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The Lewis H. Beck Foundation 





Author of The Puritan Republic 

" The broken soldier, kindly bade to stay, 
Sate by his fire and talk'd the night away, 
Wept o'er his wounds or tales of sorrow done, 
Shoulder'd his crutch and show'd how fields were won. 

- — Goldsmith. 




Copyright 1902 
The Bowen-Merrill Company 








In an address to the New England Society of New 
York, Oliver Wendell Holmes said : "The story of 
the Pilgrims may be told for a thousand anniversaries 
and the next year it will be fresh again." So it is 
with the story of the Civil War. Notwithstanding 
the passing years, it retains all its interest, especially 
for those who bore arms on either side. The surviving 
veterans never tire of telling the story or of hearing it 
told, and its fascination is such as to lend a charm to 
even the most unpretentious narrative of the conflict in 
which they took part. 

Macaulay said that he intended to write a history of 
England that would make the lady in her drawing- 
room lay down the latest novel and take up his book, 
and he accomplished his purpose. The time has not 
yet come, nor has the historian appeared, for writing 
a history of the Civil War. No man now living can 
write it with the impartiality that should characterize 
the historian, and no historian could now write such 
a history without rekindling the embers of passion and 
prejudice still smoldering beneath the ashes of the 
conflict that once glowed with such fierce heat. 

When the time comes for writing the history of the 



Civil War the historian will find a wealth of materials 
from which to construct a history far more fascinating 
than Macaulay's and infinitely more interesting" than 
the distorted history conveyed in diluted doses through 
the pages of so-called historical novels. It will be suf- 
ficient honor for the author of a volume like this if 
he has contributed even a little to the history that is 
to be written. 

The general scope of this volume is indicated by 
the table of contents and a very full index. The state- 
ments in the text are supported by a liberal citation of 
authorities, a table of which precedes the general index. 
The military operations described are chiefly those of 
the Army of the Cumberland, and in describing them 
I have avoided, as far as possible, the use of technical 
military terms not generally understood by civilians. 
In the appendix will be found tables showing the 
organization of that army during the most important 
battles and campaigns in which it participated. 

I claim no credit for discovering such facts relating 
to the Civil War as any one may find by an industrious 
examination of official records and histories open to 
all. Nor do I pretend to knowledge of facts, outside 
the official records, such as officers of high rank and 
those intimately associated with them may have ac- 
quired. The highest rank I attained was that of cap- 
tain, and my associates in the army were chiefly among 
the line officers and enlisted men. My relations to 
these, however, were such as gave me greater famil- 
iarity than that generally possessed by officers of 


higher rank with the daily life and thoughts of a pri- 
vate soldier and with his views of military life and 
events. Moreover, the knowledge that I acquired of 
the battles and campaigns in which I participated, 
limited as were my means of knowing anything about 
them at the time beyond what I saw and heard, has 
given me clearer ideas of many matters in connection 
with them than I could have acquired by any amount of 
reading. I fully realize, however, that I am quite as 
liable as others to make mistakes in attempting to 
record personal observations of events that occurred 
so long ago, and I claim such indulgence on this ac- 
count as I would freely accord to those whose recollec- 
tion of the same events may not coincide with mine. 

The political conditions and the military movements 
of the Civil War period were intimately connected, 
and the questions growing out of them have given rise 
to great diversity of opinion — some of them to acri- 
monious controversy. A colorless narrative of that 
period, ignoring these questions, would be of little 
value or interest. On the other hand, a mere partisan 
discussion of them would be equally unprofitable and 
uninteresting. Therefore, when expressing my opin- 
ion on any of these controverted questions, I have done 
so without reserve, endeavoring, however ; to write as 
fairly and impartially as is possible for one who took 
an active part in either war or politics during the Civil 
War times, and who has intelligence enough to ripen 
into a conviction. 

We wish to forget the animosities of the Civil War 


period, but not the heroism of those who bore arms 
on either side of the bloody conflict. That is now the 
common inheritance of all Americans. The soldiers, 
Federal and Confederate, to whom I have inscribed 
this volume, first learned on the field of battle to re- 
spect their adversaries. No eulogy can do justice to 
those of either side which ignores the heroic achieve- 
ments of those who fought against them. I trust that 
the soldiers of the South who may chance to see this 
book will read it with the same generous feelings that 
inspired a soldier of the North in writing it. 

In the preparation of this volume I have been great- 
ly aided by General Henry V Boynton, Colonel Wil- 
liam F Fox, Colonel Thomas L. Livermore, and Mr. 
Jacob Piatt Dunn of the Indianapolis Sentinel, and 
especially by Mr. Charles R. Williams of the Indian- 
apolis News, who has already placed me under great 
obligations by assisting me in preparing The Puritan 
Republic. All these well-known writers hold decided 
views that probably do not coincide throughout with 
mine, and, therefore, I deem it justice to exonerate 
them from any responsibility for my own conclusions. 
My daughter, Lucy Howe, has helped me very much 
in revising the manuscript for publication. 

Daniel Wait Howe. 

Indianapolis, Ind., October, 1902. 




Flic Three Months' Picnic, . I~i4 

"urthcr Development of the Great Conflict, I5~55 

Tamp, March and Battle, 56-96 

-Seeing Real War; the March from Louisville to Nashville, 07-105 

The Battle of Stone's River, 106-122 

-Six Months in Camp at Murfreesboro, 123-155 


The Chattanooga Campaign and the Battle of Chicka- 

mauga, 156-209 



The Siege and the Battles of Chattanooga, 210-241 

The East Tennessee Campaign, 242-267 


Negro Soldiers in the Civil War, 268-282 

The Atlanta Campaign, 283-304 

Hood's Invasion of Tennessee, 305-329 

The End of an Unimportant Military Career, 330~334 

The Story Told by the Statistics, 335 — 355 

Revisiting Chattanooga and Chickamauga, 356-367 

Appendix, 369-390 

Index to Citations, 391-393 

General Index, 395-421 




I come of a family always loyal to country One of 
my ancestors, Colonel Thomas Howe, of Marlborough, 
Mass., was prominent in King Philip's War; two oth- 
ers, Captain Eliakim Howe and his son Otis were in 
the New Hampshire militia in the Revolutionary War, 
and my grandfather, Captain Nathan Howe, served in 
a New York regiment in the War of 1812. When the 
Mexican War broke out my father was dead and I, 
his only child, was about five years old. 

From the time it was known that Lincoln had been 
elected President, the nation was in a ferment of ex T 
citement. The papers were full of rumors of the seces- 
sion of the southern states and of the warlike prepara- 
tions already begun. Among the citizens of Indiana 
were many whose ancestors had come from Kentucky, 
Virginia, and other southern states, and who were 
bitterly hostile to Lincoln. Nor was there entire 
unanimity among those who had supported him as to 
the proper course to be pursued in the event of the 



secession of the southern states, and many, influenced 
by the early opinions of Horace Greeley, were in favor 
of letting them go in peace. A great many others 
thought that the talk of war was but the vainglorious 
boasting of southern fire-eaters. Few suspected that 
such a bloody contest as that which followed was so 
near at hand. 

In the early months of 1861 I was in Indianapolis 
attending a course of law lectures given to a small 
class by Judge Samuel E. Perkins, then one of the 
judges of the Indiana Supreme Court. It was during 
this time that Lincoln passed through that city on 
his way to Washington to be inaugurated. A great 
crowd assembled and listened to him as he spoke from 
the balcony of the Bates House. I remember, as if it 
were yesterday, his tall, lank form towering above 
those about him while he delivered his brief address. 
It was but little more than four years until the funeral 
train passed through the city bearing his body. back to 
his old home. 

After the conclusion of the lecture course, I returned 
to my home in Franklin, the county seat of Johnson 
county, and I had been there only a few days when the 
whole country was startled, as if by the shock of an 
earthquake at midnight, by the news of the firing on 
Fort Sumter. This was followed at once by the procla- 
mation of the President calling for 75,000 volunteers. 
Those who do not remember the situation can form 
some idea of it from the contemporaneous accounts in 
the newspapers. Lincoln had received a majority of 


the electoral, but not of the popular, vote, and would 
not have been elected at all but for the split between 
the Breckinridge and Douglas wings of the Democ- 
racy. If the bombardment of Fort Sumter "fired the 
southern heart," it fired the northern heart as well. 
There was at once a shifting of position and a new 
alignment of political parties. There were few left 
among the Republicans of the North who advocated 
letting the southern states go their way. Conspicuous 
among the great papers that helped to mold public 
opinion in the North was Harper's Weekly, which had 
not favored the election of Lincoln. Its issue of April 
27, 1861, contained President Lincoln's proclamation 
and an editorial in which it said : 

"War is declared. President Lincoln's proclama- 
tion, which we publish above, is an absolute proclama- 
tion of war against the Gulf states. The die is now 
cast, and men must take their sides, and hold to them. 
No one who knows anything of the southern people 
supposes for a moment that, having gone so far as to 
bombard a United States fort and capture it, they 
will now succumb without a fight. No one who has 
seen the recent manifestations of popular sentiment 
in the North can doubt that the northern blood is up, 
and that they will listen no more to talk of compro- 
mise, truce, or treaty, until they are fairly beaten. 

"Let us then forbear puling, and look the situation 
in the face. There are some among us still who whine 
about the evils of civil war. These are they who, with 
a burglar in their house, his hand on the throat of 
their wife or daughter, would quote texts on the love- 
liness of Christian forbearance and charity Nobody 


— outside of lunatic asylums — doubts that civil war 
an enormous calamity. On this point all are agreed. 
But as it has actually begun, and exists, what is 
use of deprecating it ? What should we think of a doc- 
tor who, summoned to visit a half-dying patient, 
should wring his hands hopelessly and bewail the ma- 
lignancy of disease ?" 

Its next issue of May 4, 1861, contained another 
editorial in which it said : 

"It is not now a question of slavery or anti-slavery. 
It is not even a question of Union or disunion. The 
question simply is whether northern men will fight. 
Southerners have rebelled and dragged our flag in the 
dirt, in the belief that, because we won't fight duels or 
engage in street brawls, therefore we are cowards. 
The question now is whether or no they are right." 

These utterances exactly sounded the keynote of 
northern sentiment. No paper was more loyal to the 
Federal government or more zealous for a vigorous 
prosecution of the war, and its able editorials and the 
striking illustrations of Thomas Nast exercised a pow- 
erful influence in shaping northern sentiment. 

At the outbreak of the war the attitude of Kentucky 
was uncertain. The sympathies of the governor, 
Beriah Magoffin, were wholly with the seceding states, 
and to President Lincoln's call for troops he had an- 
swered that "Kentucky will furnish no troops for the 
wicked purpose of subduing her sister southern states." 
It was Magoffin's purpose to force Kentucky to secede, 


or, failing in that, to assume the position of "armed 
neutrality." The farce planned by Magoffin was not 
successful in the land of Henry Clay and soon ran its 
course, but, while it lasted, Indiana was practically a 
border state. It was fortunate for the state and for 
the Union cause that at this time there was in the office 
of governor a man of unquestioned loyalty, of tre- 
mendous energy, and of indomitable will. In the four 
years that followed, the name of Oliver P Morton 
became a household word throughout the United 
States. No governor in any northern state met with 
more bitter opposition ; none worked for the success 
of the Union cause with more untiring energy, or 
looked after the welfare of the soldiers of his own 
state with more watchful and careful solicitude. 

Morton was then in the prime of vigorous manhood 
— a man of far-seeing sagacity, of great endurance, of 
dauntless courage ; a man who could have taken Crom- 
well's place in England, and who needed all of Crom- 
well's force of character to fill the place of governor 
of Indiana. Clearly foreseeing from the beginning 
the magnitude of the Rebellion and the tremendous 
efforts that must be made to suppress it, he often 
chafed under what he thought to be the puny and tardy 
measures of the Federal government. When the Fed- 
eral authorities were too slow in supplying arms for 
the Indiana troops, he bought them on his own respon- 
sibility. When the government became short of am- 
munition, he established at Indianapolis an arsenal for 
its manufacture, soon having 600 men employed, 


and ammunition enough for the Indiana troops and 
some to spare to the government. When the legisla- 
ture in 1863 adjourned, after refusing to make any 
appropriation to carry on the state government, he 
borrowed money sufficient for two years without clos- 
ing a single state institution and without stopping the 
organization of a single regiment. 

The President's proclamation calling for 75,000 vol- 
unteers was issued April 15 and six three-months' 
regiments with 4,683 men were required of the state 
of Indiana. Within a week 12,000 men had responded 
— twice as many as could then be armed. The four 
three-year regiments required under the President's 
call of May 3 were raised at once, and ten more besides 
in advance of the call in July, and before January 1, 
1862, Indiana had 60,000 troops in the field. 

The Morgan raid found Indiana almost destitute of 
armed soldiers, but within twenty-four hours after 
Morgan had touched her borders 15,000 men were has- 
tening to Indianapolis; and before two days had 
passed Morton had 30,000 assembled to repel the in- 

No orator ever lived in Indiana whose speeches had 
such weight as those of Morton. He never attempted 
to be funny; he never indulged in the "spread-eagle" 
style of oratory; he never resorted to the tricks prac- 
tised by the modern professional "spell-binder." But 
under his sledge-hammer logic all opposition went 
down as the gates of Torquilstone went down under 
the blows of Richard the Lion-hearted. Probably no 


one speech ever delivered in America left such a deep 
impress upon the public mind as Morton's Masonic 
Hall speech in 1866. I once heard a prominent Dem- 
ocrat say that this one speech determined the election 
in the state for that year. No Republican could add 
strength to it ; no Democrat could answer it. 

Morton's care for the Indiana troops in the field 
was proverbial throughout all the armies. Surgeons 
and nurses were sent by him to every battle-field. 
Often he went himself to give his personal attention to 
the care of the wounded. His strong hand was the 
chief support of the Indiana Sanitary Commission, 
whose special business it was to care for the sick and 
wounded soldiers in the hospitals. No regiment passed 
through Indianapolis, either going to or returning 
from the front, that did not enjoy the fruits of his 
provident hospitality. His kind and sympathetic feel- 
ing for his suffering fellow men was not limited to 
soldiers of the Union armies. It extended to the Con- 
federate prisoners confined at Indianapolis, and no- 
where in the North were they more humanely treated. 

His vigilance was marvelous. Nothing escaped his 
keen watchfulness. Not a plot against the government 
was concocted in Indiana that he did not ferret out ; 
hardly a meeting of the Knights of the Golden Circle 
or Sons of Liberty was held of whose proceedings he 
did not know. On one occasion a prominent citizen 
of Indianapolis called on him to assure him that the 
reports of an alleged treasonable meeting held the 
night before were exaggerated, and that he, the visitor, 


would certainly have heard of the proceedings if they 
were such as had been reported ; whereupon Morton 
almost paralyzed him by at once pulling out of a 
pigeon-hole a stenographic account of the proceedings, 
including a full report of the visitor's own treasonable 

He was omnipresent ; now buried in the details of 
the work of carrying on the state government, or pre- 
paring troops for the field, now going about the state 
making speeches and infusing into the people some of 
his own enthusiasm , now visiting battle-fields and 
camps at the front — wherever he was most needed dur- 
ing the war he was always to be found. It was chiefly 
to his untiring efforts that Indiana enjoys the distinc- 
tion of having furnished to the Federal armies over 
seventy-four per cent, of the entire fighting population 
of the state. No obstacles stopped him; his tremen- 
dous energy overcame them all ; no disasters dismayed 
him — they only strengthened his courage and inspired 
him with renewed determination. He will live in his- 
tory as the greatest war governor of his time. 

Morton's response to the President's proclamation 
was instantaneous, and the call to arms was heard in 
every town and village in Indiana. At once old party 
affiliations were broken and the question no longer 
was whether a man were a Republican or a Democrat, 
but whether he stood for or against the Union. A 
great meeting was called at Franklin, patriotic ad- 
dresses were made, and preparations were at once 
begun to enlist a company of volunteers. I was then 


living at home with my mother and my stepfather, 
Samuel P Oyler. There were only three of us. It 
was felt that either my stepfather or I should enlist; 
my mother would not decide between us, so we both 

The quota of the company was filled almost as fast 
as the men could write their names. We did not wait 
for uniforms, but were all rigged out in red shirts. 
The loyal ladies of the town presented us with a beau- 
tiful silk banner and we were ready to march. My 
stepfather was elected captain and I was elected pri- 
vate, a rank which I retained throughout the three- 
months' service. Another little fellow and I, being 
the two smallest men in the company, were assigned 
to the position of rear guard — which I think we filled 
with due regard to the responsibility and the honor 
attached to it. The fashion was then to dignify each 
local company with some distinctive appellation indi- 
cating the warlike character of its members, and I have 
an indistinct recollection that we were known as "The 
Franklin Tigers." 

When the day arrived for us to take the train to 
Indianapolis, our company was marshaled in the pub- 
lic square, and, preceded by fife and drum, we marched 
through the streets to the railroad station. It was a 
great day for the staid old town. All the people were 
out, and thousands gathered from the country round- 
about. In the crowds that thronged the sidewalks 
along the line of march were some tender-hearted 
women who wept, but most of the spectators and the 


volunteers wore smiling faces. It was generally 
thought that the flurry would soon blow over. Sew- 
ard, in whose sagacity we had unbounded confidence, 
predicted that the war would end in sixty days. 

Arriving at Indianapolis we went into camp, and 
the Franklin company became Co. H of the 7th 
Ind. Vols., of which Ebenezer Dumont was commis- 
sioned colonel and Captain Oyler, major. We re- 
mained in Indianapolis only long enough to receive 
arms and uniforms, diligently employing the interval 
before our departure in drilling; and then the regiment 
was sent to what is now West Virginia, crossing the 
Ohio at Bellaire and going into camp near Webster. 
From there we marched in a few days to Philippi, 
which was captured with a great flourish. The "Bat- 
tle of Philippi" was described in bombastic style by the 
northern press, and Lander's ride down the hill was 
supposed to rank next to the mad plunge of General 
Israel Putnam in Revolutionary times. The truth is 
that, to quote from the old nursery rhyme, describing 
the fierce assault of the youthful soldiers upon a flock 
of geese, "we routed them, we scouted them, nor lost a 
single man." Not a man was killed on either side. 
Colonel Kelly of the Federal forces was wounded ; one 
unfortunate Confederate had his leg taken off by a 
stray cannon-ball; two or three others were slightly 
wounded and all the rest precipitately fled — in army 
phrase they "skedaddled" — and probably lived to fight 
another day. 

There were many incidents of the three-months' 


campaign that, at the time, made a deep impression 
upon my mind, but most of them have been obliter- 
ated by the more significant events of the three-years' 
service. My first experience on picket was at Webster. 
I was stationed in a dense wood, and it poured down 
rain all night. It was so dark that I could scarcely 
see my hand before me. About midnight a vivid flash 
of lightning suddenly revealed a man approaching 
within ten feet of me. This was a trying ordeal for a 
boy who had not been in service a month, and who 
had not been in the enemy's country more than a week, 
and I am not ashamed to say now that I was nearly 
frightened out of my wits. But I had enough courage 
left to call out "Halt! who goes there?" and I do not 
recall anything in my life that was such a relief to me 
as the quick response, "A friend with the countersign." 
It was at Philippi that I first heard the "long roll," 
a peculiar rolling beat of the drum betokening immi- 
nent danger, and calling instantly to arms every sol- 
dier that hears it. Its effect upon an army is more 
startling than the cry of "fire" at midnight. In this 
instance it turned out to be a false alarm. 

While at Philippi another incident occurred which 
I have never forgotten. Co. H had been totally 
stripped one night of all its cooking utensils by ma- 
rauders from another company. There was not a 
skillet nor a frying-pan nor a coffee-pot left in the 
whole company. The next day the captain's son and 
I obtained a pass permitting us to visit Philippi. 
There was not much to be seen — the most prominent 


public buildings being the court-house and the county 
jail which had been used by the Confederates as a 
guard-house while they occupied the town. Nearly 
all the inhabitants, most of whom were known to be 
violent "secesh," had fled. Passing a deserted house 
it occurred to us that here was a good chance to re- 
pair the losses of Co. H ; so we entered the house 
and filled an empty sack with cooking utensils. But 
we had no sooner passed through the gate than we 
were seized by a provost guard, stripped of our booty 
and hurried off to jail where we were kept in durance 
vile until night, and then dismissed with a severe repri- 
mand and an admonition that if ever detected commit- 
ting a similar offense we were liable to be instantly 
shot. This was during the period when McClellan 
and other Union generals seemed to be far more solicit- 
ous to protect the property of Confederates than they 
were to protect the property of those loyal to the gov- 
ernment. It is but justice to them to add that this 
policy seemed for a time to meet the approval of the 
authorities at Washington, who still clung to the hope 
that some compromise could be patched up by which 
their erring southern brethren might be coaxed back 
into the Union. 

The summer was spent chiefly in camp on a hill 
overlooking Philippi. The weather was hot, and when 
not drilling we sought the friendly shade of the great 
chestnut trees that were so abundant in that locality. 
The regiment was engaged in a few insignificant skir- 
mishes, then dignified by the press in grandiloquent 


descriptions as "battles" ; but the only real battle of 
any consequence in which it was engaged was that at 
Carrick's Ford. That was my first battle. Before 
reaching the ford we had repeatedly crossed Cheat 
river, a mountain stream with a very swift current 
and about waist deep, the bottom of which was cov- 
ered with slimy boulders. I had twice slipped and 
fallen, and I had gone clean under and rolled over on 
the bottom, gun and all. On getting to shore I had 
tried in vain, by putting dry powder in the tube, to 
make my musket go off. I also tried to pull the load, 
but the attempt was equally vain. Probably it made 
little difference, for my gun was an old Harper's Ferry 
musket that nearly dislocated my shoulder every time 
I fired it. and was almost as dangerous to the man be- 
hind as to the man in front of it. But I remained in 
the ranks and went through the battle, feeling as proud 
as anybody when it was over. General Garnett, the 
Confederate commander, was killed there. I passed 
by the place where he lay dead and thought he was 
one of the finest looking officers I had ever seen. 

Our term of enlistment expired the latter part of 
July and we started home. On our return we stopped 
for a night at Bellaire, Ohio, and there I first heard 
the dismal tidings of the disaster that had overtaken 
the Union army at the first battle of Bull Run. Young 
and inexperienced as I was, I understood its sig- 
nificance. It meant that going to war was no longer 
like going to a picnic, as we thought when we volun- 
teered, but that a mighty effort must be made by the 


North or the Union would be shattered and broken 
forever. I had not yet learned, nor had the nation yet 
learned, the truth of the saying of General Sherman, 
that "War is hell." 

The three-months' service, though somewhat of a 
picnic when compared with the three-years' service, 
nevertheless produced very important results not at 
once apparent. One of the most important was that 
the three-months' men gained a fair knowledge of the 
manual of arms and of company and regimental evo- 
lutions, and learned some of the rudiments of a sol- 
dier's education. A great many again enlisted for 
three years ; many who did so became officers, and the 
military experience, limited as it was, acquired in the 
three-months' service, was of great value in enabling 
them to drill and discipline the troops over whom they 
were placed in command. 



The disaster of Bull Run occurred on July 21, 1861. 
Its effect was to throw the North into a panic. The 
venerable General Scott, then seventy-five years of age, 
was general-in -chief. The next day General George 
B. McClellan was called to Washington to take charge 
of the defense of the city and he arrived there July 
26. The Confederates, as much elated as the people 
of the North were depressed, at once moved up to the 
Potomac, stopped navigation, and virtually blockaded 
the national capital. 

At Washington the authorities, civil and military, 
were in constant dread of an attack that might result in 
the capture of the capital and an invasion of the coun- 
try north of it. Still the mass of people of the North 
did not yet fully appreciate the magnitude of the prep- 
arations necessary to suppress the Rebellion. Even 
the Secretary of War, as late as October, 1861, had no 
conception of the stupendous proportions into which 
the conflict, then scarce six months old, was destined 
to expand. 

"About this time," says Mr. Foulke, 1 "Secretary 

1 Life of Morton, vol. 1, p. 147. 



Cameron stopped at Indianapolis, on his way from 
St. Louis to Washington, and in company with Sena- 
tor Chandler, took supper with Morton at the govern- 
or's mansion. He was quite talkative and laughed 
heartily at Sherman's idea that it would take two hun- 
dred thousand men to recover the Mississippi states. 
He made no secret of his belief that Sherman was 
crazy, and unfit for any military command. He de- 
rided Sherman's notions of the need of cavalry and 
artillery as old-fashioned and silly, and was boyish in 
his fun over the 'Minie rifle,' and over improved arms 
generally. The old smooth-bore musket, in the hands 
of well-disciplined infantry, he regarded as the best 
kind of arms. Morton listened to this talk in silence." 

We can well understand why Morton listened in 
silence, and no doubt in amazement, to such twaddle 
at such a time from the Secretary of War. 

Moreover the slavery question continued to be a 
disturbing element, and military operations were in- 
terfered with by political considerations and by the 
jealousies of generals. The senseless clamor expressed 
in the cry of "On to Richmond," which led to the dis- 
astrous defeat at Bull Run, again urged an advance 
of the Union armies and led to another defeat on 
October 21st at Ball's Bluff, and soon after, on Novem- 
ber 1, 1 86 1, General Scott was succeeded as general- 
in-chief by General McClellan. 

The disasters at Bull Run and Ball's Bluff only 
deepened the conviction, long before entertained by 
Morton and others of far-seeing sagacity, that the 
Rebellion would not blow over in sixty days as Seward 


had predicted. It also became apparent that it was 
not wise policy to enlist men for a term so short that 
their period of service would expire before they had 
acquired more than the rudiments of a military edu- 
cation, and that the regular army could not be de- 
pended upon, as General Scott had supposed, to sup- 
press the Rebellion. Many of its officers sympathized 
with the South, and those who resided there, with a 
few notable exceptions, accepted commissions in the 
Confederate army. There were not enough left of 
those loyal to the Federal government to officer the new 
regiments. It was useless to expect to fill the regi- 
ments necessary to be raised by recruiting for the reg- 
ular army. The men of the North were eager to enlist 
but they preferred to serve with their neighbors and 
under officers whom they knew. I doubt whether ten 
men in my company in the three-years' service could 
have been induced to enlist in the regular army. 
It was upon the volunteers that the Federal govern- 
ment was forced to rely for the material with which 
to make up the rank and file. 

Therefore on May 3, 1861, President Lincoln issued 
another call for volunteers, and under this call, and the 
acts of Congress confirming and supplementing it, 
500,000 men were required. There was not much diffi- 
culty in getting the men. Indeed, under this call and 
the acts of Congress supplementing it, over 700,000 
volunteered, of whom over 657,000 enlisted for three 
years. The first serious trouble arose in equipping 


them for active service. It had been difficult to arm 
and equip the 75,000 three-months' troops, and it was 
only by almost superhuman exertions that Governor 
Morton had been able to send to the front the six 
three-months' regiments contributed by Indiana. No 
preparations had been made by the Federal govern- 
ment or by any state for such a war as had now 
burst forth. Long before the outbreak of the war the 
militia organizations in most of the northern states had 
been practically abandoned. Governor Chase of 
Ohio had made vigorous efforts to reorganize the mi- 
litia system of that state. Whitelaw Reid says : 2 

"In this, as in his political views, he was in advance 
of his times. In every state west of the Alleghanies 
the militia had fallen into undisguised contempt. The 
old-fashioned militia musters had been given up; the 
subject had been abandoned as fit only to be the fertile 
theme for the ridicule of rising writers and witty 
stump orators. The cannon issued by the government 
were left for the uses of political parties on the occa- 
sion of mass meetings or victories at the polls. The 
small arms were scattered, rusty, and become worth- 
less. In Chicago a novel drill had been an inducement 
for the organization of the Ellsworth Zouaves ; and 
here and there through the West the young men of a 
city kept up a military company; but these were the 
exceptions. Popular prejudice against doing military 
duty was insurmountable, and no name for these ex- 
ceptional organizations so struck the popular fancy 
as that of "the Cornstalk Militia." 

2 Ohio in the War, vol. 1, p. 19. 


An effort was made by Chase's successor to continue 
the policy inaugurated by the former, but with little 
success. "And yet," quoting again from Reid, "the 
organization of Ohio militia was far superior to that 
existing in any of the states to the westward. All of 
them combined did not possess so large a militia force 
as the First Ohio Regiment, then under the command 
of Colonel King, of Dayton." 

General Cox 3 has given a graphic account of the 
military condition of the great state of Ohio at the 
outbreak of the Rebellion. Governor Dennison on the 
first call for troops summoned to his aid Captain 
George B. McClellan, then a railway superintendent. 
General Cox says : 

"The next morning McClellan requested me to ac- 
company him to the state arsenal, to see what arms 
and material might be there. We found a few boxes 
of smooth-bore muskets which had once been issued 
to militia companies and had been returned rusted 
and damaged. No belts, cartridge-boxes, or other ac- 
coutrements were with them. There were two or 
three smooth-bore brass field-pieces, 6-pounders. which 
had been honey-combed by firing salutes, and of which 
the vents had been worn out, bushed and worn out 
again. In a heap in one corner lay a confused pile of 
mildewed harness which had been once used for artil- 
lery horses, but was now not worth carrying away. 
There had for many years been no money appropriated 
to buy military material or even to protect the little 

3 Article on War Preparations in the North; Battles and Lead- 
ers of the Civil War, vol. I, p. 84. 


the state had. The Federal government had occasion- 
ally distributed some arms which were in the hands 
of the independent uniformed militia, and the arsenal 
was simply an empty store-house. It did not take 
long to complete our inspection. At the door, as we 
were leaving the building, McClellan turned, and, 
looking back into its emptiness, remarked, half hu- 
morously and half sadly, 'A fine stock of munitions 
on which to begin a great war !' " 

Scanty as were Ohio's military supplies they far sur- 
passed those of Indiana and of most of the northern 
states. In Indiana there was not the semblance of a 
state militia organization. Even the "cornstalk" mus- 
ters had almost passed out of mind. There were not 
muskets enough in the whole state to arm a single regi- 
ment, to say nothing of uniforms, tents, knapsacks and 
the other equipments essential to actual military serv- 
ice. Now 500,000 men were not only to be raised 
but equipped. Not only were they to be equipped but 
they were to be drilled and disciplined, to be organized 
in regiments, brigades, divisions, corps, and armies, 
and officers were to be found competent to command 
all these military organizations. The work to be done 
was of stupendous magnitude. The first of the great 
armies organized in the North was that for the defense 
of Washington, and, whatever may be said of General 
McClellan, it must be conceded that the country owes 
to him a great debt for his untiring labor in fashioning 
from the crude material with which he was supplied 
that great army afterward known as the Army of the 


Potomac. Looking back over the history of the Civil 
War, nothing in it is so wonderful as the transforma- 
tion in so short a time of the men taken from the 
fields, the shops and other civil pursuits, wholly inex- 
perienced in war, into trained soldiers, and the crea- 
tion in both North and South of armies such as were 
never before known in the history of the world. 

The most difficult task of all was not, as had been 
expected, to find the men and the arms and equipments 
for them, but to find the generals able to lead these 
great armies to victory. As in many professions, other 
than that of arms, the education acquired in the 
schools, indispensable as it may be to success, must be 
supplemented by the experience acquired in actual 
practice, and not infrequently it turns out that the 
bright man at recitations utterly fails to fulfil the ex- 
pectations raised by his success as a scholar. And so 
it was with many of the West Point generals. More- 
over, the best of the generals developed by the war 
had much to learn in the field. It is no discredit to 
them that all made some mistakes. Marshal Turenne 
once said : "When a man boasts that he has never 
made mistakes in war, he convinces me that he has not 
been long at it." The weeding out of political gener- 
als, the failure of one after another of those appointed 
to command the great armies, went on during four 
years and cost the North heavily in money and in 
lives , in the end, however, generals were found "fit 
to stand by the side of Caesar and give direction." 

Shortly after the Ball's Bluff disaster another 


event of great importance occurred. Captain Wilkes, 
commander of the San Jacinto of the United States 
Navy, had seized the Trent, a British mail steamer, 
in the Bahama channel, and forcibly taken from her 
Mason and Slidell, Confederate commissioners on their 
way to Europe. They were brought to the United 
States and imprisoned in Fort Warren, near Boston. 
There were some mitigating circumstances, but it is 
now generally conceded that the seizure was a plain 
violation of international law. It immediately stirred 
up a great ferment both in England and in America. 
It very nearly caused Great Britain to declare war 
against the Federal government, or at least to recog- 
nize the Southern Confederacy. Either course at that 
time would have been fatal to the Union cause. There 
was nothing to do but promptly return the Confeder- 
ate commissioners. This was done, and upon Secre- 
tary Seward devolved the delicate task of pacifying 
the English government and at the same time mollify- 
ing the wrath of those in the North who have never 
got beyond the idea that twisting the tail of the British 
lion is the acme of American statesmanship. It is 
needless to say that Seward accomplished his task with 
consummate diplomatic skill. 

When Congress met in December, 1861, one of its 
first acts was the appointment of a joint committee 
consisting of three members of the Senate and four of 
the House, thereafter known as the Committee on the 
Conduct of the War, of which Senator Wade of Ohio 
was made chairman. He continued to serve as such 


during the war. We are told by eminent historians 4 
that this committee 

"was for four years one of the most important agen- 
cies in the country. It assumed, and was sustained 
by Congress in assuming, a great range of prerogative. 
It became a stern and zealous censor of both the army 
and the government ; it called soldiers and statesmen 
before it, and questioned them like refractory school- 
boys. It claimed to speak for the loyal people of the 
United States, and this claim generally met with the 
sympathy and support of a majority of the people's 
representatives in Congress assembled. It was often 
hasty and unjust in its judgments, but always earnest, 
patriotic and honest ; it was assailed with furious de- 
nunciation and defended with headlong and indiscrim- 
inating eulogy ; and on the whole it must be said to 
have merited more praise than blame." 

One of the first matters investigated by the commit- 
tee was the humiliating affair at Ball's Bluff. The in- 
vestigation is a fair illustration of the difficulties un- 
der which the Federal generals labored in the early 
part of the war. The country was smarting under the 
disaster and, as is usual in such cases, a scapegoat was 
demanded and General Stone was the unfortunate vic- 
tim selected. He was suspected of having held trea- 
sonable correspondence with the enemy and, by an 
order issued from the office of the Secretary of War, 
he was arrested and imprisoned for six months in 
Fort Lafayette. No formal charges were filed, but a 

4 Nicolay and Hay: Abraham Lincoln, vol. 5, pp. 150-1. 


secret investigation was held by the Committee on the 
Conduct of the War. He was not permitted to con- 
front the witnesses against him, nor was he informed 
what testimony they had given ; in vain he demanded 
a hearing ; in vain he demanded a copy of the charges 
against him*. At last such a commotion was raised 
over the arbitrary proceedings by which he was de- 
prived of his liberty that the authorities were compelled 
to release him. No one now doubts his loyalty and it 
has since been shown that the evidence upon which he 
was imprisoned was totally unworthy of credit. The 
case stands as a striking illustration of the necessity, 
even in time of war, of jealously guarding the individ- 
ual liberty of the citizen. 5 

Before the meeting of Congress in December, 1861, 
General McClellan had gathered together the greatest 
army ever known in America. It is true that it was 
not made up of veteran soldiers, but neither was the 
Confederate army under the command of General 
Joseph E. Johnston confronting Washington. Mc- 
Clellan's troops were as well disciplined and as well 
equipped as Johnston's, and numbered twice as many. 
But McClellan's army had been in camp for five months 
and had made no advance nor any sign of an advance. 
The whole country was impatient at this delay and the 
demand in the North was loud and emphatic for a 

5 A full account of this remarkable case will be found in Blaine's 
Twenty Years of Congress, vol. I, pp. 381-395. See also Lt.-Col. 
Richard B. Irwin, article on Ball's Bluff, etc., in Battles and Lead- 
ers of the Civil War, vol. 2, p. 123. 


more vigorous prosecution of the war. One of the 
first changes made in response to this demand was the 
resignation of Simon Cameron as Secretary of War 
and the appointment of Edwin M. Stanton as his suc- 
cessor. All efforts to induce McClellan to move had 
so far proved unavailing. Even Lincoln's patience had 
been exhausted, and in an interview with Generals 
McDowell and Franklin, January 10, 1862, he said 
in his homely way that "if something was not soon 
done the bottom would be out of the whole affair ; and 
if General McClellan did not want to use the army he 
would like to borrow it, provided he could see how it 
could be made to do something." 6 

Under the constitution Lincoln, by virtue of his 
office, was commander-in-chief of the armies and na- 
vies of the United States. He was, however, totally 
destitute of military education. Appreciating his de- 
ficiencies in this respect he diligently studied books of 
strategy, pored over the reports of the department com- 
manders, familiarized himself with maps, and in every 
way sought to understand the military situation. 
The generals with whom he consulted were surprised, 
or pretended to be surprised, at his familiarity with 
technical military learning and with the acuteness of 
his suggestions. He discussed with McClellan and 
other generals not only their own plans for the advance 
to Richmond, but some which he himself had con- 
ceived. At a later date he undertook to unfold a fa- 

Swinton : Campaigns of Army of Potomac, p. 80. 


vorite plan to Grant. Grant tells us that he "listened 
respectfully." He did not tell Lincoln, but he tells 
the readers of his Memoirs, 7 why Lincoln's scheme 
was impracticable, and adds this brief and character- 
istic sentence : "I did not communicate my plans to 
the President, nor did I to the Secretary of War or to 
General Halleck." 

The chief need now of the Union cause was the want 
of a competent, responsible head with intelligence to 
direct, and power to enforce the conduct of mili- 
tary operations comformably to some general sys- 
tematic plan. After the appointment of the Commit- 
tee on the Conduct of the War and of Stanton as Sec- 
retary of War, McClellan was general-in-chief in name 
only. All his plans were subjected to the scrutiny not 
only of the President but of the Committee on the 
Conduct of the War and of Stanton, whose influence 
in military operations was now more powerful than 
that of President, committee, and general-in-chief 
combined. The difficulties incident to such divided 
responsibility and conflicting counsels were intensified 
when, on March 12, 1862, McClellan was deprived of 
authority as general-in-chief and his command was 
limited to that of the Army of the Potomac. For 
four months after that date there was no general-in- 
chief of the Federal armies and each department com- 
mander was left to work out his own plans without ref- 
erence to those of other commanders, modified only 

7 Vol. 2, p. 123. 


by such orders as came from Washington. It was 
not until July u, 1862, when General Henry W Hal- 
leck was appointed general-in-chief, that there was a 
responsible head of the Federal armies. y 

Three of the men already mentioned became very 
prominent in the Civil War — Stanton, Halleck, and 
McClellan. Stanton, the new Secretary of War, was 
a man of great intellectual strength, of sterling hon- 
esty, of boundless energy, and of vast executive 
ability. Though of Quaker descent he was a man of 
the type of Oliver Cromwell. Men of this type are 
necessary in great emergencies, but the very qualities 
that make them valuable are also apt to make them 
at times arbitrary and tyrannical. Stanton had 
been Attorney-general under President Buchanan and, 
according to McClellan, was wont, before he became 
Secretary of War, to speak of Lincoln as the "original 
gorilla," shocking McClellan by the virulence with 
which he abused the President, his administration, 
and the Republican party. But, after becoming Sec- 
retary of War, he speedily developed into the most 
radical of the Radicals. He favored the policy of 
emancipation long before the proclamation was issued 
and was one of the earliest advocates of the arming of 
the negroes. He was a man who brooked no oppo- 
sition and whose dislikes were relentless and enduring. 
He assumed toward Lincoln the attitude of a self-con- 
stituted guardian rather than that of a subordinate 
officer, and there is no doubt that he was often exas- 


perated by Lincoln's seeming irresolution and disgust- 
ed with his jests. K 

It is probable that Halleck while general-in-chief 
was little more than Stanton's scribe. The latter soon 
became hostile to McClellan and to Rosecrans. His 
injustice to Thomas before the battle of Nashville 
has never been satisfactorily explained, nor has it ever 
been forgotten by the friends of that illustrious com- 
mander In Grant Stanton at last found a general 
whose iron will and stubborn tenacity of purpose were 
superior to his own. Grant's opinion of Stanton is 
expressed without any circumlocution. He says: 9 

"Owing to his natural disposition to assume all 
power and control in all matters that he had anything 
whatever to do with, he boldly took command of the 
armies, and, while issuing no orders on the subject, 
prohibited any order from me going out of the ad- 
jutant-general's office until he had approved it. This 
was done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any 
orders that came from me to be issued from the ad- 
jutant-general's office until he had examined them and 

8 Stanton's virulent hostility to Lincoln before entering the 
cabinet and his subsequent relations to him are clearly shown by 
McClure in his chapter on Lincoln and Stanton in Lincoln and 
Men of War Times. In his Ohio in the War, vol. I, p. 1029, 
Whitelaw Reid says of Stanton : "He was, throughout Mr. Lin- 
coln's administration, all-powerful. It was with reference to 
some strong-willed action of Mr. Stanton's, in opposition to his 
own wishes, that Mr. Lincoln, in reply to a personal appeal for 
aid, made the jocose remark, so often quoted, that he (Lincoln) 
had very little influence with this administration." 

9 Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 105. 


given his approval. He never disturbed himself, 
either, in examining my orders until it was entirely 
convenient for him ; so that orders which I had pre- 
pared would often lie there three or four days before 
he would sanction them. I remonstrated against this 
in writing, and the Secretary apologetically restored 
me to my rightful position of general-in-chief of the 
army. But he soon lapsed again and took control 
much as before.'' 

And again, comparing Stanton with Lincoln, Grant 
says of the former : 10 

"Mr. Stanton never questioned his own authority 
to command, unless resisted. He cared nothing for 
the feeling of others. In fact it seemed to be pleas- 
anter to him to disappoint than to gratify. He felt no 
hesitation in assuming the functions of the executive, 
or in acting without advising with him. If his act was 
not sustained, he would change it — if he saw the mat- 
ter would be followed up until he did so." 

Throughout Grant's Memoirs it is easy to perceive 
the trouble he experienced with both Stanton and Hal- 
leck. Probably no enemy in front ever caused him so 
much annoyance as did these two Federal officials in 
the rear. During the four months, from March 12 
to Julv 11, 1862, when the Union armies were without 
a sreneral-in-chief, Stanton was virtuallv militarv die- 
tator, for his imperious will was too strong to be 
curbed bv Lincoln. Whatever his abilities in other di- 

10 Ibid., p. $&. 


rections, he did not have the military education quali- 
fying him to direct the operations of the armies in the 
field, and McClellan maintains, and with some rea- 
son, that the disasters following the Peninsular cam- 
paign were in no small part due to Stanton's ignorant 
and arbitrary interference. 

Consistently with the policy of inconsistency, which 
seemed at the time to govern the military plans of the 
Federal authorities at Washington, Halleck, who had 
demonstrated his utter incompetence to accomplish 
anything with an army of 100,000 men in his own de- 
partment, had been appointed general-in-chief of all 
the Federal armies. Only two excuses have ever been 
offered for his appointment : That General Scott fa- 
vored him as his successor, and that it was desired to 
give General Grant full command of Halleck's depart- 
ment where it was thought the latter's jealousy 
of Grant's rising fame was keeping him in the back- 
ground. Whatever were the motives for Halleck's 
appointment as general-in-chief, there is now almost 
entire unanimity respecting his unfitness for the 
place. McClellan says of him .- 11 

"Of all men whom I have encountered in high posi- 
tion, Halleck was the most hopelessly stupid. It was 
more difficult to get an idea through his head than can 
be conceived by any who never made the attempt. I 
do not think he ever had a correct military idea from 
beginning to end." 

11 McClellan' s Own Story, p. 137. 


Swinton, 12 a less prejudiced witness than McClellan, 
speaks of Halleck as "the incalculable obstruction of 
the conduct of the war, and the intolerable annoyance 
of every general commanding the Army of the Po- 
tomac." Halleck's jealousy of Grant became apparent 
at an early period. Soon after the surrender of Fort 
Donelson, Grant went to Nashville to consult with 
General Buell, whereupon Halleck sent to McClellan, 
then general-in-chief, a dispatch containing this out- 
rageous charge : 

"I have had no communication with General Grant 
for more than a week. He left his command without 
my authority and went to Nashville. His army seems 
to be as much demoralized by the victory of Fort Don- 
elson as was that of the Potomac by the defeat of Bull 
Run. It is hard to censure a successful general im- 
mediately after a victory, but I think he richly deserves 
it. I can get no returns, no reports, no information of 
any kind from him. Satisfied with his victory, he sits 
down and enjoys it without any regard to the future. 
I am worn out and tired with this neglect and ineffi- 
ciency. C. F Smith is almost the only officer equal to 
the emergency." 

Afterward, Halleck wrote Grant that his conduct 
had occasioned "very serious complaint at Washing- 
ton," and tried to make him believe that it was his own 
interference in his behalf that saved him from the dis- 
grace of an arrest. Halleck's downright duplicity in 

12 Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, p. 170. 


this affair is very clearly exposed by both Grant and 

Sherman was even more incensed than Grant 
against both Stanton and Halleck. His preliminary 
negotiations with General Joseph E. Johnston just at 
the end of the war have since been fully explained, but 
at the time, largely through the distorted construc- 
tion of them by Stanton, they excited great indignation 
in the North against Sherman, causing that great sol- 
dier much mortification. Shortly before that time 
Halleck had been appointed to the command of the De- 
partment of Virginia with headquarters at Richmond, 
and he took it on himself to send a dispatch to Stanton 
containing this extraordinary suggestion : 

"The bankers here have information to-day that Jeff 
Davis' specie is moving South from Goldsborough in 
wagons as fast as possible. I suggest that orders be 
telegraphed through General Thomas that Wilson 
obey no orders from Sherman," etc. 

Thereupon Stanton sent a dispatch to Thomas, April 
27, 1865, reciting Halleck's dispatch and adding this: 

"You were some days ago notified that the President 
disapproved Sherman's proceedings and were directed 
to disregard them. If you have .not already done so, 
you will issue immediate orders to all officers in your 
command, directing them to pay no attention to any 
orders but your own or from General Grant," etc. 13 

13 Reb. Rec, ser. No. 104, pp. 483-4. 


The insulting character of this order conveying, as 
it did, a scandalous insinuation against Sherman's loy- 
alty, will he better understood when it is remembered 
that Generals Thomas and Wilson were at that time 
subordinate officers under General Sherman, and that 
he and his victorious army, after the conspicuous ser- 
vices they had rendered the Union cause, were then 
on their way to Washington. Grant tells how Sher- 
man resented Halleck's insult: 14 

"It was during this trip that the last outrage was 
committed upon him. Halleck had been sent to Rich- 
mond to command Virginia, and had issued orders 
prohibiting even Sherman's own troops from obeying 
his, Sherman's, orders. Sherman met the papers on 
his return, containing this order of Halleck, and very 
justly felt indignant at the outrage. On his arrival 
at Fortress Monroe returning from Savannah, Sher- 
man received an invitation from Halleck to come to 
Richmond and be his guest. This he indignantly re- 
fused, and informed Halleck, furthermore, that he had 
seen his order He also stated that he was coming up 
to take command of his troops, and as he marched 
through it would probably be as well for Halleck not to 
show himself, because he (Sherman) would not be re- 
sponsible for what some rash person might do through 
indignation for the treatment he had received." 

Grant also says 15 that at the grand review in Wash- 
ington after the close of the war, Sherman "showed 

"Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 529. 
10 Ibid., p. 534- 



his resentment for the cruel and harsh treatment that 
had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him by the Secre- 
tary of War, by refusing to take his extended hand." 
At that time Halleck, at least, who had just emerged 
from a year's obscurity at Washington, had become a 
very insignificant figure in comparison with the illus- 
trious soldier who had completed a triumphant march 
through the heart of the Confederacy, and Stanton was 
no longer the military dictator that he had been for 
over three years. 

As general-in-chief Halleck conducted military op- 
erations at long range from Washington — never ap- 
pearing on a field of battle, but sending telegraph dis- 
patches and voluminous letters, planning on paper vast 
campaigns utterly impossible of execution in the field, 
and so hampering all the generals in front as to make 
it impossible for them to execute any plans of their 

Of McClellan it is safe to say that there are few at 
this day that question his loyalty, of which there was, 
during the war, a widespread suspicion. Of his mil- 
itary abilities and operations it is perhaps not possible, 
even at this day, to form a just and impartial estimate. 
There is no doubt, however, that he was constantly 
embarrassed and thwarted by the orders that he re- 
ceived from Washington and by the relentless hos- 
tility of Stanton. This is clear from the evidence 
that he himself has furnished. 16 In view of the con- 

See McClellan' s Own St 



stant interference with his plans, the wonder now is 
that he accomplished as much as he did. That he 
himself felt stung to desperation by what he believed 
to be the persecution of Stanton is indicated by his 
remarkable dispatch to the latter June 28, 1862, in 
which he said : 

"If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I 
owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Wash- 
ington. You have done your best to sacrifice this 

When McClellan took command of the troops at 
Washington immediately after the first battle of Bull 
Run, he found the city full of stragglers and round 
about it regiments camped indiscriminately here and 
there without even a brigade organization, or general 
organization of any kind ; without any systematic 
fortifications or defenses, and even without pickets on 
some of the roads leading to the capital. McClellan 
took these unorganized troops, together with the raw 
recruits that were afterward added, organized, trained, 
and disciplined them, and out of them fashioned the 
magnificent Army of the Potomac. He took that 
army again and with it won a great victory at Antie- 
tam ; he had never shown so much vigor and general- 
ship as he exhibited immediately before and during 
this battle, and at the time when he was finally re- 
moved from the command of the Army of the Potomac 
he had the unbounded confidence of all the officers and 
men under his command. 


But McClellan's great faults as a general were that 
he never ceased preparing for a forward movement, 
and that he was perpetually exaggerating the strength 
of the enemy in his front. The chief drawback, how- 
ever, to his success as a general was a delusion of 
which he was possessed that he had been predestined 
from all eternity to be a Moses and Washington com- 
bined and to go down to posterity as the savior of his 
country, his memory surrounded with a halo of glory 
and his fame forever growing more resplendent. 
Therefore he undertook not only to conduct the mili- 
tary operations entrusted to him, but to advise Lincoln 
how to discharge his duties as President. In a long 
letter to the latter, dated July 7, 1862, he said : 

"Neither confiscation of property, political execu- 
tion of persons, territorial organization of states, or 
forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated 
for a moment. Military arrests should not be 

tolerated except in places where active hostilities exist, 
and oaths not required by enactments constitutionally 
made should be neither demanded nor received. 
Military power should not be allowed to interfere with 
the relations of servitude, either by supporting or im- 
pairing the authority of the master, except for repress- 
ing disorder, as in other cases." 17 

In the same letter he assured Lincoln: "A decla- 
ration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will 
rapidly disintegrate our present armies." 

17 McClellan's Own Story, p. 497. 


Such sentiments ill suited the radical element then 
in control of the Republican party, but greatly elated 
those in the North who were denouncing the prosecu- 
tion of the war as an Abolition crusade and who were 
loudly complaining of arbitrary arrests. The radical 
leaders of the Republican party could not believe that 
a man with such sentiments as those advocated by Mc- 
Clellan was fit to lead the armies of the Union to vic- 
tory, and their conviction of his unfitness was strength- 
ened by his acceptance in 1864 of the nomination for 
President on a "Peace at any price" platform. 

It is probable, however, that future generations, un- 
influenced by the intense political prejudices that 
swayed McClellan's contemporaries, will judge him 
more leniently. The spirit of justice that, after many 
years, brought about the vindication of General Fitz- 
John Porter may be depended upon to correct, as far as 
it is possible to correct the errors of the past, whatever 
injustice may have been done to McClellan. In 
McClellan's Oxvn Story he has made a strong defense 
against many of the aspersions that at an early period 
were accepted by his political opponents as undoubted 
facts. His admirers, however, will probably never 
succeed in convincing the American people that if he 
had been given all the men and all the opportunities 
that Grant had, he would ever have accomplished what 
Grant accomplished. 

The wonder is that under such conflicting and in- 
competent management the L nion cause did not speed- 


ily fall to pieces. It did not, because military opera- 
tions in the South were conducted under still greater 
difficulties. The South, from the beginning, was in- 
ferior to the North in men, in munitions of war, and 
in material resources. It excelled the North, however, 
in its abundant yield of political generals, but this 
proved to be a constant source of weakness. More- 
over, if the generals of the North were perplexed with 
the interference of Stanton and the Committee on the 
Conduct of the War, the southern generals were still 
more harassed by the perpetual interference of Jeffer- 
son Davis, who affords a striking illustration of the 
truth of the saying that "a little learning is a danger- 
ous thing." Priding himself on being a West Point 
graduate and puffed up with exaggerated notions of 
his military acquirements, he imagined himself pro- 
foundly versed in the art of war. Acting on this as- 
sumption, he constantly thwarted the plans of all the 
Confederate generals, addling the weaker and confus- 
ing the stronger, by suggestions and advice springing 
from his conceited superiority as a military strategist. 
With the extraordinary vanity of Davis was com- 
bined an uncontrollable propensity to boast of the an- 
ticipated results of his military schemes, thus betray- 
ing to the enemy in advance plans which a careful gen- 
eral would have taken all pains to conceal. On several 
occasions the Federal generals gained the first and most 
reliable information of proposed movements of the 
Confederate armies from the boastful speeches of 
Davis as reported in the southern newspapers. It was 


in this way that Grant was advised of the purpose of 
Longstreet's advance against Burnside, and Sherman 
of Hood's proposed invasion of Tennessee. A south- 
ern historian, speaking of the withdrawal of Long- 
street's corps during the siege of Chattanooga, says : 

"This extraordinary military movement was the 
work of President Davis, who seems, indeed, to have 
had a singular fondness for erratic campaigns. His 
visits to every battle-field of the Confederacy were om- 
inous. He disturbed the plans of his generals ; his mil- 
itary conceit led him into the wildest schemes ; and so 
much did he fear that the public would not ascribe to 
him the hoped-for results of the visionary project, that 
his vanity invariably divulged it, and successes were 
foretold in public speeches with such boastful plain- 
ness, as to put the enemy on his guard and inform him 
of the general nature of the enterprise." 18 

The same author, in speaking of Davis's visit to 
Hood's army after the capture of Atlanta, says : 

"The catastrophe moved President Davis in Rich- 
mond, and mortified the vanity that had so recently 
proclaimed the security of Atlanta under the command 
of Hood. He determined to visit Hood's new lines, 
to plan with him a new campaign, to compensate for 
the loss of Atlanta, and to take every possible occasion 
to raise the hopes and confidence of the people. It is 
remarkable that the visits of the Confederate President 
to the armies were always the occasions of some far- 
fetched and empirical plan of operations, and were al- 

18 Pollard: The Lost Cause, p. 456. 


ways accompanied with vapors and boasts that 
unduly exalted the public mind. Mr. Davis never 
spoke of military matters without a certain ludicrous 
boastfulness, which he maintained to the last event of 
the war. It was not swagger or affectation ; it was the 
sincere vagary of a mind intoxicated with conceit when 
occupied with a subject where it imagined it found its 
forte, but where in fact it had least aptitude. Mr. 
Davis, as a military commander or adviser, was weak, 
fanciful to excess, and much too vain to keep his own 
counsels. As he traveled toward Hood's lines, he 
made excited speeches in South Carolina and Georgia. 
At Macon he declared that Atlanta would be recov- 
ered ; that Sherman would be brought to grief ; and 
that this Federal commander 'would meet the fate that 
befell Napoleon in the retreat from Moscow ' These 
swollen assertions, so out of character, were open ad- 
vertisements to the enemy of a new plan of opera- 
tions." 19 

If Davis had ever heard it, he evidently did not ap- 
preciate the pith of the witty saying attributed to John 
Adams who is reported to have added, after comment- 
ing on a portrait of George Washington : "And that 
old wooden-head made his fortune by keeping his 
mouth shut." 

Notwithstanding the unfavorable conditions, great 
success attended the Union cause during the first four 
months of the year 1862. At the beginning of the 
year the national capital was deemed secure. Ken- 
tucky, Missouri, Maryland, and West Virginia had 

19 Ibid., p. 581. 


been kept in the Union. On January 19 General 
Thomas defeated the Confederates in an engage- 
ment at Mill Spring, in which the Confederate Gen- 
eral Zollicoffer was killed. Cieneral Grant, aided by 
flag officer Foote and his gunboats, captured Fort 
Henry February 7 and Fort Donelson February 16, 
with over 10,000 prisoners, forty cannon, and im- 
mense stores. The day after the surrender of Fort 
Henry a permanent footing on the coast of North Car- 
olina was gained at the battle of Roanoke Island by 
General Burnside and the navy under Commodore 
Goldsborough. On March 8 General Curtis defeated 
General Price at Pea Ridge, and the next day the 
Monitor practically destroyed the Mcrrimac in Hamp- 
ton Roads. In the month of April a great battle, re- 
sulting in a Union victory, had been fought at Shiloh, 
in which General Albert Sidney Johnston, regarded as 
the greatest of Confederate generals, had lost his life, 
and in the same month Farragut captured New Or- 
leans. In some portions of nearly all the Confederate 
states the Federal land or naval forces had gained a 

The importance of these victories, coming at this 
time, can hardly be overestimated. For nearly its en- 
tire length above and below Vicksburg the Mississippi 
was now open to Federal gunboats, and the territory 
west of that river was practically cut off from the Con- 
federacy, while the possession of New Orleans was of 
vast importance in many ways to the Union cause. 
The drooping spirits of the North revived, President 


Lincoln issued a proclamation for a special Thanks- 
giving, and so clearly did events point to a speedy 
termination of the war, that, for a time, further re- 
cruiting was stopped by order of the Federal govern- 
ment, and Governor Morton was requested to cease 
purchasing arms. 20 

Before the year was half gone the northern skies 
were again overcast with the shadow of disasters that 
came thick and fast. While the western armies and 
the navy were achieving splendid victories, the great 
Army of the Potomac was resting idly in camp. The 
fall and winter of 1861 had passed and the spring of 
1862 was far advanced, and still that magnificent army 
had done nothing. The daily dispatch "A.11 quiet on 
the Potomac," at first conveying a cheering assurance 
of the safety of the national capital, now excited only 
derision, and was accepted as further proof of the in- 
efficiency of McClellan and his army. 

McClellan should have moved on February 2,2 — in- 
deed long before that time. The northern press, the 
leading members of Congress, and Stanton and Chase, 

20 This order for the discontinuance of recruiting is given in full 
in McClellan's Own Story, p. 258. It was issued from the Adju- 
tant-General's office April 3, 1862, and directed that "The recruit- 
ing service for volunteers will be discontinued in every state from 
this date," and that "The superintendents of the Volunteer Re- 
cruiting Service will disband their parties and close their offices, 
after having taken the necessary steps to carry out these orders." 
The extraordinary character of the order will be more fully ap- 
parent when it is considered that it was issued just after Mc- 
Clellan had started on his Peninsular campaign and only three 
days before the beginning of the battle of Shiloh. 


the two most influential members of the cabinet, were- 
urgently, almost furiously demanding that McClellan 
be forced to advance or be removed from command. 
Stanton was already bitterly hostile to McClellan. 
Chase was equally so, and at one of the cabinet meet- 
ings, to which McClellan had been invited for a dis- 
cussion of his plans, bluntly asked him whether he in- 
tended to move at all and, if so, when. Lincoln still 
clung to McClellan, but was continually urging him to 
advance. To all his appeals McClellan pleaded for 
more reenforcements, though it was then generally be- 
lieved, and is now known to be the fact, that McClellan 
had twice as many men as the Confederate General 
Joseph E. Johnston, who was in his front. Finally, 
after many cabinet meetings and councils of war, in- 
terviews, and consultations, the Army of the Potomac 
started March 17 on what is known as the Peninsular 
campaign. The story of it is sorrowful reading. It 
lasted about three months. In that time the Federal 
army had been in sight of Richmond. At the end of it, 
after seven days of battle, it had retreated to the river 
James, arriving at Harrison's Landing July 3 with a 
loss of over 15,000 men. McClellan laid the blame 
for his failure upon Stanton and Halleck, while they 
charged it to him. On August 3 Halleck ordered Mc- 
Clellan to abandon the Peninsula altogether and to 
withdraw his army to Acquia Creek. Against this or- 
der McClellan earnestly protested, but his protest was 
not heeded. The change of base by the Army of the 
Potomac exposed Washington to an attack by the Con- 


federate armies, and, to avert this danger, the troops 
scattered over northern Virginia, under the commands 
of Fremont, McDowell, and Banks, about 50,000 in 
all, were hastily patched together and called the Army 
of Virginia, over which General Pope, suddenly called 
from the West, was placed in command. McClellan 
was ordered to Washington and the Army oi the Po- 
tomac was for a time virtually without a commander. 
Pope, the young Lochinvar who had so unexpectedly 
come out of the West, signalized his assumption of 
command by an address characterized by Ropes as one 
of the most "extraordinary in military annals," 21 ex- 
traordinary alike for its bombast and for its tone of 
insult to the eastern soldiers over whom he had taken 
command. In this address, together with much like 
stuff, Pope said : 

"Let us understand each other. I have come to you 
from the West zvhere we have always seen the backs 
of our enemies; from an army whose business it has 
been to seek the adversary and to beat him when he 
was found , whose policy has been attack and not de- 
fense. Meantime I desire you to dismiss from 
your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to find in 
vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of taking 
strong positions and holding them — of lines of retreat 
and bases of supplies. Let us discard such ideas." 

The woeful outcome of Pope's boasts made them all 
the more ridiculous. The Army of Virginia lasted 

21 The address in full will be found in The Army Under Pope, 
P- 173- 


only about two months, long enough, however, to be 
demolished at the second battle of Bull Run. Pope 
afterward complained that the remnants of his army 
had been so scattered by McClellan that he (Pope) 
could not tell what had become of them. The Army 
of Virginia had vanished forever, and never again ap- 
peared in the list of Union armies. The fragments of 
it which escaped, together with the portions of the 
Army of the Potomac that had been sent to reenforce 
it, found their way back to Washington September 2. 
Again the Army of the Potomac was in the trenches 
about Washington, confronted by the army of Lee ; 
the cabinet was in a panic ; the North was in dread of 
invasion ; Halleck was helpless ; and Lincoln, in utter 
despair, was obliged to appeal to McClellan to save 
the national capital. 

On March 11, 1862, the departments formerly com- 
manded by Generals Halleck, Hunter and Buell were 
merged into the Department of the Mississippi in order 
to give Halleck control of all the armies that took part 
in the battle of Shiloh, and after the battle these armies 
were all consolidated into one, divided into the right 
wing, left wing, center, reserve, and cavalry, under the 
respective commands of Generals George H. Thomas. 
Don Carlos Buell, John Pope. John A. McClernand. 
and Andrew J. Smith. Halleck assumed chief com- 
mand and Grant was announced as second. By this 
contrivance Grant was made a fifth wheel and was tem- 
porarily shelved. 

Xo other Federal general in the Civil War ever had 


such an opportunity as that now afforded Halleck. 
Had Grant been in his place it is possible that the war 
might have been brought to a speedy termination; it 
is at least highly probable that its duration would have 
been greatly shortened. But, unfortunately for the 
country, Halleck was unequal to the opportunity. Al- 
though he had a great army of over 100,000 men, 
more than twice that of the Confederate army under 
Beauregard confronting him, he avoided bringing on 
a general engagement, proceeded to advance against 
Corinth, about twenty miles distant, after the old fash- 
ion of gradual approaches by parallels, and going 
along at a snail's pace arrived there May 30 to find 
that the Confederate army had safely retreated. 

For a few days the North was fed on bombastic dis- 
patches from Halleck to the effect that "General Pope 
with 40,000 men is thirty miles south of Corinth push- 
ing the enemy hard,'' and that "he already reports 
10,000 prisoners and deserters from the enemy and 
15,000 stand of arms captured." The country was 
chagrined to find a few days later that the pleasing 
story told in Halleck's dispatches was a hoax. All 
the blame, however, was laid on Pope. We know 
now, moreover, that Halleck's orders to Pope were not 
to press the Confederates so hard as to bring on a 

Halleck next proceeded to break up his army and to 
scatter over the country the various parts of which 
it had been composed, Buell being ordered to advance 
into east Tennessee. The movement which Buell was 


ordered to make, a very important one if pushed with 
energy and celerity, was neutralized by the condition 
imposed upon him that, as he marched, he should re- 
pair the Memphis and Charleston railroad. Buell 
strongly protested against frittering away precious 
time by repairing a railroad that ran parallel to the 
enemy's lines, which, when repaired, could not be de- 
pended upon as a safe line of communication, but his 
protests were overruled by Halleck. 

The Confederates had now determined to make an- 
other effort to regain Tennessee and Kentucky, and, 
while it was yet uncertain what would be the line of 
advance, it soon became apparent that the Confederate 
Army of the Tennessee intended to take the offensive. 
The forerunners of the projected Confederate advance 
Avere the forces under General John Morgan and Gen- 
eral Forrest, which soon began to play havoc with 
Buell's communications, destroying railroad bridges, 
capturing garrisons and creating widespread conster- 
nation in Kentucky. Before the middle of August it 
became apparent that Kentucky was to be invaded by 
General Kirby Smith through Cumberland Gap and 
by General Bragg, who had succeeded to the command 
of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee, marching 
north toward Louisville. 

Long before the removal of either McClellan or 
Buell, the commanders of the two great armies in the 
East and in the West, the people of the Xorth had be- 
gun to distrust both. It was suspected that they were 
lacking in the earnest devotion to the Union essential 


to the general who would lead its armies to victory. 
The great commanders who were to do this were yet 
in the background. After the surrender of Fort Don- 
elson the people of the North had begun to talk of 
"Unconditional Surrender" Grant, who was beginning 
to be famous ; but Halleck was jealous of him as were 
other generals ; he was assailed in Congress and in por- 
tions of the northern press for his conduct of the bat- 
tle of Shiloh, and his former victories had already been 
overshadowed by his repeated failures to take Vicks- 
burg. The newspapers of the North were ridiculing 
his attempts to dig a channel that would allow the pas- 
sage of vessels around Vicksburg and were bitterly 
complaining of his retention in command of his army. 

Referring to these failures of Grant, and to Sher- 
man, his most trusted subordinate, one of the coarsest 
and most reckless of the newspapers said that "the 
army was being ruined in mud-turtle expeditions un- 
der the leadership of a drunkard, whose confidential 
adviser was a lunatic." 22 

Senator Ben Wade, the bluff, honest, but impulsive 
chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the 
War, a man of powerful influence in Congress and in 
the national councils, vehemently urged the removal 
of Grant, at the same time giving the President the 
cheerful assurance that he was leading the government 
to hell, which at that minute was not a mile off. 23 

22 Reid: Ohio in the War, vol. 1, p. 385. 

23 Lincoln is said to have retorted: "That is just about the dis- 
tance between the Capitol and the White House." 


But for the strong support of Representative Elihu B. 
Washburne and the steadfast friendship of Lincoln, 
Grant probably would have been relegated during the 
remainder of the war to some obscure position in 
which it would have been impossible for him to display 
the soldierly qualities that afterward placed him in the 
front rank of the world's great commanders. 

Alexander K. McClure, an active and influential Re- 
publican politician of Pennsylvania, was one of those 
who urged upon Lincoln the removal of Grant and he 
has given us an interesting account of it. 24 He 
labored with Lincoln from u o'clock one night until 
1 o'clock the next morning. He says : 

"I pressed upon him, with all the earnestness I could 
command, the immediate removal of Grant as an im- 
perious necessity to sustain himself. As was his cus- 
tom, he said but little, only enough to make me con- 
tinue the discussion until it was exhausted. He sat 
before the open fire in the old Cabinet room, most of 
the time with his feet up on the high marble mantel, 
and exhibited unusual distress at the complicated con- 
dition of military affairs. Nearly every day brought 
some new and perplexing military complication. He 
had gone through a long winter of terrible strain with 
McClellan and the Army of the Potomac : and from 
the day that Grant started on his southern expedition 
until the battle of Shiloh he had had little else than 
jarring and confusion among his generals in the "West. 
He knew that I had no ends to serve in urging Grant's 

24 Lincoln and Men of War Times, pp. 179-80. 


removal, beyond the single desire to make him be just 
to himself, and he listened patiently. 

"I appealed to Lincoln for his own sake to remove 
Grant at once, and in giving my reasons for it I sim- 
ply voiced the admittedly overwhelming protest from 
the loyal people of the land against Grant's continuance 
in command. I could form no judgment during the 
conversation as to what effect my arguments had upon 
him beyond the fact that he was greatly distressed at 
this new complication. When I had said everything 
that could be said from my standpoint, we lapsed into 
silence. Lincoln remained silent for what seemed a 
very long time. He then gathered himself up in his 
chair and said in a tone of earnestness that I shall 
never forget: 'I can't spare this man; he fights' 
That was all he said, but I knew that it was enough, 
and that Grant was safe in Lincoln's hands against his 
countless host of enemies." 

Sherman had ventured to predict that it would re- 
quire an army of 200,000 to put down the Rebellion 
in the Mississippi Valley, but people thought he was 

The situation in Kentucky was alarming and boded 
ill for Indiana. Beriah Magoffin was still governor of 
that state and it was well known that he would gladly 
throw open the gates of Kentucky to the Confederate 
armies, and that he would rejoice to see them cross the 
Ohio and carry war and desolation into the states north 
of it. In Indiana the situation was critical. Lincoln 
had received of the total vote cast by the state 139,033, 
Douglas 115,509, Breckinridge 12,295, an d Bell 5,306. 
Many had voted for Douglas because he was regarded 


as the regular nominee of the party, but their sympa- 
thies were with Breckinridge and his political doc- 
trines. The great body of Douglas Democrats, how- 
ever, following the example of their distinguished and 
patriotic leader, remained loyal to the Union cause 
and were thereafter known as War Democrats. Many 
of them enlisted in the Union armies and in 1862 were 
at the front. But of the Democrats that remained at 
home, a number of influential leaders were bitterly hos- 
tile to the administration and to the further prosecu- 
tion of the war, and they had a large following. At 
a great mass meeting held at Indianapolis January 8, 
1862, Thomas A. Hendricks openly advocated the idea 
of a northwestern Confederacy which should cut loose 
from New England and ally itself with the South. 
He said : 

"The first and highest interest of the Northwest is 
in the restoration and preservation of the Union upon 
the basis of the constitution, and the deep devotion of 
her Democracy to the cause of the Union is shown by 
its fidelity in the past, but if the failure and folly and 
wickedness of the party in power render a Union 
impossible, then the mighty Northwest must take 
care of herself and her own interests. She must 
not allow the arts and finesse of New England to 
despoil her of her richest commerce and trade by a 
sectional and selfish policy — eastern lust of power, 
commerce and gain." 25 

!5 Foulke's Life of Morton, vol. 1, p. 176. 


It is pleasant to contrast with this the report of the 
proceedings of the Union convention held at Indiana- 
polis June 1 8, 1862. One of the speakers was Martin 
M. Ray, a well-known Democrat. In the course of a 
patriotic address, he said : 

"Yes, war could have been avoided by a cowardly 
surrender of the government to rebel arms. What 
difference does it make whether it costs one or four 
millions per day to save the government, since it must 
be saved at any price? We will prosecute 

the war to re-establish the supremacy of the Federal 
constitution under Mr. Crittenden's resolution at the 
extra session of Congress, and, if slavery must perish 
in the conflict, let it perish." 

The Confederate plan was that General Bragg 
should invade Kentucky, march on Louisville, destroy 
Buell's communications, and force his army back to 
the Ohio river. This meant that the invasion of Ken- 
tucky, if successful, would be speedily followed by the 
invasion of Indiana and Ohio. Indiana had gained 
some idea of what was involved in an invasion by a 
hostile army, when in July a band of Confederates 
crossed the Ohio and sacked the town of Newburg, 
situated on the river a few miles below Evansville. 

The loyal citizens of Kentucky were appealing to 
Governor Morton for aid. The people of Indiana were 
apprehensive for their own homes. Not a moment was 
to be lost. The President had called for 300,000 more 
volunteers. The emergency was pressing. The diffi- 
culty of raising the troops required, and the greater 


difficulty of equipping them, were apparently insur- 
mountable. But nothing daunted Morton. He at 
once began the work. On July 12th he addressed a 
great war meeting at Indianapolis, and all over the 
state similar meetings were held. Volunteers came 
forward faster than they could be mustered into serv- 
ice ; a new mustering officer was called and all the en- 
ergies of the state government were taxed to the ut- 
most. The result is briefly told in some of Morton's 
telegrams as given by Foulke : 28 

"Aug. 26. The Seventy-ninth leaves Tuesday ; will 
hurry others. Indiana has put 14,480 men in Ken- 
tucky up to Friday last; this will make it 19,296 by 
Thursday this week. This includes two batteries." 

"Aug. 2.7. Another regiment can leave to-morrow, 
one leaves this evening." 

"Aug. 30. The Eighty-ninth leaves this afternoon. 
The Eighty-first and Eighty-second will be armed to- 
day. Two regiments will start to-morrow, and five 
more will be ready next week." 

"Aug. 31. The Eighty-eighth is at the depot. The 
Eighty-seventh will be in Louisville to-morrow morn- 
ing. Two regiments leave to-day and two more to- 

Since my return from the three-months' service I 
had been in the law office of my stepfather But there 
was little law business and my heart was not in it. 
Inter anna leges silent. On August 14 my stepfather 
and I closed our law office and again enlisted, this time 

"''Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 187. 


"for three years or during the war, unless sooner dis- 
charged." The company in which we enlisted started 
in a few days for Indianapolis, where it became Co. 
I of the 79th Indiana. I was commissioned first 
lieutenant of the company, my stepfather, lieut.-colonel 
of the regiment, and Frederick Knefler, colonel. 

My company was recruited chiefly from Johnson 
county and the adjoining county of Brown and was 
composed in large part of men who had come from 
the farm ; probably twenty-five were from Franklin 
and smaller towns ; a few were college students, school 
teachers, and professional men.. Most of the company 
were twenty-one years old or younger and only a few 
of them were married. We were mustered into service 
August 26, and on the 27th six companies, under com- 
mand of Lieut. -Colonel Oyler, left for Louisville, fol- 
lowed September 2 by Colonel Knefler and the remain- 
ing four companies. 

The 79th Indiana, though its losses were not so 
great as those of many other regiments in the Civil 
War, nevertheless gained an honorable record. It 
was in reserve at the battles of Perryville and Frank- 
lin and took an active part in the battles of Stone's 
River, Chickamauga, Missionary Ridge and Nashville, 
and participated in the various battles of the Atlanta 
campaign and in numerous skirmishes in east Tennes- 
see in the winter of 1863. Its total losses, as given in 
Fox's Regimental Losses, were 53 killed and died of 
wounds, and 149 died of disease, in prison, etc. It 
went into the battle. of Stone's River with only 341 


men and lost 121 killed, wounded, and captured. At 
Chickamauga it participated in the charge and capture 
of a Confederate battery, and it was in the first line 
of Wood's division in the storming of Missionary 

I commanded the company in all the battles in which 
the regiment was engaged until June 23, 1864, when 
I was severely wounded at Kenesaw Mountain, on ac- 
count of which I was honorably discharged November 
10, 1864. While in the three-years' service I never 
had a furlough, never was absent from duty, and never 
was in a hospital until after I was wounded. 



In the general histories of the Civil War, and in the 
histories of great campaigns and battles, we get much 
information about noted generals, military strategy, 
and tactical maneuvers, but we gain a very imperfect 
idea of a soldier's daily life. Some phases of it, as 
seen in camp, on the march, and in battle, deserve fuller 
attention before going further in this narrative. 

When it was expected that a regiment would remain 
in one locality for a considerable period, camp was reg- 
ularly laid out according to prescribed military regula- 
tions, with narrow lanes, on each side of which were 
the tents of the enlisted men. At the head of each 
lane were the tents of the line officers, the captains and 
lieutenants, and in rear of them were those of the regi- 
mental officers. In the first year of the war, tents in 
the shape of a letter A were furnished for the enlisted 
men, and wall tents for the line officers. The former 
were secured by ropes fastened to pegs driven into the 
ground. Small trenches were dug around them to keep 
out the water in rainy weather. If boards could be 
found they were floored ; otherwise beds were made on 
the ground. There was no way of heating them and in 




cold weather the fire was made in front, the men sleep- 
ing with their feet to the fire. The tents of the officers 
were provided with flies which were erected in the rear 
and were generally used as a sort of kitchen in which 
the officers ate their meals. The tents of the regi- 
mental officers were similar to those of the line officers 
but were larger and better. 

The enlisted men's tents were found to require too 
many wagons to haul them and, in 1862, what were 
familiarly known in the western army as "dog-tents" 
were introduced, the 79th getting its first supply while 
in camp at Murfreesboro. Each man was furnished 
with a piece of canvas about five and one-half feet 
square with buttons and button-holes so placed that 
three pieces could be buttoned together, two of them 
making the sides and one the back of the tent. They 
were held in place by being stretched over a ridge pole 
laid on top of two forked stakes, and fastened at the 
bottom with wooden pins. In an emergency two mus- 
kets with fixed bayonets, stuck in the ground, served 
for temporary stakes. When so put together these 
pieces of canvas made what were at once nicknamed 
"dog-tents." As they were not more than four feet 
high, a man could not stand in them nor could he sit 
in them with much comfort. But when lumber suffi- 
cient could be found, and the regiment was in camp 
long enough, sides and rear walls were constructed 
of boards or logs and the dog-tent was used as a roof. 
Then the structure was dignified by the title "shebang," 
and bunks were made similar in size and shape to 


those in the state-rooms of vessels. Regiments which 
were fortunate enough to remain in winter quarters 
and to have access to timber, constructed miniature 
log houses, eight or ten feet square, in shape much 
like those of the early western pioneers, having stick 
chimneys — the interstices between the logs being 
filled with clay. These were palatial structures com- 
pared with the dog-tents. The 79th built them several 
times while in east Tennessee, but invariably, as soon as 
completed, the regiment was ordered to march and was 
obliged to abandon them. Into these contracted quar- 
ters five or six men could manage to stow themselves 
and all their baggage, arms, and cooking utensils and 
to live in them with a reasonable degree of comfort, 
incredible as this may seem to people in good circum- 
stances who now want houses of eight or ten or more 
rooms, and think they can not live comfortably with 

The daily routine of camp life began with the sound- 
ing of the reveille. Then the men rose, dressed, and 
responded to company roll-call, at which the names of 
those assigned from the company for police, camp 
guard, picket, or other special duty were announced. 
Next came the drawing of rations, which were obtained 
from the regimental commissary sergeant by the 
company orderly sergeants and distributed by them to 
the men. When it was possible to furnish full sup- 
plies, they were generally abundant and good, consist- 
ing usually of side-meat, always in the army called 
"sow-belly," crackers, always called "hardtack," coffee, 


and sugar. To these were sometimes added beans, 
potatoes, and a vile compound known as "desiccated 
vegetables." But such princely provisions were rarely 
distributed unless the regiment remained in camp for 
a considerable time and there was easy communication 
with the base of supplies. 

Cooking in camp was sometimes done by a company 
cook, but usually the men were divided into messes of 
six or eight, and the labor of getting wood and water 
and preparing the meals was apportioned among them 
as they might agree. Occasionally a company officer 
messed with some of the men, but usually, when in 
camp, two or three officers united and employed a 
colored man to do the cooking. Those who could af- 
ford to pay the prices, which were usually very high, 
could at times buy of regimental sutlers canned 
peaches, jellies, and a few other delicacies. Boxes of 
dainties were sometimes sent from home and were gen- 
erously shared by the recipients with their comrades. 
When the country people were allowed to approach 
the picket stations, these became trading posts for the 
purchase or exchange of pies, cakes, and other eata- 
bles. One day while on picket duty near McMinnville, 
Tennessee, I purchased of a very long and gaunt coun- 
try woman a mince pie. I had not tasted one since I 
left home and could hardly await my return to camp 
in anticipation of the feast to which I had invited some 
of my comrades. I was not more amazed when a boy, 
reading for the first time in the old nursery rhyme the 
wonderful story of the "four and twenty blackbirds 


baked in a pie" which, when the pie was opened, at 
once began to sing, than I was when I opened the pie 
I had bought and discovered that its sole contents were 
two pieces of fat pork from which the woman had not 
even removed the bristles. My disgust at finding my- 
self such a victim of misplaced confidence was not 
relieved by the merriment and the sallies of my com- 
rades, who seemed to relish the joke more than they 
would have enjoyed a good mince pie. 

It is needless to say that cooking in the army was 
not done according to the rules prescribed in approved 
cook books. Cooking utensils were scarce; the mess 
that had a camp kettle, a coffee-pot, a frying-pan, and 
a few tin plates and cups, was well provided. Occa- 
sionally we procured at some country house an old- 
fashioned "Dutch oven" — a large iron skillet with a 
lid — and the services of a "contraband" who knew 
how to bake beans and corn pone, and then we enjoyed 
a feast that could not be surpassed. 

We fared best in summer when young corn and 
berries were in season. No soldier that was in the 
vicinity of Pikeville, Tennessee, in the summer of 
1863, will ever forget the delicious roasting ears and 
blackberry cobblers with which the memory of the 
place will always be associated. The recipe for making 
a blackberry cobbler was very simple. The six or 
eight men in a mess put all their blackberries, all their 
crackers, and all their sugar into a camp kettle, filled 
it with water, and let it come to a boil, then stirred 


the contents with a bayonet or stick, and it was ready 
to serve. I do not recall that any of it was ever left. 

Drills and inspections occurred with more or less 
frequency, as the necessity for them required. Usually 
there was a company drill in the forenoon and a regi- 
mental drill in the afternoon. In the intervals between 
drills and inspections the men were required to put 
their arms and quarters in good condition. The chief 
military display during the day was the dress parade. 
This took place a little before sundown. The whole 
regiment was formed in line ; the buglers, or the regi- 
mental band, if there was one, marched up and down 
in front of the regiment playing a lively tune, generally 
"The girl I left behind me." Then the adjutant gave 
the order, "Present arms" ; the colonel or command- 
ing officer of the regiment acknowledged the salute 
and perhaps put the regiment through a brief exercise 
in the manual of arms , orders intended for the regi- 
ment, if there were any, were read; and then the regi- 
ment was dismissed and the companies marched back 
to their respective quarters. 

After supper the men spent the time as they pleased, 
writing letters, playing cards, or telling stories, until 
tattoo was sounded, when they were required to go to 
their quarters and attend evening roll-call. The last 
bugle call was taps or "lights-out," after which every 
one, unless assigned to some special night duty, was 
expected to be in bed. Then the soldier lay down to 
sleep — "to sleep! perchance to dream" of his home in 
the far distant North, to dream that he was again 



one of the cheery circle gathered about the family fire- 
side, or that he was again clasping in his arms the 
fond wife and the prattling children he had left , to 
awake in the morning and find that it was all a dream 
and that he was far away from the home and the loved 
ones that he might never see again. 

All did not sleep. The camp guards, under the com- 
mand of an officer detailed as officer of the day, were 
stationed near the camp and divided into three reliefs, 
serving alternately four hours at a time, and these 
walked the beats assigned them and allowed none to 
pass without halting and giving the countersign over 
the point of a bayonet. 

It was on the vigilance of the pickets, however, that 
the security of the army at night depended, especially 
when the enemy was in the near vicinity. They were 
posted far enough from camp to give timely warning 
in case of a sudden attack. They also were divided 
into three reliefs, each relief serving four hours at a 
time. Sometimes the picket walked over a beat vary- 
ing in length, but if in close proximity to the enemy 
he was usually stationed by a tree or in some spot 
which would serve at once to conceal him from the 
view, and to shelter him from the bullets, of the enemy. 
However tired, he was not permitted to sleep. Next 
to desertion, the greatest offense of which a soldier 
could be guilty was that of sleeping on his post. No 
matter how cold it might be, no matter how pitiless the 
blast, no matter if the rain came down in torrents, he 
must stand at his post until relieved. To stand alone 


anywhere for four hours on a dark night, in a lonely 
spot, would try the nerves of most men, but to stand 
there in momentary expectation of being fired on by an 
enemy known to be near by is an experience the full 
meaning of which none but soldiers can appreciate. 
On one occasion in the three-years' service, when I 
was acting as officer of the day and had command of 
a picket station, I narrowly escaped being shot. I did 
not hear the first challenge and a frightened picket 
aimed at me, but his gun snapped. Fortunately, before 
he could aim again, I succeeded in making myself 
known to him. 

Pay-day was of course an important day in the army. 
In anticipation of it the muster-rolls were prepared, 
showing the amount due to each man, and when the 
paymaster arrived the money was speedily distributed. 
Most of it was sent home by the men for the use of 
their families, or to be invested or kept until their re- 
turn. It was usually sent by some one going North 
on furlough, or by some visitor or sutler ; but after 
the first year's service much of it was sent by what 
was known as the "allotment roll" plan. During the 
last year that I was in the service there was little op- 
portunity to spend money, if I had had ever so much, 
for we were on the march most of the time, sutlers 
were scarce, and there was little to buy in the country 
through which we passed , so I invested most of my 
pay in government 5-20 bonds, which proved to be a 
very good investment, for with the proceeds of them 


I paid my way through the Albany Law School and 
had enough left to buy a very good law library. 

The first pay I received in the three-years' service 
was in government paper money. I do not remember 
ever having seen a piece of gold or silver after leaving 
Louisville in the fall of 1862. The small scrip, the 
ten and twenty-five and fifty cent bills issued by the 
government, were looked on with suspicion, and it 
was difficult to pass them among the people of the 
South with whom I came in contact. Long before the 
close of the war they refused to receive Confederate 
bills at almost any discount, but I never knew a "green- 
back" to be refused. This was a silent but significant 
proof of the belief of the great mass of the southern 
people, at least in the regions through which I trav- 
eled, that the North, if it did not succeed in the contest 
of arms, would at least redeem its financial obligations. 
The great medium of exchange was coffee. A grain 
of coffee was next in value to a grain of gold, and the 
soldiers could exchange coffee for almost everything 
that the people of the South had to sell. 

Next to the arrival of the paymaster, the event most 
eagerly anticipated was the arrival of the mail. When 
in camp for a considerable time the mails came with 
something like regularity. Occasionally some one who 
had been home on furlough returned, bringing letters 
and papers. The letters were, of course, read with the 
most eager interest, for they brought news directly 
from home and from those nearest and dearest to the 
soldier. After the letters the papers were read and 


passed around. The local papers were of greatest in- 
terest to those from the town or county where they 
were published, and usually contained letters from sol- 
diers in the various regiments having representatives 
from the place. Of the newspapers most highly appre- 
ciated in the Army of the Cumberland, composed 
largely of troops from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, the 
Cincinnati Gazette and the Cincinnati Commercial 
were the most popular. Whitelaw Reid, now editor 
of the New York Tribune, was one of the war corre- 
spondents of the Gazette. He wrote under the nom de 
plume "Agate." I had seen him in the three-months' 
campaign in West Virginia, a young, handsome, dar- 
ing-looking man. He was one of the best, if not the 
best, of the war correspondents during the Civil War. 
"Mack" (J. B. McCullagh), the correspondent of the 
Commercial, was also a popular writer. 

This leads me to say something of reading in the 
army. I do not recall that Hamerton in his delightful 
book on Intellectual Life says anything of the cultiva- 
tion of literary tastes in the army Certainly the facili- 
ties for literary studies were not numerous ; still, some 
books, generally novels, were obtainable. I read the 
IVandering Jczv while in the hospital on Lookout 
Mountain, and I account for the deep impression it 
made on the theory that I was so thirsty for something 
to read that I absorbed every word of it. I have often 
thought of Lowell's remark about books "suitable to 
a desolate island," in connection with a copy of Blair's 


Rhetoric which I picked up in the road. It had prob- 
ably been pillaged from some farm house and thrown 
away. A great many people nowadays have never 
heard of Blair's Rhetoric. A few old and wrinkled 
pedagogues may remember it, but it is safe to say 
that no one at this day could be coaxed into reading 
it for amusement. I had not seen a book or even a 
newspaper for weeks, and I positively affirm that I 
took the book with me on picket and read it entirely 
through with absorbing interest, just as a starving man 
would devour a dry crust. 

One of the prominent characters of camp life was 
the army sutler. He took a great many risks and was 
obliged to charge high prices. I doubt if many sut- 
lers in the Army of the Cumberland made a fortune. 
The sutler carried in stock some clothing, combs and 
brushes, playing cards, some canned goods, and a gen- 
eral but small assortment of such articles as the soldiers 
would be likely to need most. Sometimes he kept 
wines and liquors, but the regulations were generally 
such as made it difficult for the enlisted men to pur- 
chase intoxicants. 

It must not be supposed that the soldier's life in 
camp was an endless monotony of work and drill. 
When not on duty the men amused themselves in pitch- 
ing quoits, playing ball or cards, in reading, in visit- 
ing their friends and acquaintances in other regiments, 
and in various other ways. There was considerable 
gambling in the army, but not a great deal in the regi- 
ment to which I belonged. There was also considera- 


ble drunkenness, but it prevailed to a greater extent, 
in proportion to the numbers, among the officers than 
among the men, because it was much more difficult for 
the latter to procure liquor. The "canteen," so much 
discussed in connection with the Spanish and Philip- 
pine wars, was unknown in the Civil War. 

The hospital service in the army was as good as 
could have been expected under the circumstances, es- 
pecially in the general hospitals such as those at Nash- 
ville, Louisville, and Washington. But even in these 
the accommodations for the sick and wounded would 
have been totally inadequate without the aid of the 
loyal people, and especially the loyal women, in the 
North. In nearly every town and village in the North 
there were local organizations of the Sanitary Commis- 
sion or the Christian Commission, in which noble 
women met and prepared bedclothing and bandages 
for the sick and wounded and such delicacies as would 
tempt their appetites and forwarded them to the hos- 
pitals. Moreover, great numbers of patriotic women 
volunteered their services as nurses, soothing with 
woman's gentle touch and cheering with woman's gen- 
tle presence the suffering soldier lying helpless on his 
cot. I have before me a little pamphlet written by one 
of these nurses, Mrs. Francena Howe Brock, of Low- 
ell, Mass., recounting her three-months' experience in 
the Campbell Hospital at Washington. She says : 

"The heroic attempts of women to supplement the 
supplies of the government and afford kindly help to 
the sick and wounded, through the Christian and Sani- 


tary Commissions, will ever stand out in history as 
one of the brightest pages of our Civil War. 

"Their gifts were poured out with lavish generosity, 
and their services in the front were given with un- 
selfish heroism. 

"On many a hospital bed, the fever-scorched patient 
had on the clean, white garment, made by the loyal 
women of the North, while on the beds of the conva- 
lescents, quilts covered with mottoes and texts of Scrip- 
ture gave comfort and words of cheer." 

Every soldier will endorse the truth of this state- 
ment. Nor should we forget the noble work of the 
Catholic Sisters of Mercy. In nearly every hospital 
their sweet faces were seen as they moved quietly 
about, ministering with equal fidelity to those of their 
own or of another faith. But in the field hospitals 
the facilities for taking care of the sick were limited, 
and a rugged constitution was the main dependence 
upon which the patients could rely for recovery. 

Two diseases that at home rarely leave permanent 
bad results were, from the impossibility of proper 
diet and treatment, productive of dangerous conse- 
quences in the army. One was diarrhea which, when 
it assumed a chronic form, as it frequently did, was 
almost as fatal and became as much dreaded as con- 
sumption. The other was measles, a simple disease 
under proper medical treatment, but one which in the 
army often left the victim with impaired eyesight or 
other permanent disability. Another disease, common 
in the army, was nostalgia or home-sickness. There 
it assumed a well-defined form and undoubtedly caused 


or greatly aggravated other diseases. Malingering, or 
the feigning of disease in order to shirk duty or to 
avoid danger, is common in all armies, and in the 
British army is severely punished. It was undoubtedly 
largely practised in the Federal and Confederate 

In noting the features of life in camp, the "contra- 
bands" must not be forgotten. This was the term al- 
ways applied to the negroes. Some came from the 
North but most of them were picked up in the South. 
They were generally employed as cooks and servants 
for the officers. In a subsequent chapter, 1 the employ- 
ment of negroes as soldiers will be considered. 

Life in camp and life on the march were quite dif- 
ferent. Generally the order to break camp and prepare 
to march came very unexpectedly to the line officers 
and enlisted men and 'there was not much time for 
preparation. If it came in the night it was usually to 
prepare to inarch the next morning at daybreak. 
Sometimes the order came to break camp and prepare 
to march at once, and it was astonishing how soon a 
regiment could pack up and get into line ready to 

If it was expected merely to go on some short expe- 
dition and to return to the same camp the tents were 
left standing in charge of a guard, and the men carried 
with them only such baggage as was indispensable. 
But when it was not expected to return to the same 

1 Chap. X. 


camp the preparations involved the abandonment of 
everything that could not be taken. The officers' va- 
lises, company kettles, extra ammunition, and what- 
ever could be so disposed of were put into wagons. 
When the 79th started on its first march each company 
had a wagon ; as the war progressed only one wagon 
was allotted to a regiment and into this was put every- 
thing that was to be hauled. Those who were too 
sick to march were sent to the hospital or put into 

The soldier on the march carried his arms and am- 
munition. These consisted of musket and bayonet, a 
belt to which was attached a leather ammunition-box, 
containing generally forty-two rounds of cartridges, 
and a leather scabbard holding his bayonet. His pro- 
visions were carried in a canvas or oil-cloth haversack 
suspended over his shoulder by* straps; in like manner 
he carried a canteen holding about three pints of water. 
Each soldier was provided with a piece of oil-cloth, a 
blanket, and, later on, a piece of dog-tent. Generally 
these were all rolled together and the ends tied, mak- 
ing a roll in the shape of a horse collar, and this was 
thrown over the neck in such a way as to be carried 
on one side. Into their knapsacks the men crowded 
all they felt able or inclined to carry. Those of new 
recruits were always stuffed with enough to start a 
small store, but soldiers speedily learned that they 
could do without much which, at first, had been 
thought indispensable, and the contents of a veteran's 
knapsack were usually very scanty — a change of un- 


derclothing, a house-wife with some pins, needles, and 
buttons, a small supply of writing-paper and a photo- 
graph or two, being about all that he carried. 

In -the last two years of the three-years' service, the 
line officers on the march fared little better than the 
men. Every captain was obliged to carry his own oil- 
cloth, blanket, piece of dog-tent, haversack, and can- 
teen, and also his own knapsack if he wished to take 
any extras. 

When everything was in readiness to move the bugle 
sounded the assembly and the regiment took its place 
in the column. In a long column consisting of several 
divisions, it was very much easier to march in front, 
and for this reason, on a march of several days' dura- 
tion, the regiment at the head of the column dropped 
the next day to the rear. There are few more pictur- 
esque sights than a considerable body of troops — a 
corps or a division — on the march over a good road 
on a clear day. Stretched along the road you see a 
moving column, with waving banners and gleaming 
guns, the general and regimental officers in brilliant 
uniforms mounted on spirited steeds, the artillery roll- 
ing along, cavalrymen occasionally dashing by — all 
indicative of the strength and grandeur of the death- 
dealing powers of an army when loosed in battle. 

The men always marched in columns of fours and 
no attempt was made to step in unison, but all speedily 
adopted what was known as the route step. The dis- 
tance traveled was usually fifteen to twenty miles a 
day, according to the weather and the roads, but much 


longer distances were covered on forced marches. The 
weather and the condition of the roads determined the 
character of the march, not only as to distance traveled, 
but as to the comfort of the men. When the weather 
was fine and the roads were good the men enjoyed 
the march. But nearly all our marching in east Ten- 
nessee in the winter of 1863 was done in cold, rainy 
weather and over miserable roads. To march all day 
in the rain over a muddy road and then to pass the 
night on the damp ground was not a pleasant experi- 
ence. More than once I laid two rails together so as 
to make a sort of trough, elevating one end of the 
trough in order to keep it off the ground, and slept 
in it all night with my oil-cloth over me and my hat 
over my face to protect me from a drizzling rain. 

One of the most common incidents of a march over 
a muddy road was the stalling of a baggage or an am- 
munition wagon. On such occasions the drivers were 
apt to indulge in profanity. Indeed, it was commonly 
believed that in a very bad case an expert swearer was 
absolutely indispensable to start an obstinate team of 
mules. There was one man in the 79th who was sent 
for by all the drivers in the brigade when all other 
attempts to get a wagon out of a mud-hole had failed. 
This man would at once take the lines, crack his whip, 
and fire off a volley of profane expletives sufficient to 
make one's hair stand on end and to scare any mule 
ever hitched to an army wagon. I advance no scien- 
tific theory on the subject, but simply record the fact 


that he always succeeded in starting the mules and get- 
ting the wagon out of the hole. 

The monotony of a long march was relieved in vari- 
ous ways. New scenery was opening at every step. 
No house was passed that did not excite some com- 
ment, no rustic appeared by the roadside that was not 
plied with questions or jocularly, though not unkindly, 
bantered. Often a song was started and taken up, 
company by company, until the whole regiment joined 
in it. The 79th picked up near Louisville a ven- 
erable contraband familiarly known as "Uncle John." 
If he had any other name I have forgotten it. He re- 
mained with the regiment until its return, was elected 
an honorary member of the reunion organization, and 
died in Indianapolis. He had a great repertory of old 
plantation songs, one of them ending with this refrain 

"God'y he delivered Daniel, Daniel, Daniel. 
God'y he delivered Daniel, 
Why not deliver me." 

I do not remember the rest of the song, but I recall 
that often when we were on the march, and so fagged 
that we could hardly drag one foot after the other, 
some one would start the song and it would be taken 
up by companies and regiments until the whole brigade 
was singing it, and we would forget that we were tired. 
Foraging by individual soldiers on the march was 
strictly prohibited, but the prohibition was construed 
with more or less leniency, according to the disposi- 
tion of the commanding officers, and there were usually 


some opportunities on the march for the men to replen- 
ish their scanty supply of provisions. Guards were 
generally stationed at the farmhouses along the line 
of march, but a friendly guard over a smoke-house 
rarely observed his comrades in the rear of it dexter- 
ously poking the shoulders and jowls off the hooks 
with their bayonets. The temptation to pick up a stray 
turkey or chicken was one too strong to be resisted 
by the most conscientious soldier. Moreover, the law 
of self-defense received a very liberal construction in 
the army; it was universally allowed to be lawful to 
kill a hog or a sheep that manifested a disposition to 
bite, and, strange to say, all the hogs and sheep in the 
South exhibited such a belligerent disposition. 

The cavalrymen and the artillerymen always had 
the advantage of the infantrymen in foraging. When, 
as often happened, nothing to eat could be picked up 
on the line of march, the soldier was reduced to the 
supplies in his haversack. It did not take long for 
him to cook a meal. There were no tedious courses. 
A pot of coffee was soon boiled, and a piece of side- 
meat, stuck on the end of a ramrod and held over the 
coals, was soon broiled. I never relished the most 
sumptuous banquet as I did the cup of coffee, the slice 
of side-meat and the piece of cracker that I used to 
eat on the march. 

The stragglers were familiar figures on the march. 
Some were not strong enough to keep up, especially 
on a hard march, but most of them were men that pur- 
posely lagged behind to do a little foraging on their 


own account or for plunder. They were not all skulk- 
ers, but the skulkers were always among the stragglers 
if a battle was imminent. Straggling prevailed in all 
the armies. Federal and Confederate, but more in some 
regiments than in others. There was comparatively 
little in regiments whose officers enforced attendance 
at roll-call and other regulations designed to prevent it. 
Care was usually taken to stop the day's march at 
some spot convenient to water and wood. Sometimes 
the commanding officers were so considerate as to halt 
the troops near a rail fence and then the command to 
stack arms and break ranks was hardly repeated be- 
fore the entire fence around a twenty-acre field had 
disappeared as if by magic and almost in an instant 
thousands of camp-fires were brightly burning. Then 
was heard the sound, so familiar to all old soldiers, of 
pounding coffee. The coffee issued to the soldiers in 
the Army of the Cumberland was browned but not 
ground, and coffee-mills were unknown. So the coffee 
was put into tin cups, placed on a smooth stump or 
stone, and beaten with the butt end of a bayonet, as a 
druggist pulverizes drugs in a mortar Supper being 
ready it was speedily dispatched and then the soldiers 
gathered about the camp-fires. These were the real 
camp-fires. The incidents of the day were recalled ; 
f( inner battles and skirmishes were discussed ; story 
after story went round , sometimes a song was started 
in which all joined ; and thus the tired soldiers tried 
to forget the hardships of the past and the dangers of 
the future. Is it cause fur wonder that the friendships 


formed about these camp-fires knit together more 
strongly than iron bands those who have survived? 

The 79th Ind. was many times under fire and took 
an active part in several memorable battles, and it so 
happened that I participated in three of the most noted 
— Stone's River, Chickamauga, and Missionary Ridge. 
I have attempted a general description of them in the 
following pages and many such descriptions have al- 
ready been written, but I doubt whether, from these, 
a reader that never saw a battle would get a very dis- 
tinct idea of how it appeared to those engaged. It 
may not be amiss, therefore, to attempt a more specific 

No two battles of the Civil War were alike, yet there 
were many features common to all. Various circum- 
stances combined to determine just when and where a 
general engagement should be brought on by one or 
the other of the opposing forces, and which should 
take the initiative. 

In nearly all the battles that I witnessed it was im- 
possible to see the greater part of either of the oppos- 
ing armies from one point. At Stone's River the 
greatest number of the Confederates that I could see 
at any time were those in Breckinridge's division on 
Friday afternoon ; at Chickamauga the greatest num- 
ber I saw together were the forces of Longstreet as 
they came up toward Snodgrass Hill ; at the storming 
of Missionary Ridge, however, I could see all the Fed- 
eral troops that participated in the assault. During 
the Atlanta campaign, the whole country in which it 


was conducted was covered with such a heavy growth 
of timber and underbrush that, from any particular 
point in the lines, only a small portion of either army 
could be seen. 

Usually for some days before a great battle there 
was considerable maneuvering for position, always 
conducted in such a way as to secure the most available 
positions for attack or defense, and, on the part of the 
attacking army, to deceive the enemy concerning the 
point where it was intended to strike the hardest blow. 
The duty of "developing the enemy," as it was called, 
fell chiefly upon the cavalry, but sometimes a recon- 
naissance in force was made by advancing considerable 
bodies of infantry until the position of the main body 
of the enemy could be ascertained. The character of 
the ground, and the disposition of troops during the 
night often made it difficult or impossible to ascertain 
the exact position of the enemy, or to determine when 
and where the first attack would be made. A striking 
illustration of this was seen in the battle of Chicka- 
mauga, each army on Friday night having been ig- 
norant of the precise location of the other. 

It would seem hardly possible for an army to be 
surprised by an attack from an enemy known to be in 
the vicinity, yet such surprises sometimes occurred, 
as at Shiloh and at Stone's River. In each case the 
surprise very nearly resulted in the total rout of the 
Federal army. Night attacks were rare because in the 
dark there was so much danger that the attacking 


party would fire on troops of its own side or be fired 
on by them. 

No troops will stand a flanking fire and, when ex- 
posed thereto, they must retreat or speedily change 
front. This is very apt to throw them into confusion, 
as it is difficult to make new formations under the gall- 
ing fire of an advancing enemy ; therefore it is the ob- 
ject of every general to post and maneuver his troops 
in such a way, if possible, as to turn the right or the 
left flank of the enemy. 

When neither a surprise nor a flank movement is 
practicable, another device is to mass a heavy body of 
troops, make a sudden dash and break through some 
weak point in the enemy's lines, thus throwing them 
into confusion, at the same time concealing, as far as 
possible, the strength of the assaulting force and di- 
verting attention from the point where the attack is 
to be made by feint movements in other quarters. 

The private soldier had little to do to prepare for 
battle. He stripped himself of his knapsack and all 
superfluous baggage, saw that his gun was in order 
and that his ammunition-box was filled. The main 
attacking columns were generally preceded by a line 
of skirmishers posted a short distance in front. The 
skirmishers advanced, followed by the men in the main 
columns, until they were checked by a superior force 
of the enemy, when they fell back or halted until their 
own main lines came up and then took their places in 

The army anticipating an attack generally fortified 


its position as much as possible. The value of breast- 
works was speedily recognized. Those constructed by 
General Joseph E. Johnston to oppose the advance 
of General Sherman were so strong that the forces 
behind them would have been able to resist suc- 
cessfully a direct assault by four or five times their own 
number. Even temporary breastworks, such as could 
be erected in a night, composed of logs and rails two 
or three feet high, with a trench behind them one or 
two feet deep, or even without a trench, gave the 
troops behind them a great advantage, especially 
against a column compelled to travel a considerable 
distance over an open field in front in order to reach 
them. Behind such breastworks a line of men, armed 
with modern Mauser rifles, could probably resist a 
direct attack in front by an army ten times their own 
in number. 

"When breastworks were to be charged, the charge 
was usually preceded by a brisk cannonading, followed 
by a rapid advance of the attacking force in such num- 
bers as to exhaust the fire of those behind the works, 
before reenforcements could reach them. Such charges 
were usually very destructive to the attacking party, 
especially when exposed to the fire, at short range, of 
the men behind the breastworks and also to the fire of 
cannon loaded with grape-shot and canister. 

Next to charging breastworks, the duty requiring 
the greatest bravery was that of charging a battery 
If infantry could advance within musket range of the 
artillerymen and horses, the charge, especially if 



against a single battery, was usually successful in either 
capturing the battery or compelling it to retreat, be- 
cause, unless well supported by infantry, the men and 
horses were soon killed or disabled. But dreadful loss 
of life usually resulted when a charging column was 
forced to advance over a considerable space before com- 
ing within musket range of the enemy's artillery. The 
general reader who sees accounts of men "marching 
up to the cannon's mouth" is apt to believe that this 
is a poetic stretch of imagination. But it is not. Such 
scenes were often witnessed during the Civil War. 
Time and again there were charges by both Federal 
and Confederate troops in which men marched straight 
up to the cannon's mouth and bayoneted the artillery- 

Perhaps the most trying position in which a soldier 
can be placed is to be exposed to artillery fire when so 
situated that he can neither advance nor fire in return. 
In a charge he is carried forward by the very mo- 
mentum of the column and is inspired by the enthusi- 
asm kindled by the charge itself; when he is firing in 
return he has at least something to divert his mind 
from dwelling solely on his own personal danger; but 
when he is compelled to stand or lie still and can do 
nothing but await the coming of a cannon ball, he is 
in a situation requiring the courage of the bravest 
man. General Sheridan in his Memoirs, 2 describing 
his division in such a position at Stone's River, says 

2 Vol. i, p. 234. 


that the "torments of this trying- situation were almost 
unbearable." In a reconnaissance made on Sunday, 
September 13, 1863, preceding the battle of Chicka- 
mauga, the 79th Ind. was for a few minutes posted on 
the top of a ridge in a field, exposed to the fire of a Con- 
federate battery about half a mile distant on the oppo- 
site side of the field. The battery almost at once got 
the range of our colors, and one ball passed under the 
horse of the lieutenant-colonel who happened to be im- 
mediately behind the colors. We could see the smoke of 
the cannon an instant or so before we could hear the 
sound of the discharge and then another instant elapsed 
before the ball came along. We were all lying flat 
on the ground with our heads toward the cannon and I 
distinctly remember that every time I saw the smoke 
I thought of the possibility that the ball might hit my 
head. It is hardly necessary to say that when the or- 
der was given to fall back behind the brow of the ridge 
it was obeyed with the utmost alacrity 

Bayonet charges were not uncommon nor were hand 
to hand contests, but I think there were comparatively 
few instances in which opposing forces fought each 
other solely with bayonets. The statistics collected by 
Colonel Fox show a very small percentage of bayonet 
wounds. What generally happened when a bayonet 
charge was ordered is illustrated in a dialogue given 
by Piatt - 3 

3 General George H. Thomas, p. 14. 


" 'Do you mean to say,' asked a civilian of a veteran 
officer who had seen many fierce fights in Europe, 'that 
bayonets are never crossed in battle ?' 

" 'Oh, no ! I don't say that. What I asserted was 
that I had heard of such but never saw it, and I have 
my doubts whether it ever occurred.' 

" 'Well, when a charge of bayonets is ordered, what 
happens, how does it end?' 

" 'Why, if the other fellows don't run away, we 
do.' " 

In the pictures of battles the officers are usually de- 
picted in full uniform, generally on prancing steeds, 
and always far in advance waving their swords aloft 
and beckoning their men forward. Now this would 
be a very ridiculous position for an officer to take, be- 
cause it would expose him not only to the fire of the 
enemy but to the fire of his own men. The army reg- 
ulations required the officers, on the formation of a line 
of battle, to take their places in the rear of the line. 
An officer whose bravery or vanity induced him to ex- 
pose his rank to the enemy was certain to be made a 
special target. 

The men particularly aimed at in battle were the of- 
ficers, especially those of high rank, if they could be 
distinguished, the artillerymen, and those bearing the 
regimental colors , but most of the firing was at ranks 
or masses of men, just as one would shoot into a flock 
of blackbirds. The old soldier, however, generally 
aimed at some particular person and with a view of 
hitting him. The difference in this respect between 
a veteran and a raw recruit is illustrated in the story 


told by General Schofield 4 the substance of it being as 
follows : A new recruit after a battle was proudly ex- 
hibiting" to a veteran his empty cartridge-box and boast- 
ing of how many rounds he had fired, but he could not 
tell how many he had hit. "And how many rounds 
did you fire?" asked the recruit. "About nineteen" 
was the reply. "And how many did you hit?" "I 
think," said the veteran, "that I hit about nineteen." 

In my company was a man who used to hunt squir- 
rels in the woods of Brown county, and who could hit 
one in the top of the tallest tree. He was the most 
quiet and best-natured man in the company, and the 
coolest I ever saw under fire. Just after the storming 
of M issionary Ridge he showed me a bent sapling upon 
which he had rested his gun to take deliberate aim, and 
he assured me that he hit his man every time. I have 
not the least doubt of the truth of his statement. 

The sensation of being under fire, under any cir- 
cumstances, is not particularly agreeable, but when you 
know that the bullets are not aimed especially at you, 
you feel that the danger is being divided in some way 
between yourself and your comrades ; that it is a sort of 
lottery in which you may draw a bullet or you may es- 
cape and others may be hit. But it is altogether dif- 
ferent when you know that some one is taking aim at 
you individually. A Frenchman in describing a tiger 
hunt said : "It is great fun to hunt ze tigaire, but 
when ze tigaire hunt you it is fun for ze tigaire." 

'Forty-Six Years in the .Inny, p 142. 


There is nothing very funny in the situation when some 
one is aiming at another, but if there is any fun it is 
not relished by the man who is being shot at. I do 
not know how many times I may have been aimed at, 
but I am sure of having been on one occasion. This 
was in front of Rocky Face Ridge in the Atlanta cam- 
paign. I was on the skirmish line, picking my way 
over the rough ground and through the underbrush, 
when a bullet whizzed past and cut a bush near my 
head. There was no volley and it happened that no 
one was within fifty feet of me. So I knew that some 
Confederate sharpshooter was directing his attention 
to me individually. He would probably have hit me 
if I had not been moving. 

The last year of the war witnessed some radical 
changes in the method of fighting. The advance of 
Grant to Richmond as well as that of Sherman to At- 
lanta was through a thickly wooded country in which 
there was a dense growth of underbrush. This made 
it difficult to use in battle all the men on both sides, and 
also made it difficult for the artillery to do its most ef- 
fective work. The result was the development of a 
style of warfare similar in some respects to that prac- 
tised in the early Indian wars. It became part of the 
education of every soldier, officer as well as private, to 
take advantage of every tree, log, rock, or other natu- 
ral barrier, in order to protect himself as much as possi- 
ble in an advance against the enemy 

But the most radical changes were those occasioned 
by the fact that the armies of both Lee and Johnston 


were almost continuously on the defensive, this making 
it necessary for them to construct formidable fortified 
lines. When driven from one line they fell back to an- 
other. The fortifications encountered by the Federal 
troops in the Atlanta campaign were of far more elab- 
orate character than any which they had previously 
met. They were constructed of earth, four or five feet 
high and thick enough to withstand a six pound cannon 
ball. Over the top of these was a head-log, so placed 
as to leave an open space of about six inches between 
the lower side of the log and the top of the ridge. Be- 
hind was a trench about a foot deep in which the men 
stood while loading, entirely concealed from view. 
When ready to fire they stepped out of the trench and 
fired through the opening under the log, thus exposing 
only a small portion of their persons. Often in front 
of these breastworks were driven stakes with sharp- 
ened ends, pointing outward, and sometimes trees were 
felled in front of them for the purpose of embarrassing 
the progress of a charging column. 

Even with such weapons as were in use during the 
Civil War, one man behind such breastworks equaled 
at least five in a charging column. Experience proved 
that it was a useless sacrifice of life, in fact little short 
of butchery, to attempt to take such breastworks by di- 
rect assault. No troops in the world could hold out in 
a charge against them, if they were defended by troops 
one-fifth in number and of equal valor, especially if the 
assaulting columns were compelled, in order to reach 
the works, to advance over a considerable open space 


in front, exposed to both a direct and enfilading fire of 
musketry and artillery. Generally men would charge 
even against such works, when ordered to do so, for 
such was the high state of discipline in the last year of 
the war that soldiers would usually go whenever and 
wherever ordered, refusing only when it became evi- 
dent that, if such assaults were persisted in, every man 
in the assaulting columns would be killed. 

The futility of attempting to take strongly fortified 
lines by direct assault was clearly shown during the 
Virginia campaign in the assault at Cold Harbor. In 
his Memoirs Grant expresses regret that it was made. 
The uselessness of direct assault against such fortified 
lines was also shown, time and again, in the Atlanta 
campaign, as at Pickett's Mill, and especially in the 
bloody assault at Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864, 
which was disapproved by Sherman's subordinate gen- 
erals and afterward admitted by him to have been a 
mistake. In his account of the assault at Pickett's 
Mill, General Cox says : 

"The attack of Hooker at New Hope Church and 
this of Howard at Pickett's Mill were both made in 
column of brigades or demi-brigades. The result in 
both cases demonstrated that in a difficult and wooded 
country, and especially against intrenched lines, the 
column had little if any advantage over a single line 
of equal front. It could not charge with the en- 
semble which could give it momentum, and its depth 
was therefore a disadvantage, since it exposed masses 
of men to fire who were wholly unable to fire in return. 
Since the office of breastworks is to give the defense 


an advantage by holding the assailant under fire from 
which the defenders are covered, the relative strength 
of the two is so changed that it is within bounds to say 
that such works as were constantly built by the con- 
tending forces in Georgia made one man in the trench 
fully equal to three or four in the assault. Each party 
learned to act upon this, and in all the later operations 
of the campaign the commanders held their troops re- 
sponsible for making it practically good. The boasts, 
on either side, that a brigade or division repulsed three 
or four that attacked it, must always be read with this 
understanding. The troops in the works would be 
proved to be inferior to the assailants if they did not 
repulse a force several times greater than their own." 5 

General Schofield also gives very decided testimony 
on this point. He says : 

"In the days of bayonet successful tactics consisted 
in massing a superior force upon some vital point and 
breaking the enemy's line. Now it is the fire of the 
musket, not the bayonet, that decides the battle. To 
mass troops against the fire of a covered line is simply 
to devote them to destruction. The greater the mass 
the greater the loss — that is all. A large mass has no 
more chance of success than a small one. That this is 
absolutely true since the introduction of breech-loaders 
is probably not doubted by any one ; and it was very 
nearly true with the muzzle-loading rifles used during 
our late war, as was abundantly demonstrated on many 

'Atlanta, p. 80. 

"Forty-Six Years in the Army, pp. I45~6. 


There was only one way to take such works, and that 
was by flanking them. This required an attacking 
army largely superior in numbers to the enemy, so 
large that the attacking party could maintain its posi- 
tion in front of the works and still have enough to 
threaten the enemy's communication and thus force an 
evacuation. This was Grant's plan in the Virginia 
campaign, and Sherman's in the Atlanta campaign. 
This plan, however, while it largely avoided the inevi- 
table and useless sacrifice of life in direct assaults, nev- 
ertheless required obstinate and bloody fighting for it 
was necessary continually to push the lines of the at- 
tacking army as near as possible up to those of the 
enemy. When, therefore, an advance was made 
against fortified lines, either for the purpose of carry- 
ing them, if a weak place could be found in them, or 
for the purpose of advancing the lines of the attacking 
army, it was necessary to provide for holding the 
ground gained, even if the attempt to take the enemy's 
works should fail. 

Charging columns were often followed by men with 
entrenching tools with which defensive works could be 
speedily constructed, and it was not an unusual sight 
to see some of the men in a charging column carrying 
rails. These were thrown down as soon as a halt was 
made and then, if there were no picks and spades, the 
men would scoop out a trench behind the rail pile with 
their bayonets and their tin dinner plates, and thus 
construct rude breastworks even under a galling fire. 
I saw this done at New Hope Church and it was not 


an uncommon occurrence in the Atlanta and Virginia 

Of course there was grave danger that those en- 
gaged in battle might be either killed or wounded, and 
some regiments, as shown by Colonel Fox, suffered an 
appalling loss of life. The artillery in battle made the 
greatest noise, but comparatively few men were killed 
by cannon-balls. A single cannon-ball rarely hit more 
than one man ; most of them hit no one. The most 
deadly work of artillery was when it fired grape and 
canister at short range, especially at dense columns of 
men, or at a line exposed to an enfilading fire. The 
greatest danger in battle was that of being killed or 
wounded by a musket-ball. Considering the number 
of musket-balls fired in a great battle, the wonder, at 
first thought, is, not how many were killed or wounded 
by them, but how many escaped unhurt. It has been 
said, however, that it takes a man's weight in lead to 
kill him in battle, and, though this is a rough guess, I 
suppose that it is near the truth. Generally speaking, 
most of the bullets fired in battle overshoot the mark ; 
many just miss, some go through the clothing only; 
of those which hit the person, many inflict only flesh 
wounds and do not touch a vital spot. 7 The explosion 
of a mine, like that at Petersburg, causes great loss of 
life, but there were few such catastrophes in the Civil 

In reading of battles and in considering the inspir- 

7 See Colonel Fox, The Chance of Being Hit in Battle, Century 
Mag., vol. 30, p. 93. 


ing motives of those who fought them, there are many 
things to be taken into account. The personal brav- 
ery of the combatants is of course an important ele- 
ment. This has always been a distinguishing quality 
of the American soldier, and no troops in the world 
ever exhibited it in a higher degree than did the sol- 
diers on both sides in the Civil War. I do not mean 
by this the dare-devil courage that apparently made 
many men reckless of life. Of this there were many 
instances also, but most men in the army did not expose 
themselves to danger from mere indifference to it. I 
am quite sure that on many occasions, if I had had 
nothing to stay me but my courage, I should have run 
away at once without standing upon the order of my 
going. But there were motives and feelings other 
than mere personal courage that inspired the soldier. 
An honorable pride nerved many men to face death 
rather than to seek safety in dishonorable flight. 
Moreover, there was something in the highest degree 
inspiring in a great battle. Probably some of the in- 
spiration was artificially created, or at least stimulated, 
as we see it created and stimulated in an exciting polit- 
ical campaign by great processions, fire-works, huzzas, 
and other artifices well known to politicians. The ex- 
ample of a general rallying his troops, as General Sher- 
idan rallied his at Winchester, seemed to impart to all 
who saw him an enthusiasm that spread like wild-fire. 
There were hundreds of such instances, less noted but 
equally heroic and equally inspiring, in the Civil War. 
It was characteristic of the Confederates that they 


charged with what came to be well known as the Con- 
federate "yell." It was apt to strike terror to the new 
recruit who heard it for the first time, but his veteran 
comrade waited until the advancing hosts came within 
range of his musket, well knowing that a musket-ball 
was far more effective than a yell. 

In my opinion, the most inspiring motive was a con- 
scientious sense of duty — the same feeling that in all 
ages has inspired martyrs at the stake or on the scaf- 
fold. We call it patriotism, but patriotism is only 
another name for that sense of duty to country which, 
next to the sense of duty to God, is the highest motive 
that can excite men to heroic deeds. On a great bat- 
tle-field everything is calculated to arouse heroic im- 
pulses in even the ordinary man. The most philo- 
sophic person catches some of the excitement created 
by a fire-engine tearing along the street. But such a 
sight is of trifling significance compared with that of a 
battery ploughing along a rough road, or through 
fields and woods, bouncing over rocks, logs and 
ditches, wheeling into position, and in the twinkling of 
an eye opening fire with deafening roar and sheets of 
flame mowing great swaths through the columns of an 
advancing enemy. 

We see a great political procession go bv with wav- 
ing banners and loud huzzas and we can not help catch- 
ing some of the enthusiasm. We see a regiment of 
militia marching with gleaming guns and martial step , 
we hear the bugle notes ; and the sight inspires the or- 
dinarv spectator with something of military ardor. 


An audience is sometimes stirred to its depths by the 
mere waving of a flag. An old soldier at a regimental 
reunion, even after a third of a century has passed, can 
hardly repress the tears that come unbidden at the un- 
folding of a battle-rent flag, typical to him of so many 
hard-fought battles and desperate contests. Is it cause 
for wonder that, when it waves over him in battle, it 
makes him almost delirious with enthusiasm? 

But it is impossible to impart to one who never par- 
ticipated in a battle the feelings of the soldiers them- 
selves, when, amidst the roar of cannon, the bursting 
of shells, and the flash of musketry, opposing hosts 
madly rush against each other in charge and counter- 
charge, "where men become iron with nerves of steel," 
and those who at home were esteemed the most quiet 
and orderly citizens, become, for the time, animated 
with almost supernatural courage that makes them ut- 
terly fearless of death. 

In every battle were seen those known as "skulkers." 
Despite the utmost vigilance of the officers, they would 
succeed in getting to the rear, and to all who passed 
they would tell how their regiments had been cut to 
pieces and that they were the only survivors left to tell 
the doleful tale. They generally had a sneaking look 
and were easily recognized by the veteran soldier, who 
soon came to know them by sight and who paid little 
attention to their extravagant stories of carnage in 
front. These were the men who, after the war, were 
usually found on street-corners loudly boasting of their 
prodigies of valor. 


Besides the ordinary skulkers there were the consti- 
tutional cowards. It is as difficult to define the psycho- 
logical distinction between an ordinary skulker and a 
constitutional coward as it is to define that between 
an ordinary thief and a kleptomaniac, for between the 
skulker and the constitutional coward there were in- 
numerable gradations. But a well-defined type of the 
latter was easily recognized. He did not boast. His 
face in time of battle took on a look of abject terror 
pitiable to behold, betokening an inward unspeakable 
agony. Men of this type could be found in almost 
every regiment. No appeal to their sense of duty, 
their patriotism or pride could overcome the terror 
inspired by the sound of battle. I have seen men who, 
the moment the firing commenced, began to tremble like 
an aspen leaf, with the perspiration dripping from them 
in great drops. An officer in the Army of the Potomac 
told me of a man of this type who, when situated so 
that he could not run away, would mechanically load 
his gun, shut his eyes, and fire into the air. The poor 
fellow was killed after all. The wise and humane 
officer soon acquired the experience enabling him to 
differentiate the constitutional coward from the or- 
dinary skulker, and he endeavored, if possible, to as- 
sign the timid soldier to some duty where he could do 
better service than he was able to do on the firing line, 
and where his terror would not demoralize his com- 

To speak of the "amenities of war" would seem to 
most persons like using a misnomer, and vet during the 


Civil War there were many illustrations of a fraternal 
feeling between the combatants such as probably never 
existed between the soldiers of opposing armies in any 
other war in the history of the world. Those who 
have heard the eloquent lecture of the Confederate 
General John B. Gordon, recounting some of his war 
reminiscences, will remember hearing him relate how 
the Confederate and Union soldiers fraternized in the 
eastern armies, and how on one occasion the Confed- 
erate soldiers in his command indignantly insisted that 
the laws of hospitality required the safe return of the 
Union soldier who had been surprised while making 
them a friendly visit. Substantially the same fraternal 
feeling existed between the opposing pickets during 
the siege of Chattanooga. It was a frequent occur- 
rence for them to meet and exchange papers and have 
a friendly chat, and I never heard that the laws of hos- 
pitality were abused by the soldiers of either side. 

There were similar courtesies during the Atlanta 
campaign. A striking exhibition of them was given 
at Rocky Face Ridge. The 79th was posted about 
half way up the ridge, and at one time the pickets had 
orders to keep up a steady fire all night against the 
Confederates on the summit. One of the 79th pickets 
learned in some way that a Kentucky Confederate reg- 
iment, in which he had a brother or a brother-in-law, 
was near by. He communicated the fact to the near- 
est Confederate picket who kindly volunteered to find 
his relative and bring him to the Confederate picket 
line ; this he did, and the 79th man and his Confederate 


relative talked together for several hours from be- 
hind their respective trees, while each was keeping up 
a steady fire, according to orders, against the enemy's 
lines. It is to be presumed, however, that they took 
care not to aim at each other. 

With the exception of the assault at Kcnesaw Moun- 
tain, the bloodiest engagement of the Atlanta cam- 
paign, in proportion to the numbers engaged, was that 
at Pickett's Mill, May 27, 1864, in which an unsuc- 
cessful assault was made on the Confederate fortified 
lines. In this assault Wood's division of the 4th 
corps suffered a very heavy loss. The 86th Ind., one 
of the regiments in Wood's division, participated, and 
its colonel, George Dick, was severely wounded. It 
would naturally be supposed that these circumstances 
were not such as to inspire the most amicable feelings 
in the combatants, and yet in the History of the 86th 
Indiana 8 is recorded this singular incident which oc- 
curred the next day between a Confederate picket and 
one of the 86th Indiana : 

"On the next day, the 28th, the boys of the Eighty- 
sixth and the Confederates formed a 'Board of Trade' 
on a small scale for the purpose of disposing of surplus 
coffee on the one hand and tobacco upon the other. 
An offer to 'dicker' coffee for tobacco always caught 
the 'Johnnies' and put them in good humor, if there 
were no officers around. On the other hand tobacco 
was in brisk demand in the Union ranks. When there 
was an official about they would signal not to come. 

8 Pp. 397-8. 


but as soon as he was gone, traffic would be resumed. 
They seemed to be in excellent humor over their great 
success in repelling the assault of the previous day. 
They were quite willing to talk of the campaign, ex- 
pressing themselves freely in regard to the probable 
success of it on the Union part, and ''lowed they had 
enough for another killing yet in ranks.' 

"At one of these meetings an interesting discussion 
arose between Wat Baker, of Company H, and a Con- 
federate. Snugly ensconced behind two logs hid from 
view of the rebel line, the discussion began. Baker 
was an oddity, over six feet in height, of a nervous dis- 
position, jerky in manner and emphatic in speech. 
The discussion, as related by Baker afterwards, ranged 
over the whole subject of contention between the North 
and the South — slavery pro and con was argued, se- 
cession and coercion, and the probable success of the 
northern armies finally. For nearly two hours these 
men chatted and argued every phase of the contest 
which suggested itself to their minds." 




As already stated, six companies of the 79th, un- 
der command of Lieut. -Colonel Oyler, left Indianapo- 
lis, August 27, 1862, arriving at Louisville and going 
into camp the same day, followed on September 2 by 
Colonel Knefler with the four other companies. The 
regiment remained in the vicinity of Louisville until 
the first of October, moving from one camp to another 
but not remaining very long in any of them. 

Most of the time was employed in drilling, with a 
"grand review" once or twice a week, when the men, 
in woolen uniforms and carrying, in addition to their 
arms and accoutrements, heavy knapsacks, marched 
twelve or fifteen miles through the streets of Louis- 
ville. The weather was intensely hot, the streets were 
very dusty, and many, not yet inured to such discipline, 
were broken down before leaving Louisville. These 
reviews were especially hard upon the raw recruits of 
the 79th because, while their comrades in other 
regiments were armed with Enfield or Springfield 
rifles, the 79th was armed with Vincennes rifles — guns 
nearly twice as heavy as the Enfields and having 



weighty sword bayonets with metal scabbards. On 
a very hot day during one of these idiotic parades more 
than fifty men of the 79th were prostrated by the heat, 
from the effects of which some never fully recovered. 

While at Louisville we learned something of camp 
life and something of picket duty, but very little of real 
war. Only the Ohio river separated most of the reg- 
iment from their homes in Indiana and nearly every 
day they were visited by some of their relatives and 
friends. Nevertheless important military operations 
were taking place in Kentucky during our stay in 
Louisville. General Kirby Smith had entered eastern 
Kentucky and was threatening Cincinnati, and Gen- 
erals Bragg and Buell were on a race to Louisville. On 
August 30, 1862, the battle of Richmond, Kentucky, 
was fought and the Federal troops under General Nel- 
son, chiefly raw recruits, were defeated and routed. 
Nelson came on to Louisville and began the organiza- 
tion of the new troops. He was killed there by General 
Jeff. C. Davis for an unprovoked and flagrant insult. 

For a time there were rumors that Louisville was 
about to be attacked. Breastworks were hastily 
thrown up and the indications were that we might have 
a battle at once; but Bragg, after halting a few days 
at Munfordsville, turned aside and went to Bardstown 
and Buell continued his march to Louisville. I was on 
picket duty and talked with many of Buell's men as 
they passed. Buell and Bragg had been marching for 
several days toward Louisville, and at Munfordsville 
the two armies were in close proximity, but each 


seemed careful to avoid bringing- on a battle. I 
thought at the time, in common with many others in 
and out of the army, that this was very mysterious 
strategy, but since then it has been satisfactorily shown 
that it would not have been good generalship on Gen- 
eral Buell's part to risk a battle before reaching Louis- 
ville. 1 The last of Buell's army arrived September 29. 
The next day an order came relieving him and appoint- 
ing General Thomas as his successor. General 
Thomas, with that loyalty to his superiors and total 
absence of selfishness which at all times characterized 
his conduct, earnestly protested, and so, for the time, 
Buell was retained, with Thomas as second in com- 
mand, and on October 1 he marched in pursuit of 

The new troops already in Louisville, and those that 
came soon afterward, about 22,000 in all, were incor- 
porated into the army as rapidly as possible, new regi- 
ments being brigaded with those that had seen actual 
service , and the army was divided into first, second, 
and third corps under the commands respectively of 
Generals Alexander McD. McCook, Thomas L. Crit- 
tenden, and Charles C. Gilbert. The 79th Indiana was 
assigned to General Samuel Beatty's brigade in Van 
Cleve's division of Crittenden's corps. The other reg- 
iments of the brigade were the 19th Ohio, the 9th and 
nth Ky. The 19th Ohio and the 9th Ky., both splen- 

1 See General Cist's explanation in Army of the Cumberland, 
P- 73- 


did regiments that had fought at Shiloh, were brigaded 
with the 79th Ind. throughout the service. 

As already stated, Buell's army left Louisville Octo- 
ber 1. Contrary to the plans of Bragg, who now in- 
tended to avoid giving battle in Kentucky and who, at 
the time, was absent in Frankfort assisting in the in- 
stallation of a Confederate "provisional governor," a 
general engagement was precipitated at Perryville, 
Kentucky, October 8, 1862. On account of a misun- 
derstanding of existing conditions, the battle on the 
Federal side was fought chiefly by McCook's corps. It 
resulted in nothing of importance except great loss of 
life to the troops engaged. At this battle Beatty's 
brigade was in reserve, the men had been ordered to 
divest themselves of their knapsacks and were in 
momentary expectation of going into action, when it 
was learned that Bragg had withdrawn and was again 
in retreat. The next day I went over the battle-field, 
seeing many of the dead who had not yet been buried 
and many mangled bodies. One poor man was almost 
cut in two by a cannon-ball which had gone through 
his body near his waist. I observed large saplings and 
limbs that had been cut off by cannon-balls and great 
furrows which these had ploughed in the ground. 

After the battle we marched to Crab Orchard, then 
to the Wild. Cat battle-ground, and from there through 
Mt. Vernon, Somerset, and Glasgow, reaching Scotts- 
ville, Kentucky, November 6. On the 7th we passed 
over the Tennessee line, and reached Gallatin on the 8th. 
On the 10th we crossed the Cumberland river, camping 


that night at Silver Spring, about eighteen miles from 
Nashville. We continued in camp there until the 18th, 
when we marched toward Nashville and remained in 
that vicinity, changing the location of our camp sev- 
eral times, until we started, December 26th, on the 
march to Murfreesboro. As we passed the Hermitage 
on our way to Nashville the men gave three cheers for 
"Old Hickory." He had said — and nobody doubted 
that he meant what he said — that "The Union must 
and shall be preserved." If he, instead of James 
Buchanan, had been President in the early part of 
1861, the "irrepressible conflict" might have been post- 
poned, but it could not have been avoided. The con- 
test between freedom and slavery was inevitable. 

On October 24, 1862, while on the march through 
Kentucky, General William S. Rosecrans had been ap- 
pointed to the command of the Department of the 
Cumberland and the troops in his department were now 
designated as the Fourteenth Army Corps, but the 
name by which the army was popularly known was 
that later confirmed by general orders of the War De- 
partment, viz. : The Army of the Cumberland. Soon 
afterward the army was divided into the right wing, 
center, and left wing, under the commands respectively 
of Generals McCook, Thomas, and Crittenden. 

General Buell was singularly unfortunate. Like 
McClellan he was unpopular with the people and with 
the authorities at Washington, but, unlike him, he was 
also unpopular with a large part of his own army, es- 


pecially with the new troops, who were unaccustomed 
to the rigid restraints of military life and had not yet 
learned the value of military training. The soldiers 
who at first chafed under Buell's discipline came in 
time to realize that it was largely by reason of it that, 
out of the raw materials he found, he was able to lay 
the foundation of the splendid Army of the Cumber- 
land. His unpopularity with the people of the North 
was due to a wide-spread distrust of his loyalty, but 
the injustice of this is now generally conceded. Like 
every other prominent Federal general, he had incurred 
the hostility of Halleck, and the immediate cause of his 
removal was probably his refusal to acquiesce in a 
ridiculous scheme of the latter which contemplated 
Buell's advance into east Tennessee through Cumber- 
land Gap, a plan that would have compelled him to re- 
ly upon wagon transportation for a distance of 240 
miles, would have exposed him to constant danger of 
having his communications destroyed and the different 
detachments of his army defeated in detail, and would 
likewise have left both Nashville and Louisville open 
to attack. General Cist, a military critic not unfa- 
vorable to Buell, thus sums up his weakness as a mili- 
tary commander : 2 

"Then, again, Buell's earlier military training in the 
bureau office he held so many years unfitted him for 
the handling, on the battle-field, of the large number of 
troops which composed his command. But very few 

2 Army of the Cumberland, p. 76. 


generals during the rebellion were able to successfully 
handle on the battle-field as large an army as was un- 
der Buell. In fact, the general who has sufficient tal- 
ent as a good organizer and drill master to enter into 
the details necessary to bring an army out of raw 
troops, has not the military genius required to handle 
a large army in fighting and winning great battles." 

One of the very qualities, however, that made 
Thomas a great general was his familiarity with "all 
the details necessary to bring an army out of raw 
troops." Moreover, Buell was constantly hampered 
by Halleck and it is impossible at this day to determine 
what he might have accomplished if he had been given 
the men and the opportunities that were afterward so 
lavishly bestowed upon more favored generals. This 
much is certain : that it was his prompt movement, of 
his own accord, that ensured the Federal victory at 
Shiloh, 3 and that many of his suggestions were after- 
ward adopted by the War Department and carried 
into successful execution. 

Of General Rosecrans, the new commander, we had 
heard but little, but that little was favorable, and he 
soon won the affections of his army. 

3 Van Home in Hist. Army of the Cumberland, vol. i, pp. 103- 
105, shows conclusively that Halleck, Grant and Sherman were 
all surprised by the Confederate attack, and that, but for the 
timely arrival of the Army of the Ohio under Buell, the battle of 
Shiloh would have resulted in the overwhelming defeat of the 
Federal army. To the same effect see Ropes' Story of the Civil 
War, vol. 2, pp. 67-69. 


I do not find in my diary a great deal pertaining to 
our march through Kentucky that would be of general 
interest. Much of the country through which we 
passed, after the battle of Perryville, was rough and 
broken and the inhabitants were poor. In the poorest 
portions, however, there was the greatest loyalty to the 
Federal cause. When going through Somerset, the 
county seat of Pulaski county, I was told that, of about 
3,000 voters some 2.300 had enlisted in the Federal 
armies. We passed the battle-fields of Wild Cat and 
Mill' Spring, but we saw little on our route that was of 
special interest. During a considerable portion of our 
march through Kentucky there was continual skir- 
mishing between the rear guard of the Confederate and 
the advance guard of the Federal army, and the 79th 
was several times under fire, losing a few men killed 
and wounded, but there was no battle after that of 
Perryville. Nevertheless the march was very trying 
to raw recruits. The roads were rough and, on ac- 
count of a long drought, water was scarce. Much of 
that found in the ponds along the roads was unfit to 
drink and caused a great deal of diarrhea. We had 
already learned something — we learned a great deal 
more afterward — about a soldier's life on the march. 

While in the vicinity of Nashville we learned more 
also of camp life than we had learned at Louisville. We 
were now in the enemy's country, Bragg's army was 
not far distant, and detachments of Confederate cav- 
alry hovered about Nashville, disputing the way with 
every forage and supply train, so that a whole brigade 


of infantry was sometimes required to guard a forage 
train. The closest vigilance was demanded of the 
Federal pickets and there was heavy skirmishing al- 
most every day. In addition to these troubles many of 
the regiment sickened and died. They had been worn 
out by the "grand reviews" in Louisville and by the 
hardships of the march through Kentucky. Several of 
our camps near Nashville were in unhealthy localities. 
Many contracted camp fever (a species of typhoid), 
pneumonia, and chronic diarrhea. Ten men of my 
company, most of whom had left home apparently 
strong, robust, and in perfect health, died in the month 
of December, 1862. 



While at Nashville the army was again reorganized, 
pursuant to an order of General Rosecrans issued No- 
vember 7, 1862 — Major-General George H. Thomas 
commanding the center, Major-General A. McD. Mc- 
Cook the right wing, and Major-General Thomas L. 
Crittenden the left wing. Beatty's brigade became the 
1st brigade of Van Cleve's division, which was the 3d 
division of Crittenden's corps. 

The march from Nashville to Murfreesboro was be- 
gun December 26, 1862, Crittenden's corps moving by 
the Murfreesboro pike and bivouacking that night near 
Lavergne. Heavy rains and a dense fog retarded the 
advance on the next day and none was made on the 
28th, which was Sunday. By the night of the 29th 
Crittenden's, corps was within two or three miles of 
Murfreesboro. It was now evident that Bragg, con- 
trary to the expectations of Rosecrans, intended to 
make a stand north of Murfreesboro, and that a battle 
was to be fought. On December 30 the time was em- 
ployed by both armies in getting the troops into the 
various positions to which they were assigned. 

Murfreesboro is a town on the Nashville and Chat- 



tanooga railroad, about thirty miles southeast of Nash- 
ville. Stone's river, after passing the town, flows in 
a northwesterly course and separates the main portion 
of the battle-field from the town, the south end of the 
battle-field being about two miles west of the town. 
The Nashville and Chattanooga railroad and the Nash- 
ville and Murfreesboro turnpike run in a northwest di- 
rection and nearly parallel with the river crossing it a 
short distance west of the town and intersecting about 
500 yards beyond the river The intersection, which 
makes two acute angles, is about one-half mile west of 
the river. The Wilkinson turnpike runs westerly 
through the southern portion of the battle-field , about 
one and one-half miles south of this pike, and nearly 
parallel with it, is the Franklin road. When the bat- 
tle was fought a considerable portion of the ground 
in the vicinity of the Federal right was covered with a 
dense growth of cedar thickets. 

General Bragg, supposing the Federal army to be 
largely superior to his own in numbers, and expecting 
to be attacked, had formed his lines originally for de- 
fense, but by December 30 he determined that he would 
himself take the initiative and deliver battle the next 
day. General Polk commanded the right wing and 
General Hardee the left wing of the Confederate army, 
all of it being on the west side of Stone's river ex- 
cept Breckinridge's division which was the extreme 
right and was on the east side of the river. Mc- 
Cown's division was on the extreme left, with Cle- 
burne's division in rear of it , next was Withers's divis- 


ion, with Cheatham's in rear of it, and next, and across 
the river, was Breckinridge's division. 

All the Federal army on the night of December 30 
was west of Stone's river, the final formation that 
night, counting by divisions from right to left, being 
as follows : Johnson's, Davis's and Sheridan's of the 
right wing, then Negley's division of the center with 
Rousseau's in reserve, and then Palmer's and Wood's 
divisions of the left wing. It was intended to put 
Van Cleve's division on the extreme left the next morn- 
ing. The extreme right brigade of the Federal army 
was Willich's of Johnson's division, extending to the 
Franklin road ; the extreme left was Hascall's brigade 
of Wood's division, extending to Stone's river; Sher- 
idan's left connected with Negley's right on the Wil- 
kinson pike ; Palmer's left and Wood's right connected 
at the Nashville pike ; Hascall's brigade of Wood's 
division, the extreme left, was next to the river. 

The general direction of the Federal line conformed 
to that of the Confederates, except that there was a 
considerable distance between the north ends of the 
two battle-fronts, while the lines of Johnson's division 
were only a few hundred yards distant from the Con- 
federate lines, and that the Confederate left extended 
a considerable distance beyond the Federal right. Mc- 
Cook's lines, in conforming to those of the Confeder- 
ates in his front, were considerably broken. 

The plans of both Rosecrans and Bragg were identi- 
cal in this, that each had arranged to begin battle early 
on the morning of the 31st by an advance of his left, 


wheeling to the right — Rosecrans with the expectation 
of advancing on Murfreesboro and getting into the 
rear of Bragg's army, and Bragg with the intention 
of doubling back the Federal right across the Nash- 
ville turnpike and cutting off retreat to Nashville. 

General Rosecrans, on the night of the 30th, observ- 
ing the position of McCook's lines, had suggested a 
reformation of them, but no change was made. The 
urgent necessity of a change was disclosed when it was 
discovered during the afternoon that the Confederate 
left extended considerably beyond Johnson's division, 
thus exposing the Federal right to great danger of be- 
ing flanked. In his report of the battle, McCook states 
that this information was conveyed to Rosecrans. 
Nothing was done, however, except to order fires built 
still farther to the right "to deceive the enemy, making 
them believe we were massing troops there." It does 
not appear that the enemy was deceived, certainly not 
after daylight the next morning. McCook, however, 
called a conference of his division commanders and the 
brigades of Willich and Kirk were ordered to the right 
of his line "to protect the right flank and guard against 
surprise there." As the dangerous situation of the 
Federal right was known, it is clear that "some one 
had blundered." 

Early on the morning of December 31st, Van Cleve's 
division was ordered to cross Stone's river and to be- 
gin the attack on Breckinridge, with the expectation 
of carrying out Rosecrans's original plan, which was 
for "Crittenden to cross Van Cleve's division at the 


lower ford, covered and supported by the pioneer brig- 
ade and to advance on Breckinridge; Wood's division 
to follow by brigades, crossing at the upper ford, and, 
moving on Van Cleve's right, to carry everything be- 
fore them into Murfreesboro." We waded Stone's 
river in water over waist deep, but before Van Cleve's 
and Wood's divisions had time to "carry everything 
before them," according to order, or even to fire a gun, 
ominous tidings came from the right where the "carry- 
ing all before them" at this stage of the battle was 
being done exclusively by the Confederates under Gen- 
eral Hardee. 

Bragg had himself opened the battle on our right at 
6 130 a. m. To the blunder of not reforming Mc- 
Cook's lines were added still greater blunders. Al- 
though the dangerous situation of the Federal right 
was known, General Johnson's headquarters were a 
mile or more in rear of his division. Willich, discov- 
ering the imminent peril confronting him, instead of 
sending an orderly, had himself gone to the division 
headquarters to make a report and had ordered his 
brigade to breakfast. Some of the artillery horses 
were unhitched from the cannon and had been taken to 
water. McCook, it is said, was shaving when the at- 
tack began. 

This was the situation when Cleburne's and Mc- 
Cown's divisions under General Hardee, rapidly ad- 
vancing a little after daylight, fell upon Johnson's di- 
vision. It has been asserted that this division was not 
surprised. If there was no surprise there was some- 


thing worse. Willich's and Kirk's brigades were at 
once enveloped by the overlapping Confederate lines. 
Willich himself was captured while trying to join his 
brigade and before he could give a single order, and 
Kirk was mortally wounded. So sudden and fierce 
was the Confederate advance that three hundred and 
fifty of Kirk's brigade and over seven hundred of Wil- 
lich's were taken prisoners. Both brigades were 
thrown into utter confusion and were swept from the 
field with a loss of eleven guns. Colonel Baldwin, 
commanding the remaining and reserve brigade of 
Johnson's division, had barely time to form it in line of 
battle when it was enveloped by the Confederate lines, 
extending far beyond the right flank, and was also 
driven back just in time to avoid being surrounded and 
captured, when it took position on the right of Davis's 

The exulting troops of Cleburne's and McCown's di- 
visions, now reenforced by those of Withers's, and 
later by those of Cheatham's, fell in turn upon Davis's 
and Sheridan's divisions and for several hours these 
two made a heroic effort to maintain their position, re- 
peatedly repelling the assaults of the Confederate col- 
umns. At last, however, Davis was also forced back, 
and then Sheridan, the latter reforming on the right of 
Negley. Four Confederate divisions were now massed 
and hurled against the divisions of Xegley and Sheri- 
dan, and in making and repelling these assaults oc- 
curred the fiercest fighting of the day After four 
hours of fighting, and after his troops had exhausted 


their ammunition, Sheridan's division was again com- 
pelled to fall back. 

The Federal army was now in a most desperate 
situation and it was evident that it could be saved only 
by establishing a new line of battle. The position se- 
lected for this purpose was on the high ground west of 
and near to the Nashville pike. But it was necessary 
first to establish a temporary line strong enough to 
hold the enemy in check until the artillery could be 
saved and the troops posted on the new line. The tem- 
porary line selected was a depression in the open 
ground in rear of the cedar thickets, and to this line 
General Thomas now ordered Negley's and Rousseau's 
divisions to retire. 

The formation of a new line of battle in face of the 
enemy is always a dangerous maneuver. The move- 
ment ordered by General Thomas was especially haz- 
ardous. Each of the three divisions on the right of 
Negley had been overlapped and enveloped by the Con- 
federate lines, compelled to change front, and then to 
fall back, and two of them had been, for a time, 
almost completely disorganized. Flushed with victory 
and confident of success, the Confederate hosts were 
now swarming about Negley's and Rousseau's divi- 
sions in front and in rear, so that neither could fall 
back to the temporary line except by cutting its way 
through the Confederate lines. The movement or- 
dered by Thomas was a desperate one, but on its suc- 
cessful execution depended the safety of the Federal 


army, while its failure involved obvious defeat and 
probable annihilation of the Army of the Cumberland. 

Rousseau's division cut its way through the Confed- 
erate lines to the position designated for the temporary 
line, but, in doing this, it was compelled to fight the 
enemy in front and in rear at the same time. Negley's 
division was now left in a very precarious situation, 
with swarms of Confederates in front and rear and on 
its right flank, and it, too, was compelled to cut its 
way through with a loss of six guns. So closely was 
it pressed on all sides that at one time, two of the 
brigades, Miller's and Stanley's, were compelled to 
face to the rear and charge the pursuing enemy, thus 
holding them in check until the new line was reached. 
Palmer's division, hotly engaged at the time of Neg- 
ley's withdrawal, was now still more severely pressed, 
but by most heroic fighting repulsed the Confederates, 
preserved its organization, and established itself on 
the new line. 

The offensive movement planned by Rosecrans as 
the ruling one was now out of the question. His su- 
preme object now was to save his army from annihila- 
tion. It was plain that its salvation depended on main- 
taining the temporary line until the permanent one 
was securely established. It was equally plain to the 
Confederates that if they could break the temporary 
line their success was certain, and victory seemed to 
be almost within their grasp. Against the temporary 
line, therefore, the most desperate assaults were made 


by the Confederates, which were resisted with equal 
desperation by those who realized that it must be held 
at all hazards. 

As already stated, Van Cleve's division had crossed 
the river early in the morning for the purpose of par- 
ticipating in the attack on Breckinridge's division, but 
had scarcely completed the crossing when the news 
came of the disaster to the right. Price's brigade was 
left to guard the ford, Fyffe's was sent to fight off the 
Confederate cavalry which had attacked our trains, and 
Beatty's was ordered to hasten to the Federal right. 
The distance to be traveled was two or three miles but 
the brigade went on double quick, arriving at the 
moment Rousseau was being most sorely pressed, and 
took position on his right, where for a short time it be- 
came the extreme right of the Federal army and so con- 
tinued until Fyffe's and Harker's brigades came up and 
took position on Beatty's right. 

I could see, as we marched to position, that a great 
disaster had befallen our army. Artillery, ammunition 
wagons, ambulances, and men, apparently in a con- 
fused mass, were hurrying to the rear, while tremen- 
dous volleys of musketry were heard in the cedar thick- 
ets in front of us. Shells were bursting on every hand, 
cannon-balls were cutting their way through the thicket 
and ploughing up the ground, and dead men and 
horses in great numbers were scattered over the open 
fields near the pike. All this plainly indicated how 
sorely our army was being pressed, and the desperate 
character of the conflict in which we were about to 


take part. The captain of my company was absent 
on sick leave, the second lieutenant had resigned, and 
I, a mere boy, was the only commissioned officer pres- 
ent. Not a man in the company had ever been in battle, 
if I except the little affair in which I took part at Car- 
rick's Ford. But not a single man flinched. 

There was no time to be lost and Beatty's brigade 
was at once thrown into a cedar thicket on the right 
of Rousseau's division, the 19th Ohio and the 9th 
Ky. forming the front line and the 79th Ind. and 
the nth Ky. the rear line. As already stated, the two 
regiments in front had fought at Shiloh. There were 
no better in the service, and the bravery and coolness 
with which they held their ground furnished an in- 
spiring example to the men of the 79th. 

While in this position General Rosecrans rode up, 
remaining on horseback while he gave some directions 
to Colonel Knefler, inspiring us with confidence by 
the coolness with which he sat on his horse while 
the bullets were flying all about him. I was not ten 
feet distant and watched the commanding general with 
eager interest. After a few minutes he rode away to 
another part of the field and not long after a cannon- 
ball took off the head of Garesche, his chief of staff, 
who was by his side. 

Presently the men in the front line, who had begun 
firing as soon as they took their position, exhausted 
their ammunition; and then the 79th Ind. and the nth 
Ky. passed through their ranks, while the men of the 
front line took our former position in the rear. Nearly 


all day the battle raged in that cedar thicket. The 
awful roar of cannon and musketry almost paralyzed 
with fright the wild denizens of the forest. The birds 
twittered and flitted about in dumb terror and the 
rabbits ran aimlessly hither and thither. In his 
Memoirs General Sheridan makes note of a frightened 
rabbit that skipped from back to back of his men as 
they lay on the ground, running in this way over the 
backs of a whole regiment. I did not see anything 
that day however that excited my pity more than a 
poor old horse between the lines, shot through and 
through and unable to move, though still able to stand, 
and exposed to every volley. Sometimes we would 
advance a few hundred yards and then would be driven 
back; again we would advance and again be driven 
back, but at the close of the day we held substantially 
the same position that we had taken in the morning, 
and that night we lay on our arms near the place 
where we had first gone into battle. 

During the afternoon the permanent line of battle 
had been firmly established on the high ground near the 
railroad, extending from the railroad on the right to 
Stone's river on the left, formed by divisions from 
right to left in the order following : Davis's, Sheri- 
dan's, Van Cleve's, Rousseau's, and Palmer's, with 
Wood's division in reserve on the right and Negley's 
on the left. A.gainst this new line charge after charge 
was made, the most bloody fighting in the afternoon 
being for the possession of Round Forest, the key to 
the left. But Palmer continued to hold it against every 


assault. The last assault on the right and center of 
the new Federal line was repulsed chiefly by Van 
Cleve's division and Harker's brigade of Wood's divi- 
sion and by Stanley's cavalry. 

The night was very cold, we had twice waded 
Stone's river in water waist deep ; our clothes were 
still wet, and we had no fires. During the night I be- 
came so nearly frozen that I was forced to get up and 
walk about. At almost every step I stumbled against 
a dead man. It caused a strange sensation, but did not 
prevent me from lying down again in the midst of the 
dead and sleeping soundly for a few hours. 

The result of the first day's fighting was not en- 
couraging to the Federal soldiers. Twenty-eight 
pieces of artillery had been captured by the Confeder- 
ates; General Sill had been killed, General Kirk had 
been mortally wounded, and General Willich was a 
prisoner. Many other officers had been killed or 
wounded. Sheridan had lost seventy-two officers, and 
the brigade of regulars, twenty-two. Seven thousand 
men had been lost from the ranks. The Federal line 
on the right had been driven back fully a mile from the 
position it occupied when the battle began. The supply 
trains sent back to Nashville had been attacked at La- 
vergne and part of them burned. The Confederate 
cavalrv had gone entirely around the Federal army 
during the day, attacking trains, and the roads be- 
tween Murfreesboro and Nashville were filled with 
frightened teamsters, skulkers, and stragglers. The 
Army of the Cumberland had been saved from destruc- 


tion chiefly by the wonderful generalship of General 

That night a council of war was held in a little 
dimly-lighted log cabin. It was a weird New Year's 
eve party. The question of retreat to Nashville was 
discussed and urged by some. When it was submitted 
to General Thomas his laconic reply was "This army 
can't retreat," and it did not. Rosecrans, having as- 
certained that there was enough ammunition for an- 
other day, determined, contrary to the expectations of 
Bragg, to remain on the field and continue the battle. 

Bragg felt confident on the night of the 31st that 
Rosecrans would not risk another battle, but would 
retreat to Nashville, and little was done by the former 
on January 1st beyond a few demonstrations made to 
ascertain whether Rosecrans was preparing to retreat 
and some attacks upon the Federal trains. The com- 
manders of both armies occupied the day chiefly in 
reforming their lines, both preparing to resume the 
offensive the following day if the other did not. 

By this time the Federal lines had been entirely 
reformed and preparations were made on January 2d 
to repel an anticipated Confederate attack on the Fed- 
eral left. During the afternoon Van Cleve's division, 
now under command of General Samuel Beatty, Van 
Cleve having been wounded, had again been ordered 
to the left, and again had waded Stone's river and 
taken position in an open field between the river and 
the woods where lay Breckinridge's division, the right 
of the Confederate army. Price's brigade was on the 


right next to the river ; Fyffc's on the left, and Beatty's, 
now commanded by Colonel Grider, in reserve. Next 
on the left of Van Cleve's division was Grose's brigade 
of Palmer's division. These were the only Federal 
troops on the east side of the river. Negley's division 
was posted in reserve, in rear of them, on the west side 
of the river. 

About 4 p. m., after an ominous stillness of an hour 
or more, Breckinridge's division suddenly emerged 
from the woods on the other side of the field, advanc- 
ing in five or six columns. Halting a moment, the 
lines were formed as if for dress parade. On the right 
could be seen some general officer on a white horse 
and we could distinctly hear the command, "Forward, 
double-quick, guide center, march!" With the excep- 
tion of the charge at Missionary Ridge it was the most 
magnificent spectacle that I saw during my entire serv- 
ice. Onward came the advancing columns, cheering 
as they came. When within two or three hundred 
yards of Van Cleve's division, the men of that division, 
who had been lying flat on the ground just behind the 
crest of a little knoll, rose and fired a tremendous vol- 
ley. It did not seem to make the slightest impres- 
sion. Instantly the fire was returned, and almost at 
the same moment the front line of Breckinridge's divi- 
sion fell back behind the second, disclosing four pieces 
of artillerv. dragged by hand and hitherto concealed 
between the two front lines. The artillery at once 
opened fire, and Van Cleve's division was forced back 
across the river. A little while before, bv order of 


General Rosecrans, in anticipation of this attack, fifty- 
eight cannon had been massed near the river on a small 
hill which commanded the entire open field. As soon 
as Van Cleve's division was out of range, these fifty- 
eight cannon, loaded with grape and canister, opened 
their dreadful fire. The cannonading was the most 
terrific that I heard during the war and the destruction 
was dreadful, as shown by the official reports of the 
losses of the regiments in Breckinridge's division. 

Three times the Confederates recoiled under the ter- 
rible fire, but rallied and again advanced. Some 
reached the brink of the river and a few crossed it, 
falling almost in front of the Federal artillery. No 
braver charge was made during the war. I do not ex- 
cept even the celebrated charge of Pickett's division 
at Gettysburg. But no troops could long stand such 
a death-dealing fire as that to which Breckinridge's 
division was now exposed. 

By this time Miller's brigade of Negley's division 
and a part of Stanley's of the same division, under 
command of Colonel John F Miller, crossed the river 
and poured volley after volley into the retreating Con- 
federates, pursuing them and capturing four pieces of 
the New Orleans Washington Light Artillery. Other 
Federal troops rapidly followed and the Confederates 
abandoned the field, leaving it covered with dead and 
wounded. That was virtually the end of the battle. 
There was a little skirmishing the next day, but on the 
night of January 3 Bragg retreated. The dead were 


buried on the 4th and on the 5th the Federal army 
occupied Murfreesboro. 

The battle of Stone's River is one of the most strik- 
ing illustrations given during the war of snatching 
victory out of defeat. The surprise at Shiloh well- 
nigh caused the annihilation of the Federal army on 
the first day of the battle, but the reenforcements 
brought by Buell turned the scale the next day At 
Stone's River, however, the victory on the last day 
was won without reenforcements and after the army 
had lost twenty-eight pieces of artillery. But the most 
remarkable feature of the battle was one that had no 
parallel in any other of the Civil War : the successful 
formation of a new line in the face of the enemy, after 
half the army had been driven from position and when, 
in order to form it, the troops had to fight their way 
through the lines of the enemy enveloping them in 
front and rear. The losses were enormous, consid- 
ering that nearly all of them occurred in one day and 
in about one hour of another. 1 

"General Cist, Army of the Cumberland, p. 127, states the total 
numbers engaged as follows : 

Infantry. Artillery. Cavalry. Total. 

Federal .... 37,977 2,223 3,200 43,400 

Confederate .. .. 39,304 1,662 5,638 46,604 
Cist also states the losses as follows : 

Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total. 

Federal .... 1,553 7. 2 45 2,800 11,598 

Confederate (K. and 11') 9,000 1,125 10,125 


The figures above vary slightly from those given by Colonel 
Fox and Colonel Livermore — the latter stating the numbers en- 
gaged as follows : 

Federal 4i,4°o 

Confederate 34,73 2 

and the losses as follows : 

Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total. 

Federal 1,667 7,543 2,626 11,846 

Confederate 1,294 7,945 2,500 u,739 

It is entirely safe to say that each army lost out of the total 
engaged at least 25 per cent, in killed, wounded and missing, and 
at least 20 per cent, in killed and wounded. Shepherd's regular 
brigade of Rousseau's division, of 1,566 engaged, lost, chiefly on 
Dec. 31 in killed and wounded, 26 officers and 611 enlisted men, 
or a total of 637, making its percentage of loss nearly 40 per cent. 
Donelson's (Confederate) brigade of Cheatham's division lost, 
chiefly on Dec. 31, of 1,529 engaged, 108 killed, 575 wounded and 
17 missing, a total of 700, or more than 45 per cent. In the attack 
at Round Forest one regiment of this brigade, the 16th Tenn., 
lost 207 of 402 engaged, and another, the 8th Tenn., lost 306 of 424 

In Breckinridge's report of the Friday engagement he states 
that it occupied only an hour and twenty minutes, and that he lost 
about 1,700 men of 4,500 taken into action. There was a bitter 
controversy between him and Bragg, in which the latter main- 
tained that Breckinridge had as many as 6,000 in action and that 
he lost only 1,338. The loss was very heavy even if based on 
Bragg's statement; it was frightful if based on that of Breckin- 

The 79th went into action Dec. 31 with 341, rank and file, and in 
the two days, Dec. 31 and Jan. 2, it lost 11 killed, 74 wounded and 
36 missing. Few of the missing were captured in the battle. 
Some of those reported as missing were afterward found to have 
been killed or wounded, and a considerable number, including two 
of my company, were sick men captured by the Confederate cav- 
alry in ambulances or in the field hospitals near Lavergne. 



Probably the darkest period in the North during 
the Civil War was the first half of the year 1863. 
In every quarter the Union cause appeared to be drag- 
ging. Nowhere were there visible any preparations 
for an advance of the Federal armies. 

Harper's Weekly of January 17, 1863, contained an 
editorial entitled, "Have We a General Among Us?" 
beginning with this sentence : "They say at Washing- 
ton that we have some thirty-eight to forty major-gen- 
erals and nearly three hundred brigadiers, and now the 
question is have we one man who can fairly be called a 
first-class general in the proper meaning of the term ?" 
The article discusses the merits and prospects of vari- 
ous generals. Prophesying is always a risky business, 
but prophecy concerning the coming general in a great 
war is particularly hazardous. Sheridan and Thomas 
are not mentioned in the list as even among the possi- 
bilities. Concerning Sherman it was brieflv said: 
"General W T Sherman is making his record at 
Vicksburg; hitherto he has been known as a capable 
officer and a far-seeing man." Of Grant the editor 
spoke somewhat doubtingly, as follows : 

"Ulysses Grant has given evidence of enterprise, 



determination and personal gallantry which have stood 
him in good stead. He was very fortunate at Fort 
Donelson. Whether his record at Shiloh — where he 
would have been destroyed but for accidents beyond 
his control — will bear the test of inquiry, is a question 
yet undetermined." 

The writer of the editorial concluded that "At the 
present moment, however, the most promising of our 
soldiers is William S. Rosecrans." All this goes to 
confirm Livy's statement concerning the uncertainty 
of war, "Nusquam minus, quam in hello, eventus re- 
spondent." 1 

From the beginning of the war continued disaster 
had attended the Union armies in the East. General 
McClellan had been superseded, November 7, 1862, 
in the command of the Army of the Potomac, by Gen- 
eral Burnside, who on December 13, 1862, had led 
the Army of the Potomac into a trap at Fredericksburg 
from which it barely escaped annihilation by reason 
of the unaccountable forbearance of General Lee. 
Soon after that Burnside was superseded by Hooker, 
who, in May following, succeeded in getting the army 
across the Rappahannock again ; but, at a moment 
when he supposed the Confederate army to be in full 
retreat, it suddenly emerged from the dense forests, 
fell upon the right of the Federal army and threw it 
into a stampede, from which it was rescued only by the 
most heroic fighting of the remainder, and again that 

1 Events less correspond to men's expectations in war than in 
any other case whatever. 


great army was withdrawn with immense loss to the 
north side of the Rappahannock. 

Early in June the victorious Lee had begun to move 
for the invasion of Pennsylvania and a great battle 
was imminent, involving the fate of Washington and 
fraught with the greatest danger to the Union cause. 
At this critical time, most inopportune for changing 
commanders, Hooker was superseded by Meade. 2 

Since the battle of Stone's River the Army of the 
Cumberland had been inactive at Murfreesboro. Gen- 
eral Banks with a small army was besieging Port Hud- 
son but the garrison on July i, after having success- 
fully repelled two assaults, was still defiantly refusing 
to surrender and Banks was in imminent danger of an 
attack by the Confederate General Richard Taylor. 
Grant had Pemberton penned up in Vicksburg, but 
the first of July found the Confederate army still in 
its works and no one in the North knew how long 
it would continue to hold out. 

Halleck was still posing as general-in-chief, concoct- 
ing vast strategic movements and disapproving the 
plans of all the Union generals. Grant, indeed, had 
outwitted him, defeated the Confederate forces con- 
fronting him and invested Vicksburg, but he had ac- 
complished this only by cutting loose from his former 
base and getting entirely out of reach of Halleck's 
letters and dispatches. It was characteristic of Hal- 

2 Soon afterward, by Halleck's order, Hooker was further hu- 
miliated by being placed under arrest for visiting Washington 
without leave. 


leek to keep all the generals in the field in hot water, 
but after Rosecrans took command of the Army of the 
Cumberland an incident occurred that made him the 
special object of Halleck's displeasure. One of the lat- 
ter's novel military conceptions was the offer of a 
major-general's commission in the regular army to 
the general who should first achieve an important mil- 
itary success. When the offer was submitted to Grant 
he made no answer, discreetly refraining from express- 
ing any opinion. Rosecrans, however, whether cor- 
rectly or not, interpreted the offer as grossly improper 
and wrote Halleck a long letter, indignantly denoun- 
cing "such an auctioneering of honors" as insulting 
and degrading. This letter undoubtedly sealed the fate 
of the writer, for he had already incurred the bitter 
hostility of Stanton and now had apparently gone out 
of his way, not merely to confirm the prior dislike of 
the general-in-chief, but to court his lasting resentment. 
Grant, however, after the surrender of Vicksburg, rose 
too rapidly in public esteem to be suppressed by either 
Stanton or Halleck. 

During this period the soldiers themselves became 
restless and discontented, not because their loyalty was 
waning, but because so little progress had been made 
after nearly two years of war. The disastrous de- 
feats of the Army of the Potomac at Fredericksburg 
and Chancellorsville cast a gloom over the spirits of 
the soldiers of the West as well as those of the East. 
Moreover, there was much dissatisfaction in the army 
with the slow progress of the war and with the policy 


of the Federal administration. Many of the officers 
and men in the Army of the Cumberland were Demo- 
crats when they enlisted. A considerable number in 
my company were Democrats. I was a Republican, 
but not an Abolitionist, when I entered the service. 
There was at first considerable hostility, even in the 
army, to the emancipation proclamation. Most of the 
men in the Army of the Cumberland were from Ohio, 
Indiana and Illinois and at this time affairs in these 
states were by no means encouraging to the soldiers at 
the front. Moreover, thousands of letters were received 
daily from disloyal writers at home, written for the 
express purpose of creating dissatisfaction among the 
soldiers and of encouraging desertions. The conse- 
quence was that during the early part of 1863 there 
were many desertions from all the Federal armies. 3 

3 The morning report of the Army of the Potomac for Jan. 31, 
1863, showed : 

Aggregate present and absent 326,750 

Aggregate present .... 239,420 

Aggregate absent .. 87,330 

Rcb. Rcc, ser. No. 40, p. 15. Among Hooker's first orders on 
assuming command was one forbidding the sending of citizens' 
clothing through the mails, by which means many had previously 
been enabled to desert. There were also many desertions during 
this period from the Army of the Cumberland. A return of that 
army in December, 1862, showed 76,725 present and 46,677 absent. 
From the official returns in January, 1863, it was estimated that 
the absentees from all the Federal armies numbered 8,987 officers 
and 280,073 non-commissioned officers and privates. This ex- 
traordinary number included thousands absent without leave, and 
of these undoubtedly a great many were actual deserters. 


In the North all classes were chafing under the enor- 
mous expenses of the war, the great increase in taxes, 
both national and state, and the enforcement of the 
draft. Those who had from the beginning opposed 
the war grew more and more outspoken and defiant. 
The emancipation proclamation, foreshadowed in Sep- 
tember, 1862, but not issued until January 1, 1863, 
intensified the bitterness of those who denounced the 
war as an abolition crusade, and the enforcement of 
the draft drove them to frenzy. Even Republicans 
were not united. A radical element, which was con- 
stantly gaining strength, was becoming more and more 
impatient with what it denounced as the halting and 
vacillating policy of President Lincoln. 

The grave question uppermost in men's minds was 
whether the Union could be saved at all ; but, slowly 
evolving out of the doubts and perplexities of the situ- 
ation, and beginning to assume definite shape, was an- 
other, destined to overshadow all other questions, 
whether it were best to try to save the Union with 
slavery or to try to save it without. The Radicals de- 
clared that it must be saved without slavery, but Lin- 
coln hesitated and seemed to be groping his way. In 
a letter to Horace Greeley August 22, 1862, he said:* 

"My paramount object is to save the Union, and 
not either to save or destroy slavery. 

"If I could save the Union without freeing any 
slave, I would do it — if I could save it by freeing all 

4 Greeley : American Conflict, vol. 2, p. 250. 


the slaves, I would do it — and if I could do it by free- 
ing some and leaving others alone, I would also do 

"What I do about slavery and the colored race, I 
do because I believe it helps to save this Union ; and 
what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it 
would help to save this Union." 

By September 22, 1862, he had made up his mind to 
cross the Rubicon, and on that day he issued a proc- 
lamation announcing his intention of declaring the 
freedom of all slaves in every portion of the United 
States in rebellion January 1, 1863. The great mass 
of voters in the North, however, were not yet abreast 
of this advanced idea. The fall elections in 1862 went 
heavily against the administration, and large opposi- 
tion majorities were piled up in the great states of New 
York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana. Even Illi- 
nois, the President's own state, gave an enormous 
majority against him, while in almost all the other 
northern states the Republican majorities were cut 

In New York Horatio Seymour was elected gov- 
ernor — a pronounced opponent of every measure of the 
administration essential to a vigorous prosecution of 
the war. His influence was seen some months later 
when the opponents of the draft, taking advantage 
of the absence from the state of the troops that had 
gone to repel Lee's invasion of the North, raised a 
howling mob which roamed through the city of New 


York for three days, burning colored orphan asylums 
and recruiting offices, hanging negroes, dragging 
through the gutters the mangled corpses of murdered 
Union soldiers, and winding up its carnival of lawless- 
ness by assembling to listen to an address of the gov- 
ernor. In his speech, while counseling moderation, 
he addressed the members of the mob as his "friends," 
assuring them that he was their friend. It is needless 
to add that these utterances of the distinguished 
speaker were received by his bloodthirsty hearers with 
uproarious applause. 

No governor was elected in Indiana, but a legis- 
lature was chosen which, in every possible way, mani- 
fested its hostility to the further prosecution of the war. 

Throughout the North there were secret political 
organizations, under various names, inimical to the 
Federal administration. Some of them had existed 
prior to 1863, the members afterward adopting suc- 
cessively the names of Knights of the Golden Circle, 
American Knights, and Sons of Liberty. In the rural 
regions many of them dyed their homespun clothes 
in the juice of the butternut, and hence became gener- 
ally known as "Butternuts," a name which came to be 
well understood as indicative of hostility to the prose- 
cution of the war. These treasonable organizations 
were most numerous and active in Ohio, Indiana, Illi- 
nois, Kentucky, and Missouri, but nowhere were they 
more lawless and rampant than in Indiana. 5 All were 

5 Their names, objects, and purposes are elaborately set forth in 
the report of Judge Advocate General Holt, submitted to the 


designed to aid the cause of the Rebellion. In all the 
states named, lodges were organized with elaborate 
rituals, signs, grips, and pass-words. Early in the year 
1863 the members began to arm and to practise in 
military drills. There is now no means of ascertain- 
ing their exact numerical strength, but it has been esti- 
mated that by March i, 1864, they had 340,000 men 
capable of being mobilized into an effective military 

The general purpose of these organizations was to 
aid the Rebellion by every practicable means and to 
embarrass the Federal government by the circulation 
of treasonable publications, by furnishing such intelli- 
gence as might be serviceable to the Confederates, by 
supplying them with arms and ammunition, by de- 
stroying the property of the government and of loyal 
citizens, by co-operating with the Confederates in raids 
and invasions, but more especially by encouraging de- 
sertions from the Federal armies, protecting deserters 
from arrest, discouraging enlistments, and resisting 
the draft. 

Secret emissaries were sent to the armies at the 
front, and thousands of letters were written to incite 
discontent among the soldiers and to induce them to 
desert. When a deserter was arrested after his arrival 
at home, he was released on writ of habeas corpus if 
a disloyal judge could be found to issue the writ. In 

Secretary of War Oct. 8, 1864. No soldier who reads the report 
even at this late day can repress his indignation. See also Benn 
Pitman's Indiana Treason Cases. 


some localities in Indiana the Federal officers making 
arrests were openly attacked and fired on, and a num- 
ber of enrolling officers were shot. In Blackford 
county the court-house was attacked and all the records 
pertaining to the draft were destroyed. Nowhere were 
the "Knights" more defiant than in the counties of 
Johnson and Brown, from which my company was 
chiefly recruited. Eight hundred of them rode through 
the streets of Franklin one night, shouting hurrahs 
for Jeff Davis, and at one time 1,500 armed men 
camped near Edinburg for the avowed purpose of 
seizing some men who were in the custody of military 

The Indiana legislature which met on the 8th day 
of January, 1863, was wholly controlled by these op- 
ponents of the Federal government. It refused to re- 
ceive Governor Morton's message and one branch 
passed a resolution thanking Governor Seymour of 
New York for the "exalted and patriotic sentiments" 
contained in his message to the New York legislature, 
in which the chief measures of the Federal administra- 
tion in the prosecution of the war were denounced as 
unconstitutional, tyrannical and despotic, but which 
was prolific of suggestions between the lines far more 
inimical to the Union cause than those openly ex- 
pressed. 6 It was only because the Republican mem- 

6 A resolution was first introduced in the Indiana House of 
Representatives, Jan. 13, 1863, by Bayless W. Hanna, as follows: 
"Resolved, That this House adopt the exalted and patriotic 


bers left in a body, thus breaking a quorum, that the 
legislature was prevented from passing a bill designed 

sentiments contained in the message lately delivered to the Legis- 
lature of New York by his Excellency, Horatio Seymour." 

No action was taken on this resolution, but on Jan. 15 Marcus 
A. O. Packard introduced another, passed the same day by a vote 
of 52 to 35, as follows : 

"Resolved, by the House, the Senate concurring, That the 
thanks of the General Assembly of the State of Indiana are due 
and are hereby tendered to the Hon. Horatio Seymour, Governor 
of New York, for the able and patriotic defense of the Constitu- 
tion, the laws, and liberties of the American citizen, contained in 
his late message to the Legislature of that State, and particularly 
for his just and high appreciation of the interests, position, and 
patriotism of the great Northwest ; and that we assure him that 
the conservative people of our own beloved State are looking 
with deep solicitude and confidence to his executive action, be- 
lieving that they will find in it a firm and determined resistance 
to the encroachments of a despotic administration upon the lib- 
erties of the American people, as well as a bold defense of the 
independent sovereignty of the several States of this Union, and 
that such action will receive the warm sympathies and hearty co- 
operation of all the conservative citizens of this State. 

"Resolved, That the Speaker of the House be directed to for- 
ward copies of these concurrent resolutions to his Excellency, 
Governor Seymour, and the Legislature of that State." 

When the resolution reached the Senate it was referred to the 
Committee on Federal Relations, but it seems that no further 
action upon it was taken. See House Journal for 1863, pp. 68, 
92-3; Senate Journal for 1863, pp. 112-113; Brevier Legislative 
Reports, vol. 6, p. 49. The message of Governor Seymour, con- 
taining the "exalted and patriotic sentiments" so highly extolled, 
was delivered to the New York Legislature Jan. 7, 1863, and is 
found in Assembly Documents for 1863, No. 2. It censured the 
Federal administration for authorizing martial law, suppression 
of newspapers, and arbitrary arrests, denounced the emancipation 
proclamation as "impolitic, unjust and unconstitutional," and 


to strip Governor Morton of all military power and to 
transfer it to a board of state officers, three of whom 
were members of the Sons of Liberty, a measure that, 
if passed, would probably have precipitated civil war 
at once in Indiana. 

The Indiana soldiers were watchful spectators of 
all these proceedings and deluged the legislature with 
their protests. Those from the Army of the Cumber- 
land were numerous and emphatic. 7 The soldiers re- 
charged that the Federal War Department had set aside the 
authority of the judiciary and overridden the laws of the state, 
had treated its laws, courts and officers "with marked and public 
contempt," and had "insulted its people and invaded its rights." 
It contained an elaborate argument in support of "State Rights," 
and affirmed that "the North can not hold the southern states in 
subjection without destroying the principles of our government." 
It also urged "immediate attention to the inequality and injustice 
of the laws under which it is proposed to draft soldiers for the 
service of the general government" and condemned the exemp- 
tions allowed to the "favored classes" while "the only son of the 
widow, or the sole support of a family, may be forced into a dis- 
tant and dangerous service." It also elaborated at great length 
the intimate natural relations between "the great central and 
western states," showing that "the people of the West must have 
the markets of the southwestern states to bring back their pros- 
perity" and that "they must be reunited, politically, socially and 
commercially to the valley of the lower Mississippi." The mes- 
sage was undoubtedly the chief incentive to the bloody draft 
riots, which a few months later disgraced the city of New York, 
and probably furnished the chief arguments used at a later period 
in the western states by those who advocated the project of a 
northwestern confederacy. 

7 They were printed in pamphlet form, entitled "Proceedings of 
the Officers and Soldiers of the Indiana Regiments in the Army 
of the Cumberland on the Memorial and Resolutions to the In- 


spected the brave foemen who stood in their front, but 
they never quite forgave their enemies in the rear who 
were trying- to stab them in the back. 

As if to cap the climax of misfortune to the Union 
cause in Indiana and Ohio, the Confederate General 
John Morgan planned a raid into these states in the 
latter part of June. Gathering a mounted force of 
about 2,400 men, he crossed the Cumberland July 2, 
and the Ohio July 8, invading Indiana first and then 
Ohio. The raid, as originally planned and as approved 
by General Bragg, was intended as a diversion to arrest 
or embarrass the threatened advance of Burnside into 
east Tennessee and of Rosecrans against Bragg, and 
was to be confined to the state of Kentucky The blun- 
der of crossing the Ohio was that of Morgan himself. 

Had the invasion been made with a great army, able 
to hold its own, the result might have been vastly dif- 
ferent ; but it was made with a comparatively insig- 
nificant force, constantly in danger of capture. The 
appearance of a foe on their own soil and threatening 
their own homes and firesides instantly inspired with 
new zeal and determination the loyal citizens of the 
invaded states, strengthened the patriotism of those 

diana Legislature, with the votes and signatures of the officers 
of the 6th, 15th, 17th, 22d, 29th, 34th, 32d, 37th, 38th, 39th, 40th, 
42d, 44th, 51st, 57th, 58th, 72d, 73d, 75th, 79th, 82d, 86th, and 101st 
Regiments." When the memorial was presented to the Senate it 
was laid upon the table, with an order to print 5,000 copies, 
Si'iiatc Journal for 1863, p. 302. Copies were printed, but none 
were included in any of the bound volumes of the legislative pro- 
ceedings. Some, however, have been preserved. 


who had been wavering, and everywhere solidified the 
Union sentiment. It did not, however, as Morgan had 
probably been led to expect from the loud boasts of 
the Sons of Liberty, arouse any warlike ardor in the 
Butternuts of Indiana and Ohio, who shrank with hor- 
ror from the idea of exposing themselves to the bullets 
of either side. They would not fight and Morgan's 
raid ended in ignominious failure and in his own cap- 
ture. The patriotism inspired by the invasion, the 
ease with which it was repelled, and the inglorious 
ending of it, all combined to elate those friendly to the 
Union cause and to chagrin and dishearten those who 
were unfriendly to it. It did more than any victory 
that had been won in the field to strengthen the Union 
cause in Indiana and Ohio. Nevertheless the raid, 
while it lasted, created wide-spread consternation 
among the people and the soldiers of the invaded 
states and throughout the North. 

For nearly six months after the battle of Stone's 
River, the Army of the Cumberland remained in camp, 
Van Cleve's division being stationed near Murfrees- 
boro. During the months of January, February, and 
March the weather was generally very cold and dis- 
agreeable. Afterward there was warmer weather but 
the rains continued. About every other night the 79th 
was on picket and on these nights it nearly always 
rained. This made it hard for the men, especially as 
no fires were allowed at the picket stations and there 
was little or no shelter. Probably for the double pur- 
pose of guarding against surprise and to discipline the 


troops, they were required every morning to stand at 
arms for an hour before daylight and this was not a 
pleasant duty when they stood in the rain and mud. 
During the first three months of our stay at Murfrees- 
boro there was a great deal of sickness ; thousands died 
of disease and the hospitals were full. At one time 
during this period the 79th, which left Louisville Octo- 
ber 1, 1862, with 920 men. had only 175 present for 
duty. So frequent were desertions during this period 
that it became necessary to resort to the extreme pen- 
alty of military law. I witnessed the execution of a 
deserter while at Murfreesboro, and it left an impres- 
sion which is as vivid now as if made only yesterday 
The man was a member of a Kentucky regiment ; he 
had been tried by court-martial and condemned to 
death. On the da}- fixed for the execution the whole 
division was ordered out and was so formed as to make 
three sides of a square. In the open side of the square 
a grave had been dug. At the time set the funeral pro- 
cession entered the square, preceded by a band playing 
a dead march ; following the band came the coffin, and 
behind it marched the condemned man in his shirt 
sleeves with his hands tied behind him and a guard 
on each side , then came the detail of twelve men se- 
lected to shoot him. Half the guns were loaded with 
ball and half with blank cartridges, but none of the 
detail knew how his own was loaded. As the pro- 
cession passed the grave the coffin was deposited over 
it and the deserter was seated on the lid. The twelve 
men who were to do the shooting were then drawn up 


about thirty feet in front of him ; at the word of com- 
mand they fired, and the man, shot through with sev- 
eral bullets, instantly fell over dead on the coffin. It 
was the most dreadful sight I ever saw, far more dread- 
ful than anything I ever witnessed in battle. 

By the first of April the weather had become warm 
but the rains continued, the rainy season being extraor- 
dinary even in that region, making the roads almost 
impassable and rendering a forward movement im- 
practicable. With warmer weather sickness decreased 
and the men improved both in health and in spirits. 
Work on the fortifications was pushed with unremit- 
ting zeal, great forts were constructed, mounted with 
heavy siege guns, and immense supplies of ammuni- 
tion and provisions were collected. We felt confident 
of our ability to hold our works if Bragg should at- 
tempt to attack us. Bragg probably never had such 
an idea. Indeed it was much easier to go around Mur- 
f reesboro, as Hood did when he marched to Nashville. 

Our life while in camp at Murfreesboro became mo- 
notonous and irksome. There were drills, inspections, 
picket duty and working on fortifications. Occasion- 
ally we escorted a supply-train or were detailed to go 
on a foraging expedition and now and then we were 
stirred by rumors of intended attacks by the enemy 
which never resulted in anything more than slight 
skirmishes between our pickets and the Confederate 
cavalry. When not on actual duty we whiled away the 
time as best we could in reading, writing letters and 
in such amusements as camp life permitted. Long be- 


fore we left Murfreesboro we learned enough of the 
war to understand that the Rebellion would never be 
suppressed by armies inside of fortifications and that 
we must meet the Confederate armies in the field. 

While there I was for a time appointed to the com- 
mand of Co. E of the 79th whose officers were all 
wounded or sick, and was offered the captaincy of it 
but declined, preferring to remain with the men of my 
own company, many of whom I had induced to enlist. 

I can not describe the incidents of our stay at Mur- 
freesboro better than by giving some extracts from my 
army diary. These are given just as they were writ- 
ten forty years ago, and, I believe, convey a fair idea 
of our life in camp in the enemy's country, and of our 
daily thoughts at that time. It is hardly necessary to 
add that my opinions of men and events, as expressed 
or implied in what I wrote then, underwent many 
changes even before the close of the war. 

'b v 

January, 1863. 

10. — Wrote to mother to-day. Also one to Jeff 
[The Franklin Jcffersouian.] Received a letter from 
home. Felt quite unwell this night. Weather pleas- 
ant and men occupied in writing or in boiling their 
clothes. Found myself reenforced by a number of 
"gray backs." For the first time in two weeks had an 
opportunity of changing clothes. 

12. — Y T isited Louisville Legion and 6th Ind. 
Friends all safe and well. They confirm the reports 


of the complete surprise of Johnson's division. There 
seems* to be a general feeling of discontent among of- 
ficers and men. They are discouraged at the slowness 
of the war. 

14. — Detailed officer of guard. Guard taken off in 
consequence of a very heavy rain at 3 p. m. It rained 
harder than I have witnessed it since I have been in 
Tennessee. A dismal sleet followed in the morning. 
Lieut. -Colonel Oyler and Walter Hunter arrived to- 
day. Also several ladies from Indianapolis as volun- 
teer nurses. 

15. — Very cold to-day; so cold that it is almost im- 
possible to keep warm. Ladies must think soldiering 
a horrid business, taking this weather for a specimen. 

16. — Went out on picket. My Co. [E] being sta- 
tioned at the house formerly occupied by a 

Spence, now in the rebel army, I had an opportunity of 
seeing what havoc war makes upon wealth and refine- 
ment. I saw before me a house once elegantly, even 
luxuriously, furnished, now stripped of books, pictures, 
furniture, and nothing left but bare walls. Got myself 
a volume of Cicero's orations. 

21. — Ordinary routine of camp resumed. Policing 
and company drill as in former times. Haven't enough 
men for battalion and the men don't take any interest 
in company drill, so we usually stack arms, sit down 
and amuse ourselves in any way except drill. Pleas- 
ant but muddy. 

25. — Relieved at 2 p. m. Weather damp and dis- 
agreeable. There is, I find, a general anxiety among 


the men to go home. They can not fail to see that we 
are wanting in a vigorous policy and vigorous generals 
to carry it out. Desertions are frequent and affairs 
in Indiana are anything but encouraging. 

26. — Strolled around camp busily employed in doing 
nothing. The sad diminution of our regiment does 
not tend to create cheerfulness. We started from 
Louisville with 920 men. We have now in camp 
about 250, of whom about 175 only are fit for duty. 
Where are they ? 

31. — Relieved at 1 p. m. Weather mild. A block- 
ade of mud stops up all avenues to camp. The rain 
and mud in the South (I speak of what I have seen) 
are far more disagreeable than the snow and cold of the 
Xorth. There is much sickness now in the army. Men 
are dying off by thousands. Disease kills far more 
than the sword. Few men who go to the hospital are 
ever fit for duty. So well known is this fact that there 
is a great aversion to hospitals, and many refuse to 
go until their disease gets a firm hold on them. The 
men, too, many of them, become despondent and give 
up too easily. I am convinced that much sickness in 
the army begins with pining for home and continually 
thinking of home until the patient loses his appetite, 
and his system becomes so reduced as to invite disease. 

February, 1863. 

1. — Reeft. detailed to work on the fortifications. 
They are very formidable — consisting of heavy breast- 


works with numerous forts, so situated as to sweep 
with an enfilading fire almost every assailable point. 
Whisky was issued to the men after their day's work 
was over, and it had the "desired effect." 

4. — Picket. The night was particularly severe. 
The rain began in the afternoon and during the night 
turned into a driving sleet. An attack seems to be ap- 
prehended, as a new order forbids any fires at night 
and demands of the pickets the utmost vigilance gen- 
erally It is reported that we received twenty-four 
pieces from Nashville. 

6. — To-day our brigade started at 6 a. m. on a 
forage expedition and returned at 3 p. m., having se- 
cured our forage without molestation. Marched alto- 
gether some twelve miles. Day clear and pleasant. 
Boys brought in a number of zvhite deer. [Sheep.] 

7. — Remained in camp. Orders to make prepara- 
tions to go to Nashville as an escort for provision train 
with two days' rations and forty rounds of cartridges. 
Ours the only regiment detailed. 

8. — Started at 6 a. m. Train consisted of about 
seventy wagons. The effective force of the escort about 
175 men, the men riding in the wagons. Roads pretty 
good to Lavergne, but desperate after that. Saw re- 
mains of the train burned there a few weeks ago and 
was thankful it wasn't ours. The road is strongly 
guarded. Reached N. at 4 p. m. 

9. — Spent the day in looking around. Visited the 
convalescent camps, hospitals, state capitol, boat-land- 
ing, and other places of interest. About thirty boats 


are at the landing, among them the Jacob Strader, on 
which I went aboard. Regiment quartered at court- 
house and got full of "gray backs." 

11. — Started at daylight and moved about two 
miles when we halted and waited for the pontoons 
which didn't come up , so we camped for the night and 
I got a nice rest. I haven't heard of the pontoons 
since, and I reckon they are there yet waiting for the 
mud to dry. Jo. Applegate accompanied us in search 
of McKane. 

12. — Got under way at daylight and made camp at 
3 p. M. The men were very tired as the road was very 
muddy and slippery. The trip cost me some two dol- 
lars in sole leather. A good supper, however, put all 
right. Found Lieut. Robinson in camp. 

14. — Picket. Nothing occurred of interest except a 
slight skirmish between one of our forage trains on the 
Lebanon pike and a squad of rebel cavalry. It didn't 
amount to anything, however. It rained to-night as 

15. — Relieved at 10 a. m. After getting into camp, 
whisky rations were issued, which of course were very 
acceptable. By the way. teetotalers are scarce in the 
army, especially in wet weather. An alarm was raised 
at 9 p m. or near and the regiment called out under 
arms, after which the men went t<"> bed. 

18. — Picket. Line has been advanced a mile and 
a half from camp. The orders are that there shall be 
neither fires nor sleep on out-post. Picket is now re- 


duced to a high state of efficiency. Cleared off to- 

21. — Picket. Rained furiously and the water 
caused me to speedily evacuate my first shanty. Rain 
ceased after dark. Sometime after dark Colclaser 
[quartermaster] brought out whisky rations. If ever 
whisky was acceptable, it was to us drowned rats. 
Nothing unusual during night. Letter from H. C. B. 

23. — Did not do anything to-day. Weather prom- 
ises rain. Wrote to-day to mother and to W — . Xo 
news to-day relative to our future movements. Get 
mails and papers now quite regularly. The late Fed- 
eral conscription act pleases me very much. Prospects 
now look brighter. 

March, 1863. 

1. — By a new order men are required to stand to 
arms about an hour before daylight until further or- 
ders. "Everything quiet on Stone's river " 

5. — To-day we were paid up to the 31st of October, 
1862. Are in hopes to be paid up to the 1st of Febru- 
ary, 1863, in a few days. Payment occasioned great 
rejoicing among the men. 

6. — Picket. I had command of stations 3 and 4. 
Rained incessantly all night. I got drenched from 
head to foot. Felt unwell and did not eat a bite while 
on picket. 

22. — Very unpleasant weather. Don't get any let- 
ters except from mother. We drill now four hours per 


day. The duties of the men have been somewhat 
lighter for a few days. They are on [picket ] once in 
four or five days. Get mails and papers regularly 

25. — Officer of guard to-day; noticed elm trees in 
leaf for the first time this season. Although the season 
is so far advanced I don't see any signs of cultivation. 
This whole country will probably remain a waste till 
the end of the war We are now continually excited 
by rumors of our intended attack by the enemy. 

26. — Didn't do anything to-day out of ordinary 
camp routine. We drill four hours per day and have 
three roll calls. Rumors of an attack are still plenty. 
For several days we have been throwing up rifle-pits 
near the picket line. We hear of skirmishes along the 
line daily. The men are in good spirits and confident 
of the issue. 

28. — Nothing of importance except that our brigade 
got dog-tents. 

29. — The great topic to-day is the dog-tents. Each 
tent is designed for three men and consists of three 
pieces of cotton, each about six feet square which are 
joined by means of buttons and holes. There are no 
poles or pins. They must be made. There are ropes, 
however, to stretch with. 

31. — Relieved [from picket duty] at 10 a. m. 
Nothing of importance to-day Last night very rainy, 
turning off cold. The rumors continue of the near 
presence of the enemy. The indications now are that 
we shall remain here until the reduction of Yicksburg 


or repulse of the rebels in [illegible] will allow Grant 
or Burnside or both to co-operate with Rosecrans. 
The great amount of provisions accumulating here, the 
elaborate fortifications, mounting on them of heavy 
siege guns, the activity in operations of other depart- 
ments, go to prove that we shall not move soon. Mean- 
while the army is daily and wonderfully improving its 
discipline and acquiring an abiding faith in Rosecrans. 
The men do not seem much affected by political excite- 
ment at home. It is true that the majority would will- 
ingly see slavery go by the board if it stood in the way 
of peace. But at the same time many, if not a ma- 
jority would be perfectly willing for the slaves to re- 
main in slavery if that would end the war. The fact 
is — [remainder of sentence illegible.] 

April, 1863. 

1. — I believe an effort is making to abolitionize the 
army. The chaplain has in the past week distributed 
a great number of abolition pamphlets published by the 
American Reform [Society.] 

5. — Nothing out of way in camp. Rumors of at- 
tack have subsided. Everything now indicates that we 
shall stay here for several weeks, if not months. The 
impression seems to be gaining ground that the rebel- 
lion will be subdued by fall or Christmas. 

8. — Men in camp seem in better health and spirits 
than ever before. Their time, when not on duty, is oc- 
cupied in healthful amusements such as ball, pitching 


quoits, tossing- cannon-balls, &c. A great change is 
visible every way in the last six weeks. Got a letter 
from Ben Williams. 

9. — Got up this morning stiff from the violent exer- 
cise I took yesterday in playing ball. Adorned our 
company street to-day with cedars. Gives it a very 
tasty appearance. Everything very quiet in camp 
nowadays. Weather warm. 

10. — Everything has assumed a kind of monoto- 
nous domestic way ; that is, there is no more excitement 
about attacks, advances, moving, etc. Still the men 
are enjoying themselves better than ever and there is 
a great deal less sickness. Weather pleasant with 
indications of an approaching warm spell. 

13. — Picket. Had command of post i, station I. 
From 20 to 30 women and children (negroes) have 
congregated at a house just outside our lines on the 
pike, who are in a starving condition. They have run 
away from their masters or their masters have run 
away from them and they all refused to come in our 
lines. This is only an example of worse to follow a 
protracted war. 

15. — Very disagreeable, rainy day. Several offi- 
cers to-day put under temporary arrest. Four offi- 
cers besides are now under arrest. Lieut. 

for neglect of duty on picket; Lieut. for drunk- 
enness on guard, etc. ; Capt. and Lieut. for 

singing and laughing in a low tone after taps. 

16. — About midnight last night camp was aroused 
and orders issued to march with three days' rations and 


100 rounds to the man. Started at about 3 this morn- 
ing and went to old camp on Stone's river on Lebanon 
pike. Our brigade and part of another with a battery 
of eight guns composed the force. We brought noth- 
ing along but knapsacks and purp tents. Don't know 
object in coming. 

17 — This is our first experience with our dog-tents. 
They are very convenient and are growing in favor. 
This place has improved since we left. The trees are 
out and the prospect from the hill delightful. The hill 
has been strengthened by a sort of a fort and rifle-pits, 
Weather very warm. 

18. — The commander of the post here has impressed 
a number of contrabands to work on fortifications. 
They take hold quite readily and say they belong to the 
1st Tennessee. They have a great desire to be consid- 
ered soldiers. Nothing remarkable. Days hot and 
mornings very cold. 

19. — Were paid yesterday up to March. I received 
$208.65. Have more money than I know what to do 
with. From some cause the paymasters decline adopt- 
ing Goodwin's allotment roll plan. A good many of 
the boys will, I think, send money home by Moore. 
But a good many of the regiment have already begun 
to gamble. 

22. — Nothing of importance occurred to-day. The 
weather is now quite warm, disagreeably so along the 
middle of the day The men go on duty about every 
other day. They have plenty to do in the way of po- 
licing, cleaning guns and clothes, etc. They appear. 


nevertheless, to be in fine spirits. Homesickness is not 
nearly so prevalent as it was some time back. 

23. — Picket. In command of station 2. Instruc- 
tions on picket more stringent than ever. "Was visited 
ten different times while on. This station has two 
commissioned and seven non-commissioned officers 
and sixty privates. My detachment composed of men 
from 79th Ind. and 19th Ohio. All quiet. Elected 
company cooks to-day by general order 

24. — Relieved at 10 a. m. Had battalion drill this 
afternoon for the first time since leaving Nashville. 
John Eaton [sutler] arrived with a stock of goods. 
Also Frank Jelleff from Franklin. Weather quite 

25. — Had officers' school to-day. Capt. put 

under arrest to-day Erected a clapboard kitchen and 
an awning over our company table. It adds much to 
appearance of company quarters. Every company 
now has to have company cooks who cook according 
to furnished recipes. To-day for the first time a com- 
pany fund was distributed. Co. I got $15.25. 

26. — Visited to-day by Capt. Herriot and Ord. 
Brown. Very quiet and still in camp. Sunday is now 
in the army as at home ; a day of rest as far as practica- 
ble. By a general order no work not absolutely neces- 
sary is to be done on Sunday. 

2-j. — Everything quiet in camp. Everybody ap- 
pears to be settling down into the belief that we shall 
stay here some time and we are making preparations 
accordingly Boxes of good things from home come 


to the regiment daily to enliven and cheer the hearts 
of the soldiers. Batchelor started home. 

29. — To-day turned over our old tents and put up 
the "purps." They are put up three together and all 
on one side of the street. The cedars were also set out 
to-day. We have a nice camp now. Great pains are 
taken to preserve cleanliness. Policing is done very 
thoroughly and large and commodious covered sinks 

May, 1863. 

5. — On picket in command of station 1. Was 
complimented by corps officer of day. Occasional rain 
during the day. An improvement has been lately 
adopted in the picket system. A mounted courier is 
now kept at an important station. The whole picket 
system is now reduced almost to a state of perfection. 
Had a severe headache all day and night. 

7. — There was great cheering and rejoicing last 
night over Hooker's supposed victory. All day the 
most exaggerated reports of Hooker's success have 
been floating through camp. All eyes are now turned 
toward the Potomac army. To-day was as disagree- 
able as I almost ever experienced. Cold, rainy, and 
discomforting. Enough to give Mark Tapley the 

8. — To-day it is said that Hooker has completely cut 
the rebel communications and is only waiting for the 
30,000 reenforcements that are coming up to fall upon 
and annihilate the rebels. Of course we are all on our 


heads with excitement. Cleared up this afternoon and 
there is a promise of fine weather Regimental trou- 
bles pretty near a boil. 

9. — There are rumors to-day, which seem to be of a 
credible character, that Hooker has retired to the north 
bank of the Rappahannock and is again in his old camp 
at Falmouth. It is said the whole affair was a mere 
cavalry raid by Stoneman. I am almost prompted to 
say fizzle ! fizzle ! fizzle ! 

10. — Sunday. Had company inspection. Men 
looked remarkably neat and clean. A very perceptible 
change has come over them, inducing them to manifest 
a good deal of pride in personal cleanliness. The or- 
der excusing five men from picket and camp guard 
most distinguished for soldierly appearance has, so far, 
been highly beneficial. Day beautiful. Nothing defi- 
nite from Hooker. Wrote to . 

11. — Nothing of importance to-day. The weather 
is becoming very uncomfortably warm and the men go 
out into the woods in front of camp to sleep during the 
heat of the day. After sundown they amuse them- 
selves in playing cards, marbles, boxing, dancing, etc. 
Everybody is in good spirits and seems disposed to be 
as merry as possible. 

12. — Officer of guard. 'Was very busy all day 
Our camp now presents a beautiful appearance but does 
not equal the 19th Ohio which excels in everything. 
We're improving fast though. The first brigade drill 
for our brigade to< >k place to-day. I could not attend. 

13. — Had regimental inspection to-day. After that 


we had brigade drill, the first I was ever on. I was 
much pleased. The news from the Rappahannock is 
beautifully dubious and magnificently vague. I am 
prepared for a grand "let down." After Hooker, 
who ? A brigade camp guard was organized to-day. 

14. — Company was occupied all day in raising tents, 
building an arbor for the company table and improv- 
ing quarters generally. Our company quarters look 
actually enticing. The tents are only made for three 
but are large enough for five when raised with boards. 
The streets are neatly graded and ornamented with 
cedars. Commodious slops and wash sinks, kitchen, 

16. — Hooker seems to have very quietly subsided. 
The Army of the Potomac has now resumed its proper 
function, awaiting a forward move. But somehow it 
doesn't get along very fast. For two years that army 
has been on the eve of going somewhere and doing 
something but never doing it. We of the West will 
have to whip the rebels after all. 

17. — Usual Sunday inspection. Men remarkably 
neat and clean. Batchelor returned to-day. Brings 
very favorable news from home. Very hot and noth- 
ing stirring. The flies are growing exceedingly trou- 
blesome. The pertinacity with which they dispute 
possession of the victuals is truly remarkable. 

18. — I don't know what to fill out this journal with. 
There is a dearth of news here. The weather is hot, 
the flies terrible, and everybody in his hole during the 
heat of the day. Soldiering has become a systema- 


tized business now and is pretty much the same thing 
every day. 

19. — What will be done next? Hooker in Fal- 
mouth, Rosecrans taking it easy and making much ado 
about nothing, Grant bobbing around, nobody knows 
what at. It looks to me as if nobody is in any hurry 
about closing up the war, but that the North, confident 
of its power, is preparing to eat up the rebels by piece- 
meal. I hardly look for a great battle soon. 

22. — Completed and sent off ordnance reports this 
morning. This has been a tedious job. I now have 
a prospect of a little ease. For the last three or four 
days we have had no brigade drill, but instead two 
battalion drills — one in the morning before breakfast 
and one after dress parade. Fact is we have had an 
easy time for a week. 

26. — Picket to-day in command of station 4. Lost 
my way twice in trying to find out-post 1. The senti- 
nels of out-post 1 are stationed on the side of the field 
from which the rebels emerged on Friday of the battle. 
Everything looks as natural as life, or rather death, for 
such was that field to many a poor soldier. Was vis- 
ited only once during the night. Lizards and ticks 
abound in the woods. 

27. — Nothing unusual occurred last night. The re- 
lief this morning was nearly an hour behind time, hav- 
ing missed the way and traveled about four miles be- 
fore they found us. Didn't get a letter to-day, which 
disappointed me much , I don't think Fll write to any- 
body for six months. 


29. — Had squad drill this afternoon and battalion 
after supper. That was about all of importance. 
There was some talk of our going to Knoxville, but 
that has played out. The General has recommended 
the drawing of two months' supplies of clothing, etc., 
which I suppose indicates something, though it's 
"mighty onsartain." Rained like blazes last night. 

30. — Rained nearly all day. A partial inspection of 
the guns was made to-day with the object of exchang- 
ing our present for Springfield rifles. Very quiet in 
camp and not much prospect of a move. Grant has 
not taken Vicksburg yet. It begins to look like the 
Fredericksburg humbug. What if he don't take it? 
Good for three years I am afraid. 

31. — Day opens cloudy but cool and pleasant. Had 
regimental inspection at 5 p. m. Our company looked 
particularly fine. Lieut. Taylor of the 21st Ills., Gen. 
Grant's old regiment, was over to-day. He used to be 
a student at Franklin [College, Ind.] — is now adju- 
tant of a convalescent regiment. He vindicates Grant 
from all aspersions but didn't convince me of his abili- 
ties as a general. 

June, 1863. 

8. — Wrote to — and — . Gave them both particu- 
lar fits for not writing more promptly. The forward 
move seems to have played out. It is high time the 
Army of the Cumberland was doing something. Six 
months in one place won't do. The science of "how 


not to do it" seems to have been again inaugurated 
with improvements. Weather clear. 

13. — Drill this morning. Put in the day as usual 
in cleaning up. Eaton brought some cherries and 
raspberries which a person could luxuriate on at 25 
cents per pint. Went to river this evening and had a 
good, nice bath. We go to the railroad bridge about 
three-fourths mile distant from camp. Awfully hot 
to-day. Wm. Jacobs, Co. C, was killed yesterday by 
an accidental shot. 

16. — Ordered to march out to witness the execution 

of a deserter, Wm. Minix, private, Co. , 9th Ky., 

for desertion. The whole division turned out. We 
were on the ground by 8. The troops formed three 
sides of a square. The prisoner was brought in at 
about 9. The procession was as follows: 1st the 
band, 2d the guard, 3d the coffin and bearers, 4th the 
prisoner, 5th the detail to shoot him. The sentence 
was executed between 9 and 10. The whole affair was 
very impressive and solemn. 

2T,. — Officer of guard. Pleasant day. Rumors that 
the army marches to-morrow. Impression that our 
division remains. Wagons coming in all night from 
the Lebanon pike. The movement has begun. 

24. — Day opens with a drizzling rain. This morn- 
ing discovers all the troops gone but our division. At 
3 p. m. struck tents and moved over near the fortifica- 
tions southwest of town about a mile from our old 
camp. Rained all day. 



The country was becoming impatient because of the 
long stay at Murf reesboro ; the soldiers there were also 
becoming restive. It was plain to all that we must go 
outside our camp to meet the enemy. Naturally the 
next objective point for the Army of the Cumberland 
was Chattanooga. There was, however, but one line 
of railroad between Nashville and Chattanooga; great 
mountain ranges were to be crossed before getting to 
the latter point , and it was a most difficult problem how 
to procure supplies for the army on its way to Chatta- 
nooga and after it should get there. It was, there- 
fore, deemed advisable to defer the forward movement 
until the roads should become better, and until the rip- 
ening corn should afford the necessary forage; so it 
was not begun until the latter part of June, 1863. 

Bragg's army was then posted north of Duck river, 
the infantry in a strongly fortified position between 
Shelbyville and Wartrace, with cavalry flanks at Mc- 
Minnville on the right and Spring Hill and Columbia 
on the left, his chief depot of supplies being at Tulla- 

The forward movement from Murfreesboro, known 



as the "Tullahoma campaign," began June 2$, and in 
the brief period of nine days resulted in the evacuation 
l")y Bragg of Tullahoma without a great battle and with 
slight loss to the Federal army But Bragg's army 
was still in the field and the stronghold of Chattanooga 
was yet to be won. To capture it would require long 
and arduous marches over a barren and broken coun- 
try destitute of necessary supplies, the constant deple- 
tion of the advancing army, already 113 miles from 
Nashville, its secondary base, by the withdrawal of 
troops to guard its communications in the rear, and un- 
doubtedly the fighting of a great battle against all the 
troops that could be assembled to defend a point of 
such vital importance to the Confederacy 

The authorities at Washington knew very little 
about the character of the country over which such a 
march must be made, 1 but they were clamorous for an 
immediate advance of the Army of the Cumberland 
and preparations for it were now pushed with all possi- 
ble celerity. 

Bragg had established his headquarters at Chatta- 
nooga and the main body of his army was there or 
in the near vicinity. Detachments guarded all the 
available crossings of the Tennessee for considerable 
distances above and below that point, and Forrest s 
cavalry kept watch on the north side of the river Rose- 
crans had his headquarters at Winchester, Tennessee, 
where were also those of the 20th Arm)- Corps ; the 

1 Six- Cox's Military Reminiscences, vol. 1, p. 541. 


14th and 2 1 st corps were posted at different points be- 
tween Winchester and McMinnville and west of the 
Cumberland Mountains ; while the reserve corps was 
disposed in the rear at various points north of Duck 
river. The primary base of supplies was Louisville, 
connected by only a single railroad with Nashville, the 
secondary base. 

To take Chattanooga either by direct assault or by 
siege was plainly impracticable. The only practicable 
plan was to force the evacuation of it by Bragg's army, 
and to accomplish this it was necessary to get in the 
rear of the army and threaten its communications. 
There were two ways of doing this : To cross the Ten- 
nessee river above Chattanooga or to cross it below. 
Rosecrans's plan was to cross below but to divert 
Bragg's attention by making a feint of crossing above. 
To execute this plan required sending a considerable 
force across the Cumberland Mountains and Walden 
Ridge and making demonstrations indicating an in- 
tent to cross the river above Chattanooga while the 
main body of the army was crossing below. 

The Tennessee is a deep and wide river, and at 
Bridgeport, where it was intended to construct a 
bridge, it is over a half mile wide. Crossing the river 
in the face of the enemy was not an easy undertaking, 
but far more serious obstacles would confront the army 
after a crossing had been effected ; for it would then be 
necessary, in order to get in rear of Chattanooga, to 
cross Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Mountain, two 
precipitous ranges, having few passes with wide inter- 


vals between, and next Missionary Ridge, a lower 
range. It also involved cutting loose from Stevenson, 
Alabama, the proposed new base of supplies, and 
marching with at least twenty-five days' rations and 
enough ammunition for two battles. 

Rosecrans had an army of about 60,000 men with 
which to start on such a stupendous undertaking. He 
pleaded with the Washington authorities for reenforce- 
ments and especially for more cavalry When Sher- 
man, in May, 1864, started on his Atlanta campaign 
through the already exhausted Confederacy, begin- 
ning, moreover, at Chattanooga where Rosecrans left 
off, he was supplied with a magnificent army of more 
than 100,000 men. Rosecrans also urged that he 
should be supported by such forward movements of 
other Federal armies as would protect his flanks and 
prevent Confederate concentration against the Army 
of the Cumberland. When Sherman began his At- 
lanta campaign Grant also began his campaign against 
Richmond, leaving Lee no men to spare to reenforce 
the army confronting Sherman. Indeed, it seems now 
that a movement so important as that contemplated by 
Rosecrans should have been made only in connection 
with a simultaneous movement of the Army of the Po- 
tomac, that of Burnside in east Tennessee, and that of 
Grant at Vicksburg. But the Army of the Potomac 
was then inactive and had been since the battle of Get- 
tysburg. Grant, soon after the surrender of Vicks- 
burg, had suggested to the authorities at Washington 
that a portion of the force under his command be sent 



against Mobile, a movement which would have aided 
Rosecrans by compelling the withdrawal of detach- 
ments from Bragg's army, while, as it was, reenforce- 
ments were sent to Bragg. But Grant's suggestions 
were unheeded. Burnside had been busy in looking 
after General John Morgan and did not reach the vi- 
cinity of Knoxville until August 26. He never was 
near enough to Rosecrans to render him any assistance 
and as soon as he appeared in east Tennessee Buckner's 
corps was withdrawn and sent to reenforce Bragg. 2 

A deaf ear was turned to all the appeals of Rose- 
crans. He had sent General Rousseau to Washing- 
ton with letters to President Lincoln, to Halleck, and 
to Stanton, urging the necessity of giving him the aid 
essential for a movement so important as that designed 
to take and hold Chattanooga. Rosecrans was some- 
what given to making complaints, but in this instance 
his appeals seem to have been well grounded. Lin- 
coln sent him a kind letter, Stanton did not answer 
and is reported to have said that he would be damned 

2 Halleck, as usual, sought to shift the blame for his own fail- 
ures on some other person, and on Sept. 22, 1863, he sent a dis- 
patch to General Burnside, saying : "I fear your delay has 
already permitted Bragg to prevent your junction." To this 
Burnside sent a caustic answer emphatically denying that he had 
been guilty of any delay and showing that he had obeyed all 
orders to the letter, and that from the time when his troops first 
entered east Tennessee it had been impracticable to effect a junc- 
tion with Rosecrans. See Reb. Rec, ser. No. 52, pp. 785, 904; 
Cox: Military Reminiscences, vol. 1, pp. 530-541. 


if he gave Rosecrans another man. 3 Halleck sent the 
following dispatch August 5, 1863: "The orders for 
the advance of your army, and that its progress be re- 
ported daily, are peremptory " Not a man was sent 
to Rosecrans, nor was his movement supported by that 
of any other Federal army. 

The advance to Chattanooga began August 16th. 
The 2 ist Army Corps crossed the Cumberland Moun- 
tains into the Sequatchie Valley ; two brigades of that 
corps then crossed Walden Ridge into the Tennessee 
Valley, and these, with Wilder's brigade and Minty's 
cavalry, at once proceeded to stir up a lively commo- 
tion in front of and above Chattanooga. Camp-fires 
were lighted on the ridge, bugles were blown at numer- 
ous fords, Chattanooga was shelled from across the 
river, and various demonstrations were made indicat- 
ing a purpose to cross the Federal army at some point 
above Chattanooga. 4 

So successful was the feint that Bragg was complete- 
ly deceived and withdrew from Bridgeport the only 

3 See Rosecrans's testimony before Committee on Conduct of 
the War; Report of Committee on Rosecrans's Campaign, p. 28. 

4 The official report of General Daniel H. Hill, in command of 
the place, fairly illustrates the manner in which the Yankee in- 
vaders were regarded in the South. He says : "On fast day 
(August), while religious services were being held in Chatta- 
nooga, the Yankees appeared on the opposite side of the river and 
commenced shelling the town without giving any notice. Our 
pickets and scouts, if any were out, had given no warning of the 
Yankees approach. Some women and children were killed and 
wounded by this not unusual act of atrocity of our savage foe." 



brigade that had been guarding against the crossing of 
the Federal army at that point. Meanwhile the main 
body of the Army of the Cumberland was concentrated 
with as much secrecy as possible, near Bridgeport, and 
by September 4 all the army had crossed the Tennessee 
at that point and others near by, and by the 6th was in 
the vicinity of Chattanooga. Bragg began the evacu- 
ation of the place September 7 and had completed the 
withdrawal of the main body of his army by the even- 
ing of the 8th. On that day there were rumors of the 
evacuation and on the day following Beatty's brigade 
of Van Cleve's division ascended Lookout Mountain 
at Nickajack Trace and advanced to the point, about 
twelve miles distant, in order to ascertain the truth of 
the rumor. It was found that the Confederates had 
abandoned both Lookout Mountain and Chattanooga, 
and on the same day the Federal troops entered Chat- 
tanooga as the rear guard of Bragg's army was leav- 
ing. Thus by skilful strategy Chattanooga had been 
gained without a battle, or even a considerable skir- 
mish, after the evacuation of Tullahoma. The 79th 
Ind. had made another long march, crossing the Cum- 
berland Mountains and passing down the beautiful 
Sequatchie Valley, seeing on the way magnificent 
mountain scenery whose grandeur often evoked the en- 
thusiastic cheers of the passing troops. We were now 
in Chattanooga, but the great battle for its permanent 
occupation was yet to be fought. 

Much has been written about the battle of Chicka- 


mauga, containing a vast deal of misinformation. 5 
No battle in the Civil War was more stubbornly fought 
on both sides than was that of Chickamauga. Con- 
sidering the number of men engaged, it was by far the 
bloodiest, and was characterized from first to last by 
exhibitions of bravery on both sides not surpassed in 
any battle in history No writer of fiction ever por- 
trayed anything equal to the reality No orator could 
ever find language adequate to describe the heroic 
achievements on that bloody field. The monuments, 
the tablets, the dumb batteries that stand there now, 
remind those who participated in the conflict of the 
dreadful carnage, but can not convey to one that did 
not witness it the faintest conception of the battle. 
The field marks a contest between the highest types of 
American soldierv 

Moreover, no battle of the Civil War more clearly il- 
lustrates upon what slender chances victory depends. 
Looking back at the mistakes of both sides, one can 
now easily see how the absence of some of them might 
have turned the scale, and caused either the defeat 
of the Confederate, or the total annihilation of the 
Federal army To understand fully that memorable 

6 The most intelligible accounts of the battle, valuable chiefly 
because written by eye-witnesses, and accompanied by maps essen- 
tial to an understanding of it, will be found in Van Homes 
History of the Army of the Cumberland, Cist's Army of the Cum- 
berland, Turchins Battle of Chickamauga, Piatt's George H. 
Thomas, and Boynton's Chickamauga National Military Park. 
The official reports of the battle are contained in Rebellion Rec- 
ords, ser. Nos. 50. =;t. 


battle it is necessary to have in mind the operation 
of the ten days or more preceding it. 

Complete success had attended the movemen 
against Chattanooga and, as already stated, the towi 
had been occupied by General Rosecrans's army Sep 
tember 9, 1863, without serious resistance and witl 
little loss of life. Thus far it seemed that the strateg; 
by which the gateway to the South had been secure* 
was beyond criticism, and so it was regarded by th< 
military authorities at Washington. 

Bragg was apparently in full retreat. Rosecrans 
thinking that he did not intend to stop north of Daltoi 
or Rome in Georgia, and elated by his own easy tri 
umph, instead of concentrating his already widely sep 
arated corps, as Thomas urgently advised, 8 orderet 
them to continue in pursuit of the fleeing enemy. Oi 
the morning of the 9th Rosecrans dispatched to Crit 
tenden, and on the evening of the same day, to McCook 
that Bragg had evacuated Chattanooga and was ii 
full retreat, directing the former to push forward witl 
five days' rations in vigorous pursuit, and the latte: 
to move rapidly upon Alpine and Summerville, inter 
cept Bragg's retreat, and attack on his flank. The di 
visions of Thomas's corps were already far south 
Chattanooga, but as late as 9 145 p. m. on Septembe: 
10, Rosecrans, in a dispatch to Thomas, expressed hi: 
impatience that his advance had not been more rapid 
and, in entire ignorance of the fact that Bragg's arm] 

6 See Van Home : Life of George H. Thomas, p. 104. 


was even then concentrated at Lafayette, gave Thomas 
peremptory orders that his movement on Lafayette 
"should be made with the utmost promptness." 

Halleck, as general-in-chief, was still conducting 
military operations by telegraph from Washington. 
He, too, seems to have been somewhat dazed by the 
success of his own strategy, and to have been revolv- 
ing in his mind some stupendous plan for an "ad- 
vance into (ieorgia or Alabama or into the valley of 
Virginia and North Carolina," as indicated in his dis- 
patches of September 1 1 to Burnside and Rosecrans. 
Until Halleck's plan could be more fully matured, 
Burnside was to "hold the gaps of the North Carolina 
mountains" and Rosecrans "the mountain passes on 
the west and Dalton or some other point on the rail- 
road, to prevent the return of Bragg's army." From 
such dreams there was a sudden and rude awakening. 
It came first to Rosecrans. McCook on his way to 
Alpine had entirely missed the Confederate army. He 
had sent out several detachments on the 8th and 9th 
to scour the country in search of the whereabouts of 
Bragg's army, but no traces of it had been found. 
On the 10th, however, he discovered that if he had 
gone to Summerville he would probably have been 
surrounded by it. When Crittenden reached Ringgold 
he found that there had been some grievous misunder- 
standing of Bragg's whereabouts. Negley's division 
of Thomas's corps, in its hot chase, almost tumbled 
headlong into the midst of Bragg's army at Mc- 


Lemore's Cove, but fortunately discovered its peril 
in time to escape. 

Halleck's air-castles were undermined more slowly, 
by gradual approaches, to use a military phrase. From 
the tales related to him by deserters, who were probably 
sent expressly to tell them, he was induced to believe 
that Bragg, instead of making preparations to give 
battle himself, was sending reenforcements to Lee. 
On September 13 Halleck learned that a portion of 
Lee's army had gone somewhere ; the next day it was 
reported that it was Longstreet's corps that had gone. 
But where had Longstreet gone? There were various 
suppositions. He might have gone to Petersburg; 
he might have gone to Norfolk. At any rate, Halleck 
wisely conjectured that he would "soon strike a blow 
somewhere." By and by it occurred to him that possi- 
bly Longstreet had gone to reenforce Bragg, and then 
the telegraph was put to work again and frantic dis- 
patches were sent at once in every direction to Grant, 
to Sherman, to Hurlbut, to Burnside, to hurry to 
Rosecrans the reenforcements that should have been 
sent months before — as if armies hundreds of miles 
away could be put in motion in an instant. 

It was indeed true that a grave mistake had been 
made concerning Bragg's movements. He had re- 
treated only a short distance. Taking advantage of 
the broken and mountainous character of the country, 
well adapted to concealing his movements, he had re- 
tired into the rocky fastnesses of northern Georgia and 
was secretly massing his troops in the vicinity of La- 


fayette, hiding behind Pigeon Mountain and await- 
ing the opportunity to strike and crush in detail the 
widely separated columns of Rosecrans's army as they 
debouched from the mountain passes, and to cut off 
retreat by the Lafayette road, the only available route 
from that region back to Chattanooga. 

General Rosecrans, as late as September n, seems 
to have doubted the truth of the reports that Bragg 
was concealing his army within striking distance. By 
that time the true condition of affairs had been ascer- 
tained. The situation of the Federal army was very 
critical. Bragg had been reenforced by General John- 
ston with 15,000 men and by Buckner's corps, which 
had been withdrawn from east Tennessee, and his 
army was massed nearly opposite the center of the 
Federal army whose right and left flanks were forty 
miles apart and separated by mountain ranges permit- 
ting the passage of troops only through passes or de- 
files few and far between. McCook's corps was at 
Alpine, fifty miles south of Chattanooga, and could 
effect a junction with the other corps only by long 
and difficult marches. The intervening country was 
rough and broken and covered with a dense growth 
of trees and underbrush. The Federal commanders 
were imperfectly acquainted with the mountainous re- 
gion into which Rosecrans had been inveigled, but 
with every road and path and mountain pass the Con- 
federates were familiar. 

Moreover, in his hot pursuit of the Confederates 
Rosecrans had left Chattanooga uncovered, thus ex- 


tending an invitation to Bragg, which he was not slow 
to accept, to intervene between that place and the Fed- 
eral army and so cut off its retreat. Besides this Rose- 
crans had so scattered his corps that they were no 
longer in supporting distance and were nearer to 
Bragg's army than they were to each other. The divi- 
sions of the different corps were also disunited. Crit- 
tenden's corps, to use a military phrase, was "in air." 
There was no hope of reenforcements for the Army 
of the Cumberland. The only hope was that it might 
unite in time to meet the forces gathering for its de- 

This was Bragg's great opportunity Had he been 
a Grant or a Lee he would have seized it promptly and 
inflicted a crushing blow on the Federal army. But 
he was neither a Grant nor a Lee. If the Confederate 
commander was unequal to the occasion, his subordi- 
nates were still more so and delayed carrying out his 
orders until the golden opportunity had slipped past. 
For this, after the battle, Generals Polk, D. H. Hill, 
and Hindman were, at General Bragg's request, re- 
lieved of their commands. 

Negley's division was in an exceedingly critical sit- 
uation. It had crossed Lookout Mountain through 
Stevens's Gap, twenty-six miles south of Chattanooga, 
and on September 8 was opposite Dug Gap on the 
west side of Pigeon Mountain, Negley not then know- 
ing that Bragg's whole army was on the east side. 
There was another gap — Catlett's — a little north of 
Dug Gap, and another — Blue Bird Gap — a little south 


of it, and Negley's division was in imminent danger 
of an attack in front, on both flanks, and in the rear 
The situation was quickly perceived by Bragg and on 
the evening of the 8th he ordered General Hindman 
to attack Negley's division at once and Hill to support 
Hindman. Hill failed to obey the order and reported 
a flimsy excuse, but Hindman marched ten miles 
and halted within three miles of Xegley, where, 
according to Bragg's order, he was joined by Buck- 
ner on the ioth. When these three Confederate 
generals came together they held a council of war, 
determined that Bragg's order was impracticable, 
and deliberately waited for further orders. Addi- 
tional troops were then sent to support Hindman 
until 30,000 troops were massed for the contem- 
plated attack, but there was one hitch after another 
until Negley had safely got away and had fallen back 
to Stevens's Gap. 

Having thus failed to crush Thomas's corps, Bragg 
next attempted to concentrate against that of Critten- 
den, and on the evening of the nth he ordered General 
Polk to begin the attack at Lee and Gordon's Mill. 
In order to inspire Polk with enthusiasm he said to 
him : "This presents a fine opportunity of striking 
Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail your- 
self of it at daylight to-morrow. This division crushed 
and the others are yours ; we can then turn on the force 
in the Cove. Wheeler's cavalry will move on Wilder 
so as to cover your right. I shall be delighted to hear 
of your success." Notwithstanding these alluring as- 


surances of future glory, Polk that night reported 
that he had taken a strong position for defense and 
asked for reenforcements. Bragg sent a peremptory 
order to Polk not to defer the attack, and the next 
morning went himself with Buckner's corps to see 
that it was made, when he found that Polk's troops 
had not budged and that Crittenden had got his divi- 
sions together and had recrossed the Chickamauga. If 
there is still surviving a Confederate that sincerely 
mourns the failure of the "lost cause," he must writhe 
in agony when he reads, even at this late day, of the 
blunders of Bragg and his subordinates, and thinks 
of what "might have been." 

Owing partly to the celerity and skill of the Federal 
generals and in part to the failure of his subordinates 
to carry out his plans, Bragg' s attempts to destroy 
Thomas's and Crittenden's corps had been foiled, as 
already stated, but there was still left the opportunity 
to turn Rosecrans's left flank, get possession of the 
Lafayette road, and thereby cut off the retreat of the 
Federal army to Chattanooga, and to this object all 
Bragg's operations were now directed. 

Every day the situation of the Army of the Cum- 
berland became more critical. Immense reenforce- 
ments were being hurried to Bragg. In addition to 
those of Johnston and Buckner, two divisions of Long- 
street's corps were sent from the east and every militia- 
man of northern Georgia that could carry a gun was 
pressed into service. By the time the battle opened 
Bragg had an army conservatively estimated at 67,000 


arrayed against the Army of the Cumberland, 10,000 
less in numbers. 

It was now, as Rosecrans expressed it in his report, 
"a matter of life and death to effect the concentration 
of the army." Crittenden's corps had been pulled to- 
gether and brought within supporting distance of 
Thomas's. But McCook was still afar off. To form 
a junction with Thomas and Crittenden he would 
have been obliged to travel, by the most direct route, 
about forty miles ; he took a wrong road and traveled 
a distance of fifty-seven miles, marching day and night 
over roads almost impassable, crossing mountains and 
overcoming obstacles apparently insurmountable. 
With Wellington it was "Oh for night or Blikher !" 
With Rosecrans it was "Oh for night or McCook!" 
Every day, every night, every hour, was precious. 
By September 17 McCook had joined Thomas and 
the three Federal army corps were in supporting dis- 
tance but they were not yet in position to avert the im- 
pending danger. Bragg had his army in readiness for 
a general advance, and, had it been made on the 17th. 
it would undoubtedly have been successful, as the Fed- 
eral army was not then in a position to prevent the 
Confederate army from getting possession of the La- 
fayette road. Various delays occurred, but finally, on 
the evening of September 17, Bragg ordered a gen- 
eral attack to be made the following day. 

Delays again intervened and it was late in the after- 
noon when the Confederate heads of columns appeared 
at Reed's and Alexander's bridges. Generals Wilder 


and Minty made a heroic resistance, fighting off the 
advancing Confederates and yielding inch by inch and 
so retarding Bragg's advance that another day was 
gained. But the Federal army, though now united, 
was not yet in the position that it must occupy to be 
able to defeat Bragg's purpose. To accomplish this 
it was necessary to make still further dispositions 
which could not safely be made in the daytime. All 
night long Thomas's corps was marching to the left ; 
but the Federal lines had not been formed, nor had 
Thomas's troops reached the positions designated for 
them, when the battle opened on the morning of the 
19th. Indeed, the situation was such that Rosecrans 
was unable to present a continuous battle-front until 
the close of the day. Thomas's and McCook's corps 
had been marching all the night of the 18th from Mc- 
Lemore's Cove. Of Thomas's four divisions Baird's 
and Brannan's had reached the Kelly field about sun- 
rise on the 19th and the former had been posted on the 
extreme left with the latter on the right of it ; Negley's 
was at Glass's Mill, about two miles southeast of 
Crawfish Spring. Of Reynolds's division, Wilder's 
brigade was west of the Lafayette road and near the 
widow Glenn's house, and the two other brigades were 
marching to reach the positions designated for them. 
The three divisions of Crittenden's corps were at Lee 
and Gordon's Mill, Wood on the right, Van Cleve 
next, and Palmer on the left; the left of the latter 
extending about a mile north of the mill. Davis's, 
Johnson's, and Sheridan's divisions of McCook's corps 


had reached Crawfish Spring and were there awaiting 
further directions. Granger's reserve corps was con- 
centrated early in the morning at McAfee's Church, 
about two miles east of Rossville. 

On the morning of the 19th Bragg's army was 
formed for battle, which had been ordered to begin 
at 7 a. m. by an attack on Crittenden's corps, supposed 
by Bragg to be the Federal left. The Confederate 
army was composed of the infantry corps of Polk, 
Hill, Buckner, Walker, and part of Longstreet's ( com- 
manded by Hood), with Forrest's and Wheeler's cav- 
alry corps. Polk's corps included the divisions of 
Cheatham and Hindman ; Hill's those of Cleburne and 
Breckinridge ; Buckner's those of Stewart and Preston ; 
Walker's those of Walker (commanded by Gist) and 
Liddell; Longstreet's (commanded by Hood) those of 
Hood (commanded by Law) and Bushrod Johnson, 
Forrest's those of Armstrong and Pegram, and Wheel- 
er's those of Wharton and Martin. At the opening 
of the battle these divisions were east of and facing 
the Lafayette road, ranged from right to left as fol- 
lows : Forrest's cavalry on the right near Jay's Mill , 
McLaws, Bushrod Johnson, Stewart, and Preston 
with Cheatham in reserve. Walker's division was 
marching to take position on the right of McLaws's ; 
Wheeler's cavalry was posted along the upper fords 
of the Chickamauga. Forrest's cavalry was in close 
proximity to Brannan's division. 

On the morning of the 19th Rosecrans and Bragg 
were each ignorant of the exact position of the army 


of the other. Bragg supposed Crittenden's corps to 
be the Federal left, but during the night of the 18th 
Rosecrans had inverted his army, still leaving Critten- 
den's corps at Lee and Gordon's Mill but now making 
it the extreme right, whereas before it had been the 
extreme left, and making Thomas's corps the extreme 
left by moving it from McLemore's Cove, where it 
had been the extreme right, to a position where it was 
nearer Chattanooga and where it could better hold 
possession of the Lafayette road. On the other hand, 
Rosecrans supposed that the extreme right of the Con- 
federate army was on the east side of Chickamauga 
creek and opposite Lee and Gordon's Mill. In fact 
during the night Bragg had thrown a large force on 
the west side of the Chickamauga with the intention 
of turning Crittenden's left flank. Bragg had intended 
attacking in the vicinity of Lee and Gordon's Mill 
what he supposed to be the Federal left, but by one 
of the chances of war the battle opened in a quarter 
not anticipated by any one. 

Early on the morning of the 19th it was reported 
to Thomas that a Confederate brigade had been left 
on the west side of the river after the burning of a 
bridge the night before, and Brannan's division was 
sent out to make a reconnaissance, and, if possible, to 
capture the brigade supposed to have thus been sepa- 
rated from the Confederate army. Brannan's recon- 
naissance unexpectedly disclosed the presence of a por- 
tion of Forrest's cavalry, which was encountered by 
Brannan's right brigade, that of Croxton, about 7 :3c 


a. M., and the battle at once opened there with great 
fury, resulting in such fierce fighting that Bragg was 
compelled, for a time, to give his entire attention to 
that part of the field. Reenforcements were hurried 
by Bragg to his right and assault after assault was 
made on Thomas's lines, but the Confederates were 
repulsed at every point with heavy loss. By i p m. 
there was a lull in the fighting in that quarter, the wave 
of battle having passed down the line. 

It was now taken up by the divisions of Cheatham, 
Walker, and Stewart, who were suddenly precipitated 
against the Federal center, the weight of the blow fall- 
ing upon the division of Johnson and then on those 
of Palmer and Reynolds which had been sent to reen- 
force that part of the line. About I p. m. Beatty's 
and Dick's brigades of Van Cleve's division were also 
marched to the left, taking position on the right of the 
brigade of Reynolds next on Palmer's right. Beatty's 
brigade had scarcely taken position when a Confeder- 
ate battery was discovered directly in front of it, the 
guns spread out in fan shape, at a point southeast of 
the Brotherton house, now marked by a monument to 
the 79th Ind. It proved to be Carnes's battery belong- 
ing to Wright's brigade of Cheatham's division. The 
guns were loaded with canister and a single discharge 
would have inflicted immense loss of life. Instantly 
a volley of musketry was fired by the 79th, disabling 
both the gunners and the horses of the battery, 
and, before reenforcements could arrive, a rush was 
made, the battery was captured, and the guns were 


dragged to the rear. This was one of the few Confed- 
erate batteries captured. It was retaken after the dis- 
aster to the Federal right the next day. 

The auspicious beginning of Van Cleve's division 
was not long sustained. Following closely Van Cleve's 
division came Carlin's and Heg's brigades of Davis's 
division, which took position on Van Cleve's right. 
At about the same time the Confederate divisions of 
Law and Bushrod Johnson, under command of Hood, 
were preparing to turn the Federal right and at once 
fell on the divisions of Van Cleve and Davis. Wild- 
er's brigade, then Wood's division and Barnes's 
brigade of Van Cleve, and finally Sheridan's division, 
were sent to reenforce this part of the line, and, even 
then, it required the most heroic efforts to maintain the 
Federal right. On no part of the field was the contest 
more stubborn. For over three hours there was a des- 
perate stand-up fight between the combatants without 
breastworks or protection of any kind, until the 
Viniard fields were literally piled with dead and 
wounded. The tide of battle ebbed and flowed, each 
side alternately advancing and retreating as victory 
seemed to incline first to one and then to the other, 
hesitating with which to abide. 

During all this time the Confederates were persist- 
ing in their attacks on the divisions of Johnson, 
Palmer, and Reynolds, and all, together with that 
of Van Cleve, were forced back toward the Lafayette 
road. Finally the retreat was stayed, the Federal lines 
were hastily reformed, all the artillery that could be 


collected was brought to that part of the field, and 
a determined stand was made. But the Federal right 
center had been broken and the Confederate troops, 
pouring through the opening made by the falling back 
of Van Cleve's division, had crossed the Lafayette 
road, and. with loud cheers were now rapidly advancing 
into the fields west of it. As the tide of battle neared 
Rosecrans's headquarters at the widow Glenn's house 
it seemed like a repetition of the disaster at Stone's 
River, and that the Federal right was doomed to de- 
struction. But in the nick of time Brannan's division 
coming from the left and Negley's from the right ap- 
peared, the Confederates were repulsed, and the Fed- 
eral lines on the right were restored. 

During the day the sound of musketry was appall- 
ing. At times no interval between the volleys could 
be distinguished, but there was a continuous roar like 
that of Niagara Falls. The fighting did not cease 
with the close of the day, for long after the going down 
of the sun the stillness of the night was suddenly 
broken by tremendous firing in front of the divisions 
of Johnson and Baird, now fiercely assailed by Cle- 
burne and Cheatham. In the dense and dark woods, 
lighted only by the flashing of the guns, the weird con- 
test, bordering on the supernatural, was waged for an 
hour or more. Again, however, the Confederates were 
repulsed with frightful slaughter and the Federal lines 
remained unbroken. 

The day closed with the Army of the Cumberland 



still intact and holding its own. It had been a hard 
day on the troops, many of whom had been marching 
all the night before and fighting all day. Nearly the 
entire army had been engaged and, with the exception 
of Granger's reserve corps, there were no fresh Fed- 
eral troops with whom to renew the battle on the fol- 
lowing day. On the other hand, Breckinridge's and 
Hindman's divisions and two brigades of Preston's 
division had not been in the battle, and two fresh 
brigades of McLaws's division of Longstreet's corps 
arrived on the evening of the 19th. Nevertheless, there 
was much to encourage the Federal army and to in- 
spire it with confidence at the close of the day. The 
Confederates had suffered enormous losses. Bragg 
had been completely foiled in every attempt to get 
possession of the Lafayette road, the Federal lines were 
unbroken, and Bragg's right had been defeated at 
every point. But he had no thought of giving up the 
contest and laid his plans to renew battle the next 

Various changes in the formation of the Federal 
lines had been made during the day and night of the 
19th. The next morning Thomas still held the left, 
the order of formation by divisions from left to right 
being as follows : Baird on the extreme left near the 
Kelly house; Johnson, Palmer and Reynolds, all on 
the east side of the Lafayette road, Brannan on the 
west side of the Poe field, Negley west of the Broth- 
erton field, Sheridan in front of the widow Glenn's 
house, Wilder's brigade on the right and in rear of 


Sheridan. Early in the morning the divisions of 
Wood. Van Cleve and Davis were in rear of the cen- 
ter, but Davis soon took position on the left of Sheri- 
dan and Wood took the place of Negley who had been 
ordered to the left. Granger's reserve corps was still 
at McAfee's Church. The cavalry was mostly on the 
right guarding the upper fords of the Chickamauga. 

Various changes had also been made in the Confed- 
erate lines. Longstreet reached the battle-field at n 
p, m. and was assigned to the command of the Confed- 
erate left wing, while General Polk was placed in com- 
mand of the right wing. The formation of the Con- 
federate right wing in the order of divisions from right 
to left was as follows : Forrest's cavalry east of 
Cloud's; Breckinridge's and Cleburne's divisions on 
the east and south of the Kelly field and the east side 
of the Poe field; Walker's (Gist's) and Liddell's divi- 
sions in reserve in rear of Breckinridge's and Cheat- 
ham's in rear of Cleburne's. The left wing was posted 
as follows from right to left : Stewart's, Bushrod John- 
son's, Hindman's and Preston's with Law's in rear of 
Johnson's and Kershaw's (McLaw's) in rear of Law's. 
Bragg's order to Polk was to begin an attack on the 
Federal left at daylight on the 20th, the battle to be 
taken up by divisions along the line from right to left. 

During the day and night of the 19th the movement 
of the Federal army had been continually to the left, 
the point of danger. Division after division, brigade 
after brigade, had been sent from the corps of McCook 
and Crittenden to reenforce Thomas. Before the dis- 



aster on Sunday in which the Federal right was 
broken, Crittenden's corps organization had been com- 
pletely broken up by taking from it the troops sent to 
the support of Thomas. Palmer's division had gone 
on the 19th. Wood's was taken out to reenforce 
Thomas on the 20th, just before the break, and with 
it Barnes's brigade of Van Cleve's division, and at the 
same time the two remaining brigades of Van Cleve's 
division, Beatty's and Dick's, were also on their way 
under orders to march to the support of Thomas. 

Had the right wing of the Federal army been posted 
on the ridge where the lines were finally established 
during the afternoon of the 20th as Thomas had ad- 
vised, 7 there is little doubt that the result of the battle 
would have been altogether different. It was, however, 
posted in such position as to give it little, if any, ad- 
vantage over a superior force of the Confederates, 
and to make any change in the face of the enemy 
extremely hazardous. So hasty was the formation 
that there was no time to construct rifle-pits, and the 
light barricades of rails, logs, and stones afforded 
but slight protection. 

What added to the danger of the right, and espe- 
cially to the danger of making any change in its forma- 
tion on the morning of the 20th, was the fact, of which 
Rosecrans seems to have been entirely unconscious, 
that a large Confederate force had been massed oppo- 
site the Federal right. Concealed in the dense woods 

7 Van Home : Life of George H. Thomas, p. 121. 


east of the Lafayette road were the heavy Confeder- 
ate columns under the command of General Longstreet, 
momentarily expecting the order to advance. Imme- 
diately in front of Wood's division, and but a short 
distance away, lay the division of the Confederate Gen- 
eral Bushrod Johnson, and behind this, in supporting 
distance, were the divisions of Law and Kershaw, 
while to the left of Johnson was the division of Gen- 
eral Hindman. 

The battle opened on the morning of the 20th with 
another desperate attack on the Federal left. Had it 
been made earlier it might have been most disastrous 
to the Union army, but the disaster was averted by 
another Confederate blunder. Bragg had ordered 
General Polk, in command of the Confederate right 
wing, to attack the Federal left at daylight and secure 
possession of the Lafayette road which was not suffi- 
ciently guarded. Had the attack been made as ordered 
it would probably have been successful, as Thomas had 
not then enough troops to defend it. But Polk on the 
night of the 19th slept outside the lines and was not 
on the field at the time when he should have opened 
the battle. Bragg sent Major Lee to ascertain the 
cause of the delay and to urge a prompt movement. 
He found Polk at the breakfast-table, surrounded by 
a brilliantly dressed staff. With pompous politeness, 
Polk replied to the message "Do tell General Bragg 
that my heart is overflowing with anxiety for the at- 
tack — overflowing with anxiety, sir.'' When this was 
reported to the Confederate commander-in-chief it is 


said that it called forth a volley of sulphurous impre- 
cations upon Polk and all his corps commanders, and 
that Bragg in the fury of his disappointment at once 
gave orders to Major Lee to "ride along the line and 
order every captain to take his men instantly into 
action." 8 

By the time the attack was made Thomas was pre- 
pared for it and, though sorely pressed, he succeeded 
in maintaining his position. Against his lines the Con- 
federate billows surged and beat in vain. Once in- 
deed, only a little before the fatal break on the right, 
the columns of Breckinridge, under the supervision of 
Bragg himself, had completely enveloped the Federal 
left, and for a few moments it seemed that nothing 
could avert the impending ruin, when a single brigade 
— Van Derveer's of Brannan's division — rushed for- 
ward in one of the most brilliant charges of the battle 
and turned back the Confederate tide. 

The roar of musketry that morning clearly indicated 
the frightful carnage on the left. I never heard any- 
thing so appalling. Requests still came from Thomas 
for reenforcements. Just before the disaster to the 
right, General Rosecrans rode up in front of the 79th 
Ind. and exchanged a few words with Colonel Knefler. 
Though not near enough to hear what was said, I 
could plainly see Rosecrans's face. The intense strain 
under which he had been laboring for days had told 
upon him. He was pale as a corpse and, as he rode 

8 Pollard : The Lost Cause, p. 450. 


away, his looks too plainly disclosed the apprehensions 
he could not conceal. 

By a strange misunderstanding of the actual situa- 
tion, General Rosecrans, in order to prevent a supposed 
gap between the divisions of Wood and Reynolds, at 
about 11 a. m. ordered General Wood to close up on 
Reynolds's right. There was in fact no gap, Reynolds 
needed no support, and the order could be executed 
only by taking Wood's division entirely out of line 
and marching it in the rear of Brannan's, which Gen- 
eral Wood at once proceeded to do, taking with him 
Barnes's brigade of Van Cleve's division. 9 At the 

9 The facts relating to this order, as nearly as I can gather them 
from the official reports and all other available sources of infor- 
mation, seem to be as follows : Thomas had sent to Rosecrans 
an urgent request for reenforcements and the latter had sent a 
staff officer to Brannan directing him to go immediately to 
Thomas's support. On the supposition that Brannan would go at 
once, thus leaving a gap between Reynolds and Wood, Rosecrans 
sent another staff officer directing Wood to close up on Reynolds. 
At the time Brannan received the order directed to him, the 
enemy was already advancing against him, and he could not with- 
draw without exposing the army to great danger. He therefore 
sent word of the situation to Rosecrans and delayed moving until 
the receipt of further directions. When the order to Wood was 
received by the latter, he had not yet been attacked, though he 
expected to be soon. But the order was imperative and he pro- 
ceeded at once to obey it. Before doing so he informed General 
McCook, who was present, and advised him to make such dis- 
positions as would be necessary to fill the gap that would be 
caused by the withdrawal of his division. By McCook's direction 
the two brigades of Davis s division were on their way, at the 
time the catastrophe of Sunday occurred, to take the position 
vacated by Wood. In view of the facts above detailed, it would 


same time the two remaining brigades, Beatty's and 
Dick's of Van Cleve's division, were ordered to the 
left to support Thomas and were in motion by the left 
flank and on double quick. Sheridan's division was 
also ordered to the left to support Thomas and was 
likewise in motion by the left flank and on double 

Just at this juncture, while all these movements 
were being executed, the Confederate advance upon 
the Federal right began, and almost instantly the wide 
gap made by the withdrawal of Wood's division was 
filled with the advancing troops of General Bushrod 
Johnson, followed by those of Law and Kershaw. 
Striking Brannan's division, then on the west side of 
the Poe field, the brigade on the right of it was thrown 
into confusion, and artillery and men rushed through 
the moving columns of the brigades of Beatty and 
Dick, which happened at that particular moment to 
be passing in Brannan's rear, throwing them also into 
confusion. At nearly the same time Davis's division, 
now left without support on either flank or in the rear, 
was enveloped by the troops of General Hindman and 
was forced to fall back. As it was falling back it 
came into collision, at an angle, with Sheridan's divi- 
sion, rapidly moving to the left, and both these divi- 
sions were instantly broken in fragments. 

seem unjust to censure severely either Rosecrans or Wood for the 
disaster that followed. It was one of those unforeseen and un- 
fortunate calamities of battle which it seems impossible for human 
wisdom to anticipate or guard against. 


Thus almost at the same moment portions of Bran- 
nan's, Van Cleve's, Davis's, and Sheridan's divisions, 
together with part of Negley's, which had also been 
ordered to the left but had not yet gone, became inex- 
tricably mingled in a confused mass which, even if 
no enemy had been in sight, it would have taken sev- 
eral minutes to disentangle. But there was not even 
a single minute to spare, for the rapidly advancing 
Confederate columns were now only a short distance 
away and were pouring volley after volley into the 
disorganized mass of troops before them. Division, 
brigade, and regimental organizations went to pieces 
in an instant. 

It was impossible, under such circumstances, to make 
any new formations or to conduct an orderly retreat. 
Even Sheridan, whose influence was so magical at 
Winchester and whose subsequent career so clearly 
demonstrated his dash and his soldierly qualities, was 
powerless to stem the overwhelming tide of disaster. 
So sudden and irresistible was the onset that General 
Rosecrans and staff, who were immediately behind 
Sheridan's division, narrowly escaped capture. A 
portion of the 79th Ind. went with Colonel Knefler in 
one direction and a portion with Lieut. -Colonel Oyler 
in another. Continuing their advance westward, 
Hindman's forces swept Davis's and Sheridan's di- 
visions and part of Van Cleve's from the Dyer field 
and over the ridge on the west side of it. Hindman 
then returned and reformed his lines on the left of 
Bushrod Johnson, and the Confederate columns started 


north through the Dyer field in the direction of the 
ridge of which Snodgrass Hill forms a part. 

Rosecrans, supposing that all was lost, hastened to 
Chattanooga to prepare for the retreat of the army 
to that place, and not long afterward sent word to 
Thomas to take command of all the forces remaining 
on the battle-field. Rosecrans was soon followed to 
Chattanooga by McCook and Crittenden. 

A large part of the Federal artillery on the right was 
captured ; about fifty pieces were saved and hauled 
off the field by order of General Negley in order, as 
he said, to avoid capture, but they were never fired 
during the remainder of the battle. Five or six thou- 
sand men or more, who had escaped over the ridge 
west of the Dyer field, got into the valley beyond it. 
General Davis gathered together a few of them and 
started to join General Thomas but was unable to do 
so before the close of the battle. General Sheridan 
collected others and tried to effect a junction with 
Thomas by way of Rossville, but he also arrived too 
late to be of service. General Negley kept a large part 
of them under his command for the purpose, as he as- 
serted, of protecting the retreat of the artillery and 
ammunition trains. He was accused of taking with 
him, in addition, part of Connell's brigade of Bran- 
nan's division. 10 As if to insure the destruction of 
the Army of the Cumberland, "some unauthorized 
person," whose name, if known, has been considerately 

10 See the report of Col. John M. Connell, Reb. Rec, ser. No. 50, 
p. 407. 


suppressed in the official reports, ordered Thomas's 
ammunition trains back to Chattanooga. 

Charles A. Dana, the Assistant Secretary of War, 
who was with General Rosecrans and with him had 
been swept from the field, sent Stanton a dispatch at 4 
p. m. in which he said: "My report to-day is of de- 
plorable importance. Chickamauga is as fatal a name 
in our history as Bull Run." Affairs were bad enough 
but not quite so bad as Dana pictured, and at 8 p. m. 
he was "happy to report that my dispatch of 4 p. m. 
to-day proves to have given too dark a view of our 
disaster." 11 In face of such an appalling train of dis- 
asters, it seems miraculous that the Army of the Cum- 
berland escaped annihilation. Had the movement by 
which General Hindman, later in the afternoon, gained 
the top of the ridge north of Snodgrass Hill, been 
made before the arrival of Whitaker's and Mitchell's 
brigades, it is probable that the Federal army would 
have been totally defeated. The movement was not 
made solely for the reason that the Confederate gen- 
erals supposed that the troops that had been driven 
over the ridge west of the Dyer field were still in fight- 
ing condition and liable to fall on the Confederate 
flanks. Indeed, Hindman supposed the troops of 
Whitaker and Mitchell, that later in the afternoon 
drove his own from the hill west of the Snodgrass 
house, to be the same that he had before driven from 
the Dyer field. "At 3 p, m.," he reports, 12 "a force 

n Rcb. Rcc, ser. No. 50, pp. 192, 193. 
"Rcb. Rcc, ser. No. 51, p. 304. 


of the enemy, probably that which I had recently con- 
fronted west of the Crawfish Spring road, appeared 
on my left, capturing several men of my infirmary 
corps and others who had fallen out from fatigue or 
wounds. I was apprehensive of an attack in rear, and 
sent to General Longstreet and General Buckner for 

I return now to the time when Generals Bushrod 
Johnson and Hindman, after advancing to the west 
side of the Dyer field, reformed their lines and started 
north. When the Confederate troops broke through 
the gap caused by the withdrawal of Wood's division, 
I was near the left of the regiment. A portion of the 
regiment fell back a short distance and joined some 
fragments of other commands that were endeavoring 
to make a stand behind a slight barricade of rails. 
The bullets were still coming fast and thick from the 
east, and, so intent was I in looking in that direction, 
expecting every moment to see emerging from the 
woods an advancing Confederate line, that I did not 
observe the columns of Bushrod Johnson and Hind- 
man, which had then reformed and had begun their ad- 
vance northward through the Dyer field, until Lindsay 
Stinnett, one of my company, touched my arm and 
said : "Captain, they are all gone." Hastily looking 
I saw that what he said was true and the next instant 
I observed the Confederate columns advancing north 
and within two hundred yards of us. They wore 
dark-colored uniforms and for a second I mistook them 
for Federal troops, but a glance at the stars and bars 


dispelled all doubt. We were in very close and dan- 
gerous quarters. Escape either to the east, west or 
south was then out of the question, and the only way 
out was in the direction of Snodgrass Hill. In going 
we passed through a portion of the field where there 
must have been at least twenty or thirty pieces of Fed- 
eral artillery. Not an artilleryman nor horse was 
near ; the cannon had evidently been abandoned and 
were undoubtedly soon captured by the enemy My 
heart sank as I threaded my way through and past 
them, for the abandonment of our artillery signified to 
me with more emphasis than anything I saw the ex- 
tent of the disaster which had overtaken us. 

Reaching Snodgrass Hill I took my position near 
the east end, fifteen or twenty yards northeast of the 
place where the government observation-tower now 
stands, and there I remained until after dark, leaving 
only for a few minutes to assist one of my company 
who was wounded. About the time I reached the hill, 
General Brannan had posted his division near the 
place where the observation-tower now stands, and 
Wood's division took position on the left of Brannan's. 
Besides these, there were gathered there fragments of 
the divisions of Negley and Van Cleve. The latter 
included representatives of the 19th Ohio, the 9th and 
17th Ky., and the 79th Ind., all of Beatty's brigade, 
and the 44th and 86th Ind. of Dick's brigade. There 
were colonels without regiments, captains without 
companies, and men without officers, all gathered pro- 
miscuously together. Van Home estimates that there 


were at that time on Snodgrass Hill, all told, about 
4,000 men. General Turchin 13 makes the number 
6,500. With the exception of Brannan's and Wood's 
divisions there was little semblance of brigade, regi- 
mental, or company organization. 

It was at this critical time that I witnessed what I 
have always thought to be the most striking illustra- 
tion in the whole war of the coolness and intrepidity 
of the American private soldier when left to his own 
resources and compelled to fight "on his own hook." 
The men on Snodgrass Hill were smarting under the 
mortification of having been driven there because of a 
disaster for which they knew they were not responsible 
and which was not caused by any lack of bravery or 
discipline on their part. They were resolved to be 
driven no farther and, facing the advancing foe, they 
savagely stood at bay. Taking in the situation at 
once, and acting as if by instinct, they immediately be- 
gan the construction of rude breastworks on the brow 
of the hill from such logs, rails, and stones as could 
be hastily raked together, and then awaited the coming 
Confederate hosts. Every man seemed to realize that 
it was now a life and death struggle for the preserva- 
tion of the Army of the Cumberland. They had not 
long to wait, for the Confederate columns were ad- 
vancing rapidly, cheering as they came. Exalted to 
the highest pitch of enthusiasm by their previous suc- 
cess, it seemed that nothing could stay them in their 

13 Battle of Chickamauga, p. 124. 


victorious advance. But the men on the hill fought 
with a desperate courage that I never saw surpassed 
on any other field. A.t every point on the line the 
charge was repulsed, and the hosts that had charged 
so exultingly were forced to fall back. Again and 
again they rallied and again and again were repulsed. 
For more than four hours the sanguinary contest last- 
ed, waged with a valor on the part of the Confederates 
only equaled by the grim steadfastness of the Spartan 
band on Snodgrass Hill. 

Some time between 3 and 4 p. m., during a lull in 
the assaults, a solitary cannon was heard and then be- 
gan a cheer on the Confederate right which seemed to 
be taken up, regiment by regiment, until it extended 
apparently to the extreme left. It seemed to me, judg- 
ing the position of the Confederate lines by the course 
of the cheering, that we were almost surrounded. I 
did not then understand the situation but I know now 
that I was correct in my conjecture. 

About this time, despairing of success in their at- 
tempt to drive from the hill by direct assault the troops 
who were so bravely holding it, a portion of the Con- 
federate troops had passed round the north end of the 
hill and, establishing themselves on one of the ridges, 
were about to attack Brannan in the rear The troops 
on the hill were now subjected to a fire not only in 
front, but in the rear. Soon after this Wesley Shep- 
pard, one of my company, while in the act of firing at 
the Confederates in front, was struck by a bullet from 
the rear. The ball struck him near his shoulder ahd 


went clear through his body. There were no ambu- 
lances nor stretcher-bearers near and, as I saw his gun 
drop from his hands, I hastened to his assistance. He 
was still able to walk with my aid and I took him first 
to the Snodgrass House. As the ground for several 
rods about the house was covered with dead and 
wounded, we passed on to a straw-stack near the Snod- 
grass stable where I thought to leave him, but fearing 
that some exploding shell might set the straw on fire, 
I took him a little farther, leaving him in a fence cor- 
ner with some straw under his head and bade him 
good-bye. 14 After leaving Sheppard I hastened back 
to the little squad of the 79th that I had left, having 
been absent, I presume, not more than fifteen or twenty 
minutes. I did not fail to observe that in the field 
where I left Sheppard a line of Federal troops was on 
one side facing one way, and on the other side was a 
line facing another way, confirming my supposition 
that we were at that time nearly surrounded. 

The position of the troops on the hill was indeed 
most critical, but help was coming from an unexpected 
quarter. General Gordon Granger, of the Reserve 
Corps, four miles away at McAfee's Church, had heard 
the tremendous firing and had rapidly "marched to the 
sound of the cannon," brushing aside the Confederate 

11 When I left Sheppard the blood was gushing from his mouth 
in torrents, and I did not suppose that he would live ten minutes, 
but after having been captured by the Confederates that night, he 
recovered, was exchanged, rejoined his company in east Ten- 
nessee, and remained with it to the end of the war. 


cavalry that attempted to impede his march. He 
reached the hill with two brigades of Steedman's and 
one of Morgan's divisions about the time I left Shep- 
pard. Van Derveer's brigade was also approaching. 
Whitaker's and Mitchell's brigades of Steedman's di- 
vision were at once deployed, Van Derveer joining 
them on the left, and advanced against the Confeder- 
ates who had now gained the north end of the ridge in 
rear of Brannan. I saw the brilliant charge of 
Whitaker's and Mitchell's brigades, led by General 
Steedman waving a regimental flag. It was the turn- 
ing-point in the battle. Fearlessly confronting the 
advancing Confederate columns, Steedman's troops 
drove the enemy from the hill and again established 
the Federal right. But for this timely reenforcement 
there is little doubt that the Army of the Cumberland 
would have been utterly defeated and probably 
annihilated, for Granger had brought 4,000 fresh 
troops to the field and, what was needed as much as 
men, a supply of ammunition of which we were now 
almost destitute. 

But the end was not yet. With eleven brigades 
Longstreet again sought to dislodge the little band on 
Snodgrass Hill and assault after assault was made. 
Times of greatest danger develop the highest courage, 
often making heroes of men who are themselves un- 
conscious of the transformation. On one side were 
men flushed with victory and fighting to expel from 
their soil those whom they regarded as invaders of 
their homes ; on the other were men making a last 


stand for an army of which they were proud and for a 
Union they loved; both sides fought with a desperate 
valor never surpassed in the annals of war. Confed- 
erate soldiers were killed in front of the breastworks, 
some after they had crossed, and some were thrust 
back with the bayonet or with clubbed musket. When 
the ammunition of those on the hill ran low they re- 
plenished their scanty store from the cartridge-boxes 
of their dead and wounded comrades and renewed their 
fire, and those who had no ammunition still held fast 
to their guns, resolved to use their bayonets as a last 
resort. Thus the conflict was maintained until night- 

No higher tribute has ever been paid to the valor of 
both the Federal and the Confederate troops who 
fought that afternoon at Snodgrass Hill than that of 
General Hindman in his official report of the battle. 
Describing the assaults, he says : 15 

"The movement began at 3 :3c Skirmishing ex- 
tended along the whole line as Deas, at the extreme 
left, commenced swinging. In a few minutes a ter- 
rific contest ensued, which continued at close quarters, 
without any intermission, over four hours. Our 
troops attacked again and again with a courage worthy 
of their past achievements. The enemy fought with 
determined obstinacy and repeatedly repulsed us, but 
only to be again assailed. As showing the fierceness 
of the fight, the fact is mentioned that on our extreme 
left the bayonet was used, and men also killed and 

15 Reb. Rec, ser. No. 51, p. 305. 


wounded with clubbed muskets. A little after 4 the 
enemy was reenforced and advanced with loud shouts 
upon our right, but was repulsed by Anderson and 
Kershaw. At this time it became necessary to retire 
Garrity's battery, of Anderson's brigade, which had 
been doing effective service. It was subsequently held 
in reserve. Dent's battery of Deas's brigade was en- 
gaged throughout the struggle. Notwithstanding the 
repulses of our infantry, the officers and men of this 
battery stood to their guns undaunted and continued 
firing, inflicting severe loss on the enemy and contrib- 
uting largely to the success of my operations. 

"At 4:20 Brigadier-General Preston, of Buckner's 
corps, in answer to my application for help, brought 
me the timely and valuable reenforcement of Kelly's 
brigade, and within an hour afterward the remaining 
brigades of his division — Grade's and Trigg's. These 
brave troops as they arrived were conducted by officers 
of my staff to the right of my line, and promptly ad- 
vanced, in conjunction with the rest, upon the enemy 
From this time we gained ground , but, though now 
commanding nine brigades, with Kershaw co-operat- 
ing, and all in action, I found the gain both slow and 
costly. I have never known Federal troops to fight so 
well. It is just to say, also, that I never saw Confed- 
erate soldiers fight better." 

Some time after dark, probably about 7 p. m., an or- 
der came to those on the hill to retire, and that every 
man should hold his cartridge-box to prevent its rat- 
tling, step lightly, and make no noise. The little squad 
with which I left the hill was under the command of 
Lieut-Colonel Oyler of the 79th Ind. It numbered 
from one hundred and fifty to two hundred men, in- 


eluding some of the 79th and some of other regiments. 
We left none too soon, for a few minutes later three 
regiments posted to our right, the 21st and 89th Ohio, 
and the 22A Mich., which had not received the order in 
time, were quietly surrounded and captured by the 

Stepping on tip-toe the little band left the hill, no 
man speaking above a whisper. The deserted camp- 
fires by which we marched told us that a great part of 
the army had already retreated. We expected every 
moment to be halted or fired on by the Confederates. 
Our way was over a rough road through McFarland's 
Gap, a narrow mountain pass bordered by precipitous 
and densely wooded hills, of wild and forbidding ap- 
pearance in the day-time, and transformed by the som- 
ber shadows of the night into a region of almost super- 
natural gloom. To us, traveling at such a time and 
under such circumstances, everything assumed a weird 
look, suggestive rather of the infernal regions than of 
mother Earth. Now and then from some flickering 
camp-fire by the roadside a fitful flame shot up, for a 
moment illumining the dark ravine and showing the 
haggard and powder-begrimed faces of the passing 
marchers ; but most of the way was traveled in silence 
and in darkness, with barely light enough to enable us 
to discern the dim outlines of the file in front. We 
reached Rossville some time after 10 o'clock that night, 
and foot-sore and heart-sore, lay down for a few hours' 
sleep. The great battle was over and the Army of the 
Cumberland had been defeated. 


One need read but little of the literature relating- to 
the battle of Chickamauga to discover that it has given 
rise to infinite speculation and controversy concerning 
the causes of the defeat of the Federal army and the 
errors of both Rosecrans and Bragg. It is, however, 
generally conceded now that the initial blunder of 
Rosecrans was in allowing his troops to get so far away 
from Chattanooga and to become so widely separated 
without first ascertaining the whereabouts of Bragg's 
army. So great an army could not long have re- 
mained hidden, and, had Rosecrans used proper dili- 
gence, he might have ascertained its location in time 
to concentrate his own forces and so have avoided the 
disasters that followed. 

Before Rosecrans had obtained definite and reliable 
information of the location of the Confederate army, 
his own army was in imminent danger of being 
crushed in detail and, even after the junction of the 
Federal corps had been accomplished, there was still 
great danger that Bragg's army would intervene be- 
tween Rosecrans and Chattanooga, cut off his com- 
munications, and block retreat. To avoid these perils 
required long and hard marching, and for several days 
before and during the battle the movement of the Fed- 
eral army was steadily to the left. Day and night, 
over mountains and hills, through forests and fields, it 
was moving to the left. When the battle could no 
longer be postponed, the Federal forces, worn out by 
hard marching, were pitted against fresh troops on 
ground of the enemy's choosing. 


Moreover, the exigencies of the situation were such 
that, to supply Thomas with the reenforcements neces- 
sary to enable him to prevent Bragg from turning the 
left of the Federal army and getting between it and 
Chattanooga, it was necessary to weaken the right con- 
tinually in order to strengthen the left. In doing this 
the unity of the organizations of the 20th and 21st 
corps was broken, divisions were separated from corps 
and brigades from divisions, so that the troops were 
placed under strange commanders and subjected to 
conflicting orders, and all the strength coming from 
long association of officers and men was lost at a time 
when it was most needed. As already stated, immedi- 
ately before the break on Sunday McCook was bereft 
of all but two brigades of Davis's division, and when 
the order was given for the remaining two brigades 
of Van Cleve's division to go to the support of 
Thomas, Crittenden was left without a single brigade 
and Van Cleve without a single regiment. The new 
formations and changes of front in face of the enemy, 
made necessary by unexpected emergencies, were 
especially dangerous to the weakened right of the Fed- 
eral army, exposed to the overwhelming forces massed 
against it on Sunday. 

These facts should be emphasized in refutation of 
the impression which prevailed generally for some 
time after the battle, and may perhaps still exist in the 
minds of those who have not carefully studied the of- 
ficial reports, that the battle on the Federal side was 


fought chiefly by the 14th corps and that nearly all of 
the 20th and 21st corps ran away. 

Notwithstanding all the previous mistakes, the re- 
sult would undoubtedly have been vastly different had 
it not been for the disaster on Sunday ; but for this pos- 
sibly "Flodden had been Bannockburn." No human 
being could have anticipated the combination of cir- 
cumstances which caused it. Mere chances seemed to 
have developed the actual existing conditions. If 
these had been prearranged for the express purpose of 
producing the result which followed, they could not 
have been made to follow in more exact sequence or to 
fit together more nicely. 

Even after the confusion and partial demoralization 
following the break on Sunday afternoon, it was possi- 
ble that the result might have been different if it had 
occurred to some other general, as it did to Granger, 
"to march to the sound of the cannon" with even half 
of the five or six thousand men huddled together in 
Dry Creek Valley and about Rossville, and to make a 
stand on Snodgrass Hill with their comrades who were 
there making such a heroic fight. 

Colonel Thruston, McCook's chief of staff, states 
that he saw Sheridan soon after the disaster to the Fed- 
eral right and informed him of a short route by which 
he could effect a junction with General Thomas by 
marching only about two and a half miles. Had Sher- 
idan taken this route with such soldiers as he could 
gather together he might have fallen upon Longstreet's 
flanks, just as the latter was expecting, or might have 


taken some other position that would have turned the 
tide of battle. Instead of doing so he marched seven 
or eight miles over a circuitous route and did not reach 
Thomas until 6 p. m. 16 No one doubts the bravery or 
the soldierly abilities of General Sheridan and we must 
accept the explanation given by him in his Memoirs 
and by General Davies, his biographer, that, at the 
time, he thought himself in imminent danger of being 
cut off from the remainder of the army and believed 
the route which he took to reach General Thomas to 
be the only one practicable. 

Courts of inquiry were held to investigate the con- 
duct of some of the Federal generals but all were ex- 
onerated in flattering terms. The court which sat in 
General Negley's case went out of its way to censure 
a general who remained on the field and was conspicu- 
ous for gallant fighting at Chickamauga and in sub- 
sequent battles. One reading the proceedings of these 
courts is, indeed, likely to be somewhat bewildered in 
trying to ascertain the object of the inquiry — whether 
it was to vindicate those who left the field or to call 
for an explanation of the conduct of those who re- 
mained and fought out the battle to the end. 

1G In fact Forrest's cavalry and a Confederate corps of infantry 
(Walker's) had by that time intervened between Sheridan and 
Thomas. At dark Sheridan's heads of columns had advanced 
only as far as the Cloud House. A staff officer, sent by him to 
report his position to Thomas, reached the latter only by riding 
around the enemy. Thomas at that time was preparing to retire 
and sent word to Sheridan to remain where he was until Thomas's 
troops were withdrawn and then to return to Rossville. 


One general was never called to explain his conduct. 
No hostile criticism was ever made of the conduct of 
General Thomas, "the Rock of Chickamauga." Justice 
to the men of the 20th and 21st army corps, however, 
requires that something should be said in addition to 
what has already been stated, concerning the stripping 
of these corps of troops to reenforce Thomas. Pal- 
mer's and Wood's divisions of the 21st corps and John- 
son's of the 20th preserved their organization through- 
out the battle, and no better fighting was done by any 
troops on the field than was done by these divisions. 
Barnes's brigade of Van Cleve's division of the 21st 
corps also retained its organization. Of the two re- 
maining brigades, Beatty's and Dick's, part only left 
the field, and a very considerable number were with 
those who made the memorable stand on Snodgrass 
Hill. Five brigades of the 20th corps left. These 
were the three of Sheridan's and two of Davis's. The 
men of Thomas's corps who left the field exceeded in 
number all who left of the 21st corps. Van Home 
states the facts very clearly : 

"As the statement appears in many histories of the 
war, and even in some of recent publication, that Gen- 
eral Thomas with his single corps saved the army at 
Chickamauga, it is imperative to refute this error, as 
it does great injustice to the officers and men of the 
other corps. The preceding narrative gives an indi- 
rect refutation, but this prevalent mistake should be 
explicitly corrected. Generals Crittenden and Mc- 
Cook had each eight brigades on the field, and General 
Granger had three. And of these nineteen brigades, 


twelve were with General Thomas in the final conflict. 
Five brigades of McCook's corps were cut off on the 
right, but not more than two from Crittenden's, count- 
ing fragments. Palmer's division of Crittenden's 
corps and Johnson's from McCook's were with Gen- 
eral Thomas throughout the battle, and General Wood 
of the former corps, with two brigades of his own di- 
vision and one from Van Cleve's, went to him on the 
second day. Granger's three large brigades consti- 
tuted nearly one-fourth of the entire force on the final 
line. More men left the field from General Thomas's 
own corps, the Fourteenth, than from General Critten- 
den's. Four regiments of Wilder's brigade of Rey- 
nolds's division were on the right of the breach ; a large 
portion, more than a moiety, of Negley's division was 
led or driven from the field ( Beatty's brigade, through 
the emergencies of battle and orders of General Neg- 
ley's adjutant-general, joined the divisions on the 
right, and at night were found by General Beatty, at 
Rossville), and Brannan lost a portion of one of his 
brigades through orders of a general who left the field 
before the final crisis of the battle. The glory of the 
final conflict is then the common inheritance of the 
army, as it was won by the valor of troops represent- 
ing the four grand units." 17 

I have laid particular stress, even at the risk of be- 
ing tiresome, upon the facts relating to the part taken 
by the 20th and 21st corps, because of the injustice 
done them in the early reports of the battle. For this 
injustice Halleck is largely to blame. In the official re- 
port of the battle made by him as commander-in-chief, 

11 Hist. Army of the Cumberland, vol. I, pp. 361-2. 


November 15, 1863, he said: "Our right and part of 
center had been completely broken and fled in confusion 
from the field, carrying with them to Chattanooga 
their commanders, Generals McCook and Crittenden, 
and also General Rosecrans who was on that part of 
the line." In the same report, in order to emphasize 
the matter, he says, "As most of the corps of McCook 
and Crittenden had retreated to Chattanooga, it was 
deemed advisable to withdraw the left wing to that 
place." 18 

This report was made nearly two months after the 
battle and it would seem reasonable to suppose that in 
that time some glimmering idea of the greatest battle 
fought in the West, and, with the exception of Gettys- 
burg, the greatest of the Civil War, would have pene- 
trated even the brain of Halleck , but we have his own 
word for it in a dispatch to General Thomas, as late 
as January 12, 1864, that he had never read nor seen 
the latter's report of the battle. It is doubtful whether 
Halleck ever obtained a more accurate conception of 
the battle than he had of the military operations pre- 
ceding it, and of these it is certain that his ignorance 
was impenetrable. If any further vindication of the 
men of the 20th and 21st corps is needed, it will be 
found in the statistics of their losses given in the fol- 
lowing tables. 

The victory, such as it was, had been won by Bragg, 
but it had been dearly bought. A few more like it 

18 Rcb. Rcc, ser. No. 50, pp. 3R. 30. 



would have annihilated his army. It was too much 
broken and shattered to strike another blow, and Chat- 
tanooga, the prize for which the great battle was 
fought, had eluded the grasp of the victor. 

It is difficult to obtain from the official reports accurate sta- 
tistics of the numbers and losses of the Federal army in the 
battle of Chickamauga, and still more difficult to ascertain the 
Confederate numbers and losses. The following tables are com- 
piled chiefly from the official reports found in the Rebellion Rec- 
ords, ser. Nos. 50 and 51, and from the tables given in Turchin's 
Battle of Chickamauga: 
















General Headquarters. 
14th Corps. 


1st D. Baird. . 

2d D. Negley 

3d D. Brannan. . . . 
4th D. Reynolds . . . 





















20th Corps. 

1st D. Davis 

2d D. Johnson. 
3d D. Sheridan. 
















21st Corps. 


1st D. Wood 

2d D. Palmer 
3d D. Van Cleve 



















' 36.08 


























Reserve Corps. Granger. 


1st D. Steedman. . . . 

2d D. Morgan. . . 









Aggregate... . 
Cav. Corps. Mitchel. 

1st D. McCook 

2d D.Crook 
























The character of the ground and the nature of the battle were 
not favorable to operations of the cavalry, and calculations based 
on the numbers and losses of the infantry only show a percentage 
of loss of 31.50. Of the 4,757 reported "missing," doubtless many 
were killed and many more wounded. The general hospital at 
Crawfish Spring was captured, and it is estimated by Surgeon 
Glover Perin, the Federal Medical Director of the Department 
of the Cumberland, that 2,500 of the Federal wounded were left 
on the field. 

The brigade reports show still larger percentages of loss. 
Baldwin's and Willich s brigades lost heavily, but no official re- 
ports were made of the numbers who went into action, and hence 
the percentages of their losses can not be given. The same is true 
of the brigades of Sheridan's division, none of which made any 
return of the numbers engaged. The following tables show that 
several brigades lost over 40 and some over 50 per cent. : 








Heg.. .. 


Carlin .... 


Van Derveer. 
















5 f 









Whitaker's brigade suffered much the heaviest loss for the 
time engaged, nearly all having occurred between 2 p. m. and 
nightfall on the second day of the battle. Of the seven brigades 
cut off on the right and driven from the field on Sunday, Carlin's 
and Heg's belonged to Davis's division, Lytle's, Laiboldt's, and 
Bradley's to Sheridan s, Beatty's and Dick's to Van Cleve's. 
That they did not leave the field until they had done some hard 
fighting is shown by their losses. From those of Carlin's and 
Heg's brigades, given above, it appears that Heg's brigade lost a 
greater per cent, than any other brigade in the battle, and that 
Carlin's was third in the list. The losses of the other five 
brigades are shown in the following table : 




















Lytle, Laiboldt, Bradley 

—Aggregate . 







S. Beatty 














The following table of Confederate numbers and losses is taken 
from Turchin's Battle of Chickamauga, p. 240: 





















Right wing — Polk. 
Hill's Corps : 

Breckinridge's Div 

Cleburne's " 

Walker and 
Polk's Corps : 

Cheatham's " 


















Total right wing 







Left wing — Longstreet. 
Stewart's Div ... 

Hood's " 

McLaws's " 

Johnson's " 

Hindmans " 

Preston's " 
















Total left wing 

Cavalry, Wheeler, about. 
Total Army of Tenn . 








It will be noted that the foregoing calculations are based on the 
statements placing the numbers engaged as : 



Van Home (vol. 1, pp. 360-361) says that there is no reason to 
doubt that "General Bragg's army was the larger." He estimates 
that General Rosecrans had in action 30 brigades of infantry, 5 of 
cavalry, and 1 of mounted infantry; in all, 135 regiments of in- 
fantry, 21 of cavalry, and 5 of mounted infantry, together with 33 
batteries, amounting in all to 56,160. He estimates that General 
Bragg had in the field 35 brigades of infantry and 10 or 12 of 
cavalry, and that he had in all 70,000, thus making his army su- 


perior in numbers to that of General Rosecrans by 12,000 to 

In Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (vol. 3, PP- 673, 676) 
are tables compiled from statistics furnished by Adj.-Gen. Richard 
C. Drum, stating the numbers engaged as : 

Federals .... 56,965 

Confederates ..71,551 

Colonel Livermore's tables (2d ed., pp. 105, 106) state the num- 
bers engaged as : 

Federals 58,222 

Confederates 06,326 

The latest computation of the Confederate losses which I have 
seen is the following, furnished me by Colonel William F Fox : 

Right wing. . 

Left wing 

Scott's Cavalry 

Other Cavalry (estimated). 


1. 137 










2,127 13,368 1,410 16,905 

To this Colonel Fox adds the following : 

"The provost marshal of the Union Army reported that 2,005 
Confederate prisoners were captured at Chickamauga. This 
would indicate a total loss of 17,500 instead of 16,905, as shown 
in the Confederate returns, some of which make no mention of 
their missing." 

It will be seen that in the tables given above there is not a 
great difference in the statements of the numbers of the Federal 
army engaged, the average being about 57,675, but that there is a 
considerable variation in the figures given for the Confederate 
numbers engaged, the general average being about 66,155, which 
very nearly agrees with the figures of Colonel Livermore. The 
percentages of losses, computed on Colonel Livermore's tables, 
are about the same as those above given for the Federal, but 
somewhat less for the Confederate. 

General Boynton {Chickamauga National Military Park, pp. 
227-8), basing his calculations upon estimates of numbers and 
losses somewhat different from those of the foregoing tables, 
states the percentages of losses as follows : 


"A reference to the losses on each side will show that there has 
been no exaggeration in the description of the fighting. Rose- 
crans's loss was 16,179. This included 4,774 missing, of which a 
large number were killed or wounded. Bragg's losses, as com- 
piled and estimated at the War Records office, were 17,804. Thus 
the total loss for each army was over 25 per cent, of the entire 
force of each, and it will be found to average about 33 per cent, 
on each side for the troops actually engaged. 

"Longstreet's wing of the Confederate army lost 44 per cent., 
nearly all of this on the second day, and the largest part of that 
in an hour and a half on Sunday afternoon. 

"Steedman's and Brannan s divisions, which confronted a por- 
tion of Longstreet's assault, lost, the first, 49 per cent, in four 
hours, and all these were killed or wounded but one, and the 
second, an average of 38 per cent., while one brigade, Van Der- 
veer's, of Brannan, lost only a small fraction less than 50 per cent. 

"For the entire Union army the losses ranged from these 
maximum figures down to 33 per cent., a terrible minimum of one 
in three. 

"Bushrod Johnson's division lost 44 per cent., Patton Ander- 
son s brigade, of Hindman's, 30 per cent., and most of this on 
Sunday afternoon. Bate's brigade, of Stewart's division, lost 52 
per cent. Preston's division, in an hour and a half before sunset 
on Sunday, lost 33 per cent., and Gracie's brigade nearly 35 per 
cent, in a single hour while assaulting Brannan's position on the 
Horseshoe. The brigade losses in Cheatham's division ranged 
from 35 to 50 per cent. The aggregate loss in Breckinridge's 
division was 33 per cent. Cleburne's loss was 43 per cent." 




By midnight on September 20 nearly all the survi- 
vors of the Army of the Cumberland, able for duty, 
were collected by General Thomas at or near Rossvilk 
and were posted across the Lafayette road, at McFar 
land's Gap, and on Missionary Ridge to the right and 
left of it. They maintained substantially this position 
on the 2 1 st. Bragg followed and that night the Fed- 
eral army occupied Chattanooga; by morning of the 
22d its lines were established and fortifications begun. 
The same day Bragg's army took possession of Look- 
out Mountain and Missionary Ridge, but the attack 
ordered by him for the 23d and fully expected by the 
Federal troops, was indefinitely postponed. By this 
time the Union troops had learned that the great battle 
had been as disastrous in loss of life to the victors as tc 
the vanquished, and that their defeat was due to acci- 
dent, not to any lack of courage or discipline. There 

1 For descriptions of the battle-fields about Chattanooga, the 
troops engaged and many valuable statistics, I am largely indebted 
to General Boynton's The Chickamauga National Military Park. 
See also Van Home: Hist. Army of the Cumberland; Cist: Army 
of the Cumberland, and the official reports contained in Rebellion 
Records, ser. No. 55. 



remained an army that would have been formidable 
on any field, and no one in its ranks doubted its ability 
to hold Chattanooga. Bragg was evidently of the same 
opinion for his army quietly settled down about the 
town with the expectation, not of fighting out the 
Union troops, but of starving them out. The danger 
of starving them out grew greater every day. 

Bragg's army, stretching from the Tennessee river 
along Missionary Ridge and across the valley to Look- 
out Mountain, almost encompassed the town. The 
Confederate batteries on Lookout Mountain command- 
ed the river as well as the road and the railroad on the 
south bank of the Tennessee. To procure supplies 
from the North the supply trains were obliged to 
travel from Bridgeport, Alabama, to Chattanooga, a 
distance of sixty miles, by way of the Sequatchie Val- 
ley and over the mountains. When the rains set in the 
roads became very bad and the exhausted mules died 
by thousands until the route, strewn with their skele- 
tons, looked, as I once heard it described, like a long 
extended back-bone. Moreover, this slender line of 
communication was continually threatened by the ene- 
my's cavalry Wheeler's troops captured and burned 
one supply train and every day increased the danger 
that the Union army would be compelled either to 
surrender or to attempt a retreat to Nashville, which 
would expose it to the hazard of utter demoralization 
and possible destruction. From lack of forage great 
numbers of the artillery horses died, and the little corn 
for the few remaining horses and mules was guarded 


with the utmost vigilance from hungry soldiers, who 
were first put on half and then on quarter rations. I 
sometimes saw men pick up the few grains of corn left 
where horses had been fed and parch them for food. 
During the whole of October, while I was never off 
duty, I was so sick that I had little appetite, and lived 
chiefly on one meal a day — a scanty dinner procured 
at the house of a colored man near the camp. During 
the time of our sorest distress, Jefferson Davis vis- 
ited Bragg's army and, looking down from Pulpit 
Rock, on Lookout Mountain, upon the starving garri- 
son in Chattanooga, he gloatingly predicted its speedy 

The situation is thus concisely stated in the report 
of General Grant : 2 

"Up to this period [October 28] our forces at Chat- 
tanooga were practically invested, the enemy's line 
extending from the Tennessee river above Chattanooga 
to the river at and below the point of Lookout Moun- 
tain below Chattanooga, with the south bank of the 
river picketed to near Bridgeport, his main force being 
fortified in Chattanooga Valley, at the foot of and on 
Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, and a 
brigade in Lookout Valley. True, we held possession 
of the country north of the river, but it was from sixty 
to seventy miles over the most impracticable of roads 
to any supplies. The artillery horses and mules had 
become so reduced by starvation that they could not 
have been relied on for moving anything. An attempt 
at retreat must have been with men alone, and with 

2 Reb. Rec.j ser. No. 55, p. 29. 


only such supplies as they could carry. A retreat 
would have been almost certain annihilation, for the 
enemy, occupying positions within gunshot of and 
overlooking our very fortifications, would unquestion- 
ably have pursued our retreating forces. Already more 
than 10,000 animals had perished in supplying half 
rations to the troops by the long and tedious route 
from Stevenson and Bridgeport to Chattanooga, over 
Walden Ridge. They could not have been supplied 
another week." 

It was during this stress that General Thomas, in 
response to a message from General Grant, telling him 
to "hold Chattanooga at all hazards" and inquiring the 
prospects for holding out, returned the historic an- 
swer, "We will hold the town till we starve." 

The timber near the fortifications had been cut down 
and the proximity of the Confederate pickets made it 
difficult to procure enough wood with which to cook 
the few provisions we had. The Confederate batter- 
ies on Lookout Mountain were continually harassing 
us, and so near was the enemy to our lines that the mo- 
ment the Federal pickets left their works to go to the 
picket stations they were exposed to the fire of the 
Confederate sharpshooters. Evidently the Confeder- 
ates expected that the Union army would soon be com- 
pelled to evacuate. 

On a clear night the band at Bragg's headquarters 
on Missionary Ridge could be distinctly heard in our 
camp. We had no army tune so melodious as "Dixie," 
but when wafted through the still night air from Mis- 


sionary Ridge it seemed to have a weird sound, creat- 
ing in me a strange foreboding. 

As the days passed the situation of the beleaguered 
army became more critical. But relief was coming. 
Early in October, "fighting Jo. Hooker" arrived from 
the East with the nth and 12th corps, and so disposed 
his troops between Nashville and Bridgeport as to pro- 
tect a portion at least of Rosecrans's communications. 

About this time important military changes were 
made. Parts of the nth and 12th corps had been 
transferred from the Army of the Potomac to the 
Army of the Cumberland, and, as already stated, they 
had arrived early in October. Generals McCook and 
Crittenden were relieved October 9, and the 20th and 
2 1st corps were consolidated into the 4th, under com- 
mand of General Gordon Granger. The new corps 
comprised three divisions, General John M. Palmer 
commanding the first, General Philip H. Sheridan 
the second, and General Thomas J. Wood the third, 
which included the brigade of General Samuel Beatty. 
On October 18th the Military Division of the Missis- 
sippi was created, including the three departments of 
the Tennessee, the Cumberland and the Ohio, with 
General Grant in command, and at the same time 
General Rosecrans was superseded by General Thomas. 

The soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland always 
entertained kindly feeling for Rosecrans, believing that 
he had been made to suffer for disasters for which he 
was not wholly responsible, and that if he had been 
sustained with the powerful backing at Washington 


extended to some other generals, he might have 
achieved higher distinction among the military heroes 
of the war. But with all this kindly feeling, unmixed 
with the slightest doubt of either his bravery or his 
loyalty, there was also a conviction that he possessed 
some faults which seriously impaired his usefulness 
as a commander. He had an unfortunate tendency to 
set up his own judgment against that of his superiors, 
and this continually involved him in trouble with them. 
Moreover, it was thought that he lacked the far-seeing 
sagacity and careful attention to details which charac- 
terized Thomas; that he also lacked the latter's equi- 
poise, self-possession, presence of mind, or some other 
quality, whatever it was, that in time of disaster, seem- 
ingly irretrievable, made Thomas as clear-headed, as 
imperturbable, as immovable as he would have been if 
witnessing nothing more exciting than a grand review 
Rosecrans had neither the foresight which enabled 
Thomas to avoid disaster nor that extraordinary qual- 
ity, characteristic of Thomas but possessed by so few 
men, which, when disaster comes, however great, de- 
velops in them a latent power enabling them to tri- 
umph over it. Had Rosecrans possessed the qualities 
for which Thomas was so conspicuous, the misfortunes 
at Stone's River and Chickamauga might never have 
occurred, at least their consequences would probably 
have been far less serious. 

General Grant arrived at Chattanooga October 2$, 
and at once began preparations for raising the siege. 
Toward the end of October Hooker advanced from 


Bridgeport, and, after a sharp encounter with the Con- 
federates at Wauhatchie, took possession of Lookout 
Valley, and the way was speedily opened for getting 
supplies. General Sherman was on the way with the 
15th and part of the 17th corps, advancing as rapidly 
as the roads would permit ; all available troops in the 
rear were hurried forward to Chattanooga; great 
siege-guns were mounted in the forts ; and on every 
hand were visible preparations indicative of some 
momentous movement. 

About this time Bragg committed the blunder of 
diminishing his army by sending Longstreet to attack 
Burnside in east Tennessee, and Longstreet started 
November 4 with 20,000 men. On November 7 Gen- 
eral Grant issued peremptory orders to Thomas to 
attack the north end of Missionary Ridge on the fol- 
lowing morning. A careful examination showed that 
such an attack under the existing circumstances would 
almost certainly fail. Thomas so reported and the or- 
der was revoked. This seems to have been the begin- 
ning of the ill opinion which Grant ever afterward 
appears to have entertained for Thomas. The subse- 
quent failure of Sherman, under much more favorable 
circumstances and after two days' fighting, to make 
a successful assault at the identical place mentioned in 
the order to Thomas, justifies the opinion of military 
critics that, in this instance, Thomas was right and 
Grant was wrong. 3 

3 See General William F Smith's article, Comments on General 
Grant's "Chattanooga," in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 


It was found that the contemplated attack on Mis- 
sionary Ridge would be impracticable until the arrival 
of Sherman. He reached Bridgeport, Alabama, No- 
vember 15, and, in anticipation of his arrival in time, 
it was decided to begin the attack on Missionary Ridge 
Saturday, November 21. The general plan was out- 
lined in an order issued to General Thomas on the 
1 8th, in which it was stated: 

"However, the general plan, you understand, is for 
Sherman, with his force brought with him, strength- 
ened by a division from your command, to effect a 
crossing of the Tennessee river just below the mouth 
of the Chickamauga ; his crossing to be protected by 
artillery from the heights on the north bank of the 
river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to 
secure the heights from the northern extremity to 
about the railroad tunnel, before the enemy can con- 
centrate against him. 

"You will co-operate with Sherman. The troops in 
Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on 
your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to 
defend fortifications on the right and center, and a 
movable column of one division in readiness to move 
whenever ordered. This division should show itself 
as threatening!}- as possible, on the most practicable 
line for making an attack up the valley. Your effort 
will then be to form a junction with Sherman, making 
your advance well toward the north end of Missionary 
Ridge, and moving as nearly simultaneously with him 
as possible. The juncture once formed and the ridge 

vol. 3, p. 715; Van Home: Life of George H. Thomas, pp. 160- 
166; Nicolay and Hay: Abraham Lincoln, vol. 8, p. 131. 



carried, communications will be at once established 
between the two armies, by roads on the south bank 
of the river. Further movements will then depend on 
those of the enemy." 4 

In this general plan it will be observed that Sherman 
was to take the leading part and that to his movements 
those of the troops under Thomas were to be entirely 
subordinate. The former was delayed, however, by 
the bad condition of the roads and the attack designed 
to be begun on the 21st was postponed to the 23d. In 
the meantime Grant, fearing that Bragg was prepar- 
ing to retreat before a decisive blow could be struck, 
ordered Thomas to make a reconnaissance to ascertain 
whether the Confederates were still maintaining their 
position. This was done by the troops of the Army of 
the Cumberland under the immediate command of 
Thomas, beginning about noon on Monday the 23d, 
Wood's and Sheridan's divisions being in the lead, the 
former advancing in the direction of Orchard Knob 
with Sheridan's division on the right. So secretly had 
all the arrangements been made that when the troops 
leading the advance were formed in front of Fort 
Wood, many supposed they were preparing for a grand 
review on the open space in front. They were not 
long in doubt, however, for about 2 p. m. the advance 
began. So rapidly was it made that Orchard Knob 
and the high ground in its vicinity were speedily taken 

*Reb. Rec, vol. 55, p. 31. 


and fortified and that night a battery was planted upon 
the knob. 

Tuesday, the 24th, was an exciting day. Wood's 
and Sheridan's divisions of the 4th corps and Baird's 
and Johnson's of the 14th remained in line of battle 
near Orchard Knob. At intervals the siege-guns in 
Fort Wood fired at the Confederates on Missionary 
Ridge, the shells going over our heads and making 
a most unearthly screeching noise, such as we imagined 
might be made by some invisible saw-mill swiftly trans- 
ported through the air and in operation by Satan with 
a full set of hands. 

Other and far more exciting movements occupied 
our attention during the day. Sherman's troops had 
arrived on the 23d and he had three of his divisions in 
position behind the hills opposite the mouth of Chicka- 
mauga creek. By daylight of the 24th these had 
crossed to the east side of the Tennessee river where 
they were joined by General Jeff C. Davis's division of 
the 14th corps. One of Sherman's divisions, Oster- 
haus's, not being able to cross in time to co-operate 
with the others, joined the command of General 
Hooker. At 1 p. m. Sherman's troops were formed to 
begin the attack on the north end of the ridge, with the 
expectation of carrying it as far south as the tunnel, 
and at 3 :30 they had gained the foot-hills and two 
high points, separated by a deep depression from the 
portion of the ridge over the tunnel; but they failed 
to reach the tunnel, which was Sherman's chief ob- 
jective point, and at night the Confederates still main- 


tained their position. We could not see, but could 
plainly hear, the battle on our left. All that afternoon 
the volleys of musketry indicated to the veteran soldier 
the fierceness of the conflict. 

A still more exciting contest was being waged on 
our right. General Hooker with Geary's division of 
the 1 2th corps, Osterhaus's division of the 15th, and 
two brigades (Whitaker's and Grose's) of Cruft's di- 
vision of the 4th, had crossed Lookout creek early in 
the morning of the 24th and had begun the attack on 
the Confederate forces at the base and sides of Lookout 
Mountain. This was wholly unexpected, for it had 
never occurred to us that an attempt would be made 
to scale its precipitous and rocky steeps. One would 
almost as soon think of storming Gibraltar. But surely 
the attempt was being made to carry Lookout Moun- 
tain. During a considerable part of the day it was so 
foggy that we could see only the flashing of the guns, 
but at intervals the fog lifted, revealing the Federal 
line in the distance looking like a dark thread, slowly 
advancing from rock to rock. Then cheer after cheer 
went up from our own lines, for it was obvious that the 
Federal troops were steadily but surely gaining ground. 
Far into the night the flashes of musketry indicated 
that the weird "battle among the clouds" had not 

A grander sight greeted us next morning, for, as 
soon as it was clear enough to see, we beheld, floating 
from the summit of the mountain, the stars and stripes. 
The mountain itself is grand. Lifting its bold and 


frowning front 1,600 feet above the valley below, 
it affords from its summit one of the most magnifi- 
cent views in America. But it never looked grander 
than on the morning of November 25, 1863. 

Neither the advance on Orchard Knob nor the 
storming of Lookout Mountain was contemplated in 
Grant's original plan. The first was intended merely 
as a reconnaissance to develop the enemy's position 
and to determine whether Bragg had begun to retreat ; 
the second was undertaken at the suggestion of 
Thomas. Both had resulted in surprising and un- 
looked-for success. On the other hand, Sherman had 
failed to capture the north end of Missionary Ridge 
and thus carry out what was designed as the leading 
movement, to which, as already stated, the movements 
of all the other troops were intended to be subordinate. 

On the night of the 24th General Grant, as shown 
in his dispatch to Halleck of that date, and also in his 
order to Thomas of the same date, erroneously sup- 
posed that Sherman had gained the north end of Mis- 
sionary Ridge as far as the tunnel. On this supposi- 
tion, at midnight on the 24th, he issued an order to 
Sherman directing him "to attack the enemy at the 
point most advantageous for his position at early 
dawn to-morrow morning." At the same time the 
following order was issued to General Thomas : 

"General General Sherman carried Missionary 
Ridge as far as the tunnel, with only slight skirmish- 
ing. His right now rests at the tunnel and on top of 
the hill ; his left at Chickamauga creek. 


"I have instructed General Sherman to advance as 
soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, 
which will be simultaneous, will be in co-operation. 

"Your command will either carry the rifle-pits and 
ridge directly in front of them or move to the left, as 
the presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker's 
present position on the mountain can be maintained 
with a small force, and it is found impracticable to 
carry the top from where he is, it would be advisable 
for him to move up the valley with all the force he can 
spare and ascend by the first practicable road. 
"Very respectfully, 

"U. S. Grant, 
"Major-General, Commanding." 

When this order was issued it was expected that 
Sherman on the morning of the 25th would sweep 
down the ridge from the north end, that Hooker would 
reach the south end of the ridge near Rossville and 
advance northward; and it was intended that the ap- 
pearance of his column, moving north on Missionary 
Ridge, should be the signal for the advance of the 
troops under the immediate command of Thomas, who 
were then to storm the enemy's center on Missionary 
Ridge. But the next morning it was discovered that 
the Confederates, though they had evacuated Lookout 
Mountain, had concentrated their entire army on Mis- 
sionary Ridge and that, instead of retreating, they 
were prepared to make a stubborn defense. They had 
successfully resisted all Sherman's assaults, had forti- 
fied the north end of the ridge, and had reenforced the 
troops at that point. Hooker started from Lookout 


Mountain about 10 a. m. to fulfil his part of Grant's 
plan, but was detained three or four hours at Chatta- 
nooga creek, on account of the burning- of a bridge 
by the retreating Confederates, and could not cross 
until about 2 p. m. Though "anxiously looked for 
and momentarily expected," by General Grant, Hooker 
was not in sight at the point where he was expected 
to be on the morning of the 25th. 

The day wore on until noon and still the Confeder- 
ates were successfully resisting every assault on the 
north end of the ridge by the troops under Sherman, 
who now had under his command three of the divi- 
sions that he had brought with him, Morgan L. Smith's 
and Ewing's divisions of the 15th corps and John E. 
Smith's of the 17th, and, besides these, Steinwehr's 
and Schurz's divisions of the nth corps, Davis's divi- 
sion and Starkweather's brigade of Baird's division of 
the 14th corps — six divisions and one brigade of the 
thirteen divisions of the whole army at Chattanooga. 
Confronting Sherman were three brigades — Smith's, 
Govan's and Lowrey's — of Cleburne's division ; two — 
Brown's and Cummings's — of Stevenson's division, 
and one — Maney's — of Walker's division. 

Of the remaining divisions, three and part of another 
were in the vicinity of Orchard Knob under the im- 
mediate command of Thomas. These were Sheridan's 
and Wood's divisions of the 4th corps, Baird's divi- 
sion, and two brigades — Carlin's and Moore's — of 
Johnson's division of the 14th corps. When the assault 
began, these four divisions were ranged from right to 


left in the following order : Johnson's, Sheridan's, 
Wood's and Baird's. Confronting them were the Con- 
federate divisions of Stewart, Bate, Anderson, and 
Cheatham, ranged from left to right in the order 

As expressed by brigades, the comparative strength 
of Sherman and Thomas and the Confederate troops 
confronting them was as follows : Sherman had thir- 
teen brigades, and opposed to these the Confederates 
had six, Thomas had eleven, and opposed to these the 
Confederates had thirteen. 

Hooker had under his immediate command Whita- 
ker's and Grose's brigades of Cruft's division of the 
4th corps, Geary's division of the 12th and Osterhaus's 
division of the 1 5th. A considerable interval separated 
the right of Sherman's troops from the left of Thomas, 
and there was a still greater interval between the right 
of Thomas and the left of Hooker. 

In the forenoon of the 25th Baird's division had been 
sent to reenforce Sherman, in pursuance of Grant's 
purpose to make Sherman's movement the cardinal 
one of the battle, but, as there was no place in Sher- 
man's line for this division, it was sent back, and about 
2 p. m. took position on the left of Wood. 

All the Confederate army was now on Missionary 
Ridge, and on its summit were planted fifteen batter- 
ies, comprising about fifty guns. There were also 
two siege-pieces near Bragg's headquarters. The dis- 
tance from the Federal lines to the top of the ridge 
was about one mile, and the slope of the ridge, which 


was steep and rough, was about six hundred yards in 
width, its average height being about four hundred 
feet. There was a line of rifle-pits at the base, a line 
of breastworks on the crest, and at various intermedi- 
ate places there were breastworks on the slope of the 

During the forenoon the movements of the Confed- 
erates seemed to indicate that they were massing 
against Sherman, and Grant supposed that, in order 
to do this, they were weakening their center. This 
was not true, however, for the Confederate troops seen 
during the forenoon marching north along the ridge 
were those that had been withdrawn from Lookout 
Mountain and the valley. In his Memoirs 5 Grant 
says : "Sherman's condition was getting so critical 
that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any 
longer." In his official report 6 he says : 

"Being satisfied from the latest information from 
him [Hooker] that he must by this time be on his way 
from Rossville, though not yet in sight, and discover- 
ing that the enemy in his desperation to defeat or resist 
the progress of Sherman was weakening his center on 
Missionary Ridge, determined me to order the advance 
at once. Thomas was accordingly directed to move 
forward his troops, constituting our center, Baird's di- 
vision (Fourteenth corps), Wood's and Sheridan's 
divisions (Fourth corps), and Johnson's division 

6 Vol. 2, p. 78. 

"Rcb. Rcc, ser. No. 55, p. 34- 



(Fourteenth corps), with a double line of skirmishers 
thrown out, followed in easy supporting distance by 
the whole force, and carry the rifle-pits at the foot of 
Missionary Ridge, and when carried to reform his lines 
on the rifle-pits with a view to carrying the top of the 

It is not probable that Grant at this time intended 
that Thomas with four divisions, isolated from both 
Sherman's and Hooker's forces, the latter not yet in 
sight, and with the entire Confederate army on the 
ridge, should make an independent assault with any 
reasonable expectation of breaking the enemy's center 
posted on the steep and well- fortified heights in front. 
It is evident that only a demonstration for the relief 
of Sherman was intended, with the expectation that, 
after taking the rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge, the 
further movements of the assaulting columns would be 
governed by further orders, dependent on subsequent 
developments, and especially upon the success of Hook- 
er's movement. 

Soon after the return of Baird, Grant ordered an 
advance of Thomas's four divisions. Six cannon 
planted on Orchard Knob were to be fired in quick suc- 
cession, the firing to be the signal for the advance. 
On the knob stood Generals Grant, Thomas, and 
Granger. Near by were Generals Sheridan, Wood, 
and others whose names are now historic. In front of 
them was a long line of men in blue, upon whom all 
eyes were fixed — battle-scarred veterans of many 
bloody conflicts — standing motionless in the trenches, 


eagerly waiting for the signal to advance. It was 
given between 3 and 4 p. m. and at once began the 
charge, characterized by Dana in his dispatch to 
Stanton as "one of the greatest miracles in military 
history " It was a sight never to be forgotten by those 
who witnessed it. No sooner had the signal been 
given than the men of the four divisions of the Army 
of the Cumberland leaped from their places, eighty- 
eight battle-flags waved in line, and 18,000 men, 
making a battle-front two miles long, rushed forward 
with loud cheers, heard above all the din of battle, 
and drove the Confederates from their works at the 
foot of the ridge. At the same instant all the batteries 
on the ridge concentrated their fire upon the rifle- 
pits at the base and the bursting of shells made the 
very sky look as if filled with falling meteors. 

Then occurred the grandest spectacle I ever saw, 
affording another striking illustration of the intelli- 
gence and intrepidity of the American soldier acting 
on his own instincts. The orders given contemplated 
carrying the rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge and then 
reforming and waiting for further orders ; at least 
they were so understood by all or nearly all the troops 
engaged in the assault, and certainly by those of 
Wood's and Sheridan's divisions. But, after the rifle- 
pits at the foot of the ridge had been taken, it was at 
once apparent that they were completely commanded 
by the Confederate artillery on the top of the ridge 
and could not be held, and that the Federal troops 
must either advance or retreat. This is evident from 


the official report of General Sheridan, and it was as 
obvious to the men as it was to the generals. With- 
out waiting for further orders the advancing troops 
at once began the ascent of the ridge, the men going 
first, the officers following, and the orders following 
the officers. 

To one who stands now on the summit of Mission- 
ary Ridge, looking down its steep sides, the wondei 
is that an attempt to carry the works on the crest 
could have been contemplated, and still greater wondei 
that such an attempt could have been successful. Cer- 
tainly, until the last moment, Bragg never entertained 
a thought that such an assault would be made. But 
there were the Federal troops in long lines rushing up 
the steep ascent. 

All the batteries on the ridge to the right and left oi 
Bragg's headquarters opened a terrific cannonade, fir- 
ing in front and across the sides of the ridge at the as- 
cending columns, while sheets of flame shot forth from 
the Confederate troops behind the breastworks on the 

The 79th Ind. and the 86th Ind. regiments had been 
consolidated for the day under the command of Colonel 
Knefler, the 79th forming the right wing and the 86th 
the left, and the two being in the front line of Wood's 
division. When within fifty or seventy-five feet of 
the crest, at a point a little north of Bragg's head- 
quarters, a halt was made in order to reform the lines. 
At this moment I looked and saw that Wood's divi- 
sion was considerably in advance of the divisions on 


its right and left, and I spoke to Colonel Knefler, near 
whom I was standing, calling his attention to the fact 
that we were alone. I am confirmed in my recollection 
of this incident by the mention of it in Colonel Knef- 
ler's official report of the battle. 

We were now so near the Confederate breastworks 
that they afforded almost as much protection to us as 
to the troops behind them, but our only safety lay in 
keeping up a steady fire. If a retreat had been at- 
tempted every Confederate behind the breastworks 
would have risen and fired and we knew that such a 
fire meant certain death to all of us. But no one 
thought of retreating, though our position for a few 
moments was very critical. It seemed an age, but it 
could not have been more than a few minutes, perhaps 
not more than two or three, before the divisions on 
our right and left were in line with that of Wood. 
During the interval I was nearly opposite a gigantic 
Confederate who stood for a time in one position fir- 
ing guns handed him by those in the trenches. He 
looked to me like a demon. Once I thought he was 
aiming at Colonel Knefler or me and we both lay 
down. As I lay down a bullet rattled the leaves under 
me and I noticed from the peeling of a small sapling 
near by that another had passed just where my head 
had been the instant before. 

We waited only a few minutes, perhaps only a few 
seconds, for no man can accurately measure the pass- 
ing time when seconds seem ages, and then the whole 
Federal line made an almost simultaneous rush and 


at six different points, in almost the same instant, the 
Federal soldiers leaped over the breastworks. General 
Bragg, after vainly endeavoring to rally his men, 
barely escaped by galloping at full speed down the 
other side of the ridge. We found the giant Confed- 
erate, whom I had observed a few moments before, 
lying dead in the trenches, riddled with bullets. Hun- 
dreds of Confederates threw down their arms and sur- 
rendered. Thirty or forty pieces of artillery stood 
near the place where we crossed, abandoned by their 
gunners. It was an inspiring sight. I was myself, 
for the moment, utterly delirious with excitement. We 
had recovered not only the guns but the prestige lost at 
Chickamauga, and I knew then that no higher tribute 
could ever be paid a soldier than to say of him that he 
was in the charge at Missionary Ridge. Shortly after 
this General Grant and all his staff came riding up the 
ridge, crossing the Confederate lines a little south of 
Bragg's headquarters. That was the first and last 
time I saw Grant on a battle-field. 

Some further resistance was made by the Confed- 
erates on the north end of the ridge, but the battles 
about Chattanooga were virtually over. Bragg's army 
was completely broken and in full retreat, and the 
siege of Chattanooga was ended. So rapid was the 
advance of the Federal lines that only fifty-five min- 
utes elapsed from the time they started until they 
gained the crest. 

That night we heard floating through the still frosty 
air the notes of a band playing a familiar tune near 


the place where Bragg's headquarters had been. It 
was not "Dixie" that we had so often heard there but 
the "Star-spangled Banner." Regiment after regi- 
ment took up the cheer until ft was heard ringing all 
round the line to Lookout Mountain. 

The battles that ended the siege of Chattanooga 
will ever be memorable in the history of the Civil War. 
The glory of the final triumph was shared by the heroes 
of three great northern armies — the Army of the Po- 
tomac, the Army of the Tennessee, and the Army of 
the Cumberland. On the field were four Federal gen- 
erals whose names stand highest on the roll of famous 
Union commanders — Grant, Sherman, Thomas, and 
Sheridan. No other battle of the war exhibited any- 
thing more sublimely picturesque than the "battle 
among the clouds" and the storming of Missionary 

Some surprise has been expressed that such an as- 
sault as that of Missionary Ridge was successfully 
made with so little loss of life. In some of the official 
reports this is explained as due to the conformation of 
the ground and to the fact that the Confederate artil- 
lerymen could not, or did not, sufficiently depress their 
guns and so overshot the assaulting columns. Grant's 
explanation 7 is that : "In fact on that occasion the 
Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest 
position." This explanation is all the more singular 
because it overlooks the fact that the Union soldier 

7 Memoirs, vol. J. p. 79. 


"nearest the enemy," in order to get there, was obliged 
to travel a mile, going up a steep ascent and exposed 
at every step to a galling fire in front and on each side. 
All these "explanations" tend to belittle the achieve- 
ment of the four divisions of the Army of the Cumber- 
land by creating the impression that, as the losses were 
so slight, there could not have been very hard fighting 
nor very much danger, and that, in fact, the brilliant 
victory won by the Army of the Cumberland was 
merely a lucky accident. Considering its actual losses 
and that they were sustained within less than one hour, 
it does not seem that these explanations are called for. 

The tables in the note appended to this chapter show 
that, in the space of one hour, the four divisions of the 
Army of the Cumberland which made the assault on 
Missionary Ridge lost over sixteen per cent., and that 
two of them lost over twenty per cent., nearly twice 
as many as all the troops under Sherman in two days' 
fighting. Such losses in so short a period indicate 
that the great victory gained by the Army of the Cum- 
berland was far from being bloodless and that it was 
won by as desperate and heroic fighting as was ex- 
hibited on any battle-field of the Civil War. 

The battle of Missionary Ridge illustrates very 
clearly how the plans of the wisest generals may be 
modified by circumstances that no man can foresee. 
Grant clung with characteristic tenacity to his original 
plan. There is nothing in the official reports tending 
to show that, at the time he issued the order to Thomas 
to take the rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge, he intended 


by it anything more than a movement for the relief 
of Sherman in order to enable the latter to carry out 
the movement intrusted to him. Neither Grant nor 
any one at that time supposed that the subordinate 
movement which Thomas was ordered to make would 
prove to be the decisive one, the turning-point of the 
battle. But so it proved. It is in regard to this unex- 
pected turn of affairs that General Thomas in his offi- 
cial report says with characteristic modesty : 

"It will be perceived from the above report that the 
original plan of operations was somewhat modified to 
meet and take the best advantage of emergencies, 
which necessitated material modifications of that plan. 
It is believed, however, that the original plan, had it 
been carried out, could not possibly have led to more 
successful results." 8 

Grant underrated the ability of General Thomas. 
He was equally mistaken in underrating the soldierly 
qualities of the men of the Army of the Cumberland. 
Sherman tells us in his Memoirs 9 that when Grant first 
informed him of his plans for taking Missionary Ridge, 
he said "that the men of Thomas's army had been so 
demoralized by the battle of Chickamauga that he 
feared they could not be got out of their trenches to 
assume the offensive," and that for this reason he 
wanted Sherman's troops "to hurry up, to take the 

8 Reb. Rec, ser. No. 55, p. 96. See also Cist: Army of the 
Cumberland, pp. 259-262. 
"Vol. 1, p. 390. 


offensive first; after which he had no doubt the Cum- 
berland army would fight well." The result is a suffi- 
cient vindication of the Army of the Cumberland. 

I have one memento of the battle of Missionary 
Ridge that I greatly prize. It is the sword of a Con- 
federate captain, surrendered to one of my company 
and given by him to me. I would gladly return it to its 
owner if there were anything about it by which I could 
determine his name. But there is not, and so, during all 
the long years, I have preserved it with tender care. 
This sword and my own, crossed in friendly touch, 
hang over the mantel in my library, mute but eloquent 
reminders of days that tried men's souls, recalling no 
feeling of resentment, but inspiring the wish that if 
they are ever drawn again in war by Americans, it may 
be in defense of a common country against a common 

It is difficult to state accurately the numbers engaged or the 
losses in the battles of Chattanooga. The official reports do not 
show the numbers engaged in each battle, and the revised "Return 
of Casualties in the Union Forces," given in ser. No. 55, p- 80, of 
the Rebellion Records, includes in one table the losses at Orchard 
Knob, Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge, and the minor en- 
gagements in the vicinity of Chattanooga on Nov. 26 and 27. 
There is no complete report of the Confederate losses. Van 
Home estimates that General Grant had 60,000 and General Bragg 
40,000 men in action, and that the aggregate losses Of the armies 
of the Cumberland and the Tennessee were : 


Killed 757 

Wounded .. 4,529 

Missing .. 330 

Total .. 5,616 

Colonel Fox makes the total loss 5,382. 

General Bragg's loss in killed and wounded is not known, but 
Van Home states that "he lost by capture six thousand one hun- 
dred and forty-two men, forty-two guns, sixty-nine gun carriages 
and -seven thousand stands of small arms. His loss in material 
was immense, part of which he destroyed in his flight, but a large 
fraction, which was uninjured, fell to the national army." 

The latest, and I presume the most accurate, list of Union losses 
is that given by General Boynton in The Chickamauga National 
Military Park (pp. 137-8), from which I have condensed the 
following tables : 

Battle. Killed. 

Orchard Knob 36 

Lookout Mountain. 81 

Missionary Ridge. .. 612 

Total .... 729 4,535 5,264 

The losses in the attack on Missionary Ridge, as apportioned 
between the troops commanded by General Sherman and those 
under the immediate command of General Thomas, were as fol- 

Killed. Wounded. Total. 

Sherman 209 1,141 1.35° 

Thomas 403 2,807 3,210 









Total .. 612 3,948 4,560 

The two divisions of the Army of the Cumberland which led 
the advance and bore the brunt of the losses in the assault of 
Missionary Ridge on Nov. 25 were those of Sheridan and Wood. 


Sheridan went into action with about 6,000 men and Wood with 
about 5,200. Their losses were as follows : 

Killed. Wounded. Total. 

Sheridan 130 1,213 L343 

Wood 148 875 1,023 

Total 278 2,088 2,366 

It will be noted from the foregoing tables that each of these 
divisions lost, in about one hour, over 20 per cent., and that to- 
gether they lost nearly twice as many as were lost by all the 
troops under Sherman in two days' fighting. 

There has been considerable discussion of the question whether 
Grant's order for taking the rifle-pits at the base of Missionary 
Ridge contemplated an advance afterward, and without further 
orders, against the works on the crest. There has also been much 
newspaper comment upon a supposed "lost order" to that effect, 
alleged to have been issued by General Grant to General Granger, 
commanding the 4th corps. As to the supposed "lost order," it 
suffices to say that it is not probable that Grant would have issued 
a written order of any kind directly to Granger, inasmuch as, 
according to the regular course, Grant would have issued his 
orders to Thomas and he to Granger. There is no mention in 
Grant's Memoirs of any "lost order" to Granger, and the official 
reports make it clear that Grant's order for taking the rifle-pits at 
the foot of the ridge did not contemplate the assault of the works 
on the crest, and that, when the orders for this assault were 
issued, by whomsoever given, the men who had taken the rifle-pits 
were already far on their way up the ridge. 

General Grant in his official report states that the order to 
Thomas on Nov. 25 was to "carry the rifle-pits at the foot of 
Missionary Ridge and, when carried, to reform his lines on the 
rifle-pits with a view to carrying the top of the ridge." The in- 
ference from this is that, after carrying the rifle-pits, the further 
movements of the assaulting columns would depend on subse- 
quent developments, and especially upon the progress of Hooker; 
and we should not infer from it that, after taking the rifle-pits, 
the troops were to advance without further orders. Other official 


reports clearly show that, whatever Grant may have intended, his 
order was understood by most of the corps and division com- 
manders as not directing an advance beyond the rifle-pits without 
further orders ; that the ascent of the ridge was made by the men 
themselves without orders, and that the one issued afterward was 
not given until the men were on their way. 

General Granger reports that he was "ordered to make a dem- 
onstration upon the works of the enemy directly in his front at 
the base of Mission Ridge." After describing the taking of the 
rifle-pits, he says further : 

"My orders had now been fully and successfully carried out, 
but not enough had been done to satisfy the brave troops who had 
accomplished so much. Although the batteries on the ridge, at 
short range, by direct and enfilading fire, were still pouring down 
upon them a shower of iron and the musketry from the hill-side 
was thinning their ranks, they dashed over the breastworks, 
through the rifle-pits, and started up the ridge. They started 
without orders along the whole line of both divisions from right 
to left and from left to right, simultaneously and with one accord, 
animated with one spirit and with heroic courage. Eagerly they 
rushed forward to a danger before which the bravest, marching 
under orders, might tremble. Officers caught the enthusiasm of 
the men, and the men in turn were cheered by the officers. Each 
regiment tried to surpass the other in fighting its way up a hill 
that would try those of stout limb and strong lungs to climb, and 
each tried first to plant its flag on the summit. Above these men 
was an additional line of rifle-pits filled with troops. What was 
on the summit of the ridge they knew not, and did not stop to 
inquire. The enemy was before them ; to know that was to know 
sufficient. At several points along the line my troops were as- 
cending the hill and gaining positions less exposed to the enemy's 
artillery fire, though more exposed to the fire of his musketry. 
Seeing this, I sent my assistant adjutant-general to inquire, first 
of General Wood and then of General Sheridan, whether the 
troops had been ordered up the ridge by them, and to instruct 
them to take the ridge if possible. In reply to this, General 
Wood told him that the men had started up without orders, and 
that he could take it if he could be supported. In the meantime 
an aide-de-camp from General Sheridan had reported to me that 


the general wished to know whether the order that had been 
given to take the rifle-pits 'meant those at the base of the ridge or 
those on top.' My reply was that the order had been to take 
those at the base." 

General Sheridan states in his report that the original order to 
him was "to carry the enemy's rifle-pits at the base of Mission 
Ridge," but that after they had been carried, being in doubt as to 
what was meant by the order, he sent Captain Ransom of his staff 
to General Granger to ascertain "whether it was the first line that 
was to be carried or the ridge"; that Captain Ransom had 
brought back word "that it was the first line which was to be 
carried," but that soon after "Captain Avery of General Granger's 
staff came up and informed him that the original order was to 
carry the first line of pits, but that if, in his judgment, the ridge 
could be taken, to do so." 

General Wood reports that he was "ordered to advance and 
carry the enemy's entrenchments at the base of Mission Ridge 
and hold them." After describing the taking of the rifle-pits, he 
continues : 

"When the first line of entrenchments was carried, the goal for 
which we had started was won. Our orders carried us no farther. 
We had been instructed to carry the line of entrenchments at the 
base of the ridge and there halt. But the enthusiasm and im- 
petuosity of the troops were such that those who first reached the 
entrenchments at the base of the ridge bounded over them, and 
pressed on up the ascent after the flying enemy. Moreover, the 
entrenchments were no protection against the enemy's artillery on 
the ridge. To remain would be destruction — to return would be 
both expensive in life and disgraceful. Officers and men all 
seemed impressed with this truth. In addition, the example of 
those who commenced to ascend the ridge so soon as the en- 
trenchments were carried was contagious. Without waiting for 
an order the vast mass pressed forward in the race of glory, each 
man anxious to be the first on the summit. The enemy's artillery 
and musketry could not check the impetuous assault. The troops 
did not halt to fire. To have done so would have been ruinous. 
Little was left to the commanders of the troops than to cheer on 
the foremost — to encourage the weaker of limb, and to sustain the 
very few who seemed to be faint-hearted." 


General Baird reports that the order to him was to take the 
pits at the base of the ridge, "as preparatory to a general assault 
on the mountain" ; that after taking the pits General Turchin 
pushed on with his brigade ; that, when in the act of starting the 
other two brigades to his support, he received orders "not to per- 
mit his men to go farther and not to permit them to become 
engaged" ; but that "another order came in less than three minutes 
for the whole line to charge to the top." 

Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, who was on the 
ground, says in his report to the Secretary of War: 

"The storming of the ridge by our troops was one of the great- 
est miracles in military history. No man who climbs the ascent 
by any of the roads that wind along its front can believe that 
18,000 men were moved up its broken and crumbling face unless 
it was his fortune to witness the deed. It seems as awful as a 
visible interposition of God. Neither Grant nor Thomas in- 
tended it. Their orders were to carry the rifle-pits along the 
base of the ridge and capture their occupants, but when this was 
accomplished the unaccountable spirit of the troops bore them 
bodily up these impracticable steeps, over the bristling rifle-pits 
on the crest and the thirty cannon enfilading every gully. The 
order to storm appears to have been given simultaneously by 
Generals Sheridan and Wood, because the men were not to be 
held back, dangerous as the attempt appeared to military pru- 
dence. Besides, the generals had caught the inspiration of the 
men, and were ready themselves to undertake impossibilities." 

Finally, General Grant in his Memoirs (vol. 2, p. 80) says : 
"Without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on our 
troops went to the second line of works, over that, and on for the 
crest." Other witnesses of the battle assert, not only that General 
Grant did not order the advance beyond the rifle-pits at the foot 
of the ridge, but that he manifested some irritation at the sup- 
posed presumption of the unknown officer who had given such an 
order. General Cist, a member of General Thomas's staff, says : 

"No wonder that General Grant failed to appreciate this move- 
ment at the time, not understanding the troops who had it in 
charge. When he found these commands ascending the ridge to 
capture it when he ordered a "demonstration' to be made to the 
foot of the hill and there to wait, he turned sharply to General 


Thomas and asked, 'By whose orders are those troops going up 
the hill?' General Thomas, taking in the situation at once, sug- 
gested that it was probably by their own. General Grant re- 
marked that 'it was all right if it turned out all right,' and added, 
'if not, some one would suffer.' " (Army of the Cumberland, 
p. 262. See also Piatt : George H. Thomas, p. 481 ; General 
Joseph S. Fullerton: The Army of the Cumberland at Chatta- 
nooga, in Battles and Leaders, vol. 3, p. 725.) 

From all this accumulation of testimony, it seems to be very 
clear that the original order for taking the rifle-pits at the foot 
of the ridge did not include the storming of the ridge itself; 
that, after they had been taken, it was found that they were un- 
tenable and that the assaulting columns must either retreat or 
advance; that this was as evident to the men as to the generals; 
and that the men preferred to advance rather than to retreat. It 
is also clear that, before the orders finally given to go on to the 
summit were received, the men of Wood's and Sheridan's di- 
visions were already far on their way up the ridge. To the 
private soldiers belongs the chief glory of the successful assault 
of Missionary Ridge. 

I trust that I may not be considered vainglorious or as intend- 
ing to detract in the least from the credit due the other troops 
engaged in the assault of Missionary Ridge, if I refer in this 
note to the part taken by my own division and regiment. Van 
Home (Hist. Army of the Cumberland, vol. 1, p. 43) says: 

"To this general result, each of the four central divisions and 
those with General Hooker contributed, in coordination and har- 
mony unprecedented in an improvised attack. Each one was 
successful, though each was not equally prominent in success. 
From General Bragg's declaration that his line was first pierced 
on the right — that is, to the north of the house which he occupied 
as his headquarters — and from the observation of those occupying 
elevated positions, there is no room to doubt that General Wood's 
division first reached the summit." 

In his official report General Sheridan describes the temporary 
halt of his division after carrying the rifle-pits at the base of the 
ridge, and then says : "Looking to the left, I saw a single regi- 
ment far over in Wood's line dash up the hill and lie down below 
the crest." The regiment to which he refers was the consoli- 


dated 79th and 86th Indiana. This is indicated in a letter of Mr. 
Theodore R. Davis, the illustrator of Harper's Weekly, who wit- 
nessed the battle and who, in a letter to that journal published 
Dec. 19, 1863, says : "The color sergeant of the Seventy-ninth 
Indiana, Henry C. Lawrence, carried his colors far in advance of 
his regiment, which was the first to commence the ascent. The 
whole army are admiring him." 




Wood's division had little opportunity to rest after 
the battle of Missionary Ridge. General Burnside was 
penned up at Knoxville, besieged by General Long- 
street, and it was certain that he could not hold out 
much longer unless relief were sent. Immediately after 
the battle of Missionary Ridge orders were given to 
prepare for a forced march to Knoxville. General 
Howard started on the 29th, followed on the same day 
by three divisions of Sherman's army and Davis's di- 
vision of the 14th corps, and on the next day by Gen- 
eral Granger with Wood's and Sheridan's divisions of 
the 4th corps. But on December 5 it was learned 
that Longstreet had retreated after an assault on Fort 
Sanders on November 29, in which he had been re- 
pulsed with great loss. Sherman's and Howard's divi- 
sions and that of Davis returned, leaving the 4th corps 
to continue its march and keep on the lookout for 

This was by far the hardest campaign in which the 
79th Ind. was engaged during the service, for, after 
leaving Chattanooga, it was almost continually march- 
ing up and down east Tennessee until it started on the 



Atlanta campaign. It was especially severe on the men 
of the 79th because, when they left Chattanooga, 
they were told that they were going on a foraging ex- 
pedition and would return in three or four days, and, 
under that impression, they prepared themselves with 
only a light marching outfit, leaving everything that 
could not conveniently be carried. Most of them had 
no tents and the only shelter they had was such as 
could be improvised. Supplies of clothing were slow 
in coming. Nearly all left their overcoats in Chatta- 
nooga. I left mine and did not get another until the 
middle of February. The one pair of stockings with 
which I started soon wore out and before I got others 
only the legs and part of the heels remained. Many of 
the men were almost barefoot before shoes arrived. 

Several times, deluded with the expectation that we 
should remain at least a few weeks, we built comforta- 
ble log huts, but invariably the order came to march 
as soon as they were completed and we were compelled 
to abandon them. 

The difficulty of getting supplies made it necessary 
to depend largely for provisions upon what could be 
picked up in the country through which we passed. It 
was very poor picking. Most of east Tennessee 
through which we marched was a mountainous, barren 
region, with only here and there a fertile valley, and 
Longstreet's army, wherever it had preceded us, had 
stripped the country. Some cattle, probably driven 
from Kentucky through the Cumberland Gap, fur- 
nished our supply of meat. There was not enough corn 


for the artillery and cavalry horses, so the cattle got lit- 
tle or none. It was current rumor that they were in- 
spected every morning and that those were killed first 
that seemed to be most nearly dead of starvation. It 
was also said, though I can not affirm this to be any- 
thing more than an army joke, that, in order to deter- 
mine the amount of vitality left in a herd of starving 
cattle, they were made to jump a ditch and that those 
found to be too weak to leap across were at once dis- 
patched. The beef from this source was commonly 
known as "blue beef." There was not a particle of fat 
in it, we had no salt with which to season it, and it was 
utterly unfit to eat. So near were the men to the verge 
of starvation that they often went miles to get a little 
corn to parch. 

There were a few pleasant days after leaving Chat- 
tanooga but cold and rainy weather soon set in, caus- 
ing great suffering. We often marched in drizzling 
rain or sleet and over roads almost impassable, camp- 
ing at night with nothing to shelter us but cedar 
branches. Many in the North will recall the cold first 
day of January, 1864. That night the 79th was on 
picket duty near Strawberry Plains and was stationed 
about half way up the side of House Mountain, which 
was so steep that unless hung up to the trees one was 
in danger of sliding down. I had been trying to sleep 
with my feet next to a log fire, but getting up to re- 
plenish it I accidentally poked out the stones placed 
behind the enormous back-log to prevent it from roll- 
ing down and away it went, bouncing twenty feet in 


air over the stumps and rocks in its course until it 
reached the valley below, and from that time until 
morning it was with difficulty that I avoided freezing. 
During a considerable part of the winter our base of 
operations, if in our ramblings we had anything like 
a base, was the little village of Strawberry Plains, 
about twelve or fifteen miles east of Knoxville. Our 
regular exercise was to march from Strawberry Plains 
to New Market, ten miles farther east; sometimes we 
went on the same day or the next to Morristown, 
eight or ten miles farther east, and then we would 
return to Strawberry Plains. Sometimes we went as 
far east as Rutledge and once to Bean's Station. A.t 
another time we went within a few miles of Cumber- 
land Gap. We also explored Flat Creek Valley and 
Poor Man's Valley and Rich Man's Valley and ever 
so many little valleys lying between mountain spurs, 
some of them not more than two or three hundred 
yards wide, where the few inhabitants lived in small 
log-houses, knowing little and caring little about the 
great world outside. 

This was the most primitive region in east Tennes- 
see. It is, I presume, the locality from which came the 
hogs known in the early history of Indiana as "Ten- 
nessee sharpshooters," long-snouted hogs, that lived 
on mast, ran like deer, and never could be fattened, 
and so thin that the only way, it was said, to prevent 
them from going through a fence was to knot their 

During all this winter our army in east Tennessee 


was what, in military parlance, was known as an 
"army of observation." We were observing the move- 
ments of General Longstreet and he was observing 
ours — we to see that he did not get back into east Ten- 
nessee or reenforce the Confederate army in the East 
or West, and he to see that the Federal army did not 
invade Virginia from the west. There was constant 
skirmishing between the Federal and the Confederate 
cavalry but little fighting of any consequence, the near- 
est approach to a battle being a small engagement at 
Dandridge. It was not the intention, it seems, of the 
generals on either side to bring about a battle in that 

I have few pleasant recollections of our campaign 
in east Tennessee. The most pleasant are those con- 
nected with a foraging party ordered to go from Mary- 
ville to McGee's Ford on the Little Tennessee, about 
eighteen or twenty miles distant, and gather some corn 
which had hitherto escaped the notice of both armies. 
The detachment consisted of my own company and 
Company C, and the command of it was intrusted 
to me. It was the highest that I ever attained in the 
army and I felt highly honored by it. I was ordered 
to report to General Willich, then temporarily in com- 
mand of the division, for instructions. I found him in 
his tent, a fatherly, benevolent-looking man who at 
once made me feel quite at ease. After giving me my 
instructions he informed me that I should be provided 
with a small steer which would furnish enough meat 
for two weeks. I have probably inherited from my 


Vankee ancestors the trait, for which they were pro- 
verbial, of "looking ahead" ; so I ventured to ask : 
"What shall I do after the two weeks are out?" The 
good old general almost went into convulsions of 
laughter and, patting me on the head, replied : "Tut, 
tut, my boy, two weeks in ze army is an eternitee." I 
never forgot the interview nor the truth of what he 

Starting with my little force we arrived at our desti- 
nation that night. The Little Tennessee is a beautiful 
stream and the rocks and fish can be seen through its 
clear waters at a depth of more than twenty feet. The 
valley is extremely fertile, yielding fine crops of corn. 
Along the river were great plantations, not common 
elsewhere in east Tennessee, well stocked with slaves. 
On some of them were as many as two or three hun- 

I was now practically monarch of all I surveyed, and 
I immediately assumed the prerogatives as well as the 
honors of a military commander of high rank. I es- 
tablished my headquarters in the best negro cabin on 
the plantation and my men in others near. The little 
steer had already been traded by the men to a farmer 
for a barrel of sorghum molasses. They had been sur- 
feited with "blue beef." But we could not live on 
sorghum molasses alone. We had no money and but 
little coffee for exchange, and we were strictly forbid- 
den to pillage. It was not to be thought of, however, 
that I should let my men starve in the midst of plenty. 
In this dilemma I resorted to the plan of providing my 


foraging parties with blank receipts, signed "Daniel 
Wait Howe, Captain Commanding Detachment 4th 
Army Corps U. S. A." The issue was limited only by 
our supply of paper. The "U S. A." gave the receipts 
an official appearance, and nobody to whom they were 
tendered ever refused them. My impression is that 
the adjacent region was pretty well plastered over with 
them, and I fear that they speedily depreciated in value 
after our departure, but they were good as long as we 

When the foraging parties returned they brought 
great stores. Hams and shoulders were piled in one 
corner of my headquarters reaching from floor to ceil- 
ing. Butter, milk, eggs, honey, and other luxuries 
were soon added to our larder. The "contrabands" 
were only too glad to see us and they brought fish and 
corn pones in great abundance. 

I soon ascertained about how much corn a given 
number of men could gather in a day and established 
it as a day's work, but the men usually did it in half 
the time, and I allowed them the remainder of the day 
in which to rest and recuperate. They soon found a 
still some distance from camp, and I was informed, but 
never instituted an official investigation of the rumor, 
that some of the corn gathered was converted into 
whisky through the connivance of the "moonshiner" 
who owned the still. 

"There was a sound of revelry by night," for every 
night there was in some cabin a "stag dance" to music 
furnished by a venerable contraband with a banjo. If 


he could not be procured, some darky who was an adept 
in the art was engaged to "pat Juba" and keep the 
dance going. Though I was careful to keep pickets 
posted, it is strange that we were not all captured by 
the Confederate cavalry, and I look upon it now as a 
piece of extraordinary good luck that we were not. 

But this luxurious life soon came to an end. At the 
expiration of two weeks we had gathered all the corn, 
the division was again ordered to march, and we were 
ordered to rejoin our regiment. About no other spot 
in the South do such pleasant memories cluster as those 
that are recalled by the name of McGee's Ford on the 
Little Tennessee. 

Preparations had begun for the Atlanta campaign 
and Wood's division left Strawberry Plains April 6, 
arriving April 16 at Cleveland, Tennessee, where it re- 
mained until May 3 when it started on the Atlanta 

The following extracts from my diary given just 
as they were written thirty-nine years ago, portray 
better than any language I could now substitute, some 
of the incidents of the campaign in east Tennessee as 
I saw them. They illustrate also some of the hard- 
ships, the pleasures, the daily thoughts of a soldier in 
such a campaign, typical, for the most part, of the life 
of thousands of others in the Civil War. 

25o civil war times 

November 28, 1863. 

Rained a little. Turned cool and chilly toward af- 
ternoon; moved at 4 p. m. in the direction of Cleveland. 
Bivouacked at night about five miles from Chatta- 
nooga. Our whole corps is in the expedition. 


3. — Rumored that we are going to Knoxville by the 
shortest route, living on the country, and that we will 
draw no rations till we get there. Camped at night a 
mile beyond Sweet Water, having made about twenty 

4. — Marched at 6 a. m. Two men detailed from 
each company to forage. Marched about twelve miles 
and camped at 3 p. m. four or five miles from Morgan- 
town. Weather pleasant. 

5. — Cloudy. Marched at 6 A. m. The fruits of the 
forage party were a spoonful of flour and a potato to 
the man. They "went for" eatables to-day with a 
vengeance. Passed through Morgantown, a smart 
little village. Crossed the Little Tennessee about 12 
m. Were delayed about two hours by the breaking of 
the bridge. Marched some eighteen miles. Got into 
camp at 8 p. m. The question is, What shall we eat? 
This living on the country is a wretched plan. 

6. — Sunday. Moved at 5 a. m. Marched till 12 
and camped on Little river. Our regiment was the 
advance regiment of the column and was, by the new 


rule, detailed for picket. Nothing unusual. Rations 
were issued to-night — the fruits of the forage party. 
Three-fourths of a cup of meal for four men and a 
potato to a man. This is living on the country. 

10. — Got an old copy of Brownlow's Knoxvillc 
Whig, giving an account of the bombardment of Fort 
Sumter, of the members of Lincoln's cabinet, and sev- 
eral interesting articles relating to secession in its then 
incipient state. This is the only paper I have seen for 
a long time. The surest way of learning to appreciate 
the importance of railroads and telegraphs is to be cut 
off from them as we have been for three or four weeks. 
Nothing unusual. 

13. — Went on picket at 8 a. m v relieving the 19th 
Ohio. Quite a shower blew up during the night and 
rendered it very disagreeable. A chance was offered 
to-day for the first time since we left Chattanooga to 
send off letters. The brigade postmaster goes to Chat- 
tanooga to-morrow for mail-matter and is to take let- 
ters. We have received no mail or papers since we 
crossed the Hiawassee. 

16. — Reveille at 4. Marched at 6 a. m. Passed 
through Knoxville and took the road to Strawberry 
Plains. Bivouacked at night twelve or fourteen miles 
from Knoxville. Hear that there is some skirmish- 
ing in our front. I do not see how we can go much 
longer. The men are sadly in need of rations. The 
fact is, we are not, and have not since we left Chatta- 
nooga, been getting even quarter rations. It is grow- 


ing worse every day. They all want overcoats also, 
and shoes worst of all. 

17. — Very disagreeable and wet last night. Got 
up in the morning to find myself in a bundle of wet 
blankets. Got hold of a paper — the Chi. Comm. of 
December 2, the latest I have seen. It contains a par- 
tial account of the action at Chattanooga. Did not 
move to-day. No news from the front. 

19. — Picket at 3 p. M. Visited by — [illegible] — of 
the 4th Cav., also by Loomis, sutler in same. Con- 
versed a long time with an old lady named Fitz-Jer- 
rold. Her husband died about the time Tennessee se- 
ceded. His last vote was for the Union and he was 
hauled to the polls to give it. Her only son of any size 
is in our army in 1st Tenn. Batt. The rebs took nearly 
everything and our men the rest. But she is true yet. 

25. — Another Christmas dawns upon me in the ser- 
vice. I hardly expected it last Christmas at Nashville. 
But things look much brighter now than then. Nearly 
all of the 19th Ohio re-enlisted yesterday and day be- 
fore in the veteran service. They are making great 
preparations to go home in a day or two. How differ- 
ent is this from Christmas at home. But I must not let 
my mind dwell on the unpleasant contrast. 

January, 1864. 

1. — Picket at 3 p. m. Extremely cold all day. In 
fact the coldest day we have experienced this year and 
here we are destitute of everything in midwinter. The 


men are ragged, hungry, and with no shelter except a 
few miserable worn-out dog-tents. We have one con- 
solation at least — they are thinking and caring for us 
at home this day. May the good people who are get- 
ting up fairs and subscriptions for the benefit of those 
who are in the field meet with the greatest success. 

9. — Spent the day reading old newspapers and a 
novel, Louisa Elton, a southern concern remarkable 
for the bombast and egotism of its author. It is writ- 
ten by a lady and is dedicated to Jeff Davis as a de- 
fender of the "Union of these states." 

11. — Accepted the invitation of Sergt. to visit 

a cousin ( female ) who resides about two miles from 
camp. Started on foot about 9 a. m. Very cold. 
Noticed boys sliding on mill-pond as we passed. 
Reached our destination about 10 a. m. Found the 
young lady, Miss Lizzie, to be a miss of some eighteen 
summers, of average good looks and intelligence, an 
ex-schoolmarm, and very communicative. Showed 
me her album and set me to reading poetry for her 
Spread myself in the latter business. Ate a passable 
dinner. Played cards and conversed a while and start- 
ed back about 3 p. m. 

18. — Marched at 3 a. m., taking the back track. Of 
course a drizzling rain set in. The roads were in a 
most wretched condition. In many places it was al- 
most all the teams could do to pull an empty wagon, 
and men had to be detailed to help them along. We 
took a roundabout road and reached the Plains about 
dark without any special incidents. It was a day long 


to be remembered as severe in the extreme upon the 
troops. Turned off very cold and snowed to the depth 
of about two inches during the night. 

21. — Ammunition sufficient to supply each man 
with sixty rounds was issued this morning. Marched 
at 8 a. m. Reached Knoxville at noon. Halted just 
before entering town for the column to close up. En- 
tered the city at i p. m. with banners flying. Saw 
Fred Fout and Columbus Hancock [of Co. I]. Passed 
through the city without stopping and went into camp 
two miles from town across the river on the Sevierville 
road, which we supposed to be our destination. 
Mounted a horse and went out into a Union settlement 
a mile or so from camp. Ate supper with a Mr. Bare- 
ford, a true blue Union man. He and his wife put me 
more in mind of genuine home sympathy than any peo- 
ple I have met for a long time. Afterward I visited a 
Mr. Anderson who is a member of the 3d East Tenn. 
Cav., at home on furlough. He is a brother-in-law of 
Bareford and I found them the same kind of people. 
Although his wife had been cooking three days for 
soldiers, she said she could not turn me away, and so 
baked me a dozen ginger-cakes, for which I was glad 
to be able to pay her. His sister, who lives near and 
whose husband is in our army, had also been cooking 
all day for soldiers, and yet one graceless scamp had 
tried to steal her husband's drawers. Such vagabonds 
should be shot. 

23. — Moved at 8 a. m. — 79th in advance. Took the 
Maryville road. Rumored that our brigade and Wil- 


lich's, under command of Willich, go to Maryville to 
rest a spell. Bivouacked twelve miles from Knoxville. 


16. — Started at 2 a. m. A train being ahead of us 
we moved very slowly, marching a few yards and then 
stopping five or ten minutes. Any soldier who has ever 
marched behind a train over a bad road realizes how 
fatiguing it is. To make matters worse, it was rain- 
ing, the roads were wretchedly miry, and it grew con- 
stantly colder. A little before daylight we halted and 
threw ourselves down right in the mud, just as we 
were, and slept for perhaps an hour. By 7 in the 
morning we were just about two miles from camp. 
We had not time to get breakfast before the column 
started. We moved on without much stoppage, reach- 
ing the hills in the vicinity of Knoxville just before 
dark. We camped on a high, bleak hill. Hardly a 
splinter of wood could be found and it seemed as 
though the wind would cut us in two. The night was 
intensely cold. It is this kind of soldiering that kills 
men. It is nothing more nor less than wholesale 

17. — Remained on the hill all day It was very 
cold and snowed during the day to the depth of several 
inches. The scanty fires emitted little heat and many 
had to stay in their tents, wrapped in their blankets, 
and even then could not keep warm. Stiff and sore, 
too, from yesterday's march, we were miserable in the 


extreme. If ever a man thinks of "Home, sweet 
home," it is during such experiences as we have had 
the last three days. 

19. — Relieved about dark. When I reached camp 
I felt a strange itching and, upon examination, found 
I was alive with "graybacks," which I had probably 
got by sleeping in straw that we procured for beds 
from some huts in an abandoned camp near by. There 
was no alternative but to burn my shirt after which I 
felt considerably relieved. 

22. — Spent to-day putting a floor and bunks in my 
tent. If I can only get it finished it will be the snug- 
gest arrangement I ever had. The men have pretty 
much quit making winter quarters. They have put 
them up only four times since we left Chattanooga and 
never were permitted to stay in any except those at 
Maryville, over three days. If campaigning is as 
active in the coming summer as it has been this winter, 
this department will afford a fine field for gymnastics 
and we shall all retire from the service finished acro- 
bats. Opened my desk to-day and examined my books 
and papers. Sad spectacle. Not a report or return 
since we left Chattanooga ! I am nearly six months 
behind in my ordnance and clothing returns. Mus- 
tered up courage to make out three monthly returns 
and do some official correspondence this evening. 

23. — Orders this morning to clean up the quarters. 
Ordinarily this would signify that we were to remain 
here for a few days at any rate. But by the rule of 
contraries which obtains in this department, it fore- 


shadows an immediate mbvement. It has been said 
that this division is running an express train to all the 
little by-places around Knoxville, and it is about time 
for us to make another trip. Got my marque up to 
my notion to-day. Am prepared now to go to work at 
my books and papers and enjoy myself in comfortable 
quarters. Finis at 8. Go to bed. Grand sequel. At 
9, orders to put everything in readiness to march, with 
three days' rations for the men and complement of 
eighty rounds of cartridges. Oh ! for our old depart- 
ment and our old commander ! But I presume this is 
strategy. It's no use to swear, for like the profane 
man on a certain occasion, "I can't do justice to the 

29. — Reveille at 4. Marched at 5. Passed Mossy 
Creek Station about 8 a. m. It began to rain last 
night and continued all day The roads were very 
slippery and there was a great deal of straggling. 
General Schofield passed us again to-day and the boys 
lustily yelled "hard-tack" and "sow-belly." He took 
it in good humor and remarked that they "would get 
harder tack than they had." 


2. — Reveille at 4 a. m. Moved at 5. Supposed we 
were going toward Bull Gap until we reached the rail- 
road when we abruptly turned toward New Market. 
The 79th was in advance of the division. Am entirely 


at a loss to know why we made either the movement 
here or the movement back. Suppose it's "strategy." 
Anticipate seeing something like the following in the 
papers in a few days : "Brilliant movement in east 
Tennessee." "General Schofield drives the enemy out 
of the state." "No rebels this side of Virginia." 
"Longstreet's forces demoralized and deserting by 
scores." "Whole expedition returned without the loss 
of a man." About two miles from Morristown we 
passed the camps of a portion of the 23d Army Corps. 
Think about half the corps were straggling along the 
road. The advance of the corps and the stragglers 
probably formed a junction somewhere between Mor- 
ristown and New Market. Reached latter place at 2 
p. M. and camped. The day has been beautiful. 

3. — Listened intently for the "general" this morn- 
ing, but nobody "blowed the bazoo." Last night the 
orders were for the men to be kept in camp in readiness 
to move at a moment's notice. Probably somebody is 
scared. Or it may be that the express line is to be 
again opened up to Dandridge. Wrote a letter to-day 

to . Also took a bath, giving myself a good 

scouring. Luckily I brought a few clean underclothes 
with me in a knapsack. I have cause to congratulate 
myself on so doing for not another officer in the regi- 
ment has a stitch of clothing except what he has on and 
no very flattering prospect that his condition will be 
bettered for weeks. A report of the number of rounds 
of ammunition on hand was called for to-day, which 
may portend something and may not. Passed my time 


to-day principally in loafing. Think I shall become an 
adept in it. Weather warm and pleasant. 

4. — No orders to move. We shall probably go 
somewhere soon. I hear it rumored to-day that within 
three weeks our division will go back to the Depart- 
ment of the Cumberland. I shouldn't be surprised at 
anything now. Heard to-day from Major Parker the 
only lucid explanation of our late movements. Gen- 
eral Schofield is making a topographical map of east 
Tennessee and is taking the soldiers along just to show 
them the country. In absolute despair of something 
to read or do, I spent to-day in reading a horrid Mer- 
cury novel — Catholina or the Niche in the Wall, by 
"Dr. J. S. Robinson." I am ashamed to make even 
this private confession, but 'tis done. I excuse my- 
self in this way : a man hungry for something to read 
will do as a man hungry for something to eat ; if he 
can not get good he will take bad. Just after I had 
gone to bed companies I and C were detailed to guard 
a supply-train which arrived to-day. Received a mail 

5. — It rained last night and I climbed into a wagon 
for shelter. Got out a little before daylight to warm. 
When I returned, found the mules had pulled my 
blankets out of the wagon and had well-nigh devoured 
one. The train pulled out early in the morning and as 
there was no further need of my services I returned to 
camp about 8 a. m. Cloudy and prospect of rain this 
morning, but it finally cleared and the day was pleas- 
ant. Drew five days' rations to-day — full of meat, 


sugar, coffee, and half of bread. Also drew clothing, 
consisting of blouses, shirts, stockings, and shoes. 
The men are now pretty well supplied with clothing, 
except shoes, of which there is still a great deficiency, 
many being nearly barefoot. Hear that slight skir- 
mishing is going on in our front, which is supposed to 
be at Mossy creek. My impression is that no very 
heavy engagements will take place. 

6. — The day opened gloriously. The sun shone 
with a warmth and splendor seldom seen in Indiana be- 
fore May. The songsters made the woods fairly ring 
with their joyous melodies. The trees have not yet 
put forth their buds but the meadows are growing 
green and the unmistakable signs of spring begin to 
manifest themselves. It being Sunday, divine ser- 
vice was held in the several churches of New Market. 
I have not seen nor heard anything since I have been in 
Tennessee which so much reminded me of home as the 
pealing of the bells. It sounded so sweet and yet so 
sad, for while it brought pleasant memories it created 
sad longings. But let us "learn to labor and to wait." 
O. M. Colclazer [quarter-master] came up to-day, 
bringing a bundle of clothing for Colonel [Oyler] and 
me, sent from home. Never was clothing more ac- 
ceptable. Orders issued to be ready to move at any 
moment. Wrote to to-day. 

9. — Spent to-day as yesterday — reading and writ- 
ing. We have at least one consolation now — a daily 
mail. We get the Nashville, Louisville, and Cincin- 
nati papers regularly by newsdealers, besides the papers 


which come by mail. A newspaper is a great thing in 
camp. Men who scarcely ever read, much less buy, a 
paper at home, are eager to see one in camp. There 
seems to be a general desire to keep posted. This may 
be attributed to the great interest felt by all in every- 
thing which affects the conduct or prospects of the war. 
To the same cause may be traced the interest in poli- 
tics. People at home have no idea how well posted 
and how interested the soldier is in the political ques- 
tions of the day. My impression is that the majority 
of soldiers are now much better qualified to decide po- 
litical questions than they were at home ; therefore I 
think they should be allowed to vote. 

24. — Relieved at 10. Reached camp about u. 
Shoes and rations were to be issued. The shoes were 
in the nick of time. Four of my company were almost 
literally barefoot and three others were nearly as bad. 
Had not finished issuing when orders were received to 
be ready to march at i p. m. Noticed as we marched 
out that the men had left nearly all their beef un- 
touched, preferring to do without rather than eat it. 

29. — Rained all day or nearly all day. Somebody 
once reproved Dr. Johnson for his malignant hatred of 
Scotland and threw in, as a kind of sedative, the re- 
mark that "God made Scotland." "Yes," retorted 
the Doctor ferociously, "God made hell, too." I am 
inclined to feel the same way toward this woebegone 
waste. It looks like the refuse of creation. It might 
look romantic in summer-time with the land under cul- 
tivation, but it doesn't now by a long shot. The 



weather of the last three weeks has been highly favora- 
ble to in-door amusements, viz. : rolling one's self 
up in his dog-tent like a dog in his kennel or a hedge- 
hog in his hole. I should say Diogenes might have 
made equally as philosophical reflections in one of these 
as in his tub. (By the way, my opinion of Diogenes 
is that he was a hoax. ) 

30. — It has been raw and blustery all day I have 
passed much of the time in talking over home affairs 
with Captain Ellis. What a great pleasure it is to see 
one who has just come from the scenes to which our 
memory is constantly going back and where are all that 
are near and dear to us. It is like seeing them by 
proxy. How many inquiries we press upon the vis- 
itor that attest the eagerness of our interest even by 
their very simplicity 

"How dear to this heart are the scenes of my childhood, 
When fond recollection presents them to view ; 
The orchard, the meadow, the deep tangled wild-wood, 
And every loved spot which my infancy knew." 

Capt. Ellis confirms the report I have often heard 
of the reckless extravagance which is fast pervading 
all classes at the North. Parties, balls, festivities of 
every kind — there is no end to them. "On with the 
dance" is the cry. God forbid that in the midst of all 
these gaieties the widow and orphan be forgotten. 

31. — Picket at 10. Companies D, E, I and C. I 
had command of outpost No. 2 on the Rutledge road 
about a mile from camp. Had eight reliefs and seven 


men over for stack guards. The day was very pleas- 
ant. Being close by a house occupied by an old lady I 
made a little visit and found her to be one of the most 
intelligent women I ever conversed with. I believe 
she had been teaching several years before the war be- 
gan. On examining the library (for she had a scant 
one) I noticed D'Aubigne's Reformation, Plutarch's 
Lives, Josephus, Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress, Ever- 
ett's Washington, and several other works by eminent 
authors. A Latin reader, well thumbed on the page 
beginning with "Antiquisimis temporibus," she in- 
formed me belonged to her son, now in the rebel army 
in Texas. She also told me that the whole family, 
consisting of nine whites and six blacks, had been liv- 
ing for more than ten days on nothing but boiled corn. 
I believe her story for in all my travels I have not seen 
a family in apparently more destitute circumstances. 


3. — Troops drew three days' rations. We still get, 
for a part of our meat rations, the lean, miserable, and 
unhealthy beef that we have had all winter. Perhaps 
we are kept in this barren country that we may be 
starved into eating it and so take it off the Q. M.'s 
hands. "Hold on there, butcher," yelled a soldier the 
other day as that amiable individual was about to end 
the miseries of a very attenuated bovine, "wait for sick 

4. — Picket at 10. D, E, I and C at the same out- 


posts as before. It began to rain shortly after we 
reached the picket-line and continued all day and night 
at intervals. Borrowed Everett's Life of Washington 
from the family living near the outpost. It is written 
with great beauty of diction and in the purest style. 
Still I do not look upon it as remarkable either for great 
originality of thought or for presenting any very new 
or uncommon theories. Being intended as an encyclo- 
pedic article, however, it is all that could be expected. 
I marked one passage which impressed me with its 
beauty. It is the author's illustration of genius in the 
closing chapter. I also finished reading Oliver Tzvist. 
Chapters 1, 5 and 14, Book 2, finely exhibit Dickens's 
humorous powers. The narrative of the murder of 
Nancy and of the remorse and pursuit and final end 
of the career of Sykes are striking displays of strong 
and powerful writing. 

5. — Relieved at 10. The creek had risen so rapidly 
last night that this morning it could not be crossed un- 
til trees were felled across it. Companies D and E 
were not relieved till afternoon. It looked like 
clearing off to-day. The rain has been warm arid the 
grass and buds seem ready to leap right up. I sat 
down to-day to the best dinner I have eaten in camp 
for two months. It consisted of coffee, "slap-jacks," 
baked beans, and a pot of boiled beef and desiccated 
vegetables. The molasses for the slap-jacks was made 
by boiling common sugar. The meal was far better 
than any I have had since I left Pikeville. The great 
desideratum all the time has been to get enough of 


- ,J D 

anything Started a furlough to-day for Mat. Chand- 
ler [of Co. I]. Orders received this evening to march 
at 6 to-morrow Great glee and rejoicing prevailed 
all over the whole division until late at night, it being 
understood that we were going to Knoxville. 

6. — This evening an order from Schofield was read, 
expressing his thanks to Wood's division. So it seems 
certain we are at last to leave this one-horse depart- 
ment. We all go without regret. There was great 
cheering and rejoicing to-night. 

7.— Reveille at 4. Marched at 6. Stopped an hour 
for dinner at noon. Traveled very leisurely, the 2d 
brigade in advance and Willich's in the rear. At 4 
p. m. passed through Knoxville in style with fixed bay- 
onets. Saw nobody that I knew Camped about three 
miles on Loudon side of Knoxville. John Israel, Co- 
lumbus Hancock, and Matthew Chandler joined the 
company to-day. All our wagons — six — reported to 
regiment last night and, after unloading, went back to 
Knoxville for the baggage stored there. The impres- 
sion is that our destination is Cleveland. It is. re- 
ported that Major-General Howard has been assigned 
to the command of the 4th corps and Hooker to the 
command of the nth and 12th corps, consolidated and 
called the 20th. Did not observe anything noticeable 
at Knoxville except a couple of negro soldiers in full 
uniform, the first I ever saw A great many specta- 
tors were out to see us pass. All the "nigs" must have 
been out too, judging by the multitude I saw We 
marched about twenty miles to-day. Rained to-night. 


9. — Reveille at 5. Column in motion at 7 The 
rain was drizzling with no prospect of slacking, when 
we started, but finally, about 10, the skies cleared and 
the sun came out. The roads, however, were very 
muddy and marching very tedious. Passed Camp- 
bell's Station at 10. The traces of the skirmish there 
where Burnside fell back before Longstreet are very 
plenty. Most of the houses and trees about there ex- 
hibit the mark of a cannon-ball or bullet. The coun- 
try through which we passed can not be surpassed for 
beautiful landscapes. It needs only a river to make it 
perfectly charming. The land is rolling, the farms are 
well cleared, and the farm-houses indicate wealth and 
taste. From the number of orchards, I should judge 
it a great peach country, indeed a good country for all 
kinds of fruits. Camped at 3 130 p. m. near Lenoir 
Station, six miles from Loudon and twenty-two from 
Knoxville. A portion of Sheridan's division is here. 

15. — Reveille at 4. Marched at 6. Athens is a neat 
little place, said to be a strong Union town. Noticed 
several handsome buildings, both public and private. 
It is reputed to have many pretty girls but they didn't 
make themselves visible. Perhaps the southern beau- 
ties were in bed. The country not so good as that 
passed yesterday. Reached Calhoun about 12. Con- 
sumed about an hour in crossing the Hiawassee and 
getting into camp. Charlestown is opposite Calhoun 
and is somewhat noted as the place where the "con- 
valesce" whipped Wheeler last winter. Camped on 
the battle-ground. A meaner place could not have 


been selected for our brigade. A couple of regiments 
are stationed at this point and a fort on a high hill com- 
mands a wide scope. The troops stationed along the 
road seem to be living "old folks at home." Paper 
collars and blackened boots abound, to which our 
rough boys call the attention of the owners in no flat- 
tering terms. Marched about fifteen miles. 

16.' — Reveille at 4. Marched at 6, our brigade in 
advance. The country not as good as that heretofore 
passed though I noticed a great many very fine farm- 
houses. Reached Cleveland, twelve miles from Charles- 
town, at 12. It was doubtless the intention for us to 
stop here but for some reason we were ordered forward. 
Went through town in style in column of companies. 
A portion of Stanley's division is here. This is called 
the prettiest place between Chattanooga and Knoxville. 
Did not stop in the town but marched six or seven miles 
beyond and camped. This turn of affairs surprises all 
of us and where we will go next is the question. We 
are only twenty-two or twenty-three miles from Chat- 
tanooga. Met General Beatty and staff at Cleveland, 
also all the recruiting officers except Dick [Gosney], 
who sent word that he was sorry he couldn't come, 
wherein I think he slightly prevaricated. 



The two negro soldiers I observed at Knoxville in 
April, 1864, were the first I saw, although black men 
had been enrolled in the Federal armies long before 
that time. During the progress of the war a marked 
change was brought about in the attitude of the people 
of both North and South, not only as to the question 
of freeing the negroes, but also of arming them. It 
was, however, a change caused by the exigencies of the 
war, rather than by any change of sentiment in regard 
to the moral aspects of slavery. At the beginning of 
the war the radical element in the North would have 
preferred to let the seceding states go rather than that 
they should remain in the Union with slavery; before 
the war closed the radical leaders in the South would 
have preferred to let slavery go if by so doing they 
could have remained out of the Union. The evidence 
is abundant and convincing that, before the close of the 
war, many of the radical leaders of the South would 
willingly have consented to universal emancipation if 
by so doing they could have saved the Confederacy. 
The study of the causes operating to produce such a 
revolution of ideas is both curious and interesting. 



The value of the services of the slaves to the Con- 
federate cause was manifest from the beginning. 
Jefferson Davis says :* 

"Much of our success was due to the much-abused 
institution of African servitude, for it enabled the 
white men to go into the army, and leave the cultiva- 
tion of their fields and the care of their flocks, as well 
as of their wives and children, to those who, in the 
language of the Constitution, were 'held to service or 
labor.' " 

This fact was soon perceived in the North. At an 
early stage of the war the slaves were also employed 
in building forts and breastworks and in various places 
at first filled by white men, thus relieving an equal num- 
ber of white soldiers for service in the Confederate 
ranks. This also was seen and its significance was ap- 
preciated in the North and especially in the northern 
armies. It was obvious that whatever would weaken 
the allegiance of the slaves to their masters and induce 
them to favor the Federal cause would weaken the Con- 
federate armies and the Confederate cause. The 
emancipation proclamation was, therefore, a logical 
war measure, and it was on this ground that many in 
the North and in the northern armies, at first hostile 
to emancipation, were at a later period induced to 
favor it. 

If the first step in severing the allegiance of the slave 
to his master was to declare his freedom, then obvious- 

1 Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. I, p. 303. 


ly the next step was to arm him so that he might fight 
for it ; because, in fighting for his freedom, he was not 
only directly aiding the Federal armies, but was in- 
spiring his fellow-slaves to do likewise. Thus a dan- 
gerous enemy of the South and a zealous ally of the 
North was developed in the very heart of the Confed- 

But, when it was first suggested, the idea of arming 
negroes and enrolling them as soldiers in the Federal 
armies aroused violent opposition in the North and 
furnished new arguments to those who denounced the 
prosecution of the war as an Abolition crusade. 

The first act of Congress authorizing the enlistment 
of colored soldiers was passed July 17, 1862, after very 
bitter opposition, particularly from the members repre- 
senting the border states, but this act discriminated be- 
tween the slaves of loyal and those of disloyal citizens. 
Few colored men enlisted, and the first order for rais- 
ing colored troops was issued by the War Department 
August 25, 1862, to General Saxton, in command at 
Hilton Head, South Carolina, authorizing him to en- 
list and equip "such number of volunteers of African 
descent as he might deem expedient, not exceeding five 
thousand." When the order was issued it was ac- 
companied with the remark, "This must never see 
daylight, because it is so much in advance of public 
sentiment." It was not until 1863 that the work of 
enrolling colored troops in the Federal armies was 
begun in earnest. The first order for raising colored 
troops in the free states was issued from the War 


Department January 20, 1863, to Gove, nor Andrew 
of Massachusetts. It was not until March 3, 1864, 
that Congress passed an act making free the families 
of colored soldiers, and not until later in that year 
that colored soldiers were allowed the same pay and 
emoluments as white soldiers. 

The first colored regiment mustered into the United 
States service was the First Louisiana Native Guard, 
raised by General Butler in Xew Orleans and re- 
cruited chiefly among the free blacks. It was mustered 
in September 2j, 1862. Another, organized in Kan- 
sas but recruited chiefly from Missouri slaves, was 
mustered in January 13, 1863, as the First Kansas 
Colored Volunteers, but the name was afterward 
changed to that of 79th U S. Colored Infantry. The 
first colored regiment raised in a seceding state from 
former slaves was recruited in South Carolina, of 
which T W Higginson was commissioned colonel. 
Its organization was begun by order of General Hun- 
ter in May, 1862, but not completed until January 31, 
1863. It was at first called the First South Carolina 
but afterward the 33d U. S. Colored Infantry The 
first colored regiment raised in a northern state and 
recruited from free blacks was the 54th Massachu- 
setts, organized in Massachusetts, but recruited from 
several northern states. Its organization was begun 
in February and completed in May, 1863. The total 
number of colored troops enrolled in the Federal 


armies during the war was 178,975, of whom 99,337 
were recruited in the southern states. 2 

The idea of enlisting negro soldiers was not at first 
favorably received in the northern armies. The oppo- 
sition was plainly manifest in the Army of the Poto- 
mac during McClellan's command of that army. Nor 
was the idea generally favored in the Army of the 
Cumberland. There were never many colored soldiers 
in that army. They were at first viewed with curios- 
ity by the white troops, but all finally came to the con- 
clusion that the black man might quite as well help 
the Union cause by fighting for his freedom and that, 
in so doing, he was far better employed than he was 
when helping to construct Confederate forts and 

So vindictive was the feeling inspired in the South 
by the enrollment of negroes in the northern armies, 
that, in 1863, the Confederate Congress passed an act 
providing that "every white commissioned officer 
commanding negroes or mulattoes in arms against the 
Confederate states shall be deemed as inciting servile 
insurrection and shall, if captured, be put to death or 
be otherwise punished at the discretion of the court," 
and also providing that the negro and mulatto soldiers 
so captured should be delivered to the authorities of 

2 For a history of the Federal legislation on the subject and the 
organization and enrollment of colored soldiers in the Federal 
armies, see Wilson, Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, vol. 3, 
PP- 357~379> 4°3 _ 4 I 4; Fox, Regimental Losses, pp. 52-56; Apple- 
ton's Annual Cyclopedia, 1863, pp. 25-29. 


the states wherein captured, "to be dealt with accord- 
ing to the present or future laws of such state or 

During the first two years of the war few could have 
been found in the South bold enough to advocate the 
dangerous experiment of arming the slaves and put- 
ting them into the Confederate armies. In the North, 
even at this day, many would probably be surprised 
to learn of the gradual change of sentiment in the 
South on this proposition. It affords most striking 
proof that, long before the close of the war, the des- 
perate nature of the contest was appreciated by the 
southern leaders ; for, in their eagerness to save the 
Confederacy, they were ready to throw overboard 
slavery itself. 

The first significant evidence of this change of sen- 
timent is found in the proceedings of a meeting of the 
officers of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee at 
Dalton, Georgia, January 2, 1864. The meeting was 
attended by Joseph E. Johnston, the general com- 
manding, Generals Hardee, Walker, Stewart, and oth- 
ers. Patrick Cleburne, one of the most noted generals 
nf the army, read an elaborate paper prepared for the 
evident purpose of being circulated in the army if 
approved by the meeting. 

The paper set forth the depletion of the Confederate 

armies, the constantly increasing number of desertions, 

and the discouragement of the Confederate soldiers, 

who were "growing weary of hardships and slaugh- 



ters" which promised no results, and portrayed in 
strong language the impending danger of "subjuga- 
tion." One of the three great causes "operating to 
destroy" them was alleged to be slavery, which from 
being one of their "chief sources of strength at the 
commencement of the war," had now become, "in a 
military point of view, one of their chief sources of 
weakness." The paper emphasized the reasons for 
regarding slavery as a source of weakness to the Con- 
federacy : 

"Wherever slavery is once seriously disturbed, 
whether by the actual presence or the approach of the 
enemy, or even by a cavalry raid, the whites can no 
longer, with safety to their property, openly sympa- 
thize with our cause. The fear of their slaves is con- 
tinually haunting them, and from silence and appre- 
hension many of these soon learn to wish the war 
stopped on any terms. The next stage is to take the 
oath to save property, and they become dead to us, 
if not open enemies. To prevent raids we are forced 
to scatter our forces, and are not free to move and 
strike like the enemy; his vulnerable points are care- 
fully selected and fortified depots. Ours are found 
in every point where there is a slave to set free. All 
along the lines slavery is comparatively valueless to 
us for labor, but of great and increasing worth to the 
enemy for information. It is an omnipresent spy 
system, pointing out our valuable men to the enemy, 
revealing our positions, purposes, and resources, and 
yet acting so safely and secretly that there is no means 
to guard against it. Even in the heart of our country, 
where our hold upon this secret espionage is firmest, 
it waits but the opening fire of the enemy's battle line 


to wake it, like a torpid serpent, into venomous 

In order, therefore, to fill the ranks of the Confed- 
erate armies, to insure the sympathy of foreign na- 
tions, and to infuse new life into the decaying Confed- 
eracy it was proposed "that we retain in service for the 
war all troops now in service and that we immediately 
commence training a large reserve of the most cour- 
ageous of our slaves, and further that we guarantee 
freedom within a reasonable time to every slave in 
the South who shall remain true to the Confederacy in 
this war " 

General Cleburne recognized, not only the absurdity, 
but the danger, of arming the slaves without freeing 
them. It would be preposterous, he argued, to ex- 
pect the negro to fight against the hope of freedom 
with any degree of enthusiasm : 

"Therefore," he adds, "we must bind him to our 
cause by no doubtful bonds ; we must leave no possi- 
ble loophole for treachery to creep in. The slaves 
are dangerous now. but armed, trained, and collected 
in an army, they would be a thousandfold more dan- 
gerous ; therefore when we make soldiers of them we 
must make free men of them beyond all question, and 
thus enlist their sympathies also." 

General Patton Anderson, who attended the confer- 
ence, felt moved to write General Leonidas Polk a 
confidential letter on the subject of Cleburne's "mon- 
strous proposition" and his own feelings "on being 


confronted by a project so startling in its character — 
may I say, so revolting to southern sentiment, south- 
ern pride, and southern honor." He adds : "Not the 
least painful of the emotions awakened by it was the 
consciousness which forced itself upon me that it met 
zvith favor by others, besides the author, in high sta- 
tion then present." 

Somehow the matter reached the ears of Jefferson 
Davis and thereupon his Secretary of War, James A. 
Seddon, wrote a letter to General Johnston expressing 
the earnest convictions of the President that "the dis- 
semination or even promulgation of such opinions 
under the present circumstances of the Confederacy, 
whether in the army or among the people, can be pro- 
ductive only of discouragement, distraction, and dis- 
sension," and General Johnston was requested to 
communicate the President's views to the officers pres- 
ent at the meeting "and urge on them the suppression, 
not only of the memorial itself, but likewise of all 
discussion and controversy respecting or grozving out 
of it." 3 

The question of arming the slaves continued to be 
agitated in the South, and was favorably considered, 
though public sentiment never quite reached the point 
of universal emancipation. The Richmond Enquirer, 
in an editorial, October 6, 1864, 4 said: 

"Whenever the subjugation of Virginia or the em- 

3 The memorial itself and the correspondence relating to it will 
be found in Reb. Rec, ser. I, vol. 52, pt. 2, pp. 586, 598, 606, 608. 
* McPherson : Hist, of the Rebellion, p. 428. 


ployment of her slaves as soldiers are alternative 
positions, then certainly we are for making them sol- 
diers and giving freedom to those negroes that escape 
the casualties of battle." 

Jefferson Davis foreshadowed his own views in a 
message to the Confederate Congress, November 7, 
1864, in which he said 

"Should the alternative ever be presented of subju- 
gation or of the employment of the slave as a soldier, 
there seems to be no reason to doubt what should then 
be our decision." 

General Lee also became a convert to the proposi- 
tion for arming the slaves, and, in a letter written 
January 11, 1865, to Andrew Hunter, expressing his 
views on the subject, he said : 

"I think, therefore, we must decide whether slavery 
shall be extinguished by our enemies and the slaves 
be used against us, or use them ourselves at the risk 
of the effects which may be produced upon our social 
institutions. My own opinion is that we should em- 
ploy them without delay. I believe that, with proper 
regulations, they can be made effective soldiers. They 
possess the physical qualifications in an eminent degree. 
Long habits of obedience and subordination, coupled 
with that moral influence which in our country the 
white man possesses over the black, furnish the best 
foundation for that discipline which is the surest guar- 
antee of military efficiency. Our chief aim should be 
to secure their fidelity. There have been formidable 
armies composed of men having no interests in the 


country for which they fought beyond their pay or 
the hope of plunder. But it is certain that the best 
foundation upon which the fidelity of an army can 
rest, especially in a service which imposes peculiar 
hardships and privations, is the personal interest of 
the soldier in the issue of the contest. Such an inter- 
est we can give our negroes by granting immediate 
freedom to all who enlist, and freedom at the end of 
the war to the families of those who discharge their 
duties faithfully, whether they survive or not, together 
with the privilege of residing at the South." 

On February 7, 1865, a letter from General Lee 
to General Wise was published, thanking the latter's 
brigade for resolutions adopted declaring that they 
would consent to gradual emancipation for the sake 
of peace. Jefferson Davis, explaining his own change 
of mind, says: 5 "Subsequent events advanced my 
views from a prospective to a present need for the en- 
rollment of negroes to take their place in the ranks." 
On February 8, 1865, Senator Brown of Mississippi 
introduced a resolution in the Confederate Senate 
that, if adopted, would have freed 200,000 negroes 
and put them into the army, but this was defeated the 
next day in secret session. On February 11 a bill 
was introduced in the Confederate House of Repre- 
sentatives, authorizing the enrollment of 200,000 
slaves with the consent of their masters. While it was 
pending, General Lee wrote a letter to E. Barksdale 
of the House, urging its passage. On the subject of 

5 Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. 1, pp. 5 I S - 


emancipation he said, "I think those who are employed 
should be freed. It would be neither just nor justice, 
in my opinion, to require them to serve as slaves." 
The proposed bill was defeated February 23 by the 
vote of Senator Hunter of Virginia, who, while it 
was under discussion, made a bitter speech opposing 
it, in which he said : 

"When we left the old government we thought we 
had got rid forever of the slavery agitation; but, to 
my surprise, I find that this [the Confederate] gov- 
ernment assumes power to arm the slaves, which in- 
volves also the power of emancipation. This proposi- 
tion would be regarded as a confession of despair. 
If we are right in passing this measure, we are wrong 
in denying to the old government the right to interfere 
with slavery and to emancipate slaves. If we offer 
the slaves their freedom as a boon, we confess that 
we were insincere and hypocritical in saying slavery 
was the best state for the negroes themselves. I believe 
that the arming and emancipating the slaves will be 
an abandonment of the contest. To arm the negroes 
is to give them freedom. When they come out scarred 
from the conflict they must be free." 

On March 4 the bill was again taken up and passed, 
Senator Hunter voting for it under instructions from 
the Virginia legislature. 

The negro soldier bill passed by the Confederate 
Congress March 9, 1865, authorized the President of 
the Confederacy "to ask for and accept from the own- 
ers of slaves the services of such number of able- 
bodied negro men as he may deem expedient for and 


during the war, to perform military services in what- 
ever capacity he may direct." It also provided for the 
organization of such troops into companies, battal- 
ions, regiments, and brigades, and that while in the 
service they should "receive the same rations, clothing, 
and compensation as allowed troops in the same branch 
of service." 

A proviso was added to the bill before its final pas- 
sage, providing that "not more than 25 per cent, 
of the male slaves between the ages of 18 and 45 
in any state should be called for under the provision 
of this act." Section 5 of the act expressly provided 
"that nothing in this act shall be construed to author- 
ize a change in the relation of said slaves." 

On February 25, 1865, the legislature of Virginia 
also passed an act authorizing the governor of the 
state "to call for volunteers from among the slaves 
and free negroes of the state to aid in the defense of 
the capital and such other points as may be threat- 
ened by the public enemy." 6 

It will be observed that there was nothing in either 
the act of the Confederate Congress or in that of the 
Virginia legislature providing for emancipation, im- 
mediate or gradual. But, as had been pointed out 
by Generals Cleburne and Lee, it was futile to arm 

8 For the history of Confederate legislation on the subject of 
negro soldiers, see McPherson: Hist, of the Rebellion, pp. 282, 
283, 427, 429, 611, 612; Davis: Rise and Fall of the Confederate 
Government, vol. 1, pp. 514-519; Pollard: The Lost Cause, pp. 
659-660; Jones's Diary, vol. 2, pp. 413-444. 


the slaves without giving them their freedom; it was 
worse than futile — it was suicidal. Nevertheless, the 
negro soldiers' bill held out some hope, and Mr. Jones 
records in his Diary under date of March 17: 

"We shall have a negro army. Letters are pouring 
into the department from men of military skill and 
character, asking authority to raise companies, battal- 
ions, and regiments of negro troops. It is the desper- 
ate remedy for the very desperate case — and may be 
successful. If 300,000 efficient soldiers can be made 
of this material, there is no conjecturing where the 
next campaign may end." 

It was then too late to raise an army of Confeder- 
ate negroes, with or without emancipation. There 
were not arms enough for them ; there was not time 
sufficient to organize and drill them. The Confed- 
eracy was in the throes of dissolution. Pollard 
speaks with bitterness of this last puerile attempt of 
the southern leaders to galvanize into life the dying 
Confederacy : 7 

"Such paltry legislation, indeed, may be taken as 
an indication of that vague desperation in the Confed- 
eracy which grasped at shadows ; which conceived 
great measures, the actual results of which were yet 
insignificant , which showed its sense of insecurity — 
and yet, after all, had not nerve enough to make a 
practical and persistent effort at safety." 

Calling on the negroes at this stage of the war to 
enlist in the Confederate armies was like calling spir- 

' The Lost Cause, p. <><>o. 


its from the vasty deep. They did not come. A few 
were gathered together in Richmond, about twenty 
all told, including three slaves of Benjamin, the Con- 
federate Secretary of State, and these were paraded 
through the streets as an illustration of the loyalty 
of the southern negroes to the cause of their masters 
and as an inspiring example to their fellows. The 
loyalty of the slaves or that of their masters had 
waned, and a draft was ordered. The 3d day of 
April, 1865, was appointed to begin the conscription 
of negroes for the Confederate armies. 

But there were to be no more drafts in the South 
for either black or white men. Before the 3d day 
of April arrived, Lee had evacuated Richmond, Jef- 
ferson Davis and his cabinet had fled; the members 
of the Confederate Congress were fugitives, the Con- 
federate government had disappeared, and the city of 
Richmond was on fire. On the day set for the draft, 
amidst the smoke and flames of the burning city, 
10,000 black soldiers were marching through the 
streets singing "John Brown" and scattering broadcast 
the emancipation proclamation, and thousands upon 
thousands of the resident Richmond negroes were 
joining in the joyful chorus : 

"Glory, glory hallelujah, 

Glory, glory hallelujah, 

Glory, glory hallelujah, 
We is free to-day." 

The black soldiers who marched were not Confed- 
erate conscripts; they wore the blue and carried the 
stars and stripes. 



The future historian who looks for a date from 
which to trace the decline and fall of the Confederacy, 
will probably fix upon July 4, 1863. On that day the 
news of two great Federal victories, one at Gettys- 
burg, the other at Vicksburg, thrilled the northern 
heart and cast a gloom over the South which never 
lifted. Lee's defeat ended all hope of successful in- 
vasion of the North, and the surrender of Vicksburg 
opened the Mississippi and practically cut off all the 
country west of it from the Confederacy. 

Public sentiment in the North underwent a rapid 
and radical change. The fall elections of 1863 un- 
mistakably showed the turning tide. In Ohio, Indiana, 
and other western states large numbers of the Demo- 
cratic party were loyal to the Federal government 
and, while those known as "c'opperheads" became more 
and more venomous, their power to harm the Federal 
cause diminished and they came to be universally de- 
spised by all decent citizens, both in the North and in 
the South. In fact, after the Morgan raid, the "Peace 
at any Price" platform at Chicago, and the exposures 
in the treason trials at Indianapolis of the infamous 



schemes of the Sons of Liberty, public sentiment un- 
derwent a change so marked that nothing more was 
needed to solidify the whole North. 

The resources of the Federal government seemed 
to be inexhaustible and, notwithstanding the enormous 
expenses of the war and the steady drain of men, there 
was no abatement of the martial spirit that pervaded 
the North, now thoroughly aroused, determined, and 
confident of ultimate success. The three-years' troops 
who had entered the service in 1861 and 1862 were 
now veteran soldiers. Many of them, on the expira- 
tion of their terms of enlistment, reenlisted. On Jan- 
uary 1, 1864, there were on the Union army rolls 
860,737 men — nearly twice the number on the Confed- 
erate rolls. To insure enough soldiers, drafts for 
three-years' men were ordered February I, 1864, for 
500,000, and March 14, for 200,000 more. On April 
23, the Federal government accepted a tender from the 
governors of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Wis- 
consin of 85,000 hundred-day men. Between that 
date and July 18, 83,612 men were mustered into the 
United States' service for 100 days. There was no 
lack of men. 

On the other hand the Confederacy was now on 
the defensive. It had been shorn of a large part of 
its territory by the opening of the Mississippi ; it was 
hard pushed for means to carry on the government 
and to maintain its armies in the field ; and by the be- 
ginning of the year 1864, it was evident that it was 
in process of rapid disintegration. All hope of for- 


eign intervention had vanished and Jefferson Davis 
is reported to have replied to some one who inquired 
about the prospect of it, "We have no friends abroad." 

The Federal blockade was now so stringent that all 
foreign trade was cut off and nothing could be taken 
into or out of the Confederacy except in occasional 
blockade runners and at great risks. The Confederacy 
had no credit abroad or at home. Its financial system, 
if it can be called a system, violated every cardinal 
principle of national finance, and, in the issue of paper 
money, the wildest dreams of "fiaters" were realized. 
As the volume of irredeemable currency expanded, 
prices went up and the result, inevitable in such cases, 
was that those receiving fixed salaries, especially sala- 
ries fixed by law, were the first and greatest sufferers. 
The railroads were largely used for military purposes, 
and in Richmond and other cities, dependent chiefly on 
the railroads for supplies, provisions commanded ex- 
orbitant prices. 

The fallacy of the fascinating idea that government 
can, by mere paper decrees, create value out of noth- 
ing was never more clearly illustrated than it was in 
the financial measures of the Confederate government. 

"The consequences of this ignorant and wild finan- 
cial policy," says Mr. Pollard, 1 "were, that, by the next 
meeting of Congress, the volume of currency was at 
least four times what were the wants of the commu- 
nity for a circulating medium; that prices were in- 

1 Southern History of the War, vol. 2, pp. 233-4. 


flated more than an equal degree, for want of confi- 
dence in the paper of the government had kindled the 
fever of speculation ; that the public credit, abused by- 
culpable ignorance and obstinate empiricism, had 
fallen to an ebb that alarmed the country more than 
any reverse in .the military fortunes of the war ; and 
that the government was forced to the doubtful and 
not very honorable expedient of attempting to restore 
its currency by a system of demonetizing its own 

"The redundancy of the currency was the chief 
cause of its depreciation. The amount of money in 
circulation in the South, in time of peace, was $80,- 
000,000. In January, 1863, it was $300,000,000. In 
September, 1861, Confederate notes were about equal 
to specie ; before December, specie was at 20 per cent, 
premium; before April, 1862, it was at 50 per cent.; 
before last of September, at 100; before December, at 
225 ; before February, at 280 ; and in the spring of 
1863, at the frightful premium of 400 per cent., while 
bank bills were worth 190 cents on the dollar. 

"Since the foundation of the Confederate govern- 
ment, its finances had been grossly mismanaged. The 
treasury note was a naked promise to pay; there was 
no fund pledged for its redemption , and the prospect 
of the rigid liquidation of the enormous debt that this 
class of paper represented six months after the restora- 
tion of peace, depended solely on the speculative pros- 
pect of a foreign loan to the amount of many hundred 
millions of dollars. At the commencement of the war 
the South had the elements for the structure of one 
of the most successful and elastic schemes of finance 
that the world had seen. The planters were anxious 
to effect the sales of their cotton and tobacco to the 
Confederate States ; these would have supplied the 


government with a basis of credit which would have 
been extended as the prices of these staples advanced, 
and therefore kept progress with the war ; but this 
scheme was opposed by the Secretary of the Treasury, 
Air. Memminger, and defeated by his influence. He 
was unfortunately sustained by an executive grossly 
incompetent on subjects of finance ; which was ig- 
norant of the principle of political economy that there 
are no royal ways of making money out of nothing, 
that governments must raise money in the legitimate 
way of taxation, loans, etc. ; which relied upon the 
manufacture of a revenue out of naked paper obliga- 
tions , and which actually went to the foolish extremity 
of recommending that the creditors of the government 
should take their payment in currency rather than in 
the public stocks. It appears, indeed, that our govern- 
ment was ignorant of the most primitive truths of 
finance, and that it had not read in history or in reason 
the lesson of the fatal connection between currency 
and revenue." 

A southern writer 2 has given some Richmond prices 
during the first three months of the year 1864. Flour 
sold at $200 per barrel ; meal at $50 per bushel , beans 
at $75 per bushel; bacon at $7.75 per pound; butter 
at $8 per pound; sugar at $10 to $12 per pound; and 
$40 was asked for "an old, tough turkey gobbler." 
Fabulous prices were also demanded for clothing and 
all other necessaries of life. 

Various financial expedients had been tried. On 
February 17, 1864, a new funding law was passed, 
and also an act largely increasing taxation and author- 

2 Jones: A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, vol. 2, pp. 122-179. 


izing the collection of taxes in kind. The purpose of 
the funding act, as expressed in the title, was "to re- 
duce the currency and to authorize a new issue of notes 
and bonds." It was "hoped that as money got scarcer 
food and raiment would get cheaper." But the fund- 
ing of old notes did not keep pace with the issue of 
new ones. Eight hundred or 1,000 millions of the old 
notes had been issued ; 200 to 250 millions were fund- 
ed, leaving over 600 millions outstanding. The Con- 
federate Secretary of the Treasury is reported to have 
said that he could make "2,000,000 to 3,000,000 of 
the new currency per day " How much he did issue, 
there is no way of ascertaining, but he made all that 
was called for; prices continued to advance and there 
were renewed complaints against the "extortioners" 
who charged such enormous sums for everything that 
people were obliged to buy. 

Before the opening of the great campaign of 1864, 
the Confederate currency had so depreciated that it 
had practically ceased to afford any certain measure 
of values and, consequently, had ceased to be a medium 
of exchange. The result was that the people in their 
commercial transactions returned to the primitive sys- 
tem of barter. 3 In the agricultural regions, likely to 
be traversed by either the Federal or the Confederate 
armies, there was little encouragement for the farmer 

Prof. Schwab in The Confederate States of America has 
given an exhaustive financial history of the Confederacy and has 
clearly shown to what desperate straits the Confederate govern- 
ment had been reduced prior to the last year of the war. 


to raise more than was absolutely necessary for his 
own use. He was in danger of foe and friend alike. 
If Federal troops came by they took what he had and 
paid him nothing-; if Confederate troops visited him 
they took what they wanted and paid him in depreci- 
ated currency; if he chanced to escape both and took 
his surplus to market, he could get nothing but a wad 
of worthless paper. Under such conditions commerce 
was paralyzed, manufactures and agriculture lan- 
guished, and all business suffered. 

Dire distress was on every hand and destitution in 
many homes. A southern writer 4 has given a graphic 
description of Hard Times in the Confederacy ; of 
the fabulous prices of all the necessaries of life; of 
the substitutes people were compelled to use in place 
of luxuries formerly enjoyed. Those who liked coffee 
were obliged to content themselves with a decoction 
of dried sweet potatoes, old ladies who loved their 
tea "drowned their happy memories of hyson in a 
solution of raspberry leaves" ; the children ate ginger- 
cakes sweetened with sorghum, all kinds of make- 
shifts were resorted to in desperate attempts to pre- 
serve an appearance of gentility by bringing forth 
from old closets and garrets the antiquated and bat- 
tered hats and bonnets that had been worn "before the 
war" ; even the insignia of rank of a distinguished 
Confederate general were made of some yellow flan- 

4 A. C. Gordon, Century Mag., vol. 36, p. 761. 


nel- procured from children's petticoats that his wife 
had resurrected. We may smile when reading all 
this, but there are few that will not agree with the 
writer that "though there is something ludicrous in 
it all, the humor of it touches so nearly the outer edge 
of the heroic as to seem strangely like pathos." 

The Confederacy was driven to the severest straits 
in maintaining its armies. Its military strength had 
been largely spent. Sweeping conscription acts that 
seemed to rob the cradle and the grave for recruits had 
been passed by the Confederate Congress and were 
unsparingly enforced. The first of these had aroused 
violent opposition, but one still more sweeping was 
passed February 11, 1864, subjecting to conscription 
all white men between the ages of seventeen and fifty, 
and providing that all then in service between the ages 
of eighteen and forty-five should be retained during 
the war. The opposition to these acts continued, and 
large numbers of those so forced into the southern 
armies deserted. It has been stated that few con- 
scripts were found in the Army of Northern Virginia 
or in any other southern army at the final surrender." 
The additions to the Confederate armies hardly sup- 
plied the vacancies caused by deaths, disease, and de- 
sertions, and, long before the close of the war, Lee 
was urgently calling the attention of the Confederate 
government to this alarming fact. 

But to obtain men for the armies was not more diffi- 

5 See Stephens : The War Between the States, p. 573. 


cult than it was to procure supplies for them. In Jan- 
uary, 1864, General Lee wrote the President of the 
Confederacy that he had "but one day's meat rations 
and feared that he should not be able to retain the army 
in the field," and on February 29 his commissary re- 
ported that he had bread enough to last only until the 
next day. On March 14 Lee dispatched that "the 
army was out of meat and had but one day's rations 
of bread." Mr. Jones, recording this in his diary, 
adds : "No wonder that generals are in consultation, 
for all the armies are in the same lamentable predica- 
ment." The Confederate soldiers were as poorly 
clothed as they were fed and their pay was still more 
scanty Indeed, they were practically serving without 
pay. 6 Death stared them in front and starvation of 
their families lurked in the rear. AVhatever we may 
think of their "cause," we must admit their devotion 
to it and admire the heroism with which they fought 
for it. No soldiers ever made greater sacrifices. 

Moreover, the very idea which constituted the 
corner-stone of secession was now developing its de- 
structive tendency and bearing fruit in renewed and 
determined opposition to the measures which the gov- 
ernment had been forced to adopt. The conscription 

6 The pay of the private Confederate soldier was fixed at $11 a 
month until June 9, 1864, when the Confederate Congress raised 
the amount to $18. In January, 1864, $1 in gold was worth $21 in 
Confederate currency, so that at that time the pay of the Con- 
federate private soldier, measured in gold, was about fifty-two 
cents a month. 


laws had aroused violent hostility from the beginning. 
The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the 
declaration of martial law created great dissatisfaction. 
When people refused to sell supplies for the army at 
the prices fixed by the government, often far below the 
market prices, and to take their pay in Confederate 
currency, impressment was resorted to. This caused 
universal complaints of favoritism, corruption, and op- 
pression on the part of the impressing officers. In 
many places impressment by roving bands, claiming to 
be acting under authority of the government, degen- 
erated into what was denounced as no better than pil- 
lage. The collection of taxes in kind, a measure 
forced upon the government as one of the results of 
the depreciation of its currency, was necessarily 
accompanied with great waste and occasioned loud 
complaints of corruption and oppression of the tax- 
gatherers, especially in North Carolina, Georgia, and 
Alabama where the greater part of such taxes was 

General Bragg, chief military adviser of the Presi- 
dent, was extremely unpopular with the Confederate 
generals and with the people. Not only were his own 
official actions criticized, but he was often compelled 
to bear hostile criticism intended to cover an attack 
upon Jefferson Davis himself, for the people had al- 
ready begun to denounce what was now openly styled 
a military despotism. Both in North Carolina and in 
Georgia there were loud protests against the conscrip- 
tion and impressment laws and arbitrary arrests, and 


it was said that "seizures of persons and property had 
become as common as they were in France and Rus- 
sia." Public meetings denouncing these proceedings 
were held in various counties in North Carolina, and 
eight of the ten persons chosen in 1863 to represent 
the state in the Confederate Congress were reported to 
be secretly in favor of peace. 7 

Judge Pearson of North Carolina assumed the right 
to discharge, on writs of habeas corpus, conscripts who 
had substitutes in the army, on the ground that the law 
authorizing their conscription was unconstitutional. 
Governor Vance of that state wrote President Davis 
a letter saying that he should be obliged to sustain 
Judge Pearson "even to the summoning the military 
force of the state to resist the Confederate States au- 
thorities." Governor Brown of Georgia was equally 
outspoken in denying the constitutional power of the 
Confederacy to enforce its conscription laws in a "sov- 
ereign state." Even the Confederate Vice-President, 
Alexander Stephens, is quoted as saying in a public 
speech that "Independence without liberty was of no 
value to him, and if he must have a master he cared 
not whether he were northern or southern." 

On every hand were signs of revolt against the Con- 
federate administration. So loud were the complaints 
of illegal impressments in east Louisiana and southern 
Mississippi, that the Confederate President directed 
George B. Hodge, the Assistant Inspector-General, to 

7 See Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia for 1863, under North Caro- 
lina and Georgia. 


make an official investigation of them. This officer 
interviewed "the most prominent and respectable citi- 
zens," and on July 14, 1864, submitted a report. 
Some complaints were ascertained not to be well 
founded, but, the report stated, "The proofs, however, 
are overwhelming that the people of this district have 
for months and years undergone exactions and op- 
pressions at once illegal, vexatious, and unjust." The 
military officers "imagined themselves invested with 
plenary powers" and "supplies of forage and subsist- 
ence were impressed by officers of all grades, and even 
by privates," for which certificates were given. There 
was no money in circulation, but the people were 
"laden with these worthless certificates," which the 
Confederate disbursing officers would not honor and 
the tax-collectors would not receive in payment of 
taxes. A few examples were given in order to con- 
vey "an idea of the chaotic condition of affairs," but, 
says the report, "to enumerate all would swell the list 
of claims to thousands, the amount claimed to mil- 
lions." 8 

No northern writer ever penned so bitter an arraign- 
ment of the Confederate authorities as did Governor 
Brown of Georgia. His voluminous correspondence 
with the Confederate authorities amply proves that in 
his hands the pen was mightier than the sword. In a 
letter written by him November 14. 1864, to the Con- 
federate Secretary of War, denying the right of the 

8 See report in Reb. Rec, ser. No. no, pp. 695-700. 


Confederate government to control the militia of Geor- 
gia, the usurpations of the Confederate authorities are 
set forth in forceful language. There is no doubt that 
the Richmond military despotism grew more and more 
intolerable, but, if so obnoxious in November, 1864, as 
Governor Brown's letter indicates, it must have been 
very bad at the beginning of the year. In his letter 
Brown says : 9 

"It is not only my right, but my duty, to uphold the 
constitutional rights and liberties of the people of 
Georgia by force, if necessary, against usurpations and 
abuses of power by the central government. The 
militia is, under the constitution, one of the proper in- 
strumentalities for that purpose. There is scarcely a 
single provision in the constitution for the protection 
of life, liberty, or property in Georgia that has not been 
and is not now constantly violated by the Confederate 
government through its officers and agents. 

"It has been but a short time since one of the stores 
of the state of Georgia, containing property in the 
peaceable possession of the state, was forcibly entered 
by a Confederate officer, and the property taken there- 
from by force. I had no militia present at the time to 
repel this invasion of the rights of the sovereign state, 
but should have had them there soon if the property 
had not been restored. A single Confederate provost- 
marshal in Georgia admits that thirty citizens and sol- 
diers have been shot by his guard without his right to 
shoot citizens being questioned till within the last few 
days, when he was greatly enraged that a true bill for 
murder should have been found by a grand jury 

° Rcb. Rcc, ser. No. no, pp. 789-790. 


against one of them for shooting down a citizen in the 
streets, who offended him by questioning his authority 
over him. Every citizen in the state, both man and 
woman, is arrested in the cars, streets, and highways, 
who presumes to travel without a pass. They are ar- 
rested without law and imprisoned at pleasure of gov- 
ernment officials. The houses, lands, and effects of 
the people of Georgia are daily seized and appropriated 
to the use of the government or its agents without the 
shadow of law, without just compensation, and in de- 
fiance of the decision of the supreme tribunal of the 
state, and her officers of justice are openly resisted by 
the officers of the Confederate States. The property 
of the families of soldiers now under arms to sustain 
the Confederacy is forcibly taken from them without 
hesitation, and appropriated, in many cases, without 

The wonder is that, under the conditions prevailing 
in the southern states, the Confederacy was able to 
keep in the field such armies as it had in the beginning 
of the year 1864. Nevertheless, a great Confederate 
army, commanded by a great general, stood between 
Washington and Richmond, and one as formidable, 
commanded by another great general, still barred the 
advance of the Union armies south of Chattanooga. 
Halleck continued to pose at 'Washington as general- 
in-chief . For nearly two years he had been confound- 
ing the Federal generals and amusing the Confederates 
with his stupid strategy, but the Union cause had sur- 
vived all his blunders. It was impossible, however, to 
foretell what might happen if he were retained in chief 
command, and so in February, 1864, Congress revived 


the grade of lieutenant-general. Grant's nomination 
to fill the place was confirmed March 2 ; on the 9th he 
received his commission and on the 12th was appointed 
general-in-chief of all the Federal armies. President 
Lincoln, after so long and painful and hitherto fruitless 
search, had at last found the general who was destined 
to lead to victory the armies of the East as he had led 
the armies of the West. 

About the same time Sherman was appointed to the 
command of the Military Division of the Mississippi. 
The two generals held a conference in March and 
planned an early and simultaneous movement against 
the Confederate armies. Grant was to move on Lee's 
army, with Richmond as the objective point; Sher- 
man was to attack General Joseph E. Johnston, who, 
after the battle of Missionary Ridge, had superseded 
Bragg; and General Banks was to move against Mo- 

Pursuant to this general plan, a mighty army was 
gathered at Chattanooga, in every respect the greatest 
ever assembled in the West ; great in numbers, great in 
commanders, and great in respect to the troops that 
composed it. It drew from the Northwest the flower 
of its youth ; in its ranks were representatives of all 
the leading Federal armies of the East and of the 
West, veterans of Antietam, Chancellorsville, Gettys- 
burg, Shiloh, Vicksburg, Stone's River, Chickamauga, 
Missionary Ridge, and other famous fields. 

Three armies were combined to make up the splen- 
did host led by Sherman — the Army of the Cumber- 


land, the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the 
Ohio. General Thomas commanded the Army of the 
Cumberland, composed of the 4th corps under General 
O. O. Howard, the 14th corps under General Palmer, 
and the 20th corps (formed by consolidation of the 
nth and 12th) under General Hooker, with a cavalry 
corps under General Elliott. General James B. Mc- 
Pherson commanded the Army of the Tennessee, 
composed of the 15th corps, under General John A. 
Logan, the 2d and 4th divisions of the 16th corps 
under General Granville M. Dodge, and two divisions 
of the 17th corps under General Frank P Blair. 
General Schofield commanded the Army of the Ohio, 
composed of the 23d corps and General George Stone- 
man's cavalry division. 

During the entire month of April, troops, ammuni- 
tion, provisions, and military stores of all kinds were 
hurried to Chattanooga. Everything was in readiness 
for the forward move which began May 5, 1864. 
When General Sherman's army started it numbered 
over 100,000 men. 

General Johnston's army, variously estimated at 
from 55,000 to 65,000 on May 5. was increased in a 
few days to about 75,000. As it was too weak to take 
the aggressive, Johnston was obliged, from the begin- 
ning, to act on the defensive, keeping his army intact 
and waiting for an opportunity to take advantage of 
any false move that might be made by Sherman. It 
was also necessary for Johnston to rely very largely 
upon fortifications and to prepare for the contingency 


of being driven out of one line of works by having an- 
other in rear of it behind which he could fall back when 
compelled to retreat. 

Sherman's tactics were to move his army as near the 
Confederate works as practicable and to make such 
demonstrations in front as would fully occupy the at- 
tention of the occupants while he was sending a flank- 
ing force to the right or left. In this way the campaign 
was conducted from the beginning to the capture of At- 
lanta — Sherman continually flanking and Johnston 
continually falling back from one fortified line to an- 

A marked peculiarity of the campaign was that the 
two armies fought no great battle, such as that of 
Chickamauga or even that of Stone's River. There 
was none in which all the troops of both armies were 
engaged. The greatest number engaged at one time 
was in the battle of Atlanta, July 22, 1864, where the 
Federal troops numbered 30,477 and the Confederates, 
36,934. In the bloody assault on Kenesaw Moun- 
tain, June 2J, 1S64, the Federal troops numbered 
16,225 an d the Confederate, 17,733. The greatest 
Federal loss in any battle of this campaign was 4.200, 
at Atlanta, July 21 and 22, the next largest being 3,000 
in the assault on Kenesaw Mountain, June 27 

There was, however, a succession of battles such as 
those of Rocky Face Ridge, Resaca, New Hope 
Church, Pickett's Mill, Kenesaw Mountain, and those 
in the vicinity of Atlanta, in which large losses were 
sustained. These do not, by any means, represent all 


the fighting. In fact there was almost continual fight- 
ing in the Atlanta campaign from May 5 to September 
1. Besides the battles there was heavy skirmishing 
nearly every day at various points along the lines, re- 
sulting in severe losses to the troops that participated. 
From May 3, when the 79th left Catoosa Springs, un- 
til June 23, there were only three days when the reg- 
iment was not under fire. I was wounded on the 23d 
and can not state from personal observation what oc- 
curred after that date, but my information is that the 
regiment was almost continuously under fire until the 
capture of Atlanta. As already stated, Sherman's 
plan was to push his lines as near those of the Confed- 
erates as practicable, so that often the main lines of the 
two armies were not more than two or three hundred 
yards apart. From their works or in trees near by, 
Confederate sharpshooters kept up a constant fire into 
our lines. Men were liable to be struck by a bullet 
at any time while walking about behind their own 
works. Frequently some one was killed in his sleep 
by a stray ball of a Confederate sharpshooter. Some- 
times in the night a furious cannonading was begun 
at some point in the front, and then a whole brigade or 
division was hastily awakened and compelled to re- 
main for hours in line of battle expecting an attack. 

The sanguinary character of the fighting may be in- 
ferred from the statistics given by Colonel Fox, who 
states that the total losses in the Atlanta campaign 
from May 5 to September 1 were : 


Killed 4,423 

Wounded . . . . 22,822 

Missing . . 4,442 

Total .. 31,687 

The Confederate losses during the same period, as 
estimated by Colonel Fox, were : 

Killed . . 3,044 

Wounded . . 18,952 

Captured .... 12,983 

Total 34,979 

The Army of the Cumberland began the campaign 
with 60,773 men - Between May 5 and September 6, 
it lost in 

Killed 3,041 

Wounded ... .... .... 15,783 

Total 18,824 

The Atlanta campaign illustrates very clearly the 
folly, to call it by no harsher name, of attempting to 
take, by direct assault, strongly fortified positions. 
This was demonstrated in the assault on Kenesaw 
Mountain, June 2", 1864. It has never been satis- 
factorily explained why it was ordered but it is known 
to have been made without the approval of Sherman's 
subordinate generals and over the vigorous protests of 
McPherson and Logan. The assault was made with 
the 2d and part of the 1st division of the 4th corps, 


the 2d division of the 15th corps, and part of the 2d 
division of the 14th corps. The Federal forces num- 
bered 16,225 and the Confederate 17,733. The losses 
in killed and wounded, not including the missing, most 
of whom were probably killed, were as follows : 

Federal . . 1,999 

Confederate .... 270 

It will be observed that, the numbers being about 
equal, the Federal army lost eight men killed and 
wounded for every killed or wounded Confederate. 
At such a rate it would not take long to fritter away 
an army of a million. We can well understand the in- 
dignation of General Thomas expressed in a note to 
General Sherman on that day, when, after two unsuc- 
cessful assaults, a third was suggested. 

"The Army of the Cumberland has already made 
two desperate, bloody, and unsuccessful assaults on this 
mountain. If a third is ordered, it will, in my opin- 
ion, result in demoralizing this army, and will, if made, 
be against my best judgment and most earnest pro- 

In a later dispatch on the same day, when asked by 
General Sherman his opinion concerning a proposed 
movement, General Thomas said : 

"What force do you think of moving with? If 
with the greater part of the army, I think it decidedly 
better than butting against breastworks twelve feet 
thick and strongly abatised." 


The campaign very rapidly exhausted the vitality of 
the men. Hard marches, intense heat, loss of sleep, 
bad water, constant exposure to miasma, told heavily 
on the strongest constitutions. Hardest of all was the 
intense mental strain of being continually under fire, 
with the possibility of being killed or wounded at any 
moment in the day or night. Xo man ventured to 
undress ; every soldier sleeping in his clothes and with 
his musket and accoutrements by his side, ready to 
spring into line of battle at a moment's notice. For a 
week before I was wounded, though I was never re- 
lieved from duty, I had been taking medicine and was 
scarcely able to march. I probably could not have kept 
up another week even if I had not been wounded. 

Van Home states that, in the Army of the Cumber- 
land alone, "during the campaign forty-three thousand 
one hundred and fifty-three were reported sick to 
Major George E. Cooper, Surgeon United States 
army, medical director of the department. Of these, 
twenty-six thousand one hundred and eighty-four 
were sent to the rear ; two hundred and seven died 
from disease, and one thousand and sixty-seven died 
from wounds." 10 

The campaign closed with the surrender of Atlanta, 
September i, 1864, leaving the Confederate army near 
by. Notwithstanding its heavy losses it was still in- 
tact and formidable though it had been greatly shorn 
of its power by the removal of its commander, General 

10 Hist. Army of the Cumberland, vol. 2, p. 150. 


Johnston, who, after Lee, was the ablest general in the 
Confederacy. He had done all that' could reasonably 
have been expected. Though unable to resist success- 
fully the advance of an army greatly superior in num- 
bers, he had contested its advance with signal ability 
Because he had not accomplished more, Jefferson 
Davis, yielding to senseless clamor, had removed him 
and in his place had appointed General Hood, who was 
understood to be a "fighting general." 

General Humphreys closes his Virginia Campaign 
with this modest sentence : "It has not seemed to me 
necessary to attempt a eulogy upon the Army of the 
Potomac or the Army of Northern Virginia." The 
same may be said of Sherman's army and of the Con- 
federate army confronting it in the Atlanta campaign. 
No eulogy could add to the admiration inspired by the 
bare recital of their deeds. 



For more than a month after the capture of Atlanta, 
Sherman and Hood were each ignorant of the other's 
plans. Jefferson Davis had visited Hood and had dis- 
cussed the latter's project of marching north in order 
to draw Sherman's army after him and thereby avert 
its threatened march through the heart of the Con- 
federacy. Hood crossed the Chattahoochee Septem- 
ber 29 ; on October 4th he captured the Federal garri- 
sons at Big Shanty and Ackworth ; on the 1 3th that 
at Dalton, and on the 15th, halted his army near La- 
fayette where he remained a few days and then moved 
to Gadsden. There he had a conference with Beaure- 
gard who had been appointed to the command of the 
Confederate department to which Hood's army was 
assigned. From Gadsden Hood marched to Tuscum- 
bia, Alabama, where he arrived October 31. Sher- 
man, leaving the 20th corps at Atlanta, had followed 
Hood as far as Gaylesville and there had abandoned 
the pursuit. 

Meanwhile Sherman had been revolving in his mind 
the plan of marching through the South. There was 
nothing very wonderful in the mere idea of pushing 



on past Atlanta. It was not to be expected that, hav- 
ing taken Atlanta, his army would sit down there and 
do no more. Nor was it to be expected that it would 
march back north. This would have been imitating 
the King of France who "went up the hill with twenty 
thousand men" and then — came down. 

Manifestly it was advisable to push farther south, 
which would compel Sherman to abandon Atlanta as 
a base of supplies and seek a new one. To have re- 
tained a base so far south of the Ohio would have re- 
quired a vast army to keep open his line of communi- 
cations extending, for a long distance, through the 
enemy's country. The successful execution of Sher- 
man's plan obviously required the selection of a new 
base at some point on the gulf coast. All this is clear 
even to one not versed in military strategy. It is 
equally clear that it was a very hazardous undertaking 
to cut loose from Atlanta before Hood's army, which 
was still intact, with the possibility of being largely 
augmented, had been destroyed, or until it was cer- 
tain that there was a Federal army north of Atlanta 
sufficient to prevent Hood's advance in that direction. 
If, as Sherman maintained, the divisions of the 16th 
corps under General A. J. Smith, then in Missouri, 
could be brought to Nashville in ten days to reenforce 
Thomas, who was to be left to look after Hood, it 
would seem to have been the prudent course for Sher- 
man to delay his proposed march until they came, or 
at least until it was certain that they were on the way. 

That Sherman was sincere in his prediction that 


Thomas would be able to hold Hood in check, there 
can be no doubt. His enthusiastic belief in the success 
of his plan led him to underestimate its dangers. He 
dispatched Grant October 9 that he could "make the 
march and make Georgia howl," and the day follow- 
ing, assured him that Thomas "would have an ample 
force when the reenforcements ordered reached Nash- 
ville." On the 17th he said to Thomas "Hood 
won't dare to go into Tennessee. I hope he will." 
On the 19th in a dispatch to Halleck, Sherman was 
confident that "the enemy would not venture toward 
Tennessee except around by Decatur." 

As late as November 1, Grant does not seem to have 
been convinced of the wisdom of cutting loose from 
Atlanta and leaving Hood's army to roam about at 
will in the rear. His own idea of an "objective" was 
well known — it was the army of the enemy in his 
front. The three dispatches that follow show clearly 
his objections and the assurances by which they were 
overcome : 

City Point, Nov. i, 1864 — 6 p. m. 

Major-General Sherman : 

Do you not think it advisable, now that Hood has 
gone so far north, to entirely ruin him before starting 
on your proposed campaign? With Hood's army de- 
stroyed, vou can go where you please with impunity. 
I believed, and still believe, if you had started south 
while Hood was in the neighborhood of yon, he would 
have been forced to go after you. Now that he is so 
far away, he might look upon the chase as useless, and 
he will go in one direction while vou are pushing the 


other. If you can see the chance for destroying 
Hood's army, attend to that first, and make your other 
move secondary. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Missis- 
sippi. In the Field, Kingston, Ga., Nov. 2, 1864. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, City Point, Va.. 

If I turn back, the whole effect of my campaign will 
be lost. By my movements, I have thrown Beaure- 
gard well to the west, and Thomas will have ample 
time and sufficient troops to hold him until reenforce- 
rhents meet him from Missouri and recruits. We 
have now ample supplies at Chattanooga and Atlanta 
to stand a month's interruption to our communica- 
tions, and I don't believe the Confederate army can 
reach our lines, save by cavalry raids, and Wilson will 
have cavalry enough to checkmate that. I am clearly 
of opinion that the best results will follow me in my 
contemplated movement through Georgia. 

W T. Sherman, Major-General. 

City Point, Va., Nov. 2, 1864 — 11:30 a. m. 

Major-General Sherman: 

Your dispatch of 9 a. m. yesterday is just received. 
I dispatched you the same date advising that Hood's 
army, now that it had worked so far north, ought to be 
looked upon more as the object. With the force, how- 
ever, you have left with General Thomas, he must be 
able to take care of Hood, and destroy him. I really 
do not see that you can withdraw from where you are, 
to follow Hood, without giving up all we have gained 
in territory. I say, then, go on as you propose. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 


Grant's permission having at last been obtained, 
Sherman did not long delay Thomas had already 
been sent to Nashville and, in view of the proposed 
movement south, Sherman had authorized him "in the 
event of military movements or the accidents of war 
separating the general in command from his military 
division," to assume command over all troops and gar- 
risons not absolutely in the presence of the command- 
ing general. 

In a dispatch to Thomas November 10, Sherman 
made the prediction : "I think you will find Hood 
marching off and you should be ready to follow him," 
and in another on the nth he gave Thomas this cheer- 
ful assurance : "You can safely invite Beauregard 
across the Tennessee and prevent his ever returning. I 
still believe, however, that public clamor will force 
him to turn and follow me ; in which event you should 
cross at Decatur and move directly toward Selma as 
far as you can transport supplies." Sherman started 
November 15 on his poetic and erratic "march to the 
sea," carrying out his threat to "make Georgia howl." 

Hood, meanwhile, had been cogitating a plan of his 
own which he tells us he had evolved during his stay at 
Lafayette, October 15 and 16, 1 and to which he had 
finally won the consent of General Beauregard and 
Jefferson Davis. This was to march rapidly north, 
cutting off the 4th and 23d corps, then to Nashville, 
and thence to the Ohio. In order to accomplish this, 

battles and Leaders, vol. 4, p. 427. 


he expected to be reenforced by Forrest's cavalry, 
12,000 strong, and by 18,000 or 20,000 Confederate 
troops west of the Mississippi. He also expected the 
advance of his army to be greeted by a great uprising 
of the people in Tennessee and Kentucky. His plan 
has been denounced by both Federal and Confederate 
critics as chimerical, but, from his standpoint, and tak- 
ing into account the unforeseen accidents which pre- 
vented its accomplishment, it does not seem to merit 
so severe a criticism. 

It was evident that Hood could not make a success- 
ful stand against Sherman's strong and well-equipped 
veteran army, and, desperate as was the venture made, 
the condition of the Confederacy was such that noth- 
ing remained for Hood but to take desperate chances. 
No critic has yet suggested any plan which offered 
greater promise of success than the one which he 
adopted. Even if he had reached the Ohio it is not 
probable that he could have gone beyond it, or that his 
march would have saved the dying Confederacy; but 
it is probable that, but for the unforeseen delay in 
crossing the Tennessee at Florence and the blunder by 
reason of which Schofield's army was permitted to es- 
cape at Spring Hill, Hood might have reached the 
Ohio. It is also probable that if he had done so the 
war would have been indefinitely prolonged, that he 
would have been the hero of the "march to the Ohio," 
and that Sherman's "march to the sea" would have 
been condemned as the colossal blunder of the war. 

On November 13 Hood moved to Florence, Ala- 


bama, where he was joined the next day by Forrest, 
one of the boldest and best cavalry commanders in the 
war, with 12,000 cavalry fully equipped. The vigi- 
lance of Canby and the gunboats prevented his re- 
ceiving the trans-Mississippi reenforcements which he 
had expected, but, with Forrest, he had an army of 
nearly 50,000 veteran soldiers. He had ordered the 
railroads and bridges to be repaired, so that he could 
cross the Tennessee at once and begin his march to 
Nashville, but this had not been done. The weather 
was bad, the roads were in wretched condition, and he 
was obliged to wait another week before starting. By 
November 21 all his army had crossed the Tennessee 
near Florence and he began his march, intending first 
to cut off the Federal troops between him and Nash- 

Sherman, before starting south from Atlanta, had 
sent to Nashville all superfluous baggage, arms, and 
stores, and also all sick and disabled soldiers. Two 
divisions of cavalry were dismounted in order to sup- 
ply horses and equipments for General Kilpatrick's 
cavalry which was selected to accompany Sherman and 
the dismounted cavalry and scraps of accoutrements 
were also sent to Nashville. 

It was originally intended to leave Thomas only the 
4th corps, but to this was afterwards added the 23d. 
These were the two smallest corps of Sherman's army 
and thcv were still further depleted before the battle 
of Nashville by the return home of large numbers 
\vho~e terms of enlistment had expired. 


By this division of the army which had accom- 
panied Sherman to Atlanta he retained a force of about 
62,000 veteran soldiers, with nothing to impede their 
march that could be dispensed with, while Thomas was 
given the 4th and 23d corps, together with the divi- 
sions of A. J. Smith, then in Missouri, and the "odds 
and ends." 

We turn now to the man who thenceforward, until 
after the battle of Nashville, becomes the chief figure 
in the exciting military drama that followed. Upon 
Thomas the eyes of all the North were riveted ; it was 
he whose success was to make the "march to the sea" 
the theme of poets' songs for all ages, or whose failure 
was to stamp it as a stupendous blunder. It was with 
great reluctance that he had assumed the vast responsi- 
bility placed upon him by Sherman, but having accept- 
ed it he discharged it, as he could always be depended 
upon to do, faithfully and loyally. 

When Hood began his advance on Nashville, Sher- 
man's army was so far away that, for all the aid it 
could render Thomas, it might as well have been in 
South America. The divisions of Gen. A. J. Smith 
had not arrived. Thomas had telegraphed to Rose- 
crans for them but could get no response. As was 
afterward learned, the river was too low to transport 
them by boats and they were obliged to march across 
the state of Missouri in order to reach St. Louis. They 
did not arrive until November 30, the day on which 
the battle of Franklin was fought and one day before 
the advance of Hood's army was encamped before 


Nashville. Troops were stationed at various garri- 
sons throughout Georgia, Tennessee, and Alabama, 
but it was necessary that a large portion of them 
should remain to save the immense stores collected at 
Chattanooga, Bridgeport, Murfreesboro, and other 
points, and to guard the railroads, unless all the terri- 
tory, acquired after two years' hard fighting, was to be 

All the troops that could possibly be spared were 
hurried to Nashville. Raw recruits, belated soldiers 
who had been home on furloughs, conscripts, and con- 
valescents, about 12,000 in all, had been gathered to- 
gether by Thomas. These were put into provisional 
organizations, but they made a motley gathering. "In 
some of the companies," it has been said, 2 "every sol- 
dier was a stranger to every other No man knew 
his file leader and the officers did not know a single 
member of their command." Such an organization 
was ill fitted to take the place of the 15,000 veterans 
who had been sent north from Nashville on furlough 
or by reason of expiration of enlistment within a few 
days after Hood's movement began. 

No better cavalry commander could have been se- 
lected than General Wilson, a general of great energy 
and recognized ability, whom Grant had recom- 
mended to Thomas with the assurance that he "would 
add fifty per cent, to the effectiveness of his cavalry." 

'Captain John E. Cleland : The Second March to the Ohio, a 
paper read before the Indiana Loyal Legion, War Papers, vol. 1, 
P. 233- 


But notwithstanding the most extraordinary exertions 
of General Wilson, he had been able, from the dis- 
mounted cavalry sent to Thomas, to send to the front 
only about 5,000 and of these only about 4,300 were 
fully mounted and equipped and able for duty. With 
these he was to oppose Forrest's 12,000. 

The only available forces to resist the advance of 
Hood were the troops about Pulaski, Tennessee, com- 
prising the three divisions of the 4th corps, numbering 
about 12,000, the second and third of the 23d number- 
ing about 10,000, and Wilson's cavalry. Immediate 
command of the troops at the front was given to Gen- 
eral Schofield. It would have been madness to risk a 
pitched battle, if it could be avoided, with Hood's 
army, numbering twice as many, and, therefore, the 
instructions to Schofield were to fall back, contesting 
the Confederate advance as stubbornly and as long as 
practicable, until Thomas could gather troops enough 
to make a stand or to take the offensive. 

Hood's first move was to cut off Schofield's retreat 
to Nashville, and this compelled the quick withdrawal 
of the troops at Pulaski. It was thought that a stand 
might be made at Columbia on Duck river, and prepa- 
rations were made accordingly But Schofield stood 
longer than was safe, and during the night of Novem- 
ber 28 General Wilson found that Hood's infantry was 
crossing the river with the purpose of getting in Scho- 
field's rear and cutting off retreat by the pike, leading 
from Columbia to Spring Hill and Franklin, by which 


the army must pass to reach Nashville. Forrest's cav- 
alry was already between Wilson and Schofield, so that 
the messenger who was to carry this most important 
and alarming news was obliged to travel by a long and 
circuitous route and did not reach Schofield until day- 
light on the morning of the 29th. There was now a 
race to Spring Hill between the Federal and the Con- 
federate troops. Forrest's cavalry arrived first, but 
as his men were entering the town, General Stanley, 
with Wagner's division of the 4th corps, appeared, 
drove Forrest's troops out of town, and began to pre- 
pare works to hold Hood's army in check until the re- 
maining four divisions of Schofield should arrive. 

In the meantime Hood, with Cheatham's and Stew- 
art's corps and Johnson's division of Lee's corps, had 
come up, going into camp about 3 p. m., two miles and 
a half from Spring Hill and not more than half a mile 
from the pike by which Schofield' s troops and trains 
must pass to reach Franklin. Schofield' s little army 
was now in a very perilous situation. Of the three di- 
visions of the 4th corps Wagner's had preceded 
Hood's army and was at Spring Hill, but Kimball's 
was at Rutherford creek, seven miles south, and 
Wood's was still at Duck river, where were also Cox's 
and Ruger's divisions of the 23d corps, and all of them 
with their trains, in order to reach Spring Hill, were 
obliged to march over the pike near which Hood's 
army had halted. The danger greatly increased when 


darkness came on. Colonel Stone, of Thomas's staff, 3 
thus describes the situation : 

"When night came the danger increased rather than 
diminished. A single Confederate brigade, like 
Adams's or Cockrill's or Maney's — veterans since 
Shiloh — planted squarely across the pike, either south 
or north of Spring Hill, would have effectually pre- 
vented Schofield's retreat and daylight would have 
found his whole force cut off from every avenue of es- 
cape by more than twice its numbers, to assault whom 
would have been madness and to avoid whom would 
have been impossible." 

And now occurred one of the most extraordinary in- 
cidents of the war, betokening something like a mirac- 
ulous intervention of Providence. Nearly all that 
night the four divisions mentioned, with their trains, 
were passing along the pike on the road to Spring Hill. 
Hood states 4 that he called Generals Cheatham and 
Cleburne to the spot "where sitting upon his horse he 
had in sight the enemy's wagons and men passing at 
double quick along the Franklin pike," and, pointing 
out to them the moving columns, urged them to attack 
at once, but that they failed to do so. Cleburne was 
killed the following day and we do not have his ver- 
sion of the matter, but Cheatham indignantly denies 
that anything of the kind occurred, and says that, on 
the contrary, Hood told him he had concluded to defer 

3 Article on Repelling Hood's Invasion of Tennessee, Battles 
and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 4, p. 446. 

4 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 429. 


the attack until the next morning and that the only 
thing in the semblance of an order was the suggestion 
received about midnight that it would be well for him 
to order his pickets to fire on the stragglers of the Fed- 
eral army that Hood understood to be passing along- 
the road. 5 

Why Hood did not place his army across the pike 
as soon as he reached the place where it halted, and 
why he allowed the troops and trains to march by dur- 
ing the entire night without molestation, has never 
been satisfactorily explained. I have often talked about 
it with the men of the 79th Ind. They speak of it as a 
"close call," but they are at a loss to explain this, to 
them, the most inexplicable circumstance of their en- 
tire military experience. I have in my possession 
the diary of Lieut. William H. Huntzinger of Co. I, 
which states that the regiment started at 8 o'clock on 
the evening of the 29th. He records : "At midnight 
we were ordered to be very still and march very quiet- 
ly, as we must pass near a rebel camp-fire not more than 
half a mile from the pike. Soon we came to the light 
from the rebel camp-fires; the rebel pickets heard us 
and began firing." He adds that they marched safely 
by, passing through Spring Hill and halting at 3 a. m. 

The whole army, with all its trains of ammunition 
and supplies, reached Franklin the next day, November 
30, but here another trouble arose. The Confederate 
advance at Columbia had been so rapid that Schofield 

6 Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 429. 439- 


was unable to save his pontoons and, without them, 
it was impossible to get the army across the Harpeth 
river at Franklin before the arrival of Hood. To make 
a stand was not a matter of choice but of necessity. 
Such works were thrown up and such preparations 
made as were practicable in the short time allowed 
and one of the bloodiest battles ot the war, in propor- 
tion to the numbers engaged, was now fought. Again 
it seemed that the little Federal army was doomed. 
This time, however, it was saved, not by the blunder 
of Hood, but by the desperate valor of the Federal 

By some misunderstanding of orders, two brigades 
of Wagner's division stood too long in an exposed 
position and were driven back by an overwhelming 
force of the Confederates which followed so closely 
that the Federal guns could not fire on the pursuers 
without subjecting the pursued to equal danger, and 
so all entered together the Federal works at the strong- 
est point in them. At once the Federal guns at that 
point were captured and turned on the Federal troops, 
and for a few minutes it seemed that all was lost. At 
this critical juncture General Stanley, commanding 
the 4th corps, hastened to order forward the remain- 
ing brigade of the division, but Colonel Opdycke, the 
brigade commander, without waiting for orders, had 
already started, and Stanley himself marched with 
the men of the brigade. The charge was one of the 
most brilliant in the war and resulted in recapturing 
the guns, driving back the Confederates, and firmly 


establishing the Federal lines. From that time until 
the end of the battle every assault was repulsed with 
frightful loss to the Confederates. The bloody char- 
acter of the contest may be inferred from the fact 
that in this single engagement more general officers 
were killed and wounded than in any other battle of 
the war. The Confederate loss in general officers was 
five killed, including General Cleburne, one of the most 
noted of the Confederate fighters, six wounded, and 
one taken prisoner. 

That night the Federal army with all its trains 
crossed the Harpeth and the next night reached Nash- 
ville. Hood was not far behind, and by December 3 
his entire army was in front of the Federal lines, just 
where it had been two years before. General A. J. 
Smith had arrived on the day the battle at Franklin 
was fought. Not until then, since Hood had started 
on his march to Nashville, had Thomas troops suffi- 
cient to justify him in risking a battle. 

By this time the whole North was alarmed, the au- 
thorities at Washington were in a panic, and Grant 
himself exhibited more uneasiness than ever before 
or after The danger now was not that Hood would 
attack Nashville — it was almost certain that he would 
not — but the danger was that he would go around it 
and continue his march through Kentucky to the Ohio, 
leaving: both Sherman's and Thomas's armies behind 
him. He had not even waited for the "invitation," 
which Sherman thought Thomas might safely extend. 


to invade Tennessee, and here he was in front of 

Grant, foreseeing the danger, had sent General Raw- 
lins, his chief of staff, to St. Louis to hasten the divi- 
sions of General A. J. Smith. Every day he became 
more pressing in his demand that Thomas should take 
the offensive and attack Hood. Thomas was ready 
to move December 9, but a great storm of sleet fell 
upon the country about Nashville, making the ground 
so slippery that, until the 14th, it would have been 
difficult for infantry to march on level ground and 
impossible for them to ascend the hills upon which 
Hood's army was entrenched, and the cavalry horses 
would have been liable to fall and maim both them- 
selves and their riders. Under such circumstances an 
assault on the Confederate entrenchments would have 
savored of madness, as Thomas's subordinate generals 
in council of war agreed. 

Grant's demands on Thomas for an immediate ad- 
vance became more urgent every day. Halleck also 
prodded him with messages, and Stanton sent insult- 
ing dispatches. The crudest of all was a dispatch sent 
by the latter to Grant December 7, in which he said: 
"Thomas seems to be unwilling to attack because it is 
hazardous. If he waits for Wilson to get ready, 
Gabriel will be blowing his horn." And this was said 
of the man by whose heroic stand, more than all else, 
the Union army had been saved from annihilation at 
Chickamauga ! 

Indeed, for a few days, the fault-finders at Wash- 


ington made Thomas's life more miserable than all 
the Confederates that had ever confronted him in bat- 
tle. Notwithstanding his explanation of the situation, 
the carping at his alleged "slowness" continued. 
Grant every day became more importunate and plainly 
indicated to him that unless he made an immediate 
advance, sleet or no sleet, cavalry or no cavalry, he 
was likely to be removed from command. But Thomas 
comprehended, more clearly than Grant or any one 
in Washington, the gravity of the situation ; he under- 
stood his duty and he had the moral heroism that 
nerves a man to discharge it, fearless of all personal 
consequences. He knew that, by refusing to advance, 
he was incurring the displeasure of his superiors, and 
that he might bring upon himself the disgrace of being 
removed from command, but knowing that to advance 
at that time would, in all probability, result in a dis- 
astrous defeat and in incalculable injury to the Union 
cause, he remained as immovable in his purpose as he 
had been at Chickamauga. The high quality of moral 
heroism which he exhibited in this trying situation is 
admirably expressed by Prof. Coppee : 6 

"A weaker man than Thomas would have yielded 
to the importunity and attacked before he was ready. 
Indeed, there seemed little discretion in the matter 
He was ordered to attack at once. If he obeyed, the 
best interests of the country were endangered. If he 

° General Thomas, p. 262 


did not, he was liable to the charge of 'disobedience 
of orders.' The firmness of General Thomas, there- 
fore, assumes the proportions of a martyr's faith ; he 
would die for the cause, for the honor of the profession 
of arms, and for his own spotless character, rather 
than obey the orders." 

Thomas had explained the situation to Grant and the 
Washington authorities. With modest dignity he said 
in a dispatch to Grant December 9 : "I can only say 
that I have done all in my power to prepare, and if you 
should deem it necessary to relieve me, I shall submit 
without a murmur." He did not know that on the 
very day he penned this dispatch, an order, dictated 
by Grant, had been prepared, relieving him and turn- 
ing over his command to General Schofield. The or- 
der was withheld at the instance of Halleck, who re- 
deemed many of his own mistakes by this one exhibi- 
tion of ability to comprehend the situation, superior 
to that of both Stanton and Grant. 

But Grant would brook no delay, and another order, 
prepared December 13, was given to General Logan, 
directing him to proceed at once to Nashville and to 
take the command if Thomas had not moved before his 
arrival. Grant finally started to Nashville to take 
command in person. Fortunately for Thomas and for- 
tunately for the country, the battle of Nashville had 
begun before the arrival of either Logan or Grant. 
On the 14th a thaw set in which broke the sleet block- 
ade and orders were given for opening the battle on 


the following day It could not safely have been be- 
gun a day sooner. 

It is not necessary to tell again in detail the story 
of the battle of Nashville. Military critics unite in 
saying that the generalship of Thomas was unsur- 
passed by that of any other general in any other battle 
of the Civil War. His plan of battle is studied in mili- 
tary schools and will be for ages, as a marvelous mas- 
terpiece of battle tactics. It was far-reaching, compre- 
hending the minutest details, and was executed with 
unerring skill. The battle was like a game of chess 
in which a skilful player so disposes his pieces and so 
makes his moves that the defeat of his adversary is 
inevitable. The fighting lasted two days. When it 
ended Hood's army was utterly broken and practically 
destroyed. The victory at Nashville, quoting again 
from Prof. Coppee, 7 "stands alone as a unique, thor- 
ough, magnificent and far-reaching victory, achieved 
by the skill and firmness of one man, who had acquired 
the confidence of his officers and men, so that they 
fought for him as well as for the cause." 

It was the last great battle fought by General 
Thomas and by the 4th corps or by any part of the 
Army of the Cumberland. It was a fitting climax to 
the military career of that great general, and added 
fresh laurels to the brilliant record of the 4th corps 
and the Army of the Cumberland. For the Confeder- 
ates it was the most crushing defeat inflicted during 

7 Ibid., p. 276. 


the war upon an arm}- in the field. In the battle and in 
the rout which followed Hood lost over 13,000 men, 
seventy-two guns, and seventy flags. In the retreat 
thousands of Confederates, especially those whose 
homes were in Kentucky and Tennessee, left the ranks 
never to return. They were not cowardly deserters. 
Far from it. Among them were doubtless great num- 
bers whose bravery and whose loyalty to the Confeder- 
ate cause had been amply proved on many bloody 
fields. They were men who now saw plainly the hand- 
writing on the wall and who were determined to be 
led no longer to useless slaughter in a vain attempt 
to prolong a hopeless struggle. 

The Confederate Army of the Tennessee never 
fought another battle under that name. Hood himself, 
on January 2$, 1865, was relieved of its command at 
his own request. Between the Ohio and the Gulf of 
Mexico there was no Confederate organization left 
which deserved the name of army The only Confed- 
erate army worth considering was that of Lee, now 
hemmed in between the great host of Grant in front 
and that of Sherman in the rear. The final blow to 
the dying Confederacy was given at Five Forks, but 
the mortal wound was inflicted at the battle of Nash- 

Mr. Ropes, s while awarding the credit due to Gen- 

8 Article on General Sherman in the Atlantic Monthly, Aug., 
1891, reprinted in a volume entitled Some Federal and Confed- 
erate Commanders, pp. 125, 144, 152, published by the Military 
Historical Society of .Massachusetts. 


eral Sherman's great military ability, thus clearly 
states the risks that attended the march to the sea and 
the importance of Thomas's victory at Nashville : 

"Yet the propriety of the withdrawal of this army 
from the seat of war in the west can be defended only 
by the event. To have imperiled the hold of the Union 
government on the states of Tennessee and Kentucky; 
to have exposed all the posts from Chattanooga to 
Nashville, to say nothing of Louisville, to assault and 
capture by the Confederate army under Hood ; in short, 
to have left so much to chance when everything might 
so easily have been made secure, was to count unwar- 
rantably upon the favors of fortune. No margin was 
left for accidents. It is not easy to see why 50,000 
men would not have served Sherman's purpose as well 
as 62,000 men, and assuredly 12,000 good troops 
would have added greatly to Thomas's scanty re- 
sources, and contributed largely to insure the destruc- 
tion of Hood's army, which alone could give to the 
strategy which sanctioned the withdrawal of so many 
troops to the Atlantic coast the possibility of leading 
to useful results. It is true that Thomas's victory 
practically attained this end. In the march of his 
army through the Carolinas, Sherman had to encoun- 
ter only the remnants of Hood's defeated and discour- 
aged troops added to the insignificant garrisons of the 
Atlantic cities; and with these forces he was abun- 
dantly able to cope. But Thomas's success was really 
unprecedented. It could not fairly have been antici- 
pated. And it would have been an entirely different 
matter for Sherman if Hood's whole army, or the 
greater part of it, had confronted him at the marshes 
and rivers over which his toilsome and difficult route 


"Thomas, however, was equal to the occasion. He 
scored a magnificent success at Nashville. Sherman 
at the same time captured Savannah. Everything 
turned out marvelously well. Both officers showed 
themselves at their best. The risk having passed by, 
the North reaped the full advantage of the daring 
march. The task then before Sherman was one to 
which he was by nature wonderfully adapted, and 
which he soon brought to a triumphant end." 

The victory at Nashville was fortunate for the 
Union cause. It was fortunate for Thomas because 
it saved a noble soldier the mortification of a shameful 
requital for four years of conspicuous services and un- 
flinching loyalty to the Union cause. It was fortunate 
for Sherman, because defeat would have stripped all 
the glory from the march to the sea; it was fortunate 
for Grant, because, if his ill-advised order to Logan 
had been carried out, he would have been adjudged 
guilty of the most stupendous blunder of the war. 

General Thomas, above all other generals who ever 
commanded them, is the idol of the survivors of the 
Army of the Cumberland. A born Virginian, he re- 
mained steadfast to the Union cause. His ability as 
a general was demonstrated on many fields. There 
was nothing of the martinet in his military character. 
He disciplined his troops in all that was required to 
make soldiers of them, but avoided wearing them out 
in useless drills and pompous displays. He never use- 
lessly sacrificed them in battle. His fatherly care of 
them was so proverbial that he was familiarly known 


as "Pap Thomas." He was equally distinguished for 
his generosity and his sense of justice. After Halleck 
had shelved Grant in the reorganization of his army 
for the advance on Corinth, Thomas voluntarily re- 
signed his command of the right wing, the Army 
of the Tennessee, in order that Grant might take it, 
and he himself resumed the command of a single di- 
vision in the Army of the Ohio under General Buell. 
He was as loyal to his superiors in command as he was 
to the government. He refused to take Buell' s place 
when it was offered, because of his belief that the latter 
had been unjustly criticized. He stood by Rosecrans 
long after the hostility of Stanton and Halleck had be- 
come apparent, and after it had become equally appar- 
ent that they were seeking some excuse to remove him 
from command, and when Thomas must have known 
that in the event of the removal of Rosecrans he would 
become his successor. 

It is painful, even at this late day, to read of the 
jealousy and envy of generals in the early years of 
the war, of the political "pulls," the intrigues by which 
promotion was sought, of the disasters that came be- 
cause some risked defeat of the Union arms rather 
than help achieve victory under the leadership of an- 
other. Thomas's rugged honesty would have made 
him recoil from the mere suggestion of his own ad- 
vancement by such means. Modest and retiring, he 
never thrust himself forward to grasp for honors ; 
those that came were almost thrust upon him. When 
juniors in rank were appointed over him, when his 


own plans or suggestions were ignored by his su- 
periors, he never, like Achilles, sulked in his tent, but 
manfully and faithfully persevered in doing all in his 
power to aid the cause he had espoused. 

The affection of the soldiers of the Army of the 
Cumberland for their loved commander has been in- 
tensified by the conviction that he was unjustly treated 
by his superiors and was deprived, during his lifetime, 
of the recognition that he had so fairly earned. As 
the years go by General Thomas's fame grows. In 
the estimation of those who served under him no man 
ranks higher on the splendid roll of famous Union 
generals. But there is something more than admiration 
and respect for his military abilities. There is added 
a feeling such as one entertains for a kind father. 
Other great Union generals may be admired and re- 
spected for their shining soldierly qualities and their 
great achievements — the memory of none is cherished 
with such deep and lasting affection as that of General 
Thomas. 9 

"Adam Badeau in his Military Life of U S. Grant has prob- 
ably done more than any other writer to cast discredit upon the 
well-earned fame of General Thomas. In all his allusions to 
Thomas we perceive a covert attempt to damn him with faint 
praise. That he merited some commendation for his great 
achievements and that he had earned the love of his soldiers and 
the respect of his country, Badeau could not well deny, and so 
there is a studied effort to show that Thomas's "slowness" per- 
petually exasperated the general-in-chief and thwarted his plans, 
and was, in fact, one of the chief drawbacks to the Federal cause 
in the last year of the war. This slowness, which Badeau vari- 
ously characterizes as "torpor," "inertia," or "a provoking, ob- 


stinate delay before battle," he would have us believe was a con- 
stitutional defect in Thomas's character, so deep-seated and 
inveterate that it rendered him invulnerable to any amount of 
prodding and goading by his superior officers. To prove that he 
"was always heavy and slow," Badeau has raked up an alleged 
nickname of "Slow Trot Thomas," a sobriquet which he says 
Thomas acquired as a West Point cadet at the very outset of his 
military career. We are assured that his failure to carry out 
Grant's order of Nov. 7, 1863, to attack Missionary Ridge the 
next morning "was a great disappointment" to Grant ; that there 
was no necessity for Thomas falling back to Nashville "except 
what Thomas imposed on himself by not concentrating earlier." 
For his alleged procrastination in giving battle at Nashville, 
Badeau finds no excuse, and he asserts that Thomas's delays con- 
tinued to embarrass Grant in 1865 and "now compelled Grant to 
change his plans." Indeed, according to Badeau, the "torpor of 
Thomas in the Nashville campaign had determined the general- 
in-chief to entrust to that commander no more operations in 
which prompt aggressive action was necessary." Finally we are 
told, notwithstanding the admission that Thomas's signal victory 
at Nashville vindicated the soundness of his judgment and his 
splendid generalship, that "if Grant's other subordinates had 
taken it upon themselves at critical moments to defy his judg- 
ments and disregard his orders, the strategy which gave Thomas 
the opportunity to strike that blow would have come to naught." 

At this day little weight is accorded Badeau's opinion of any 
Federal general. Van Home, in his Life of Thomas, has con- 
clusively shown that Badeau's aspersions on his character are 
made with a reckless, if not malicious, disregard of facts which 
are amply established by the official records. 



I did not see the close of the Atlanta campaign. My 
military career was abruptly cut short June 23, 1864. 
My experience on the last day of service in the field 
affords a fair illustration of much of the fighting dur- 
ing the campaign. 

The Confederates had made a stand at Kenesaw 
Mountain. On June 23 Wood's division occupied a 
position in the line six or eight miles southeast of 
Big Shanty, a small station on the railroad. At that 
point the main lines of the two armies were hardly 
more than three hundred yards apart. The Confed- 
erate breastworks were so formidable that to take them 
by direct assault was plainly a hopeless undertaking. 
In front of them, probably seventy-five or one hundred 
yards, were the rifle-pits of the Confederate skirmish- 
ers. About seventy-five )^ards in front of these were 
the Federal rifle-pits, mereh a slight barricade of rails, 
two or three feet high, with a shallow excavation be- 
hind them. To reach these from the main line, the 
pickets were obliged to run from the brow of a little 
elevation, exposed at every step to the bullets of the 
Confederate skirmishers and sharpshooters, jump into 



the rifle-pits, and lie flat on the ground all day So 
close was the watch that the exposure by a man in the 
rifle-pits of his head, his arm, or any part of his per- 
son, instantly drew the fire of the enemy's sharp- 

Six companies of the 79th were on skirmish duty 
that day and I was in command of the right of the line. 
About 4 o'clock in the afternoon orders came for the 
skirmishers to advance at the sound of the bugle and 
to charge the Confederate rifle-pits. I do not know 
whether the purpose was to develop the actual strength 
of the Confederates at that point, or to ascertain if 
they had evacuated their main works, or whether the 
charge was designed as a mere feint to cover an attack 
in some other quarter. When the bugle sounded there 
was a momentary hesitation, for every one felt that 
those who first exposed themselves were doomed to cer- 
tain death. A second time the bugle sounded the ad- 
vance, and then the whole line of Federal skirmishers 
leaped from the rifle-pits, every man rushing forward, 
sheltering himself as much as possible behind trees 
and stumps. This advance drew the fire of the Confed- 
erates, and before they could reload, the Federal skir- 
mishers were upon them, driving them out of their 
rifle-pits and back into their main works. For a few 
seconds not a Confederate could be seen. Then came 
a volley and I felt a sharp, stinging sensation and 
knew that I had been hit. As far as I could see, the 
space directly beneath the head-log of the Confederate 
breastworks was filled with human faces. That was 


all we could see of those behind the works but the pro- 
truding guns and the flash of their discharge told very 
plainly that the works had not been evacuated. Al- 
most immediately after the first volley the Confederates 
made a counter-charge ; reenforcements were sent from 
our lines, and, for a few minutes, there was an almost 
hand to hand struggle. So closely were the combat- 
ants intermingled that a Confederate captain, with 
drawn revolver, chased the color-bearer of the 79th 
around a tree demanding his surrender. It is almost 
needless to say that the demand was emphatically re- 
jected. Sergeant Matthew Chandler of my company 
assisted me to the rear. As we were leaving the field 
we were pursued by two Confederates. They were 
about to overtake us when Chandler turned and shot 
one of them. He fell dead and the other stopped. 

This engagement was never specially mentioned in 
the official reports. It was only a skirmish, and yet 
two men of my company, which numbered about 
twenty-five on the skirmish line, and five Federal 
commissioned officers standing within twenty-five 
yards of me, were killed within less than ten minutes. 
Similar skirmishing occurred almost every day at va- 
rious points along the lines. 

The rest of the story of my military career can be 
briefly told. I was taken to one of the general field 
hospital tents in the rear. There I rested for three 
days on a cot laid on the ground. r All was done for me 
that could be done there. The surroundings were not 
very cheerful, and now and then I involuntarily shud- 


dered as I looked through the opening of the tent and 
spied a hospital attendant carrying an armful of am- 
putated legs and arms with as much indifference as 
if they had been so many sticks of stovewood. , 

On June 27, the day of the general assault on Ken- 
esaw Mountain, the ambulances having been sent to 
the front, I was put in a government wagon and 
hauled eight miles over a new corduroy road to Big 
Shanty, the nearest railroad station, where I was put 
on board a freight train with three or four hundred 
wounded soldiers. There were various delays, occa- 
sioned by the passing of other trains and anticipated 
attacks of guerrillas, and our train did not reach Chat- 
tanooga until nearly noon on the 29th. 

On my arrival there I was put into an ambulance 
and driven to the officers' hospital on Lookout Moun- 
tain. As the ambulance neared the hospital I observed 
several female nurses moving about and instantly it 
occurred to me that I was appareled in a style scarcely 
befitting my return to civilized society One leg of 
my trousers had been cut off to facilitate the dressing 
of my wound, and, as the weather was very hot, I had 
not paid much attention to the remnant which entirely 
disappeared on the way to Chattanooga, so that when 
I arrived at the hospital I found myself bereft of every 
stitch of clothing except a very short blouse and a 
very short undershirt. However, the driver lent me 
a long-tailed rubber overcoat, in which I was smug- 
gled into the hospital without attracting special atten- 


It was found that I had a very bad wound, but I 
received every possible attention from the kind hos- 
pital surgeon in charge, Dr. J. G. McPheeters, and 
his attentive assistants. In about five weeks I was 
pronounced strong enough to be sent home on fur- 
lough. I reached Franklin August 4. At that stage 
in the war the return of dead and wounded soldiers 
had long ceased to be an unusual spectacle. Four old 
friends of the family met me at the railroad station. 
Any of them could easily have carried me on one arm, 
so poor and thin had I grown, but they put me on a 
stretcher and tenderly bore me home. My mother 
was waiting at the gate to clasp in her arms once more 
her boy, the mere shadow of his former self, but still 
alive. She had discharged her duty to her country 
and I had discharged mine. 

My wound healed slowly. It was several months 
before I could sit in a chair and many months after 
that before I could walk without crutches. On No- 
vember 10, 1864, I was honorably discharged from the 
service. The day that I received notice of it I hob- 
bled on crutches to my stepfather's law office and 
resumed the study of law. I had laid aside forever 
the duties of an American soldier, thenceforth to re- 
sume the less dangerous, but not less important duties 
of an American citizen. 



The United States government has published a 
great mass of records, both Federal and Confederate, 
relating to the Civil War, including reports of battles, 
military reports, correspondence, and documents of 
all kinds. The volumes, popularly known as the "Re- 
bellion Records," are bulky and now number 130. 
These are the great storehouse of information relating 
to the war. 1 

A large amount of information is to be gathered 
from the muster-out rolls on file in the United States 

1 There is much diversity in the methods of citing these vol- 
umes. The official title printed on the back of each is : War of 
the Rebellion. Official Records of the Union and Confederate 
Annies. They are variously cited as Official Records, War Rec- 
ords, or Rebellion Records. I have referred to them by their 
popular title, or by the abbreviation Reb. Rec. To one not fa- 
miliar with the method of citation there may also be difficulty in 
following references to volumes prior to the one now designated 
as "Serial Number 36" which, according to the original and 
cumbrous method of citation adopted by the government, was 
"Series 1, Vol. XXIV, Part 1." This and following volumes 
now have double labels, one designating the series, volumes and 
parts, and the other the serial number. The volumes subsequent 
to vol. 35 are usually referred to by the serial numbers ; those 
prior to that volume by series, etc. 



war department and in the archives of the different 
states. Indiana has published eight large volumes, 
compiled by Adjutant-General Wm. H. H. Terrell, 
containing not only the muster-out rolls of the various 
military organizations contributed by the state during 
the Civil War, but also a brief history of each. Other 
northern states have issued similar publications, but 
few are so complete as those of Indiana. North Caro- 
lina has published a roster of the Confederate organi- 
zations contributed by that state. But many states are 
still much behind in such work; some have not even 
printed their muster-out rolls and the information 
contained in them can be found only in the unpublished 

To make all this mass of facts available to the gen- 
eral reader requires long and laborious investigation 
and study. No single volume' yet published gives 
such an exhaustive compilation of statistics as that of 
Colonel Fox, entitled Regimental Losses in the Amer- 
ican Civil War, published in 1898. A smaller book, 
by Colonel Thomas L. Livermore, entitled Numbers 
and Losses in the Civil War in America, has recently 
passed to a second edition. It contains in a condensed 
form a great deal of information compiled from official 
records, the portion relating to the numbers and losses 
of the Confederates being especially valuable and in- 
teresting. Many statistics are also to be found in the 
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, published by 
the Century Company, and in Phisterer's Statistical 
Records of the Armies of the United States. Besides 


these, there are multitudes of histories of the war, of 
particular campaigns and battles, regimental histories, 
etc., in which statistics of various kinds may be found. 

It is difficult to determine the exact number of men 
enlisted on each side. Some of the records have been 
lost ; others were imperfectly kept ; the enlistments cov- 
ered various periods, and some men enlisted more than 
once. Reducing the whole number to a three-years' 
basis, Colonel Fox's estimate of the total number of 
men enlisted in the northern armies is 2,326,168 while 
that of Colonel Livermore is 1,556,67s. 2 

It has been much more difficult to ascertain the total 
number of enlistments in the Confederate armies. For 
a long time those speaking from the Confederate stand- 
point assumed that it did not exceed 600,000, but Col- 
onel Livermore has shown that it was much larger — 
nearer 1,000,000. 

Mere figures do not convey a tangible idea. We ob- 
tain a clearer conception of the great armies in the last 
year of the war, of their composition and dimensions, 
from General Webb's statement of the organization 
and strength of the army with which General Grant 
entered upon the Virginia campaign in April, 1864. 


says : 


The variance is chiefly the result of differences in the method 
of computing the term of service of those who enlisted for three 
years, but who were discharged before the expiration of that 
period by reason of the close of the war. See Numbers and 
Losses, 2d ed., p. 49. 

3 Article on Through the Wilderness, Battles and Leaders of the 
Civil War, vol. 4, p. I5 2 - 



"The total force under General Grant, including 
Burnside, was 4,409 officers and 114,360 enlisted men. 
For the artillery he had 9,945 enlisted men and 285 
officers; in the cavalry 11,839 enlisted men and 585 
officers; in the provost guards and engineers 120 offi- 
cers and 3,274 enlisted men. His 118,000 men, prop- 
erly disposed for battle, would have covered a front 
of twenty-one miles, two ranks deep, with one-third of 
them held in reserve ; while Lee, with his 62,000 men, 
similarly disposed, would cover only twelve miles. 
Grant had a train which he states in his 'Memoirs' 
would have reached from the Rapidan to Richmond, 
or sixty-five miles." 

What became of the vast host enrolled in the Fed- 
eral and Confederate armies ? Of those in the Federal 
armies Colonel Fox estimates that there were 

Killed in battle (including those who died of wounds).. . 110,070 

Died of disease iaa,7 20 

Deaths from all causes 359>5 2 8 

It is impossible to make an accurate statement of 
the Confederate losses. The number of those killed 
in battle or died of wounds has been variously esti- 
mated ; it is stated by Colonel Fox as at least 94,000. 
The lowest estimate of the number of those who died 
of disease is 59,297. 

It is difficult to form an adequate idea, from these 
figures, of the enormous number killed and died of 
wounds. The number in fact was much larger than 
that given by the statistics, for these include only 
those who died in service, while many died of wounds 
after their discharge from the army. Instances are 


not rare of men who died many years after the close 
of the war from wounds received in the service. 

Persons not familiar with the statistics usually im- 
agine that most of those who died in the service died 
on the battle-field or as the result of wounds received 
in battle. In fact the number of those who died from 
disease was nearly twice as large as the number killed 
in battle, or, exactly stated, 199,720. Colonel Fox 
states that of those who died from disease, one-fourth 
died from fevers, principally typhoid ; one-fourth from 
diarrhea or other bowel trouble ; nearly one-fourth 
from consumption or other pulmonary disease, and 
the remainder from various other diseases. 

The statement of the number of deaths from disease 
is remarkable when considered in connection with the 
fact that, before being mustered in, a physical exami- 
nation was made of the enlisted men, and that most 
of them were young, strong, and robust ; but it is not 
surprising when we consider the exposures to which 
they were subjected, the unhealthy camps, the poor 
diet, the bad water, and the great physical and mental 
strain to which they were subjected. My company 
on December 1, 1862, numbered ninety, rank and file. 
Of these ten died of disease in that month. We can 
form some idea of this per cent, of mortality if we im- 
agine a village of nine hundred in which one hundred 
are carried off by cholera or other epidemic in one 

But appalling as are these statistics of the loss of 
life, they do not by any means tell the whole story of 


those who died from disease; for many of those dis- 
charged for disability died after reaching home, and 
of these the army records give no account. The men 
who died either in or out of the army, from disease 
contracted in the service, as truly gave their lives for 
their country as did those who died on the field of bat- 
tle. Nor do the statistics tell of all who lived, some 
of whom still live, with broken health and shattered 

Notwithstanding the drafts ordered during the war 
there were very few drafted men in the Federal armies 
in proportion to the total enrollment. The total num- 
ber held to service, as given by Colonel Fox, was 

There was also a very small percentage of regulars 
in proportion to the volunteers. "At no time," Col- 
onel Fox states, 4 "during the period of active hostili- 
ties, did the regular army number, present and ab- 
sent, over 26,000, officers and men." 

There are some curious statistics concerning the 
number of deserters. In the regular army the loss 
by desertions was 24 per cent., while in the volun- 
teer service it was only 6 per cent. But, according 
to the provost marshal general, 25 per cent, of 
those reported as deserters were wrongly reported. 
I have no doubt of the truth of this statement. 
There was but one real deserter from my company, 
though several men who had been sent home on 

4 Reg. Losses, p. 528. 


sick furloughs from various hospitals were reported 
by the hospital authorities as deserters and were so 
entered on the muster-rolls. All of them afterward 
rejoined the company, when it was ascertained that 
they had been unable from sickness, inability to get 
transportation, or other meritorious excuse, to return 
to the hospitals at the expiration of their furloughs. 

The most interesting statistics, on the compilation 
of which the greatest labor has been expended, are 
those relating to the battles in which the armies were 
engaged. These give the number engaged, the num- 
ber killed, wounded and captured, the number hit in 
every 1,000, the proportion of the number killed and 
wounded to the number engaged, and various other 
curious facts. 

The magnitude of the Civil War will most clearly 
be perceived by comparing it with prior wars of this 
country. The statistics given in Spofford's American 
Almanac for 1886 5 of the Mexican War and the War 
of 1812, are as follows : 

Mexican War 18 46- 18 48: 

Total American troops enrolled. 101,282 

Total killed 1,049 

Total died of wounds.. .. .. 508 

Total wounded. .. 3.4-20 


8 P. 23. 


War 1812-1815: 

The whole number of regulars during the entire 
service can not be accurately given, but there were in 
service in February 181 5. 33,424. The whole number 
of militia enrolled during the war was 471,622 and the 
losses were : 

Killed 1,877 

Wounded . . . . 3,737 

— 5,6i4 

The battles of the Revolution deservedly occupy a 
prominent place in history, but they seem insignificant 
when compared with those of the Civil War. The 
official records of the Revolutionary battles, especially 
those relating to the militia, are very imperfect and it 
is impossible to reconcile the discrepancies in the un- 
official accounts given of the numbers and losses. 

The report of the Secretary of War May 10, 1790, 6 
gives the number of troops from each of the thirteen 
states during the years 1775-1783, including conti- 
nental soldiers and militia. The largest number in 
service at any time was in the year 1776, when it 
amounted to 89,651. In the last year, 1783, it was 
13,476. The following table is probably sufficiently 
accurate for the purpose of making a comparison be- 
tween the battles of the Revolution and those of the 
Civil War : 7 

'American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. 1, pp. 14-19- An 
abstract of this report will be found in Spofford's American 
Almanac for 1886, p. 23. 

' This table does not include the naval engagements and omits 

■j'uai ui ini, aiAii&TICS 


Numbers and Losses in the Revolutionary War. 

Battle— Date. 












or Surren- 


Lexington, April 19, 














































"' 626 

Concord, April 19, 

Noddles Island, May 

27, 1775. 
Bunker Hill, June 17, 

Montreal, Sept. 25, 

1775- ( 
Quebec, Dec. 31, 

1775- \ 
Moore's Cr'k Bridge, ' 

N.C., Feb. 27, 1776. ] 
Sullivan's Island or 1 

Ft. Moultrie, S. C, ■ 

June 28, 1776. 1 





some insignificant skirmishes and "affairs," and also various en- 
gagements between the Patriots or Whigs on one side and the 
Tories on the other, but it includes all the principal land battles 
of the Revolution and most of the minor engagements. In com- 
piling the table I have taken the numbers of those engaged from 
Townsend's U. S. Curious Facts, pp. 338-9. This author does 
not cite his authorities and I have been unable to verify his fig- 

Statements of the numbers of killed, wounded and missing in 
some of the battles are given in Bancroft's Hist, of the U. States, 
but, in the main, I have adopted the figures kindly furnished me 
by Colonel William F. Fox, author of Regimental Losses. These 
correspond substantially with those given in Dawson's Battles of 
the United States, Lossing's Field Book of the Revolution, and 
Carrington's Battles of the Revolution. In a few instances the. 
numbers given are only estimates and these are indicated by 



Battle— Date. 

Long Island, N. Y., 

August 27, 1776. 
Harlem Plains, N. Y., 

Sept. 16, 1776. 
White Plains, N. Y., 

Oct. 28, 1776. 
Ft. Washington, 

N.Y., Nov. 16, 1776. 
Trenton, N. J., Dec. 

26, 1776. 
Princeton, X. J., Jan. 

3. 1777- 
Danbury, Conn., 

April 25-27, 1777. 
Hubbardton, Yt., 

July 4-7, 1777. 
Oriskany or 

Ft. Schuyler, X.Y., 

Aug. 2-22, 1777. 
Bennington, Vt., 

Aug. 16, 1777. 
Brandywine, Pa., 

Sept. 11, 1777. 
Bemis Heights or 

Stillwater, N. Y., 

Sept. 19, 1777. 
Paoli, Pa., Sept. 20, 

Germantown, Pa., 

Oct. 4, 1777. 
Ft. Clinton, N. Y., 

Oct. 6, 1777. 
Saratoga, N. Y., 

Oct. 17, 1777. 
Ft. Mercer, X. J., 

Oct. 22, 1777. 
Ft. Mifflin, Pa., Nov. 

10-15, 1777- 
Whitemarsh, Pa., 

Dec. 5-8, 1777. 
Monmouth, X. J., 

June 28, 1778. 


1 B- 



























































































a i_ 5 

U OT3 




















* 1,297 


























Battle— Date. 












Wyoming, Pa., ( A. 
July 1-4, 1778. 1 B. & I. 








Ft. Boone, Ky., Aug. ( 





8-20, 1778. i 





Quaker Hill, R. I., < 







Aug. 29, 1778. ] 







Tappan, N. Y., Sept. 1 





27, 1778. 1 




Cherry Valley, N. Y., 1 





Nov. 11, 1778. ] 



Savannah, Ga., Dec. [ 



' ' ' 80 




29, 1778. i 






Sunbury, Ga., Jan. 1 







9. 1779- i 






Beaufort or Port Roy- ( 





al,S.C.,Feb. 3 ,'79J 






Kettle Creek, Ga., ' 





Feb. 14, 1779- i 






Brier Creek, Ga., [ 





" 189 


March 3, 1779. i 






Stono Ferry, S. C, [ 







June 20, 1779. 1 







New Haven, Conn., 
July 5, 1779. } 










Stony Point, N. Y., 
July 16, 1779. ( 












Paulus Hook, N. J., 
Aug. 19, 1779. ; 









• > 



Newtown or Che- ( I 






mung, N. Y., ] B. 

Aug. 29, 1779. ( & I. 


Siege of Savan- ( .or 
nah, Ga., Sept. ] ^ • 
2 3 -Oct.i8,i77 9 ( ii - 






Young's House, N. 






Y., Feb. 3, 1780. 




Siegeof Charleston, 
S. C, March 29- 
May 13, 1780. 







Waxhaws, S. C, May 






29, 1780. 





Springfield, N. J., 







June 23, 1780. 





Battle— Date. 








or Surren- 

Rocky Mount, S. C, ( A. 

July 30, 1780. 1 B. 
Green Spring, S. C, ( A. 

Aug. 1, 1780. 1 B. 
Hanging Rock, S. C, l A. 

Aug. 6, 1780. 1 B. 
Camden, S. C, Aug. \ A. 

16, 1780. 1 B. 
Musgrove's Mill, i A. 

S. C.Aug. 18, 1780 .} B. 
Fishing Creek, S. C, i A. 

Aug. 18, 1780. I B. 
Charlotte, N. C, < A. 

Sept. 26, 1780. } B. 
King's Mountain, \ A. 

S. C, Oct. 7, 1780. ) B. 
Blackstocks, S. C., i A. 

Nov. 20, 1780. / B. 
Cowpens, S. C, \ A. 

Jan. 17, 1781. ( B. 
Guilford Ct.H.,S.C, \ A. 

March 15, 1781. ( B. 
Hobkirks Hill, S. C, A. 

April 25, 1781. ( B. 
Siege of Augusta, ( A 
























' ' 718 







































Ga., April 16-June j -d 



5,1781. ( D - 
Ft. Ninety-Six, S. C, ^ A. 

June 19, 1791. ) B. 
Jamestown Ford,Va., ( A. 


















July 6, 1781. 1 B. 
Ft. Griswold, Conn., ( A. 

Sept. 6,1781. 1 B. 
Eutaw Springs, S.C., { A. 

Sept. 8, 1781. ) B. 
Yorktown, Va., Sept. ( A. 

28-Oct. 19, 1781. ) B. 





















Americans . . 






Total . 






Killed, wounded, missing, captured or surrendered: 

Americans... ..22,109 

British . . 29,643 


Killed, wounded and missing: 

Americans... .. .. 14,045 

British.. 12,763 


Killed and wounded: 

Americans.. ... . , . . 10,630 

British 11,526 


It would require too much space to give the numbers 
and losses in each of the battles of the Civil War. 
Those stated in the following table, compiled mainly 
from Livermore's Numbers and Losses, are for bat- 
tles in which the total engaged was 50,000 or more. 
In preceding chapters are given fuller statistics of the 
battles of Stone's River, Chickamauga, and Missionary 



Numbers and Losses in the Civil War. 


Shiloh, April 6-7, 1862. 

Williamsburg, May 

4-5, 1862. 
Fair Oaks, May 31- 

June 1, 1862. 
Gaines's Mill, June 27, 

Seven Days v , June 25 

to July 1, 1862. 
Manassas & Chantilly, 

Aug. 27-Sept. 2, 1862. 
Antietam, Sept. 16-17, 


Perryville, Oct. 8, 1862. 

Fredericksburg, Dec. 

13, 1862. 
Stone's River, Dec. 31, 

1862, to Jan. 1, 1863. 
Chancellorsville, May 

1-4, 1863. 
Champion Hill, May 

16, 1863. 
Assault on Vicksburg, 

May 22, 1863. 
Gettysburg, July 1-3, 

Chickamauga, Sept. 

19-20, 1863. 
Chattanooga, Nov. 23- 

25, 1863. 
Mine Run, Nov. 27- 

Dec. 1, 1863. 
Wilderness, May 5-7, 

Spottsylvania, Mav 12, 

Cold Harbor, June 1-3, 





\ F 
I c - 

\ F c 





































K., W. 


















& M. 








































3> ! 99 

































Petersburg, June 15-18 



K., W 

& M. 




Atlanta, July 22, 1864. 







Winchester Sept. 19, 













Cedar Creek, Oct. 19, 





1. 591 








Boydton Plank Road, 

\ F 






Oct. 27, 28, 1864. 



Franklin, Nov. 30, 1864 







Nashville, Dec. 15, 16, 

\ F - 









Assault at Petersburg, 







April 2, 1865. 


The greatest loss of general officers in any single 
engagement was' that of the Confederates in the battle 
of Franklin, in which one major-general and four 
brigadier-generals were killed, one major-general and 
five brigadier-generals were wounded, and one briga- 
dier-general was captured. This was most remarka- 
ble, considering: that the total number of Confederates 
engaged was only 26,897. 

Neither the number of men lost in a particular bat- 
tle nor the number lost by a particular regiment gives 
us an accurate idea of the dangers to which the partici- 
pants were exposed, unless we know the proportion 
of the killed and wounded to the number engaged. 
Many regiments lost a greater per cent, of killed and 


wounded in some small battle or skirmish than others 
lost in greater ones. 

The charge of the Light Brigade has been celebrated 
in prose and verse as the most striking exhibition in 
history of men marching into the very jaws of death. 
The Light Brigade lost 36.7 per cent, in killed and 
wounded. Colonel Fox gives a list of 63 Federal 
regiments and 52 Confederate regiments, each of 
which in a single engagement lost over 50 per cent, in 
killed, wounded, and missing; 24 of the Federal regi- 
ments lost over 60 per cent. Two Federal regiments, 
the 1st Minn, and the 141st Penn., and two Confeder- 
ate regiments, the 1st Texas and the 21st Ga., each 
lost at Gettysburg over 75 per cent. In a single charge 
at Gettysburg, the 1st Minn, took into action 262 offi- 
cers and men and lost 50 killed and 174 wounded; 
seventeen officers, including the colonel, lieutenant- 
colonel, major, and adjutant, being among the num- 
ber. In the same battle the 26th North Carolina of the 
Confederate army went into the first day's fight with 
800 men, losing 86 killed and 502 wounded; it par- 
ticipated on the third day in the charge of Pickett's 
division with 216 men; of these only 80 were left for 
duty the next day. The 5th New Hampshire, during 
its four-years' service, lost 295 men killed in action or 
died of wounds, the killed including 18 officers and 
2~]j enlisted men. The Federal regiment that lost 
the greatest number, though not the greatest per cent., 
of killed and died of wounds, was the 1st Maine Heavy 
Artillery, recruited for artillery service but serving as 


an infantry regiment. Of its total enrollment of 
2,202, it lost 423 in killed and died of wounds, or 19.2 
per cent., all these losses occurring during a period 
of about ten months. 

Undoubtedly there were other regiments, Federal 
and Confederate, the statistics of which are imperfect, 
whose losses were fully fifty per cent., or perhaps 
more; but the average per cent, of killed and died of 
wounds was far below that of the regiments above 
mentioned. It was about 4.7 per cent, of Colonel 
Fox's total of 2,326,168, and about 7 per cent, of 
Colonel Livermore's total of 1,556,698. 

The figures given in the foregoing tables do not fully 
represent the fighting in campaigns such as those of 
Grant and Sherman in the spring and summer of 1864. 
The battles beginning with the first day's fight in the 
Wilderness, May 3, 1864, and ending with that of 
Spottsylvania, May 12, were really parts of one con- 
tinuous battle in which the Federal loss, according to 
Colonel Livermore, was 26,815 in killed and wounded, 
and 4,183 missing. So the battles of the Atlanta cam- 
paign in the month of May, 1864, were really parts 
of one continuous battle in which the Federals, with 
an effective force of 110,123, lost in killed and 
wounded 10,528 and in missing, 1,240, and the Con- 
federates, with an effective force of 66,089, l° st m 
killed and wounded 9,187. Even these figures do not 
convey an accurate idea of the desperate fighting and 
the enormous losses in the last year of the war. 


Charles A. Dana 8 has compiled from the official re- 
ports a table showing the losses in the Army of the 
Potomac and the Army of the James in Grant's Rich- 
mond campaign, from the beginning, May 3, 1864, 
to the surrender at Appomattox, April 9, 1865. It 
shows the following totals : 

Captured and 
Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total. 

15,139 77,748 31,503 124,390 

Some idea may be formed of these enormous losses 
if we consider that they far exceed the great army with 
which Sherman began his Atlanta campaign, and that 
they more than twice outnumber the army with which 
Rosecrans started on his Chattanooga campaign. 
They also outnumber all the American troops engaged 
in the whole of the Mexican War. And yet these 
figures represent only the Federal losses and do not 
take into account those of the Confederates. 

The magnitude of the battles of the Civil War, 
compared with those of the Revolution, will be seen 
by comparing the following summary of the losses at 
Chickamauga and Gettysburg with the summary given 
of the Revolutionary losses. 


Killed. Wounded. Missing. 

Federals 1,657 9,756 4757 

Confederates 2,312 14,674 1,468 

Total 3,969 24,430 6,225 34,624 

'Recollections of the Civil War, p. 211. 


Killed, wounded and missing: 



Killed and zvonndcd: 


Federals . . .... 3,155 

Confederates 3,903 








Total .... 7,058 
Killed, wounded and missing: 





Killed and zvounded: 

Federals . . . 


The following statistics of my company probably do 
not vary materially from those of other companies in 
active service, in the showing made of the men who 
entered the service and what became of them. 

Mustered into service : 

Captain . . .... . . 1 

1st Lieutenant.. .... .. 1 

2d Lieutenant. .. .... .. .. 1 

Sergeants .... 5 

Corporals . . . . 8 

Wagoner .. .... . . 1 

Privates . . 79 




Gained by assignment. .. ..I 
Gained by recruit I 

Total 98 

Resignations . . 3 

Transferred by promotion . . 1 

Transferred to Engineer Corps, Veteran Reserve Corps, 

and other army organizations . 10 

Released by civil authority.. 1 

Deserted ... I 

Killed in action. 5 

Died of disease.. .... ..22 

Discharged for wounds or disability. 15 


Mustered out at expiration of enlistment 40 

The number killed and wounded during the service 
were : 

Killed, enlisted men... 5 

Wounded, officers .. 2 

Wounded, enlisted men . . 10 


Total ... 17 

All these were killed or wounded after December 30, 
1862, at which time the total rank and file of the com- 
pany numbered only eighty, so that about 20 per cent, 
of those remaining after that date were killed or 
wounded. But there were never eighty men in any 
engagement. At Stone's River, the first battle, the 
total number engaged was only thirty-four, and there 
was never a greater number in action at one time. 

The statistics give us only a hint of the development 


of a citizen into a soldier, and, to understand this fully, 
we must read such books as General Humphreys's Vir- 
ginia Campaign and General Cox's Atlanta Campaign. 
These are not mere eulogies, such as are found in regi- 
mental histories and memorial day addresses. They 
are careful statements of facts by men fully conver- 
sant with them. They tell of such heroic fighting on 
both sides as was never surpassed in any war in the 
world. The men of the North and the South that 
fought in 1864 in the Richmond and Atlanta cam- 
paigns were veteran soldiers, whose training and ex- 
perience had raised them to the highest grade of ef- 
ficiency. We read of repulses but of few panics. The 
men on both sides went where they were ordered, stood 
as long as they were commanded to stand, and retreat- 
ed only when it was apparent to their officers that to 
stand longer would result in useless slaughter. 



Since the close of the Civil War the United States 
government has established the Chickamauga and 
Chattanooga National Military Park, including not 
only the battle-ground of Chickamauga, but consider- 
able portions of Missionary Ridge and Lookout Moun- 
tain and the approaches to the battle-fields. Part of 
the ground has been acquired by purchase and part by 

The plan of this great work originated with General 
Henry V Boynton, then the Washington correspond- 
ent of the Cincinnati Commercial-Gazette, and now 
President of the Park Commission. As Lieut. -Colonel 
of the 35th Ohio Vols., he participated in the battle of 
Chickamauga and in the assault of Missionary Ridge, 
and he has been actively identified with the park since 
its inception. He began by advocating the project in 
a series of letters to the Commercial-Gazette. It was 
favorably considered at a meeting of the Society of the 
Army of the Cumberland, and a committee was ap- 
pointed by the society which met in Washington in 
February, 1889, and secured the cooperation of a 
number of those, formerly in the Confederate army, 



who had taken a prominent part in the battle. Out 
of this grew the Chickamauga Memorial Associa- 
tion. The original plan was to include in the pro- 
posed park only the Chickamauga battle-ground, but 
its scope was enlarged to include the approaches and 
portions of Missionary Ridge and Lookout Moun- 
tain. Later the aid of Congress was invoked. This 
resulted in the passage in 1890 of a bill, prepared by 
General Boynton, for the purchase of the necessary 
ground and the establishment of a national park to 
be known as the "Chickamauga and Chattanooga Na- 
tional Military Park." The purchase of the ground 
and the establishment of the park were placed under 
the direction of the Secretary of War, and the manage- 
ment, subject to his supervision, was given to three 
commissioners, each of whom must have actively par- 
ticipated in the battle of Chickamauga or in one of the 
battles about Chattanooga. Two of the commis- 
sioners were to be appointed from civil life by the 
Secretary of War and a third was to be detailed by the 
Secretary from among the officers of the army best 
acquainted with the details of those battles, who was to 
act as secretary of the commission. 

Since then the government has acquired 5,000 acres 
of the ground on which the battle of Chickamauga was 
fought, about fifty acres of the north end of Mission- 
ary Ridge, five acres where the north observation tower 
stands, and three acres where Bragg had his head- 
quarters, also Orchard Knob, about eight acres, and 
about ninety-eight acres at the point of Lookout Moun- 


tain, besides about 330 acres for the various ap- 
proaches. About seventy-five miles of the approaches 
have been improved and converted into magnificent 
boulevards. The ground which it is proposed to ac- 
quire, in addition to that already obtained, will make a 
total of nearly 7,600 acres. 1 

The appearance of Missionary Ridge has been much 
changed since the war. Several houses have been 
erected on it and a considerable portion of the ground 
between Fort Wood and the base of the ridge has been 
platted into lots upon which houses have been built. 
The government has constructed a road on the crest, 
following the line occupied by Bragg's army, and has 
erected two observation towers, one at the point where 
Bragg's headquarters were located, the other some dis- 
tance north of that point and opposite the place where 
the left of the assaulting line reached the summit. 
Along the crest of the ridge are various monuments 
and markers commemorating the positions of some of 
the troops engaged, but when I was last there the mark- 
ing was not so complete as that on the battle-field of 

Greater changes are seen on Lookout Mountain and 

1 General Boynton published a volume in 1895 entitled The 
Chickamauga National Military Park, containing a full history of 
the preliminary steps and the legislation leading to the establish- 
ment of the park, its boundaries, the approaches, and the method 
of marking the various points of interest, with much valuable in- 
formation concerning the battles intended to be commemorated. 
To this volume I am largely indebted for statistics not easily 
obtainable elsewhere. 


in its vicinity. A railroad now reaches the summit 
by winding around the mountain. There is also an 
inclined railroad on which cable cars, drawn by pow- 
erful machinery, are hauled up a very steep incline. 
A dummy railroad on the top extends back several 
miles from the point. There is a large hotel not far 
from the place where the old wagon road reaches the 
summit and another on the side of the mountain a little 
below the point. The old officers' hospital burned 
down and on its site another building has been erected. 
Various other changes are manifest but the point itself 
looks precisely as it looked during the war. 

The greatest effort made by the government is seen 
in the work which has been done to restore the battle- 
field of Chickamauga, so that it may present, as nearly 
as possible, its appearance when the battle was fought. 
The timber which afterward grew in the open fields 
has been cut down, and in places where, after the bat- 
tle, timber was cut down, trees are now being allowed 
to grow. Nearly all the old roads and bridges are 
there just as they were during the battle, but the roads 
have been improved by the government and converted 
into splendid driveways. Roads opened since the bat- 
tle have been closed, except a few, constructed by the 
government to afford greater facilities for viewing 
the battle-field. The most noticeable change in the 
natural surface of the ground itself is seen in the clear- 
ing away of the underbrush, which was necessary in 
order to srive an unobstructed view of the lines of bat- 
tie, and access to them. A few structures appear that 


were not there at the time of the battle, particularly 
the buildings erected by the government for the use of 
the troops quartered in the park during the Spanish 
War, and a hotel near Crawfish Spring. But nearly 
all the old houses, chiefly log structures, remain, nota- 
bly Lee and Gordon's Mill, the Widow Glenn, the 
Brotherton, the Poe, the Kelly, and the Snodgrass 
houses, and they show few changes. 

Three iron and steel observation towers, each sev- 
enty feet high, have been erected by the government, 
one on Snodgrass Hill, one near Hall's Ford and one 
near Jay's saw mill. The positions occupied by the 
Federal and Confederate lines during each day of the 
battle are designated by small stone markers, indicat- 
ing each regiment engaged. The position of each bat- 
tery is indicated by cannon, of the kind used by it in 
the battle, mounted on carriages but without caissons. 
Iron markers, three by four feet, indicate the head- 
quarters of the armies and the positions of the corps, 
divisions and brigades. A tablet designating the posi- 
tion of a corps is inscribed with the name of the com- 
mander, the divisions, and the division commanders. 
The division tablets represent the brigade organiza- 
tions, and the brigade tablets, the regimental organiza- 
tions. On each tablet is also inscribed the position or 
event which it commemorates. Smaller tablets com- 
memorate some notable event of the battle. The place 
where any general officer was killed is indicated by a 
pyramid of cannon-balls. Monuments have also been 
erected by the government and by the states whose 


troops were represented in the battle, in honor of the 
various organizations engaged. These are generally 
located at some point where the organization desig- 
nated especially distinguished itself, or where, for some 
other reason, the site was deemed most appropriate. 
The monument erected by the state of Georgia, the 
Wilder brigade monument, and some others, are beau- 
tiful and imposing. 

I did not see Chattanooga or the Chickamauga bat- 
tle-field after the year 1864 until the fall of 1899, when 
Captain Eli F Ritter, of the 79th Ind., and I accom- 
panied a small party going to participate in the dedica- 
tion of the monument erected to Wilder' s brigade. In 
the forenoon of the first day after our arrival we vis- 
ited the National Cemetery. To me it did not seem 
right that only Union soldiers should be buried there. 
I hope to see the day when the Confederate dead also 
shall be buried in this ground which now belongs to a 
common Union. 

We next visited Missionary Ridge, ascending at the 
north end where Sherman fought, and driving along 
the magnificent boulevard on the crest to a considera- 
ble distance south of the point where Bragg had his 
headquarters. From the summit one has a full view 
of the valley below, of Orchard Knob, Chattanooga, 
and Lookout Mountain. The distance from Orchard 
Knob to the top of the ridge in front is a mile or more, 
the slope of the ridge is about six hundred yards, and 
its height about four hundred feet. It would require 
considerable physical exertion to walk from Orchard 


Knob to the top of the ridge, and not many would at- 
tempt it without a good stout pair of legs. Looking 
at the long distance traveled by the assaulting forces 
and at the steepness of the ascent, it seems incredible 
that the Union troops should have carried the works 
on the summit. But Captain Ritter and I can each 
vouch that the other, on November 25, 1863, ran at a 
pretty brisk gait from Orchard Knob to the foot of 
the ridge and then climbed the hill without stopping to 
take breath until near the top. 

In the afternoon we ascended Lookout Mountain in 
a cable car which, at times, seemed to be going almost 
straight up. Notwithstanding the changes since the 
war, the essential features of the mountain, and es- 
pecially of Lookout Point, remain as they were during 
the war. From the point, which rises almost perpen- 
dicularly about 1,600 feet above the valley of the Ten- 
nessee, the view is one of the most beautiful in Amer- 
ica. It is said that one standing there on a clear day 
can see portions of seven states — Tennessee, Georgia, 
Alabama, North Carolina, South Carolina, Kentucky, 
and Virginia. When in the hospital there I could 
view from my window the thunder-storms raging in 
the clouds below. It was below and about Lookout 
Point that Hooker's men fought the memorable "battle 
among the clouds." After going on the dummy rail- 
road to its terminus, we returned and spent some time 
walking about in the vicinity of the point. 

The next day we drove from Chattanooga to the 
Chickamauga battle-ground, passing through Ross- 


ville, of which I had a very vivid recollection as it ap- 
peared on the morning- of September 21, 1863. Leav- 
ing Rossville we drove first to the Wilder monument 
near Lytle's station. All along the road from Chatta- 
nooga we passed the tablets commemorating some im- 
portant event that occurred during or shortly before 
the battle. 

To one who participated in the battle of Chicka- 
mauga, it is a weird sight which the field now presents 
to his view. Looking through the trees at the monu- 
ments and markers which indicate the lines of battle 
and at the batteries which now stand as mute as the 
monuments themselves, one can almost imagine the 
dead rising out of the ground and taking their places 
in mortal conflict. 

Some points on the field were especially interesting 
to us. We first visited the place now marked by a 
monument to the 79th Ind., a little southeast of the 
Brotherton House, where Beatty's brigade charged and 
captured a Confederate battery. As we stood silently 
looking at the monument I felt the tears trickling down 
my cheeks. I looked at Captain Ritter and the tears 
were running down his cheeks also. Neither of us 
spoke, but each understood that memory had recalled 
the scenes of long ago and had touched some hidden 
spring in the human heart that causes it to overflow. 

Lee and Gordon's Mill appears almost precisely as 
it did at the time of the battle, but there has been a 
change in the road crossing Chickamauga creek. 
Crawfish Spring is unchanged, but the surroundings 


have been somewhat altered by the erection of a dam 
just below it and a hotel near by. The flow is of suf- 
ficient volume to make a large stream. We camped 
near it a few days before the battle, after a hot and 
dusty march, and I recall the ecstasy with which men 
and beasts quenched their thirst in the cold clear water 
that gushed out of the rocks. 

The point that interested me more than any other 
was Snodgrass Hill. I easily found the spot, a few- 
yards east of the observation-tower, where I stood 
Sunday afternoon until after 7 o'clock and witnessed 
the repeated assaults of Longstreet's forces and the 
.magnificent charge of Whitaker's and Mitchell's bri- 

The day after visiting the battle-field of Chicka- 
mauga I happened to meet in the hotel at Chattanooga 
a Confederate officer of the brigade to which Carnes's 
battery was attached. This was the battery in the cap- 
ture of which I had participated. We had a brief but 
social talk about it and, with a cordial grasp at part- 
ing, he said : "Well, Captain Howe, the war is over." 
I replied: "Thank God, we can at last clasp hands 
over the bloody chasm." 

That evening all the visiting Union soldiers were 
cordially invited to attend a camp-fire at one of the 
Confederate camps in the city. Much to my regret, on 
account of engagements at home, I could not stay. 
Nothing would have pleased me better than to accept 
the hospitality of the battle-scarred veterans who were 
once my foes. I felt that I had been thoroughly "re- 


constructed." "Old age," it is said, "ne'er cools the 
Douglas blood." Perhaps it has not cooled my own 
patriotic ardor, but the lapse of years has wrought a 
wonderful change in my feelings toward my ancient 

Xo one who took part in the bloody contest at Chick- 
amauga can ever forget it. But the field on which 
that memorable battle was fought has since taken on 
a new glory. We recall that it was the camp-ground 
of the soldiers of the Spanish-American AVar. We 
see marching from that field to the defense of a com- 
mon country men of Massachusetts and South Caro- 
lina, of Georgia and Indiana, marching side by side, 
men whose fathers a third of a century before had met 
there in mortal combat. Whether they step to the 
tune of "Dixie" or the "Red, White and Blue," they 
are marching under one flag and keeping time to the 
music of the Union. Is there a soldier, Federal or 
Confederate, in whom this scene inspires no generous 
thoughts, no new devotion to his country? 

We of the North recall with honest pride the splen- 
did achievements of the Army of the Potomac, the 
wonderful victories won by Grant, Sheridan's brilliant 
climax at Five Forks. But as I read the glowing ac- 
counts of the final Federal triumph, I can not help 
thinking of the last stand made by the gallant band un- 
der General Lee at Appomattox Court House, of the 
little handful left of the once great Army of Northern 
Virginia, men whose valor had been proved in many 
desperate conflicts, heroes whn had fought at Freder- 


icksburg and Chancellorsville, at Gettysburg- and on 
many famous fields, tired, hungry, worn with days 
and nights of fighting and marching, brought to bay at 
last, hemmed in by overwhelming numbers, knowing 
that the cause so dear to them had been forever lost, 
and yet ready at the word of command to rush against 
their exulting foes and cut their way out or perish in 
the attempt. 

When I reflect on all this I respect more than ever 
the brave men against whom I fought. I no longer 
think of them as foemen, but as Americans whose an- 
cestors and my own were comrades in the Revolution; 
and I rejoice, as I believe most of them in their hearts 
rejoice, that the war ended as it did, not as a mere 
triumph of the soldiers of the North over those of the 
South, but as the close of a struggle which, without 
casting any shadow on the motives or the valor of the 
soldiers of either section, makes this the common 
country of us all, and enables us all to say, whether we 
stand at the base of Bunker Hill monument or beside 
Georgia's shaft at Chickamauga, "This is my own, my 
native land." The "Lost Cause" has been forever lost, 
but the heroism it developed will bear fruit for ages yet 
to come. 

It was the soldiers of the North and of the South 
who first learned to respect their adversaries and who 
were the soonest reconciled. In the last volume of 
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 2 is a picture of a 

2 Vol. 4. p. 745- 


scene at Appomattox after Lee's surrender. Though 
a mere wood-cut it tells a touching, an impressive 
story The picture is entitled : "Union soldiers shar- 
ing their rations with the Confederates. From a 
sketch made at the time." The restoration of broth- 
erly feeling between the North and the South, slow as 
it may have been in coming, began with the men who 
for four years had confronted each other in mortal 
combat ; it began as soon as the last gun had been fired ; 
it began with the sharing of rations. 

I grasp with greatest ardor the hand of the comrade 
who stood side by side with me in deadly conflict ; but, 
strange as it may seem, next to the pleasure of grasp- 
ing the hand of one who fought with me is the pleas- 
ure of grasping the hand of the man who fought 
against me. All are Americans now ; all are com- 
rades. Why should we not clasp hands? It is true 
that in the bloody contest many went down, but in both 
North and South widows and orphans still weep for 
the "touch of a vanished hand, the sound of a voice 
that is still." It is true that we may not agree in our 
views of the causes of the strife long past, but when 
we talk of long and weary marches, of standing on 
picket, exposed to howling storms and wintry blasts, 
of battles in which Federals and Confederates marched 
into the very jaws of death, we speak in words that 
all understand and of experiences in which, as Amer- 
ican soldiers, all bore an honorable part. 



When General Buell arrived at Louisville in September, 1862, 
he combined the old regiments of the Army of the Ohio and the 
new ones which he found there, and which subsequently came 
there, into brigades, and the brigades into divisions. The 
brigades and divisions were consecutively numbered from first to 
last ; the army was designated as the Army of the Ohio, and was 
divided into the First, Second, and Third Corps. 

Pursuant to general order No. 168 of the War Department, 
issued Oct. 24, 1862, General Buell was superseded by General 
William S. Rosecrans, a new department was created, called the 
Department of the Cumberland, and the army was designated as 
the Fourteenth Corps. It was, however, from that time popu- 
larly known as the Army of the Cumberland. 

On Nov. 7, 1862, by order of General Rosecrans, the army was 
divided into the Center, Right Wing, and Left Wing, under 
the commands respectively of Generals George H. Thomas, Alex- 
ander McD. McCook, and Thomas L. Crittenden, the brigades and 
divisions retaining their former numbers. The roster of the 
army under this order is given in Cist's Army of the Cumberland 
(pp. 263-5). 

By a subsequent order of General Rosecrans, issued Dec. 19, 
1862, the Center was given five divisions and the Right Wing and 
Left Wing three each. Most of the divisions comprised three 
brigades, the brigades being numbered as parts of the division to 
which they were assigned, and the divisions as parts of the Center, 
Right Wing, and Left Wing. The organization so effected con- 
tinued without substantial change until after the battle of Stone's 

Pursuant to general order No. 9 of the War Department, issued 
Jan. 9, 1863, the Center, Right Wing and Left Wing were re- 
spectively designated as the 14th Army Corps, the 20th Army 

24 (369) 


Corps, and the 21st Army Corps, but the commanders were not 
changed and the army was now formally called the Army of the 

The corps and division organizations remained substantially 
the same until after the battle of Chickamauga, Sept. 19 and 20, 
1863, the roster at that date being given in one of the tables fol- 

Soon after the battle of Chickamauga the second and third di- 
visions of the nth corps and the first and second of the 12th were 
transferred from the Army of the Potomac to the Army of the 
Cumberland, the nth under General Oliver O. Howard and the 
12th under General Henry W Slocum, both under general com- 
mand of General Joseph Hooker. 

Generals McCook and Crittenden were relieved Oct. 9, 1863, 
and the 20th and 21st corps were consolidated into the 4th under 
command of General Gordon Granger. The new corps comprised 
three divisions, General John M. Palmer commanding the first, 
General Philip H. Sheridan the second, and General Thomas J. 
Wood the third. General Rosecrans was superseded Oct. 16 by 
General Thomas. General John M. Palmer afterward succeeded 
Thomas in command of the 14th corps, General David S. Stanley 
succeeding Palmer in command of the first division of the 4th 
corps, this division, during the battles at Chattanooga, having 
been under the temporary command of the senior brigadier, 
General Charles Cruft. 

The roster of the Army of the Cumberland at the battles of 
Chattanooga, Nov. 23-25, 1863, is given in one of the tables fol- 

Pursuant to general order No. 144 of the War Department, 
issued April 4, 1864 (Reb. Rec, ser. No. 59, p. 258), the nth and 
12th corps were consolidated into the 20th under command of 
General Hooker ; General Granger was superseded in command 
of the 4th corps by General Howard, and General Sheridan was 
transferred to the Army of the Potomac. Subsequently General 
John Newton was assigned to the command of Sheridan's division 
of the 4th corps. 

The roster of the Army of the Cumberland at the beginning of 
the Atlanta campaign, May 5, 1864, is given in one of the tables 


The Army of the Cumberland practically ceased to be known by 
that name after Sherman began his march to the sea. The 14th 
and 20th corps made part of the army which accompanied him, 
being thereafter designated as the Army of Georgia, under com- 
mand of General Slocum. The 4th corps returned to Nashville 
and remained under the command of General Thomas. 

The roster of the troops which took part in the battle of Nash- 
ville, including the 4th corps, is given in one of the following 

The following rosters contain only the corps, division, and 
brigade organizations. The regimental lists and lists of depart- 
ment, headquarter, unassigned, garrison, and other detached 
troops will be found in the volumes cited. 




Dec. 31, 1862 — Jan. 1 and 2, 1863. 

(Reb. Rec, ser. 1, vol. 20, pt. 1, pp. 174-182; Van Home: Army 
of the Cumberland, vol. 1, pp. 281-286.) 

Maj.-Gen. William S. Rosecrans, Commanding. 

Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas. 

Maj.-Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau. 
Brigades. 1st, Col. Benj. F Scribner. 
2d, Col. John Beatty. 
3d, Col. John C. Starkweather. 
4th, Lt.-Col. Oliver L. Shepherd (Regulars). 


Artillery. Capt. Cyrus O. Loomis. 
Kentucky Battery A. 
ist Mich. Battery A. 
5th U. S. Battery H. 

Brig.-Gen. James S. Negley. 

Brigades, ist, Brig.-Gen. James S. Spears. 

2d, Col. Timothy R. Stanley. 

3d, Col. John F Miller. 
Artillery. Kentucky Battery B. 

10th Wis. (2 sections). 

ist Ohio Batteries G and M. 


Brig.-Gen. Speed S. Fry. 

(The first brigade and Church's Battery were the only troop: 
of this division engaged.) 

Brigades, ist, Col. Moses B. Walker. 

2d, Col. John M. Harlan. 

3d, Brig.-Gen. James B. Steedman. 
Artillery, ist Mich. Battery B. 

ist Ohio Battery C. 

4th U. S. Battery I. 


Maj.-Gen. Robert B. Mitchell. 

(Only a portion of the division engaged. See Reb. Rec, ser. I 
vol. 20, pt. 1, p. 179.) 

Brigades, ist, Brig.-Gen. James D. Morgan. 

2d, Col. Daniel McCook. 
Artillery. 2d 111. Battery I. 
10th Wis. 

Artillery Reserve, nth Ind. Battery. 
12th Ind. Battery, 
ist Mich. Battery E. 


Brig.-Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds. 
(The division was not engaged.) 
Brigades, ist, Col. Albert S. Hall. 

2d, Col. Abram O. Miller. 
Artillery. 18th Ind. Battery. 
19th Ind. Battery. 


Maj.-Gen. Alexander McD. McCook. 
Brig.-Gen. Jefferson C. Davis. 
Brigades, ist, Col. P. Sidney Post. 

2d, Col. William P. Carlin. 
3d, Col. William E. Woodruff. 
Artillery. 2d Minn. Battery. 
5th Wis. Battery. 
8th Wis. Battery. 


Brig.-Gen. Richard W. Johnson. 
Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. August Willich. 

2d, Brig.-Gen. Edward N. Kirk. 

3d, Col. Philemon P. Baldwin. 
Artillery. 5th Ind. Battery. 

ist Ohio Batteries A and E. 

Brig.-Gen. Philip H. Sheridan. 

Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. Joshua W Sill. 

2d, Col. Frederick Schaeffer. 

3d, Col. George W Roberts. 
Artillery. Capt. Henry Hescock. 

ist 111. Battery C. 

4th Ind. Battery. 

ist Mo. Battery C. 



Maj.-Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden. 


Brig.-Gen. Thomas J. Wood. 

Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. Xlilo S. Hascall. 
2d, Col. George D. Wagner. 
3d, Col. Charles G. Harker. 

Artillery. Maj. Seymour Race. 
8th Ind. Battery. 
10th Ind. Battery. 
6th Ohio Battery. 


Brig.-Gen. John XI. Palmer. 

Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. Charles Cruft. 
2d, Col. William B. Hazen. 
3d, Col. William Grose. 

Artillery. Capt. William E. Standart. 
1st Ohio Batteries B and F 
4th U. S. Batteries H and XL 


Brig.-Gex. Horatio P. Van Cleve. 

Brigades. 1st, Col. Samuel Beatty. 
2d, Col. James P. Fyffe. 
3d, Col. Samuel W. Price. 

Artillery. Capt. George R. Swallow. 
7th Ind. Battery. 
26th Penn. Battery B. 
3d Wis. Battery. 



Brig.-Gen. David S. Stanley. 


Col. John Kennett. 

Brigades, ist, Col. Robert H. G. Minty. 

2d, Col. Lewis Zahm. 
Reserve. Gen. David S. Stanley. 
Artillery, ist Ohio Battery D. 

Capt. James St. Clair Morton. 





Sept. 19 and 20, 1863. 

(Rcb. Rec, ser. 1, vol. 30, pt. 1, pp. 40-47; Van Home: Army 
of the Cumberland, pp. 378-385; Turchin: Battle of Cliickamauga, 
pp. 215, 223.) 

Mat. -Gen. William S. Rosecrans, Commanding. 


Mat. -Gen. George H. Thomas. 


Brig.-Gen. Absalom Baird. 

Brigades, ist, Col. Benj. F. Scribner. 

2d, Brig.-Gen. John C. Starkweather. 

3d, Brig.-Gen. John H. King (Regulars). 
Artillery, ist Mich. Battery A. 

4th Ind. Mattery. 

Sth U. S. Battery H. 



Mat. -Gen. James S. Xegley. 
Brigades, ist, Brig. -Gen. John Beatty. 
2d, Col. Timothy R. Stanley. 
3d, Col. William Sirwell. 
Artillery, ist Ohio Batteries G and M. 

111. Light Art., Bridge's Battery. 

Brig.-Gen. John M. Brannan. 

Brigades, ist, Col. John M. Connell. 

2d, Col. John T. Croxton. 

3d, Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer. 
Artillery, ist Mich. Battery D. 

ist Ohio Battery C. 

4th U. S. Battery I. 

Maj.-Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds. 
Brigades, ist, Col. John T. Wilder (Mounted Infantry) 
2d, Col. Edward A. King. 
3d, Brig.-Gen. John B. Turchin. 
Artillery. 18th Ind. Battery. 
19th Ind. Battery. 
21st Ind. Battery. 


Mat. -Gen. Alexander McD. McCook. 
Brig.-Gen. Jefferson C. Davis. 
Brigades, ist, Col. P. Sidney Post. 

2d, Brig.-Gen. William P. Carlin. 
3d, Col. Hans C. Heg. 
Artillery. 5th Wis. Battery. 
2d Minn. Battery. 
8th Wis. Battery. 



Brig.-Gen. Richard W. Johnson. 
Brigades, ist, Brig.-Gen. August Willich. 

2d, Col. Joseph B. Dodge. 

3d, Col. Philemon P. Baldwin. 
Artillery, ist Ohio Battery A. 

20th Ohio Battery. 

5th Ind. Battery. 

Maj.-Gen. Philip H. Sheridan. 
Brigades, ist, Brig.-Gen. William H. Lytle. 
2d, Col. Bernard Laiboldt. 
3d, Col. Luther P. Bradley. 
Artillery. 2d Ind. Battery "11." 
ist Mo. Battery G. 
ist 111. Battery C. 



Maj.-Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden. 
Brig.-Gen. Thomas J. Wood. 
Brigades, ist, Col. George P. Buell. 

2d, Brig.-Gen. George D. Wagner. (Not engaged.) 
3d, Col. Charles G. Harker. 
Artillery. 8th Ind. Battery. 

10th Ind. Battery. (Not engaged.) 
6th Ohio Battery. 

Maj.-Gen. John M. Palmer. 
Brigades, ist, Brig.-Gen. Charles Cruft. 

2d, Brig.-Gen. William B. Hazen. 
3d, Col. William Grose. 
Artillery. Capt. William E. Standart. 
1st Ohio Batteries B and F 
4th U. S. Batteries H and M. 




Brig.-Gen. Horatio P. Van Cleve. 
Brigades. 1st, Bng.-Gen. Samuel Beatty. 

2d, Col. George F Dick. 

3d, Col. Sidney M. Barnes. 
Artillery. 7th Ind. Battery. 

26th Penn. Battery. 

3d Wis. Battery. 


Maj.-Gen. Gordon Granger. 
Brig.-Gen. James B. Steedman. 
Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. Walter C. Whitaker. 
2d, Col. John G. Mitchell. 

3d, Col. John Coburn. (On detail service; not en- 
gaged at Chickamauga.) 
Artillery. 18th Ohio Battery. 
1st 111. Battery M. 
9th Ohio Battery. (Not engaged.) 

Brig.-Gex. James D. Morgan. 
Brigades. 1st, Col. Robert F Smith. (Not engaged.) 
2d, Col. Daniel M. McCook. 
3d, Col. Charles C. Doolittle. (Not engaged.) 
Artillery. 10th Wis. Battery. (Not engaged.) 
2d 111. Battery I. 
1st Ohio Battery E. 

(Not engaged.) 
Brig.-Gen. Robert S. Granger. 
Brigades. 1st, Col. S. D. Bruce. 

2d, Brig.-Gen. T. D. Ward. 

3d, Brig.-Gen. James G. Spears. 




2d 111. Battery H. 
5th .Mich. Battery, 
ist Term. Battery. 


Maj.-Gen. David S. Stanley (Absent). 
Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Mitchell (Commanding). 

Col. Edward M. McCook. 
Brigades, ist, Col. Archibald P Campbell. 
2d, Col. Daniel M. Ray. 
3d, Col. Louis D. Watkins. 
Artillery. 1st Ohio Battery D (Section). 

Brig.-Gen. George Crook. 
Brigades. 1st, Col. Robert H. G. Minty. 
2d, Col. Eli Long. 

3d, Col. William W Lowe. (Not engaged.) 
Artillery. Chicago Board of Trade Battery. 




Nov. 23-25, 1863. 

(Reb. Rcc, ser. No. 55, pp. 14-21.) 

Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas, Commanding. 

3 8o 



Maj.-Gex. Gordon Granger. 


Brig.-Gen. Charles Cruft. 

Brigades, ist, Brig.-Gen. Charles Cruft. (The brigade not 
engaged ; stationed at Bridgeport, Ala. ; the 
brigade commander temporarily in command of 

2d, Brig.-Gen. Walter C. Whitaker. (The 115th 
111., 84th Ind. and 5th Ind. Battery not engaged; 
stationed at Shellmound, Tenn.) 

3d, Col. William Grose. (The 30th Ind., 77th 
Penn., and Battery H 4th U. S. Art. not en- 
gaged; stationed at Whitesides, Tenn.) 

Maj.-Gen. Philip H. Sheridan. 

Brigades, ist, Col. Francis T. Sherman. 

2d, Brig.-Gen. George D. Wagner. (The 51st Ind. 
not engaged; between Nashville and Chatta- 
nooga. ) 

3d, Col. Charles G. Harker. 
Artillery. Capt. Warren P. Edgarton. 

ist 111. Battery M. 

10th Ind. Battery. 

ist Mo. Battery G 

ist Ohio Battery I. 

4th U. S. Battery G. 

5th U. S. Battery H. 


Brig.-Gen. Thomas J. Wood. 

Brigades, ist, Brig.-Gen. August Willich. 

2d, Brig.-Gen. William B. Hazen. 
3d, Brig.-Gen. Samuel Beatty. 


Artillery. Capt. Cullen Bradley. 
Bridge's (111.) Battery. 
6th Ohio. 
20th Ind. 
Penn. Light Battery B. 

Maj.-Gen. Joseph Hooker. 


Maj.-Gen. Oliver O. Howard. 

Brig. -Gen. Adolph Steinwehr. 
Brigades. 1st, Col. Adolphus Buschbeck. 
2d, Col. Charles Smith. 

Maj.-Gen. Carl Schurz. 
Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. Hector Tyndale. 
2d, Col. Wladimir Krzyzanowski. 
3d, Col. Frederick Hecker. 
Artillery. Maj. Thomas W. Osborn. 

1st N. Y. Light Batteries 1 and 13. 
1st Ohio Batteries I and K. 
4th U. S. Battery G. 

(Batteries I, 1st Ohio, and G, 4th U. S., tempo- 
rarily attached to 2d div. 4th corps.) 

Maj.-Gen. Henry W. Slocum. 
(The corps commander and the first division on detached duty 
and not in battle.) 

Brig. -Gen. John W. Geary. 
Brigades. 1st, Col. Charles Candy. 

2d, Col. George A. Cobham. 
3d, Col. David Ireland. 


Artillery. Maj. John A. Reynolds. 
Penn. Light. 
5th U. S. Battery K. 


Maj.-Gen. John M. Palmer. 


Brig.-Gen. Richard W. Johnson. 

Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. William P Carlin. 

2d, Col. Marshall F Moore. 

3d, Brig.-Gen. John C. Starkweather. (During 
the battles was holding fort and breastworks at 
Artillery. 1st 111. Battery C. 

1st Mich. Battery A. 

5th U. S. Battery H. (Temporarily attached tc 
2d div. 4th corps.) 

Brig.-Gen. Jefferson C. Davis. 
Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. James D. Morgan. 
2d, Brig.-Gen. John Beatty. 
3d, Col. Daniel McCook. 
Artillery. Capt. William A. Hotchkiss. 
2d 111. Battery I. 
2d Minn. 
5th Wis. 

Brig.-Gen. Absalom Baird. 
Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. John B. Turchin. 
2d, Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer. 
3d, Col. Edward H. Phelps. 
Artillery. Capt. George R. Swallow. 
7th Ind. 
19th Ind. 
4th U. S. Battery I. 


Bkig.-Gen. William F. Smith. 


Brig. -Gen. John AI. Brannan. 



Col. Eli Long. 

(The other brigades of first and second divisions on detached 
duty at various points.) 

Col. John G. Parkhurst. 




May 5, 1864. 

(Rcb. Rcc, ser. No. 59, pp. 551-560; Van Home: Army of the 
Cumberland, vol. 2, pp. 31-39.) 

Mat. -Gen. George H. Thomas, Commanding. 

Maj.-Gen. Oliver O. Howard. 

Maj.-Gen. David S. Stanley. 
Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. Charles Cruft. 

2d, Brig.-Gen. Walter C. Wliit.tker. 
3d, Col. 'William Grose. 



Artillery. Capt. Peter Simonson. 
5th Ind. Battery. 
Penn. Battery B. 

Maj.-Gen. John Newton. 
Brigades. 1st, Col. Francis T. Sherman. 

2d, Brig.-Gen. George D. Wagner. 
3d, Col. Charles G. Harker. 
Artillery. 1st Mo. Battery G. 
1st 111. Battery M. 

Brig.-Gen. Thomas J. Wood. 
Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. August Willich. 

2d, Brig.-Gen. William B. Hazen. 
3d, Brig.-Gen. Samuel Beatty. 
Artillery. Capt. Cullen Bradley. 
6th Ohio Battery. 
Bridge's (111.) Battery. 


Maj.-Gen. John M. Palmer. 


Brig.-Gen. Richard W. Johnson. 
Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. William P. Carlin. 

2d, Brig.-Gen. John H. King. 

3d, Col. James M. Neibling. 
Artillery. Capt. Lucius H. Drury. 

1st Mich. Battery A. 

1st 111. Battery C. 

Brig.-Gen. Jefferson C. Davis. 
Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. James D. Morgan. 
2d, Col. John G. Mitchell. 
3d, Col. Daniel McCook. 


Artillery. Capt. Charles M. Barnett. 
2d Minn. Battery. 
2d 111. Battery I. 
5th Wis. Battery. 

Brig.-Gen. Absalom Baird. 
Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. John B. Turchin. 
2d, Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer. 
3d, Col. George P Este. 
Artillery. Capt. George R. Swallow. 
7th Ind. Battery. 
19th Ind. Battery. 



Maj.-Gen. Joseph Hooker. 
Brig.-Gen. Alpheus S. Williams. 
Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. Joseph F Knipe. 
2d, Brig.-Gen. Thomas H. Rnger. 
3d, Brig.-Gen. Hector Tyndale. 
Artillery. Capt. John D. Woodbury. 

1st N. Y. Batteries M and I. 

Brig.-Gen. John W Geary. 
Brigades. 1st, Col. Charles Candy. 

2d, Col. Adolphus Buschbeck. 
3d, Col. David Ireland. 
Artillery. Capt. William Wheeler. 

Independent Penn. Battery E. 
13th N. Y. Battery. 

Maj.-Gen. Daniel Butterfield. 
Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. William T. Ward. 
2d, Col. John Coburn. 
3d, Col. James Wood. 




Artillery. Capt. Marco B. Gary. 
ist Ohio Battery C. 
ist Mich. Battery I. 

Maj.-Gen. Lovell H Rousseau. 
(The organization of this division was incomplete and it never 
joined the corps; portions of it were on detached or garrison 
duty. See Fox: Reg. Losses, p. 104.) 

Brigades, ist, Brig.-Gen. Robert S. Granger. 

Various regiments not brigaded. 
Artillery. 9th Ohio Battery. 
20th Ind. Battery. 


Brig.-Gen. Washington L. Elliott. 

Col. Edward M. McCook. 

Brigades, ist, Col. Archibald P. Campbell. 

2d, Col. Oscar H. LaGrange. 

3d, Col. Louis D. Watkins. 
Artillery. 18th Ind. Battery. 

Brig.-Gen. Kenner Garrard. 
Brigades, ist, Col. William B. Sipes. 
2d, Col. Robert H. G Minty. 
3d, Col. Abram O. Miller. 
Artillery. Chicago Board of Trade Battery. 

Brig.-Gen. Judson Kilpatrick. 
Brigades, ist, Col. William W Lowe. 
2d, Col. Charles C. Smith. 
3d, Col. Eli H. Murray. 


Brig.-Gen. Alvan C. Gillen. 
Brigades. 1st, Lt.-Col. Duff G. Thornburgh. 
2d, Lt.-Col. George Spalding. 
3d, Col. John K. Miller. 

Brig.-Gen. John AI. Brannan. 


Dec. 15 and 16, 1864. 

(Cox: March to the Sea, pp. 223-227.) 

Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas, Commanding. 

Brig.-Gen. Thomas J. Wood. 

Brig.-Gen. Nathan Kimball. 
Brigades. 1st, Col. Isaac M. Kirby. 

2d, Brig.-Gen. Walter C. Whitaker. 
3d, Brig.-Gen. William Grose. 

Brig.-Gen. Washington L. Elliott. 
Brigades. 1st, Col. Emerson Opdycke. 
2d, Col. John Q. Lane. 
3d, Col. Joseph Conrad. 


Brig.-Gen. Samuel Beatty. 
Brigades. 1st, Col. Abel D. Streight. 
2d, Col. P. Sidney Post. 
3d, Col. Fred Knefler. 

Maj. Wilbur F Goodspead. 

Maj.-Gen. John M. Schofield. 

Maj.-Gen. Darius N. Couch. 
Brigades. 1st, Brig.-Gen. Joseph A. Cooper. 
2d, Col. Orlando H. Moore. 
3d, Col. John Mehringer. 

Artillery. 15th Ind. Battery. 
19th Ohio Battery. 

Brig.-Gen. Jacob D. Cox. 
Brigades. 1st, Col. Charles C. Doolittle. 
2d, Col. John S. Casement. 
3d, Col. Isaac N. Stiles. 
Artillery. 23d Ind. Battery. 

1st Ohio Battery D. 

Maj.-Gen. Andrew J. Smith. 

Brig.-Gen. John McArthur. 
Brigades. 1st, Col. William L. McMillen. 
2d, Col. Lucius F. Hubbard. 
3d, Col. S. G. Hill. 


Brig.-Gen. Kenner Garrard. 
Brigades. 1st, Cof. David Moore. 

2d, Col. James I. Gilbert. 
3d, Col. Edward H. Wolfe. 

Col. Jonathan B. Moore. 
Brigades. 1st, Col. Lyman M. Ward. 
2d, Col. Leander Blanden. 
Artillery. 14th Ind. Battery. 
2d Mo. Battery A. 


Etowah ) 

Maj.-Gen. James B. Steedman. 

Brig.-Gen. Charles Cruft. 
Brigades. 1st, Col. Benjamin Harrison. 
2d, Col. John G. Mitchell. 
3d, Lt.-Col. Charles H. Grosvenor. 
Second Brigade (Army of Tenn.), Col. Adam G. Malloy. 
First Colored Brigade, Col. Thomas J. Morgan. 
Second Colored Brigade, Col. Charles R. Thompson. 


Brig.-Gen. John F Miller. 
Second Brigade, 4th Div., 20th Army Corps, Col. Edwin G. 

Garrison Artillery, Maj. John J. Ely. 


(Composed of Quartermaster's employes.) 
Col. James L. Donaldson. 



Brevet Maj.-Gen. James H. Wilson. 
Brigades, ist, Brig.-Gen. John T. Croxton. 
Artillery. 111. Board of Trade Battery. 

Brig.-Gen. Edward Hatch. 
Brigades, ist, Col. Robert R. Stewart. 

2d, Col. Datus E. Coon. 
Artillery, ist 111. Battery I. 


Brig.-Gen. Richard W. Johnson. 
Brigades, ist, Col. Thomas J. Harrison. 

2d, Col. James Biddle. 
Artillery. 4th U. S. Battery I. 

Brig.-Gen. Joseph F. Knipe. 
Brigades, ist, Col. J. H. Hammond. 
2d, Col. G. M. L. Johnson. 
Artillery. 14th Ohio Battery. 


NOTE: I have consulted and drawn very liberally from Van 
Home's Army of the Cumberland, Cist's Army of the Cumber- 
land, Cox's Atlanta Campaign and Fox's Regimental Losses. I 
make this general acknowledgment in lieu of a multitude of cita- 
tions from them. 

American State Papers. Military Affairs, 342 

Appleton. Annual Cyclopedia for 1863, 272, 293 

Atlantic Monthly, 324 

Badeau, Adam. Military Life of U. S. Grant, 328 

Bancroft, George. Hist. U. States, 343 

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 

19, 24, 208, 216, 240, 309, 316, 317, 336, 337, 366 
Blaine', James G. Twenty Years of Congress, 24 

Boynton, Gen. Henry V. Chickamauga National Military 

Park, 163, 208, 210, 235, 358 

Boynton, Gen. Henry V Continuation of Piatt's George 

H. Thomas. See Piatt. 
Brock, Francena Howe. Campbell Hospital, 67 

Carrington, Gen. Henry B. Battles of the American Revo- 
lution, 343 
Century Magazine, 89, 289 
Cheatham, Gen. Benj. F. Article on General Cheatham at 

Spring Hill (Battles and Leaders), 317 

Cist, Gen. Henry M. Army of the Cumberland, 

99, 102, 121, 163, 210, 233, 240 
Cleland, John E. The Second March to the Ohio (Indiana 

Loyal Legion; War Papers), 313 

Committee on Conduct of the War. Report on Rose- 

crans's Campaign. 161 

Coppee, Henry. General Thomas, 321, ^2^ 

Cox, Gen. Jacob D. Atlanta, 87, 355 

Cox, Gen. Jacob D. Military Reminiscences, 157, 160 

Cox, Gen. Jacob D. War Preparations in the North 

(Battles and Leaders), 19 

Dana, Charles A. Recollections of the Civil War. 352 

Davie, Gen. Henry E. Biography of Gen. Sheridan, 200 



Davis, Jefferson. Rise and Fall of the Confederate States, 

269, 278, 280 
Dawson, Henry B. Battles of U. States, 343 

Foulke, William Dudley. Life of Oliver P. Morton, 15, 51, 53 
Fox, Lt.-Col. Wm. F. Regimental Losses, 

54, 81, 89, 122, 235, 272, 300, 301, 336, 337, 338, 340, 350 
Fox, Lt.-Col. Wm. F The Chance of Being Hit in Bat- 
tle (Century Magazine), 89 
Fullerton, Gen. Joseph S. The Army of the Cumberland 

at Chickamauga (Battles and Leaders, vol. 3, p. 725), 240 

Gordon, A. C. Hard Times in the Confederacy (Century 

Magazine), 289 

Grant, Gen. Ulysses S. Memoirs, 26, 28, 29, 33, 225, 231, 239 
Greeley, Horace. American Conflict, 128 

Harper's Weekly, 3, 123, 241 

History of 86th Indiana, 95 

Holt, Joseph (Judge Adv. Gen.). Report to Secy, of War 
on the Order of American Knights or Sons of Liberty, 
etc., 130 

Hood, Gen. John B. Article on The Invasion of Tennessee 

(Battles and Leaders), 309, 316 

Humphreys, Gen. Andrew J. Virginia Campaign, 304, 355 

Indiana Adjutant General's Reports, 336 

Indiana Brevier Legislative Reports, 133 

Indiana Commandery Loyal Legion. War Papers, 313 

Indiana House Journal, 133 

Indiana Senate Journal, 133, 135 

Irwin, Lt.-Col. Richard B. Ball's Bluff, etc. (Battles and 

Leaders), 24 

Jones, J. B. A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, 280, 281, 287 

Livermore, Col. Thomas L. Numbers and Losses in the 

Civil War, 122, 208, 336, 337, 341, 343, 347, 351 

Lossing, Benson J. Field Book of the Revolution, 343 

Military Historical Society of Mass. Some Federal and 

Confederate Commanders, 324 

McClellan, Gen. George B. McClellan's Own Story, 

30, 34, 36, 37, 42 
McClure', Alexander K. Lincoln and Men of War Times, 28, 49 
McPherson, Edward. History of the Rebellion, 276, 280 

New York. Assembly Documents, 133 

Nicolay and Hay. Abraham Lincoln, 23, 217 

Phisterer, Capt. Frederick. Statistical Record of the Ar- 
mies of the U States, 336 
Piatt, Donn. General George H. Thomas (with a continu- 
ation by Gen. Henry V. Boynton), 81, 163, 240 
Pitman, Benn. Indiana Treason Cases, 131 
Pollard, E. A. The Lost Cause, 39, 40, 182, 280, 281 
Pollard, E. A. Southern History of the War, 285 


Proceedings of the Officers and Soldiers of the Indiana 

Regiments, 134 

Rebellion Records, 
32, 48, 127, 160, 163, 186, 187, 194, 203, 204, 210, 212, 218, 225, 
233, 234, 276, 294, 295, 335. 
Reid, Whitelaw. Ohio in the War, 18, 19, 28 

Richmond Enquirer. Editorial on Arming the Slaves, 276 

Ropes, John C. The Army under Pope, 44 

Ropes, John C. Story of the Civil War, 103 

Ropes, John C. Article on General Sherman {Atlantic 

Monthly, and Some Federal and Confederate Commanders) , 324 
Schofield, Gen. John M. Forty-Six Years in the Army, 83, 87 
Schwab, Prof. John C. The Confederate States of America, 288 
Sheridan, Gen. Phil H. Memoirs, 80, 200 

Sherman, Gen. Wm. T. Memoirs, 233 

Smith, Gen. Wm. F Comments on General Grant's "Chat- 
tanooga" (Battles and Leaders), 216 
Spofford, Ainsworth R. American Almanac, 341, 342 
Stephens, Alexander. The War between the States, 290 
Stone, Col. Henry. Repelling Hood's Invasion of Ten- 
nessee (Battles and Leaders), 316 
Swinton, William. Campaigns of the Army of the Poto- 

wicic 2K ^1 

Terrel'l, Adj.-Gen. Wm. H. H. Reports, '336 

Townsend, Malcom. U. S. Curious Facts, etc., 343 

Turchin, Gen. John H. Battle of Chickamauga, 163, 190, 204, 206 
Van Home, Thomas B. Army of the Cumberland, 

103, 163, 190, 202, 207, 210, 234, 240, 303 
Van Home, Thomas B. Life of George H. Thomas, 

164, 180, 217, 329 
Webb, Gen. Alex. S. Through the Wilderness (Battles 

and Leaders), 337 

Wilson, Henry. The Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, 272 


Ackworth (Ga.) : 305. 

Acquia Creek (Va.) : 43. 

Adams, John : 40. 

Alabama, state: 165,313,362. 

Alexander's bridge (Chicka- 
mauga) : 171. 

Allotment rolls: 63, 148. 

Alpine (Ga.) : 164, 165, 167. 

Amenities of war: 93-96. 

A meric an Knights : 130-132. 

American Reform Society : 146. 

Amusements in Army: 66. 

Anderson, Gen. Patton: 275. 

Anderson, Mr. : 254. 

Andrczv, Gov. John A. : 271. 

Antietam, battle of : 35, 297 ; 
numbers and losses, 348. 

Appomattox Court House : 
surrender at, 367. 

Armed neutrality : of Ken- 
tucky, 5. 

Army of the Cumberland: or- 
ganization in 1862, 101 ; Gen. 
Rosecrans appointed to com- 
mand of, 101 ; organized into 
Center, Right Wing, and 
Left Wing, 101 ; in camp at 
Nashville, Tenn., 104-5 ; re- 
organization Nov. 7, 1862, 
106; in camp at Murfrees- 
boro, Tenn., 123-155; com- 
posed mainly of men from 
Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, 
127; Democrats in, 127; de- 
sertions from in 1863, 127, 
137; protests of Indiana 
regiments in to Indiana leg- 
islature, in 1863, 134; con- 


solidation of 20th and 21st 
corps into 4th, 214; Thomas 
succeeds Rosecrans in com- 
mand of, 214; kindly feeling 
of soldiers for Rosecrans, 
214; Grant underestimates 
soldierly qualities of men, 
233 ; reorganization prior to 
Atlanta campaign, 298; af- 
fection of soldiers for Gen. 
Thomas, 326, 328; see also 
titles of battles and cam- 
paigns in which the army 

Army of the James : losses in 
Richmond campaign, 352. 

Army of Northern Virginia 
(Confederate) : 24, 45, 304, 
365 ; its last stand, 365. 

Army of the Ohio : 99, 103, 

Army of the Potomac : 24, 26, 
31, 35, 42, 43, 44, 45, 93, 124, 
126, 150, 152, 159, 272, 304, 
365; organization, 20, 35; 
Gen. McClellan appointed to 
command of, 35 ; Burnside 
supersedes McClellan in 
command of, 124; Hooker 
supersedes Burnside, 124; 
desertions from in 1863, 127; 
Meade supersedes Hooker, 
125 ; losses in Richmond 
campaign, 352. 

Annv of the Tennessee (Fed- 
eral) : 208. 

Army of the Tennessee (Con- 
federate) : Gen. Bragg ap- 




pointed to command of, 47; 
Gen. Johnston supersedes 
Bragg, 297 ; Gen. Hood su- 
persedes Johnston, 304; vir- 
tually destroyed at battle of 
Nashville, 324; Hood relin- 
quishes command of, 324. 
See the titles of the 1 various 
battles and campaigns in 
which it participated. 
Army of Virginia: organiza- 
tion, 44 ; demolition of, 45. 
Army Organizations (Fed- 
eral) : 
Corps (Infantry) : 

Crittenden, Thomas L. : 99, 
106. See 21st Army 
Gilbert, Charles C. : 99. 
McCook, Alexander McD. : 
99, 100, 106, 109. See 1 
20th Army Corps. 
Thomas, George H. : 106. 

See 14th Army Corps. 
Fourth : 214, 219, 220, 223, 
226, 242, 265, 298, 309, 
312, 314, 315, 318. 
Eleventh: 214, 223, 265, 
298. See 20th Army 
Twelfth: 214, 224, 265, 
298. See 20th Army 
Fourteenth (old) : 101. 
Fourteenth (new) : 158, 
164, 169, 170, 171, 172, 
174, 175, 178, 179, 199, 
201, 202, 204, 219, 223, 
226, 242, 298. 
Fifteenth : 216, 223, 224, 

242, 298. 
Sixteenth: 298, 306, 312, 

Seventeenth : 216, 223, 298. 
Twentieth (old) : 109, 157, 
167, 171, 172, 179, 199, 
201, 202, 204, 214. See 
4th Army Corps. 

Twentieth (new) : 265, 
298. See nth and 12th 
Army Corps. 

Twenty-first: 106, 158, 
161, 168, 169, 170, 171, 

172, 173, 174, 179, 199, 

201, 202, 204, 214. See 
4th Army Corps. 

Twenty-third : 258, 298, 

309, 312, 314, 315- 
Corps (Cavalry) : 

Elliott, Washington L. : 

Kilpatrick, Judson: 311. 
Mitchell, Robert B. : 205. 
Wilson, James H. : 313, 

314, 315- 
Corps (Reserve) : 
Granger, Gordon: 158, 173, 

178, 179, 192, 193, 201, 

202, 205. 
Divisions : 

Baird, Absalom: 172, 177, 
178, 204, 219, 223, 224, 
225, 226. 

Brannan, John M. : 172, 

173, 174, 177, 178, 182, 
183, 184, 185, 186, 189, 
191, 193, 202, 204, 209. 

Cox, Jacob D. : 315. 

Crook, George (Cav.) : 

Cruft, Charles : 220, 224. 

Davis, Jefferson C. : 108, 
in, 116, 172, 176, 179, 
183, 184, 185, 198, 201, 
204, 206, 219. 242. 

Ewing, Hugh : 223. 

Geary, John W. : 220, 224. 

Johnson, Richard W. : 
108, no, in, 172, 175, 
176, 177, 178, 201, 202, 
204, 219, 223, 224, 225. 

Kimball, Nathan : 315. 

Mitchell, Robert B. : 
(Cav.) 205. 

Morgan, James : 193, 205. 



McCook, Edward M. 
(Cav.) : 205. 

NegleV. James H. : 108, 

in, 112, 113, 116, 119, 

120, 165, 168, 169, 172, 

177, 179. 185, 189, 202, 

Newton, John : 301. 
Osterhaus, Peter J. : 219, 

220, 224. 
Palmer, John M. : 108, 

113, 116, 119, 172, 175, 

176, 178, 201, 202, 204, 

Reynolds, Joseph J. : 172, 

175, 176, 178, 183, 202, 

Rousseau, Lovell H. : 108, 

112, 113, 114, "5. n6, 

Ruger, Thomas H. : 315. 

Schurz, Carl : 223. 

Sheridan, Phil. H. : 108, 

in, 112, 116, 117, 172, 

176, 178, 179, 184, 185, 
201, 204, 206, 214, 218, 
219, 223, 224, 226, 235, 
236, 242, 266. 

Smith, John E. : 223. 
Smith, Morgan L. : 223, 

Stanley, David S. : 120, 

267, 302. 
Steedman, James B. : 193, 

205, 209. 
Steinwehr, Adolph V. : 

Van Cleve, Horatio P : 

106, 108, 109, no, 114, 

116, 117, 119, 120, 136, 

155, 162, 172, 175, 176, 
-177, 179, 180, 183, 184, 

185, 189, 198, 201, 202, 

204, 206. 
Waener, George D. : 315, 


Wood, Thomas J. : 55, 95, 
108, no, 116, 117, 172, 
176, 179, 180, 183, 184, 
189, 201, 204, 214, 218, 
219, 223, 224, 226, 228, 
229, 235, 236, 240, 242, 
249, 257, 259, 265, 315, 

. 330. 
Brigades : 

Barnes, Sidney M. : 176, 
180, 183, 201, 202. 

Beatty, Samuel : 100, 106, 
114, 115, 119, 162, 175, 
180, 184, 189, 201, 202, 
206, 214, 254, 267. 

Bradley, Luther P. : 206. 

Buell, George P. : 206. 

Carlin, William P : 176, 
206, 223. 

Connell, John M. : 186. 

Croxton, John T. : 174. 

Dick, George F. : 175, 
180, 184, 189, 201, 206. 

Dodge, Joseph B. : 206. 

Fyffe, James'P. : 114, 119. 

Grose, William: 119, 220, 

Harker, Charles G. : 114, 

Hascall, Milo S. : 108. 

Hazen, Wm. B. : 265. 

Heg, Hans C. : 176, 206. 

King, Edward A. : 206. 

Kirk, Edward N. : 109, 

Laiboldt, Bernard: 206. 

Lytle, Wm. F. : 206. 

Miller, John F : 113, 120. 

Minty, Robert H. G. : 161, 

Mitchell, John G. : 187, 

193, 364- 
Moore, Marshall F. : 223. 
Opdycke, Emerson: 318. 
Price, James P.: 114, 118. 
Shepherd, Oliver L. : 117, 




Stanley, Timothy R. : 113, 

Starkweather, John C. : 

Van Derveer, Ferdinand : 

182, 193, 206, 209. 
Whitaker, Walter C. : 187, 

193, 206, 220, 224, 364. 
Wilder, John T. : 161,169, 

172, 176, 178, 202, 361. 
Willich, August: 108, 109, 

no, in, 254, 265. 
Pioneer Brigade: no. 
Regimental and other organ- 
izations : 

United States: 33d U. S. 
Col. Inf., 271; 79th U. S. 
Col. Inf., 271. 
Illinois: 21st Inf., 154. 
Indiana: 4th Cav., 252; 6th 
Inf., 135, 139; 7th Inf., 10; 
15th Inf., 135; 17th Inf., 
135; 22d Inf., 135; 29th 
Inf., 135; 32d Inf., 13s; 
34th Inf., 135; 37th Inf., 
135; 38th Inf., 135; 39th 
Inf., 135; 40th Inf., 135; 
42d Inf., 135 ; 44th Inf., 135, 
189; 51st Inf., 135; 57th 
Inf., 135; 58th Inf., 135; 
72d Inf., 135; 73d Inf., 135; 
75th Inf., 135; 79th Inf., 
53, 54, 57, 58, 73, 76, 81, 94, 
97, 99, 104, 105, ii5, 122, 
135, 136, 137, 149, 162, 175, 
182, 185, 189, 192, 195, 228, 
240, 242, 244, 250, 254, 257, 
300, 317, 331,361, 363; 79th 
Inf., Co. E, 139, 140; 79th 
Inf., Co. I, 54, 55, 105, 115, 
149, 339, 353-4; 81st Inf., 
53; 82d Inf., 53, 135; 86th 
Inf., 95, 135, 189, 228; 87th 
Inf., 53; 88th Inf., 53; 89th 
Inf., 53; 101st Inf., 135. 
Kansas: 1st Kans. Col. Inf., 

Kentucky: 5th Inf., 139; 9th 

Inf., 99, 115, 189; nth Inf., 
99, 115; 17th Inf., 189; 
Louisville' Legion, 139. 

Louisiana : 1st Louis. Na- 
tive Guard (Col.), 271. 

Maine : 1st Me. Heavy Art., 

Massachusetts : 54th Inf. 
(Col.), 271. 

Michigan : 22d Inf., 196. 

Minnesota: 1st Inf., 350. 

New Hampshire : 5th Inf., 

Ohio: 19th Inf., 99, 115, 149, 
189, 251, 252; 21st Inf., 
196; 35th Inf., 356; 89th 
Inf., 196. 

Pennsylvania: 141st Inf., 

South Carolina: 1st Inf. 
(Col.), 271. 

Tennessee : 1st Tenn. Bat- 
talion, 252; 3d East Tenn. 
Cav., 254. 
Army Organizations (Confed- 
erate) : 

Corps (Infantry) : 
Buckner, Simon B. : 160, 

167, 170, 173, 195. 
Cheatham, Benj . F. : 207, 

315- . 
Hardee, Wm. J.: 107, no. 
Hill, Daniel H. : 173, 207. 
Hood, John B. : 173, 176. 
Lee, Stephen D. : 315. 
Longstreet, James : 39, 

166, 170, 173, 178, 179, 

Polk, Leonidas: 173, 179, 

Stewart, Alexander P. : 

Walker, William H. T.: 

Corps (Cavalry) : 
Forrest, Nathan B. : 47, 
157, 173, 174, 179, 200, 
310, 314, 315. 



Morgan, John: 47. 
Wheeler, Joseph : 169, 173, 

207, 211, 266. 
Divisions : 
Anderson, Patton: 195, 

209, 224. 

Armstrong, Frank C. 

(Cav.) : 173. 
Bate, William B. : 224. 
Breckinridge, John C. : 

76, 107, 109, no, 114, 

119, 120, 122, 173, 178, 

179, 182, 207, 209. 
Cheatham, Benj. F. : 108, 

in, 122, 173, 175, 177, 

179, 207, 209, 224. 
Cleburne, Patrick R. : 107, 

no, in, 173, 177, 179, 

207, 209, 223. 
Gist, S. R. : 173, 179. 
Hindman, Thomas C. : 

173, 178, 179, 181, 184, 

185, 187, 188, 194, 207. 
Hood, John B. : 173, 207. 
Johnson, Bushrod R. : 173, 

176, 179, 181, 184, 185, 

188, 207, 209. 
Johnson, Edward: 315. 
Kershaw, Joseph B. : 179, 

181, 184, 195. 
Law, Evander Mclver : 

173, 176, 179, 181, 184. 
Liddell, St. John R. : 173, 

179, 207. 
Martin, William T. (Cav.) : 

McCown, John P : 107, 

no, in. 
McLaws, Lafayette: 173, 

178, 179, 207. 
Pegram, John (Cav.) : 173. 
Pickett, George E. : 120, 

Preston, William : 173, 

178, 179, 195. 207, 209. 
Stevenson, Carter L. : 223. 
Stewart, Alexander P. : 

173. 175. 179, 207, 209, 

Walker, William H. T.: 

173, 175- 179, 207, 223. 
Wharton, John A. (Cav.) : 

Withers, Jones M. : 107, 

Brigades : 
Adams, Daniel W. : 316. 
Anderson, James: 195. 
Anderson, Patton: 209. 
Bate, William B. : 209. 
Brown, John C. : 223. 
Cockrell, Francis M. : 316. 
Cumming, Alfred : 223. 
Deas, Zach C. : 194, 195. 
Donelson, Daniel S. : 122. 
Govan, Daniel C. : 223. 
Gracie, Archibald : 195, 

Kelly, John H. : 195. 
Lowrey, Mark P. : 223. 
Maney, George: 223, 316. 
Scott, John S. (Cav.) : 

Smith, J. A. : 223. 
Trigg, Robert C. : 195. 
Wise, Henry A. : 278. 
Wright, Marcus J. : 175. 
Regiments, Artillery, Cav- 
alry, etc. : 

Georgia : 21st Inf., 350. 
North Carolina : 26th Inf., 

Tennessee: 8th Inf., 122; 

16th Inf., 122. 
Texas : 1st Inf., 350. 
Carnes's Battery: 175, 364. 
Dent's Battery: 195. 
Garrity's Battery : 195. 
Washington Light Artil- 
lery : 120. 
Athens (Term.) : 266. 
Atlanta (Ga.) : 39, 40, 84. 299, 

300, 303, 305, 306, 307, 308. 
Atlanta: battles of, 300; num- 
bers and losses, 340. 



Atlanta Campaign, The: Chap. 
XI, pp. 283-304; character of 
country traversed, yy, 84; 
breastworks and fortifica- 
tions encountered, 79, 85 ; 
courtesies shown each other 
by combatants, 94-6; con- 
dition of Confederacy at be- 
ginning of, 284-296; Sher- 
man appointed to command 
of Military Division of Mis- 
sissippi, 297; gathering of 
troops and supplies at Chat- 
tanooga, 297-8; strength of 
Sherman's army, 298; 
strength of Johnston's army, 
298; Johnston's tactics, 298; 
Sherman's tactics, 299; no 
one great battle fought, 299; 
but many smaller ones, 299; 
troops constantly under fire, 
300; Federal losses in cam- 
paign, 301, 351 ; Confederate 
losses, 301 ; losses of Army 
of the Cumberland, 301 ; 
campaign showed futility of 
assaulting fortified lines, 301 ; 
assault of Kenesaw Moun- 
tain, 301-2; campaign ex- 
hausting to vitality of 
troops, 303 ; illustration of 
severity of fighting on the 
skirmish line, 331-2. 

Augusta, siege of: numbers 
and losses, 346. 

Avery, Capt. William L. : 238. 

Badeau, Gen. Adam: injustice 

to Gen. Thomas, 328-9. 
Baird, Gen. Absalom : 239. 
Baker, Wat : 96. 
Balaklava: charge at, 350. 
Baldwin, Col. Philemon P. : 

Ball's Bluff: battle of, 16, 21, 

Banks, Gen. Nathaniel P. : 44, 

125, 297. 

Bareford, Mr. 


Barksdale, E. : 278. 

Battle: how it appeared to a 
soldier, 76; difficulty of see- 
ing all the combatants, 76; 
maneuvering for position, yy, 
developing the enemy, yy; 
surprises, yy\ night attacks, 
yy; flanking, 78; private sol- 
dier's preparation for battle, 
78; the skirmishers, 78; 
charging a battery, 79; lying 
charging a battery. 79; lying 
still under artillery fire, 80; 
bayonet charges, 81-2 ; posi- 
tion of officers, 82 ; those 
specially aimed at, 82; dif- 
ference between shooting of 
veteran and recruit, 83 ; sen- 
sation of being specially 
aimed at, 83-4; radical 
changes in methods of fight- 
ing in last year of war, 84; 
the fortifications encountered 
in last year of war, 85 ; fu- 
tility of attacking by direct 
assault, 86; how advance on 
fortifications made, 88; in- 
trenching under fire, 88; 
danger in battle of being hit 
by cannon balls, 89 ; danger 
from musket balls, 89; mine 1 
explosions, 89 ; the inspiring 
motives in battle, 89-92; a 
batterv in action, 91 ; skulk- 
ers and cowards, 92-3; 
amenities of war, 93-96. 

Battles of Civil War: numbers 
and losses, 348-9. 

Battles of Mexican War: 
numbers and losses, 341. 

Battles of Revolutionary War: 
numbers and losses, 343~7- 

Battles of War of 1812 : num- 
bers and losses, 342. 

Bayonet charges : 81. 

Bean's Station (Tenn.) : 245. 



Beatty, Gen. Samuel: 118, 202, 

Beaufort, battle of: numbers 
and losses, 345. 

Beauregard, Gen. P. G. T. : 
46, 305, 308, 309. 

Bell, John : 50. 

Bellaire (Oh.) : 10, 13. 

Bemis Heights, battle of: 
numbers and losses, 344. 

Benjamin, Judah P : 282. 

Bennington, battle of : num- 
bers and losses, 344. 

Big Shanty (Ga.) : 305, 330, 


Blackford Co. (Ind.) : 132. 

Blackstocks, battle of : num- 
bers and losses, 346. 

Blair, Gen. Frank P : 298. 

Bliicher, Gen. : 171. 

Blue Bird Gap (Ga.) : 168. 

Boston (Mass.) : 22. 

Boydton Plank Road, battle 
of: numbers and losses, 349. 

Boynton, Gen. Henry V : 356, 

357, 358. 

Bragg, Gen. Braxton : ap- 
pointed to command of Con- 
federate Army of the Ten- 
nessee, 47 ; his invasion of 
and retreat from Kentucky, 
52, 98, 100; his controversy 
with Gen. Breckinridge, 122; 
superseded by Gen. Johns- 
ton, 297 ; his subsequent un- 
popularity in the South, 292. 
See Army of Tennessee and 
its Battles and Campaigns. 

Brandywine, battle of : num- 
bers and losses, 344. 

Brannan, Gen. John M. : 183. 

Breastworks: 79, 85-6. See 
Fortified Lines. 

Breckinridge, Gen. John C. : 
SO, si, 122. 

Bridgeport (Ala.): 158, 161, 
162, 211, 212, 214, 216, 217, 

Brier Creek, battle of : num- 
bers and losses, 345. 

Brock, Francena Howe : 67. 

Brotherton field (Chickamau- 
ga) : 178. 

Brotherton house (Chickamau- 
ga) : 175, 360, 363. 

Brown, Albert G. : 278. 

Brown, Gov. Joseph : 293. 

Brown, Orderly : 149. 

Brown Co. (Ind.) : 54, 132. 

Buchanan, Pres. James : 27, 

Buckner, Gen. Simon B. : 169, 

Buell, Gen. Don Carlos : his de- 
partment merged into De- 
partment of the Mississippi, 
45 J appointed to command of 
left wing of Halleck's army, 
45 ; his advance to east Ten- 
nessee, 46; distrust of in the' 
North, 47; reorganizes army 
at Louisville, 99; marches in 
pursuit of Bragg, 100; su- 
perseded by Rosecrans, 101 ; 
value of his discipline, 102; 
hostility of Halleck to, 102; 
criticisms of his military 
abilities, 102-3 ; his timely 
arrival at Shiloh, 103. See 
Army of the Cumberland; 
Battles of Perryville and 

Bull Gap (Tenn.) : 257. 

Bull Run: first battle of, 13, 

15, 16, 31, 35- 

Bull Run : second battle of, 45. 

Bunker Hill, battle of: num- 
bers and losses, 343. 

Burnside, Gen. Ambrose E. : 
supersedes McClellan in com- 
mand of Army of the Poto- 
mac, 124; is superseded by 
Hooker, 124; his contro- 
versy with Halleck, 160. See 
Battles of Fredericksburg, 



Roanoke Island ; Knoxville, 
siege of. 

Butler, Gen. Benjamin F. : 271. 

"Butternuts" of Indiana and 
Ohio : 130, 136. 

Calhoun (Tenn.) : 266. 

Camden, battle of: numbers 
and losses, 346. 

Cameron, Simon: 15, 16, 25. 

Camp fires : 75. 

Camp guards : 62. 

Camp, life in : laying out 
camp, 56; tents, 56-7; dog- 
tents, 57; shebangs, 57; 
daily routine of camp life, 
58; roll-call, 58; rations, 58; 
cooking, 59, 60; exchanges 
at picket stations, 59; drills 
and inspections, 61 ; dress 
parade, 61 ; close of day du- 
ties, 61; camp guard, 62; 
picket, 62 ; pay day, 63 ; mail, 
64 ; newspapers in the army, 
65 ; literature in the army, 
65 ; the sutler, 66 ; amuse- 
ments, 66; gambling, 66; 
drunkenness, 67 ; hospitals, 
67; contrabands, 69. 

Camp, March and Battle: 
Chap. Ill, pp. 56-96. 

Campbell Hospital : 67. 

Campbell's Station CTenn.) : 

Canby, Gen. Edward R. : 311. 

Cannon balls : danger of being 
hit by, 89. 

Carrick's Ford: battle of, 13. 

Catholic Sisters of Mercy: 68. 

Catlett's Gap (Ga.) : 168. 

Catoosa Springs (Ga.) : 300. 

Cedar Creek, battle of : num- 
bers and losses, 349. 

Champion Hill, battle of: 
numbers and losses, 348. 

Chancellorsville, battle of: 126, 
366 ; numbers and losses, 348. 

Chandler, Matthew: 265, 332. 

Chandler, Senator Zachariah: 

Chantilly, battle of: numbers 
and losses, 348. 

Charging a battery: 79. 

Charging breastworks : 79. 

Charleston, siege of (in Rev.) : 
numbers and losses, 345. 

Charlcstoii'n (Tenn.) : 266, 267. 

Charlotte, battle of: numbers 
and losses, 346. 

Chase, Salmon P : 18, 42, 43. 

Chattahoochee river : 305. 

Chattanooga (Tenn.) : 156, 
157. 15S. 159, 160, 161, 162, 
164, 167, 168, 170, 174, 186, 
197, 198, 203, 204, 212, 213, 
242, 243, 244, 250, 251, 256, 
267, 296, 297, 29S, 308, 313, 
333, 364; revisited in 1899, 

Chattanooga, Campaign and the 
Battle of Chickamauga . 
Chap. VII, pp. 156-209. See 
Chattanooga, Siege and Bat- 
tles of. 

Chattanooga, battles of: num- 
bers and losses, 348. See 
Chattanooga, Siege and Bat- 
tles of. 

Chattanooga creek (Tenn.) 


Chattanooga, Siege and Battles 
of : Chap. VIII, pp. 210-241 , 
establishment of Federal 
lines and fortifications after 
battle of Chickamauga, 210; 
surrounding of town by 
Bragg's army, 211; difficulty 
of getting supplies, 211; 
short rations, 212; visit _ ot 
Jerterson Davis, 212 ; critical 
situation -of Federal army, 
212; Gen. Thomas's reply tc 
Grant's message, 213 ; Fed- 
eral garrison harassed by 
Confederate batteries and 
sharpshooters, 213; playing 



of "Dixie," 213; coming of 
Gen. Hooker, 214; Gen. 
Rosecrans superseded by 
Gen. Thomas, 214; arrival of 
Gen. Grant, 215; prepara- 
tions for Federal advance, 
215-16; Bragg sends Long- 
street to East Tennessee, 
216; Grant's order to Thom- 
as to attack Missionary 
Ridge issued and recalled, 
216; arrival of Gen. Sher- 
man, 217; Grant's proposed 
plan of battle, 217; capture 
of Orchard Knob, 218; Sher- 
man's attack on north end of 
Missionary Ridge, 219 ; 
Hooker's attack on Lookout 
Mountain, 220; repulse of 
Sherman, 221 ; Grant's or- 
ders for simultaneous ad- 
vance on Nov. 25 of troops 
of Sherman, Thomas and 
Hooker, 221-2; Federal and 
Confederate movements dur- 
ing forenoon of Nov. 25, 
222; comparative strength of 
opposing armies, 223-4 ! 
character of Missionary 
Ridge and its defenses, 224; 
critical situation of Gen. 
Sherman, 225 ; Grant orders 
assault of ridge by Thomas's 
troops, 225 ; only a demon- 
stration to relieve Sherman 
intended, 226; assault by the 
troops of Army of the Cum- 
berland begun, 227; rifle pits 
at base of ridge taken, 227 ; 
without further orders troops 
begin ascent of the ridge, 
228; the crest of the ridge 
taken, 230; Bragg's retreat, 
230; erroneous explanations 
of supposed small Federal 
losses, 231-2; desperate and 
heroic fighting of assaulting 
troops, 232; modifications of 

Grant's original plan of bat- 
tle, 233 ; Grant underesti- 
mated Thomas and Army of 
the Cumberland, 233 ; num- 
bers and losses, 234-6; con- 
troversy as to whether 
Grant's order for the assault 
contemplated the storming of 
the ridge or only the taking 
of the rifle pits at the base, 
236-240; the part taken by 
Wood's division and the 79th 
Ind., 240; present appear- 
ance of battle-fields about 
Chattanooga, 358-9, 36i~3- 

Chattanooga National Ceme- 
tery: 361. 

Chattanooga Valley (Tenn.) : 

Cheat river (W Va.) : 13. 

Cheatham, Gen. Benjamin F : 

Chemung (N. Y.), battle of: 
numbers and losses, 345. 

Cherry Valley massacre : num- 
bers and losses, 345. 

Chicago (Ills.) : 283. 

Chickamauga, battle of: diffi- 
culties preceding, 156, 157, 
158; the advance to Tullaho- 
ma, 157: movements preced- 
ing occupation of Chattanoo- 
ga, 158-159; vain appeals of 
Rosecrans to Washington au- 
thorities for aid, 159-161 ; ad- 
vance from Tullahoma to 
Chattanooga, 161 ; evacuation 
of Chattanooga by Bragg, 
162 ; historical accounts of 
the battle, 163 ; movements of 
Federal army after evacua- 
tion of Chattanooga, 164; 
Halleck's plans, 165 ; the dan- 
ger discovered by Halleck 
and Rosecrans, 165-6 ; 

Bragg's situation and plans, 
166-7 ; critical situation of 
Army of the Cumberland, 



167-8; how Bragg and his 
subordinates neglected their 
opportunity, 168-170; Bragg's 
. attempt to cut off Rosecrans 
from retreat to Chattanooga, 
1 70- 1 ; Bragg's re-enforce- 
ments, 170; efforts of Rose- 
crans to concentrate his 
army, 17 1-2; position of Fed- 
eral and Confederate troops 
on morning of Sept. 19, 
172-4; each commander ig- 
norant of position of the 
other, 173-4; opening of the 
battle, 174-5; the fighting on 
the 19th, 175-7; the position 
of the Federal and Confed- 
erate troops on morning of 
the 20th, 178-9; stripping the 
right of the Federal army to 
reenforce the left, 179-80; 
position and danger of Fed- 
eral right, 180-1 ; opening of 
battle on morning of 20th, 
181 ; attack on Federal left, 
181-2; the break in the Fed- 
eral right and how it was 
caused, 183-6 ; Rosecrans 
narrowly escapes capture, 
goes to Chattanooga and or- 
ders Thomas to assume com- 
mand, 185-6 ; narrow escape 
of Federal army from an- 
nihilation, 186-7 ! the Con- 
federate attack on Snodgrass 
Hill and its repulse, 188-91 ; 
Confederates gain position in 
rear of the hill, 191 ; the 
coming of Gen. Granger, 
192 ; charge of Whitaker and 
Mitchell's brigades, 193; con- 
tinued Confederate assaults 
on Snodgrass Hill and their 
repulse, 193-5 I Federal army 
retires to Rossville, 196; 
causes of the disaster to the 
Federal army, 197-200 ; vin- 
dication of men of 20th and 

21st corps, 201-2; numbers 
and losses, 204-9, 348, 352; 
present appearance of battle- 
field, 359-361; 363-4- 

Chickamauga creek (Ga.) : 173, 
174, 179, 217, 221. 

Chickamauga Memorial Asso- 
ciation : 357. 

Chickamauga and Chattanooga 
National Military Park : 
origin of plan of, 356; Fed- 
eral legislation for, 357 ; di- 
mensions of park, 357-8; 
present appearance of old 
battle-fields, 358-9 ; monu- 
ments and markers, 360-1. 

Christian Commission : 67. 

Christinas in the army: 252. 

Cincinnati (O.) : 98. 

Cincinnati Commercial: 65, 

Cincinnati Gazette: 65. 

Clay, Henry : 5. 

Cleburne, Gen. Patrick R. : 273, 
2 75> 3 l 6> 3 l 9> memorial on 
arming negroes, 273, 280; his 
death, 316. 

Cleveland (Tenn.) : 249, 250, 
265, 267. 

Cloud house (Chickamauga) 
179, 200. 

Coffee: as medium of ex- 
change, 64. 

Colclazer, O. M. : 260. 

Cold Harbor, battle of: 86; 
numbers and losses, 348. 

Columbia (Tenn.) : 156, 314, 

Committee on Conduct of the 

War : 22, 23, 26. 
Concord, battle of: numbers 

and losses, 343. 
Confederacy, southern : See 

South, The. 
Confederate money : 64. 
Confederate "yell": 91. 
Contrabands: 69. 
Cooking in the army: 59, 60. 



Cooper, Maj. George E. : 303. 
Corinth (Miss.) : capture of, 

Cowards, constitutional : 93. 
Cowpens, battle of: numbers 

and losses, 346. 
Crab Orchard (Ky.) : 100. 
Crawfish Spring (Chickamau- 

ga) : 172, 173, 360, 363. 
Crawfish Spring road (Chicka- 

mauga) : 188. 
Crittenden, John J. : 52. 
Crittenden, Gen. Thomas L. : 

99, 101, 109, 164, 165, 186, 

198, 214. 
Cromwell, Oliver : 27. 
Cumberland, Army of: See 

Army of the Cumberland. 
Cumberland, Department of : 

214, 259. 
Cumberland Gap (Tenn.) : 47, 

102, 243, 245. 
Cumberland mountains: 158, 

161, 162. 
Cumberland river : 100, 135. 
Curtis, Gen. S. R. : 41. 

Dalton (Ga.) : 164, 165, 273, 


Dana, Charles A. : 187, 239. 

Danbury, battle of : numbers 
and losses, 344. 

Dandridge (Tenn.) : 246, 258. 

Dangers in battle : 89. 

Davis, Jefferson : 32, 132, 212, 
253, 276, 304, 305, 309; his 
egotism, 38; his propensity 
to boast, 38; divulging Con- 
federate plans in his speeches, 
38-9; visit to Gen. Hood, 39; 
visit to Bragg during siege 
of Chattanooga, 212; views 
on question of arming ne- 
groes, 277; flees from Rich- 
mond, 282; his financial the- 
ories, 286-7; becomes un- 
popular in the South, 292. 

Davis, Gen. Jefferson C. : 98, 

Davis, Theodore R. : 241. 

Decatur (Ala.) : 307, 309. 

Democrats in army: 51, 127; 
Douglas Democrats, 51. 

Dennison, Gov. William : 19. 

Deserters: frequency of deser- 
tions in 1863, 127, 131, 132, 
137, 141 ; how protected in 
North, 131-2; letters to sol- 
diers encouraging, 131 ; ex- 
ecution of a deserter, 137 ; 
proportion of regulars and 
volunteers, 340 ; many wrong- 
fully so reported, 340. 

Developing the enemy : 77. 

Diary, extracts from, 139-155; 

Dick, Col. George : 95. 

Diogenes: 262. 

Disease in army : 68, 105, 137, 
141 ; what diseases most 
prevalent, 339; total deaths 
from, 339; deaths from in 
Co. I, 79th Ind., 339. 

Dodge, Gen. Granville M..: 298. 

Dog-tents : 57, 145, 148. 

Douglas, Stephen A. : 50 ; loy- 
alty of him and his follow- 
ers, 51. 

Draft: opposition to in North, 
131 ; number of drafted men 
in actual service, 340. 

Dress parade : 61. 

Drills: 61. 

Drunkenness in army : 67. 

Dry Creek valley (Ga.) : 199. 

Duck river: 156, 158, 314, 315. 

Dug Gap (Ga.) : 168. 

Dumont, Col. Ebenezer : 10. 

Dyer field (Chickamauga) : 
'185, 186, 187, 188. 

East Tennessee : 54, 58, 72, 
102, 159, 167, 192, 243, 245, 
246, 247, 249, 258, 259; char- 
acter of country, 243, 266; 



primitive character of peo- 
ple, 245. 

East Tennessee Campaign, 
The : Chap. IX, pp. 242-267 ; 
beginning:, 242 ; hardships, 
242-4; scarcity of clothing, 
243 ; difficulty of getting pro- 
visions, 243 ; continual march- 
ins-, 243 ; a little side cam- 
paign, 246-9. 

Eaton, John : 149. 

Edinburg (Ind.) : 132. 

Elliott, Gen. Washington L. : 

Ellis, Capt. William B. : 262. 

Emancipation proclamation : 
foreshadowed in September, 
1862, 128 ; issued January 1, 
i86r 128; hostility to in 
North, 127; hostility to of 
soldiers in Federal armies, 
127; chansre of attitude in 
North and South, 268; proc- 
lamation for logical war 
measure, 269. 

End of an Unimportant Mili- 
tary Career : Chap. XIII, pp. 

England: excitement over 
Trent affair, 22. 

Eutaw Springs, battle of : num- 
bers and losses, 346. 

Evansville (Ind.) : 52. 

Fair Oaks, battle of: numbers 
and losses, 348. 

Falmouth (Va.) : 151. 

Farragut, Admiral David G. : 

Fishing Creek, battle of; num- 
bers and losses, 346. 

Fitz-Jerrold, Mrs. : 252. 

Five Forks, battle of: 365. 

Flanking: 78, 88. 

Flat Creek valley (Tenn.) : 

Florence (Ala.) : 310, 311. 

Footc, Commodore Andrew 
H.: 41- 

Foraging: 74. 

Forrest, Gen. Nathan B. : 47, 
310, 311, 314. 

Fort Boone, battle' of : num- 
bers and losses, 345. 

Fort Clinton, battle of: num- 
bers and losses, 344. 

Fort Donelson, capture of: 31, 
41, 48. 

Fort Griswold, battle of : num- 
bers and losses, 346. 

Fort Henry, capture of : 41. 

Fort Lafayette : 23. 

Fort Mercer, battle of : num- 
bers and losses, 344. 

Fort Mifflin, battle of: num- 
bers and losses, 344. 

Fort Ninety-Six, battle of: 
numbers and losses, 346. 

For t Schuyler, battle of : num- 
bers and losses, 344. 

Fort Sumter : firing on, 2, 3, 

Fort Warren : 22. 

Fort Washington, battle of : 
numbers and losses, 344. 

Fort Wood : 218, 219, 358. 

Fortified lines : advancing 
against, 88; futility of at- 
tacking by direct assault, 86, 
301. See Breastworks. 

Fortress Monroe : 33. 

Font, Fred: 254. 

Fox, Lt.-Col. William F. : 208, 

343, 3Si- 
Frankfort (Ky.) : 100. 
Franklin, Gen. William B. : 25. 
Franklin (Ind.) : 2, 8, 54, 132, 

334; raising first company in, 

Franklin (Tenn.) : 314, 315, 

Franklin, battle of: 54, 312, 

318-19; numbers and losses, 




Franklin road (Stone's River) : 

"Franklin Tigers" : 9. 
Fredericksburg, battle 1 of: 124, 

126, 154, 365; numbers and 

losses, 348. 
Fremont, Gen. John C. : 44. 
Further Development of the 

Great Conflict: Chap. II, pp. 


Gadsden (Ala.) : 305. 
Gaines's Mill, battle of : num- 
bers and losses, 348. 
Gallatin (Tenn.) : 100. 
Gambling in army : 66. 
Garesche, Lt. Col. Julius P. : 


Gamett, Gen. Robert S. : 13. 

Gaylesville (Ala.) : 305. 

Georgia, state : 40, 87, 165, 166, 
170, 292, 307, 308, 309, 313, 
361, 362. 

Germantown, battle of : num- 
bers and losses, 344. 

Gettysburg, battle of : charge of 
Pickett's division, 120, 350; 
effect of in North and South, 
283 ; numbers and losses, 348, 
350, 353- 

Gilbert, Gen. Charles C. : 99. 

Glasgow (Ky.) : 100. 

Glass's Mill (Chickamauga) : 

Glenn, widow, house (Chicka- 
mauga) : 172, 177, 178, 360. 

Gordon, Gen. John B. : 94. 

Gosney, Richard M. : 267. 

Goldsborough (N. C.) : 32. 

Goldsborough, Commodore 

Louis M. : 41. 

Grand reviews at Louisville: 

97, 105- „ J 

Granger, Gen. Gordon: 199, 
226, 236, 237, 238, 242 ; at bat- 
tles of Chickamauga, 192-3; 
appointed to command of 4th 
corps, formed by consolida- 

tion of 20th and 21 st corps, 
214; superseded by Gen. 
Howard, 298. 

Grant, Gen. Ulysses S. : listens 
to Lincoln's military plans, 
26; his opinion of Stanton, 
28-9; ill treatment by Hal- 
leck, 31 ; capture of Fort 
Henry, 41 ; of Fort Donelson, 
41 ; temporarily shelved by 
Halleck, 45 ; dissatisfaction 
with in North after battle of 
Shiloh, 48; begins to be fa- 
mous, 48; Lincoln's friend- 
ship for, 49; regret for as- 
sault at Cold Harbor, 86; in- 
curs displeasure of Halleck, 
126; appointed to command 
of Military Division of the 
Mississippi, 214; underesti- 
mates Thomas and Army of 
the Cumberland, 233 ; ap- 
pointed Lieut-General, 297 ; 
appointed general-in-chief, 
297; first views of Sherman's 
proposed march to the sea, 
307-8 ; dissatisfaction with 
Thomas at Nashville, 321-2; 
strength of his army in Rich- 
mond campaign, 337-8. See 
Army of the Potomac ; Rich- 
mond Campaign ; Shiloh ; 
Siege and Battles of Chatta- 

Greeley, Horace: at first fa- 
vored peaceable secession, 2; 
correspondence with Lincoln 
on emancipation proclama- 
tion, 128. 

Greenbacks: during the war, 

Green Spring, battle of: num- 
bers and losses, 346. 

Grider, Col. Benjamin C. : 119. 

Guilford, Ct. H, battle of: 
numbers and losses, 346. 

Gulf of Mexico: 306. 



Halleck, Gen. Henry W. : ap- 
pointed general-in-chief, 27; 
estimate of his character, 30- 
34 ; McClellan's opinion of, 
30 ; his ill treatment of 
Grant, 31; of Sherman, 32; 
appointed to command of De- 
partment of Virginia, 32; of 
Department of the Mississip- 
pi, 45 ; his advance on Cor- 
inth, 46 ; his orders to Pope, 
46; hostility to Buell, 102; 
outwitted by Grant, 125 ; 
hostility to Rosecrans, 126; 
seeks to shift blame for 
Rosecrans's defeat at Chicka- 
mauga on Burnside, 160; an- 
swer to Rosecrans's appeal 
tor aid in Chattanooga cam- 
paign, 160- 1 ; his plans prior 
to battle of Chickamauga, 
165 ; discovers perilous situa- 
tion of Army of the Cumber- 
land, 166; his ignorance of 
the battle of Chickamauga, 
203 ; is instrumental in with- 
holding Grant's order for re- 
moval of Thomas, 322. 

Hall's Ford (Chickamauga) : 

Hampton Roads : 41. 

Hancock, Columbus : 254, 265. 

Hanging Rock (S. C), battle 
of : numbers and losses, 346. 

Hanna, Bayless W. : 132. 

Hardee, Gen. Wm. J. : 107, no, 

Harlem Plains, battle of: num- 
bers and losses, 344. 

Harper's Weekly: 241; its in- 
fluence in the war, 3-4; pre- 
dictions as to coming gen- 
erals, 123. 

Harpeth river : 318, 319. 

Harrison's Landing: 43. 

Hendricks, Thomas A.: 51. 

Hermitage (Tenn.) : 101. 

Herriot, Capt. George : 149. 

Hiawassee river: 251, 266. 

Higginson, Col. T. W. : 271. 

Hill, Gen. Daniel H. : 161, 168, 

Hilton Head (S. C) : 270. 

Hindman, Gen. Thomas C. : 
168, 169, 187, 188, 194. 

Hobkirk's Hill, battle of: num- 
bers and losses, 346. 

Holt, Joseph (Judge Adv. 
Gen.) : 130. 

Homesickness in army : 68. 

Hood, Gen. John B. : super- 
sedes Johnston in command 
of Army of the Tennessee, 
304; relieved of command of 
that army, 324. See Hood's 
Invasion of Tennessee; At- 
lanta Campaign. 

Hood's Invasion of Tennessee: 
Chap. XII, pp. 3057329- Jef- 
ferson Davis visits Hood, 
305 ; Hood's movements after 
surrender of Atlanta, 305 ; 
Sherman's plan of marching 
to the sea, 305-6; Grant's 
view of it, 307-8; Thomas 
left to take care of Hood, 
309; Hood's plans, 309-10; 
the troops left for Thomas, 
311-13; Schofield given com- 
mand of troops in front, 314; 
Hood's attempt to cut off 
Schofield's retreat to Nash- 
ville, 314; narrow escape of 
Schofield's troops at Spring 
Hill, 315-17; battle of Frank- 
lin, 318-19; Schofield's army 
arrives at Nashville, 319; 
Hood's army also arrives, 
319; authorities at Washing- 
ton alarmed, 319; Grant 
urges Thomas to give battle 
at once, 320; impossibility of 
doing so, 320; the pressure 
brought to bear on Thomas, 
321-2 ; his firmness of pur- 
pose, 321 ; orders given to re- 



lieve Thomas of command, 
322; the battle of Nashville, 
323-4; fortunate results of 
victory, 326; estimate of 
Thomas's character, 326-8 ; 
Badeau's aspersions on 
Thomas, 328. 

Hooker, Gen. Joseph : 86, 127, 
150, 151, 152, 153, 215, 219, 
222, 224, 226, 236, 265; su- 
persedes Burnside in com- 
mand of Army of the Poto- 
mac, 124; is superseded by 
Meade, 125; joins Army of 
the Cumberland in command 
of nth and 12th army corps, 
214; the "battle among the 
clouds," 220; takes command 
of 20th corps formed by con- 
solidation of nth and 12th 
corps, 298'. See battles of 
Chattanooga and Chancel- 

Hospitals: general, 67, 68; 

- field, 68, 332. 

House Mountain (Term.) : 244. 

Howard, Gen. Oliver O. : 86, 
242; supersedes Granger in 
command of 4th army corps, 
265, 298. 

Howe, Capt. Eliakim : 1. 

Howe, Capt. Nathan: 1. 

Howe, Otis : 1. 

Howe, Col. Thomas : 1. 

Hubbardton, battle of: num- 
bers and losses, 344. 

Hunter, Andrew : 277, 279. 

Hunter, Gen. David: 45, 271. 

Hunter, Walter : 140. 

Huntzinger, Lieut. Wm. H. : 

Hurlbut, Gen. Stephen A.: 

Illinois, state: 65, 127, 129; 
treasonable political orders 
there in 1863, 130; condition 

in i86r 130; 100-day men 
tendered by, 284. 
Indiana Sanitary Commission : 


Indiana, state: 5, 6, 50, 53, 65, 
98, 127, 129, 136, 260, 336; 
early opposition in to Lin- 
coln, 1 ; troops furnished in 
Civil War, 6; effect of Lin- 
coln's first call for troops, 8 
per cent, of fighting popula- 
tion in Federal armies, 8 
lack of preparation for war 
20; situation there in 1862 
50 ; vote of Presidential elec- 
tion in i860, 50; early hos- 
tility there to prosecution of 
war, 51 ; Confederate inva- 
sion of in 1862, 52 ; disloyal 
political orders there, 130-2; 
legislature of refuses to re- 
ceive Gov. Morton's message 
and t-anks Gov. Seymour for 
his, 132 ; protests of Indiana 
soldiers in the field to legis- 
lature in 1863, 134; raided 
by Gen. John Morgan, 135 ; 
Indiana "Butternuts," 136; 
condition in 1863, 141 ; pub- 
lic sentiment there' in 1864, 
283; 100-day troops tendered 
by, 284; muster rolls pub- 
lished by, 336. 

Indianapolis (Ind.) : 2, 6, 7, 9, 
10, 16, 51, 52, 53, 54, 97, 283. 

Iowa, state : tender of 100-day 
men by, 284. 

Israel, John : 265. 

Jackson, President Andrew : 

Jacobs, William : 155. 
James river : 43. 
Jamestown Ford, battle 1 of: 

numbers and losses, 346. 
Jays Mill (Chickamauga) : 173, 

Jeleff, Frank: 149. 



Johnson, Gen. Richard W. : 

Johnson, Dr. Samuel: 261. 

Johnson Co. (Ind.) : 2, 54, 132. 

Johnston, Gen. Albert Sidney: 

Johnston, Gen. Joseph E. : 24, 
32, 43, 79, 84, 167, 170, 273, 
276, 297, 298; supersedes 
Bragg in command of Army 
of Tennessee, 297; is super- 
seded by Hood, 304. See 
Atlanta Campaign. 

Kansas, state: 271. 

Kelly, Col. Benjamin F. : 10. 

Kelly field (Chickamauga) : 
172, 179. 

Kellv house (Chickamauga) : 
178, 360. 

Kenesaw Mountain (Ga.) : 55, 

Kenesaw Mountain, battle of: 
86, 95, 299, 301, 333; num- 
bers and losses, 302. 

Kentucky, state : 4, 40, 47, 50, 
53, 100, 101, 104, 105, 243, 
310, 319, 362; invasion of by 
Bragg, 52; situation there in 

1862, 52; military operations 
there in 1862, 98; march 
through in 1862, 104; dis- 
loyal political orders there in 

1863, 130. 

Kettle Creek, battle of: num- 
bers and losses, 345. 

Kilpatrick, Gen. Judson: 311. 

King, Col. : 19. 

Kings Mountain, battle of: 
numbers and losses, 346. 

Kirk, Gen. Edward N. : in, 

Kneiler, Col. Frederick: 54, 
97, 115, 182, 185, 228, 229. 

Knights of the Golden Circle: 
130, 132. 

Knoxville (Tenn.) : 160, 242, 

245, 250, 251, 254, 255, 257, 

265, 266, 267. 
Knoxville, siege of: 242. 
Knoxville Whig: 251. 

Lafayette (Ga.) : 165, 166, 178, 

305, 309- 

Lafayette road (Chickamau- 
ga) : 167, 170, 171, 172, 173, 
174, 176, 177, 178, 181. 

Lander, Col. Frederick W. : 10. 

Lavergne (Tenn.) : 106, 117, 
122, 142. 

Lawrence, Henry C. : 241. 

Lee, Maj. Pollok B. : 181, 182. 

Lee, Gen. Robert E. : 84, 124, 
125, 129, 159, 166, 168, 283, 
304, 365, 367; views on ques- 
tion of arming negroes, 277, 
278, 280. 

Lee and Gordon's Mill (Chick- 
amauga) : 169, 172, 174, 360, 


Lenoir Station (Tenn.) : 266. 

Lexington, battle of : numbers 
and losses, 343. 

Light Brigade: percentage of 
losses in charge at Balaklava, 

Lincoln, President Abraham: 
election as President, 1 ; 
passes through Indianapolis, 
2; calls for troops, 2, 52; 
Gov. Magoffin's response to 
call on Kentucky, 4; efforts 
to familiarize himself with 
military movements, 25 ; 
Stanton's early opinions of 
and subsequent relations to, 
27, 29; McClellan's letter to, 
36 ; issues proclamation for 
special Thanksgiving in 1862, 
42; clings to McClellan, 43; 
his friendship for Grant, 49; 
his letter to Horace Greeley, 
128 ; issue of emancipation 
proclamation, 128, 129; op- 
position to of radical ele- 



ment in Republican party, 
128; opposition majorities 
against in fall of 1862, 129; 
writes Rosecrans a kind let- 
ter, 160. 

Literature in the army : 65, 
253, 259, 263, 264. 

Little river : 250. 

Little Tennessee river : 246, 
247, 249, 250. 

Logan, Gen. John A. : 298, 301, 
322, 326. 

Long Island, battle of: num- 
bers and losses, 344. 

Long roll : effect of on army, 

Longstreet, Gen. James : 39, 
76, 179, 181, 188, 193, 199, 
209, 216, 242, 243, 246, 258, 
266, 364. 

Lookout Creek (Tenn.) : 220. 

Lookout Mountain (Tenn.) : 
158, 162, 168, 210, 211, 212, 
213, 220, 221, 222, 225, 333, 
356, 357; appearance in 1899, 
358, 361, 362. 

Lookout Mountain, battle of : 
See Chattanooga, Siege and 
Battles of. 

Lookout Valley (Tenn.) : 212, 

Loomis, : 252. 

Loudon (Tenn.) : 265, 266. 

Louisville (Ky.) : 47, 52, 53, 
64, 67. 97, 98, 100, 102, 105, 
137. ML 158. 

Lying still under artillery fire: 

Lytle station (Chickamauga) : 

Macon (Ga.) : 40. 
Magoffin, Gov. Beriah : 4, 50. 
Malingering in army: 69. 
Manassas, battle of: numbers 

and losses, 348. 
Marlborough (Mass.) : 1. 
Mail, receiving in army: 64. 

March, the : breaking camp, 
69; baggage, 70; what tlu 
soldiers carried, 70; the 
start, 71 ; picturesque ap- 
pearance of marching col- 
umn, 71 ; distance traveled 
per day, 71 ; discomforts on, 
72; swearing mule-drivers, 
72 ; how monotony of march 
relieved, 73; foraging, 73-4; 
going into camp at night, 75 ; 
camp-fires, 75 ; camping in 
enemy's country, 104. 

Maryland, state : 40. 

Maryville (Tenn.) : 246, 254. 
255. 256. 

Mason, James M. : seizure of, 

Massachusetts, state: 271. 

Meade, Gen. George: 125. 

Memmingcr, Christopher G : 

Memphis and Charleston rail- 
road : 47. 

Mcrrimac: destruction of by 
Monitor, 41. 

Mexican War : numbers and 
losses, 341. 

Militia: in the North prior to 
war, 18. 

Mill Spring: battle of, 41, 104. 

Miller, Col. John F : 120. 

Mine explosions : 89. 

Mine Run, battle of; numbers 
and losses, 348. 

Minix, William: 155. 

Minty, Gen. Robert H. G. : 

Missionary Ridge: 159, 210, 
211, 212, 213, 217, 219, 221, 
222, 226, 227, 228, 233, 234, 
356, 357. 35§, 361. 

Missionary Ridge : battle of. 
See Chattanooga, Siege and 
Battles of. 

Mississippi, Department of : 
creation of, 45. 



Mississippi, Military Division 
of: 214, 297. 

Mississippi i river: 41,310. 

Mississippi Valley : 50. 

Missouri river : 312. 

Missouri, state : 40, 271, 306, 
308, 312; disloyal political 
orders there in 1863, 130. 

Mobile (Ala.) : 160, 297. 

Money during the war: 
greenbacks, 64; Confederate, 
64; coffee as medium of ex- 
change, 64. 

Monitor: destruction by of the 
Merrimac, 41. 

Monmouth: battle of, 344. 

Montreal, battle of: numbers 
and losses, 343. 

Moores Creek, battle of; num- 
bers and losses, 343. 

Morgan, Gen. John : 6, 47, 135, 
136, 160. See Morgan Raid. 

Morgan Raid in Indiana and 
Ohio: 6, 135, 283. 

Morgautozcn (Tenn.) : 250. 

Morristozvn (Tenn.) : 245, 258. 

Morton, Gov. Oliver P : 16, 
18, 42 ; governor of Indiana 
at outbreak of war, his sa- 
gacity and energy, 5 ; power 
as a political speaker, 6; care 
for Indiana soldiers, 7; kind- 
ness to Confederate prison- 
ers, 7 ; his vigilance, 7 ; re- 
sponse to first call for troops, 
8; raising and forwarding 
troops in 1862, 53; legisla- 
ture of 1863 refuses to re- 
ceive his message, 132 ; passes 
bill to strip Morton of mili- 
tary power, 134. 

Mossy Creek Station (Tenn.) : 
257^ 260. 

Mount Vernon (Ky.) : 100. 

Munfordsville (Ky.) : 98. 

Murfreesboro (Tenn.) : 101, 

106, 107, 109, 110, 117, 121, 
125, 136, 137. 138, 139, 156, 

313 ; camp life there in 1863, 


Musgrovcs Mills, battle of : 
numbers and losses, 346. 

Musket balls : danger of being 
hit by in battle, 89. 

McAfee Church (Chickamau- 
ga) : 173, 179, 192. 

McClellan, Gen. George B. : 
succeeds Gen. Scott as gen- 
eral-in-chief, 16 ; takes charge 
of defenses at Washington, 
15 ; his inspection of Ohio 
state arsenal, 19; work of or- 
ganizing the Army of the 
Potomac, 20, 35 ; deprived of 
authority as general-in-chief, 
26: his despatch to Stanton, 
35; his letter to Lincoln, 36; 
estimate of his character, 34- 
7; hostility of Stanton and 
Chase, 43 ; Lincoln clings to, 
43 ; the Peninsular cam- 
paign, 43-4; again takes 
charge of defenses at Wash- 
ineton, 45 ; distrusted by the 
North, 47; superseded in 
command of Army of the 
Potomac by Burnside, 124. 

McClernand, Gen. John A. : 45. 

McClure, Alexander K. : 49. 

McCook, Gen. Alexander 
McD. : 99, 109, no, 164, 165, 

171, 183, 186, 198. 
McCullagh, J. B. : 65. 
McDowell, Gen. Irvin: 25, 44. 
McFarland's Gap (Tenn.) : 

196, 210. 
McGee's Ford (Tenn.): 246; 

foraging expedition to, 246-9. 
McLemore's Cove (Ga.) : 166, 

172, 174. 

McMinnville (Tenn.) : 59, 156, 

McPheeters, Surgeon J. G. : 

McPherson, Gen. James B. : 

298, 301. 



Nashville (Tenn.) : 31, 67, 101, 
102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 117, 
118, 142, 156, 157, i 5 8, 211, 
214, 252, 307, 309, 311, 312, 
313, 314, 319, 320, 322; camp 
life there, 104, 105; mortal- 
ity there, 105. 

Nashville, battle of: 322-4; 
importance of victory, 326; 
numbers and losses, 324, 349. 

Nashville turnpike (Stone's 
River) : 107, 108, 109, 112. 

Negley, Gen. James S. : 186, 

Negro Soldiers in the Civil 
War: Chap. X, pp. 268-282; 
changes of sentiment in 
North and South on ques- 
tions of emancipation and 
arming of slaves, 268; value 
of slave labor to Confeder- 
acy, 269; emancipation proc- 
lamation, 269; opposition in 
North to enrolling negroes 
in Federal armies, 270; en- 
rollment of negro soldiers in 
northern armies, 270-1 ; Fed- 
eral legislation on subject, 
272; early opposition in Fed- 
eral armies to arming the ne- 
groe_s, 272; vindictive feel- 
ing in South against Federal 
enlistment of negro troops, 
272; change of sentiment in 
the _ South on question of 
arming negroes, 273 ; pro- 
ceedings of Confederate 
Army of Tennessee in 1864 
on Cleburne's memorial, 273 ; 
objects set forth in the me- 
morial, 274-5 ; the memorial 
suppressed by Confederate 
authorities, 276; continued 
agitation in the South of 
nuestion of arming the ne- 
groes, 276; Jefferson Davis 
and Gen. Lee finally become 
converted to the idea, 277; 

Confederate legislation on 
subject, 278-280; defects in 
legislation, 280-1 ; legislation 
too late, 281 ; failure to get 
negro volunteers and draft 
ordered, 282 ; collapse of 
Confederacy stops the draft, 

Negroes: in camp, 69; as sol- 
diers, 265. See Contrabands ; 
Negro Soldiers. 

Nelson, Gen. William : 98. 

New England: 51. 

New Haven, battle of : num- 
bers and losses, 345. 

New Hope Church : battle of, 
86, 88, 299. 

Nezv York City: draft riots 
there in 1863, 129. 

New York, state : 129. 

New York Tribune : 65. 

New Orleans (La.): 41, 271; 
capture of, 41. 

Newburg (Ind.) : sacking of 
by Confederates, 52. 

Nezvmarket (Tenn.) : 245, 257, 
258, 260. 

Newtown, battle of: numbers 
and losses, 345. 

Neivspapers in the army: 65, 

Nickajack Trace (Tenn.) : 162. 

Night attacks : 77. 

Noddles Island, battle of: 
numbers and losses, 343. 

Norfolk (Va.) : 166. 

North, The : election of Lin- 
coln, 1 ; effect of firing on 
Fort Sumter, 2; public sen- 
timent in at beginning of 
war, 3-4; effect of Bull Run 
defeat, 15; the cry of "On 
to Richmond," 16; apparent 
that war would not blow 
over in sixty days, 16 ; Fed- 
eral government forced to 
rely on volunteer armies, 17; 
call for 500,000 volunteers, 



17; difficulty of equipping 
men, 18 ; lack of munitions 
of war, 18, 20; magnitude of 
work of organizing armies, 
20; value of McClellan's 
services in organizing, 20; 
finding generals for the ar- 
mies, 21 ; West Point offi- 
cers, 21 ; seizure of Mason 
and Slidell, 22; Seward's 
diplomacy, 22 ; investigation 
of Ball's Bluff disaster, 23, 
24; inactivity of Army of 
the Potomac, 24; resignation 
of Cameron and appointment 
of Stanton as Secretary of 
War, 25 ; Lincoln as com- 
mander-in-chief, 25 ; want of 
competent head of armies, 
26; character and influence 
of Stanton, Halleck and ilc- 
Clellan, 27-36; great success 
of northern armies in early 
part of 1862, 40-1 ; order dis- 
continuing recruiting, 42 ; 
subsequent disasters in that 
year, 43-45 ; North becomes 
distrustful of McClellan and 
Buell, 47 : hostility in North 
to Grant, 48; Sherman 
thought to be crazy, 48, 50; 
situation in Kentucky, 50; 
situation in Indiana, 50-1 ; 
President Lincoln's call in 
1862 for 300,000 volunteers, 
52 ; Gov. Morton's efforts to 
raise Indiana's quota, 53 ; 
darkest period in the war, 
123; dissatisfaction in 1863, 
126-7; opposition to eman- 
cipation and draft, 128; dis- 
satisfaction of radical element 
in Republican party, 128 ; 
slavery question in, 128 ; op- 
position majorities in fall of 
1862, 129 ; organization of 
disloyal political orders, 130- 
1 ; change of attitude of 

North on question of eman- 
cipation and arming negroes, 
268-9 ; the emancipation 
proclamation, 269; early op- 
position in North to enroll- 
ing negroes in Federal ar- 
mies, 270; Federal legisla- 
tion on subject, 271-2; or- 
ganization of Federal negro 
regiments, 271-2; number of 
men in northern armies in 
1864, 284; tender of 100-day 
men by governors of north- 
ern states, 284; public senti- 
ment and resources of the 
North at beginning of 1864, 

North Carolina, state: 41, 165, 
292, 293, 336, 362; Confed- 
erate muster rolls published 
by, 336- 

Northzvcstcrn Confederacy : 
scheme for, 51. 

Numbers and Losses : in Revo- 
lutionary War, 343-7; in 
War of 1812, 342; in Mexi- 
can War, 341 ; in Civil War, 
348-9. See Statistics. For 
losses in particular battles, 
see these titles. 

Officers in battle: 82. 

Ohio, army of. See Army, etc. 

Ohio, Department of: 214. 

Ohio river: 50, 52, 98, 135, 306, 
309, 3io, 319- 

Ohio, state: 52, 65, 127, 129, 
136; lack of preparation for 
war, 18-20 ; organization of 
disloyal political orders, 130; 
raided by Gen. John Morgan, 
!3S ! public sentiment in 1864, 
283 ; 100-day men tendered 
by, 284. 

Opdycke, Col. Emerson : 318. 

Orchard Knob (Chattanooga) : 
218, 219, 221, 223, 226, 357, 
361, 362. 



Oriskany, battle of: numbers 

and losses, 344. 
Oyler, Lt.-Col. Samuel P • 9, 

10, S3, 54, 81, 97, 140, 195, 


Packard, Marcus A. 0. : 133. 
Palmer, Gen. John M. : 214, 

Paoli, battle of: numbers and 

losses, 344. 
Parker, Maj. George W : 259. 
Paulus Hook (N. J.), battle 

of: numbers and losses, 345. 
Pay Day in army : 63. 
Pea Ridge, battle of: 41. 
Peace at any price platform at 

Chicago in 1864 : 37, 283. 
Pearson, Judge Richard M. : 


Pemberton, Gen. John C. : 125. 

Peninsular Campaign : 30, 43. 

Pennsylvania, state : 49, 129 ; 
invasion of by Gen. Lee, 125. 

Perkins, Samuel E. : 2. 

Perryville: battle of, 100; num- 
bers and losses, 348. 

Petersburg (Va.) : 166. 

Petersburg: battles of, 89; 
numbers and losses, 349. 

Philippi (Va.) : 10, 11, 12. 

Philippi, battle of: 10. 

Picket duty: 11, 150; ex- 
changes at picket stations, 59 ; 
responsibility and dangers of, 
62-3 ; courtesies between 
Federal and Confederate 
pickets, 94-5. 

Picket fs Mill, battle of: 86, 
95, 299. 

Pigeon Mountain (Ga.) : 167, 

Pikeville (Tenn.) : 60. 

Pittsburg Landing. See Shiloh. 

Poe field (Chickamauga) : 178, 

Poe house (Chickamauga) : 

Polk, Gen. Leonidas: 107, 169, 
170, 179, 181, 182, 275. 

Pope, Gen. John : appointed to 
command of Army of Vir- 
ginia, 44; his extraordinary 
address to, 44; appointed to 
command of center of Hal- 
leck's army, 45 ; his pursuit 
of Beauregard, 46. See Army 
of Virginia ; Bull Run, sec- 
ond battle. 

Poor Man's Valley (Tenn.) : 

Port Hudson : 125. 
Port Royal, battle of; numbers 

and losses, 345. 
Porter, Gen. Fitz-John : 37. 
Potomac, Army of : See Army, 

Potomac river: 15, 42. 
Price, Gen. Sterling: 41. 
Prices in Confederacy : 287. 
Princeton, battle of; numbers 

and losses, 344. 
Pulaski (Tenn.) : 314. 
Pulaski Co. (Ky.) : 104. 
Putnam, Gen. Israel : 10. 

Quaker Hill, battle of: num- 
bers and losses, 345. 

Quebec, battle of ; numbers and 
losses, 343. 

Raccoon Mountain (Ga.) : 158. 
Ransom, Capt. J. S. : 238. 
Rapidan river : 338. 
Rappahannock river: 124, 125, 


Rations in the army: 58. 
Rawlins, Gen. John A. : 320. 
Ray, Martin M. : 52. 
Rebellion: first outbreak. See 

Further Development of the 

Great Conflict. 
Rebellion records : method of 

citation, 335. 



Reconnaissance in force : 77. 

Recruiting, order discontinu- 
ing in 1862 : 42. 

Reed's bridge (Chickamauga) : 

Reid, Whitelaw: 65. 

Republican party: distrust of 
McClellan, yj; opposition of 
radical element to Lincoln, 

Resaca, battle of : 299. 

Revisiting Chattanooga and 
Chickamauga, Chap. XV, pp. 

Revolutionary War: numbers 
and losses in battles of, 343-7. 

Rich Man's Valley (Tenn.) : 


Richmond (Ky.) : battle of, 98. 

Richmond (Va.) : 16, 32, 33, 
39, 43, 84, 159, 282, 295, 297, 
338; evacuation of, 282; 
prices there during the war, 

Richmond Campaign: charac- 
ter of country traversed, 84; 
losses in, 352. See Virginia 

Ringgold (Ga.) : 165. 

Ritter, Capt. Eli F : 361, 362, 

Roanoke Island: battle of, 41. 

Robinson, Lieut. James I. : 143. 

Rocky Face Ridge, battle of: 
84, 94, 299. 

Rocky Mount (S. C), battle 
of : numbers and losses, 346. 

Rome ('Ga.) : 164. 

Rosecrans, Gen. William S. : 
appointed to command of 
Department of the Cumber- 
land, 101 ; popularity with his 
soldiers, 103 ; incurs displeas- 
ure of Halleck, 126; vain 
appeals to Washington au- 
thorities for aid in Chatta- 
nooga camoaign, 159; an- 
swers of Lincoln, Stanton 

and Halleck", 160 ; superseded 
by Gen. Thomas, 214; kindly 
feeling of soldiers of Army 
of the Cumberland, 214; es- 
timate of his character, 215. 
See battles and campaigns of 
Army of the Cumberland. 

Rossville (Ga.) : 173, 196, 199, 
200, 202, 210, 222, 225, 362. 

Rousseau, Gen. Lovell H. : 

Rutherford Creek (Tenn.) : 

Rutledge (Tenn.) : 245. 262. 

Sanitary Commission : 67. 
San Jacinto (war vessel) : 22. 
Saratoga, battle of : numbers 

and losses, 344. 
Savannah (Ga.) : 33. 
Savannah, battle of: numbers 

and losses, 345. 
Savannah, siege of (in Rev.) : 

Saxton, Gen. Rufus : 270. 
Schofield, Gen. John M. : 257, 

258, 259, 265, 298, 310, 314, 

315, 317, 322. 
Scotland: 261. 
Scott, Gen. Winfield: 15, 16, 

Scottsville (Ky.) : 100. 
Secret disloyal orders in the 

North : 130-1. 
Seddon, James A. : 276. 
Seeing Real War: Chap. IV, 

pp. 97-105. 
Selma (Ala.) : 309. 
Sequatchie Valley (Tenn.) : 

161, 162, 211. 
Seven Days' Battles : 43 ; num- 
bers and losses, 348. 
Scviervillc (Tenn.) : 254. 
Seivard. William H. : 10, 22. 
Seymour, Gov. Horatio : 129, 

130, 133- 
Shebangs: 57. 
Shelbyville (Tenn.) : 156. 



Sheppard, Wesley T.: 191, 192, 

Sheridan, Gen. Phil. H. : 90, 
116, 117, 185, 186, 199, 200, 
214, 228, 236, 237, 238, 239, 
240, 365. 

Sherman, Gen. William T. : 
definition of war, 14; Hal- 
leck's insulting treatment of, 
32-3; early prediction of 
number of soldiers required, 
50; his tactics in Atlanta 
campaign, 88, 300; appointed 
to command of Military Di- 
vision of the Mississippi, 
297; plan for march to the 
sea, 305-6 ; correspondence 
on subject with Grant, 307- 
8; starts on the march, 309. 
See Atlanta Campaign; Bat- 
tles of Chattanooga; Hood's 
Invasion of Tennessee; Shi- 

Shiloh, battle of : 41, 103 ; num- 
bers and losses, 348. 

Sill, Gen. Joshua W : 117. 

Silver Springs (Tenn.) : 101. 

Six months in Camp at Mur- 
freesboro: Chap." VI, pp. 

Skirmishers in battle: 78. 

Skulkers: 75, 92. 

Slavery question : in the North, 
16, 128; views of soldiers on, 

Slidell, John: seizure of, 22. 

Smith, Gen. Andrew J. : 45, 
306, 310, 320. 

Smith, Gen. Charles F : 31. 

Smith, Gen. Kirby: 47, 98. 

Snodgrass Hill (Chickamau- 
ga) : 76, 186, 187, 189, 190, 
191, 193, 194, 199, 201, 364. 

Snodgrass house (Chickamau- 
ga) : 187, 192, 36o-. 

Soldiers: private soldier s prep- 
aration for battle, 78; fra- 
ternal feeling between Fed- 

eral and Confederate sol- 
diers during the war, 94-6, 
366; dissatisfaction of north- 
ern with slow prosecution of 
war, 126. 156; sacrifices of 
southern, 291 ; development 
of efficiency of both Federal 
and Confederate, 355 ; brav- 
ery of those on both sides, 
365, 366; early reconciliation 
between those of North and 
South, 366. 

Somerset (Ky.) : 100, 104. 

Sons of Liberty: 130, 136, 284. 

South, The : inferiority to 
North in men and resources, 
38; great yield of political 
generals, 38; meddlesome in- 
terference of Jefferson Davis 
with Confederate generals, 
38; change of attitude of 
South on question of eman- 
cipation and arming the ne- 
groes, 268, 273; vindictive 
feeling inspired by enrolling 
negroes in Federal armies, 
272; agitation and legislation 
on enrolling negroes in Con- 
federate armies, 272-282; be- 
ginning of decline of Con- 
federacy, 283 ; condition at 
beginning of 1864, 284; Con- 
federate financial system, 
284-8; prices in the South in 
1864, 287; the funding act, 
288 ; Confederate currency, 
288; condition of agricultural 
regions, 288-9; destitution in 
South in 1864, 289; difficulty 
of raising recruits for armies, 
290 ; sweeping conscription 
acts, 290, 292; difficulty of 
providing supplies for ar- 
mies, 291 ; destructive tend- 
ency of doctrine of seces- 
sion, 291 ; opposition in 
South to martial law and im- 
pressment laws, 292-3; com- 




plaints of military despotism, 
2 93~4; Confederate armies in 
1864, 296. 

South Carolina, state : 40, 270, 

S pence, : 140. 

Spottsylvania, battle of: num- 
bers and losses, 348, 351. 

Springfield, battle of : numbers 
and losses, 345. 

Spring Hill (Tenn.) : 156, 310, 
314, 315, 316; narrow escape 
of Schofield's army at, 310, 


St. Louis (Mo.) : 16, 312, 320. 

Standing in line of battle: 137. 

Stanley. Gen. David S. : 315, 

Stanton, Edwin M. : succeeds 
Cameron as Secretary of 
War, 25 ; his influence in 
conduct of the war, 26; es- 
timate of his character, 27- 
30; Grant's opinion of, 28-9; 
his treatment of Sherman, 
32-3 ; his hostility to Mc- 
Clellan, 35, 43 ; hostility to 
Rosecrans, 126; answer to 
Rosecrans's appeal for aid, 
160; his dispatch to Grant 
concerning Gen. Thomas, 320. 

Statistics: The Story Told by 
The, Chap. XIV, pp. 335- 

355- . 
Statistics of War : sources of 
information, 335-6; number 
enlisted in Federal armies, 
337 ; number enlisted in Con- 
federate armies, 337 ; dimen- 
sions of an army of 100,000, 
337 ; numbers killed in battle 
in Federal and Confederate 
armies, 338; numbers died of 
disease in Federal and Con- 
federate armies, 339; num- 
bers of drafted men in serv- 
ice, 340; proportion of regu- 
lars to volunteers, 340; de- 

sertions, 340; losses in Revo- 
lutionary War. 343-7; losses 
in Mexican War, 341 ; great- 
est loss of general officers at 
battle of Franklin, 349; re- 
markable percentage of losses 
in Civil War, 350-1 ; average 
percentage of losses in killed 
and died of wounds, 351; 
statistics of Co. I, 79th Ind., 

Steedman, Gen. James B. : 193. 
Stephens, Alexander : 293. 
Stevens's Gap (Ga.) : 168, 169. 
Stevenson (Ala.) : 159, 213. 
Stewart, Gen. Alexander P. : 


Stdhvater, battle of : numbers 
and losses, 344. 

Stinnett. Lindsay: 188. 

Stone, Gen. Charles P. : 23, 24, 

Stone's river: 107, 108, 109, 
no, 116, 118, 148. 

Stone's River, Battle of: Chap. 
V, pp. 106-122; 76, 77, 80; 
the advance from Nashville, 
106 ; Bragg makes stand at 
Murfreesboro, 106 ; descrip- 
tion of the battle-field, 106-7 ; 
position of opposing lines, 
107-8 ; Rosecrans's and 
Bragg's plans of battle, 108- 
9; faulty position of Mc- 
Cook's lines, 109; movements 
of Federal army on morning 
of Dec. 31, 109-10; Bragg 
opens battle, no; Johnson's 
division surprised and rout- 
ed, no; Confederate attack 
on Davis's. Sheridan's and 
Negley's divisions, in; new 
Federal line of battle formed, 
1 12-13; desperate fighting of 
Rousseau's, Negley's and 
Palmer's divisions, 113; Con- 
federate assaults on the tem- 
porary -new line, 1 13-14; 
Beatty's brigade becomes 



Federal right, 114; Rose- 
crans s coolness in battle, 
115; the battle in the cedar 
thickets, 116; formation of 
permanent new line, and 
Confederate assaults upon it, 
116-17; results of first day's 
fighting, 117; the New 
Year's eve council of war 
and Gen. Thomas's answer, 
118; movements on Jan. 1, 
118; formation of Federal 
lines on Jan. 2, 118-ig; 
Breckinridge's assault and 
repulse on that day, 1 19-120; 
retreat of Bragg and Fed- 
eral occupation of Murfrees- 
boro, 120; striking features 
of battle, 121'; numbers and 
losses, 121-2. 348. 

Stoneman, Gen. George D. : 
151. 298. 

Stono Ferry, battle of: num- 
bers and losses, 345. 

Stony Point, battle of: num- 
bers and losses, 345. 

Stragglers in army: 74-5. 

Strawberry Plains (Tenn.) : 
244, 245, 249, 251, 253. 

Sullivan's Island, battle of: 
numbers and losses, 343. 

Summerville (Ga.) : 164, 165. 

Sunbury (Ga.), battle of: 
numbers and losses, 345. 

Surprises by hostile army: 77. 

Sutlers in army : 59, 66. 

Sweetwater (Tenn.) : 250. 

Tappan, battle of: numbers 

and losses, 345- 
Taylor, Gen. Richard : 125. 

Taylor, Lieut. : !S4- 

Tennessee, Army of. See 

Army, etc. 
Tennessee, Department of: 214. 
Tennessee river: 157- 1 5S, I °2, 

211, 212, 217, 309- 310, 311. 

Tennessee, state: 39. 47, 100, 

252, 260, 307, 310, 313, 362. 
See East Tennessee. 

Tennessee Valley : 161,362. 

Tents: shape and construc- 
tion, 56-7. 

Terrell, Adj. -Gen. William H. 
H.: 336. 

Thomas, Gen. George H. : ap- 
pointed to command of right 
wing of Halleck's army, 45 ; 
declines appointment as suc- 
cessor to Buell, 99; appoint- 
ed to command of center of 
Army of the Cumberland, 
101 ; his familiarity with de- 
tails, 103; succeeds Rose- 
crans in command of Army 
of the Cumberland, 214; 
takes command of troops in 
Military Division of the 
Mississippi in Sherman's ab- 
sence, 309; how harassed by 
Grant and Washington au- 
thorities prior to battle of 
Nashville, 320-2; orders di- 
recting Generals Schofield 
and Logan to relieve him of 
command, 322 ; his generosity 
to Grant, 327 ; estimate of his 
character, 327-8 ; affection 
for him of soldiers of Army 
of the Cumberland, 328; 
Badeau's aspersions on his 
character, 328. See Battles 
and Campaigns of Army of 
the Cumberland; Battles of 
Mill Spring and Nashville; 
Hood's Invasion of Tennes- 

Three Months' Picnic, The: 
Chap. I, pp. 1 -14. 

Three Months' Service: ex- 
citement consequent on elec- 
tion of Lincoln, 1 ; rumors of 
secession, I ; feeling in In- 
diana, 1 : Lincoln stops at 
Indianapolis on his way to 
Washington, 2; firing on 



Fort Sumter and its effect on 
the North, 2; Gov. Morton 
of Indiana, 5 ; his efforts in 
behalf of the Union cause, 
5-8 ; the call to arms in In- 
diana,^; raising of the first 
company in Franklin, Ind., 
9-10; organization of 7th 
Ind. Inf., 10; regiment goes 
to West Virginia, 10; the 
battle of Philippi, 10; inci- 
dents of three months' serv- 
ice, 11-12; battle of Car- 
rick's Ford, 13 ; the disaster 
at Bull Run and its effect on 
the North, 13 ; benefit of ex- 
perience gained in the three 
months' service, 14. 

Thrust on. Col. Gates P : 199. 

Treason trials at Indianapolis, 
Ind.: 283. 

Trent affair : 22. 

Trenton, battle of: numbers 
and losses, 344. 

Tullahoma (Tenn.) : 156, 157, 

Tullahoma campaign: 157. 

Turchin, Gen. John B. : 239. 

Turcnne, Marshal: 21. 

Tuscumbia (Ala.) : 305. 

"Uncle John" : 73. 
Under fire: sensation of being, 

Vance, Gov. Zebulon B. : 293. 

Van Cleve, Gen. Horatio P. : 
118, 198. 

Vicksburg (Miss.) : 41, 48, 123, 
125, 126, 145. 154, 159, 283. 

Vicksburg, assault on : num- 
bers and losses, 348. 

Viniard field (Chickamauga) : 

Virginia, Army of: 44, 45. 

Virginia Campaign: 88, 89. 
See Richmond Campaign. 

Virginia, Department of : 32. 

Virginia, state: 1, 44, 165, 246, 
258, 276, 279, 280, 362. 

Volunteer armies : govern- 
ment forced to depend on, 17. 

Wade, Senator Benjamin: ap- 
pointed chairman of Com- 
mittee on Conduct of the 
War, 22: early opposition to 
Grant, 48. 

Walden Ridge: 158,161,213. 

Walker, Gen. William H. T. : 

War of 1812: numbers and 
losses, 342. 

Wartrace (Tenn.) : 156. 

IVashburnc, EHhu B. : friend- 
ship for Grant, 49. 

Washington, D. C. : 2, 12, 15. 
20, 24, 30. 31, 33, 34, 35, 43, 
45, 67, 101, 125. 157, 159, 164, 
165, 214, 296, 319, 320, 322. 

Washington, George: 40. 

Wauhatchie (Tenn.) : 216. 

Waxhaws, battle of : numbers 
and losses. 345. 

Webster (Va.) : 10, II. 

Wellington, Duke of: 171. 

West Virginia, state': 10, 40, 

White Plains, battle of: num- 
bers and losses, 344. 

Whitemarsh, battle of: num- 
bers and losses, 344. 

Wildcat (Ky.) : 100, 104. 

Wilder, Gen. John T. : 171. 

Wilderness, battle' of: num- 
bers and losses, 348. 

Wilkes, Capt. Charles : 22. 

Wilkinson turnpike (Stone's 
river) : 107, 108. 

Williamsburg, battle of: num- 
bers and losses, 348. 

Willich, Gen. August: no, in, 
117, 246. 



Wilson, Gen. James F : 32, ■?-?, 

308 313, 314, 31s, 320. 
Winchester (Term.) : 157, 158. 
Winchester, battle of : 90, 185 ; 

numbers and losses, 349. 
Wisconsin, state: tender of 

160-day men by, 284. 
Wise, Gen. Henry A. : 278. 
Wood, Gen. Thomas J. : 183, 

184, 214, 226, 237, 238, 239. 

Wyoming Massacre : numbers 
and losses, 345. 

Yorktown, battle of : numbers 
and losses, 346. 

Youngs House, battle of : num- 
bers and losses, 345. 

Zollicoffer, Gen. Felix K. : 41.