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1815
WATERLOO
AGENTS IN AMERICA
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
66 Fifth Avence, New York.
HEJ^RY E 0 U S SAY E
MEMBER OF THE ACADEMIE FRjiNQAISE
1815
WATERLOO
TRANSLATED WITH THE AUTHOR'S PERMISSION
FROM THE 3 1st FRENCH EDITION
BY
AETHUE EMILE MANN
AND EDITED BY
A. EUAN-SMITH
LONDON
ADAM & CHAELES BLACK
1900
629201 X^C-
CONTENTS
BOOK I
COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN
CHAPTER I
THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE
I. Change from a Peace footing to that of "War — Recall
of men on leave — Mobilisation of the National Guards
— The Conscription of 1815
II. Arming and equipping — Supplies — Military strongholds
and forts — The War Budget .....
III. First and second re-division of the troops into Army
Corps — Strength of the Army of the first line and of
the Auxiliary Army on 15th June 1815
IV. Dismissals and promotions
V. Leaders : The Marshals of France .
VI. Leaders : The Chief of the Staff .
VII. Leaders : The Generals
VIII. The spirit of the Army .
11
19
22
26
32
35
40
CHAPTER II
THE PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN
I. Project for an invasion of Belgium in the early part of
April 49
11. The plan of campaign formed of the Allies . . 51
III. Napoleon's plan of campaign . 54
vi WATERLOO
PAGE
IV. Concentration of the French Army (8th to 14th June) —
Arrival of the Emperor at Beaumont — Strength and
positions of the armies on the 14th of June . . . 57
CHAPTER III
THE FIRST ENGAGEMENTS
I. Passage of the Belgian frontier (I5th June) — The desertion
■j of General de Bourmont ...... 60
II. Taking of Charleroi 63
III. The interview between Napoleon and Ney — Battle at
Gilly with the right wing . . . . . . 65
IV. Key's operations on 15th of June — Battle of Gosselies —
Battle of Frasnes — Quatre-Bras . . . . 70
BOOK II
LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS
CHAPTER I
THE MORNING OF THE 16tH OP JUNE
I. Plans and orders of Napoleon (from live o'clock to eight) . 75
II. Departure of Napoleon for Fleurus (half-past nine o'clock) 77
III. Concentration of the Prussian Army on the north of the
brook of Ligny — Immobility of the English Army
throughout the 15th of June — The Duchess of Rich-
mond's ball (night of the 15th to the 16th of June) . 79
IV. "Wellington's arrival at Quatre-Bras (16th June, ten o'clock)
— Interview between Wellington and Bliicher at the mill
of Bussy, near Ligny (one p.m.) . . . . 84
CHAPTER II
THE BATTLE OF LIGNY
I. The field of battle — Dispositions of Bliicher and
Napoleon ........ 88
CONTENTS vii
PAOB
II, From three to four o'clock — Attacks on Saint- Amand by
Vandamme, and on Ligny by Gerard . . . 93
III. From four o'clock to half-past seven : Counter-attack by
Bliicher — Appearance on the French flank of a column
recognised as belonging to the enemy — Grouchy's
demonstration against the Prussian left — Fierce contest
at Saint- Amand and at Ligny . . . . . 9G
IV. From half- past seven to half- past nine o'clock — Final
assault — Capture of Ligny — Engagements on the hills
— Ketreat of the Prussians . • . . .103
CHAPTER III
THE BATTLE OF QUATRE-BRA8
I. Inaction of Marshal Ney during the morning of the 16th
of June — Repeated orders from the Emperor . . 108
IT. Attack on Quatre-Bras by Reille's corps (two o'clock
P.M.) — Wellington's return to Quatre-Bras and arrival of
the first English reinforcements (three o'clock) — Death of
the Duke of Brunswick (half-past four o'clock) . . 112
in. The false move of Count d'Erlon 116
IV. Charge of Kellermann's cuirassiers (six o'clock) — Offensive
action of "Wellington (seven o'clock) — The French driven
back on their original positions (from eight to nine
o'clock) 119
CHAPTER IV
THE RETREAT OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY
I. First plans of Napoleon for 17th June . . . .125
II. The Emperor's orders to Grouchy (between eleven o'clock
and half-past eleven) .128
III. Retreat of the Prussian Army on Wavre .132
IV. Movements of Pajol towards Namur and of Exelmans on
Gembloux in pursuit of the Prussian columns . . 134
V. March of Grouchy's army — Bivouac at Gembloux —
Grouchy's letter to the Emperor (ten o'clock p.m.) . 137
iii WATERLOO
CHAPTER V
THE RETREAT OF THE ENGLISH ARMT
FAOB
I. Exchange of despatches between Bliicher and Wellington
(morning of the 17th of June) — Retreat of the English
(ten o'clock) . . . . . . . .143
11. Arrival of Napoleon at Quatre-Bras, still held by the
English cavalry (two o'clock) . . . . .145
III. Keen pursuit of the English rearguard personally led by
Napoleon — Engagement at Genappe — Cannonade at
Mont-Saint- Jean (seven o'clock) . . . . .149
IV. Night in camp . . . . . . . .151
V. Indecision of Napoleon — Letter from Bliicher to Wellington
— Orders of Napoleon (night of the 17th to the 18th of
June) 153
BOOK III
WATERLOO
CHAPTER I
BLUCHER AND GROUCHY
I. Dispositions and movements of the Prussian Army on the
morning of the 1 8th of June — Departure from Wavre of
Field-Marshal Bliicher (eleven o'clock) . . . 161
II. Dispositions of Grouchy . . . . . .164
III. Discussion between Gerard and Grouchy at Walhain
(mid-day) . . . . . . . .167
CHAPTER n
THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO
The Morning
I. Topography of the field of battle . . . .171
II. Positions of the Anglo-Netherland Army . . .173
\
CONTENTS
PAGE
III. Napoleon's breakfast at Le Caillou — Letter to Grouchy . 177
IV. The last review (ten o'clock) — Order of battle for the
French Army — Napoleon's plan of attack (eleven o'clock) 182
CHAPTER III
THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO {continued)
From half-past eleven to three o'clock
I. Attack on Hougoumont by the division of Jerome Bonaparte
of Eeille's corps ....... 187
II. Appearance of Billow's corps on the heights of ChapeUe-
Saint - Lambert — New despatch from Napoleon to
Grouchy 189
III. Attack on La Haye-Sainte and on the plateau of Mont-
Saint-Jean by Count d'Erlon's corps . . . . 193
IV. Counter-attack of the English under Picton — Charge of Lord
Somerset's horse-guards — The press of the cuirassiers
in the hollow road . . . . .195
V. Charge of Ponsonby's dragoons — Rout of d'Erlon's infantry
— Counter -charge of Jacquinot's lancers and Farine's
cuirassiers — Conflagration of Hougoumont . . . 197
CHAPTER IV
THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO (continued)
From three to sewn o'clock
I. Second attack on La Haye-Sainte — The order from Ney to
Milhaud .201
II, First and second charges of Milhaud's cuirassiers and the
light cavalry of the Guard — Order of the Emperor
to Kellermann's cuirassiers and the cavalry under Guyot 205
III. Bulow's corps enters in line — Lobau's defence — Capture
and recapture of Plancenoit ..... 208
IV. Third and fourth charges of Milhaud's cuirassiers, supported
by those of Kellermann, the dragoons, and the mounted
grenadiers of the Guard . . . . . .211
WATERLOO
PAOB
V. General attack on the plateau by the infantry under Reille
and d'Erlon, and by the remainder of the cavalry —
Storming of La Haye-Sainte — The English line shaken
— New struggle at Plancenoit .214
CHAPTER V
THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO (continued)
From seven to nine o'clock
I. Dispositions for the final attack — Strengthening of the
English line — Approach of Zieten's corps . . .220
II. Assault on the plateau of Mont-Saint-Jean by the " Middle "
Guard 223
III. " The Guard falls back ! " — General forward movement of
the English Army — Irruption of the Prussians under
Zieten — The panic 228
IV. The squares of Christiani, of Roguet, of Cambronne . . 230
V. Arrival of Pirch's corps to the assistance of Biilow —
Slaughter at Plancenoit — The struggle on the plateau of
La Belle Alliance — The last squares of the Old Guard . 233
CHAPTER VI
THE ROUT
I. Meeting between Wellington and Blticher in front of the
inn of La Belle Alliance (a quarter past nine o'clock) —
The rout of the French 237
II. Attempt to resist at Genappe (eleven o'clock) . . .240
III. Pursuit by the Prussian cavalry (night of the 18th to the
19th of Jime) 242
IV. Halt of the Emperor at Quatre-Bras— Passage of the army
at Charleroi (morning of the 19th of June) . . . 244
V. Retreat on Laon — Departure of the Emperor for Paris
(20th June) 248
CONTENTS xi
CHAPTER YII
THE ACTIONS AT WAVRE A^-D GROUCHT'S RETREAT
PAGE
I. Grouchy marches on Wavre — Battle at La Baraque —
Attack on Wavre (afternoon of 18th June) . . 253
n. Soult's second despatch — Renewed assaults upon Wavre
and Bierges — Passage of the Dyle at Liinale and battle
in the night 258
III. Renewal of the fight and defeat of ThieLmann (morning of
the 19th of June) — News of the disaster (half-past ten,
morning of the 19th of June) — Retreat of Grouchy (after-
noon and evening of the 19th of June) . . .126
IV. Actions at La Falise and Le Boquet (morning of the 20th
of June) — Defence of Namur (from three to nine
o'clock at night) — Rallying of Grouchy's army at Givet
(21st June) 265
CHAPTER YIII
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1S15
I. The operations of the 1 5th of June — The battles of Ligny
and of Quatre-Bras . 269
II. Napoleon's mistake ....... 276
III. Marshal Grouchy ....... 280
IV. Waterloo 288
I
NOTE ON THE MAPS
I
GENERAL iLA.P OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815
II
MAP OF THE MILITARY OPERATIOXS FROM THE 15TH TO THE
20th of JVSE
I have drawn these maps after two models of those by Ferrari and
Capitaine, which were used by the Emperor during the campaign.
I have corrected their inaccuracies (with regard to the positions of
certain villages and the direction of the watercourses) by means of the
Map of the Military Engineers published in 1825, and the map
of 40,000e of the Military Cartographical Institute of Belgium,
published in 1892. It is on the latter, on account of the dimensions of
the scale, that I have calculated throughout all the distances, when
writing Waterloo.
Map I. should be consulted for the cantonments of the different
armies during the first fortnight of June 1815, and for the passage of
the Belgian frontier.
Map II. will be useful for the military operations from the 15 th
to the 20th of June, and principally for the route followed by Grouchy,
as also for that he ought to have taken.
Ill
PLAM OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO
I have reproduced, at half its original size, the plan drawn out in
1816 by Craan, the surveying engineer of Brabant This plan, which
is now extremely rare, is the oldest topographical document. It is, at
the same time, the most correct and the most valuable with regard to
xiv WATERLOO
certain essential details, such as the position and form of the woods, the
situation of the farms and of the sandpit, the roads of communication,
also the hedges and banks of the Ohain Road. I must also point out,
that Craan having made use of an oblique illustration, has by it given
undue relief to the undulations of the ground on which the battle was
fought. The edges are too sharply defined. The hollows, like the
plains, seem to be equalised by the plane. The gradation of the slopes
is not sufficiently marked. Thus, on this plan, one would never realise
that from La Haye-Sainte the ground continues to ascend to the road
of Ohain, which formed the crest of the English position.
Craan has traced all the movements of the troops from eleven o'clock
till night. On a reduced plan, the multiplicity of the interlacing lines
would have created confusion. I have therefore merely indicated the
position of the divisions and of the brigades at the outset of the battle,
rectifying at the same time the occasionally incorrect diagrams drawn
by Craan.
I have also made use of the plans of Siborne, those in Napoleon's
Commentaries and in the Waterloo Letters, and also of the information
to be gathered from the numerous accounts of the combatants themselves.
H. H.
bth December 1898.
BOOK I
COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN
WATEELOO
BOOK I CHAPTER I
THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE
I. Change from a peace footing to a war footing. — Recall of men on
leave. — Mobilisation of National Guards. — Conscription of 1815.
II. Arming and outfitting. — Supplies. — Military strongholds and forts. —
"War Budget.
III. First and second re-division of the troops into Army Corps. — Strength of
the Army of the first line and of the Auxiliary Army on 15th June
1815.
IV. Dismissals and promotions.
V. Leaders : the Marshals of France.
VI. Leaders : the Chief of the Headquarters Staff.
VII. Leaders : the Generals.
VIII. The spirit of the Army.
Section I
On his return from Elba the Emperor foimd scarcely 200,000
men under arms.^ Had he felt himseK in possession of his
former imlimited power, he might have doubled his forces bj
calling for an extraordinary levy on the lists dating from
1806 to 1814, also on those of 1815, and by anticipating a
call on those on the list for 1816. But having just resumed
the crown, he hesitated to resort to such an unpopular measure
as the re-establishment of conscription, which Louis XYIII. had
recently abolished- His only resource lay, therefore, in re-
incorporating the men who were on leave for an unlimited or a
limited space of time, and in recalling nimierous deserters,
entered on the reports as " absent without leave." The
number of men on six months' leave of absence amounted to
4 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
32,800,^ the deserters to 85,000. It was possible to rely on^
the vast majority of the former ; and already three or four
thousand of them had rejoined their depots in obedience to the
Royal decree of 9th March.* But amongst the 85,000 men "ab-
sent without leave " there would undoubtedly be many refractory
ones ; there would also be a number liable, on presenting
themselves, to be finally dismissed on the ground of their being
either invalids or fathers of families. The Minister of War,
Marshal Davout, reckoned that the recall of soldiers of every
description would hardly muster a total of 59,000 men.^
The proclamation calling out the troops, prepared on
28th March,® was not published until April 9th. This delay
was owing to political reasons. The Emperor, who was then
striving by every possible means to open negotiations with the
European powers for the maintenance of peace,^ was afraid
that the placing of the Army on a war footing would seem a
flat contradiction of his pacific declarations. With regard to
the people of France, who were ardently longing for peace, he
felt bound to act with the greatest discretion. The western
provinces were in a state of agitation, the south was taking up
arms. In the rest of France, the Royalists were labouring to
undermine the Emperor's popularity, by prophesying war.
This was not a time to alarm and alienate the whole country,
by calling out the reserve forces. Moreover, Napoleon still
retained a glimmer of hope that a rupture with Europe might
be avoided.^ As this illusive hope grew fainter and fainter
every hour, he boldly determined to publish the decree in the
Moniteur of April 9 th. As he had foreseen, this proclamation
came as a shock to the whole country. In a few days the
funds went down 8 francs. Gloom and depression prevailed
among the rural populations. On the whole, the peasants, well
satisfied to be exempt from the exactions of their landlords,
and from the re-establishment of the rights of their emigrant
noblesse, yet felt their loyalty towards the Emperor quickly
decline at the thought that his return might produce, pro-
bably a second invasion, or at least an endless war.^
Owing to the time necessary for the transmission of orders,
for the posting of placards, and the legal delays, the muster only
began on 25 th April.^'' Public opinion was so hostile to the
CHAP. I TEE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE 5
idea of war, that even amongst the men themselves, all of them
former soldiers of Napoleon, numbers responded to the call
merely to urge reasons for their exemption or disqualification.
It is true that, though a great number of these men had
deserted in 1814 to avoid wearing the white cockade, a greater
nimiber had left the ranks through sheer weariness of war.
During the last year they had resumed their labours in the field
and workshop ; many of them had married, and these were all
the less disposed to serve. In the departments where Eoyalist
tendencies prevailed, the recalled men, feeling sure of public
sympathy, behaved in a most disorderly way at the recruiting
stations. They shouted : " We will not go ! Long live the
King ! " ^^ Fearing an insurrection in the west, the Emperor
authorised several of the prefects in that region to apply the
Act with great discretion, and if need be, to suspend its
execution entirely.^" In spite of all opposition, however, the
levy produced 17,000 men more than Davout, little inclined
to optimistic views, had predicted.^^ In the early days of June
82,446 recalled men had been enrolled, and 23,448 were on
their way to join.^"*
The number of volunteers, so scarce during the campaign
of France,^^ amoimted approximately to 15,000.^® A Eoyal
decree issued on 30 th December had granted every volunteer
a bounty of 50 francs. This premium was suppressed by the
Emperor. " Such methods," he said, " are not worthy of the
sentiments which should inspire the French to defend their own
independence." ^' In order to encourage recruiting, he ordered
the call to arms to be read by ofl&cers of the Guard, with the
accompaniment of drums, on all public squares, and outside all
workshops and in the villages. But Davout having pointed
out to him that this might cause useless disturbances, he gave
up this expedient, adopted from the recruiting sergeants of the
eighteenth century.^^
Eeduced to a very few seaworthy ships, which had neither
ammunition ^^ nor crews (two-thirds of the sailors being on
leave), the fleet was useless save for cruising in the Mediter-
ranean.'^ Taking into account the men available in the sea-
ports and those entered on the naval lists, the Emperor hoped
to raise from fifty to sixty battalions of sailors.^^ "With great
6 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
difficulty twenty only were formed/^ and by the middle of
June only one had been started,^^ to garrison Calais. The
three regiments of naval artillery, which amounted actually to
5284 men under the Eestoration, were increased to about
6000 men by the addition of a new battalion,^* Six battalions
remained to defend the seaports of France ; two were detached
and sent to Paris, another to Lyons, and another fought in
Brittany in the flying column of General Bigarre."°
Of the three foreign regiments existing under Louis
XVIII., the Emperor kept the second (Isenberg) and the
third (Irish), mustering together a force of 875 bayonets; the
first (La Tour d'Auvergne) was disbanded, having remained
faithful to the " Due d'Angouleme " during the short campaign
of the south.^^ The Emperor wished to retain the four Swiss
regiments, but the determined refusal of the officers to wear
the " tricolor cocade " compelled him to disband these troops.^^
He then turned his attention to the organisation of five new-
foreign regiments : one of Polish recruits rapidly amounted to
the number of 800, thanks to the admission into its ranks of
soldiers belonging to the former Vistula Legion, and who,
though discharged in 1814, had not yet returned home; one
of Swiss, numbering 502 men, from the four Swiss regiments
suppressed on 2nd April ; one of Italians, one of Germans, one
of Dutch and Belgians. The three latter were formed of
deserters from the troops of Bliicher, Erimont, and the Prince
of Orange. In the beginning of June the Dutch and Belgian
regiment numbered 378 bayonets. Lastly, in the department
of Gironde, a battalion of coloured men was raised, as well as
a few companies of Spanish refugees.^^
The Fatherland itself being in danger, the laws and decrees
of 1791, 1792, 1805, and 1813, which had not been abrogated,
gave the Emperor the right to increase the Army by mobilis-
ing the National Guards. A few days after his return to the
Palace of the Tuileries, he with Carnot and Davout set
about the reorganisation of the National Guard.^^ At that
time there were in the whole of France 200,000 National
Guards, or thereabouts, aged from twenty to sixty; Carnot
deemed it possible to raise their number to two millions and a
half.^° A decree issued on 10 th April provided that all citizens
CHAP. I THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIEE 7
liable to service in the National Guards, should be entered on
the rolls, so as to be formed into battalions.^^ The Emperor
did not propose organising such an immense multitude ; but
he intended forming a large number of battalions of the
mobilised Guards, composed solely of men from twenty to forty
years of age. He remembered that at Fere-Champenoise, in
1814, the National Guards had fought like veterans. By
fresh decrees, he ordered the mobilisation of 326 battalions,
each 720 men strong, which were to be immediately despatched
to the frontier strongholds and to intrenched camps.^" This
amounted to an application of the Legislative Assembly's edict
of 11th July 1792, with this amendment, that in the war
battalions, paid substitution was permissible. The substitu-
tion tax was fixed at the small sum of 120 francs.^
In some twenty departments the levy took place without
a hitch, viz., in Ain, Aisne, Ardeche, the Ardennes, Aube,
Cote-d'Or, Isere, Jura, Marne, Meurthe, Meuse, Mont Blanc,
Haut Ehin, Bas Ehin, Ehone, Haute Saone, Saone-et-Loire,
Seine -et- Marne, Seine -et-Oise, Vosges, and Yonne ; the
battalions were soon complete ; the recruits left their families
and their homes with cries of " Vive I'Empereur," ^ with the
same enthusiasm as in 1791. Those of the Guards who could
afford it, bought their own arms and uniforms.^ But the
same patriotism and the same zeal did not animate the whole
of France. In half the country, only one -quarter of the
estimated contingents was raised, spite of the lavish use of
flying columns and recruiting sergeants. By the end of May
the department of Orne had raised 107 Guards, out of the
2,160 required, Pas-de-Calais 437 instead of 7,440, Gers 90
out of 1,440.^ At Amiens the following placard was posted
up : •' Who recalled Buonaparte ? The Army. Well, let the
Army defend him. It is not for us to carry arms in the
defence of a man cast up by hell itseK." ^' In Vendee and in
Brittany, where an insurrection was feared, the National Guards
were never called out ; but when civil war broke out, some
thousands of citizens spontaneously took up arms, and helped
the regulars to fight the Royalist troops, remaining, nevertheless,
within the confines of their own department.^
On June loth, out of the 234,720 National Guards
8 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book f
summoned to active service by the proclamations of 10th
April and 15th May, about 150,000 had assembled at the
various depots, or were marching to join them.^^ The battalions
were composed, in the proportion of one -third, of half-pay
officers, and the rest of civilians. The Emperor would not allow
these to be elected to posts in their regiments. The officers
were appointed from lists made up in each department by a
committee formed of the prefect, a " conseiller general," two
generals, and one staff officer,''*' Most of the National Guards
seemed resigned not only to do their duty, but to do it cheer-
fully. In the manceuvres they did their very best ; they sub-
mitted to discipline willingly, marched into the cities with
branches of lilac in the barrels of their muskets, singing the
Marseillaise and ending each verse with shouts of : " Long live
the Emperor ! Long live the Nation ! " If now and then
complaints were uttered, it was by those who, being neither
armed nor clothed, clamoured for muskets, greatcoats, and
shoes. Mortier, Jourdan, Leclerc des Essarts, Eouyer, Lanusse,
Berckheim, all the general officers who commanded or reviewed
these mobilised National Guards, praised the fine spirit and
martial bearing of these improvised soldiers. On the 5 th of June
Gerard wrote thus to Vandamme : " The ten battalions of the
National Guard of the Nancy reserve are superb. In three weeks
there will be no difference between them and the regulars." *^
If the war lasted, the Emperor could be certain that the
number of men from twenty to forty, forming the first corps
of the National Guards would amount to 150,000 at least, for
a large number of malcontents in the central and southern
departments were bound to submit in the long run.'*^ In the
event of the pacification of La Vendee, which was imminent,
the acts of mobilisation might even be applied, in course of
time, to the western departments, and it would even be possible
to raise fresh levies in the patriotic departments of the east.''*
As for the second militia corps, there was no need to hurry on
its formation, except in Paris and at Lyons. Now that time
and arms were lacking for the mobilised battalions,^* it was not
expedient to multiply the stationary battalions, which were
numerous enough,*^ seeing the services likely to be required of
them were of a most peaceful nature.
CHAP. I THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE 9
In the remaining mass of citizens from forty to sixty years
of age, there were many able-bodied men, fit to be employed
against the enemy, at least in the defence of fortified places.
There were the old officers, subalterns, and privates who had
retired after a minimum period of twenty-four years' service.
As early as April, several retired officers had asked leave to
re-enter the Army ; but there were more half- pay officers than
could be utilised. Davout proposed to form the retired officers
and soldiers, into companies of veterans for the fortified places.
" They will be an example to the National Guards," he wrote to
the Emperor, " and will inspire them with the true soldier spirit."
Xapoleon did not hesitate to adopt this proposal On May
18th he issued an edict inviting all retired military men to
resume service temporarily, that they might be formed into
battalions and garrisons of fortresses. These veterans,
numbering 94,000, of which scarcely half seemed capable of
serving, hastened to report themselves. Fifty-six battalions
and twenty-five companies of artillery, numbering about 25,000
men, were selected from the fittest of their muster.*^
In Paris the stationary iN'ational Guard was raised to
36,518 men.*" "Workmen from the " faubourgs " had spontane-
ously asked to take part in the defence ; they formed twenty-
four battalions of sharpshooters. These troops, numbering
18,000 men and commanded by half-pay officers, were destined
to occupy the advanced posts and works of the front line.^
At Lyons 4,000 stationary National Guards were ready on the
1 2th June, and Mouton-Duvernet was busy forming from these
fifteen battalions of sharpshooters.^^ If the worst happened,
and France were invaded, in Aisne, in the Ardennes, and in
all the eastern departments the general levies could be relied
upon. Composed of forest rangers, of gendarmes, of custom-
house officers, of stationary National Guards, in a word of all
able-bodied citizens, these levies would, upon receiving orders
from the military authorities, assemble at the sound of the
alarm and occupy the moimtains and the passes.'^''
With 150,000 mobilised troops, 25,000 pensioners, 26,000
federated troops from Paris, Lyons, Toulouse, and Nancy, with
the rural and city National Guards, the free corps, and the general
levies, it seemed that aU the strongholds, large towns, passes ^^
10 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
and bridges were amply supplied with defenders. But not-
withstanding that numerous volunteers had enlisted, and two-
thirds of the men on leave had rejoined their regiments, the
active forces were still far below the mark. After much
hesitation the Emperor therefore decided to call out the
reserves of 1 8 1 5.^^ Conscription had been abolished by Article
XII. of the Royal Charter ; this Article had been interpreted
as applying retroactively to the conscripts of 1815,^^ although
a " Senatus-consulte " had summoned them to the standard as
early as 9 th October 1813 : the summoning of these con-
scripts now, would, it was feared, seem an abuse of power.
Davout himself, usually so resolute, pointed out to the Emperor
that it would be prudent to avoid using the vexatious word
" conscription." " Merely give the thing another name," he
said, " and declare that all young men in their twentieth
year from the 1st of January last are to be enrolled into
the National Guard and sent to the military depots, under
the understanding they shall be discharged at the close of the
war." ^* The proposed decree regarding the conscription of
1815 was then submitted to the Council of State during
the session of 23rd May, and rejected on the ground
that " the right of levying men belonged to the legislative
power." ^^
To await the meeting of the Chambers ! To wait ! But
would the enemy wait before they invaded France ? Now,
the conscription of 1815 ought to furnish 120,000 soldiers,
20,000 of whom had fought in the last campaign.^^ The
Emperor overcame the scruples of the Council of State by
proposing that the conscripts of 1815 should be assimilated
with the soldiers on leave. To recall them, an edict was no
longer necessary ; a simple measure of administration would
suffice. The Council of State gave a favourable opinion.
From the early part of June Davout was free to send out
instructions for levying the class of 1815.^^ The country
was now resigned to war. The departure of the conscripts
was effected without the resistance and rebellion wliich the
recall of the men on leave, and even the mobilisation of the
National Guard, had provoked in so many provinces. On
June 11th, only a week after the proclamation had been issued.
CH.1P. I THE LAST ABMY OF THE EMPIRE 11
46,419 conscripts were assembled and ready to start, in the
various headquarters of each department.^^ From Alsace,
Lorraine, Champagne, Franche-Comte, Burgundy, and even
several provinces of the centre, reports were received of positive
eagerness on the part of the men, "The conscripts of 1815,"
writes the prefect of Seine-et-Oise, " have joined in three days
with amazing readiness." The prefect of Mont Blanc remarks
that his department has provided the ranks with more
combatants than at any period during the Eevolution.^^ The
Aisne, which from 1st April to 12th June had furnished
18,200 men — volunteers, reserves, conscripts, National Guards,
" Francs-Tireurs," and retired soldiers (some of the latter men
of seventy -three years of age) — deserves this verdict of
Napoleon : " In that department will be found as many men
as there are muskets to give them."^
Section II
There was a great scarcity of muskets, ammunition, provisions,
shoes, and horses : while large supplies were needed, few were
forthcoming. War material in every branch was lacking.
Though the artillery had 13,947 guns, it had neither horses
nor harness, and 600,000 shells were required.^^ The regular
regiments of infantry and cavalry, both far beneath their
effective strength, were completely equipped ; but on the arming
of newly foi med regiments — the volunteers, the marines, the
mobilised National Guards, the sharp-shooters, the conscripts
of 1815 — which were expected to yield a total of 500,000
men by the middle of September, no sufficient supply existed,
the arsenals and the storehouses only furnishing 195,000
muskets, 74,000 of which needed repair.^'
" The salvation of the country," wrote the Emperor, "depends
on the number of muskets we can shoulder.^^ In the Imperial
factories all the armourers exempted from former conscriptions,
dating from the year VIII, were recalled by an edict,*^ and
orders were given for 235,000 muskets and musketoons, and
15,000 brace of pistols. Bayonets were made in the Langres
and Moulins cutleries, 10,000 fowling-pieces and 4,000 "short
muskets " were dealt out amongst the peasants of Alsace,
12 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
Lorraine, Champagne, and Burgundy, that they might be
ready for the general levy.^^ The task of repairing the worn-
out muskets was left to private industry. In the principal
towns, workshops were formed of gunsmiths, armourers, cabinet-
makers, and brass- workers ; there were six of these in Paris,
employing 2000 workmen. Attempts were also made to buy
muskets in England, and several thousands were conveyed
surreptitiously in coal barges from Belgium and the Khenish
provinces. Others were brought in by the peasants, a premium
of 1 2 francs being offered for every gun recovered ; others
were raised amongst the merchants and shipbuilders, who were
ordered, by means of placards, to declare all the implements of
war they might happen to have in their possession.^^
In spite of the activity displayed, in spite of all the means
employed, the men arrived at their depots far quicker than
did their arms at the various magazines. The factories and
the workshops could not provide monthly more than 20,000
new rifles, and about as many repaired ones.'''^ In the early
days of June, scarcely half the mobilised National Guards were
provided with muskets.^^ As for sabres, the manufacture of
which had been postponed, as bayonets had to be made first, it
was decided that even in the line the Grenadiers only should
be provided with them. Cuirasses too were lacking : " Never
mind cuirasses, send the men off," wrote Napoleon ; " cuirasses
are not indispensable in warfare." ^^ Everywhere the manu-
facture of cartridges was pressed on so as to allow 100 to each
man — fifty in the pouch and fifty in the ammunition waggons.
At Vincennes 12,000,000 cartridges were turned out in two
months. On the 1st of June the reserve supply for the Army
of the North amounted to 5,500,000 cartridges, and in all
the regiments of the first line the men — with a few trifling
exceptions — had their stock of fifty cartridges per man
complete.^"
The Government of the Eestoration had not only neglected
to restock the clothing department, which the gigantic
armaments of 1812 and 1813 had exhausted, but it had not
even provided for the outfit of the troops actually under arms.
From May 1814 to February 1815 the war department had
allowed 4,0 00,00 Of. only for clothing expenses, and of this
CHAP. I TEE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE 13
1,000,000 alone had been spent."^ The uniforms were in
tatters. In more than twenty regiments the men were
without shoes ; even in the dite corps, such as the Eoyal
Chasseurs, the horsemen had neither boots nor shirts. In the
14th Light Infantry the men had been wearing for the last
two years, winter and summer, their canvas trousers. In the
29th Eegiment of line 30,000 francs were due for the first
outfit of the prisoners sent home previous to the 1st of
January 1815 : these men served through the campaign with
policemen's caps on their heads."" The Emperor was forced to
raise the credit for equipment of his men to 3 0,0 00,00 Of, and
the "War Office estimated that it would be necessary to increase
that sum to 5 1,0 00,00 Of. in the course of the year.'^ Work-
shops opened in Paris, turned out 1,250 suits a day. "Work
meanwhile proceeded briskly at the depots, to which manu-
facturers were requested to make an advance of material under
guarantee of the several cities. Blue cloth being scarce,
greatcoats of various hues were made.^*
On March 20th the cavalry had only 27,864 horses,^^ the
artillery and the auxiliary corps 7,765. 5,000 out of these
35,629 horses had been let out to farmers in order to save
their keep ; they were hastily reclaimed for the use of the
corps.^^ The departments were put under requisition to
furnish 8,000 horses, to be paid for on arrival. At the same
time horses spontaneously offered by breeders and farmers
were purchased at the central remount depot at Yei-sailles. The
horses of the King's bodyguard and those of the Eoyal volunteers
were reserved for the Guard. The depot centres of every corps
were authorised to make purchases on the spot. Finally, the
Emperor hit on the excellent idea of appropriating half the
horses of the " gendarmerie." Each gendarme received a com-
pensation of 600 francs and was bound to find another horse
for himself within a fortnight, and this was an easy task,
considering his position in the country. Thanks to this
expedient, 4,250 horses, strong and ready trained, were im-
mediately allotted to the cuirassiers and the dragoons." The
requisition in the departments yielded more than was expected,"^
but at the central depot at Versailles the remounting pro-
gressed very slowly. It seemed that General Preval was the
14 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
very man to resume the command of this department, where he
had worked miracles in 1814. Justly or unjustly, he was,
however, suspected of Eoyalist opinions. The Emperor sent
him, or rather exiled him, to the depot at Beauvais, and
Greneral Bourcier was appointed to Versailles. The latter was
a pedant, a slave to rules, quibbling over the smallest trifles.
He would refuse any horse over eight years of age, and any
which happened to be half an inch under the regulation height.
In the midst of the war, within the month of March alone,
Preval had collected more than 7,000 horses ;^^ in the space
of two months, in time of peace, Bourcier could only raise
2,579 ! ^° In spite of this mismanagement at the beginning of
the campaign, there was a fine body of horses in the field. The
cavalry mustered 40,000 horses at the depots ^^ and with the
troops ; the artillery and the Army Service Corps amounted to
16,500.'-
Threatened by the whole of Europe, Napoleon was well
aware that he could not guard against invasion at every point
of his territory. He might even be compelled at the outset,
as in the preceding year, to confine his operations on this side
of the Oise, the Aisne, and the Marne. Even under the most
favourable circumstances his campaign must be at the same
time an offensive and defensive one. Necessary and urgent as
the reorganisation of the Army was, it was equally needful to
place all the fortified places in a state of defence. As early
as the 27th of March the Emperor had issued orders for these
preparations, but they were not carried out till between the 15 th
and 25 th April. It was necessary to wait for the reports on
the condition of the various fortresses, for instructions from
the engineering committees, the opening credit accounts, and
the creation of workshops.^^ At Metz 700 workmen were
employed daily; at Eocroi, 500 ; at Toul, 700 ; at Landrecies,
400 ; at Dunkerque, 1000 ; at Huningue, 500 ; at Grenoble,
400 ; at Cherbourg, 500 ; at Bayonne, 400 ; at Bordeaux,
200 ; at Perpignan, 150 ; in the intrenched camp at Maubeuge,
1,000. By June 15th the valleys of the Vosges and the
passes of the Argonne, were bristling with redoubts, masked
batteries, and stockades. The northern districts could be
flooded at a moment's notice, and in more than eighty towns
CHAP. 1 THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE 15
the works were either completely fmished or on the high road
to being so. Besides, in most of the fortresses there were no
breaches in the ramparts ; nothing was needed but to raise the
slopes of the counterscarps, to set up batteries, to repair the
embrasures, the " banquettes," and the glacis, and to add a few
necessary defences, and some exterior outworks.®^
More important by far were the works required at Lyons
and in Paris. At Lyons 4,000 workmen were hired. The
old walls of Fourviere were repaired, as well as the walls con-
necting the Ehone with the Saone ; " tetes de pont " were built
at Le Guillotiere and Les Brotteaux, redoubts at Pierre Seise,
at Saint-Jean, and at Croix-Eousse.^^ Owing to his fear of
estranging the Parisians by bringing them face to face with
danger, Xapoleon, though he knew the need of fortifying Paris
to be paramount, only issued the necessary orders for this on
May Ist.^ It was a serious loss of time, especially as he needed
a vast system of fortifications with uninterrupted lines, with
works in the shape of " cornes and couronnes," with redoubts
and forts crossing their fire.^" General Haxo and General
Eognet designed the plans. But not before the middle of
May were these works undertaken seriously. 1,500 men
were employed, then 2,000, then 4,000, to say nothing of
numerous bodies of volmiteers from the Guards, the line, the
National Guard, and the sharpshooters.^^ When Napoleon
started to join the army, the entrenchments and all the works
on the right bank of the Seine, undertaken first because they
covered the points most likely to be attacked, were partially
finished ; the works on the left bank were hardly begun.^*
At the same time that the work of fortification was proceeding,
the strongholds were being armed and provisioned. The
arsenals of Metz, Douai, Lille, Grenoble, and Toulouse furnished
cannon and powder to those towns where the supply of artillery
necessaries was insufficient. Furnaces also were established
for the casting of projectiles. The naval department sent from
Toulon to Lyons, via Aries and the Ehone, 100 24-pounders,
12-pounders, and 6-poimders, and 300 pieces from Brest and
Cherbourg, via Havre and the Seine, to Paris. The armament
of Paris also included 300 field gims, 100 of which were sent
out to the flying batteries. " Turn out as much cannon as
16 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
possible," wrote the Emperor ; " you must fight with cannon
as you would fight with your fists." ^°
In order to gain time Davout directed the commanders
of Army Corps to attend personally to the supply of fortified
places, with the assistance of the prefects and the other
officials.^^ This system was not unsuccessful, but it had a
dangerous tendency to develop into the practice of exactions
and extortion. There was in existence a contract concluded
between the Government of Louis XVIII. and the contractor
Doumerc. This contract was still in force. But Doumerc,
brother of the general of cavalry, was only acting really in the
interest of Ouvrard, who was a man who made light of his en-
gagements. Complaints poured in from all sides. It became
necessary to draw on the reserve supplies, in order to feed
both men and horses, Ouvrard was accused of using the
money advanced by the Treasury for speculations on the
Bourse. For the maintenance of the forces Davout was
obliged to authorise the prefects to buy at any cost, at con-
tractors' prices. This measure, if put into force universally,
would have cost Ouvrard dear. He therefore proposed a new
contract through the medium of Doumerc, which was accepted
on May 24th by Davout and Daru ; it stipulated that the
supply was to be completed within thirty days, in exchange
for payment in advance of 4,000,000 francs.^^ By the middle
of June the fortified places of the first and second lines were
supplied for an average period of four months, and the convoys
following the Army of the North carried reserve provisions for
one week.^^
More time and more money were needed to effect such
immense operations with any degree of success. The Eoyal
War Budget for 1815, which was to have been presented
to the Chambers during the April session, amounted to
2 9 8,0 00,00 Of, including 2 5,0 00,00 Of. for the Eoyal household
troops, the Swiss regiments, and pensions granted to the Emigres
and the Vend^ens.^* Even though he deducted aU expenses
on these latter items, the Emperor immediately realised that
the War Budget would have to be increased by 1 0 0,00 0,0 OOf.,^^
and this was probably too low an estimate. If war lasted,
the expenses would greatly exceed this total. Napoleon was
)iAP. I THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE 17
verse to loans, because, as he said, " he did not like feeding on
he future " ; he had besides but small faith in credit.^ In
1815 he refused to increase the taxes because of his dread of
unpopularity. Far from seeking to increase his resouices by
fresh taxation, he suppressed the tax on the transmission of
i'|Uor,^' the tax on home consumption, and the dues of entry
on drinkables, in communes of less than 4,000 inhabitants.
This reform, which histoiy has failed to record in the midst of
so many greater events, did not fail to influence public opinion
at the time. The Bourbons, who had solemnly promised to
suppress these duties, had taken good care not to change them
ne whit ; whereas Xapoleon, who had promised nothing,
abolished all those impositions which were reckoned the most
vexatious and unbearable. Among the peasants, among small
proprietors, in the comparatively influential circles of inn-
keepers and wine merchants, this reduction of taxes rallied
more people to the Emperor than those who had been
alienated by the " Additional Act " ; this Act was specially
attacked by the wits of society and professional politicians.^
An unexpected soiu-ce of supply was discovered by Napoleon
on March 20 th in a reserve sum of 50,000,000 francs at the
Treasury.^ The Minister of Finance, Baron Louis, made free
use of a part of these funds, by speculating on the Boui'se with
he Eoyal bonds: he scrupled, however, to carry them away
with him to Ghent.^*^ It was fortimate for the Imperial
Government that the overthrow of Louis XYIII. had happened
when it did ; for on 20 th March the tax-payers had paid
down but a small proportion of the three first monthly in-
stalments of the current year. On this account, a great influx
•A money came into the receivers' offices during the months
of April and May ; on the whole the taxes came in in a veiy
satisfactory manner.'"^ But the regular receipts and the
money in hand were still inadequate to meet the current
expenses ; Gaudin, by order of the Emperor, then negotiated
3,600,000 francs' worth of bonds fi-om the sinking fund,
which were covered by the same amount on credit in the
national securities. This transaction, effected with the help of
Ouvrard, produced 40,0 00,00 Of. in cash, clear of all discount.^**^
The arming, outfitting, and clothing expenses for the
2
18 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
mobilised National Guards, rated at 24,000, 000f./°^ were not
included in the War Budget. They were charged to the
account of the departments, which had to settle them out of
funds for the providing of substitutes (fixed at 12 Of. per
man), by the deduction of one-tenth of the communal revenues
and the sale of one- quarter of the wood reserves.^°^ The total
amount of freewill offerings and a reserve amounting to
6,000,0001, to be drawn on the sinking fund, were devoted to
the expenses of the National Guard.^'^^
Thanks to these resources and expedients, it became
possible at last to place France on a complete war footing.
But in how many of the strongholds work had been interrupted
for lack of money ! how many of the soldiers were still
wearing worn-out clothing ! How many of the National
Guards were waiting in the ranks, useless and discontented,
to receive their muskets ! ^^^ In May, in spite of delays and
difficulties, the men had at last received their pay.^''^ On 12th
June not more than 1000 pairs of spare shoes ^°^ were forth-
coming for the use of the Army of the North ; the bonus
usually distributed on taking the field was unpaid ; ^^ and
whilst the total sum required for the pay of the men amounted
to 5,000,000f a month, the strong rooms of the Treasury only
contained 670,000f.^'°
The extraordinary resources (viz., the balance left by Baron
Louis and the sum derived from the appropriation of
3,600,000 francs' worth of bonds) were exhausted ;^^^ the
regular receipts were already on the decrease. However
adverse the Emperor and his advisers were to enforce excep-
tional measures,^^^ they were compelled to adopt them, for
the amount demanded by Davout for the month of July alone
was computed at the sum of 7 2,0 0 0,00 Of ^^^ Consequently,
in the Budget submitted to the Chambers on 19th June
a national loan of 150, 000, 000 f. was proposed on the
guarantee of the forests of the State. All tax-payers were to
subscribe a sum equal to the total of their land and personal
taxes.-^^^ It was, in fact, a compulsory loan.
CHAi'. I THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE 19
Section III
The Emperor did not even wait till mobilisation had begun,
to organise the Army Corps. Thanks to the body of troops
concentrated round Paris by order of Louis XYIII./^^ the
numerous regiments which, from Grenoble onward, had
joined the battalion of Elba, the strong garrisons of the
northern and eastern frontier towns, Napoleon had scarcely
returned to the Tuileries when he found ready to his hand, a
great part of the elements of all necessary for forming a
mighty army. As early as March 26 th, in order to provide
against all emergencies, he speedily ordered the formation of
eight Corps of Observation. The 1st was to assemble at Lille,
the 2nd at Valenciennes, the 3rd at M^zieres, the 4th
at Thionville, the oth at Strasburg, the 6th at Chamb^ry,
the 7th at the foot of the Pyrenees, the 8 th (or Corps
of Eeserve) in Paris.^^*^ The regiments forming these Army
Corps were temporarily fixed at two battalions each. The
cadres of the 3rd battalions, and of the depots, would be
concentrated under the military government of Paris, and in
the towns of the interior, until such time when the calling
out of reserves would allow of the forming of the 4th and
5 th battalions, which would then immediately join the Army.
In the fortresses and depots the National Guards were to
take the place of the troops of the line.^^"
The light cavalry was distributed in the proportion of
one division to each Army Corps. Of the surplus of this
body of cavalry, and the dragoons, the cuirassiers, and the
carabineers, eight reserve divisions were formed, to each of
which was attached a battery of mounted artillery.^^^
On 20th March the Imperial Guard only included the
two regiments of grenadiers and the two chasseurs regiments
of the Old Guard and four cavalry regiments.^^^ The Emperor
increa.sed the effective strength of the cavalry regiments,
created a 3rd and 4th regiment of grenadiers, a 3rd and
4th regiment of chasseurs (Middle Guard), eight regiments
of voltigeurs (light troops), and eight of sharpshooters (the
Young Guard), and a second regiment of mounted chasseurs.
20 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
He reconstituted the regiment of horse artillery, the un-
mounted artillery regiment of the Old Guard, as well as the
Army Service regiment, a squadron of picked gendarmes, the
Marine Corps, and the companies of sappers and miners.^^°
The Young Guard was formed of volunteers and of men who
had formerly served in the corps, and they had special pay — a
sou per day. The men of the Elba battalion were incorporated
into the Old Guard. For the artillery and cavalry of the
Middle Guard, the " gendarmerie " and the line were put in
requisition; of these the gendarmerie gave 500 men. Each
regiment of the line was to furnish thirty picked men, tall
and healthy, with a minimum record of service of four years in
the infantry and eight in the cavalry or artillery.^^^
At the end of May, when the reserves, the mobilised National
Guards, and the volunteers had swelled the numbers of the
Army, the Emperor made a new distribution of his forces.
The 1st Corps (under Drouet d'Erlon), the 2nd Corps (under
Keille), the 3rd Corps (under Vandamme), the Army of the
Moselle, formerly the 4th Corps (under Gerard), the 6th,
formerly the 8th Corps, (under Lobau), the Cavalry Reserve
(under Grouchy), and the Imperial Guard, formed the Army
of the North, 124,139 men strong, and under the personal
command of the Emperor himself. ^^^ The 5 th Corps became
the Army of the Rhine (23,097 men, including 3,000 mobiles,
under Rapp) ; ^^^ the 6th Corps became the Army of the Alps
(23,617 men, including 13,000 mobiles, under Suchet).^^*
The 7th Corps was divided into two parts : one took the
name of the Corps of the Western Pyrenees (6,820 men,
including 3,300 mobiles, under Clausel);^^^ the other that of
the Eastern Pyrenees Corps (7,633 men, including 3,300
mobiles, under Decaen).^^^ Three new Army Corps were added
to the above by the Emperor : the Army of the West (about
10,000 men, under Lamarque),^"^^ which was told off to repress
the insurrection in La Vendue; the Var Corps (5,544 men,
under Brune);^^^ and the Jura Corps (8,420 men, including
5,500 mobiles, under Lecourbe),^^^ who were to support Suchet's
Army in defending the Alps.
Four divisions of the select National Guards, altogether
17,466 men strong, were encamped by Avesnes, Sainte
CHAP. I THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE 21
Menehould, Colmar, and Nancy ; ^^ 90,000 mobiles and 25,000
veterans were assembled in the fortified towns and in the
depots :^^' 11,223 gunners of the line,^^- and 6,000 marine
artilleiy^^ to act with 2,071 veteran gunners,^^ and 6,000
garrison artillerj.^^ 13,934 soldiers of every branch of the
service were marching in detachments to join the active
troops ;^"^ there were 59,559 qualified and disqualified of the
line,^^'^ 5,559 in the depots of the Guards ^^ (which had already
been put under contribution). To these must be added
4,700 men from the battalions stationed in the Island of
Elba^^^ and in the colonies,^""^ 8,162 men in the hospitals,"^
10,000 marine fusiliers,^*- 5,129 veteran fusiliers,^*^ 14,521
gendarmes, on horse or on foot,^*^ 12,000 custom-house ofiicers
enrolled as soldiers,"^ and 6,000 " partisans." ^^"^ Thus the
Emperor had raised the active Army fi'om a total of 200,000
men "^ to 284,000, and he had formed an auxiliary army of
222,000 men.''«
One month later, these two armies would receive an
increase of, first, 19,000 re-enlisted men who had received
marching orders before 10 th June, but had not yet joined
their posts ; ^^^ second, of several thousand re-enlisted men who
had not yet reported themselves at the depot centres of the
various departments ^°** by 15th June; third, of 46,500
conscripts of 1815 who at that date were assembled in the
chief towns of departments;^'^ fourth, of 15,000 mobilised
Guards who were already on their way to the mustering
Xwints ^^" by the middle of June. In addition to these, from
15th July to 25th September, there would be 74,000 men,
completing the contingent of 1815,^^^ and 84,000 men, form-
ing the complement of the mobilised National Guards.^^
60,000 or 70,000 more National Guards could be mobilised
at any time by applying to the departments of the west, where
it had been postponed, the call to arms, and by issuing orders
for a new summons to the field throughout the whole extent of
France.^ "^ Napoleon was not far from the truth when he said
the Army would amount to 800,000 men "^ by 1st October !
22 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
Section IV
In conformity with the Edicts of Lyons, all officers who,
having emigrated, or retired from the service during the
devolution, had returned to the Army since 1st April 1814,^^^
were struck off the roUs.^^® But as many of these officers had
held commissions, mainly in the household troops and on the
staff', this wholesale dismissal created but few vacancies in the
Army at large. The officers whose names came next in order
were enough to complete the lists. All half-pay officers were
placed in the numerous newly-formed battalions, squadrons,
and batteries, in the Young Guard, and in the federated sharp-
shooters. 2500 officers in this category were still available
in the middle of May. Napoleon paid them in full for the
time they were out of employment and despatched them to
the frontier strongholds to command the mobilised National
Guards,-^^^
Certain of the devotion of those officers who were in direct
touch with the troops, there were still many colonels and many
generals whom Napoleon had good reason to distrust. In
1814, amongst the officers of high rank many had been the
cases of weakness and treachery, of hesitation and disobedience.
Numerous changes in the upper ranks of the Army were
inevitable. But it was in the interests of the Army itself far
more than from motives of personal dislike or sympathy that
the Emperor acted in dismissing or promoting his followers.
Whilst he was pitiless towards officers who, like Augereau
and Oudinot, had shown their incapacity during the French
campaign, or their treachery, like Marmont and Souham, he
knew how to forget his grievances against those who had
from the 1st to the 20 th of March striven to change his
triumphal march into a miserable fiasco. Colonel Cuneo
d'Ornano, who had imprisoned twenty-five grenadiers of the
Guard in the citadel of Antibes, was appointed general. ^^
General Miollis, who had led the garrison of Marseilles in
pursuit of the small Imperial column, was appointed com-
mander of the stronghold of Metz. Colonel RoussiUe had
stubbornly defended the gates of Grenoble ; he was allowed to
CHAP. I THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE 23
remain in command of the 5 th of the line. Colonel Dubalen,
of the 64th, had publicly given in his resignation to Xey on the
" Place d'Armes " of Lons-le-Saunier ; he was recalled to his
regiment.^^^ Greneral Marchand might have returned to favour,
had he not refused, as he said, to " figure on the list of
traitors." ^^^ F07 had been faithful to republicanism under the
Empire ; he became a convert to constitutional monarchy
under Louis XVIII. ; in Xantes he did not place himself at
the head of the Bonapartist movement till he had done his
utmost to thwart it; nevertheless, he was given the com-
mand of a fine division in the Army of the North. Several
officers of the 10 th of the line had been promoted by the
Due d'Angoulerae during the campaign of the south ; their
promotions were confirmed.^^ Harispe and Heudelet were
deeply implicated in Bourbonist demonstrations : nevertheless
they lx>th received a command. The Emperor employed
Eapp, Belliard, Ruty, Haxo, the younger Kellermann, Gourgaud,
as though he utterly ignored the fact that they had ever served
imder the Duke de Berry with the troops assembled at Ville-
juif. " "Would you have dared to fire upon me ? " Napoleon
inquired of Eapp. " Most certainly, Sire, it would have been
my duty." And Xapoleon gave him the Army of the Rhine.^^^
On the other hand. Napoleon dismissed or relegated to the
retired list a himdi-ed officers of all ranks : ^^ Dupont, whose
dishonour at Baylen was not effaced by the favours Louis
XYIII. had conferred on him ; Dessolles, who had so weU
seconded Talleyrand in April 1814 ; Bem-nonville, Donnadieu,
and Bordessoulle, who had emigrated to Belgiimi ; Maison,
another emigri, who on being invited by the Imperial Grovem-
ment to return to France, replied that he would come back,
but with 500,000 bayonets at his back ; ^^ Curto, whose
furious utterances against the Emperor had brought about
the mutiny of the garrison at Thionville ; the Grenerals
d'Aultanne, Monnier, Ernouf, Loverdo, and Briche ; the colonels
of the 10 th Regiment of the line and the 14th Chasseurs, who
were still fighting in the south under the Due d'Angouleme, a
week after the Empire had been acknowledged by two-thirds
of France. In no wise conscience-stricken on the score of his
complicity with Marmont in the disloyalty of D'Essonnes,
24 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
Souham had good hopes of retaining his command at
Perigueux. When dismissed, however, he appeared at the
Tuileries at a public reception and attempted to move
Napoleon. " What more do you want of me ? " said Napoleon,
turning aside. " Can't you see that I do not know you any
more." '^^
At the suggestion of Davout and the commanders of the
Corps d'Armee, several colonels, majors, captains, and lieutenants
were struck off the rolls on the charge of persistent hostility. .
It is more difficult to account for the disgrace of Colonels
Moncey, Oudinot, and Zoppfell : Moncey had merely tried to
keep the 3rd Hussars faithful to the King, and this only up to
3rd March. In many similar cases the Emperor had shown
himself lenient.^'^^ Against Oudinot nothing could be alleged
save that he bore his father's name, whilst Zoppfell was merely
guilty of being a froUg6 of the Duke de Feltre. Bugeaud,
denounced as a Eoyalist, was placed on the retired list during
the month of April ; but Suchet, Grouchy, Gerard, and
Bertrand hastened to plead earnestly on behalf of " the best
colonel in the Army." He was restored and placed at the
head of the 14th of the line, and the rank of Commander of
the Legion of Honour was bestowed on him as a compensation
for his temporary disgrace.^"^
General de Bourmont was left without employment for
some length of time. He had rushed to Paris from Lons-le-
Saunier to be with Louis XVIII. At Ney's request the
Emperor gave orders for his arrest ; but Ney reconsidered the
matter, and was the first to petition Napoleon to restore him
to his command. Bourmont had served under Gerard durinic
the campaigns of 1812 and 1814, and Gerard requested he
might command one of the divisions in his corps. The
Emperor consented to this after much hesitation ; he had
great difficulty in convincing Davout, who only yielded to
formal orders from the Emperor. " Gerard answers for
Bourmont with his head," said the Emperor. " Gerard is
wrong," replied the Prince of Eckmuhl ; " I never answer for
anybody, I only answer for myself." ^'°
The Emperor, as may be seen, was lenient towards men
who had wished to fight against him, but at the same time
CHAP. I THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE 25
he did not lavishly shower rewards ou those who had com-
promised themselves for his sake from the very first. While
he appointed Major-Greneral Labedoyere brigadier, already
destined for that rank during the campaign of France, and
Mallet, commandant of the battalion of the Island of Elba ;
while he promoted Simmer, who had brought over to Napoleon
two regiments at Lyons, as lieutenant-general, and raised
Brayer to the French peerage ; still, men like Dessaix, Girard,
AlUx, Amiel, Mouton-Duvernet, Gilly, Pii-e, Proteau, Chartran,
received no privileges whatever ; they were employed in strict
accordance with the rights Ijelonging to their rank. Yet
Dessaix had accepted the government of Lyons a week before
the Emperor's retiu*n to the Tuileries ; Girard had commanded
the Imperial vanguard from AvaUon ; Allix had proclaimed
the Empire at Xevers ; Amiel had been arrested at Auxerre
as an emissar}' of Napoleon ; Chartran paid with his life
for his loyalty to the Emperor's cause ; Mouton-Duvernet,
Pire, Proteau, had ardently and efl&ciently helped Grouchy
in the southern campaign against the Due d'Angouleme.
General PoiTet de Morvan, who had led the Infantry Chassems
of the Old Guard at Sens, indulged the flattering hope of
taking Curial's place as principal colonel in the same corps ;
Curial was disgraced, but the command of the Chasseurs passed
on to Morand.^'^ Prince Jerome, Imperial Highness as he was,
only obtained an infantry diWsion. Merlin received the
three stars for having compelled the Governor of Yincennes to
capitulate, while Sebastiani, who had brought about the dis-
bandmeut of the Duke de Berry's army, was entrusted with a
mission utterly unworthy — as he rightly felt— of his merit
and his services,^ '-^ namely, the organisation of the National
Guard in the 1 6th military division. Exelmans, who was the
first to enter the Tuileries on the 20th of March, was given a
cavalry corps, but Kellermann was given one also, though he
had been employed in the army of Yillejuif. The elder Lalle-
mand, one of the principal chiefs of the northern conspiracy,
l)ecame a lieutenant-general, while his younger namesake, Lalle-
mand junior, and Lefebvre Desnoettes were merely restored to
the command of the mounted Chasseurs and of the unmounted
Artillery of the Old Guard. After the skirmish at Compiegne
26 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
Colonel Marin, who had galloped off at full speed to join
Napoleon at Auxerre/'^^ doubtless hoped for the command of
the Horse Artillery of the Old Guard, in which he had served
as major. Instead of this Colonel Duchand of the Line
Artillery was appointed.
Section V
Theee of the twenty Marshals of France, Berthier, Marmont,
and Victor, had accompanied or joined Louis XVIIL in Belgium.
The Emperor gave orders for their names be to struck ofiP.'^*
Perignon, who had stupidly compromised himself with VitroUes
at Toulouse, and Augereau, whose recent recantation could not
efface the stain of his disgraceful conduct while commanding
the Army of Lyons in 1814, were both subjected to the same
punish ment.^"^ Napoleon wished also to dismiss Gouvion-Saint-
Cyr for having disobeyed his orders after the 20 th of March,
and having ordered the troops of the 22nd division to resume
the white cockade, and Kellermann the elder, Duke of Valmy,
for having voted for the Emperor's deposition on 1st April
1814.^^^ Madame Gouvion-Saint-Cyr wrote Davout a letter
which pacified the Emperor, and the Marshal escaped with no
worse punishment than a compulsory exile to his castle at
Eeverseaux.^^^ Napoleon did not even persist in his first decision
with regard to the Duke of Valmy.^"^ S^rurier, who had also
voted for the act of forfeiture in his capacity as senator, was
yet allowed to retain his post as governor of the Invalides :
Napoleon, however, refrained from including him in the
Chamber of Peers, and this lesson was well deserved.^ '^
Like Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, Oudinot had refused to comply
with the Emperor's orders after the 20 th of March. He had
refused to proclaim the Empire in Metz until a rising of the
garrison and people forced him to do so. Relieved from his
command he did all he could to regain the favour of Napoleon.
He wrote himself to the Emperor ; he besought Davout, Suchet,
Jacqueminot, to intercede for him. " Go at once to the Emperor,"
he wrote to Suchet ; " tell him your opinion of me ; accuse
yourself, say you did not send me your letter or Ney's until
CHAP. I THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE 27
the evening of the 27th. Say that Oudinot has never forgotten
what he owes to Xapoleon, that if Oudinot has done wrong
his faults are no sooner pointed out to him but he will do
all in his power to expiate and atone for them. I sorely need
this intercession of yours for the sake of my wife and my
children, who will share in my crushing misfortune." ^^ The
Emperor revoked the order he had signed for Oudinot's exile
to Lorraine, and even consented to see him in the Tuileries,
but he left him without employment.^^^ !N'apoleon doubtless
would not have remained obdurate had there been nothing
against Oudinot except his conduct at Metz. He was more
probably influenced by the recollection that the year before
the Duke de Eeggio had been beaten at Bar-sur-Aube owing
to the unskilful marshalling of his troops on the eve of the
contest, and his fatal indecision during the battle itself.^^"-
Although Macdonald had shown himself a zealous Eoyalist,
and had spared no efforts to organise the opposition at Lyons
and Villejuif, the Emperor yet wished to give him a command.
But the Marshal, who had returned to Paris after escorting
Louis XYIII. to the frontier, was firmly resolved not to serve
under the new Government. In vain did General Maurice
Mathieu, his former chief on the staff of the Army of the
Grisons, beg him to come to the Tuileries, where the Emperor
was expecting him. In vain did Davout force himself on him
to induce him to yield ; he was inexorable. Weary of the
stmggle, the Emperor granted him the only favour he had
deigned to ask, the permission to go and live as a "bon
bourgeois " on his estate of Courcelle, near Gien.^^
After publishing a violent order of the day against Xapoleon,
Moncey had left Paris on the 20th of March. Two days later
he wrote to the Emperor that he intended to retire to the
country. Napoleon had already appointed Eo\dgo in his
stead as general inspector of the gendarmerie.^*"* But ought
not the Emperor to have remembered all Moncey had done
in 1814 at the head of the Paris National Guard, and re-
stored him to his command ? He was content to raise him
to the Chamber of Peers, together with Lefebvie, who had
held no command during the campaign in France, and had
had no employment under Louis XVIII.^^^ It is fair to say
28 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
Lefebvre was sixty-seven, and the Emperor naturally preferred
younger leaders for the Army Corps.
Massena had assisted the Due d'Angouleme during the
short campaign on the Ehone, but with evident reluctance,
and immediately after the capitulation of La Pallud, he had
hastened to proclaim the Empire. On 14th April he gave
his reasons for so doing in a report addressed to Napoleon,
which concluded thus : " I cannot conceal from Your Majesty
how anxious I am for the honour of serving you again and of
assuring you of my boundless devotion." ^^^ The Emperor con-
gratulated the Prince d'Essling in a letter ; he summoned him
to Paris and received him with great demonstrations of friend-
ship ; but notwithstanding his half promise, he decided not to
restore him to the command of the 9 th military division. To
humour the Eoyalists at Marseilles it was necessary to appoint
a man who had not already commanded them under Louis
XVIIL Massena, who was too infirm to serve efficiently with
the armies in the field, was then offered the government of
the 4th and 5th military divisions, including the Moselle, the
Meurthe, and the Vosges. The Marshal refused this post and
remained in Paris, where he showed himself most zealous in
attending all the sessions of the Chamber of Peers.^^'^
Although Mortier, Governor of Lilies, Suchet, Governor of
Strasburg, and Jourdan, Governor of Eouen, had held out for
the King two or three days after the 20 th of March, they
had not compromised themselves to the extent Oudinot and
Gouvion-Saint-Cyr had done, and the Emperor could have no
ill-feeling against them ; nevertheless he did not wish to
retain them in the posts they held under Louis XVIIL To
his mind this was a question of principle.^^^ Appointed at
first to the post of inspector of the fortresses of the north-
east stations, then to the command of the cavalry of the Guard,
Mortier was finally placed at the head of the Young Guard.^^^
Suchet received the command of the Army of the Alps,^^
Jourdan the government of BesauQon, a fortified town in the^
first line of defence, where Davout felt the presence of a
Marshal of France was needed.^^^
Prune had been in disgrace since 1807, on account, it was
rumoured, of his toleration of De Bourrienne's extortion and
CHAP. I THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE 29
peculation in the towns of the Hanseatic league ; he had
vainly applied for a new post in the early part of the campaign
of France.^^"- He was still unemployed under the Eestoration.
On the Emperor's return, Brune again offered his services.
* His abilities as administrator, which had been tested in
Belgiimi, Gironde, La Vendee, and Tuscany, qualified him for
the government of any province which remained persistently
hostile. He was sent to Marseilles as governor of the 9 th
military division ; to his duties as governor were added those of
the organisation and command of the Army Corps of the Var.^^^
On 23rd March Ney reached Paris with his troops :
that same day he started on a mission to the departments
of the north and the east. The acknowledged object of his
mission was to inspect the fortresses and strongholds, its
secret object to ascertain the state of public opinion, to
report on the officers and officials, to propose, if need be,
fresh dismissals and charges.^'^^ Ney discharged this mission
with zeal, but he had the bad taste to manifest feelings of
unheard-of violence against the Bourbons. At the officers'
gatherings he would shower abuse on King and princes.
" They are a corrupt family," ^"^ he would say. Such language
was not calculated to pacify the hostility with which he was
regarded by popular opinion at large. Even among Bona-
partists, even in the Imperial circle, his conduct at Lons-le-
Saunier was condemned. In Paris a wretched pun on his
name was in ever}' mouth : " II fallait etre ne (Ney) pour
cela." His sudden change of party did not shield him from
suspicion. " If Xey is employed during the campaign,"
wrote an anonymous correspondent to the Emperor, " he must
have a trustworthy staff"." Many reminded Napoleon of the
memorable scene at Fontainebleau, and possibly some may
have repeated to liim Xey's remark as he passed through
Dijon : " I was congratulating myself on having compelled
the Emperor to abdicate, and lo ! now I must serve him ! " ^^
The climax of all was the Marshal's huge blunder when on
his return from his tour of inspection towards the 15th of
April,^^' he apologised to the Emperor for his speech
respecting the iron cage. " The remark is correct," he said,
" for I had already made up my mind and there was nothing
30 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
better I could say to conceal my plans." Not a word did
Napoleon answer, but the Marshal saw an ominous flash in
his eyes.^^^
Stung with despair, confusion, and remorse, accusing
himself and every one else, Ney retired to his estate of Les
Coudreaux. For six weeks nothing more was heard of him.
People said he was in disgrace ; a report was even spread
that he had been arrested.^^^ He returned to Paris for the
ceremony of the Champ-de-Mai. Created Peer of France
on June 2nd, he went to the Elysee four days later to obtain
a grant of 37,000 francs, which sum was due in arrear on
his pay and his travelling expenses.^°° " You here ! " said
Napoleon ; " I thought you had emigrated ! " "I ought to
have emigrated long ago," replied the Marshal bitterly.^°^ On
1 1th June he called at the Tuileries again, but in neither
of these two meetings was any mention made of a command
for him with the Army of the North.^*^^ Ney no doubt
knew that Napoleon called him his " bete noire," ^°^ and he
dared not present his request. As he left Paris on 11th
June, a scruple crossed the Emperor's mind. Had he the
right to doom the hero of so many battles to degrading
inaction ? Could he afford to deprive France and himself
of such a soldier in the hour of peril ? He wrote to the
Minister of War: "Eecall Marshal Ney. Tell him that if
he wants to take part in the first engagements he must be at
Avesnes by the 14th ; I shall have my headquarters there." ^°'*
Napoleon thought thus to promote the interests of the Army
and his own, which were identical, and he was also prompted
by feelings of pity, as is evident by the tone of this
message. It is not an order, it is merely a piece of advice
which left Ney free to choose his course. But could Ney
choose any other course than to be present at the opening
engagements,^"^ if only in the hope of being killed ? ^^^ He
left Paris on the 12th of June, reached Avesnes on the
13th, where he dined with the Emperor; but not until the
afternoon of the 15 th, after the action had begun, did he
receive the command of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps.^°"
Since he had " passed over to the King," according to the
expression then used in the Army, Murat's name was no
CHAP. I THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE 31
longer on the list of Marshals. Three weeks before the
beginning of the campaign, deprived of throne and title,
Joachim had taken refuge in the suburbs of Toulon. He
had not even retained his sword, and he entreated the
Emperor to give him one. " I desire," he wrote, " to shed
the last drop of my blood for you." Napoleon refused. He
felt it was impossible to give a command in the French
Army to a Frenchman who had fought against it only twelve
months before. He was also irritated with his brother-in-
law because the latter, in spite of his positive instructions,
had begun the war with Austria before the proper time ;
above all, he had allowed himself to be beaten.-''*' Later, in
his musings at Saint Helena, Napoleon would regret his
decision concerning this " great leader of cavalry charges."
" At Waterloo," he would say, " the victory might have been
ours had we had Murat. What was needed ? Only a
matter of breaking through three or four English squares.
Murat was the very man to do this,"^^ And, indeed,
with his twofold gift of inspiring his men to desperate deeds
of valour and of terrorising the enemy might Murat not have
ridden down the English ?
The name of Grouchy is for ever irrevocably bound up
with the accursed memory of Waterloo, so much so that the
splendid services and the marvellous feats of this brilliant
officer are forgotten. If he coidd not rival Murat's irresist-
ible dash, like Murat, he could handle skilfully masses of
cavalry. Second commander of the Irish expedition of the
year Y., Governor of Madrid in 1808, Colonel- General of
chasseurs and light cavalry in 1809, chief of the sacred
squadron during the Eussian retreat, he had contributed to
the victories of Hohenlinden, Eylau, Friedland, Wagram,
and La Moskowa. After Yauchamps, the Emperor had
thought of appointing him Marshal of the Empire. In
disgrace under Louis XYIIL, Grouchy on March 31st was
sent to Lyons to fight against the Due d'Angouleme. Pro-
moted at last to be ^larshal, at the close of that short and
easy campaign, he was placed at the head of the Army of
the Alps, then recalled to Paris on May 8 th. The Emperor
proposed giving him the four corps of cavalry of the Army of
32 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CylMFAIGN book i
the North, and it was in the capacity of chief commander of
the cavalry that he entered Belgium on 15th June. To his
own great misfortune the very next day he was entrusted
with a post of still greater importance.
Section VI
A MATTER of great moment with Napoleon was the choice
of the Chief of the Staff. Who should take Berthier's
place ? The Prince of Wagram was neither a great soldier, a
great organiser, nor a high-minded man. But he jDossessed
extensive technical knowledge, and had shown that he
possessed also in the highest degree the gifts of a first-rate
agent. Indefatigable, conscientious, diligent, prompt in
grasping the most complicated orders, executing them in
every detail with admirable minuteness, clearness, and pre-
cision, ever punctual in transmitting them at the appointed
time, he had been a perfect instrument in Napoleon's hands.^^^
With him the Emperor's mind was at rest. The orders were
always so worded as to admit of no possibility of doubt or
hesitation as to the manner of their execution. These orders
always arrived safely, for Berthier would despatch them, if
need be, by eight different officers ^^^ on eight different routes.
Many said Berthier had become feeble in body and in mind.
Yet his correspondence in 1815 gives evidence that his pen
was still active and had lost none of its luminous precision.
The Emperor missed him sadly : he could not forget the Prince
of Wagram's services during the late campaign, and he never
gave up the hope of seeing him return to France. "That
brute Berthier ! " he would say to Rapp, " he will come back
to us, we will forgive him everything provided he wears his
uniform of " garde-du-corps " when he appears before me." ^^^
Indeed, Berthier was willing enough to return to France,
where he had left his wife, the Princess of Wagram, with his
son and two daughters. After a short stay at Ghent, he had
gone to the Castle of Bamberg, the property of the King of
Bavaria, his uncle by marriage. Early in May lie started for
the French frontier by Basle, but he could not go farther
CHAP. I THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE 33
than Stockach, where the Prince of HohenzoUern ^^^ had his
headquarters. The Allies would doubtless have preferred to
keep Berthier in their own hands as a semi-prisoner, than
to see him on Napoleon's staff. Much dejected, he returned
to Bamberg. In the afternoon of June 1st, as a regiment of
Eussian dragoons on its way to France marched past the
castle, Berthier, according to eye-witnesses, disappeared abruptly
from a mndow on the first floor, reappeared on the third floor,
and threw himself from the window there, on to the pavement
beneath.^^^ He was picked up dead, with his skull fractured.
For three weeks pre\'iously the Emperor had decided to
appoint Marshal Soult as head of the staff. Soult, it seems,
had himself applied for the post."^^
Suspected by the friends of the King, hated by Bona-
partists and by Liberals, execrated by the entire body of ofiicers,
Soult had retired to Yilleneuve I'Etang.-^^ This retreat being
conveniently near Paris, he presented himself at the Tuileries
as early as 26th March.^^'^ He certainly did not do so, to
remind the Emperor that he had spoken of him as a fool and
adventurer in his very last " order of the day " ; -^^ but after
this interview, of which nothing has transpired, Soult exchanged
several letters with Davout, who liked him. But in spite of
the Duke d'Eckmiihl's promise to take the thing in hand, the
Emperor's decision was delayed for some time. " I hope,"
wrote Soult on April 11th to the Minister of War, " that your
Excellency will be so kind as to answer the letter I had the
honour of addressing to you two days ago, in order that I
may be prepared for his Majesty's ultimate decision concerning
me." ^^^ A few days later, Soult, who had sent in his written
oath of allegiance, was invited to renew it solemnly before
the Emperor."^ The Duke of Dalmatia could now consider
his disgrace a thing of the past. On May 9 th he was ap-
pointed chief of the headquarters staff.
Soult was as much Berthier's superior, as a man of thought
and action is the superior of a good clerk. But he had never
filled the office of chief of the staff in any army corps. ^^ He
was unaccustomed to the practical workings of the sendee ;
he was deficient in the necessary qualities of industry and
accuracy. Bailly de Menthyon, who had been always con-
3
34 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
sidered Berthier's right hand, who was chief of the general
staff from 1812 to 1814, and who had twice filled Berthier's
post during the latter's absence ; Drouot, deputy - head
of the general staff of the Imperial Guard ; Belliard, chief
of Murat's staff from 1805 to 1808, and deputy-head of the
general staff during the two campaigns of Saxony and of
France ; Reille and Drouet d'Erlon, both former heads of the
staff of Lannes; Bertrand, so long aide-de-camp to the
Emperor, accustomed as field-marshal to receive and transmit
orders ; Gerard, ex-chief of Bernadotte's staff ; Euty, chief of
the artillery staff in the " Grande Armee " of 1813; also a
number of other generals, would have been far more fitted to
replace the Prince of Wagram. But from considerations of
rank or etiquette, the Emperor desired to have a marshal of
France for chief of the headquarters staff, Now, not one
among the marshals was more qualified for the post than
Soult himself, save Davout and Suchet. At the moment when
France was busily engaged in military organisation, on the eve
of a war which would include so wide a range as La Vendee,
the northern frontier and the Pyrenees, when a political crisis
might occur at any moment, it was of the highest necessity
to keep Davout as Minister of War and Governor of Paris. ^^^
But there was Suchet, who had been formerly chief of the
staff under Joubert and Massena. Merely with regard to
the moral effect on public opinion, it would have been a
happy inspiration on the part of the Emperor, had he given
Suchet the preference over Soult — Suchet, who was above
mistrust and suspicion ; while Soult might without any risk
have replaced the Duke d'Albufera as commander of the
Army of the Alps, as this post was far less conspicuous and
would not have attracted the attention of the public. Had
this been done, the great scandal might have been avoided
of having for the highest military personage after the Emperor
and the Minister of "War, the one man among all the generals
who had made himself the most detested by the Army at large,
under the Royalist regime.^"^
Soult, before his appointment had been officially announced,
sent an order to Vandamme ; that irascible general retorted
by writing to Davout the following letter, remarkable for its
CHAP. I THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE 35
delicate sarcasm : " I have received a letter from the Duke of
Dalmatia in which he announces himself as chief of the
headquarters staff. I think it my duty to send it to your
Excellency before replying to it. As the Duke of Eagusa might
send me the same announcement, I must consider this as not
having taken place, until informed of the appointment by
your Excellency or by an Imperial decree." ^*
Secjtion VII
Before he dealt with the marshals, the Emperor had already
appointed to the highest posts, many generals who might
aspire to the marshal's baton, and whom he had mentally
promoted long ago. He reckoned on finding amongst those
men, " who had still their way to make for themselves," as he
said, more zeal and devotion than in his former comrades who
were already laden with glory and honour. Therefore he gave
the 1st Army Coi-ps to Drouet d'Erlon, commanding a division
in 1805, who had fought at Jena and Friedland, and who had
proved one of Soult's and Massena's best lieutenants in the
Spanish wars. Eeille obtained the 2nd Corps : he was a
veteran of the Italian campaigns, commander of a di\dsion in
1807, then head of a division of the Guard at Wagram, and
commander-in-chief of the Ai'my of Portugal at the end of
1812. Gerard had the 4th Corps ; he had been colonel at
AusterHtz, brigadier at Jena, lieutenant-general at the Moskva ;
one of the heroes with Xey, who fought in the long-drawn
struggles of the Eear Guard in the retreat from Eussia, and the
only officer of his rank who had led an army corps during
the campaign of France. The 5 th Corps, ultimately the Army
of the Ehine, was entrusted to Eapp, a man of twenty-two
wounds, the celebrated defender of Dantzig ; commander of a
division in 1805, he had acted as aide-de-camp to Napoleon
for twelve years. Mouton, count of Lobau, second to none in
the art of handling troops, commanding a division in 1807,
received the command of the 6 th Corps, which was then being
formed in Paris. Charles Lebrim, son of the Duke de Plaisance,
and a distinguished cavalry general, was placed for the time
36 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
being at the head of the 3rd Corps. The Emperor proposed
to give his place in course of time to a more " able man," "^^ and
by the middle of April he gave this Corps to Vandamme.
Napoleon disliked this rough soldier, as disagreeable a man as
could be found ; but his great soldierly qualities, his claims in
seniority of rank (he had commanded a division at the
age of twenty -seven in 1799), marked him out above all
others, for a command. This command he discharged, so long
as he was his own master, with supreme conscientiousness,
firmness, and zeal, careful of all details of organisation, equip-
ment, and military instruction, prompt to check all tamperers
and alarmists, ardent in kindling the spirit of the soldiers,
of the mobilised, and the inhabitants of the Meuse and the
Ardennes. Davout's eulogy on Vandamme was well merited :
" You have infused your own ardour into the whole country
where you are." ^^"^
Sent to Bordeaux to proclaim the Imperial Government,
Clausel, who had distinguished himself in Italy and Spain, re-
mained there as governor of the 1 1th military division. He also
received the command of the Corps of the Western Pyrenees.
General Decaen, veteran of the Ehine and Vendeen campaigns,
for six years governor of the Ile-de-France and the He Bourbon,
had sincerely endeavoured to keep Bordeaux faithful to the
King; like the Duchess of Angouleme herself, he had been
compelled to yield to the force of circumstances. He returned
to Paris and started again at the end of May for Toulouse.
The Emperor had entrusted to him the command of the 8th
and 10 th military divisions and the Corps of the Eastern
Pyrenees ; Decaen would have been wiser had he applied for
a corps in the Northern Army instead of accepting this post,
which was political as well as military. Owing to his previous
attitude at Bordeaux, he was doomed either to incur the
suspicion of the Emperor, if he did not show sufficient zeal,
or to become an object of intensified hatred to the Eoyalists, if
he acted with the sternness demanded by circumstances. He
chose the latter course, as he was bound by duty to do, and
the name of Decaen was soon abhorred throughout the length
and breadth of Languedoc.^^'^
Lecourbe had been struck off the lists in 1804, for having
CHAP. I THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE 37
in full court, expressed his indignation with regard to the trial
of his comrade Moreau, but was restored to his rank by Louis
XVIII. At Lons-le-Saunier he had striven hard to prevent
the desertion of Marshal Ney ; but on the report of the latter,
Napoleon gave orders for Lecourbe's arrest. However, he
presented himself at the Tuileries, to protest his devotion to
the Emperor, Only too delighted to attach to his cause, this
experienced officer, who passed as a republican, and whose
name was still popular among the veterans of the armies of
Sambre-et-Meuse, Ehine, and Switzerland, the Emperor gave
him the command of the Corps of the Jura.^^^
On the 20 th of March, Lamarque had assumed on his own
account, the command of the fortress of Paris. Supplanted
two days later by G-eneral Hullin, who had filled the post from
1807 to 1814, he was appointed to a division in the Corps of
Keille ; then he was sent to La Vendee as general -in-chief of
the Army of the West. He had formerly fought against the
troops of the Abruzzi and the guerillas of the Sierras of
Aragon. His knowledge of iiTecjular warfare marked him out
to operate against the Vendeens."^
General Durosnel, formerly aide-de-camp to the Emperor,
received the post of second in command of the National Guard
in Paris — Napoleon being nominally the first. Durosnel
could boast of eminent services in the cavalry; but while
Moncey, Ornano, Hullin, D'Heriot, Lespinasse had been
present in Paris during the campaign of 1814, he was a
prisoner in Dresden, and only returned to France after the
war was over. This accounts for his ignorance of what the
National Guard had done, and above all, of what it was capable
of doing ; thus he was ill qualified for its command. He
might have made up for his inexperience by zeal and energy,
but he was thwarted by his staff, which was composed of secret
Eoyalists and bigoted Liberals.-^ Far from infusing a spirit of
patriotism and self-sacrifice into the National Guard, he soon
fell a prey to the same feelings of selfish caution, which ani-
mated the most influential leaders of this mercenary militia.
Entrusted with the revision of the officers of the staff -^^ he set
about his task with studied carelessness, as if he wished
merely to give satisfaction to the Emperor. He could not
38 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
avoid striking off the names of officers who were too notoriously
implicated, such as Decazes and Eemusat ; but he retained
men like Major Billing, the intimate friend of Comte, editor of
the Censeur, and Acloque, commander of the " Legion " who
forbade the band to play the popular air " Let us watch over
the Empire " under pretext that it was an incendiary tune.
Warm supporters of the Emperor were dismissed, notably
Major Beck, the only superior officer of the 6 th Legion who
had fought at the Buttes Chaumont in 1814, Captain
Albert, who had made the voyage to the island of Elba, and
Captain Olivier, who had equipped half his company at his
own expense.^^^
Added to this, Durosnel left no stone unturned, first to
prevent the creation of the federate sharpshooters, then to
delay their organisation. " To arm such men," he said,
" would be to create uneasiness and discontent among the
National Guards." The truth was that, had they been under
the exclusive command of half-pay officers, with a leader who
was the exact opposite of Durosnel, such as the enthusiastic
and high-spirited General Darricau, a man who had won his
steps at Toulon, in Egypt, with the Grande Armee, and in
Spain, the National Guards would have effectually contributed
to the defence of Paris. As Carnot and Davout justly re-
marked, the creation of these battalions of workmen could
be criticised unfavourably, by none save cowards or enemies.^^*
The appointments in the Army were made by the Emperor
motu 'proprio, or on the suggestion of Davout. In a few
instances appointments were made directly by the Minister of
War.^^* Davout was not infallible, any more than Napoleon
himself Of these a few were unfortunate, some were pitiable.
Berkheim and Millet, who had never served but in the cavalry,
and Molitor, commanding a division in 1809 (at the age of
thirty-two), whose eminent military gifts fitted them to be with
the armies in the field, were appointed to command the National
Guards ; while Marcognet, a second-rate man, and Donzelot,
who had lost all his military habits during the seven years he was
governor at Corfu, obtained each a division in the 1st Corps
of the Army of the North. A few days after being relieved of
his command, the colonel of the 14th Chasseurs, one of the
4
CHAP. I THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE 39
most devoted officers of the Duke d'Angouleme, was proposed
for a mobilised regiment. Another colonel, who had proved
such a coward under fire that he had to be relegated to the
retired list, was proposed for a line regiment.^^"" Finally, Greneral
Moreau, the pusillanimous commander of Soissons in 1814,
who only escaped capital punishment through the fall of
Napoleon, was given the command of a brigade on active
service.-^*^ The Emperor might well say : " It seems to me
that among the general officers, there are many young men
who are more clever than those who hav^e been proposed
to me." 237
Overworked, and a prey to the gravest anxieties, the
Emperor would often ratify Davout's proposals without ex-
amining them. He would then lay all the blame on his
minister; for Davout, the Minister of War, was, it appears, little
liked at the Tuileries, on account of the stiff and severe
manner in which he discharged his duties. The Imperial
circle never failed to criticise severely any doings of his, which
were in any way censurable.'^ As an additional guarantee for
the military staff, the Emperor entrusted to his aide-de-camp,
Flahaut, the revision of the propositions of the Minister of
War. " Collect as far as you possibly can," he wrote, " all the
information obtainable, respecting the generals and officers, for
if I make any unfortunate choice, I shall hold you responsible."^^
Flahaut was an excellent staff officer, remarkably brave, and
had shown himself as brilliant a rider at Friedland and
Moskva, as he was a skilful diplomatist at Neumark and
Lusigny. And yet it was believed he owed his extraordinary
success to favouritism alone. Indeed, he had been appointed
a general of division at twenty-eight, though up to that time
(1813) he had only commanded a squadron. For so yoimg
a lieutenant-general, it might have been better to decline the
mission entrusted to his care, a most delicate one to fulfil in
conjunction with such a man as Davout."-*" At all events, he
might have performed it with more discretion and with no
less zeal. He spent several hours a day at the War Office,
overturning the dossiers, examining the accounts, striking out
on his own authority the names of candidates entered on the
rolls, and even giving orders which flatly contradicted those
40 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
of Davout. Nor were his selections any better ; ^^^ in spite of]
his loyalty and intelligence, the aide-de-camp of the EmperorJ
could not judge more wisely than Davout himself. The Prince *
of Eckmiihl deeply resented this inquisition, from which, how-
ever, he was soon delivered,^*^ He expostulated with the,
Emperor himself, telling him he would not remain an houri
longer at the War Ofiice, did he not deem it cowardly to,
resign at such a time.^*^
To conclude, among the officers provided with commissions, I
some were incapable, some were prematurely worn-out, others
were disloyal at heart ; yet the leaders of the last Imperial
Army formed an admirable body as a whole. We may even
say that, unless a repetition of such revolutions and wars as
occurred between 1789 and 1814 were to arise, the French
Army will never again have such chiefs. Independently of
their innate military qualities, they possessed the strength of
experience and the virtue of youth. They had all fought for
more than twenty years, yet they were all under fifty.
Napoleon was forty-six ; Davout, forty-five ; Soult, forty-six ;
Ney, forty-six ; Grouchy, forty-nine ; Drouet d'Erlon, forty-
nine ; Lobau, forty-five ; Lamarque, forty-five ; Kellermann,
forty-five ; Eeille, forty-four ; Vandamme, forty-four ; Eapp,
forty-three ; Clausel, forty-three ; Suchet, forty-three ; Pajol,
forty-three ; Gerard, forty-two ; Drouot, forty-one ; Exelmans,
forty. All of these were commanders of army corps or of
cavalry corps. Among the generals of division several, such
as Alten, Pire, Flahaut, Berckheim, Teste, were under forty.
The youngest brigade - general was La Bedoyere ; he was
twenty-nine.
Section VIII
These men, who had so often led the French to victory,
were, unfortunately, more conspicuous for their physical
strength and military talents, than for their confidence in the
triumph of their cause. They knew only too well the magni-
tude of the preparations of Europe, and the comparatively
small resources of France in point of men and material ; they
realised that but for a series of lucky accidents of fate, such as
CHAP. I THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE 41
are of course always possible in war, the Emperor with his
small army could never long resist the overwhelmiug strength
of the coalition. On 10th June, as he passed through La Fere,
Greneral Euty, commander-in-chief of the artillery, said to
Colonel Pion des Loches : " Bonaparte is doomed without
greater resources. The King will return before long. What
is to become of us ? — this miserable army that did not want
to fire a shot three months ago ! " In a gathering of officers,
the day before crossing the Sambre, another general spoke in
such a discouraging tone that Major Xegrier, in spite of the
rules of discipline, stopped him sharply : " It is not for you,"
he said, " to express such feelings. Om* bed is made, we must
lie on it' Do not try to demoralise us." Confidence was at
a low ebb even among the general officers who were among
the first to declare themselves for Napoleon, urged to do so by
their sympathies or the force of events, and who, deeply com-
promised as they were, ought to have understood that it was
their best policy to raise the spirits of their comrades. But
they were all anxious, when they realised that their lives were
at stake in this desperate game."**
Discord reigned in the general staffs. The generals who,
without being ardent Eoyalists, would yet have preferred to
end their career peacefully under the Bourbons, scowled on
the conspirators of 20 th March, who had plunged their
country into a perilous venture and provoked a frightful war.
These men were suspected by the others and denoimced
as officers without energy, lukewarm patriots, shameless
Eoyalists. Fiercer than ever grew the competitions, rivalries,
jealousies, respecting promotion. However cautious the
Emperor had been in granting rewards to his true adherents,
the other generals found that after the first battle these alone
would win promotion and rewards. On the other hand, those
who had first rallied to the Emperor's standard, were amazed
to see men like Soult, Durutte, Bruny, Bourmont, Dumonceau,
still in the Army. General Pire objected to the insufficiency
of the bonus on taking the field first : " Such flagrant neglect
of private interests," he said, " often ruins the general cause."
General Mathieu insisted on retiring, to avoid serving imder
Clausel, who was his junior. Duhesme, placed at first in the
42 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
3rd Corps, was sent into the Young Guard. " He cannot
possibly," wrote Davout, " serve under Vandamme." General
Bonnet accused General Ornano of having prejudiced the
Emperor against him ; he challenged him and shot him through
the lungs. Vandamme, who had a corps of 18,000 men under
him, complained to the Minister of "War that generals who were
his juniors had commands of far greater importance. Gressot
wrote to Soult that the generals of the Khine Army, were
unanimous in expressing their regret at being led by Eapp,
" Eapp being an utter nonentity." If it had not been the
actual day for beginning the campaign, many a general would
have refused to serve under the Prince of " la Moskva " ; only
with the greatest reluctance did Vandamme and even Gerard
serve under the command of Grouchy. An officer of the
Emperor's staff wrote to Davout : " Each one of us regards his
neighbour as a crusader involved in the same adventure, but
towards whom he has no duties." ^^"
As to the good fellowship and loyalty to each other
between the generals of 1815, we need only refer to the noble
words pronounced by Cambronne before the court-martial : " I
refused the rank of lieutenant-general, because there were so
many who were jealous. You saw what happened at Waterloo ;
we had a leader of great repute. Very well, he was powerless
to put everything in order. They would have said my ap-
pointment was by favour and that I was too young. They
might have left me in the lurch, and I did not care to run
the risk of endangering the safety of the whole Army." '^^^
On the other hand, the soldiers, and nearly all the sub-
alterns, were filled with enthusiasm and confidence. While
the generals saw things as they really were, the soldiers were
once more dreaming the dream of glory from which they had
been awakened by the invasion, but which they could not
believe had ended. The Emperor's return had been pro-
phesied for a whole year in all the barrack-room ballads and
marching songs — lo ! had he not returned at last ? In
the opinion of the soldiers. Napoleon was invincible. If he
were defeated in 1812, it was by the snow and the cold; in
1814, because he was betrayed. This belief, always encouraged
by the Emperor, was well adapted to keep up the spirit of the
CHAP. I THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE 43
Army ; unfortunately, as an anti-climax, it led to distrust and
disbelief in all but Xapoleon himself. Defeat was only possible
in case of treachery, but then the soldiers imagined traitors
to exist everywhere. "Do not employ the marshals during
the campaign," somebody wrote to Napoleon. Complaints and
denunciations poured into the War Office and to the officials at
the Tuileries, concerning officers who had shown leanings
towards the Bourbons or Orleanists imder the preceding reign,
or who were merely guilty of having a handle to their
947
name."
At the advanced posts of the Army of the Ehine, a sentinel
fired on a man who was trying to swim across to the Grerman
side. A rumour spread among the troops, that on his dead
body a note was found, indicating the existence of a plot to
blow up the powder magazine of Strasburg.-'*^ The commander
of Conde, Colonel Taubin, pleaded as an excuse for certain
delays in provisioning the place that " he could not make himself
obeyed," and maddened by the reply of the deputy-chief of
the 1st Staff Corps, who wrote sternly that "an officer who
cannot make his men obey is not fit to command," Taubin
instantly blew out his brains. The garrison believed that the
colonel had killed himself for fear of being called before a
court-martial as accomplice in some conspiracy.^'*^ While the
minds of the men were filled with fears of treachery,
it is easy to imagine the feelings produced in the 1st
Kegiment by the distribution of defective cartridges. This
certainly was no trifling matter, for the artillery authorities at
Lille had distributed to the 19th and 42nd Eegiments of the
line, ball cartridges containing, not gun-powder but bran, clay,
and iron filings. The director of the artillery was kept under
surveillance by Drouet d'Erlon, who had long suspected him ;
the latter reported to Davout " that for some time he had
suspicions of the man's opinions." Davout ordered an inquiry,
which, like most inquiries, led to no results. No one could ever
discover why, or how, or when, these extraordinary cartridges
found their way to the magazine.^^"
Discipline, which even in the armies of Aust^rlitz and
Wagram had not been nearly as strict as might be imagined,
was still further impaired by this universal mistrust coupled
44 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
with the impression caused by the events of the past year.
The soldiers were not inclined to obey chiefs who were capable
(they suspected) of treason, or " ragusade " as they expressed
it, or to respect their chiefs who, only three months previously,
were leading them against the Emperor, and who now pro-
fessed ardent feelings of loyalty towards him. Only those
officers who by word or deed had incited and urged their
men to rebel, during the period from 5th March to 20th March,
only those retained their authority, and even they could not
always do so. Six officers of the 1st Cuirassiers, who had been
promoted one rank higher by the Emperor for having gained over
the regiment, were regularly installed in presence of the troops.
The Cuirassiers received them with groans and shouts, crying,
" We have done as much as you, and we have received neither
promotion nor reward." In more than one brigade, it was
hoped that most of the officers would make way for their
subordinates. In many addresses from the regiments to the
Emperor they petitioned for the dismissal of their colonel.
"We claim," wrote the dragoons of the 12 th Eegiment, " the dis-
missal of our colonel, whose ardour in the cause of your Majesty
is not by any means equal to our own devotion." " We are con-
vinced," wrote the officers and soldiers of the 75 th Eegiment
of the line, " that it is your Majesty's intention not to keep a
single traitor at the head of a French regiment." ^^^
There was yet another reason for the decline of discipline.
Deceived by appearances, as almost all the world was at that
time, the soldiers imagined that the revolution which had
brought back the Emperor to the Tuileries, was entirely their
work.^^^ Napoleon was indebted to them for the throne ; and
consequently they imagined the cry of " Vive I'Empereur ! "
entitled them to any license. Had not Davout declared that
the desertions of the soldiers which took place during the
recent events, amounted to proofs of devotion towards the
Emperor ? Did not the wise Drouot himself advise the re-
incorporation into the ranks of the Old Guard, of all those
sub-officers who had been cashiered in 1814, for deserting their
colours owing to their " grief at the departure of his
Majesty " ? ^^^ What examples for an army !
On March 26 th the dragoons of the Guard arrived from
CHAP. I THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE 45
Tours. They learnt on the quays that the Emperor was in
person, reviewing the troops. It was a year since they had seen
their idol ! They got beyond the control of their officers, filed
through the gateway of the Louvre, and burst in upon the
Place du Carrousel at quick trot, bespattered with mud
on their smoking horses, with cries of " Vive I'Empereur ! "
A few days later, dm-ing an inspection with open ranks, the
dragoons of the line followed their own cue ; suddenly the first
rank faced right about, and both ranks raised their swords
and crossed them over the head of Napoleon. The Emperor
bent his head laughingly and finished the inspection under
this canopy of steel.^" This frenzy of devotion towards
Napoleon might excuse such breaches of discipline and un-
soldierly freaks, but there were faults of a far graver
character. At Orgon, on their march from Pont-Saint-Esprit
to Marseilles after the capitulation of La Pallud, Grouchy 's troops
committed the greatest excesses, under the pretext that the
previous year, when Napoleon passed through the town on his
way to exile, the inhabitants threatened to hang him.^^^ At
Aire (Pas-de-Calais) the 105th Eegiment of the line on its
way to the frontier, began pulling down a newly-built house
because its frontage was decorated with the royalist Jleurs de
lis; the commander of the garrison had no other means of
quieting the soldiers than to put the unfortunate owner of the
house into prison. At Aix the artillery, offended by the sight
of young Eoyalists walking about with huge white roses in
their buttonholes, rushed upon them with drawn swords and
dispersed them."''^ At Saint-Germain the sharpshooters of
the Young Guard mutinied and refused to enter their
barracks, because there was no tricolor flag over the entrance
door. In the theatres the soldiers maltreated those spectators-
who did not cheer the Marseillaise. In the cafes they beat
those who refused to shout "Vive I'Empereur !"^" In Belgium^
where they had just arrived, every man plundered right and
left. " Marauding and pillage are rampant in the Army now,"
wrote Eadet, general of gendarmes, to Soult on the 1 7th ;.
" the Guard itself sets the example. Forage magazines have
been plundered, horses have been stolen. Plunder has been
going on all night in the homes of Belgians who gave us
46 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
everything willingly and nursed our wounded. The men
flatly defy the authority of the gendarmerie. I beg to tender
my resignation as Provost-Marshal of the Army." ^°^
Several regiments refused the biscuit -bread. Friant
complained that the grenadiers of the Guard were taking
women in their train. A voltigeur of the 96 th threw down
his arms to go and see his parents ; on his return after a
week's absence the captain merely gave him a trifling dis-
ciplinary punishment.^^^ 292 soldiers of the 39th and 59th
Eegiments of the line declared they would desert, if they were
not passed on into the Guards. The men of the Transport Corps
who had followed the Emperor from Grenoble got incorporated
into the 1st Hussars, and the Hussars from the same regiment,
had themselves enrolled with the Guards.^^° General Barrois,
under whose command a division of the Young Guard was
being formed, received this singular petition : " Monsieur le
comte, there are 1374 of us of the 1st and 2nd infantry of
the line who have always served with honour. We think it
our duty to warn you, that we do not intend to stay any
longer in our present regiments. Although we have nothing
to complain of, we have served in the Guard, and to the
Guard we intend to return. It would not be wise to stop us,
for our minds are made up irrevocably. You can prevent
the error we contemplate, by obtaining our return into the
Guard. We will wait four days, but no longer. Our colonels
are warned." ^^-^
Eivalries between the corps led to brawls and duels. The
Emperor was compelled to countermand a mere detail of dress
viz. the white shoulder -knots hitherto worn by the five
cavalry regiments bearing the No. 1, as they provoked the
jealousy of all the other regiments."*^^ The soldiers from Elba
were quartered in the " Hotel des Cent Suisses " on the Place
du Carrousel, and some few enthusiasts had put over the
entrance a new inscription, " Quarters of the Heroes." The
other heroes of the Army, Bonapartists though they were,
took umbrage at this. The old soldiers of the 1st Empire
were quizzed by their comrades of the line, and even by the
Old Guard. Swords were drawn, and the inscription had to be
effaced.2^^
I
I
CUAP. I THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE 47
But if the Army was weakened by its lack of discipline,
it was filled with eagerness to fight, resolution to conquer,
idolatry of the Emperor, and hatred of foreigners. A spy
wrote from Paris to Wellington in the middle of the month
of May : " To convey an accurate idea of the enthusiasm of
the Army, I need merely point a parallel between the
period of 1792 and the present year. The balance still would
certainly be in favour of Bonaparte, for now it is no longer
a question of mere enthusiasm, but of positive fren2y. The
cause of the soldiers, who have nothing to hope, after the fall
of their chief, is inseparably linked with his own. For this
reason I must not conceal from your Excellency that, in spite
of all the Bourbonists may say, the struggle will be a bloody
one, and will last to the bitter end." " The excitement of the
troops," according to General Hulot, " was at its highest pitch,
their ardour amounting to fanaticism." On Jime 15 th Greneral
Foy writes in his diarj^ that " the moment for taking the field
has been admirably chosen. The troops are thrilled, not with
patriotism or enthusiasm, but with positive frenzy on behalf of
the Emperor and against his enemies." It was in all sincerity
that Adjutant-Major Gordon, himself a deserter and traitor,
sent the following information to Clarke : " The King on his
return will have to disband the Army and to create a new one.
The soldiers are infuriated ; their temper is frightful ! " '^
" The temper of the soldiers is frightful," meaning that
aU the soldiei*s were clamouring to be re^-iewed by the
Emperor himself. They hailed the new eagles with enthusiastic
cheers and threatening oaths. They answered the cries of
" Vive I'Armee ! " with shouts of " Vive I'Empereur ! " They
put little tricolor flags in the barrels of their muskets. They
swore with swords crossed over flaming punch-bowls, that they
would conquer or die. " He will be with us," -"^^ they said,
pointing to the bust of the Emperor. They erected at their
own expense a monument at the Gulf of Jouau. They had
medals struck to commemorate Xapoleon's return. They gave
up their pay for one, two, or five days, in order to contribute
to the expenses of the war. They left their garrisons and
marched through towns and villages shouting, " Vive I'Em-
pereur!" and singing "Le Pere la Violette." They tore to
48 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN bk. i ch. i
shreds, the white flags of the Eoyalists and put them to the
vilest uses. They took it upon themselves to arrest all
traitors, and they beat them with the butt -ends of their
muskets. They snatched deserters from the hands of the
gendarmes and degraded them on the spot, without further
ceremony. They would fain have doubled their marches to
take part in the first battles. They declared they needed no
cartridges, as they meant to rush on the enemy with fixed
bayonets. They said " they did not care a rap for their skins
provided the Emperor thrashed the Allies ! " ^^^
Such was the Army of 1815 — impressionable, critical,
without discipline, and without confidence in its leaders,
haunted by the dread of treason, and on that account, perhaps,
liable to sudden fits of panic ; it was, nevertheless, instinct
with warlike aspirations and loving war for its own sake, fired
with a thirst for vengeance ; it was capable of heroic efforts
and furious impulses ; it was more impetuous, more excited,
more eager for the fray than any other Kepublican or Imperial
Army after or before it. Napoleon had never before handled
an instrument of war, which was at once so formidable, and so
fragile.
I
BOOK I CHAPTEK II
THE PLANS OF CAMPAIGN
I. Project for the invasion of Belgium in the early part of April.
II. Plan of campaign of the Allies.
III. Napoleon's plan of campaign.
IV. Concentration of the French Army (8th to 14th June) — Arrival of the Emperor
at Beaumont — Strength and positions of the armies on the 14th of June.
Section I
On the 25th of March 1815, when the sovereigns at Vienna
were forming a seventh coalition against France, the forces
they could bring into the field to meet any sudden attack of
Napoleon on Belgium, amounted to 80,000 soldiers at the
most — 30,000 Prussians, 14,000 Saxons, 23,000 Anglo-
Hanoverians, and about 10,000 Dutch and Belgians.^
The Saxons were still inclined to mutiny,- and defections
amongst the Dutch and Belgians were to be expected. Most
of the latter had served under Napoleon; and in Brussels,
throughout the " Walloon " country, specially the provinces of
Namur and Liege, which had suffered most during the stern
Prussian occupation, there was a strong French party.^
Posted aU the way from Treves and Coblentz to Courtrai
and Antwerp, over an extent of seventy miles, the allied troops
had begun to concentrate * as early as the 15th of March ; but
this would not have prevented Napoleon from crossing the
Belgian frontier with 50,000 men on the 1st of April,^ and
from entering Brussels three days later with perfect ease.
Wellington was in Vienna, Bliicher in Berlin. The French
would not have met with the slightest resistance, for the Prince
of Orange and Greneral Kleist, who commanded the Prussian
4
50 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
Army in the Ehenish provinces, had decided, in case of attack,
to operate with combined forces on Tirlemont, eleven leagues
to the east of Brussels.^
Would this easy success have been sufficient to bring
about an insurrection in Belgium, as the Emperor hoped ? In
any case, without deceiving the military authorities, the
occupation of Brussels would have created a profound impression
in France and abroad. The Prussian generals, the Prince of
Orange, Wellington himself, dreaded this sudden attack.
" Brussels must be protected," Muffling wrote to the King of
the Netherlands, " lest this city should become the focus of the
Ee volution." " It would be of the greatest importance to
Bonaparte," Wellington wrote to Gneisenau, " if he could make
us withdraw behind Brussels, drive back the King of France,
and overthrow the government established here by the King of
the Netherlands. This would have a terrible effect on public
opinion." '' But this bold stroke which had suggested itself to
Napoleon, was abandoned as soon as conceived,^ though he knew
it might be executed with ease and certainty. He realised
perfectly that a defeat inflicted on the tenth part only of the
forces of the coalition, would be considered by the Allies as a mere
brush with the advanced guards,'' and that such a victory, even
though it might result in a rising in Belgium, would by no
means terminate the war. By crossing the Sambre on the 1st of
April, he would endanger his future for the sake of a fleeting
success ; for the ex-royal army, though able to furnish at a
moment's notice 50,000 excellent troops, was in no condition
to bear the brunt of a campaign of any length. Men, arms,
horses, supplies, all were lacking, and the Emperor could not
conduct operations in Belgium and reorganise the Army at the
same time. Besides, a corps of 50,000 men could not be formed
without drawing on the garrisons of the departments of the
north, where the population was hostile to the Empire, and
without employing the men of the Paris reserves, which
were intended, in case of pressing necessity, to act in the west,
where the Vendeen chiefs were still disturbed, and in the south,
where Bordeaux, Toulouse, Marseilles still acknowledged the
authority of the Due d'Angouleme, who was preparing to march
upon Lyons.-^°
CHAP. II THE PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 51
If the military condition of France made it impossible for
Napoleon, as a leader, to enter the field hastily, he was also
hampered, as a sovereign, by the political situation. A week
only having passed since he had resumed the sceptre, it was
impossible for him to leave the seat of government to go and
fight, unless imperative circumstances compelled him to do so.
It was much more needful to reorganise the administration, to
fill the treasury, to pacify the country. To win the hearts of
the French, who were all so eager for peace, would it not be a
questionable stroke of policy to invade Belgium ! Would not
the taking of Brussels be counterbalanced by the terror of
seeing Napoleon, who had only just come back to France, step
once more into his seven-league boots and rush to win fresh
conquests ? The Emperor had another reason, which out-
weighed all the others, for not beginning the war till he had
exhausted all means of conciliation : like his people, he desired
to preserve peace, if only for the time being.^^
For more than a month the Emperor persisted in believ-
ing peace was possibla " If we have war ^- . . . " he still wrote
to Davout on the 30 th of April, and with Davout he had no
need to dissemble. But, however obstinately he clung to his
illusions, he did not fail at the same time to take every
measure for defence. He had called out the reserves, he had
mobilised the National Guards ; he had given orders for the
collection of all kinds of warlike supplies, and it was not till
the middle of June, when he had almost given up all hope of
avoiding war,^^ that he drew out his plan of campaign.^*
Section II
From the beginning of April the Allies were making their
preparations. There were several schemes under consideration.
Knesebecke actually proposed to deceive Napoleon by putting
him in possession of a false plan. " We will make the enemy,"
he said, "imagine that we mean to operate by Basle, that
he has nothing to fear from the English Army, which will be
engaged at the siege of Dunkerque, nor from the Prussian
Army, which will remain on the defensive. We will thus draw
52 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
Bonaparte between the Marne and the Upper Ehine against
the Austrian, Bavarian, and Eussian armies, while the English
and the Prussians will easily advance upon Paris." ^'^
Schwarzenberg renovated the science of war by gravely
declaring that the Allies should neither " divide their forces
too much, lest they weakened their strength, nor march in
large masses, lest they might not find sufficient for their
sustenance." He concluded they ought to march on Paris in
three strong columns, " leaving details of the operations to
the individual lights and experience of the Generals-in-
Chief." i«
The plan devised by Gneisenau, which was formidable and
crushing, was founded on the enormous numerical superiority
of the Allies. Gneisenau said : " Pour great operating armies,
the fourth of which (the Eussian Army) will form the Eeserve,
will enter Prance simultaneously and march straight on to
Paris. Whatever happens to one of the three armies of the
first line, whether it be beaten or not, the two others will
continue to advance, leaving detachments in their rear to watch
the fortresses. The mission of the Eussian or reserve army, is
to retrieve any misfortune which may overtake either of the
armies of the first line. To that end, it will bear down at
once to the help of the retreating army, or harass the enemy's
flank. Supposing Napoleon beats one of the armies of the first
line, the other two, still marching forward, will gain ground and
draw nearer Paris, while the army of Eeserve will succour the
defeated army. If Napoleon, instead of pursuing the defeated
army, bears down on the flank of another army of the first line,
the Eeserve will join the latter, in such a way that the battle
must turn to the enemy's disadvantage. Meanwhile the third
army will continue to advance, and the troops which received
a check at first will recover themselves and start anew on their
offensive march." ^^
Wellington wished to begin hostilities without waiting
for the arrival of the Eussian Army, and even before the
three armies had completed their concentration. He wrote on
the 10th of April: "It will suffice to bring between the
Sambre and the Meuse 60,000 Anglo-Dutch, 60,000 Prussians,
and 140,000 Austrians and Bavarians, to find oui"selves in
CHAP. II TEE PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 53
France with forces far superior to those of the enemy, and free
to manceuvre in the direction of Paris." Earnestly anxious to
protect the interests of Louis XVIII., Wellington felt that
every day the truce lasted only made Xapoleon's power the
firmer; and convinced of the importance of the Hoyalist
operations in the south, he desired to second them by prompt
action on the northern frontiers.^^
At Vienna no such haste was desired- They meant to
make war indeed, but war without risks. The idea was to be
at least three to one in each battle, and to win "according to
mechanical rules and the laws of gravitation." ^^ The Council of
War held on the 1 9 th of April, under the presidency of the Czar,
decided that to give sufficient time for the various armies to
concentrate their forces, the campaign should not begin before
the 1st of June.^ This was one month wasted, in the opinion
of Wellington and Bliicher ; one month gained, according to
Knesebeck and Schwarzenberg. The latter even hoped to gain
another month when the strategical plans were discussed.
In fact, on the 10 th of June, when Bliicher, although he
had had the distraction of a rebellion of the Saxons,^^ was
becoming " enraged " at his enforced inaction, and was telling
his soldiers of his impatience to go and fetch the pipe he had
left in Paris,^' Schwarzenberg had induced the sovereigns to
accept his final plan, the execution of which was deferred till
the 27th of Jime or the 1st of July.^
According to these new dispositions, six armies were to
cross the French frontier simultaneously : the Army of the
Netherlands (93,000 English, Hanoverians, Brimswickers,
and Dutch-Belgians -^ under Wellington) between Maubeuge
and Beaumont; the Prussian Army (117,000 men under
Bliicher -'') between Philippeville and Givet : the Eussian
Army (150,000 men^ under Barclay de Tolly) by Saarlouis
and Saarbruck; the Army of the Upper Pthine (210,000
Austrians, Bavarians, Wiirtembergians, and Hessians ^ under
Schwarzenberg), the right wing by Sarreguemines, the bulk
by Basle. These four great armies would march on Paris
concentrically, the English by Peronne, the Prussians by Laon,
the Eussians by Xancy, the Austrians by Langres.
On the extreme left, the army of Upper Italy (38,000
54 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
Austrians ^^ and 12,000 Piemontese ^^ under Frimont) and the
Austrian Army of Naples (25,000 men^'' under Bianchi) were
to pass the Alps, the former advancing on Lyons, the latter
making for Provence, where the English squadron of the
Mediterranean would second their operations.
Section III
Through secret reports from Vienna and Brussels, and
through the foreign newspapers (the press was most incautious ®^
at that time). Napoleon was tolerably well informed of the
strength and projects of the enemy. Two plans of campaign
presented themselves to his mind.^^
The first plan consisted in massing round Paris the 1st,
2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th Corps, the Guard, the Cavalry Reserve,
and the Army of the Rhine (or 5 th Corps) ; in concentrating
by Lyons the Army of the Alps and the Corps of the Jura ;
and in allowing the enemy to fight within this network of
military strongholds, which were all well supplied and
defended by about 150,000 men — mobilised national guards,
pensioners, gunners of the line, veterans, custom-house officials,
gendarmes, and the city national guards.^^ The allied armies,
which were not to cross the border till the 1st of July, could
not arrive within the radius of Lyons before the 15th or the
18th, and the radius of Paris before the 25th.^* By the 25th
of July the intrenchments of Paris would be finished, and
the garrison would muster 30,000 regulars, 18,000 sharp-
shooters, and 36,000 national guards. The army concentrated
round Paris would number 200,000 men;^^ and there would
be left about 80,000 men at the depot centres,^*^ and 158,000
men learning their drill or under training.^^
Of the 645,000 allies entering France. 75,000 would
have to operate in Lyonnais and Provence. 150,000,^^ owing
to his innumerable lines of operation, must perforce be left
by the enemy in his rear to guard his communications and
to besiege or cover the strongholds. The fom- great armies,
on arrival between the Oise and the Seine, would have
dwindled to 420,000 men. Against these 420,000, NapoleonJ
CKAP. II THE PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 55
would oppose 200,000 mobiKsed troops and the intrenched
camp of Paris. He would repeat the campaign of 1814, but
with 200,000 soldiers instead of 90,000,^' and with Paris
strongly fortified, defended by 80,000 men, under the govern-
ment of no less a man than Davout, the able captain of
Auerstaedt and Eckmiihl, the stern defender of Hamburg.
The second plan, which was bolder, more worthy of the
genius of Napoleon, of the French temperament, and even of
the principles of la grande guerre, though it was infinitely
more hazardous, was to attack the enemy without giving him
time to concentrate his forces. By the 15 th of June the
Emperor would be able to assemble an army of 125,000 men
on the northern frontier. He would enter Belgium ; he would
beat in turn, or separately, the English and the Prussians ;
then, as soon as new reinforcements had arrived from the
depot centres, he would effect a junction with the 23,000
men under Rapp, and would bear down upon the Austro-
Eussians.
If the military question had been the only one to consider,
doubtless the Emperor would have adopted the first plan, the
success of which seemed certain."*® But he was not free to act,
as he had been in 1805, or even in 1812. Chief of the
Army as he was, he had to reckon with public opinion.
What an impression would be produced in the country were
he to leave defenceless, a third of his territory — those very
provinces, too, which were most patriotic, most devoted to
the Imperial cause ! *^ Would he not provoke universal
despondency and disaffection ? would he not excite the ill
feeling of the Chamber to the pitch of open hostility ? would
he not spread through the west, and rekindle in the south,
fresh sparks of insurrection ? The Emperor felt that, in order
to raise the spirits of all, to silence the discontented and the
fiictious, he must win a glorious victory on the very outset of
the war. With his usual illusions, he imagined such a
victory would be conclusive — enough to break up the coalition.
The Belgians, he thought, will rally to the French flag, and
the destruction of Wellington's army, will lead to the downfall
of the Tory cabinet and the advent of a peace ministry in
England. If circumstances turned out difterently, then the
56 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
Ai'my, victorious in Belgium over the Prussians and English,
could not fail to be victorious also in France over the Russians
and Austrians.^^ At the worst, granting a check on the
Belgian frontier, it would be possible to fall back on Paris
and to operate on the defensive plan.^^ But the Emperor,
nevertheless, did not hide from himself that, in the event of
a defeat in Belgium, his first plan, to which he would have
to return, would have greatly diminished chances of success.
He would have suffered severe losses, the morale of the army
and the country at large would be lowered, he would provoke
the Allies to march into Prance a fortnight earlier, and
decidedly, through the impossibility of attending to everything
at once, he would be compelled to neglect in some degree the
organisation for defence.*^
The Emperor pondered lengthily over these schemes.^^
When he had made up his mind to act on the offensive, he
still hesitated for several days, before deciding at which point
he would strike his first blows/*^ To ensure the success of
his plan, which was to beat, one after the other, the two
armies occupying Belgium, he would have to attack "Wellington
or Bliicher, before they could effect the junction of their
forces. If he directed his line of operations against Brussels
through Ath, and debouched from Lille or Conde against
Wellington's right, he would merely drive the English Army
towards the Prussian Army, and two days later he would
find himself face to face with their united forces. If, on the
contrary, he marched against Bliicher's left through Givet
and the valley of the Meuse, in the same way he would still
hasten the union of the hostile forces by driving the Prussians
to the English. Inspired by one of his finest strategical con-
ceptions, the Emperor resolved to break boldly into the very
centre of the enemy's cantonments, at the very point where
the English and Prussians would probably concentrate. The
road from Charleroi to Brussels forming the line of contact
between the two armies, Napoleon, passing through Beaumont
and Philippeville, resolved by this road, to fall like a thunder-
bolt on his foe.
CHAP. II THE PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 57
Section IV
The orders for concentration were issued early in June.
The 1st Corps proceeded from Valenciennes to Avesnes ; the
2nd from Avesnes to Maubeuge ; the 3rd from Rocroi to
Chimay ; the 4th from Thionville to Eocroi ; the 6th from
Soissons to Avesnes ; the Imperial Guard from Paris to
Avesnes,^^ vid Soissons.
Communications between Belgium and the Ehine provinces
were intercepted ; in the sea-ports all vessels were laid under
an embargo, even the fishing-boats ; and for fear of giving any
hint to the enemy's advanced posts, bodies of volunteers
and divisions from the National Guard were posted along
the frontiers of the north and the east, to replace troops
which were summoned to the various meeting-places.*^ When
Napoleon, who had left Paris by night, arrived at Laon at
twelve on the 12 th of June, all the troops were still on the
march. Grouchy's troops were an exception ; they had not
yet stirred, though Grouchy's headquarters were in Laon
itself. Summoned to the Emperor's presence, Grouchy stated
that he had received no orders.*'' This was the truth, for not
till that very day (12th June) did the chief of the staff at
headquarters send him Napoleon's instructions *° from Avesnes!
But immediately after seeing the Emperor, Grouchy issued
orders to the four cavalry corps that they were to make for
the frontier by forced marches ; and he himself started off to
Avesnes without losing an hour's time. In this way the
concentration was not delayed, since the whole Cavalry
Reserve were beyond Avesnes on the night of the 13th; but
several regiments had been compelled to ride for 20 leagues
without drawing rein, — wretched preparation indeed for
horses at the opening of a campaign ! ^^ The misfortune was
that this incident, which foreboded evil, failed to arouse the
attention of Napoleon to the negligence of the chief of the
staff at headquarters.
On the 13th of June the Emperor slept at Avesnes ; on the
evening of the 14th he moved his headquarters to Beaumont,
the centre of his army.^"" That night, in spite of bad weather.
58 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
all the troops bivouacked in order to keep well together.^^
At the sound of the rdveil the Emperor's order of the day was
read out to them : " Soldiers, to-day is the anniversary of
Marengo and Friedland, which twice decided the fate of
Europe. We were too generous then, as we were too generous
after Austerlitz and Wagram, And now, banded together
against us, the sovereigns we left on their thrones, conspire
against the independence and the most sacred rights of France.
They have begun by the most iniquitous aggression. Let us
march to meet them ; are we not the men we were then ? " ^*
The positions of the Army were as follows : — The 1st Corps
(20,731 men under Drouet d'Erlon "), forming the extreme
left, between the road from Avesnes to Maubeuge and Solre-
sur-Sambre ; the 2nd Corps (25,179 men under Eeille^^),
between Solre-sur-Sambre and Leers; the 3rd Corps (18,105
men under Vandamme^^); and the 6th Corps (10,821 men
imder Lobau ^^) between Beaumont and the frontier ; the
4th Corps (15,404 men under Gerard ^^) between Philippeville
and Florenne ; the Cavalry Keserve (13,144 men under
Grouchy *'^) at Valcourt, at Bossus, and at GayoUe ; the
Imperial Guard (20,755 men®^) before and behind Beaumont.*'^
This army had 370 pieces of heavy artillery .^^ The ground
covered by the Ibivouacks did not exceed 8 leagues in breadth
by 10 kilometres in length.
In ten days 124,000 men, separated by distances
varying from 10 to 70 leagues, had assembled on the
frontier, within easy cannon range of the enemy's advanced
posts, before the Allies had taken a single defensive measure.
Never was a concentration march better planned or better
carried out, save for trifling delays quickly remedied.
While the French Army had massed in such imposing
numbers, the English and Prussians were still scattered over
a front line extending over more than 35 leagues, and of
an average breadth of 12 leagues. On the 14th of June,
Bliicher's headquarters were at Namur. The 1st Corps
(30,800 men under Zieten®^), which formed the right of the
Prussian Army, occupied Thuin, rontaine-L'Eveque,Marchienne,
Charleroi, Moustiers, Fleurus, Sombreffe, and Gembloux ;
the 2nd Corps (31,000 men under Pirch I. ^^), Namur,
CHAP. II THE PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 59
Heron, and Hannut ; the 3rd Corps (23,900 men under
Thielmaun ^^), Cinej, Dinant, and Huy ; and the 4th Corps
(30,300 men under Bulow^^), Liege and Tongres.*'^
The cantonments of the army of Wellington, who had
established his headquarters at Brussels, extended from the
Lys and the Scheldt to the little river of La Haine, The
2ud Corps (27,321 men under Lord Hill^^) occupied Leuze,
Ath, Audenarde, Ghent, and Alost ; the 1st Corps (30,246
men under the Prince of Orange""), Mons, Eoeulx, Frasnes,
Seneffe, Nivelles, GTenappe, Soignies, Enghien, and Braine-le-
Comte ; the Cavalry Corps (9913 men under Lord Uxbridge '^)
was encamped along the Dender, between Ninove and
Grammont; and the Eeserve (25,597 men under the direct
command of "Wellington "^) in Brussels and its neighbourhood.
In the positions which they occupied, three days were
necessary for each of the two armies to concentrate on the
line of contact, and double that time to concentrate, as the
case might be, on the right wing of the English troops or
the left wing of the Prussians."^ This imusual extension of
the cantonments, so perilous with an adversary like Napoleon,
and so favourable to the success of his boldly conceived plan,
I has been criticised by nearly all military %vi-iters. "Wellington
sought to justify these dispositions, by pointing out the
difficulty of keeping the troops supplied with food and the
necessity of protecting all points."* The truth is, that though
they admitted the possibility of an attack from Napoleon,
and though they had made arrangements to parry it eventu-
ally, they believed such an attack to be more than improb-
able. On the 15th of June, at the time when the Emperor
had already set foot on the Belgian territory, Wellington was
calmly expounding, in a long letter to the Czar, his intention
of taking the offensive at the end of the month."^ A few
days before, Bliicher had written to his wife : " We shall soon
enter France. We might remain here another year, for
I Bonaparte will never attack us." "^
BOOK I CHAPTEE III
THE FIKST ENGAGEMENTS
I. Passage of the Belgian frontier (15th June) — Desertion of General de
Bourmont.
II. Taking of Charleroi.
III. Interview between Napoleon and Ney — Battle at Gilly w^ith the right
wing.
IV. Ney's operations on 15th June — Battle at Gosselies — Battle of Frasnes —
Quatre-Bras.
Section I
At half-past three in the morning of the 15 th of June, advanced
posts of the French crossed the frontier at Leers, Cour-sur-
Heure, and Thy.^ Carrying out the marching orders issued
from Imperial headquarters the evening before, the Army
marched on Charleroi in three principal columns : the left
column (Corps of Eeille and Corps of Erlon by Thuin and
Marchienne) ; the central column (Corps of Vaudamme, Corps
of Lobau, Imperial Guard, and Grouch y's Cavalry Eeserve) by
Ham-sur-Heure, Jamioulx, and Marcinelle ; the right column
(Corps of Gerard) by Elorenne and Gerpinnes.^
The Emperor had arranged everything from a pro^getic
point of view, to effect a rapid transport of these masses, and
to spare his men the enervating fatigue of aimless tramping
to and fro ; his dispositions from a tactical point of view were
all designed to facilitate, in case of any serious resistance from
the enemy, the prompt deployment of the columns, and their
mutual assistance. The breaking up of the bivouacs took place
at intervals of half an hour, the troops nearest the frontier
starting on their way at three o'clock in the morning, those
farthest off at eight o'clock. Only twelve regiments of cavalry
BK. I CH. Ill THE FIRST ENGAGEMENTS 61
led the way. The other mounted troops had directions to
advance on the left of the infantry. The sappers of each
army corps were to keep together, and to march in each
division, behind the first regiment of Light infantry. Three
companies of pontoniers with fifteen pontoons and fifteen boats,
were appointed to follow immediately after Vandamme's corps :
the ambulances were to start in the rear of the Imperial
staff. Orders were given to burn any vehicle that might
try to slip in with the columns, and not to allow the baggage
waggons or ammunition waggons, to approach the Army within
a distance of three leagues, till further notice. The generals
who commanded the advanced guards were ordered to regulate
their march so as to remain always on a line with one
another ; they were to send out scouts in every direction, to
question the natives about the enemy's position, to seize all
letters in the post-offices, and to communicate their informa-
tion in frequent reports to the Emperor, who would be in
person at the head of the central column. The bulk of the
Army must have crossed the Sambre before noou.^
These orders are justly considered as perfect. Napoleon
had never issued marching orders which were more carefully
studied or better thought out, even in the happy days of
Austerlitz and Friedland. Never had his genius been more
brilliant, never had he exhibited to such perfection, his atten-
tion to detail, his broad grasp of the whole, his clearness, and
his mastery of the science of war.
Unfortunately his orders were not faithfully executed.
Drouet d'Erlou preferred to take his own course and started
at half -past four,^ instead of breaking up his camp at three, as
he had been ordered. Vandamme, who should have started at
three, was at five, still awaiting instructions fi'om the Imperial
headquarters ; during the night, the officer who had been sent
with his marching orders, had fallen from his horse and broken
his leg, and had lain all night alone and helpless in the
open field. Vandamme was warned of the Army's march only
by the arrival of Lobau's corps from the rear of his camp.^
Finally, the troops of Gerard, which should have been on their
way at three, did not meet at the gathering-point, which was
on the heights at Florenne, till seven o'clock.^
62 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
Great agitation reigned in the 4th Corps. They had just
heard that General de Bourmont, who commanded the head
division, had passed over to the enemy's ranks. This deser-
tion confirmed in the most untimely manner, the fears of
treachery, the mistrust of their generals, which had been tor-
menting the minds of the soldiers for the last three months.
Murmurs and imprecations arose from the ranks. One of the
brigadiers of Bourmont, General Hulot, " judging the moment
was critical," harangued the two regiments under his orders ;
sword in hand, he gave them his solemn oath " he would fight
with them against the enemies of France to his last breath." ^
Gerard in his turn passed along, in front of his troops and
addressed a few words to them ; they answered him by loud
cheers.^ Gerard was personally very much distressed by the
desertion of his protege Bourmont, all the details of which
were related to him later by Hulot.
Shortly after five o'clock in the morning, at Florenne,
Bourmont had mounted on horseback with his whole staff,
Colonel Clouet, chief of the Villoutreys squadrons. Captains
d'Andign^, de Trelan, and Sourda, and an escort of five
lancers. Once beyond the French outposts, he had given
the corporal of the chasseurs, a letter for Gerard written
in Florenne, and had dismissed him with the rest of the
escort, and with the other officers had galloped off in the
direction of the frontier.^ In his letter to Gerard he wrote :
" I refuse to join in establishing in France, a sanguinary
despotism which would ruin my country. ... I woidd have
resigned and returned home had I thought I should be left
free to do so. This seemed so unlikely, that I am obliged to
ensure my liberty by other means. ... I shall never be seen
fighting in the ranks of the foreigner. . . . They will get no
information from me which could injure the French Army,
composed of men whom I love and shall ever continue to
regard with deep affection." ^° m
Two hours after having written this protest that he was a
deserter but not a traitor, Bourmont revealed to Colonel von
Schutter, commander of the Prussian advanced posts on the
Sambre, that the French would attack Charleroi in the course
of the afternoon." Shortly after, he told Colonel von Keiche,
I
CHAP. Ill THE FIRST ENGAGEMENTS 63
aide-de-camp to Zieten, that the French Army amounted to
120,000 men.^" Finally, at three o'clock, when he met
Bliicher at Sombreffe, he would doubtless have shown the same
eagerness in answering all questions the latter could ask.
But the old warrior, indignant that a man wearing the
uniform of a general of division, could desert on the morn-
ing of a battle, hardly condescended to speak to him. An
officer of the Prussian staff having pointed out to the old
Field-Marshal that he should not treat Bourmont so rudely,
since the latter wore a white cockade, Bliicher, little caring
whether he was imderstood or not by the traitor, who probably
knew Grerman, said out loud, " Cockade be hanged ! a cur
must always be a cur ! " ^
Section II
The enemy could afford to dispense with Coimt de Bour-
mont's information. As early as the 9th of June, Zieten and
General Dornberg, who commanded the light cavalry brigade
detached before Mons, were perfectly well informed on all the
great movements of the troops towards the frontier. On the
12th, General Dornberg had sent to "Wellington, who in tm-n
had forwarded it on to Bliicher, the news that 100,000 French
were concentrating between Avesnes and Philippeville. On
the 13th, the same Dornberg,' who had numerous spies on the
frontier, wrote directly to Bliicher that an attack seemed im-
minent. On the IVth, Pirch II. announced from Marchiennes,
that the French would attack on the following day. In the
evening the Prussian outposts were thoroughly well-informed
respecting the proximity of the Imperial troops. In vain had
tl ey taken the precaution of making their bivouac fires in
the hollows of the ground, for the glow of these innumerable
fires was reflected on the sky, which glowed with a great
white radiance.^*
Though they did not believe Napoleon would take the
offensive,^^ Wellington and Bliicher had agreed to provide for
such an emergency as early as the 3rd of May, in an inter-
view at Tirlemont.^^ Had they specially decided that day, as
many historians declare, that they would concentrate on the
64 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
line of Sombreffe-les-Quatre-Bras ? This is doubtful, as they
did not know whether the French Army would debouch by
Philippeville, Maubeuge, Cond^, or Lille. More probably the
two Commanders-in-Chief had merely arranged for a junction
before Brussels, without specifying any precise spot, which
circumstances alone could decide.^'^ The day after the con-
ference at Tirlemont, Blucher, ever zealous for the common
cause, ordered a general movement of his troops to their right,
that they might be nearer the English Army. The 1st Corps
concentrated at Fleurus ; the 2nd at Namur ; the 3rd Corps
marched from Treves to Arlon, then on to Dinant and Huy ;
the 4th came from Coblentz to Malmedy, and shortly after
to Li^ge. Bliicher transferred his headquarters from Li^ge to
Namur.^^ Zieten, who commanded the 1st Army Corps, which
was nearest the English cantonments, received instructions to
keep in close contact with the army under Wellington.
" In case of attack," Blucher wrote him on the 5th of May,
" you will await at Fleurus the development of the enemy's
manoeuvres, and you will send the news to "Wellington, and to
me with the greatest possible dispatch." ^^ Wellington, relying
on the promise made him by Blucher at Tirlemont, to cover
the left flank of the English Army, had drawn up his forces
in dchelons in such a manner as to protect specially the roads
of Ath, Mons, and Nivelles ; ^° he would thus be prepared
to meet any attack from Charleroi. Before noon on the 14th
of June, the Field-Marshal, warned by reports from Pirch II,
and Dornberg, began taking measures towards a concentration
of the whole of his army on Fleurus.^^
All through the night of the 14th, the outposts of Pirch
II., which covered the van of Zieten's corps, expected to be
attacked at dawn. They received the French tirailleurs with
a volley of musketry ; then, fearing lest they should be out-
numbered, they retreated step by step, from position to position,
to the Sambre. In these various engagements, at Thuin, at
Ham, in the woods of Montigny, at " La Tombe " farm, the
Prussians lost about 500 men, killed, wounded, or taken
prisoners.^^ Still driving their enemy before them, the heads
of the French columns reached the banks of the Sambre,
between nine and ten o'clock ; Bachelu's division, from Eeille's
CHAP. Ill THE FIRST ENGAGEMENTS 65
corps, in front of Marchienne; Pajol's cavalry in front of
Charleroi, The bridges were barricaded and defended by
infantry and cannon. The attack of Marchienne, too elabor-
ately prepared, lasted two hours. It was nearly twelve before
the 2nd Light Infantry succeeded in clearing the bridge with
fixed bayonets. Eeille immediately sent up the 2nd Corps ;
but the bridge being very narrow, the four divisions and the
cavalry could not come to the front, till the middle of the
afternoon. The 1st Corps, which was following Eeille's, did
not begin to cross the Sambre tiU half-past four,^^
Pajol was also detained for a long time at the entrance
of the bridge of Charleroi. Between nine and ten, the 1st
Hussars attempted a hurrah, which was at once silenced by the
continued firing of the sharpshooters, who lay in ambush in
the houses, and behind the barricade. Infantry were needed
to carry this position. Pajol resigned himself to wait for
Vandamme, who was, he thought, following at a short distance.
It must be remembered that Vandamme's corps had broken
up its camp, four hours after the time appointed. Towards
eleven Pajol, to his surprise, beheld not Yandanune, but the
Emperor himself, arriving with the marines, the sappers of the
Guard, and the Young Guard of Duhesme. On learning Yan-
damme's delay, Xapoleon instantly ordered Duhesme's division
to leave its place in the central column, and to proceed with the
greatest haste towards Charleroi by a cross-road. The sappers
and the marines made a rush on the bridge, and swept away
the barricade, clearing the way for Pajol's squadrons. The
Prussians were already in retreat. The horsemen at full
trot, moimted the steep and winding street which traverses
Charleroi from south to north, and pursued them to the point
where the two roads diverged. Pajol dispatched the 1st
Hussars to the road to Brussels, to reconnoitre on the left and,
with the bulk of his cavalry, dashed up the Fleurus road, in.
the wake of the retreating Prussians whom he had dislodged
from Charleroi" ^^
Section III
It was now a little past noon.'^ The Emperor, amid the
cheers of the inhabitants,-^ passed through Charleroi and halted
5
66 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book I '
at the foot of the crumbling glacis, some few hundred yards
before the branching off of the Brussels and Fleurus roads, near
a little public-house called La Belle-Vue. From thence the
whole valley of the Sambre could be plainly seen. He got off
his horse, sent for a chair from the Belle-Vue, and sat down
by the side of the road. The troops defiled past him. As
soon as they saw him, the infantry and the cavalry cheered
lustily, the sound of their voices completely deadening the
roll of the drums and the shrill calls of the bugles. The
enthusiasm bordered on frenzy ; soldiers broke from the ranks
" to embrace the horse of their Emperor." ^"^ According to an
eye-witness, Napoleon soon fell into a doze and the uproarious
cheering was powerless to rouse him.^^ This singular fact
does not seem impossible, if we remember that during April
and May 1815, in Paris, the Emperor was constantly subject
to these sudden attacks of drowsiness ; ^^ and that day at noon,
he had been seven or eight hours in the saddle.
Gourgaud, who had accompanied the 1st Hussars on the
road to Brussels, came back towards two o'clock with the news
that the Prussians were appearing in great force at Gosselies.
The Emperor dispatched him instantly to Marchienne, with
orders to General Keille to march on Gosselies. Uneasy,
nevertheless, about his left flank until this movement had
been executed, he posted, at a distance of two kilometres from
Charleroi, on the road to Brussels, one of Duhesme's regiments
of the Young Guard, and a battery of horse artillery. Shortly
after, he commanded Lefebvre-Desnoettes to hurry off to the
assistance of the 1st Hussars with the light cavalry of the Guard
(lancers and chasseurs), and he dictated to Soult a letter for
d'Erlon, enjoining the latter to march on Gosselies, and second
Reille.^° This letter had just been dispatched — it was then
a little after three o'clock — when Ney appeared on the scene.^^
Ney bad arrived at Avesnes on the 13 th of June in a post-
chaise, without his chargers and with a single aide-de-camp ;
he found next day he could get no conveyance to take him to
Beaumont, save a peasant's cart. At Beaumont, in the morning
of the 15 th, he had bought two chargers belonging to General
Mortier, who was disabled by a sudden attack of sciatica, and
he had ridden to Charleroi on the outskirts of the columns.
CHAP. Ill THE FIRST ENGAGEMENTS 67-
The soldiers recognised him ; they seemed pleased to see him
again. " All will go well now," thej cried, " there is ' Eed-
head!'"32
The Emperor, who was also desirous that "all should
go well," said to the Marshal, " How are you, Ney ? I am
very pleased to see you. You will take the command of the
1st and 2nd Army Corps. I give you, besides, the light
cavalry of my Guard, but do not make use of it. To-morrow
you will be joined by Kellermann's cuirassiers. Now you can
go ; drive the enemy on to the Brussels road, and take up
your position at Quatre-Bras." ^^
On the ground, in presence of the enemy, the grand strate-
gical plan conceived in Paris by Napoleon, grew into shape
and developed. He had only expected on this, the first day,
to bear down towards the supposed point of junction of the
allied armies, and if possible to get in advance of it. But
now, since his adversaries gave him time, he would extend
his field of action, and make it impossible for them to unite
at all. As the bulk of the English forces was coming from
Brussels, and that of the Prussians from Namur, the two
armies must necessarily effect their junction by the high-road
from Namur to Nivelles which runs to Sombrefife, and crosses
the road from Charleroi to Brussels at Quatre-Bras. The
Emperor desired, therefore, to post his left wing at Quatre-Bras,
and his right at Sombreffe.^ He himself would establish his
quarters at Fleurus, the summit of the triangle formed by these
three points, and on the following day, he would swoop down
with his Eeserve on that portion of the enemy's forces which
should first come up. If both of them retreated, he would gain
Brussels without firing a cannon-shot.
Grouchy arrived just as the Emperor had finished giving
his instructions to Marshal Key, who started immediately.
An hour before, Grouchy, with the dragoons of Exelmans, had
penetrated to the bridge of Charleroi, over which the Young
Guard was still defiling. Impatient to join his first cavalry
corps, which he supposed was in action, he had outdistanced
the column and galloped off to GiUy. After having recon-
noitred this position, he came to the Emperor to await
his orders. The latter immediately got on horseback, anxious
68 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
to judge for himself. It was now past three o'clock ; the
dragoons of Exelmans had finished defiling through, in the
rear of the Guard, and now the head of Vandamme's column
appeared at Charleroi.^^
General Pirch II. had posted his division behind Gilly,
his front being covered by the muddy stream of Le Grand-
Eieux. Four battalions and one battery occupied the slopes of
the wooded heights which overlooked the valley from the
abbey of Soleillemont as far as Chatelineau ; three other
battalions were in reserve near Lambusart ; and a regiment
of dragoons kept watch on the Sambre, from Chatelet to
Farciennes.^^ Deceived by the length of their line of battle,
an extension which was precisely intended to mislead the
French, Grouchy roughly estimated the enemy's forces at
20,000 men.^^ At the first glance the Emperor declared there
were not more than 10,000 at the outside. He arranged the
plan of attack with Grouchy, whom he invested verbally with
the command of the right wing.^^ One of the divisions under
Vandamme, seconded by Pajol's cavalry, would attack the
enemy in front ; Grouchy was ordered to ford the stream with
Exelmans' dragoons near the mill of Delhatte, and take the
enemy in flank. The Prussians might then be pursued as far
as Sombreffe, and there Grouchy was to halt and take up his
position.^^
Having given these orders, the Emperor returned to
Charleroi in order to hasten the march of Vandamme's corps.*"
It would have been wiser far had he remained at Gilly. In
his absence, Vandamme and Grouchy took two hours to arrange
their plan of attack. Towards half-past five the Emperor,
surprised at not hearing the sound of cannon, returned to the
field and commanded Vandamme to make a headlong rush
against the enemy instantly.*^
After a short cannonade which silenced the fire of Pirch's
guns, three columns, two battalions each, dashed up with
crossed bayonets. The Prussians of the first line did not wait
to receive the shock. On an order from Zieten, Pirch made
them retreat without losing a second. Enraged at seeing
these battalions retire without any loss, the Emperor ordered
one of his aides-de-camp. General Letort, " to charge and crush
CHAP. Ill THE FIRST ENGAGEMENTS 69
the Prussian infantry " with the squadrons under his command.
Letort did not even take the time to assemble his four
squadrons. He dashed off with the dragoons only, trusting
the others to follow as soon as they were ready ! He passed
the stream to the north of the road, by that part of the gorge
which was the least steep, recrossed the road of Sart-Allet in
front of Vandamme's columns, and fell upon the retreating
Prussians. Two out of the four battalions of the enemy
succeeded in gaining the cover of the woods of Soleillemont ;
but the two others, formed in squares, were broken and cut
down. Those men who escaped took refuge in the woods, the out-
skirts of which were occupied by the 1st Kegiment of Western
Prussia. During the pursuit, a bullet struck Letort in the
stomach, and he fell from his horse mortally wounded. He
was a kind and fearless leader and the dragoons worshipped
him; and they avenged his death by slaughtering all who
came within reach of their long swords.*^
During this engagement Exelmans' dragoons, with the
Burthe and Vincent brigades at their head, debouched above
Chatelineau ; they overthrew Colonel Moisky's regiment of
dragoons, drove a battalion from the Pironchamp woods,
and threw them back on Lambusart. Here all the troops
of Pirch had rallied and made a stand against the enemy.
Attacked simultaneously by Exelmans' dragoons and the light
cavalry of Pajol, who had preceded the columns of Vandamme,
the enemy retreated beyond Fleurus.*^ Grouchy had person-
ally directed the attack on the right. Though the day was
waning, he was anxious to carry Fleurus, which he knew was
defended by only two battalions,'*^ and to drive the Prussians
as far as Sombrefife, in accordance with the Emperor's orders.
But Vandamme, who had already begun to form his camp
between Winage and the Soleillemont woods, distinctly refused
to go any farther, saying his troops were too tired, and that, at
any rate, " he would take no orders from the commandant of
the cavalry." ^* Grouchy, who could not attack Fleurus without
infantry, remained near the village at a distance of two cannon-
shots. The corps of Exelmans and Pajol bivouacked in the
first line, covering Vandamme's infantry, between Lambusart
and Campinaire.*^
70 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN book i
Section IV
The left wing did not advance as far as Napoleon wished.
Towards half-past one the 1st Hussars, sent from Charleroi on
the Brussels ^^ road, had met, a short distance beyond Jvmiet,
Liitzow's cavalry and the sharpshooters of the 29 th Kegiment,
who were covering the concentration of Steinmetz's division at
Gosselies. The enemies watched each other for some time,
then the two bodies of cavalry began the struggle. The uhlans
vigorously drove back the hussars when they were charged, and
were repulsed in their turn by Pirn's lancers, who formed the
vanguard of Eeille's corps.*^ Keille hastened the march of his
infantry, and within three hours came within cannon-shot of
Gosselies, and immediately opened fire on the village. At the
moment when the attacking columns were commencing their
manoeuvre. Marshal Ney arrived ^^ with the light cavalry of
the Guard, which he had overtaken on the way. Gosselies,
defended by the 29 th Prussian Eegiment, was carried after a
slight skirmish. But this was not the end of the matter. The
largest portion of Steinmetz's division were still marching to
the west of Gosselies ; by the occupation of Gosselies their
direct road to Heppignies and Fleurus was blocked. Without
any hesitation, Steinmetz sent out a few battalions against the
French, who were beginning to debouch from Gosselies, drove
them back into the village, and under protection of a strong
detachment posted in the houses at the north of the town, he
continued his retreat upon Heppignies.^"
The road to Brussels was now free, and daylight would last
four hours longer. But Marshal Ney probably felt, that, not-
withstanding the Emperor's orders to press the enemy closely,
he had already advanced too far from the right of the army.
Instead, therefore, of continuing his march with the whole body
of his troops, he posted the divisions under Foy, Girard, and
Jerome round Gosselies, sent Bachelu's division to Mellet
with Pirn's light cavalry, and told off only the lancers and
the chasseurs of the Guard *^ towards Quatre-Bras.
The lancers of the Guard got in sight of Frasnes ^^ towards
half-past five, and their arrival was hailed by a burst of cannon-
CHAP. Ill THE FIRST ENGAGEMENTS 71
shot. The village was occupied by the Nassau battalion and a
battery of horse artillery under the command of Major Normanu.
This officer had been left without any instructions, but on
hearing the sound of the cannonade towards Gosselies, he had
immediately taken steps for a desperate defence of his post.
Lefebvre-Desnoettes instantly applied for a body of infantry.
A battalion of the 2nd Light Infantry, the head of the column
of Bachelu's division, had already gained the heights of Mellet,
and quickening their steps they pressed on towards Frasnes.
The sharpshooters opened fire on the Nassau regiments.
"While waiting for this reinforcement, Lefebvre-Desnoettes had
directed a portion of his lancers to the right of Frasnes, so as
to turn the enemy's line.^^ The squadron from Elba (Poles),
commanded by General Edouard de Colbert in person, pushed
on as far as Quatre-Bras, which was not then occupied. But
Colbert, finding himseK there without support, and at a great
distance from the main body of his division, returned to
Frasnes.^* During this interval. Major Normann's battalion
had been retreating down the road, continuing to keep the
French well within reach of the cannon. It took up its
position on the borders of the woods of Bossu, two kilometres
before Quatre-Bras, where, at that very moment. Prince Bernard
of Saxe-Weimar arrived with four of the Nassau battalions.^^
Learning accidentally at Gennappe that the French had crossed
the Sambre, the young prince, on his own responsibility,
inarched his troops forward in order to seize and occupy this
important strategical post.^^
At the sound of the cannon Marshal Ney joined his van-
guard. He reconnoitred the position. Although the Nassau
force only amounted to 4,500 men with six guns,^" they were
rong enough to defend Quatre-Bras against the 1,700 lancers
and chasseurs of Lefebvre-Desnoettes,^® who were backed by a
single battalion. Ney was content to direct a few desultory
charges against the Nassau infantry posted before Quatre-Bras,
and to send eastwards in the direction of Sart-Dame-Aveline
a reconnaissance which did not even come within shot of the
enemy's outposts.^^ Then, a little before eight o'clock, he
rallied at Frasnes, Lefebvre-Desnoettes division, which encamped
there, while Ney himself returned to Gosselies for the night.*"^
72 COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN bk. i ch. hi
Colonel Heymes, Ney's aide-de-camp during this campaign,
has urged as a possible explanation of the Marshal's conduct,
that " there was not one chance in ten of seizing Quatre-Bras." ^^
And certainly, when they arrived within sight of Quatre-Bras,
not at ten in the evening, as asserted by Heym^s, but at seven
at the latest, he could hardly hope to carry this position with
two regiments of cavalry and a single battalion. But if at
five o'clock, while at Gosselies, he had dispatched on the road
to Brussels, a mere quarter of the troops entrusted to him by
the Emperor, — let us say, two divisions of infantry, two of
cavalry, and four batteries of artillery ,^^ — by nine o'clock, with
the help of this force of 14,000 men, he might have annihilated
Prince Bernard of Saxe- Weimar's 4,5 0 0 infantry, most of whom
had only ten cartridges in their belts.®^ In halting Keille's
corps at Gosselies, Ney, for the first time in his life, yielded
to motives of prudence. He had given up all thoughts of
occupying Quatre-Bras, unless as a cavalry post in case this
point were not defended. In his opinion it would be en-
dangering his army to transfer it at a distance of four leagues
from the right wing, to a position where it might come in
contact with the whole body of Wellington's forces. Authorities
on strategy have declared that Ney acted according to the
strict principles of the art of war. This may possibly be true.
But had Prince Bernard adhered as strictly to these principles,
he would never have acted on his inspiration of marching on
Quatre-Bras, with four battalions, at the risk of being utterly
crushed by the whole French Army.
\
\
BOOK II
LIGNY AND QUATEE-BEAS
BOOK II CHAPTER I
THE MORNING OF THE 16X11 OF JUNE
I. Plans and orders of Napoleon (from five o'clock to eight).
II. Departure of Napoleon for Fleurus (half-past nine).
III. Concentration of the Prussian Army on the north of the brook of Ligny —
Inmovableness of the English Army on the loth of June — Tho Duchess
of Richmond's ball (night of the 15th to the 16th of June).
IV, Arrival of Wellington at Quatre-Bras (16th June, 10 o'clock) — Interview
between Wellington and Bliicher at the mill of Bussy, near Ligny
(one P.M.).
Section I
The occupation of Sombreffe and Quatre-Bras, on the evening
of the 15 th of June, was only the necessary sequel to the grand
strategical plan conceived by Napoleon. That Grouchy and
Ney should have failed to take possession of these two points,
was a mere contretemps. The chief aim of the French Army's
manceuvre was attained, namely, to bear at once on the point
of junction between the English and the Prussians. Almost
without striking a blow, and in spite of various delays in the
inarch of several of the columns, the Emperor had crossed the
Sambre, penetrated seven miles into the enemy's territory,
and encamped his army in the very centre of the Allies'
cantonments. He had 124,000 men bivouacked within a
tariangle of three leagues on each of its sides.^
The enemy appeared to be thrown into disorder. In the
course of the day not a single English uniform had been seen,
neither had the Prussians appeared in any great numbers ; they
had feebly contested the passages of the Sambre, and thek lack
of perseverance in the defence of Gilly and GrosseUes, skilful
and courageous though it was, favoured the assumption that
76 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
their object was rather to protect a retreat, than to cover a
concentration.
Therefore, when the Emperor, who returned to Charleroi
for the night,^ examined the reports sent him by Grouchy
and Ney^ he concluded that the Allies were disconcerted by
his unexpected aggression, and had resolved to fall back on the
base of their operations, the Prussians in the direction of
Li^ge and Maestricht, the English and Belgians towards Ostend
and Antwerp. The route taken by the Prussian outposts, from
Thuin to Marchienne, from Eontaine-L'Eveque and Marchienne
to Gosselies, from Charleroi and Gosselies to Eleurus, tended to
confirm this presumption. If the Prussians had manoeuvred
with the design of immediately joining the English, they would
have withdrawn towards the north, whereas they had retreated
towards the north-east, thus leaving the road to Brussels
unprotected. This resolution, which, judging from appearances,
Napoleon attributed to Wellington and Bliicher, seemed to
ensure the victory to him. The further the allied armies were
separated from one another, the easier it would be to beat them
in detail. It was one thing to attack the English when the
Prussians were within a single march of them, and another
to do so when Wellington and Bliicher were separated by
fifteen or twenty leagues.
The Emperor drew out his plan of action on the morning of
the 16 th of June, probably about six o'clock or a Kttle earlier.*
With Grouchy and the right wing^ he meant to march to-
wards Sombrefife and Gembloux. Should a Prussian corps
happen to be in either of these two positions, he would attack
it. Having reconnoitred and cleared the ground to the east,
he would call up the Reserve, temporarily stationed at Fleurus,
and with it, he would join Ney and the left wing at Quatre-
Bras. From thence he would march on Brussels by a
forced night -march. He calculated that the head of the
column would reach Brussels on the 17th of June at seven
o'clock in the morning.^
The orders for the execution of this double movement were
dispatched by the chief of the staff between seven and eight in
the morning : orders to Kellermann to proceed on Gosselies and
place himself at the disposal of Marshal Ney ; orders to Drouot to
CHAP. I TEE MORNING OF THE leTH OF JUNE 77
start the Guard on its road towards Fleurus ; orders to Lobau to
push on the 6th Corps midway between Charleroi and Fleurus ;
orders to Yandamme and Gerard to march on Sombreffe with
the 3rd and 4th Corps, and then to carry out the instructions
of Marshal Grouchy, commanding the right wing. Soult wrote
to Ney to take up his position at Quatre-Bras, with six divi-
sions of infantry and Kellermann's cuirassiers, and to lead his
two other infantry divisions, one to Genappe (five kilometres
beyond Quatre-Bras) with Pirn's cavalry, and the other to
Marbais with the cavalry of Lefebvre-Desnoettes, in order
eventually to support the movements of the right wing.
Lastly, Ney was to push his reconnoitring bodies, as far as
possible on the Nivelles and Brussels roads. As for Grouchy,
he received the order to take possession of Sombreffe, whence
he was to send an advanced guard to Gembloux and scouts in
every direction.'^
Section II
At the Imperial headquarters, all were busied with the
"dispatch of these orders, when the Emperor received a letter
from Grouchy, notifying that strong columns of the enemy,
which had apparently come up by the Namur road, were
proceeding towards Brye and Saint -Amand.^ Though he
believed the Prussians were retreating, 2!Tapoleon had recog-
nised the possibility of a coUision with them at Sombreffe ; ^
but he had not the remotest idea that they would come and take
np positions at the entrance of the approach to Fleurus. This
movement indicated that, far from withdrawing his troops and
forsaking the English Army, as might have been inferred the
night before from the direction taken in retreat by his out-
posts, Bliicher was manoeuvring to give battle together with
Wellington on that very day. Instead of the French having
merely to dislodge from Sombreffe or Gembloux, the rearguard
or an isolated corps, it was evident they had to encounter on
the north of Fleurus the entire Prussian Army, and, as Bliicher
and Wellington evidently meant to operate in concert, the
English would probably be encountered in force on the road
to Brussels.
78 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
This meant the complete ruin of the plan conceived by
the Emperor. He could not possibly beat Blticher's army to
his right during the day, destroy Wellington's army to his
left in the evening, and then march on Brussels that same
night. However, Napoleon was in no wise disconcerted. With
him, presumptions quickly changed into certainties. When
he had once imagined a thing, that thing had to be as he
fancied. Indeed, how many times had not fortune justified
his previsions! On the morning of the 16th of June he
believed that Bliicher was retreating and that the road to
Brussels was clear ; therefore Bliicher must be retreating and
the road to Brussels was clear. The manoeuvres notified by
Grouchy were merely demonstrations intended to put him on
the wrong scent. It would be mere child's play to settle this
handful of Prussian regiments, which was only as it were a
screen, to mask the retreat of the bulk of their army.^*' Besides,
these views were evidently shared by Grouchy himself; for in
the letter in which he mentioned the appearance of the enemy's
columns towards Saint-Amand, he also announced that he
was mustering his own troops to march on to Sombreffe, in
accordance with the orders of the preceding night.^^
If at five that morning, Grouchy had suspected that the
whole of Bliicher's army was concentrating to the west of
Sombreffe, he would not have prepared for a movement on
this village, at the risk of sustaining a disastrous flank attack.
The Emperor did not modify his orders in any way. Far
from changing anything, he wrote to Ney and Grouchy towards
eight o'clock to reiterate his commands and to hasten their execu-
tion. Knowing that his own aides-de-camp were better mounted
than the officers of the chief of the staff, he entrusted one
of the letters to La Bedoyere, the other to Flahaut, hoping that
in this manner, his two lieutenants would receive his reiterated
instructions even before those he had just dispatched through
Soult. In these duplicates, the Emperor insisted on certain
executive details, and disclosed, what Soult had concealed, that
the object of this double movement on Sombreffe and on
Quatre-Bras, was a night march to Brussels.^^
Between nine and ten in the morning,^^ as Napoleon was
about to start for Fleurus, an officer of lancers arrived from
CHAP. I THE MORNING OF THE UTH OF JUNE 79
the left wing, to announce that the enemy was massing in
great force in the direction of Quatre-Bras.^* Fearing lest
the presence of these supposed masses should cause Ney to
hesitate, as on the previous evening, the Emperor thought it
necessary to reassure him and to repeat his orders once more.
He directed the chief of the staff to \sTite to him immediately
to this effect: "As Bliicher was in Xamur yesterday, it is
not likely he has marched his troops towards Quatre-Bras.
Therefore you need only attend to what comes from Brussels.
Unite together the divisions of Counts Eeille and d'Erlon, as
well as the corps of Count de Valmy ; with these forces you
are to beat and to destroy all the enemy's coi'ps which may
happen to come in your way." ^^ In case of any eventuality
occurring, the Emperor commanded Lobau to remain for the
time being at Charleroi, so as to march the 6th Corps to the
assistance of Xey, if necessary. In pursuance of these orders
Adjutant-Commandant Janin, deputy commander on Lobau's
staff, was sent to Frasnes to ascertain the position of matters.^^
The Emperor arrived at Fleurus shortly before eleven o'clock.
Here he found Grouchy, and this was no small surprise, as he
imagined him to be already marching towards Sombreffe.^"
The Marshal easily explained, that in presence of the hostile
masses which were taking up their positions to the north of
Fleurus, he had been obliged to confine himself to the occupation
of this village, which had been evacuated by the Prussians
towards dawn.^^ Napoleon passed along the line of outposts.
At the end of Fleurus stood a brick mill, built in the shape
of a tower and commanding the whole plain. He ordered his
sappers to open a breach in its circular roof and to contrive a
kind of loggia or balcony, which he ascended to inspect the
positions of the enemy .^^
Section III
At the first alarm, Bliicher had hurriedly left Xamur, and
by four o'clock on the afternoon of the 15 th of June he was
at Sombreffe.^ He was confident he could get his four army
corps drawn up behind the little stream of ligny, by the early
//
:?■'
80 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
morning of the 16th ;^^ his attention had been directed to
this position two months before by Major von Groben, and
from that time he had resolved he would fight the French at
that very place, should they cross the Sambre at Charleroi."^
He was full of ardour and deemed himself invincible. " With
my 120,000 Prussians," he wrote to his wife, "I would
engage to take Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers, if there were not
the sea to cross ! " ^^ However, on account of the inordinate
extension of his cantonments, the Field-Marshal experienced
some disappointments. At eleven A.M. on the 16 th, Zieten's
corps, which was reduced to 28,000 men by the losses of the
previous evening, was the only one in line. The corps of
Pirch I. (31,000 men) did not arrive at Sombreffe before
noon ; it was followed at a short distance by the corps of
Thielmann24 (24,000 men). As for the 4th Corps, a letter
from Biilow reached the general headquarters in the night,
announcing that this corps could not possibly muster at
Hannut (42 kilometres from Sombreffe) before the middle of
the day.^^ This meant a difference to Bliicher of 30,000
bayonets. Nevertheless, he was determined to accept battle,
especially as he counted on the co-operation, more or less
effective, of the Anglo-Dutch army.^^ Had not the two
Commanders-in-Chief, at the interview of the 3rd of May at
Tirlemont, agreed to lend each other mutual support, were
Napoleon to take the offensive ? ^^ And in the evening of the
13 th June, had not Wellington himself said to Bliicher 's
emissary, Colonel von Pfiiell : " My army will be concentrated
at Nivelles or Quatre-Bras, according to circumstances, twenty-
two hours after the first cannon-shot " ? "^^
There was something of diplomacy in these promises given
by Wellington. The effect of Blticher's retreat on Liege would
be to leave the English Army alone before Napoleon ; in
this case there would be no alternative for it but to accept
battle, with vastly inferior forces, or to fall back on its base
of operation, leaving Brussels unprotected. It was therefore
most important that Bliicher should remain in his position,
and as an inducement to that end, Wellington could not but
promise him his support. This promise of support he certainly
hoped to give,^^ but, practical Englishman as he was, Wellington
CHAP. I THE MORNING OF THE UTH OF JUNE 81
meant to do so at his own time, and his own convenience,
without imperilling in the least, the safety of his own army for
the common cause. But might not the offensive movement
of the French towards Charleroi be a mere demonstration
calculated to draw off in that direction the masses of the
Anglo- Prussians ? Might not the Emperor, at the same time,
bear down on Brussels with the bulk of his army, either by
Maubeuge, Mons, and Hal, or by Lille, Tournay, and Ath ?
Such were "Wellington's apprehensions, and fearing he might
be decoyed into a false manoeuvre, he was determined not to
move horse or man before he knew on which precise spot
I Napoleon would direct his principal attack.^
i Although on the 12th, 13 th, and 14th of June numerous
I warnings respecting the concentration of the French Army on
I the frontier had reached the headquarters at Brussels ; ^^
' although on the 15th, as early as eight in the morning,
, Wellington had been informed through a letter from Zieten,
I that the Prussian outposts had been attacked at daybreak,^'"
' at three in the afternoon that same day he had not issued a
I single order.
I Miifiling, the Prussian commissary attached to the English
; headquarters, having received a private letter from Zieten
confirming these previous warnings, hastened to communicate
it to the Duke. " If aU is as Zieten thinks," replied "Wellington,
I " I will concentrate on my left wing so as to act in concert
] with the Prussian Army ; but should a portion of the enemy's
I forces march on Mons, I shall be compelled to concentrate on
! my centre. Therefore, before coming to any decision or taking
any step, I must await news from my outposts at Mons.
However, as the destination of my troops remains uncertain,
while their departure is certain, I will give orders that they
should be in readiness to march at any moment." ^
After such orders, which were not issued till the 15 th of
June, between six and seven in the evening,^ the troops had
merely to assemble by divisions at Ninove, Ath, Grammont,
Brussels, Braine-le-Comte, NiveUes, and to hold themselves in
readiness to march at daybreak on the following day.*^^ The
result was that when the French left wing had already gone
ibeyond Gosselies, and its right had arrived within sight of
6
82 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BBAS book i
Fleurus, Wellington, instead of directing his troops to the
threatened point, was content to assemble them in isolated
divisions within a parallelogram of ten leagues by nine. It
seemed indeed as if he were bewildered and paralysed by the
vision of Napoleon attacking in person at all points at once.
At twelve o'clock, Bliicher wrote to Muffling to say that
Pirch's division was retiring on the left bank of the Sambre,
and that he was going to concentrate at Sombreffe, where he
intended to accept battle from the enemy. He added : " I am
awaiting early news of the Duke of "Wellington's concentra-
tion." This letter, which arrived about seven in the morning,
was immediately laid before Wellington ; it had no more
power to influence him than the two previous despatches from
Zieten, " The dispositions of the Field-Marshal are excellent,"
he said, "but I cannot decide anything till I know what
is going on in the direction of Mons." ^'^ At last he received
the desired assurance that all was quiet there. A letter of
General Dornberg, delivered between nine and ten o'clock, set his
mind at rest on that score.^^ He then determined on a partial
concentration towards Nivelles, and not, as is claimed by his
apologists, on a movement of the whole army upon Quatre-
Bras.^«
After giving these orders, which could not possibly be
executed before daybreak,^^ owing to the lateness of the hour
and the immense distance between the various cantonments,
Wellington said to Muffling: "My troops are on the point
of marching. But here in Brussels the partisans of Napoleon
are beginning to agitate. We must reassure our friends.
Therefore let us show ourselves at the Duchess of Eichmond's
ball, and we will be in the saddle by five to-morrow morning." ^*
In Brussels, though there had been entertainments every
night, this long-expected ball was as much a topic of interest
as the impending campaign. It was known that the Duchess
of Eichmond had made great preparations, that a vast barn
which adjoined her palace or villa had been transformed into
a sumptuous haU, where the guests were to dance to the sound
of military music, and to which the dite of the British staff
and of the cosmopolitan society in Brussels — Eussian and
German diplomatists, English peers, French 4migr4s — had been
CHAP. I THE MORNING OF THE l&TH OF JUNE 83
invited. There the Duchess of Eichmoncl did the honours with
her eldest daughter, who became later Lady de Eos, and was
then seventeen years old.^^ All manner of schemes, entreaties,
and intrigues had been used to obtain the coveted invitations
to this ball. There were hardly more than two hundred
present : the Prince of Orange, Prince Frederick of the
Netherlands, the Duke of Brunswick, the Prince of Nassau,
the Duke of Wellington, the burgomaster of Brussels, Princes
Augusta and Pierre d'Arenberg, Duke and Duchess de Beaufort
with their daughter, Duke and Duchess d'Ursel, Count and
Countess Mercy Argenteau, Count de la Tour-Dupin (French
Ambassador at the Hague) and Countess de la Tour-Dupin,
Marquis and Marchioness d'Assche, Count de la Rochefoucauld,
Dowager Countess d'Oultremont and the Misses d'Oultremont,
Lady Fitz-Roy Somerset, Count de Cayla (without his wife).
Sir Charles Stewart, Lord and Lady Seymour and their
daughter, Count Pozzo di Borgo and Baron de Vincent (Am-
bassadors of Russia and Austria at the Court of His Majesty
the King of France at Ghent), General Alava (Spanish commis-
sary attached to Wellington's staff). General von Muffling,
Lord Uxbridge (commander-in-chief of the British Cavalry),
Lord Saltoun (colonel of the Foot Guards), Lord Somerset
(commander of the Horseguard Brigade), Lord Hill (commander
of the 2nd English Corps), Generals Clinton, Ponsonby, Picton,
Vivian, Byng, Pack, Cooke, Kempt, Maitland, and a great
number of colonels, majors, young captains, lieutenants, and
ensigns.*" When Wellington made his appearance at the
Duchess's towards midnight, the ball was in full swing.*^ In
the flush of life's happiness, lovely girls and handsome ofBcers
were intoxicated with the music and the movement. But as
in the " dance of death " of the old frescoes, Death led the
dance.
The passage of the Sambre by the French Army was not
yet known. Wellington disclosed to the Duke of Brunswick
that Bonaparte had entered Belgium, and that there might be
fighting that very day. Brunswick, through a sort of pre-
sentiment, felt the shudder of death. Turning very pale, he
sprang up, and through his abrupt movement, the little Prince
de Ligne, whom he had had in his lap, fell to the ground.
/
84 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
Wellington called all the general officers aside and gave them
by word of mouth their marching orders, which were the same
as the written ones he had dispatched a short time before.
They instantly took their leave. In the midst of the ball,
towards one o'clock, the Prince of Orange was informed by a
despatch from Constant Eebecque, that the French had appeared
at Quatre-Bras, and he at once also started for Genappe. By
degrees, the rumour spread through the assembly that the
Army was on the eve of marching. But the young officers
could not tear themselves away from that night of pleasure,
little knowing, as Byron says, that —
Upon night so sweet, such awful morn could rise !
At last, when they heard the trumpets and the bugles sound
the assembly, they darted off in their silk stockings and
buckled shoes, to join their regiments. The Duchess of Eich-
mond, deeply moved, would fain have stopped the ball, but
the young ladies and a few young men who did not belong to
the Army, continued to dance till dawn.
Wellington took leave at three o'clock, after supper. The
Duchess woke up her youngest little girl, a typical " Eeynolds'
baby," and the child fastened on the sword of the Commander-
in-Chief with her little rosy fingers.**
Section IV
Muffling remarks that during the ball Wellington was in
high spirits. He had no occasion for being so. All day he
had obstinately left his troops in their scattered camps at
distances of eight, ten, fifteen leagues from each other ; and
the orders of the evening, by which he trusted to atone
entirely for his mistake, were lamentable. His last plan
amounted to nothing less than leaving the road from
Charleroi to Brussels exposed in order to protect the road
to Mons, which was not threatened. Had Wellington's
orders been executed, a gap four leagues wide would have
been opened between Brussels and Basse Dyle, and through |
this gap Ney could have advanced half-way to Brussels I
CHAP. I THE MORNING OF THE IQTH OF JUNE 85
without firing a shot, and also, according to Gneisenau, he
could have " fallen back upon the rear of the Prussian Army
and annihilated it." *^
Fortunately for the Allies, several of Wellington's officers
had deliberately acted without waiting for his orders ; others,
with great discrimination, had disobeyed the commands which
after so much time lost he had issued. In the course of
the preceding day Major Normann had defended Frasnes,
the Prince of Saxe- Weimar had marched his brigade from
Genappe to Quatre-Bras,*^ General Chasse had concentrated
his division at Fay.^'^ Shortly after, in the absence of the
Prince of Orange, Constant Eebecque, the chief of his staff,
ordered General CoUaert to collect his cavalry behind the
Haine, and Perponcher to prepare to march on Quatre-Bras.
At eleven in the evening, Eebecque found it impossible to
avoid giving the generals of division Wellington's order to
concentrate the entire Xetherland corps on Nivelles, which
would leave the Brussels road unguarded ; but at the same
time he sent them verbal instructions which left them free
to comply with this order or not as they judged best. " It
is impossible in Brussels," he said, " to know the exact state
of things here." Perponcher did not hesitate for an instant.
Instead of keeping the Bylandt brigade at Nivelles and
summoning the brigade of Saxe-Weimar to take its place,
as was enjoined by Wellington, he marched with Bylandt to
Quatre-Bras in order to assist Prince Bernard.*^
Ah ! would that Napoleon had been seconded by such
a leader of his staff as Constant Eebecque, and such
lieutenants as Perponcher and Bernard of Saxe-Weimar !
And, on the other hand, what a splendid opportunity for
strategists like Charras to denounce the fatal indecision, the
mental torpor, the moral weakness of the Emperor, if on
the eve of a battle Napoleon had delayed ten hours before
concentrating his troops, if he had then ordered a movement
in the opposite direction to the enemy's forces, and had
passed the night at a ball !
But in war as in cards, nothing prevails against fortune
or luck. When Wellington, starting from Brussels at six
in the morning, arrived at Quatre-Bras towards ten, he
86 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
found Perponcher's division intrenched there instead of the
advanced guard of Marshal Ney, His Grace apparently
forgot that this was in direct contradiction to his own orders,
and he condescended to congratulate General Perponcher
on the step he had taken, as well as the Prince of Orange,
who had had no hand in the matter.*^ Then, after advanc-
ing near enough to Frasnes for a thorough inspection of the
French outposts,^" he dispatched orders to Picton's division
and the Brunswick corps, posted at Waterloo,^^ to resume
their march,^^ and he wrote to Bllicher that Quatre-Bras
was occupied by a division of the Prince of Orange, and that
the English Army was making for that point. The letter
ended with these words : "I do not see many of the enemy
in our front, and I await news from Your Excellency to
decide my operations." ^^
Wellington very soon changed his views. Thinking,
justly or unjustly, that ere several hours had elapsed he
would be attacked at Quatre-Bras, he concluded that, instead
of waiting for news which he could not control, he had better
go and see things for himself, and arrange with Bliicher by
word of mouth. Towards one o'clock he joined the Field-
Marshal on the heights of Brye.^* Together they went up
into the mill of Bussy,^^ situated before this village ; the
whole field lay before them, better even than from the Fleurus
mill, where Napoleon had established his observatory.^^ They
could now see the French columns debouching, and with the
field-glass could even discern the Emperor in the midst of his
staff. It appeared evident they would have to contend with
the entire Imperial Army, of which the detachment occupy-
ing Frasnes was a mere fraction, not worth consideration.^^
" What do you wish me to do ? " said Wellington abruptly
in French, for he knew no German. Gneisenau suggested
that the Duke should immediately march all his troops
behind Brye so as to act as a reserve to the Prussian Army.
This plan, based on an incorrect estimate of the redistribution
of ISTapoleon's forces, was opposed by Muffling. He said
in substance that the English should manoeuvre so as to
outflank the French left wing. "Exactly so," exclaimed
Wellington. " I will overthrow all before me on my way to
CHAP. I THE MORNING OF THE \%TH OF JUNE 87
Fiasnes, and I will march on Grosselies." Gneisenau objected
that this movement would be most eccentric and its success
more than doubtful, whereas the concentration on Brye could
not fail to be attended by certain and conclusive results. As
the discussion continued for some time, Wellington closed
it, saying, " Very well ! I will come, if I am not attacked
myself." Having said these words, which had not in the
slightest degree the character of a formal engagement, the
Duke returned to Quatre-Bras, while Bliicher proceeded to
make his final arrangements.^^
BOOK II CHAPTEE II
THE BATTLE OF LIGNY
I. The battlefield — Dispositions of Bliicher and Napoleon.
II. From three to four : Attacks on Saint -Amand by Vandamme, and on
Ligny by Gerard.
III. From four to half-past seven : Counter-attack by Bliicher — Appearance on j
the French flank of a column recognised as belonging to the enemy-
Grouchy's demonstration against the Prussian left — Fierce contest at
Saint- Amand and Ligny.
IV. From half-past seven to half-past nine : Final assault — Capture of Lignyj
— Engagements on the hills — Retreat of the Prussians.
Section I
Opposite the hill of Fleurus, rises in a gentle slope above]
an undulating plain, a line of ridges of no very great!
height ; in their midst are situated the village of Bryej
to the west, the village of Tongrinne to the east, in the centre]
and slightly in the rear, the town of Sombreffe. In them-j
selves, these positions are easy of access. But in the hollowj
at their foot winds the Ligne,^ a little stream four or five
yards in width, intrenched between vertical banks, from three taj
four feet deep, bordered with willows, alder trees, and thickets!
of brambles. This brook, and the broken ground which leads j
down to it, form a deep trench, flanking to the right the!
village of Wagnelee, the hamlets of La Haye and Petit Saint-]
Amand, and the village of Saint-Amand ; on the left, the
hamlets of Potriaux and Tongrinelle, and the villages oi
Tongrinne, Boign^e, and Balatre. In the centre, is the village]
of Ligny, with its two large farms, its old castle,^ and its
church surrounded by a cemetery, stretching upwards and]
surrounded by walls. The front of the position is thus]
BK. II CH. II THE BATTLE OF LIGNY 89
formed by an uninterrupted ditch and ten bastions, some in
front of this foss^, as Petit Saint -Amand, La Haye, Grand
Saint- Amand, Tongrinelle, Boignee, Balatre ; others in the rear,
such as Potriaux and Tongrinne. The ninth, the most im-
portant of all, Ligny, is traversed its entire length by the
stream.
From Napoleon's observatory in the mill at Fleurus, the
Prussian positions did not appear nearly as strong as they
really were. The Emperor could not form an exact idea of
the depth of the hollows. The ravine through which the
Ligne flowed, was quite hidden from view. Before him lay
what appeared to be merely a vast plain covered with corn,
slightly depressed to its centre and rising in a gentle slope to
the extreme of the horizon — a landscape of the true Beauce
type. He sent for the land-surveyor of the town, a certain
Simon, who gave him all the information in his power.^ At
twelve o'clock Zieten's four divisions were the only ones drawn
up in line of battle, with Eoder's cavalry ; the corps of Pirch II.
and of Thielmann were only just commencing to muster behind
Sombreffe and Tongrinna"* The Emperor justly concluded that
he had only a single army corps before him.^ But he did
not deceive himself as to Bliicher's intentions. " The old fox
will not stir out," he said. He conjectured that the Field-
Marshal had taken up a waiting position, and that Bliicher hoped
to overawe the French long enough to give his other army
corps, and possibly Wellington's army also, time to join him.^ If
Bliicher, in short, had had no other object than to defend his
lines of communication with his own forces alone, he would
have taken up his position perpendicularly to the Fleurus
road. The extension of his right towards "Wagnelee, indicated
the existence of a design to unite with the English army on
their march from Brussels.
As he was resolved to attack immediately, the Emperor
was much perturbed to learn that Gerard's corps was not even
in sight.^ He waited. Doubtless at the time, he believed
that he had only a single army corps to deal with, and he
had at his disposal Vandamme's corps, the 1st and 2nd Cavalry
Corps, and in the second line, behind Fleurus, the Imperial
Guard. He feared, reasonably enough, that during the course
90 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
of the battle, they might be interrupted by the arrival of
the bulk of the Prussian Army, which was then probably
marching on Sombreffe.
Shortly after twelve, Gerard, who had preceded his army
corps, reached the line of outposts with a small escort.
Whilst seeking the Emperor, he came within musket-range of
the enemy's cavalry. The Prussians charged ; Gerard, thrown
from his horse, was in imminent danger of being captured ;
he was saved by one of his aides-de-camp. Having found the
Emperor at the mill, he felt bound to say a few words about
the desertion of Bourmont, whose command had been obtained
principally through Gerard's pressing entreaties. ISTapoleon
cut him short, saying, " It was just as I told you. General ;
what is blue is blue, and what is white is always white ! " ^
Not before one o'clock did the head of Gerard's column
appear.® Their marching orders had been dispatched before
eight o'clock,^° and from Le Chatelet to Fleurus the distance
is ten kilometres. Yet, in consequence of the neglect of
the Emperor's instructions during the preceding afternoon,
ordering the 4th Corps to take up their position on the left
bank of the Sambre in the morning, Gerard had to get the j
greatest part of his troops across the river on a single bridge. ||
Hence arose the long delay in the march of the 4th Corps.^^
It appears the Emperor had thought at first of attacking
by Wagnelee and Saint- Amand, so as to throw the Prussians
back on Sombreffe.''^ But the position of their right suggested
the idea of surrounding them, instead of driving them back.
On this account he modified his previous orders to Ney.
According to the instructions forwarded in the morning, the
Marshal should have planted his men at Quatre-Bras and
beyond it, and awaited the order to march on Brussels.'^ At
two o'clock Soult was commanded to write to him thus :
" The Emperor bids me warn you that the enemy has assembled
a body of troops between Sombreffe and Brye, and that
Marshal Grouchy with the 3rd and 4th Corps will attack
them at half-past two. His Majesty's desire is that you
should also attack the forces in your front, press them closely
and with great vigour, then draw back in our direction to
help us to surround the corps I have just alluded to." ^*
I CH.\p. II THE BATTLE OF LIGNY 91
Vandamme's and Gerard's corps, with Grouchy's cavalry,
J were spread out before Fleurus, and perpendicularly to the
road. The Emperor ordered the front to wheel round, the
i right in the first rank. Through this manceuvre, Vandamme
drew nearer Saint- Aniand, Gerard advanced within a distance
, of 1,000 yards from Ligny parallel to the road, and Grouchy
i| posted his men in the form of a T opposite Boign^e. The
Guard and the cuirassiers under Milhaud, stationed behind
Fleurus until two o'clock, came forward and formed the second
' line.^^
From the mill at Bussy, where at two o'clock he was still
with "Wellington, Bliicher had been able to watch this move-
ment being carried out. He hastened to complete his own
order of battle. Zieten's corps, of which a few detachments
only occupied the front, up to that time in the line of defence,
now took up their positions : four battalions of Steinmetz's
division at La Haye and at Le Hameau (or Petit Saint-
Amand), the remaining six supporting the first ; three
battalions of Jagow's division at Saint -Amand, and the
remaining seven under the Bussy mill ; Henckel's division at
Ligny, with two battalions slightly in the rear, and the division
of Pirch II. drawn out between Brye and the mill at Bussy.
Ptoder's cavalry was massed in a hollow to the north of the
road from Ligny to Sombreffe, excepting the 1st Silesian Hussars,
who, with a light battery to the extreme right, were detached
on the Eoman way, to reconnoitre on the flank of the Army.
The artillerj' was posted between the villages, on the lower
portion of the slopes. Saint- Amand, La Haye, Ligny had all
been hastily fortified ; but none of the bridges over the Ligue
had been cut, as Bliicher desired to preserve these outlets,
in case he should decide to take the offensive.
Behind this first line, the corps of Pirch I. (divisions
Tippelskirch, Krafft, Brause, and Langen, and Jtirgass's cavalry),
was held in reserve to the north of Brye, along the Xivelles
I I road. As for Thielmann's corps, which formed the Prussian
left, the di\isions of Luck and Kempter were posted at Potriaux,
Tongrinne, Tongrinelle, and Balatre, and Hobes's cavalry formed
the reserve at Sombreffe and behind Tongrinne.^^
This vast display did not escape Napoleon's vigilant
92 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
glance. Until past two o'clock, and until Bliicher's own
manoeuvres compelled the Field-Marshal to reveal the total
amount of his forces, the Emperor believed he had to deal
with 30,000 men at the most.^^ The extension of the enemy's
front, the masses which he saw in motion, now revealed the
presence of an entire army. What happy fortune for him !
The fight would doubtless be a stubborn one, but he might
now settle accoimts with Bliicher in a single day. In a few
hours Bliicher would be in his clutches ! For Ney had but to
storm the position of Brye from the rear, with his cannon to
sound the death-knell of the Prussian Army, " It is possible
that three hours hence, the fate of the war may be decided,"
the Emperor said to Gerard. " If Ney executes orders pro-
perly, not a single piece of artillery of this army can escape
him ! " ^^ At a quarter past three, a second order was sent to
Ney ; it was more peremptory, more imperative than the first.
" An hour ago," said Soult, " I wrote to you that the Emperor
was about to attack the enemy in the position he has taken
up between Saint- Amand and Brye, and now the engagement
has become very decided. His Majesty charges me to say to
you, that you are to manoeuvre immediately, so as to surround
the enemy's right, and fall on his rear with might and main.
This army is lost if you act vigorously. The fate of France
is in your hands. Therefore do not hesitate one instant to
execute the manoeuvre enjoined on you by the Emperor, and
make for the heights of Saint- Amand and Brye." ^^
As Soult was dispatching this order, Napoleon received a
letter from Lobau informing him that, according to Colonel
Janin's report, Ney had about 20,000 enemies before him at
Quatre-Bras.^° The Emperor reflected that were these 20,000
men to defend themselves obstinately, it might prevent the
Prince of La Moscow from executing the desired movement
against the Prussian Army at the proper time. Evidently his
grand tactical combination might prove abortive. He did not
flatter himself, as he has been unjustly accused of doing, that
he could win two battles in the same day. The important
point for him, was not to win a partial victory over Bliicher
and a partial victory over Wellington, but to hold the English
in check, while he annihilated the Prussians. The Emperor
CHAP. II THE BATTLE OF LIGNY 93
thought that Eeille's corps was all that Ney needed to overawe
the English, and that d'Erlon's corps was amply sufficient to turn
the Prussian right. He resolved to entrust to d'Erlon, the
charge of executing the movement which he had previously
entrusted to Ney, and from which he expected such momentous
results. There was not an instant to lose. He sent directly
to Count d'Erlon, the order to march with his army corps to
the rear of the Prussian Army's right. Colonel de Forbin-
Janson, who was told to transmit this order to him, was also
directed to communicate it to Xey.^^
At the same time the Emperor, wishing to have all his
forces well in hand, sent a message to Lobau, who was tem-
porarily stationed at Charleroi, ordering him to march on
Fleurus.""
Section II
The battle was now in full force. Towards three o'clock,
three cannon-shots fired at regular intervals by the battery
of the Guard, gave the signal for attack.^^ Vandanune did
not even deign to prepare the way for the assault with his
artillery, but hurled Lefol's division on Saint-Amand. To
the tune of " La victoire en chantant," played by the band of the
23rd, the division marched forward in three columns, each of
which was preceded by a swarm of tirailleurs. The ground in
front of the enemy had been swept of every tree and hedge,
and was now a sheet of ripening corn four or five feet high.
The march through this surging mass was slow and difficult,
and though the ears of wheat affi)rded cover to the tirailleurs,
the columns were perfectly visible. It was on the latter,
therefore, that the batteries directed their fire : cannon-balls
ploughed down files of men eight deep. The Prussians were
well imder cover, ambushed in the houses or behind the
embankments, and the dense hedges which surrounded the
orchards. Fifty yards from the village, Lefol's soldiers
sprang up to the first enclosures. Even point-blank discharges
failed to check their rush ; in less than a quarter of an hour's
furious fighting, the enemy was driven from the orchards, the
houses, the cemetery, and the church. But Jagow's Prussians
94 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
rallied on the left bank of the brook, and soon after, supported
by four battalions under Steinmetz, they prepared for a counter-
attack. The battery of Steinmetz's division turned its fire
upon Saint- Amand, where several buildings were seen, bursting
into flames, and the 24th Eegiment crossed the stream at La
Haye to take the French in flank. Vandamme ordered
Berth^zene's division to deploy to Lefol's left, and in accord-
ance with the Emperor's previous instructions, he ordered
Gerard's division, stationed on the north of Wangeuies, to
attack Le Hameau and La Haye.^*
Whilst Lefol had been working towards Saint-Amand,
Pecheux's division had advanced on Ligny in three attacking
columns, under the fire of the Prussian batteries. The left
and central column carried the hedges and the fences at the
entrance to the village ; then they were repulsed, their ranks
being terribly thinned by the fusillade which poured thick
and fast, from the old castle and the nearest houses. The
right column of the 30 th of the line pushed forward. They
fought up the hollow road, at the end of which rose the farm
of La Tour, a building with walls like those of a fort, from
which poured a perfect hailstorm of bullets ; it penetrated
as far as the square of the church. Here the regiment,
literally surrounded by the enemy, concealed in the houses, in
the cemetery, and behind the clumps of willows by the brook-
side, found itself the centre of a square of crossing fires. In
a second the whole head of the column was overwhelmed,
20 ofiicers and nearly 500 men fell, killed or wounded.
Those who survived retired in disorder and strove to regain
their original positions.^^
Two fresh attacks proved equally unsuccessful. Batteries
from the 12th of the Guard came to reinforce Gerard's artillery,
which until that time had merely answered the artillery of
the enemy. They opened fire on Ligny. Cannon - balls
shattered the houses and ricochetted in the streets, the thatched
roofs took fire and fell in ; the conflagration burst out in ten
different points at once. For the fourth time Pecheux's
division, seconded now by a brigade from Vichery, marched
against the Prussians. After an obstinate struggle and a
succession of assaults on each several house, the French
CHAP. II THE BATTLE OF LIGNY 95
gained possession of nearly the whole upper portion of the
village."^
Ligny was formed of two streets which ran parallel to the
Ligne, and were separated by it : the " rue d'En-Haut to the
south, the rue d'En-Bas to the north." Between the two
streets there were a few straggling cottages, the square of the
church, and a vast common which sloped down to the Ligne in
the form of a glacis. Expelled from the farm of La Tour and
the rue d'En-Haut, the Prussians resumed their positions in
the cemetery, in the church, in the houses, and on the square.
P^cheux's soldiers advanced valiantly under crossing fires.
Some dashed into the houses, others climbed the embankment
around the cemetery. Thereupon a great body of the enemy
which had rallied under shelter of the church, charged the
French, who were thrown into great disorder owing to these
repeated assaults. The little square, too narrow for such a
number of combatants, became the scene of a terrific contest, a
hand-to-hand struggle with no quarter given or sought, a
frightful carnage! They shot at one another point-blank,
they charged with their bayonets, with the butt ends of their
muskets, and even fought with their fists. " The men," says
a Prussian officer, " slaughtered one another as if they were
impelled by personal hatred. It seemed as if each of them
felt he was struggling with his own mortal enemy, and rejoiced
that he had at last met with an opportunity of avenging
himsel£ No man thought of flight or of asking for quarter." ^
The Prussians at last gave way. They abandoned the
houses, the church, and the cemetery, and retired in disorder
across the two bridges of the Ligne, and were pursued at the
point of the bayonet. More than one was thrown into the
muddy bed of the brook beneath. Still, on the left bank, the
enemy, reinforced by the two last battalions of Henckel's
division, re-formed and made a determined stand. The
Prussians fired from the hedges and the fringe of willows that
bordered the brook, whilst others fired over the heads of their
comrades from the houses of the Kue d'En-Bas, and from loop-
holes opened in the walls of the large farm on the left bank.
In spite of this terrible ladder of fires, the soldiers of the 30th
and the 96 th crossed the bridges and forced back the tirail-
96 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
leurs on to the houses. But Jagow brought up four battalions
to the help of Henckel. The Prussians repulsed their assail-
ants on to the right bank ; they even attempted to cross to
the other side by the two bridges. It was now the turn of
the French to defend the brook. From either bank, the
soldiers shot at each other at a distance of only four yards,
through dense clouds of smoke. A threatening storm hung
heavy in the air, and its sultry heat increased that of the
continuous firing and of the flames kindled by the falling
shells. Ligny became a fiery furnace. Amid the roar of the
battle rose the piercing cries of the wounded who were being
burnt alive beneath the flaming ruins.^^
Grouchy, on his side, had commenced his attack against
the Prussian left. His cavalry had driven the enemy's posts
from Boign^e ; and Hulot's division from Gerard's corps, which
had passed under his direct command, threatened Tongrinelle
and exchanged shots in front of Potriaux with Luck's
Prussians.^^
On all points new batteries were being brought into
action, and the firing waxed hotter and hotter. From La
Haye to Tongrinelle, the fight waged on both banks of the
Ligne, from which rose a curtain of fire and smoke, as if from
a river in hell itself.
Section III
Towards four o'clock the battle extended to the west.
Girard had marched his division against Le Hameau and La
Haye. The assault was so prompt, so resolute, and so spirited,
that the terrified Prussians yielded the ground, scarcely striking
a blow.^° Bliicher, whose centre was solid, and whose left was
intact, saw that his right wing was being overpowered. He
knew that it must be relieved by a vigorous counter-attack.
Cost what it might, he must clear the way at that point, for
there he intended later on to make a joint advance with the
English, whose assistance he still expected. The Field-Marshal
did not hesitate to diminish his reserve. The division of
Pirch II., the only one of Zieten's corps which had not yet
been under fire, was ordered to march from Brye against La
CHAP. II THE BATTLE OF LIGNY 97
Haye and Saint-Amand, whilst Jiirgass's cavalry, from the
corps of Pirch I., and Tippelskirch's division, from the same
corps, 47 squadrons ^^ and 9 battalions in all, were to push
on to Wagnelee, whence they would fall like a thunderbolt
on the French flank.^^
Formed in battalion columns, the infantry of Pirch II.
made a bayonet charge upon Girard's troops, who had already
advanced from La Haye to turn the enemy's position at Saint-
Amand, where Steinmetz's Prussians had returned in force,
reoccupying several points. Girard's division gave way under
the attack of these fresh troops, and took refuge in La Haye,
and after a stubborn resistance abandoned half of this hamlet.
With such a leader as Girard, this state of things did not last
long. In the street, swept by shells and bullets, he re-formed
his decimated battalions and hurled them once more against
the enemy. He led them himself, with sword drawn, and fell
mortally wounded ; but before his death he saw his soldiers
repulse the Prussians from La Haye, on to the left bank of
the brook for the second time.^^
The flank movement attempted by Jagow and Tippelskirch,
1 proved more unsuccessful than the counter-attack of Pirch II.
; Habert's division and Domon's cavalry, which Vandamme had
■ until then kept in reserve, were deployed opposite Wagnelee
with two battalions as skirmishers concealed in the com. The
head of Tippelskirch's column advancing on it in marching order,
without reconnoitring, was taken utterly by sui-prise, by a
sustained and weU-directed volley from the com. It fell back
in disorder, carrying confusion amid the battalions which
were coming up behind it, amongst which were numerous
recruits. Without hesitating, Habert charged these disunited
troops with the bayonet, and forced them back into Wagnelee.
Awkwardly placed, intimidated moreover by the manoeuvres of
(reueral Domon's mounted chasseurs, Jiirgass's cavalry took
scarcely any part in the action.^*
During these struggles Bliicher had come down from the
mill at Bussy, in order to direct personally further developments
of the manceuvre, from which he anticipated such brilliant
results. He arrived within easy range of the guns of La
Haye, at the precise moment when Pirch II.'s division was
7
98 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
being expelled from it by the dying efforts of the intrepid
Girard. Without even allowing the men time to recover
their breath, Bliicher ordered Pirch II. to lead them back
under fire and to retake La Haye at all costs. Encouraged by
the presence of old " Forwartz " (Forwards), the soldiers shouted
" Hurrah " again and again, leapt across the brook, and with
crossed bayonets penetrated into La Haye.^^ Girard's division,
reduced from 5,000 to 2,500 men, with its chief mortally
wounded, its two brigadier-generals disabled (Colonel Matis
of the 82nd of the line was in command at the time), made a
desperate resistance. Completely outnumbered, however, it
retreated from house to house, from orchard to orchard, from
hedge to hedge, till it reached Le Hameau, where it mustered
its scattered men and awaited the assault. The enemy was
compelled to pause for a moment, for the French had beaten
back Tippelskirch into Wagnelee ; moreover, at Saint- Amand
they stood their ground, and at Ligny they still occupied half
the village. Bliicher was forced therefore to relieve Steinmetz's
division in front of Saint-Amand, as it had lost half its effective
strength ; he had also to send reinforcements to Henckel in
Ligny, and give Tippelskirch time to re-form and rally at
Wagnelee, and to forward the manceuvre he then contemplated,
he had to move the corps of Pirch I. to the south of Brye.^^
The Emperor on his part now took measures for the great
movement which had been his fixed object, since the outset of
the battle. It was now half-past five ; at two o'clock he had
written to Ney ; at six he calculated he would hear the deep
roar of the Marshal's cannon, thundering in the rear of the
Prussian Army. Then he would hm'l his reserves, which were
still intact, against the enemy's centre ; he would break
through it, cut off its retreat towards Sombreffe, and at the
point of the sword would thrust it between the murderous fire
and steel of Vandamme and Ney. Of the 60,000 Prussians
of Zieten and Pirch, not one should escape.^^
The Guards on foot and on horseback, with Milhaud's
cuirassiers, were already preparing for the attack, when an
aide-de-camp from Vandamme arrived with grave tidings.
A league to the left, a column of the enemy's forces, numbering
from twenty to thirty thousand men, had been sighted ; they
CHAP. II THE BATTLE OF LIGNY 99
appeared to be proceediiig towards Fleurus with the intention
of turning the Army's flank. Vandamme added that, on
discovering these troops were hostile, Girard's troops had
abandoned La Haye, and that he himself woidd be forced to
evacuate Saint- Amand and to beat a retreat, unless the Eeserve
anived in time to arrest this colimin.^^
Napoleon was much embarrassed. At first the idea struck
him, as it had done Yaudamme, that this colimin might be
the French division, which according to his orders, dispatched
at eight that morning, should have been led by Ney to Marbais.
But no division contains twenty or thirty thousand men, and
troops appearing to the south of Villers-Pei-win coidd not
possibly come from Marbais. ^'^ Could it be Ney arriving with
all his forces, in pursuance of the new orders sent out at two
and repeated at three ? or was it d'Erlon arriving with the
1st Coi-ps in accordance with the despatch forwarded at haK-
ptist three ? But d'Erlon like Xey had orders to fall on the
enemy's rear from the heights of Saint-Amand, not to come
to Fleurus.
To march on Fleurus would be to wreck the Emperor's
plan. Neither Marshal Xey nor Count d'Erlon were capable
of such a blunder ! Besides, Vandamme said positively that
the column had been recognised as the enemy.*' They must
therefore be in the presence of an English corps which had
passed by Ney's right, or a Prussian corps which had ac-
complished a wide turning movement by Villers-Perwin and
the Koman way.*^ The Emperor lost no time in sending one
of his aides-de-camp to reconnoitre the force and intentions of
the hostile column. Meanwhile he suspended the movement of
the Guard against Ligny, and ordered it to resume its previous
position before the mill at Fleurus, with its regiments
deployed. Duhesme's division of the Young Guard and the
2nd, 3rd, 4th Unmounted Chasseurs of the Guard, detached
from this reserve, advanced by quick steps to the assistance
of Vandamme.*"
It was high time that these reinforcements should arrive.
Vandamme's corps had scarcely yet recovered from the panic
which had been caused by the approach of the hostile forces,
and Greneral Lefol was obliged to arrest the flight of his
100 LIGNY AND QUATllE-BBAS book ii
men by turning his cannons against the fugitives ; ^^ and
this corps had now to receive an attack of nearly the whole
Prussian right. A little before six, the batteries in
the Eeserve formed in line and prepared for the assault.
Tippelskirch debouched from Wagnelee and marched on Le
Hameau, supported on his right by Jlirgass's numerous
squadrons. The tirailleurs of the 1st Pomeranians opened fire,
and so fiercely and so fast, that in a few seconds they had not
a single cartridge left in their pouches ; the hussars on their flank
supplied them with theirs. The division of Pirch II., seconded
by fresh troops from Brause's division and by a portion of
Krafft's division, assaulted Saint- Amand at three several points.
The French now gave way. The remnants of Girard's division
abandoned Le Hameau ; Lefol and Berthezene surrendered the
entire northern part of Saint-Amand ; Habert fell back on his
first position to the left of that village. Prom the mill at
Bussy to which he had returned, Bliicher watched the success
of his troops with keen interest. He had reason to believe
he was already master of the road to Fleurus, and that he
would soon be at liberty to attack the French reserve in flank,
a manoeuvre which he had long been meditating.'**
But Duhesme's Young Guard advanced at quick steps ; it
rushed past Habert's division and met Tippelskirch's Prussians
with superb dan. The latter suffered severely, and took refuge,
some in Wagnelee, the rest in Le Hameau. The cavalry of
Jiirgass, held in check by Demon's chasseurs and the lancers
under Alphonse de Colbert, which the Emperor had just
brought up from the right to the left of the battlefield, were
able merely to protect Tippelskirch's retreat and were powerless
to make any move against the Young Guard. The indefatigable
division of Girard, whose four intrepid regiments, the 11th
and 12th Light Infantry and the 4th and 82nd of line,
deserve special mention, made a new rush on Le Hameau
and drove out from thence the Prussians for the third time.
Lefol and Berthezene turned Pirch II. out of Saint-Amand.
The French were once more masters of the ground as far as
the first houses of La Haye.*^ " What soldiers ! " writes a
royalist emigH who was present at the battle. " These are
no longer the spiritless wrecks of Arcis-sur-Aube. They are
either a legion of heroes or of devils." *^
CHAP. II TEE BATTLE OF LIGNY 101
On the right wing, Grouchy's cavah-y had occupied Ton-
grinelle and Hulot's infantry attacked Potriaux vigorously/^
In the furnace at Ligny, battalions of brave men had melted
away like gold in the crucible. Gerard had thrown himself
into it with his last reserve, the second brigade of Vichery.
Bliicher had increased Henckel's division by the largest part
of Krafi't's corps. The fury of the struggle continued with
unabated force ; Prussians and French crossed and recrossed
the brook in turn, contesting the possession of the church,
the cemetery, the farm of " En-Bas," and the chateau of the
Counts de Looz, where two companies of Silesian tirailleurs still
held their own valiantly, in spite of the advancing flames of
the conflagration which surrounded them. Men fell to the
ground from sheer exhaustion. Krafft lost all hope of carry-
ing on the resistance much longer ; he sent a message to
Gneisenau telling him that he and Jagow were on the point
of being hemmed in at Ligny. " Hold on for one half-hour
longer," Gneisenau answered, " the English army is drawing
near." *^ A delusion or a falsehood I For Bliicher was about
to receive, if he had not already received, a despatch from
Miiftiing informing him that Wellington was himself contend-
ing with a whole army corps, and could not spare him a single
squadron.*^
Nothing, however, could daunt the intrepid soul of Bliicher.
If Miifiiing's letter did bring " unpleasant news," as Grolemann
mildly put it, at any rate it showed him that Napoleon had
not his entire army with him, as he imagined ; it gave him
the assurance he could not be attacked in the rear, since the
French corps detached on the Brussels road, was being held
in check by Wellington. Simultaneously he received two
messages, one from Pirch II., the other from Thiehnann, both
announcing that the attack of the French appeared to be
slackening towards La Haye and Potriaux. After their forward
movement, the Old Guard had resumed their previous posi-
tions. This counter-march, which had been noticed from the
mill at Bussy, seemed to indicate at least hesitation on the part
of the Emperor. The time to act had now come, imless they
wished the victory to escape them. Bliicher still believed it
was possible. He clung to the idea of winning the battle
102 LIGNY AND QUATEE-BRAS book ii
unassisted, if he could only force the French on their centre.
This could easily be done if his lieutenants only retained their
hold on Ligny. He would take charge of the rest himself.
He called up his last reserves, with the exception of two
battalions, which he posted at Brye and near the mill. To
reinforce Jagow and Krafft, he sent a portion of Langen's
division to Ligny, and ordered Thielmann to proceed there
also with Stlilpnagel's division. Then, taking with him the
last battalions of Langen and the remains of Steinmetz's
division which had retired to the second line, towards five in
the afternoon, this valiant old warrior of seventy-three led
them towards Saint- Amand.^°
On his way he gathered round him all the crowds of
soldiers who had left the field : here a company, there a section,
farther on a group of fugitives. With these seven or eight
battalions he re-formed the exhausted divisions of Brause,
Pirch II., and Tippelskirch, and ordered a new attack. " My
men have fired off all their cartridges and also emptied the
pouches of the dead," Pirch said to him ; " they cannot fire a
single shot more." " Fix bayonets and forward ! " Bliicher
cried in reply ; and brandishing his sword, spurring on his
magnificent white horse, a gift of the Prince Eegent of England,
he swept onward with his electrified soldiers. ... It was the
expiring effort of brave men, but their strength was spent.
They retook Le Hameau, but their ranks dashed in vain
against the wall of steel formed by the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th
Chasseurs of the Guard, who were drawn up in regiments to
the left of Saint- Amand.^^
The Prussians retired in disorder to La Haye. Bliicher
still entertained the forlorn hope of spending the night in his
intrenchments. He considered the battle was over, for it was
growing dark.^^ But the darkness was not of the night, for
during the solstice of June, at half-past seven the sun is
still high above the horizon. It was a storm. Great black
clouds rose and massed themselves in the sky, covering the whole
battlefield with a vault of inky blackness. Large drops of raia
began to fall. Peal after peal of thunder crashed overhead, but
the din of the thunder was soon drowned by the roar of the
" roW'^^ cannonade which suddenly burst out towards Ligny
no loi
either a
5Sl
ifAP. II THE BATTLE OF LIGNY 103
Section IV
Towards half -past six ^ the aide-de-camp, sent to
leconuoitre the strength of the hostile column marching
r '3 wards Vandamme's flank from the woods of Villers-
L'erwin,^'' returned to tell the Emperor that this presumed
English column was in reality the corps of Count d'Erlon.^
Xapoleon might have guessed as much. A false manoeuvre, a
confusion of orders, a cross-march are not such unlikely events
in war, as to preclude their being seriously considered as
possible. Disconcerted to such a degree that his spirit had
sunk, by the threatening direction of this column, he had
never thought of d'Erlon's corps, though he had himself
summoned it to the battlefield. Had not his usual presence
of mind failed him then, the frustrated movement might still
nave been executed. Its success depended merely on Napoleon's
nding to d'Erlon the very aide -de - camp who went to
reconnoitre the unknown column, with pressing orders to
manoeuvre so as to turn the Prussian right. Napoleon never
even thought of this ; and when the aide-de-camp returned
to him, he wisely judged that the delay had made the move-
ment useless. Two full hours w-ould have been required to
rry out this march and surround the foe.^" The Emperor,
i-esides, learned probably from his aide-de-camp, that the
ist Corps was retiring.** Had Xey, feeling himself in peril,
called it back ? Or had d'Erlon discovered his direction was
the ^vrong one, and resolved to bear westwards of Wagnelee,
in order to manoeuvre on the rear of the Prussian lines,
according to the order brought to him by Forbin-Janson ?
The Emperor made up his mind at once. If the misunder-
.^ landing of his orders, or their non-execution, seemed to him
to preclude his relying any longer on the co-operation of a
portion of his left, at any rate he was relieved from his anxiety
respecting the presence of a supposed column of the enemy on
his flank. He was once more free to act. The conclusive
N'ictory he had dreamed of the whole afternoon had escaped him:
but for all that he might still win the battle and separate
104 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
Bliicher far from Wellington. He gave his orders for the
final assault.^^
The reserve batteries opened fire upon the little hills
above Ligny; the Old Guard deployed in columns; the squadrons
of service, the 2nd Cavalry Division of the Guard, and Milhaud's
cuirassiers prepared for the attack ; Lobau's corps poured out
of Fleurus. The cannonade ceased, the drums beat the charge,
the seething mass moved oft' under the warm rain of the storm,
with cries of " Vive I'Empereur ! " The first column of the
Guard (2nd, 3rd, and 4th Grenadiers) penetrated to the west
of Ligny ; the second (1st Chasseurs and 1st Grenadiers)
attacked the village to the east. Led on by Gerard, the
soldiers of Pecheux and Vichery crossed the brook of La Ligne ;
and at last wrested from the Prussians, the farm of En-Bas and
all the houses on the left bank. The fragments of Jagow's
and KraSt's divisions attempted to re-form on the nearest
slopes above the ravine. But Pecheux rushed from the
midst of Ligny followed by Vichery and the first column of
the Guard ; from the right of the village deployed the 1st
Grenadiers and the 1st Chasseurs, followed by Milhaud's
cuirassiers ; while up from the left with the Emperor himself,
advanced the service squadrons and the heavy cavalry of the
Guard. The Prussians gave way at every point. Describing
the rapidity and the efiect of this irresistible attack, Soult
wrote to Davout, " It was like a scene on the stage." ^
Bliicher arrived at full gallop from La Haye. The rain
had ceased and the wind was dispersing the straggling clouds.^^
In the last rays of the setting sun, as they lit up for a minute
the hills of Brye, he watched the disastrous retreat of his
troops ; and in the wide breach made in his line of battle, he saw
the shaggy helmets of the Old Guard, the mounted dragoons
towering above the rest, the dragoons turning round for a fresh
charge, and in a glittering mass, Milhaud's 3,000 cuirassiers.
The veteran Bliicher, as Major von Grolemann aptly said,
*' never considers himself vanquished, so long as he can
continue the fight." He counted on Eoder's cavalry, in reserve
between Brye and Sombreffe ; on the remnants of Henckel's
division, which had been relieved at Ligny at six ; on the
Stulpnagel and Borcke divisions, which Thielmann ought to
CHAP. II THE BATTLE OF LIGNY 105
have detached from his army corps, to hold the French in
check. But his orders had been misinterpreted ; Henckel
was akeady very close to Sombreffe, while Stiilpnagel was still
far from Ligny. As for Borcke's troops, Thielmann could not
afford to diminish this his last reserve, so closely was he
pressed in front by Grouchy ; Hulot's division had carried
Potriaux and was threatening Sombreffe ; Exelmans' dragoons
(Burthe's brigade) had routed Lottimi's cavalry, had taken its
cannon, and were advancing towards the Xamur road.^" Eoder's
32 squadrons alone were at his disposal. Bliicher rode up to
them and commanded them to charge. Llitzow, the celebrated
"partizan" leader in the war of 1813, hurled the 6th Uhlans
against a square which he believed to be composed of national
mobilised guard, on accovmt of the disparity of the xmiforms
worn by the men."^ It was the 4th Grenadiers of the Guard.
The uhlans were received by a line of fire at close quarters,
and 83 of their men fell to the earth. Llitzow was thrown
from his horse and made prisoner. A charge of the 1st
Dragoons and of the 2nd Landwher of Courmache, then a
charge of the Brandebm'g uhlans and of the Queen's dragoons,
then a fourth one in which all the squadrons took part, were
equally unsuccessful. The first were repulsed by the Old Guard,
which had come to the first line to relieve Gerard's divisions ;
the others were sternly flung back by the dragoons of the
Guard and Milhaud's cuirassiers.*^ Till nightfall, the inter-
mingled French and Prussian squadrons, surged and struggled
on the slopes of the hills, before the squares of the Guard,
which continued their slow but steady advance towards the
mill at Bussy.
Bliicher's horse was struck by a bullet and fell upon its
rider. The Field -Marshal's aide-de-camp, Xostiz, who rode
beside him, saw him fall and sprang to the ground to assist
him. They found themselves in the very centre of the
cuirassiers of the 9 th Regiment, who were driving back the
Prussians, but in the increasing gloom, these passed by without
distinguishing the two officers. A few seconds later it was
the fate of the cuirassiers to be themselves forced back ; for
a second time they passed by them, almost over them, with-
out noticing them. Nostiz hailed the Prussian dragoons.
106 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book n
Bruised all over and half-unconscious, Bliicher was dragged out
from under his horse ; bruised and almost fainting, he was
helped into the saddle of a charger belonging to a subaltern
and led far from the battlefield amid the stream of fugitives,
who were innumerable.*'^ The next day 8,000 of them were
arrested at Liege and Aix-la-Chapelle.'^^
The Prussian centre was shattered and broken, with the
exception of a few battalions which retired in good order and
bravely resisted Delort's cuirassiers, who were unfortunately
not backed up by the second division of Milhaud's corps.'''^
The whole infantry fled helter-skelter. Thanks to the
desperate charges of Eoder's cavalry, they in some degree
arrested the impetus of the French march, thus enabling
Krafft, Jagow, and Langen to save part of their artillery ^^ and
to rally the remains of their divisions between Sombrefife and
the Koman way. But though the enemy's centre had been
cut in two, they regained their former positions on both wings.
Zieten and Thielmann only commenced to beat a retreat when
they heard of the surrender of Ligny. The Prussians massed
around La Haye, and regained with steady steps the higher
summits of the hills, harassing by sudden charges from time to
time, Vandamme's infantry when it pressed too closely ; their
rearguard held their own at Brye till daybreak. Thielmann
withdrew his corps to the rear of Sombrefte, which he occupied
all night with a strong detachment. The sharpshooters again
opened fire on the Brye-Sombreflfe line about half-past nine.^^
Towards eleven the Emperor returned to Fleurus, where ^
the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Chasseurs were assembled from Saint-
Amand."° With the exception of these three regiments and the \
reserve batteries, the whole army bivouacked on the left bankj
of the brook : Lobau's corps, which had not taken part in the
action, in the front line near the mill at Bussy : Vandamme's!
corps before La Haye ; Gerard's corps, the Old Guard, and the
Guard's cavalry in front of Ligny ; Milhaud's cuirassiers to the!
right of this village ; Hulot's division and Grouchy's cavalryj
between Tongrinne, Potriaux, and Sombreffe. Opposite Brye I
and facing Sombrefife the French Great Guards found themselvesj
within easy range of the Prussian guards. So vivid was the]
impression of the enemy's proximity, that the grenadiers of J
CHAP. II THE BATTLE OF LIGNY 107
the Guard, though they were on the second line, bivouacked
without any fires, with theii' battalions formed into sciuaresJ^
During the night the task of removing the wounded com-
menced ; but the ambulances were so few in number, and so
imperfectly organised, that they were hopelessly unfitted for
the work.""' In the plain and in the villages, which were
veritable charnel-houses, lay 12,000 Prussians"^ and 8,500
French, killed or wounded."'*
BOOK II CHAPTER III
THE BATTLE OF QUATRE-BEAS
I. Inaction of Marshal Ney during the morning of the 16th of June —
Repeated orders from the Emperor.
II. Attack on Quatre-Bras by Reille's corps (two p.m.) — Return of Wellington
to Quatre-Bras and arrival of the first English reinforcements (three
o'clock) — Death of the Duke of Brunswick (half-past four).
III, The false move of Count d'Erlon.
IV. The charge of Kellermann's cuirassiers (six o'clock) — Offensive action by
Wellington (seven o'clock) — The French driven back on their original
positions (from eight till nine).
Section I
In the course of the day the Emperor had sent no less than
nine despatches to Marshal JSTey.^ But as he said long after
at Saint Helena, "Ney was no longer the man he had been." ^
Ney, once the most ardent of Napoleon's lieutenants, he who
in so many battles, notably at J(^na and Craonne, had
attacked the enemy before the appointed time, had now
grown temporising and circumspect, even to moral inertness.
On the previous evening, a prey to strategical scruples,
the Marshal had dispatched towards Quatre-Bras only one
detachment, which was far too weak to carry that position.
On the morning of the 16th of June he did nothing to
regain the lost time. Even admitting that he considered
it necessary to await fresh orders from the Emperor
before attacking,^ he should at least have so disposed his
forces, that he might be ready to act at the first command.
His troops were echeloned from Frasnes to Thuin over a
distance of seven leagues. At daybreak he should have
concentrated at Frasnes the divisions of J(5r6me Bonaparte,
BK. II CH. Ill THE BATTLE OF QUATBE-BIiAS 109
Bachelu, and Foy, with the whole of the cavalry, and called
up the corps of d'Erlon to Gosselies. This movement might
have been completed before nine o'clock in the morning, without
including the division of AUix, which could not possibly join
till two hours later. Thus by nine o'clock Ney would have
been in a position to attack Quatre-Bras, at the first order, mth
19,000 bayonets, 3,500 sabres, 64 cannons, and a reserve of
20,500 men.* But the Marshal took no steps in preparation
for such a move. He left his divisions scattered, his soldiers
in camp, while he himself awaited inertly the Emperor's
orders.
Towards half-past six the Marshal received Soult's first
letter. It was not, strictly speaking, an order to march, but
a warning that his troops might be called on to march ere
long. Soult also announced the approaching arrival of
Kellermann's cuirassiers at Gosselies, and asked Ney whether
the 1st Corps had effected a move in that direction.-^ The
point was always the same, that Key's duty was to march
straight before him on the Brussels road. Had the Emperor's
intention been to summon the Marshal to his left, he would
not have sent him a reinforcement of eight regiments of
hea\y cavalry. Ney, however, remained sunk in apathy. He
contented himself with requesting Soult to give him the
information he required.^ Then, towards seven o'clock, he
started off for Frasnes without even directing Eeille to place
the troops under arms.'' He limited himself to remarking,
"If orders from the Emperor should arrive diu'ing my
absence, you will execute them immediately and communicate
them also to Count d'Erlon." ^
At Frasnes, Ney continued to be as inactive and careless
as at Gosselies. He did not even think of examining on the
spot, the enemy's positions, or of urging toward Quatre-Bras
offensive reconnaissances, in order to compel the enemy to
unmask. It even seemed as if he neglected to question his
generals, the commanders of his outposts, or that he paid no
attention whatever to their reports. Lefebvre-Desnoettes or
Colbert certainly warned him that the Netherlanders appeared
to have received reinforcements, that since the morning they
had extended and advanced their front, that at six o'clock
J
110 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
their skirmishers had driven back the French outposts to the
borders of the wood at La Hutte,^ After these skirmishes,
it is true, the firing had degenerated into spasmodic shooting ;
nevertheless the general aspect of the enemy's dispositions
gave reason to conclude, that they meant to remain at Quatre-
Bras. All this Ney refused to believe. These were but vain
demonstrations made to impose on the French, and to mask
a retreat. At the most there would be " but a handful of
Germans to deal with, who were cut to pieces yesterday." ^°
The Marshal was so convinced of this, that towards
eleven o'clock, when Flahaut brought him the Emperor's letter
directing him to take up his position at Quatre-Bras,^^ and
in front of Quatre-Bras, he dictated the following orders
without any hesitation : " The 2nd Corps is to march immedi-
ately and take its place: the 5th division behind Genappe on
the heights; the 9th division in the second line to the right
and left of Bauterlez ; the 6 th and 7 th divisions at the branch
roads of Quatre-Bras. The three first divisions of Count d'Erlon
are to take up their positions at Frasnes. The right division
will establish itself at Marbais with the 2nd cavalry division.
The 1st cavalry division will cover om- march and clear
our way in the direction of Brussels, and on our flanks. The
two divisions of Count de Valmy will place themselves at
Frasnes and Liberchies. The cavalry division of the Guard is
to remain in its present position at Frasnes." ^" These were
not the preparations for a battle ; they amomited to a simple
order of march. Key's intentions were now clearly revealed
by them. He counted on seizing Quatre-Bras without
striking a blow, or at the worst after a very feeble resistance.^^
His instructions were a literal transcription of the Emperor's
orders.^'* Like Napoleon himself, he believed the road to
Brussels to be clear. And he was on the ground !
As a climax Ney, who seconded the Emperor so badly,
was himself badly seconded by Eeille. He had enjoined this
general instantly to obey any orders he might receive from
Napoleon.^^ But when Flahaut passed through Gosselies at
ten o'clock, and communicated to Eeille the instructions of
which he was the bearer, the latter, disturbed by a report
from General Girard, considered it his duty to await positive
CHAP. Ill THE BATTLE OF QUATRE-BBAS 111
onters from Ney before starting with his troops. " General
FL'^haiit," he writes to the Marshal, " has shown me the orders
het is bearing to you. I meant to commence my movement
ml Frasnes as soon as my divisions were under arms; but
after receiving a report from General Girard informing me
that two large bodies of the enemy, each six battalions strong,
were advancing by the Namur road, their front being at
baiiit-Amand, I will keep my troops ready to march until
I lueeive your orders. As these can reach me quickly, there
will be but very little time lost." ^^
This " very little time lost " meant a delay of two hours.
Keille set his troops in motion, only after he had received
^Tey's order, that is to say, towards noon at the eai-liest. His
vanguard did not arrive at Frasnes before half- past one.^'
In vain, during this interval, Xey had received a fresh letter
from the chief of the staff reitemting the previous instructions.^^
With merely a single battalion under his command at that
moment, and the mounted chasseurs of the Guard, he could do
nothing but wait for Eeille's infantiy before commencing the
attack. Besides, he persisted in believing he had ample time
before him, to intrench himself at Quatre-Bras, and he still
clung to his delusion that the enemy were in small force and
wculd offer no serious resistance.^'
As yet, it is true, the Prince of Orange had only the
divibi'^n of Perponcher at his disposal — 7,800 bayonets
and 14 cannons.^ But being firmly convinced of the
strategical importance of Quatre-Bras, he was determined to
hold his own at any cost, until the arrival of the English
Army.
The position was one that lent itself to a sustained
defence. The hamlet of Quatre-Bras, formed by a group of
three large farms and two houses situated at the point where
the roads crossed from Charleroi to Brussels, and from Xamur
to Xivelles, commanded the numerous undulations of the
ground. To the east, the embankment of the Xamur road
formed a natural intrenchment, in front of which the Pirau-
mont farm rose in the form of a redoubt. To the south-west,
the approach to Quatre-Bras was protected by the Pierrepont
farm and the thickets of the Bossu woods, which covered a
112 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS B00:k n
surface of 2,000 yards to the left of the Charleroi road.^^ Lastly,
half a mile to the south of the hamlet, in a hollow, stood jth<i
large farm of Gemioncourt, built by the roadside and CjOi-
stituting another advanced work. ,
Although a division which did not amount to 8,000 men
was insufficient to guard this front, which was more than three
kilometres in length, and to occupy efficiently all its positions,
yet Perponcher, in order to impose upon the French and to
postpone for a time, the attack on Quatre-Bras, boldly scattered
his men. Two battalions with three pieces of artillery were
stationed in reserve at Quatre-Bras and on the Namur road ;
the rest were distributed as follows': to the left, a battalion
with five cannon in front of Gemioncourt and another
battalion occupying that farm ; to the right, four battalions
and the mounted battery, on the eastern borders of the Bossu
wood and in front of Pierrepont.^^
Section II
Towards half-past one Keille, who was marching with the
vanguard of Bachelu's division, joined Ney. " There is hardly
any one in the wood of Bossu," said the Marshal ; " we must
take it at once." Eeille, however, was in no enterprising mood
that day. He answered, " It may turn out to be one o^^ i/nese
Spanish battles, in which the English never appear till their
own time has come. It is prudent to defer our attack until all
our troops have mustered here." Ney answered impatiently,
" Nonsense ! the companies of voltigeurs can manage it
alone ! " Nevertheless, Eeille's remark made him ponder, and
he too delayed the attack till the arrival of Bachelu's second
brigade and Toy's division.^
At two o'clock these troops appeared from Frasnes, and"^
their battalions drew up into columns, Bachelu to the right of
the road, Foy to the left, and on the road itself; Pirn's
chasseurs flanked the right of Bachelu's division, the lancers
being posted in the rear of the interval between the two
divisions. On the second line, the cavalry of the Guard were
stationed in columns on the highway, and the first brigade of
CHAP. ;ii THE BATTLE OF QUATRE-BRAS 113
ISIellennann's cuirassiers was deployed to the left. Jerome
Bonaparte's division was still on the move between Grosselies
and Frasnes, and the three other brigades led by Kellermann,
had taken up their positions at Liberchies in accordance with
the orders received from Xey.'*
The Marshal was anxious no longer to delay the attack ;
but troubled by Eeille's speech, he considered that the troops
he had in hand, were insufficient to assault the position in
front of him. He therefore decided to direct all his efforts
against the enemy's left.'^ (He had grounds for hoping that
the defenders of Pierrepont and of the wood at Bossu, would
draw back as soon as they saw themselves outflanked; but
Prince Bernard, having secured his line of retreat on Houtain-
le-Val, ran no risk of being cut off from Quatre-Bras.) After a
short cannonade, the Marshal hurled the division of Bachelu,
the cavalry of Pire, with the Jamin brigade from Foy's
division, against the foe in the direction of Piraumont. Foy's
second division (Greneral Gauthier) was to act as a temporary
resei-ve. Between the wood of La Hutte and the highroad,
Bachelu's division and Pire's cavalry advanced towards
Piraumont. The Netherlanders posted on the first line, were
not sufficiently numerous to sustain this attack. Bachelu had
no difficulty in forcing back the 27th Chasseurs on Pirau-
mont. When they reached the heights by the Lairalle farm,
Jamin's brigade, led by Foy, made head against the left
column ; it forced back the 2nd Nassau battalion, routed the
oth battalion of the militia from Gemioncourt, the remnant
of which had re-formed on the west of the road, and then
retreated toward the Bossu wood. Ney ordered Pire's lancers
to charge and they completely routed them. The Prince of
Orange was so closely pressed that he owed his safety merely
to the speed of his horse ; one of his aides-de-camp was
wounded and captured. Excepting to the right, where
Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar's battalions had not yet been
molested, the French were masters of all the enemy's advanced
positions.^^
It was about three o'clock. Wellington, returned from
the Bussy mill,-" saw that the situation was critical, almost
desperate.'^ A few minutes more and Quatre-Bras wovdd be
8
114 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS -JOok i
carried by Foy and Bachelu ; Foy was already marching i/j
the hamlet to attack it from the south, and Bachelu would
soon be in a position to attack it from the east. Eeinforce-
ments, however, arrived: the brigade of van Merlen (Dutch
hussars and Belgian dragoons) by the Nivelles road ; Picton's
division (eight English battalions and four Hanoverian) by
the Brussels road.^^ Wellington was specially uneasy about
the left of his line ; it was almost denuded of troops and was
threatened by Bachelu, who held the Piraumont farm with its
dependencies. Picton's division, by a rapid movement, bore
down upon the Namur road : the brigades of Kempt and
Pack formed the first line, kneeling in the corn, while the
Hanoverian brigade, sheltered behind the embankments of the
road, formed the second line of fire.^°
During the deployment of the English, the Prince of
Orange made a rush, first with his hussars, then his dragoons
against Foy's column, the tirailleurs of which were nearing
Quatre-Bras. Before getting a chance of attacking the
enemy's squadrons, the infantry were in their turn broken by
Pirn's lancers, who drove them back sharply to the other side
of the cross-roads. Wellington was jostled and swept away in
the flight as far as the Brussels highroad. Marching off to
the right toward Gemioncourt, Pire's lancers again routed a
battalion of militia, and seized eight cannon.^^
The action had also commenced to the south of the Bossu
wood. At three o'clock Prince Jerome's division debouched
from Frasnes, and Ney immediately turned it against the
Pierrepont farm, whilst Gauthier's brigade proceeded to join
General Foy. Dislodged from Pierrepont, the enemy fell
back on the wood, into which the tirailleurs followed on their
steps quickly. Here the advance was very slow indeed ; not
only was the wood well defended, but the underwood was so
dense that the men had to cut their way through the thickets
with their swords.^^
At this period of the struggle, shortly before four o'clock,
the Marshal received Soult's letter written at two o'clock,
which ordered him to press the enemy vigorously and to close
round the Prussian corps in its position at Brye, so as to
envelop it.^^ Ney had now fully grasped the object of the
CHAP. Ill THE BATTLE OF QUATRE-BRAS 115
Emperor's schemes and the supreme importance of the posses-
sion of Quatre-Bras ; he at once ordered a general movement
forward. Bachelu proceeded to Piraumont toward the enemy's
left ; Foy marched from the low-lying ground of Gemioncourt
toward Quatre-Bras, one column on the road, the other to the
right of the road ; Jerome flung Soye's brigade into the Bossu
wood and with the brigade of Bauduin marched between the
road and the wood, in order to meet the Brunswick corps,
which had just arrived to reinforce Wellington. Such was
the impetus of this combined attack, that the Allies' right and
their centre recoiled before it. Soye's brigade got good hold
of nearly the whole of the Bossu wood and drove back its
defenders as far as Houtain-le-Val, with the exception of one
battalion which still held its own at the northern corner, near
Quatre-Bras. Toy's division with Bauduin's brigade marching
on its left, repulsed the black battalions of Brunswick. A
charge of the Brunswick cavalry conducted by the Duke in
person, broke on the steel wall of the bayonets of the 1st Light
Infantry. Frederick William of Brunswick received a bullet
in the stomach ; he was carried into a house at Quatre-Bras,
where he died that very evening.^ His father, the author of
the famous manifesto of 1792, had met with his death at
Auerstadt. Both were violent enemies of France.
To the right, Bachelu's column had crossed the little
vaUey between the Gemioncourt heights and the hill which
commanded the Namur road ; it was ascending this slope,
when it encountered an almost point-blank fire from Picton's
first line ambushed in the corn. The column halted and
wavered. Picton, seeing the hesitation of the French, ordered
a bayonet charge by Kempt's brigade, which did not stop to
take breath, till it had driven them as far back as the vicinity
of Piraumont. Here, however, the batteries of Bachelu and
the rifles of the 108th, which had been posted as a reserve,
commenced mowing down the English battalions as they
advanced ; and before this murderous fire they were forced to
stop and regain their first positions as quickly as possible. As
they retreated, they were charged by the 1st and 6 th Chasseurs
(Pirn's division) and their sharpshooters were cut down, but
the battalions, quickly forming into squares, presented a firm
116 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
front to their assailants. The square of the 28 th, being
attacked on both sides, seemed on the point of giving way,
when Picton restored the courage of his men by shouting
" 28th, remember Egypt ! " ^^
The 42 nd (Highlanders) and the 44th which formed
Pack's right were less fortunate. Pirn's lancers, who were
galloping in pursuit of the Brunswickers, caught sight of the
red-coats who were fighting at the angle of the two roads ;
they spurred their horses right upon them and scattered them,
without, however, routing them. Bayonets against lances
clashed together in a furious melee ; the flag of the 44th was
lost and retaken again and again. Colonel de Gallois with
the 6th Lancers managed to pierce through as far as the
Namur road, where he cut a battalion of Hanoverians to
pieces.^®
Section III
In order to second his attack, Ney relied on the 20,000 men
under Count d'Erlon, who was bound to debouch from Frasnes
ere long. But by a chain of fatalities, or rather through the
logical consequence of delays in his preparatory arrangements,
orders which had been misunderstood or wrongly executed,
and inopportune counter-orders, this corps d'arm^e was
destined to fail him, as completely as he had himself failed
Napoleon.
In the morning, d'Erlon had concentrated his five divisions
at Jumet (half a league in the rear of Gosselies), where he
remained in person, from the previous evening, with the
divisions of Durutte and Donzelot.^'^ As the corps of Eeille,
the corps with which he was to join his own, did not stir from
Gosselies, he waited for instructions. Shortly before eleven,
he received word from Eeille to prepare to follow the move-
ments of the 2nd Corps, Eeille informing him also that he
himself would remain in his present position till further
orders.^^ D'Erlon therefore could only follow his example.
Towards a quarter past twelve, Ney's order to proceed to
Frasnes was transmitted to him, either directly or through
CHAi. lU' THE BATTLE OF QUATRE-BRAS 117
the mediUiii of llf-iWe ; ^^ but even then, he did not consider
it necessary to start until the whole 2nd Corps, which pre-
ceded his own, had marched ahead. Besieges, at one o'clock,*^
the division of Prince Jerome had 'liz^j broken up their
camp on the south of the Lombuc wood, so the vanguard of
the 2nd Corps could not possibly reach Gosselies before half-
past one or two. There d'Erlon halted his troops, until the
return of a strong reconnaissance which he had sent from Jumet,
in the direction of Chapelle-Herlaymont. A false account
given by the peasants led him to believe he would find a corps
of Anglo-Belgians threatening his left at the latter village/^
In spite of ISTey's order of eleven o'clock, dictated in accordance
with the instructions the Emperor had issued at eight,^^ he
neglected, or he deferred sending either of his divisions to
Marbais. Probably his intention was to detach the aforesaid
division toward this village as soon as he should have reached
Frasnes/^ Be this as it may, it was three o'clock when he
started on his march again.
Between four and a quarter past four, one-half of the
column had gone beyond the Eoman way, when d'Erlon was
joined by Colonel de Forbin-Janson, of the Imperial staff.^
Forbin-Janson had left Fleurus a quarter of an hour later than
the officer entrusted with Soult's despatch,*^ but in taking a
short cut through Mellet he had outdistanced the latter and
gained almost an hour in advance.*^ He brought an order
from the Emperor, commanding Count d'Erlon to march the
1st Corps to the heights of Saint-Amand in order to storm
Ligny.^^
Eager to forward the Emperor's views, General d'Erlon
immediately ordered the column to make head against the
right.*^ Unfortunately he read the order incorrectly ; it was
a mere pencil scrawl, and Forbin-Janson, who owed his appoint-
ment to favour, and was without any experience in military
combinations, could not explain it.^^ The order ran thus : On
the height of Saint-Amand ; d'Erlon read or understood : At
the height of Saint-Amand.^° Consequently, instead of taking
the direction of Brye-Ligny, to attack the Prussians cross-wise,
he took the direction of Saint-Amand-Fleurus,^^ so as to extend
the Emperor's left. This movement was in direct opposition to
118 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS bojk ii
the instructions issued by Napoleon. It ic easy to anderstand
why the Emperor^ on being infonfled that a column was
advancing and threatening l^is left, never thought of d'Erlon,
whom he did not expect would be at that point, and why he
mistook this column, as Vaudamme himself had done, for a
body of English or Prussians.^^
It was an imprudence on the part of the Emperor to
entrust an order of such vital importance to an inexperienced
staff- officer, such as Count de Eorbin-Janson. Up to the year
1814, when he raised a corps of partisans in the Nievre, Forbin-
Janson had hardly been in action at all, save in a few trifling
skirmishes. Until that time, Forbin-Janson had never served
at alL In 1815 the Emperor admitted him to the army with
the rank of colonel, and attached him to his staff. He had no
knowledge whatever of staff-officers' duties. In the present
instance, he could throw no light on the meaning of the
Emperor's command to d'Erlon, and when he did give the
order for the proposed movement, he either forgot to give, or
misunderstood the subsidiary instructions of the Emperor, or
for some other unknown reason he neglected to communicate
this order to Marshal Ney, but rejoined the Imperial staff,
with the same speed, as in justice to him, we must acknowledge
he had shown in delivering his orders.^^
The Prince of La Moscow only heard of d'Erlon's move-
ment through General Delcambre, chief of the staff of the 1st
Corps. As he was marching along the Eoman way, d'Erlon,
seized with misgivings, had dispatched that officer to the
Marshal to inform him of his march toward the other field
of battle.^^ Ney flew into a violent passion.^^ His fury
increased when a few minutes later there arrived an officer
bearing Soult's order, dated a quarter past three : " You must
manoeuvre immediately so as to surround the enemy's right,
and grapple with him at close quarters on his rear. His army
is lost if you act vigorously. The fate of France is in your
hands. Therefore do not hesitate a second to execute the
manoeuvre the Emperor orders, and make for the heights of
Saint - Amand and Brye." ^*^ Seeing the enemy's masses
rapidly increasing (the vanguard of Alton's division had
debouched from Quatre-Bras),^^ Ney perceived more keenly
.HAP. Ill THE BATTLE OF QUATRE-BRAS 119
than ever, that he would have to oppose them with all his
forces. Moreover, at the very moment when the Emperor's
letter suggested to his mind, the grand manoeuvre which
would have annihilated the Prussian Army, he recognised the
utter impossibility of accomplishing it. Ney found himself
in the line of fire of an English battery ; projectiles ploughed
up the ground and ricochetted around him. He was heard to
exclaim, " Ah ! those English shells, I wish they would all
bury themselves in my body ! " ^
Maddened and blinded with rage, Ney did not reflect that
the 1st Corps could not possibly arrive at Frasnes in time to
be of any use ; he forgot that to call it back would be to
thwart Napoleon's plans and to contravene his will in the
most serious way:^^ he sent back General Delcambre with
imperative orders to d'Erlon to march back his troops to the
left wing.^
Section IV
And yet the words of the letter of Napoleon, " The fate of
France is in your hands," troubled and fascinated the Marshal.
The very movement which he had exhorted d'Erlon to suspend,
he still entertained a lingering hope of executing himself!
What if he were still able by a desperate effort, and in spite
of the disproportion between the rival forces, to drive back the
English beyond Quatre-Bras ? and once master of that point,
with d'Erlon, who would be back by that time, to effect the
decisive manosuvre against the Prussian Army which the
Emperor expected ? All the troops had been engaged, except
the cuirassiers of Kellermann and the cavalry of the Guard.
He called for Kellermann.
" My dear General," he said in a broken voice, " the
safety of France is at stake ! We must make an extraordinary
effort. Take your cavalry, throw yourseK in the midst of the
English. Crush them, trample them under your feet I "
The intrepid Kellermann had never yet discussed an order
to charge. Still he could not refrain from representing to
Xey that the Dutch and English forces amoimted apparently
to 25,000 men ; and he had at his disposal only a single brigade
120 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
of cuirassiers, his three other brigades having remained behind,
in accordance with the orders of the Marshal himself
" What does that signify ! " cried Ney. " Charge with
what you have. Crush them under your feet. I will send
after you all the cavalry I can muster. . . . Go, I tell you, go
on ! " '^
Kellermann had nothing left but to obey. He rejoined
Guiton's brigade (8 th and 11th Cuirassiers), formed it into a
column by squadron columns, each squadron being separated
by an interval double its own front, and led it at full trot to
the summit of the eminence which rises between G^mioncourt
and Quatre-Bras. There he cried out the command, which was
instantly repeated from the head to the foot of the column :
"Charge — at full gallop! — Forward — march!" "I used
great haste," he said in his report to Ney, " so as not to allow
my men time to shrink, or to perceive the whole extent of the
danger in front of them."
The trumpets sounded the charge. With a flash of
glittering steel and a shower of turf-clods torn up by the hoofs
of the chargers, the cuirassiers swept down like an avalanche.
At every step their speed increased. The ground trembled
and crumbled into clouds of dust. The men in the first rank
bent low on their horses' necks, with their lances lowered,
point forward; the others flourished their flashing spears.
Kellermann, sword unsheathed, charged twenty paces in
advance of the leading squadron.
In the valley, the four battalions of Colin Halkett's fresh
brigade were drawn up in line of battle or formed into squares.
Motionless, resolute, so calm that they were terrible to behold,
the English waited and reserved their fire. The 69th Eegi-
ment posted in the first line between Bossu and the road,
only fired when the French were within thirty paces. The
cuirassiers dashed through the hail of bullets, and through the
smoke like lightning through a cloud. They swept down on
the 69th, broke through, trampling down its ranks, and seized
its standard. They then charged the square of the 30 th and
overthrew the 33rd. Then, without even breathing their
horses, they swept up the opposite slope, cutting down the
gunners of a battery as they passed, breaking through a
CHAP. Ill THE BATTLE OF QUATBE-BRAS 121
square of Brunswickers, and penetrated as far as Quatre-
Bras.^2
The first and second lines of the enemy were divided, and
a bloody breach left in their ranks. Unfortunately, the
cuirassiers of this gallant charge were not supported. Offended
by Ney, who appeared to doubt his resolution, Kellermann had
made his charge prematurely. "With his mind still filled with
rage against d'Erlon, Ney had managed this supreme attack
most unwisely; he had delayed sending his orders and had
quite forgotten the cavalry of the Guard which was held in
reserve near Frasnes.^^ Fire's columns of infantry, his lancers,
and his chasseurs were merely beginning to move,'*'* while the
two regiments of cuirassiers, now reduced to 500 men, broken
by the very impetuosity of their charge, with their horses
breathless, found themselves alone in the very heart of
"Wellington's troops. They were at the very apex of a triangle
of fire, and were fired on from the Bossu wood by the Dutch, from
the embankments of the Xamur road by the English, fi-om the
houses of Quatre-Bras by the Brunswick sharpshooters, and
from the Brussels road shelled by Major Kulmann's batteries
which spread death through their ranks. The Count de Yalmy
fell to the ground under his dying horse.^^ This gave the
signal for a general stampede. In vain did he scramble to
his feet and strive to rally his squadrons, the cuirassiers
were now deaf to his commands. They wheeled round, put
spurs to their horses, and in small disorderly groups, but still
with their lances threatening their foes, they plunged through
a perfect hailstorm of bullets from the enemy's lines, carrying
off with them as a trophy, the standard of the English 69th.^
These horsemen, perfectly maddened, rode on at break-
neck speed, hustling and dragging after them in their headlong
flight, several battalions of Toy's division and Bauduin's
brigade. From afar, Bachelu, who was advancing toward
Piraumont, saw the rout, and also halted in his movement.
Alone, Fire's cavalry pressed on against the enemy. At full
gallop, they rushed upon Kempt's battalions. They were met
by the bayonets of the English battalions and their flanking
fires. Again and again did lancers and chasseurs return to
the charge — they were utterly powerless.®'^
122 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
At this moment Major Baudus, sent by the Emperor, came
up to Marshal Ney, who had lost two horses under him and
was now standing on foot "at the most threatened point."
Baudus acquainted him with the words of Napoleon : " The
order delivered to Count d'Erlon must absolutely be executed,
no matter in what situation Marshal Ney may be placed.
I do not attach any great importance to any event that may
occur in his direction, the whole interest centres where I am
myself, for I mean to settle matters with the Prussian Army.
As for the Prince of La Moscow, he must, if he cannot do
better, be content with holding the English Army in
check." ^^ Ney, maddened and his face crimson, brandished
his sword like a madman.^^ He scarcely listened to the
words of Baudus, and shouted out that he had just sent to
d'Erlon the order to regain Frasnes. Baudus vainly strove to
induce him "° to reconsider this determination. The Marshal
left him abruptly, to throw himself into the midst of his
routed infantry. He quickly rallied it and led it against
Pack's brigade, which was marching to the attack.""
From six to seven o'clock, Wellington had been receiving
fresh reinforcements : Brunswick's artillery, the brigades under
Maitland, and Byng's English guards, Kruse's Nassau brigade.^^
It was now his turn to attack, — and to attack with certainty
of success, as was his wont. Maitland and Byng took pos-
session of the Bossu wood ; Halkett and Pack, supported by
the corps of Brunswick and of Nassau, marched to the right
and left of the road leading to Gemioncourt ; the Englisli
under Kempt, and the Hanoverians with Kielmansegge
converged toward Piraumont. The French only yielded the
ground which they had conquered but inch by inch, and under
repeated attacks. It took more than an hour to drive Jerome
out of the Bossu wood. Foy, repulsed from one position
after another as far as Gemioncourt, succeeded in holding
his own at this farm for a considerable time. Bachelu only
abandoned Piraumont after a severe struggle. When eight
o'clock had passed, a battalion under Maitland, sallied forth
from the south-western extremity of the wood to recover
Pierrepont ; the battery of Foy's division arrested its progress
with a heavy fire, and Pi re's indefatigable lancers charged it.
.HAP. Ill THE BATTLE OF QUATRE-BRAS 123
then drove it back in disorder and pursued it to the edge of
the Gemioncourt brook ; it escaped, however, to the cover of
the wood. At the same time the cuirassiers routed the 7th
Belgian battalion to the north-west of Pierrepont.'^^ Every-
where, heaps of dead bodies and crowds of wounded, bore
witness to the fury of the struggle — 4,300 French"^ and
■4,700 English and Netherlanders.'^
At nine, with the battle lost, or rather ended without
any definite result, since both armies had retaken the same
positions they had held in the morning/'' the 1st Corps
appeared from Frasnes.^^
Having been joined by G-eneral Delcambre towards six
o'clock, within cannon range from Saint- Amand," d'Erlon had
hesitated between obeying the first instructions of the Emperor,
or the imperative order of Xey.^^ In spite of the advice of
Generals de Salle and Garbe, and to the great discontent of
the soldiers, who saw the Prussians, and burned to come to
blows with them,"^ he finally resolved on a counter-march.
" I decided," he said, " that as he summoned me back, in direct
opposition to Napoleon's will, the Marshal must be in extreme
peril" ^° But d'Erlon did not reflect that, being only three
kilometres from Fleurus, and three leagues from Quatre-Bras,
he might have assisted the Emperor most effectually, whereas
it was not possible for him to arrive in time to succour Ney,
And in fact when he reached Frasnes at nightfall, with his
troops " irritated and ashamed at having done nothing during
the day," ^^ the Marshal had no longer any need of them.
Count d'Erlon only brought back with him, three of his
divisions. The idea having occurred to his mind in the
beginning of the counter -march, that the gap between the
right wing and the left must be filled, he had left Durutte
in sight of Wagnelee with the 4th Infantry division and
Jacquinot's cavalry. Having been unable to obtain any
definite orders from d'Erlon, excepting the advice " to be
prudent," Durutte proceeded slowly between Yillers-Perwin
and Wagnelee. To the north-west of the latter point,
Jacquinot had been skirmishing towards eight o'clock with
General de Marwitz's cavalry, which covered Bliicher's right.
Shortly after, Durutte fell back upon Wagnelee, which he
124 LIGNY AND QUATBE-BRAS bk. ii ch. m
occupied after ousting a feeble rearguard. These positions
against the Prussians' flank, were effected in a manner which
was neither timely enough, nor thorough enough, to hamper
in any way the retreat of the defeated army.^^ And yet at
Wagnelee, Durutte could see the Prussians distinctly, as they
retired from Le Hameau and La Haye to the heights of Brye.
Stolid and unmoved, he allowed them to defile within easy
range of his guns. He was paralysed by d'Erlon's instructions
as to the necessity of prudence. This inaction of Durutte's
so exasperated one of his brigadiers. General Brue, that he
cried : " It is unheard of, that we should stand here with
folded arms, and witness the retreat of a beaten army, when
everything shows we had but to attack, to destroy it." " It is
lucky for you," answered Durutte, " that you are not
responsible." " Would to God that I were ! " retorted Brue.
" We should be fighting at this moment." ^^
BOOK II CHAPTEE IV
THE EETREAT OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY
I. First plans of Napoleon for the day of tlie 17th of June.
II. The Emperor's orders to Grouchy (between eleven o'clock and half-past
eleven).
III. Retreat of the Pnissian Anny on Wavre.
IV. Movements of Pajol towards Namur, and of Exehnans on (Jembloux in
pursuit of the Prussian columns.
V. March of Grouchy's army — Bivouac at Gembloux — Grouchy's letter to the
Emperor (ten o'clock p.m.).
Section I
On the evening of the battle of Ligny, the Emperor had not
thought it possible to pursue the enemy any farther than the
Brye-Sombreffe line. The Prussian Army, the right and left
wings of which were withdrawing in fairly good order, and which
continued to occupy these two villages by detachments, seemed
still capable of a serious resistance. The arrival of a reserve
corps debouching by the Namur road, was to be feared. And
Napoleon was without news from his left. Through the
whole of that day. the Prince of La Moscow had not sent
him a single despatch.^ The Emperor knew from indirect
information that there had been a battle at Quatre-Bras.
But had Marshal Ney been victorious ? The presumptions
were rather that he had been held in check, if not repulsed,
for the orders prescribing a movement on the rear of the
Prussian Army had not been executed There were many
reasons against running the risk of a pursuit by night.^
The Emperor therefore contented himself with directing
Grouchy, who, according to his orders, had come to Fleurus
126 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ir
about eleven o'clock, to pursue the enemy at daybreak by the
cavalry corps under Pajol and d'Exelmans.^
On the 17th of June, toward seven o'clock a.m., Flahaut
came back from Frasnes, and brought the account of the battle
of Quatre-Bras to the Emperor, who was then at breakfast.*
At about the same hour, a despatch from Pajol was also
received at Imperial headquarters ; it was dated from BaMtre,
four o'clock A.M., and announced that Pajol was pursuing the
enemy, who were in full retreat toward Liege and Namur.
He added that he had already made numerous prisoners.^
Thus, between seven and eight at the latest, the Emperor
was as well-informed with regard to the Prussians, as he was
in regard to the English. The former were withdrawing
toward Liege and Namur ; the latter still held their positions
at Quatre-Bras. But was this intelligence sufficiently complete
and precise ? "Was it the bulk of the Prussian Army, or was
it merely an isolated corps which was retreating toward
Namur ? Was it a rearguard which occupied Quatre-Bras, or
was it Wellington's whole army ? ISTapoleon considered that
he was not sufficiently well-informed to allow of his taking any
decided step. Grouchy had come for orders : he was told to
wait, and accompany the Emperor to the battlefield of Ligny,^
where the latter proposed to inspect the troops. At the same
time he commanded Soult to write to Ney : " The Emperor is
going to the mill of Brye, where the highway leading from
IsTamur to Quatre-Bras, passes. This makes it impossible that
the English Army should act in front of you. In the latter
event, the Emperor would march directly on it by the Quatre-
Bras road, while you would attack it from the front, and this
army would be destroyed in an instant. Therefore keep His
Majesty informed of whatever takes place in front of you. , . .
His Majesty's wishes are, that you should take up your position
at Quatre-Bras; but if this is impossible and oannot be ac-
complished, send information immediately with full details,
and the Emperor will act there as I have told you. If, on the
contrary, there is only a rearguard, attack it and seize the
position. To-day it is absolutely necessary to end this
operation, and complete the military stores, to rally scattered
soldiers and summon back all detachments." ^
CHAP. IV THE RETREAT OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY 127
The Emperor's plans for the 17th were therefore limited
to the occupation of Quatre-Bras by Xey, and the revictualling
of the Army. Undoubtedly, if he had heard that Wellington
was still unsupported at Quatre-Bras, he would have taken
advantage of this stroke of luck, to march on the English and
annihilate them ; but he greatly doubted that his wily adversary
would commit so great a blunder. Xey would easily drive
from Quatre-Bras, the rearguard which still held its own there,
and the French Army would remain all day without stirring
from its bivouacs.
The morrow of a victory might have been better employed
Nor did Napoleon persist very long in the idea of allowing so
long a rest to his troops, and such a respite to the enemy. It
may have been his intention up to eight o'clock, as is shown
by Soult's letter to Marshal Ney ; but at half-past eight, before
stepping into his carriage, he was meditating other schemes.
He sent an order to Lobau to march the infantry division of
Teste, with its battery, on to the Namur road to the assistance
of Pajol ; ^ he sent a cavahy reconnaissance scouring toward
Quatre-Bras to make sure that the English were still occupying
that position in force ; ^ and left the chateau de Fleurus
himself, resolved not to set his foot there again. Already in
the Imperial circle, it was rumoured that the French were
about to pursue the Prussians towards Namur, and the English
towards Brussels.^" The Emperor had in fact conceived this
double manoeuvre, but had not yet settled on the means of
executing it. He desired further intelligence. He would
wait for it on the battlefield of the day before, and in the
midst of his soldiers, to whom he knew he could never show
himself too much, or too often.
Shortly before nine, the Emperor drove away.^^ His
heavy coach moved at a snail's pace across the furrows, jolting
violently. Tired as he was, he alighted, says Grouchy, and
mounted his horse. He visited Ligny, Saint- Amand, and the
vicinity of La Haye. Innumerable Prussian wounded had
remained lying peU-mell among the dead bodies. The Emperor
spoke to them, caused money and brandy to be distributed
among them, and gave, in their presence, most emphatic orders
that they were to be raised from the ground without delay
/
128 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
and their wounds dressed with as much care as the French.
A Prussian field-officer, horribly mangled, was lying in the
same spot where he had fallen the day before. The Emperor
hailed a peasant who happened to be close by, and said to him
in a solemn voice — " Do you believe in hell ? " The Belgian,
terribly overawed, muttered an assent. " Well, if you do not
wish to go to hell, take care of this wounded man whom I
entrust to you; otherwise God will make you burn; He desires
us to be charitable." The injunction, concludes a witness of
this scene, was not needless, for, eager as the Belgians were to
nurse the French wounded, they were quite as averse to assist
the Prussians, who had made themselves hated.^^
Having arrived at the height of the Bussy mill, the
Emperor passed in front of his troops, which were standing
in line, unarmed, at the head of their bivouacs. He stopped
to congratulate the heads of the corps, the officers, and the
men. So tremendous was the cheering on the part of the
latter when they saw their Emperor, that the sound was heard
at more than three kilometres' distance by General von Groben,
who was in observation before Tilly.^^ Having completed his
round, the Emperor dismounted and conversed at some length
with Grouchy, and several other generals on the state of public
opinion in Paris, on the legislative assembly, and Fouch^ and
the Jacobins. Some among his hearers admired the freedom
of mind which he preserved under such grave circumstances,
but others were slightly disturbed at seeing him waste his time
talking politics, allowing his thoughts to wander on irrelevant
topics, instead of on those which should have completely
absorbed him. Grouchy did not, however, dare to question
the Emperor on the operations he had designed for the day.
Already, as they were starting from Fleurus, he had asked foi'
his orders, and Napoleon had answered with some temper —
" I will give them to you when I see fit." ^*
Section II
The Emperor was not so absorbed by the intrigues of the
liberals in the Chambers, as to forget the enemy. He had
CHAP. IV RETREAT OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY 129
received fresh information. First, there was a letter from Ney
announcing that the English, posted in front of Quatre-Bras,
held the wood of Bossu, Gemioncoui-t, Piraumont, and numbered
eight regiments of infantry and two thousand horses.^" These
masses, the Emperor could no longer doubt, were not a rear-
guard, but the first line of Wellington, who must be iu com-
mand there with his army. Shortly after, between ten and
eleven o'clock, the officer in command of the reconnaissance
sent to Quatre-Bras, returned with tidings that the English
still held that point, their left being covered by a force of
cavalry, with which he had had an engagement.^*^ Information
regarding the Prussian retreat also arrived. A despatch from
Pajol, announced that in front of Le Mazy on the Namur road,
he had captured eight cannon and numerous waggons ; ^^ a
despatch from Exelmans declared that he was marching with
his two divisions of dragoons and his mounted batteries on
Grembloux, " where the enemy had massed themselves." ^^
It was then about eleven o'clock. The Emperor at last made
his final arrangements. He dispatched Lobau to lead the 6th
Corps ^^ to Marbais, so as to support the attack of Marshal
Ney on Quatre-Bras by overpowering the left flank of the
English. Drouot received orders to follow up the manoeuvre
with the whole of the Guard.-"
The Emperor then said to Marshal Grouchy : " Whilst I
am engaged in marching on the English, you must devote your
energies to the pursuit of the Prussians. You will have
under your orders the corps of Vandamme and of Gerard, the
division of Teste, the cavalry corps of Pajol, of Exelmans, and
of Milhaud." ^i
From the very first. Grouchy realised the burden, rather
than the honour of this mission. In the whole course of
his long career he had never held so important a command.
He had performed his splendid feats of arms, and won his
renown in the capacity of a cavalry general He had the
master-glance of a great leader on the battlefield ; he was
endowed with a lucid and prompt perception of every weak
point, and a power of conceiving sudden and decisive move-
ments. But he was the man of a single hour, a single
manoeuvre, a single effort. He was a tactician, but only on
9
130 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
the spur of the moment, a tactician who was local and special,
and he was not fitted for the management and the responsi-
bilities of great strategical operations. What was worse, he
was conscious of his inferiority as an army commander, of
whom independent action was expected. This feeling naturally
paralysed him. Moreover, he knew, or he suspected, that Gerard,
and especially Vandamme, whose unbending character he well
knew, were both annoyed at being placed under his orders.
What authority could he have over lieutenants who lacked
confidence in him ? Nevertheless, as Marshal of France, he
could not decline, nor could he desire to decline, this mission
through sheer self-respect, plainly as he foresaw its difficulties
and its perils. His secret wish was to refuse it, but he dared
not give utterance to this wish.^^
If, as he asserts, he had observed to the Emperor that the
Prussians having commenced their retreat in the night or at
daybreak, it would be very difficult to find traces of them and
frustrate their designs,^^ Napoleon would not have failed to reply
in some such words as these : " Pajol ^"^ has been marching on
the trail of the enemy since three o'clock this morning; as
early as five or six on the Namur road, he has captured from
them men, baggage, and cannon. Exelmans,^^ who has followed
the Prussian infantry mustered at Gembloux, has certainly by
this time come into touch with them again. Therefore, even
should the vanguards of Blucher's columns have the start of
eight or ten hours over you, your cavalry is on the heels of
its rearguard." It is even very possible that the Emperor
would have added, as Grouchy affirms he did : " All the
probabilities lead me to believe that it is on the Meuse that
Bliicher means to effect his retreat ; therefore proceed in that
direction." ^*^ Indeed the reports of Pajol and Exelmans seemed
to confirm the assumption that, in accordance with the rules
of strategy, the Prussians were withdrawing towards their base
of operations.
Grouchy having departed to give his orders, the Emperor
reflected that more cavalry were required with the principal
part of the army. He determined to take back from his
lieutenant the division of Domon, of Vandamme's corps, and
Milhaud's corps of cuirassiers. In the absence of the chief of the
CHAP. IV RETREAT OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY 131
staff, who was still at the Imperial headquarters in Fleurus,^"
he dictated to Bertrand an order to Grouchy, enjoining the
latter to direct these three cavalry divisions on Marbais
without delay.'-^
A few minutes later (it might have been half - past
eleven or a quarter to twelve) the Emperor resolved to
develop, and emphasise in writing, the verbal instructions he
had just given to Marshal Grouchy.^ Soult had not yet
arrived. Bertrand again took up his pen and wrote at the
dictation of the Emperor : " Eepair to Gembloux with the
cavalry corps of Generals Pajol and Exelmans, the light
cavalry of the 4th Corps, the division of Teste, and the 3rd
and 4th Corps of infantry. You will send out scouts in the
direction of Namur and Maestricht, and you will pursue the
enemy. Eeconnoitre his march and tell me of his movements,
that I may penetrate his intentions. I shall move my head-
quarters to Quatre-Chemins, where the English still were this
morning ; our communication will then be direct by the Namur
road. Should the enemy have evacuated Namur, write to the
general in command of the 2nd Miltary Division at Charle-
mont, to occupy this town by a few battalions of national
guards. It is important to discover what Wellington and
Bliicher mean to do, and whether they meditate uniting their
armies to cover Brussels and Liege, by risking the fate of a
battle. At all events keep your two infantry corps con-
tinually together within the limits of a mile, reserving several
outlets for retreat ; place cavalry detachments between, so as
to be able to communicate with headquarters."^**
According to this letter. Marshal Grouchy was, first, to
concentrate all his forces at Gembloux, the intermediate point
between Xamur, Liege, and Wavre ; second, to reconnoitre by
the roads leading to Xamur and Maestricht, the roads by
which the enemy would probably retreat, though this was
uncertain ; third, to follow the traces of the Prussians and
to penetrate their designs while pursuing them ; fourth, to
ascertain whether Bliicher's object was to unite with the
English. No doubt the Emperor did not indicate as
definitely as he ought to have done, the conduct his lieutenant
was to adopt in all emergencies ; but he could not suspect
132 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
that Grouchy, who was plainly meant, by his very position on
the flank of the army, to cover it against an offensive move-
ment, would not manoeuvre so as to act as its shield.
Napoleon had provided for Bliicher. He had now to
settle with Wellington. He ordered Soult, who had just
joined the Imperial staff, to write to Ney that he was to
attack the English immediately, while he would himself
march to support him,^^ It was now noon. By this time the
heads of the columns should have reached Marbais. The
Emperor remounted his horse and took the road to Quatre-
Bras, upon which were marching, filled with ardour for the
fight, Lobau's soldiers, the whole of the Guard, the Domon and
Subervie divisions, and Milhaud's cuirassiers.
Section III
Napoleon, Soult, Grouchy, all the staff, believed that the
Prussians were retreating toward the Meuse ; in point of fact
it was toward La Dyle. The night before, at dusk, while the
troops were rallying between the Namur road and the Eoman
way, Zieten, Pirch I., and the other generals, receiving no
orders, had hurried to Brye, where they expected to find
Bliicher. At that very moment the dragoons who had picked
up the Field-Marshal on the field of battle, were carrying him
into a cottage of Mellery, bruised all over from his fall, and
half fainting. His staff had no news of him ; they did not
know whether he was captive or free, dead or alive. Con-
sternation prevailed ; the looks of all eyes were anxiously
turned towards Gneisenau, to whom the command fell in the
absence of Bliicher, through seniority of rank. What course
would he adopt ? Would he be willing to abandon his lines
of communication with Namur, and make a fresh attempt to
join the English by a parallel march ? Would he resign him-
self to falling back on his base of operations, thus leaving
Wellington alone, face to face with the French army, an(i
overthrowing the plan of campaign settled two months ago
Gneisenau was on horseback in the middle of the road whicli
runs northward of Brye to the Namur road ; in the moonlight
CHAP. IV RETREAT OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY 133
he had some difficulty in studying his map. After a short
examination he cried : " Eetreat on Tilly and Wavre." ^^
A few days after this, Wellington wrote emphatically to
the King of the Netherlands : " It was the decisive moment
of the century." ^^ In the same strain, German military
historians have extolled the retreat on Wavre, and placed it on
an equality with the finest conceptions of strategy. This
opinion must be discounted in some degree. The decision
manifests Gneisenau's firmness imder disaster and his compre-
hensive grasp of the necessities of war ; but at the time when
he decided on this movement, he certainly did not foresee the
tremendous consequences it would bring about. As yet, he
had not formed the scheme of joining the English Army to
cover Brussels. If he thought that at Wavre the Prussians
might once more be in touch with the English, he was by no
means certain that this desirable circumstance would come
to pass, for everything depended on the line of retreat
Wellington might choose, and on many other eventualities
besides. At any rate he never expected to be resuming
offensive operations again, thirty-six hours after his defeat.^^
It was specially as a position of waiting, as a point of con-
centration, that he had decided on Wavre, the defence of which
was rendered easy by the Dyle. The movement was not so
daring as the Germans assert. If Gneisenau did abandon his
lines of communication on Xamur and Liege, he was about
to open fresh ones through Tirlemont and Louvain, on
Maestricht, Cologne, Wezel, Miinster, Aix-la-Chapelle. From
the morning of the 17th of June, estafettes were dis-
patched to these various places to order military stores, and
a command was transmitted to Liege to bring up the siege
artillery to Maestricht.^^ Gneisenau had therefore not " broken
down his bridges behind him," as General von Ollech puts
it : ^ rather he had broken them down, but with the certainty
of being able to build new ones the very next day.
The corps of Zieten and Pirch I. encamped between
Mellery, Tilly, and Gentinnes ; three of Jagow's battalions
remained as a mainguard at Brye, under the command of
Quartermaster-General Grolemann. Notice of the retreat on
Wavre was forwarded to Thielmann, who had faUen back vdth
134 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
his troops to the north of Sombreffe, and was still continuing
to occupy this position with a strong detachment, and to
Biilow, who knew already that the battle had been lost, and
had halted his army corps on the Eoman highway, its head
at Baudeset. On his arrival at Mellery, Gneisenau found
Bliicher lying on a bed of straw in a solitary cottage, sipping
a few mouthfuls of milk from time to time.^^
On the 17 th at daybreak the whole Army broke up camp.
The corps of Zieten and of Pirch, which had just rallied the
three battalions of the mainguard at Brye, reached Wavre by
G-entinnes, Villeroux, and Mont-Saint-Guibert ; Colonel von
Sohr was left temporarily behind Tilly, with two regiments of
cavalry. Zieten, who arrived in front of Wavre between
eleven and twelve, moved his troops across the left bank of
the Dyle and posted them at Bierges and its neighbourhood.
Pirch halted his on the right bank ; they bivouacked between
Aisemont and Sainte-Anne.^^
From Sombreffe, Thielmann proceeded first to Gembloux,
Knowing that his troops were very tired, he took up his posi-
tion a little beyond this village, and very imprudently remained
there without moving, from seven o'clock in the morning till
two in the afternoon. At last he resumed his march, passed
by Corbais, but did not cross the bridge of Wavre till eight,
and then encamped at La Bavette (half a league north of
Wavre). The cavalry of Lottum and the division of Borke,
which formed the rearguard of this corps, did not arrive in
sight of Wavre till long after midnight ; they were obliged to
bivouac on the right bank of the Dyle.^^
Biilow, whose troops were drawn up in column on the
Eoman way, had orders to take up his quarters at Dion-le-
Mont (a league to the south-east of Wavre). His progress
was very slow. At ten o'clock that night his movement was
not yet completed.^"
Section IV
The retreat of the Prussian Great Guard stationed at Brye,
and with them the corps of Pirch and Zieten, completely escaped
the notice of the vedettes on watch before the mill at Bussy.
CHAP. IV BETREAT OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY 135
Tliroughout the morning not a single movement was made
by the cavalry outposts, not a reconnaissance, not even a
patrol sent out.^^ On the French right toward Tongrinne, the
hussars of Pajol showed themselves more vigilant. As early
as half-past two in the morning, they had warned their General
that the enemy were leaving their positions. Pajol immediately
ordered both the regiments which he had kept under his
immediate command ^ to saddle and mount, and they dashed
up the Xamur road in pursuit of the Prussians. Unfortu-
nately he took the wrong direction. He had imagined he was
on the track of Thielmann's corps, but he was merely following
a few stragglers, a park convoy and a battery which had lost
its way.^^ This column he caught up a little beyond Mazy,
toward five or six o'clock in the morning ; he cut down a
squadron of the 7 th Uhlans which had joined it, and took both
their cannon and their waggons. He did not, however, push
on farther up the Namur road than Les Isnes, for he saw
nothing more. Very undecided as to what he should do, he
sent out reconnaissances in various directions, and halted in
person at the junction of the highway and the road to Saint-
Denis. Only at midday, misled by false reports and believing
that the enemy was retreating, not upon !N'amur, but on
Saint - Denis, to take the road to Louvain, did he start in
that direction. Owing to the arrival of the 1st Hussars, who
had joined him about nine, and Teste's division, which the
Emperor had just sent to him, his forces amounted then to
three regiments of cavalry, four regiments of infantry, and
two batteries.*^
The brigade of Berton's dragoons from the corps of
Exelmans, had begun to move shortly after Thielmann's rear-
guard had evacuated Sombrefife. But instead of entering this
village and taking the road to Gembloux, Berton struck up
the Namur road behind PajoL However, he marched no
farther than the Orneau brook, some peasants having told
him that the Prussian army was retreating by Gembloux, and
that there were still numbers of troops there. Berton lost no
time in acquainting General Exelmans with this news, and he
awaited fresh instructions. He shoidd also have informed
Pajol, who was 1,500 yards in advance of him. Berton soon
136 LIGNY AND QUATBE-BRAS book ii
received the order to proceed to Gembloux. Accordingly he
resumed his march, and arrived before the village at nine
o'clock. Prussian vedettes were posted on the left bank of
the Orneau ; beyond Gembloux the enemy's masses could be
perceived, resting.*^
Soon after, Exelmans, bringing with him three other
brigades of cavalry, rejoined Berton. He correctly estimated
the Prussians bivouacked behind Gembloux at 20,000. He
had himself more than 3,000 mounted dragoons and two
mounted batteries ; Pajol, at a distance of six kilometres to
the right, had 1,400 hussars, 3,000 infantry, and two batteries.
But Exelmans never thought of informing him that the
Prussians were occupying Gembloux, though this knowledge
would have spared his colleague a round-about march of twenty
kilometres (there and back) in the direction of Leez.^*^ Nor
did he make any demonstration to compel the Prussians
to reveal their plans. Not a cannon did he fire on these
masses, nor even a musket shot against the vedettes. He
contented himself with observing the enemy,^^ very half-
heartedly, as will be seen later. With unpardonable careless-
ness, he omitted giving immediate notice to Grouchy, or the
Emperor, that he was in presence of one of Bliicher's corps.'**
In spite of all these mistakes, matters were not yet
seriously compromised. At midday, at the very moment when
the Emperor was reiterating to Grouchy in writing, his orders
to pursue the Prussians, the latter found themselves divided
and separated. The corps of Zieten and of Pirch were
concentrated at Wavre ; the corps of Biilow, marching from
Baudeset, had not yet passed Walhain;^^ the corps of Thielmann
was halting near Gembloux, within range of Exelmans' guns.
The inattention of the French vedettes, the carelessness of the
oflBcers in command of the mainguard, the time that had
been wasted that morning, the false information respecting
the line of retreat of the Prussians, all might have been
retrieved, if Exelmans had been but vigilant and active, and
if Grouchy had hastened the march and had thoroughly
understood his mission.
CHAP. IV BETBEAT OF THE PRUSSIAN ABMY 137
Section V
After leaving the Emperor about half -past eleven ^ near the
mill at Bussy, Grouchy sent orders through Colonel de Blocque-
ville to General Yandamme at Saint- Amand, to dispatch the
3rd Corps promptly to Point-du-Jour, at the intersection of
the Namur and Gembloux roads. At the same time he
dispatched to Exelmans, in the direction of Grembloux, another
aide-de-camp, Captain Bella, with a view to gaining news from
him.^^ He then proceeded to Ligny, wishing to give his
instructions to Gerard himself. On the way, he came upon
Marshal Soult, who was hastening to rejoin the Imperial staff.
A short conversation ensued between the two men, which
touched merely on the divisions of cavalry which Grouchy was
to detach from his army, and direct on Marbais^" in accordance
with the first of Bertrand's orders, which he had just received.
"When Grouchy had taken his departure, Soult said to one of
his aides-de-camp : " It is a mistake to divert so consider-
able a force from the army which is going to march against
the English. Considering the plight into which their defeat
has thrown the Prussians, a slight infantry corps, with the
cavahy of Exelmans and Pajol, would be quite sufficient to
follow the Prussians and obsei-ve them." ^^ It is true that
Soult, who was mistaken as to the extent of the Prussian
Army's disorder, censured the too great strength of the detach-
ment placed under Grouchy's orders ; but he did not criticise
the direction, which had been given for the pursuit of the
enemy.
At Ligny Grouchy found Gerard fuming. It seems he
was very indignant at not having been awarded the marshal's
baton at the close of the battle ; and doubtless he was the
reverse of delighted at seeing himself placed under the orders
of Grouchy.^ In obedience to the second despatch from
Bertrand which had reached him, the Marshal ordered Gerard
to follow the 3rd Corps to Gembloux." It is hardly probable,
in spite of all that Grouchy may say, that his irritation
should have prompted Gerard to postpone the expected move-
ment with any evil design.^^ In order to start his own troops
138 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
on the march, he was bound to wait until the whole corps of
Vandamme had finished defiling. And in those days, the
passage of an army corps, which included three infantry divi-
sions, with artillery, engineer and transport corps, would last
at least an hour, though the intervals between the various
component parts of the column, were less than they are at the
present time. If delays arose in the departure of the 4th
Corps, the responsibility rested with Grouchy himself. As the
3rd and the 4th Corps were both to follow the same road, and
as Vandamme's corps was stationed at Saint-Amand-La-Haye,
2,000 yards in a straight line to the left of Ligny, where the
corps of Gerard was encamped. Grouchy should have started
Gerard on the march first, not Vandamme. More than an
hour would thus have been gained. It has been said that
Grouchy desired to humour the pride of Vandamme, whose bad
temper he dreaded. What a fine reason to give ! Grouchy
must then have felt his authority to be feeble indeed ! More-
over, for the last two days, on the left wing the 2nd Corps had
formed the head of the column instead of the 1st ; and in the
Guard it was customary for the left to march always in front, nor
did the grenadiers ever feel themselves humiliated by this.
The corps of Vandamme plodded on with incredible slow-
ness. From Saint-Amand to Point-du-Jour via Ligny and
Sombreffe there is a distance of 6,300 yards. Yet the advanced
guard of the 3rd Corps, which had broken up camp from Saint-
Amand before noon, did not reach Point-du-Jour before three
o'clock at the earliest. It would seem from this, that they had
marched at the rate of two kilometres an hour.^'^
Grouchy arrived at Point-du-Jour at about the same time
as the head of Vandamme's column.^^ What he had been doing
from the time he left Gerard at Ligny, less than one league's
distance from Point-du-Jour, it is impossible to explain. At
any rate it had not occurred to him to send a few squadrons in
reconnaissance toward Gentinnes,^^ though the Emperor had
said to him, " It is for you to discover the traces of the
enemy." ^°
At Point-du-Jour or at Sombreffe, the aide-de-camp Bella
returned from his mission to Exelmans and rejoined Grouchy.**'
At Gembloux, between one and two o'clock, Exelmans had
CHAP. IV RETREAT OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY 139
entrusted him with a letter to the Marshal, which notified that
he was observing the enemy's armj collected on the left
bank of the Orneau, and that he would follow the Prussians as
soon as ever they should begin to march.^"- Xews of such im-
portance, he should have taken advantage of instantly. Grouchy
should have set spurs to his horse and galloped to Grembloux ;
he should have seen with his own eyes what was going on
there, and directed in person, he who was so skilful in handling
masses of cavalry, the movements of the four brigades of
dragoons. He contented himself with proceeding there at a
leisurely pace with the whole of Yandamme's corps, followed
by Grerard's men.^^ The troops continued to advance very
slowly. There are seven kilometres between Point-du-Jour
and G^mbloux. Vandamme only arrived there at seven
o'clock,*'^ Gerard at nine.^^ Notwithstanding the leisurely
march of these army corps, they might have reached Grembloux
two hours earlier, and, had Grouchy so willed it, they might
have simultaneously attacked this village in two separate
columns. Gerard should have taken the road to Point-du-
Jour, Vandamme might have reached the Eoman way above
Sombreffe.
Thielmann's corps had departed long ago, and Exelmans,
whose vedettes were only separated from the enemy's by the
Orneau brook,^ had allowed the Prussians to escape on his
left, without noticing their retreat tiU it was too late.^ At
two o'clock Thielmann had left his camp at the north of
Gembloux ; at three only, Exelmans entered the village with
his dragoons.^ The Prussians were not yet very far off.
Contact with them, which had been lost through his fault,
might yet have been regained. But even now he failed to
, repair his criminal want of vigilance. Instead of sending out
i scouts in every direction and with the bulk of his forces
following those who should happen first to discover traces of
! the enemy, he merely marched to take up his position at
I Sauveniere, a short league to the north of Gembloux, satisfied
with having captured near by, a herd of four hundred oxen.^^
During the afternoon Grouchy displayed but little activity ;
Exelmans' inertness had completely paralysed him. He put
ofif the pursuit of the Prussians to the following day. Van-
140 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
damme's corps had hardly accomplished thirteen kilometres,
Gerard's barely ten. But though he had two hours of
daylight still at his disposal, Grouchy ordered his troops to
halt. He ordered Vandamme's infantry to encamp around
Gembloux, and Gerard's in the rear of the same village J'^ As
an excuse, the Marshal has urged the wretched condition of
the roads, and the rain, which fell in torrents.'^^ But on the
side of Wavre and Dion-le-Mont the roads were no better, yet
this did not prevent the Prussians from marching on steadily
in the pelting rain.
On the other hand, toward six o'clock, Exelmans had
resolved to send Bonnemains' brigade exploring towards
Sart-k-Walhain, and the 15th dragoons towards Perwez.^^
Bonnemains advanced beyond Sart-k-Walhain, and sent out
scouts toward Nil-Saint-Vincent and Tourinnes. Tourinnes
was still held by a Prussian rearguard. After spending an
hour in observing this body of infantry, which did not move,
the dragoons retraced their steps ; they bivouacked at Ernage.
Here towards ten o'clock, a peasant informed Bonnemains that
the enemy had evacuated Tourinnes and were proceeding
towards Wavre. This fact Bonnemains reported. On his
return from Perwez, the Colonel of the 15th Dragoons also
brought the news, that the retreating Prussian troops were
marching on Wavre.'^^
It was late in the night when these reports reached
Grouchy. But ever since six o'clock he knew, through a
letter from Pajol, that the enemy's column, which seemed at
first to be proceeding to Namur, was really marching toward
Louvain.''^* Then between seven and eight o'clock he had
himself collected much important information at Gembloux.
If this information did not agree on every point, if, according
to some, the Prussians were marching on Li^ge or Maestricht
by Perwez, the greater part indicated that they were pro-
ceeding by Wavre to join Wellington near Brussels.~^
Therefore from Pajol's despatch, and from the information
afforded by the inhabitants of Gembloux, it seemed clear, in
the first place, that the enemy were not retreating on Namur,
as had been believed in the morning ; in the second, that they
were marching either on Louvain, Maestricht, Liege, or
CH.\p. IV RETREAT OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY 141
Wavre, most likely on the latter point, with the intention
of joining the English Army.
Under these circumstances it was in the highest degree
advisable to proceed to Wavre, for if the Prussians retreated
on Liege, Maestricht, or Louvain, they would be prevented
through their own fault, from taking any part in the proceed-
ings for two days at least, whilst if they succeeded in rallying
at Wavre with a view to union with Wellington's army,
imminent danger to the Emperor would ensue. Consequently
Grouchy 's duty, a duty he could have easily accomplished,
was at ^^ eight o'clock to transfer Exelmans' cavalry to Walhain
and Sart-k- Walhain, Yandamme's corps to Ernage, and Gerard's
corps to Saint- G^ry. By means of this movement, not only
would he have established his army a mile nearer Wavre that
same evening, but by immediately doubling back the 4th
Corps on to the 3rd in order to move it to Saint-Gery, he would
have made it possible to march on the next day, without any
loss of time, in two parallel columns. Moreover, at Saint-
G^ry, the 4th Corps would have foimd itself ready placed to
reach rapidly Mont-Saint-Guibert and the bridges of Mousty
and Ottignies, and if Grouchy should so decide, at sunrise, to
march on Wavre by the left bank of the Dyle.
Grouchy did not grasp the fact that Wavre should be his
first aim, and that he ought to sacrifice the doubtful hope of
overtaking the Prussians should they prove to be retreating
on Liege, to the urgent necessity of covering the flank of the
Imperial army, if the former manoeuvred to join the English.
At ten o'clock p.m. he wrote to the Emperor : " It seems, from
all the reports, that on their arrival at Sauveniere, the
Prussians divided into two columns ; the one must have taken
the road to Wavre, the other column seems to have headed
towards Perwez. We may therefore, perhaps, infer that one
portion is going to join Wellington, and that the centre, which
is Bliicher's army, is retiring on Liege, another column, with
artillery, having effected its retreat on Namur. General Exelmans
has orders to push on six squadrons this evening towards
Sart-a-Walhain, and three squadrons on Perwez. After their
reports, if the bulk of the Prussians retire on Wavre, I shall
follow them in that direction, in order that they may not
142 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS bk. ii ch. iv
reach Brussels, and in order to separate them from Wellington.
If, on the contrary, my information shows that the principal
Prussian force has marched upon Perwez, I will proceed by
this town in pursuit of the enemy." ^^
Although in this letter, Grouchy declares he is preparing
to march either on Wavre or toward Liege, in accordance with
the night's news, he takes no steps to further the first of
these two movements. His orders for the next day — orders to
Exelmans and Vandamme to proceed to Sart-^-Walhain ;
orders to Pajol to march from Le Mazy to Grand-Leez ; orders
to Gerard to follow the 3rd Corps to Sart-a-Walhain and to
send his cavalry to Grand-Leez, "the enemy retreating on
Perwez " ^® — testify that, unmindful of Wellington and neglect-
ing Wavre, it was in the direction of Liege, that he persisted in
seeking the enemy.
BOOK II CHAPTER V
THE RETREAT OF THE ENGLISH ARMY
I. Exchange of despatches between "Wellington and Bliicher (morning of the
17th of June) — Retreat of the English (ten o'clock).
II. Arrival of Napoleon at Quatre-Bras — still occupied by the English
cavalry (two o'clock).
III. Brisk pursuit of the English rearguard personally conducted by Napoleon
— Engagement at Genappe — Cannonade at Slont-Saint-Jean (seven
o'clock).
IV. Night in camp.
V. Napoleon's indecision — Letter from Bliicher to Wellington — Orders of
Napoleon (night of the 17 th to the 18 th of June).
Section I
In the direction of Quatre-Bras, the French and English
remained motionless in their respective positions during the
morning of the 1 7th of June.^ Xot tiU past nine, did Ney learn
the result of the battle of Lignj.^ As for "Wellington, he
had remained all night without news from his allies. The
last message which he had received from Bliicher the evening
before, announced that the Field-Marshal had resumed the
offensive and that " all was well." ^ A little later Gneisenau
had dispatched an officer to inform him of the retreat ; but
this officer, seriously wounded on the way by French skirmishers,
had not been able to fulfil his mission.'* Wellington thought
that the action, undecided as it had been at Ligny, would be
resumed the. next day along the whole line ; ^ he encamped,
his troops at Quatre-Bras and simimoned up fresh reinforce-
ments. The cavalry of Lord Uxbridge arrived in the evening
and during the night ; on the morning of the 17 th the brigade
of Ompteda, the divisions of Clinton and Colville, and the
artillery reserve also marched off to join '^ Wellington, who.
144 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
having slept that night at Genappe, returned to Quatre-
Bras at daybreak. Anxious to receive news from Bliicher, for
a rumour had reached Genappe that the Prussians were
beaten/ he sent his aide-de-camp, Colonel Gordon, to his left,
with a detachment of the 10th Hussars. Gordon, avoiding:
the French vedettes of Marbais, pushed on as far as Tilly,
where he had the good fortune still to find General Zieten
with the rearguard of the 1st Corps. He learnt from him
that the Prussian Army was retreating on Wa-\Te. Eeturning
to Quatre-Bras at half-past seven, he delivered this intelligence
to Wellington, who, in order to relieve his impatience, was
pacing with long strides up and down the Charleroi road in
front of Quatre-Bras.^ This indeed was a sudden turn of
events ! Wellington could no longer remain at Quatre-Bras,
where he was exposed to a combined attack of Ney on his
front, and Napoleon on his left. Much perturbed, he at first
thought of retreating then and there : " Old Bliicher," he said,
" has had a damned good licking and gone back to Wavre,
eighteen miles. We must follow his example. I suppose
they will say in England we have been thrashed too ! I
cannot help it." ^
Muffling observed that the situation did not seem so
desperate : " The Prussian Army," he said, " having marched on
Wavre, you can easily resume your connection with it and
concert operations together. Pall back on some point parallel
to Wavre ; there you will have news from the Field-Marshal,
and information as to the state of his troops, and you can then
take steps according to circumstances." ^°
Wellington determined to occupy the eminence of Mont-
Saint-Jean, a strong defensive position which he had examined
the year before, when on his journey to Brussels,^^ But ought
he to decamp immediately, or should he wait till his troops
had taken some food, at the risk of a hot engagement in
his rear ? From time to time there were a few shots
between the outposts, but Ney's troops did not show the
slightest sign of moving : " I know the French," said Miiffling.
" They won't attack before they have made their soup."
Wellington decided the retreat should not commence before
ten o'clock. To Lord Hill, he sent orders to lead back to
CHAP. V RETREAT OF THE ENGLISH ARMY U5
Waterloo, the divisions which were marching on Qnatre-Bras.
Then, after looking through his mail which had just arrived
from Brussels, he wrapped himself in his cloak and fell asleep.
When he awoke towards nine o'clock, he threw a glance over
the French positions. Seeing that Ney made no preparations
for attack, he said : " Are the French retreating ? It is not
at all impossible." ^"
At this moment a Prussian officer. Lieutenant von Massow,
arrived from Mellery. He had been dispatched by Gneisenau
to inform Wellington of the intended concentration of the
whole Prussian Army on Wavre, and to inquire what he
meant to do. In presence of Miiffling, the Did^:e answered to
this effect : I am going to take up my position at Mont-Saint-
Jean. There I will wait for Napoleon and give him battle, if
I may hope to be supported even by a single Prussian corps.
But if this support is denied me, I shall be compelled to
sacrifice Brussels and take up my position behind the Scheldt.
Massow set off immediately for the Prussian headquarters.^^
The English commenced their movement. The Divisions
of Cook and Picton, the Dutch-Belgians under Perponcher, the
Division of Alten, finally the corps of Brunswick, passed in
succession up the Brussels road. The nimierous squadrons of
Lord Uxbridge had deployed on the first line so as to conceal,
then cover this retreat. By one o'clock this cavalry corps was
alone still in position.^^ As Ney allowed plenty of leisure to
Lord Uxbridge, the latter seated himself with his aide-de-camp
on the edge of the road. To Uxbridge's remark that the
French were curiously slow in attacking, the aide-de-camp
retorted laughingly, "They are eating." ^^ Shortly after,
Uxbridge was ad\-ised that masses were perceived marching
toward the left. The Imperial advanced guard was approaching
by the Namm* road.
Section II
From the Bussy mill near Ligny, the Emperor, with Domon's
light cavalry and Milhaud's cuirassiers, had proceeded to
Marbais, whither he had previously dispatched the corps of
Lobau, the cavalry division of Subervie, and the Guard.^^
10
146 LIGNY AND QUATBE-BRAS book ii
Having arrived there shortly before one o'clock, he rested a
few minutes, expecting news from Ney or the sound of
cannon.^^ Becoming impatient, he determined to march him-
self on Quatre-Bras. About half a league from this point the
scouts of the Vth Hussars,^^ who were scouring the country in
front of the army, fell back before the English vedettes. The
Emperor drew up his troops in order of battle, the artillery in
the centre, the infantry in the second line, Milhaud's cuirassiers
to the right, the light cavalry of Jacquinot, Subervie, and
Domon to the left.^^ In the meantime he detached toward
Frasnes, in order to communicate with Ney, the 7 th Hussars,
who began firing on the red lancers of the Guard, mistaking
them for the English! The scouts had captured an English
vivandiere. Ushered into the presence of the Emperor, the
woman declared that Lord Uxbridge's cavalry only, was still at
Quatre-Bras, being charged to cover the retreat of the army.
As for the French who had fought the day before, she knew
nothing about them ; she thought they had recrossed the
Sambre.^° Very much provoked that Wellington should thus
have evaded his grasp, the Emperor determined at any rate to
get as many of the fine English cavalry as possible. The
cuirassiers, the chasseurs, the lancers, the mounted batteries
dashed off at full trot. He himself in his impatient haste,
out-distanced them with the service squadrons.^^
Lord Uxbridge at the first notice had hurried up to the
Namur road. He found "Wellington there. The French were
still very far distant, and only a glitter of steel could be per-
ceived. " Those are their bayonets," said Wellington. But
with the help of General Vivian's field-glass, he recognised
the cuirassiers. After exchanging a few words with Lord
Uxbridge, he decided to beat a retreat. He entrusted Uxbridge
with the command of the rearguard and set off.^^ Whilst the I
brigades of English dragoons filed on behind him up thf
Brussels road, Vivian's and Grant's hussars deployed per-
pendicularly towards the Namur road, the mounted batterie-
being posted on their front.^^
It was a little after two o'clock.^* Great black clouds,
driven by a furious wind, were covering the sky. As the
storm came from the north-west, Quatre-Bras was already
CHAP. V RETREAT OF THE ENGLISH ARMY 147
plunged in shadow while it was still fine at Marbais. Lord
Uxbridge rode on horseback near the light battery of Captain
Mercer, whose guns were winding up the Namur road.
Suddenly from a dip of the ground, a horseman was seen to
emerge, followed by a small escort. His face, his figure, his
horse, lit up from behind, stood out in black relief — a statue
of bronze set on a background illuminated with floods of sun-
light. From the mere silhouette. Lord Uxbridge at once
recognised Xapoleon. " Fire ! fire ! " he said, " and aim welL" "^
The cannon thundered; the Emperor called forward a
mounted battery of the Guard. The English, considering they
were in too great danger to continue this artillery duel,
limbered up. The horsemen of Jacquinot and Subervie made
a rush forward. Both the hussars and gunners of the enemy
fled in disorder, through blinding flashes of lightning and the
rain of the storm which now began to fall. " It seemed,"
said Mercer, " as if the first cannon-shot had burst open the
clouds." -^
]\Iarshal Ney had not yet given the slightest sign of life.
The Emperor sent orders direct, to the commanders of the
corps in position before Frasnes. D'Erlon appeared at last
with the head of his column of infantry."'' As the Emperor
reproached him for having arrested his movement against the
Pmssian right on the pre"vdous evening, he answered that,
being under the direct command of Marshal Ney, he had been
obliged to obey the orders of his immediate chief. The
Emperor, feeling time was too precious to be wasted in idle
discussion, ordered Count d'Erlon to take the 1st Corps and
instantly follow the cavalry on the Brussels road.-^ Shortly
after this, Ney arrived. In his letter of eight o'clock.
Napoleon had already expressed his displeasure at Ney's
extremely unskilful operations of the previous day.^ He
did not return to the subject, but he very drily expressed his
surprise that the orders he had forwarded to him that very
morning, relative to the occupation of Quatre-Bras had not
yet been executed. Ney excused himself on the ground that
he believed Wellington's entire army was before him,^ In
that case the Marshal might at least have ascertained the fact,
by sending out a vigorous offensive reconnaissance. Now he
148 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
had not pushed forward a single squadron beyond his lines.
He had proved as negligent, as heedless, as apathetic as on the
morning of the 16 th and the evening of the 17 th.
It is true that Marshal Ney, through the carelessness of
the chief of the staff, had remained all night in complete
ignorance of the battle of Ligny. He could not have taken
the offensive, until he had received the order of eight
o'clock in the morning. Moreover, this order was conditional.
Even had Ney attacked then, it was likely the English would
have effected their retreat with no more confusion than before,
thanks to the masses of their cavalry. They would merely
have started an hour sooner, and Ney would have occupied
Quatre-Bras at noon : a sterile result, indeed. All the same,
there would have been the chance, that Wellington, under a
vigorous assault, might have decided to fight in his positions.
And this action Marshal Ney had done nothing whatever to
bring about. For this the Emperor reproved him. Far more
bitterly, no doubt, did he reproach himself for not having
transferred, as early as seven o'clock that morning, the Guard
and Lobau's corps from Ligny to Quatre-Bras. He had thus
let slip the opportunity of annihilating the English Army.
Wellington, with nearly all his troops still in position, with
his line of retreat on Genappe endangered, his left over-
powered by Napoleon, his front attacked by ISTey, would have
been forced to accept a battle which he would have virtually
lost before it began.^^
Whilst speaking to Ney at Quatre-Bras, the Emperor had
the vision of this lost victory before his eyes. He wished to
seize it still. He imagined that by hastening his march, he
might be able to join Wellington and compel him to make a
stand. Finally, he gave orders that Keille, then Lobau, then
the Guard should rapidly follow the 1st Corps and the light
cavalry up the Brussels road ; they were to be flanked by the
chasseurs of Domon and the cuirassiers. He himself, with
the service squadrons and the mounted battery of the Guard,
galloped to the head of the column to kindle fresh vigour
in the pursuit.^^
CHAP. V RETREAT OF THE ENGLISH ARMY 149
Section III
This pursuit was carried on at the pace of a " fox-hunt,"
as Captain Mercer terms it. The English rearguard fled in
the greatest disorder : hussars and gunners galloped pell-mell,
"going like mad," blinded by the flashes of lightning and
lashed by the rain, which was falling so thick and so fast that
the colour of the uniforms could not be distinguished at a
distance of five or six paces. Lord Uxbridge acted as cornet.
He galloped along the column, crying to his men : " Faster,
faster ! for God's sake gallop, or you will be taken." The
lancers of Alphonse de Colbert were at times so close on the
heels of the English hussars, that through the trampling of
the horses and the roar of the thunder, their laughter and
their jeers reached the ears of the fugitives.^^
The English crossed the Dyle ^ by the bridge of Genappe
and by another bridge higher up ; a few of them by the ford.
North of Genappe a curtain of hills slopes gently upward. In
order to arrest in some slight degree, the mad pace of the
pursuit, half-way up, in two lines. Lord Uxbridge posted the
bulk of his cavalry and two batteries. When the 1st Lancers
debouched from the village close on the heels of Vivian's
brigade, they were saluted by a volley of grape shot, then
charged in turn by the 7th English Hussars and the 1st Eegi-
ment of Life Guards. The lancers had no difficulty in breaking
through the hussars ; but they were repulsed as far as Genappe
by the Guards, who streamed in behind them. Uxbridge
himself led this charge. In the narrow, -winding street,
which at that time formed nearly the whole of the village,
a hand-to-hand struggle began, man to man, and the
lancers thus lost all the advantage of their long arms. Up
in the midst of Genappe the 2nd Lancers, debouching in
groups, or rather lines foui' deep, from the cross lanes, fell
upon the Guards and forced them back beyond the first houses.
On the Brussels road, the English suffered another charge on
the part of Marbot's hussars, who had turned the village on
the right. Thrown into disorder, they regained the heights
under the protection of their artiUery.^^
150 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
At this moment the Emperor appeared from Genappe, with
his service squadrons and a mounted battery. Mounted on
"D^siree," a very swift white mare, he had galloped from Quatre-
Bras to join the head of the column. His gray coat, of very
thin cloth, a sort of dust-coat, was soaked. Water was stream-
ing on to his boots. The clasps of his hat snapped under the
violence of the rain, the flaps had fallen over in front and
behind ; he appeared with the same head-gear, as Basile wears
in the Barhier de Seville. He superintended the placing of the
guns in the batteries himself, crying to the gunners in tones
of anger and hatred : " Fire ! fire ! these are the English!" ^"^
In the street of Genappe, Colonel Sourd of the 2nd Lancers,
surrounded by several Life Guardsmen, had had his right arm
hacked by six sabre strokes. Larrey amputated it on the
spot. During the operation, Sourd dictated this letter to the
Emperor who had just created him general : " The greatest
favour you could grant me is to allow me to remain colonel
of my regiment of lancers, which I hope to lead again to
victory. I refuse the rank of general. May the great
Napoleon forgive me ! The rank of colonel is everything to
me." Then with the fresh bandages on his bleeding stump,
he remounted his horse and galloped all along the column to
join his beloved regiment.^^ In the armies of the Eepublic and
the Empire there were many men of the same stamp.^^
After Genappe, the march slackened considerably. The
EngUsh were in quite as great haste, and the French had not
lost their ardour, but under the continuous action of the
pouring rain, the ground was becoming more and more difficult.
On the road reserved for the artillery and the infantry, the
water rushed like a torrent : in the fields, the horses sank up
to their knees.^^
Towards half-past six,'^° Napoleon reached the heights of
La Belle Alliance with the head of the column.*^ Brunswick's
infantry in the most hideous disorder, and the rearguard of
the English cavalry, crossed the valley which separates these
heights from the plateau of Mont-Saint-Jean. Marbot's
hussars followed them. They were beginning to blaze away
again, when from the edge of the plateau a battery of the
enemy began cannonading the bulk of the cavalry which had
CHAP. V RETREAT OF THE ENGLISH ARMY 151
halted near " La Belle Alliance." The rain had ceased, but
the atmosphere was still saturated with damp. Through the
veil of mist, the Emperor thought he distinguished a host of
cavalry and infantry. Was this the whole of "Wellington's
array, ready to fight a battle, or was it merely a strong rear-
guard which had taken up its position in order to protect
the retreat ? The Emperor determined to ascertain the truth.
Under his orders, four field batteries opened fire while
Milhaud's cuirassiers deployed as if to charge. The enemy's
cannon thundered back with increased violence ; and the
English unmasked. The whole of their army was there.*^
Section IV
Night drew on, and nearly the whole of the infantry was
still very far behind.*^ The Emperor put a stop to the firing.^^
During the cannonade he had remained near La Belle Alliance,
exposed to the cannon-balls which Captain Mercer, who had
recognised him, was directing on the staff.'*^ He himself in-
dicated to the troops, the different positions on which they were
to bivouac.^^ D'Erlon's corps (excepting Durutte's division,
which joined the next morning) posted itself between Plance-
noit and the Monplaisir farm, its front and its right flank being
covered by Jacquinot's cavalry. Milhaud's cuirassiers, the
light cavalry of Domon and of Subervie, and the cavalry of
the Guard, bivouacked in the second line on the height of
Eossomme. The corps of Eeille and Lobau and Kellermann's
cuirassiers, di'ew up at Genappe and in the vicinity.*" After
crossing this village at sunset, the mounted Guard left the
highway, which was eucumbered with artillery and transport
trains, and struck across country in an attempt to reach the
Imperial headquarters. Only two or three regiments arrived
near by, in the village of Glabais between eleven o'clock and
twelve. The other regiments having gone astray, the men
broke from their ranks and wandered all over the country in
quest of farms and isolated houses. They did not rejoin their
colours tiU the next morning.**
A wretched night for a bivouac ! The troops arrived in
152 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
the darkness, exhausted with fatigue, streaming with water, and
" not a man among them but carried two or three pounds of
mud clinging to his boots." Some were walking barefoot, for
their shoes had stuck in the greasy earth of the ploughed fields.
Now they were to lie down amid stalks of rye, a yard and a
half in height and drenched with rain. " It was like stepping
into a bath." To erect any shelter was out of the question ;
the wood which had been cut in the thickets of Vardre,
Le Chantelet, Le Caillou, was needed for making the camp
fires, which were lighted with great difficulty, kept going out
continually, and gave out more smoke than flame in the end.
Only now and then was there any pause in the rain. For the
sake of receiving a little less water and obtaining a little more
warmth, soldiers gathered into groups of ten or twelve and
slept standing, closely huddled against one another. Others,
more stoical or more exhausted, lay down flat in the mud.
There are times in war when one could sleep on bayonets.
After picketing their horses, a number of men got back into
the saddle and fell asleep, wrapped in their big cloaks, bend-
ing down over their horses' necks. The four days' rations of
bread carried in each knapsack were consumed. Men were
suffering from tortures of hunger. In most of the regiments,
the distributions were only made in the middle of the night
and even in the morning. The discontent of the soldiers may
be imagined, as well as the unrestrained plunder which the
Belgian peasants suffered at their hands.^^
The Guard, which had spent part of the night wandering
through the fields and through the lanes, was specially furious.
Never had the " grumblers " grumbled so loudly. Murmm'S
and oaths were coupled with imprecations on the generals ;
the men accused them of having wilfully led them astray and
stranded them in these unknown ways. And under the spell
of their recollections of 1814, these old warriors would declare,
" This smacks of treason." But neither in the Guard nor in
the line was there a sign of demoralisation or even discourage-
ment; they cherished in their hearts still the hope of vengeance
and faith in victory. In spite of all and above all, it was on
the English, the red-coats, the " goddams," that all the blame
fell, on account of this night's misery in the rain, without bread
CHAP. V RETBEAT OF THE ENGLISH ARMY 153
and without fire. And many were the vows made to make
them pay dear for this on the morrow.^
The English did not fare much better on the plateau of
Mont- Saint- Jean. However, the infantry which had begun
its retreat as early as four, had reached its positions while it
was still light. The head divisions had even arrived before
the storm. The soldiers settled down on ground which was
still dry, made themselves comfortable straw beds out of the
long stalks of rye which they beat down, and proceeded to light
the fires ; the conmiissariat having been well managed, they
were able to prepare their meal in peace. The cavalry of Lord
Uxbridge, whicli did not take to its bivouacs before night, alone
had to suffer severely from the inclemency of the weather.^^
Section V
The Emperor having retraced his footsteps, put up for the
night in the pretty little farm of "Le Caillou," situated by
the side of the road, 2,700 yards from "La Belle Alliance." ^-
The farmer Boucqueau and his people had fled to avoid the
doings of the Brunswickers, who, as they passed on their retreat,
had fired shots at the windows, broken in the door, and finally
plundered the house. The Emperor had a large fire lit; while
he waited for his baggage he dried himself as best he might
in the glow of the hearth.^^
Towards nine o'clock, General Milhaud advised him
verbally, that in his march from Marbais to Quatre-Bras, his
right flank had recognised a column of Prussian infantry
which from Tilly, had withdrawn toward Wavre.^^ It is
possible that the Emperor may have written immediately
to Grouchy, from whom he had not yet received any news, to
warn him of the direction of this column, and enjoin him to
march to Wavre so as to be nearer the Imperial Army. But
whether the order was sent on or not, it certainly did not
reach its destination. The officer who carried the order did
not reach the Marshal, either on account of his being captured
or killed on the way by the Prussian scouts, or for some other
reason.^^
154 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
Be this as it may, it does not seem that the Emperor
was alarmed by Milhaud's report. Ever since noon he had
manoeuvred, on the assumption that Bliicher's army was either
retreating on Namur or Maestricht, or withdrawing northward
to join the English Army in front of Brussels.^^ Therefore
the march of a Prussian column on Wavre would only confirm
one of his previsions. Of course this column might be
nothing more than a wandering troop cut off from its line of
retreat. But if things came to the worst, and all the Prussian
corps sought to concentrate on Wavre, Grouchy could get up
to them in time to fight them. Should they make straight
for Brussels up the road from Wavre to this town, there was
nothing to be feared from them for the present. As for
supposing that Bliicher, thirty-six hours after a defeat and
with 33,000 French at his heels, would risk a flank march
from Wavre on Plancenoit or Ohain, such a hypothesis never
entered the Emperor's mind.^*^
On the evening of the 17th of June, he was far less
concerned with the movements of the Prussians, than with
the schemes of the English. He feared that Wellington would
merely halt at Mont-Saint-Jean, and manage to slip away in
the night to take up, before Brussels, a position where the
Prussians could join him easily. If such was the enemy's
aim, the Emperor considered the game greatly endangered, for,
sure as he was of exterminating the English Army at Mont-
Saint-Jean, he was quite as keenly conscious of the great peril
he ran, in debouching from the forest of Soignes in front of
both armies together.^^ However, all this was mere conjecture
for the Emperor, as he was still uncertain as to whether the
bulk of the Prussians were withdrawing toward Brussels or
toward Liege.*^ And amid the tide of conflicting thoughts
which surged through his brain, dominated the hope that, even
in the event of Bliicher's manceuvring so as to get nearer
Wellington, the Prussian Army, ruined, cut up, demoralised
by the defeat of Ligny, would be in no condition to fight again
for several days.""
The Emperor's doubts concerning the schemes of Wellington
were most justifiable, for, until a late hour of the night, the
Duke himself did not yet know what course to adopt.*^^ It
CHAP. V RETREAT OF THE ENGLISH ARMY 155
depended on Bliicher. As he had said that morning to
Lieutenant von Massow, Gneisenau's orderly officer, he would
accept battle at Mont-Saint-Jean, provided he had the assurance
of being supported by at least one of the four Prussian Corps.
Otherwise he would continue his retreat.''^
But during the last twelve hours, Wellington was without
any news whatever from Prussian headquarters. Bliicher, it
is true, had been informed through Massow (who returned to
him by noon) of the eventual plan of the English General, and
he was burning to co-operate with him.*^^ But before formally
undertaking to second Wellington on the morrow, Bliicher
was obliged to wait, till his army was concentrated and
revictualled.^* Things do not proceed so quickly. In the
afternoon of the 1 7th of June, only the Ist and the 2nd Corps
were mustered at Wavre; and they still lacked ammunition and
food. The main park of artillery had been sent by Gembloux
to Wavre ; but could it avoid the French cavalry ? As for
the 3rd and 4th Corps they might be followed so closely by
the French, that they might be forced to stand and iight.*'''
Towards five o'clock, as the noise of the Genappe cannonade
was gi"0wing fainter, the main park arrived. Three hours
later, the 3rd Corps passed through Wavre on its way to La
Bavette. Finally, at eleven o'clock, a report from Biilow
announced that he was at Dion-le-Mont with the head of the
4th Corps.^ Bliicher received at the same moment a despatch
from Miiftiing, confirming the news that Wellington had finally
taken up his line of battle at Mont- Saint-Jean.^" Gneisenau
still hesitated. " If the English should be defeated," he objected
judiciously enough, "they themselves would be utterly destroyed."
Bliicher succeeded at last in convincing his all-powerful chief of
the staff. "Gneisenau has given in!" he said with a trimuphant
expression to Colonel Hardiuge,*^^ the English military attache.
" We are going to join the Duke." To Wellington he wrote :
"Biilow's corps will set off marching to-morrow at daybreak
in your direction. It will be immediately followed by the
corps of Pirch. The 1st and 3rd Corps will also hold them-
j selves in readiness to proceed towards you. The exhaustion
I of the troops, part of which have not yet arrived, does not
allow of my commencing my movement earlier." ^
156 LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS book ii
This letter reached Wellington toward two o'clock in the
morning7° at his headquarters at Waterloo, a village situated
a league in the rear of the first English lines. Now that he
could rely on the assistance of the Prussians, Wellington deter-
mined to accept battle."^ Fortune had once more favoured
him, but he had not the less remained too long expectant.
The failure of news from Bliicher ought to have made him
conclude, that the Prussians would not be able to second his
army, and though he would fight only if he had their support,
at one o'clock in the morning, he had not yet made any
arrangements for retreating.'^^
At the very moment when Wellington had formed his
resolutions. Napoleon divined them. He had retired to bed
rather late at Le Caillou. But first, with the probability of
a great battle on the morrow, he had dictated the order of
battle.^^ The mail from Paris had also been read to him, and
he had dictated several letters, " necessitated," says Davout, "by
the annoyances and difficulties resulting from the intrigues of
the Chambers of Eepresentatives." "^ And when he had
hardly slept at all, the Emperor rose about one o'clock in
the morning, to make the entire round of his outposts. His
only companion was General Bertrand. Eain had set in again,
and was falling in torrents. When Napoleon had gained the
crest of La Belle Alliance, the English bivouacs appeared before
him within easy cannon range. Complete silence reigned, the
allied army seemed wrapped in slumber. On the horizon the
forest of Soignes, upon which, through a veil of rain and smoke,
the innumerable camp fires lit by the soldiers cast their
reflections, was glowing red as if it were burning. The Emperor
decided that the English would keep to these positions. Had
they contemplated retreating in the night, or even at sunrise
as he feared, their camp would already have been astir with
preparations for the start. The Emperor returned to I^e
Caillou just as the first streaks of dawn appeared.^^
There he found the letter which Grouchy had written him
at Gembloux the day before, at ten o'clock in the evening.
The estafette had arrived at Le Caillou about two o'clock.'*
This despatch announced that the Prussians seemed to be with-
drawing in two columns, the one toward Ligny, the other
CHAP. V BETREAT OF THE ENGLISH ABMY 157
toward Wavre, and that, should the march of these masses be
confirmed by the night reports, Grouchy " would follow them
so as to separate them from Wellington." ~ Trusting to his
lieutenant's word, the Emperor did not think it necessary, for
the present, to send any fresh instructions."^ It does not
follow, however, that he was right.
Shortly after, spies, then the officers he had sent off
reconnoitring, and some Belgian deserters, came in and con-
firmed by their various accounts the Emperor's previsions.
The English did not stir. The battle would take place at
Mont-Saint-Jean."^
The Emperor believed he had the victory in his grasp.
The pale sun which pierced through the mists " was to shine
on the ruin of the English Ai-my." ^ However, Xapoleon was
filled with anxiety, at being unable to attack as soon as he
\\-ished, and as he ought to do.^^ The day before, in the-
doubtful hope that Wellington would wait for him at Mont-
Saint-Jean, he had indicated the position in battle of the
various army corps, so as to be able to commence the action at
an early hour.^"" Unfortimately, the storm had soaked the
ground to a degree, that in the opinion of the artillery generals
made it impossible to manoeuvre the guns. The rain, it is
true, had just ceased ; but several hours would be needed to dry
and harden the ground.^ Towards five o'clock the Emperor,
judging, no doubt, that it was no longer necessary to occupy
the positions for the battle so early, and that it was better to
allow the troops time to rally, to clean their arms and make
their soup, determined to wait till nine before beginning the
attack. He dictated to Soult this order, which modified that
of the evening before : " The Emperor orders the army to be
ready to attack at nine o'clock in the morning. The com-
manders of each army corps will rally their troops, will see
that their arms are put in order, and will allow their soldiei"S
to make their soup. They will also make the men eat, so that
at nine o'clock precisely each man may be ready and standing
in battle array, each with his own artillery and his own
ambulances, in the same position of battle which the Emperor
indicated in his order of last night." ^
BOOK III
WATERLOO
BOOK III CHAPTEE I
BLUCHEK AN*D GROUCHY
I. Dispositions and movements of the Prussian Army on the morning of the
18th of June — Field-Marshal Bliicher leaves Wavre (eleven o'clock).
II. Dispositions of Grouchy.
III. Discussion between Gerard and Grouchy at Walhain (midday).
Section I
Faithful to his promise/ Bliicher had made his arrangements
to second his allies vigorously. Orders dispatched in the
night, enjoined Biilow to march at daybreak on Chapelle-Saint-
Lambert, at a distance of seven kilometres in a straight line
from Mont- Saint -Jean, and Pirch I. to follow this move-
ment of Billow's corps. Once at Chapelle-Saint-Lambert
the generals would act according to circumstances. Shoidd
the action not seem to have commenced seriously, they
would remain in position, concealing their presence ; in the
contrary event, they were to attack the right flank of the
French army.- As for the corps of Zieten and of Thielmann,
they were to remain in their cantonments on the left bank of
the Dyle, till further notice. Bliicher intended to lead them
also to the support of the English ; but before taking such a
determination he must wait for the morning's reports.^ He
could not completely strip the line of the Dyle, without having
positive information as to the march, and the forces of the
French corps signalled at Gembloux.
Well-planned as this project was, it had one radical
defect. As Billow's corps had not been in the action at Ligny,
Blucher wished to use it first. To this design, which was
to a certain extent legitimate, he sacrificed the rapidity of his
11
162 JFATEBLOO book hi
movements. The corps of Zieten and Thielmann were
bivouacking at Bierges and La Bavette (eight or nine
kilometres from Chapelle-Saint-Lambert) ; the corps of Pirch
and of Billow were at Aisemont and Dion-Le-Mont (ten and
fourteen kilometres from Chapelle-Saint-Lambert). Manifestly
the troops which were nearest to the battlefield should have
been moved there first, and meanwhile those which were more
distant might have come up and occupied the line of the Dyle
temporarily. At any rate it was the duty of the staff to have
foreseen that Pirch's corps would have to remain without
moving, until Billow's corps had defiled. Therefore it was
for Pirch to form the head of the column. Had this course
been taken, half the Prussian Army would have found itself
concentrated at Chapelle-Saint-Lambert long before midday.
The issue was very different indeed. The Losthin division,
Billow's vanguard, only arrived before Wavre at seven o'clock
in the morning. Much time was lost in crossing the bridges,
and climbing the main street of the village, which was narrow
and very steep. As it debouched, a violent fire unexpectedly
broke out in the street and blocked the passage. The bulk of
Billow's corps was compelled to wait till the fire was ex-
tinguished. In this way the march of the 4th Corps was
delayed for more than two hours ; the rearguard division did
not reach the vicinity of Chapelle-Saint-Lambert till towards
three o'clock.'* The 2nd Corps (Pirch) was under arms by five,
but as they had to let the troops of the 4th Corps defile first,
the troops remained at the head of their bivouacs, stamping on
the ground where they stood, until past midday. At two
o'clock the half of Pirch's corps was still on the farther side
of the Dyle.^
Between seven and eight o'clock in the morning. Count
Groben, returning from the outposts, had reported that the
French stationed at Gembloux had not yet begun to move,
and that their forces, in his estimation, did not amount to
more than 15,000 men, or thereabouts. "I cannot affirm
positively," he added, " that the French are not more numerous,
but, were there 30,000 of them, a single one of our army
corps would suffice to guard the line of the Dyle. It is at
Mont-Saint-Jean that the fate of the battle will be decided. "We
CHAP. I BLtiCHER AND GROUCHY 163
must send as many men there as possible." Bliicher was of
the same opinion ; but Gneisenau and Grolemann were still
averse to stripping the Dyle too much. " The question," said
Grolemann, with the formal approval of Gneisenau, " will be
settled at noon ; if by that time, the enemy has not appeared
before Wavre in too great force, the 1st Corps will follow the
2nd and the 4th Corps, and perhaps the 3rd Corps will march
as well." *^ Meanwhile Bliicher wrote to Miiffling : " I request
you to say in my name to the Duke of "Wellington that, ill as
I am, I will put myself at the head of my troops and fall on
the right wing of the enemy, as soon as Xapoleon begins the
battle. Should the day go by without an attack on the part
of the French, I propose that we should both attack them
together to-morrow." "
Before dispatching this letter, which had been dictated
to him by Bliicher, the aide-de-camp, Nostiz, showed it to
Gneisenau. The day before, and on the morning of the battle
of Ligny, the latter was doubtful of the promises of Wellington,
whom he regarded as a " master knave." ^ The day of the
16th of June, when the Duke had sent to Brye, neither a man
nor a cannon, had confirmed and increased these suspicions of
Gneisenau. He was afraid lest the English should fall back
on Brussels without fighting. In that case the Prussian
Army would find itself exposed to a disaster, liable to be
surprised in the very act of marching, and attacked by
Kapoleon in the front, by Grouchy's corps ^ on the flank, or in
the rear. To Bliicher's letter Gneisenau added this post-
script : " General von Gneisenau is of one mind with the
Field-Marshal ; but he begs Your Excellency to penetrate to
the innermost thoughts of "Wellington, and to ascertain
whether he really entertains the firm resolution of fighting
1 in his present positions, or whether he intends making mere
! demonstrations, which may involve our army in the greatest
' peril" ^°
Time drew on ; Bliicher, ever eager, wished to be on the
spot for the first cannon shot. Lea^'ing Gneisenau free to
i decide on the movements of the remaining army corps, he left
'"Wavre at eleven o'clock to join Biilow near Chapelle-Saint-
Lambert. " In spite of aU I was suffering from my fall," he
164 WATERLOO book hi
said later, " I would rather have been tied to my horse than
have missed the battle ! " ^^
Section II
If Grouchy, on the evening of the 17th of June, had still
been able to preserve any doubts as to the concentration of
the Prussian Army on Wavre,^^ the intelligence which reached
him during the night was of a nature to dissipate them
completely. Between eleven o'clock and midnight, he
received a report from General Bonnemains, and another
from the colonel of the 15th dragoons, both announcing that
the Prussians were marching on Wavre.^^ Towards three
o'clock in the morning news from Walhain or Sarta-Walhain
advised him that, in the course of the preceding day, three
army corps had been perceived passing by in the direction of
Wavre, and that, according to what both officers and men were
reported to have said, these troops were going to mass them-
selves near Brussels to give battle.^*
All these informations, which confirmed those of the
previous evening, only threw a confused light upon Grouchy's
mind ; he no longer doubted that the enemy had marched to
Wavre, but, rashly taking the words of the Prussians liter-
ally, he imagined their army was merely halting there, not
carrying out a strategical concentration, and that it was going to
file on towards Brussels by the main road.^^ He was aware that
the Emperor had expected a battle against the English, before
the forest of Soignes,^^ yet it did not occur to him that, instead ,
of gaining Brussels, the Prussians might join their allies
directly by a short lateral march. He did not see that, in
order to prevent this junction, it was necessary not to follow
the Prussians by Walhain or Corbais, but to pursue them in
flank by Saint-Gery and Mousty. There was everything t'
gain and no peril to incur, by crossing the Dyle at the nearc-i
point, and manoeuvring along the left bank of this little river.
Should the Prussians have remained at Wavre, which is on
the left bank of the Dyle, this position would be much easier
to attack from the left bank than from the right. If the}
CHAP. I BLUCHER AND GROUCHY 165
proceeded toward Brussels it would be possible to follow them
after reaching Wavre. Should they march straight to the
English, the appearance of 33,000 men on their flank would
stop, or at any rate delay, their movement. Finally, if they
had effected their junction with the English and threatened
to crush the French Imperial Army under their united masses,
the French on the left bank of the Dyle would be near
enough to the Emperor to bring him effectual aid in the thick
of the battle.
Grouchy had no idea of all this ; not a single item did he
modify in his order of the previous day. Though he had by
that time resolved to march himself to "Wavre, he allowed
Pajol's corps and Tallin's cavalry to carry out the excentric
movement which he had directed, on Grand-Leez.^" He wrot«
to the Emperor that, as all information confirmed the news
that the Prussians were marching on Brussels vid "SYavre "so as
to concentrate there or to give battle after joining "Wellington,
he was starting immediately for "Wavre himself." ^^
Grouchy had at his disposal 33,000 men and 96 pieces
of artillery.^^ His servile persistence in keeping in the tracks
of the Prussian rearguard, instead of manoeuvring from the
morning of the 18th of June alonoj the left bank of the
Dyle, was a huge strategical blunder. By lea^'ing his troops
in bivouac part of the morning, under circumstances so
pressing and so grave, he was guilty of an irreparable
mistake. At that season, on the 18 th of June, the sun rises
at half-past two ; at three it is quite light enough to march.
And yet Grouchy directed Yandamme and Gerard to begin
marching, one at six o'clock, the other at eight.^ Unhappy
man !
Owing to delays in the distribution of food, the troops
did not even start off at the appointed time.^^ Exelmans'
dragoons, who had spent the night at Sauveniere and were
to form the head of the column, only mounted their horses
about six o'clock." Vandamrae's corps only set out on its
way from G^mbloux between seven and eight o'clock,**
and Gerard's corps left camp on the right bank of the
Orneau at the same hour."-* Another cause for the delay
was, that these troops all took the same route. Had they
166 WATERLOO book iii
inarched in two separate columns, the one by Sauveniere
and Walhain, the other by Ernage and Nil-Pierreux, the two
army corps would have mustered at Corbais at the same
time.^*
Grouchy, it appears, did not leave Gembloux before eight
or nine.^^ He proceeded slowly and joined the head of the
3rd Corps a little way before Walhain.^^ Having reached
the first houses of this village at about ten o'clock, he
allowed the infantry column to file on, and entered the house
of the notary Holliirt to write to the Emperor.^^ His aide-de-
camp, Pontbellanger, sent out to reconnoitre on the banks of
the Dyle toward Mousty, had returned and reported — it
appears — that no hostile troops were to be found in this
region ; ^^ and a resident, a former officer of the French Army,
or said to be such, came to furnish him with new and
important information.^'^ He declared that the bulk of the
Prussians who had passed by Wavre, were encamped in the
plain of the Chyse, near the road from Namur to Louvain
(three leagues as the crow flies, north-east of Wavre).^^
This false intelligence, which the ancient ofiicer " gave
as positive," more than satisfied Grouchy. Not only was
there no attempt on th.i part of Blticher's army to effect its
junction with Wellington by a side march, but it had
made a long circuit to concentrate first in the direction of
Louvain. Thus the enemy were, for a time, placing them-
selves out of the proceedings. Grouchy could congratulate
himself on liaving manoeuvred so successfully. Though he
had not overtaken the Prussians, he was on their traces, and
he had separated them from the English, which was the
principal aim of his movement. That evening all his troops
would find themselves concentrated at Wavre in positions
between the two armies of the enemy. The day after, he
would be free either to go and fight the Prussians in the plains
of La Chyse, or to attack them in their flank march, if they
were marching towards Brussels, or to proceed to that town
himself and join the bulk of the French forces. The Marshal
lost no time, in writing to convey this news to Napoleon.
The end of the letter ran thus: "This evening I shall
have massed my troops at Wavre, and shall thus find myself
ciL\p. I BLUCHER AND GROUCHY 167
between Wellington, who is, I presume, retreating before
Your Majesty, and the Prussian Army. I need further
instructions as to what Your Majesty desires me to do
next. The country between Wavre and the plain of La
Chyse is rough and broken and in some parts marshy. I
shall easily get to Brussels before the troops, who have
halted at La Chyse. Deign, sire, to transmit me your orders ;
I can receive them before commencing my movement to-
morrow.
To-morrow ! What would not to-morrow bring forth !
Grouchy gave this letter to Major la Fresnaye, ex-page
to Napoleon, who started immediately.^^ As for the Marshal,
now freed from all anxiety and believing he still had a whole
day before him to make his final decision, he quietly sat down
to breakfast.
Section III
He had got as far as his strawberries (eating strawberries,
even on the morning of a battle, is not in itself a hanging
matter) when Gerard, who had outdistanced the head of the
4th Corps by two or four kilometres, entered the room where
he was breakfasting.^ Shortly after, Colonel Simon Loriere,
head of Gerard's staff, was introduced. Whilst walking in
the garden of the notary Hollert, he had heard the roar of
cannon in the distance ; he hastened to inform his chiefs. It
was a little after half-past eleven. Grouchy and Gerard went
down into the garden. General Baltus, commander of the
artillery of the 4th Corps, Greneral Valaz^, commander of the
Engineering Corps, the review inspector, Denniee, met there
with several other staff-officers, all eagerly listening to the
noise of the cannonade. Several of them knelt down with
their ears to the ground to ascertain the direction.^^ Gerard
listened a few minutes and said, " I think we ought to march
to the cannon." '^
Grouchy objected that more likely than not, it was
merely a rearguard affair.^" But the fire grew quicker and
more sustained. " The ground trembled under us," reports
Simon Loriere. It was no longer possible to doubt that the
168 WATERLOO book hi
two armies were engaged. Toward the west, clouds of smoke
arose on the horizon,
" The battle is at Mont-Saint-Jean," said a peasant whom
Valaze had taken as guide. " You could get there in four or
five hours' march."
Notary HoUert, called by Gerard, confirmed the opinion
of the guide.
" It is on the edge of the forest of Soignes," he said. " The
distance from here, is about three leagues and a half."
" We must march to the cannon," repeated Gerard.
" "We must march to the cannon," said General Valaze in
his turn.^^
Grouchy has admitted that he was " vexed " to hear his
subordinates give him advice publicly.^^ This was one reason
for not paying any attention to it. There was another,
namely, the fear of incurring any responsibility. Eather than
follow the hazardous advice of his generals, was it not better
to keep blindly to the letter of the Emperor's instructions,
which would cover him, whatever happened. Accordingly
he said :
" The Emperor informed me yesterday that his intention
was to attack the English Army, should Wellington accept
battle. Therefore I am in no wise surprised at the en-
gagement that is taking place at this moment. If the
Emperor had wished me to take part in it, he would not have
sent me away from him, at the very moment that he was
himself bearing down upon the English. Besides, if I took
the rough crossroads which are now drenched with the rain
of yesterday and this morning, I would not arrive on the
field of battle in time to be of any use." ^'^
General Baltus came to the same conclusion as Grouchy.
" The roads would be very difficult. The artillery would
never be able to extricate itself." ^^
" With my three companies of sappers," retorted General
Valaze, " I undertake to settle every difficulty." ^^
" At any rate, I would arrive with the chests ! " cried
G^rard.'^
Valaze having again questioned the guide, who gave his
word that the march would not be difficult, replied :
CHAP. I BLUCHER AND GROUCHY 169
" The sappers can make any number of passages." **
Gerard grew more and more excited. "Monsieur le Mari-
chal" he said, " it is your duty to march towards the cannon.'"*^
Offended that Gerard should take the liberty of rebuking
him audibly in the presence of twenty officers. Grouchy retorted
in a stern tone, in such a way as to end the discussion : ^
" My duty is to execute the Emperor's orders, which direct
me to follow the Prussians ; it would be infringing his com-
mands to follow your advice."*"
At this moment arrived an aide-de-camp from Exelmans,
Major d'Estourmel. He announced that a strong Prussian
rearguard was posted before AVavre. This officer was also
charged to say that, according to all indications, the enemy's
army had passed the bridge of Wavre during the night and
morning, in order to get nearer the English Army, and, con-
sequently, that General Exelmans contemplated proceeding to
the left bank of the Dyle xid Ottignies. This fresh in-
formation and the opinion expressed by Exelmans, furnished
additional reasons in favour of Gerard's opinions. However,
to Grouchy, who was as convinced as ever that the Prussians
had gained Wavre in order to retreat towards the Chyse, the
presence of their rearguard in this town only confirmed him
in his presumptions. He congratulated himself that he had
resisted Gerard, because the Emperor's orders were to follow
the Prussian Army, and that at last he seemed on the point
of reaching this army that had hitherto baffled him. He
told d'Estourmel that he would himself give orders to General
Exelmans and called for his horses.'*^
As he set foot in the stirrup, Gerard risked a last
attempt.
" If you do not wish to march toward the forest of
Soignes with all your troops, allow me, at any rate, to
effect this movement with my army corps and General
VaUin's cavalry. I am certain of arri^-ing, and arriving in
time to be useful." ^^
" 1^0," answered Grouchy, " it would be an unpardonable
military mistake to separate my troops and make them act on
both banks of the Dyle. I should be exposing one or other
of these two bodies, which would not be able to support
170 WATERLOO _ bk. hi ch. i
each other, to annihilation by forces twice or thrice their
superior." ^°
He set his horse at a gallop.^^ Those among the officers
of his staff who had followed the discussion from afar, and
who heard the cannon, thought a manoeuvre was about to
take place with a view to drawing nearer the Imperial Army.^^
BOOK III CHAPTEE II
THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO
The Morning
L Topography of the battlefield.
11. Positions of the Anglo-Netherlander Army.
III. Napoleon's breakfast at " Le CaUlou " — Letter to Grouchy.
IV. The last review (ten o'clock) — Order of battle of the French Army —
Napoleon's plan of attack (eleven o'clock).
Section I
The plateau of La BeUe Alliance and of Mont -Saint -Jean,
each with an average elevation of 132 yards, run nearly-
parallel to each other from west to east. They are separated
by two twin valleys, which the main road from Charleroi to
Brussels crosses perpendicularly from south to north. These
two valleys are narrow and not very deep ; from La Belle
Alliance inn to the ridge of Mont-Saint-Jean there is only
the distance of 1300 yards as the crow flies, and the lowest
levels of the valley are computed at 110. East of the main
road, lies the valley of Smohain, which is very broken and
grows continually narrower imtil it becomes a ravine and is
lost in the bed of the brook of Ohain ; the other valley,
that of Braine-L'Alleud, stretches to the west with numerous
undulations, and crosses the Xivelles road, cutting it obliquely.
This second road runs from S.S.'VY. to X.X.E. Having gained
the plateau of Mont-Saint-Jean, it branches off at an acute
angle to the hamlet of the same name on the main road, which,
a league farther up, passes through the village of Waterloo,
built in a hollow of the forest of Soignes ; then it continues
towards Brussels, through the wood.^
172 WATERLOO book iii
Seen from La Belle Alliance, the main road to Brussels,
which goes down and up again in a straight line, seems very-
steep. But this is an illusion of perspective. In reality the
inclination of the slope is not great. A horseman can ascend
it at an even gallop, without straining his horse or putting it
out of breath.^ However, to the right as well as to the left of
the road, the ground is extremely uneven, and, in many places,
becomes steep. It is an infinite succession of mounds and
hollows, of depressions and banks, of furrows and hillocks.
Nevertheless, when viewed from a height, the double valley
has the aspect of a plain extending without any marked
depressions between two low hills. It is necessary to walk
over the ground, to perceive the constantly undulating for-
mation of the ground, similar to the billows of a swelling sea.
The road from Ohain to Braine-L'AUeud, which skirts the
ridge of the plateau of Mont-Saint-Jean where it cuts the
Brussels road at a right angle, covers with a line of natural
obstacles, nearly the entire line of the English positions. To
the east of the main road, this road is on a level with the
ground, but a double border of high, thick hedges renders it
inaccessible to cavalry. To the west the ground rises sharply,
the Ohain road winding between two embankments of from
£ve to seven feet in height ; it forms thus, for a distance of
400 yards, a formidable covering trench. Then it regains its
level, and continues its course without presenting any further
obstacles save a few scattered hedges.^ Behind the ridge,
which forms a screen, the ground inclines northward, a
tendency favourable to its defence. The troops of the second
line and the reserves were thus hidden from the telescopes of
the enemy and were partly sheltered from their fire.
Scattered over a radius of 3,500 yards, half-way up the
hill and in the levels beneath — the chateau of Hougoumout
with its chapel and its vast dependencies, its park surrounded
by walls, its orchard enclosed by a barrier of hedges, and the
copses which guarded its approach from the south ; the farm
of La Haye-Sainte, a stone building flanked by a hedge-girt
orchard and a terraced kitchen-garden ; the hillock overlooking
the excavation of a sand-pit which was protected by a hedge ;
the Papelotte farm ; the large farmhouse of La Haye ; and
CHAP. II THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 173
last of all the hamlet of Smohain — formed so many bastions,
" covered lodgments and small forts," in front of the position.
The horizon was bounded on the north by the green masses
of the forest of Soignes, standing out against which, the distant
steeples of Mont -Saint -Jean and Braine-L'Alleud showed
clearly. To the north-east extended the woods of Ohain and
of Paris, and farther on the wood of Chapelle-Saint-Lambert.
To the east, the woods of Vardre and Hubermont bordered the
ridges which crown the ravine of the Lasne, which takes its
rise near the village of Plancenoit. All the rest of the ground
was exposed. On the summit of the plateau, on the slopes
of the v^alleys . , . everywhere, masses of rye were beginning
to turn yellow.
To conclude, a vast curtain (the plateau of Mont-Saint-
Jean) rising above the valleys of Smohain and Braine-L'Alleud ;
two rows of hedges and a double bank like a parapet (the
Ohain road), from which it was possible to attack from the
slope of the parapet, every point of approach ; six defensive
works before the front (Hougoumont, La Haye-Sainte, the
sand-pit, Papelotte, La Haye, Smohain) ; easy outlets for
coimter-attacks ; in the rear of the parapet a steep piece of
ground, masked from the enemy's view, crossed by two high-
roads and well adapted for the rapid movements of reinforcing
troops and of artillery reserves : such was the position selected
by Wellington.
Section II
The English had bivouacked in some confusion over the
whole of the plateau. Eoused at daybreak, they began to
relight their fires, to prepare their food, to clean their uniforms
and their arms. Instead of unloading their muskets, most of
the soldiers discharged them in the air. There was a con-
tinuous discharge of musketry, giving the impression of a
fight. Napoleon's great guards were either very imwatchful,
or war had made them callous, for no French account
mentions any false alarm caused by this fusiUade. Toward
six o'clock, at the discordant caU of the bugles, the pibrochs
and the drums, sounding and beating from aU sides at once.
I
174 WATERLOO book hi
the troops assembled. The inspection once passed, battalions,
squadrons, and batteries, led by the officers of the staff, took
up their appointed places for the action.'*
The English brigades of Byng and Maitland (Guards) and
Colin Halkett, the Hanoverian brigade of Kielmansegge, and
the Anglo-German brigade of Ompteda, posted themselves on
the first line, along the Ohain road ; the right (Byng), near
the road to Nivelles ; the left (Ompteda), backed by the road
to Brussels. To the east of this road, also along that of Ohain,
were placed the English brigades under Kempt and Pack
(Picton's division), the Dutch and Belgian brigade of Bylandt,
and the Hanoverian brigade of Best.
These nine brigades formed the centre, or more correctly,
nearly the entire front of the Allied Army; indeed, in
Wellington's order of battle there was not, properly speaking,
any centre. There was a right centre and a left centre,
separated by the Brussels road, and two wings. The right ^
wing, formed of the English brigades under Adam and
Mitchell, the Hanoverian brigade under William Halkett, and.
the Anglo-German brigade under Duplat, was placed betweeaj
the Nivelles road and Merbe-Braine ; at the extreme right thej
Dutch-Belgian division of Chasse occupied the ground in front]
of Braine-L'AUeud. The left wing consisted only of the]
Nassau brigade under the Prince of Saxe- Weimar, and the]
Hanoverian brigade under Wincke ; these troops were drawn]
up above Papelotte, La Haye, and Smohain, with posts inside]
the positions themselves. On the extreme left, Vandeleur's]
and Vivian's English cavahy brigades flanked the army in]
the direction of Ohain.
The reserve drawn up on the plateau in two lines, the]
second line near the farm of Mont -Saint -Jean, comprised:]
behind the right centre, the Nassau brigade under Kruse, the]
whole Brunswick corps (infantry and cavalry), the Anglo-|
German cavalry brigades under Grant, Dornberg, and Arens-
child, the horse-guard brigade under Somerset, the brigades!
of Trip and Von Merlen (Dutch - Belgian carabiniers and]
hussars) ; behind the left centre, the English brigade under]
Lambert, the brigade of English dragoons led by Ponsonby,]
and the brigade of Dutch and Belgian dragoons of Ghigny.*'
CHAP. II THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 175
The artillery was posted as follows : four batteries on the
front of the right centre ; one battery exactly in the centre of
the line of battle, at the intersection of the road to Brussels
and the road of Ohain ; four on the front of the left centre ;
two with the right wing; two at the extreme right with
Chass^ ; two foot batteries and seven horse batteries on the
second line behind the right centre ; three batteries in reserve
near the farm of Mont-Saint-Jean7
It was Wellington's wont in Spain and in Portugal, to
meet the impetuous attacks of the French columns by very
peculiar tactics. He woidd place his first line behind ridges,
so as to conceal it from the sight and the shots of the enemy
during the preparatory stage of the assault, and even during
the assault itself. It was only when his assailants, separated
during the ascent effected under the galling fire of the
skirmishers and of the artillery posted above, gained the
summit of the position that the hitherto unmolested English
battalions would unmask, discharge their muskets point-blank,
and rush forward with fixed bayonets.^ The ground of Mont-
Saint-Jean favoured these tactics. "Form in the usual way,"
said A^'ellington to his generals.® Accordingly, with the
exception of the Belgian brigade under Bylandt and a chain
of skirmishers who were posted on the slopes — so to speak in
the front line — ^the whole of the infantry took up positions
twenty, sixty, a hundred yards in rear of the Ohain road.
These troops found themselves completely masked, some by the
banks and hedges on the roadside, the remainder, owing to
the interior declivity of the plateau. This declivity was also
an advantage for the reserves, for it prevented their being
perceived from the opposite heights.^® The batteries were
posted to the front, before and behind the Ohain road, according
to the convenience of the ground and the greater or lesser
extent of their range.^^ In the embankments and in the
hedges, embrasures had been cut for the heavy guns.^"
The farms, the accidents of the ground which formed the ad-
vanced works, had all been put in a state of defence. A barri-
cade was formed across the road to Brussels at the height of La
Haye-Sainte ; abatis barred the road to Nivelles. Hougoimiont
was occupied by seven companies of the 1st, 2nd (Coldstream),
176 WATERLOO book hi
and 3rd regiments of the English Guards, a company of the
Hanoverians, and a Nassau battalion ; La Haye-Sainte by five
companies of the German Legion ; the sand-pit and its
approaches, by a battalion of the 95th; Papelotte, La Haye,
and the first houses of Smohain by detachments under the
Prince of Saxe-Weimar.^^
But Wellington trusted in his English troops alone. For
this reason, his own national troops were placed alternately all
along the line with the various allied contingents. He desired
the latter to be substantially supported everywhere.-^*
/ Deducting the losses incurred on the 16th and 17th of
June,^^ the duke had in hand 67,700^^ men and 184 guns.^'^
He could have concentrated at Mont-Saint-Jean a larger number
of combatants, but, ever anxious about his lines of communica-
tion with the sea, and fearing that a French corps might turn
his right, he had massed between Hal and Enghien — four
miles as a bird flies from Mont-Saint- Jean — about 17,000
men and 30 pieces of cannon under Prince Frederick of the
Netherlands.^^ It was a capital mistake to send such a body
on the eve of a battle with no other object, but to parry an
imaginary danger ! As General Brialmont has very justly
observed, " It is inconceivable that Wellington should have
credited his adversary with a plan of operation which could
only tend to hasten the junction of the Allied Armies, because
from the outset of the campaign, Napoleon had been evidently
manoeuvring to prevent this junction." ^^
Whilst the troops were taking up their position, Wellington,
accompanied by Miiflfling and a few officers, went over the
whole line of battle. He examined in detail all the positions
and went down as far as Hougoumont. He frequently directed
his field-glass towards the heights occupied by the French.
He rode his favourite horse "Copenhagen," a superb bay-brown
thoroughbred who had been tested at Vittoria and Toulouse.
Wellington was in his usual campaigning dress : breeches of
white doe-skin, tasselled boots, a dark blue coat and a short
cloak of the same hue, a white necktie, a small hat without
feathers, but adorned with the black cockade of England and
three other cockades smaller in size, of the colours of
Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands. He was very calm.
HAP. II THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 177
His face reflected the confidence which he felt in the promised
co-operation of the Prussian Army.^
Section III
The orders of the Emperor directed that all the Army-
Corps should be in their positions of battle and ready to
attack, at nine o'clock precisely.^^ But the troops which had
passed the night at Genappe, Glabais, and at the farms in the
vicinity, took a very long time in rallying, in cleaning their
arms, and in preparing their soup. Moreover, the main road
to Brussels was the only outlet through which they could
debouch.-" At nine o'clock, only Reille's corps arrived at the
height of Le Caillou. ^ The foot-guard, the cuirassiers of
Kellermann, Lobau's corps, and Durutte's di^^sion were far
behind.-^ Wisely or not, the Emperor desired to have all his
men in hand before beginning the action ; besides, it did not
seem as if the state of the ground would as yet allow of the
artillery manoeuvring. This at least was the opinion held by
Napoleon himself and by Drouot.-'^
About eight o'clock the Emperor had breakfasted at the
Caillou farm with Soult, the Duke of Bassano, Drouot, and
several general officers. After the meal, which had been
served on silver plate with the Imperial arms, the maps of
Ferrari and Capitaine were spread out on the table.^^ The
Emperor said : " The army of the enemy is superior to ours
by more than one -fourth. "We have nevertheless ninety
chances in our favour, and not ten against us." Ney, who was
entering, heard these words. He came from the outposts and
had mistaken some movement of the English as a preparation
for a retreat ; he exclaimed : " Without doubt. Sire, provided
Wellington be simple enough to wait for you. But I must
inform you that his retreat is decided, and that if you do not
hasten to attack, the enemy is about to escape from you."
" You have seen wrong," replied the Emperor, " and it is too
late now. Wellington would erpose himself to certain loss.
He has thrown the dice and they are in our favour." -"^
Soult was uneasy. He no more dreaded the arrival of the
12
178 JVATERLOO book m
Prussians on the field of battle than did the Emperor ; he
considered they were out of the game for several days. But
he regretted that 33,000 men liad been detached with Marshal
Grouchy, when a single corps of infantry and a few thousand
horse would have sufficed for the pursuit of Bliicher. Half of
these troops of the right wing, he thought, would have been
invaluable in the great battle that was about to be fought
with this English army, which was so firm, so resolute, so
formidable. In his capacity as head of Lefebvre's staff", on the
9th of July 1794, Soult had taken this same plateau of Mont-
Saint-Jean by storm, and had driven back the Imperials from
J the forest of Soignes to Brussels. But he knew that the
English infantry was incomparably more determined in their
resistance, than the Austrian infantry. For this reason, during
the preceding evening, he had already urged the Emperor to
recall part of the troops placed under Grouchy's orders. That
morning he repeated his warning. Napoleon, exasperated,
:^ replied to him roughly : " Because you have been beaten by
Wellington, you consider him a great general. And now I
tell you that Wellington is a bad general, that the English
are bad troops, and that this affair is nothing more serious
than eating one's breakfast." " I earnestly hope so," said
Soult.=^«
. ^ Shortly after Eeille and Jerome entered Le Caillou. The
■ Emperor asked Eeille his opinion of the English Army, which
this general was in a position to give, since he had had many
a contest with it in Spain. Eeille answered : " Well posted,
as Wellington knows how to post it, and attacked from the
front, I consider the English Infantry to be impregnable,,
owing to its calm tenacity, and its superior aim in firing.
Before attacking it with the bayonet, one may expect half
the assailants to be brought to the ground. But the English
Army is less agile, less supple, less expert in manoeuvring
than ours. If we cannot beat it by a direct attack, we may do
so by manoeuvring." For Napoleon, who had never personally
fought a pitched battle against the English, the opinion of a
veteran of the Spanish wars was worthy of consideration. But
he was probably irritated with Eeille for having spoken so
freely, without reflecting that the generals who heard him
CHAi\ II THE BATTLE OF JFATERLOO 179
might be discouraged, aud therefore he did not appear to
attach the least importance to his opinion. He broke off the
conversation by an exclamation of incredulity.^
The weather had cleared, the sun was shining ; a rather
brisk wind, a drying wind as sportsmen call it, was beginning
to blow.^ Artillery officers came to report that they had
inspected the ground, and that it would soon be possible to
manoeuvre the pieces.^^ Xapoleon called for his horses. Before
starting he graciously received the farmer Boucqueau, who had
returned from Plancenoit with his family, upon hearing that
the Emperor was at Le Caillou. The old man complained that
he had been plundered the day before, by stragglers belonging
to the enemy ; Xapoleon, with an absorbed expression on his
face, seemed to be thinking of anything but the old man's
grievances. He spoke at last, saying : " Do not distress yourself,
you shall have a safeguard." This seemed very much to the
point, for the Imperial headquartera were to leave Le Caillou
in the course of the day. It was said they would sleep in
Brussels.^"'
The Emperor, skirting at full trot the flank of the columns
which were still debouching from Grenappe, rode to the front
of La Belle Alliance, in the very line of the tirailleurs, in
order to observe the enemy's positions.^ His guide was a
Fleming named Decoster. This man o^vned a little inn on the
roadside between Kossomme and La Belle AUiance; he had been
taken in his own house at five o'clock in the morning and
brought before the Emperor, who required some native of the
country. The maps which Xapoleon used in his campaigns
indicated the features of the ground only in a very general
and summary way, and Xapoleon nearly always took a guide.
Decoster had been carefully kept in sight, for he seemed anxious
to escape ; on departing from Le Caillou he had been hoisted
on to a charger whose saddle was attached by a long strap
to the saddle-bow of a chasseur of the escort. Xaturally
he cut a very sorry figure during the battle and amid the
flying balls and bullets. He wriggled in the saddle and kept
ducking his head and bending over his horse's neck. The
Emperor said to him once : " Xow, my friend, do not be so
restless. A musket-shot may kill you just as well from behind
180 WATERLOO book hi
as from the front, and will make a much worse wound." ^*
According to local traditions, either through imbecility or
through malice, Decoster gave false information throughout the
whole day. Another guide as well, was brought to the
Emperor, a certain Joseph Bourgeois, from the hamlet of
Odeghien. He stuttered with fear and kept his eyes
obstinately fixed on the ground ; Napoleon sent him away.
Whenever he was asked what the Emperor was like he would
answer : " If his face had been the face of a clock, nobody
would have dared to look at it, for the hour." ^^
The Emperor remained some time before La Belle Alliance.
After dispatching General Haxo of the Engineers to ascertain
whether the English had raised any entrenchments,^*^ he took
up his post about three-quarters of a mile in the rear, on a bank
which rises near the Eossomme farm. From the farm were
brought out a chair and a little table upon which the maps
were spread. Towards two o'clock, when the action had be-
come serious, the Emperor posted himself on another eminence
nearer the line of battle, at a short distance from the Decoster
Inn, General Foy, who had recognised the Emperor by his
grey coat, could see him walking up and down with his hands
behind his back ; at times he would stop, put his elbows on
the table and then resume his walk.^'
At Le Caillou, Jerome had acquainted his brother with
a report he had heard the day before, in the Inn of the " Eoi
d'Espagne." The waiter who served him at supper, and who
had previously waited on Wellington at breakfast, related that
an aide-de-camp of the Duke had spoken of a junction agreed
on between the English and Prussian Armies, at the entrance
of the forest of Soignes. This Belgian, who seemed well
informed, even added that the Prussians would march by
Wavre. The Emperor treated this as mere nonsense. " After
such a battle as Fleurus," he said, " the junction between the
English and Prussians is impossible for at least two days ;
besides, the Prussians have Grouchy on their heels." ^^ Grouchy,
always Grouchy! The Emperor placed far too much con-
fidence in the information, as well as in the promises of his
lieutenant. According to the letter from the Marshal, written
in Gembloux at ten o'clock in the evening, and which arrived
CHAP. II THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 181
at Le Caillou at two o'clock next morning, the Prussian Army,
reduced to about 30,000 men, had divided into two columns,
of which the one seemed to be proceeding toward Liege and the
othertoward Namur, possibly to join Wellington. Grouchy added
that if the reports of his cavalry testified that the bulk of the
Prussians was doubling back upon Wavre, he would follow it
" in order to cut it off from Wellington." ^^ All this was
well calculated to reassure the Emperor. But did this Prussian
force only amount to 30,000 men ? Had they not divided for
the sake of marching, and might they not reunite ultimately
to fight ? Would Grouchy, beyond whom they had advanced
to a considerable distance, overtake them in time ? These were
so many questions which the Emperor never asked himself, or
which he decided in the way which was most in accordance
with his own wishes. Blinded himself, as Grouchy was, he
imagined that the Prussians were going to halt at Wavre, or
at any rate that they would make for Brussels and not for
Mont -Saint -Jean. The Emperor contented himself with
writing to Grouchy from Eossomme, to inform him that a
Prussian colimin had passed by Saint-Gery proceeding toward
Wavre, and to order him to march as quickly as possible to this
point, with the object of driving the enemy before him.*^
A few minutes later, the Emperor ordered Colonel Marbot
to take up his position behind Frichermont with the 7th
Hussars and send out piquets to Lasne, Couture, and the
bridges of Mousty and Ottignies.^^ May we infer from this
that Napoleon had a sudden intuition of the movement that
was about to be suggested to Grouchy by Gerard, and that he
thought that the Marshal, before receiving his despatch, might
cross the Dyle at Mousty to bear on the left fiank of the
Prussians, instead of following them to Wa\Te ? or may we
conclude more simply, that in the Emperor's thoughts the
only object of these piquets was to reconnoitre on the Army's
right wing and to link together the commimications with
Grouchy's corps by ensuring the passage of the estafettes ? *^
182 WATERLOO book hi
Section IV
The troops took up their positions for the battle : Napoleon
remounted his horse and passed them in review as they formed
up on the ground. The whole plateau was furrowed by the
marching columns. D'Erlon's corps closed up on its right, to
allow the corps of Eeille to establish itself on the left. On
the flank and rear of these first lines of infantry — the infantry
of battle in blue coats, white breeches and gaiters, the light
infantry clad in blue coats with black gaiters — eight divisions
of cavalry began to deploy, their swords and their cuirasses
shining in the sun, the pennons of their lances waving in the
breeze. It was a kaleidoscope of vivid hues and metallic
flashes. After the chasseurs, wearing bright green jackets,
with facings of purple, yellow or scarlet, and breeches of leather
fastened with big buttons, came the hussars, with " dolmans,"
pelisses, breeches « la hongroise, plumes upon their shakos,
all varying in colour with each regiment ; some chestnut and
blue, others red and sky-blue, others grey and blue, others green
and scarlet. Then passed the dragoons with brass casques,
over turban-helmets of tiger skin, white shoulder belts crossed
over a green coat, with facings of red or yellow, long guns at
their saddle bows and bumping against their stiff boots ; the
light-lancers in green like the chasseurs, and having like them
sheep-skin shabracks, but distinguished from them, by their
helmets with silken cords, and by the cut and colour of their
plastrons ; the cuirassiers wearing short coats with Imperial
blue collars, facings, and trimmings varying from red to yellow,
according to the different regiments, white breeches, top-boots,
steel cuirasses and helmets, with crests of copper and floating
horse-hair manes ; the carabineers, giants of six feet and clad
in white, with breastplates of gold and tall helmets with red
cords — like those worn by the heroes of antiquity. And now
the entire body of the horse guards deployed on the third line ;
the dragoons in green coats faced with white and with scarlet
plumes on their helmets ; the grenadiers in blue coats faced
with scarlet and leather breeches, with aiguillettes and fringe-
less epaulettes of orange-yellow, and liigh caps of bearskin,
OHAP. ir THE BATTLE OF JFATEBLOO 183
with a plume and hanging cords ; the lancere with red kurkas
and blue plastrons, with light yellow aiguillettes and epaulettes,
red trousers with a blue stripe, and the red shapska cap bearing
a brass plate inscribed with an N and a crown, and surmounted
with a white plume half a yard long ; and last, the chasseurs,
with green dolmans embroidered with orange braid, red pelisses
edged %vith fur, and kolbachs (or caps) of brilliant scarlet, with
great plumes of green and red upon their heads. The epaulettes,
the braids, the stripes, the gimps of the oflBcei-s glittered with
a profuse display of gold and silver.
By the Brussels road other troops debouched. jMen, horses,
and cannon were coming up as far as the eye could reach ; the
numerous battalions of Loljau, Domon's chasseurs, Subervie's
lancers, the foot artillery in its plain dark blue uniform with
touches of red, the horse artillerj' in " dolmans," the front of
them covered with scarlet braid ; the Young Guard, tirailleurs
with red epaulettes, voltigeurs \vith green epaulettes ; the foot
artillerymen of the guard, with bearskin helmets, marching by
the side of those terrible 12 -pounders which the Emperor
called his " most beautiful daughters." Far in the rear
advanced the dark columns of the Old Guard : chasseurs and
grenadiers wore the campaigning-dress — blue trousers, long
blue greatcoats with a single row of buttons, bearskin helmets
without either plume or braid. Their parade uniforms for
their triumphal entrance into Brussels, they carried in their
knapsack, which brought the weight that each man carried,
including equipment, arms and fifty cartridges, to a load,
weighing sixty-five pounds ! The grenadiei'S could only be
distinguished from the chasseurs by their greater height, the
brass plate on their bearskins, and their epaulettes which
were entirely red, while those of their comrades were green
with red fringe. Both grenadiers and chasseurs wore
powdered queues and massive gold ear-rings half a crown in
diameter.
The drums beat, the trumpets blew, the bands struck up,
" Veillons au salut de I'Empire " (Anglice, " Let us watch over the
safety of the Empire "). Passing before Napoleon the eagle-
bearers inclined their standards — the standards of the " Champ
de Mai," the new standards already baptized at Ligny by fire
184 WATERLOO book in
and blood, — the horsemen brandished their sabres, the infantry-
waved their shakos on the points of their bayonets. The
cheers overpowered and drowned the sound of the drums and
trumpets. The cries " Vive I'Empereur " followed each other
so lustily and so rapidly, that they prevented the words of
command from being heard, " Never," says an officer of the
1st Corps, " were the words * Vive I'Empereur ' shouted with
more enthusiasm ; it was like frenzy. And what made this
scene even more solemn and more affecting was the fact that
facing us, only a thousand feet distant perhaps, stood the dark
red line of the English Army, distinctly visible." *^
The infantry of d'Erlon and the infantry of Eeille deployed
in the first line on the height of La Belle Alliance ; the four
divisions of d'Erlon, arranged two deep, the right opposite
Papelotte, the left resting on the Brussels road ; the threal
divisions of Eeille in the same order, the right upon this road J
the left not far from the road to Nivelles. The light cavalry [
of Jacquinot and the light cavalry of Pire, arranged in battle
array three deep, flanked the right of d'Erlon and the left
of Eeille. On the second line, the infantry of Lobau postec
itself in double column by divisions, along and to the left of
the Brussels road, and the cavalry of Domon and Subervie
were placed in compact columns by squadrons, along and to the
right of the same highroad. Prolonging the second line, the
cuirassiers of Milhaud and of Kellermann stood in battle ordei
and two deep — the former to the right, the latter to the
left. The Imperial Guard remained in reserve near Eossomme
the infantry (Young Guard, Middle Guard, Senior Guard) upon^
six lines, each of four battalions, deployed on both sides of the
Brussels road ; the light cavalry of Lefebvre-Desnoiittes (lancers
and chasseurs) on two lines six hundred feet behind the
cuirassiers of Milhaud ; the reserve cavalry of Guyot (dragoons
and grenadiers) also on two lines, six or seven hundred feet
behind Kellermann's cuirassiers.
The artillery of d'Erlon was in the intervals between the
brigades, Eeille's artillery before the front, Lobau's artillery
on the left flank. Each cavalry division had its battery
of horse artillery by its side. The batteries of the Guard were
placed quite in the rear between Eossomme and La Maison
CHAP. II THE BATTLE OF JVATERLOO 185
du Eoi. The highroad to Brussels and the roads which
crossed it, were left clear purposely, so as to allow of the rapid
transit of artilleiy reinforcements to all points."
74,000 men^^ were gathered there, with 246 guns.*^ On
the other side of the valley, 1,300 yards off as a bird flies, was y
collected the allied host of 67,000 men. Xever in the wars
of the Eevolution and the Empire had so many combatants
occupied so contracted a space. From the farm of Mont-
Saint-Jean, the position of Wellington's last reserves, to the
farm of Le Caillou, where the Imperial treasure and the
Service corps were stationed under the protection of a battalion
of chasseurs of the Old Guard, there was only a distance of
4,500 metres, and the front of each army did not extend over
more than three-quarters of a league.*" The ridges of the
plateaux being very irregular, the two armies' parallel lines
were very far from being straight. The English right wing
lapped over upon the centre and the left wing receded. The
French Army with its right in advance, its centre, its left in
the rear, and the extremity of its left wing in an oblique line,
formed a concave encircling line.
It was now nearly eleven o'clock and the troops ought by
that time to have arrived in their positions."*^ The Emperor
even thought he would not be able to commence the attack
before one o'clock in the afternoon. Having returned to his
observ^atory of Eossomme he dictated the following order to
Soult : — " As soon as the whole army is arranged in battle
order, towards one o'clock, and at the moment when the
Emperor will give the order to Xey, the attack will commence
by seizing the village of Mont-Saint-Jean, at the intersection
of the roads. For this purpose, the batteries of the 12 th and
2nd Corps and those of the 6th, wiU unite with those of the
1st. These twenty-four guns will fire on the troops at Mont-
Saint-Jean, and Count d'Erlon will commence the attack by
bringing forward his division from the left, and supporting it
according to circumstances, by the other divisions of the Ist
Corps, The 2nd Corps will advance accordingly to keep at
the same level as Count d'Erlon. The companies of sappers
of the 1st Corps are to be ready to barricade themselves
immediately within Mont-Saint-Jean." *^
J
186 WATERLOO bk. hi ch. ii
This order does not leave any doubt as to the plans of the
Emperor. He wished merely and simply, to pierce the centre
of the English Army and drive it back behind Mont-Saint-
Jean."" Once master of tliis position which commands the
plateau, he would act according to circumstances against the
shattered enemy ; by that time victory would be virtually in
his grasp. Thus the Emperor forgot or scorned the opinion
expressed by Eeille that, owing to the precision of its aim and
the solidity of its infantry, the English Army could only be
defeated by manoeuvres. Manoeuvring he considered unworthy
of him. Witliout doubt an attack against Wellington's right,
which was very numerous, and covered by the village of Braine
I'AUeud and the farm of Hougoumont, and having as a redoubt
the village of IMerbe-Braine, would have demanded much time
\J and great efforts ; but the extremity of the enemy's left wing
was very weak, quite unsupported, badly protected, and easy of
attack. They might firat operate by Papelotte and La Haye.^^
It seems as if at one time the Emperor had some idea of
♦^'f-his.^^ But for Napoleon, it was a slight result indeed to
- inflict but a partial defeat upon the English, and to throw
them back on Hal and Enghien ! He longed for a conclusive
battle, the Entscheidungsschlaclit. His aim was the same as at
Ligny : to pierce the enemy's army in the centre so as to
throw it out and annihilate it. He would use his usual
tactics : the parallel order, the direct attack, the assault by
masses upon the strongest point of the English front, with no
other preparation than a shower of shells.
The Emperor, it is true, could not form an accurate estimate
of the number of the English nor of the strength of their
positions. More than half of the allied army was concealed
by the undulations of the ground, and General Haxo, of the
Engineers, charged to ascertain whether there were any
entrenchments on the enemy's front, had reported that he
could not perceive any trace of fortifications.^^ Either
Haxo's sight or his judgment was at fault, for the hollow road
of Ohain, the sand-pit, the barricade on the Brussels highroad,
the abatis of the road to Nivelles, the farms of Hougoumont,
La Haye-Sainte, and I'apelotte, might well have been reckoned
most formidable entrenchments.
)
BOOK III CHAPTEE III
THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO {Continued)
From half-past eleven to three o'clock
I. Attack of Hougoumont by the division of JerSme Bonaparte of Eeille's
corps.
IL The apparition of Billow's corps on the heights of Chapelle-Saint-
Lambert — New despatch from Napoleon to Grouchy,
in. Attack of La Haye-Sainte and of the plateau of Mont -Saint -Jean by
d'Erlon's corps.
IV. Counter-attack of Picton's English — Charge of Lord Somerset's horse-
guards — The press of cuirassiers in the hollow road.
V. Charge of Ponsonby's dragoons — Rout of d'Erlon's infantry — Counter-
charge of Jacquinot's lancers and Farine's cuirassiers — The conflagiation
of Hougoumont.
Section I
The Emperor, a few minutes after dictating the order to attack,
purposed preparing the assault on Mont-Saint-Jean, by a
demonstration in the direction of Hougoumont. By thus
arousing Wellington's anxiety for his right, he might induce
him to impoverish his centre. Eealising at last the value of
time, Napoleon resolved to effect this movement without
waiting until all his troops had taken up their positions in
order of battle. About a quarter past eleven Eeille received
the order to occupy the approaches to Hougoumont.^
Eeille entnisted this trifling maucEu\Te to Prince Jerome,
whose four regiments formed Eeille's left. To cover the
movement, a divisional battery of the 2nd Corjis opened fire
on the enemy's positions. Three English batteries, established
on the edge of the plateau east of the road to Nivelles,
replied." "When the firet cannon shot was fired, some of the
188 WATERLOO book hi
English officers looked at their watches. It was exactly
thirty-five minutes past eleven.^
During this artillery duel, in which other batteries of the
English right soon joined, a portion of Eeille's artillery and
Kellermann's mounted batteries (the latter acting on orders
from the Emperor) and the Bauduin brigade from Jerome's
division, preceded by its skirmishers, descended into the
valley in columns by echelons ; at the same time, Pire's lancers
started a movement of their own on the road to Nivelles."*
The 1st Light Infantry charged the wood with fixed bayonets,
headed by Jerome, and General Bauduin who was killed at the
beginning of the action. In spite of the desperate defence of
the battalion of Nassau and of a company of Hanoverian
carabiniers, they gained a footing on the edge of the wood.
They now had only to overcome about 300 yards of very
dense thickets. The 3rd of the line forced its way in behind
the 1st Light Infantry. The enemy fell back, but only step by
step, taking shelter behind every clump, firing almost point-
blank, and continually turning round and resuming the offensive.
It took an hour to drive out of this wood, Nassau's battalion
and the companies of English guards which had come to
reinforce them.^
On debouching from the copse, the French found themselves
thirty paces distant from the buildings of Hougoumont, a
vast mass of stone, and from the wall of the park which was
two yards high, Jerome only needed to keep to the level or
in the hollow behind the wood and maintain in front of him a
good line of skirmishers.^ But, whether the order was badly
explained or misunderstood, or whether the Emperor's brother
would not consent to play this passive role, or whether the i
excited soldiers rushed on of their own accord, they dashed
forward to the assault. The wall and the enclosures were
pierced with loopholes through which the English commenced |
a well-sustained fusilade. They were under shelter and they |
aimed coolly; and at so short a distance every shot told. ;
Jerome's infantry wasted their bullets on an invisible foe. A
few among them tried to break in the great door with the !
butts of their muskets, but this door was placed in a recess ; j
they were fired on from the front and from the flank. Others i
CHAP. Ill THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 189
attempted to scale the wall of the park by climbing on each
other's shoulders ; through the loopholes the English pierced
them with their bayonets. Dead bodies lay heaped up around
Hougoumont. The assailants fell back to the shelter of the
wood."
General Guilleminot, head of Jerome's staff, advised that
they should not push the attack further.^ It was enough to
occupy the wood, the contest must cease. Eeille, according to
his own account, sent orders to the same effect.^ Neverthe-
less, Jerome persisted. He was determined to carry the
position. He called up his second brigade (General Soye's)
to relieve the brigade of Bauduin in the wood,^° with the
remnant of which he turned Hougoumont by the west. His
column which was no longer defiling, marched at a range of
600 yards, under the fire of the English batteries. It
succeeded in reaching the north facade of Hougoumont, which
it proceeded to storm. Whilst Colonel de Cubieres fell under
his horse grievously wounded, a giant nicknamed "I'enfonceur"
(the breaker-in), Lieutenant Legros from the 1st k'ger, seized
a hatchet from a sapper and shattered a panel of the door. A
handful of soldiers rushed into the court with him. The
mass of the English surrounded them, shot them down, exter-
minated them ; not a man escaped the slaughter. At this very
mpment four companies of the Coldstreams, the only rein-
forcement which Wellington, who watched the struggle from
afar, but did not overrate the importance of the onslaught at
Hougoumont, thought necessary to send, attacked the French
column. Caught between two fires, the decimated battalions
of Jerome fell back, part into the wood, part toward the
Nivelles road.^
Section II
During this combat, the Emperor was preparing his
great attack. He reinforced the twenty -four 12 -pounders,
by the batteries of 8 -pounders, of the 1st Corps and three
batteries of the guard, though at the outset of the action, the
first had been judged sufficient to cannonade the enemy's
centre. Thus in front and to the right of La BeUe Alliance
190 JFATERLOO book hi
a formidable battery of eighty guns was formed.^^ It was now
close on one o'clock, Ney despatched one of his aides-de-
camp to Eossomme, to inform the Emperor that all was
ready, and that he awaited the order to attack. Before the
smoke of all these cannon should have raised a curtain
between the two hills, Napoleon determined to cast a last
glance over the whole extent of the battlefield.^^
At a distance of about two leagues to the north-east, he
perceived what appeared to be a black cloud emerging from
the woods of Chapelle-Saint-Lambert. Though his practised
eye made it impossible for him to doubt, he hesitated at first
to acknowledge these were troops. He consulted with the
officers around him. All the glasses of the staff were turned
upon this point. As usually occurs, opinions differed.
Some officers contended that there were no troops there
at all, but only a clump of trees or the shadow of a cloud ;
others saw a marching column, even discerned French
uniforms, or Prussian uniforms. Soult said he could plainly
distinguish a numerous body of troops which had piled
arms.^*
It was not long before the point was fully settled. As a
detachment of cavalry galloped off to reconnoitre these troops,
a subaltern of the 2nd Silesian Hussars whom Colonel
Marbot's hussars had just captured near Lasne,^^ was brought
before the Emperor. He was the bearer of a letter from
Biilow to Wellington, announcing the arrival of the 4th Corps
at Chapelle-Saint-Lambert. This hussar, who spoke French,
made no difficulty about telling all he knew. " The troops
just perceived," he said, " are the advanced guard of General
von Biilow. Our whole army passed last night at Wavre.
We have seen no French, and we suppose they have marched
on Plancenoit." ^^
The presence of a Prussian corps at Chapelle-St.-Lambert
which would have confounded the Emperor a few hours before,
when he treated as " nonsense " the account brought by Jerome
with regard to the proposed junction of the two armies of the
allies, now only surprised him in a slight degree, for during
the interval he had received this letter from Grouchy, dated
Gembloux, six o'clock in the morning : —
CHAP. Ill THE BATTLE OF JVATERLOO 191
"Sire, aU my reports and information confirm the fact
that the enemy is retiring upon Brussels, either to concentrate
there, or to give battle after uniting with Wellington. The
first and the second corps under Bliicher appear to be march-
ing, the former upon Corbais and the second upon Chaumont.
They must have started from Tourinnes yesterday evening at
half-past eight, and have marched all night ; fortunately, the
weather in the night was so wretched that they cannot have ad-
vanced very far. I am going to start immediately for Sart-a-
Walhain whence I shall proceed to Corbais and to Wavre." ^'
This despatch was far less reassuring than the one of the
previous day. Instead of the retreat of two Prussian corps in
two columns, the one upon Wavre and the other upon Liege,^^
Grouchy announced that these two columns were marching
concentrically upon Brussels, with the probable design of.
joining Wellington. He no longer spoke of preventing their
junction ; and though it was natural to conjecture he intended
manoeuvring to that effect, by marching to Wavre, he used but
little haste in so doing, for at six o'clock in the morning he
had not yet left Gembloux.
No doubt the Emperor might hope that the Prussians
would march straight upon Brussels ; but it was also ver}'
possible that they would join the English Army by a flank
movement.
To parry this probable danger, the Emperor did not think
of sending fresh instructions to Grouchy till very late. Except
in the event of a delay, which was possible but highly im-
probable, the Marshal's letter ought to have reached the Imperial
headquarters between ten and eleven o'clock ; ^^ and it was only
at one o'clock, a few minutes before perceiving the Prussian
corps on the heights of Chapelle-Saint-Lambert, that the
following message from the Emperor was ^vritten to Grouchy :
— " Your movement from Corbais to Wavre agrees with His
Majesty's arrangements. Nevertheless, the Emperor requests
me to tell you that you must keep manoeuvring in our direc-
tion, and seek to draw^ nearer to the army, so as to be able
to join us before any corps places itself between us. I do not
indicate to you any special direction. It is for you to ascertain
the point where we are, to act accordingly, and to keep up our
192 WATERLOO book hi
communications, and to see that you are constantly in a posi-
tion to fall upon and annihilate, any of the enemy's troops
which might try to molest our right." ^°
This order had not yet been dispatched, when the
Prussian columns appeared in the distance. A few minutes
later the Emperor, after questioning the captive hussar, had
this postscript added : " A letter which has just been inter-
cepted tells us that General Billow is to attack our right flank.
We believe we can perceive this corps on the heights of
Chapelle-Saint-Lambert. Therefore do not lose a minute to
draw nearer to us and to join us and crush Biilow, whom you
will catch in the very act " {en flagrant ddit)}^
The Emperor was then not otherwise disconcerted.^^ Though
he realised that his situation had seriously altered, he did not
consider it compromised. Indeed, the reinforcement that had
reached Wellington, only consisted after all of a single Prussian
corps, for the prisoner had not mentioned that the whole of
the army was following Biilow. This army must be still
at Wavre. Grouchy would either come up with it there,
attack it, and consequently hold it back at a great distance
from Biilow ; or else, giving up the pursuit of Bliicher, he was
already marching on Plancenoit by Mousty, as the hussar
supposed,^^ and would bring to the bulk of the French Army,
a reinforcement of 33,000 bayonets. The Emperor, who easily
deluded himself by his own fancies and wished above all things
to impart them to others, said to Soult : " This morning we
had ninety odds in our favour. We still have sixty against
forty, and if Grouchy repairs the terrible fault he has made
in amusing himself at Gembloux, and marches rapidly, our
victory will be all the more decisive, for Billow's corps will be
completely destroyed." ^*
In any case, as Grouchy might delay, and Billow's advanced
guard was in view, the Emperor immediately took measures to
protect the flank of the army. The light cavalry divisions
under Domon and Subervie were detached to the right to
observe the enemy, to occupy all the outlets, and to connect
themselves with the heads of Marshal Grouchy's columns as
soon as they appeared.^*' Count Lobau received orders to move
up the 6 th Corps behind this cavalry, to a good intermediate
CHAP. Ill THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 193
position, which would enable him to hold the Prussians in
check.-*'
Section III
It was now about half-past one.^" The Emperor gave
Ney the orders to attack. The battery of eighty pieces began
with the roar of thunder to pour forth a sudden storm of fire,
which was at once answered by the English artillery. After
half an hour's cannonading, the main battery suspended its fire
for a minute, to allow of the passage of d'Erlon's infantry. The
four divisions were marched in echelons by the left, with
intervals of 400 yards between each echelon. The Allix divi-
sion formed the first echelon, the Donzelot division the second,
the Marcognet division the third, and the Durutte division the
fourth. Xey and d'Erlon led the assault.-"^
Instead of arranging these troops in columns of attack,
that is to say in columns of battalions by divisions, at half or
at full distance, a manoeuvre which is very favourable for rapid
deployments, such as the forming of squares, each echelon had
been arranged by battalion, deployed, and in close ranks. The
divisions of Allix, Donzelot, and Marcognet (Durutte on his own
responsibility would not consent to this manoeuvre) thus pre-
sented three compact phalanxes of a front of 160 to 200 files,
with a depth of twenty-four men."^ "VSTio had ordered such a
formation, perilous under any circumstances, but specially
unfortunate on this uneven ground ? Ney or rather d'Erlon,^*'
commander of the army corps. At any rate, it was not the
Emperor, for in his general order of eleven o'clock, nothing of
the sort had been specified ; there was not even any question
of attacking by echelons.^^ On the battlefield, Napoleon wisely
left his lieutenants to take the initiative in all details of
execution.^-
Irritated at not having fought on the previous day, the
soldiers were burning to attack the enemy. They rushed
forward with cries of " Vive I'Empereur ! " and descended into
the valley under the fiery vault of French and EngUsh shells
which crossed over their heads, the French batteries blazing
rth anew every time our columns reached the fatal comers.^
13
194 WATERLOO book hi
The head of the AUix division (Quiot's brigade), wheeling
slightly to the left, bore down upon the orchard of La Haye-
Sainte, whence a well-sustained fusillade was issuing. The Bour-
geois brigade, now forming alone the echelon of the left, con-
tinued its march toward the plateau. Quiot's soldiers quickly
drove the German companies out of the orchard, and assailed
the farm. But as at Hougoumont, they had not thought it
necessary to open breaches in these buildings, with a few shells.
The French again and again vainly attempted to assault the
high and solid walls, under shelter of which Major Baring's
Germans poured a murderous fire. One battalion turned the
farm, scaled the walls of the kitchen-garden and dislodged the
defenders who sought shelter in the buildings ; but they could
not demolish the walls with the butt ends of their muskets.^*
Wellington stood at the foot of a great elm planted on the
west of the road to Brussels, at the intersection of this highway
with the Ohain road. During almost the whole of the battle
he remained in this spot with his staff, whose numbers were
increased by the presence of the allied commissaries, Pozzo di
Borgo who received a slight bruise, Baron de Vincent, who was
wounded. Muffling, General Hligel, General Alava.^^ Seeing La
Haye-Sainte completely surrounded by the French, Wellington
ordered Ompteda to send a battalion of the German Legion
to the assistance of Baring. The Germans descended to the
left of the main road, recaptured the kitchen -garden, and
passing by the west side of the farm, advanced toward the
orchard. At this moment they were charged by the cuirassiers
of Greneral Travers, whom the Emperor had detached from
Milhaud's corps to second the attack of the infantry. The
cuirassiers charged through them, and, continuing their rush, cut
down the tirailleurs of the Kielmansegge brigade on the edge of
the plateau.^^
East of the road, the other columns of d'Erlon had climbed
the slopes under the fire of the batteries, and the bullets of the
English 95 th, and the fusillade of Bylandt's brigade drawn up
before the Ohain road. The charge went on with quickened pace,
in spite of the taU stalks of rye which impeded the march, in
spite of the soaked and slippery ground into which men sank
and tottered. The cries "Vive I'Empereur ! " at times drowned
CHAP. Ill THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 195
the roar of the cannon.'^ The Bourgeois Brigade (left echelon)
drove back the skirmishers, assaulted the sand-pit, dislodged
the carabiniers of the 9oth and hurled them on to the plateau
below the hedges, which it reached in the pursuit.^^ The
Donzelot division (second echelon) was engaged with Bylandt's
right, whilst the Marcognet division (third echelon) advanced
towards the left of this brigade. The Xetherlanders and Dutch
gave way, fell back in disorder, recrossed the hedges of the
Ohain road, and in their flight broke the ranks of the English
28th.^^ On his side Durutte, who commanded the fourth
echelon, dislodged from the Papelotte farm the light companies
of Xassau, and was already half-way up the hill, threatening
Best's Hanoverians.'*"
In the Imperial staff* the prevailing opinion was that " all
was going marvellously," *^ and, in fact, should the enemy retain
his advanced posts of Hougoumont and La Haye-Sainte, these
posts were attacked, hemmed in, and the left centre of his line
of battle seriously threatened. Travers' cuirassiers and d'Erlon's
skirmishers appeared to dominate the crest of the plateau, and
the bulk of the infantry was following them closely, behind.
Supposing these troops advanced a few steps farther, supposing
they could maintain themselves long enough in these positions
to allow time to the reserve cavalry to deal the finishing blow,
'" !e coup de massue "), victory seemed certain.
Section IV
The vicious arrangement of d'Erlon's columns, which had
already hindered their march and doubled their losses in the
ascent to the plateau, was now to occasion a disaster. After
the skirmishers had overthrown Bylandt's Netherlanders, the
Donzelot division advanced within thirty paces from the road.
Here Donzelot halted his column to deploy it. In climbing
the battalion had still more decreased their intervals. They
were a mere mass now. The deployment, or rather the attempt
10 deploy — for it did not appear that they succeeded in
executing it — took a very long time ; each fresh command
<july increased the confusion. The enemy took advantage of this
196 WATERLOO book iii
respite. When the French batteries opened fire, the division
under Pieton (brigades Kempt and Pack) had fallen back by-
Wellington's orders to a distance of 150 yards from the road.
The men were all there in line, but lying flat, so as to evade
the projectiles. Pieton noticed that the Dutch were routed,
and that the French tirailleurs were crossing the hedges and
advancing boldly against a battery. He gave the order " Stand,"
and at a bound, Kempt's brigade stood on the road. It drove
away the tirailleurs, crossed the first hedge, then, upon
discovering the column of Donzelot, which was engaged in
deploying, it saluted it with a fire in line at forty paces.
Attacked thus unawares, surprised in the very act of forming
up, the French instinctively and involuntarily made a slight
retrograde movement. Pieton, seizing the moment, shouted :
" Charge I Charge ! Hurrah ! " The English rushed from the
second hedge and flung themselves with their bayonets fixed
upon this seething mass, which resisted from its very weight.
Eepulsed several times they repeated their charges unceasingly.
The combatants were so close to each other that the wads of
their guns adhered smoking to the cloth of their uniforms.
During this hand-to-hand fight a French officer was killed as
he seized the flag of the 32nd regiment, and the intrepid
Pieton fell dead with a bullet through his temples.^^
At the time of the flight of the Dutch and Belgians the
Marcognet column (third echelon) had arrived at about the
same height as the Donzelot column. Marcognet, not think-
ing it possible to deploy his column, had continued his march
and outdistanced Donzelot, who had halted. Then, with his
leading regiment and shouting, " Victory ! " he broke through
the double hedge, and was advancing against a Hanoverian
battery, when, to the piercing sounds of the pibrochs, the
Scotch brigade of Pack moved forward by battalions, deployed
in four ranks. At a distance of about twenty yards the
92nd Highlanders opened fire; shortly after, the rest of the
Scotch followed them. Owing to their crowded formation,
the French could only reply from the front line of a single
battalion. They fired one volley and rushed forward with
fixed bayonets. They attacked their foes ; the first rank of
each side were involved in a furious struggle. " I was thrust-
CHAP. Ill THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 197
ing a soldier forward," relates an officer of the 45th : " I saw
him fall to the ground at my feet from a sabre wound. I
raised my head and saw the English cavalry from every side
forcing their way into our midst and hacking us to pieces." ^^
As the French were about to surmount the plateau —
Travers' cuirassiers on the left of the main road and d'Erlon's
columns on the east — Lord Uxbridge charged them with fhe
dite of his cavalry." The four regiments of Somerset's mounted
guards — 1st and 2nd Life Guards, the Blues, and the King's
Dragoons — started off at a gallop in line. A few steps
farther on, they arrived within pistol-range of the cuirassiers,
who were only separated from them by the Ohain road. On
the western side of the highway to Brussels, the Ohain road
ran for the space of 400 yards between two very steep banks,
which disappeared farther on. The left of Travers and the
right of Somerset charged each other at a gallop on the level
portion of the road. But the platoons of the right of the
cuirassiers were met by the trench. They resolutely descended
the outer slope, and were spurring on their horses to climb the
opposite side, when tenyardsabove them flashed the line of sabres
of the 2nd Life Guards charging them at full speed. In order
to avoid being utterly crushed — for they had neither time nor
space to attempt a charge back — the cuirassiers filed up the
hollow road, jostling each other terribly, regained the main road,
near Wellington's elm, and rallied in a field near the sand-
pit. The Life Guards, who had pursued them along the edge
of the road, charged before they had time to re-form, and,
after a hand-to-hand struggle, in which, says Lord Somerset,
" they hammered on the cuirasses like coppersmiths at work,"
they flung several into the excavation of the sand-pit. The
bulk of the brigade under Travers was shattered and driven
back into the valley by the other regiments of Somerset,
which, besides being better mounted than the cuirassipr„„„ .
' o .ivio wks busy in
superior m numbers, and had the ^fllLsides, which a moment
-. covered with combatants, were now covered
^gg WATERLOO BOOK iii
.r.A ^"
198 WATERLOO book iii
the columns of d'Erlon. The Eoyals debouched from the
main road of Brussels, swept aside the Bourgeois brigade as it
was struggling with the 95 th, who were ambushed behind the
hedges, and drove it back as far as the sand-pit. The Innis-
killings passed the road by the openings which had been cut
in the double hedge for the firing of the cannon, and assaulted
the column under Donzelot. The Scots Greys — so named
after the colour of their horses — followed in the steps of
Pack's battalions, which opened their ranks to allow them to
pass through. Highlanders and Scots Greys greeted each other
with the shout, " Scotland for ever ! " and the horsemen fell
impetuously on the Marcognet division.^^ Fired on from the
front by the infantry, charged on either flank by the cavalry,
paralysed by their own unwieldy masses, the heavy French
columns could only make a faint show of resistance. The
men stumbled over one another, and were huddled together in
such dire confusion, that they had no room to take aim or
even to use their side-arms against the horsemen, who
penetrated through their bewildered ranks. Bullets were
fired into the air ; bayonet thrusts aimed so badly they had no
effect. It was a harrowing sight to see the English breaking
through and slaughtering these fine divisions as if they were
flocks of sheep. Intoxicated with slaughter, inciting each other
to kill, they pierced and cut down the miserable mass with glee.
The columns were shattered, divided, scattered, and hurled
down to the foot of the slopes by the swords of the dragoons.
The Bourgeois brigade, which had rallied at the sand-pit, was
thrown into disorder and swept away pell-mell by the crowd
of fugitives and horsemen. The Quiot brigade abandoned
the attack of La Haye-Sainte.^^ Above Papelotte, the Durutte
division received on its right flank the charges of Vandeleur's
dragoons — 11th, 12 th, and 13 th regiments — seconded by
i^-^-Ti^tch dragoons and the Belgian hussars of Ghigny.
each side were-.- cc_.^ ^ g^^^^.^ attack at the outset, it fell
•^d in fairly good order,
"fj valrv.** I
CHAP. Ill THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 199
not wearing any curb-chains that day, themselves excited by
the rush, the tumult, the struggle, the victory, the Engi'ish
crossed the valley at a furious speed and attacked the opposite
slope. In vain was the retreat sounded by order of Lord
Uxbridge ; his horsemen neither heard nor wished to hear,
and they dashed up to the French position at a gallop. They
could not get a footing there. The Life Guards and the
Dragoons were decimated by the fire of the Bachelu division
posted near the eminence, to the west of the main road. The
Scots Greys met the division batteries half-way up the hill,
cut down the artillerymen and drivers, hurled the guns
into a ravine, then assaulted the main battery. Thereupon
the lancers of Colonel Martigue charged them in flank, and
routed them, whilst the lancers of Colonel Bro disengaged
the Durutte division from the murderous grip of Vaudeleur's
dragoons. " Never," said Durutte, " did I realise before the
great superiority of the lance over the sword." *^ It wa.-. in
this struggle that the valiant Greneral Ponsonby lost his life.
Unhorsed by a subaltern of the 9th Lancers, named Urban,
he had surrendered, when several of his Scots Greys returned
to rescue him. Urban, fearing to lose his prisoner, had the
cruel ccrurage to plunge his lance into his chest. After which
he rushed at the dragoons and brought three of them to the
ground.^'^'
The dashing charge of the lancers was promptly supported
by General Farine's brigade of cuirassiers. The Emperor,
perceiving that the Scots Greys were about to attack the main
battery, had sent to General Delort, Lieutenant -General imder
Milhaud, the order to fling two regiments against them.
Lancers and cuirassiers swept the slope of La Belle Alliance,
the whole extent of the valley, and pursued the horse guards
and the dragoons as far as the first slopes of Mont- Saint -
Jean, beyond La Haye-Sainte. The light cavalry brigades of
Vi\dan and von Merlen, which had followed the movement of
I Lord Uxbridge from a distance, did not consider it wise to
I attack also.^^
A pause in the action followed. Either side was busy in
returning to its positions.^" The hill-sides, which a moment
before had been covered with combatants, were now covered
20O WATERLOO bk. hi ch. hi
on]ly by dead bodies and wounded men. " The ground," said
an English officer, " was literally covered with French killed
and wounded." ^^ It had the heart-rending aspect of the day
after a battle, and the battle was only commencing !
During this interval, a cuirassier detached himself from
his; regiment, which was re-forming at La Belle Alliance, and
starting at a gallop, descended to the main road. They
watched him cross the entire length of this valley of death
where he was the only living being. The Germans posted at
La Haye-Sainte took him for a deserter, and refrained from
firing. When he reached the orchard at the very foot of the
hedge, he straightened his gigantic body in the stirrups,
raised his sword, and shouted " Vive I'Empereur ! " Then,
midst a shower of bullets, with a few bounds of his powerful
charger, he returned to the French lines.^'*
At Hougoumont the contest waxed fiercer and fiercer.
Th?'c;e companies of English Guards, a battalion of Brunswickers,
a battalion of Duplat's German legion, two regiments under Toy,
had successively reinforced the defenders and the assailants.
The French, once again masters of the wood which they had
previously lost, took possession of the orchard ; but the
English Guards would not relinquish the garden above, v/hicli
was protected by a small wall provided with a natural
banquette, and held their own in the farm itself By order
of the Emperor a battery of Howitzers stormed these buildings.
Fire burst forth in a barn, spread rapidly, and consumed the
chateau, the farmer's house, the cattle sheds and the stables.
The English took refuge within the chapel, the barn, the
gardener's cottage and the adjoining hollow road, from whence
they resumed their fusillade. The fire itself proved an obstacle
to the French. From the burning stables, from whence the
enemy's ambulances had not had time to be moved, were heard
vain appeals for help, and shrieks of agony.^^
BOOK III CHAPTER IV
THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO
From three to seven o'clock
I. Second attack of La Haye-Sainte — Ney's order to Milhaud.
n. First and second charges of Milhaud's cxiirassiers, and of the Light
Cavalry of the Guard — Order of the Emperor to Kellermann's cuirassiers
and Guyot's cavalry.
in. Bulow's corps enters in line — Defence by Lobau — The capture and re-
capture of Plancenoit.
IV. Third and fourth charges of Milhaud's cuirassiers, supported by Keller-
mann's cuirassiers, the dragoons, and the mounted grenadiers of the
Guard.
V, General attack on the plateau by Reille's and d'Erlon's infantry and the
remainder of the cavalry — Storming of La Haye-Sainte — The English
line shaken — Renewed struggle at Plancenoit.
Section I
The one aim of Wellington was to retain his position until
the Prussian Army should enter into line. This movement
Was delayed far longer than he liked. He had hoped that
Bliicher would commence the attack by two o'clock ; it was
now half-past three, and the Prussians did not seem ready to
show themselves. The English staff feared that they would
not be strong enough to resist a second assault.^
Napoleon also had grave anxieties. Major La Fresnaye
had just delivered him a letter from Grouchy, written in
Walhain at half-past eleven.- In this very confused despatch,
two things especially struck the Emperor : the first was, that
Grouchy had made his way very slowly, since at half-past
eleven he was still three leagues distant from Wavre ; the
second was, that the Marshal seemed in nowise concerned as
I to what was happening on his left, and that he was asking
202 WATERLOO book hi
for orders to manoeuvre on the next day in the round-about
direction of La Chyse.^ It was therefore most unlikely that
Grouchy would have the happy inspiration by noon, to march
to the cannon, that he might take in flank Billow's corps,
which was already in position at Chapelle-Saint-Lambert. At
the best, the Marshal could fall upon the rear of this corps,
or contrive by an energetic attack to keep back the other
parts of the Prussian Army far from the battlefield. Can we
wonder that the Emperor did not at once send back La
Fresnaye with fresh instructions for Grouchy ? These in-
structions could only have been " to draw nearer the army so
as to fall upon any corps of the enemy which might attempt
to harass the right." Napoleon had already sent these
directions to his lieutenant at a quarter past one."* He could
not have done more than reiterate them, and at a very late hour.
The presence of Biilow at Ohapelle-Saint-Lambert, the
sanguinary check to Count d'Erlon, the absence of Grouchy,
might perhaps have induced the Emperor to stop the contest,
as he had done at Essling, and to take up a strong defensive
position on the plateau of La Belle Alliance, But it does
not seem that he thought of this expedient, which could only
have served him for the day. Even if reinforced by Grouchy
on the next day, the French Army would have to give battle
to the united armies of Wellington and Bliicher, nearly in the
proportion of two to one. The Emperor preferred to take
advantage of the expectant attitude which Biilow maintained,
to crush the English before the Prussians came into line.''
As soon as d'Erlon had rallied some of his battalions,
about half-past three, the Emperor ordered Ney to attack La
Haye-Sainte again.*" He contemplated using this position as
a base for a general movement with d'Erlon's corps, the corps
of Keille — who would, he thought, be soon master of Hougou-
mont — the whole of the cavalry, and lastly the foot Guards.^
Ney led against La Haye-Sainte the brigade of Quiot, whilst
one of Donzelot's brigades, the whole of it deployed in
skirmishing order, climbed the slopes to the east of the
Brussels high road and opened fire at twenty paces distance,
on the English who were ambushed behind the hedges of the
Ohain road. The attack was a failure. Donzelot's tirailleurs
CHAP. IV THE BATTLE OF TFATEIiLOO 203
were repulsed half way up ; the soldiers of Quiot, decimated
by the point-blank fire of Major Baring's Germans, who had
just received a reinforcement of two companies, fell back
upon the orchard.^
To support this attack the main battery had increased the
fury of its fire against the left centre of the enemy's position,
while the batteries of Eeille, reinforced by a portion of the
Guards' guns of twelve, relentlessly cannonaded the right
centre. This was the moment in the day when the artillery
fire was most intense. " Never," said General Alten, " had the
oldest soldiers heard such a cannonade." ^ Some battalions in
the first of the English line retrograded a hundred paces back,
so as to be sheltered by the edges of the plateau. At the
same time, groups of wounded, convoys of prisoners, empty
ammunition waggons and fugitives were streaming towards
the forest of Soignes.^° Ney, mistaking movements which he
could not well distinguish through the dense smoke, took them
for signs of a commencing retreat, and thought the time had
come to gain a footing upon the plateau with the cavalry.
He immediately applied for a brigade of cuirassiers.^^
The aide-de-camp applied to General Farine, who sent
his two regiments. But General Delort, commanding the
division, arrested the movement. "We receive no orders," he
said, " but from Comte Milhaud." Ney, growing impatient,
hastened to Delort.^^ The Marshal was very irritated by this
refusal to obey. Not only did he reiterate the order with
regard to the Farine brigade, but he ordered that six other
regiments of Milhaud's corps should move forward as well
Delort having objected that this manceuvre would be most
imprudent on such ground, Ney appealed to the instructions
of the Emperor. " Forward," he cried, " the salvation of
France is at stake." Delort obeyed.^^ The two di\'isions of
cuirassiers started at full trot, %vith the red lancers and the
horse chasseurs of the Guard coming on behind. Did these
regiments follow the movement in pursuance of an order from
Lefebvre-Desnoettes, to whom it would seem that Milhaud
said, " I am going to charge, support me ! " before he started ?
O'" -^".i they rush forward of their own accord, seized with
the madness of the charge at the sight of their comrades'
204 WATERLOO book m
rush toward the enemy, whose retreat seemed commencing,
and eager for their share in the slaughter of the English ? ^*
From the commencement of the action, Ney was planning
a great cavalry movement of which the Emperor had spoken
to him, and for which he had placed under Ney's command
the cuirassier's corps, and even the divisions of the Horse
Guard.^^ The Prince of Moscow anticipated the most
wonderful results from this charge. He rejoiced in the thought
that he would lead it, for, as Foy says, he was considered one of
the first cavalry officers in the army. He had discussed the
matter with Drouot, assuring him that he was certain of its
success.^'^ At first Ney had not intended to engage the
cavalry until he had received orders from the Emperor^" to
that effect ; he had at that time no other wish but to obtain a
footing on the plateau with a brigade of cuirassiers. Then
the idea occurred to him to hasten the retreat of the English,
by hurling all Milhaud's cuirassiers against them. It was for
this reason that he had brought up both these divisions.
Probably, however, he might have hesitated to employ them
without a fresh order from Napoleon, But when he saw this
multitude of cuirassed squadrons, the mounted chasseurs of the
Guard and the red lancers all descending to the levels of La
Haye-Sainte, he had no longer any doubt that all was taking
place in accordance with the Emperor's own instructions, and
that the Emperor had considered the time had come for the
grand attack. Otherwise, would the light cavalry of the
Guard have followed the cuirassiers ? It seems almost certain,
however, that Napoleon saw nothing of this movement.'^
From the dip of the ground in which they were posted, the
divisions of Milhaud and Lefebvre-Desnoettes could gain the
Brussels highway, cross it close up to La Belle Alliance, and
descend into the valley, without being perceived by the
Emperor from his post near the " Maison Decoster." ^^ But
it was natural Marshal Ney should conclude that this glitter-
ing mass of 5,000 horsemen had not escaped Napoleon's notice.
Hastily he drew up these magnificent squadrons in the
hollow of the valley to the left of the Brussels road, and at
their head, rushed forward against the English Army.^
CHAP. IV THE BATTLE OF JFATEBLOO 205
Section II
The idea of a retreat was so &r from Wellington's mind, that
he had just reinforced his line of battle in front with several
brigades of his second line and his reserve. The Brunswickers
advanced to the support of Maitland's guards, the Mitchel and
Adam brigades crossed the road to XiveUes to establish them-
selves above Hougoumont, before the Ohain road.-^ It must
be said that in the allied army, there were also many misgiv-
ings. The staff anxiously scrutinised the French positions,
seeking to predict what movement was in preparation by
Napoleon, when the cavalry descended towards La Haye-Sainte.
The surprise was extreme, and dispelled every fear." Kennedy
says : " To our surprise, we soon saw that it was the prelude to
an attack of cavalry upon a grand scale. Such an attack we
had fully anticipated would take place at some period of the
day ; but we had no idea that it would be made upon our line
standing in its regular order of battle, and that line as yet
imshaken by any previous attack by infantry." Instantly the
men sprang to their feet and formed into squares. The batteries
remained in front, on the very edge of the plateau. The
teams of horses were sent to a distance, and the artillerjTnen
received orders not to fire until the last moment, then, after
abandoning their pieces, to take shelter within the squares.-^
The French cavalry advanced in echelons of squadron
columns, the cuirassiers on the right, the chasseurs and the
" chevau-legers " on the left. They moved in a slightly oblique
direction, the first echelons manceuvring so as to gain the level
portion of the Ohain road, the left echelons converging toward
the slopes above Hougoumont.-^ The flank was exposed to the
enemy's artillery. As soon as the cuirassiers commenced to
debouch from the hoUows in which they had formed up, the
French batteries ceased to fire, and the English batteries
increased their cannonade. The pieces were loaded with a
double charge : shell, grape-shot and bar-shot."^ A hurricane
of iron rent the air. At a slow canter, the horses climbed
those steep slopes, over the soaked and greasy ground into
which they sometimes simk up to the knees, and through the
tall stalks of rye which swept against their breasts. By
206 WATERLOO book hi
accelerating their fire, the batteries were able to discharge
several times. A last salvo at forty paces distance from the
batteries of Lloyd and of Cleeves, which were posted at the
exact spot where the " Butte du Lion " now rises, mowed down
half the leading squadrons. The survivors halted for a few
seconds and seemed to hesitate. The charge sounded, louder
and louder ; the shout arose of : " Vive I'Empereur ! " The
cuirassiers flung themselves on the cannon. One after the
other, all the batteries were taken.^^ A superb feat of arms
indeed, but a delusive capture ! There were no horses to
carry off the pieces, no spikes to make them useless. It was
possible to throw them down into the ravine, and to drive the
ramrods of their pistols instead of nails, into the touch-holes.
Nothing was done, it did not even occur to a single officer to
have the cannon sponges destroyed."'
The cannons were silenced, but the fusillade continued to
roll and crackle. Between the Nivelles road and the Brussels
highroad, twenty English, Hanoverian, Brunswick, and German ^^
battalions were posted, formed into squares like those on a
chess-board. The bullets struck and rebounded from the.
cuirasses with the sound of hail on a roof of slates. Cuirassiers
and lancers, their ranks already shattered by the storm of
bullets, by the ascent, by their very passage through that
hedge of artillery, still fell upon these squares. But from the
edge of the plateau, which they took at full gallop, to the first
line of the infantry, the field was far too narrow. The charge
was lacking in vigour and consequently in effect. The English
were in squares three ranks deep, the first rank with one knee
on the ground, with muskets resting on the earth, and sloping
bayonets, thus forming chevaux-de-frise. In spite of vigorous
spurring, and their maddened sabre cuts, in spite of their
valour and their rage, the horsemen were powerless to pierce
these serried walls of men.-^ They advanced obliquely to the
right and to the left, and under cross firing spurred onwards,
charging the squares of the second line. As one wave follows
another, so did the squadrons follow each other in quick succession.
The tide of cavalry flooded the whole plateau. Cuirassiers,
chasseurs, red lancers surged around the squares, assaulted
them on their four sides, dashed with fury against their
CHAP. IV THE BATTLE OF 1FATERL00 207
corners, struck down the bayonets with their swords, with
their spears pierced through the breasts of their foes, dis-
charged their pistols point blank, in these furious hand-to-
hand struggles, but they only succeeded in making partial
breaches which were as quickly filled up again.^
Lord Uxbridge watched this melee. The two-thirds of his
cavalry had not as yet been in action. He hurled against
these disordered masses, Dornberg's dragoons, Arenschild's
hussars, Brunswick's black lancers. Trip's Dutch carabiniers,
the two Dutch-Belgian brigades of van Merlen and of Ghigny,
altogether five thousand fresh horses. They had the advantage
of numbers and cohesion. The French bent under the shock,
were forced back into the spaces between the squares, and only
escaped the sword to fall under the bullets of the foe. They
abandoned the plateau. The gunners rushed back to their
posts at the guns ; all along the crest, the fire of the English
batteries blazed out anew.^^ Scarcely had they reached the
bottom of the valley, when Milhaud's and Lefebvre-Desnoette's
valiant soldiers charged again. Once more they climbed, midst
volleys of grape-shot, the muddy slopes of Mont-Saint-Jean,
took possession of the cannon, crowned the heights, fell upon
the infantry, and with their flashing swords made deep furrows
in the whole chess-board of the squares.^"
Many an Englishman believed then that the battle was
lost. The batteries in reserve were prepared to retire at the
first order. Artillery-Colonel Gould said to Mercer : " I much
fear all is lost." ^ From La Belle Alliance the staff watched
these magnificent cavalry charges ; they saw the cannons
abandoned, the horsemen galloping over the plateau, the lines
of the enemy broken through, the squares surrounded ; those
around the Emperor declared the victory gained.^^ He was
himseK surprised and annoyed that his cavalry had been used
without his orders against troops which were still un-
shaken.^^ He said to Soult : " This is a premature movement
which may produce fatal results in the issue of this day." ^
The chief of the staff was loud in his condemnation of Ney :
" He is compromising us as he did at Jena ! " The Emperor
swept a searching and prolonged glance over the battlefield,
reflected for a moment, then resumed : " This has taken place
208 WATERLOO book hi
an hour too soon, but we must stand by what is already done." ^^
He sent off one of his aides-de-camp, General Flahaut, with an
order to Kellermann to charge with the four brigades of
cuirassiers and carabiniers.^^
Like the Emperor, Kellermann considered that Milhaud's
movement had been premature ; he thought it would be most
imprudent to engage his own cavalry. He was probably about
to give his opinion on the matter to Flahaut, when General
Lheritier, who commanded his first division (cuirassiers and
dragoons) set it off at full trot without waiting for any orders.
Kellermann was obliged to follow with his second division,
composed of the 2nd and 3rd cuirassiers, and of the 1st and
2nd carabiniers ; however, not far from Hougoumont he halted
the brigade of carabiniers in a dip of the ground ; strictly
forbidding General Blancard to stir from the spot unless he
received formal orders from Kellermann himself.^*^ This proved
a wise precaution, for these eight hundred carabiniers were
afterwards the only cavalry reserve which the Army possessed.
Flahaut in pursuance with the Emperor's instructions had
transmitted the order to charge, not only to Kellermann, but
also to General Guyot, commander of the heavy cavalry of the
Guards (dragoons and mounted Grenadiers).^°
The Emperor had said that Milhaud's divisions must be
supported, as he feared that any reverse suffered by them
in the presence of the whole Army, might unnerve the men
and bring about a panic and a rout.^^ Did he not hope also
to crush the English under a fresh mass of cuirassed cavalry ?
It was necessary to hasten the action, to gain on one point, to
hold firm on another, to vanquish and to triumph through
sheer audacity, for matters had become terribly critical. The
Emperor was in fact fighting two battles at the same time,
the one parallel, the other oblique ; in front he attacked the
English ; on his right flank, he was himself attacked by the
Prussians.
Section III
Towards one o'clock Bliicher had joined the main body of
Billow's corps at Chapelle- Saint -Lambert; but, eager as he
CHAP. IV THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 209
was to fight, he judged it imprudent to advance in the
defiles of the Lasne, before making sure he would not be
caught there in the act of marching. Three quarters of an
hour later, he learnt by reports from his scouts, that the French
were very far off and that he ran as yet no risk.'*" He at once
started his troops in the direction of Plancenoit. His object
was to fall upon the right of the Imperial Army.^ When one
follows the steep and hollow road which descends from Chapelle-
Saint-Lambert, crosses at Lasne the brook of that name, and
remounts the no less abrupt slope of the other hill, one is
amazed that the Prussian artillery could have overcome the
difficulties of this defile. It required all Blucher's indomitable
will. He was everywhere at once, cheering his soldiers, who
were exhausted by fatigue and hunger (they had been on the
march from five o'clock in the morning and had taken no
food since the previous day), lavishing encouraging words on
them and appeals to duty — kindly, pleasant words : " Now
then, comrades, " he said to some gunners who were straining
at the wheels of a cannon which had sunk deep into the mire,
" surely you would not have me break my word." "**
At four o'clock the heads of his columns reached the
wood of Paris (3,500 yards from Plancenoit). Here the
Losthin and Hiller divisions established themselves without
striking a blow, for instead of occupying the avenues of
the wood. General Domon's cavalry had been content merely
to watch its outlets.*^ In this new position the Prussians
found themselves under cover. Before unmasking, Bllicher
would have preferred waiting for Billow's two other divisions,
which were still in the defiles of the Lasne. But "Welling-
ton's messages imploring him to take part in the fight,
became more and more pressing ; he could hear, too, the
thunder of the French guns and distinguish, it is said, the
movement of the cuirassiers on the heights of La Belle
Alliance. He determined to act with what troops he had.^
At half-past fovir *^ the Prussians debouched, Losthin's infantry
to the right of the Plancenoit road, Hiller's infantry to the
left, the front covered by two cavahy regiments and three
light batteries. Bliicher hastened to open fire with his
guns on the squadrons of Domon ; ^ his object, says Muffling,
14
210 WATEBLOO book hi
was to inform and to strengthen Wellington, and at the same
time to prevent Napoleon from crushing the English.*^
Domon at first met the attack by a counter-attack. He
repulsed the Prussian hussars, and fell upon their batteries.
Mown down by their cannonade and by the fusillade of the
whole Losthiu division, he slowly fell back ; then passing
to the reserve, he unmasked the infantry of Lobau, who
had taken up position crosswise on the Lasne road, about
half a league to the east of the road to Brussels. The
Simmer and Janin divisions, deployed there one behind the
other, were arranged in the shape of a T, nearly perpendicu-
larly to the line of battle.^" To supply their places on the
front, the Emperor had moved his foot Guards forward near
La Belle Alliance, to the right of the Brussels road, with the
exception of the 1st Grenadier regiment, which remained
near Eossomme, and the 1st battalion of the 1st Chasseurs
posted at Le Caillou. At the same time he had given
Durutte orders to assail Papelotte and La Haye, so as to
support Ney's grand attack and to cut the communication
between Billow's right and the English left.^^
Well aware that passive resistance was virtually doomed,
Lobau headed straight for the Prussians, who gave way,
whereupon the divisions under Eyssel and Hacke debouched
from the woods. Again the Prussians resumed the offensive,
30,000 against 10,000 Erenchmen.^^ But Lobau had under
him regiments of long standing and as firm as rocks. The
5th of the line, the first regiment which had gone over to
Napoleon, in the Laffray defile, and the 10 th of the line,
the only one which had fought for the Bourbons at the
bridge of Loriol,^^ vied with each other in courage and
tenacity. With these fine troops, Lobau presented such a
fierce front that Bliicher, instead of persisting in his parallel
attack, manoeuvred for an assault on the right of the 6 th
Corps. The cavalry of Prince William of Prussia and
Killer's infantry, supported by the Eyssel divisions, bore down
towards Plancenoit. Lobau, fearing he might be turned,
drew back to the height of the village, where he posted a
brigade. Assailed on three points, this brigade was unable
to hold its ground and was driven out from Plancenoit,
CHAP. IV THE BATTLE OF JVATERLOO 211
which was occupied and entrenched by the enemy. From
his front Billow cannonaded the other three brigades of
Lobau with eight batteries, the shells from which sometimes
fell on the Brussels road, amid the battalions of the Guard,
and even of the Imperial staff.^^
At the moment when his infantry was attacking
Plancenoit, Bliicher received one of Thiehnann's aides-de-
camp. The commander of the 3rd Corps announced that
he was being attacked at Wavre by superior forces (these
were Grouchy's 33,000 men), and that he was doubtful as
to his power of resistance : " Let Thielmann defend himself
as best he can," said Gneisenau. " It matters little if he be
crushed at "Wavre, provided we gain the victory here." ^^
"With the enemy in possession of Plancenoit, N'apoleon
was hemmed in and his line of retreat threatened. He
ordered Duhesme, commanding the division of the Young
Guard, to recapture this village. Its eight battalions, four
of voltigeurs, four of sharpshooters, rushed to the charge.
The Prussians were dislodged from the houses and from the
cemetery, which they had made a redoubt.^^
Section IV
The English still stood their ground. When the heavy
cavalry of Kellermann and of Guyot had debouched in the
valley between five and half-past five, Millhaud's cuirassiers,
repulsed for the second time by the English dragoons, rushed
to the bottom of the slopes.''' Having promptly re-formed,
they charged these three fresh divisions. The cuirassiers of
Lheritier, of Delort, of "Wathier, of Eoussel d'Hurbal, the
chasseurs and lancers of Lefebvre - Desnoettes, the dragoons
and mounted grenadiers of Guyot — more than sixty squadrons
— gained the plateau. The enemy's staff was amazed that
eight or nine thousand cavalry, should offer battle on a front
which afforded space for the deployment of one thousand only
at the most. They covered the whole area between Hougou-
mont and La Haye-Sainte. Their ranks were so closely
pressed that the horses were actually lifted off the ground by
212 WATERLOO book m
the pressiire.^^ This mass of cuirasses, casques, and swords
overflowed the uneven ground. To the English they looked
like a rising tide of steel.
The enemy renewed their twice -successful manceuvre.
After pouring a storm of grape-shot upon the cavalry, the
gunners abandoned their pieces and took refuge within the
squares. The latter, at a range of thirty paces, opened an
enfilading fire, which mowed down entire ranks as with a scythe,
receiving the shattered remains of the squadrons upon their
triple line of bayonets. Charge after charge followed without
any intermission. The squares sustained five, seven, ten, and
even thirteen assaults. Several were shaken and partially
broken, if not crushed and scattered altogether. A quarter-
master of the 9 th Cuirassiers seized an English flag. Captain
Klein de Kleinenberg, of the chasseurs of the Guard, had his
horse killed under him as he bore off the flag of the German
Legion.^^ However, most of the squares remained impreg-
nable. For an instant they seemed overwhelmed by the
surging masses of cavalry, then they would reappear through
the smoke, bristling with flashing bayonets, whilst the squadrons
were scattered like breakers dashing against a sea-wall.
Lheritier's cuirassiers pierced through a labyrinth of cross
fires as far as the squares of the 2nd line, passed beyond them,
and were swept down by the batteries in reserve. An entire
regiment wheeled to the left, enfiladed at full gallop the
Nivelles road, cutting down the sharpshooters along the road
to Braine-l'Alleud, turned Hougoumont, and came back to
re-form on the plateau of La Belle Alliance. The dragoons of
the Guard engaged with Grant's light cavalry, which had
been occupied all the afternoon in observing Fire's lancers
before Monplaisir, and recognising at last that the movements
of the latter were mere demonstrations, had fallen back from
the right wing to the centre.^^ Mercer's battery, the only one
whose gunners had remained at their guns in spite of
Wellington's order, found itself slightly in the rear, its front
sheltered by an embankment of the road, its flanks protected
by two squares of Brunswickers. The mounted grenadiers,
giants on huge steeds whose stature was augmented by their
huge hairy helmets, advanced at a trot in line. They looked hke
CHAT. IV THE -BATTLE OF WATERLOO 213
a moving wall. Under Mercer's grape-shot, crossed by the
enfilading fires of the two squares of Brunswickers, this wall
crumbled quickly away, strewing the ground with bleeding
fragments. A second charge only resulted in fresh butchery.
General Jamin, colonel of the grenadiers, fell fatally wounded
on a gun carriage. In front of the battery rose a rampart of
corpses and mangled horses. " You have a goodly pile there,"
laughingly remarked Colonel Wood to Mercer. The last
platoons of grenadiers leapt over the hideous obstacle, traversed
the intervals between the guns, cutting down the gunners, and
joined in the charges of the cuirassiers."^ Terribly hampered
by their numbers, which were far too great for the small
expanse of ground, all these squadrons clashed together, broke
in charging, and became inextricably confused in their ranks.
Though their attacks were as eager as ever, they gradually
became less and less vigorous, less and less rapid, less
and less effective, owing to the disorder and the breathless-
ness of the horses, which at every step sank deeper into the
soaked and slippery ground. The atmosphere was scorching ;
it was hardly possible to breathe : " It was like being at the
door of a hot oven." General Donop was wounded, so also
was General Delort, General Lheritier, General Guyot, and
General Eoussel d'HurbaL Edouard de Colbert charged with
his arm in a sUng. Generals Blancard, Dubois, Farine,
Guiton, Picquet, Travers, Wathier, were also wounded.
Marshal Ney, whose third horse had been killed under him,
stood alone by the side of an abandoned battery, and was furiously
striking with the blade of his sword at the bronze mouth of an
English cannon. The whole field of battle was encimibered
with non-combatants : dismounted cuirassiers walking heavily,
borne down by the weight of their armour, toward the valley ;
wounded men crawling from under heaps of the slain ; riderless
horses galloping madly, terrified by the bullets whizzing past
their ears. Wellington came out of the square of the 73rd, in
which he had taken refuge durinsr the hottest time of the
action ; he rushed to his cavalry and hurled it against the
exhausted battalions, which were separated and broken by their
own charges. For the third time the French surrendered the
plateau.®"" For the fourth time they remounted the hill
214 WATERLOO book hi
shouting " Vive TEmpereur ! " Ney led the charge at the
head of the carabiniers. From the distance he had distin-
guished their gold cuirasses ; he flew to them, and in spite of
General Blancard's remonstrances, who urged the precise orders
of Kellerraann, he hurried them away with him, to a wild race
of death.*'^
The fury of Ney and his heroic horsemen, who, like him,
were intoxicated with rage, verged on madness. This last
charge with squadrons reduced one-half, with exhausted troops,
with half-dead horses, could only result in a fresh reverse.
The action of cavalry upon infantry consists entirely in its
moral effect. And what hope was there of producing a moral
effect on these foot soldiers, whose success in repulsing with
their fire and their bayonets one charge after another, had
taught them that these wild rushes of cavalry were merely a
bugbear, and who through these two terrible hours, long as
days, had acquired the assurance that they were utterly in-
vincible ? It was, on the contrary, the horsemen who were de-
moralised by the uselessness of their attacks, the vanity of their
efforts. They charged with the same intrepidity, but no longer
with the same confidence. Once more they traversed the line
of the batteries, but after vainly urging their wearied horses
against the squares, or, to speak more correctly, against the
ramparts of dead men and slaughtered horses which protected
each side, they fell back of their own accord, discouraged and
despairing, to the bottom of the valley, followed at a distance,
rather than actually repulsed by the English cavalry, which
was itself completely worn out.^*
Section V
These magnificent charges might have succeeded, had
they been immediately followed up by infantry. Whilst the
enemy's batteries, beyond which the cuirassiers had passed, were
silent, the infantry could have climbed the slopes without
either risk or loss, might have taken their positions on the edge
of the plateau, and assailed the squares. The English would
have been compelled either to submit to the fire and assaults
CIL4P. IV THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 215
of the infantry in a very disadvantageous formation, or to deploy,
which would have placed them at the mercy of the horsemen.
The Bachelu division and the Janin brigade (Foy division)
were only 1,300 yards distant from the Allies' position, and
stood there at attention for several hours watching this furious
fight. They only waited for the order to go to the support
of the cavalry. Ney had completely forgotten them ! Only
after the repulse of the fourth charge, did he think of using
these six thousand bayonets. The six regiments marched by
echelons in columns of division with intervals of half a distance.
It was too late. They were swept down by the batteries ; and
the Anglo-Allied infantry, which had extended its front towards
Hougoumont in crescent shape, riddled them through and
through with converging fires. " It was a hail of death,"
said Foy. In a few seconds 1,500 men were kiUed, woimded,
and scattered. jSTevertheless they came within pistol shot of
the enemy, but the fresh brigades under Duplat and William
Halkett commenced an offensive movement (Duplat was killed
at this moment), whereupon the columns, cut to pieces by the
shells, began to retreat. Vainly had Ney sent to their aid
the carabiniers and the skeleton remains of a few other
squadrons. In these partial charges, which continued till
nearly the close of the fight, the horsemen could no longer
pierce through the line of the English batteries as they had
done.^^
With his mind intent on the cavalry charges Ney, in the
heat of this tumultuous action, had lost sight of his first
intention, namely, the capture of La Haye-Sainte. Here, as at
Hougoumont, though with far less ardour, the struggle con-
tinued, without any residt. And yet the intrepid defenders,
furnished with only sixty cartridges each, were beginning to
slacken their fire. Major Baring had sent to ask for more
ammunition. Wellington had none to give ; he sent him a
fresh reinforcement of two companies.^
Toward six o'clock, at the moment when the Foy and
Bachelu divisions advanced toward the plateau, the Emperor
went along the entire line of battle under a shower of shells
and cannon balls. General Desvaux de Saint Maurice, com-
mander-in-chief of the artillery of the Guard; General
216 JVATERLOO book m
Lallemand, commander of the batteries on foot ; Bailly de
Monthyon, chief of the general staff, had been struck down by
his side, the first-named killed, the two others seriously
wounded. Napoleon sent word to Ney that he was to take
La Haye-Sainte whatever the cost.'^'^ This was a fresh prize
offered to the Marshal, a new opportunity of meeting death.
He went there instantly, hurried off the loth leger (Donzelou's
division), a detachment of the 1st regiment of Engineers, and
hurled them against the farm. The bullets fired at ten yards
and at five yards, point blank, soon thinned the number of
assailants. Some soldiers tried to disarm the Germans by
seizing the barrels of their muskets, which projected through the
loopholes. In an instant seventy French fell at the foot of the
eastern wall. Their comrades mounted on the heap of bodies
to scale the top of the wall, whence they could shoot Major
Baring's chasseurs in the court below ; others pulled themselves
up to the roof of the barn. Lieutenant Vieux of the engineers,
who met with his death as colonel many years after at the
siege of Constantine, hacked the door of the court-house with
repeated blows of a hatchet. He received a bullet in his
wrist, another in his shoulder. The axe passed from hand
to hand ; the door at last gave way and the human tide
flowed into the court. Hemmed in, their backs to the wall,
and with no cartridges, the Germans defended themselves
with their side arms. Major Baring, with forty-two men —
all that remained of his nine companies — broke through the
crowd of the assailants and regained Mont-Saint-Jean.^^
Ney immediately posted a mounted battery upon a mound
near La Haye-Sainte and pushed forward a regiment to the
sand-pit, which was once more abandoned by the English 95th.
In these two positions the gunners fired at a distance of less
than 300 yards, the tirailleurs at less than 80, upon the very
centre of the enemy's line. Supported by this fire, which
made a breach for them, the remainder of the divisions of
Allix, Donzelot, and Marcognet ascended on either side of the
farm as far as the Ohain road. The enemies shot at each
other through the hedges, from the banks, and attacked with
their bayonets. Ompteda meanwhile, with the 5 th and
8th battalions of the German legion on the main road
CHAP. IV THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 217
delivered a counter-attack, which at first was crowned with
success, A bullet brought him to the ground under his horse,
mortally wounded. The oth battalion fell back. The 8 th,
which was in advance of it, was exterminated by a squadron of
cuirassiers. Its flag was taken ; its chief, Colonel Shrader,
killed ; thirty men alone escaped from the sabres. ^^
The enemy's left centre (brigades Kempt, Pack, Lambert,
Best, and "Winke) still held firm ; but on the extreme left, the
jS'assau troops of the Prince of Saxe-Weimar were for the
second time driven out of Papelotte by the division of Durutte,
and on the right centre, the Anglo-Allies were wavering and
their strength almost spent. The ammunition gave out, the
guns were dismounted, others were left without a gunner.
The Prince of Orange and General Alten, both of them
wounded, quitted the battlefield ; Colonels Gordon and De
Lancy-Evans, aides-de-camp to "Wellington, were killed. The
cavalry brigades, under Somerset and Ponsonby, were reduced
together to two squadrons; the Ompteda brigade had now
only a mere handful of men ; the Kielmansegge brigade fell back
behind Mont-Saint-Jean ; the Kriise brigade gave way. In
the rear, the fugitives grew more and more numerous. The
whole regiment of the Cumberland Hussars wheeled round, with
its colonel at its head, and at full trot rode away on the high-
road to Brussels. Everywhere the ranks were thinning, the
wounded were numerous, and numerous also were the men who
went off with them imder the pretext of carrying them to the
, ambulances. Disorder appeared even in the dauntless brigade
of Colin Halkett, where a battalion foimd itself under the
command of a mere lieutenant. The standards of the 30th
, and the 73 rd were prudently sent to the rear.""
I " The centre of the line was left open," said an aide-de-
1 camp of General Alten, " We were in peril. At each moment
; the issue of the battle was more than doubtful" "^ In spite of
) his accustomed confidence, Wellington became imeasy. He
could see plainly the black masses of Bliicher's troops assaulting
' the flank of the French Army, but he himseK was without
I any support. He was heard to murmur : " Xight or the
Prussians must arrive." He had already despatched several
aides-de-camp in the direction of Ohain to hasten the march
218 WATERLOO book iii
of Zieten's corps. But his resolution was in nowise daunted.
Officers arrived to him from every side, describing the situation
as desperate, and asking for fresh orders. There was no other
order but to stand firm to the last man.^'^
The wavering and the slight move backward of the
enemy's line, had not escaped the notice of Marshal Ney.
But his soldiers were quite as exhausted as those of
Wellington. He realised that the addition of a few fresh
troops would have sufficed to give them new spirit and new
courage, to overcome the last resistance of the English. He
sent Colonel Heymes to the Emperor asking for a few infantry.
" Troops ! " cried Napoleon, " where do you expect me to get
them ? Do you expect me to make them ? " ''^
The Emperor still had eight battalions of the Old Guard,
and six battalions of the Middle Guard left. If at that very
moment, he had sent but half of them to Marshal Ney we
may believe, on the authority of the best informed and most
impartial of the English historians, that this reinforcement
might have forced the enemy's centre.^^ But Napoleon, who
had no cavalry reserve, did not consider that with all his
" bear skins " he had too many to preserve his own position.
The situation was quite as critical for him as for Wellington.
Before a third onslaught from the whole of Billow's corps,
Lobau gave way, and the Young Guard, after a stubborn
resistance, allowed Plancenoit to be torn from its grasp.'^*
The shells of the Prussian batteries were now ploughing up
the ground around La Belle Alliance. Napoleon, already over-
powered on his flank, was menaced by an irruption of the
Prussians to the rear of his line of battle. He formed eleven
battalions of the Guard into as many squares, and posted them
opposite Plancenoit along the Brussels highroad from La Belle
Alliance as far as Eossomme. The 1st battalion of the Ist
Chasseurs was kept at Le Caillou. Generals Morand and Pelet
received orders to recapture Plancenoit with the 1st battalion
of the 2nd Grenadiers and the 1st of the 2nd Chasseurs.^'
With their drums beating, these old veterans charged forward
in close columns of platoons. They outdistanced the Young
Guard, which Duhesme was striving to rally, assaulted
Plancenoit on two different points, forced their way in, without
HAP. IV THE BATTLE OF JVATERLOO 219
'leigning to fire a shot, overthrew, trampled down, and drove
ut the mass of the Prussians. The attack was so impetuous,
that in twenty minutes the whole village was swept. With
their bayonets dyed with blood, these old soldiers followed on the
heels of the fugitives, chased them for six hundred yards, and
drove them to the opposite hill behind the batteries under
Hiller, which were for the moment abandoned. The Young
Guard aided in this movement and reoccupied Plancenoit.
Lobau, struggling with the Hacke and Losthin divisions, also
regained part of the lost ground.""
BOOK III CHAPTER Y
THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO {Continued)
From seven to nine o'clock
I. Dispositions for the final attack — Strengthening of the English line —
Approach of Zieten's corps.
II. Assault on the plateau of Mont-Saint- Jean by the "Middle " Guard.
III. " The Guard falls back ! " — General forward movement of the English Army
— Irruption of Zieten's Prussians — The panic.
IV. The squares of Christiani, of Roguet, and of Cambronne.
V. Arrival of Pirch's corps to the assistance of Billow — Slaughter in Plancenoit
— The struggle on the plateau of La Belle Alliance — The last squares
of the Old Guard.
Section I
By a single stunning blow from his Old Guard, Napoleon had
arrested the Prussians. His right flank was set free ; he had
recovered his liberty to act on the front line of battle. It
was past seven o'clock/ but there were still two full hours
of daylight, for the weather had cleared and the sun shone
over Braine-l'Alleud. Grouchy's cannonade grew louder, came
nearer and nearer, and rumbled in the direction of Limale.^
It was taken for granted, that at last the Marshal had come
up with the Prussian Array, that he was fighting with it, and,
whether victor or vanquished, would hold it in check long
enough to prevent its junction with the English. It seemed
that Bllicher was able to detach Billow's corps only, and this
could be easily reckoned with, by Lobau, Duhesme, and two
battalions of the Old Guard. The Emperor turned his field-
glass on the English position. The points from whence the
artillery fire and the discharges of musketry proceeded, served
him as land-marks. On the extreme right, the Durutte divi-
BK. m CH. V THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 221
sion, in possession of Papelotte and La Haye, was ascending
the plateau.^ On the left, the struggle continued around
Hougoumont, in flames ; the position was stormed by one of
Jerome's brigades ; the French sharpshooters, supported by
Fire's lancers, had passed beyond the Nivelles road. In the
centre, above La Haye-Sainte, from which the enemy was at
last expelled, the soldiers of Donzelot, Allix, and Marcognet
crowned the ridges and vigorously drove the English along the
Ohain road. In the valley the six regiments of Bachelu and
Foy had rallied, with the debris of the cavalry.^ The enemy's
line seemed shaken. The Emperor presimied that "Wellington
had all his troops in action. He himself still had his Old
Guard, his invincibles. The critical moment had come when
victory, still undecided, would be won by the most furious and
most daring. He ordered Drouot to bring forward, in the
formation of squares previously adopted, nine battalions of
the Guard (of the five which remained, two were to stay at
Plancenoit, and three on the plateau as a last resen^e). He
placed himself at the head of the first square and quickly
proceeded to La Haye-Sainte, to the very mouth of the
furnace.^
According to the testimony of the enemy,^ this attack
might have been decisive half an hour earlier, when Xey
asked for reinforcements. But the time was past now.
Whilst Morand had retaken Plancenoit, in the short space of
time dming which the Guard had been formed up and started,
Wellington had quickly re-ordered his positions. To reinforce
his shaken centre, which seemed on the point of giAlng way,
he had recalled from his left, Wincke's brigade and from his
right, four battalions of Brunswickers, of which he himself
took the command. With the assistance of these fresh troops,
the Kempt, Lambert, Pack, and Best brigades on the east of
the Brussels road, and the Kruse and Halkett brigades on the
west of the same road, made a vigorous counter-attack and
rove back the infantry of Donzelot, Allix, and Marcognet.
>Vhilst the latter fell back at the foot of the slopes, sharp-
hooting all the way, the Anglo-Germans reoccupied the edge
'jf the plateau, and their batteries, harassed no longer by the
close fusillade, silenced the guns posted at La Haye-Sainte.'^
222 WATERLOO book hi
At the same time the Dutch and Belgian division of Chasse
arrived from Braiue-l'Alleud with the six cavalry regiments
under Vandeleur and Vivian, which, upon hearing of the im-
minent arrival of the Prussian corps of Zieten, left their posi-
tion as flanking troops above Papelotte, and rode up at a
gallop.^
The Prussian reinforcements, which were so urgently needed,
and the first result of whose approach was to render Vivian's
and Vandeleur 's 2,600 fresh horses available, very nearly failed
Wellington. After leaving Bierges at noon ^ Zieten had been
compelled to halt for over two hours to allow Pirch's corps
to defile on to the heights at the north-west of the Dyle ;
he was further delayed in his march by the steep paths in
the woods of Eixensart, where the men often had to advance
in single file and to force a passage for the cannons ; ^° con-
sequently Zieten only reached Ohain toward six o'clock with
his advanced Guard.^^ He was joined there by Colonel Pree-
mantle, aide-de-camp to Wellington, who laid before him the
critical situation of the English Army and asked for some
reinforcements, if only as few as 3,000 men, but at once.
Zieten did not wish to run the risk of having his army corps
beaten in detail ; he replied that he would hasten to the rescue
of the English as soon as the bulk of his troops had come up
with the advanced Guard,^^ Meanwhile he sent a staff ofl&cer
toward Mont-Saint-Jean in order to ascertain exactly how
matters stood. The latter was deceived by the great number
of wounded and fugitives who were flying to the rear, and,
coming back, he reported that the English were in full retreat.
Fearing to be dragged into a rout without any advantage
to the Allied Army, he immediately headed to the left, in
order to rally Billow between Frichermont and the Paris wood.
Muffling, who was then in observation above Papelotte, saw
this movement. He spurred his horse to a gallop, and, joining
Zieten, gave him more correct information, beseeching him to
bear down to the English left. "The battle is lost," he
exclaimed vehemently, " if the first corps does not go to the
Duke's rescue." After much hesitation Zieten yielded to
Mliffling's arguments and resumed his previous direction.^^
The head of Zieten's column debouched from Smohain ixc
CHAP. V THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 223
the Guard was descending toward La Haye-Sainte. Already
some of the French troops had fallen back on perceiving the
Prussians. The Emperor rushed to them, and harangued them,
and they marched forward to the front.^^ A fresh corps of
the enemy broke into the right angle of our two lines of battle,
and this gave the finishing blow. Yet it is doubtful whether
the Emperor could then have stopped the battla^^ Owing to
the disorder which already prevailed among the troops, their
dissemination over so wide an area, and the advanced position
of Billow's corps on their llank, a retreat would have proved
terribly hazardous. Even had it been effected without great
loss and confusion, and under shelter of a dyke formed at the
summit of the Belle Alliance plateau, with all the battalions
of the Guard, what terrible developments such a retreat meant
to Napoleon ! The Army reduced by one half (for Grouch y's
corps, left isolated, and cut off from its line of retreat, seemed
doomed to total destruction), the frontier left unprotected,
France discouraged, patriotism cast down, the Chambers pass-
ing from secret hostility to open war ; on every side intrigue,
desertion, treason. Eather than live over again the agony of
1814, it was better to make a supreme and desperate effort to
conquer rebellious fortune.
Section II
The approach of the Prussian corps had no other effect
upon the Emperor than to induce him to precipitate the
attack. Only six battalions of the Guard had arrived in the
plain of La Haye-Sainte. The Emperor posted one (the 2nd
of the 3rd Grenadiers) on a small eminence half-way between
the farm and Hougoumont, and upon perceiving Ney, who
was found wherever death had to be faced, he entrusted
him with the command of the five others with which to
assault the English right centre.^^ At the same time orders
were sent to the batteries to increase their fire, and to d'Erlon,
Pieille, and the chiefs of the cavalry to second the movement
of the Guard on their respective fronts. The rumours that
the Prussians were debouching from Ohain might spread.
224 WATERLOO book hi
The Emperor determined to prevent any alarm. He ordered
La Bedoyere and his orderlies to traverse the length of the
line of battle and announce everywhere the arrival of Marshal
Grouchy.^^ Ney said that he was indignant at this stratagem.
As if Napoleon had any choice of means ! In point of fact
this false intelligence revived the confidence and rekindled the
enthusiasm of the soldiers. The troops again formed up their
ranks and shouted " Vive TEmpereur ! " Even the wounded
rose to cheer the columns as they passed by. A soldier with
three stripes, a veteran of Marengo, whose legs had been crushed
by a shell, sitting near the embankment of the road, repeated
in a loud, firm voice : " This is nothing, comrades. Forward,
and long live the Emperor ! " ■'^
Did Wellington detect the preparatory movements for this
final attack through the ever-thickening clouds of smoke ? It
mattered little, for he was advised of them by a traitor. At
the very moment when Drouot was mustering the Guard, a
captain of the carabiniers rode across the valley at full gallop,
defying the shells and the bullets which fell like hail, and
with his sword in the sheath and his right hand raised in the
air, he accosted the advanced skirmishers of the English 5 2nd.
Brought before the major of this regiment, who was then
talking to the commander of the light artillery, Colonel
Eraser, he exclaimed, " Long live the King ! Get ready.
That scoundrel Napoleon will be upon you with his Guard
in less than half an hour. " ^^ Colonel Eraser immediately
went to Wellington to convey this intelligence to him. The
Duke went along the battle line, from the Brussels road to
that of Nivelles, issuing his final orders. The Adam brigade
and the brigade of Maitland's guards, which had with-
drawn to a depression of the ground to be sheltered from the
shells, resumed their position. The William Halkett Hano-
verian brigade and the German brigade of Duplat prolonged
Adam's right towards Hougoumont. The Dutch -Belgian
division of Chass4 came up and posted themselves thus : the
Aubreme brigade in the rear of Maitland's guards, having
behind them Vandeleur's cavalry ; the Dittmer brigade be-
hind the three battalions of Brunswickers posted on the left of
Colin Halkett's English brigade. Vivian's cavalry deployed
CHAP. V THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 225
on the west of the Brussels road, to support the deci-
mated brigades of Ompteda and of Kruse, and another
battalion of Brunswickers. The three batteries, mitil now
kept in reserve, advanced to the front. The gunners were
ordered not to respond to the French artillery, and to con-
centrate all their fire on the assaulting columns. They were
to fire till they were reduced to the very last charge of shell.^
It appears that Ney gave an ill-advised order and a
wrong direction to the Guard. Instead of forming one single
column strong enough to pierce through the enemy's line, the
Marshal left the battalions divided. Instead of marching
straight up to the plateau from the lowlands of La Haye-
Sainte by the Brussels road, over which the column had barely
400 yards to traverse and where the embankments sheltered
it from the slanting fire of the artillery, he took an oblique
course by the unprotected slopes which the cuirassiers had
climbed in their first charge.^^
The five battalions of the Middle Guard, formed into as
many squares, advanced in echelons, the right leading.
Between each echelon the mounted gunners of the Guard
drew two cannons of 8 ; the total forming a complete battery
under the orders of Colonel Duchand. During this oblique
movement, almost identical with the movement known as
" Towards the left, forward to battle," all the echelons did not
maintain the proper interval. The fourth approached too
closely to the third. Soon the five echelons were condensed
into four : on the right, the 1st battalion of the 3rd Grenadiers ;
in the centre, the one battalion of the 4th Grenadiers ; farther
to the left, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 3rd Chasseurs;
on the extreme left, the 4th Chasseurs, now reduced to a single
battalion. '-
All the troops had received orders to support this attack.
Already the Donzelot, Allix, and Marcognet divisions climbed
to the plateau ; the first along and up the left side of the
Genappe road ; the two others on the right of this road. But
ReiUe's infantry and the fragments of the cavalry had scarcely
commenced to move.-^ Between La Haye-Sainte and Hougou-
mont, the five battalions of the Guard advanced alone against
the whole English Army ! They marched presenting arms ;
15
226 WATERLOO book hi
their line as perfect as if for a review at the Tuileries, superb
and impassive. All their officers leading, the first to be
exposed to the enemy's fire. Generals Friant and Porret du
Mervan commanded the battalion of the 3rd Grenadiers ;
General Harlet, the battalion of the 4th Grenadiers ; General
Michel, the 1st battalion of the 3rd Chasseurs ; Colonel Mallet,
a faithful follower from Elba, the 2nd battalion ; General
Henrion, the battalion of the 4th Chasseurs. Ney fell heavily
to the ground with his horse ; it was the fifth that had been
killed under him. He disentangled himself, rose, and walked
on, sword in hand, by the side of Friant. The English
artillery was drawn out in a semicircle from the Brussels
highroad to the slopes around Hougoumont — for the previously
convex line of the enemy's right wing had now become concave
— and it discharged a double volley of grapeshot at a distance
of 200 yards. The Guard was assailed from the front and
in a slanting direction. Each volley made a breach in its
ranks. The Grenadiers closed up their files, contracted their
squares, and continued to ascend at an even pace, shouting,
" Long live the Emperor ! " ^*
The 1st battalion of the 3rd Grenadiers (right-hand
echelon) repulsed a corps of Brunswickers, seized the
batteries under Cleeves and Lloyd which were abandoned
by their gunners, and by a slight divergence proceeded
against the left of the Halkett brigade. The English 30th
and 73 rd fell back in disorder. Friant, wounded by a
bullet, left the battlefield believing that the victory was
won. But the Belgian General Chasse, one of the heroes
of Arcis-sur-Aube (he actually served at that time under
the French flag!), brought up to the right of the 30th and
the 73rd, the battery of Van der Smissen, the fire of which
mowed down the assailants. Then he deliberately brought to
the left of the two English regiments, the Ditmer brigade,
3,000 strong, hurled it with fixed bayonets against the
enfeebled square, crushed it under this mass of troops, and
cast the miserable remnant to the bottom of the slopes.^*
The battalion of the 4th Grenadiers (second echelon) was
meanwhile engaged with the right of the Halkett brigade.
Under the grapeshot of Duchand's two pieces and the
CHAP. V THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 227
fusillade of the Grenadiers, the fragments of the 33 rd and of
the 69th began to give way. General Halkett seized the flag
of the 33rd, stood still and waved it above his head and by
his example steadied his men. " Look at the General," they
cried, " he is between two fires. He can't escape ! " and
indeed he fell grievously wounded. But the English had
rallied and made a firm stand. An old soldier exclaimed,
biting his cartridge, " We shall see who kills the longest." ^^
The 1st and 2nd battalions of the 3rd Chasseurs (3rd
echelon) had almost reached the crest without meeting any
infantry. They were still marching in the direction of the
Ohain road, which was only the distance of a pistol-shot
from them, when suddenly, twenty steps ahead, a red wall
loomed before them. They beheld Maitland's 2,000 Guards
drawn up four deep. The latter had been waiting all this
time, lying hidden in the wheat. On the command of
Wellington himself, " Up Guards, ready ! " they sprang up as
if moved by a spring, took aim, and fired. This very first fire
swept down 300 men, almost one-half of the two battalions
already decimated by the artillery. General Michel fell
mortally wounded. The French halted, their ranks broken,
their march obstructed by dead bodies. Instead of hurling
them fonvard immediately with fixed bayonets, regardless of the
disorder which prevailed, the ofl&cers strove to form them into
line, to meet fire with fire. The confusion increased. The
deployment was carried out badly and with much loss of time.
For ten minutes the chasseurs remained on the same spot under
the withering fire of Maitland's Guards, and under the fire
also of the Bolton and Eamsay batteries, which took them
slantingly. At last Wellington saw that the Guard was
giving way ; he ordered the charge. " Forward, my boys,"
cried Colonel Saltoun, " now is your time ! " The impetuous
English made a headlong rush upon this handful of soldiers,
broke through them, and went down with them in a furious
hand-to-hand struggle as far as the orchard of Hougoumont.
" The combatants were so mingled together," says an of&cer
of Bolton's battery, " that we had to stop firing." -"
At the hurried commands of their leaders, the English
halted abruptly. The battalion of the 4th Chasseurs (left
228 WATERLOO book hi
echelon) drew near with the design of extricating the debris
of the 3rd Chasseurs, as well as those of the 4th Grenadiers,
who had also begun to retreat. Without awaiting the
shock, Maitland's soldiers yielded the ground in disorder, and
climbed back to their positions almost as fast as they had
come down. Chasseurs and Grenadiers closely followed
them, tramping up the hill under volleys of grapeshot.
Just as they crossed the Chain road, the Adam brigade
(52nd, 71st, and 95th regiments), which had rapidly marched
down upon their right flank, received them in flank with
four lines of fire. Maitland's Guards wheeled half round,
formed up again as best they could, and joined in the firing
with Colin Halkett's brigade ; whilst William Halkett's
Hanoverians emerged from the hedges of Hougoumont, and
fired on the French from the rear. On all sides rained a
storm of bullets. Mallet was seriously wounded. A battalion
deployed opposite Maitland; all that remained of the two
others marched by the left against the Adam brigade.
Colonel Colborn, whom the soldiers in Spain called the
" fire eater," hurried along the 5 2nd. The whole brigade
followed him with fixed bayonets. Already terribly shaken by
the formidable fusillade they had experienced. Chasseurs and
Grenadiers yielded to numbers, and withdrew in confusion.^^
Section III
The cry " The Guard gives way ! " rang out as the death-
knell of the Grand Army. Every man felt that all was over.
Keille's infantry, the cuirassiers, the squadrons of the Guard,
which at last marched off to support Ney's attack, stopped,
paralysed. The soldiers of Donzelot and Allix, struggling
on the ridges above La Haye-Sainte with the brigades of
Kruse, Lambert, Kempt, and Pack, saw the Guard fall back.
They, too, yielded the conquered ground and came down to the
foot of the hill, dragging along with them in their retreat,
the Marcognet division which had attacked the extended
positions of the enemy on the right. The vetrograde move-
ment spread from right to left over the entire line of battle.^*
/
/
I
CHAP. V THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 229
At the same time Durutte's infantry was attacked at Papelotte
and at La Haye, by the vanguards of the Prussian columns
which debouched from the Ohain road. The cry went up,
" Sauve qui jpeut ! We are betrayed ! " This panic is easy
to understand when we consider the state of mind of the
soldiers, uneasy and haunted for the last three months with
fears of treachery. Everything appeared to justify their
suspicions. Under their very eyes a general, a colonel, officers
of every grade had passed over to the enemy. Amongst their
cartridges they discovered some filled with bran instead of
powder. They were amazed by these badly -planned, fruit-
less manoeu^Tes ; they were disheartened by so many useless
assaults. Finally, they were expecting Grouchy 's corps,
whose approach had been positively announced, and there
was Zieten instead, marching to crush them. The rout
began and increased. The Prussians rushed to the assault,
drove from the farm buildings the few handfuls of heroes
who still held on in spite of the panic, and hurled them
down into the ravines. The remains of d'Erlon's four
divisions ebbed back upon one another, mutually hustling,
jostling, and trampling down each other. To the east of the
main road, in the hollow of the valley where volleys of
English grapeshot and Prussian shells crossed each other, the
most lamentable confusion prevailed.^''
"Wellington was determined to finish this deadly wounded
army. He spurred his horse to the edge of the plateau
in front of the battle, took off his hat and waved it in the air.
The signal was at once understood. Instantaneously all the
troops marched off, preserving the order they happened to be
in at the moment. Without even waiting to muster, the
battalions, the batteries, the squadrons of the various divisions
rushed on side by side,^^ passing over the dead and trampling
the wounded imder the hoofs of their horses and their cannon
wheels. The brigades under Pack, Ompteda and Kielmansegge
alone remained in their original positions, with two or three
batteries which it was absolutely impossible to move on account
of the tremendous number of corpses and dead horses heaped
up in front of them. From right to left, English, Hanoverians,
Brunswickers, Belgians, cavalry, infantry, artillery — altogether
230 WATERLOO book hi
40,000 men came pouring down in a torrent, amid the
shadows of the twilight,^^ to the sound of drums, bugles and
pibrochs. At this sight, terrifying to the bravest, the last
echelons of the infantry wheeled half round, and with
the whole of the cavalry rushed helter-skelter to climb the
hill-slopes on the west of La Belle Alliance; the leading
battalions, which ran the risk of being crushed the first by the
descending human avalanche, disbanded altogether and fled for
their lives. La Haye-Sainte was abandoned, abandoned, too, was
the orchard of Hougoumont and the wood. Vivian's hussars
and Vandeleur's dragoons, whose forward rush made a wide gap
in the masses of the English, cut down the fugitives, shouting
the fierce cry, " No quarter ! no quarter ! " ^^
Section IV
Whilst the Middle Guard were attacking the English
positions, the 2nd battalions of the 1st Chasseurs, of the 2nd
Grenadiers, and of the 2nd Chasseurs, with Generals Cambronne,
Eoguet, and Christiani, had returned to the spot where the
Emperor stood at the foot of La Haye-Sainte. JSTapoleon was
occupied in forming into a column of attack, one battalion
deployed, and two on the flank in close columns, with the
intention of leading them himself up to the plateau, where,
as the wounded Friant reported to him, " Everything was going
on well," when suddenly he beheld his whole line of battle
falling to pieces ! He, too, then realised that he was irretrievably
beaten. Nevertheless he clung to the hope of organising and
directing the retreat. Without losing any of his sang froid,
he broke up the column of the Old Guard, and of its three
battalions formed an equal number of squares ; these he posted
about a hundred yards above La Haye-Sainte — the right-hand
square on the road to Brussels. He hoped and expected that
under shelter of this dike, the army might rally and march
away.^^
Vivian's hussars, powerless to bite into tliese squares, turned
them and continued to pour their red furrows through the
disorderly mob of fugitives. Intoxicated with blood, they
CHAP. V THE BATTLE OF JFATERLOO 231
revelled in the slaughter. A subaltern of the 18th said to
Vivian, " We will follow you down to hell, if you will lead us
there ! " In the train of the hussars galloped other horsemen
of the enemy. The Emperor hurled his four service squadrons
against this fresh tide of cavalry, which completely submerged
them.^^
Not far from the road. Marshal Ney stood bare-headed,
unrecognisable, his face blackened with powder, his uniform in
tatters, one of his epaulettes cut off, the hilt of his sword
in his hand, shouting furiously to Count d'Erlon, who was
being swept past, by an eddy of the drifting rout, " d'Erlon,
if you and I escape, we shall both be hanged ! " The Marshal's
appearance was " less that of a human being than of a furious
wild beast." His efforts throughout the day had exceeded
human strength and energy. Never in any battle did any
officer or soldier so generously sacrifice himself. Ney had sur-
passed Ney ! Twice he had led d'Erlon's infantry to the attack,
four times he had charged over the plateau with the cuirassiers,
and he had conducted the last desperate assault of the grenadiers
of the Guard. And now he rushed to the Brue brigade
(Dui^utte's division), the only troops of the line which were
falling back in good order, though they were reduced now to
two battalions. He stopped the soldiers and once more flung
them upon the enemy, crying to them, " Come and see a
Marshal of France die ! " When this brigade, too, was quickly
broken and dispersed, Xey still clung to the fatal battlefield.
Since he could not meet death there, he was determined to be
the last man to leave it. He entered a square of the Guard
with Major Eulliere, who had taken the Eagle of the 95 th
from the dying hands of Lieutenant Puthod. Durutte, with
his right wrist severed, his forehead cut open, and blood
streaming from his wounds, was carried by his horse into the
heart of a cavalry charge of the enemy. He galloped in the
midst of the English as far as La Belle Alliance.^
The three battalions of the Guard repulsed the cavalry
with ease. But their formation in squares, which they were
compelled to retain in order to resist fresh charges, placed them
in a position of tactical inferiority to the English infantry
arranged in lines of four deep. The latter's fur more extended
232 JFATEELOO book hi
and denser fire raked the squares in front and on the side.
The musketry fire was mingled with grapeshot from the
batteries under Rogers, Whyniates, and Gardiner, posted at
only sixty yards distance. The masses of the enemy swarmed
around the grenadiers ; the brigades of Adam and "William
Halkett were more specially furious in their attacks upon them,
so also were the brigades under Kempt, Lambert, Kruse, Wincke,
Colin Halkett. The Emperor gave the order to abandon this
untenable position. He reflected, probably when too late, that
the wisest course to stop a rout, is not to remain in front of
the yielding troops, but to go to their rear in order to rally
them in a fresh position ; and he accordingly galloped up to
the heights of La Belle Alliance, with an escort of a few
chasseurs.^^
The three battalions — as well as the battalion of the
3rd Grenadiers posted on their left, assailed in turn by the
English dragoons, the black lancers of Brunswick, the
infantry under Maitland and Mitchel — fell back step by step.
Reduced to too small a number of men to remain in squares
three rows deep, they formed themselves into two ranks in
triangles, and with bayonets crossed, slowly cut their way
through the throng of fugitives and of the English. At each
step, the men stumbled over dead bodies or fell down pierced
by bullets. Every fifty yards they halted to re-form their
ranks and repulse a fresh charge of cavalry or a new attack
from the infantry.^^ During its heroic retreat the Guard,
as it marched, was literally surrounded with enemies, like a
wild boar at the " hallali " amidst the boar hounds. The foes
were so close to each other that, despite the varied sounds of
the combat, they could hear each other's voices. In the midst
of the firing some English officers shouted to the veterans to
surrender.^^ Cambronne, who was on horseback in the square
of the 2nd battalion of the 1st Chasseurs, heard this. "With
despair in his breast, suffocated with rage, exasperated by
the incessant summons of the enemy, he retorted furiously,
" M . . . ! " ^° A few seconds after, just as he had gained the
summit of La Belle Alliance with his battalions, a ball struck
him full in the face, and he fell to the ground bleeding and
apparently lifeless ! ^^
CHAP. V THE BATTLE OF JFATERLOO 233
Section V
During the last assault on Mont-Saint-Jean half the corps
of Pirch(Tippelskirch and Kraft divisions and Jlirgass's cavalry)
had joined Biilow, whose forces were thrown into confusion.*-
Bliicher immediately gave orders to renew the general attack
upon the whole right flank of the French, At Plancenoit
itself, the Young Guard of Duhesme and two battalions of the
Old Guard of Morand and Pelet remained unshaken. But at
the extension of this village, Lobau's infantry and Domon's
cavalry, with the cavalry of Subervie, were giving way before
15,000 troops imder Hacke, Losthin, and Prince William;
they were overthrown completely when the Steinmetz division
and the Eoder cavalry, debouching from the Smohain road in
pursuit of Durutte, attacked them in flank- The French
masses, scattered a quarter of an hour before, over the road to
NiveUes as far as the ravines of Papelotte and Plancenoit,
swarmed back in the same time on to the plateau around
La Belle Alliance. On their heels, sabring, shooting, shouting
hurrahs, rushed the English from one side and the Prussians
from the other. The two jaws of the vice closed on this
terrified and defenceless rabble, which had once been the
Imperial army ! *^
In this frightful disorderly mob, every one pushed and
jostled his neighbour to flee the faster. Dismounted cuirassiers
threw away their cuirasses, drivers cut their horses' traces,
men were trampled to death under foot. They stumbled over
dead horses, overturned ammunition chests, abandoned cannons.
The shades of night, which began to darken (it was nearly nine),
added to the horror and confusion of the scene. The 12th
and 16 th English dragoons were charged by the 1st Hussars
of the German Legion. The Adam brigade sustained the fire
of a Prussian battery. The 7 1st Highlanders turned the
French cannon upon the flying columns. The four battalions
of the Guard, which had just regained the plateau, were the
only infantiy troops still in order. English and Prussians
encircled each square with a ring of grapeshot, swords, and
bayonets. Simultaneously charged by the infantry and the
I
234 JFATERLOO book iii
cavalry, they were shattered, demolished, and utterly crushed.
Their wrecked fragments were merged in the general rout.^
Five hundred yards farther to the rear, close to Decoster's
house, waited, in squares and commanded by General Petit,
the two battalions of the 1st Grenadiers. These men were the
dite of the dite. Almost all of them had at least two stripes,
and four in every ten of them, belonged to the Legion of
Honour. On horseback, within the square of the first battalion,
was the Emperor himself With these living redoubts he
still hoped to cover the retreat. He gave orders to place the
12-pounder battery, the same which had been playing for a
long time upon the Prussians above Plancenoit, upon the
prolongation of the squares ; then he caused the Guard's call
to arms to be sounded to rally all the detachments of the
Guard. On either side of the squares an endless stream of
fugitives kept pouring down the road, with the enemy follow-
ing close behind. The battery of the Guard had but one
shot left for each gun. Its last discharge thundered forth,
and at close range, confounded a column of cavalry. The
gunners, with their ammunition spent, stood stoically beside
their guns, hoping thus to deceive their assailants. Other
squadrons approached at a gallop. " Do not fire," cried a
French grenadier, " they are French hussars." They were
English hussars, who fell upon the batteries and cut down the
disarmed artillerymen. But on the squares themselves, these
obstinate charges dashed and broke like whirlwinds of sand
on a block of granite. Before each battalion of the grenadiers
rose a bloody heap of corpses and dead horses.*^
In Plancenoit, which the Prussian batteries had set on fire,
the fight was waged by the lurid glare of the flames. The
Young Guard, almost entirely recruited from among the
Paris and Lyons volunteers and the 1st battalion of the
2nd Chasseurs and the 2nd Grenadiers, fought in the pro-
portion of one against five. The combined attacks of the
divisions led by Hiller, Eyssel, and Tippelskirch had failed.
Gneisenau animated the spirit of his soldiers ; once more they
rushed to the assavdt and penetrated into the village. Victors
and vanquished fired point-blank on each other, struggled
hand-to-liand, slew with the bayonet and with the butt-euds
CHAP. V THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 235
of their guns. The gigantic drum - major, Stubert, of the
2nd Grenadiers, felled the I'russians with the heavy knob of
his stick. A whole battalion of the Young Guard was cut to
pieces in the cemetery, which served them as a redoubt. One
by one, the houses fell into the hands of the Prussians. A
fearful slaughter ensued in the rooms, in the garrets ; and
during these merciless struggles the thatched roofs caught fire
and fell upon the combatants. " We must destroy the French,"
said Major von Damitz, " to take possession of Plancenoit." On
their egress from the village, these heroic battalions were
charged and vigorously pursued as far as the plateau. There
the English cavalry put an end to them. General Pelet found
himself alone for an instant in the midst of the enemy with
a few men and the Eagle -bearer of the chasseurs of the
Old Guard. " Follow me, chasseurs ! " he shouted in vibrating
tones, " let us save the Eagle or die by its side ! " All who
heard this desperate appeal retraced their footsteps, rushed to
him, cut their way through the horses ; they rallied round
the flag and surrounded it with an impenetrable rampart of
bayonets.^® From Plancenoit both French and Prussians
debouched pell-mell on the Brussels highroad, near the squares
of the 1st Grenadiers. The fugitives pressed up to these to
obtain refuge in their ranks, but they were remorselessly
repidsed by sword and fire. This cruelty was necessary for
the preservation of the squares. General Pioguet narrowly
escaped being shot poiut-blank by a grenadier. " We shall
fire," said General Petit, " on every man that comes up, friend
or foe, for fear of letting the latter enter with the former. It
is an evil to ensure a benefit." The squares were attacked
; from the right and from the left ; the English and Prassian
masses grew more and more numerous, more and more compact.
; The Grenadiers repidsed all these assaults. Two battalions
; against two armies !
I At last the Emperor ordered them to abandon the position.
' Slowly the Grenadiers began their retreat, the 1st battalion
to the left of the road, the 2nd battalion on to the road itself.
' **"• every moment they halted to rcctify the line of the
iares and to arrest, in some degree, the pursuit of the enemy
effective enfilading fires.*'
236 WATERLOO bk. hi ch. v
The Emperor proceeded at some distance in advance of
the squares with Soult, Drouot, Bertrand, Lobau, and five or
six mounted chasseurs of the Guard. At the farm of Le
Caillou he joined the 1st battalion of unmounted chasseurs of
the Old Guard. This battalion, entrusted with the care of
the treasury and of the Emperor's equipages, was commanded
by Duuring, a Dutchman by birth. About seven in the
evening, two Prussian columns had advanced through the
wood of Chantelet with the obvious intention of cutting off
the retreat of the French army. Duuring at once sent the
carriages on the road to Genappe, in concert with Greneral
Eadet, the Grand-Provost, who had just rallied two or three
hundred dismounted horsemen and infantry fugitives. He
wheeled his battalion round later to face the enemy. The
Prussians, greeted by a lively fusillade quickly followed by a
bayonet charge, were driven back into the middle of the wood,
whence they retreated toward Maransart.^^ The Emperor
now halted for a few moments and questioned Duuring under
the final shells from the Prussian batteries at Plancenoit.
He congratulated him on the firmness and the initiative spirit
he had displayed, and then ordered him to follow him. " I
rely upon you," he said. The battalion having closed up
their ranks, the Emperor let the reins drop on his horse's
neck and rode slowly on, keeping pace with the flank of the
column.^^
BOOK III CHAPTEK VI
THE ROUT
I. Meeting between Wellington and Bliicher in front of La Belle Alliance
Inn (a quarter past nine) — The rout of the French.
II. Attempt to resist at Genappe (eleven o'clock).
III. Pursuit of the Prussian cavalry (night of the 18th to the 19th of June).
IV. Halt of the Emperor at Quatre-Bras — Passage of the army to Charleroi
(morning of the 19th of June).
V. Betreat upon Laon — Departure of the Emperor for Paris (20th June).
Section I
About a quarter past nine o'clock/ while the Hiller, Eyssel,
and Tippelskirch brigades were wrenching Plaucenoit from the
grasp of the Young Guard, and while the squares of the 1st
Grenadiers still held their ground near the Maison Decoster,
Bliicher and Wellington met in front of La Belle Alliance.
Bltlcher followed the portion of Billow's troops which had
repulsed Lobau. Wellington arrived from La Haye-Sainte
with the last echelons of his army. The two generals
advanced toward each other, and, according to Gneisenau's
expression, " each greeted the other as victor." As they
passed by, the bands of the Prussian cavalry struck up " God
save the King ; " in the distance, the noise of the fusillade
grew fainter. Billow's foot soldiers, who had stopped to re-
form their ranks, joined their voices in singing Luther's hymn :
" Lord God, we praise Thee ! Lord God, we thank Thee ! " or
(" Now thank we all our God.")""
Bliicher, impressed by the fact that his meeting with
Wellington should have taken place in front of La Belle
Alliance, suggested giving this name to the battle in which
the alliance between English and Prussians had produced
238 WATERLOO book hi
such momentous results. But Wellington wished the victory
— his victory — should bear the name of the village which
had had the honour of being his headquarters on the previous
night.^
It was decided that, in spite of the darkness, the remains
of the Imperial Army should be pursued without mercy.
The English were exhausted by ten hours' fighting, " wearied
to death," said Wellington.'* The Prussians had marched an
average of five leagues over the most wretched roads, and
between Frischermont and Plancenoit had fought with no less
furious obstinacy than was displayed at Mont-Saint-Jean by
Wellington's own soldiers. Nevertheless, Bliicher volunteered
that his troops should be entrusted with the pursuit. The
offer being accepted without scruple, he summoned the com-
manders of each corps and ordered them to " pursue the enemy
as long as they had a man and a horse able to stand."
Gneisenau placed himself at the head of Count Eoder's
squadrons. All the remaining troops followed. Toward
Eossomme they encountered other Prussian troops which were
debouching from Plancenoit, and the more advanced columns
of the English infantry and cavalry.^
Wellington's army halted. As the Prussians went by,
the English soldiers saluted them with a threefold cheer of
" Hip ! Hip ! Hurrah 1 " Then they proceeded to settle down
in their bivouacs, despite the heaps of dead around them.*
From the plateau of Mont-Saint-Jean to the heights of
Eossomme, from Hougoumont to Plancenoit, and even as far
as Smohain, the ground was covered with dead bodies and
slain horses. More than 25,000 French, and 20,000 English,
Belgians, and Prussians "^ lay upon the ground, in some places
scattered about like fallen trees, in others, lying in long files
like rows of wheat cut down by the reapers' sickles. The
moon had risen and lit up distinctly their ghastly, blood-
stained faces and their mud-stained uniforms smeared with
red stains ; the weapons that had dropped from their hands,
gleaming in the moonlight. Now and again thick, dark
clouds, spreading over the sky, veiled this vision, from which
the least sensitive among the old warriors turned away their
eyes. But soon the vision reappeared in the cold light of the
CHAP. VI THE ROUT 239
moon. Amidst the agonised moans of the dying and the
groans of the wounded, at short intervals, a hoarse cry went
up, stifled as it were with horror and dread. It was some
officer whom a vile robber of the dead was finishing with the
butt-end of a gun in order to rob him of his purse or his
cross of honour.^
The Prussians carried out their pursuit with the utmost
vigour. Those among the fugitives of the right Aving (Lobau
and d'Erlon's corps. Young Guard, horsemen of Domon,
Jacquinot, and Subervie), who, being too closely followed or
cut off from their line of retreat, had been prevented from
getting beyond the squares of the rearguard of the 1st
Grenadiers, were cut down or taken prisoners. On the left
wincr, a certain number of cuirassiers whose horses were still
in a condition to carry them, and Pirn's lancers who had done
nothing more than skirmish during the battle, reached Quatre-
Bras unmolested vid Neuve-Court, Malplaquet, and Vieux-
Grenappe. They crossed the Sambre at Marchienne. Five or
six thousand foot soldiers of Keille's corps rallied at night-
fall, proceeded to Genappe across country, in a parallel line
about half a league distant from the highroad. A few
Prussian squadrons sufficed to disperse them. With the
exception of three companies of the 93rd, which wheeled
around and faced the enemy, the whole of this mass were
dispersed. In order to run faster, soldiers would throw away
their knapsacks and their muskets, thus justifying the old
saying, " French more than men in attacking, less than women
in retreating." The chiefs were no longer listened to ; panic
prevailed throughout the army.^
The Old Guard alone remained worthy of itself. The
chasseurs and the lancers of Lefebvre-Desnoettes, the regiment
of mounted Grenadiers, which had left the battlefield at a
foot's pace, presenting so proud a front that the English
cavalry had not dared to approach them, \vithdrew in good
order to the west of the highroad, and reached Quatre-Bras
without suffering fresh losses.^" On the highroad itself, the
Prussians were held in check by the two squares of the 1st
Grenadiers, preceded by the 1st battalion of the 1st Chasseurs.
The Grenadiers continued to march at their usual pace, defying
240 IFATERLOO book hi
all attacks. Unable to tackle them, the Prussian pack of
hounds grew weary at last, and was content to follow them at
a safe distance out of the reach of their guns. Finally, half a
league from Genappe, General Petit deemed it unnecessary to
preserve the order of battle longer, and, breaking up the squares,
he made his men march in columns of sections. It was at
this very moment that the Emperor separated himself from
the 1st battalion of Chasseurs, and proceeded to Genappe,
where he hoped to arrest the enemy's progress and rally the
fragments of the army.^^
Section II
Genappe was practically nothing but a long, steep, and
winding street, which led to a bridge over the Dyle. It would
have been possible to hold this defile for several hours, though
it was commanded from the North by eminences where the
Prussian batteries would have been planted. Unfortunately,
such fearful crowding and such confusion reigned in the
village, that a systematic plan of defence was not to be
thought of, especially with soldiers who never ceased shouting,
"We are betrayed, let us fly ! " Overturned vehicles, forage and
baggage waggons, guns, ammunition carts, abandoned by the
auxiliary drivers, encumbered a very considerable extent of the
approaches to the bridge, which, in 1815, was only 2|- yards
wide at its broadest part.-^^ The fugitives poured by masses into
the street, the farther end of which did not allow of the egress
of more than three or four at a time ; a horrible crush resulted.
Maddened by fear, men attempted to cut their way through,
by striking straight in front of them. The General of the
Gendarmerie, Eadet, also Grand-Provost of the army, was beaten
with the butt-ends of muskets. Horsemen slashed with their
swords, the infantry retaliated with their bayonets, and, at
times, even fired. They killed one another without making any
progress in front ; the living becoming hampered by the dead.^^
The rear of the column stood in dense crowds at the entrance
of Genappe. The Prussians approached nearer and nearer.
The three battalions of the Old Guard, threatened with being
crushed completely between the masses of the enemy and the
CHAP. VI THE BOUT 241
throng of the fugitives, which could no longer advance a step,
diWded, and reached Charleroi by turning the village on
the east. The Prussians did not pursue them, but furiously
attacked the human herds before Genappe, which were power-
less to move. Not until they found themselves literally
under the lances of the Uhlans, did these unfortunate wretches
think of escaping by the right and the left of the village, and
of fording the Dyle. The little river, which at this point is
hardly three yards broad and one yard deep, is impossible for
vehicles only, owing to the steepness of its banks."
Genappe was still crowded with French soldiers. A
handful of men, who alone in the panic had preserved their
resolution and courage, made an attempt to arrest the progress
of the enemy. They rapidly erected a barricade of overturned
carts, from behind which they opened fire. A few shells soon,
however, shattered this feeble defence and its defenders. Eoder's
cavalry came riding down the sloping street, trampling under
their horses' hoofs the inert multitude of fugitives, cutting and
striking with sword and lance with no more risk to themselves
than to butchers in a slaughter-house. The Emperor, who, it
seems, had been over an hour forcing his way through this long
street, was still on the near side of the bridge, and had just
seated himself in his campaign carriage, recovered by chance
among the abandoned vehicles. The horses were not yet in
harness, when Xapoleon, hearing the Prussian hurrahs, hastily
alighted, sprang upon his horse, and succeeded in escaping with
a few horsemen. The Prussians plundered his carriage, which
contained a dressing-case, a sword, an iron bedstead, and an
extra uniform, in the lining of which were sewn unmounted
diamonds to the value of a million francs.^^
Bliicher had pushed on as far as Genappe with Billow's
corps. He halted for the night at the " Eoi d'Espagne " inn.
Almost immediately after, General Duhesme was brought
I here on an ambulance litter. In the last hour of the battle
Duhesme had fallen, grievously wounded, between Plancenoit
and Eossomme ; a few devoted soldiers had raised him and
carried him as far as Genappe, where he was taken prisoner by
the Prussians. The Field-Marshal came to visit him, and recom-
mended him to the care of the surgeon of his own staff. But
16
242 WATERLOO book hi
the wound was a mortal one, and he died the following night.^°
Bliicher, although broken with fatigue, would not retire
to rest till he had written to his wife : " I have been true
to my word," he wrote. "On the 16th I was compelled to
withdraw before superior forces; but on the 18th, acting in
concert with my friend Wellington, I have annihilated the
army of Napoleon." ^^ He also sent the following letter to
his friend Knesebeck : " My friend, the finest of battles has
been fought, the most brilliant of victories won. Details
will follow. I think that Bonaparte's history is ended. I
cannot write any more, for I am trembling in every limb.
The strain was too great." ^^
Section III
Beyond Genappe, the pursuit grew fiercer. As there were
no longer any troops in order forming the rearguard, the
Prussians sabred this bewildered crowd with impunity. " It
was a regular hunt," said Gneisenau, " a hunt by moonlight."
The main road, the lanes, the cross-roads, the fields, as far as
the eye could reach, were strewn with soldiers belonging to
every arm of the service, dismounted cuirassiers, lancers riding
maimed horses, infantry who had thrown away their knapsacks,
wounded soldiers bleeding to death, amputated soldiers who
had escaped from the ambulances ten minutes after their
operations. Without any authority over their men, and no
less demoralised, captains, colonels, and generals, thinking only
of their own safety, were mixed up and carried along in the
throng of fugitives.^^ Durutte on horseback, but blinded by
the blood which flowed from his gashed forehead, was being
guided by a sergeant of the cuirassiers. A corporal of the
Old Guard supported Ney by the arm, until Major Schmidt of
the red lancers alighted from his own horse and handed it
over to the Marshal. The head-surgeon, Larrey, already
wounded with two sword-cuts, was again struck by the Uhlans,
who plundered him, stripped him, and led him, almost naked,
with his hands tied, to a General ; the latter ordered him to
be shot. As they were taking aim at him, a Prussian surgeon
recognised him, threw himself before him, and saved his life.^°
CHAP. VI THE ROUT 243
Every man walked, ran, dragged himself along as best he
could, and went wherever he wished ; no one attempted to
give orders, which none would have obeyed. And whenever
the sound of the Prussian trumpets, the gallop of horses, the
savage cries of the pursuers drew nearer, the terrified crowd
would yell : " Here they are, here they are ! Eun for your
life ! " Under the goading spur of terror, infantry and
cavalry, officers and soldiers, sound men and wounded, found
new strength to run. Bands of fugitives, who had dropped
down with fatigue and had stopped in the thickets, in hollows
of the ground, in farm-houses, in the hamlets, were soon
hunted out by the cavalry. The Prussians broke up nine
bivouacs in succession. The wounded committed suicide,
rather than fall alive into the enemy's hands. An officer of
cuirassiers, seeing himself encircled by Uhlans, cried, " They
shall have neither me nor my horse," and very coolly he
fired a bullet into his horse's ear, then blew his own brains
out with his second pistol."^
Xearly all Billow's infantry having halted at Grenappe,
and the corps of Zieten and Pirch having not yet passed Le
Caillou," the troops under Gneisenau consisted merely of
Greneral Roder's Uhlans, a battalion of the 1st Pomeranians, and
a battalion of the 15 th regiment.^^ This fact seems absolutely
incredible: it was before a force of 4,000 Prussians that
30,000 or 40,000 French were flying! Had only a few
hundred French soldiers, overcoming their terror and re-
covering their presence of mind, re-formed and made a stand,
their resistance might have put an end to this lamentable
pursuit. The Prussian horsemen, who sabred with special
fury the more terrified among the fugitives, were apparently
very easy to overawe, since a handful of resolute French-
men sufficed to save the eagles of each regiment, as they
marched grouped around them. The enemy gathered from
the roads and on the battlefield more than 200 cannon that
had been abandoned"* and about 1,000 vehicles, but during
the rout they could not capture a single flag.^^
However hardened, however insensible a soldier may be
from habit or his calling in life to scenes of death, the fugitives
were struck with horror as they passed Quatre-Bras. The
244 WATERLOO book hi
men who had fallen there in the battle of the 16 th of June,
had not yet been buried. Three or four thousand corpses,
quite naked, for the Belgian peasants had stripped them even
of their shirts, covered the whole of the area between the road
and the wood of Bossu. The aspect was that of an immense
morgue. The dead, alternately lighted up by the moonlight,
then covered by shadows from the passing clouds, seemed in
this rapid play of light and shade to be moving their stiffened
limbs and contracting the features of their ashy pale faces.
" We fancied," said a grenadier of the Guard, " that we beheld
spectres beseeching us for burial." Lower down, at the brook
of Gemioncourt, which the storm of the two previous days had
turned into a torrent, and down which dead bodies were
drifting, the soldiers quenched their thirst.^''
With their numbers dwindling and their fatigue increasing,
the Prussians continued the pursuit with undiminished ardour.
Gneisenau had dropped half his men along the way. There
were only with him a few squadrons and a detachment of the
15 th Infantry, whose solitary drumnier, perched on the back of
a horse taken from one of the Imperial carriages, sturdily beat
the charge.^^ By this time they had passed beyond Frasnes.
Gneisenau judged that the fatigue of the men and of the
horses, did not sanction his carrying on the pursuit any
farther.
Accordingly he gave orders to halt in front of an inn, the
sign -board of which bore the inscription " A I'Empereur."
Such was the irony of fate ! ^^
Section IV
From Genappe, Napoleon had reached Quatre-Bras ou
horseback with Soult, Bertrand, Drouot, a few officers, and
about ten red lancers of the chasseurs of the Guard. When
he arrived there toward one o'clock in the morning,^^ he hoped
to find the Gerard division, which had been left at Fleurus on
the 17th of June to protect the passage of the convoys, and
to which on the evening of the 18 th had been sent the order
to proceed to Quatre-Bras and to take up its position there.'"
CHAP. VI THE ROUT 245
These instructions had not been carried out. No doubt
Colonel Matis, who in the interim commanded the remains of
this division, duly received Soult's order ; but whether he
considered it was too late for these instructions to be of any
practical use, or whether he acted from any other motive, he
broke up his camp during the night and proceeded to cross
the Sambre at CharleroL^^
Meanwhile the Emperor was waiting for these troops at
Quatre-Bras. He alighted from his horse in a glade of the
Bossu wood, near a camp fire which a few grenadiers of the
Guard had kindled. A wounded officer who was rushing
along the road, recognised the Emperor by the light of the
fire. He stood quite erect, his arms crossed on his chest, his
figure motionless as a statue, his eyes fixed, and turned toward
Waterloo.^-
As there was no news from Grouchy, it was thought he
must be in a very perilous situation. The Emperor directed
Soult to send him a message to inform him of the retreat of
the Army, and to order him to fall back on the lower Sambre.^
Soldiers of all arms of the service were running by on the
road and across the fields. Major Baudus, who was riding
among the fugitives, caught sight of the small group of the
Imperial staff. He drew near. The Emperor inquired
whether he had not come across some corps which was not
completely disorganised. At a short distance from Quatre-
Bras, Baudus had passed the 5 th Lancers of Colonel Jacqueminot,
which were still marching in good order. He informed the
Emperor of this. " Go quickly and tell them to halt at
Quatre-Bras. It is already late, and upon finding this point
occupied, the enemy will most likely halt." Baudus set off at
a gallop, but he was saluted by shots from the houses at the
crossway, and at once turned back and entreated the Emperor
to withdraw, since he was no longer protected by any troops.
As he spoke he watched the Emperor's face. Napoleon was
silently weeping over his lost army. His face was filled ^vith
an intense sadness and was as pale as wax ; life had nothing
more to give him, save tears.^^ Through his deep despair, the
Emperor still preserved his presence of mind. As the Girard
division failed to make its appearance, he concluded that it
246 WATERLOO book hi
had not received orders to that effect from the chief of the
staff. In its ignorance of the ' defeat, this division ran the
risk of being taken by surprise in camp and surrounded by
the enemy. Accordingly he ordered Baudus to hasten with
utmost speed to Fleurus, to call these troops to arms and to
lead them back to the right bank of the Sambre. Then,
yielding to necessity, he sprang on his horse and took the road
to Charleroi by Gosselies and Lodelinsart.^^ At Charleroi, which
the Emperor reached toward five in the morning,^*^ he found
the same disorderly mob, the same confusion as in the night at
Genappe. Since the 15 th of June, the ammunition waggons, the
pontooning waggons, and the provision carts blocked up the
squares and avenues. On the 17th, the wounded from Ligny
and the prisoners, the twenty-seven guns and the equipages
captured from the Prussians, had all been sent to Charleroi.
It is true that on the evening of the 18th, when all our troops
were giving way, a commissary of war had been sent there
from Eossomme with instructions to move immediately all the
vehicles to the other side of the Sambre. But on his arrival
at Charleroi between one and two after midnight, he found the
" commandant of the place " ill, or dead drunk, as some said,
at any rate incapable of rendering him any assistance. The
commissary of war had perforce to look up, one by one, the
chiefs of the various departments of the service. They ail
displayed the greatest zeal, but too much time had been
wasted. Already the first convoys of wounded were appearing
from the Brussels road, and swarms of fugitives traversed the
city, spreading the alarm by crying that the enemy were at
their heels.^^
The only bridge at Charleroi was 38 yards long
and 8 wide. It was raised in the middle and its parapets
were of wood. Some cuirassiers who were rushing at full
speed down the steep slope of the street which led to it,
struck one of the parapets with such violence that it snapped
and fell to pieces. Several horsemen were drowned in the
Sambre. The sentry box at the head of the bridge was thrown
down ; one of the waggons was turned over ; the vehicles
which were behind, and which came at a quick trot down the
slope of the " Eue de la Montagne," were unable to stop in
CHAP. VI THE ROUT 247
time and upset at the first obstacle. Soldiers were crushed to
death. Sacks of flour and rice, casks of wine and brandy,
hundreds of loaves rolled on the pavement. Owing to this
obstruction of the bridge, the whole convoy stopped whilst the
fugritives climbed over the barricade of overturned vehicles
and fallen horses. Each man as he passed by thrust his
bayonet into a loaf and bore it away. The contents of the
casks were still more tempting ; the soldiers stove them in
with their muskets and drank the wine and brandy through
the holes. "When these barrels were half empty, others upon
the carts were broken in the same way. Over the whole
length of the street, red streams flowed down to the Sambre.^
The Treasury waggon, which Grand-Provost Eadet had de-
spatched from Le Caillou at seven o'clock the evening before,
found itself with its six horses, involved in the block of
vehicles some 100 yards from the bridge. The Paymaster,
who had all the responsibility of this precious load, despaired
of ever making his way through the crowd. He therefore
opened the waggon, and entrusted to his men and to the
soldiers of the escort, as many bags of gold as each could
carry. All these men were to meet at a given point on the
other bank of the Sambre. The agent entered in a register,
the names of the depositaires and the corresponding number
of bags of 20,000 francs entrusted to each. But while this
operation was still proceeding, the air rang with the shots
fired into the wine casks at the lower portion of the street.
An alarm was raised, which soon degenerated into a panic
amid cries of " The Prussians! Save yourselves ! " intentionally
uttered by some of the natives of Charleroi, and even by the
soldiers. These scoundrels quickly pounced upon the waggons.
With blows from sword and bayonet they seized the bags of
gold. AQ were plundered.^^ The halt of the head of the
convoy, had blocked all vehicles as far as the entrance to the
upper portion of the town. The berline which contained the
portfolio of State papers, was also unable to move on the road
amid the artillery trains. Sounds of a fusillade were heard
in the distance. The Duke of Bassano commanded the most
important papers to be torn to pieces and cast to the winds.^
The evacuation of Charleroi might certainly have been
248 WATERLOO book hi
effected without any disorder, for on the 19 th of June the
Prussians had slackened their pursuit. With the exception
of a few cavalry reconnaissances, they did not approach the
city before noon ; it was quite late in the day when they
seized the bridges of Marchienne, Charleroi, and Le Chatelet.
In the evening, while Pirch, who in the previous night had
been sent towards Gembloux with the 2nd Corps to cut off
the retreat of Grouchy, was occupying Mellery, Zieten's and
Billow's corps bivouacked, with their front covered by the
Sambre. The next day only, the Prussian army crossed the
river in three columns and proceeded to Beaumont and
Avesnes. The English, less ardent or slower in marching, were
still between Nivelles and Binche.*^
Section V
In vain had the Emperor endeavoured to organise resist-
ance in the plains of La Haye - Sainte, at Eossomme, at
Genappe, and at Quatre - Bras. He realised that with a
disbanded army who were governed only by terror, it was
best to make as prompt a retreat as possible.^^ He passed
through Charleroi and halted in a meadow on the right bank
of the Sambre.*^ From thence he issued a few orders, which
were not carried out, with the object of rallying the fugitives
and collecting the equipages.^* An hour later, he mounted
his horse and proceeded towards Philippeville, where he arrived
at nine o'clock in the morning. The gates of the stronghold
were locked ; he had to reveal himself to the officer of the
Guard.*^ With him were Bertrand, Drouot, Dejean, Elahaut,
Bussy. He was soon after joined by the Duke of Bassano and
Fleury de Chaboulon, then by Marshal Soult.*^ Among his
most pressing preoccupations, was the rallying of his troops.
Instructions were sent to the commanders of Givet, Avesnes,
Maubeuge, Beaumont, and Landrecies. They were to revictual
with provisions and ammunition, the detachments and isolated
fugitives who might present themselves at these places, and
to direct them afterwards to the mustering points ; Laon for
the 1st, 2nd, and 6th Infantry Corps ; La Fere for the Artillery;
CHAP. VI THE ROUT 249
Marie, St. Quentin, Eethel, Vervins, and Eheims for the Cavalry;
Soissons for the Guard. Of all the commanders of the army
corps, Keille was the only one who had joined the Emperor
at Philippeville : he was entrusted with the mission of
reorganising the troops which arrived at the glacis of this
fortress. A fresh despatch enjoining Marshal Grouchy to
retreat, was sent to him by a spy named Cousin. The garrison
commanders of the 2nd and 16 th military divisions were
ordered to stand on their guard.^'
But the Emperor had not only to consider his army ; he
had also to think of public opinion, external enemies, and the
Chambers. He wrote two letters to his brother Joseph. The
first, destined to be read at the council of ministers, reported,
with certain reservations, the issue of the battle ; in the other,
which was entirely personal, Napoleon concealed nothing of
the great disaster *^ and announced his immediate return to
Paris.^^ Fleury de Chaboulon, to whom both letters were
dictated, asserts that the second ended thus : " All is not lost.
By uniting all my forces, the depots, the national guards, I
shall still have 300,000 men to oppose to the enemy. But I
must be helped, not bewildered. I think the deputies will
realise it is their duty to stand by me in order to save
France." ^
The Emperor then proceeded to write with his own hand,
the bulletin of the battles of Ligny and Mont-Saint-Jean,
which was to appear in the Moniteur^^ after which, leaving
Soult at Philippeville to superintend the rallying of the Army,
he went alone, as it appears, in one of the carriages of the
head of the staff, Bassano, Bertrand, Drouot, and the other
; aides-de-camp following in two other carriages. ^^
From Philippeville to Paris, the most direct route (forty-
I eight posts and a half), was via Barban^on, Avesnes, La
j Capelle, Marie, and Laon. But the Emperor did not desire to
j run the risk of being captured, by some body of Prussian
t cavalry which might have crossed the Sambre at Marchienne ; ^^
' he chose therefore a somewhat longer route (fifty-one posts),
1 via Marieubourg, Eocroi, Maubert-Fontaine, La Capelle, Marie,
j and Laon. At sunset they halted for a few minutes in sight
of EocroL The inhabitants knew nothing of the terrible
250 WATERLOO book hi
defeat, and crowded to the ramparts in the hope of seeing the
Emperor. Their cheers aroused him from his sleep in the
deep cushions of his carriage.^^ For one instant he may have
had a momentary illusion — events had followed each other so
quickly — that he was merely awaking from a bad dream.
Probably from fear of being unable to find relays at
Maubert-Fontaine (a number of horses having been put under
requisition there a week earlier for the auxiliary services of
Vandamme's corps), the travellers made a detour as far as
Mezieres. Here also, horses were not to be procured. They
were sought for at a distance of a league. From half -past ten
to midnight the three carriages remained with the horses in
harness on the square of Des Fontaines in front of the post-
house. General Dumonceau, governor of Mezieres ; TrauUe,
the commander of the garrison, and the officers of their staff
surrounded the carriages. They stood there motionless and
spoke in low tones " as in a day of mourning." None of the
travellers alighted except Bertrand, who was summoned to the
door of Napoleon's carriage by a staff officer of the hussars ;
this solitary officer formed the whole of the Imperial escort.
The carriages drove off. As they neared the " Porte de Pierre "
the sentries shouted " Long live the Emperor ! " and repeated
this cry, which was, said Commandant TrauUe, " harrowing,
under the circumstances," until the last carriage had passed
the ramparts.^^
It was only between six and seven in the evening of
the next day, 20th June,^^ that they arrived at the foot of the
mountain of Laon, in the suburb of Vaux. The Emperor
alighted in the courtyard of the Hotel de la Poste. Through
the large gate, which remained open, the people in the street,
could see him pacing up and down, with his head bowed down,
and arms folded on his chest. The courtyard was covered
with straw from the adjoining barns and stables. One of the
spectators said in a low voice, " It is Job on his dunghill."
Napoleon appeared so overwhelmed, so wretched, the scene was
so impressive, even to those rustic spectators, that none dared
to cheer. However, a few faint, timid, stifled cries of " Vive
I'Empereur ! " arose from this crowd. The Emperor stopped
and lifted his hat.^^ His arrival was known in the town. A
CHAP. VI THE ROUT 251
detachment of the National Guard came down to form a guard
of honour. Shortly after, came General Langeron, commander
of the department, with the Prefect and the Municipal Council.
The Grand-Provost, General Eadet, and General Neigre then
conferred with the Emperor. Napoleon charged the Prefect,
with whom he coupled his aide-de-camp Bussy, a native of
the country, to gather large stores of provisions, as the Army
was to concentrate at Laon. He sent Neigre to La Fere to
organise the batteries for the campaign, Dejean to Guise to
examine the condition of the fortress, Flahaut to Avesnes
to gather information respecting the march of the enemy.^*
Night fell. The Emperor did not wait for Marshal Soult,°^
with whom he had left ample instructions at Philippeville.
Toward ten or eleven o'clock, he started for Paris.^
Since leaving Philippeville, and no doubt ever since his halt
in the meadows of the Sambre, Napoleon had resolved to push on
to Paris.^^ He remembered his deplorable lesson in 1814,
that vote of deposition which had paralysed him at the head of
his army. He knew that if he did not return immediately
to his capital to overawe Fouche, with the conspirators of all
parties, and the deputies, who were hostile or blinded, his crown
was doomed, as well as the country's last chance of resistance.
From a military, as well as from a political point of view, his
place for at least a few days, was plainly in Paris. Without
soldiers and without artillery, it was out of the question to
arrest the enemy's progress on the frontier. As to the
rallying of the wreck of his troops at Laon, Soult and the
generals could effect it as well as himself. Genius was not
necessary for that task ; and during this time in Paris, the
Emperor could arrange measures for the public safety, with the
assistance of Davout and Carnot. He would calm the political
crisis, accelerate all branches of the services, send towards
i Laon all the available men from the depots, the mobilised
battalions, the field batteries, the convoys of arms and
ammunition ; with the consent of the Chambers he would
decree fresh levies of soldiers and national guards, and in four
or five days he would himself resume the command of the
army.®'^
It has been said that Napoleon " abandoned " his Army, as
252 WATERLOO bk. hi ch. vi
he had done in Egypt and in Eussia.^^ Alas ! Napoleon had no
Army left. Of Grouchy he knew nothing.®* He was supposed
to be in great peril with Vandamme's and Gerard's corps.*"^
Of the 74,000 combatants of Waterloo, probably 40,000 had
retired safe and sound and had recrossed the Sambre,®® but
more than three-fourths of their number were still scattered
between Cambrai and Eocroi, straggling along the roads, singly
or in small groups, bivouacking in the woods, taking refuge
with the peasants. On the 20 th of June, at the time when
Napoleon left Laon for Paris, there were 2,600 soldiers as-
sembled at Philippe ville and about 6,000 at Avesnes.*"'^ This
was the entire Army '
BOOK III CHAPTEE VII
THE ACTIONS AT W'AVRE AND GROUCHY'S RETREAT
L Grouchy marches on Wa\Te — Battle of La Baraque — Attack of Wavre
(afternoon of the 18th of June).
IL Soult's second despatch — Renewed assaults upon "Wavre and Biei^es —
Passage of the Dyle at Liniale and battle in the night.
III. Renewal of the fight and defeat of Thielmann (morning of the 19th of
Jmie) — Tlie news of the disaster (half-past ten in the morning) —
Retreat of Grouchy (afternoon and evening of the 1 9th of June).
IV. Actions at La Falise and Le Boquet (morning of the 20th of June) —
Defence of Namur (from three to nine at night) — Rallying of
Grouchy 's Army at Givet (21st of June).
Section I
It has been seen, that in the course of his discussion with
' rerard at Walhain, on the 18th of June about noon. Grouchy
received one of Exelmans' aides-de-camp, who informed him
of the presence of the Prussian rearguard before Wavre.^
Between nine and ten o'clock, the two divisions of Exel-
mans' di-agoons had arrived at La Baraque, five kilometres
distant from this little town. Scouting parties, which had pushed
beyond the defile of La Huzelle, notified that Prussian troops
of three branches of the service, were on the heights of "VVavre."
These proved to be the entire corps of Pirch, still on the right
bank of the Dyle, and two regiments of the Landwehr cavalry,
the rearcniard of Biilow.^ Although he had received the
order " to follow closely upon the heels of the enemy," * Exel-
mans feared to commence hostilities against these masses
with his cavalry only, and in such a wooded region. More-
over, from fresh information or fresh indications, he knew
that the Prussian Army was manceuvring to join the English.
He thought that Grouchy would interrupt his march on
254 WATERLOO book hi
Wavre, which was now useless, in order to cross the Dyle at
the nearest point. With the design of preparing this move-
ment, he moved the Vincent brigade toward the Dyle, and it
took up its position at the farm of La Plaquerie, within cannon
range of Ottignies. Exelmans posted near Neuf-Sart, the
Berton brigade to reconnoitre on the right. He left at La
Baraque, an advanced guard of two squadrons, and fell
back himself to about one league to the rear, near Corbais
with the bulk of the Chastel division. It was during this
halt, that he sent an aide-de-camp to Grouchy to inform him
of the presence of the Prussians before Wavre, and of the
steps he had taken.^
At that time Vandamme's corps had halted at Nil-Saint-
Vincent, in accordance with Grouchy's orders of the previous
evening. Notwithstanding all the information given him
respecting the march of the Prussians towards Wavre, the
Marshal was still so undecided on the evening of the 17th of
June as to the direction he should take, that he had ordered
Vandamme to proceed to Walhain only." A little later,
toward eleven o'clock or midnight, he wrote to him : " I have
forgotten to tell you to push beyond Walhain, in order to
allow General Gerard to take up his position in the rear.
I think that we shall go farther than Walhain ; therefore this
will be rather a halt than a definite position." "^ When the
bivouacs were raised on the morning of the 18th, there would
still have been time for Grouchy, who had now determined
to march upon Wavre, to order Vandamme to follow Exelmans'
cavalry as rapidly as possible. It did not occur to him to do
so. After passing Walhain, Vandamme halted at Nil-Saint-
Vincent, where he awaited further orders.^
About one o'clock, Grouchy, who had been warned by
Major d'Estournel, aide-de-camp to Exelmans, that the
Prussian rearguard was in sight, reached Nil-Saint-Vincent.
He gave to Vandamme, and dispatched to Exelmans, orders
to start the troops on their march again.^ A short time
before two o'clock, as the head of the column of the dragoons
approached La Baraque, the two squadrons which had been
left as the advanced guard, were attacked by the 10 th regiment
of hussars debouching on their left flank.^° This regiment,
CHAP. VII ACTIONS AT TTAVRE 255
with two battalions and two guns, formed the detachment under
Lieutenant -Colonel Ledebur, posted in observation at Mont-
Saint- Guibert
Until about one o'clock, Ledebur had not moved. Mis-
informed by his patrols and his vedettes, he was in complete
ignorance of the approach of the French Armj, as also of the
ground to which they had advanced that morning at La
Baraque, with the two divisions of Exelmans, and the position
taken at the farm of La Plaquerie by the Vincent brigade.
He was surrounded with enemies, and had not the slightest
suspicion of it. Enlightened at last by the presence of the
French at Nil- Saint -Vincent, and on the road to Wavre,
Ledebur saw that his direct line of retreat ran the risk of
being cut. He rapidly pushed his hussars across country to
La Baraque, while his two battalions reached at double-quick
step, through Bruyeres and Bloc-Ey, the woods of La Huzelle,
which bordered the road on either side to the north of La
Baraque, forming a sort of defile." The hussars drove back
the two French squadrons on the east of the road, kept up
the fight for a few minutes, then upon the approach of the
bulk of the dragoons they retired through the defile which
had just been occupied by Ledebur's sharpshooters." ^' Infantry
were required to drive out the latter. The dragoons allowed
the head of the Vandamme column to pass, and it began the
attack at once. Two battalions of the Brause division, which
was stni with the Langen division (both of them belonging
to Pirch's corps) on the right bank of the Dyle,^^ had been
nt to support Ledebur.^* The defence was most stubborn.
Cirouchy, without Exelmans' knowledge, had recalled the
Vincent brigade from the banks of the Dyle.^^ All the
dragoons were thus together. He then sent orders to
Exelmans, to turn the position toward Dion le Mont with
these three thousand horsemen. This well-conceived manceuvre
was, however, executed too late or too slowly, and was not
attended by the results that might have been expected.
Before the movement of the French cavalry was completed,
the Prussians had already evacuated the woods and were
falling back upon Wavre.^'' Vandamme cleared the defile.
He had orders from Grouchy to pursue the enemy as far as
256 WATERLOO book hi
the heights which commanded this town, and to take up his
position there, while awaiting further instructions.^^
In spite of the confidence with which he had spoken to
Gerard, Grrouchy had many misgivings concerning the cannon
which he heard thundering on his left. He galloped towards
Limelette, " in order," he said, " to form a definite opinion as
to the cause of this cannonade." He was finally convinced
that a great battle was raging on the border of the forest of
Soignes.^^ On regaining the Wavre road between half-past
three and four o'clock ^^ he received the letter from the
Emperor, or rather from Soult, dated Le Caillou, ten o'clock
in the morning.^° This letter being addressed to Marshal
Grouchy at Gembloux or beyond, the estafette, adjutant-
commandant, Zenowicz, ought to have passed by Genappe,
Sombreffe, and Gembloux. This was a journey of ten leagues.
But Zenowicz could have covered the distance in less time.'^^
Moreover, if this despatch, which enjoined Grouchy to march on
Wavre, and at the same time to connect his communications
with the Imperial Army, had reached him earlier, it would
not have inclined him to alter his main dispositions. After
reading it, he remarked to his aide-de-camp, Bella, that he
" congratulated himself on having so well fulfilled the instruc-
tions of the Emperor, marching on Wavre instead of listening
to General Gerard's advice." ^^ And he sent a reply to
Berthezene, who had sent him an aide-de-camp to inform him
of the march of the Prussian columns in the direction of the
firing : " Let the General's mind be at rest, we are on the right
road. I have heard from the Emperor, and he commands me
to march on Wavre." ^^
The Emperor ordered also, in a subsidiary manner, it is
true, the linking together of the communications with the
bulk of the Army. Grouchy took very tardy measures to
execute these instructions. Pajol had just notified him,
through an aide-de-camp, that the right column, in its march
from Grand-Leez upon Tourinnes, had found no trace of the
enemy. Grouchy sent back the aide-de-camp with an order to
Pajol, to despatch at once the 2nd Cavalry Corps and the Teste
division to Limale, and to cross the Dyle there by main force."^
Grouchy did not realise the value of time ; otherwise he
CHAP. VII ACTIONS AT TFAVEE 257
would have entrusted the carrying of the bridge at Limale,
not to Pajol, who from Tourinnes had three leagues and a half
to march, but to Greneral Vallin's cavalry, which was only one
league distant from the Dyle, and the Hulot division of
Gerard's corps, which had just reached La Baraque.^
The despatch once sent off to Pajol, Grouchy galloped
toward Wavre, where he proposed to direct the attack in person.
The eager Vandamme had not waited for him. Eegardless of
the Marshal's orders, and without reconnoitring the position,
or preparing for the action by his artillery, he launched against
the enemy, French fashion, the whole of the Habert division
in assaulting columns.^^
The second echelon of Zeiten's corps (Brause and Langen
divisions and Sohr's cavalry), had crossed the Dyle after the
fight in the La Huzelle defile, and was marching on Chapelle-
Saint-Lambert. But nearly the whole of Thielmann's corps
remained to defend Wavre and its approaches. At first,
mistaking the deploying of the cavahy under Exelmans,
between Sainte-Anne and Dion-Le-Mont, for a mere demonstra-
tion, Thielmann had set his troops in motion in the direction
of Couture-Saint-Germain ; two battalions only were ordered
to remain behind to protect Wavre, Then seeing Yandamme's
corps debouching before the town, he reoccupied the positions
he had just evacuated. The divisions of Kempher and Liick,
three battalions of the Borcke division, and Kobe's cavalry,
posted themselves at Wavre, at Basse- Wavre, and on the heights
over the left bank of the Dyle. The Stiilpnagel division
occupied Bierges, the detachment of Zieten's corps (three
battalions and three squadrons under Yon Stengel), appointed
to guard the Limale Bridge, was retained at this post.-^
Habert's infantry speedily drove the Prussians from the
suburb of Wavre ; but their furious charge was arrested at the
Dyle, which separated the town from its suburbs. The two
bridges were strongly barricaded, and enfiladed, by the batteries
established at various altitudes up the steep streets leading
down to the river; moreover, more than 1,000 sharpshooters
were ambushed in the houses on the left bank. General
Habert, Colonel Dubalen of the 64th, and 600 men, were
disabled in a few minutes. Powerless to carry the bridges,
17
258 WATERLOO book hi
the soldiers hesitated to fall back, through fear of exposing
themselves to the terrible fire of the Prussian batteries which
swept the approaches to the suburb, and the steep slopes of the
right bank. They sheltered themselves in the streets parallel
to the Dyle. " They were wedged," says Grouchy, " into a kind
of cul de sac." ^^
Section II
After closely examining the position. Grouchy resolved to
second the attack on Wavre, by two other attacks up the river
and down the river, Keinforcements entered the suburb ; a |
battalion under Lefol was detached to cross the Dyle at the
bridge of the mill of Bierges ; Exelmans, with his dragoons,
advanced to the front of Basse-Wavre.^^ The Marshal had
hardly made these dispositions, when he received about ^° five
o'clock, the despatch which Soult had sent him at half-past
one from the battlefield, and which concluded thus : " At this
moment the battle is raging on the line of Waterloo, in front
of the forest of Soignes. Therefore manoeuvre so as to join
our right. We think we can distinguish Billow's corps on the
height of Chapelle-Saint-Lambert. Therefore do not waste an
instant in drawing nearer to us, so as to join us, and to crush
Billow, whom you will surprise in the very act." ^^
The Emperor's order was undoubtedly direct and urgent ;
it prescribed a march on Saint -Lambert to crush Biilow.
Grouchy so understood it ; but he showed neither resolu-
tion nor method in his arrangements. The two divisions of
Yandamme were a sufficient force to keep the Prussians in
check before Wavre. It seems clear that the Marshal should
at once have despatched towards Limale, Vandamme's 3rd
division, as well as the eight regiments of Exelmans' dragoons,
whose diversion to Basse-Wavre was no longer of any use.
But Grouchy, through the most extraordinary of strategic
conceptions, determined at one and the same time to carry
Wavre with half of his army, and to direct the other half
upon Saint-Lambert, by the bridge of Limale. Accordingly,
the whole of the 3rd Corps, with the cavalry of Exelmans,^^
I
CHAP. VII ACTIOXS AT WAVRE 259
he left in front of the Prussian positions, and sent his aide-
de-camp, Pont-Bellanger, with a verbal order to Pajol, who
was just starting from Tourinnes, to hasten his march on
Limale. " Never has the Emperor been so great ! " said Pont-
Bellanger, as he accosted PajoL " The battle is won ; they
are only waiting for cavalry to complete the rout." ^
Having despatched this order to Pajol, Grouchy galloped
off with Gerard to La Baraque, to direct thence upon Limale,
the 4th Corps, whose leading division (General Hulot) alone
had reached the heights of "Wavre. Is it true, as Grouchy
states, that the two other divisions of the 4th Corps (Tichery
and Pecheux) had not reached La Baraque by six o'clock that
evening ; that the Marshal, tired of waiting for them, returned
to the front of "Wavre, leaving orders for these two di^*isions
to proceed directly on Limale ; and finally that owing to a
misinterpretation of this order, Yichery and Pecheux con-
tinued their march on Wavre ? Or must we not rather
believe that Grouchy found these divisions at La Baraque,
that he ordered them to march on Limale, but that the head
of the column lost its way, owing to the absence of a guide,
and returned towards "Wavre ? It seems impossible to get at
the truth in the midst of the contradictory testimonies of
Gerard, General Hulot, and Grouchy himself, whose own
assertions are far from agreeing with each other. ^* Certain it
is that Grouchy did go to La Baraque, and afterwards returned
to "Wavre.^
The fight still waged fiercely on either side of the Dyle.
The attack on the Bierges bridge by the Lefol battalion had
been repulsed. Grouchy, who furiously persisted in crossing
the Dyle at this spot, ordered Gerard to renew the attack,
with a battalion of the Hulot division. And when Gerard
remarked to Grouchy, that it would be better to support Lefol's
detachment by other troops of the same army corps,^^ the
Marshal took his judicious advice in very bad part. Gerard
then passed on the order to Hulot, who, in person, led a
battalion of the 9 th Leger to the assault. To reach the
bridge, they had to traverse a tract of marshy fields, furrowed
with deep and very broad ditches running parallel to the
Dyle. Hulot ordered the men to plimge into these ditches
260 WATERLOO book iii
if they could not leap across them. The water being between
four and six feet deep, the sharpshooters narrowly escaped
being drowned ; their comrades had to pull them out. Mean-
while the bullets fell thick around them. Discouraged, the
soldiers fell back.^^ At this juncture Grouchy and Gerard,
the latter leading another battalion, arrived on the border of
the meadow. Gerard, who was not in the habit of sparing
himself, exposed himself all the more that he had good reason
to be in a very bad temper. He received a bullet full in his
chest which necessitated his being carried to the rear.^^
Grouchy then requested Artillery -General Baltus to take
Gerard's place at the head of the assaulting column. This
the general having flatly refused. Grouchy sprang from his
horse crying : " If a soldier can't make his subordinates obey,
he must know how to be killed ! " ^^ This third assault
failed, as the previous ones had done. Grouchy left the Hulot
division before Bierges, as if he intended, says Hulot, to make
fresh arrangements for attacking the mill ; then, suddenly
changing his mind, he joined Gerard's other two divisions, and
with them proceeded towards Limale.^'^
During these ineffectual assaults, skirmishing continued
before Basse-Wavre, while at Wavre the struggle was carried
on with terrible ferocity. Vandamme made no less than thirteen
attacks, without being able to wrench from the enemy this
little town, which had been transformed into a fortress. At
eleven o'clock that night the fight was still raging.''^
When Marshal Grouchy reached Limale at nightfall *^ the
Dyle bridge was free. Eenewing the daring mauoeuvi'e of the
preceding year at Monterau, Pajol had hurled General Vallin's
hussars,*^ at full speed upon this bridge, though it was
accessible only to four horses at a time, and was guarded
by an entire battalion. The Prussians broken into and
cut to pieces. Teste's infantry and the rest of the cavalry
passed over to the left bank in the wake of the Hussars. Von
Stengel gave up Limale after a hard struggle, and took up
other positions on the heights which overlooked the village.
In spite of the darkness, the assault was vigorously led by
Teste, when Grouchy debouched from the Limale bridge with
the Vichery and Pecheux divisions. These reinforcements had
CHAP. VII ACTIONS AT WAVRE 261
become very necessary, for Thielmann hearing the cannonade,
had brought to Stengel's rescue,^"* by the left bank of the Dyle,
the Stiilpnagel division and Kobe's cavalry. They fought till
eleven o'clock in the night for the possession of the crest of
the plateau, which at last fell into the hands of the French.'*^
And now the road to Mont-Saint-Jean was open ; but for a
long time the Emperor's cannon had ceased to be heard.
Section III
The French bivouacked in squares, and face to face with
their foes, who occupied the woods of Piixensart. The outposts
were so close to each other, that the balls they exchanged
throughout the whole night, would often fall in the rear of
the first lines.^^ At half-past eleven at night Grouchy sent
Vandamme orders to join him at once at Limale ^vith the 3rd
Corps. He proposed resuming the fight very early in the
morning to rally the Imperial Army at Brussels, for it was
rumoured — no one could say on what grounds — that the
Emperor had beaten the English.'"
The Prussian staff were better infoimed. An ofi&cer of
the Marwitz cavalry who had been reconnoitring, had brought
back the news that the French were in full retreat.^^ Eeassured
for the future, Thielmann directed almost all his troops towards
the plateau of Limale, in order to resume the offensive by
daybreak. At three o'clock in the morning, Kobe's cavalry
debouched from the woods of Eixensart with two mounted
batteries which, in a moment, poured a rain of shells on the
French encampments. Grouchy, hurrying with utmost speed
to the first line, brought his artillery into play ; then, with all
his men formed in battle array, Pajol's cavalry on the extreme
left, the Pecheux and Vichery divisions in reserve at the centre,
the Teste division on the right, he marched against the enemy.
After holding firm for a long time, the Prussians at last
yielded the wood of Kixensart. It was now about eight
o'clock. Thielmann received from General Pu'ch positive
intelligence of the defeat of the French. The despatch added
that the 2nd Army Coi-ps was going to manoeuvre in order to
262 WATERLOO book hi
intercept the retreat of Marshal Grouchy. The news of this
great victory, which was immediately announced to the troops,
put new spirit into them. Thielmann wheeled around his
front, to the rear upon his left wing, which still occupied
Bierges. Through this movement the Prussian right found
itself deployed on a line parallel to the road from Wavre to
Brussels.^^
The fighting was resumed, not without advantage to the
Prussians, until the Teste division had carried the village and
the mill of Bierges. In this assault General Penne, one of
Teste's brigadiers, who was himself wounded, had his head
crushed by a shell, Berthezene, posted on the right bank of
the Dyle, had seconded Teste's attack ; both divisions now
mustered together. Thielmann, seeing his left attacked, and
his right on the point of being turned by Pajol's cavalry,
which was manoeuvring towards Eosieren to reach the Brussels
road, fell back and retreated in the direction of Louvain. The
four battalions left at Wavre, evacuated this position, and
marched to La Bavette, from whence they were speedily
dislodged by Vandamme's advanced guard.^° Notwithstand-
ing Grouchy 's orders to join him at Limale with the 3rd
Corps, Vandamme had remained the whole morning in front
of Wavre. He had sent to the Marshal, Exelmans' dragoons
only, with the Hulot division, which he had replaced before
Bierges, by the Berthezene division.^^
Master of the battlefield, where the Prussians had
abandoned five pieces of cannon and a number of wounded.
Grouchy had his right at La Bavette, his left beyond Eosieren.
He was taking steps to march upon Brussels, when towards
half-past ten o'clock,^^ an officer of the head of the staff rode up
to him. With a visibly dejected face, with eyes staring from
terror, his whole form bent, and apparently his horse broken
down by exhaustion, he seemed the embodied image of defeat
and ruin. Scarcely able to collect his ideas or to find his
words, he related in such incoherent language the disaster of
Mont-Saint-Jean, that at first the Marshal thought he had to
deal with a madman or a drunkard. To Grouchy's questions
whether he were the bearer of an order, or to which point they
were to retreat, whether the army had crossed the Sambre, the
CHAP. VII GROUCHTS RETREAT 263
officer instead of replying, began repeating his involved story
of the battle. From the very precise details gathered from the
midst of his confused ramblings, Grouchy was at last con-
vinced.^ This was not the time to give way to grief ; it was
necessary to save what remained of the army.
Grouchy assembled his general officers and held a sort of
council of war. He announced to them the terrible news.
It is said that, as he spoke, he had tears in his eyes.^ His
discussion with Gerard on the previous day at "Walhain, was
known to all the different staffs. The Marshal considered that
circumstances called upon him to justify his refusal to listen
to the advice of his lieutenant. "My honour," he said,
" makes it a matter of duty to explain myself, in regard to my
dispositions of yesterday. The instructions which I had
received from the Emperor, left me free to manoeuvre in no
other direction than "VVavre. I was obliged, therefore, to refuse
the advice which Count Gerard thought he had the right to
offer me. I do ample justice to General Gerard's talents and
brilliant valour ; but you were doubtless as surprised as I was,
that a general officer, ignorant of the Emperor's orders, and
the data which inspired the Marshal of France, under whose
orders he was placed, should have presumed publicly to dictate
to the latter, his line of conduct. The advanced hour of the
day, the distance from the point where the cannonading was
heard, the condition of the roads, made it impossible to arrive
in time to share in the action which was taking place. At
any rate, whatever the subsequent events may have been, the
Emperor's orders, the substance of which I have just disclosed
to you, did not permit of my acting otherwise than I have
done." ^5
Having pronounced these words, which were as much of the
nature of a confession as of an excuse, the Marshal expounded
his plan of retreat. He had thought at first of marching upon
the rear of the Anglo -Prussians, with the hope that this
diversion might hamper their pursuit of the Imperial Army ;
but he quickly abandoned the idea, the only result of which
would have been the total destruction of 30,000 men, over-
powered and crushed by 50,000.^ For similar reasons he
wisely rejected the daring project of Vandamme, which con-
264 WATERLOO book hi
sisted in marching on Brussels, where numerous prisoners
might be set free, and in repairing then to the frontier, towards
Valenciennes or Lille, by Enghien and Ath.^'^ Vandamme
surmised that, in this direction, only a few detachments of the
allied army would be encountered. Grouchy wisely preferred
directing his line of retreat upon Namur, Dinant and Givet.^^
It was necessary to hasten with the utmost speed, for he ran
the risk not only of being harassed by Thielmann, who would
undoubtedly hurry back to the front at the first retrograde
movement of the French, but also there was the prospect of a
fiank attack at the hands of a corps of Bliicher's army.
Perhaps such a detachment might even arrive in time to take
up its positions towards Gembloux, and cut off the retreat.
Such was indeed the Prussians' main object ; and at eleven
o'clock, at the time when Grouchy still had his army beyond
the Dyle, his front resting between Eosieren and La Bavette,
Pirch, detached from Eossomme during the night, had already
occupied Mellery with the 2nd Corps.^^ He was three hours
ahead of Grouchy, for the distance between Mellery and
Gembloux is ten kilometres, as the bird flies, and between La
Bavette and Gembloux there are twenty kilometres.
The retreat commenced between eleven and midday,
Exelmans' dragoons, with the exception of the 20 th regiment
placed under Vandamme's orders, rapidly marched to Namur
to secure the bridges over the Sambre. Their advanced Guard
arrived there at four o'clock.^^ The 4th Corps and Vallin's
cavalry crossed the Dyle at Limale, and reached the direct
road to Gembloux ; during the night, these troops bivouacked
at a distance of two leagues beyond this village, on the road
which leads from Nivelles to Namur, between Le Mazy and
Temploux. Grouchy, who was marching with this echelon of
the army, established his headquarters at Tembloux.*^^
From La Bavette, Vandamme's corps fell back on Wavre,
held its positions there until rather late, and then marched on
by Dion-le-Mont, Tourinnes and Grand-Leez. In the evening,
at about eleven o'clock, it halted on the road from Gembloux
to Namur, on the height of Temploux.^^ Pajol, in charge of
the rearguard composed of General Soult's cavalry and the
indefatigable Teste division, kept Thielmann in check by
CHAP. VII GROUCHTS RETREAT 265
following him as far as the vicinity of Saint- Achtenrode, where
the latter took up his position. Then when the entire corps
of Vandamme had crossed the bridges at Wavre, Pajol himself
began his retreat, reached Gembloux by Sauveniere, and
established his quarters there during the night.^
This perilous retreat was effected with some disorder;^
but they had not been compelled to fire a shot. Thielmann,
whose corps was now reduced to 12,500 men by the losses of
the previous day and of that morning,''^ learned but very late
of the retrograde movement of the French. As for the 2nd
Prussian corps, though it had reached Mellery by noon, it had
aiTived there in the most pitiable condition, after an unbroken
march of twenty-four hours. Besides, it is clear that Pirch did
not feel strong enough with these forces to act singly. He
had not heard from Thielmann, from whom he expected help.
He did not wish, nor did he think it possible to lead his
harassed soldiers ^^ any farther, on that day.
Section IV
On the morrow, June 20th, Pajol and Teste left Gembloux
in the morning, according to Grouchy's orders, and proceeded
to Namur by Saint-Denis and Saint-Marc.*^" Towards nine
o'clock, Grouchy directed upon Namur the 4th Corps, which
was bringing on all the wounded and the reserved park of
artillery. The Marshal hoped to send this army corps
through the town, whilst Yandamme's corps remained in
position till after twelve o'clock, across the Gembloux road, to
cover the movement.^^ Matters did not, however, work
! smoothly by any means. At the moment when the head of
i the 4th Corps was leaving Temploux, a lively cannonade was
! heard from the front, to the left. Instead of bivouacking
j among his troops, Yandamme had gone to spend the night at
Namur. He had not received the orders sent by Grouchy, to
guard his position ; and in the morning, Generals Lefol,
i Berthezene and Habert, who had been left without instructions,
I had set off for Xamur, thus leaving unprotected the flank of
' the 4th Corps.^^ They were attacked near La Falise by the
266 JFATERLOO book hi
thirty and odd squadrons under Hobe whom Thielmann had
started from Achtenrode with a mounted battery, at five
o'clock in the morning, and who had marched ten leagues at
a stretch, in pursuit of the French. At the same time, a large
body of the enemy's troops debouching from Le Mazy, was
notified to Grouchy. It was Pirch's advanced guard march-
ing from Mellery.^°
Grouchy now found himself in a position of great peril,
for if Vandamme's infantry fell back too quickly on the other
side of the Sambre, he himself would be cut off by Hobe
from the road to Namur, whilst he was fighting Pirch. The
troops, realising the danger, showed signs of uneasiness ; the
numerous wounded that were being convoyed from Limale
and Wavre, expressed by murmurs, groans, and angry cries,
their dread of falling alive into the hands of the Prussians.
Grouchy came among the vehicles with General Vichery.
He spoke in a loud voice. " Be quite easy," he said, " we
swear never to abandon you. I am confident that our dis-
positions will save us." '^ Thereupon, with General Vallin's
cavalry, he immediately fell upon those of the Prussian
squadrons, which after turning the Vandamme divisions, were
attacking his line of retreat, and repulsed them to the left.
Then pursuing his course, he hurried to the assistance of
Vandamme. During this time the 4th Corps, whose way was
now free, reached Namur with the wounded and the artillery
park ; the rearguard, commanded by Vichery in person,
checked for some time at Le Boquet, the Prussians under
Pirch ; then it fell back, disputing the ground inch by inch.'^
Surprised by the sudden attack of the Prussian cavalry,
the 3rd Corps was thrown into confusion. One of Lefol's
squares was broken : the men only escaped the Uhlans' spears,
by taking refuge in a wood. Two pieces of cannon were
lost. Grouchy's approach arrested the enemy. Vallin's
cavalry dashed off at a gallop. Colonel Briqueville, who
charged at the head of the 20 th Dragoons, overthrew the
more advanced of the Prussian squadrons, recovered the two
guns, and even captured another. The entire cavalry of
Hobe fell back by its right upon Pirch's corps, which was just
debouching from Temploux.'''^
CHAP. VII GROUCETS BETREAT 267
At the sound of the combat, Vandamme had come from
Namur. Grouchy reiterated his order to cover the retreat of
the 4th Corps. Vandamme reformed his battalions, took up
his position before the suburbs, and held the Prussians in
check."* The cavalry, the entire 3rd Corps, the convoys, all
entered Xamur. The Prussians were detested there. The
retreating French brought in their train, the terrible risks of
war. They were nevertheless greeted as friends. The muni-
cipality distributed 100,000 rations of bread, 100,000 rations
of brandy. The good citizens of Namur lent their boats for
the transfer of the wounded by the Meuse, and even helped to
embark them themselves. "Women, even under fire, brought
provisions to the soldiers, and assistance to the wounded.'^
The army merely passed through Xamur. Grouchy with
the 4th Corps, then Vandamme slightly wounded, with the
3rd, crossed the Sambre, and plunged into the long defile
formed by the Meuse and the forest of Marlagne. The Teste
division, acting as rearguard, had been enjoined to hold the
city imtil nightfall. For the defence of Xamur, whose
dilapidated fortifications were not proof against an escalade.
Teste had eight field-guns and, at most, 2,000 men under his
command. He scattered them about the ramparts and the
three Eastern gates ; the " Louvain Gate," " the Iron Gate "
and the " Gate of St. Nicholas." Scarcely were his troops in
position, when Pirch hurled his assaulting columns against
him. Greeted by a volley of grapeshot and a rolling musketry
fire, the Prussians wheeled half round, leaving on the glacis a
heap of dead and wounded. A second attack, during which
Colonels von Zastrow and von Bismark feU mortally wounded,
failed like the preceding one. As the cartridges were giving
out, each Frenchman aimed at his Prussian and brought him
j down. It was 8 at night. Pirch, who had lost 1,500 men and
I despaired of carrying the place by storm, stopped the fight.
iBy that time General Teste, whose ammunition was almost
j exhausted, was already commencing his retreat. The Prussians
I having perceived this, burst into the city through the windows
I and the small door of the custom-house, and speedily made
I their way as far as the bridge on the Sambre. There, a
detachment of Engineers posted in some houses which the
268 IVATERLOO bk. hi ch. vii
sappers had found time to pierce with loopholes, arrested
them for a long time, by a spirited and well-directed fusillade.
This rear-guard then withdrew through the " Gate of France "
where quantities of faggots and bundles of straw saturated
with tar, were heaped up together. The sappers set them
alight, and the Gate and the neighbouring houses caught fire,
closing the access of the street to the Prussian columns.^*^
During this combat the main body of Grouchy's army had
reached Dinant. The next day, June 21st, the forces passed
the frontier, and on that evening, the whole army was
re-assembled under the cannon of Givet.^^
Even if this march from Wavre to the frontier is not, —
we must allow, — " one of the most astonishing retreats of
modern military history," "^ for Tliielmann's carelessness and
Pirch's timidity, facilitated it to a most singular degree,^ — it
nevertheless does the greatest credit to Grouchy. He did not
give way to despair when, in the immensity of the disaster,
all hope seemed lost. He acted with decision and rapidity.
By the direction which he chose, and the steps he took, he
saved his Army. One can only ask what might not have
happened, if on the 17th and the 18 th of June, the unfor-
tunate Marshal had displayed the same resolution, the same
activity, the same military talent, and the same comprehension
of the necessities of the situation ?
271
BOOK III CHAPTER VIII
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815
I. The operations of the 15th of June — The battles of Ligny and of Quatre-
Bras.
II. Napoleon's mistake.
III. Marshal Grouchy.
IV. Waterloo.
Section I
The original plan of the campaign of 1815, and even the
movements which were its development, rank amongst the
finest strategical conceptions of Napoleon, Everything failed
owing to defects of execution, some of which may be attributed
to the Emperor, a far larger number to his lieutenants.
The very first day, Drouet d'Erlon started marching an
hour and a half behind the time appointed ; Gerard interpreted
the instructions of the Emperor to suit his own convenience ;
Vandamme broke up his camps three hours after the hour
fixed, halted his troops before the end of the fight, and refused
to co-operate with Grouchy ; Xey suddenly became cautious
even to timidity, and did not dare to carry out the manoeuvre
with which he was charged. The service of the staff was badly
performed, the transmission of orders was slow and imcertain.
The chiefs were hesitating and apathetic, without zeal, with-
out initiative, without spirit. They seemed to have lost aU
faith in the Napoleonic star ; they only appeared to wish to
advance with measured steps beyond the frontier, as if they
felt the grip of the enemy's two great hosts already upon them.
The all-powerful engine of war, constructed by Xapoleon, was
apparently worn out, or overstrained.
Thus the day of the loth of June, did not produce the
results which might have been anticipated. Had the army
268 WATERLOO book hi
sa-crched as the Emperor's orders directed, before twelve o'clock
all the troops would have crossed the Sambre ; by three
o'clock, the Prussians under Pirch II. would have been dis-
lodged from Gilly ; in the evening. Grouchy would have
occupied Sombreffe, and Ney, Quatre-Bras. The next day
Bliicher and Wellington, separated by this double manoeuvre,
and neither of them wishing to risk giving battle singly, to the
whole of the French army, would have fallen back on the base
of their operations, the first to the north-east of Sombreffe, the
second to the west of Brussels. The effect of this divergent
retreat, would have been to separate the English from the
Prussians by a distance of some twenty leagues, as the bird
flies. It would have required a period of several days before
they would have been able to concert and operate a fresh
junction. Meanwhile, Napoleon would have occupied Brussels
without striking a blow, and arranged some overwhelming
march, upon one or other of the two hostile armies.
On the morning of the 16 th, however, in spite of Ney's
mistakes, and the delays of the right wing, nothing was as
yet compromised.^ The Emperor even imagined that the
Prussians and the English were in full retreat, and that he
might possibly reach Brussels without meeting with any
resistance. Probabilities induced him to believe this, for, as
Kennedy remarks, "Wellington and Bliicher committed a serious
mistake, considering the dispersion of their troops and the
separation of their army, in giving battle on the 1 6th of June.
Consequently the Emperor issued orders for a march on
Brussels, and left Charleroi at nine o'clock. The criticism that
he wasted his time in the morning, seems groundless. As the
Emperor did not at all expect a battle that day, such an event
seeming highly improbable, one day would suffice for his point
upon Gembloux, and the night for his march on Brussels. By
six o'clock in the morning, he dictated orders, with a view to
the concentration of the whole right wing at Eleurus. He
cannot be held responsible for the delay on the part of Gerard,
who did not arrive tiU past one o'clock. If the Emperor
failed to repeat to Ney early in the morning the order to take
up his position at Quatre-Bras, it was because he was deceived
by the latter's report, into believing that this post was merely
CHAP. VIII THE CAMPAIGN Oi' 1815 271
occupied by a very small force, or even evacuated altogether ;
and he judged there would be no difficulty in taking possession
of it. In point of fact, the Prince of Orange ha\'ing received
reinforcements only at three o'clock, it was as easy for Xey to
dislodge the Perponcher di^^sion from Quatre-Bras at eleven
o'clock,^ at the moment when the instructions of the Emperor
reached him, as it would have been during the first hours of
the morning.
However, the " General Imprevu " (General Unforeseen)
intervened in favour of Napoleon ; Bllicher knew that the
1 French numbered 120,000; owing to Billow's delay he him-
, self had only 80,000 men. But faithful to his promises to
j protect the English left, impatient to fight, and trusting too
I much in the very problematical support of AVellington, he
rashly offered battle to Xapoleon, from his position at Ligny.
When Xapoleon saw the deployment of the Prussian Army, he
congratulated himself that it was bringing itself within reach
of his sword. This battle, which he in no way foresaw, or
j expected, gave him the opportunity of bringing to an end in one
; single day, as it were by a thunderbolt, the campaign which
I had only commenced on the previous day. He was going to
I exterminate the Prussian Army. He at once decided on his
j plan, disposed his troops, sent orders to Xey. AYliilst he
attacked. Marshal Xey would bear down on the Prussian rear,
j and when at the end of the day he made the final assault,
' Bliicher's army broken at the centre, attacked on the right,
assailed from the rear, would be almost entirely caught in a
net of iron and fire.
Muffling, Kogniat, and others, contend that Xapoleon
should have limited himself to demonstrations toward Ligny,
and have brought all his efforts to bear upon Saint-Amand,
j where the Prussian right was quite isolated, and incapable of
I making any but a feeble resistance. This is to misunderstand
j one of Xapoleon's finest inspirations of military tactics.
[Assuredly, the attack on Saint-Amand would have brought
I about the retreat of the Prussians, in less time and with
I smaller casualties. But on the 16 th of June the Emperor
had a more decided aim in view, than to separate Bliicher
from "Wellington, by driving back the latter toward the Meuse ;
272 JVATERLOO book in
his object was no less, than to destroy the entire Prussian
Army, This could only be accomplished through piercing its
centre and surrounding its right wing. The left wing alone
would have escaped from the general disaster.
We have seen through what a series of mistakes and
blunders, this well-conceived plan came to fail,^ and how each
one contributed to bring about its failure. Flahaut, bearer
of the first instructions of the Emperor, spent two hours in
riding four leagues. Eeille delayed a movement that had
been ordered, under the pretext that a small loss of time was
of no consequence ; he considered, according to the extra-
ordinary explanation of Jomini, that it was better to obey the
laws of great tactics, than the orders of the head of the army.
'Forbin-Janson did not understand a single word of the
despatch entrusted to him ; he was unable to explain it, and
after transmitting it to General d'Erlon, he omitted to com-
municate it to Marshal l!s"ey. D'Erlon set out in the wrong
direction ; he had not the common sense to rectify it, and
after going three-quarters of the way, he decided to retrace his
footsteps to comply with the injunctions of Marshal Ney, who
recalled him in spite of the formal orders of Napoleon ; he
—^ did not see that by this countermarch, he was depriving the
Emperor of a very efficient support, and that he could not
reach Ney in time to fight. In a word, throughout this after-
noon, D'Erlon neutralised his troops, marching them about
with arms presented, from the left wing to the right wing, and
without helping either one or the other. Vandamme, who
perceived the first of d'Erlon's corps, was misinformed by his
scouts, and notified this corps to the Emperor as belonging to
the enemy. Napoleon disturbed by Vandamme's message, and
by the direction of this column, lost his presence of mind.
He either did not realise, or he refused to admit that the body
of troops threatening his flank, might be the first corps which
he had himself summoned to the field of battle ; he neglected
to enjoin on the officer, whom he sent to reconnoitre once more
the supposed hostile column, to direct it on Brye, should it
prove to be, contrary to his expectations, the corps under
d'Erlon.
But on Marshal Ney, rests the principal responsibility for
CHAP. VIII THE CAMPAIGN OF 1615 273
-^ the incomplete results of the day. By recalling d'Erlon,
against the special orders of the Emperor, he committed an
act of disobedience liable to a court-martial, and which it is
only possible to explain by the undisciplined spirit which
then prevailed throughout every rank of the army. But this
desperate act of Ney's had no serious influence on the issue,
for already Count d'Erlon, in taking Saint-Amand, instead
of Brye as his destination, had compromised the brilliant
manoiuvre conceived and ordered by the Emperor. The
principal charge against Marshal Ney, consists in an initial
I mistake which brought about all the subsequent delays,
j misunderstandings, false movements, and misfortunes of this
double action. Had he acted that morning as he ought to have
done, in accordance with circumstances and with the principles
of war, by eight or nine o'clock he would have had the 2nd
Corps mustered at Frasnes and the 1st Corps concentrated at
Goaselies. Thus at eleven o'clock, after receiving the order
brought by Flahaut, he would have been in a position to
attack Quatre-Bras with the four divisions of Eeille and the
Lefebvre-Desnoettes cavalry, and to call up to Frasnes, the five
divisions under d'Erlon, and Kellermann's four brigades of
cuirassiers. Long before two, he would have wrested the
position from the 7,500 Dutch who were its only defenders.
At three, with his 43,000 men, he would easily have
repulsed on the road to Brussels — granting that Wellington
had dared take the offensive — the 7,0 0 0 English under Picton,
and the 6,000 Br uns wickers of Duke Frederick William. At
four, when the despatch of the Emperor reached him, enjoining
him to fall back on Brye, he could have detached, by the
Namur road, more than half his forces on to the rear of the
Prussian Army, and changed thereby Bllicher's defeat, into a
disaster.
Jomini allows that the results of the battle of Ligny
might have been decisive, had Ney directed a portion of his
troops upon Brye. But he objects that the Marshal could
not have carried out this movement, even with the help of
the corps under Eeille and d'Erlon, because he would have had
to deal with the 40,000 Anglo- Allies under Wellington.
This argument rests on an essential error. At four o'clock
18
274 WATERLOO book hi
Wellington had with him only the Perponcher division, the
Van Merlen cavalry, the Brunswick corps, and the Picton
division, that is 22,000 men. (Moreover, presupposing the
capture of Quatre-Bras by Ney, between noon and two o'clock,
Perponcher's 7,200 soldiers would have been so crushed, as. to be
quite useless, when the English reinforcements arrived.) The
Alton division (4,000 muskets) did not debouch till half-past
five, and the Cooke and Kruse divisions (7,000 men) not
before seven. Thus, either Wellington would have attacked
at three with Perponcher, Picton, or Van Merlen, in which
case these 15,000 men, struggling against 43,000, would
have been exterminated ; or rather, to prevent his two
divisions being destroyed, one after the other, he would have
waited not only for Brunswick, but for Alten as well, before
taking the offensive ; consequently, he would not have engaged
in battle until about six o'clock. By this time, one -half of
Key's corps would already have been close on the Prussians'
heels, and the Marshal would have had 20,000 men in a good
position, whom he could oppose until nightfall against a force
of 28,000, then of 32,000 assailants. Even if he were com-
pelled to fall back on Frasnes, this retreat, at the approach
of night, would have been without any strategical importance.
Besides, it is very probable that if Wellington, on his return
from the Bussy mill at about three o'clock, had found Quatre-
Bras strongly occupied by the French, he would have
prudently concentrated his troops on Genappe while awaiting
the issue of the battle waging before Ligny. So much, at
least, may be inferred from his ordinary circumspection and
his British egotism.
After a long and confused argument, Clausewitz concludes,
that " ten thousand men on the rear of the Prussian Army
would merely have rendered the issue of the battle more
doubtful, by forcing Bliicher to retire earlier." It proves the
weakness of his case that he intentionally quotes inaccurate
figures. Clausewitz knew very well that the number of
cavalry and infantry, that might have attacked the Prussians
on the rear, amounted not to 10,000, but to 20,000. Now, if
this attack could have no other effect than to precipitate
Bliicher's retreat, by what miracle was Billow's attack at
CHAP. VIII THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 275
Waterloo, two days later, attended by an entirely different
result ? If we listened to Clausewitz we might, in fact, believe
that an army is free to leave a battlefield as easily as a
drilling-ground, and that a sudden retreat, in the heat of
action, can be effected without disorder and without peril.
As for Charras, he takes an entirely personal view of the
question. " The generals," he exclaims, " were admirable. They
did not fail their chief, their chief failed them." He extolls
Ney, "who passed the bounds of possibility, in checking
Wellington with 20,000 men." Charras does not seem aware
that Wellington, until the arrival of the Cooke and Kruse
divisions (at half-past six in the evening), had scarcely 26,000
men* to oppose to the French, who numbered more than
23,000.^ And he wilfully omits to state that, if Ney had
but one army corps to oppose to the English, it was because
he had that morning neglected to concentrate the 2nd and
j 1st Corps between Gosselies and Frasnes. Here, and this
cannot be repeated too often, lies the radical mistake which
: gave rise to all the others : the mistakes of Ney, those of
j Keille, those of d'Erlon, those of the Emperor.
Facts, written orders, time, dates, figures, all contradict the
I conclusions of Clausewitz and Charras. We have also the
I testimony of KeUermann : " Napoleon failed to accomplish his
I object, through the fault of Marshal Ney ; " of Eeille : " It
would have been possible to achieve a far greater success by
turning the right of the Prussian Army ; " of General Delort :
,"Ney, with his 44,000 men, could have held the English in
j check and turned Bllicher's army." Here is also the opinion
I of Kopes : " Had Ney carried out the Emperor's orders, the issue
I of the campaign would have been changed." ^ Here is also the
i opinion of Marshal Wolseley : " If all had happened as Napoleon
} had planned, it is hardly too much to say that Zieten and Pirch's
'.corps would have been annihilated, and, in all probability,
I Blticher and Gneisenau would have been made prisoners." "
I Finally, there is the conclusive admission made by Gneisenau,
'chief of the staff with the Prussian Army, who wrote to the
iKing of Prussia on the 12th of June 1817: "If General
jPerponcher had not made so bold a resistance, Marshal Ney,
irriving at Quatre-Bras, might have turned the right and
276 WATERLOO book hi
fallen on the rear of the army which was fighting at Ligny,
and thus caused its total destruction." ^
Section II
The battle that should have been won — and won even to
the annihilation and dissolution of the enemy — was the battle
of Ligny. On the 16th of June a complete victory gained
over the Prussian Army might, at one blow, have closed the
campaign of the Netherlands. Through Ney's fault, this
battle was not a decisive one. The following day, another
opportunity presented itself, of ending the campaign by the
destruction of the entire English Army. Napoleon, through
his own fault, allowed this opportunity to escape.
The Emperor had separated Wellington from Bliicher, and,
notwithstanding the pause in the action and the commence-
ment of a panic caused by the approach of d'Erlon's corps, he
had, in six hours, beaten 87,000 Prussians with 65,000 French,
thus proving, as he often did, the folly of his own axiom, that
victory was always on the side of huge battalions. There
remained the English Army posted at Quatre-Bras, which had
successfully resisted Marshal Ney. On the 17th of June it
was in the Emperor's power to have exterminated it. Un- i
fortunately, though such a battle was bound to be conclusive I
_and prove a victory, though he had an intuition of it in time
to be of use,^ he did not attempt to enter on the struggle
until he had lost four long hours in delays and hesitations.
This was giving too long a respite to the enemy, and
Wellington decamped.
Doubtless, at daybreak, the Emperor was unaware of the
Prussians' line of retreat, and of the issue of the battle of |
Quatre-Bras. But between seven and eight o'clock, he learnt
from a despatch from Pajol, that Bllicher's army was falliii;,'
back toward the Meuse, and from the verbal report of Elahaut.
that the English were still at Quatre-Bras. Had he, then and
there, taken the steps which he only resolved on between
eleven and mid-day, that is to say, had he marched at once to
Quatre-Bras with Lobau's corps, the Guard, and Milhaud's
CHAP. VIII THE CAMPAIGN OF \%\b 277
cuirassiers, these troops would have debouched between ten
and half-past ten o'clock upon the flank of the English Army,
at the precise moment when the latter was breaking up its
camp. Wellington's forces, deducting the losses of the previous
day and adding the five brigades of Uxbridge's cavalry
which had arrived during the night and in the morning,
numbered hardly 35,000 muskets and sabres. Caught in the
very act of marching, and attacked simultaneously by the
30,000 soldiers under Napoleon on its left, by the 40,000
soldiers under Ney upon its front, the English Army, whether
it made a stand, or whether it attempted a very hazardous
retreat on Genappe or upon NiveUes, could never have avoided
a disaster.
Instead of this Napoleon intended, at first, to leave his
army in camp throughout that day. Then he changed his
mind, matured a new scheme, issued his orders, and started
on his march. But it was too late. The Emperor did not
reach Quatre-Bras until two o'clock. The Anglo-Netherland
division had crossed the Dyle at Genappe. Nothing was left
for him, but to give chase to the horsemen of Lord Uxbridge.
When he came up with the English Army, in position at
Mont-Saint-Jean, night was falling. " I wish," he said, " that
I had Joshua's power now to stop the sun." But the sun had
been shining on the earth for fourteen hours, and Napoleon
had not profited by its light.
It may be urged that the information which the Emperor
received at seven o'clock in the morning, did not appear to
him as sufficiently precise and reliable as to induce him to act
immediately. Was it certain that the Prussians were retiring
towards the Meuse, and could he start in pursuit of them,
without even being certain of the direction they had taken ?
On the other hand, could he, in this imcertainty, march with
his army toward Brussels, without exposing himself to an
offensive blow from Bliicher either against his right flank or
on his lines of communication ? As for Wellington, was it
possible that, knowing of the Prussians' defeat, he had not
already evacuated his position at Quatre-Bras ? As far as
the retreat of the Prussians and the march upon Brussels were
concerned, the Emperor's hesitations were perfectly natural.
278 WATERLOO book hi
But his reasons for deferring the movement against Wellington,
were by no means so judicious. This movement was calculated
to produce such great results that, even at the risk of a useless
march, it should have been undertaken at once with the
Guard and the corps led by Lobau. Either Wellington
would still have been found at Quatre-Bras, thus giving an
opportunity to Napoleon and Ney to attack him in concert,
under the most favourable conditions, or the English would
have decamped already, in which case the Guard and the
6th Corps, could have effected their junction with the corps
of d'Erlon and Eeille. The march upon Quatre-Bras, which
would have resulted in the extermination of the English
Army, would not, in any case, have compromised anything,
for, in view of the trifling distance between this point and
Brye, it was quite as easy for the Emperor to concentrate
his reserve upon his left wing, as to leave it with his right
wing.
It has been alleged, again, that the troops needed rest, and
had to be revictualled with food and ammunition. Kest ?
Exelmans' and Pajol's cavalry had fought the day before until
nightfall, yet were on their march again by sunrise. With
still more reason the Guard, which had been engaged for a very
short time, and the 6th Corps, which had scarcely fired a
shot, might have started at seven o'clock in the morning.
Ammunition ? Only the corps of Gerard and Vandamme
needed a fresh supply, and this operation was certainly
completed by noon. As for the 30,000 men of the 6th Corps
and of the Guard who had marched on Quatre-Bras, their
cartridge belts and ammunition boxes were undoubtedly well
furnished.
There were other causes, therefore, for the Emperor's
inaction during the morning of 17th June. Charras, General
Berthaut, Ropes, and still more, General Wolseley, attribute
it to his state of health. (Neither Wolseley nor Eopes specify
the disease he was suffering from ; Charras declares that 1m
had every disease.) ^° It is possible, indeed, that, during the
night of the battle of Ligny, Napoleon suffered from one of
those attacks of ischuria to which he had been subject for the
last three years, and wbicli had become very frequent during
CHAP, vni THE CAMPAIGN OF \S\o 279
the months of April and May 1815." Grouchy incidentally
mentions that the Emperor felt tired on leaving the Chateau
of Fleurus on the morning of the 17th. According to CJeneral
Le Senecal and Colonel de Blocqueville — the former head of
the staff, the latter aide-de-camp to Grouchy — Napoleon had
been ill during the night.^' "We repeat once more this is
possible. But as Thiers remarks : " Whatever may have been
Napoleon's state of health in 1815, it did not in any way
affect his activity."
Let us review once more these memorable days during
which, if we believe Marshal AVolseley, Napoleon was " wrapped
in a veil of lethargy." On the loth of June he rose at
three o'clock in the morning, went as far as Jamignon,
mounted his horse, stormed Charleroi, issued orders for the
movement of the left wing, superintended the storming of
Gilly by the right wing, and returned to Charleroi at ten at
night. On the 1 6 th he despatched aides -de - camp, and
was busy writing orders by four o'clock next morning. At
nine o'clock he rode to the mill at Fleurus, engaged in battle
at Ligny, and during the final assault at dusk he led the
Guard in person, beyond the first Prussian lines. He retired
to rest after ten o'clock. If he was ill in the night, that did
not deter him from being present by ten o'clock in the
morning of the next day at Brye, where he reviewed his troops
and superintended the care of the wounded. Then lie marched
upon Quatre-Bras at the head of his troops, and, in his
impatience, outdistanced them. He attacked the English
cavalry, and pursued it with his advanced Guard during three
hours at breakneck speed and under a tropical rain. At
Le CaUlou, where he took shelter after sunset, streaming with
water, and as drenched as if he had come out of a bath, he
dictated orders for the army, and was absorbed in the perusal
of his Paris letters. He threw himself on his bed for a few
moments ; then at 1 a.jl he rose, and under the rain which
was still falling, he made the entire round of all his outposts.
When he returned at three o'clock, he listened to the reports
of his scouts and spies. He dictated fresh orders. At nine
o'clock he was on the battlefield again. He did not leave it
until the middle of the night, with the last squares of the
280 WATERLOO book hi
Guard ; and, always on horseback, he crossed the Sambre at
Charleroi, eight leagues from La Belle Alliance, During these
ninety - six hours, this man, who is represented as broken
down, depressed by disease, lacking in energy, unable to
overcome sleep, and incapable of keeping in the saddle, scarcely
took twenty hours' rest ; and, granting that he was on foot
for three-quarters of the time that the two great battles lasted,
he remained in the saddle for more than thirty-seven hours.
In 1815 Kapoleon was in sufficiently good health to enable
him to bear the great fatigues of war, and his brain had lost
none of its power. But with him, his moral power no longer
upheld his genius. Though he strove in his dictations at
Saint-Helena, to prove that he had committed no faults during
his last campaign, in intimate conversations, the secret of these
faults would often escape him. " I had no longer within me
the feeling of certain success," he would say, " I had no longer
the confidence I had of yore. I felt that fortune was abandon-
ing me. No sooner did I secure some advantage, than it was
immediately followed by a reverse. None of these blows
surprised me, for I instinctively felt the issue would be an
unfortunate one." ^^ This state of mind accounts for the hours
wasted by the Emperor during the campaign, his irresolution,
his confused estimate of events, the respite often left to the
enemy. He no longer believed in success, his boldness gave
way with his confidence. He dared not seize and force
circumstances. With his faith in his destiny, he had
always been a daring, audacious gambler. Now that fortune
showed herself contrary, he became a timid player. He
hesitated to risk the game, he no longer followed his inspira-
tion, temporised, weighed the chances, saw the pros and cons,
and would risk nothing save on a certainty.
Section III
In order to be at liberty to act against the English, the
Emperor ought to have been protected against a counter-attack
from Bliicher. And where were the Prussians ? Were they re-
treating toward the Meuse ? or marching to join Wellington
CHAP. VIII THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 -^^ t^
on the south of Brussels ? The Emperor charged Grouchy to
discover their traces and pursue them. It has been said that,
in his uncertainty as to the direction taken by the Prussians
in their retreat, Napoleon, by ten or eleven o'clock on the 1 7th
of June, ought, at all risks, to have ordered Grouchy to march
laterally by the left bank of the Dyle. The Emperor has him-
self refuted this criticisism. '' If Grouchy," he says, in sub-
stance, " had by twelve o'clock on the 17 th marched along the
left bank of the Dyle, without knowing the direction the
Prussians had taken, he would, no doubt, have covered the
flank of the main column, but he would also have left our
lines of communication unprotected." ^* In point of fact, if
the Prussians had withdrawn towards Namur, they might have
returned to Charleroi and cut off the Imperial Army from its
base of operations.
It has also been asserted that, when detaching from the
right only two cavahy corps, some cannon, and a division of
infantry — a force sufficient to hold the Prussians in check — the
Emperor ought to have retained with him a surplus of 20,000
men, who would have proved very useful at Waterloo. Certainly,
in 1814, after the battle of Arcis-sur-Aube, Winzingerode had,
with 10,000 horse, held for two days at bay, the whole of the
French Army. But there were objections in the present in-
stance. Although Tandamme's and Gerard's corps, with Pajol's
and Exelmans' cavalry, were absent from Waterloo, the French
were slightly superior in numbers to the English, and had not
the approach of the Prussians paralysed a portion of the army, it
is probable that the plateau of Mont-Saint-Jean would have
been carried by them about five o'clock. On the other hand.
Napoleon had detached 33,000 men with Grouchy, precisely
for the purpose of holding the Prussians in check. It was
much more important to keep Bliicher away from the battle-
field, than to have himself a surplus force of 20,000 men.
This division of the army into two main bodies, so much /
censured by the historians of the campaign of 1815, was the
usual strategical de^^ce of Napoleon. It was thus that he had
manoeuvred at Marengo,^^ at Jena, at Friedland, and throughout
the whole French campaign, which is so justly admfred. When
two armies are to be reckoned with, it is plain that one must
282 WATERLOO book hi
be held in check, whilst the other is made the object of a
supreme eftbrt.
But could Grouchy oppose the movements of the Prussians ;
were not the Emperor's orders sufficiently precise and explicit,
to preclude their being misinterpreted by Grouchy, and make
him see clearly that his principal aim was to be the warding
off an offensive attack from Bliicher on the flank or on the
rear of the army ? It may be assumed that in his verbal
instructions Napoleon had explained this to the Marshal ; but
with respect to the Emperor's remarks to Grouchy, testimonies
are so self-interested and contradictory, that fair criticism
requires us to rely only on the written order. I have already
quoted the original order. I will now recall the essential
points. " Proceed to Gembloux, reconnoitre in the direction
of Namur and Maestricht, pursue the enemy. It is important
to ascertain whether Bliicher proposes joining Wellington in
order to give battle in front of Brussels."
If, in truth, this letter does not explicitly desire Grouchy
to cover the army, it appears to me certain that it tacitly enjoins
him to do so. " Ascertain whether Bliicher proposes joining
Wellington," that is the important point. Now as Grouchy
had with him not only a few squadrons sufficient to reconnoitre
the enemy, but an army capable of offering a serious resistance,
it was his duty not only to keep the Emperor well informed,
but also to protect him against an offensive attack by
manoeuvring in such a way as to interpose his forces between
the Prussians and the Imperial Army. A man who had
had a twenty years' experience of war could not be mistaken
as to the object of the mission with which he was entrusted.
And indeed the following words from Grouchy's letter, on the
evening of the 1 7 th of June, " I shall follow the Prussians in
the direction of Wavre," prove that he had understood perfectly
the implicit instructions of the Emperor.
Unfortunately Grouchy did not know how to manceuvre
with sufficient rapidity, intelligence, or resolution. On the
1 7th his troops marched with incredible dilatoriness. Whereas
Napoleon reached La Belle Alliance at seven o'clock in the
evening, covering six leagues and fighting all the way. Grouchy,
at the same hour, had only got as far as Gembloux, fourteen
CHAP, vm THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 283
kilometres distant from Saint-Amand. And yet, owing to
the length of the summer days, he might have marched two
hours longer, but he ordered his troops to encamp for the
night. On the next day he could make up for lost time. Well
informed as he was, he could be in no doubt that the Prussians
were heading on "Wavre to join "Wellington. The Emperor
could not order the march by the left bank of the Pyle, as
he was then ignorant of Bliicher's line of retreat, while
Grouchy, who knew this direction, ought not to have hesitated
for a moment in taking it. He would have risked nothing in
any case ; for the Prussians would either be at Wavre, and then
he could turn them by the left bank of the Dyle — a more
advantageous manceuvre than to attack them from the right
bank — or they would already he marching on Brussels or on
Mont-Saint-Jean, in which case he could pursue them by a
flank movement, or, could march to prolong the right of the
Emperor. Grouchy should, therefore, on the 18 th of June,
have marched on Wa^-re, not at seven o'clock in the morning
in single column by Walhain and Corbais as he did, but at
daybreak in two colimms and by Vilrom, Mont-Saint-Guibert,
and Ottignies.^" Starting at four o'clock in the morning, the
two columns would have arrived on the banks of the Dyle at
the bridges of Mousty and Ottignies (seventeen or eighteen
kilometres from G^mbloux) between nine and ten o'clock.
Allowing an hour and a haK for the defiling of the troops
over the two bridges. Grouchy would have found liimself at
eleven o'clock, with the whole of his army on the left bank of
the Dyle.
Before this, no doubt (about eight o'clock). Colonel Ledebur,
on the look-out at Mont-Saint-Guibert with the 10th Hussars
and two battalions, would have perceived the leading columns
of Grouchy's troops. His detachment being too v.eak to
resist, he would have retired upon Wavre, and would have
sent an estafette to Gneisenaii to inform him of the approach
of the French. This despatch would have reached Wa\Te
about nine o'clock, when Billow's corps alone was on the march.
In aU probability Bllicher, or rather Gneisenau, who practi-
cally had aU the authority in his hands, would not have
altered the orders informing Billow and Pirch I. to march on
284 WATERLOO book iii
Chapelle-Saint-Lambert, but would have taken measures to
defend the approaches to Wavre, with the corps under Zieten
and Thielmann. While awaiting the development of the
French manceuvre, would he have been content with leaving
these two corps in position at Bierges and Wavre ? Or, aware
that Grouchy was passing on the left bank of the Dyle, would
he have sent forward Zieten and Thielmann to encounter the
French Army by Bierges and Limelette ? Under the first
hypothesis, it would have been allowable for Grouchy to
start on his march, by his left, upon Ayviers or Maransart as
soon as he heard the sound of the Emperor's cannon ; a
manceuvre which would have brought him close to the battle-
field at half-past two, fully two hours before Blucher assumed
the offensive. Under the second hypothesis, which I grant
is the more probable of the two, Grouchy, with 33,000 men
in a good position on the plateau of Mousty-Ceroux, could
easily have resisted the 40,000 Prussians under Zieten and
Thielmann. But would he have been able, between eleven and
four o'clock, to inflict upon them so decisive a defeat as to
disable them from any further contest, and leave himself free
once more to march on Maransart ? This is most doubtful.
By this battle Grouchy would, in any case, have succeeded
in holding back from Mont-Saint- Jean the two corps under
Zieten and Thielmann, which would have been of no small
importance. In the first place, the panic which ensued at
the close of the battle of Waterloo, when Zieten debouched
on Papelotte, would have been avoided. Nor is this all. We
have seen that at half-past six, when, according to the admission
made by Colonel Kennedy, aide-de-camp to Alten, " the centre
of the English line had been broken through," the approach of
Zieten's corps allowed Generals Vandeleur and Vivian to
move 2,600 fresh horses from the extreme left to the centre,
and strengthened Wellington's confidence. If this support — a
support both material and moral — had failed him, it is
probable that he would not have been able to regain his
positions, before the assault of the Middle Guard, and that
under this supreme onslaught the English line must have
yielded. Wellington has acknowledged that, on the 18th of
June, he found himself in the greatest possible danger.
CHAP. VIII THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 285
" Twice," he has said, " have I saved this day by perseverance.
... I have never fought such a battle, and I trust I never
shall fight such another ! " ^" We may believe also that, if by
mid-day Bllicher had heard the cannonade of a great battle, two
leagues distant from his left flank, and if estafettes had arrived,
hour after hour, announcing the successive reverses of his
lieutenants, he would himself have attacked Plancenoit with less
resolution. Finally, it must not be forgotten that if the Emperor
had been warned, between eight and nine in the morning, by
a despatch from Gembloux, that Grouchy was goiag to cross the
Dyle at Ottignies, he could, long before noon, have sent him
fresh orders, and he would thereby have found it possible to
remain the whole day in close communication with him. What
consequences I
Grouchy, by marching towards the sound of the cauuon at
half-past eleven o'clock, in accordance with Gerard's advice,
might have repaired his grave mistake of the morning in
servilely following on the traces of the Prussians. At that
hour, Exelmans had three brigades of dragoons between
Corbais and La Baraque, and one brigade at the farm-house
of La Plaquerie (1,500 yards from Ottignies); Vandamme's
corps had halted at Nil-Saint- Vincent ; Gerard's corps had
reached Walhain ; Pajol, with his cavalry and the Teste
division, was marching from Grand-Leez on Tourinnes. The
best course was plainly to push forward Exelmans as far as
the woods of La Huzelle, and still farther towards Wavre (if he
could do so without committing himself) in such a way that he
might make the enemy imeasy, and mask from him the move-
ment of the army ; to send Yandamme on Ottignies by Mont-
Saiut-Guibert, and Gerard on Mousty by Gour-Saint-Etienne ;
and lastly, to recall Pajol, who would then have come up and
formed the rearguard. Starting at noon, Vandamme's leading
column would have reached the bridge of Ottignies (10
kilometres from Xil-Saint- Vincent) about a quarter past
three, whilst Gerard's leading column, starting a quarter of
an hour earlier, would have arrived at the bridge of Mousty
(13 kilometres from Walhain) about four o'clock. After
crossing the Dyle, and the troops having henceforth to
march by one road only, Yandamme would have taken the
286 WATERLOO book hi
lead, and his 1st division would have arrived at Maransart
(2 leagues from Ottignies by Ceroux) about six o'clock. To
effect this, no doubt, the columns would have had to march
for 18 kilometres at an average rate of 3 kilometres an hour.
In spite of the wretched cross-roads, the miry lanes, all of
which, indeed, sloped down to the river ; in spite of the time
which the crossing of the bridges would have required, this
pace was possible,^^ especially when we remember, that at each
step the sound of the cannon would grow nearer and more
intense. What a moral stimulant to the soldiers of 1815,
to be marching to rescue the Emperor, to fight under his
command and before his eyes !
Let us now see whether, as Charras and others contend,
the Prussians could have hindered this movement. At noon
Billow was at Chapelle-Saint-Lambert with his cavalry and two
divisions ; his other two divisions were marching to join him.
The corps of Pirch I., bivouacked at Aizemont, had scarcely
begun to cross the bridge of Wavre ; Zieten's corps, bivouacked
at Bierges, was on the point of starting towards Ohain by
Fromont. Thielmann's corps, destined to remain the last in
position on the border of the Dyle, was massed between
Wavre and La Bavette. Finally, Ledebur with his detach-
ment, occupied Mont-Saint-Guibert, where he remained most
tranquilly, without suspecting in the least that he was out-
flanked on his left.
Had Grouchy marched on Ottignies and Maransart instead
of marching on Wavre, on the Prussian side, events would
have happened exactly as they did, at least until three o'clock.
Between one and two, Ledebur would have cut his way
through Exelmans' cavalry ; at two the Brauze and Lange
divisions (Pirch's corps), hearing the noise of the battle raging
in the wood of La Huzelle between Ledebur's sharpshooters
and Exelmans' dragoons, who had two batteries, would have
marched in the direction of this wood, and Thielmann would
have postponed his departure until the issue of the fight.
Towards three o'clock, it is true, the enemy would then
have realised that Exelmans' attack, unsupported as it was
by infantry, was but a mere demonstration. The Prussians
would then have resumed the manoeuvre that had been
CHAP. VIII THE CAMPAIGN Oi* 1815 287
ordered. Pirch's second echelon (Branze and Langen divisions)
would have crossed the bridge of Wavre, and directed its
march on Chapelle-Saint-Lambert. Thielmann would have
left only a few battalions at Wavre, and he would have
prepared to march on Couture with the bulk of his troops.
But before starting from La Bavette in the direction of
Couture, he could not have done otherwise than wait until
the Brauze and Langen divisions, and the cavalry of Sohr (of
Pirch's corps) had defiled ; the latter, as seen previously,
having to wait for the defiling of the whole of Zieten's corps,
which had been obliged to allow the tail of Billow's corps and
the head of Pirch's corps, to pass before them. The Prussian
staff had made the arrangements for the march, so badly that
the intercrossing of the different colimins w^as inevitable. The
principal column (Billow and Pirch I.), marching from Dion-
le-Mont and Aizemont rid Wavre on Chapelle-Saint-Lambert,
was bound to intercept the route of Zieten's corps, which was
striking from Bierges to Chain by Fremont, and of Thiel-
mann's corps which had orders to proceed from La Bavette
to Couture.
In these circumstances, Thielmann could not possibly have
started before four o'clock at the earliest. From La Bavette
to Maransart by Couture, the distance is 14,500 yards.
The 3rd Prussian corps could not, therefore, have reached
Maransart before a quarter to nine, much too late in con-
sequence to stop Grouchy. At that moment Billow, taken in
flank by Grouchy 's troops while stmggling against Lobau and
the Young Guard, would have been for more than an hour
thrown back beyond the Paris wood, or perhaps exterminated
in the valley of the Lasne.
Grouchy acted blindly, but Napoleon did nothing to
enlighten him. Although warned by Milhaud, on the evening
of the 17th, of the retreat of a column of the enemy towards
the Dyle ; although advised by a despatch during the night
lom Grouchy, of the march of at least one Prussian corps
towards Wavre; although cautioned on the morning of 18th
June by Prince Jerome, against a probable junction of the two
belligerent armies on the entrance of the forest of Soignes, it
was only one hour after midday, when the battle was raging.
\
J
288 WATERLOO book hi
that the Emperor sent to Grouchy a formal and distinct order
to cover his right. No doubt he had believed up till then,
perhaps he believed still, that the Marshal was manoeuvring
toward this great object ; no doubt Grouchy 's letter, in which
he was told, " I shall follow the Prussians in order to separate
them from "Wellington," had strengthened this delusion.
But was it necessary to place so much confidence in Grouchy ?
"Was it not most hazardous, with so bold an adversary as
Bllicher, to let the safety of his right flank depend on the
strategic intelligence, the initiative, and the resolution of a
leader who had never exercised so important a command
before ? At all events, the Emperor should have reiterated his
instructions to him, much earlier, and with more precision than
he had done the first time.
J
Section I"V
At Waterloo Napoleon wished to begin the action in the
early morning ; his orders testify to this. Had the battle
begun towards six or seven o'clock, neither Grouchy's great
strategic blunder, nor the mistake of the Emperor himself in
neglecting to repeat his orders, would have led to any serious
consequences, for the English Army would have been routed
before the arrival of the Prussians.^^ Undoubtedly Lobau's
corps, the Young Guard, Domon's and Subervie's cavalry,
which the Emperor was employing against Biilow, and the Old
Guard itself, which, in his anxiety for his right, he kept in
reserve till the last, would, by supporting the other troops,
have decided Wellington's retreat towards twelve or one
o'clock, or perhaps earlier.
The state of the ground, or if we wish to quibble, the false
estimation of the state of the ground, by Drouot and the
artillery ofl&cers, compelled the Emperor to alter his orders.
The attack was postponed from six or seven o'clock, to nine
o'clock, then once more deferred because the troops had not
yet taken up their positions. This delay saved the English
Army.
An attack against the enemy's left, which was weak and
CHAP. VIII THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 289
quite unsupported, or even against his right, in which case a
vast deployment was possible, would certainly have been easier
and less murderous than the assault against the centre. But
Napoleon, manoeuvring between two armies found himseK, so
to speak, pressed between the two jaws of a vice. It was not
enough to remove one of them for a day or two as he had
done at Ligny : he must crush it entirely. For this purpose
the Emperor had to pierce through the centre of the English
army,-° and crush its broken wings. " Napoleon," said
"Wellington, " has attacked me in the old-fashioned way, and I
have repulsed him in the old-fashioned way." Owing to the
circumstances, and in spite of the very restricted position of
the enemy, the " old-fashioned way " was the best for the
Emperor to adopt.
But how many blunders, negligencies, and errors were
there not in the execution ! As we have seen, the demonstra-
tion against Hougoumont, ordered by the Emperor, degenerated
through Jerome's eagerness, through the enthusiasm of the
soldiers, through the lack of viodlance and firmness on the
part of Eeille, into a headlong attack in which the lives of
half the 2nd Corps were uselessly sacrificed. "We have also
seen that the clumsy formation of the four divisions of
General d'Erlon, was the virtual cause of the confusion in
which these troops found themselves, when they gained the
crests, and of the lamentable ruin into which they were
lirown by the English cavalry.
How did it come to pass that Eeille who, according to the
Emperor's orders, was " to advance by degrees, to keep at the
same height as Count d'Erlon," did not carry out this move-
ment ? It is true that one of his divisions (that of Jerome)
was engaged at Hougoumont, but Bachelu and Foy remained,
and were at his disposal, ready to march against the right
centre of the enemy.
How was it that Xey, who had under his immediate
command, the first line, d'Erlon's and Eeille's corps, more than
30,000 bayonets, led two ineffectual assaults against La Haye-
>ainte defended by five companies. "Why did he not shell
the walls till he battered them down ? After two successive
failures in attacking this farm, why did he not renew the
19
290 WATERLOO book hi
assault ? Why did he not comply with the Emperor's order ?
How did he fail to understand that the position of La Haye-
Sainte — " the key of the English position " as Kennedy, Alten's
aide-de-camp, said — ought to be his main object ?
Ney found it easier to commence by the end. Too
cautious at Quatre-Bras, he proved too daring at Mont-Saint-
Jean. Without preparations, without support, without orders,
and before the appointed time, he deliberately risked the
great cavalry movement planned by the Emperor. He
imagined that he could fling down with his cavalry, a
hitherto unshaken infantry, which was occupying a dominant
position. He madly hurled forward to the assault, the two
corps of cuirassiers, the mounted Guard and even the brigade
of carabiniers, the last cavalry reserve of the army which
Kellermann had kept back with strict orders not to stir.
Eeckless though they were, these heroic charges might have
J been successful had they been properly supported by infantry.
Near La Belle Alliance, half of Eeille's corps was posted within
easy range of the cannon from the English position. These
twelve battahons had not yet been engaged ; they were waiting,
standing at ease ! Ney, who, according to Napoleon's remark,
" would forget in the heat of the action any troops which were
not actually under his eyes," never thought of summoning
them to the plateau. It was only when the last charges had
been repulsed, when it was too late for the infantry to
intervene, that he launched these 6,000 men on to the slopes
of Mont-Saint-Jean, where they were decimated without any
useful result.
It was nearly six o'clock. La Haye-Sainte, which Ney had
attempted to carry at two o'clock, and again at four o'clock,
was still in the hands of the enemy. Notwithstanding this,
the Emperor reiterated the order to take it at all costs. This
time Ney did carry the position, and only then did Wellington
consider he was in danger. Unfortunately, it was too late to
turn this gain to advantage. Men and horses were exhausted.
Napoleon entrusted the Marshal with the Middle Guard to
make a supreme last effort ; but instead of making a breach
in the English line with these five battalions of heroes formed
into a single column, Ney broke them up into " echelons," so
CHAP. VIII THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 291
that each battalion found itself, at each point, outnumbered
by the enemy in the proportion of nearly three to one.
It seems that on the right wing, also, great negligence
and mistakes had occurred. The cavalry under Domon and
Subervie proceeded to the outlets of the wood of Paris, when
they ought to have guarded its approaches. Lobau's defence
was brave, but it was Ul-conceived and ill-prepared. It was
not at a distance of only 1,200 yards to the east of La Belle
Alliance in open ground, that he ought to have taken up his
position to arrest the Prussians. At haK-past one, when
Billow's corps was still stationary at ChapeUe-Saint-Lambert,
Lobau had received from the Emperor an order to march in
that direction, "and to choose a good intermediate position,
where he might arrest 30,000 men with his 10,000." This
" good, intermediate position " Lobau did not take the trouble
to seek. It should have been on the range of steep hills
which commanded the valley of the Lasne, opposite the
solitary bridge of Lasne. Here, with his communications
with the bulk of the army secured by the numerous squadrons
under Domon and Subervie, Lobau might have resisted much
longer and more efficiently than before Plancenoit. Indeed,
he might have been impregnable. Clauzewitz admits that
Bllicher would have been compelled to turn him, by way of
Couture. This would indeed have been time gained for the
Emperor ! In case Lobau would have hesitated to proceed so
far in a slanting direction (one league from La Belle Alliance),
he might at least have occupied the Paris wood.
Through the various incidents of the battle we can follow
the development of the Emperor's plan as he had expounded
it that morning to Prince Jerome : Preparation by artillery,
attack by d'Erlon's and Eeille's corps, charges by the cavalry,
final assault by Lobau's corps and the Guard on foot. But
the presence of the Prussians on his right compelled the
Emperor to hold them in check with the 6 th Corps and the
Young Guard, and to keep the Old Guard in reserve far too
long. On the other hand, instead of operating against the
English with method and concerted union, the forces acted
spasmodically, awkwardly at first, then rashly, and at last
desperately.
292 WATERLOO book hi
To judge fairly the Commander-in-chief, who was the
greatest of captains, it must be remembered how his orders
had been understood and executed, where they were not
misinterpreted. Marshal de Saxe, in his Reveries sur I'Art
de la Guerre, has said : " The orders of the general of an
army must be correct and simple, as let us say : " Such and
such a corps is to attack, and such and such a corps is to
support." The generals under him would be men of very
narrow minds indeed, if they did not know how to execute
this order, and carry out the manoeuvre he thought right.
Thus the general of an army ought not to attend to this, or
be anxious about it. He will see things better, preserve a
clearer judgment, and be more in a condition to profit by
circumstances. It is not for him to be everywhere, and play
the part of a sergeant of battle " (Sergent de bataille).
From the great number of mistakes perpetrated at "Water-
loo, Charras, York of Wartenbourg, and Marshal Wolseley,
have all concluded that the Emperor, broken down by mis-
fortune, collapsed under the strain, that he remained inert
and blinded far from the battlefield, and allowed the contest
to proceed without any guidance. "With regard to the
physical and moral state of Napoleon on the 18 th of June,
testimonies are contradictory. Colonel Bandus relates that
the Emperor " was plunged in a species of apathy." ^^ Accord-
ing to oral traditions quoted by Marshal Canrobert and by
General du Barail, Napoleon was asleep during the battle of
"Waterloo. (He also slept at Jena and at "Wagram, and
directed the battle none the less victoriously notwithstanding.)
But Marshal Eegnault de Saint-Jean-d'Angely, who made the
campaign of 1815 in the Imperial staff, relates that far from
dozing, the Emperor was nervous and impatient, and was
continually striking his boot with his cane. (It is thus that
Coignet describes Bonaparte at Marengo, before the arrival of
the Desaix division.) In his manuscript journal, General Foy
writes that he could see the Emperor pacing up and down,
his hands behind his back. I have not read anywhere that
the guide Decoster, so loquacious and circumstantial, ever
spoke of Napoleon's prostrate condition. Walter Scott, who
questioned this innkeeper a few months after the battle, learnt
CHAP. VIII THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 293
from him, that throughout the afternoon the Emperor remained
near La Belle Alliance on horseback most of the time, and
paid great attention to the various phases of the action.
From a remark of Xey uttered at Mezieres, where he passed
the 19 th of June, it appears that Napoleon had shown great
bravery. Be this as it may, there are facts which testify more
clearly than all this hearsay evidence : At eleven o'clock the
Emperor dictated all his arrangements for the attack; at a
quarter past eleven he ordered the demonstration against
Hougoumont; at one o'clock he despatched a message to
Grouchy ; at half-past one he gave an order to Lobau to take
up his position in order to arrest the Prussians, and commanded
Xey to begin the attack on Mont-Saint-Jean. In the inter\^al,
he had caused Hougoumont to be shelled by a battery of
howitzers ; at three o'clock he hm'led a brigade of cuirassiers
against Uxbridge's cavalry, which was assailing the chief
battery ; at half-past three he ordered Ney to take possession
of La Haye-Sainte ; at half-past four he moved the Guard
forward close to La Belle Alliance ; at five o'clock he brought
up the Young Guard to Lobau's rescue ; at half-past five he
ordered Kellermann to support Milhaud's charges ; at six
o'clock he repeated the order to take La Haye-Sainte. A
short time after, he detached two battalions from the Old
Guard to drive the Prussians from Plancenoit. At seven
o'clock he led his Guard in the hollows of La Haye-Sainte
for the final assault. On the way he harangued Durutte's
soldiers, who were on the point of giving way, and sent them
back to face the fire ; he enjoined all the officers to go down
the line of battle, announcing the approach of Marshal Grouchy.
In the evening he formed into squares, in the vaUey, the
2nd echelon of the Guard, rushed to Eossomme, made a stand
there with Petit's grenadiers, and ordered the last volley of
grapeshot tc be discharged into the English cavalry.
Xapoleon never exercised the commandership more
efficiently, and never was his action more direct. But in
reality, forced to play the part of " sergent de bataiUe," so
censured by Maurice de Saxe, he applied all his efforts in
repairing the mistakes, the omissions, and the faults of his
lieutenants. And, seeing all his combinations prove abortive.
294 WATERLOO bk. hi ch. viii
all his attacks failing, his generals frittering away his splendid
troops, his last army melting through their hands, and the
enemy dictating to him, he lost his resolution with his
confidence, hesitated, limited himself to providing against the
more pressing dangers, waited for the lucky moment, let it
pass, and did not dare in time, to risk all, in order to save
aU.
Paris, 1894-1898.
NOTES
BOOK I
CHAPTER I
1. The general estimate on January 15th, 1815 (Military Archives)
shows 195,883 officers and soldiers, from which number must be deducted
3,208 men of the Swiss regiments, and of the 1st foreign regiment (La
Tour d'Auvergne), which Napoleon was compelled to dismiss. There
remained then 192,675 men. But the Army had been increased by 7,000
to 8,000 soldiers enrolled since 15th January, in virtue of an order of
recall issued in November 1814. This levy (which ought to have
produced 60,000 men, and produced but 35,000) continued till February'
15th (Henry Houssaye, 1815, i. 165). As for the re-engaged men who
had, on the 15th, and 20th of March, joined at the depot centres of the
departments, in conformity with the Royal rescript of 9th March (Henry
Houssaye, 1815, i. 327) their number cannot be estimated here, for, on
the 20 th March, they had not yet been enrolled.
The " household troops," the " gendarmerie," the veterans, etc.,
are not included in those 200,000 men.
I cite here the estimate of 15th January, for the excellent reason that
it is, with that of 1st January, the only authentic one existing of the
Eoyal Army of 1815. The estimate of the National Archives (AF.* iv.
1153) which is incorrectly dated 15th March, is obviously subsequent to
5th April, since the Imperial Acts of 2nd April are quoted therein, as
well as the departure from Lyons of the Girard division (4th April).
Napoleon {Memoirs to serve for French History in 1815, 19) estimates
the effective strength of the Royal Army, on 20th March, at 149,000 men,
and Charras (Cavipagne de 1815, i. 40) at 224,000 men. Be it said
here, once for all, that it is useless to stop and discuss the discrepancy
between the estimates given by the Emperor at St. Helena, and those given
by Charras, for both alternately lowered or raised the number of soldiers,
the former in the interest of his memoir, and the latter in the interest of
his thesis. The tables given in his Relation, written by Gourgaud
at dictation of the Emperor, and in the Memoirs to serve for French
History in 1815, are, as a rule, mere deceptions. As for the lists of
estimates given by Charras, and taken from copies sent to him from
Paris, they almost all, as I have ascertained, present notable dis-
crepancies from the originals in the Archives. Is it the fault of
298 WATERLOO book i
the copyist, who copied them incorrectly, or that of Charras, who
misinterpreted them 1
2. Davout (report to the Emperor, undated, 25th or 26th of
March? — Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1936) says 26,000; the estimates show
31,469, 32,884, and even 38,233.
3. Report (mentioned above) of Davout to the Emperor. The
estimates on 1st January show 101,503 deserters; but in January and
February, the levy of 60,000 men, commenced in November 1814. and
which reached men in that category, had continued to work efficiently.
Numbers of men had rejoined the corps, others had obtained after
rejoining their final dismissal at the subsequent musters.
4. The Royal rescript of the 9th March, published on the
12th March, enjoined all soldiers on leave, of every description, to
present themselves, some at their corps, others at the depot centres of the
departments, to be organised into reserve battalions. The Emperor, who
did not care for these reserve battalions (to Davout, 26th March, War
Arch., portfolio of Napoleon's letters), issued on 28th March a decree
abrogating the Royal rescript of 9th March, and ordering every soldier
" who had left the Army, for whatever reason," to rejoin his corps. This
decree was not published before the 9th April. Yet from March 15th
to April 9th, about 4,000 soldiers on six months' leave had returned to
the depots.
5. Report above quoted of Davout to the Emperor (Nat. Arch.
AF. iv. 1936).
6. Napoleon, Corresp. 21,737.
7. Henry Houssaye, 1815, 435-39, 445-47, 563, and notes.
8. Caulaincourt to Napoleon, 25 th March ; to Cardinal Fesch,
8th April (Arch, of Foreign Affairs, 672 and 1801) ; F. de Chaboulon,
Me'm., i. 330.
9. Henry Houssaye, 1815, i. 510-11, and the notes.
10. Carnot's circular, 9th April (Nat. Arch, F.^ * 31); Davout to
Napoleon, 1st May (Nat, Arch. AF. iv. 1936),
11. Corresp. of the prefects, April-June; Reports to the Emperor
and to Fouche, May-June ; Davout's report, 11th May (Nat. Arch.
F. 7, 3774 ; and AF, iv. 1934 and 1936 ; AF. iv, 1947 ; AF.
1939) ; General Corresp. April- June (War Arch.).
12. Davout to the prefects of Mayenne and Maine-et-Loire, 28th
April ; to Bigarre, 14th May (War Arch., Davout's Report to Napoleon,
undated, 10th or 12th April? and 11th May; Nat, Arch. AF. iv.
1936). Those who showed themselves refractory were not prosecuted;
the re-engaged men who were willing to present themselves, were
authorised by certain of the prefects, to enter the departmental corps
destined for home service only. After the 15th May even the reviews
on reassembling were done away with.
13. "The only available resources will amount to 59,000 men,"
Davout had said (report to the Emperor, April, Nat. Arch. AF. iv.
1936). Davout's estimate was even increased by 25,000 men, if we
add to the 76,000 men enrolled or started from 25th April to 10th
CHAP. I NOTES 299
June the 4,000 men on half-year's leave, who had rejoined the corps
between 15th March to 9th April, and finally a few thousand re-enlisted
men who arrived at the depot centres of departments between the 10th
and the 25 th June. (The recruiting operations lasted till after the
abdication.)
14. Davout's report to Napoleon, 11th June (Nat. Arch. AF. iv.
1936). 82,560 re-engaged men had received their marching orders,
but 6,662 had deserted. Of these 82,560 re-engaged, some belonged
to the 85,000 deserters of 1814, others to the 32,000 men on leave
for a limited or imlimited period, who had not rejoined their corps
before 9th April.
15. Henry Houssaye, 18 14^ ii. note 1.
16. Henry Houssaye, 1815, i. note 3, 628.
17. Davout's circular, 8th May (War Arch.).
18. Napoleon to Drouot, 24th May (War Arch., Portfolio of Napoleon's
Correspondence) ; Davout to Napoleon, 26th May (Nat Arch. AF. iv.
1936).
19. Decr^ to Napoleon, 22nd March, and state of the fleet on
23rd March (Nat Arch. AF. iv. 1941). Tliere were but eighty -eight armed
vessels altogether, among these one man-of-war only, eleven frigates,
and five " corvettes." I could not find in the Marine Archives any
general estimate of the personnel ; but a letter from Admiral Duperre,
in command of the arrondissement of Toulon (to Decres, 8th June,
Marine Arch. BB.^ 427) shows that the twenty-nine ships attached to this
naval port — that is to say more than two-thirds of the fleet — had altogether
only 2,666 men to form the united crews.
20. Napoleon, Corresp. 21,698, 21,783, 21,818 ; Decres to Napoleon,
22nd March (Nat Arch. AF. iv. 1941).
21. Napoleon, Gorresp. 21,836, 21,875; Decres to Napoleon, 2nd
May (Nat Arch. AF. iv. 1941).
22. I vainly sought in the Archives of the Marine an estimate of
those mobilised sailors. But a letter of Admiral Duperre, 8th June,
gives at least an approximate result of the levy. Duperre writes that
the first regiment to be formed at Toulon had but 512 officers and men,
that he proposes to raise this number to 1,000, but that he does not
believe it wOl be possible to furnish men for the second regiment
(Duperre to Decres, Toulon, 8th June, Marine Arch. BB.^ 427). Thus
on 8th June, there was at Toulon but one battalion formed. But if
the very hostile arrondissement of Dunkerque was below the mark, those
of Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient, and Rochefort, where the population was
more patriotic and less unwilling to serve, gave a larger number of men
(see the reports on the levies for the sea, 8th, 12th, 14th, and 15th
May, Nat Arch. AF. iv. 1941). Becker, in his Relation (p. 98),
mentions the 14th Regiment of marines. It may then be admitted
that, during June, fourteen regiments of marines were in course of forma-
tion, probably amounting to a single battalion each, which gave a total of
about 10,000 men.
23. The composition of garrisons (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1936). On
300 WATERLOO . book i
14th June, Decres announced to tlie Council of Ministers that the first
regiment formed at Brest would reach Paris on 18th July (Nat. Arch.
AF. iv. 990 ^). See with regard to the Toulon regiment the above-
mentioned letter of Admiral Duperre.
24, History of the Marine Artillery, 135,
25, Davout to Lobau, 1st May (War Arch,) ; official reports of the
Council of Ministers, 8th June (Nat. Arch, AF, iv. 990 ^). See Napoleon,
Corresp. 21,846 ; History of the Marine Artillery, 134-35.
26, Davout to Napoleon, 24th April (War Arch.), See Henry
Houssaye, 1815, i, 20 and 413.
27, Fririon to Davout, 21st March (War Arch.); Imperial decree,
2nd April (War Arch,, Portfolio of Napoleon's Corresp.),
28, Napoleon, Corresp. 21,765 ; Davout to Durutte, 23rd March ;
to Napoleon, 5th and 23rd April ; Derivaux to Davout, Verdun, 25th
March ; Lebarbier de Tinan to Davout, 12th April ; Protean to Davout,
8th April ; Fririon to Davout, 16th April and 1st May; Bigarre's order,
5th June; situation of General d'Armagnac, 17th June (War Arch.);
condition of the fortified posts in June (Nat. Arch. AF, iv, 1936),
29, Napoleon, Corresp. 21,728, 21,767, 21,775 ; Davout, Corresp.
1560, 1561 ; Carnot's circulars, 28th March and 12th April (Nat, Arch,
F.^ * 31) ; memoirs in manuscript of Davout (furnished by General Davout,
Duke of Auerstaedt).
30, Report from Carnot to the Chamber of Peers, 13th June ;
Moniteur, 15 th June.
31, Bulletins des Lois, 13 th April,
32, Decrees of 10th, 15th, 19th, 27th April, and 10th and 15th
May, not recorded in the Bulletin des Lois, but mentioned in the estimates
of the select National Guards, 3rd May (Nat, Arch, AF, iv. 1936) ;
Carnot's circular, 13th April (Nat. Arch. F.^*^ 31).
In his report to the Chamber of Peers, 13th June, Carnot says that
orders had been issued for the formation of 417 battalions. The reason
was that, during June, new battalions were levied in the departments
which were not put down in the May register, namely in Basses-Alpes,
Ardeche, Charente-Inferieure, Cher, Creuse, Dordogne, Gard, Indre,
Lozere, Nievre, Vaucluse, Haute- Vienne, etc. (reports from Limoges,
15th June; from Gueret, 16th June; from Poitiers, 18th June; from
Perigueux, 20th June ; War Arch.). Davout's report to the executive
commission, 23rd June (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1936).
33, Carnot's circular, 18th April (Nat. Arch. F.^ * 31); Carnot's
report to the Chamber of Peers, 13th June (Moniteur, 15th June),
34, Carnot's report to Napoleon, 10th April (for 10th May);
estimate of the select National Guards, 31st May and 8th June (Nat,
Arch, AF. iv. 1935, and AF. iv, 1936) ; Corresp. of the prefects, 1st,
4th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 22nd, and 27th May; 3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th, 9th,
11th, and 14th June (Nat. Arch. F. 7 (3044 2), and F. 7, 3774) ; General
Corresp. from 8th April to 20th June (War Arch.) ; a spy's report to
Clarke, Ghent, 24th April (Wellington's Despatches, Suppl, x. 154).
See Memoirs in manuscript of Barras (comm. by M, Georges Duruy)
CHAP. I NOTES 301
" The battalions of the mobilised National Guards are most en-
thusiastic."
35. Henry Houssaje, 1815, i. 628 and the notes.
36. Estimates of the select National Guards above mentioned ;
Corresp. of the prefects (Nat. Arch. F. 7, 3044 - and F. 7, 3774) ; Carnot's
report to Napoleon, 27th May (Nat Arch. AF. iv. 1936) ; General
Corresp. May (^Ya^ Arch.).
37. Proclamation. Amiens, printing-house of Cherche (W"ar Arch,).
38. Delaborde to Davout, Angers, 8th May ; Davout to Bigarre,
14th May; Prefect of Ile-et-Vilaine to Davout, 26th May ; Charpentiue
to Bigarre, Nantes, 1st June ; Lamarque to Davout, 3rd June ; Bigarre
to Davout, Rennes, 7th and 18th June (War ArcL).
39. State of the select National Guards on 8th June (Nat. Arch.
AF. iv. 1936). See Carnot's report to the Chamber of Peers, 13th June,
and 1815, i. 627, note 4.
40. Davout to Napoleon, 13th May (Nat Arch. AF. iv. 1939);
Decree respecting the National Guards, 10th April.
41. General Rouyer's reports and letters to Davout, 22nd April ;
others from the commissaries extraordinary, Bedoch and de Gerando,
Bar-le-Duc and Nancy, 8th and 10th May; from Leclerc des Essarts,
Sainte-Menehould, 18th May; from Lanusse, Metz, 21st May; from
the commandant at Landrecies, 6th June ; from Major Hervo, Poitiers,
18th June ; from Jourdan, Besancon, 25th June ; Gerard to Vandamme,
Metz, 5th June ; Colonel of gendarmerie at Eovigo, Nancy, 16th
June (War Arch., General Corresp. and the Northern and Jura armies).
Corresp. of the prefects, April-June (Nat. Arch. F. 7, 3774, and F. 7,
3040*); Davout to Napoleon, 28th May (Nat Arch. AF. iv. 1936);
La Bretonniere, Souvenirs du Quartier-Latin, 228 ; Barras' Memoirs in
manuscript. See Henry Houssaye, 1815, i. 629-630.
42. Correspondence of the prefects (Nat. Arch.), and the general
correspondence (War Arch.) infers that from day to day the refractory
soldiers and the insubordinates came in in increasing numbers. One
example amongst many ; the 1 8 battalions to be furnished by the depart-
ments of Charente, Correze and Dordogne had not registered a single
man in the estimates of 8th June, but on 20th June, General Lucott«
Avrites from Perigueux to Davout : " Thanks to the mobilised columns,
I have been enabled to muster 1 3 battalions. The others will follow "
(War Arch., Army of the Western Pyrenees).
43. In his report of 13th June to the Chamber of Peers, Camot
estimated at 751,440 the National Guards, from twenty to forty years
old, who were liable to be mobilised.
44. "You have done very wrong in distributing muskets to the
stationary National Guards of Bethel, whatever may be their patriotism,
for the mobilised Guards themselves cannot be sufficiently armed."
Davou* to Vandamme, 25 th May (War Arch., Army of the North).
The prefect of the Vosges had pikes distributed to the stationary
National Guards. " Pikes are better than nothing," he said in a letter
of 12th June.
302 WATERLOO book]
45. In 1815 the reorganisation of the city and stationary Nationa
Guards, commenced by virtue of a Royal edict, on 18th July, was far"
from being completed ; but in all the towns, and even in many of the
villages, there were a certain number of National Guards provided with
arms and uniforms.
46. Davout's reports to Napoleon, 11th, 20th, 22nd, and 28th May
(Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1936); Napoleon to Davout, 17th May (Nat. Arch.
AF. iv. 1937).
47. Condition of the Paris National Guard on 1st June (Nat. Arch.
F. 9, 760). 11,000 Fusiliers among these Guards, were not yet
clothed.
48. Davout to Napoleon, 17th June (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1936);
General Darricau to Davout, 29th June (War Arch.). On the federated
sharpshooters, see Henry Houssaye, 1815, i. 623-625 and notes.
49. Mouton to Davout, from Lyons, 12th June (Mouton's documents
and papers, "War Arch.) ; Suchet to Davout, 13th June (Nat. Arch. AF.
iv. 1937).
50. Napoleon, Corresp. 21,861.
51. On 17th June the stationary National Guards of the Vosges
started, in the ratio of one company to each battalion, to occupy the
passes (Decree of the prefect, Epinal, 17th June, War Arch.).
52. Early in March the Emperor had felt it must come to this. " It
is a senseless idea," he writes to Davout, " to try to convince oneself
that the army can be recruited otherwise than by conscription. Besides
I flatter myself I have authority enough with the nation to make them
understand this " (Letter of 26th March, War Arch., Portfolio of
Napoleon's Corresp.).
53. Thus the young soldiers of the class of 1815, deserters or
enrolled in the corps, had been dismissed (Royal Act, 15th May 1814,
Military Journal).
54. Davout to Napoleon, 3rd June (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1936).
55. Miot de Melito, Mem. iii. 430, 431.
56. Davout to Napoleon, 15th May (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1534). Cf.
1814, 9, note 1. "The annual contingent," wrote Davout, "is 280,000
men, but there must be a deduction of more than half this number on
account of undersize, infirmities, and, as enrolled in the marines, supporters
of their families, etc. The levy ought to furnish 120,000 men net.
57. Napoleon to Drouot, 30th May (War Arch., Portfolio of
Napoleon's Corresp.) ; Davout's manuscript communicated by General,
the Duke of Auerstaedt).
These orders were not issued till after June 3rd, since Davout's
letter above cited, advising the Emperor not to use the word conscription,
is dated 3rd June.
58. First and second reports from Davout to Napoleon, 11th June
(Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1936); see Davout to Caffarelli, 18th June (Wai-
Arch.).
59. Correspondence of the prefects, 5th and 22nd June (Nat Arch.
F. 7, 3774) ; Prefect of Seine-et-Oise to Carnot, 16th June (War Arch.).
CHAP. I NOTES 303
60. Davout to Durieux, 8th May ; Prefect of the Aisne to Davout,
25th May; Langeron to Lobau, Laon, 2nd June (War Arch^ Army of
the North) ; Napoleon, Corresp. 22,047. The following words of Camot,
in his report to the Emperor, 16th May {Moniteur), must also be quoted :
"Citizens of all ranks, in the department of the Aisne, are giving
unceasing proofs of the noblest patriotism and the most sincere loyalty
to the country" {Moniteur).
61. Greneral Evain's report, 21st March (Nat Arch. AF. iv. 3940).
62. Depots of the corps, 27,000 rifles; artillery stores, 157,000, of
which 70,000 out of repair; marine arsenals, 10,990, of which 3,600
out of repair; general total, 194,990. (Drouot to Napoleon, 27th
March ; Davout to Napoleon, 4th April ; Decres to Napoleon, 29th
March and 10th May, Nat Arch. AF. iv. 1940 and AF. iv. 1941.)
63. Napoleon, Corresp. 21,755, Cf. 21,811, and Napoleon to Davout,
8th April (portfolio of Napoleon's Corresp., War Arch.).
64. Bulletin des Lois, 29th March.
65. Napoleon to Davout, 23rd March (War Arch., Portfolio of
Napoleon's Corresp.) ; Davout to Napoleon, 4th April (Nat. Arch.
AF. iv. 1940); Napoleon, Corresp. 21,755, 21,947, 21,972.
66. Davout to Napoleon, 4th, 14th, and 29th April ; to Lemarois,
3rd June (Nat Arch. AF, iv. 1940 and War Arch.) ; Napoleon, Corresp.
21,755, 21,811, 21,887 ; Bulletin des Lois, 29th March.
67. Davout to Napoleon, 4th, 14th, and 29th April (Nat Arch.
AF. iv. 1940). The rifles out of use, were in such a pitiable condition,
that the Emperor's first plan was to have them taken to pieces (Napoleon
to Davout, 8th April ; 8th April, War Arch., Portfolio of Napoleon's
Corresp.).
68. Davout to Napoleon, 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th of June (Nat. Arch.
AF. iv. 1940) ; Davout, Corresponde^ice, 1747. Letters from Langeron,
Laon, 1st June ; from Lorecez, Metz, 5th June ; from the Commandant
of Landrecies, 6th June ; from Suchet, Chambery, 9th and 10th June ;
from Bonnaire, Conde, 12th June ; from Hervo, Poitiers, 18th June,
etc. (War Arch., Armies of the North, of the Alps, and General
Corresp.).
69. Ruty to Davout, and Davout to Ruty, 19th May (War Arch.,
Army of the North) ; Napoleon, Corresp. 219.
70. Davout to Napoleon, 29th April (Nat Arch. AF. iv. 1940);
Davout's circular, 22nd April ; Orders of Neigre, 18th May ; Reports
from the colonels of the 1st and 2nd of the line, Beaumont, 22nd May ;
state of the artillery on 1st June (War Arch., Army of the North). A
number of cartridges had been used besides for target practice. In
several regiments the men had used as many as forty each.
71. Davout's report to Napoleon, 5th April (Nat. Arch. AF. iv.
1940).
In 1815 the outfit of an infantry soldier, first suit, cost 122 frs^
including under-clothes and shoes ; that of a cavalry soldier, 197
frs. In addition, there was a sum of 17 frs. for keeping each man's
garments in repair.
304 WATERLOO book i
72. Eeports of the Councils of Ministers, 14th June 1814 (Nat.
Arch. AF.* v.2); sub-prefect of St. Quentin to Clarke, 14th March 1815 ;
Letters to Davout : from Briche, 26th March ; from Vandamme, 22nd
April ; from Brune, 1 6th May ; from Lobau, 1 2th June ; from Grouchy,
14th June (War Arch. AF. iv. 1936); Davout, Gorresp. 1661, 1664;
Napoleon, Gorresp. 21,884.
73. Davout's report, 5th and 6th April ; report from Lebarbier
de Tinan, 23rd June (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1941) ; C. Napoleon, Gorresp.
21,885, 21,886, 21,891 ; Davout, Gorresp. 1603 ; report of the Council
of Ministers, 26th April (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 990^).
74. Davout, Gorresp. 1590, 1603, 1667, 1678. (See in the Gorresp.
of Napoleon the above letters, in which Napoleon complains of the
delays in completing the outfit and equipment.)
75. Estimates according to the tables of 1815 (War Arch.) ; Davout
(report to Napoleon, 28th March, Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1941) says
21,320 ; but he only reckons those horses fit to enter on the cam-
paign.
76. Estimates as above. See Napoleon, Memoirs to serve as History, 26.
77. Napoleon, Gorresp. 21,741, 21,756, 21,810, 21,910; report of
the Council of Ministers, 1 7th May ; Davout's reports to Napoleon,
7th and 21st April (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1940 and 1941); Davout's
circulars 17th and 26th April ; Rovigo to Davout, 27th April and
6th May (War Arch.).
78. Davout dreaded difficulties which did not arise (Letter to
Napoleon, 6th May, Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 990 ^ and 1941). Certain
departments, notably L'Aisne and the Ardennes, furnished as many as
500 horses (Letter from Langeron, 3rd June, War Arch., Army of
the North).
79. On the conduct of Preval, during the campaign of France, see
Henry Houssaye, 1814, 435.
80. Napoleon, Gorresp. 21,982 ; report of Bourcier, 21st June
(War Arch, estimates). General Preval was restored to favour 23rd May.
The Emperor appointed him director of the cavalry, at the ministry of
war (Napoleon, Gorresp. 21,961). But this measure was too late.
81. Cavalry of the line, 35,201 (general situation on 1st June, Nat.
Arch. AF. iv. 1936) ; cavalry of the Guard, 4,958 (estimate of d'Heriot
on 16th June, War Arch.) ; total, 40,159.
82. Artillery of the line, 13,823 (general estimate on 1st June,
Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1936). Artillery of the Old Guard. Auxiliary
artillery train of the Guard, 2,851 (estimate of d'Heriot, 6th June, War
Arch.) ; total, 16,674.
83. Napoleon, Gorresp. 21,729, 21,733, 21,787, 21,828, 21,865;
Davout to Napoleon, 11th, 13th, 19th, and 25th April (Nat. Arch.
AF. iv. 1940) ; Davout's orders, 8th April, and various letters to
Napoleon, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th April (War Arch.).
84. Reports on the works at the fortresses, 1st, 5th, 9th, 11th, 20th,
24th, 28th of May (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1940). Letters to Davout, from
Ruty, 7th May; from Dumonceau, 7th May; from Suchet, 21st May;
CHAP. I NOTES 305
from Perrin, 26th May ; Lelerc des Essarts to Loban, 27th May.
Condition of the works in various places, 15th June (War Arch.).
85. Napoleon, Corresp. 21,733, 21,865, 21,892 ; Dejean to
Xapoleon, 2nd May (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1940); General Lery's report,
Lyons, 1st June (War Arch.).
86. Napoleon, Corresp. 21,862.
In his writings at St. Helena, Napoleon Insists several times on
the urgent necessity of fortifying Paris in 1815. But neither in his
correspondence, nor in any of the documents at the Archives, do we find
any proof of his attending to them before 1st May. During March
and April he orders a great number of towns to be placed in a state of
defence ; he makes no orders with regard to Paris. No special motive
can be ascribed to this delay, save the fear of alarming the Parisians.
It is true that in his letter of 1st May, the Emperor says, " my aim is
to show that we are conscious of the danger." But if Napoleon had
that aim in view on 1st May when all hopes for peace had vanished, he
did not have it a month or even a fortnight previously.
87. Napoleon, Corresp. 21,862, 21,273. See Memoirs to serve for
History in ISlo, 45-57. Gourgaud, Campagne of 1815, 14-16, and the
map of the defensive works planned or executed in 1815 (published
about 1840).
88. Reports to Napoleon from Davout, Lannoy, and Dejean, 2nd
3rd, 8th, 20th, 24th, and 29th May. Police reports, 1st, 2nd, and 4th
June (Nat Arch, AF. iv. 1938, 1940, and F. 7, 3774) ; Journal de
VEmpire, 1st June ; Duponthon to Davout, 18th May (War Arch.).
89. Davout to Napoleon, 29th and 31st May, 9th June (Nat Arch.
AT. iv. 1940); Davout to Duponthon; Commandant Martin's report,
June s.d. ; Valence to CaffareUi, 19th June ; Gienier to Davout, 20th
June (War Arch.). See Davout's report to the commission of the
government, 2nd July (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1936).
90. Napoleon, Corresp. 21,856, 21,867, 21,883, 21,888, 21,934,
21,973, 21,983, 21,995, 22,041, 22,048. Davout to the director of
the artillery at Metz, 2l5t April ; to Soult, 31st May. Report of the
artillery, undated, Lannoy's report, Lyons, Ist June ; Vallee's report,
Paris, 15th and 17th June (War Arch.): Davout to Napoleon,
16th May. Decres' report, 8th and 10th June (Nat, Arch. AF. iv.
1940 and AF. iv, 1941),
91. Davout's letters, 23rd March and 1st April; "Feuillea de
travail" of the Council of Ministers, 5th April (Nat. Arch. AF. iv.
1941, and AF. iv. 990^). See Napoleon, Corresp. 21,971; Suchet to
Davout, Chambery, 21st May; La Salcette to Davout, Grenoble, 25th
May (War Arch.).
92. Ordonnateur Daure's report, 16th May (War Arch.) ; Davout,
' rresp. 1587, 1595, 1656, 1670, 1685, 1693; Napoleon, Corresp.
21,872, 21,915 ; Davout's manuscript souvenirs (furnished by GSeneral
Davout, Duke of Auerstaedt^. Draught of the Doumerc contract (Nat.
Arch. AF. iv. 1941),
93. Condition of the fortified places on 15th June (War Arch.),
20
306 WATERLOO book i
Napoleon, Memoirs to serve for History in 1815, 36-38. General- Intendant
Daure's reports, 4tb. and 12th. June (War and Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1938).
94. Davout to Napoleon, 28th March (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1941) ;
see Carnot, Tahlea^i of the situation of the Empire {Moniteur, 1 5th June).
Soult had deemed this budget of 200 millions to begin with (Law of
23rd September 1814) inadequate, and an increase of 98,052,000 was to
be demanded from the Chambers of Louis XVIII.
95. Napoleon to Gaudin, 2nd April (Corresp. 21,761).
96. Las Cases, Memoires, vi. 418, 419 ; Pasquier, Mem. 3, 26.
97. Act of the 8th of April {Bulletin des Lois, 11th April).
The Emperor created besides a Fund extraordinary to receive all
the casual sums not entered in the Budget ; these sums to be used to
indemnify the proprietors of houses destroyed during the invasion of
1814 (Act of 6th April).
98. Corresp. of the prefects, April- June (Nat. Arch, F. 7, 3774 and
AF. iv. 1935).
99. 50 millions (Pasquier, Mem. iii. 151) ; 50 millions (Napoleon,
Mem. to serve for History, 27, 28) ; 42 millions in bonds and 30 millions
in specie (Allgemeine Zeitung, 16th May).
100. Vitrolles, Mem. ii. 339. Baron Louis' scruples, unfounded, if
he believed that the royal government would establish itself at Lille,
were quite legitimate, if, as may be surmised, he expected the king
would pass the frontier. These funds belonged not to Louis XVIII., but
to the country.
101. Corresp. of the prefects, April-May (Nat. Arch. F. 7, 3774 ;
Lannoy's report, Lyons, 1st June (War Arch.). " The contributions are
coming in well," Avrites the prefect of the Moselle, on lOtb May. There
only remain to be recovered, on the first j^, 169,000 francs, out of
1,256,000 francs.
Needless to remark the same readiness was not manifested in all the
departments. See Mollien, Mem. iv. 190 ; and Mollien to Davout, 15th
June (War Arch.).
102. Napoleon, Mem. to serve for History, 27. (See Corresj). 21,761.)
103. 23,920,120 francs, Carnot, Outline of the Situation of the Empire
(Moniteur, 15th June). About one-tenth of this sum was to be deducted,
for the citizens who paid a minimum of 50 francs in direct taxation had
to arm and clothe themselves at their own expense.
104. Carnot's circular, 29th April (Nat. Arch. F.i » 31).
105. Official reports of the Council of Ministers, 1st and 24th
May (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 990^). Imperial act, 27th May ; Carnot,
Outline of the Situation of the Empire {Moniteur, 15th June). On patriotic
donations amounting, it seems, to several millions, see 1815, i. 630, 631.
These various resources were inadequate to the expenses. In the
department of Yonne the prefect Gamot opened a subscription list ;
in the Aisne also the subscription amounted, from 8th May, to
200,000 francs. In the Ain they had recourse to a division of the
contributors on account of the 13 centimes per franc paid in direct
taxes ; in the Ardennes, General Vandamme requested the manu-
CHAP. I NOTES 307
facturers of Sedan to furnish clotli under guarantee of the department
By the middle of June almost all the prefects found it impossible to
fulfil the engagements they had entered into with the contractors.
Carnot's circular, 31st May. Letter of the prefect of the Ain, 14th
May (Nat Arch. F.^^Sl and F. 7, 3740); Vandamme to Davout, 1st
May (War Arch.) Moniteur, 16th May.
106. General Corresp. between 15 th May and 23rd June (War Arch.).
Report on the works in the fortified places, 28th May (Nat Arch. AF.
iv. 1940).
107. Paymaster- General to Soult, 20th May ; Davout to Soult,
I 21st May ; Mollien to Davout, 28th May (War Arch., Army of the
! North). See Napoleon, Corresp. 21,960.
I 108. General Manager Daure's report, 12th June (Nat. Arch. AF.
iv. 1935). Daure adds, " There will be 25,000 by the end of July."
I 109. Pire to Davout, Laon, 13th June (War Arch.) Guilleminot to
j Davout, La Villette, 1st July (Nat Arch. AF. iv. 1941). The expenses
I of the early part of the campaign were not paid until the army was
I about to retire beyond the Loire,
i 110. Daure's report, 12th June (Nat Arch. AF. iv. 1938). Daure
! means here the pay for the Army of the North alone, and the funds
j belonging to this army.
111. See Napoleon, Corre.9p. 21,886, 21901, 21,960. Mollien, JW^tw.
! iv. 190. Allgemeine Zeitung, 16th May; Mollien to Davout, 28th May
(War Arch.).
112. MoUien, Mem. iv. 192.
113. Davout's report to the Government Commission, 23rd June (Nat
I Arch. AF. iv. 1941).
, 114. Gaudin's report to the Emperor, proposed financial bill
1 (Moniteur, 20th and 21st June). A short time after the second return of
I the Bourbons, an absolutely similar loan, amounting, however, to
50,000,000 less, was raised or rather enforced in accordance with Baron
as' advice.
The Imperial budget for 1815 was forecast in receipts and expenses,
at the same sum, 770 millions. If one considers that the expenses of
i the Royal budget were estimated at 646 millions, 547,700,000 francs
(Moniteur of 2nd July 1814) with a surplus of 98,052,000 francs for the
I war budgets (Davout to Napoleon, 28th March 1815. Nat Arch. AF.
jiv. 1941), it seems certain that Gaudin's budget would have resulted
;in a deficit of some importance, though the Emperor estimated that,
'except in the war expenses, great saving might be effected in the budgets
of all the ministries (Napoleon, Corresp. 21,761).
115. Henry Houssaye, 1815, i. 342, 343.
116. Napoleon, Corresp. 21,723, 21,734, 21,747, 21,765. Davout
rresp. 1514, 1515; Lobau to Davout, 24th March; Davout to
Napoleon, 31st March, 11th April (War Arch.).
The 1st Corps was formed of the garrisons of the 16th military
[division (Lille). The 2nd partly of the troops of the Duke de Berry's
'late army, partly of those who had followed the Emperor from Grenoble.
308 WATEBLOO booki
Tlie 3rd witli the garrisons in the 2nd military division (Mezieres) ; the
4th with the garrisons of the 3rd and 4th military divisions (Metz and
Nancy); the 5th with the garrisons of the 5th military division (Strasburg) ;
the 6th with the garrisons of the 7th and 8th military divisions (Grenoble
and Toulon) ; the 7th with the garrisons of the 9th and 10th and
11th military divisions (Montpellier, Toulouse, and Bordeaux) ; the 8th
partly with the troops formerly under the orders of the Duke de Berry,
partly with those the Emperor had brought with him.
117. Napoleon to Davout, Gorresp. 21,749, 21,789, 21,794, 21,821,
21,822; Davout to Carnot, 11th April; Davout orders, 10th, 11th,
12th, 20th, 21st, and 27th April (War Arch.).
118. Napoleon, Gorresix 21,731; see 21,147, 21,810; Davout's
orders, 1st April ; Davout to Napoleon, 24th April (War Arch.).
119. The Guard comprised, on 20th March, 7,390 officers and
soldiers (Davout's report, 21st March, Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1940). The
Emperor increased it to 28,328 officers and soldiers. (Estimates signed
by d'Hdriot, 16th June, War Arch., Portfolio of estimates.)
120. Napoleon to Davout, 26th March (War Arch., Portfolio of
Napoleon's Correspondence) ; Napoleon, Corresp. 21,737, 21,896, 21,994 ;
Davout to Napoleon, 22nd April, 9th and 13th May (Nat. Arch. AF. iv.
1940) ; d'H^riot's estimates, 16th June (War Arch., Portfolio of
estimates).
Moreover, there was organised a company of foot artillery of the
Young Guard, and an auxiliary artillery corps of the Guard, including
horse artillery, foot artillery, and waggons.
121. Davout's circular, 14th April (War Arch.); Napoleon, Corresp.
21,737 ; Davout's reports, 22nd, 23rd, 26th April, 9th and 13th May
(Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1940).
122. See chap. ii. (pages 101-104) a complete estimate of the Army
of the North on its entrance on the campaign.
123. 15th infantry division, Heudelet, then Rottenbourg ; 16tli
division, Albert ; 8th cavalry division. Merlin ; division of the select
National Guard, Berkheim ; artillery and engineers (Estimates of the
Army of the Rhine on 20th June, Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1936).
124. 22nd infantry division, Pacthod ; 23rd division, Dessaix ;
15th cavalry division, Quesnel : four divisions of select National Guards
under Chabert, Pannetier, Dufresse, and Morantin ; artillery and
engineers (Estimates of the Army of the Alps on 15th June, War j
Arch.).
125. 26th infantry division, Harispe ; 5th Mounted Chasseurs, six i
battalions of select National Guards from Charente ; artillery ami
engineers (Estimates of the corps on 8th June, War Arch.).
126. 27th infantry division, Fressinet ; 15th Mounted Chasseurs,!
seven battalions of mobilised soldiers under the name of Chasseurs of the
Pyrenees ; artillery and engineers (Estimates of the corps on 1st Juno,
War Arch.).
127. Divisions of Travot and Brayer. The general estimate on 1
June (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1936) places the Army of the West at 7,5:^"
CHAP. I NOTES 309
men for the infantry of the line only, that is to say leaving out the 2nd
Voltigeurs, and the 2nd Light Infantry of the Young Guard, in all
2,014 bayonets.
128. 17th infantry division, Verdier ; 14th Mounted Chasseurs,
artillery and engineers (Estimates of the corps on 20th June). See Brune
to Davout, Antibes, 16th June (War Arch., Corps of the Var).
129. 18th infantry division, Abbe; 9th cavalry division, Castex ;
two divisions of mobilised National Guards, artillery and engineers
(condition of the corps on 15th June, War Arch.).
130. Keserve of Avesnes, 5,000 men ; corps of the Argonne (at St.
Menehould), 3,063 ; reserve of Colmar, 3,603 ; reserve of the Moselle at
Nancy, 5800 (condition of the divisions of the select National Guards on
1st and 10th June, War Arch, and Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1936).
Nine other divisions of mobilised National Guards, in all 28,437
men strong, were included, as seen before in the corps of Rapp, Suchet,
Clausel, Decaen, and Lecourbe.
I 131. State of the garrisons on 10th, 15th, and 21st June ; General
I Frere's report on the northern fortresses, 1st June ; General d'Ambrugeac's
report, Bordeaux, 1 7th June ; estimate of the Army of the Alps, 1 5th
! June (War Arch.) ; Davout to Napoleon, 10th June ; Davout's report to
j the Government Commission, 23rd June (Nat Arch. AF. iv. 1936).
I 132. General estimate on 1st June (Nat Arch. AF. iv. 1936). In
j this number are included the sappers, and miners, pontoonmen and
j artillery labourers.
133. 500 men out of these 6,000 had been attached to the flying
columns of the West See page 6.
134. General situation from the 5th to the 10th April, -wrongly
dated 15th March (Nat Arch. AF.* iv. 1153).
135. The thirty fortresses from Abbeville to Metz, possessed
altogether 3,236 gunners of the garrison artillery (garrisons of fortresses
of the 2nd, 5th, 1st, and 16th military divisions in June. Nat.
Arch. AF. iv. 1936). There is therefore no exaggeration in estimating
at 3,000 the garrison artillery in the other sixty-five strongholds of
France.
136. The general estimate on 1st June (Nat Arch. AF. iv. 1936)
gives 16,916 men ; but according to private estimates of the army corps on
10th June, which help us to judge of the effective strength of these army
corps on 10th June, 2,982 men only had joined the war battalions. On
10th June, there remained, therefore, 13,934 men on their road to join
them.
137. The recapitulation of the above estimates shows for the line,
only 70,792 officers and soldiers liable or not, to be employed in the
depots and in the cities of the interior. But from this total of 70,792
men must be deducted 11,233 gunners, soldiers of the engineer corps,
artillery men, etc., supposed in these general estimates to be in the
fortified places, and consequently already reckoned above by us.
138. Estimates of the Guard on 16th June, signed d'Heriot (War
Arch.).
310
WATERLOO
BOOK I
139. Napoleon summoned from Corsica, which he believed might
defend itself with its militia only, all the troops of the line, but he sent
from Toulon to Elba a battalion of the 15th of line, 700 men (Napoleon,
Gorresp. 21,698, 21,786, 21,896, 21,951).
140. Eight additional battalions of the 5th Light Infantry, 26th,
62nd, and 7l8t of the line. Plan of the movements of the troops, April
1814 to May 1815 (War Arch.). Trial of Admiral de Linois, 41, 44, 47.
141. General situation on 1st June (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1996).
142. See page 6 and the notes.
143. General situation from 5th to 10th April, falsely dated 15th
March (Nat. Arch. AF. iv.* 1153).
144. Rovigo to Napoleon, 12th April (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1936).
145. In the only strongholds of four departments: Pas-de-Calais,
Nord, les Ardennes, and Meuse, there were 3,541 custom-house officers.
(Estimates of the garrisons of fortified places in June, Nat. Arch. AF. iv.
1936). In estimating three times the number of custom-house officers in
all the other frontier departments, this figure is certainly below the
correct one.
146. Henry Houssaye, i5jf5, i. 628-629.
147. See page 7 and notes.
148. Imperial Guard — Officers and Men.
In the Army of the North ...... 20,755
In the Army of the Loire ...... 2,014
In the depots : fit or unfit for service .... 5,559
Troops of the Line
With the armies ........
In the fortresses : artillery, engineers, artillerymen, etc.
On the way to join the armies .....
In the depots : fit or unfit for service ....
In the hospitals ........
War battalions despatched to the island of Elba, and in
the Colonies ........
Total of the Army under Arms
28,328
158,174
11,233
13,934
59,559
8,162
4,700
284,090
Auxiliary Army
Reserve divisions of the mobilised National Guards . . 45,903
Mobilised National Guards (on the frontier and in the
towns of the interior), about ..... 90,000
Military pensioners on the frontier and in the towns of
the interior 25,000
Marine gunners ........ 6,000
Marine fusiliers, about ....... 10,000
Carried forward . 176,903
CHAP. I NOTES 311
Officers and Men.
Brought forward . 176,903
Veteran fusiliers . . . . . . . . 5,129
Veteran gunners ......
Garrison artillery, about .....
Gendarmes .......
Custom-house officers (in frontier fortresses), about
Partisans and free corps, about ....
2,071
6,000
14,521
12,000
6,000
Total of the Auxiliary Army . . 222,624
(The gunners and coast-guards, the foresters, the free battalions from
Corsica, and the Corsican and Elban militia, the Vendean chasseurs, are
not included in this list, neither are the federated sharpshooters from
Paris, Lyons, and Toulouse, etc. (about 25,000 men), the levies en masse,
and the garrison artillery of the National Guards.)
With regard to this table, will be given as, in some way, a mathe-
matical proof, the list of the resources in men, which the Emperor found
ready for bringing up the active strength of the army to 284,090 men.
Royal army on 1 5th March (troops of the line and of the ex- Imperial
Guard) about 200,000
Soldiers on leave (for a limited or unlimited period) who
had joined the corps on 15th March and 25th April, about 4,000
Deserters of 1814 and soldiers on leave (for a limited or
unlimited period) who had joined the corps 1st May and
15th June 52,446
Men in the same categories having received their marching
orders previous to 10th June, and having rejoined the
depots, 15th June, about ...... 4,500
Foreign soldiers, — Swiss, Poles, Belgians, German, Spanish,
eta, about ........ 3,500
Troops recalled from Elba, about . . . . . 1,100
Volunteers, about ........ 15,000
Officers on half-pay re-embodied in the regiments of the
Xew Guard, and in the new battalions, squadrons, and
batteries of the line ....... 4,506
285,052
(The surplus of these officers was employed in the battalions of federated
sharpshooters, and in the battalions of the mobilised guards.)
These two lists being a recapitulation, it seems superfluous to give
again the references already quoted in the preceding pages ; but it must
be said that the different totals resulting, with few exceptions, from
estimates made previous to 15th June, are certainly below the real
totaL And for this reason: During the month of June 1815, France
was wholly occupied by recruiting operations. From the depots, men
were constantly starting for the army ; from the chief centres of the
312 WATERLOO book i
departments, men were ceaselessly passing to the depots ; from towns
and villages also men were every day sent on to the chefs-lieux
of departments. The result was that the army daily increased, but
without exhausting the depots. Thus in a report dated 11th June
(Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1936) and necessarily compiled from previous
estimates, Davout writes that there are 52,464 half-year men and
re-enlisted men, enrolled, and 23,448 on their way. Now, on 15th
June, not only several thousands of those 23,448 men had rejoined the
depots, but as the recruiting operations had gone on, more men than
Davout had reckoned on, had left the departments. The Correspondence
of the prefects (Nat. Arch. F. 7, 3044,* and F. 7, 3774) mentions
departures of re-engaged men up to 25th June.
The same applies to the mobilised National Guards. In a report of
8th June (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1936) Davout estimates at 108,094 the
mobilised who have reached their destinations, and at 24,178 the
mobilised en route. Now, in another report of 23rd June (Nat. Arch.
AF. iv. 1936) he enumerates for each reserve division and stronghold all
the mobilised men, and the total thus obtained amounts to over 140,000
men formed in battalions.
149. Davout's report to Napoleon, 11th June (Nat. Arch. AF. iv.
1936) ; Davout says : 23,448 from the estimates of 1st to 10th June ;
but as was seen in the recapitulary lists on the preceding page, one-
fifth at least of those re-engaged men sent on — about 4,500 — ought to
have joined the depots by 15th June.
150. See note on preceding page.
151. Davout's report to Napoleon, 11th June (Nat. Arch. AF.
iv. 1936).
152. See the estimates of the National Guards on 8th June
(Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1936) ; review of the situation of the Empire,
by Carnot on 13th June in the Chamber of Peers, and Davout's
report on 23rd June to the Government Commission (Nat. Arch. AF. iv.
1936).
153. The contingent ought to have furnished 120,000 men at least,
and from this number 46,419 men must be deducted who were
assembled from 11th June, at the depot centres of the departments.
(Davout to Napoleon, 23rd May and 11th June, Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1534
and 1936.)
154. The levy should have amounted to 234,720, but 150,000 only,
or thereabouts, had been enrolled or sent en route by the beginning of
June. (See Henry Houssaye, IS 15, i. 627 and note 4, also p. 8 of
this vol.)
155. See p. 8 and notes 42, 43.
156. Napoleon, Memoirs to serve for the History of 1815, 28. At all
events, if Napoleon gave a fairly accurate estimate of the French army
when he computed it at 800,000 men on the 1st October, he made a
radical mistake in the details he gave respecting it. His estimate
(Annexe B) is in every point inaccurate. He computes the Army extra-
ordinary, National Guards, etc., at 224,000 men only, and the army of
ciL\p. I NOTES 313
the line at 584,000, when the Guard and aU the line together could
scarcely furnish 420,000 men.
157. Henry Houssaye, 1815 i 22.
158. Davout's circular, 28th March (War Arch.).
Moreover, a commission composed of Grenerals Arrighi, Girard,
Berthezene, Sebastiani, Lallemand, Colonel Bernard, etc., was formed on
2nd April, to revise all promotions to the rank of superior officer and
general which had been conferred on the oflBcers of the ex-Imperial army
under Louis XVIII.
{Mon-Ueur, 2nd April ; Davout, Gorresp. 1617). The official reporta
of this commission do not exist among the War Archives (at least we have
not been able to find them), and the retrogressions pronounced by it are
naturally not mentioned in the record of those concerned ; no more are
the promotions signed during the Hundred Days. In a letter annexed
to Berthezene's dossier, this general says that the work of the Commission
was never completed and had no results. This assertion agrees with a
report addressed from Paris to Wellington, 22nd April {Despatches,
Supplementary, x. 163) where it is said: "The Emperor has confirmed
, almost all the nominations in the Army and in the ' Legion of Honour.' "
! "We know, however, from Davouf's reports, that the Commission proposed
the confirmation of 36 promotions out of 66, signed by the king in the
1 cavalry of the line, and the annulling of 30 ; it decided also on the
retrogression to brigadier rank of several generals of division, among
them Preval (Davout to Napoleon, 6th and 28th April, 26th May, 7th
and 14th June, Nat Arch. AF. iv. 1940 and 1939).
[ 159. Lobau and Davout's circulars, 1 7th and 22nd April (War Arch.) ;
! Davout's report, 13th May (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1939). See Napoleon,
Corresp. 21,737, and Napoleon to Davout, 26th March (War Arch.,
Portfolio of Napoleon's Letters).
160. Notice on Cuneo d'Omano, Journal de VInditut Historique, 1st
June 1863. This appointment, unrecognised on the king's return, as
well as all those made during the Hundred Days, is not mentioned
in the record of Cuneo d'Omano.
161. For the conduct, on the Emperors return, of the 50 or 60
officers here mentioned, see Henry Houssaye, 1815, L 207-426.
162. Marchand's account (Marehand's documents, War Arch.).
163. Ofticial reports of the Council of Ministers, 7th June (Nat. Arch.
AF. iv. 990 \
164. General Rapp, Mem. 342, 347.
165. Napoleon to Davout, 26th March, 10th April, 6tli, 15th, and
22nd May (War Arch. Napoleon's Letters) ; Napoleon to Davout, 26 th
and 29th March, 10th and 18th April, 2nd and 28th May (Nat. Areh.
AF. iv. 907); Napoleon, Corresp. 21,706, 21,788, 21,820, 21,964;
Davout, Corresp. 1619, 1620, 1654, 1657, 1724; Davout to Napoleon,
26th March, 16th April (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1939).
I say about 100 officers, but this figure is certainly exaggerated,
for the documents mention altogether only 43 dismissals, or cases of
men put on the retired list, among them that of a sub-lieutenant. Of
314 WATERLOO book i
course in this number are included, neither, the officers enrolled in the
army under Louis XVIII., and who left it by virtue of the Lyons
decrees, nor the officers condemned for desertion by court-martial, nor
the officers proposed by the Commission for retrogression, nor even the
officers who passed with their rank from one regiment to another.
166. Napoleon to Davout, 18th April (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 907).
Maison was dismissed by a special decree. Beurnonville, Donnadieu,
Bordessoulle, and also Clarke, lost their rank from the very fact of their
emigration, by virtue of the decree of 9th May 1815, which re-enforced
the laws of the Legislative Assembly against " emigres."
167. Davout to Napoleon, 16th April (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1939);
Napoleon, Elba and the Hundred Days; Corresp. xxxi. 103. These
words, " What more do you want of me ? " seem to confirm the assertion
of Fain (Manuscript of 1814, 242) that Souham, the day before his
desertion, had come to Fontainebleau to claim from the Emperor 6,000
francs, which the latter had given him.
By a chance, which gave justice fair play, Souham was replaced at
Perigueux by Lucotte, the only general of the 6th Corps who remained
true to his duty, in the inexpiable night of 4th April 1814.
168. In vain did Davout entreat the Emperor to maintain Moncey
in his post (to Napoleon, 26th March, Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1939).
169. Bugeaud's papers (War Arch.) and letter from Napoleon to
Bugeaud, 8th May (quoted by d'Ideville, Marshal Bugeaud, i. 172).
170. Cross-examination of Ney. Ney's papers and documents
(Archives of War) ; Gourgaud, Gamp of 1815, 44, note ; Montholon,
Recits. ii. 90 ; MSS. Recollections of Davout, furnished by General the
Duke of Auerstaedt.
Soult, when chief of the staff, requested that Bourmont should leave
the Army of the North (Soult to Davout, 22nd May, Nat. Arch. AF.
iv. 1949).
171. Davout to Curial, and Curial to Davout, 14th, 16th, and 17th
April (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1940). General Girod de I'Ain, Souvenirs,
375, 377, 381. The Emperor rescinds Curial's commission, because
that general had attempted to prevent the departure of the chasseurs.
A short time after he gave him an infantry division in Suchet's army.
172. "I claim a corps in the active service, or permission to resign,"
Sebastian! to Davout, Amiens, 3rd May (War Arch.).
173. Colonel La Borde, Napoleon and tJie Guard at Elba, 116.
174. Napoleon to Davout, 26th March (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 907);
Napoleon, Corresp. 21,790.
Those strikings off the list were inserted neither in the Moniteur nor
in the Bulletin des Lois, and were consequently not made public. A
simple letter of notification was addressed by the Minister of War to
those concerned, informing them that their names were struck off the
list of marshals, and that they would be allowed a retiring pension.
See on the subject Davout, Corresp. 1632, 1633, and Davout to
Napoleon, 27th April (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1939).
Annulled by the mere fact of Louis XVIII.'s return, those erasure-
CHAP. I NOTES 315
iis well as the dismissals of the Hundred Days, do not appear in the
records of service of these oflScers.
175. Napoleon, Corresp. 21,790.
176. Napoleon to Davout, 2Gth March (Nat Arch. AF. iv. 907), and
Corresp. 21,790.
177. Davout, Corresp. 1506, 1535, 1539. Gtouvion had previously
been compelled to come to Paris to justify himself before the Emperor.
178. Davout, Corresp. 1633.
179. Out of the sixty-six senators present at the sitting of 1st April
1814, three were nevertheless created peers during the Hundred Days;
they were General Valence, Pontecoulant and Roger Duces.
180. Oudinot to Suchet and to Jacqueminot Bar-sur-Ornain, 28th
March (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1939) ; Davout, Corresp. 1504, 1509, 1510.
In his letter to Jacqueminot, Oudinot says : " Make haste and tell me
that my disgrace is at an end. That is the best news you could give me."
181. Napoleon, Elba and the Hundred. Days ; Corresp. xixi. 104.
At first, Napoleon had given orders to have Oudinot's name struck out
of the list of marshals (to Davout, 26th March, Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 907) ;
but he revoked this decision {Corresp. 21,790).
Marshal Oudinot's wife {Souvenirs, 371) insists that it was at the
express request of the Marshal himself that Napoleon left him un-
employed. But the above-quoted i letters of Oudinot (which of course
the Duchess of Eeggio abstained from mentioning), and his presence in
the Imperial cortege at the ceremony of the Champ-de-Mars, testify to the
weakness of his royalist scruples, and lead one strongly to infer that he
might have accepted a post, had the Emperor offered him one.
182. Henry Houssaye, ISI4, 115-119.
183. Macdonald to Davout, Paris, 27th and 30th March; to Maurice
Mathieu, 30th March ; to his aides-de-camp, 6th April (Macdonald's
ledger. War. Arch.) ; C. Macdonald, Souvenirs, 385, 387-389.
184. Napoleon, Corresp. 21,694. It was during the night of the
20th to the 21st March that Eovigo had been appointed inspector-
general of " gendarmerie "' (Eovigo, Mem. vii. 387).
185. Lefeb^Te had gone through the whole campaign of France, but
on the Emperor's staff. Louis XVIII. raised him to the peerage.
186. Massena's report to the Emperor, Toulon, 14th April (Nat.
Arch. AF. iv. 1938).
187. Napoleon, Corresp. 21,825, 22,043 ; Davout, Corresp. 1627.
188. Thus Durutte, who had the command at Metz, was appointed
to the command of a division of the 1st Corps. " Although I have no
cause to be displeased with Durutte, I must recall him from Metz and
give him another appointment" (Napoleon to Davout, 27th March,
Nat Arch. AF. iv. 907).
189. Davout to Mortier, 22nd March ; La Poype to Davout, Lille,
13th May ; Lanusse to Davout, Metz, 21st May (War Arch.) ; Napoleon,
Corresp. 21,852, 22,025; Davout, Corresp. 1657 ; Army Bulletin,
15th June {Moniteur, 18th June).
190. Napoleon, Corresp. 21,844 ; Davout, Corresjx 1518, 1538,
316 WATERLOO booki
1691, 1721. The Emperor had for a moment thought of leaving Suchet
at Strasburg, as commander of the Army of the Rhine ; but on 30 th
March he had recalled him to Paris, reserving for him eventually the
command of several corps (Napoleon, Gorresp. 21,723, 21,747); then
he sent him to Lyons as superior commandant of the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th
and 19th military divisions, with Grouchy under his orders {1815, i.
424-425). Later he gave him the Army of the Alps.
191. Davout to Napoleon, 1st and 3rd June (Nat. Arch. AF. iv.
1939).
192. Brune to Clarke, 5th January 1814 (Brune's papers, War Arch.).
193. Napoleon, Gorresp. 21,815, 21,896, 21,952 ; Davout to
Brune, 16th April (War Arch.).
194. Ney to Davout, Paris, 23rd March ; and Lille, 28th March
(War. Arch.); Ney to Napoleon, 25th, 26th, 28th and 30th March, 1st,
7th and 9th April (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1936) ; Napoleon, Gorresp. 21,734.
195. Depositions of Captain Grison of the 37th, and of Captain
Casse of the 42nd {Ney's Trial, ii. 163-165). See the written deposition
of the j ustice-of-the-peace at Auxonne, 3rd November (Ney's papers and
documents), who quotes these words of the marshal : " These rascally
Bourbons and this cowardly nobility will have to go and spend another
twenty years in England ! "
196. Rousselin's notes (Begis collection), Aaran Gazette, 13th May ;
Madame Maury's deposition (Ney's Trial, ii. 177, 178); Napoleon,
Elba and the Hundred Days; Gorresp. xxxi. 104 ; letter to the Emperor,
June (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1934).
197. See Davout, Gorresp. 1605.
198. Napoleon, Elba and the Hundred Days ; Gorresp. xxxi. 104.
199. Aaran Gazette, 13th May ; Journal Universel (of Gand), No. 8 ;
report to Clarke by Lieutenant Jallot, a deserter of the 11th Chasseurs,
Ghent, 12th June (War Arch.).
200. Davout to Napoleon, 6th June ; Napoleon to Davout, 7th
June (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1949, and AF. iv. 907).
201. First examination of Ney (Trial, i. 19),
202. Peyrusse, Memorial, 311 ; letter from Ney to the Duke of
Otrante (Journal of the Empire, 26th June).
203. First examination of Ney, before the prefect of police (AVar
Arch., Ney's papers and documents).
204. Napoleon, Gorresp. 22,042.
205. " The Marshal's requests were granted ; he was given an army
corps" (Account of the Gampaign of 1815, by Colonel Heymes, 1st aide-
de-camp to Ney, 7).
206. "I only wished for death. I was often tempted to blow my
brains out" (Ney's examination, Ney's papers and documents, War Arch.).
207. Heym6s, Account, 5, 6.
On 11th June, when the Emperor sent a warning to Ney, all the
general officers had been commissioned for several weeks. It may then
be surmised that Napoleon had not wished from the first to give one to
the Prince of Moscow.
CHAP. I NOTES 317
208. Henry Houssaye, IS 15, i. 468, 469. See Las Casas, Memorial,
iv. 424, 425. "Murat," said the Emperor, "is one of the main causes
of the misfortunes of 1814. It is difficult to conceive greater depravity,
or to pursue fresh honours with greater shamelessness and vileness,"
209. Las Casas, Memorial, ii. 276 ; see Montholon, Anecdotes, ii. 90.
210. It follows that a chief of the staff, in certain cases the real chief
of the armies, should have the power of conception and direct command,
of which Berthier was so lamentably deficient. In the case of Berthier,
this power was not needed. It is one thing to be chief of the staff
under William of Germany, like Moltke, and another to be chief of the
staff under Napoleon.
211. The day before the battle of Eylau only one of those eight
officers reached the headquarters of Bernadotte. This fact is related
by the Intendant- General Denniee (quoted by Pierron, Methods of War,
ii. 1551).
212. Eapp, Mem. 345; Mollien, Mem. iv. 199: "The Emperor
regretted he had Berthier no longer with him." " He was," said he,
" the best of staff-generals. He had a quicker perception of every
thought and plan than anyone else, and explained them better to the
heads of the corps.'' He spoke without bitterness, only saying, " I
should like to see him as a captain of the body-guai-d."
On 10th April only {Corresp. 21,790), that is to say when all
probability of Berthier's return to France had vanished, the Emperor
ordered his name to be struck off the list of marshals. His first order
of 26th March, on the striking out of names, refers only to Marmont,
Augereau, Victor, Gouvion, St.-Cyr, and Oudinot (letter to Davout,
27th March, Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 907).
213. Meneval, Napoleon and Marie-Louise, ii. 330.
214. Journal of Frankfort, 4th June ; Gazette Universelle, 5 th June ;
Nuremberg Gazette, 4th June ; Journal of Cologne, 10th Jime. Bamberg's
correspondent of the Journal of Cologne gives the following details : —
"For some days a change was noticed in Berthier. On 31st May he had
dined at the Prince of Bavaria's palace with the Russian general, Sacken,
and the latter having complimented him on his faithfulness to King
Louis XVIII., he had looked extremely embarrassed and had made no
reply. ... It was from his children's apartment that he threw himself out
of the window. His little boy, who caught him by the leg to save him,
narrowly escaped being dragged out with him." These particulars are
pure invention, for we know from the Prince of Wagram that the
Princess and her children spent all the time of the interregnum at
Grosbois. When the marshal fell (according to the legend, was thrown
or threw himself out) there were two servants by his side.
215. The nomination of Soult is dated 9th May (Imperial Decree,
Napoleon's letters. War Arch.) ; and on 25 th April there was a rumour
at Ghent {Journal Universel, No. 4) that this general, who for a long
time had entertained the hope of succeeding Berthier, would be
chief of the staff.
Soult was enough of a Gascon to persuade the Emperor he would
318 WATERLOO book i
make a first-rate chief of the staff. One must read in his Memoirs (ii. 206)
the portrait he draws from his own model of ideal head of the staff. If
it be true that, when he discharged these functions in the Lefebvre
division, he was so active, so diligent, so prudent, he had somewhat
altered in 1815. However, during the campaign, Soult was not as
much below his task as was presumed. His greatest fault was in
sometimes writing his orders without precision and clearness, and in not
ensuring their rapid transmission. As for the charge of negligence and
want of foresight brought against him, it is just to say that Bailly de
Monthyon, who had been appointed to assist him as chief of the staff, is
also responsible for these to a certain extent.
216. Soult, Mem. Justificatif, 24, and Soult to Davout, Villeneuve-
I'Etang, 11th April (Soult's documents and papers, War Arch.).
217. Soult, Mem. Jiistificatif, 24. Soult pretends that he only came to
the Tuileries because the Emperor had sent for him twice, through Clausel
and Rovigo. This is doubtful. Discredited as Soult was at that time,
and after the order of the day he had published against Napoleon, the
latter could not be so impatient to see him, and to employ him. If
Rovigo and Clausel had interfered, it was most likely at the Marshal's
own request. The tone of his letters to Davout bespeaks his desire to
regain lost favour. Besides, if the Emperor made any advances to
Soult, Soult could have evaded them just as easily as Macdonald did.
218. Moniteur, 9th March.
219. Davout, Gorresp. 1530, 1567, 1597, 1598; Soult to Davout,
11th April (Soult's documents and papers. War Arch.).
220. Soult to Davout, 11th April (Soult's documents and papers);
Davout, Gorresp. 1598.
221. Soult had been only two or three months chief of the staff in
the Taponnier division, then chief of the staff in the Lefebvre division
during the campaign of 1794 in the Netherlands. By the way, it would
be very hazardous to conclude that Soult's participation in that campaign
was one of the causes which decided the Emperor to select him as
chief of the staff for a new campaign in Belgium. On the one hand,
Napoleon had not (as will be seen further on) quite made up his mind
on 9 th May, the date of Soult's appointment, to carry the war into the
Netherlands at all. On the other hand, his personal experience convinced
him that, after twenty years and countless battles all over Europe, Soult
could not have retained any but the vaguest recollections of the topo-
graphy of the country between the Sambre and Brussels. Besides, one
does not choose a chief of the staff as one chooses a guide, because he
knows the country !
222. Napoleon to Davout, 30th April {Gorresp. 21,856): "If we
have war, I propose to leave you in Paris as Minister of War, Grovernor
of Paris, and Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard of the levies
" en masse " and of the troops of the line which may happen to be in the
city . . ." Order for 11th June (quoted in Davout's manuscript
memoirs) : " Our cousin. Prince of Eckmiihl, is appointed Governor of
Paris." From the manuscript souvenirs of Davout and Jean de Chdnier
CRAF. I NOTES 319
(History of Davo&t, 540, 541). Davout repeatedly requested a command
in the army ; but the Emperor invariably answered : " I can entrust
Paris to no one but you."
223. Soult, who did not deceive himself as to the feeling in the
Army, endeavoured to win back public opinion with an order of the
day. He submitted it to the Emperor, who wrote to him ; " In order
that the Army should have no remarks to make, I think that you may
say, without any inconsistency, that the flight of the Bourbons from
French territory, their appeal to foreign powers to regain the throne,
and also the wish of the entire nation, have cancelled all engagements
made with them. Without this sentence, I fear this order of the day
might injure you in the minds of men who take umbrage easily (Napo-
leon to Soult, 3rd June, Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 907). Soult added the
paragraph, but he embellished it with abuse of the Bourbons and
their partisans, which Napoleon had never suggested. The manifesto
appeared on 4th June in the Moniteur.
224. Vandamme to Davout, Mezieres, 12th May (^Var Arch., Army
^^ the North). Soult's appointment, signed 9th May (War Arch.,
ipoleon's Letters), was not officially announced imtil 14th May (Davout's
ircular, 13th May, War Arcli., Army of the North).
225. Napoleon, Corresp. 21,723. See Davout to Lebrun, 31st
March (War Arch., Army of the North) ; Davout to Napoleon, 19th
April (Nat Arch. AF. iv. 1939). Lebrun resumed his functions as aide-
-camp to the Emperor.
226. Vandamme to Davout, Mezieres, 20th and 30th April, 9th and
i 4th May ; Vandamme's orders, Mezieres, 2nd and 7th May ; report of
Lieutenant Jallot of the 11th Chasseurs, deserter, to Clarke, Ghent, 12th
June ; Davout to Vandamme, 7th and 29th May (Wa.r Arch., Army
of the North).
Before receiving his command of the 3rd Corps (20th April),
^'mdamme had been entrusted with the military and political inspection
all the fortresses north of Lille ; he had fulfilled that mission with
me utmost zeal (Vandamme to Davout, 28th March and 30th April,
War Arch.).
227. Decaen's Corresp., June (War Arch., Army of the Western
Pyrenees). See ViUele, M(fm, i. 296, 297. On Clausel and Decaen, see
also Henry Houssaye, IS 16, i. 398-416, 620.
228. Napoleon, Corresp. 21,732. Davout to Eapp, 16th April (War
Arch.). See the arrest : Ney's Trial, and Henry Houssaye, 1816, i. 303,
310-312, and note 3, page 314.
229. Lamarque to Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Tours, 27th July (War Arch.,
Army of the Loire).
See Napoleon, Corresp. 21,948.
I 230. Napoleon to Durosnel, 30th April (Nat Arch. AF. iv. 907). See
on Durosnel the "satisfecit" bestowed by Dessolles, as he resumed, in
the name of the king, the command of the National Guard ; supplementary
1 order of the day, 8th July ; Moniteur, 10th July.
231. According to one of the Emperor's letters (Napoleon, Corresp.
320 WATERLOO book i
21,868), Carnot, R^al, Dubois, Regnaud were to assist Durosnel in this
work, but Durosnel's correspondence indicates that he undertook it
alone, or almost alone.
232. Durosnel's report to Napoleon, 30th May and 6th June ;
Perregaux to Napoleon, 3rd June ; various letters and police notes, 28th
and 31st May, 2nd June (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1935 and F. 7, 3774).
233. Mathieu Dumas to Napoleon, r.d. (May) ; Davout to Napoleon,
7th June (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1935 and AF. iv. 1936). On the " federated
Parisians," see Henry Houssaye, 1815, i. 623-625.
234. Napoleon, Gorresp. 21,263, 21,960, 21,926. Davout {Gorresp.
1740) maintains, it is true, that it was only on the verbal order of
Napoleon that he appointed Chambarlhac to Dijon. But other officers,
were provided by him with commissions which were never ratified by
the Emperor. There is no doubt on that point.
235. Napoleon to Davout, 2nd and 16th May (Nat. Arch. AF. iv.
907, and M^^ de Blocqueville, Marshal BavoUt, iv. 137) ; Flahaut's letter
to Thiers, 1st October 1861 (quoted by F. Masson, General Flahaut,
20, 21).
236. Moreau to Clarke, Chateauroux, 19th November 1815, and
Moreau's record of service (War Arch., Moreau's documents and papers).
237. Napoleon to Flahaut, 13th April (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 907).
238. Manuscript memoirs of Davout (furnished by General Davout,
Duke of Auerstaedt. See Davout, Gorresp. 1607 ; Fleury de Chaboulon,
Mem. i. 262.
239. Napoleon to Flahaut, 18th April (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 907).
See Napoleon to Flahaut, 12th May (War Arch., Portfolio of Napoleon's
Gorresp.).
According to another letter from Napoleon to Flahaut, 13th April
(Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 907), Lobau and Labedoyere were to share this
mission with Flahaut. For some reason or other, the latter remained in
sole charge of it.
240. Manuscript memoirs of Davout (above quoted) ; cf. I.
Masson, General Flahaut, 21, 22 ; and Ghenier, History of DavoM, ii.
503, 504,
241. Several of the unfortunate selections, quoted in the preceding
page, were in fact made- prior to 18th April, the day when Flahaut was
ordered to overlook these propositions.
242. From 15th May, nothing in Napoleon's correspondence leads to
believe that he has anything more to do with the appointments ; and
from several other letters, it seems that the Emperor asked Davout to
select without control several of the generals.
243. Manuscript memoirs of Davout (comm. by General the Duke of
Auerstaedt).
244. Pion des Loches, My Gampaigns, 465 ; notes of Golonel BauduB
(comm. by M. de Montenon) ; Ameil to Grundler, 24th April ; Sucbet
to Davout, 21st, 22nd and 25th May ; Lecourbe to Davout, 12th, 16th,
and 20th June ; report of Adjutant-Gommandant Gordon, 20th June
(War Arch.); Gourgaud, Gampaign of IS 15, 67, 68; Napoleon, Mem.
CHAP. I NOTES 321
180 ; report to Wellington (Suppl. Despatches, x. 55, cf. Soult to Napoleon,
22nd June, War Arch.).
245. See Ney to Napoleon, Avesnes, 1st April ; Davout to Napoleon,
13th, 22nd, and 26th April, 1st, 3rd, and 8th June (Nat Arch. AF. iv.
1936, 1939, 1940 and 1949) ; Ameil to Grundler, Mezieres, 20th April;
Grundler to Davout, Amiens, 24th April ; Rapp to Davout, Strasburg,
15th May (War Arch.) ; D'Erlon to Davout, Lille, 11th and 25th April ;
Vandamme to Davout, Mezieres, 24th April, 6th and 12th May; Pire to
Davout, 3rd June ; Gressot to Soult, 8th June ; confidential note to
Davout's address from an officer of the Imperial Staff, 20th June (War
Arch^ Army of the North) ; Kellermann's account (War Arch.) ; General
Delorf 3 account ; manuscript notes of Eousselin ; Du Casse, The three
Marshals cPOrnano, 105, 106 ; Grouchy, Historical Fragment, 10 (see 9)
and Short Account, 23, Gerard, Last Observations, 55 ; D'Artez' report
{Suppl. Despatches of Wellington, x. 250).
It is evident, that as in every generalisation of facts, one might oppose
a certain number of contradictory witnesses. Gerard, Pajol, Exelmans,
Vandamme, Allix, Gilly, Brayer, Michel, were, to the very last, full of
enthusiasm, Foy wrote on 15th June in his diary : "No one thinks of
doubting the ultimate triumph of France." Dessaix, intended first for
the command of the Army of the Alps, passed without a murmur to the
command of simple general of a division in that army. Travot, whose
whole career had been passed in la Vendee, uttered not a word of protest
when he was appointed to serve in la Vendee itself under the orders of
Lamarque, a man much younger than himseK, below him in military rank,
and inexperienced in the wars of the Western provinces.
246. Trial of Camhronne, 41, 42.
247. Greneral corresp. and the Armies of the North, the Ehine
and the Jura, 25th and 28th March, 6th, 11th, 14th, 23rd, 24th, and
25th April, 3rd and 16th June (War Arch.) ; Letters to Napoleon, 5th
and 9th May, 12th June, etc. Private letter from a soldier, Laon, 22nd
June (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1934) ; Davout, Corresp. 1588; General Delort'a
account. Manuscript memoirs of the chief of the squadron Bourgeois,
aide-de-camp of HuUin during the Hundred Days, and grandfather on
the maternal side, of the author.
248. Davout to Napoleon, 17th May (Nat. Arch.), D'Erlon to
Davout, Lille, 4th June (War Arch., Army of the North).
249. Letter of Colonel Viala de Sommieres, formerly deputy-chief of
the staff of the Ist Corps, published in the Review of the Empire, iii.
373 ; Colonel Taubin temporarily commanded the fortress of Conde in
the absence of General Bonnaire who had come to Paris for the ceremony
of the Champ-de-Mai.
250. D'Erlon to Davout, LiUe, 25th April (War ArcL, Army of the
North) ; Davout, Corresp. 1636. It will be seen farther on that during
the campaign, from the 15th to the 18th June, cartridges and cannon
charges filled with bx-an were still distributed to certain of the corps.
I Soult to Davout, Laon, 21st June (War Arch., Army of the North).
251. General Saunier to Davout from Orleans, 25th March ; d'Erlon
21
322 WATERLOO book i
to Davout, 1st April (War Arch.) ; Napoleon to Davout, 25th March
(Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 907) ; Chevalier d'Artez' report, April {Suppl.
Despatches of Wellington, x. 250) ; addresses to the Emperor from the
25th, 39th, and 75th of the line, 12th of Dragoons, etc. (Nat. Arch. AF.
iv. 1950).
252. This is a delusion of contemporary writers which has misled all
historians. The revolution of 20th March was not a military movement
submitted to by the people, but a popular movement seconded bv the
army. I have endeavoured to prove it (Henry Houssaye, 1815, i. 364-
369), and, judging from the opinion of most critics, I believe I have
succeeded.
253. Davout's orders, 29th March (War Arch.); Drouot's report,
15th May (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1940).
254. La Bretonniere, Souvenirs du Quartier Latin, 211, 225. See
the arrival of the Dragoons of the Guard at Paris, order of Davout to
Pajol, 21st March (War Arch,).
255. Grouchy a le Sdnecal, Aix. 15th April (War Arch., Army of
the Alps). Already in July 1814, the inhabitants of Orgon had been
ill-treated from the same motive by a detachment of infantry (Henry
Houssaye, 1815, i. 47).
256. Commandant of the fortress of Aire to Drouot, 8th May (War
Arch.) ; Prefet of Les Bouches du Rhone to Carnot, 25th May (Nat.
Arch. F. 7, 3774).
257. Mayor of St. Germain to Davout, 6th May ; order of the day
of Pire, 14th May (War Arch.) ; corresp. of the prefects and reports
of police, April-June (Nat. Arch. F. 7, 3740 and F. 7, 3774.)
258. Order of the day, Foy, Gosselies, 11th June (registry of Foy's
Corresp.) ; Vandamme's order of the day, Gembloux, 18th June ; Radet
to Soult, Charleroi, 16th June, and Fieurus, 17th June (War Arch.,
Army of the North).
259. Daure to Davout, Laon, 5th June ; Pire to Davout, Laon, 6th
June; Friant's order of the day, Charleroi, 16th June; report of the
2nd military division, 27th May (War Arch., Army of the North).
260. Lobau to Davout, 3rd and 7th April ; Davout to Lobau, 5th
April (War Arch.).
261. Letter quoted in extenso in a report from Drouot to Napoleon,
26th April (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1940) ; see Reille to Drouot, 29th April
(Ibid.).
262. Soult to Grouchy, 5th June (War Arch., Army of the North).
263. Report of Chevalier d'Artez, April {Suppl. Despatches of
Wellington, x. 250) ; La Bretonniere, Souvenirs du Quartier Latin, 202.
See Journal of the Empire, 23rd ]\Iarch, and Alexander Roger's letter
inserted in the same paper, 15th April.
264. General Hulot's report on the operations of the 3rd division of
the 4th Corps (comm. by Baron Hulot) ; report to Wellington, May
(Suppl. Despatches, x. 365) ; daily notes of General Foy (comm. by
Count Foy) ; report of Adjutant-Commandant Gordon, Ghent, 20th June
(War Arch., Army of the North) ; see report to Wellington, 22n(l
CHAP. II NOTES 323
April (Suppl. X. 163). "The enthusiasm of the Army is beyond all
expression." Bassano to Caulaincourt, 18th June, Arch, of Foreign
Affairs, 1802) ; "our Army is as good as it was in the most prosjjerous
times."
265. Xey to Davout, 23rd and 24th March ; Colonel of the 67th
to Davout, 11th ^[ay ; letter from the officers and soldiers of the 56th
to Vandamme, 11th June; Major of the 57th to Davout, Strasburg, 1st
June ; Rapp to Davout, 4th June ; ofi&cial reports of the restoring of
eagles to the 6th, 52nd, and 101st, 24th June ; General Thery to
Davout, Sarrelouis, 27th March; the Colonel of the 106th to Napoleon,
4th June ; General de Civray to Brune, Antibes, 7th May ; Mayor of
Rouen to Davout, 24th April ; Gerard to Vandamme, Metz, 2nd June ;
General Hugo to Davout, Thionville, 8th April ; report of Rovngo, 17th
June (War Arch., General Corresp., and the Armies of the North, the
Rhine and Var) ; deposition of the Vendean Major E. de Marans
(Documents and Papers of Travot, "War Arch.) ; La Bretonniere, Souvetdrs
of the Quartier Latin, 228, 251, 252 ; Corresp. of the prefects and
report of police, April-June (Nat Arch. F. 7, 3774 ; F. 7, 3740 ; and
F. 3044*) ; Real's Bulletin, 8th April ; extract of a letter from General
Baraillon, Lille, 4th May; Napoleon to Fouche, 13th May; Mouton-
Duvemet to Davout, Lyons, 12th June (Nat Arch. F. 7, 3774 ; AF. iv,
60 and AF. iv. 1934, 1937. On the giving up of pay days, see Henry
Houssaye, 1815, i. 630.
266. The addresses of the regiments to the Emperor might also be
quoted (Nat Arch. AF. iv. 1950) if such compulsory tokens of loyalty were
. Jt generally unconvincing. These, however, have a tone of passion which
-eems sincere, when one knows of the soldiers' feelings for Napoleon.
But do not all these protestations pale before this simple fact The old
soldiers, veterans of the Armies of the Rhine, of Sambre-et-Meuse, of
Italy and Egypt, fully intending to retire or named for final dis-
missal, refused to leave the regiment as soon as they heard of the
Emperor's return. Sixty men did so in the 42nd, and thirty in the
64th (Daumesnil's reports, Conde, 31st March ; and from Ney, Haguenau,
9th April; Nat Arch. AF. iv. 1950; and AF. iv. 1936).
BOOK I CHAPTER II
1. Letter from Kleist to the King of Prussia, Aix-la-Chapelle, 19th
March (quoted by von Ollech, Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815, 5).
Wellington to Gneisenau, Brussels, 5th April {Despatches, xiL 288).
See Waterloo Campaign (Mii filing), Hist 1, 2 ; State of the troops in
the Netherlands, 23rd March {Suppleinentary Despatches of Wellington,
X. 716).
Clause witz himself (Der Feldzug von 1815, 16) estimates the Dutch
324 WATERLOO book i
and English forces at 20,000 men only ; he gives 50,000 men to the
Prussians and Saxons together. Damitz, i. 6, says that the forces of
Kleist would have amounted to 50 or 60,000 men had the regiments
been complete.
In the estimate (account) quoted in the Supiilementary Despatches the
Dutch - Belgian troops, quartered in Belgiu.m on the 23rd March, are
computed at 7,233 men only. Kleist writes: "The Belgians hardly
deserve mention." And the fact is, if van Loben Sels (44 to 69) is to be
trusted, it appears certain, that the Dutch and Belgian army, which
was still being organised, could hardly muster together 10,000 bayonets
and sabres by the month of March. In the middle of June the number
was raised to 29,500.
2. Letter from the Minister of War to Kleist, Berlin, 13th March
(quoted by von Ollech, 4). We shall see later, that a revolt of the Saxons
took place at Liege, which resulted in the whole corps being sent back
to Germany.
3. Allgemeine Zeitung, 27th March. Report from Vienna (undated,
subsequent to 8th April) ; reports from Commandants du Quesnoy,
de Maubenge, de Givet, 27th March, 7th April, 23rd and 29th
May; report from Saint -Amant (a Belgian arrived from Ghent),
Paris, 15th April and 29th May; report from a Belgian deserter,
Mezieres, 22nd April ; report from a traveller, 4th June (War Arch.) ;
reports from agents, 5 th May and 3rd June (Arch. Foreign Affairs,
1802); Miiffling, Av.s meinem Leben, 193. See Wellington to Feltre
(Despatclies, xii. 389): "The fact is that these gentlemen (Bliicher and
Wrede) have wretchedly governed the country which fell under their
government."
Napoleon, {Mem. four servir d VHistoire en 1815, 52, 57, and Gourgaud
Gamp, de 1815, 20) counted on a rising of the Belgians. His hopes, it
is true, were never realised. But it must be noted that if the Emperor
had occupied Brussels in the beginning of April, the policy of the French
party in Belgium would have been quite different.
4. Letters from Kleist to the King of Prussia, Aix, 19th and 24th
March, to Pirch, 25th March (quoted by von Ollech, 5, 6, 7).
5. Napoleon {Mem. 2)our servir d VHistoire, 52) says 35,000 men,
and Clausewitz {Der Feldzwj von 1815, 16, 17) admits the possibility of
a victory of these 35,000 Frenchmen over the Anglo -Prussian arm}'.
But the Emperor, if he had decided on weakening his garrisons in the
fortresses of the North as he said, and then marching up the Paris
reserve, and one-third of the troops of the 2nd division, could havf
formed an army of 50,000 men. According to Davout's rejiort of tli<
28th March (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1936) at that date there were 27,949
soldiers in the 16th military division (Lille) and 10,000 in Paris. If to
these 38,000 men are added, 4,000 men from the 2nd military division
(Mezieres) which numbered 12,340 men, the corps of Reille 15,865 men
strong on 24th March (Davout to Reille, 24th March, War Arch.), and
7,390 men from the Guard (estimate of 21st March, Nat. Arch. AF. iv.
1940), a total amount is obtained of 65,204 or 50,000 men, deducting'
CHAP. II NOTES 325
the " incapables" from the 16th military division, from the'Paris reserve,
and from the Guard.
6. Kleist to the King of Prussia, Aix, 24th March and Mufl3ing to
the King of the Netherlands, Brussels, 29th March (quoted by von
Ollech, 6 and 8). In point of fact the Prince of Orange had thought of
giving battle between Xivelles and Braine-le-Comte on the 31st March,
with the co-operation of the Prussian army (Roder to Miiflling, Ath, 31st
March, quoted by von Ollech, 9). But as the Prussians could not
have arrived in time it is certain that the 30,000 English and Belgians,
who were not yet concentrated at Ath on the 5th April, would have
retired beyond Brussels without fighting.
7. Miiffling to the King of the Netherlands, 30th March (quoted
by von Ollech, 8) ; Wellington to Gneisenau in Brussels, 5th April
{Despatches, xii. 288).
8. Napoleon, Mem. pour sermr a VHistoire, 52, 53. In the corre-
spondence of Napoleon, there is no trace of any preparations for a sudden
invasion of Belgium. These words of Davout, in a letter to Lobau, dated
3rd April : " . . . the possibility of the campaign beginning suddenly,"
can only be interpreted in the sense of a defensive campaign, in case of
an attack on the part of the Allies. The proof is that Davout writes
on the 9th April to Erlon : '• The Emperor is only preparing for defence."
9. Clausewitz (16, 17) says "it would have been nothing but a shot
in the air, without any influence on the final results of the campaign."
10. Napoleon, Mem. pour servir d VHistoire, 52, 53. See Henry
Houssaye, 1815, i. 393-415.
11. Napoleon, Mem pour servir a VHistoire, 52, 53. See Gorresp.
21,756, 21,856 ; and Henry Houssaye, 1S15, i 435-439.
12. Napoleon, Corresp. 21,856. See Caulaincourt to Napoleon, 25th
March ; to Cardinal Fesch, 8 th April (Archives of Foreign Aff.
672).
13. I say " nearly lost," for the third mission of Fleury de Chaboulon
to Basle, on 29th May, was nothing but an attempt at peace (Henry
Houssaye, 1815, i. 592, note 2).
14. The correspondence of Napoleon, and that of Davout, testify
that the Emperor did not decide upon his plan of campaign at the
earliest before the middle of May. On the 9th May, Napoleon
writes: " Vandamme ought to join the Army of the North, on the Sambre,
where I shall probably be going myself, in order to act with great
masses" (Corresp. 21,879). But "probably" suggests a doubt, and in
another letter of the same day we read these words : " I am waiting till
the nature of the war we are to engage in, is more clearly defined"
(Corresp. 21,882). On his side Davout, who is acquainted with
Napoleon's scheme, writes to Gerard, on 9th May : " The character of
the war we are to engage in is not yet defined clearly" (Corresp. of
Davodt, 1684). On the 10th May the marshal seems to think that
it is the enemy who will take the offensive, for this is his message to
Vandamme : " You must render it impracticable for "Wellington to force
his way through the opening at Chimay" (Corresp. 1692). Finally,
326 WATERLOO book i
two letters of Napoleon, dated ISth and 22nd May {Gorresp. 21,900,
21,955), reveal that he is still hesitating on the choice of his line of
operations.
The orders given by Napoleon and Davout in March and April, and
in the first days of May — concentration of the army corps on the frontiers
of the north, east, and south-east, armament of the fortresses, state of
defence in the Vosges and the Argonne, tetes dc pont or fortified bridges
to be established on the Sambre, instructions " to be ready for r.ny
emergency," — do not imply the existence of an offensive plan. These
preparations are purely expectant.
15. Memoranda Knesebeck, 18th and 2 4th April {Suppl. Despatches
of Wellington, x. 174-178).
16. Schwarzenberg's memorandum, 28th April {Sujypl. Despatches of
Wellington, x. 179-181).
17. Memorandum sent from Vienna by Gneisenau {S^ip2)l. Despatches
of Wellington, x. 196, 197).
1 8. Wellington to Clancarty, Brussels, 1 0th April ; Wellington's
memorandum, 12th April {Despatches of Wellington, xii. 295 sqq. and
304 sqq.).
Bllicher, while he had not the same sympathy for Louis XVIIL,
weighed the possible influence on the campaign of the civil war in the
South. He wrote to his wife on the 16th April (Bliicher in Brief en,
138): "The French will probably destroy each other, so I don't believe
we shall have much to do."
19. Baron Gay's report on his return from Vienna ; Paris, 28th May
(Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1938).
20. Protocol of the sitting of the Council of War on 19th April
(quoted by von Ollech, 33, 34) ; Wrede to Wellington, Vienna, 20th
April {Suppl. Despatches of Wellington, x. 109).
21. On the 2nd May, the Saxon regiments stationed at Liege
mutinied on the announcement they were going to be incorporated into
the Prussian army. The disbanded soldiers ran through the streets,
crying : " Long live the King of Saxony ! long live Napoleon ! " They
had many sanguinary brawls with the Prussians. When night fell, the
rebels made an onset on the hotel where Bliicher was staying. Had it
not been for the arrival of a strong Prussian detachment, the old marshal
would have been in considerable danger. The next day the Prussians
quelled the insurrection. Four officers were shot on the charge of
inciting the movement ; 2,000 soldiers were disarmed ; the whole Saxon
contingent was sent back to Germany and replaced by Prussian troops
which were marching on the Elbe and the Rhine. General de Borstell,
who on the first day had not executed Bliicher's orders satisfactorily, was
replaced by General Pirch I. Bliicher wrote to the King of Saxony :
" I am determined to restore order, if I have to shoot down the whole
of your army."
Hardinge to Wellington, Lioge, 4th May ; Bliicher to the King
of Saxony, 6th May {Suppl. Despatches, x. 219-221, 256); Bliicher to
his wife, Liege, undated {Bliicher in Brief en, 140-142); report of La
CHAP. II NOTES 327
Hauvrie, Inspector of Forests, Givet, 8th May (War Arch.) ; report
from Brussels, undated (Arch. Foreign Aff., 1802) ; correspondence of
Liege {Monitmr, 9th May) ; Wellington to Bliicher, 7th May {Despatches,
xii. 357).
22. Wellington to Schwarzenberg, Brussels, 2nd June {Despatches,
xii. 437) ; Vandamme to Davout, Chimay, 7th June (War Arch.).
23. Memorandum of Schwarzenberg, 8th June ; Schwarzenberg
to Wellington, Heidelberg, 10th June ; protocols of the Conferences
at Heidelberg, 9th and 10th June {Suppl. Despatches of Wellington,
X. 440-448). According to Schwarzenberg's plan, the different armies
should have begun to move on 27th June. But in order to march in
line with the Austrians and the Russians, who had a longer way to go
before reaching the Paris radius, Wellington, with the assent of Bliicher,
had decided that the English and the Prussian armies should not cross
the frontier before the 1st July (Letter from Miifliing to Bliicher,
Brussels, 14th June, quoted by von Ollech, 68).
24. Estimate of 6th June, quoted by van Loben Sels (82, 83),
according to the Military Archives of the Netherlands. This report of
the situation, apparently the only authentic one existing, computes the
men present under arms at 91,228. But, on the one hand, we must
deduct 2,150 men from the brigade of the Hanoverian landwehr of
Beaulieu, stationed at Antwerp ; and, on the other hand, we must add
the strength of twelve batteries of reserve, of engineers, of transport corps,
of pontonniers, etc., which are merely noted, and which may be
estimated (according to Siborne's indications) at 4,000 men at the lowest ;
the following total is thus attained, 91,200-2,151 = 89,049 + 4,000 =
93,049.
There were, moreover, stationed in Antwerp, Ostend, Ghent, etc.,
four brigades of the Hanoverian landwehr and a few other troops which
were not to be called to enter on the campaign. These garrison troops
are estimated by Siborne (i. 426) at 9,000 men, by Colonel Chesney
52, 53) at 12,000.
25. Tables given by Plotho {Der Krieg im Yahre 1815, 35 sqq.),
and by Damitz {French Translation, i. 354 sqq.). In the second and third
lines, the Prussians had the Royal Guard, the corps of Kleist (ultimately
of Hacke), the corps of Louis of Hesse-Homburg, of York and Tauenzien,
and the Rhine landwehr, which was not yet organised ; altogether
124,000 men, of which 70,000 only (the Guard and the corps of Kleist
and York) were successively to enter France.
26. Plotho, and Damitz, who copies him, estimate the Russian Army
at 167,950 men, in addition to the battalions and the squadrons, which
they compute, the first at 800 muskets, the second at 150 sabres.
Now supposing, improbable as it may seem, that not a single man were
missing in the corps at the time of their departure, it is impossible to
believe this would still be the case when they reached the banks of the
Rhine. From the confines of Poland to the French frontier, the Russians
must have left about one-tenth of their efifective strength on the way, at
halting places and small depots, to say nothing of the sick, the footsore
328 WATERLOO book i
and deserters. Moreover, the 7 th Corps (twenty-two infantry regiments)
and the 2nd and 3rd Corps of the Reserve Cavalry (sixteen regiments)
were ten marches behind. On the 8th July, they had scarcely
reached the Sarre (see Bamitz, ii. 182). According to two reports from
Vienna, one dated the beginning of April (War Arch.), the other dated
28th May (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1938), Eussia was to bring to the field
only an army of 120,000 men or even of 80,000 men.
27. According to official reports quoted by Plotlio (63 sqq.), the Army
of the Upper Rhine amounted to 254,542 men. But, trusting to
information given by Plotho himself, from this number must be
deducted : first, 6,000 Bavarians left in the garrisons of Mayence,
of Germersheim and Mannheim ; second, about 15,000 men of Baden
who were not to join the army till later on. It is further necessary to
deduct the Saxon corps (computed by Plotho at 16,700 men) which had
been sent back to Germany after the revolt at Liege, and would not
have been allowed by the Allies to re-enter France on account of their
French sympathies.
28. Plotho (74 sqc[.) rates the Austrian army stationed in Upper Italy
in 1815 at 48,000 men; but of these 48,000 men, Frimont leaves
10,000 in garrisons in Lombardy.
29. Plotho, Der Krieg im Yarhe 1815, 75.
30. Memorandum of Schwarzenberg, 6th June {Suppl. Des2)atches,
xii. 440). This army, which had fought against Murat (Henry Houssaye,
1815, i. 465-467), was reduced from about 40,000 men to 25,000
owing to losses of men killed, others left in the garrisons of Naples and
the Duchies.
31. Undated reports from Vienna (previous to 8th April); from
Bresson de Valensole, return to Vienna, 15th April; report from the
spy Gottlieb, 3rd June ; " Gendarmerie " report from Givet, 4th June,
etc, etc. (War Arch.) ; reports from Dresden, 1st and 3rd June (Nat
Arch. AF. iv. 1936) ; reports from Vienna and from Brussels (undated),
about 1st May, 1st and 3rd June (Arch, of Foreign Aff., 1802) ; Gazette
de Bade, 27th May ; Journal de Francfort, 22nd May.
32. In my description of these plans of campaign, I only follow the
exact text of Napoleon himself {M^m. pour servir a I'Histoire en IS 15,
51-61), although I have corrected certain estimates, with regard to
dates, in accordance with documents in the archives.
33. This computation, like most of the estimates quoted in this
paragraph, is necessarily only an approximate one, since the partition of
troops alluded to, fits in with a plan that had not been adopted. These
are the figures, the exact figures, which are my authority. It must be
remembered (see pp. 20 and 21) that by the middle of June 135,000
mobilised National Guards had joined the armies at the frontier strong-
holds, and at the depots, and that 15,000 had been sent on their road to
join the points of concentration. Now, I admit tbat, on 1st July,
two-thirds of these 150,000 National Guards had already occupied the
strongholds ; the last third remaining in the depot centres of the interior,
and with the armies of the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. To these
CHAP. II NOTES 329
100,000 mobilised men, I add two-thirds from the total number of
pensioned soldiers, of gunners of the line, of veteran and stationary
gunners, of custom-house officers, of veteran fusiliers, etc. (see p. 21),
with an addition of 2,000 or 3,000 gendarmes, and 8,000 or 10,000
National Guards from the towns.
34. Napoleon goes so far as to say that the Allies could not reach
Paris before the Ist August, and he did not exaggerate. No doubt
after Waterloo the Prussians and the English marched to Paris from
the Belgian frontier in nine days only ; but, had it not been for the
fact that they were advancing, so to speak, in a conquered country, —
" victory giving them wings," says Grolemann, — they certainly could not
have marched at the rate of 25 kilometres a day. Besides, they were
bound to regulate their speed by that of the Austrians and the Russians.
It was therefore the march of the Anglo-Russians which furnishes us
data for computing the numbers. Now, though the Russian and Austrian
armies crossed the frontier on the 23rd of June, as soon as the news
reached them of the victory of Waterloo, " which electrified them," says
MiiiBing, "up to that time, they had not stirred." On the 10th of July
their vanguard had gone no further than Chalons, 43 miles from Paris.
If, then, the Austrian-Russians had not crossed the frontier before the
•27th of June, as they should have done according to the original plans,
they could not have reached Chalons before the 14th of July. Allowing
them to proceed, from that time, at the rate of 15 kilometres a day, they
1 could not have been concentrated under Paris before the 25th or 26th of
July.
! 35. We have seen (p. 21) that on the 15th of June, inde-
pendently of the armies of operation, there were 13,900 soldiers on
their way to join these armies ; 65,000 at the depots, 8,000 in the
hospitals, 19,000 re-enlisted men who had received marching orders,
and 46,500 conscripts of 1815 (one half of whom had taken part in the
campaign of 1814) assembled in the depot-centres of the departments ;
in all 152,400 men.
We must therefore admit that in six weeks' time Napoleon had been
able to find in that mass of 152,400 soldiers, at least 80,000 men,
"0,000 of which would form the garrison of Paris, and 50,000 rein-
rce the army concentrated around that city. As this army was
composed of the Army of the North and the Army of the Rhine, amount-
ing together to a total strength of 147,000 men (see p. 20), it would
thus have been raised to 200,000 combatants.
36. 72,000 soldiers out of the 152,400 mentioned above, and one-
third of the 25,000 pensioners, that is to say, 80,000 men or thereabouta
37. 74,000 soldiers completing the contingent of 1815, and 84,000
men completing the levy of mobilised National Guards (see p. 21).
38. Mem. pour servir a VHistoire, 55. General Berthaut (Principes de
ttrat^gie, 26) estimates this number at 180,000. Foreign documents
inform us, in fact, that the plan of the Allies was to keep nearly all the
fortresses under observation, and to invest a sufficient number of them to
ensure for themselves a solid basis, eine solide basis. See Memorandum
330 TVATERLOO book i
of "Wellington, Brussels, 12tli April, and Heidelberg, 6tli June; Letter
of the same to Stewart, 8tli May {Despatches, xii. 359-362, and Suppl.
X. 440) ; Grolemann to Schwarzenberg, Liege, 20tli May (quoted by
von Olech, Geschichte cles Felzuges von, 1815, 50).
39. During the campaign of France, Napoleon never had more than
90,000 men operating between the Aisne, the Marne, and the Aube,
under his direct command or the command of his lieutenants Macdonald,
Oudinot, Mortier, and Marmont. At Brienne the Emperor had 60,000
men ; at Champaubert, at Montmirail, and at Vauchamps, 24,000 ; at
Montereau, 40,000 ; at Craonne, 25,000 ; at Laon, 38,000 ; at Arcis
sur Aube, 17,000 the first day and 28,000 the second. See Henry
Houssaye, ISlJf, passim.
40. Napoleon, Mem. 56, 57 ; Clausewitz (Der Feldzug von 1815, 19),
and Jomini {Precis de la Camp, de 1815, 141) are of opinion that, from a
military point of view, the defensive plan was preferable. Davout, on the
contrary, thought that it was not possible to adopt any but the offen-
sive plan. MSS. Memoirs, furnished by General the Duke d'Auer-
staedt.
41. Gourgaud, Gamp, de 1815, 30 ; Napoleon, Mem. 58.
42. Napoleon, Mem. 57, 58.
43. Napoleon, Mem. 60 ; Souvenirs in manuscript of Davout, quoted
above.
44. Napoleon, M^m. 60.
45. Napoleon, Mem. 59. See p. 51, and note 14.
46. There are traces of this hesitation in the Correspondence, 13th
May, to Davout (21,900) ; " How wide is the Scheldt in the neighbourhood
of Mons ? the Sambre by Charleroi 1 the Meuse by Maestricht 1 and how
many pontoons would it require to throw a bridge across each one of
these rivers'?" 22nd May, to Soult (22,955) : " If I took the offensive on
the left. . . ."
47. Napoleon, Corresp. 22,004, 22,005, 22,006, 22,022. Napoleon's
order, 10th June ; Soult's orders and letters, 5th and 6th June (War
Arch., Army of the North); Soult's report to Napoleon, Avesnes, 12th
June (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1938).
48. Order of the Emperor, 10th June; La Poype to Davout, Lille,
2nd June; Davout's orders, 5th and 10th June ; Soult to Rouyer, 5th
June ; Frere to Davout, Lille, 8th June ; Vandamme to Davout, 10th
June (War Arch., Army of the North).
49. Grouchy, Relation snccincte, 10, 11 ; Declaration of Colonel de
Elocqueville ; General Bonneraains' Journal (War Arch., Army of the
North).
50. Order from Soult, Avesnes, 12th June : " The Emperor commands
that you should set your four corps marching on Avesnes. . . . Your
move must be completed by the 1 3th " (War Arch.).
51. Bonnemains' Journal ; Declaration of Elocqueville ; Grouchy,
Relation succincte, 10. Bonnemains says that many horses were woundei'
in their withers and that all were worn out.
52. Journal des sejours de I'Empereur (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 437).
CHAP. II NOTES 331
53. Napoleon, Corresp. 22,049 ; Grouchy to Soult and to Kellermann,
Bossus, 14th June (War Arch.).
54. Order to the Army, Avesnes, 14th June (Corresp. 22,052). This
proclamation was read to the troops at reveille. Order from Erlon, 14th
June (War Arci.).
55. 1st Co:iPS : Drouet d'Erlox —
1st Infantry Division : Allix ; Brigades — Quiot and Boui^eois ; 54th,
55th, 28th, and 105th of line.
(Allix being unable to rejoin his corps in time, the 1st Infantry
Division was commanded by Quiot.)
2nd Infantry Division : Donzelot ; Brigades — Schmitz and Aulard ;
13th, 17th, lOth, and 51st Light Infantry.
3rd Infancry Division : Marcognet ; Brigades — Noguez and Grenier ;
21st, 46th, 2i)th, and 45th of line.
4th Infantry Division : Durutte ; Brigades — Perot and Brue ; 8th,
29th, 85th, f nd 95th of line.
1st Cavflry Division : Jacquinot ; Brigades — Bruno and Gobrecht ;
7th Hussars, 3rd Chasseurs, 3rd and 4th Lancers.
ArtiDery : de Salles ; six batteries, train.
Engineers : Garbe ; five companies.
(Estimate of the 1st Corps on 10th June, War Arch., Portfolio of the
Estimates.)
56. 2nd Corps : Reille —
5th Infantry Division: Bachelu ; Brigades — Husson and Campy;
2nd Light Troops, 61st, 72nd, and 108th of line.
6th Infantry Division : Prince Jerome Bonaparte ; Brigades — Bauduin
and Soye ; 1st Light Troops, 3rd, 1st, and 2nd of line.
7 th Infantry Division : Girard ; Brigades — Devilliers and Piat ; 11th
Light Troops, 82nd of line, 12th Light Troops, and 4th of line.
8 th Infantry Division : Foy ; Brigades — Gauthier and B. Jamin ;
92nd, 93rd, 100th of line, and 4th Light Troops.
2nd Cavalry Division : Pire ; Brigades — Hubert and Yathiez ; 1st
and 6th Chasseurs, 5th and 6th Lancei-s.
Artillery : Pelletier ; six batteries, train.
Engineers : de Richemont ; five companies.
(Estimate of the 2nd Corps on 10th June, War Arch.)
57. 3rd Corps : Vandamme —
9th Infantry Division: Lefol ; Brigaues — Billard and Corsin ; 15th
Light Troops, 23rd, 37th, and 64th of line.
1 0th Infantry Division : Habert ; Brigades — Gengoux and Dupeyroux ;
88th, 22nd, and 70th of line, 2nd foreign regiment (Swiss).
1 1th Infantry Division : Berthezene ; Brigades — Dufour and Lagarde ;
12th, 56th, 33rd, and 86th of line.
3rd Cavalry Division : Domon ; Brigades — Dommanget and Vinot ;
4th, 9th, and 12th Chasseurs.
Artillery : Doguereau ; five batteries, train.
Engineers : Xempde ; three companies.
(Estimate of the 3rd Corps on 10th June, War Arch.).
332 WATERLOO book i
58. 6th Corps : Mouton, Count of Lobau —
19th Infantry Division : Simmer ; Brigades — Bellair and M. Jamin ;
5th, 11th, 27th, and 84th of line.
20th Infantry Division : Jannin ; Brigades — Bony and Tromelin ;
5th Light Troops, 10th, 47th, and 107th of line.
21st Infantry Division : Teste; Brigades — Laffite and Penne ; 8th
Light Troops, 40th, 65th, and 75th of line.
Artillery : Noury ; four batteries, train.
Engineers : Sabatier ; three companies.
(Estimate of the 6th Corps on 10th June, War Arch.).
59. 4th Corps : Gerard —
1 2th Infantry Division : Pecheux ; Brigades — Romme and Schoeifer ;
30th, 96th, 63rd of line, and 6th Light Troops.
13th Infantry Division : Vichery ; Brigades — Le Capitaine and
Desprez ; 59th, 76th, 48th, and 60th of line.
1 4th Division of Infantry : de Bourmont ; Brigades—Hiilot and
Toussaint; 9th Light, 111th, 44th, and 50th of the line.
7th Cavalry Division : Maurin ; Brigades — Vallin and Berruyer ; 6th
Hussars, 7th and 8th Chasseurs.
Artillery : Baltus ; five batteries, train.
Engineers : Valaze ; four companies.
(Estimate of the 4tli Corps on 13th May and 1st June, War Arch.).
From Davout's report, 23rd June, on the strength of the armies in the
field (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1936), the 4th Corps must have been 17,303
men strong. This is not impossible, for between the 1st and the 15th
of June, that corps had been reinforced. However, Gerard says (Quelqiies
Observations, 45) that his infantry did not amount to 13,000 men.
60. Cavalry Reserve : Grouchy —
1 ST Cavalry Corps : Pajol —
4th Division : Soult ; Brigades — Saint-Laurent and Ameil ; 1st, 4th,
and 5th Hussars, one mounted battery, train.
5th Division : Subervie ; Brigades — Alphonse de Colbert and Merlin ;
1st and 2nd Lancers and 11th Chasseurs, one mounted battery, train.
2nd Cavalry Corps : Exelmans —
9th Division: Strolz ; Brigades — Burthe and Vincent; 5th, 13tli,
15th, and 20th Dragoons, 8th and 11th Cuirassiers, one mounted
battery, train.
10th Division: Chastel ; Brigades — Bonnemains and Berton ; 4th,
12th, 14th, and 17th Dragoons; one mounted battery, train.
3rd Cavalry Corps : Kellermann, Comte de Valmy —
11th Division : Lheritier ; Brigades — Picquet and Guiton ; 2nd and
7th Dragoons, 8th and 11th Cuirassiers, one mounted battery, train.
12th Division: Roussel d'Hurbal ; Brigades — Blancard and Donop ;
1st and 2nd Carabiniers, 2nd and 3rd Cuirassiers, one mounted battcrj,
train.
4th Cavalry Corps : Milhaud —
13th Division: AVathier de St. Alphonse; Brigades — Dubois and
Travels ; 1st, 4th, 7th, and 12th Cuirassiers, one mounted battery, train.
CHAP. II NOTES 333
14th Division : Delort ; Brigades — Farine and Vial; 5th, 10th, 6th,
and 9th Cuirassiers, one mounted battery, train.
(Estimate of the corps on 1st and 15th June; general estimate of
the cavalry on 1st June, furnished by General Preval, War Arch.).
61. Imperial Guard —
Old Guard on foot ; 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Grenadiers ; first colonel,
Friant ; second colonel, Roguet ; generals in command of the regiments.
Petit, Christian!, Porret de Morvan, Harlet.
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Chasseurs ; first colonel, Morand ; second colonel,
Michel ; generals in command of the regiments, Cambronne, Pelet,
Mallet, Hanrion.
(3rd and 4th Grenadiers, and 3rd and 4th Chasseurs recently formed,
were in common parlance called the ^fiddle Guard, even though they
•officially belonged to the Old Guard.) .
Young Guard, Ist and 3rd Voltigeurs, Ist and 3rd Skirmishers
Senior commandants, Duhesme and Barrois ; junior commandants, Guy
and Chartran.
Light Cavalry : Lefebvre-Desnoettes ; Chevau-legers-lancers : Edouard
de Colbert ; Mounted Chasseurs : F. Lallemand.
Reserve Cavalry : Guyot ; Mounted Grenadiers : Dubois ; Dragoons :
Omano (left in Paris, wounded in a duel) ; elite gendarmes : d'Autancourt.
Artillery of the Old Guard, Auxiliary Artillery (Young Guard), train,
Sappers, Marines of the Guard : Desvaux de Saint-Maurice, Artillery on
foot, thirteen batteries : Dominique Lallemand ; Mounted Artillery, three
batteries : Colonel Duchand.
(Estimate of the Guard, 16th June, signed d'Heriot, sub-aid-major
of the Guard, "War Arch.).
62. For positions : order of the day, Avesnes, 13th June (Xapoleon,
Corresp. 22,049). Hulot's report, Soult^s orders, Beaumont, 14th June ;
Grouchy to Soult, to Pajol, to KeUermann, to Milhaud, Bossus, 14th and
15th June; ReUle to Soult, Solre-sur-Sambre, 14th June; order of
General Delcambre, Chief of the StaflF of the 1st Corps, Avesnes, 14th
June, War ArcL, Army of the North.
63. Xeigre's report, 2nd June (War Arch.), Ruty's report, 13th June
vXat. Arch. AF. iv. 1938). The artillery included 35 unmounted
batteries of 8 (batteries of divisions) and 1 2 (resen'e batteries), all of them
with 8 pieces, and 15 with 6 pieces.
64. 1st Corps : Zietex —
Infantry Divisions : Steinmetz, Pirch II., Jagow, and Henneckel ;
Reserve Cavalry Roder : Treskow and Liitzow Brigades.
12 batteries.
The Prussians called infantry brigades, the aggregation of three
regiments composed each of three battalions of 730 men. In order to
avoid misleading the reader, I apply the name of divisions to those
brigades whose effective strength were equal and often superior to those
of the French divisions.
65. 2nd Corps : Pirch L —
Infantry Di\-i3ions : Tippelskirch, Krafft, Brause, and Langen.
334 WATERLOO
BOOK I
Reserve of Cavalry: Jiirgass ; Thuemen, Schulenburg, and Sohr
Brigades.
10 batteries.
66. 3rd Corps : Thielmann —
Infantry Divisions : Borcke, Kemphen, Liick, and Stiilpnagel.
Reserve Cavalry : Hobe ; Marwitz and Lottum Brigades.
6 batteries.
67. 4th Corps : Bulow —
Infantry Division : Hacke, Ryssel, Losthin, and Hiller.
Reserve Cavalry : Prince William of Prussia ; Scbwerin, Watzdorf,
and Sidow.
11 batteries.
68. Plotho. Annexes viii. and xi. For the positions, Damitz, i. 35, 36,
.353-364 ; von Ollech, 62.
69. 2nd Corps : Lord Hill —
Clinton Division : Adam Brigade (English) ; Duplat Brigade (German
Legion) ; William Halkett Brigade (Hanoverian).
Colville Division : Mitchell Brigade (English) ; Johnstone Brigade
.(English) ; Lyon Brigade (Hanoverian).
Estorff Brigade of Cavalry (Hanoverian).
Corps of Prince Frederick of the Netherlands; Steedmann Divi-
sion (Hollando - Belgian) ; Anthing Brigade, surnamed Indian Brigade
(Dutch).
4 batteries.
70. 1st Corps : Prince of Orange —
Cooke Division : Maitland and Byng Brigades (English Guards).
Alten Division : Colin Halkett Brigade (English) ; Ompteda Brigade
(German Legion) ; Kielmansegge Brigade (Hanoverian).
Perponcher Division : Bylandt Brigade (Hollando-Belgian) ; Prince
of Saxe- Weimar Brigade (Nassau).
Chasse Division : Detmers and d'Aubremd Brigades (Hollando-
Belgian).
Cavalry Division : CoUaert (Dutch) ; Trip Brigade (Carabiniers) ;
Ghigny and van Merlen Brigades (Hussars and Light Dragoons).
9 batteries.
71. Cavalry Corps : Lord Uxbridge —
Somerset Brigade (Life-Guards, Horse-Guards, and Dragoons of the
Guard) ; Ponsonby Brigade (Royal Dragoons, Scots Greys, and Enniskillen
Dragoons) ; Dornberg Brigade (Light English Dragoons and German
Legion) ; Vandeleur Brigade (English Dragoons) ; Grant Brigade (English
Hussars and German Legion); Vivian Brigade (English Hussars aud
Oerman Legion) ; Arenschild Brigade (German Legion).
72. Reserve : Lord Wellington —
Picton Division : Kempt and Pack Brigades (English) ; Wincke
Brigade (Hanoverian).
I battery.
Cole Division : Lambert Brigade (English), and Best (Hanoverian).
1 battery.
HAP. Ill NOTES 335
The Duke of Brunswick corps : eight battalions, five squadrons,
two batteries. Kruse Brigade (Nassau).
Reserve Artillery : 1 2 batteries.
Estimates of 6tli June (quoted by van Loben, 82, 84, 86, after the
military archives of the Netherlands). See p. 53.
There were in addition to these, as already stated (ibid.), 10,000 or
12,000 men of the Hanoverian garrison at Fumes, Ostend, Antwerp,
Nieuport, etc But in the hypothesis of either the Allies or
Napoleon taking the oflFensive in the valley of the Sambre, these troops
were not to take an active part in the hostilities.
For positions : Wellington to the Prince of Orange and to Lord
Uxbridge, Brussels, 30th April (Despatches, xii. 337, 338); Sibome,
History of the War in 1815, i. 25, 26, van Loben, 98-100.
73. Clause witz [Der Fehiig von 1815, 29) says that the armies could
not be concentrated on their point of union in less than four or five days.
This is a slight exaggeration, disproved by facts. Had not the battle of
Ligny been fought, the concentration, which commenced on the 14th for
the Prussians, and in the night of the 1 5th to the 16th for the English,
would have been completed at noon on the 17 th, between Sombreflfe
and Quatre-bras.
74. Wellington, Eeply to Clausewitz (Despatches, xiL 523).
75. Wellington to the Czar, Brussels, 15th June (Despatches, xiL 470
ag.). See letter from the same to Lord Lyndoch, 13th June (ibid.
462) : " Our strength is such that we cannot be attacked here."
76. Bliicher to his wife, Namur, 3rd Jime (Blucher in Briefen, 143).
BOOK I CHAPTER m
1. Reille to Soult, Gosselies, 15th June, 9 o'clock p.m. Pajol's notes
on the day^s engagements, 15th June (War Arch., Army of the North).
2. Order of movement for the 15th, Beaumont, 14th June (Napoleon,
Gorresp. 22,053) ; Soult to Vandamme, to Grouchy, and to Gerard,
Beaumont, 14th June (Register of the Chief of the Stafi", Bihliotheque
Xationale, ^L Ms. F. Fr. 4366).
3. Older of movement for the 15th of June, Beaumont, 14th June
'^Napoleon, Corresp. 22,053).
4. Order from the head of the staflF of the Ist Corps, Avesnes, 14th
June (War. Arch.).
5. Lobau to Soult, Jamignon (Jamioulx), 15th June, 8 p.m. ; Janin,
Camp, de Waierloo, 6, 7. The Adjutant-Commandant Janin, was deputy-
chief of the staff at Lobau.
6. Hulot's report (communicated by Baron Hulot).
7. Hulot's report (communicated by Baron Hijlot).
8. Hulot's report. See Mauduit, Les Demiers Jours de la Grande
Armee, iL 33 ; and La Relation de VAmbigu of London, lii. 423 ;
336 WATERLOO book i
Bourmont's treachery inspired the soldiers with the fear of foul play
elsewhere, and predisposed them to be easily depressed by checks and
hardships.
9. Hulot's report. See Clouet, Quelques mots sur la conduite du Comte
de Bour'mo7it, 11-22.
On the evening of the 1 4th Bourmont had been to supper with
General Hulot, without in any way leading him to suspect his determina-
tion, says Hulot ; Clouet says on the contrary that it was announced
then and there. Hulot's testimony to us seems the most reliable.
10. Bourmont to Gerard, Florenne, 11th June, in the morning (War
Arch., Bourmont's documents and papers) ; Bourmont's letter, remarks
Hulot, was accompanied by another letter of Clouet to Gerard, also to be
found among Bourmont's documents and papers.
In this letter he vainly attempts to vindicate his conduct. It is
proved only too well (see p. 24) that, far from urging him to accept a
command, the Emperor had employed him, merely at the repeated en-
treaties of Ney and Gerard.
Apparently, if these two generals insisted so strongly, they had only
done so at the request of Bourmont himself. The letter to Gerard proves
but one fact ; premeditation on the part of Bourmont — premeditation
which is certainly confirmed by this fact, quoted further, that Bourmont
had the white cockade on his hat as soon as he stepped on the enemy's
ground. It is difficult to believe that he found that cockade on the
road. See concerning the disgraceful conduct of Bourmont, Les Cent
Jours en Belgiqiie, by an emigre {Bibliotheque tmiverselle de Geneve, July-
Aug., 1857).
11. Von Ollech, Gescliichte des Feldzuges von 1815, 100.
12. Zieten's report, on the height near Gilly, half-past one (quoted
by von Ollech, 101). See von Ollech, 100, and Hooper {Waterloo, 68)
relating, on the testimony of Sir Francis Head, who was present at the
meeting of the Zieten's staff on 15th June, that Bourmont gave up the
order of movement for the day, saying, " He had carried out his cherished
intention of betraying Napoleon."
Not content with having spoken in the evening, Bourmont ivrote from
Namur to the Duke de Feltre, as if he were anxious to leave some
evidence of his treachery : " Having started from Florenne this morning,
I left the 4th Corps under the orders of General Gerard at Philippeville,
To-day he has no doubt marched on Charleroi. The rest of the army,
that is to say, three corps and the guard, were massed towards Beaumont.
It is likely that the English or the Prussians will be attacked to-morrow"
(Catalogue of autographs of Benjamin Fillon, No. 2840).
13. Einerlei toas das Volk fur ein Zeichen ansteckt ! Hundsfott bleibt
Hundsfott! Siborne, i. 56. See von Ollech, 101, who says that Bliicher
let Bourmont pass without asking him any question,
14. Order of Zieten, Charleroi, 9th June, and letters from Domberg,
Zieten, Hardinge, Pirch II., and Steinmetz, 9th, 12th, 13th, and 14th
June (von Ollech, 87, 88, Supjil. Despatches of Wellington, x. 436, 437,
454, 455, 476).
CHAP. Ill NOTES 337
15. See p. 59.
16. "Wellington to the Prince of Orange, Brussels, 2nd May (in the
morning and at 9 p.m.) ; to Hardinge, Brussels, 5th May {Despatches, xii.
345, 349) ; Muffling, Aus meinem Leben, 183.
17. See Muffling, Aus meinem Leben, 200, 201 ; Sibome, History of
the War in 1813, i. 39 ; Damitz, Hv^t. de la Camp, de 1815 (French
translation), L 32 ; van Loben, Precis de la Campagne de 1815 (transla-
tion from the Dutch), 96 ; Chesney, Conferences sur Waterloo (translation
from the English), 119; von Ollech, Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815,
45 ; Ropes, The Campaign of Waterloo, 71, 91, 92,
No contemporary document, except perhaps Miiffling's work — which
is not remarkably clear on the point — gives a detailed and specified
account of the decisions taken at Tirlemont, It is very likely, as
Eopes judiciously remarks, that the plan for concentration, which
Miiffling describes as settled between Wellington and Blticher, was con-
ceived after the event, by Miiffling himself ; besides, in case of an attack
towards Charleroi, the positions of the armies and the nature of the
ground rendered the choice of the plan unavoidable. But Ropes goes
too far in saying that offensive plans alone were discussed at Tirlemont.
Wellington's letters of the 30th of April to the Prince of Orange, testify
that, at that time, the Duke thought then of protecting himself
against any attack, and as Muffling says {Axis meinem. Leben, 190),
he desired the Prussian army to come and prolong his left in case of
need- Such was the object of the Tirlemont interview. Bliicher's
j orders of the 5th of May, in pursuance of which the Prussians began to
i assemble on their right, show that defensive measures had been agreed on
by the two generals on the 3rd of May. " My interview with Blticher
I was most satisfactory." Wellington wrote on the 4th of May to the
Prince of Orange {Despatches, xii. 345).
I 18. Orders of Bliicher, Liege, 5th May (quoted by von Ollech, 45,46) ;
1 Hardinge to Wellington, 5th May {Suppl. Despatches, x. 239). Bliicher
came to Namur between the 10th and 15th of May.
19. Orders of Blticher to Zieten, Liege, 5th May (quoted by von
OUech, Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815, 45).
20. Wellington to the Prince of Orange, Brussels, 9th and 12th May
\ {Despatches, xii. 365, 367); Prince of Orange to Wellington, Braiae-le-
Comte, 10th and 12th May {Suppl. Despatches, x 271, 281).
21. Orders of Blticher and of Gneisenau, Namur, 14th June ; Blticher
Ito Muffling, Namur, 15th June, 9 a.m. (quoted by von Ollech, 90, 91, 96).
22. ReUle to Soult, Gosselies, 15th June, 9 pji. ; Notes of Pajol, 15th
June (War Arch.) ; Damitz, i. 62, 63 ; Wagner, iv. 11, 12.
23. Reille to Soult, Gosselies, 11th Jime, 9 p.m., ReiUe's Report,
d'Erlon to Soult, Marchienne, 15th June, 4.30 p.m. ; Notes of Pajol
War Arch.); Damitz, i. 64; Wagner, iv. 12.
24. Notes of Pajol on the engagements of 15th June (War Arch.) ;
Gourgaud, 44 ; Napoleon, Mem. 79 ; Damitz, L 63-16 ; Journal manu-
script of Gourgaud (Papers of General G.).
25. The Notes of Pajol and the Bulletin de Varme'e {Moniteur, 18th
22
338 WATERLOO book i
June) both agree as to the time when Pajol, closely followed by the
Emperor, passed through Charleroi, mid-day ; German documents say
half-past eleven.
26. Napoleon, Corres}). 22,055 ; account of the Ambigu, London, lii.
422. Local traditions : At Charleroi the Prussians had made themselves
odious.
27. Merode, Westerloo, M^m. i. 348 ; Notes in manuscript of Colonel
Baudus (commented by M. de Montenon). Local traditions. The " Belle-
Vue " was pulled down about fifteen years ago. It was situated on the
left of the road, about 150 metres south from the spot where the viaduct
of the " Grand-Central-Beige " now stands.
28. Notes above quoted of Colonel Baudus. Baudus was then
commandant attached to Soult's staff.
29. Henry Houssaye, 1815, i. 614.
30. Manuscript journal of Gourgaud ; Notes of Pajol (War Arch.) ;
Soult to d'Erlon in front of Charleroi, 15th June, three o'clock (Major-
General's Ledger) ; see Napoleon, Alem. 80, 81 ; Gourgaud, Camp, de
1815, 45, 46.
31. Numerous controversies have arisen concerning this very im-
portant question — At what time did Ney join the Emperor ? Heymes
(Relation, 6) says, seven oclock ; Pajol (Notes on the events of the 15th of
June, Military Arch.) says, mid-day ; Gamot (rectifying letter, Armales
Militaires, October, 1818) says, in the afternoon. All historians say,
between 4 and 5 p.m.
From the general agreement of the witnesses quoted hereafter, it is
beyond doubt that the interview between Ney and the Emperor took
place between three or a quarter past three at the latest.
1st. Gourgaud (manuscript journal) says that Ney assumed the com-
mand before the attack of Gosselies.
2nd. Gourgaud {Gamp, de 1815, 46) says that Ney arrived at the
moment when Reille was marching from Marchienne on Gosselies.
3rd. Reille {Relation, War Arch.) says that Ney took the command of
the 2nd Corps when this army corps was marching on Gosselies.
4th. Ney himself (letter to the Duke of Otrante, 26th June, Jotirnal
de V Empire of 29th June) says that he reached Charleroi just as the
enemy was falling back on Gosselies, and that soon after he pursued
them and compelled them to evacuate Gosselies.
But from the little inn of Belle-Vue, the point where Ney met the
Emperor, to Gosselies, the distance is about 6 kilm. ; and according to
the testimony of German and Dutch authors (Damitz, 67 ; Reiche, ii
416; von Ollech, 101; Treuenfeld, 103, 128; van Loben, 123. See
Clausewitz, 30; Plotho, 30; Wagner, iv. 14, etc.) the French attacked
Gosselies at four o'clock at the latest.
One word more to prove Heymds's want of truthfulness. According
to him, Ney must have left Beaumont towards eleven o'clock. If, then,
he did not reach Charleroi before seven, he must have taken eight hours
to accomplish 26 kilm. Is this possible with a rider like Ney, mounted
on a fresh horse to boot, and with the cannon thundering in his ears ?
CHAP. Ill NOTES 339
32. Letter of Ney to the Duke of Otrante, 26tU June ; Heymes
(Relation^ 6). As stated (see pp. 29, 30), Ney was not called to the army
before the 11th of June, the Emperor having only decided at the very
last moment to give him an appointment
33. These are the very words of Heymes {Relation, 6, 7), with the
exception of the last sentence relating to Quatre-Bras which Ney's aide-
de-camp, in a pamphlet written solely to justify the Marshal, has of
com-se "forgotten " to mention. But Gourgaud (Camj). de 1815, 46) and
Napoleon himself {Mem. 81) positively affirm that Ney received the order
to march on Quatre-Bras, on the 15th of June. Two decisive testimonies
exist to confirm on this point, the dictated accounts of St. Helena.
1st. Grouchy {Observations sur la Camp, de 1815, Philadelphia edition
1818, p. 32) says that the Emperor, in his presence, censured the conduct
of Ney, who had stopped the movements of the troops, instead of executing
his orders to march on Quatre-Bras.
2nd. The army Bulletin, dictated at Charleroi on the evening of the
loth {Moniteur, 18th June), states that : '• The Emperor gave the command
of the left wing to the Prince of Moscow who had that evening his
headquarters at les Quatre-chemins (Quatre-Bras) on the road to Brussels."
This last document is conclusive and closes the discussion.
34. Grouchy says positively and repeatedly {Relation succinde, 12,
and Appendix, iv. 32 and vii. 12 : aide-de-camp Bella's declaration and
notes on Jomini's letters) that Napoleon gave him not only verbal, but
written orders, to pursue the enemy beyond Fleurus and Sombreffe, and
even to advance to Gembloux. This assertion is confirmed by Grouchy's
letter to Napoleon, Fleurus, 16th June, 5 o'clock A.M. (War Arch.): "I
am now gathering my troops to effect the movement you have ordered on
Sombreffe."
Thus, in spite of Napoleon's declarations to the contrary, in the 15th
of his Notes on the Art of War, of General Rogniat, his object certainly
was to occupy Sombreffe on the eve of the 15th of June.
" Had we occupied Sombreffe," says the Emperor, in his note dictated
at St. Helena, " this would have involved the failure of all my manoeuvres,
for the battle of Ligny would not have taken place." But, as I will
prove further by the letters of the Emperor himself, the possibility of
this battle was absolutely overlooked, in his calculations on the eve of the
15th and even on the morning of the 16th. Consequently he could not
have wished to manceuvre, so as to bring about a concentration of the
Prussians at that point, as he tried to prove at St Helena.
35. Grouchy, Observat. sur la Camp, de 1815, 61. See Relation
succinde, 11, where Grouchy says that the dragoons came up before
Vandamme's corps, and the Bulletin of the Army {Moniteur, 18th June),
where it is stated that Vandamme's corps came up at three o'clock.
36. Wagner, iv. 13 ; Damitz, L 69, 70 ; von Ollech, 103.
37. Grouchy, Relation succincte, 11.
38. Grouchy, Relation succincte, 13, and Appendix, iv. 31 ; declaration
of aide-de-camp Bella. Napoleon, at the same time that he gave Grouchy
the command of the right wing, gave also Ney the command of the left.
340 WATERLOO book i
But written orders confirming the appointments were not addressed to
the two marshals, until the morning of the 16th. (Napoleon, Corresp.
22,058, 22,059; Soult to Ney and to Grouchy, Charleroi, 16th June;
Register of orders of the Major-General.)
39. Grouchy, Relation succinde, 11, 12 ; Observations, 61 ; Notes of
Pajol (War Arch.) ; see Gourgaud, 82, 83 ; Napoleon, Mem. 49.
40. Grouchy, Eelation succinde, 11. See Notes on Pajol (War Arch.),
41. Gourgaud, 49 ; Napoleon, Mem. 83 ; manuscript journal of
Gourgaud; Damitz, ii. 70, 71 ; Notes of Colonel Simon-Loriere on the
battles of the 15th and 16tli of June (War Arch.); Grouchy {Eelation
succinde, 11 and 12, and Appendix, iv. 31) will not acknowlege that he
and Vandamme had wasted time. He contends that Vandamme attacked
prematurely and without waiting for his orders. But it was the Emperor
himself who ordered Vandamme to attack. Grouchy, being on the left,
could not exactly know what was going on in the centre.
42. Letter of Kimann, chief of the squadrons of the Night Guard,
17th June (General Gourgaud's papers) ; manuscript journal of Gourgaud,
Army Bulletin {Monite%hr, 18th June); Gourgaud, Gampagne de 1815^
49, 50 ; Napoleon, Mem. 83 ; Damitz, 71 ; Wagner, iv. 15.
43. Grouchy to Napoleon, Campinaire, 15th June, 10 o'clock p.m.
See Exelmans to Soult, 16th June, and Pajol to Grouchy, Lambusart,
15th June, 10 o'clock p.m. (War Arch.).
44. Wagner, iv. 16.
45. Grouchy, Relation succinde, 12, 13, and Appendix, iv. 32;
Bella's declaration; see Pajol to Grouchy, Lambusart, 15th June, 10
o'clock P.M. (War Arch.) ; manuscript journal of Gourgaud. Gourgaud
relates that after a long and lively discussion, Vandamme consented to
give a battalion. But too much time had been wasted ; it was already
pitch dark.
It must be noted that on the 1 5th of June, Vandamme did not yet
know that he was under Grouchy's orders, the Emperor having neglected
to inform him of the fact. Grouchy being merely verbally invested with
the command of the right wing. See on this subject p. 68, and note 38.
46. Grouchy to Napoleon, Campinaire, 15th June, 10 o'clock P.M. ;
Pajol to Grouchy, Lambusart, 10 o'clock p.m. (War Arch., Army of
the North).
47. See p. 65.
48. Reille's account (War Arch.); Damitz, i. 66, 67. See Zieten'a
report, 11th June, half-past one (quoted by von Ollech, 100), and Soult
to d'Erlon, Charleroi, 11th June (Ledger of Major-General).
As stated (p. 66), Gourgaud had carried to Eeille the order
to march on Gosselies from Marchienne. When Reille received this
order, he had already started for Jumet on his own initiative.
49. Reille's account (War Arch.). "The divisions were marching
on to the wood of Lombuc and Gosselies," says Reille. " It was at that
moment that Marshal Ney came to assume the command." Nothing
could be more definite. See manuscript journal of Gourgaud (General
Gourgaud's papers).
CHAP. Ill NOTES 341
50. Reille's account ; manuscript journal of Gourgaud. See Wagner,
iv. 14; Plotho, 30; Clausewitz, 30; Daraitz, 68; Hoffmann, 28;
Reiche, Reply to Hoffmann; von Ollech, 101. According to Plotho
and Hoffmann, Steinmetz had recaptured and entirely reoccupied
Gosselies, But Clausewitz and Reiche say that his division cut its way
through with their bayonets and went on retreating. Steinmetz himself,
in his official report (quoted in the MUitiir Wochenhlatt, 1847), says : "I
reached Gosselies and continued the retreat as far as Heppignies." There
is no question here of the reoccupation of Gosselies.
Steinmetz was scarcely pursued at all. Indeed, it was only at
eight o'clock in the evening when, upon the order of the Emperor to
send forces towards Fleurus, the Girard division marched on "Wangenies,
passing through Ransart, and had a fresh struggle with the Prussians ;
Reille to Soult, Gosselies, 15th June (War Arch.); see Damitz, 68;
Girard to ReiUe, "Wangenies, 15th June, 11 o'clock p.m. (General
Grourgaud's papers).
51. Notes of de Stuers, chief of the Red Lancers squadrons (comm.
by M. de Stuers). Reille's account (War Arch., see Reille to Soult,
Gosselies, 15th June, 9 p.m.) states expressly that after the attack of
Gosselies, the whole of the second corps rallied and took up their
positions ; three divisions surrounded Gosselies — two divisions, one of
which was Pile's, at Mellet, and only the cavalry of the Guard was
detached to the road to Brussels. Pages 2 and 8 of Heymes's Eelation
are a tissue of intentional errors.
It may be noted also that Ney, with complete disregard of the
Emperor's orders not to employ the cavalry of the Guard, sent that very
corps to the front, when he had Pire within reach.
52. The Prince of Orange (Report to the King of the Netherlands,
Nivelles, 17th June, 2 o'clock a.m.. General Gourgaud's papers) says that
the attack of Frasnes commenced alx)ut five o'clock ; Prince Bernard of
Saxe- Weimar, in his report of 15th June, Quatre-Bras, 9 o'clock p.m.
(quoted by van Loben, 134, 135), says, at half-past six This discrepancy
between the two statements, arises no doubt from the fact that the Prince
of Orange means, by the beginning of the attack, the time when the
Lancers reached Frasnes, while Prince Bernard means the moment when
the infantry battalion, on which they had been obliged to wait for a full
hour, arrived at the village.
53. Reports above mentioned from the Prince of Orange and Prince
of Saxe-Weimar ; van Loben, 132-134 ; Notes of de Stuers, chief of the
Red Lancers squadrons of the Guard (comm. by M. de Stuers).
See Ney's letter to Soult, Gosselies, 16th June, 7 o'clock a-M. (Greneral
Gourgaud's papers), in which the presence at Frasnes of the battalion
detached from the Ballu Division, is mentioned.
54. Colbert to the Duke d'Elchingen, 15th May 1829. This lett«r,
the copy of which has been communicated to me by General de Colbert,
was addressed to the Duke of Elchingen who collected all the testimonies
of the officers who served under his father on the 15th and 16th of June,
in order to insert them in his pamphlet. Documents ivMits, etc. But
342 WATERLOO bk. i ch. hi
for obvious reasons this letter was not piiblished by the Duke of Elchingen.
This reconnoitring manoeuvre is mentioned also by Colonel Lemonnier,
Toy's aide-de-camp (Gamioagnes, 236). It is imquestionable that Colbert
pushed on as far as Quatre-Bras ; but the general's memory is at fault,
when he asserts that he arrived there at four o'clock. He could not, at
the earliest, have arrived before six, that is to say, an hour before the
Prince of Saxe- Weimar himself rode in from Genappe.
55. Reports already mentioned from the Prince of Orange and the
Prince of Saxe- Weimar ; van Loben, 134; see 130-132; de Stuers's
Notes. In his report Prince Bernard says that when he concentrated his
brigade at Quatre-Bras, Normann's battalion had already taken up its
position at the wood of Bossu.
56. Van Loben (130-132) expressly says that Prince Bernard began
to move towards Quatre-Bras of his own accord, before receiving the
order sent at about four o'clock from Nivelles, by General Perponcher ;
this order had been transmitted first to Houtain-le-Val. Chesney's
remark {Waterloo, 128) is therefore absolutely erroneous.
57. 1st, 2nd, and 3rd battalions of Nassau; 1st and 2nd battalions
of Orange-Nassau ; a company of chasseurs on foot ; a mounted battery.
Altogether about 4500 men. The estimate of the 12th of June quoted
by van Lciben, 69, assigns only 3,821 men to that brigade ; but the 2nd
battalion of Orange-Nassau and the company of chasseurs are not
mentioned.
58. The Lefebvre-Desnoettes Division numbered 2,067 men (estimate
of 15th June, signed d'Heriot, War Arch.), but two squadrons on duty
had remained with the Emperor.
59. Notes of de Stuers, chief of the squadrons, and letter from
Colbert (above mentioned) ; report of the Prince of Saxe-AVeimar, Quatre-
Bras, 9 o'clock P.M.
According to this report everything was over by eight o'clock, and
the Prince feared no other attack during the evening. The Prince of
Orange corroborates this in his report to the King of the Netherlands :
" The skirmish," he says, " ceased at eight o'clock."
60. Reille's account (War Arch.); Stuers's Notes. See Ney's letter to
the Duke of Otrante, 26th June {Journal de V Empire, 29th June).
61. Heymes, Relation, 9.
62. In this case the other two divisions of Reille's corps would have
marched on Mellet, and would have been replaced at Gosselies by the two
first divisions of d'Erlon's corps. It has been asserted that d'Erlon was
far in the rear. This is a mistake. His troops were close to the 2nd
Corps, but seeing that the latter had halted at Gosselies, he did not
push on farther than Jumet (2 kilometres from Gosselies), where he took
shelter during this night of the 15th to the 16th. D'Erlon to Soult,
Marchienne, 16th June, 4.30 p.m. (War Arch.).
63. Report of the Prince of Saxe- Weimar, Quatre-Bras, 9 o'clock p.m.
(quoted by van Loben, 134).
BK. II CH. I NOTES 343
BOOK II
CHAPTER I
1. Positions of the French Army during the night of the 15th to the
16th of June.
Eight Wing — Grouchy
Grouchy's headquarters at Campinaire.
Cavalry corps under Pajol and Exelmans, between Lambusart and
Campinaire.
Milhaud's cuirassiers on the right bank of the Sambre.
3rd Corps (Vandamme) : the right wing beyond "Winage, the left in
the wood of Soleillemont (or wood of Fleurus).
4th Corps (Gerard) : Hulot's division at Chatelineau ; Pecheux,
Vichery, and Berthezene divisions at Chatelet ; ^laurin cavalry at
Roussieux.
Grouchy to Soult, Campinaire, 16th June, 3 a.m. ; Vandamme to
Soult, La Cens de Fontenelles, 15th June, 10 p.m. ; Soult to Delort,
Charleroi, 15th June (p.m.), Gerard to Soult, Chatelet, 15th June (p.m.)
(War Arch.).
Left Wlsg — Net
Ney's headquarters at Gosselies.
Lefebvre-Desnoettes cavalry division of the Guard at Frasnes.
2nd Corps (Reille) : Bachelu division at Mellet ; Foy and Jerome ;
Bonaparte divisions at Gosselies ; Girard division at Wangenies ; Pire
division at Heppignies.
1st Corps (d'Erlon) : Durutte and Donzelot between Jumet and
Gosselies ; Marcognet division at Marchienne ; Allii division at Thuin ;
Jacquinot's cavalry : 1st Brigade'at Jumet ; 2nd Brigade at Sobray.
Kellermann's cuirassiers also with the right wing, north of Chatelineau.
Lefebvre-Desnoettes to Xey, Frasnes, 16th June, 5.30 o'clock a.m. ;
Ney to Soult, Gosselies, 16th June, 7 o'clock A.M. ; Girard to Eeille,
Wangenies, 15th June, 11 o'clock p.m. (General Gourgaud's papers);
ReUle's account ; d'Erlon to Soult, Marchienne, 15th June, 4 o'clock p.m. ;
and Jumet, 15th June, evening (War Arch.).
Reserve — The Emperor
Imperial headquarters at Charleroi.
Young Guard at Gilly.
Old Foot-Guards and Guyot cavalry division of the Guard, between
Gilly and Charleroi.
Grand park, back of Charleroi.
344 WATERLOO book ii
6th Corps (Lobau) on the right bank of the Sambre.
(Gourgaud, Gamp, de 1815, 51), Lobau to Soult, on the height over-
looking Jamioulx, 15th June, 8 o'clock p.m. (War Arch.) ; General Petit's
manuscript account (London Morrisson Collection) ; Notes of Captain de
Stuers of the unmounted chasseurs of the Guard (comm. by M. de Stuers).
2. Towards eight o'clock, seeing the enemy in full retreat, the
Emperor had left the field of battle. Then he had returned to Charleroi
where the Imperial headquarters were established, and there, in the
house of an ironmaster of the name of Puissant, he had thrown himcelf
on his bed for a few minutes till the reports were brought in (Napoleon,
Corresp. 22,055 ; see Gourgaud, 50). This house, with its interior
decorations of the time of the Empire, is stiU in existence. It is
situated on the right bank of the Sambre.
3. Gourgaud, Camp, de 1815, 60 ; Gourgaud's manuscript journal
(General Gourgaud's papers).
Grouchy's report, Campinaire, 10 o'clock p.m. (War Arch.), should
have been transmitted to the Imperial headquarters towards 11
o'clock. As for Ney's, written at Frasnes, or more likely at Gosselies,
between nine and ten, it must have reached the Emperor at midnight.
The fact of his sending a report might seem doubtful, as there exists no
trace of it. But a letter from Ney on 16th June, 7 a.m., to be found in
General Gourgaud's papers, contains the following words : — "The 1st Corps
is at Julmet (sic). My report of yesterday mentions it." Thus all
doubt is dismissed,
4. See further, note 7, p. 346.
5. On the resolution taken in the afternoon of the 15th, to divide the
army into three great masses, and on the distribution of troops, see p. 68,
and note 38.
6. The Emperor's intentions are definitely expressed in his letters to
Ney and to Grouchy (Charleroi from half-past seven to half-past eight in
the morning), Corresp. 22,059, 22,060, and fully confirmed as to certain
details in the execution, by the Major- General's orders to Ney, Grouchy,
Drouot, Lobau, Gerard, and Vandamme (Charleroi, from half-past six to
eight in the morning ; Soult's Register, Bibliothhque Nat. MSS. 4366).
In the account written at St. Helena, this plan is naturally not mentioned.
In the face of facts, Napoleon deemed it too chimerical to be even men-
tioned. He was unwilling to show to what extent he had been mistaken
in the enemy's designs. But between the account written several years
after the events, and the orders of battle written on the very day, the
critic cannot hesitate. From Napoleon's letters we learn his real thoughts
and ideas, but not from his other writings. The above quoted letters,
it is evident, establish beyond a doubt that in the morning of 16th June: —
1st. The Emperor believed the Prussians were retreating, and he did
not expect to find any left on the Saint-Amand-Ligny road. " Proceed to
Sombreffe," he writes to Grouchy; "Gerard has orders to proceed to
Sombrefi'e loithout passing by Fleurus." He even doubted whether he would
find any at Sombrefi'e. " I shall attack the enemy if I meet him," he
writes to Nev : " and I shall reconnoitre the road as far as Gembloux."
CHAP. I NOTES 345
■ If the enemy he at Sombreffe," he writes to Grouchy, " I mean to attack
him."
2nd. The Emperor was by no means certain that the Prussians, or at
any rate a force of Prussians worth mentioning, were still occupying
Grembloux. In this sentence of his letter to Grouchy, " If the enemy be
at Sombreffe, I will attack him, I will even attack him at Gembloux,"
the second clause of the sentence (as may be inferred by what follows) is
conditional, as the first : "I wUl even attack him at Gembloux, if I
find him there." The Emperor proceeds : "... my intention being,
when I have studied those two positions, to go and operate with my left
wing." Had the possibility of a serious battle at Sombreffe or Gembloux
crossed his mind, he would not, towards evening, have been planning a
night march with Ney on Brussels.
3rd. The Emperor also assumes that the English are retreating.
Although he knew that Ney had not occupied Quatre-Bras the day before,
he still imagined that this position had been abandoned by the Dutch
and English. Otherwise he would not have written to Ney, nor would
he have requested the chief of his staff to write to him : " Take up your
positions at Quatre - Bras, establish a division at Genappe, and send a
reconnaisance to Nivelles, from which the enemy has probably retired."
Gfenappe is 5 kilom. further than Quatre-Bras, and Xivelles 10 kilom.
to the west of this same point. Therefore it is clear that Ney was not
expected to attack the cross - roads at Quatre - Bras, which Napoleon
believed to be abandoned by the enemy, but to take up his positions
there and to wait.
4th. The Emperor hoped to ascertain whether the Prussians had
retreated beyond Gembloux, and to drive back their rearguard if he
encountered it. He would then join Xey's two corps at Quatre-Bras with
his Guard and the 6th Corps, and march on Brussels that same night
He writes to Grouchy : " I propose to operate to-night with my left wing.
Do not use Gerard's division except in case of absolute necessity, as it
I has to march all night" He writes to Ney : "I propose that you should
be ready to march on Brussels, where I intend to arrive to - morrow
morning. . . . You realise sufficiently the importance attached to the
capture of Brussels. I desire your dispositions to be so arranged, that at
I the first order your eight divisions may be in readiness to march rapidly,
and unopposed, to Brussels."
5th. Napoleon's plan depended, moreover, on circumstances. He
! writes to Grouchy : " The quicker I make up my mind (that is to say, I
I shall make up my mind), the better it will be for the result of my opera-
tions." He writes to Ney : " There at Gembloux, according to events, I
will make up my mind, perhaps at three, perhaps this evening. . . .
You might be on your way this very evening, if I made up my mind in
time for you to be informed of it, during the day and start for Brussels
Ito-night. ... It is possible I may decide to march on Brussels this
evening with the Guard." The circumstances which might frustrate the
Emperor's plan, was the possible presence at Sombreffe or Gembloux, of
the whole or an important part of the Prussian Army. If he had merely
346 WATERLOO book ir
to fight an isolated corps, it would not prevent him from marching on
Brussels that same evening.
7. Register of the correspondence of the chief of the staff (Bibliothiqiie
Nat. MSS. F. Fr. 4366).
These orders dated from Charleroi do not give any indication as to the
hour ; nevertheless they were written and forwarded before eight o'clock
in the morning, since we know that Napoleon's letters to Ney and to
Grouchy (Corresp. 22,058, 22,059), which both contain these words,
" The chief of the staff has doubtless acquainted you with my intentions,"
started at the latest between eight and nine o'clock (Flahaut's letter to
the Duke d'Elchingen, Doc. inedits, 63).
The letters to Ney and Grouchy having been copied on Soult's
register after the orders of Kellermann, Drouot, Vandamme, Gerard,
etc., it may be assumed that these orders had been dictated and despatched
earlier than the letters, possibly about seven o'clock, perhaps even six in
the morning. It must be noted that these orders and letters form a total
of nearly 300 lines. The wording and copying of such a correspondence
requires some length of time ; most probably then, the Emperor had given
his instructions to Soult towards 6 a.m., if not earlier still.
Moreover, as early as four o'clock. Napoleon had sent his orderly
officer, Bussy, to Frasnes to learn the news (Bussy's letter to Napoleon,
Frasnes, 16th June, 6 o'clock a.m, ; General G.'s papers) ; and as early
as five, Soult, in accordance with the Emperor's orders, had written to ask
Ney the exact position of Reille's and d'Erlon's corps (Major-General's
Register, and letter of Ney to Soult, Gosselies, 7 a.m., Gen. G.'s papers).
8. Grouchy to Napoleon, bivouac near Fleurus, 16th June, 5 o'clock
A.M. (War Arch.). Pajol, who in his notes mentions this letter, says it
should have reached Imperial headquarters at half-past six.
At six o'clock, Grouchy wrote again to the Emperor to inform him
that General Gerard, posted at Wangenies, saw the Prussians bearing in
force towards the heights which rose around the mill of Brye (War Arch.
16th June).
9. See p. 76.
10. The Emperor's letters to Ney and to Grouchy {Corresp. 22,058,
22,059), written (see above, p. 347, note 6) towards eight o'clock in the
morning, that is to say, about two hours after receiving Grouchy's report,
prove that Napoleon had attached no importance to the intelligence
conveyed by the latter. Had he realised that the Prussian Army was
concentrated at the entrance of Fleurus, he would not have written to
Ney : " I am sending Marshal Grouchy to Sombreffe. There I will
attack the enemy if I meet him, and will reconnoitre the road as far as
Gembloux. Then, according to the course of events, I will make up
my mind " ; nor would he write to Grouchy : " The rendezvous
is at Sombreffe. ... If the enemy be at Sombreffe I mean to attack
him. I should even like to attack him at Gembloux."
11. "This very instant I am gathering my troops to effect the
movement you have ordered at Sombreffe " (Grouchy to Napoleon, at the
bivouac near Fleurus, 16th June, 5 a.m. (War Arch.).
CHAP. I miES 347
The day before, as the attack on Gilly was commencing, Grouchy,
it will be remembered, received orders to occupy Sombre fFe the same
evening. He had been compelled to halt before Fleurus owing to
Vandamme's refusal to second him, and also because of the lateness
of the hour (see pp. 67, 69, and notes). On the morning of the
16th, he was preparing to execute the movement, which circumstances
had prevented him from accomplishing on the evening of the 15th.
But seeing the enemy's forces increase, he hesitated and preferred to
await fresh instructions. When confirmatory orders reached him from
Soult and Napoleon, towards nine or half-past nine, he was so dismayed
by the display of the Prussian forces, that he limited himself to occupying
Fleurus only. However, he had taken measures in the early morning
to carry out the Emperor's orders, and this, as may be seen further,
cannot be said of Marshal Xey.
12. Napoleon, Carresp. 22,058, 22,059. See Soult to Ney and
to Grouchy, Charleroi, 1 6th June (Register of the Chief of the Staff).
13. The letter of Soult relative to that officer of lancers (to Ney,
Charleroi, 1 6th June), bears : " The Emperor is about to proceed to
Fleurus." On the other hand, Grouchy {Relation succincte, 14) testifies
that Napoleon reached Fleurus between half-past ten o'clock and eleven.
Aa 13 kilom. separate Fleurus from the lower portion of Charleroi,
where the Imperial headquarters were (maison Puissant), the Emperor
certainly left the latter before ten o'clock.
14. Soidt to Ney, Charleroi, 16th Jime (Register of Chief of the
Staflf).
There has been much discussion as to who had sent that officer of
lancers. It was no doubt General Eeille, for he says in his account
(War Arch.) : " Towards nine o'clock, I received a report from General
Girard informing me that from Wangenies he could perceive the Prussians
massing beyond Fleurus. This intelligence was immediately conveyed
to the Emperor."
15. Soult to Ney, Charleroi, 16th June (Major- General's Register).
16. Lobau to Napoleon, Charleroi, 16th June ("War Arch.); Janin,
Campaffne de Waterloo, 19.
17. See pp. 76, 78, and notes.
18. Grouchy, Relation succincte, 14 ; see Damitz, i. 74 and 84.
19. Grouchy, Relation succincte, 15 ; Colonel de BlocqueviUe's
declaration (War Arch. 18th June); Gourgaud, 54. Local traditions.
20. Damitz, L 80. See Blucher to Miifliing, Namur, 15th June,
midday (quoted by von Ollech, 99).
21. "To-morrow at early dawn my army will be concentrated here,"'
Blucher to Schwarzenburg, Sombreffe, 15th June, half-past 12 p.m.
j (quoted by von Ollech, 105, 106-107). See the orders for concentration
'of 15th and 16th June.
22. Wagner, iv. 20 ; Damitz, L 87, note.
23. Bliicher to his wife, Namur, 3rd June (Bliicher in Briefen,
143).
24. Damitz, i. 85. See von Ollech, 104, 105.
348 WATERLOO book ii
25. Biilow to Bliicher, Liege, 15tli June (quoted by von OllecL,
106, 107). Billow's delay has been almost as much criticised by the
Germans as that of Ney and Grouchy was by the French. See von
Ollech, 90, 91, 99, 106, 107.
26. Clausewitz, "Wagner, Damitz, Delbrtick assert that Bliicher only
decided to accept the battle after midday on the 16th of June, when
he had received from Wellington a formal promise with regard to help
from the English. This is one way of justifying Bliicher's rashness and
excusing his defeat. As may be seen further, Wellington's verbal
promise was not formal, but merely conditional. Moreover, the original
documents testify that long before his interview with Wellington, Bliicher
had resolved to maintain his position of Sombreffe. The orders of the
14th and 15th (quoted by von Ollech, 90-92, 97-99, 104-107) are
conceived with a definite view to a battle at this point. At midday
on the 15th of June, Bliicher writes to Miiffling : "I intend accepting
the battle to-morrow." In the evening he writes to the King of Prussia :
" I shall concentrate my army to-morrow morning. ... I am without
news from the Duke of Wellington. At any rate, to-morrow will be the
decisive day" (quoted by von Ollech, 99-106). Finally his dispositions
on the morning of the 16th, which were taken before the receipt of any
notice from Wellington, confirm beyond any doubt, Bliicher's intention of
giving battle.
But all this did not prevent Bliicher, in s]oite of Gneisenau's well-
grounded mistrust of Wellington (Miiffling, Aus meinem Leben, 184 sg.),
from counting on the assistance of the English Army.
27. See pp. 63, 64, and note 17,
28. Von Ollech, GescMchfe des Feldzuges von 1815, 80-90.
29. Miiffling says expressly (190) that Wellington desired the
Prussians and the English should unite, if Napoleon attacked them, that
Brussels might not fall into the hands of the French till after the first
battle, if things came to the worst (see Clausewitz, 31).
30. See Wellington, Memorandum (Suppl. Despatches, x. 513).
Miiffling, 191, 192, 198. See Clausewitz, 31; Siborne, i. 71 ; Kennedy,
171 ; and the letter from Paris received by Wellington on the 6th of
June, where intelligence is given of Napoleon's plan of making a feigned
attack on the Sambre (quoted by von Ollech, 73).
31. Letters from Dornberg, Roisin, Uxbridge, the Prince of Orange,
Hardinge (Suppl. Despatches, x. 451, 465, 471, 476, 478).
32. Von Ollech, 96. In his memorandum, Wellington asserts that
he did not receive Zieten's letter announcing the French attack before
three in the afternoon ; but this assertion is discredited by the terms of
Wellington's letter to Clarke, 8 p.m., 1 5th June : " I have received
nothing since eight o'clock this morning from Charleroi" {Despatches,
xii. 473).
33. Miiffling, A\is meinem Leben, 198. See Wellington to the Duke
de Berry and to Clarke, Brussels, 1 5th June, half-past 9 p.m. {Despatches,
xii. 473).
34. Miiffling, 198. See van Loben, Sels 127.
CHAP. I NOTES 349
35. Order of movement, Brussels, 15th June (Wellington, Despatches,
xii. 472).
36. Muffling, 198. Bllicher's letter, or rather the letter dictated by
Bliicher to Gneisenau, is quoted by von Ollech, 100.
37. Miiffling, 199; Letters from Dombei^, Berkeley, de Behr, 15th
June (Snppl. Despatches, x. 480, 481).
38. According to this order (Brussels, 15th June, 10 P.M., Despatches,
xii. 494), the Alten division was to proceed to Nivelles, Cooke's division
to Braine-le-Comte, Clinton's and ColvUle's divisions to Enghien. No
reference was made to the two Belgian diArisions, which were consequently
to continue their movement on Nivelles according to the preceding order.
39. This was the last order issued in the night from the 15th
to the 16th, except towards midnight, the order for Picton's division, and
the Brunswick corps, to proceed at two in the morning towards Waterloo,
a point which was midway between Brussels and Nivelles. At the
Duchess of Richmond's ball, where "Wellington gave verbal orders to the
o£Bcers towards midnight, he merely spoke of a concentration at Xivelles
(Letter of General Vivian, Waterloo Letters, 151). It was as late as six
in the morning when he gave orders for a partial march towards Qiiatre-
Bras (Dispositions of the English Army, 16th June, 7 A.M., Suppl.
Despatches, x. 496). At the Duchess of Richmond's ball, a despatch from
Constant Rebecque to the Prince of Orange, had warned him that the
French had appeared at Quatre-Bras. (Braine-le-Comte, 15th June,
10 P.M., quoted by van Loben, 176.) However, when he passed at
"Waterloo, at about 8 a.m., Wellington was still so undecided that he
commanded Picton's division to halt there till further notice.
40. 'hiiiMing, Ausmeijiem Leben, 199. Cf. Colonel Ftslzbt, Letters, 535.
41. Letters from Hervey, Wellington's aide-de-camp, 3rd July 1815
.Xineteenth Century, March 1893) ; Cotton, Voice of Waterloo, 14, 15 ;
I Fraser, Word on Wellington, 283, 285, 301 ; Letter from General
Vivian {Waterloo Letters, 151). See Capt. Bowles's letter (quoted by
^lalmesbury, Letters, ii. 445), in which two most inaccurate statements
I are made. See also on the ball of the Duchess of Richmond : Lord
I Byron, Childe Harold; Thackeray, Vanity Fair; William Pitt Lennox,
Percy Hamilton.
42. List of invitations, communicated by Lady de Ros to Sir William
Fraser, and reproduced in his Word on Wellington, 285-294.
43. Muffling, 199.
44. Lady de Ros, letters quoted by Fraser, 284, 300, 301, 305 ;
Miifliing, 199 ; above-quoted letters of Hervey, of Capt. Bowles, and
'jreneral Vivian.
45. Gneisenau to the King of Prussia, 12th June 1817 (quoted by
van Loben, 225). See van Loben, 177, note 2 ; Chesney, 109.
46. See pp. 70, 71.
47. Van Loben, 125.
48. Constant Rebecque's orders and letters, Braine-le-Comte, 15th
June (quoted by van Loben, 128, 129, 175-178). See above-quoted
tter from Gneisenau to the King of Prussia.
350 WATERLOO book ii
49. Van Loben, 142, 187. The Prince of Orange, absent from his
headquarters during the day and night of the 15th, had given no orders
(Berkeley to Somerset, Braine-le-Comte, 15th June, 2 o'clock p.m., Suppl.
Despatches of Wellington, x. 480 ; and Constant Rebecque to the Prince of
Orange, Braine-le-Comte, 10 p.m., quoted by van Loben, 176). All the
arrangements had been made by Constant Rebecque, the Prince of Saxe-
Weimar, and Perponcher.
50. It is probable that Wellington advanced as far as the hillock
which rises south-east of the farm of Grand-Pierrepont, point marked 162
on the Chart of tlie Belgian Staff.
51. Wellington had posted Picton at Waterloo, at the branching of
the roads to Nivelles and Charleroi ; although he should have made up
his mind long ago, he was then still in doubt whether he should direct
his troops on Nivelles or on Quatre-Bras (Siborne, i. 182).
52. Wellington (Memorandum {Suppl. Despatches, x. 513). Clause-
witz is mistaken when he says it was past one when this order was
sent. If this had been the case, Picton could not have reached Quatre-
Bras at three. However, after his arrival at Quatre-Bras, Wellington
again made the mistake of neglecting to call up the Chasse division and
CoUaert's cavalry. The latter were motionless at Nivelles all day, —
excepting the 6 th Hussars and the 5 th Dragoons, who were led by an
aide-de-camp of the Prince of Orange (van Loben, 183, 196).
53. Wellington to Bliicher, on the height (north) in rear of Frasnes,
16th June, half-past ten in the morning (quoted by von Ollech, 125).
54. Milffling, Ausmeinen Leben, 199, 202 ; Clausewitz, 67.
55. This mill, named also the mill of Winter, was pulled down in
1895. I could not find it on my second excursion to Ligny.
56. See p. 79. The altitudes are identical, about 157 metres;
but it is rather a question of the formation of the ground. Moreover,
the Bussy mill was more to the centre of the positions than the Fleurus
mill, which stands on the extreme west.
57. Milffling, 202 ; Damitz, i. 92. See Chesney, 145.
58. Milffling, Aus meinen Leben, 202-205 ; Napoleon's Gorresp.
(Milffling) 10. See Damitz, Clausewitz, 67, and Dornberg's account, who
witnessed the interview, quoted by von Ollech, 127. Von Ollech, prefer-
ring Miiffling's testimony to Clausewitz's opinion, — an opinion favoured Ijj^ _
Charras, — concludes that Wellington's promise was purely conditional.
BOOK II CHAPTER II
1. From Wagnel^e to Saint- Amand, where it receives two small
tributaries, that brook is called Grand-Ry, from Saint-Amand beyond
Tongrinne it is called La Ligne or Le Ligny.
2. The chateau of Counts de Looz, no longer in existence, was already
in ruins in 1815.
HAP. II NOTES 351
3. Local traditions. The Emperor then realised that the position
vas very strong (Gourgaud, 55).
4. Wagner, iv. 21 ; Damitz, i. 85, 90 ; von OUech, 120.
5. " The Emperor bids me warn you that the enemy has mustered
un corps de troupes between Sombreffe and Brye, and that at half-past two
Marshal Grouchy will attack it with the 3rd and 4th Army Corps. His
Majesty's intention is that you should also attack the forces in front of
you, and having pressed them vigorously, that you should move back
towards us to aid us in surrounding the corps I have just mentioned"
(Soult to Xey, out of Fleurus, 16th June, two o'clock, Register of the
Chief of the Staff).
This letter, dated two o'clock, must have been dictated by the Emperor
in substance, shortly before. And at that time Napoleon had every possible
reason to conclude that the Prussian forces still only amounted to a single
army corps, for the 2nd and 3rd Corps only left Sombre S'e and Tongrinne
towards two o'clock in order to bear down on their positions.
In the accounts from St. Helena (Gourgaud 55, Napoleon 90) it is
recorded — quite erroneously — that Napoleon estimated the Prussians at
80,000 men. These accounts, given on the spur of the moment, are
very brief, omit many details, and take no heed of hours. The Emperoi*
certainly did estimate the Prussians at 80,000 men ; but that was at three
o'clock, when the 2nd and 3rd Corps had already entered into line.
Besides in a subsequent letter of Soult to Ney, dated a quarter past three,
e read : " His Majesty bids me tell you you must manceuvre immediately;
■ as to surround the right of the enemy and fall on his rear at close
uarters. This army is lost if you act vigorously." Here it is no longer
a question of a corps of troops but of an army.
6. See Gourgaud, 55 ; Damitz, i. 98 ; Napoleon, Me'm. 91. Napoleon
even goes as far as to say : " Evidently Bliicher did not expect to be
attacked that day."
7. Grouchy, Observations, 43 ; Relation succinde, 15 ; Colonel de
Blocqueville's declaration (War Arch., dated 1 8th of June).
8. Colonel del Blocqueville's declaration. Gourgaud {Campagne de
1815, 41) relates that these words were 'spoken to Marshal Ney, another
f Bourmont's patrons, on the 15th of June at Charleroi. It is possible
::iat Napoleon spoke thus to Ney, and that he repeated these words to
Gerard.
9. Gerard, Quelques Observations, 48 ; Colonel de Blocqueville's de-
claration.
10. See p. 11, and note 7.
1 1. According to the first order of march of the 14th of June, Gerard
was to march from Philippeville to Charleroi ; but on the 1 5th, at half-past
three, Soult had written to him to proceed forward in the direction of
Lambusart (Chief of the Staff's Register). Instead of moving his whole
army corps to the other bank of the Sambre, Grerard transfened the Hulot
division alone to Chatelineau, and posted the three others on the right
bank of the Sambre (Gerard to Soult, Chatelet, 15th June, evening, War
Arch.).
352 WATERLOO book ii
Gerard (Quelques Observations, 48) maintains that Soult's order of
1 6tli June only reached him at half-past nine, which seems at least strange,
since this order was written between seven and eight o'clock at latest, and
there is only a distance of six kilometres between Charleroi and Chatelet.
He adds that in his impatience to march forward on that morning, he
said to Exelmans, " whose troops were cantoned near his and who had come
to talk to him, that all these delays foreboded no good."
Exelmans being at the time with his dragoons at Lambusar*-, two
miles from Chatelet, and in presence of the enemy, how could he have
come to have a chat with Gerard 1
How was it that Gerard, who was always so eager to act, executed
at five in the morning the Emperor's orders, which for some reason or
other he had disregarded the evening before ? Why had he not made his
three divisions cross the Sambre, and joined them to Hulot's division at
Chatelineau? Ten minutes after receiving the order he might have
started all his men on their march.
12. The first order of battle for the French troops, perpendicular to
the Fleurus road, is a strong presumption. See on the subject, Damitz, i.
99, 100.
13. Above-quoted letters of Napoleon and Soult (see p. 76).
14. Soult to Ney, 16th June (Major-General's Register).
Napoleon, who continues in his memoirs to confuse orders and
hours, speaks as if this letter had been sent at half-past ten (that is to
say, before he had arrived at Fleurus !), and as if it contained an order
to Ney to march against Brye, not with all his troops, but with a single
detachment. Napoleon also relates (90, 91) that he received an ofl&cer
from the left, who told him that Ney hesitated to march, for fear of
having his flank turned by the English and Prussians, whose junction,
he was assured, had already taken place at Fleurus. This is a confusion
with the report of the officer of lancers sent by Reille, of which I have
spoken on a previous occasion (see p. 78). Gourgaud (56, 57) is
quite as inaccurate.
15. Gourgaud, 54, 56 ; Napoleon, Mem. 93.
16. Gneisenau's report; Damitz, i. 90, 95, 96, 100, 101 ; "Wagner,
iv. 23-25 ; von Ollech, 143-145 ; Notes of Colonel Simon-Lorifere (War
Arch.).
17. See p. 89, and note 5.
18. Napoleon, Mem. 93, 94. See Gourgaud, 57.
19. Soult to Ney, out of Fleurus, 16th June, quarter past three
(Register of the Chief of the Staif, Bibliothhque Nationale, MSS. F. Fr.,
4365).
20. Lobau to Napoleon, before Charleroi, 16th June (War Arch.,
Army of the North). This letter has no indication as to time. But
from what it relates concerning the state of things at the moment when
Janin left Frasnes, it may be inferred that the latter started about half-
past twelve in the day. At an average rate of 10 kilometres an hour he
must have returned to Charleroi (at the forking of the Brussels and .
Fleurus roads) about two. It was therefore two o'clock or thereabouts I
CHAP. II NOTES 353
when Lobau sent the Emperor his letter, which must have reached
Fleurus between a quarter past and half-past three in the afternoon.
On Janin's mission see p. 79. When Janin left Frasnes there were
not 20,000 of the enemy at Quatre-Bras. There were hardly 7,000.
The officer was misled by the great extension of the front line of the
Dutch.
21. " . . . Colonel de Forbin-Janson had received the important
mission of carrying the order for the marching of the 1st Corps to the
rear of the right of the Prussian Army. ... At the moment when the
engagement was raging all along the line, the Emperor asked Marshal
Soult for an experienced officer to carry to Marshal Ney the duplicate
I of the order concerning Count d'Erlon. The Major-Greneral ha\dng
summoned me, the Emperor said to me : ' I have sent Count d'Erlon
the order to advance with his whole army corps to the rear of the
Prussian Army's right. You will carry to Ney the duplicate of this
order, although he is no doubt acquainted with it already. Tell him
that whatever his own position may be, it is absolutely urgent that this
, order should be executed ; that I do not attach very great importance to
: what happens to-day in his direction, but that the whole interest of the
i day is centred where I am, because my aim is to settle matters with the
1 Prussian Army. As for him, if he can do nothing better, he must content
i himself with holding in check the English Army.' " MS. notes of
I Colonel Baudus, communicated by M. de Montenon, his grandson- These
■tes have only been partly reproduced in Colonel Baudus's Etudes sur
' 'pole'on.
The existence of this order, implicitly denied by Napoleon, but
"v^hich a letter of Soult to Ney on the 17th of June alone suffices to
ove, is affirmed unanimously by all witnesses. They will be furnished
rther, p. 117 and the notes, where I discuss this vexed question.
22. Soult to Lobau, out of Fleurus, 16th June, quarter past three
Major-General's Ledger).
23. Pontecoulant, Souvenirs militaires, 92. Gneisenau, Wagner,
N'apoleon, Gourgaud all say three o'clock.
24. Lefol, Souvenirs, 61-62 ; Gneisenau's report, Damitz, i. 102-104 ;
'•'agner, iv. 28, 29 ; Gourgaud, 58 ; Xapoleon, Mem. 95 ; von Ollech,
= 8, 149.
It happened that the Girard division, detached on the evening before
: om Key's corps, formed the extreme left of the army then fighting
Ligny, see p. 127.
25. Journal of Captain Frangois of the 30th of the line (Revue Armori-
ine, 128). See Damitz, 110 ; Wagner, iv. 36. "At a quarter past
ree, the 4th Corps attacked the village of Ligny" (Xapoleon, Mem. 91).
26. Captain Francois's journal ; Gneisenau's report ; Damitz, 110, 111;
agner, iv. 36, 37 ; Gourgaud, 58 ; Gerard, Quelques Observations, 54 ;
mon-Loriere's account (War Arch., Army of the North).
27. Damitz, i. 112, 113; General Romme's letter to Gourgaud,
iris, 27th May, 1823 (General Gourgaud's papers ; letter from Imperial
adquarters at Fleurus, 17th June, Arch, of Foreign Affairs, 1802).
23
354 WATERLOO book ii
28. Above-quoted letter of General Romme to Gourgaud, Damitz, i.
112, 113 ; Wagner, 37, 38 ; Relation de la dernilre campagne de Bonaparte,
51; Lefol, Souvenirs, 68. See official report of Gneisenau : "This
battle may be considered as one of the most desperate recorded by-
history."
29. Napoleon's order to Grouchy, 16th June (War Arch., Army of
the North) ; General Hulot's report ; Grouchy, Relation succincte, 16.
Wagner (iv. 41) says the action commenced only at six o'clock at
Sombreffe and Balatre ; this is true, but it began much earlier at
Boign^e, at Tongrinelle, and at Potriaux.
30. Damitz, i. 104, 105 ; Wagner, iv. 29.
31. The Thuemen, Schulenburg, and Sohr brigades of Pirch's corps,
and the Marwitz brigade detached from Thielmann's corps.
32. Wagner, iv. 29, 30 ; von Ollech, 154 ; Damitz, i. 104, 105.
See Gneisenau's report.
33. Damitz, i. 104, 105; Wagner, iv. 30; Napoleon, M^. 95;
Relation de I'AmbigA, London, vol. liii.
34. Damitz, i. 106, 107 ; Wagner, iv. 32.
35. Gneisenau's report; Damitz, i. 106, 107 ; Wagner, 31, 33.
36. Damitz, i. 108 (see pp. 64, 65, and 67) ; Wagner, iv. 33.
37. Napoleon, Me'm. 96 ; Gourgaud, 59. See Soult to Ney,
Fleurus, 17th June (Major-General's Register).
38. Napoleon, Mem. 96 ; Gourgaud, 59. See Lefol, Souvenirs, 63 :
"... A false rumour that a column of the enemy had taken our left
by surprise, caused a sort of panic " — Souvenirs d'un ex-officier (of the
45th, Erlon's corps), 226 : " We came in sight of Saint- Amand towards
five or six o'clock."
39. Napoleon, Mim. 96. '
40. Napoleon, Me'm. 96. According to a tradition related by I
Pierart (Le Drame de Waterloo), Vandamme's alarm may be imputed to j
the cowardice of the officer who was sent to reconnoitre the column. This j
officer dared not go within gunshot of the balls, and came back without
fulfilling his mission, with the news that it was the enemy.
41. Napoleon, Mem. 96.
42. Napoleon, Mem. 96, 97 ; Gourgaud, 59 ; General Petit's account
(Morrison Collection, London).
43. Lefol, Souvenirs, 63, 64.
44. Wagner, iv. 33, 34 ; see Gneisenau's report; Damitz, i. 117-12].
45. Damitz, i. 119, 120 ; Wagner, iv. 33.
46. Souvenirs de 1815, les Gent Jours en Belgique {BihliotMque univeru
de Geneve, July 1887). . The author of these souvenirs adds: "Fresli!
returned from the deserts of Russia and the English hulks, inspired 1 ,
the recollection of their early triumphs, by the rankling shame of their
recent defeats, and eager to hide under a blaze of glory their desertion of ,
the Royal party, the French soldiers surpassed themselves." 11
47. General Hulot's account. See Damitz, i. 124.
48. Gneisenau's report; von Ollech, 151, 152; Gourgaud, 58, 59
Damitz, i. 122, 129, 131 (see pp. 62, 63) ; Wagner, iv. 38, 39.
i
CHAP. II NOTES 356
49. Muffling, Au$ meinem Leben, 206 ; Damitz, i 126.
50. Wagner, iv. 39 ; Damitz, i. 126, 127.
51. Von Ollech, 154 ; Damitz, i. 127 (see 131 and 141); Wagner,
iv. 33, 34.
52. Damitz, 132 and note ; Wagner, iv. 43. See von Ollech, 154 ;
and Maudiiit, ii. 86, 87.
53. Damitz, i. 32, Official Report from GneisenatL See Wagner, 43.
54. Gourgaud, 59 ; Napoleon, Mem. 97.
55. See p. 99.
56. Napoleon, Mem. 97 ; Gourgaud, 59.
57. The l3t Corps ought to have gone up straight towards the north,
marching 3,500 metres to the west of Wagnelee, and to have turned
eastwards so as to fall back on Brye. This journey of 6 kilometres across
country, required nearly an hour and a half, and another haK-hour was
necessary before the order to effect this movement could be sent from
Fleurus, to the point occupied by Count d'Erlon. Clausewitz, more
thoughtful and more just than Charras, acknowledges that it was then too
late to order a turning movement upon Brye {Der Krieg von 1815, 84).
58. Napoleon is silent on this point (all that concerns d'Erlon's
movement is intentionally left wrapt in mystery) ; but it is more than
likely, for, as may be seen further (214), Delcambre, sent by Ney, and
the Emperor's own aide-de-camp arrived almost simultaneously at their
destination (Count d'Erlon's camp).
59. Letter from Napoleon, Mem. 97 ; Gourgaud, 59.
60. Letter from Imperial headquarters at Fleurus, 17th June (Arch,
of Foreign Affairs, 1802); General Pe tit's above - quoted account.
Commandant Duuring's account of the 1st Regiment of Chasseurs (comm.
by M. de Stuers) ; Gneisenau's report to the King of Prussia, Wavre,
17th June (quoted by von Ollech, 162-165); Gneisenau's official
report ; Wagner, iv. 39, 40, 43 ; Soult to Joseph, out of Fleurus,
16th June, half-past 8 p.m., and to Davout, Fleurus, 17th June (Major-
General's Register).
61. Twice Damitz mentions the light which for a few seconds (i. 132,
133) succeeded the almost complete darkness caused by the storm.
62. Damitz, i. 128, 129, 133, 134. General Hulot's report (com-
municated by Baron Hulot) ; Wagner, iv. 42.
63. Above -quoted account of Commandant Duuring. The 4th
Grenadiers, newly formed, had been clad in any kind of garments.
Many of the men had shakos instead of bonnets a poil.
64. Gneisenau's report, Wavre, 17th June (quoted by von Ollech,
163, 164); General Petit's and Duuring's accounts ; Damitz, i. 133-135 ;
Report of Kimann, captain of dragoons of the Guard, 1 7th June (General
G.'s papers) ; Wagner, iv. 44.
65. Bliicher to his wife, Wavre, 17th June {Bliicher in Briefen, 146) ;
Gneisenau's official report ; Damitz, i 134, 135 ; Wagner, iv. 44 ; General
Delort's account (General G.'s papers) ; see von Ollech, 155, 157.
66. Damitz, ii. 211. This declaration of Damitz is in direct con-
rradiction to Gneisenau's official report, and to the accounts of the majority
356 WATERLOO book ii
of German historians, also that of Damitz himself, who affirms that the
retreat was effected with perfect order at every point. A number of
8,000 or 10,000 fugitives on a field of battle points emphatically to a
certain degree of confusion. Then there is the testimony of the emigre
officer whose Souvenirs of 1815 were published in 1857 by the Bibliotheque
universelle de Geneve; he states that very great disorder prevailed amid
the greater part of the Prussians, and that everywhere there were masses
of fugitives. The truth is, there was a complete rout at the centre, great
confusion on the left, and a most dignified retreat on the right \dng.
Besides, neither Gneisenau (in his confidential report, Wavre, 17th June)
nor von Ollech (157) conceal the fact that the close of the battle was
marked by great disorder.
67. General Delort's account (General Gourgaud'a papers). Delort's
assertion is confirmed by a letter addressed from Imperial headquarters at
Fleurus, 17th June, 9 a.m. (Arch, of Foreign Affairs, 1802): "... Had
Delort been supported even in a small degree, he might have captured
in less than fifteen minutes, fifty pieces of artillery."
68. The French, according to Soult (Letter to Davout, 17th June,
Major-General's Register), took forty cannon and several thousand prisoners.
According to Gneisenau (Report of 17th June, quoted by von Ollech), the
Prussian Army lost only sixteen pieces, and left few prisoners except the
wounded. Grouchy {Relation succinde, 1 7) makes a similar statement :
about fifteen cannon, a few flags, and a small number of prisoners. Wagner
(iv. 44) acknowledges to twenty-seven cannon lost, and this seems an
accurate figure.
69. Gneisenau's report, Wavre, 17th June (quoted by von Ollech,
163, 164) ; Gneisenau's official report ; Damitz, i. 139-142, 146 ; Wagner,
iv. 35, 47.
From the comparison of French with German documents, the time-
table of the battle can be established as follows : —
From one to three o'clock : concentration, preparatory manoeuvres ;
skirmishing at the outposts.
From three to four : taking of Saint- Amand by the Lefol division ;
fruitless attacks of the Pecheux division against Ligny ; Grouchy's demon-
strations on Tongrinelle and Boignee.
From four to five : the Girard division takes possession of the hamlet
of La Haye ; counter-attack of the Prussians on these positions ; Girard
is killed in retaking La Haye ; Tippelskirch's attack repulsed by Habert ;
the Pecheux division, supported by two of Vichery's regiments, occupies
the upper part of Ligny.
From five to six : retaking of La Haye by Pirch II. ; Napoleon
prepares for the final assault ; the supposed column of the enemy (d'Erlon's
corps) is signalled ; Napoleon stops his manoeuvre and sends the Young
Guard with three regiments of chasseurs of the Old Guard to reinforce
Vandamme ; Gerard throws his last reserve into Ligny.
From six to half-past seven : recapture of Le Hameau by the enemy
recoil of Vandamme's troops ; the Young Guard comes to the front ;
retaking of Le Hameau by the remnant of the Girard division ; Grouchy
CHAP. Ill NOTES 357
occupies Tongrinelle and attacks Potriaux ; Bliicher's last counter-attack
on Saint- Amand ; the Prussians are repulsed by the unmounted chasseurs
of the Guard and by Yandamme's troops ; continuation of the fight in
the burning street of Ligny ; Grouchy takes possession of Potriaux and
drives back Lottum's cavalry ; Napoleon prepares to assault the enemy's
centre again.
From half-past seven to half-past nine : taking of Ligny ; engagements
on the north of Ligny ; retreat of the Prussians.
70. Soult to Davout, Fleurus, 17 th June (Chief of the Staffs Register) ;
Notes of Captain de Stuers of the 2nd of Unmounted Chasseurs (comm.
by M. de Stuers). The Imperial headquarters were established at Baron
Zualart's chateau quite near to the mill which the Emperor had used as
an observatory.
71. General Petifs account (Morrison Collection of London); above-
quoted letter of Kimann of the dragoons of the Guard (Lefol, Souvenirs^
66, 67 ; Hulot's account).
72. Soult to Davout, Fleurus, 17th June (Chief of the Staffs Register) ;
Lefol, Souvenirs, 69.
73. Wagner, iv. 47 : 11,706 soldiers and 372 officers. Gneisenau in
his report to the King of Prussia, Wavre, 17th June (quoted by von Ollech,
163, 164), says : 15,000 men, but he must include the prisoners.
Goui^aud (170) gives the number of killed and wounded for each
army corps, and the total is not more than 6,800. This estimate is evidently
inaccurate in many points. Thus the losses for Gerard's corps are put
down to 2,170 men only, while a list quoted by Gerard in a letter to
Simon-Loriere (23rd February 1820, War Arch.) brings their number to
3,686, which shows already a difference of 1,516 men. As for the Guard
and the Young Guard, which were both seriously engaged in the contest,
they had, according to Gourgaud, only 100 men killed or disabled. Their
losses must have been at least three times that amount.
BOOK II CHAPTER HI
1. 1st, letter of Soult, five o'clock ; 2nd, of the same, seven or eight
o'clock ; 3rd, of Napoleon, haK-past eight ; 4th, of Soult, ten o'clock ;
5th, of the same, two o'clock ; 6th, of the same, a quarter past three ;
7th, duplicate of the latter, half-past three ; 8th, verbal order conveyed
by Colonel Forbin-Janson, half-past three ; 9th, verbal order conveyed
by Commandant Baud us, five o'clock.
2. Gourgaud, 67, 68; Napoleon, Mem. 180, 181. See account of
General Delort (General Gourgaud's papers) and General Kellermann's
account (War Arch.).
3. Grouchy, without any fresh orders, had made his arrangements
for marching at dawn upon SombrefiFe, in accordance with instructions
358 JVATERLOO book ii
received the day before from the Emperor (see p. 78). Ney might
have done the same.
It has been urged that, during the night, Ney had another interview
with the Emperor at the Imperial headquarters in Charleroi, and that the
latter had undoubtedly enjoined him to await fresh orders.
But Colonel Heyraes, whose testimony is suspicious, and whose
pamphlet bristles with errors, is the only contemporary writer who
mentions this visit of the Marshal to Napoleon. On the other hand, this
nocturnal excursion seems to me at least unlikely, for several reasons : —
1st. The Marshal having sent a report to the Emperor towards nine
o'clock, there was no need for him to go two hours later to report again
in person.
2nd. Had Ney left his army in the night, and in the presence of
the enemy, to wander about two miles away from its rear, this would
have been a breach of all military rules.
3rd. From Beaumont to Charleroi, from Charleroi to the other side
of Frasnes, and from Frasnes to Gosselies, Ney had already ridden
thirteen leagues. It is not very likely that he would care to ride four
extra leagues (there and back) in the dead of night, on an errand which
was quite unnecessary, as he had already sent a report to the Emperor.
Other questions : In his letters of 16th June, why does not the
Emperor blame Ney for not occupying Quatre-Bras on the 1 5th ? Most
likely because Ney's report had alleged the darkness, the fatigue of his
troops, etc., adding that Quatre-Bras might be taken at any time without
difficulty, the position being weakly defended.
Why, as soon as he received the report that night, did not the
Emperor write to Ney to march on Quatre-Bras as early as possible,
instead of waiting till the next day to send him this order ? Un-
doubtedly because Ney's report had led him to think that this position
was feebly defended, or perhaps already abandoned by the enemy, so that
it might be considered as virtually in the hands of the French. In the
first order of 16th June to Ney, Napoleon seems to consider the occupa-
tion of Quatre-Bras as a matter of course, and even overlooks the idea of
a possible contest. The whole of the morning Ney himself, as will be
seen further on, did not expect to meet with any resistance worth
considering at Quatre-Bras. A fortiori he had come to this conclusion in
the night, and had written his report accordingly.
4. For these estimates see p. 58.
5. Soult to Ney, Charleroi, 16th June (Major-General's Register).
This letter does not bear any indication as to time, but we know that it
was received by Ney towards half-past six, since his answer to that letter
is dated seven o'clock.
6. Ney to Soult, Gosselies, 16th June, 7 o'clock (General G.'s
papers).
7. The troops were not under arms at ten o'clock in the morning,
since in his letter to Ney at a quarter past ten (War Arch.) Reille
says : " I should have commenced moving on Frasnes as soon as my
divisions had been under arms."
CHAP. Ill NOTES 359
8. Reille's account (War Arch.).
9. Report of the Prince of Orange, 17th June (General G.'s
papers) ; van Loben, 184-186.
10. Colonel Repecaud, Napoleon at Ligny and Key at Quatre-Bras, IT.
Repecaud heard these words from the mouth of Ney himself, not at
ten or eleven o'clock, but, stranger still, about two o'clock, at the very
time of the attack.
11. Napoleon, Corresp. 21,058.
From Flahaut's letter to the Duke of Elchingen {Documents in^dits, 63)
we know that he left Charleroi at nine o'clock at the latest, and from
Reille's letter to Xey (16th June, a quarter past ten, "War Arch.) that
he reached Gosselies about ten o'clock. Now Gosselies, making an
allowance of 300 yards, is half-way from Charleroi (Puissant's house)
to Frasnes ; therefore Flahaut should have reached Frasnes towards
eleven o'clock, and this is corroborated by Heymes's statement (12). It
must be noted that Flahaut was in no hast« ; he was quietly riding a
fresh horse at the rate of two leagues an hour.
12. Order of Ney, Frasnes, 16th June (between eleven and half-past
eleven. War Arch., Army of the North). In this order, Ney disposes
of the 7th division (Girard), for he was still unaware that the Emperor
meant to employ it on the right wing. He confuses the 1st Cavalry
Division with the 2nd, evidently. It was the 2nd (Prre of Reille's
corps) which was to reconnoitre Reille, and the 1st (Jacquinot of
d'Erlon's corps) which was to march with d'Erlon. This is how things
occurred subsequently.
13. The conclusion which we gather from a perusal of this order is
confirmed by the above-quoted testimony of Colonel Repecaud. Repecaud
says further: "The Marshal imagined that the position was feebly
occupied."
14. ". . . One division two leagues beyond Quatre-Chemins if
possible ; six divisions around Quatre - Chemins ; one division at
Marbais" (Napoleon, Corresp. 22,058). See almost identical letter of
Soult (Major-General's Register), which Ney must have received a few
moments after that from the Emperor.
15. Reille's account (War Arch.).
16. Reille to Ney, Gosselies, 16th June, a quarter past ten (War
Arch., Army of the North).
Jomini, while admitting (p. 274) that this incident was a misfortune,
says (p. 283) : " Reille was guided by logical reasons derived from the
laws of great tactics ; for he would naturally suppose that the right wing
would be called to that point where the enemy appeared ; a disaster
seemed certain if after Girard's intelligence, he were to fight on the
Genappe road when he ought to fall back on Brye." This system of
defence does not work : — 1st, If generals under orders were "to obey the
laws of great tactics" instead of obeying the orders of their chiefs, a
strange confusion amongst the troops would ensue ; 2nd, In fighting on
the Genappe road, Reille ran only one risk, and that was precisely that
of approaching Brye ; 3rd, In his letter. Napoleon said that he might
360 WATERLOO book ii
summon a division of the left wing, but this division was to debouch
from Marbais and not from Gosselies. Now at Frasnes, to which Reille
should have marched at once, he would have been far nearer Marbais
than when he was at Gosselies. However, the documents must be
studied minutely before forming any judgment on the matter.
That which paralysed Reille was the personal fear of the Prussian
masses, that Girard announced were debouching from the Namur road.
Imaginary fears and ill-founded conclusions ! He knew from the
Emperor's letter just communicated to him, that the latter was marching
on Sombreffe through Fleurus, and this proved, evidently, that the object
of the Prussians was the Emperor, not Reille at all.
17. The distance between Frasnes and Gosselies is two leagues, and
Ney's order was sent at a quarter past eleven, at the earliest. Reille in
his account, says that the heads of his divisions commenced the attack
about two o'clock. Foy in his report of the 17th (Corresp. Register) also
says that his regiment was formed in front of Frasnes at two o'clock.
18. On this letter, derived from the report of an officer of lancers,
and sent by Soult towards ten o'clock, see pp. 78, 79.
19. Repecaud, 17. As already remarked, this assertion is confirmed
by Ney's order of march quoted above,
20. Bylandt and Saxe-Weimar brigades. Estimates of 12th June
quoted by van Loben (see note 1, p. 129). At noon, Perponcher had not
even 7,000 men, for the 7th battalion of the line did not reach Nivelles
before two or half-past two (van Loben, 193).
21. This wood has been cut down, as well as the wood of La Hutte,
which extended 1,200 yards to the right of the road, between Frasnes and
Villers-Perwin.
22. Van Loben, 185-188.
23. Diary of Foy, Frasnes, June 17 (comm. by Count Foy). See
Reille's account (War Arch.) and Ney's above - quoted words to CoL
Repecaud.
Reille referred to the ordinary tactics of the English in the Spanish
wars, when Wellington never unmasked his forces until the moment
of the enemy's decisive attack.
24. Reille's account (War Arch.); Foy's report, Frasnes, 17th June
(Foy's Register of Corresp.). See Siborne i. 100 : "Towards two o'clock
Ney prepared for the attack." See also Ney's order above quoted, and
the account of Kellermann (War Arch.), who besides confuses Frasnes
with Liberchies.
25. Letter of Foy to Guilleminot, 20th October 1815 (Foy's Register
of Corresp., communicated by Count Foy).
26. Reille's account ; Foy's report (Register of Corresp.) ; van Loben,
190-196; Siborne, i. 101, 102.
Ney might have made a better distribution of his forces. Tlii
Bachelu division and Pire's cavalry would have sufficed for an attacl.
against G^mioncourt and Piraumont ; leaving Foy's 1st brigade free to
march towards the Avood while the 2nd formed the reserve.
27. A note of the Stippl. to TVelliiigton's Corresp. (x. 525) fixes the
CHAP. Ill NOTES 361
return of the Duke at three o'clock. MiifiSing (Corresp. of Napoleon, ii.)
also says : " Towards three o'clock." Van Loben, Damitz, Sibome,
Chesney agree on this point
28. Muffling, Aus meinem Leben, 205. See Wellington to Lady
Webster, Waterloo, 18th June, three o'clock a.m. {Suppl. Despatches,
X. 501).
29. Wellington's report {Despatches, xii. 478) says that the Picton
division appeared at half-past two. This is a mistake, for we know that
Wellington did not return from Brye before three o'clock, and according
to Miiffling's testimony, Aus meinem Leben, 205 (see Corresp. of Napoleon,
ii.), there is not the least doubt that the Duke's return took place before
Picton's arrival. Sibome (L 104) says on his side : " Wellington returned
a short time before Picton's arrivaL" As for the van Merlen brigade,
van Loben, whose account is based on the Dutch archives (196, 197), says
that it reached Quatre-Bras at the same time as the Picton division.
30. Letters of officers of the Kempt and Pack brigades {Waterloo
Letters, 353, 358, 373, 377) ; Siborne, i. 102.
31. Siborne, L 104, 105 ; Damitz, i. 197. See van Loben, 197, 198,
who says that these cannons were recaptured later.
32. Reille's account ; Foy's report ; Mem du roi Jerome, vii 67 ; Letters
of the Prince of Saxe- Weimar, Waterloo, 19th June ; van Loben, 204.
33. See p. 90.
From the Fleurus mill to the height of Pierrepont (the point of
the road to Brussels where Ney should have been posted), through
Ransart and Gosselies, the distance is 20 kilometres, 500 metres ; the
road is good, and slopes gently ; therefore, without pressing his horse,
the officer who bore the order ought to have ridden at the rate of 10 to
1 1 kilometres an hour. In the Documents ine'dits, the Duke of Elchingen
states that his letter arrived at four o'clock.
34. Van Loben, 203, 204 ; Reille's account, Memoires du roi Je'r&me,
vii. 69, 75 ; Miiffling, A^ls meinem Leben, 10 ; Damitz, 198, 199 ;
Sibome, 109-117. From a tradition recorded in the Memoires de Jerome,
Brunswick was wounded in the act of haranguing the head of the column
of the 1st Light Infantry, trying to persuade it to abandon the cause of
the Emperor. This is highly improbable, considering the hatred the
Duke of Brunswick had vowed to all the French in general.
35. Reille's account (War Arch.) ; Letters of officers of the Kempt and
Pack Brigades {Waterloo Letters, 348, 353, 354, 358, 373, 374) ; Sibome,
i. Ill, 112.
These words : " Remember Egypt ! " were an allusion to the battle
of Ramanieh, 21st March 1801, where the English 28th resisted the
desperate cavalry charges of General Roize.
36. Letters of officers of the Pack Brigade {Waterloo Letters, 376-379,
381) ; Siborne, 117, 122 ; see Damitz, i. 197, 198. In one moment the
Colonel of the 42nd was killed, and 284 men were disabled. Galbois
received a ball in his chest, but he remained on horseback and fought two
days later at Waterloo.
3 7. lyErlon to Soult, Jumet, 1 5th June (War Arch.). See Delcambre's
362 WATERLOO book ii
order (Marchienne, 17tli June, 3 a.m.) to start the Marcognet division
immediately on its march, " so that it might be at Gosselies at six o'clock
in the morning at the latest " (War Arch.) Similar orders were certainly
sent to the Allix division still at Thuin, and to the second Jacquinot
brigade stationed at Sobray. Therefore it is likely that the entire 1st
Corps was concentrated around Jumet on the morning of the 16th of
June.
38. Eeille to Ney, Gosselies, 16th June, a quarter-past ten (War
Arch.).
39. D'Erlon to the Duke of Elchingen, 9th February 1829 {Docu-
ments ine'dits, 64).
40. We have said before that the head of the column which set out
towards noon did not reach Frasnes till about half-past one, and the
Jerome division arrived towards three o'clock. Two leagues separate
Gosselies from Frasnes.
41. Letter from d'Erlon to Soult, Gosselies, 16th June (without any
reference to time, between one and three o'clock), (General G.'s papers).
42. See pp. 77, 78.
43. On what authority does Thiers tell us (xx. 123) that d'Erlon
had directed the Durutte division on Marbais as early as eleven in the
morning, but that it was recalled to Quatre-Bras an hour later by Ney ?
There is not a word to that effect in Durutte's account nor anywhere else.
44. See extract of the recollections of General de Salle commanding
the artillery of the 1st Corps (Nouvelle Revue, 15th January 1895), the
manuscript notes of Colonel Baudus, Durutte's account, and our note 47
of the present page.
45. See p. 92.
46. From Fleurua to the crossing of the Brussels road with the Voie
romaine, there are 15|^ kilometres passing through Ransart and Gosselies ;
the short cut through Mellet brings this distance down to 8 kilometres.
The officer who carried Soult's order evidently took the Gosselies way,
for Gamot (Befut. 16, 17) declares that when Ney received that order he
had already been informed of d'Erlon's movement, while Kellermann
says that the order did not reach the Marshal till half-past five. Appar-
ently Forbin-Janson, who had set out half an hour after the other officer,
took the short cut, and thus managed to reach d'Erlon a full hour before
the other joined Ney.
Another proof lies in the fact that, if he had followed the Ransart-
Gosselies road, Forbin-Janson could not have acqiiainted d'Erlon with the
Emperor's order at the earliest before a quarter to five ; yet the 1st Corps
was perceived at five o'clock by Vandamme, at a league's distance, from
Saint- Amand, as the crow flies.
47. Above-quoted >S'oMvemVs of General de Salle, Artillery Commandant
of the Ist Corps.
"While we were pressing in slowly towards the 2nd Corps, there
arrived a subaltern of the Guard with the following letter from the
Emperor : —
" Monsieur le Comte d'Erlon — The enemy is falling headlong into
CHAP. Ill
NOTES 363
the trap I have laid for him. Proceed immediately with all your forces
to the height of Ligny and fall on Saint- Amand. Monsieur le Comte
d'Erlon, you ai-e about to save France and cover yourself with glory. —
Napoleon."
De Salle adds : " Having no map of Belgium before me, it is possible
that I am transposing the names of the two villages. I rather think that
it was ' at Saint-Amand,' and ' fall upon Ligny,' otherwise I am certain
I make no mistake."
These last words indicate that de Salle repeated the letter from
memory. Can we accept his version of the letter as authentic 1 At all
events, there is a confusion in this sentence : " Proceed to the height of
Ligny to fall on Saint-Amand." The Emperor, whose plan was to attack
the Prussians on the rear of their right (see Soult's letters to Ney
mentioned above), had evidently written, not, " Bear up to the height of
Ligny," but rather, as corrected by de Salle, " Bear upon the height of
Saint-Amand and fall on Ligny" (see Soult's letter to Xey). Except
for this confusion in de Salle's quotation — a confusion which d'Erlon
must have made himself, and which explains his mistaken move, it
would seem that if this is not the exact text of the order, it is at least
the gist of it.
The testimony of General de Salle, who affirms that the Emperor's
order was addressed directly to d'Erlon, is confirmed by eleven other
testimonies. I quote them in their order of date : —
1st. Soult to Xey, Fleurus, 17th June (Major-General's Register):
" Had Count d'Erlon executed the movement ordered by the Emperor
on Saint-Amand, the Prussians would have been totally destroyed."
2nd. Soult to Davout, Fleurus, 17th June 1815 (War Arch.) :
" Count d'Erlon has received wrong directions, for if he had executed
the movement enjoined by the Emperor, the Prussian Army was
irremediably lost
3rd. Book of daily notes of General Foy (communicated by Count
Foy). Note dated Genappe, 18th of June, morning: "The Emperor
reproached Count d'Erlon because his entire corps did not bear on
Marbais during the operations of the 16th."
4th. Letter of Marshal Ney to the Duke of Otrante, Paris, 26th June
1815 (Journal de I'Empire, 29th June): "I was going to send forward
the 1st Corps, when I heard that the Emperor had disposed of it"
5th. Notes of Colonel Simon Loriere, deputy-chief of Grerard's staflF
(War. Arch.): "Orders to bear upon Brye were given to the 1st
Corps."
6th. Gamot, Ney's brother-in-law. Refutation en ce qui cojicenie le
mare'chal Xey (1819), p. 16: "The Marshal knew already through
Colonel Laurent, bearer of the pencilled order, that he was not to count
any longer on d'Erlon." P. 19 : "Count d'Erlon's movement took place
according to the positively expressed orders of Napoleon. I have the
testimony of the bearer of these orders, Colonel Laurent"
7th. Fleury de Chaboulon present at Ligny as attache to the
Emperor's cabinet, Memoires sur les Cent Jours (1820), ii. 157 : "The
364 JFATERLOO book ii
Emperor had sent a direct order to Count d'Erlon to come and join him
with the 1st Corps."
8th. Colonel Baudus of Soult's staff (notes communicated by his
grandson, M. de Montenon) : " At the moment when the engagement was
in full swing along the entire line, the Emperor said to me : ' I have sent
to Count d'Erlon an order to proceed with his whole army corps to the
rear of the Prussian Army's right. You will carry to Marshal Ney the
duplicate of this order, which ought to have been communicated to him
by this time. You will tell him that whatever may be his position, this
order must absolutely be carried out. . . .' I reached the Marshal.
He was very much excited, for when he had wished to send d'Erlon
forward, that general having received orders direct from Napoleon, had
set out on his march to carry them out."
9th. Account of Durutte, general of one of d'Erlon's divisions
(written before 1827, the year of the general's death, and published in
the Sentinelle de VArme'e, 8th March 1838) : "The Emperor sent Count
d'Erlon the order to attack the left (the right) of the Prussians, and to
try to take possession of Brye. The 1st Corps passed near Villers-
Perwin to execute the movement.
10th. Colonel Heymes, Ney's aide-de-camp. Relation de la Campagne
de 1815 (1829), p. 14: "Colonel Laurent's despatch from the Imperial
headquarters came to inform Ney that, in pursuance of an order from
the Emperor which he had transmitted to d'Erlon, the 1st Corps was
proceeding in the direction of Saint-Amand."
11th. Petiet of Soult's staff. Souvenirs militaires (1844), p. 199 : "In
great haste the Emperor sends for the 1st Corps, and Marshal Ney does
not hear of this before it is well on its way."
To tell the truth, d'Erlon gives rather a different version. In his
letter to the Duke of Elchingen {Documents ine'dits, 64), he says : " I
outdistanced my column and reached Frasnes. There I was joined by
General La Bedoyere, who showed a pencilled note which he was carrying
to Ney, and which enjoined the Marshal to direct his corps d'arm^e on
Ligny. La Bedoyere warned me that he had already given orders for
this movement, by causing the direction of my column to be changed ; he
informed jne where I could rejoin it. I immediately followed the road
he indicated."
And in his Vie militaire (95) d'Erlon writes : " The Emperor sent
Marshal Ney an officer to tell him to direct the 1st Corps on Ligny, so
as to turn the Prussians' right wing. This officer met the vanguard of
the 1st Corps before he had delivered his orders to Ney, and straightway
sent this column in the direction of Ligny. Towards four o'clock I
had gone forward, still completely ignorant of the direction taken
by my army ; later on, having indirectly heard of it, I hastened to
rejoin it."
In these two accounts of d'Erlon, a flagrant inconsistency appears,
yet both accounts agree on two points : first, that the 1 st Corps was
directed on Ligny without the knowledge of d'Erlon ; second, that the
Emperor's order was addressed to Ney, not to d'Erlon, and tliat it wa.-=
CHAP. Ill NOTES 365
only owing to an excess of zeal on the part of the oflBcer entrusted with
this order, that the 1st Corps was acquainted with it first.
All the testimonies quoted above, refute these assertions which are
inspired by personal motives. It is quite obvious that d'Erlon is en-
deavouring to cast off his responsibility. The movement which so
fatally paralysed the 1st Corps consisted in a march and a counter-
march. D'Erlon attempts to prove that he is not responsible for the
march, because his generals proceeded to the right without referring to
him. He also pleads not guilty on the score of the countermarch which
he executed later in pursuance of Ney's order. His grounds are, that as
the order was addressed to Ney, not to him, the Emperor seemed to
leave him implicitly under the command of the Marshal, whom d'Erlon
therefore thought himself bound to continue to obey. Evidently this is
the double motive of Count d'Erlon's inaccurate and embarrassed
statements.
There remains to be discovered the reason, why the Emperor in his
accounts of St. Helena denied, or rather completely omitted his sending
this order to d'Erlon, an order whose existence is proved by two letters
of Soult, 17th of June, to say nothing of the ten other testimonies.
Gourgaud, or Napoleon, for it amounts to the same, says (p. 69) :
" Napoleon could not perceive the reason of such a movement ; " and (p. G7),
" The movements of the 1st Corps are not easy to explain." But on the
day after the battle, could not the Emperor have sought and obtained an
explanation ? Baudus, Ney, d'Erlon himself were there present to
enlighten him. Undoubtedly the Emperor did not wish to acknowledge,
that his keen eye and quick perception had failed him on the battle-
field of Ligny to such an extent, and that he was so dismayed by the false
direction of d'Erlon's corps which he had himself just summoned, that
he had actually mistaken it for a body of the enemy.
48. Above quoted accounts of de Salle and Durutte. See Baudus's
notes.
49. Baudus's notes. Gamot and Heymes say that this officer was
Colonel Laurent ; de Salle says : a marshal des logis of the Guard ;
d'Erlon (first account) : General La Bedoyere (which is impossible, for
we know from Petiet {Souvenirs militaires, 198) that at five o'clock
La Bedoyere was with the Emperor) ; second account : an officer of the
Imperial staff.
Baudus's notes, so minute and precise on this point, show beyond a
doubt that it was Forbin-Janson.
50. See order quoted after de Salle, p. 171, and note 47.
51. From Durutte's and de Salle's accounts, from the announce-
ment sent by Vandamme to Napoleon towards a quarter-past five, " That
a column of the enemy was emerging from the woods one mile off to the
left, and apparently bearing on Fleurus," one must infer that d'Erlon's
column first took a short cut between VUlers-Perwin and the Voie
romaine, then joined the Voie romalne near the road that skirts the
Chassart mill, and proceeded by this road in the direction of Fleurus.
From the intersection of this road with the Voie romaine, to the point
366 WATERLOO book ii
before Saint-Amand where Vandamme was posted, there is a straight
line of just one league. The woods from which the column seemed to
emerge were the woods of Villers-Perwin, now cleared out and cut down.
52. See pp. 98, 99, 103.
53. Manuscript notes of Baudus (communicated by M. de Montenon).
54. Manuscript notes of Baudus. D'Erlon's letter to the Duke of
Elchingen {Documents inedits) and d'Erlon, Vie militaire, 295. See letter
of Ney to the Duke of Otranto, 26th June : "I learnt that the Emperor
had, without informing me, disposed of the 1st Corps." One ct^nnot
give credit to Gamot, who is very confused, and Heymes, who is always
inaccurate, when they say that Ney was warned by Colonel Laurent of
the Imperial staff, for then it would be necessary to admit that Laurent
was entrusted with a duplicate. As already stated, the original pencilled
note was carried by Forbin-Janson who neglected to convey it to Ney.
55. An hour later, said Baudus (above quoted notes), Ney was still in
a state of most violent exasperation.
56. From Gamot's Refutation, it appears that Soult's despatch of a
quarter-past three reached Ney when the latter already knew of the
movement of the 1st Corps. Delcambre must have joined Ney towards
five o'clock, and Soult's officer arrived a few minutes later.
Besides, Gamot confuses things when he says that Soult's despatch
was brought by Forbin-Janson. Forbin-Janson carried not the despatch
from Soult, but the pencilled order from the Emperor ; and after
acquainting d'Erlon with this order, he had returned directly to Fleurus.
Gamot's confusion is accounted for by the fact that Forbin-Janson was
seen near Ney on the battlefield of Quatre-Bras, though this was long
after the charge of the cuirassiers. On his return to Fleurus, towards
five, Forbin-Janson had again been sent to Ney by the Emperor, who
was dissatisfied with the way in which he had discharged his mission,
and entrusted him with a duplicate or rather a triplicate of the pencilled
order. The Emperor even had him provided with a fresh horse, as his
own charger was half spent by the first journey. In his manuscript
notes, Baudus gives the most minute details on all these points.
57. Letters from officers of the Halkett brigade {Waterloo Letters,
320-323, 326, 333, 334), etc. ; Letter of Alten to the Duke of Cam-
bridge, Brussels, 20th June (General Gourgaud's papers). The English
brigade of Colin Halkett advanced in company columns in the direction
of G^mioncourt, whilst the Hanoverian brigade of Kielmansegge came to
prolong Picton's left, facing Peraumont.
58. Pontecoulant, 121 ; Fleury de Chaboulon, ii. 159. Baudus
(manuscript notes) relates that an hour later Ney exclaimed several
times in his presence : " What, is there neither a ball nor a bullet for
me
I "
59. Jomini, without entirely excusing Ney, pleads that the Marshal,
having only Reille's corps at his disposal, had good ground to fear lest he
might not be able to cover the entrance of the Charleroi road till night,
and this was the retreating line for the whole Army. This may be true,
but for all that d'Erlon could not return in time !
CHAP. Ill NOTES 367
The Duke of Elchingen {Documents inedits) remarks that d'Erlon
having committed himself to a false direction, his movement could not
produce the great results expected by the Emperor. But it is highly
improbable that Xey at that time was aware that the 1st Corps was
going the wrong road ; if he knew it, it was his duty to enlighten
d'Erlon through Delcambre as to the right direction, instead of summoning
him back to Frasnes.
60. D'Erlon, letter to the Duke of Elchingen (Documents inedits, 64) ;
and Vie militaire, 95 ; Durutte's and de Salle's accounts.
Ney (in his Letter to the Duke of Otrante), and his apologists, Heymes
and Gamot, carefully avoid mentioning this order.
61. Kellermann's account (War Arch.). On the three brigades posted
at Liberchies, see Xey's order, Frasnes, 16th June, a quarter-past eleven
or half-past eleven.
62. Kellermann's report to Xey, near Frasnes, 16th June, 10 p.m.
Kellermann's account. Kellermann to Grouchy, 16th June, p.m. EeUle's
account (War Arch.) ; Wood berry, Journal, 310 ; letters of officers
of the Halkett brigade {Waterloo, Letters, 318, 319, 322, 323,
324, 335, 337). See Souvenirs dJun ex-officier (of the 45th), 227,
in which there is a statement that the day after the battle, one of the
squares remained visibly marked out on the soil by the bodies of the
dead.
Most English authors deny that the charge was pushed as far as
Quatre-Bras, but Kellermann's testimony is confirmed by Mercer, captain
of artillery. He relates {Journal of the Waterloo Campaign, i. 263) that,
on his arrival, the night of the 16th to the 17th, he saw many bodies of
dead cuirassiers lying "just opposite the large farmhouse of Quatre-Bras,
on the road which skirts the farm."
63. The Duke of Elchingen says that Ney had an order from the
Emperor enjoining him not to use this division. If the verbal order of
the 15th was indeed to that effect (the written order enjoins merely to
spare the Guard, and to employ in preference the cavalry of the line), Ney
certainly acted in direct contradiction to it. On the 15 th, it was the
Lefebvre-Desnoettes cavalry in preference to that of Pire, which was at his
disposal, that he had directed on Frasnes, against the battalions of Nassau,
without any scruple as to sparing it (see pp. 70-72). Besides, it is not
absolutely certain that this division was not partially engaged on the
16th at Quatre-Bras in an early stage of the battle. Damitz (i. 197)
attributes to it the charge of three o'clock against the 5 th battalion of
militia. In point of fact, Colbert (letter communicated by General de
Colbert) says that the division of the Guard remained in reserve on the
16th ; but we know that he had received a bullet wound ; and, moreover,
the squadron chief, de Stuers of the Red Lancers, without specifying the
part taken by his division in the day's business, relates in his notes
(comm. by M. de Stuers) that fifty men were disabled in the fight The
question remains therefore a doubtful one.
At all events, it would have been better to employ this division, rather
than to place it in a position where it suffered a profitless loss of fifty
368 TFATERLOO book ii
men ; it would have been better still to send it at noon to Liberchies,
and to call to Frasnes the three brigades of Kellermann.
64. Kellermann is most emphatic on this point, not only in his
account, but in his report to Ney, dated 10 o'clock p.m. It is therefore
a grave error on the part of Charras and others, to represent the charge
of cuirassiers and the charge of lancers and chasseurs as simultaneous.
65. General Guiton and Colonel Garavaque were also dismounted.
Whenever they had to deal with the cavalry of the cuirassiers, the English
always preferred aiming at the horses {Waterloo Letters, 378).
66. Kellermann's report, 16th June; Kellermann to Grouchy, 17th
June ; Kellermann's account ; Reille's account (War Arch.) ; Woodberry,
Journal, 310 ; Siborne, i. 144 ; letters of officers from the Kempt and
Pack Brigades {Waterloo Letters, 359, 378, 386).
67. Memoir es du roi Jerome, vii. 78, 79 ; Siborne, i. 148-150 ; letters
of officers of the Kempt Brigade {Waterloo Letters, 344, 354, 359).
68. ]\Ianuscript notes of Colonel Baudus (comm, by M. de Montenon).
These notes, as we have stated before, have only been partially repro-
duced in Colonel Baudus's Etudes sur Napoleon; but they can be trusted,
so accurate and so precise are they, although they do not in some points
agree with other accounts ; the latter, as far as names and details are con-
cerned, do not agree among themselves. Baudus could justly write :
" Nobody knows better than myself, the circumstances which precluded
the 1st Corps from being of use, either to Marshal Ney or to the Emperor
on the day of the 15th."
69. Notes of Baudus. Letter of General F. (comm. by M. X.).
70. Notes of Baudus. See letter of the major of the 92nd High-
landers {Waterloo Letters, 387) ; Siborne, i. 148, 149.
71. Letters of officers of the Maitland and Byng Brigades (Waterloo
Letters, 241, 252, 258 ; Letter of Hervey, aide-de-camp to Wellington
{Nineteenth Century, March 1893) ; report of Alten to the Duke of
Cambridge, Brussels, 20th June (General Gourgaud's papers) ; Siborne,
i. 152.
72. Letters of officers of the Maitland, Byng, Halkett, and Pack
Brigades {Waterloo Letters, 241, 242, 251, 270, 319, 387, 388, etc.);
Siborne, i. 154-158; Memoires du roi Jerdme, 79; Reille's account
(War Arch.) ; Souvenirs d'un vieux soldat beige, 83 ; van Loben, 206.
73. Reille's account (War Arch.).
74. Anglo-Hanoverians, 2,911 (Wellington, Despatclies, xii. 486);
Brunswick, Kruse, and van Merlen, about 1,100 (estimates quoted by
Charras, i. 252) ; Perponcher, 667 (van Loben, 207).
75. With this difference, however, that the enemy established them-
selves in force in the positions where there were only detachments in the
morning, and also that the French kept the farmhouse of Grand Pierre-
pont taken from the Nassau Corps in the early part of the fight. See plan
of the battle at 9 o'clock p.m. in the Letters of Waterloo.
76. Reille's account (War Arch.) and d'Erlon's letter to the Duke of
Elchingen {Documents inedits, 64).
77. D'Erlon's letter to the Duke of Elchingen ; Durutte's account
CHAP. Ill NOTES 369
{Sentinelle de I'Armee, 1838) ; Souvenirs of Greneral de Salle (Nouvelle
Revue),
The 1st Corps must have been posted at about 2,000 yards to the east
of Saint-Amand and 1,500 yards to the south-east of Wagnel^e. This
point is precisely in the direction taken by d'Erlon, who marched in
accordance with Vandamme's suggestion to the Emperor, from the woods
of Villers-Perwin ou to Fleurus ; the distance which separated him from
Fleurus, about 3 kilometres, may account for the fact that the officer
sent by the Emperor took a full hour to get there, to reconnoitre the
column, to speak to d'Erlon or the officer in charge of the advanced guard,
and to return to Napoleon.
Moreover, we know from Damitz (i. 139) that a little later the cavalry
of the 1st Corps advanced between Wagnelee and Mellet. It seems then
that it did come from the point indicated. This point is 11 kilometres
distant from Gemioncourt. Having left Gemioncourt about a quarter
})ast five, Delcambre must haA*e joined d'Erlon towards six o'clock.
78. De Salle, Souvenirs, Durutte's account. Durutte speaks of
" entreaties " from the right which embarrassed d'Erlon. Do not these
" entreaties " mean the advice and requests of the officer despatched by
the Emperor to reconnoitre 1 Surprised to meet the Ist Corps instead
of the presumed English column, may he not have pressed d'Erlon to act
against the Prussian Armyl This is most probable. At any rate, there
could not have been fresh instructions from the Emperor, for the Emperor
never used " entreaties," he gave orders ; and if d'Erlon had received
orders from Napoleon, he certainly would have obeyed them. But no
order did the Emperor send, because the column then nearing his flank
had been described as that of the enemy, and he never thought it could
be the Ist Corps.
79. De Salle, Souvenirs {Nouvelle Revue, 1895) ; Souvenirs d'un ex-
Hcier (of the 45th), 277.
According to a tradition, held as authentic by several historians, the
battalions of Drouet d'Erlon's corps which had advanced farthest, were able
to distinguish (with a field-glass no doubt) the figures on the knapsacks
of the Prussians. The Tippelskirch division was then emerging from
Wagnelee, to bear down against Le Hameau and La Haye. This explains
how the rear of the Prussians could be visible from the point where the
Durutte column had its vanguard, 300 or 400 yards to the south of the
mill at Chassart. However, it is a mistake as far as figures on the knapsacks
are concerned. In the Prussian Army the knapsacks were not numbered,
but their colour was different in the battalions of each regiment, so that
the chiefs of the corps might recognise their own battalions at a distance ;
it was therefore the colour of the knapsacks, not the numbers, which
were spoken of.
80. D'Erlon's letter to the Duke of Elchingen {Documents inSdits, 64).
81. Souvenirs d!un ecc-otficier (of the 45th), 277.
82. Durutte's account. Durutte's rather confused account is elucidated
by Damitz's book, i. 141, 142. Wagner (iv. 35) confirms the information
f Damitz. Durutte maintains that he hurled two battalions upon Brye.
24
370 WATERLOO book ii
This is incorrect. As may be seen farther on, the Prussians occupied
Brye the whole night.
83. General Brue's letter to Captain Chapuis, Toulouse, 3rd November
1837 (quoted in the Journal des sciences militaires, second half-year of
1863).
BOOK II CHAPTER IV .
1. Not only did Ney send no news to the Emperor during the
afternoon of the 16th June, when at six o'clock Soult's aide-de-camp,
Commander Baudus, wished to return to the Emperor to report to him
on the mission he had just fulfilled, but Ney detained him, on the pretext
that he needed staff officers. Baudus did not return to Fleurus till two
o'clock in the morning or even later (Notes of Baudus, commimicated
by M. de Montenon),
"We must reject the following assertion of Gourgaud {Campagne de
1815, 72) : "At eleven in the morning, the Emperor received at Fleurus,
the report on what had occurred at Quatre-Bias. The Emperor immedi-
ately sent to Marshal Ney orders to pursue the English Army as soon as
day dawned, when the latter had begun the retreat, necessitated by the
losses of the battle of Ligny."
All this is incorrect. 1st. The account of Ney's sending a report on the
evening of the 1 6th is contradicted by this letter dated from Imperial head-
quarters at Fleurus (17 th) in the morning, and sent to Paris to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs : " There is no report from Marshal Ney " (Arch, of
Foreign Affairs, 1802). 2nd. The despatch by night to Ney ordering
him to attack on the morning of the 17 th, is contradicted by this letter
of Soult, dated Fleurus, 17th June, morning (Major- General's Register):
" Gen. Flahaut just arrived intimates that : yoit are in a state of uncertainty
about the results of yesterday's battle. Yet I believe I have informed you
of the victory." If the order to attack the English on the 17th had been
sent to Ney during the night, the Marshal would not have been in a state
of uncertainty as to the results of the battle of Ligny, as Flahaut said.
On the other hand, these words of Soult : " Yet I believe I have informed
you," are an apology for a negligence, rather than a statement of a fact.
In conclusion, Ney received no information during the night of the 16th
to the 17th, and still less any orders. Equal carelessness on all sides!
Ney neglects to send his report on his movements, and Soult forgets to
inform Ney of the victory won at Ligny.
2. Clausewitz (Der Feldzug von 1815, 95) applauds the Emperor i.
this circumstance.
3. From the two accounts of Grouchy {Observations, 10, and Relation
succincte, 17), it would seem — 1st, that Grouchy saw the Emperor at
Fleurus at eleven o'clock in the evening of the 16th ; 2nd, that tlii
Emperor enjoined him to send the cavalry in pursuit of the enemy th;.
CHAP. IV NOTES 371
same night or very early the next morning. Therefore Charras has no
right to accuse Napoleon of neglecting to give these orders.
According to Jomini (185, 188), who, however, is mistaken in
saying that these orders to Grouchy were given only on the morning of
the 17th, the Emperor had also given orders to General de Monthyon,
chief of the general staff, to have the enemy pursued in the direction of
TUly and Mont-Saint-Guibert. This is possible for, if Napoleon thought
of having the ground explored to his right, he must also have thought of
having it explored in front of the centre and before the left. But
Monthyon neglected to ensure the execution of these orders. The
Prussian documents testify that no reconnaissance took place towards
Tilly and Mont-Saint-Guibert during the morning of the 1 7th.
4. Flahaut's note (in Le General Flahaut, by F. Masson, 23). See Soult
to Ney, Fleurus, 17th June (Major-Gteneral's Register) : "General Flahaut
who has just arrived. . . ." This letter bears no indication as to time, but
it says : " The Emperor proceeded to the mill at Brye." Now we know
from Grouchy (Observations, 10, and Relation succincte, 18), and by a
letter dated Imperial headquarters at Fleurus, nine in the morning, 17th
June, that Napoleon left Fleurus between eight and nine in the morning.
Soult's letter, then, was written about eight in the morning, and Flahaut's
assertion that he (Flahaut) left Frasnes at one o'clock in the morning is false.
He only started about four, and reached Frasnes about six o'clock.
5. Pajol's despatch before Balatre, 17 th June, four in the morning
(General Goiu^ud's papers). This message, addressed to Grouchy, had
1 been sent or brought by him to the Imperial headquarters. I have
1 definite reasons for affirming this.
11 6. Grouchy, Observations, 10 ; Relation succinde, 18.
7. Soult to Ney, Fleurus, 17th June (Major-General's Register). As
have just seen, this letter which bears no indication as to the time,
as written towards eight o'clock in the morning.
8. " I am going to march with the Teste division which His Majesty
has just sent me." Pajol to Grouchy, before le Mazy, 17th June, midday
i(War Arch., Army of the North).
From the point where Teste had bivouacked, on the morning of the
17th, between Brye and Sombreffe to le Mazy, which he reached before
jnoon, there is a distance of two leagues. Consequently Teste had received
I ;the order of movement about nine o'clock at the latest, so that this order
pnust necessarily have been sent from Fleurus before nine o'clock.
Moreover, a letter dated from the Imperial headquarters at Fleurus, 19th
;ne, nine in the morning (Arch, of Foreign AflFairs, 1802) reads thus :
Lobau (which means one of Lobau's divisions) is following the enemy in
heir flight."
9. Grouchy, Observaiions, 11, 12 ; Relation succincte, i. 19 ;
jourgaud, 73, 74.
10. General headquarters, Fleurus, 17th June. "It was nine in the
uoming. We sprang on our horses to follow the enemy on Namur and
Brussels. Yesterday the whole bodyguard of the Emperor came with us
o the fire. Had General Delort been only fairly supported he might
372 JFATERLOO book u
have captured fifty cannon in a quarter of an hour. But all this will be
done to-day " (Arch, of Foreign Affairs, 1802).
This letter, or rather this note, without either address or signature,
yet with all the marks of authenticity, was probably written to the Duke
of Vicenza, either by General Fouler, equerry to the Emperor (there are
in existence similar letters from Fouler), either by an ofiicer of the
Imperial staff, or by an attache of Bassano's cabinet. It shows that from
the time of his leaving Fleurus, Napoleon had conceived the double
manoeuvre which was carried out during that day. This is confirmed by
Soult's letter to Davout, Fleurus, 17th June (Major-General's Register) :
"The Emperor remounts his horse to follow up the success of the battle
of Ligny." This letter was written a short time after the departure of
the Emperor, that is to say, between nine and ten o'clock. We know
from the notes of Baudus, Soult's aide-de-camp (communicated by M. de
Montenon), that the chief of the staff did not accompany the Emperor
on his visit to the battlefield, but joined him later at the Bussy
mill.
11. Above quoted note (Arch, of Foreign Affairs, 1802). Grouchy,
Observations, 1 0 ; Relation succinate, 1 8 ; Letter of General Baudrand,
quoted by Grouchy, App. viii. 63. According to local traditions,
Napoleon must have left the chateau at eight o'clock. General von
Groben, in observation at Tilly, wrote at noon to Gneisenau : " . . . The
French Army was making soup. A short time after nine o'clock a long
retinue appeared in sight. The soldiers sprang to their feet shouting :
' Long live the Emperor ! ' " (report quoted by von OUech, Geschichte des
Feldzuges von 1815, 168, 169).
12. Grouchy, Observations, 11; Relation succincte, 18; Lefol.
Souvenirs, 69 ; above quoted notes of Baudus.
13. Grouchy, Observations, 11; Relation succincte, 18; Report of
von Groben, Tilly, 17th June (quoted by von Ollech, 169).
14. Grouchy, Observations, 11 ; Relation succincte, 18.
15. Ney to Soult, 17th June, half- past six in the morning (General
Gourgaud's papers). This despatch only reached Soult at Fleurus, after
the Emperor's departure. Soult had it forwarded to him on the battle-
field of Ligny.
16. Gourgaud, 73, 74; Grouchy, Observations, 11, 12; Relatioi
succincte, 19. According to Gourgaud, this reconnaissance returned ai
ten ; according to Grouchy, as late as midday. This is an intentional
inaccuracy on the part of Grouchy. As may be seen further, by midday,
the Marshal had quitted the Emperor, at least half an hour previously.
17. From Pajol's letter to Grouchy, le Mazy, 17th June, midday
(War Arch.), it appears that he had sent to the Marshal an aidt-
de-camp at three o'clock, to announce that he was starting oft' in pursuii
of the enemy ; from le Mazy, between six and seven, a despatch to tli<
effect that he had captured on the Namur road several waggons and eight
cannon. Moreover, he had written from Balatre at four o'clock to
announce that he had already taken several prisoners (this letter off
Balatre is in General Gourgaud's papers).
CHAP. IV NOTES 373
The despatch here mentioned (between six and seven o'clock) is from
le Mazy.
18. "I had the honour of acquainting you this morning with the
movement I effected on Gembloux in pursuit of the enemy who ia
mustered there. . . ." Eielmans to Grouchy, 17th June (War. Arch,).
From this despatch, which was written in front of Gembloux between
noon and two o'clock, it is evident that in the course of the morning
Exelmans had informed Grouchy of the movement he had eflfected,
between eight and nine in the morning. See on this point, General
Berton, Precis des Batailles de Fleurus et de Waterloo, 47, and Greneral de
Bonnemains' Journal (War Arch.).
19. The 6th Corps now included only the Simmer and Jannin
divisions, the Teste division having been detached in the morning with
Pajol.
20. Gourgaud, 75 ; see Soult's letter to Xey at the fore of Ligny,
17th June, twelve o'clock (quoted by the Duke of Elchingen, Documents
ivedits, 44) : " The Emperor has just posted in front of Marbais a body
of infantry and the Guard, to second your operations ; " and von Groben's
report from Tilly, 17th June, midday (quoted by von Ollech, 168):
" Numerous troops (the 6th Corps) are moving towards Marbais. Fresh
reinforcements of troops (the Guard) will follow later in the same direc-
tion." Gourgaud says that Lobau's movement commenced at ten o'clock.
I believe that it began at eleven o'clock.
21. I give here the Emperor's words, in substance and not literally,
as they have been reportetl in ten different ways.
In the first, by date of his writings {Observations, 1 2), Grouchy simply
says : " The Emperor gave me the order to march in pursuit of Marshal
Bliicher." In his Fragments historiqices (4), and in his Relation sucdnde
(19, and Appendix, i. 17), he repeats in the following terms the
Emperor's verbal order : " Set off in pursuit of the Prussians. Complete
their defeat by attacking them as soon as you have come up with them,
and never lose sight of them. I am going to unite with Marshal Ney in
attacking the English, if they keep to this side of the forest of Soignes.
You can communicate with me by the paved road (road from Xamur to
the Quatre-Bras}." In the same work Grouchy also quotes (Appendix, iv.
and viii. 63) the testimony of de Blocqueville : "The Emperor gave
Marshal Grouchy the order to pursue the enemy as far as Gembloux and
Wavre," and this testimony of General Baudrand : " The Emperor says :
'You are to take the 1st and 3rd Army Corps, one division of the 6th,
the cavalry, etc., and this evening you must enter Xamur.' "
Naturally other versions are given in the accounts from St. Helena.
Gourgaud (75) says : " The Emperor issued orders to pursue the Prussians
closely, to overthrow their rearguard, not to lose sight of them, to
attack their right wing, and to be always in communication with the
rest of the army." In his Memoires pour servir a Phistoire (107)
Napoleon writes : " Grouchy ought to have followed Bliicher, sword in
hand, to prevent him from rallying." He had positive orders always to
keep between the Charleroi road and Bliicher, in order to be in constant
374 WATERLOO book ii
communication with the army and in a position to join it. If the enemy
fell back on the Meuse, he was to send Pajol's cavalry, to keep them
under observation and occupy Wavre with the bulk of the troops.
All discussion on the purport of this verbal order is useless, for a
quarter of an hour or half an hour at the most after issuing it, the
Emperor sent Grouchy a written order which is quoted further. It is in
this written order, not in words more or less correctly repeated, that we
find Napoleon's real thought and intention.
22. From the various accounts of Grouchy (Ohservations, 12 ;
Bemarques, 10 ; Relation succincte, 19, 20, 23), it appears that it was
with no slight embarrassment and annoyance, that the Marshal received
the mission to pursue the Prussians. This feeling on the part of I
Grouchy has been confirmed to me by M. G. de Molinari, formerly chief
editor of the Journal des Debats, who knew Grouchy in 1845. The
Marshal in conversing did not attempt to conceal his regret that the.
Emperor should have entrusted him with this command, for which he
felt himself totally unfitted. Edgar Quinet {Gam'parjne de 1815, 166), so ;
to speak, has pictured this state of mind of Marshal Grouchy. Grouchy
threw himself at the feet of the Emperor and said : " Sire, take me with
you, and bestow this command on Marshal Ney." Such was indeed
Grouchy's secret desire, but there is no evidence that he ever expressed
it. Is it possible to imagine Ney being recalled from Quatre-Bras, where ■
he was supposed to be fighting with the English ? The two divisions of i
the army changing their heads again ? The pursuit of the Prussians thus
delayed three hours longer ? All this to give Ney time to come to Ligny
and assume the command ? The idea is an absurdity.
23. Grouchy, Observations, 12, 13; Relation sticcinde, 19, 20.
If we are to believe Grouchy, he should have said also that the
troops would be very slow in getting started ; " that they had not been
warned they would have to march on that day ; that squads of the men
were foraging for provisions ; that the infantry had unscrewed their
muskets to clean them ; that the cavalry (Maurin division) had unsaddled
their horses."
I very much doubt whether Grouchy would have dared to urge
such paltry objections in the Emperor's presence. How was it that
soldiers who had not stirred since reveil, liad not commenced to clean
their arms before ten o'clock ? Besides, putting the muskets together was
the work of a few minutes. As for the cavalry whose horses were un-
saddled, five minutes would have sufficed for re-saddling them.
I also doubt whether the Marshal advised Napoleon to keep him at
hand " to cover his right flank " (as he declares. Relation succincte, 20),
by marching on the left bank of the Dyle, so as to prevent the junction
of the English and the Prussians (as the aide-de-camp Bella, questioned
in 1841 by Grouchy, pretends that the Marshal told him, during the
evening of the 17th June, Appendix, iv. 42). These are assertions made
after the event. Grouchy could not have advised the Emperor to
employ him in covering the right flank of the army, for Napoleon had
already precisely entrusted this very operation to him. But to carry it
CHAP. IV NOTES 375
out, it was necessary to discover the Prussians. Grouchy himself
acknowledges this (Obsenations, 12). Napoleon Baid to him: "It
devolves upon you to discover the direction taken by the Prussians."
Grouchy says also {Fragment historiqiies, 31), "When I left the Emperor
he was uncertain whether it icould be on Brussels or on Namur that I should
have to march." And so from Grouchy's own confession he was in
nowise bound by the Emperor's instructions. Besides, if at noon the
Marshal had formed the idea of marcliing along the left bank of the
Dyle as he pretends, why did he not do so early the next morning,
when all the information gathered gave him every inducement to do so ?
Finally, it will be noticed that in the declarations of Colonel Baudrand
and Colonel de Blocqueville, who were present at this conversation
(declarations quoted by Grouchy in his voluminous appendix), it is not
even hinted that Grouchy made the slightest objection to Napoleon.
24. Pajol, as I have said, note 17, had sent three despatches to Grouchy
before seven in the morning. The eight Prussian cannons had arrived
at Imperial headquarters before half-past eight (Grouchy, Relation
siuxincte, 17).
25. Eielmans had written firom Sombreflfe about eight o'clock, that
he was marching on Gembloux, and at nine o'clock the Berton brigade
liad already taken up its position before this village, opposite Thielmann's
corps (Exelmans to Grouchy) ; Gembloux, 1 7th June, and (reneral de
Bonnemains' Journal (War Arch.) ; Berton, Precis, 47.
26. Grouchy, Relation succinde, 19 ; Appendix i. 18.
27. Manuscript notes of Colonel Baudus : " The chief of the staff,
who had not yet finished sending off orders when Napoleon started on
horseback (for Ligny), remained at Fleurus for some time longer, and only
reached the battlefield at the moment when the head of Marshal Grouchy's
columns was going to open the fight in the direction assigned to them."
28. Order to Grouchy, Ligny, 17th June, "dictated by the Emperor
to the grand-marshal, in the absence of the chief of the stafl" (War
Arch-).
29. Some historians contend that it was a report from General
Berton which induced Napoleon to give Grouchy fresh instructions, and
the only reference they quote is the pamphlet by this general. However,
in his Precis des Batailles (h Fleurus et de JVaterloo, Berton says (p. 47) :
'*' I heard there (near the Omeau) that the Prussian army was retreating
by way of Wavre, and that there were still a great number at Gembloux.
/ reported this, and received orders to proceed at once to Gfembloux. I
arrived in front of this town at nine in the morning." He reported this,
not to Napoleon but to Exelmans, and the effect of this report was, that
Exelmans directed all his dragoons on Grembloui, and only informed
Grouchy of the movement when he was executing it (above quoted
letter of Exelmans to Grouchy). In his turn. Grouchy informed Napoleon
of it, but not before nine or ten in the morning. Consequently the
Emperor received no report at all from Berton. No mere brigade-
general ever sent direct reports to the Emperor, unless they were
entrusted by him with some special mission.
376
JVATERLOO
BOOK II
30. To Marshal Grouchy, Ligny, 17th June, "dictated by the
Emperor to the grand-marshal, in the absence of the chief of the staff"
(War Arch., Army of the North).
This letter, like the preceding one, bears no indication as to the hour ; '
but it is easy to prove that they were both written between half-past
eleven and midday, that is to say, between the time Grouchy left Napoleon
after receiving his verbal orders, and the moment when Soult rejoined
the Emperor in front of Ligny.
1st. In his answer to Grouchy's own questions, aide-de-camp Bella
says {Relation mccincte, Appendix iv. 41) : "The Emperor caused a letter
to be written to you soon after you left him, enjoining you to march on
Gembloux. This letter was in General Bertrand's handwriting."
2nd. This annotation inscribed on both letters written by General
Bertrand : "In the chief of the staff's absence" proves that, if Napoleon by
derogation dictated them to the grand-marshal, it was because he could
not have them written by Soult, who had not yet joined him. Colonel
Baudus, aide-de-camp to Soult (Manuscript Notes, communicated by de ^
Montenon), in fact, says : " The chief of the staff, who had not yet finished
sending off orders when Napoleon mounted his horse, remained at Eleurus '
for some time longer."
It only remains to determine exactly at what time Grouchy left thel
Emperor, and at what time the latter was joined by Soult.
The report of the Prussian general, von Groben, addressed about
midday from Tilly to Wavre (quoted by von Ollech, 169) bears: "A
number of troops are in motion on the Fleurus road in the direction of j
Gembloux. These are Grouchy's troops." General Rogniat, in command
of the engineers of the army, says {Reponse aux notes critiques de Napoleon,
270) : " The army left the battlefield of Ligny in two columns, between
eleven and twelve. As an eyewitness, I can testify to the fact."
Baudus (above-quoted notes) says that when Soult arrived from Fleurus
at Ligny (which he reached a little before noon, as I will prove further),
he saw Grouchy's columns on the march.
The conclusion is that Grouchy had received a verbal order, and had
left the Emperor, to execute it between eleven and half-past eleven.
On the other hand, it is evident that Soult joined Napoleon at the
Bussy mill a little before noon, since the order he wrote there, in accordance
with the instructions of the Emperor to Marshal Ney, bears : Before
Ligny, 17th June, midday (War Arch., Army of the North).
I will add simply, to point it out as a curiosity, that Bertrand's
letter to Grouchy emphasising the verbal orders — which letter I repeat
has no indication as to the hour, in the copy at the War Arch. — reads
thus, " towards three o'clock," in Grouchy's Relation succincte. This is
an interpolation which cannot be censured too severely.
It is known, moreover, that Grouchy only recovered this important
and conclusive letter, and published it (1843) after it had been produced
in the discussion by Pascallet, in his Notice biographique sur le mar^chal
de Qrouchy (Paris, 1842). In 1819 Grouchy coolly wrote: "Such are
word for word the only dispositions (the verbal orders) that were
CHAP. IV NOTES 377
conunimicated to me, and the only orders that I received " {Ohservationt,
13). And again, p. 30 : "If I refrain iroxa publishing the orders that
1 received, it is because they were only transmitted to me verbally."
Truly, there never was a more timely and convenient lack of memory !
31. Soult to Ney, before Ligny, 17 th June, at noon (quoted by the
Duke of Elchingen, Documents inedits, 44) : " The Emperor has just
posted an infantry corps and the Imperial Guard at Marbais. His
Majesty charges me to tell you his intentions are that you should attack
the enemy at Quatre-Bras in order to drive them from their position,
and that you will be assisted in these operations by the corps now posted
at Marbais. His Majesty will proceed to Marbais, where he will
impatiently await your reports."
In this instance the order is formal. The course is no longer left
to Ney, as had been prescribed in Soult's letter of eight o'clock that
morning, to take up positions at Quatre-Bras^ should there be only a rear-
guard there, and to icait, ichile informing the Emperor if the English army
be present in full numbers. Now, whatever force he has in front of him,
Ney is to attack it.
It will be seen that this letter to Ney, dated Ligny, midday, is
written by Soult. It is no longer Bertrand's hand that holds the pen,
as was the case with both orders to Grouchy.
32. Report of Gneisenau to the King of Prussia ; Wavre, 17 th June,
2 o'clock (quoted by von Ollech, Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815, L
162 sqq!) ; Wagner, Plan of the Battles, iv. 46 ; Damitz, Camp, de 1815,
i 143 ; von Ollech, 155-157 ; Delbriick, Das Leben des Grafen von
Gneisenau, ii. 191.
33. Report of Wellington to the King of the Netherlands (19th and
20th of June), copy of which was sent on the 24th June to the King of
Wiirtemberg (quoted by Pfister, Aus dem Lager der Verbiindeten 1814
und 1815, 371).
34. Even after "Wellington had taken up his position at Waterloo, and
had asked Bliicher to assist him, Gneisenau, as will be seen farther on,
hesitated for some time, before engaging the Prussian Army in this new
operation. In his report to the King of Prussia, 17 th June (already quoted)
Gneisenau does not suggest in any way, that he prescribed the retreat
upon Wavre, with a view to ultimate action in concert with Wellington.
35. Damitz, i. 210.
36. Von OUech, 157.
37. Gneisenau's report, Wavre, 17th June, two o'clock (above quoted);
Wagner, iv. 47; Damitz, i. 142, 145-147; ii 206-209; von OUech, 157.
38. Gneisenau's report, Wavre, 17th June, two o'clock; Wagner, iv.
46, 54, 55 ; Damitz, ii. 207, 226 ; von Ollech, 166, 167.
39. Wagner, iv. 46, 55 ; Damitz, ii. 207-209 ; von OUech, 167.
Damitz justly blames Thielmann for his too prolonged halt at Gembloux,
although he adds that Thielmann knew that BiUow, who was marching
one league off, from Baudeset on Dion-le-Mont, would support him in
ease of attack. But it was neither for Thielmann nor for Biilow to risk
an action in which they might have to contend with the whole French
378 WATERLOO book ii
Army ; tlieir object was to concentrate speedily at Wavre, while concealing
from tlie French the direction of their retreat.
40. Billow's report to Blticher, Dion-le-Mont, 17th June, 10 km.
(quoted by von Ollech, 167, 168); Damitz, ii. 209, 210. From informa-
tion gathered by Grouchy and recorded by him (War Arch., Armj-^ of
the North, 18th June) Billow passed through Walhain and Corroy.
Indeed this is the most direct road from Baudeset to Dion-le-Mont ; more-
over, had Billow passed through Corbais, he might have hampered the
march of Thielmann, who was compelled to pass through that village.
According to the reports of the inhabitants (Grouchy to Napoleon,
Gembloux, 17th June, and Walhain, 18th June, War Arch.), Thielmann
and Billow's corps marched in several columns, for there were Prussians
passing through all the villages, within an area of from ten to twelve
kilometres.
41. Von Groben's report to Gneisenau, 17 th June, about noon
(quoted by von Ollech, 169-379).
42. The 1st Hussars (Soult division) had not rallied yet, and the
Subervie division had been detached to the left.
43. The previous day, towards the end of the battle, the mounted
battery. No. 14 (Pirch's corps), having exhausted its ammunition, had
fallen back to the east of Sombreffe, near one of the columns of the
Grand Park, which had come from Naraur and halted there. Before
sunrise, battery and column, probably through fear of being cut off
from Sombreffe, had taken the direction of Namur ; on their way they
had been joined by an isolated squadron of the 7th Uhlans. Damitz, ii.
215, 216. See Wagner, iv. 55, and von Ollech, 172.
44. Pajol to Grouchy before Mazy, 17th June, twelve o'clock (War
Arch.). See Pajol, Le General Gomte Pajol, iii. 212, 213, 218; and Damitz,
ii. 216.
45. Berton, Precis, 47. Berton insinuates that in following Pajol up
the Namur highway, he merely complied with orders received from Exel-
mans or from Lieutenant-General Strols, and that he did not act on his
own inspiration. He also contends that he heard from the peasants that
the Prussians were falling back by Gembloux on JFavre, and that lie
warned Exelmans of this direction of their retreat. This addition of
Berton is more or less involuntary. If Exelraans had known at eight in
the morning that the direction of retreat was Wavre, is it possible to
admit that he would not have notified this to Grouchy, either in the first
letter that he sent him at the very time, or in the second written in the
afternoon, or in the course of his conversation with Bella, aide-de-camp
to the Marshal ? (Letter of Exelmans to Grouchy, 17th June, War Arch.;
and Grouchy, Relation succincte, App. iii. 22).
46. Had Pajol received this information, most likely he would have
marched to the right of Exelmans, on the right bank of the Orneau,
threatening Thielmann's flank.
47. Exelmans to Grouchy, 17th June (in front of Gembloux from
twelve to two o'clock) ; Gen. de Bonnemains' Journal (War Arch., Army
of the North) ; Berton, Precis, 48.
CHAP. IV NOTES 379
48. According to the above-quoted letter of Exelmans, which l)ear8
no indication as to the time, he warned Grouchy about eight o'clock that
he was bearing on Grembloux, in pursuit of the enemy. But after giving
this message he sent no news whatever, except in this very letter which
he wrote between midday and two o'clock, and which Grouchy declares
he did not receive tUlfour o'clock {Relation succincte, Appendix iii. 22).
However, the intelligence sent at eight o'clock was too slight to lead
the Emperor to take any decisive step, for it left him in doubt whether
the enemy would still be at Gembloux when Exelmans arrived there.
If, on the contrary, at half-past nine Exelmans had sent a second despatch,
announcing that he had before him at Gembloux a Prussian corps of
20,000 men in camp, this announcement would very probably have
induced Napoleon to make his arrangements an hour earlier.
49. In the details gathered by Grouchy at Walhain (War Arch.,
Army of the North, 18th June) it is mentioned that the passage of
Biilo\v'8 corps at Walhain was completed by three in the afternoon of
the 17th. This information agrees with the German documents which
state that the head of the Billow column did not reach Dion-le-Mont
before eight in tlie evening.
50. See Henry Houssaye, ISlo, ii., note on page 230.
51. Grouchy, Obser~vcUions, 13 ; Bella's and de Blocqueville's declara-
tions {Relation succincte. Appendix iv. 4, 40, 41).
52. Grouchy, Observations, 13. See manuscript notes of Baudus
(communicated by M. de Montenon).
53. Manuscript notes of Baudus. See General Petiet, Souvenirs, 202.
54. Grouchy, Relation succincte, 22, 23. See Fragment historique,
9, 10.
55. Grouchy, Relatio7i succincte, 22 ; Gerard, Demieres Ohservationt,
66. Gerard says that it was then about one o'clock. It was certainly
not so late. Grouchy having left the Emperor about half-past eleven,
and having had but a short conversation with Soult.
Grouchy credits himself with the idea of the Gembloux movement,
although it is obvious that he only ordered it in compliance with the
instructions of Bertrand's second letter. The proof is that, on quitting
the Emperor, Grouchy sent to Vandamme orders to proceed to Point-du-
Jour, and that half an hour later, after receiving the letter in question, he
ordered Gerard to go to Gembloux.
56. "I was inciignant Instead of ordering his horses, Gerard had
given orders for his dinner to be prepared " (Grouchy, Relation succincte,
23. See 24, 25).
And indeed Gerard had ample time to dine, since before mounting
his horse he must of necessity wait till the 3rd Corps had reached the
height of Saint-Amand and defiled completely. General Hulot (Report
communicated by Baron Hulot) says that, towards one, the 4th Corps
received the order to prepare to march, and that the movement com-
menced as soon as the 3rds Corps had cleared the way.
57. I shall not attempt to explain the extraordinary dilatoriness of
this march, for there are no documents whatever on the question. I
380 JVATEBLOO book ii
shall limit myself to proving that Vandamme, who had left Saint- Aniand
before noon, did not reach Point-du-Jour till after three.
There are ample proofs that he broke xip camp before noonday.
1st. The report of von Groben, addressed about noon from Tilly to
Wavre (quoted by von Ollech, 169) : "A number of troops are moving
on the Fleurus road, in the direction of Gembloux." 2nd. By the Notes
critiques (270) of Rogniat, commander-in-chief of the engineers, the army
in two columns left the battlefield between eleven and midday. 3rd.
By the Manuscript Souvenirs of Baudus, who relates that when Soult
went from Fleurus to the Bussy mill (where he arrived before twelve, as
I have proved in the preceding pages), he saw Grouchy's columns on the
march. 4th. Berthezene, lieutenant-general of Vandamme, who says in
his Souvenirs that Grouchy's little army started about twelve.
On the other hand, General Hulot says that " the tail of the 3rd
Corps had got beyond Ligny at three o'clock." Allowing an hour and a
quarter for the passing of the whole army corps, it may be presumed
that if the tail had passed beyond Ligny at three, the head must have
arrived there at a quarter to two. The distance from Ligny to Point-du-
Jour is one league. Therefore, even on the assumption that Vandamme's
corps had marched much more rapidly on leaving Ligny than it had
done previously, the head of the column could not have arrived before
three at the very earliest.
58. Grouchy, Relation succincte, 23.
59. The Vallin division of Gerard's corps was at liberty to effect this
operation.
60. Grouchy, Observations, 12.
61. Grouchy, Relation succincte, 23 ; Bella's declaration (Appendix
iv. 40).
62. Exelmans to Grouchy, Gembloux, 17th June (War Arch.).
It will be remembered (see p. 136) that Exelmans' letter was
written at two o'clock at the latest, that is to say, before Thielmann had
resumed his march.
63. " I have just arrived with Vandamme's and Gerard's corps "
(Grouchy to Exelmans, Gembloux, 17th June, seven in the evening,
War. Arch.). In his various reports. Grouchy pretends that he rode at
a gallop to Gembloux, leaving the infantry column behind him. His
letter to Exelmans proves this assertion to be incorrect.
64. Grouchy's above -quoted letter. Having reached the Point-du-
Jour towards three o'clock, Vandamme's infantry could not have taken
four hours to traverse seven kilometres. Most likely it made a long halt
at the Point-du-Jour.
65. Hulot's report (communicated by Baron Hulot).
66. Berton, Precis, 47, 48. See above-quoted letter of Exelmans.
67. Of course Exelmans with his 3,300 dragoons, even had they been
assisted by the 4,500 infantry and horsemen of Pajol (granting that he
had warned the latter before noon), could not have blocked the road, by
Ernage or Walhain, against Thielmann's 20,000 men. Thielmann
would have held him at bay with his rearguard, and continued his
CHAP. IV NOTES 381
m^rch on Wavre. But while following the Prussians closely, without
getting seriously engaged, Exelmans might at least have known as early
as three o'clock, that they were falling back on Wavre, and this infor-
mation conveyed to Grouchy would have compelled the Marshal to
manoeuvre in a different way.
68. Berton, 48, 49. See "Wagner, iv. 35 ; Damitz, ii. 208 ;
Journal of the Bonnemains brigade (War Ai-cL, at the date 3rd June).
69. Berton, 49. See Grouchy to Napoleon, Gembloui, 17th June,
a quarter past ten (War Arch.).
70. Grouchy {Relation succinde, 24) contends that Vandamme posted
his army corps a league and a half beyond Gembloux. This is
another lapse of memory. Lefol {Souvenirs, 75), whose testimony agrees
with that of Vandamme (Letter to Grouchy, and order of the day,
Gembloux, 17th June, War Arch.), expressly states that the troops of
the 3rd Corps bivouacked around (Jembloui, excepting the statf, who were
housed in this village. The position of Gerard's bivouacks is indicated
in Hulot's report (communicated by Baron Hulot).
71. Grouchy, Relation succinde, 25. The Marshal also pleads in
excuse the darkness of the night; he forgets that Vandamme's corps
halted at Gembloux at seven o'clock in the evening, and that at this
time of the year, even in heavy rain, it is quite light enough to march up
to half-past eight.
72. Bonnemains' Journal (War Arch.) ; Berton, Precis, 49. Grouchy
says in his letter to Napoleon (Gembloux, 17th June, 10 p.>l) that
Exelmans sent out these reconnaissances by his orders. This is not
certain, for — 1st, no such order is prescribed in Grouchy^s letter to
Exelmans (Gembloux, 7 p.m.) ; 2nd, we know by Bonnemains' letter
to Exelmans (Ernage, 10 p.m.), that Bonnemains had pushed on as far
as TourLunes, had halted about an hour in front of this village, and was
already retracing his steps by eight in the evening. Sauveniere being
nearly two leagues distant from Tourinnes, Bonnemains must certainly
have left Sauveniere before seven o'clock, that is to say, before the
arrival of Grouchy at Gembloux.
73. Bonnemains to Chastel, Ernage, 17th June, a quarter past ten
in the evening (War Arch.) ; Journal of the Bonnemains brigade ;
Berton, Pre'cis, 49.
74. Pajol to Grouchy, before Mazy, 17th June (Relation succinde, 24),
states that he received this letter before reaching Gembloux.
75. Information gathered at Grembloui, 17th June (War Arch.,' Army
of the North). This " information," with two more of the same order, is
reproduced in Grouchy's book Relation succinde, Appendix ii. 21, 22.
There, as in the copy at the War Arch., it is described as traisieme
renseignement recueilli a Gembloux. In reality it should be entered as
premier renseignement recueilli a Gembloux. It is obvious that this " in-
formation " of Gembloux is previous to both the others of Sart-i-Walhain
dated "yesterday, 17th June." Moreover Grouchy {Relation succinde,
25, 27, 33) expressly says that the first piece of information was
obtained at Gembloux towards seven in the evening on the 1 7 th ;
382 JVATEBLOO book ii
the second at Sart-a-Walhain during the night ; and the third at Sart-a-
Walhain on the 18th, about ten o'clock in the morning. Finally,
Grouchy's three letters to the Emperor, 17th June, 10 p.m. ; 18th June,
6 A.M.; and 18th June, 11 a.m. {Relation succincte, Appendix ii. 3-6),
reproduce in part and in sequence these three pieces of information. It
is easy to perceive that the first, which is erroneously numbered third,
was received first ; that which is numbered first was received second ;
and that which is numbered second was received last.
76. Grouchy might have have efi'ected this movement without over-
taxing the strength of his troops or exhausting their patience. Exelmans'
dragoons alone would have had to leave their cantonment ; Vandamme's
corps had hardly commenced preparations for bivouacking, while Gerard's
corps was still on the march.
Before arriving at Gembloux, Gerard would only have had to wheel
the head of his column to the left, to gain the road leading to Saint-Gery.
77. Grouchy to Napoleon, Gembloux, 17th June, 10 p.m. (War
Arch., Army of the North).
In his Relation Succincte (Appendix ii. 3, 4) Grouchy quotes this
letter, but in slightly different terms. Instead of "... If the bulk of
the Prussians retire upon AVavre, I will follow them in this direction
in order that they may not reach Brussels, and so separate them from
Wellington " ; it reads :"...! will follow them in this direction and
attack them as soon as I have come up to them." Marquis de Grouchy
{Mfhnoires de Grouchy, iv. 58, 59, and 263, 264) has also quoted the letter
of ten in the evening with this second wording, adding that he has the
original before his eyes. He no doubt means the " rough copy," for
the orginal of a letter generally remains in the hands of the recipient.
However, the copy at the War Arch, bears on its margin, after the
original, and Gerard has quoted this letter {Dernieres Observations, 15, 16)
in the first edition with this note : " Certified in conformity with the
original handed to us by the Emperor Napoleon, and which is in our
possession. Signed, General Gourgaud."
Finally, I was informed of another copy belonging to the collection
of St. Helena, and which agrees with the copy at the War Archives.
The two different versions of this letter have given rise to much
discussion. I am inclined to believe that the copy at the War Arch.
is the authentic one. But in my opinion the question is of little
importance. In both texts Groiichy commences by speaking of a possible
movement of the Prussians to join Wellington by Wavre. Whether
he says : " I will pursue them so that they cannot reach Brussels, and I
will thus separate them from Wellington," or " I shall follow them and
attack them as soon as I come up to them," the meaning remains the
same. Be it as it may, it is clear that Grouchy announces his intention
to attack the Prussians on the march, and that the Emperor on receipt
of the letter was certain that Grouchy would manceuvre, so as to prevent
a flank movement of the Prussians.
78. Grouch y's orders to Exelmans, to Vandamme, to Pajol, and to
Gerard, Gembloux, 17th June, in the evening, and 10 p.m. (War Arch.).
CHAP. V NOTES 383
It is worthy of remark that in these various orders, Perwez is several
times mentioned, whereas there is no reference to Wavre.
BOO.K II CHAPTER V
1. Ney's report to Soult, Frasnes, half-past six in the morning
(Greneral Gourgaud's papers) ; d'Erlon's report to Xey, 1 7th June, in the
morning (War Arch.}. From live in the morning to two in the afternoon
a few shots were exchanged between the outposts (Colonel Taylor's
letter of the 10th Hussars, Waterloo Letters, 166).
2. By Marshal Soult's letter written between seven and eight in the
morning (see Henry Houssaye, p. 126).
3. This despatch arrived at about eight o'clock in the evening
(Letter of Hervey, aide-de-camp to Wellington, 3rd July 1815, Nineteenth
Century, March 1893). See Damitz, ii 206.
4. Hervey's above - quoted letter. Miiffling, Aus meinem Leben,
206 ; Damitz, ii. 206, 212.
5. Hervey's above-quoted letter; Miiffling, Aus vieinemi Leben, 206 ;
Report of the Prince of Orange, 17th June, 2 a.m. (General Gourgaud's
papers).
6. Wellington's orders, 16th June, in the evening (Despatches, xii.
474-476); Letters of LTxbridge, Kennedy, Vivian, Banner, Taylor
{WaUrloo Letters, 5, 66, 93, 148, 166) ; van Loben, 231, 232.
7. Above-quoted letter of Hervey, aide-de-camp to Wellington.
S. Wellington, Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo (Suppl.
Despatches, x. 527) ; Colonel Taylor's above-quoted letter ; Miiffling, Av^
meinem Lebai, 207, and Histoire de la Campagne, 16 ; Hervey's above-
•[uoted letter ; General von Hoffmann, Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815,
67 ; Lord Malmesbury, after Captain Bowles's Souvenirs (Letters, ii. 447).
Miiffling and Hoffmann say that the officer in charge of this reconnais-
sance was the quartermaster-general of the English Army, Colonel de
Lancy. I am satisfied with the English testimonies.
9. Lord ifalmesbury (from the notes of Captain Bowles), Letters, ii.
447. See Corresp. of Wellington (Miiffling), Histoire de la Campagne, 18,
19, 20.
10. Miiffling, Axi^ meinem Leben, 207.
11. Memorandum on the defence of the Netherlands, 22nd September
1814 {Despatches of Wellington, xii. 129; Wagner, iv. 61).
12. Wellington to Lord Hill, 17th June (Despatches, xii. 475);
Muffling, Aus meinem Leben, 208, and (Corresp. of Wellington) Histoire
de la Campagne, 16 ; Letter of Vivian (Waterloo Letters ; 166) ; Sibome,
History of the War in 1815, i. 250. See Wellington's memorandum
[Suppl. Despatches, x. 527).
13. Muffling, Aus meinem Leben, 208, and (Wellington's Corresp.)
Histoire de la Campagne, 19, 20 ; Colonel Fraser, Letters, 543, Cf. von
384
WATERLOO
BOOK 11
Ollech, Geschichte des Feldzuges von IS 15, 180, and Wellington's Mem-
orandum {Suppl. Despatches, x. 527).
14. Wellington's Corresp. (Miiffling), Histoire de la Gampagiu, 18, 19 ;
Siborne, i. 252, 253. See Damitz, ii. 226 ; W. Gomm, Letters, 356 ;
and Waterloo Letters, 5, 27, 66, 94, 148, 253, 366, etc.
Whilst this infantry was advancing on Mont-Saint-Jean, through
Genappe and Rossomme, the troops which had concentrated at Nivelles
under Lord Hill were marching from the latter town on Mont-Saint-
Jean, via Braine-l'Alleud. See orders from Wellington to Lord Hill
(Quatre-Bras, morning of 17th June) Despatches, xii. 477).
15. Mercer, Journal of the Waterloo Campaign, i. 266. See Colonel
Taylor's letter, of the 10th Hussars {Waterloo Letters, 166), relating that
at midday he could see the French preparing their soup.
16. See pp. 129, 132; Soult's order to Ney, 17th June, midday:
" His Majesty proceeds to Marbais."
17. See Soult's letters to Ney, Fleurus, 8 a.m. (Chief of the StaflPs
Register), and at the front of Ligny, 1 7th June, midday (Duke d'Elchingen,
Documents ine'dits), in which he enjoins this Marshal to send reports and
to attack the enemy.
We must absolutely discard the local tradition, according to which
Napoleon stopped at Marbais, at the house of a certain Delestange, and
slept an hour there, after taking some breakfast. (^Vhile I was in
Belgium, I was shown twenty different houses where the Emperor
stopped.) The Bussy mill is at a distance of 10 kilometres from Quatre-
Bras. The Emperor, who had left the mill about a quarter past twelve,
arrived at 1,000 or 1,500 yards' distance from Quatre-Bras about two
o'clock. As he was marching with the columns, that is to say, at a foot's
pace, he had only time for a short halt at Marbais. Moreover, this halt
was necessary to allow the officer who carried Soult's order (sent at mid-
day) enough time to rejoin Ney at Frasnes, by the Roman way and
Villers-Perwin. The Emperor had intended at first to second Ney's
attack (see the order referred to), and not to precede it. But in a fit
of impatience at Marbais, he marched on Quatre-Bras without waiting till
Ney had opened fire.
18. Napoleon, Me'm. 109 ; Gourgaud, 76 ; Damitz, ii. 226.
It is expressly stated in the three accounts, that the march was
reconnoitred by the hussars. But of the five regiments of hussars in the
Army of the North, the 1st, 4th, and 5th were with Pajol on •17th
June, on their way to Namur, and the 6th (Maurin division) was with
Gerard marching to Gembloux. Therefore the regiment referred to here
can only be the 7 th (Colonel Marbot) of the Jacquinot division in
d'Erlon's corps. On the previous day, when d'Erlon had retraced his
steps towards Frasnes, he had left this division and also Durutte's
division before Wagnelee. We know from Durutte's account (Sentinelle
de I'Arm^e, 8th March 1836) that Jacquinot pushed on to the north-west
of Wagnelee, as far as the road from Quatre-Bras to Namur, that is to
say pretty near Marbais. We are also told by Durutte that on the morn-
ing of the 17th his division was recalled by d'Erlon to Villers-Perwin;
CHAP. V NOTES 385
but from his account may be inferred the fact that Jacquinot's cavalry did
not follow this manccu\Te. It was most likely left near Marbais. The Em-
peror having come across it there, employed it to form his advanced guard.
19. Napoleon, Mem. 109.
Subervie, detached from Pajol's corps, from the afternoon of the 16th,
had marched with Lobau in the morning. The preceding note explains
the circumstances through which Jacquinot (of d'Erlon's corps) found
himself with Xapoleon. Domon (of Vandamme's corps) and Milhaud,
had just joined the Emperor, who, in his letter of half-past eleven, had
ordered Grouchy to send them on to him (see p. 131).
20. Gourgaud, 76, 77 ; Napoleon, Mem. 109, 110.
21. Pontecoulant, Souvenirs militaires, 180. See Mercer, Journal of
the Waterloo Campaign^ i. 269.
22. Letters of General Vi\ian and Colonel Taylor of the 10th
Hussars {Waterloo Letters, 148, 154, 155, 167); Letter of Hervey, aide-de-
camp to Wellington, 3rd July 1815 {Xitieteenth Century, March 1893).
See Sibome, ii. 256-258.
Taylor asserts that he heard Wellington say that the battle should
begin against the cuirassiers, but that Wellington gave up this scheme
upon the judicious advice of Lord L^xbridge. In any case, Wellington
could never have thought of making but one single charge against his
assailants, and then falling back immediately. He could never have
wished to engage in battle at Quatre-Bras, with his cavalry only, against
the united armies of Xapoleon and of Xey.
23. Letters of Lord L'xb ridge, Vivian, Taylor, Kennedy, Banner, etc.
{Waterloo Letters, 2, 5, 66, 94, 119, 148, 167,' etc.) ; Mercer, i. 267-278;
Tomkinson, Diary of a Cavalry Officer, 383.
24. The approach of the Imperial army had been signalled toward
one or a quarter past one, and the retreat of the English cavalry com-
menced about two o'clock. All the witnesses among the combatants who
thought of marking the hour, agree on these points (Waterloo Letters, 5,
27, 94, 148, etc.).
25. Mercer, Journal of the Campaign, i. 269, 270. See letters of
Colonel Taylor and General Vivian (Waterloo Letters, 154, 167).
26. Mercer, i. 269, 270; Vi\'ian's letters (Waterloo Letters, 154, 167,
etc) ; W. Gomm, Letters, 356 ; Cotton, A Voice of Waterloo, 24 ; Gour-
gaud, 77; Xapoleon, Memoires, 110 ; Pontecoulant, Souvenirs, 180.
By his silence in regard to this cavalry manoeuvre Xapoleon seems to
imply that he waited for d'Erlon's corps at least half-an-hour before send-
ing his cavalry forward ; but from the above-quoted English documents,
it appears that the pursuit on the part of the cavalry followed immediately
on Lord Uxbridge's retreat. As .for the regiments employed in the first
line in this puiouit, we know from the details of the fight of Genappe
{see further) that they belonged, not to the Domon division, as Ponte-
coulant asserts, but to the divisions led by Subervie and Jacquinot.
27. Gourgaud, 77, 78 ; Xapoleon, Memoires, 110. Foreign documents
{Mercer's Journal, Waterloo Letters, book on Damitz) confirm absolutely
the assertion of Xapoleon in regard to Xey's immobility.
25
386 WATERLOO book ii
28. Diary of General Foy, 17tli June (communicated by Count de
Foy) ; Souvenirs of General de Salle, in command of the artillery of the
1st Corps in 1815 {Nouvelle Eevue, 15th January 1895). These
impartial testimonies must take precedence over that of d'Erlon (Notice
sur ma vie, 96), who does not mention these reproaches of the Emperor.
According to him, however, it would seem that Napoleon said with deep
grief, " They have ruined France ! " But this appeared to refer to Marshal
Ney.
29. "The Emperor has seen with deep concern that yesterday you
were unsuccessful ; the divisions have acted independently of each other.
It is owing to this that you have suffered losses. Had the corps of Counts
d'Erlon and Keille been together, not an Englishman of the corps that
attacked you would have escaped ; had Count d'Erlon executed the move-
ment that the Emperor ordered, the Prussian army might have been
totally destroyed and we might have taken 30,000 prisoners" (Register
of the Chief of the Staff).
30. Gourgaud, 78 ; Napoleon, Memoir es, 110 ; Fragment of Molitor's
Memoirs (War Arch., Historical Memoirs).
31. "Wellington would perhaps have attempted to double back oa^
Nivelles, But the French, finding themselves two to one, would have!
thrown themselves furiously in the pursuit of him, and at any rate, in
taking this line of retreat, Wellington would have sacrificed Brussels, and
renounced all hope of joining the Prussian Army.
32. Gourgaud, 78, 79; Napoleon, M^moires, 111; Pontecoulant, 183.
See Napoleon, Memoires, 182; " . . . AVhat would I not give to have
Joshua's power to-day and stop the progress of the sun for two
hours ! "
It was Domon, not Subervie, who flanked the right (see note 26).
33. Mercer, Journal of the Waterloo Camjyaign, i. 270-274. Ponte-
coulant, 185: "This march resembled a steeple-chase rather than the
pursuit of an enemy." Gourgaud, 79 : "The enemy was hotly pursued
at the point of the sword " (see Waterloo Letters, 167, 168). And it is of
this furious pursuit that Wellington dared to write, in his report of 19th
June {Letters and Despatches, xii. 478): " The enemy did not attempt to
molest our march from the rear."
34. On old maps, the small river which passes Genappe, bears the
name of Genappe river, and runs on towards the east, till its junction
with the Dyle. But the map of the Belgian staff calls this river the
Dyle. It is generally known as such in the country.
35. Tomkinson, Diary of a Cavalry Officer, 284, 285 ; Mercer, i. 275-
278 ; Letter of Lord Uxbridge, Brussels, 28th June, quoted by Cotton,
A Voice of Waterloo, 27 ; Letters of Evans, Grady, Vivian {Waterloo
Letters, 37, 60, 135, 155); Siborne, i. 261-267; Pontecoulant, 186,
187 ; Petiet, Souvenirs militaires, 205-208 ; Paillard, Biographie du
General Sourd, 15,
During the skirmish at Quatre-Bras, the English lost 238 men killed,
wounded, or taken prisoners (Lists of the missing, 17 th June, Despatches
of Wellington, xii. 485).
CHAP. V NOTES 387
36. Petiet, Souvenirs, 204, 208 ; Pontecoulant, 185, 186 ; Souvenirs
d'un ez-officier, 281.
Petiet was on Soult's staff. Pontecoulant, the son of the Senator, was
a lieutenant in the horse artillery of the Guard, and was attached to the
very battery which marched in the advanced guard on 17 th June.
37. Larrey, Relations de Gampagne, 395 ; Letter of Souxd quoted by
Paillard, Sourd, 17 ; Pontecoulant, 186.
38. On the 26th of November 1812, a gunner, whose arm had been
amputated in the open field, rose immediately after the operation, and
resumed his course with a firm gait, saying, " Xever mind, I have still a
long way to cover before I get to Carcassonne !" (General Lejeune, Memoires,
IL 275).
39. Letter of Lieutenant Grady {Waterloo Letters, 162) ; Mercer, i.
275 ; Cotton, A Voice of Waterloo, 24 ; Napoleon, Memoires, 111.
40. Grourgaud, 79, says : half-past six ; Petiet, 208 : six o'clock.
These assertions are confirmed by foreign testimonies. The Prince
of Orange, in his report to the King of the Netherlands, Brussels, 22nd
June {Suppl. Despatches of Wellington, x. 555) reports that he rejoined
the rearguard of the Brunswickers near Mont^aint-Jean, passed it,
established his battery, and that, a short time after, the Brunswickers
crossed the valley, followed by the French advanced guard.
The distance from Quatre-Bras to La Belle Alliance is only twelve
kilometres ; but the pursixit, very brisk at the outset, considerably slackened
after the struggle at Genappe, which had lasted over an hour. See Report
of von Groben (quoted by von OUech, 179), who had heard the cannonade
from Mont-Saint-Guibert
41. La Belle Alliance is an inn situated on the highroad firom Charleroi
to Brussels, on the extreme edge of the plateau which faces the Mont-
Saint-Jean plateau. The name of Belle Alliance was ironically intended
to commemorate the marriage of the first proprietor of the inn, who was
old and ugly, with a young and pretty peasant girl.
42. Gourgaud, 79 ; Napoleon, Memoires, 111, 112 ; Mercer, i. 281-
283 ; Petiet, 208, 209 ; Letter of Captain Rudyart {Waterloo Letters,
232) ; Cotton, 27.
43. Reille's account (War Arch.) ; Daily notes of Greueral Foy (com-
municated by Count de Foy) ; Notes of Duuring, chief of battalion
(communicated by M. de Stuers) ; Durutte's account {Sentinelle de VArmee,
8th March 1836) ; Relation de la demiere Gampagne (by Rene Bourgeois,
surgeou-major in the cuirassiers), 67.
44. Gourgaud, 79, 80 ; Napoleon Memoires, 112 ; Petiet, 209.
45. Mercer, i. 283.
46. D'Erlon to Ney, in camp, on the evening of 17th June (War Arch.).
47. D'Erlon to Ney, in camp, on the evening of 17th June (War
Arch.) ; Reille's account ; above-quoted notes of Foy ; Notes of Captain
le Stuers of the red lancers (communicated by M. de Stuers). Dupny,
ymvenirs militaires, 288, 289. See Relatioii de la demiere Gampagne, 71.
48. General Petit's account ; above-quoted notes of Duuring, chief of
: attalion of the 1st Unmounted Chasseurs of the Guard. See Mauduit,
388 WATERLOO book ii
Demurs jours de la Grande Arme'e, ii. 230. In Petit's account, the name
of the village is left blank, but it must be Glabais, the only village between
Genappe and Le Caillou farm, to the east of the Brussels road. Only the
1st battalion of the 1st Chasseurs came as far as Le Caillou ; it did duty
as Guard at the Imperial headquarters. Duuring, who commanded this
battalion, states that the next day, from Le Caillou he saw the Guard
marching on the highroad.
49. Kene Bourgeois (surgeon-major of the cuirassiers), Relation de la
derniere Campagn^, 67, 71 ; Lemonnier, Souvenirs militaires, 375 ;
Mauduit, ii. 231, 233 ; Precis des journees des 15, 16, 17, et 18 juin
(Amhigu of London, lii. 430); Souvenirs d'un ex-qfficier, 281-283; Petiet,
Souvenirs militaires, 209. Gembloux was also pillaged, and the night
before, Fleurus, Ligny, Saint- Amand, and Gosselies had been looted also.
See the orders of the day of Vandamme, Gembloux, 18th June (War
Arch.) ; of Foy, Gosselies, 17th June (Register of correspondence, com-
municated by Count Foy) ; and Gen. Radet's letter to Soult, Fleurus,
17th June, in which he offers his resignation of the post of Grand Provost
of the Army (War Arch.).
50. Mauduit, ii. 231 ; Letter of Lavoye, sub-lieutenant of the 29th of
line, Soissons, 26th June (communicated by M. Piat) ; Lemonnier, 375 ;
Souvenirs d'un ex-qfficier (of the 45th), 283, 284 ; Relation de la dernihre
Campagne, 71. Surgeon Bourgeois, the author of this report, does not
attempt to conceal his ultra-royalist sentiments ; therefore his testimony
on this point is all the more weighty.
51. Colonel Tomkinson, Tlie Diary of a Cavalry Officer, 287 ; Letters
of Gomm, Kennedy, Taylor, Pratt, etc. {Waterloo Letters, 28, 67, 168, 326,
and passim.) ; Cotton, A Voice of Waterloo, 28 ; Relation anglaise de la
bataille de Waterloo, 13, 32 ; Relation (anglaise) de la Canipagne de Flandre,
215, 223, 236, 285 ; Mercer, Journal of the Campaign, ii. 285-292 ;
Letter of Hervey, aide-de-camp to Wellington, 3rd July 1815 {Nine-
teenth Century, March 1893).
52. Journal of the Emperor's halting-places (Nat. Arch. AF.* iv.
437).
With its two-storey front, its small projjortions, and the garden that
surrounds it, Le Caillou has more the appearance of a villa than of a
farmhouse. It is a country villa at the present time. A barn adjoining
it in 1815 was burnt down by the Prussians, during the night of the 18th
of June. The room in which the Emperor slept on the 17th is on the
ground floor, and looks on the road. Here his attendants had prepared
his camp bed, covered with a silk counterpane with gold fringe, and
hun" with green satin curtains. Next to this room, and looking on the
garden, was the half dining-room, half drawing-room in which he dined
on the 17th and breakfasted on the 18th. Through the cordial hospitality
of the present proprietors of Le Caillou, Mme. Emile Coulon and her two
sons, MM. Emile and Henry Coulon, I sat at the very table — still
religiously preserved — where Napoleon, so to speak, ate his last meal as
Emperor. Besides M. Coulon, whom I can never sufficiently thank for
the collection of local traditions and various documents he made for my
CHAP. V NOTES 389
benefit in that neighbourhood, I am also indebted to M. Clement Lyon of
Charleroi for his very cordial reception and much valuable information.
He was kind enough to act as my guide from this town to a point beyond
Ligny, during one of the excursions I made to the scene of the war, with
my kind colleague of " La Sabretache," M. Paul Marmottan. To MM.
Gouttier, notary at Braine-l'Alleud, van Malderghem, sub-director of the
Archives in Brussels, Berger, burgomaster at Genappe, Dr. Delpierre of
Braine-l'Alleud, Yiandier, notary at Nil-Saint- Vincent, I offer also my
sincere thanks.
53. La Belle Alliance, Ode a la Princesse cTOrange, by Conqu^bau
(son of the farmer of Le Caillou, Boucqueau, of which Conquebau is the
anagram).
All these facts, as well as the details given in the preceding note, are
recorded in the bills of sale of Le Caillou (communicated by M. Emile
Coulon).
54. Napoleon, Mem. 114. See Soult's letter to Grouchy, Le Caillou,
18th June, 10 A.M. (Major-General's Register). See "Wagner, iv. 55 ;
Damitz, ii. 226.
It was Colonel von Sohr's brigade stationed behind Tilly to
observe the movements of the French. Two or three platoons were
detached from the bulk of the cuirassiers in order to reconnoitre the
Prussian cavalry. After a slight skirmish, the latter withdrew slowly,
and 'was followed at a respectful distance nearly as far as Mont-Saint-
Guibert (nine kilometres as the crow flies). There at about four o'clock
the cuirassiers moved off.
"Wagner is mistaken when he says that von Sohfs cavalry only reached
Mont- Saint -Guibert at dusk. We know from von Groben's report
(quoted by von Ollech, 170) that at five this cavalry was relieved at
Mont-Saint-Guibert by the Ledebur detachment (Billow's corps).
55. Napoleon {Mem. 115), expressly states that he sent to Grouchy,
at ten at night, on the 17th, the order to despatch a detachment of 7,000
men to Saint-Lambert to unite with the Imperial Army, and to march
himself with all his troops on this point, as soon as he had ascertained
that Bliicher had evacuated "Wavre (see Gourgaud, Cavipagne de 1815, 82,
where the same order is reported in slightly different words).
This assertion is obviously erroneous. If, as is probable, though
not certain, the Emperor wrote to Grouchy on the evening of the 1 7th, it
was simply to inform him of the march of a Prussian column on Wavre,
and to enjoin him to march himself in that direction, " in order to draw
nearer to the Imperial Army and manoeuvre with it." The proof is that
the very next morning at ten, Napoleon sent Grouchy instructions to that
effect (Soult to Grouchy, Le Caillou, 18th June, ten o'clock. Register of
Chief of the Staff). If, on the 17th, when he did not yet know whether
he would fight a battle on the next day or not. Napoleon sent to Grouchy
precise and formal orders to occupy Saint-Lambert, on the 18th, when the
battle was on the point of commencing, there was all the more reason for
giving him this same order. On the other hand, in the letter written at
Le Caillou, Wavre is mentioned and not Saint-Lambert.
390 WATERLOO book ii
The statement of Baudus (Manuscript Souvenirs) to the effect that
Soult advised the Emperor, on the evening of the 17th, to recall part of
Grouchy's forces, and that his advice was disregarded, is another proof
that the said letter was not sent.
As for the argument of many historians, that Napoleon could not
have sent Grouchy this order on the evening of the 17th, because it does
not appear in the Register of the Chief of the Staff, it is worthless. During
this campaign several others of Napoleon's orders were not entered in this
register, namely, Soult's letter to Ney, on 17th June, midday (Duke
of Elchingen, Documents inedits), and the letter of Soult to Grouchy, 18th
June, one o'clock (quoted by Grouchy, Relat, succ. App. i. 21).
On the testimony of a certain Letourneau, whose letter is quoted in
Grouchy's Eelat. succ. (App. iv. 21), an aide-de-camp of Bliicher's asserted
at Caen in 1815, that the French officer, bearer of the order of 10 p.m. in
the evening, was brought to the Field-Marshal at Wavre " as a prisoner
or a traitor." This fact is not mentioned in any of the German
documents.
56. "We must know whether Bliicher and Wellington propose
uniting to cover Brussels" (Napoleon to Grouchy, Ligny, half-past
11 A.M). (I have quoted this letter in extenso, pp. 229, 230.)
57. Even the next morning,Napoleon still did not admit this hypothesis.
It was only an hour after noon that he ordered the following message
to be written to Grouchy : " Draw nearer to the army, that no body of
the enemy may get between us." See Grouchy's two letters, Le Caillou,
18th June, one o'clock (quoted by Grouchy, Relation succincte, Appendix
i. 21).
58. Napoleon, Mem. 119. See 193-196, 198, 199.
59. See above-quoted order of Grouchy, 17th June: "Keep me
informed of the movements of the enemy, so that I may discover what
they mean to do."
60. Napoleon, M^m. 195, 199. See Bassano's letter to Caulaincourt
(Le Caillou, 18th June, in the morning. Arch, of Foreign Affairs, 1802),
which reflects the Emperor's idea : " The victory of Ligny is of supreme
importance. The elite of the Prussian Array has been crushed. The
morale of this army will for a long time be affected." The Eelation
of the Ambigu of London (lii. 429), which Napoleon considered as very
reliable : " . . . The results of the battle of Ligny were much exaggerated."
Words of Soult quoted in the manuscript notes of Baudus : " The battle
left the Prussian Army in such a state, that a small corps only was suffi-
cient to watch it."
61. The letters of Wellington in which he announces that he is going
to give battle are dated Waterloo, 18th June (from two to four in the
morning (Despatches, xii. 476, 478, and Supplementary, 601). On this he
eventually takes up his stand. He hopes to fight the next day (to Colville,
17th June, evening, Despatches, xii. 476) : ". . . The army will probably
keep its position before Waterloo to-morrow" ; but he has not yet made
his final decision. Moreover, Hiigel, commissary to the King of Wxirtem-
berg at the English headquarters, writes to his sovereign on the evening
CHAP. V NOTES 391
of the 1 7tli : " At the news of the Prussians' retreat, "Wellington retired
on "Waterloo, and will retain that position if Bliicher keeps his promise "
(Letter quoted by Pfister, Aus clem Lager der Verbiindeten, 367).
62. Muffling, Aus meinem Leben, 208. See "Wellington's report to
Bathurst, "Waterloo, 18th June (Despatches, xii. 479), and Memorandum
of "Wellington (Siipplementary Despatches, x. 527).
63. Von OUech, 186.
64. Von Ollech, 187.
65. "Wagner, iv. 55 ; Damitz, ii. 145, 146, 207 ; von Ollech, 166,
167, 187.
66. Letter of Biilow, Dion-le-Mont, 17th June, 10 p.m. (quoted by
von Ollech, 167, 168) ; Damitz, ii. 207-210.
67. Von Ollech, 187.
68. Hardinge's testimony, quoted by Stanhope, Notes of Conversations
with the Duke of Wellington, 110. See Colonel Maurice's article in the
United Service Magazine, July 1890. Hardinge, wounded at Ligny by
the side of Bliicher (his left hand had to be amputated), had been removed
to Wavre.
69. Bliicher to Muffling, "Wavre, 17th June (between eleven and mid-
night), quoted by von Ollech, 187. Orders to Biilow and to Pirch,
Wavre, 17th June (midnight), quoted by the same, 188. See Corresp.
of Wellington (Miiffling), 20.
70. From "Wavre to "Waterloo the distance, as the crow flies, is fifteen
kilometres. Miiffling (Corresp. of Napoleon, 20) says that this letter
arrived at nine in the morning. This is a mistake, for "Wellington's
letters, dated three o'clock (after midnight), testify that he had already
received Bliicher's despatch.
71. Wellington to Sir Charles Stewart, to the Duke de Berry, to
Lady Webster, Waterloo, 18th June, 3 p.m. {Despatches, xii. 476, and
Siippleraentary, x. 501).
In these letters Wellington seems certain of the victory at Mont-Saint-
Jean ; but he admits the possibility of being turned by Hal. In this
case he would abandon his position and leave Brussels exposed. " Hold
yourself in readiness to leave Brussels for Antwerp," he writes to Lady
Webster, " in case this should become necessary ! "
72. Marshal Wolseley (Decline and Fall of Napoleon, 196) considers
that Wellington's conduct is unaccountable. To explain it, he is rather
inclined to admit, without, however, emphasising the idea, that, in accord-
ance with the statements of Lockhart, Young, Colonel Maurice, and Ropes,
the Duke went to Wavre in the evening, conferred with Bliicher, and
returned to Waterloo before midnight, with the formal assurance of
Prussian co-operation.
But this visit of Wellington to the Prussian headquarters is implicitly
and positively denied by Bliicher's letter quoted above. Moreover, if
Wellington went to Wavre, how is it that Miiffling should neither know
of it nor mention it, that the fiict should not have been rumoured and
related afterwards by German and English historians ?
Since I wrote this note, Mr. Archibald Forbes has published {Century,
392 WATERLOO bk. ii ch. v
1st January 1898) an article in wliicli he emphatically denies, and for
many good reasons, the supposed visit of Wellington to Bliicher at Wavre.
Besides, he quotes a conversation of Wellington in the course of which
the Duke said : " No ; that was not so ; I did not see Bliicher the day
before Waterloo,"
73. Napoleon, Mem. 118. In Soult's order (18tli June, War Arch.),
which I will quote later, mention is made of an order of battle dictated
the day before by the Emperor.
74. Davout's Reminiscences of the Hundred Days, dictated to Gordon,
tutor to his son (comm. by General the Duke of Auerstaedt).
It seems to me that this assertion of Davout should not be doubted,
especially as there had been at the Chambers on the 16th, a rather
stormy sitting, of which Napoleon was informed. Note for the Emperor,
16th June (Arch, of Foreign Affairs, 1802), and Berlier to Bassano,
17th June (Arch, of Nat. Affairs, iv. 1933) : " The proposal respecting the
finances will furnish the Chambers with a subject for discussion. All the
better, for when one has nothing to do, one is apt to grow excited and to
act in an unfortunate manner. . . . The successes of the Army will be
useful in raising the courage of the weak, and overawing the discontented."
The author of Napoleon, sa famille et ses aviis, etc. (iv. 382, 385),
assures us, from a confidential remark made by the Emperor to
Regnaud de Saint-Jean-d'Angely, that into this mail of the 1 7th of June
some treacherous hand had slipped a note, signed " Duke d'Enghien,
Ferdinand VII., Pie VII," in which the fall of the Emperor was
prophesied in apocalyptical terms. The same author also says that ou
the battlefield of Ligny, the day after the action, a wounded Frenchman
predicted to Napoleon treason on the part of the generals-in-chief, and
that in the orchard of Le Caillou the following notice was found : " This
will be the grave of the French." This seems an amazing number of
prophecies for a single day !
75. Napoleon, Mem. 120. Napoleon's account is confirmed by the
notes of Conqu^bau (Boucqueau, son of the farmer at Le Caillou), written
in 1816 {La Belle Alliance, Ode dediee a la Princesse d' Orange), and by local
traditions. The Emperor, in the course of his visits to the outposts,
stopped at the farm of Chantelet, where Marshal Ney had taken up his
abode. Soult, Bertrand, Bassano were sleeping on straw at Le Caillou,
in the second-floor rooms ; other officers were quartered at Plancenoit
and Montplaisir.
76. Gourgaud, 82. The distance between Gembloux and Le Caillou,
by Sombreffe and Quatre-Bras, is over eight leagues. It is not strange that
the messenger, in the dead of night, should have spent four hours on the
journey. Marmont, who is always very unreliable, contends {Mem. vii.
124), according to Bernard's testimony, that this letter reached the
Imperial headquarters at eight in the evening, that is to say, hvo hours
before it was imitten ! Napoleon {Mem. 116) is quite as inaccurate when
he says — 1st, that this letter was dated five o'clock ; 2nd, that he received
it at eleven o'clock.
77. I have quoted thia letter in extenso, pp. 141, 142.
BK. Ill CH. I NOTES 393
78. Napoleon (Goiirgaud, 83, and Mem. 117) asserts that he sent a
duplicate of the order which he had despatched at nine o'clock, ordering
Grouchy to send a detachment to Saint-Lambert. The arguments which
I have before given against the despatch of an order from the Emperor
to Grouchy to occupy Saint-Lambert, have the same weight in regard to
the supposed duplicate of this supposed order.
79. Napoleon, J/eni. 122. See Gourgaud, 84, and Drouot, Speech to
the Chamber of Peers (Moniteur, 24th June).
80. Napoleon, Mem. 122.
81. Napoleon, Mem. 122.
82. The existence of this order of 17th June (from eight to ten in
the evening), which no one had mentioned before, is proved by the words
of Soult's order of the 18th of June, in the morning (W'ar Arch., Army
of the North) : " ... that in the battle each man may stand in the
fighting order which the Emperor has indicated in his order of yesterday
evening."
It was plainly for the execution of this evening order, that Foy had
ordered his division to be under arms at Genappe at half-past three in
the morning, and to hold itself in readiness to follow the movement of
Jerome's division (Order, Genappe, 1 7th June, Register of Corresp. of Foy,
comm. by Count de Foy).
83. Napoleon, Mem. 122 ; Drouot's Speech at the Chamber of Peers
{Moniteur, 24th June).
84. Soult's order, general Imperial headquarters, 17th June (between
4 and 5 a.m.), (T\'ar Arch., Army of the North).
This order proves that the Emperor expected to attack at nine in the
morning. It may also be concluded that, on the evening of the 17th, he
had intended to attack earlier still. In short, if Napoleon had already
prescribed in his order of ten in the evening, that the army should be
ready for the battle at nine next morning, he would not have seen any
use in reiterating this same order at daybreak. In the second order
there is no mention of any new positions. The positions to be occupied,
were those indicated the day before. What is the reason then for this new
order, if it is not to appoint a difiFerent hour for mustering 1 As to the
causes of this delay, as I have said before, they were the condition of
the ground, and also the necessity of giving the troops, who were widely
scattered, sufficient time to rail v.
BOOK III
CHAPTER I
1. Bliicher to Muffling, Wavre, 17th June, 11 p.m. (quoted by von
Ollech, Geschichte des Feldzuges von IS 15, 187) ; Mltffling, Aus meinem
Leben, 209.
2. Billow's orders to Pirch, Wavre, 17th June, midnight; BiiloVs
order, Dion-le-Mont, 18th June (quoted by von Ollech, 188, 191).
k
394 WATERLOO book hi
3. Above-quoted letter of Bliicher to Muffling. See von Ollech, 188;
Wagner, iv. 58.
4. Biilow's report (quoted by von Ollech, 192); Wagner, iv. 58;
von Ollech, 191. See Clausewitz (126), who erroneously says that the
4th Corps only broke up their camp at seven o'clock.
The head of Biilow's corps reached Chapelle-Sain1>Lambert about ten
o'clock, the bulk of it after midday, and its rearguard (von Ryssel
division) at three o'clock only.
5. Von Ollech, 193. See above-quoted order to Pirch I., Wavre,
17 th June, midnight.
6. Von Ollech, 188, 189. See Wagner, iv. 58, and Corresp. of
Wellington (Miiffling), 22.
7. Bliicher's letter to Miiffling, Wavre, 18th June, half-past ten
(quoted by von Ollech, 189). See Hugel to the King of Wiirtemberg
(quoted by Pfister, Axis dem Lager der Verhiindeten, 369) ; Miiffling, Aus
meinem, Leben, 289.
8. Miiffling, Aus meinem Leben, 184. (See p. 80, and note 26.)
9. Von Ollech, 190.
10. Nostiz to Miiffling, Wavre, 18th June, half-past 10 a.m, (quoted
by von Ollech, 189).
11. Damitz, ii. 248 ; von Ollech, 190.
12. See pp. 140, 141.
13. Letter of Bonnemains, Ernage, 17th June, a quarter past 10
P.M., and Journal of the Bonnemains brigade (War Arch., Army of the
North) ; General Berton, Precis, 49.
14. Information gathered at Sart-a-Walhain in the night of the
17th of June (War Arch., Army of the North). See Grouchy's letter to
Napoleon, Gembloux, 18th June (War Arch.). This information, gathered
at Sart-a-Walhain, is erroneously numbered first information. It is in
reality the second (see on this subject p. 140, and note 75). It reads as
follows : " From 30,000 to 40,000 Prussians passed yesterday at Sart-
a-Walhain, between nine in the morning and three in the afternoon.
Three corps are supposed to have passed, the second and the third for
certain, and probably the first. They are all proceeding to Wavre.
They announced their intention of giving battle near Brussels, whither
they are mustering."
15. "All my reports and information confirm the fact that our foes
are withdrawing on Brussels " (Grouchy to Napoleon, Gembloux, 1 8th
June, 6 o'clock a.m.. War. Arch.).
16. "Having been notified by Your Majesty, when I left you at Ligny,
that you were marching against the English to fight them, if they kept
on this side of the forest of Soignes . . ." (Report of Grouchy to
Napoleon, Rosiren, 19th June, War Arch., Army of the North).
17. See p. 142. Far from cancelling these orders. Grouchy con-
firmed them by a fresh despatch to Pajol. Pajol was at Le Mazy at four
in the morning ; from Le Mazy to Grand-Leez the distance is 10 kilo-
metres as the crow flies; from Le Mazy to Gentinnes it is 12 kilometres.
Consequently Pajol might have been at Gentinnes, to concentrate with the
CHAP. I NOTES 395
army in the direction of Mont-Saint-Guibert, almost in the same time
he took to reach Grand-Leez, where there was nothing for him to do,
whereas there were 12 extra kilometres to travel — making a total of
22 — before he could join the army from Grand-Leez to Gentinnes. This
movement was therefore most eccentric ; but Grouchy only thought of
covering his right, neglecting altogether to protect his left The same
remark applies to the movement of the Vallin cavalry, which had spent
the night at Bothey, between Le Mazy and Gembloux, and which was
also sent on to Grand-Leez (Groiichy to Gerard, 17 th June and at
Vallin, 18th June, War Arch.).
18. Grouchy to Napoleon, Grembloux, 18th June (War Arch., Army
of the North),
This letter, which I give in extenso further on, has no date as to the
hour, but it is quoted in the Relation succinde of Grouchy (App. ii. 4),
with the mention three o'clocic in the morning. On the other hand, in a
letter of the head of the staff to Grouchy, of the 18th June, after midday
(quoted by Grouchy, App. i. 21), we read : "You wrote this morning at
three o'clock." But the original of this letter of Soult's, which has been
communicated to me (Arch. Guerre) reads : " You wrote this morning at
six o'clock." It seems certain, therefore, that this letter of Grouchy's
was written at six o'clock. Besides the text of Soult's letter, there
are two good reasons for believing this. The first reason is, that in a
letter from the head of the staff to Grouchy, ten o'clock in the
morning, there is no allusion made to this letter. It follows that if
it had been written at three o'clock. Napoleon would undoubtedly have
received it before ten, and had he received it, he would certainly have
mentioned it in his letter. The second reason is, as will be seen further,
that Grouchy did not leave Gembloux before eight or nine o'clock.
Consequently, he could not have written to the Emperor at three in the
morning : " I am starting immediately." This would have been giving
him a false impression of extreme gravity, considering the circumstances.
19. Vandamme's infantry : 13,960 men.
Gerard's infantry : 10,275 men.
Teste division (detached from Lobau's corps) : 2,960 men.
Maurin's cavalry division (passed under the command of General
Vallin, Maurin having been wounded at Ligny) : 1,326 men.
Exelmans' cavalry : 3,250 men.
Pajol's cavalry (minus the Subervie division) : 1,374 men.
Total: 33,145 men (deduction to be made of the losses at Ligny),
and 96 cannons. See official returns at the outset of the campaign, to
compare the strength of the corps at the opening of the campaign and the
losses at Ligny (see pp. 58 and 107).
20. Grouchy to Vandamme, Gembloux, 17th June (T\"ar Arch.) :
"As has been agreed between us, I desii-e you to commence moving
to-morrow by six in the morning."
Grouchy to Gerard, Gembloux, 1 7th June ("War Arch.) : " I desire
that you should start on your march to-morrow, the 18th inst, at eight
in the morning. You will follow (General Vandamme's corps."
396 WATERLOO book hi
In his various writings {Observations, 15 ; Fragments, 8 ; Relation
succincte, 28), Grouchy contends that, according to his orders, Vandanime
ought to havj started on his march at daybreak, and Gerard early in the
morning. But the letters above quoted are unanswerable.
21. According to Hulot's report (coinm. by Baron Hulot), all the
troops had been obliged to send detachments to Gembloux for the
distributions, which were not completed at eight o'clock.
22. Bonnemains in his "Journal de marche" (War Arch.) states that
Exelmaus' cavalry, of which he commanded a brigade, reached Walhain
at seven o'clock. Now from Sauveniere to Walhain (by Baudeset) the
distance is five kilometres. Exelmans (letter quoted by Gerard, Nouvelles
Observations, 24, 25) says that he broke up his camp at half-past seven
only. But Bonnemains' testimony seems the more reliable of the two.
23. Berthezene (letter quoted by Gerard, Nouvelles Observations, 25)
says, " eight o'clock." See Hulot's report stating that about nine o'clock
Vandamme's troops were still defiling through the streets of Gembloux.
Grouchy, whose memory is decidedly defective, asserts that Vandamme
began his march before sunrise.
24. Above-quoted report of Grouchy ; Hulot's report.
25. Gerard {Quelques Documents, 47) complains that Grouchy made
the two infantry corps march in a single column. Grouchy replied
(Relation s^iccincte, 28, 29) that he had ordered Gerard to take another
road. But this order came far too late, for Gerard was already following
Vandamme, in compliance with the order of the previous day.
26. In his various writings, Grouchy does not state the precise time
of his departure. He only says that he joined the head of Vandamme's
corps five or six kilometres from Gembloux {Relation succincte, 28), and
his statement is confirmed by the testimony of his orderly-officers, la
Fresnaye and Legouest {Relation succincte, App. iv. 13, 25). But as
Vandamme's division did not commence its movement before seven in
the morning, Marshal Grouchy could not have left Gembloux before eight
o'clock. Moreover, as Grouchy himself tells us that he wrote to the
Emperor as soon as he had reached Walhain or Sart-.V Walhain, his
letter being dated eleven o'clock, and as the distance from Gembloux to
Walhain or Sart-a- Walhain is less than seven kilometres, it is obvious,
not only that the Marshal started very late from Gembloux, but that he
must have made the journey at a foot's pace on horseback. Le Sen^cal's
statement (App. iv. 6) that Grouchy left before daybreak is therefore a
palpable falsehood.
27. The village of Walhain and the hamlet of Sart-a- Walhain, 1,700
yards distant from each other, were united into the same commune in
1822. Four roads led from Gembloux to Corbais, the route of Grouchy's
army ; one of them passing through Walhain, and another, the longest of
the four, through Sart-a- Walhain.
This point being settled, I shall recall the fact that all French
historians, even Charras and Quinet, who resided in Belgium, say that
Grouchy halted at Sart-a- Walhain on the 18th of June. In point of
fact, in every one of Grouchy's orders, reports, and accounts, as well as in
CHAP. I NOTES 397
the written recollections of the officers of his staflF, Sart-a-Walhain is
constantly mentioned, and Walhain never.
But Gerard {Quelques Documents sur la Bataille de Waterloo, 7) says :
" Walhain or Sart-d- Walhain, a small village between Gembloux and
Wavre " ; then in the pages which follow, and in his other \vritings, he
alternately says Walhain and Sarra- Walhain ; Colonel Simon-Loriere
says Walhain; Genei-al Berton says Walhain; Berthezene says Sarra
Walhain, but these words — "village situated slightly in front of Nil-Saint-
Vincent," imply that he speaks of Walhain; Lefol says Walhain and Sarra
Walhain; Catoire, a Belgian, says, in a letter to Gerard, Sarra- Walhain,
which is obviously a slip, meaning Walhain, for he speaks of the chateau
of notary Hollaert (really HoUert), who lived at Walhain, not at Sart-d-
Walhain.
Must we conclude then that, like Berthezene and Catoire, Grouchy
and other officers made a confusion between the hamlet and the village,
writing Sart-a- Walhain for Walhain. Such an error would be all the
more natural, because on the map by Ferrari, which Grouchy used, the
name of Sart-a-Walhain is inscribed almost above the spires of the two
villages, whilst the name of Walhain is on the left In a rapid glance of
the map one might easily be mistaken. Grouchy, besides, was rather
addicted to such mistakes. As may be seen further, he wrote Dion-le-Yal
for Dion-le-Mont, and Temploux for Gembloux.
The following indication is of great importance in the discussion :
the house of the notary Hollert, where, according to Gerard and his
officers, Grouchy stopped for breakfast, is situated not at Sart^a- Walhain,
but at WalhaiiL And we read also in the Histoire des Communes beiges,
that the famous discussion between Grouchy and Gerard took place at
Walhain, not at Sart-a-Walhain.
But everything is perplexing in this question. Neither in his letter
to the Emperor nor in his Relations does Grouchy speak of the notary
Hollert. He says, " an old decorated officer at whose house I stopped to
write to Napoleon." I thought at first that the old decorated soldier and
the notary of Sart-a-Walhain might be the same person. I made
inquiries and found that Hollert did serve in the French army from 1792
to 1795 (Campaign of the Netherlands), but as a health officer, and that he
was not decorated. Could Grouchy have intentionally described the ex-
medical officer as an old decorated officer with the object of giving more
authority to the intelligence he was conveying to the Emperor? Or
rather, as Major la Fresnaye seems inclined to believe, had the Marshal,
after receiving some false information from an officer, or some man
claiming to be such, just entered Hollert's house to acquaint the Emperor
with what he had heard ? All that is certain, according to the very
minute details given by Gerard, Colonel Simon-Loriere, General Valaze,
and Chief-Intendant Denniee, is that the discussion between Grouchy and
Gerard took place in a private house with a large garden attached, in
which there was an "arbour painted green." Now at Walhain the
farm of La Marette (anciently the house or chateau of Longpre) answers
to this description thoroughly, whereas at Sart-a-Walhain there is not a
398 WATERLOO book hi
trace nor a recollection of any dwelling of this type. Moreover, Gerard and
Simon-Loriere particularly mention the name of Hollert ; it is notorious
in the country that Grouchy was the guest of Hollert ; at the death of the
latter the circumstance was referred to, in his funeral oration (this was
communicated to me by his great-grandson, M. Vianvier, notary at Nil-
Saint- Vincent). And, finally, this funeral sermon records the fact that
after his death, Hollert, in accordance with his express wish, was laid on
the same stretcher which, on the evening of the 18th of June 1815, had
been used to carry General Gerard to his house at Walhain after he was
wounded at Bierge. This stretcher had been religiously preserved by
Hollert for forty years. Now we know by a letter from the lutendant-
General-Denniee that Gerard, after being wounded, was transported to the
same house in which his discussion with Grouchy at noon had taken
place.
To sum up, it is possible that in 1815 a decorated officer lived at
Walhain or Sart-a-Walhain ; but no recollection is left of him, whereas
the existence of notary Hollert is undeniable, and he in his lifetime
had often asserted that Grouchy had been his guest on the morning of
the 18th June.
28. Gvowchj, Observations, \b; Eelation succinde, 32. See note above.
29. Grouchy, Relation succinde, 27. See Le Sen^cal's declaration
and Grouch y's letters to Marbot (Appendix viii. 50, 51, 56).
The mission of Pontbellanger does not seem certain. At any rate,
this ofiicer fulfilled it badly, for he failed to inform Grouchy of the
presence at Mont-Saint-Guibert of Colonel Ledebur's detachment (two
battalions and four squadrons), which remained there till about one o'clock
(see Ledebur's letter to Billow, Mont-Saint-Guibert, 18th June, half-past-
twelve ; quoted by von Ollech, 207).
30. Grouchy, Observations, 15 ; Fragments historiques, 8 ; Relation
succinde, 33 ; La Fresnaye's declaration (Appendix iv. 13).
31. Information gathered at Sart-a-Walhain (Walhain), (War Arch.).
See Grouchy to Sart-a-Walhain, 18th June, eleven o'clock (War Arch.) ;
see Declaration of La Fresnaye {Relation succinde, iv. 13) : "A decorated
officer came to you and told you that Prussian colunms were marching to
Wavre, although he thought that Bliicher would collect his army near
Louvain."
As explained above (see p. 166, note 31), this report, which is
erroneously numbered second, is in reality the third received. In it La
Chyse is mentioned for the first time. Also for the first time. Grouchy
speaks of La Chyse in the letter written from Walhain at eleven o'clock.
Here is this third report : " The wounded proceed to Liege through
Beauvale, Jodoigne, and Tirlemont. The capable, and those who have
not taken part in the battle of Fleurus, march upon Wavre, and a few
on Tirlemont. The bulk of the troops are camping on the plain of La
Chyse, near the road from Namur to Louvain. The plain of La Chyse
is two and a half leagues to the right of Wavre, close to Goddechins.
The latter report is positive. It was here that they seem to have decided
to mass themselves. They say they hold the field of battle (at Ligny),
CHAP. I NOTES 399
and that they are only retreating, to give battle again after their concerted
reunion with Bllicher and Wellington."
32. Grouchy to Napoleon, Sart-a-Walhain (Walhain), 18th June, 11
A.M. (War Arch.).
The first portion of this letter is not very clear. Grouchy says :
"The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Corps of Bliicher are marching in the direction
of Brussels. A corps arriving from Liege has effected its junction with
those who fought at Fleurus. Some of the Prussians I have in front of
me are proceeding towards the plain of La Chyse. It would seem that
they are doing so with the object of mustering there, or of fighting the
troops which may pursue them, or lastly of joining Wellington, a plan
announced by the officers."
Does Grouchy really believe, then, that three Prussian corps were
marching on Brussels, and that a fourth was proceeding towards La Chyse ?
But which could this 4th Corps be, for he says that the Liege corps
joined those who fought at Fleurus 1 And if Grouchy supposes that the
bulk of the Prussian Army is already marching on Brussels, how can he
say, "I shall find myself at Wavre, between Wellington and the
Prussian Army " ? Also, why does he speak of going to the marshy
neighbourhood of La Chyse, to overtake a mere detachment, when he
thinks that the bulk of the Prussians is already near Brussels ? Lastly,
if he believes that three Prussian corps are marching on Brussels, why
does he not speedily pursue them or draw nearer to Napoleon, why does
he put off his mancEUvre till the next day ?
Thus, in comparing the first part of his letter with its conclusion, it
is evident, that if Grouchy rightly understood the information of the
" old officer," he gave a very incorrect resume of it in his letter.
Obviously, on the 18th June, at eleven in the morning, Grouchy
believed that the bulk of the Prussian Army was concentrated towards
La Chyse. Indeed he could not think otherwise, since he unfortunately
considered, as reliable, the information he had just received to the
effect that "the bulk of the Army is camping on the plain of La
Chyse."
33. Grouchy to Napoleon (Walhain), 18th June, 11 a.m.; and
Rosieren, 19th June (War Arch.) ; above -quoted declaration of Major
la Fresnaye {Relation succinde. Appendix iv. 3).
34. Gerard to Simon-Loriere, 10th August 1819 ; Simon-Loriere to
General Hulot, 16th August 1819 (War Arch.) ; Gerard to Colonel de
Grouchy (Qv^lques Documents, 24). See Grouchy, Relation succinde, 33 ;
Lefol, Souvenirs, 76.
35. Simon-Loriere to General Hulot, 16th August 1819 ; Gerard
to Loriere, 10th August 1819 ; Declaration of Captain of Artillery,
Thouvenin, attache to the staff' of the 4 th Corps (War Arch., Army of
the North, at the date of 18th June) ; Denniee's letter and Simon-
Loriere's report (quoted by Gerard, Deniieres Observations, 31) ; Gerard to
Colonel de Grouchy {Quelques Documents, 24). See Grouchy, report to
Napoleon, Rosieren, 19th June (War Arch.).
36. Letter from Valaze, quoted by G^ravdi (Demih-es Observations, 31 ;
400 WATERLOO book hi
Quelques Documents, 24). See Grouchy, report to Napoleon, Rosiren,
19tli June, and Relation succinde, 33.
37. List of questions to Grouchy and Bella's answers (Grouchy, Belation
succinde, 33 ; Appendix iv. 43, 44, 49, 50 ; Grouchy, Fragment
historique, 26).
38. Simon-Loriere's report (quoted by Gerard, Quelques Documents,
12, 13) ; above-quoted letters of Valaz^ and Denni^e. See Grouchy's
report to Napoleon, Rosiren, 19th June (War Arch.).
39. List of questions to Grouchy (Grouchy, Relation succincte, iv. 45).
40. Grouchy, Relation succincte, 33, and Colonel de Blocqueville's
declaration {ibid. Appendix v. 5) ; above-quoted letter of Valaze. See
Grouchy to Napoleon, Rosiren, 19th June.
41. Valaze's and Denni(3e's letters ; Grouchy, Relation siicci')icte, 33.
ThouveniUj though he was in the garden, did not hear the discussion ;
but he asserts that Baltus repeated these words to him when they left
Walhain.
42. Letter of Valaze ; Grouchy, Relation succiiKte, 34.
43. Letter of Valaze.
44. Letter of Valaze ; Grouchy, Relation succincte, 34.
45. Grouchy, Relation succincte, 33. See list of questions to Bella
{Relation succincte, Appendix iv. 45).
46. Grouchy's report to Napoleon, Rosiren, 19th June (War Arch.) ;
list of questions to Bella {Relation succincte, Appendix iv. 34).
47. Grouchy, Relation succinde, 34.
48. Exelmans's letter to Gerard, 1st February 1830 (quoted bj'- Gerard,
Dernieres Ooservations, 13 and 25) ; Account of an officer of Grouchy's
army (General Gourgaud's papers). See Grouchy's report to Napoleon,
Rosiren, 19th June (War Arch.); Grouchy, Relation succincte, 34; le
S^necal's declaration and questions to Bella (Appendix iv. 7 and 44).
As will be seen further, Exelmans, to prepare the movement on the Dyle,
had already despatched a brigade of dragoons within 1500 yards of
Attignies.
49. Grouchy, Relation succincte, 34 ; de Blocqueville's declaration ;
Simon-Loriere's report. See Gerard, Dernieres Observations, 41.
50. Grouchy, Relation succincte, 34 ; de Blocqueville's declaration ;
Simon-Loriere's report.
51. Thouvenin's declaration (War Arch., Army of the North, dated
18th June).
52. Thouvenin's declaration.
BOOK III CHAPTER II
1. It has been seen that Wellington, on the evening of the 17th,
had established his headquarters at Waterloo ; from thence, on the 19th,
he wrote the official report of his victory. For this reason, the battle
HAP. II NOTES 401
received the name of Waterloo, although the action took place one league
to the south of this village.
2. I experienced this several times. Owing to the uneven surface of
the ground through which it runs, the Brussels road is now on a level
with the fields, now raised, now sunk between two banks. These
depressions were much deeper in 1815, from La Haye-Sainte to the
Ohain road.
3. I ought to use the past instead of the present tense, for Wellington
said in 1825, on his return from an excursion to Mont-Saint- Jean, that
his battlefield had been quite changed. Several woods, as well as the
Soignes forest, which surrounded Waterloo to the north, have been cleared
away. The hedges which bordered the Ohain road to the east of the
Brussels highroad, have been torn up. And lastly, nothing remains of
the embankments which ran along this road and to the west of the high-
road, as far as the road to Merbe-Braine, but a portion of the inner
embankment. The other was rased to the ground at the time of the
important excavation which took place for the erection of the " Belgian
Lion," on an immense artificial conical mound which is seen for miles
round, and which spoils the scenery on all sides.
It has been said repeatedly that to raise this mound, two yards depth
of earth were cut from the entire plateau, over a surface of 14 to 15
hectares. (A hectare in English terms amounts to over two acres.) If this
is 80, by what miracle does the inner embankment of the highroad still
exist ? It is an erroneous tradition. The surface of the plateau was
never removed, and the soil of the Ohain road is the original soiL The
ground was levelled only on the upper slopes of the hill, to the west of
the road from the kitchen-garden of La Haye-Sainte to the present base
of the " Butte-du-Lion." The outer embankment of the road was rased
at the same time. This portion of the ground belonged to the Fortemps
family. The bill of sale was shown to me by M. Gtoutier, the notary of
Braine-rAlleud.
It is admitted that the original height of the cleared ground is
approximately marked to-day, by the summit of the mound which
supports the monument of the English Colonel Grordon. This mound is
not an artificial one, as tourists believe. The monument, erected in
1817 on the very spot where Gordon was killed, was then on a level
with the top of the embankments. The ground which it covers was
untouched, and when the earthworks were being made, the surrounding
ground was lowered, and the tomb remained like a sort of pyramid.
It would seem also, that the steep embankment which on the east
bordered the road to Brussels was also rased, from the sandpit, as far
as the Ohain road. The position of the high bank, which rose above
the sandpit, is marked now by the sandy hillock on which stands the
monument of the Hanoverians.
For the rest, to clearly understand what the Ohain road was at that
time, it will be sufficient to consult the grand Plan du Champ de
Bataille de Waterloo drawn by W. B. Craan, engineer and surveyor of
Brabant, and published in Brussels in 1816. In this plan, the Ohain
26
402 WATERLOO book iii
road is bordered with an unbroken line of hedges for a space of 700
yards to the east of the road to Brussels, and it runs between two steep
banks from this road westward for about 400 yards. At this point
the embankments disappear. A little farther on, facing the road of
Merbe-Braine, a few hedges are indicated ; also, some near the Nivelles
road.
4. Mercer, Journal of the Campaign of JFaterloo, i. 288, 292, 296 ;
Letter of Hervey, aide-de-camp to Wellington, 3rd July 1815 {Nineteenth
Century, March 1893) ; Siborne, History of the War, i. 325-327 ; Cotton,
A Voice of Waterloo, 46, 47.
5. These expressions " right centre " and " left centre " are used by
Wellington in his official report to Lord Bathurst (Letters and Despatches,
xii. 479) and by Major Pratt of the English 27th {Waterloo Letters,
325).
6. Report of Wellington, Waterloo, 19th June; Eeport of Kempt,
Genappe, 19th June {Despatches, xii. 479, 534) ; Kennedy, Notes on the
Battle of Waterloo, 60-67 ; Siborne, i. 330-354 ; van Loben, 257-259.
See Craan's chart, and Chart I. of the Letters of Waterloo, drawn according
to the information found in numerous letters of officers who were present
at the battle.
7. Siborne, i. 356, 357. See van Liiben, 257-260 ; Kennedy, 72 ;
and above-quoted charts.
8. See on the subject Marbot, Me'm. ii. 39 1 ; Laurillard - Fallot,
Coiirs d'Art militaire, 71 ; and the very learned and suggestive pamphlet
of A. de Selliers de Moranville, head of the staff of the Belgian Army,
De V Occupation des positions dans la defensive.
9. Kennedy, 98.
10. Report of Pozzo di Borgo to Prince Wolkonsky, 19th June
(General G.'s papers) ; Siborne, i. 328-350 ; Cotton, 34 ; Kennedy,
66 ; Daily Notes of Foy (comm. by Count Foy). The correctness of these
assertions can be verified by walking over the plateau.
1 1 . Craan's maps and those of the Waterloo Letters.
12. It was through these openings, that the squadrons of the Scots
Greys passed to charge d'Erlon's infantry (Letter of Colonel Windham
of the Scots Greys, Waterloo Letters, 78). See Kennedy, 110.
13. Waterloo Letters, 345, 404 ; Siborne, i. 131, 234, 335 ; van
Lbben, 259, 260.
Chesney (182) says that La Haye-Sainte was not fortified. This i&
only a figure of speech. Undoubtedly this position, as Kennedy remarks
(174) was not fortified as much as it might have been, but it had never-
theless been put in a state of defence, for according to Cotton's express
testimony (39) loopholes had been made in the walls and in the roof.
Traces of these can still be seen on the south and west walls.
14. Above-quoted report of Pozzo di Borgo, Brussels, 19th June.
15. At Quatre-Bras, and in the pursuit of the 17th, Wellington's
army had lost 4,916 men {1815, 213, note 3 ; 263, note 1).
16. Exactly: 67,661 men (Siborne, i. 460, 461). Wagner says,
69,000 men ; van Loben : 66,000 men. [The estimates quoted in the
CHAP. II NOTES 403
Letters and Despatches of Wellington (xii. 486) only give to the Engliab
troops and tlie German Legion 37,603 men.]
17. The number of pieces of artillery, 156, which is given by Siborne
(L 460) does not correspond with the number of batteries: 17 unmounted
artillery of 8 pieces ; 8 horse artillery of 6. Van Loben says : 194
cannon ; Damitz, 230.
18. Wellington to Hill (Quatre-Bras), 17th June, in the morning ; to
Colville (Waterloo), 17th June, in the evening ; to the Duke of Berry
(Waterloo), 18th June, 3 o'clock a-M. {Letters and Despatches, xii. 475,
476). See Memorandum of Wellington on the Battle of Waterloo {Suppl.
X. 530) ; Kennedy, 68, 69 ; Miifliing, Aus meinera Leben, 210.
The troops detached between Hal and Enghien comprised the Johnstone
and Lyon brigade (of the Colville division), the Steedmann division, the
Indian brigade, and the Hanoverian brigade of cavalry under Estorff.
19. Brialmont, Histoire de Wellington, ii. 412.
Clausewitz, Kennedy, Hoffmann, Chesney are unanimous in con-
demning this arrangement of Wellington. Napoleon, it is true, asserts
{Me'm. 114) that on the evening of the 17th he had sent towards Hal a
detachment of 2,000 horse, and that Wellington, informed of this move-
ment, had felt afraid of being turned. But this assertion seems doubtful.
The Emperor does not state the corps to which this detachment belonged, it
is mentioned in no contemporary account, either French or English, and
on the evening of the 17th, the cavalry were too fatigued to attempt such
a vast turning movement It seems then likely that Xapoleon at St.
Helena, learning from English works that Wellington had sent 1 7,000
men to Hal, imagined this cavalry manceuvre of his, after the event.
Thus he gave himself the credit of having, through a feigned menace,
paralysed a whole corps of the enemy. Be it as it may, the above-quoted
letter of Wellington to Hill proves that, by an early hour of the morning,
the Duke intended guarding himself in the direction of Hal ; consequently
the movement of the French cavalry in this direction, whether real or
imaginary, had had no iniiuence on his determination-
20. Miiffling, Aus meinera Leben, 208 ; Letter of Hervey, aide-de-
camp to Wellington, 3rd July 1815 {Nineteenth Century, March 1893);
Letter of Hiigel to the King of Wiirtemberg, Brussels, 19th June (quoted
by Pfister, Aus dem Lager der Verhiindeten, 369) ; Cotton, 47. See
Wellington to Sir Charles Stuart, Waterloo, 1 8th June (3 o'clock am.) :
" The Prussians will be again ready for everything this morning "
{Letters ayid Despatches, xiL 476).
21. Order of Soult, Le Caillou, 18th June, from 4 to 5 a.m. (War
Arch., Army of the North). Janin, deputy-chief of the staff of the 6th
Corps, also says that the attack was ordered for nine o'clock {Camp de
Waterloo, 51).
22. Account of General Petit {Morrison Collection of London); Janin, 51.
In the So^a•enirs d'un ex-officier (283) it is stated that in the morning,
the soldiers of the 1st Corps, who had bivouacked on the first line, became
impatient at the other corps not coming up more quickly.
23. ReiUe's account (War Arch.). EeiUe says that he left Gtenappe
404 WATERLOO book hi
at daybreak. It may be surmised that, having on his way received Soult's
order to see that the troops were fed and had cleaned their arms, Reille
had made a long halt for that purpose. And indeed if he had not lingered
he might have reached Le Caillou, five kilometres distant from Genappe,
long before nine o'clock.
24. General Petit (above-quoted account) says that the Guard did not
break up camp till ten, and Durutte {Sentinelle de rArme'e, March 1838)
relates that he took his post in the battle, only when the cannonade was
going on along the whole line, that is to say, at about midday. The son
of Boucqueau, the farmer of Le Caillou, who wrote, under the anagram of
Conquebau, an ode entitled La Belle Alliance, also remarks, note 9, that
at nine o'clock the troops were still debouching from Genappe. It is a
curious fact that a writer of romances, Walter Scott, is the only historian
of the battle of Waterloo, who points out that at eleven o'clock the French
Army was not yet in line (Life of Napoleon, viii. 559).
25. Napoleon, Mem. 121, 122.
Jomini was the first to express this opinion {Precis de la Gampagne de
1815, 199), confirmed by almost all military historians, that a few hours
of fair weather are not sufficient to harden the ground. This is an open
question. I put the question to many artillery officers, on their return
from the grand manceuvres of 1897, which were specially rainy ; most of
them answered that, even in September, the soil dries rapidly, provided
there be sun and wind. My friend Mr. Charles Malo, one of the first
military critics of our time, told me that when he visited the battlefield
of Bouvines, where the soil is formed of clay as it is at Waterloo, he had
been surprised to find that the ground, though it had been soaked by a
long and tremendous rain, had hardened in two or three hours under the
combined action of sun and wind.
Jomini goes so far as to say that the condition of the ground was a
bad excuse concocted at St. Helena, as an apology for the delay in the
attack. But this is so far from being an invention made at St. Helena,
that on 23rd July 1815, Drouot declared in the Chamber of Peers, that
at daybreak the weather was so frightful that it was impossible to manoeuvre
with the artillery. Towards nine the weather improved and the wind
dried the country a little (Moniteur, 24th June). According to a note of
Colonel Combs-Brassard, quoted by Thiers (xx. 283, 284), Drouot in April
1816 accused himself of having involuntarily contributed to the disaster
of Waterloo, by advising the postponement of the attack. Pont^coulant
(Souvenirs milit.) bears the same testimony, and adds that the difficulties
attendant on an early manoeuvre had been very much exaggerated. This
is very possible, but the fact remains that, rightly or wrongly, both
Napoleon and Drouot dreaded these difficulties.
26. Napoleon, M4m. 124 ; La Belle Alliance, ode to the Princess
of Orange, by Conquebau, note 9 ; Bill of sale of the farm of Le Caillou,
(comm. by M. Emile Coulon).
I have had in my hands, copies of the two original maps which the
Emperor used during this campaign. The map by Capitaine belongs to
His Imperial Highness Prince Napoleon, Ferrari's map to Baron Gourgaud.
CHAP. II NOTES 405
27. Gourgaud, 85 ; Napoleon, Mem. 124, 125.
28. Manuscript Notes of Baudus, aide-de-camp to Soult (comm. by M.
de Montenon, his grandson).
29. Segur, Melanges, 273. Thiers, who no doubt, like Segur, had
this account from Reille himself, repeats the anecdote in almost similar
terms (xx. 180, 181). But he adds that Napoleon replied : " I know the
English are difficult to beat in position ; and that is why I am going to
manoeuvre." However, for some reasou or other, no manctuvre took
place.
The Duke d'Aumale, who had also known Reille, gave me a diflferent
version. Reille said nothing to Napoleon, but he spoke to d'Erlon of
the risk there was in attacking the English in front. D'Erlon having
advised him to return to the Emperor and state his opinion, Reille
replied, " What is the use 1 He would not listen to us."
30. Drouot, speech at the Chamber of Peers (Moniteur, 24th June),
Manuscript Notes of Baudus; Heymes, Relation, 19; Souvenirs d'un ex-
offider (of the 45th), 284 ; Colonel Lemonnier, Campagnes, 375 ; Petiet,
Souvenirs, 212.
The same testimony comes from the English : " Towards seven o'clock
the weather cleared up," says Hervey, aide-de-camp to Wellington (Nine-
teenth Century, March 1893). "In the morning the weather cleared up
and the sun shone as if to illumine the victory of the English," says
Siborne, who anticipates.
31. Napoleon, M(^m. 125. See Gourgaud, 86 ; and Siborne, i. 384 :
" By midday the ground had become practicable for artillery."
32. Couquebau (Boucqueau\ La Belle Alliance, ode, note 9
Boucqueau says that the Emperor left Le Caillou about half-past eight ;
Zenowicz (IVaterloo, 28) savs at nine o'clock, which seems more prob-
able.
33. Boucqueau, La Belle Alliance, note 10 ; Napoleon, Mem. 125 ;
Gourgaud, 86 ; Zenowicz, 28.
34. Decoster's account, in the Relation de la Bataille de Mont-Saint-
Jean, 4th edition, 1816, pp. 249, 250-252 ; Boucqueau, note 10.
In several accounts this Decoster is called Lacoste ; his cottage still
exists, and is marked on several maps as maison d'Ecosse (a corruption of
Decoster : Decostre, dJEcosse).
35. Local tradition.
36. Napoleon, Mem. 125 ; Gourgaud, 86. See Boucqueau, note 10.
37. Daily notes of Foy (comm. by Count Foy).
The map of the Belgian staff inaccurately indicates the place of
Napoleon's observatory, the point 150, as 700 yards to the west of the
road. A trigonometrical observatory built of timber had been erected
there in 1815, for surveving purposes (see Craan's and JMaud'hu/s
maps, ii. 255). But Napoleon did not go there. Wagner (62) is right
when he states that this observatory was not used by the French.
Napoleon at first took up his post on an eminence at the distance of
a musket-shot from the road, near the farm of Rossomme (burnt down in
1895). Napoleon {Mem. 133) states that he first went to Rossomme.
406 IFATERLOO book hi
Mauduit (ii. 214) says that the Guard was on the heights of Eossomme,
below the little mound upon which the Emperor stood.
Later, Napoleon took up his post, as Gourgaud relates (91), between
La Belle Alliance and Decoster's house. Foy (Daily Notes) says that the
Emperor placed himself on a low eminence behind La Belle Alliance.
Captain Lambert de Stuers, of the 2nd of Unmounted Chasseurs (Manu-
script Notes), says that the Emperor was on the height by Decoster's
house. Guided by these various documents, I went up to these two
positions, and verified the fact that they command an extended view of
the battlefield. From neither of them, however, is it possible to
distinguish the hollows of the valley. But the Emperor knew the
ground well, for he had been several times to La Belle Alliance.
38. Daily Notes of General Foy, Ham, 23rd June 1815 (comm. by
Count Foy). Foy was one of the guests at the supper, in the course of
which the waiter gave this information ; and though he was not j^resent
at the conversation between Jerome and the Emperor, he learnt all
details from Jerome himself. We also know from another source that
Jerome, on the morning of the 18th, had a talk with the Emperor at the
farm of Le Caillou (Letter to Queen Catherine, 15th July 1815,
quoted in the Mem. du roi Jerdme, vii. 21).
39. Grouchy to Napoleon, Gembloux, 17th June, 10 o'clock p.m.
(War Arch.). I have given the text of this letter, p. 181.
40. " The Emperor has received your last report, dated from Gembloux.
You speak to His Majesty of only two Prussian columns which passed at
Sauveniere and at Sart-^-Walhain. However, other reports state that a
third column of some importance passed through Gory and Gentinnes,
making for Wavre. The Emperor bids me warn you that at this very
moment he is about to attack the English Army, which has taken its
position at Waterloo near the forest of Soignes. Accordingly His
Majesty desires that you should direct your movements on Wavre in
order to draw closer to us, so as to operate in concert with us, and to
preserve our line of communications, meanwhile driving before you any
corps of the Prussian Army which may have taken this direction and
halted at Wavre, where you should arrive as soon as possible. You will
pursue the columns of the enemy which have turned off to your right,
with a few light infantry corps, that you may observe their movements
and capture the stragglers. Let me know your arrangements and your
line of march at once, as well as all news you may have heard I'egarding
the enemy, and do not neglect to keep up your communication with us.
The Emperor wishes to hear from you very frequently " (Soult to
Grouchy, before the farm of Le Caillou, 18th June, ten o'clock in the
morning, Register of the Chief of the Staff).
Ingenious efforts have been made to read more in this letter than it
ever meant, namely, an order to Grouchy to manoeuvre upon his left so
as to draw nearer to the bulk of the French Army. Of this there is not
a word. The Emperor does say : " in order that you should draw closer
to us." But it is obvious that in marching from Gembloux to Wavre,
Grouchy must draw nearer to the Emperor ; and even admitting the
CHAP. II NOTES 407
Emperor's meaning to be that Grouchy is to draw nearer still, Grouchy
is not to do so until he has reached Wavre, that is rather late in the day.
As for the expressions " to operate in concert, and keep up communica-
tions," they do not mean at all that Grouchy, by operating in concert,
is to come and support the Emperor's right. At Wavre, whether he
were fighting or driving the Prussians, he was placed in an almost
parallel position to that of Napoleon, who was fighting the English, and
thus Grouchy was ojperating in concert. And by sending numerous
patrols and establishing piquets to ensure the service of the estafettes, he
was " keeping up the line of communications." From this order it is clear
that the Emperor, at ten in the morning, neither summoned Grouchy to
his battlefield nor expected him to appear there.
41. The existence of this verbal order is proved not only by the
Derniercs Observations of Gerard (44) and by Marbot's letter to Grouchy,
May 1830 {Relation succinte, App. \'iii. 51-54), but also by a private letter
of Marbot, 26th June 1815 (Marbot, Mem. iii. 403).
In his letter to Grouchy, Marbot, who always blows his own trumpet,
exaggerates the extent of his exploration of the 18th of June. He
was able to push his reconnaissances as far as Couture, Mousty, Ottignies,
on the right bank of the Lasne, and as far as Lasne on the left bank ;
but they certainly did not go as far as Saint-Lambert, from whence
radiated by ten o'clock, the cavalry of the Losthin division of Billow's
corps (see report of Biilow, quoted by von Ollech, 192 ; Damitz, ii.
242, 243, and the letter of Hervey, aide-de-camp to Wellington, of 4th
July 1815 {Nineteenth Century, March 1893).
42. According to Marbot, the object of these piquets was to send the
Emperor prompt notice of Grouchy's approach ; but on referring to the
above-quoted letter from Soult to Grouchy, it would seem that the mission
of the hussars was to keep up the communications. Moreover, it will be
noticed that, even if the Emperor foresaw the arrival of Grouchy through
Mousty, the order to Grouchy and the order to Marbot were not contra-
dictory. ^\Tiilst ordering the Marshal to march to Wavre, Napoleon,
admitting the possibility that Grouchy, before receiving these last in-
structions, might have marched to the left, sent piquets to meet him
near the Dyle.
43. Gourgaud, 91 ; Napoleon, Mem. 132, 133; Petiet, 213; Mauduit,
ii. 248, 271 ; Pontecoulant, 261 ; Souvenirs (Tun ex-officier, 284 (this
testimony is all the more interesting from the fact that, this officer
belonging to the 45th Line was born a Swiss. His name was Martin,
and at the time of his death he was a pastor at Geneva). The English,
Siborne (i. 282) and Cotton (51), also speak of tremendous acclamations.
44. Napoleon, Mem. 128-132. See Gourgaud, 87, 88, and the
above-quoted accounts of Eeille, Foy, Greneral Petit, de Stuers, etc.
45. D'Erlon's corps : 20,531 men.
Reille's corps (minus the debris of the Girard division left at Ligny
to ensure the lines of communication) : 16,774 men.
Lobau's corps (minus the Teste division detached under Pajol's
orders) : 7,861 men.
408 WATERLOO book in
Imperial Guard : 20,000 men.
3rd and 4tli cavalry corps (Milhaud's and Kellermann's cuirassiers) :
6,500 men.
Demon's cavalry division (detached from Vandamme's corps) : 1,100
men.
Subervie cavalry division (detached from Pajol's corps) : 1,200 men.
Total, 73,935 men (deducting the losses of the 15th, 16th, and 17th
of June). See the estimate at the commencement of the campaign and
the returns of the losses (pp. 57, 58, 107, 123).
46. At the outset of the campaign the Army had 50 batteries of
8 pieces for the unmounted batteries, and 6 pieces for the horse batteries
(see p. 58). From these 50 batteries, forming a total of 370 guns, I
deduct 8 pieces in the battery of the Girard division, and the 96 pieces
with the corps and divisions placed under the command of Grouchy.
47. According to the arrangement now in force, the first French line
(seven infantry and two cavalry divisions) would normally have a front
of four leagues.
48. The fine description by the Emperor, so often quoted {Mem. pour
servir d I'Histoire, 127-132), of the eleven columns deploying almost
simultaneously, and the whole of the army ranged in six lines in the
shape of a V, long before the beginning of the battle, is perfectly in-
accurate. According to the accounts of Generals Durutte and Petit already
({uoted, several divisions came on the field when the battle had been for
some time raging with violence. The very order of Napoleon of eleven
o'clock in the morning, quoted further : " By the time the whole army
is in order of battle, towards one in the afternoon," proves that at eleven
o'clock all the troops were not engaged in battle.
49. Order, 18th June, eleven in the morning (Napoleon, Corresp.
22,060).
In the copy of this order (at the War Arch.) it is mentioned
that the original, written in Soult's hand, bore the following pencilled
marginal note, signed Ney : " Count d'Erlon will understand that the
action is to commence on the left, not on the right. Communicate this
new arrangement to General Reille." It would seem, therefore, that the
Emperor had previously given an order, in pursuance of which d'Erlon
should have attacked with the right of the 1st Corps, either by Papelotte
or La Haye.
50. "This is indeed what Napoleon says in his first account, dictated
to Gourgaud (Correspondence de 1815, 88). It is true that in the
second account he is not: so precise (Mem. pour servir d, I'Histoire). He
speaks first of this single attack upon the centre (133), but he contends
(134, 135) that he intended at the same time to turn the enemy's left
by La Haye and Papelotte. It is safer to trust the first account, which
fully confirms the order of eleven o'clock in the morning.
51. No doubt on this side they would not have the main road on
which the batteries could defile, but the artillery posted to the east of La
Belle Alliance could none the less have crushed the enemy's masses ; and
the infantry, as well as the cavalry, might have climbed the slopes without
CHAP. Ill
NOTES 409
more difficulty than at the other points. This was proved by the march of
the Durutte division at half-past two, and by the fact related by Wagner
(67), and by Siborne (L 387), that a short time after midday, a body of
French cavalry (very likely from the Jacquinot division) pushed forward
a reconnaissance as far as the edge of the plateau, where it appeared before
the Hanoverian brigade of Best, which speedily formed up into squares.
I have explored this portion of the groxm^d. The levels are not less
practicable and the slopes are not more abrupt than they are around the
main road. Opposite La Haye, the soil of the valley is very stiff. And
further the Ohain brook is only 0*30 or 0*40 centimetres in breadth.
Doubtless had they attacked at first by Papelotte, Wellington would
have ordered a partial change of front, and denuded his centre and his
right, to reinforce his threatened left. But such a movement was exactly
what Napoleon ought to have wished for, since it was his tactical interest
to compel the English to manosuvre.
52. See note 49, p. 185.
53. Napoleon, Mem. 125.
BOOK III CHAPTER III
1. Reille's account (War Arch.).
The existence of this order, — a verbal one, no doubt, — which is not
mentioned by any historian, cannot be gainsaid ; for in the general order,
dictated at eleven o'clock, no mention is made of a movement upon
Hougoumont, and it states that the artillery is to enter into action
towards one. Now Reille, posted at about 1,000 or 1,500 yards' distance
from the Emperor, would not have taken upon himself to open fire with-
out provocation, an hour and a half before the appointed time, had he
not received fresh instructions to that effect.
Napoleon also modified in other points his original order. For
instance, this order enjoins that the great battery should be composed
of 24 pieces, yet it was increased to 80 pieces before opening fire.
Moreover, according to the order of eleven o'clock, Reille's corps was
to second the movement of d'Erlon on Mont-Saint-Jean, " advancing
at the same time to keep pace with the 1st Corps." These instructions
were not carried out ; either Napoleon modified them, or more likely
Reille, preoccupied with the diversion on Hougoumont, where one of his
divisions was already fighting, neglected them completely.
With regard to Napoleon's orders concerning the movement towards
Hougoumont, or at least the spirit of this order, Reille expressly says
that the only direction was " to keep in the hollow behind the wootl,
meanwhile maintaining in front a strong line of tirailleurs." He
adds that the injunction not to exceed these instructions, was repeated
again and again, but in vain. Guilleminot, chief of Jerome's staff, also
states that he had attempted to put a stop to a fruitless contest at
410 WATERLOO book hi
Hoiigoumont (conversation reported by General Woodford, Waterloo
Letters, 261). These testimonies are of great importance, and demon-
strate that Napoleon did not propose to take Hougoumont, as its posses-
sion was of small avail to him, for the attack he had ordered on the
English left centre. And indeed it may be noticed that : 1st, in the
order of eleven o'clock there is no mention of an attack on Hougoumont ;
2nd, in the report of the battle {Moniteur, 21st June) the name of
Hougoumont does not even appear, and consequently the attack on the
farm is not mentioned. It only says : " Prince Jerome commanding a
division of the 2nd Corps, destined to form the extreme left, attacked the
wood, which was partially occupied by the enemy. At one o'clock the
prince was master of the entire wood."
2. Reille's account (War Arch.) ; Jerome's letter to Queen
Catherine, 15th July {Memoires du roi Jerdme, vii. 22) ; Report of the
Prince of Orange {Supyl. Despatches of Wellington, x. 555) ; Letters of
Captain Yalcott and of Colonel Gawler {Waterloo Letters, 192, 288, etc.);
Kennedy, 102.
3. Kennedy (102), "half- past eleven"; Waterloo Letters (288,
Captain Yalcott's letter), "twenty minutes past eleven"; (192, Colonel
Gawler's letter), "half-past eleven" ; Siborne (i. 384), "half-past eleven."
4. Reille's account (War Arch.) ; Report of the Prince of Orange ;
Napoleon, Mhi. 136 ; Jerome's letter to Queen Catherine ; Kennedy,
Notes on tlie Battle of Waterloo, 102, 103; Cotton, A Voice of Waterloo,
54, 55
5. Jerome's letter to Queen Catherine, ] 5th July {Waterloo Letters,
249, 259) ; Report of the Prince of Orange ; Kennedy, 104 ; Cotton, 55,
56 ; Siborne, i. 386-389.
6. Reille's account (War. Arch.). See last paragraph of our note,
p. 187.
7. Lord Saltoun's and General Woodford's letters, etc. {Waterloo
Letters, 246, 259, 261) ; Cotton, 55, 56 ; Memoires du roi Jerome, vii.
91 ; Siborne, i. 389.
8. General Woodford's letter, Gibraltar, 27th January 1838
{Waterloo Letters, 261). Woodford, former major of the Coldstreams,
had this information from GuiUeminot himself, whose acquaintance he
made later.
9. Reille's account (War Arch.). The order to that effect was
issued several times (to keep in the level behind the wood), but other
attacks were attempted in vain.
10. Memoires dxh roi Jerome, vii. 92. See Reille's account.
11. Kennedy, 105, 106; Letters of General Woodford, of Captain
Bull, of Ensign Standen, etc. {Waterloo Letters, 258, 261, 264, 265, 268.
See 188, 192) ; Letter of Hervey, aide-de-camp to Wellington {Nineteenth
Centuri/, March 1893); Report of Pozzo di Borgo to Wolkonsky, 19tli
June (General G.'s papers) ; Mem. de Jerome, vii. 94, 95 ; Mauduit,
ii. 321, note ; Cotton, 57, 58 ; Siborne, i. 395, 396.
12. Gourgaud, 92 ; Pontecoulant, 263 ; Heymes, 19 ; Kennedy,
107 ; Marshal W. Gomm, Letters, 351.
iLVP. Ill NOTES 411
13. Napoleon, Mem. 137.
14. Napoleon, Mem. 137. See Gourgaud, 89 : Rogniat, Reponse attx
notes critiques de Napolem, 273 ; and Baudus, Etudes snr Xapoleon, i. 225.
Baudus affirms that it was Soult who first distinguished this column.
This may be, but Baudus furnishes inaccurate details : — 1st It is not true
that at one o'clock Soult was nearer the enemy's line than Napoleon,
since, at one o'clock, Soult was with the Emperor busily employed in
writing or dictating a letter to Grouchy (quoted below) ; 2nd. It is not
true that the letter aforesaid, which ordered Grouchy to join the main
portion of the army, was sent because the Prussians had made their
appearance, for the approach of Biilow is not hinted at, in the body of
this letter, and is mentioned only in the postscript ; 3rd. It is not true
that Soult was more uneasy than the Emperor about the possible arrival
of the Prussians, since the letter to Grouchy expressing their anxiety was
written in obedience with the instructions of the Emperor. Baudus, very
royalist, and aide-de-camp to Soult, is anxious to exalt his chief at the
expense of Napoleon, but he forgets what he wrote Tp. 224\ that
Soult's advice was to recall part of Grouchy's corps, not because he feared
the arrival of the Prussians, but because he desired more men to attack "
the English army; and on p. 222 that Soult said : "Considering the
state in which the defeat of Ligny had left the Prussian army, a small
body of troops would suffice to follow it and watch it in its retreat."
Neither is Napoleon more truthful, when he says that Soult declared
that the Prussian corps of Saint-Lambert was "probably a detachment
from Grouchy." Soult could not really believe this, since Grouchy, in
his letter written at six in the morning and received between ten and
eleven, announced that he was still at Gembloux, and that he was going
to follow the Prussians on to Wavre. From Grembloux to Chapelle-Saint-
Larabert, through Wavre, Grouchy would have had a march of six leagues
to accomplish, and a Prussian corps to put to the rout.
15. Marbot's letter to Grouchy, 1830 (quoted by Grouchy, Relation
sitceinde, Appendix viii. 51 sqq.). Marbot asserts that this hussar was
taken near Saint-Lambert ; but the French cavalry, as I have said before
(187, note 1), advanced no farther than Lasne.
No mention of this intercepted letter is made in the German reports ;
yet the fact cannot be doubted, since not only Napoleon, Baudus, and
Marbot speak of it, but Soult refers to it as well, in a despatch to
Grouchy (quoted below), dated 18th June, one o'clock in the after-
noon.
Napoleon says : a black hussar. I do not know what the uniform
of this sub-officer was, but he must have belonged to the 2nd Silesian
Hussars forming the Prussian advanced guard, several detachments of
which assaulted the height in front of Saint-Lambert as early as eleven
in the morning (see Damitz, ii. 242, 243 ; an(^ Billow's report, quoted
by von Ollech, 192).
16. Napoleon, Mem. 139; Gourgaud, 89 Baudus, i. 226; Soult to
Grouchy, before Le Caillou, 18th June, '■ue o'clock (Chief of the Staff's
Register).
412 JFATEBLOO book hi
17. Grouchy to Napoleon, Gembloux, 18tli June (War Arch., Army
of the north).
As I have previously remarked (p. 165, note 18), this despatch, the
different copies of which are dated some three o'clock, some six o'clock in
the morning respectively, was written at six o'clock. I gave several
reasons for tliis. I repeat here that if this despatch had been written at
three o'clock, it would have reached the Imperial headquarters before
ten o'clock, wheretis it did not arrive till after ten. Otherwise Soult
would have mentioned it in his letter to Grouchy (before Le Caillou,
ten o'clock), and the instructions contained in this letter would have been
quite different ; they would have been the same which were written by
Soult in the letter of one o'clock, reproduced further, and which obviously
were the outcome of the perusal of the said despatch of Grouchy.
18. See Grouchy's letter to the Emperor, Gembloux, 17th June,
10 P.M., quoted p. 248.
; 19. See note 17.
20. Soult to Grouchy, 18th June, one o'clock (quoted by Grouchy,
lielation succinct e, Appendix, i. 21).
21. Soult to Grouchy, 18th June, one o'clock (quoted by Grouchy,
Relation succincte, Appendix i. 21). See Gourgaud, Campagne de 1815,
89 ; and Napoleon, Alemoires pour servir a I'Histoire, 139.
It is certain, as I stated before, that the body of this letter, dated
one o'clock, was written before the appearance of the Prussians, and that
the postscript was added after the hussar prisoner had been examined.
The interval must have been from a quarter to half an hour.
22. According to Gourgaud (118, 119), the Emperor, although immov-
able in his resolution to give battle, wavered for a moment whether it
would be wise to carry his line of operations on to the road to Nivelles to
attack the English right. By this means he might have kept his line of
retreat at a greater distance from the Prussians. He gave up this plan
for fear of hastening the junction of Bliicher with the English, and also
because he judged correctly that the right of the English was stronger
than their left centre.
23. Napoleon, Mem. 139.
24. Napoleon, Mem. 142. A letter of Marbot written from Laon,
26th June 1815 (Mem. de Marhot, iii. 403), proves that the Emperor,
in the afternoon of the 18th, hoped to see Grouchy debouch on Bulow's
flank. " I was flanking the right during the battle," says Marbot. " I
was assured that Marshal Grouchy would arrive at this point. Instead
of the Marshal, it was Bliicher's corps which appeared."
25. Gourgaud, 90 ; Napoleon, Mem. 137, 138, 140. Napoleon says
that the cavalry was spread over 3,000 toises (about 5,580 yards). In
this case it would have reached as far as Lasne. This is not correct, for
the bulk of these divisions did not go farther than the south-eastern
border of the Paris wood (see Billow's report quoted by von OUech, 192,
and Damitz, ii. 257-260, inly one of Marbot's patrols, as has been seen
above, advanced beyond the ±ons wood), but this was towards noon, and
it did not remain there long.
lAP. Ill
NOTES 413
26. Napoleon, Mem. 140, 141 ; Gourgaud, 90. See. 94. Tlie two
accounts from St. Helena do not tally, with regard to the execution of
tliis raan(BUvre. According to the one, Lobau changed liis position
shortly after Domon's cavalry ; according to the other Lobau merely went
to reconnoitre his future position in the line of battle, and he established
himself there only at half-past four. In this case, as in so many others
luring this campaign, the question arises whether the orders of the
I'mperor were faithfully executed or not ?
27. Kennedy, aide-de-camp to Gen. Alten {Notes on the Battle of
'aterloo, 166). Lieutenant Shelton's letter {Waterloo Letters, 349), and
borne, ii. 3.
28. Report of Kempt, Genappe, 19th June (Wellington, Supple-
■ntary, x. 524) ; Souvenirs d'un vieux soldat beige, 84 ; Souvenirs d!un
(c-oflicier, 285, 286 ; Mauduit, ii. 293-295 ; Janin, Campagne de Waterloo,
33 ; Kennedy, 107, 108 ; SilDorne, ii. 3-5 ; Cotton, 62. See Gourgaud,
92 ; Napoleon, Mem. 143 ; Damitz, ii. 260, 261.
29. Souvenirs dJun ex-officier, 285, 286 ; Mauduit, Demiers jours de la
mnde Armee, ii. 293 ; note of General Schmitz, brigadier of Donzelot
ommunicated by Commandant Schmitz) ; Durutte's account {Smtinellc
de V Armee, March 1838) ; Durutte's notes (communicated by Commandant '
Durutte of the Belgian army).
30. There is every presumption that this order was given by Count
d'Erlon, who had the direct command.
It may be that the aide-de-camp, in transmitting the order, made a
confusion between the division column (that is to say, a battalion closely
massed) and the column arranged in divisions (that is to say, in united
)mpanies and marching at half distance or whole distance).
31. Order of the Emperor, before Le Caillou, 18th June, eleven
clock (War Arch.).
32. See on the subject, Jomini, Pre'ds de la Campagne de 1815, 229.
33. Sibome, History of the War, ii. 3, 5 ; Cotton, A Voice of
Waterloo, 63.
34. Waterloo Letters, 404 ; Sibome, ii. 3, 16 ; Kennedy, 107, 108 ;
Jomini, 204, 206 ; Cotton, 63, 73, 74.
35. Hilgel to the King of Wiirtemberg, 19th June (quoted by Pfister,
[lis dem Lager der Verbiindcten, 69) ; Wellington's report, Waterloo, 19th
"line {Despatches, xii. 478).
According to the plan of Craan, this tree was planted near the
'juthern border of the hollow road. Consequently, Wellington must
therefore have stood on the road, where he was sheltered from the shells
and the fusillade.
The elm tree was bought for 200 francs by a clever Englishman, who
sold it in London in the shape of canes, snuff-boxes, and napkin-rings to
Wellington's adorers.
36. Kennedy, 107, 108 ; Sibome, ii. 16, 19 ; Cotton, 73, 74. See
Waterloo Letters, 38.
37. Souvenirs d'un ex-officier, 287 ; Sibome, ii. 5, 10.
38. Letter of an oflBcer of Kempt's brigade {Waterloo Letters^ 345,
414 JVATERLOO book hi
64,363, 3367). "The French came within two yards of the hedge,"
says Sir Andrew Barnard, Colonel of the 95th.
39. Report of Kempt, Genappe, 19th June {Despatches of Wellington,
Suppl. X. 534) ; Letters of brigade officers Pack and Kempt {Waterloo
Letters, 349, 361, 382, etc.). See Kennedy, 109 ; Sibome, ii. 5-7 ;
General Eenens, Les troupes des Pays-Bas en 1815, 29, 30.
Foreign writers confuse the French columns and place them in-
correctly in this order, from the left to the right : Donzelot, AUix,
Morcognet, Durutte. Van Loben alone (267) gives the accurate arrange-
ment : Allix, Donzelot, Marcognet, Durutte.
40. Kennedy, 109, 111; Siborne, ii. 4. See van Loben, 267, and
Durutte {Sentinelle de VArmee 1838), who says that he reached the height.
It is probable that, while one or two battalions assailed Papelotte, the
rest of the Durutte division, masked by this attack from its right,
continued their ascent towards the plateau.
41. Letter of Jerome to Queen Catherine, Paris, 15th July {Mem. du
roi Jerome, vii. 22, 23).
Shortly after two o'clock the Emperor sent Jerome orders to come
and join him : " It is impossible to fight better," he said ; " since you
have only two battalions left, remain ready to give help wherever there
is danger." Did Napoleon wish to shield the life of his brother, who had
been wounded two days before, and who had just remained for two
hours and a half in the thickest of the fight ? or, displeased that Jdrome
had so untimely involved his whole division in the useless attack
upon Hougoumont, did he recall him in order to leave the command in
the hands of Guilleminot, a less ardent but far more cautious general ?
42. Report of Kempt, Genappe, 19th June {Wellington's Despatches,
Sitppl. X. 534) ; Fraser, Letters, 554 ; Letters of officers of the Picton
division, and of the Ponsonby brigade {Waterloo Letters, 70, 85, 89.
345, 349, 350, 356, 361, 363) ; Kennedy, 109 ; W. Gomm, Letters, 352 ;
Siborne, ii. 11-14.
Sibome, carried away by his patriotism, says that the French officer
was killed in attempting to recover the flag of the French 32nd. The
32nd was not in the Army of the North, whilst the 32nd English un-
doubtedly formed part of Kempt's brigade.
43. Letters of brigade officers Kempt, Pack, and Ponsonby {Waterloo
Letters, 64, 69, 355, 356, 371, 374, 382, 383, etc.) ; Cotton, 67, 68 ;
Souvenirs d'un eo>officier (of the 45th), 287, 288.
English historians refuse to confess (why should they, since Well-
ington's array was victorious ?) that in this first attack the French reached
the crest of Mont -Saint -Jean. But the Waterloo Letters, all of them
written by officers who took part in the battle, testify that : — 1st. On the
English right, the cuirassiers of Travers arrived exactly on the border of
the Chain road ; 2nd. On the left, the Bourgeois brigade also reached
the road after dislodging from their position the defenders of the sand-
pit ; 3rd, Donzelot's column stopped to deploy at a distance of 40 yards
from the road, and his tirailleurs pushed past the hedges ; 4th. At least
the battalions forming the head of the Marcognet column crossed the
CHAP. Ill NOTES 415
road, and advanced as far as the Hanoverian cannon, and attacked the
Scotch under Pack on the plateau itself. In his report to "Wellington,
19th June {Siijjpl. Despatches, x. 534), Kempt expressly says that Picton's
charge took place as the French carried the crest of the position, and
that, even a few minutes afterwards, when Picton was killed, the situation
u-as very critical. In a letter of 23rd June to Herv'ey, aide-de-camp to
Wellington {Suppl. Despatches of Wellington, x. 568), Colonel Clifton, who
replaced GreneraJ Ponsonby, who was also killed, says on his side : " The
enemy (previously successful) was routed by our cavalry."
44. Kennedy, 110; Siborne, ii. 19; Colonel Tomkinson, Tlu
Diary, 300.
45. Keport of Somerset to "Wellington, La Foret, 24th June (Suppl.
Despatches of Wellington, x. 577) ; Letter of Hervey, aide-de-camp to
"Wellington ; "W. Gomm, Letters, 352 ; Letters of officers in the brigades
of Somerset and Kempt and Lieutenant Graeme of the German Legion
(Waterloo Letters, 41-56, 361, 406); Siborne ii. 19-24; Cotton, 74;
Kennedy, 110.
It is very likely that it is this jostling and scramble of the cuirassiers
between the embankments of the Ohain road, followed by the fall of some
of them into the sand-pit, which gave rise to the legend of their destruc-
tion in the hollow road, and inspired Victor Hugo ^vith the epic pages of
Le^i Mise'rables.
46. Letters of brigade officers Ponsonby, Kempt, and Pack (Waterloo
Letter.i, 63, 64, 70, 78, 349, 363, 383); Kennedy, 110; Report of
Kempt, 19th June (Despatches of Wellington, Suppl. x. 534).
47. Somerset's report ; Colonel Clifton to Hervey, Croix, 23rd June
(Supplementary Despatches of Wellington, x. 568, 577) ; Letters of brigade
officers Ponsonby, Kempt, and Pack (Waterloo Letters, 58, 61, 63, 65,
70, 72, 78, 86, 345, 367, 374, 376, 384, 404 ; Kennedy, 118 ;
Souvenirs (Tun ex-officier, 288, 290.
In this rout the English took from 2,000 to 3,000 prisoners.
Ponsonby's dragoons captured the eagle of the 45 th (Marcognet division)
and that of the 105th (Bourgeois brigade). Another standard taken by
the mounted guards under Somerset, was recovered in the fight.
48. Letters of officers in the "N'andeleur brigade (Waterloo Letters,
103, 104, 112, 114, 115); Durutte's account; Van Loben, ii. 9. See
Siborne, ii. 38, 39.
Durutte, whose account contains, however, more than one mistake,
contends that he repulsed the charges of the Yandeleur brigade. He, con-
sciously or unconsciously, confuses the first charges of this body of cavalrv',
which compelled him to retreat in disorder, with another charge of
Vandeleur's against the 85th, left in reserve in their original position ;
a charge which was in fact repulsed with heavy losses. See on the
subject Captain Chapuy's account (Journal des Sciences militaires, July
1863).
49. Above quoted reports of Somerset and of Clifton ; Letters of
officers of the Somerset, Ponsonby, and Yandeleur brigades (Waterloo
Letters, 38, 62, 64, 65, 79, 86, 114, 115); above quoted accounts of
416 WATERLOO book hi
Durutte and Captain Chapuy (of the 85th); Kennedy, 110; Siborne,
ii. 36-39 ; Cotton, 71, 72.
It has been said that the English horsemen were intoxicated. This
is a bold charge to bring against such valiant soldiers.
50. Mauduit, ii. 300. See Letters of Colonels Evans and Straton
{Waterloo Letters, 64, 85) and above quoted report of Clifton.
A relative of General Ponsonby, Lieutenant-Colonel Ed. Ponsonby
(of the Vandeleur brigade), was severely wounded during the same action,
and remained on the battlefield till the next morning. He has given an
account of the sixteen or eighteen terrible hours which he passed there
(Cotton, App. vi.). In the evening a French tirailleur crouched behind
Colonel Ponsonby's body, using it as a sort of shield, under shelter of
which he commenced shooting at the enemy. Whilst he was firing he
conversed gaily with the English officer. When he had exhausted his
stock of cartridges he went off, saying : " You will be glad to know that
we are getting out of this. Good night, my friend."
51. Reports of Somerset and Clifton (Suppl. Despatches of Wellington,
X. 568, 577). Above quoted letter of Hervey ; Letters of Somerset,
Kennedy etc. (Waterloo Letters, 38, 42, 69, 77); Kennedy, 110, 111;
Siborne, ii. 39-43 ; Cotton, 71 72 ; Van Loben, 279 ; Gen. Delort's
account (General G.'s papers); Gourgaud, 93 ; Napoleon, Me'm. 144.
52. Kennedy, 111, 114 (Waterloo Letters, 346, 383); Siborne, ii.
43, 46.
53. Waterloo Letters, 406.
54. Letter of Lieutenant Graeme of the Hanoverian Legion (Waterloo
Letters, 407).
55. Letters of officers of the 1st regiment of the Guards and the
Coldstreams (Waterloo Letters, 246, 249, 259, 261, 264, 266) ; Kennedy,
106 ; Daily notes of Foy, and letter of the same to Guilleminot
(Register of Correspondence, comm. by Count de Foy); Van Loben, 272,
273 ; Cotton, 85, 86.
BOOK III CHAPTER IV
1. Letter of Hervey, aide-de-camp to Wellington, 3rd July 1815
(Nineteenth Century, March 1893) ; Miiffling, Aus meinem Leben, 209.
2. La Fresnaye's declaration, quoted by Grouchy (Relation succincte,
Appendix iv. 13). See Napoleon, M^m. 146.
La Fresnaye says that he was " fully two hours and a half " on the
journey, and that he found Napoleon on the battlefield. Starting from
Walhain between eleven and half-past eleven. La Fresnaye must therefore
have reached the Emperor about half-past two in the very heat of the
action, at the moment of d'Erlon's assault.
3. Grouchy's letter to Napoleon, Gembloux, 18th of June, eleven
o'clock (War Arch.). See Napoleon, Mem. 146.
I
CHAP. IV NOTES 417
4. Soult to Grouchy, 18th June, one o'clock (War Arch.). As
previously stated, the postscript of this letter was written between one
and a quarter-past one. The estafette must have left at half-past one.
6. Clausewitz {Der Krieg von IS 15, 166) very judiciously remarks :
" Turenne or Conde would have withdrawn at mid-day without giving
battle, but Napoleon could not do otherwise than fight, for there was no
salvation for him except in victory."
6. Gourgaud, 93. See 96. Kennedy, generally a very precise and
very truthful witness, says {Notes on Vie Battle of Waterloo, 114) that a
long interval elapsed between the grand assault of d'Erlon and the
second attack on La Haye-Sainte. According to the Waterloo Letters (404)
and Kempt's report (Despatches of Wellington, Suppl. x. 534) the second
attack of La Haye-Sainte followed closely on the first. Undoubtedly,
there was a pause in the fight after the cavalry engagement of Lord
Uxbridge with the cuirassiers and the French Lancers, for the scattered
battalions of d'Erlon had need of time to rally ; but this respite was a
short one. D'Erlon's assault and the cavalry engagements which followed,
had lasted at least an hour, from two to three o'clock. Delort in his
account expressly states that this period of the fight ceased at three
o'clock. From four o'clock or a quarter-past four, the great cavalry
charges commenced. In the interval, Ney's second attack against La
Haye-Sainte had failed.
7. Letter of Jerome to Queen Catherine, 15th July 1815 (M^moires
du roi Jerdine, vii. 23). See Gourgaud, 96 : "The Emperor had ordered
Marshal Ney to hold out at La Haye-Sainte, to throw up entrenchments
and post several battalions there, but to keep perfectly stilL ..."
Napoleon, Mem. 187 : "The Emperor's intention had been to order this
attack of cavalry, but an hour later, and to have it supported by the
infantry of the Guard." Daily notes of Foy (communicated by Count
de Foy) : The Emperor said in the morning at Le Caillou : " I shall
bring my numerous artillery into play, and charge with my cavalry,
then I shall march with my Old Guard."
It will be noticed that the manoeuvres spoken of by Jerome and Foy
were in fact executed, but without method, without harmony, as if at
random.
8. Kempt's report to Wellington, Grenappe, 19th June (Letters and
Despatches, Suppl. x. 534) ; Major Baring's account (Hanoversches
militarisches Journal, 1831); Letters from officers of the Somerset,
Kempt, and Lambert brigades, and the Germanic Legion (Waterloo
. Letters, 52, 354, 391, 394, 404, 406); Siborne, ii. 62. The English
brigade under Lambert, which by Wellington's order had arrived at
three o'clock, and taken up its post to the east of the Brussels road, to
reinforce Kempt's right, took part in this action.
9. Alten's letter to the Duke of Cambridge, Brussels, 20th June
(Gen. Gourgaud's papers) ; Letter of Pratt of Halkett's brigade ( Waterloo
Letters, 327, 328); Notes of Gen. Foy (above quoted); Kennedy, 114;
€otton (87, 88).
10. Letter from Windham of the Scots Greys (Waterloo Letters, 80) ;
27
418 WATERLOO book iii
Heymes, 23, 24; Bulletin de I'Arm^e {Moniteur, 2l8t June); Kennedy,
113 ; Siborne, ii. 65. See Relation (English) de la Gampagne de Flandre,
170.
It has been seen (page 196) that during the fire of the chief
battery which preceded the attack of d'Erlon's four columns, several
English and Scotch battalions had effected a similar retrograde movement.
11. Heymes, 23 ; General Delort's account (Gen. Gourgaud's papers).
These two concordant testimonies, one of which is from the chief of
Ney's staff, seem to me conclusive. It was Ney, as Gourgaud expressly
says (97), who asked for cavalry ; it was not the Emperor who of his
own accord supplied him with it, as several historians assert ; Gamot (Ney's
brother-in-law) says that the Marshal asked the Emperor for more troops,
and that Milhaud's cavalry came forward {Refutation, 40). Both these
apologists of Ney, endeavour also to insinuate that Ney only asked for
more cavalry because he had no infantry at his command. This is
obviously incorrect, for, in addition to the AUix, Donzelot, and Marcognet
divisions, which still amounted to 10,000 or 12,000 men, whom Ney
could have employed, the whole Bachelu division and Foy's second
brigade were intact and ready for work at the left of La Belle Alliance.
See on this subject the daily notes of Foy and his letter to Guilleminot
(already quoted). Foy expressly says that only one of his brigades and
the Jerome division were engaged at Hougoumont.
12. General Delort's account.
13. General DelorVs account (Gen. G.'s papers).
14. See Bulletin of the Army (Moniteur, 21st June) ; Napoleon,
Mem. 149 ; Heymfes, 23 ; Mauduit, ii. 346-348 ; General Thoumas,
Les trois Colbert, 46. In his manuscript account, which I have often
quoted, Capt. de Stuers of the Red Lancers does not say that the move-
ment was spontaneous. One may conclude therefore that it was eflfected
by order of the chief directly in command, Lefebvre-Desnoettes. Be this
as it may, it is certain that the light cavalry of the Guard left its position,
neither by Ney's orders nor by those of the Emperor.
15. See Jerome's letter to Queen Catherine {Mem, de Jer&tne, vii. 23) :
" The Emperor ordered Marshal Ney to bear upon the enemy's centre
with the bulk of his cavalry, two infantry corps, and the Guard, in order
to deal the final blow, and in fact the fate of the English army was as
good as sealed, had the Marshal executed the Emperor's orders ; but,
carried away by his ardour, he attacked three quarters of an hour too
soon." Victoires et ConquStes, xxiv. 217, note : " It is not true that General
Guyot engaged the heavy cavalry division of the Guard without orders, as
is stated in the Me'moires sur la Campagne de 1815, attributed to Napoleon.
We know from General Guyot himself that from three o'clock in the after-
noon he had been placed at Marshal Ney's disposal." Daily notes of
General Foy (already quoted) ; " The Emperor had said at the farm of Le
Caillou, ' I will bring my numerous artillery into play, order my cavalry
to charge, and march with my Old Guard.' "
16. Drouot's speech at the Chamber of Peers {Moniteur, 24th June).
1 7. From the above passage in J(5r6nie's letter it is evident that the
CHAP. IV NOTES 419
Emperor had placed the cavalry under Ney's command, but that the
latter was not to use it at once, and was expected to await fresh orders.
See Gourgaud, 96 : " Marshal Ney, carried away by an excess of ardour,
and forgetting the order received (to keep perfectly still at la Haye-
Sainte), debouched on the plateau with Milhaud's cuirassiers and the
light cavalry of the Guard."
This grand cavalry charge was part of the Emperor's scheme. He
never said (and this should be noticed) that the charge itself was contrary
to his plans. He simply said {Mem. 150, and Gourgaud, 97): "The
movement was premature," and {Notes sur VArt de la Guerre, Corresp.
xxxi. 393) " the cavalry charge of four o'clock took place rather too
soon." He also said {Me'm. 189) : "It was the Emperor's intention
to order this movement, but an hour later."
In his letter of July 1 5th Jerome does not state the reason why the
Emperor wished Ney to carry out this grand charge three-quarters of an
hour later. Gourgaud (96) says " that it was necessary first to ascertain
the result of the Prussians' manoeuvre." This cannot be the true reason.
At half-past three, when the Emperor ordered Ney to occupy La Haye-
Sainte — a movement preparatory to the proposed grand attack, — Billow's
advanced guard had scarcely reached the Paris wood, where its approach had
not even been announced. If the smoke was not too dense. Napoleon
could see, two leagues ahead, on the heights of Saint-Lambert, a portion of
the Prussian troops (Hacke division). He might, therefore, suppose that
Billow was still waiting on the alert ; he could not have wished to defer his
great attack, at the risk of losing at least three hours, till he learnt the
" result of a manoeuvre " which had not yet commenced, and which was
still subject to future contingencies. Besides, it stands to reason that the
Emperor did not intend to await the attack of the Prussians in order to
attack the English ; he intended, on the contrary, to overthrow the
English before the arrival of the Prussians, and this was divined by
Bliicher's stafif. " Napoleon," says Gneisenau, " will make a supreme
eflFort to force the English line. He will use against us the minimum of
force necessary to hold us in check till he has dealt his great blow against
the English" (von OUech, 227). Thus if Napoleon commanded Ney
not to hasten anything, it was probably to give the artillery time to
perform its deadly work, the infantry of d'Erlon to rally completely,
Reille's infantry to occupy Hougoumout, and the unmounted guard to
advance : in a word to be perfectly prepared, and to support effectually
the grand charge of the cavalry.
18. General Rogniat, who at Waterloo commanded the engineers, and
cannot be suspected of partiality towards Napoleon, says in his Considera-
tions sur VArt de la Guerre, 235: "When the cavalry engaged with
the English lines. Napoleon seemed surprised, and for a moment doubted
whether these masses of cavalry which he saw in the midst of the English
were his own ; and when he had convinced himself that they were, he
seemed displeased with this premature change." Therefore it is likely
that, had the Emperor seen the cavalry start, he would have given orders
to stop it
420 WATERLOO book hi
19. This configuration of the ground is sufficient to account for the
fact that the Emperor did not see the manoeuvre of the cavalry.
Napoleon also said in his notes {Notes sur i'Art de la Guerre, Gorresp.
xxxi. 398): "When General Milhaud was engaged on the plateau,
Napoleon was busy repulsing Billow, whose grapeshot reached as far as the
causeway in front of La Belle Alliance." The Emperor confuses
Milhaud's charge with that of Kellermann. Milhaud began his charges
between four and a quarter -past four, at the latest. All foreign
documents agree on this point (Report of the Prince of Orange, Kennedy,
115, 119, 120 ; Waterloo Letters, 54, 124, 292, etc.). In the same note
the Emperor himself says : "at four o'clock." On the other hand, it is
certain that Blilow unmasked only at half-past four. Up till that time
he had remained ensconced and hidden in the Paris wood (Billow's report ;
Gneisenau's report ; Damitz, ii. 273). Napoleon says himself (Gourgaud,
94) : "At half-past four General Domon reported that Billow's corps was
emerging from the wood." Therefore, at four o'clock Napoleon was not
occupied with repulsing Billow, whose approach had not even yet been
signalled.
20. Kennedy (114, 117), Cotton (88), Major Lautour of the 23rd
Light Dragoons {Waterloo Letters, 99), Siborne (ii. 65, 66) expressly say
that this first charge was general and suddeu. Their testimony is
confirmed by Reille's account and the daily notes of Foy. " In a few
minutes," says Foy, " the plateaux were covered, flooded with the procella
equestris." See Heymes, 23.
It is not true that the grand charge of Milhaud was provoked, as has
been often said, by an engagement of Jacquinot's lancers with the English
cavalry, or as also said, by the engagement of a brigade of cuirassiers with
a Hanoverian battalion marching to the help of La Haye-Sainte. The
error is due to a double confusion with the partial charges of the
cuirassiers and of the lancers, between half-past two and three.
21. Letters from officers of the Adam, Maitland, Byng, Mitchell
brigades {Waterloo Letters, 252, 270, 271, 289, 290, 316, 391). Craan,
Notice pour le Plan; Siborne, ii. 63.
-«^ 22. Kennedy, 114, 115 ; General Hiigel to the King of Wtirtemberg,
Brussels, 19th June (quoted by Pfister, Aus dem Lager der Verhilndeten,
369).
J The English infantry forming the left centre had sufi"ered most
severely, but on that side the plateau was inaccessible to the cavalry, on
account of the high and dense hedges of the Ohain road.
23. Kennedy, 115 ; Letters of officers of the English artillery
{Waterloo Letters, 186, 193) ; Cotton, 88 ; Siborne, ii. 67. See Mercer,
i. 310, and Miiffling (C. of W.), 27.
24. Kennedy, 116 ; Notes of Capt. de Stuers of the red lancers
(Communicated by M. de Stuers) ; Siborne, ii. 66 ; Cotton, 88.
25. Letter of Yalcott of the Royal Horse Artillery {Waterloo Letters,
193); Kennedy, 116; Siborne, ii. 65,66; Cotton, 88, 92; Mercer,
Journal of the Campaign, i. 320.
26. Letters from English artillery of&.ceT3 {Waterloo Letters, 186, 193,
CHAP. IV NOTES 421
195, 215, 282); Letter of Hervey (Nineteenth Century, March 1893);
CapL Pringle, Semarqties (vol. viii. of The Life of Napoleon, by Walter
Scott, 644) ; Kennedy, 116 ; Siborne, ii. 65-68 ; Cotton, 88 ; Notes of
Colonel Planzeaux (War Arch.) ; daily notes of Foy. Foy says that all
the batteries were past, and Siborne that the firing completely ceased
for twenty minutes. This proves that they were in our power.
27. Colonel Baud us (account communicated by M. de Montenon) is
justly surprised that the precaution was never taken, to provide a few
chosen horsemen, in every regiment, with headless nails and hammers, to
enable them to spike all captured guns quickly. Four times such an
opportunity presented itself at "Waterloo.
28. On the first and second line there was then one of Byng's
battalions (the others were at Hougoumont) ; four of Colin Halkett's ; two
of Maitland's (comprising 1,000 men each) ; two of Adam's (the others
were in reserve) ; two of Ompteda's (the others were at La Haye-Sainte) ;
five of Kielmansegge's ; three of Kruse's ; four of the Brunswickers (the
others in reserve). Later the four battalions of Duplat left their position
near Merbe-Braine, and came to prolong the line of squares.
The squares were composed of one battalion, except the squares of
Halkett, which were of two battalions on account of the losses sufifered at
Quatre-Bras. On the very minute plan of Craan, sixteen squares are
indicated.
29. Letters of artillery officers of the Mitchell and Halkett brigades
{Waterloo Letters, 193, 216, 311, 318, 320, 326, 339); Siborne, ii.
67, 68 ; Cotton, 88, 89 ; Heymes, 23 ; Pringle, Remarques, 644 ; Keller-
mann's account (War Arch.) ; Notes of Foy ; Notes of de Stuers.
Some squares consisted of four rows. Most of them had rounded
angles.
30. Letters from artillery officers of the Maitland, Halkett, Adam,
and Mitchell brigades {Waterloo Letters, 189, 235, 242, 252, 272, 302,
311, 320); Report of Pozzo di Borgo to Prince Wolkonsky, Nivelles,
1 9th June (Gen. G.'s papers) ; Letter of Hervey, aide-de-camp to
Wellington; Kennedy, 116 ; Mercer, ii. 301 ; Siborne, ii. 69 ; Cotton,
89 ; De Brack, Avant pastes de cavalerie, 79 ; Heymes, 23 ; Notes of Foy ;
Notes of de Stuers of the red lancers.
31. Letters of Lord Uxbridge, Major Lautour of the 23rd Light
Dragoons {Waterloo Letters, 10, 99, 100) ; Mereer, ii. 307-309 ; Kennedy,
117; Siborne, ii. 70 ; Notes of de Stuers ; Tomkinson. Diary, 305.
32. Letters from artillery officers of the Domberg, Halkett, and Adam
brigades {Waterloo Letters, 99, 189, 193, 234, 235, 302, 328, 339) ;
Kennedy, 117 ; Report of the Prince of Orange, Brussels, 22nd June
{Suppl. Despatches of Wellirigton, x. 555) ; Siborne, ii. 71, 72 ; Mercer,
ii. 308 ; Notes of Foy ; Notes of de Stuers.
33. Capt. Mercer, i. 301, 307, 308: "/ fear all is (yver." See
Miiffling, Aus meinem Lehen, 213.
34. Goui^ud, 97 ; Napoleon, Meni. 150.
35. Jerome's letter to Queen Catherine, 15th July 1815 ; Gourgaud,
97 ; Napoleon, Mem. 150; Flahaut's letter {Moniteur, 9th April 1857).
422 WATERLOO book hi
See General Rogniat, Remarques sur PArt de la Guerre, 235 : " Napoleon
seemed displeased with this premature charge." I have explained
previously that owing to the conformation of the ground, the Milhaud
and Lefebvre-Desnoettes divisions were able to carry out their movement
without the Emperor's knowledge.
36. Gourgaud, 97. Jerome, who was at the time near the Emperor,
relates (above-quoted letter) that the latter, speaking of Ney, said to him :
" Unfortunate man ! it is the second time since the day before yesterday,
that he has compromised the fate of France ! "
At the battle of Heilsberg the Emperor, seeing that Murat's cavalry
had advanced too far, before the arrival of the infantry, looked anxious
and seemed to say : " A badly-managed affair " (Saint-Joseph, Relation de
la Campagne de Prusse en 1807, 17.
37. Napoleon, Mem. 150. See Gourgaud, 97, and above-quoted letter
of Flahaut : " the Emperor said, ' There is Ney turning a safe affair
into an uncertain one ; but now that the manccuvre has begun there is
nothing to be done but to support him.' "
38. Gourgaud, 97; Napoleon, Mem. 150, 187; Flahaut's letter
(Moniteur, 9th April 1857).
39. Kellermann's account (War. Arch.) ; account of Col. Planzeaux
of the 2nd Dragoons (War. Arch.).
40. Napoleon contends that the Guyot division charged without
orders, by a spontaneous impulse, and that he sent off Bertrand to recall
this cavalry, but that it was already engaged (Gourgaud, 104 ; Napoleon,
M^. 151, 187, 188). This is a gross error of memory. Two formal
testimonies correct it : —
1st. Flahaut, in his letter inserted in the Moniteur of the 9th April
1857, says : "The Emi^eror commanded me to convey to all the cavalry,
the order to support and follow those wht) had already passed the ravine."
2nd. Montholon (R^cits de la captivite, ii. 84) says: " 17th February
1817 — At dinner the Emperor discussed a few facts which his memory
recalled uncertainly, and which all refer to Waterloo. He refuses to
believe that he gave General Guyot the order to attack with the cavalry
of the Guard. It is, notwithstanding, an indisputable fact."
41. Gourgaud, 97; Napoleon, Mem. 151.
42. Billow's report quoted by von Ollech, 192 ; Wagner, iv. 75.
In his Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo {Despatches, xii. 528),
Wellington asserts that the advanced guard of Billow's cavalry was on the
ground in front of Ohain at daybreak on the 18th. Damitz also states
(ii. 242, 243) that on the 18th, very early in the morning, a detachment
of the 2nd Silesian Hussars went to reconnoitre the passes of Lasne,
Both these statements are inaccurate. Hervey, aide-de-camp to Wellington
(letter of 9th July 1815, in the Nineteenth Century, March 1893), says
that it was between ten and eleven only, that the Prussian cavalry was
perceived two leagues off in the direction of Ohain. We know, on the
other hand, that the 2nd Hussars were still at Dion-le-Mont at four o'clock
in the morning of the 18th, and that Billow's advanced guard, of which
it formed part, reached Chapelle-Saint-Lambert only about ten o'clock.
CHAP. IV NOTES 423
Besides, had the defiles of the Lasne been explored early in the morning,
these horsemen would have given an account of their errand before
two o'clock.
43. Billow's report. See Miifliing, Aus meinem Leben, 209, and
C. of W. (Miiffling), 23 ; von OUech, 214, 215.
Miiffling assures us that he submitted to Wellington, and sent off
towards half-past twelve to Biilow, a plan of attack comprising three
hypotheses : —
1st. If Napoleon attacked the centre or the left of the English army,
the Prussians were to bear down on his right flank ; 2nd. If he attacked
the English right, the Prussians were to come and reinforce it ; 3rd. If
he manoeuvred towards Chapelle - Saint - Lambert, the Prussians should
receive the shock and the English would advance towards his right flank.
The original of this disposition exists, in fact, at the "War Arch, of Berlin.
But from the two letters of Bliicher that I have quoted at p. 163, and
the report of Biilow liimself, it is evident that the field-marshal, before
receiving Mliffling's plan of attack, had conceived the scheme which he
subsequently carried out, and which consisted in attacking Napoleon's
right flank, with one half of his army, and seconding the English left
with another portion of his troops.
44. Varnhagen von Ense, Biographisch Denhmalle, Bliicher, 447 ;
Damitz, ii. 272 ; letter of Hervey, aide-de-camp to "Wellington {Nineteenth
Century, March 1893) ; Wagner, iv. 75.
45. Billow's report, quoted by von Ollech, 192. Biilow and the
German historians state expressly that there was not a single Frenchman
in the Paris wood.
46. Billow's report ; Wagner, iv. 75 ; Damitz, ii. 273 ; Miifliing,
Aus meineni Lehen, 263 ; and C. of W. (Miiffling, 31).
47. Billow's report ; Damitz, ii. 273 ; von Ollech, 242 ; C. of "W., 31 ;
see Napoleon, Mem, 146; and Gourgaud, 93, 94: "At half-past four
General Domon notified the Emperor that Billow's corps was in motion."
Clausewitz {Der Feldzug von 1815, 128) is guilty of a double error
when he says that Biilow occupied the wood from three o'clock, and that
he attacked at half -past six.
48. Order of Biilow, quoted by von Ollech, 242 ; Wagner, iv. 76 ;
Damitz, ii. 274.
49. C. of W. (Miiffling), 31 ; Damitz, ii. 274.
50. Damitz, ii. 274 ; Gourgaud, 94 ; Durutte's account.
51. General Petit's account (Morrisson Collection) ; Duuring's account
(communicated by M. de Stuers) ; Gourgaud, 95 ; Letter of General
Vivian {Waterloo Letters, 161) ; Damitz, ii. 275. See report of
Prince Bernard of Saxony (quoted by Gourgaud, 227) ; Gourgaud, 95.
The Jacquinot cavalry, reduced to 900 sabres and lances, — for Marbot's
1st Hussars were detached to Domon's right, — had to remain for the
time in its first position, forming the extreme right of the original line
of battle.
52. At the outset of the campaign Biilow's corps consisted of 30,328
men, and it had not been engaged yet. Lobau's corps, deducting the
424 WATERLOO book hi
Teste division detached to Grouchy, numbered 7,860 muskets ; the Domon
and Subervie divisions comprised about 2,200 sabres, deducting the losses
suffered on June 16th and 17th.
53. See Henry Houssaye, 1810, i. 244, 254, 256 and 416, 417.
Colonel Roussille, who had refused to leave his regiment, which rebelled
against him, on the entrance of the Emperor into Grenoble, was killed
before Plancenoit.
54. Damitz, ii. 274, 275, 280, 281 ; Wagner, iv. 76 ; Gourgaud,
95 ; Mauduit, ii. 390, 391.
The attack on Plancenoit took place at six o'clock (Damitz, ii. 281) ;
the Ryssel and Hacke divisions had emerged from the Paris wood at
half-past five (Damitz, iv. 279).
55. An hour or two before, Gneisenau had already sent the same
reply to a former despatch of Thielmann. Lieutenant Niissow's account
(quoted by von OUech, 195) ; Wagner, iv, 77 ; Damitz, ii. 281.
56. Wagner, iv. 77 ; Damitz, ii. 280, 281 ; Gourgaud, 95, 96.
See Napoleon, Mem. 159 ; Mauduit, ii. 385, 393, 394.
57. Letters of Colonel Lautour and artillery Major Bull {Waterloo
Letters, 99, 189) ; Kennedy, 116 ; Mercer, i. 309 j Siborne, ii. 73.
58. Kennedy, 118. Account of Capt. de Steurs of the Red Lancers
(communicated by M. de Stuers, Waterloo Letters, 130, 235); Siborne,
ii. 79.
59. Letters from artillery officers of the Maitland, Adam, and
Halkett brigades {Waterloo Letters, 216, 242, 283, 289, 290, 304, 305,
311-316, 320, 336, 339, 342); Letter of Colonel Harris of the 73rd
(quoted by Cotton, 211); Alten's report to Wellington, Brussels, 19th
June ; Report of the Prince of Orange to the King of the Netherlands,
Brussels, 22nd June (Wellington Suppl. Despatches, 534, 555) ;
Siborne, ii. 81, 86, 114 ; Van Loben, 291 ; General Delort's account,
Klein de Kleinenberg's Dossier (War Arch.) ; Delort quotes besides the
following attestation : " Received an English flag, taken at the battle of
Waterloo, by the 9th regiment of cuirassiers, 16th June 1815. For
Marshal Grouchy, the aide-de-camp : De Lafontaine." According to
the Histm-y of the 10th Cuirassiers, an English flag had also been taken
by le Marechal des logis, Gautier.
The English deny the charge that any of these squares were even
shaken. But General Delort expressly states that several squares were
broken, and Jomini also acknowledges that three squares were broken
{Precis de let Gampagne de IS 15, 210, 211). At any rate how could the
flags have been captured during the charges, if breaches had not been
made in the squares ?
60. Daily notes of Foy (above quoted) ; Letters of officers of the
Grant and Mitchel brigades {Waterloo Letters, 126, 137, 142, 144,
313, 314, 316) ; C. of W. (Muffling, 30).
61. Mercer, Journal of the Campaign, i. 311, 324; Letters of
officers of the Grant and Royal Artillery brigades {Waterloo Letters,
144, 186, 214, 219); Note of Valery de Siriaque, aide-de-camp to
Janin (War Arch., Janin's dossier).
CHAP. IV NOTES 425
62. Kellermann's account (War Arch.); Kennedy, 118; Mercer,
L 310; Letters of officers of the Grant, Adam, and Halkett brigades
{IVat^loo Letters, 142, 144, 302, 305, 328, 329). Colonel Laborde,
Napoleon et sa garde d Vile d'Elbe, 117, note ; Siborne, ii. 82 ; Cotton, 94
63. Kellermann's account ; Kennedy, 119 ; De Stuers's notes
Siborne, ii. 95 ; Letters of Capt. Eogers of the Royal Artillery, and
of officers of the Halkett brigade {Waterloo Letters, 235, 318-342)
Fraser, Letters, 559.
64. KeUerman's account ; Note of Colonel Planzeaux (War Arch.)
Notes of De Stuers ; Kennedy, 119 ; Journal of Lieutenant Woodbury,
321 ; Letters of officers of the Eoyal Artillery, and the Domberg and
Halkett brigades {Waterloo Letters, 100, 235, 32S, 339, 342 ; Siborne,
i. 82, 90, 97) ; Alten's report to Wellington, Brussels, 19th June,
Somerset's report, 24th June {Despatches of Wellington, Suppl. x. 534,
578).
65. Daily notes of Foy and letter of the same to Guilleminot (comni.
by Count de Foy) ; Reille's account (War Arch.) Waterloo Letters, 126,
128, 193, 242, 256, 305, etc. ; Kennedy, 124, 125 ; Siborne, ii. 84.
Foy expressly says : " When our cavalry returned, we received
the order to ascend to the plateau. . . . The 5 th and 9th divisions did
not move until our cavalry began to retire." Lieutenant-Colonel Davis
of the Maitland brigade also says {Waterloo Letters, 256): "Towards
evening, when the attacks of the cavalry had been repulsed, the infantry
advanced against us, supported by the cavalry." Capt. Eeles of the
95th rifles makes a similar statement {JFaterloo Letters, 305); "There
was a pause between the charges of the cavalry, and the fresh attack
from the infantry."
Key's forgetfuLness in regard to Reille's divisions confirms this remark
of Napoleon {Mem. 182) : "Ney, always the first under fire, forgot the
troops which were not actually under his eyes."
66. Account of Major Baring {Hanoversches militarisches Journal,
1831) ; Waterloo Letters, 404; Kennedy, 123; Siborne, ii. 74, 84, 86. See
General Rogniat, Eeponse aux notes de Napoleon, 174. "The attacks
were feebly renewed. There was some skirmishing."
67. Note of Colonel Planzeaux (War Arch.); Heymes, 25, 26;
Account of Delort ; Xapoleon (Mem.), 145; Kennedy, 124; Monthyon's
dossier (War Arch.).
68. Account of Major Baring ; Letters of Leach, of the 95th
rifles, and of Graeme of the Germanic Legion {Waterloo Letters, 365, 404-
406) ; Kennedy, 121-123; Cotton, 104, 105, 110, 111 ; Mauduit, ii. 333,
334 ; Siborne, ii. 62, 63 ; Dossier of chief of battalion Borrel-Vivier, of
the 1st Engineer Regiment (War Arch.) ; Note of General Schmitz
(communicated by Commandant Schmitz).
All the accounts of the combatants. Baring, Kennedy, Planzeaux,
Heymes, and those of the Waterloo Letters agree on this point that La
Haye-Sainte was not taken until between six and half-past six o'clock.
How then, in face of the agreement of all these eye-witnesses, can
the French historians, without exception, assert on the sole authority of
426 WATERLOO book hi
Gourgaud, that this position was carried at four o'clock 1 The historians
Siborne and Chesney say that La Haye-Sainte was taken at six o'clock. True,
van Loben says that he believes La Haye-Sainte was taken at four o'clock, or a
little later, but he adds in a note that in the Dutch account from which he
draws his information, the time is not specified.
Wellington, in a letter of the 17th of August 1815 (Despatclies, xii.
619), says that La Haye-Sainte was taken at two o'clock through the
negligence of the officer who commanded that post. " This is a gross
error, as well as an unjust accusation. Major Baring defended it like a
hero. This error of Wellington has been accounted for, by the fact that,
at two o'clock, seeing the orchard in the hands of the French, he
imagined that the whole farm was also in their possession. This may
be. However, the " noble Duke " should have inquired more thoroughly.
69. Alten's report, Brussels, 19th June {Despatches of Wellington, Suppl.
X. 534) ; Letter of Alten to the Duke of Cambridge, Brussels, 20th June
(General G.'s papers); Waterloo Letters, 128, 330, 390, 391 ; Kennedy,
124; Cotton, 105, 113, 114; Siborne, ii. 113-116; Souvenirs d'un ex-
officier, 293.
70. Report of Kempt, Genappe, 19th June ; Report of Lambert,
Genappe, 19th June; Reports of Alten, Brussels, 19th and 22nd June
{Despatches of Wellington, Suppl. x. 533, 535, 537, 559); Waterloo Letters,
161, 179, 330, 340; Letters of Hiigel to the King of Wiirtemberg,
19th and 25th of June (quoted by Pfister, Aus dem Lager der Verhiindeten,
370, 390) ; Kennedy, 127 ; Muffling, Aus meinem Leben, 215 ; Cotton,
106, 119, 120, 123,^126, 127; Siborne, ii. 146, 152, 153, 156 ; Captain
Pringle, Remarks on the Campaign of 1815 (in vol. ix. of the Life of
Napoleon by Walter Scott, 649).
71. Kennedy, 127. See Hiigel (letter of June 19th to the King of
Wiirtemberg) : " The firing began to grow dangerous for the Duke ; "
Pringle, 649 : "Owing to the dead, the wounded, and the fugitives, our
forces were considerably diminished" ; Cotton, 120: "The fight appeared
to be desperate"; Siborne, ii. 121: "The situation was extremely
grave."
72. Letters of Colonel Freemantle and Colonel Murray {Waterloo
Letters, 20, 21, 22, 178); Journal of Lieutenant Woodberry, 313, 314;
Cotton, 125; Siborne, ii. 143. See Kennedy, 128; von OUech, 243;
and Colonel Frazer, Letters, 560.
73. Heymes, 25-26.
74. Kennedy, Notes on the Battle of Waterloo, 127, 129, 130,
At Waterloo, Colonel Kennedy was captain and aide-de-camp to
General Alten. Of all those who have written about the battle, no one
was more observant. His opinion, therefore, has great weight. The judg-
ment he pronounces, is besides, expressly or implicitly, confirmed by
Hiigel (letter to the King of Wiirtemberg, 19th June), Muffling {Aits
meinem Leben, 215), by Cotton (120), by Colonel Freemantle {Waterloo
Letters, 22), by Siborne (ii. 121), and — curiously enough — by Marmont
{Esprit des Institutions militaires, 25).
75. Report of Colonel von Hiller, commanding the 16th Prussian
CHAP. V NOTES 427
brigade (division) (quoted by von Ollech, 248) ; Damitz, ii. 282 ; Wagner,
iv. 77, 78.
76. Account of General Petit (Morrisson Collection of London) ;
Mauduit, ii. 394, 400.
77. Account of General Petit ; Report of Colonel von Hiller; Mauduit,
ii. 400-404 ; Wagner, iv. 78 ; Damitz, ii. 282.
BOOK III CHAPTER V
1. Gourgaud, 99 : "At half-past seven, we heard at last the cannonade
of Marshal Grouchy, two leagues and a half on our right. The Emperor
thought that the time had come to make a decisive attack." Kennedy
(140) also says, at half- past seven.
2. Grourgaud, 99 ; Napoleon, Mem. 153.
3. Except van Loben, who speaks from hearsay, and expresses doubts,
all the witnesses agree on this point, that Durutte had taken possession
of La Haye-Sainte and of Papelotte about a quarter-past seven. Miiffling,
Aus vuinem Leben, 215 ; Letter of General Vivian {Waterloo Letters, 161);
Damitz, ii. 287 ; von Ollech, 244.
4. Letters from officers of the Grant, Kempt, and Lambert brigades
{Waterloo Letters, 128, 354, 365, 391) ; Reports of Kempt and Lambert,
Genappe, 19th June {Despatches of Wellington, Suppl. x. 534, 537);
Kennedy, 124, 127 ; Cotton, 118-121 ; Siborne, ii. 113-116, 121, 146,
152, 153 ; Daily notes of Foy ; Gourgaud, 99 ; Napoleon, Mem. 152, 153.
5. Gourgaud, 99 ; Napoleon, Mem. 159, 160 ; Rogniat, Reponse aux
notes de Napolean, 277, 278; Account of Greneral Petit (Morrisson Collection
of London).
In the Relation of the Ambigii of London, vol. lii. 434, it is stated that
murmurs began to be heard in the army against the inaction of the Foot
Guard.
6. Kennedy, Hiigel, Freemantle, Miiffling, Cotton, Sibome. See onr
note on page 382.
7. Kennedy, 127, 128 ; Letters from officers of the Adam, Halkett,
and Lambert brigades {Waterloo Letters, 306, 328, .342, 391); Cotton,
119 ; Siborne, ii. 116 ; Gourgaud, 100.
8. Letters from officers of the Vivian brigade {Waterloo Letteis, 149,
179, 180); Kennedy, 127, 128; Muffling, Aus meinem Leben, 214;
Sibome, ii. 120.
9. Damitz, ii. 245 ; von Ollech, 193.
10. Account of Colonel von R^iche, quoted by von Ollech, 193, and
von Ollech, 193.
11. Von Ollech, 194 ; Wagner, iv. 79.
12. Letters of Colonel Freemantle {Waterloo Letters, 21, 22).
13. Miiffling, Aii^ meinem Leben, 215; Wagner, iv. 79 ; von Ollech.
243, 244.
428 WATERLOO book hi
According to von Ollecli, Zieten hesitated all the more, because Blitcher,
who had made up his mind to sacrifice everything in order to take
possession of Plancenoit, had sent him orders to strike in this direction.
14. Gourgaud, 100, 101 ; Napoleon, Mem. 160.
15. Rogniat liimself {Reponse aux notes criticpies, 277) says : " Perhaps
the battalions of the Guard might have succeeded in assisting the retreat."
Clausewitz {JDer Feldzug von 1815) and York of Wartenburg (Napoleon
as Feldher) blame the desperate resolution of Napoleon, but they are far
from aflBrming the possibility of a retreat. There is more justice in the
opinion of Ch. Malo and Arthur Chuquet. The former says (in his
Precis de la carapagne de IS 15): "What else could Napoleon have
done ? " The latter (in the Eevue critique, 25th October 1886) says : " The
Emperor had no alternative left. He was compelled, as the Germans say,
' dx7i grossen Trumpt ausspielen ' — ' to play his highest trump.' "
16. Letter of Ney to the Duke of Otranto, 26th June {Journal des
Vebats, 29th June) ; Account of General Petit (Morrisson Collection of
London) ; Drouot, Speech at the Chamber of Peers (Moniteur, 24th
June); Gourgaud, 101 ; Napoleon, Alera. 160.
General Petit specifies that five battalions only marched on to the
plateau, all belonging to the Middle Guard : the 1st of the 3rd Grenadiers ;
the single battalion of the 4th Grenadiers ; the two battalions of the
3rd Chasseurs ; the 4th Chasseurs, reduced to a single battalion, in
consequence of the losses suffered at Ligny. Ney says that he led four
regiments against the enemy. This is not less accurate ; but of these
four regiments, two consisted of a single battalion, and one battalion was
detached. Therefore five battalions remained under Ney's command.
English authors are quite at fault, but it is easy to understand their
motive, when they contend that eight and even twelve battalions of the
Guard took part in the attack.
17. Letter from Ney to the Duke of Otranto, 26th June ; Gourgaud,
101 ; Napoleon, Me'm. 160 ; Notes of Baudus (comm. by M. de
Montenon).
18. Notes of Baudus ; Soiive7iirs d'un ex-officier, 296 ; Letter of Captain
Powel (Waterloo Letters, 254) ; Letter of Hiigel to the King of Wiirtemberg,
Brussels, 19th June (quoted by Pfister, Atis dem Lager dei- Verbiindeten,
390) ; Colonel Lemonnier, Gampagnes, 387, 388,
19. Frazer, Letters, 552 ; Letters of General Adam, of Major Blair,
and of Colonel Colborne (Waterloo Letters, 276, 280, 283).
Strange to say, this officer had twice gallantly charged the English.
Many years after, on a visit to the field of battle, he met there the
ex-sergeant of the 23rd Dragoons, Cotton, who had become guide at
Waterloo. He explained to him that he had not deserted sooner, because
he hoped to carry off with him several of his comrades (Cotton, A Voice
of Waterloo, 126).
20. Letters from officers of the brigades under Vandeleur, Vivian,
Maitland, Adam, and of the Royal Artillery (Waterloo Letters, 104, 179,
187, 194 ,228, 237, 244, 276, 277, 280, 291). See Kennedy, 126, 127 ;
van Ltiben, 285, 298, 301 ; map and notice of Craan, and letters from
p
CHAP. V NOTES 429
Chasse to Lord Hill, and from Lord Hill to Chasse, 5 th and 11th July
(quoted in the Relation beige de la Bataille de Waterloo, 10-12).
2 1 . This remark is by Colonel Kennedy, aide-de-camp of Alten, Notes
on the Battle of Waterloo, 130.
22. My authority is the very precise and very minute account of
Greneral Petit (Morrisson Collection of London), who was present during
the formation of these squares, saw them move off and perhaps climb the
hill of Mont -Saint- Jean, and subsequently gathered supplementary
information from the very lips of the surviving officers. It seems certain
from this account that the battalions marched in squares. This formation,
rather singular for the assault of a position, may be explained by their
fear of having to parry the charges of cavalry. Strictly speaking, accord-
ing to Sibome, Cotton, Kennedy, and a number of Letters of Waterloo, the
Guard was formed in close columns; but at a distance, through the
smoke, it was easy to confuse the squares with " columns en masse." " /
believe," says Lieutenant Sharpin (229), "they were in close columns."
" I was not able to make out exactly," says Colonel Gawler (292), " what
the formation of the enemy was, the smoke being too thick, but I was
told that it was in columns." I add that in the English Relation of
the Batth of Waterloo, published in 1815 (32), we read that the Guard
attacked in squares.
According to all French historians, the Guard attacked in a single
column ; according tf) English authorities, in two columns. Both statements
are wrong. Had the attack taken place in a single column, it would have
been impossible for the Guard to assail the two battalions of Brunswick
and the left of the Halkett brigade and the Ditmer brigade and Halkett's
right, with Maitland's guards, and finally the Adam brigade, all together,
these troops being disposed, not in depth, but in a semicircle 1,000 yards
wide. Had the attack been carried out in two columns, the Guard would
have assailed only the Maitland and the Adam brigades. The battalions
of Brunswickers, the Halkett and the Ditmer brigades, would not have
been engaged at alL Such, however, i.s the contention, inspired by vain
glory, of some English historians, who also pretend that the attack was
effected by twelve battalions. But, as I myself prove further on,
exclusively from the testimony of English combatants (letters of Lord
Hill to Chasse, of Lieutenant Sliarpin, of Colonel Gawler, of Major Kelly,
of Captain MacEeady, etc., and The 5th Brigade at Waterloo, account by
an officer of the 30th Regiment, published in the United Service Gazette,
October, 1845), the five battalions of the Guard attacked together, at four
different points, two battalions of Brunswickers, three English brigades,
and a Belgian brigade. Hiigel (letter to the King of Wiirtemberg, Brussels,
19th June, quoted by Pfister, 370) expressly states that the "attack of the
Guard was repulsed by 6,000 to 8,000 men of the English infantry."
Thus the Guard was drawn up in five echelons at starting, according to
General Petit, and four echelons at the attack, in consequence of the union
of the third with the fourth echelon, as is indicated by the positions of
the different brigades of the enemy, and as is absolutely confirmed by the
account in the United Service Gazette: "The column of the Imperial
430 WATEBLOO book iii
Guard was subdivided, and advanced towards our front in four columns,
by echelons."
23. Daily notes of General Foy ; Account of Reille ("War Arch.) ;
Souvenirs d'un ex-officier (of the Marcognet division;, 296 ; Kennedy, 141,
147.
D'Erlon's attack was very spirited ; but Foy and Reille agree in
saying that, except on the east of Hougoumont, where the Jerome division
made an effort, the infantry marched slowly and languidly. As for the
cavalry, it seconded the Guard with only a detachment of cuirassiers, which
took possession of a battery of the enemy at the very end of the assault,
and was repulsed by the 23rd Dragoons {Waterloo Letters, 91, 273;
Siborne, ii. 175).
Ropes {The Camfaign of Waterloo, 319) remarks, not without reason,
that if the attack of the Guard was a failure, it was because it was not
backed up as it should have been by the other troops.
24. Letters of officers of the Royal Artillery, and of the Adam,
Maitland, and Halkett brigades {Waterloo Letters, 187, 194, 223, 227,
232, 237, 244, 254, 257, 292, 322, 330) ; Letter of Ney to the Duke
of Otranto ; Account of General Petit ; Journal of Mackworth of Lord
Hill's staff (quoted by Sidney, Life of Lord Hill, 309); W. Gomm,
Letters, 361,
25. Concerning the repulse of the Brunswickers, and the capture of
the battery : — Letters of Colonel Taylor and Captain MacReady {Waterloo
Letters, 172, 330, 322) ; Account of General Petit; van Loben, 296, 297 ;
Damitz, ii. 288.
Concerning the attack against Halkett's left and the reverse of the
30th and 73rd: — The note of the Waterloo Letters, 319 ; the letters of
Major Luard, Colonel Gawler, Colonel Kelly, Captain MacReady
(Waterloo Letters, 121, 291, 330, 331, 341). After speaking of the giving
way of the 30th and 73rd, MacReady says : "I beg you will keep this
a secret." MacReady adds : " The dead and wounded who remained
before us, belonged to the Middle Guard." (In the account of the United
Service Gazette (see note 22) it is also stated that all the dead lying
in front of the Halkett brigade were grenadiers of the Guard.) Major
Luard says : " For a moment I thought that the infantry was
repulsed. The hill seemed to me to be on the point of being carried by
the enemy."
Concerning the action of the van der Smissen battery, and the charge
of the Ditmer brigade : — Letter from Chasse to Lord Hill, and answer of
Lord Hill, 5th and 11th July 1815 (quoted in the Relation beige de la
Bataille de Waterloo, 9, 11); the already quoted account of the United
Service Gazette ; and the letters of Colonel Taylor, Lieutenant Anderson,
and Captain MacReady {Waterloo Letters, 172, 330, 338). Anderson says
that there was a foreign corps behind Halkett's left, and MacReady, that
the Imperial Guard attacking Halkett's infantry disappeared suddenly.
The foreign corps was the Belgian brigade under Ditmer, and if the Guard
disappeared suddenly, it was because it was repulsed by this foreign corps.
English historians, in their desire to spread the belief that the
CHAP. V NOTES 431
English army won the battle unassisted, do not mention the charge of
the Belgians. They even attempt to make a confusion between the 2nd
brigade of Chasse (d'Aubrem^), which was very nearly giving way, in
spite of its being placed on the second line {Waterloo Letters, 104, 108,
118), with his first brigade (Ditmer), which repulsed the grenadiers.
26. The 5th Brigade at Waterloo {United Service Gazette, October
1845) ; Letters from Lieutenant Gawler and Colonel Kelly {Waterloo
Letters, 291, 340) ; Cotton, 123, 134, 136. See the very reticent
letter of Lieutenant Anderson {Waterloo Letters, 338). •
27. Letters from oflScers of the Maitland and Halkett brigades and of
the Royal Artillery {Waterloo Letters, 223, 225, 227, 228, 229, 237,
242, 244, 254, 257, 319) ; Kennedy, 142 ; Account of General Petit;
L'elation of the Amhigii of London, liL 436 ; Letter of Hiigel to the
King of Wiirtemberg, Brussels, 19th June (quoted by Pfister, .4its dem
Lager der Verhiind. 370 ; TV. Gomm, Letters, 373.
28. Letters from officers of the Maitland, Adam, Mitchell, Domberg,
and Vivian brigades, and of the Eoyal Artillery {Waterloo Letters, 91, 100,
162, 237, 242, 245, 248, 254, 276-278, 280," 284, 286, 294, 298, 308,
309, 319). See letter of Hiigel to the King of Wiirtemberg, 19th June.
From these various incidents of the attack, it appears that each of
the five battalions of the Guard, except that which was opposed to
Maitland, began by repulsing the enemy, but that, one after another, they
all yielded to superior forces, being scarcely 3,000 against 8,000 to 10,000
and a formidable artillery. It appears then likely, as was pointed out
by a captured grenadier officer to the author of The oth Brigade at
Waterloo, that had the assault been directed on a single point by these
five battalions together, the English line would certainly have been
broken. See on this subject the remark of Colonel Kennedy, which I
quoted, page 225, note 21.
29. Drouot's speech in the Chamber of Peers {Moniteur, 24th June) ;
Bulletin of the Army {Monite^ir, 21st June) ; Daily notes of Foy ; Eeport
of the Spanish general, Alava ; Kennedy, 147 ; Cotton, 154 ; Letters
from officers of the Vivian, Maitland, and Lambert brigades {Waterloo
Letters, 149, 245, 273, 391, 400). j
30. Bulletin of the Army {Moniteur, 21st June) ; Report of Colonel
de Bellina to Davout, 23rd June (War Arch.) ; General Delort's account ;
Petiet, Souvenirs, 221, 222 ; Kennedy, 150 ; Wagner, iv. 80 ; Damitz, ii,
248 ; Miiffling, Axis meinem Leben, 215 ; von Ollech, 244, 245. On
the false cartridges : Soult to Napoleon and to Davout, Laon, 21st June
(Major-General's Register).
In his letter to the Duke of Otranto, Ney says that there were
no cries of : " Run for your life ! " This may have been true on the left,
where Ney stood ; but on the extreme right, the fact appears certain.
According to the report of Mouton-Duvemet to Davout, 28th June (Nat.
Arch. AF. iv. 1938), the above-quoted letters of Soult, and many other
documents, it is undeniable that the opinion prevailed in the army that
they had been betrayed at Waterloo.
31. Letter from Hervey, aide-de-camp to Wellington, 3rd July 1815
432 WATERLOO book hi
{Nineteenth Century, March 1893); Report of General Alava ; Cotton,
146 ; Colonel Tomkinson, Diary of a Cavalry Officer, 314.
32. It was then a quarter-past eight (Cotton). Colonel Gawler
(Waterloo Letters, 295) says that the general attack took place after
sunset (on the 18th of June the sun sets at three minutes past eight),
and that it was dusk when his regiment crossed the Brussels road, which
seems to indicate about half-past eight.
General Byng (Waterloo Letters, 261) gives this further information :
" The general movement forward did not commence until ten or twelve
minutes after the Imperial Guard had been repulsed." As this move-
ment commenced after sunset, the Guard must have remained in the
English positions until about eight o'clock.
33. Report of Wellington, Waterloo, 19th June, and note of the
same, October 1836 (Letters and Despatches, xii. 478, and Supplementary,
X. 513); Miiffling, Aus meinem Lehen, 216 ; Kennedy, 148 ; Letters from
officers of the brigades under Somerset, Ponsonby, Dornberg, Vandeleur,
Grant, Vivian, Royal Artillery, Maitland, Adam, C. and W. Halkett,
Kempt, and Lambert (Waterloo Letters, 42, 59, 91, 100, 101, 116, 122,
124, 149, 153, 185, 187, 201, 202, 238, 245, 257, 261, 267, 277, 306,
340, 356, 393) ; English Account, 32 ; Mercer, i. 232 ; Mauduit, ii.
462 ; Daily notes of Foy ; Account of Reille (War Arch.).
Miiffling and the German historians assert that the rout was caused
by the intervention of Zieten. Captain Pringle and the other English
historians claim, on the contrary, that it was caused by the general attack
by Wellington. As both manoeuvres took place almost simultaneously,
the discussion might be carried on for ever. However, the retreat of the
French army was marked by three very distinct movements, of which
the first and third were due to the English alone. The check to the Middle
Guard occasioned the yielding of more than two- thirds of the French
line. Later on, the irruption of the Prussians provoked the panic and
disorder on the right (d'Erlon's corps). Finally, the forward march of
Wellington hastened the disaster to the left (Reille's corps and the
remains of the cavalry).
Therefore it is false to say with Muffling : " Wellington only hurled
his troops against the French, to appear as if he were winning the victory
without the help of the Prussians." Had Wellington at eight o'clock
retained his positions, the Prussians under Zieten would very likely have
sustained a check. Had Zieten refrained from attacking, the Emperor
might have resisted the English, as well at La Haye-Sainte and on the
Brussels road, as on the slopes to the west of La Belle Alliance.
34. General Petit's account ; Gourgaud, 102, 103 ; Napoleon, Mem.
162, 169 (there is some confusion and inaccuracy in the St. Helena
account); Kennedy, 145; Waterloo Letters, 149,274, 298. See Bulletin
of the Army (Moniteur, 21st June).
35. Gourgaud, 104 ; Napoleon, Mem. 162 ; Letters from officers
of the Vivian brigade (Waterloo Letters, 181, 182, 182).
36. Durutte's account; Mauduit, ii. 440-442; Recollections of
Lieutenant Francois- Victor B. (Arch, at M^ziferes). Ney's apostrophe
CHAP. V XOTES 433
to d'Erlon, related elsewhere in more choice language, was told me
several times by General Schmitz, who held the story from one Leblanc
de Prebois, a former aide-de-camp to d'Erlon in the Army of Africa.
37. General Petit's account; Gourgaud, 105, 106 ; Mauduit, ii. 427,
438, 444 ; Letters from ofBcei-s of the Royal Artillery, and of the Vivian,
Adam, Kempt, and Lambert brigades {JVaterloo Letters, 149, 185, 187,
201, 239, 273, 274, 277, 279, 297, 303, 307, 308, 356, 401). See note
of Wellington, October 1836 {Despatches, Suppl. x. 513).
38. General Petit's account ; Mauduit, ii. 444, 450. See letters of
officers of the Dumberg, Vandeleur, Grant, Maitland, and Mitchel brigades
{Waterloo Letters, 91, 122, 140, 245, 254, 274, 313).
39. Letter of Colonel William Halkett {Waterloo Letters, 308) ;
Siborne, ii. 219.
40. I liave gathered and compared all the testimonies relating to
Cambronne's answer. I may some day publish them under the title :
" The Guard dies and does not surrender — History of an historical phrase."
I venture to give a summary of my conclusions : — 1st, From the tmion
of all these testimonies, it seems certain that the General uttered either
the sentence or the word, or something like this : " Men like us never
eurrender." 2nd, Cambronne has always energetically denied having uttered
the sentence, which seems to have been invented in Paris after the battle
of Waterloo, by an editor of the Journal general. 3rd, Cambronne
denied, but with some embarrassment, it is true, havitg ever said the
icord. But if one cannot see his motive in denjing the sentence, it is
easy to understand why he denied the icord, even if he did say it,
Cambronne, who had the weakness to accept from Louis XVIII. a title
of Viscount, and who was married to an Englishwoman, wished to pass for
"a gentleman." 4th, At Nantes, where Cambronne died in 1843, it
was notorious that, spite of his repeated denials, he had said the u-ord.
5th, If we picture in our minds the scene of the 18th June, and think of
the probable state of mind in which Cambronne was in, the exasperation
resulting from the English summons, we conclude that the word was the
word absolutely suitable to the situation. It is psychologically true. And
since Cambronne did say something, this word must be the something.
41. "I was wounded and left for dead in the battle of the 18th
June" (cross-examination of Cambronne, Case of Cambronne, 5).
" General Cambronne is wounded, thrown from his horse, and supposed
to be dead " (General Petit's account). Petit specifies that Cambronne
fell during the retreat, between the fields of La Belle Alliance and La
Haye-Sainte. Colonel William Halkett {Waterloo Letters, 309) asserts
that a general of the Guard, separated from a square, surrendered to him,
and that this general was Cambronne. I do not know who the general
taken prisoner by Halkett may be, but it was certainly not Cambronne,
who at that very time lay stretched on the ground unconscious.
42. Report of Gneisenau ; Wagner, iv. 78, 82 ; von OUech, 193.
" At half-past seven," says Gneisenau, " the issue of the battle was still
tmcertain."
43. Report of Gneisenau ; Wagner, 82 ; Damitz, ii. 290, 291 ; von
28
434 WATERLOO book hi
OUech, 245 ; Gourgaud, 106 ; Colonel Janin, 39 ; Souvenirs d'un ex-
ojficier (of the 45th), 296, 297.
44. Accountof Captain deStuers of the Red Lancers; Account of General
Petit ; Letters of Colonel Freemantle, of Generals Vivian and W. Halkett,
and other officers {Waterloo Letters, 22, 108, 117, 147, 150, 162, 176,
187, 201, 222, 274, 278, 298, 309).
45. Account of General Petit ; Gourgaud, 106, 107 ; Mauduit, ii. 460-
462 ; Letters of officers of the Grant, Vivian, and Adam brigades
{Waterloo Letters, 131, 148, 149, 183, 278).
Napoleon {Mem. 163) says that during the last discharge of artillery
the Commander-in-chief of the English artillery was seriously wounded.
This is a mistake. Lord Uxbridge had his leg carried off by a shell, on
the plateau of Mont-Saint-Jean, towards a quarter past eight, at the
moment when he was galloping to join in the general attack.
46. Report of Colonel Hiller (quoted by von Ollech, 248, 249) ; Report
of Gneisenau ; Wagner, iv. 82, 83 ; Damitz, ii. 292, 293 ; Mauduit, ii.
403, 434-436 ; General Pelet's account, quoted in Victoires et Conquetes,
xxiv. 225, 226) ; Account of Commandant Heuillet {Sentinelle de FArvie'e,
8th September 1845).
47. General Petit's account (Morrisson Collection in London) ;
Mauduit, ii. 460-463 ; Letters of Colonel Murray and General W.
Halkett {Waterloo Letters, 183, 309).
After saying that Napoleon formed the square and commanded to
fire, Gourgaud addc (108, note) : "He seemed to have no wish to survive
this fatal day. He wished to die with his grenadiers, and was in the act of
entering the square when Marshal Soult stopped him, saying, ' Oh, Sire,
the enemy is too fortunate already ! ' And he turned the Emperor's
horse towards the road." This seems somewhat contradictory, for if the
Emperor gave orders to fire, apparently he was within the square. There-
fore Soult did not prevent him from entering it by uttering these senti-
mental words, which were not at all like his character.
From the concordant accounts of the eye-witnesses Petit and
Mauduit, it results that Napoleon did not leave the 1st battalion of the
1st Grenadiers until he had given Petit orders to fall back, and that he
afterwards rode at a foot pace some distance ahead of the two battalions
which formed his protection. He outdistanced them, as will be seen later,
near Le Caillou, where he joined the 1st battalion of the 1st Chasseurs.
48. Duuring's note (comm. by M. de Stuers). See Damitz, ii. 292, 293 ;
and Radet's report to Soult, Beaumont, 19th June (War Arch., Army
of the North).
In the papers of the Secretary of State's office (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1940)
is to be found this letter of Drouot to the Emperor, 25 th April 1815 :
" I demand a letter of naturalisation for the commander of the battalion
of the chasseurs a pied, the Dutchman Duuring. In 1814 he had asked
me to allow him to accompany Your Majesty to Elba, but as I had
already appointed Mallet, Duuring wept for a very long time in my room.
He is a first-rate officer."
49. Notes of Commandant Duuring (comm. by M. de Stuers).
CHAP. VI NOTES 435
BOOK m CHAPTER VI
1. Report of Gneisenau : "It was then half-past nine." C. of W.
(Miiffling), Hist 36 : " It was nine o'clock. It was quite dark."
2. Gneisenau's report; Muffling, Aus meinem Leben, 217, Hist. 36,
37 ; von OUech, Geschichte des Feldzurjes von IS 15, 252 ; Letters from
officers of the Adam and Maitland Brigades {Waterloo Letters, 245, 298).
Probably in his anxiety to prove that he might have dispensed with the
Prussians' help in pursuing the French, Wellington denied having
seen Bliicher at La Belle Alliance. "This meeting," he writes to
Mudford {Supi^l. Despatches, x. 508), only " took place at Genappe,
after eleven o'clock at night." This denial cannot prevail against
the testimony of Gneisenau, in a public report written the day after
the battle. Moreover, there is the testimony of Miiffling, who was
present at the interview {Aus meinem Leben, 217, and Hist. 36, 37); of
Pozzo di Borgo (report of Wolkonsky, 19th June); of General Hiigel (letter
to the King of Wurtemberg, 23rd June ; and finally, that of General Vivian
(JVaterloo Letters, 153): "I have not the least doubt that when I saw the
Duke (near Rossomme) he had met Bliicher. I offered to pursue the enemy,
but he said to me : " Our troops have had a severe day. The Prussians
will pursue ; as for you, stop your brigade." After his interview with
Bliicher, Wellington pushed on to Rossomme, or as far as the hamlet of
the Maison du Roi (letter of Hervey, Nineteenth Ce-ntury, March 1893 ;
Kennedy, 151), where the head of the troops halted ; but he did not go
to Genappe that evening. This is quite plain from the Memoirs of
Miiffling, in which it is stated that Miiffling came to Waterloo to report
to the Duke what had taken place at Genappe, from Cotton's account
(156), and from several passages in the JVaterloo Letters.
3. Report of Gneisenau ; Muffling, Aus meinem Leben, 217 ; above
quoted letter of Hiigel, 23rd June.
4. Wellington to Lady Webster, Brussels, 1 9th June, half-past eight
{Despatches, Sxippl. x. 53).
5. Report of Gneisenau ; Report of Wellington, Miiffling, Aus
TTieinem Leben, 217 • Letter of Hervey (above quoted); Wagner, 84;
Damitz, 296, 297 ; von Ollech, 252 ; Waterloo Letters, 153, 274, 309.
6. Letters from officers of the brigades under Somerset, Vivian,
Maitland, Adam, and Halkett {Waterloo Letters, 54, 150, 245, 273, 274,
319, 341) ; Lieutenant Woodberry, Journal, 314.
7. The Anglo-Hanoverians had 9,063 killed or wounded, without
including 1,623 missing {Despatches of Wellington, xii. 485) ; the
Dutch - Belgians; about 3,200 (van Loben, 304, 305) ; the corps of
Nassau and of Briinswick, 1,330 (figures given by Charras after the
Geschichte des herzogliche braunschiceigschen Arm^'e-corps and the History of
the King's German Legion) ; the Prussians, 6,999 (Wagner, iv. 85) ;
general total, 20,592.
On the casualties of the French, see farther our note 66 on page 252.
436 WATERLOO book hi
8. Mercer, Journal of the Campaign, 1, 333-336, 342, 347, 348 ;
Letters from officers of the Eoyal Artillery, of the Maitland brigade,
and of the German Legion {Waterloo Letters, 202, 221, 241, 406) ;
Dumesnil's account, quoted by Mauduit, ii. 452-454 ; Account of the
wounded English officers, quoted by Cotton, Voice of Waterloo, Appendix,
303-313.
The removal of the wounded, who were transferred to Brussels, to
Nivelles, and to Namur, commenced on the 19th ; but they were so
numerous that many remained on the battlefield until the evening of
the 21st.
The robbers of the dead murdered the wounded indiscriminately,
without stopping to see whether they were compatriots, allies, or enemies.
Several of these miserable scoundrels were shot by the English.
I have not found in any authentic document the facts related by
Vaulabelle, of French and Prussian wounded continuing to fight on the
straw on which they lay, and who, for want of weapons, tore at each
other with their hands. However, this is not impossible. Mercer says
(i. 343) that during the night of the battle, an officer of lancers, mortally
wounded, whom he was trying to assist, turned on him a look of fury,
and violently dashed the water he held to his lips, in his face.
9. Daily notes of Foy, and letter of Foy to Guillerainot, 20th
October 1815 (comm. by Count de Foy) ; Reille's account (War. Arch.);
Souvenirs d'un ex-officier (of the 45th), 297, 298. See official report of
Gneisenau.
10. Account of the chief of the squadrons, de Stuers (comm. by M. de
Stuers) ; Mauduit, ii. 451-458 ; Waterloo Letters, 104, 116.
11. Account of General Petit ; Account of Duuring. See Napoleon,
Mem. 163, 164.
According to Mauduit (ii. 443, 444), the Emperor, about eight o'clock
at night, had sent for that purpose an order to Pire, whose cavalry
division was almost intact, to gallop in front of Genappe, to take up his
position there, and to rally the fugitives. The testimony of Mauduit, then
sergeant of the 1st battalion of the 1st Grenadiers, is not without
authority respecting the facts he witnessed. But how did he get knowledge
of this order from the Emperor ? In any case, the order did not reach
Pire, who withdrew, as we have seen, and passed to the west of Genappe.
12. The bridge of Genappe is to-day three yards broad. But accord-
ing to the recollections of the inhabitants and the Histoire des Communes
beiges of Tarlier and Wauters, its breadth was increased when it was
rebuilt
13. Souvenirs d'un ex-officier (of the 45th), 298 ; Letter from Brussels,
22nd June 1815 (quoted in the account of Mont-Saint-Jean, 245) ; Report
of Bellina to Davout, 23rd June (War Arch.) ; Wagner, 84 ; Damitz, ii.
297] von OUech, 253 ; Napoleon, Mm. 267 ; Radet to Soult, Saint-
Germain, 22nd June ; to Davout, Paris, 26th June ; certificate of Radet's
physician, Paris, 26th June (Radet's dossier. War Arch.).
Napoleon (167) says that this accumulation of vehicles was caused by the
soldiers of the waggons, who had purposely obstructed the bridge in order
CHAP. VI NOTES 437
to stop the Prussians. According to other and more probable versions,
it arose from the natural course of events.
14. Accounts of General Petit and Commandant Duuring ; Mauduit,
ii. 478, 479 ; Souvenirs d!un ex-officier, 298, 299.
The dimensions of the Dyle (breadth, 3 yards, depth, 0-85 cent or
0'15 cent, as the lock gates are raised or lowered) were given me by the
burgomaster of Gtenappe, M. Berger.
15. Report of Gneisenau ; Letter from Bliicher to his wife {Bliicher in
Brie/en ausdeii FeldrAigeyi, 1813-1815, 150) ; Letter of Hiigel to the King
of Wiirtemberg, 23rd June (quoted by Pfister, Aus dem Lager der VerhUn-
deten, 370) ; Napoleon, Mem. 167, 168; Peyrusse, Meinorialet Archives, 312.
These diamonds, according to Peyrusse, had been ceded to the
Emperor by Joseph. They were seized by an officer of the name of
Keller, who sold them to Ma we, an English jeweller. See on this
subject, in the catalogue of the Tussaud museum, the letter from Bullock,
who bought the carriage from the Prince Regent, to whom it had been
given, and exhibited it in the Egyptian Hall.
It is also stated that from this carriage was taken a bundle of copies
of a proclamation of the Emperor : " To the Belgians and to the
inhabitants of the left bank of the Rhine," bearing the anticipated date,
" Brussels, Imperial Palace of Laeken."
16. Letter of Captain Marquiaud (Spedateur mUitaire, 1827) ;
Damitz, ii. 297. Captain Marquiaud, aide-de-camp and nephew of
Duhesme, remained in the inn of the Roi-d! Egpagne until the death of the
general, to whom he acted as a self-appointed nurse. His testimony
destroys the odious legend, related by all French historians without an
exception, that Duhesme, fatally wounded at Genappe itself, and having
surrendered his sword, was assassinated in cold blood by a hussar (lancer)
of Brunswick.
17. Bliicher to his wife, battlefield of La Belle Alliance, undated
(Genappe, 19th June, towards 1 a.m.) {Bliicher in Briejen, 150).
18. Letter of Bliicher to Knesebeck (quoted by von OUech, 254).
19. Report of Gneisenau ; Notes of Lieutenant Julius, prisoner of
the French (quoted by von Ollech, 256, 257); Souvenirs d^un ex-officier,
290, 300 ; Wagner, iv. 84 ; Fleury de Chaboulon, ii. 181 ; Belation de la
Bataille de Mont-Saint-Jean, 89, 90, 94.
20. Durutte's account {Sentinelle de FAnne'e of 8th March 1838) ;
Mauduit, ii. 442, note ; Ney's letter to the Duke of Otranto {Journal des
Debats, 29th June) ; Larrey, Relation medicale de campagnes et de voyages,
10, 13.
The brutalities suffered by Larrey, and the danger he ran, form a
contrast with the care bestowed upon Duhesme. Larry himself seems to
think that it was out of spite that the Prussian general gave the order to
have him shot. Larrey bore a slight resemblance to the Emperor, and on
that day was wearing a gray coat. The horsemen who took him prisoner
led him to their general, saying that he was Napoleon. Exasperated
with the mistake, the general sentenced to death the intruder who had so
grievously disappointed his hopes.
438 WATERLOO book hi
Let us add, however, that, according to Mauduit (ii. 472, 473), General
Durrien, head of the staff of the 6th Corps, who did not resemble
Napoleon, came very near being shot by order of another Prussian general,
and that he owed his life to the interference of Colonel Donoesberg. F. de
Chaboulon (ii. 181, 182), whose testimony is confirmed by local traditions,
also speaks of wounded soldiers whose lives were taken, and of slaughtered
prisoners. It is asserted that when the Prussians set the barns of Le
Caillou on fire, they did not take the trouble to bring out the wounded
French first. It appears probable, if not certain, that during the pursuit
they were too often pitiless.
21. Gneisenau's report ; above-quoted note of a captive Prussian
officer ; Relation de la Bataille de Mo7it-Saint-Jean, 89, 90, 94 ; Report of
Bellinato Davout, 23rd of June (War Arch.); Daniitz, ii. 298 ; Mauduit,
ii. 472 ; Fleury de Chaboulon, ii. 182.
22. Except the Tippelskirch brigade (Pirch's corps), which had
followed Billow as far as Genappe, and RiJder's cavalry (Zieten's corps),
led by Gneisenau, with that of Prince William.
23. Von OUech, 254. See Daraitz, ii. 297, 298. The cavalry of Prince
William did not join Gneisenau until early in the morjiing of the 19th.
24. "I have, I believe, 150 pieces of cannon, and Bliicher tells
me that he has got sixty more" (Wellington to Lady Webster,
Brussels, 19th of June, Desixdches, Suppl. x. 531). A list, signed
Wood, mentions 122 pieces of artillery, 344 chariots, ammunition
carts, etc., taken from the enemy on the battlefield itself {Despatches, Siqjpl.
X. 547). Wagner (iv. 85) says 250 cannons. At any rate, the whole
artillery was lost, with the exception, perhaps, of three or four batteries.
25. We read in Charras (ii. 91, 92) a paragraph on the defence
of the flags ; but I have found no authentic documents to confirm these
details. It is, however, a positive fact that the Prussians captured
no flags. The only eagles lost by the French army, those of the 45th
and the 105th, were carried off by the English, about half-past two, at
the time of the first assault of d'Erlon's corps (see p. 198, note 47).
26. Mauduit, ii. 480-482.
27. Damitz, ii. 298 ; von Ollech, 254. See Mauduit, ii. 483, who
says he heard in the distance the beating of this solitary drum. Damitz
thinks that the horse had been unharnessed from the Emperor's carriage,
taken at Genappe. This seems hardly probable, for it is difficult to admit
that from Genappe, the two infantry battalions had only one drum left
between them. More likely this horse was one of those belonging to the
Imperial carriage overturned by the inhabitants of Quatre-Bras, in order
to plunder it at the cross roads (local traditions).
28. Von Ollech, 254 ; Damitz, ii. 298, 299. This inn was situated on
the border of the road of Charleroi to Brussels, between the Roman way
and the village of Frasnes.
29. Napoleon, Mem. 168.
30. " Order to the Brigadier-General, Remond, to assume the command
of the Gerard division and to proceed to Quatre-Bras to take up positions
there " (order of Soult, 18th of June, in front of Le Caillou, Register of the
CHAP. VI NOTES 439
Chief of the Staff). This order bears no indication as to time ; but we may
presume that it was wTitten between eight and nine o'clock. (Previous to
this, a retreat was not contemplated ; there was consequently no reason for
ordering a body of troops to " take up their positions " at Quatre-Bras.)
The order must have arrived at Fleurus at the earliest at eleven o'clock.
31. "On the evening of that fatal day, I received the order to
support the retreat. I crossed the Sambre at Charleroi" (Manuscript
Memoirs of General Matis, quoted by Edgar Quinet ; Waterloo, 437, 438).
This is rather brief for an explanation. On the other hand, it has been
seen that Soult's order was addressed, not to Colonel Matis, commanding
the division for the time, but to General Remond. Several general
officers, notably Curely, were in the army without holding any command.
Remond was undoubtedly one of these. Did he join Matis? Did the
latter evade his orders, or did he persuade him that it was too late to
carry them out 1 Had Soult sent a direct despatch to Matis ? All
remains obscure ; certain it is, however, that Matis received orders to
proceed to Quatre-Bras, and that he did not obey them.
32. Souvenirs cVnn ex-oMder (of the 45th), 299, 300. See Napoleon,
Mt'ra. 168 ; see manuscript notes of Colonel Baudus.
33. Xapoleon, Mem. 168. See letter of Soult to Grouchy, Philippe-
ville, 19th June (Register of the Chief of the Staff) : " . . . I wrote to you
last night to recross the Sambre " ; and the letter of Soult to Napoleon,
Laon, 22nd June (War Arch.): "The officer who brings me the news
of Marshal Grouchy's return, is the same I sent to Quatre-Bras." As we
shall see later, the officer sent by Soult joined Grouchy about half-past ten,
but he did not hand him the despatch, having undoubtedly lost it in his
distress ; he merely announced the defeat of the army.
Napoleon says {Mem. 168) that he found at Quatre-Bras General Neigre
with the reserve parks of artillery. This seems to be a mistake. No
French or German document mentions the presence of such parks at
Quatre-Bras, and we know, on the other hand, that at any rate the most
important number of the artillery carriages had remained at Charleroi.
34. Manuscript notes of Colonel Baudus (communicated by his
grandson, M. de Montenon).
35. Manuscript notes of Baudus, See Napoleon, Mem. 168, 169.
The Emperor's assertion (Mem. 1 69) that he sent Jerome from Quatre-
Bras to Marchienne, with orders to rally the army between Avesnes and
Maubeuge, is not correct. According to the letter he wrote on 15th
July 1815 to Queen Catherine {Mem. dii Roi Jerome, vii. 24), Jerome was
separated from the Emperor long before reaching Quatre-Bras (most likely
in the plains of La Haye-Sainte, as the editor of the Memoires du Roi
Jerome is inclined to suppose). He retreated with a battalion and a
squadron which he was able to keep in order, crossed the Sambre at
Marchienne, and reached Avesnes. Here, without any other mandate
than his patriotism and his devotion to the Emperor, he rallied a portion
of the fugitive troops and led them to Laon (22nd June), where he handed
over the command to the chief of the staff.
36. Journal of the Sejours de I'Empereur (Nat Arch. AF. * iv. 437).
440 WATERLOO book hi
37. Local traditions ; Maiiduit, Derniers Jours de la Grande Arme'e, ii.
484, 485 ; Notes of the Abbe Pierard (communicated by M. Clement
Lyon of Charleroi) ; Report of Colonel de Bellina to Davout, 23rd June
(War Arcb.). It is Captain Mauduit who asserts that the officer in
command of the garrison at Charleroi Avas intoxicated.
38. Local traditions ; Souvenirs d'un ex-ojfkier (of the 45th), 302 ;
Mauduit, ii. 487-489 ; Notes of the Abbe Pierard.
39. Peyrusse, Memorial et Archives, 312 ; Mauduit, ii. 488, 489 ;
Souvenirs d'un ex-officier, 302 ; local traditions ; Notes of the Abbe
Pierard. Fleury de Chaboulon (ii. 184) says that the bags of gold were
brought back by those who had been entrusted with them ; but Peyrusse
confirms the local traditions that the treasury was entirely pillaged.
It was not the army treasury, but the private treasury of the
Emperor, which, on leaving Paris, amounted to one million in gold, and
200,000 francs in silver (letter of Napoleon to Peyrusse, 7th June,
quoted by Peyrusse, 310).
40. Bassano to Caulaincourt, Paris, 25th June (quoted by Ernouf,
Maret Duke of Bassano, 657, 658) ; Fleury de Chaboulon, ii. 183. See
Las-Cases, iii. 93.
Many of the letters and reports which there was no time to destroy, were
seized by a Dutch officer who, being taken prisoner on the 17th of June
and confined at Charleroi, appointed himself commander of the place on
the 19th, after the French had left. These papers were piiblished under
the title of Portefeuille de Buonaparte pris a Charleroi (in 8vo, The
Hague, 1815). See on the subject of this pamphlet, erroneously treated
as apocryphal by some bibliographers, Henry Houssaye, 1815, i. 497,
note.
41. Order of Bliicher, Gosselies, 19th June (quoted by von Ollech,
268) ; C. of W. (Miiffling), 41-43 ; Wagner, iv. 85 ; Damitz, ii. 318, 319,
347-350 ; local traditions.
42. Gourgaud, 127.
43. Local traditions ; Relation of the Amhirjit of London, Iii. 441 ;
Napoleon, Mem. 169.
44. Report of Colonel de Bellina to Davout, 23rd June (War Arch.) ;
Gourgaud, 130.
45. Journal des Scjours de I'Empereur (Nat. Arch. Afl". iv. 437) ;
Napoleon, Mem. 169; Relation of the Amhigti of London, Iii. 441 ;
Relation de la Bataille de Mont-Saint- Jean, 99.
46. Fleury de Chaboulon, ii. 185. See 187, and account of Trauffe,
in command of the garrison at Mezieres (Archives at Mezicres).
47. Orders of Soult, Philippeville, 19th June (War Arch.). Four
only of these orders are transcribed on the Register of the Chief of the
Staff. See Gourgaud, 130 ; Fleury de Chaboulon, ii. 185.
According to Fleury de Chaboulon, the Emperor could not have seen
Soult again at Philippeville, and the instructions relative to the orders
to be drawn up and sent by the chief of the staff, were dictated to the Duke
of Bassano. But why, in any case, to the Duke of Bassano, since Bertrand,
who in similar circumstances always filled the place of the chief of the staff.
CHAP. VI NOTES 441
was present 1 But from Gourgaud's testimony (131), implicitly confirmed
by the text of certain orders from Soult, it seems clear that the Marshal
did receive, at Philippeville, direct instructions from the Emperor.
Gourgaud says that the Emperor also sent to Generals Rapp, Lecourbe,
and Lamarque, orders to retreat by forced marches to Paris. There is
no trace of these despatches in the Register of the Chief of the Staff in the
Archives of War. Besides, Rapp wrote from Wissemburg to Davout, on
24th June, that he was awaiting orders to know whether he was to return
towards Paris (War Arch., Army of the Rhine).
48. Fleury de Chaboidon, ii 185.
49. Memoirs of Mme. de X. I am not at liberty to designate
these Memoirs more precisely, one of the most precious documents in
existence on the last days of the Empire.
50. Fleury de Chaboulon quotes the text of this letter, which Charraa
and others consider authentic. I am not so positive about it ; but if
these are not the very words of the letter, they probably give the drift
of it. I know, on the other hand, thanks to the communication I
received from ilme. X.'s manuscript Memoirs (above quoted), that Joseph
knew the chief details of the battle of Waterloo, from the afternoon of
the 20th of June, through the letter aforesaid.
51. The Bulletin, dated from Laon, 20th June, was published in a
special supplement of the Moniteur of the 21st June. This supplement,
covering half a printed sheet, on the first pages only, must have appearetl
rather late in the afternoon. According to the somewhat contradictory
testimonies of Fleury de Chaboulon (ii. 192, 193), of Captain de Vatry
(Notes on the Hundred Days, quoted in the Memoirs du Marechal de
Grouchy, iv. 113, 114), and the Nuits de V Abdication, a copy of which
exists at the Archives of Foreign Affairs (1802), it appears that this
Bulletin was commenced at Philippeville on the 19th, completed at
Laon on the evening of the 20th, finally re-read and modified at the
Elysee, on the morning of the 21st.
52. Gourgaud, 131 ; Fleury de Chaboulon, ii. 187 ; Account of
Traulle, commanding the garrison at Mezieres (Archives at Mezieres).
Traulle saw the three carriages arrive at Mezieres.
53. Rogniat, Repoiise aux Notes critiques de Napolean, 279.
54. Relation de la Campagne de Mont-Saint-Jean, 100, 101 ; Fleury
de Chaboulon, ii. 187.
55. Account of Traulle (in command of the garrison at Mezieres).
See General Rogniat, Reponse aux Notes critiques de Napoleon, 279.
56. Radet to Soult, 22nd June (Radefs dossier. War Arch.): "I
reached Laon at six o'clock, and I was beginning to rally the fugitives,
when the Emperor arrived."
57. Notes of Radet for his advocate (1816), quoted by Combier,
Memoires de Radet, 340) ; Devismes, Histmre de Laon, ii. 240, 241 ;
Fleury de Chaboulon, ii. 289, 290. Devismes makes a mistake when he
says that the Emperor arrived by the Rheims road. He came by the
Marie road, for Traulle reports that, early in the morning of the 20th,
Napoleon breakfasted on two eggs, at the Hotel of the Grand-Turk at
442 JFATERLOO book hi
Maubert-Fontaine, and rested there for a few hours. Now Maubert-
Fontaine is on the way from Mczieres to Laon, through Maree.
58. Gourgaud, 131 ; Napoleon, Mem. 169, 170 ; Fleury de
Chaboulon, ii. 189, 190 ; Devismes, Histoire de Laon, ii. 240-242. See
Soult to Davout, Laon, 21st June ; Napoleon, Laon, 22nd June
(Register of Major-General). From an order to Neigre, this general,
after mounting all the batteries he could find at La Fere, was to go to
Paris to reorganise the field artillery.
59. Soult did not reach Laon before the morning of the 21st June
(Soult to Davout, 21st June, Register of the Chief of the Staff).
60. From Radet's account, it may be inferred that the Emperor left
Laon between eight and nine o'clock. Devismes (ii. 244) says, at ten
o'clock, the Journal des Sdjours de I'Empereur (Nat. Arch. A.F. iv.
437), at eleven o'clock.
61. According to Fleury de Chaboulon (ii. 190-192), it would
seem that the Emperor was very undecided on the 19th and 20th of June.
He made up his mind only at Laon, and although he was inclined to
remain with the army, he yielded to the advice and arguments of those
around him.
It is probable that a deliberation took place at Laon, as to what steps
should be taken, and that arguments were brought forward, for and against
the return to Paris, since this is reported by Fleury de Chaboulon, who,
as a rule, is a most reliable witness. But it seems none the less certain,
that the Emperor left Philippeville with the positive intention of going
to Paris. In the manuscript Memoirs of Mme. de X., an invaluable
document already quoted, we read : " In the afternoon of the 20th June,
I heard from Mme. de Rovigo, who called on me, that the Emperor was
on his way to Paris. King Joseph was informed of this." Now, if on
the 20th of June, King Joseph knew of the imminent return of the
Emperor, it was through the letter written, as previously seen, at
Philippeville on the 19th of June. In the relation of the Amhigii of
London (lii. 441), which Montholon {Ee'cits, ii. 84) asserts the Emperor
considered as trustworthy, we are told that it was there (during the
halt on the banks of the Sambre) that he debated whether he should
return to Paris, and that he decided to do so in spite of the objections of
several bystanders. In a report to Davout of the 23rd June (War
Arch.), Colonel de Bellina says : " The Emperor took post at Philippeville,
bound for Paris." Lastly, in none of his accounts from St. Helena, nor in
the conversations reported by Las-Cases, Montholon, Antomarchi, does the
Emperor allude to tlie pretended advice proffered to him, urging him to
go to Paris against his will. He has on the contrary repeated again and
again that, of his own accord, and without any hesitation, he had taken
this step, which circumstances rendered inevitable, "his presence with
the army being useless for several days, and his most dangerous enemies
being in Paris." (See Napoleon, Mem. 171; Gourgaud, 132, 133;
Montholon, i. 3, ii. 178-180; Las-Cases, i. 20.)
In conclusion, it is evident that if Napoleon had planned not to leave
the army, he would most probably have remained with the chief of the
CHAP. VI NOTES 44S
staff at Philippeville until the 20th of June : at all events, upon reaching
Laon, he would at once have gone up to the town, to establish himself at
the Prefecture, instead of making a simple halt at the foot of the moun-
tain, in the courtyard of the Hotel de la Poste.
62. Gourgaud, 132, 133 ; Napoleon, Mem. 171 ; Montholon, EecitSj
i. 3, ii. 179 ; Las-Cases, i. 20.
63. If Bonaparte had not abandoned his army in Egj'pt, he would
neither have become Consul nor Emperor. If Napoleon had not abandoned
his army in Russia he would not, so to speak, have caused to spring from
the earth the "Grande Armee" of 1813. And lastly, if he had not
abandoned his army after Waterloo, the vote for his deposition Avould have
surprised him at Laon in the midst of this army, as had happened the
year before at Fontainebleau. No doubt, in 1815, his going to Paris did
not arrest the march of events, since he was compelled to abdicate there ;
but he hoped, and with just reason, that his presence would have had
a very different effect
64. It was not until the night of the 21st to the 22nd of June that
Soult received at Laon information from General Dumonceau, in command
of the 2nd military di\'ision, to the effect, that according to a despatch of
General Bonnemains, dated Dinant, 20th June, Grouchy's army had
recrossed the Sambre at Namur (Soult to Grouchy, 22nd of June, seven
o'clock in the morning, and to Napoleon, 22nd of June, six o'clock in
the morning. Register of Chief of the Staff).
65. Fleury de Chaboulon ii. 191. See report of Davout to the
Commission of the Government, 23rd June (Nat. Arch. AF. iv. 1936) :
" We have now some grounds for hope, founded on the fact that the
portion of the army acting under Marshal Grouchy, about whose fate there
was such grave anxiety, is preserved to the country."
66. As no returns were drawn up of the losses of the French army at
Waterloo, they can only be approximately estimated. Gourgaud (128)
computes them at 26,000 men, of whom 7,500 were prisoners. From the
manuscript Memoirs of Mme. de X., who received her information
from Joseph, 30,000 men were left on the field of battle. A confidential
report sent from Avesnes to Davout on 20th June (War Arch.) estimates
the kiUed, wounded, and prisoners at from 30,000 to 40,000.
If we consult the lists of the army corps engaged in the battle
of Waterloo, we find on the 29 th of June a total of men present under
arms amounting to 26,715, and on the 1st of July 32,646 (War Arch.,
portfolio of the situations). As the army at Waterloo numbered 74,000
men, we must have lost 41,500 men. But this calculation is incorrect :
IsL Of these 32,646 men assembled on the 1st of Julv, a certain number
had just been drafted from the depots to the battalions and squadrons of
war. 2nd. Many able and willing men had not yet joined. 3rd. Among
the soldiers who had escaped from the disaster, crowds had deserted, some
because they were weary of fighting, others because they thought the war
was ended, " since the Emperor had abdicated." Even among the soldiers
who had joined their corps from the 19th to the 23rd of June, there were
numberless desertions as soon as the aMication was known.
444 WATERLOO book hi
From the Tableau des Officiers tues et blesses pendant les Gv^rres de
VEmpire, by M. Martiuieu, clerk of the War Arch, (a work in the press),
the officers lost at the battle of Waterloo are estimated at 720, and at the
battles of Ligny and Quatre-Bras at 346. I have previously given the
total number of killed and wounded at Ligny and Quatre-Bras as 13,500.
Therefore, if the proportion was the same at Waterloo between officers and
men, there must have been in this action at least 27,000 killed and
wounded French. In conclusion, probably out of the 74,000 French
who fought at Waterloo, 25,000 to 27,000 were killed or wounded, 8,000
to 10,000 taken prisoners, 30,000 rallied to their corps, and from 8,000
to 10,000 deserted.
67. Soult to Napoleon, Rocroi, 20th June (Register of Major-General);
Jerome to Napoleon, Wavre, 21st June (quoted in the Memoires diL Roi
Jerome, vii. 131).
We have seen in the preceding note that this nucleus of an army
increased rapidly ; on the 22nd of June, already 14,800 men had
reassembled at Laon (Soult to Napoleon, 22nd June, War Arch.).
BOOK III CHAPTER VII
1. See pp. 168, 169.
2. Journal of the Bonnemains brigade ; Report of Grouchy to
Napoleon, Rosiren, 19th June (War Arch.) ; Letter of Exelmans (quoted
by Gerard, Dernier es Observations, 13, 24) ; Account of an officer of
Grouchy's army (papers of General G.) ; Grouchy, Relation succincte, 34 ;
de Blocqueville's and Bella's declarations (Relation succincte, Appendix
iv. 5, 50). General Berton {Precis des Batailles de Fleurus et de
Waterloo, 54-56) says that Exelmans' corps was sent first by Nil-Saint-
Martin towards the road from Namur to Louvain, and that it did not
get near La Baraque till about two o'clock, when he heard the roar of
Vandamme's cannon. This assertion is confuted, not only by all the
above-quoted witnesses, but by Reyher's report to Biilow (quoted by von
Ollech, 208). What is true, however, is, as we shall see presently, that
the Berton brigade (but it alone) was detached from La Baraque towards
Neuf-Sart. It was from there, undoubtedly, that Berton pushed forward
part of it, in the direction of the Louvain road.
3. Von Ollech, 208 ; Damitz, ii. 245, 247. Only at noon did
Pirch's corps begin to pass through Wavre. At noon, Zieten's corps
also started on its march from Bierges to Oliain.
4. Grouchy to Exelmans, Gembloux, 17th June, 7 p.m. (War Arch.).
5. Above quoted letter of Exelmans ; Journal of the Bonnemains
brigade ; above quoted account of an officer of Grouchy's army. See
Grouchy's report to the Emperor, Rosiren, 19th June, and de Blocque-
ville's and Bella's declarations in the Relation succincte. Exelmans, in
his letter, does not say that he fell back with the bulk of his troops, but
CHAP. VII NOTES 445
this is positively stated by Bonnemains and confirmed by the details
given in the report from the Prussian Rehyer on the battle of La
Baraque.
6. Grouchy to Vandamme, Gemblonx, 17th June, p.m. (towards
ten o'clock), quoted by Grouchy, Relation succincte, App. iii. 20.
As every indication shows that Grouchy made a confusion between
Walhain and Sart-a-Walhain (see p. 126, note 27), hencefortb, in order
to obviate further confusion, I change Sart-a- Walhain into Walhain in
the orders and letters of Grouchy.
7. Grouchy to Vandamme, Gembloux, 17th June (War Arch.).
8. On this long and useless halt at Saint- Vincent, see manuscript
account of Lefol (comm. by M. Paul Marmottan) ; Letter of Berthezene
(quoted by Gerard, Dernihres Observations, 25); and Berthezene, Mevi.
ii. 391.
9. Manuscript account from Lefol (before quoted). See report of
Grouchy to Napoleon, Rosiren, 19th June ; and Relation succincte, 34.
10. Report of Reyher to Biilow (quoted by von OUech, 208).
According to this report, it is absolutely impossible that the battle of
La Baraque should have commenced before two o'clock.
11. " . . . The enemy has not disturbed us yet Only a few patrols
are to be seen in the direction of Chastre. I have sent out three
reconnaissances. None have returned. According to V. E.'s order, we
shall keep our position here as long as Kie enemy does not press us"
(Ledebur to Biilow, Mont- Saint- Guibert, 18th June, half an hour after
mid-day, quoted by von OUech, 207).
Chastre lies to the south-east of Mont -Saint -Guibert. The troops
seen there by the Prussians were the advanced guard of Vallin's cavalry,
which, recalled from the right to the left, was now flanking the march
of Grouchy's column. As for the Vincent brigade, which Exelmans had
posted at the farm of La Plaquerie, the Prussians had no intimation of
its being so near to them. It is true that an hour later, Vincent proved
no longer vigilant, for he aUowed the whole detachment of Ledebur to
pass without his perceiving it, between him and La Baraque. He did
not join his corps until he had received orders from Grouchy.
12. Reyher's report (above quoted). See Wagner, iv. 58, 59 ; Damitz,
ii 245, 246.
13. Damitz, i. 247 ; von OUech, 208, 209.
At two o'clock, one-half only of Pirch's corps (Tippelskirch and
Kraft's brigades, and Thuemen's and Schlilenburg's cavalry) had passed
through Wavre. Pirch himself was stUl at Wavre.
14. Von OUech, 209 ; Wagner, iv. 59 ; Damitz, ii 247. Pirch,
says Damitz, had been warned by the scouts of Colonel von Sohr, who was
posted with his brigade in the ^'icinity of the bridge of Bierges, and
also by a despatch from Ledebur. The estafette must have ridden at
full gaUop.
15. Exelmans' letters to Gerard, 1st February 1830 (quoted by Gerard,
Dernieres Observations, 1 3) ; Account from an oflBcer of Grouchy's army
(papers of General G.). Exelmans says that he sent word to Grouchy
446 WATERLOO book hi
expressing his surprise, that the latter should give this order at the very
moment the Emperor's cannon commanded him to march beyond
the Dyle.
We must take this opportunity of destroying a legend reported by
General du Barail {Souvenirs, iii. 185), after a story of Marshal Canrobert,
who had it from some veteran officer of the " Grande Armee." Exelmans
is reported to have said to Gerard : "You are the oldest of the generals
of division here present. If the Marshal should disappear, you must take
the command and march to the cannonading. I am going to blow out
the brains of this d b !"
For two reasons these words cannot have been uttered. The first
is that Exelmans and Gerard were not together at any moment of the
day, — neither during the march in which Exelmans commanded the
advanced guard, and Gerard the 2nd echelon ; neither at two o'clock,
when Exelmans was at La Baraque, and Gerard at the head of his corps,
between Nil-Saint- Vincent and Corbais ; nor at five o'clock, when
Exelmans was on the right towards Basse-Wavre, and Gerard on the left
at the mill of Bierges. The second reason is that Exelmans must have
been aware that " if Grouchy disappeared," the command would fall to
Vandamme, a general of division since 1799, and not to Gerard, promoted
to that rank only in 1812.
16. Grouchy, Relation succincte, 34, 35 ; von Ollech, 209 ; Damitz,
ii. 248. Now Grouchy confuses Dion-le-Mont with Dion-le-Val, as he
confused Walhain v/ith Sart-a-Walhain.
17. Grouchy, Relation sicccincte, 35.
18. Grouchy, Relation succincte, 35 ; Interrogatory of Bella, de
Blocqueville's declaration (Appendix iv. 44).
19. Grouchy, Relation succincte, 35, 36 ; Zenowicz, Waterloo, Deposi-
tion, 30. Zenowicz states that he handed the despatch to Grouchy
between three and four o'clock. This assertion accords with Grouchy's
statement that Soult's letter reached him after the Prussians' retreat from
the defile of La Huselle (at three o'clock at the earliest, according to
German documents), and on the return of his reconnaissance towards the
Dyle. The assertion of Le Senecal (Grouchy, Relation succincte, App.
iv. 8), that the despatch was handed to Grouchy towards half-past twelve,
at the moment of the attack of the Prussian rear-guard in the wood of
Limelette (La Huselle) — an attack which began at two at the earliest — is
obviously incorrect.
20. I gave the text of this letter, p. 181, note 40.
21. In truth, Zenowicz (29, 30) declares that Soult did not hand
him the despatch till a quarter past eleven, though it was dated ten
o'clock. " I had been galloping for a few minutes," he says, " when 1
first heard the cannonade." This detail seems to confirm the correctness
of Zenowicz's assertion.
Zenowicz is far from being trustworthy on all points. He
reports (29) that at ten o'clock the Emperor said to him in front of Le
Caillou : " You must return and rejoin me here when Grouchy arrives.
I long for him to be in direct communication and in line of battle with
CHAP. VII NOTES 447
us." The wortls which Zenowicz attributes to the Emperor contradict
flagrantly his written order: "His Majesty requests that you should
direct your movements upon Wavre, and that you should arrive as soon
as possible." Grouchy could not, at the same moment, march upon
Wavre, and aid in prolonging the right of the Emperor's troops.
22. Grouchy 's examination of Bella ; Bella's declaration ; le Senecal's
declaration (Grouchy, Relation succincte, App. iv. 9, 45, 49, 50). See
report from Grouchy to Napoleon, Rosiren, 19th June, 9 a.m. (War
Arch.).
23. Letter of Berthezene, quoted by Gerard, Demieres Observations, 25.
In a rather confused letter, full of inaccuracies (Vandamme to Simon
Loriere, Ghent, 9th February 1830, War Arch., 18th June 1815), Van-
damme asserts also that Grouchy accosted him in front of AVavre, with a
triumphant air saying : "I have just had an order from the Emperor to
unite the whole right wing before Wavre. I am glad to say that I
carried out this order two hours ago." A'andamme, according to his own
testimony, viewed things quite differently, and would have given the
Marshal the same advice as that given by Gerard at Walhain.
24. Order to Pajol, 18th June, road from Walhain to Wavre (quoted
by Grouchy, Relation succincte, App. iii. 31). In a duplicate at the
War Arch, we read Bielge (Bierges) instead of Limale ; but in the original
pencil note, Limale must have been written (since Pajol was marching on
Limale). See Grouchy's report to Napoleon, Rosiren, 19th June (War
Arch.) ; Grouchy, Relation succincte, 37 ; Pajol, Le General Pajol, iii. 229.
Grouchy declares that he explained and amplified his written order,
by saying to the aide-de-camp who was to convey it that the object of
the occupation of Limale was to re-establish communications with the
Emperor. It is possible that these supplementary instructions may have
been sent an hour later, after the second despatch of Napoleon had been
received.
25. Hulot's report (comm. by Baron Hulot).
26. Grouchy's report to the Emperor, Rosiren, 19th June (War
Arch.) ; Grouchy, Relation succincte, and Questions to Bella and Le Senecal
and declarations of the same (App. iv.) ; Berthezene, Souvenirs, ii. 392.
According to Berthezt-ne, the Habert division was at first engaged alone.
Grouchy says : " The whole of the 3rd Corps." This is less likely.
27. Damitz, ii. 302-305 (see 246-248); Wagner, iv. 86, 89; von
Ollech, 209, 210.
Damitz says that, deducting the six battalions of Borke, who, in
consequence of a misunderstanding, continued their march on Couture,
and the losses of the 16th, Thielmann had with him only 15,000 men.
To this estimate, at all events, must be added Stengel's detachment (three
battalions and three squadrons of Zieten's corps), which defended
Limale. Damitz says that this detachment took up its positions at
Limale only at four o'clock in the afternoon. There is every reason to
believe that it arrived there by noon, on the departure of Zieten's corps.
28. Grouchy's report to Napoleon, Rosiren, 19th June (War Arch.) ;
Grouchy, Relation succincte, and list of questions to Bella (App. iv.) ;
448 IFATERLOO book hi
Berthezene, ii. 393 ; Damitz, ii. 306, 308 ; Wagner, iv. 89 ; von Ollech,
210. Wagner says that the attack upon Wavre commenced at four o'clock.
Von Ollech says, more correctly, between four and five o'clock.
29. Grouchy, Fragment Historique, 12, 12, and Observations, 17. See
Relation succinde, 40, 41 ; Report of Napoleon, Rosiren, 19th June (War
Arch.).
30. Grouchy contradicted himself several times with regard to the
time at which he received Soult's second despatch. In the first draft
of his report to the Emperor, Rosiren, 19th June (War Arch.), he says,
at five in the evening. In this same report, reproduced in Relation succincte
(App. ii. 7), he says, between six and seven o'clock ; in the examinations of
Bella and Le Sendcal, between half-past four and five o'clock ; in" the
Observations (17), towards seven o'clock, in front of Wavre ; in the Frag-
ments historiques (14), between four and five, in front of Wavre; in the
Relation succincte (39), at La Baraque, after being at Wavre (which implies
six o'clock).
The officers of Grouchy's staff, Blocqueville, Le Senecal, and Belhi
(Relation succincte, App. iv. 6, 9, 51), agree in saying, between half-past
four and five o'clock. Their united testimony claims our belief.
The Adjutant-Commandant Zenowicz had taken five hours and a half
to accomplish the journey between Rossomme and Wavre, whereas the
other estafette scarcely took three hours and a half. This difference is
explained by the fact that Zenowicz had passed by Genappe, Les Quatre-
Bras, Sombreffe, and Gembloux, whereas the second officer had evidently
gone by Ottignies or Limelette ; he had ridden about six leagues over
wretched side roads, instead of ten over the main roads.
31. I have quoted this despatch in extenso, pp. 191, 192.
31*. If we are to believe Grouchy (Observations, 20, Fragm. Hist., 14,
Relation succincte, 40 ; Declarations de Blocqueville, de le Senecal, de
Bella ; Relation succincte, App. iv. 6, 53), Grouchy and the officers of
his staff had read on this despatch, partly erased and written in an
illegible hand : la bataille est gagne'e (the battle is won), instead of la
bataille est engagee (the battle is pi'oceeding).
Now the original of this despatch has been communicated to me by
M. de S., related by marriage to Marshal Grouchy. The whole of the
despatch is written in Soult's hand and is quite legible. It is impossible
that Grouchy or anybody would have read : la bataille est gagne'e.
32. Grouchy, Relation succincte, 38, 41. See Journal of the Bonne-
mains brigade (War Arch.). General Berton says (Precis des Batailles de
Fleurus et de Waterloo, 65) : " Four-fifths of our infantry were debarred
from the engagement in front of Wavre, and our cavalry, sent to the rear
and to the right, had nothing to do, for there was no one there."
33. Souvenirs of Commandant Biot, aide-de-camp to Pajol (quoted
by Pajol, iii. 231).
34. See report of Grouchy to Napoleon, Rosiren, 19th June (War
Arch.) ; Grouchy, Observations, 19, 20 ; Fragments historiques, 15 ; Relation
succincte, 38, 40 ; Report of General Hulot ; Gerard, Quelques Documents,
Q, 10.
CHAP. YII
NOTES 449
Gerard declares that his troops were not in the rear, and calls as his
witness General Vichery. Hulot says that at four o'clock he was on the
heights before Wavre with his division (a statement confirmed by Grouchy's
own testimony, Relation succinde, 38), and that both the other divisions
ixnder Gerard came, and were massed half an hour later, in the rear of his
own.
But if the three divisions had passed beyond La Baraque, why did
Grouchy go there ? If he was in a hurry to march Gerard's corps upon
Limale, why did he not first make the Hulot division, which was close
to Wavre, turn back ? If Gerard were with him in front of Wavre, why
did he not give him his orders there instead of at La Baraque? If.
Gerard was at La Baraque, from whence he was to lead the 4th Corps to
Limale, why did Grouchy summon him back to Wavre, where there was
nothing for him to do ? These are amongst the questions which to me,
appear impossible to solve.
35. De Blocqueville's, Le Senecal's, and Bella's declarations (Relation
succinde, App. iv. 6, 9, 54); Gerard, Quelques Docwnents, 10.
36. Gerard, Quelques Documents, 10 ; Deniieres Observations, 56.
37. Hulot's report ; Gerard, Quelques Observations, 42. On the three
fruitless attacks against Bierges, occupied by the whole of Stiilpnagel's
division, see Wagner, iv. 80, 90 ; Damitz, ii. 308, 310 ; von Ollech, 211.
38. Hulot's report; Grouchy, report to the Emperor, Rosiren, 19th
June ; Gerard, Quelques Observations, 10, 42.
39. Grouchy, Relation succinde (see 40) ; Bella's declaration (App. iv.
55) : " This refusal of General Baltus caused a scandal in the army." See
report of Grouchy to the Emperor, Eosiren, 1 9th June.
40. Report of Hulot ; Grouchy, Relation succinde, 41 ; Grouchy's
report to the Emperor, Rosiren, 19th June.
41. Wagner, iv. 92 ; Damitz, 312, 313. Grouchy, in his reports
and his pamphlets, refrains from alluding to these bitter attacks from
Vandamme.
42. In his report from Rosiren, 19th June, Grouchy says that he
reached Limale at eleven o'clock at night ; but in another report, Dinant,
20th June (War Arch.), he says, at the close of day, and this is correct.
43. As he debouched from Tourinnes, Pajol had found the Vallin
division (Gerard's corps) at La Baraque, and had started it towards Limale
at the head of his own cavalry and of the Teste division (Pajol, iii. 230,
231).
44. The Stiilpnagel division was relieved at Bierges, whence it had
marched towards the heights of Limale, by three battalions of the
Kemphen division.
45. Grouchy to Vandamme, height of Limale, 18th June, half -past
eleven at night; Reports from Grouchy to the Emperor, Rosiren, 19th
June, and Dinant, 20th June (War Arch.); Grouchy, Relation succinde,
42, 43; Pajol, iii. 232-234 ; .Wagner, iv. 91, 92; Damitz, 311, 312;
von Ollech, 312.
46. Grouchy's report, 19th June; Grouch j. Relation succinde, 42;
Damitz, ii. 312.
29
i
450 WATEBLOO book hi
47. Grouchy to Vandamme, height of Limale, 18th June, half-past
eleven at night (War Arch.) ; Grouchy's reports to the Emperor, 19th
and 20 th June.
48. Damitz, ii. 314.
49. Wagner, iv. 94, 95 ; Damitz, ii. 325-327 ; von Ollech, 259, 260.
See Grouchy's reports to Napoleon, Rosiren, 19th June, and Dinant,
20th June (War Arch.) ; Pajol, iii. 238, 239 ; Recollections of Captain
Francois {Revue Armoricaine, 1826) ; Grouchy, Relation succincfe, 43.
50. Wagner, iv. 95-97; Damitz, ii. 326-329; von Ollech, 261;
above -quoted reports of Grouchy to the Emperor; Grouchy, Relation
succinde, 43, 44 ; Berthezene, Souvenirs, ii. 393.
51. Letter of Grouchy to Vandamme, Limale, 18th June, half-past
eleven at night ; Grouchy's reports to Napoleon, Rosiren, 19th June
and 20th June (War Arch.) ; Hulot's report ; General Berton, Precis, 68.
The Hulot division and Exelmans' dragoons joined, rather early in
the morning, the 4th Corps on the plateau of Limale ; but, contrary to
many accounts, they were not engaged in the action, and remained in the
reserve.
52. Grouchy's declaration on the conduct of General Teste (War
Arch., dated 20th June) ; Hulot's report.
53. Report of Grouchy to the Emperor, Rosiren, 19th June, and
Dinant, 20th June (War Arch.) ; Report of Hulot ; Grouchy, Observations,
22 ; Fragments historiques, 18 ; Relation succinde, 44 ; Pajol, iii. 239, 240 ;
Declarations of Legouest and Bella, Relation succinde, App. iv. 27, 57.
See p. 245.
Pajol, according to the notes of Commandant Biot, aide-de-camp to
Pajol, states that this officer was Captain Dumonceau, aide-de-camp to
General Gressot, deputy-chief of the general staff.
54. Vandamme's letter to Simon Loriere, 10th May 1830 (War. Arch.) ;
Pajol, iii. 230, from the testimony of aide-de-camp Biot.
" Grouchy," spitefully remarks Vandamme, " could do nothing but
weep like an old woman." Vandamme is more than vmjust to Grouchy
and to others. In the same letter, and in another of 9th February, he
actually goes so far as to say that General le Senecal, head of Grouchy's
staff, spent the whole of the night of the 18th to the 19th June at the
quarters of the Prussian headquarters staff, and that he came in the
morning of the 19th to acquaint the Marshal of the success of our foes,
who, " no doubt, were no foes of his." The solitary testimony of
Vandamme would never make any one credit such an accusation.
55. " Address of Marshal Grouchy to some of the general officers
under his orders when he learnt the Waterloo disaster," Relation succinde
(App. iii. 35); Legouest's declaration (App. iv. 27); General Hulot's
report (comm. by Baron Hulot). Hulot was present at the meeting
of the generals.
56. Grouchy's report to Napoleon, 19th June (War Arch.) ; Grouchy,
Relation succincte, 44.
57. Letter of Vandamme to Simon Loriere, Ghent, 10th February
1830 (War Arch.).
CHAP. VII NOTES 451
58. Reports of Grouchy to Napoleon, 19th and 20th Jnne (War
Arch.) ; Relation Succincte, 44.
59. Wagner, ii. 99 ; Damitz, ii. 336 ; von OUech, 263. Pirch had
not been able to muster more than three of his divisions, Kraft, Brause, and
Langen, and the cavalry of Jiirgass, the Tippelskirch division having
pursued the fugitives of Mont-Saint-Jean as far as Genappe, Pirch
marched by Maransart and Bousval.
60. Journal of the Bonnemains brigade (War Arch.) ; Greneral Berton,
Precis, 69.
61. Grouchy to Vichery, Nil-Pierreux, 19th June ; Reports of Grouchy
to Xapoleon, Temploux, 20th June, and Dinant, 21st June (War Arch.) ;
Relation succincte, 45. See Hulot's report : " I arrived at Gembloiix
towards nine at night, and followed the two other divisions on the Temploux
road."
62. Report from Grouchy to Napoleon, 20th June (War Arch.) ;
Relation succincte, 45. Berthezene (Souvenirs, ii. 398), declares that the 1st
Corps did not leave Wavre before sunset, and only reached Gembloux at
eleven o'clock at night. This means a march of 20 kilom. in three hours !
On the other hand, it is a positive fact that this body of troops bivouacked
far beyond Gembloux, in the direction of Namur.
63. Pajol, iii. 241. See Grouchy to Teste, Temploux, 20th June
(War Arch.).
64. Grouchy to Vichery, Nil-Pierreux, 19th June (War Arch.) : "The
disorder now prevailing in the march, makes it necessary that you should
for a short time take up a position at La Baraque with your rear-guard."
65. In the battles of the 18th and 19th, Thielmann lost 2,400 men
and 76 officers (von Ollech, 264).
66. Muffling, Hi^t. 41, 42 ; Wagner, iv. 99, 100 ; Damitz, ii. 336, 337 ;
von Ollech, 263, 264. It appears that Pirch sent towards Mont-Saint-
Guibert a reconnaissance of cavalry, which found the defile occupied by
the French. This reconnaissance was evidently not effected until about
four o'clock. The Prussian scouts encountered Vallin's cavalry, which
flanked the right of the 4th Corps.
67. Grouchy's order, Temploux, 20th June (War Arch.) ; Pajol, iii.
242, 243. In Grouchy's order, we must read Gembloux, not Temploux.
68. Grouchy'sorderto Vandamme, Temploux, 20th June ; Report from
Grouchy to Napoleon, Dinant, 20th June, half an hour after midnight
(War Arch.).
69. Grouchy's reports to Napoleon, Dinant, 20th June (War Arch.) ;
Grouchy, Observations, 23 ; Relation succincte, 45, 46 ; Hulot's account.
See Berthezene, Souvenirs, ii. 398, 399 ; Lefol, Souvenirs, 82.
70. Clausewitz, 140, 142 ; Wagner, iv. 98-100 ; Damitz, ii. 338, 340
(see 333) ; Hulot's account ; Wedel, Geschichte eines Offiziers, 254.
Thielmann followed with his infantry, but at a very great distance.
His cavalry, which was originally composed of twenty-four squadrons under
Hobe, had been reinforced during the night of the 19th to the 20th June
by nine perfectly fresh squadrons.
71. Grouchy, Relation succinct^, 46, 47.
452 WATERLOO book hi
72. Eeports of Grouchy, 19tli and 20th June (War Arch.) ; Relation
succincte, 47 ; Hulot's account. See Damitz, ii. 339, 340 ; Wagner, iv. 100.
73. Above-quoted reports of Grouchy to Napoleon ; Relation succindc,
47 ; Clausewitz, 141 ; Wedel, 254 ; Lefol, Souvenirs, 82, 83 ; Berthezene,
Souvenirs, ii. 298, 299.
74. Above-quoted reports of Grouchy ; Relation succincte, 47.
75. Journal of the Bonnemains brigade (War Arch.) ; Berthezene,
Souvenirs, ii. 29 ; Lefol, Souvenirs, 84, note. .See Grouchy to Vandamme,
Temploux, 20th June (War Arch.).
76. Report of Teste to Grouchy, Profondeville, 21st June (War Arch.) ;
above-quoted reports of Grouchy ; Berthezene, iv. 400 ; Wagner, iv. 100 ;
Clausewitz, 142; Damitz, ii. 342-345; von Ollech, 273, 274.
Teste says in his report that he defended Namur from the afternoon
of the 19th to the evening of the 20th. This is an error in editing, for
in the afternoon of the 1 9th Teste was still at Wavre.
77. Grouchy's report to Napoleon, Dinant, 20th June, half an hour
after midnight ; Grouchy to Vandamme, Givet, 21st June (War Arch.),
78. Colonel Chesney, Lectures on Waterloo, 236. This professor of
military science forgets that Grouchy's retreat was less perilous than
it appeared to be. Undoubtedly, the Marshal might have feared, at
the outset of his march, that he would be pursued by Thielmann and
attacked on his flank by the half of Bliicher's army ; but these fears
were only partly realised. Thielmann allowed him a fifteen hours'
start, and Pirch did not begin to operate against him until Grouchy had
already filed off. And even had Pirch (Clausewitz extols him for so
doing) marched in time to bar the road to Namur, Grouchy, who had
still 30,000 men under his command, could have easily forced his way
through these 20,000 Prussians. He had more than sufficient men for
this purpose.
BOOK III CHAPTER VIII
1. Colonel Chesney, always so unfair to Napoleon, acknowledges
that the balance of strategy was in favour of the French.
2. Kellerman in his account states the fact (War Arch.).
3. The risks of war ! After all, it might have been in the power of
an obscure French cuirassier to bring about, as a result of the battle
of Ligny, the decisive separation of the two allied armies. Imagine
Bliicher taken prisoner, at the moment when he had been thrown under
his horse, by a charge from one of Milhaud's brigades. Doubtless the
retreat on Wavre would have taken place notwithstanding, since it was
Gneisenau and not Bliicher who had given the order for it. But it has
been seen that at Wavre, the entreaties of the eager Bliicher were
necessary to induce his all-powerful chief of the staff to march on Mont-
Saint-Jean. Would Gneisenau of his own accord have decided on this
flank movement ? Without laying more stress than need be on this
CHAP. VIII NOTES 453
Bupposition, I must, however, recall the words of Damitz : "Let us picture
to ourselves Bliicher prisoner to Napoleon — what impression would this
not have made on the morale of the French army, of the Prussian army,
and of the allied nations ! " and the conclusion of Charles Malo : " Who
would dare to assert that the captivity of the undaunted Bliicher would
in no way have influenced the result of the following days ? "
4. Perponcher division, 7,500; Picton division, 7,158 ; van Merlen's
cavalry, 1,200 ; Alten division (minus the Ompteda division), 4,000 ;
Briinswick corps, 6,300; total, 26,158.
5. Reille's corps (minus the Gerard division), 21,074 ; Lefeb\Te-
Desnoettes division (minus the two squadrons of service which had
remained near the Emperor), 1,800; Guiton brigade of cuirassiers, 777 ;
total, 23,651.
6. Ropes, The Campaign of Waterloo, 343.
7. Mai'shal Wolseley, Decline and Fall of Napoleon, 184.
8. Letter quoted by van Loben, 225, note.
9. " ... If this were so (if the English army had remained at
Quatre-Bras), the Emperor would march directly upon it by the Quatre-
Bras road, whilst you would attack it in front . . . and this army
would be destroyed in a moment" (Soult to Xey, Fleurus, 17th June,
between seven and eight in the morning, Register of the Head of the
Staff).
10. This pathological enumeration, suppressed in the Paris edition,
is to be found, pages 512-514, in the one-volume edition published in
Brussels in 1863. Charras expresses himself there without any
reticence.
11. Henry Houssaye, 1815, i. 613, 615, and the notes.
12. Grouchy, Relation succinde, 18, and App. iv. 5, declaration
of Le Senecal ; Declaration of de Blocqueville (War Arch., Army of the
North, dated 1 8th of June).
13. Las-Cases, vii. 179-183. See MoUien, Mem. iv. 198 ; Lavallette,
Mem. ii. 170-176; Fragments of de Mole's Memoirs {Revue de la
Rholutum, xi. 96) ; Notes of Lucien (Arch, of Foreign Affairs, 1815).
14. Napoleon, Notes sur VArt de la Guerre, of General Rogniat
(Corresp. xxxL 400).
15. "Napoleon deserved to be beaten at Marengo, and we perhaps
find in this unjust victory the source of the reverses which subse-
quently ruined the Napoleonic edifice " (York of Wartenbourg, Napoleon als
Feldherr, i. 57).
At all events, it is curious to quote this opinion. There are other
and still more curious opinions in the book by York of Wartenbourg.
He admires unreservedly only two campaigns : that of 1796, and that of
1814. In 1805, in 1806, in 1807, in 1808, in Spain, he abeady detects
in Napoleon, numberless faults, a "gi\ang way of the mainsprings,"
" symptoms of decline." At Wagram, Napoleon did not know to turn the
victory to good account ; in Russia he was contemptible. He rises
almost to his former self in the campaign of 1813, surpasses himself in
1814, and subsides into insignificance during the campaign of 1815.
454 JFATERLOO book hi
York asserts, but does not prove. It would indeed be very difficult to
exjjlain how, after 1796, the military genius of Napoleon underwent
an eclipse of sixteen years, shone brilliantly for one year, and then
disappeared.
16. Vandamme, who had bivouacked at Gembloux, to the north of
Gembloux, would have gone by Cortil, Alerne, Hevillers, and Mont-Saint-
Guibert ; Gerard, who had passed the night south of Gembloux, would
have gone by Saint-Gery, Vilroux, and Court-Saint-Etienne (see map II.
at the end of the volume).
17. Colonel Frazer, Letters, 560.
18. Theoretically, the average marching speed of a column of the three
services, is 4 kilometres an hour, including the hourly halt. But in
practice it may be more, it may be less, according to the condition of the
roads, the length of the stages, the temperature, the physical training, and
the morale of the troops.
I shall quote two instances which are decisive, in regard to this
question. The first applies to the march of Grouchy's own troops, on
June 19th ; the other to a movement similar to that which Grouchy
ought to have undertaken on the 18th June, and which was executed
with great success in 1870 by General Voigts-Rhetz, commanding the
10th Prussian corps.
On the 19th of June 1815, as I have previously related, the corps of
Gerard and Vandamme found themselves by mid-day in line between
Rosiren and La Bavette ; the former had marched and fought since three
o'clock in the morning, the other since seven o'clock. At twelve o'clock,
Gerard's corps retreated by the bridge of Limale, La Baraque, Corbais, and
Gembloux, upon Temploux, where the head of the column arrived towards
nine o'clock at night. Thus it accomplished 9 leagues in nine hours,
which is very different from marching 19 kilometres in five hours.
Vandamme's corps drew back on Wavre, where it remained in position
till six o'clock. It then marched on Rhisnes by Dion-le-Mont, Tourinnes,
and Grand-Leez. It reached Rhisnes at midnight, after accomplishing
more than 8 leagues in six hours.
On the 16th of August 1870, General Voigts-Rhetz was marching with
the 10th Prussian corps from Pont-a-Mousson to Saint-Hilaire, passing
through Thiaucourt. Near Thiaucourt, he heard the cannon of Rezonville.
Far from imitating Grouchy's example, he wheeled the head of his column
to the right, to bring his troops to the spot where the battle was raging.
The 20th division (Kraatz), which marched ahead with two batteries,
left Thiaucourt at half-past eleven. It proceeded by Chambley, and at
half-past three it engaged in the action in the wood of Trouville against
the French, who till then were victorious. Now from Thiaucourt to
Trouville the distance is over 20 kilometres. Thus in four hours the
Kraatz division (twelve battalions strong), had marched 5 leagues, after
having done 4 in the morning (from Pont-a-Mousson to Thiaucourt).
On this movement of the 10th Prussian corps, in every point similar
to that which Grouchy ought to have undertaken, the Account of the
Getieral Prussian Staff says (i. 570) : " On account of the evident numerical
CHAP. VIII NOTES 455
superiority of the French, the situation was very critical when the 20th
division appeared on the field of battle." And Alfred Duquet (Les
Grandes Batailles de Metz, 154) concludes : "We may say that on that day
General Voigts-Rhetz saved the Prussian army."
19. Clause^vitz supposes quite gratuitously that if the battle had
commenced earlier, the Prussians would also have attacked earlier. He
forgets that at eleven in the morning, Billow had only at Chapelle-Saint-
Lambert Prince William's cavalry and the Losthin division, in all 9,000
sabres and muskets, and that 7 kilometres of wretched roads and the
rough passes of the Lasne, separated him from the battlefield. It is
difficult to believe that he would have ventured to the rescue of the
English, at the almost certain risk of sharing in their defeat. The
Prussian generals were ardent but circumspect. We have seen that
Bliicher hesitated a whole hour before undertaking the defiles of the
Lasne, and that he did not unmask until half-past four. It has also been
seen that Zieten, at half-past six o'clock, absolutely refused Wellington's
aide-de-camp to march on Papelotte, so long as the bulk of his army had
not come up close to his advanced guard ; that he even retraced his steps,
fearing to commit himself, and that he yielded only to the entreaties and
remonstrances of Miiflling, who had galloped at full speed to make him
turn back. There is no doubt that Biilow would have shown himself as
prudent as Zieten. At all events his intervention would have come too
late.
20. Clausewitz, while he extols (wrongly from a strategic point of
view) an attack on the right wing, admits finally that only an attack upon
the left centre, hazardous as it would have been, might have produced a
decisive result.
21. " Apathy exactly similar to that which he experienced at Moscow."
If it is certain that on the day of Moscow the Emperor suffered from
an attack of ischuria, it is not at all proved that he kept away from the
field of battle, and that he was so cast doAvn that he took no interest
in what went on around him. The testimonies of Gourgaud and General
Pelet, the reports of Prince Eugene, of Ney, and of Murat, do not agree
with the story of the eloquent General de Segur. Clausewitz has said :
'■ Circumstances fully explain and justify, to my mind, the manner in
which Xapoleon acted at Moscow."
THE END
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