speculative theology. The Scriptures hold an immense store of food for thought in virtue of their ambiguity alone; as to what the Scriptures mean there is almost always room for doubt and argument. What is possibly the largest field for the exercise of subtlety ever entered by the human mind was opened to everybody by the printing of the Bible. Any man who could read or could get another to read for him was likely to become a theologian. Reading and pondering, his mind, newly awakened to its power, would interpret, more or less confidently, and, interpreting, in a sense create, to the end that it would cleave to its interpretation as a parent to his child. Particularly would the man come to esteem his own interpretation, for the reason that his neighbor was almost certain to have a different one; there would inevitably be diverse interpretations, each fondly cherished and zealously defended, since there is nothing like opposition to beget zeal.

Yet there would be certain similarities or uniformities of interpretation. For temperament would have greatly to do with resolving the doubts raised by scriptural ambiguity, and there are uniformities or resemblances of temperament among men. We find racial or national temperaments, and we should therefore expect to find racial or national interpretations.

Let us suppose, for instance, two men, a typical Teuton and a typical Latin, meeting the passage we were just now quoting from the gospel according to St. Mark:

“Eat, this is my body.”

The Latin lives under a benign sky; he breathes a soft, languorous air; lofty mountains shut off the north winds, and his seas lie to the south of him. But the Teuton's airs are harsh, his skies are cold, the mountains are to the south of him, the sea to the north.

To what effect?

Not to attempt any exhaustive analysis, I should say that the Latin develops the easy temperament which does not quickly challenge dogma, while the Teuton grows self-confident and impatient of authority. Where the former should find no difficulty at all in the conventional doctrine that the wafer of the communion was Christ's body, become such by mystical process, the latter would stick at the why and the wherefore; to allege a mystery satisfies the one where it serves only to challenge the other's doubt. Of course a great variety of influences have had effect here, but in this single item of physical environment we have, I am confident, a beginning of the difference there is between those who assert and those who deny the real presence of Christ in the sacramental element.

Generally speaking, the Latin temperament is, as we might expect it to be, unfavorable to schism; the Teuton favorable. The Latins stood by the conventional order while the Teutons split off; but that did not end the matter. The Latins stood together, henceforth, whereas the Teutons, having fallen out with their neighbors to the south, now fell out with each other. It is perhaps significant of the origin and nature of the sentiment behind all the turmoil of the Reformation that about the only common rally-

ing point of the Protestants at last was not a theological point at all, but the doctrine of individual interpretation, whereby it was held that each man is to decide for himself what the Scriptures mean.

Teutons were Protestants generally, but there was no such thing as a universal Protestantism. Each separate Teutonic people or nation had to have its own Protestantism, suited to its peculiar temperament, protesting fundamentally against Catholicism, but hardly less fundamentally against every other sort of Protestantism. Germany, Switzerland, France, Holland, England, Scotland developed each a peculiar faith; nor did the process of schism stop when the nations were supplied; in the end geographical lines were lost, and men of similar temperament, though of different places, had the faith that suited their temper.

But what had all this to do with the pastors?

We need here to take into account the limitations of the people of those times. Thinking was a new business for them. Of themselves they knew they thought, but scarcely more. They needed somebody to tell them what they thought; somebody telling them what to think would be flouted, but somebody telling them what they thought would be welcomed.

I venture to call up a modern instance illustrative of the great service rendered crude men under strong conviction by him who tells them what they think.

A few years ago there assembled at Chicago a convention of crude men under strong conviction. They were intensely radical in their sentiments, and yet any exact expression of their radicalism they lacked. The call was for a leader, and the task that awaited the leader was the task of telling these men what

they thought. The man of the hour proved to be a youth hitherto almost unknown, who, when it came his turn to address the convention, after several others had spoken and evoked but a perfunctory response, had not uttered a hundred words before he had set the assemblage on fire with enthusiasm.

"Bryan," said the London Times, commenting on the incident, "gave his hearers back their thoughts."

That told the whole story. The speech, modified by the circumstances of personality and of the occasion, expressed the thought that had been clamoring for expression, and the youth was from that hour the idol of his party. He had rendered those men a very great service.

The character of the Reformation was schism. Behind the Reformation there were a thousand and one causes, I suppose, religious, political and social; but dominating all was the temperamental tendency to schism. Every new schism called for its new prophets to give it expression, and here the pastors found their uses.

In his sturdy defiance of papal authority, Luther was pan-Protestant; he was the prophet of all Protestantism, expressing a thought common to all Protestants. In his particular doctrine, he was merely German; not more pan-Protestant than Melancthon; in particular doctrine there was no pan-Protestantism. Luther and Melancthon answered to the German thought; there had to be a Zwingli before the Swiss found their thought expressed, a Calvin or a Beza for France, and over in Scotland a Knox.

Here, then, was a large chance for the pastor to serve the people sensibly to themselves, and religiously, and still without walking in the way of the

cross; indeed, the chance was boundless while yet the spirit of speculative theology held the people. The Zwinglian pastor who should thunder against the pope would please his people, and serve them, since he would be telling them what they thought, but he was not confined to thundering against the pope; he might thunder against Luther or against Calvin or any of the others, and his people would be scarcely the less pleased and served. And not far away was to be found the pastor serving quite as sensibly by thundering against Zwingli.

The cause of this condition, whereby the pastor was permitted, even after the fear of God was again extinct, to render a sensible, unworldly service otherwise than by walking in the way of the cross, was naturally not long operative. Food for thought rapidly increased in quantity and variety. Books other than the Bible soon went out among the people. Men were no longer compelled to ponder over the Scriptures. The affairs of industry and commerce were coming up for consideration; science was expanding; geographical discoveries of the utmost moment were being made. There were presently many things to think about more interesting than the Scriptures.

But the condition was likely to outlive its original cause. In the first heat of the Reformation, controversy had raged so fiercely as to create what amounted to sectarian feuds. Theological disputes engendered positive hatreds, not quickly to be allayed, especially with every effort being made to keep them alive. The sectarian father brought his children up to abhor those who disagreed with him in religious views, and, although these children might feel no direct effect of the circumstances which had made their father sec-

tarian, they would still retain their abhorrence. In other words, something of the fierce sectarian zeal of the Reformation was preserved in tradition; and to the sentiment thus preserved the church might look to give it, in its controversial activities, a sensible usefulness with the people, even after the people had ceased to care, of themselves, about fine distinctions of theology. To keep this sentiment alive the church in its own behalf would naturally spare no effort. And when it is borne in mind that hatreds are rather easily preserved, men being what they are, it were not surprising if the condition we are observing outlived its original causes many years. I do not doubt, for myself, that much of what passes in our own time for genuine piety, and which in its outward manifestation is certainly very like genuine piety, is indeed the mere inheritance of sectarian bitterness from the period of the Reformation.

To review, briefly:

The barbarian incursions provided a crude generation of men for the Christian pastor to serve sensibly and religiously otherwise than by following Christ in the way of the cross.

When evolution had refined the fear of God out of men again, the spirit of speculative theology came in, and provided still a generation to be served sensibly and religiously, and otherwise than Paul served in his day the generation of men then living.

Finally, even after the spirit of speculative theology had been crowded out, the habit of mind it had set up remained to make men have a use for the pastor serving otherwise than as the pastors had served in the beginning.

That is, the postponement of the effect of the pastor's lapse is exactly what we should expect. Though the pastor departed from the apostolic practice almost at once, no decadence of the church's unworldly usefulness were likely to be observable until near our own time.

The condition of religious uselessness, coming thus only after many centuries of great and undoubtedly unworldly usefulness, is not likely to warn the pastor of any failure in himself. It is far more likely to suggest to him a failure in the people of the religious sentiment, since the ancient times. Very naturally he scouts the claim that he now confronts substantially the conditions which Paul confronted, as regards popular religious sentiment, and that his failure where Paul succeeded is due to his neglect of Paul's method.

There is still another circumstance of prime importance, I should say, as helping to modify the pastoral practice, and unconsciously to the pastor himself. I refer to the circumstance of the corporate church.

CHAPTER XVII.

The Corporate Church.

If we take it that the Christian method contemplates the communication of God's will to men through the secondary religious appetite, then is the church, that is, the organ of the Christian purpose, the pastor carrying his cross, and no more. Temples and rites and vestments have no necessary part in the ministry of Christianity, provided it be proposed by Christianity to bring men into communion with God in the way I have suggested, namely by confronting them with a spectacle of the carnal self devoted to sacrifice.

There is nothing in the pastoral practice, as I believe the Saviour defined it, which excludes the pastor from following almost any calling, within limits which are obvious. He would have to bear it in mind to seize every opportunity to deny the carnal self, and he might not therefore do business just as other men do business. But I do not doubt that he might easily earn his own living, at making tents, say, if he were Paul, without impairing his pastoral fitness or interfering with his pastoral duties. He might till a small acre of soil, or he might employ himself as a day laborer, and yet offer all the time the spectacle suggestive of devotion. In fact, he might even use his ordinary employment as a means of making his devotion the more manifest.

In other words, the church has really no need of revenue.

The probability seems to be that the Christian church had no revenue in the beginning. For a considerable period, perhaps for as long as a century, the new religion, as we have already had occasion to notice, would naturally gain the favor and adherence only of the poorest; the well-to-do would be distrustful of the innovation and hold aloof. Any considerable revenue was probably not available to the church at first. This need not matter at all, provided the pastors were doing what I have supposed they were doing, namely, walking in the way of the cross; and in point of fact, let us observe, it did not matter, for in this period of poverty the church flourished, according to all testimony.

But presently it came to pass, in the natural course, that a revenue was available.

The access of good will, bringing with it the sense of being exalted out of the carnal self, of approximation to pure spirituality, is very grateful to any man, as we can all testify from our own experience, whether we identify it with a communion with God or not. The man who experiences this sense of being exalted, this grateful sense, naturally feels himself indebted to the means whereby the exaltation has been effected; as the man entering the theater pays for his ticket cheerfully on the promise of a moving play, and does not begrudge the price if the promise is fulfilled. The gratification of his appetence leaves him with a feeling of indebtedness. If it happens to be the spectacle of a Christian pastor carrying his cross that has effected his exaltation, we are not surprised to

find the man freely confessing his indebtedness to the pastor. The expression of his gratitude in the bestowal of earthly goods is altogether natural; so we are not surprised to find the man casting riches, if these he has, at the feet of the pastor.

That is, although the church should have no revenue in the beginning, it would not be long, in course, until a revenue would offer, with the pastor still holding to the apostolic practice. As soon as Christianity began to make its benign and sensibly valuable influence felt among those who had the wherewithal to render substantial offerings in expression of their gratitude, the church, we may be assured, began to find itself possessed of a revenue.

What should be done with it?

Paul had declared that God dwells not in temples built by hands, nor is he served by men as one wanting anything. But on the other hand there was the thought, habitual with mankind from time out of mind, that earthly pomp is pleasing to God.

The pagans had built gorgeous temples, for the particular residence of their deities, and while the Christian pastor might not wittingly go to the pagans for inspiration, it is not unlikely that the thought which they expressed in their temples survived, measurably, at least, in him, since it had always been a common thought. Moreover, the Jews, to whom the Christian pastor might becomingly go, to whose sacred writings his gospels were constantly directing him, these, the chosen people, had raised a temple and ordained rituals in honor of God. Opposed to the vague reflections of Paul was the illustrious and approved example of Solomon, or of David himself, if a

better example were needed. On the whole it is not likely that the good pastor was left with any misgivings about using the goods laid at his feet by grateful communicants, in the raising of temples and the ordination of rituals.

And even though he were still devoted, there is nothing to shock his sense of duty in the proposal to use the offerings for raising temples and ordaining ceremonies. No indulgence of his carnal self is proposed; the honor is all to God. Vestments glittering with gold and jewels to the glorification of the most high did not exclude the hair shirt to the mortification of the flesh. For the pastor to take these offerings and use them to honor God as the Jews had honored Him, and as it was natural and habitual for men to think He might be honored, necessitated not the least deviation from the way of the cross.

There are always works to do, which it cannot but please a benevolent God to have done. On every hand there is always the opportunity to spend money to purposes confessedly good; and notably there is the giving of alms, for the poor we have ever with us. Certainly God is pleased to see His poor relieved. Certainly to bestow the thank offerings left at the altar in alms is to use them worthily. To feed the hungry and clothe the naked, these were works which Christ himself had expressly commended, and now was the church providentially given the means wherewith it might engage in them.

But these perfectly natural and in themselves perfectly proper undertakings must in time bring about a certain enlargement of the church, hitherto only the pastor, into a corporation including the pastor and

more, a corporation of temporal character, having temporal obligations, to be met and discharged only by means of a material revenue. The purposes for which the thank offerings had been used in the beginning, simply in order to get rid of them worthily, in the course of time became fixed purposes, of paramount importance, in the consummation of which the honor of God was involved. In a word, whereas there had been at first no need for a revenue, now there had to be a revenue, lest the glory of God suffer.

And now, though the pastor should still hold it his duty to serve by walking in the way of the cross, his original notion of the end and aim of it all could hardly fail of becoming in some degree confused. He might serve still precisely as he had served, namely, by following Christ, but there would be with him the new thought that his services had to fetch a revenue. By degrees and insensibly he would come to the point of testing the adequacy of his services by their effect in bringing revenue, without regard to what else they might effect.

That the pastor might make revenue his chief concern and yet walk in the way of the cross, is apparent. Walking in the way of the cross is wholly a matter of denying the self, and provided that no part of the revenue derived from his pastoral activities is used by the pastor in his own behalf, there seems to be no reason why he might not carry the cross while expecting pay for so doing. But it is equally apparent, on the other hand, that the moment any portion of this pay should be retained by the pastor as personal compensation, to be used in his own behalf, in that moment would he depart from the way of the cross; his

devotion would be a theatric illusion, of effect only as it imposed on men, inasmuch as the plain effect of pay is to eliminate the element of self-sacrifice.

Along with the growth of the corporate church, the pastor's duties amplify. The ancient pastor might go about his ordinary business of tent-making, or what not, provided only he neglected no occasion to crucify the carnal self, and still be in all respects an efficient pastor. But now that ceremonies have been ordained and extraneous duties undertaken, howbeit all looking to the glory of God, he has less and less time to give to his ordinary calling. Every new ceremony means a new fixed duty for the pastor to attend to, as does every work undertaken in the name of God, and to His honor. It presently comes about that he may not attend to all these duties and still have time to labor at making tents, and to all these he need attend, or else neglect God, an unthinkable alternative.

There is nothing left but to take from the church revenues at least enough to keep the pastor alive and well.

Still the good pastor need not have compunctions; for this he might do and yet do nothing appreciably to impair his pastoral fitness. The living he gives himself, off the church revenue, is very mean at first; a crust to eat and a coarse frock to wear. And his manner of living being such, the self is not largely compensated; he offers still a spectacle in high degree suggestive of devotion; in comparison with other men, he is self-sacrificing.

But the fact remains that the crust and the coarse frock, bought with the revenue of the church, measure a deviation from the way of the cross, not consid-

erable in itself, truly, but nevertheless a deviation. The pastor is brought into a position where he need be extremely vigilant lest he be led astray. The crust and the frock do not themselves much matter, but they open the easy way to things that matter very much indeed. Under the circumstances a wariness more than human would be needed to save the pastor; and without imputing to him either dullness or neglect, it is not hard to understand how the crust became breakfast, lunch and dinner, and the frock the broadcloth coat with which we are so familiar.

CHAPTER XVIII.

The Established Church.

The duty of the Christian pastor, then, is to deny the carnal self in order to exhibit to his fellow men the carnal self denied, and regardless of any other purpose; to devote himself to sacrifice in order to provide the spectacle suggestive of devotion.

And this, I think, is not necessarily to propose a revolution.

It is true that some of the things which pastors do in these days, they would not be doing were their purpose to exhibit the self devoted to sacrifice. Many, perhaps, of the activities which now fill the pastor's time, he would be finding no time for had his purpose always been, from the beginning until now, the purpose to exhibit the self devoted to sacrifice. Activities which are now conventional have become conventional since the pastor departed from the old way, but, for all that, they would not of necessity be forbidden the pastor, should he embrace the purpose we are indicating as the proper purpose. For it is less the deed itself than the manner of its doing, that is important.

Preaching, doubtless, is the chief pastoral business of the modern pastor; the average pastor gives his best effort to the preparation and delivery of his sermons.

What is it to preach?

Everybody remembers the famous pastor who undertook to edit a newspaper as Christ would edit it; to print a Christian newspaper.

"And by Christian newspaper," he explained, "I mean a newspaper which lays before its readers not what they would like to read but what they ought to read."

What the pastor proposed doing and did was to supersede his reader's choice of reading-matter with another choice. For example, he filled his first page with a sermon which the average reader did not care to read, and he omitted or cut down to a few lines a scandal which the average reader did care to read.

Now of course the pastor did not offer this choice of reading matter as his own, but as Christ's, that is, God's choice. I suppose there is no doubt that he himself thought it was God's choice; he prayed for divine guidance and declared he was given it. Moreover, it is not for me to say that he was not justified in his belief; perhaps it was God's choice; perhaps he was divinely guided. But that is not the point. What really matters is the sort of spectacle he made of himself in doing as he did.

A man strong in the fear of God is in the frame of mind to have his natural choice superseded. Indeed, he is uneasy if he is left to his own natural choice; he feels much more secure to give it up, and accept in its stead another choice which he is able to believe is God's. As the hart pants for the water, so thirsts the soul of the God-fearing man for an oracle. He hearkens with ears astrain for the voice which shall tell him what God's choice is, and he is quick to welcome any voice which affects to speak with authority.

Whoever commands him in the name of God, he is likely to obey. He takes it that the will he hears voiced is God's will; that the tongue and lips which speak are the tongue and lips of a man like himself, but appropriated by God to His uses, and no longer in the service of a merely human will. In a word, with a God-fearing generation, the oracle loses his human aspect; he does not appear as a man at all; there is no suggestion of arrogance in what he does.

But let men be divested of the fear of God, and the case is altogether different. Now the element whereby the oracle gains credit, and gets to be regarded as a mere assemblage of human parts in the service of the divine will, fails. The average man is in no mood to have his choice superseded; he is not anxious to know the will of God, since he no longer fears God. Accordingly, when another man affects to supersede his choice he sees in that act, not the play of the divine will, but the play of a human will, like his own.

In short, oracular instruction with men devoid of the primary appetite is productive of irritation, it leaves the impression of self clashing on self; the oracle wears the look of arrogance, than which nothing is less suggestive of the carnal self denied.

The pastor become editor is oracular; he is magisterial; he is dogmatic. The choice which prefers sermons to scandals as reading matter is a reasonable choice. That is, it is to be shown, by rational argument, that we might better read sermons than scandals. But the pastor makes no appeal to reason; he proposes the choice as being God's choice, and that is all.

I believe he irritated most men. I believe he offered to most men the spectacle of the self indulged rather than the self denied. A pastor determined to deny the self in order to exhibit the self denied would be very careful to take full account of conditions external to himself; he would not be content in that his purpose was devoid of selfishness, as a matter of fact; he would think of the seeing eye; he would always ask himself what sort of a spectacle he was likely to make, in virtue of any proposed act, and, unless it was a spectacle suggestive of devotion, he would shun the act.

Oracular instruction is the character of much if not most of the preaching we hear. Pastors are often found trying to supersede men's natural choice with another choice, which they call God's. And thereby, not to intimate for a moment that they are mistaken, and not to deny that it would be better for men to do as the pastors bid them, they none the less irritate; they give the impression of arrogance, of the self indulged rather than the self denied. Such preaching we should not hear, I am confident, were pastors bent on denying the self with a view to exhibiting the self denied.

Still there might be preaching, as much, perhaps, as now. I have myself heard sermons which would become St. Paul, in their spirit of humility, in their suggestiveness of devotion; and my experience has not been large. Were pastors to come into the purpose to deny the self in order to exhibit the self denied, it is more likely that such sermons would become common than that preaching would be given up altogether.

Likewise with pastoral activities generally; they do not seem to me to conflict essentially with the pastoral duty, as I understand it. The pastor who should devote himself to sacrifice would not find the occasion for doing many of the things he now does, perhaps, and yet these things he might do, did he choose, and still not of necessity impair the suggestion of devotion in the spectacle he should offer.

CHAPTER XIX.

The Ethical Impulse.

In the Methodist Episcopal book of discipline there is a law which forbids members of that communion to dance.

It seems to me quite certain that the average, normal human being finds a gratification in dancing; that he has, in other words, the natural impulse to dance. Many people do not dance, and some do not care to dance, yet it may nevertheless happen that even these have the impulse to dance. If they do not dance, is it not because the impulse to dance has been overcome by opposite impulses before it has found expression in conduct? If they do not care to dance, is it not because the impulse to dance has been overcome before it gets to be a conscious impulse?

What the church needs to do, then, in order to make good its inhibition, is to provide its members or communicants with an impulse that shall work counter to the impulse to dance, and be sufficiently strong to overcome it. Natural impulses, as experience seems to show, ordinarily leave a man in possession of the impulse to dance. On natural impulses the average man does dance, or at least wishes to dance. If he is to be kept from dancing, or from wishing to dance, an impulse in some sense artificial has to be provided, and given place among the impulses that have to do with his conduct and his conscious desires; that is,

artificial circumstances have to be created which shall beget an impulse counteractive or regulative of the purely spontaneous impulse.

Now the time has been, and plenty of men still living can remember it, when the Methodist church was able to provide its communicants with an impulse counteractive of the impulse to dance, of such strength that not only did no Methodist dance, but no Methodist cared to dance. The impulse thus provided was sufficient to extinguish the spontaneous impulse, not alone before the latter took effect in conduct, but even before it had any conscious form in the mind. That is, the church was able actually to regulate conduct to accord with a law which proposed the denial of natural spontaneous impulses.

At a late general conference of the Methodists, a memorial or overture came up boldly proposing that the law against dancing be stricken from the book of discipline. The proposal found large support. It narrowly missed carrying, if I remember rightly. Its proponents confidently predicted that it would prevail at the next conference. Indeed, this seemed to be the general expectation.

There can be no doubt that a conscious impulse to dance, in Methodists, is what is pushing this overture, and giving it its strength before the conference. Nobody but a Methodist desirous of dancing would be likely to initiate a movement for the abrogation of this law against dancing. That is to say, Methodists are not of their former mind; whereas, a few years ago, it would be hard to find a Methodist with any conscious inclination to dance, many Methodists, possibly a majority of Methodists, are now avowedly in-

clined to dance. The spontaneous impulse to dance, from being practically extinguished, is become quite active and strenuous to manifest itself.

This argues but one thing. The power of the church to curb, to regulate, the spontaneous impulses, the impulses such as wrong gets to be done on, is largely lost. This power the church had once, but has it no more. Once the church might forbid the doing of a deed, and the deed would not be done, in consequence, even though there was the natural impulse to do it. But now, if there is the natural impulse to do the deed, the church may not prevent; its ban notwithstanding, the deed is done.

In a word, the church has ceased to provide the ethical impulse.

What is true of the Methodist church is likewise true of the other churches. No other church, perhaps, lays down such a rigid discipline; by which I mean that no other church sets down in black and white the particular deeds which are forbidden to be done. They are more general in their directions and regulations. Consequently, they do not in their experience exhibit so markedly the decadence of the ethical impulse provided by them. With them the decadence is as gradual in its manifestations as it is in fact; no such abrupt innovation as the abrogation of a written rule is possible. But there is no pastor in any sect who does not know it were vain for him to attempt to regulate conduct by means of church authority. The church, in any of its creeds, has no longer such influence over men as warrants the attempt to regulate conduct. Should the attempt be made, the only effect would be to drive the people away from the church.

In the Roman Catholic church, we are told, the penances imposed by the pastors on those who have confessed sins are much lighter than they were in ancient times. In ancient times the penances were not short of appalling; yet they were undergone, and if the people were in the frame of mind to endure heavy penalties for having disobeyed the church, they were obviously in such a frame of mind as that the ban of the church would powerfully deter them. Of course the lightening of the penances is not due to any betterment of men, whereby the need to regulate spontaneous impulses is lessened; it is plainly due to the fact that heavy penalties will not be undergone; if they are imposed, the people, rather than undergo them, will cut loose from the church altogether. To impose such penances as were anciently imposed would be to alienate about all communicants, at least in civilized communities.

As the case stands, no ethical impulse of large effect proceeds from Christianity any more. A Christian and an infidel live side by side. The Christian is a Christian on the church's strictest definition; in his life he distinguishes himself in the activities recommended by the church. The infidel scoffs at the church and its activities, and engages in none of these. And yet the infidel is as good a neighbor, as much like the good Samaritan, as is the Christian. Nor is this any extraordinary spectacle. It is a common spectacle. The church is forced to admit that the being a Christian seemingly does not make a man any better man, taking Christ's own definition of a good man. The Christian in his conduct manifests no ethical impulse which is not found manifest likewise in the con-

duct of the infidel. He gets no ethical impulse from the church, as far as anybody can see. His spontaneous impulses hold full sway over him, for all that the church does in regulation of them. Of course these are regulated, and largely, but it is by agencies other than the church.

And, after all, why should we expect anything else?

The regulative power of the church, under the conventional teaching of Christianity, waits on the fear of God. While men fear God, they fear to disobey the church which they have learned to deem God's; for them, its commands are the commands of God; fearing God, they obey the church. But with the primary appetite extinct, through the processes of evolution, men are no longer consciously concerned with the will of God; they hear with indifference the voice of the pastor, as he commands them in the name of God, and Christianity fails to provide them with any impulse strong enough to stand up against their spontaneous impulses.

We are not likely to be restored to the possession of the primary appetite. The likelihood is that the Christian church will remain impotent to regulate men's conduct, while yet it looks to the fear of God to give it power.

Is Christianity capable of providing civilized men with an ethical impulse? Particularly, were the theory of Christianity which I have been trying to set out to be put in practice, would any general modification of men's conduct result? Were the pastors to take up the cross, to deny themselves in order to exhibit the self denied, would they thereby give the church the power to regulate natural, spontaneous impulses?

This brings us to the second part of our discussion, and we proceed to consider our theory, if you will permit me to call it ours, in respect of its application to affairs; to apply to it, in other words, the utilitarian test.

PART II.

The Application.

CHAPTER I.

Vengeance Without the Law.

Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the law. For when a man is struck, the law does not suffer him to strike back. If the blow is to be repaid, either in kind or in equivalent, the law lets none other than itself repay.

Unless the law has this monopoly of vengeance, so to speak, it is clear that legal rights are liable to unsettlement. The effect of vengeance taken by the law is to vindicate a legal right, but if vengeance be taken without the law, the effect may or may not be vindicatory of a legal right; in fact, its effect is very likely to be the contrary of vindicatory of a legal right.

Is vengeance indeed the law's? Is the law's monopoly complete?

I quote an item from a newspaper:

“Williamsport, Pa.—Sympathy for three girl strikers at Reynoldsville culminated in a remarkable demonstration at that place last night, and during the day caused a run on the First National bank, which almost caused it to close.

“Only \$30,000, hastily borrowed from a bank at the neighboring town of Brookville, saved the institution from going down, because its president is the burgess who sentenced the girls to six days in jail, after convicting them of disturbing girls who had taken the strikers' places in the local silk mill. Bitter feeling

has been engendered by a strike of silk mill employes. The contest has already lasted six months, and the entire population of the town has become interested on one side or the other.

"Jennie Smith, Myrtle Sones and Edith Williams, three of the girl strikers, were charged with interfering with some of the employes who took their places. Burgess Mitchell sentenced the girls to pay a fine of \$3 each and costs or spend six days in jail. They chose the latter. Yesterday their terms expired.

"On their return from Brookville, where they were confined, they were greeted by a band and almost the entire population. During the imprisonment of the girls their friends had been withdrawing their funds from the bank of which Burgess Mitchell is president. On the day of their release it grew into a rush which fast depleted the funds of the bank."

The girls who went to work in the places of the striking girls were made to suffer for it; vengeance was taken on them, and it was not of the law's taking; it was vengeance without the law. Moreover, when the law, as to make good its monopoly, took vengeance on those who had taken vengeance without it, vengeance was forthwith taken on its agent.

Whatever vengeance the law has taken tends to the vindication of a certain legal right, namely, the legal right of any girl who will, to go to work in the place of a girl who has struck. But the vengeance that has been taken without the law, this is clearly in derogation of the legal right.

In fact, another right squarely in denial of the legal right has been asserted, and this the vengeance taken without the law tends to vindicate. What we have

is the spectacle of two rights, each in denial of the other, with vengeance being taken by the law in vindication of the one, and vengeance without the law being taken in vindication of the other.

It is not a rare thing to see.

CHAPTER II.

The Making of a Right.

It happened once that some street car drivers, in the old day of horse cars, asked the company employing them to raise their wages from 16 cents an hour to 18 cents. The company promptly declined to pay more than 16 cents; plenty of men, the company said, were willing to drive cars for 16 cents an hour. Then the drivers struck.

There was some interruption of traffic in consequence, but not much. The places which the strikers had vacated were filled by other men, and these soon learned to drive the cars properly. Within a few hours after the old drivers quit work, the cars were running again as if nothing had happened.

What thought had the drivers, in quitting that way?

It was their thought, undoubtedly, that events would prove the company's inability to run its cars as profitably with other men driving as with themselves driving; that if they quit, the business of the company would be hurt to such an extent that the latter would find its profit in employing them, even at 18 cents an hour.

In this thought they would seem to be wrong, since the company is already, within a few hours after the inauguration of the strike, doing business with other men driving, and men whom it pays only 16 cents an hour.

It was common talk that the drivers were foolish to strike. Men engaged in highly technical work, it was argued, men whose places might not be filled except by skilled laborers, these might strike with some hope of proving thereby that they were indispensable to the most profitable conduct of the business, even at advanced wages. But here were men driving cars, doing work which almost anybody might learn in a few minutes to do; of course they were not indispensable; the company could pick up men skilled enough for its purposes almost anywhere; there was seldom any scarcity of what was termed common labor, and common labor was competent to the work of driving a street car.

Hitherto, all parties have kept strictly within their legal rights. The old drivers had the legal right to quit work; the company had the legal right to hire other men, who, in their turn, have the legal right to work for the company. Outside of these, nobody seems particularly concerned.

The strikers had recourse now to what they described as moral suasion. That is, they tried to dissuade the new men, by arguments, from continuing in the employment of the company at the wages of 16 cents an hour. They were not altogether without success. Some of the new men were thus rendered unwilling to drive cars for 16 cents an hour, and quit. But, after all, moral suasion accomplished comparatively little. Most of the new drivers were not to be persuaded. Sixteen cents an hour with steady work was better fortune than many of them had hitherto enjoyed; for many of them had been used to living precariously from hand to mouth, doing only such odd jobs of day work as offered, being idle for whole

months at a time, and these could see but small reason for demanding 18 cents an hour. And there seemed to be an inexhaustible supply of men ready and even anxious to take the places of the few who were persuaded to quit.

No question was raised as to the strikers' legal right to use moral suasion.

But by degrees the arguments, mostly failing of their purpose, gave way to impatient reproaches and reproaches, since they failed for the most part, too, to threats. The strikers were plainly disappointed in the way things were going, and their disappointment was making them desperate. They talked of taking violent measures.

But any resort to violence would at once bring them into conflict with the law. And what had this mere handful of men to hope from a conflict with the law of the strong arm?

It is on the third day after the drivers quit that a horse attached to a car happens to stumble and fall near a busy corner. When the driver gets the horse up again, presently, he finds a heavy truck standing across the track in front of him. The driver of the truck at first claims to be stuck fast and unable to get out of the way, but when the driver of the car expresses some doubts, he flares out angrily that he doesn't propose to "get out of any scab's way!"

By this time a crowd of people have gathered. There is a good deal of hooting and jeering on the part of the crowd, directed toward the driver of the car, and indicating decided hostility. Other wagons draw up across the track in front of the car, and the crowd grows, until shortly the street for a long way

is filled with wagons and people. Going forward is out of the question. The driver appeals to a policeman, and the policeman orders everybody to move on, but nobody moves.

A brick is thrown from somewhere in the crowd. It goes crashing through the car windows. Then other bricks are thrown, and clubs. In short order the car is reduced to a mass of wreckage and the horses are turned loose. The driver has fled.

The crowd is a wild mob, now. Another car comes along, and it is wrecked, too.

The police march up in force and take a hand. They mass themselves about a car and move forward, thus, into the mob, and, after a good deal of struggling, through it. A dozen or more rioters, caught red-handed, so to speak, are arrested and taken away, but the mob is not visibly affected, except, perhaps, to be made more furious. The tumult grows and the police advise a suspension of operations until the mob shall have had time to disperse from weariness. Their advice is taken; no more cars are run that day.

The next day traffic is resumed, cautiously. Only a few cars are run, and these are heavily guarded. No more mobs of large proportions are encountered, but plenty of trouble of one kind and another. There are rocks piled on the tracks, and in some places the tracks are torn up. Once a few men, not more than three or four, rush suddenly out at a car in which several policemen are riding, cut the traces and reins, start the horses off at a gallop, and make good their escape before the policemen get out to do anything in the way of preventing them. Then the car and the police and the driver are the center of a hooting,

jeering crowd of men, women and children, until more police come with another team of horses and rescue them.

All this sort of thing costs the company money, of course. Wrecked cars have to be repaired, and tracks torn up have to be laid down again. And the story of the expense to which the company is being put is not half told.

The new drivers are persecuted.

For instance, one of these enters a saloon where he has often been before, and been always welcome, doubtless, and orders a glass of beer. It is brought, and he drinks it, and after he has drunk it the proprietor of the place takes the empty glass and dashes it to pieces on the floor, saying that no decent man will ever care to drink out of it, now. The saloon is filled with men of the driver's class, many of them his friends hitherto; they loudly cheer the proprietor's act, and say all manner of insulting things. Naturally the driver is hurt; he feels the affront.

But insults are not all. These drivers are visited with injury whenever the occasion offers. It is not only that they and their families are given the cold shoulder by their neighbors; that none of those with whom they have lived in amity ever speak to them now except to revile them. They are under constant menace of attack, and they are often attacked. They are the targets for bricks and clubs thrown by unseen hands. Their footsteps are dogged, and advantage taken of every opportunity to harm them with impunity.

They are made very uncomfortable, and, plainly, it is all because they have taken the jobs of the strikers. The consequence is that the persecution they undergo

makes their employment less attractive to them; it becomes less easy to find men who are willing to drive cars for 16 cents an hour. The persecution, resulting from their taking employment with the company, has to be compensated with higher wages. Larger wages have to be paid in order to get drivers. This, too, costs the company money.

Moreover, few passengers ride in the cars, whether through fear of the mob or out of sympathy with the strikers, who have asked that the cars be boycotted. So there is a great reduction of revenue, which is equal to the company being put to still further expense, by reason of having hired new drivers rather than pay the old the 18 cents an hour which they ask.

What the old drivers thought when they quit proves, then, not to be so very far wrong, after all.

In fact, the company presently does precisely what the strikers hoped it might do: it gives up the fight, dismisses the new drivers and takes the old drivers back substantially at their own terms. Circumstances were become such that the company found its profit in doing this.

To be sure, these circumstances are not brought about while yet everybody keeps within his legal rights. For it is the legal right of the company to employ the new drivers, and of the new drivers to be employed by the company, and any molestation of the one for hiring or of the other for being hired, is necessarily unlawful, legally unrightful. This is recognized; the law makes every effort to save the company and the new drivers from being molested.

But it is evident from the first that the mob, meaning collectively all those who oppose the purpose of the law, has a thousand hands where the law has one.

The attempt is made to give the law more hands. The common council of the city are asked to vote funds for the temporary augmentation of the police force. The council deliberate, hear arguments, and finally decide that the condition of public finances will not justify the expense. All sorts of ulterior motives are imputed to the aldermen; they are accused of recrancy to their oaths, of truckling to the forces of lawlessness and disorder and what not, but they remain steadfast. Whatever their motives, the matter of the augmentation of the police force rests with them, and their attitude simply draws yet narrower the limitations of the law. If the officers of the law are with the mob, it but reveals a further weakness of the law.

There is talk of calling out the militia. The governor of the state may order out the militia to aid in the preservation of the peace, provided the local peace officers make representations to the effect that they are of themselves unable to preserve the peace. In particular it falls to the sheriff to make these representations. The sheriff is asked to make representations, and he refuses, although the mob at the moment is leaving pretty much its own way. The governor declines to act independently of the sheriff. The militia is not called out.

That is to say, the resources of the law are exhausted, and still the law is unable to save the company and its new drivers from being molested in their lawful pursuits.

As soon as the company gives up and concedes what the old drivers ask, peace instantly reigns. The mob vanishes. Its purpose, we may assume, since it was under no compulsion to vanish, is achieved.

What has been achieved?

Hitherto, or until the strike, the company, in hiring help, has hired whom it chose to hire, and dismissed its men at its pleasure. It was answerable to nobody; nobody might ask its reasons for hiring this man or for dismissing that man. It might dispense with a driver because his hair was red, or because he belonged to a certain church or a certain political party; for any reason whatsoever or for no reason at all. The job belonged to the company; for the company gave it, and the company took it away, without condition.

But now the company no longer hires whom it chooses to hire. It chooses, naturally, to hire the man who asks but 16 cents an hour for wages; in fact, it hires a man who asks 18 cents an hour. Indeed, the company has entered into a covenant, the drivers being the party of the second part, whereby it binds itself to pay 18 cents an hour for the work of driving cars, no matter although there are men willing to drive cars for less. Not only this, the company binds itself not to dismiss a driver for any reason or for no reason, but only for certain specified reasons.

The company waives a right, namely, the right to hire whom it likes and to dismiss him as it will. Perhaps the company still calls this its right, but the right it no longer exercises; it has ceased to be a right, in any practical sense.

The drivers, on the other hand, exercise a new right. It would be hard to describe this right precisely, but it is something like a property right to their jobs. Their jobs are now in a sense their own;

or their own in a larger sense than hitherto. For they hold their employment now not altogether at the company's pleasure, but on terms which make it their property in a measure.

As the master waives his former right, the man is at once clothed with a new right. As between these two, a new order of rights, of practical rights, is established. And, what is chiefly important to observe here, this new order of rights is established by the instrumentality of the mob. The master waives his old right simply and solely because of circumstances created by the mob, in defiance of law. The new right of the men, a valid right, a right in practice, is the result, not of orderly enactment, but of the resort to violence; it stands vindicated, but by vengeance without the law.

A shoemaker once said in my hearing that he was being held up and robbed of \$5 every week.

He was a shoemaker of the latter day sort, the proprietor of a vast factory where thousands of pairs of shoes were made up from the raw leather each day. He employed many hands. These hands had struck on the occasion of his replacing a man, whom he called a nailer, who asked \$10 a week for his services, with a woman, who was glad to do the work for \$5 a week; and in the final event, the shoemaker had retained in his employ the man nailer, paying him \$10 a week.

"The \$5 difference between what the woman asked and what the man asked," said the shoemaker, "was and is legally mine. In order that I come by that \$5, neither I nor anybody else would do anything unlawful. The law says I have the right to hire this

woman, and that she has the right to be hired by me. In working for me she is doing only what the law says she may do; and by plain implication the law is bound to protect her from molestation while she works for me. Likewise the law, since it permits me to employ the woman, is bound to protect me from being molested as I employ her.

“Why is it that I hire the man at \$10 a week, and not the woman at \$5?

“Simply because it is cheaper for me, on the whole. The man is the cheaper help, all things considered. For in fact I have not the option of hiring the man at a cost to me of \$10 a week, or the woman at a cost of \$5 a week. In fact I have only the option of hiring the man at a cost of \$10 a week, or the woman at a cost of much more than \$10 a week. My legal option, the option which the law allows me, proves to have no reality.

“The law does not protect me in doing what it permits me to do, or the woman in what it permits her to do. The strikers and their friends persecuted the woman for working for me until she was no longer willing to work for \$5 a week. I could find nobody who cared to do the work, and undergo the persecution involved, for \$5 a week; although if there had been no persecution, if, in other words, the law had made good its plain promise, there would be plenty of people willing to do the work for \$5, or even less. The law confessed its obligation; it tried to put a stop to the persecution, but it failed. As a result of its failure, I was compelled to pay more than \$5 a week in order to get the work done; as a matter of fact, before the strike was over, I paid as high as \$15 a week to get the nailer's work done.

"That wasn't all, by any means. I myself was persecuted. My property was threatened with destruction. The law could not protect it. I had to go to the expense of hiring detectives, as they called themselves, to watch the factory. Their bill was something appalling. Furthermore, the strikers laid a boycott on my goods. It happens that I make a specialty of coarse shoes such as working people wear, and these working people, out of sympathy with the strikers, were only too glad to boycott me. My custom was cut in two. On the one hand, it was costing me more than it had ever cost me before to make the shoes, and on the other hand, my revenue was greatly reduced. Of course it was all due to the disorderly and illegal practices of the strikers; but it was vain, it seemed to me, to speak of that, when there was apparently no way to make the strikers stop being disorderly and illegal in their practices. It was also due to my having hired the woman in the man's place. I knew perfectly well that if I took the man back at his own terms, my troubles would cease at once. I was advised to wait and let the mob wear itself out; but it was not easy to be patient, under the circumstances. I did what I then believed and still believe the wisest thing, although it went against my grain. I can assure you, I made my escape along the line of least resistance, if not indeed along the only line which did not offer insuperable resistance. I took the man nailer back, and paid him his \$10 a week. But of this \$10 I say \$5 is legally mine. Am I not being held up and robbed of \$5 a week?"

There is certainly force in the shoemaker's reasoning; that the \$5 is the shoemaker's, legally, is a plain

implication of the specific promises and engagements of the law; but for all this, the nailer it is who finally has the \$5.

Were a highwayman to meet the shoemaker in a lonely place of a dark night, and thrust a pistol in his face, and thereby take from him the sum of \$5, he, too, would rob the shoemaker. Here again the shoemaker gives up the \$5 which is legally his, which the law says is his, as being the cheapest, that is, the most profitable thing for him to do under the circumstances. The law defines the \$5 as being the shoemaker's to the exclusion of the highwayman. But the law does not affect the exclusion. The highwayman has the \$5 at last.

The case of the highwayman and the case of the shoemaker are both cases of robbery, on any strict construction of the law, since each of these persons equally with the other gets \$5 of money which the law defines as being the shoemaker's. But they are not robbery of the same sort. In both cases circumstances have been created, by reason of which the shoemaker finds it cheaper to give up the \$5 than to keep it. These circumstances are as unlawful in the one case as in the other, but, in the case of the highwayman, they have been created in evasion of the law, whereas in the case of the nailer they have been created in defiance of the law. Were the law present in force, the circumstances by reason of which the highwayman gets the \$5 would not be created. But, in the case of the nailer, the law is present and in force, and still the circumstances by reason of which the nailer gets the \$5 are created; the circumstances are created, the law being present notwithstanding.

The nailer's case is the case of the street car driver over again. The shoemaker waives a right which in its exercise is worth \$5 a week to him, and, as he waives his right, the nailer comes into the enjoyment of a right which in its exercise is worth precisely \$5 a week to him. Looking at the fact from the point of view of the law, the nailer is engaged in robbery; but he is likewise exercising that which, save for the law's definition, is to all intents a right; a new right in practice has been established.

It is impossible to speak of a right without bringing in perplexities and uncertainties. Before proceeding, further, then, let us see more precisely what we mean by a right.

CHAPTER III.

Right and Might.

If a strong man takes a weak man's coat away from him, we protest that the coat is still the weak man's, by right; might, we say, does not make right. We revolt at the suggestion that might makes right.

But who has the coat at last?

The strong man, to be sure, unless there interposes force which is able and disposed to take the coat from him and give it back to the weak man. The weak man's right to the coat, whatever else it does, avails him nothing, is of no solid advantage to him, unless such force interposes. Very likely the law takes the strong man in hand and compels him to render to the weak man the coat or its equivalent. But if it should happen for any reason that the law was less strong than the strong man, nobody will suppose that its interposition would give the weak man's right any validity or substantial value. In that case, the strong man would have the coat.

We have no trouble in deciding, in instances, what is wealth and what is not. The man who knows nothing of general definitions is yet able to apply such a test as discloses to him at once the qualities or accidents which make a thing to be wealth. What is the test?

Not to venture any exhaustive definition of wealth, I dare say that a thing is not wealth except it commands the service of him who has it not in behalf

of him who has it. If you say a thing you have is wealth, because you can trade it off for gold or silver, you offer no ultimate reason. You make no final disposition of your wealth, that is, you do not develop its nature, until you buy services with it; only in compensating services rendered you do you make way with your wealth.

Two conditions, then, are necessarily prior to the fact of wealth. These we may describe as

1. Desire for the thing on the part of him who has it not.
2. Exclusive possession on the part of him who has it.

You have corn, say, and Smith has none, to designate by the name of Smith any other man than yourself, thus making the proposition perfectly general. The corn is wealth, that is, you deem yourself the better off by reason of having it, provided in the first place that Smith desires the corn and in the second place that he may not have it except as you consent. If Smith does not desire the corn, either now or in anticipation, it is not wealth any more than yonder pile of rubbish; and likewise, if Smith is free to come and get the corn, whether you are willing or not, it is not wealth, for you, any more than the air or the water, however much desired. In a time of famine, the element of desire might operate vastly more powerfully in the creation of wealth; your corn might command in your behalf the largest services from other men; but always only on condition that other men are kept from having the corn except as you are willing.

It is quite plain that this condition of exclusive possession in you depends on there being a force able

and disposed to exclude Smith from having the corn except as you consent. Failing such a force, the corn is not wealth, for you.

A right, as I understand it, is permission to have; it is valid when it confers actual, exclusive possession. When we say that the weak man has the legal right to his coat, we mean that the law permits him to have it. When we say he has the moral right to the coat, we mean that our moral sense or the general moral sense permits him to have it. His right is valid, in any case, provided the permitting will has at its disposal sufficient force to put him in actual exclusive possession.

A valid right, in a word, is the permission of might.

We shall have frequent occasion to mention this might which by its permission, if might may be properly thought of as permitting, constitutes a valid right, and for convenience I shall call it the Greater Force. The name is perhaps fairly descriptive. For if the weak man's right to the coat is the permission of a force greater than any force which will be encountered in giving the weak man actual exclusive possession of the coat, then is the right valid. There are really two forces concerned in determining the validity of the right, namely, the force which permits and the force which does not permit. If the permitting force is the greater of the two, the right is valid; otherwise it is not.

It is to be observed that the sum of the Greater Force is relative and not absolute. A less force makes up the Greater Force now, perhaps, than made it up some other time; here than there; under these circumstances than those. The weak man may be aided by some other men, who find common cause

with him; if together they are stronger than the strong man, their permission is the permission of the Greater Force, and the weak man keeps the coat; his right is valid. Again, many men may find common cause with the weak man, and, on the other hand, many others find common cause with the strong man, and thereupon the sum of the Greater Force be a much larger sum of force than before. Indeed, it may be the sum of one man's force, or of ten or of a million men's.

As a matter of practice, then, might has its part in making a valid right. No right is valid or valuable unless it is the permission of might, as the case stands.

CHAPTER IV.

The Resort to Violence.

When it comes about that one man is disposed to do what another man is disposed not to let be done, there necessarily ensues a physical conflict, unless the disposition of the one or the other is yielded.

We know as a matter of the commonest experience that this condition of diverse dispositions is constantly arising. Everywhere, we may say, there is the man who is disposed to do that which some other man is disposed not to let be done. Yet this condition is far from resulting always in physical conflict. It often happens that one disposition or the other is yielded. Still, there is sometimes conflict as a result of the condition of diverse dispositions; that is to say, sometimes neither of the dispositions is yielded.

Why is there ever yielding? And since there is ever yielding, why not always?

When there is resort to violence, as a consequence of the condition of diverse dispositions, we observe that men do not always fight until the physical force of the one or the other is completely exhausted; that is, until the one or the other is utterly unable to fight any longer. They seem rather to fight only until it is proved, to the satisfaction of all concerned, which of the diverse purposes or dispositions has the greater physical force at its disposal. Whenever, as now and then happens, the fight does proceed until the physical force of the one party or the other is completely ex-

hausted, it appears to be only because the conflict does not sooner prove, conclusively, and to the satisfaction of all concerned, which of the two diverse purposes has the larger sum of physical force at its disposal. As soon as the conflict has served to convince all concerned which of the two parties is physically the stronger, it ceases. In other words, the moment the will of the Greater Force is conclusively identified, as sooner or later physical conflict cannot fail of identifying it, the opposing will or disposition yields.

It is suggested, by this, that men resort to violence for the purpose of identifying the will of the Greater Force. And what is more important, the suggestion is, further, that men would resort to violence less often, and perhaps never, should there be otherwise effected an identification of the will of the Greater Force, prior to, but equally conclusive with, an identification by physical conflict.

The suggestion is confirmed, I should say, as we consider the nature of human dispositions.

Disposition seems to be begotten of the promise of profit, and I mean by profit that which avails to the satisfaction of desire. When a man becomes possessed of a desire for a thing, he is naturally prompted to do that which promises to get him that thing; he comes into a disposition. Likewise, he is prompted not to let be done that which promises to deprive him of the thing he desires. If it happens that two men desire that which only one of them may have, clearly their common desire prompts the one to do precisely what it prompts the other not to let be done; and here, at once, we have the condition of diverse dis-

positions. Everybody, I think, has the proof within himself that this is so.

For myself, I am unable to understand how a disposition may take hold of a man apart from the promise of profit. No two men, perhaps, are ever disposed precisely alike. Dispositions differ, but they do not differ in that the promise of profit is responsible for some and not for others. Dispositions differ as desires differ, as circumstances differ to make that which is profit in one man's eyes to be not profit in the eyes of another man; no matter what the effect of a particular disposition, it springs from the promise of profit in any case. A savage is not given a disposition by the promise of an unabridged dictionary; the civilized man is not induced by the promise of a string of glass beads; each is moved only by the promise of what he deems profit, that is, what would avail to the satisfaction of his peculiar desires; the beads for the savage, say, and the dictionary for the civilized man. The disposition of him who labors all his life to win a crown in heaven, and the disposition of him who toils for money merely, these are equally begotten of the promise of profit; they differ simply in that the notion of what constitutes profit differs as between these two persons.

I cannot understand, either, how that the disposition to do a deed, which has hitherto promised profit, but now no longer promises such, may remain longer than the mere force of habit sustains it. Whether the desire which determines what is profit shall change, and thereupon what has seemed profit cease so to seem; or whether, the desire remaining unaltered, the particular deed which has hitherto prom-

ised to procure the means to the satisfaction of the desire shall cease so to promise; in any case, and for whatever reason, if the promise stands no longer, the disposition fails.

And particularly, if the deed which has hitherto promised profit, not merely ceases to promise profit, but comes now to promise penalty, that is, the denial of means to the satisfaction of desire, the disposition to do such a deed vanishes at once.

This is no unconventional view of the matter.

"The main strength and force of a law," says Sir William Blackstone, "consists in the penalty annexed to it. Herein is to be found the principal obligation of human laws.

"Legislators and their laws are said to compel and oblige; not that by any natural violence they so constrain a man, as to render it impossible for him to act otherwise than as they direct, which is the strict sense of obligation; but because, by declaring and exhibiting a penalty against offenders, they bring it to pass that no man can easily choose to transgress the law; since, by reason of the impending correction, compliance is in a high degree preferable to disobedience."

That is to say, legislators rely on the principle that dispositions are induced by the promise of profit. They cannot directly restrain the doing of any deed; but they are able to make any deed unprofitable in its ultimate consequences by attaching artificial penalties, and this comes to the same thing, practically. By declaring and exhibiting penalties, they affect the promise of profit until, as the great commentator observes, no man can easily choose to transgress the law.

Now, speaking generally, the deed which a man

well knows is only to be done against the will of the Greater Force, promises that man no profit, no matter how much of profit it might promise otherwise.

For, firstly, it is the promise of material profit that is responsible for most dispositions of most men. The desire which is not to be satisfied by material means is extremely rare; and even rarer is the man who has such desire and no other. I say in all confidence, therefore, that the most of most men's dispositions are induced by the promise of material profit. To state the whole case, if a deed promises the average man material profit, that deed he is disposed to do; and if thereafter the deed ceases to promise material profit, and particularly if it comes to promise material penalty, he ceases to be disposed to do it.

And, secondly, the Greater Force is obviously and as a matter of definition able to impose material penalty in any degree whatever, even to the extreme material penalty of death; that is to say, it is able to cause any deed to be materially unprofitable in its consequences. The Greater Force may take away every material thing a man has; there is no force able to prevent.

Finally, experience cannot have failed to teach men long ago what the Greater Force is competent to do; to teach them that any and all material profit waits on the consent of the Greater Force. With a thorough understanding of the competence of the Greater Force fixed in men's minds, no deed which men are assured is to be done only against the will of the Greater Force can promise profit.

To be sure the Greater Force, while it may not be defied with material profit, may sometimes be evaded; and this, too, men inevitably learn by experience. In

the possibility of evading the Greater Force, as this possibility gets to be understood by men, there survives something of a promise of profit in the doing of a deed naturally profitable, the inhibition of the Greater Force notwithstanding. But no large promise survives; for evasion is only for the few at most; evasion by many amounts to defiance, and defiance cannot possibly prove profitable.

On these considerations, I think, we should expect to find men in general avoiding the doing of the deed which they know is to be done only against the will of the Greater Force, quite as they avoid touching a hot iron with their flesh. They avoid doing such a deed involuntarily, and without conscious self-restraint. No matter what profit naturally promises in the doing of a certain deed, give men thoroughly to understand that it is to be done only against the will of the Greater Force, and there is in them no disposition to do it. If there has been in them hitherto a disposition to do this deed, it is because there has failed the definite understanding as to the will of the Greater Force; when the understanding is given them, by whatever means, their disposition vanishes; it is instantly yielded.

Accordingly, men cease fighting the moment conflict determines who is physically the stronger. When conflict has determined this, the disposition which has the lesser force behind it yields. It is only while there remains a doubt as to the will of the Greater Force, that there can be diversity of dispositions. With the will of the Greater Force known, there is but one disposition, or, at least, but one disposition taking effect in conduct. The condition of diversity is practically done away with.

Thus we come again to the suggestion that men resort to conflict in order to identify the will of the Greater Force, and that any means whereby an identification of the will of the Greater Force should be effected, prior to conflict, would obviate the resort to violence.

Such a means the law aims to provide. For the main purpose of the law is to keep the peace which physical conflict disturbs.

CHAPTER V.

The Law.

Whenever the condition of diverse dispositions arises, the law, to the end that the peace may not be disturbed by conflict, commands one or the other of the dispositions to be yielded. Every statute of the law is in effect the command to yield some natural disposition. Naturally, with two men desiring the coat which only one may have, there would follow the resort to violence, to determine who should have the coat. Each man would be brought by his desire into the disposition to do precisely what the other would be brought by his desire to be disposed not to let be done. The law frames statutes concerning property, which are very complex and extensive, but which, after all, amount to the designation of the disposition which shall be yielded, the hope being that, with one or the other disposition thus designated, there will be no resort to violence.

If the law is obeyed, of course there is no conflict; the peace is kept. Speaking generally, provided men stand ready to obey the law at once it commands them to yield a disposition, then does the law keep the peace. Give the law such authority that men will obey it at once it commands, and no matter what it commands them to do or not to do, and the peace is quite safe.

But, as Blackstone observes, men are under no compulsion to obey the law; they are perfectly free to

disobey it at any time, if they choose. And if a man chooses to disobey the law, what happens to the peace?

If a man chooses to disobey the law, when commanded by it to yield a natural disposition of his, and sets out to do that which he is naturally disposed to do, in spite of the command of the law, the law, on its part, may do either of two things, and two only; it may restrain the man by force or, failing in that, it may impose penalties on him after the fact. Either of these courses involves physical conflict, the setting of force against force, quite regardless of the event, whether the law finally prevails or not; and conflict is none the less a disturbance of the peace in that the law is a party to it. The law may shoot down a burglar or it may send him to prison; by the former course it may prevent that particular burglary which the burglar has in mind; by the latter it may render the burglary already committed an act of disadvantage to its perpetrator. But in neither case does it keep the peace. While yet men choose to disobey the law, the peace is not kept by the law.

What is necessary, then, if the law is to keep the peace, is that men in general be made ready to obey the law at once it commands, and no matter what it bids them do. In order to the achievement of its purpose of keeping the peace, the law has to have such authority that men will not have to be restrained forcibly or forcibly visited with penalties, but will choose to refrain whenever the law bids them refrain.

How is such a condition to be brought about?

A general readiness to obey the law, at once it commands, and no matter what it commands, would

plainly be the effect of a general understanding that the law writes the will of the Greater Force. Since to men in general no profit is promised in the doing of that deed which they know is to be done only against the will of the Greater Force, naturally no profit is promised by the unlawful deed, likewise, provided it be understood that the law writes the will of the Greater Force; and no disposition to do such unlawful deed remains. With the word of the law standing in effect as a final identification of the will of the Greater Force, there would be no disposition to disobey the law.

Does the readiness to obey the law, which we seek, arise except on the understanding that the law writes the will of the Greater Force?

All the things which the law forbids to be done are divided by the lawyers into *mala in se* and *mala prohibita*. In the case of the *malum prohibitum* there is no doubt, I suppose, that the authority of the law is a matter of men understanding that the law writes the will of the Greater Force. When a man is advised by considerations of material profit to do a *malum prohibitum*, he chooses to do it unless he has the prospect of being visited after the fact with penalty sufficient to offset the profit; and there is no such prospect, failing in him the understanding that the will of the law is the will of the Greater Force. No man who should think himself to be stronger than the law would be expected to refrain, of his own volition, from doing *mala prohibita*, provided considerations of material profit advised him to do these. We have numberless instances of this in actual practice. Municipal ordinances are concerned with *mala prohibita*,

and it is well known how completely without effect these are except as repeated demonstration leaves no doubt that they write the will of the Greater Force.

But the case of the *malum in se* looks to be different. We find men in general refraining from doing *mala in se* without any apparent reference to their understanding of the will of the Greater Force, whether or not it is the will written by the law. In this case, men do as the law bids them, and refrain from deeds which often promise in their natural consequences the highest material profit, without seeming to bethink them at all whether the law writes the will of the Greater Force or not. Grand larceny is a *malum in se*. Most men never steal, and we feel no small confidence in saying that most men never steal, quite without regard to the penalties which the law pronounces on thieves; that is, they would equally never steal were the law to pronounce no penalties, or were the law known by them to be unable to impose the penalties it pronounces.

Blackstone says it is the moral sense that restrains men of good will, that is, most men, from doing a *malum in se*, thus to intimate that their understanding of the will of the Greater Force has nothing to do with men's readiness to obey the law in this case. This must likewise have been the view of those who named *mala in se*; the name implying that there is a sense or faculty in men which deprives them of the liberty to do one of these deeds. Such being the case, men will not do *mala in se*, even though they know that the law does not write the will of the Greater Force; even though they know that the Greater Force permits these things to be done.

But does experience altogether justify this view?

When the allied armies invaded China, not long since, there came out sundry stories of sack and pillage by our soldiers and by the soldiers of other nations equally as civilized. Doubtless the stories were exaggerated, and yet it is likely, I may say certain, that there was sacking and pillaging, at least to the extent that soldiers did over there in China deeds which we call *mala in se*, and which they would not think of doing in their own countries.

Yet these soldiers had not left their moral sense at home. If it restrained them at home, why not in China?

There in China, as it happened, the circumstances were such that the will of the Greater Force was the will of the soldiers, let their will be whatever it might. The Greater Force was their own force, in any case; it permitted them to do whatever they chose. And at once they got to understand this, they proceeded to do what promised them profit, which was to loot. The moral sense interposed no effectual barrier.

Is it not suggested that they refrained from looting at home, not on reference to the moral sense, but rather on reference to their understanding that looting at home was counter to the will of the Greater Force?

The Chinese expedition is not singular. Soldiers almost always sack and pillage when they take possession of a hostile country. It will not do to say that soldiers have the moral sense less than other men. They differ from other men only in their circumstances. Their invasion suspends the ordinary courses of the law. The force which the law ordi-

narily has at its disposal is dissipated. The force of the soldiers is supreme; it is the Greater Force. Pillage holds out the promise of profit, and pillage the Greater Force permits.

That the moral sense has to do with determining the will of the Greater Force and thus mediately contributes to the authority of the law, I have no wish to deny. But it seems to me very clear that the moral sense is of no considerable effect to restrain a man from doing that which in the doing promises him profit.

Probably in these days the act of holding a man as a slave would be pretty generally esteemed a *malum in se*. Possibly it would not be easy to find anybody ready to deny that slavery is essentially wrong. But it is not many hundred years ago that about everybody thought slavery quite the proper thing. The time is within the memory of living men when a great many of our fellow citizens denied most strenuously that slavery was wrong. The notion that slavery is wrong is in its universality rather new.

This notion that slavery is wrong had its origin, so far as our country is concerned, in the North. It was the people of the North who came into this notion first, and held it while yet the people of the South were strangers to it.

Was it because the people of the North had a keener moral sense, whereby they were the better able to discern the quality of wrong?

By no means. Nobody will say that.

I but repeat what has been often suggested, when I aver that if slavery had proved as profitable in the valley of the Connecticut as it proved to be in the valley of the Savannah, the people of New England

would have remained as destitute of the notion that slavery is wrong as were their brethren of the Carolinas say fifty years ago. My belief is, to state the case generally, that the moral sense, while it is doubtless a constructive faculty, giving us positive notions, does not become operative in the face, so to speak, of a promise of profit. That is to say, the average man does not come into the notion that the doing of a thing is wrong while yet the doing of it promises to profit him. Circumstances made it profitless for a New England man to hold slaves; natural circumstances, such as the rigorous climate which the Africans could not withstand. Thus the constructive activities of his moral sense were left a clear field. The Carolinian, on the other hand, found it profitable to hold slaves, and with him the moral sense, albeit equally strong, was estopped from constructing the new ethical notion.

But that was long ago. In our day even the Carolinian, particularly if he be a Carolinian born since the war, will confess that slavery is wrong. How came he into the notion?

For a long time, now, slavery has been as unprofitable in South Carolina as in Massachusetts, not in virtue of any natural circumstances, but in virtue of the circumstance that it is contrary to the will of the Greater Force for slaves to be held anywhere. The war, being the final identification of the will of the Greater Force, has removed the obstacle which stood in the way of the constructive activities of the Carolinian's moral sense, namely, the promise of profit in holding slaves; and in due course the Carolinian has come into the notion that slavery is wrong.

Whatever authority the law forbidding slavery had in South Carolina, right after the war, consisted in the conscious understanding of the people there that slavery was against the will of the Greater Force. But the time will come when there will be no conscious reference by anybody to his understanding of the will of the Greater Force; and then it will be as fair to say that men refrain from holding slaves because they are bound in conscience to refrain as it is now to say that they refrain from stealing because they are bound in conscience to refrain.

For in the course of time the understanding of the will of the Greater Force touching a particular deed takes on the character of an intuitive principle; a man's reference to it is unconscious; he acts in pursuance of it involuntarily, without stopping to reason out that the particular deed is unprofitable, since it is against the will of the Greater Force; he refrains from doing it without any exercise of volition. While yet the man's reference to his understanding of the will of the Greater Force is conscious, the deed remains a *malum prohibitum*; at once the reference becomes unconscious, the deed becomes a *malum in se*. In either case, the authority of the law is a matter of its being understood to write the will of the Greater Force.

If a man is possessed of a disposition sprung from the promise of material profit, nothing is able to dispossess him, I believe, except the complete assurance that what he is disposed to do is to be done only against the will of the Greater Force. Failing of such assurance, he remains in possession of his disposition, for the reason that, failing of such assurance, the promise of material profit remains. It falls to

the law to convey precisely that assurance. If the law is to have authority, it has to be that when the law has spoken no doubt remains as to what is the will of the Greater Force. In other words, the authority of the law in general, and touching all conduct, is a matter of it having the reputation of writing always the will of the Greater Force. With men generally believing that the law writes always the will of the Greater Force, the authority of the law is complete.

Manifestly the authority of the law is a growth, and not an instant acquisition. It is to be gained only after much conflict and disturbance of the peace, but certainly gained in the end, provided the event of each and every conflict (necessarily the conclusive identification of the will of the Greater Force) leaves no room for doubt that the law has in that particular case written and notified to men the will of the Greater Force. With every conflict which proves the law to have written the will of the Greater Force the authority of the law grows. With every such conflict men are in general less doubtful, the law having spoken, what is the will of the Greater Force.

On the other hand, any conflict which shows in its event that the law has written a will other than the will of the Greater Force, necessarily lessens the law's authority. With every such conflict men are less certain, in virtue of the mere assurance of the law, what is the will of the Greater Force. It is likely, too, that such a conflict does more to lessen the law's authority than several conflicts of the other sort do to increase it, inasmuch as it is easier to tear down than to build up.

And, finally, any man may take his appeal to conflict at any moment, for all he has to do in order to appeal to conflict is to defy the law. This makes it out that the law cannot long retain authority while writing any other will than the will of the Greater Force.

To recapitulate:

1. Since rights are made by might, the definition of rights involves the identification of the will of the Greater Force.

2. This identification being naturally effected by conflict, or violence, the definition of rights naturally involves conflict; but not necessarily. Conflict is necessary only as there is no other means to the identification of the will of the Greater Force.

3. The aim of the law is to anticipate the effect of conflict in the identification of the will of the Greater Force. The law essays to provide the alternative means of identification.

What difficulties does the law encounter?

CHAPTER VI.

The Will of the Individual.

We all know, without looking at the reasons, that the law loses authority whenever it is worsted in a fight. It is recognized as being essential to the law's authority that the will written by the law prove on every test to be the will of the Greater Force.

But when the law proves to have less than the Greater Force with it, what is to be done?

Give the law more force you say, perhaps. Enlist more policemen. Marshal a standing army. Let the law have such force at its absolute disposal, that is, regardless of its specific purpose, as shall serve to make any will written by it to be always the will of the Greater Force.

And it seems altogether reasonable to say, when the law proves lacking in force, that it should be given more force; if 1,000 policemen are not sufficient to constitute the Greater Force on any and all occasions, 10,000 policemen should be sworn in, and if these prove inadequate, 100,000.

That is precisely what was proposed to be done in the cases of the nailer and the street car driver. But nothing came of it. There are obstacles in the way.

What is proposed is absolute government. Where the law has at its absolute disposal, that is, at its disposal no matter what its specific purpose happens to be, a force sufficient to make up always and under all circumstances the Greater Force, there is absolute government. The world has known absolute govern-

ment, in successful practice. There have been times, in ages past, when the law might have any purpose, might indeed take as its purpose the merest caprices of some king, and still be assured of having with itself the Greater Force always. Then the law always prevailed in conflict and steadily gained in authority until its authority was often very great, and it was able to keep the peace quite effectively. Whenever it is possible to place at the absolute disposal of the law a force sufficient to constitute always the Greater Force, absolute government is possible.

Is it possible in our day?

A few years ago some desperadoes entered a bank in a small village, cut the cashier's throat, rifled the vaults, and got away before the public were fairly aware that anything unusual was taking place.

The nominal force of the law was made up by a sheriff and a handful of deputies. The real force of the law comprised virtually all the force not only of that village, but of neighboring villages, and of the surrounding farming country. For people in all directions instantly dropped their own affairs and gave themselves to the pursuit of the robbers. The latter found no sympathy whatever. They could not get as much as a drink of water except at the point of a pistol. They were driven into the swamps and at length either shot down or captured. In that case, the force of the law was overwhelmingly the Greater Force.

Again, on the occasion of the famous Pullman strike, a train with Pullman coaches in it was stopped by a small gang of switchmen, who declined to let it go on its way until the Pullmans should be cut out. Of course the train had a legal right to proceed, with the Pullmans. The switchmen were unquestionably

out of order, and acting unlawfully. The law was appealed to, and the sheriff came with a hundred deputies, or such a matter. The switchmen numbered fewer than a dozen.

But in the meanwhile a great crowd had collected; a disorderly, unlawful crowd. By the time the sheriff arrived, it was impossible to distinguish the switchmen by their disorderliness; everybody was in disorder, since everybody was helping to detain the train. The sheriff commanded the crowd to disperse, and the crowd laughed at him, dispersing not. The sheriff bade his deputies clear a way for the train to proceed. The deputies made a mere show of trying to clear a way. They brandished their clubs, jostled about a little and desisted. The sheriff made no further effort to enforce the law. The superintendent of the railway had come out to the scene of the trouble and he intimated rather broadly that the officers were not doing their utmost; it was impossible to deny that the intimation was justified.

Here, as anyone might see, the law was virtually without force. The Greater Force was overwhelmingly against it.

It would appear that the getting of force to be at the disposal of the law is not a simple matter of fastening badges on men's coats and calling them sheriffs or policemen or soldiers, although it was no more than that once on a time, perhaps. Conditions have changed since the day of absolute government.

The change that has taken place might be likened to the change in water when it is heated. The molecules of cold water are inert; they yield readily to pressure, and they transmit pressure, for a molecule being pressed, presses equally in turn on its neighbor:

but the molecule of cold water moves with no impulse that is original to itself. But when you heat the water, each of its molecules becomes violent with an original force, and presses against its neighbors of its own motion.

Man, the molecule in the mass of society, from having been inert, has become violent with an original impulse; and why, it is not difficult to see. Men want more than they ever wanted before, and they are getting to want still more every day. So it happens the oftener that two men want what only one of them may have, thus to come into diversity of disposition. So, in other words, the individual will, the will that is peculiar to one man, develops. The average man has come to feel more and more, as his wants have multiplied and amplified, the impulse of a will distinctly his own. In the amplification and multiplication of human wants, there has been a quickening of the individual will; all of which has to do with the law and government.

In order to gain authority, as we have seen, the law has always to write the will of the Greater Force. This is no doctrine peculiar to a particular system of government, but a doctrine fundamental to all systems. This thing the law had to do as much a thousand years ago as now. Whether the form of government or attempted government be autocratic or democratic or what not the law has always to write the will of the Greater Force, if it is to gain authority. But the proposal that a force be put at the absolute command of the law, sufficient to constitute always the Greater Force, no matter what the circumstances and no matter what the law's specific purpose, this was by no means the proposal a

thousand years ago, while yet the social molecule was mostly inert, that it is in our day, with the will of the individual quickened.

This force which the law requires has to be supplied by men. A shotted cannon is not force. It becomes force, or exerts force, only on the impulse which proceeds ultimately from a human intelligence. In order that the force in the cannon be placed at the absolute disposal of the law, a human intelligence has likewise to be placed at the absolute disposal of the law, that is, to repeat, at the disposal of the law no matter what the law's specific purpose may be. Plainly the putting of a human intelligence at the absolute disposal of the law was more easily to be effected a thousand years ago, before the individual will was much quickened, than it is to be effected now. It happens now that there is an individual will behind almost every human intelligence, an active will; before a human intelligence can be got to give impulse to force in the law's behalf, there is a distinct, independent will to be consulted.

The day of absolute government passed as the individual came to have a will of his own. It is not because men were created equal that the people had now to be given a voice in the framing of the law's specific purposes, but because the individual will was quickened and had to be reckoned with. Force the law had to have, in order to its general purpose of keeping the peace; the will which it should write must be the will of the Greater Force, but the will of the Greater Force was now a composite will, as it were, in virtue of the quickening of the individual will. Once it might on consultation with the king's will, merely, be known what was the will of the Greater

Force; but now it might be known only on consultation with many wills, with the wills of the people, as the saying is.

Naturally rights are affected. Every right, to be valid, has to be the permission of the Greater Force. Once, one man's permission sufficed to constitute a valid right, for once one man's permission was the permission of the Greater Force. But now, the individual will having been quickened, a right, to be valid, has to be the coincident permission of many men. And this coincidence is manifestly by no means a permanent condition; indeed, it is extremely precarious, affected by a thousand and one influences working on a thousand or a million dispositions; at any moment the coincidence of a sufficient number of permissions to constitute the permission of the Greater Force is liable to pass.

To illustrate:

Suppose that I am in the grocery business, and have a trade which is worth some thousands of dollars, a trade which I could sell at any time for several thousand dollars. You open a department store not far away, and sell there not only groceries but almost everything else that anybody ever wants. Naturally, you do business more economically than I do, and you are able therefore to make concessions to customers which I cannot make; that is, you are able to undersell me. Circumstances give you an advantage over me, and you take the advantage. The effect is that I presently have no trade at all; the trade which I had is yours; the thousands of dollars which were mine are yours.

You have a legal right to do what you have done; you have the law's permission. It is likely, too, that

you have the permission of the Greater Force. But that argues nothing as to whose permission you will certainly have tomorrow.

Hitherto this legal right to do what you are doing has been a valid right, or the permission of the Greater Force, partly in virtue of my own permission, it is likely. Hitherto anybody doing as you are doing has had my permission. You would still have my permission were it somebody else's trade which you are taking away and not mine. But since I have suffered by what you are doing, since that which you are doing is depriving me of means to the satisfaction of my desires, I come quite naturally into the disposition not to let be done what you are doing. That is to say, I withdraw my permission. If the right remains valid, it is because my permission is not needed in order to make up a sufficient number of permissions to constitute the permission of the Greater Force.

Very likely you have taken the trade of other men, as you have taken mine; not only grocers, but druggists and dry goods merchants and clothiers. Moreover, there are other department stores, like yours, to similar effect. Thus many besides me come naturally to withdraw their permission from you or another doing as you are doing.

Still others, for one reason or another, get to feel themselves aggrieved by what you are doing, and withdraw their permission, too; sympathy with me, or with some other whom a department store has impoverished might bring some into a disposition not to let be done what you are doing. Possibly, in time, a great many withdraw their permission, so many, indeed, as to leave your right no longer the permis-

sion of the Greater Force, and therefore no longer valid.

In this case, the law has only one thing to do, if it is to gain authority, or, indeed, to avoid losing authority; it has to withdraw its permission. It has to take cognizance of all these changes in individual wills, and if enough individual wills change to effect a withdrawal of the permission of the Greater Force, the law has no alternative but to forbid what it has hitherto permitted.

This condition democratic law fully recognizes. The law is all the time consulting individual wills, to discover if they have changed.

The practice is to ask each of certain men to indicate his will by casting a ballot. The ballots thus cast are counted, and the will indicated by a majority thereof is taken to be the will of the Greater Force. This will the law writes. Were your right to run a department store to be called in question, and were the ballots to disclose that a majority of those voting did not permit you to run a department store, the law would at once forbid you to run a department store.

The law depends entirely on the ballots to keep it informed as to changes of individual dispositions. The proposal of a new order of rights, as for example, of an order of rights in which the right to run a department store has no place, may be submitted to the voters or electors at any time; in fact proposals of new orders of rights are constantly being submitted. But unless the new order thus proposed is approved by a majority of the ballots, the law must hold to the old order; it cannot but assume that the rights

of the old order are still, as they have been, the permission of the Greater Force, and therefore valid.

The courses of the law, as we have observed, aim to anticipate the effect of conflict in the identification of the will of the Greater Force, thus to do away with the need of conflict. Accordingly, when a man is asked to vote his will, what is expected of him is that he disclose precisely the will which would direct his physical force, should conflict be appealed to. In assuming that the will indicated by a majority of the ballots is the will of the Greater Force, the law assumes, it is plain, that each separate ballot, declaring the will of an individual, declares exactly the will that would actuate that individual in conflict.

I do not know how I can make this clearer than by saying that the law expects the elector to vote as he would fight. And when every elector votes as he would fight, the likelihood is that a majority of the ballots indicates what is indeed the will of the Greater Force. There is no doubt at all about it, if the electorate includes every man who would have to be reckoned with in a fight. But any man who votes otherwise than precisely as he would fight, misleads the law. If men vote otherwise than as they would fight, their ballots fail to give the law the certain information without which it cannot except by the merest accident anticipate the effect of conflict. Unless men vote as they would fight, their ballots lead the law to write a will which on any appeal to conflict must prove not to be the will of the Greater Force.

Do men vote as they would fight?

In the particular case of the shoemaker and the nailer, there has been an appeal to violence, as the effect of a diversity of dispositions. The law has

commanded one of the dispositions, namely, that of the nailer, to be yielded, but it has not been yielded, and the conflict has ensued. In the event of this conflict the will of the Greater Force has been identified. What does it prove to be? Not the will written by the law, for the shoemaker's will is agreeable to the will written by the law, and the shoemaker has yielded his will, which he would not do unless the conflict had shown him that his will was not agreeable to the will of the Greater Force. The law is writing a will which is not the will of the Greater Force.

Yet there is no doubt at all that the will now written by the law was once the will of the Greater Force. Once the shoemaker's right to hire whom he likes and to dismiss as he will was the permission of the Greater Force. That it is the permission of the Greater Force no longer, the conflict makes very apparent; but the ballots have given no intimation of this. There have been changes of individual wills, but the ballots have not informed the law. The will written by the law is still the will indicated by a majority of the ballots. This argues but one thing, namely, that men have not voted as they would fight; they have voted one way, and when the appeal to conflict is taken, they have fought the other way.

Why has the law been thus misled?

Who are the men that have changed their minds touching this right of the shoemaker's; who, from having permitted, permit no longer? And why, when they changed their minds, did not their ballots disclose the fact?

CHAPTER VII.

Wants.

Now and then we see tables of figures which purport to show the increase of the world's wealth. They deal in vast sums. The increase of the world's wealth has been very great during, say, the past 1,000 years.

Of course no new material has been brought into the world. Everything that is in the world now was in the world a thousand years ago, in so far as regards ultimate material. What the tables show is the extent to which men have been got to want the things that are in the world. The material of the world is becoming wealth through the amplification of human wants. Men seem to be gifted with a great capacity for wanting things, an unlimited capacity, so far as we yet know. Our energies are largely, if not chiefly, directed to making ourselves want things, to bringing out the want which is still potential into activity; all for the sake of the wealth which active want creates. We are all the time confronting each other with things not wanted now, in the hope, not always but often justified by the event, that the sight of them will get them to be wanted, and thus they will be made wealth. So wants are amplified and wealth increased.

But the increase of wealth is not the only effect of the amplification of wants.

We have suggested that a thing in order to its being wealth has to command the services of him who

has it not in behalf of him who has it. Now a man's capacity to serve is limited, and when the limit of his capacity to serve has been reached, no further want of his creates new wealth, for there is no more service to be commanded of him. If, for example, a man is having all he can do to provide himself with mere daily bread, his desire for a grand piano, however strong it may be, does not create new wealth; there is no new wealth in the form of grand pianos because of his desire. Yonder mansion is wealth, primarily because it is wanted. But it is not wealth in any degree because it is wanted by the common laborer who picks in the sewer trench in front of it. His want of the house has no effect whatever to augment the value thereof, because his capacity to serve is exhausted with the services given in payment for the means to the satisfaction of more pressing wants.

What is the effect of amplifying a man's wants, after his capacity to serve has been exhausted?

The nailer of shoes has a little boy, let us say. This boy's eyes chance one day to fall on a new toy in a shop window, and at once the boy is taken with a desire for the toy. A want is developed in him. He goes home and asks his father, the nailer, to buy him the toy. The boy's desire becomes by natural sympathy the man's desire; but the man is having all he can do to procure them food and clothing and shelter; he has reached the limit of his capacity to serve; the boy may not have the toy.

The new want is called out only to be denied.

Suppose the toy is a certain toy which was put on the market some years ago, with great success; a soft rubber ball fastened to the end of an elastic string. At the moment it was first offered to the public, the

toy was worth only as much as the ball and string were worth by themselves. But there was at once awakened a new desire; a new want was called out, a want for the ball and string in combination. It was said at the time that the projectors of the toy realized a large fortune from its sale. Whatever they realized was the measure of the new wealth created by the new want. But there was new want called into activity which did not create new wealth, since it was called out in such as had no further capacity to serve; the nailer, for example. Because of the new want, there is more wealth in the world. But there is also more want, active want, denied. What becomes of this?

The boy goes back to his play, by no means forgetting his new want. Presently circumstances permit him to appropriate to himself one of the toys belonging to another boy. He takes the toy surreptitiously or he overpowers the other boy. His new want is now satisfied; but when the nailer finds out about this, he whips his boy for stealing, and commands him to take the toy back to its rightful owner.

The desire for the toy is not the only desire of the nailer's that is denied, by reason of his having reached the limit of his capacity to serve. He wants a carpet for his front room, and has no service to give for it, since he has all he can do to meet his more urgent wants.

There are plenty of carpets to be had. Yonder store is filled with them. But any of these the nailer may not have unless he gives services for it or the equivalent of services. Why is that? Why may not the nailer go and help himself to such a carpet as he wants? Simply because the carpets are another's by

permission of the Greater Force. The Greater Force excludes the nailer from having a carpet except as he buys it with services or their equivalent. The carpets belong to the merchant by valid right.

Here, too, is a bank filled with money, the equivalent, by common consent, of services. There is plenty of money in the bank with which to buy a carpet, but none of it is the nailer's. It is another's, held exclusively by another under the permission of the Greater Force. The money belongs to the banker, by valid right.

That is to say, in so far as they are valid, the rights of the merchant and the banker stand between the nailer and the means to the satisfaction of his want. They are valid in that they are the permission of the Greater Force, and they are the permission of the Greater Force in that they are the permission of each of many men. Whoever gives his permission to the merchant to have the carpet, and the banker to have the money, helps to exclude the nailer from having the means to the satisfaction of his want. If the nailer gives his permission to the merchant and banker, he helps to exclude himself from having the means to the satisfaction of his want; and there is no doubt that he does give his permission; he does not for a moment deny the merchant's right to the carpets or the banker's right to the money.

It is not natural for a man to help with his own permission to constitute and make valid a right which stands between him and the satisfaction of his wants. The hungry tramp denies the commonest right of property, when it stands between him and a loaf of bread, and the tramp is not essentially different from other men; the nailer, or you, or I would doubtless

likewise deny, and withdraw our permission from this commonest right, under similar circumstances. What, then, is the circumstance by reason of which the nailer does not deny the merchant's or the banker's right? Here is a right which stands between the nailer and the means to the satisfaction of his want as certainly as the commonest right of property stands between the tramp and the means to the satisfaction of his want; why does not the nailer, equally with the tramp, deny and withdraw his permission?

There are other rights which in their exercise exclude the nailer from having the means to the satisfaction of his want. There is one other right in particular.

The nailer is paid \$5 a week. Were his wages \$10 a week, instead, he would then have the means to get him a carpet. Why does he get only \$5 a week? For one reason, because there are others who are willing to do his work for \$5 a week, and any of these the shoemaker is permitted to hire, at any time, in the nailer's place. So long as the shoemaker is permitted to hire whom it pleases him to hire, the nailer has only the choice of working for \$5 a week, or of leaving his employment altogether. Were it to come about that the shoemaker was not permitted to hire whom it pleases him to hire; that the shoemaker must employ the nailer or nobody, then would the nailer be in a position to command more wages; possibly he might command as much as \$10 a week. The shoemaker's right to hire whom he likes, this right in its exercise also excludes the nailer from the means to the satisfaction of his want. In so far as it is valid, that is, the permission of the Greater Force, it stands between the nailer and a carpet.

From the nailer's point of view, there is a difference between the merchant's or the banker's right, just mentioned, and this right of the shoemaker's. The banker's or the merchant's right is a right which the nailer himself exercises in his own behalf; it is the identical right under which he has what he has, to his own exclusive use and enjoyment, his plot of land and his cottage; it is the right in virtue of which he shall have his carpet, if he gets a carpet. Without this right, his carpet will be worth nothing to him; it is necessary in order to his exclusive enjoyment of whatever he has; were it to cease to be valid, he would be the loser. The nailer is not like the hungry tramp, who has no property, and nothing to lose, even though every right of property be invalidated. In a word, this right of the merchant's or the banker's, while it excludes the nailer from having the means to the satisfaction of his want, compensates him, in that it is in a sense his own right also, a right which he himself has the occasion to exercise.

But the shoemaker's right to hire whom he likes is another matter, from the nailer's point of view. To be sure, it is a right which anybody may exercise, if he chooses, but that is nothing to the nailer, for the reason that he never has occasion to exercise it. He never has to hire help. The right to hire whom he will, as it is exercised by the shoemaker, excludes the nailer from having what he wants and it does not compensate him.

Since the banker's or the merchant's right compensates the nailer, it remains the permission of the Greater Force partly in virtue of his permission. Since the shoemaker's right does not compensate the nailer, it loses, so to speak, the permission of the

nailer; if it remains the permission of the Greater Force, it remains such in spite of the nailer withdrawing his permission; and this although it does not the more certainly exclude the nailer from having what he wants than does the other right.

The nailer is typical of hired help in general. His fellows in the shop, and all men and women who are themselves hired and have no occasion to hire, it is easy to see how they get to withdraw their permissions from the shoemaker's right. Very naturally, the shoemaker cannot long have the permission of these persons to hire whom he chooses to hire. If his right is valid, it is valid without their permissions.

But are these enough to effect a withdrawal of the permission of the Greater Force?

Manifestly not.

It is a common saying that no strike is ever won by strikers alone, or by organized labor alone. The determinative element, the element which decides the event, is the element of public sympathy; if the strikers have public sympathy, they win, otherwise they lose. In other words, of the Greater Force which identifies itself in the conflict, a part only is the force of organized labor; the rest is supplied by the community at large, by persons apart from those who are hired help in the ordinary sense.

Accordingly, we have yet to discover the most general term descriptive of those who have changed their minds touching the shoemaker's right; who from having permitted him to hire whom he chooses to hire, permit him now no longer.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Poor.

The average man's wants have become such that he cannot, taking what the hand of nature offers, get himself anything that he wants by his own unaided efforts. He cannot, for example, get his own breakfast. He wants coffee for his breakfast, say, and sugar and bread, and perhaps a bit of meat, to say nothing of the table off which to eat these things, and the chairs and the dishes and the other accompaniments. None of these can he get for himself by his own unaided efforts.

In order to get the coffee by his own unaided efforts, he would have to go, himself, in person, to the tropics where coffee grows, that is, where the hand of nature offers it. Arrived there, he would have to take coffee in its natural state, and not as the labor of other men has improved it. If he must have the improved coffee, in order to have what he wants, he has to improve it himself, with his own unaided efforts. When he has procured the coffee, he has still to bring it to his table. He has doubtless to cross seas on the way, and, if he crosses seas, he has to build his own ship, and navigate her himself, since he is to have the help of no man. He may not even ask of any man the way. He may not use the charts which the efforts of others have provided. If he needs a compass in order to bring the coffee, it falls to him

to invent and construct a compass for himself; he may not take advantage of that which another's effort has achieved. Plainly, we are proposing an impossibility. Did it rest with the man to get his coffee himself, or go without it, he must necessarily go without.

It is likewise with any of the other things. The man's bread has to be made of bolted flour, and cooked in an oven, or it is not what he wants, and the process of making such bread necessarily involves the work of many men. For we are here considering the process as including not only the work applied to the wheat and flour, directly, but as well that applied indirectly, in the inventing and building of all the machinery involved; in a word, as including all the work in any way connected with the making of finished bread, such bread as the man wants, out of that which the hand of nature offers. Were the man getting the bread with his own unaided efforts, he might not even begin with wheat as we know it, although wheat is in a sense the raw material. He would have to begin with the poor grain which nature originally offered, and which has been developed by the labor of many men, exerted throughout many ages, until it is become the wheat we know.

So of the sugar and the meat, in fact, of everything the man wants, not only for breakfast, but generally. Alone, and with his unaided efforts, the man may get nothing that he wants.

If the man wanted no more for his breakfast than a handful of raw berries, he would easily be able to get his own breakfast unaided. Were his other wants in keeping, he could doubtless take what the hand of nature offers, and from it get himself all he wants.

asking no man's help. But wanting what he does, he has to be helped, or he has nothing that he wants.

The coffee and the sugar and the bread the man actually has for his breakfast. They are ready promptly when he wants them. They are brought to him by others, who are for the moment in his service. It takes a thousand men, perhaps, to bring him the cup of coffee; that is, a thousand men have to join together, first and last, in order to bring the cup of coffee. The services of the thousand men this man commands, because he has that which they want, to give them in payment for their services. It is only when he has what they want that their services are his to command. That is to say, in order to have anything that he wants, a man has to have something that other men want.

But the average man is no more able, with his own unaided efforts, to get anything that another man wants, than he is to get anything that he himself wants. In order to have anything which another wants, anything which will command another's service in his behalf, he has to be helped to get it. He cannot get any such thing by himself.

It has come about, then, because of the amplification of human wants, that the fruit of a man's unaided efforts avails him absolutely nothing in satisfaction of his wants. With his own unaided efforts he can get nothing that he wants, and nothing that anybody else wants. Unaided, he may neither get his own breakfast, nor procure others to get it for him.

It is the effect of all this that the fruit of a man's effort has only a conditional or contingent value; that is, the fruit of his effort has value, availing the man something in the satisfaction of his wants, on condi-

tion that the efforts of others shall be joined with his; for except the efforts of others are joined with his, nothing is made available to the satisfaction of wants.

The nailer, for example, thrusts bits of leather into a machine. That is all he does, day in and day out. The fruit of his effort is in itself worth nothing. It satisfies no want of his and no want of any other man, in itself. By himself, the nailer makes nothing available to the satisfaction of wants. The fruit of his effort has present or immediate value only in anticipation of the completion of the shoe, and the shoe cannot be completed until the efforts of many others have been joined with his; not only of the others in the shop, but of the others at the tannery where the leather was dressed, or on the farm where the ox was raised whose hide is the material of leather. The nailer merely helps to bring the elements of the shoe into the state of being available to the satisfaction of wants.

There is no room for doubt that the division of labor has immensely increased the capacity of the individual to serve. Whereas, under the primitive condition of labor in severalty, a man might be barely able to provide himself with berries to eat and the pelt of a beast to wear, the average man is now able, under the condition of labor in division, to provide himself with coffee and bread and meat, with woven clothing, with a convenient habitation, and a thousand other things which would be out of the question should he labor all by himself. But it has to be borne in mind that the fruit of a man's effort, under the condition of labor in severalty, had an absolute value, whereas, under the condition of labor in di-

vision, it has a value which, though much greater, is contingent.

The bits of leather which have passed through the nailer's hands, and have in them the fruit of his effort, will be wanted after they have taken their place in the completed shoe, and not sooner; and the shoe is not completed, really, until it is passing to the final consumer, as the term is; until it is on the point of being used in the satisfaction of wants, which may not be until next week or next month or next year.. even.

But the nailer lives from hand to mouth. He depends on the fruit of today's effort to procure him tomorrow's dinner. He cannot wait until next week or next year for the contingent value of the fruit of his effort to be realized. What then?

The nailer who cannot wait, since he cannot live in the meantime, assigns the contingent value of the fruit of his effort to the shoemaker, who can wait. The nailer gets thus at once, in payment for the contingent value of the fruit of his effort, a sum of wealth which is immediately available to the satisfaction of his wants. It is thus that he is enabled to make today's effort procure him tomorrow's dinner.

The nailer is dependent on somebody to come forward and take the assignment of the contingent value of the fruit of his effort. The shoemaker, in other words, is quite indispensable to the nailer. In order that the nailer may live, in fact, there has to be somebody at hand who will buy from him the fruit of his labor, and wait for the contingent value of this to be realized.

The only alternative to such dependence, it is to be observed, is a reversion to the condition of labor in

severalty; and this is impracticable. Let the nailer put forth his will and deny every desire of his which he may, and live, and still he has to have that which he may not procure of his own efforts. We hear men talk of living on bread and water, for the sake of being independent. Supposing the average man in his present bodily state can live on bread and water, he is not thereby able to meet all his wants of his own unaided self. While social and industrial conditions have been changing, man in himself, and in respect of his purely physical organization, has been changing. He would starve to death on the diet which sustained his remote ancestor. The bread which in connection with water might possibly suffice to keep a modern man alive, need be such bread as no man of himself could procure. The nailer may not revert to the independence of labor in severalty, however good his will.

The square opposition between the selfish interests of master and man is apparent. The sum in return for which the nailer assigns the contingent value of the fruit of his effort to the shoemaker, the wage, as it is called, the less this is the better for the master, who is the shoemaker, and the more it is, the better for the man, who is the nailer.

Several circumstances affect this sum, the wage, to make it more or less.

The circumstance of the nailer living from hand to mouth, and depending on today's effort to procure him tomorrow's dinner, this circumstance is to the shoemaker's advantage. By reason of it, he may compel the nailer to yield him much, since it is a matter of life and death with the nailer that he at once get something. Were there but this circumstance, the

nailer would be quite at the shoemaker's mercy, and the shoemaker need pay him no more than would barely suffice to keep his body and soul together.

But when the shoemaker has taken the assignment of the contingent value of the nailer's effort, the nailer has no further interest in the realization of the contingency; it makes no material difference to him whether the contingency is ever realized or not; he has got in any event all he will ever get for his effort. All the other men in the shop are situated substantially as the nailer is. They, too, when once the contingent value of the fruit of their effort is assigned, lose all interest in the realization of the contingency.

By reason of this circumstance, the shoemaker is dependent on each and every man in his factory. The shoemaker has his money staked, so to speak, on the realization of a contingency; unless each and every man in the shop does his work, the shoe is not completed, the contingency is not realized and the shoemaker loses his stake. Hereupon, the nailer has an advantage over the shoemaker.

Moreover, whatever tends to increase the shoemaker's interest in the contingency, manifestly tends to increase this advantage of the nailer's; and a good deal has been done to increase the shoemaker's interest. The shoemaker provides a machine which enables the nailer to nail four bits of leather where he would otherwise nail only one. This has the effect of raising the stake which the shoemaker has laid on the realization of the contingency, and thus of making him more than ever dependent on the nailer. For still the nailer has to exert his effort or the shoe is not completed; and, if he does not exert his effort, the shoemaker's loss is several times the greater for his

having provided the machine; it is the value of four shoes that is lost, where otherwise it would be the value of only one; to say nothing of the cost of the machine. Whatever the shoemaker does in the way of facilitating the work, raises his stake, and while it brings him the greater profit, provided the contingency is realized, it leaves him the more at the mercy of the nailer, on the exertion of whose effort the realization of the contingency still waits.

By these two circumstances the shoemaker and the nailer are made mutually dependent; the advantage of one is met by the advantage of the other. Were there only these two circumstances affecting the sum of the wage, it is likely that no considerable advantage would finally remain to either party. Their mutual dependence would amount to independence. But there are other circumstances. Notably, there is the circumstance of there being several nailers to every shoemaker, whereby, if one nailer declines to do the work another may be got to do it.

The effect of this last circumstance is to leave the advantage decidedly with the shoemaker. In fact, by reason of this circumstance, the shoemaker depends on any particular nailer for nothing, since there are several nailers. All these nailers live from hand to mouth; all need assign the contingent value of the fruit of their efforts, or else die. The plain effect is that they bid against each other for the shoemaker's favor, until they finally consent to assign for the bare cost of living. So in practice the tendency of wages is to fall to the limit of subsistence, as we say.

We have considered three circumstances, then, as contributing to fix the sum of the nailer's wages, namely:

1. The circumstance of the nailer living from hand to mouth, by reason of which he has to assign the contingent value of the fruit of his effort.

2. The circumstance of the shoemaker having laid a stake on the realization of a contingency which cannot be realized unless the nailer's work is done.

3. The circumstance of there being several nailers to every one shoemaker.

The aim of labor organization, and of the strike, which is labor's last resort, is to eliminate this last circumstance, thus to leave the sum of the nailer's wages to be fixed by the other two. The strike in the case of the shoemaker and the nailer had for its object to make it unprofitable for the shoemaker to take advantage of the circumstance of there being several nailers; to compel him, on the consideration of his own material advantage, to proceed as if there were but one nailer in the world, and that the nailer he has.

Now the sympathy of whom, among the people at large, does this purpose of the strike command?

The answer is obvious.

We all labor in division who labor at all. Whether we drive street cars or nail shoes or write books or preach sermons or till the soil, the fruit of the effort of each of us, immediately the effort is exerted, has only a contingent value. There is none of us, in these days, who does more than merely help to make anything available to the satisfaction of want.

And if it chances that any of us, like the nailer, lives from hand to mouth, he, as does the nailer, depends on somebody to buy the contingent value of the fruit of his effort, in order that he may live; and the several circumstances which affect the sum of the

nailer's wages, affect likewise the sum of his own wages, or whatever he may call the price he is paid for the contingent value of his effort.

In a word, whoever of us is poor is situated substantially as the nailer is situated. Whoever of us is poor, the nailer's cause is naturally his cause.

CHAPTER IX.

How the Law Fails.

The man who, having formerly permitted the shoemaker to hire whom he likes to hire, permits him now no longer, he is, in general, then, the poor man. It is the poor man's change of disposition that has brought about the change in the will of the Greater Force which is disclosed in the event of the strike.

Now in order to have succeeded in its purpose, in order to have avoided losing authority, the law need have written precisely this will, as the conflict discloses it, prior to any conflict. It is in that the law did not write this will before there was the resort to violence, that the law has failed.

But such a will, differing as it does from the will hitherto written, the law might not write, except as it was directed so to do by the ballots; it has no initiative of its own; the initiative is with the electors.

Had it been proposed, prior to any resort to conflict, that the law write down and define as the existing order of rights, this order which now obtains as the result of conflict, who would have voted his approval? Particularly, would the poor man, who has supported this order on the appeal to conflict, and in virtue of whose support this order has been established, would he have voted for it?

Such a proposal would be equal to asking the voters whether or no the law should decree the destruction of a portion of the shoemaker's wealth, as of the wealth of every capitalist; whether or no the law

should proceed through its executive agencies actually to destroy wealth. For it were to ask whether or no the law should pronounce and effect the end of a right which in its exercise was worth something to the shoemaker, as to every capitalist.

We will say that you and I are electors, and poor men, both, with such prejudices as it is natural for poor men to have.

Do we vote yes to this proposal?

Before we vote, we deliberate, somewhat at least; voting is a deliberate act; the casting of the ballots follows weeks and even months of discussion. As we deliberate, misgivings come to us.

Here it is proposed that the law proceed to do that which cannot help but discourage the activities of capital. And what will become of labor, of us poor men, if capital shall choose to cease its activities?

Hard is the lot of the poor, we think, but will not this step make it harder rather than easier, in all probability? Capital is not to be compelled to be active, by force of law. Its activity is induced by the promise of profit, and if its rewards are denied it, the motive to its activity fails.

We should like very much to see the nailer's estate enlarged, and we care nothing though the estate of the shoemaker is thereby diminished. But may the estate of the nailer be enlarged at the shoemaker's expense, in the way proposed? Is this loss to the shoemaker's estate surely going to be added to the nailer's estate, as seems at first blush likely? Will not the wealth thus taken from the shoemaker vanish rather in thin air? Will not the final effect be, not the nailer's gain at the shoemaker's expense, but loss, not only to the shoemaker but to the nailer as well?

Badly off as he is, is not the laboring man better off than he would be if he were standing all day idle in the market place because there was no man to hire him?

There are many misgivings natural to be had; the more we think over the matter, the larger the difficulties appear; difficulties not from the capitalist's point of view, but from our own; we care nothing for the capitalist except as his welfare is necessary to ours. And finally, a vote in favor of this proposal is a vote to close the cause; a vote against it is a vote to leave things as they are, to keep the cause open. If the proposal is rejected now, it may still be urged again, when the propriety of the change may the more clearly appear.

We take counsel of our misgivings; we vote against the proposal.

The next day, or the next day but one, the operatives in some sweat shop strike for more pay, and come trooping out into the street and show us their starved faces. When their employer attempts to fill their places, to give their jobs to others, they fight. What do we do then?

The law, of course, busies itself with resisting these people, and with trying to protect the employer as he fills their places with other help. In doing this, the law does precisely what we have just now, with our ballots, bidden it to do.

Do we help the law resist these people?

It is not likely. It is more likely that we join the mob. Perhaps we throw stones; perhaps we only hoot, or boycott the goods of the shop. It makes no difference; unless we help protect the employer in the full enjoyment of his right, provided our help is

needed, we fail to do as our ballots have led the law to expect us to do. We have bidden the law to hold to a particular purpose; now, when the conflict is brought on between the law and them that oppose this purpose, we give our force to the opposition, even though we merely refrain from giving it actively to the law when the law needs it.

We vote deliberately; we fight impulsively; we do not vote as we would fight.

At the polls our reason has a part in determining what we do, and before the court of our reason, all manner of misgivings are heard. In the riot, our passions sway us, and in the court of our passions, misgivings have no standing. We say with our ballots that we permit the employer to employ whom he likes, and then we throw stones at the employer, or hoot him or boycott his goods, if he acts on our permission. By our votes we cause the law to give permission, and when there comes the test of conflict we deny our force to help make the permission of the law a valid right.

All the while we are quite candid with the law. When we are asked to indicate by ballot what is our will, we describe the will which deliberate introspection discloses to us. But there are elements of disposition which elude deliberate introspection. They make themselves manifest, even to ourselves, only when we are acting impulsively. Almost any riot shows how illy the average man knows himself; for almost any riot has in it men who have hitherto seemed not only to others but to themselves incapable of being disorderly.

Because we are poor, you and I, we aspire to a new order of rights. It is our nature to ascribe our pov-

erty to the injustice of the existing order; it is our nature to find fault with the order that obtains simultaneously with our being poor. It is as natural for the poor to aspire to a new order as it is for water to seek its level.

On the other hand, likewise because we are poor, we are not likely deliberately to do aught which bids fair to discourage the activities of capital; for capital seems of vast importance to us, being poor; we shudder to think how dire our fate, were capital to cease to be. And what assures us of capital, except capital has its expected reward? If we deny capital its reward; if, because we may, having the physical power, we take to ourselves the reward which has been fairly promised to capital, are we not as false to our own best interest as was the foolish peasant who killed the goose that laid the golden egg?

It has been said that no new order is ever achieved through the peaceful instrumentality of the ballot. Is it not to be expected?

If a new order is to be achieved through the ballot, it is to be achieved by the votes of the poor. None but the poor have any aspiration for a new order. But any new order necessarily proposes in effect a denial to capital of its promised and expected reward. The moment this appears to their deliberate judgment, the poor shrink back. They repress their natural aspiration for the moment, and vote for the old order, unwilling to fly from present ills to evils that they know not of.

But all the time their natural aspiration remains. It waits for its expression only until some desperate man appeals to conflict, and seldom has it long to wait.

CHAPTER X.

Legislation by the Mob.

We have lived long enough since the French Revolution to understand that the activities of the mob, which at the moment seemed altogether intent on choking the sewers of Paris with human blood, served, after all, other and more seemly purposes. Notably, they served to identify finally and beyond a doubt the will of the Greater Force; and that is to legislate.

It is easy to see, now, that the French Revolution was the inevitable in process of consummation. Certain things achieved in the Revolution had to be achieved one way or another. It is clearly not for us to propose that the achievement might have been prevented. All that we may venture to suggest at most is the possibility that the manner of the consummation was not inevitable; the possibility of the inevitable coming about without the butchery and destruction; in a word, the possibility of legislating otherwise than through the instrumentality of the mob.

As we observe the circumstances of the French Revolution, we are not long in getting to think that it would have been easy to avoid the abhorred carnage and destruction, and still not to stand in the way of the inevitable. The evil came, we say, because it was stupidly left to the mob to legislate; of course the mob made bad work of it; the mob should have been anticipated.

The Revolution was an explosion, due to the constraint of an expansive force. The will of the indi-

vidual had begun to stir; the social molecule had quickened; the will of the Greater Force was not the simple thing it had been, namely, the will of a king, or of a king and a few nobles; it was become the will of the people, now.

Instead of reckoning with the individual will, the law of the *ancien regime* ignored it. This came about quite naturally. For when the law of the old fashion began to be, there was no such thing as the individual will; the old law was not designed to take any account of the individual will. It was not capable of taking cognizance of any impulse coming up from the individual; such impulse it was capable only of resisting, thus to store it up, as it persisted, until it could no longer be repressed, and the explosion came that shook the world.

It was a dreadful mistake, but a mistake not difficult to avoid, we fondly assure ourselves.

Democratic law, we say, will avoid this dreadful mistake. The democratic law makes it a chief concern to consult the individual will, to give due weight to the impulse that comes up from the individual. Thus democratic law cannot possibly fall into the error of resisting the inevitable. Whatsoever may be the will of the Greater Force, this will democratic law writes; this it cannot help but write. With democratic law, there can be no more of the hideous legislation by the mob.

But how are we legislating, now, after upwards of an hundred years?

The order of rights which obtains today is not the order which obtained twenty-five years ago, as concerns the relative rights of master and man. In that period of time the man has come into the exercise

of a new right, in derogation of the master's former right. Twenty-five years ago the master exercised the right to hire whom he liked and to dismiss him as he thought fit, being responsible to nobody; in general, he exercises that right no longer. Twenty-five years ago, the man had nothing like a proprietary right to his job, since the job was the master's to give or take away; but now, since the master no longer gives or takes away as he will, the man actually exercises something like a proprietary right to his job.

How has this new order of rights been brought about?

The Commissioner of Labor tells us that during the last twenty years of the nineteenth century, there were more than 20,000 strikes in the United States, affecting some 120,000 employing establishments. That these strikes were instrumental in bringing about the new order of rights is not, I suppose, open to doubt. But for these strikes, the status of the laboring man would now be about what it was twenty-five years ago, in all probability.

And what is a strike?

A strike is the assertion of the man's right to his job, since it is specifically the denial of the master's right to hire whom he pleases and to dismiss him at will. And it is an extra-legal assertion of a right. The law provides that a new right, that is, a right not already defined by law, shall be asserted through the ballot. The strike ignores the ballot; in asserting this new right, it follows courses other than those prescribed by the law.

Some say that disorderly strikes are mostly unsuccessful. In the Commissioner's report, the strikes are classified as successful and unsuccessful; they are put

down as succeeding as to 55,000 establishments, partly succeeding as to 15,000, and failing as to 50,000, in round numbers. But these figures consider each strike with reference to its immediate, ostensible purposes. With reference to the general, and more remote, purpose of all strikes, the purpose expressed in the new order, as actually established, it is impossible to say what any particular strike has not achieved. It may easily happen that a strike failing as to its ostensible purpose, nevertheless achieves much in behalf of the general purpose. The several strikes are to be viewed rather as skirmishes in one great battle.

Perhaps the most disorderly strike in recent years, if not in all history, was the Pullman strike. On that occasion the mob was rampant. It was no merely local mob, either, it was in evidence from one end of the country to the other. It was a tremendous show of force and determination behind the aspiration to a new order. In the Commissioner's list the Pullman strike would have to be put down among the failures; it certainly won nothing for the ostensible purposes of the strike. But that it wrought mightily in behalf of the general purpose, that it powerfully assisted the establishment of a new order of rights as between master and man, is hardly to be doubted. It was a revelation to capitalists; it gave them a new notion of the power they were resisting. It gained nothing directly for the men at Pullman, perhaps; but it made the master generally more ready to concede to the man a proprietary right to his employment. My own opinion, based on a limited observation, of course, is that the Pullman strike did more than almost any other to win the universal assent in which the new order of rights subsists.

What we call an orderly strike, is a strike which runs its course without the mob becoming very active. I submit to any candid observer of strikes that the mob is always in evidence; it is simply more or less active according as more or less conflict is required in order to identify the will of the Greater Force.

I have heard of a strike being won by a parade. The strikers in that case were few in number. Their cause appeared to be quite hopeless until the men in a great foundry, several thousand of them, quietly left their work and walked in a body through the streets of the town, a host of bare-armed Titans, black and silent. They molested nobody; but their fearsome display left no doubt that the strikers had the permission of the Greater Force, and that there would be trouble unless their demands were conceded. This strike is doubtless among the successful strikes in the Commissioner's list, and in a sense it was an orderly strike. It was orderly as compared with the Pullman strike, or the French Revolution, but it was the mob legislating, nevertheless. If there was no violence, it was simply because the mob was not put to its resources.

There is some talk these days about the possibility of doing away with strikes through conciliation. The miners, say, fall out with the operators; a third party intervenes in the name of peace and the public weal, and the quarrel is accommodated. The idea is, or seems to be, that in all these quarrels there is ground of accommodation, provided only a sincere search be made for it, such a search as the parties to the dispute, inflamed by passion, are not likely to make. There is doubtless merit in it.

But strikes are by no means the only instance of the mob legislating. It may happen that there will be no more strikes, as the result of the institution of courts of conciliation; but, if it does happen, it is because the mob has finished that particular bit of legislation; it is because the identification of the will of the Greater Force, as it bears on the relation of master and man, is complete, and there is no further call for the mob to intervene. It does not in the least show that the mob is to legislate no more. The mob legislates, after all.

Democratic law has the intent to take due account of the individual will, which intent the old autocratic law had not. But intent argues nothing as to achievement, certainly; the intent avails nothing if the ability fails. If the law cannot learn what is the will of the individual, in advance of the disclosure of that will in conflict, the effect is precisely the same as if the law had still no intent to consult the individual will. It makes no difference that the fault is with the individual himself, in that he fails to vote as he would fight; the individual has to be taken as he is; he cannot be made over to suit political systems.

At Chicago, when the mob called into activity by the Pullman strike had put the police and the state troops to flight, the federal troops were brought in. This was something of an innovation. It was declared by many to be in the interest of peace. For the moment it was, possibly.

Your boiler writhes with the pressure of the steam inside it. The seams gape. An explosion clearly impends. You hastily forge a heavy band of iron around the boiler, and the explosion is averted for the time

being. But the fire roars and rages in the furnace below, and the pressure mounts. Of course sooner or later the boiler will burst, and the explosion will be all the more violent by reason of the reinforcing band of iron.

Obviously the law cannot do otherwise than resist the mob. There is no ground for accommodation between the law and the mob. The mob in its very existence is a denial and a defiance of the law. Even though the mob is due to the law's own lapse, nevertheless there is nothing for the law to do but resist the mob. Even though the mob is only doing the work which the law ought to have done, and is designed to do, yet does not, still it is the business of the law to resist the mob. Democratic law cannot possibly recognize any impulse except as this finds expression in the ballot. The impulse otherwise expressed, the law may only stand firmly against.

Perhaps there does not in time gather a force equal to that which caused the French Revolution. It may be that there is not in the law a power of restraint and repression sufficient to that end; but the resources of the law are not small, and it will do its utmost. It may be, too, that the people will not supply the elements of a French Revolution; I have been assured that we are as a people too highly educated, too refined to admit of there being a French Revolution with us. And yet man under the sway of his passions is substantially now what he was a hundred years ago or a thousand years ago for that matter; the same in free America that he was in enthralled France, namely, a wild beast for the most part. There is little in the conduct of the latter-day mob to distinguish it from the mob of the *sans culottes*.

But, after all, that really does not matter much. Whether we are to have a great explosion now and then, or whether the gathering force is to find its escape more frequently in little explosions such as we have had in the form of labor strikes, it is still legislation by the mob, a wasteful process, which all men would do away with.

My purpose in following up the affair of the master and man so particularly has been to make it appear how futile have been the political devices gotten up with a view to doing away with legislation by the mob. In a state of society wherein the transition from the old order of rights is being effected more and more rapidly, wherein the new order is scarcely established but it is shoved aside by an order yet newer, we have still to find the means whereby the transition may be effected peacefully.

And what has all this to do with the church?

CHAPTER XI.

The Prince of Peace.

We cry, Peace, Peace! and there is no peace.

Saith the prophet Isaiah:

"Unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given; and the government shall be upon his shoulders; and his name shall be called the Prince of Peace."

It is nearly two thousand years since the promised Prince of Peace came, and still we have no peace.

Is it that we aspire to the unattainable?

Once on a time a pastor, preaching to the subject of a labor strike come to the point of threatening to disturb the peace, urged master and man to forget their greed.

"Be as Jesus was, meek and unselfish," said he, "and tomorrow you go back to your factory to work together again in the service of mankind, and to wonder why you ever quarreled."

There could be no doubt that the pastor was proposing an expedient quite adequate to the purpose of keeping the peace; for with men ungreedy, there would manifestly fail the elements of conflict. And all those with whom it rested to give this expedient effect were sincerely desirous of preserving the peace. Neither master nor man wished a conflict. But the expedient was not given effect. Neither master nor man acted on the pastor's advice. The affair of the strike proceeded in the usual way; that is, there was

more or less disorder incidental to the identification of the will of the Greater Force, and after that peace again.

If all men were to go down to the water and drown themselves, the instant solution of any problem arising out of human relations would obviously be effected. This is an impracticable expedient, of course; yet it is quite as practicable, in my judgment, as the expedient which the pastor proposes.

Mankind generally have the option of becoming ungreedy precisely as they have the option of drowning themselves. Of no one man can it be pretended that he has not the option of drowning himself; any man who chooses may drown himself; but when you propose that all men drown themselves, you propose what is unthinkable, preposterous. Such a proceeding would defeat at once what we agree in naming the purposes of creation; and yet these purposes would not the more certainly be defeated with all men drowned, than with all men become ungreedy.

Were master and man to act on the pastor's advice and become as Christ was, ungreedy, they might indeed go back to their factory tomorrow; but how about the day after tomorrow, and the day after that? Why should they go back, being ungreedy? Being ungreedy, what would impel them to go back, except the mere force of habit? It strikes me that ungreedy men would not be working in factories at all; more likely they would be living in caves, eating raw berries for food and wearing the pelts of beasts for clothes.

Certain men who under the existing order of rights are fed with crusts, if indeed they are fed at all, and attired in rags or left naked, these men rise up against

the existing order and strive to overthrow it; because they are greedy. Certain other men who under the existing order are blessed with all manner of earthly blessings, these strenuously defend the existing order; because they, too, are greedy. In the event we see that all of these men have been unconsciously serving a single purpose, though their conscious purposes have been as diverse as possible. This unconscious purpose in its consummation is what we call progress, and we unhesitatingly pronounce it good. The suggestion that progress is inevitable meets with universal assent; no man would have it otherwise. But the unconscious purpose which in its consummation is progress, this men serve only as they have their conscious purposes. Greed is the prior fact to progress. The pastor's expedient proposes peace, indeed, but peace at the cost of progress, which may not be.

No order of rights is final. The order of yesterday went with yesterday; the order of today goes with today. The expedient which looks to the keeping of the peace looks in vain, unless it rests on the understanding that this procession from the old to the new is not to be escaped. The expedient which would resist the process with soldiers is vain; but it is not more vain than the expedient which would stop the process at its very beginning, by making men ungreedy.

Progress might be described not inaccurately as the resultant of two forces; the force of poverty, or the radical, revolutionary force, and the force of wealth, or the conservative force. But as matters stand, progress is not the smooth, fair line that we

see in the diagrams used to illustrate the resolution and composition of forces. Because the elemental forces take turns, as it were, in dominating progress, we advance in a tumultuous zig-zag. It is not comfortable. But we are promised that the crooked ways shall be made straight.

We come upon Mr. Pullman and his men at the moment when their respective dispositions, diverging in greed, have brought them to the point of physical conflict; their conscious purposes are very far apart, and the peace is threatened.

But the gulf between Pullman and his men did not open all at once. It had its beginning, like all things else. It was a long time attaining cognizable width, perhaps. The chasm-like extent of it which we behold with alarm has been the growth of years.

It will take a very large concession by one or both parties to close the gulf, now, but what if the closing of it had been undertaken in the very beginning?

Then a small concession would have sufficed, of course.

The mood to concede enough to close the chasm as it now stands would be a mood to concede about everything; it would amount to ungreediness; such a mood it would be as that if it were general to mankind, the elemental forces of progress would be annihilated. It would be such a mood as the pastor we were just now considering proposed that men have; an impossible mood.

But is not that because it is only occasionally invoked?

It seems to me mathematically demonstrable that the mood to concede, provided only it were general to mankind and habitual—not an occasional but a con-

stant mood—would operate to keep the peace, and yet leave men free to pursue their several selfish purposes, and to achieve in the pursuit of these all that it is incumbent on them to achieve for progress. For the habitual mood to concede would not wait until a large concession was necessary in order to keep the peace; it would act when the smallest concession, a concession all but inconsiderable, would suffice. Such a concession could work no detriment to progress. By it the elemental forces of progress would lose no more at most than they now lose in mere friction.

But the acquisition of a general, habitual mood to concede is plainly not to be compassed by the voluntary assumption of such a mood by individuals. Any particular man may voluntarily assume the mood, of course, but for all men simultaneously to assume it, of their own volition, would be a miracle. What is needed is the means whereby men may be put in the mood to concede, involuntarily.

Such a means, I contend, is the spectacle suggestive of devotion. Quite involuntarily, as regards him who is acted on, and in virtue of qualities of human nature which are universal, the spectacle suggestive of devotion effects an access of good will, and gives the mood to concede. And in order that the mood to concede be general and habitual, it is only necessary that the spectacle suggestive of devotion be common.

It is the principle of psychic induction. The physicist tells us that a current of electricity traversing a wire to little or no direct purpose, induces in a parallel wire a current of the highest efficiency. Just how this is brought about we do not know. But the

fact is enough; there is no need that we know the why and wherefore. My idea is that a man denying himself after the pattern of Jesus Christ in the sight of men, induces in these some movements of their minds, the effect of which is peace. Again the why and the wherefore are a sealed book; but the fact, is it not before our eyes?

I wish to speak of the story of Jean Valjean, for it was the story of Jean Valjean which first suggested to me the thought I have tried in these pages to set forth.

Jean, as we first see him in the story, is a hard wretch. Years ago he has stolen a loaf of bread, and has been sent to the galleys for it. He has tried to escape, only to be brought back to serve a longer term, a frightfully long term, altogether. His is such a punishment as makes a man either an idiot or a devil, and Jean is not an idiot. Just now he has been finally released, placarded as a dangerous man, and sent his way.

He journeys toward his old home. The people he meets shun him, for they fear him. He is denied entertainment at the inns. Fainting with hunger and weariness, he finally bursts into a private house and ferociously demands to be fed. He is desperate.

The house is the house of the prelate of the diocese, who is called Bishop Welcome, in the story. It is a mean house, and meanly furnished, not at all such a house as bishops usually live in.

Jean is treated as a guest. He is given a seat at the table, and fares as the family fare. Then he is lodged in the best chamber of the house.

During the night he gets up and creeps away, unknown to the bishop or any of the household, and takes with him a pair of silver candlesticks, the only plate in the house; in fact, the only articles of value.

The next day, as he travels on, he is observed to have the candlesticks. His character is known, the police are informed, and he is arrested. The crest on the silver discovers at once whose it is. Jean is dragged back and confronted with the man whose kindness he has so outrageously repaid.

"Here are your eminence's candlesticks," say the police.

"They were mine," says the bishop, "but I gave them to this man last night."

In that moment the great light descends on Jean. He is transformed by the access of good will which he receives. He is given most conspicuously the mood to concede. All the rest of his life he exhibits it.

This is fiction, in so far as regards events and persons, but it is fact as regards human nature. In giving Jean the mood to concede as the effect of his contact with a man devoting the carnal self completely to sacrifice, Victor Hugo takes due account of human nature as it is. In kind if not in extent (the romancer exaggerates the extent) it is precisely the effect that a similar contact would have on you or me or any other man.

This is the Christian principle in practice. I leave it to you to say if the peace would be in any measure conserved or not, with a Bishop Welcome as near to every man as a Christian pastor is. The pastor who exhorts men to be as Christ was, he achieves nothing for peace. But what if he were to be himself as Christ

was? Would he not achieve more? Would he not be making his Master to be indeed the Prince of Peace?

This is a world of trouble for us, and, when the trouble is past, it is usually easy to look back and see that it was all of our own making. What I would suggest of Christianity is that it might be putting us in the way of making ourselves less trouble.

We pray that God's will be done. Of course God's will is done. God's ends are never defeated; they prevail in any event, for any event is the exact definition of the Almighty's purpose. What do we mean by our prayer?

Man's days are full of woe chiefly because he is forever trying to do a will other than God's; forever resisting the inevitable. He conceives purposes in blindness, and pursues them in blindness; if they chance to be at variance with God's purposes, he knows it not until he has suffered the pain of defeat and failure. And so the universal prayer goes up: "Thy will be done! Incline my heart to keep Thy law! Not my will, but Thine!"

I believe of Christianity that it might be made effective to hold men's conscious purposes in better agreement with the divine purposes, to the promotion of their worldly comfort; I believe it is potentially a means of inspiring men with God's will, thus to get them His will to do, even though they are blind. And to make it such a means actually, it needs but that its pastors follow after Christ in the way of the cross.







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