


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


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YOUR CONGRESS

AN INTERPRETATION OF THE POLITICAL
AND PARLIAMENTARY INFLUENCES
THAT DOMINATE LAW MAKING
IN AMERICA

By

LYNN HAINES

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TO WHOM IT SHOULD CONCERN:

I am not inscribing this little book to my wife whose counsel guided me, nor to my parents who gave me the desire for such work, but to the common citizen whom I shall never see or know: the individual to whom I would carry the message that laws more than labor determine what each of us shall have to enjoy; that government means more, not in sentiment, but in dollars and cents, than does his or her business, regardless of how great that private enterprise may be.



CONTENTS

The individual's material interest in government is suggested
in the dedication—

	PAGE
TO WHOM IT SHOULD CONCERN	3

IN THE FOREWORD

THE REASONS FOR IT	9
MORE HOUSE THAN SENATE	10
THE SYSTEM RATHER THAN INDIVIDUALS	11
ANOTHER "DOUBLE STANDARD".	12
Set forth the scope and purpose of the book.	

CHAPTER I

POLITICIANS AT PLAY	13
Includes a series of incidents which illustrate the plunder of congressional politics and the general character of members. These stories include:	
THE CONGRESSIONAL TIME CLOCK	13
A farcical attempt to make members earn their salaries.	
FORTY CENTS A MILE	15
All sides of the mileage graft; and	
THE MULHALL-McDERMOTT FIASCO	28
In which the politicians make a defensive fight.	

Such incidents, which are not isolated examples, but typical of the
system, signify something big and vital—that modern politics is
not the means to good government, but an end in itself, this end
being office and the perquisites of office. This truth is elaborated
in—

CHAPTER II

	PAGE
MODERN POLITICS—AN INTERPRETATION	38
<p>Ninety-five per cent of the attention of Congress is given to political matters. There is a chart showing the comparative time given to various issues. The basic elements of the end-in-itself political system—</p>	
PATRONAGE.	41
THE PORK BARREL	42
PERVERSION OF PUBLIC OPINION, and	44
BI-PARTISANSHIP	46
<p>are traced to their common center, parliamentary conditions in Congress. The immediate problem is big politics, rather than big business. Political reform must be carried on through (1) parliamentary reconstruction, (2) adequate educational publicity, and (3) the anti-spoils, anti-political, balance of power position in elections and legislation. There follows a defining of—</p>	
INSURGENCY	52
<p>Before determining upon remedies for parliamentary conditions it is necessary (1) to know the history of rules reform, and (2) to understand conditions as they exist today. The first part of this preliminary ground is covered in—</p>	

CHAPTER III

THE EBB AND FLOW OF INSURGENCY.	53
<p>Where there is traced, with a diagram illustrating each stage, the history of rules reform efforts in the House, from the rise of insurgency in 1907 to its collapse in 1911. Both individual and party elements are detailed, with the sham battles of the bi-partisan machine duly emphasized.</p>	
GETTING AT THE TRUTH OF IT.	66
<p>Has to do with the perversion of public opinion in reference to rules reform in 1911, and leads to—</p>	

CHAPTER IV

	PAGE
LEGISLATING WITH A DARK LANTERN	67
In which present parliamentary conditions are discussed in detail.	
ORGANIZING THE HOUSE—THEN AND NOW	69
Details the processes of reassembling the congressional machine.	
THE CLOSED CAUCUS	75
A vicious instrumentality that touches legislation at every point, is discussed in all its phases.	
THE DISFRANCHISING OF MEMBERS	80
Through the caucus principle is illustrated with a map and figures.	
THE CONTROL OF COMMITTEES	86
Includes the amazing story of the "discharge calendar."	
THE RULES COMMITTEE	92
With its almost absolute authority over all questions of procedure, is next considered.	
After showing how the unlighted, undemocratic congressional machine is organized and controlled, each stage of legislation is studied:	
THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBER	96
How and where he becomes submerged, the things he has to do in order to survive in politics:	
STANDING COMMITTEES.	100
Their organization, plunder practices, and obstructive powers;	
THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE.	103
The House under an assumed name;	
THE OPEN HOUSE	105
Showing how few and inadequate are the opportunities for a direct and public facing of issues; and—	

	PAGE
THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE	106
The final, inevitable vicious instrumentality of a bi-cameral Congress.	
In a general summary of parliamentary conditions and practices, it is revealed that there is no regular orderly procedure—that the rules are such that the smallest minority may block legislation which the leaders do not want, while, when the reigning oligarchy does desire action, all rules are trampled under foot.	
The object of this book is constructive. Insurgency failed because it never presented adequate constructive remedies.	
WHERE CREDIT IS DUE	110
Discloses the sources of assistance in preparing—	

CHAPTER V

RECONSTRUCTING CONGRESS	112
In which there are outlined the principles upon which needed parliamentary and political and institutional changes should be founded.	
AS CITIZEN INSTEAD OF SUBJECT	125
A small essay on democracy, introduces—	

CHAPTER VI

THE NATIONAL VOTERS' LEAGUE	127
With an outline of the organization and publicity objects of this movement.	
THE APPENDIX	137
Contains a table of votes revealing the attitude of all members on fifteen important political andparliamentary tests.	

THE REASONS FOR IT

My life work is in the development of the National Voters' League. I want this book to interpret and aid that movement.

With no other interests to intrude, I have had unusual opportunities to study Congress at close range. It is my ambition to know what is vital about the National Government. I expect to write an annual book on Congress. I want that book to become an institution, more and more in demand as a right educational influence. I hope for this volume that it may advance that ambition.

Human happiness should be the goal of government. I desire happiness for myself. The most enduring foundation for individual peace of mind is general contentment, which can exist only when those in public position have a vision of the functions of government and are wholesomely performing their duties to society. It is only selfish that I should want this book to help toward better government.

Our government is, at least it should be, the exercise of sovereignty in the interest of society. At present politics is the only instrumentality through which moral and economic truths may be translated into the life of the people. Instead of being, as it should be, only the agency, the means, to that end, which is the common welfare, modern politics has become an end in itself, this end being office and the ever-increasing perquisites of office. I want this book to show the perverted character of modern politics.

In our desire for greater industrial democracy, we have placed the cart before the horse. We have attempted economic changes without first controlling politics, the only means of their accomplishment. Politics must be given new character, new aims and ends, before much moral and economic advancement can be secured through politics. I would have this book emphasize that immediate problem, which is not so much big business as it is big politics. And I am venturing to outline the fundamental remedies whereby modern politics may be converted from principal to agent in government.

Above all else, I hope that this book may do a little toward teaching the importance and meaning of government. When each individual sees his or her material interest in public affairs, then politics will be shorn of its professionalism and its plunder.

I have written of the past and present in Congressional matters. The immediate future is the object of it all. Political reconstruction can only be built upon an adequate understanding of the conditions that require correction.

MORE HOUSE THAN SENATE

These revelations relate largely to the House of Representatives. The problems of the Senate are different, and far less difficult. Both democracy and deliberation exist to some extent in the upper branch of Congress. Its membership is not too large to be workable. It has no gag rules. Its members are not elected by districts, and their longer terms remove them still more from the bargainings of politics. The Senate has thirty record votes to every one in the House.

THE SYSTEM RATHER THAN INDIVIDUALS

The House has a system against which individuals do not count. Only in the rarest events do individuals stand out apart from its machine. This book deals mostly with the system. If it did seek to portray personalities, and praiseworthy performances, I would first single out these men:

Sydney Anderson, of Minnesota, as a protest against the wholesale disfranchisement of the minority, braved the ridicule of colleagues by resigning from the Ways and Means Committee. It marked his independence and made the country think.

Robert Crosser, of Ohio, is an independent Democrat who labored conspicuously for democracy in the District of Columbia and the municipalizing of its utilities.

James A. Frear, of Wisconsin, made two notable, though futile, fights; one against the Rivers and Harbors pork barrel bill, and the other in the Whaley election contest case.

Edward Keating, of Colorado, refused to be yoked and driven by the Democratic leaders. He did creditable work in the Colorado strike matter and for the woman suffrage amendment.

M. Clyde Kelly, of Pennsylvania, was the only consistent advocate of publicity on the Rules Committee. In and out of that body, he fought gag rules and methods.

William Kent, of California, is the only political independent in the House. He affiliates with no party, coming to Congress in all ways free and independent. In that respect he stands as the prophet of a new and advanced order.

David Lewis, of Maryland, has led and is leading a masterful fight for the postalization of telephone and telegraph.

Charles A. Lindbergh, of Minnesota, is the hardest worker in the House. He was the first to rebel against the caucus and Cannonism, and there has been no sign of waning, no decrease of industry, in the subsequent years which saw other insurgents weary of the struggle.

William J. MacDonald, of Michigan, was the most conspicuous new member in the last Congress, through his persistent attempts to thwart the bi-partisan machine in its whitewashing of all and everything connected with the Mulhall exposé.

Victor Murdock, of Kansas, is one of the original insurgents whose opposition to machine methods has increased with the years.

John M. Nelson, of Wisconsin, another of the original anti-Cannon group, has remained consistent in that attitude. In the Mulhall-McDermott matter he stood fearlessly against the whitewash.

Raymond B. Stevens, of New Hampshire, one of the few independent Democrats, proved his ability and independence in numerous things. His best work was in the darkened Interstate Commerce Committee and against the water power program of the bi-partisan politicians.

Clyde Tavenner, of Illinois, made an able and determined fight against the private manufacture of munitions of war.

And the five Republicans—Cary and Cooper, of Wisconsin, Mapes, of Michigan, and Norton and Young, of North Dakota,

who refused to join the harmony movement within their party, their independence being evidenced in the refusal to support James R. Mann for Speaker, certainly would be entitled to special recognition.

ANOTHER "DOUBLE STANDARD"

If a grocer's helper kept his family larder supplied with articles surreptitiously taken from his employer's shelves, the practice would not be called legitimate.

If a clothier's clerk were to garment himself, in the stillness of night, from the stock of his employer, that, too, would be illegal.

If the teller of a bank were to divert to his own uses a portion of the money passing through his hands, he would hardly be called a good citizen.

Why are the petty misappropriations of private life considered so different from those in public affairs?

CHAPTER I

POLITICIANS AT PLAY

THE CONGRESSIONAL TIME CLOCK

The House of Representatives, engaged in the making of laws for the rest of us, has for years taken lightly one of its own enactments. There is a statute which forbids Congressmen their salary when not attending sessions. Our national legislators have always honored this law a thousand times more in breach than observance.

Last year, on August 25, the leaders suddenly decided that there was too much Congressional truancy. Perhaps they arrived at this decision because the public was beginning to take notice of no-quorum difficulties. At any rate, they started the time clock and arranged to check up members in the most effective way—no attendance, no salary. And they advertised far and wide this devotion to public business. That was a significant phase of the incident. Advertising is the life of politics. Had these politicians not desired advertising, they might have done no more than enforce the old law on the subject. Of course that could not have been done in such a way as to yield the coveted advertising, because publicity so founded would also have advertised the fact of their having so long ignored the law. Accordingly, with trumpets tuned high, they passed a new resolution, which was as follows:

HOUSE RESOLUTION 601

Resolved, That all leaves of absence heretofore granted to Members are hereby revoked.

Resolved further, That the Sergeant at Arms is hereby directed to notify all absent Members of the House by wire that their presence in the House of Representative is required, and that they must return without delay to Washington.

Resolved further, That the Sergeant at Arms is directed to enforce the law requiring him to deduct from the salary of Members their daily compensation when they are absent for other cause than sickness of themselves and their families.

This was remarkable. It said to Congressmen, "You are neglecting your official duties; return to work and remain at your task; otherwise you will be arrested and brought back." It charged the makers of law with disrespect for and the breaking of law. It was an admission that leaves of absence had not been legally founded. In instructing the disbursing officer in this special exigency to enforce a law which had so long been disobeyed, it showed the necessity of at least a double enactment to validate a statute so far as the authors of it were concerned. It constituted a confession that a law affecting members was not to be taken seriously unless the House specifically, in a subsequent action, commanded its enforcement.

House Resolution No. 601 accomplished its purpose. Many members hurriedly returned and stood around—in working clothes. It brought to Washington Congressmen who had been so persistently away that the doorkeepers hardly recognized them. Others did not return. Possibly they knew what the sequel was to be.

The advertising ended at this point. Subsequent developments lacked the spotlight. Only a careful searching of the records would disclose that on March 3, 1915, the last all-night session, with only a sleepy, worn-out few present, under suspension of the rules, without debate, this resolution was adopted:

HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 437

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Speaker be, and he is hereby, directed to certify for payment of the respective amounts heretofore deducted from the annual salaries of Members of the House in obedience to H. Res. 601, agreed to August twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and fourteen. And the Sergeant at Arms is directed to pay said Members the amounts so respectively certified.

That was the sequel of the sham attempt to make members earn their salaries. The politicians, with blare of trumpets, had docked themselves, and then, with the lights of publicity turned off, quietly returned the money to their own pockets.

This refunding resolution was even more remarkable than its predecessor. The first resolution put temporary life into an unrepealed, but dormant and neglected statute. The second one, without repealing either, set aside not only the previous advertising resolution which had supplemented the law, but also the solemn statute itself.

More astounding than all other features, the public is denied every financial detail. I made repeated attempts to get a list of the members involved, with the amounts refunded to each, all of which were futile. As a last resort, I sought the aid of Congressmen who tried in vain to obtain the information for me.

FORTY CENTS A MILE

The story of what one session of the last Congress did to save its mileage plunder is equally illuminating.

Here, again, Congress does not encourage inquiry. No details of its mileage profits are published, and a most insistent investigation failed to discover them. First, I sent an assistant to four different public officials, each of whom had the information, but all refused to disclose it. Then I wrote to the chairman of the House Committee on Mileage, whose only committee function is to prepare mileage data. He replied that he did not have the figures, and directed me to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House. That office most emphatically refused to give out the dollars and cents details. Then Congressmen tried without success to obtain the figures for me.

We only know that it costs the country 40 cents a mile, Congressional distance—20 cents each way—to get its legislators to and from regular sessions of Congress. There is a suspicion that in many cases the distance “actually traveled” is less than the number of miles for which the public pays, a suspicion which naturally increases with the secrecy surrounding the subject.

In the earlier days of the republic, this mileage allowance was recognized as a legitimate part of a Congressman's in-

come. On July 28, 1866, an act was approved, of which Section 17 was as follows:

That the compensation of each Senator, Representative, and Delegate in Congress shall be \$5,000 per annum to be computed from the first day of the present session, and in addition thereto mileage at the rate of 20 cents per mile, to be estimated by the nearest route usually traveled in going to and returning from each regular session.

In 1907, on February 26, a law was passed which raised the salary of members from \$5,000 to \$7,500. Section 4 reads:

That on and after March 4, 1907, the compensation of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Vice-President of the United States, and the heads of executive departments who are Members of the President's Cabinet, shall be at the rate of \$12,000 per annum each, and the compensation of Senators, Representatives in Congress, Delegates from the Territories and the Resident Commissioner from Porto Rico, shall be at the rate of \$7,500 per annum each.

At this point, mileage took on its present questionable character. Its legitimacy became a matter of doubt. I do not mean to infer that Congress entertained any doubt, at least none was ever manifested. *The law of 1907 repealed the law of 1866. Congress agrees to this in so far as increased salaries are concerned, but has assumed that the repeal did not extend to the mileage allowance. Moreover, there has been no specific subsequent enactment authorizing mileage, excepting in annual appropriation bills.* Not being a proper subject of advertising, the politicians have gone on assuming that the repeal force of the law of 1907 stopped short two commas from the end of a paragraph. Throughout this recital, as in every consideration of the subject, we find members referring to 20 cents a mile each way as "existing law."

In recounting what happened in respect to mileage in the Sixty-third Congress, it should be remembered that every Congress goes through much the same farcical procedure. Mileage is always a part of the Legislative, Executive and Judicial appropriation bill, which is considered once a year, at every regular session.

No longer able to disguise it, the play seems to have taken the character of a demonstration to the people that the poli-

ticians of the House are opposed to the plunder; that it is "forced" upon them. In the first scene, on April 3, 1914, the Appropriations Committee reported this substitute for the old, unpopular provision:

For actual traveling expenses incurred by Senators, including actual traveling expenses of immediate and dependent members of their families, incurred in going to and returning once from each session of Congress by the nearest route usually traveled, the same to be paid on certificates duly approved as in the manner heretofore prescribed for the payment of mileage, \$25,000.

There was a similar paragraph for House members.

Whether or not it was so intended, the phrasing of this substitute was full of cleverly masked plunder. Under its provisions, members might have traveled royally at public expense. And the words, "immediate and dependent members of their families," could have been construed to include servants, and friends masquerading as servants. The words "each session" also were significant. The suggested change was so phrased as to include special assemblings of Congress. In all probability this substitute would have resulted only in a variation of the same plunder. But it served the purposes of the play.

It should be stated at this point that bills, after leaving committees, are first considered in Committee of the Whole, which is the House under an assumed name. The alias enables Congressmen to violate the Constitution in reference to roll calls. They call themselves the Committee of the Whole and then have the rules provide that there shall be no record votes in the Committee of the Whole.

The House, in the darkness of the Committee of the Whole, made short work of this substitute. Twenty-cent mileage each way was quickly placed in the bill. Representative Good, of Iowa, made the first move. He proposed the following amendment:

Page 2, lines 4 to 10 inclusive, strike out the paragraph and insert: "For mileage of Senators \$51,000."

Mr. Good stood for the old mileage rate, and worked and voted that attitude out in the open. But obviously the play was to have the Senate bear the brunt of the odium for continuing the plunder. Senators are farther from the people; they do not face re-election so often. The House, then, under its assumed name, without a record vote, magnanimously decided to give Senators 20 cents a mile. It would follow, of course, that the Senate would either refuse to receive that amount or else insist that House members get the same. The House knew that the Senate would not refuse.

It would not have served the purposes of politics to reach the appointed climax at once, and the play progressed. Several other amendments were proposed.¹

Mr. Foster's proposal to eliminate the "dependent members of families" part, the chief joker in the committee substitute, was voted upon and rejected. Mr. Bartlett's 10-cents-a-mile amendment shared the same fate. The amendment of Mr. Good, providing 20-cent mileage for Senators, was adopted, 73 to 41.

Then for a time the parliamentary hair-splitters held sway. Points of procedure were raised, questions as profound and ponderous as though the fate of the universe, rather than a little petty plunder, were the issue. Finally, Mr. Bartlett's amendment was voted down again, its second demise. Following that, Mr. Page's 5-cents-a-mile suggestion received the disapproval of the House, 32 ayes to 63 loud noes.

Next, Mr. Thompson insisted that his wild proposal to abolish all mileage be considered. Mr. Good sought to reflect

¹ Among these amendments were the following:

By Mr. Bartlett, of Georgia: Strike out "\$51,000" and insert "\$25,000."

By Mr. Page, of North Carolina: Page 2, line 10, strike out the sum "\$25,000" and insert in lieu thereof the following: "\$12,750: Provided, That hereafter each Senator, Representative, Delegate, and Resident Commissioner shall receive mileage at the rate of 5 cents a mile, to be estimated by the nearest route usually traveled in going to and returning from each regular session, in lieu of the present rate of 20 cents a mile."

By Mr. Thompson, of Oklahoma: Page 2, strike out all of lines 4 to 10, inclusive, and insert in lieu thereof the following: "That all laws and parts of laws now in force allowing mileage to Senators, Representatives, Delegates, and Resident Commissioners, be and the same are hereby, repealed."

By Mr. Foster, of Illinois: Page 2, lines 5 and 6, strike out the following language: "Including actual traveling expenses of immediate and dependent members of their families."

on the standing of this amendment by making a point of order against it. In this crisis, Mr. Madden, of Illinois, proposed:

That upon the filing of a written statement of any Senator, Representative, Delegate, and Resident Commissioner to the effect that he does not desire to accept the amount credited to him for mileage it shall hereafter be the duty of the disbursing officer to cover the amount standing to the credit of any such Senator, Representative, Delegate and Resident Commissioner, back into the Treasury of the United States.

Whereupon the House burst into laughter and applause. When quiet had been restored and sober statesmanship reigned once more, the *Congressional Record* pictures the immediate subsequent proceedings as follows:

"THE CHAIRMAN: The question is on the substitute offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Madden) to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Oklahoma.

"The question was taken, and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

"MR. MADDEN: Division, Mr. Chairman.

"The Committee divided; and there were: ayes 68, noes 27.

"So the substitute was agreed to.

"THE CHAIRMAN: The question is on the amendment as a substitute.

"The question was taken, and the Chairman announced that the noes seemed to have it.

"MR. THOMPSON, of Oklahoma: Division, Mr. Chairman.

"The Committee again divided; and there were: ayes 26, noes 66.

"MR. THOMPSON, of Oklahoma: Mr. Chairman, I demand tellers.

"Tellers were refused.

"So the amendment as a substitute was rejected.

"MR. MURDOCK: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

"THE CHAIRMAN: The gentleman will state it.

"MR. MURDOCK: Has the Madden amendment been adopted?

"THE CHAIRMAN: It has not."

And neither had Mr. Thompson's. Mr. Madden's proposal had been substituted for Mr. Thompson's and then rejected, thus disposing of both without a direct vote on the one which was dangerous. That is a favorite form of Congressional humor. We find it recurring hundreds of times every session.

Mr. Good now came forward with another 20-cents-a-mile amendment, this time in reference to House members. After the author had explained, "Mr. Chairman, I want to say one word, that the amendment I offer is to restore existing law,"

the Good amendment was adopted, 37 to 35, rather a small minority of 435 members.

In the meantime, Mr. Madden had recast his "covering back into the treasury" proposal to have it provide that in cases where members had not drawn their mileage money within 90 days "after the same has become available," it should be returned to the vaults of Uncle Sam. Ninety minutes would have safeguarded members about as well.

This time Mr. Madden's amendment was held to be out of order. Not being a political "parliamentarian," I cannot explain why.

All this occurred in the Committee of the Whole, where the rules specifically forbid record votes. It is easy to see why 20 cents a mile each way for both Senators and Representatives had been placed in the bill. But after a measure has gone through the recordless Committee of the Whole, the House, minus its alias, has to consider it. And, if amendments have been adopted in the Committee of the Whole, it is possible to secure a yea and nay vote upon them in the House. If an amendment has been rejected in the Committee of the Whole, that ends it so far as a record vote is concerned. The usual machine way is to have the bill presented by the organization leaders in the form in which they desire it to pass, and then vote down all amendments in the Committee of the Whole. But in the case of mileage, the Appropriations Committee appeared as opposed to the old rate, and hence could not report the bill in that form. So 20-cent mileage was provided in Committee of the Whole, and the opportunity for a record vote came later.

The House acted on this momentous question April 17, 1914, with a duly recorded vote. The mileage of both House and Senate was included.²

²Amendment adopted in recordless Committee of the Whole:

Page 2, lines 4 to 10, inclusive, strike the paragraph and insert: "For mileage of Senators, \$51,000."

Page 12, line 19, strike out the paragraph beginning on line 19, on page 12, and including line 2, on page 13, and insert: "For mileage of Representatives and Delegates and expenses of Resident Commissioners, \$175,000."

A vote for this combined amendment meant the old rate for both bodies. A vote against it, so Speaker Clark held, meant a return to the bill of the questionable substitute reported by the Appropriations Committee in the original bill, the one providing for actual traveling expenses for "each session," including "immediate and dependent members of their families." Under its assumed name, without roll calls, the House had chosen 20 cents a mile. Here, acting as itself, with a roll call which the public could see and in part comprehend, the House did not endorse the position it had taken in darkness. The action of the Committee of the Whole was voted down, 95 to 242, with 94 not voting. The question then passed automatically to the Senate.

Duplicity is the keynote of modern politics. Most deceptions are successfully concealed. In this case the official records disclose no hint of what actually happened when the mileage question was passed on to the Senate. It is reported that certain House members discarded their make-up and hurried over to the Senate, where they pleaded with Senators to save their mileage; that they appeared almost openly as lobbyists against the position they had voted in their own body.

The Senate received this momentous matter on June 15, 1914. The question was divided. First Senators voted on the \$51,000 item for their own allowance at 20 cents a mile. This was quickly adopted, 23 to 9, without a roll call, although Mr. Kenyon sought vainly to secure a record vote.

Then, with House members in the background, with their refrain in the air, "Remember our mileage; save us from ourselves," the Senate took up the other portion of the fated question:

For mileage of Representatives and Delegates and expenses of Resident Commissioners, "\$175,000."

This time Mr. Kenyon was successful in getting a record vote which resulted 42 yeas to 17 nays, with thirty-six not voting.

What had happened to this point? The House had passed one kind of mileage provision; the Senate, in compliance with its own desires and the whispered wishes of the House, had rejected the House amendments and re-adopted the old rate. The two branches of Congress were in disagreement, what looked to be a contrived, prearranged disagreement. That meant a conference committee to reconcile the differences between House and Senate.

When the House and Senate failed to agree, a conference committee consisting of Messrs. Thomas S. Martin, Lee S. Overman and F. E. Warren for the Senate, and Messrs. Joseph T. Johnson, Joseph W. Byrns and James W. Good for the House, were appointed by the Vice-President and the Speaker. All three of these Senators and Mr. Good on the House side had voted for the old rate; Mr. Byrns had voted against it, while Mr. Johnson had not voted either way. The minds of these conferees soon met on all features of the Legislative, Executive and Judicial appropriation bill excepting the mileage question. Early in the controversy the conference report on the bill was adopted in all respects save that of mileage. That disposed of all other phases of the measure. Mileage alone was in disagreement. Bear this in mind. It has a subtle bearing on subsequent acting.

On June 25, 1914, Mr. Johnson, of South Carolina, representing the House conferees, addressed the Speaker and said, "I ask now that the clerk report Senate amendment No. 1 which is still in disagreement."

The play might have ended here, but the House was not yet ready to have mileage "forced" upon it. The politics of the situation seemed to demand more reluctance, and the House made a flank movement in favor of 5-cent mileage. Mr. Cox, of Indiana, moved "to recede and concur in Senate amendment No. 1, page 2, with the following amendment:"

"For mileage of Senators, \$25,000, and hereafter Senators shall be paid mileage at the rate of 10 cents per mile each way while traveling from their homes to Washington City and return by the ordinary and usual routes of travel, once at each session of Congress."

Mr. Mann "reserved" a point of order, and there was some running debate, mostly political. Then—

MR. BYRNES, of South Carolina, moves to amend by striking out the figures "\$25,000," and inserting the figures "\$12,500," and by striking out the words "10 cents" and inserting the words "5 cents."

There was much less likelihood that the Senate would accept 5-cent mileage than the 10-cent kind. That may have been why Mr. Byrnes' amendment to Mr. Cox's amendment was adopted on a roll call, 132 to 94, with 207 not voting. Next the amended amendment was adopted, with another roll call, which fixed the Senate's rate at 5 cents a mile.

On the following day, June 26, Senate amendment No. 30 came up, which it will be remembered restored the old 20-cent rate for House members. Mr. Johnson, of South Carolina, moved the adoption of a 5-cents-a-mile substitute.

Mr. Mann, of Illinois, made a preferential motion, that the House recede and concur, which meant abandon its own position and adopt that of the Senate—20-cent mileage. There was another roll call on this indirect facing of the question, and by a vote of 60 to 184, with 189 not voting, the House refused to recede, which the Speaker held to mean insistence on its first position of actual traveling expenses for "each session," including "dependent" members of Congressional families. Mr. Mann is recorded as voting against his own motion. I do not know why.

At this point⁷ the House had voted 5-cent mileage for Sena-

⁷ After this vote had been taken, dividing consideration of House and Senate mileage, whereas they had before been considered together, Mr. Falconer of Washington secured the floor and in a spirited speech reviewed the farce. These are excerpts:

"By a series of parliamentary gymnastics the House just now voted not to recede from the House disagreement to the Senate amendment on House mileage, and now, Mr. Speaker, we have a record vote of the same men, economists, if you please, last evening voting 5 cents per mile for Senators' mileage allowance and today voting actual traveling expenses for Representatives and their families.

"Mr. Speaker, was there ever a more complete demonstration of political trimming by parliamentary chicanery? What is the purpose and what is the effect on the public?

"Mr. Speaker, 'mileage' and 'graft' have for some time been held up by the press of the country as synonymous terms. Is there a man here who believes the present mileage is graft? If so, why did he not object to the unanimous consent to consider Senate and House mileage in one vote by Mr. Byrnes of Tennessee when this bill was before the House?

"Mr. Speaker, there has been no proposition on which I have voted, or had a chance to vote, where 20-cent mileage or a less amount for House members has been involved. Why do not the conferees eliminate this parliamentary tangle with the Senate and put the House on record on House mileage?

ators and actual expenses for themselves. As the House and Senate were farther apart than before, the play continued, with the conference committee in the center of the now darkened stage.

On July 1, with all other parts of this great appropriation bill settled, remember that, the House conferees again reported, with Mr. Johnson as their spokesman. He said:

"We have been able to agree upon every item in the bill except amendments 1 and 30. These amendments, as the membership well knows, deal with the mileage of Senators and Representatives and Delegates in Congress. In the last conference, which was the third, the Senate absolutely refused to recede from its position upon these two amendments."

The end was in sight. The House was getting ready to "yield." Mr. Johnson continued:

"I am not an authority on parliamentary law, but I understand that it is a long-established precedent in all legislative bodies that where one house proposes legislation in an appropriation bill and the other house finally and flatly refuses to accept that legislation the House proposing it must yield. In other words, one legislative body has no authority to force legislation upon the other body."

A little farther on this small cloud, soon to loom large, was suggested by Mr. Johnson:

"The conferees on the part of the Senate have assured the conferees on the part of the House that they would rather kill the bill than let this provision go in it."

The controversy over mileage had begun to threaten the passage of the great appropriation bill of which it was a part. But Mr. Johnson moved that the House further insist upon its amendment to Senate amendment No. 1—5-cent mileage for Senators—and insist on its disagreement to Senate amendment No. 30—actual expenses for House members.⁸

"Mr. Speaker, the result of this whole matter, taking as it has many hours of debate, has been that some Members of this House have been advertised the country over as guardians of the public funds, while actually sparring behind parliamentary methods for 20-cent mileage."

⁸In the debate which followed, more straws rode the breezes. From the remarks of Mr. Cox of Indiana, we glean:

"Now, here comes a threat, an absolute threat, from the grave and sedate Senators of the United States to the House of Representatives, to this effect: 'We propose to let this big appropriation bill fail rather than give up our mileage.' . . . The burden is not upon this House if this bill fails. The burden is upon the Senate of the United States, and if there is any odium attached to the failure of this bill, let them and them alone be responsible. Let no Member of this House undertake to take the responsibility from their shoulders."

There was another roll call and by a vote of 125 to 138, with 170 not voting, the motion to recede on Senate amendment No. 1 was defeated. A further conference was demanded.

In the Senate, on July 13, 1914, Mr. Martin, of Virginia, reported for the conferees, emphasizing the same parliamentary points that had been raised in the House.⁹

After long and dignified Senatorial debate, Mr. Hughes, of New Jersey, proposed this amendment :

Omit the matter inserted by the House amending said amendment, omit the matter stricken out and inserted by said Senate amendment, and in lieu thereof insert the following :

"For mileage of Senators, \$51,000: Provided, That after the fiscal year 1915, no mileage or other allowance for expenses in attendance on sessions of Congress shall be paid to any Senator, Representative, Delegate from a Territory, or Resident Commissioner."

Vice-President Marshall ruled the Hughes amendment out of order. I do not know why. Mr. Martin then moved that the Senate further insist on its amendments, which was done, by a vote of 55 to 7, with thirty-four not voting. And the play went on.

Returning to the House, on July 14, J. J. Fitzgerald, of New York, took charge. Mr. Fitzgerald was a much bigger, more influential "leader" than Mr. Johnson. This change of

Mr. Mann, minority leader and bell weather for the regular republicans, said:

"Mr. Speaker, in all parliamentary bodies which consist of two parts of equal authority, there come times when one body must yield to the other. Where there are differences of opinion we endeavor to reconcile those differences through the appointment of conference committees, giving and taking. But the time often comes when one body proposes something new and the other body declines to accept it. Being of equal authority, it is a natural rule of procedure that that legislative body constituting half of the whole which proposes a new matter must in the end yield unless the other body consents, because the bodies are coequal. When the Senate proposes an amendment to a House appropriation bill which inserts a new principle, unless in the end the House is willing to accept it the Senate must recede. And likewise, when the House proposes a new proposition and the Senate refuses to accept it the House must recede, because unless this procedure should be followed one of the two bodies becomes superior to the other.

"Now, we have reached the point where we will have to put aside, it seems to me, a matter of pride and use common sense. If we are going to yield, let us yield now. If we are going to say that we will not pass the legislative bill unless we can have our way about a new proposition, we stamp ourselves as incapable legislators."

⁹ Mr. Martin said:

"The conferees on the part of the two Houses have been unable to agree on the question of mileage for Senators and Members of the other House.

"So far as the Senate conferees are concerned, they feel practically, indeed distinctly, instructed by the Senate to adhere to the existing law. It is a recognized principle in matters of this sort in all legislative bodies when there is an existing law and one House proposes to change it, that the house proposing the change must yield, unless the house to which the proposition is made is satisfied with the change. The Senate has expressed its disapproval of the provision of the House of Representatives in this bill, which is a change of existing law."

command was a sign that the end was near. He made this motion :

"MR. FITZGERALD moves that the House recede from its amendment to the amendment of the Senate No. 1, and recede from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate Nos. 1 and 30 and agree to the same."

Mr. Fitzgerald, as chairman of the great Appropriations Committee, in arguing for his motion, emphasized the fate of the bill itself.¹⁰ Other House leaders followed suit.¹¹

With the bi-partisan leadership practically unanimous for surrender, the House "yielded." By a vote of 132 to 121, with 180 not voting, Mr. Fitzgerald's motion was adopted. Twenty cents a mile, both ways, for both House and Senate, had been saved. Political records had been made, honor preserved and everybody was satisfied. So the play ended.

Such plunder plays will always occupy the time and attention of the politicians who make our laws so long as there is a bi-cameral Congress. With two branches, one or the other, and often both, can play politics to their hearts' content. Disagreements between House and Senate occur on practically every public measure. The conference committee, with its darkened procedure and privileged reports, then takes

¹⁰ From Mr. Fitzgerald's remarks:

This bill carries \$36,000,000 for the support of the departmental services of the Government. The difference involved between mileage at the rate of 20 cents a mile and the amount estimated and fixed in the bill to pay the actual expenses of Members and their families amounts to \$100,000. So far as I am concerned, in view of the action of the Senate, I believe that the House, having demonstrated its desire to make the reduction in the amount of mileage and having resorted to everything within reason that could be justified under parliamentary law to effect its purpose, that the time has now come for the House to recede from its position and agree to the Senate provision and permit the bill to become law. We gain nothing by further agitation and discussion. The responsibility for the failure to reduce the mileage from the amount fixed by law must be borne by the body which declines to yield in any respect, and we should not, in our desire to change this mileage, whatever be our motive, longer delay the enactment of this bill, so important to the maintenance and conduct of the Government."

¹¹ Mr. Gillette of Massachusetts, the ranking republican member of the Appropriations Committee, said:

"Mr. Speaker, I agree entirely with the argument made by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Fitzgerald) and the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Underwood), but I criticize them because they did not make that argument two weeks ago instead of today."

Mr. Underwood, democratic leader, delivered this ultimatum to the followers of himself and Jefferson:

"It is the duty of every man on this side of the House, who is responsible to the country to maintain this Government, to pass this bill at this time regardless of his views on the question of whether there should be mileage or whether mileage should be abolished." (Applause.)

Mr. Mann, republican leader, had already expressed his attitude. He did again.

charge. The conference committee has in it greater possibilities for evil results than any other parliamentary institution.

The fate of a big appropriation bill was involved in this mileage plunder. In fact, mileage was made the overshadowing element in a \$36,000,000 measure. The system is such that all sorts of questionable matters are included in appropriation measures. In addition to the fact that the present methods of making appropriations is basically wrong, there is invariably this added evil of loading appropriation bills with alien things. It would seem a simple matter to legislate once and for all on this mileage question. Certainly it ought not to be given a position in which it would overshadow all else in a great appropriation bill.

This mileage farce recurs every regular session. From twelve to fifteen big appropriation bills are considered every year—twice in each Congress—by both House and Senate. The politicians delight in these measures. They take up from one-third to two-thirds of the time of each regular session. The politicians like to kill time. They are privileged bills and can be used as buffers to prevent the consideration of politically dangerous questions. The politicians like that feature. But, more important than all else, the pork barrel ramifies in a thousand directions from these annual appropriation measures. The politicians live on pork. Obviously, there should be a responsible budget method of appropriating public money, one that would divorce the pork barrel and legislation.

It is hardly necessary to outline the mileage farce as it was repeated in the last session of the Sixty-third Congress. There were the same disagreements, the same conference committee, the same "reluctant yielding" by the House, the same final result—20 cents a mile both ways for both House and Senate. This time, however, the play lagged, was less spirited, and somewhat shorter. Nearby elections always speed up the acting.

These little stories are not the only plunder tales that might be told. But they are sufficient to evidence a most important

truth, that self-interest, which means politics, is the first and last and intermediate consideration of those who make our laws. From the viewpoint of professional politicians, "public service" has come to mean "serve us." These stories reveal Congress in this attitude of self-interest. I want now to present the House in a related, but very different rôle—a desperate defensive struggle to save its system. In this there will be seen the same clever posing and playing, and the same sequel—victory for the politicians. Whether fighting to gain plunder or to save plunder, it is always the parliamentary system that enables the politicians to prevail. Keep that in mind.

THE MULHALL-McDERMOTT FIASCO

This generation has known no political earthquake like that of the Mulhall exposé, which came June 29, 1913. The whole country was stirred to the depths by what Martin M. Mulhall had to reveal.

For years the people had believed that Congress was controlled by well-organized special interests. Mr. Mulhall's was a stirring story because it supplied much of previously hidden proof. He named names and cited incidents. His statements were corroborated in important particulars. The invisible government at Washington at last became partly visible, even to the blinded partisan.

The history of the lobby investigation by the House which followed might be divided into three periods, each representing a distinct crisis for those involved:

First, the Mulhall charges of corruption against Congressmen, on June 29, 1913, which astounded the nation, and necessitated a vindicating investigation;

Second, the report of the investigating committee, five months later, on December 9, 1913, when the bi-partisan program of further delay was carried out, and both discussion and a record vote averted, by steam-rolling everything into the hands of another committee; and

Third, the fixing of a time for a final facing of the issues, on July 20, 1914, after a year of delay, when the House was saved from going on record by the resignation of McDermott.

Briefly summarized, the net results of the exposure and investigation are as follows:

1. All members excepting Mr. McDermott were vindicated of the Mulhall charges. Every one who understood Congressional procedure and practices expected that.

2. Mr. McDermott was made the goat, shielded as long as possible, and then "forced" to resign. Every political spasm like the Mulhall exposé has to have a goat.

3. Action upon the real issues of the investigation was so long delayed that the fine edge of the people's indignation had time to wear away. Delay always dulls popular indignation.

The only unbelievable thing about it is that Congress could dally along for a full year with about the most important issue it had faced in decades, in all that time permitting only five minutes of discussion and not a single roll call. That is the part which the public should consider. At every stage of the protracted proceedings, the Mulhall-McDermott matter presented questions of the highest privilege. If the House leaders could keep under cover for twelve months the most highly privileged matter, what chance have the people of getting action out in the open on questions of ordinary legislative routine?

It will be remembered that the Senate had a lobby inquiry under way at the time of the Mulhall exposé. Thereupon the Senate committee turned its lobby investigations in that direction. The first few days of the Senate inquiry into the Mulhall charges seemed to develop proof of their accuracy. It also became evident that House members were involved in a serious way. Then, although the Senate was already investigating the matter, the House decided upon an investigation of its own.

The House resolution for an investigating committee was considered July 5, 1913, but not adopted until July 9, an adjournment being forced by lack of a quorum. The fight over the question of legal assistance for the committee demonstrated the extent to which the House is boss controlled. Jefferson Levy, of New York, moved to strike from the resolution the words which gave the committee authority to employ a lawyer or lawyers to help with the investigation. On the 5th Minority Leader James R. Mann led his Republican followers in support of the Levy amendment. When the House met again—on the 9th—Mr. Mann announced that he had changed his mind, and moved to reconsider the vote whereby the Levy amendment had been adopted. *Practically every Republican who had voted with him on the former occasion again followed him in exactly the opposite direction.* Individual thinking and individual action in the House have been reduced to the minimum.

The resolution adopted contained a joker which proved most useful to the politicians in the crisis of the inquiry: the committee was empowered to investigate, but given no authority to make recommendations. This was made the excuse for the sidestepping of the House, on December 9, which will be detailed later.

THE COMMITTEE AT WORK

The investigating committee appointed by Speaker Clark consisted of Messrs. Garrett, of Tennessee, chairman; Cline, of Indiana, Russell, of Missouri, and Roddenbery, of Georgia, Democrats; Stafford, of Wisconsin, and Willis, of Ohio, Republicans; and Nolan, of California, Progressive. Mr. Roddenbery became ill and was replaced by Mr. Ferris, of Oklahoma, early in the investigation. The protracted illness of Mr. Nolan finally compelled his resignation, that place being taken by Mr. MacDonald, of Michigan, shortly before the committee ended the taking of testimony.

This select committee began its work July 12, 1913. The hearings continued until September 19. As has been suggested, Mr. McDermott was kept pretty much in the limelight, the press helping to sensationalize his conduct with lobbyists. At the same time the investigation of his relations with the pawn brokers and liquor interests was never carried quite far enough to establish either his guilt, or more far-reaching revelations involving other Congressmen. All the other House members brought into the Mulhall charges were vindicated.

An accident interfered with the even course of the committee. The illness and resignation of Mr. Nolan necessitated the substitution of another Progressive member. W. J. MacDonald had just been seated in the House, his election contest resulting in his favor August 25, 1913. As he was without committee assignments of any kind, it was only natural that he should be given Mr. Nolan's place on the lobby committee. That marked a change in the proceedings. As soon as Mr. MacDonald could get into the swing of the inquiry, he began to ask questions which tended to direct it into more vital channels—the underground activities of the National Association of Manufacturers. A few days later, on September 19, 1913, the committee terminated its hearings.

THE BI-PARTISAN MACHINE

The investigating committee reported to the House December 9, 1913. The majority report, signed by Finis J. Garrett, Cyrus Cline, Joe J. Russell, Scott Ferris, Wm. H. Stafford and Frank B. Willis, contained not a line of recommendation, and was accompanied by no resolution upon which the House could act. William J. MacDonald, however, presented a minority report and the following privileged resolutions:

Resolved, That the House proceed forthwith to determine whether under the report of your select committee on lobby investigations it has not been shown that J. Philip Bird, John Kirby, Jr., James A. Emery, Martin M. Mulhall, and other officers and agents of the National Association of Manufacturers have been engaged in systematic,

continuous practices against the order and dignity of the House and in improper and vicious lobbying activities rendering them liable to punishment by this House for contempt.

Resolved, That this House proceed forthwith to determine whether under the report of your select committee on lobby investigations Representative JAMES THOMAS McDERMOTT, of the fourth congressional district of the State of Illinois, has not been shown guilty of disgraceful and dishonorable misconduct, and venality, rendering him unworthy of a seat in this House and justly liable to expulsion from the same.

There followed a series of parliamentary, or rather unparliamentary, episodes such as occur but rarely in the whole history of Congress.

First, Mr. MacDonald was jockeyed off the floor, not being permitted to move the adoption of his resolutions. The injustice of this is apparent to anyone. The majority members of the committee had offered no motion which would bring the issues before the House, they taking refuge in the joker already referred to in the resolution creating the committee. Neither would they allow the dissenting member to interfere with the "nothing doing" program.

Second, Mr. Garrett moved that the MacDonald resolutions, which were of the highest privilege, and the reports of the select investigating committee be referred to the Judiciary Committee.

Third, to shut off all discussion, the previous question on Mr. Garrett's motion was moved and carried.

Fourth, in the attempt to get a record vote on the Garrett motion, only twenty-three members, according to the official record, joined in the demand for a roll call. As thirty-four, or one-fifth of those present, were necessary to secure a roll call, this failed. Only the Progressives and a few independent Republicans and Democrats were for a record vote.

Fifth, only 168 members were present, not a quorum; but when Mr. MacDonald made the point of order of no quorum, which automatically should have compelled a roll call on the Garrett motion, under the rules, no attention was paid to his demand. Instead the House hurriedly adjourned.

The Garrett motion had carried and everything was steam-rolled into the hands of the Judiciary Committee, 133 to 34. In this, the crisis of the whole Mulhall-McDermott matter, there was neither discussion nor a record vote.

A QUESTION OF VERACITY

Realizing that the attempt to get a roll call on the Garrett motion was likely to be the last opportunity for a record vote on the issues of the lobby investigation, acting for the National Voters' League, I made an effort in the only possible way to obtain the names of those who had then signified that they were for open action. This letter was sent to all members of the House:

"DEAR CONGRESSMAN: The National Voters' League desires to secure for publication a list of those Members who joined in the demand for a roll call on the question of referring the lobby reports and Mr. MacDonald's resolutions to the Judiciary Committee when that issue came up in the House December 9.

"Will you aid us in this by answering these questions?

"1. Were you present in the House on that occasion?

"2. Did you rise and join in the demand for a roll call on the above-mentioned motion?

"We will appreciate an early answer.

"Very truly,

"_____"

In response to this letter the National Voters' League has on file the statements of forty-seven members of the House that on December 9, 1913, they arose and joined in the demand for the roll call in question. In addition to the forty-seven, eight members were not certain, but the majority of these replied to the League's query in such a way as to imply that they also had supported the demand for the roll call. One member telephoned that he had voted for the roll call. Sixteen returned more or less evasive answers. Fifty-six, many of whom said they would have favored the roll call had they been present, replied that they were not in the House on that occasion. Two stated that they took no part in the proceedings because their

names were involved in the Mulhall charges. Only five out of the 135 who replied stated that they were against the roll call.¹²

Here 56 members stated or implied that they rose and joined in the demand for a roll call on the Garrett motion: the Congressional Record gives twenty-three as the number who were on their feet at that time. The League had expected accurate information and was as much astonished as anyone at the discrepancy.

EIGHT MONTHS MORE OF DELAY

The Judiciary Committee kept all the issues of the Mulhall-McDermott matter buried away from the House from December 9, 1913, until April 24, 1914. Then a report from a majority of the committee was made by Mr. Floyd of Arkansas, with a recommendation that Mr. McDermott be censured. The old convenient contention that a member cannot be more severely punished for offenses committed in and against a previous Congress was embodied in the report. An important thing to note is that this committee, like the select committee, kept the spotlight on Mr. McDermott rather than the bigger subjects of the investigation.

Mr. Nelson, of Wisconsin, filed a scathing minority report from the Judiciary Committee and recommended Mr. McDermott's expulsion.

The Judiciary Committee delayed action for five and one-half months. After the pressure of public opinion had doubtless influenced the filing of a report from that committee,

¹² The forty-seven who replied definitely that they joined in the demand for a roll call are as follows: Sydney Anderson, William A. Ashbrook, Silas R. Barton, Ellsworth R. Bathrick, Charles W. Bell, Stanley E. Bowdle, M. E. Burke, Philip P. Campbell, Ira C. Copley, Louis C. Cramton, Charles H. Dillon, Jeremiah Donovan, John J. Esch, John R. Farr, H. Robert Fowler, George E. Gorman, Courtney W. Hamlin, W. H. Hinebaugh, Willis J. Hulings, Albert Johnson, Edward Keating, M. Clyde Kelly, Thomas F. Konop, William L. LaFollette, Fred E. Lewis, W. J. MacDonald, James Manahan, Andrew J. Montague, Victor Murdock, William F. Murray, George A. Neeley, John I. Nolan, P. D. Norton, Dennis O'Leary, Percy E. Quin, John E. Raker, Arthur R. Rupley, Dorsey W. Shackelford, R. B. Stevens, Tom Stout, Howard Sutherland, H. W. Temple, Charles M. Thomson, J. B. Thompson, Anderson H. Walters, Otis Wingo and Roy O. Woodruff.

The eight members who were in doubt, but the majority of whom replied to the League's query in such a way as to imply that they also demanded the roll call, are as follows: Robert Crosser, John J. Eagan, W. R. Green, E. L. Hamilton, Walter I. McCoy, N. J. Sinnott, Luther W. Mott and John H. Small.

The member who telephoned that he stood up to ask for the roll call is H. T. Helgesen.

there was a further delay of three months, during which time the report and everything connected with the investigation rested on the House calendar, *with only one member, Mr. Floyd, who made the majority report, having the privilege of bringing the matter before the House.* Finally Mr. Floyd promised to call up the report and gave notice to the House, July 20, 1914, that he would do when consideration of the Adamson dam bill was finished.

Then, after a year of total delay, when there seemed no other way to preclude discussion and a roll call, there came Mr. McDermott's resignation. The sequel to his retirement was unfolded in a meeting of the Judiciary Committee, July 28, 1914, when Mr. Floyd was instructed to move that the whole McDermott-Mulhall matter be tabled, which, however, was never done.

WHY DID McDERMOTT RESIGN?

The public knows that on July 21, 1914, James T. McDermott, a member from the Fourth District of Illinois, resigned his seat in Congress. That is about as far as the people have been given an opportunity to comprehend the unusual incident.

It is of no very great consequence that Mr. McDermott retired under fire, that he was facing almost certain censure and probable expulsion, because of his connection with Martin M. Mulhall, of the National Association of Manufacturers, and other lobbyists. The important thing for the people to know is the relation of his resignation to the system that prevails in the House of Representatives.

Mr. McDermott's place in the Mulhall exposé was never important. He was the most insignificant sideshow feature. Yet all through the investigation his petty relations with lobbyists were so emphasized and kept before the public as to eclipse the really consequential issues. However, anomalous as it may seem, all the time that he was being painted a political pervert, Mr. McDermott apparently was aided and his punishment

postponed as long as possible. It would appear as though the "system" desired to save him, yet demonstrated so much of his misconduct as might be necessary to divert attention from the vital phases of the inquiry.

For more than a year Mr. McDermott served that purpose. Whether designedly or not, he became the buffer. Whenever important issues of the investigation began to threaten, the spotlight played upon him. When the House could no longer dodge or delay an open vote in any other way, there came his weakly staged retirement. By his own confession, borne out by circumstantial evidence of the most convincing kind, Mr. McDermott's resignation could hardly have been voluntary; obviously it was encouraged by his colleagues in the House who did not dare to face free discussion and a record vote.

By Mr. McDermott's resignation,¹³ the House was spared the politically dangerous vote upon the question of his expulsion, which would have involved discussion of the whole matter. By having this artificially enlarged scapegoat efface himself, evidently it was hoped also to wipe the slate clean of all the issues of the Mulhall exposé.

The most astounding revelation of political corruption that this generation has known thus passed into history with its real issues undecided and undiscussed.

The work of Mr. MacDonald on the select investigating committee, and in his fight to emphasize and get open action on the vital phases of the inquiry, stands out conspicuously. Mr. Nelson's fight within the Judiciary Committee was of the same high courageous order. The public should bestow unstinted credit upon men who persist in opposing the all-powerful, bi-partisan organization in such matters which mean life or death to the system.

The Progressives, led by Messrs. MacDonald, Murdock and Kelly of Pennsylvania, bore the brunt of the fight to compel all members to go on record in the crisis of the controversy.

¹³ It is interesting to note that Mr. McDermott was reelected to Congress. Help in his reelection was undoubtedly a part of the bargaining in his resignation.

Had it not been for the determined vigilance of no more than a half-dozen members, the bi-partisan program in reference to the Mulhall-McDermott matter would in all probability have been consummated without the least hindrance. As it was, of course, all the fighting was futile. The struggle to eliminate sham, secure adequate discussion and obtain record votes, will always be futile until the parliamentary practices of the House are shifted from bossism to a basis of democratic deliberation.

There is a temptation to continue these recitals of the politicians at play. Their purpose has been to supply samples of Congressional atmosphere, to suggest how the plunder and expediencies of politics outweigh all other elements in legislation. The great need of this day and hour is a subordination of the interests of professional politicians to the common welfare. The business of politics should give way to the business of government.

CHAPTER II

MODERN POLITICS—AN INTERPRETATION

Big politics, more than big business, is the immediate and common problem which we have to face.

Politics is the gateway to everything government has to offer or to withhold from the people. At present no real advancement in industrial conditions, no vital change in government, can come excepting through political action. No economic theory, no moral idea, can become a reality excepting through the instrumentality of politics. And that is the only legitimate function that politics has—to serve as the agency for the application of economic and moral principles to the life of the people. Politics should be only the means to that end; but modern political organization has become an end in itself. This end is office and the ever-increasing perquisites of office.


In the last short session of the Sixty-third Congress there were passed 244 bills and resolutions. Of this number 229 related to one or both of the basic elements in the political system—patronage and pork. Less than thirty were measures in which the general public had an interest. Adding such perennial incidents as the mileage grab and misappropriated clerk hire, and special events like the sham attempt to make members earn their salaries and the Mulhall-McDermott matter, one gets a startling, but not an unfair, picture of the American Congress in action.

Congress is the source and center of practically all that is perverse in modern politics. The situation in the national legislature may be illustrated in the diagram on the opposite page.

The darkened space represents, comparatively, the portion of the law-making field occupied by the system for itself, an overwhelming preponderance of Congressional attention being

given to matters involving the selfish interests of the politicians as such—spoils, patronage, pork barrel projects, and all manner of log rolling bills which strengthen the members in their hold upon the positions and perquisites of public life.

THE FIELD OF CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT



A few of many economic and governmental questions dependent upon legislation are suggested in the white spaces at the right of the drawing. The size of these spaces indicates as closely as can be estimated the time given to each as compared with the attention given to purely political questions—to the system itself.

It will be noted that labor legislation occupies a larger space than any other subject, with conservation issues next in size. Such questions received greater attention, at least greater talk, because the labor and conservation movements had made them conspicuous in the public mind: Congress turns, almost automatically, where publicity directs. At the same time, issues in the limelight are the ones in which there enters the greater proportion of duplicity, of personal and partisan politics.

At present the whole combined force of the entrenched political plunder system is massed as a buffer against every

separate economic or governmental idea. For the most part, each economic group is struggling alone against the forces of politics, often in addition fighting other economic groups.

Before there can be any substantial economic change, all must unite to light up and liberate that portion of the field now occupied by the parasitic political system. That is common fighting ground for every legitimate legislative interest in America today. The millions who through instinct or necessity desire industrial democracy must first join forces in the fight for political democracy.

Whatever is national in scope must come out of Congress. Congress as at present constituted and controlled is 99 per cent politics—perverted politics. Politics is always the first and last and intermediate consideration. Economics, national morality, the common welfare, are only incidental. The first concern of every legitimate economic and moral interest should be to reverse this relationship. Then only can there come a fair, out-in-the-open consideration and choice among economic principles.

The great economic problem today is the labor question, but until the hold of the political system upon Congress is broken there can come no adequate and lastingly equitable changes in that field.

Those who embrace socialism as the best economic doctrine are confronted with the same political problem: No part of the national ownership program will be possible excepting through Congressional action.

Advocates of the single tax face the same necessity for acting through perverted political agencies.

You may regard equal suffrage, or social legislation such as old age pensions, or prohibition, or conservation, or national highways, as of chief importance; whatever your interests, if national in scope, they can be realized only through Congressional, which means political, action.

Many hold that governmental institutions must be changed,

that the machinery of government should be made more democratic: in the field of "popular government" the same common problem appears, only more perplexing because attended by more duplicity and double dealing. A national initiative and referendum can come only out of a Congress in which politics and political objects occupy the center of the stage. It is the same with a gateway amendment to the Constitution, and proportional representation, and a one-branch legislature. Even the changes that would help to change Congress must come out of Congress—where politics and politicians dominate in their own interests, which are not public interests.

Politics, the servant, the incidental thing, has grown so great as to overshadow and subordinate all else in government. The problem, then, the first task of all groups, regardless of conflicting economic convictions, is to unite to break up the vicious, bi-partisan political plunder system, and reduce politics back to its only legitimate function, that of serving as the instrumentality for the application of economic and moral principles to the common welfare of the people.

PATRONAGE

This perverted, end-in-itself, political plunder system has two basic elements: (1) Patronage, and (2) the pork barrel.

Patronage means political machinery, political work at public expense for the benefit of professional politicians. This type of spoils is of two kinds: (1) The positions and perquisites controlled by the Congressional machine, and (2) the thousands and thousands of offices filled by presidential appointment. Both kinds are directly related to legislation and used to control legislation.

Congressional plunder will be discussed later. It consists chiefly in choice committee places, which carry with them much politically important prestige and many special privileges, such as extra clerks to do at public expense the personal and personally political business of those getting the plums. This

form of patronage resolves itself into subtle briberies by which those in control of the spoils buy human material for their bi-partisan machine.

The other and more far-reaching branch of patronage, that at the disposal of the President, who in that capacity acts as the head of the dominant political organization, is usually parceled out by cabinet members or "unofficial advisers" through Congressmen and Senators, thus vitally touching the sources of legislation.

THE PORK BARREL

The pork barrel, a form of plunder closely related to patronage, is another corner-stone of the system. Impelled by political necessity, each member seeks to secure for his district and for influential individuals and classes in his district everything possible at public expense. The Congressional machine, in control of the "pork," can parcel out or withhold it according to the measure of the members' allegiance to their system. There are from twelve to fifteen separate appropriation measures in every regular session. The corruptions of the pork barrel permeate each of them and ramify in all directions from all of them. In addition, thousands of bills are presented, and many of them become laws, which give more private and personal expression to the pork barrel element. Pensions, public buildings, local improvements, road, rivers, harbors, Indian affairs, salary manipulations and war munitions are included.

The currency of politics is not the gold and silver of commerce. It is office. Therefore the object of each member who is a regular and orthodox politician is to get every possible personal and political advantage from these appropriation bills. In the final analysis personal and political mean the same thing. Whatever a member obtains for his constituents under this system in reality he gets for himself, because the favor of the voters reacts to continue him in public position. The

general public, directly and in a thousand indirections, pays for it all. Through this monstrous trading system, the legitimate interests of the whole country are sacrificed to exalt professional, pie-and-pork politicians, to perpetuate their system.

Likewise the Congressman who is a regular, aside from petty spoils such as misappropriated clerk hire, gets little or nothing of a direct money value from patronage. His interest in patronage is purely political; it contributes at public expense to his election and retention in office. Office means "honor"—to small-sized men a great thing—and the salary of the position, which in most cases is more than he could earn in private life. To secure and retain public position is the object of those with patronage to disburse. The smaller beneficiary of patronage feels the same way. Here we get the connection. Those individuals whose appointive positions are dependent upon the political success of a Congressman labor, without cost to him, for his election. More than that, much, and in some cases all, of the time of those receiving appointments to public position is afterward given to practical politics. This means political organization—perpetual political work, for which the public pays. Most of the waste and inefficiencies of governmental service are due to this cause. Office is held to be a political and not a public trust.

There is one distinctive difference between patronage and pork. The pork barrel merges directly into another problem, the greatest of all; that is, the wholesale manipulation of public opinion in reference to everything political. Legislators bend every energy to get pork barrel results because those results create the impression at home that they are influential and working for the "best" interests of their district. As a matter of fact, those members who obtain most for powerful interests and individuals invariably do so through the trading and sacrifice of all that should be held sacred for the welfare of the public as a whole; they are the most

servile and inconsequential when measured by the standard of real public service. But the selfish interests of those who gain through pork blind them to this truth. Therein lies the duplicity, the perversion of public opinion.

PERVERSION OF PUBLIC OPINION

In this connection, we have, all unknown to ourselves, entered upon a new political epoch. Formerly those who profited from the control of government depended upon the old Tammany style of politics—the colonization of voters, the stealing and stuffing of ballots, the bribery of legislators and executives and judges. Now, except in rare localities, such crude means are being abandoned. For a decade professional politicians have been employing the subtler, safer way of getting the same results by so manipulating public opinion that the voters would support their system and their servants, at the same time believing that their own interests were being advanced.

I am not arraigning the army of small political individuals, but the system itself. Those who naturally and by character adjust themselves to the prevailing deceptions of politics are a minority. But those who view the aims and ends of politics as secondary to public interests are forced also to practice duplicities, to pose and play, in order to survive. You cannot find anywhere in the *Congressional Record* of the last Congress a set speech in which personal or party politics did not enter. Always, in whatever is said or done, the object is to get political results—to win or hold the votes of the people. The system makes it so.

Politicians are good and bad. So far as the distant people may judge, it is practically impossible to choose between the good and the bad, for which political control of public opinion is responsible. Take such a question as the initiative and referendum, for example. I know politicians in Congress and in State legislatures, representing the very worst elements of our

political life, who pose as leaders in the movement for popular government. Public sentiment is so misdirected as to exalt their shamming into actuality. That is the purpose of it.

This manipulation of public opinion might be divided into two grades, major and minor—general and local. In the larger field, politicians and the press are inseparable. The relation is so natural, so necessary, that most professional office seekers and office holders have control over publicity channels—in many cases as direct as that of ownership. In big matters, such as the making of presidential candidates, the system can and does mask professional politicians with almost any character they choose. On the other hand, those inclined to independence can be belittled and ridiculed out of public life. Today, with public opinion controlled as it is, there is not the remotest chance for a Lincoln to come up out of obscurity to influence our national tendencies, even for an hour. Political control of public opinion is so thorough that only politicians can survive. It is difficult of proof, but without doubt there exists an unseen and unseeable organization of opinion-molding agencies. Beyond doubt this concert of controlled publicity is employed to direct public thought toward certain definite selfish aims of politicians and away from objects of opposite importance.

But when one comes to consider the manipulation of public opinion in the narrower, local sense, all shadows and vagueness disappear. Individual Congressmen and Senators have at their disposal every conceivable opportunity to practice duplicity in respect to their own public service. There is wholesale abuse of the franking privilege—members may communicate at any time and in almost any way with their constituents at public expense. They engage in cheap advertising schemes through this means. They frank free seeds to the voters. They get leave to print speeches, often written by someone else, and these are franked broadcast. They introduce all sorts of local bills, which are purely for political

effect, rarely being pressed beyond the point of introduction. They share in all the ramifications of the pork barrel. The system is such that the member can keep in touch with and appear to do something for every community and influential class in his district—all at public expense—all tending to give him such false character and standing that he will be continued in office.

BI-PARTISANSHIP

This wholesale manipulation of public opinion is aided, it is almost founded upon, the blind personal bias and prejudices of the voters, which is partisanship. Ninety per cent of our political ills, back of which is practically every industrial inequity that exists, are due to the paradoxical facts that the voters are partisan and the politicians are not.

The political plunder system is bi-partisan. In all probability it would include the leaders of more than two great political organizations, if there were more than two with any considerable representation in Congress. A Tammany Hall politician once was asked how Tammany got on with the Republicans. He answered: "Oh, we fight some on little things like the tariff, but we agree on the main issue, that them as works in politics is entitled to make a living out of it," which tells the whole story.

There is, of course, some partisan strife as to which party shall control the spoils, but none as to the plunder itself. And, so far as the people are concerned, plunder is the important issue, not those who enjoy it at public expense. This slightly confusing distinction may be illustrated in a parallel case. With two brewery firms, their rivalry extends only to the sale of beer. The question of prohibition brings both together at once. And to those interested in the abolition of liquor, prohibition is the issue, not which particular brewery does the business. Rival breweries may vie with each other over the sale of beer, but they are always agreed as to beer as an institution. It is the same with professional politicians of rival parties in

respect to their plunder. Each party is better fed in than out; therefore each seeks as honestly as their motives will permit to control and enjoy the spoils of office. But there is never a thought of antagonism to the spoils system; the regular leaders of both old parties would no more do anything to disturb plunder as a basic institution of politics than would breweries work for national prohibition. There are party controversies—for the most part sham battles, shrewdly staged—but in everything that concerns the politicians and their plunder the leaders of both old parties seem to work in perfect agreement. The following chapter contains many conclusive illustrations of this fact.

The political plunder system could not exist if it were not bi-partisan. If the rivalry were real, the minority party would always expose the plundering of the majority; the outs would invariably unmask the ins. Publicity then would cure the evil: plunder can exist only in darkness. The very beginning of the political plunder system, its primary and most crucial element, therefore, is bi-partisanship.

Here, then, is the situation we have to consider: government is the all-important element in human life. Politics is the only existing instrumentality through which the objects of government can be translated into common welfare. The agency functions of politics are corrupted and perverted, by pork and patronage, into an end in itself. This perversion, founded upon the unseeing bias and prejudices of partisanship among voters, is made complete by the wholesale manipulation and misdirection of public opinion. The deception is crowned completely by a bi-partisan harmony of purpose and program among professional politicians.

The obvious thing to do is to take away from politics its duplicities, its perversions, and make it the agency, not the end, of government. How can this be done?

POLITICS AND BUSINESS

The weakness of those attempting reform has been twofold: (1) they have failed to see the end-in-itself character of modern politics; and (2) they have never presented an adequate constructive program of remedies. The two must go together. The muck-raking of the last decade yielded little more than a reaction in the public mind for the reason that it lacked a constructive program.

The big object of this little book is to point the way out, to outline constructive remedies. These remedies will go no further than politics. I shall not in any way deal with economic questions. Great, deeply rooted moral and industrial inequities exist, but I believe that "big politics," rather than "big business," is the immediate problem—that it will be possible to reach and rectify economic conditions if politics first be reformed, if the means and machinery to that end be provided. To attempt economic changes with the political machinery at hand would be as futile and foolish as would be the harvesting of wheat with the ancestral sickle.

The political system is, of course, the source and, through its failures, the cause of our chief industrial difficulties. No one will dispute that. That is why government means so much to the individual in dollars and cents. Special interests seeking great governmental favors are still dependent upon politics, but politics has become more and more independent of "big business," more and more an end in itself. It has its own complete circle, with certain streams of influence and power flowing from the people, through the professional politicians, to Congress, and certain other disguised and colored streams reaching back from Congress to the people. Special interests are coming in contact with a constantly decreasing number of politicians. The leaders, the big bosses, are about the only ones with whom they now need to deal directly.

Real predatory interests could hardly exist without modern politics, but politics could get on very well without the prac-

tical support of special interests, because it has a perverted system complete in itself, based on office and the spoils of office.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF POLITICAL REFORM

The reconstruction of modern politics, its demotion from principal to agent in government, must be brought about through three concerted influences: (1) publicity, the establishment of permanently open avenues of honest, comprehensive information, which is an educational and fundamental necessity if the personnel of the public service is to be improved; (2) the substitution of the independent, non-partisan, anti-spoils balance of power position in elections and legislation for partyism, which is fundamentally constructive and necessary, if politics is to be shorn of its end-in-itself character; and (3) an adequate constructive program of parliamentary and institutional reform in legislative bodies, through which alone can come light and honesty and efficiency in the doing of public business.

In Chapter VI there is outlined a way to secure honest information, instead of the perverted publicity now almost wholly in the hands of the self-interested political system. The great problem in this respect is to bridge the long, mysterious distance between Congress and the people. That is one of the big objects of the National Voters' League—to study the national legislature as a whole, to reduce its activities down to individuals, and then to reveal each Representative and Senator to his constituents exactly according to his record in public life.

Chapter VI also outlines a method of dealing with the bipartisan combination, which of course means the political system. There are only two basic principles upon which the work of reforming politics can be founded: one is to work through political parties, in an attempt to control the prevailing party; the other is to secure the balance of power in elections, and legislation. The first means politics, the second a breaking

up of politics. If orthodox political results are the objects to be obtained, by all means choose to work through modern political organization. If moral, or economic, or vital governmental changes are sought, the independent position, the balance of power, is the one to take. This is fundamental. It is one of the big ideas underlying all advancement in American government today. Yet hardly a handful of people comprehend its importance.

Parliamentary reconstruction must naturally precede both adequate educational publicity and a change in our attitude toward partyism, because only through this lifting of the curtain can their meaning be made clear. Parliamentary reconstruction means rules reform. Rules reform implies no more and no less than simple honesty and efficiency in the conduct of the public business. It means the substituting of daylight for darkness, the divorcing of the spoils of politics and legislation. In Chapter V, after a detailed diagnosis of parliamentary conditions, rules reform remedies will be outlined.

The interrelations of these three lines of political reform must be kept in mind. There can be no adequate publicity, no clear understanding of conditions, without rules reform, until dark spots in the procedure are lighted up. When professional politicians are driven into the open, and the plunder of politics revealed, then only will the voters be able to discriminate in their own interest in the choice of public servants. But even with light and honest information, the voters will fail so long as their vision remains distorted by the bias and prejudices of partisanship. There must be recognition of the crucial fact that partyism means political objects rather than public service. Then will come the practical part, to work for the public interest, as the politicians now do for their own political ends, through the balance of power in elections and legislation.

Parliamentary reform is the crucial point of attack. The parliamentary system of the House of Representatives is the

politicians' melting pot. Into it they pour the powers and privileges which the votes of the people have given them; out of it come influences which deceive the people into continual support of the same politicians and the same system. Otherwise politics could not be an end in itself.

To change the parliamentary conditions of Congress, substituting light where now there is darkness, taking power from the few and placing it in the keeping of the majority, establishing regular order and substituting regular, orderly procedure for the extraordinary boss proceedings that now prevail, divorcing legislation from the plunders of politics—this is the first and most necessary step in political reform. By this means the professional politicians would be driven out of their entrenchments. Politicians will not fight in the open.

Chapter V presents a constructive program of rules reform. Before adequate remedies could be conceived, it was necessary to make two preliminary studies: first, of the history of attempts at rules reform during the the last decade; and, second, of the existing parliamentary conditions which are in need of reconstruction. We will cover the preliminary ground in that order, next considering insurgency within Congress. Insurgency is only another name for rules reform. All the recent attempts at parliamentary reconstruction are included in the story of House insurgency.

INSURGENCY

The insurgent in public life is an individual who instinctively, or through vision, understands that office and the spoils of office have become the chief ends of politics. He may or may not be radical in an economic sense; economic attitude rarely enters into it. The element that determines the true insurgent is his willingness to face political disgrace and death rather than to live the lie of pretended public service when the public actually is serving him.

It should be easy for the citizen to be an insurgent. Individually, and as a whole, the people have no interest in the plunder of politics, excepting to end its cost and corruptions. Self-interest should prompt the rank and file to adopt the insurgent, or balance of power, position. But when a man in public life takes that position and becomes independent of prevailing political practices, he divorces himself from all those influences through which ninety-nine of every hundred advance in the political world. The last decade has seen hundreds of political insurgents; less than a dozen have survived. Many remain who pose as independents, but these have made secret peace with the political powers that be: like the regulars who wear no mask, they eat and drink of the sustaining plunder.

Insurgency has never been fully comprehended or appreciated, because we have failed to see that plunder, not public service, was the cornerstone of the end-in-itself political system. With modern politics as a background, it becomes possible to see in insurgency the only highway to practical public service. In itself it embodies two of the three fundamental remedies for bad political conditions: (1) rules reform; and (2) the independent, anti-partisan, anti-spoils, balance of power position, both in elections and legislation. And insurgency also has contributed more to the third fundamental requisite of reform—educational publicity—than all other forward influences combined.

CHAPTER III

THE EBB AND FLOW OF INSURGENCY

Progressivism in this country, although since gone far astray, had its origin and impetus in insurgency within legislative bodies.

Out on the prairies of Minnesota I remember a time when the people waited, day by day, for developments to come out of Congress. The things for which we watched and waited were not tariffs nor currency bills. They were the issues of fights against entrenched stand-pat machines—La Follette in his political life-and-death struggle with the old Senate oligarchy, the contests of men like Lindbergh and Nelson and Norris and Murdock with Cannonism. Those were the issues that stirred the thinking voters. Perhaps we did not then understand the meaning of insurgency. We may not at that time have seen clearly the shams of partisanship, nor comprehended how the clubs of patronage and pork were holding the threatened revolt to a handful of pioneers. But we did know, instinctively, that insurgency was a protest against a bad political system, that it evidenced something righteous and vital in American public life.

Those early insurgent struggles centered about parliamentary questions. Remember that. The parliamentary system of Congress was then the source of all the larger vicious influences that contributed to existing political conditions. It is even more so today. In the last decade parliamentary conditions have steadily gone from bad to worse.

The politicians know this. Their duplicities in parliamentary matters constitute a confession of it. At one time or another practically every member has voiced and voted his opposition to some phase of the system; yet nothing has been done. By every artifice of politics they have contrived to prevent parliamentary changes, thus safeguarding their plun-

der, although simultaneously posing as in favor of rules reform. The very situations that promoted a greater degree of bossism and of darkness were so manipulated that the politicians responsible might appear as favoring exactly opposite tendencies, changes which would light up and democratize the proceedings. More hypocrisy and double dealing has attended the handling of rules reform questions than all other subjects before Congress.

Those responsible for present conditions understand that their position is indefensible, that their only chance to escape popular condemnation is to keep the people in ignorance; that is why they dissemble, both as to authority for and the meaning of actual conditions. But they comprehend clearly the relation of parliamentary institutions to political plunder; therefore they permit nothing to disturb their parliamentary institutions. As parliamentary conditions have grown worse, the deceptions have become deeper and more complicated. To take any other view is to enthrone chance and accident as the architects of a most complicated system, and to assume that the politicians have only drifted, hand in hand with chance. Masterful things do not just happen; nor are the politicians given to a blind reliance upon undirected developments. They are men making a profession of politics. They study their business as you do yours.

The dividends of politics are represented in office and the perquisites of office. The parliamentary system of Congress is both mint and clearing house for this counterfeit currency of politics. Both of the other basic elements in the political system also enter into this consideration of insurgency. These are the bi-partisan spoils combination and the manipulation of public opinion. All three, (1) parliamentary conditions, (2) bi-partisanship, and (3) the misdirection of public sentiment, blend in every manifestation of modern politics.

It will not be necessary to go back farther than ten years, nor to consider conditions outside the House of Representa-

tives. A decade ago there were only whispers of protest against the complete bossism of that régime. A little later, becoming conspicuous in 1907 and culminating in 1910, insurgency took shape and assumed real influence. A most important point to bear in mind is the fact that this insurgency was wholly within the dominant party. Therein lies the reason of its failure. The opposition of the minority party to darkened, undemocratic, unbusinesslike procedure, has in recent years been only a sham battle. And rules reform never will succeed so long as existing lines of sham partisanship are kept intact. Insurgency must become non-partisan; to be potent it must include the members of all parties who stand for public service rather than the spoils of politics. It must occupy the balance-of-power position.

We ought to have a new political vocabulary. Old phrases have become hackneyed and nearly meaningless, whereas the troubles lies in the fact that we never comprehended the conditions they were intended to express. For example, the public has been surfeited with such words as "rules reform." I must use them here. Their use would not hinder, but aid interest, if the people understood that rules reform means simple honesty and efficiency where there is now plunder and waste in public life; that it means regular, orderly procedure where now disorder reaches almost to chaos; that rules reform means only a substitution of sunlight for the darkened processes of professional politicians. Publicity and an opportunity to have a voice and vote by breaking down the absolute bossism of that period were the more definite issues which caused the first insurgency against Cannonism to develop.

What the Cannon régime was, and what has since developed out of it, will be detailed in the next chapter. It is sufficient here, for the purposes of this installment, to point out that *Cannonism was the parliamentary system of that period*. In every interpretation of politics we come to that basic fact,

the coursing of all political streams through parliamentary conditions.

In 1905-7 affairs in the House of Representatives were running smoothly, with Cannonism in full swing. The Republicans were then in overwhelming control, and practically all were "regular." Only distant mutterings of the insurgent storm had been heard. The Democrats, a helpless minority of 136, were then arrayed solidly against the majority on questions of procedure. They stood for "rules reform." That is always the way: the minority, when their protests cannot count, invariably favor light and order and democracy in the proceedings. The majority, in whom power and responsibility lie, are as unvaryingly for the darkened parliamentary system. The outs are virtuous, while the ins are vicious. Viciousness and virtue have seemed to depend entirely on who were in and who were out. In other words, the majority is always reactionary and the minority always progressive on all-important questions of procedure, it matters not in the least which political group happens to be in authority.

The parliamentary situation ten years ago in its partisan aspects may be diagrammed as follows:

FIFTY-NINTH CONGRESS-1905-7 386 MEMBERS

Republicans	250	Democrats 136
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Darkened space represents reactionary attitude on rules reform. While space indicates reform attitude

In the Sixtieth Congress, while the sham battle conditions still remained nearly ideal for the professional politicians, there began to develop signs of what was to follow. The Democrats gained twenty-eight in number, and the inter-Republican revolt against boss control became perceptible. Cannonism became an issue. The dissenters within the Cannon party made it an issue. Bear that in mind. And

another important point to remember is the fact that these few pioneer majority party insurgents quickly took from the Democrats the center of the stage in the fight against Republican parliamentary practices. This was because their opposition was real, while the Democrats as a party had been maintaining only the usual blank-cartridge attitude of the outs against the ins.

At this stage the situation was as follows:

SIXTIETH CONGRESS-1907-09 -

386 MEMBERS



Dark-reactionary on rules reform. White-progressive in procedure.

The next Congress, the Sixty-first, witnessed the culmination of insurgency. The Republican dissenters grew in numbers to a point where their votes, added to those of the Democratic minority, were sufficient to overthrow the Cannon Republicans. Then the inevitable happened. The unmasking began. The common danger impelled the politicians of both parties to cease their sham battles. A number of Democrats adequate to save Cannon joined with the Republican regulars when the crisis came. That marked the birth of the bi-partisan combination which in every Congress since has grown in amity and effectiveness.

This most instructive period may be diagrammed as follows:

SIXTY-FIRST CONGRESS -1909-11.

386 MEMBERS



Dark-reactionary

White-progressive

In an appendix to this chapter there is given a table of roll calls, from which it can be ascertained just how the mem-

bers voted on several vital parliamentary matters in the Sixty-first Congress. The unmasking crisis came on March 15, 1909. The insurgent-Democratic alliance had been sufficiently strong to prevent the adoption of the old rules. Champ Clark, leader of the Democrats, then proposed an amendment to the rules, deposing Cannon from the Rules Committee and providing that that committee should be elected by the House. John J. Fitzgerald, of New York, moved the adoption of a substitute, making a few minor changes in the rules, but leaving Cannon's power over the Rules Committee—the crucial point—as it had been. The Fitzgerald amendment was adopted March 15, 1909, by a vote of 211 to 173, with five not voting.¹⁴ On this occasion the Republican regulars were reinforced by a number of Democrats led by Mr. Fitzgerald. This was the first evidence of the bi-partisan organization which has since become so pronounced whenever it is necessary to drop the mask of partyism.

The next development shows a complete reversal of party attitude in reference to the parliamentary system. The Democrats gained control of the House and became the responsible reactionaries on rules reform. They did not improve conditions; on the contrary, the parliamentary system became more undemocratic and darker than it had ever been. During this period, as in the following Congress—the Sixty-third—the Democratic majority employed the same parliamentary tactics

¹⁴ It is of interest to note who were the irregulars of both parties on this crucial occasion. The following Republicans voted against Cannon: William J. Cary of Wisconsin, Henry A. Cooper of Wisconsin, James H. Davidson of Wisconsin, Charles R. Davis of Minnesota, Augustus P. Gardner of Massachusetts, Asle J. Gronna of North Dakota, Gilbert N. Haugen of Iowa, Everis A. Hayes of California, Edmund H. Hinshaw of Nebraska, Elbert H. Hubbard of Iowa, Nathan E. Kendall of Iowa, Moses P. Kinkaid of Nebraska, Arthur W. Kopp of Wisconsin, Gustav Kusterman of Wisconsin, Irvine L. Lenroot of Wisconsin, Charles A. Lindbergh of Minnesota, William C. Lovering of Massachusetts, Edmond H. Madison of Kansas, Elmer A. Morse of Wisconsin, Victor Murdock of Kansas, John M. Nelson of Wisconsin, George W. Norris of Nebraska, Charles E. Pickett of Iowa, Miles Poindexter of Washington, Andrew J. Volstead of Minnesota, Frank P. Woods of Iowa.

The Democrats who came to Cannon's rescue were as follows: George A. Bartlett of Nevada, William G. Brantley of Georgia, Robert F. Broussard of Louisiana, Michael F. Conry of New York, Charles G. Edwards of Georgia, Albert Estopinal of Louisiana, John J. Fitzgerald of New York, Charles V. Fornes of New York, Henry M. Goldfogle of New York, Joseph A. Goulden of New York, Francis B. Harrison of New York, William M. Howard of Georgia, John A. Keliher of Massachusetts, Gordon Lee of Georgia, George H. Lindsay of New York, L. F. Livingston of Georgia, James T. McDermott of Illinois, John A. Moon of Tennessee, Joseph F. O'Connell of Massachusetts, Andrew J. Peters of Massachusetts, Daniel J. Riordan of New York, Stephen M. Sparkman of Florida.

that the Cannon Republicans had used; but their method of organization was much more complicated and irresponsible, and the closed caucus was raised to an evil importance never approached by any previous régime.

A diagram would reveal this situation:

SIXTY-SECOND CONGRESS - 1911-13

386 MEMBERS



It was logical, perhaps inevitable, that the Democrats should thus completely change their character on rules reform. The transition from impotent minority to responsible majority always means a reversal of attitude in parliamentary matters. The parliamentary system has to be preserved, and the majority must invariably face the stigma of upholding it. The politicians know that in two or three Congresses the failure to improve parliamentary conditions, more than all other influences, will swing the pendulum of control back to the other party. They expect that. They expect also, when they become a minority again, to change their spots, to make a new reputation as parliamentary reformers, which will return them to another period of power. So the political teeter board, balanced on the back of the people, works—now up, now down.

It is quite as natural for the minority, relieved of responsibility for vicious, unpopular conditions, suddenly to become progressive. The minority has nothing to do but play politics, to make amends for past misconduct, in anticipation of the day of their return to authority. It is natural for the minority to become united and harmonious in that rôle. There is nothing at stake. The time has come for all of the minority to protest against dark-lantern methods in legislation.

Therefore, in the Sixty-second Congress, we find the old

Cannon regulars in the rôle of progressives, denouncing the very "gag rules" they had modeled a few years before. They talked as loudly and as long in favor of reform as the anti-Cannon group had done. The tendency, then, was for the original Republican insurgents to lose their identity and progressive character in the general minority blending of the fictitious with the real. But that did not come completely until the next Congress. On questions of procedure, the original revolters could not vote more progressively than the old regulars did. The only opportunity to manifest the distinction that still existed came when that Congress was organized; and they here refused to join with the regulars in organizing the minority. When James R. Mann, a former Cannon lieutenant, was presented as the regular Republican candidate for Speaker, which meant the leadership of the minority, they refused to support him.¹⁵

In view of the past irreconcilable differences between Cannon and anti-Cannon Republicans, this situation was not in the least illogical. The more inexplicable development came in the next Congress, when the breach was healed. The unusual feature at this time—the Sixty-second Congress—was the fact that the minority was lacking in unity, while the majority, where insurgency usually manifests itself, was a harmonious whole.

The next development may be diagrammed as follows:



¹⁵ On April 4, 1911, the following Progressive Republicans voted against Mr. Mann's leadership of their party:

Akin, Anderson, Cooper, Davidson, Davis, French, Jackson, Kent, Kopp, Lafferty, LaFollette, Lenroot, Lindbergh, Morse, Murdock, Nelson, Warburton.

The organization of this last Congress presented a crisis for the politicians. Their system hung by a thread. But the day was saved, and the insurgents lost the best chance in a decade to break the power of the bi-partisan combination, to expose and diminish their hold upon the parliamentary system. The "leaders" proved equal to the emergency: they were able to prevent the formation of the non-partisan, anti-spoils, balance of power group which threatened their system.

Three elements, working together partly through chance, contrived to turn victory into defeat for the public. These were:

1. The return of the anti-Cannon group to the camp of the Republican regulars;

2. The untimely introduction of a new partisan influence in the Progressive party group; and, more inexplicable than the others;

3. The fact that the Democratic majority reached its crest of strength and power without insurgency.

All this meant partyism, the safeguard of the politicians. Just at the most critical time, the independents were divided and subdivided into antagonistic groups. It meant not only that the insurgents were kept apart, but that they were set to fighting in every crisis, progressive against progressive. It meant that each party should segregate and submerge and control its own progressives.

The test came with the election of Speaker. The Democrats voted unanimously for Champ Clark. That was the work of the majority party caucus. It meant that the Democratic progressives were a part of the secret caucus system of that party and rendered powerless through meek submission to the straw-strength of that vicious instrumentality. Their battles were fought within the caucus. The practice of the caucus has been, and will be until revolt and revolution come, to "bind" every member to vote in the House as a majority may decide in the caucus. (What the caucus is and does will be explained later.) The Democratic caucus was about two-thirds reac-

tionary; the reactionaries controlled the progressives. That took care of the problem of the Democratic progressives. There was no contest on the Speakership, and on the vital issue of organization and the rules all stood together. Except for a few individuals, it was impossible to distinguish between progressives and reactionaries on the Democratic side.

The vote for Mr. Mann meant that the House Republicans had at last been "harmonized;" that distinctions between progressives and reactionaries had been largely swept away; that, for the first time since the beginning of the fight against Cannonism, the Republicans presented an almost unbroken front; that a reawakened spirit of partisanship had bridged party differences and difficulties which one short year before seemed absolutely unbridgeable.

The vote for Mr. Murdock, the Progressive party candidate for Speaker, in a fundamental sense emphasized a new subdivision of progressives, another and fiercely jealous partisanship. It was a most inopportune time for the birth of a new partyism in Congress.

The session had hardly begun before there came a typical illustration of the results of this new alignment. A number of vital and necessary reforms in the rules were proposed. Because these amendments came from a Bull Mooser, both Republican progressives and Democratic progressives joined with Republican reactionaries and Democratic reactionaries in a refusal to accept them, although if the question of party advantage could have been eliminated every real progressive would have supported the proposed changes. As it was, only twenty-five voted affirmatively—not a sufficient number to secure a roll call. That happened repeatedly.

Think how differently the situation might have been. There were probably fifty incipient insurgents among the Democrats—members disgusted with the caucus and pelf and plunder methods of their own party organization—who were almost ready to bolt. There were about twenty-five progressive Republicans, new and old, who surrendered to the har-

mony movement within their own party. There were eighteen Progressives who supported the Bull Moose candidate for Speaker.¹⁷ Add to these Cary, Cooper, Mapes, Norton and Young, of North Dakota, Republicans who protested against organizing their party under Mann's leadership. All these hundred members belonged together. They believed in the same parliamentary changes, so far as fundamentals were concerned. Had they stood together, as they would have done had the artificial influence of partyism not made them political enemies, the whole history of the last Congress would have been very different.

If the original Republican insurgents had gone through just this one more crisis, maintaining their independence; if the Bull Moosers had not played so openly for party advantage; if revolt within the Democratic ranks could have been encouraged, rather than prevented, by the example of these progressives who had a right to be called the pioneers, it would have been possible, easy even, to have banded together on the high patriotic plane of non-partisanship, a force strong enough to compell a roll call on every important question. Public sentiment would have accomplished the rest. A balance of power in the people's interest would have been achieved.

It was the time of all times for the original anti-Cannon group, dwindled though they were, to stand firm. One more fight would have won. They were logically the leaders, if a non-partisan, anti-spoils, balance-of-power movement was to be launched. The Bull Moose members could hardly have refused cooperation. The many wavering Democrats needed only that little encouragement to break with their organization. But the original anti-Cannon insurgents, instead of rising to the occasion, surrendered, and the opportunity was gone.

Another point should be noted here. The system in Congress—and by that I mean the methods by which a few poli-

¹⁷ A few did not reach Washington in time to vote on the Speakership. Possibly others of them would have taken the independent position.

ticians control the membership and activities of every session—is always aided by the complete exclusion, during the critical organization period, of the new member element. More than 150 Congressmen entered the House for the first time April 7, 1913. These new members came fresh from the people, bearing a direct commission to do certain things, to represent their constituents along certain lines. Yet not one of them was given even the smallest chance to work for a change in the conditions that made the last Congress the plaything of a few past-master politicians. The organization was maneuvered to the minutest detail by the old members, which is done every biennium. Being ignorant of the game, not knowing either their power or their opportunity, all that the new members did, with only a few exceptions, was to merge into their respective party herds. Then it was too late to get out of the party pasture, or to do any good if it had been possible to scale the 15-foot fence of partisanship. The progressive strength had been hopelessly divided and subdivided; the old rules had been adopted; the opportunity to fight effectively was gone.

What will be the situation in the Sixty-fourth Congress? We know only the party divisions, and the general trend of parliamentary developments, all of which is unpromising. But a new element, a constructive program of rules reform, is to be projected into the balance. This will be entirely new, and no one can estimate its influence. Five years ago it would have been sufficient to alter conditions; now conditions are much more favorable to the enemies of change.

Party divisions in the next Congress will be proportionally as follows:

SIXTY-FOURTH CONGRESS - 1915-17.

435 MEMBERS

Republicans - 193 Progressives 9	Democrats - 233
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These figures tend to indicate that in the following Congress—the Sixty-fifth—the Republicans will return to power. Then the circle will have been completed—with worse than nothing accomplished in the all-important parliamentary field. At this point it is perfectly clear—

That partyism, in a sham sense, is more pronounced than ever before;

That insurgency is at its lowest ebb since 1907;

That the Democrats as a party have passed the crest, and are declining in strength, without insurgency;

That the Republicans, now gaining and apparently soon to reclaim control of the House, are almost completely harmonized, with insurgency stamped out; and

That the Bull Moosers, after contributing an influence toward partyism at an inopportune time, have dwindled from little to less, with their ablest leaders defeated in the last election.

And just when insurgency, which in its final analysis means rules reform, is at its lowest ebb, with the bi-partisan combination in the most advantageous position to keep this influence from developing, parliamentary conditions have never been so dark and undemocratic as now—so much in need of wholesome change.

GETTING AT THE TRUTH OF IT

In 1911 the politicians boldly trumpeted to the country the claim that the rules of the House had been reformed. The people, perhaps a majority of them, having no means of ascertaining the truth or falsity of this political assertion, took the politicians at their word. That is where the perversion of public opinion entered into it. I know of only one other manipulation of public sentiment on a national scale that was bigger or more successful. The best proof of this will be found in the analysis of what followed Cannonism which is given in the next chapter.

There are two reasons for the following installment: (1) to correct, as much as it can be done at this late date, the erroneous idea of parliamentary conditions which the self-interested politicians have planted in the public mind; and (2) to make that detailed diagnosis of the unhealthy system which must precede the prescription of remedies. Reconstruction is the big object. I would not have traced the ebb and flow of insurgency, nor would I stop next to study existing parliamentary abuses, if both were not necessary antecedents of the chapter on constructive remedies.

And do not forget that just as politics is at present the only instrumentality for the fulfillment, or abortion, of the objects of government, so is insurgency, which means independence and opposition to spoils, the only agency through which can come a purifying of politics at its most unwholesome spot—the parliamentary system of congress.

P 7

CHAPTER IV

LEGISLATING WITH A DARK LANTERN

My study of Congress has been marked by a series of simple discoveries. First came the revelation that public position, with its prestige and perquisites, rather than public service, was the aim and end of political organization. Then, in searching for the chief instrumentalities of this end-in-itself political system, I found them all to center in the parliamentary institutions of Congress. Next I discovered that the utter failure of insurgency even to maintain itself, to say nothing of accomplishing rules reform, was due largely to the fact that it never had big reconstructive objects. Following that I discovered that Cannonism was not a thing of the past, that parliamentary conditions were darker, more devious and undemocratic now than ever before in the whole history of Congress.

The Democrats, when they assumed control of the House of Representatives in 1911, did not abolish Cannonism; they disguised it by combining with that system the discredited machine methods that Aldrich had used in the Senate. The only essential difference between the old Cannon régime and the House machine that grew out of it exists in a cleverly masked transfer of power from Speaker to floor leader.

In modern times Congress has known but two systems of parliamentary procedure. One, based upon extraordinary powers vested in the presiding officer, reached its highest development under Cannon in the House. The other, based upon authority in the hands of the floor leader, was developed by Aldrich in the Senate. What the Democrats did in 1911, without disturbing the foundations of either, was to combine Cannonism and Aldrichism. The Democrats did not make a single contribution to this supposedly new régime. They adapted and blended together the worst elements of two bad systems, both Republican in origin.

It is interesting further to note that the Democrats have recognized and depended upon regular Republicans to such an extent that the new system has been distinctly bi-partisan. Under Cannon, except during the crisis of insurgency in 1910, the Republicans were partisan in parliamentary matters. The Democratic leaders, on the contrary, have worked hand in hand with their political "enemies." Using Republican machinery, perhaps they deemed it necessary to employ machinists of that school. At first the usual sham battles might deceive you on this important point, but a close inspection of the machine at work would remove all doubt.

The best way to study the parliamentary system is along practical lines. It is not a theoretical thing. Legislation is accomplished or defeated through the direct operation of parliamentary institutions. It is not a question of votes, but of manipulations. Those few in control of parliamentary devices have their powers multiplied manifold. The members on the outside, regardless of ability or inclination, are as helpless against the "leaders" as unarmed men would be facing instruments of death.

First, the individual member introduces a bill. It goes automatically to the standing committee having jurisdiction. Ordinarily that ends its history. If there is a report from its committee, the bill next is considered in the darkened committee of the whole. Then the open House has a chance, just sufficient to maintain a pretense of deliberation. After that, almost without exception, measures of general interest pass finally into the hands of a conference committee, an inevitable evil in a bi-cameral congress.

The situation would be simple if we had only to deal with the routine above suggested, but three big influences touch legislation at every point.

These are:

1. *The somewhat vague, but always all-powerful element which we may call the "organization;"*

2. *The closed caucus, a wholly unofficial institution, which is at once creator and creature of the organization; and*

3. *The Committee on Rules, a subsidiary body over which the House itself has no authority, which is the politicians' steering committee and can step in at any point to control the fate of almost all legislation.*

These special instrumentalities should be studied in advance of a general inspection of events in the order of their occurrence. They show how the House is organized and controlled, and illuminate every step in the proceedings.

ORGANIZING THE HOUSE—THEN AND NOW

Cannonism was the parliamentary system of that period. Back in those dark parliamentary days the insurgents fought chiefly for two changes, both aimed, not at the system but at the individual head of the system. These were:

1. *To take away from the Speaker the appointment of committees; and*

2. *To give to a majority of the House control over its standing committees.*

The crux of Cannonism was the Speaker's power to appoint committees. But there was coupled with the one-man naming of committees a complete lack of control over these committees by the House itself. Otherwise the machine thus assembled could not have been manipulated at will by the organizer. When the Speaker, in the exercise of his arbitrary privilege as the organizer of the House, had packed the crucial committees, these committees were supreme. The rules gave to the House no adequate authority over its subordinate bodies.

Another basic element in the Cannon system was the Speaker's position at the head of the Committee on Rules, from which vantage ground he could dictate the regular and

special rules under which the House was operated by a small oligarchy of leaders.

In that period, then, the power to appoint committees, coupled with the impotency of the majority in reference to committees and rules, was the power to control the politics, perquisites and legislation of the House. What is the situation in these respects today?

During the régimes of Cannon in the House and Aldrich in the Senate, the appointive power was virtually in the hands of one man. Cannon was direct and absolute in his authority to build an organization through control of the personnel of committees. Aldrich arrived at the same result in a more irresponsible way, through a "committee on committees," which he dominated.

In the last Congress the bi-partisan organization was effected through a combination of Aldrich and Cannon methods. The Democratic members of committees, including the fifty-eight chairmanships, were given their places, *à la* Aldrich, by the Democratic members of the Ways and Means Committee, of which Oscar W. Underwood was chairman. As the leader of his side of the House, Underwood did as Aldrich formerly did in the Senate. The Republican minority members were apportioned by one man as they were during the Cannon days. The Republican organizer was James R. Mann.

These two—Oscar W. Underwood, Democrat, and James R. Mann, Republican—were the all-powerful figures in the House. They did not often openly cooperate in legislation, but their organizations usually worked together to prevent fundamental changes in the rules, to protect the personal and political interests of members of both parties, and to keep the present undemocratic parliamentary system intact.

The Democratic caucus resolution which gave to Mr. Underwood, whom the caucus had already chosen chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, his opportunity and power in the selection of committees should be presented here. The

first paragraph contains a fine touch of humor. It is as follows:

Resolved, That the rules of the House in the Sixty-third Congress shall prescribe that the standing committees of the House of Representatives shall be elected by the House.

Resolved further, That the majority members of the Ways and Means Committee elected by the caucus to serve as such during the Sixty-third Congress be and they are hereby authorized to nominate the majority members of the standing committees of the House in the Sixty-Third Congress to the caucus for its ratification or rejection, and that the majority members of the Ways and Means Committee of the House in the Sixty-third Congress shall not be eligible to serve on any other standing committee of the House.

Resolved further, That all vacancies occurring on any standing committee shall be filled in the same manner.

When this crucial matter was before the majority party caucus, on March 5, 1913, an unsuccessful attempt was made to change the system from the Aldrich method to one more democratic. William H. Murray, of Oklahoma, offered the following substitute, but Mr. Underwood's supporters controlled the caucus and it was voted down:

Be it Resolved by the Democratic House Caucus, That the rule of this caucus providing that the Committee on Ways and Means shall select and recommend to the caucus the members of the various standing committees of the House of Representatives is hereby abolished; and that for the future guidance in the selection of the committees the States shall be grouped into seven several zones of an equal number of Democratic House members, and that three members from each zone shall be selected by the membership of each several zone who shall constitute a committee on committees to consist of twenty-one members, and the Speaker shall be chairman thereof, and that said committee thus formed shall select the majority members of the various House standing committees and recommend same to this caucus for the approval of this caucus and that the members for the various committees thus selected and approved by this caucus shall constitute the majority members for the several House committees.

The Murray resolution, while moderating somewhat the Underwood-Aldrich method, would not have remedied matters. It also recognized the "committee on committees" idea and operated through the unofficial, closed caucus, neither of which influence could be expected to contribute to democratic character in the organization.

The Underwood resolution, being adopted, meant a method of majority party organization two steps removed from responsibility, and as great a distance from deliberate democracy in that proceeding. The caucus had given Mr. Underwood's "committee on committees" the authority to name the standing committees. Then the caucus "approved" these nominations. A further fiction of the rule existed in that portion of it which seemed to imply that the House should "elect" its own committees; the House also approved, as a matter of course. In the history of the last two Congresses neither the caucus nor the House once interfered with the machine building of the committee on committees. It would have been utterly futile to attempt to interfere after the committee on committees had been launched by the "leaders" and sanctioned by the caucus. That signified that the trading and dickering for place and pelf had already been done, that the machine was in motion. The "organization," which in turn dominated the closed caucus and controlled the House, was settled by a few in advance of both caucus and House.

Mr. Mann, as the organizer of the Republican members, was not even nominally handicapped by having to work through "a committee on committees." His authority and power were directly exercised. He used the Cannon one-man method.

The original Democratic caucus resolution bearing on this point was as follows:

Resolved, That the Democratic members of the Ways and Means Committee, through their designated representative (Underwood), shall arrange the assignment of the minority members on the standing committees of the House, with the person (Mann) or persons authorized by the minority members to represent them.

The necessary supplemental authority came from a secret Republican caucus held on April 5, 1913. Mr. Austin, of Tennessee, offered the following resolution, which was adopted unanimously:

Resolved, That the Republican membership of the House be represented by our candidate for Speaker in the matter of representation and recommendation of Republican members of the House committees under the rules of the House.

In this same caucus, with ninety-seven Republicans present, Mr. Mann had been unanimously chosen as the Republican candidate for Speaker.

Cannon formerly organized the House directly under the rules. Underwood and Mann have since done it indirectly, in violation of the spirit of the rules, one using the Aldrich "committee on committees" method, and operating through the Democratic caucus, the other employing the Cannon method, with authority from both old party caucuses.

REASSEMBLING THE MACHINE

It can be seen, then, that there are three stages in the reconstruction, or continuation, of the House machine. First, the re-elected leaders, quietly and under cover, parcel out coveted committee places and complete almost to the last detail the work of reorganization. This is done soon after the congressional elections and weeks before the new members appear on the scene. This initial manipulation is unauthorized and unofficial. It is so far removed from an official organization that the distance must be divided by still another unofficial but slightly more public proceeding. This is called the majority party caucus. Because the real organizing already done must be ratified, the leaders arrange for an organization caucus. This is the second step.

Then, on the opening day of the new Congress, the old rules are readopted and the unofficial, unauthorized work of the reorganizers is made official. When that is done it means another boss-controlled Congress.

For the Sixty-fourth Congress the first and second steps have already been taken. There is nothing authentic to discuss in reference to the preliminary slate fixing. That was all under cover. But the organization caucus of the majority party was held on February 4, 1915. The more important results of this closed caucus may be summarized under five heads:

The New Floor Leader.—This caucus was called upon to approve the old guard's selection of a new floor leader to replace Underwood (who had been elected to the Senate), a position more important than that of the Speakership. Claude Kitchin, of North Carolina, had been agreed upon for chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, which carried with it the office of floor leader, and the caucus approved as a matter of course. Mr. Kitchin's record in the House is that of the ordinary machine member. He voted against the open caucus. He voted against Republican gag rules and for Democratic gag rules. He voted against woman suffrage. He voted, on February 15, 1915, against the Palmer child labor bill.

Clark for Speaker.—Next in importance in the work of this closed caucus was its ratification of Champ Clark as the Democratic candidate for Speaker. This office has been shorn of much of its power, but during the last two Congresses Mr. Clark has demonstrated no inclination to reform undemocratic parliamentary conditions.

The Ways and Means Committee.—This closed caucus approved the slate in reference to the Democratic membership of this all-important committee. Upon the motion of Champ Clark, Messrs. H. T. Rainey, L. Dixon, C. Hull, J. N. Garner, J. W. Collier, C. C. Dickinson and M. F. Conroy were chosen to succeed themselves on that committee. Vacancies were filled by the selection of A. G. Allen, D. J. McGillicuddy, G. T. Helvering, J. J. Casey, C. R. Crisp and W. A. Oldfield. These Democratic members of the Ways and Means Committee were next authorized to "organize" the new House.

Chairman of the Caucus.—The only contest was over the chairmanship of the Democratic caucus. E. W. Saunders, of Virginia, received 108 votes and Martin D. Foster, of Illinois, 86 votes, the doubtful honor going to the former. This meant the reorganization of the caucus machinery for the next Congress.

Out of this closed caucus, meeting behind barred and bolted doors, with no sight or sound of its proceedings reaching the public, the new House régime was born.

THE PART THE CAUCUS PLAYS

Leadership, to be effective, must be based upon something more than personal power. The party "leader," in order to have a following, must have at his disposal spoils with which to reward his followers. In the House these rewards take the form of favored committee places, patronage, perquisites, prestige, etc. It is instructive to note how Mann and Underwood came to occupy the positions they undeniably held as respective leaders of the Republican and Democratic regulars in the last House. The method is simple. It should be understood, however, because it illustrates the comparative importance of caucuses and committees, their dependence each upon the other, their respective contributions to the building of the organization.

Take the case of Mr. Mann. Before the last Congress was organized, the leaders of his party apparently effected a tentative combination of re-elected Republicans. (The new members are always excluded from real participation in the organization.) With this *assumed* power, they went into the Republican caucus. The caucus ratified their tentative action, making Mr. Mann their candidate for Speaker, their floor leader, and giving him authority over the Republican membership of committees. Thus was the *assumed* power made *real*. Mr. Mann then had actual control of the regulars of his party because their congressional fortunes were largely in his hands. It was much the same on the Democratic side, only the procedure in that camp was more complex and mystifying.

Neither party caucus could have become a dominating force in the beginning without a tentative "organization" to bring it into being. Neither caucus could long remain intact without a real organization back of it. In fact, a caucus is only the manifestation of an organization. One man, or a few men,

can control a caucus only when they have gained control of the membership of the caucus through domination of the machine—which means the regular committees.

The power of the caucus lies in the popular belief that it is an institution of real power. It is not. It has no power except that born of the fear of it. When its bluff and bluster fail, the caucus is a weak, timorous thing that shies at its own shadow. So false is its foundation, so indefensible is its place in the machinery of legislation that, by bolting and advertising their insurgency throughout the country, no more than ten determined members can bring about its disruption at any time.

This misunderstanding of the people is based largely on the belief that the caucus can bind reluctant members to unanimity. That is false. The action of a caucus binds only those members who were bound by the "organization" before the caucus acted. No one ever heard of a caucus where the leaders were not in harmony as to the course to be taken. Why did not the Democrats caucus and unite in the fight to repeal free tolls?

The greatest fallacy of all is the contention that the caucus sometimes is used to promote good legislation. The caucus in its influence is always obstructive, and never constructive. Not once in the last Congress did the caucus contribute the deciding factor of strength to secure the passage of a measure. On the other hand, it was employed repeatedly to shield and mantle with vague, shifting irresponsibility the obstructive tactics of so-called leaders.¹⁸

¹⁸ Take the tariff for example. The passage of the tariff bill was inevitable. The caucus did not promote its passage. What the caucus did was to obstruct and prevent the open consideration of all sorts of features of the tariff bill, which was made possible by the unprotesting acquiescence of members in its straw-man strength. The caucus prevented the adoption of amendments; it precluded "schedule by schedule" consideration; it saved the politicians from record votes on various amendments and schedules; it obstructed every effort to remove inequities from the measure.

It was the same with the currency bill. The caucus did not pass that measure. It only obstructed amendments. The caucus operated to prevent the incorporation in the bill of such vital features as an interlocking directorates prohibition and a provision for rural credits.

In the adoption of the administration's "trust program" by the caucus, there was the same undeniable evidence of obstruction rather than construction. What those in control may have desired was not so much to pass those measures as to keep certain provisions out of them, and, by giving them the right of way, to postpone the consideration of other matters upon which the House preferred not to vote.

The caucus assumes and exercises responsibility for the organization and activities of the House. But who in the caucus is responsible? There's the rub. How is it possible to reduce the responsibility down to individuals? If the caucus has any power, regardless of what form of power it may be—negative, obstructive, or even a kind of positive power based on the tolerant ignorance of participants and people—it is an irresponsible power. When you try to fix responsibility for anything the caucus does or does not do, the outlines of individuals, dimly seen even at first, gradually dissolve into a misty mass.¹⁹

Yet the majority party caucus, an unofficial institution, essentially secret, its meetings held behind barred and bolted doors, with no record of the debate, not even a sound escaping; with no assured integrity of the meager records it does keep; with absolutely no power to prevent dodging or the manipulation of quorums; with its portals ever open to pork-barrel bargainers, and all the underground influences of politics; with rarely more than a fourth of the whole membership of the House doing the deciding, has often usurped the official functions of the House itself.

A small minority may prevail over the whole House through the caucus. The caucus is the instrument of a minority; it means minority rule, the most undemocratic thing in the catalogue of political perversities.

It is indefensible enough when a minority in the caucus presumes to act for the House, but that is not the worst of it. The caucus has become the last refuge of the dodgers. Those actually responsible for not bringing politically dangerous questions before the House for an open vote seek shelter in the failure of the caucus to command them to do so.

¹⁹ Sometimes there are roll calls in the caucus. These have little value. Two years ago I published a caucus roll call and a now nameless Democrat claimed my report was incorrect, that he had voted the other way. And he got other Democrats to join him in the deception. I expected that there would be an attempt to change the caucus minutes and hurried witnesses there who are ready at any time to testify that my report was a true copy of the original records. But when caucus roll calls are disputed, as in this case, what can be done about it? The members may lie about their attitude, and there is no official evidence to the contrary. Caucus records are unofficial. The caucus itself is wholly unofficial.

"Log jams" are the modern politicians' chief delight. When the calendars become so congested and obstructed with appropriation measures and special orders that dangerous issues cannot be reached, then ordinary Congressmen are in bliss. In the first session of the last Congress, the caucus passed a resolution forbidding standing committees to report bills to the House without express permission from the caucus.

During all that period this meant a double check upon committees. The "reformed rules" gave the House no practical power to compel reluctant committees to report business; that was one side of it. On the other hand, if standing committees desired to act on bills and advance the work of Congress, there was this caucus mandate to obstruct them. In that way the caucus contributed to a "log jam" which was so complete as to make the Rules Committee almost the absolute dictator of what the House did or did not do.

Then, with Calendar Wednesday filibustered and disregarded out of countenance, the only possible way to get anything not privileged before the House was through a special rule from the Rules Committee, and the Rules Committee, although the caucus may not have whispered "thou shalt not," refused to act until the caucus thundered "thou shalt." Neither the Committee on Rules nor any other committee is in any official way responsible to the caucus, but the game worked because the excuse was convenient, and the people too far away to understand.

Partyism is the parent evil in Congress. The caucus is the last and fullest expression of partyism.

SECRECY OF THE CAUCUS

Only the dominant party uses the caucus regularly. The minority have no need of caucuses, except to organize their hungry forces. In the old Cannon days the Republicans had a caucus. They have it yet. They used it in the last Congress to select James R. Mann, a former Cannon lieutenant, as their candidate for Speaker. Then, after carefully oiling it

and giving it a good coating of publicity about "open caucus meetings"—to prevent the rust of unpopularity—they placed it in the machine shed. It is there now, without a nut loose.

The Republican caucus which decided that Mr. Mann should be the organizing head of the Republicans was held in secret. There was no further need of a secret caucus on the minority side. The Republicans had nothing to do but protest, and partisan protests are for political purposes; they abhor barred doors and closed shutters. Accordingly at a subsequent session the Republican caucus adopted a resolution declaring for open meetings. But—

This amendment, offered by I. L. Lenroot, of Wisconsin, was made a part of the resolution: "*Provided, That the conference or caucus may go into executive session at any time by a majority vote of those present.*"

That joker made the resolution meaningless. The amendment left things about as they were. It meant that they could have open meetings when nothing important was being considered and that they could go into secret session when matters were up which, in the politicians' judgment, ought to be kept out of sight. The fact that the Republicans had resolved against closed caucuses went all over the country, but I do not recall anything in the public prints which pointed out the life-size loophole in their publicity "reform." As a rule, woodchucks like that rarely get their pictures in the papers.

In view of the fact that the majority party caucus, and not the House, makes the rules, ratifies the organization and determines the details of much important legislation, the question of whether or not its sessions shall be held behind closed doors is vital. This issue was decided by the caucus on April 8, 1913. Mr. Shackelford, of Missouri, offered the following resolution:

"*Resolved, That this Caucus shall be open to the press, to the President, to the Senators, and to the Cabinet officers, and that the President, the Senators and the Cabinet officers may occupy seats upon the floor.*"

Mr. Carlin, of Virginia, moved the adoption of the following substitute:

“Resolved, That hereafter all Democratic caucuses or conferences, when called either by the membership or by the chairman of the caucus, shall be open to the public.”

Mr. Hay, of Virginia, moved that both resolution and substitute be referred to a committee of three, to report later.

Mr. Thomas, of Kentucky, moved that all resolutions and motions be tabled, thus defeating the attempt to secure open meetings. The Thomas motion was adopted, 167 to 84.

DISFRANCHISING MEMBERS

In practical operation the caucus disfranchises every Congressman who does not participate in caucus legislation. That means all minority members, in the last Congress one-third of the membership of the House. As will be shown, many more are indirectly disfranchised by being outvoted in the caucus.

Members who participate in a caucus, either through ignorance of its straw-man strength or a desire to justify their position before the public, feel that they are bound to abide by the decisions of the caucus, and to carry out its decrees. Take away from a caucus that cardinal fiction and it is no longer a caucus. Without assuming the power to bind its members to a unanimity, a caucus becomes only a conference. Obviously, then, a majority of the caucus “controls” its own minority, and, when it is a caucus of the predominant party, a majority of the caucus controls the whole membership of the House.

A rule of the Democratic caucus provides that two-thirds of those present shall be necessary to bind the caucus, with the added provision that those two-thirds must be a majority of the whole membership of the caucus, but this rule is not enforced. A majority of those present determine the issue for all.

The last House had 435 members. Of these 291 were Democrats. All Democrats were members of the majority

party caucus. The "binding" principle compelled practically all members of the caucus to vote later on the floor of the House as a majority of those present decided in the caucus.²¹

Mathematically, this minority rule, through the disfranchising process, works out as follows:

Whole membership of the House in 1913-15, 435 members.

291	124	20
Democrats	Rep.	Prog.

When an issue is decided in the closed caucus, which "binds" practically all Democrats to vote as a unit later when the same issue is brought formally before the House, it means that both Republicans and Progressives have been disfranchised, that their votes have been nullified in advance, that all subsequent official proceedings after the caucus has acted are only sham battles. This may be illustrated by shortening the line thus:

291	
Democrats	

Analyzing a step farther, we find that the issue in the caucus might be decided by a vote of 146 to 145. The line could then be pictured:

146	145	
Democrats		

The 145, being outvoted in the caucus, would feel compelled by caucus "principles" to vote with the 146 on the floor of the

²¹ The binding principle was specifically invoked in the case of the tariff bill by the following resolution offered by Mr. Underwood, which was adopted without a roll call:

"Resolved, That the tariff bill passed by this caucus in its amended form is declared to be a party measure and that the members of this caucus are hereby pledged to support the bill in the House of Representatives and to vote against all amendments or motions to recommit the bill; Provided, however, That the Ways and Means Committee are authorized to propose amendments to the bill and that shall not be considered as included in the foregoing inhibition."

Again, at the conclusion of the caucus consideration of the currency bill on Mr. Underwood's motion a similar resolution was adopted:

"Resolved, That the Currency Bill adopted by this caucus be declared a party measure and the members of this caucus are pledged to vote for the bill to its final passage without amendment; Provided that the Banking and Currency Committee may offer amendments in the House."

These resolutions meant that all the issues in both the tariff and the currency bills had been decided by the caucus; that the caucus, and not the House, determined both the principles and the details of legislation; that subsequent official proceedings on the floor of the House were only to comply with legal formalities and to carry out the pretense of deliberation.

House. So far as the determining power is concerned, the line would be reduced again:

146

A majority of the majority.²²

As a matter of fact, through what is called "the organization," the minority which actually controls becomes very much smaller. A careful study of the caucus records shows that, with not a single important exception, the caucus when considering the details of legislation ratified the action of a majority part of the standing committee which had the bill in charge. The caucus acted upon 211 amendments to the tariff bill. With hardly an exception every amendment adopted came from the Ways and Means Committee. It was the same with

²² It should be noted in this connection that the whole democratic membership was never present at any caucus meeting. The highest vote cast on any caucus roll call was 251. The caucus records show that frequently many less than a quorum were present.

The following figures reveal the number actually present and voting on some roll calls taken in the caucus during the Sixty-third Congress:

April 8, 1913, on the question of the open caucus, 84 for to 167 against.

April 14, to put cattle on the free list, 81 for to 124 against.

April 17, to take wool off the free list in the tariff bill and impose a duty of 15 per cent ad valorem, 42 for to 196 against.

April 17, to place ready made clothing on the free list, 70 for to 96 against.

April 19, to take from the tariff bill the ship subsidy provision granting a 5 per cent rebate of the tariff on goods handled in American ships, 58 for to 124 against.

August 22, to put in the currency bill a provision forbidding interlocking directorates, 60 for to 143 against.

August 23, the Wingo amendment limiting the voting power of banks owning other banks in the election of district reserve boards, 46 for to 95 against.

August 23, the Murray amendment to increase the number of directors of the new banking system, 47 for to 100 against.

August 25, the Gray amendment fixing geographical districts for the new reserve system, 55 for to 85 against.

August 25, the Barkley amendment eliminating the advisory council, 64 for to 107 against.

August 28, to take from the table a motion involving the sending of rural credits amendments to the Banking and Currency Committee, 166 for to 66 against.

These figures show that in only two roll calls did more than a majority of the whole membership of the caucus vote with the side which controlled. Yet in every case the number which decided any issue in the caucus bound practically all of the 291 democrats later to vote the same way when the issue came before the House.

It should be noted that the caucus acted upon several hundred different matters in which there were no roll calls. It is nearly as difficult to get a record vote in the caucus as it is in the House. Numerous attempts were made to obtain a caucus roll call which failed because the necessary one-fifth of those present did not join in the demand. One notable example of this was when, at the beginning of caucus consideration of the currency bill, Mr. Neeley, of Kansas, moved that the doors of the caucus be thrown open to the public. On a division there were 63 ayes and 119 nays. Mr. Neeley then asked for a roll call, but it was refused.

The caucus acted on 314 amendments to the tariff and currency bills, only ten of which were decided by roll calls. In addition, the caucus, without record votes, decided numerous motions involving patronage, instructions to committees as to the reporting of bills, etc., etc.

the currency bill, which was considered first by the Democratic members of the Committee on Banking and Currency, all minority members of that committee being excluded according to the caucus "principle" of rule through a majority of the majority. The caucus acted on 103 amendments to the currency bill in which a majority of the Democratic majority of the banking committee were sustained.

This may be delineated as follows:

Banking and Currency Committee, twenty-one members—

14		7
Democrats		Minority

First the minority members would be cut off—

14	
Democrats	

Next, as the Democratic part of that committee actually divided on several important amendments—

8		6	
Democrats			

Then the line would show—

8	
A majority of the majority of the committee.	

These eight would seem to have, at least they assumed and exercised, greater power than all the other members of the House. In the case of the interlocking directorates amendment to the currency bill the Democratic part of the Committee on Banking and Currency divided 5 for to 9 against. The nine, backed by the organization, prevailed through the whole machine.

By applying the vicious principle of rule through a majority of the majority, that is, the exclusion of all minority members at every stage—in standing committees, the caucus and conference committees—the caucus has become Congress in all

matters where the caucus acts. Those without the caucus have little more voice in legislation than as though never elected to Congress. This means that every district not represented by a member of the majority party is practically without representation.²³


It has been demonstrated that at least as many more were indirectly disfranchised by being outvoted in the caucus.

The map on the next page locates the disfranchised districts and shows also the geographic centers of real authority in the last Congress. The territory represented by Republicans and

²³ Under the present system, in the last congress, not counting the territories,

Alabama,	with 10 Representatives,	had 0 disfranchised
Arizona,	with 1 Representative,	had 0 disfranchised
Arkansas,	with 7 Representatives,	had 0 disfranchised
California,	with 11 Representatives,	had 8 disfranchised
Colorado,	with 4 Representatives,	had 0 disfranchised
Connecticut,	with 5 Representatives,	had 0 disfranchised
Delaware,	with 1 Representative,	had 0 disfranchised
Florida,	with 4 Representatives,	had 0 disfranchised
Georgia,	with 12 Representatives,	had 0 disfranchised
Idaho,	with 2 Representatives,	had 2 disfranchised
Illinois,	with 27 Representatives,	had 7 disfranchised
Indiana,	with 13 Representatives,	had 0 disfranchised
Iowa,	with 11 Representatives,	had 8 disfranchised
Kansas,	with 8 Representatives,	had 3 disfranchised
Kentucky,	with 11 Representatives,	had 2 disfranchised
Louisiana,	with 8 Representatives,	had 0 disfranchised
Maine,	with 4 Representatives,	had 3 disfranchised
Maryland,	with 6 Representatives,	had 0 disfranchised
Massachusetts,	with 16 Representatives,	had 8 disfranchised
Michigan,	with 13 Representatives,	had 11 disfranchised
Minnesota,	with 10 Representatives,	had 9 disfranchised
Mississippi,	with 8 Representatives,	had 0 disfranchised
Missouri,	with 16 Representatives,	had 2 disfranchised
Montana,	with 2 Representatives,	had 0 disfranchised
Nebraska,	with 6 Representatives,	had 3 disfranchised
Nevada,	with 1 Representative,	had 1 disfranchised
New Hampshire,	with 2 Representatives,	had 0 disfranchised
New Jersey,	with 12 Representatives,	had 1 disfranchised
New Mexico,	with 1 Representative,	had 0 disfranchised
New York,	with 43 Representatives,	had 12 disfranchised
North Carolina,	with 10 Representatives,	had 0 disfranchised
North Dakota,	with 3 Representatives,	had 3 disfranchised
Ohio,	with 22 Representatives,	had 3 disfranchised
Oklahoma,	with 8 Representatives,	had 2 disfranchised
Oregon,	with 3 Representatives,	had 3 disfranchised
Pennsylvania,	with 36 Representatives,	had 24 disfranchised
Rhode Island,	with 3 Representatives,	had 1 disfranchised
South Carolina,	with 7 Representatives,	had 0 disfranchised
South Dakota,	with 3 Representatives,	had 3 disfranchised
Tennessee,	with 10 Representatives,	had 2 disfranchised
Texas,	with 18 Representatives,	had 0 disfranchised
Utah,	with 2 Representatives,	had 2 disfranchised
Vermont,	with 2 Representatives,	had 2 disfranchised
Virginia,	with 10 Representatives,	had 1 disfranchised
Washington,	with 5 Representatives,	had 5 disfranchised
West Virginia,	with 6 Representatives,	had 4 disfranchised
Wisconsin,	with 11 Representatives,	had 8 disfranchised
Wyoming,	with 1 Representative,	had 1 disfranchised

CONGRESSIONAL CONSTITUENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES



SAN FRANCISCO
LOS ANGELES COUNTY

CHICAGO
ST. LOUIS

EXTRA CONGRESSMEN AT LARGE

- ALABAMA ●
- COLORADO ●
- FLORIDA ●
- ILLINOIS ●
- MICHIGAN ●
- MINNESOTA ●
- OHIO ●
- OKLAHOMA ●
- PENNSYLVANIA ●
- TEXAS ●
- WASHINGTON ●
- WEST VIRGINIA ●

DARK - Districts represented by republicans and progressives
SHADE - Districts represented by rank and file democrats
LIGHT - Districts represented by chairmen of important committees

BOSTON
NEW YORK
BROOKLYN
PHILADELPHIA
BALTIMORE
JERSEY CITY, N.J.
ESSEX COUNTY, MASS.
HADDON COUNTY, N.J.

Progressives, who have practically no voice in legislation, is shown by the black sections on the map. The shaded sections show those districts represented by Democrats, who are comparatively unimportant parts of the dominant legislative machine. The districts in white are those represented by the chairmen of the appropriation, or "pork barrel," committees, and the other committees which determine practically all legislation, as follows:

LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES

<i>Name of Com.</i>	<i>Chairman.</i>	<i>Dist. and State.</i>
Ways and Means	Oscar W. Underwood	9th Alabama.
Rules	Robert L. Henry	11th Texas.
Judiciary	Henry D. Clayton	3d Alabama.
Bank. and Cur.	Carter Glass	6th Virginia.
Int. Commerce	Wm. C. Adamson	4th Georgia.
Labor	David J. Lewis	6th Maryland.
For. Affairs	Henry D. Flood	10th Virginia.
Immigration	John L. Burnett	7th Alabama.
Public Lands	Scott Ferris	5th Oklahoma.
Mer. Marine	J. W. Alexander	3d Missouri.

APPROPRIATION COMMITTEES

Appropriations	John J. Fitzgerald	7th New York
Agriculture	Asbury F. Lever	7th South Carolina.
Claims	Edward W. Pou	4th North Carolina.
Dist. of Col.	Ben Johnson	4th Kentucky.
Indian Affairs	John H. Stephens	13th Texas.
Military Affairs	James Hay	7th Virginia.
Naval Affairs	Lemuel P. Padgett	7th Tennessee.
Pensions	William Richardson	8th Alabama.
Postoffice	John A. Moon	3d Tennessee.
Public Buildings	Frank Clark	2d Florida.
Rivers and Harbors.	Stephen M. Sparkman	1st Florida.
Roads	D. W. Shackelford	8th Missouri.

ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF COMMITTEES

It should be kept constantly in mind that minority rule is the common object of the caucus and the organization which grows out of the caucus. Minority rule, even when not carried to the final extreme as in the Sixty-third Congress, means domination by a few leaders. This bossism in Congress is based on obstructive power. In the last analysis obstructive power means also the power to legislate.

Therefore, more important than the naming of committees is the control of committees. During the Cannon régime, if a mere majority of a committee chose to pigeon-hole a bill, all the other members of the House were powerless to compel action; even an overwhelming majority of the House had no power to bring the measure out into the open. Each committee had complete obstructive power. When public opinion and the persistent fighting of the little band of insurgents forced the leaders to give attention to this condition, some significant things happened.

First, as is always the case when the "organization" is threatened with any real change in the system, the leaders of both old parties ceased their sham battles and joined forces to save the day.

Next, as is invariably true of such situations, the bi-partisan leaders assumed the rôle of reformers and themselves initiated the new rule which was supposed to end the pigeon-holing of bills and to make standing committees serve the wishes and interests of the House as a whole.

John Dalzell, of Pennsylvania, one of Speaker Cannon's leading lieutenants, was then the Republican head of the Committee on Rules. Champ Clark, of Missouri, was the ranking Democratic member. This committee, on June 17, 1910, reported a new rule which provided for "A Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees." The bi-partisan combination back of this move was apparent: Mr. Clark, a Democrat, in the debate said he was the author of the resolution; Mr. Dalzell, a Republican, offered it to the House and moved its adoption. The usual parliamentary methods prevailed. No opportunity was given to amend the rule thus presented. It was adopted, without a roll call.

The issue involved in this new rule was by far the most important, in a parliamentary sense, that has been before the House in a decade. So long as the House as a whole could not exercise control of its committees, a few leaders would.

The method of appointment made little difference. Bear that fundamental fact in mind as we proceed with an interpretation of what happened then and since in respect to this "reform."²⁴

This rule, instead of being an adequate remedy, contained numerous "jokers" which made it ridiculous and an insult to the public. Some of them were:

1. The Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees could be reached only twice a month. The Unanimous Consent Calendar, which always preceded this order of business, came before the House on only the first and third Mondays of each month.

2. The new calendar could be used only after business on the Unanimous Consent Calendar had been finished. This afforded all sorts of opportunity to filibuster and thus prevented action under the rule.

3. No motion filed on this calendar could be even considered until first seconded *by a majority of those present*, as many as were required to pass a bill.

4. These handicaps were of small consequence compared to the final safeguard put into the rule. Read this part again: "*Such motions shall require for adoption an affirmative vote of a majority of the membership of the House.*" It required, then, as now, only a majority of those present to pass a bill. But the authors of the resolution so doctored it that a larger vote should be necessary to get a bill out of a committee than to secure its final passage. This rule provided that no bill

²⁴ Even a casual reading of this Dalzell-Clark rule makes perfectly patent the fact that it was unworkable. It reads as follows:

"Any Member may present to the Clerk a motion in writing to discharge a committee from further consideration of any public bill or joint resolution which may have been referred to such committee. All such motions shall be entered in the Journal and printed on the calendar under an appropriate heading. Immediately after the Unanimous Consent Calendar shall have been called on any Monday, it shall be in order to call up any such motion which shall have been entered at least seven days prior thereto. Recognition for such motions shall be in the order in which they have been entered. Such motions before being submitted to the House shall be seconded by a majority by tellers. If a second be ordered debate on such motion shall be limited to twenty minutes, one-half thereof in favor of the proposition and one-half in opposition thereto. Such motions shall have precedence over motions to suspend the rules and shall require for adoption an affirmative vote of a majority of the membership of the House.

"Whenever such a motion shall prevail the bill so taken from the consideration of a committee shall thereupon be placed upon its appropriate calendar and upon call of the committee from which any bill has been so taken it may be called for consideration by any Member prior to any bill reported by said committee at a date subsequent to the discharge of said committee."

could be withdrawn from a committee except by a vote of more than half of the whole House—at present 218 members—an almost impossible number. Considering that the number actually present during business hours in the House then, as now, hardly averaged 50, with rarely more than a quorum, the meaning of this “safeguard” becomes plain.

5. A vital omission of the rule was its failure to include the various resolutions which go to the Committee on Rules. That body, with all its arbitrary authority over changes in the rules, special rules, Congressional investigations, etc., was left “a law unto itself.” The House was not then given, nor has it since been given, any power over the rules committee.

Such was the rule originally provided to give the House some measure of control over its committees. It never was workable. Note how it was subsequently “improved,” from the politicians’ point of view.

On February 3, 1912, Robert L. Henry, of Texas, Democratic chairman of the Committee on Rules, presented a committee amendment to this rule. This amendment did not disturb any of the original “safeguards.” It added another, providing that the Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees could not be reached *until after both the Unanimous Consent Calendar and Motions to Suspend the Rules had been exhausted. These are rarely if ever finished.* As first adopted the rule placed this vitally important calendar behind only one other order of business on the two Mondays of each month when it could be reached. This later change gave precedence to still another filibustering device—motions to suspend the rules.

This last rules committee amendment, which was adopted by a vote of 157 to 103, made the possibility of reaching the discharge calendar so remote that nothing short of a miracle could have brought about its use. But still the leaders seemed fearful that the tranquillity of their organization might be disturbed by the exercise of control over some committees by the House itself. Accordingly, more “safeguarding” was done.

Inspect the last House calendar of the Sixty-third Congress, that of March 3, 1915, and you will discover, in the department devoted to "Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees," that sixty-eight motions were filed. Forty of these motions were filed December 1, 1913; twenty-one on the day following, and two on the next day, December 3. After thus "choking the calendar," this activity suddenly ceased.

Another significant fact is that all the first sixty-three motions to discharge committees were made by Republicans—regular organization Republicans—irrefutable evidence of the bi-partisan character of the House machine.

A further significant fact is that for the most part these motions were filed in pairs—twenty-four regular Republicans filing forty-eight motions. (The rule provides that no member shall have pending on this calendar more than two motions.)

On the face of the record, only ten of these motions appear to have been filed in good faith. The other motions pertain to comparatively unimportant bills, not introduced by the members asking that they be withdrawn from the committees to which they had been referred.

It is only fair to infer that this was a concerted move to create an immovable "log-jam" on this calendar. Under the rule, motions so filed have to be considered in order. That meant that not even a miracle could have cleared the way for the use of the discharge calendar during the Sixty-third Congress.

I was convinced that most of the members had no personal or public interest in filing these motions to discharge committees from the consideration of bills. To get evidence of this important "political" fact, the following letter was sent to each Congressman who had done so:

MY DEAR SIR:

The record shows that you have filed two motion on the Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees. It will aid the National Voters' League in its study of the parliamentary system of the House, if you will explain the practical operation of this device for discharging reluctant committees. We are especially anxious to know why so

many motions were filed during the first three days of the regular session, with no subsequent action.

Thanking you for this assistance, I am,

Very truly,

Only a few answered. Several of the replies were evasive as to the main point. But a few did contain suggestions that tended to confirm my belief. For example, Allen T. Treadway, of Massachusetts, wrote :

I am in receipt of your letter relative to filing motion in discharge committee. I beg to refer you to Hon. James R. Mann, for explanation of that parliamentary procedure, for which you ask information.

Halvor Steenerson, of Minnesota, further suggested that the choking of this calendar was done deliberately and in a concerted way. His letter said :

Replying to your favor of the thirteenth instant I would say that I signed the two motions to discharge committees, as far as I now can recollect, at the request of one of the Minority employes of the House, made on behalf of a member.

Samuel Winslow, of Massachusetts, disclaimed his own lack of interest in the following :

My recollection is not clear about the motion to discharge H. R. 3388, excepting that I am quite sure that some other member who was particularly interested in obtaining action on this bill requested me to assist him by making the motion to discharge."

Other letters, of a nature too personal to be quoted, were more positive in their assertion as to this manipulation, and the responsibility for it.

None of these motions were ever acted upon. That is absolute proof that the rule was unworkable. The point that you should consider most seriously, however, is the obvious fact that it was never intended to be workable. If, by any remote chance, the "leaders" who conceived this Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees thought that it might work, it would be an admission of their ignorance concerning the meaning of the simplest words as indicative of unfitness for public service as would be a confession that they had deliberately tricked the people.

In the last Congress, therefore, each standing committee was as supremely "a law unto itself" as during the best days of Cannonism. The result was a combination of undisturbable forces which made up the "organization."

THE RULES COMMITTEE

P. 7
 The power to obstruct legislation is also the power to legislate. There is now in the House practically no such thing as regular, orderly procedure. If there is opposition to a measure, even from the smallest possible minority, if a bill cannot be passed under "suspension of the rules" or by "unanimous consent," it means that it must be made "privileged" to get consideration. Appropriation bills and bills coming from the Ways and Means Committee are privileged under the rules. Otherwise, if a measure is to be given the right of way, it must be done through a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules. All reports from the Committee on Rules are "privileged" and can be taken up at any time. This unlimited, uncontrolled power makes the rules committee almost the absolute dictator of what the House does and does not do.

9
 It should be kept in mind that the Committee on Rules is absolute in its field. The rules give to the House no authority over this subsidiary body. Even the over-jokered discharge calendar does not apply to this committee. The rules committee is almost as independent of the House as though it did not pertain to Congress. I know that such a statement seems utterly unbelievable, but it is literally true. There is no official way for a majority of the membership to control this committee. Only the little oligarchy of leaders who make up the Committee on Rules have any influence upon the exercise of its arbitrary powers, and such influence is wholly dark and undemocratic.

The powers of the Committee on Rules lie in three fields: (1) It makes and controls changes in the rules; (2) it has jurisdiction over resolutions for Congressional investigations,

and (3) it can at any time report special rules to give precedence to certain measures.

READOPTIOIN OF THE OLD RULES

The "unofficial," preliminary organizing of the House for the next Congress has already been discussed. This unauthorized organizing must be made official. The old guard must bring about the readoption of the old rules, which is all that remains to be done—of the machine building—from their point of view.

All hinges upon the first day's session of the new Congress, when the rules are presented for the approval of the House. Once the old rules are readopted the Committee on Rules will again be in supreme control of the whole parliamentary situation. Every proposal for a change in the rules goes automatically to that committee, and then, if all other Congressmen were to unite in a demand that that committee report rules reform proposals back to the House there would be no official way to enforce the demand.

The history of the rules committee in the Sixty-first Congress illuminates this point. When the last Congress was organized officially there was the usual demand for changes in the rules. Several vital amendments were offered. To secure the readoption of the old rules at that critical time, without these changes, Chairman Robert L. Henry, of the Committee on Rules, then made a definite promise that rules reform would be subsequently considered. He said:

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Texas (himself) will say this, that if Members desire to introduce amendments to every rule of this House, and those amendments are referred to the Committee on Rules, they will there be carefully and deliberately considered, with an abundance of time for each member to present his views if he wishes to appear, and then the Committee on Rules will present a report to this House for its action, to adopt if it wishes to do so, or to vote it down if it desires to do so.

What resulted from this promise? Nothing. During the Sixty-third Congress, after this assurance that the Committee

on Rules would play fair with the independent, anti-machine members, and that it could be depended upon to do what the House had no power to compel, *sixty-eight different amendments to the rules were introduced. Congress closed with sixty-seven of them still buried in the rules committee. The only proposal acted upon was one offered by Mr. Henry himself (H. R. No. 104), which involved only the creation of a new standing committee on roads.*

That tells the whole story of its arbitrary power over changes in the rules and of what may reasonably be expected from the voluntary action of the Committee on Rules in the matter of rules reform.

Changes in the rules must be made, or at least an opportunity for subsequent changes provided, at the opening of the new Congress. Otherwise the old order will continue. The old order means, on the obstructive side, general rules and parliamentary conditions which multiply obstruction and congestion of business indefinitely; and on the "constructive" side, when action is desired by those in control, the power to nullify and override all rules by the "organization," acting through the Committee on Rules.

OTHER POWERS OF RULES COMMITTEE

Likewise resolutions for Congressional investigations go automatically to the Committee on Rules. That body may report them back to the House, or not, as it chooses. In the last Congress, this committee had referred to it eighty investigative resolutions, among them being the Mulhall-McDermott matter and the Calumet-Colorado strike situations.

The fullest expression of the influence of the Committee on Rules lies in its responsibility for the vicious parliamentary system—in its failure either to initiate or to permit opportunities for forward changes in the rules. But almost equally undemocratic is its sponsorship of gag rules, its uncontrolled control over the procedure of the House. In the last Congress this committee reported sixty-two special rules, giving precedence

to certain measures, limiting debate to almost no discussion, and shutting off amendments. Through this reprehensible practice—

On February 16, 1915, the House "passed" a most important measure, all in one day, without even the formality of having it introduced regularly into that body.

At about 9 o'clock the previous evening a new ship purchase bill was presented to the Democratic caucus of the House. There was a lot of "stand by the organization," of "be regular or you will return to another sixteen years of wandering in the wilderness, without political pie and pork," talk. Then this unofficial, closed caucus "passed" the measure.

The following morning the members of the Committee on Rules were hurriedly assembled. The result was a special gag rule of almost unprecedented scope. This gag rule not only provided that the measure should have immediate "consideration" by the House, with six hours of "debate," *but also virtually introduced the measure and prescribed the exact and only form in which it should "pass."*

At 11 o'clock the same morning the Rules Committee journeyed to the House with this most extraordinary gag rule and before the adjournment of that day's session the farce had been completed by the "passage" of the measure.

The lower branch of Congress has descended to the "shoes soled-while-you-wait" level in legislation. It is all done by a few leaders, with a machine so well organized, so perfectly controlled, that some political king or kaiser need do little more than press a button. To maintain a shallow pretense of deliberation, and to afford opportunity for a sham battle of partisan oratory, those in command of the House organization arrange in the special gag rule for a few hours of "debate." But no new amendments are permitted. No deviation from the prescribed program is possible. It is all a farce. The Committee on Rules contributes the biggest, most essential element to such farcical proceedings.

There is another side to the gag rule powers of this committee. It may at any time bring "buffers" before the House. Special consideration may be given "time killers"—bills which are given the right of way because the organization wishes to sidetrack politically dangerous questions. That is why an unimportant measure often receives a hundred times more and truer deliberation than one in which the politics of members and the interests of the public are involved.

When they wish quick action on some politically dangerous question, there is only the pretense of deliberation. The organization can "pass" a bill in a day.

In this connection, a difference between Cannonism and the Underwood-Cannon-Aldrich system should be noted. Cannon's machine was a model on the obstructive side: the new régime is not only perfect in that respect, but it can "legislate" along boss lines as well. Through the further abortion of the "discharge calendar," it has even improved the obstructive phases of Cannonism. Its boss-controlled devices for "passing" measures—chiefly the caucus and rules committee—make old masters like Cannon and Aldrich appear amateurish.

THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBER

Having seen something of how the House is organized and controlled, with a view of the caucus and Committee on Rules at work, let us now follow a measure through the machinery of legislation.

First, the bill is introduced. A measure may come from a committee, but it is usually presented by some member. The individual member has full freedom to introduce bills. There his representative powers practically end. The machine takes his measure. He has no influence over it at any subsequent stage. He cannot advance it; only the caucus or a committee may do that. If the committee having it in charge should voluntarily report it to the House, that would be no guarantee of its further consideration. The general log jam might engulf it; a privileged measure might get in its way; or the rules com-

mittee might interfere by placing some "buffer" ahead of it. Neither its author, nor any other individual member, not even a majority of individual members, have any real deliberative functions. They cannot advance, debate or amend a measure unless the "leaders" desire it and condescend to give the opportunity.

There are 435 members in the House. Of this number fully four hundred are figureheads. That accounts for many of the duplicities of Congressional politics. These dummy members, made so by the system, are compelled by the exigencies of politics to practice every possible deception to keep their constituents from the realization that they are nonentities in Congress. Denied all opportunity to serve the public in legitimate ways, they are forced to play politics in order to survive. Accordingly they study politics rather than public service. Hundreds of times do Congressmen investigate the political significances of a question, where there is but a single inquiry into its moral or economic aspects. The system has made Congress a school wherein is taught the science of seeming.

Public service is out of the question for the average individual member. Numerically he is one of the 435, but in influence and power a few "leaders" are the 435. Denied his legitimate rights as a legislator, the politics of Congressional life is all that remains open to him. How does he take advantage of these political opportunities?

1. The pork barrel is open. The "leaders" keep it open. Pork is one of his rewards for servility to their system. However much a nonentity he may be, so long as he does not "insurge," the average member is permitted to reach into the pork barrel for whatever will be of political advantage to him with influential classes and communities at home. That is a standing reward for regularity.

2. Patronage is the same. He is given every possible opportunity to build a personal machine in his district, so long as he remains a regular and makes no trouble for the political powers that be.

3. Such petty Congressional trash as free seeds becomes important. Every recipient of free seeds should understand that in ninety-nine of a hundred cases the sender is only courting political favor. Votes, not vegetables, is what he is after.

4. Even Government documents are prostituted to political purposes. When a document is printed, each Congressman is entitled to his quota. A certain publication may be of political value in one district and not in another. In such cases Members may trade, each getting extra copies with which to remind his voting constituents that he is not forgetful of their particular interests.

5. The same political necessities are responsible for the grossest abuse of the leave-to-print privilege. All manner of things which can be disseminated back home—at public expense—are put into the record. In most campaigns the people pay for their own deception in this way. I recall one “campaign” speech in Congress which was reprinted by other Members, as their own, and franked broadcast to the voters of their districts.

6. Akin* to this is the franking privilege, through which the average member can—at public expense—keep in touch with and appear to be doing something for almost every individual voter in his district.

7. The purely personal side of the individual member situation is even more perverted. The mileage graft has already been considered. The stationery allowance illustrates the same petty mercenary element. Each member is given \$125 for stationery each session. This may be drawn in cash, or left to be drawn against in stationery. Most members draw it all in cash. And there is no record in such cases to show whether or not any of it was ever paid out for stationery. All Congressmen are members of committees. At the beginning of a Congress standing committees get through a kind of blanket resolution authorizing at public expense such printing as may be “necessary.” This is interpreted to authorize the printing of stationery, which is furnished to members. When you

receive a letter from your Congressman, the chances are 100 to 1 that it will be written, not on letterheads for which he has paid out of his allowance for that purpose, but on the stationery of the committee of which he is a member. That probably means that all or a part of the stationery allowance has gone into his pocket. This small plunder is another of the fruits of the system.

A far more serious misappropriation, at least misapplication of public money, is found in the clerk hire allowance. Each member is given \$125 a month with which to pay his secretary. The law on this subject was so joked that this money does not go directly to the employes, as it should; they are on no salary rolls. It is paid to individual Congressmen to do with as they choose. There is no public record in this connection, and it is impossible to identify the offenders. But it is known that three different possibilities for misappropriation exist: (*a*) if a member is chairman of a committee he may use the committee clerks for his own personal political business and pocket all of the clerk hire allowance; (*b*) a member may employ a stenographer, for part or full time, at a less salary than he is expected to pay, and pocket the difference; and (*c*) two or more members may join in the use of a single fifty-dollars-a-month stenographer and pocket a still greater difference.

8. One of the big fundamental difficulties in national legislation has developed naturally out of the general disfranchisement and nonentitizing of members. That is the tendency toward private rather than public bills, and a resulting congestion of business. The individual member is not a public servant, however much he may pose and play in that rôle. The system has reduced him to the status of an errand boy, a pettifogging attorney, for this, that and the other interest in his district. It makes no difference whether these local interests be legitimate or not. He must at least appear to be doing something for the greatest possible number of people and

groups of people among the voters upon whose favor he has to depend for re-election. This necessity leads to—

(a) A constantly increasing number of “private” bills, many of which have to be enacted to keep their authors servile and the system intact. This means in Congress an ever-increasing tendency to give time and attention to petty private and local matters, rather than questions in which the general public is concerned. It means a hopeless congestion of business, a condition which aids the “leaders” in their control of the machine.

(b) The introduction of thousands and thousands of “political” bills, measures which the authors know will never progress beyond the point of introduction, measures which they never intend to push beyond that stage. But the mere introduction of them serves a campaign purpose. When introduced they are printed and may be franked to those individuals or communities specially interested. Being ignorant of conditions, or too far away to get light, the small, selfishly interested part of the public to whom they are sent immediately conclude that their member is busy and influential in their behalf.

The average member, therefore, reduced by the system to the importance of a rubber stamp, is thereby forced to depend upon essentially selfish and corrupting practices for his standing with constituents. The only course open to him is to convert into political capital the last available bit of pork and plunder; to cater to local interests and ambitions; to take the fullest advantage of the franking privilege, of free seeds and free advertising. A serving man for the machine, he must subsist largely on tips. These tips—public buildings, local improvements, pensions, private claims, and various kinds of patronage—the system enhances into inflated political values.

THE STANDING COMMITTEE

After a bill has been introduced it goes automatically to the committee which the rules give jurisdiction over its subject

matter. The standing committee is the real basis of the congressional machine.

There are fifty-eight standing committees, fully twice as many as are needed. The unnecessary number only contributes to the bad politics of the situation. At present the House has such committees as these: a Committee on the Disposition of Useless Papers; three different Committees on Elections; eleven different Committees on Expenditures, and a Committee on Mileage—a wholly useless body, because its duties are arbitrarily defined by “law” and would take less than a week of work by an ordinary clerk. All the needless committees are very essential to the existing boss system for two reasons: (1) Each carries with it a chairmanship and certain perquisites; these positions and perquisites of the lesser committees, together with chairmanships and positions on the more important committees, particularly the pork barrel committees, are the subtle briberies by which the organization is built and held together. (2) These useless committees are used further by the leaders as burial places for those members of all parties who are independent and likely to make trouble for the system.

It has been shown how these committees are beyond the control of a majority. Once organized, the foundation forces of the boss-controlled machine are thus undisturbable.

Most important among these standing committees, as has already been demonstrated, are the Ways and Means Committee, which, in addition to “privileged” jurisdiction over revenue measures, does the organizing of the machine; and the Committee on Rules, which sponsors and protects the reactionary rules, and acts as the steering committee of the machine. The twelve different committees dealing with appropriations virtually complete the system. These preside over the political rewards or punishments of the pork barrel. I have studied dozens of crucial roll calls: in 95 per cent of them the membership of the appropriations committees, both Democratic and Republican, have stood almost solidly for whatever the “organization” wanted.

Controlling both the personnel and procedure of standing committees, it is only natural that the organization leaders should be able to keep the membership subjected and submissive. For decades, throughout American legislative institutions, from Congress down to municipal machines, good committee places have been held superior to all else in that field. The average member has been made to feel that prominence on a committee is everything—opportunity, prestige, power. It is because of this mental attitude that the bosses who control the organization of committees are able to control the membership. Measured by the standard of a century, they possess the most potent weapons through which to control: they can reward those who are faithful by giving them favored places in the organization; or they may punish those who insurgé by withholding positions with “perquisites” and “influence.”

The chairmanship of a standing committee is the chief “plunder.” To be the chairman of a committee is the ambition of the average member. That position on the more important committees means political power and prestige; in all cases it means perquisites of a substantial kind—committee clerks, a committee room, printing privileges, etc. As has been suggested, the extra clerk or clerks may enable the committee chairman to pocket his clerk hire allowance; in any event this means additional political work for the chairman, for which the public pays.

Seniority also contributes here to the general submission. Members usually are reappointed to the same committees, Congress after Congress, and advance as vacancies occur. Therefore the special reward of a chairmanship is constantly ahead, if the member remains “regular,” and does nothing to incur the displeasure of the organization. This influence is potent, even with the minority members. With them the “ranking place” on the minority side will mean the chairmanship when their party returns to power.

Standing committees keep no public record of their acts. With only two or three exceptions, they keep no calendars.

At present there is chaos in this direction. Members themselves have to take hours and days if they want to investigate bills along any certain line. In its work the National Voters' League has been compelled to make up from the proceedings day by day a calendar for each of the fifty-eight committees. And then there was no way to discover what some or all of these committees may have done in executive sessions with the lights out.

A bill, then, after the individual has performed his only unrestricted representative function of introducing it, passes automatically into the custody of a standing committee, organized "politically," subject to no control other than the boss devices of the congressional machine, meeting in darkness, with no public record of its proceedings, and not even a calendar to enable the public to comprehend the status of its business.

Obstructively, once the organization has packed the committees, its control over legislation is supreme. The majority is wholly without power. That is simple, and easily understood. The more complicated part comes when the leaders desire to legislate. To pass a measure, without giving the majority the smallest opportunity for deliberation is indeed a triumph of political parliamentarism. Let us see how that is done.

The standing committee having jurisdiction reports the bill, in the form in which the organization desires it to pass. What the closed caucus or the rules committee may do in this connection has been outlined. After being reported, the bill is considered in—

THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

No parliamentary institution, save only the conference committee, is darker or more devious than the Committee of the Whole.

The Committee of the Whole is the House itself under an assumed name. The Constitution provides that when one-fifth

of the members of the House demand an aye and nay vote, there shall be a roll call and a duly recorded vote. Obviously to get around that provision of the Constitution, the House assumes a different name and calls itself the Committee of the Whole. The rest is simple. The rules provide that there shall be no roll calls in Committee of the Whole.²⁵

As was illustrated in the story of the mileage graft, unless a bill is amended in the recordless Committee of the Whole, there is no subsequent opportunity for a record vote on various amendments. If the organization is overthrown in the Committee of the Whole (and such cases occur very rarely), then, upon the demand of the constitutional one-fifth, the amendment may have a record vote when the measure passes into the open House.

Practically the only opportunities for "debate" and "deliberation" come when a measure is in Committee of the Whole. And these "opportunities" are only nominal because the attitude of members cannot be made a matter of public record. Where there is no record vote, the average member will stand by the organization. That was true all through the alleged deliberation on the tariff and currency bills. Not a single important amendment to either was adopted in the Committee of the Whole. This meant that members had to vote finally for these measures as a whole, that they had been denied the right to vote upon the various questions involved. No tariff schedule, no item of a schedule, not even the income tax provision of that bill, could be voted upon excepting in the measure as a whole.

The organization has the power to determine just what the House shall consider; and through the Committee of the Whole the leaders can prescribe the exact and only form in which a measure shall be considered. There is no deliberation that can in the remotest way affect legislation. The indul-

²⁵ The Senate has roll calls in the Committee of the Whole. The difference between the Senate and House in this respect is illustrated by the fact that there were 118 roll calls on the tariff bill in the Senate as against only 3 in the House.

gence in debate, the offering of amendments, are only for political effect.

When the House assumes its alias, the general attitude is a confession of its farcical meaning. It is a kind of play time. There can be no roll calls to show whether or not members are present. The speeches more often than not pertain to entirely different subjects, most of them of campaign character for home consumption. The members only show humaneness in refusing to be on hand and listen. Instead, many of them go to ball games, or enjoy other diversions. Ordinarily, if a special gag rule has set aside ten hours for "general debate" on a measure in the Committee of the Whole, it means that members, save only a few awaiting opportunity to make political speeches, will absent themselves for that time. Frequently I have seen less than a dozen in the House chamber.

The Committee of the Whole is only a contrivance through which politicians carry on a pretense of deliberation. Its chief purpose is to evade public records. It is the House itself, with the lights out.

THE OPEN HOUSE

P 7

After the Committee of the Whole has "passed" a measure, it is taken up by the House minus its alias. If the constitutional one-fifth demand a record vote on its final passage, there is a roll call. This record is always shorn of much of its meaning by the controlled and darkened processes which preceded it. As has been explained, the leaders are able not only to decide what the House shall consider but also the exact and only form in which measures shall finally be voted upon.

In the ordinary course of machine events the Committee of the Whole refuses to adopt any amendments to a measure. That precludes the possibility of a record vote upon amendments; the House then can only vote upon a bill as a whole.

There is, however, one opportunity to force a record vote in addition to that upon the final passage of a measure. The rules provide at this stage for "a motion to recommit" a bill

to its committee. If this motion is made in good faith, it may include instructions to report the bill back with an amendment, upon which the minority desires a record vote. But the bi-partisan organization is able to control even this proceeding. Here the Speaker's power of "recognition" and precedents enter to safeguard the leaders. The motion to recommit is a privilege given to the minority. The only one of the minority usually recognized to make such a motion is the ranking minority member of the committee which has had the bill in charge. Here, again, you get the importance to the politicians of a "safe" organization of the standing committees, even on the minority side. To illustrate, when the House passed the "war tax" bill, Sereno Payne, the ranking Republican on the Ways and Means Committee, was recognized to make the usual motion to recommit. His motion was a perfectly meaningless one. It provided merely that the measure be recommitted to that committee, providing for no "instructions" or amendment of any kind upon which the record vote could be based.

The full import of this becomes clear when you remember that the Republicans had fairly stormed against the war tax bill. But when the opportunity came to do something more than talk, to vote upon the measure in a form which would give expression to the minority attitude, they did nothing. There can be no more conclusive evidence of the bi-partisan harmony that exists among Democratic and Republican regulars, nor of the importance of the organization to both sides.

THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE

The politicians have still another chance. Even after the closed caucus, and controlled committees, and lightless Committee of the Whole, have finished with a bill, and it has passed the House, there comes the worst parliamentary institution of all, the Conference Committee.

Almost without exception, the House and Senate disagree on public measures. Then a conference committee is ap-

pointed by the presiding officers of the two branches, to reconcile their differences. The story of the mileage graft has already illustrated the manipulations that are possible by this body.

Precedent decrees that the "conferees," usually six in number, shall be for both House and Senate the chairman and ranking majority member and the ranking minority member of the standing committee that originally had jurisdiction of the bill. Here, again, recurs the meaning of the organization in the beginning. The organization leaders are the only members with a real opportunity to influence legislation at any point.

The conference committee meets in darkness and keeps no public record of its acts. Its reports are of the highest privilege, and cannot be amended. It is the culminating feature of a parliamentary system that is unbelievably dark and undemocratic. So long as there is a bi-cameral Congress, it will be next to impossible to eliminate this evil.

RULES REFORM TO DATE

In the last decade, notwithstanding insurgency and all the efforts at rules reform represented by that movement, just two noteworthy parliamentary changes were accomplished. Both were backward steps. These were: (1) The over-jokered Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees, which has been discussed in detail, and (2) Calendar Wednesday. The discharge calendar was masked as a contrivance through which the majority might exercise some measure of control over standing committees. Calendar Wednesday was one day a week in which nothing was supposed to interfere with the regular business of the House.

The discharge calendar was wrong in principle and would have proved inadequate in practice, even had it been workable. It amounted only to a confession that the House was organized, not to do business, but to obstruct business.

Calendar Wednesday was an equally humiliating admission that there was no such thing as regular, orderly, routine procedure; that the House could not act unless some special means was provided.

Both in respect to organization and control, conditions in the House of Representatives were far more undemocratic during the last Congress than in the best days of Cannonism. Why has rules reform failed? Why have parliamentary conditions gone from bad to worse?

The chief reason lies in the fact that insurgency never took a constructive position, nor advanced a constructive program. Even during the crisis of the revolt against Cannon, those who bore the brunt of the attack did not have adequate remedies to propose. They were an energetic wrecking crew, but with apparently no vision of what parliamentary institutions should replace the ones they sought to demolish. Nor is there any evidence that those early insurgents, to whom the country owes so much, ever even took a survey of the whole parliamentary situation, as we have tried to do. Perhaps they were too close to the system to comprehend the relative importance of the various institutions and instrumentalities that entered into it. They fought for and welcomed both Calendar Wednesday and the discharge calendar, not seeming to realize that they were neither adequate nor rightly founded.

The two steps, the only two that the public can take, in parliamentary reconstruction, are an appraisal of conditions that need correction, and the presentation of a program of remedies. The House alone has the opportunity and power to build a new system. We have, I think, seen enough of existing conditions to comprehend wherein they should be changed. The question concerns the changes that should be made, which is considered in the next chapter. To present to Congress a constructive program of rules reform will mark the entry of an entirely new element, an influence that the bosses have never had to confront.

It should be kept in mind that the one great evil to be corrected is perverted politics. The parliamentary system of Congress is its chief corner-stone. Bossism, seniority, minority rule, patronage, the pork barrel, partyism, the complete lack of publicity, and all the other elements are only manifestations of the end-in-itself political system.

WHERE CREDIT IS DUE

"Congress should attend to that," said a friend upon learning that I intended to present the principles of a constructive program of rules reform. "Why not let the House work out that problem? Are not members themselves in the best position to know what should be done about the things of which you complain?" One of my earliest investigations was for light upon that point.

In recent years I have interviewed practically every congressman who manifested a disposition toward rules reform. Not more than three have shown a comprehensive grasp of the problems involved, nor of the remedies necessary to change conditions. The eager, hopeful way in which the insurgents accepted Calendar Wednesday and the Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees illustrates their general attitude.

When a number were asked to state specifically what should be done to make Congress deliberative and democratic, without exception everyone, now admitting its complete failure, urged schemes to make the "discharge calendar" workable. Not one of them saw what seems almost obvious, that there is no necessity for a discharge calendar, that the only remedy needed in that direction is a simple rule requiring every standing committee to report back to the House all business given into its hands.

Others recommended that there be provided more opportunities for "special orders." That, too, seems obviously absurd—like trying to cure an inebriate with more and more whiskey. One of the basic difficulties in the House now is that regular, orderly business hardly exists. Routine procedure should be the rule and not the exception. How long could your business endure if it were conducted on the principle of "special orders," if there were no regular routine about it, if you had to make extraordinary provision for everything you desired to do? That is the situation in Congress. Regular, orderly, routine procedure is almost unknown. Yet the best intentioned members, so bewildering is the system when seen at close range, solemnly propose still more "gag rules" as a means of getting public business done.

I cite these things to show that Congress itself would not be likely, in a century, to initiate adequate parliamentary reform. A program of constructive changes must be conceived by citizens on the outside, disinterested people who have stood apart from the turmoil and surveyed the situation from every side. And then only the uncompromising demand of many people, expressed in what we call public opinion, will compel the leaders to act, although a majority in Congress would welcome emancipation.

In preparing the following outline of parliamentary reconstruction, I have had little help from public men. But from people on the outside, citizens here and there throughout the country, I have received so much assistance that the remedies proposed are more theirs than mine. My task has been largely one of compilation and correlation.

The Executive Committee of the National Voters' League has been of the greatest help. Five of these, Elizabeth G. Evans, Alice G. Brandeis, C. H. Ingersoll, Lieutenant C. P. Shaw and Stiles P. Jones, have given generously of their time and talents.

There is in Washington a fine group of young men known as the H. R's. To this group I am under special obligation.

Among others whose aid has been invaluable are Dr. C. F. Taylor, C. G. Hoag, F. F. Anderson, Frederick M. Kerby, Julian Leavitt, Basil M. Manly, Laurence Todd, W. L. Stoddard, Harry A. Slattery and Gilson Gardner. Many more deserve the thanks of the public for contributions to the following chapter.

CHAPTER V

RECONSTRUCTING CONGRESS

The conversion of Congress from a political machine to a legitimate law-making body involves difficulties of three separate kinds: Institutional, political and parliamentary. These cross and criss-cross in the most complicated way.

There is unanimity of opinion regarding the principles upon which reconstruction should be founded: (1) Complete publicity at every stage of the proceedings; (2) democracy, or majority rule, throughout elections and legislation; (3) the divorcing of the spoils of politics and legislation; and (4) honesty and efficiency in the conduct of the public business. But none of these basic principles can be fully applied to national legislation without involving all three kinds of change—institutional, political and parliamentary.

Publicity means the substitution of light for the darkened processes of professional politicians. The selection of Congress, its organization, its standing committees, the Committee of the Whole, and all other agencies of legislation must be brought into public view. But this cannot be accomplished alone by parliamentary changes. Simple reforms in the rules can go so far as to abolish executive sessions and compel public records in all the subsidiary bodies of Congress; such parliamentary remedies as electrical voting and roll calls in the Committee of the Whole will eliminate much more of darkness. But there would remain inherently dark and pervertible political instruments like the caucus, which has no official connection with Congress and over which Congress cannot exercise parliamentary control. And even with all possible parliamentary and political agencies of light applied, it would still be necessary to alter the Constitution in at least two respects before complete publicity could be attained: that is, to do away with a bi-cameral Congress, which does and always will contribute to evasion and irresponsibility; and

certainly the Constitution should also be changed to enable a smaller number than one-fifth to secure record votes.

Democracy means majority rule, the most fundamental thing of all. It implies deliberation in law-making. There is now neither majority rule nor any real deliberation in Congress. Rules reform alone can do much to eradicate boss control, which, of course, is the antithesis of democracy. But the deeper difficulties can be reached only by more fundamental remedies. Here, again, enters the great instrumentality of bossism, a bi-cameral Congress. And with one branch eliminated, the membership of the remaining body would have to be reduced to a workable number: there can never be true democracy and deliberation among 435 members. Nor can there ever be real majority rule in the deliberations of a public body until majority rule governs in their election: the members of Congress must be elected by a system of proportional representation, which, to be ideal, involves both political and constitutional changes.

The spoils of politics, both patronage and the pork barrel in all their many manifestations, the basic influences which make politics an end in itself, can only be eradicated when parliamentary and political and institutional reforms have been jointly applied. Rules reform alone can eliminate the more superficial and petty congressional plunder; but the bigger spoils of the political system would remain as a perverting influence. Only such fundamental changes as proportional representation and a budget method of appropriations will ever satisfactorily reach and rectify the corruptions of the pork barrel.

It is the same in the field of efficiency. Publicity, democracy and the elimination of spoils all enter into this principle. And in this connection we have a problem apart from all others: the spectacle of a national legislature giving nine-tenths of its attention to purely local and private matters. To right that condition, in connection with all the obvious mani-

festations of anti-efficiency and dishonesty, it will be necessary to go farther than rules reform alone can reach.

The complete conversion of Congress from what it is to what it ought to be is, therefore, a stupendous task. At least a decade, perhaps a quarter of a century, will be necessary for its accomplishment. It is not strange that Congress itself stands appalled at the magnitude and complexities of the problem. But the transition is easily possible, if the American people will first survey the entire situation, decide upon a program of reconstruction, and then in turn demand of their representatives the application of these parliamentary and political and institutional remedies.

Let us see what the Congress, already elected and now assembling, can do as a beginning.

STANDING COMMITTEE CHANGES

The standing committee is the foundation of the congressional machine. It has been explained that there are an unnecessary number—fifty-eight—and that the unneeded committees only contribute more plunder on one hand and extra safeguards on the other for the few leaders in control of them.

The first reform in this field, therefore, is to eliminate at least half of the standing committees. The functions of the remaining committees should then be equalized as much as possible. The House can do this now.

Election of Committee Chairmen.—Each committee should select its own chairman. There can be no argument against that. And it would be a body blow to bossism in Congress. The American Congress is about the only parliamentary body in the civilized world which is now organized on a basis of plunder and spoils. Committee chairmanships, as has been shown, are used by the leaders as subtle bribes by which they build an organization. The election by each committee of its own chairman would greatly improve that condition. Only a simple rule is necessary to make this important change.

Committee Clerks.—Next important to chairmanships in its spoils influence is the question of the regular employees of standing committees. These clerks should be controlled by the committee rather than by its chairman. They should be used by the committee for public business and not by the chairman for his personal political work. This change can be made at once.

Publicity of Committee Meetings.—Just a simple rule would abolish executive sessions. It is indefensible and an insult to the public that Congress should have permitted its committees to meet in darkness. Every standing committee should assemble in the open and be required to keep a public record of its proceedings. More than that, a journal of these proceedings should be published at adequate stated times—at least twice a month—in the *Congressional Record*. The work of its committees is at present far more important to the public than that of the House itself. It follows, therefore, that it should be brought into public view.

Committee Calendars.—Each standing committee should be required to keep such a calendar as would enable every one interested to know at any time the exact status of its business. In addition, there should be bulletins posted and notices printed in the *Congressional Record* announcing all meetings and for what purpose. That can be done now.

Committee Hearings should not only be adequately advertised, but the integrity of their proceedings should be safeguarded. It is notoriously true that the printed reports of such hearings have often been “edited” to suit the desires of those especially interested. The public has a right to a verbatim, and not a perverted, report of what is said and done in committee rooms.

Reporting Business.—Each standing and special committee should be required, by a simple rule, to report back to the House, within a stated time, all bills and resolutions given into its hands. Such a rule would shake the foundation forces

of the machine. It would obviate all necessity for a "discharge calendar."

Organization of Committees.—The question of how standing committees are selected would lose most of its present crucial importance if their plunder were removed and they were forced to act openly in accordance with the foregoing suggestions. If standing committees had no obstructive powers, and recommendations regarding subsequent procedure were adopted, it would matter little whether they were appointed by the presiding officer, or "elected" by the House, excepting for one principle—non-partisanship. Partyism is the parent evil in the existing House system. The House should be so organized as to serve the economic interests of the whole country rather than the spoils interests of a temporarily dominant party. With committees elected by the House or appointed by the Speaker, the majority party would be favored. To take a position against this practice will, of course, seem revolutionary to professional politicians; the people themselves have so long known only the doctrine, "to the victors belong the spoils," that they, too, may take alarm at the suggestion. But it is high time for us all to cease confusing public interests and political interests. It is all-important that the House should be organized on a non-partisan basis.

Here is one way that this can be done. There are at present 435 members to be apportioned among, say, twenty-nine committees. I would for this purpose divide the country into fifteen districts, each having twenty-nine representatives, with territory as contiguous as possible. Then have the representatives of each of these fifteen districts meet publicly, with duly recorded proceedings, and elect from their own number one member to each of the twenty-nine committees. This method would not only eliminate partyism in organization, but also the sectionalism that now prevails. In addition it would reduce the influence of seniority to such an extent that new members would have a voice in legislation.

If, in the years ahead, the membership is reduced, it will further simplify this problem of organization.

OTHER STEPS THE HOUSE CAN TAKE

Electrical Voting.—The political leaders of the Sixty-fourth Congress have the power to extend publicity to all the processes of legislation. In this connection, electrical voting should be provided. It now requires nearly an hour for a roll call in the House. Electrical systems have been devised by which the same vote could be taken in two or three minutes, and much more accurately than by the yea and nay method. The fact that the House has not made this simple change is most illuminating. The leaders seem to be opposed to devices which will expedite business: their political purposes are better served by a hopeless congestion of business. And electrical voting would remove their stock excuse—"roll calls require too much time"—for not permitting record votes. Therefore, being better served by darkness, they have failed to install electrical voting.

Obviously there should be installed at once a system of electrical voting.

Roll calls by this system should be provided in the Committee of the Whole, if the House persists in its alias.

Abolish Short Session.—Congress can and should advance by nearly a year its time of meeting. Members are now elected in November. If there is not a special session, they do not take office until December of the following year. This is absurd. And it contributes vitally to bad legislation and bad politics. The last session of each Congress is held after a new Congress has been elected. For that reason, being the longest possible distance from another election, this short session is notoriously irresponsible and extravagant. Politically dangerous questions are always considered in the short session. A record made them in only about half as important as at other times, because the members already defeated are not so vitally concerned and the newly-elected members have not been seated.

Congress is primarily a political playground. This practice contributes to that condition. Not taking office until thirteen months after election, members have less than a year in which to "campaign" for re-election. It is inevitable under this senseless arrangement that 99 per cent of the membership should weigh every word and act only in the light of election precedents and prospects.

A change in this respect would also do away with special sessions, which are an added expense to the people.

Each Congress should be convened in regular session at least by the January following elections. No constitutional amendment is necessary to bring about this reform. Congress already has the authority to make the change.

Secretaries on the Pay Roll.—The House should remove from members the temptation to graft from their allowance for clerk hire. All employes should be placed upon the pay roll.

The Franking Privilege.—Free use of the mails by Congressmen is grossly abused. It is the old, old story of politics, rather than public service. The franking privilege should be restricted to the legitimate interests of the public.

Integrity of the Records.—Two conspicuous evils enter into almost every edition of the *Congressional Record*. These are abuse of the "leave to print" privilege, and verbal changes in speeches made on the floor of the House. If you are one of the minute minority that reads the *Congressional Record*, you probably regard it as an accurate portrayal of what the House has said and done. This is far from true. There has grown up the practice of permitting members to "edit" the speeches they actually deliver. Frequently I have listened to remarks which bore little resemblance to what would appear the next day in the printed record.

The *Congressional Record* should contain no "leave to print" matter. It should include only what is said and done on the floor of the House, and certainly this should be a true, verbatim report of the proceedings.

Election Contests.—When the House faces an election contest, and there are several every Congress, the customary thing is to drag it along until the regular session, which does not meet until thirteen months after election, is nearly over. Then, if the contestant is seated, they pay his salary for the whole Congress and also that of the ousted member up to the time the case was decided. If the House will not do it voluntarily, there should be a rule requiring a decision on all contested cases within a reasonable time.

A "Gateway" Rules Amendment.—Above all else, as a beginning, there should be a simple rule requiring that every proposal for changes in the rules should, within a reasonable time, be reported to the House for its decision.

If it were possible, before the next House convenes, adequately to educate new members and the public as to the meaning of parliamentary reform, there should be an attempt, on the opening day, to adopt entirely new rules. But whether or not complete revision of the rules is undertaken then, there should be provided a workable method of securing parliamentary changes. It is unthinkable that the Committee on Rules should have absolute obstructive powers in that direction.

In short, the House now has the power to provide for publicity throughout the processes of legislation; it can abolish the congressional side of plunder; and many parliamentary changes in the public interest may be made at once. But some of the basic difficulties lie deeper. For example, consider what must be done—

FOR THE RELIEF OF CONGESTION

If the standing committees were organized democratically, and worked openly for the public, with none of their present powers of obstruction, the legislative situation would be greatly improved, but still far from remedied. I would go farther than to compel committees to report all business back to the House. There should be a limit upon the time when bills could be

introduced; probably the first two months of a session would be sufficient. That, with the almost automatic reporting back of bills and resolutions, would bring everything before the House in ample time for deliberate action. But what a hopeless congestion of business would result! What is the remedy in this respect? It is to eliminate a thousand and one different subjects of legislation with which Congress should not be burdened, and confine its activities strictly to national matters.

A Budget System.—First of these eliminations should be the twelve or fifteen separate appropriation bills which at present take up one-third to one-half of the time of every regular session. The political and parliamentary significances of these bills have been explained. These measures not only require more time than all other public matters combined, but their pork barrel influence is responsible for most of the corruptions and perversions in national legislation. There should be substituted for the present wasteful, inefficient, corrupting methods of appropriating public money a responsible budget system. The President and his Cabinet should be empowered to prepare and introduce the budget. With the constitution as at present, this budget would have to be acted upon by Congress at least once each biennium. But once in each administration would be far better. With the budget system adopted, there should be no appropriations committee in Congress. The budget should be introduced by the administration, after full publicity in its preparation, and at once have the same status as would a bill reported from a committee. The President and his Cabinet members should be granted the privilege of the House and expected to participate in all debate on the budget.

Deficiency appropriations could be handled in the same way.

Abuses and extravagances would probably at first enter into such a budget system; but they could not possibly equal the evils that exist in the present congressional method. The tendency would be toward honesty and efficiency. And the compensations of the change to the public in saving the time

of Congress and in divorcing legislation from spoils would be immeasurable.

Having the President and his Cabinet become sponsor for the budget, and assume responsibility for public appropriations, may seem at variance with the position expressed in reference to partyism. But there is no other proper place for the responsibility to be placed. And this would have a tendency to make parties represent something vital to public welfare—the economies and efficiencies of government on the business side—whereas now their differences are only sham differences.

Only through a budget system, coupled with elections by proportional representation, can the vicious pork barrel be eliminated from legislation.

And a budget system would free, for the consideration of public matters, probably one-half of the time of Congress. It would contribute the biggest single element to relieve the congestion of business.

The District of Columbia.—Another elimination would be to treat the people of the District of Columbia as human beings, giving them control of their local affairs. The Sixty-second Congress changed the name of "Sixteenth Street" in Washington to "The Avenue of the Presidents." The last Congress changed it back. Isn't that big business for the national legislature? Under the rules, two Mondays a month are given to District matters. That consumes about one-thirteenth of the whole time of the House.

Self-government for the District of Columbia would not only rid Congress of a demoralizing influence, but also remove an added reason why there is such a congestion of business, with practically no time to deliberate on important public questions.

Private vs. National Legislation.—Probably three-fourths of the time not now given to "privileged" matters is taken up with the consideration of purely local and private bills. In this respect Congress appears more like a municipal council than a national legislature. All measures and matters which

do not include the general public in their scope should be taken out of the hands of Congress. This elimination would include local and personal bills of every character; pensions, claims, etc.

At present, if the Court of Claims, supposed to settle such questions, refused to allow a certain claim, in all probability the matter would be brought into Congress through the introduction of a bill. It is the same with pensions. What the Pension Department regards as too questionable to be acted upon is taken into Congress. In a degradingly petty way, Congress has become the supreme court of plunder and spoils.

This limitation of the functions of Congress to strictly public matters, national in scope, together with a substitution of the budget system of appropriations, and other eliminations, would give Congress the time for real deliberation on important questions. These changes would also do much to make Congress serve public rather than political interests. But even these reforms, and the improved parliamentary instrumentalities previously outlined, would not insure either democracy or true deliberation in the fullest sense until other influences had been removed.

PATRONAGE

A budget system, together with proportional representation, would eliminate the pork barrel; but the vicious influence of patronage would remain. The best remedy is to place all appointive positions, below those of the Cabinet, under civil service. This implies, of course, that the civil service system shall be above and beyond political manipulation, as it is not at present.

There may be objection to this. Certainly the professional politicians will protest. And disinterested citizens may not at first comprehend its meaning. One of the most tenaciously rooted fallacies of "popular" government is the belief that democracy is most fully expressed in elections; instead, democracy is best expressed in the results, rather than the forms of government—in those things which are the farthest removed

from practical politics. The "fathers" were right when they sought a separation of administrative and legislative branches of the government. But now there is no such separation; the two are crossed and criss-crossed, and with the judiciary as well. All patronage must be divorced from legislation. In this connection, the Constitution should be changed to enable the President to select his cabinet without the concurrence of the Senate.

A ONE BRANCH CONGRESS

Even with every foregoing suggestion applied, the national legislature would not be fully safeguarded against perverted political influence, nor completely efficient and responsible, so long as it remained a bi-cameral Congress. Politics in the interest of politicians, and not legislation in the interest of the public, will always be possible and probable with two branches of equal authority. Inefficiency, irresponsibility and political horse-play will inevitably attend a bi-cameral Congress. Where there might be one case in which the public would benefit from two branches, there would be a hundred of opposite importance to the people.

It should not be a question of abolishing either House or Senate, but of doing away with both and creating a new body along ideal lines. There is no reason why the ideal cannot be realized in lawmaking machinery. But if it were necessary to choose between them and retain one or the other, I would abolish, not the Senate, but the House. The Senate is now far more democratic and deliberative than the House. Its records are more in the open. Its members are elected for longer terms, a distinct advantage. Its membership is more nearly the number the one branch should contain. Not now being elected by districts, it would be easier to adopt the proportional representation principle in their selection. In brief, it would involve less of reconstruction, and less of a strain upon our traditional habits of thought, to convert the Senate into an efficient, responsible, democratic law-making body than would be necessary in the case of the House.

REDUCTION IN MEMBERSHIP

True deliberation is a fundamental necessity in legislation. Deliberation implies that every member shall have equal opportunity to represent his constituents. This ideal condition cannot exist with 435 members. Some form of bossism is necessary among that number, if business is to be done. Congress should have but one body, and the membership of the one branch should not exceed 150.

ELECTED FOR LONGER TERMS

Members should be elected not oftener than once in six years. It is inevitable that politics will prevail over all other considerations in any public body with elections every biennium. The terms of members should be increased, with adequate recall provisions to safeguard the people.

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

Above all else in elections, Congressmen should be selected by a system of proportional representation. There is no other way to insure democracy in the selection of these officials.

The principle of preferential voting is also most important.

The ideal, then, is a single branch Congress, removed as far as possible from both executive and judicial checks, responsible only to the people; with its membership, elected for longer terms, by proportional representation, small enough to insure democracy and deliberation in all proceedings; with its business strictly confined to public matters; with efficiency and publicity provided at every stage.

This is an outline of the Congressional reconstruction program of the National Voters' League. It is one of the three reforms necessary to end the corruptions and perversions of modern politics, to reduce politics from principal to agent in government. The other two—adequate political education, or publicity, and the non-partisan, anti-spoils, balance-of-power idea in elections and legislation—will be discussed in the final chapter.

AS CITIZEN INSTEAD OF SUBJECT

America is an experiment in democracy. This tryout of popular government is succeeding.

So far, the success of democracy in this country consists chiefly in the safe nurturing of a new idea in government—that of the individual as citizen instead of subject. Therein lies the difference between monarchy and democracy. It is a shifting of sovereignty from a ruling house or class to society itself. The old world today is in mighty travail, torn and tortured with the struggle to give birth to democracy in government.

That agony is over here. Our sovereignty is a fact. And other, less painful, forward experiences are approaching. We are having, for the first time, a vision of sovereignty and society seen together. We are just beginning to realize that the scope of government reaches far beyond all previous conceptions; that its functions extend to every concern of the common welfare.

Men and women together compose society. Our sovereignty is seeing that.

Old age pensions is another sign. It is not prophecy to assert that soon this nation will be ready and eager to recognize that its patriotism can be as righteously exercised in administering to those fallen in industrial warfare as to worthy heroes of the battlefield; and that the state will be as well served by one as the other.

Justice, rather than charity, is coming within the range of our national vision. And we are beginning to see both justice and charity among the legitimate functions of government.

Above all else, in the great awakening, there is coming to sovereignty the consciousness that government is largely a matter of business—big, all-important public business.

There would be no need of this little book, if we had sooner seen these things, and other things. But the failures of democracy were only natural. As sovereigns we had to work out our own upbringing. There were no older relatives or friends to guide our infancy. The experience of the world before us had been with the

old idea of the individual as subject. When in the childhood of our sovereignty, we were children, running at large, happy and neglectful of the new freedom. Like a barefoot boy with torn toe, we exhibited the wounds of war. We were boastful, and believed there was nothing to do but enjoy the new order. Even today, with its fruits of failure apparent on every side, we have hardly outlived the habit of beholding government largely through eyes of sentiment, as a thing apart from the people.

The dollars and cents meaning of government has always been known to predatory interests, and public indifference to that truth has been Aladdin's lamp to them.

Taking the fullest advantage of the same popular indifference, of the remoteness of government, professional politicians have, for their own ends, built up a system which makes them the chief beneficiaries of our sovereignty.

This perverted, end-in-itself political system is the first problem, because its solution must precede the long neglected unifying of sovereignty and society. Politics, the instrument of sovereignty, must be made to serve the interests of society.

In Chapter II there are outlined the three fundamental influences necessary to convert politics from principal to agent in government: (1) reforms in the parliamentary methods and machinery of legislation; (2) political education for all the people; and (3) the functioning of this information through the independent, anti-spoils, balance of power position in elections and legislation. The work of the National Voters' League is based upon these three foundation ideas in political reform.

The first of these—congressional reconstruction—has been discussed. The National Voters' League recommends and will work for rules reform along the lines laid down in the preceding chapter.

It only remains to consider what may be done to help the citizen reclaim his or her sovereignty, through publicity, and exercise it in anti-political ways.

CHAPTER VI

THE NATIONAL VOTERS' LEAGUE

In recent years there has come to the people an understanding of their personal interest in government. This discovery of the material meaning of government was followed naturally by a desire to discriminate as to efficient and inefficient public officials. The problem, then, was how to interpret the record and measure the service of those entrusted with their political affairs. Out of the searching for instrumentalities has been evolved a new implement of citizenship called the voters' league.

The mission of a voters' league is to learn the exact truth about public business and report back to the people. It meets democracy's most urgent need.

The city furnished the first test of this new instrument of democracy. In several municipalities, under various names, it was used most effectually to purify and make more efficient the local law-making bodies. Next it was tried successfully in certain states with reference to their legislatures.

Wherever the idea has had adequate trial two fundamental facts stand out of the experiences of voters' leagues:

With honest information in their hands, the people will choose the right course in their political affairs.

It is futile to attempt to obtain reforms through reluctant legislators and unworkable legislative machinery.

The first statement is obviously true. Otherwise popular government is foredoomed to failure. Without basic confidence in the intelligence and integrity of the people, it is useless to struggle. If the people, properly fortified with facts, cannot be trusted, then all attempts to secure more equitable human relationships had better be abandoned. If our sovereignty is a failure, then Europe's turmoil must also be our national destiny.

The second assertion means that there are two distinct steps in all this fighting upward, steps which must be taken in order: (1) The people must first get control of their own government: law-makers must be chosen who are independent and efficient, and law-making machinery must be provided which will enable those officials to exercise their independence of political and special interests. (2) Then only will it be possible to legislate seasonably and wisely in the interest of the public.

Taking the first step—getting control of the personal and parliamentary instrumentalities of legislation—is common fighting ground for every forward force in the country. Every man and woman, regardless of conflicting economic beliefs, should unite with every other person in the effort to make Congress deliberate and representative of the people. To help toward that end is the sole object of the National Voters' League.

This movement grew out of experiments in Minnesota with the voters' league idea. It was the discovery of a law of politics, as unfailling almost as the law of gravity, which led to the organization of a group of patriotic men and women to reclaim the legislature of that State. In Minnesota, a few years ago, a certain corrupt politician was a candidate for re-election to the legislature. His success seemed assured. Personally very popular, he had practically no opposition; he belonged to the predominant party; the second term custom decreed that he should be returned; not more than a dozen in his district were aware of his real official character. One of these twelve, however, had his record carefully analyzed and a digest given to every elector. The result was his defeat, overwhelmingly, by an unknown man.

There followed other experiments, first in isolated cases and then quite generally. In the end it was undeniably demonstrated that the people could be trusted—that the rank and file always would act upon accurate information as to the public

character of candidates; that if the actual record of any aspirant for public position was placed before the people, they would elect or defeat him according to the measure of his merit and their own welfare.

The voters' league work in Minnesota, without discussing details, influenced four important results:

First, and most important, is the fact that almost every citizen of that State has been given an accurate picture of what past legislatures have been, and it follows logically that they know what present and future legislatures ought to be. Not in another generation at least will it be possible for a legislature in Minnesota to meet without having the eyes of the people understandingly upon it. Nor will legislative elections be held without the closest scrutiny and discrimination as to candidates.

Second, the publicity given the third house and supply purchase grafts have probably forever ended those practices. The element of political plunder no longer predominates.

Third, Minnesota now has non-partisan elections to both House and Senate. The importance of that is beyond the comprehension of those of us who have been taught and still practice the false philosophy of partyism.

Fourth, that work in Minnesota resulted in such reforms of the rules as partly to democratize the procedure. Nothing could be expected of the legislature until that had been done.

That Minnesota effort succeeded, and yet it failed. We soon discovered that the political stream had its sources higher up, that the chief corruptions came from above. We might do a thorough work of renovating locally, but it would not last. There would sweep down upon us, out of the national field, vicious influences to undo what had been accomplished at home. Then it became apparent that the education and reconstruction would have to be directed at the system higher up. Accordingly the movement was made national in scope.

The National Voters' League is an attempt to bring Con-

gress closer to the people. The average state legislature is isolated enough for the purposes of politicians, but Congress, with publicity and parliamentary and political conditions as they are, might as well convene on Mars or the moon, so far as the public is concerned.

EDUCATIONAL WORK OF THE LEAGUE

The object of the National Voters' League, in bridging this distance, is to publish such information as will enable the people to know what Congress is doing, and how, and by whom. The two most needed changes, improvement in the personnel and in the procedure of Congress, then will follow. Public opinion, if liberated, will accomplish both of these crucial changes. Public opinion, now manipulated at will by professional politicians, and misdirected to serve their purposes, is the all-important element in democratic government.

The National Voters' League will have nothing to do with the issues that come before Congress, excepting to relate their legislative history and to record the attitude of Senators and Representatives. Its information will be directed solely to improving the personnel of Congress and to reforming its procedure. Publicity will be the only weapon. This educational work will be divided into—

1. The furnishing, at all times, to members and others interested, of any desired information as to the provisions or status of bills, the work of caucuses and committees, the votes and attitude of members, etc.

2. The issuing of bulletins to members, newspapers, magazines, schools, and libraries, giving special emphasis to such matters as seem to require public attention at the moment.

3. The publication of special reports, at proper times in campaign periods, giving to any district or State information as to the record of its Congressman or Senator.

4. The publication of a book each year in which the chief acts of Congress shall be carefully analyzed, the records of

members shown, and such other facts given as will enable those interested to have, in permanent reference form, a history of the national legislation of that period.

The National Voters' League was organized just prior to the beginning of the Sixty-third Congress. The congressional situation was so dark and complicated in all things that the League has given practically the entire time since 1913 to a preliminary survey of conditions, to such a study of the machinery and methods of national legislation as would enable the movement to proceed upon a sure foundation of information. This foundation building is now accomplished and, beginning with the Sixty-fourth Congress, the League will engage persistently in publicity work.

Despite the necessity of devoting all the forces available to investigative work, to foundation building, the League has during the past two years accomplished a great deal in the educational field.

Its first bulletin, issued in January, 1914, disclosed the practices of the majority party caucus in legislation, showing exactly how this unofficial, irresponsible device operated to disfranchise members and bring about minority rule.

In March, 1914, there was issued a second bulletin of fundamental importance, dealing with the bi-partisan boss system of organizing and controlling Congress.

For the 1914 campaigns, the League prepared a big tabulation, revealing the record of each of the 435 members of the House on forty-four important roll calls. This was the first time in the history of the country that such a thing was done. That work alone required months of patient, painstaking investigation.

A bulletin dealing with the parliamentary aspects of the Hobson prohibition amendment, with all the official proceedings in reference to that resolution, was issued in January, 1915.

In March, 1915, there was published a bulletin entitled, "New Members and the House Machine." This was sent

to all newly elected Congressmen. It was intended to acquaint them with conditions of which men entering Congress ordinarily know nothing. It outlined the things that new members might do to change conditions in their own interest and that of the public.

The League has responded to many appeals, from country wide sources, for information in respect to individuals and issues in Congress.

Such publicity work will now be emphasized a dozen fold. The chief consistent feature of this will be a monthly bulletin, entitled *The Searchlight on Congress*. Subscriptions to this regular publication will be \$1 a year. Each subscriber will be a member of the National Voters' League and in every way a sharer in the labor and results of the movement.

Through its regular and special publications, the League will work to make Congress a local issue everywhere. There is now no connecting link, except perverted publicity controlled by politicians, between Congress and the people. The League will work to bridge, with accurate, timely information, the long, mysterious distance between Congress and the people.

BALANCE OF POWER GROUPS

The functioning element in this movement must come from the people. Assuming that the League will in a few years be able to present a true picture of Congress, individually and as a whole, to every section of the country, upon what principle of politics should the politically disinterested public act?

It has been explained that there are only two basic principles upon which such functioning can be founded: One is to work through political parties, in an attempt to control the prevailing party; the other is to secure the balance of power in elections. The first means politics, the second a breaking up of politics. Obviously, the second is the course to take.

To succeed in its purpose, the National Voters' League must have the active cooperation of many people. This co-

operation must be systematic and concentrated in the various congressional districts. Until democracy has advanced to a point where the present basis of representation shall be abandoned, the district seems logically to be the unit upon which to build local functioning forces.

Therefore the League will work to organize its members into balance of power groups, one in each congressional district. The balance of power in this connection implies public rather than political objects: it means complete independence of political organization. It signifies more than passive non-partisanship. It means a militant attitude against the spoils and perversions of all parties.

To win any forward achievement through control of a party means that you must have at least a majority of that party. Then there is against you the minority of that party and the whole of the opposition party. If your object is anti-political, the only influence more demoralizing than to have one party "platform" for you is to have both big parties insert "planks" in favor of your project. Then you are foreclosed against fighting, and there are a thousand political ways of "doing nothing" in all things save those in which the politicians and their system are better served by action.

But this independent, balance of power position would give power, in the interest of the public, to the smallest possible number. Under the existing plurality system, which, of course, is wrong in principle, a few hundred citizens, through their votes and influence, could control the elections in a majority of districts.

The principle of the balance of power would fail, however, if applied only in elections. It must be extended also to legislation. Therefore the exercise of this independent, anti-political influence in elections must be directed to definite objects to be carried out in Congress. There should be a constructive program which will be the same for all congressional districts.

The only purpose of these district, balance of power branches of the National Voters' League shall be the election to Congress of candidates who will intelligently and whole-heartedly exercise complete independence of party organization and machinery wherever such partisanship, or bi-partisanship, would in any way conflict with the anti-political interests of the public. There will be no economic issues involved.

This platform of the people, to be functioned by the election of Congressmen who will carry out its principles, will consist of only three planks:

1. The complete divorcing of patronage and legislation.
2. The abolition of the pork barrel influence in politics and in legislation by the substitution of a responsible budget system for the present method of appropriating public money.
3. The reconstruction of Congress, institutionally, politically and along parliamentary lines, according to the principles outlined in the preceding chapter.

The voters' league idea must be applied, both locally and nationally. To guide the voters in the choice of candidates, the National Voters' League will report fully, but without recommendation, as to the record of each Congressman or Senator who is a candidate for re-election. This information must be supplemented by reports from the local branches. Each district voters' league should—

1. At the proper time in congressional campaigns, after careful investigation, issue a report to the voters based on the local record of all candidates, emphasizing those without Washington records, and recommending the candidate who should be supported.
2. In cases where none of the candidates are of the right character, a district league should undertake to bring into the field a suitable candidate.
3. The district league should in no case recommend nor give support to any candidate not in favor of the anti-spoils platform outlined above.

To organize the country along these lines will be a tremendous task. Under the most favorable circumstances considerable time will be required. But the start will be made at once, and with the right measure of cooperation from the public a great deal can be accomplished in the next two years.

The work of the National Voters' League has been in the hands of the following Executive Committee:

Herbert S. Bigelow, Cincinnati.

Mrs. Alice G. Brandeis, Boston.

Mrs. Elizabeth G. Evans, Boston.

Mrs. Borden Harriman, New York.

Frederic C. Howe, New York.

Charles H. Ingersoll, South Orange, N. J.

Fred S. Jackson, Topeka.

Stiles P. Jones, Minneapolis.

Herbert Quick, Berkeley Springs, W. Va.

Lieut. C. P. Shaw, Norfolk, Va.

John F. Sinclair, Minneapolis.

Miss Ida M. Tarbell, New York.

William S. U'Ren, Oregon City.

Charles H. Ingersoll is treasurer, and Lynn Haines, secretary. The headquarters of the league is in the Woodward Building, Washington, D. C.

This Executive Committee is now being reorganized and will be increased to twenty members, divided into subcommittees of five members each, as follows:

1. *Administration*, having to do with questions of policy and the work of the headquarters at Washington.

2. *Publicity*, to have supervision over all regular and special publications of the League.

3. *Organization*, for the development and functioning of the movement.

4. *Finance*, for the support of the work.

Similarly it is proposed that each "Balance of Power" League in the congressional districts shall be governed by an executive committee consisting of one member from each county in the district and one chosen at large, who shall be chairman. The chairmen of these district organizations shall make up an advisory council of the National Voters' League.

All questions of policy and the election of the Executive Committee of the National Voters' League shall be submitted to a referendum vote, first to the Advisory Council, and then to the whole membership of the League.

The problem of adequately financing this movement is one of the greatest importance. For the present the publicity and organization work of the National Voters' League cannot be sustained alone by the income from one dollar a year members, although it is expected that this source of support will be sufficient after a few years. An effort is being made to obtain more substantial financial help from all who are interested in the fulfillment of its objects.

You can assist the National Voters' League by becoming a subscriber to its regular monthly bulletin, *The Searchlight on Congress*; by helping to circulate this little book; and by special contributions to supplement the income from those sources.

In turn, the National Voters' League will aid you in every possible way by giving accurate and timely information concerning the all-important business of the public, which is your business.

L

APPENDIX

In this attempt to tabulate a number of roll calls sufficient to aid the public in comprehending both the sham and the real in the situations described in Chapter III, the difficulty has been twofold.

First, record votes of importance are few and far between. The bi-partisan leaders have so firm a hold upon the machinery of the House and operate through such a clever parliamentary system that determinative roll calls in that body hardly exist. Practically all issues are decided either in the majority party caucus or in the Committee of the Whole, in neither of which the attitude of members is recorded officially. At other times, on crucial questions, members, by concerted refusal to demand roll calls, deliberately dodge the responsibility of an open vote.

Second, the few roll calls that are recorded in the House rarely reveal the real attitude and inclination of members. Almost without exception, House roll calls are either partisan or political. Purely partisan roll calls—those votes which reflect a blind servility to party organization and leadership, a harking back to the days when party pride and prejudice were everything—will require no explanation. A good illustration of votes for “home consumption,” or political effect, can be found in the history of the lobby investigation in the House. When the appointment of a committee to investigate the Mulhall charges of corruption against members was first considered, the House decided, without a roll call, not to give that committee the authority to employ an attorney or attorneys to aid the inquiry. This recordless action looked like fear that an investigation in the hands of any not carefully chosen for the task might be carried too far. But on the following legislative day, *after the leaders had had an opportunity to ascertain who were to be named on the committee and that they were not likely to employ special counsel*, the House, this time in a record vote, reversed itself and decided that the committee might at its discretion get legal help. This roll call, although appearing to the uninitiated as evidence that the House wanted the whole truth of the Mulhall charges, really means next to nothing. And that is too generally the case with House roll calls.

You will find in the following tabulation fifteen roll calls. The first six are “deadly parallels,” showing how members voted, at different times and under different political conditions, on exactly the same issues. The next four represent crises during the period of the anti-Cannon revolt. The last five reveal the bi-partisan combination in the Sixty-third Congress.

Gag Rules—A Parallel.—In the Sixty-first Congress the Republicans were supremely in control of the proceedings of the House. On April 5, 1909, page 1119, John Dalzell, chairman of the Committee on Rules, presented a "gag" rule typical of those Cannon days. It limited debate and prevented amendments to the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill. It was adopted, 195 to 178, with 15 not voting (1). On this occasion Mr. Underwood pleaded for a rule by which the House could act upon the tariff "item by item;" Mr. Fitzgerald referred to "the system of tyrannical rules;" and Mr. Clark (now Speaker) characterized this rule as "unjust, unfair, un-American and preposterous." The Democrats were then "progressive" on the rules.

In the Sixty-third Congress the House was in the hands of the Democrats. On April 21, 1913, page 299, Chairman Henry, of the Rules Committee, reported a typical Democratic "gag" rule. It provided for the passage of the sundry civil appropriation bill, involving \$116,795,327, and allowed only forty minutes of debate, no opportunity for amendment, even under the five-minute rule, and no motion to recommit. It was charged in the discussion, and not disputed, that this rule was a verbatim copy of one formerly drawn and used by the old Republican organization. It was adopted, 221 to 110, with 101 not voting (2).

These two roll calls—columns 1 and 2—illustrate how little reliance can be placed in party protestations in reference to the rules.

The Cullop Amendment.—The next two roll calls—those in the columns marked 3 and 4—relate to attempts to incorporate in a judicial bill a provision requiring the President to make public the recommendations upon which he based the appointment of federal judges. The question came up first in the Sixty-second Congress. On January 24, 1912, page 1287, Mr. Cullop, of Indiana, offered this publicity amendment to a general judicial bill:

That hereafter, before the President shall appoint any district, circuit, or supreme judge, he shall make public all indorsements made in behalf of any applicant.

The Cullop amendment was adopted by the House, 151 to 85, with 155 not voting (column 3). In view of what happened later it is obvious that many of the Democrats who voted for the publicity provision in 1912, were playing politics by seeking to embarrass a Republican President. (It will be remembered that the thirteen Democrats who opposed the Cullop amendment in 1912 were roundly roasted by Mr. Bryan.)

The same issue was presented in the last Congress, with the political situation exactly reversed. This time the Republicans sought the

embarrassment of a Democratic administration by voting quite generally for the amendment, while eighty Democrats repudiated their former position by voting against the amendment. On May 10, 1913, page 1477, the House, by a vote of 171 to 84 with 175 not voting (column 4), adopted the so-called Cullop amendment to the Philadelphia judgeship bill, the amendment here being presented by Republican leader James R. Mann, who voted against his own proposal.

These roll calls, one in the Sixty-second and one in the Sixty-third Congress, are here placed in parallel columns so that the public may see the inconsistency of many members. This issue reached two other roll calls besides those given, and of the membership of the last House, 115 voted on both sides. This furnishes one of the best illustrations of political voting.

In both columns—3 and 4—"a" indicates a vote in favor of the Cullop publicity amendment.

Panama Canal Tolls.—There is further inconsistency, or lack of conviction, or responsiveness to leadership, exemplified in the two votes recorded on the question of Panama Canal tolls. The Doremus amendment to the canal bill, which was adopted by the House May 23, 1912, page 7019, by a vote of 147 to 128, with 117 not voting (5), exempted American coastwise vessels from the payment of tolls. The same issue came before the House March 31, 1914, page 6323, when the tolls exemption law was repealed, 247 to 162, with twenty-three not voting (6). Of the 266 Congressmen who were members in 1912, forty voted one way on the tolls question in 1912 and took the opposite side of the same issue in 1914.

In both columns—5 and 6—"a" indicates a vote for free tolls.

The Democrats Save Cannon.—The real crisis in which was seen the beginning of the present bi-partisan combination has been described. This was at the time of the adoption of the rules of the Sixty-first Congress, when Mr. Fitzgerald led a Democratic group to the support of Speaker Cannon. "A" in this column (No. 7) indicates a vote for the Fitzgerald amendment.

The Norris Resolution (8).—Later in that Congress, on March 19, 1910, page 3436, the deserting Democrats voted with all the other anti-Cannonites for the Norris resolution, which increased the rules committee and eliminated the Speaker from it. This was the much discussed victory over the Republican machine. The Norris resolution was adopted, 191 to 156, with 42 not voting. An "a" indicates an affirmative vote.

To Vacate the Speaker's Chair (9).—The Fitzgerald Democrats may have supported the Norris resolution thinking that it would be followed by the removal of Mr. Cannon and the election of a Democratic speaker. The attempt to depose Cannon was made on the same day (page 3438), but it failed because several insurgent Republicans voted against the motion to vacate the Speaker's chair, thus saving Mr. Cannon in that crisis. This vote, 155 to 192, with 41 not voting, is given in column 9. An "a" indicates a vote in favor of declaring the Speaker's chair vacant.

The Ballinger-Pinchot Controversy.—Another significant roll call in that Congress occurred January 7, 1910, page 404, on the question of taking the appointment of the committee to investigate the Department of the Interior and Bureau of Forestry (the Ballinger-Pinchot matter) out of the hands of Speaker Cannon and having that committee elected by the House. This amendment carried, 149 to 146, with 92 not voting. In column 10, "a" indicates a vote in favor of electing the committee.

These four roll calls in the Cannon period show not only the inception of bi-partisanship as a machine, but the personnel of the original insurgents.

It can readily be seen that none of the roll calls already described are very reliable. They are too full of partisanship and politics. They are chiefly useful in so far as they serve to point out those members whose conduct indicates that they are primarily politicians. But the next five columns of the tabulation contain as many record votes which more generally reflect the bi-partisan combination on one side and the independent members on the other. These roll calls are the most important to be found in the history of the last Congress.

To Clear Calendar Wednesday (11).—Students of the procedure of the House know that the bi-partisan leaders can control directly the activities of all daily sessions, excepting those on Calendar Wednesdays. Privileged business or special orders, always in the hands of the leaders, have the right of way over all ordinary matters. But Calendar Wednesday was supposed to be above and beyond manipulation. That was intended to be one day each week on which nothing could prevent the consideration of bills reported from committee. However, through unfortunate chance or deliberate manipulation, Calendar Wednesday was "log-jammed" in the Sixty-third Congress by a comparatively unimportant bill upon which the politicians filibustered for eleven weeks. The only explainable object of this filibuster was to prevent the reaching of a number of vital matters, such as the

presidential primary bill, safety at sea legislation, various labor bills, rural credits legislation, the national prohibition amendment, woman suffrage, etc. To break this long filibuster and restore to Calendar Wednesday its functions, a motion was made April 22, 1914, page 7636, to drop consideration of the judicial code bill, which was the buffer. This motion was defeated, 115 to 167, with 151 not voting (11). Those voting "aye" were against the filibuster and in favor of ending the further abuse of Calendar Wednesday. As indicating a fairly clear-cut division among those members who wanted action and the bi-partisan machine obstructionists, this roll call is one of the most valuable in the last Congress.

The Fitzgerald Salary Amendment (12).—Heretofore the salaries of the legislative, executive and judicial officers of the National Government have been fixed by statutes; and appropriation bills, at least in so far as salary increases were concerned, could not disregard the figures named in existing law. But, at the eleventh hour in the consideration of the Legislative, Executive and Judicial appropriation bill, Mr. Fitzgerald offered an amendment repealing all laws relating to salaries appropriated for in the measure and making the provisions of that measure the substantive law on the subject. In other words, Congress could, under this amendment, change the salaries of Congressmen, Senators and other federal officials without having the changes subject to points of order and in a way vastly less public than when it had to be done through separate, bona fide bills. This amendment added greatly to the already powerful political and legislative influence of the Committee on Appropriations. It established a dangerous precedent. The Fitzgerald amendment was adopted on April 17, 1914, page 7372, by a vote of 193 to 136, with 102 not voting (12). An "a" means a vote in favor of its adoption. As in the case of the attempt to break the filibusterers' hold upon Calendar Wednesday, this roll call is a highly important test. The leaders of both old parties and the bi-partisan machine were for the proposal, while the progressives and the independents of all parties who understood the issue were opposed to the change.

The Whaley Case (13).—In column 13 will be found another sample of the working together of Democratic and Republican "organizations." This is the roll call in which the House refused to investigate seemingly well-authenticated charges of corruption in the election of Richard S. Whaley, of South Carolina. The charges were made by Mayor John P. Grace, of Charleston, who, at his own expense, brought witnesses to Washington and collected a mass of evidence against the validity of Whaley's election. Mayor Grace had not been a candidate against

Mr. Whaley, but sought the investigation as a citizen. The Committee on Elections, No. 1, in a manner which suggests how Tammany used Sulzer as an example and a warning, turned the investigation against Mayor Grace and thereby appeared to serve notice on people in the South that it was not safe to interfere in such matters. The point to the incident is that it discloses the lack of teeth in the federal corrupt practices act. In each district where the election to Congress is virtually decided in the primary and not the regular election, as is the case throughout practically all of the South, the defeated candidate in the primary is not recognized nor given rights before Congress as is done with a candidate defeated in the November election. When a defeated candidate in the regular election desires to bring a contest for a seat in Congress, the way is open before him; he has a well-established standing; his rights and interests are safeguarded; his contest expenses are paid by the House. But the candidate defeated in a primary must prosecute a contest at private expense and with obstacles at every turn; or interested individuals must face the same handicap, as did Mayor Grace in this case. In truth, the federal corrupt practices act hardly applies in those sections of the country where there is dominance by a single party. In the South particularly it would seem as though primary election corruption can be carried on with practical assurance of immunity so far as Congress is concerned.

In this roll call on the Whaley case the House voted to reindorse that condition, as had been done in the passage of the corrupt practices act without specific provisions for the correction of primary election frauds. James A. Frear, a member of Elections Committee No. 1, presented a minority report and a resolution for an investigation. This resolution was defeated on January 27, 1914, page 2487, by a vote of 98 to 227, with 108 not voting.

In this column—13—an "a" indicates a vote in favor of the investigation.

The Underwood Cotton Futures Amendment.—Another significant roll call occurred on September 30, 1913, page 5288. The Senate had adopted a provision in the tariff bill, known as the Clarke amendment, which struck at gambling in cotton futures. In the House, Mr. Underwood offered an amendment which greatly modified the Clarke amendment and, it was charged in the debate, carried recognition and regulation of stock gambling in cotton so far as in effect to be a step toward legalization of it. Afterward, as was to be expected, in the controversy between the House and Senate over the Clarke amendment and the Underwood substitute, all legislation on the subject of cotton

futures failed. By a vote of 171 to 161, with 96 not voting (14), the House adopted the Underwood cotton futures amendment. An "a" indicates a vote for the Underwood amendment.

To Displace District Day (15).—A roll call, somewhat similar in significance to that when the attempt was made to shake Calendar Wednesday free of the filibuster, occurred on June 8, 1914, page 10827. The rules give two Mondays of each month to bills relating to the District of Columbia. That calendar then contained bills of very great importance, such as the Buchanan bill to amend the building law to safeguard the lives of workmen, while the Crosser bill providing for municipal ownership of the street railways of Washington had been reported from the committee. Seemingly to prevent the reaching of such bills a motion was made to displace District Day on the Monday named above. This motion was carried by a vote of 202 to 64, with 167 not voting. In this column—15—an "a" indicates a vote in favor of displacing District Day.

Number of District	Alabama	Party	Beginning of Service	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
				Republican Gag Rule 1909	Democratic Gag Rule 1913	Cullop Amendment 1912	Cullop Amendment 1913	Doremus Amendment 1912-"a" for free Tolls	Canal Tolls Repeal 1914-"a" for free Tolls	Fitzgerald Amendment to Rules 1909	Taking Speaker from Rules Committee 1910	To Vacate Speaker's Chair 1910	To Elect Ballinger-Pinchot Committee	To Break Filibuster--Calendar Wednesday	Fitzgerald Salary Amendment	Whaley Contest--for Investigation	Underwood Cotton Futures Amendment	To Displace District Day
1	G. W. Taylor....	D	1897	n	a	o	o	a	o	n	o	o	a	o	o	n	a	o
2	S. H. Dent, Jr....	D	1909	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	n	a
3	H. D. Clayton....	D	1897	n	a	a	p	a	n	n	a	a	a	o	o	n	n	...
4	F. L. Blackmon..	D	1911	...	a	a	n	n	o	n	a	n	n	a
5	J. T. Heflin.....	D	1904	n	a	a	a	a	n	n	o	o	o	o	n	n	a	a
6	R. P. Hobson....	D	1907	n	o	o	o	a	o	n	a	a	o	o	a	o	n	o
7	J. L. Burnett....	D	1899	n	a	o	n	a	o	n	a	a	a	o	n	o	a	n
8	C. C. Harris.....	D	1914	a
9	O. W. Underwood.	D	1895	n	a	a	n	a	a	n	a	a	a	o	a	n	a	a
	J. W. Abercrombie	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	n	n	a	n	a	a
	Arizona																	
1	Carl Hayden.....	D	1912	...	a	...	a	a	a	a	a	o	a	o
	Arkansas																	
1	T. H. Caraway... D	1913	...	a	...	n	...	n	n	n	n	n	n
2	W. A. Oldfield... D	1909	n	a	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	n	n
3	J. C. Floyd..... D	1905	n	a	a	n	n	n	n	n	a	a	a	o	o	n	n	a
4	Otis Wingo..... D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	n	n	n	o	n	n
5	H. M. Jacoway... D	1911	...	a	a	a	n	n	a	n	n	n	a
6	S. M. Taylor..... D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	n	n	n	n	n	a
7	W. S. Goodwin... D	1911	...	o	a	a	n	o	o	o	o	o	a
	California																	
1	Wm. Kent..... I	1911	...	o	a	o	n	n	o	o	a	n	o
2	J. E. Raker..... D	1911	...	a	a	a	a	a	n	n	a	a	a
3	C. F. Curry..... R	1913	...	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	o
4	Julius Kahn..... R	1905	a	n	n	o	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	o	o	
5	J. I. Nolan..... P	1903	...	a	...	a	...	a	a	n	a	o	o
6	J. R. Knowland.. R	1904	a	o	n	a	a	a	a	n	n	n	o	o	a	n	o	
7	D. S. Church.... D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	n	n	a	o	a	a
8	E. A. Hayes..... R	1905	a	n	n	o	a	a	n	a	n	a	a	a	a	n	o	

Number of District	a-Affirmative vote n-Negative vote p-Answered present o-Not voting	Party	Beginning of Service	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
				Republican Gag Rule 1909	Democratic Gag Rule 1913	Cullop Amendment 1912	Cullop Amendment 1913	Doremus Amendment 1912-"a" for free Tolls	Canal Tolls Repeal 1914-"a" for free Tolls	Fitzgerald Amend-ment to Rules 1909	Taking Speaker from Rules Committee 1910	To Vacate Speaker's Chair 1910	To Elect Ballinger-Pinchot Committee	To Break Filibuster—Calendar Wednesday	Fitzgerald Salary Amendment	Whaley Contest—for Investigation	Underwood Cotton Futures Amendment	To Displace District Day
9	C. W. Bell.....	P	1913	n	a	a	a	n	o	n	n
10	W. D. Stephens..	P	1911	n	o	a	a	a	o	n	a	n	n
11	Wm. Kettner....	D	1913	a	o	a	a	n	n	a	n
Colorado																		
1	G. J. Kindel.....	D	1913	a	o	n	n	n	n	n	o
2	H. H. Seldomridge	D	1913	a	o	n	a	a	o	a	a
	E. T. Taylor.....	D	1909	n	o	a	a	a	n	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	n	a
	Edw. Keating....	D	1913	a	a	n	a	n	o	o	o
Connecticut																		
1	A. Lonergan.....	D	1913	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	n
2	B. F. Mahan.....	D	1913	o	o	a	o	a	o	a	o
3	T. L. Reilly.....	D	1911	a	a	n	o	o	n	o	o	a	a
4	J. Donovan.....	D	1913	a	n	n	n	n	n	a	a
5	Wm. Kennedy....	D	1913	a	n	n	n	a	n	a	a
Delaware																		
	F. Brockson.....	D	1913	a	o	a	n	o	p	a	o
Florida																		
1	S. M. Sparkman..	D	1895	n	a	o	n	o	n	a	a	a	o	o	o	n	a	o
2	F. Clark.....	D	1905	n	a	o	o	o	o	o	p	p	a	n	n	n	o	o
3	E. Wilson.....	D	1913	a	a	n	o	o	n	n	a
4	C. L'Engle.....	D	1913	a	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
Georgia																		
1	C. G. Edwards...	D	1907	n	a	o	o	n	n	a	a	a	a	n	n	n	o	a
2	F. Park.....	D	1913	n	n	n	n	a
3	C. R. Crisp.....	D	1913	a	a	o	o	o	n	a	o
4	W. C. Adamson..	D	1897	n	a	p	p	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	o	a
5	W. S. Howard....	D	1911	a	a	n	n	n	o	n	n	n	a
6	C. L. Bartlett....	D	1895	n	a	p	n	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	n	a
7	G. Lee.....	D	1905	n	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	a	o	n	n	a	o

Number of District	a-Affirmative vote n-Negative vote p-Answered present o-Not voting	Party	Beginning of Service	Legislative Record														
				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
8	S. J. Tribble	D	1911	...	a	a	o	a	n	n	n	n	n	a
9	T. M. Bell	D	1905	n	a	o	a	n	n	n	a	a	o	n	n	n	n	a
10	T. W. Hardwick . .	D	1913	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	o	o	n	a	o
11	J. R. Walker	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	n	n	n	n	n	a
12	D. M. Hughes	D	1909	n	a	o	a	n	n	n	a	a	o	n	n	n	n	a
Idaho																		
1	B. L. French	R	1911	...	n	n	n	a	a	a	a	n	n	n
2	A. T. Smith	R	1913	...	n	...	n	...	a	a	a	a	n	a
Illinois																		
1	M. B. Madden . . .	R	1905	a	o	n	n	n	n	a	n	n	n	a	a	n	o	a
2	J. R. Mann	R	1897	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	p	a	n	o	a
3	G. E. Gorman	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	a	n	n	n	o	n
4	J. T. McDermott . .	D	1907	n	a	p	a	n	a	a	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	n
5	A. J. Sabath	D	1907	n	a	o	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	o	n	a	n
6	J. McAndrews . . .	D	1913	...	a	...	n	...	a	n	o	n	a	a
7	F. Buchanan	D	1911	...	a	o	a	n	n	n	n	n	a	n
8	T. Gallagher	D	1909	n	a	o	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	n	o	a	o
9	F. A. Britten	R	1913	...	n	...	n	...	n	a	n	a	n	a
10	C. M. Thomson . . .	P	1913	...	n	...	o	...	n	a	n	a	n	n
11	Ira C. Copley	P	1911	...	o	o	a	o	n	o	o	a	n	o
12	W. H. Hinebaugh .	P	1913	...	n	...	a	...	a	a	o	o	n	n
13	J. C. McKenzie . . .	R	1911	...	n	n	o	n	n	a	n	a	o	a
14	C. H. Tavenner . . .	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	n	a	n	n	n	n
15	S. A. Hoxworth . . .	D	1913	...	a	...	o	...	o	o	o	o	o	o
16	C. U. Stone	D	1911	...	a	a	a	a	n	n	n	n	a	n
17	L. Fitz Henry	D	1913	...	n	...	a	...	n	n	n	o	n	o
18	F. T. O'Hair	D	1913	...	a	...	n	...	n	o	n	n	n	n
19	C. M. Borchers . . .	D	1913	...	a	...	n	...	n	a	o	a	a	a
20	H. T. Rainey	D	1903	n	a	o	a	n	n	n	a	a	o	o	a	n	a	a

Number of District	a-Affirmative vote n-Negative vote p-Answered present o-Not voting	Party	Beginning of Service	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
				Republican Gag Rule 1909	Democratic Gag Rule 1913	Cullop Amendment 1912	Cullop Amendment 1913	Doremus Amendment 1912-'a' for free Tolls	Canal Tolls Repeal 1914-'a' for free Tolls	Fitzgerald Amend- ment to Rules 1909	Taking Speaker from Rules Committee 1910	To Vacate Speaker's Chair 1910	To Elect Ballinger- Pinchot Committee	To break Filibuster— Calendar Wednesday	Fitzgerald Salary Amendment	Whaley Contest—for Investigation	Underwood Cotton Futures Amendment	To Displace District Day
21	J. M. Graham....	D	1909	n	o	o	a	n	a	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	o	o
22	W. N. Baltz....	D	1913	...	o	n	n	a	n	n	n
23	M. D. Foster....	D	1907	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	a	n	n	a	a
24	H. R. Fowler....	D	1911	...	a	a	a	n	n	a	n	p	n	n
25	R. P. Hill.....	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	n	n	n	n	a	n
	W. E. Williams...	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	n	n	a	n	a	a
	L. B. Stringer....	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	n	n	n	a	a	n
Indiana																		
1	Chas. Lieb.....	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	n	n	a	n	a	a
2	W. A. Cullop....	D	1909	n	a	a	a	n	o	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a
3	Wm. E. Cox....	D	1907	n	a	o	a	o	n	n	a	a	a	a	n	n	o	a
4	L. Dixon.....	D	1905	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	o	a	n	a	a
5	R. W. Moss.....	D	1909	n	o	a	o	n	n	n	a	a	a	o	n	o	o	a
6	F. H. Gray.....	D	1911	...	a	a	a	n	o	p	n	n	n	n
7	C. A. Korbly....	D	1909	n	a	n	n	n	o	n	o	p	a	o	o	o	o	o
8	J. A. M. Adair...	D	1907	n	o	a	o	n	n	n	a	a	a	o	a	n	o	a
9	M. A. Morrison...	D	1909	n	a	n	n	n	n	n	a	a	a	o	a	n	a	o
10	J. B. Peterson....	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	n	o	a	n	o	n
11	G. W. Rauch....	D	1907	n	o	a	o	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	o	n	a	a
12	C. Cline.....	D	1909	n	a	a	o	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	o	p
13	H. A. Barnhart...	D	1908	n	o	a	o	n	n	n	a	a	a	o	a	n	a	o
Iowa																		
1	C. A. Kennedy...	R	1907	a	n	o	a	o	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	a
2	H. Vollmer.....	D	1914	n	n	o	a
3	M. Connolly....	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	n	o	o	n	n	n
4	G. N. Haugen....	R	1899	n	n	o	o	n	n	n	a	n	a	o	n	a	n	a
5	J. W. Good.....	R	1909	n	n	n	o	n	n	n	a	n	a	a	a	a	n	a
6	S. Kirkpatrick...	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	n	n	a	a	n	o
7	S. F. Prouty....	R	1911	...	o	a	o	n	n	o	o	o	o	o

Number of District	a-Affirmative vote n-Negative vote p-Answered present o-Not voting	Party	Beginning of Service	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
				Republican Gag Rule 1909	Democratic Gag Rule 1913	Cullop Amendment 1912	Cullop Amendment 1913	Doremus Amendment 1912- "a" for free Tolls	Canal Tolls Repeal 1914- "a" for free Tolls	Fitzgerald Amend- ment to Rules 1909	Taking Speaker from Rules Committee 1910	To Vacate Speaker's Chair 1910	To Elect Ballinger- Pinchot Committee	To Break Filibuster— Calendar Wednesday	Fitzgerald Salary Amendment	Whaley Contest—for Investigation	Underwood Cotton Futures Amendment	To Displace District Day
8	H. M. Towner....	R	1911	...	n	n	o	a	o	a	a	a	n	a
9	W. R. Green.....	R	1911	...	n	n	a	n	n	o	o	a	o	a
10	F. P. Woods.....	R	1909	n	n	a	o	o	a	n	a	n	a	a	n	a	n	a
11	Geo. C. Scott....	R	1912	...	n	...	a	...	a	a	a	a	o	a
Kansas																		
1	D. R. Anthony, Jr.	R	1907	a	o	o	o	o	a	a	o	o	n	o	a	a	n	a
2	J. Taggart.....	D	1911	...	a	a	o	a	a	o	n	n	a	a
3	P. P. Campbell..	R	1903	a	n	o	o	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	o	o
4	D. Doolittle.....	D	1913	...	a	...	o	...	n	a	n	a	n	n
5	G. T. Helvering..	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	n	a	n	n	a	o
6	J. R. Connelly....	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	n	a	a	n	n	a
7	G. A. Neeley....	D	1912	...	a	...	a	a	n	o	o	o	o	o
8	V. Murdock.....	P	1903	n	n	a	a	o	a	n	a	a	a	a	n	o	n	n
Kentucky																		
1	A. W. Barkley....	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	n	n	n	n	a	a
2	A. O. Stanley.....	D	1903	n	o	o	o	o	n	n	a	a	a	o	o	o	a	o
3	R. Y. Thomas, Jr.	D	1909	n	a	a	a	o	n	n	a	a	a	n	o	n	a	n
4	Ben Johnson.....	D	1907	n	a	a	o	n	n	n	a	a	o	o	n	n	a	n
5	S. Sherley.....	D	1903	n	a	n	o	p	n	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	a	o
6	A. B. Rouse.....	D	1911	...	a	a	o	o	n	n	n	n	a	a
7	J. C. Cantrill....	D	1909	n	a	o	a	o	n	n	a	a	a	n	o	n	o	o
8	H. Helm.....	D	1907	n	a	o	a	o	a	n	a	a	o	n	n	n	n	o
9	W. J. Fields.....	D	1911	...	o	o	a	o	n	n	n	n	a	a
10	J. W. Langley....	R	1907	a	n	o	a	o	a	n	n	o	o	o	a	p	n	n
11	C. Powers.....	R	1911	...	n	n	n	n	a	o	o	n	n	a
Louisiana																		
1	A. Estopinal....	D	1908	a	o	o	o	a	a	a	p	p	o	n	o	n	a	a
2	H. G. Dupre.....	D	1910	...	a	o	o	a	a	n	a	n	o	a
3	R. F. Broussard..	D	1897	a	o	o	o	a	a	a	a	a	o	o	n	n	a	a

Number of District	a-Affirmative vote n-Negative vote p-Answered o-present Not voting	Party	Beginning of Service	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
				Republican Gag Rule 1909	Democratic Gag Rule 1913	Cullop Amendment 1912	Cullop Amendment 1913	Doremus Amendment 1912-"a" for free Tolls	Canal Tolls Repeal 1914-"a" for free Tolls	Fitzgerald Amend-ment to Rules 1909	Taking Speaker from Rules Committee 1910	To Vacate Speaker's Chair 1910	To Elect Ballinger-Pinchot Committee	To Break Filibuster--Calendar Wednesday	Fitzgerald Salary Amendment	Whaley Contest--for Investigation	Underwood Cotton Futures Amendment	To Displace District Day
4	J. T. Watkins....	D	1905	n	o	a	a	a	n	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a
5	W. Elder.....	D	1913	...	o	...	a	...	n	o	a	n	a	a
6	L. L. Morgan....	D	1912	...	a	...	n	...	a	o	a	n	a	a
7	L. Lazaro.....	D	1913	...	a	...	o	...	n	n	n	n	a	a
8	J. B. Aswell.....	D	1913	...	a	...	o	...	n	n	n	n	a	a
Maine																		
1	A. C. Hinds.....	R	1911	...	n	n	n	o	a	o	o	a	n	a
2	D. J. McGillicuddy	D	1911	...	a	a	o	a	n	o	a	n	a	a
3	J. A. Peters.....	R	1913	a	a	a	o	o	o
4	F. E. Guernsey...	R	1908	a	n	n	o	a	a	a	n	n	n	o	o	a	n	o
Maryland																		
1	J. H. Covington..	D	1909	n	a	o	p	a	n	n	a	a	a	o	a	n	a	o
2	J. F. C. Talbott..	D	1903	n	o	o	o	a	n	n	a	a	a	n	a	o	o	a
3	C. P. Coady.....	D	1913	n	o	a	o	...	a
4	J. C. Linthicum..	D	1911	...	o	a	o	a	n	o	a	n	a	o
5	F. O. Smith.....	D	1913	...	a	...	o	...	n	o	o	n	o	o
6	D. J. Lewis.....	D	1911	...	o	o	o	a	n	o	a	n	a	o
Massachusetts																		
1	A. T. Treadway..	R	1913	...	n	...	a	...	a	o	a	n	n	a
2	F. H. Gillett....	R	1893	a	n	o	o	p	n	a	n	n	o	n	a	o	n	a
3	C. D. Paige.....	R	1913	a	a	o	n	...	a
4	S. E. Winslow....	R	1913	...	o	...	o	...	a	a	o	a	n	o
5	J. J. Rogers.....	R	1913	...	n	...	a	...	a	a	n	a	n	o
6	A. P. Gardner....	R	1902	a	n	n	o	n	n	n	a	n	o	a	a	a	o	a
7	M. F. Phelan....	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	a	n	o	n	a	o
8	F. S. Deitrick...	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	a	n	a	o	a	a
9	E. W. Roberts....	R	1899	a	n	o	o	a	a	a	n	n	n	o	a	a	n	o
10	W. F. Murray....	D	1911	...	a	o	a	a	a	n	a	n	a	o
11	A. J. Peters.....	D	1907	n	a	n	o	a	n	a	a	a	o	n	a	o	a	o

Number of District	a-Affirmative vote n-Negative vote p-Answered present o-Not voting	Party	Beginning of Service	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
				Republican Gag Rule 1909	Democratic Gag Rule 1913	Cullop Amendment 1912	Cullop Amendment 1913	Doremus Amendment 1912-"a" for free Tolls	Canal Tolls Repeal 1914-"a" for free Tolls	Fitzgerald Amend-ment to Rules 1909	Taking Speaker from Rules Committee 1910	To Vacate Speaker's Chair 1910	To Elect Ballinger-Pinchot Committee	To Break Filibuster—Calendar Wednesday	Fitzgerald Salary Amendment	Whaley Contest—for Investigation	Underwood Cotton Futures Amendment	To Displace District Day
12	J. A. Gallivan....	D	1914	n	a
13	J. J. Mitchell....	D	1913	a	a	n	a	o	a	a
14	E. Gilmore.....	D	1913	a	a	n	o	a	n	a	a
15	W. S. Greene.....	R	1898	a	n	o	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	n	n	o
16	T. C. Thacher....	D	1913	a	a	n	n	a	n	a	a
Michigan																		
1	F. E. Doremus...	D	1911	o	a	a	a	a	o	a	o	o	o
2	S. W. Beakes....	D	1913	a	n	n	a	a	n	a	a
3	J. M. C. Smith... R	1911	n	n	o	a	a	a	a	n	o	a
4	E. L. Hamilton... R	1897	a	n	n	n	n	n	n	a	n	n	n	a	n	n	n	a
5	C. E. Mapes..... R	1913	n	a	a	a	a	a	n	n
6	S. W. Smith..... R	1897	a	n	n	o	a	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	n	n	o
7	L. C. Cramton... R	1913	n	o	a	a	n	a	n	n
8	J. W. Fordney... R	1899	a	n	o	o	o	o	a	n	n	o	a	a	a	n	n	a
9	J. C. McLaughlin.	R	1907	a	n	a	n	a	o	a	a	n	n	a	a	n	o	a
10	R. O. Woodruff... P	1913	n	o	a	a	n	a	n	n
11	F. O. Lindquist... R	1913	n	o	a	o	o	o	o	o
12	W. J. MacDonald. P	1913	a	a	a	n	n	n
	P. H. Kelley.... R	1913	n	o	a	a	a	n	o	o
Minnesota																		
1	S. Anderson..... R	1911	n	a	a	n	n	a	n	a	n	o
2	W. S. Hammond.. D	1907	n	a	n	n	a	n	n	a	a	a	a	n	a	n	a	a
3	C. R. Davis..... R	1903	a	n	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	o
4	F. C. Stevens.... R	1897	a	n	o	o	n	n	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	o	a	a
5	G. R. Smith..... R	1913	n	a	a	a	n	n	o	o
6	C. A. Lindbergh... R	1907	n	o	a	o	n	n	n	a	a	a	a	n	a	o	n	n
7	A. J. Volstead... R	1903	a	n	a	o	n	n	n	a	n	a	a	a	o	n	a	a
8	C. B. Miller..... R	1909	a	n	a	o	n	n	a	a	n	a	o	n	a	o	o	o
9	H. Steenerson... R	1903	a	p	a	a	n	n	a	a	n	n	a	n	a	n	n	n

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J. Manahan.....	R	1913	...	n	...	a	...	a	o	o	a	n	o
Mississippi																		
1 E. S. Candler, Jr.	D	1901	n	a	o	a	n	n	n	a	a	o	o	o	n	n	a	a
2 H. D. Stephens...	D	1911	...	a	a	a	n	n	n	n	n	n	a	a
3 B. G. Humphreys.	D	1903	n	a	o	n	n	n	n	a	a	a	o	a	n	a	o	o
4 T. U. Sisson.....	D	1909	n	a	a	o	n	n	n	a	a	a	o	n	n	n	a	a
5 S. A. Witherspoon	D	1911	...	a	a	o	n	n	n	n	n	n	a	a
6 B. P. Harrison....	D	1911	...	a	o	o	a	a	n	a	n	n	a	a
7 P. E. Quin.....	D	1913	...	a	...	o	...	n	n	n	n	o	a	a
8 J. W. Collier.....	D	1909	...	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	a	o	a	a	a
Missouri																		
1 J. T. Lloyd.....	D	1897	n	o	a	a	a	n	n	a	a	o	n	a	n	o	a	a
2 W. W. Rucker....	D	1899	n	o	a	o	o	n	n	a	a	a	o	o	o	n	o	o
3 J. W. Alexander..	D	1907	n	a	a	n	a	n	n	a	a	a	o	a	o	a	a	a
4 C. F. Booher.....	D	1907	n	a	a	n	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a
5 W. P. Borland....	D	1909	o	a	o	o	a	o	n	a	a	a	o	a	n	o	o	o
6 C. C. Dickinson..	D	1910	...	a	a	a	n	n	...	a	a	...	n	a	n	a	a	a
7 C. W. Hamlin....	D	1907	n	o	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	o	a	n	o	a	a
8 D. W. Shackelford	D	1899	n	o	a	o	o	n	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	o	n	n
9 Champ Clark.....	D	1897	n	o	o	o	o	a	n	a	a	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
10 R. Bartholdt.....	R	1893	a	n	n	o	a	n	a	n	n	n	o	a	o	o	o	o
11 W. L. Igoe.....	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	a	a	a	n	a	o	o
12 L. C. Dyer.....	R	1911	...	n	a	a	p	a	n	a	o	o	n	n
13 W. L. Hensley....	D	1911	...	a	o	a	n	n	n	n	n	a	a	a
14 J. J. Russell.....	D	1911	...	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	n	a	a	a
15 P. D. Decker.....	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	n	n	n	n	a	n	n
16 T. L. Rubey.....	D	1911	...	a	a	a	n	n	n	o	n	a	a	a
Montana																		
T. Stout.....	D	1913	...	a	...	o	...	n	o	o	o	a	a	a

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	J. M. Evans.....	D	1913	a	o	o	n	n	n	n	n	o	a
	Nebraska																	
1	J. A. Maguire....	D	1909	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a
2	C. O. Lobeck....	D	1911	a	a	a	a	n	o	a	o	a	a
3	D. V. Stephens...	D	1911	a	o	a	n	n	o	a	n	a	a
4	C. H. Sloan.....	R	1911	n	a	n	n	a	a	n	a	n	o
5	S. R. Barton.....	R	1913	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	n
6	M. P. Kinkaid....	R	1903	o	n	n	o	n	a	n	a	n	o	a	n	o	n	n
	Nevada																	
	E. E. Roberts....	R	1911	o	a	n	a	o	a	a	o	o	n
	New Hampshire																	
1	E. E. Reed.....	D	1913	a	a	n	n	n	n	n	a
2	R. B. Stevens....	D	1913	o	o	n	n	a	a	a	o
	New Jersey																	
1	W. J. Browning..	R	1911	p	n	o	o	a	a	p	a	n	o
2	J. T. Baker.....	D	1913	a	n	n	n	a	o	o	a
3	T. J. Scully.....	D	1911	o	o	o	o	n	n	o	n	a	o
4	A. B. Walsh.....	D	1913	a	o	n	o	o	n	a	a
5	W. E. Tuttle, Jr.	D	1911	a	a	n	a	n	o	o	o	a	o
6	A. C. Hart.....	D	1913	n	o	a	n	a	o
7	D. H. Drukker...	R	1914	o	o
8	E. F. Kinkead....	D	1909	n	a	a	a	a	n	n	a	a	o	n	a	n	a	o
9	W. I. McCoy....	D	1911	a	o	o	n	n	o	a	n	a	o
10	E. W. Townsend..	D	1911	a	o	n	o	n	n	a	o	a	a
11	J. J. Eagan.....	D	1913	p	n	n	n	a	o	a	o
12	J. A. Hamill.....	D	1907	n	a	o	n	a	n	n	a	a	o	o	o	o	a	o
	New Mexico																	
	H. B. Fergusson..	D	1912	a	a	a	a	n	n	a	n	a	a

Number of District	New York	Party	Beginning of Service	a-Affirmative vote n-Negative vote p-Answered present o-Not voting														
				1 Republican Gag Rule 1909	2 Democratic Gag Rule 1913	3 Cullop Amendment 1912	4 Cullop Amendment 1913	5 Doremus Amendment 1912. "a" for free Tolls	6 Canal Tolls Repeal 1914. "a" for free Tolls	7 Fitzgerald Amend- ment to Rules 1909	8 Taking Speaker from Rules Committee 1910	9 To Vacate Speaker's Chair 1910	10 To Elect Ballinger- Pinchot Committee	11 To Break Filibuster-- Calendar Wednesday	12 Fitzgerald Salary Amendment	13 Whaley Contest--for Investigation	14 Underwood Cotton Futures Amendment	15 To Displace District Day
1	L. Brown.....	D	1913	...	a	...	o	...	n	n	n	n	a	a	
2	D. O'Leary.....	D	1913	...	o	...	o	...	a	a	a	o	a	o	
3	F. E. Wilson.....	D	1911	...	o	a	o	a	o	o	a	o	o	o	
4	H. H. Dale.....	D	1913	...	o	...	o	...	a	o	o	o	a	o	
5	J. P. Maher.....	D	1911	...	o	a	o	a	a	o	o	o	a	o	
6	W. M. Calder....	R	1905	a	o	n	o	o	a	a	n	n	n	o	o	a	o	
7	J. J. Fitzgerald...	D	1899	n	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	n	a	a	n	a	
8	D. J. Griffin.....	D	1913	...	o	...	o	...	a	n	o	o	a	o	
9	J. H. O'Brien.....	D	1913	...	a	...	o	...	n	n	a	o	a	o	
10	H. A. Metz.....	D	1913	...	o	...	o	...	a	o	o	n	a	a	
11	D. J. Riordan....	D	1906	o	o	p	o	p	a	a	a	a	o	o	a	o	n	
12	H. M. Goldfogle..	D	1901	n	o	o	o	a	a	a	a	a	o	n	o	o	a	
13	G. W. Loft.....	D	1913	n	o	a	o	...	o	
14	J. M. Levy.....	D	1911	...	a	o	o	o	n	o	o	o	a	a	
15	M. F. Conry.....	D	1909	n	a	o	o	a	a	a	a	a	a	n	a	o	n	
16	P. J. Dooling....	D	1913	...	o	...	o	...	a	a	o	o	a	o	
17	J. F. Carew.....	D	1913	...	o	...	o	...	a	o	o	n	n	o	
18	T. G. Patten.....	D	1911	...	o	a	o	a	a	o	a	n	o	a	
19	W. M. Chandler..	P	1913	...	n	...	a	...	a	a	o	o	o	a	
20	J. A. Cantor....	D	1913	n	o	n	n	...	o	
21	H. George, Jr....	D	1911	...	o	o	...	a	n	n	o	o	a	o	
22	H. Bruckner....	D	1913	...	o	...	o	...	a	n	a	o	a	o	
23	J. A. Goulden....	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	a	n	a	n	a	o	
24	W. R. Oglesby...	D	1913	...	a	...	o	...	n	o	a	n	n	o	
25	B. I. Taylor.....	D	1913	...	o	...	o	...	n	n	a	n	a	a	
26	E. Platt.....	R	1913	...	n	...	n	...	a	o	a	a	o	a	
27	G. McClellan....	D	1913	...	a	...	o	...	n	n	a	o	a	o	
28	P. G. Ten Eyck..	D	1913	...	a	...	o	...	n	n	a	n	a	a	
29	J. S. Parker.....	R	1913	...	n	...	o	...	a	a	a	n	o	a	

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30	S. Wallin.....	R	1913	n	o	a	o	o	o	o	a
31	E. A. Merritt, Jr..	R	1912	n	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
32	L. W. Mott.....	R	1911	n	o	o	o	a	a	n	a	o	a
33	C. A. Talcott....	D	1911	a	a	n	a	n	a	a	o	a	a
34	G. W. Fairchild..	R	1907	a	n	o	p	a	a	a	o	o	o	o	a	o	o	o
35	J. R. Clancy.....	D	1913	a	n	n	n	a	o	a	o
36	S. E. Payne.....	R	1889	a	o	n	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	o	o	a	n	o
37	E. S. Underhill..	D	1911	o	a	n	a	n	o	a	n	a	a
38	T. B. Dunn.....	R	1913	n	p	a	o	o	a	o	o
39	H. G. Danforth...	R	1911	o	n	o	a	n	a	a	n	o	o
40	R. H. Gittins....	D	1913	o	n	n	n	o	n	a	o
41	C. B. Smith.....	D	1911	o	a	o	a	n	n	n	n	p	o
42	D. A. Driscoll....	D	1909	o	a	o	n	o	a	n	a	a	o	o	a	n	a	a
43	C. M. Hamilton..	R	1913	o	o	a	a	n	a	o	o
North Carolina																		
1	J. H. Small.....	D	1899	n	a	o	o	a	n	n	a	a	a	o	o	n	a	a
2	C. Kitchin.....	D	1901	n	a	o	o	o	a	n	a	a	a	o	a	o	a	a
3	J. M. Faison.....	D	1911	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	n	a	o
4	E. W. Pou.....	D	1901	n	a	a	n	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	a	n
5	C. M. Stedman...	D	1911	o	a	o	n	n	n	a	n	a	a
6	H. L. Godwin....	D	1907	n	o	a	o	n	n	n	a	a	a	o	n	n	o	a
7	R. N. Page.....	D	1903	n	a	a	n	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	a	a
8	R. L. Doughton..	D	1911	a	a	a	o	n	n	a	n	a	o
9	E. Y. Webb.....	D	1903	n	a	a	o	o	n	n	a	a	o	o	n	o	a	o
10	J. M. Gudger, Jr.	D	1911	a	o	o	o	n	o	o	n	a	o
North Dakota																		
1	H. T. Helgesen...	R	1911	n	a	a	n	n	o	n	a	o	a
2	G. M. Young....	R	1913	n	a	a	a	n	a	o	o
3	P. D. Norton....	R	1913	n	a	a	o	o	a	o	o

Number of District	a-Affirmative vote n-Negative vote p-Answered present o-Not voting	Party	Beginning of Service	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
				Republican Gag Rule 1909	Democratic Gag Rule 1913	Cullop Amendment 1912	Cullop Amendment 1913	Doremus Amendment 1912-"a" for free Tolls	Canal Tolls Repeal 1914-"a" for free Tolls	Fitzgerald Amend- ment to Rules 1909	Taking Speaker from Rules Committee 1910	To Vacate Speaker's Chair 1910	To Elect Ballinger- Pirchot Committee	To Break Filibuster— Calendar Wednesday	Fitzgerald Salary Amendment	Whaley Contest—for Investigation	Underwood Corton Futures Amendment	To Displace District Day
Ohio																		
1	S. E. Bowdle.....	D	1913	...	o	...	a	...	n	n	a	a	o	a
2	A. G. Allen.....	D	1911	...	a	a	a	o	n	n	a	n	a	a
3	W. Gard.....	D	1913	...	o	...	a	...	n	o	n	n	a	o
4	J. H. Goeke.....	D	1911	...	o	a	a	o	n	n	o	n	a	o
5	T. T. Ansberry...	D	1907	n	o	a	o	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	o	o
6	S. D. Fess.....	R	1913	...	n	...	a	...	a	n	n	a	o	o
7	J. D. Post.....	D	1911	...	a	n	n	o	n	o	a	n	o	a
8	F. B. Willis.....	R	1911	...	n	n	a	n	a	a	n	a	n	n
9	I. R. Sherwood...	D	1907	n	a	a	a	o	n	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	a	a
10	R. M. Switzer....	R	1911	...	o	n	o	o	a	a	a	o	n	o
11	H. C. Claypool...	D	1911	...	a	a	n	o	n	n	n	n	n	a
12	C. Brumbaugh..	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	n	n	a	o	n	a
13	J. A. Key.....	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	n	n	o	o	a	a
14	W. G. Sharp.....	D	1909	n	a	p	o	o	n	n	a	a	a	n	o	o	a	o
15	G. White.....	D	1911	...	o	n	o	o	n	o	a	n	n	a
16	W. B. Francis....	D	1911	...	a	a	a	o	n	n	a	n	o	o
17	W. A. Ashbrook..	D	1907	n	a	o	a	o	n	n	a	a	o	n	a	n	a	o
18	J. J. Whitacre....	D	1911	...	a	o	o	n	n	o	a	a	n	o
19	E. R. Bathrick...	D	1911	...	o	o	o	o	n	o	o	n	o	n
20	W. Gordon.....	D	1913	...	a	...	o	...	n	n	o	n	a	o
21	R. J. Bulkley....	D	1911	...	a	a	o	n	n	n	a	n	a	o
	R. Crosser.....	D	1913	...	n	...	a	...	n	o	a	a	n	o
Oklahoma																		
1	B. McGuire.....	R	1907	a	n	n	n	p	a	a	n	n	n	o	a	o	o	a
2	D. T. Morgan....	R	1909	a	n	n	a	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	n	n	a	n
3	J. S. Davenport..	D	1911	...	a	a	a	o	n	o	n	n	n	n
4	C. D. Carter.....	D	1907	n	a	a	a	o	n	n	a	a	a	n	a	o	o	o
5	S. Ferris.....	D	1907	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	n	a
	W. H. Murray....	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	a	a	a	n	n	a

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				Republican Gag Rule 1909	Democratic Gag Rule 1913	Cullop Amendment 1912	Cullop Amendment 1913	Doremus Amendment 1912-"a" for free Tolls	Canal Tolls Repeal 1914-"a" for free Tolls	Fitzgerald Amend-ment to Rules 1909	Taking Speaker from Rules Committee 1910	To Vacate Speaker's Chair 1910	To Elect Ballinger-Pinchot Committee	To Break Filibuster—Calendar Wednesday	Fitzgerald Salary Amendment	Whaley Contest—for Investigation	Underwood Cotton Futures Amendment	To Displace District Day
	C. Weaver.....	D	1913	a	n	n	a	a	o	a	a
	J. B. Thompson..	D	1913	a	a	n	n	o	n	n	a
Oregon																		
1	W. C. Hawley....	R	1907	a	n	o	a	a	a	a	n	n	n	o	n	a	a	a
2	N. J. Sinnott....	R	1913	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	n
3	A. W. Lafferty...	P	1911	n	a	a	a	a	a	n	a	n	o
Pennsylvania																		
1	W. S. Vare.....	R	1912	o	o	a	a	o	a	a	n	o
2	G. S. Graham....	R	1913	n	o	a	a	o	o	o	o
3	J. H. Moore.....	R	1906	a	n	o	n	o	a	a	n	n	o	n	a	o	n	o
4	G. W. Edmonds..	R	1913	o	o	a	o	a	a	o	o
5	M. Donohoe....	D	1911	o	o	o	a	a	n	a	n	n	a
6	J. W. Logue.....	D	1913	a	n	n	n	a	n	a	o
7	T. S. Butler.....	R	1897	a	o	o	o	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	o	n	n	a
8	R. E. Difenderfer.	D	1911	o	p	o	a	a	o	n	n	n	o
9	W. W. Griest....	R	1909	a	o	n	o	a	a	a	n	n	n	o	a	o	n	o
10	J. R. Farr.....	P	1911	o	a	a	o	a	a	o	a	n	n
11	J. J. Casey.....	D	1913	a	o	a	n	o	n	n	o
12	R. E. Lee.....	D	1911	a	o	n	a	a	n	n	n	n	n
13	J. H. Rothermeal.	D	1907	n	a	a	n	a	n	n	a	a	a	n	o	o	p	o
14	W. D. B. Ainey...	R	1911	o	o	o	o	a	o	a	a	a	o
15	E. R. Kiess.....	R	1913	o	o	a	o	o	o	o	o
16	J. V. Leshner....	D	1913	o	n	n	o	n	n	n	a
17	F. L. Dershem....	D	1913	o	a	n	a	n	a	n	o
18	A. S. Kreider....	R	1913	n	o	a	a	a	a	n	o
19	W. W. Bailey....	D	1913	a	a	n	n	o	n	n	a
20	A. R. Brodbeck....	D	1913	a	n	n	o	n	n	n	o
21	C. E. Patton....	R	1911	n	o	o	o	a	o	a	a	o	o
22	A. L. Keister....	R	1913	n	n	a	a	a	o	n	a


Number of District	a-Affirmative vote n-Negative vote p-Answered present o-Not voting	Party	Beginning of Service	'1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
				Republican Gag Rule 1909	Democratic Gag Rule 1913	Cullop Amendment 1912	Cullop Amendment 1913	Doremus Amendment 1912-"a" for free Tolls	Canal Tolls Repeal 1914-"a" for free Tolls	Fitzgerald Amend- ment to Rules 1909	Taking Speaker from Rules Committee 1910	To Vacate Speaker's Chair 1910	To Elect Ballinger- Finchot Committee	To Break Filibuster— Calendar Wednesday	Fitzgerald Salary Amendment	Whaley Contest—for Investigation	Underwood Cotton Futures Amendment	To Displace District Day
23	W. N. Carr.....	D	1913	a	a	n	n	o	n	o	a
24	H. W. Temple....	P	1913	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	n
25	M. W. Shreve....	R	1913	n	o	a	a	a	n	n	o
26	A. M. Palmer....	D	1909	n	a	a	n	o	n	n	a	a	a	o	o	n	a	o
27	J. N. Langham...	R	1909	a	n	o	o	a	a	a	n	n	n	o	o	a	n	o
28	W. J. Hulings....	P	1913	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	n
29	S. G. Porter.....	R	1911	o	o	a	o	a	o	a	a	n	o
30	M. C. Kelly.....	P	1913	n	a	a	a	o	a	n	o
31	J. F. Burke.....	R	1905	a	o	n	o	a	a	a	n	n	o	o	o	o	a	p
32	A. J. Barchfeld...	R	1905	a	o	o	o	a	a	a	n	n	n	o	a	o	n	o
	A. R. Rupley....	P	1913	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	n
	J. M. Morin.....	R	1913	n	o	a	a	o	a	n	o
	A. H. Walters....	P	1913	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	n
	F. E. Lewis.....	P	1913	o	a	a	a	n	a	o	o
	Rhode Island																	
1	G. F. O'Shaunessy	D	1911	o	n	n	o	a	a	a	o	a	o
2	P. G. Gerry.....	D	1913	a	o	n	o	a	n	a	o
3	A. Kennedy.....	R	1913	o	o	a	a	a	o	n	o
	South Carolina																	
1	R. S. Whaley....	D	1913	a	n	o	a	o	a	a
2	J. F. Byrnes.....	D	1911	a	a	n	n	n	n	a	n	a	a
3	W. Aiken.....	D	1903	n	a	o	a	o	a	n	a	a	o	o	a	n	a	a
4	J. T. Johnson....	D	1901	n	a	o	o	o	n	n	a	a	o	n	o	n	a	a
5	D. E. Finley....	D	1899	n	a	a	o	n	a	n	a	a	o	o	o	n	o	a
6	J. W. Ragsdale...	D	1913	a	a	a	o	a	o	a	n
7	A. F. Lever.....	D	1901	n	a	o	o	o	n	n	p	p	a	o	a	n	a	a
	South Dakota																	
1	C. H. Dillon....	R	1913	n	a	a	n	n	a	n	a
2	C. H. Burke.....	R	1909	a	n	n	n	o	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	o	o	a

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3	E. W. Martin....	R	1908	a	a	o	n	p	o	a	a	n	n	o	o	o	o	o
	Tennessee																	
1	S. R. Sells.....	R	1911	o	o	o	a	a	o	n	a	n	a
2	R. W. Austin....	R	1909	n	n	n	a	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	n
3	J. A. Moon.....	D	1897	n	a	a	a	n	o	a	o	o	o	n	a	n	a	o
4	C. Hull.....	D	1907	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	n	a
5	W. C. Houston...	D	1905	n	o	a	o	n	n	n	a	a	a	o	o	n	a	a
6	J. W. Byrns.....	D	1909	n	a	o	n	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	a	a
7	L. P. Padgett....	D	1901	n	a	o	o	a	n	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	a	a
8	T. W. Sims.....	D	1897	n	a	a	o	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	n	o
9	F. J. Garrett....	D	1905	n	a	n	n	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	n	a
10	K. D. McKellar..	D	1911	a	o	o	n	n	n	o	n	a	a
	Texas																	
1	H. W. Vaughan...	D	1913	a	a	n	n	n	n	n	a
2	M. Dies.....	D	1909	n	a	n	o	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	a	a
3	J. Young.....	D	1911	a	a	a	n	n	n	n	n	a	o
4	S. Rayburn.....	D	1913	a	n	n	o	n	n	n	n	n	a
5	J. Beall.....	D	1903	n	a	o	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	n	o	n	a
6	R. Hardy.....	D	1907	n	a	a	a	o	n	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	n	a
7	A. W. Gregg.....	D	1903	n	a	a	a	a	n	n	a	a	o	n	a	n	n	a
8	J. H. Eagle.....	D	1913	o	a	n	n	n	o	a	a
9	G. F. Burgess....	D	1901	n	a	o	n	o	n	n	o	o	a	o	a	n	a	a
10	J. P. Buchanan...	D	1913	a	a	n	n	a	n	a	a
11	R. L. Henry.....	D	1897	n	o	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	o	o	o	a
12	O. Callaway.....	D	1911	a	a	a	n	n	n	n	n	a	o
13	J. H. Stephens....	D	1897	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	o	a	n	o	a
14	J. L. Slayden....	D	1897	n	a	o	n	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	o	n	a	o
15	J. N. Garner.....	D	1903	n	a	a	p	a	n	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	n	a
16	W. R. Smith.....	D	1903	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	a	n	n	n	o

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	H. W. Sumners...	D	1913	a	o	n	n	n	n	a	a
	D. E. Garrett....	D	1913	a	a	n	n	n	n	n	a
	Utah																	
	J. Howell.....	R	1903	a	o	o	o	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	o	a	a	a
	J. Johnson.....	R	1913	n	n	a	a	a	n	n	a
	Vermont																	
1	F. L. Greene.....	R	1912	n	n	a	a	a	a	n	a
2	F. Plumley.....	R	1909	a	n	o	n	o	a	a	a	n	o	o	a	a	n	a
	Virginia																	
1	W. A. Jones.....	D	1891	n	a	a	o	o	a	n	a	a	a	o	a	o	a	o
2	E. E. Holland....	D	1911	a	n	n	o	n	n	a	n	a	a
3	A. J. Montague...	D	1913	o	n	n	n	a	o	a	o
4	W. A. Watson....	D	1913	a	a	n	o	a	o	a	o
5	E. W. Saunders..	D	1906	n	o	o	n	o	n	n	o	o	a	o	a	n	a	o
6	C. Glass.....	D	1902	n	o	o	o	o	n	n	o	o	a	n	p	n	a	a
7	J. Hay.....	D	1897	n	a	a	n	o	n	n	a	a	a	n	a	o	a	a
8	C. C. Carlin.....	D	1907	n	p	a	o	o	n	n	a	a	a	o	o	o	a	o
9	C. B. Slemper....	R	1907	a	o	n	o	o	a	a	o	o	n	o	o	o	n	o
10	H. D. Flood.....	D	1901	n	a	a	a	o	n	n	a	a	a	n	o	n	a	a
	Washington																	
1	W. E. Humphrey..	R	1903	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	n	n	a	a	a	n	a
2	A. Johnson.....	R	1913	n	o	a	o	a	a	n	a
3	W. L. LaFollette..	R	1911	n	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	n	n
	J. A. Falconer....	P	1913	n	a	a	a	n	a	n	n
	J. W. Bryan.....	P	1913	n	a	a	a	n	a	o	n
	West Virginia																	
1	M. M. Neely.....	D	1913	n	n	n	n	o
2	W. G. Brown, Jr..	D	1911	a	a	a	o	a	n	o	n	n	n
3	S. B. Avis.....	R	1913	o	n	a	a	n	o	n	a

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4	H. H. Moss, Jr...	R	1913	...	n	...	o	...	a	o	a	o	n	o
5	J. A. Hughes.....	R	1901	a	o	n	o	o	p	a	n	n	p	o	o	o	o	p
	H. Sutherland....	R	1913	...	n	...	o	...	a	a	n	a	n	a
Wisconsin																		
1	H. A. Cooper.....	R	1893	n	n	a	o	a	a	n	a	a	a	n	n	a	n	o
2	M. E. Burke.....	D	1911	...	a	a	a	n	n	o	a	n	o	n
3	J. M. Nelson.....	R	1906	n	o	a	a	a	a	n	a	a	a	o	n	a	n	n
4	W. J. Cary.....	R	1907	n	n	p	a	n	a	n	a	a	o	a	o	o	p	n
5	W. H. Stafford...	R	1913	...	n	...	a	...	n	a	n	n	n	a	n	a	n	n
6	M. K. Reilly.....	D	1913	...	a	...	a	...	n	o	a	n	n	a
7	J. J. Esch.....	R	1899	a	n	p	o	n	n	o	o	o	n	a	n	a	n	a
8	E. E. Browne....	R	1913	...	n	...	o	...	n	a	n	a	n	a
9	T. F. Konop.....	D	1911	...	a	a	o	n	n	a	a	n	n	o
10	J. A. Frear.....	R	1913	...	n	...	a	...	a	a	n	a	n	a
11	I. L. Lenroot....	R	1909	n	n	a	o	n	n	n	a	a	a	a	n	a	o	a
Wyoming																		
	F. W. Mondell...	R	1899	a	n	o	o	n	a	a	n	n	n	o	a	o	n	a





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