0
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:
CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt
ro: OFFICERS: ALL CHIEFS: E-6 and Below
14 days of screening after port visits
Sunday, March 15, 2020 8:19:34 PM
COVID-19 SCREENING PLAN - after a port visit.docx
All,
Some clarification on screening on the ship after port visits. First, the
rationale for 14 days: everything we know about Coronavims shows that 99%
of people will have symptoms by approximately 13 days (mean 5 days). There
are three categories of screening:
1) As previously passed, each department will screen their sailors for 7
days after leaving a port by asking them questions regarding Fever, Chills,
Cough, Sore Throat, Shortness of breath. Body aches, and Abdominal pain.
After the 7 days (which expired yesterday, 3/15), then each individual will
self-monitor for the same symptoms for the next 7 days. If at any time
during this process a person answers yes to one of those symptoms then they
are to report to medical for additional screening and they enter the next
category.
2) Individuals that answered yes to one of those symptoms now get daily
temperature checks in Medical. They are required to do these checks for the
full 14 days after leaving the port (last day 3/22). This is the list that
CAPTCbf(6) (nurse anesthetist) is tracking and sending to leadership.
3) Personnel arriving via COD - HODs/DLCPOs are notified (by CAPT
using the ATO manifest) of those individuals that require screening after
arrival on a COD. Same screening concept except that their 7-1-7 days of
screening starts the day they arrive on the ship and results are emailed to
CAPT£)|gJ
Again, at any time within the 14 days, if a person develops these symptoms
they need to be evaluated by Medical.
This, combined with sanitation, hand washing, respiratory/cough etiquette,
is an all hands event - that applies to the Coronavims and all infectious
diseases that are more easily spread in close quarters.
Please contact myself or CAPT^^(6J if you have any questions.
Thanks for your help.
v/r,
SMO
CAPT MC(FS) USN
Senior Medical Officer
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)
Work: (TO I
J-dial: [b) I
H-3-69
H-3-69
1 MAR 20
MEMORANDUM
From: Senior Medical Officer, USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71)
Subj; USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 7 1) COVID-19 SCREENING PLAN AFTER A PORT
VISIT
Ref: (a) C7F FRAGORD 0 1 1 TO TASKORD 20-057 FOR FHP AGAINST COVID-19
(b) COVID-19 Screening Questiomiaire
1 . Due to the increasing risk of Coronavirus transmission, per reference (a), all persormel boarding the
ship require a COVID-19 Medical Screening for seven days and an additional seven days of self-
monitoiTiig. This 14 day period will start the day we get rurderway from a port visit. The Medical
Departrnerrt will oversee the COVID-19 screening process. COVID-19 screeners are rrot reqirfred to be
Medical department persormel.
2. Per references (a) and (b), all persormel coming to the ship will be screened for the following
symptoms:
a. Fever
b. drills
c. Coirgh
d. Sore Throat
e. Shortness of breath
f Body aches
g. Abdomuial pain
3. COVID-19 screenurg plan for all persormel gettmg tmderway after a port visit is as follows:
a. Persomiel will be queried daily by their departmentaFsqrradron leaderslrip for 7 days for arry of the
syrrrptorrrs in paragraph 2. Persormel will then self-monitor for synrptorns for an additiorral 7 days.
Individuals rvith positive screening must report to Medical immediately. They will be asked to put
on a mask and undergo further screening. From 0700-0900 Monday-Saturday they will be directed
to enter via Aslation Medicine (port side entry fonvard of CMC’s door). Routine Sick Call (0830-
0930) will enter the Physical Therapy door (port side entry, frame 102).
(DOncescreeningisaccon^ished. reports of positive screening will be forwarded via errrail to
CAPT|B||^^^^^| at [BB^^J@cvir71. naw.mil. Departrrrerrts are required to provide feedback
to MedrcalDyffiOOon a aartyoasrror as soon as possible after everring muster. Departments will
maintairr then screerring resirlts. Medical wiU track the positive screening resrrlts.
4. Please contact LTJ^V}~^H||, Ship’s Ninse, or CA^|5yffr~^J, Ninse Anesthetist, at J-dial
or via email at fh) (6> ^|@'cvri7 1 .naw.mil or |@cvn71.naw^mil with arry
qirestions.
H-3-69
From:
To:
Cc:
Baker. Stuart P RDML USN. CCSG-9
CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:
Post-Danang Update 17 March
Monday, March 16, 2020 9:58:12 PM
C7F TASKORD FHP REVl dtd 16 Mar.pdf
Admiral.
Dady update on the 39 sailors in monitored sequestration.
1 . Daily tenqserature checks perfomied viith no fevers. All sailors are
cuiTently symptom-free. Anticipate release from quarantine on Sunday (3/22)
assumuig no cliange in clinical status.
2. C7F TASKORD FHP Revision 1 released 16 March. Clianges in tlie TASKORD:
a. Recommended liberty groups no larger than 6 people (Para.
4.A.10.D.2.A).
b. Lists places that will be off limits during port \isits (e.g..
community centers, nursing facihties. office builduigs) (Para.
4.A.10.D.2.B).
c. Excludes air crew from travel/restriction of movement (ROM)
requirements when flyuig in official duties (Para. 4.A.12).
d. Extensive ROM requuements (e.g.. separate berthing, no closer'
tharr 6 feet, no crowded areas, taking temperature twice a day) for anyorre
travelmg tluoirgli a Level 2 or 3 country in the past 14 days. (Para.
4.A.12.Band4.A.12.C).
e. Post port visit screening for influerrza-like illness (fever >
100.4, cough, sore tliroat) will be done at days 5-7 arrd 9-11 after getting
underway. For ease of managing screening a crew of tliis size, we are going
to screen fiorn day 1-11.
3. I have pushed my concerns to tire C7F/PACFLT Surgeons about the chaUerrge
of conqrlying with the ROM reqirirernents for 5000 people after Vietnam (and
sirbsequent port visits). We are imable to comply as currently written. My
recommendation is tliat we continue the screeniirg we are doing and
qirararrtirre/isolate as clinically indicated.
Standing by for questions.
v/r,
SMO
MD
CAPT MC(FS) USN
Senior Medical Officer
USS Tlieodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)
H-3-69a
LCDR USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
Subject: FW: R 160551Z MAR 20 COMSEVENTHFLT COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET TASKORD
REV 1 FOR PHASE TWO (MITIGATION) AGAINST COVID-19
- OFFICIAL INFORMATION DISPATCH FOLLOWS - RTTUCYUW ROUIAAA0107 0760550-UUUU-RHMCSUU.
ZNR UUUUU
R 1605512 MAR 20 MID111000060720S
FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO CTF 70
CTF 71
CTF 72
CTF 73
CTF 74
CTF 75
CTF 76
CTF 78
INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC
CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA
COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA
COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA
COMSUBPAC PEARL HARBOR HI
COMNAVREG JAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
COMNAVREGKOREA CHINHAE KOR
COMNAVMARIANAS GU
COMTHIRDFLT
CG III MEF
CG THIRD MEB
CG THIRD MARDIV
CG THIRD MLG
CG FIRST MAW
COMMARFORPAC
COMMARFORK
COMSEVENTHFLT
BT
UNCLAS
PASS TO OFFICE CODES:
CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI/J3/
COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI/N1/N3/N01H/
MSGID/ORDER/COMSEVENTHFLT/20-099/MAR//
SUBJ/COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET TASKORD REV 1 FOR PHASE TWO
(MITIGATION) AGAINST COVID-19//
MSGID/TASKORD/COMSEVENTHFLT//
TIMEZONE/Z//
REF/A/ORD/USINDOPACOM/091955ZFEB20//
REF/B/ORD/USINDOPACOM/050410ZFEB20//
REF/C/ORD/USINDOPACOM/060656ZFEB20//
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REF/D/ORD/USINDOPACOM/070648ZFEB20//
REF/E/ORD/USINDOPACOM/080635ZFEB20//
REF/F/DOC/DOD/15OCT2013//
REF/G/DOC/DOD/26FEB2013//
REF/H/DOC/aCS/13JUN2005//
REF/I/DOC/USINDOPACOM/01AUG2016//
REF/J/DOC/UNDERSECDEF/07FEB2020//
REF/K/DOC/UNDERSECDEF/30JAN2020//
R EF/L/GE NADMl N/CNO/112054ZFE B20//
REF/M/ORD/DOC/aCS/05SEP2019//
REF/N/ORD/USINDOPACOM/150242ZFEB20//
REF/O/ORD/USINDOPACOM/220401ZFEB20//
REF/P/DOC/COMPACFLT/26FEB2020//
REF/Q/GENADMIN/USINDOPACOM/260625ZFEB2O//
REF/R/ORD/COMPACFLT/270419ZFEB20//
REF/S/ORD/COMPACFLT/290417ZFEB20//
REF/T/ORD/USINOOPACOM/010335ZMAR20//
REF/U/ORD/USINDOPACOM/O405412MAR20//
REF/V/ORD/USFFC/020255ZMAR20//
REF/W/ORD/USFFC/021600ZMAR20//
REF/X/DOC/OPNAV/19NOV2018//
REF/Y/ORD/USFFC/030052ZMAR20//
REF/Z/DOC/USFFC/03MAR2020/-/SEPCOR//
REF/AA/DOC/DOD/28MAR2019//
REF/AB/ORD/COMPACFLT/12MAR2020//
REF/AC/ORD/COMPACFLT/060424ZMAR20//
REF/AD/DOC/OSD/11MAR2020//
REF/AE/DOC/OUSD/11MAR2020//
REF/AF/GENADMIN/USINDOPACOM/130424ZMAR20//
REF/AG/GENADMIN/SECNAV/121914ZMAR20//
REF/AH/DOC/CNO/122210ZMAR20//
REF/AI/ORD/USFF/121310ZMAR20//
REF/AJ/DOC/OSD/13MAR2020//
REF/AK/ORD/USFJ/20200204//
REF/AM/WEBSITE/CDC/CORONAVIRUS//
REF/AN/DOC/NTRP_4-02.10//
REF/AO/DOC/DHA/5FEB020//
REF/AP/DOC/NAVEDTRA 43699-2A//
REF/AQ/DOC/COVID-19//
REF/AR/DOC/COVID-19//
REF/AS/DOC/NAVEDTRA43119 SERIES.
REF/AT/DOC/C7F/FEB20//
REF/AU/ORDER/C7F/081148ZMAR20//
REF/AV/GENADMIN/SECNAV/140235ZMAR20//
NARR/(U) REF A IS USINDOPACOM EXORD P-963 DIRECTING EXECUTION OF PHASE I TO CONPLAN 5003-18.
REF B IS USINDOPACOM RESPONSE TO CORONA VIRUS P-957 EXORD.
REF C IS USINDOPACOM FRAGORD 001 TO REF B.
REF D IS USINDOPACOM FRAGORD 002 TO REF B.
REF E IS USINDOPACOM FRAGORD 003 TO REF B.
REF F IS DOD GLOBAL CAMPAIGN PLAN FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE 3551-13.
REF G IS DOD INST 3025.14 FOR EVACUATION OF U.S CITIZENS AND DESIGNATED ALIENS FROM THREATENED AREAS
ABROAD.
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REF H IS aCSINST 3121.01B PRESCRIBING THE STANDING RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE (SRUF) FOR U.S. FORCES.
REF I IS USINDOPACOM CONPLAN 5003.
REFS J AND K PRESCRIBE UPDATED FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION GUIDANCE FOR CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK.
REF L IS CNO GUIDANCE FOR MONITORING PERSONNEL RETURNING FROM CHINA DURING THE NOVEL CORONAVIRUS
OUTBREAK.
REF M IS aCS MANUAL 3105.01 ON RISK ASSESSMENT.
REF N IS USINDOPACOM FRAGORD 001 TO REF A.
REF O IS USINDOPACOM FRAGORD 002 TO REF A.
REF P IS CPF CONORS FOR COVID-19 RESPONSE.
REF Q IS USINDOPACOM FORCE PROTECTION DIRECTIVE 20-006.
REF R IS CPF EXORD IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19.
REF S IS CPF FRAGORD 001 TO REF R.
REF T IS USINDOPACOM FRAGORD 003 TO REF A.
REF U IS USINDOPACOM FRAGORD 004 TO REF A.
REF V IS CUSFF/NAVNORTH EXECUTE ORDER (EXORD) IN RESPONSE TO NOVEL CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019.
REF W IS CUSFF/NAVNORTH FRAGORD 001 TO REF V.
REF X IS OPNAVINST 3500.41A PANDEMIC INFLUENZA AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE POLICY.
REF Y IS CUSFF/NAVNORTH FRAGORD 002 TO REF V.
REF Z IS NORTHCOM AOR C2 DIAGRAM.
REF AA IS DODI 6200.03, PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENa MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE DOD.
REF AB IS CPF VOCO 20-033, COVID-19 OPREP-3 REPORTING GUIDANCE.
REF AC IS CPF FRAGO 002 TO REF R.
REF AD IS OSD TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS FOR DOD COMPONENTS IN RESPONSE TO CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019.
REF AE IS OUSD FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION (FHP) GUIDANCE, SUPP 4, GUIDANCE FOR PERSONNEL TRAVELING DURING
THE NOVEL CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK.
REF AF IS USINDOPCOM FHP GUIDANCE, SUPP 2 REF AG IS ALNAV 25-20, VECTOR 15 FHP GUIDANCE FOR DON.
REF AH IS NAVADMIN 064-20, NAVY MITIGATION MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK.
REF Al IS NAVNORTH FRAGO 20-019.77 TO USFF AND NAVNORTH EXORD IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19.
REF AJ IS OSD MEMO ORDERING STOP MOVEMENT FOR ALL DOMESTIC TRAVEL.
REF AK IS USFJ FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION ORDER.
REF AM IS CDC CORONAVIRUS WEBSITE.
REF AN IS SHIPBOARD QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION PROCEDURES.
REF AO IS DHA GUIDANCE TO MILITARY TREATMENT FACILITIES REGARDING COVID-19.
REF AP IS PERSONAL QUALIFICATION STANDARD FOR NAVY CORPSMAN.
REF AQ IS C7F COVID-19 SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE.
REF AR IS C7F COVID-19 CONORS.
REF AS IS PERSONAL QUALIFICATION STANDARD FOR DAMAGE CONTROL.
REF AT IS GUIDANCE FOR UNDERWAY EVALUATION AND MANAGEMENT OF 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS WITH CHART
VIGOR CURRENT VERSION.
REF AU IS C7F COVID SECRET TASKORD CONSOLIDATING ALL OAI REQUIREMENTS.
REF AV is ALNAV 26-20 OFFICIAL AND PERSONAL DOMESTIC TRAVEL HEALTH PROTECTION GUIDANCE FOR DON.
NARR//(U) This is a Commander, U.S. SEVENTH FLEET (C7F) Rev
1 to C7F COVID-19 TASKORD. Rev 1 transmitted to incorporate emerging OSD, CNO, CDC, SECNAV and USINDOPACOM
guidance to existing C7F TASKORD and is being transmitted in its entirety as Rev 1 for ease of readability and execution
by subordinates.// TIMEZONE/Z// GENTEXT/5ITUATION// 1. (U) Situation.
l.A. (U) COMPACFLT has initiated PHASE II of REFT, mitigation efforts in response to COVID-19. Continued progression
of COVID-19, specifically in Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Southeast Asia has triggered the following indicators for
progressing into Phase II of USINDOPACOM Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 5003 Pandemic and Emerging Infectious
Diseases (PEID):
l.A.l. (U) Allies and partners have introduced COVID-19 travel restrictions that may restrict routine USINDOPACOM
forces access. Forces should anticipate the potential for more restrictions.
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l.A.2. (U) U.S. Government travel warnings and or health advisories that could affect USINDOPACOM operations,
activities, and investments (OAI| in area of responsibility
(AOR) have occurred.
l.A.3. (U) USINDOPACOM has activated T-JFLCC for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) requests and other
response forces may be required.
l.A.4. (U) USINDOPACOM restricted all nonessential DOD travel, in particular TDY and leave, to the Republic of Korea to
reduce risks associated with COVID-19. This travel restriction applies to all military, civilians, and contractors.
l.A.3. (U) USINDOPACOM has stopped all DOD travel to and from CDC Level 3 countries. This travel restriction applies to
all military, civilians and contractors.
l.A.4. (U) USINDOPACOM and DON have placed restrictions on all non-mission essential travel across the SEVENTH Fleet
AO. Exceptions are to be address on a case by case basis.
l.A.S. {U| On 13 MAR, OSD ordered the stop movement of all DOD military, civilian personnel and family members in
CONUS until further notice.
l.A.6. (U| The COVID-19 outbreak continues to spread globally, and as a result the CDC is rapidly issuing travel health
notices (THN) and guidance for persons with international travel in countries or areas with COVID-19 transmission. CDC
THN Tier these international locations as Level 3 (widespread sustained and ongoing transmission). Level 2 (sustained
and ongoing community transmission) and Level 1 (risk of limited community transmission) with associated monitoring
guidance for returning travelers.
l.A.7. (U) On 14 MAR, SECNAV ordered the stop movement of all DON personnel, civilian personnel, and family
members and foreign military under DON authority in the United States and its territories effective 16 MAR.
l.B. (U) The World Health Organization (WHO) has declared
COVID-19 a pandemic.
l.C. (U) Fleet level primary concerns. Protection and mitigation of USN forces from COVID 19 exposure, treatment of
USN forces with COVID-19, protection of partners and allies from the spread of COVID-19 via USN forces and mission
readiness.
l.D. (U) Additional guidance.
l.D.l (U) For all countries, no cross decking of personnel during exercises or operations is permitted. Regular assigned
LNOs to staffs or exchange officers may remain in place and are subject to the COVID-19 screening, testing
requirements, and ROM requirements of this order.
1.D.2 (U) No personnel will attend any planning conference, bi-lateral, or multi-lateral meeting in person. Planning
conferences will occur by virtual or other means unless determined otherwise by procedures outlined in this order.
l.D.3. (U) In person bi-lateral or multi-lateral exchanges with foreign and host nation military are not permitted until
further notice. Exceptions are permanently assigned LNO and PEP officers.
1. D.4. (U) Rotational forces assigned to the Korea Peninsula in support of USFK contingency plans remain in place.
GENTEXT/MISSION//
2. (U) The SEVENTH Fleet mission is to protect Fleet personnel, protect mission readiness and protect against spreading
infection to both U.S. Forces and allies and partners, in order to ensure warfighting readiness.
GENTEXT/EXECUTION//
3. (U) Commander?s Intent.
3.A. (U) Purpose: Prevent the spread of COVID-19 to force, CONUS, host nations, partners and allies, preserve SEVENTH
Fleet readiness of assigned forces, and maintain current operating posture.
3.B. (U) Method.
3.B.I. (U) LOO 1: Prevention. This line of operation seeks to prevent and/or mitigate further spread of the disease.
This line of operation includes medical protocols and procedures for monitoring, screening, disposition and treatment of
potential and confirmed cases, and mitigations put into effect to minimize potential exposure and spread in support of
operations.
3.B.2. (U) LOO 2: Mission Readiness and Execution. This line of operation supports continued campaign plan execution
and maintains readiness for contingency/operations and plans.
3.B.3. (U) LOO 3: Support to U5G and other External Agencies outside the U.S.
3.B.3.A. (U) LOO 3A: Support to Other Agencies - DSCA. DSCA refers to operations in the domestic portion of the
USINDOPACOM AOR. USARPAC is designated the supported commander for DSCA operations.
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3.B.3.B. (U) LOO 3B: Support to other agencies outside the U.S. This primarily includes FHA and Emergency Evacuation
Operations (EEO), as related to REF G. The normal lead federal agency for operations outside the U.S. will be the
Department of State with Chief of Mission as the lead in their respective nations.
3. C. (U) End State: C7F minimizes the impact of COVID-19 on Force Readiness. Allies and partners are assured of U.S.
resolve to assist and protect against COVID-19 spread.
4. (U) Tasks.
4.A. (U) All aPs.
4.A.I. (U) Execute Fleet Health Protocols (FHP) as outlined in REF AN and REF AT. FHP are the baseline that supports LOO
1.
4.A.2. (U) Homeported units in FDNF, including Guam and Singapore, will conduct screening daily.
4.A.3. (U) Small force units and laydowns throughout the AOR will conduct screening at a minimum every 5 days or daily
when permitted by the nature of operations. Afloat units and aviation units engaged in flight itineraries are covered
further in this order below.
4.A.4. (U) Be prepared to execute a shipboard illness outbreak plan.
4.A.5. (U) Build and maintain required stock levels of personal protective equipment (PPE) and required medical
equipment and consumable items.
4.A.6. (U) BPT execute isolation, treatment and patient movement CONOP.
4.A.7. (U) Develop, test, and drill a platform-specific isolation plan.
4.A.8. (U) Schedule a minimum of 14 days in between ports.
This 14 day requirement does not apply when returning to the same port recently departed. Monitor changes in country
risk conditions and be alert to such changes. Any request to pull an afloat unit into port prior to the 14 day minimum
COVID monitoring requirement is an Exception to Policy (ETP). Decisions on approval for ETPs follow the same method
of determination for OAls outlined in this order. Submit ETPs no later than 7 days prior to execution.
4.A.9. (U) Ships shall not grant off-ship liberty when in port on an approved 14 day ETP. In these cases personnel will be
limited to the pier and will only interact with harbor or pier personnel for mission essential functions only. If the port
visit under the ETP is extended beyond day 14 such that the 14 day requirement is met, liberty is authorized under the
OAI evaluation method promulgated in this order.
4.A.9.A. (U) Formally submit ETP requests to C7F BWC in the form of an email with an accompanying USINDOPACOM
Decision Point and Risk Decision slide (all formats found on the C7F CAS page; email format discussed in this section) per
OAI evaluation procedures found in section 4.A.10.A. below.
4.A.9.A.1 (U) Submit all ETP requests NLT 7 days prior to execution. Urgent or emergent ETP requests may be submitted
at any time (i.e. to support redline repairs).
4.A.9.A.2. (U) ETP Request E-mail requirements.
4.A.9.A.3. (U) Subject of e-mail will be: (U) (Unit Name)
14 Day ETP Request. Example. (U) USNS OILER 14 Day ETP Request 4.A.9.A.4. (U) E-mail body will consist of:
4.A.9.A.4.A. (U) BLUF. BLUF should read; CTF XX requests exception to policy with mitigation for (Unit Name) from the 14
day quarantine requirement for (operations) between
(location) and (location) to support
(operation/requirement). ETP supports completion of
(operation/requirement) without delay. Operations support mission requirements. Example. CTF XX requests exception
to policy with mitigation for USNS SALVAGE from the 14 day quarantine requirement for logistics transits between
Chuuk and Guam to support OP MICRODAWN. ETP supports completion of OP MICRODAWN without delay. Operations
support mission requirements.
4.A.9.A.4.B. (U) SUMMARY. SUMMARY should read: Transit time between (location) and (location) is (X) days. Operating
at sea for (XX) days between (location) and (location] will limit days available for (operation/requirement) and result in
(impact). [No positive COVID- 19 cases currently exist in (location)] (if applicable). SUMMARY: Transit time between
Chuuk and Guam requires 3 days. Operating at sea for 14 days between Guam and Chuuk will limit days available for
pier side salvage operations and result in delayed completion. No positive COVID-19 cases currently exist in Guam or
Chuuk.
4.A.9.A.4.C. (U) Unit schedule.
Unit schedule should read: (Unit) tentatively schedule to execute the following.
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DATE LOCATION
XX DAY XXXXXX
Example. DSNS TIPPECANOE tentatively schedule to execute the following:
DATE LOCATION
04 MAR DEP CHUUK, FSM
07 MAR ARR GUAM
4.A.9.A.4.D. (U) REQUEST. Request C7F exception to policy decision NLTTTTTZ DD MMM. Example. Request C7F
exception to policy decision NLT OlOOZ 05 MAR.
4.A.9.B. (U) For brief stops for cargo, personnel or fuel inside the 14 day requirement, submit ETP and contact C7F as to
whether this will require resetting the 14 day counter. Limit crew activity on the pier to mission essential functions for
the brief stop. For transfer of cargo and personnel, where feasible, use boat transfer from underway or at anchor.
4.A.10. (U) Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAI).
OAls are comprised of operations and exercises, conferences and port visits. Determination of whether to continue with
OAls will be viewed through three lenses. The first lens is operational importance. The second lens is the specific level of
concern in each country ? note that conditions are evolving on an almost daily basis requiring continual re- evaluation of
plans. The third lens is magnitude of risk, to include the number of sailors associated with the OAI (crew or detachment
size) and potential damage and criticality of mission failure unique to each mission.
4.A.10.A. (U) Conduct risk assessment and risk mitigation for OAls to prevent COVID-19 exposure. Recommend
decisions to execute (with mitigations), modify, or cancel OAls.
4.A.10.A.1 (U) Assess for three types of risk.
4.A.10.A.1.A. (U) Risk to Force. The risk to force if the OAI is conducted as planned. Include assessment of deployment,
execution and redeployment risks, medical response alignment and capacity with host nation agencies, and implications
on unit force flow and redeployment requirements from additional foreign travel restrictions or quarantine.
4.A.10.A.1.B. (U) Risk to Mission. The impact on training and or readiness of the OAI is not conducted or conducted at
less than planned execution level.
4.A.10.A.1.C. (U) Risk to Strategy. The negative impact on partner of choice status, alliance maintenance and or regional
access if the OAI is not conducted or conducted at less than planned execution level.
4.A.10.A.1.D. (U) Capture risk according to the GCS risk assessment format per REF M, tailored by CPF as posted on the
C7F CAS site. Include the following elements to characterize risk and make risk decisions or recommendations as
appropriate.
4.A.10.A.1.0.1 (U) Source of risk.
4.A.10.A.1.0.2. (U) Consequences of the risk.
4.A.10.A.1.D.3. (U) Probability of the consequence. Measure as highly unlikely, improbable, probable, or very likely.
4.A.10.A.1.D.4 (U) Severity of consequence. Measure as minor, moderate, major, or extreme harm to something of
value.
4.A.10.A.1.D.5. (U) Determine initial risk level as either low, moderate, significant, or high.
4.A.10.A.1.D.6. (U) Identify relevant risk mitigation that can be applied in terms of actions or decisions required at
appropriate level.
4.A.10.A.1.D.7. (U) Consolidate all OAls into a spreadsheet of prioritized importance, listing the OAI, INDOPACOM risk
assessment, magnitude of crew size, recommendation to continue or cancel and mitigations and provide a 90 day rolling
update to the C7F BWC as outlined in reporting requirements in section 5. A template is provided on the C7F CAS site
(OAI 90 Day Spreadsheet). For crew size, list nominal crew carried for class of platform.
4.A.10.A.1.D.8 (U) OAls requiring decision will include - in addition to the OAI 90 Day spreadsheet input - the
accompanying USiNDOPACOM Decision Point and Risk Decision slides (format available on C7F CAS page).
USINDOPACOM country risk assessments are used when determining whether or not to execute OAls. This differs from
CDC threat levels. The latest USINDOPACOM country risk levels are available on the C7F CAS page.
4.A.10.B. (U) Operations and Exercises. Operations will continue unless otherwise directed. Exchanges of personnel will
not occur from any country. Contact C7F if virtual planning done in place of travel is not sufficient to continue execution
of operations and exercises with partners and allies.
4.A.10.C. (U) Planning, Pre-Sail and other conferences. No personnel will attend conferences of any type. Plan all
conference functions virtual or by other means.
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4.A.10.C.1. (U) Exercises and bi-lateral or multi-lateral operations requiring conferences or pre-sail coordination will
continue at sea only if the required safety elements are satisfied by conferencing via other means. Where so
Commanders determine these operations cannot continue based on inability to execute the necessary coordination for
safety, report this via the OAI risk evaluation process in section 4.A.10.A.
4.A.10.C.2. (U) The restrictions imposed on conference attendance are in addition to those imposed on travel as outlined
further in this order.
4.A.10.0. Port Visits, including those in conjunction with scheduled operations and exercises.
4.A.10.D.1. (U) Persons exhibiting III symptoms are not permitted off ship unless being placed under medical evaluation
for condition or under care.
4.A.10.D.2. (U) Port visits will not be scheduled in countries ranked as HIGH risk by INDOPACOM. Port visits in
SIGNIFICANT, MODERATE or LOW risk countries require mitigations. Commanders may employ additional mitigations as
they determine. The following mitigations serve as a baseline for planning and will be tailored to crew size, risk category,
and port and country specific information in reporting the OAI.
4.A.10.D.2.A (U) Groups of personnel on liberty should be kept at smaller sizes (i.e. not to exceed 6] unless groups are
part of MWR or other tour services that ensure accountability of the group.
4.A.10.D.2.B (U) Groups will be cognizant of areas of
COVID-19 infection within the country/regions/areas visited and remain clear of these areas (i.e. placed off limits).
Contact C7F Fleet Surgeon and Country Teams for information and support as needed. At a minimum, place off limits
community centers, hospitals (unless seeking medical care), nursing facilities, and office buildings. Place off limits any
house of worship the host nation has identified as a source of COVID-19 infection. These types of facilities have shown
to be effective places of viral transmission.
4.A.10.D.2.C (U) Avoid large gatherings in crowded spaces.
4.A.10.D.2.D (U) Follow Fleet Health Protocols for prevention of COVID-19.
4.A.10.D.2.E (U) Do not construct COMRELs or other activities in hospitals or nursing home type facilities unless
approved by C7F.
4.A.10.D.2.F (U) Ensure overnight liberty is not conducted in locations or establishments known to have had COVID-19
exposure. Do not concentrate large numbers of personnel in the same location for overnight liberty.
4.A.10.D.2.G (U) In countries with no COVID cases, no restrictions are in effect other than those under regular Fleet
liberty policies.
4.A.11. (U) Aviation Specific Requirements. The requirements of para 4.A.10.D apply to aviation crews and detachments
on through flights into countries. Aircrew shall ensure minimum time is spent outside official capacities in execution of
mission duties. Minimize time spent with local populations. Operations teams shall not build in liberty time between
flights outside of mandatory crew rest/crew day requirements.
4.A.11.A. (U) Conduct no flights to South Korea from points of origin outside of South Korea until specifically directed.
4.A.11.B. (U) Operations teams shall ensure that scheduling aircrew based on their travel history will not conflict with
country-specific travel restrictions as described in the COVID-19 TRANSCOM Travel Restrictions posted on the C7F SIPR
CAS Portal.
4.A.11.C. (U) Operations teams will, to the maximum extent practicable, ensure that flight schedules are written in a
manner that aircraft and aircrews are flying to a single destination and return to the point of origin.
4.A.11.D. (U) As a part of the preflight brief, aircrew and passengers shall be screened for COVID-19 by ensuring each
individual completes the screening protocols using COVIO-19 Screening Questionnaire found in REF N, posted on the 7th
Fleet SIPR CAS Portal.
4.A.11.E. (U) Requirements for passengers on military air, to include passengers in transit to operational duties, are
found in paragraphs 4.A.13.C and 4.A.13.D.
4,A.12. (U) Travel. Determination of travel is governed by CDC threat assessment (COVID-19). These requirements apply
to all personnel (uniformed, contractor, civilian) of afloat or deployed units and Task Forces that are transferring or
traveling from afloat or deployed units, as well as homeported and in port units. All travel official and non-official is
secured for SEVENTH Fleet forces unless determined essential travel or warranted for humanitarian or hardship reasons.
Submit requests for exceptions to C7F.
Exceptions are currently held at the PACFLT level. Air crews are not subject to these requirements when flying in official
duties. Air crew operations are governed under the guidance of OAls promulgated in this TASKORD. Personnel
separating or retiring in the next 60 days are not subject to these requirements.
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4.A.12A (U) Travel in conjunction with assigned operational duties. Upon determination to execute an OAl, Service
Members may be required to travel via military or commercial air as an authorized exception. Section 4.A.12.K contains
requirements. ROM may be required depending on the country, or organization receiving. Paragraphs 4.A.13.C and
4.A.13.0 describe miiitary air screening requirements for these passengers. When on assigned duties in these
circumstances, ensure personnel conduct self-observation as defined in section 6. When units are capable, institute
small force laydown screening procedures as outlined in paragraph 4.A.3.
4.A.12.B. (U) Immediately identify all Service Members who traveled in the prior 14 days to or through a CDC THN Level
3 or Level 2 country by any means as well as private conveyance. This applies to all forms of travel official and non¬
official. Place these Service Members in Restriction of Movement (ROM). During the ROM (starting from the day of
departure from the Level 2 or 3 country) Service Members will be restricted to their residence or other appropriate
domicile for 14 days and limit close contact (within 6 feet or 2 meters) with others. A negative test for COVID-19 does
not reduce or eliminate ROM requirements. For Service Members living onboard ship, quarantine per NTRP protocols.
4.A.12.C. (U) Guidance for personnel in ROM status.
4.A.12.C.1. (U) For Military Open Bay or rooms with shared bathrooms or kitchen facilities, attempt to place persons in
separate lodging for the ROM period. If unable to quarantine onboard per NRTP protocols, contact C7F for assistance.
4.A.12.C.2. (U) Service Members will seif-monitor by taking their temperature twice a day and remain alert to difficulty
breathing or developing a cough. If feeling feverish or for a documented temperature (greater than
100.4 F or 38 C), self-isolate and limit contact with others, and seek advice by telephone from their command and or
health care provider.
4.A.12.C.3. (U) Separate from other people in homes or dwelling if residing with roommates or family members.
Avoid sharing personal items.
4.A.12.C.4. (U) Do not travel, visit public or crowded areas, or use public transportation. Avoid interaction with pets and
animals.
4.A.12.C.5. (U) Commands will provide medical evaluation and care immediately if the Service Member displays fever
and symptoms consistent with COVID-19 per CDC guidance AT HTTPS:(DOUBLE
SLASH)WWW.CDC.GOV/CORONAVIRUS/2019-
NCOV/HCP/INDEX.HTML).
4.A.12.C.6. (U) Establish a means of communication with all personnel in ROM until allowed to resume their normal
duties.
4.A.12.C.7. (U) The Service Member will call ahead before going to a MTF and inform them of symptoms and travel
history.
4.A.12.D. (U) Upon receipt identify and track all Service Members who travel or have a history of travel in the prior
14 days through CONUS or territories.
4.A.12.D.1 (U) Implement self-observation and remain alert for fever, cough or difficulty breathing.
4.A.12.D.2. (U) Practice social distancing (6 feet or 2 meters), remain out of congregate settings and avoid mass
gatherings.
4.A.12.D.3. (U) Immediately self-isolate, limit contact with others and seek advice by telephone from appropriate health
care providers to determine whether medical evaluation is required if individuals feel feverish or develop measured
fever, cough or have difficulty breathing.
4.A.12.E. (U) It is strongly recommended that DOD civilian employees, contractor personnel and family members who
travel to, through and from countries with a CDC THN level
2 and 3 location for COVID-19 follow DOD guidance which is more stringent than CDC guidance.
4.A.12.E.1. (U) Commands will restrict DOD workplace access for 14 days for DOD civilian employees and contractors
whose travel has included THN level 2 and level 3 international locations. For all other travel, commands will encourage
self-observation procedures. In restricting access, commands will attempt to provide measures to allow telework and
consult contracting offices or their ISIC for guidance.
4.A.12.F. (U) lAW REF AJ and AV, and until further notice, all CONUS (to include Guam) DON military, civilians, and their
families will stop movement.
4.A.12.G. (U) Effective 13 Mar 2020, and for the next 60 days, concurrent official travel for family members of DOD
uniformed personnel and civilian personnel is denied to CDC THN Level 2 (COVID-19) designated international locations.
DOD civilian hiring actions for positions in Level 2 and Level 3 designated international locations are postponed for non-
essential civilian personnel who have not yet begun to travel.
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4.A.12.H. (U) lAW REF AF, uniformed and civilian personnel and family members traveling to, from, or through CDC THNS
Level 3 {COVID-19) designated locations will stop movement until 12 May. This includes all forms of travel, including
leave.
4.A.12.I. (U) lAW REF AF, DOD travelers should plan travel to ensure their scheduled flights do not transit through or
originate in Level 3 designated locations. DOD authorized departures are delayed until appropriate transportation and
reception procedures are in place for their intended route of travel.
4.A.12.J. (U) Exceptions to policy for travel to Level 3 designated countries may be granted for compelling cases where
the travel is determined to be mission essential, necessary for humanitarian reasons, or warranted due to extreme
hardship. Authority for these exceptions resides at PACFLT.
4.A.12.K. (U) Upon receipt, identify all travel determined mission essential (to include compelling humanitarian or
hardship cases) and submit per reporting procedures found in section 5 to C7F for determination in the format posted
on the C7F CAS page. For travel that is authorized:
4.A.12.K.1. (U) Transition to military or DOD contracted aircraft for DOD sponsored travelers coming from or going to
CDC level 3 or Level 2 designated international areas to the greatest extent practical.
4.A.12.K.2 (U) Consider the risk profile of the traveler (older individuals or those with underlying diseases).
4.A.12.K.3 (U) Limit travel to those who are healthy to the greatest extent possible.
4.A.12.K.4 (U) Establish a means of communication with all personnel throughout the travel process and impose ROM
until they are allowed to resume their normal duties.
4.A.12.K.5 (U) Inform all travelers of their responsibility to contact their gaining organization in advance of travel and to
keep the organization updated on their travel itinerary.
4.A.13. (U) Medical Requirements. For all in person assessments of personnel, to include asymptomatic assessments,
medical personnel will wear appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) lAW REF AN. A surgical mask shall be
placed on the patient.
4.A.13.A (U) Screen all personnel for Influenza Like Illness (ILI) reporting from PCS transfer or returning from TAD prior to
embark. Screen all personnel for ILI prior to debarkation. ILI is defined as fever (temperature greater than 100.4 F),
cough and/or sore throat without a known cause. Person Under Investigation (PUI) is defined as a member presenting
with ILI and an intent to test for coronavirus.
4.A.13.B. (U) Following port visits, screen personnel for ILI at the five to seven day and nine to eleven day points of
voyage.
4.A.13.C (U) Aircraft units will screen personnel prior to embarkation on flights to airfields in different countries.
For aircraft that visit multiple airfields in multiple counties in a flight profile, mission commanders will screen personnel
prior to embarkation at each airfield. If medical screening is positive, individual will be isolated per procedures in this
order and not permitted to disembark.
4.A.13.D (U) If determined to have an alternate diagnosis for ILI that does not require isolation, patients wili be
dispositioned with Sick in Quarters (SIQ) procedures and return to duties when symptom free and/or medically cleared.
This applies to ships in port and at sea and aircraft crews and authorized passengers.
4.A.13.E. (U) For ships in port, ILI patients without an alternate diagnosis will be referred immediately to military
treatment facilities (MTF) ashore for further evaluation. Provide advance notification to the MTF. If MTF is not available,
the Internationa] SOS identified.
Tricare- approved host nation hospitals located throughout the C7F AOR are the alternate preferred location.
4.A.13.E.1. (U) Local MTF or host nation hospital may admit the patient lAW their medical policy. Additional testing may
be performed as clinically indicated.
4.A.13.E.2. (U) Host nation criteria for COVID-19 testing may differ from USN or USG criteria. ILI patients referred to
external treatment facilities that do not receive an alternate diagnosis, but do not meet Host Nation or MTF
COVID*19 testing criteria or are in locations where testing is not available will be placed under ROM for a period of
14 days. ROM should be executed ashore when feasible to reduce transmission aboard ship. If not feasible, member
may be returned to ship and will remain in isolation for 14 days. If still symptomatic after 14 days, contact ISIC medical
for guidance and assistance.
4.A.13.E.3. (U) Patients receiving an alternate diagnosis from the local MTF or host nation facility will be treated as SIQ
and returned to duties once symptoms resolve and they are medically cleared.
4.A.13.E.4. (U) Patients with ILI who test negative for
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C0\/ID-19 via CDC approved testing may return to duties once symptoms resolve and they are medically cleared.
Patients with III who test negative for COVID-19 via host nation or other procedures not CDC approved will remain in
ROM for 14 days prior to return.
4.A.13.F. (U) Ships at sea with patients lacking alternate diagnosis for III symptoms and lacking testing capabilities for
COVID-19 will isolate the patients and use MEDADVICE procedures to ISIC to determine disposition.
4.A.13.F.1. (U) For ships at sea equipped with COVID-19 testing, patients with III symptoms who do not have another
diagnosis will be tested for COVID-19. Examples of current testing means are surveillance protocols (EUA), diagnostic
protocols (RUO), and are expected to eventually include Biofire testing to all large deck ships.
4.A.13.F.1.A. (U) Patients at sea with III and without alternate diagnosis who test negative for COVID-19 by surveillance
testing will be isolated for 14 days, even if symptoms resolve prior to returning to duties. If symptoms persist at day 14,
contact ISIC medical for guidance and assistance with disposition.
4.A.13.F.1.B. (U) Patients with III and without alternate diagnosis who test negative for COVID-19 by approved
diagnostic testing at sea may be returned to duty once symptoms resolve and they are medically cleared.
4.A.13.F.2. (U) Patients receiving an alternate diagnosis will be placed SIQand returned to duty when symptoms clear
and/or authorized by medical authorities.
4.A.13.G. (U) If COVID-19 is diagnosed, maintain the patient in isolation and contact ISIC medical. Treatment for COVID-
19 is supportive. If possible, patient will be transferred to a shore facility for isolation and treatment. If not possible,
maintain the member in isolation aboard ship. If MEDEVAC is recommended by the medical provider on the ship based
upon clinical condition, call ISIC medical to facilitate patient movement. Once a patient has recovered and has no
symptoms, 2 sets of negative tests and a medical evaluation are required for return to duty lAW CDC guidance.
4.A.13.H. (U) Complete COVID-19 screening questionnaire prior to dental care. Do not provide routine, elective, or non-
emergent dental care if III or suspected COVID-19 contact. Emergent dental procedures must be performed with
stringent attention to best infection control practices due to very high risk of disease transmission from aerosols
generated during dental care.
4.A.13.I. (U) lAW CDC guidelines, execute cold chain shipping of laboratory specimens.
4.A.14. (U) All afloat command triads, department heads, departmental leading chief petty officers and unit medical
departments shall review NTRP 4-02.10, Shipboard Isolation and Quarantine, and be prepared to execute the TTPs in
this policy.
4.A.14.A. (U) Identify locations and develop plans for quarantine and isolation.
4.A.14.B. (U) Ensure high contact areas are cleaned daily at a minimum, to avoid spread of disease using appropriate
virucidal solutions lAW REF AN.
4.A.14.C. (U) Maintain cognizance and track their personnel during their absence from the unit due to ROM, SIQ,
quarantine and isolation.
4.A.14.D. (U) Develop a plan for personnel with family members who are in or return from countries with moderate or
higher risk and who have III symptoms.
4.A.14.E. (U) Maintain cognizance of and track personnel during absence from unit due to ROM, SIQ, quarantine and
isolation.
4.A.15. (U) Conduct Crisis Action Planning.
4.A.15.A. (U) Mass Shipboard Isolation and Quarantine planning. Identify designated spaces and materials required for
quarantine.
4.A.15.B. (U) Identify critical manning shortfalls that impact ship?s readiness and mission readiness.
4.A.15.C. (U) If underway plan for conducting emergency port visit.
4.A.15.D. (U) If in port, identify the respective shore commands and facilities for coordination of transfer of infected
personnel to medical facilities as required.
4.A.15.E. (U) Test the reporting processes for ensuring C7F and higher commands are in communications.
4.A.15.F. (U) BPT conduct ship operations out of Guam and Japan only.
4.A.15.G. (U) Rotational forces BPT conduct ship operations out of Guam only.
4.A.16. (U) CTF 70, CTF 71, CTF 72, CTF 76 and CFWP 4.A.16.A. (U) BPT provide air transportation for evacuation.
4.A.16.B. (U) Identify and acquire required PPE for flight crews and required equipment to properly sanitize aircraft in
the event C7F is tasked to provide MEDEVAC for infected personnel. Household level cleaning chemicals are considered
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acceptable for sanitization purposes. Refer to paragraph 6.B.4. for a list that includes NSN numbers for cleaning
materials.
4.A.17. (U)aF73.
(U) Submit logistics plan and laydown to minimize the number of ETPs needed to resupply the fleet.
4.A.18. (U) aF 70, CTF 71 and CTF 76.
4.A.18.A. (U) BPT conduct more frequent refueling and resupply in port under ETP requests.
4.A.18.B. (U] BPT conduct operations out of Guam and Japan only.
4.A.19. (U) BPT enact Hazardous Protection Conditions
(HPCON) as set by Regional Commanders.
4. A.20. (U) BPT enact additional region specific restrictions.
5. (U) Coordination Instructions
5.A. (U) Updates to country level risk will be posted on C7F CAS webpage at:
https://www.pr.cas.navy.smil.mil/fleet/c7f/site.nsf/Main.ht
ml
5.B. (U) Reporting.
S.B.l. (U) Commanders will report and submit the following to the C7F BWC, C7F ABWC, C7F Surgeons Office and C7F N1
by
1400 (l)/0500(Z) daily.
S.B.l.A. (U) COVID 19 SITREP Quad Slide ? format found on the C7F CAS page.
S.B.l.B. (U) ETP requests, NLT 7 days prior to execution.
5.B.I.C. (U) OA! 90 day spreadsheet inputs ? format found on the C7F CAS page.
S.B.l.O. (U) On hand quantities of PPE and overage/shortage percentage as part of the Daily Progress Report ? format
found on the C7F CAS page.
5.B.I.E. (U) Daily counts of III per platform as part of the Daily Progress Report.
S.B.l.F. (U) Summary reports of requested mission essential, hardship, and humanitarian travel exception requests ?
format found on the C7F CAS page.
5.B.I.G. (U) COVID- 19 Patient Tracker ? format found on the C7F CAS page.
S.B.l.G.l. (U) COVID- 19 Patient Tracker supersedes the Quarantine Tracker and will be utilized for reporting of
personnel who are PUIs and in ROM status. Discontinue submission of a separate quarantine tracker. Ensure all updates,
to include new patients, are highlighted in blue font.
5.B.2. (U) Submit OPREP-3 Navy Unit SITREP for all PUI.
Send reports of all PUI in parallel email to C7F BWC, C7F ABWC and FLEET SURGEON.
5.B.2.A. (U) Format OPREP-3 unit SITREPS with the following
information: command, rank/rate, age, gender, ROM location, ROM start date, ILI symptoms, reason for PUI status,
travel locations and dates if applicable, known persons contacted between the time of suspected infection and ROM.
5.B.2.B. (U) For positive COVID- 19 results, commands will release an OPREP-3 NAVY BLUE and make voice report to the
C7F BWC. Where possible, phone call notifications will be made to the C7F Commander orChiefof Staff prior to
transmission.
5. B.2.C. {U) OPREP status shall be updated as member status changes, with final update when member is declared no
longer a PUI or, in the case of a positive test, is assessed by medical professional as clear of infection.
GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOGISTICS//
6. (U) Admin.
6.A. (U) Definitions
6.A.I. (U) Quarantine. The separation of an individual or group that has been exposed to a communicable disease, but is
not yet ill, from others who have not been so exposed, in such manner and place to prevent the possible spread of the
communicable disease.
6.A.2. (U) Isolation. The separation of an individual, or group, infected or reasonably believed to be infected with a
communicable disease from those who are healthy In such a place and manner to prevent the spread of the
communicable disease.
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6.A.3. (U} Restriction of Movement. Limiting movement of an individual or group to prevent or diminish the transmission
of a communicable disease, including limiting ingress and egress to from or on a military installation; isolation,
quarantine and conditional release.
6.A.4. {U} Influenza Like Illness (ILI). Fever (temperature over 100.4 F), cough and/or sore throat without a known cause.
6.A.5. {U} Person{s) Under Investigation (PUI). Individuals with an influenza like illness with provider intent to test for
COVID-19.
6.A.6. (U) Confirmed Case. A person with a positive laboratory test for COVID-19.
6.A.7. (U) Self-monitoring. The process of individuals monitoring themselves for COVID-19 symptoms by taking their
temperatures twice a day, if able, and remaining alert for symptoms like cough or difficulty breathing. Commanders
should provide a plan for service members on self- monitoring with instructions on whom to contact if they develop
fever, cough, or difficulty breathing during the self-monitoring period, and to determine how best to seek further
medical evaluation.
6.A.8. (U) Self-observation. The process of individuals remaining alert for COVID-19 symptoms. If symptoms develop
during the observation period, the member should limit contact with others and seek health advice by telephone from
healthcare provider to determine how to seek further medical evaluation.
6.A.9. (U) Active Monitoring. The process in which MTFs establish regular communication with potentially exposed
people to assess for the presence of fever, cough or difficulty breathing. For people with high risk exposures this
communication occurs at least once per day.
6.B. (U) Logistics.
6.B.I. (U) Personal protective equipment (PPE). Use the planning factors for DOD non-healthcare personnel to maintain
the following stock levels of PPE: 5X Surgical Masks, 28 Pair Exam Gloves, IX Bottle Hand Sanitizer, IX Eye Protection per
person onboard.
6.B.2.(U) CTFs and units will coordinate with local DLA and NAVSUP FLC activities for coordination of bulk requirements
for all units for PPE and other equipment required to conduct screenings. CTFs will coordinate with unit TYCOMs for ETP
approval to exceed high- level limit on ship stock items.
6.B.3. (U) CTFs and units will submit requisitions through normal supply channels. Report item shortages directly to
TYCOM and C7F to assist expediting of required PPE.
6.B.4. (U) Units will order items listed below and non- contact thermography equipment if not part of ship's Authorized
Medical Allowance List (AMAL).
6.B.4.A. (U) Hypochlorite Wipes, NSN: 7930014233699.
6.B.4.B. (U) Culture Swab, NSN: 6550014740651.
6.B.4.C. (U) Specimen Bags, NSN: 6530013234586.
6.B.4.D. (U) Gloves, NSN: 6515015265210.
6.B.4.E. (U) Face Shield, NSN: 6515013615228.
6.B.4.F. (U) Cooler. NSN: 6515014672081.
6.B.4.G. (U) N-95 Respirator, NSN: 6515015001519.
6.B.4.H. (U) Hospital Personnel Gown. NSN: 6532015888167.
6.B.4.I. (U) Face Mask, NSN: 6515009827493.
6.B.4.J. (U) Rapid Influenza Test Kits, NSN: 6550015413237.
6.B.4.K. (U) Viral Transport Media, GSA Advantage Contract
NUMBER; 36F79718D0395.
6.B.4.L. (U) Shoe Covers, non-skid-universal, fluid resistant NSN
6532015847682
6.B.5. (U) Additional recommended supplies will be posted on the C7F CAS site.
6.C. (U) Funding.
6.C.I. (U) Supporting commands will capture and report incremental costs ISO this TASKORO through their respective
agency comptroller to Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) lAW DOD FMR 7000.14-R, Volume 12, Chapter 23.
6.C.2. (U) Commands supporting DSCA operations will capture costs for potential reimbursement by lead Federal
Agency, HHS.
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6.D. (U) Public Affairs.
6.D.I. (U) Public Affairs lead is COMPACFLT. Public Affairs posture is respond to query for external media, active for
internal communication. Public Affairs guidance will be provided SEPCOR.
6.D.2. (U) CTF PAOs will submit to C7F PAO RTQ products on events to include but not limited to OAI impacts, 14-day
underway requirement ETPs, and any personnel exhibiting COVID symptoms.
6.D.3. (U) CTF PAOs will refer all media queries to C7F PAO.
6.D.4. (U) CTF PAOs are encouraged to utilize all command information channels (Social Media, SITE TV, IMC,
Newsletters, etc.) to disseminate regular updates to inform SEVENTH Fleet Sailors and their families.
6.D.5. (U) Recommend using region and installation social media pages for area specific information. In addition, use the
following websites for the latest information:
6.D.5.A. www.cdc.gov
6.D.5.B. www.who.int
6.D.5.C.
https://community.max.gov/display/DoD/Navy+Medicine+COVID-
19+Response
6.D.5.D. https://www.med.navy.mil/sites/nmcphc/program-and-
policy-
support/pages/novel-coronavirus.aspx
6.E. (U) Lessons Learned.
6.E.I. (U) All lessons learned developed from the SEVENTH Fleet response to COVID-19 will be recorded in the Joint
Lessons Learned Information System (JLLI5).
6.E.2. (U) Lessons learned should follow the Joint Lessons Learned format (observation, discussion, and
recommendation) and should be classified at the lowest level possible. Classified lessons must include
portion/paragraph markings.
6.E.3. (U) Lessons learned products shodd be provided to the SEVENTH Fleet Battle Watch Captain, copy to SEVENTH
Fleet Lessons Learned Manager, Mr|^H^_~^^^HBH^^^^^^Hi@l<^cl9.navy.(smil).mil, copy to
MBIMBBMMIgife.navv.fsmiilmil. Mr.tbUeSwill upload lessons learned products to the JLLIS COVID-19
Communities of Practice (COP) on JLLIS NIPR and JLLIS SIPR.
6.E.4. (U) The JLLIS COVID-19 COPs, which contain existing lessons learned documents and guidance, can be accessed at
the following links. To contribute to either, select Become a Contributor.
6.E.5. (U)
https://www.jllis.mil/apps/?do=cops.view&copid=3381
6.E.6. (U)
https://www.jHis.smil.mil/apps/?do=cops.view&copid=864
GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL//
7. (U) Command and signal.
7. A. (U) Points of Contact.
7.A.I. (U) COMSEVENTHFLT
7.A.I.A. (U) C7F BWC/DSN Underway]
7.A.I.B. (U) C7F Surgeons Office,
I/Cell p)P)
«0107
NNNN
<DmdsSecurity>UN(^SSIFIED//</DmdsSecurity>
<DmdsReleaser]I^O|
irwaypTWr
J77bt
_ j/COMM Underwa
j(^lccl9.navy.smil.mil/DSN Underway
AT)lccl9.navy(.smil).mil//
DSN AshoreBH
/DmdsReleaser>
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//
13
H-3-69a
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt
BaKei , Stuart P RDML USN. CCSG-9
Crccici , Eir-tt E CAPT USN. USS Tlieodore Roosevelt:
CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt:
CAPT USN. CSSG9:
CAPT
jQsevelt:
Post-Daoang Update 18 March
COMDESRON23
THEODORE ROOl
Tuesday, March 17, 2020 9:03:41 PM
Admiral.
Daily update on the 39 sailors in monitored sequestration.
1 . Daily ten:q)erature checks perfomied "with no fevers. All sailors are
cmrently symptom-free. Still on track for Sunday monung release from
quarantme after temperatiue checks.
2. Biological Defense Research Directorate medical augment team. Discussed
with 7tli Fleeb'PACFLT - tlie cunent plan is that tliey will be with us tlie
rest of deployment imless tliey receive taskuig from liiglier headquarters.
3. C7F TASKORD FHP Revision 1 released 16 March. Clarification on one of
the changes: screening (askuig questions of everyone if tliey are
symptomatic) is now for 1 1 days after a port call. Quarantine is still a 14
day process for those potentially exposed to Coroiminis.
4. C7F/PACFLT surgeons concur with our plan for continued screenuig and
quarantine/isolate as clinically indicated after port \Tsits (as opposed to
trying to put everyone into indiiidual beitlung).
Standuig by for questions.
v/r.
SMO
|,MD
CAPT MC(FS) USN
Senior Medical Officer
USS Tlieodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)
Work:
J-dial:
CeU:
H-3-69b
LCDR USN NAVCIVLAWSUPPACT DC (USA)
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Signed By:
CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
Saturday, March 14, 2020 3:31 AM
Baker, Stuart P RDML USN, CCSG-9
Crozier, Brett E CAPT USt^US^^ieodoi^ Roosevelt; ^
Theodore RooseveltP'
rt) (6)
USN, CVW-11 CAG;
CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt;
CAPT USN, CSSG9;(^^
CAPT USN, CVW-11
CAPT USN, USS
CAPT
5
CAPT USN. COMDESRON23:
CDR - BKH XO';
CAPT BKH
THEODORE ROOSEVELT;
—
I MCPO USN CVW-11 (USA)';[_
USN, USS Theodore RooseveR
Post-Dananq Update 14 March — TESTING RESULTS
@mail.mil
CMC USNJJSS Theodore Roosevelt;
e^3c
LCDR USN, USS
CMC USN, CCSG9;
i
Admiral,
All 39 tested NEGATIVE for COVID-19. This does not release them from
quarantine but does make everyone breathe a little easier.
They will continue to be observed for the remainder of the 14 days and if
any develop symptoms they will be re-tested.
v/r,
SMO
- Original Message
From:p)tP)
CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
Sent: Saturday, March 14, 2020 10:29 AM
To: Baker, Stuart P RDML USN, CCSG-9 _
Cc: Crozier, Brett E CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt; |[b) (fl)
USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
CAPT USN, CVwTl CAG;ffa) (6)
CAPT
CAPT USN, CSSG9;
DCAG;fb) (6) cAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt;
CAPT USN, COMDESRON23;PW
XO';PMPf ’
CAPT BKH CO;
LCDR USN, USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT
CMC USN, CCSG9
CMC USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
velt; ^
CAPT USN, CVW-11
)(e)
CDR- BKH
MCPO USN CVW-11 (USA)';
CDR USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
Subject: Post-Danang Update 14 March
Admiral,
Daily update on the 39 sailors in monitored sequestration.
1. Daily temperature checks performed with no fevers. Only two patients
with minimal symptoms (cough/sore throat), all without a fever, treating
with over the counter medications.
1
H-3-70
2. Biological Defense Research Directorate medical augment team. Testing
ongoing today for the 39 sailors. Should have results by the end of the
day. Will update later.
3. COVID-19 worldwide notes. Continued cancellation of numerous high-level
sporting events. On a local level, Coronado schools closed until 6 April.
Map attached of CDC risk assessment. Level 3 is dark orange. Level 2 is
yellow (the rest of the world).
Standing by for questions.
v/r,
SMO
'*)
CAPT MC(FS) USN
Senior Medical Officer
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)
Work I
J-dial
Cell:
2
H-3-70
LCDR USN NAVCIVLAWSUPPACT DC (USA)
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:
Crozier, Brett E CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
Thursdav,_March 12, 2020 11:03 PM
CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt; T
CAPT USN, USS
Theodore Roosevelt; I
CMC USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
LCDR USN, USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT
LTR to TR Families
200313 Letter to the Family ICO Capt. - Cl 9 (3).docx
Gents,
Please see attached and give me any feedback. Intent is to release after our second set of CV19 tests are complete (and
negative) tomorrow/Sunday. I'll sign on command letterhead and send them a PDF copy to post on the OMBUDSMAN
closed FB page.
Credit goes 10^ and her a\A/esome writing skills.
Vr,
Capt
CAPT Brett E. Crozier
Commanding Officer
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71)
1
H-3-71
To our family and friends,
Hello to all from aboard 'America's Big Stick', the mighty TR. We have enjoyed a very eventful and
productive almost two months at sea, covering thousands of nautical miles on the seas and in the air.
Our presence out here has never been more important for our nation, and your Sailors are the ones
making it happen successfully every day. Just over a week ago, we had the opportunity to recognize 87
such Sailors, spot promoting them the next superior paygrade, in recognition for all they provide for our
team, their respective departments and the friends and family back home that are no doubt extremely
proud.
Besides highlighting the accomplishments of our Sailors, I wanted to reach out as the Nation and the
world attempt to contain COVID 19 and limit its effects. Onboard the TR, taking care of our Sailors is our
number one priority, and we are doing everything we can to ensure they remain healthy so we can
continue to accomplish our mission out here in the Western Pacific. In addition to keeping the ship
clean on a regular basis, we have also increased our ship wide sanitization procedures to include the
daily wipe downs of all surfaces with a strong disinfectant.
Additionally, we have educated the crew for symptoms to look for should they feel under the weather,
and our world-class medical department is screening any Sailors that reports feeling ill to ensure we stay
on top of any increasing reports of illnesses. We also recently received a medical team onboard that can
provide rapid testing should a Sailor show any symptoms. Out of an abundance of caution, we've tested
select individuals. Based on the test results, there are no indications that any Sailors onboard have
COVID-19 or symptoms consistent with COVID-19 exposure.
Taking COVID-19 into consideration, there has been no change to our current schedule, but we will take
a close look at all future port calls, and reevaluate them as necessary, to ensure we do not stop
anywhere that has an increased risk of exposure.
Again, your Sailors are our top priority and we will continue to do everything we can to keep them safe.
Everyday your Sailors provide me the opportunity to be proud. I am always in awe of the pride,
professionalism and work they do every day. You have every right to boast that your father, mother, son
or daughter is a United States Sailor, and trust that as their leadership, they are always in good hands.
Very Respectfully,
Capt. Brett Crozier
H-3-71
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Home : Media : News : News Article View
Navy Preventive Medicine Teams Embark Ships in 7th Fleet
I U.S. 7th Fleet Public Affairs | March 23, 2020
SOUTH CHINA SEA — Members of Navy Forward-Deployed
Preventive Medicine Units (FDPMU) and Naval Medical Research
Center (NMRC) embarked several 7th Fleet ships March 14 to help
combat the risk of and provide laboratory batch testing for COVID-19
onboard the ships.
Photos
Teams are embarked on the amphibious assault ship USS America
(LHA 6), the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), and
the U.S. 7th Fleet flagship USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19) and have the
ability to batch test Sailors onboard who present with influenza-like
illness symptoms, instead of only sending samples to be tested ashore
This capability provides early-warning surveillance for the medical
teams to be able to identify if a COVID-19 case is onboard a ship, but
does not individually diagnose Sailors. If a batch were to test positive
for COVID-19, the medical teams would take additional measures, such
as isolating the Sailors whose samples were in the batch, and
depending on the Sailor’s symptoms, potentially medically evacuating
them off the ship to a shore facility for testing.
Hospital Corpsman 2nd Class Ashton K
from Imlay City, Michigan, tests respirat
samples in the medical bay of amphibio
assault ship USS America (LHA 6). Ami
flagship of the America Expeditionary S
Group, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit t
operating in U.S. 7th Fleet area of open
enhance interoperability with allies and
and serve as a ready response force to
peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific re
(Photo by (U.S. Navy photo by Mass
Communication Specialist Seaman J
Berlier))
To date, no cases of COVID-19 have been diagnosed aboard any U.S
7th Fleet Navy vessel.
"The team here in 7th Fleet has taken COVID-19 seriously from the
beginning and has many public health measures already in place," said
Capt. Christine Sears, U.S. 7th Fleet Surgeon. "The FDPMU and
NMRC augmentation teams
provide additional depth in our ability to combat this virus."
Photo Details | Download |
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
USINDOPACOM
PRINT EMAIL
H-3-72
Teams embarked the ships to provide at-sea testing and to ensure the U.S. 7th Fleet operating forces are ready
to combat a possible outbreak while maintaining mission readiness. The teams provide additional capabilities in
addition to the U.S. 7th Fleet's isolation procedures.
The teams are comprised of a variety of specialized Navy Medicine personnel to ensure force health protection
of the fleet, and may include; a microbiologist, medical laboratory technician, preventive medicine officer,
preventive medicine technician.
"As a medical service corps microbiology officer, this embark gives us the chance to demonstrate some of our
skillsets to the fleet, and what we bring
to the fight," said Lt. Cmdr. Rebecca Pavlicek, Blue Ridge COVID-1 9 testing team lead. "This capability allows
us, the Navy, to protect mission readiness and protection of our Sailors."
To ensure force health protection of the fleet, other medical specialties or logistical components can be scaled
up or down to meet mission specific
requirements in the mitigation, health surveillance, and casualty prevention.
The 4-person team aboard America was the first to bring COVID-1 9 testing capability to a U.S. Navy ship.
"This is the most advanced laboratory capability that Navy Medicine has placed forward deployed," said Cmdr.
Brian Legendre, team lead and
preventative medicine officer for the preventative medicine team aboard America.
"We can make force health protection decisions in real time, enhancing the health of the crew while minimizing
any potential outbreak of COVID-1 9,"
added Lt. Cmdr. Danett Bishop, team microbiologist.
The FDPMU teams aboard the USS America and the USS Blue Ridge are from Navy
Environmental Preventative Medicine Unit Six based out of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and work to facilitate and
educate using preventive medicine
practices and provide additional laboratory capabilities. The team embarked with USS Theodore Roosevelt is
assigned to the Naval Medical Research Center based in Silver Spring, Maryland.
Currently, the teams are only authorized to perform surveillance testing and not individual testing. This means
that the results cannot be linked to a
particular patient for diagnostics, but would enable the team to detect COVID-1 9's presence on the ship based
off of the results.
"Since we are performing surveillance testing, the results of COVID-1 9 present, or not present can help inform
the force health protection posture
and provide valuable insight for the senior medical officer and outbreak response team," said Pavlicek.
The teams are equipped with two testing capabilities, including the BioFire Film Array and the Step One RT-PCR
System. The BioFire Film Array will test for a dozen different respiratory diseases, while the Step One RT-PCR
System
allow for complex COVID-1 9 tests at sea, if necessary.
H-3-72
As the U.S. Navy's largest forward-deployed fleet, 7th Fleet operates roughly 50-70 ships and submarines and
140 aircraft with approximately
20,000 Sailors.
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May 12, 2020 - WASHINGTON - Every Air Force wing, squadron and unit has felt the effects
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May 12, 2020 - KUNSAN AIR BASE, Republic of Korea - The Wolf Pack is home to more
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□ a
LCDR USN NAVCIVLAWSUPPACT DC (USA)
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Signed By:
CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
Monday, March 16, 2020 10:17 PM
ALL_OFFICERS; ALL_CHIEFS; E-6 and Below
Coronavirus screening - Update - now only 1 1 days of screening
l(a)mail.mil
All,
On the heels of the message I sent yesterday, C7F released a revision to the
TASKORD for Force Flealth Protection against COVID-19.
BLUF: Everything stays the same (regarding what we're looking for) except
now the duration of screening is 11 days total. Not 7+7, just 11 days of
Departmental/Squadron leadership asking their sailors if they have flu-like
symptoms and if the answer is "yes" then they report to Medical. For
Vietnam, the 11 days expires on 3/19.
Thanks for your help in the ongoing battle against Coronavirus... I'm sure
there will be more changes in the future, appreciate the flexibility.
v/r,
SMO
ft>) (6) ], MD
CAPT MC(FS) USN
Senior Medical Officer
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)
Work: JPnO)
J-dial: p) [
Cell: p) (6)
- Original Message
From:pHP)
CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
Sent: Monday, March 16, 2020 8:19 AM
To: ALL_OFFICERS; ALL_CHIEFS; E-6 and Below
Subject: 14 days of screening after port visits
All,
Some clarification on screening on the ship after port visits. First, the
rationale for 14 days: everything we know about Coronavirus shows that 99%
of people will have symptoms by approximately 13 days (mean 5 days). There
are three categories of screening:
1
H-3-73
1) As previously passed, each department will screen their sailors for 7
days after leaving a port by asking them questions regarding Fever, Chills,
Cough, Sore Throat, Shortness of breath. Body aches, and Abdominal pain.
After the 7 days (which expired yesterday, 3/15), then each individual will
self-monitor for the same symptoms for the next 7 days. If at any time
during this process a person answers yes to one of those symptoms then they
are to report to medical for additional screening and they enter the next
category.
2) Individuals that answered yes to one of those symptoms now get daily
temperature checks in Medical. They are required to do these checks for the
full 14 days after leaving the port (last day 3/22). This is the list that
CAPtBB^I (nurse anesthetist) is tracking and sending to leadership.
3) Personnel arriving via COD - HODs/DLCPOs are notified (by CAPT^^^
using the ATO manifest) of those individuals that require screening after
arrival on a COD. Same screening concept except that their 7+7 days of
screening starts the day they arrive on the ship and results are emailed to
captHH.
Again, at any time within the 14 days, if a person develops these symptoms
they need to be evaluated by Medical.
This, combined with sanitation, hand washing, respiratory/cough etiquette,
is an all hands event - that applies to the Coronavirus and all infectious
diseases that are more easily spread in close quarters.
Please contact myself or CAPT
if you have any questions.
Thanks for your help.
v/r.
SMO
MD
CAPT MC(FS) USN
Senior Medical Officer
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)
Work:
J-dial: (b) |
Cell: p) (6)
2
H-3-73
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:
FTT57 — ~~| CAPT USN NBG
"Croziei, brrrtt ii CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt"
LCDR USN NSF:lf)l IHt I MCPO USN NBG:1F!~~
i:;(b)(51 - cfiL M'rN. visS Theodore Roose* !; (b)(6)
- L.Ml ,VJ
March 23, 2020 5:29:56 AM
|)(6)
RE: TR I
Monday,
kilo.DDb
1 CAPT USN. USS TIreodore
“""I CAPT BKH CO:a^~
(6)
Chopper,
My teaui arid I are woriciiig the problem feverislily wliile we are still engaged
on the groimd here in the CO\TD-19 figlit.
My first priority is to support your safe mooring, protide proper'
husbanding, supporting as many of your reqirired 5Rs all while ENSURING your
crew stays "Clean". Once we get tliat locked in we will focus on the QOL.
I have attached a general schematic of Kilo Wliarf for tire potential Force
Health Protection Enclave (FHPE) we may employ to enable its to keep tire
required separation. External to the yellow line we (military, govenmient
citihan and contractor) will be able to operate and inside will be 1 of the
QOL zones.
Tire otlrer QOL zones will most hkely be Gab Gab Beach mid the Helicopter
Triple Pad. botli of which m e witliin walking distmice of the wliarf. I still
plmi on enclaiing most if not all of Orote Peninsula so there is a lot of
room for the crew to stretch tlieir legs, (there is also a Small Amis Rmige
up there)
We will set up Gab Gab witli recreational gem for your use. Triple Pad cmi
be some more tents siniilm to tlie Kilo Wharf set-up.
Based on tlie continued spread I do not feel comfortable Umisporting a crew
of yoiu' size moiuid on buses.... with the coumimiity spread we me seeing
there is simply no way to ensure your team will stay clemi.
Tlie smiie is tme with the NEX. Howevei', I am working witli tlie NEX to bring
them to you. Cmi I get a supply POC tliat I cmi link up with NEX to woik on
the details to this plmi.
A lot of work is left to be done but we me progressing our plamung for
both TR mid BKH. So please keep liaving yom' temn reach out to my temii mid we
will all converge on the riglit balmice for tlris Business Not As Usual
situation.
Very respectfully,
CAPT
Coiimimiding Officer
Naval Base Guam
W:JD) (01 ^
C:M) J
NIPRrfb) (6) ^{l|9@fena\'y.mil
SIPR: |(b) (6) J@fe.na\'y.smil mil
H-3-74
- Original Message -
From: Crozier, Brett E CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
rmailto^^^^^^J@cvn71 navv.mill
Sent: Sunday, March 22, 2020 11:01 PM
To: CAPT USN NBG dJD) (0) ■ @fe navy.mil>
Cc: USN NSF <j(D) (6) ^FE.navy mil>; |
@FE navy.mir>; ^b) (6)
@cvn71 navy.mil>; Kb) (6)
MCPO USN NBG
Theodore Roosevelt
USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt < @cvn71.navy mil>;
^|CAPT BiaiCO_^^^^ji|@cg52 navy.mil>;
BKH XO <^^^^^^J@cg5^iavy mil>
Subject: RE: TR PVST
m
Good evening from the TR.
CAPT USN, USS
BBj CMC
/y mil>; (b) |
CDR -
CDR-
The team has been working on a plan for our upcoming visit and I wanted to
ensure we are all still aligned with current NBG policy (knowing that it
could
certainly change moving forward).
(BKH CO) cc’d for SA and
additional coordination. BKH would likely prefer their own set up on their
pier, but the rest of the plan would remain the same for both ships.
Current Plan (Pier Liberty +limited NBG access):
1: Pier liberty with ship beer sales, occasional ship bbq, wifi, and games.
- We'll need to contract out tables, tents, wifi, and rent some MWR
type
games that are appropriate for the setting.
2: Exclusive Gab Gab access for TR and BKH. (some MWR rentals - paddle
board,
vball set up, etc..)
- We will provide all security, lifeguards, and oversight for the
time GabGab
is open. Pedestrian access in addition to bus access.
3: Limited NBG access (NEX/Liberty Center/Movie Theater/Gym/ball
fields/hiking
area above K Wharf) - assumption is that this will be exclusively for TR and
BKH so we're going to volunteer to staff it as required to minimize
interaction with NBG personnel.
- Obviously a lot of details to needed to worked out based on your
comfort
level and ability to limit interactions between ship's company and TR/BKH
Sailors.
Other discussion points:
- Buses. We intend to provide bus riders, but we'll need to work through
the
medical screening process for the drivers.
- Pier support. Wifi, stage, tents, etc., can be set up before our arrival,
but I imagine we'll also need to ensure a screening process exists for them
as
well.
H-3-74
- We intend to purchase beer from nexcom (or out in town if necessary) so we
can control the sale and not require venders on the pier.
- We intend to execute 'comrels' which will essentially entail us cleaning
up
the beach, beer, and surrounding areas every morning. If there are other
areas on the base we can assist with let us know.
- We're working through advon requirements to assist with the setup prior to
our arrival. This will be a minimal footprint, but we might need assistance
ensuring they can get lodging on base that minimizes exposure risks.
Overall goal is to provide decent QOL, while minimizing risk form CV19.
Should CV19 cases increase significantly in Guam/NBG, then our alternate GOA
is Pier liberty only. Hopefully it doesn't come to that.
If this aligns with the current situation there let me know and we'll get
the
action officers working an update logreq and coordination with FLC and
others.
Thanks in advance.
Vr,
Chopper
CAPT Brett E. Crozier
Commanding Officer
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71)
H-3-74
H-3-74
Witness Statement of p) (^)
, AMEl:
On 13 May 2020, 1 was interviewed in connection with a command investigation concerning
chain of command actions with regard to COVID-19 onboard USS THEODORE
ROOSEVEET (CVN 71) via telephone.
What follows is a true and accurate representation of my statement for this investigation.
Witness Name: AMEl p) W) Position: EPOw/VEA-154
Command: VPA-154
Department/Division : VPA-154
Email Address:
@ cvn71.navv.mil Phone(s): N/A
In August of this year, I will have been in the Navy for 18 years. I have been on seven
deployments. I reported to VPA-154 in July 2019. When I first got onboard the ship,
everything ran smoothly for a ship this size. Everyone seemed to like each other and got
along. The ships CO, XO and CMC were out on the deck plates and involved with the ships
company. The CMC of my squadron is probably the best CMC I have ever worked for.
When we first left for deployment, I had symptoms on point with COVID-19. 1 went to
medical and was diagnosed with pneumonia. Medical gave me breathiim treatments and I
was SIQ for four days. Another Sailor was sick too his name is AME2 pTW | from VPA-
86.
There was a sickness going around the ship. We did cleaning stations twice a day due to
double dragon. Bleachapoloza did not start until after the Da Nang port visit. There was talks
on SITE TV about hygiene and washing hands. The liberty brief for Da Nang did include
talks about COVID. No social distancing was discussed but I knew about it because my wife
is a nurse. Outside of the liberty brief the ship did not touch more on the topic of COVID -
19, 1 believe the ship was not trying to scare anyone with the information. Arriving in Da
Nang was hectic. We rushed off the ship and then on the pier with no addition checks on the
pier. There was bad weather and the liberty boats stopped running in the evening. I had no
COVID concerns until the last day in port Da Nang. Eiberty was secured while I was in the
hangar bay. An Officer walked around telling everyone liberty was secured and to leave the
Hangar bay. Two to three days later there was a IMC announcement about the quarantine
and that there were no positive Sailors.
After leaving Da Nang the ship started enforcing cleaning with bleach. We were encourages
to wear PPE for protection. At first, I thought the original 39 Sailors that were quarantined,
could be sick but then we were told that it was out of pre caution that they were placed in
quarantine. I heard through the deck plates that quarantine was bad. It took them a while to
get the food delivery set up and there was nothing set up for them to communicate with
family. We did receive IMC announcements about the quarantine. Nothing about the status
of the individual Sailors but just about updates on the outlook. Cleaning became an all hands
effort. I heard through word of mouth about two Sailors testing positive. I believe they
H-3-75
isolated them in medieal. I ended up having to stay in isolation in my berthing for 10 days
beeause one of the initial positive COVID Sailors was from my berthing. My CMC lined us
all up in berthing. He placed a first class at the head of the line and a first class at the back of
the line. He then instructed us to go to medical ten people at a time. Straight there and back
to the berthing. Once we all got back, security chained all the doors, and shut everything
down. One door was not chained which had a security guard in front of it. There was no
communication besides my CO and CMC coming to check on us. At this time we weren’t
told anything about the status of the ship. I did not feel safe at this time.
The Gym stayed open until we arrive in Guam. We were instructed to wipe down our
equipment as we were using it. Barbershop stayed open until the two positives went into
quarantine. Ship operation and day to day stuff was pretty much normal until we arrived in
Guam. Social distancing was not put in place until after we arrive in Guam.
I was unaware of anything with the Guam Government. I did know that Guam was operating
under reduced operation levels. This information was told to me by a friend who knows
someone in Guam. No plan was put out about what to expect in Guam. Everyone seemed
confused about the whole situation. I did not expect a mass exit off the ship but I did expect
things to move pretty quickly. Minute by minute things were changing and not moving.
When I did finally leave the ship, I was test on the ship and then took a van to the gym. Once
my results came back, I went to my hotel Grand Hyatt. Upon arrival at the hotel, I got my
temperature taken again, someone was there to explain the rules to us and I went to my room.
The internet sucked but the food was good. There ended up being two positive Sailors within
the hotel. My understanding was the ship took them back to base. Communication with my
chain of command at that time was good. We used a signal app and the TR “alone together”
Facebook page for updates. Morning and evening muster were conducted but really just to
make sure everyone was okay.
Coming into Da Nang the morale was great. The liberty boat was kind of an issue but I still
enjoyed my time there. COVID hit morale a bit, while I was in quarantine my morale was
low. I felt like I was in jail. After arriving in Guam nothing was being done to help us. The
CO’s letter happened and I understand why he did it. So many people were getting sick in
such a short time and nothing was being done for us. At this point I just want to go home and
continue with my life.
I swear (or affirm) that the i
my knowledge, information
)ove is true and accurate to the best of
(Witness’ Signature)
22 May 2020
(Date)
0958
Guam
Time
H-3-75
Name of Interviewer: Command Master Chief
H-3-75
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
Witness Statement
offBnBT
CSC:
On 13 May 2020, 1 was interviewed in connection with a command investigation concerning
chain of command actions with regard to COVlD-19 onboard USS THEODORE
ROOSEVELT (CVN 71) via telephone.
What follows is a true and accurate representation of my statement for this investigation.
Witness Name
Command: USS THEODORE ROOSEVEL
~"^cvn71. navv.mil
Email Addressfllioi
Position: Ninht Food Production Chief _
Department/Division: SudpIv/S2
Phone(s): N/A
I have been in the Navy for 18 years. I reported onboard USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT in
December 2018. 1 am currently working in the S2 Supply department When I first reported
to the ship my impression was that the ship was a busy environment. The ship was coming
out of the yards and everyone was getting back into it.
I do not recall an outbreak before Da Nang. There were the normal discussions at quarters
about washing hands and maintaining sanitation. Nothing was out of the ordinary, the
normal out to sea sickness. I did get sick but treated myself. This felt like a normal cold, my
body felt uneasy. I eventually went to sick call and got medication and felt better. Prior to
entering Da Nang 1 do not recall COVID discussions. I did hear about it on the news.
Everything happened so quickly back to back. There was a liberty brief we had to watch
prior to Da Nang port call. The brief did included COVID- 1 9 information. It was covered
that there were cases in the Northern Vietnam area. This is basically on the other side of the
country. Everyone was forced to stay in Da Nang, hotels had to be selected from on approved
list At this time there was no discussion of social distancing. I don’t really there being any
change to watch standing routine. Upon leaving the ship for liberty in Da Nang we were
required to show our ID and liberty verified documents such os hotel reservation. I went on
overnight liberty and enjoyed myself. I ate some food and took a lot of pictures.
I found out rather quickly about the Sailors in Da Nang. I’m not sure who told me but I
recall being told that Sailors came into contact with COVID positive civilians in a hotel.
Once the Sailors arrive back on the ship they were placed in quarantine for two weeks and I
do believe they were tested. The Sailors were brought food and bedding in an attempt to
make them comfortable. I do not recall where the Sailors were placed during that time.
Prior to Da Nang we did cleaning station in the morning for an hour and sweepers in the
evening. Cleaning stations went to 30 minutes in the morning and sweepers in the evening
before Da Nang. I can’t remember when we started cleaning with bleach. In the Galley we
have been cleaning with bleach for a while but 1 do know we continued cleaning stations and
sweepers.
After Da Nang, more leadership was out cleaning and monitoring areas that should be getting
cleaned. The XO gave information on all areas people touch and that should be cleaned. I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY// PRIVACY SENSITIVE
H-3-76
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
thought it could have been possible that the Sailors in quarantine could have been positive.
But it came out within a few days that they were negative. It gave me some comfort knowing
that but you still thought about what if The ship put measures in place and we did do
extreme cleaning. The chain of command communicated all information very well. The CO
made IMC announcements and the department leadership was very involved. It felt like we
were fighting against something that could be sitting right next to you.
The Gym stayed open until Guam or maybe a day before we arrived in Guam. MWR
monitored the Gyms cleanliness and ensured that people were wiping down their equipment
after they used it.
I knew if there were positive cases within my chain of command because medical will
contact the chain of command. Medical would require us to wear a mask and cloves to get
things out of their berthing. COC would then take them back to medical and medical will
take them off the ship. Before pulling in Guam there were minimal cases, medical places
them in isolation. 1 can’t remember where the isolation place was onboard the ship.
The CS’s and FSA’s did not wear mask but they did wear gloves to serve Sailors on the line.
Supply talked to the CS’s and FSA’s about sanitizing their hands and hygiene all the time.
We had CS’s standing at the beginning of the line in the galley making sure everyone was
using sanitizer as they entered the line in the galley. Everyone sat together on the mess desk,
there was no social distancing. The barbershop stayed open until we arrived in Guam, I
believe.
I knew about the situation in Guam. There were a few different plans but we ultimately
implemented a group concept. Everyone received a list of everything they should take.
Instructions were to clean our racks, met in the hangar bay, wc all got in a van and were
taken to a housing area. Prior to leaving the ship wc were tested and then taken to a housing
area. The house was nice with four bedrooms and three bathrooms. We hod the option to get
food in a little area or food was brought to us. Food was okay most days. Eventually I was
taken to the Hilton hotel. My stay at the hotel was nice. I had no issues communicating with
the ship. We mostly communicated via email.
The morale on the ship was interesting. We knew there were cases, now what? People were
trying to figure out what to do. It was a questioning environment, concerns, worry, the news,
am I ok? No real worry about COVID at first until Guam. Captain took the L for us.
Meaning he took the lost for us. During this magnitude something had to be done, plans had
to be executed and nothing was really working.
I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above is true and accurate to the best of
my knowledge, information, and belief
PXO)
17MAY20
1435
(Date)
Time
Hzl leas oigiiuiuie;
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
H-3-76
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
Nome of Interviewer: Command Master Chief
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY// PRIVACY SENSITIVE
H-3-76
USA
' TODAY
LOCAL
Guam denies entry to ship over
coronavirus concerns
Jerick Sablan Pacific Daily News
Published 12:44 a.m. ET Feb. 7, 2020 | Updated 3:02 a.m. ET Feb. 7, 2020
The government of Guam has denied a State Department request to allow a cruise ship to
dock on the island over concerns some passengers may be infected with coronavirus.
A release from the governor's office stated acting Gov. Josh Tenorio denied entry to the MS
Westerdam, a British-American private cruise vessel with 1,455 guests and 802 crew
members.
There are no known cases of coronavirus aboard the vessel, according to Holland America
cruise line, but it has been turned away by the Philippines and Japan over concerns about the
illness.
More: Guam DOE takes precautionary measures in response to coronavirus
More: Officials on coronavirus: Rumors, misinformation can 'spread faster than the virus
itself
Tenorio consulted with Gov. Lou Leon Guerrero and denied the request, the release stated.
“While we feel for every soul on board the MS Westerdam. Our obligation is to protect the
people of Guam," Leon Guerrero said. "Though Guam is prepared to deal with the potential
implications of the coronavirus, few jurisdictions can screen, quarantine, or treat 1,400
patients at one time. We respect that Guam has a duty to the nation we love, but that duty
cannot jeopardize the health and safety of our people.”
“We have made clear that we will use every tool available to us to protect our people and our
border,” Tenorio said.
The Westerdam docked in Hong Kong on Feb. 1 and boarded approximately 800 passengers.
The vessel sought entry at two other ports but was denied, given the potential risk of
infection and the need for a large quarantine th^e release stated.
Based on information from counterparts at the Center for Disease Control and the U.S. State
Department, the vessel has enough food and fuel to sustain itself, the release stated.
Princess Cruises cases
Meanwhile, the Japanese Ministry of Health notified Princess Cruises that an
additional 41 people screened aboard another ship, the Diamond Princess, have
tested positive for coronavirus, the cruise line said in a statement.
On Wednesday, Princess Cruises confirmed 20 diagnosed cases of coronavirus on the ship,
which was already under a 14-day quarantine. Guests testing positive are expected to be
transported to local hospitals immediately, according to USA TODAY.
Guam precautions
To date, there are no confirmed cases of the coronavirus on Guam.
The Department of Public Health and Social Services continues to follow established
protocols for reporting infections of public health significance, according to a news release.
Guam medical providers are reaching out to Public Health to discuss and evaluate suspicious
cases, the release stated.
Testing at CDC
CDC recently developed a new laboratory kit that tests patient specimens for the virus, and
Public Health has requested the test kits to establish testing on Guam, the release stated.
Each test kit can test approximately 400 patient specimens. On Feb. 5, the CDC began
shipping diagnostic test kits to U.S. domestic laboratories and select international
laboratories, the release stated.
H-3-77
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Attachmeirts:
'^M^CDR USN. CCSG-9
USN VCNO (USA)
CSG9 BWC
RE: TR Command Investigation
Wednesday, May 20, 2020 2:53:43 AM
En Route to Nam. pdf
CCSG-9 NOTE 1051 VIETNAM LIBERTY POLICY.pdf
TRNOTE 1050 CVWNOTE 1050 LIBERTY RISK PROGRAM. pdf
Vietnam Liberty Risk Signed. pdf
In response to your RFI -
RFI #1: What were the original dates for TR's Guam port visit and when did those dates change?
Original Guam port dates for TR: 3-10 APR. We pulled into Guam on 27 MAR 20. That
date changed on 25 MAR 20.
RFI #2: Please provide the PowerPoint used by the TR SMO for the quarantine plan/COVID
mitigation strategies prior to the Da Nang port call. The PPT would have covered how to handle
Individuals who tested positive, where to place them onboard, and the flow of services to spaces and
how medical personnel would treat them.
Attached
RFI #3: Please provide the CCSG-9 and TR Da Nang liberty plan.
Attached
Very respectfully,
(i)
Carrier Strike Group NINE
N31/N7
Embarked: USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT
NIPR: j^^^^^^^Jf5)ccsg9.navv.mil
SIPR: I f5)ccsg9. navv.smil.mil
J-Dial: xQI
VOSIP:
COMM
From: pO) (g)
LT USN VCNO (USA) fmailto:
(Snavv.mill
H-3-78
Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2020 5:57 AM
To: CSG9 BWC
Cc: C7F BWC; C7F ABWC; C7F-COVI D-WG; C7F-N31-COPS; cpf.catbwc
Subject: TR Command Investigation
**PRE-DECISIONAL/ DELIBERATIVE INFORMATION // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**
Good morning CSG-9 BWC,
Three new RFIs from our team today. Thank you again for all the hard work and prompt responses.
Request confirm receipt of this email.
Please encrypt any email(s) containing PH or sensitive information.
Please have the information available for closeout within 24 hours.
Point of Contact: LTp) W)
pm
fSnavv.f.smil.'lmil
If information is sent via SIPR, please emai
: LCDRp)(6)
(TO
fSnavv..smil.mil
and LT
Onavv.smil.mil
RFI #1: What were the original dates for TR's Guam port visit and when did those dates change?
RFI #2: Please provide the PowerPoint used by the TR SMO for the quarantine plan/COVID
mitigation strategies prior to the Da Nang port call. The PPT would have covered how to handle
Individuals who tested positive, where to place them onboard, and the flow of services to spaces and
how medical personnel would treat them.
RFI #3: Please provide the CCSG-9 and TR Da Nang liberty plan.
Thank you for your help with these RFIs and for all the help our team has received thus far.
Very respectfully,
LTp)CT
Command Investigation Team
Vice Chief of Naval Operations
O-.^W
Pentagon Roomj^^J
Washington, DC 20350-1000
■ f5)navv.(smil.)mil
H-3-78
**PRE-DECISIONAL/ DELIBERATIVE INFORMATION // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, PRIVACY SENSITIVE. This electronic transmission, and any attachments,
may contain confidential information intended only for the person(s) named above. It may be
protected from disclosure by applicable la\A/, including the Privacy Act, attorney-client privilege,
and/or \A/ork product doctrine. Any misuse, distribution, copying, or unauthorized disclosure of this
information by another person is strictly prohibited and may result in both civil and criminal
penalties. If you receive this transmission in error, please notify the sender at the telephone number
or e-mail address above.
H-3-78
En Route to ‘NAM
H-3-78
Agenda
• Care in 'Nam
• Hospitals in Vietnam
• MEDEVAC/Patient Transport
• Screening/Fleet Landing Plan
• Duty in 'Nam
H-3-78
After Action from Guam
• Sick call hours the same. Start at 0830.
• Place signage in morning on the Port Side
• Secure the starboard door.
H-3-78
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71)
DA NANG, VIETNAM
5 MAR - 9 MAR
PORT CALL
MEDEVACS/OFF SHIP
EMERGENCY/CONSULT
H-3-78
Emergent Medical Care
or
Emergency MEDEVAC:
- Notify ACDO, SMO and Duty Provider.
- Notify ISOS.
TRICARE/INTERNATIONAL SOS (ISOS)
24 HOURS: pjp)
24 HOUR EMAIL: pm
@ internationalsos . com
^ CVN 71 Medical Dept will NOT send patients to any hospital in Da Nang without ISOS
approval except for emersencies. *
H-3-78
MEDEVACS/OFF SHIP
EMERGENCY/CONSULT
Emer2ent Consults
Non-Emergent Consults:
If urgent consult is required (trauma,
patient reports to local hospital,
orthopedics, etc) notify SMO and Duty
Doc. If ISOS is needed, contact ISOS
with required information:
Name
Date of Birth
- SSN
SMO and Duty Doc must determine
treatment needs of the patient.
Contact with ISOS can be may made by
any Medical Department Personnel.
Utilize the medical van for patient
transport if directed to transport patient
to Hoan My Da Nang Hospital.
SMO and Duty Doc must determine
treatment needs of the patient.
Contact with ISOS can be may made by
any Medical Department Personnel
For non-emergent consults, ISOS will
determine the best suited medical
facility for the patients medical
condition.
Utilize the medical van for patient
transport in non-emergent cases, in
which ISOS has aheady been contacted
and directed to transport patient to
hospital. (Medical has driver and van
available)
H-3-78
HEALTHCARE FACILITY
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OFF
SHIP COMM
HOAN MY DA NANG HOSPITAL
161 Nguyen Van Linh Street, Thanh Khe
District,
Da Nang, Vietnam
From ship: 338-9-011-84-236-3650-305
From local cell: 169-616-7172
DA NANG MEDICAL DUTY VAN
Name of Driver:
CELL NUMBER:
FROM SHIP:
DUTY CORPSMAN ON THE PIER
CELL NUMBER:
FROM SHIP:
FROM VIETNAM DUTY CELL TO SHIP:
H-3-78
Medical Evacuation - Priority I
Name (Last, First, MI)
Rate/Rank/Sers'ice:
DODID:
SSN:
Date of Birth:
Gender:
Male Female
Cmd/Dept
ICD 10 Code(s):
Allergies:
Medications:
Altitude restiictions?
YES NO
Any precautions regarding Altitude restrictions?
contagious diseases? YES NO YES NO
Condition:
(circle) Stable Ciitiral
Aircraft Configiuation;
(circle) An4)ulatory
Litter
Command Escort Require?
YES NO
Medical Attendant?
YES NO
Medical FaciliK:
Hospital;
Phone:
Accepting Physician:
Phone;
- Before the patient leaves :
A copy of all medical documentation that needs to accompany the patient.
- After the patient leaves I will need:
Brief summary of the medical picture. Mesfela^sTraffic is required.
Patient Transport for Medical Reasons
Name (Last, Fii-st, MI)
Rate/Rank/Senice:
DODID:
Date of Biith:
Cell Phone Number:
Cmd/Dept:
If neressaiy, is patient able to tolerate the forces of a catapult launch?
YES NO
Command Escort Require?
YES NO
Pix)\1der to Piwider Tuniover:
Hospital;
Accepting Physician:
Phone:
Time and Date:
- Before the patient leaves ;
A copy of all medical documentation that needs to accompany the patient.
- After the patient leaves I will need;
Brief summary of the medical picture H-3-78
Screening/Fleet Landing Medical
H-3-78
Fleet Landing Layout
huts (ECP)
Landing
barge #1
Conex box barrier
Bus staging and
vehicle parking
s pick up
i-ocked gate
(vehicles)
Port gate
(vehicle entry)
Vehicle
exit
Bus drop off
3 X portaloos and
1 X handwash
Bus route
(DEP)
Bus route
(ARR)
100 pax tent
Bus King tent
2 X X-Ray
(vans) and 3
X walk-thru
metal
detectors
300 oax tent
Pedestrian fence
300 pax ten
(closed)
20' container
officers
(Beach
Guard /
Medic /
HSP)
300 pax tent
6 X portaloos and
1 X handwash
100 pax tent
300 oax tent
Landing
baroe #2
300 pax tent
Screening Set up
Comms pending
IH-3^78
LB= Landing Barge
USFFC COVIP-19 SCKEENIWG QUESTIONNAIRE
v2020.02.28
1. HAVE YOU BEEN TO ANY HIGH RISK COUNTIRES IN PAST 14 DAYS? YES
a . Ctiina, including Hong Kong and Macau
If STOP! DENY ENTRY, screening complete, provide individual a mask, consult Medical Dept
NO
2. HAVE YOU BEEN TO ANYSIGNIFICAMT RISK COUNTRIES IN PAST 14 DAYS?
a. Japan
b. Singapore
c. South Korea
d. Italy
e. Iran
YES NO
3. ARE YOU CURRENTLY SICK? YES NO
a. Fever
b. Chills
c. Cough
d. Sore throat
e. Shortness of breath
f. Body aches
g. Abdominal pain
•••IF YOU DEVELOP ANY OF THESE SYMPTOMS, CONTACT YOUR MEDICAL DEPARTMENT •* *
4. IN PAST 14 DAYS, HAVE YOU HAD CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT, AS DEFINED BELOW, WITH ANYONE YES NO
KNOWN TO BE INFECTED WITH COVID-19?
a . Within 6 feet
b. In a confined space {cab, small room, shared stateroom, berthing proximity, office, etc.)
c. Had direct contact with secretions {been coughed on, sneezed on, etc.)
S. HAVEYOU VlSmEDANYMEDICALFACILITYINTHE PAST14DAYS? YES NO
a . Facility visited: _ (Medical Dept can cfuery if cases reported there}
b. If "Yes', for Medical Department Representative inquiry only:
i. For what reason/conditioo: _
If 2 or more questions are answered “YES', with appropriate PPE, temperature screening will be ccHiducted. Data will
be logged with DOO ID number, date, time, screener name, and temperature.
Log will be maintained by Medical Department and frequently reviewed by senior medical department
representative.
a. If temperature is greater than or equal to 100 °F (37.S ENTRY, provide individual with a dean
mask
b. If tonperature is less than 100 "F {37.S “C}, log, allow access, screening complete.
Screening/Fleet Landing Medical
Screening
H-3-78
n
Answer No: Welcome to the
TR
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Answer Yes to questions: Take vitals
(temperature) Patient logged in Green book.
Place in holding area and coordinate with ship's
medical for further evaluation.
Screening
Area
Screening Area
Medical Logistics/Set
Logistics needed from
Supply:
5-10 chairs
1 tables (screening /
equipment table)
1 tent (holding)
Trash bin, trash bags
Food for watchstanders
Power source
Medical Supplies:
Thermometer
Water
Log book
Hand sanitizer
Vital signs
Biohazard bag
Alcohol swabs
Chem lights
Comm w/ ships medical
Radio and radio charging
station
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Risk Assessment and Public Health
Management Decision Making Each question refers to within the past Hdays
Coi H: uainiwilBi
Did the person being —
evaluated travel from Chna?
X
livtsj
Did the person have any contact with a labotatocy-confirmed case of COVlD-1 9*?
7'*' Fleet AOR
$e)
(kio)-
Is the person being evaluated a heatthcaie worker in a US. healthcare settirig?
Did the person travel from
Hubei, Ghina specifically?
Refer to Guidance for Flidt Assessment
and Public Health Management of Persons
with Potential COVlD-1 9 Exposure"
Was contact within the context of iving with, being
an irftimate partnero( orcaring for a person with
confirmed COVI[>-l 9 outside a healthcare fKility?
(vtsj
Did the person being evaluated
have contact with a person with
confirmed COVlD-l 9 in the context
of living with,, being an intimate
partner of, or carirrg far the persort,
outside a healthcare facility?
Were al recommended
precautiDns for home care arvd
isolation falowed coruistently?
{HOf-
Did the person contact respiratory
secretions or was the person within 6 f^t
of a case far a prolonged period?
Vfas the person in the same indoor
environment as a case fora pmloriged
period but did not meet the definitiDn of
close contact (e.g, in the same classroom
or same hospital waiting room}?
-^ES) — L-(^
High Risk |
1 HMiun Risk |
Lew Risk
1 MaMkntffUbllerisk I
IrtiMs hr pe«fl« Remain under quarantine authority;
wItiMrrt syngtaMS no pubik activities: dai^ active
Msfetent Htth monitoring: controlled travel
OWD^I*
Stay homes active monitoring or
self-monitoring vrith public health
supervision; recommerxi to not travel
Self observation
None
ikOfTH hr pcoflf Immediate isolatiort: medkal
rrttli ryagiHis evaluation guided by PUI definttion:
Immediate isolation; medkal
evaluation guided by PUI deUnttion;
Stay home from work or school, avoid
corrtact with othersv don't travel. Seek
None; routine medical care
«HsfeteHt irtth pre-notiiy healthcare servke^
CCWD-lf controlled travel
pre-notify healthcare servkes;
controlled travel
health advke
mc^JiDramruflpctortKrf
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*0 A ustdiagncsed dnuJIy wkh C0V1OI9 ouoide afthe Lirhed States who did rat hdM testing
**MeakhaK pmidef IHCP) gu^ance outlines rislicategaies to dnorine UMork eduswn and rnenroirng piecedLres Afoer
identifiping rHi categoiyin che guidznee, ux the <af:Bgcnes Dutlned hefeto detsrm'ne quvxrtine requivnenti
Medical Screening - Inbound COD
Screen Incoming COD passengers from all countries in current AOR
Time Frame: 7 days by department (daily reports to CAPT
), next 7 days via self-reporting
Departments will email CAPT p) CT | daily report of negative and positive screenings on all COD
individuals NLT 1600.
Department Level Screening
- Ask member about COVID-19 specific symptoms
- Positive Screens for flu-like illness sent to medical for evaluation immediately (do not wait
for sick call)
- Patient dons surgical mask in medical
- Fill out Respiratory Questionnaire (if initial visit)
- Vital Signs taken, if abnormal. Duty IDC and/or Doc will evaluate
- Patients will wait until evaluated by provider.
- Option #1: Quiet Room (1-6 people)
- Option #2: Ward with Curtain closed(~10-15 people)
- If patients require Biofire or COV-19 testing, they will be moved to Quiet Room vs Ward
depending on number.
- Daily Re-evaluation by medical: current symptoms and vital signs including temperature (fill
out Re-evaluation Form)
H-3-78
Medical Screening - Post Vietnam
All Personnel Screened
Time Frame: 7 days by department, next 7 days via self-reporting
Departments email names of positive screenings to CAPT p) CT | NLT 1600.
- Ask member about COVID-19 specific symptoms
- Positive Screens for flu-like illness sent to medical for evaluation immediately (do not wait
for sick call)
- Patient dons surgical mask in medical
- Fill out Respiratory Questionnaire (if initial visit)
- Vital Signs taken, if abnormal. Duty IDC and/or Doc will evaluate
- Patients will wait until evaluated by provider.
- Option #1: Quiet Room (1-6 people)
- Option #2: Ward with Curtain closed (~10-15 people)
- If patients require Biofire or COV-19 testing, they will be moved to Quiet Room vs Ward
depending on number.
- Daily Re-evaluation by medical: current symptoms and vital signs including temperature (fill
out Re-evaluation Form)
H-3-78
Respiratory
COA#l
ICU
Ward
■
OJ
c
03
U
u
Lo
p/s
PWay
PT Ward
OR
Tx Room
Pharm
Dedicated
equipment &
supplies
InAVR h-3
-Regular Sick Call enter via PT/Psych Door
-Flu-like Symptoms enter via AVR
- Don Mask (in line)
- Screened with Vital Signs
- Symptoms, but Temp < 100
- Treat symptomatically with OTC
Meds
- Come back for Re-eval by medical
daily 0700-0900
- Temp >100
- Eval by Duty Doc/IDC to treat
- Wait in AVR
- If further testing required, moved
to Quiet Room
- Investigate for other etiologies
- Test with Biofire
- If positive^ viral etiology
- If negative-> Covid -19
"research" sequence.
- Quarantine/isolate
- Re-eval by medical daily
- OTC Medications available to RN/HMs
- Daily Field Day in AVR post evaluation
of patients (Quiet Room if applicable).
Respiratory
COA #2
ICU
BH
Ward
1 _
to
E
o
+-»
Q.
E
>•
CO
PT Ward
p/s
PWay
Tx Room
Pharm
(U
c
(T3
U
U
CO
AVR
BMR
RAD
LAB
Dedicated
equipment &
supplies
In Ward Area
H-3-7:
-Regular Sick Call enter via AVR
-Flu-like Symptoms enter via PT/Psych
- Don Mask (in line)
- Screened with Vital Signs
- Symptoms, but Temp < 100
- Treat symptomatically with OTC
Meds
- Come back for Re-eval by medical
daily 0700-0900
- Temp >100
- Eval by Duty Doc/IDC to treat
- Wait in PT Area
- If further testing required, moved
to Quiet Room
- Investigate for other etiologies
- Test with Biofire
- If positive^ viral etiology
- If negative-> Covid -19
"research'' sequence.
- Quarantine/Isolate
- Re-eval by medical daily
- OTC Medications available to
RN/HMs
- Daily Field Day in Ward post evaluation
of patients (Quiet Room if applicable).
External Support
• The NAVMED R&D Team (1 lab) will support CTF-71.
• request arrival around 10 March (estimated).
Players: LCDRf^
HM2*™n (female).
|, PhD, MPH, HMlf^
(male), and
• Equipment:
- NGDS Biofire instrument and enough Biofire Respiratory-2 Panels to
run diagnostics for the usual respiratory pathogens on up to 250
sailors. 1 hour run time, 10 at a time.
• does not include COVID-19
- 2 RT-PCR instruments on which we will be able to run COVID-19
''research only" assays for surveillance purposes
• run approximately 800-1000 COVID-19 assays. 2 hour run time
• Training: teach MLTs to run the Biofire on III cases for diagnostic
purposes. If the BioFire results are all negative, we then turn to the
COVID-19 assay for surveillance purposes.
H-3-78
Quarantine Options
DV Row
• 6 rooms (2 person racks), cots for additional patients
Berthing
• Chief Overflow Berthing ( aft mess deck)
• Admin Male berthing
• Medical Quiet Room (4 racks-isolated head)
Additional berthing
Brig
• Up to 20 (not ideal)
H-3-78
Logistics
• Heads
- Secure heads for restricted use for isolated/ quarantined patients. If movement outside
necessary, ensure wearing mask
- Signage to secure the head for isolated/quarantined individuals only
- Head cleaning with HTH, diluted chlorine bleach, cavicide with appropriate PPE
• Food delivery:
- Delivered to them, wearing PPE.
• Laundry delivery
- All laundry in tied plastic bag and transported.
- Standard procedures for washing, minimal risk of transmission
• Trash
- Soiled material and PPE tied in a sturdy leak proof bag and should be incinerated.
• Medical Checks
- Daily medical checks. Must don appropriate PPE prior to entry and doff off BEFORE exiting.
- Disposable or dedicated patient care equipment. Cavicide available.
- Airborne precautions = N95 mask (fit testing)
- Droplet= surgical mask
H-3-78
ILI thresholds
• Carriers 0.11%
• LHA, LHD, LSD, LCC: 0.41%
• DDG, CG, FG: 2.0%
• SSN, SSBN: 1.32%
• All others: 1.5%
H-3-78
MED DEPT- SHARED DUTIES
Strict respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette
Hand washing before and after patient
Clean patient care bed and chair after every
use
In waiting area,
— Surgical mask for URI symptoms
— No touch receptacle for tissue disposal
— Monitor replacement of hand sanitizer (walls units
and mayo trays)
Duty Schedule
Guam
7-10 Feb
'Nam
5-8 Mar
Duty (Day
1)
Duty (day 4)
OFF
Duty (Day 3)
Duty(Day
3)
Off
Off
Duty (Day 1)
Duty (Day
2)
Off
Off
Duty (Day 2)
Guam 7-10
April
Singapor
Guam
Total
Por
e
11-14
duty
ts
28 May-
Jun
days
off
01 Jun
2
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
H-3-78
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER. CARRIER STRIKE GROUP NINE
UNIT 200219 BOX 1
FPOAP 96602
EN REPLY REFER TO
COMCARSTRKGRUNINENOTE 1051
NOO
24 Feb 20
COMCARSTRKGRU NINE NOTICE 1051
From: Commander, Carrier Strike Group NINE
Subj: CARRIER STRllCE GROUP NINE LIBERTY POLICY FOR DA NANG, VIETNAM
PORT VISIT 5-9 MARCH 2020
Ref: (a) COMSEVENTHFLTINST 1 050 dtd 22 Jul 1 9 “Liberty within the T” Fleet Area of
Operations”
(b) Foreign Clearance Guide
(c) JAGINST 5800.7F
Enel: ( 1 ) Individual Liberty Plan for E-6 and Below
(2) Command Liberty Log Template Page
1 . Purpose. To provide guidelines per references (a) through (c) for the port visit to Da Nang,
from 5 March 2020 to 9 March 2020. This policy shall be reviewed in its entirety.
2. Background. Liberty is a mission in Vietnam. Port visit incidents will have negative
strategic impacts on an important developing relationship. This policy applies to all personnel,
civilian and military within Carrier Strike Group NINE (CSG-9). We represent our Navy and
must demonstrate exemplary personal and professional conduct without exception. All
personnel will take immediate action and intervene when circumstances warrant. Do your part,
make good decisions, set your people up for success and ensure that the liberty mission is solid.
3. Liberty Policy.
a. Overnight Liberty. Overnight liberty is only authorized for personnel who possess a valid
U.S. Passport (passport cards are not authorized), proof of an authorized hotel reservation and a
pre-approved liberty chit signed by the Chief of Staff and a liberty card.
b. Liberty Cards. Liberty cards will be issued in this port. Each person leaving the ship will
be required to have a Vietnamese "Shorepass" with a serialized number corresponding to your
crew member number. Every person will need to show the Shorepass in order to depart and
return into Fleet Landing area. Anyone losing their Shorepass will be temporarily detained by
the Vietnamese Border Patrol/Police until a signed request from the ship's Command Duty
Officer (CDO) can be obtained to retrieve them. Service members who lose their Shorepass will
not be permitted on liberty again. The list of names that correlates to numbers will NOT be
provided to the government of Vietnam.
H-3-78
COMCARSTRKGRUNINENOTE 1051
24 Feb 20
c. Liberty Plans. All E-6 and below personnel are required to submit a written liberty plan
using enclosure (1) to their Department Head for final approval via their Division Officer and
Leading Chief Petty Officer. Each department will maintain copies of the liberty plan and make
them readily available upon request.
d. Liberty Lo^. All personnel will sign in and out using the Liberty Logbook located in
Tactical Force Combat Center (TFCC); enclosure (2). This logbook will include full name, rank,
liberty buddies, hotel information, email contact, passport number, and crew member number.
4. Liberty Expiration.
a. While in Da Nang, Vietnam, the local government (“People’s Council of Da Nang”) has
ordered a curfew for ALL HANDS from 2400 to 0700. Disobeying this curfew is in violation of
a direct order and can result in disciplinary action, in addition to charges by the local authorities.
b. Due to liberty boat capacity and limitations while at anchorage, liberty expires by
paygrade every night and will expire inside the Entry Control Point at Fleet Landing as follows:
{ 1 ) E-4 and j unior: 2200
(2) E-5 and E-6: 2300
(3) E-7 and senior; 2359
Upon returning from liberty, ALL HANDS must check back in using the liberty log located in
TFCC. BEACH Guard will record all names of Sailors returning to Fleet Landing after their
respective liberty expiration.
c. For personnel who have been authorized overnight liberty and are not returning to the
ship, liberty expires at 2359 in your hotel. Personnel must remain in their hotel until 0700 the
followingmoming^LM|lANDS are required to muster between the hours of 0500-0700 by
emailing|MM^^^^^B®CCSG9.NAVY,MIL or by callingf^W^^NB^ For
emergency purposes only, you may contact the BWC at|(^^
d. Duty section personnel liberty will expire at 1000 on their duty day.
Mar 5: Duty Section 4
Mar 6: Duty Section 5
Mar 7: Duty Section 6
Mar 8: Duty Section 1
Mar 9: Duty Section 1
e. Liberty for All Hands will expire at 1000 on 9 March 2020 so plan accordingly.
2
H-3-78
COMCARSTRKGRUNINENOTE 1051
24 Feb 20
5. Liberty Buddy Policy.
a. The liberty buddy system is mandatory. Liberty buddies must remain together and must
sign out from and return to the ship together. The liberty buddy rule applies to all, to include
Goyemment Seryice employees and contractors.
b. When authorized by the Department Head in accordance with requirements of reference
(a), liberty buddies may be from other commands or trusted civilian acquaintances (e.g. spouse,
sibling, or parent).
c. Liberty buddy swaps are NOT authorized in this port except by physically returning to the
ship and recording the buddy swap in the liberty log.
d. Liberty buddy groups must be of at least two, but no greater than five persons.
e. If found without a liberty buddy, lone Sailors will be escorted back to the ship. If a Sailor
loses their liberty buddy, he/she will report to the nearest member of the Shore Liaison
Group/Shore Patrol and return to the ship immediately. There are no refunds for unused hotel
rooms due to violations of the liberty buddy policy.
f. Liberty buddies arc not required for official Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR)
tours and command-sponsored Community Relations (COMREL) projects that leave from and
return to Fleet Landing. Liberty buddies are not required at Fleet Landing but are required if
leaving the Fleet Landing area.
6. Senior Person Present Rule. All leaders are expected to enforce Strike Group liberty policies,
and to intervene to prevent incidents.
7. Leave Policy. Leave will NOT be authorized for this port.
8. Drinking.
a. The drinking age for ALL HANDS while in port Da Nang is 1 8 years of age.
b. The Navy standard is RESPONSIBLE USE of alcohol. Inebriation is the most common
cause of liberty incidents and could result in Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) charges.
9. Off Limits Areas/Activities.
a. Designated Liberty. The designated liberty area is the limit of the municipal province of
Da Nang. You may not leave the designated liberty area unless on a command-sponsored
COMREL event or MWR tour.
3
H-3-78
COMCARSTRKGRUNINENOTE 1051
24 Feb 20
b. Bars/Clubs After Closing Hours. Expect an increased Vietnamese security presence
during this port visit. You will be arrested if found in a bar or club after liberty expiration.
c. Prostitution. Engaging in prostitution or any commercial sex act is a violation of Article
1 34 of the UCMJ. Department of Defense policy prohibits any activity that may facilitate or
encourage trafficking in persons. Trafficking in persons is cruel, inherently harmful, and
dehumanizing. It is demeaning and contrary to our Core Values. Additionally, HIV rates among
prostitutes generally run exceptionally high.
d. Two-wheeled Vehicles. Riding on two wheels, to include motorcycles, scooters, mopcds,
and bicycles is strictly forbidden. Two wheeled vehicles are extremely dangerous on
Vietnamese roads. Vehicular accidents are the leading cause of death of tourists in Da Nang.
e. Car Rentals. Renting or purchasing vehicles is not authorized in this port.
f. Water Vehicles. Operating wave runners, jet skis, or power boats is prohibited.
g. Hitchhiking. Hitchhiking is prohibited.
h. Extreme Sports. Bungee jumping, parasailing, sky-diving, boxing, wrestling, and martial
arts are inherently dangerous activities are not permitted.
i. SCUBA diving. Diving is prohibited unless the member is qualified by an officially
recognized association (i.e. PADI). Personnel may participate in qualifying dives in order to
become certified by an officially recognized association, or may participate pursuant to approved
MWR tours.
j. Surrendering Military ID/CAC. Restaurants or hotels may ask tor an identification card
when ordering to discourage walk-offs. Use a Driver’s License or State ID. It is okay to show
your Military ID/CAC to local law enforcement or border guard officials, but do not allow
anyone to take possession of, make copies of, or photograph your Military ID/CAC.
k. Gun shops and Weapons. It is illegal for foreigners to possess guns. It is also prohibited
to possess any ammunition, spent shells, or training rounds or throwing stars. Vietnam strictly
prohibits importation of weapons.
l. Tattoo/Piercing Establishments. Tattoos and piercings are prohibited as hepatitis
infections are common in this port through transmission via piercings or tattoos.
m. Local Pharmacies. Many drugs contain U.S. scheduled controlled substances which can
result in a positive urinalysis, leading to non-judicial punishment (NJP) or administrative
separation (ADSEP).
4
H-3-78
COMCARSTRKGRUNrNENOTE 1051
24 Feb 20
n. Counterfeit Merchandise. Avoid shops or street vendors selling counterfeit merchandise.
It is illegal to bring counterfeit goods onboard a naval vessel or import them into the United
States.
o. Hotel/Lodging. Being present in, making a reservation at, or staying overnight at, any
hotel not on the authorized hotel list is prohibited. Private property rentals or housing (e.g.
AirBnB, Vrbo, etc.) are not authorized.
p. Photography of Military or Security Interest. Taking photographs of anything that could
be perceived as of military or security interest may result in questioning by authorities, fines,
detention, or arrest.
q. Religious Items. Importation of religious material is outlawed in Vietnam. NCIS does
not recommend visibly displaying or carrying prayer books or otlier religious materials. Avoid
religious or political conversations with local nationals.
r. Drug Offenses. Punishments are severe and include the death penalty. Expect plain
clothes police and heavy surveillance on local drug traffickers interacting with and targeting
foreign tourists.
1 0. Authorized Hotels. The following hotels are the only authorized hotels for personnel on
liberty in Da Nang:
a. Downtown North/ Novotel Drop Off
(1) Da Nang Golden Bay
(2) Stay Hotel
(3) Zen Diamond Suites Hotel
(4) Novotel Premier Han River
(5) Hilton Hotel Da Nang
b. Downtown South/ Green Plaza Drop Off
(1) Brilliant Hotel
(2) Vanda Hotel
(3) Samdi Hotel
(4) One Opera Hotel
c. Beach Drop Off
(1) A la Carte
(2) Belle Madison Parosand
(3) Mandila Beach Hotel
(4) BlueSun Hotel
(5) Paris Deli Danang Beach Hotel
(6) Royal Lotus Hotel
(7) Sofia Boutique Hotel*
(8) Sofia Suites Hotel*
(9) Four Points by Sheraton
5
H-3-78
d. Beach Other
COMCARSTRKGRUNINENOTE 1051
24 Feb 20
(1) Premier Village Da Nang Resort
(2) Pullman Danang Beach Resort
(3) Intercontinental Da Nang
(4) Hyatt Regency Danang
(5) Olalani Resort and Condote
*The Sofia Hotels are two hotels operated by Vietnam Boutique Quality. No other Vietnam
Boutique Quality hotels are authorized for lodging.
1 1. Violations.
a. Personnel will obey all orders of the local authorities. Shore Patrol, Beach Guard,
and orders set forth in this policy.
b. In the event of a liberty incident, the entire N-Codc will return to the ship for
remediation. In addition, the Sailor will be subject to individual disciplinaiy action.
12. Conclusion. ALL CSG-9 personnel regardless of rank or status will be familiar with
this policy. Our mission ashore as representatives of the United States of America and the
U.S. Navy is equally as important as our mission at sea. Like our mission at-sea, we will
execute to the highest standards without fail and will provide each other with forceful
backup and support when acceptable risk to mission exists.
13. Records Management. Records created as a result of this notice, regardless of media and
format, must be managed per Secretary of the Navy Manual 5210.1 CH-1 of August 2017.
14. Cancellation Contingency. TTiis notice will be updated and remain in effect until superseded
by another notice of the same subject.
PIFW
Chief of Staff
Releasability and Distribution:
This notice is not cleared for public release and is available electronically only via the CCSG-9
Sharepoint folder to users with common access card authorization.
6
H-3-78
COMMANDER CARRIER STRIKE GROUP NINE INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY PLAN
Rate/Rank/Namc; Dale: _ DIV; _ Dufy Section;
LIBERTY EXPIRATIONS (AT FLEET LANDING OR AT HOTEL)
E4 AND BELOW: 2200 E5/E6: 2300 / E7 AND ABOVE: 2359
Division LCPO Risk Category □ Low □ Medium r~| High
1. Have you read the SOP A liberty policy and understand the contents? YES NO (Circle one)
2. If you arc of legal age to drink alcohol, are you going to drink responsibly? YES / NO ■ N/A (Circle one)
3. Are you aware of the liberty policy? _ YES / NO (Circle one)
THURSDAY. 05 MARCH 2020 SECTION 4 ALCOHOL YES / NO tCircle onet OVERNiCHT YES / NO rCirrle anet Diitv/Slavinr on Ship
Plans: d^ShoppliiK CH Sight Seeing 1 1 MWRTour | | NIghI LlFc/Bar | | Movie | | Restaurant
Olhcr/Octiih:
□
Hold Name:
Hotel Plione #1
Liberty Buddy 1: (Rale, Last, Hrst, Oept/DIv):
Sicnaturc:
Liberty Buddy 2: (Rate, Last, First, Depi/Div);
Signature:
FRIDAY. 06 MARCH 2020 SECTION 5 ALCOHOL YES / NO fCIrdc ond
Plaas: | | Shopping | | SIglil Sedng | | MWRTour | | Night
OVERNIGHT YES / NO (Cirdc one) Duty/Staying on Ship
Lifc/Bar I I Movie | | Rcstaarant
□
Oibcr/DetniU:
llolci Name:
Hotel Phone#;
Liberty Buddy 1: (Rate. Last. First DcDl/Divi;
Signatarc:
Liberty Baddy 2; (Rate, Last, First, Dept/Div):
Sicnalarc:
SATURDAY. 07 MARCH 2020 SECTION 6 ALCOHOL YES/ NO (ardconcl OVERNIGHT YES /NO (Circle one) Dnfy/Stnyinp oa Ship
Plans: | | Sliopplng | | Sight Seeing | | MWRTour | | Night Ufe/Bar | | Movie | | Restaurant
□
Othcr/Details:
Hotel Name:
Hold Phone #;
Liberty Buddy 1: (Rate, Last. First. Dcpt/Oiv):
Sicnaturc:
Liberty Buddy 2: (Rale, Last, First, Dept/Div):
Sicnaturc:
.SUNDAY. 08 MARCH 2020 .SECTION 1 ALCOHOL YES / NO (arelc and OVERNIGHT YES / NO fCirrir ond Ih.iv/Si.vlnp »n Ship
Plans; | | Shopping | | Sight Seeing Q MWRTour | | Night Ufe/Bar Movie | | Restaurant
□
Other/ Del alls;
Hotel Name:
Hold Ptianc #:
Liberty Buddy 1: (Rate, Last, First, Dcpl/Dlv):
Sicnatarc:
Liberty Baddy 2: (Rale, Last, Flrsl, Dcpt/Oiv);
Signature;
H-3-78
Enclosure (I)
COMMANDER CARRIER STRIKE GROUP NINE LIBERTY GUIDANCE
ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION;
• Alcohol consumption will be done in a responsible and mature manner, not to bring discredit to the Armed Services.
(INITIAL _ )
DA NANG VIETNAM OVERNIGHT LIBERTY GUIDANCE;
- Hotci/Address of liberty buddy
- Recall/cell phone number of overnight location (residencc/hotel/Uberty buddy)
- Provide liberty buddy name, rank and department/division
- Liberty buddies must stay at the SAME HOTEL
- Anyone separated from their Liberty Buddy will immediately return to the ship
(INITIAL _ )
CHANGES TO LIBERTY PLAN:
- You must contact in person or by phone the first Khaki in your division. If not available, the senior Khaki on duty will be
authorized to make a change to your liberty plan.
-Anyone involved in an incident will immediately return to the ship.
(INITIAL _ )
I _ _ will adhere to this liberty plan and I understand that any
diversion from this plan is against the T"* Fleet liberty policy. If I need to make changes to this liberty plan 1 will
update CCSG-9 Staff Duty Officer.
SVM SIGNATURE:
DATE:
LPO:
LCPO:
DIVO:
H-3-78
Enclosure (1)
H-3-78
CCSG-9 VIETNAM LIBERTY LOG
Member
Number
Duty
Section
Passport it
Passport
Expiration
Check-out
Check-in
Hotel Name
Oate(s) of
overnight
E-mail contact
Liberty Buddy
1
N/A
2
N/A
%
5
9
4
tl
1
12
1
U
N/A
16
N/A
IB
2
20
6
24
3
27
H/A
2B
H/A
30
1
47
i
4B
3
S3
$
56
4
61
3
69
2
64
2
66
6
67
4
Rate/Rank
Name
Enclosure (2)
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT CVN 71
UNIT 100250 BOX 1
FPO AP 96632
Cane frp: Jun 2018
TRNOTE 1050
CVW17NOTE 1050
CMC
23 Aug 17
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71) NOTICE 1050
CARRIER AIR WING SEVENTEEN (CVW 17) NOTICE 1050
From: Conunanding Officer, USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71)
Commander, Carrier Air Wing SEVENTEEN (CVW 17)
Subj : LIBERTY RISK PROGRAM
Ref :
(a) COMCARSTKGRUNINENOTE 1050
(b) TRINST 1050. IB
Enel :
(1) Liberty Risk Nomination Form
(2) Class Liberty Risk Designation
(3) General Order 17-01 Liberty Buddy Duties and
Responsibilities
(4) Liberty Risk Assignment
1. Purpose . To establish practices, procedures and policies on
liberty restrictions consistent with reference (a) and delineate
those in reference (b) , for the purpose of minimizing the risk
that Sailors will commit discreditable conduct overseas.
a. The Liberty Risk Program is administrative in nature.
b. It is not a substitute for non-judicial punishment
(NJP) , court-martial or pretrial restraint.
c. Administrative regulation of liberty through the Liberty
Risk program is not a form of punishment and does not prevent
the use of disciplinary procedures such as NJP or court-martial.
2. Scope. This notice applies to all military personnel
embarked on or attached to USS THEORDORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71)
while in foreign ports.
3. Background. Many foreign nationals form opinions of the
U.S. based largely on their observation of U.S. military
H-3-78
TRNOTE 1050
CVW17NOTE 1050
23 Aug 17
personnel. Therefore, as guests in a foreign country, service-
members must conduct themselves in a friendly, courteous and
law-abiding manner. If previous behavior indicates that a
Sailor or Marine is unable or unwilling to conduct
himself /herself appropriately ashore, the Commanding Officer
(CO) has the authority and responsibility to limit or cancel the
member's liberty by placing him/her in a liberty risk status.
4. Referral for Liberty Risk Consideration. All departments,
squadrons and embarked staffs will submit liberty risk
nominations 30 days before deployment to the Liberty Risk Board
(LRB) via the Legal Department using enclosure (1) . LRB will be
held prior to deployment to assess whether members pose a
liberty risk and to recommend a liberty class assignment (A, B,
or C) . Only the least severe limitation on liberty necessary to
prevent discrediting conduct ashore will be imposed. LRB will
be held approximately three days prior to each subsequent port
visit when new referrals will be reviewed and members previously
placed on liberty risk may be considered for category upgrade or
removal from liberty risk.
5. Composition of LRB. The THEODORE ROOSEVELT and Carrier Air
Wing SEVENTEEN (CVW 17) Command Master Chiefs (CMDCMs) will co¬
chair the board. One Master Chief Petty Officer from CVN-71 and
one CVW-17 squadron CMDCM will make-up the remainder of the
board. Other leaders such as the Command Drug and Alcohol
Program Advisor (DAPA) or Command Climate Specialist may attend
as appropriate to advise the board. A representative of
THEODORE ROOSEVELT'S Legal Department will be present for
administrative purposes.
6. LRB Considerations. The following factors will be
considered in determining whether a member is referred to LRB:
a. Any alcohol-related incidents in the last 6 months or
any driving under the influence (DUI) in the last 12 months.
b. NJP in the last year, specifically incidents involving
alcohol, theft, belligerence to authorities or members pending
administrative separation.
c. Current participation in mandatory substance abuse
and/or alcohol abuse aftercare program.
TRNOTE 1050
CVW17NOTE 1050
23 Aug 17
d. Any prior violent incidents such as domestic violence,
assaults, fighting or other episodes caused by anger control
problems .
e. Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) history, trend of
problems or significant negative counseling that would indicate
difficulty with authority or following orders.
f. Unauthorized absence to include returning after
expiration of liberty and/or missing ship's movement -
g. Any port visit misconduct in the past, to include:
(1) Disrespect to local cultures, customs and
traditions .
{2) Failure to obey shore patrol, security or beach
guard .
(3) Conduct embarrassing to the United States.
(4) Uniform or civilian attire violations.
h. Failure to pay personal debts.
i. Other incidents which involve military or civilian
authorities or local civilians which may bring discredit upon
the armed forces or the United States.
7. Classes of Liberty Risk and LRB Procedures. The board will
review all nominations with the goal of ensuring that a uniform
standard of liberty risk category assignment is made across all
participating commands and will provide clear commentary on any
disparities in recommendations.
a. Class "A" Liberty Risk. Personnel who have demonstrated
behavior indicating an elevated likelihood of improper conduct
while on liberty. Personnel may not have any liberty escorts
who are also on liberty risk. At least one escort must be an E-
5 or above, but in no case junior to the person. Class "A"
liberty risk personnel are prohibited from purchasing, consuming
or possessing any alcoholic beverages. Furthermore, they may
not be present in any establishment which provides alcohol as
its primary business (e.g., bars, clubs, etc.).
3
H-3-78
TRNOTE 1050
CVW17NOTE 1050
23 Aug 17
Their liberty will expire onboard at 2100 or one hour prior to
the normal liberty expiration time for E-3 and below, whichever
is earlier.
b. Class ”B" Liberty Risk. Personnel who have demonstrated
behavior indicating a significant likelihood of improper conduct
themselves while on liberty. Personnel may not have any liberty
escort who are also on liberty risk. At least one escort must
be an E-6 or above, but in no case junior to the person. Class
"B" liberty risk personnel are prohibited from purchasing,
consuming or possessing any alcoholic beverages. Furthermore,
they may not be present in any establishment which provides
alcohol as its primary business (e.g., bars, clubs, etc.).
Their liberty will expire onboard at 1800 or two hours prior to
the normal liberty expiration time for E-3 and below, whichever
is earlier.
c. Class ”C" Liberty Risk. Individuals who have
demonstrated an inability to conduct themselves appropriately
while ashore and have a high likelihood of a liberty incident.
Personnel assigned to this category will not have liberty
ashore .
d. Personnel being processed for administrative separation
due to misconduct will automatically be assigned as Class "C"
and will remain in Class "C" status until discharged.
e. After the board completes its recommendations, it will
forward them, along with its comments, to the CO and Commander,
Carrier Air Wing (CAG) as applicable for approval via enclosures
(1) and (2). The Legal Department shall then promulgate
enclosure (4) of approved liberty risk personnel to THEODORE
ROOSEVELT/CVW-17 Administrative Department, Security and the
Senior Shore Patrol Officer.
8. Authority to Assign Liberty Risk. Only the ship and
squadron CO's have the authority to formally assign liberty risk
status to assigned personnel- However, in the event that a
member commits misconduct during a foreign port visit, the
member will be returned to the ship in the custody of a Beach
Guard member or the senior person in the liberty boat/bus.
4
H-3-78
TRNOTE 1050
CVW17NOTE 1050
23 Aug 17
Authorization to temporarily curtail the liberty of that member
until a formal liberty risk determination can be made is
delegated to:
a. THEODORE ROOSEVELT Executive Officer (XO) .
b. Deputy Commander, Carrier Air Wing SEVENTEEN (DCAG) .
c. Squadrons CO's.
d. Command Duty Officer (CDO) .
e. Air Wing Duty Officer (AWDO) .
f. Senior Shore Patrol Officer.
g. The member will not be permitted to re-commence liberty
ashore until a proper liberty risk determination is made at the
next LRB or authorized by the CO or CAG. Ordinarily, a LRB will
not be held until the ship is underway.
9 . Administration of Liberty Risk Personnel
a. THEODORE ROOSEVELT'S Legal Department shall maintain a
running list of those personnel assigned to liberty risk
categories. Copies of the liberty risk list shall be
distributed to the CO, XO, Head of Departments {HODs), CVW-17
Administrative Department, embarked squadrons and Chief Master-
at-Arms and will be included in the CDO's turnover.
b. Personnel designated as liberty risks will be notified
by THEODORE ROOSEVELT'S Legal Department to execute enclosure
(2), Liberty Risk Designation.
10 . Mustering Liberty Risk Personnel
a. Class "A" liberty risk personnel will sign-out with
their Departmental Duty Officer (DDO) or Squadron Duty Officer
(SDO) prior to commencing liberty. Class "A" liberty risk
personnel will muster daily in-port with their DDO or SDO at
2100.
b. Class "B" liberty risk personnel will sign-out with
their DDO or SDO prior to commencing liberty.
TRNOTE 1050
CVW17NOTE 1050
23 Aug 17
Class "B" liberty risk personnel will muster daily in-port with
their DDO or SDO at 1800.
c. After checking out with their respective
department/command. Class "A" and ”B" liberty risk personnel
will then report to Security Dispatch with their liberty escorts
to sign out on the liberty log. Immediately upon completion of
liberty, they are required to report back to Security Dispatch
to sign in on the liberty log and be subject to a breathalyzer
before reporting to their department /command.
d. Class "C" liberty risk personnel will muster daily in
port with their DDO/SDO at 0700, 2100 and at one other time as
randomly determined by the DDO/SDO.
e. Any violation of liberty risk orders shall be reported
in writing to the THEODORE ROOSEVELT'S Legal Department.
11. Escort Duties. For members placed in Class "A" or "B"
liberty risk status, DDOs and SDOs will verify the escort's
acknowledgement of their duties using enclosure (2) and
enclosure (3). The escort must remain with the Class "A" or "B"
liberty risk member at all times. After the escort returns the
liberty risk member to the ship, the escort can return to
regular liberty provided they still have the requisite number of
liberty buddies. Changing escorts while on liberty is not
permitted. Both the escort and the liberty risk member are
prohibited from consuming alcohol. Assignment as a liberty risk
escort is purely voluntary. Liberty buddies will not be
required on supervised Community Relations (COMREL) projects
or command sponsored functions, where members depart and return
to the ship as a group. MWR tours and trips have the same
liberty buddy requirements.
12 . Review of Liberty Risk Status
a. Each person placed on liberty risk will be promptly
notified of the fact and the basis for the status. The
individual may be afforded an opportunity to discuss the reasons
6
H-3-78
TRNOTE 1050
CVW17NOTE 1050
23 Aug 17
for this assignment with the CO or CAG, via the chain of
command.
b. Liberty risk status should be reviewed prior to each
overseas port visit. An individual may be moved to a more
lenient classif ication or be removed from the program at any
time by the CO. Reconsideration shall be reserved for only the
most extraordinary cases.
c. Personnel who have maintained the same class of liberty
risk for two consecutive in-port periods following the one for
which they were originally placed on liberty risk, shall be
moved to the next more lenient classification or restored to
general liberty privileges, unless there is convincing evidence
that the service member will commit further misconduct if his or
r _ lihertv privileges are upgraded or res tL _
(b) (6)
Commander
Comma
Df ficer
Distribution:
Sharepoint
7
H-3-78
TRNOTE 1050
CVW17NOTE 1050
23 Aug 17
LIBERTY RISK NOMINATION FORM
NOMINEE NAME;
RANK/RATE:
DEPT/SQDN;
LIBERTY RISK RECC»4MENDATION
DATE;
(NORMAL LIBERTY) (A)
(B) (C)
REASON FOR NOMINATION:
The purpose of the liberty risk program is to protect the foreign
relations between the United States and the host nation. Any conduct
forming the basis for a liberty risk designation must have a reasonable
nexus to this purpose.
DATE:
LIBERTY RISK BOARD RECOMMENDATION
(NORMAL LIBERTY) (A)
(B) (C)
COMMENTS :
CHAIRMAN, LIBERTY RISK BOARD
COMMANDING OFFICER'S DETERMINATION
DATE ;
(NORMAL LIBERTY) (A)
(B) (C)
COMMANDING OFFICER (OR DESIGNEE)
H-3-78
Enclosure (1)
TRNOTE 1050
CVW17NOTE 1050
23 Aug 17
CLASS LIBERTY RISK DESIGNATION
From: COS/Ship/Squadron CO/CAG
To: Rate, Full Name, USN
Subj: CLASS "A" LIBERTY RISK DESIGNATION
1. After careful review by the Liberty Risk Board, it has been
determined that your past conduct warrants your designation as a CLASS
"A" LIBERTY RISK during the next foreign port visit.
2. You are prohibited from purchasing, consuming or possessing any
alcoholic beverage for the duration of your liberty risk designation.
Furthermore, you may not be present in any establishment which
provides alcohol as its primary business (e.g., bars, clubs, etc.},
3. You must adhere to the liberty escort system. One of your liberty
buddies must be a command approved E5 and above (but in no case junior
to you) . You are required to sign in and out of the Liberty Log
located in Security Dispatch, Your liberty expires at 2100 or one
hour prior to the normal liberty expiration time for E-3 and below,
whichever is earlier. You are additionally required to muster daily
at 2100 with your DDO or SDO.
4. This designation will remain in effect until you are informed
otherwise. Your designation will be reviewed by the Liberty Risk
Review Board prior to the next port visit. Failure to comply with the
above order may subject you to disciplinary or administrative actions.
COS/SQUADRON/SHIP CO/CAG
I understand that I am in a liberty risk status and that I must abide
by the rules set forth in the designation letter, I also understand
that failure to comply could result in adverse administrative and/or
disciplinary action.
Member's Signature/Date
I understand that by signing as the liberty escort for the above
listed Sailor that I will perform the liberty escort duties as
described in TR/CVW17NOTE 1050 paragraph (11). I also understand that
failure to comply could result in adverse administrative and/or
disciplinary action.
Liberty Escort Printed Rate/Name Signature/Date
H-3-78
Enclosure (2)
TRNOTE 1050
CVW17NOTE 1050
23 Aug 17
From: COS/Ship/Squadron CO/CAG
To; Rate, Full Name, USN
Subj : CLASS "B" LIBERTY RISK DESIGNATION
1. After careful review by the Liberty Risk Board, it has been
determined that your past conduct warrants your designation as a CLASS
”B" LIBERTY RISK during the next foreign port visit.
2. You are prohibited from purchasing, consuming or possessing any
alcoholic beverage for the duration of your liberty risk designation.
Furthermore, you may not be present in any establishment which
provides alcohol as its primary business (e.g., bars, clubs, etc.) for
the duration of your liberty risk designation.
3. One of your liberty buddies must be a command approved E6 or above
(but in no case junior to you) . You are required to sign in and out
of the Liberty Log located in Security Dispatch. Your liberty expires
at 1800 or two hours prior to the normal liberty expiration time for
E-3 and below, whichever is earlier. You are additionally required to
muster daily at 1800 with your DDO or SDO.
4. This designation will remain in effect until you are informed
otherwise. Your designation will be reviewed by the Liberty Risk
Review Board prior to the next port visit. Failure to comply with the
above order may subject you to disciplinary or administrative actions.
COS/SQUADRON/SHIP CO/CAG
I understand that I am in a liberty risk status and that I must abide
by the rules set forth in the designation letter. I also understand
that failure to comply could result in adverse administrative and/or
disciplinary action.
Member's Signature/Date
I understand that by signing as the liberty escort for the above
listed Sailor that I will perform the liberty escort duties as
described in TR/CVW17NOTE 1050 paragraph (11) . I also understand that
failure to comply could result in adverse administrative and/or
disciplinary action.
Liberty Escort Printed Rate/Name Signature/Date
2
H-3-78
Enclosure (2)
TRNOTE 1050
CVW17NOTE 1050
23 Aug 17
From: COS /Ship/Squadron CO/CAG
To: Rate, Full Name, USN
Subj : CLASS "C" LIBERTY RISK DESIGNATION
1. After careful review by the Liberty Risk Board, it has been
determined that your past conduct warrants your designation as a CLASS
«C" LIBERTY RISK during the next foreign port visit.
2. You are not authorized liberty ashore. While inport you will
muster daily with the DDO/SDO at 0700 and 2100 in the uniform of the
day-
3. This designation will remain in effect until you are informed
otherwise. Your designation will be reviewed by the Liberty Risk
Review Board prior to the next port visit. Failure to comply with the
above order may subject you to disciplinary or administrative actions.
COS/SQUADRON/SHIP CO/CAG
I understand that I am in a liberty risk status and that I must muster
as indicated above. I also understand that failure to comply could
result in adverse administrative and/or disciplinary action.
Member's Signature/Date
3
H-3-78
Enclosure (2)
TRNOTE 1050
CVW17NOTE 1050
23 Aug 17
GENERAL ORDER 17-01: LIBERTY BUDDY DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1. Purpose. To establish duties and responsibilities of liberty
buddies for TRSG deployment .
2. Authority. Uniform Code of Military Justice; U.S, Navy
Regulations, 1990, Chapter 7.
3 . Background
a. The "buddy system" is in effect at all times during port
visits. It promotes safety, good behavior, and is an important
force protection risk management tool. The buddy system mandates
that all TRSG Sailors identify individuals with whom they will spend
their time off the ship on liberty. At a minimum, the buddy system
requires liberty buddies to sign out /sign in together and remain
with each other while they are on liberty. This order promulgates
the mutual duty for liberty buddies to ensure each other's safety,
welfare, and appropriate behavior.
b. The buddy system is also a crucial enabler to the Navy's
mission to conduct successful foreign port visits. Foreign port
visits not only promote strong morale and readiness of our military
forces, but they also foster goodwill and positive relations with
host nations - setting the foundation for cooperative relationships
with foreign communities and governments. Buddy system misconduct
by Service members overseas undermines those efforts and jeopardizes
foreign relations.
4. Action. TRSG personnel have the duty and obligation to ensure
the safety, welfare, and appropriate behavior of their liberty
buddies .
a. TRSG personnel have a duty to take all appropriate and
reasonable measures, as defined below, to ensure the safety,
welfare, and appropriate behavior of all liberty buddies. In the
event liberty buddies begin to behave inappropriately, TRSG Sailors
are required to take positive action to ensure that the
inappropriate conduct ceases. TRSG Sailors shall not use physical
force against liberty buddies at any time.
b. If physical restraint is required, TRSG Sailors should seek
assistance from on-duty master-at-arms, shore patrol, or local or
host nation law enforcement officials. Although it is
impossible to list each example of when and how one must take
action to prevent inappropriate behavior by liberty buddies, TRSG
Sailors must take reasonable measures to prevent excessive
H-3-78
Enclosure (3)
TRNOTE 1050
CVW17NOTE 1050
23 Aug 17
consumption of alcohol, altercations with civilians in U.S.
territories and host nations, and violations of local laws or the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) .
c. What constitutes "reasonable measures" will depend on the
specific circumstances. Reasonable measures include but are not
limited to:
(1) Monitoring and, if necessary, limiting the alcohol
consumption of a liberty buddy.
(2) At the first indication of inappropriate behavior,
verbally counseling the offending liberty buddy to behave
appropriately.
(3) Returning to the ship with the liberty buddy if they
become or are becoming intoxicated.
(4) If a TRSG Sailor is unable to persuade the offending
liberty buddy to behave appropriately, seek assistance from another
Sailor, shore patrol, or law enforcement. TRSG personnel should
never be required to use physical force to control a liberty buddy.
(5) Under no circumstances are TRSG personnel permitted to
become separated from designated liberty buddies while ashore. If a
TRSG Sailor becomes separated from their liberty buddy for any
reason, or if a TRSG Sailor is abandoned, they must notify shore
patrol and their chain of command as soon as possible and return to
the ship.
d. TRSG personnel have the duty and obligation to adhere to all
liberty policies.
(1) Failure to exercise reasonable care and take positive
action as described above to ensure the safety, welfare, and
appropriate conduct of a liberty buddy is a violation of this order.
(2) Under the authority of the UCMJ and U.S. Navy
Regulations, 1990, Chapter 7, this order is punitive in nature.
Violations of this order may result in punitive and/or
administrative action.
2
H-3-78
Enclosure (3)
ADMINISTRATIVE REMARKS
NAVPERS 1070/613 (REV. 08-2012)
SHIP OR STATION
Ref: (a) COMCARSTRKGRUNINE NOTICE 1050 (Overseas Liberty Policy for FIFTH/SEVENTH Fleet)
(b) USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT(CVN 71)/CARRIER WING SEVENTEEN NOTICE 1050 (Liberty Risk Program)
_ I have been briefed and understand that I have a positive duty to take all reasonable measures to prevent
inappropriate behavior by my liberty buddies, to include: the excessive consumption of alcohol, altercations with local
citizens, and violations of local laws or the Unifonn Code of Military Justice, lam not, however, required to use physical
force against my liberty buddies at any time. If physical restraint is required, 1 will seek assistance from the Ship’s Liaison
Group, Shore Patrol, Beach Guard, .security, or Law Enforcement ofTicials. What constitutes reasonable measures will depend
on the specillc circumstances, and includes but is not limited to:
(1) Monitoring and, if necessary, limiting the alcohol consumption of my liberty buddies.
(2) Returning to the ship with my liberty buddies if they have had too much to drink.
(3) At the first indication of inappropriate behavior, verbally counseling the offending liberty buddy to behave
appropriately.
(4) If I am unable to persuade my offending liberty buddy to behave appropriately, I will seek assistance
from another Sailor, Ship’s Liaison Group, Shore Patrol, or law enforcement.
(5) Staying with my buddy at all times. If my liberty buddies abandon me. or if we become separated for any
rea.son, I will notify the Ship’s Liaison Group, Shore Patrol, and my Chain of Command as .soon as possible.
(6) Making a plan. 1 will plan what I want to do with my liberty buddies, plan how we will get back to the ship,
and stick with the plan. I acknowledge that failing to plan is planning to fail.
1 understand that when 1 go ashore in a foreign country, I am a representative of our Navy and Nation. TRSG’s
succe.ssfttl visits to these ports play an important part m building cooperative relationships with foreign communities governments
and are a key element of our national security.
_ I understand that misconduct by service members in foreign ports undermines these efforts, undennines our fighting
strength, and jeopardizes foreign relations. At the same time, we must protect each other from the very real threat of terrorism and
local criminal elements while on liberty overseas.
_ 1 have been briefed and understand that when interacting with civilians, local nationals, e.xpatriates, or third
country nationals, 1 must remember OPSEC. I will not discu,ss any details of TRSG movements, mission, capabilities, numbers of
personnel, ships or aircraft, future operations or port calls.
I have been briefed and understand the applicable liberty policies for the FIFTH and SEVENTH Fleet Area of
Operations, including the dress code, prohibited activities, and off-limils locations.
Member's Signature
_ I hereby acknowledge the above NAVPERS 1070/613 entry and understand that failure to obey this
lawful general order could subject me to administrative and/or disciplinary actions as a violation of Article 92, Unifonn
Code of Military Justice.
Member’s Signature/Date Witness Signature/Datc
NA.ME (Last, First, Middle) SSN BRANCH AND CL,\SS
H-3-78
Enclosure (3)
TRNOTE 1050
CVW17NOTE 1050
23 Aug 17
LIBERTY RISK ASSIGNMENT
CLASS ALPHA |
Rank
Name
Departmenl:
Current
Category
Previous
Category
Date
Justification
CLASS BRAVO |
Rank
Neuoe
Departaoen't
Current
Category
Previous
Category
Date
Justification
j CLASS
CHARLIE
Rank
Name
Department
Current
Category
Previous
Category
Date
Justification
_
Enclosure (4)
H-3-78
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT {CVN 7 1 )
UNITHXGSO BOX)
AP 96632
5500
3 Mar 20
MEMORANDUM
From: Commanding Officer, USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71)
To: Officer of the Deck, In-Port
Subj : LIBERTY RISK FOR DA NANG, VIETNAM - MARCH 2020
Ref: (a) TRNOTE 1 050 dtd 1 2 Feb 2020
End: ( 1 ) List of No Alcohol, Liberty Risk, and Restricted Personnel
1 . The individuals listed in enclosure (1 ) are on Alpha, Bravo, or Charlie Liberty Risk, have
been issued No Alcohol Letters (NAL), or are on restriction,
2. Per reference (a), none of the personnel listed in enclosure (1 ) are permitted to purchase,
consume, or possess alcohol while in port. Other restrictions are as follows:
a. Restricted Personnel: Restricted personnel are not authorized to leave the ship.
b. Class Charlie: Personnel on Class Charlie are not permitted to go on liberty. They are only
authorized to transit to and from Fleet Landing in their dress white uniform. They must be escorted
by an E-6 or above, who in no case may be junior to them. Class Charlie personnel must be back
onboard the ship no later than 1 600.
c. Class Bravo: Personnel on Class Bravo are permitted to go on liberty. They must be
escorted by an E-6 or above, who in no case may be junior to them. Class Brave personnel must be
back onboard the ship no later than 1800.
d. Class Alpha: Personnel on Class Alpha Bravo are permitted to go on liberty. They must be
escorted by an E-5 or above, who in no case may be junior to them. Class Alpha personnel must be
back onboard the ship no later than 2 1 00.
e. No Alcohol Letter: Personnel who have been issued a NAL may go on liberty free of any
additional restrictions, but are not permitted to purchase, consume, or possess alcohol while in port.
3. Anym^tion^erlaining to this issue should be referred to the Command Judge Advocate,
LCDR|®®^"'m| JAGC, USN at(b) (P) l@cvn7X.navv.mil or^*^^^
(b) (6)
B. E.^ROZI^
(bTfoy
H-3-78
FOR OFFIQAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
Witness Statement of USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71)
Reactor Officer
On 1 1 May 2020 I was interviewed in connection with a command investigation concerning
chain of command actions with regard to COVID-19 onboard USS THEODORE
ROOSEVELT (CVN 71) via telephone.
What follows is a true and accurate representation of my statement for this investigation.
Witness Name: CAPT^*^^^ _ Position: Reactor Officer
Command: USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT Department/Division: Reactor
Email Address:pi
vBcvn71.navv.mil Phone(s)p? W
Prior to our pulling into Da Nang we were in normal operations because we did not have a
positive case onboard. We had lots of discussions at HOD meetings about how to operate in a
COVID environment. There was a scheduled reception on the ship, but the was talk of
cancelling it because of worries about the virus and the logistics of properly screening people.
Once we pulled into Da Nang we began actively screening people using a questionnaire.
Because of the COVID testing protocols all Sailors were told to provide extra time on the pier to
get back on the ship.
After we left Da Nang, there were some changes onboard following the report that 39 Sailors
that may have been exposed because they were staying in a hotel where there may have been
some COVID exposure. One measure was that those potentially infected people were moved to
different berthing. It was very chaotic. There was a lot of training and talks to the crew about
reporting symptoms and washing your hands, not to touch your face. We did not have face
masks yet. We were already bleaching the ship twice a day as a result of a bad case of “double
dragon” prior to the Da Nang port visit and continued doing so as a precaution. There was talk
about social distancing and spreading out but it was mostly written off because with the berthing
filled to 90% capacity, not much we could done.
After we had the positive cases of COVID-19 onboard there was a hard push for social
distancing. One of the things they started to do was put tape down in the chow line, but 1 would
still see Sailors together, khakis would walk around and tell them to stay 6ft apart but as soon as
they would leave the Sailors would start grouping together again.
There was a lot of talk about COVID prevention since February. SMO was really pushing it at
meetings and in emails; XO would be on the 1 MC daily telling people to wash their hands, don’t
touch their face, it was discussed frequently at the HoD meetings.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
H-3-79
FOR OFFiQAL USE ONLY // PRIVAGT SENSITIVE
Subj: Witness Statement of USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71) Reactor Officer
After the 24"’ of March when we had our first positive case, things got chaotic; we were going
through what seemed like hundreds of COAs, like go to Yokosuka even though we could not go
there because the only pier we could go to was already occupied by a CVN there (REAGAN).
Again 1 admit things are a little fuzzy in my memory about that time, because we were going
through RF Is 24/7. We would start one COA, then work through the info just to have to start
another one, the time from 24 to 27 March are a blur since I didn’t get a lot of sleep. We knew
we needed to get people off the ship, but even after we arrived in Guam there were still requests
for COA development. 1 would say it was about triple of the COAs I am usually asked for, the
flippancy of it all was fhistrating.
Luckily the climate among the HoDs was the best 1 have ever seen. I have been aboard for two
years, I have seen three sets of HoDs in some cases and this group got along the best. The XO
was the hammer and we supported him. Regarding CSG-9, until 1 forced ourselves into the
“Bubba’s” meeting 1 was clueless on a lot of the CSG planning (and a lot of things didn’t make
sense or were very last minute) - once 1 did, we worked well with the Strike Group staff Either
1 or the Assistant Reactor Officer sat in on the “Bubbas” meeting to evaluate the impact on my
ability to run drills and maintenance or what required speed was needed to transit for future
tasking.
Both reactors were up without any issues as we went into Guam.
1 have a very good relationship with Naval Reactors, an open relationship. Thye had some RFls
about watch station mitigations. We talked about pulling people from other ships if we needed
to, we were very protective of a core team of senior watch supervisors in the event we needed
them to lead others in the specific of our plants. We provided a list of everyone we would need
to get the ship underway, the questions was where to send the 230 people? They ended up going
to the gym on base. 1 got very concerned because the Reactor personnel at the gym were getting
one or two positive cases a day for COVID. They were sleeping on cots that were barely 6 feet
apart, people were not able to social distance any better than they could on the ship. If the rate of
infection continued, I knew that we would not be able to re-man the department in a timely
maimer. This was 30 March, the day of the letter. I was concerned and went to the CO and said
we may need to send a special letter to the Admiral, CAPT Crozier asked me to speak to the
TYCOM N9. (A CO writes a periodic letter to the Admiral to relay any concerns, normally
every 3 months, but if there is something pressing, a “special” letter may be written.) N9 told me
a letter will go through his staff and the Admiral may not read it for a week and that an email is
better and faster. I then read the letter that tlie CO, XO and ship’s secretary were drafting (the
letter that was later released). I drafted a ghost email for the CO on SIPR, and 1 have forwarded
this Email to the VCNO inspection team. The CO sent the email to the TYCOM N9 later that
day.
In closing 1 want to stress that March 24*'’ to the 27"’ were a blur to me; I got little sleep, there
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
H-3-79
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
Subj: Witness Statement of USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71) Reactor Officer
were so many RFIs and COAs being discussed that required input and there was a feeling that
people were not receptive to any of the information that we were providing.
I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above is true and accurate to the best of
my knowledge, information, and belief.
204-0
(Date) Time
Wff)
(w ifness 'Signature)
3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
H-3-79
H-3-79
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Attachmeirts:
LCDR USN. USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Crozier. Brett E CART USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt
CART USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt: g]
RE: TRSG RTQ
Tuesday, March 24, 2020 3:32:16 AM
200324 TRSG Positive COVID IMC Remarks.docx
200324 Letter to the Family I CO Capt. - C19 (21.docx
CMC USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt
Captain,
Attached are updated talking points for the IMC this evening. I added
additional Public Affairs concerns to the remarks.
Also attached is a letter to the families that I'm going to vet through C7F
and CPF public affairs to ensure we can send to our team of strike group
ombudsman tonight before we go out of rivercity.
Very respectfully.
LCDR I
Public Affairs Officer
Carrier Strike Group NINE
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
Offic^m J
Celh p) (6) ^
PIB)
@cvn71 navy.(smil) mil
JDi^b) [
Hydrajb) ]
- Original Message -
From: LCDR USN, USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 2:49 PM
To: Crozier, Brett E CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
Cc: CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt; p) (Bj)
USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
Subject: RE: TRSG RTQ
CMC
Captain,
Attached is the CCSG-9 approved RTQ (with C7E and CPE for final approval).
Additionally attached are draft IMC remarks for this evening. Working on the
draft letter for the families.
Very respectfully.
LCDR I
Public Affairs Qfficer
Carrier Strike Group NINE
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
QfficeJ
CelhiP) (6)
3) |@cvn71 navy.(smil) mil
H-3-80
JDiah]^)
Hydrato
- Original Message -
From: |[g) (6) ^ LCDR USN, USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 10:40 AM
To: Crozier, Brett E CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt; |[5) (6)
'(6)
Cc:
USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
Subject: TRSG RTQ
CMC
Captain,
I still need SMO's chop but wanted you to see what I've drafted so far for C7P
and PACFLT based on guidance put out previously from CHINPO. PACPLT will have
lead for external communication. Once this is finalized. I'll work on a
briefing card spedifically for communication with our families/ombudsmen.
Also working IMC remarks as well.
Very respectfully.
LCDR I
Public Affairs Officer
Carrier Strike Group NINE
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
Offic^
CellJ) (6)
|b) (6) @cvn71 navy. (smil) mil
JDMilb) [
Hydra^b) ]
H-3-80
Good Evening Rough Riders,
Fantastic job by our bridge watch standers that supported our
third PHOTOEX with the America ARG and 7^^ Fleet Flag ship,
USS Blue Ridge, along with the bridge team and air, deck and
supply departments that supported the RAS this afternoon. Two
major evolutions in one day is no easy task and you all knocked
it out of the park!
On a more serious note, I want to take a few minutes to address
some events that occurred over the last 24 hours. I’m sure many
of you have walked by Medical today and wondered why they
are closed.
Yesterday evening, two Sailors did the right thing and went to
medical stating they were experiencing flu-like symptoms.
The two Sailors were tested by our embarked Naval Medical
Research Center team that joined us after Vietnam, and this
morning the results of the tests indicated positive for
coronavirus or what is officially known as, COVID-19.
Both Sailors have been placed in isolation and we are
coordinating flying those Sailors off ship as soon as we are
within COD range to Guam, which could be as soon as
tomorrow.
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As always my number one concern is the health and safety of
every Rough Rider and Sailor onboard and I want to reassure
you that we are taking all the precautions available to a large
city afloat in attempts to mitigate the spread of the virus
onboard.
- As I mentioned before we have a medical team embarked
with us to help with testing of possible COVID-19 cases.
- We have antiseptic wipes and hand sanitizer throughout the
ship, especially in workspaces, mess decks, common areas
and tool issue.
- We have secured self-serve on the mess decks, CPO Mess
and Wardrooms.
- We are limiting dental services onboard.
- And starting this evening we are going to increase how
often we are wiping down surfaces with bleach. We will
continue with XO’s bleachapalooza every morning but now
in the evening during sweepers we are going to repeat the
process.
Myself and leadership onboard will continue to do everything in
our power to ensure the health and safety of everyone onboard
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continues to be the top priority as we re-evaluate future
operations for the ship.
In return I ask for your support in going to sick call in the
morning should you have respiratory symptoms which include
fever, chills, cough, sore throat or shortness of breath.
And I need your support for bleachapalooza and washing your
hands throughout the day.
Lastly, I ask that you remember that you represent our ship and
the Navy. We need to be respectful of our shipmates in isolation
so be mindful of the information you send off ship.
While leadership supports you keeping in touch with family and
love ones, we ask that you and your family do not engage with
the media. As many of you are already aware, those back at
home are already dealing with heightened tensions and anxiety
due to ongoing media coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic, we
do not need to add it. We also do not need our adversaries
knowing either.
However, if you or your family is contacted by media, please
refer them to our Public Affairs Officer onboard.
As always. . . keep an eye on your shipmates, your head on a
swivel and be ready for the fight tonight.
H-3-80
Captain out.
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To our family and friends,
Hello again from aboard 'America's Big Stick', the mighty TR. As you can imagine in the dynamic world
within which we all live, your Sailors commitment to ensure the safety and security of our Nation is on
display to the world. Even with difficulties at home, knowing we have your support and you have ours,
provides the foundation for our continued success at sea, and is the framework for our homecoming
once our mission is complete.
We just wrapped up our third evolution of expeditionary strike operations with the America
Expeditionary Strike Group and our Sailors continue to go above and beyond with any tasking we are
given from Fleet commanders. I am proud to serve alongside your loved ones across the Strike Group.
Each day, they conduct themselves as the professional Sailors they are; focused, committed and
determined to see the mission through to the end. Thank you for being the support they need at home
in order for them to perform at their peak out here.
As the Captain, it's important for me to maintain an open dialogue with the families and the friends of
the Sailors I have been entrusted to lead and I wanted you to hear from me an update to the last letter I
sent when we left Vietnam. Yesterday evening, two Sailors did the right and brave thing, reporting to
medical stating they were experiencing flu-like symptoms.
The two Sailors were tested by our embarked Naval Medical Research Center team that joined us after
Vietnam, and this morning the results of the tests indicated positive results for coronavirus (COVID-19).
Both Sailors have been placed in isolation in accordance with the Center for Disease Control and we are
coordinating flying those Sailors off ship as soon as we are logistically able to, which could be as soon as
tomorrow.
Your Sailors remain our number one priority and we are doing everything we can to ensure they remain
healthy so we can continue to accomplish our mission out here in the Western Pacific and return them
to you again safely. We are continuing aggressive precautions to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. Our
world-class medical department is working around the clock, screening any Sailor that reports feeling ill,
as well as sanitizing the ship on a regular basis.
Since the ship's last port visit in Vietnam, we have been following an aggressive mitigation strategy to
minimize spread of coronavirus and protect the health of our force. The mitigation efforts included the
following:
• The ship's medical team onboard monitored Sailors with respiratory symptoms and those Sailors
who transferred to the ship following the port visit daily for 11 days.
• Verbal screening of all Sailors. Each department onboard asked all Sailors if they were
experiencing any flu-like symptoms.
• Ship personnel conduct deep cleaning of ship with bleach on a daily basis.
• Antiseptic wipes and hand sanitizer were placed throughout the ship, particularly in workspaces
near computers, mess decks, common areas, and tool issue.
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• The ship secured self-serve on the mess decks, CPO Mess, and Wardroom.
• A medical augment team from Biological Defense Research Directorate from Fort Detrick, MD
embarked the ship following the port visit. This team has the ability to test Sailors onboard who
present influenza-like illness symptoms. This capability provides early-warning surveillance for
the medical teams to be able to identify if a COVID-19 case is onboard a ship - as they did in our
two current cases onboard.
Immediately following the positive results from the two Sailors onboard, we additionally implemented:
• Limited services offered by the onboard dental department.
• Testing has be conducted for all the Sailors who were in close contact with the two infected
Sailors and half of the tests will be sent over to the USS America to load share and increase
throughput.
• Continued verbal screenings of all Sailors. Each department onboard will ask all Sailors if they
are experiencing any flu-like symptoms.
• An additional Preventive Medicine Officer and Preventive Medical Tech will be joining us from
USS America. They will be able to assist the current Preventive Medical team onboard in
contact tracing, quarantine, etc.
Please remember that you are an integral part of our Navy Team. You represent our ship, your Sailor
and our Navy. There can be a lot of inaccurate information out there so, if you are contacted by external
media, please refer them to our public affairs team onboard atpH@cvn71.navy.mil .
Sailors are our top priority and we will do everything we can to keep them safe. Each day your Sailors
provide our Navy Team something to be proud of, and in the most challenging times that does not
change! I remain in awe and count it a privilege to serve with, beside and to lead such a distinguished
group of military leaders.
Very Respectfully,
Capt. Brett Crozier
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LCDR USN NAVCIVLAWSUPPACT DC (USA)
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Attachments:
CDR USN, C7F <fb)(P) I
2020 2:20 PM
JSN, USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT
FW: Proposed statement
200325-TRSG-Postive-COVID-RTQ aR Update).docx
Thursdav. Ma
IBTWI “
rch 26,
LCDR
@lcc19.navy.mil
>
Importance:
High
Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged
You were on this, sorry for the wake-up.
CPF is looking for details on your mitigation strategy, from your PAG:
Surveillance testing of three Sailors conducted on March 24 was indicative
of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). The individuals were isolated in
accordance with the Center for Disease Control and Prevention Guidelines
until the Sailors could be flown off the ship.
Shipboard health professionals conducted a thorough contact investigation to
determine whether any other Sailors may have been in close contact and
possibly exposed. Those Sailors have been placed in quarantine berthing for
further evaluation.
Since the ship's port visit, the ship has been following an aggressive
mitigation strategy to minimize spread of respiratory viruses and protect
the health of our force. The mitigation efforts included the following:
The ship's medical team onboard monitored Sailors with respiratory
symptoms and those Sailors who transferred to the ship following the port
visit daily.
. Ship personnel conduct deep cleaning of ship with HTH (bleach) on a
twice daily basis.
Antiseptic wipes and hand sanitizer are located throughout the ship,
particularly in workspaces near computers, mess decks, common areas, and
tool issue.
The ship secured self-serve on the mess decks, CPO Mess, and
Wardroom.
Also, please look at below and let me know if this is accurate, and what
else you can say about testing, quarantine and isolation. If you have
details on where isolation will take place please let me know. Call me when
you get this. Sorry!
1
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V/R,
apr+m
Public Affairs Officer
U.S. Seventh Fleet
DSN:PW’
COMjlb) (6)
INT:p) (6)
- Original Message
From
CAPT USN COMPACFLT (USA) [mailto
l@navy.mil]
Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 2:26 AM
To:Gt))(e)
CDR USN, C7F ^(!5rW^^H^@lccl9.navy.mil>; (b) (6)
LT USN, C7F (P)
@lccl9.navy.mil>;p) (PJ
LT
@lccl9.navy.mil>
CDR USN COMPACFLT (USA) <^W
LCDR USN, USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT'
@cvn71.navy.mil>
@navy.mil>;
Subject: RE: Proposed statement
Reann, Call me immediately. RDML wants me to work directly with the ship for
a tasking to CPF, so I am bringing you in first. This train is moving fast.
0
From: Brown, Charles W RDML USN (USA)
Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2020 7:14 AM _
To: Gilday, Michael M ADM USN CNO (USA)
Robert P ADM USN VCNO (USA) <^) («!)
USN COMPACFLT PEARL HI (USA)^b) (6)
VADM USN (USA)
(USA)
@navy.mil>
@navy.mil>; Burke,
@navy.mil>; Aquilino, John C ADM
@navy.mil>; Sawyer, Phillip G
@navy.mil>; Gillingham, Bruce L RADM USN CNO
J@mail.mil>
Cc: Dunn, Paula D RDML CHINFO, 01-00
CDR USN CNO (USA)
CAPT USN COMPACFLT (USA)
Subject: Proposed statement
@navy.mil>
@navy.mil>;|
@navy.mil>;^b) (6)
2
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CNO, VCNO, ADM Aquilino, VADM Sawyer and SG,
We have drafted a statement below re: TR. We will socialize with OSD-PA,
and pending your concurrence issue this statement, attributable to CNO.
V/r,
Charlie,
"As testing continues, additional positive cases of COVID-19 have been
discovered aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt. We are taking this threat very
seriously and are working quickly to identify and isolate positive cases
while preventing further spread of the virus aboard the ship. No Sailors
have been hospitalized or are seriously ill.
"We are prioritizing testing for the crew, beginning with symptomatic
Sailors and essential watchstanders, as well as those in close contact with
Sailors who have tested positive already. Testing will continue as necessary
to ensure the health of the entire ship's crew.
"There are two preventative medicine units aboard Theodore Roosevelt that
are conducting surveillance testing for small groups of Sailors and
individual tests. Those who test positive will immediately be transported
off the ship. In addition to identifying and isolating any positive cases,
the crew is quarantining those who have been in close contact and
deep-cleaning the ship's spaces.
"USS Theodore Roosevelt is in Guam on a previously-scheduled port visit.
The resources at our naval medical facilities in Guam will allow us to more
effectively test, isolate, and if necessary treat Sailors. We expect
additional positive tests, and those Sailors who test positive will be
transported to the U.S. Naval Hospital Guam for further evaluation and
treatment. During the port visit, base access will be limited to the pier
for Roosevelt's Sailors. No base or regional personnel will access the
pier.
3
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"We're taking this day by day. Our top two priorities are taking care of our
peopie and maintaining mission readiness. Both of those go hand in giove.
"We are confident that our aggressive response wiii keep USS Theodore
Rooseveit abie to respond to any crisis in the region."
RDML Chariie Brown, APR+M
U.S. Navy Chief of information
pm
pm
(0)
(m)
p)CT @navy.mii <maiitop) (W @navy.mii>
@navy.edu <maiito pj 10 @navy.edu>
www.navy.mii <http://www.navy.mii>
@chinfo <http://twitter.com/chinfo>
4
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Response to Query
Theodore Roosevelt Strike Group Sailors with COVID-19 Diagnosis
Updated on March 25, 2020 at 1:20 p.m.
1. Background (not for release): On March 23, three Sailors presented to Medieal reporting
they had influenza- like symptoms. The medical augment team from Biological Defense
Research Directorate from Fort Detrick, MD embarked on TR tested the Sailors. On March 24,
surveillance testing of both Sailors was indicative of COVID-19. The Sailors have been plaeed in
isolation in the ship’s medieal until they can be flown off the ship.
Theodore Roosevelt Strike Group (TRSG) completed a port visit to Da Nang, Vietnam March 9.
Following the port visit ship’s medical monitored Sailors with respiratory symptoms and those
Sailors who flew aboard following the port visit via the Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD) daily.
In addition, 39 Sailors from USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) and USS Bunker Hill (CG 52)
who were registered guests or visited the Vanda Hotel during the same timeframe as non-strike
group affiliated (British) guests who tested positive for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
supported a 14-day monitored berthing and observation period. Male and female berthing areas
were identified to support. During the 14-day period none of the Sailors were assessed to have
influenza-like symptoms and none of the three Sailors identified by Medical testing as indicative
of COVID-19, stayed at the Vanda Hotel.
The three individuals with test results indicative of COVID-19 are isolated in aecordance with
the Center for Disease Control and Prevention Guidelines until the Sailors can be flown off the
ship. Those deemed to be in close contaet with them (sleep in the same berthing or work in the
same work eenter) are in male and female quarantine berthing areas of the ship.
Batch testing of the close contacts of the sailors was completed last night. There were 192 close
eontaets tested in groups of 5, with 9 positive group tests. The preventive medieine team
onboard is in the process of individually testing the samples from the positive batches.
TR’s Operations Officer and Senior Medical Officer are working with the Joint Region Marianas
and Naval Base Guam team to coordinate a medieal evaeuation of all Sailors with test results
indicative of COVID-19. Initial 3 Sailors are scheduled to be flown off Wednesday, May 25.
The ship intends to pull into Guam on Friday, Mareh 27.
The statement, talking points, and Q&A below are from the COVID-19 Public Affairs Guidance
(PAG) provided by CHINFO.
2. PA Posture/Lead: ACTIVE for COVID cases with CHINFO and OSD eoordination.
PACFLT as lead.
3. Holding Statement.
(Begin) As confirmed by the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, on Mareh
24, surveillanee testing of three Sailors was indicative of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19).
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The individuals are isolated in accordance with the Center for Disease Control and Prevention
Guidelines until the Sailors can be flown off the ship. Shipboard health professionals conducted
a thorough contact investigation to determine whether any other Sailors may have been in close
contact and possibly exposed. Those deemed to be in close contact with the three individuals
with test results indicative of COVID-19 have been moved to male and female quarantine
berthing areas onboard the ship. Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet is committed to taking every
measure possible to protect the health of our force. (End)
4. Talking Points:
• On March 24, surveillance testing of three Sailors was indicative of Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19).
• The individuals are currently isolated in accordance with the Center for Disease Control
and Prevention Guidelines until the Sailors can be flown off the ship.
• Shipboard health professionals are conducting a thorough contact investigation to
determine whether any other Sailors may have been in close contact and possibly
exposed.
• Those deemed to be in close contact with the three individuals with test results indicative
of COVID-19 have been moved to male and female quarantine berthing areas onboard
the ship.
• Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet is committed to taking every measure possible to protect
the health of our force.
• The Navy is following guidance from OSD-P&R which is consistent with current CDC
guidelines.
• Sailors work in close quarters and reducing possible infection vectors supports readiness
of the whole unit.
• Screening of individuals potentially exposed to COVID-19 is based on their risk of
exposure, using CDC Patients Under Investigation (PUI) criteria.
• Our Sailors did the right thing by seeking medical care when they were experiencing
symptoms of a respiratory illness.
• Please continue to respect the privacy of our shipmate and their family — do not
speculate or contribute to false of unconfirmed information.
For Ship ’s Company
• Please remember that you represent our ship and the Navy, there can be a lot of
inaccurate information in the media, if you are contacted by media, please refer them to
public affairs for the facts and notify your Chain of Command.
5. Questions and Answers:
Q. Does a Sailor assigned to USS Theodore Roosevlet (CVN 71) have the 2019 Novel
Coronavirus (COVID-19)?
A. As confirmed by the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, on March 24,
surveillance testing of three Sailors was indicative of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). The
individuals are currently isolated in accordance with the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention Guidelines until the Sailors can be flown off the ship.
Q. Do you know if the Sailor had contact with an individual infected with COVID-19?
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A. Similar to other respiratory illnesses, which are far more common according to the CDC,
individuals may come in contact with people who are not exhibiting any symptoms. As a
reminder, CDC always recommends everyday preventive actions to help prevent the spread of
respiratory illnesses, including:
• Wash your hands often with soap and water for at least 20 seconds.
• If soap and water are not available, use an alcohol-based hand sanitizer that contains at
least 60% alcohol.
• Avoid touching your eyes, nose, and mouth with unwashed hands.
• Avoid close contact with people who are sick.
• Stay home, or follow your local sick call procedure, when you are sick.
• Cover your cough or sneeze with a tissue, then throw the tissue in the trash.
• Clean and disinfect frequently touched objects and surfaces.
Q. Are Sailors assigned to USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) at risk?
A. Sailors work in close quarters and reducing possible infection vectors supports readiness of
the whole unit. Defensive protocols are in place onboard the ship. As with any respiratory
illness. Sailors are encouraged to follow CDC preventative recommendations to ensure a healthy
working environment. These include frequently washing hands, avoiding touching eyes, nose,
and mouth, and consulting a medical professional if you feel ill.
Q. Does the Navy have the ability to test for COVID-19.
A. The medical augment team from Biological Defense Research Directorate from Fort Detrick,
MD is embarked on USS Theodore Roosevelt and has the ability to conduct surveillance testing
onboard for Sailors who present influenza-like illness symptoms. This capability provides early-
warning surveillance for the medical teams to be able to identify if a COVID-19 case is onboard
a ship.
Q. Is/Are other Sailor(s) quarantined?
A. Shipboard health professionals conducted a thorough contact investigation to determine
whether any other Sailors may have been in close contact and possibly exposed. Those deemed
to be in close contact with the three individuals with test results indicative of COVID-19 have
been moved to male and female quarantine berthing areas onboard the ship. Moreover, we
continue to monitor the crew wellness, and we encourage any Sailors feeling unwell to visit our
shipboard medical professionals.
Q. Will USS Theodore Roosevelt he quarantined and what precautionary measures are in
place?
A. The Sailors are being held in isolation until the ship is able to fly those Sailors who were
indicative of COVID-19 off the carrier. Those deemed to be in close contact with the three
individuals with test results indicative of COVID-19 have been moved to male and female
quarantine berthing areas onboard the ship. The ship will take appropriate preventative
measures, in accordance with specific guidance on the Navy-Marine Corps Public Health Center
and CDC environmental cleaning and disinfection recommendations. Moreover, we continue to
monitor crew wellness, and we encourage any Sailors feeling unwell to visit our shipboard
medical professionals
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Q. Where did the Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group visit before the Sailor’s tested
positive for COVID-19?
A. USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN71) made a routine port call in Guam in February and Da
Nang, Vietnam March 5-9. At the time of the port visit there were only 16 positive cases and
those were localized in northern Vietnam. The decision to conduct the port call was a risk-
informed decision made by the INDOPACOM commander.
Q. Where will the ship go next?
A. It is the policy of the U.S. Navy to not discuss future ship movements or operations due to
operational security considerations.
Q. What guidance is the Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group following?
A. Theodore Roosevelt is following the U.S. Pacific Fleet recently issued guidance directing all
ships operating in the Western Pacific to remain at sea for 14 days between port visits to monitor
Sailors for COVID-19 symptoms following port. Additionally, cases that are indicative of
COVID-19 are being isolated on the ship and flown ashore at the first opportunity. Theodore
Roosevelt will continue to take every measure to protect our Sailors, prevent the spread of the
virus and continue to support our mission in the Indo-Pacific.
Q. What measures are you taking to ensure service members' health safety?
A. Theodore Roosevelt Strike Group has been closely monitoring the latest information and
guidance being provided by the Centers for Disease Control, World Health Organization, and
Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and applying defensive protocol measures where feasible
for a ship at sea to reduce the risk of respiratory viruses.
Q. Have USS Theodore Roosevelt conducted any port visits that were not
maintenance/stores unload- and if so, were Sailors restricted to the ship?
A. Since leaving San Diego in mid-January, USS Theodore Roosevelt has pulled into Guam
February 7-10 and Vietnam March 5-9. Both were liberty ports.
Q. How many Sailors are in isolation or quarantine on the USS Theodore Roosevelt?
A. To protect operational security, we are not disclosing any specific numbers of Sailors in
quarantine, but I can tell you that Sailors identified as having been in close contact with the
Sailors who were indicative of COVID-19 are being tested as well.
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Medical Evacuation conducted for Sailors embarked on USS Theodore Roosevelt
From U.S. Pacific Fleet Public Affairs
PEARL HARBOR (NNS) - On March 25, Sailors with test results indicative of COVID-19 were
medically evacuated from USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) to Naval Base Guam.
The Sailors were taken to U.S. Naval Hospital for evaluation and treatment.
Surveillance testing of three Sailors conducted on March 24 was indicative of Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19). The individuals were isolated in accordance with the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention Guidelines until the Sailors could be flown off the ship.
Shipboard health professionals conducted a thorough contact investigation to determine whether
any other Sailors may have been in close contact and possibly exposed. Those Sailors have been
placed in quarantine berthing for further evaluation.
Since the ship’s port visit, the ship has been following an aggressive mitigation strategy to
minimize spread of respiratory viruses and protect the health of our force. The mitigation efforts
included the following:
• The ship’s medical team onboard monitored Sailors with respiratory symptoms and those
Sailors who transferred to the ship following the port visit daily.
• Ship personnel conduct deep cleaning of ship with HTH (bleach) on a twice daily basis.
• Antiseptic wipes and hand sanitizer are located throughout the ship, particularly in
workspaces near computers, mess decks, common areas, and tool issue.
• The ship secured self-serve on the mess decks, CPO Mess, and Wardroom.
U.S. Pacific Fleet is committed to taking every measure possible to protect the health of our
force.
For questions, contact U.S. Pacific Fleet Public Affairs atp)
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6. Public Affairs Points of Contact
6.1 Commander, Pacific Fleet: CDR PW
Email:
@ navy .mil
: Comm:
; Mobile:
6.2 Commander Seventh Fleet: CDR
Mobile:
; Comm: PP) DSN: PW
(6)
; Email: PW
6.3 Commander Seventh Fleet Deputy PAO: FT
piB)
@ lee 1 9 .navy . (smil) .mil
@lcc 19.navv.mil
6.4 TRSG PAO: FCDR
@cvn71. navy. mil; pfw
6.5 TRSG DPAO: FTJGpW
@ c vn7 1 . nav V . mil ;
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LCDR USN NAVCIVLAWSUPPACT DC (USA)
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Signed By:
CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt ~j@cvn71.navy.nnil>
Tuesday, March 24, 2020 1 2:04 PM
I uesdav, March 2
CAPT USN, C7F;
CAPT USN COMPACFLT N01H
USA)'
CAPT USN COMNAVAIRPAC SAN CA (USA)
WARNORD for BUMED
l@rnail.mil
Requesting a WARNORD to Navy Medicine to be prepared to support the TR when
we pull into Guam. Did batch testing of 192 samples tonight (these were the
close contacts from the first two positive sailors - both from the air
wing). 192 sailors in groups of 5, with 9 positive group tests meaning 1-5
people per group test were positive = 9-45/200 positive = 4.7-23.4%. Will
get the individual results tomorrow and work to get them off the ship. Will
also do contact testing (approx.. 200) on the +sailor from Rx. Needless to
say, this is not good, and following up on my previous email I believe we're
at the tipping point and anyone who is defined as an III is a presumptive
+COVID-19 and should be treated as such. Thoughts?
v/r.
p} (6) ], MD
CAPT MC(FS) USN
Senior Medical Officer
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)
Work: | pey 1
J-dialJb/Jtj^
Cell: p)(f )^
1
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USA
' TODAY
POLITICS
Eight sailors from USS Theodore Roosevelt have
coronavirus, raising concerns about pandemic's strain
on military
Tom Vanden Brook USA TODAY
Published 4:22 p.m. ET Mar. 24, 2020 | Updated 6:49 p.m. ET Mar. 25, 2020
WASHINGTON - The Navy on Wednesday diagnosed five more sailors with COVID-19 aboard the 5,000-member USS
Theodore Roosevelt, bringing the total to eight with the illness, according to Navy Cdr. Clay Doss, a Navy spokesman.
The Navy plans to airlift the five newly diagnosed sailors from the ship, which is operating in the Pacific, Doss said. Officials
aboard the Roosevelt are still determining if the coronavirus has spread to more sailors.
"They’re doing everything they can to isolate anyone who had contact with those sailors and prevent further spread," Doss
said.
The sailors became ill while at sea, raising questions about further spread of the highly contagious disease and the overall
strain of the pandemic on military readiness.
The Pentagon already has canceled or curtailed major war-training exercises, quarantined thousands of troops, closed
recruiting centers and slapped limits on foreign and domestic travel.
Defense Secretary Mark Esper acknowledged Tuesday that readiness, the term the military uses to gauge its ability to fight,
has been affected by coronavirus. Several major training operations have been canceled since the pandemic swept around
the globe.
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The Pentagon remains capable of meeting any threats, he said.
The Roosevelt had been at Danang, Vietnam, 15 days ago for a port visit. The sick sailors have been flown from the ship to a
military hospital in the Pacific region, Adm. Michael Gilday, chief of naval operations, said on Tuesday.
Gilday declined to say how many others had been in contact with the ill sailors, saying he did not want to signal
vulnerability to adversaries.
Military readiness: Coronavirus forces cuts in training, recruiting, creating strains
It’s not clear that the sailors contracted the virus in Vietnam, Gilday said. Aircraft have also been flying to and from the
Roosevelt as well.
The Navy has canceled port visits for its nearly 100 ships at sea, Gilday said. The ships will stop only for maintenance or
resupply. No sailors aboard submarines have tested positive, Gilday said. Social distancing aboard submarines would be
difficult given close quarters.
Army Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, predicted the effects of missed training opportunities from
coronavirus to be minimal.
"There will be an impact to readiness," Milley said. "I think will be on the low end."
What coronavirus does to your body: Everything to know about the infection process
H-3-83
Crozier. Brett E CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt
"USS Theodore Roosevelt Ombudsman Team"
From:
To:
Cc:
CAPT USN. USS Theodore
RooseveltJlpB^^^^^^^ CMC USN. USS Tlieodore Roosevelt:
;(b) (6)^. LCDR USN. USS THEODORE
ROds^trL I
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:
TR letter to the families
Tuesday, March 24, 2020 9:59:14 AM
Letter to TR Family and Friends 20200325.Ddf
Ladies.
(jood moniiiig. A hectic last 24 hours onboard the TR. hi the last 24 hoiu's
3 Sailors (TR and CVW) tested {xisitive for COVID-19. We have limited off
sliip coimectivity. but Fm sure the word will soon be out. Hie attached
letter can be emailed out to your distro hst. and jxisted on die closed FB
account.
I realize it w'on't answer all the questions, but hopeflilly it will help some
of the famihes tliat ai'e concerned.
Althougli you guys are more than capable of assisting die famihes back home,
feel fiee to reach out to the regional OMBUDSMAN if you feel you need
assistance dming these challenging times.
Tlie good new's is tliat the crew' remains positive, focused on die mission, and
eager to tackle tins cliallenge just like diey do any other.
Tlianks for all tliat you do and dianks for all your support.
Vr,
Brett
CAPT Brett E. Crozier
Commanding Ofhcer
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71)
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71)
UNIT 100250 BOX I
FPOAP 96632
March 25, 2020
To our family and friends.
Hello again from aboard ‘America’s Big Stick’, the mighty TR. As you can imagine in the
dynamic world within which we all live, your Sailors commitment to ensure the safety and
security of our Nation is on display to the world. Even with difficulties at home, knowing we
have your support provides the foundation for our continued success at sea, and is the framework
for our homecoming once the mission is complete.
We just wrapped up training with the USS America and accompaning ships, and our Sailors
continue to go above and beyond with any task assigned. Each day they conduct themselves as
the professional Sailors they are; focused, committed and determined to see the mission through
to the end. Thank you for being the support they need at home in order for them to perform at
their peak out here.
As the Captain, it’s important for me to maintain an open dialogue with the families and the
friends of the Sailors I have been entrusted to lead, and I wanted you to hear from me an update
to the last letter I sent when we left Vietnam.
Y esterday evening, a few Sailors did the right and brave thing, reporting to medical stating
they were experiencing flu-like symptoms. These Sailors were tested by our embarked Naval
Medical Research Center team that joined us after Vietnam, and this morning the results of the
tests indicated positive results for coronavirus {COVID-19).
These Sailors have been placed in isolation in accordance with the Center for Disease
Control and we are coordinating flying those Sailors off the ship as soon as possible. They have
also all been able to contact their families, and will be able to stay in contact once ashore.
Your Sailors remain our number one priority and we are doing everything we can to ensure
they remain healthy so we can continue to accomplish our mission out here in the Western
Pacific and return them to you again safely. Our world-class medical department is working
around the clock, screening any Sailor that reports feeling ill, as well as aggressively sanitizing
the ship on a regular basis.
Since the ship’s last port visit in Vietnam, we have been following an aggressive mitigation
strategy to minimize spread of coronavirus and protect the health of our force. Some of the
mitigation efforts included the following:
• The ship’s medical team onboard monitored Sailors with respiratory symptoms and those
Sailors who transferred to the ship following the port visit daily.
• Verbal screening of all Sailors for any flu-like symptoms.
• Ship personnel conduct deep cleaning of ship with bleach on a daily basis.
• Antiseptic wipes and hand sanitizer were placed throughout the ship, particularly in
workspaces near computers, mess decks, common areas, and tool issue.
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• The ship secured self-serve on the mess decks, CPO Mess, and Wardroom.
• A medical augment team from Biological Defense Research Directorate from Fort
Detrick, MD embarked the ship following the port visit. This team has the ability to test
Sailors onboard who present influenza-like illness symptoms. This capability provides
early-warning surveillance for the medical teams to be able to identify if a COVID-1 9
case is onboard a ship - as they did in our few current cases onboard.
Immediately following the positive results from the Sailors onboard, we additionally
implemented:
• Limited services offered by the onboard dental department.
• Testing has been conducted for all the Sailors who were in close contact with the infected
Sailors,
• Continued verbal screenings of all Sailors for any flu-like symptoms.
• An additional Preventive Medicine Officer and Preventive Medical Tech will be joining
us from USS America. They will be able to assist the current Preventive Medical team
onboard in contact tracing, quarantine, etc.
Please remember that you are an integral part of our Navy Team. You represent our ship,
your Sailor and our Navy. Operational security regarding both ship movements and our medical
readiness is sensitive information and should not be made public (i.e. posted on social media) as
this information can leave the ship vulnerable. There can also be a lot of inaccurate information
out there so, ij^ou are contacted by external media, please refer them to our public affairs team
onboard at ^H^J@cvn71. navy.mil.
Sailors are our top priority and we will do everytliing we can to keep them safe. Each day
your Sailors provide our Navy Team something to be proud of, and in the most challenging times
that does not change. I remain in awe and consider it a privilege to serve with and lead such a
distinguished group of Sailors, and I thank you for your continued support.
Sinrpi-plv
H-S84
Witness Statement of Commander, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet
On 1 3 May 2020, 1 was interviewed in connection with a command investigation concerning
chain of command actions with regard to COVID-19 onboard USS THEODORE
ROOSEVELT (CVN 71) via video-teleconference.
What follows is a true and accurate representation of my statement for this investigation.
Witness Name: VADM William R. Merz, USN
Position: Commander, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet
Email Address: (t) ]@lccl9.navy.mil
Phone(s): |WP) _
I would like to point out that the effort to recover TR is significant, spanning thousands of active
duty service members and civilians across the joint force. There are some incredible folks out
there who set the standard, while being held accoimtable [by the media] for defeating a virus the
whole world has still yet to figure out — and the world doesn’t yet know about their contributions
to the fight against COVID-19.
There are four Captains in particular who own this:
1.
Captain^^ ^ j (CoS, C7F): Lead sled dog. Orchestrated and synchronized all
initial and ongoing major muscle efforts on Guam and off-island support of Guam,
coordinated up and down-chain reports and communications.
2. Captain!
|(CO, NBG): Generated ample and adequate berthing within the
base fence line, manag^ all logistics regarding medical support, movement and feeding
sailors on and off base. Stayed ahead of need.
3. Captai
(CoS, JRM); Liaison with Gov Guam office and Hotel
association, coordinated all movements through both Guam airport and Anderson AFB,
coordinated movement in and through the hotels. General utility fielder for short-fused
on-island issues.
Captain Carlos Sardiello (CO, TR): recovered the crew, reestablished standards and
purpose - just what the ship needed.
1 have been C7F since mid-September 2019.
RDML Baker (CCSG-9) is doing fine, but tired. CSG-9’s performance has been average -
operational performance was good, communications average. The strike group struggled early
staying within the chain-of-command, but quickly corrected. They settled in well.
Communications prior to the first COVID positive case with the strike group followed the
normal CTF battle rhythm, bi-weekly reports, daily CUBs (4 time per week, mandatory on
Tuesdays), and regular CDR-CDR emails as they moved through their missions. There had been
no prior significant challenges with CSG-9. My COS tunes in quickly when we have a needy
strike group, CSG-9 is not one of them. Additionally, communications ramped up quickly upon
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infection of the ship. I established set morning Tanbergs with JRM, CSG-9, CNFJ, CSG5 (RRN
had become infected, too). Frequent comms through the day have been added as needed.
There was early tension between CPF and C7F staffs, bora out of the day-to-day friction of
routine operations - doesn’t get better in crisis. Through frequent CDR-CDR dialogue, tension
eased.
Regarding the decision to visit Da Nang, we followed the in-place processes to evaluate the
spectrum of threats - COVID was one of the driving issues. I had ample opportunity to ask
questions and discuss risks. In the context of port visits throughout the region, I concurred with
the INDOPACOM decision and supporting threat assessments and risk calculus. Of note,
INDOPACOM was the promulgated decision authority for cancelling any activity in my AOR
due to COVID (unusual). For context, during the same basic timeframe of TR’s Vietnam visit,
USS BOXER and USS AMERICA were visiting Thailand and USS BLUE RIDGE was visiting
Singapore. BUNKER HILL (pierside) visited Vietnam with TR (at anchor). All three countries
were low risk for COIVD, only TR contracted the virus. USS BLUE RIDGE had also previously
visited Korea, Okinawa and Thailand prior and I was embarked for all port visits.
I sent out a COVID-19 TASKORD on 1 5 February 2020, which referenced the NRTP. We put a
lot of thought into this and it proved to be very helpful. The NRTP was basically the reference I
would have expected to be used by the TR SMO when advising the XO and CO.
When BLUE RIDGE left Thailand in late February we were in discussions with CPF regarding
14-days at sea between port visits for the Fleet. Because of the steady dialogue with CPF, the
C7F TASKORD, and a well-informed crew, BLUE RIDGE had initiated strict hygiene protocols
and was well-postured for a break-out. We were not yet wearing PPE or social distancing in the
Fleet. At the time, face masks were still not considered viable protection. Interestingly, though,
the aggressive cleaning and hygiene program resulting in an amazingly healthy ship, no illness
onboard of any kind. Never seen that before. Very healthy 1000-person crew.
While at sea following BLUE RIDGE’sport visit to Thailand (23-26 February), the 14-day at-
sea requirement was issued by CPF. Accordingly, BLUE RIDGE’s next port of Brunei was
shifted to a BSP on 1 March. At that point, we were in the COVID mindset and started to shift
Fleet- wide Ops to align with the at-sea 14-day requirement. I departed the ship in Brunei and
returned a week later in Singapore on 10 March - my last Flag travel with the exception of
visiting TR in Guam.
TR departed Da Nang on 9 March. 14-days after leaving Vietnam, the ship reported quarantine
complete of their 39 sailors pulled from the hotel in Da Nang. TR’s first positive test was on 24
March, and TR reported generating their close contact list and segregation plan. Two more
positives quickly followed, and again TR reported the additional close-contacts and quarantine
plan. Because the cases were unrelated, and based upon what we knew about the virus at the
time, I explained to them the likelihood of multi-generation asymptomatic transmission onboard
and that they had to aggressively segregate the close contacts and critical watchstanders (for
protection). Essentially, it’s at your doorstep. Prior to reaching Guam, I also discussed with
RDML Baker the need to protect the command element and lock down the Strike Group staff
and directed him to create a succession plan in case he became infected. I also shifted all other
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ships out of CSG-9 to allow complete focus on TR. In addition to segregating the infected crew
and close contacts, I also expected them to close barber shops, ship’s stores, gyms, libraries,
gyms, chapels, etc. I did not verify compliance, but these actions were discussed in prior
guidance, and additional Fleet guidance was promulgated on 20 and 22 March. From the 24*
through the 27* of March positives began to increase. At this point we had the ship moving
towards Guam, and once in range we flew the infected sailors to shore (25-26 March).
As part of our prior preparation for an outbreak at sea in 7* Fleet, we identified Guam, Okinawa
and Yokostika as the best candidate locations to take a ship if needed (Japan agreed to support).
Thailand was their scheduled port visit but was shifted to Guam because all port visits had just
been cancelled in the AOR by INDOPACOM. We assumed TR was going to be a large effort
and preferred a U.S. option. Guam also had an open CVN pier in a remote location on the
island.
At this time, RFIs steadily increased from several HHQ sources, direct to C7F, CSG9 and TR.
C2 was confused at the outset as HHQ began reaching directly to the ship for details and
information. This was distracting and was quickly reined in by both CPF and OPNAV. The
volume of formal RFIs fi-om that point forward was heavy but manageable, mostly sent to C7F
(as requested). Prior to TR’s arrival ir^u^n, the COVID response lead was established within
the C7F MOC, where the C7F COS |||H||||||||| carved out a cell to specifically manage the
numerous and rapidly expanding organizations coming online. Of note, C7F runs all operations
and HQ functions fi’om the MOC, resulting in the ability to leverage the familiar day-to-day
cycle to absorb the additional COVID-related tasks. This same group also managed the RRN
infections and Pre-Deployment Segregation (PDS) in Yokosuka and Atsugi.
Also prior to arrival in Guam, there was significant HHQ attention placed on COD flight history,
and determining if this is how COVID was introduced. This resulted in detailed reconstruction
of the COD flights and personnel transfers (resulting analysis provided SEPCOR). The
conclusion was that COD flights post Da Nang port visit were not likely the source, but because
of the nature of the breakout, it’s virtually impiossible to tell when the ship was infected
(validated by the ongoing stubbornness of the virus).
My involvement with the recovery of TR has been necessarily direct. CSG-9 was quickly
overwhelmed and became largely unresponsive - this improved over time. In general, I prefer to
stay “on-the-loop” with my MOC, not “in-the-loop”. For this challenge I had to be “in-the-
loop,” working with CSG-9, keeping the chain-of-command informed and aligned, and allowing
my MOC to keep focus on TR, RRN and Fleet Ops (the other 50 ships). BLUE RIDGE was at
sea (7 days out of Singapore) when TR became infected, followed her to Guam, and then
remained on station beyond the harbor to ensure point-to-point comms and helo access if needed.
I and the team remained onboard. I did fly to Guam a week into the effort for an eyes-on
assessment, followed by a two-week quarantine period prior to returning to the ship (AAR sent
to VADM Brown on SIPR).
There were four COAs running in parallel for segregating the TR crew that conceptually came
together very quickly a few days prior to TR’s arrival, with the intent to keep all in play until one
or more panned out. The TR CO was briefed and updated on each. They were:
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1 . Naval Base Guam (JRM) with the resources available;
2. In port and nearby shipping with available berthing;
3. Airlift to Okinawa or Atsugi; and
4. Hotels on Guam.
NBG: TheJRMeffbrt was impressive and relatively seamless, particularly the ability of the NB
Guam COjUmilUto quickly pull together off-ship berthing at scale, employing NGIS,
barracks. Navy Housing, schools, gyms, and warehouses for a total capacity of ~2400 beds in
one week. 1 did not expect that much capacity to be generated that quickly (small island, big
problem). Coordination with JRM initiated several days prior to arrival Guam. It was clear
RDML John Menoni had well-established, strong on-island relationships, which 1 leveraged
often. He, RDML Baker, and 1 started daily synchs prior to TR’s arrival. Several times a day
initially, these settled into a set morning synch and then as needed through the day (still in
progress). TR CO and CSG-9 COS would typically join RDML Baker.
In port and nearby shipping: Berthing aboard other ships was held in reserve if unable to keep
pace with other options - never needed.
Oflf-lsland: Okinawa was very promising, and leveraged our strong working relationship with III
MEF to generate within a few days up to 1000 single rooms, with a commitment for an
additional 2000 rooms. This option was not favored up-chain, presumably because of the heavy
airlift required and the optic of flying TR sailors to a foreign country, although the articulated
plein was to fly only tested-negative sailors in order to allow more room and support for the
tested-positive sailors (on Guam). In addition to being ready to receive our sailors. III MEF
provided the bulk of our medical support, sourced from 3"^ Medical Expedition Battalion, and is
still leading the on-island effort under the TF-MED designation. TF-MED is in the “supporting”
role to TR (supported) via C7F TASKORD. Atsugi ended up being needed to support the much
lower scale RRN recovery and PDS process.
Hotels: The hotel effort was also impressive, orchestrated by JRM and the Governor. There was
hesitation to engage directly with GovGuam, so on 28 Mar 1 asked RDML Menoni to initiate the
discussion at a lower level to pulse support. Clearly financial beneficial for the hotels due to
COVID impacts, the response was positive and we then pursued the formal request needed by
GovGuam from either C7F, CPF, or IPC. CPF informed me it would be him or IPC. TR CO
was briefed on the option and the support, and voiced no concerns when asked (but then sent his
letter the same or following day, 29 or 30 Mar). CPF made the formal call on 31 Mar and sailors
started arriving at the hotels on 2 Apr, one week after TR’s arrival. SF Chronical published
CO’s letter on 1 Apr and GovGuam felt we had broken trust, resulting in a series of short- fused
discussions and apologies. RDML Menoni’s relationship with her saved us. I want to point out
how heroic this was on behalf of the Governor. Despite considerable political risk of bringing
TR sailors to downtown hotels, she went very public and very positive with her support, “these
are our sons and daughters. . .” The hotels were all shutdown due to COVID and had to be
reopened, cleaned, inspected and re-manned to support of TR, including kitchens and supplies.
The JRM team had to put in place protected transportation and sailor accoimtability processes for
hotel and medical support, and all of this put at risk by the CO’s unwarranted plea for the same
support he knew was already in progress. Head- scratcher. . . The Governor told me after the fact
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that she had actually initiated discussions with the hotel association the same day we initiated
low-level discussions with her staff (day after TR’s arrival). She was apparently all-in from the
beginning.
The combination of Hotels and NBG became the combined solution. It’s important to note that
at no time did off-ship berthing capacity fall short of TR’s ability to move sailors. When the ship
pulled in there was immediately available accommodations for ~500 personnel, improving to
-2500 over the next several days, including medical support. However, there was continual
resistance by the ship’s command team, presumably heavily influenced by the ship’s SMO, to
move TR sailors into austere, but effectively segregated, berthing when available while waiting
for hotels. This resistance was based upon the SMO not accepting any segregation that was not a
single hotel room with a single bathroom. We emphatically agreed that would be best but could
not get through to him it wasn’t an option yet. When pressed for his Plan B (by me in a
conference call), he refused to accept the reality that Plan A just wasn’t yet available, and could
not comprehend the hurdles that needed to be cleared along that path. His obstinacy in the face
of reality continued throughout the recovery - constantly claiming a high-road that didn’t exist.
There was also the additional victim mentality and entitlement dynamic (.. .CPOs claiming the
off-ship berthing was “not suitable for TR sailors”), with little concept and virtually no
appreciation for the massive effort in play on their behalf or the importance of segregation - 1
was immensely disappointed in the TR Khaki leadership, and this persistent mentality resulted in
friction between the ship and everyone trying to help the ship.
Accordingly, once the first 1000 sailors were moved ashore, the ship elected to keep everyone
else onboard until the hotel option was available, leaving -1200 beds on NBG unfilled at the end
of the first week, contrary to the central theme cited in the CD’s letter. When pressed again,
their response was they now had enough room to effectively segregate onboard and that they
could also conduct more centralized, more efficient entrance testing. We concurred, but we
subsequently learned nothing was actually done by the SMO and TR team to improve the
effectiveness of the segregation - the crew essentially continued to co-mingle for several more
days and two-weeks elapsed until the bulk of the crew was moved off-ship. At some point in
this timeframe I had a direct conversation with the TR/CSG team on the role of the SMO as an
advisor not the decider, which is the responsibility of the URL leadership.
There was considerable HHQ focus on immediate initial testing of the entire TR crew, which
was at odds with our initial focus of segregating the entire TR crew. We were able to balance the
two priorities and coordinated early with CNFK to leverage USFK and ROK testing capacity.
There was early belief that ROK could support up to 1000 tests/day. A considerable logistics
demand followed that included swabs and air-transport, and actual testing was fiiBught with
interruptions due to off-pen sensitivities (the lab was used for Koreans civilians, too). Highest
level ROK Government intervention was required, but delays were significant for two weeks. It
finally settled out and now that lab provides support for both TR and RRN - invaluable, but took
a while.
Regarding the CO’s letter, despite being his operational commander I was not a recipient. It was
forwarded to me by VADM Miller (AIRFOR). I discussed with CPF his sense of the CO’s intent
and why I was not included. CPF had no insight, shared our concern of the CO’s lack of
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awareness of the efforts underway to support his ship, and opined that the letter would go public.
His belief on why 1 was not included was that the letter was sent just to aviators and that he was
not attempting to inform the operational chain of command. In any event, there was impact on
my team, a team working long hours on the CO’s behalf We pulled the team together, reset to
the same target, and returned to work. I also discussed with RDML Baker, and he assured me
that he didn’t know the CO was going to send the letter, and also had no insight into the CO’s
lack of awareness. My Fleet Surgeon was also surprised by the letter. She spoke with the TR
SMO regularly and knows he knew about the efforts in play. The letter gave pause to a lot of
people working on behalf of the CO, and I can’t see how the letter didn’t slow things down,
sparking off endless critiques, distracting media coverage, interviews, a preliminary inquiry, the
SECNAV’s visit, RFIs, etc. - singularly unnecessary. Nothing was happening until he sent his
letter was the opinion most annoying to all, particularly the Governor.
My visit. I visited Guam ahead of SECNAVs visit and toured all shore support facilities, hotels
and medical teams - universally in awe of the effort, seeing it in person after managing it from
sea. I was onboard for the SECNAV’s IMC remarks and spent over six hours onboard the
following day speaking to all elements of the command. I forwarded my after-action report to
VADM Brown on SIPR. In summary, the Khaki leadership had broken down at nearly every
level, and seemed to have abdicated their responsibility to lead those men and women through
this. My high-level diagnosis is that CAPT Crozier had lost separation and therefore perspective.
He became too familiar with his crew, was unable to make objective decisions, and bred that in
his wardroom. Their heads were in the wrong place. When we saw the video of the send-off, I
was quoted in a CNN article “that my job just got a lot harder.” Captain Crozier’s inappropriate
ending of segregation at sea, combined with the lack of COVID protocols (e.g. his send-off)
when directed and the resistance to use available off-ship accommodations when available, all
likely contributed significantly to the large final positive population (~1200).
Regarding the CO’s lack of awareness, I don’t believe he really understood the complex process
building around him. Somehow he just wasn’t tracking, despite sitting in on my discussions with
RDML Baker and being specifically asked if he had questions, concerns, or input many times up
to that point.
How much trust and confidence in CAPT Crozier do I have to command a ship? Zero. Based on
the regular and timely feed of information to him and his team, either he wasn’t listening, could
not comprehend, or maliciously undermined the response. When he did act, he did so in a way
arguably the most inappropriate possible and in spite of all other avenues being available. All
fatal flaws - not fit for command. Two hypothesis: First, he knew he put his crew at significant
risk, panicked, and opted for distracting offensive action by passing blame in the context of the
ludicrous statement “were not at war”; second, he saw an opportunity to be the hero who saved
the day - possibly more effective and more public than anticipated. Either way, he surrendered,
and brings into question his resiliency and toughness in command.
Do I have trust and confidence in RDML Baker to command a strike group? I do, including in
war. He can get the job done. It is hard now because they’re locked down, but staff performance
has improved throughout the recovery. He has a competent TR CO and would prefer not to
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serve with CAPT Crozier again. RDML Baker is an average performer. He is competent and I
have no reservations.
CO, CAPT Sardiello is just what the command needed. 12-O’Clock High scenario precisely. He
has the crew’s respect and continues to restore professionalism and confidence. My sense, he
was amazed how far these elements had eroded since last onboard (as previous TR CO). CAPT
Sardiello took immediate ownership of the plan and gradually threw us out of his kitchen. He
participates in the daily battle rhythm and his no-nonsense approach has brought order back to
his ship, and his crew knows it. The victim mentality has morphed into teamwork imder his
leadership.
I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above is true to the best of my
kno .rtf -
(Witness’ Signatur^^^
(Date)
7
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CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt
CDR USN. CCSG-9
Fr.,m: L
To: tb) (6) )
Subject: FW: PROPOSED PAPER / COURSE OF ACTION FROM WARFARE COMMANDERS
Date: Wednesday, May 6, 2020 5:39:26 PM
Attachments: COVI D Test vs Isolation Slide. pptx
Rocklov et al.Ddf
COVI D 19 Shipboard Consideration 18MAR2020 final (002). pdf
Public Health Responses to COVI D-19 Outbreaks on Cruise Shins - Worldwid....Ddf
TR COVID-19 SITUATION - 29 Mar V2.docx
- Original Message-
From: PO) CCj)
CAPT USN, CVW-11 CAG
@cvwll navy.mil>
Sent: Sunday, March 29, 2020 1 1 :01 AM _
To: Baker^ Stuart P RDML USN, CCSG-9 <Mr
CAPT USN, CSSG^b) (6)
@ccsg9.navy mil>
@ccsg9.navy.mil>;
Crozier, Brett E CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
@cvn71.navy mil>;
Roosevelt
Theodore Roosevelt <|(b)
USS Theodore Roosevelt <(b) (I
~| CA
@cvn71 navy mil>; ^ _
l@cvn71.navy mil>; (b) (6)
w
CAPT USN, USS Theodore
CAPT USN, USS
CAPT USN,
CAPT USN, CVW-1 1 DCAG'^b) (6)
I CAPT USN, COMDESRON2^b) (6)
CDR USN, USS Theodore Roosev^(b) (6)
CDR USN, CVW-11
{b) (6)
]CDR
n CIV
@cvn71.navy mil>; (b) (6)
@cvwl l.navy mir>; (b) (6)
@cvn71 navy.mil:Jb) (6)
@cvn71 navy.mil>;5b) (6)
?
CAPT BKH CO •
CMC USN, USS Theodore Rooseye^^(E
CMDCM USN, CVW-11
@cg52.navy mil>
r@cvwll.navy mil>; (b) (6)
_ @cvn71 navy.mil>;
j@navy.mil>;
Subject: PROPOSED PAPER / COURSE OE ACTION EROM WAREARE COMMANDERS
Admiral, based on your discussion yesterday with the Warfare Commanders, the
attached paper 'TR COVID-19 SITUATION" is what we have put together. Other
attachments are either referred to in the paper or are for background /
reference.
- COVID Test vs Isolation Slide - Shows that testing cannot determine that
you don't have the vims, it can only confirm that you do. Makes the point
that because of this fact, you can't get to a "safe-ship" situation
leveraging testing alone, but you can via individual isolation. Explained
in the paper. (Requires editing after recent edit to the paper).
- Rocklov et al - Epidemiological research paper that concludes that -500
additional infections occurred due to quarantine / restricted movement
onboard versus removal from the ship to individual isolation. Pertinent
exerpts copied in the paper.
- COVID 19 Shipboard Considerations - Navy and Marine Corps Public Health
Center product. Contains projected infection curves (modeled). Pinal page
makes the point "Assuming 'enclave' means 'quarantine,' it is not
recommended that a ship be quarantined should a COVID-19 case be discovered
aboard. Rather, home isolation and self-quarantine is recommended."
- Public Health Responses to COVID-19 on Cmise Ships - Shows that 46.5% of
positives on the
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Diamond Princess were initially asymptomatic (a bulk of them developed
symptoms and later they estimate that 17.9% remained asymptomatic). Shows
that Sailors we may think are safe to put in groups are not; lack of
symptoms is not an indicator of lack of infection... negative test results
are not an indicator of lack of infection.
We have other background references from the CDC / NAVADMINs etc., but the
attached are the ones referenced specifically in the paper.
V/r,
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Categories of Patients
Cat
Status
Condition
COVID-19
Test Confirms
Virus Carrying
Status
14 Day
Individual
Isolation
Confirms Virus
Free
Safe Ship
with this
person
aboard
1
Symptomatic & Contagious
Yes
Yes
No
2
Infected
Asymptomatic & Contagious
Unable
Yes
No
3
Asymptomatic & Not Yet Contagious
Unable
Yes
No
4
Virus
Free
Exposed & Not Infected
Unable
Yes
Yes
5
Unexposed
Unable
Yes
Yes
6
Previously Infected / Virus Free
Unable
Yes
Yes
• Tested and negative does not mean patient is not infected
• 7 of 33 (21%) Sailors on TR who tested negative subsequently presented with symptoms and tested
positive for COVID-19
• Personnel in restricted movement on ship in combined berthing : Categories 2, 3, 4, 6
• Personnel in restricted movement onshore : Categories 2, 3, 4, 6
• Safe ship requires personnel only from categories 4, 5, 6
Testing for COVID-19 is NOT able to confirm the lack of infection;
14+ days of incj^i^i^ual isolation IS
CuMcr NiN-
UNCLASSIFIED
1
COVID-19 outbreak on the Diamond Princess cruise ship: estimating the epidemic potential and
effectiveness of public health countermeasures
Rocklov J PhD*, Sjodin H PhD*, Wilder-Smith A MD^’^’"*
1 Department of Public Health and Clinical Medicine, Section of Sustainable Health, Umea
University, Umea, Sweden
2 Department of Epidemiology and Global Health, Umea University, Umea, Sweden
3 Department of Disease Control, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, UK
4 Heidelberg Institute of Global Health, University of Heidelberg, Germany
Key words: coronavirus; SARS-CoV-2; basic reproduction number; isolation and quarantine;
incubation time; evacuation
Declaration of interest: none declared
Abstract:
Background: Cruise ships carry a large number of people in confined spaces with relative
homogeneous mixing. On 3 February, 2020, an outbreak of COVID-19 on cruise ship Diamond
Princess was reported with 10 initial cases, following an index case on board around 21-25* January.
By 4* February, public health measures such as removal and isolation of ill passengers and quarantine
of non-ill passengers were implemented. By 20* February, 619 of 3,700 passengers and crew (17%)
were tested positive.
Methods: We estimated the basic reproduction number from the initial period of the outbreak using
SEIR models. We calibrated the models with transient functions of countermeasures to incidence data.
We additionally estimated a counterfactual scenario in absence of countermeasures, and established a
model stratified by crew and guests to study the impact of differential contact rates among the groups.
We also compared scenarios of an earlier versus later evacuation of the ship.
Results: The basic reproduction rate was initially 4 times higher on-board compared to the Rq in the
epicentre in Wuhan, but the countermeasures lowered it substantially. Based on the modeled initial Rq
of 14.8, we estimated that without any interventions within the time period of 21 January to 19
February, 2920 out of the 3700 (79%) would have been infected. Isolation and quarantine therefore
prevented 2307 cases, and lowered the Rq to 1.78. We showed that an early evacuation of all
passengers on 3 February would have been associated with 76 infected persons in their incubation
time.
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Conclusions: The cruise ship conditions clearly amplified an already highly transmissible disease. The
public health measures prevented more than 2000 additional cases compared to no interventions.
However, evacuating all passengers and crew early on in the outbreak would have prevented many
more passengers and crew from infection.
Introduction
Cruise ships carry a large number of people in confined spaces with relative homogeneous mixing
over a period of time that is longer than for any other mode of transportation.^ Thus, cruise ships
present a unique environment for transmission of human -to-human transmitted infections. The
association of acute respiratory infections (ARI) incidence in passengers is statistically significant
with season, destination and duration of travel.^ In February 2012, an outbreak of respiratory illness
occurred on the cruise ship off Brazil, resulting in 16 hospitalizations due to severe ARI and one
death.^ In May 2020, a dual outbreak of pandemic (HlNl) 2009 and influenza A (H3N2) on a cruise
ship occurred: of 1,970 passengers and 734 crew members, 82 (3.0%) were infected with pandemic
(HlNl) 2009 virus, and 98 (3.6%) with influenza A (H3N2) virus. Four subsequent cases were
epidemiologically linked to passengers but no evidence of sustained transmission to the community or
passengers on the next cruise was reported."^ In September 2000 an outbreak of influenza-like illness
was reported on a cruise ship sailing off the Australian coast with over 1,100 passengers and 400 crew
on board, coinciding with the peak influenza period in Sydney.^ The cruise morbidity was high with
40 passengers hospitalized, two of whom died. A total of 310 passengers (37%) reported suffering
from an influenza-like illness.
In December 2019, a novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, emerged in Wuhan, China and rapidly spread
within China and then to various global cities with high interconnectivity with China. The resulting
ARI due to this coronavirus, a disease now coined COVID-19, is thought to be mainly transmitted by
respiratory droplets from infected people. The mean serial interval of COVID-19 is 7.5 days (95% Cl,
5.3 to 19) and the initial estimate for the basic reproductive number Rq was 2.2 (95% Cl, 1.4 to 3.9),*
although higher Rq have since been reported with a mean of more than 3.® On 18 February 2020,
China's CDC published their data of the first 72,314 cases including 44,672 confirmed cases. About
80% of the confirmed cases were reported to be mild disease or less severe forms of pneumonia,
13.8% severe and 4.7% critically ill. Risk factors for severe disease outcomes are older age and co¬
morbidities. The progression to acute respiratory distress syndrome occurs approximately 8-12 days
after onset of first symptoms, with lung abnormalities on chest CT showing greatest severity
approximately 10 days after initial onset of symptoms. Evidence is mounting that also mildly
symptomatic or even asymptomatic cases can transmit the disease.
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On 3'“^ February, 2020, an outbreak of COVID-19 was reported on Cruise Ship Princess Diamond off
the Japanese coast, with initially 10 persons confirmed to be infected with the virus. The number has
since ballooned into the largest coronavirus outbreak outside of mainland China. By 19* February,
619 of 3,700 passengers and crew (17%) were tested positive. By end February, six persons had died.
The outbreak was traced to a Hong Kong passenger who embarked on January 21st and disembarked
on January 25th. After docking near New Taipei City, on January 31, the ship arrived in Yokohoma,
Japan. By the following day, the Japanese health ministry ordered a 14-day quarantine for everyone on
board and rushed to close its ports to all other cruise ships. The public health measures taken
according to news reports and the media were removal of all PCR positive passengers and crew from
the ship and their isolation in Japanese hospitals. The remaining test-negative passengers and crew
remained on board. Passengers were quarantined in their cruise ship cabins, and only allowed out of
the cabin for one hour per day. By 20* February, the decision to evacuate was made and more than
3000 passengers left the ship. Most were air-evacuated by their respective countries.
The cruise ship with a COVID-19 index case onboard between the 21-25* January serves as a good
model to study its potential to spread in a population that is more homogenously mixed, compared to
the more spatially variable situation in Wuhan.
We set out to study the empirical data of COVID-19 confirmed infections on the Cruise ship Diamond
Princess, to estimate the basic reproduction number (Rq) under cruise ship conditions, the response
effectiveness of the quarantine and removal interventions, and compare scenarios of an earlier and
later evacuation of the ship.
Methods:
We used data on confirmed cases on the cruise ship as published on a daily basis by public sources'^ '*
to calibrate a model and estimate the basic reproduction number Rq from the time sequence and
amplitude of the case rates observed. COVID-19 is thought to have been introduced by an index case
from Hong Kong visiting the ship between the 2D‘ to 25* of January, 2020. We thus used the date of
2F' January 2020 as the first time point, t-0, assuming the index case was infectious from the first day
on the ship. The estimates of Rq and the associated Covid-19 incidence on the cruise ship was derived
using a compartmental model estimating the dynamics of the number of susceptible (S), exposed (E),
infected (7), and recovered (7?) individuals, adapted but modified from a published COVID-19 study.
We analyzed two instances of the model assuming respectively: (1) a homogenous population (3700
individuals), and (2) a stratified population of crew (1000 individuals) and guests (2700 individuals).
The model used a relationship between the daily reproductive number, fS, and Rq to infer the
transmissibility and contact rate across the whole cruise ship population by the relationship:
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= transmissibility * contact rate = R^/i
where the infectious period equals to one over the recovery rate (y), i = Ijy
In the homogeneous model, the infectious period, i, of COVID-19 was set to he 10 days based on
previous findings.* In the situation of no removal (ill persons taken off the ship to he isolated in a
Japanese hospital), the incubation period (or, the latent period), I was estimated to be approximately 5
days (ranging from 2 to 14 days).^° In order to model the removal/isolation and quarantine
interventions, we implemented time dependent removal and contact rates as described in Table 1. We
performed additional sensitivity analysis reducing the Rq to 3.7, an estimate of the average value
across mainland China studies of COVID-19.^
We further estimated a counterfactual scenario of the infections dynamics assuming no interventions
were implemented, in particular no removal and subsequent isolation of ill persons. We assumed an
infectious period of 10 days, with a contact rate remaining the same as in the initial phase of the
outbreak. Additionally, in the stratified model of crew and guests, the contact rate was assumed to be
different due to the assumption that crew could not be easily quarantined as they had to continue their
services on board for all the passengers and possibly had more homogeneous mixing with all the
passengers, whereas passengers may be mixing more within their preferred circles and areas. We kept
the transient change in the contact rate and the removal of all PCR confirmed patients starting from the
3"“^ and the 5* of February respectively as in the first model. Parameters are described in Table 1.
The model describing a homogeneous population onboard can be described by:
dS
dt
dE S
dl
where S denote all susceptible people on the cruise ship, E all exposed, I all infected and R all
recovered or removed, and where N = S + E + I + R denotes the whole population.
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The model describing a stratified population onboard can be described by:
dSq Sq Sq
dEq Sq Sq
dl,
a
dt
— ylg
dRg
dt
= y[c.
dSr Sr Sr
dEr Sr Sr
dl
dt
= Ec/l - Ylc
dR
dF = >"'
where S denotes susceptible, E exposed, I infected and R recovered or removed, N = S + E + I + R,
and the subscript g and c are indicating guest and crew respectively. Overall, we assume mortality is
negligible.
Models with interventions were calibrated to reports of total infection occurrence, while models
simulating the counterfactual scenarios where left with the naive parameter settings (no
countermeasures). The net effects of the countermeasures where estimated as the difference between
the counterfactual scenario and the model with the interventions. Model parameters are described in
Table 1. The effectiveness of the countermeasures was estimated by calibration of the model to data.
We here also present estimations of the plausible consequences of a hypothetical third intervention
strategy, whereby all individuals onboard would have been evacuated either on of February or 19*
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of February. We estimated and presented the number of latent cases on 3'^‘* February evacuation and on
19* February, 2020.
Results:
Using the SEIR model assuming relatively homogenous mixing of all people onboard, we calibrated
the predicted cumulative number of infections from the model to the observed cumulative number of
infections among all people onboard and estimated the initial Rq to 14.8. This resembled an estimate
of p (the daily reproduction rate) to 1.48. To derive this estimate we calibrated functions describing
transient change in the as a result of changes in contact rate and the removal of symptomatic
infections. The parameter values of contact rate, quarantine interventions and removal presented in
Table 1 are the results of the calibration to the observed cumulative incidence data. The contact rate
between persons on the cruise ship was calibrated to give the best fit to data with a reduction of 70%
by the quarantine countermeasure with onset February, 2020. The transient function of removal and
isolation of infected cases with an onset on 5* February, 2020, reduced the infectious period from 10
to 4 days, and substantially reduced the transmission and sub-sequent infections on the ship. In Figure
1 we present the change in Rq based on the relationship between Rq and ^ and how it is affected by
the transient countermeasures of quarantine and removal of ill patients from the model. Here Rq
should be interpreted as the basic reproductive rate in a totally naive population on the Diamond
Princess (i.e. same contact rate), and not the actual basic reproductive number over time on the cruise
ship. The Rq was 14.8 initially and then R^ declined to a stable 1.78 after the quarantine and removal
interventions were initiated (Figure 1).
The predicted cumulative number of cases over time from this model described the observed cases
well, but overestimated the cumulative case incidence rate initially (Figure 2). This allowed to
compensate for reporting bias in the initial phase, given that the proportion of testing of all passengers
was patchy while at the end of the study (19* February, 2020) the testing of passengers had a higher
coverage and was more complete. The modelled cumulative number of cases on 19 February, 2020, is
613 out of the 3700 people at risk, while the observed reported number of cases is 619. The
counterfactual scenario assuming homogenous rates among crew and guests without any interventions
(no removal off the ship or isolation of ill persons nor any quarantine measures for the remaining
passengers on boat), estimated the number of cumulative cases to be 2920 out of the 3700 after 30
days, that is by 19* of February (Figure 2). The net effect of the combined interventions was estimated
to prevent a total number of 2307 cases by 19* February, 2020 (Figure 2).
In a sensitivity analysis we modified the Rq to 3.7 (and consequently p to 0.37) as this has been
reported the average basic reproduction number from studies of COVID-19 in China.^ However, from
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our simulation, even in the absence of any intervention, such a low Rq cannot explain the rapid growth
of incident cases on the cruise ship (Figure 3). This sensitivity scenario excluded countermeasures
from the model making it unrealistic that such a low Rq value could be the true value in the cruise ship
situation with confined spaces and high homogeneous mixing of the same persons. The estimate with
the lower Rq value also omitted to consider the strong interventions put into place, making it even
more unrealistic.
We additionally modeled a scenario stratified by crew and guests whereby we assumed the parameter
values of transmission risk to be lower for crew to guest than for guest to crew (Table 1). The
predicted cumulative number of infected crew and guests by 19th of February from this model was
168 out of 1000 (16.8%) and 464 out of 2700 (17.2%), respectively (Figure 4). The total number of
cumulative cases by 19* of February predicted from this model was 632, close to the observed number
of cases of 619. The predicted cumulative incidence rates were overestimated for crew while
underestimated for guests based on available tests results at the time of writing (Figure 4). These data
still need to be validated against the empiric data of test results in all crew and passengers which
should soon become available.
Instead of keeping all passengers on board, another option would have been to evacuate all individuals
onboard the cruise ship earlier, and allow them to go home for a potential quarantine in their
respective home countries. We modeled that an evacuation by 3* February, 2020, would have resulted
in 76 latent cases (cases during the incubation time), while an evacuation by 19* February would have
resulted in 246 latent cases.
Discussion:
Modelling the COVID-19 on-board outbreak reveals important insights into the epidemic risk and
effectiveness of public health measures. We found that the reproductive number of COVID-19 in the
cruise ship situation of 3,700 persons confined to a limited space was around 4 times higher than in the
epicenter in Wuhan, where Rq was estimated to have a mean of 3.7.^ Interestingly, a rough estimation
of the population per square km on this 18-deck ship is 286 by 62 meters (0.32 km^). Assuming that
only 50% of decks are being used, approximately 24,400 persons are confined per km^ on a ship
compared to approximately 6000 persons per km^ (9,000,000/1528) in urban Wuhan. This means that
the population density was about 4 times higher on the cruise ship. Thus, both Rq and contact rate are
dependent on population density, as also suggested by previous research.^^ In population-based models
on observational data the population per square km is often substantially different, affecting the Rg and
P coefficient implicitly by changes in the contact rate expressed as:
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Ro
— = Transmissibility * contact rate
The local estimate of Ro can be divided into a localized contact rate and a multiplier that is necessary
for moving from one population to another:
contact rate = contact rate
localized
pd, where pd is the population density multiplier. In our
case it was approximated to 4. Here the contact rate is relating to a contact rate in a defined population
in a certain area and the population density multiplier modifies the contact rate when moving across
different local population and geographical areas representing heterogeneity in population density. In
the case of the cruise ship, the potential relationship of Rq to population density appear thus mainly be
attributed to the contact rate and mixing effects. This information is also important for other settings
characterized by high population densities.
With such a high Rq, we estimated that without any interventions within the time period of
January to 19* February 2920 out of the 3700 (79%) would have been infected, assuming relatively
homogenous mixing between all people on board.
The quarantine and removal interventions launched when the outbreak was confirmed (3’^'* February
and 5* of February) substantially lowered the contact rate and reduced the cumulative case burden by
an estimated 2307 cases by 19* February. We note, however, that the longer time span of simulation
beyond 19* February, assuming people would stay on the boat, would reduce the net effect of the
intervention substantially. We further note that an earlier evacuation would have corresponded to
disembarking a substantially lower number of latent undetectable infections (76 vs. 246), likely giving
rise to some further transmission outside the ship.
We also found that contact rate of guest to guest and crew appeared higher than the contact rate from
guest to crew, perhaps driven by high transmission rates within cabins. However, testing of crew was
delayed, and there was a testing bias towards testing more passengers than crew. Hence our access to
empiric data may have and this analysis need to be revisited when all data is available.
The limitations of our study include our lack of data on the lag time between onset of symptoms, the
timing of testing and potential delay to the availability of test results. Due to the large number of
people, not everyone was tested, and we suspect that the timing of the test results do not totally tally
with real-time onset of cases. We had no access to data on incident cases in crew versus passengers,
nor any data on whether there was clustering of cases around certain nationalities or crew members.
Furthermore, although the Hong Kong passenger was assumed to be the index case, it could well have
been possible that there was more than one index case on board who could have contributed to
transmission, and this would have lowered our estimated RO. Lastly, our models are based on human-
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to-human transmission and do not take into account the possibility that fomites, or water systems with
infected feces, contributed to the outbreak.
The interventions that included the removal of all persons with confirmed COVID-19 disease
combined with the quarantine of all passengers substantially reduced the anticipated number of new
COVID-19 cases compared to a scenario without any interventions (17% attack rate with intervention
versus 79% without intervention) and thus prevented a total number of 2307 additional cases by 19*
February. However, the main conclusion from our modelling is that evacuating all passengers and
crew early on in the outbreak would have prevented many more passengers and crew members from
getting infected. A scenario of early evacuation at the time of first detection of the outbreak (3
February) would have resulted in only 76 latent infected persons during the incubation time (with
potentially still negative tests). A late evacuation by 19* February would have resulted in about 246
infected persons during their incubation time. These data need to be confirmed by empiric data of
testing all evacuated persons after 19* February, and may be an overestimate as we assumed a stable
Rq after quarantine was instituted. However, the Rq probably declined over time, as the
implementation of quarantine measures were incrementally implemented leading to better quarantine
standards towards the end of the quarantine period.
In conclusion, the cruise ship conditions clearly amplified an already highly transmissible disease. Rq
is related to population density, and is particularly driven by contact rate and mixing effects, and this
explains the high Rq in the first weeks before countermeasures were initiated. Population densities and
mixing need to be taken into account in future modeling of the COVID-19 outbreak in different
settings. Early evacuation of all passengers on a cruise ship- a situation with confined spaces and high
intermixing- is recommended as soon as an outbreak of COVID-19 is confirmed.
Author contributions: JR and AWS conceived the study. JR developed the model and run the
analysis. HS advised on model development, and helped with the figures. AWS advised on model
parameters. All authors wrote the final manuscript.
Funding: None
Declaration of interest: none declared.
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Table 1. Model parameter description and values. Start time {t = 0) the 20^*' of January.
Parameters
Explanation (unit)
Estimated to
P
Overall transmissibility and contact rate (1/day)
1.48 i/ t < 14
0.44 if t > 14
1
Incubation period (days)
5 days
i
Infectious period or time to removal (days)
10 if t< 16
4ift>16
N
Total number of people onboard (persons)
3700
Pc
Transmissibility and contact rate crew (1/day)
I.IS if t< 14
0.3S if t> 14
Pgg
Transmissibility and contact rate guests to
guests (1/day)
I.IS if t< 14
0.3S if t> 14
Pgc
Transmissibility and contact rate guests to crew
(1/day)
0.17 if t < 14
O.OS if t> 14
N,
Total number of guests onboard (persons)
2700
Nc
Total number of crew onboard (persons)
WOO
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Figure 1. The estimated basic reproduction number, Rq, on the cruise ship and its change over time
as a result of the transient interventions of quarantine and removal of infectious cases. The Rq given
here assumes one index case in a totally naive population, although that is not the case on the ship, we
use it here to illustrate how the Rq is sensitive to the interventions, but still substantially large to fuel a
continuation of the epidemic. The grey line indicates Rq = 1-
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Figure 2. Predicted total number of infections using model 1 (no stratification) for the realistic
situation with interventions (blue), counterfactual scenario without intervention (grey) and the net
effect of the interventions (black).
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0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Time in days since 21 Jan
Figure 3. Sensitivity analysis: predicting total number of infections using a model without
interventions with Rg set to 3.7 with index case 21th January (bottom). Observed reports of
cumulative cases are marked as "o ”.
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Time in days since 21 Jan
Figure 4. Predicted total number of infections using a model stratified into crew and guest for the
realistic situation with interventions. Total population onboard (black), guests (grey), crew (blue).
Observed total case numbers of total (black), crew (blue) and guest (grey) are marked as "o".
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COVID-19 Shipboard Considerations
1.) If there is a COVID-19 outbreak on a ship, what is the expected attack rate (i.e. what
% of the crew do we think will get infected)?
In a shipboard population, with the assumption of only one member of the ship crew infected and all
others susceptible, the table below displays the estimated proportion of the crew that will be infected at
points in time (days). Additionally, this projection assumes that no preventive measure are taken.
Day
Only 1 ship crew personnel initially infected
Population: 150
Population: 300
Population: 1,000
Population: 5,000
7
3%
1%
<0%
<0%
14
14%
8%
2%
<0%
21
41%
29%
12%
3%
28
49%
50%
38%
13%
35
36%
42%
49%
39%
42
23%
28%
37%
49%
Note: The model was generated using the SIR model for epidemics.
2.) How long do we think they will be down?
The duration of illness (defined as the number of days that corresponds to a proportion of people
infected) differs conditional on the population size of the ship and assuming that no public health
intervention is applied. Using the SIR model, as the population size onboard the ship increases the
proportion of people who become infected over time decreases. For instance, for a ship with 150
personnel, if a Commander decides that the ship is no longer functional when 20% of the ship's crew is
ill, the ship becomes non-functional at day 16, and subsequently recovers functionality at day 44, or a
total of 28 days. (Please see 'Shipboard Population 150' graph, below).
Assumptions:
• The R-naught (Ro) represents the number of people infected by a person sick with the
virus; this model assumes an Ro of 5 people (Ro=5).
o On average, the Ro for COVID-19 ranges from 2.5 to 5.
o A higher Rois used given the close quarters on a ship and higher
likelihood of transmission.
• An individual is infectious for 14 days, (https://www.who.int/docs/default-
source/coronaviruse/who-china-ioint-mission-on-covid-19-final-report.pdf)
• No control measures are implemented.
COVID-19 Shipboard Considerations
Prepared by the EpiData Center - March 17 2020
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NAVY AND MARINE CORPS PURLIC HEALTR CENTER
PREVENTION AND PROTECTION START HERE
Shipboard Population: 150
100%
c 80%
o
^ 60%
Q.
Q- 40%
'o
20%
0%
1 3 5 7 9 11131517192123252729313335373941434547 49
Day
^^™% infected not currently infected
• The peak represents the interception where the maximum number of people are infected and
more people recovered (day 25).
• Lines in the above graph indicate day 16 (20% infected) and day 44 (20% infected)
Shipboard Population: 300
100%
c 80%
o
^ 60%
3
C3.
Q- 40%
o
^ 20%
0%
1 3 5 7 9 1113151719212325272931333537394143454749
Day
^^— % infected % not currently infected
• The peak represents the interception where the maximum number of people are infected and
more people recovered (day 28).
COVID-19 Shipboard Considerations
Prepared by the EpiData Center - March 17 2020
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NAVY AND MARINE CORPS PURLIC HEALTR CENTER
PREVENTION AND PROTECTION START HERE
Shipboard Population: 1,000
c
o
Q.
O
•% infected
Day
•% not currently infected
The peak represents the interception where the maximum number of people are infected and
more people recovered (day 33).
Shipboard Population: 5,000
Day
infected not currently infected
• The peak represents the interception where the maximum number of people are infected and
more people recovered (day 40).
COVID-19 Shipboard Considerations
Prepared by the EpiData Center - March 17 2020
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3.) What are the triggers for ordering a ship into enclave?
Assuming 'enclave' means 'quarantine', it is not recommended that a ship be
quarantined should a COVID-19 case be discovered aboard. Rather, home
isolation and self-quarantine is recommended. Should the ship be underway, it is
recommended that disease mitigation processes be implemented as per
Guidance for Underway Evaluation and Management of 2019 Novel Coronavirus
(available through NMCPHC website COVID-19 toolbox at:
https://esportal.med.navv.mil/sites/nmcphc/pps/wppcl9/COVID-19-
Toolbox.aspx).
^Lauer, S., Grantz, K., Bi, Q., Jones, F., Zheng, Q., Meredith, H . & Lessler, J. (2020). The Incubation Period of
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) From Publicly Reported Confirmed Cases: Estimation and Application. Annals
of Internal Medicine.
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COVID-19 Shipboard Considerations
Prepared by the EpiData Center - March 17 2020
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
ALL HANDS
CIV USN
Gym"s Secured
Sunday, March 29, 2020 11:09:13 PM
Hello Rough Riders,
All the Gym's on the TR are currently secured until further notice. The Pier "Gym" will be reorganized and opened
at the earliest opportunity today. We apologize for any inconvenience. Thank you.
v/r
Afloat Rec Specialist "Funboss"
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)
TO
)(6)
@cvn71 navy mil
w.cel^b) (dJ’
Jdialrp) ^
brickrtb) 1
@gmail.com
H-3-87
5/25/2020
https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2020/nav20092.txt
UNCLASSIFIED//
ROUTINE
R 272107Z MAR 20 MID110000530450U
EM CNO WASHINGTON DC
TO NAVADMIN
INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC
BT
UNCLAS
NAVADMIN 092/20
PASS TO OFFICE CODES:
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC//N1//
INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC//N1//
MSGID/GENADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC/Nl/MAR//
sub: /URINALYSIS POLICY UPDATE//
REF/A/DOC/N1/4:UN09//
REF/B/WEBPAGE/CDC//
NARR/ REF A IS OPNAVINST 5350. 4D, NAVY ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE
PREVENTION AND CONTROL. REF B IS CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL (CDC)
COVID-19 HOW TO PROTECT YOURSELF AVAILABLE AT
HTTPS : //WWW . CDC . GOV/CORONAVIRUS/2019-NCOV/PREPARE/PREVENTION .HTML //
RMKS/1. This NAVADMIN announces a temporary amendment to the Navy
urinalysis program to minimize Sailor exposure to Coronavirus-19
(COVID-19) and adhere to social distancing requirements.
2. Commands will continue random urinalysis specimen collection
from Sailors during the COVID-19 pandemic to the greatest extent
possible. Commanders and Commanding Officers may pause collection
and/or reduce collection percentages and numbers of days collected
if he/she deems it necessary to support maximum operational
flexibility and/or COVID-19 mitigation efforts.
a. Drug testing shall be conducted with no more than 10 people^
including the urinalysis program coordinator (UPC) and observerj
gathering for testing in one place at one time while maintaining
social distancing of six feet at all times while continuing to
follow all collection procedures outlined in reference (a) .
b. All command-directed j probable cause^ mishap investigations
and rehabilitation testing will continue in accordance with
reference (a) .
c. Commands shall not recall individuals who are sickj
restricted in movement (ROM)j quarantined or self -monitoring and
should not recall individuals who are teleworking or in a non duty
status to provide a drug testing specimen.
d. Navy Drug Screening Laboratories (NDSL) will continue to
operate and test these specimens.
3. Sailors assigned to non-Navy activities will follow the policy
of those activities.
4. As a result of this temporary policy change^ the requirement in
paragraph 6. a., enclosure (2) of reference (a) to provide their
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5/25/2020
https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2020/nav20092.txt
echelon 3 commander with the reason for failing to comply with
reference (a) is suspended until further notice.
5. Care must continue to be taken when conducting random urinalysis
collections. According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)j it
is not known whether non-respiratory body fluids such as urine can
contain the virus. The CDC indicates interpersonal contact
continues to present the greatest risk of COVID-19 exposure. Please
adhere to the following processes to mitigate risks to exposure
during urinalysis collections in line with reference (b).
a. All urinalysis specimen collection testing shall comply with
all current OPNAV policies and CDC Health Guidance.
b. All participants must engage in safe hygiene practices^
including hand washing^ maintaining the six feet social distancing
requirement^ and refraining from touching their face.
c. Administrators shall wipe down all surfaces contacted (after
each contact) throughout collection to include tables and door
handles .
d. UPCs will not handle a specimen bottle after it has been in
the possession/control of the Sailor. Sailors providing a specimen
will tighten the lids securely to avoid cross contamination^ adhere
labelSj affix security tape on the specimen bottle and place their
specimen bottle in a secondary container with absorbent materials
under the observation and direction of the UPC. Sailors should use
their own pen to sign and initial during the process. Additionally^
UPCs should not handle the military identification card of the
Sailor.
e. SailorSj UPCs and observers must avoid personal touch and
wash their hands after any contact during this process. All must
avoid the exchange of personal items (i.e.j identification cardSj
penSj etc.).
6. For additional information or questions^ the urinalysis program
point of contact is Ms. LaNorfeia Parker j OPNAV N170Dj at (901) 874-
4249/DSN 882 or lanorfeia.parker(at)navy.mil.
7. This NAVADMIN will remain in effect until superseded or
canceled^ whichever occurs first.
8. Released by Vice Admiral lohn B. Nowell^ 3r, Nl.//
BT
#0001
NNNN
UNCLASSIFIED//
H-3-88
https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2020/nav20092.txt
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
p->) (K) I MA2 USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt
hods: hods & PAs: DLCPOs: ALL OFFICERS: ALL CHIEFS: E-6 and Below: Yeoman
R 272107Z MAR 20 CNO WASHINGTON DC URINALYSIS POLICY UPDATE
Sunday, March 29, 2020 2:17:07 AM
Good Morning Rough Riders and Embarked Staff,
We will be continuing urinalysis testing despite COVID-19. Please see the
NAV ADMIN on the policy update below for instmctions on the process we will
be following until further notice. To ensure the health and safety of all
personnel, the following must be adhered by.
When the urinalysis list comes out for the day, we will be assigning times
for each department, please ensure your department reports by their assigned
time.
Thank you for your patience during this process. If you have any questions
please email myself, MAI and MAC If your department has
individuals that are TAD or quarantined please forward a list ASAP.
CNO WASHINGTON DC NAV ADMIN 092/20 message below.
- — OFFICIAL INFORMATION DISPATCH FOLLOWS- —
RTTUZYUW RHOIAAAOOOI 0872III-UUUU-RHSSSUU.
ZNR UUUUU
R 272I07Z MAR 20 MIDII0000530450U
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC
TO NAV ADMIN
INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC
BT
UNCLAS
NAV ADMIN 092/20
PASS TO OFFICE CODES:
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC//NI//
INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC//NI//
MSGID/GENADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC/N I/MAR//
SUBJ/URINALYSIS POLICY UPDATE//
REF/A/DOC/NI/4JUN09//
REF/B/WEBPAGE/CDC//
NARR/ REF A IS OPNAVINST 5350.4D, NAVY ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE
PREVENTION AND CONTROL. REF B IS CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL (CDC)
COVID-19 HOW TO PROTECT YOURSELF AVAILABLE AT
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prepare/prevention.html //
RMKS/1. This NAV ADMIN announces a temporary amendment to the Navy
urinalysis program to minimize Sailor exposure to Coronavims-19
(COVID-19) and adhere to social distancing requirements.
2. Commands will continue random urinalysis specimen collection
from Sailors during the COVID-19 pandemic to the greatest extent
possible. Commanders and Commanding Officers may pause collection
and/or reduce collection percentages and numbers of days collected
if he/she deems it necessary to support maximum operational
flexibility and/or COVID-19 mitigation efforts.
a. Drug testing shall be conducted with no more than 10 people,
including the urinalysis program coordinator (UPC) and observer.
H-3-89
gathering for testing in one place at one time while maintaining
social distancing of six feet at all times while continuing to
follow all collection procedures outlined in reference (a).
b. All command-directed, probable cause, mishap investigations
and rehabilitation testing will continue in accordance with
reference (a).
c. Commands shall not recall individuals who are sick,
restricted in movement (ROM), quarantined or self-monitoring and
should not recall individuals who are teleworking or in a non-duty
status to provide a dmg testing specimen.
d. Navy Drug Screening Laboratories (NDSL) will continue to
operate and test these specimens.
3. Sailors assigned to non-Navy activities will follow the policy
of those activities.
4. As a result of this temporary policy change, the requirement in
paragraph 6. a., enclosure (2) of reference (a) to provide their
echelon 3 commander with the reason for failing to comply with
reference (a) is suspended until further notice.
5. Care must continue to be taken when conducting random urinalysis
collections. According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), it
is not known whether non-respiratory body fluids such as urine can
contain the vims. The CDC indicates interpersonal contact
continues to present the greatest risk of COVID-19 exposure. Please
adhere to the following processes to mitigate risks to exposure
during urinalysis collections in line with reference (b).
a. All urinalysis specimen collection testing shall comply with
all current OPNAV policies and CDC Health Guidance.
b. All participants must engage in safe hygiene practices,
including hand washing, maintaining the six feet social distancing
requirement, and refraining from touching their face.
c. Administrators shall wipe down all surfaces contacted (after
each contact) throughout collection to include tables and door
handles.
d. UPCs will not handle a specimen bottle after it has been in
the possession/control of the Sailor. Sailors providing a specimen
will tighten the lids securely to avoid cross contamination, adhere
labels, affix security tape on the specimen bottle and place their
specimen bottle in a secondary container with absorbent materials
under the observation and direction of the UPC. Sailors should use
their own pen to sign and initial during the process. Additionally,
UPCs should not handle the military identification card of the
Sailor.
e. Sailors, UPCs and observers must avoid personal touch and
wash their hands after any contact during this process. All must
avoid the exchange of personal items (i.e., identification cards,
pens, etc.).
6. For additional information or questions, the urinalysis program
point of contact is Ms. LaNorfeia Parker, OPNAV N170D, at (901) 874-
4249/DSN 882 or lanorfeia.parker(at)navy.mil.
7. This NAV ADMIN will remain in effect until superseded or
canceled, whichever occurs first.
8. Released by Vice Admiral John B. Nowell, Jr, Nl.//
BT
#0001
NNNN
<DmdsSecurity>UNCLASSIFIED//</DmdsSecurity>
<DmdsReleaser>QUINONES.JUSTIN.1465628673</DmdsReleaser>
H-3-89
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//
V/R, _
MA2(SW/AW/IW) p) (B)
Assistant Urinalysis Coordinator
USS Theodore Roosevelt
Security Dept.
I-DIAL: I
H-3-89
5/25/2020
https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2020/NAV20080.txt
UNCLASSIFIED//
ROUTINE
R 212007Z MAR 20 MID110000505261U
EM CNO WASHINGTON DC
TO NAVADMIN
INFO SECNAV WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
BT
UNCLAS
NAVADMIN 080/20
PASS TO OFFICE CODES:
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC//N1//
INFO SECNAV WASHINGTON DC//CNO//
CNO WASHINGTON DC//N1//
MSGID/NAVADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC/CNO/MAR//
sub: /NAVY MITIGATION MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO CORONAVIRUS
OUTBREAK UPDATE 3//
REF/A/NAVADMIN/OPNAV/122210ZMAR20//
REF/B/NAVADMIN/OPNAV/142000ZMAR20//
REF/C/NAVADMIN/OPNAV/192309ZMAR20//
REF/D/MEMO/OSD/20MAR2020//
REF/E/OPLAN/NORTHCOM/DOD GCP PI&ID 3551 13/150CT13//
REF/F/INST/DODI 6200.03/28MAR19//
REF/G/MEMO/OSD/30:AN2020//
REF/H/EXORD/:OINT STAFF :3/012240ZFEB20//
REF/I/MEMO/OSD/07FEB2020//
REF/:/MEMO/OSD/25FEB2020//
REF/K/NAVADMIN/OPNAV/071613ZFEB20//
REF/L/NAVADMIN/OPNAV/112054ZFEB20//
REF/M/NAVADMIN/OPNAV/051456ZMAR20//
REF/N/GENADMIN/:OINT STAFF/051908ZMAR20//
REF/0/MEM0/:0INT STAFF/06MAR2020//
REF/P/MEMO/OSD/10MAR2020//
REF/Q/MEMO/OSD/11MAR2020//
REF/R/ALNAV/SECNAV/025-20//
REF/S/MEMO/OSD/11MAR2020//
H-3-90
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1/12
5/25/2020
https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2020/NAV20080.txt
REF/T/ALNAV/SECNAV/026-20//
REF/U/MEMO/OSD/13MAR2020//
REF/V/MEMO/SECNAV/21MAR2020//
NARR/REF A IS NAVADMIN 064/20, NAVY MITIGATION MEASURES
IN RESPONSE TO CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK (OVERSEAS) . REF B
IS NAVADMIN 065/20, NAVY MITIGATION MEASURES IN RESPONSE
TO CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK UPDATE 1 (DOMESTIC). REF C IS
NAVY MITIGATION MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO CORONAVIRUS
OUTBREAK UPDATE 2. REF D IS MEMO FROM UNDERSECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS, AUTHORIZED
DEPARTURE INDIVIDUALS AT HIGHER RISK FROM COVID-19.
REF E IS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) GLOBAL CAMPAIGN
PLAN FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE. REF
F IS DODI 6200.03, PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
WITHIN THE DOD. REF G IS MEMO FROM UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS PROVIDING FORCE
HEALTH PROTECTION GUIDANCE FOR PERSONNEL RETURNING FROM
CHINA DURING THE NOVEL CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19) OUTBREAK.
REF H IS SECDEF-APPROVED EXORD THAT DIRECTS USNORTHCOM
TO EXECUTE ITS PANDEMIC PLAN 3551-13 AND SUPPORTING
GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDERS TO EXECUTE THEIR
PANDEMIC PLANS IN RESPONSE TO THE NCOV (COVID-19)
OUTBREAK. REF I IS SUPPLEMENT 1 TO REF G. REF 3 IS
SUPPLEMENT 2 TO REF G. REF K IS NAVADMIN 033/20, OPNAV
REPORTING GUIDANCE SUPPORTING DOD RESPONSE TO THE COVID-
19 OUTBREAK. REF L IS NAVADMIN 039/20, UPDATED DOD
GUIDANCE FOR MONITORING PERSONNEL RETURNING FROM CHINA
DURING THE NOVEL CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK. REF M IS
NAVADMIN 058/20, UPDATED NAVY GUIDANCE DURING THE NOVEL
CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK. REF N IS lOINT STAFF MESSAGE FOR
DOD COVID-19 PASSENGER SCREENING GUIDELINES FOR OVERSEAS
MILITARY TRANSPORTATION TERMINALS. REF 0 IS lOINT STAFF
FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION GUIDANCE TO MITIGATE THE RISK OF
COVID-19 TRANSMISSION. REF P IS MEMO FROM UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS
PROVIDING FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION GUIDANCE FOR THE USE
OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT AND NON -PHARMACEUTICAL
INTERVENTIONS DURING THE CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019
OUTBREAK. REF Q IS MEMO FROM UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS PROVIDING FORCE HEALTH
PROTECTION GUIDANCE FOR PERSONNEL TRAVELING DURING THE
NOVEL CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK. REF R IS ALNAV 025/20,
FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION GUIDANCE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF
NAVY. REF S IS MEMO FROM SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS FOR DOD COMPONENTS IN RESPONSE TO
CORONAVIRUS DISEASE. REF T IS ALNAV 026/20, OFFICIAL AND
PERSONAL DOMESTIC TRAVEL FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION
GUIDANCE FOR DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (CONUS TRAVEL
GUIDANCE). REF U IS MEMO FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR STOP MOVEMENT FOR DOMESTIC TRAVEL FOR DOD
COMPONENTS IN RESPONSE TO CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019. REF
V IS ASN (M&RA) MEMO ON AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE
INDIVIDUALS AT HIGHER RISK FROM COVID-19.//
POC/RADM KARL THOMAS/OPNAV N3N5B/703-692-
9291/KARL.0.TH0MAS1(AT)NAVY.MIL/
RADM lEFFREY lABLON/OPNAV N13/703-604-
5040/: EFFREY.IABLON (AT) NAVY. MIL/
RADM GAYLE SHAFFER/OPNAV N093B/703-697-7399/
GAYLE. SHAFFER(AT)MED. NAVY. MIL//
RMKS/1.
This NAVADMIN supersedes references (c) and
https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2020/NAV20080.txt
2/12
5/25/2020
https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2020/NAV20080.txt
consolidates those NAVADMINs into one NAVADMIN for ease of
reference. It also adds implementing guidance in paragraph 3.H. for
an Authorized Departure (AD) of DoD eligible family members (EFMs)
and civilian employees in line with references (d) and (v) . This
NAVADMIN contains measures to mitigate the spread of COVID-19
throughout the Navy enterprise and amplifies DoD and DoN direction
for Service Members and Navy civilians. It summarizes and repeats
applicable guidance where appropriate so that this will serve as a
one-stop information source. Authorized travelers will adhere to
the Force Health Protection Guidelines (FHPG) as detailed throughout
references (a) through (v) as summarized in this NAVADMIN^ and later
guidance.
l.A. Background. The DoD has transitioned to Phase Three
(Respond) of reference (e), the global campaign in response to the
COVID 19 outbreak. Our workforce is our first line of defense. All
hands must proactively take action to ensure the health of our
forcOj and to ensure we mitigate the spread of COVID-19 in order to
maintain our readiness. During the COVID-19 outbreak^ the DoD and
DoN will continue to protect and preserve the operational
effectiveness of forces worldwide in accordance with (lAW)
references (e) and (f) . Utilizing FHPG from the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R)) provided in
references (g) and (q)j USNORTHCOM is executing its pandemic plan
and geographic combatant commanders are executing their supporting
pandemic plans lAW reference (h). In compliance with updated USD
(P&R) FHPG issued in references (i) and (j)j Office of Chief Naval
Operations (OPNAV) published initial reporting guidance supporting
DoD response to the COVID-19 outbreak in reference (k) and updated
that guidance in references (c)j (l)j and (m).
l.B. Role of the CDC. As the leading U.S. government Public
Health Agency^ the CDC continues to assess the risk of COVID 19 and
to provide guidance for those residing in the U.S. and traveling
abroad. Because CDC guidance is principally tailored for persons
residing in the U.S.j some CDC COVID-19 guidance may have limited
applicability for commanders^ particularly those outside the United
States j and is not recognized by other sovereign nations. While DoD
continues to follow the lead of the CDCj when needed^ additional
military specific measures are authorized to mitigate risk to U.S.
forces stationed or deployed around the worlds and to protect
Service Members^ Navy civilian employees^ and their family members.
USD (P&R) FHPG issued in reference (q) provides guidance for DoD
personnel traveling during the novel coronavirus outbreak.
l.C. CDC Travel Health Advisories. The CDC provides travel
health advisories at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/travelers/index. html . The Advisory Levels are noted below and
will be referenced in this NAVADMIN (note that CDC warning levels DO
NOT apply to the U.S.):
Level 1 Watchj practice usual precautions (risk of
limited community transmission)
Level 2 Alertj practice enhanced precautions
(sustained (ongoing) community transmission)
Level 3 Warnings avoid nonessential travel (widespread
sustained (ongoing) transmission)
l.D. DoN Civilian Guidance. The DoN civilian workforce more
than 220J000 strong plays an integral role in supporting our
Sailors and buildings manning and maintaining our shipSj aircraft^
and submarines. Working shoulder to shoulder with our Service
MemberSj it is imperative to have alignment between Navy civilian
and military COVID 19 policy and guidance. DoN civilian guidance is
contained in references (r) and (t) as well as this NAVADMIN.
l.E. Military Health Protection Guidance. The Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF) provided explicit FHPG in references (g) and (q)
which is more restrictive than CDC guidance. Commanders must read
both documents in their entirety and ensure they are following the
actions spelled out in this guidance.
Local Co
s can be more
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3/12
5/25/2020
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restrictive based on Command location^ local community transmission j
risk to mission and risk to force. Each and every Sailor must
ensure they proactively manage and minimize their personal risk to
exposure^ and that of their families. Commands are charged with
ensuring they track and monitor each Sailor and aggressively follow
SECDEF guidance in these references.
2. Mission. All commands will take specific actions to mitigate
the spread of COVID-19 worldwide and adhere to the policies and
reporting requirements contained in this NAVADMIN.
3. Policy. This NAVADMIN applies to all Navy Service
MemberSj Navy civilians^ and their families assigned to DoD
installations world-wide. In order to maintain force health
protectionj readiness of the force and mitigate the risk of
transmission among personnel^ SECDEF directed an OCONUS
travel stop movement to affected countries and areas
effective 13 Mar 2020 in reference (s). This includes all
forms of travel (Permanent Change of Station (PCS)j
Temporary Duty (TAD/TDY)j and government-funded leave). For
Service Members this also includes personal leave and other
non-official travel. On 13 March 2020 Deputy SECDEF
directed a domestic travel stop movement in reference (u).
In line with references (t) and (u)j which provides domestic
travel guidance^ all Service Members will stop movement and
Navy civilian personnel and family members whose
transportation is government funded will also stop movement.
The domestic travel stop movement applies to PCS and
TAD/TDYj and Service Members are only authorized local
leave. Until the domestic travel restrictions prescribed
above are lifted^ Navy commands may only gain/onboard
civilian employees within the local commuting area. The
following domestic travel is authorized: (1) Travel by
patients and medical providers for the purpose of medical
treatment for Navy personnel and their family members (2)
Individuals who have already initiated PCS or TDY travel
(including intermediate stops) are authorized to continue to
their final destination (see paragraphs 3.B. through 3.E.
for further amplification) (3) Individuals whose TDY and/or
leave ends while this NAVADMIN is in effect are authorized
to return to their home station at the end of their TDY
and/or leave (see paragraph 3.C. through 3.F. for further
amplification) (4)Individuals pending retirement or
separation during this period are exempt. This stop
movement (both overseas and domestic) will remain in effect
until 11 May 2020.
3. A. Permanent Change of Station (PCS) Overseas. Service
MemberSj Navy civilians and dependents under OCONUS PCS orders to
locations designated CDC COVID-19 Warning Level 3 or CDC COVID-19
Alert Level 2 will follow the guidance in section 3. A. of this
NAVADMIN. Note that CDC warning levels DO NOT apply to CONUS.
3.A.I. PCS orders to or from CDC COVID-19 Warning Level 3
locations for Service Members. Service Members and their dependents
under PCS orders to or from a CDC COVID-19 Warning Level 3 location
will stop movement. This policy applies to currently designated CDC
COVID-19 Warning Level 3 locationSj or those designated Level 3 at a
later date.
3.A.l.a. Service Members who have detached from
their parent command prior to the date of this NAVADMIN and are in
transit are directed to contact Navy Personnel Command (NPC) for
follow-on guidance per paragraph 5. A. NPC is standing by to address
each specific case and will authorize entitlements based on current
location and situation.
3.A.l.b. Detaching and gaining commands shall
make every effort to contact affected Service M^b^t^^ enroute
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to/from their command to advise them of the contents of this
message .
3. A. 2. PCS orders to CDC COVID-19 Alert Level 2 locations
for Service Members. Service Members under PCS orders to a CDC
COVID-19 Alert Level 2 location will execute orders. Dependents of
Service Members executing accompanied PCS orders to a CDC COVID-19
Alert Level 2 location will delay travel to the CDC COVID-19 Alert
Level 2 location until 11 May 2020. This policy applies to
currently designated CDC Alert Level 2 locations and those
designated at a later date.
3. A. 2. a. Service Members who have detached from
their parent command prior to the date of this NAVADMIN and are in
transit are directed to contact NPC for follow-on guidance per
paragraph 5. A. NPC is standing by to address each specific case and
will authorize entitlements based on current location and situation.
3.A.2.b. Detaching and gaining commands shall
make every effort to contact affected Service Members enroute
to/from their command to advise them of the contents of this
message .
3. A. 3. PCS orders to or from CDC COVID-19 Warning Level 3
locations for Navy civilians. Navy civilians and their dependents
under PCS orders to or from a CDC COVID-19 Warning Level 3 location
will stop movement. This policy applies to currently designated CDC
COVID-19 Warning Level 3 locations^ or those designated Level 3 at a
later date. Contact your supervisory chain of command for further
guidance.
3. A. 4. PCS orders to CDC COVID-19 Alert Level 2 locations
for Navy civilians. Navy civilians under PCS orders to a CDC COVID-
19 Alert Level 2 location will execute orders. Dependents of Navy
civilians executing accompanied PCS orders to a CDC COVID-19 Alert
Level 2 location will delay travel to the CDC COVID-19 Alert Level 2
location until 11 May 2020. This policy applies to currently
designated CDC Alert Level 2 locations and those designated at a
later date. Additionally^ until the travel restrictions are lifted
Navy civilian hiring actions for positions in Level 2 and Level 3
countries are postponed for non-essential civilian personnel who
have not yet begun travel. Contact your supervisory chain of
command for further guidance.
3.B. PCS in the United States and its territories. Service
MemberSj Navy civilians and dependents under domestic PCS orders
will follow the guidance in section 3.B. of this NAVADMIN.
3.B.I. Navy Civilians. All Department of the Navy
civilian employees whose transportation is government funded will
stop movement. Navy commands may continue civilian hiring actions^
but may only onboard civilian employees in the local commuting area.
Contact your supervisory chain of command for further guidance.
3.B.2. Service Members.
3.B.2.a. Service Members who have not yet
initiated PCS travel as of the effective date of this
NAVADMIN are directed to contact NPC for follow-on guidance
per paragraph 5. A. NPC is standing by to address each
specific case and will authorize entitlements based on
current location and situation.
3.B.2.b. For Service Members who have
already initiated PCS travel^ detaching and gaining commands
shall make every effort to contact those Service Members to
advise them of the contents of this message.
3.B.2.C. A local PCS move may be executed without
an exception since it does not involve travel outside of the local
area. To be clear^ same geographic location PCS moves will only be
executed with due regard to the operational readiness of the
commands involved. Losing and gaining commands are encouraged to
coordinate with placement coordinators and detailers in PERS-4 as
required. PERS-4 shall adjudicate same geographic location PCS move
decisions in situations where losing and gainin^c;
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agree on an execution timeline. This adjudication may be delegated^
but no lower than the 0-6 Division Director level at PERS-4.
3.C. Other Official Overseas Travel (Meetings^ ConferenceSj
Site VisitSj etc). All other official travel by Service Members and
Navy civilians to or from a country designated as CDC COVID-19
Warning Level 3, is prohibited and will require an exception lAW
paragraph 3.G. Navy Reserve personnel will follow guidance
promulgated by the Chief of Navy Reserves.
3.D. Other Official Domestic Travel (Meetings^
Conferences j Site Visits j etc.). All other official travel
by Service Members and Navy civilians in the United States
is prohibited and will require an exception lAW paragraph
3.G. Navy Reserve personnel will follow guidance
promulgated by the Chief of Navy Reserves.
3.E. Travel for Official Training (Overseas and Domestic).
3.E.I. Service Member and Navy civilian travel to attend
formal training will require an exception lAW paragraph 3.G prior to
travelj will require advance coordination with the training command
and will comply with Navy Component Commander guidance concerning
pre- and post- travel medical screening and reception procedures to
include restriction of movement (ROM) if applicable.
3.E.2. Service Members and Navy civilians currently under
PCS or TAD/TDY orders and attending training and/or schools will
complete their current training and/or school. For those on TAD/TDY
orderSj Service Members and Navy civilians are directed to contact
the command that issued the orders for returning
instructions/guidance. Navy civilians executing PCS orders are
directed to contact the command that issued the orders for further
guidance. Service Members executing PCS orders are directed to
contact Navy Personnel Command for guidance and potential orders
modification. Once the current school/training is complete^ Service
Members should expect to take one of the following actions: (1)
Return to their previous Permanent Duty Station (PDS)j (2) Remain at
the school/training site if prudent for health protection^ (3) If
the next school/training is in the same location and the course is
still being offered^ continue training. Reevaluate after
school/training completion^ (4) Proceed to the ultimate PDS.
Decisions will be based on force health protection considerations.
Throughout the process^ Service Members should consult with their
affected command (current^ losing or future) as well as their
detailer where applicable.
3.F. Personal Leave and Liberty (overseas and domestic).
Commanding Officers (CO) and officers in charge may authorize local
leave lAW command policy for Service Members. Leave or personal
travel outside of the local area^ as defined by Commanding Officers
and officers in charge^ requires an exception as outlined in
paragraph 3.G. For those Service Members currently on leave^ COs or
officers in charge are delegated authority to terminate leave early
or allow completion of leave as authorized based on location^
duration and risk to Service Member. For Navy civilians^ approval
or denial of civilian annual leave requests will be based on mission
requirements. While intended travel outside the local commuting
area may be considered in determining impact to mission
requirementSj leave requests for Navy civilians cannot be denied
solely because an employee is travelling outside of the local
commuting area. In line with reference (t) paragraph 3(b)j Navy
civilian employees are strongly encouraged to avoid personal leave
outside of the local area.
3.G. Exceptions.
3.G.I. Individuals pending retirement or separation
within the next 60 days are exempt from this stop movement.
3.G.2. Commanding officers and officers in charge may
request an exception to paragraphs 3. A. through 3.F. in the
following cases: (1) determined to be mission
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necessary for humanitarian reasons^ or (3) warranted due to extreme
hardship. Mission-essential travel refers to work that must be
performed to ensure the continued operations of mission essential
functionSj as determined by the local Commander.
3.G.2.a. Navy Personnel Command (PERS-4) is
authorized to approve or deny stop movement exceptions for Service
Member PCS travel in paragraphs 3.k., 3.B.j and 3.E.2. Approvals of
exception requests shall be made via message traffic to all
concerned and will specify whether dependents are authorized to
accompany the Service Member. Detaching Commander endorsement is
required. Upon receipt of an approved exception^ Transaction
Service Center or Personnel Support Detachment/personnel offices
will process the Service Member for transfer to the gaining command.
Send all exception requests to pers451(at)navy .mil with the subject
line PCS EXCEPTION REQUEST. Exception request formats will be
provided by PERS-4 and posted on MyNavy Portal. Service Members who
are granted an exception and are traveling from a CDC COVID-19
Warning Level 3 or Alert Level 2 location will receive guidance from
NPC concerning Navy Component Commander pre- and post- travel
medical screening and reception procedures to include ROM.
3.G.2.b. Authority to approve or deny stop
movement exceptions for Service Members in the case of: (1)
Official travel in paragraph 3.C. and 3.D.j and (2) Official
trainings not associated with a PCSj in paragraph 3.E.j and (3)
Leave requests that include travel outside of the local area in
paragraph 3.Fj is delegated to the echelon 2 commander. The echelon
2 commander may further delegate exception authority^ but no lower
than the first flag officer or Senior Executive Service (SES) in the
chain of command of the Service Member. Those who are granted an
exception will comply with the echelon 2 guidance concerning pre-
and post- travel screening and reception procedures.
3.G.2.C. Exceptions for PCS of Navy civilians.
Authority to approve or deny exceptions of the PCS of Navy civilians
from outside the local commuting area in paragraphs 3. A. and 3.B is
delegated to the echelon 2 commander. The echelon 2 commander may
further delegate exception authority^ but no lower than the first
flag officer or SES in the chain of command of the command or
activity performing the hiring action. Those who are granted an
exception will comply with the echelon 2 guidance concerning pre-
and post- travel screening and reception procedures.
3.G.2.d. Authority to approve or deny stop movement
exceptions for Navy civilians in the case of: (1) Official travel in
paragraph 3.C. and 3.D. and (2) Official trainings not associated
with a PCSj in paragraph 3.E. is delegated to the echelon 2
commander. The echelon 2 commander may further delegate exception
authority^ but no lower than the first flag officer or SES in the
Service Member or Navy civilian employee chain of command. Those
who are granted an exception will comply with the echelon 2 guidance
concerning pre- and post- travel screening and reception procedures.
3.H. Authorized Departure.
3.H.I. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Personnel and Readiness) has announced an Authorized Departure (AD)
as outlined in reference (d) . In line with reference (v)j Navy
Service Member eligible family members (EFMs) and Department of the
Navy civilian employees who have determined they are at higher risk
of a poor health outcome if exposed to COVID-19 or who have
requested departure based on a commensurate justification in foreign
areas as well as a civilian employee and/or other eligible family
members who may need to accompany them - are authorized to depart
their current duty station. DoN civilian employees who wish to
depart their duty station must consult with their chain of command.
3.H.2. The designated safe-haven for departing Service
Member eligible family members is the contiguous United States (US) .
The designated safe-haven for departing DoN civilian employees is
Arlington^ Virginia. Members should work with
ommands and
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local travel office to arrange for transportation to their safe-
haven. Authorized departures are only permitted when appropriate
transportation and reception procedures are in place consistent with
reference (s). Travelers should be aware that preventative health
measures to include restricted movement and business closures have
been implemented in the United States to various degrees by federal^
state and local governments. Travelers shall be advised to check
the restrictions applicable to their situation^ based on their
departure locationj any enroute locations (foreign and in the United
States) and their ultimate safe-haven^ as well as availability of
lodgingj prior to commencing travel. lAW the loint Travel
Regulations (ITR)j chapter 6, dependents must designate their
specific safe haven location in the United States upon^ or prior tOj
entry to the United States. Once designated j the specific safe-
haven cannot be changed. Dependents of uniformed personnel will be
processed for safe-haven allowances lAW with the ITRj Chapter 6,
paragraph 0602. DoN civilian employees and their eligible family
members will be processed for allowances lAW with the ITRj Chapter
6, paragraph 0604.
3.H.3. It is strongly recommended that eligible family
members and civilian employees after traveling tOj through and from
a location with a Center for Disease Control Travel Health Notice
for COVID-19 take the following measure for the next 14 days: (a)
Implement self-observations for symptoms of fever^ cough or
difficulty breathing (b) Implement social distancing^ e.g.j remain
out of congregate settings^ avoid mass gatherings^ and maintain 6
feet distance from others when possible (c) If individuals feel
feverish or develop measured fever^ coughj or difficulty breathings
immediately self -isolates limit contact with otherSs and seek advice
by telephone from the appropriate healthcare provider to determine
whether medical evaluation is requireds .
3.H.4. The following provides general information for
Service Member eligible family members regarding allowances. Members
are advised that the impact of this authorized departure on their
specific allowances is highly dependent on member individual
circumstances. For questions regarding specific allowanceSs members
should contact their nearest Personnel Support Detachment or My Navy
Career Center (MNCC) or consult the ITRs chapter 6.
3.H.4.a. Per diem: Transportation expenses and
travel per diem are authorized from the time the family departs the
evacuation site^ through the time they reach their selected safe
haven location in the continental United States including processing
time at both the evacuation and receiving site. A non-command
sponsored dependent is only authorized transportation and per diem.
Other allowances will not be paid.
3.H.4.b. Escort allowances: Travel and
transportation allowances are also payable to a member^ a U.S.
government civilian employee^ or a person who travels under an
official travel authorization/order as an escort for an evacuated
dependent who is incapable of traveling alone to the safe haven due
to age, physical or mental incapacityj or other extraordinary
circumstances .
3.H.4.C. Household goods (HHG) /shipping
allowance: upon a dependent departing for a safe haven^
unaccompanied baggage (for the dependent)^ and HHG items as needed
for dependent comfort and well-beingj may be transported at
government expense.
3.H.4.d. POV: Transportation of a POV at
government expense to a safe haven is not authorized.
3.H.4.e. Pets: A member is authorized
transportation to the safe haven location incident to an evacuation
from a foreign PDS for up to two household pets (defined by ITR
060204 as a cat or dog)j which the member owned at the evacuated
foreign PDS (to include quarantine fees) .
lerj whose
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3.H.4.f. Housing allowance: A
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command sponsored dependents are evacuated and who was authorized a
with dependent housing allowance on the evacuation date^ continues
to be paid such allowance while the members PDS remains unchanged
and the member continues to maintain private sector housings as long
as the command-sponsored dependents are receiving evacuation
allowances .
3.H.4.g. Family separation allowance (FSA): A
member is entitled to FSA if a member has a dependent depart an
overseas duty station at government expense because of an evacuation
and begins on the 31st day of dependent departure from the PDS.
3. FI. 5. The above listed allowances are not all inclusive
and may not be applicable in all cases. Members are encouraged to
contact the MNCC to obtain information specific to their
circumstances. Receipts/records pertaining to evacuation should be
retained .
3.1. Actions upon return from a CDC COVID-19 Alert Level 2 or
higher location or if in close contact with a confirmed COVID-19
infection .
3.1.1. Service Members who travel or have traveled in the
prior 14 days to or through a CDC COVID-19 Warning Level 3 or Alert
Level 2 location will immediately notify their chain of command and
be placed in a 14 day ROM status. Immediate supervisors will not
require Service Members to report to their duty location or
otherwise disregard the ROM. Service Members will comply with
reference (q) and Navy Component Commander guidance concerning pre-
and post- travel medical screening and reception procedures to
include ROM. Commanders may^ pursuant to DoD and Navy regulations
and policies^ authorize telework opportunities j permissive TAD/TDY
or work from home as necessary.
3.1.2. Service Members who have had close contact with
someone with a confirmed COVID-19 infection and feel sick with a
fever j cough or difficulty breathing shall:
3. 1. 2. a. Inform their Senior Medical Department
Representative immediately.
3.1.2. b. Seek medical care immediately. Before
going to the office of a doctor or emergency room^ call ahead to
provide recent travel locations and symptoms.
3.1.2. C. Avoid contact with others.
3.1.2. d. Stay home except to get medical care.
3.1.2. e. Cover mouth and nose with tissue or
sleeve (not hands) when coughing or sneezing.
3.3. Flolding Conferences. All Navy personnel shall maximize
the conduct of virtual conferenceSj meetings and classes to the
fullest extent. Flolding conferences are strongly discouraged and
must be approved by a Navy Component Commanderj Deputy Fleet
Commander^ Task Force Commander or Navy Region Commander charged
with hosting the conference.
3.K. General Flealth Guidance. Compliance with CDC guidance is
critical to minimize the spread of COVID-19. All personnel shall:
3.K.I. Wash hands often with soap and water for at least
20 secondSj especially after going to the bathroom^ before eatings
and after blowing your nose^ coughing or sneezing. If soap and
water are not readily available^ use an alcohol-based hand sanitizer
with at least 60 percent alcohol. Always wash hands with soap and
water if hands are visibly dirty.
3.K.2. Avoid close contact with people who are sick.
3.K.3. Avoid touching your eyeSj nose and mouth.
3.K.4. Stay home when you are sick.
3.K.5. Cover your cough or sneeze with a tissue^ then
throw the tissue in the trash.
3.K.6. Clean and disinfect frequently touched objects and
surfaces using a regular household cleaning spray or wipe.
3.K.7. Maximize open doors within area with equivalent
classification levels.
3.K.8.
Minimize meetings of more tha
persons .
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3.K.9. Practice social distancing.
3.K.10. Minimize attendance at large group gatherings
outside of the workplace (for example shopping malls and restaurants
with large attendance) .
3.L. Supplemental Guidance for Commanders.
3.L.I. lAW reference (q)j Commanders should identify and
track all Service Members who travel or have a history of travel in
the prior 14 days. This includes travel by military or commercial
means as well as private conveyance and includes all forms of travel
to include PCSj temporary duty and leave. Commanders shall ensure
Service Members implement the following actions for the next 14
days :
3.L.l.a. Implement self-observation^ i.e.j take
temperature twice a day and remain alert for fever (>100.4 degrees F
or 38 degrees C) and remain alert for fever^ cough or difficulty
breathing.
3.L.l.b. To the extent possible implement social
distancing^ i.e.j remain out of congregate settings^ avoid mass
gatherings and maintain 6 feet or 2 meter distance from others when
possible.
3.L.I.C. If individuals feel feverish or develop
measured fever^ cough or difficulty breathings immediately self-
isolatej limit contact with others and seek advice by telephone from
the appropriate healthcare provider to determine whether medical
evaluation is required.
3.L.2. Commanders will adhere to DoD guidance for
personnel traveling during the novel coronavirus outbreak per
reference (q) to include COVID-19 screening at overseas military
transportation terminals per reference (n). Commanders will review
the supplemental risk-based measures and observe the operational
risk level mitigation actions for COVID-19 outlined in reference
(f).
3.L.3. For individuals traveling OCONUS to OCONUSj
Commanders will ensure travel is mission essential and follow the
guidance listing in reference (s) if compelling exceptions are
necessary. Military air crew are exempt from the requirements in
this NAVADMINj but will ensure they actively practice social
distancing and prudent measures to mitigate potential contact and
COVID-19 transmission.
3.L.4. Commanders will comply with status of forces
agreements when applicable.
3.L.5. Consider measures to place mission essential shore
staffs on alternating day or split shift rotations.
3.L.6. Use maximum latitude to authorize telework^
liberal leave^ permissive TDY as necessary to minimize spread within
your teams.
3.L.7. Implement social distancing techniques for any
meetings you conduct.
3.L.8. Ensure the health of your force by conducting
regular screenings and restrict movement of those potentially
infected with COVID-19.
3.M. Entitlements. Changes to entitlements associated with a
ROM have been approved and put in place by DoD. The entitlements
include^ but are not limited to per diem for Service Members and
dependents directed to ROM after arrival at a duty station after a
PCS move and the implementation of Flardship Duty Pay (FIDP) ROM for
members who incur unreimbursed lodging expenses when directed to ROM
at their PDS. Additionally^ the Pay and Personnel Management Branch
(PERS-2) has released Pay and Personnel Information Bulletin (PPIB)
20-5 and 20-6 which provided Navy Pay Offices with information
regarding recent 3TR changes regarding self -isolation and
establishment of FIDP-ROM. Eligibility for entitlements varies based
on individual circumstances. If you have questions about
entitlements^ please contact the MyNavy career
m-¥o
(1-833-330-
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6622) or via e-mail at askmncc(at)navy.mil.
4. Regular Reporting. For CONUS commands^ ensure your points of
contact (POC) submit accurate and timely COVID-19 daily reports and
CCIRs to USFFCj with an information copy to the local installation
commander^ for consolidation and subsequent reporting to OPNAV. For
OCONUS commands^ ensure your POCs submit accurate and timely COVID
19 daily reports and CCIRs to the Navy Component Command/echelon 2
commands with an information copy to the local installation
commander^ for consolidation and subsequent reporting to OPNAV.
Given potential rapid escalation of case numbers and impact on
readinesSj additional reporting is required. Navy commands will
report the following through their chain of command and via OPREP
where appropriate:
4. A. COVID 19 daily reports. COVID 19 Case Information broken
out by Active-Duty^ DON Civilian^ Military Family Members and Navy
Contractors as follows:
4.A.I. Active-Duty: Total Persons Under Investigation
(PUI)/Positive Cases/Positive Cases in Flome Isolation/Positive Cases
in Flospital/Positive Cases Recovering Post-Flospitalization/Positive
Cases Returned to Work/DeathSj
4. A. 2. DoN Civilian: Total PUI/Total Positive
Cases/Positive Cases in Flome Isolation/Positive Cases in
Flospital/Positive Cases Recovering Post-Flospitalization/Positive
Cases Returned to Work/DeathSj
4. A. 3. Family Members: Total PUI/Total Positive
Cases/Positive Cases in Flome Isolation/Positive Cases in
Flospital/Positive Cases Recovering Post-Flospitalization/DeathSj
4. A. 4. DoN Contractors: Total PUI/Total Positive
Cases/Positive Cases in Flome Isolation/Positive Cases in
Flospital/Positive Cases Recovering Post Flospitalization/Deaths .
4.B. CCIRs. For COVID-19 Active-Duty Service Members and Navy
civilians only (in accordance with FIIPAA and the Privacy Act):
4.B.I. Date individual identified as infected
4.B.2. Date individual admitted to hospital (if applicable)
4.B.3. Is individual in ICU?
4.B.4. Is individual on a ventilator?
4.B.5. Date individual is discharged
4.B.6. Date individual recovers
4.C. The death of a Navy Service Member^ Navy civilian^ Navy
contractor^ or family member due to COVID-19.
4.D. Any shortage of medical personal protective equipment
(PPE) or test kits.
4.E. Significant or newsworthy installation or facility
closures .
4.F. Unit or installation is unable to meet isolation
requirements .
4.G. Unit or installation is unable to meet operational
requirements .
4. FI. Any local or regional change in health protection
condition (FIPCON).
5. Points of Contact.
5. A. Sailor Support. Service Members with questions regarding
this stop movement or entitlements for PCS travel should contact the
MyNavy Career Center (1-833-330-6622) or email ASKMNCC(AT)NAVY.MIL.
Datallers are ready to support all order modifications and commands
should work with their placement officers.
5.B. Medical Questions. BUMED Watch: 703 681 1087/1125 or
NIPR EMAIL: usn . ncr . bumedfchva . list . burned — 2019-ncov-response-
cell(AT)mail.mil.
5.C. Reporting Requirements. OPNAV Battle Watch Captain at
703 692 9284 or BWC.PTGN(AT)NAVY.MIL.
5.D. Navy civilians. Navy civilians with questions regarding
this guidance should contact their supervisory
command .
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https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2020/NAV20080.txt
6. The Navy will ensure the best possible Navy-wide Force Health
Protection for its Sailors^ civilian employees and family members.
However^ all members of the Navy family must do their part by
adhering to CDC guidelines as they relate to basic hygiene and human
interaction. The Navy will remain focused on meeting our global
commitments while also ensuring the health and well-being of our
Service Members j Navy civilians and our families.
7. Our understanding of COVID-19 is rapidly evolving and
this guidance will continue to be evaluated as conditions
change. We recognize many of the policies in this NAVADMIN
will place a strain on our force^ but they are absolutely
necessary to preserve our ability to conduct the mission.
Local Commanders will exercise prudent judgement when
determining mission essential travel and granting waivers
and err on the side of conservatism. This is not business
as usual. The expectation is that these exceptions are
done on a case by case basis and that they are very limited
in number. The entire team must understand their role in
minimizing the spread of COVID-19 among our ranks. All
efforts should be taken to combat the spread of COVID-19
and to minimize impact on our force. The Navy will remain
focused on meeting our global commitments while also
ensuring the health and well-being of our Service Members^
Navy civilians and our families.
8. As the COVID-19 situation continues to evolve^ Commander
feedback is an important part of issuing revised or additional
guidance. It is virtually impossible to address all specific cases
or situations. However^ Commanders have the latitude to adjust
direction based upon their unique situation. For example^ a unit
that has been at sea for 14 days with no COVID-19 cases may make the
decision to relax social distancing requirements until they pull
into port. Thank you for your leadership at the tip of the spear^
wherever that may be. We know that it is not easy and simply ask
that you make the best call possible we will back you up.
9. Released by Vice Admiral lohn B. Nowell^ 3r, Nl.//
BT
#0001
NNNN
UNCLASSIFIED//
H-3-90
https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2020/NAV20080.txt
12/12
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Attachmeirts:
CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt
CDR USN. CCSG-P: ®[m;
I CAPT USN. CCSG9
Testing planning factors
Friday, March 27, 2020 9:24:32 AM
TR Triage and Disposition Plan.odf
CDR USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt
All,
Attached is the most current version of what C7F put out for the get well
plan for the TR. This model starts with testing the entire ship and then
after the negatives finish their 14 day quarantine then they repeat the
testing.
One testing team can test 200 sailors/day in batches of 5 (40 batches of 5
sailors). Based on our experience, 16.7% of the batches of 5 will be
positive, requiring individual testing of each person in the batch to figure
out the individuals. Two teams can test 400 sailors per day (80 batches).
5000 sailors = 1000 batches
1000 batches/80 batches per day = 12.5 days of testing
16.7% positive batches = 167 batches x 5 people per batch = 835 individual
tests
835 individual tests/80 tests per day =10.4 days of testing to identify the
positive tests
Total for the first round of testing = 22.9 days of testing
From start of testing to completion of 14 days quarantine = 37 days.
The testing at the end of quarantine would be much closer to 12.5 because
there should be very few, if any positives, and that should finish at
approximately 50 days.
Assumptions:
1) Two testing teams mnning at full capacity with no interruptions to
testing and complete complement of supplies.
2) Robust ancillary support for tracking/documentation.
3) If available, a third testing team could do the positive testing in
parallel with the batch testing, reducing this to closer to 12.5 days.
My recommendation: No testing at the beginning, quarantine the bulk of the
ship in single rooms with heads, and if testing is required (though not
medically indicated), do it at the end with bulk collection of tests which
can then be shipped to numerous labs around the world to process
expeditiously while the ship gets ready to return to sea.
v/r,
SMO
MD
CAPT MC(FS) USN
H-3-91
Senior Medical Officer
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)
Work:
J-dial: Ib) I
Cell: tb) (6i I
H-3-91
UNCLASSIFIED
TR Triage and Disposition Plan
- USFK: 40-60 per day
- Biofire COVID-19 test at
USNH Guam when
available, est. April
Asymptomatic
Batch Test
Confirmation
Batch Test
_ V
Negative Batch
Test
X5 persons per batch
X40 batches per tray
=200 persons per day
UNCLASSIFIED
H-3-91
From: CAPT USN. C7F
To: So^ero^au^^DML USN USFFC fUSA^
Cc: 11 I h I n CAPT USN NAVY JAG WASH DC (USA'): ■ (h) H CIV USN COMNAVSAFECEN NOR VA
l|Ai;(b) (6)' - 1. LCDR USN NAVCIVLAWSUPPACn!' i Li -r A i
Subject: RE: Signed C7F CoS statement
Date: Friday, May 22, 2020 1:22:28 AM
Sir
Answers follow
1. Yes. Commander, SEVENTH Fleet was engaged in the hotel option early. As
stated in the email to which yon refer I told CoS^^H 'not saying no it is
on the table.' Hotels were always an option like all others, but in the
first 48-72 hours not certain. Tliere was general hesitation initially in the
first 48-72 lioius to engage Governor of Guam dir ectly, I spelled out some
sensitivities in my statement. Tliis was one planning factor driving other
COAs in die first 48-72 bom's. JRM wanted space to work Gover'nor Guam - all
matters - bringing TR in. how many persons Governor Guam expected to send to
NBG at the same time (this was an active discussion dire to Guam expected
COVID oirtbreak). hotels, etc. I recall C7F asking CJRM to engage directly
widi the Governor on the hotel option in diese first few days.
C7F did not directly engage Govenmient of Guam - tiiat is outside our C2 lane
- that is JRM who reports to INDOPACOM. C7F worked througli JRM. I recall
additional direct discussions betw^een C7F and CJRM on engaging Governor of
Guam on 28 Mar on the hotel option and he did. liaiing laid the groimd work
in die days prior. C7F brought up hotels with CPF as early as Saturday 28
Mar. Was told would require INDOPACOM permission to piu'sue. Not miexpected.
From there, once approved, we were very involved in die detailed plamiing
and execution of getting die crew to hotels, including Conuiiarider level
engagement widi DMHQ at PACFLT to get the contracts in place. Also very
involved in getting the samples moiing tluougli the Korea lab to enable crew
to get to the hotels.
2. Yes to all. Commander SEVENTH Fleet was very aware of testing limitations
on Guam fi'oni the outset. Both C7F and Staff were awai'e of the limits of
smveiUance (STEP ONE) testing. Guam NH and we learned quickly how large of
an effort it was for a CVN medical department to get nasal swab capacity up
to a high nimiber. not a trivial task. C7F and Staff liad a realistic
appraisal of how long testing would take on die groimd. Hie Korea lab was
another issue. We liad a plaruiing factor there of 90 per day, until on 28 Mar
die reference lab was brought into the pictme widi an advertised 1000 per
day (not reached for quite some time, the lab provides services to other
customers).
We knew this woidd make tilings slow going, but until we had to test for
hotel entry, we thouglit we could get into quarantine (i.e.
segregation)/isolation fast without testing - ordy testing at the back end
of 14 days, which woidd have given us time to tliink it dirougli. But hotels
got turned on quickly, requiring lab tests first and then testing became the
occupying LEMFAC.
It is important to note that the first weekend 28 Mar C7F came imder liigli
pressure fi'oui CPF to expand testing capacity to 500 per day miriiniimi to meet
die newly advertised 1000 per day capacity. HHQ focus was test. C7F focus
H-3-92
was get segregated/isolated - the COAs to get there. I was present for
several phone calls between CPF and C7F where the subject was raise testing
capacity immediately and fast - 1 think it fair to say it was FiFiQ primary
focus. This resulted in C7F and Staff having to get answers from CSG-9 on
testing throughput of the medical department from day 1 which frankly I
viewed as a distraction (this was before hotels were a go). This also
resulted in having to focus on getting a high number of nasal swabs the
first weekend, even though we didn't yet have the flights in place for
Korea. These swabs were not needed to get into Naval Base Guam occupancy the
first weekend. We could not yet complete the 'kill chain' to Korea at that
time (air transport). STEP ONE was also a slow process. It was several days
if not near to a week or more before nasal swab capacity was up around
400-500 per day. This intensive labor, and the fact that TR medical would
have to go to segregation, was one driving factor on getting the 3rd Med
Battalion.
VR
Chief of Staff
SEVENTH Fleet
Embarked on USS BLUE RIDGE (LCC-I9)
Inport DSNpJCB) H
Inport Commi][b) (6) |
At Sea DSN Direct; (b) (6) |
CENTRDCS (All Locations)
- Original Message -
Erom: Spedero, Paul C Ir RDML USN USEEC (USA)
Imailto
@navv mill
Sent: Eriday, May 22, 2020 7:23 AM
To:
CAPT USN, C7P
@lccl9 navy.mil>
H-3-92
CAPT USN NAVY JAG WASH DC (USA)
CIV USN COMNAVSAFECEN NOR VA
LCDR USN NAVCIVLAWSUPPACT
@navy.mil>;
@navy.niil>;
DC (USA)^ (6) I @navy.niil>
Subject: RE: Signed C7E CoS statement
COS,
I have two follow-up questions:
In an email to COS CSG-9, in which he asked about hotel room in Guam and you
said something to the effect that it was a "big ask" and we would like to
know if the option continued to be worked or explored by C7E. We have
information that CJRM continued to work hotels as an option and would like
to know if you and/or the Commander 7E continued to be engaged in that
planning and coordination.
Second,
Testing capacity was an issue in the first few days in Guam. Were you aware
of capacity that the ship was able to meet? Was C7E? Did anyone provide
the Commander 7E with feedback on capacity?
V/r
Speedy
RDML Paul C. Spedero Jr., USN
Command Investigation Team
@ navy.mil
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- Original Message-
Prom:
CAPT USN, C7P
@lccl9.navy mil>
Sent: Thursday, May 21, 2020 5:11 AM
To: Spedero, Paul C Jr RDML USN USPPC (USA)
Cc:
@navy mil>
(6)
(USA) <j(b) (6)' |@
DC (USAJ^ (6) ^ @navy.mil>
Subject: Signed C7P CoS statement
CAPT USN NAVY JAG WASH DC (USA)
CIV USN COMNAVSAPECEN NOR VA
LCDR USN NAVCIVLAWSUPPACT
@navy.mil>;
@navy.mil>;|[b) (6)
Sir
Please find attached.
VR
CAPT
(i)
H-3-92
Chief of Staff
SEVENTH Eleet
Embarked on USS BLUE RIDGE (LCC-19)
Inport
Inport Comm: (6)
At Sea DSN Direct: {b) (6)
At Sea (Commercial) Direct: (b) (6)
At Sea BLR Exchange DSN: jb) (6)
At Sea BLR Exchange (Commercial) (b) (6)
Tandberg EX-90: F
Mobile: Overseas: lb) (6)
Mobile in Japan: p) (6)
SIPR:
@lccl9.navy.smil mil
Hot Site:!
OneNet:lb) (6)
OneNet SIPR: (b) (6)
PSNpJCT
Tandberg: (6) [
Mobile: Overseasjlb) (6J
Mobile in Japan: p) (6)
[@fe r
@fe navy mil
@fe navy.smil.mil
CENTRIXS (AllLo^tions)
CENTRIXS K:[D)(G9
CENTRDCS J: p) (6)
CENTRIXS EVEY: [(b) (6)
CENTRIXS CFMP:lb) (6)
@pacom kor.cmil.mil
@mail.jpn.cmil mil
@rel.pacom. smil.mil
@af.usa.getf-cmfp.cmil mil
H-3-92
FOR OPPICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
Witness Statement olft) iO
AME2:
On 14 May 2020, 1 was interviewed in connection with a command investigation concerning
chain of command actions with regard to COVID-19 onboard USS THEODORE
ROOSEVELT (CVN 71) via telephone.
What follows is a true and accurate representation of my statement for this investigation.
Witness Name: Position: Ejection Seat Mechanic
Command: VFA-87 _ Department/Division: I3B
Email Address:!
tocwvl 1. navv.mil
Phone(s): N/A
1 have been in the Navy for about six years. My job is to work on ejection sets in aircrafts. I
reported to VFA-87 in May 2019. We embarked onboard USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT
in January 2020. This is my first deployment. While embarking my first impression of the
ship was fine. 1 have a buddy of mine who was stationed onboard before and he told me
good things about the command. 1 feel that my chain of command passes information to us
well.
Three days after leaving San Diego for deployment I got really sick. My symptoms were
very similar to COVID-1 9 symptoms. I had a runny nose, dry cough and night sweats. 1
went to medical and received a cold pack. A few days later 1 went back to medical as my
symptoms were not getting better and medical refilled my cold pack and gave me an SIQ
chit. After about 1 4 days from my initial start of my symptoms I went back to medical for a
third time and was diagnosed with pneumonia. The first two to two an a half weeks of
deployment were horrible due to my sickness. Other people within my shop were sick loo
and we all just took turns getting pneumonia. I believe we only had one person get sick with
the double dragon. 1 was working night shift so if 1 felt really ill my night check supervisor
would let me go to my rack. I don’t recall announcements about the sickness around the
ship. Hand washing and hygiene were short discussed, but that’s about it. 1 heard about
COVID-19 from social media and the news. 1 started to feel better about two days before our
first port visit to Guam.
I can’t remember details from the Da Nang liberty brief. 1 can’t recall a specific cleaning
routine or discussions of social distancing prior to Da Nang. While in port Da Nang, my
watch standing did not change. I continued standing my watch in an office. I was excited
about Da Nang port visit. The first day in port liberty secured. The liberty boats stopped
running due to the state of the sea. The second day I left to ship and attended an MWR tour.
On my way back to the ship, 1 was unable to return because the liberty boats stopped running.
The liberty busses eventually took us to a hotel called the Golden Bay and I stayed there
overnight. On the third day I stood duty and on the fourth day I just walked around town. I
was unaware of any health pre cautions. The Vietnam citizens would wear mask and some
businesses had signs up stating “closed due to COVID-1 9”. There was no screening on the
ship or pier. The last day 1 believe medical made us use hand sanitizer when we came back
to the ship. 1 happened to be standing watch in the ready room when a Chief received word
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
H-3-93
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
on a possible COVID case at a hotel he and others were staying at by I believe a Major. The
Chief sent an email to me for mustering telling me about what he was told and I then
informed the CVW Senior Chief on watch. At that pxjint there were a limited number of
people who were aware of this including myself and the people who were involved. When
the sailors returned to the ship they were quarantined.
After Da Nang we started covering the symptoms of COVID- 1 9 at quarters. We were told if
there are any concerns to go to medical. We started using bleach during cleaning stations
once per day. Currently we do it three time a day but I cannot recall doing it twice a day.
After the positive cases were identified everyone started wearing mask. 1 absolutely believed
there were more positive sailors then those two cases. There are 5,000 sailors onboard this
ship, I knew this would become an issue. I did however believe that the initial 39 Sailors
placed in quarantine were placed there out of a pre caution. There were other complete
berthings who went into a quarantine as well, but tliere were not strong controls for those in
quarantine as I have seen people who were supposed to be quarantined walk around the ship.
After several days they released the onboard quarantine personel. We were being told this
information at our squadron quarters. Some of my chain of command were placed into the
initial quarantine. It was known throughout the deck plates that the quarantine was kind of a
bad deal. The sailors were only given the basics and could not leave to do anything. I recall
there was a IMC announcement about the sailors in quarantine informing us that they did not
test positive for the virus. I personally had no concerns for my safety. I honestly think I
already it based on my symptoms at the beginning of the deployment. The two sailors that
tested positive were quarantines and the flown off the ship to Guam. 1 am not sure what their
quarantine location was or what they looked like.
Cleaning became an all hands effect twice a day for 30 minutes. We did use bleach during
cleaning stations at that time. The transit from Da Nang to Guam felt like a normal
underway. We still had to complete our maintenance and flight hours had to get done. ITiere
was no pause, we still had to get the job done. My health was good and I felt normal. After
Da Nang the gym stayed open. There were some restrictions such as limiting the amount of
sailors in the gym and limiting each sailor to an hour to workout until the ship started to
sanitize the spaces on the ship. The barbershop was closed right before Guam. The main
ship store stayed open but the small ships store closed after Da Nang.
I was aware of the situation with Guam Governor and the limitations of the base, A
memorandum was shared with via all hands email explaining the situation with the Governor.
I knew about the base restrictions from a friend who knew someone that is stationed there.
The restrictions included for example only letting 50 people into the NEX at a time. I was
told going to Guam, that the hospital would be taken care of our people. 1 did think once we
got there things would move a lot faster than what they did. When there finally was a plan it
would change. It seemed as though there was not good preparation for us to get off the ship
in Guam and the process was slower than and what was told to us. It did appear that once the
email of our status was leaked and the media spread the news about Capt Crozier’s relief of
duty and the SECNAV’s speech, that was when things moved slightly faster but still slowly.
My chain of command told me that a few hundred sailors would be taken off each day.
Before any of that happened, they move everyone to day shift which anywhere you went
increased lines and made more people come into closer contact therefore increasing the risk
of COVID 19. But we continued normal working operations until I got to leave the ship
sometime in April. 1 was tested on the ship and then a few days later was taken to a hotel.
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H-3-93
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The day left the ship, I was told to report to the hangar bay with 14 days worth of clothes.
My group got into a bus and that bus took us to the hotel. At the hotel a marine took my
temperature, brief us on some formalities and let me to go to my hotel room. I stayed at my
hotel for about three and a half weeks. It was okay but I could not leave the room. The food
at the hotel was hit or miss. In the beginning it felt like they were not bringing us enough
food but then over time it did get better. This was different per hotel and some hotels were
better and some were worse regarding food. The people who stayed in the Gym in isolation
slept on cots in an open area, this is what was told to me and shown to me via a photo.
Otherwise I experienced no issues while at the hotel. Leadership communicated via chat app
and a TR Alone Together facebook page. Upon returning to the ship the food served to us at
the pier was extremely inadequate, the portions would be equivalent to what I would serve
my 8 year old daughter which is not enough for an adult. 1 was told that this was how the
people at the gym were eating everyday.
Prior to Da Nang morale was good. The Da Nang port visited was not so great because of the
liberty boats situation. After leaving Da Nang morale was consistent with what you would
expect during a deployment. After the CO was relieved morale sank. There was a lot of
anger and resentment towards big Navy. This is how big Navy is going to treat a CO would
stood up for us, then I don’t want to know how big Navy would treat their enlisted sailors. I
believe that we should not have even gone to Vietnam. It seemed like a political stunt despite
the risk it posed to the crew. Rumor on the ship has it that soon we are scheduled to get back
out to sea and take a picture to show U.S power. It appears that big Navy does not care about
its sailors and social media responses shows how sailors feel. It shows with what happened
to the CO. Yes there is a mission to complete but it was no secret that we were going to
Guam, the CO was put in a very tough Lose Lose situation. He was penalized for putting his
crew’s health first, but if he had not done anything and a crewmember died the world
would’ve been against him for not doing anything. I believe the retention rate for the Navy
will drop as a result of this, especially for more junior sailors where this is their introduction
into the Navy and how we’ve been treated. The THEODORE ROOSELT chain of command
is trying their best with what they have been given. We’ve been here for 50 some days not
doing anything for whatever our mission was, this deployment was a flop and we’re over it,
by the time we are out to sea there would be barely any time left for this deployment, so just
let us go home already.
I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above is true and accurate to the best of
my knowledge, information, and belief.
(Witness’ Signature)
\hy^Ph2.oT-o c^oS
(Date) Time
Name of Interviewer: Command Master Chief^^^^
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY// PRIVACY SENSITIVE
H-3-93
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVAa SENSITIVE
Witness Statement
On 14 May 2020. 1 was interviewed in connection with a command investigation concerning
chain of command actions with regard to COVID-1 9 onboard USS THEODORE
ROOSEVELT (CVN 71) via telephone.
What follows is a true and accurate representation of my statement for this investigation.
Witness Name: AT
Position: Super\'isor _
Command: USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT Department/Division: Air/VI
Email Addres5:^^^^^^^Bfatgmail.com Phonc(s): N/A
I joined the Navy in May 2018. I’ve been onboard the USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT
since August 2019. I work in VI as the supervisor of elevator operations. I have about ten
sailors working under me and we arc the second hand to llie Handler. This is my first
deployment in the Navy. When I first report my impression of the ship w'os that it was huge.
My chain of command is really involved in our personal and work life. Everyone up and
down the chain of command do what they can to help us. V 1 is a lot better since there was a
change in leadership in November 2019. The chain of command really cares. For example:
For a new dad they really worked hard to gel him ofi the ship and home to his new baby.
The CO has a CO suggestion box. The minute someone had an issue and let him know via
the box there was immediate action. UsualK an email would go out so cvcr>’one know .about
it.
Prior to Da Nang wc double dragon on the ship. There were signs around the ship telling us
to wash our hands and to go to medical if we experienced any symptoms. I recall discussion
about the double dragon at quarters and signs every where. The ship at that lime took away
self serve laundry- and serv ed us our food in the aft galle> . However in the fonvard galley
you were still able to serve yourself, at that time and now.
I knew that COVID was happening around the world. My parents talked to me about it. I
knew there were a couple of cases in the U.S. My division would talk about it at lime too.
But for example at the time we thought it was because a girl ate a bat. The Da Nang liberty
brief did talk about COVID. If I recall it talked about how- Vietnam did not have any cases.
When we pulled into Da Nang 1 was excited. 1 received a head of the line pass so on the first
day I was able to leave the ship. I left the ship and got on the liberty boats to the pier. 1 do
not recall their being any screening on the pier. The waters were rough so they eventually the
liberty boats were secured. On my first day I went to a marble palace and ale food out in
town. On the way back to the ship we ended up not being able to take the liberty boats back
to the ship, as a result of the rough seas. The ship had liberty buses which took us to a hotel
for the night. I found out about the sailor in Da Nang by word of mouth and because I was
on duty that day. I do not know what actually happened with the sailors. I do not know any
of the 39 Sailors that were quarantine after Da Nang. I’m sure they were bored in that
berthing. 1 was told they eventually got a POTS line installed to be able to call their families.
There was a IMC announcement and an email asking for donations of food and toiletries for
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H-3-94
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
those in qiinranline. My friend and I went to the ship store and got a few extra things to
donate to them. The only other thing shared with us was that they all tested negative. I
believe the ship placed those sailors in quarantine out of pro caution. 1 did not think there
would be any positive cases onboard. I was not concerned for my safety or health.
Before Da Nang we did normal cleaning stations; morning 30 dirty and evening sweepers.
After Da Nang there was no change to our cleaning station. I cannot recall when but at some
point we did add bleach to our cleaning station. Initially it started with one cleaning station,
then it went to two and now we are doing it three times a day.
Then then.' was not just one but three positive cases. I work on the flight deck so 1 saw all the
corpsman with gloves and mask on and the titrcc sailors with them, i asked them what was
going on and they told me the sailors were being medical evacuated from the ship to Guam.
More and more Sailors started testing positive. I'm embarrassed to admit this but for my
friends and I. it started to become a game of who could guess how many more would fly ofT
•daily. I do nen-work out but- 1 believe the gyrmr-atayed-epeiMintil-Guam^ -
Prior to polling into Guam 1 did not know anj^hing obout the Guam Government or the base.
I do remember a rumor about splitting the crew and letting half of the crew quarantine is
Japan while the other half stayed in Guam. We did lly off a skeleton crew that once we got
to Guam would come back onboard while we quarantine. That skeleton crew would take the
ship to Japan. Personally ! think Andrews Air Force Base did not have manpower to keep
flying people back and for\vard. When we pulled in Guam I just thought the deployment was
over. Everything was super hectic and it seemed like no one knew what to do. I was told by
my chain of command to pack enough things for 14 days. 1 departed the ship on two or three
day in port. Tlie day I left it was really hectic and the time for my division to report to the
hangar bay kept getting pushed back. When we did finally get called wc got on a bus and it
took me to Charles King gym. 1 got a cot and just chilled for the next 10 days. The Master
Chief at the gym would keep us informed of eveiylhing that w as going on. My air chain of
command would sometimes sent emails to check on us but the leadership at the gym was
really good. The food at the gym was okay but sometimes not enough. We were allowed to
order Dominos so it really was okay. After the 10 days, my test results came back negative
so I w'as sent to the Hilton for another 20 days. It was a nice stay but I was really bored.
Coming back to the ship the focus is on cleaning.
Morale didn't really change between Da Nang and Guam. I can't really put into words how I
felt about Captain Crozier leaving. He was always on the 1 MC, reassuring us that we would
be okay. The kept us up to date even if those plans would change daily. Because of the virus
vve have to cancel a few' port visits in China. CO told us about the change and let us know
that he was trying to make other port visits possible. I just trusted him. I don't know how
else to explain it. Now, we're taking it day by day. We are no longer trying to figure out a
plan, we're ju-st waiting for things to happen now. Everyone is over it. Wc just want to go
home.
I swear (or alTirm) that the information in the statement above is true and accurate to the best of
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
H-3-94
FOR OFPICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
(Witness’ Signature)
Name of Interviewer;
(Date)
Time
Command Master Chic
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
H-3-94
H-3-94
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt
Bal<er. Stuart P RDML USN. CCSG-9
Crozier. Brett E CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt: I
CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt:
SN. CVW-11 CAG:
osevelt:
COMDESRON23
THEODORE ROOS^vll!': (b) (6)
CVW-11 (USA)":lij (6)
I CDR USN.l?:: 1 I
^(b){61^
CDR - Br H XO":
USS Tlie 11 dore Rdos^
['R USN. USS
CAPT
-(b) (6)
'.If t- i:
COVID-19 update 28 March - Mid-day update
Saturday, March 28, 2020 12:00:53 AM
<"APT
p) (6) “ PTUSN. CCSA 'A
b) 16) .AP
rTjiP'J, (.(..spim; l)H 71: ECC
MCFO USN
T;(b)“
^APT USN.
Admiral.
Current total positive: 44
New cases:
1.
symptoms. -ECOVID test.
2.
contact and now with ILI symptoms. -ECOVID test.
3. PS35)^^^; ADMIN;
symptoms. -ECOVID test.
4. 2\D1 VFA-154;Py
now witli ILI symptoms. -ECOVID test^
5. 2\DAN| _
and now with ILI symptoms. -ECOVID test.
6. MMN2|
symptoms. -ECOVTDtest.
AIMD;|[b) (C^ came tluougli sick call with ILI
I; NAV;B)|B)!r^^l known close
I
came tlu'ough sick call with ILI
with known close contact and
; VFA-154;^^^^^H with known close contact
test.
came througli sick call with ILI
If possible, w ill w oik with ECC to get them off the ship today,
v/r.
SMO
H-3-95
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt
BaKei , Stuart P RDML USN. CCSG-9
Crccici , Eir-tt E CAPT USN. USS Tlieodore Roosevelt:
CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt:
CAPT USN. CSSG9:
CAPT
osevelt:
USS Tli- jJore Roosevv t:
THEODORE ROOSEvll
COMDESRON23
RE: COVID-19 update 28 l''larch - Evenitig update
Saturday, March 28, 2020 7:23:21 AM
TAPT ' 'SN, 1
' Ani!!)) (6)
“ ITUSN. CCSA-'J:
b) (6)
CAPTuA'M, ALSA
l)H 71: ECC
Admiral.
Two more positives today. Current total fwsitive: 46.
1. LS3
SUPPLY; (Byioy
from sick call witli ILI
symptoms. -l-COVID-19 test.
fr'om sick call with fever,
-l-COVID-19 test.
2. ANI
|; AIR:[b)(P)
Don't have tlie frnal results on the 16 from the VRC-30 det. Will have that
tomorrow.
Will work w'/ECC to get 8 cases from today off the ship in the momuig.
Plan to test 100 at tire gym tomon'ow.
v/r,
SMO
-Oiigmal Message -
From: I
CAPT USN, USS Tlieodore Roosevelt
Sent: Saturday, March 28. 2020 2:01 PM
To: Baker, Stuart P RDML USN, CCSG-9
Cc: Crozier, Brett E CAPT USN, USS Tlieodore Roosevelt;
USN, USS Tlieodore Roosevelt; EM
CAPT
CAPT USN, CVW-1 1 CAG;
ICAI
CAPT USN, USS Tlieodore Roosevelt;
CAPT USN, CSSG9;
CAPT USN, CVW-1 1
w
CAPT USN, COMDESRON23;l
CAPT BKH CO^b) (6)
LCDR USN, USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT;
CMC USN, USS Tlieodore Roosevelt;
CMC USN, CCSG9;
Roosevelt; ^b)
MCPO USN CVW-1 1 (USA)';
CDR USN. USS Tlieodore
CDR USN, CCSG-9;
CDR USN, USS Tlieodore Roosevelt; EM-
HMl USN, CCSG^b) (I
CAPT USN, CCSG9;
LT USN, CCSG-9:
USN, USS Tlieodore Roosevelt;(b) (6)
CSG^t
pm
CAPT
C2\PT USN, CCSG9; DH_71; ECC
Subject: COVID-19 update 28 March - Mid-day update
Admiral.
H-3-96
Current total positive: 44
New cases:
1. AIMD;|
symptoms, +COVID test.
QM3 ; NAV; I
contact and now with ILI symptoms, +COVID test.
3. PS3
; ADMIN;
symptoms, +COVID test.
4. ADI
; VFA-154;
now with ILI symptoms, +COVID test.
5. AD AN
; VFA-154;
and now with ILI symptoms, +COVID test.
6. MMN2^^|^|;RX;|
symptoms. +COVID test.
came through sick call with ILI
with known close
came through sick call with ILI
with known close contact and
with known close contact
came through sick call with ILI
If possible, will work with ECC to get them off the ship today,
v/r.
SMO
H-3-96
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt
Bal<er. Stuart P RDML USN. CCSG-9
Crozier. Brett E CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt:
*1 CAPT USN. CSSG9:
CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt:
SEvmj (b)(6)
COMDESRON23
THEODORE ROOS^vlI:' (b) (6)
CVW-ll fUSA)":||i) (6) ^
I CDR USN.Ti: 1 I
CAPT
M - Lisr). 'USS Tlieiidore Roosevv i;-(b)(6)
Sg9: (b) (6T — |. USN. USS Th^lnre Knr
COVID-19 update 29 March - Mid-day update
Saturday, March 28, 2020 11:39:21 PM
'"APT '.-''-.1'.,
F)(^)
“ PTUSN. CCSA 'A
b) (6) C.AP
Tlian, (.a::
vPnP: L)H 71: ECC
MCFO USN
T;(b)“
^APT USN.
Admiral.
4 more positives today. Current total: 50.
1. QM3
2. LSI
d-test.
3j[b)(b) JP){B
^)(6) SUPPLY,
(6)
with ILI symptoms. +test.
with ILI syii^itoms/fever.
; SUPPLY;
□
d-test.
4. MMN2|g» (Or
j;RX:Q
witli ILI symptoms/fever,
male witii ILI symptoms/fever, d-test.
All VRC-30 det tests hum yesterday w^ere negative - sailors from Andersen APB.
v/r,
SMO
H-3-97
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:
CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt
BaKei , Stuart P RDML USN. CCSG-9
Crccici , Eir-tt E CAPT USN. USS Tlieodore Roosevelt:
P»(6)
COMDESRON23: |
STTC)
THEODORE ROO.^J
tVLL ; :
CVW-ll fUSAr:l
!>»!
CDR USN.T
U ' Theo^^^ L
■ > -T-
CAPT USN. CSSG9:
(b)(6)
CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt:
SN. CVW-11 CAG:— CAPT
osevelt j
CDR - BKH XO":
USS Tlia 11 Tore Roo^
(b) (6)
MCPO USN
:i;(b)-
(b) (6)
COVID-19 update 29 March - Evening update
Sunday, March 29, 2020 5:44:43 AM
(FOUO^ COVID-19 Positive Ust 29 MAR 20 1741).xlsx
Admiral.
3 more positives today. Current total: 53.
#51 from HSM-75, close contact from an ear lier case, was
called as a medical emergency today due to fainting (syncope) from ILI
symptoms. +test.
#52 -Rl) (6) fr'om VFA-154, close contact from an earlier C2ise. earlier
test on 24 Mar was negative, now widi ILI symptoms/fever and positive test.
#53-^5)76)
from ENG. came througli sick call with ILI. +test.
A sailor over in the gym (MM3 ENG) lias developed a fever
and was evaluated by NH Guam and w'ill be moved into isolation at NGIS. We
will test liim tomorrow' and the results w'iU detennine w'hether or not he is
called a positive COVID case. I beheve he w'dl be. but w'dl withliold
of&cial call luitil later tomorrow'. If positive, this also resets tlie 14
day clock on the preople in the gym.
Plan to swab additional 150 in the gym tomorrow'.
v/r,
SMO
H-3-98
Ordin
al
LAST NAME
FIRST NAME
RATE/RANK
COMMAND
GENDER
AGE
DODID
TEST DATE
TEST RESULT
DISPOSITION
ILI SYMPTOMS. TEMP
REFERRAL SOURCE
> iM rm
AA
VFA-154 mi IWl
(b) (b)(e)
25-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
ILl 102.5
sick call
2
AM2
HSM-75
25-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
ILl, 99.2,
close contact
3
AMAN
VFA-154
!6)
- ^ - [ _
25-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
None, 98.2
close contact
4
CDR
CVN-71,NAV
25-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
ILI, 100.9
sick call
5
AT2
VFA-154
25-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
ILI. 98.1
close contact
6
AT2
VFA-154
25-Mar
PRESUMPTIVE POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
ILI, 100.0 ; developed sympt after testing- test negative
close contact
7
AD2
VFA-154
24-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
ILI, 101
sick call
8
AM2
HSM-75
25-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
ILI 99.4
close contact
9
AT2
VFA-154
25-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
None 98.3
close contact
10
ADAA
VFA-154
25-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
None, 98.2
close contact
11
AE3
VFA-154
25-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
ILI. 99.4
close contact
12
HMl
VFA-154
25-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
None, 100.5
close contact
13
MMN2
CVN-71,RX
24-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
ILI. 100.4
sick call
14
AZAN
VFA-154
24-Mar
PRESUMPTIVE POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
None, 100.4; devleoped sympt after testing- test negative
close contact
15
AMEAN
VFA-154
24-Mar
PRESUMPTIVE POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
ILI, 1 00. 1 devleoped sympt after testing- test negative
close contact
16
AMI
HSM-75
25-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
None, 99.1
close contact
17
EM3
CVN-71 ENG
25-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
ILI 101.3
sick call
18
LS3
HSM-75
25-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
None 98.7
close contact
19
LS3
HSM-75
25-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
None, 99.1
close contact
20
LS2
CVN-71, SUPPLY
25-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
ILI, 100.9
sick call
21
AM2
HSM-75
24-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
ILI. 100.4
sick call
22
A03
HSM-75
25-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
None, 98.9
close contact
23
ETNCS
CVN-71. RX
25-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
ILI. 100.3
sick call
24
AZ2
VFA-154
24-Mar
PRESUMPTIVE POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
ILl, 100.3 devleoped sympt after testing- test negative
close contact
25
CSCS
CVN-71 SUPPLY
24-Mar
POSITIVE
MEDEVAC
WORSENING ILI
sick call
26
OS
CVN-71. OPS
NONE
PRESUMPTIVE POSITIVE
ISOLATED
ILl, 100.0
close contact
27
A03
VFA-146
26-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
ILI. 101.2
sick call
28
MM3
CVN-71, RX
25-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
None, 99
close contact
29
MM2
CVN-71. RX
25-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
None, 98.3
close contact
30
MM2
CVN-71, RX
25-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
None, 98.0
close contact
31
MM3
CVN-71 RX
25-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
None 97.7
close contact
32
MM3
CVN-71, RX
25-Mar
PRESUMPTIVE POSITIVE
ISOLATED
None. 100.7; devleoped sympt after testing- test negative
close contact
33
MM2
CVN-71, RX
25-Mar
PRESUMPTIVE POSITIVE
ISOLATED
None, 100.3; devleoped sympt after testing- test negative
close contact
34
MM3
CVN-71, RX
25-Mar
PRESUMPTIVE POSITIVE
ISOLATED
ILI, 101.1; devleoped sympt after testing- test negative
close contact
35
AM3
HSM-75
27-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
None. 99.4
close contact
36
AOAN
VFA-87
27-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
ILl 100.8
sick call
37
MM2
CVN-71 ENG
27-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
ILI
sick call
38
CWO-2
VRC-30
27-Mar
PRESUMPTIVE POSITIVE
ISOLATED
No Symptoms. COD arrived 16 Mar
sick call
39
AM2
CVN-71. AIMD
28-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
ILI
sick call
40
QM3
CVN-71, NAV
28-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
ILl
sick call
41
PS3
CVN-71. ADMIN
28-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
ILl
sick call
42
ADI
VFA-154
28-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
ILI
sick call
43
AD AN
VFA-154
28-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
ILI
close contact
44
MMN2
CVN-71, RX
28-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
None. 103.0
sick call
45
LS3
CVN-71 SUPPLY
28-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
WORSENING ILI 99.2
sick call
46
AN
CVN-71 AIR
28-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
None 102.2
sick call
47
0M3
CVN-71, NAV
29-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
Worsening ILL, 99.2
sick call
48
LSI
CVN-71, SUPPLY
29-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
ILL 100.9
sick call
49
CS2
CVN-71, SUPPLY
29-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
ILL 101.8
sick call
50
MMN2
CVN-71, RX
29-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
ILL 101.8
sick call
51
LSSN
HSM-75
29-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
ILL 97.3
close contact -i- Med
Emergency
52
AT3
VFA-154
29-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
ILI 99.2 (1st test 24 Mar neg 2ndte!!t 28 Mar positive)
close contact
53
EM2
CVN-71 -ENG
29-Mar
POSITIVE
ISOLATED
ILI 100.2
sick call
H-3-98
From:
To:
CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt
Subject:
Date:
Attachmeirts:
CAPT USN. C7F:
LAP I UbN L^^TOVAIRPAC SAN CA’iUbAl'
Reality
Saturday, March 28, 2020 4:25:14 AM
NAVADMIN 083 20. pdf
Rocklov et al.pdf
CAPT USN COMPACFLT NOIH (USAt:
All,
For the record, we have lost. We have gone from 2 cases to 44 cases (another 6 today - so far) in less than 5 days.
So, that's a doubling time of less than 1 day...
"Quarantine" measures on the ship are a sham. See the attached study from the Diamond Princess - and they have
significantly better berthing conditions than we do.
The conclusion sums it up: The cruise ship conditions clearly amplified an already highly transmissible disease. The
public health measures prevented more than 2000 additional cases compared to no interventions. However,
evacuating all passengers and crew early on in the outbreak would have prevented many more passengers and crew
from infection.
Again, we have lost and will keep going down this path because apparently medical advice doesn't matter, whether
it is from us or from the CDC (which apparently we're telling the world that we're following their guidelines). We
are failing to comply with any sort of guidance be it testing guidelines or guidelines on quarantine (see attached
NAVADMIN). Sailors are ultimately going to suffer.
We will keep plugging away out here, but we have lost this battle and need to implement appropriate quarantine
measures now which will involve getting 4500 people off the ship into individual berthing with single heads. That
message is apparently falling on deaf ears.
v/r.
li}
CAPT MC(FS) USN
Senior Medical Officer
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)
Work: ff))tg) I
J-dial:
Cell: p) (6)
H-3-99
-—OFFICIAL INFORMATION DISPATCH FOLLOWS- —
RTTUZYUW RHOIAAAOOOl 0832050-UUUU-RHSSSUU.
ZNR UUUUU
R 231957Z MAR 20 MID110000511164U
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC
TO NAVADMIN
BT
UNCLAS
NAVADMIN 083/20
MSGID/NAVADMIN/CNIC WASHINGTON DC/NOO/MAR//
SUBJ/RESTRICTION OF MOVEMENT (ROM) GUIDANCE//
REF/A/DOC/USD/11MAR20//
REF/B/NAVADMIN/OPNAV/212007ZMAR20//
REF/C/DOC/BUMED/17MAR20//
NARR/REF A IS UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO, FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION
GUIDANCE (SUPPLEMENT 4) - DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE GUIDANCE FOR PERSONNEL TRAVEL DURING
THE NOVEL CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK.
REF B IS NAVADMIN 080/20, NAVY MITIGATION MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK
UPDATE 3. REF C IS BUMED RETURN TO WORK GUIDELINES FOR CORONAVIRUS.//
RMKS/1. REF A requires that personnel returning from a Center for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) Travel Health Notice (THN) Level 3 or Level 2 location perform a 14 day restriction of movement
(ROM). During ROM, Service Members should be restricted to their residence or other appropriate
Domicile and limit close contact (within 6 feet or 2 meters) with others. This NAVADMIN clarifies the
definition of ROM, provides amplifying guidance, and delineates responsibilities for execution of ROM.
2. Definitions.
2. a. Restriction of Movement (ROM). General DoD term referring to the limitation of personal liberty
for the purpose of ensuring health, safety and welfare. ROM is inclusive of quarantine and isolation.
2.a.(l) Quarantine. Medical term referring to the separation of personnel from others as a
result of suspected exposure to a communicable disease. For the world-wide COVID-19 epidemic, this
should be imposed on those with no COVID-19 symptoms who have either recently returned from a
high-risk location (CDC THN Level 2 or 3), or have had close contact with a known COVID-19 positive
patient. The current recommended quarantine period is 14 days. Per CDC, quarantine generally means
the separation of a person or group of people reasonably believed to have been exposed to a
communicable disease but not yet symptomatic, from others who have not been so exposed, to prevent
the possible spread of the communicable disease.
2. a. (2) Isolation. Medical term referring to the separation of personnel from others due either
to the development of potential COVID-19 symptoms or as a result of a positive COVID-19 test. Per CDC,
isolation means the separation of a person or group of people known or reasonably believed to be
infected with a communicable disease and potentially infectious from those who are not infected to
prevent spread of the communicable disease. Isolation for public health purposes may be voluntary or
compelled by federal, state, or local public health order.
2.b. Patient (or Person) Under Investigation (PUI). In the case of COVID-19, a PUI is defined as
an individual with either a pending COVID-19 test or for whom a test would have been
ordered/conducted had one been available.
2.C. Self-monitoring. Per CDC, self-monitoring means people should monitor themselves for
fever by taking their temperatures twice a day and remaining alert for the onset of a cough or difficulty
breathing. If an individual feels feverish or develops a measured fever, cough, or difficulty breathing
H-3-99
during the self-monitoring period, they should self-isolate, limit contact with others, and seek advice by
telephone from a healthcare provider or their local health department to determine whether further
medical evaluation is needed.
2.d. Close Contact. Per CDC, a close contact is defined as:
2.d.(l) Being within approximately 6 feet (2 meters) of a COVID-19 case for a prolonged]
period of time; the current recommended threshold is 10 minutes. Close contact can occur while caring]
for, living with, visiting, or sharing a healthcare waiting area or room with a COVID-19 case, oi
Z.d.(2) Having direct contact with infectious secretions of a COVID-19 case (e.g., beinj
coughed on)
3. Applicability. ROM applies to all Service Members, who in the last 14 days have either been in:
3. a. An area with ongoing spread of COVID-19 as defined as CDC designated Level 2 and 3
countries (https:// www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/map-and-travelnotices.html), or
J.b. Close contact with a person known to have COVID-19.
3.C. Per REF A, it is strongly recommended that DoD civilian employees, contractor personnel
and dependents also follow this guidance.
4. Guidance.
4.a. ROM personnel shall be directed to remain at home or in a comparable setting for 14 days
ROM from the day of departure or contact. [For transient personnel and those residing in close quarter!
luch as unaccompanied housing or ships, temporary lodging meeting CDC guidance of separate sleepinj
ind bathroom facilities shall be arranged, when available
4.b. When in ROM, personnel shall avoid congregate settings, limit close contact with people and pets
or other animals to the greatest extent possible, avoid traveling, self-monitor, and seek immediate
medical care if symptoms (e.g., cough or shortness of breath) develop.
4.C. Personnel assigned ROM may exit quarters to access laundry facilities, outdoor exercise, and
designated smoking areas; and conduct other routine tasks not in a public setting provided they
maintain social distancing greater than 6 feet from others. Access to messing facilities, stores, fitness
centers and other widely used support services is prohibited.
4.d. For temporary lodging, normal room cleaning services will be suspended during the ROM period.
4.e. For personnel executing ROM in private residence, coordinate with parent command for the
purchase of required food/hygiene items or arrange delivery through other means.
4. f. After completion of ROM, return to work per REF C and Combatant Commander guidance, if
applicable.
5. Responsibilities.
5. a. Parent command Commanding Officer/Officer in Charge shall:
5.a.(l) Ensure screening of personnel for ROM.
5. a. (2) Ensure ROM personnel comply with paragraph 4.
5. a. (3) If temporary lodging is required:
5.a.(3)A. Provide cost orders for ROM personnel. Orders will direct the Service Member to a
ROM status and not TAD to the host installation. Recommend funding for temporary lodging, if required,
be obtained through the Type Commander. This may be accomplished utilizing a General Terms and
Conditions document to avoid issues arising from Service Members not having government travel cards.
5.a.(3)B. Coordinate with installation Commanding Officer for room assignment. It is imperative
that tenant commands inform installations of all personnel in ROM within government facilities (to
include barracks, NGIS, Navy Lodge, PPV family housing, and PPV barracks).
H-3-99
5.a.(3)C. As needed, coordinate messing support with the Commanding Officer where a galley is
available. Arrangements will be made between the parent command and the installation for the
delivery of meals to Service Members in a ROM status.
5.a.(3)D. As required, provide daily support to ROM personnel to ensure meal delivery as well as
health and comfort checks.
5.A.(3)E. Ensure personnel supporting individuals in ROM are trained on the status of ROM
personnel and associated interaction protocols. Close contact is prohibited. PPE is not required.
5. a. (4) If private residence is utilized, coordinate with ROM personnel to ensure all messing needs
are met.
5.b. Installation Commanding Officers shall;
5.b.(l) Account daily for available temporary lodging to support ROM.
5. b. (2) Track all ROM personnel residing in Navy Lodging (unaccompanied housing, NGIS, Navy
Lodge, PPV family housing, PPV barracks) both on and off installation. There is no need for installations
to track tenant personnel in a ROM status in private residence/lodging.
5.b.(3) Provide detailed instructions to tenant commands who require temporary ROM lodging
support.
5.b.(4) If available, coordinate with parent commands to provide take -out meals for delivery to
ROM personnel.
5.b.(5) Ensure temporary lodging staff are trained on the status of ROM personnel and associated
interaction protocols. Close contact is prohibited. PPE is not required.
5.b.(6) Follow CDC guidance for cleaning rooms following the ROM period. Ensure the standards
are the same across all facilities (unaccompanied housing, NGIS, Navy Lodge).
5.b.(7) For the safety of lodging personnel, ensure clear discrete procedures are in place to identify
rooms which are occupied by ROM personnel.
5.b.(8) Ensure fire and emergency services are aware of ROM personnel locations, particularly those
in isolation, and are prepared to respond to medical emergencies with appropriate PPE.
6. Entitlements. Per REF B.
7. Reporting Requirements. Per REF B.
8. ROM FAQs.
Question 1. When placed on Restriction of Movement (ROM), can I travel to locations within the fence
line of an installation to utilize facilities such as the NEX food court or the gym?
Answer 1. No, during the duration of ROM, Service Members must remain in their rooms with the
exception of brief trips to utilize designated smoking areas, walking in the immediate vicinity of the
building (usually within 100 feet), and limiting close contact (within 6 feet) with others. If your facility
contains an in house gym, do not use it.
Question 2. Can I accept food deliveries from various services?
Answer 2. Yes, food must be placed outside the room. Minimize close contact (within 6 feet).
Question 3. Can my family or friends visit me?
Answer 3. Yes, provided they do not enter your room. Conversations should be held with visitors staying
in the passageway outside the room and Service Members in their room. Minimize close contact (within
6 feet).
Question 4. Can I do my laundry?
Answer 4. Yes, but you should coordinate with your command to utilize in house laundry facilities.
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Question 5. How do I obtain personal hygiene items?
Answer 5. Utilize the point of contact provided by your command to arrange for purchase of these
items.
Question 6. Will my room be cleaned daily?
Answer 6. No, your room will not be cleaned during your stay. Trash pickup is available by placing your
trash can in the passageway.
Question 7. Is Personal Protective Equipment required for personnel in my vicinity?
Answer 7. No, you should limit close contact (within 6 feet) with others.
Question 8. Can I RQM in open bay barracks or in rooms with shared bathrooms?
Answer 8. No, individuals should be placed in separate lodging (when available).
Question 9. Can I use public transportation if in RQM status?
Answer 9. No, individuals on RQM should avoid crowds and public locations.
Question 10. Can I get off RQM early if I was in close contact to a person with CQVID-19, and I feel like I
am not sick?
Answer 10. No, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) recommends 14 days of RQM from the last date of
exposure to a CQVID-19 positive person.
Question 11. What is the difference between quarantine and restriction of movement (RQM)?
Answer 11. Quarantine is a legal public health term used for civilian restrictions and RQM is a military
term being used to identify military individuals who are restricted in their movement, generally to their
residence.
Question 12. Are my family members at risk if I RQM at home with them?
Answer 12. RQM status is a precautionary step to prevent spread to others. Considering this, it is
recommended that while at home in a RQM status, you practice social distancing. This means try to
remain at least 6 feet from other persons, avoid using the same bathroom, or sleeping in the same bed.
Question 13. Can I prepare meals for my family while on RQM?
Answer 13. When in a RQM status, it is recommended you not prepare meals for your family because
the virus is spread through respiratory droplets that can land on surfaces such as food. Ideally, you
should have other individuals prepare food. If you are the only care giver, make sure you are washing
your hands with soap and water for 20 seconds for general food safety. Make sure you cover your nose
and mouth when coughing and wash your hands after using the bathroom.
Question 14. Should I be wearing a mask?
Answer 14. Masks will not protect you from inhaling the virus. The virus is very small and can make its
way through and around the mask. The best way to prevent being infected or infecting others is to
practice social distancing and good hygiene techniques (such as washing your hands regularly with soap
and water for at least 20 seconds, avoid touching your face, avoid sick persons, etc).
Question 15. Do I need to clean my house to CDC standards?
Answer 15. It is recommended you maintain a clean living environment as you normally would. This
includes frequent hand washing, washing clothing and bedding, and wiping down frequently touched
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surfaces with a sanitizing wipe or any cleaning product that contains at least 10 percent bleach. The
Environmental Protection Agency has a list of products that have been specifically tested as effective in
sanitizing surfaces.
9. Released by Vice Admiral M. M. Jackson, Commander, Navy Installations
Command.//
BT
#0001
NNNN
V/r,
CNRSW ROC
fax:|ifti^ag8UilllMI
NIPR:rR»lliiM@navv.mil
SIPR:|^||^^B@navy.smil.mil
Privacy Act - 1974 This E-Mail may contain information to be protected lAW
DoD 5400. HR and is For Official Use Only.
Warning: This is an information report. It is being shared for
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not to take actions based solely on this report unless the information is
independently verified.
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COVID-19 outbreak on the Diamond Princess cruise ship: estimating the epidemic potential and
effectiveness of public health countermeasures
Rocklov J PhD*, Sjodin H PhD*, Wilder-Smith A MD^’^’"*
1 Department of Public Health and Clinical Medicine, Section of Sustainable Health, Umea
University, Umea, Sweden
2 Department of Epidemiology and Global Health, Umea University, Umea, Sweden
3 Department of Disease Control, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, UK
4 Heidelberg Institute of Global Health, University of Heidelberg, Germany
Key words: coronavirus; SARS-CoV-2; basic reproduction number; isolation and quarantine;
incubation time; evacuation
Declaration of interest: none declared
Abstract:
Background: Cruise ships carry a large number of people in confined spaces with relative
homogeneous mixing. On 3 February, 2020, an outbreak of COVID-19 on cruise ship Diamond
Princess was reported with 10 initial cases, following an index case on board around 21-25* January.
By 4* February, public health measures such as removal and isolation of ill passengers and quarantine
of non-ill passengers were implemented. By 20* February, 619 of 3,700 passengers and crew (17%)
were tested positive.
Methods: We estimated the basic reproduction number from the initial period of the outbreak using
SEIR models. We calibrated the models with transient functions of countermeasures to incidence data.
We additionally estimated a counterfactual scenario in absence of countermeasures, and established a
model stratified by crew and guests to study the impact of differential contact rates among the groups.
We also compared scenarios of an earlier versus later evacuation of the ship.
Results: The basic reproduction rate was initially 4 times higher on-board compared to the Rq in the
epicentre in Wuhan, but the countermeasures lowered it substantially. Based on the modeled initial Rq
of 14.8, we estimated that without any interventions within the time period of 21 January to 19
February, 2920 out of the 3700 (79%) would have been infected. Isolation and quarantine therefore
prevented 2307 cases, and lowered the Rq to 1.78. We showed that an early evacuation of all
passengers on 3 February would have been associated with 76 infected persons in their incubation
time.
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Conclusions: The cruise ship conditions clearly amplified an already highly transmissible disease. The
public health measures prevented more than 2000 additional cases compared to no interventions.
However, evacuating all passengers and crew early on in the outbreak would have prevented many
more passengers and crew from infection.
Introduction
Cruise ships carry a large number of people in confined spaces with relative homogeneous mixing
over a period of time that is longer than for any other mode of transportation.^ Thus, cruise ships
present a unique environment for transmission of human -to-human transmitted infections. The
association of acute respiratory infections (ARI) incidence in passengers is statistically significant
with season, destination and duration of travel.^ In February 2012, an outbreak of respiratory illness
occurred on the cruise ship off Brazil, resulting in 16 hospitalizations due to severe ARI and one
death.^ In May 2020, a dual outbreak of pandemic (HlNl) 2009 and influenza A (H3N2) on a cruise
ship occurred: of 1,970 passengers and 734 crew members, 82 (3.0%) were infected with pandemic
(HlNl) 2009 virus, and 98 (3.6%) with influenza A (H3N2) virus. Four subsequent cases were
epidemiologically linked to passengers but no evidence of sustained transmission to the community or
passengers on the next cruise was reported."^ In September 2000 an outbreak of influenza-like illness
was reported on a cruise ship sailing off the Australian coast with over 1,100 passengers and 400 crew
on board, coinciding with the peak influenza period in Sydney.^ The cruise morbidity was high with
40 passengers hospitalized, two of whom died. A total of 310 passengers (37%) reported suffering
from an influenza-like illness.
In December 2019, a novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, emerged in Wuhan, China and rapidly spread
within China and then to various global cities with high interconnectivity with China. The resulting
ARI due to this coronavirus, a disease now coined COVID-19, is thought to be mainly transmitted by
respiratory droplets from infected people. The mean serial interval of COVID-19 is 7.5 days (95% Cl,
5.3 to 19) and the initial estimate for the basic reproductive number Rq was 2.2 (95% Cl, 1.4 to 3.9),*
although higher Rq have since been reported with a mean of more than 3.® On 18 February 2020,
China's CDC published their data of the first 72,314 cases including 44,672 confirmed cases. About
80% of the confirmed cases were reported to be mild disease or less severe forms of pneumonia,
13.8% severe and 4.7% critically ill. Risk factors for severe disease outcomes are older age and co¬
morbidities. The progression to acute respiratory distress syndrome occurs approximately 8-12 days
after onset of first symptoms, with lung abnormalities on chest CT showing greatest severity
approximately 10 days after initial onset of symptoms. Evidence is mounting that also mildly
symptomatic or even asymptomatic cases can transmit the disease.
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On 3'“^ February, 2020, an outbreak of COVID-19 was reported on Cruise Ship Princess Diamond off
the Japanese coast, with initially 10 persons confirmed to be infected with the virus. The number has
since ballooned into the largest coronavirus outbreak outside of mainland China. By 19* February,
619 of 3,700 passengers and crew (17%) were tested positive. By end February, six persons had died.
The outbreak was traced to a Hong Kong passenger who embarked on January 21st and disembarked
on January 25th. After docking near New Taipei City, on January 31, the ship arrived in Yokohoma,
Japan. By the following day, the Japanese health ministry ordered a 14-day quarantine for everyone on
board and rushed to close its ports to all other cruise ships. The public health measures taken
according to news reports and the media were removal of all PCR positive passengers and crew from
the ship and their isolation in Japanese hospitals. The remaining test-negative passengers and crew
remained on board. Passengers were quarantined in their cruise ship cabins, and only allowed out of
the cabin for one hour per day. By 20* February, the decision to evacuate was made and more than
3000 passengers left the ship. Most were air-evacuated by their respective countries.
The cruise ship with a COVID-19 index case onboard between the 21-25* January serves as a good
model to study its potential to spread in a population that is more homogenously mixed, compared to
the more spatially variable situation in Wuhan.
We set out to study the empirical data of COVID-19 confirmed infections on the Cruise ship Diamond
Princess, to estimate the basic reproduction number (Rq) under cruise ship conditions, the response
effectiveness of the quarantine and removal interventions, and compare scenarios of an earlier and
later evacuation of the ship.
Methods:
We used data on confirmed cases on the cruise ship as published on a daily basis by public sources'^ '*
to calibrate a model and estimate the basic reproduction number Rq from the time sequence and
amplitude of the case rates observed. COVID-19 is thought to have been introduced by an index case
from Hong Kong visiting the ship between the 2D‘ to 25* of January, 2020. We thus used the date of
2F' January 2020 as the first time point, t-0, assuming the index case was infectious from the first day
on the ship. The estimates of Rq and the associated Covid-19 incidence on the cruise ship was derived
using a compartmental model estimating the dynamics of the number of susceptible (S), exposed (E),
infected (7), and recovered (7?) individuals, adapted but modified from a published COVID-19 study.
We analyzed two instances of the model assuming respectively: (1) a homogenous population (3700
individuals), and (2) a stratified population of crew (1000 individuals) and guests (2700 individuals).
The model used a relationship between the daily reproductive number, fS, and Rq to infer the
transmissibility and contact rate across the whole cruise ship population by the relationship:
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= transmissibility * contact rate = R^/i
where the infectious period equals to one over the recovery rate (y), i = Ijy
In the homogeneous model, the infectious period, i, of COVID-19 was set to he 10 days based on
previous findings.* In the situation of no removal (ill persons taken off the ship to he isolated in a
Japanese hospital), the incubation period (or, the latent period), I was estimated to be approximately 5
days (ranging from 2 to 14 days).^° In order to model the removal/isolation and quarantine
interventions, we implemented time dependent removal and contact rates as described in Table 1. We
performed additional sensitivity analysis reducing the Rq to 3.7, an estimate of the average value
across mainland China studies of COVID-19.^
We further estimated a counterfactual scenario of the infections dynamics assuming no interventions
were implemented, in particular no removal and subsequent isolation of ill persons. We assumed an
infectious period of 10 days, with a contact rate remaining the same as in the initial phase of the
outbreak. Additionally, in the stratified model of crew and guests, the contact rate was assumed to be
different due to the assumption that crew could not be easily quarantined as they had to continue their
services on board for all the passengers and possibly had more homogeneous mixing with all the
passengers, whereas passengers may be mixing more within their preferred circles and areas. We kept
the transient change in the contact rate and the removal of all PCR confirmed patients starting from the
3"“^ and the 5* of February respectively as in the first model. Parameters are described in Table 1.
The model describing a homogeneous population onboard can be described by:
dS
dt
dE S
dl
where S denote all susceptible people on the cruise ship, E all exposed, I all infected and R all
recovered or removed, and where N = S + E + I + R denotes the whole population.
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The model describing a stratified population onboard can be described by:
dSq Sq Sq
dEq Sq Sq
dl,
a
dt
— ylg
dRg
dt
= y[c.
dSr Sr Sr
dEr Sr Sr
dl
dt
= Ec/l - Ylc
dR
dF = >"'
where S denotes susceptible, E exposed, I infected and R recovered or removed, N = S + E + I + R,
and the subscript g and c are indicating guest and crew respectively. Overall, we assume mortality is
negligible.
Models with interventions were calibrated to reports of total infection occurrence, while models
simulating the counterfactual scenarios where left with the naive parameter settings (no
countermeasures). The net effects of the countermeasures where estimated as the difference between
the counterfactual scenario and the model with the interventions. Model parameters are described in
Table 1. The effectiveness of the countermeasures was estimated by calibration of the model to data.
We here also present estimations of the plausible consequences of a hypothetical third intervention
strategy, whereby all individuals onboard would have been evacuated either on of February or 19*
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of February. We estimated and presented the number of latent cases on 3'^‘* February evacuation and on
19* February, 2020.
Results:
Using the SEIR model assuming relatively homogenous mixing of all people onboard, we calibrated
the predicted cumulative number of infections from the model to the observed cumulative number of
infections among all people onboard and estimated the initial Rq to 14.8. This resembled an estimate
of p (the daily reproduction rate) to 1.48. To derive this estimate we calibrated functions describing
transient change in the as a result of changes in contact rate and the removal of symptomatic
infections. The parameter values of contact rate, quarantine interventions and removal presented in
Table 1 are the results of the calibration to the observed cumulative incidence data. The contact rate
between persons on the cruise ship was calibrated to give the best fit to data with a reduction of 70%
by the quarantine countermeasure with onset February, 2020. The transient function of removal and
isolation of infected cases with an onset on 5* February, 2020, reduced the infectious period from 10
to 4 days, and substantially reduced the transmission and sub-sequent infections on the ship. In Figure
1 we present the change in Rq based on the relationship between Rq and ^ and how it is affected by
the transient countermeasures of quarantine and removal of ill patients from the model. Here Rq
should be interpreted as the basic reproductive rate in a totally naive population on the Diamond
Princess (i.e. same contact rate), and not the actual basic reproductive number over time on the cruise
ship. The Rq was 14.8 initially and then R^ declined to a stable 1.78 after the quarantine and removal
interventions were initiated (Figure 1).
The predicted cumulative number of cases over time from this model described the observed cases
well, but overestimated the cumulative case incidence rate initially (Figure 2). This allowed to
compensate for reporting bias in the initial phase, given that the proportion of testing of all passengers
was patchy while at the end of the study (19* February, 2020) the testing of passengers had a higher
coverage and was more complete. The modelled cumulative number of cases on 19 February, 2020, is
613 out of the 3700 people at risk, while the observed reported number of cases is 619. The
counterfactual scenario assuming homogenous rates among crew and guests without any interventions
(no removal off the ship or isolation of ill persons nor any quarantine measures for the remaining
passengers on boat), estimated the number of cumulative cases to be 2920 out of the 3700 after 30
days, that is by 19* of February (Figure 2). The net effect of the combined interventions was estimated
to prevent a total number of 2307 cases by 19* February, 2020 (Figure 2).
In a sensitivity analysis we modified the Rq to 3.7 (and consequently p to 0.37) as this has been
reported the average basic reproduction number from studies of COVID-19 in China.^ However, from
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our simulation, even in the absence of any intervention, such a low Rq cannot explain the rapid growth
of incident cases on the cruise ship (Figure 3). This sensitivity scenario excluded countermeasures
from the model making it unrealistic that such a low Rq value could be the true value in the cruise ship
situation with confined spaces and high homogeneous mixing of the same persons. The estimate with
the lower Rq value also omitted to consider the strong interventions put into place, making it even
more unrealistic.
We additionally modeled a scenario stratified by crew and guests whereby we assumed the parameter
values of transmission risk to be lower for crew to guest than for guest to crew (Table 1). The
predicted cumulative number of infected crew and guests by 19th of February from this model was
168 out of 1000 (16.8%) and 464 out of 2700 (17.2%), respectively (Figure 4). The total number of
cumulative cases by 19* of February predicted from this model was 632, close to the observed number
of cases of 619. The predicted cumulative incidence rates were overestimated for crew while
underestimated for guests based on available tests results at the time of writing (Figure 4). These data
still need to be validated against the empiric data of test results in all crew and passengers which
should soon become available.
Instead of keeping all passengers on board, another option would have been to evacuate all individuals
onboard the cruise ship earlier, and allow them to go home for a potential quarantine in their
respective home countries. We modeled that an evacuation by 3* February, 2020, would have resulted
in 76 latent cases (cases during the incubation time), while an evacuation by 19* February would have
resulted in 246 latent cases.
Discussion:
Modelling the COVID-19 on-board outbreak reveals important insights into the epidemic risk and
effectiveness of public health measures. We found that the reproductive number of COVID-19 in the
cruise ship situation of 3,700 persons confined to a limited space was around 4 times higher than in the
epicenter in Wuhan, where Rq was estimated to have a mean of 3.7.^ Interestingly, a rough estimation
of the population per square km on this 18-deck ship is 286 by 62 meters (0.32 km^). Assuming that
only 50% of decks are being used, approximately 24,400 persons are confined per km^ on a ship
compared to approximately 6000 persons per km^ (9,000,000/1528) in urban Wuhan. This means that
the population density was about 4 times higher on the cruise ship. Thus, both Rq and contact rate are
dependent on population density, as also suggested by previous research.^^ In population-based models
on observational data the population per square km is often substantially different, affecting the Rg and
P coefficient implicitly by changes in the contact rate expressed as:
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Ro
— = Transmissibility * contact rate
The local estimate of Ro can be divided into a localized contact rate and a multiplier that is necessary
for moving from one population to another:
contact rate = contact rate
localized
pd, where pd is the population density multiplier. In our
case it was approximated to 4. Here the contact rate is relating to a contact rate in a defined population
in a certain area and the population density multiplier modifies the contact rate when moving across
different local population and geographical areas representing heterogeneity in population density. In
the case of the cruise ship, the potential relationship of Rq to population density appear thus mainly be
attributed to the contact rate and mixing effects. This information is also important for other settings
characterized by high population densities.
With such a high Rq, we estimated that without any interventions within the time period of
January to 19* February 2920 out of the 3700 (79%) would have been infected, assuming relatively
homogenous mixing between all people on board.
The quarantine and removal interventions launched when the outbreak was confirmed (3’^'* February
and 5* of February) substantially lowered the contact rate and reduced the cumulative case burden by
an estimated 2307 cases by 19* February. We note, however, that the longer time span of simulation
beyond 19* February, assuming people would stay on the boat, would reduce the net effect of the
intervention substantially. We further note that an earlier evacuation would have corresponded to
disembarking a substantially lower number of latent undetectable infections (76 vs. 246), likely giving
rise to some further transmission outside the ship.
We also found that contact rate of guest to guest and crew appeared higher than the contact rate from
guest to crew, perhaps driven by high transmission rates within cabins. However, testing of crew was
delayed, and there was a testing bias towards testing more passengers than crew. Hence our access to
empiric data may have and this analysis need to be revisited when all data is available.
The limitations of our study include our lack of data on the lag time between onset of symptoms, the
timing of testing and potential delay to the availability of test results. Due to the large number of
people, not everyone was tested, and we suspect that the timing of the test results do not totally tally
with real-time onset of cases. We had no access to data on incident cases in crew versus passengers,
nor any data on whether there was clustering of cases around certain nationalities or crew members.
Furthermore, although the Hong Kong passenger was assumed to be the index case, it could well have
been possible that there was more than one index case on board who could have contributed to
transmission, and this would have lowered our estimated RO. Lastly, our models are based on human-
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to-human transmission and do not take into account the possibility that fomites, or water systems with
infected feces, contributed to the outbreak.
The interventions that included the removal of all persons with confirmed COVID-19 disease
combined with the quarantine of all passengers substantially reduced the anticipated number of new
COVID-19 cases compared to a scenario without any interventions (17% attack rate with intervention
versus 79% without intervention) and thus prevented a total number of 2307 additional cases by 19*
February. However, the main conclusion from our modelling is that evacuating all passengers and
crew early on in the outbreak would have prevented many more passengers and crew members from
getting infected. A scenario of early evacuation at the time of first detection of the outbreak (3
February) would have resulted in only 76 latent infected persons during the incubation time (with
potentially still negative tests). A late evacuation by 19* February would have resulted in about 246
infected persons during their incubation time. These data need to be confirmed by empiric data of
testing all evacuated persons after 19* February, and may be an overestimate as we assumed a stable
Rq after quarantine was instituted. However, the Rq probably declined over time, as the
implementation of quarantine measures were incrementally implemented leading to better quarantine
standards towards the end of the quarantine period.
In conclusion, the cruise ship conditions clearly amplified an already highly transmissible disease. Rq
is related to population density, and is particularly driven by contact rate and mixing effects, and this
explains the high Rq in the first weeks before countermeasures were initiated. Population densities and
mixing need to be taken into account in future modeling of the COVID-19 outbreak in different
settings. Early evacuation of all passengers on a cruise ship- a situation with confined spaces and high
intermixing- is recommended as soon as an outbreak of COVID-19 is confirmed.
Author contributions: JR and AWS conceived the study. JR developed the model and run the
analysis. HS advised on model development, and helped with the figures. AWS advised on model
parameters. All authors wrote the final manuscript.
Funding: None
Declaration of interest: none declared.
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Table 1. Model parameter description and values. Start time {t = 0) the 20^*' of January.
Parameters
Explanation (unit)
Estimated to
P
Overall transmissibility and contact rate (1/day)
1.48 i/ t < 14
0.44 if t > 14
1
Incubation period (days)
5 days
i
Infectious period or time to removal (days)
10 if t< 16
4ift>16
N
Total number of people onboard (persons)
3700
Pc
Transmissibility and contact rate crew (1/day)
I.IS if t< 14
0.3S if t> 14
Pgg
Transmissibility and contact rate guests to
guests (1/day)
I.IS if t< 14
0.3S if t> 14
Pgc
Transmissibility and contact rate guests to crew
(1/day)
0.17 if t < 14
O.OS if t> 14
N,
Total number of guests onboard (persons)
2700
Nc
Total number of crew onboard (persons)
WOO
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Figure 1. The estimated basic reproduction number, Rq, on the cruise ship and its change over time
as a result of the transient interventions of quarantine and removal of infectious cases. The Rq given
here assumes one index case in a totally naive population, although that is not the case on the ship, we
use it here to illustrate how the Rq is sensitive to the interventions, but still substantially large to fuel a
continuation of the epidemic. The grey line indicates Rq = 1-
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Figure 2. Predicted total number of infections using model 1 (no stratification) for the realistic
situation with interventions (blue), counterfactual scenario without intervention (grey) and the net
effect of the interventions (black).
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Downloaded from https://academic.oup.eom/jtm/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jtm/taaa030/5766334 by Department of Defense user on 27 March 2020
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Time in days since 21 Jan
Figure 3. Sensitivity analysis: predicting total number of infections using a model without
interventions with Rg set to 3.7 with index case 21th January (bottom). Observed reports of
cumulative cases are marked as "o ”.
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Downloaded from https://academic.oup.eom/jtm/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jtm/taaa030/5766334 by Department of Defense user on 27 March 2020
Time in days since 21 Jan
Figure 4. Predicted total number of infections using a model stratified into crew and guest for the
realistic situation with interventions. Total population onboard (black), guests (grey), crew (blue).
Observed total case numbers of total (black), crew (blue) and guest (grey) are marked as "o".
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
CAP! USN COMPACFLT NOIH (USA)
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 4:10 AM
CAP! USN NAVY JAG WASH DC (USA) <|_
Subject: RE: TR INVESTIGATION - REQUESST FOR RESPONSE
@navy.mil>
My apologies for the late response to this email. I did appreciate our discussion on SUN (17 May)
covering the questions below.
My responses follow:
1. I do not specifically recall telling CAPTm that an action he was taking was wrong. During the time
from when COVID was confirmed by testing and the arrival to Guam, the focus was on ensuring he had
the maximal support to frame/contain the problem to include PMO/preventive medicine support (flown
while ship was en route) as well as coordination with C7F SG.
2. No.
3. I did participate in many, but not all of these meetings. CAPT^^ also participated in many but not
all meetings. The meetings were focused more up and out as far as requirements and support, rather
than what specifically was being done within the ship as far as policy execution. I would anticipate
release from quarantine and that approach to be shared with C7F SG, but not necessarily in this
forum. If CAPT^^ was unclear of approach, he certainly could solicit input in this forum and has done
so with other questions.
4. No. I would recommend closure. The first 39 in quarantine were tested negative in VN, and
subsequently released on ship after completing quarantine. These Sailors were felt to be low risk of
infection. The approach would certainly change after first suspected cases - closure would be an
expected public health response.
5. Very seriously. This is an all-out total team effort to combat COVID and keeping it off the ship. CPF
has been consistent with this approach and frequent with this message.
V/R,
CAPT CD) Kfl
MC, USN
Pacific Fleet Surgeon
Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet
COMM:|
Mobile:!
@navy.mil
@navy.smil.mil
From:^^^^^^g CAPT USN NAVY JAG WASH DC (USA) <^^^^^_@navy.mil>
Sent: Sunday, May 17, 2020 2:44 PM
1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
COMPACFLT NOIH (USA)
Subject: TR INVESTIGATION - REQUESST FOR RESPONSE
m
I have been appointed by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Robert Burke, to serve as a part of a
command investigation concerning chain of command actions with regard to COVID-19 onboard USS
TFIEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71). Attached is a copy of my appointing letter.
Thank you for speaking with me earlier concerning CAPTmg^^. In order to have a written record for
inclusion in the report, can you please answer the below questions in your own words. Your response is
requested as soon as possible.
Questions:
1. In regards to the fight to prevent the spread of COVID-19 aboard the USS TFIEODORE
ROOSEVELT (CVN 71) (TR), do you ever recall telling CAPT|g|| that some action he was taking or
recommending was wrong?
2. Were you aware that the TR made a decision to release quarantined Sailors from the aft portion
of the ship to go back to their regular berthing after arriving in Guam?
3. Did you participate in daily synchronization meetings to discuss COVID-19 and, if so, would you
expect such meetings to include a discussion about the possibility of releasing quarantined
Sailors from the aft portion of the ship to go back to their regular berthing after arriving in
Guam?
4. Did CAPT^^ ever consult with you about closing common areas on the ship where Sailors
would congregate in close contact with each other (e.g., gyms, ship's stores, barber shops, and
chapels) and, if not, what would your advice have been if CAPT^^ had asked for it? Would it
make a difference whether he asked you before the first positive COVID-19 test (while 39 Sailors
were in quarantine following a port visit to Vietnam) or after the first positive COVID-19 test? If
so, what you your advice have been on each occasion?
5. Flow seriously does CPF want ship's to implement precautions to stop the spread of COVID-19?
Thank you in advance for your cooperation in this matter. The investigation is ongoing, so please do not
discuss the above questions or your answers with anyone other than members of the investigation
team. Again, thank you.
V/R,
IS
CAPT^^^^^g, JAGC, USN
Command Investigation Team Legal Advisor
Vice Chief of Naval Operations
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In follow up to our phone call on 13May2020, 1 offer the following points for the investigation's
consideration. All data was compiled from notes, emails, conversations to clarify dates and
personal/collective recollections. All dates are Guam local.
Government of Guam Response
From the onset of the first MEDEVAC flights from USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT, JRM has
benefited from the solid support from people and Government of Guam led by Governor Leon
Guerrero in our efforts to assist our shipmates. After my initial notification to her of the first
three MEDEVAC patients on 25March2020, followed by my notification of 21 more COVID (+)
patients on 26March2020, the Governor has been consistently receptive to my periodic
updates concerning our response helping the Sailors of THEODORE ROOSEVELT. As the situation
onboard the ship became more serious and the medical response evolved 27 to 29March2020
my conversations with the Governor became more frequent. During a phone conversation on
28March2020 with Governor Leon Guerrero, at her request in preparation for her COVID-19
DSCA call with the INDOPACOM Commander, I first broached the subject of billeting
quarantined TR Sailors in Guam commercial hotels. Initially I was cautious because I
understood the potential political risk that the Governor may be opening herself up to given the
CNO and SECNAV's statements of 26March2020. During the conversation on 28March2020 and
in subsequent "temperature taking" calls between my Chief of Staff and the Governor's Chief of
Staff concerning the "hotel option" I was very appreciative of the Governor and her staff's
objective consideration to the proposal to quarantine Sailors in commercial hotels despite the
unknown nature of and widespread concerns about the COVID-19 virus.
Following the initial calls during which the Governor pledged her assistance saying that
"we (Guam) need to support the people who defend us. This is the humanitarian thing to do"
we quickly began the background work of identifying the scope and requirements. The
Governor's Chief of Staff provided an initial referral to the President of the Guam Hotel and
Restaurant Association (GHRA) on 29March2020. The detailed, immediate planning fell to my
Chief of Staff, Captain Mr. JRM's Regional Lodging Director and Ms.
the President of GHRA, in conjunction with the THEODORE ROOSEVELT
leadership on approximately SOMarch to 01April2020. Of note, I believe that THEODORE
ROOSEVELT was aware of the hotel closures as JRM received an inquiry from Marriott Sales San
Diego through GHRA on SlMarch 2020. This inquiry via email indicates on or before
30March2020 someone affiliated with the THEODORE ROOSEVELT attempted to reserve 400
rooms at the Marriott, was interested in reserving 5000 rooms on Guam, and that at least one
major hotel on Guam had closed. After the initial concept of operations was developed and the
first hotels were identified by GHRA, a unified "walk through" of partner hotels was arranged
on 01/02April2020 at the various sites to reach an agreement on the operational concept
between the Navy, hotel management, GHRA and various Government of Guam agencies.
I have been continually impressed by the responsiveness of the Governor's team and
that of the community/commercial partners. It should be noted that the majority of the hotels
were shut down at the time of the first discussions with the Governor and GHRA, with
permanent staff layoffs in progress, due to the financial situation resulting from the drop in
tourist travelers to Guam in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.
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Impact of Captain Crozier's Letter
As we were in the early process of developing the hotel CONORS, which started with my
phone conversation with Governor Leon Guerrero on 28March2020, we consciously refrained
from any public comment concerning this effort to allow the Governor to make a public
announcement of support for the plan. When CART Crozier's memorandum was published in
the San Francisco Chronicle (01April2020), the result was public consternation, significant Guam
Legislature concerns expressed publicly in the media, via direct letters and during a JRM-
Legislator briefing session via phone, and a local media environment which was trending
negative. While the article did not change the Governor's support for THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
she indicated it usurped her team's opportunity to shape the public narrative for the
partnership. The Governor had intended to voice her support during a press conference on
01April2020 in order to convey the well-managed and thoughtful Civil-Military response to the
situation on the ship. The San Francisco Chronicle article and Captain's memorandum changed
the narrative from a measured response to an urgent and reactive crisis. The Governors' staff
had some concern that the "dire situation" that CART Crozier described in his memorandum
would result in increased public health concern among the community, potentially drum up
more vocal opposition from anti-DoD activists, and negatively impact the GHRA's support of
this COA - resulting in the loss of critical capacity to house quarantined Sailors. Ultimately a
plan to quarantine Sailors went forward, but the opportunity for a coordinated messaging
initiative was lost.
The publication of the memorandum did not speed up or slow down execution of the
hotel COA as discussions and negotiations were already in progress starting 28March2020 with
a tentative rollout on 01April2020. If the memorandum had not been written or published.
Sailors would have still been quarantined in hotels, in DoD houses and mass lodging areas on
Naval Base Guam, as the requirement to move the majority of personnel off the ship had been
identified and communicated to JRM as early as 27/28March2020 by both the CSG-9 and C7F
Commanders. The actual impact of publication of the memorandum was mission distraction
and consumption of limited bandwidth, as numerous DoD and local government RFIs and media
RTQs pulled staff and senior leadership time and attention away from the actual THEODORE
ROOSEVELT support mission, and added friction points to the support process. The Governor's
COS' sentiments summarize the memorandum's effect as "not helpful."
Response by Guam Military Leadership
Concerning the initial response to the arrival of THEODORE ROOSEVELT, I was fortunate
to have a community of Navy Captains on the island and within the fleet that already enjoyed a
cooperative and robust working relationship. With strategic commander's guidance and vague
initial requirements, the local military team went into overdrive following notification on
25March2020 of THEODORE ROOSEVELT'S pending arrival. Led by the Commanding Officer of
Naval Base Guam (CO NBG), the Joint Region Marianas Chief of Staff (JRM COS) and the C7F
Chief of Staff, this group of leaders created a rough medical concept of operations and billeting
options for Sailors requiring quarantine and isolation. Though the initial requirement was
unknown, CO NBG used a planning assumption of 1000 beds to mobilize his installation team
and the tenant community to assist in the care, feeding, logistics and transportation needs of
THEODORE ROOSEVELT Sailors. He quickly set up pier side support and containment facilities.
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mass and individual berthing options (more than 2400 cots and beds), relocated homeported
Sailors from their barracks rooms to their individual ships, and also setup a tactical emergency
operations center to manage the operation on the installation. CO NBG was fortunate to have
tenant partners such as the Commodore of CTF-75 and the Commanding Officer of Naval
Hospital Guam who never said no, worked in concert with other tenant commands assisting
with care and feeding, logistics, transportation, housing, patient care and medical
accountability. As we quickly developed additional quarantine capacity outside DoD fence lines
JRM COS led the effort develop a parallel command and control, care and feeding, medical
monitoring, security and transportation structure required to manage quarantined Sailors in
commercial hotels. Requesting support from additional joint forces on Guam, Task Force Hotel
grew to more than 350 personnel managing all quarantine requirements for more than 4,000
Sailors housed in 11 commercial hotels. Ultimately, the local DoD personnel response to
supporting THEODORE ROOSEVELT Sailors totaled approximately 1,000 individuals.
Challenges
What challenged the shore response to support THEODORE ROOSEVELT the most was
the lack of initial communication and clear articulation of requirements.
• MEDEVACS: As this crisis and the response was dynamic, unprecedented, and at a scale
not seen, including MEDEVACs that were essentially unannounced and grew in scope
from the arrival of three personnel on 25March2020 to 21 Sailors on 26 March 2020,
clear communications were required to enable a coordinated, effective response. The
first two days of MEDEVAC operations were done with minimal coordination from the
ship to Naval Hospital Guam, which devolved into notification of pending MEDEVAC
flights during VTCs as the aircraft were getting ready to launch and without the Naval
Hospital's knowledge of inbound patients.
• QUARANTINE CAPACITY: These communications challenges continued through the first
week where the requirements for shore billeting were not defined other than the need
to get sick, close contact and assumed COVID negative Sailors off the ship. Though the
THEODORE ROOSEVELT medical community voiced the opinion on or around
29/30March2020 that each infected or potentially infected Sailor needed an individual
room with their own bathroom, physically that was impossible due to the lack of
capacity on Naval Base Guam and the closed status of the local commercial hotels. This
was communicated to the THEODORE ROOSEVELT via their Chain of Command with no
further response from the ship. The initial planning assumption of 600-800 beds was
generated by the JRM Commander in the absence of any communicated requirement
from THEODORE ROOSEVELT to JRM or CO NBG. This initial estimate was later raised by
the CO NBG on his own initiative and approved by CJRM to more than 1000 beds, and
ultimately resulted in more than 2,400 beds and cots available on base. The upward
adjustment of the requirement to house 3000-4000 Sailors ashore did not come from
THEODORE ROOSEVELT to JRM or CO NBG, but rather was articulated on
27/28March2020 by both CSG-9 and C7F via TANDBERG and VTC to JRM leadership.
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• QUARANTINE CONDITIONS: By 29March2020, Naval Base Guam had a 1,167 bed
capacity to support Sailors in mass quarantine areas, though only 535 beds had been
filled (Table 1). This capacity was developed in coordination with the Public Health
Emergency Officers and Base Safety Personnel. Bed capacity was communicated daily
to CSG-9 and C7F at the Flag Officer level and by CO NBG and COS JRM to THEODORE
ROOSEVELT, CSG-9 and C7F leadership at the 0-6/Staff Officer level. However, between
BOMarch to 01April2020 issues of testing limitations onboard the ship, at the local Naval
Hospital, and testing friction external to Guam, and the THEODORE ROOSEVELT Senior
Medical Officer opinion that the mass quarantine areas would be unacceptable given
the current knowledge of COVID-19, became apparent thereby resulting in several days
of excess bed capacity on Naval Base Guam while Sailors remained onboard the ship
rather than ashore in isolation or quarantine.
Date
NBG Bed
Capacity
NBG Beds
Used
Hotel Beds
Available
Hotel Beds
Used
27-Mar-20
840
264
0
0
28-Mar-20
939
382
0
0
29-Mar-20
1167
535
0
0
30-Mar-20
1351
897
0
0
31-Mar-20
1626
951
0
0
l-Apr-20
1767
969
0
0
2-Apr-20
2343
1060
180
180
Table 1
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
Witness Statement of Commander, Destroyer Squadron 23
On 9 May 2020, 1 was interviewed in connection with a command investigation concerning
chain of command actions with regard to COVID-19 onboard USS THEODORE
ROOSEVELT (CVN 71) via videoteleconference.
What follows is a true and accurate representation of my statement for this investigation.
Witness Name:
Position:
CAPTp^g**
USN
Commander, Destroyer Squadron 23 (COMDESRON TWENTY-THREE)
il Addresses:
ra).cvn71.navv.mil
@naw.mil
me.com
Phone(s);
I am the Commander, Destroyer Squadron 23. 1 am the Sea Combat Commander for Carrier
Strike Group NINE. I have command of six destroyers and have an operational staff of 36
personnel embarked in USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT. During the month of March 2020, my
staff and I were supporting operations across the 3'*', 4*’’, 5"’, and 7*'' Fleet operating areas. All of
my ships were in a deployed status during this timeframe. 1 characterize the pace of operations
during this timeframe as very high.
Q: Were there concerns regarding the port visit prior to arrival?
Yes. There were a small number of cases reported in the North part of the country prior to the
visit. Tbe prevalent thinking was that because these cases were limited to the North part of the
country, we were relatively safe in Da Nang. As a group, we conceded that if we took the data at
face value, pulling in to Da Nang was low risk. Most of us felt the decision to go ahead with the
Da Nang port visit was above our level. There was clear geopolitical value in conducting the port
visit.
Q: Did you have any ships pull in with TR?
No. We had planned for USS PINKCNEY to accompany us but their tasking changed. Prior to
the Da Nang port visit, my staff was supporting five ships already underway. The majority of
my effort as well as my staff remained focused on those ships and their issues.
Q: Were you aware of the TASKORD from C7F and what effort went into planning for
that?
I was familiar with the C7F TASKORD, but was not directly involved in the planning effort
onboard TR. One of our DESRON units, USS PAUL HAMILTON had conducted a port visit to
Singapore in late February and we worked with them to achieve compliance with the C7F
TASKORD and FRAGO.
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Subj : Witness Statement of Commander, Destroyer Squadron 23
Q: Did you think the crew took the guidance seriously?
Yes. The ship and embarked staffs were engaged and applied oversight to ensure procedures
were followed. A dedicated effort was made to change the culture to account for COVID-19
mitigation protocols. Messaging from the CO and XO was appropriate. The crew was aware and
concerned about their own safety, health, and potential operational impacts with respect to
COVID-19.
Q: Arc you familiar with NTRP, NAVADMINs and other COVID-19 guidance?
Yes. I received guidance via message traffic and multiple emails from the CNSP CoS on
applicable COVID-19 references including NAVADMINs, NTRP and other policy updates. We
used NTRP 4-02 as a reference to conduct outbreak drills on CDS-23 ships in accordance with
the TASKORD. In the days prior to our outbreak, 1 was reviewing a shipboard outbreak
instruction for USS KIDD with the CNSP Force Surgeon and was actively tracking a PUI
reported on USS PREBLE. COVID-19 policy was a steady discussion point in conversations
with CDS-23 COs. 1 received and distributed NAVADMINs and other COVID-19 guidance
regularly. Staying abreast of the most current guidance across multiple AORs was, and continues
to be, a significant challenge.
Q: Was a liberty brief provided and did it discuss COVID-19?
As is typical, TR conducted a liberty brief that was played on CCTV onboard the ship. It was
primarily focused on explaining the mechanics of going on liberty, which included the use of
liberty cards and visa cards issued by the country of Vietnam for day and overnight
authorizations. The brief did cover some basic COVID-19 precautions. There were other public
service announcements generated by the ship’s media department on COVID-19. CDS-23 staff
conducted an internal liberty brief as well for embarked personnel, which included specific
discussion on COVID-19 mitigations.
Q: Was it a good port visit?
Yes. Weather related embark/debark issues were the main issues we encountered. Boat
operations were secured on several occasions due to sea state. It was fhistrating for some, but the
safety of the crew was understood as the priority. Embark and debark operations were supervised
by the XO and were executed safely. Once off the ship, TR Sailors enjoyed the port visit. The
crews' performance on liberty was excellent. To my knowledge there were no liberty incidents.
A Big Top reception had been planned onboard the carrier, but was changed to an offsite hotel
due to weather concerns. I attended the event and recall receiving a temperature screening with
touchless thermometer and being asked if I had symptoms prior to entry into the hotel. The
screening precautions were planned for the Big Top on TR so I was pleased to see them in place
at the new location despite the short notice change.
Q: Were you aware of the Sailors that had potential contact with COVID-19 positive
British citizens?
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Subj: Witness Statement of Commander, Destroyer Squadron 23
A day before the TR left Da Nang, I was back on the ship preparing for the underway when I
was told of the Sailors who had potential contact with two British citizens who had tested
positive for coronavirus. The 39 Sailors did not have confirmed contact, but were placed in a
single berthing for quarantine out of an abundance of caution. I was not directly involved in
planning or execution of the quarantine and no DESRON 23 sailors were among the 39 Sailors.
The ship worked provided access to medical care, food, and quality of life issues for the
quarantined Sailors. Both the CO and the CMC donned PPE and visited the Sailors during their
quarantine. My impression was that the quarantine was well-executed. We also left Da Nang
with additional medical personnel to help us conduct COVID-1 9 testing onboard.
After we left Da Nang we were concerned about bringing a COVID-19 infection onboard. The
CO and XO messaged to the crew about the importance of the cleaning and sanitization protocol,
covering your cough and going down to Medical if you had symptoms - of having integrity in
self-reporting symptoms and not “fighting your way through it.” The messaging was aligned to
guidance during that time period. We continued cleaning/sanitizing protocols and social
distancing. There were numerous IMC calls/updates to the crew by XO and CO.
Infection data and COVlD-19 related news updates were briefed daily at MUB and TFCC stand-
up meetings.
Q: Approximately when did you become aware of COVID cases onboard the TR? What
can you tell me about the discussions and actions after the first Sailor tested positive?
The first Sailor tested positive on March 23^** and I was made aware within a couple hours.
Contact tracing and movement to establish a quarantine area began immediately. We knew we
had to take aggressive action given the unique transmissibility of the virus.
The decision was made very quickly to proceed towards Guam. We worked logistics for a
medical evacuation to Guam, which seemed the most accessible location given our operating
area.
Q: Was the SMO involved in the discussions among warfare commanders?
The SMO was an active participant in the majority of warfare commanders' meetings and we all
shared information in discussion. SMO was treated as a warfare commander and given a place at
the table during WCBs. We viewed SMO as the supported commander for the outbreak response
effort. We reviewed NMCPH and CNA projections to develop a sense for what to expect as we
moved forward. The projections were grim. We assessed the number hospital beds and
ventilators onboard TR and talked frankly about how many sailors would be at risk if the spread
continued unchecked. We also talked about the Diamond Princess outbreak, which we viewed as
a similar in some respects. We knew that cruise ships with COVID-19 onboard were being
denied port entry, which brought forward concerns about access to Guam. We were aware that
Guam was working through their own COVID-19 outbreak, mitigations and state of emergency.
We talked openly about the possibility of having to recover at sea, pierside, with or without
support from Naval Base Guam and without the support of civilian resources.
3
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Subj; Witness Statement of Commander, Destroyer Squadron 23
Q: Were you aware that the US Navy initially informed Guam their assistance would not
be required?
No. 1 was not directly involved in the dialogue external to TR regarding the use or potential use
of Guam resources. I attended the 7"^ fleet CUBs and I was cc'd on email updates from Admiral
Baker.
Q: What can you tell me about the 28 Mar 20 proposed paper generated from the warfare
commanders? What was the driver for the document? What sources were used and why?
What was the desired effect?
In the days prior to generating the information paper, approximately 25-28 March, we developed
concerns about C7F direction on how to achieve recovery on TR; specifically, the use of
negative test results to establish “clean” groups and the use of group quarantine to maintain those
“clean” populations did not appear viable. There were other issues such as limited swab
inventory, batch-testing taking priority over sick call patients, testing throughput for processing,
and CDC compliance, but our chief concern was that the actions directed by C7F would not meet
recovery expectations.
We raised our concerns and provided recommendations at the 0-6 level and RDML Baker
communicated our concerns in VTCs to C7F. I do not have a perfect account of who registered
what concern and when, but my overall sense from being present was that RDML Baker
understood our perspective and was communicating effectively up the chain. We were instructed
to press forward and do what we could with what we had. We were asked what our plan was to
achieve a clean virus-free ship. We were told in no uncertain terms to continue the batch-testing
and separating those with negative test results until we had tested the entire crew. We took action
and did our best to comply with the direction from HHQ.
On or about 28 March, the warfare commanders collectively decided to generate an information
paper to communicate the facts as we understood them and the related context onboard TR. We
felt that an information paper could more clearly and concisely communicate the issues onboard
TR than continued VTC. The information paper was intended as a mechanism to illicit
commander's guidance up echelon.
Q: Did you have input to it? How was it generated? What were the sources?
CAG generated the initial draft. On 29 March, 1 reviewed a draft of the warfare commanders'
white paper. I made edits and sent it back with some comments. The sources came from
materials on the CDC website, the Navy and Marine Corps Public Health (NMCPH) and Center
for Naval Analysis (CNA). CAG sent the paper to RDML Baker and went into his office to talk
with him about it around mid-day. This resulted in a 1600 meeting with warfare commanders,
CoS and RDML Baker. At the end of that meeting, RDML Baker directed us to generate a brief
with 4 COAs. That evening we generated the COA brief with the CSG-9 team.
Q: Did it have the desired effect?
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Subj: Witness Statement of Commander, Destroyer Squadron 23
From my perspective, yes. The paper framed the problem, outlined the friction points and
provided a recommendation to secure a large number of rooms for TR recovery. The paper,
combined with the COA brief provided sufficient context as well as a range of options. In my
view, we had organized and registered our concerns at the warfare commander level, provided
the underlying context in the information paper and re-framed the problem into COAs that could
be used to support a decision from HHQ.
Q: How would you characterize the USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71) CO email
and Itr of 30 Mar 20 (Subj; REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19
PANDEMIC)?
I was surprised. After reading it, I went to CAPT Crozier’s cabin to ask him about it. It was clear
the letter in the email had been informed by the information paper. CAPT Crazier expressed to
me that he did not tell us about his letter because he did not want to be talked out of sending it
and that he wanted to protect the other warfare commanders from any repercussions.
Q: Why did he include those specific individuals in the TO and CC lines?
1 do not know. The individuals listed represent TRs ADCON chain of command. I have a
similar direct line of communication to the surface TYCOM.
Q: What was the response to the letter?
TTie letter appeared to accelerate and elevate dialog into the public domain. As stated above, we
had generated COAs with RDML Baker and were moving them up the chain for consideration.
Had we continued the staffing process using only the information paper and COA brief, I suspect
we would have landed at a similar outcome.
Another response to the letter was the significant uptick in demand from up-echelon as well as
public media outlets for additional data and information related to the TR situation. This demand
required a shift in focus on TR and within all embarked staffs to support additional CCSG9
communications.
Q; Why did SMO send his letter?
I have no awareness of a letter from SMO.
Q: What can you tell me about the relationship among the warfare commanders and with
RDML Baker.
We worked well together and trusted each other. As with any group, there were friction points
that had to be resolved. We worked through conflicts quickly and easily.
As a Strike Group Commander, 1 found RDML Baker accessible and reasonable. I would
characterize his relationship with the other warfare commanders as strong. There were points of
friction, but from my view, they were resolved quickly and without drama.
Q: Is there anything else you would like to add?
5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
H-3-102
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
Subj: Witness Statement of Commander, Destroyer Squadron 23
I am available for further questions or to provide additional detail on any of the answers
provided.
I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above is true to the best of my
knowledge or belief.
(Date)
BRBJ
Time
6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRIVACY SENSITIVE
H-3-102
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:
CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt
Baker. Stuart P RDML USN. CCSG-9
Crozier. Brett E CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt:
CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt:
CAPT USN. CSSG9:
CAPT
USSji- jJore Roosev^r i; (b)(6)
COMDESRON23
THEODORE ROOS^vlI:' (b) (6)
CVW-11 (USA)":lij (6) ^
CDR USN.lJCb I I . ; ; ?
_ _ _ (6)
COVID-19 update 25 Mar ch - EtkI of Day testing results
Wednesday, March 25, 2020 10:18:20 AM
OPREP3 COVIDIO (Positive’) Tracker 2020 - 25 March.xisx
Admiral -
1) 23 positives at tliis point. An additional 4 from afternoon batch
testing. 3 more from sick call, and 4 presumptive positives (close contacts
fi'om VFA-154, now witli fever/symptoms consistent witli CO\TD-19). Spreadsheet
attached.
2) 9 positive groups yielded 1 1 positive cases (1 1/192 = 5.7%). Relatively
liigh nimiber of asymptomatic positive individuals (7/1 1 = 63.6%). will have a
better overall look at group numbers after completing all the reactor testing.
For reference, the cmise ship Diamond Princess liad an asjanptomatic positive
rate of 18% - obvious differences in bertliing.
3) 198 Rx testing tomorrow.
3) Tlie foiu sailors that were medevrac'd earlier today were evaluated at USNH
Guam and hospitalization is not required. Tliey are in then rooms at NGIS.
4) Cunent approximate close contacts: 750. Expect it w'ill continue to
grow, possibly getting close to 1000.
v/r,
SMO
- Original Message -
From; CAPT USN, USS Tlieodore Roosevelt
Sent; Wednesday, March 25, 2020 7:09 PM
To: Baker, Stuart P RDML USN, CCSG-9
Cc: Crozier. Brett E CAPT USN, USS Tlieodore Roosevelt:
USN. USS Tlieodore Roosevelt; W (0)
pm
-CAPT USN, CSSG9;
CAPT USN. CVW-1 1 CAG;^b) (^Ij
CAPT
CAPT USN, CVW-1 1
DC"AG;(b) (6). CAPT USN, USS TheodofeRobseveElb
CAPTU^, COMDESRON23:m|^^J CAPT BKH C(^) (6) ) CDR - BKH
XO';|P)^[^^ LCDRUSN, USS THEODORE ROOSEVELTHb) (6)
CMC USN, USS Tlieodore Roosevelt; BHHHI MCPO USN CVW-1 1 (USA)';
I CMC USN, CCSG9; USN, USS TliTOdore
Roo^velt: j brH^^M CDR USN, USS Tlieodore Roosevelt; p) |B)
' II'CDR USN^^9; HMl USN, CCSG^b)^
J CAPT USN. CCSG9;^K1B) ^^SN. CCSG-9
Subject: RE: COVID-19 update 25 March - Mid-day testing results
Admiial.
Demograpliics fioiii the 5 positives from mid-day:
CDRB)'(B^^^BfB (6)^^, Navigation Department
H-3-103
, VFA-154 — medevac'd to the USNH Guam this
ti)
afternoon.
AM2 (0} 1^, I, HSM-75
ADA^b) (6) |Tb) ('6) V VFA-154
AMI p) (6) |,|(b) (6) |, HSM-75
We are currently tracking 3 more positives from the second batch of 3 (15
patients), and are running the last batch of 3. Should have all
demographics and a better sense of what our total "close contact" number is
by late tonight.
v/r.
SMO
- Original Message -
From: Baker, Stuart P RDML USN, CCSG-9
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 5:08 PM
To: CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt _
Cc: Crozier, Brett E CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt; CAPT
USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt; ] CAPT USN, CSSG9;
ID) fPt I CAPT USN, CV^^^AG^)^ | CAPT USN, CVW-11
DCAG;(b) (6)
^ CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt; (b) (B)
CAPT USN, COMDESRON23; CAPT BKH CO^ (6)
XO'; LCDR USN, USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT^b) (6)
CMC USN, USS Theodore Roosevelhjpn5r"~^B MCPO USN CVW-11 (USA)';
CMC USN, CCSG9; [B)^(6) fCDR USN, USS Theodore
Roosevelt;
HMl USN, CCSG 9
Subject: RE: COVID-19 update 25 March
CDR USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt;
Mid-day testing results
SMO - thanks for the update.
Need rank, age and rate of #4 as well as other demographics.
If I read this right you have done 3 of the batch test. Is that out of 9 so
still 30 folks to go?
V/r,
Studa
Erom:
Original Message -
CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
,6 ) @ c vn7 1 . navy mil>
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 2:20 PM
To: Baker, Stuart P RDML USN, CCSG-9
Cc: Crozier, Brett E CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
@ccsg9.navy mil>
;lt <(1
@cvn71.navy mil>;
Roosevelt ■ <|bM^
@cvn71.navy mil>;p) (u)
(6) I@ccsg9.navy mil:^b) (6)
@cvwll navy.mil>; 1^(6)
CAPT USN, USS Theodore
CAPT USN,
CSSG9 _
CVW-11 CAG^) (6)
CVW-11 DCAG 4b) (6)
USS Theodore Roosevelt ^b) (6)
CAPT USN, COMDESRON23 <j(b) (6)
CAPT BKH CO <
@cvwll.navy mil>;p) (6)
CAPT USN,
CAPT USN,
CAPT USN,
]@cvn71 navy.mil^(b) (6)
^^^^|@cvn71.navy mil>; (b) (6)
CDR
@cg52 navy.mil>;
@cg52.navy mil>; CDR - BKH XO'
LCDR USN, USS THEODORE
H-3-103
ROOSEVELT <|Ejrg9 ~~|@cvn71 navy.mil>;
Theodore Roosevelt <|(b) (6)
1(b) (6)
USN CVW-1 1 (USA)' ^ ^
@ccsg9 navy.mil>; pm
@cvn71 navy.mil>; jb) (I
_ ^@cvn71.navy mil>; (b) (6)
|@navy niil>;
CMC USN, USS
MCPO
CMC USN, CCSG9
CDR USN, USS Theodore
Roosevelt
Theodore Roosevelt <(c5
CCSG 9 4^}) (B) J@ccsg9 navy.niil>
Subject: COVID-19 update 25 March - Mid-day testing results
@cvn7 1 navy mil>;(b)
]^DR USN, USS
HMl USN,
Admiral,
Testing update (8 total so far):
3 positive from Monday/Tuesday (VEA-154, HSM-75, Rx)
4 positive today from three of the batch tests from last night, one
(VEA-154) with ILI symptoms/fever. Awaiting demographics on the other 3.
1 additional positive today, came down with fever/chills.
Currently testing the additional batch tests from last night to get accurate
numbers/demographic info.
Sending 4 (3 from Mon/Tues and the VEA-154 sailor from today) to Guam today
via helo direct to the hospital. Hospital is tracking and standing by to
receive. Anticipate sending the next 4 tomorrow, and likely more based on
the rest of today's results.
Collecting info to have an idea of scope of "close contacts" from the newest
positives.
v/r.
SMO
- Original Message -
Erom: Baker, Stuart P ROME USN, CCSG-9
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 10:31 AM
To: CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
Cc: Crozier, Brett E CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt;
USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt;
CAPT USN, CVW-11 CAG;I
CAPT
CAPT USN, CSSG9;
CAPT USN, CVW-11
b)l
DCAG; (b) (6) CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt;
CAPT USN, COMDESRON23; CAPT BKH COi]^) (6)
XO'; LCDR USN, USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT^b) (6)
CMC USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt;
HMl USN, CCSG 9
Subject: RE: COVID-19 update 25 March - Eirst testing results
CDR - BKH
m MCPO USN CVW-11 (USA)';
CDR USN, USS Theodore
CDR USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt; p) (B)
SMO - good update, thanks. We'll discuss more at 1100.
V/r,
Studa
Prom:
Original Message -
CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
@cvn71.navy mil>
H-3-103
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 1:11 AM
To: Baker, Stuart P RDML USN, CCSG-9 <sJ|^j^J@ccsg9.navy mil>
Cc: Crozier, Brett E CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
<|j31 @cvn71.navy mil>; P)P) I CAPT USN, USS Theodore
Roosevei^l bJIB) [@cvn71.navymil>;Jb) (Q I CAPT USN,
CSSG9 <^B) (6) ^ @ccsg9.navy mil:^b) (6) ] CAPT USN,
CVW-11 CAG <s[b) (6) ^[^vwll navy.mil>;(b) (6) |^CAPT USN,
CVW-11 DCAG 4b) (6) l@cvwll.navy mil^b) (6) ^ CAPT USN,
USS Theodore Roosevelt ^b) (6)
CAPT USN, COMDESRON23 4b) (6)
CAPT BKH CO <i
]@cvn71 navy.mii^(b) (6)
I@cvn71.navy mil>; (b) (6)
CDR
J @cg52.navy niil>; CDR - BKH XO
|@cg52 navv.md>: LCDR USN, USS THEODORE
ROOSEVELT
Theodore Roosevelt 4b) (6)
I n@ccsg9 navy . mil> ; PJCT [CDR USN, I
;lt<|[bM^ |@cvn71 navy.mil>;tb) (B} |CI
re Roosevelt <(l W I @cvn7 1 navy niil>;(b) CT
]@cvn71 navy.niil>;
^^^@cvn71.navy mil>; |(b) (6)
USN CVW-1 1 (USA)' 4b) (6) [@Mvy mil>; |p) (B) '
■»t°> ~|@ccsg9 navy . mil> ; MM
Roosevelt
Theodore
CCSG9
CMC USN, USS
MCPO
CMC USN, CCSG9
CDR USN, USS Theodore
CDR USN, USS
HMl USN,
@ccsg9 navy.mil>
Subject: COVID-19 update 25 March - Eirst testing results
Admiral,
Batch testing of the close contacts for the HSM-75 and VEA-154 sailors
completed. 192 close contacts tested in groups of 5, with 9 positive group
tests meaning 1-5 people per group test were positive = 9-45/192 positive =
4.7-23.4% incidence. Sending the testing team to bed. Will get the
individual results tomorrow and work to get them off the ship. Will test
the 5 reactor sailors (individual tests) in the first batch in the morning
and then start the batch Reactor close contact testing (approx.. 200).
v/r.
SMO
- Original Message -
Erom: CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 4:40 PM
To: Baker, Stuart P RDML USN, CCSG-9
Cc: Crozier, Brett E CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt;
USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt;
DCAG;(b) (6)
Mil ■
CAPT
CAPT USN, CVW-11 CAG;lb)
CAPT USN, CSSG9;
CAPT USN, CVW-11
CDR - BKH
CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt; (b)
CAPT USN, COMDESRON23; CAPT BKH COHIb) (6)
XO';
LCDR USN, USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT^b) (6) |
CMC USN, USS Theodore RoosevebJERCTTB MCPO USN CVW-11 (USA)';
CMC USN, CC.SC,9:rBn6) Icf^ USN, USS Theodore
Roosevelt; |b)
CDR USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt;
HMl USN, CCSG 9; DH_71
Subject: RE: COVID-19 update 24 March
Admiral,
Copy all and during the meeting the AMA declined to accept the tests for the
concerns you raised about a live vims. We're still getting supplies from
them and 2 prev med staff from NEPMU.
W-
H-3-103
Second update while in the meeting: E4 from Reactor (RP div) tested
positive. He presented with one day of symptoms at sick call this morning -
temp of 101.4, body aches, sore throat. Currently working to get
names/numbers of this next large batch of close contacts. The potential
operational impacts of quarantining this large group is obviously
significant. CO/XO/RO are aware.
To that end, as you pointed out, this will become a testing problem very
quickly and we're back to batch testing in groups of five. While that will
speed up testing some, with a small lab team that does the testing, there
will be some delays as we have to let the lab team sleep at some point and
they have been up since 2200 last night.
v/r,
SMO
- Original Message -
From: Baker, Stuart P RDML USN, CCSG-9
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 2:55 PM
To: CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
Cc: Crozier, Brett E CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt;
USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt;
ICAPT
CAPT USN, CSSG9;
CAPT USN, CVW-11 CAG;Ib)j
DCAG; (b)(6) | CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt; (b)
]^APT USN, CVW-11
CAPT USN, COMDESRON23; CAPT BKH COi]^) (6)
XO'; LCDR USN, USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT^b) (6)^
CMC USN, USS Theodore Roosevdt; MCPO USN CVW-11 (USA)';
_ CMC USN, CCSG9; [Bl(6) ICDR USN, USS Theodore
Roosevelt; CDR USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt; |
HMl USN, CCSG 9; DH_71
Subject: RE: COVID-19 update 24 March
SMO - copy. Don't think we should send to AMA. We'll discuss at 1500.
V/r,
Studa
From:
Original Message -
CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
@cvn71.navy mil>
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 2:31 PM
To: Baker, Stuart P RDML USN, CCSG-9
Cc: Crozier, Brett E CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
@ccsg9.navy mil>
@cvn71.navy mil>;
(6)
Roosevelt
CSSG9
CVW-ll'CAG<|b) (6)
CVW-11 DCAG ^b) (6)
USS Theodore Roosevelt <J(b) (6)
CAPT USN, COMDESRON23 <i(b) (6)
CAPT BKH CO
CAPT USN, USS Theodore
CAPT USN,
@cvn71.navy mil>
@ccsg9.navy mil:^b) (6)
@cvwll navy.mil>; lb) (6)
@cvwll.navy mil>;(b) (6)
CAPT USN,
CAPT USN,
CAPT USN,
]@cvn71 navy.mii^(b) (6)
j2^@cvn71.navy mil>; (b) (6)
@cg52.navy mil>; CDR - BKH XO'
_ @cg52 navy.mil>; _
ROOSEVELT <(LJJ (U) | @cvn71 navy.mil>;
Theodore Roosevelt <|(b) (6) ~^@cvn71.navy mil>; |(b) (6)
LCDR USN, USS THEODORE
CMC USN, USS
USN CVW-1 1 (USA)^(b) (6) f@jjavy mil>;
MCPO
CMC USN, CCSG9
H-3-103
@ccsg9 navy.mil>; tD)CT
@cvn71 navy.mil>; (b) ('
CDR USN, USS Theodore
Subject: COVID-19 update 24 March
CDR USN, USS
HMl USN,
@cvn71 navy mil>1b)
@ccsg9 navy.mil>; DH_71 <j[Bj (6) @cvn71.navy niil>
Admiral,
Update on current events.
1. Planning to MEDEVAC the two COVID positive patients, plus one
non-medical attendant, tomorrow - pending Governor of Guam approval. That
issue is currently being worked by Ops.
2. Berthing and work centers plus a few other named individuals (named by
the patients) yielded 201 close contacts. That number will likely rise.
Based on recommendations from the medical chain of command and theater Prev
Med specialists we are testing all of them individually. Half of the tests
will be sent to the America on a helo this afternoon (1700) to load share
and increase throughput. Anticipate it will take close to 24 hours for all
results to be finalized.
3. A Preventive Medicine Officer and Prev Med Tech will be joining us from
the America for an undetermined period of time. They will be able to assist
in contact tracing, quarantine, etc.
4. Requesting that all departments, squadrons, and units resume daily
verbal screening of their sailors. Specifically, asking for flu-like
symptoms: fever, chills, cough, sore throat, shortness of breath and body
aches. This needs to continue for 14 days (last day 7 April). If anyone
answers ''yes'' to these questions, they need to be evaluated by Medical.
Routine evaluation of these individuals will occur daily from 0730-0930 and
1930-2130. Obviously, if someone feels that they can't wait until those
times, we can evaluate them at any time.
5. Bleachapalooza is now twice a day - 0730 and 2000.
Standing by for questions.
v/r,
SMO
H-3-103
I LAST NAME | FIRST NAME |
RATE/RANK
COMMAND
GENDER 1 AGE | DODID
fb)(6)
EM3
CVN 71
[BTiB)
LS2
CVN 71
CDR
CVN 71
ETNCS
CVN 71
AT2
VFA-154
AT2
VFA-154
AES
VFA-154
H-3-103
LCDR USN NAVCIVLAWSUPPACT DC (USA)
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:
LCDR USN, USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT <Jp)W
Tuesday, March 31. 2020 2:24 AM
LCDR USN JRM
@cvn71. navy.mil >
LTJG USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt;
RE: IMMEDIATE AWARENESS >> Fwd: 400 Rooms checking in ASAP
Hotel Room inquires (8.69 KB)
CIV USN JRM
Big XO just sent out the attached email to leadership onboard notifying them of the ramifications for those that are
trying to determine space availability off base.
Very respectfully.
LCDR|)J^m
Public Affairs Officer
Carrier Strike Group NINE
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
Office :P)) I
Cell:JW(6)
^ooseve
w
@cvn71.navy.(smil).mil
JDi^J^ r
Hydr^^) |
- Original Message -
From: |[b)(8) ~^^[@fe.navy.mil [mailtojP)
Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2020 3:49 PM
@fe. navy.mil]
To:
Cc:
pm
p) (6)
LCDR USN, USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT
LTJG USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt;
I (S)fe. navy.mil
Subject: FW: IMMEDIATE AWARENESS » Fwd: 400 Rooms checking in ASAP
Importance: High
FYSA below.
V/R,
Very Respectfully,
LCDR
USN
Public Affairs Officer
Joint Region Marianas
N I P R : @f e . n a vy . m i I
1
H-3-104
Office
- Original Message
From:
CAPT USNJRM
Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2020 3:39 PM
CAPT USN, C7F
To:
CAPT USN, CSSG9
Cc: p)
@lccl9.navy.mil>;
CAPT USN C7F
(B)(6)
@fe.navy.mil>; p) W)
CAPT USN NBG^) W
@fe.navy.mil>;p) (0}
@ccsg9.navy.mil>
LCDR USNJRM
@fe.navy.mil>
Subject: IMMEDIATE AWARENESS » Fwd: 400 Rooms checking in ASAP
Importance: Fligh
Teammates,
This just came in via the Guam Hotel and Restaurant Associate.
Apparently someone is making calls to Marriott Sales Team in San Diego about reserving 400 rooms ASAP in Guam for
TR.
I don't know the point of origin, but please see the below thread.
We are pulling strings now to get to the source.
BTW,p)(W
the President of GHRA has been very vocal in the press recently about DoD so I would not be
surprised if this made local media.
Very Respectfully,
CAPTp)^
USN
Chief of Staff
Joint Region Marianas
@fe.navy.mil
@fe. navy.smil.mil (please send alert via NIPR to ensure prompt response)
Work:
Cell:
(6) I
Email [NIPR^fb) (6)
Email (SIPR):|b) (6)
"FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRIVACY SENSITIVE: ANY MISUSE OR UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE MAY RESULT IN BOTH
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES"
From:
[mailtoi
@ghra.org]
Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2020 2:35 PM
To:JD)CT_^
|@gmaiLcom>;
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Fwd: 400 Rooms checking in ASAP
CIV USNJRM
@fe.navy.mil>
FYI - seeking guidance from the Governor's Chief of Staff and Legal Counsel
2
H-3-104
Best regards,
Begin forwarded message:
From: m@ghra.org>
Date: March 31, 2020 at 2:31:51 PM ChST
To: Gov legal Counsel
Subject: Fwd: 400 Rooms checking in ASAP
l@guam.gov>.
@guam.gov>
and^P,
Please see this request from Marriott corporate regarding the USS Roosevelt. Need to discuss as soon as possible.
Best regards.
Begin forwarded message:
From:
Date: March 31, 2020 at 2:24:50 PM ChST
To:
GHRA
@ghra.org)"
@westinguam.com>
@ghra.org>
Subject: FW: 400 Rooms checking in ASAP
m
Please find email from Marriott sales team in San Diego.
I just let her know that hotel is available but, they cannot come straight to our hotel without negative COVID-19
certificate. Due to Gov Guam's executive order.
3
H-3-104
Please let me know if there anything updated.
Best regards,
Director of Sales and Marketing
THE WESTIN RESORT GUAM
105 Gun Beach Road
Turnon, GU 96913
United States of America
marriott.com/gumwi
T
F pJCT
M
FACEBOOK <https://www.facebook.com/westinresortguam/> | TWITTER <https://twitter.com/WestinGuam>
INSTAGRAM <https://www.instagram.com/westinguam/>
TripAdvisor Certificate of Excellence - Prego 2018 & 2017, Taste 2018
Winner of Stars & Stripes Best of Pacific - Taste 2018, 2017, 2016 Best Sunday Brunch, Taste 2016 Best Family
Restaurant and 2016 Best Hotel
Winner of Pika's Best of Guam - Taste 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015 & 2014 Best Buffet and Best Sunday Brunch,
Taste 2018 Best Breakfast, Best Family Restaurant and Best Seafood Restaurant, Taste 2017 Best Fine Dining and 2016
Best Hotel
Winner of World Travel Awards - 2017 & 2016 Guam's Leading Hotel Suite and 2017 Guam's Leading Resort
From:^(B)
@marriott.com>
Sent: Monday, March 30, 2020 1:44 PM
To:
pjCT
@westinguam.com>
fb) (6)
LCDR USN, USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT <p) P)
@cvn71.navy.mil>
Subject: 400 Rooms checking in ASAP
Good Evening,
I hope all is well.
4
H-3-104
The aircraft carrier, USS CVN 71, is looking to book 400 rooms checking in ASAP. I have sent over the
information in CI/TY. Please reference opportunitytip) P? . They are looking for 5000 rooms though I
understand you have 400 at your property and the Sheraton has closed its doors temporarily.
I have copied the main contact so that you can communicate on availability and rate. We are looking to book
under the per diem rate if possible. This can certainly be ROH as well and all rooms will be individual pay.
Thank you and we look forward to working with you.
Travel Brilliantly,
Sales Executive I SW Area Sales - San Diego
Direct: p)(Pi) I
@marriott.com
<mailtoP) (Oj)
@marriott.com>
5
H-3-104
LCDR USN NAVCIVLAWSUPPACT DC (USA)
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Signed By:
CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt <^J^^^^J@cvn71.navy.mil>
Tuesday, March 31, 2020 2:02 AM
DH 71: DLCPOs: CVW-11 CO's; CVW-II XO's-CVW-11 CMC's
(B)TCr
Roosevelt;
^)W
CdMbESRON23;[2
USS Theodore Roosevelt;
Hotel Room inquires
I (5) navy, mi I
CAPT USN. CSSG9:
CAPT CVWTTCAGi'^J <
CAPT USN, CVW-11 DCAG;p)
CMC USN. ccsGoyf^
CMDCM USN, CVW-1 1
CAPT USN. USS Theodore
CAPT CDS23 DCRE;
CAPT USN,
CMC USN,
All,
We have received reports that someone is making anonymous calls regarding
hotel availability in Guam. The reports indicate the individual is
requesting very large blocks of rooms.
Please pass along that this effort is very counterproductive. Local Guam
political leaders are under tremendous pressure from their constituents to
contain our problem to the base. These reports will likely make the local
press and increase the anxiety of the local population. There is very
little local support for moving us into hotels on the island.
"Off the reservation" efforts like this make an unlikely course of action
even more unlikely. Please ask your people (and their families) to politely
knock it off.
V/R
USN
CAPT I
Executive Officer
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71)
In Port:
fb) (6)
1
H-3-104
LCDR USN NAVCIVLAWSUPPACT DC (USA)
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Signed By:
CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
Tuesd^y^March 31, 2020 2:18 AM
@fe. navy . m i I
RE: Hotel Room inquires
l@navy.mil
Copy. FYI - the natives are getting restless. Stand by for congressionals.
-Original Message-
From:
@fe. navy.mil [mailtoj
@fe. navy.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2020 4:16 PM
CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
CAPT USN, CSSG9
Subject: RE: Hotel Room inquires
Thanks brothers!
Very Respectfully,
CAPT
USN
Chief of Staff
Joint Region Marianas
Work:
¥
Cell:p)(6)
Email (NIPR):)^) (6)
Email (SIPR): b) (6)
I
I@fe.navy.mil
j@fe.navy.smil.mil (please send alert via NIPR to
ensure prompt response)
"FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRIVACY SENSITIVE: ANY MISUSE OR UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURE MAY RESULT IN BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES"
- Original Message- —
From: ^151 CAPT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
[mailt^b) (6) _ P^@ cvn71.navy.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2020 4:09 PM
pm
CAPT USN JRM <j®yW)
@fe.navy.mil>
tb)(6)
CAPT USN, CSSG9 W
Subject: FW: Hotel Room inquires
@ccsg9.navy.mil>
I have done what I can... (Sent to HODS, DLCPOs and CVW-11 Tirads)
1
H-3-105
- Original Message -
From: APT USN, USS Theodore Roosevelt
Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2020 4:02 PM
Subject: Hotel Room inquires
All,
We have received reports that someone is making anonymous calls regarding
hotel availability in Guam. The reports indicate the individual is
requesting very large blocks of rooms.
Please pass along that this effort is very counterproductive. Local Guam
political leaders are under tremendous pressure from their constituents to
contain our problem to the base. These reports will likely make the local
press and increase the anxiety of the local population. There is very
little local support for moving us into hotels on the island.
"Off the reservation" efforts like this make an unlikely course of action
even more unlikely. Please ask your people (and their families) to politely
knock it off.
V/R
CAP! MW
USN
Executive Officer
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71)
In Port:
2
H-3-105
5/7/2020
UPDATED: USS Thecxiore RooseveK Quarantines Sailors on Guam as Coronavims Outbreak Spreads - USNl News
"."sameAs":!]}]}
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Home » Aviation » UPDATED: USS Theodore Roosevelt Quarantines Sailors on Guam as Coronavims Outbreak
Spreads
UPDATED: USS Theodore Roosevelt
Quarantines Sailors on Guam as Coronavirus
Outbreak Spreads
By: Megan Eckstein
March 26, 2020 11:29 AM • Updated: March 26, 2020 4:00 PM
Hospital Corpsman 2nd Class Maria F. Potts-Szoke, assigned to Naval Medical Research Center, prepares a
sample for investigational analysis in Naval Medical Research Center’s mobile laboratory aboard the aircraft
carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) on March 19, 2020. US Navy Photo
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https://news.usni.org/2020/03/26/coronavinjs-outbreak-sidelines-aircraft-carrier-uss-theodore-roosevelt
1/6
5/7/2020
UPDATED: USS Theodore Roosevelt Quarantines Sailors on Guam as Coronavirus Outbreak Spreads - USNI News
This post has been updated to include statements from Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday
and from U. S. Pacific Fleet.
THE PENTAGON - A Navy aircraft carrier in the Pacific has pulled into Guam to deal with a growing
outbreak of COVID-19, with the ship planning on testing the entire crew of about 5,000 and
quarantining personnel as needed at Navy medical facilities on the island.
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) had been operating in the Philippine Sea when three sailors had
to be flown off the ship to a Defense Department facility in Guam after testing positive for COVID-19,
Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly told reporters on Tuesday.
Today, Modly said in a Pentagon press briefing that five more sailors had since tested positive and
were being flown off the ship, and that the ship and its crew of 5,000 were heading to Guam to figure
out the next steps.
“We found several more cases onboard the ship. We are in the process now of testing 100 percent of
the crew of that ship to ensure that we are able to contain whatever spread might have occurred
there on the ship. But I also want to emphasize that the ship is operationally capable to do its mission
if required to do so,” he said.
“The ship is pulling into Guam; it will be pierside, no one on the crew will be allowed to leave
anywhere into Guam other than on pierside. And we are already starting the process of testing 100
percent of the crew to ensure that we’ve got that contained.”
U.S. Pacific Fleet spokesman Cmdr. Myers Vasquez told USNI News that Theodore Roosevelt had
already planned to make a port call in Guam ahead of the outbreak. He could not say if the visit to
Guam would last longer than planned due to the COVID-19 testing and quarantining effort.
After Modly’s press briefing, other news outlets began reporting the number of infected sailors was
actually around two dozen sailors. Vasquez would not comment on the current number of TR sailors
determined to have the virus.
“The sailors who have been flown off the ship are currently doing fine. None of them have been
required to be hospitalized because their symptoms are very mild - aches and pains and those types
of things, sore throats, but nothing that requires hospitalization. They are in quarantine now on
Guam,” Modly said during the briefing.
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UPDATED: USS Theodore Roosevelt Quarantines Sailors on Guam as Coronavirus Outbreak Spreads - USNI News
Chief of Naval Operations Ad m. Mike Gilday said in a statement later in the day that “as testing
continues, additional positive cases of COVID-19 have been discovered aboard USS Theodore
Roosevelt. We are taking this threat very seriously and are working quickly to identify and isolate
positive cases while preventing further spread of the virus aboard the ship. No sailors have been
hospitalized or are seriously ill.”
“Our medical team aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt is performing testing for the crew consistent with
CDC guidelines, and we are working to increase the rate attesting as much as possible. Immediate
priority will be symptomatic sailors, those in close contact with sailors who have tested positive
already, and essential watch standers. We are isolating those who test positive. Testing will continue
as necessary to ensure the health of the entire ship’s crew. In addition, the medical staff will continue
to actively monitor the health of the crew. Deep cleaning of the ship’s spaces is also ongoing,”
Gilday’s statement continues.
“USS Theodore Roosevelt is in Guam on a previously-scheduled port visit. The resources at our
naval medical facilities in Guam will allow us to more effectively test, isolate, and if necessary treat
sailors. We expect additional positive tests, and those sailors who test positive will be transported to
the U.S. Naval Hospital Guam for further evaluation and treatment as necessary. During the port visit,
base access will be limited to the pier for Roosevelts Sailors. No base or regional personnel will
access the pier.”
‘We’re taking this day by day. Our top two priorities are taking care of our people and maintaining
mission readiness. Both of those go hand in glove,” the CNO continued.
“We are confident that our aggressive response will keep USS Theodore Roosevelt able to respond
to any crisis in the region.”
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https://news.usni.org/2020/03/26/coronavirus-outbreak-sidelines-aircraft-carrier-uss-theodore-roosevelt
5/7/2020
UPDATED: USS Theodore Roosevelt Quarantines Sailors on Guam as Coronavirus Outbreak Spreads - USNI News
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) arrives in Da Nang, Vietnam on March 5, 2020. US Navy Photo
The Navy’s aircraft carriers and some other larger ships have medical capabilities sophisticated
enough to process tests aboard, though the daily throughput of these labs is limited. Modly called the
capacity the “limiting factor” for testing and said “we are looking at ways now to not only maximize
that capacity on the ship to test but also to send some of those swab tests out to some of the other
DoD labs fortesting.”
There are two different kinds of tests the Navy can perform. To positively diagnose a patient with
COVID-19, a nasal swab must be performed and tested, but the testing kits have been available in
limited quantities for hospitals around the country dealing with the outbreak. It is unclear how many of
these COVID-1 9-specific kits the Navy has access to. The Navy can also conduct surveillance
testing, where a sample is tested for a range of flu-like viruses to rule in or out different diseases; this
type of testing can help medical officers understand who has been exposed to what onboard a ship
and could narrow down who may need the COVID-specific test kit.
Rear Adm. James Hancock, medical officer of the Marine Corps, said during the press briefing that
the military was working with industry to get point-of-care COVID-19 testing capability, but “we’re just
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UPDATED: USS Theodore Roosevelt Quarantines Sailors on Guam as Coronavirus Outbreak Spreads - USNI News
not there yet. What we can do is do surveillance testing, so we do it across the ship so we know that.”
Modly said the testing on TR would be a combination of swab and surveillance testing to whatever
extent was available.
“The ship is going to be pulling into Guam, and then they’re going to figure out from there who needs
to come off, who can stay on, looking at the level of symptoms and things like that,” he said about the
next steps for the carrier.
Like What You’ve Been Reading? a
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Article Keywords; COVID 19, Guam, Thomas Modly, USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)
Categories: Aviation, News & Analysis, U.S. Navy
About Megan Eckstein
Megan Eckstein is the deputy editor for USNI News. She previously covered Congress for Defense
Daily and the U.S. surface navy and U.S. amphibious operations as an associate editor for Inside
the Navy.
Follow @maeday22
View all posts by Megan Eckstein ^
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UPDATED: USS Theodore Roosevelt Quarantines Sailors on Guam as Coronavirus Outbreak Spreads - USNI News
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From:
To:
LT USN. CVW-11: LT CVW-11:
ISS Theodore Roos^^^^B) (6) [ LCDR USN.
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:
|py7l^~~| CAPT USN. USS Theodore Roosevelt
MEL) KHAfv!;
HMCUSN. CVW-ll:
FW: Situation on the ground
Sunday, March 29, 2020 6:43:32 PM
NAVADMIN 1)83 20.pdf
Rocklov et al.odf
Keep this close hold,
v/r,
SMO
-Original Message -
From:
_ CAPT USN, USS Tlieodore Roosevelt
Sent: Monday, March 30, 2020 8:40 AM
To; 'Gillingliam. Bmce L RADM USN CNO (USA)'
Cc: Shaffer, Gayle D RADM USN BUMED FCH VA (USA); | _
BUMED FCH VA (USA); Weber, Timothy Harding (Tim) RDML USN NAVMED WEST SAN CA
(USA)
Subject; Situation on the groimd
CAPT USN
Admiral.
I imderstand tliis email is going to cause concern. Tliat is the intent. We
are in the midst of a disaster and not getting the action we need.
We liave gone from 2 cases to 53 cases in 6 days. We're currently evaluating
another 10. We have a pregnant patient and an FnV+ patient botli positive witii
COVID-19. We are seeing cases already in one of the "quarantme" spaces in a
gym on the base. We are losing.
"Quarantine" measures on the sliip are a sham. We are frgliting and losing and
wa telling a public healtli disaster unfold in real time. Tlus isn't a lessons
learned issue, tlie lesson was afready learned on the Diamond Piincess. From
die attached study; "Tlie cniise sliip conditions clearly amplified an already
highly transmissible disease. Tlie public health measiues prevented more tlian
2000 additional cases compared to no inteiv'entions. However, evacuating all
passengers and crew early on in the outbreak would have prevented many more
passengers and crew' from infection."
We are a week into diis and significant amoiuits of time/resoiu'ces/people are
being used up to pursue testing for the entfre sliip. Wliile testing is nice
and presents a good optic, that will not stop the transmission of disease or
"flatten the cuiv'e." I am asking that all of that effort go into getting at
least 4500 people off die sliip into tone single bertliing quarantine. We aie
simply unable to conply n'ith any of the requirements from NAVADMIN 083-20
wliich is contributing to die rapid spread of disease. Tlie best we can do. and
are religiously, is cleaning the ship widi bleach tw'ice a day - but domg tliat
with almost the entire crew (all considered close contacts at this point)
isn't solving die problem of almost 5000 people hvmg on top of each other
continuing to spread the disease.
We must get the sailors off tliis sliip mto smgle berth quarantme. Everyone
H-3-107
knows that is the answer. That is not happening. We are hurting our most
precious asset.
V/R,
19
H-3-107
-—OFFICIAL INFORMATION DISPATCH FOLLOWS- —
RTTUZYUW RHOIAAAOOOl 0832050-UUUU-RHSSSUU.
ZNR UUUUU
R 231957Z MAR 20 MID110000511164U
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC
TO NAVADMIN
BT
UNCLAS
NAVADMIN 083/20
MSGID/NAVADMIN/CNIC WASHINGTON DC/NOO/MAR//
SUBJ/RESTRICTION OF MOVEMENT (ROM) GUIDANCE//
REF/A/DOC/USD/11MAR20//
REF/B/NAVADMIN/OPNAV/212007ZMAR20//
REF/C/DOC/BUMED/17MAR20//
NARR/REF A IS UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO, FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION
GUIDANCE (SUPPLEMENT 4) - DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE GUIDANCE FOR PERSONNEL TRAVEL DURING
THE NOVEL CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK.
REF B IS NAVADMIN 080/20, NAVY MITIGATION MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK
UPDATE 3. REF C IS BUMED RETURN TO WORK GUIDELINES FOR CORONAVIRUS.//
RMKS/1. REF A requires that personnel returning from a Center for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) Travel Health Notice (THN) Level 3 or Level 2 location perform a 14 day restriction of movement
(ROM). During ROM, Service Members should be restricted to their residence or other appropriate
Domicile and limit close contact (within 6 feet or 2 meters) with others. This NAVADMIN clarifies the
definition of ROM, provides amplifying guidance, and delineates responsibilities for execution of ROM.
2. Definitions.
2. a. Restriction of Movement (ROM). General DoD term referring to the limitation of personal liberty
for the purpose of ensuring health, safety and welfare. ROM is inclusive of quarantine and isolation.
2.a.(l) Quarantine. Medical term referring to the separation of personnel from others as a
result of suspected exposure to a communicable disease. For the world-wide COVID-19 epidemic, this
should be imposed on those with no COVID-19 symptoms who have either recently returned from a
high-risk location (CDC THN Level 2 or 3), or have had close contact with a known COVID-19 positive
patient. The current recommended quarantine period is 14 days. Per CDC, quarantine generally means
the separation of a person or group of people reasonably believed to have been exposed to a
communicable disease but not yet symptomatic, from others who have not been so exposed, to prevent
the possible spread of the communicable disease.
2. a. (2) Isolation. Medical term referring to the separation of personnel from others due either
to the development of potential COVID-19 symptoms or as a result of a positive COVID-19 test. Per CDC,
isolation means the separation of a person or group of people known or reasonably believed to be
infected with a communicable disease and potentially infectious from those who are not infected to
prevent spread of the communicable disease. Isolation for public health purposes may be voluntary or
compelled by federal, state, or local public health order.
2.b. Patient (or Person) Under Investigation (PUI). In the case of COVID-19, a PUI is defined as
an individual with either a pending COVID-19 test or for whom a test would have been
ordered/conducted had one been available.
2.C. Self-monitoring. Per CDC, self-monitoring means people should monitor themselves for
fever by taking their temperatures twice a day and remaining alert for the onset of a cough or difficulty
breathing. If an individual feels feverish or develops a measured fever, cough, or difficulty breathing
H-3-107
during the self-monitoring period, they should self-isolate, limit contact with others, and seek advice by
telephone from a healthcare provider or their local health department to determine whether further
medical evaluation is needed.
2.d. Close Contact. Per CDC, a close contact is defined as:
2.d.(l) Being within approximately 6 feet (2 meters) of a COVID-19 case for a prolonged]
period of time; the current recommended threshold is 10 minutes. Close contact can occur while caring]
for, living with, visiting, or sharing a healthcare waiting area or room with a COVID-19 case, oi
Z.d.(2) Having direct contact with infectious secretions of a COVID-19 case (e.g., beinj
coughed on)
3. Applicability. ROM applies to all Service Members, who in the last 14 days have either been in:
3. a. An area with ongoing spread of COVID-19 as defined as CDC designated Level 2 and 3
countries (https:// www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/map-and-travelnotices.html), or
J.b. Close contact with a person known to have COVID-19.
3.C. Per REF A, it is strongly recommended that DoD civilian employees, contractor personnel
and dependents also follow this guidance.
4. Guidance.
4.a. ROM personnel shall be directed to remain at home or in a comparable setting for 14 days
ROM from the day of departure or contact. [For transient personnel and those residing in close quarter!
luch as unaccompanied housing or ships, temporary lodging meeting CDC guidance of separate sleepinj
ind bathroom facilities shall be arranged, when available
4.b. When in ROM, personnel shall avoid congregate settings, limit close contact with people and pets
or other animals to the greatest extent possible, avoid traveling, self-monitor, and seek immediate
medical care if symptoms (e.g., cough or shortness of breath) develop.
4.C. Personnel assigned ROM may exit quarters to access laundry facilities, outdoor exercise, and
designated smoking areas; and conduct other routine tasks not in a public setting provided they
maintain social distancing greater than 6 feet from others. Access to messing facilities, stores, fitness
centers and other widely used support services is prohibited.
4.d. For temporary lodging, normal room cleaning services will be suspended during the ROM period.
4.e. For personnel executing ROM in private residence, coordinate with parent command for the
purchase of required food/hygiene items or arrange delivery through other means.
4. f. After completion of ROM, return to work per REF C and Combatant Commander guidance, if
applicable.
5. Responsibilities.
5. a. Parent command Commanding Officer/Officer in Charge shall:
5.a.(l) Ensure screening of personnel for ROM.
5. a. (2) Ensure ROM personnel comply with paragraph 4.
5. a. (3) If temporary lodging is required:
5.a.(3)A. Provide cost orders for ROM personnel. Orders will direct the Service Member to a
ROM status and not TAD to the host installation. Recommend funding for temporary lodging, if required,
be obtained through the Type Commander. This may be accomplished utilizing a General Terms and
Conditions document to avoid issues arising from Service Members not having government travel cards.
5.a.(3)B. Coordinate with installation Commanding Officer for room assignment. It is imperative
that tenant commands inform installations of all personnel in ROM within government facilities (to
include barracks, NGIS, Navy Lodge, PPV family housing, and PPV barracks).
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5.a.(3)C. As needed, coordinate messing support with the Commanding Officer where a galley is
available. Arrangements will be made between the parent command and the installation for the
delivery of meals to Service Members in a ROM status.
5.a.(3)D. As required, provide daily support to ROM personnel to ensure meal delivery as well as
health and comfort checks.
5.A.(3)E. Ensure personnel supporting individuals in ROM are trained on the status of ROM
personnel and associated interaction protocols. Close contact is prohibited. PPE is not required.
5. a. (4) If private residence is utilized, coordinate with ROM personnel to ensure all messing needs
are met.
5.b. Installation Commanding Officers shall;
5.b.(l) Account daily for available temporary lodging to support ROM.
5. b. (2) Track all ROM personnel residing in Navy Lodging (unaccompanied housing, NGIS, Navy
Lodge, PPV family housing, PPV barracks) both on and off installation. There is no need for installations
to track tenant personnel in a ROM status in private residence/lodging.
5.b.(3) Provide detailed instructions to tenant commands who require temporary ROM lodging
support.
5.b.(4) If available, coordinate with parent commands to provide take -out meals for delivery to
ROM personnel.
5.b.(5) Ensure temporary lodging staff are trained on the status of ROM personnel and associated
interaction protocols. Close contact is prohibited. PPE is not required.
5.b.(6) Follow CDC guidance for cleaning rooms following the ROM period. Ensure the standards
are the same across all facilities (unaccompanied housing, NGIS, Navy Lodge).
5.b.(7) For the safety of lodging personnel, ensure clear discrete procedures are in place to identify
rooms which are occupied by ROM personnel.
5.b.(8) Ensure fire and emergency services are aware of ROM personnel locations, particularly those
in isolation, and are prepared to respond to medical emergencies with appropriate PPE.
6. Entitlements. Per REF B.
7. Reporting Requirements. Per REF B.
8. ROM FAQs.
Question 1. When placed on Restriction of Movement (ROM), can I travel to locations within the fence
line of an installation to utilize facilities such as the NEX food court or the gym?
Answer 1. No, during the duration of ROM, Service Members must remain in their rooms with the
exception of brief trips to utilize designated smoking areas, walking in the immediate vicinity of the
building (usually within 100 feet), and limiting close contact (within 6 feet) with others. If your facility
contains an in house gym, do not use it.
Question 2. Can I accept food deliveries from various services?
Answer 2. Yes, food must be placed outside the room. Minimize close contact (within 6 feet).
Question 3. Can my family or friends visit me?
Answer 3. Yes, provided they do not enter your room. Conversations should be held with visitors staying
in the passageway outside the room and Service Members in their room. Minimize close contact (within
6 feet).
Question 4. Can I do my laundry?
Answer 4. Yes, but you should coordinate with your command to utilize in house laundry facilities.
H-3-107
Question 5. How do I obtain personal hygiene items?
Answer 5. Utilize the point of contact provided by your command to arrange for purchase of these
items.
Question 6. Will my room be cleaned daily?
Answer 6. No, your room will not be cleaned during your stay. Trash pickup is available by placing your
trash can in the passageway.
Question 7. Is Personal Protective Equipment required for personnel in my vicinity?
Answer 7. No, you should limit close contact (within 6 feet) with others.
Question 8. Can I RQM in open bay barracks or in rooms with shared bathrooms?
Answer 8. No, individuals should be placed in separate lodging (when available).
Question 9. Can I use public transportation if in RQM status?
Answer 9. No, individuals on RQM should avoid crowds and public locations.
Question 10. Can I get off RQM early if I was in close contact to a person with CQVID-19, and I feel like I
am not sick?
Answer 10. No, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) recommends 14 days of RQM from the last date of
exposure to a CQVID-19 positive person.
Question 11. What is the difference between quarantine and restriction of movement (RQM)?
Answer 11. Quarantine is a legal public health term used for civilian restrictions and RQM is a military
term being used to identify military individuals who are restricted in their movement, generally to their
residence.
Question 12. Are my family members at risk if I RQM at home with them?
Answer 12. RQM status is a precautionary step to prevent spread to others. Considering this, it is
recommended that while at home in a RQM status, you practice social distancing. This means try to
remain at least 6 feet from other persons, avoid using the same bathroom, or sleeping in the same bed.
Question 13. Can I prepare meals for my family while on RQM?
Answer 13. When in a RQM status, it is recommended you not prepare meals for your family because
the virus is spread through respiratory droplets that can land on surfaces such as food. Ideally, you
should have other individuals prepare food. If you are the only care giver, make sure you are washing
your hands with soap and water for 20 seconds for general food safety. Make sure you cover your nose
and mouth when coughing and wash your hands after using the bathroom.
Question 14. Should I be wearing a mask?
Answer 14. Masks will not protect you from inhaling the virus. The virus is very small and can make its
way through and around the mask. The best way to prevent being infected or infecting others is to
practice social distancing and good hygiene techniques (such as washing your hands regularly with soap
and water for at least 20 seconds, avoid touching your face, avoid sick persons, etc).
Question 15. Do I need to clean my house to CDC standards?
Answer 15. It is recommended you maintain a clean living environment as you normally would. This
includes frequent hand washing, washing clothing and bedding, and wiping down frequently touched
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surfaces with a sanitizing wipe or any cleaning product that contains at least 10 percent bleach. The
Environmental Protection Agency has a list of products that have been specifically tested as effective in
sanitizing surfaces.
9. Released by Vice Admiral M. M. Jackson, Commander, Navy Installations
Command.//
BT
#0001
NNNN
V/r,
CNRSW ROC
fax:|ifti^ag8UilllMI
NIPR:rR»lliiM@navv.mil
SIPR:|^||^^B@navy.smil.mil
Privacy Act - 1974 This E-Mail may contain information to be protected lAW
DoD 5400. HR and is For Official Use Only.
Warning: This is an information report. It is being shared for
informational purposes but has not been fully evaluated, integrated with
other information or analyzed. Receiving persons and agencies are cautioned
not to take actions based solely on this report unless the information is
independently verified.
H-3-107
COVID-19 outbreak on the Diamond Princess cruise ship: estimating the epidemic potential and
effectiveness of public health countermeasures
Rocklov J PhD*, Sjodin H PhD*, Wilder-Smith A MD^’^’"*
1 Department of Public Health and Clinical Medicine, Section of Sustainable Health, Umea
University, Umea, Sweden
2 Department of Epidemiology and Global Health, Umea University, Umea, Sweden
3 Department of Disease Control, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, UK
4 Heidelberg Institute of Global Health, University of Heidelberg, Germany
Key words: coronavirus; SARS-CoV-2; basic reproduction number; isolation and quarantine;
incubation time; evacuation
Declaration of interest: none declared
Abstract:
Background: Cruise ships carry a large number of people in confined spaces with relative
homogeneous mixing. On 3 February, 2020, an outbreak of COVID-19 on cruise ship Diamond
Princess was reported with 10 initial cases, following an index case on board around 21-25* January.
By 4* February, public health measures such as removal and isolation of ill passengers and quarantine
of non-ill passengers were implemented. By 20* February, 619 of 3,700 passengers and crew (17%)
were tested positive.
Methods: We estimated the basic reproduction number from the initial period of the outbreak using
SEIR models. We calibrated the models with transient functions of countermeasures to incidence data.
We additionally estimated a counterfactual scenario in absence of countermeasures, and established a
model stratified by crew and guests to study the impact of differential contact rates among the groups.
We also compared scenarios of an earlier versus later evacuation of the ship.
Results: The basic reproduction rate was initially 4 times higher on-board compared to the Rq in the
epicentre in Wuhan, but the countermeasures lowered it substantially. Based on the modeled initial Rq
of 14.8, we estimated that without any interventions within the time period of 21 January to 19
February, 2920 out of the 3700 (79%) would have been infected. Isolation and quarantine therefore
prevented 2307 cases, and lowered the Rq to 1.78. We showed that an early evacuation of all
passengers on 3 February would have been associated with 76 infected persons in their incubation
time.
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Conclusions: The cruise ship conditions clearly amplified an already highly transmissible disease. The
public health measures prevented more than 2000 additional cases compared to no interventions.
However, evacuating all passengers and crew early on in the outbreak would have prevented many
more passengers and crew from infection.
Introduction
Cruise ships carry a large number of people in confined spaces with relative homogeneous mixing
over a period of time that is longer than for any other mode of transportation.^ Thus, cruise ships
present a unique environment for transmission of human -to-human transmitted infections. The
association of acute respiratory infections (ARI) incidence in passengers is statistically significant
with season, destination and duration of travel.^ In February 2012, an outbreak of respiratory illness
occurred on the cruise ship off Brazil, resulting in 16 hospitalizations due to severe ARI and one
death.^ In May 2020, a dual outbreak of pandemic (HlNl) 2009 and influenza A (H3N2) on a cruise
ship occurred: of 1,970 passengers and 734 crew members, 82 (3.0%) were infected with pandemic
(HlNl) 2009 virus, and 98 (3.6%) with influenza A (H3N2) virus. Four subsequent cases were
epidemiologically linked to passengers but no evidence of sustained transmission to the community or
passengers on the next cruise was reported."^ In September 2000 an outbreak of influenza-like illness
was reported on a cruise ship sailing off the Australian coast with over 1,100 passengers and 400 crew
on board, coinciding with the peak influenza period in Sydney.^ The cruise morbidity was high with
40 passengers hospitalized, two of whom died. A total of 310 passengers (37%) reported suffering
from an influenza-like illness.
In December 2019, a novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, emerged in Wuhan, China and rapidly spread
within China and then to various global cities with high interconnectivity with China. The resulting
ARI due to this coronavirus, a disease now coined COVID-19, is thought to be mainly transmitted by
respiratory droplets from infected people. The mean serial interval of COVID-19 is 7.5 days (95% Cl,
5.3 to 19) and the initial estimate for the basic reproductive number Rq was 2.2 (95% Cl, 1.4 to 3.9),*
although higher Rq have since been reported with a mean of more than 3.® On 18 February 2020,
China's CDC published their data of the first 72,314 cases including 44,672 confirmed cases. About
80% of the confirmed cases were reported to be mild disease or less severe forms of pneumonia,
13.8% severe and 4.7% critically ill. Risk factors for severe disease outcomes are older age and co¬
morbidities. The progression to acute respiratory distress syndrome occurs approximately 8-12 days
after onset of first symptoms, with lung abnormalities on chest CT showing greatest severity
approximately 10 days after initial onset of symptoms. Evidence is mounting that also mildly
symptomatic or even asymptomatic cases can transmit the disease.
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On 3'“^ February, 2020, an outbreak of COVID-19 was reported on Cruise Ship Princess Diamond off
the Japanese coast, with initially 10 persons confirmed to be infected with the virus. The number has
since ballooned into the largest coronavirus outbreak outside of mainland China. By 19* February,
619 of 3,700 passengers and crew (17%) were tested positive. By end February, six persons had died.
The outbreak was traced to a Hong Kong passenger who embarked on January 21st and disembarked
on January 25th. After docking near New Taipei City, on January 31, the ship arrived in Yokohoma,
Japan. By the following day, the Japanese health ministry ordered a 14-day quarantine for everyone on
board and rushed to close its ports to all other cruise ships. The public health measures taken
according to news reports and the media were removal of all PCR positive passengers and crew from
the ship and their isolation in Japanese hospitals. The remaining test-negative passengers and crew
remained on board. Passengers were quarantined in their cruise ship cabins, and only allowed out of
the cabin for one hour per day. By 20* February, the decision to evacuate was made and more than
3000 passengers left the ship. Most were air-evacuated by their respective countries.
The cruise ship with a COVID-19 index case onboard between the 21-25* January serves as a good
model to study its potential to spread in a population that is more homogenously mixed, compared to
the more spatially variable situation in Wuhan.
We set out to study the empirical data of COVID-19 confirmed infections on the Cruise ship Diamond
Princess, to estimate the basic reproduction number (Rq) under cruise ship conditions, the response
effectiveness of the quarantine and removal interventions, and compare scenarios of an earlier and
later evacuation of the ship.
Methods:
We used data on confirmed cases on the cruise ship as published on a daily basis by public sources'^ '*
to calibrate a model and estimate the basic reproduction number Rq from the time sequence and
amplitude of the case rates observed. COVID-19 is thought to have been introduced by an index case
from Hong Kong visiting the ship between the 2D‘ to 25* of January, 2020. We thus used the date of
2F' January 2020 as the first time point, t-0, assuming the index case was infectious from the first day
on the ship. The estimates of Rq and the associated Covid-19 incidence on the cruise ship was derived
using a compartmental model estimating the dynamics of the number of susceptible (S), exposed (E),
infected (7), and recovered (7?) individuals, adapted but modified from a published COVID-19 study.
We analyzed two instances of the model assuming respectively: (1) a homogenous population (3700
individuals), and (2) a stratified population of crew (1000 individuals) and guests (2700 individuals).
The model used a relationship between the daily reproductive number, fS, and Rq to infer the
transmissibility and contact rate across the whole cruise ship population by the relationship:
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= transmissibility * contact rate = R^/i
where the infectious period equals to one over the recovery rate (y), i = Ijy
In the homogeneous model, the infectious period, i, of COVID-19 was set to he 10 days based on
previous findings.* In the situation of no removal (ill persons taken off the ship to he isolated in a
Japanese hospital), the incubation period (or, the latent period), I was estimated to be approximately 5
days (ranging from 2 to 14 days).^° In order to model the removal/isolation and quarantine
interventions, we implemented time dependent removal and contact rates as described in Table 1. We
performed additional sensitivity analysis reducing the Rq to 3.7, an estimate of the average value
across mainland China studies of COVID-19.^
We further estimated a counterfactual scenario of the infections dynamics assuming no interventions
were implemented, in particular no removal and subsequent isolation of ill persons. We assumed an
infectious period of 10 days, with a contact rate remaining the same as in the initial phase of the
outbreak. Additionally, in the stratified model of crew and guests, the contact rate was assumed to be
different due to the assumption that crew could not be easily quarantined as they had to continue their
services on board for all the passengers and possibly had more homogeneous mixing with all the
passengers, whereas passengers may be mixing more within their preferred circles and areas. We kept
the transient change in the contact rate and the removal of all PCR confirmed patients starting from the
3"“^ and the 5* of February respectively as in the first model. Parameters are described in Table 1.
The model describing a homogeneous population onboard can be described by:
dS
dt
dE S
dl
where S denote all susceptible people on the cruise ship, E all exposed, I all infected and R all
recovered or removed, and where N = S + E + I + R denotes the whole population.
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The model describing a stratified population onboard can be described by:
dSq Sq Sq
dEq Sq Sq
dl,
a
dt
— ylg
dRg
dt
= y[c.
dSr Sr Sr
dEr Sr Sr
dl
dt
= Ec/l - Ylc
dR
dF = >"'
where S denotes susceptible, E exposed, I infected and R recovered or removed, N = S + E + I + R,
and the subscript g and c are indicating guest and crew respectively. Overall, we assume mortality is
negligible.
Models with interventions were calibrated to reports of total infection occurrence, while models
simulating the counterfactual scenarios where left with the naive parameter settings (no
countermeasures). The net effects of the countermeasures where estimated as the difference between
the counterfactual scenario and the model with the interventions. Model parameters are described in
Table 1. The effectiveness of the countermeasures was estimated by calibration of the model to data.
We here also present estimations of the plausible consequences of a hypothetical third intervention
strategy, whereby all individuals onboard would have been evacuated either on of February or 19*
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of February. We estimated and presented the number of latent cases on 3'^‘* February evacuation and on
19* February, 2020.
Results:
Using the SEIR model assuming relatively homogenous mixing of all people onboard, we calibrated
the predicted cumulative number of infections from the model to the observed cumulative number of
infections among all people onboard and estimated the initial Rq to 14.8. This resembled an estimate
of p (the daily reproduction rate) to 1.48. To derive this estimate we calibrated functions describing
transient change in the as a result of changes in contact rate and the removal of symptomatic
infections. The parameter values of contact rate, quarantine interventions and removal presented in
Table 1 are the results of the calibration to the observed cumulative incidence data. The contact rate
between persons on the cruise ship was calibrated to give the best fit to data with a reduction of 70%
by the quarantine countermeasure with onset February, 2020. The transient function of removal and
isolation of infected cases with an onset on 5* February, 2020, reduced the infectious period from 10
to 4 days, and substantially reduced the transmission and sub-sequent infections on the ship. In Figure
1 we present the change in Rq based on the relationship between Rq and ^ and how it is affected by
the transient countermeasures of quarantine and removal of ill patients from the model. Here Rq
should be interpreted as the basic reproductive rate in a totally naive population on the Diamond
Princess (i.e. same contact rate), and not the actual basic reproductive number over time on the cruise
ship. The Rq was 14.8 initially and then R^ declined to a stable 1.78 after the quarantine and removal
interventions were initiated (Figure 1).
The predicted cumulative number of cases over time from this model described the observed cases
well, but overestimated the cumulative case incidence rate initially (Figure 2). This allowed to
compensate for reporting bias in the initial phase, given that the proportion of testing of all passengers
was patchy while at the end of the study (19* February, 2020) the testing of passengers had a higher
coverage and was more complete. The modelled cumulative number of cases on 19 February, 2020, is
613 out of the 3700 people at risk, while the observed reported number of cases is 619. The
counterfactual scenario assuming homogenous rates among crew and guests without any interventions
(no removal off the ship or isolation of ill persons nor any quarantine measures for the remaining
passengers on boat), estimated the number of cumulative cases to be 2920 out of the 3700 after 30
days, that is by 19* of February (Figure 2). The net effect of the combined interventions was estimated
to prevent a total number of 2307 cases by 19* February, 2020 (Figure 2).
In a sensitivity analysis we modified the Rq to 3.7 (and consequently p to 0.37) as this has been
reported the average basic reproduction number from studies of COVID-19 in China.^ However, from
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our simulation, even in the absence of any intervention, such a low Rq cannot explain the rapid growth
of incident cases on the cruise ship (Figure 3). This sensitivity scenario excluded countermeasures
from the model making it unrealistic that such a low Rq value could be the true value in the cruise ship
situation with confined spaces and high homogeneous mixing of the same persons. The estimate with
the lower Rq value also omitted to consider the strong interventions put into place, making it even
more unrealistic.
We additionally modeled a scenario stratified by crew and guests whereby we assumed the parameter
values of transmission risk to be lower for crew to guest than for guest to crew (Table 1). The
predicted cumulative number of infected crew and guests by 19th of February from this model was
168 out of 1000 (16.8%) and 464 out of 2700 (17.2%), respectively (Figure 4). The total number of
cumulative cases by 19* of February predicted from this model was 632, close to the observed number
of cases of 619. The predicted cumulative incidence rates were overestimated for crew while
underestimated for guests based on available tests results at the time of writing (Figure 4). These data
still need to be validated against the empiric data of test results in all crew and passengers which
should soon become available.
Instead of keeping all passengers on board, another option would have been to evacuate all individuals
onboard the cruise ship earlier, and allow them to go home for a potential quarantine in their
respective home countries. We modeled that an evacuation by 3* February, 2020, would have resulted
in 76 latent cases (cases during the incubation time), while an evacuation by 19* February would have
resulted in 246 latent cases.
Discussion:
Modelling the COVID-19 on-board outbreak reveals important insights into the epidemic risk and
effectiveness of public health measures. We found that the reproductive number of COVID-19 in the
cruise ship situation of 3,700 persons confined to a limited space was around 4 times higher than in the
epicenter in Wuhan, where Rq was estimated to have a mean of 3.7.^ Interestingly, a rough estimation
of the population per square km on this 18-deck ship is 286 by 62 meters (0.32 km^). Assuming that
only 50% of decks are being used, approximately 24,400 persons are confined per km^ on a ship
compared to approximately 6000 persons per km^ (9,000,000/1528) in urban Wuhan. This means that
the population density was about 4 times higher on the cruise ship. Thus, both Rq and contact rate are
dependent on population density, as also suggested by previous research.^^ In population-based models
on observational data the population per square km is often substantially different, affecting the Rg and
P coefficient implicitly by changes in the contact rate expressed as:
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Ro
— = Transmissibility * contact rate
The local estimate of Ro can be divided into a localized contact rate and a multiplier that is necessary
for moving from one population to another:
contact rate = contact rate
localized
pd, where pd is the population density multiplier. In our
case it was approximated to 4. Here the contact rate is relating to a contact rate in a defined population
in a certain area and the population density multiplier modifies the contact rate when moving across
different local population and geographical areas representing heterogeneity in population density. In
the case of the cruise ship, the potential relationship of Rq to population density appear thus mainly be
attributed to the contact rate and mixing effects. This information is also important for other settings
characterized by high population densities.
With such a high Rq, we estimated that without any interventions within the time period of
January to 19* February 2920 out of the 3700 (79%) would have been infected, assuming relatively
homogenous mixing between all people on board.
The quarantine and removal interventions launched when the outbreak was confirmed (3’^'* February
and 5* of February) substantially lowered the contact rate and reduced the cumulative case burden by
an estimated 2307 cases by 19* February. We note, however, that the longer time span of simulation
beyond 19* February, assuming people would stay on the boat, would reduce the net effect of the
intervention substantially. We further note that an earlier evacuation would have corresponded to
disembarking a substantially lower number of latent undetectable infections (76 vs. 246), likely giving
rise to some further transmission outside the ship.
We also found that contact rate of guest to guest and crew appeared higher than the contact rate from
guest to crew, perhaps driven by high transmission rates within cabins. However, testing of crew was
delayed, and there was a testing bias towards testing more passengers than crew. Hence our access to
empiric data may have and this analysis need to be revisited when all data is available.
The limitations of our study include our lack of data on the lag time between onset of symptoms, the
timing of testing and potential delay to the availability of test results. Due to the large number of
people, not everyone was tested, and we suspect that the timing of the test results do not totally tally
with real-time onset of cases. We had no access to data on incident cases in crew versus passengers,
nor any data on whether there was clustering of cases around certain nationalities or crew members.
Furthermore, although the Hong Kong passenger was assumed to be the index case, it could well have
been possible that there was more than one index case on board who could have contributed to
transmission, and this would have lowered our estimated RO. Lastly, our models are based on human-
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to-human transmission and do not take into account the possibility that fomites, or water systems with
infected feces, contributed to the outbreak.
The interventions that included the removal of all persons with confirmed COVID-19 disease
combined with the quarantine of all passengers substantially reduced the anticipated number of new
COVID-19 cases compared to a scenario without any interventions (17% attack rate with intervention
versus 79% without intervention) and thus prevented a total number of 2307 additional cases by 19*
February. However, the main conclusion from our modelling is that evacuating all passengers and
crew early on in the outbreak would have prevented many more passengers and crew members from
getting infected. A scenario of early evacuation at the time of first detection of the outbreak (3
February) would have resulted in only 76 latent infected persons during the incubation time (with
potentially still negative tests). A late evacuation by 19* February would have resulted in about 246
infected persons during their incubation time. These data need to be confirmed by empiric data of
testing all evacuated persons after 19* February, and may be an overestimate as we assumed a stable
Rq after quarantine was instituted. However, the Rq probably declined over time, as the
implementation of quarantine measures were incrementally implemented leading to better quarantine
standards towards the end of the quarantine period.
In conclusion, the cruise ship conditions clearly amplified an already highly transmissible disease. Rq
is related to population density, and is particularly driven by contact rate and mixing effects, and this
explains the high Rq in the first weeks before countermeasures were initiated. Population densities and
mixing need to be taken into account in future modeling of the COVID-19 outbreak in different
settings. Early evacuation of all passengers on a cruise ship- a situation with confined spaces and high
intermixing- is recommended as soon as an outbreak of COVID-19 is confirmed.
Author contributions: JR and AWS conceived the study. JR developed the model and run the
analysis. HS advised on model development, and helped with the figures. AWS advised on model
parameters. All authors wrote the final manuscript.
Funding: None
Declaration of interest: none declared.
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Table 1. Model parameter description and values. Start time {t = 0) the 20^*' of January.
Parameters
Explanation (unit)
Estimated to
P
Overall transmissibility and contact rate (1/day)
1.48 i/ t < 14
0.44 if t > 14
1
Incubation period (days)
5 days
i
Infectious period or time to removal (days)
10 if t< 16
4ift>16
N
Total number of people onboard (persons)
3700
Pc
Transmissibility and contact rate crew (1/day)
I.IS if t< 14
0.3S if t> 14
Pgg
Transmissibility and contact rate guests to
guests (1/day)
I.IS if t< 14
0.3S if t> 14
Pgc
Transmissibility and contact rate guests to crew
(1/day)
0.17 if t < 14
O.OS if t> 14
N,
Total number of guests onboard (persons)
2700
Nc
Total number of crew onboard (persons)
WOO
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Figure 1. The estimated basic reproduction number, Rq, on the cruise ship and its change over time
as a result of the transient interventions of quarantine and removal of infectious cases. The Rq given
here assumes one index case in a totally naive population, although that is not the case on the ship, we
use it here to illustrate how the Rq is sensitive to the interventions, but still substantially large to fuel a
continuation of the epidemic. The grey line indicates Rq = 1-
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Figure 2. Predicted total number of infections using model 1 (no stratification) for the realistic
situation with interventions (blue), counterfactual scenario without intervention (grey) and the net
effect of the interventions (black).
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0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Time in days since 21 Jan
Figure 3. Sensitivity analysis: predicting total number of infections using a model without
interventions with Rg set to 3.7 with index case 21th January (bottom). Observed reports of
cumulative cases are marked as "o ”.
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Time in days since 21 Jan
Figure 4. Predicted total number of infections using a model stratified into crew and guest for the
realistic situation with interventions. Total population onboard (black), guests (grey), crew (blue).
Observed total case numbers of total (black), crew (blue) and guest (grey) are marked as "o".
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