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August 22, 1914

LAND AND WATER

THE BRITISH COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

FIELD-MARSHAL SIR JOHN FRENCH, K.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.
Field-Mar.h,l Sir John French wa. born in 1852. .»d began his career in the service of his country as a naval cadet and midship-
man in the Royal Navy (rom 1866 to 1870. In 1874 he entered the 8th Hussars, and *., transferred to the 19th Hussar, w.lh
r i««q'u"""' .""' ''"°"**' "" ^''"'^■" Campaipn o( 1884-5. being in the action, of Abu Klea, Gubut. and Meleilineh
In lOtjy he as.umed command of hi. regiment, and in 1897 wa. appointed Brigadier in command of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade On
the outbreak of the South African war Sir John was appointed Major-General. and given command of the Cavalry Division in
Natal. He wa. in command at the battle of Elandslaagle, and of the cavalry of Sir George White's force at Re.ifonlein and
Lombard . Kop. Promoted Lieutenant-General in 1900. he lock part in many imporlant engagement,, remaining on actual field
Ted u*nT ^Ql 1 '"1 IQM l"' T^^ o ^"""^ '" '^°^- •"'' '"^"""^ Inspector-General of the Forces, which post he

iCW, . .1, P X •"L"«"'"J •"• B.<on. and on the outbreak of the pre.eni war wa. given the post of Commander-

ia-t_biel ol the txpeditionary Force

953

LAND AND WATER August 22, 1914

WITH THE BELGIAN ARMY

DOGS EMPLOYED BY THE BELGIAN ARMY

KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM

Who has been congratulated on all sides upon the valour

and ability of his troops

BELGIAN ARTILLERY

Whose accurate fire has done much to check the

German advance

BELGIAN INFANTRY MARCHING TO THEIR POSITION

954

Photos by Sewspaper IllustfaHotu

August 22. 1914

LAND AND WATER

BELGIANS, DUTCH, AND GERMANS

Copyrigkl, Ntaspaper lUuitrations FIRST AID ON THE FIELD
Tending the wound of t Belgian Officer

Copyrigkt, Newspaper lUustraiiotu

DUTCH AND GERiMAN SOLDIERS SIDE BY SIDE
Od the Dutch-Belgian Frontier at Emsden

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GERMAN CAVALRY ot i HE 23th REGIMEN F ENTERING MOULAND. NEAR VISE

955

LAND AND WATER

August 2 2, I9I4

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956

August 22, 1914

LAND AND WATER

CURRENT SPORT

'T'HE hunting people in the United Kingdom are responding
'- quickly to the call to do what is possible for their country
in this time of trouble. All the horses of the Heythrop
Hounds have been placed at the disposal of the War Office by
Mr. Albert Bras^ey, the Master of the Hunt. Mr. F. M.
Freake and Mr. C. T. Garland, both prominent hunting men
in Wanvickshire and well-known polo players, have joined
the Suffolk Yeomanry at Portsmouth. Mr. Emmett, of
Moreton Paddox, is raising a troop of his own, and Mr.
Polehampton, of Walton Wood House, has joined the Army
Flying Corps. Mr. Charles Romer Williams and Mr.
Nicholson have joined the Intelligence Department as inter-
preters, and Mrs. Garland and Mrs. Emmett are converting
their Warwickshire houses into convalescent homes.

A PRACTICAL suggestion is made by Mr. A. S. Sherwood,
■^*- secretary to the Walton Heath Golf Club. He points
out most golf clubs possess or can readily secure the control
of a few acres of vacant land which might be cultivated, thus
providing employment for unskilled workers and adding to
the nation's food supply. At Walton Heath an experiment
is being made with twelve acres of land. There are 2000
golf clubs in the country, and if each devoted two or three
acres to cultivation, employment would be provided for
many thrown out of work. Another suggestion is to the
effect that golf houses should be utilised as hospitals or con-
valescent homes.

TN the opening match of the challenge round for the Davis
■'■ Cup A. F. Wilding (Australasia) defeated R. N. Williams
(America) in straight sets, 7 — 5, 6 — 2, 6 — 3. M. E.
McLoughlin (America) defeated Norman Brookes in the
second of the two singles. McLoughlin squared the match
at one all by a magnificent straight-set victory. The game
was one of the most brilhant ever seen in a Davis Cup contest.
The first set, which went to thirty-two games, was the longest
ever witnessed in a Davis Cup tie. The strain of the first set
exhausted Brookes, and consequently he was unable to show
his best form in the other two sets. The first set was a
brilliant exhibition of faultless tennis, both men placing with
machine-like accuracy. Each won his own service till
Brookes began to tire, when his game slowly weakened.

nPHE following notice appeared in last Thursday's " Racing
-*■ Calendar " : — " The Stewards of the Jockey Club desire
to point out how important it is in case of abandonment of
race meetings that a decision should be arrived at by the local
Stewards and announced sufficiently long before the date of
the meeting to avoid any inconvenience or expense to owners
dispatching their horses unnecessarily. At the same time
the Stewards of the Jockey Club do not wish this to be taken
as a discouragement to executives from making every effort

to hold their meetings. In fact they hope that local Stewards
will not decide on abandoning unless they are quite satisfied
that it is imperative for them to do so, as it must be remem-
bered that any prolonged discontinuance of racing will throw
a large number of persons dependent upon it for their liveh-
hood out of employment. On public grounds it is desirable
tliat no reason should be pubhshed for the abandonment of
a fixture."

T ORD CAVAN, Master of the Hertfordshire Hounds, has
-*-^ written a letter to all interested in the Hunt to explain
how they stand in the present crisis. He writes: "I have
received an appointment which will keep me fully occupied.
Seventeen kennel horses have gone to the regular cavalry.
At the same time I hope it will be possible for the Hunt
servants to get out on young horses or cast horses and to kill
a large number of cubs, and I have given such instructions
as I can to this effect. May I appeal to covert owners,
keepers, rearers of poultry, and farmers, at least to give the
hounds the first chance of kOling Icxes, resting assured that
their interests will not be lost sight of even in the turmoil
of war."

IRISH RED SETTER
FIELD TRIALS

By "OVER AMD UNDER •

THE Irish Red Setter Club Field Trials were held
on Tuesday, August 4, at the Marquess of
Waterford's shooting lodge, Glenbride. There
was a large attendance, and Lady Waterford,
who kindly entertained the members and visitors
to tea, was out on both days.

Owing to the War Office requiring his services. Sir
William Austin, Bart., was unable to judge, and Colonel
Milner kindly consented to act in his place, together with
Mr. Tooney, D.L.

A start was made with Mr. Wood's Fountainstown Meg
and the Rev. J. Meehan's Caislean a'Bharraigh. Meg kept
too near her handler and Caislean was not very steady on a
brace of grouse. Brian of Bo3-ne and Clonterry Flo got
several points and dropped to a rabbit, whOe Brian only
scored a back ; both might have worked a bit wider in their
range. Gruniard Gloria and Fountainstown Meg then came
together ; Gloria was slow and not much of a ranger. Clon-
terry Flo was down with Caislean. Flo false-pointed, but
then worked one grouse well. She proved a merry worker, with
great tail action, and improved as the trials went on ; she
also got nearly all the points. After a few more trials of
Gruniard Gloria, Brian of Boyne, and Caislean a'Bharraigh

rnKKfOfaoaaaiaociosici'sic] isi qamaKW^oafflaiamffl^amacAsmMOfflMiapai

Each genu. DC fly ii diftinguiil
by ■ blue and while lab

^ fff£G. TRADE MARK i

(/f£G. TRADE MARK}

TROUT
FLIES

This is a Registered Trade Mark of
which Milwards are sole Licensees

Whirling
Blue ^ _„
Dun. 449

'T'HERt are I U8 Flies described and

[lustrated in Mr. West's Work,

1 he Natural Trout Fly and its
Imitation." We show a few typical patterns, h is, however, impossible in "black and

Fly an<
I white '

do justice to the wonderful effects, both of colour and design, obtained by Mr. West's unique dressings.

14 Silver and Black

15 BUck Cuss

16 Green Insect

19 Snipe Fly

20 Hawthorn
Silver Tail
Small Oak Fly
Bronze Fly
Meulllc Fly
Bloe Fly
Turkey Brown
Sulphur Dun
March Brown
Early Olive Dun

Evening Crane Fly
Gravel Bed Fly
Small Yellow Crane

Fly
Olive Gnat
Black Gnat
Green Gnat
Ruby Gnat
Brown Gnat
Cow Dunt; Fly

Large Crane Fly
Orange Crane Fly
Green Drake
Dark Drake

Green Dun
Green Spinner
Olive Dun
Medium Olive Dun
Pale Evening Dun
Dark Olive Dun
Whirling Blue Dun

51 H February Red
52H Yellow Sally
S3H Early Brown
54H Small Yellow Sally
S5H Willow Fly
S6H Dark Needle
58 Corncrake Sedge

12 Hoverer Fly

13 Small Hoverer Fly
17 Green Bottle

1« Oak Fly

23 Striped Hoverer

24 Wood Ry

25 Speckles

34 Brown Spinner

35 Brown and Yellow

Spinner

31 Yellow Dun

50 Stone Fly

81 Xyloto

83 Ichneumon

59 Speckled Buff Sedge 73

60 Mottled Cinnamon 74

61 Grouse and Green 75

62 Cinnamon Sedge 77

63 Buff Sedge 78

64 PaleCinnamonSedge 79

65 Silver Horn 82

66 May Bug 86

67 Cow Dung Beetle 87

68 Soldier Beetle 88

69 Sailor Beetle 89

70 Earth Beetle 90

71 Corixa 91

72 Water Boatman

Water Measure
Water Cricket
Green Lace Wing
Yellow Lace Wing
Sweep

Yellow Nematus
Hylotoma
Green Ichneumon
Autlimn Green
Grass Bug
Green Aphis
Green Bug
Wren Tail

3/-

per

[doz.

Small Red Spinner
Red Spinner
Yellow Tail Spinner
olive Spinner
Jenny Spinner
February Red
Yellow Sally, Pale

Quill Body
Early Brown
Small Yellow Sally

Ruby Wasp
Green Spider
Wolf Spider
Diadem Spider

68 Willow Fly

56 Dark Needle

57 Bustard
76 Blue Lacewing
80 Alder
84 Sand Wasp

96 Black Ant

97 Red Ant

101 Green Beetle

102 .Small Beet.j

98 Red & Black Caterpillar,

98 Green Caterpillar

99 Black Caterpillar f P"

100 Paint Brush Caterpillar' doz.

3/6
per
doz.

4/6

Dia SOLE UCENSED MAKERS :

Ifi73
Water Mea«urer.

REDDITCH. WSSm&

957

LAND AND WATER

August 22, 1 9 14

the awards were given as follows : — ist, Clonterry Flo ;
2nd, Caislean a'Bharraigh ; 3rd, Brian of Boyne.

The Grand All-Aged Stake opened with Tony of Boyne
V. Clondalee. The latter had a good point on grouse, and
was backed, but Tony Hushed three grouse later. Glenavon
Kitty and Curraghmore Brevity both muddled a grouse.
Brevity pointed two grouse well, but was a bit sticky and
incUned to false-point. Kitty was faster, but did nothing.
Max of Gallawa, an English setter that went fast with good
range, was down with Clondalee. Clondalee false-pointed,
and was well backed, but later Max poked up some grouse
and was not steady. A further trial was then given to
Clondalee and Brevity, when Clondalee got a good point.
After Tony of Boyne had been tried with Glenavon Kitty,
without much result, the awards were given as follows : —
1st, Clondalee ; 2nd, Curraghmore Brevity ; 3rd, Glenavon
Kitty.

In the Irish Red Setter All-Aged Stake Tony of Boyne
met Cinderella. Tony got a good back, but later would not
notice a snipe ; he then pointed and worked out some grouse
well, and went the faster of the two. Cinderella sprang a
grouse and later was weak in her point. Noreen of Boyne
then met Glenavon Kitty. Kitty pointed grouse well, but
Noreen was not steady to wing, and later got in on grouse
and sprung them, and was inclined to false-point. Kitty was
whistled at too much and is not a good backer. Caislean a'-
Bharraigh and Red Flag came together. Caislean pointed
and sprang three grouse. Flag would not back, and sprung
three grouse. Both sprung grouse later Caislean was
afterwards weak in pointing. After Tony and Kitty had
been tried the prizes were awarded as follows : — ist, Tony of
Boyne ; 2nd, Cinderella ; 3rd. Glenavon Kitty.

The braces were next down, and Max of Gallawa and
Sibyl of Gallawa were the faster pair, the better rangers, and
did the better work, and gained first prize. Curraghmore
Brevity and Curraghmore Ben, pointers, gained second
prize ; and Tony of Boyne and Noreen of Boyne, third prize.

HORSE SALES

ALDRIDGE'S.

Messrs. \V. & S. Free.man. — There was a good attendance at the

Falc licUl at St. Martin's Lane on Wednesday, August 12. and tlicre

was a brisk trade for a horse of size and quaUty. A roan mare, quiet

iri harness, realised the top price of the day, changing owners at 58 gns.

LEICESTER.
Messrs. Warner, Sheppard &. W'ade. — This firm are holding
their next sale at the above repository on Saturday, September 5.
Owing to so many horses having ocen taken lor the Army, there is
sure to be a good demand for cobs, ponies, and other horses suitable
for trade purposes, and owners of such will find this an excellent
opportunity for disposing of them.

TffE Board of Agriculture and Fisheries have made special
inquiries by their own ollicers into tlic supply of meat now in cold
storage in the principal centres in England and Wales. As regards
chille<l and frozen meat, tne existing stocks are sufficient to meet the
ordinary needs at the normal rate of consumption for about six weeks,
while tnere are tliree to lour weeks' supply on passage and due to
arrive shortly. As regards home supplies, wliich represent 60 per cent,
of the total consumption, the Board have ascertained from the
recently collected agricultural returns that there is a substantial
increase in the numbers of live stock as compared with last year.

Owing to the international crisis the British Motor Boat Club
has decided to abandon all racing tfiis season.

C.A.V. Car Lighting lights up everything on the road. It is the
system which enables you to take the daylight with you, and gives you
a pleasurable assurance of complete immunity from risks on difficult
roads. The only self-contained system, aptly described as " simple,
safe and certain." Write for the C.A.V. Blue Book. — C. A. Vandervell
and Co.. Electrical Engineers. Acton, London. W.

Nurses' Uniforms, Etc. — Messrs. Debenham A- Freebody, of
Wigmore Street, with their long experience and special facilities for
making every grade of hospital uniform, including the Queen Alexandra
Imperial Nursing Service, are in a position to undertake every garment
and requisite required for the nursing profession at very moderate
prices, and will be pleased to forward anyone an illustrated catalogue
upon application. They also hold a very large stock of flannels,
calicoes, blankets, etc. Also natural and blue flannel as used for
soldiers' shirts and pyjamas, and red flannel for hospital wear.

About a thousand employees of the Dunlop Rubber Co., Ltd.,
have been called up for active service. During their absence the Com-
pany will pay half wages to tlie families of all the married men, whose
places will also be kept open for them.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The " Candid Quarterly Review of Public Affairs : Political.
Scientific, Social, and Literary." Conducted by Thomas Gibson
Bowles. Frederick Henry Garratt. .5s. net.

Smokeless Cartridges

Loaded with "Neonlte" (30 gr.) Powder
in Gastight Quality Case.

Loaded with " N.E." (36 «r.) Smokeless in
Special Gastight Quality Case.

THE.

^fffW<S/e&saMaMcfgem/

Loaded with "Stowmarhet Smolieless"
(33 gr.) or " N.E^"' (36 gr.) Smokeless.

Loaded with '* Stow^znarhet Smokeless"
or '* N.E." StnoReless.

The Trade only suj:pUed,

SOLE MANUFACTURERS

The New Explosives Go. Ltd.

62 LONDON WALL^ LONDON, E.G.

Should a "Viyella" Gar- 1| you wish to purchase high-class All-British
ment shrink it will be Qpods which are really economical insist upon

replaced free of charge.

Viyella

BRITISH-MADE

Shirts & Pyjamas

True economy consists in buyins the best at the price, and
ihere IS no other material which has all the "Viyella"
virtues. Exceedingly durable and healthful, soft, non-
irritant and reBned in appearance, it washes well and
does not shrink. The ready-to-wear garments are tailor-
cut and finished equal to the best bespoke work.

OF ALL HIGH-CLASS OUTFITTERS

// aMv difficully is experitnced in obtaining, please write
\VM. HOLI.INS & CO., LTD. (Wholesale onlvl.
76a Vivella House, Newgate Street. 1-ondoii. H.C.

The LANCET says : *' We found that th$ stattments mmd«

in regard to the merits c/ this paper are cerrect. The paper,

at any rate, is free from injurious or irritating substances, is

smooth, and, while firm, becomes soft and apparently soluble like thin

rice paper in contact with water. ' '

THE MOSTPERFECT TOILET PAPER EVER PRODUCED

■ J?^^'

If yoii are not usinj " NOVIO " TOILET I'Al'l-k
you are not using the BEST AND MOST tCONOMlCAL.
Costs but little more than the cheaper makes, and the ROLLS
CONTAIN MORE THAN DOUBLE THE QUANTITY.

ANTISEPTICTHINSOFTSTRONG & SILKY

\<n Rolls.
. Wholi

SOI.D EVERYWHERE

Packets, Cartons, by all Ghemists, Stores. Grocert,
and Stationers.
Wholesale only of the Sole Makers. Chadwick Works,
26 Grove Park. S.E.

cert, ^^r

958

LAND &WATER

Vol. LXIII. No. 2729

SATTTRDAY ATTniTST ^n 101.1 tpublished as-i prick sixpencr

aniUKUni, nULjUOi 29, I914 La newspaperJ published weekly

»♦

■'•*'.*J-fl

MR. HILAIRE BELLOC

Photogfafih by Hector Murchison
Strictly Copyright

Whose comprehensive Weekly Articles in ** Land & Water" are creating
immense interest throughout the United Kingdom

LAND AND WATER

ENGLISH TROOPS

August 29, 1 914

THE SILENT ARMY

The Expediliooary Force Disembarking at Boulogne

962

August 29, 1 9 14

LAND AND WATER

FRENCH TROOPS

:^-^

FRENCH INFANTRY RESTING ON THE BELGIAN PLAINS

FRENCH TROOPS MOVING OUT OF NAMUR

963

LAND AND WATER

August 29, 19 14

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964

August 29, 1 9 14

LAND AND WAT FJR

THE MYSTERY OF THE NORTH SEA

H.M.S. •• MONARCH "(SUHER-DREADNOUGHT)
Wiih her I 3'5 Guns in Action. Eich projectile weighi 1,250 lb., and the c»n fire len guns on either »ide

965

LAND AND WATER

August 29, 1914

#?i*
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A DAY WITH THE CUBHUNll KS
Gone to Ground

CopyrvglU, Spoil unit General

AMONG THE CUBS

All-Round Value of the Preliminary Campaign

By "RAMBLER"

N the grave
situation so
quickly brought
about by the inter-
national crisis on
the Continent, the
vast majority of
people hax'e been
little inclined to
turn their thoughts
seriously or for any
length of time to
the subject of sport.
Yet it says much
for the self-posses-
sion of the British
sportsman that
although his first
and unwavering
desire is to do some-
thing of solid use-
fulness for his
country, when and
where his services
are not required,
he does not fidget
and fume in gloomy
idleness, but is up
and doing and
bracing himself with
healthy exercise in
the open air.
And so in a relatively minor degree grouse shooting is
going on in the north, cricket and golf are being played,
and a few Masters of Foxhounds are here and there already
giving attention to the cubs in the woodlands and the
education of their young hounds^

The hunting outlook may appear to be decidedly obscured
at the moment, for it is feared that in the coming winter
" money will be very tight," and that there may be many
resignations of masterships on that account, while it is certain
that there will be scarcely any hor=es left for hunting pur-
poses ; but it is early yet to talk of the probable effects of
the great international upheaval upon our sport at home. For

altogether abandoned, though, as at the time of the South
African War, it will be conducted in quite a subdued and
modified way as compared with times of peace and prosperity
at home and abroad.

In the Farmers' Interests

That cubhunting is an all-important branch of the
chase needs no telling, and if there is to be any regular hunt-
ing when November comes round, war or no war, the ensuing
weeks must be devoted to this educational part of the business
by huntsmen and their hounds. For one thing, the conditions
are fairly favourable for an early start in the big woodlands
this autumn, and by all accounts most countries, where the
preliminary campaign is taken seriously, are well stocked
with foxes. Farmers' interests have to be studied, and too
many foxes in a country are certainly a nuisance. Thorough
cubhunting, then, is an advantage to all concerned, and,
although countries and their needs vary vastly, and no hard-
and-fast rules may be said to govern cubhunting generally,
it is a maxim that may be commonly applied that early and
genuine work in the big coverts means a steady pack of hounds,
straight-necked foxes, and high- class sport when the real
thing begins.

There are some countries which are ideal for the making
of a pack of hounds. The Grafton is one ; the Fitzwilliam
another ; and many other well-wooded countries might be
named in the same category. In big well-foxed woodlands
there can be real drilling without unnecessary noise or holloa-
ing, and without holding-up and mobbing. I have long
held the opinion that it is neither for the good of the pack
nor for the encouragement of bold straight-necked foxes to
force tired cubs back into covert when they have been well
rattled and bustled. Of course, hounds must have blood,
and pretty regularly, but not to the excessive amoimt which
many huntsmen seem to crave for. And where the harvest
is over, and the ground is not too hard, no great harm can
be done in allowing the hounds from following the cubs into
the open occasionally, though I know that this is not a canon
in the creed of very many Masters and huntsmen until Sep-
tember is over. I always hold that the sporting custom of
the late Mr. Coupland, during his most successful mastership
of the Ouorn, is the one to adopt. " Let every fox be driven
out of covert," was his maxim, " and then clap hounds on
the last one to leave and kill him if they can." Even in early
September the Ouorn used to have some sharp little scurries
over the open in those days ; and I am sure the subsequent
winter sport proved that the efficiency of Tom Firr and his
beauties had in no wise been adversely affected.

the time iieing. at all events, hunting is not likely to be Riot

There are widely different views regarding even the
entering of young hounds to foxhunting. There always
have been. When Jack Raven, Mr. Meynell's famous old
huntsman, saw Jones, his cork-legged whipper-in, start off in

966

August 29, 1914

LAND AND WA T E R

't: ^ •.»

pursuit of a hound which was running a hare, he pulled him
up with the remark : " Let him alone ; he'll stop soon enough
when he sees what he is after." And so it proved ; but there
are not many huntsmen at the present day who conduct their
early operations on quite such lenient principles. Still,
even now there are men who let their puppies start
by hunting whatsoever they like so long as they do hunt
something, and afterwards by degrees stop them from all
kinds of riot.

Opinions vary also as to the size of the pack to take into
the large woodlands. A few Masters even now believe to
sfjme extent in the doctrine which used to be held by owners
of strong kennels in the early days — that of starting cub-
hunting with very large packs. I believe it was Mr. Meynell,
again, who began by taking as many as eighty couple into
the field in August. \o doubt it was sweet to the ears of a
keen hunting man to hear the woodlands echo with the music
of such an enormous number of hounds. And how they
must have made the startled foxes fly ! But Mr. Meynell
discovered that better results could be obtained with a far
smaller pack, and he soon brought the number down to about
thirty couple. Still, there are Masters to-day who believe
in making quite a call upon the resources of their kennel,
when the early work begins in the extensive woodlands.

The Big Woods First

It has been said — but I have never known an instance
myself — that some Masters are disposed to think that by
" nursing " the big coverts instead of hunting them, they
are more likely to find in them and have good sport from them
in winter. It would be a huge mistake, for, as the author
of " Notitia Venatica " laid down, so long as there is a chance
of finding and killing f<r;es in the larger wftodlands during
the first part of cubhunting at all events, hounds should on
no account be taken to draw small spinneys. Perhaps
there are easy-going short-sighted huntsmen who prefer
small coverts to large ones, if they hold enough cubs to
provide his young hounds with a lesson and a sufficiency
of blood. But I have never met the Master who alkwcd
the big woodlands to be neglected during September when
there was a chance to draw them.

And that recalls the fact that in some countries all the
big woodlands unfortunately are not open to hounds during
cubhunting. There are shooting men who loyally see to it
that a few litters of foxes are reared in their woodlands,
realising that the loss of game they occasion is not after all
serious. Yet they cherish a dislike to hounds drawing their
coverts before the shooting parties have been held, and in
so acting they largely discount the value of their generous
services in preserving foxes. The drawing of the coverts
during cubhunting makes all the difference in the world
to the sport later in the season, and it is quite a mistake to
imagine that shooting prospects suffer thereby in any material
degree. A few pheasants may desert the disturbed coverts
for the time being, but they are quickly back in their original
haunts. This lias been proved again and again, and shooting

AN EXPECTANT FIELD

in October and November certainly cannot suffer at all by
visits of the hounds in the latter part of August and the
beginning of September.

Education for the Young Follower

If during this j^reliminary campaign there are far smaller
fields than usual — in fact, if those who come out to see the
early morning work in the coverts are confined to a few
farmers and sporting residents — so much better forthe Masters
and their huntsmen. The class of sportsmen who get the
real enjoyment out of cubhunting are what may be called
the scientific sportsmen, the genuine houndmen. These it
is who love to see the young entry at work, and to watch
the progress of their education day by day. There are
pleasures and delights in September woodland hunting
which the man who hunts to ride cannot detect or appreciate,
and large promiscuous crowds at the covert-side during
cubhunting arc often an intolerable nuisance. We wisli
to make no acquaintance with our familiar friends the
"tailers" and thrusters until November is here; we do not
wish to have recalled yet what it is to put up with the jostling
and jamming at the gaps and gates.

Cubhunting no more exists for the Young Rapids
of the chase than does the rehearsal at the theatre for the
ungodly gods. Yet when September is advanced, and the
cubs begin to fly at the first challenge, then mav some of
the recruits among the field be the better for an occasionrl
morning with the hounds. They will learn more perhaps
in an hour than they would in a week in the hunting field in
mid-winter ; they may learn to appreciate some of the
difficulties of hounds and huntsmen ; they may be steadied
by a few mild ratings and expostulations on the part of those
in authority. There is then something to be said for a field
during cubhunting, for if the cubs and the puppies that
have been put on benefit by gradual initiation into what
is expected of them, why not also the young followe" of
hounds. No one wants to see cubhunting become a fashion-
able amusement, and I think harm may often come — docs
come — from the advertising of cubhunting meets in the
local newspapers long before the ]>reliminarv business has
taken on the semblance of the Real Thing, nevertheless, when
September has almost run its course, and October darts
in the open are being anticipated, surely the young sportsman
and sportswoman genuinely anxious to learn the game
should not be discouraged. Cubhunting is a fine prepara-
tory school all round, and the character of the coming season
will depend very much upon how the lessons are learnt in
the next six or eight weeks. Unhappily the war has broken
out, and the whole prospect of hunting has been clouded over
this autun.n. We must look beyond this winter for a return
to the normal aspect for our national sport. In the meantime
let us congratulate ourselves that such a sport has so long
flourished in these islands, providing us with a ready means of
securing horses in a time of national emergency and so many
brilliant horsemen with the valour and spirit to serve their
country in a terrible crisis such as the present.

967

LAND AND WATER

August 29, 1914

A BROOD OF PARTRIDGES

From till I

PARTRIDGES AND OTHER THINGS

By GUY C. POLLOCK

WITHIN three days of the partridges ! That
should be an exhilarating and joyous thought.
It is not so. It cannot be so while the shroud
of destiny is still wrapped, like a clammy
mist of death, over all the world, and while
we cannot tell to what new duties, trials, and tests of fortitude
and patriotism these days may call us.

Some day, in the mercy of a divine dispensation, we shall
iiave put this, the greatest war of history, behind us. We
shall have put behind us the aftermath of conflict, which may
well be only less disturbing than the war itself. We shall
have returned to a normal England, free, proud, unshaken,
with unsullied honour by sea and land. But we shall not be
as we were. Neither politics nor parties, things nor men,
can ever be what they were. They will be, we may hope,
purer and finer, purged of much pettiness, exalted by sacrifice
to nobler conceptions. But not the same. Already tempora
miUantnr, nos et nuitamur in Hits. Yet it is reasonable to
believe that in time the partridges of England, our native
game bird — neither decimated nor terrified, let us beUeve, by
any successful invasion of armed enemies sweeping with fire
and sword over a craven or defeated land — will again occupy
our earnest thoughts when warm September days of a peaceful
EInghsh autumn come near again. War will not drive from
us our love of sport. Indeed, our love of sport may have
lielped us much in war. A foreign military writer, a man of
wide experience of war, who has himself commanded in many
campaigns levies of ardent volunteers, has already expressed
a great surprise in the soldierly efficiency of our Territorials,
and has attributed this efficiency to the British love of sport
and from athleticism, fit training for the soldier's mind and
body. Our games and field sports may yet vindicate them-
selves on the battlefields of Belgium, on the sacred shores of
this our native land.

But I wish — if only I can rid my mind sufficiently of the
shadow of war, which impinges on my manuscript as King
Charles's head bothered the unhappy Mr. Dick — to consider
the partridges in relation to the present crisis. No good
sportsman, I think, is keen on partridge shooting now. Too
many who have been our comrades in the shooting field —

good fellows, brave and enduring men — are facmg shot and

shell at the call of patriotism and a righteous cause. I could

not even carry a gun over the stubbles and roots of the

little shoot without too poignant memories of happier days,

when one who now commands a British cruiser in action did

such excellent execution in our hottest corner at pheasants,

when another who commands a regiment of the expeditionary

force shared the varied fortunes of a September partridge

day, when yet another, comrade of many days, now recalled

to the colours of his heart, walked close with me to make a

triumph of the season's very end. I should have, too, to

think very nearly of our most faithful and enthusiastic beater,

an old soldier, still a reservist, a person, I fear, with an

unquenchable thirst, but with a stout and lovable heart,

tender to all the brute creation, if not a perfect husband,

wearing the ribbon of the medal with four clasps which lie had

long since pawned, our excellent friend, one of our defenders

now. These memories would overpress the day and take

from partridge shooting all its joyous friendliness. It may

even be that outpost duty and not partridges may claim those

of us who, beyond the military age and not so sound as when

the doctor vetted us in pre-Territorial days, have offered,

obeying a duty which the poorest Englishman could not

ignore, to go back to military duty.

Yet, with all this, the game must be shot, if possible.
It must be shot because it will be useful, because it may be
distributed either to supplement a local food supply or to
add to the larders of hospitals delicacies which may have a
tragically enhanced value. I hope and believe that neither
on big shoots or little shoots will there be any attempt to
make a profit by the sale of game in war-time. We do not
want our grouse and partridges and pheasants for the dinner
tables of the well-to-do. This is no time for many courses
and high living. It is a time for simple fare and a com-
munistic spirit. Wc want the game for the sick, the wounded,
and the poor. We must shoot very liberally for the pot.
We must shoot, too, because it is important not to withdraw,
so far as withdrawal can be avoided, any circulation of money
in British districts which have been used to depend for
prosperity on such expenditure. Hunting is almost bound

968

August 29, 1914

LAND AND WATER

to be stopped. All the hunt horses — or nearly all — are gone.
Most of the fields are on active service. And that, too, is
true of shootina;. But there are many left who can use a
shot-gun where thej- cannot carry a rifle through a campaign,
and many more whose best duty it is to carry on our everyday
affairs with as serene a heart as man can muster. At the
worst there are keepers and farmers who could shoot the
game. And the rabbits can be trapped and ferreted.

Very well, then. We must look forward to September
and be glad that this has every promise of being an excep-
tionally good game year. There are tragi-comedies in the
situation, and many shoots will be thrown on a market
unwilling to receive them. Has not our little syndicate been
implored to rent the neighbouring coverts which once we shot
over, and which have been Naboth's vineyard to us ever
since ? The guns that took those coverts from us were
Service men. Now they have done with sport and the
coverts are empty But we cannot take them. That is
only one of a thousand ironies of Fate.

One change that seems probable in the season's partridge
sh )otin'j is a return in many cases to the more old-fashioned
method of walking up. Organised driving on a large scale

will surely be a difficulty, and it will be well to secure fair
bags of partridges as soon as the law permits. That would
be no change on the little shoot, where narrow boundaries
make driving almost impossible and where nearly all our
partridges are got by walking. But I do not think it will
be found an unwelcome change on larger manors. Walking
up got a bad name chiefly because it was conducted on
unimaginative lines. !\Iarching and counter-marching in a
solid line across illimitable acres of roots, always shooting at
the tails of birds, is a monotonous and uneventful aftair.
But when you use guile and woodcraft to keep your coveys
within your boundaries and to push them in a desired
direction, when you use the half-moon formation and
necessary variations of it, when you vary the monotony of
walking with an occasional impromptu drive, walking up
partridges becomes, to my mind, the best of sports — strenuous,
eager, giving excellent opportunities for using a knowledge
of the ways of game, and offering many difficult, sporting
shots. It is by no means to be despised, as many who may
come to it after a set habit of driven partridges will discover.
But the best of it all is the comradeship of good fellows
And as for that — King Charles's head again. Let me stop.

REPORTS FROM THE MOORS

VERY few sportsmen have yet been on the
moors for grouse shooting. The call of war
accounted for the absence of many owners,
lessees, and others who would have been
members of shooting parties but for the present
state of affaii's. The weather conditions were ideal, and the
few reports to hand indicate that if the normal number of
sportsmen had been out good bags would have been obtained,
since birds are plentiful and free from disease.

ABERDEENSHIRE.
A very fair percentage of moors were shot over. A
large box of grouse was sent to his Majesty the King from the
Balmoral Moors. The Brackley Moors, adjoining the Royal
estate of Birkhall, yielded a large bag, and a parcel of several
brace was sent to Mr. S. H. Bridges, at Ewell Court, Sligo.
I-argc parcels of grouse have been sent to the soldiers, and
also to hospitals and other charitable institutions. There is
to be no shooting on Clashhadarroch, which is one of the best
moors in the country, since Mr. Holt, the lessee, has offered
his services to the Army.

CAITHNESS.
The moors were almost entirely unoccupied ; tenants in
most cases had not travelled north.

DUMFRIESSHIRE.
The Eskdale and Liddesdale Moors, two of the very best
moors in the United Kingdom, were not shot over, but
Mr. Berkeley Mathews and his party secured more than
50 brace on the Westerhall Moor.

DUMBARTONSHIRE.
Birds are reported as being remarkably plentiful this
season, but so far owners and lessees have not been out. A
few of the keepers have been out for a short time and killed
a considerable number.

INVERNESS-SHIRE.

Most of the sportsmen in the Badenoch district have
decided not to organise shooting parties this season. A large
proportion of the sportsmen who usually shoot over the
moors are soldiers or are more or less directly interested in
other ways in the war. On a few moors a start was made,
but even in these cases arrangements were greatly modified.

KINROSS-SHIRE.

The expectations of good sport have not been realised.
The weather was excellent, but the birds were never so wild
on the opening day. On Ledlanet Moor Mr. J. C. Calder
and a friend in a short day had 13 brace. Mr. Balfour
Kinnear and Mr. Montgomery shot 12J brace on Warroch
Moor.

MIDLOTHIAN.

In the Stow district only one or two parties have been out.
Re])orts as to game fulfilled the high expectations. Grouse
are numerous, particularly on the lower beats, and young
birds are strong and healthy. No trace of disease.

MORAYSHIRE. - "^

The majority of the shooting tenants in the Grantown-

on-Spey district have not gone north, while many of those
who had arrived have returned south. Grouse are reported
good, and far in advance of last year.

PERTHSHIRE.

Large numbers of the sportsmen and their friends arc
engaged in military duties. In the Dunkeld district several
of the moors were shot over. In Pitlochry there were no
supplies of grouse for sale, and no demand is anticipated on
account of the present expenditure in other directions.

ROSS-SHIRE.
Few guns were out on Ross-shire moors, and on some not
a shot was fired. In the Ardgay district grouse were plentiful,
but there were few sportsmen. For many miles around all
shooting quarters were let, except Deanich and Alladale
Forests ; but owing to the war sportsmen had been called
away and numerous lodges are empty. Others are repre-
sented by only one gun each.

SUTHERl.AXDSHIRF.
Only one of four moors in the Rogart district — Robie —
was shot over. The sportsmen had not yet gone to the other
three — Tresaa^, Morbich, and Dalreaboch — war having com-
pletely disorganised their arrangements. It is reported that
the moors as a whole were never better stocked. Young
birds are in excellent condition, not a trace of disease, and
no cheepers have been seen.

YORKSHIRE MOORS.

There has been practically no shooting over these moors
during the first few days, except by keepers. Many beaters
have joined the ranks of the Services, but a good number of
the men usually employed on the moors have been thrown
out of employment. All the principal moors had been let, but
the opening day was marked by a total postponement, as.
although a few birds were taken on the smaller patches, there
was no shooting on the principal moors, and the date of
actual opening of shooting is doubtful. In any case, shoot-
ing parties will be small, and the excellent prospects of the
season will not mature.

On the Lancashire and Yorkshire borders, and in the
Clitheroe district, sport has been almost entirely given up, and
the Waddington Fell party was the only one out for the
opening of the season. This had result in the escape of the
birds, strong and vigorous as they were, to neighbouring
moors where no shooting was going on, and only moderate
sport was had in consequence. Earl Sefton has followed a
wise course with regard to the moors near Abbeystead,
having given the keepers instructions to shoot there, anticipat-
ing being able to supply the needs of some hospitals to a
certain extent later on. It is noteworthy that the King should
have paid a visit to Earl Sefton's preserves this season,
but the visit has been cancelled owing to the war.

In the Whitby district the prospects are excellent, but
few of the covers have been broken up to the present. Mr.
J. K. Foster, of Egton Lodge, has set the example for this
district by announcing that the proceeds of all game sold on
his estate will be devoted to the fund for injured soldiers
and sailors.

969

LAND AND WATER

August 2 0, 19

JI/<wffT {ipiUchin{i th^ smile of sathfncfion on h!s
kft'f>rr'.t fare) : " Ttiat ^VHl}!KY is 12-ykak.
oi.n ' JoHNNiK Walkkr ' Black Label."

Kefpn- {smaekimj his lips tpith satisfactim) :
" G-K-ASD ! Blt it*s ykkka small fob

ITS AQB

Born 1830

— still guiny stroiiy

Then is redly MllMy small about " Johimie Walko-." Big ageing: reserve stoda
to meet lag inarMOii^ demaad, big time aUoirance to ensure bi? gnanntee of big
qaalhy tbroqghooft ftk big world. Ahboogb ** bom in 1820," ** Johnnie Walker''
k % for its age.

Bmy drop of *' Johimie Walker'' Black Label is over It yeare old.

6UA&AXTKSD SAME QUALITT THROrOHOUT THE WORLD.
Jais Walok & Sos^ Lt»., Scotch Whiset Distillbbs. KitmAByooK.

970

August 29, 19 14

LAND AND WATER

CURRENT SPORT

Vl/ITH reference to hunting in Cambridgeshire, Mr.
'•^ Douglas Crosman, tlie Master of tlie Cambridgeshire
Foxhounds has informed us that his present intention is to
go out cubliunting wlien possible and as the horse supply
allows, for two reasons : — (i) To kill a certain amount (if
cubs and reduce the stock of foxes, which would otherwise
be too numerous ; (2) To enter the young hounds and teach
them their business in life, so that another season, when we
hope foxhimtipg will be in full swing again, the young hounds
(this season's entry) may know their work. This war has
already proved what a tremendous asset the Hunt horses are
to the horse supply of the cavalry, and every M.F.H. should
endeavour to keep his pack together and prevent the foxes
being shot indiscriminately.

TT is untrue that the Oakley Hunt is to be disbanded as
■'■ was recently rumoured. The single men employed at
the Milton kennels were given one week's notice; most of
these if not all have volunteered for the front, and one of
them has gone with the Master, Mr. Esme Arkwright. It
is improbable that there will be any hunting during the
progress of the war. though as to that nothing has been
decided yet. The married servants of the Hunt will be
retained, and the hounds will be kept as usual at the kennels.
The hunt has lost upwards of twenty horses through the
requirement of the War Office.

A VOUNC. border terrier belonging to " Rokeby," of the
-^~* Northern Counties Otterhounds recently ran a wild
rabbit into a 6 in. drain pipe to the east of Dodmire Schools,
Darlington. The terrier also entered the drain and was
soon lost, and, darkness coming on, she was left for the night.
On Saturday afternoon the owner and two professional
drain men dug the drain for over six hours, but failed to
locate the terrier bef(jre darkness put an end to their exertions.
On Sunday morning four willing hands again attacked
the drain and dug six separate trenches quite 4 ft. deep in
the hard clay. The terrier at tinics could be distinctly
heard, the diggers stuck manfully to their heavy task, and

at 8 p.m. they had the great satisfaction to o\erhaul
the terrier. She proved to be in a very weak condition,
covered with sores and clay. She was fifty hours in the
drain, and had travelled underground between eighty and
ninety yards.

" How to u.sc a Kifle," publislied by the Temple Press at si.xpence,
is a handy httlc manual for the average civilian who wants to know
how to handle and care (or his gun. It is written in simple language,
free from technical terms, and is intended to tell the man who handles
a rifle for the first time what to do and how tc do it ; it will thus he
seen that the manual is invaluable to the mar just joining the ranks
of the Territorials — or of any other force, for that matter. A u.seful
chapter is added on the use of revolvers and automatic pistols, and
another chapter forms a guide to military an<l other map reading ;
but the manual is mainly intended, as its preface states. " to present
in simple language, the elements of shooting for the consideration of
the average man."

The Hoard of Agriculture and Fisheries have received a number
of complaints from farmers representing that all their working stock
of horses has been re(|uisitioned for military purposes and that they
are unable to harvest their crops or are seriously impeded in doing
so. His Majesty's government have clearly stated in Parliament
that it is their desire that such interference witli harvest operations
should be avoided ; but where it ha.-.- unforlimately hapjiened that
necessary working stock has been withdrawn, the Hoard of Agriculture
and risheries would urge that neighbouring larmers, landowners
and land-agents should interest themselves in remedying (he mis-
fortune by some measure of co-oi)rration. and that those in a position
to do so should arrange to assist or to procure assi.'^tance for those whose
stock has been removed to supply the needs of thi; nation.

The Development Commissioners desire to suggest to landowners
in Kng'and and Wales that they should at once forward to the Agri-
cultural College for their province particulars of any waste land which
they are willing to place at the disjjosal of suitable authorities for
improvement by such means as reclamation or alTorestation.

Anglers, golfers, sportsmen, and tourists at home and abroad
are liable to suffer from the attacks of midges, sand-flies, mosquitoes,
etc. No defence against these pests is so convenient, none so plea.sant
to use, none so sure as " .Muscator." The ocauty of " Muscator "
is that it is not greasy, and with its agreeable ;'cent is most soothing
and refreshing to the skin ; but insects hate it like poison, and will
not come witliin yards of it. .Mr. Hogers, the well-known chemist
of 327 Oxford Street, London, W., sells it in bottles, ranging in price
from IS. to 21S.

®j) Appointment

to His Majesty

SERVICE REQUIREMENTS

For Home or Abroad, for Field or Hospital.

We have arramz.-d a ipe;ial E:i-jipni*nt Department in our men't shop on the around
Soor. where the tollowine articles may be obtained in either large or small quantities at
our well-known manufacturing prices.
SHIRTS (Khaki, Flanneli BLANKETS
TOWEL.S

ANGORA JACKETS
UNIFORMS
TUNICS
BREECHES
PUTTIES
T'rice List sent fioit free.

SOCKS
COLLARS (Khaki. Soft)
RAZORS IM descriptions)
PYJAMAS and N.GHT-

SHfRTS
UNDERWEAR

RAINCOATS
MACKINTOSHES
SERVICE CAPS
BRITISH WARM

COATS Fleece Linedl

WOOLLEN SLEEP-
ING HELMETS

SLEEPING BAGS "'^'^^Z,:^''—

Also Warm Fleecy Cloth. 20/-

31/6, 39/6

ROBINSON & CLEAVER

156 REGENT ST., LONDON & BELFAST

LTD.

Children's
OUTFITS

Difficulties may be ex-
perienced in certain
i|uarters with regard
to Girls' Dresses and
School Outfits owing
to the fact that these
garments have hither-
to been largely sup-
plied from France
and Germany.
We do not anticipate,
however, that we shall
ha\e any trouble in
meeting the demands
from our own work-
rooms and factories,
providing that our
customers are pre-
pared to give their
orders at an earlydate.
From our point of
view this will have the
great advantage of en-
abling us to keep our
usual workroom and
factory staff fully em-
ployed during the
slack period.

Girl'a Suit (,0s sketch), in
velour tweeds. Finished
at neck witli velvet collar.

Price

49/6

DebenKam
& Freebody

vtirimore Street.
iCovrndish Square) London.W

971

LAND AND WATER

August 29, 191

MMMHMHMMHMMHMMIIMMMHMHHM

Country Life

Smolctng Mixture

This deltghtiul comoination ot tne Best
Tobaccos IS sold \a two strcngtKs

MILD and MEDIUM

^r ounct

1/8

|>er
i-lt. tin

P58

N.B. "Country Life ts t>acked only

tn original l>ackets and tins by tke

Manufacturers :

JOHN PLAYER & SONS. Nottingkam.

The Imperial Tobacco Co. (of Gt. Britain & Ireland), Lid,

For Healthy, Enjoyable, and Economical Holidays,
the Resort at the present time is M M M

ABERDEEN V:rf^'^l

A beautiful town with the finest Pleasure Beach
and Sands in Britain. Delightful bathing and boat-
ing. Capital seaside and inland golf courses.
Bowling, tennis, angling, and all recreations and
entertainments. Splendid centre for tours through
Deeside and the Grampians. The best of accommo-
dation at moderate cost ; all other charges normal.

Illustrated Guide, post free, from
Town Cler{, 3 i 3 Town Hall, Aberdeen.

Cheap Excursions weekly by L. & N.W., L. & Y , and Caledonian
RIys. 8-day ticket from Manchester 26/6, from London (Euston) 38/-

For all inform.ition and batch of Scottish Tourist Guides (post-
age 3d.), write Superintendent of the Line (Dept. 313),
Caledonian Railway, Glasgow.

BRAND'S
ESSENCE OF BEEF
MUTTON & CHICKEN

FOR ALL CASES OF EXHAUSTION
AND WEAK DIGESTION.

LONDON &
LANCASHIRE

FIRE

INSURANCE COMPANY

LIP ^ ^

SECURITY - £5,927,293.

FIRE.

LOSS OF PROFITS.

ACCIDENT.

BURGLARY. MOTOR CARS. DOMESTIC SERVANTS.

MARINE.

Head OFficesr

45, DALE STREET, LIVERPOOL.
76, KING WILLIAM STREET, E.G.

Inexpensive
Autumn Suits

New Autumn Tailor Suit

(Hi iketclt), made by our own
workers from high - grade
British Navy Serge Suiting,
with collar of fancy striped
chenille, perfectly cut and
tailored. Exceptional value

I'rice

£4

SOLDIERS' SHIRT-
ING FLANNEL AT
CONTRACT PRICES

Per yd.

Blue Lincey VVoIsey - 9^d.
Blue-Grey Army Shirtinj,', 1 Oid
All - Wool Natural Flannel,

1/Oi. 1/2*

All - Wool Scarlet Flannel,

1/1. 1/3

All - Wool White Flannel,

I/O!, 1/24
Striped ShirtinR - 94d„ l/-
StripeH All Wool Flannel, 1/6

DebenKam
&Freebodv

\vifjmore bfreet.
(Covchdish Square) London W

972

The County Gentleman

AND

LAND &WATER

Vol. LXIIl. No. 2730 SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1914 [^7e'-A=s"p?pe\^] ^S^^^U^^^!^

CE
KLY

Photograph hy Uas^ano

VICE-ADMIRAL H.S.H. PRINCE LOUIS OF BATTENBERG

The First Sea Lord, is one of the most able and popular Men in the Navy

LAND AND WATER

September 5, 1914

THE FRENCH ARMY

STAFF OFFICERS IN CONSULTATION

General Silveslre (in forage cap) with his Staff considering the stralcgetic movemenis of the French Cavalry

Copy/tght, Newipaptr JUuslratiom

BODY OF FRENCH LANCERS
Welcome viiitori in a Belgian village

976

September 5, 19 14

LAND AND WATER

SCENES IN BELGIUM

Copyrieh. Ntwipaptr lUustraHoHS

BELGIAN CYCLE CORPS EVACUATING DIEST

Gt-KMAN PARADE AT BRUSSELS
Artillery pasting through one of the main itreeti

LAND AND WATEK

September 5, 1914

IN THE WAR ZONE

FRENCH INFANTRY EN TRENCHED AND IN ACTION NEA.x ^nAKi^EKwi

Cjpy;igfil, C^mrai iVttt4

WITH THE SERVIAN ARMY

The Servian Army pasiinj through Niich aher their great victory over the Austrians

Cupyriglit, CtnifOi i\ews

978

September 5, 19 14

L AND AND W A T E R

Copyrifla, Central .\Vu

FRENCH ARTILLERY TAKING UP THEIR POSITION

Cupyn^ht, Land and Water

RUSSIAN TROOPS MARCHING THROUGH ST. PETERSBURG
Scenes of great enlhutiaim marlied the Declaration of War in Rus.ia

»-*•-■« TIit~

''upyrttHI, Tvpical I'rtM

THE MOBILISAilON OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY
The Czar reviewing Troopi prior lo their moving off to ihe Front

979

LAND AND WATER

September 5, 191^

Performances by
BRITISH-MADE

DUNLOP

tyres

in the great races of the year can be explained only
by a wonderful property of resistance to wear.
The lesson they convey is that Duniop tyres will
give exceptional length of service in everyday motor-
ing, and that the safest choice is always the Duniop.

The new and improved Duniop steei-
sludded tyre — a great advance in
non-skid tyre construction — is giving
everywhere extraordinarily good service.

IN TIME OF WAR

Duniop lyres — grooved, steel-studded, and plain
— can be obtained with the same facility as before
the war ihn'jgh the usual agents. By buying
British-made goods you help to support the
industries and workpeople of your own country.

THE DUNLOP RUBBER CO., LTD.

FOUNDERS OF THE PNEUMATIC TYRE INDUSTRY

Aston Cross, Birmingham ; 14 Regent Street,
London, S.W. Paris ; 4 Rue dii Colonel Moll.

Duniop Solid Tyres for Heavy Commercial Vehicles

TAILOR - MADE

SHIRTS

Designed and cut by our
own highly skilled tailors
and quite difterent from
the ordinary so-called
Tailor Shirt. Stocked in
five sizes, or made specially
to order.

Shirt (as sketch), perfect
shape and cut, in heavy
striped pyjaraa silk, deep
yoke at back. Colourings
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980

September 5, 19 14

L A N D AND W A T E R

KEEPING A GOOD LINE

BIG GUNS AND SMALL

By GUY C. POLLOCK

IT is impossible, of course, to say or even to tliink how
the various sporting estates and shoots will fare in
England through tlie time of the great war. They
must fare better than the sporting districts of France,
Belgium, and Germany, than the plains of Hungary,
where Servians or Cossacks may do any killing of the swarms
of partridges which, in normal years, are so largely imported
to this country, both dead for food and alive, or as eggs for
stocking purposes. Among the many legends of Wellington,
who is now supposed to have omitted to say that the battle
of Waterloo — are we to know it as the " first " battle of
Waterloo ? — was won on the playing fields of Eton, one to
be cherished is that he galloped his staff into what was nearly
a successful ambush in the enthusiasm of an impromptu run
after a chance fox. The soldier on active service, who takes
a less tra;;'" view of the business of war than those must take
who are left at home to admire or to mourn him, will not
neglect any opportunities of sport that may come his way.
But modern war may very much restrict such opportunities.
Meanwhile our game birds at home are not in deadly
peril. A raid or raids on our coasts may come. Not one of
us imagines that the raiders will get very far, or do very
deadly damage. But I write under the shadow of an
impending clash of colossal armies in Belgium, and the issue
cannot be predicted. The battle of Mukden, previously the
largest battle in history, raged for weeks, and was not
conclusive in the end. Moreover, so many of the soothsayers
who prophesied the great war were very much out in their
prophecies that a layman must hesitate to adopt their mantle.
We have had the story of Anglo-German conflict told very
often. Sometimes, as the story went, we have been absurdly
triumphant ; sometimes we have been utterly smashed ;
generally we have been vanquished first and victorious in the
" happy ending " which was supposed to make the prophecy
edible. Very few of the prophets have foretold or even
suggested, so far as England and the Empire were concerned,
the strange and ennobling spirit in which all the subjects of the
British crown are rising to their opportunity of life or
death.

It is, then, bad work to prophesy. Yet the mundane
busir-.css of sport, like those of coal mining and bootmaking,

and the manufacture of linens, lace, or hardware must depend
enormously for its course in the near future on the issue of
this Titanic struggle in Belgium, which must dictate for a
time the course of the campaign. If the event goes well for
the Allied arms, it is reasonable to b(lie\e that a tremendous
impulse will be given towards that resumption of our normal
activities which would help so much to keep us all going, and
to strengthen the hands of ("io\-ernnient and people in waging
the greatest of all wars. Tuxury and sheer extravagance are,
let us hope, destroyed in this country for many years to come.
But is it ill for us all to live continually at concert pitch. The
strain on nerves must sap the vital energy which the nation
now needs more than e\-er before. When or if we have reason
to believe that the tide of war is with us, the manufacturer
will seek new outlets for trade, and recreations will be resumed
in quiet and reasonable ways. Even the silent grouse paths
may again be occupied here and there, and the partridges
will be shot.

There are good reasons why one has not been to have
that look round the partridge ground which usually makes
such an e.vhilarating excursion at this time of year — {a) one
has no heart for such things ; (h) there is no train service ;
(c) one has other and more important duties. But it is
impossible not to believe that this will be an excellent year
for partridges, and this, I take it, is of good augury, like the
abundant crops. But I confess that I should like to know
how one may find the fields if it is possible to go down and
shoot some partridges in September. Three days before
war was declared I watched the reaping machine make short
work of the farmer's wheat. But after war was declared ?
How many horses were left on the farm ? How many of
the horses I saw are now being trained to military uses ?
And if many of the horses are gone, how has the harvest
progressed ? We may indeed feel in Septembqj; that the
stooks are still in the field, and that some crops are still
standing uncut. We may be able to lend a hand as amateur
farm labourers as a variant to sport. We may, too, find
unexpected acres of plough where pasture of doubtful value
has been prepared for the aftermath of war.

One change is sure — unless, indeed, this country were
then called to meet and destroy alien enemies from overseas.

981

L A X D AND WATER

September 5, 19 14

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982

September ^, 1914

L A X D AND \Y A T E R

The military aeroplane will not br 'pen li'£;h iiji aliove us.
When first these then novel sights were seen upon the little
shoot, we used to stop and gaze upward at them, debating
what would happen if with shot guns we treated the queer
and noisy apparition as a rocketing pheasant We prophesied
gloomily then that the comings and goings of these strange
birds would drive all the game from our fields and spinneys.
Lately even the beaters have only given an u]')ward glance
as the roar of the engine was heard high in the air : and as
for the game, no notice whatever has beers taken of aeroplanes
by birds which would cower and crouch from a hawk ho\'ering

in the sky. Thus war becomes familiar to us all.
For the rest, the semi-military formations of a line of
guns and beaters will serve to keep our minds on the subject
which must fill them through many difficult and historic
months. And I doubt not that we shall concert our plans
and issue orders in that martial parlance which is the tongue
of the boar. We shall adjure the line to dress by the right,
and order " left shoulder up," and wheel by sections, and
talk of the enemies' left, and outflank the covey that has been
marked into the left-hand corner of the roots close to the
boundary hedge. All these things may happen — if — —

GOLFING TOPICS

Bogey

Bv F. KINLOCH

OT verv long ago no Scottisli

j^wlfer (and by

that term I mean a golfer who has drunk in

Nthe mother-milk of his golf in the atmosphere
of any of the Scottish golfing nursery homes)
would have deigned to consider what is known
as a " Bogey " competition as worthy of notice. The name
was enough. " What's in a name ? " A great deal in this
particular instance. Truly the godfathers and godmothers
who gave this form of playing at the game of golf its most
unattractive and absurd name have a good deal to answer
for. And vet, in a wav, this name is illustrative of the
paucity of the English language, or rather of its inability
to describe nicely and reatly, in terms not directly calculated
to upset any delicate susceptibilities, a new departure in a
very ancient game. The French, on the other hand, had no
difficulty ; they hit the nail right on the head when they called
it La Xormalle. Like many other French phrases, La Normallc
cannot be properly translated into bald Erglish. It has
in its own tongue a pretty sound, it is romantic feminine,
full of possibilities. But fancy going out to play against
" the Normal." Here is a cold, hard, nasty thing impossible
to cope with. Yet is not what was at first known as
"Colonel Bogev " (the Colonel is now dropped) ahiiost
worse ? The name savours of frivolity, of sp'>oks, of spiritual
seances, of childish fables, in fact, of all that a serious-minded
golfer would divest frcm his favourite game.

The game, or whatever you like to call it, was invented
not long after the great golf invasion of England, when golf
was in a stage of transition ; when it was feared that the
old traditions were in danger ; when there were no dealings
with the Jews who played for biscuit boxes and tantalus

spirit cases in the South, and the Samaritans who played ''or
the love of the game, plus a half-crown on the match, in the
North. The origin of the name was probably a pantomime
song, which was very popular in the early 'nineties.

" Hush, hush, hush, here comes the Bogey Man," a
mvthical being who was supposed to be the special enemy
of children who did not go to bed when they were told. No
one had seen him, but there was no doubt of his existence.
The bogey man as a golfer was given the rank of colonel,
but why, it is not easy to discover. Probably because
colonels having reached a staid middle age are presumably
steady golfers. This may be true in theory, but it is open
to considerable doubt whether actual facts warrant the
presumption. Anyhow, behold this new pastime (that
seems to be the best name for it) duly baptised, and launched
to fight its way all o\er the many odd places where men play
golf. And a very hr.rd fight the ugly-named creature has
had ; at the same time, it must be confessed, a much more
successful one than many of the older school would even now-
con fess. To some sacred spots it has never and will never
penetrate.

I do not think " Bogey " as a term or a game is recog-
nised at any of the championship or aristocratic courses ;
certainly St. Andrews, Prestwick, Muirficld, and North
Berwick, in Scotland, and Hoylake, Sandwich, Westward Ho,
in England, have never been " Bogey iscd." Nevertheless,
so insistent is this dumb, shapeless spectre that its followers
have forced the Rules of Golf Committee to draft rules for
their guidance. Whether these said rules have grasped the
true inwardness of what they are meant to direct is rather
a -doubtful point. After havingVplayed seriously (almost

CRAFNANT VALLEY FROM IREFRIW GOLF CLUB

983

LAND AND WATER

September 5, 19 14

LLANDUDNO GOLF LINKS

with shame let me confess it) in bogey competitions for
a year, I am incHned to think that theRulesof Golf Committee
were wrong in treating these as if they came within the subtle
distinction that separates medal from match play. I am
firmly convinced that bogey should be played under match-
play rules.

For instance, lost ball should be lost hole ; of course
the penalty for the loss of a ball is equivalent to the loss of a
hole, but there are some obstinate people in this world who
are always ready to imagine they can do impossible shots,
and who will keep the green back by teeing another ball on
the million to one chance that they will hole it or lay it dead.
There are a good many other instances which could be cited
in favour of legislating tor bogey as match play, but
into this rather vexed question it is not proposed to enter
further.

Speaking, however, as one who, from having been
an absolute scoffer, from a fine old Tory point of view,
has come to recognise that there is a certain amount
of merit in the pastime I should like to draw attention
to one or two points. In the first place (we must admit the
ugly name), what does the " Bogey " of a course mean ?
Before bogey was heard of we knew what " the par "
of any course implied, viz., the best score per hole that the
best player playing his best, but without any flukes, could do.
" Par " reduces the score of all courses to its absolute mini-
mum. But that is not what is meant or should be meant
by the " Bogey " of a course. Bogey, as I understand it,
is the score, per individual hole, which an ordinary scratch
player ought to make under ordinary conditions, and it is
so interpreted in hard and fast figures in every card that is
issued. It is true that in clubs and courses the estimated
capacity of the average scratch player varies very consider-
abl}'. Some have a very high opinion of him as a player,
others quite a moderate one ; so you will see by the Saturday
reports that in one club the bogey prize has been won
by a glorious victory of seven down, and in another one
reads of a feeble defeat by one up. What is radically wrong
about making the bogey score a fixed one is that no attention
at all is paid to climatic conditions, and in these islands wind
is the most powerful handicapper that we have.

Thus, if I may take a concrete instance from the only
course on which I have played this peculiar form of golf,
viz., Newcastle, County Down. There are three holes over
five hundred yards in length, two of which are played against
the prevailing wind, which is sou'rherly and generally a good
deal in evidence, and each of these is put down as a bogey
five.

In the same way there are several holes of about four
hundred yards, for which four is the ghostly score. In calm
weather this would be about correct, though it is probable
that the ordinary scratch player would have to squeeze a
bit to get the figures in comfort ; but when, as is often the
case, there is half a gale blowing, trying to do these long
holes in the stipulated figures becomes a heart-breaking job
even for the long powerful hitters, while the short drivers
might just as well not try to play the holes at all.

There is indeed nothing more disheartening in golf
than to face a hole more than a quarter of a mile long with
the foreknowledge that you must do it in five otherwise you
will lose it.

There is, it humbly appears to me, a remedy for this, and
one that might seriously be considered. It is a simple one,
viz., to take the force and direction of the wind into con-
sideration, and vary the inexorable figure for each hole
accordingly. At first sight, this may seem so complicated

as to be unworkable, but, seriously speaking, it should not
be difficult to work out. Let the club committee, or whoever
arranges the bogey score, draw up a sliding scale of figures
per hole, varying according to the wind, and let them have
a cone hoisted on bogey competition days so as to indicate
the allowance to be given for the wind. Of course, only
a few of the holes would have moveable figures, and it would
require a fairly strong wind for the north or south cone to
be hoisted. There need only be the two cones, the north
taking in the bottom half of the compass, and the south the
top half. It would be left to the discretion of the club
professional to decide whether a cone should be hoisted. I
think this is a scheme which could be easily worked, and
it would add considerably to the pleasure or (a better way
of putting it) mitigate against the annoyance of playing
against a bogey score in a gale, by giving the ordinary human
being a chance.

It is claimed for bogey that it is less irritating than
playing an ordinary medal round. In a modified wav that
is quite true ; you may take double figures to several holes
and yet not ruin your chances. It is indeed much more
satisfactory to go the whole hog when one is about it. The
man who just misses a hard half by a putt, which if there
were any justice in this world should certainly have been
in, is likely to be much more annoyed than the man who
has made a hopeless mucker of the hole. Yet both have to
mark down that algebraical sign ( — ).

And in this connection let me give a word of advice
to those who like to have a small bet on their respective
scores with their opponents. Don't. It is bad enough to
play a ghostly enemy, but do not give him the help of a
material friend. V/hat I mean can best be illustrated by
a.n example of what actually occurred to me the other day.
I arranged to play for a bogey competition with a friend,
with whom I was in the habit of having the keenest of keen
matches, which almost always came to the last hole ; and
the piece of family plate which passed alternately from one
to the other was regarded as of the greatest value. We
agreed that the usual stake should depend on our scores
against bogey. The first three holes were played against
a stiff wind, which made the proper figures chfficult to obtain.
My opponent lost his ball at the first hole. I just missed a
half with bogey " by a hair." At the second he was unplayable
off the tee, and I got a hard half. At the third I again
had the best of it as regards my human enemy, but the worst
as regards the ghostly one. The result of those three holes
was that I was two down against bogey, and rather irritated ;
whereas if I had been playing proper golf I would have been
three up against my man, quite happy and pretty sure to
win my match. The result of that bogey round, so far as
I was concerned, was that I lost my half-crown. Speaking
personally, I would infinitely prefer to play a keen blood match
with a friend, and win or even lose it at the last hole, than win
twenty bogey prizes; but so long as human nature is what
it is you will have pot hunters, and if you have to have
pot hunting, playing against bogey is, to my mind, preferable
to counting one's strokes.

The Board of Agriculture and Fisheries stated a few days ago
that there was in this country sufficient wheat to supply the whole
population for about four months. They have now obtained more
complete information, including returns of the stocks of wheat and
flour held by about i6o of the principal millers in Great Britain. On
the basis of the figures now available, it may be said with confidence
that there is actually in the United Kingdom at the present time,
including the home crop now being harvested, five months supply
of bread stuffs. This is additional to the wheat and flour on pas. age
and due to arrive shortly.

9S4

The County Gentleman

AND

LAND & WATER

Vol. LXIII.

No. 2731

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 19 14

rPUBHSHED AST

La newspaperJ

PRICE SIXPENCE
fUBLISHED WEEKLY

CAPTAIN FRANCIS GRENFELL

Whose cool courage and daring in action on the Belgian Frontier played a prominent part in
the 9th Lancers' brilliant feat of arms. He is a dashing horseman, an all-round sportsnian,
and a first-class polo player, having assisted his regiment and also the team of Old Etonians
to gain many notable successes at the London Clubs.

LAND AND WATER

September 12, 1914

BOYS OF THE OLD BRIGADE

BRITISH INFANTRY WELL ENTRENCHED

AND HOLDING THEIR OWN AGAINST SUPERIOR NUMBERS

The troops ire firing as calmly and critically as though at target practice

988

LAND AND WATER

WAR SCENES

ZEPPELIN BOMB HAVOC
IN ANTWERP

BRITISH TROOPS LEAVING A
FRENCH BASE

ZEPPELIN BOMB HAVOC
IN ANTWERP

-->

?ly|llj^«1»<>^

CopyrifU, Nmtpaper TOuslratumi

GERMAN CULTURE (?)
German Troops lootiag and wantonly deilroying Buildings at Viie

Beraharcit in his book mikei a point of the fact that the refinement and culture ot the Germanic races must maiie itself felt
throJlhout tlie world. Fbe examples I'lat they provide at present dufina the war are not, however, such as wilt appeal to the more civilised races

989

LAND AND WATER

September 12, 19 14

THE RUSSIAN ARMY

THE FAMOUS CU/RASSIERS OF THE GUARD

RUSSIAN INFANTRY OF THE LINE
Slow but Sure

990

Septemberli2, 19 14

L A N'D AND WATER

THE COSSACKS ARE COMINC

THE TERRIBLE COSSACKS
Whose fiery reputation and gradual approach are already cauiiog contternalion in Berlin

A FAMOUS RUSSIAN CAVALRY REGIMENT

The progress o( ihe Russian Armies through Austria and East Prussia is being watched with intense interest,

and their brilliant victories over the Austrian! are a matter of intense satisfaction

991

LAND AND WATER

September 12, 1914

: <
O a

992

September 12, 19 14

LAND AND WATER

SOCIAL AND SPORTING NOTES

IJUNTING is not to be entirely in abeyance this coming
^ -*■ winter, but what there is of it will be purely expedient ;
there will be ro more of it than is necessary in order to keep
the number of foxes within due limits, to keep hounds in
work, to afford employment for huntsmen and whippers-in
who are not eligible for service in the Army. Doubtless a
few clderl}- farmers may be found in the field if all their cobs
have not be^n commandeered, and there is no reason why
ladies who have mai'nts for tV" purpose should not ride to
hounds as usual. But coun '.!:':_ figures which have been so
familiar and so welcome at the r>ivertside will be missing ;
quite a number of Masters of Hou.: '- themselves are at the
front ; and the " Image of War," as Jcrrocks called hunting,
wiU be but a very faint image of itself thi« season. There
can be no heart in it. Even as it is an ex-Ma:?ter of an East
Anglian pack has severed his connection with his hunt in
order to mark his disapproval of the continuance of the sport
in any shape or form, which, to our way of thinking, is quite
illogical, though his patriotic fervour is commendable enough.

"VIT^HILE hunting has been proving its worth to the nation
' ' at such an hour of need in providing for the Army so
many gallant horsemen — the best horsemen over a country
in the world — and so many thousands of light horses — again
the very best Army remounts to be found in the world — is
it not despicable on the part of some people to try to stir up
strife among poultry-keepers and clamour for a wholesale
destruction of foxes by poison and gun ? " Hunting men are
at the front fighting for us," is really the gist of their argu-
ment ; " now is our chance, destroy aU the foxes, so that
when they come back there can be no such thing as hunting
for them, which is only the selfish sport of the rich." That
is the attitude which is being adopted in some quarters.
This agitation against hunting at such a time is surely the
meanest and most contemptible action ever perpetrated by
so-called well-wishers of the poultry-farming industry. No,
let foxes be thinned out by the ordinary and legitimate
means, even if it be only in the nature of cubhunting
throughout the winter. Let there be no sly attack upon the
future interests of a sport which has done so much for
England and the British Army, and whose votaries are now
serving their country in probably greater proportion than
the votaries of any other sport, pastime, or pursuit in the
kingdom.

TVyCANY hunts, whose Masters have undertaken active
■'■'-'■ service during the war, are in the management of
committees pro tern, and everywhere strict economy, of
course, will have to be practised. Some private packs have
been given up — notably that of Mr. T. Bouch, Joint Master
of the Belvoir, who has rejoined his old regiment, the loth
Hussars ; Lord Robert Manners, the other Joint Master of this
famous pack, has joined the Rifle Brigade, and accordingly
Mr. Cyril Greenall has been asked to act as Deputy Master
during the season 1914-15. Everywhere the lack of horses
will be a handicap to those whose duty it is to carry on
hunting in order to keep the thing going, and this will be felt
not only this season but perhaps for several seasons yet to
come. On the day that the Southdown began cubhunting
recently, the hunt servants rode from kennel to covertside
on bicycles, and then hunted hounds on foot. This practice
has been followed in several other countries, where practically
a clean sweep was made of the hunt horses for national
purposes, and it has answered tolerably well, a very fair
number of cubs being brought to hand. Lord Harrington,
M.F.H., has been more fortunate than some, for he has been
able to mount his staff on polo ponies. Hunting may still
serve a highly useful and important service, if those who
are able to go out with hounds in the ensuing months will
carefully break in young horses and get others fit and in hard
condition for the front when wanted by the authorities.

I IKE hunting men, followers of other sports and pastimes
■'-' have not failed the country in time of need, and it was
encouraging to find how spontaneously and readily Rugby
football players abandoned their season's fixtures when the
call to arms came. It was a timely lead to those who play
under the Association code, to athletes of every class, and
particularly, perhaps, to county cricketers, whose matches
dragged on drearily during the very period when anxiety
as to the results of Lord Kitchener's appeal for men was
rather acute. There will be no representative Oxford
University Rugby team this term, Cambridge University
will follow suit, and all the crack clubs with one accord have
struck out their season's list of engagements, their players
having leapt to the call of duty with the fire and enthusiasm

we are accustomed to see at Twickenham, Richmond, the
Rectory Field— wherever the game of games is played. And
what grander material could our Army wish to recruit from than
that of British Rugby Union football, with its splendid spirit
and unexampled hardihood ? There is no game in the world
— unless it is polo — which fosters so surely those high qualities
of courage, endurance, judgment swift and sound, and pure
unselfishness, which fit a man to discharge the duties of a
good soldier. Men long past the glorious Rugby age must
have envied players of the present day their opportunity
to " form down," when Edgar Mobbs, the old England
" internationalist " and former captain of the Northampton
Club, undertook, with the approval of the military authorities,
to raise in seven days a corps of two hundred and fifty men
on the guarantee that they should go in one division.
Amateur Association footballers have also answered to the
call, and we could have wished that League football had been
cancelled this winter, so that the thousands of trained pro-
fessionals, hard and fit, had been given the opportunity to
enlist instead of exhibiting themselves to the sixpenny public
as " muddied oafs at the goal."

JUST now reference was made to polo. Alas! a number
^ of brilliant horsemen who have distinguished themselves at
Hurlingham, Ranelagh. and Roehampton in times of peace,
will never again take part in the galloping game, which has
long been recognised as an ideal training for the cavalry
officer. In the very first official list of casualties to officers
sent from the front appeared the names of well-known polo
players among the killed and wounded. The former, we
regret to say, included Mr. Harold Martin Soames, the
youngest son of Mr. W. A. Soames, of Moor Park, Farnham,
and a popular officer in the 20th Hussars, a noted polo
regiment. He was rated in the handicap at seven points,
and for his regiment he proved a sound and reliable back.
Major F. Swetenham, of the 2nd Dragoons, was also a well-
known polo player, though lower in the handicap,and every one
will deplore the death in action of Major V. R. Brooke, of
the 9th Lancers. This was not reported officially when the
first list of casualties was made out, but from a private
source. Major Brooke, though not in the 9th Lancers' first
polo team, was a keen and enthusiastic player.

. 'T^HAT 9th Lancers' sweep down on the concealed guns of
the Germans in an encounter close to the Belgian frontier
reads like a second edition of Balaclava. The regiment
charged through " a hail of melinite or lyddite " (according
to the Evening News), cut down aU the German gunners, and
put the guns out of action. In spite of being hit in both
legs and having two fingers shot off (according to the reports)
another fine deed is recorded of Captain Francis Grenfell, of
the same regiment, in recovering a couple of British guns,
whose servers had been put out of action. Our readers do
not require to be told that Captain Grenfell (like his twin
brother, Mr. " Rivy " Grenfell) has been one of the best and
most dashing polo players in London polo in recent seasons,
though he has had more than his share of bad luck in the
shape of accidents. There is no doubt that to the game in
which he has played such a conspicuous part must be given
some credit for having developed in him those soldierly
qualities of dash and cool resource he has now displayed upon
the battlefield. According to another account, when Captain
Grenfell was wounded he was carried into safety under heavy
fire and at great personal risk by the Duke of Westminster. It
may seem a small matter at a time hke this, but it should be
pointed out that the Duke of Westminster is another keen votary
of that game which calls for so much reckless courage, such
physical fitness, perfection of eye and wrist, and most finished
horsemanship on the part of the rider. This war is going to
prove to us once more that the Britisher's love of sport and
games at their fit time and in their proper places is his
salvation and not his undoing, as croakers and detractors
are so fond of telling us.

TN consequence of the war Surrey cancelled their last two
■*■ matches, and the season's first class county cricket came
to an end last week. But there was little interest in it. Who
cared what county stood at the top of the table, or how So and
So finished up in the averages. At this time of the year we
are accustomed to a bewildering array of figures every morn-
ing showing how the counties and their players have fared
during the past four months. But even if they have appeared,
no one has had the time or the inclination to study them.
It is sufficient to summarise the thing into the statement
that Surrey finishes at the head of the table, with Middlesex
second, and Kent third, while those unfortunate West of

993

LAND AND WATER

September 12, 19 14

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The purity and age of this Whisky ("Sandy Mac-
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994

September 12, 1914

LAND AND WATER

England counties, Somerset and Gloucestershire, are hopelessly
at the bottom of the list. Hobbs, the Surrey crack, had the
remarkable average of 62'47 and the record of ten three-
figure innings for his county, but in the general batting
averages he played second fiddle to J. W. Hearne, of
Middlesex, while C. P. Mead is a creditable third. But for
all-round performances the figures of F. E. Woolley and
Tarrant are the features of the averages. The former made
considerably over 2000 runs and took 124 wickets for iS-gi
apiece. Tarrant's total was nearly 2000 with an average
of something over 45 per innings, while in bowling he had
138 victims at a cost of 18-84 i^ns each. In many respects
it was a wonderful season, and but for the war the inquest
on it would have furnished some most interesting reflections.

A MEETING of the committee of the Culmstock
-^*- Otterhounds was held at the Castle Hotel, Taunton,
on August 22, to consider whether hunting, which had
temporarily been suspended, should be resumed. Mr. A.
Venables Kyrke was in the chair. Among those present
were the Master, Mr. H. Welch-Thornton, Mr. C. W. Nelder,
and Mr. H. Gillham. After the minutes were read and signed
the chairman placed before the committee his views on the
matter, and it was eventually decided that hunting should
be resumed in such districts as might be considered advis-
able, provided that it were not against the wishes of the
riparian owners. It was also decided that at each meet the
" cap " should be devoted to the Prince of Wales's Relief
Fund. This was signed by A. Venables Kyrke, chairman.
The Culmstock Otterhounds will meet at the Carnarvon
Arms, Dulverton, at nine o'clock on September 14, and at
East Budleigh at ten o'clock, September 16, to wind up the
season.

WHATEVER the hoHday-makers by the side of the sea
may have to sav about the weather, the angler certainly
has no cause for complaint, for the dull cloudy days
and the constant rainfall have kept fish on the move.
Very few fishermen have visited Blagdon recently, but some
good baskets were obtained by those who were out, Mr. C. R.
Batey having seven on the 22nd, three on the 24th, and two
on the 25th, a splendid brown trout of 5 lb. 4 oz., which
§;raced his basket on the last day, being a record for the week.
Some good sport has also been had on the Elan Reservoirs, where
the trout run rather smaller but make up in gameness what
they lack in size. On the Tavy. Devonshire, the peal are
running well, General Eagles having nine. Captain Roe four,
and Colonel Trotman two, while some nice catches of brown
trout are reported. Wroxham Broad and the rivers in the
vicinity are in first-class fettle and some huge catches of
bream, roach, and rudd have been taken during the last
week. The fishing is all that could be desired in Ireland, and
excellent sport has been had recently on the Great Southern
Hotel lakes at Waterville, Co. Kerry, and from Murphy's Hotel,
Oughterard. We hear that the " Daddy " is putting in an
appearance on Lough Corrib, where some splendid trout have
recently been caught.

PARTRIDGE shooting in Scotland opened under delightful
circumstances as regards weather, but very few sportsmen
were out during the first few days. Even those that did take a
turn in the meadows remained only to secure a few birds, and
did not indulge in anything like systematic shooting. Despite
some discouraging predictions, the birds are said to be very
numerous, strong and well-developed. In fact, there is good
reason to believe that they are more plentiful than they have
been for the last five years. Shooting, which will not be
general until the beginning of October, must this year be
conducted with special care and caution. The reason of this
is that for some time to come it will be impossible to replenish
the stocks by the introduction of live birds from Hungary
or Belgium. Grouse are everywhere abundant and in the
pink of condition, but the moors have not yet been much
disturbed except by keepers. The largest bag hitherto
reported was secured in Gaick on the opening day, and con-
sisted of 115 brace. Stags everywhere make a superb show,
but stalking is not conducted with anything like the usual
energy. Seven fine animals were shot in Stray and Braulen
forests by Lord Stanley and his guests, the best head obtained
falling to Mr. Oliver. Among those who secured heavy
stags are Sir Arthur Bignold, of Lochrosque, and party,
Captain Combe, of Strathconon, and party, and Mr. Wills,
Killilan, and party.

THE weather, on the whole, has been favourable to angling
during the last few days. More wind would certainly
be welcome, but the waters have been in a fairly satisfactory
state, and nice baskets have been obtained. Recent catches
on Ballindalloch stretches^of the Spey included a salmon' of
loj lb. by Mr. A. Robertson ; a salmon of gj lb. and a grilse

of 5 lb. by Mr. A. Murdoch ; two salmon weighing each
II lb. by Mr. A. Shiach ; and a grilse of 5 lb.* by Mr. J.
MacGilchrist. On Loch Assopol, Island of Mull, Mr. French
had six sea trout ; while on Loch Eye, Mr. Wilson, Edinburgh,
had eighteen trout weighing i^lb. On River Cononish,
Tyndrum, Mr. R. Stewart landed a salmon of 15 lb. ; on
River Garry, Mrs. Hands got a salmon of gi lb. ; and on River
Avon, Tomintoul, Mr. Frank Reid, Edinburgh, had a fine
salmon of 6 lb. Loch Leven is giving some fine sport, and
its habitues have every reason to be satisfied with the season.
Last month the total catch with the rod was g.yab trout,
weighing 6,7g4| lb. In August last year the catch was
3,021 trout, weighing 2,532^ lb. We are informed that Mr.
Gilbert Tweedie. W.S., Annan, honorary secretary of the
Annan Angling Association, has received a communication
from the Fishery Board for Scotland, to the effect that Mr.
W. L. Calderwood, Inspector of Salmon Fisheries, will hold
a public inquiry at Annan with respect to the petition of the
District Board craving for an alteration of the rod-fishing
close time within the district.

TN the competition for the prize presented to the
■*■ Routenburn Club, Largs, by the vice-president, Mr.
MacAndrew, of Knock, the best cards returned against bogey
were J. A. Malcolm (scratch), four down, and A. H. Orr (2), five
down. In the Tillicoultry Club Championship competition,
Thomas S. Millar beat W. M. Bett by one hole, and W.
Caldwell beat William MacLauchlan by one hole. In the final
William Caldwell beat Thomas S. Millar by 2 up and i to
play. The winner in the ladies' competition was Mrs.
Caldwell (14), 70 (14 holes). Troon Ladies' Club played
for Captain Dickie's prizes, for second division and club
medals. The winner of both prizes was Miss Graham (25),
71. Miss Sinclair (17) made a score of 72 ; Miss W. A.
Robertson (10), a score of 72 ; Mrs. Collins (i), a score of
74 ; Miss L. Neilson (20), a score of 76, and Miss G. Wilson
(14), a score of 76. Under the auspices of Balmore Club
the ladies' monthly medal was won by Miss Nan Reid (22),
gi. At a meeting of Glasgow Corporation Sub-Committee
on Recreation — Baihe Robert Mitchell, convener, in the
chair — there was taken into consideration the question of
proceeding with or postponing the golf competitions which
were fixed to take place on two consecutive Saturdays in
the course of this month. After some discussion it was
finally agreed to recommend that, in view of the present
national crisis, the competitions be postponed sine die.

TT is officially announced that it has been decided, on
■*■ account of the war, to abandon the Western Race
Meeting which was to have taken place at Ayr on September
16, '17, and 18. A disappointing afternoon's sport was the
outcome of the £15 'one mile open trotting match promoted
by Mr.'S. Ferguson at Hawkhill enclosure, Edinburgh. Only
six horses turned out, and it was found necessary to run off
the handicap on the best average, Mr. Campbell's Owl
winning two out of the three finals. The entries were : Mr.
Campbell's Owl (60) ; Mr. Ovens's Dr. Crippen (200) ; Mr.
Cranston's Erin's Queen (scratch)'; Mr. Haxton's Miss'T.
(250) ; Mr. Beattie's Carpets (250), and Mr. Nicol's Mistake,
Dyart (180). An unsuccessful attempt to break her own
record was made by Mr. Cranston's Erin's Queen. There
have been sold in Messrs. Lyon and Turnbull's Rooms,
Edinburgh, a number of sections of the Traill estates of
Castlehill and East Murkle, Caithness. They included a
mansion house, home farm, quarries, harbour and parks.
In each case the upset price was obtained. Most 'of the
important athletic fixtures have been abandoned, including
the Braemar gathering, the Northern meetings '(Inverness),
and the Argyllshire gathering (Oban).

To those who are interested in the present struggle now going
on just across the Channel, and are unable from any reason whatever
to take part in that struggle, I can commend them to do nothing
better than go to the Scala Theatre and see the pictures that are there
given in their natural colours of the whole fighting units now engaged.
The series is entitled : " The Fighting Forces of Europe," and in
addition there are some wonderful pictures straight from the fighting
lines, showing the awful ravages of war, and the penalty inflicted on
Belgium for not standing out of the Kaiser's way and allowing him
to pass on. There is also a very fine picture which shows our splendid
young men of to-day, who are giving up their lives, their home com-
forts, in fact everything they can, to help to keep the British flag flying.
The picture in question is Lord Roberts inspecting the recruits who have
just joined Lord Kitchener's Army, Here, in truth, is a patriotic
exhibition which no Britisher should miss. He will also have the
satisfaction of knowing that a part of the money he pays for admission
is being sent weekly to swell the Prince of Wales's Fund. The number
of well-known people who have already visited the exhibition are too
numerous to mention, but here a few may be given : H.R.H. The
Prince of Wales, Lord Titchfield, Admiral Fisher, Lady Hansell,
Prince Bariatinsky, Sir Alexander Asancheyv, the Servian and
Roumanian Ambassadors, and quite large numbers of the staff of the
War Office.

995

LAN'D AND WATER

September 12, 19 14.

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59-ei NEW OXFORD St,1_ONDON,W.C.«. I6UORD EDWARD S^f.DUBLIN

996

The County Gentleman

AND

LAND &WATER

Vol. LXIIl. No. 2732

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, i<)i4

rpUBi,iSHeD Asn
La nfw^faprrJ

PRICE SIXPENCE
PUBLISHED WEEKLY

Photograph by SiratM, io6 Nm Bond Stre4t, W.

THE MAHARAJA OF BIKANIR

Who is on his way over to lead his troops in the defence of the British Empire. Not the least

gratifying resuh of the war has been the spontaneous action of all classes and creeds in India to

place their services and their wealth at the disposal of the British Government.

LAND AND WATER

September 19, 19 i .1

SOLDIER-SPORTSMEN

Left to right, top

VISCOUNT CASTLEROSSE.2nd LIEUTENANT IN THE
IRISH GUARDS

Who ii reported wounded and missing. He is an all-round sportiman
and particularly fond oi golf.

Left to rigfit. bottom

LIEUTENANT LORD R. E. INNES-KER OF THE IRISH

GUARDS

Reported wounded and missing. Like his brothers the Duke ol

Roxburghe and Lord Alistair Innes-Ker, he is particularly fond

of polo.

CAPTAIN LORD H. C. C. SEYMOUR OF THE
GRENADIER GUARDS

Who hat been wounded in ihe course of the actions earned out by
the British Expeditionary Force. Lord Seymour is a fine horseman
and has steered many winners past the post in regimental racing.

CAPTAIN GEORGE BELLVILLE OF THE

16th LANCERS

Who has been wounded. Captain Pellville is captain of his

regimental polo team and has played in many important tournaments

for Ihe Old Cantabs, in (act, he is one of the best No. Is »ho hat

ever played in Mr. Buckmaster's famous side.

1000

September 19, 1914

LAND AND WATER

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lOOI

LAND AND WATER

September 19, 1914

Water Meadows and Stubble Fields

By GUY C. POLLOCK

IT is surely reasonable to hope that before these lines
appear in print all doubt or hesitation as to recruits
for the new army will have been ended. As things
now are, with the story of our little army's heroic
stand against desperate odds hot in the memory,
it is difficult to conceive the mind of the man who does not
genuinely thirst for such training as may fit him for battle
against an insolent and savage enemy.

They say that the country needs enlightenment, especially
in the great towns and industrial districts. That may be
so. Yet it seems odd we have been taught to believe that
here dwelt the sections of our people most intelligent and
most alert. The rural districts were supposed to enjoy a
monopoly of slow-witted lethargy. Yet the rural districts
perfectly understand the war,
the German menace, and the
duty of a Briton.

Two days ago I found
myself, for the first time since
war, on a chalk stream with
a rod in my hand. It was not
a very gay experience. A
mist of tears and rage came
between an angler and what
used to be his passionate
sport. But that is a mere
digression. I had not been
fishing long before I was
hailed by the excellent fellow
who. with another, older than
himself, cuts our weeds for
us and looks after our
hatches. The second weed-
trimming had been under-
taken just before the declara-
tion of war.

His first words were :
" Well, sir, I never expected
to see you again. I said to
Carter, I says, you may be
sure we shan't see none of the
gentlemen here again. Gone
to the war you may depend
on it, I says."

With an almost apologetic
regret I explained the non-
military character of our oc-
cupations and, in self defence,
the reluctance of authority
to accept such material aid as
one had been able to offer.
My friend joined me in these
regrets. He, too, had offered
himself. But they wouldn't
have him. Forty-one are his
years, and a fine upstanding
man he is. " But, sir," he went on, " they may take us

yet. Let us get at them devils. That is what I

want. That's what I tells the missus and the kids."

He had said nothing about the payment due to Carter
and himself for the weed cutting. No doubt they had
counted that out as a personal sacrifice on the altar of
patriotism. But he was glad as well as surprised to receive
it. He went on to talk about the war and recruiting. He
told me of a neighbouring farmer who had gone to his young
men and told them that the country wanted them. " Four-
teen of them there was, as fine a set of fellows as you might
find anywhere. And all of them went, and all of them was
accepted barring one. Too short he was — but eager, right
eager." He told me the same tale of all the neighbouring
villages. He told me of ten of them talking in a bar when
a recruiting sergeant happened along, and how all but one
stood up at once in response to an appeal. And what he
told me was confirmed from other sources. The villages
of Hampshire — I heard of one, to take exception, where
only two men could be got, and I heard of one man brave
enough to confess that he " hadn't the heart for the job "
(a man, this, who might make a better soldier than some
who enlist with unthinking valiance) — have poured in men
to the new army. And I went back to my indifferent siege
of a great trout, engaged in the meal time of one^of the^most
baffling evening rises by which I have ever been worsted.

A LIKELY SPOT

wondering where the brains and heart of England really
rested — in the rural or in the industrial districts.

Angling with a dry fly in a chalk stream is not^expcrts
crede — a really exhilarating business while one's country
is at grips with Fate, while one's friends and fellows are being
killed to defend one's own liberties. I do not think angling
is any more a matter for shame — so long as a man has offered
what he can of personal service — than any other reasonable
occupation or recreation. But it seems so. And all the
ancient zest has gone for it. You cannot catch wary trout
without a great concentration of will and skill. You cannot
concentrate any thought on anything except the country's
need, the army's heroism, the nav3''s splendour, and the
duty of a man. My creel was Ught at the day's end, and I

found only part of that
recreation of spirit which I
sought by the water meadows.
So it will be with shoot
ing. We have the purpose
now to go to the little shoot
— which might so easily be-
come the big shoot in these
days when shoots are going
so tragically cheap — for some
days and to kill some part-
ridges, hares, and rabbits for
the general food, while still
leisure and opportunity may
be found. That again is, I
think, a reasonable and even
necessary excursion. Nothing
will be gained by complete
cessation of shooting. Much
will be lost and jeopardised.
A source of food supply
would be stopped, and the
evils of unemployment would
be spread widely. Already
the game food manufacturers,
the game farmers, the keepers,
the gun makers, the powder
factories, the beaters, face the
prospect of evil fortunes.
It will not help the fortunes
and the resisting powers of
this country to make these
fortunes worse than they
must be. But I cannot sup-
pose that any of us will enjoy
very keenly the sport of
shooting partridges in these
desperate and bloody days.
The thought of killing, for
one thing, has become not

itself. And there are other
fields for kiUing than the stubbles of this, as yet, peaceful
and inviolate countryside.

But these rural sports have one sound effect. They
reinforce that actual love for England which drives men to
any sacrifice not less surely than the hottest conceptions of
an ethically righteous cause. [One looks along the chalk
stream, at the woods and water meadows, the broody
peace of a sunht evening in England ; one's eye follows the
undulations of stubble and roots and plough, of coppices and
hedgerows, of farm and villages ; one says to oneself : "Here
is the England that is mine, the fields I know, the beauty Xhit I
love." And, so seeing, no man could fail to give his unimportant
life to save this England if England shall have need of it.

In spite of being inundated with orders for military kit, in which,
since the South .-\frican war, Burberrys have specialised with such
splendid results, this enterprising firm has without interruption con-
tinued its seasonable innovations in ladies' out-door dress, which,
as usual, will be the universal standard of autumn and winter fashion.
Burberrys believe with confidence that their many distinguished
clients will recognise the desirability at this national crisis of supporting
a typically Bntish house in" its endeavour, not only to do justice to its
reputation, but to maintain undiminished its entire staff and the
families of such married members as are now serving our country.
Burberry weatherproofs, owing to their wonderful wearing properties,
are economical as well as efficient, and the new Burberry cloths eclipse
in beauty of colouring and artistic originality ofjdesign those hitherto
introduced. A post card to Haymarket will elicit illustrated catalogue
and patterns.

1002

September 19, 191 4

LAND AND WATER

Polo and the Roll of Honourl

QUITE a long list is already formed of well-known polo
players who have been killed or wounded durmg the
war, some of the best polo regmients havmg been in tlie very
tlnck of It. It IS very sad, but losses are nievitable, and we
can only console ourselves with the knowledge tliat in each
and every instance the dash and brilliancy 01 these officers'
play on the polo ground have been truly reflected by their
grand courage and spirit in action, f'he death of Lieutenant-
Colonel G. K. Ansell is a great loss to the British Army ; it
is also a loss to iiritish poJo. For many years he had been a
prominent player, and__^lus_mterest in the game this season,
when he took part in the Inter-Kegimental with his team of
the 5th Dragoon Guards, was just as keen as it was in the
hey-day of the prosperity of his former regiment, the Innis-
killing Dragoons, when he and his colleagues, Colonel (then
Mr.) F. A. B. Fryer, Major (then Mr.) Neil VV. Haig, and
General (then Major) M. F. Kimmgton were one of the
strongest military teams of the day. They won the Inter-
Kegimentcd Cup in 1897 and (with Mr. C. H Higgin No. i
instead of Mr. F^ryer) again in 1898, beating that rare com-
bination, the 13th Hussars, by one goal to none after a
memorable final. Their other Army championship victory
at Hurlingham was in 1905, when, with Captains Gibson and
Ewing Paterson in the side, they triumphed over the 20th
Hussars by four goals to three ; and altliough they were a
team of veterans, they were still to be reckoned with as a
hard-hitting combination, up to every move on the board,
until five or six years ago. Colonel Ansell was a very good
forward, with a remarkably quick eye and exceptional wrist
stroke. ^He had not the extraordinary physique of Major
Neil Haig, whose tremendous strokes frequently called forth
the wonder and admiration of onlookers, but with his wrist-
fKjwer his hitting was always crisp and clean, and he got a
great length on the ball, tie was a member of the Army
Polo Committee, and always worked hard in the interests of
the game, the value of which he fully recognised as a training
m horsemanship for the cavalry o£&cer.

Memorable Finals Kecalled

A NOTHER well-known player who has figured in a
•**■ victorious Inter-Regimental side on more than one
occasion, and whose brilliant career as a soldier has ended in
the pres( nt war, was Captain J. S. Cawley, of the 20th Hussars.
It seems only the other day, though in reality it is ten years
ago, sinc'j the 20th Hussars sprang a surprise on us all as the
" dark horse " of the tournament, having only returned from
foreign service a few months ago, yet running the best
regimental sides very closely ; indeed, as shown in the
preceding paragraph, they were only beaten by the Innis-
killings by the odd goal in seven in the final of 1905. The
20th Hussars as it then stood was Mr. J. S. Cawley, Mr. C.
McG. Dunbar, Captain H. C. Hessey, and Captain H. R. Lee.
Quick on the bail, tricky in^^tactics, dogged triers all, and
finely balanced as a team, they were doughty opponents
indeed, and they triumphed in 190b and 1907, beating the
nth Hussars in the final on each occasion. 1 well recollect
the sensation Captain Cawley then made with his dashing
play at No. i. One of his ponies was an Arab stallion named
The Turk, and this pony was so handy that he could pull up,
turn, and jump into lus quickest stride almost as quick as
thought. On The Turk Mr. Cawley, as he then was, proved
a source of constant trouble to the opposing back, and his
dashes down the field when he had slipped tlie field (as he
often did even in those days of " offside ' ) drew the spectators
on to their feet breathless in e-xcitement. " Officers wounded "
have also included a number of polo players, prominent
among whom is Captain J. G. Porter- the No. j of the crack
9th Lancers' side. The gallantry of his fellow officer and
colleague in the regimental polo team, Captain Francis

Grenfell, was referred to last week. The 9th Lancers have
lost Major V. Brooke, a four-goal man ; and among the
wounded officers whose names were recorded in last
week's lists were such well-known players as Captain George
Beliville, of the ibth Lancers (the famous No. i ot the (>ld
Cantabs) ; Major E. A. W. Harman and Major G. H. A. fng,
of the 2nd Dragoon Guards;^ Captain W. G. F. Kenton, ol
the 1st Dragoon (iuards ; Lieutenant-Colonel I G. Hogg,
D.S.O., of the 4th Hussars;, Captain E. G. Christie-Miller
and Mr. E. D. H. ToUemache, of the Coldstream Guards ;
and Lord R. E. Innes-Ker, of the Iri'^h Guards, who was also
reported as missing.

The National (>ame of India

TNDIA'S magnificent devotion to the cause of tlie Empire
-*■ in this war has had due recognition in the columns ol the
daily Press. In this country, however, people do lu t
sufficiently realise the great part which polo has played in
training the cavalry officers in the Indian Army and the
military forces of the states. Take those chiefs who
were selected to accompany the Expeditionary Force to
F'rance for example — they are all polo plaj'ers and promoters
of the game. I'he Maharaja Sir Pertab Singh has played on
several occasions at the London grounds ; the present
Maharaja of Patiala, like his predectssor, is an enthusiastic
sportsman and lover of polo and pigsticking. For many
years the Patiala team proved invincible against the best
linglish regimental teams. Tlien the Maharaja of Bikanir
keeps the game going in his state, and the Maharaja ol
Jodhpur is a famous enthusiast and exponent, as are two
others who are with tlie Expeditionary Force — the Maharajas
of Kishengarh and Rutlain. Ihe last named is a fine, sale,
clever back — a nine-goal player — the former a quick and
resolute No. 2 ; and with Captain F. W. Barrett (England's
international captain) between at " 3, " and K. Ratan Singh
at " 1," they won the Calcutta Coronation Cup Tournanieiit
in great style a season or two ago. And so the list of famous
Indian players who have gone gladly and gallantly to the
front with their splendidly-trained troops on behalf of the
Empire might be greatly extended. Suffice it to say that
finer and fitter horsemen and soldiers more dashing and daring
are not to be found in the world. To a larger extent than
many of the uninitiated here can realise they owe their
brilliance and fitness to their true soldier's game of polo ;
and no matter to what task these Indian duels and their
soldiers may be put in the war we may rest fully assured that
they will do honour to themselves and their Empire.

Should Kacing Continue r

'T'HE question as to whether it is the public wish that
-■■ racing should continue was answered in no uncertain
fashion at the Doncaster meeting last week. The Corporation
had prepared itself to encounter an appreciable loss as the
result ol their policy of holding the meeting in the face of
the war difiiculties, but the attendances were so good tlu.t
by the end of the third day there was actually the prospect
ol a small ! ilance on the right side. Apart from this, there
is no doubt but that the townspeople of Doncaster would
have suffered heavily if the meeting had been abandoned.
They look to the race-week as an important source of revenue
and, trade being already bad in consequence of the war, it
would have been a double hardship upon them to have a
blank St. Leger week. The fact that the King allowed his
colours to be carried in the St. Leger was a sign that His
Majesty does not view with any disfavour the continuance
of racing. This branch of sport has grown into a real industry,
and the question is whetlier more mischief would not be
caused by its total suspension than by the present policy of
bringing off fixtures wherever practicable.

1003

LAND AND WATER

September 19, iqi^

An appeal to
PATRIOTISM

S"pp°" ."«=^P""« Will YOU answer it ?

ot Wales s INaticnal

Relief Fund. Con- ^ . 1 1 ■ i"

tnbut.ons should b= Continental tyres are made m Cermany
(orwardedioH.R.H. by the enemy. Their purchase here
ihe Prince of Wales, assists him, while the use of any
Buckingham PaJace. foreign tyre diminishes employment
for British workpeople.

British-made

DUNLOPS

are far superior in quality, and can
be supplied in unlimited quantities
at usual prices.

Fit them to your motors and cycles
D ■ . . ■ , and help to keep the flag flying.

By appointment motor '^ '^ o j a

tyre manufacturers to 11 ri . • "X-T/^X fT% O

H.M.King George V What IS YOUR aHswcr?

THE DUNLOP RUBBER CO., LTD.

FOUNDERS OF THE PNEUMATIC TYRE INDUSTRY

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HOW WILL THE WAR AFFECT

YOUR INVESTMENTS?

Read the September issue of Cbe

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THE LEADING MAGAZINE ON INVESTMENT

which contains Special Articles by distinguished
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C Every Copy of the September issue contains a
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y "" l^CLle or from the Publishers.

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" Dear Sirs, — I enclose cheque value £1 13s. for Constitu-
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years with satisfaction.— Yours truly, Henry W. Taylor."
Prepared upwards of 50 years by FRANCIS CUPISS.
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PRICESi— 1/9. 3/6, 10/6, 21/-
WriU for HlusiraUd Handbook to
FRANCIS CUPISS. LTD.. DISS. NORFOLK.

INVALID CARRIAGE FOR SALE

(By Messrs. Leveson & Sons).

A GENUINE BARGAIN, having

■^*- only been used half a dozen times, conditi- n
both of tyres and body as new. Painted black and
balled in every bearing. A luxurious carriage at
a sacrifice, owner having no further use ; cost
£18 I2S. ; seen by appointment. — Write, A.W.W.,
offices of Land and Water, Central House,
Kingsway, London, W.C.

ENTLEMAN farming

over 2000

acres REQUIRES WORKING PARTNER, with
£4000 or £5000 capital, to free him for military service • all
accounts audited and open for inspection ; fullest part'icu-
lars.-Apply, X.Y.Z office of Land and.Water, Central
House, Kmgsway, W.C.

BAR.R.S*FLOWERING BULBS

Choice Crocus Species, Colchicums, Hardy

Cyclamen, Nerines, Roman Hyacinths, etc.,

for present planting.

LIST ON APPLICATION.

BARR & SONS. 11,12&13King Street, Covent Garden, London

IMPORTANT TO SPORTSMEN
AND MASTERS OF HOUNDS

THURLOWS

Scotch Oatmeal

WARRANTED GENUINE
As supplied to numerous Ken-
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IMPORTERS ot hne qualit) IRISH and CANADIAN
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For pretent prioei and samples apply to—
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IRON FENCING,

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RAILING, GATES, &c. Catalogue Free.

<♦♦♦>»>♦>»♦«««♦

Mltl^^fftif

Messrs. WARNER, SHEPPARD k WADE
At Leicester.

LEICESTER.

WARNER, SHEPPARD & WADE, Ltd
beg to announce that they will bold their ne
SALE of Horses at the REPOSITORY, LEICESTER, •
SATURDAY, September 26, at 12 o'clock.

Owing to so many horses having been taken by the Am
there is a good demand for

COBS, PONIES AND OTHER HORSES

suitable for trade purposes, and owners of such will 61
this an excellent opportunity for disposing of them.

Early entries solicited to ensure due publicity.

Full particulars in catalogues which may be obtained
application.

WANTED, RE-ENGAGEMENT j:

*' FARM MANAGKK or WORKING BAILIFF,
practical knowledge of farming in all its branchesand estm
management, and the management of pedigree Cattle a
Shires. Good leader and manager of men; singl
abstainer; trustworthy, energetic, keen, and intelHgei
Strictly honourable, highest character.— M. A, PtRCKii
Fauld House, Hanbury, Burton-on-Trent, (iw

STAMPS.

OOK VALUABLE COLONIA

STAMPS (majority before 1660), valued about £
Sacrifice £2, Approval. — Stamps, 3 Dornclifle Ror
Pulham, London. (9-j

NEW ZEALAND & AUSTRAL

Calling at TENERIFFE, CAPE TOWN, and HOBAS

S>S« & Ai CO- 0 STEAMER

(largest in the trade) leave London every Four Weei
"IONIC "(t.s.), Sept. i;, " MAMAKl " (t.s.), Oclober
Wireless Teleeraphy, Unsurpassed Accommodxtion lor Passeoa
tst, and. and 3rd Class. SPACIOUS STATE ROOMS for ONE, T^
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Mall; or to White Star Line, Liverpool, and 1, Cockspur Street, S

1004

The County Gentleman

AND

LAND &WATER

Vol. LXIII. No. 2733 SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1914

fpublished ast price sixpence
La newspaperJ

PUBLISHED WEEKLY

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES

The Prince's Regiment, the 2ncl Grenadier Guards, has now moved out of London for a destination
at present unknown. His Royal Highness, who has been transferred to the 1 st Grenadier Guards,
expressed great regret that he was not permitted to go to the front, and has since approached Lord
Kitchener on the subject, but it is understood that at present his wish cannot be complied with.

LAND AND WATER

September 26, 1914

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lOIO

September 26, 19 14

L A N D AND \\ A T E'R

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,;^-"'.;y-;y'.'.'/"'^'":

: -^A

Xeo Britannicue

The British Lion is the sort
Of thing to spend the day with,

At any kind of friendly sport
The animal to play with ;

But do not anger him, because

He has the most tremendous claws.

A wholly tranquil creature he,
Who likes to spend his leisure

In making lots of £ s. d.

Wherewith to purchase pleasure ;

But irritate him and a roar

Of mighty volume is in store.

He's not at all the kind of beast

To get into a flurry,
Nor does he trouble in the least

H folks his leisure worry ;
But harm his friend and you'll not fail
To see a lashing of his tail.

The German Eagle is a bird
That causes small annoyance ;

No sound from it is ever heard
Which dissipates his joyance ;

But batter Belgium and you'll trace

Black looks upon the Lion's face.

The Eagle lately gave a prance,
And 'mid much loud concussion

Went first to meet the Man of France
And secondly the Russian ;

The Lion, too, she chanced to meet.

And now she beats a bad retreat.

The Teuton Eagle has a fleet

On which she's spent much money,

And which the Lion wants to meet ;
But this seems truly funny —

It gives no sign of any sort

Of ever coming out of port.

And so the war goes grimly on

To its predestined finish ;
The Eagle, grave and woebegone,

Sees hope on hope diminish ;
The Lion, with a sigh most deep,
Still pining to resume his sleep.

MOSTYN T. PiGOTT.

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lOI I

LAND AND WATER September 26, 1914

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

FRENCH INFANTRY CHARGING

FRENCH DRAGOONS

In pursuit of flying German Uhlans passing through a villa|;e on the Marne

FRENCH INFANTRY

In action against Germans, who are lighting a rear-guard action

IOI2

September 26, 19 14

LAND AND WATER

THE HAVOC OF WAR

Copyngkt, Cenlral News

THE BEAUTIFUL TOWN OF DINANT, NOW A SAD RUIN

VIEW OF TERMONDE
A scene which bringi home lo us the horrors of bombardment

IOI3

LAND AND WATER

September 26, 191

■Bww 1820
Still going strong.

"Ah, vain keghets ! One cannot BiUNfJ back the past."

"That is where you are wb( ng. If "Johnnie Walkeh," Black Label, were not a thing of

THE past, it would NOT BE FOR ME A THING OF THE PRESENT.

s»

"Johnnie AYalker," Black Lnbel, is a tiling of the past, Viecause every drop is guaranteed over
12 years ohl.

It i^^ a thing of tlie ])!-eseiit because it is obtainable everj^wliere.

And it is a tiling of the fiitiii'e bee uisu the past, present ajid future policy of maintaining
large reserves to meet the ever increasing demand ensures l)eyond doid)t its uniform quality.

GUAUANIKED SAMK QUALllY THItOUGHOUT THK WOULD.

John Yv a l e e r & Sons, Ltd.. Scotch AY im s k y DioTillets, Kit, marnock,

1014

September 26, 19 14

LAND AND W A T E R

WE welcome the^appeal that has been made by an eminent
soldier to Masters of Hounds not to stop hunting during
the war. It was time such an appeal was made, for many
prominent people — and among them at least one ex M.F.H. —
have from the purest, though in our view the most mistaken,
of motives urged the contrary. In their opinion a continuance
of the sport while the great struggle between the powers is
proceeding and so many thousands of our countrymen are
fighting nobly in the cause of liberty for the nations is uncalled
for--unseemIy. Unseemly it would be if the hunting it is
proposed to carry on were of the " merrily we'll whoop and
we'll holloa " nature ; but it is nothing of the sort. The
Masters of Foxhounds Association, who considered the subject
a month ago, came to the wise decision that it would be most
prejudicial to the country in general if it were allowed to
lapse altogether, though they fully recognised that " regular
hunting," as it is known in normal times, would this season
be impossible. They suggested that it should be carried on
as a matter of expediency and not as a sport. Field-Marshal
Sir Evelvn Wood, the last man in the world to advocate
anything contrary to the interests of the Army or contrary
to taste, so thoroughly agrees with this attitude adopted by
the Masters of Foxhounds Association that he has made a
direct appeal not to stop hunting. " It is a very important
training for our officers," he remarks, " the very dash of our
cavalry being attributable to hunting at home " ; and he
knows the value of the hunting field even at the present time
as a means of supply to the cavalry of the best jiossible horses
for the purpose. By all means keep hunting going, he and
many others agree ; but let there be no panoply or heedless
merriment about it this winter, for such would certainly be
out of taste.

ENF:K.\I- FREN'CH, who lias shown all his old mastery
and wonderful military science in his command of the
liritish Expeditionary Force during the past six weeks,
gained undying fame in South .Africa by his brilliant work in
command of the cavalry. And General French has always
acknowledged his indebtedness to the hunting field for the
experience which proved of such service to him in his career
as a cavalry leader. He has been a hunting man all his life,
like Sir Evelyn Wood, who hopes to be out with hounds
prettv often this winter on the only horse the (iovcrnment
has left him— a cast-off .\rmy one. Earl Roberts is a firm
believer in the value of hunting and polo, so long as they do
not interfere with a soldier's duties. The great Duke of
Wellington, who kept a pack of hounds going during the
Peninsular campaign, always declared that " I-Lngland will
rue the day when her field sports are abandoned." Major-
General Sir William Knox expressed the strongest views on
the necessity of looking upon hunting as the last hope of our
riding-horse' supply in the absence of the expensive one of
breeding establisliments and declared : " There is no better
school of training for \\mv officers of all arms than the
hunting field." Major-General E. A. H. Alderson, himself a
Master of Hounds thought so highly of the value of hunting
that he wrote a book, " Fink and Scarlet," showing the
inseparable connection between soldiering and the sport ;
and there are other Masters of Hounds serving the country at
this critical time who have left strict injunctions for their
staffs to keep hunting going in a practical and businesslke
way until their return. A better lead and example than that
no one can wish for.

pURTHEk well-known names of polo players have
^ appeared in recent casualty lists, and furtlier stories
come from the front of the particular dash and gallantry of
well-known polo regiments, which seem to have played their
part nobly in the work of the cavalry. One list of wounded
officers contained the names of two members of the Inter

regimental Cup winning team this \ear — Captain T. R.
Badger and Mr. B. G. Nicholas, the 12th Lancers' No. 2 and
No. 3. It is to be hoped that their injuries are not serious,
but slight. The 12th Lancers, it will be remembered, showed
extraordinary combination in their play this year. In-
dividually, the officers named were tlie strongest members of
the side, though Mr. E. H. Leatham was a capable " I." and
Mr. R W. R. Wyndham-Ouin a reliable and steadily-
improving back. But it was their remarkable team-work
wliich carried them through all the rounds into the final, in
which the\- beat the 1st Life Guards. Their record for the
tournament speaks for itself — 38 goals for : lO against. And
they capped it all subsequently by beating the Champion
Cup winners, the full team of Old Cantabs, and then the
Cavalry Club in securing the King's Coronation Cup. It
was the first time since the institution of the latter tourna-
ment that the " championship of champions " had been won
by a regimental side, and both Captain Badger and Mr
Nicholas had a big share in this success. In the same list of
wounded appeared the names of Mr. L. H. Jefferson (the
nth Hussars' No. i) and Major W. J. Lockett, of the same
regiment ; and previously it was announced that Lieutenant-
Colonel the Hon. G. H. Morris, of the Irish Guards, a keen
and well-known polo player, was not only among the wounded
officers, but also among those missing.

The War and the Turf

LAST week's discussion by the members of the Jockey
Club as to propriety of continuing to hold race meetings
during the war bids fair to become historic in the annals of
the Turf. The meeting had been preceded by panic rumours
in the sporting columns of at least one important newspaper
to the effect that the Jockey Club had in contemplation the
abandonment of the three autumn Newmarket meetings.
Had this been true it would have meant the summary end
of the flat-racing season. If the authorities of the Turf had
abandoned the meetings for which they are primarily respon-
sible, it can be taken for granted that race-course companies
in general would have followed their lead. But we now know
tiiat tlic members of the Jockey Club were never desirous of
putting into practice the drastic measure falsely attributed
to them. On the contrary, the Stewards went \ery carefully
into the facts and the figures, and at the meeting at Derby
House they were able to present a strong case for the con-
tinuance of racing during the war. Thus it was resolved,
without a dissentient voice among the Jockey Club members,
that the racing fixtures at Newmarket and elsewhere should
be carried out where the local conditions permit and where
the feeling in the locality is not averse to the meeting being
held.

Autumn Handicap

NOW that racing at Newmarket next month is practically
assured there will be rapidly growing public interest in
the prospects of the Cesarewitch and the Cambridgeshire,
which are perhaps the most attractive of all the racing
season's handicaps. Some good judges declared that the
winner of the Cesarewitch was seen at Doncaster in John
Amendall, who won the Rufford Abbey Handicap on the
Town Moor in most convincing style. That h rse,
unfortunateh-. died last week as the result ot a
severe kick". Princess Dorrie is sure also to be
well backed. The Oaks winner stays- well, and is by
no means harshly treated in view of her smart achieve-
ments this season.' One will await with interest the further
performances of those good three-year-old colts Willbrook
and Dairy Bridge, who filled the leading places in the Don-
caster Cup. It 'is certain that both of them are well endowed
with stamina, that quality which, above all others, is indis-
pensable in a Cesarewitch winner.

1015

LAND AND WATER

September 26, 19 14

BURBERRY WAR KIT

The Burberry Weatherproof

Infantry or Cavalry Patterns, lined
wool or with detachable fleece lining.

As supplied to every regiment in H.M.'s
Army, the Stafl, and Military Colleges, has
been indispensable to Officers ever since the
South African War.

LORD KITCHENER referring to THIC
BURBERRY describes it as "a most vain
able addition to his campaigning kit.'

campaigning

Burberry Khaki Uniforms

Complete in 4 Days

For Officers of all arms,
designed by Burberrys
for the War Office, and
weatherproofed by the
Burberry process.

Burberrys' War Kit

includes Service Jackets,
Hreeches, Slacks, Great
Coats, Pea Jackets, Caps,
Haversacks, Slings, Put-
tees, Shirts, S. B. Belts.
Gabardine Ground
Sheets (lined oil silk), and
Sleeping Bags (lined
fleece), Gabardine Tente
d'Abri (8| lbs.)

GABARDINE DAWAC-a
Bivouac weisrhing only 3i lbs.
inclusive of pegs.

PEACE PRICES

Regiments in any part of the
United ICintrdom wail ted
upon by appointment.

ILLUSTRA TED BROCHURE ON
Burberry Service Dress MILITARY KIT, POST FREE.

BURBERRYS Haymarket S.W. LONDON

8 & 10 Boul Malesherbes PARIS ; Basingstoke and Provincial Agents.

THE BURBERRY
Burberry Coats are
labelled "Burberrys."' Be
sure that yours is genuine,
otherwise at sorest need
the imitation may fail you.

INVALID CHAIRS

To wheel up or down stairs — and many
other ingenious devices for the comfort
and relief of the wounded — can be obtained
from JOHN WARD Limited.
A "John Ward" Chair is the ideal gift
for a Red Cross Hospital.
Write for No. 12 List of Models. Pesce Prices.

JOHN WARD LTD..

MAKERS TO TUEIK M4JEST1ES,

247C Tottenham Court Road,
London, W.

FASHIONABLE

'BLOUSES

Designed by our own artist
and made by our own workers
from very rich quality bro-
caded crepe de chine ; in
a wide range of beautiful
colours, also in black and
white. The workmanship and
cut are excellent. Can be
worn buttoned right up to
the throat.

SPECIAL PRICE

15/9

Some idea cj the value of
this blouse will be gathered
from the fact that the crepe
de chine] from which it is
made is worth fully 6/11
per yard.

SENT ON A PPROVA L

SOLDIERS' SHIRTS

Unshrinkable Army and Navy
Blue-Grey Shirts - each 3/6
Men's Pyjama Suits, in striped
flannel - - - 5/11

Men's Striped Flannel Shirts.
3/6 and 4/6
Khaki Sweaters - 6/11

Cardigan Jackets - each 6 6

DebenKam
&Freebodly,

Wigmop« Street.
iCBveridi«K Square) London.W

=HORLICK'S=
MALTED MILK

Pure full-cream milk, enriched with choice

malted barley and wheat, in powder form.

Keeps indefinitely.

THE FOOD DRINK FOR ALL AGES

A refreshing and sustaining beverage, in-
stantly ready by the addition of hot or
cold water only. No cooking. Also

available in Tablet form to be dissolved
in the mouth. Nourishing and convenient.

NO ADVANCE IN PRICES

of the various sizes, which are to be obtained of all

Chemists and Stores, or of us direct by post, in sterilised

^lass bottles at 1/6, 2 6, and 11 -

Conespontlt'iue Invited.

HORLICK'S MALTED MILK CO., SLOUGH, BUCKS. ENGLAND

Reduction in Prices

BELDAM

TYRES

But Same Famous Quality Guaranteed!

New Prices

for Cover..

Size

V-Grooved

Combination
V-Stcel Studded

De Luxe
AllRubber

815x105
880 X 1 20

£5 14 3
6 19 9

£710
8 5 9

£6 7 9
8 3 0

IVrile for complete list

The Beldam Tyre Co., Ltd., Brentford

ioi6

September 26, 19 14

LAND AND WATER

The Shooting of Game

T^HE idea of giving official encouragement to co-operation
in game-shooting originated with Lord Leith, of Fyvie.
At his suggestion the County Clerk of Aberdeenshire
approached the administrative authorities, and the response
to his appeal was prompt and satisfactory. The Com-
missioners of Inland Revenue have intimated that they will
make no additional claim for licence duty in respect of duly
hcensed keepers who, for the purposes of the Prince of Wales's
National Relief Fund, shoot on the lands of and by permission
of others than their employers. This means that a keeper
with a £2 licence may help in shooting game on neighbouring
estates without having to provide himself with a £3 game
licence. The concession is highly appreciated by preservers,
and we are informed that it has already borne excellent fruit.
In all parts of the country keepers belonging to different
estates are carrying out joint shoots. They fully realised
that it is only by clubbing together that they can possibly
accomplish the thinning out that is indispensably necessary
in the different preserves. There is little danger that the
military and naval hospitals will suffer for lack of game or
venison during the shooting season.

River and Loch

'T'HE angling season is now tapering to a point, and on some
leading waters the rod has been definitely laid aside. In
the majority of Scottish districts the sport has been rather
indifferent, the protracted drought preventing salmon and
sea-trout from ascending the rivers with the requisite ease
and freedom. Trout were impeded more, perhaps, than the
lordly fish. The former often frequent small streams which
are Hable to dry up, whereas the latter are invariably found
in large rivers which are never without a moderate flow of
water, even in the longest and brightest summer. Within
the last few days the weather has been marked with heavy
and frequent showers, and in many places good baskets have
been obtained. On Loch Shiel Mr. Wilson secured thirteen
sea-trout in four days and Mr. Chalmers had ten sea-trout,
and five brown trout in one day. Mr. MacQueen creeled
seven sea-trout in two days and also landed a salmon weighing
15 lb. In Kyle of Sutherland, Mr John MacLennan brought
to gaff in a single day four fine sea-trout, the heaviest scaling
6 lb. 13 oz. On the Esk and Liddle herling continue to give
fine sport. In one of the Xetherby reaches a single rod
accounted for fifty in less than a week, and another rod
had a score in one day The Spcv. the Garrv, the Shiel,

and other rivers have recently yielded some capital salmon
fishing.

On the Links

'T'HE camping and drilling of troops on many of the best-
■*■ known Scottish hnks has interfered to some extent witli
golf playing, but in very few places has it been found necessary
to put a complete veto on the ancient game. The men in khaki
have everywhere evinced a laudable desire to interfere as little
as possible with the wielders of the clubs ; but of course it is
impossible that practice should go on " just as usual." Half
a loaf, however, is better than no bread. The autumn medal
competed for by the Montrose Mercantile Club was won by
J. C. Jessop with a score of 73. Other scores were :■ — W. S.
Pairman (i), 75 ; A. P. Mitchell (4), D. Patterson (2), and
J. Fyfe, jun. (plus i), 78 ; A. Harley (i) and G. M. Smith (2),
79 ; C. Lamb (scratch) and D. Thomson (plus 3), 80 ; and
R. Middleton (i) and A. Patterson (3), 81. The hole com-
petition of the Hawick Club was keenly played, and the
following is the result : — J. S. Reid beat W. Boyd by 3 and 2 ;
C. S. Rennie beat A. Elder by 3 and i ; W. Burnett beat
H. L. Purdon by 6 and 5 ; H. M. Duncan beat R. H. Lindsay
Watson by 3 and i. In the semi-final W. Burnett beat
H. M. Duncan by 2 and i ; J. S. Reid a bye. The final
resulted in W. Burnett beating J. S. Reid by 3 and 2.

Polo in Ireland

T IKE most other Irish pastimes, polo has been severely
-'-' handicapped by the war, and the game jmay be said
to have been brought to an abrupt close with the departure
for the front of most if not all the principal players in
Ireland. All the important fixtures have been abandoned,
and while regret is widespread there is hope of a speedy re-
sumption of the play. The military, who have popularised
polo in Ireland, hope to render a good account of them-
selves in the more real opportunity afforded them for the
display of coolness and courage. That they have
done so is already a matter of history, and next year
when the Open Cup Tournament, now in its thirty-sixth j'ear,
is played, it is anticipated the contest will arouse a degree
of enthusiasm never previously experienced. One or two
famous players of the 5th Royal Irish Lancers and several
" strong men " of the i6th Lancers have rendered a good
account of themselves under fire, and that they do not forget
the game is evidenced by references to it in their home
correspondence.

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General Sir Richard Airey
General the Earl of Albemarle
Captain Oswald H. Ames
Lieutenant-Colonel Anstruthev-

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Sir George C. A. Arthur, Bart.
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Lieutenant-General Valentine

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Lieutenant-General Charles

Baring
Captain John Bastard
Lieutenant-Colonel the Duke of

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Lord Wm. de la Poer Beresford,

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Colonel Sir Arthur J. Bigge
Lieutenant-Colonel John P.

Brabazon
Colonel Robert G. Broadwood
Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel

J. Browne, V.C.
General Sir Redvers BuUer, V.C.
Major-Gen. Edwyn S. Burnaby
Captain Frederick G. Burnaby
Captain Richard F. Burton
General Sir Wm. Butler
Colonel the Hon. Henry W. Byng
Colonel T. Calley, C.B.
H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge
Colonel the Hon. Wm. H. P.

Carington
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General Lord Chelmsford
Lord Chesham (Yeomanry)
Colonel Sir Henry E. Colvile
H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught
Gen. the Marquess of Conyngham
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Sir Wm. A. Gordon Cumming,

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Colonel Vesey Dawson
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The late Lord de Ros
General Sir James C. Dormer
Major Viscount Downe

General Sir Charles Hastings

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The Earl of Dundonald
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Colonel the Hon. Herbert F. Eaton
General Sir Charles Henry Ellice
Colonel Henry P. Ewart

Colonel Viscount Falmouth
General the Hon. St. George G.

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Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon.

Henry T. Forester
General Sir Frederick W. E. F.

Forestier-Walker
Colonel Barrington Foote
Colonel George M. Fox
Major-General Charles C. Eraser,

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Colonel James K. Eraser
General Sir John D. French
A " General Group "
Captain Lord Gifford, V.C.
Captain Count Albert E. W.

Gleichen
Lieutenant Daniel Godfrey
Field-Marshal Sir William Gomm
Captain Arthur Gooch
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles G.
(iordon

General Sir Hugh Gough, GC.B.
Major-Gen. the Duke of Grafton
The Earl of Granard
Major-Gen. Sir Francis Grenfell
Gen. Sir Frederick Paul Haines
General Julian H. Hall
General Sir Ian S. M. Hamilton
Capt. the Marquess of Hamilton
Lieutenant-General Sir E. B.

Hamley, MP.
Colonel Lord Hatherton
Major-General Sir Henr\- M.

Havelock, V.C, M.P.
Lieutenant-General George W.

A. Higginson

Colonel James M. Hogg, M.P.
Captain George L. Holford
Lieutenant-General Sir Alfred H.

Horsford
Captain Henry M. Hozier
Colonel Francis C. Hughes-

Hallett, M.P.
Major-Gen. Sir Archibald Hunter
Major-General H. D. Hutchinson
Surgeon-General Jameson
Major the Hon. A. G. F. Jocelyn
General Kelly-Kenny
Lieutenant-General Sir Arnold

B. Kemball
Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Charles

Tnnes Ker
General Lord Mark R. G. Kerr
Colonel Robert Nigel F.

Kingscote, M.P.
Lord Kitchener of Khartoum
General Sir William T. Knollys
Major-General Sir R. B. Lane
Colonel Cuthbert Larking
Lord Lawrence
Colonel Sir George Leach
Colonel the Hon. Charles H.

Lindsay
Colonel R. J. Llovd Lindsay,

V.C, M.P.
Gen. Sir William S. A. Lockhart
General the Earl of Lucan
Lieutenant-General Sir George

Luck, K.C.B.
Major-Gen. Sir Peter S. Lumsden
Major-Gen. Sir Daniel Lysons

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LAND AND WATER

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Major-General Sir Daniel Lysons
General the Hon. Neville G.

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Major-General the Hon. Jas.

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Colonel John J. Macdonell
Colonel Vivian Dering Majendie
General Sir Edwin Markham
General Frederick Marshall
Major-General Sir Hugh

McCalmont, K.C.B.
Major-General Lord Methuen
General Sir James Wolfe Murray
General Lord Napier of Magdala
Colonel Audley D. Neeld
Field-Marshal Sir Henry Noiman
Captain George C. Nugent
Colonel Laurence J. Oliphant
Major - General Lord Alfred

Henry Paget
General Lord George A. F. Paget
General Sir A. H. Paget
Sir Roger W. H. Palmer, Bart.
Colonel Lewis G. Phillips
General Plumer
General Reginald Pole-Carew
General Sir Henry Ponsonby
Major Sir F. C. Rasch, Bart., M. P.
Colonel Francis Rhodes
Major Michael Rimington
Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, V.C.
General Sir F. Roberts (Earl

Roberts)
General Lord Sandhurst
Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar
Captain Conway Seymour
General Sir Francis Seymour,

Bart.
Colonel Shuttleworth
General Sir John L. A. Simmons
Captain Kincaid Smith
General Smith-Dorrien
Major Lord Henry A. G.

Somerset
General Sir Thomas M. Steele
General Sir Frederick C. A.

Stephenson
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Lieut. -Colonel Henry Stracey
General Lord Strathnairn

Major Edward J- M. Stuart-

Wortley
Colonel Charles Napier Sturt
Major-General Hon. Reginald

Talbot
H.S.H. the Duke of Teck
Major H.S.H. Prince Francis of

Teck

General Viscount Templetown
Major-General Sir Henry Trotter
The Marquess of Tweeddale
Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Vivian
Colonel Sir Edward W. D. Ward
Major-Gen. Sir Charles Warren
Lieutenant-Colonel the Duke of

Wellington
Duke of Wellington
General Sir George White, V.C.
Colonel Owen L. C. Williams
Colonel Francis R. Wingate
Sir Garnet J. Wolseley, Bart.

(Viscount Wolseley)
Brigadier-General Sir Evelyn

Wood, V.C.
H. S.H. Prince LouisofBattenberg
Admiral Sir Frederick G. Bedford
Lord Charles W. de la Poer

Beresford, M.P.
Captain Lord Charles William de

la Poer Beresford
Admiral Lord Charles W. de la

Poer Beresford, M.P.
Lieutenant Cameron

Admiral the Earl of Clanwilliam
Admiral Sir John E. Commerell,

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Hon. Seymour J. Fortescue
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Edward J. Reed
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LAND AND W A T E R

September 2O, 1914

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Printed by THE MENPES PRINTING & ENGRAVING CO., Ltd., London and Watford, an I published by THE COUNTY GENTLEMAN PUBLISHING CO.. I.I.I ,
Central Hnusp, Kingswav. London: and 11-13 West sind Streit, New Vock. Sa'turday. September :6, 1914.

The County Gentleman

AND

LAND &WATER

Vol. LXIV. No. 2734

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1914

rpublished as-] p ri c e s i x p e n c e
La newspaperJ published weekly

GENERAL SIR H. SMITH-DORRIEN

Who is so ably commanding one of the Army Corps at the Front

LAND AN D W A T E R

October 3, 1914

HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF

THE HUNS A.D. 451

An old French Engraving, showing ihe hordes of barbarians who were defeated at Chalons

The Kaiser's legions have copied their, methods as far as acts of barbarity, cruehy, and vandalism are concerned

October 3, 1914

LAND AND WATER

October 3, 19 14

CAPTAIN WILMOT S. NICHOLSON OF H.M.S. HOGUE CopyrigU, n'l^t & Son, SoMsea

Who is to be congratulaled On his rescue in the North Sea after ihe foundering of hii ship. The followins quotation is from one of the men who were
aboard the Hogue : " A few minutes later we were struck twice. Captain Nicholson, who was on the bridae, was as cool as a cucumber. He gave us the
word to tip over everything that would float, to take off our clothes, and to look after ourselves. It was done ahip-shape- The Navy rule is 'keep your
mouth shut and do your job well* We did it. It went off. as you might say, just like evolutions. The ship turned over and we saw the Captain with
nothing on sliding down the keel into the water."

October 3, 1914

LAND AND WATER

PHEASANT SHOOTING IN THE FLINT-LOCK PERIOD
One ot a set of four fine old shooting prints from paintings and engravings by T. Sutherland

ABOUT PHEASANTS

By GUY C. POLLOCK

IT would be rash indeed to suppose that one will do
much pheasant shooting this year— though certainly
a good many people must and should shoot a good
many pheasants. But the time when it is legal, if not
expedient, to shoot pheasants can hardly come and
go, even in these days, leaving one quite unresponsive to its
memories and delights.

A suggestion has been made that all pheasants, or as
many as possible, should be killed this year in the earliest
days of October as a generally prudent contribution to the
communistic good which is now the general goal. But the
suggestion seems to me neither very wise nor very feasible.
A great glut of pheasants will do no one any good. Birds
killed in early October are by no means so good to eat,
whether for the healthy or for the sick and wounded, as birds
killed in November and December. It may be doubted,
moreover, whether it would be found possible to trap or net
a great number of pheasants— certainly of wild pheasants—
at this time. It would certainly be foolish to try to shoot
very large numbers in early October.

Most of us have at one time or another taken part in days
of covert shooting attempted prematurely. Lack-lustre days
they generally are : days of low and reluctant birds, of small
bags, of much cry and little feather. One such day holds
pride— if that be the word— of place in m>- memor\' and m
my game book. That was in a year when we had added to
the little shoot adjoining coverts most desirable in many
ways. The keeper then persuaded us to try a premature day
in these coverts. His intentions were excellent. They were
frustrated no less by a paralysis of marksmanship that over-
came even the efforts of ordinarily decent guns than by the
extreme difficulty of showing anything but foxes in the
circumstances of the case. That year the leaves clung to the
trees with an unusual obstinacy. The day was a redoubtable
disappointment.

It began with one of those tragi-comedies that add
variety to all sorts of sport. We were, first of all, to attempt
a drive of as many coveys as might be pushed successfully
over a line of guns, despite the difficulties of narrow boundaries.
The coveys were there, they were remarkably tractable, and
the keeper's plans worked well . We should, no doubt, have put
together quite a respectable bag of partridges out of one
drive if —if we had not solemnly lined the wrong hedge 1 he
situation, indeed, would have been, for a dispassionate
onlooker, deliciously humorous. Five guns took their post
behind what they believed to be the selected hedge bordering
.a stubble field. They were agreeably excited by a distant
cry of " Mark ! " They gripped their guns nervously, as
guns do at a partridge drive, kept eager eyes on the hedge m
front, and made up their minds to secure at least one bird in
front. But nothing happened. After an abominable silence
more cries came, louder and more insistent— cries of " Mark ! "
■■ Mark over ! " " Coming to the right." And still nothing
happened. For myself, I began to deem the world bewitched
when I saw the end gun on the right run hurriedly towards
the other hedge, passing at right angles to the one we lined.
As he ran and as, quite amazed, I watched him, I saw a large
covey break over that hedge and stream away. It was the
last ol seven coveys which had passed behind our backs while
we patiently lined the wrong hedge.

That was a fitting prelude to a day on which impenetrable
coverts, a multitude of foxes, and very poor shooting made a
very poor bag, when quite a good one would have rewarded us
if we had deferred pheasant shooting for two or three weeks
and if we had not put ourselves in an evil mood by the tragi-
comic error about the selected hedge.

But against this I have to set very many memories ol
quite delicious days and half-days spent in the outwitting of
outlying pheasants in early October. These have been great
days of variety and charm. They have commonly begun and
ended with an impromptu partridge drive, while the major
part of the day has been spent outside the boundary spinneys
or along the hedgerows with a spaniel . Some of these October
days have been spent in the great wood, after a morning had
been occupied in driving the partridges in the adjoining fields.
The sum of their memories is of sunshine to make perfect a
day of crisp English autumn, with all the gorgeous hues of
beech woods at the turn of their tide to satisfy the eye and
to charge the spirit with an abounding sense of beauty, of
good, honest, free and easy sport, of the comradeship of good
fellows It is a happy memory and it is a sad one, for some
of these good fellows have fired their last shot on the battle-
fields of France, and the memory of their companionship
makes the sport of shooting seem in some sort profane.

Other memories crowd on me of very happy days spent
in breaking a few phea-ants out of the hedgerows and spinneys
of the little shoot One may not find in these hedgerow
pheasants the thrill of rocketers coming in a steady stream
over one's stand and demanding a top-notch speed and
accuracy if one is to look the keeper squarely in the eye
when the best is finished. But one finds in these little days
of few birds, no rocketers, but great endeavour— a very honest
and enjoyable sort of sport. October days are very gracious
and their spoil is not to be despised.

AVON TYRES

THE \von Tyre Co., second largest firm ot solid and pneumatic
tyre manufacturers in Britain, fiave lost 20 per cent, of their
employees since the declaration of war. The firm have made
arrangements for the support of the dependents of these men for the
duration of the war and have guaranteed to each man that his post
shall be kept open. As a rule the company employ only British labour.
This has been slightly departed from at present by the finding of
temporary posts for Ally refugees.

The work done with a set of square-ribbed motor tyres of Avon
make that has come to our notice is of interest as showing the quality
of work and material turned out by the firm. Out of a total of 5,000
miles that the car has run since being fitted with these tyres only one
puncture has been experienced, and there is a large amount of life
left in all four tyres. The work that this particular set has accom-
Dhshed is a good testimonial to the quality of Avon manufactures.

For every dozen golf balls manufactured and sold by the Avon
Tyre Co. the company are contributing 2S to the Prince of Wales s
Fund. .

Messrs Williamson & Cole, Ltd., who publish an excellent
book on artistic furnishing entitled the ■■ Home Beautiful, have
recently added to their premises a spacious carpet floor, and on view
here they have every variety of carpets, including the newest and
choicest productions from the British loom. The adjoining premises
are under constructional alteration, and when completed will be
opened as high-class furniture galleries.

1 I

LAND AND WATER

October 3, 1914

the windows of the «ards can be seen a fair prospect of
snJling countrv. The inhabitants 1 [of the narrow ,ron
S L trim and clean and comfortable. w,l have everyth.ng
to win thom bark to health in th.s beautiful spot^ Broad
white notices, headed hs the sign of the Red Cross are
displayed in manx- of the siiops of the little town signed by
the commandant of the local Voluntary Aid Detachment
and setting forth a list of needs that still remain unsupplied.
We are asked to send soap, candles, soda, rice, flour, and
that expensive commodity, sugar. A demand for jars to
accommodate fifty pounds of jam is made, together with a
few hints as to bacon, eggs, and such like aids to convales-
cence It is probable that all will be provided, judging by
the number of people \\ho stud>- the poster and make a few
notes for future reference, and presumably active attention.

NOTHING daunted bv her previous experiences, Mrs. St.
("lair Stobart has gone once again to the front. She is
in charge of the hospital sent out by the Women's National
Service League to help the Belgian Red Cross Society. The
hospital has its headquarters at Antwerp, and is served by
six women doctors and surgeons, twelve fully trained nurses,
cooks, orderlies, and electricians in charge of the X-ray
apparatus so kindly given bv Ladv Cowdray. Mrs. Stobart
had a tale to unfold, without doubt, of her recent vicissitudes
as a prisoner in the hands of the Germans, but she has been
too busy getting ready for her new departure to waste much
time in talking, and the story will have to wait till a more
leisured moment. In the meantime the Women's National
Service League is working hard in the interests of the Belgian
Red Cross, which is having its resources fully taxed and can
ill afford any fresh demand upon its funds. So it is hoped
by the League that the expenses of the hospital will be
subscribed for in this country, and Lady Muir MacKenzie
makes a special appeal to this effect from the headquarters

of the Women's National Service League at 39 St. James's
Street, London, S.W.

WHETHER we feci inclined to think of clothes or whether
we do not the fact remains that witli the approach of
autumn we must more or less replenish our wardrobes. The
first snap of cold weather has already distinctly asserted itself,
and nearly every post brings an appeal from one of the large
shops, or a private dressmaker or milliner, asking for support
as usual, so that workrooms may be maintained and the
dread plague of unemployment not spread. Prices all round
have certainly decreased-^of that there is no shadow of doubt —
so that the shops are doing their best to conform to the heavy
claims on every purse. Perhaps one of the strongest proofs
of this was included in the contents of this morning's mail,
when some sketches of the hats of a famous I-ondon milliner
arrived. They one and all bore prices of amazing moderation,
and it is safe' to prophesy that in ordinary times their cost
would have been far higher. No one is inclined to wear vivid
colours these days, and in not one single instance did the six
small sketches offend. It is easy to see that black velvet will
have it all its own charming way this cold-weather season,
and few of us will grudge it its pride of place. Black velvet
hats are universally becoming, and, moreover, they serve
exceedingly well with the furs which will soon fall to our
daily lot. " There is a certain type of hard winter hat which
quarrels ceaselessly with our fur wraps, and quite undoes
any softening effect they are able to impart. Velvet, on the
contrary, never annoys in this way, and we can welcome the
velvet hat in all its various shapes and guises.

Besides the general subduing of colour the war influence
shows itself in yet another way. Exaggerations of shape or
trimming have almost completely vanished, judging by the
same modistic guide ; and not many of us will regret the
passing of their day. Erica.

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The County Gentleman

AND

LAND &WATER

Vol. LXIV. No. 2735

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 10, 19 14

[-published ast price sixpence
La newspaperJ published weekly

FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ROBERTS

The Graod Old Maa of the Army, who has recently celebrated his eighty-second birthday

LAND AND WATER

October lo, 1914

f////////////AV/^vr.v///////r//r///r/.■.v/r//A■//y.Y//////f.■/t,

H #-. ■■■/ ^^/ i g

U 9

M ?

A RECRUITING SONG

" To arms ! " is the cry

That comes echoing by , • w

Through the length of the day and the niglit ;

" To arms ! " calls the Kmg,

With a soldierlike ring
That tells that his summons is right.

To the order come forth

From the South and the North,
From the limits of East and of West ;

Come forth and don't lag,

Come and fight for the flag.
Obeying the nation's behest.

Old England is ready
For freedom to fight ;

Her purpose is steady.
Her standpoint is right.

Though never denying

That peace has its charms.

Her colours high flying.

To foemen replying,

You'll still have her crying,
" To arms ! "

" To arms ! " cries the Russ,
Who is warring with us.
And the same cry the children of France ;
" To arms ! " Belgium calls
As her tottering walls
Are opposing the German advance.
Our Colonies call.
And the Hindoos are all
Most eager their duty to do :
So come out and fight.
For the Black and the White
Are maintaining the Red, White, and Blue.
Old England is steady,

Not longing for strife.
But eagerly ready

To fight for her life.
Her summons is winging

To townships and farms ;
Her Britishers bringing,
With cheers loud and ringing.
She's lustily singing,
" To arms ! "

MOSTYN T. PiGOTT

•J '/'^ '/'•■•/A o'/t V.

y. '/.n » y/y/// 9//////////////////////Mvjx:/i:v//M-.'.

Vli:v//.w///.v//////////////////////:v//.v//j//.y//.vA/////.v/.\w.v/.w.v/A///M'/^^^^^

^>;»'.y/.»'.»«'/<:»;»«>!«v«VKiK:v«i«;»:>s'.-.y/.;y/'.M«'/K»'/:4K»c»'.;»:5K:!«:>K2

October lo, 1914

LAND AND WATER

THE SENTINEL

LAND AND WATER

October lO, 1914

IN THE TRAIL OF WAR

'Ti^

ON THE ROAD TO RHEIMS

All that is left of a small village near Soiiey-Ie-Boit

October lo, 1914

LAND AND WATER

MODERN SIEGE ARTILLERY

Copynght, I Hitrnatiotial Wustraiions

GERMANS VIEWING THE DAMAGED FORTS AFTER THE FALL OF NAMUR

^PyngHi, inUrnanonal Illuitrations

THE EFFECT OF THE GERMAN GUNS AT NAMUR
All that remain! of one of the Great Forti

LAND AND WATER

October lo, 1914

SHOOTING OVER DOGS

l-f'tm nil iHd J'rint

WALKING UP

By GUY C. POLLOCK

THIS is indeed, by the irony of fate, a wonderful
year for partridges, and I have lately had some
actual and extremely heating proof of this.
Three of us have been spending three days in
walking up the birds on the Little Shoot, and,
since all three have undertaken such duties as the State can
find for us, and these three days represent the whole holiday
of busy men, I am not in a mood to apologise too much for
carrying on peaceful sport while the country is at war. If
excuse were needed it might be found in the local lamentations
of the village over the abandonment to a very great extent
of shooting and hunting, and in the frantic persuasions made
in vain to us to fill the gaps caused in the local shooting
world by the war. It does the village harm and not good
that shooting should be abandoned, while the ramified
interests of various trades and their dependents are also
injured.

These, however, are brave words, and I am bound to
say that one goes about this business of shooting partridges
in war time with an uneasy mind, and that every Territorial
sentry with his rifle seems to shame the man with a shot-gun
on his shoulder, however clear he may have his patriotic
conscience. Troops pass along the roads by day, and one's
night's rest, filled with its inevitable dreams of war, is broken
by the hoarse sounds of challenges upon the bridges. You
cannot get away from the war by walking after partridges in
a home county. You cannot really feel that the duty of
" carrying on," laudable and harmless as it may be for those
who are not permitted to render military aid, is satisfactory
or ennobling.

These thoughts were too keenly present with us all to
allow the shooting to be good. They weighed especially
with the ex -officer who, still hoping for active re-employment,
found his usually accurate aim greatly diverted by the
thrusts of a disquieted spirit. Besides, we came down three
pale, wan, overworked wretches on whom a day's walking
under a blazing September sun over stubbles and grass fields
baked to a desert dryness and roots languishing with tired
leaves had an uncommonly exhausting effect. Thus it
befell that for the first two days, when the coveys were
young and foolish, we shot extremely badly. And I do not
think that the ineradicable loquacity of the chief beater,
partly induced by the fact that he "had a brother at the
front and had been himself rejected for the Army on account
of faulty eyesight, really helped us much. Plven the black
dog, the indefatigable, seemed to feel the influence of these
days — so much so that, brought to one supposed runner in
the turnips, she just lay down and said very plainly : "I
don[t believe there's no sich person." When the man of
affairs had found the bird for her she could hardly be per-
suaded to make a full and frank apology.

For my own part, I had during the first two days an
excellent excuse for poor marksmanship. Accident had
deprived me of the use of my cherished weapon, and I was
reduced to a spare gun which never did suit me well and
with which I have become thoroughly unfamiliar. I did
not hesitate to impress upon the others and upon the chief
beater, when he bemoaned the poverty of my aim the fact
of this misfortune. But I will confess that when 'the right
gun turned up the discomforting thought came that, unless

the aim were very sensibly improved, the excuses made for
failure would make me look uiuisually foolish. Fortune,
however, was kind enough to put me, on the last day, in a
mood to shoot as well as I can. It was, for me, one of those
days on which one goes out not caring particularly whether
one hits or misses. Either the intense heat or the war, or
both, brought an indifference of spirit, and such indifference,
quelling the tumult of over-eager " nerves," is just what one
wants for shooting. Anyhow, the last day and the new gun
were tolerably successful.

On the last day, moreover, by a freak of nature, the
coveys sat extremely tight. On the first day, when the
noise and the effect of guns were presumably strange to them,
the birds rose in a surprising hurry, and showed how strong
and forward they were by going off like rockets. On the
second day they were obviously perturbed. On the third — a
day of rest having intervened — they lay and waited for us to
kick them up. And they waited on one occasion in cabbages
— an unusual incident, accounted for, no doubt, by the
excessive drought and by the fact that such moisture as
remained from an early morning mist was there to be found.
The man of affairs bemoaned the impatience which took
several coveys up at some distance, and expressed a preference
for the shower of birds which suddenly bursts all round one's
progress across the drills of a root field. But that seems to
me a mistaken preference. Whenever a covey of partridges
gets up in the course of a day's walking it is almost bound to
surprise the gun. But when the sudden whirr fills all the air
with accountable birds I am myself reduced to a deplorable
indecision. The first bird is easily picked, though ore is apt
to fire at too close a range. The second, being found, is too
often abandoned for what may seem a more suitable chance
at a bird rising after the first lot are well on the wing. And
this second bird is apt to prove a less hardy and well-grown
specimen than one would select in a perfectly calm moment.
The perversity of coveys, of course, adds to the very
real enjoyment of walking up on a limited acreage, where
half the sport is the effort to push the birds in the right
direction and to keep them within the boundaries. One such
covey defeated us very handsomely. We pursued it with
admirable craft and guile over four fields, and imagined that
we had it fixed, with all its twelve well-grown members, in a
convenient strip of swedes and turnips. To make doubly
sure we took a wide and hurried sweep over an adjacent
stubble towards the roots. Inevitably, therefore, we dis-
turbed our covey on the stubble, to which it must have run
out of the roots, and then it finally defeated all our efforts by
flying right out of our ground. As I watched it go I said to
the chief beater : " We shall never get one of that lot," and
he answered : " No, sir, I don't believe we ever shall."

These are, however, the misfortunes which lend charm
and variety to sport. I expert, if we are still able to pursue
our partridges before all the cover is gone, that we shall lia\ o
great fun trying to outflank that covev. If all else fails,
those twelve crafty birds will play games with us and kec]i
us walking and mananivring if out shooting. It would be a
pitv to shoot them. Their loss would spoil much genuine
sport. They are better out of the bag , at all events, it is
better for us to regard them in that light, for they will remain
out of it.

October lo, 19 14

LAND AND W A T E R

Pink and Scarlet

nPHERE are now serving with the colours, it is stated.
-'- forty-four Masters of Hounds — really a very good per-
centage, especially when the fact is taken into consideration
that the ambition to take a mastership is not often realised
by sportsmen until they are getting on in years, so that
many Masters, who doubtless would otherwise be serving
their country at the present moment arc precluded from so
doing by age. The percentage of regular followers of hounds
who are eligible for Service, and have joined some branch of
the Service or other, must be nearly as satisfactory, for there
is practically no one left in the hunting field who need have
any qualms of conscience at being there, and huntsmen say
tiiat they never recollect such a " lonely " cubhunting season
as this has been so far. Mr. T. Bouch, Joint Master of the
Bel voir, who has been in training on Salisbury Plain, is
reported to have left Tidworth with his regiment for the
front, where he will have the opportunity possibly of meeting
several fellow M.F.H.'s who but for the war would be busily
engaged in superintending the preparations for the hunting
season. Captain J. E. X. Heseltine, of the King's Royal
Rifle Corps, recently reported wounded, is a brother of
Captain Godfrey Heseltine, Master of the Essex Union
Foxhounds, of which he himself was a keen follower ; and
the late Captain R. B. Parker, of the Northamptonshire
Regiment, who was among the officers killed, used to be a
brilliant rider to hounds in the shires. Only a season or two
ago he had the great distinction of alone seeing the finish of
I tremendous thing with Mr. Fernie's hounds, in the course
'if which event that brilliant horseman Arthur Thacker, the
huntsman, got thrown out. Then Captain C. W. Banbury,
of the Coldstream Guards, whoee death is generally deplored,
was a first-class man to hounds, a useful polo player, and a
brilliant steeplechase jockey. He won many races at regi-
mental and other meetings, notably the Grand Military Gold
Cup at Sandown Park, which he twice secured on Sprinkle
Me, the property of his brother officer. Captain E. G. Cliristie-
Millar.

In Abeyance

T T is not every pack that will hunt at all this season. Mr.
■*■ Curwen's foxhounds are among those establishments in
abeyance, and the reason is one of which Cumberland sports-
men may be proud. Practically every member of the staff
is on active service. The Master himself, Mr. F. A. Ircdale,
and his amateur huntsman. Captain A. F. Broadley-Smith,
have rejoined their regiments, which are under orders to
proceed abroad. The honorary secretary, Mr. W. T. Highet,
is with the colours, and so is Captain H. R. S. Massy, adjutant
of the 4tli East Lancashire Howitzer Brigade. More than a
few of the followers of this Cumbrian pack have likewise
given their services to the King in this critical hour of the
nation's history ; and it furnishes a notable instance of what
hunting is doing as a sport generally to strengthen the forces
of the Crown. Mr. Curwen's hounds were started eight
seasons ago to fill the void caused by the abandonment some
years previously of the Whitehaven Harriers, which for
many years hunted both fox and hare in the country. It is
not a pretentious establishment, but a very sporting one ;
and it is to be hoped that all the good men and true who
have helped to make it such a success will come back from
Service, when Germany has been fairly " run to earth," to
enjoy many a great chase behind the stout greyhound foxes
of \Vost Cumberland.

Cricket in 1915?

TS it realised that next summer there may be no first-class
cricket, and that it is possible that we may have to wait
until ifjif) before things are in shape and swing again at
I-ord's, the Oval, and other county grounds ? Nothtjig, of
course, is settled yet ; in fact, it is impossible to see how the
authorities could come to a decision in the matter for some
time to come, because no one can foresee or foretell the

probable duration of the war, or its effect upon games seven
or eight months hence. Still, at the special meeting of the
Worcestershire County Cricket Club the other day " the
probability of first-class cricket being suspended next year "
was taken into consideration as well as the provision of the
small sum of £350 to meet expenses assuming that no cricket
takes place. Arrangements will be in the hands of the
committee during the suspensory period, if suspensory period
there is, and the professionals have consented to accejit
winter pay for six months, when the club's liability will
cease. All this shows plainly enough how problematical
first-class cricket in 1915 really is. It is almost as doubtful,
in fact, as is the holding of the Ohmpic Games at ruined and
impoverished Berlin in 1916.

A Light of Other Days

TDEGARDIXG cricket, the mo.st notable item of news
■*-*- recently — though in these critical days it has passed
comparatively unheeded — was the report of the death of
Mr. Bransby Beauchamp Cooper at Geelorg, Australia.
Perhaps the present generation of cricketers can be said to
know very little of Bransby Cooper ; as a matter of fact, it is
nearly fifty years ago since he gave up participation in
English first-class cricket, and his career for Middlesex and
Kent, though brilliant, was of short duration. Yet he was a
remarkably sound bat, and that in days when wickets were
not nearly so good as they are now. Many of the important
county matches in which he figured were played on a ground
at Islington. But his best performance was at the Oval in
1.S69, when he and Dr. W. G. Grace scored 2cS3 runs for the
first wicket in 200 minutes. They were playing for the
Gentlemen v. Players of the South, and Bransby Cooper's
contribution was loi — as faultless as and f)nl\' a little less
masterly than the Doctor's iSo. Nor was that the only
occasion upon which he helped to put on over 200 nms for
the first wicket ; in partnership with Mr. " Jimmy " Slight
(another fine hitter of former days) at Melbourne in the
'seventies,, he scored 117 against the best bowling of the
time in Australia, while Slight rattled up 124. A few seasons
later, by the way, the last named (279) and J. Rossen (192)
made 593 for the first wicket, phuing for South Melbourne
against Kilda.
The Australian Tattersall

"Lj*R()M Sydney also has come news of the death of Mr. J. T-
■*• Inglis, whose eldest son, Mr. Gordon Inglis, on the staff
of Sir George Reid, High Commissioner for Australia, is well
known in I,ondon sporting and social circles. Head of the
famous Australian bloodstock firm of William Inglis & Son,
Mr. J. T. Inglis was often spoken of as the " Tattersall of
Australia," and at " Xewmarket," a place celebrated in
.Australian sporting annals, he used to preside over sales of
bloodstock second only in importance and scale to the dis-
persals conducted by Mr. Somerville Tattersall at Doncaster
and Newmarket at home. The Australian Newmarket, by
the way, is a wonderfully well-adapted property to serve the
dual purpose of training establishment and centre of sale
activity. No one was regarded as a higher authority on
horse-breeding in Australia than the late Mr. Inglis, who was
a fine type of sportsman, and in his younger days an athlete
and Rugby football player much above the average. Mr.
Gordon Inglis has distinguished himself in lawn tennis among
other pastimes, and his younger brothers. Dr. Keith Inglis
and Mr. Clive Inglis, were rowing Blues at Sydney University.
The death of their father will be greatly regretted, not only
in Australia, but in this country, for he was known and
highly respected by bloodstock breeders the whole world over.
Hunting in Ireland

IV/fAY be said to have ])ro]H'rly begun wilb the advent of
•'■'-'■ Mi(-haelmas, when the weather, (hanging for the better,
gave the necessary stimulus to cross-country sjxjrt. There
was a welcome fall in the temperature, and with unproved

»3

LAND AND WATER

October lo, 1914

VX^ <'^^

*«

Johnnip: Walker: "How f^oes the recruitinc,^ ?"
ShRGKANT: "Like yourself, Sir; still goinc,^ strong."

JOHN WALKER & SONS. LTD., Scotch Whisky Distillers. KILMARNOCK.

October lo, 19 14

LAND AND WATER

scent the members of the Meath Hunt made a capital start
at Gibstown, where Major Colhns's woodlands were drawn
and several foxes scattered effectively by the hounds, which
were followed in a capital run from Arch Hall, heading back
towards Balsaw and into the Decoy, where the quarry was
killed. The Donaghpatrick Moat also held a leash, and one
was marked to ground. The Ballinter Woodlands were
visited, a fine show of cubs being successfully hunted to the
neighbourhood of the kennels, where hounds caught their
fox. The Clewd Wood and surrounding plantation afforded
scope for a brisk run. Colonel Stuart's Pond Wood, at
Dowdstown, was hunted through to Brady's Wood, several
local sportsmen being well in at the death.

Rod and Gun

A NGLING and rifle shooting have played an important
■**- part amongst Irish sportsmen for some time past, and
although the former may be said to be on the decline, owing
to the passing of the year and the absence of many devoted
fishermen, interest in the latter recreation continues unabated,
local clubs holding their periodic meetings with success. The
bright and sultry weather and general calmness of the waters
tend at present to retard fly fisliing and to reduce the
importance of captures generally. The chief resorts at
Waterville, Castleconnell, and adjoining lakes are growing
less frequented, and sport is mostly backward. Sea trout
take well at Lough Currane, one of the best baskets being
that of Mr. Thompson, who captured several beauties one
day last week. On the Inny, Mr. Verschoyle landed a fine
salmon, and on the Cummeragh the former gaffed a salmon
weighing 6 lb. and a few nice sea trout. The salmon and
peal running on Waterville river is at a standstill, but sea
angling is affording a pleasant alternative. The need of the
hour is being promptly recognised by the various rifle clubs
throughout the country, and a gratifying instance of un-
swerving loyalty is afforded in the offer to the military
authorities by the Ulster clubmen to form a corps of expert
Service shots. The Ulster Rifle Association numbers amongst
its members some of the foremost marksmen in the kingdom,
and the addition it affords to the ranks is a welcome one.

Irish Turf Topics

TPHE third meeting of the season at Kells brought a strong
■*■ contingent of sportsmen to the popular Meath event,
where, with favourable weather and excellent fields, there
was no lack of enjoyment. The hurdle racing and steeple-
chases were well contested, Mr. J. Rogers riding two winners.
The Tipperary fixture was a powerful attraction, and, despite
the fact that there are few families in the county who have
not relatives at the war-— for the district has always
given of its best to the Army — there was a large and fashion-
able attendance at Powerstown Park. Gloriously fine weather
— more suggestive of mid-summer than advanced autumn —
made for unalloyed pleasure. The Greenmount stable was
in capital form at Iramore, where a well-raced programme
formed the attraction for the Waterford people and visitors
from all parts. Large fields ruled and good going was general.

Angling

T^ISHING on the River Forth, Mr. Alan Hannah, president
■• of Bonnybridge Angling Club, was successful in landing a
salmon weighing 19 lb. The fish, which was a beautiful,
clean-run specimen, measured 38 in. in length and 20 in. in
girth. In the opinion of Alexander Greenhill, keeper of the
Forth fishings, the salmon was the finest specimen taken from
the river for fully ten years. Mr. Hannah hooked the splendid
creature with the fly known as " a small turkey." In the
Esk and Liddle an increased number of salmon are now in
evidence, especially in the lower waters. Herling and sea
trout have afforded good sport with the fly during the past
few days. In the stretch below Longtown, Mr. Makant
secured, with a minnow, a salmon weighing 14 lb., and
Mr. Keith Makant, fishing with dun turkey winged fly, had
three fish of the same species, weighing respectively 10 J lb.,
12 J lb., and 12 lb. Mr. Keith had also a splendid basket of
thirty herling. The River Tay continues low and clear, but
despite this fact a few fish are showing, and some nice sport
has recently been obtained. In one day's fishing Mr. J.
Cattanach landed three salmon, 10 lb., 11 lb., and 12 lb. ;
Mr. J. Jack, a fish of 151b.; and Mr. W. R. Stuart, two
salmon, 61b. and 11 lb.

Trotting and Steeplechasing

TN dull but dry weather the open trotting handicap was
■*■ decided on Victoria Race course, Glasgow, in three heats
and a final. There was a large attendance of spectators, and
the sport provided was of an excellent character. The
starters in the preliminary heats were well up to the average
in point of numbers. For the final, George IV. was in most
request at even money, and next in favour came the two

ponies Wee Pod and Cinderella. At three-quarters distance
it seemed as if the ponies could not be overhauled, but on
coming into the straight the champion put in some capital
work and ultimately won a well-contested race by half a
length. George IV. is the property of Miss Trail, Wee Pod
is owned by Mr. MacCusker, and Cinderella belongs to
Mr. Clark. There also ran in the final, Walter W. (Mr.
Alexander), Dun Jack (Mr. Lindsay), His Worshipful (Mr.
Johnstone), and Directese (Mr. Binnie). The effects of the
war in taking away owners and producing a scarcity of steeple-
chase horses in training induced the committee of the United
Border Hunts to apply to the National Hunts stewards for
permission to abandon the October fixture at Kelso. Leave
has been granted, and the meeting has been removed from the
calendar.
Retriever Trials

nPHE annual field trials for retrievers, promoted by the
-*■ Gamekeepers' National Association, was held on the
Duchess of Norfolk's estate of Caerlaverock, near Dumfries,
and extended over two days. The weather was simply
perfect and the meeting was largely attended. The opening
day was devoted to the competitions in the Castlemilk Stakes
for ten dogs or bitches, the property of ordinary members.
The challenge cup was taken by Ian Earsman, Hoddam, with
Jubilee Drake ; T. Parmley, Bradfield Kennels, came second
with Pallinsburn Nell ; and R. Reay, Wooperton, third with
Ilderton Ben. The prize for the best handler was awarded
to Ian Earsman, and that for the best-looking Labrador to
R. Reay for his Ilderton Ben. On the second day the
National Stakes for dogs owned by honorary members of the
association was decided, and the entries numbered sixteen.
The winner was Snipe, belonging to the Hon. Mrs. Lionel
Walrond, Bradfield ; the second prize went to Mr. T. W.
Twyford, Whitmore Hall, for Peter of Whitmore ; and the
third to Mr. R. A. Ogilvie, London, for Caulcleuch. The
judges were Mr. Ernest E. Turner, Gloucester ; Captain G.
Hutchison, of Kenbank, New Galloway ; and Mr. Wilson
Davidson, jun., Beechgrove, Annan. The work of the dogs,
taken as a whole, was decidedly good.
Golf

A T the business meeting of the Royal and Ancient Golf
-^*- Club, St. Andrews, it was reported that on account of
the war the captaincy of Major Bethune had been deferred
till next September. Mr. H. W. Forstcr, M.P., is to continue
to discharge the duties of the office for the next eleven months.
Referring to steel-shafted clubs, the chairman of the rules
committee stated that clubs of this make had been carefully
tested for a number of years and the results had from time to
time been placed before the committee. It had always been
decided that such clubs were not a permissible departure
from the traditional instrument and that their adoption ought
not to be encouraged. In the final round for the hole-and-
hole tournament, under the auspices of the Musselburgh
Royal Club, Mr. Richard Niven (receiving 6 holes) beat the
club honorary secretary. Mr Herbert Millar (owing li holes)
by 10 to 9, and won the Menzies Cup. Mr. Harry Hope,
M.P., has presented the Bute Club with a handsome cup, and
the final in connection therewith was played on Saturday.
The result was a victory for William T. Esplin (scratch), who
beat Malcolm Bell (2) by 5 up and 3 to play. In the hole
tournament for prizes presented to Cochrane Castle Club
(ladies' section) by Mrs. H. W. MacGregor, the winners were :
1st, Miss Jessie Jackson ; 2nd, Mrs. James MacNab.
Items of Interest

TOURING the past few days some very good stags were
■'-' accounted for in the forests of Ross-shire and Inverness-
shire. A considerable number of excellent heads are reported
from Gaick, Killilan, Cozac, Monar, Strathconan, and Loch-
rosque. Colonel Clarke, Fasnakyle, brought down two
magnificent stags, each of which scaled 19 st. 41b. clean.
One carried a grand head of 11 points and the other had a
fine, rough head of 16 tines. The latter is regarded as the
outstanding trophy of the season. — Owing to the war the
executive of the Border Coursing Club have cancelled the
Spotsmain and Redden meetings fixed for October 1;^ and
November 5 respectively. It is announced by the Mid-
Annandale Club that unless there is a satisfactory entn,- the
proposed meetings on the 13th and 14th current will not be
held. — The principal subject discussed at the annual meeting
of the Scottish Ice Rink Club was the effect that the war is
likely to have on curling during the coming winter. While it
was recognised that the game, in common with other forms of
sport, must suffer in some measure, there was a unanimous
expression of opinion that as the majority of players are out
of the fsphere of active service no useful object could be
attained by giving up curling, even temporarily. It was
agreed to open the Crossmyloof Rink on the rgth current.

LAND AND W A T K R

October lo, 19 1-:

Alexander & Macdonald

DISTILLERS AND ftM BLENDERS, LEITH

A Blend of
Old Highland
Malt Whiskies

Guaranteed
not less than
10 years old

ALSO IS AND 20 YEARS OLD

i"Sandy Mac

\^Pec/AL L/QueoR
PTC+I plSKt

SANDY
MACDONALD

The ideal drink, both for refreshment and for medicinal purposes, is, it is

generally agreed, Scotch Whisky. And that "Sandy Macdonald" is the

ideal Scotch Whisky is a widespread belii^f amongst connoisseurs.

October lo, 19 14

LAND AND \\' A T E K

CHOOSING KIT

Practical Hints

THE choosing of kit for ciimpaijining purposes is
of more importance than would appear at first
sight, and the path of the new recipient of a
commission in His Majesty's Army is beset, as
lie soon finds to his great mental inconvenience,
with many doubts, queries, and difficulties when it conies
to selecting the paraphernalia comprised in the average land
kit.

That the possession of a good kit is half the battle is
generally conceded so far as experienced officers are concerned ;
the man who has undergone the rigours of active service
understands the real value of good boots, good glasses,
perfectly fitting and thoroughly suitable clothing, and really
portable accessories to personal comfort. These things, and
an intelligent choice of them, go far to make up the difference
between the successful man and the failure, for although a
bad workman is said to quarrel with his tools a good workman
cannot do good work with bad tools ; and in the peculiarly
exacting conditions which active service entails, kit and
equipment must be of the very best, and the choice of what
to take and what not to take must be as nearly perfect as is
humanly possible if a man is to give his very best to his work.
It is fairly safe to say that the most important item of
kit is boots ; smart footwear is useless for campaigning. It
lies with the wearer to decide what size and fitting suits him
best, but he should bear in mind that he ought to take only
boots that he can " sleep in." Not literally, of course, but
the boots ought to fit so loosely and easily that they can be
worn for at least forty-eight hours without causing discomfort
to the wearer. At the same time they must not be loose
enough to chafe the feet ; a pair of heavy walking boots, well
broken in before departure on Service, and roomy enough to
be as comfortable at the end of a long walk as at the
beginning, is the ideal to be striven for. Further, the owner
of the boots should take care to obtain and take with him a
small tin of ordinary motor grease, or of vaseline, in order to
keep the feet in condition, together with a supply of boracic
powder, with which to dress chafed skin when necessary.
For the carriage of these latter articles an airtight tin is
necessary, and this should be rounded in form, for corners
are to be avoided in all articles of equipment, since they mean
trouble either in the haversack or wherever else they may be
carried.

It is to be borne in mind in the selection of a kit — apart
from the things that must be taken as a matter of course —
that lightness and compactness are the first considerations,
while another important point is the ease with which any
article can be washed or cleaned. In the matter of drinking
vessels, for instance, one should carry an aluminium
collapsible drinking cup for field use ; it is the lightest form
obtainable, it is easily kept clean, and it gives the greatest
capacity in the smallest form. Again, in the matter of
underclothing the lightest and smallest-folding articles should
be taken, and a sufficiency only carried, not a super-
abundance. In choosing from among these the probable
climatic conditions must be taken into account, and
with these kept in view the necessary minimum should
be chosen, while if choice arises between two articles the one
which packs more easily and in the less space must be chosen.
A rainproof — and a real rainproof at that — is a necessity.
The cape form of coat is not advisable, for the time may come
when one needs all the freedom for the arms that can be had,
and then the man with a sleeved coat has the advantage
over the man with a mere cape. In the fitting of this coat
]).irticular care should be taken to see that full play is allowed
to the arms, and if the garment can be worn for a time before
actually setting out for that vague region known as " the
front " so much the better. It is a good rule, so far as
lothing is in question, to take nothing new in the kit, but to
take only articles which have been tested by actual wear.
This is especially applicable to boots and riding breeches,
3oth of which articles require to be " broken in " before they
vill give the maximum of comfort to the wearer. As to
iding breeches, much chafing will be avoided if the thinnest
if pants are worn under them ; half the discomfort of this
;ind that is experienced comes from the rucking and doubling
if thick underwear at the points where riding breeches crease
bout the inside of the knee and higher up the leg. Thin
inderwear does not necessarily presuppose absence of the
warmth required for winter campaigning, nor, conversely,
Iocs the wearing of thick underwear mean always greater
I'armth. {To be conlinueU next week.}

KHAKI SHIRTS

Regulation Pallern rj / 1 ^ < O /C i

tor Officer, from 7/11 'o 1 /5/D «^ch.

Khaki Handkerchiefs

A nice sod Handkerchief j/j P^' dozen.
A cheaper quality 1/11 J per dozen

KHAKI COLLARS

1/. each.

WE also have a large stock of warm and durable 4 '5/
FLANNEL SHIRTS for MEN from ZfJo'

WRITE FOR PRICE LIST.

Robinson ^LCIeaven

156 Regent St., LONDON and BELFAST

SERVICE KITS

— IN 48 HOURS. —

Every detail guaranteed correct, in
accordance with War Office regulations.

P alter m and Estimate post free.

A large number of half-finished Service

Jackets always on hand, which can be

completed in eight hours.

WEST & SON, Ltd.

,uij;- Military and Sporting Tailors,

151 NEW BOND STREET, W.

(Opposite Conduit Street)

Phone Gerrard 8161.

rr'-

Everything for
active service

You can get practically everything
you will require to wear — from
sword to puttees, from cap to great-
coat— at the old-established Bond
Street House of Rimell & Allsop.

The cut and finish and practical usefulness
of your uniform will be of the character which
h IS given Bond Street tailoring its reputation.

The joUoivifx^ tire slafiittnt prices: —

£ s. d.

Khatfi Service Jacket 400

Knicker Breeches 112 6

Short Breeches for Infantry 2 2 0

Do. for Cavalry 2 10 0

Knees strapped Buckskin extra 12 ft

Do. same material extra 7 6

Thin Continuations extra 5 6

Khaki Serge Trousers .. 176

Khaki Flannel Shins 12 6

Do. Collars each 1 6

Khaki Ties (wide end) each 3 6

Do. (narrow end) each 2 0

Great Coat for Infantry 5 10 0

Do. for Cavalry 600

British Warm 440

Cap 17 6

Rimell & Allsop,

sporting and Military Tailors,
54, New Bond Street, W.

TernDi t Caih on or before Delivery.

-jy

LAND AND WATER

October lo, 191

War-Time

ECONOMY.

THREE CUPS A PEMWY—

Buy onlv tliosi- ((»..l>.iml lR\or,if,H-s wliich provide
the most nourishment at the least cost
A most economical and delicious new food
beverage is

PLASMON OAT- COCOA,

a combination o( the celebrated Plasmon
Oat Food and PURE COCOA. It Kives
mure nourishment at a lower cost than

;dmost any other beverage you can buy.
The flavour equals that of the C

finest drinking chocclate.

Procurable through all chemists,
grocers, or stores. If not. send P.O.
or stamps and it will be forwarde<l
post free. Manufact^ired solely by
PLASMON, Ltd. (Dept. 25),
Farringdon St., London.

PLASMDN '^^

THE WONDERFUL NEW FOOD BEVERAGE

NO INCREASE IN PRICES
OF PLASMON FOODS.

ALL BRITISH.

PLASMON CHOCOLATE is supplied as an emergency

ration for the British troops.

V ^

INEXPENSIVE
Cord Velveteen

COATS

Thoroughly well made
by skilled men tailors
from high-grade materials
that can be recommended
with the utmost confi-
dence. The cut, style,
and finish of these gar-
ments are invariably
exceptionally good.

Fur-trimmed, Well-tailored
Street Coat {as sketch), in
best quality corduroy vel-
veteen, body lined soft silk,
with collar of fine seal
musquash. Exceptional value.

70/-

KHAKI ARMY RUGS
Very warm and durable.
Size 60 X 90 inches.

10/6 each.
100 Rugs (or £50.

Debenham
&Freebody

lC*vm4;«V 1f»iri) London W

LONDON &
, LANCASHIRE

FIRE

INSURANCE COMPANY

LIP

SECURITY - £5,927,293.

FIRE.

LOSS OF PROFITS.

ACCIDENT.

BURGLARY. MOTOR CARS. DOMESTIC SERVANTS.

MARINE.

Head Offices :

45, DALE STREET, LIVERPOOL.
76, KING WILLIAM STREET, E.G.

The BEST for USE on
LAND and WATER

ROYAL ARMS

RARE OLD

SCOTCH WHISKY

SPECIAL LIQUEUR

The most perfect example of the Art of
Blending — the result of 130 years' experience.

Proprietors :

J. G. THOMSON & Co., Ltd.

LEITH, SCOTLAND.

Also at 17 FENCHURCH STREET, LONDON, E.G.

October lo, 1914

LAND AND WATER

THROUGH THE EYES
OF A WOMAN

Feminine Facts and Fancies

WOMEN to-day are occupied with a score of
things, and to those who are watching and
waiting for news from the front these claims
upon their attention must be a veritable
relief. Many women, for example, are taking
more than a passive interest in the Belgian refugees who
have come over in such numbers to our country, and whose
condition beggars sympathy. Alexandra Palace is now being
used for the housing of a considerable number of Belgians.
Men, women, and little children are here, and this large,
somewhat unwieldy building has certainly never been put
to a better use. The rooms have been turned into dormi-
tories, and are bright and cheerful, besides being scrupulously
•clean. The main hall is the children's playground, and here
large swings have been fixed, which are rarely idle, as can
easily be imagined. Here also are the inquiry bureaus. The
various organisers have their own particular tables, dealing
quickly and sympathetically with the different questions that
arise. Alexandra Palace is, in fact, the clearing house of the
refugees. The offers of hospitality arriving from all parts of
the country are sent here, and receive careful consideration.
The great difficulty is to please both parties — the entertainers
and the entertained — and to see that all are satisfied as far
as possible. Not an easy task by any manner of means, but
it is being more or less accomplished, nevertheless. The
refugees do not stay long at Alexandra Palace, for new
homes are quickly provided for them, and they then leave to
make room for new arrivals. Visitors are not allowed inside
the gates without passes, but there are many who receive
the necessary authorisation, and several well-known Belgians
in London have been down to welcome their compatriots,
amongst them the Duchesse de Vend6me. Several people
have arrived at the gates with presents of clothing and food,
and the gate-keeper has his time fully occupied answering
questions and receiving various «jfferings.

The Womsn's Emergency Corps

Many societies and organisations have sprung into being
since the commencement of the war, some of which bear
tribute to little but misplaced energy, overlapping as they
do societies already in working order. No such criticism,
however, can be levelled at the Women's Emergency Corps.
In the first days of the war the headquarters of the
Corps were at the Little Theatre, John Street. Adelphi, but
its activities grew so rapidly that larger premises had to be
found in York Place. Baker Street ; and here great things
are being done. The main object of the Women's Emergency
Corps is to find employment for those who through no fault
of their own have been thrown out of work. It is a work of
women for women, and many clever people are bringing their
best wits to bear upon the matter. One of the latest things
that the Women's Emergency Corps is doing is to train a
selected number of girls to become toymakers. The collapse
of the German monopoly of the toy trade gives too good a
chance to be lost, and of this full advantage is being taken.
Sixty girls are busy making toys in the top rooms of the
Corps' premises in York Place, and a very interesting sight
it is. They have already made considerable progress in the
art, and, judging from appearances, it will not be long before
they are experts. Christmas and the toy season is not so
very far away now, and war was declared j\ist at the time
when large stocks of toys would in the ordinary course of
events have been arriving in this country from Nuremberg
and the country round. The children, however, are not
going to be disappointed of their Yuletide gifts if the Women's
Emergency Corps can help it. The Duchess of Marlborough
is amongst the many taking an active interest in the Corps
and its objects, and her example has been followed bj' many
of the Americans who have been " held up " here. The
boats now, of course, are running much more frequently,
and a great many of our trans-Atlantic visitors have left for
home. A considerable number, however, still remain, and
more than one American woman has found her way to York

Place during the last week or so. One pretty woman, who
has joined the Corps till her departure for Washington, at the
middle of this month, was ordering quite a large consignment
of toys for her small boy and girl, and their tribe of little
cousins in the United States of America. Many other orders,
also, are arriving daily, and this latest industry should
flourish. Nor is this the only work that the Women's
Emergency Corps is providing. They have equipped the
Queen's Canadian Military Hospital, at Shorncliffe, Folkestone,
with sheets, pillow cases, draw sheets, and surgeon's overalls,
and have offered to take on orders from any Government
contractors who are finding it difficult to complete their orders
within the promised time.

The Latest Entertainment

The newest form of entertainment seems to be the
knitting dinner. The moment dinner is over, and the ladies
have left their lords and masters to discuss politics, wars, and
rumours of wars in the dining-room, knitting needles are
produced and fingers grow busy. It is quite a usual thing
for an informal dinner invitation to con\ev the warning,
" Bring your knitting," and by this permission no time is
wasted. Many people, indeed, are so occupied in making
and dispatching knitted goods to sources all over the country,
as well as abroad, that they grudge a leisurely evening in
which needles and wool play no part. Lately it has fallen
to my lot to go to three of these knitting dinners, and very
amusing have they all been, each in its own particular way.
Every woman has her own individual style of knitting. Some
knit quickly, others are slow. Some are cxceedinglv practical
at their task, finishing each row with decision and decreasing
and increasing with the air of a commanding general, whilst
others knit in an apologetic way, fully conscious that at any
moment they may drop a stitch, let it unravel, and occupy
some more capable person's time in repairing the damage.
At the last dinner of the trio there was an exceedingly
attractive culprit of this sort, who dropped stitches more
readily than she knitted them, but was so pleasant to behold
that we cheerfully forgave her her shortcomings in this
particular way. She wore one of the new very short dresses
of flounced net, with jei chains in lieu of sleeves, and a general
impudence of design. The matron of the ]iarty wore a
stately gown of velvet with a modest quantity of the family-
diamonds, and the war, as usual, was the sole topic for dis-
cussion from the moment we met till the moment we parted.

The Fashions That Are

As a matter of fact, for those who feel inclined to think
about clothes, there are such things as the new winter models.
All the models were ready and waiting in the Paris ateliers
when war broke out, the only difficulty being their dispatch
to London. This, as can easily be imagined, was a formid-
able one, but it has been solved in a certain number of cases.
The manager of one of the best-known London houses brought
home a collection of models in his own personal luggage, and
secured them for the benefit of his customers that way. \^'t
were present at their display an afternoon or so ago, and
duly noted the one or two points which differentiate the
models of the autumn from those of the summer. One thing
that is noticeable is the exceeding shortness of the skirts.
They are almost absurdly short, and it is quite difficult for
the eye to become accustomed to this curtailment. It is not
with the walking suits alone that this can be noted ; afternoon
gowns of taffeta or charmeuse are equally brief ; nor do
the evening frocks escape. One of the most effective evening
frocks we saw was entirely composed of moonlight-blue
sequins, caught up on the shoulder and at the knee with a
single red rosebud. Its wearer admitted its excessive weight ;
but this in no way discouraged its subsequent purchaser,
whose rapid decision, no less than her accent, proclaimed her
from New York. It is Americans, in fact, who up to the
present have kept the shops at work ; but trade shows signs
of reviving now, and everybody is getting busier. — Erica.

LAND AND WATER

October lo, 191^

tCT'cm"

nfflftsfflw

MiMiwiNiiBHmnHffliiiniiii^

WAR'S SACRIFICES

^ UDDrKcdtnlfd ,nllu« o( b..ut.ful furnilu.c ..crific.d by ojSc«. and olh«s c.lU-d .b.o.d

i 10 ?.^1 « •• W.r Price.." W. ,H.in lull ...» .n .11 dfp..lm.n..^ on MI w.««-

1 p,I.TwhoU..I. ,cqu,.,.ion,n, ol ou, n,o.o. vehicle. .»d hon,. bupl»rl • S"" of 50
^ ye.r. .landing, which i. iltcU .upporl.ng a Dormally large .I.B.

Hi«>;er Har^ains than ever in ^^o.ooo Stock of

High-grade Second-liand Furniture

CASH OR EASY TERMS.

' Half the Cost and Double the Wear of Cheap New Goods.
TYPICAL EXAMPLE FROM MONTHLY BARGAIN LIST.

I
1

1 Fine set of 8 Chippendale Character Dining Chairs, "l A rf^c

1 upholstered in genuine Leather iV gli»«

B EASY TEKMS can be arranged for Payment of ES worth, 4/- monthly ;

B £!•, 6/-; £20, I'h: MO, 16/-. Larjjer amounts by arrangement.

W A Personal Call is Solicited, otherwise

I Write To-day for Descriptive Bargain Boolilet (Post Free).

B London Deliveries all Districts Daily. Country Orders Carriage Paid.

S EslabUsliKl
s ovtr

W. J ELKS & SONS,

Half a a

Century, v:

263, 265,267,269,271,273, 275, HoUoway Road, LONDON, N. -

BEMOYAL ESTIMATE FBEE. ^

TtUt.:3tStttasnlf9rtM:7Sa6Ctmtr,i4, TeUg^ams :" ytUicot, London," =

^iiimi{){fi{uiii)iiiiiiiii{i9iiiii«iiiiiii'iiiiiiiiiH'iiiKi;iiiiiiiiiii'iiii!iiiiiiiiii[iiiiiinniiimiiH^^

NORWICH UNION FIRE

INSURANCE SOCIETY, LTD.

FOUNDED 1797.

Witli which is iticarporattJ tht Ntrwich and
London Accident Insurance Association.

HEAD OFFICES:

NORWICH & LONDON.

FIRE. ACCIDENT.
MARINE.

Sickness. Employers' Liability. Third
Party. Fidelity. Burflary. Plate Glass.
Property Owners. Hailstorm. Motor.
Loss ol Prolits following Fire. Live Stock

PROMPT & LIBERAL SETTLEMENTS

BRANCHES AND AGENCIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

barrs'f^o^^^^i'^.g bulbs

Choice Crocus Species, Colohlcums, Hardy

Cyclamen. Nertnes, Roman Hyacinths, eto..

for present plantirif,

LIST ON APPLICATION.

BARRASONS.11,1 2 4 1 3 King Street, Covent Garden, London

NATIONAL RELIEF FUND.

AH tfltfrt m»j it ml p

The I'rince to the People.

" Buckingham Palace.

"Atsncbamoinentweall stand by one another, and it is to the heart of the
untisb people thai I confidently make this most earnest appeal. EDWARD P."
Sobscr.iiti.ns a,st it .dJresKd t. : H.R.H. Princt .1 Wales. Buikiathaa P.l.ce, Un<l.n

CYDER with FLAVOUR SUPERB

HENLEY'S

MADE IN DEVONSHIRE

In Bottles : Extra Dry, Dry, and Medium Sweet
(BufF, Green and Gold Labels).

In Casks : 6 and lO gallons, Dry and Medium
Sweet (Special " F " Brand).

Obtainable at all Leading Wine Merchants.
HENLEY & SON, NEWTON ABBOT & LONDON.

=HORLICK'S=
MALTED MILK

Pure full-cream milk, enriched with choice

malted barley and wheat, in powrder form.

Keeps indefinitely.

THE FOOD DRINK FOR ALL AGES

A refreshing and sustaining beverage, in-
stantly ready by the addition of hot or
cold water only. No cooking. Also

available in Tablet form to be dissolved
in the mouth. Nourishing and convenient,

NO ADVANCE IN PRICES

of the various sizes, which are to be obtained of all

Chemists and Stores, or of us direct by post, in sterilised

Mlass bottles at 1/8, 2 S, and 11/-

Correspontlence Invited.

HORLICK'S MALTED MILK CO., SLOUGH, BUCKS. ENGLAND

Reduction in Pricei

RELDAM

■■^ TYRES

But Same Famous Quality Guarantee

Some Specimen

'rices for Coveri.

Size V-Grooved

CombinatioD
V-Steel Studded

Dc Luxe
All Rubber

813x105 £5 14 3
880x120 6 19 9

£7 1 0
8 5 9

£6 7 9
8 3 0

Write /or complete Lid of all Sizes and Pricei

The Beldam Tyre Co., Ltd., Brentfoi

THE WAR AND INVESTMENTS.

The Financial Review of Reviews

THE LEADING MAGAZINE ON INVESTMENT,

Contains the followinff Special t>*irticles :

The Military Problems of the War. By T. Miller Maguire, M. A., LL.D.

The Navy's Task : Anticipation and Realisation. By Archibald Hurd.

Investors' Interests in Enemy Countries. By Sidney M. Edwards,

Barrlster-at Law.
The Future of the Iron, Steel, and Engineering Trades.

By the Investment Critic.
European Trade and the War: The Allies' Opportunity.

By John B. C. Kershaw, F.S.S.

« Every copy of this REVIEW contain! a Coupon entitling the
purchaser to FREE INFORMATION regarding any Investment.

■1 /_ M^f O" Sale at all Bookstalls,

1/- lid. , or from the Publishers, :

2 WATERLOO PLACE. PALL MALL, LONDON, S.W.

The County Gentleman

AND

LAND &WATER

Vol. LXIV. No. 2736 SATURDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1914.

[-published as1 price sixpenck
La newspaper.J published weekly

Prom a Painting by A ngeh
Photograph by William H. Grove

FIELD-MARSHAL EARL KITCHENER

The appointment of our most prominent General on the Active Service List as Secretary of
State for War has given general satisfaction throughout the whole of the Empire. His magnificent
organising ability has already made itself powerfully felt in all branches of the War Office.

LAND AND WATER

October 17, 19 14

Sir Uke WUtc.

Mr. Un4«r> Bon:JJ. Mr. H.11 Cain.. Mr. lU.ry Arthur Jones.

What do you find best to

SOME DISTINGUISHED PEOPI.l-

keep you in good health ? ^^ ^

RELATE THEIR EXPERIENCE.

L»*ia, B.A.

" 1 HAVK eiirn Bniiatoiien b fair trial
I M> exiK-rieiicr confirms the ineilical
* ouinion-thcre i* no longer that
fcclinR <.( (aliRue which one prcvionsly
cxiienVnce.l. Mit llifre follows from lis
use a distinct rcsloralive effect."

" O ANAIXXJKN seems to me a very
^ valuable food and nerve tonic.
'-' I have several times taken a course

of it when 1 have been run down, and

alwas's with (io>)d results.'

"M^':

1 exi>cri.?nce has been that as a
tonic nerve food. SanatoKen lins
on more than one occasion done
me Kood."

\((LUi (jU/KSU

FIND Sanalofteu an excellent tonic."

i/A^t'P*'^/^Js*^J^

>cryt^^

" OAN-^'l'<^f'K^' has done everything
J5 (or me which it is said to be able
to do for cases of nervous debility
and exhaustion. I becan to lake it after
nearly (our years' enforced idleness from
extreme debility, and now (after only
four months) I find myself able to enjoy
both work and play again."

I HAVK for two months been sufTerinj;
from a rather severe attack of Con-
jjestion of the I.ungs. I am now
recoverint! and rapidly icfiaininK strength,
which I attribute in a «reat meas\ire to
my having taken Sanatogen twice daily
for some weeks."

GwTnM,

SIRJOH.V
BENN
is de-
li ving much
benefit from
Sanatogen."

" I H-WK l>een taking Sanatogen. and
I think Hint it has decidedly helped
* me to get through the extremely

arduous work that I have had to do

during the past few mouths."

SIR KREDERICK MILNKR was
much run down from overwork
when he took Sanatogen. and it
certainly did good. He has more than
once sent supplies to i>oor people, run
down from illness or overwork, and it has
invariably proved successful. It seems
both to nourish and give strength."

•• QANAT-
|j OOKN
prom-
ises, when
you are run
down, to pick
you up. It
does so."

Rev. Father Bernard Vaughaib

/(ju^-«^c^ /L^-..^-^^. Yi' l'7't^-^U^ut'^ y^-^JyL^Y

Sir Jokn Bcnn.

Sanatogen will give you back
Health, Strength and Nerve-
power — not visionary, hut real.

That the regular daily use of Sanatogen does actually produce a remark-
able improvement in many conditions of ill-health is a fact ■which has been
vouched fot by no fewer than twenty thousand physicians, as well as by
many celebrated people who have used it.

A True Tonic Food — Start a course to-day

Anaemia, Dyspepsia, Lassitude, and other symptoms
of nervous disorders — all disappear rapidly after a course
uf Sanatogen. Itrestores and invigorates the system after
Influenza, Operations, and illness generally. Sanatogen

is, therefore, specially prescribed for nursing mothers and
weakly children of all ages, for in no case can it do harm,
while its bland composition renders it easily anc' rapidly
digestible.

Sanatogen is sold bv all Chemists from is. Q'i. per tin.

SANATOGEN — a Scientific Health Food withTrue Tonic Properties.

October 17, 19 14

LAND AND WATER

3URBERRY WAR KIT

'he Burberry Weatherproof

Infantry or Cavalry Pattern*, lined
wool, or with detachable fleece lining,

5 supplied to every regiment in H.M.'s

rtny, hjis been indispensable to Officers ever

ice the beginning of the South African

'^ar.

ORD KITCHENER referring to THE

URBERRY described it as "a most valu-

jle addition to his campaigning kit."

urberry Coats are labelled " Burberry*."
e sure that your* i» genuine, olherwi*e
t sorest need the imitation may fail you.

burberry Khaki Uniforms

esigned by Burberrys for the War Office,
id proofed by their process, are supplied
ith the greatest expedition.

Pea Jackets

Made in Burberry-
proofed Regulation coat-
ing, lined fleece or fur.

Burberrys' War Kit

includes, besides full
Service Dress, Haver-
sacks, Slings, Puttees,
Shirts, S. B. Belts, Water
Bottles.

Gabardine Ground
Sheets and Sleeping Bags

GABARDINE DAWAC— «
Bivonac weishing only 3i lb*,
induaive of pes*.

PEACE
PRICES

iThe Burberry

Regiment* in any part
of the United Kingdom
waited upon by ap-
pointment.

lURBERRYS Haymarket S.W. LONDON

l& 10 Boul Malesherbe* PARIS; Ba*ing*toke and Provincial Agent*.

Burberry Service Dre**

OFFICERS IN FRANCE
can obtain all Ifar Kit from
Burberrys' Paris House.

FURS

A t Special Prices

With the object of finding
work for our staiT of
skilled Furriers we have,
during the last few weeks,
designed and made about
100 Fur Coats in four
different shapes, of which
the garment sketched is
an example. These coats
are made from sound and
reliable skin?. They
follow the lines of the
latest Paris Models, and
the shape and finish are
excellent.

Seal Musquash Coat (as sketch) .
made from reliable skins, lined
new striped chiffon taffeta silk.

Price

134

Gns.

Actual Valui, 19J Cns.

KHAKI ARMY RUGS

Very warm and durable. 1 f\ /z.
Size 60x90 in. Each lU/O

DebenKam
&Freebod[y

wigmore Street.
iCBveTidish Square) Londori-W

IMPORTANT PRIVATE SALE

HIGH-GLASS SEGOND-HAND AND ANTIQUE FURNI-
TURE^ GARPETS^ PLATE^ LINEN^ PIGTURES^ PIANOS

JO THE VALUE OF OVER £500,000. MUST BE SOLD EMTIRELV WITHOUT RESERVE.

ENTIRE CONTENTS OF A LARGE WEST-END CLUR ««™»*^1,r''2'o'SvfnVn"ororia1l.^ *

ANY ARTICLE MAY BE HAD SEPARATELY, and, if desired, CAN REMAIN Stored Free, and payment made when
delivery required, or will be PACKED FREE AND DELIVERED OR SHIPPED TO ANY PART OF THE WORLD.

98 COMPLETE BEDROOMS.

Comprising i6 well-made solid oak bedroom suites complete £S 17t. Bd. ; solid oak
bedsteads to match, complete 16s. Sd. ; handsome china toilet services, from St. 6d. ;
large bedroom and other carpets, from 7». Id. ; 14 well-made solid walnut bedroom
suites complete at 5 C>> i massive black and brass-mounted bedsteads, full size, com-
plete with spring mattresses, at ZSt. ; three ver^ handsome design while enamel bed-
room suites of Louis XIV. style at £S ISt. ; four well-made large solid oak bedroom
suites at £8 17». Sd. ; ^^our very artistic Sheraton design inlaid mahogany bedroom suites
at £7 ISs. : three artistic large solid walnut bedroom suites at £9 17t. Bd. ; several fine
Old English gent's wardrobes, fitted sliding trays and drawers, from £| ISt. ; several
fine bow-front and other chests of drawers, from 37t. 6d. ; old Queen Anne and other
tallboy chests, from Sgt.: six very choice inlaid mahogany bedroom suites, 15 At. ;
elaborate all-brass Sheraton style bedsteads with superior spring mattresses complete,
45*. : choice Chippendale design bedroom suites, 12 gt. ; Chippendale design bedsteads
to match ; Queen Anne design solid mahogany bedroom suites, £14 14*. ; all-brass square
tube full-siee bedsteads with superior spring mattresses, at £S 17«. Sd. ; costly Chippen-
dale design mahogany bedroom suite, IB fts. ; costly inlaid satinwood bedroom suites
£45 ; panelled satinwood bedstead to match^ 9 ^

DINING-ROOMS, SMOKING-ROOMS AND LIBRARIES

Several fine quality real Turkey carpets about 9 ft. by 12 ft. from £4 17t. 6d. ;
real Turkey ru^s at 17t. Bd. ; massive carved oak sideboard, £5 ISs. ; overmantel
fitment to match, £2 lOt. ; extending dining^ table to match, £2 17s. Bd. ; two
elegantly-carved armchairs and six small ditto to match, £8 15s. ; elegant Queen Anne
design sideboard, fitted drawers, cupboards, etc., £7 16s. : set of eight Queen Anne

design dining room chairs, comprising two large carved chairs and six smaller ditto
£7 ISs. ; oval extending Queen Anne design dining table £4 10s. ; Queen Anne design
mantel mirror to match, 42s.; iS luxurious Chesterfield settees, £2 15s. ; luxurious
lounge easy chairs to match at £1 lOs. ; magnificently carved grandfather clocks ;
fine tone upright piano, £7 15s. ; a magnificent instrument by George Brinsmead,
12 8s. t atnd an exceptionally fine small grand piano, £25, equal to new. Several sets
of complete Old English table glass from £4 ISs. i set of f^our oak American roll-top
desks at £3 lis. ; and many other items too numerous to mention here.

DRAWING-ROOMS AND ANTE-ROOMS.

Nineteen elegant design large Axminster bordered carpets from S ^ ; elegant
design suite, comprising luxuriously sprung settee, with two lounge easy chairs and four
occasional chairs, covered rich Paris stlk tapestry, £9 15s. ; very elegant Louis XIV,
design china cabinet to match, £8 15s. ; choice centre table, 21s.; and Louis XIV.
design overmantel, 55s. ' elaborately carved and gilt Louis Seize design suite of seven
pieces, including settee, 12 8S< complete; white enamelled French cabinets; Vernis
Marten painted tables, escritoires, etc. ; the satinwood decorated china cabinet,
4 ft. 6 in. wide, £14 14s. : satinwood decorated centre table, £2 10s. ; satinwood
decorated overmantel, £3 IDs. ; costly satinwood decorated suite, covered choice
brocade gobelin blue silk, £18 IBs.

Also BED and TABLE LINEN, Carpets, Curtains, Draperies, &c.

SILVER and SHEFFIELD PLATE, &c., &c.

Five full-sized billiard tables from 50 8S. complete with all accessories. Billiard
dining table, three iron safes, and thousands of other items impossible to mention here,
including two nearly new motor cars.

Write for Complete Catalogue {"Land and Water"), Illustrated bv Photographs. New Ready. Sent anywhere Post Free.

THE FURNITURE & FINE ART DEPOSITORIES, Ltd.

48 to SO PARK STREET, UPPER STREET, ISLINGTON, LONDON, N.

Grand Prix,

Diploma of Honour.

and

Gold Medals,
(Paris Exhibition, igi:

The following Number Motor
'Buses pass Park Street, Isling-
ton : Nos. 4, 19, 43, 43a, and 30.

"Phone 3472 North.
Cab Fares refunded to all pur-
chasers.

Business Hours : Open every

day, 9 till 9, except Saturdays,

when we close at i.

ESTABLISHED OVER
HALF- A - CESTURY.

By Royal Appointment

to H.M. the King o( Spain.

IMPORTANT NOTICE.—

We have NO WEST END
BRANCHES, neither are we
connected with ANY OTHER
DEPOSITORIES. Our ONLY
ADDRESS is asabove. Having
NO WEST END EXPENSES
TO MAINTAIN enables us to
offer GENUINE advantages in
really Fine Antique and High-
class Goods.

L. LEWIS, Manager

Grand Prix
and Gold MfHals,

International Exhibition,
Home, 1913.

LAND AND WATER

October 17, 19 14

THROUGH THE EYES
OF A WOMAN

Some Leaves from a Feminine Note Book

TAKE us on the whole, we are not an imaginative
race. It is very difficult for us to picture the
h)rrors of invasion when such a thing has never
happened in our experience nor in that of our
forefathers. Owing to what has been neatly
described as a geographical accident, the people of this
country are in very different case from those on the Contment,
and this has its natural result on life in general. It is probably
for these reasons that the charge of apathy has been made
against us. Fugitives from abroad, escaping from scenes of
horror and desolation, marvelled and were perhaps somewhat
shocked at seeing us proceeding on our way much the same
as usual. They asked whether the English really knew they
were at war. We may perhaps have been slow in fully
realising it, but every day now drives the fact harder home.
To those living in London one of the first visible signs of
being in a state of war has been the darkening of the streets
at night. This most certainly helps to stimulate the imagina-
tion. Gone are the sky-signs, the illuminated lettering, and
all the eye-catching devices of electric advertisement. No
longer are there the brightly-lighted shop windows that in
times of peace remained brilliant and shining far into the
night. The street lamps are carefully graded, those which
are not absolutely necessary for the safety of traffic being
unlit. Added to this, folk who are awake at night can some-
times hear a patrolling airship with engines throbbing dis-
tinctly as she passes overhead. It is the first unusual
demonstration we have had, though it probably will not be
the last. Many people lately have made a pilgrimage to the
Embankment after it is dark to see the effect of the search-
lights that pivot from the top of Charing Cross against the
sky. This also is new to our experience, and makes its own
peculiar claim upon the imagination.

The Families Left Behind

The Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association has been
very busy since the outbreak of war and has relieved several
cases of distress that almost instantaneously arose. It will be
remembered that Queen Alexandra made an appeal on behalf
of the Association, but this was withdrawn shortly after
to allow freer scope for the Prince of Wales's Fund. Those in
authority felt that the two appeals running simultaneously
might interfere one with the other and lead to confusion.
Lady Londonderry, as President of the Durham County
Branch of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association, has
just made a statement regarding the administration of relief
in that county, which makes very interesting reading. The
Association here has had no fewer than 11,151 cases on its
books, and the numbers have increased week by week. The
organisation is relying for funds upon the balance of the
money collected in Durham for Durham families at the time
of the Boer War, upon contributions and subscriptions which
have been given now, and a contribution from the Prince of
Wales's Fund. This last has been sufficiently large to enable
Lady Londonderry to hope that there may be no need to
make any further appeal on behalf of the Association. A
detailed return is shortly to be published giving an account
of the way in which the relief has been distributed amongst
the dependents of our troops at the front.

All those who have been interested in the Association in
the past are anxiously waiting to see how the new scheme of
the Government, which came into operation on the 12th of
this month, vrill work. The Government has undertaken to
make the payments direct, and it is now a matter of State
control. \Vhcther this means the resulting decrease of
personal interest remains to be seen. That, as we all know,
is the danger of the State machine. The county branches of
the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association have counted
many helpers amongst their ranks, who watch over the various
cases and pay frequent visits to the different homes. The
personal note, therefore, has not been lacking in the past, and
in "many instances has proved of great value in the good work
accomplished.

Patriotic Shopping

Women have many duties at present, and not least
amongst them is patriotic shopping. We can all do a very
formidable best to encourage home industries. It has been
shown quite recently that though we are at war with Germany
German commercial agents still overrun our markets. The
German trader, naturally enough, is sufficiently astute to
know that he must disguise his nationality . but this presents
no difficulty. To this end German businesses are making an
effort to be turned into English limited liability companies
and traders in neutral countries are being used as middlemen
by German concerns. By these subterfuges German trade
with this country is by no manner of means as completely
closed as it should be. The remedy for this lies in the hands
of the English shopping public. If everybody made a point
of examining the articles they buy and mquiring as to their
origin the British trader and British trade would have a very
decided stimulus. There has never been such a chance as
the present for promoting English manufactures and strangling
German competition. If every mistress of a house makes
up her mind that nothing of German manufacture shall enter
her doors she will help her native land in the most practical
of all practical ways. Nor need this be an uninteresting task
to perform. If we once set our minds to cope with the
question we should learn more about the clothes we wear
and the food we eat than we probably have ever known
before, and the study cannot fail to be a fascinating one.

Lace aixd the Belgians

Belgian lace is being given a foremost place in the
catalogue of many a great shop's wares, and the examples
now being displayed amply merit attention. Apart from
all sentimental value attaching to work done by our brave
Ally, lace made by the Belgians has always ranked high in
excellence and been a foremost industry of the country. The
specimens shown in London are particularly beautiful, and it
is no wonder that many people have taken the opportunity to
add to their lace collection. There are various signs that lace
is to be much used on evening frocks and tea gowns. This is
a time when the tea gown has undoubtedly come into its own.
Women who have been out all day, serving on various charity
organisations, attending first-aid lectures, and working in
many other ways, are well inclined towards the rest frock
when they reach their own home again. And the rest gown
at its best is as becoming a garment as the heart of woman
can desire. Planned upon up-to-date lines, it partakes much
of the nature of an evening dress, but is infinitely easier to
don. A pretty gown of Neapolitan violet charmeuse, intended
for the trousseau of a war-wedding bride, had wide scarf
sleeves of delicately-meshed lace, with a tiny edging of hand-
embroidered violets, outhned by a background of leaves in
very natural colourings. The lace was toned to the shade of
old parchment, of the colour to which the inferior denlelks
never aspire. That the cheaper kinds of lace, however, rareh'
justify their existence is too well established a fact for pressing
at this or any other time.

A Good Response

Many gifts have reached Devonshire House in response
to the Queen's appeal for knitted belts and socks for the
troops at the front. No fewer than six thousand pairs of
socks have been forwarded by the women of Dundee through
Colonel Hill, chairman of the Dundee Territorial Association,
and from Lady French's Fund comes a regular supply every
week. Lady Salisbury has sent five hundred pairs, Mrs.
Ronald Greville seven hundred pairs, and Lady Phillips has
sent over a thousand pairs of socks and three hundred belts.
It has been requested that the givers of socks will see that
each pair is sewn together, so that one sock may not escape
from Its fellow. This small detail, however, is "forgotten by
numerous people, and the result is that a staff of a dozen
sewmg women is kept constantly employed at Devonshire
House sewing the socks together in pairs.

Erica.

October 17, 1914

LAND AND WATER

CHOOSING KIT

Practical Hints

(Continued from page 27)

VERY many firms who cater for the soldier in
the field, both with regard to items which fall
under the head of "kit" and those which must
be designated " equipment," are making their
appeal by way of cheapness. But when cam-
paigning is in question the old proverb which states that the
best is the cheapest is more than ever true, for the man who
cuts cost also cuts comfort ; and it cannot be too often
repeated that comfort is half the secret of endurance and
fitness.

For the Mounted Man

Especially is this true of riding breeches. The tailor who
advertises a cheap line in riding breeches will make you a
pair of breeches out of very good quality material, and
usually they look well. They are all right for the man who
does four or five hours riding a day and then changes into
just what kind of clothing suits him best for his hours out of
the saddle ; but it must be remembered that on actual
service the man who is wearing riding breeches may have to
wear them tor a week without a chance of changing his
clothes, and may have to sleep in them every night as well
as wear them during the day. For this sort of work only the
very best and most carefully cut breeches will give even
comparative comfort ; a slight ruck inside the knee or along-
side the thigh, which for ordinary riding use would pass
unnoticed, develops into a rasp which involves a patch of
raw flesh and consequent torture in the saddle. This is
where the high-priced breeches come in, for if the wearer
makes his tailor alter and alter until the fit is perfect, and
then breaks in the breeches by a few days of hard wear
before actual service begins, he can be sure of all the comfort
that campaigning will allow him when the hardest stress has
to be put on him and clothes alike. And with the cheap
tailor there is no chance of making the tailor alter and fit
till absolute satisfaction is obtained. " Your money back if
we fail to satisfy you," says the cheap tailor, and he means it,
for that sort of statement when properly carried out is a good
advertisement for his business ; it is cheaper for him than
altering clothing to give full satisfaction. But the man
who is preparing for active service has no use for " money
back."

Paying for the Name

Half a dozen or more of the West End houses are
specialising in fitness without regard to cost, both in clothing
and equipment. It must be said against them that in most
cases one has to help to pay their rent in purchasing their
goods ; and that rent is higher than the expenses of establish-
ments in some other localities. But, admitting this, it must
also be said that the West End houses carry only the best
stock. They bought to sell at high prices, and they bought
perfect goods ; to put it differently, they bought the best,
knowing that they would sell to buyers who would not
consider cost so long as they could be certain of reliability.
It is often said in a disparaging way, with regard to West
End houses, that '' one pays for the name," but the speaker
usually forgets that the name has to be maintained by

(Continued on page 39)

CASTLE & CO.,

MILITARY TAILORS.

(Emtabllahed 1889.)

HOURS.

ABSOLUTELY CORRECT.

STORE PRICES.

37 PICCADILLY, LONDON, W.

(FACING ST. JAMES'S CHURCH).

'Phone Regent 5624.

KHAKI SHIRTS

Regulation Patlern for Officers from
7/11 'o 12/6 each

Khaki Handkerchiefs

A nice soft Handkerchief 3/3 P" dozen.
A cheaper quality 1/1 IJ per dozen.

KHAKI COLLARS

\l~ each.

L ..Iso have Flannel Shirts, Cholera Belts, Mufflers,
Sleeping Helmets, Woollen Gloves, and Mittens, al
moderate prices. Suitable for the men

WRITE FOR PRICE LIST.

Robinson ^.Cleaver

156 Regent St., LONDON - and - BELFAST

SERVICE KITS

— IN 48 HOURS. —

Every detail guaranteed correct, in
accordance with War Office regulations.

Patterns and Estimate post free.

A large number of half-finished Service

Jackets always on hand, which can be

completed in eight hours.

WEST & SON, Ltd

Military and Sporting Tailors,

151 NEW BOND STREET, W.

(Oppoiile Conduit Street.) Phone— Gerrard 8161.

Everything for
active service

You can get practically everything
you will require to wear — from
sword to puttees, from cap to great-
coat— at the old-established Bond
Street House of Rimell & Allsop.

The cut and finish and practical usefulness
of your uniform will be of the character which
has given Bond Street tailoring its reputation.

The following are standard prices : —

£ ». d.

Khaki Service Jacket 400

Knicker Breeches 1 12 6

Short Breeches for Infantry 2 2 0

Do. for Cavalry 2 10 0

Knees strapped Buckskin extra 12 6

Do. same material extra 7 6

Thin Continuations extra 5 6

Khaki ^^erge Trousers 176

Khaki Flannel Shirts 12 6

Do. Collars each 1 6

Khaki Ties (wide end) each 3 6

Do. (narrow end) each 2 0

Great Coat for Infantry 5 10 0

Do. for Cavalry 600

British Warm 440

C«P 17 6

Rimell & Allsop,

Sporting and Military Tailors,

54, New Bond Street, W.

Tarou : Cuh oa or bafw* D«Ut«t.

LAND AND WATER

October 17, 1914

By affHMtm*nl mof^r tyr*

manHfaanrtn to H At. t:,H£ C't^^rxf /'.

War Service

corroborates the wonderful wear-resisting
qualities of Dunlop motor-cycle tyres.

" Albany Road Hospital. Cardiff.

'• September 23rd, 1914.

1 SHOULD like to say how much I appreciated Dunlop
tyres out in Belgium and France. I am a motor-cycle
despatch rider, and was one of the first to go to the
front. I covered well over 2,000 miles in three weeks, and
only had one puncture. The roads in Belgium were some
of the most fiendish imaginable, and I frequently rode across
fields of stubble and tracks of all descriptions. This shows
that Dunlop tyres are the best and wear the longest, for
active service is a sure test of endurance and fitness. I was
invalided home, and am now convalescing here.

(Signed) " Corporal J. K. Stevens, R.E."

Vhe capacity for hard wear of "Dunlop motor-cycle tyres is unique,
and is llie result of an important development in lyre construction.

DUNLOP

The Dunlop Rubber Co., Ltd., Founders through-
out the world of the Pneumatic Tyre Industry

Aslon Crosi. Birminsliani.

Parii ; 4, Ru

14. Renenl Sired, London. S.W.
du Colonel Moll.

DURLOP SOLID TYRES FOR HE»Y COIIERCItL VEHICLES

War-Time ECONOM1

THREE CUPS A PENNY

A wonderful new
food-beverage which
gives more nourish-
ment at a lower cost
than almost any other
beverage you can buy.

PLASMON 'c^

is a combination of the celebrated PLASMON OAT-FOOD

and PURE COCOA, and in flavour equals that of the finest

drinking chocolate.

Procurable through all chemists, grocers or stores.

If not, send P.O. orstamps, and it will be forwarded

post free. Manufactured solely by Plasmon, Ltd.

(Dept. 25), Farrinxdon Street, London, F,.C.

WO IISICREaSE IN PRICE

OF plusmon foods,
ALL BRITISH.

PLASMON CHOCOLATE is supplied

as an emergency ration to the

BRITISH TROOPS.

THE SGHULTZE COMPANY^ LTD.

SOLE MAKERS OF

SGHULTZE
LIGHTNING

GUNPOWDER.

THE Company desires to inform the
Sporting Public that the constitu-
tion of the Company is entirely
British. There are no alien Shareholders,
and all the Directors and Employees are
British. The Schultze Powders were the
first smokeless sporting powders made,
and have been manufactured since 1865
at the Company's Works in Hampshire.
Sportsmen may therefore continue to
use the Schultze Co.'s Gunpowders with
the knowledge that by so doing they
are supporting a purely British industry.

For THE SCHULTZE COMPANY, LIMITED

0> G> WILL, Secretary,

Smokeless Cartridges

Loaded with "Naontte" (30 cr.) Powder
la Gaatlght Quality Caao.

Loaded wtth " N.E." (36 gr.) SmoKeless in
Special Gaslight Quality Case.

LfOaded with "StowmarKet SmoHeless"
(33 gr.) or " N.E." (36 gr.) SmoHeless.

Loaded with " StowmarKet Smokeless"
or " N.E." Smokeless.

The Trade only supplied.

SOLE MANUFACTURERS

The New Explosives Go. Ltd.

62 LONDON WALL, LONDON, E.C.

October 17, 19 14

LAND AND WATER

CHOOSING KIT

(Continued from page 37)

providing only goods of a quality that will maintain the name.
Certainly one pavs for the name, but that name ensures to
the purchaser expert choice and a quality consistent with the
name ; and in buying for Service the name is worth paying
for The old campaigner knows this, and pays cheerfully.

WaterproDfs v. Rainproof.

Now about waterproofs. The thing known as " rain-
proof " may be passed over as practically useless, for though
it is relatively proof against showers — a good many of them —
it admits some part of a steady, soaking rain to contact with
the skin of the wearer. Further, it is a clammy, soggy
thing after a day's rain ; not at all the kind of garment that
one can use as an overcovering in a wet bivouac. The
waterproof coat must be so in fact as well as in name, and
this is just as important in the case of the coat as in that of
the ground sheet and sleeping valise. One should go to a
firm which is prepared to guarantee every garment as
absolutely waterproof — not merely " rainproof " — and should
be content with no less than the absolute guarantee. Further,
the waterproofing should be in the material, not on it.
Many makers dress their waterproof cloths on the surface,
and at first these clothes will keep out any amount of rain.
But the perfect waterproofed fabric is dressed in as well as
on the cloth, and it is consequently impossible to force water
through the garments. The former kind lose their water-
proofing after a certain amount of wear, but the latter will
keep out water as long as they are fit for wear — as long as a
rag remains, to use a common phrase. One noteworthy
point with regard to waterproofs is that constant tight
folding is bad for them, for the strain involved on the material
helps to destroy the dressing, and the folds will leak after a
time. If it is necessary to roll a waterproof tightly it should
be folded for rolling in a different way each time so far as is
possible. Persistent creasing in the same place makes for
leakage. In the matter of quality and price one may go a
long way to look for a better garment than the officially
sealed regulation waterproof and not find it.

False Bconam'es

I make no attempt in these notes to help the intending
campaigner to save money over his purchases, for experience
has proved to me that economy in outfit is false economy.
The work of the soldier subjects every item of his outfit to
special strain, and in regard to the quality of every item
that must be taken the best is none too good. Further,
I do not believe in the " complete outfit." Every house
concerned in the supply of military equipment specialises in
some thing or things, and from that house the things in
question should be procured. If any one house sets out to
provide a complete outfit the range of its supply is so wide
that some items, perforce, must either be obtained from the
houses which specialise in them or else be selected without
that peculiar knowledge which makes for perfection. In the
first case, one pays two profits on the one article, and in the
second case one is not absolutely certain of quality. Not
only should expense be disregarded as far as possible, but no
trouble should be spared in getting a kit together. One
should be prepared to go to half a dozen places in order to
get things exactly right, for approximately right is not good
enough for active service.

{To be continued next wuk.)

SERVICE BOOTS

MARSHALL'S
Handsewn Boots

For the FIELD or for SERVICE.
WELL - SEASONED AND

READY FOR WEAR

Quagga Hide or Brown

Grain Hide.

Price 36/6

Genuine Porpoise,

45-

W. MARSHALL, LIMITED

10 FENCHURCH STREET, LONDON, E.C.

(ESTABLISHED
1SS4)

Junior Army & Navy Stores

LIMITED

YORK HOUSE,
15 REGENT STREET, LONDON, S.W.

SPECIALISTS IN

GAMP EQUIPMENT
MILITARY TAILORING

Etc.

Young Officers may safely rely upon the 35 years' experience of
the Junior Army and Navy Stores. Every detail of Uniform and
Equipment correct.

INQUIRIES INVITED.

Army and Navy Equipment.

WATERPROOFS

OILSKINS. RAINCOATS.

SLEEPING VALISES.
GROUND SHEETS.
CAMP BUCKETS.
BATHS and BASINS.

OUR PRICES ARE THE SAME NOW AS BEFORE THE WAR.

Anderson, Anderson & Anderson, Ltd.

Makers of the A rmy and Nary Regulation Waterproofs,

37 QUEEN VICTORIA STREET, E.C. t niVnniV
58-59 CHARING CROSS, S.W. L-WiM^Wi-N.

CivJ/ @ "Mififarj/ C/aifors ^

Royal

Warrant

lo HM.

the King
of Spain.

OFFICERS' SERVICE KIT.

As previously notified the following revised prices are quoted
on a basis of io% profit, which profit wiK be handed to the
Prince of Wales's National Relief Fund.

Service Tunic (Finest Quality Khaki) £330

Bedford Cord Riding Breeches i 2 2 0

Infantry Trousers . . . . 110

British Warm 3 15 0

Full Kit Prices on application.^

MUFTI.

The New Model Overcoats, together with the New Winter
Materials, designed by H. Dennis Bradley exclusively for the
House, are now on view in both establishments.

By our system of trading upon a cash basis only the productions
of the firm are offered at the most moderate prices compatible
with their quality.

Lounge Suits
Slip Overcoats
Town lOvercoats
Evening Suits

fror

4 guineas.

Upon application we shall be pleased to forward our book,
"THE MAN OF TO-DAY," dealing exhaustively with men's
dress in every phase.

l^OLiD BOND STREET. 'W®
11-15 SOUTHAMPTON I<OW^WC

LAND AND WATER

October 17, 1914

CONNOISSEURS OF COFFEE

DRINK THE

RED

WHITE

BLUE

DELICIOUS FOR BREAKFAST & AFTER DINNER
I. m,UH. «- LtM QUANTITY, it b«lnt much tlronjer than ORDIMWY COFFK.

DrJ.CoUisBro\«^

CHIARODY

THE RELIABLE MEDICINE.
The Best Remedy known for

COUGHS, COLDS,

ASTHMA, BRONCHITIS.

A true palliative in NEURALGIA, .„._ isu« a Ctiarm

TOOTHACHE. RHEUMATISM, Acts like a cnarm

GOUT. in DIARRHCEA and

Cuts short attacks of SPASMS. otherbowel complaints.

PALPITATION, HYSTERIA. "••"«•■«'"■"

Convincing Medical Testimony with each bottle.
Alway*askfora"Dp.COLLiS BROWNE." °\f^l^^g!^Jt

BULBS

n. A D D C AUTUMN.
Jj/xIVlVO FLOWERING

Choloa Cpoous Speoles, Golohloums, Hardy

Cyolamen, Nerines, Roman Hyaolnths, ato.,

for preaant planting.

LIST ON APPLICATION.

BARR & SONS. 11.12 & 13 KIntf Street, Covant Garden, London

NATIONAL RELIEF FUND.

Tht Prince to tht People.
Aiiiuimmntiimpttifrft. " Buckiiigbam Palace.

"At such a moment we all stand by one another, and it is to the heart of the
British people that I conlidently make this most earnest appeal. EDWARD P."

Snkscriptiois must be addresMd to : H.R.H. Prince nl W«les. Biickintham Palace. Lomlon.

CUPISS'

CONSTITUTION BALLS.

FOR HORSES.

For Grease, Swelled Legs,
Cracked Heels.Coughs, Colds,
etc , and keeping High-fed
Horses in Meaith.

FOR

MEAT CATTLE & SHEEP.

In cases of Hove or Blown,
Hide Bound, I^ss of Appetite,
Staring Coat, Distemper, Epi-
demic or Influenza.

For Securing in Calves they are
almost Infallible.

"Showlc Court, Ledbury.

" Dear Sirs.— I enclose cheque value £i 13s. for Constitu-
tion Balls. Ido not like to be without them ; my father and
myself have used them for cattle and horses for about 50
years with satisfaction.— Yours truly, Hknrv W. Taylor."

Prepared upwards of 50 years by FRANCIS CUPISS,
M.R.C.V.S.,Diss.

PRicesi— 1/9, s/e, 10/s. si/>

Wrilt /of lllutlralcd H«nJI,<,ol.- la
FRANCIS CUPISS. LTD., DISS. NORFOLK.

The Prince of Wales s Fmui Own P;itriolic .Soni;.

"THE HOMES THEY LEAVE BEHIND.*

Music by Waller Rubens. Words by Harold Begbie.

The entire profits of this song will be devoted to tlie
National Relief Fund and the Variety Artistes' fienevoleni
Fund and Institution, the former receiving 75 per cent., the
latter 2s per cent.

"THE HOMES THEY LEAVE BEHIND." Will you
help thcui by purchasing the song? (Price i/i post free).

Band parts are published at the nominal charge of 2/- net
by the Publishers of the song. Enoch & Sons, 14 and 14a
Great Marlborough Street, London, W.

How Canada does it

CANADA'S splendid identification of herself
with the Mother Couniry in the present
crisis, and her magnificent war gifts, make
the publication of "CANADA TO-DAY. 1914,"
just now specially opportune.

Tht« Bne publication which is )ust out is the finest
•hillinssworth ever produced. It tells all about the
greatest of our Oversea Dominions~~how wheat, corn,
and fruit are grown : about its commerce and in-
dustries : finance and investments ; mining and
lumbering : education ; emigration ; transportation ;
sport and travel— how Canada does everything in
which you may be interested.

The numerous illustrations (over 200) from recent
photographs give an exceptionally fine idea of every
phase of life and activity in all parts of Canada. The
complete gazeteer of cities and towns, their population,
officials, business facilities, etc.. is another most
useful feature.

IF YOU would know more about this great and growing
country, get a copy of "CANADA TO-DAY. 1914."
from the nearest newsagent or bookstall now. A large
demand has already attended the publication of this popular
work, and although the supply is large it is limited, and a
reprint is quite impossible.

■Price //-, or poil free 114 in the United Kingdom, from

CANADA NEWSPAPER Co., Ltd.

Kingsway House. London, W. C.

Suede Velour

B 1 0 uses

Designed and made by
our own workers in the
new Sufede Velour. Very
warm and comfortable
and at the same time
smart and becoming. The
Sufede Velour from which
these blouses are made
is sold in the ordinary
way at fully 10/6 per yard.

Blouse ai sketch), in rich, soft
Suede Velour. Beautifully
warm and comfortable; very
practical. In green, red,
orange, tilleuil, champagne,
brown, grey, sapphire, and
purple.

21/9

Practical Hat in Suede
Velour or Velveteen 21/9

DebenKam
firFreebody

Wigtnore Street.
iCovehdisK Square) London.W

DELICIOUS.

NUTRITIOUS.

ECONOMICAL.

Delicious, soft, with a (Jelicate
creamy consistency and the
flavour of ami W, perfect cheddar.

Highly nutritious, as it possesses
the natural nourishing properties
of cheese with the addition of
those cultures which keep the
system sound and healthy.

Economical, because there is no
rind and no waste.

PRICE AS USUAL

13 "2 d. each.
PLENTIFUL SUPPLIES

From Grocers and Dairymen

Si. Ivel, Lid., Yeovil.

The County Gentleman

AND

LAND & WATER

Vol. LXIV. No. 2737 SATURDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1914. [fisSn^sS^^^;

UEUT.-COMMANDER MAX K. HORTON

Whose brilliant exploits with Submarine E9 have done much to satisfy public opinion that the

vigilance of our Navy is as marked as its silence.

LAND AND WATER

October 24, 191 4

Chiffon Velvet

FROCKS

I>esi(?ned by our own artist
and made by highly-skilled
workers from ricli sofl Lyons
chiffon velvet. Some idea of
the value of these frocks will
be gathered from the fact that
the chiffon velvet from which
they are made is on sale in
our silk department at 12/6
per yard.

Smart Afternoon or Rei-
taurant Frock las sketch), in
best quality Lyons silk chiffon
velvet. Cleverly draped
bodice with sash ends at back,
giving long-waisted effect.
Skirt with the new over-tunic.
In black and newest colourings

98/6

Actual value, 6| gnt.

DebenKam
6Freebocly

Ct^igmore Street.
(CavehdisK Square) London. W

BURBERRY WAR KIT

The Burberry Weatherproof

Infantry or Cavalry Pattern*,
lined wool, fleece, or fur.

WHAT THE Ol-FICER NEEDS! .\n
Olficer at the front writing to an Officer at
liome. giving hints as to kit. insists on the
necessity of '-A I3URBEKRY."

Vide " Times, " 13-10-14.

LORD KITCHENER referring to THE
BURBERRY described it as "a most valu-
able addition to his campaigning kit."
Burberry Coat* are labelled "Burberry*."
Be «ure that your* i* genuine, otherwise
at *ore»t need the imitation may fail you.

Burberry Khaki Uniforms

British
Warms

Made in Burberry-
proofed Regulation coat-
ing, lined Camel Fleece
or Fur.

Burberrys' War Kit

includes, besides full
Service Dress, Haver-
sacks, Slings, Puttees,
Shirts, Sam Browne
Belts, Water Bottles.

Gabardine Ground
Sheets and Sleeping Bags

GABARDINE DAWAC-.
Bivouac weiKhins only 3 ^4 lb*,
inclusive of peg*.

Regiments in any part of
the United Kingdom waited
upon by appointment.

The Burberry

Burberry Service Dre*s

OFFICERS IN FRANCE
can obtain all War Kit
from Burberry*' Pari*
House.

BURBERRYS Haymarket S.W. LONDON

8 & 10 Boul Malesherbe* PARIS ; Basingstoke and Provincial Agent*.

IMPORTANT PRIVATE SALE

HIGH-GLASS SECOND-HAND AND ANTIQUE FURNI-
TURE^ CARPETS^ PLATE^ LINEN^ PICTURES^ PIANOS

TO THE VHLVE OF OVER £500,000. MVST BE SOLD ENTIRELY WITHOUT RESERVE.

ENTIRE CONTENTS OF A LARGE WEST-END CLUB

Removed from St. James's St., S.W.
for convenience of Sale.

ANY ARTICLE MAY BE HAD SEPARATELY, and, if desired, CAN REMAIN Stored Free, and payment made when
delivery required, or will be PACKED FREE AND DELIVERED OR SHIPPED TO ANY PART OF THE WORLD.

98 COMPLETE BEDROOMS.

ComprisiaK 16 well-made toUd oak bedroom suites complete £3 17*. 6d. ; solid oak
bedsteads 10 match, complete 1(t, Id. ; handsome china toilet services, from 3*. 6d
large bedroom and other carpets, from 7*. M. ; u well-made solid walnut bedroom
suites complete at S (1. : massive black and brass-mounted bedsteads, full size, com-
plete with sprine mattrewes, at 25*. ; three very handsome design white enamel bed-
room tulles of Louis XIV. style al fiS IS*. ; four well-made large solid oak bedroom
'is* ■'■•''•• M. : four very artistic Sheraton design inlaid mahogany bedroom suites
JJiT^, ■•' I •* »■■"•"<= '"rge solid walnut bedroom suites at £9 17*. 6d. ; several fine
Old Enfllab gent'a wardrobes, 6tled sliding trays and drawers, from £S IS*. ; several
line bow-from and other cbesti of draweri, from 57^ 8d. ; old Queen Anne and other
tallboy cheiti, from ( ft. ; sii very choice inlaid mahogany bedroom suites, IJ «*. ;
^£V' ;,"'?'' Sheraton style bedsteads with superior spring mattresses complete,
««.: choice Chippendale design bedroom suites, « g», ; Chippendale design bedsteads
,?.^, u ■ -V", .""', ''"'S" •°l"i.n>»''0|;any bedroom suites, £14 14*. ; all-brass square
tube lull-size bedsteads with aupenor sprmg mattresses, at £1 17», 6d. ; costly Chippen
dale design mahogany bedroom suite, 18 1*. i costly inlaid satinwood bedroom suites
Ms . panelled tatinwood bedstead to match, I g».

DINING-ROOMS, SMOKING-ROOMS AND LIBRARIES

.-"f'-J^L *■"* 1"''"' ""' Turkey carpets about 9 ft. by 11 ft. from £4 17* 6d '
real Turkey rugs at 17*. Id. ; massive carved oak sideboard, fiS IS*. ; overmamei
Btmcnl to match, £I 10», ; extending dining; table to match, £2 17*. Id. ^ two

A^lnI{A!:iJI^A"Z^i^A ""'' '" *"•"" ''«'° '° ">"":h. £8 IS*. ; elegant Queen Anne
design wdeboard, fitted drawers, cupboards, etc., £7 IS*.: set of eight Queen Anne

design dining room chairs, comprising two large carved chairs and six smaller ditto
£7 IS*. ; oval extending Queen Anne design dining table £4 10*. ; Queen Anne design
mantel mirror to match, 41*. ; 18 luxurious Chesterfield settees, £2 IS*. ; luxurious
lounge easy chairs to match at £1 10*. ; magnificently carved grandfather clocks ;
fine tone upright piano, £7 IS*.; a magnificent instrument by George Brinsniead,
12 gs. i and an exceptionally fine small grand piano, £25, equal to new. Several sets
of complete Old English table glass from £4 IS*. ; set of f^our oak American roll-top
desks at £3 11*. ; and many other items too numerous to mention here.

DRAWING-ROOMS AND ANTE-ROOMS.

Nineteen elegant design large Aiminster bordered carpets from 3 g*. ; elegant
design suite, comprising luxuriously sprung settee, with two lounge easy chairs and four
occasional chairs, covered rich Paris silk tapestry, £9 IS*. ; very elegant Louis XIV.
design china cabinet to match, £8 15». ; choice centre table, II*.; and Louis XIV.
design overmantel, 55*. : elaborately carved and gilt Louis Sei/e design suite of seven
piecf.s. including settee, 12 g*. complete; while enamelled French cabinets; Vernis
Marten painted tables, escritoires, etc. ; the satinwood decorated china cabinet,
4 ft. 6 in. wide, £14 14*. ; satinwood decorated centre table, £2 10*. ; satinwood
decorated overmantel £3 lOfc ; costly satinwood decorated suite, covered choice
brocade gobelin blue silk, £11 18«

cl^,°,?J^,P ^"AT.'Vy-'^ LINEN, Carpets, Curtains, Draperies, &c.

SILVER and (SHEFFIELD PLATE, &c.,&c.

Five full-sized billiard tables from 30 g*. complete with all accessories. Billiard
dining table, three iron safes, and thousands of other items impossible to mention here,
including two nearly new motor cars.

Now Ready. Sent anywhere Post Free.

IVr.te for Complete Calalogu, (-Land and Water"). Illustrated bv Photographs. .._ .„„.., ^,„. „„,„„„,,, ,,„„ ^,„

THE FURNITURE & FINE ART DEPOSITORIES, Ltd.

48 to SO PARK STREET, UPPER STREET, ISLINGTON, LONDON, N

The following Number Motor By Royal Appointment

'Buses pass Park Street, Isling-
ton : Nos. 4, 19, 43, 43a, and 30.
■Phone 3472 North.

Grand Prix,
Diploma of Honour, and

Gold Medals,
Paris Exhibition, 1913.

Cab Fares refunded to all pur-
chasers.
Business Hours : Open every
^Ji 9 till 9, except Saturday*,
when we close at i.

ESTABLISHED OVER
HALF- A - CENTURY.

toH.M. the King of Spain.

IMPORTANT NOTICE

We have NO WEST END
BRANCHES, neither are we
connected with ANY OTHER
DEPOSITORIES. Our ONLY
ADDRESS is as above. Having
NO WEST END EXPENSES
TO MAINTAIN enables us to
offer GENUINE advantages in
really Fine Antique and High-
class Goods.

L. LEWIS, Manager

Grand Prix
and Gold Medals.

International Exhibition,
Rome, 1913.

OctoHtT 24, 1 9 14

LAND AND WATER

piiiiimiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii|

I How to help Tommy Atkins |

S We cannot all go out to fight, but we can S

— all do something to help our soldiers who S

S are fighting our battles and defending the ^

^ honour of our native land, and in this way =

^ contribute to their well-being and efficiency —

I SEND HIM A FLASK OF I

I HORLICK S i

i MALTED MILK TABLETS I

Invaluable to a soldier ^

in the field and most ^

efficient in relieving =

hunger and thirst ^

and preventing fatigue. —

We will send post free to any ~

address a flask of these delicious ZZ

and sustaining food tablets and ^

a neat vest pocket case on ^

receipt of 1/6. If the man is at ^

the front, be particular to give s

his name, regimental number, ZZ

regiment, brigade and division. =

of all Chemists and Stores, in con- ^Z

veiiient pocket flasks, 1/> each. m

Larger sizes, 1,6. 2/6 and 11/- ^

HORLICK'S MALTED MILK Co., =

SLOUGH, BUCKS. =

iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiitiimmiiiiiiiiimiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiin /

Half Price

of good-class ordinary cocoa.

THREE CUPS A PENNY

The wonderful new food beverage

PLASMDNSf^

— a combination of the celebrated Plasmon Oat-Food and Pure Cocoa —

LEAST COST

MOST NOURISHMENT

FINE CHOCOLATE FLAVOUR

Procurable through all chemists, grocers or stores. If not, send P.O.
or stamps, and it will be forwarded post free. Manufactured solely
by Plasmon, Ltd. (Dept. 25), Farringdon Street, London, E.G.

AfO imCREaSE f/V PRICE OF PLUSHION FOODS.

ALL BRITISH

PLASMON CHOCOLATE

is supplied as an
Emergency Ration to the

BRITISH TROOPS

LAND AND WATER

October 24, 19 14

THROUGH THE EYES
OF A WOMAN

Plans, and those Who plan them

THE National Relief Fund continues to accumulate
like the proverbial snowball, each day witnessing
a further growth in the already large total. The
anu-chair critic has never been more carping
than during the course of the last ten weeks
•ind needless to sav, the National Relief Fund has not escaped
h?s 'attentions There is no more difficult proceeding than
the just administration of a charitable fund, and it must
surelv be allowed that the executive committee o the one in
Question has made every effort to solve the problem I he
ideal state of things is a central fund and its local distribution,
S this has been recognised. Mr. Wedgwood Benn as chair-
man of the committee, has issued a statement makmg this
abundantly plain. In each district a central register of
information has been formed and agencies already in exist-
ence asked to contribute to this end. l<oremost amongst
them are the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association, the
Royal Patriotic Fund Corporation, and the Soldiers and
Sailors' Help Society. Then there is tlie Government Com-
mittee on the Prevention and Relief of Distress, which has
been collecting information for some time past and is now
ready with its report. Through these channels the fund is
already being distributed and much needed relief being given.
It is, however, very certain that some very deserving cases
have not come to the notice of those in authority. The truth
is that those administering the fund are face to face with the
problem confronting all social workers. The shiftless poor
are only too ready to claim all the relief they can secure,
whilst others, brought to misfortune often through no fault
of their own. are too proud to beg. A much-criticised letter
has recently appeared in the Press eulogising the social
conditions in Berlin. Only one of the points it made was
worthy of attention, and that dealt with the house-to-house
visitation carried out in the German capital. This is done
through the medium of a corps of German girls of good
family, who make it their business to investigate every
genuine case of distress. Germany has learnt and copied so
much from us that we in our turn need not hesitate over the
adoption of a useful hint from her. Some such organisation
started over here, and worked tactfully and well, could not
fail to be helpful in directing attention to cases that might
otherwise be unavoidably overlooked.

Women and the Fund

Many reports have been circulated as to the practical
working of this fund, some of which have been accurate and
others very wide of the truth. Until quite recently many
people believed that women were not eligible for help and
that men alone were to benefit. This has been proved to be
wrong upon the authority of Mr. Balfour, who makes a very
sympathetic reference to the working woman and war con-
ditions It must regretfully be allowed that the war has
caused hundreds of women to lose their employment, and the
difficulties of obtaining fresh work are very great. The
demands of the new army for numbers of men is lessening the
male ranks of the unemployed, but women have no such
claim upon their services. Mr. Balfour says that in his
opinion the women thrown out of work by the war have the
strongest claim to sympathy, and so, he believes, think the
other members of the executive committee. Few will quarrel
with this opinion. The working woman, indeed, would
be in evil case at present if strenuous efforts were not being
made on her behalf. It is calculated that already thirty-five
thousand women are out of work in London alone. The
Queen's Work for Women Fund is striking at the root of the
rnatter, and has successfully provided some much needed
employment. Many private individuals also are providing
all the work they can, realising that the truest form of charity
is that which receives as well as gives. The briefest survey
of recent years shows that women come more prominently
into the labour market with every day that passes. Times
change, and we with them, but amongst the many points of
difference between this present conflagration and the last
which set Europe in a blaze is the position of women. Woman,

as a class, is affected bv the present war in a way which would
not have been possible a hundred, fifty, or even fifteen years
ago. She feels the rise and fall of trade prosperity directly
instead of indirectly as heretofore, because in many instances
she is personally concerned. Every intelligent scheme, there-
fore, to cope with women's employment deserves very warm
approval. The National Union of Women Workers is fixing
its attention upon the need for social work amongst the
women and girls living in the neighbourhood of the many
large camps now rapidly being formed. They suggest that
a band of voluntary workers should be formed under the
control of paid organisers. These organisers will have to be
carefully selected, as the work will be difficult and responsible,
and adequate salaries must be forthcoming. The object is so
e.xcellent, however, that these will probably be ensured and
this important work maintained.
A Belgian School in London

One of the most practical schemes for helping the Belgian
refugees may be found at 4 Challoner Street, West Kensington.
Here Miss Ruth Holland has started a school for the Belgian
children now in this country. Some of these children have
already attended various county council schools, but owing
to their speaking a foreign tongue this has not been altogether
successful. Miss Holland's school will be conducted pre-
cisely as if it were in Belgium. One of the teachers speaks
Flemish, but practically all the lessons will be given in French.
Lessons in English are to be given as a foreign language
subject, but otherwise English will be rarely spoken One
hundred children will be sent as boarders to this school by
the Belgian Legation, and it will be opened on the first of
November, when all arrangements are to be in working order.
The conduct of the school has been carefully planned, and it
should prove a very happy venture.

Erica.

LOOKING WESTWARD

( HE subject of investments and profitable re-investment is one
that is occupying the attention of a good many people at the
_ present time, for, in the state in which all Europe is now,
securities that have long been regarded as thoroughly safe and capable
of paying a good rate of interest are no longer to be considered worth
holding even ; some other field for enterprise must be sought, and the
prospective re-investor naturally turns to a country where the war
and its effects are not so likely to be felt as in the older European
states. It is probable that European stocks will fall still more before
they rise, and since investors are already looking westward for fresh
enterprises it is also probable that the available stock of the western
countries will rise steadily in value. Interest is naturally centred to
a large extent on Canada, where agricultural and commercial prosperity
is assured, capital earns a high rate of interest, and the effects of the
war are less likely to be felt than in most countries, since geographical
position, combined with the absolute loyalty of the Dominion, render
it more than probable that European disorganisation and cessation ol
industry will prove Canada's opportunity.

But one requires the assistance of those thoroughly familiar with
the country and its ways in selecting investments in Canada just as
much as elsewhere. The Alberta Co-operative Development Agency,
with headquarters at Craven House, Kingsway, has been established
with a view to dealing with Canadian stock of all kinds. Mr. C.
Copley Singleton, the managing director of the company, is a firm
believer in personal acquaintance between investor and agent, and is
willing to place his experience of things Canadian at the dispo.sul ul
clients. It is not to be supposed that the agency is not established to
work at a profit, but the method of business is such that the investor
reaps benefit from consulting the agency, just as the agency also reaps
a reward for its enterprise. The business has been established for tlie
purpose of dealing in Canadian stocks, enabling members to secure
investments without incurring heavy brokers' commissions. The
managing director is a man of extensive commercial and general
business experience, and may be ranked among e.xperts on the subject
of Canada and its possibilities. The organisation of the agency
provides for the thorough investigation of any commercial, industrial,
or agricultural undertaking. An interesting feature is that no invest-
ment is recommended unless it is approved by the agency's Canadian
representatives ; this provides investors with the assurance that it
has the support of local men living on the spot and knowing conditions.
The prospective investor or re-investor is thus fully safeguarded, and
it may be added that the safeguard is afforded by a sound business
organisation in which clients and members can have full confidence.
.\ny particulars in connection with the business will be gladly afforded
on application at the address given above.

October 24, 19 14

LA ND AND WATER

CHOOSING KIT

Practical Hints

{Continued from pagf 39)
Underclothing

LAST week 1 started to talk about undercloth-
ing and then my allotted space ran out. This
matter of cheapness is just as important with
regard to underclothing as riding breeches.
To each man his own idea with regard to the
kind and quality of underclothing taken, but my own experi-
ence in this matter is that the lightest possible is the best.
Weight does not always mean warmth ; the best blankets
are of very light weight in comparison with cheap ones, and
so, with regard to quality, weight is no criterion in under-
clothing. Here again the point to be observed is fit, for one
may turn out with perfectly fitting riding breeches, and yet
if the pants under them fit so loosely as to make folds, chafes
and discomfort will result. Underclothing needs just as
much care in fitting as outer wear, and ready-made stuff
should be avoided if possible, especially b)' the mounted man.
Pure wool, and as thin in texture as possible, according to
the temperament and needs of the wearer, are safe guides in
choosing the stamp of material to be used, and this should be
made up to fit in just the way that outer clothing is made up.

Cost and Quality

These may seem like counsels of perfection, but they are
worth heeding when active service is contemplated. Extra
expense will be involved, of course, but it must always be
borne in mind that life itself may depend on the fit and
comfort of clothing. On the big retreat to the position of
the Marne more than one man was left behind and taken
prisoner, or perhaps killed, just because of a blister on the
heel caused by a badly fitting boot. There is a world of
warning in this simple fact, which applies not only to foot-
wear but to the whole outfit. When life itself is in question
no expense is too great, and the man turning out to risk his
life should spare no expense in fitting himself for all the tasks
that may be his to accomplish. The great merit of the
German system of preparation for this campaign is that it
includes not only preparation for what will happen but for
what may possibly happen — this with regard to the German
army as a whole, and for our part we should see that every
man of the Army that goes out is fitted in like fashion —
prepared for possibilities as well as probabilities. If expense
is a thing to be considered the consideration should be
ignored when clothing has to be obtained, though it may be
given a look in when equipment is under consideration. Yet
here again the man who buys the best is at an advantage
over the man who skimps his purchases.

Waterproof Warmth

Among items worthy of considisration for inclusion
among the winter kit is a sleeved vest made of waterproof
oiled silk, with fleecy lining. The garment weighs just
20 oz. and fits under the military tunic, being long enough to
afford protection as low as the tunic falls. The idea of this
garment is admirable, for it affords both warmth and pro-
tection from wet ; no amount of rain can penetrate through.
A disadvantage, however, lies in the short life such a garment
must necessarily have under active service conditions.
Personally, I should think it will wear well for three months,
and then a new one will be required. On the other hand,
so light and small-folding is the thing that it can almost be
put in the pocket, and thus replacement is not such a great
difficulty. Ventilation is secured by slits under the arms
and eyelet holes at the waist — the latter if desired — and
altogether the oiled silk vest is an admirable addition to
field kit, fulfilling as it does all requirements of lightness
and warmth.

Leather Wear

For those who require something stouter and likely to
wear as long as required a chrome leather vest is to be
recommended. Since leather is not so absolutely non-
conducting as rubber the problem of ventilation does not
enter into a consideration of this style of garment, which is
admirable as regards warmth. The chief drawback is that,
in case of persistent rains, leather is never absolutely water-
proof, and a vest fitting under the tunic will hold a good deal
of water and will get heavy without actually wetting the
wearer. It has a damp and uncomfortable feel at these
times, and on the whole I prefer the oiled silk idea.

The Drawback of Oiled Silk

Vet another item displayed is the oiled silk ground
sheet, but this se ins to sacrifice absolute efficiency to

(Conlinutd on pagt it)

KHAKI SHIRTS

Regulation Pattern for Officers from
7/11 .o 12/6 each

Khaki Handkerchiefs

A nice soft Handkerchief 3/^ P^*^ dozen.
A cheaper quality 1/11^ per dozen.

KHAKI COLLARS

1/-

ch.

E also have Flannel Shirts, Cholera Belts, Mufflers,
Sleeping Helmets, Woollen Gloves, and Mittens, at

moderate prices. Suitable for the men.

WRITE FOR PRICE LIST.

Robinson ^Cleaven

156 Regent St., LONDON - and - BELFAST

SERVICE KITS

— IN 48 HOURS. —

Every detail guaranteed correct, in
accordance with War Office regulations.

Patterns and Estimate post free.

A large number of half-finished Service

Jackets always on hand, which can be

completed in eight hours.

WEST & SON, Ltd

Military and Sporting Tailors,

151 NEW BOND STREET, W.

(Oppotite Conduit Street)

'Phone— Gerrard 8161.

THE NEW

SILK-SKIN WAISTCOAT

for Officers' wear.

Impervious to wet or searching winds.
The special slip finish allows the
service tunic to be worn comfortably
over the waistcoat. f^^V/^S
Weight 2o oz. Price «^ C /O

EVERT MTICLE OF MILITARY EQUIPMEIIT

DUNHILLS Ltd.

2 Conduit Street, W.

LAND AND WATER

October 24, 1914

FURS

At Special Prices

With the object of finding
work for our siafT of
skilled Furriers we have,
during the last few weeks,
designed and made about
100 Fur Coats and Capes
in various shapes.of which
the garment sketched is
an example. These coats
are made from sound and
reliable skins. They follow
the lines of the latest Pans
models, and the shape
and finish are excellent.

New Model Fur Coat (<"

shtch). in Seal Musquash. .An
exact copy of an exclusive
Trench model, lined with
rich French Brocade, with
handsome Skunk Collar.

Special Price 29 ^"^'

Actual Value, 45 Gn$.

FUR CATALOGUE POST FREE

Long Seal Musquash;
Coats. V.ooA shapes.
Selected skins. 13i gns.

DebenKam
&Freebody.

Wigmope Street.
lC»vet>iii«ti Square) London.w

LONDON &
LANCASHIRE

FIRE

INSURANCE COMPANY

LIP ^

SECURITY - £5,927,293.

FIRE.

CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS.

ACCIDENT.

BURGLARY.

MOTOR CARS. DOMESTIC SERVANTS.

MARINE.

Head Offices:

45, DALE STREET, LIVERPOOL.
155, LEADENHALL STREET, E.G.

Reduction in Prices

But Same Famous Quality Guaranteed

Beldam Motor Tyres arc (amout (or long wear and for the grip they have on every
kind of road surface. Fit them to your cat — they will save you money and trouble

Some Specimen Prices for Covert.

Sii.

V.Steel Studded

D* Luxe

All Rubber

815x105 £5 14 3
660x120 6 19 9

£7 I 0
8 5 9

£6 7 9
8 3 0

Designed for rims of S.M.M.T. Standard Sizes.
Write for complete Lht of all Sizes and Pn'cet

The Beldam Tyre Co., Ltd., Brentford

ffip

BRAND'S

ESSENCE OF BEEF
MUTTON * CHICKEN

FOR ALL CASES OF EXHAUSTION
AND WEAK DIGESTION.

HMMHMMMMMMMMMMHMHHMMMHH

Country JLtic

Smolcing Mixture

Tkw JeligKtjful comttnatton of tke Best
Tobaccos IS sold tn two strengths

MILD anJ MEDIUM

{>er ounc<^

1/8

kit. tm

N.B. "Country Ltie \a |>«cked only

in original |>acKet9 and tins oy the

Manufacturers :

JOHN PLAYER ^ SONS. Nottlnglt.m.

1' .''^ Th.- IiHi.iTi il Tolmcio Co, (cif Ot. Britain & IrelanHI, Ltd,

October 24, 19 14

LAND AND WATER

CHOOSING KIT

(Contimud fiom page' 47)

f*" lightness. Certainly it is very light and portable, and folds
into half the space occupied by the ordinary waterproof fabric
ground sheet. But it must be said that if the ground sheet
is to be used for ordinary campaigning purposes and laid
down on all sorts of ground it will very soon show an array
of holes and tears. It is not to be trusted for hard wear,
and if a ground sheet is to be used, then the ordinary fabric,
thoroughly waterproofed, should be used.

Sleeping Bags

But the ground sheet is not in it with the sleeping bag.
A thoroughly waterproofed sleeping bag takes up very little
more room than a ground sheet, and the weight is no more
than a ground sheet and blanket put together, while the
actual use is far more than twice as much. Warmth and
thorough protection from wet are afforded in a normal way,
and there is also the bag for use as a kit bag when folded.
Quality is a great consideration here ; the sleeping bag must
be of the very best material, and is one of the items of kit on
which no expense may be spared.

Nurses' Kit

Reverting to leather goods, mere nas recently been
designed a very light leather coat to fit under a nurse's
cloak. The ordinary regulation cloak worn by nurses is not
an extremely serviceable garment ; it is a relic, rather, of
other times — a" regulation " affair — that needs supplemert ;i g
for full warmth and protection. For the warmth, ard to a
certain extent for the rain-resisting qualit es desiied, the
light leather cloak, three-quarter length is to be recom-
mended. It is made in three lengths — eiii eras short jacket,
as full-length cloak, or in three-quartei kr.gth ; and of these

1 recommend the three-quarter lenttli, which weighs about

2 lb. and affords full protection agamst all kinds of weather.
It is windproof and rainproof, though not absolutely water-
proof against days of rain ; but then nurses under any
conditions are not likely to undergo more than five or six
hours in the rain at a stretch, and the three-quarter length
cloak will keep this out and leave the wearer comfortable.
Several of these cloaks have been made and supplied to
order, and they have given every satisfaction in field use.

Waterproofing

The waterproofing question is a vexed one. Oiled silk
does not stand hard wear very well : leather can never be
considered absolutely waterproof, for it absorbs a certain
amount of rain and gets heavy and damp-feeling, even if it
does not let the rain through. Rubber-proofed materials
bring in the trouble of ventilation and cause stuffiness, while
another drawback is that when a waterproofed fabric is
folded several times in the same way the folds lose their
waterproof quality. The ideal fabric for keeping out con-
tinuous rain has yet to be devised, and up to the present the
rubber-proofed material is about the best.

The Ways of Officers' Servants

The maintenance of rubber-treated fabric, so far as the
fficer is concerned, consists very largely in the possession of
a good servant, and in the training of the man to the care of
clothes as well as to his other duties. The training of the
man is largely a matter for the oflBcer himself, and when
waterproofs are in question the man should be taught that
he must not fold a coat always the same way. It takes very
little time and trouble to teach a man the reason for this, to
point out to him that if he persists in folding a rubber-proofed
article always in the same creases these creases will lose their
waterproof quality, whereas if he will fold the thing in a
different way each time — either for the saddle or for any
other form of carriage — he will increase the life of the garment
and add to his master's comfort. The average man on service
who takes up the duties of " officer's servant " is a bom
valet, but he needs instruction in the little points which will
make him careful of his master's pocket as well as of his
personal comfort. And the time taken up in teaching a
man how to fold a waterproof, how to make boots comfortable
by the application of grease outside or French chalk and
boracic powder inside — all the little tricks that make for
increase of comfort — is well repaid by increased efficiency.
It is repaid also in the decrease of expense as regards upkeep
of kit ; your average officers' servant looks on his master as
a man with plenty of money to spend, one to whom the
saving of a shilling is a matter of no consequence. It is an
idea of which men should be disabused as soon as possible,
especially on active service, where economy of kit often pays
in other ways than that of mere money.

(To be coMtinutd nsxt w€«k)

Junior Army & Navy Stores

LIMITED

YORK HOUSE,
15 REGENT STREET, LONDON, S.W.

SPECIALISTS IN

GAMP EQUIPMENT
MILITARY TAILORING

Etc.

Young Officers may safely rely upon the 35 years' experience of
the Junior Army and Navy Stores. Every detail of Uniform and
Equipment correct.

INQUIRIES INVITED.

CASTLE & CO.,

MILITARY TAILORS.

{Ealabllshed 1889.)

.V.v«*T"'^'>.

Kcuns.

ABSOLUT! LY CORRECT.

STORE PRICES.

37 PICCADILLY, LONDON, W.

(FACING ST. JAMES'S CHURCH).
'Phone Regent 56Z4.

Civif®. "'Mifitamj Cfailbrs ^^

Roy>l
Wirninl

to H.M.
the Kini!
of Spain.

£3

OFFICERS' SERVICE KIT.

As previously nolifitd the following re\ised prices are quolfd
on a basis of io% piofil, vhich profit wili be banded to the
Prinre of Wales's National Relief Fund.

Service Tunic (Finest Quality Khaki)
Bedford Cord Ridirg Eieecbes
Infantry Trousers
Britifh Warm

Full Kit Prices on application.^

;mufti.

The New Model Ovciccats, together with the New W'inier
Materials, designed by H. Dennis Bradley exclv,si\ely for the
House, are now on view in both establishments.

By our system of trading upcn a cash baeis only the productions
of the firm are offered at the inost moderate prices compatible
with their quality.

Loun&e Suit*
Slip Overcoats
Town Overcoats
Evening^ Suits'

froK

4 guineas.

4
6

Upon application we shall be pleased to forward our book,
•THE MAN OF TO-DAY," dealing exhaustively with mens
dress in every phase.

14 OLD BO>fI> STREET.'^JK®
11-15 SOUTHAMPTON KOW^^C

LAND AND WATER

October 24, 19 14

WAR OFFICE

'22 BORE Dl P" I P" ^
MINIATURE nil I— I— ^»i^

(SERVICE RIFLES IN MIN'IATURE).

Made to War Depart nent specification, they are reproductions in
miniature of the actual Service rifle. Sights, action, and design similar.
Will make i-inch groups at too yards range with the inexpensive 22 long
rifle ammunition. Price from 45/- from all gun dealers.

Fully illustrated booklets of B.S.A. tar-
get practice rifles and sights, post free.

LEARN HOW TO SHOOT

with one of these ofiicial rifles and
prepare to be value to the Nation.

The Birmingham Small Apms Co., Ltd., BIpmlngham.

Umlurt at mfin /or H.M. Wm Dtptrtmmt.

DUNLOP

OVERSIZE TYRES

TRADE

MARK

USERS of Oversize tyres are notified that they can
procure the undermentioned sizes in this type of
tyre, bearing the sovereign stamp of excellence —
the Dunlop head.

DUNLOP OVERSIZE
TYRES.

Steel-
studded
cover.

Grooved
cover.

Plain
covet.

Tube.

813x120 mm. to fit JOS mm. rim

820X 135 mm. to fit 120 mm. rim
880 X 135 mm. to fit 120 mm. rim
895 X 150 mm. to fit 135 mm. rim

£ s. d.

6 9 3

7 7 9

8 6 0
10 0 0

£ s. d.

6 4 3

6 13 0

7 13 9
9 8 3

£ s. d.
5 1 3

5 8 6

6 5 6

7 7 0

£ s. d.
1 9 3
1 12 3
1 16 6
1 18 3

Oversize tyres are distinct from the interchangeable sizes, which
continue to be manufactured by the Dunlop Company as heretofore.

DUNLOP tyres, of whatever type, are " quality '' tyres.
Judged by the standard of mileage cost, no tyre has
so consistent a reputation for the best value — -no tyre
is so generally acknowledged to be the best choice — as the
Dunlop.

THE DUNLOP RUBBER CO., LTD., Founders thhouohout thi-;
World of the Pneumatic Tyre Industry, Aston Cross, Birmingham ;
14 Regent Street, London, S.W. Paris: 4 Rue du Colonel Moll.

DUNLOP SOLID TYRES FOR HEAVY COMMERCIAL VEHICLES.

CUPISS'

CONSTITUTION BALLS.

FOR HORSES.

For Grease. Swelled Legs,
Cricked Heels.Coughs, Colds,
etc., and keeping Hiijii-fed
H jrses in Health.

FOR

NEAT CATTLE & SHEEP.

In cases of Hove or Blown,
Hide Bound, LossoF Appetite,
Staring Coat. Distemper, Epi-
' demic or Influenza.

For Soourint in Calves they are
1 almost Infallible.
"Showle Court, Ledbury.
'* Dear Sirs.— I enclose c'leque value £1 13s. for Constitu-
tion Balls. 1 do not like to ba without them : my father and
myself have used them for cattle and horses forab>ut 50

years with satisfaction Yours truly, Henrv W. Tavlor."

Prepared upwards of 50 years by FRANCIS CUPISS,
M.R.C.V.S., Diss.

PRIOKSi— 1/9, s/e. 10/6. SI/.
WrIU for IlluilialcJ Hanjkook to
FRANCIS CUPISS, LTD., DISS, NORFOLK.

The I'rincf of Wales's Fund Own Palnouc Song

"THE HOMES THEY LEAVE BEHIND."

Music by Walter Rubens. Words by Harold Begbie.

The entire profits of this song will be devoted to the
National Relief Fund and the Variet); Artistes' Benevolent
Fund and Institution, the former receiving 75 per cent the
latter as per cent. "

"THE HO .VIES THEY LEAVE BEHIND.' Will you
help them by purchasing the song? (Price l/i post free)

Band parts are published at the nominal charge of 2/- net
bj the Publishers of the song, Enoch & Sons, 14 and 14a
Great Marlborough Street, London. W.

NEW ZEALAND & AUSTRALIA

Calling at TKNERIFFE, CAPE TOWN, and HOBART

S.S. & A. CO.'S S^^e^'m^^r'^

(largest In the tradei leive London (Grevesend following day)
"CORINrHlC" (t.s.),Dec.lo. * '

Wli«lus Tel«ffraphy. tjnsurpassed Accoaiaodation for Passenzers
'"■■^^iV-i'AS^^ SPAC'IOU? STATE ROOMSforONE, VWo
£.nl"i\^,i?'''',?°'',^/' MODERATE FARES. Apply to Sha..
S«. IL a- Albion Co.. Ltd.. 34. Leadenhall Street. E C.T and fa, Pali
Mall; or to While SUr Line. Liverpool, and 1. Cockipur Stieel. S W.

QKAMOPHONE. —20. guinea hand-

some, hornless, inlaid Sheraton cabinet, height 4 ft.,
record cupboard, completely enclosed, on wheels; pur-
chased April ; with records, £5 los. .'Approval willingly.

3 Auberl Park, Hmhbury, London. (187)

How Canada does it

CANADA'S splendid identification of herself
wilh the Mother Country in the present
crisis, and her magniBcent war gifts, make
the publication of *' CANADA TO-DAY, 1914."
just now specially opportune.

Thia fiae publication which is juit out is the finest
shillingswoTth ever produced. It tells all about the
sreatest of our Oversea Damioions —how wheat, corn,
and fruit are grown; about its comnerce and in-
dustrtes ; finance and investments ; mining and
lumbering ; education ; emigration : transoortation ;
sport and travel — how Canada djes everything in
wbich you may be interested.

The numerous illustrations (over 200) from recent
photographs give an exceptionally fine idea of every
phase of life and activity in all parts of Canada. The
complete gazetteer of cities and towoi, their population,
officials, business ficilities, etc., is another moit
useful feature.

IF YOU would know more about this great and growing
country, get a copy of "CANADA TO-DAY. 1914.
from t4ie nearest newsagent or bookstall now. A large
demand has already attended the publication of this popular
work, and altho igh the supply is large tt is limited, and a
reprint is quite impossible.

■Prrce //-, or poit frte 114 in the United Kingdom, from

CANADA NEWSPAPER Co., Ltd.

Kingsway House. London, W. C

STAMPS.

DOOK VALUABLE COLONIAL

-■-' STAMPS (majority before i860), valued about £20.
Sacrifice /2. Approval.— Stamps, 3 Dorncliffe Road,
Fulham, London. (gf,j ,

^DVEETISER, being unable to shoot

this season, wishes to dispose of his GUN (hamiiier-
less.ieborel, by well-known London maker; never been
used Cost £15, will sell for f 12.— Vindex, care of Land
AND Watisk, Central House, Kingsway W C

NATIONAL
RELIEF FUND

TT/ie 'Prince to the 'People

" Buckingham Palace.

"At such a moment we all stand
by one another, and it is to the
heart of the British people that
1 confidently make this most
earnest appeal.

"EDWARD P."

Subicriptions must be addressed to :

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES,
BUCKINGHAM PALACE,

LONDON.
All letters may be sent post free.

The County Gentleman

AND

LAND &WATER

Vol. LXIV. No. 2738 SATURDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1914. [m^TpiVR^] l^^^xiAl^^iAl^

CopyriiU, Horace W. NichtMi

THE OLD AND THE NEW

An interesting Picture recently taken at Portsmouth showing a modern Waterplane flying over

the venerable " Victory "

LAND AND WATER

October 31, 191

Sentrv : " Halt ! Who goes there ? '

JoHNNiK Walker: "Friend."

S'NTRv: "Advance and give the countersign."

f"^'"^-^'^^^^--"B— 8ao; sni, going strong "

Wkv: "Pass, .Johnnie Walker/ you're all rioht"

JOHN WALKER & SONS, LTD c:

^' LTD., Scotch W h , s k v D.stille

R s , KILMARNOCK.

October 31, 1 9 14

LAND AND WATER

I How to help Tommy Atkins |

S We cannot all go out to fight, but we can S

— all do something to help our soldiers who =

S are fighting our battles and defending the ^

S honour of ournative land, and in this way ^

= contribute to their well-being and efficiency ^

I SEND HIM A FLASK OF I

I HORLICH S i

i MALTED MILK TABLETS i

Invaluable to a soldier
in the field and most
efficient in relieving
hunger and thirst
and preventing fatigue.

We will send post free to any
address a flask of these delicious
and sustaining food tablets and
a neat vest pocket case on
receipt of 1/6. If the man is at
the front, be particular to give
his name, regimental number,
regiment, brigade and division.

Of all Chemists and Stores, in con-
venient pocket flasks, 1/» each.
Larger sizes, 1^6, 2/6 and 11/-

HORLICK'S MALTED MILK Co.,
SLOUGH. BUCKS.

!>RRiiilillllllllllllilllllllllllllllllllltlllIIIIMIIIIIItllllllllllllE

Warm Winter
Tailor-mades

We have just made up about
250 Smart Winter Tailor-
mades in four designs, of which
the garment sketched is an
example These Suits are
made from high-grade Novelty
Tweeds, Vicunas, Boucle
Cloths and Striped Velouis,
which sell in the ordinary way
at from 7/6 to 10/6 per yard.
As the quantity is limited the
garments cannot be sent on
approval, or made specially
to order.

Smart Street Suit [as sketch),
in high-grade Novelty Tweeds,
Vicunas, BoucleCloths. ^» A
All dark shades. eC4

Actual value 5^ to 6^ gn«.
CATALOGVE fOST FKEE.

KHAKI ARMY RUGS

Very warm and durable.
Size 60 in. by 90 in.

Each 10,6
lOQ Rugs for £50

DebenKam
& Freebody,

%^igmoro Street.
iCavetidisK Square) London.W

Half Price

of good-class ordinary cocoa.

THREE GUPS A PENNY

PLASMDN

The wonderful new food beverage

OAT-
COCOA

—a combination of the celebrated Plasmon Oat-Food and Pure Cocoa—

LEAST COST

MOST NOURISHMENT

FINE CHOCOLATE FLAVOUR

Procurable through all clieniists. grocers or stores. If not, send P.O.
or stamps, and it will be forwarded post free. Manufactured solely
by Plasmon, Ltd, (Depl. 25), Farringdon Street, London, E.G.

NO iNCREASE iN PRICE OF PLASMON FOODS.

ALL BRITISH

PLASMON CHOCOLATE

is supplied as an
Emergency Ration to the

BRITISH TROOPS

Tks LANCET says : " W« found that the statements made

in ruard to the merits of this paper are correct. 1 he paper.

at any rate, i$ free from injurious or irritating substances,

smooth, and, while firm, becomes soft and apparently soluble tike thin

rice paper in contact with water. ' '

THE MOST PERFECT TOILET PAPER EVER PRODUCED

^iS

If you are not uainl "NOVIO" TOILET PAPER
yon are not utini the BEST AND MOST ECONOMICAL.
Cost! but little more than the cheaper makes, and Ih" ROLLS
CONTAIN MORE THAN DOUBLE THE QUANTITY.

ANTISEPTIC-THINSOFT-STRGIMG & SILKY

Uada la EltatAND bj ESOLIBH FIKH implOTlnf IHOLISH LABOUR

SOLD EVERYWHERE in Rolls. Packets, Cartons, by all

Chemists. Stores, Grocers, and Stationers.

Wholesale only of the Sole Makers. Chadnick Works,

26 Grove Park, S.E.

NATIONAL RELIEF FUND

THE PRINCE TO THE PEOPLE

" Buckingham Palace.
"At such a moment we all stand by one another,
and it is to the heart of the British people that I
conBdently make this most earnest appeal.

"EDWARD P."

Subscriptions must be addressed to :

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES.
BUCKINGHAM PALACE. LONDON.

All letters may be went post free.

LAND AND WATER

October 31, 19 14

THROUGH THE EYES
OF A WOMAN

Some Everyday Impressions

LONDON streets are infinitely interesting these days.
There is always something to hold the attention
of the passer-by, and much that marks this
present time as being different from all others.
For one thing, we have never been so cosmopolitan
as we are now. Nearly every other person to be seen bears
unmistakable traces of French or Belgian nationality, and
there are not a few Russians in our midst. We have grown
accustomed to the sight of little groups of people struggling
to make themselves understood in a strange country. We
have also grown accustomed to the good Samaritan who
almost invariably arrives to act as interpreter and earns a
genuine gratitude. One of the most cheering signs of the
times, indeed, is the anxiety shown by the English people to
help in all possible ways. And this spirit of camaraderie
grows and continues to flourish. It should mean the breaking
of that national reserve and aloofness upon which, though
low be it spoken, we have undoubtedly prided ourselves.
Circumstances have proved too strong, and even such a long-
estabhshed tradition as this vanishes before the bonds uniting
the Allies. Another point worthy of note is the vast variety
of uniforms to be seen. Here a Belgian officer passes swiftly
on foot, receiving and returning the salute of an officer of the
English army, wearing the badges of major's rank and a
line of war ribbons. Further along are two Belgian privates,
one of whom is limping rather badly, while both look sorely
in need of care and rest. Naval officers in undress uniform
wend their way along, either coming from or going to the
Admiralty. Men from India, still wearing their sun-helmets
and burnt brown after a sojourn in the tropics, jostle the
elbow of some pale-faced Londoner wearing a medallion to
show he has joined some particular branch of the New Army
and awaits Service dress. Close to the headquarters of their
regiment are some men wearing the well-known uniform of
the London Scottish, with its unobtrusive kilt. Then there
are the dispatch riders on motor cycles, with the blue and
white band of their calling round their arm, and proceeding
in recognised disdain of speed limits and their requirements.

The Army in Making

We are not at all ashamed of the impulse which makes
us stand still to watch the passing by of a battalion of
Kitchener's Army as it marches along, singing a snatch of
some well-known song. All sorts and conditions of men are
numbered in the ranks, from the stable lad to the boy who
looks as if he had not left public school days very far behind.
All sorts and conditions of hats and suits are worn also, for
the recruit and his uniform are long parted. Now and again
some enthusiast creates a diversion by waving his hat at
these citizens who have answered their country's call ; but,
apart from this, it must be admitted that it is our trans-
Atlantic cousins who make most demonstration as the steady
tramp goes by. One attractive Washingtonian, waving a
minute handkerchief vigorously, was forcible in her dis-
approval of English methods. " You watch your New
Army," she said, indignantly, " but why don't you give

them a cheer. Now, if it were us ! " And no amount

of excuse of the true Britisher and his truly British habits
would satisfy her. As a matter of fact, it is quite likely
that the Englishman, being such as he is, would be the first
to deprecate any undue notice as he makes his way through
the streets on route-marching bent. He has made soldiering
his business, like he makes most other things his business
that he takes it into his mind to do. To form part of a
spectacular show will certainly rasp his sense of fitness, and
even if attention be not meant in this way he will probably
get it into his head that it is As a nation we have certainly
brought disguise of our feelings to a fine art, and this char-
acteristic is dear to the heart of the race. The dread of
anything approaching emotion, or what we are pleased to
term bad form, is the strongest of motives, accounting for
much that is quite incomprehensibie to people of other
nationalities. The laconic Englishman has been a butt for
much good-natured and some spiteful ridicule, but this ver\-

quality makes him " the first-rate fighting man " of whom
we are so justly proud to-day. The keynote of the country's
attitude towards this crisis of its fate was struck by the
manner in which the c?mpaign both on land and sea opened.
Fleet and Army arrived at their allotted posts in silence, and
nothing could have been more impressive than the grim
qaiet with which they handled their appointed tasks from
that time forward.

Every Little Helps

Such is the motto of the entirely fascinating toyshop
which has been started at 21 Old Bond Street by Mrs. Duveen.
It is known as " The Toy Shop," and is thus a toy shop both
by name and by nature. Its object is no less excellent than
the helping of the Belgian Relief Fund in Belgium. All the
profits are going to be devoted to the succour of the unfor-
tunate people left behind in the devastated districts of this
country. With such an aim in view it is no wonder that
" The Toy Shop " has the support of Comte de Lalaing, the
Belgian Minister in England, and that he opened it at a very
attractive little ceremony of inauguration. It is charming
to see this toy shop, both inside and out. A carefully limited
number of toys are arranged by a clever hand on a dark back-
ground in either window. Inside, also, it is easy to realise
that here may be found toys to please even the most
sophisticated of children. Some of these toys are in-
structive without being boring, and by their means many
a child will be coaxed to improve his little mind as
well as amuse it. We all know how many children resent
instruction presented to them in play-time guise. It is the
old story of the powder and the jam — an unfair combination,
as all must agree, grown-up people as well as the nursery
folk. This charge, however, cannot be made against a
spelling game played with carved letters, which can be made
to stand upright in a grooved wooden stand. " The Toy
Shop " is busy now, but it will certainly grow busier still as
Christmas looms nearer and nearer and toy-making as an
English industry progresses. To this end and in connection
with this particular venture a toy manufactory has just been
started at Reading, and from this a great number of the
supplies will come. Every good idea is welcomed in the
region of toyland, where the magic word " novelty " spells
" Open Sesame," when it is such as will appeal to the rising
generation and its critical standards.
Gardens Trim

Lady Catherine Milnes Gaskell is one of the many who
are doing all they can to help our soldiers and sailors. She
has been selling rock and herbaceous plants for the benefit of
the sick and wounded, and a few days ago had made ;f84 by
this means. Lady Catherine's gardens at Wenlock Abbey,
in Shropshire, are justly famous, and of late years she has
made a special study of rock gardens and their suitable
planting. A rock garden, indeed, can afford many hours of
pleasure to any reasonable individual. The collection and
rearing of suitable rock garden plants is a hobby in itself,
and when two rock gardeners meet they have, as a general
rule, but one topic of conversation. A rock garden,
indeed, is apt to become so absorbing that it grows into a
considerable extravagance. But when we can combine our
own besetting hobby with the most deserving of charities our
state is indeed gracious. Erica.

The French Government has officially recognised the Blue Cross,
and Captain Claremont has been deputed by the French Minister of
War to immediately instal eight base hospitals for wounded horses at
the front. Donations immediately required. Arthur J. Coke.
Secretary, Our Dumb Friends' League, 58 Victoria Street. London, S.W.

«r J^Z^^f ^^''^ ^^ Leicester.— Messrs. Warner, Sheppard and
Wade held a sale of horses at the Repository on Saturday, October
17. Good prices were realised, the followintr being some of the
principal : — *

„ Gn«.

Grey mare r.R

Topper :. 55

ppiiy ........■.•.•..•.■.; 40

' licstiiut marc (cob) 49

G119.

DefeiKier 72

Fortuna 61

Badger (cob) 44

Browu Peter 44

5^'

October 31, 1 9 1 4

LAND AND WATER

CHOOSING KIT

Practical Hints

(Continued from page 49)

UNDER the heading of camp equipment comes
such a varied list of articles that it is impossible
to treat of them separately and fully in a single
article on the subject of kit. Camp bedsteads
occur to one's mind inevitably; but, except for
the staff officer well away down on the lines of communi-
cation, camp bedsteads are not to be thought of on active
service, coming under the head of sybaritic luxuries for the
man who is moving on every day from position to position
as the line goes forward or sometimes back. The sleeping
bag or valise is the best that can be done in this direction,
and that, as pointed out last week, should be of substantial
and thoroughly waterproofed material, for it is a mistake to
try for too much lightness in choosing it. The campaigner
should bear in mind that as regards sleeping accommodation
one sleeping bag fulfils the purpose of two ground sheets,
while it is also of use as a kit valise.

Water Bottle Shapes

A water bottle seems a small thing to talk about, but a
word on it is worth while. A day or two ago I saw exposed
for sale in a shop window a water bottle covered with felting
in the usual way, and with what used to be the usual square
edges at the bottom, though the thing was curved to fit on
the body of the wearer, just as a metal cigarette case is
curved. It struck me at the time that the makers of that
pattern of water bottle must be remarkably short-sighted
folks ; they had allowed the curve for the body, and yet had
squared the bottom of the water bottle, so that there was
evidently a right angle between the bottom of the bottle and
the sides. The drawback of this becomes obvious after the
bottle has been in use for a little time, for in order to clean
out the angle formed by the bottom and the sides it is
necessary to use sand or something and go in for about ten
minutes of hard shaking if any fluid other than pure water
has been placed in the bottle. It is just as easy and just as
little expense in purchasing a water bottle to get one of oval
pattern, which holds just as much as the one with squared
edges, and is far easier to keep clean. The ideal water bottle
is oval in form, made of aluminium, and sufficiently solid in
build to stand lots of hard wear. Care should be taken to
see that the felt with which it is covered is of good quality,
for with the swing of the arms in marching or the swaying of
the bottle in riding there is a good deal of wear on this felt,
which acts as a non-conductor of heat and preserves the
drink in the bottle fresh and good
Gloves

For winter work gloves are a necessity for campaigning.
Some kit furnishers recommend mitts, but these are a snare
and a delusion, since all the freedom of the fingers that can
be obtained is required when wearing the gloves. For
ordinary work good stout leather gloves, unlined, are to be
preferred. Lined gloves are thoroughly warm and comfort-
able, but they make all the difference when handling a
weapon, either a fire-arm or any other kind, while unlined
gloves, after the hands have grown accustomed to them,
give practically as much freedom to the fingers as is obtained
with the bare hands ; and the warmth of lined gloves, unless
the weather is perfectly arctic in quality, is very little greater
than that of unlined articles after the first ten minutes of wear.
A very good glove for motoring and for aeroplane work was

{Continued on page 59)

CASTLE & CO.,

MILITARY TAILORS.

{.EutaUUhed 1889.)

,,vt» ^T'^^AV.

HOURS.

ABSOLUTELY CORRECT

STORE PRICES.

37 PICCADILLY, LONDON, W.

(FACING ST. JAMES'S CHURCH).

'Phone Rageni 5624.

BLANKETS

g ACTIVE
2 SERVICE

AS Winter approaches the necessity for really
warm coverings in the trenches is obvious.

We are now producing Blankets on the lines of our famous
Ulster Fleece Rugs (the eiderdown of cloth), made from pure
high-grade wool, which gives more bodily warmth than two or
more of many of the so-called Army Blankets.

The size is ample. 60 by 90 inches, and the colours are
crey. khaki, natural and dark natural.

PRICE

18/6

On receipt of 1 9 6 we will forward one of them securely
packed to any Officer of the Expeditionary Force.

Our new Linen Hall in Regent Street, London, will he ottened on 2nd November with
a treat Sale of Specialities.

Robinson ^LCleaven

156-170 Regent St., LONDON, And BELFAST

SERVICE KITS

— IN 48 HOURS. —

Every detail guaranteed correct, in

accordance with War Office regulations.

Patterns and Estimate post free.

A large number of half-finished Service

Jackets always on hand, which can be

completed in eight hours.

INFANTRY SWORD £4 14 6

WEST & SON, Ltd.

ff$' Military and Sporting Tailors,

151 NEW BOND STREET, W.

(Opposite Conduit Street)

"Phone — Gerrard 8161.

HARRODS'

GIFT BOXES

FOR

TROOPS AT THE FRONT

Specially selected and appropriate "Comforts" have been
arranged in Parcels, details of which are given below.
These are securely packed and will be dispatched imme-
diately to anyone serving in the Expeditionary Force, upon
receipt of instructions.
No fuss or bother with packing.

You simply send your order by letter, 'phone or wire to
Harrods, specifying Box No. 1 or Box No. 2 (or both),
and the following goods to the value of one Sovereign are
dispatched without delay straight to the Firing Line : —

BOX No. 1

ONE SOVEREIGN.

1 lb. Chocolate (Harrods).
3 Tins Oxo Cubes.

2 Potted Meats.
1 IvelcoD.

1 Brand's Ess. Chicken.
1 Brand's Ess. Beef.
100 Cigarettes. Best. Flat Box.
\ lb. Tobacco (com pressed).
1 Packet Boracic Powder.
1 Tube Vaseline.
1 Tin Coffee and Milk, or

Cocoa and Milk.
1 Plum Cake.
J Tin Danish Butter.
1 Pipe.

Bromo Toilet Paper.

HARRODS Ltd. (

BOX No. 2.

ONE SOVEREIGN.

1 Pair Gloves.
1 Pair Socks.
1 Undervest.
1 Pair Pants.
3 Handkerchiefs.
1 Pair Braces.
1 Woollen Scarf.
1 Balaclava Cap.

The Sovereign

covers

cost of packing

and postage.

Richard Burbidec

;), London, S.W.

LAND AND WATER

October 31, 19M

By appointment
motor lyre manu-
facturert to H-M.
King George V.

A subtle attack

upon the British tyre industry is being
made by foreign-owned firms posmg as
Enghsh companies.

Solid and pneumatic tyres are being
offered in such a way as to mislead the
British public as to their country of origm.

The purchase of goods produced by
firms such as these only helps the enemy,
while home industry correspondingly suffers.

In the interests of British trade, purchase
Dunlop tyres, the manufacture of which
gives continual employment to many
thousands of British workpeople in British
factories.

In your own interest insist upon

DUNLOP

tyres

which are far superior in quality.
THE DUNLOP RUBBER CO.. LTD.

Fcunitr, Ihroughoul Ihc World of Iht Vncumalic ITyre InJvilry.

Alton Crow, Birmiiuham. 14 Rc«ent Street. London, S.W.

PARIS: 4 Rue du Colonel Moll.

DUNLOP SOLID TYRES FOR HEAVT COMIERCIIL VEHICLES.

CONNOISSEURS OF COFFEE

DRINK THE

RED

WHITE

BLUE

DELICIOUS FOR BREAKFAST & AFTER DINNER

in making, us. LM8 QUANTITY. It beint much itroneer than OBDIHARV COFFEE.

DrJ.C<dUsBroMr

CHLORODY

THE RELIABLE MEDICINE.
The Best Remedy kno^wn for

COUGHS, COLDS,

ASTHMA, BRONCHITIS.

A true palliative in NEURALGIA, .„,._ isu« <■ Charm
TOOTHACHE, RHEUMATISM, Acts like a Charm
GOUT. In DIARRHCEA an i

Cuts short attacks of SPASMS, othepbowelcomplaintj.
PALPITATION, HYSTERIA.

Convincing Medical Testimony with each bottle.
Always ask for a << Dr. COLLIS BROWNE." °\fa!^^g"llt'

IMPORTANT PRIVATE SALE

HIGH'GLASS SECOND-HAND AND ANTIQUE FURNI-
TURE, CARPETS, PLATE, LINEN, PICTURES, PIANOS

TO THE vatVE OF OVER £500,000. MUST BE SOLD ENTIRELV WITHOUT RESERVE

ENTIRE CONTENTS OF A LARGE WEST-END CLUR

Removed from St. James's St., S.W.
for convenience of Sale.

ANY ARTICLE MAY BE HAD SEPARATELY, and, if desired, CAN REMAIN Stored Free, and payment made when
delivenrrequrredror will be PACKED FREE AND DELIVERED OR SHIPPED TO ANY PART OF THE WORLD.

design dining room chain, comprising two large carved chairs and six smaller ditto
fl7 151. ; oval eitending Queen Anne design dining table £4 10s. ; Queen Anne design
mantel mirror to match, 42s. ; i8 luxurious Chesterfield settees, £2 ISs. ; luxurious
lounge easy chairs to match at £1 10s. ; magnificently carved grandfather clocks ;
fine tone upright piano, £7 ISs.; » magnificent instrument by George Brinsmead,
12 gs. ; and an exceptionally tine small grand piano, £25, equal to new. Several sets
of complete Old English table glass from £4 15a. i set of four oak American roll-top
desks at £3 IBs. ', and many other items too numerous to mention here.

98 COMPLETE BEDROOMS.

Comprising j6 weU-madc solid oak bedroom suites complete £3 17t. 6d. ; solid oak
bedsteads to match, complete IBs. 6d. ; handsome china toilet services, from St. 6d. ;
large bedroom and other carpets, from 7%. 6d. ; 14 well-made solid walnut bedroom
suites complete at S ts. ; massive black and brass-mounted bedsteads, full size, com-
plete with spring mattresses, at 2St. ; three very handsome design white enamel bed-
room suites of Louis XIV. style at £5 15t. ; four well-made large solid oak bedroom
suit«s at £t ^^%. Id. ; four very artistic Sheraton design inlaid mahogany bedroom suites
at Ml IBb. : three artistic large solid walnut bedroom suites at £9 17s. 6d. ; several fine
Old En|;lisb gent's wardrobes, fitted sliding trays and drawers, from £5 15s, i several
fine bow-front and other chests of drawers, from 57s. fid. ; old Queen Anne and other
tallboy chests, from I gs. ; six very choice inlaid mahogany bedroom suites, 15 gs. ;
elaborate all-brass Sheraton style bedsteads with superior spring mattresses complete,
46s. ; choice Chippendale design bedroom suites, 12 gs. ; Chippendale design bedsteads
to match ; Queen Anna design solid mahogany bedroom suites, £14 14t. ; all-brass square
tube full-size bedsteads with superior spnng mattresses, at £5 178. fid. ; costly Chippen-
dale design mahogany bedroom suite, 16 gs. ; costly inlaid satinwood bedroom suites
£45 ; panelled satinwood bedstead to match, 9 gs.

DINING-ROOMS, SMOKING-ROOMS AND LIBRARIES

Several fine quality real Turkey carpets about g ft. by u ft. from £4 17s. fid. ;
real Turkey rugs at 17s. fid. : massive carved oak sideboard, £S 15s. ; overmantel
fitment to match, £2 10s. ; extending dining table to match, £2 17s. fid. i two
elegantly-carved armchairs and six small ditto to match, £fi 1*^ ; elegant Queen Anne
design sideboard, fitted drawers, cupboards, etc., £7 ISs. ; set of eight Queen Anne

DRAWING-ROOMS AND ANTE-ROOMS.

Nineteen elegant design large Aiminster bordered carpets from 5 ^ ; elegant
design suite, comprising luxuriously sprung settee, with two lounge easy chairs and four
occasional chairs, covered rich Paris silk tapestry, £9 158. ; very elegant Louis XIV,
design china cabinet to match, £6 15s. ; choice centre table, 21s.; and Louis XIV,
design overmantel, 55s. " elaborately carved and gilt Louis Seize design suite of seven
pieces, including settee, 12 gs. complete; white enamelled French cabinets; Vernis
Marten painted tables, escritoires, etc. ; the satinwood decorated china cabinet,
4 ft. 6 in. wide, £14 14s. ; satinwood decorated centre table, £2 IDs. ; satinwood
decorated overmantel, £5 10s, ; costly satinwood decorated suite, covered choice
brocade gobelin blue silk, £1fi Ifis.
Also BED and TABLE LINEN, Carpets, Curtains, Draperies, &c.
SILVER and SHEFFIELD PLATE, &c., &c.

Five fuU-sized billiard tables from 50 gs. complete with all accessories. Billiard
dininp; table, three iron safes, and thousands of other items impossible to mention here,
including two nearly new motor cars.

Write for Complete Catalogue {"Land and Water"), Illustrated bv Photographs. Now Ready. Sent anywhere Post Free.

THE FURNITURE & FINE ART DEPOSITORIES, Ltd

Grand Prix,
Diploma of Honour, and

Gold Meiluls,
Paris Exhibition, 1913.

48 to SO PARK STREET,

The following Number Motor
'Buses pass Park Street, Isling-
ton : Nos. 4, 19, 43, 43a, and 30.

'Phone 3472 North.
Cab Fares refunded to all pur-
chasers.

Business Hours : Open every

day, 9 till g, except Saturdays,

when we close at i.

ESTABLISHED OVER
HALF- A - CENTURY.

UPPER STREET, ISLINGTON, LONDON, N.

By Royal Appointment

to H M the Kmg of Spain.

IMPORTANT NOTICE.-

We have NO WEST END
BRANCHES, neither are we
connected vtith ANY OTHER
DEPOSITORIES. Our ONLY
ADDRESS is as above. Having
NO WEST END EXPENSES
TO MAINTAIN enables us to
offer GENUINE advantages in
really Fine Antique and High-
class Goods.

L. LEWIS, Manager

Grand Prix
and Gold Medals,

International Exhibition,
Rome, igia.

October 31, 1914

LAND AND WATER

CHOOSING KIT

(Continued from page 57)

shown me the other day — a gauntlet cuff of rubber, lined
with fleece, completely covered in the coat cuff, and this
rubber was continued up the back of the glove to the finger
tips. The palm and the insides of the fingers, where the hard
wear would come, were of very soft and flexible kid, and the
glove was fleece-lined throughout. For ordinary field service
such a glove as this would not stand a week's wear, but for
motoring — if kept solely for that purpose — it is ideal, for the
rubber of the glove where all the wind pressure comes is
sufficiently non-conducting of heat to afford perfect warmth,
while the kid of the palm and inside the fingers assures
flexibility ; and the lining affords sufficient warmth even for
motor cycling. It struck me as just the very tiling for
dispatch riders and airmen.
HeaJgear

Yet another item, scarcely coming under the head of
camp equipment, was a tightly-fitting cap of oiled silk,
lined with thin yet warm material, with fur covering for the
ears and the back of the neck, designed to fit under a peaked
field-service cap. This again looked just the thing for the
use of airmen and motorists, while at the same time it would
be of good service for mounted men, and for infantry as well
in the winter months. The field-service cap affords practically
no protection from rain in its normal state, but gets soggy and
heavy after very little wet weather, while, even when a
waterproof cover is fitted, it leaves the rain to trickle down
the back of the neck in most uncomfortable fashion. This
under-cap of oiled silk does away with all the difficulties,
affording both warmth and thorough protection frcm wet,
while it will also come in as a sleeping cap for winter use.
For such as have either no opportunity or not sufficient
inclination to wear such a thing there is a waterproof cover
to fit the field-service cap, made of oiled silk, and so light and
small that it can be crumpled up in a wisp and placed in a
vest pocket without damage either to pocket or cover, when
the latter is not in use.

Sleeping in the- Open

With regard to sleeping out in a sleeping bag, without
the comfort of a camp bedstead, 1 have heard amateur
campaigners declare they could never get a comfortable
sleep on the ground. Personally, I have found the reverse
to be the case, and have never slept better than when directly
under the stars — or the rain clouds — with something water-
proof over and under me, and a hole to fit my hip-bone. It
is always possible to find that hole, with a little trouble, for
a very small depression in the ground suffices for comfort ;
and after a night or two, to grow accustorred to the change
from spring mattresses and similar luxuries, sleep in the
open is far healthier and sounder than sleep in a bedroom,
no matter how well ventilated the latter may be. One
wakens more fresh and fit, and is more ready to face the
day after a night's sleep in the open.
Air Pillows

An air pillow, though a luxury, is one worth having. It
can be inflated without apparatus — simply by blowing into it,
and is very little trouble to deflate. It can be deflated in a
second or two and thrown inside the sleeping bag in the
morning, when it takes up practically no space and weighs
only ounces. It may seem almost as sybaritic an article of
equipment as a camp bedstead, but it is not so, since a pillow
of some sort is a necessity, and if the folded coat is used on a
wet night and the user is a restless sleeper — likely to turn and
twist during the night — the result is often a wet coat to wear
at the start of the day. Not that an air pillow should be
taken when it is necessary to keep kit and equipment within
the strictest limits, but in many cases it is a very useful
accessory to field kit, and most men have sufficient judgment
to know when it is not admissible.

invat r. Rubber

It may be stated definitely that the canvas washing bowl
is better than anything that can be done in the way of rubber
proofing. The chief drawback to the canvas article is that it
must nearly always be folded and put away wet, and this is
a difficulty that cannot be overcome, apparently. But then
there is a drawback to practically every article of camp equip-
ment ; all things used in campaigning have either to serve
double purposes or else must be collapsible ; the users must
get accustomed to the fact that they cannot have the amount
of comfort that the Ritz or Carlton can provide ; they are out to
rough it, and rough it they must, though it rests with them-
selves to a very great degree how much of comparative
comfort they get out of their campaigning ; and the more
comfort they get the more efficient they will be.

(To be contir.ued titxt u-*ek) *

Tinder Lighters

FOR

Active Service, Motoring, &c.

No. V. 7JI,— Vickery's
New Tinder Lighter.

Excellent for Cam-
paigning, etc. Will not
blow out in strongest
wind.

Plain Gold - £2100
Engine-Turned tiold,

£2 15 0
Plain Silver - £0 7 6
Engine-Turned Silver,

£0 10 6

No. V. 2156 — Vickery's New
Thinnest Pcssible Flaik, in solid
Sterling Silver. E.xtremely flat
for the pocket. In five sizes.

£1 6t. 6d., £1
£2 15s. 6d.,

15s., £2 5s.,
£3 6s. 6d.

Ditto without cup :

£1 Is., £1 8s. 6d., £1 15s.,
£2 2s., £2 12s. 6d.

ICKER>^

The New

SILK-SKIN WAISTCOAT

Impervious to wet or
searching winds. The
special slip finish
allows the service
tunic to be worn
comfortably over the
waistcoat. Wright
20 oz.

Pri

ice

27/6

Special Articles :

Waterproof Sleeping Bags, Fur-lined Warmers,
Leather Waistcoats, Oil-silk Cap Covers, " Wolsey"
Valises "Sam Browne" Belts (finest quality 37/6).

DunhiU's

2 CONDUIT STREET, LONDON, W.
359-361 EUSTON ROAD, N.W.

LAND AND WATER

Octobtr 31, 1 91 4

— \

Smokeless Cartridges

TH^'

■PRLMMU;

3MOKELESS CAR|
EOHITE

Loaded with "N^onlle" (30 «r ) Powdtr
lo Gaatigbl Quality Ca^e.

I^^

S,MOKLL€S'j,

eARTPioae.'fy

Loaded with ■• N.F. ■' 136 gr.) SmoKeless In
Special Gaslight Quality Case.

THE

»»

Smokelesz Cartridge'.'

Loaded wilb ■ si.'" M,;^r^.■l Smoheless"
(33 gr.) or "N.E.'' (36 gr.) Smoheless.

THt

^^^^S^?'

-SMOK£i£SS

Loaded ivlth " Stowmarhet Smoheless"
or " N.E." Smokeless.

The Trade only supplied,

SOLE MANUFACTURERS

The New Explosives Go- Ltd.

62 LONDON WALL, LONDON, E.G.

THE SOHULTZE COMPANY^ LTD.

SOLE M/tKERS OF

SCHULTZE
LIGHTNING

GUNPOWDER.

THE Company desires to inform the
Sporting Public tinat the constitu-
tion of the Company is entirely
British. There are no alien Shareholders,
and all the Directors and Employees are
British. The Schultze Powders were the
first smokeless sporting powders made,
and have been manufactured since 1869
at the Company's Works in Hampshire.
Sportsmen may therefore continue to
use the Schultze Co.'s Gunpowders with
the knowledge that by so doing they
are supporting a purely British industry.

For THE SOHULTZE COMPANY, LIMITED

O. G> WILL, Secretary.

MAKERS TO THE KING.

HARDYS

PALAKONA

(reod.)

ill

Split Bamboo are
the highest quality

Fishing Rods

They are of most perfect
balance— aie the lightest
and have everlasting wear.

A " Hardy " rod is a rod
with a character and a
reputation — a rod which
is a valuable investment.

These rods are made under
the supervision of the
Hardy experts. There are
no rods "Just as good as
Hardy's."

Buyers only pay cost
price — no middleman's
profit comes between
them and the actual
manufacturers.

Stnd lor great lUmltated
jiiig/tr'i Guide and Cata-
k[.ur. Fret.

HARDY 'ltT ALNWICK.

LONDON I 61 PALL MALL, S.W.
MANCHESTER: 12 to 14 Moult StPoet.
EDINBURGH: 101 Ppinces Street.

O.^IV.^'S FLOWERING DVJL^DO

Choioe Crocus Species, Colchicums, Hardy

Cyclamen, Nerlnes, Roman Hyacinths, etc.,

for present planting.

LIST ON APPLICATION.

BARR & SONS, 11,12&iaKlng Street, Covent Garden, London

IMPORTANT TO SPORTSMEN
AND MASTERS OF HOUNDS

THURLOW'S

Scotch Oatmeal

WARRANTED GENUINE
As supplied to numerous Ken-
nels in all parts of the Country

IMPORTERS of fine quality IRISH and CANADIAN
Oatmeal. Manufacturers of Thurlow's HOUND FEED
„,L ,■■ ^'""■'ne"' "se. Best plain and NAVY BISCUITS
^l fpSi^^ '^?»?o^ ^?r "S PRATT'S PATENT,"
St'^'^h'^S "MELOX," "COMBERMERE," HOUND
BREAD, and GARTHWAITE'S FISH BISCUITS, &c.

"^ P'^r^Pf^'"^"^ °' ■°'- PER TON for Cash within two
months of delivery of goods.

For present prices and samples apply to —

J. THURI.OW & SON, High Wycombe.

(JKEOSOTE, full strength. 5 galls.

B \.A [°'*'^-'° «»">*■ for 7S. 6d., 40 gall, barrel 20s. Sd.
Renders woodwork rol-proof,stain5 russet brown, preserves
disinfects destroys insects.-ALDRiDGE, Islington Greenl
London. N. Established loo years ^'cc".

CUPISS'

CONSTITUTION BALLS.

THAnC MARk^

'* Dear Sirs.— I enclos
tion Balls. I do not like
myself have used them
years with satisfaction.—

Prepared upwards of
M.R.C.V.S., Diss.

FOR HORSES.

For Grease, Swelled Legs,
Cracked Heels Coughs, Colds,
etc., and keeping High-fed
Horses in Health.

FOR

NEAT CATTLE & SHEEP,

In cases of Move or Blown,
Hide Bound, Loss of Appetite,
Staring Coat, Distemper, Epi-
demic or Influenza.

Fop Scouring in Calves they ap«
almost Infallible.

"Showle Court, Ledbury,
e cheque value £i 13s. for Cons titu-
to be without them ; my father and
for cattle and horses for about 50
-Yours truly, Hf.nry W. Taylor."
50 years by FRANCIS CUPISS,

PRICES:— 1/9, 3/B. 10,6, 21/-
Wrile for lUuilraicd Handbook lo
FRANCIS CUPISS. LTD., DISS. NORFOLK.

NEW ZEALAND & AUSTRALIA

CallinK at TENERIFFE, CAPE TOWN, and HOBART.

S.S. & A. CO.'S S^V^a^m^r'^

(largest in the trade) leave London (Gravesend following day)

"CORINTillC '■ (t.s.), Dec. 10.
Wireless Telegraphy, Unsurpassed Acccminodation for Passengers
ist. and, and 3rd Class. SPACIOUS STATH ROOMS forO.SE. TWO
or THREE PHRSONS at MODERATE FARES. Apply lo Shaw,
S.W1II, &• Albion Co., I,td., 34, Leadenhall Street, E C. and 62. Pall
Mall; or to White Star Line, Liverpool, and r, Cocltspur Street, S.W

£500 I^'VESTMENT. — .\ Gentle-

man with this amount at his disposal can
participate in a sound high-class trading proposition. Con- ■
tracts with some of the most important business houses (^
already promised, others now being negotiatett. A unique
opportunity. Principals only. — "Cosmos,' c/o Land and
Water, Central House, Kingsway, W.C.

The County Gentleman

AND

LAND &WATER

Vol. LXIV. No. 2739

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1914. [

PUBLISHED AST

A newspaperJ

PRICE SIXPENCE
PUBLISHED WEEKLY

THE LATE PRINCE MAURICE OF BATTENBERG

It is with great regret that we record the death of the Prince as the result of wounds received near Ypres. Educated at Welhngton and
I'.ie R.M.C. (Sandhurst), he was appointed in 1911 to the King's Royal Rifle Corps. He was recently mentioned in despatches.
He was an ardent sportsman and motorist and greatly interested in Aviation, making frequent flights as a passenger at Hendon.

■LAND AND WATER

November 7, 1914

\l:^n.U''m2-Zi%m9:s'^^^^^^^^^ ''''^■■' ho-e power, 30,000; bu.lt at Portsn^outh ;

1912, cost £2,080,918, guns, 10 of 13-5 in., 12 of 6 in., and smaller; four torpedo tubes; speed 22 knots; crew about 90o!

From the on^mal by Monlaju. Dawon. Copyn^ht of M«.r.. Andrew Ush.- 4 Co.. Ltd.. D,st,ll.rs, Edinburgh

November 7, 1914

LAND AND WATER

November 7, 19 14

LEATHER VESTS

FOR OFFICERS

at the Front

Heavy Chamois,
exira length 50/-

Heavy Chamois,
ordinary vest
length - 42/-

Best Chrome

Leather, lined

flannel - 30/-
SPECIAL ARTICLES : Waterproof Sleeping Bags, Fur-
lined Warmers, Leather Waistcoats, Oil-silk Cap Covers,
"Wolsey" Valises, " Sam Browne" Belts (finest quality 37/6)

The Finest Stock of Leather
Waistcoats in London at

Dunhills

2, CONDUIT STREET, W.

OFTHE PEOPLE:-

7?/6 simple /iberal and

comprehensive policies >

issued by the

NORTH BRITISH & MERCANTILE

INSURANCE CO.

E^tabiiahed Jd(/.if

Htntis/kd, 500,000

LONDON:- 61 TMREADNEEDLE ST.E.C. EDINBURGH:- «.4 PRINCES ST.

iffe^i;

By Appointment
Jr-wcllcn and Silverim'tln to H.M. The King

THE

Goldsmiths & Silversmiths Compan]

Ltd.

DESIGN

JEWELLERS

Famous for
QUALITY

VALUE

TRAVELLING CASES

Completely fitted with serviceable Toilet Requisites.

Rolled up they occupy a minimum space. At a

wide range of prices

112 REGENT STREET, LONDON, W.

^y appointmen! to

H.M. King George V.

The best choice

PI^XCELLENCE in tyre construction
■*— ' depends very largely on attaining per-
fection in a thousand details. More
accumulated knowledge of how to do
this goes to the making of the Dunlop
tyre than to any other.

l_J ENCE the superiority of the Dunlop, the proof
of which is before you in the countless in-
stances of splendid service that have made the word

DUNLOP

synonymous with satisfaction

The Dunlop Rubber Co., Ltd. Founders through-
out the world of the Pneumatic Tyre Industry

Aston Cross. Birmingham. 14 Regent Street, London. S.W. . ,^ ,_^ ,

Paris : 4 Rue du Colonel Moll. \ /HfKM'/

DU1IL0P SOLID TYRES FOR HEAVY COIIIERCIAL VEHICLES XradTin.rk.

November 7, 19 14

LAND AND WATER

CHOOSING KIT

Practical Hints

(Continued from page 69)
The Ubiquitous Cigarette

STRICTLY speaking, the business of sending out
things to men of our Army in France is not in any-
way connected with the choice of kit, but, since
several of our readers have already made inquiries
on the subject, it is as well to accord it at least a
passing mention. Many who have friends or relatives at
that mysterious region known as " the front," as well as the
charitably inclined, are dubious as to what to send out. It
is always perfectly safe, of course, to send cigarettes, for
even if the recipient is a pipe-smoker he can make currency
of the gift and trade off his cigarettes for practically anything
he likes. I remember how in the South African War the
value of a cigarette would go up as the distance from a town
increased, until one could trade off one cigarette for a tin of
jam, and on an exceptionally long trek for far more than that.
Both cigarettes and tobacco are very safe things to send out,
the only point being to ascertain that the articles sent really
get to the men for whom they are intended.

Sending — and Receiving

In this connection it is worthy of note that several large
firms are making up hampers for sending out to the troops,
and one benefit in connection with the dispatch of these
hampers by relatives or friends is that the goods get there ;
they are practically certain to reach their destination without
trouble, and, in addition to this, they are packed by men
who have experience in the needs and tastes of men at " the
front." It is worthy of remark that to the average civilian
mind there is no such thing as line of communication or base
in the composition of the field army ; but everybody is at
"the front," even though he may be fixed up at a wireless
station a hundred miles or so behind the guns, or stuck away
on the lines of communication with plenty of hard work and
no excitement. His relatives always speak of him a<; " at the
tront," wherever he is.

Hamper Contents

In selecting the contents of a hamper one should
be certain that it contains a tin of vaseline, which is the
thing most appreciated by the troops for preserving the feet
in condition. Most firms in the composition of their gift
hampers include a number of compressed foods, which are
thoroughly popular with the men.

Clothing Parcels

If one desires to send out articles of clothing let there be
a Balaclava cap in the outfit, for with the winter coming on
some warm covering for the head at night makes all the
difference to the sleeping outfit, and the man who is actually
■' at the front " without a woolly nightcap has no chance of
getting one other than by means of the kindness of his
friends. Socks, of course, are always welcome, and it should
be definitely specified in the packing of a parcel of clothing
that boot-laces are included — two or three pairs of really
strong laces, preferably leather ones. Undervests are almost
as welcome as socks, too.

Matches and Substitutes

Almost as welcome as the man with a cigarette is the
man who can supply a light for the cigarette or pipe smoker.
After a week or so away from supplies matches begin to grow
scarce, and the various automatic lighters on the market
come to their own. I have no faith in the thing which
presses open with a spring, lights itself, and is dependent for
its usefulness on a supply of benzine — that is, I have no
faith in it unless it is particularly well made and a supply of
either petrol or benzine is available for the owner's use.
Otherwise, the thing runs dry at the time it is most needed
and one sighs for a box of vestas. There is also the dis-
advantage of wind, which this class of lighter will not stand.
One presses the spring and the thing flies open, lights itself,
and promptly goes out, leaving the owner swearing. There
is, however, a tinder lighter, made by various firms, which
needs no constant supplies of benzine or petrol to render it
efficient, and its greatest advantage is that the worse the
wind the better it works. The idea is an adaptation of the
old-fashioned flint, steel, and tinder dodge of our forefathers,
and the new lighter is worked by a string of tinder stuff
contained in a metal tube, which, when rubbed sharply
against a prepared surface in the way a match is rubbed on

(Continued m page 09)

BLANKETS

FOR

ACTIVE
SERVICE

^S Winter approaches the necessity for really
warm coverings in the trenches is obvious.

Yf.^^t^S "°^ producing Blankets on the lines of our famous
ULSTER FLEECE RUGS (THE EIDERDOWN OF CLOTH),
made from pure high-grade wool, which gives more bodily
warmth than two or more of many of the so-called Army Blankets.

The iiize is ample. 60 by 90 inches, and the colours are
srey. khaki, natural and dark natural.

PRICE 18/6

On receipt of 19 6 we will forward one of them securely
packed to any Officer of. the Expeditionary Force.

Our new Linen Hall in RttenI Street. London, will be oHened on 2nd November
with a great Otening Sale of Linens, etc.

Robinson ^LCleaven

Regent Street, LONDON, And BELFAST

SERVICE KITS

—IN 48 HOURS. —

Every detail guaranteed correct, in

accordance with War Office regulations.

Palterns and Eslimale post free.

A large number of half-finished Service

Jackets always on hand, which can be

compl ted in eight hours.

INFANTRY SWORD £4 14 6

WEST & SON, Ltd

Military and Sporting Tailors,

151 NEW BOND STREET, W.

(Opposite Conduit Street )

'Phone — Gerrard 8161.

CIVIL and
MILITARY
TAILOR.

(J^^^HITE

CIVIL at>d
-^r MILITARY

lO Blenheim Street tailor.
New Bond Street.W

OFFICERS' SERVICE KIT

Of the finest quality KHAKI,
Correct in every detail,

Supplied at shortest notice at the following reasonable prices :

Service Tunic (heavy whipcord), from £3 3 0

< „ Barathea) „ £4 4 0
Bedford Cord Breeches, strapped

buckskin - - - „ £2 10 0

British Warm <lined fleece) - „ £3 10 0

Service Great Coat - - ,,£4 4 0

OVERCOATS

My new Season's Models are now ready, and can be seen
at the above address, together with new Winter Suitings.

Slip Overcoats , - - from 3 guineas

Town Overcoats - - - „ 3i „

Suits „ 3J „

Dress Suits - - - - „ 6 „

ALL GARMENTS PERSONALLY FITTED.

During the present crisis I am charging the lowest possible
prices in order to keep my staff of workpeople fully employed.

TELEPHONE - - MAVFAIR 145.

SAMPLES AND ESTIMATES POST FREE.

LAND AND WATER

November 7, 1914

HJiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiixiiiiiiiiii'ii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii|

I How to help Tommy Atkins |

= We cannot all go out to fight, but we can ^

= all do something to help our soldiers who ^

E are fighting our battles and defending the =

E honour of our native land, and in this way =

E contribute to their well-being and efliciency =

I SEND HIM A FLASK OF I

i HORLICK S I

i MALTED MILK TABLETS |

Invaluable to a soldier —

in the field and most =

efficient in relieving =

hungerand thirst =

and preventing fatigue. =

We will send post free to any E

address a flask of thesedelicious ^

and sustaining food tablets and =

a neat vest pocket case on =

receipt of 1/6. If the man is at =

the front, be particular to give E

his name, regimental number, —

regiment, brigade and division. =

Of all Chemists anil stores, in con- ~

venient pocket flasks, 1/- each. ^

Larger sizes, 1,6, 2/6 and 11/- —

HORLICK'S MALTED MILK Co., =

i SLOUGH, BUCKS. E

Liberal Sample sent post free for 3d. in stamps. ^

fsriiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiF.

DAINTY AND
INEXPENSIVE
REST GOWNS

Designed by our own artist
and made in our own work-
rooms from rich quality bro-
caded velvets. The value
of these gowns is quite excep-
tional, «hile the cut, style
and finish is of a particularly
high order.

Rest Gown {as sketch), in rich
brocaded velvet, with belt of
roses in gold or silver, and
finished at neck and sleeves
with a little lace. Excep-
tionally good in black ; also
in heavy rich brocaded crepe
de chine.

Price

58/6

Note. — The velvets from which
these gowns are made are
usually sold at from 10/6 to
1 2/6 per yard.

CATALOGUE POST FJIEE.

KHAKI ARMY RUGS

Very warm and tiurable.
Size 6o in. by 90 in.

10,6 each
100 Kugs for £50

DebenViam
& Freebpdy,

Wigmope Street.

iCnvendifiK Squfire) Lon*1onW

^'TAYMOUTH"
L; WHISKY

Old
Liq

posses-es great age and bouqutjt, and
is tlie finest "Scotch" in the market.

Bfac/L V^atcfl
Mon u ment

TRADE MARK

SOLE PROPRIETOR:

PETER McPHAIL,

^Distiller and Wine ^Merchant,

EDINBURGH.

For Home
Rifle Practice

Every one may learn ho>v to shoot accurately
in an easy and inexpensive manner by using the lemarkable

Di Oi Ai RIFLE

A serious arm, solidly built and easy to manipulate. " Cocked"
by the patent lever arrangement beneath the barrel.

Price from 4-0/-

B.S.A. Pellets i/6 per looo.
(55 Shots for One Pennv !)

This is the only weapon with which regular serious and
accurate practice may be obtained in the house or
garden. A complete home outfit, with which practice

may be started at once and conducted indefinitely, consists
of a Light pattern B.S.A. Air Rifle with straight hand
stock, a steel-faced wall target with paint and brush, and
1,000 pellets, and costs but 50s. It may be regarded as a
patriotic investment in these troublous times, when every one
should be able to shoot a rifle in case of necessity.

For fully illustrated
Rifle Booklets post
free write to

The Birmingham Small Arms

Co., Ltd.,
BIRMINGHAM.

Milken of Rifles for H.M. Il'.ir. /)«/•/.

November 7, 19 14

LAND AND WATER

CHOOSING KIT

{Continued from page 67)

tne side of the box, ignites the string of tinder, which a wind
fans to greater fire instead of putting out. As the tinder
burns away it can be pushed up into the tube, and one string
of it will last an enormously long time, while extra supplies
can be carried, if necessary, with no trouble. The idea is
distinctly good, and seems to solve the problem of the ideal
lighter, so far as this can be done.

The Importance of the Match

Substitutes for matches seem very small things to talk
about in connection with the selection of field kit, but they
are in reality most important items. We who sit within
reach of a match-stand half our time, and the other half
have only to go round the corner, put down a copper, and
get a box of vestas, do not realise all that the absence of
matches would mean to us. We have utterly lost the old-
time habit of using flint and steel, and must have some
mechanical substitute ; we have grown so used to that
substitute that it seems a very small thing to us, while in
reality it is responsible for half our comfort. Let every man
bound for " the front " see that he is well provided in this
respect, or he will regret his carelessness before many days
are over.
Flasks

Another thing is the flask. This must be covered in
altogether ; the one that exposes half the glass is useless.
Glass for cleanliness, and a metal cover for protection, or a
thick leather cover for the same purpose, makes the ideal
flask. Personally, I prefer the metal cover, but would not
have a solid metal flask without the glass lining. The flask
should be taken filled and kept filled with the best brandy
that can be obtained. Its contents should be looked on as
an emergency ration — only to be used in dire necessity,
unless it is possible to refill at once with the same quality of
spirit. Far too many men regard the flask as a mere camp-
dinner accessory, to provide a peg at any odd time ; but this
is a bad misconception of the reason for carrying a flask.
One can always get pegs for a camp dinner when pegs are
available for other men, and if they are not then it is no time
for using up the reserve supply that the flask carries, for
that supply may save iome poor devil's life in the course of
the next few hours, and using it as a drink in the ordinary
way is sheer wanton waste. A good flask, kept full, is a very
necessary adjunct to the camp outfit. The lower part of the
metal casing, of course, forjns a cup. Having a stopper
which also forms a tiny cup is also an advantage, though
this is largely a matter of taste, and the stoppers that are
hinged and secure with a half-twist have an advantage in
that they do not get lost and leave the flask useless until a
stray cork, with a doubtful sanitary history, can be found
for replacement.

Wool and Comfort

One very necessary item of clothing for the coming
winter months is a cardigan jacket, woollen jersey, or some-
thing of the kind. Mention has already been made of an
oiled-silk sleeved vest to fit under the tunic, and this forms
an ideal warm garment, except on the score of hard wear ;
it is an '♦t.t that needs renewing fairly often, as these things
go, but at the same time it is well worth while renewing
such an article as this. If, however, it be desired to get a
woollen garment only, and sacrifice the waterproof quality
of the oiled-silk article, then care should be taken to
ascertain that the sweater or cardigan jacket chosen is all
wool, for the half-cotton half-wool things are unsatisfactory'
both on the score of warmth and that of wear. There used
to be obtainable a brown wool sweater, something like an
Army blanket in colour, fitted with sleeves, and so expandable
— to coin a word — that any size would fit any man, practically.
Its elasticity arose out of the fact that it was all wool ; and
a thoroughly comfortable thing for cold mornings it was, too.
I have one of these articles yet in my possession, and value
it highly when out cycling, although it cannot be less than
twelve years old, and has several darns in it. Sweaters of
this kind can be obtained at most outfitters, and make most
acceptable gifts to troops at the front when included in
parcels of clothing.

A Personal Opinion

Personally, I would rather have one of these sweaters
to slip on than a lot of warm underclothing. The reason
for the preference is that in the actual work of a campaign
a man very seldom has a chance to remove his underclothing
for the night, and thus does not feel the benefit of it to such
an extent during the day, while the man with a sweater can
slip it oft as easily as his tunic, almost, and put it on again
to get the full warmth from it.

(To bt conUnutd tuxt wetk)

CASTLE & CO.,

MILITARY TAILORS.

iCstabllshed 1889.)

^^ SERVICE

^^ IN O HOURS. ^^

ABSOLUTELY CORRECT

STORE PRICES.

37 PICCADILLY, LONDON, W.

(FACING ST. JAMES'S CHURCH).
'Rhone Regent 5624.

BENSON'S

"Active Service" Watch.

FINE QUALITY

LEVER
MOVEMENT.

Sterling Silver Case and
Buckle Leather Strap,

£2 10

Gold, £5

WARRANTED
TIMEKEEPER.

Superior quality in Silver

£3 10 & £4 4

AN ESSENTIAL PART OF AN OFFICERS EQUIPMENT.

Luminous Dial and Hands so that the time may be readily seen at night.

Illustrated List post free.

Largest Stock in London of Luminous Dial Wriitlet Watches.

62 & 64 LUD6ATE HILL, E.G., and 2S OLD BOND ST.. W.

HARRODS'

GIFT BOXES

TROOPS AT THE FRONT

BOX No. 1

ONE SOVEREIGN.

1 lb. Chocolate (Harrods).
3 llns Oxo Cubes.

2 Potted Meats.
1 Ivelcon.

] Brand's Ess. Chicken.
1 Brand's Ess. Beef.
100 Cisarettes, Best, Flat Boil.
} lb. Tobacco (compressed).
1 Packet Boracic Powder.
1 Tube Vaseline.
1 Tin Coffee and Milk, or

Cocoa and Milk.
I Plum Cake.
^ Tin Danish Butter.
1 Pipe.

Bromo Toilet Paper.

HARRODS Ltd. (

BOX No. 2.

ONE SOVEREIGN.

1 Pair Gloves.
1 Pair Socks.
1 Undervest.
1 Pair PanU.
3 Handkerchiefs.
1 Pair Braces.
1 Woollen Scarf.
1 Balaclava Cap.

The Sovereign

covers

cost of packing

and postage.

Richard Burbidte.

), London, S.W.

LAND AND WATER

November 7, 19 14

THROUGH THE EYES

OF A WOMAN

Notes by a Feminine Pencil

WITH the afternoon came a visitor, and \yith
the visitor much indignation. She had just
heard from the hps of her austerely respect-
able maid a long tale of the delinquencies
of two soldiers' wives who apparently had
done little save drink since their husbands left for the front.
And what was worse, they showed no tendency to change,
but erry intention of continuing to waste their substance
in the same manner. Both these women were in receipt of
dlowances. making them far better off than they had ever
KHn all their lives before. Both, moreover, had married
immediately after the outbreak of war, and had never started
Thome, but were living in lodgings with no work to do
It can hardly be wondered at if time hangs heavily on their
hands and the temptations of the drinking bar are powerful
So it comes to pass that day after day we see the statement
that drinking amongst women is on the increase, with many
incontrovertible facts added in support of the charge.

It is really hardly fair on the women themselves that
they should have this weight of unoccupied days in addition
to their other burdens. Every one whose man is on active
service knows how the agony of suspense is relieved only by
steady occupation. Then the mind is forced, often in spite
of itself to concern itself with other things, and it takes a
healthier point of view involuntarily. It is very certain that
many soldiers' and sailors' wives cannot find sane dis-
traction when thrown completely upon their own resources.
It is equally certain that other resources can be forthcoming.
Clubs started for these women in each of our big towns woilld
go far towards solving the problem. They could be worked
upon the most attractive lines, so that the members would
find it a pleasure to belong and count hours spent there as
happy ones. Plenty of occupation could be given. Working
parties could be formed to sew for some of the many schemes
to provide our soldiers and sailors with creature comforts.
The women forming these work parties would feel of some
use in the general disposition of things, and it would provide
interests for them— those most important possessions.
Games could also be played, such as draughts, chess, and
halma, and the winter days would lose half their dreariness
to many women such as those described by the Afternoon
Visitor with such virtuous wrath and disapproval.

The Blue Cross

Several little leaflets decorated in the corner by a broad
blue cross have found their way into the letter box, together
with sundry other missives. They show that Our Dumb
Friends League has not forgotten our dumb friends on the
battlefields abroad, and will be eagerly scanned by many an
animal lover. The Blue Cross Fund has been formed by
this League to help horses in war time, and it has been
officially recognised by the French Government. Captain
Claremont has been working ceaselessly on its behalf, and it
is mainly owing to him that this has come about. All goes
very well now, however, for he has been deputed by the
French Minister of War to form base hospitals for the wounded
horses ; and here the life of many a valuable animal will be
saved. It is good to think that such an idea has been started
and is being energetically carried out. The Blue Cross Fund
makes its appeal above Mr. Arthur J. Coke's well-known
signature from 58 Victoria Street, Westminster. It asks for
wither pads, embrocations, and bandages, amongst many
other things of veterinary requirements. Already the fund
has supplied several ambulances for the use of horses at the
different Army camps in this country. When the base
hospitals are in working order abroad Captain Claremont will
have, it is hoped, many ambulances over there, too, so that
the wounded horse, like his master, can be transported with
all possible speed from the battlefield. Needless to say,
such activities will need help from the Chancellor of the
Exchequer's Silver Bullet. The sufferings of dumb animals,
however, make a powerful lever for unlocking the pocket,
and several people have a personal interest in horses at the
front. Recently there was a mepting at Claridge's Hotel
at which Lady Smith-Dorrien presided, and the aims of

the fund were explained to a very sympathetic audience.
The badge of the fund is a blue and white enamel
cross, and it is so pretty that it is well worth buying for
itself alone.

A Mission to Servia

The last accounts from Servia show that she is in
desperate plight. There has been an almost complete lack
of medical stores, and doctors and nurses working there
have done so under terrible disadvantages. A warning was
actually issued by the Servian Government urging the
strictest economy with all medical stores, and the sick and
wounded have had extra but unavoidable suffering in conse-
quence. Lady Paget has been working at the Servian
Legation for the last few weeks collecting medicine and
surgical stores, and her hospital unit has just left for Servia.
Accompanying it were eight surgeons, twenty nurses, and a
staff of ward maids and orderlies. Lady Paget hopes to
form a hospital of two hundred and fifty beds, and she and
her helpers at the Legation have spent a busy time sending
off the equipment to Southampton, from whence it was
shipped. Though the mission has already set off upon its
work of mercy, contributions towards its upkeep will no
doubt still be welcome. Sir Edward Boyle is the honorary
treasurer to the Servian Relief Fund, and his address is
22 Berners Street. To know Servia and the Servians is to
sympathise with them. They are a brave people, very
industrious and hardworking, and have suffered so cruelly
during the past months that to describe Servia as the Belgium
of the East is no exaggeration. In addition to medical
stores. Lady Paget took with her also a store of clothing for
the Servian refugees from Bosnia and neighbouring provinces.
And, as a passing thought, why do we not show the Servian
flag in common with those of the Alhes ? A quintette of
flags is displayed in many instances : and where space can
be found for five there is surely room for a sixth. It is
quite amusing to note how the flag-carrying brigade flourish.
People who a short while ago would have considered such
ornaments as the worst form of Jingoism now fall victims
to the wily tradesman and his neat series of small silk flags
for motor car or bicycle. Take them from every point of
view the flags of the Allies are a well-assorted lot, and those
of us who have no possessions to beflag, and would not beflag
them if we had, none the less feel their significance in our
hearts each time we see them.

The Personal Column

It has been quoted as typical of the Englishman that he

still looks at the announcement page of his morning paper

before opening it and reading the news of the day. As a

matter of fact, however, there is no page showing forth more

clearly the conditions under which we are living at present.

Almost the whole history of the war can be gleaned, for

example, from the announcements appearing day by day in

the personal columns. They make interesting if sometimes

very sad reading. Many of them are in Flemish or French,

asking for news of some Belgian relatives or friends, who it

is believed have arrived in England, but about whom there

is no certainty. Then there are some, which are far more

cheerfully worded, conveying thanks to people who have

supplied the eagerly desired information. Further down the

column a well-known author advertises for officers' diaries of

the war, or asks for a personal interview with men who have

returned from the front. Evidently another book of thrilling

adventure is on the high road to preparation. Offers of

hospitality are given to wounded soldiers or refugees in

distress. Numerous officers' wives appeal for clothing,

tobacco, and several small luxuries for the men in their

husbands' regiments. An application is made for a revolver

and sword by a subaltern who has just joined the New Army

and is evidently not overburdened with this world's goods.

An adventurous soul asks for a motor ambulance, which he

is prepared to drive for the Red Cross abroad. A wonderful

study is the personal column, and sufficiently engrossing to

warrant attention. Erica.

The County Gentleman

AND

LAND & WATER

Vol. LXIV. No. 2740 SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1914 \S^S^!^^] l^iS^!'nll\^iAl^

Copyrighl, The Cardinal Publishing Co.

GENERAL JOFFRE

Commander-in-Chief of the French Army

LAND AND WATER

November 14, 19 14

Alexander & Macdonald

DISTILLERS AND im BLENDERS, LEITH

A Blend of

Old Highland
Malt Whiskies

("Sandy Mac") '■

Guaranteed
not less than
10 years old

ALSO 15 AND 20 YEARS OLD

\specM£ uQuem.
jCOTCtl

^ 10 Years Old

^ --^

SANDY
MACDONALD

The ideal drink, both for refreshment and for medicinal purposes, is, it is

generally agreed, Scotch Whisky. And that "Sandy Macdonald" is the

ideal Scotch Whisky is a widespread belief amongst connoisseurs.

November 14, 1914

LAND AND WATER

CHOOSING KIT

Practical Hints

(CotUinued from page 69)
Saddle Blankets

A MATTER of nearly fourteen years ago I was
detailed, with the rest of the men of a troop,
for flank guard to a cavalry column, and, in
common with the rest of the men that morning,
I folded my two blankets and placed them
under the saddle when saddling up. My horse had a habit
of " blowing " at the time he was girthed, and, as a rule,
I tightened the girths again about five minutes after saddling ;
but that morning everything had to be done in a hurry, and
I overlooked the second tightening of the girths. We went
out on the extreme flank, and ran into such a hot comer
that it took a good half-hour's gallop to get us out of it, and
I came out minus two blankets, for, with the loose girths,
they had slipped away from under the saddle and been left
on the veldt. There was no chance of retrieving them, and
only a combination of luck and judgment saved me from
slipping round with the saddle and getting a nasty fall.
I slept that night with the one blanket that travelled on the
transport wagons ; and it was a cold night.
A Blanket Clip

This, I repeat, is a matter of nearly fourteen years ago.
With the regulation saddle one blanket is still carried folded
on the back of thejiorse, and there is as yet no offtcially-
adopted device to prevent that blanket from slipping just
where it likes. At a prominent firm of saddlers I have just
been shown a small clip, made scissor pattern, so that the
harder it is pulled the tighter it grips, which is intended to
grip the front of the blanket in the middle and buckle on to
the peak of the regulation saddle. This is an excellent idea,
but it has the drawback of allowing the blanket to slip
diagonally, so that at the back of the saddle the blanket may
fall a long way over to one side or the other, as in the course
of a day's march that blanket is almost certain to alter from
its original position.

Ventilation

There is another point to be considered, too. A blanket
flat down on a horse's back, or even raised at the front with
a clip of this description so as to expose the withers to the
air, is going to affect the horse rather adversely before the
day is over, for in a long march all that makes for warmth
and consequent perspiration ts a decided drawback. My
own plan, after losing two blankets in the way already
described, was to get a strong, narrow, leather strap, which
fastened on the ring at the back of the saddle, passed between
the folded blankets and the back of the horse, and was
pulled up as tightly as possible and buckled to the peak of
the saddle, so as to pull the blankets quite up off the back
of the horse and leave a space through which a current of
air could penetrate from back to front This kept the
blankets quite firmly in position, and also gave the horse a
good deal more ease than could be obtained by leaving
the blankets flat on his back, or even by merely lifting them
by means of a clip in front, which affords no ventilation
near the point at which the rider sits, or in rear of that point.
Many little tricks have been tried in order to fix the saddle
blanket and allow of such ventilation as was obtainable
with the old-fashioned numnah, but I believe this of the
strap through under the saddle is the best. One must
exercise extreme care, however, in folding the blankets and
pulling up the strap, so that the blankets are pulled well up
into the body of the saddle, and also so that no folds or
rucks are made which might cause soreness to the horse.
Bitting

Another point in connection with saddlery that appeared
worthy of attention was the regulation-pattern headstall for
use with the " reversible " pattern bit. The regulation
pattern allows for the use of a bridoon with a strap fastening
to the D's of the head-collar, and a reversible bit attached to
a separate headstall. The use of this in its complete form
is a matter of taste ; personally, I should scrap the bridoon
and use its reins on the reversible bit as a second pair, for
I have never yet come across the horse that needed both
bridoon and reversible bit in his mouth, and to carry the two
is only a needless burden on the horse. The bit with four
reins is enough for all circumstances, and on Service every
extra ounce that is imposed on a horse counts very heavily
in a strenuous march. As to whether the separate headstall
is a necessity for carrying the bit, this also must be left to
individual judgment. If the headstall is retained, adjust-
ment of the bit is certainly easier.

{Continued on page 81)

■ XMAS.

HANDKERCHIEFS Ifep-r^.

'™™™™nmiliiiiiiniiinii!r™^ ■ ~

Handkerchiefs are a neorssiiy, but when buying ace thit they are Linen Handkerchief* from
Robin«on Jk Cleaver as we have been noted since 1870 for uniform excellence.

No. 27. Men's Handker-
chiefs, in I ,inen Cambric,
hemstitched. Sizes ao'i, 19,*.
and ig ins. square wiih .J. 1
and I J in. hems, respectively.
Per doz. lo/ii. Largest size
per doz. 13/9

We quote three handkerchiefs, we hive others to suit all tastes and all pursp>. Price List and
complete range of Patterns post free on application.

No. 41. Men's Handker-
chiefs in fine Linen, hand em-
broidered with I in. monogrom
Jany two-letttr conibinatinni.
About igj ins. siiuar>; with 1 in.
hem. Per doz. 13, ii

No. 28. Men's HamJker-
chiels in I.inen Cambric with
tape or corded borders I'sual
size 31 ins. square. Per doz.
10/3, Largegt size per doz. i-ij-

I Khaki Handkerchiefs from 1/1 1|^ per doz. |

Robinson ^LCleaven

156 170 REGENT STREET LONDON, W.

SERVICE KITS

—IN 48 HOURS. —

Every detail guaranteed correct, in

accordance with War Office regulationa.

Palitrns and Estimate post free.

A large number of half-finished Service

Jackets always on hand, which can be

complfrted in eight hours.

INFANTRY SWORD £4 14 6

WEST & SON, Ltd.

Military and Sporting Tailors,

151 NEW BOND STREET, W.

(Oppotile Conduit Street)

*Phoa« — Geirard 8161.

CIVIL ar)d
MILITARY
TAILOR.

lO Blenheim Street
New Bond Street W

CIVIL and
MILITARY
TAILOR.

OFFICERS' SERVICE KIT

Of the finest quality KHAKI,
Correct in every detail,

Supplied at shortest notice at the following reasonable prices:

Service Tunic (heavy whipcord) - - from £3 3 0

„ < „ Barathea) - - ,,£4 4 0

Bedford Cord Breeches, strapped buckskin „ £2 10 0

British Warm (lined fleece) - - - „ £3 10 0

Service Great Coat - - - - ,,£4 4 0

ALL GARMENTS PERSONALLY FITTED.

TELEPHONE - - IVIAYFAIR 145.

SAMPLES AND ESTIMATES POST FREE.

CHAMPION &WILTON

457 &, 459 OXFORD ST., LONDON, W.

l^||tfi|f MILITARY

^^1^^ SADDLERY

BRIDLES. WALLETS & SADDLE BAGS
lor immediate delivery.

LAND AND WATER

November 14, 19 14

Colonel John Bull : '' I believe in having plenty of reserves
and in getting them in good condition."

Johnnie Walker : " You are quite right— that's been our
policy since 1820."

JOHN WALKER & SONS. Ltd.. Scotch Whisky Distillers. KILMARNOCK.

November 14, 19 14

LAND AND WATER

CHOOSING KIT

{Continued from page 79)
Head-collars

But I do not like the regulation head-collar. It is a
nice-looking affair, but the " throat-lash " is not solid or
wide enough to stand hard wear. The same saddlers who
showed me the blanket clip e.xhibited a special pattern
head-collar with extra strength in the throat fastening, and
this looks a far more serviceable article for hard wear. It
must be remembered that on actual service a groom often
has no chance to change the head-collar used for riding for
another one in the lines, and thus the parade article has to
be used for fastening the horse at night as well as for riding
purposes. If a horse jerked his head up suddenly from any
cause he would snap the throat fastening of the regulation
head-collar — not when it is new, but after a month or two
of wet weather and hard wear. It is strong enough at the
beginning of things, but saddlery must be so built as to stand
wet weather without cleaning and all the hardships that its
user has to stand on campaigning work. And it is not
possible to get breakages repaired or replaced on Service
as it is in peace time ; as a rule, one cannot carry duplicates
of articles in use, and thus everything should be patterned
and constructed to stand the maximum of strain, which the
regulation pattern head-collar will not do.

Wallets and Saddlebags

A point on which all saddlers concur is that no leather
can be made absolutely waterproof ; pigskin, and the
other leathers from which saddlebags and most wallets
are constructed, are even worse than heavier leathers
in their wet- resisting qualities, and thus it is imperative
that both wallets and saddlebags should be properly lined
with absolutely waterproof material. Further, the ex-
teriors of these articles should be dressed as often as
possible with some waterproofing composition ; but, at the
same time, they must not be soaked in grease, or the rubbered
lining will speedily lose its power to resist water, for nothing
is so damaging to rubber and rubber-proofed fabrics as
grease. The regulation wallets are the best, and as for the
pattern of the saddlebag, it should be perfectly plain —
compartments and fittings are nuisances in actual work.

The Safety Bar

Many nervous riders seem to have a hankering after a
safety bar to release the stirrup leather in case of a fall ; but,
after seeing trials of several of these devices, I have come to
the conclusion that, for Service work, the ordinary bar fitted
to the regulation saddle is a§ " safety " as anything else.
The patent devices for releasing the stirrup leather usually
fail to act in case of a downward and backward pull, and the
man who cannot trust himself and his horse with the ordinary
fitting ought not to go campaigning — his nerves are not fit
for it. There is, certainly, a safety device which releases
the stirrup leather instantly if the stirrup is thrown over to
the other side of the saddle in case of a fall, but this happens
so seldom that the thing is not worth fitting for campaigning,
whatever may be its merits in the hunting field. Safety bars
may be counted out for practical purposes in a military sense.

Wire-Cutters

Most of the German barbed-wire entanglements — at
least, those used for the defence of prepared positions —
contain at least one strand of barbed wire charged with a
very powerful electric current. The average man advancing
on these entanglements with ordinary wire-cutters, should he
get a chance to cut any of the strands, will sooner or later
get electrocuted — when he comes to the electrically-charged
strands. In order to overcome this difficulty it is now
possible to get wire-cutters with vulcanite or rubber- covered
handles, both in the ordinary and the " Ironside " pattern.
The latter are by far the better pattern. There is enough
power in these " Ironside " cutters to sever half a dozen
strands of ordinary barbed wire at once with ease. But the
rubber-covered handles should be insisted on, as they may
mean the saving of a life — and, in fact, of many lives.

{To be continued next week)

^^-k ^' '(.>^rN a^^

SHIR.TMAKER

,277 HIGH IIOLBORN LONDON/-

Khaki
Shirts

made to measure on the premises In

2 HOURS

Send lO'day for patterns and prices.

W. TACON, spfciaii.t 277 High Holborn, LONDON.

f^hone : Central 483. Cables and Telegratns : " Skirlmaker. London. ' '

WHAT IS WAR?

What IS War?
what it is."

Half the people who talk of war know not
John Blight — House of Comiiioiis Speech.

What IS Military Tailoring? a difficult and complicated busi-
ness requiring knowledge, brains and skill to produce any
and every Officer's Uniform.

It is a Scandal that vast numbers of Officers, especially
newly-appointed Lieutenants, have gone to the
front in abominable rubbish.

Printed Estimates are misleading always, especially
advertised ones. Call and examine the Regulation Military
Cloths, Linings, Badges, and the Sewing that is the making
of the Kits turned out by

Castle & Co.,

MILITARY
TAILORS

{Established 1889).

37 PICCADILLY, LONDON, W.

Telephone: Regent 5624.

SERVICE KIT

AT SPECIAL
WAR PRICES

FOR DURATION OF WAR ONLY,
consisting of
GREAT GOAT (Stars), BRITISH WARM (Stars), TUNIC
(Stars), KNICKER BREECHES, TROUSERS, CAP & BADGE,
GREAT COAT STRAPS & CARRIER, PATENT SPIRAL
PUTTIES, HAVERSACK, WATER BOTTLE, WHISTLE and
LANYARD, SAM BROWNE BELT complete (including Revol-
ver Case, Pouch, Frog and Braces)

Inclusive Cost £23 Net Cash

DA \/ T C TAILORS TO ROYALTY
-**. ▼ X VJ (By Royal H'arranis),

31 George Street, Hanover Square, W.

TELEPHONE

GERHARD 2093.

HARRODS'

GIFT BOXES

TROOPS AT THE FRONT

Specially selected and appropriate " Comforts " have been
arranged in Parcels, details of which are given below.
These are securely packed and will be dispatched imme-
diately to anyone serving in the Expeditionary Force, upon
receipt of instructions.
No fuss or bother with packing.

You simply send your order by letter, 'plione or wire to
Harrods, specifying Box No. 1 or Box No. 2 (or both),
and the following goods to the value of one Sovereign are
dispatched without delay straight to the Firing Line : —

BOX No. 1 BOX No. 2.

ONE SOVEREIGN.

1 tb. Chocolate (Harrods).
3 Tin* Oxo Cube*.

2 Potted Meats.
1 IvelcoD.

1 Brand's Ess. Chicken.
1 Brand's Elss. Beef.
100 Cigarettes, Best, Flat Box.
i lb. Tobacco (compressed).
1 Packet Boracic Powder.
1 Tube Vaseline.
1 Tin Coffee and Milk, or

Cocoa and Milk.
1 Plum Cake.
A Tin Danish Butter.
1 Pipe.

Bromo Toilet Paper.

HARRODS Ltd. (

ONE SOVEREIGN.

1 Pair Gloves.

1 Pair Socks.

1 Undervest.

1 Pair Pants.

3 Handkerchiefs.

1 Pair Braces.

1 Woollen Scarf.

1 Balaclava Cap.

The

Sovereign

covers

cost

of packing

d postage.

Richard BurbidtCi

Ma nagiHi' Dt

;), London, S.W.

LAND AND W A T E K

November 14, T914

f VIRGINIA CIGARETTES '|,

JOHN PLAYER & SONS

beg to draw tlio attention

of connoisseurs to

PERFECTOS No. 2

hand-made Cigarettes. They
are distinguished by a superb
delicacy, the result of a
matchless blend of the finest
Virginia Tobacco.

10 - 6d. 20 - 1/-
50 - 2/6 100 - 4/9

"PERFECTOS FINOS" are

larjer Cigarettes of the same duality

JOHN PLAYER & SONS,

Nottingham.

^_^ 4 Nottingham. ^ J)

iV\ //j, The Imperial Tob -ceo Co. (of Gre;t Britain and .iW (f^
/)) % Ireland, Ltl ^ ^

LONDON &
LANCASHIRE

FIRE «

INSURANCE COMPANY,/

SECURITY - £5,927,293.

FIRE.

CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS.

ACCIDENT.

BURGLARY.

MOTOR CARS. DOMESTIC SERVANTS.

MARINE.

Head Offices:

45, DALE STREET, LIVERPOOL.
155, LEADENHALL STREET, E.G.

The BEST for USE on
LAND and WATER

ROYAL ARMS

RARE OLD

SCOTCH WHISKY

SPECIAL LIQUEUR

The most perfect example of the Art of
Blending — the result of 130 years' experience.

Proprietors :

J. G. THOMSON & Co., Ltd.

LEITH, SCOTLAND.

Alto at 17 FENCHURCH STREET. LONDON, E.G.

Smoothness of Running

is essential in a Motor Ambulance — Perfect Relia-
bility and ease of control are also vital. These
qualifications are pre-eminent in the following : —

ARROL - JOHNSTON
AMBULANCES

I5"2 h.p. Two-Stretcher Ambu-
lance, electric lighting, self-
starler,5 detachable steel wheels,
5 tyres. Full kit of tools, etc.

£375.

20-9 h.p. Arrol-Johnston Four-
Stretcher .'Vmbulance, electric
lighting, self-starter, 5 detachable
steel wheels, 5 tvres.

£450.

RRIT

TWO-STRETCHER
AM BULANC E

Seating also five patients. Com-
plete with electric light, self-
starter, electric horn .speedometer,
5 detachable rims and 5 tyres.
Complete kit of tools.

£300.

Now being supplied to the

British Red Cross Society

Immediate
Delivery

Full particulars sent and
appointment to view
arranged on application.

Long Acre Autocar Co., Ltd., 127 Long Acre, W.C

November 14, 1914

LAND AND \\' A T E R

THROUGH THE EYES
OF A WOMAN

Comfort and Discomfort

■>

A BRIEF retrospect of the hundred days since war
began shows what wonderful things can be
achieved when the heart of the nation is touched.
If we remember the few committee meetings
and sewing parties that inaugurated the women's
work for the nation, and see the vast machinery that has
developed so rapidly, we can say, without fear of contra-
diction, that women, as well as men, have borne willingly
some of the burden imposed by war. When the new and
great Army came into being in a night its simplest require-
ments made an instant appeal to our mothering instincts.
Nobody cavilled, or criticised, or spoke in a detached way of
the duty of Government and so on ; instead of that, a
great resolution seemed to be made quite spontaneously that
the Executive of the Empire should have immediate and
disinterested support in its almost superhuman task. From
small beginnings have come the great undertakings in London
and the provinces ; the men in the services, the unemployed
workers, the professional classes, who, perhaps more than
all others, are affected by the dislocation of civil life, are all
being cared for by some agency. England, always " rich
in human sympathies," aided by the generous help of the
Greater Empire, seems to have received a deep impulse to-
wards an idealism of brotherhood, which will surely last into
the future — long after the last sound of war has died away.
Just a few days ago a small paragraph appeared in a
daily paper appealing for warm clothing for recruits at a
certain depot. Within a week the whole requirements had
been sent in , socks, shirts, belts and underwear, books.

'baccy and pipes, all the hundred and one little odds and
ends that humanise and help, had reached their destination,
and soldiers knew that somebody had taken a little trouble
about their well-being. The aim and object of us all must he to
co-ordinate our efforts so that we do not make " meal of one
and malt of the other," to use a homely simile, and as the
weeks go by it is comforting to notice how well the various
committees are endeavouring to define the scope and locality
of their individual schemes and to co-operate with each other.

The Field Force Fund

With Lady French and the Duchess of Portland's names
to head the list of the executive, the Field Force Fund has
come into action again. Many of us remember its fine
services in the South African War, when it secured the delivery
of parcels to the troops at the front. During one year nearly
two hundred and thirty-seven thousand parcels went out to
the men. It was a fine effort to relieve the powers that be
in a gigantic task, and to this end it is working again.
There is no desire to interfere with or limit the various
activities now at work ; it is merely an endeavour to bring
all agencies into one line, to make sure that provision is
made for everv unit in the field and that wastage is avoided.
Mrs. William Sclater, who organised the work for South Africa,
has consented t(i become honorary secretary, and anybody
who is anxious to know of the requirements of ihe Field
Force Fimd will receive full information from her at 5j Gros-
venor Street, London, W., care of Lady Henry Bentinck.

Cleanliness is the God-like essential of health. We

JlllllllilllllllllllllllllllllllllllilllllillllllllllllllMIIMilllllllllllllli!^

How to help Tommy Atkins |

We cannot all go out to fight, but we can =

all do something to help our soldiers who ^

are fighting our battles and defending the ^

honour of ournative land, and in this way ^

contribute to their well-being and efficiency S

SEND HIM A FLASK OF I

HORLICK S I

MALTED MILK TABLETS I

Invaluable to a soldier
in the field and most
efficient in relieving
hunger and thirst
and preventing fatigue.

We will send post free to any
address a flask of thesedelicious
and sustaining food tablets and
a neat vest pocket case on
receipt of 1/6. If the man is at
the front, be particular to give
his name, regimental number,
regiment, brigade and division.

of all chemists anH Stores, in con-
venient j)ocket t1 isks, 1/- each.
Larger sizes, 1.6, Z/S and 11/-

/. iberal Sample icnt fosl jut for Jd. in stamps. ^Z

HORLICK'S MALTED MILK Co., =
SLOUGH, BUCKS. =

7?7Miiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii!iiiiiiiiiiiiiii!iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiirH

A hot bath after marching or any
form of vigorous exercise is the best
preventive against either cold or
stiffness.

The Gas Water-Heater supplies
the bath with plentiful hot water at the
shortest notice ; there is no risk of
getting chilled through having to wait.

A Gas Fire is a further safeguard ;
it needs no preparation and makes no
work.

LAND AND WATER

November I4, 19 14

know that the men have toiled mght and day or ou p o^
tection. and that thev can onl J-P.'^^^^tfntan received in
i"Th"4kTmu.t hat bee? welcome. It contained a

[Kf^lie-M^^

anH sifetv-matchcs. Thousands of parcels have ^ont^

ouJalreadv sonie have reached their owners and ^ome have

nS Under' the Field Force scheme no parcel should go

astray.

Comforts for the Fleet

\ huge Union Jack floats outside No. 47 C.rosvenor
Square a^nd. though a house-agent's board announces
faScallv that the f.ouse is to be sold, the Passer-bjMS wc
aware that it is inhabited temporarily. Cabs, and arts, ana
vanr, ull up at the entrance all day long. People m cars
and pS^on foot come and go early and late . when
curiosity or kindness prompts a fresh v.sUor to penetrate e
doors, he receives a cheering impression o ^^ "a;|:Jl c
carpeted premises, and is greeted so complaisantly that he
feels he is the one person on earth whose presence is desired
From small and tentative beginnings this wonderful
work has developed into a perfect organisation for sending
comforts to the Fleet. Its administrative abihty '« a great
tribute to womankind, and its sympathv is all it should be.
In the secretary's room Mrs. Jebb-Scott, the honorary
secretary and her assistant secretaries are busy from mornmg
till night acknowledging cheques and parcels answering
inquiries and attending to the many secretarial duties that
arc inevitable. In the unpacking room the clothes are arranged
under the care of Mrs. Longland, another member of the com-
mittee There is no confusion, no misplaced energy anywhere
— simplv a desire to send good things out to the Fleet, and to
accomplish this as speedily as possible before the cold becomes
too bitter. Further on in the packing room Miss Kathleen bcott
directs the energies of her assistants. Here the parcels are made
up • thev are sent off, with a list and a message in each, at
the' rate "of a hundred and a hundred and twenty a day, and
already two hundred ships have been cheered and comforted
bv these practical evidences of sympathy from the Mother
Country. Over a ton of clothing and hospital equipment has
been sent to the Naval hospitals at Haslar, Chatham,
Plymouth, and Southend. The work has been done with
the approval of the Admiralty ; it has been assisted very
generously by Queen Mary's Needlework Guild, and has
co-operated with Ladv Jellicoe's fund.

The amateur packer becomes expert in a few days.
Her parcel must pass severe scrutiny before it is allowed to
risk transit ; but the labours of the packers are amply repaid
bv the grateful letters received telling that " the men look
like balloons," so well are they protected, or " the arrival of
the parcels was the great excitement of the day." Piloted
by Miss Matheson, another member of the executive, the
hospital room, where all the emergency night-shirts, bed-
iackets, apphances, etc., are stored, is reached. Here the
visitor is brought up face to face with stern realities, and
then up a few stairs is shown the large reception
rooms of the house, turned for the time being into a work-
room, as busy and as businesslike as that of any factor}'.
Here Mrs. Walter Scott and Mrs. Fuller administrate, and
the work is turned out beautifully. It is the result of
voluntary effort almost entirely, though a few paid machinists
are working there under ideal conditions. Erica.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of L.\nd .^xd W.\ter.

Sir —Apropos the recent article in Land and Water
querying female adders swallowing their young, will you
permit my telling what I witnessed vvhcn a boy ?

Mv home in North Wales was locally renowned for the
number of snakes one could find in those days on its 300 acres.
Always interested in them, the opportunities afforded for
observation were many ; besides, I have had several snakes

in captivity. ,, ,, ^ 4. 1

Once I was passing near a stone wall that separated a
small plantation from a grass field when I spotted a snake,
dark brown and white in colour. Having got nearer— some
two yards away— I saw five or six baby snakes about 4 in.
long ■ They were close to and in front of their mother. 1 he
faniily were on a low rock, just above the surface of the ground.
i saw the mother snake open her large mouth- the lower
iaw did not seem to move— and most distinctly did I see the
five or six little ones wriggle into that mouth and disappear.
The parent slid away and through the dry wall, and was lost
to view in the grass on the other side.

As she left the rock I thought her mouth remained open.
I heard no hissing or other invitation to her children. That
snake, I should say, was not more than 2 ft. in length. All
this was a matter of seconds only,

I take it that as soon as she was beyond the wall, i.e.,
out of danger, the little ones reappeared. In about an hour
I returned to the spot— this time very cautiously— but I only
saw three of the baby snakes, and I captured them.

It must be borne in mind that the gullet of a snake is
very elastic. It is fair to presume that the little ones did
not go lower than the gullet, for there they had the air taken
in by the mother at the time of their entry— inhaled by her
for the purpose of the youngsters.

I have opened British snakes, and several times found
young ones inside, but never in the gullet ; they were
invariably in the oviduct. I doubt whether they had ever
teen daylight before, though on emerging they wriggled
about. I rather think it was premature birth, those snakes
being viviparous. Of the hundreds I have handled and
seen, I never knew one larger than 3 ft. 5 in. ; and that
was a harmless green snake with^the white collar.

I have watched wild snakes catching and devouring their
prey ; but only once did I see young ones taking refuge in
the mother's gullet.

Doubtless it will astonish many of us to be told that in
a certain part of England there are to-day snakes 8 ft. and
9 ft. in length. Luckily they are not venomous. Also
that south of the Amazon,"^ in the swamps of Brazil, anacondas
have been killed that measured 65 ft. long, whilst others
have been seen approximating 85 ft.

The largest of snakes never kill for their food anything
more bulky than a marsh pig or a dwarf deer — shall I add
travellers' tales notwithstanding ?

Yours faithfully.
Sunny Bank, Coldbrook, P. Picton.

Abergavenny.

A SUNDAY LECTURE

Next Sunday, at 4 p.m., Mr. Hilaire Belloc, whose weekly
articles in Land and Water are commanding considerable
attention, will deliver a lecture on " The Strategy of the
War " at the Globe Theatre, Shaftesbury Avenue, which is
being lent by Mr. Oscar Asche and Miss Lily Brayton for
that occasion. The proceeds of the afternoon will be devoted
to the Daily Telegraph Belgian Relief Fund. Seats may now
be booked bv written application to the manager at the
theatre. Ordinary theatre prices (los. 6d. to is.) will be
charged.

The Cardinal Publishing Co.. of .^ Wine Office Court. London, E.C.,
have just issued their No. i of " War Hero Portraits " from the
original copperplate etchings by WilUam Renison. One of these will
be found as a frontispiece to Land and Water this week. The price
is 3d. each, or is. 6d. the set of six.

THE NECESSITOUS LADIES' HOLIDAY FUND

To Die Editor of Land and Water.

Sir, — You were good enough on previous occasions to allow me
space in your valuable paper to appeal for contributions to provide
holidays by the sea or country side for necessitous ladies. Through
the generosity of your readers I was enabled to bring rest and
refreshment to many.

I appeal again for help to send away governesses, typewriters,
hospital nurses, secretaries, musicians, actresses, and ladies engaged
in other professions, who, unable to provide holidays for themselves,
and without the possibility of earning money in the summer months,
are left behind in London, exposed to the sufferings attendant on
poverty.

I appeal for those too proud to plead for themselves, for the
delicate, and more especiallv for those broken down in health from
overwork.

.Ml contributions sent to me will be thankfully acknowledged
and distributed among deserving cases if sent to appended address.
f am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

CONSTANCE BEERBOHM.
48 Upper Berkeley Street,
London, W.

Among the well-known employers who arc holding out induce-
ments to their staffs to respond to the call to arms, Messrs. James
Carter &- Co., of Raynes Park, S.W., the well-known seedsmen, are
not only keeping positions open but paying half wages to all incmbers
ol their staff who are accepted for service. No distinction between
married or unmarried is made, as Messrs. James Carter & Co. realise
the latter have dependents also.

August 22, 1914

LAND AND WATEK

THE WORLD'S WAR.

The Meaning of Military Terms and
THE Reading of Military News.

WHEN two independent communities conflict in
will, if neither give way, there must be recourse
to force. That is, each community must
attempt to render life so unpleaaing to the
members of the other community that, rather
than continue imder such conditions, that other community
will accept its enemy's wiU.

For example : If nation A desires to take the goods of nation
B, while nation B desires to retain its goods, tlien there is a
conflict of wills. If nation A refuses to give up its project, and
nation B refuses to give up its goods, recourse to force is
inevitable.

Such a recourse to force we call A Stale of War, and the
operations whereby force is exercised on either side we call War.

It has been found by experience that men are better able
to impose their will thus by force upon other men in proportion
as they are (a) armed with a superior weapon ; {&) mmierous as
compared with their enemies ; (c) so organised and so informed
with certain habits both of routine and of obedience that they
can act in great numbers to the dictation of one central authority,
with the maximum of cohesion and at the same time with the
maximum of elasticity.

A nimibei of men so organised is called an Army. The
operations of an army, especially against another army, are
termed Military Operations.

These operations, having now many generations of tradition
behind them and a continued development, have accumulated a
number of technical terms, and are spoken of in a language of
their own.

Some of these technical terms are unavoidable, because they
relate to things peculiar to warfare ; others are merely the
equivalents of everyday words, and to use them in general
description is unnecessary. But all Military News comes to us
expressed in such terms, both necessary and unnecessary, and
these terms must, therefore, be understood if we are to read
military news intelligently.

In order to understand these terms and the way in which
they are used, we must begin at the beginning and discover
(1) what is the Composition of an Army ; (2) under what
conditions an Army lives and movea ; and (3) what task it is
expected to accomplish,

I.— THE COMPOSITION OF AN ARMY.

The essential feature in the composition of an Army is
that it must be divided and subdivided into separate parts, both
(a) because only s( can its numbers be controlled, and the central
command conveyed to all its members, (h) Because only so can
there be the power to use any part for a time independently of
the rest j n other words, only thus can dasticity be secured,
(c) Because «in Army demands the services of men in various
ways, armed and unarmed, and because, among the armed, the
weapons differ in their nature and use.

A modem national army is first of all divided into Army
Corps. Each Army Corps is in itself a complete model. It is
an army fully found. If a, nation can put into the field but one
Army Corps it can none the less put into the field a perfect
though small army. For every Army Corps has its due
proportion of the various arms and auxiliary bodies which
together make up a modem army.

Each such Army Corps is imder the command of a general
ofnccr who is aided by his staff, and it is the peculiar business of
the staff to work out the details of timing, provisioninfj, etc., in
the movements of a Corps. It is a fair rule of thumb to reckon
an Army Corps, upon a war footing and at the beginning of a
campaign before wastage sets in, at about -lO.OOO men.

An Army Corps is again divided into Divisions : usually
two in number : in some services and in some special cases, three.
Each Division contains a duo proportion of every arm and each
U under a General Officer, subordinate to the General commanding
the whole Corps. But though divisions thus make up an Army
Corps, they do not entirely constitute it. Certain groups of men,
both armed and unarmed, are ascribed to the Coi-ps as a whole,
and not to the Divisions. For instance, in most services, of
all the guns present in an Army Corps, only some are attflcLed to
the Divisions, others are under the direct control of the Army
Corps as a whole, that is, of its General in command.

Divisions are again subdivided into Brigades. And here
wo approach the cross- division of aU armies into bodies using
different kinds of offence, or, as they are technically called,
" Armsr

It is customary to speak of " the three Arms" that is, Infantry,
Cavalry, and Artillery. But an arm separate from these ia that
of the Engineers who prepare communications, undertake the
larger forms of fortification, and attend to all scientific work in
general, as also what is teniied nowadays sometimes " the fourth
arm " — that of the men who work the Flying Machines.

Not all these arms are organised in Brigades, but Cavalry and
Infantry nearly always are, and a Brigade normally consists of
two or three Regiments, The Brigade is commanded by the lowest
grade of General Officer, who is responsible to his General of
Division, who ia again responsible to the General commanding
the whole Army Corps.

Below the unit of the regiment are, of course, many other
subdivisions, of which the most important to retain is that of
the Battalion in the Infantry, for that is the unit of the principal
fighting arm. The Battalion may be taken, by a rough rule of
thumb, to number, on a war footing and before wastage sets in,
about a thousand men ; and the strength of a Brigade is reckoned
in Battalions rather than in Regiments. Thus the French
Brigade, which [made the reconnaissance in force the other
day into Upper Alsace beyond Altkirch, and which was in its
turn a portion of a whole Division advancing from Belfort,
numbered six Battalions ; and a Brigade of Infantry in the
field may generally be reckoned at from five to eight of these
Battalions.

Another important subdivision to retain is the Battery of
Field Artillery. In some services a Battery consists of six, in
others of four, guna.

A rough list of the various arms and auxiliary forces into
which any complete armed force is divided comprises not only
the main arms of Cavalry, Infantry, Field Artillery, and
Engineers, but also a Medical Corps, the New Flying Corps, and a
nmnber of smaller bodies — the interpreters, for instance, the
despatch bearers, etc.

A rough general idea of the proportion these arms bear one
to the other is obtained if we give about 60 per cent, to the
Infantry, rather more than 20 per cent, to the Artillery and
Engineers, not 11 per cent, to the Cavalry, and the small
remainder to the train, to the administrative Corps, etc. Or
again, still more roughly, we may consider a modern Army as
being as to nearly two-thirda of it Infantry, and as to the
remaining third mostly Artillery and Cavalry in not quite equal
proportions (the Cavalry less than the Artillery), with a small
margin of a twentieth or so left over for administrative and all
other services.

Of the actual combatants who form but a large majority and
not the totality of any force, it is customary to speak in terms of
one of their weapons. Thus we say that in such and such an
action, such and such a Commanding Officer could count upon
so many Bayonets (Infantry), so many Sabres (Cavalry), and so
many Guns (Artillery).

Finally, it must be remembered that when a great modem
national army goes into a Campaign, its Army Corps are grouped
together into various larger forces, each with a General Officer in
supreme command. And these larger forces are usually
designated by the name of some natural feature in the neighbour-
hood of which their operations are to be conducted. Thus three
Army Corps under Generals A, B, and C, will be grouped together
to act in the Meuse Valley, will be put under the supreme
command of General D, and will be called the Army of the
Meuse. The operations of the whole national army, including
every Army Corps and the various groups into which they may
be combined, are controlled by a Supreme General Staff with a
General Officer usually called a Generalissimo. In the present
struggle General Joffre occupies that position upon the French
side, and General Von Moltke upon the German.

A modem Army is further distinguished in its composition,
with all the Great Powers save Britain, by the feature of Con-
scription, and in every case. Great Britain included, by the
feature of Mobilisation.

Conscription is a system whereby all the able-bodied males of
a country are, on arriving at maturity (that is, in their twentieth
or twenty-first year) summoned according to a register that is

LATTD AND WATER

August 22, 1914

kept of them, and Kcamined to bcs wLkli of them are fit to

bear arm'. , --, ^ ^i i i

Of those fit to bear anns the Government then takes a
certain number, greater or less according; to its financial rcsoiirccs,
tlio task expected of its army, and the theory the politicians
and their advisers mav hold as to the length of training necessary
to the making of a soldier and the number required to provide
a first line. Thus, in France nearly all those called up and
practicallv all those fit to bear arms are taken. In the German
Empire a' much smaller proportion. The men so taken are put,
as it is called, uilh the Colours. That is, are put into umfona
and into barracks to live for a certain time the life of a soldier,
and to be trained in all the duties of a soldier and in the use of
their weapons. This time varies from two to three years.

Each yearlv batch thus called up is designated by the name
of the vcar in which it was called, and is called a Class. Thus
when we talk of " The Class of 1905 " we mean all those men who
were called up for Ser\-ice in 1905, whether they were taken for
the Colours in that year or not ; and these men remain marked
by that term throughout the whole of their connection with the
.^iilitary organisation, that is, from the moment they are first
examined till they are over forty years of age. If we hear that
tiie Government has, in sav, 1913, when they have long ceased to
be with the Colours, " Called up the Class of 1905," it means that
it has summoned back to the Army the survivors who were first
examined as to their fitness for service in that year.

A man ha\-ing ser%-ed his two or three years " With the
Colours " passes some seven years oi so in the " Reserve of the
Active Army," the years immediately succeeding these he passes
into the Territorial Army, and later again, before coming to his
fortieth year, he passes into the Reser\'e of the Territorial Army.

There are thus in every country where Conscription is
instituted, four groups of men ; the first and youngest group
in imiform and being trained as soldiers ; the next, the immediate
lleser\-e coming up a few days at certain long intervals, to renew
their training ; the next oldest subject to very short periods of
traim'ng but still in connection with the Army ; the fourth, no
longer coming up for any training, but forming the last Reser\-e of
all. These four groups cover the trained male population
between the ages of 20 or 21 and 42 or 45, and while they
are called by difierent names in different services, are everywhere
arranged in these four sections and correspond roughly to these
four groups of ages.

A very important exception to this system must here be
noticed because it will be of the greatest moment in the present
war.

In the German Service, only a certain proportion — far smaller
than the French — of the young men are taken for the Active
Army. The Germans have a larger population than the French
by more than tifty per cent., and they claim that in this fashion
they can pick the best men, and yet have an Army equal to their
neighbours. Meanwhile they put the rest into a special sort of
Reserve, of which some are slightly trained and some are not
traraed at all. This Special Reserve (not to be confounded
with the Regular Reserve of trained men, who have passed
through^the ranks), which is of course very large, is called up in
time of War, incorporated with the trained men, and trusted
thus to acquire a sufficient military habit to be usable in the
Front hne before the war has long proceeded.

With this system of a short-ser%ice active Army, backed by
a much more mmieroua Reserve, consisting of men who have
already passed through the ranks, which system is to be found in all
modem countries (even in those which^ hke Britain, have not
the institution of Conscription), necessarily goes the other modern
feature called Mchilisation.

It is evident, before a short -service modern Armv can begin
great operations in the field, the men actually with the Colours
must be supplemented by a greater or lesser number of tho
Reserves, who are no less a part of the Army than those actually
in uniform and in barracks. This process of bringing up the
Reserves, and so putting the Army upon a War footing is, with
certain other activities involved, called by the general name of
Mobilisation, which means the turning of the Army from an
incomplete and, as it were, stationary condition, into a complete
condition in which it is mobile ; tliat is, loosed from all local
ties and necessities which could hinder its action in war.

When mobihsation is decreed, the Reser%e men, who have
left the Colours from one to twenty years ago, come up to be
clothed and armed. They join certain centres of concentration
until as many of them as the Government has chosen to call
up arc gathered together in places where they can be put into
uniform, given their weapons, and drafted into the Corps in
which they belong.

Every Conscript in a modem armv has a booklet or papers
describing the place, length, and character of his training, with
notes on the way in which he served, his abilities, rank^in the
serA-ice, etc., and tn particular a notification of the place to which
he ts to go vhen he is mobilised and the exact day on uhich he is to
reach it.

It is clear that the'concentration of many hundred thousands
of men occupied in their various civilian duties over the whole
surface of a coimtry could not be undertaken in one nor even in
a few days. The carrying capacity of railways, the time taken
to distribute the order, etc., the necessity of preventing confusion,
and the further necessity of grouping men from smaller centres
of concentration into larger ones, all take time. The soldier,
therefore, who has passed into the Reserve, has marked upon Lis
papers his duty to present himself at such and such a place not
necessaril}' on the first day of mobilisation but on the third, or
fifth, or whatever day may be appointed.

Further time is taken up in clothing and arming, in drafting,
each into his own corps, the men called up, and in moving the
first troops towards the scene of action.

Mobilisation is again lengthened by the concentration of
stores, the liberation and movement of Reserve weapons, and a
host of other operations.

The consequence is that even with everything moving
exactly to a scheduled time, the mobilisation of any great modern
national army will always take a considerable number of days.
In Franco and Germany it is not far short of a fortnight ; in
Russia it is certainly over three weeks. The amount of rolling
stock available, the length and direction of railways, the distribu-
tion of population, all enter into tliis calculation ; and if there
is any considerable hitch or confusion that period might be very
disastrously prolonged.

It is this operation of mobilisation and the length of time
attached to it which explains not only the delay between the
beginning of a state of war and the first decisive actions, but
also much of the strategics of the campaign.

For instance, in the present embarrassment of Germany the
fact that Russia mobilises more slowly than France determines
the whole of Germany's main plan. She must try to put France
at least half out of action, to prevent the French Army at least
from pressing her badly upon the West, before Russia comes into
play on the East ; and that is why she mobilised secretly before
anybody else, and why she made her great effort of the very first
davs of the war against the Belgian defences which block her
easiest road for attacking the French forces.

II. -THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH AN ARMY
LIVES AND MOVES.

An Army being of its nature a body of men compelled to
live under luglily artificial conditions, consuming all kinds of
wealth and yet producing nothing, covering at any one time a
comparatively small area, which could never produce even tho
food it requires, and being in many other ways restricted by its
special formation and purpose, can only be moved from place to

PLAN ]

place imder certain peculiar conditions, and according to certain
peculiar rules.

The body of knowledge and practice concerning these rules
and conditions is (together with the art of bringing it against the
enemy in the best posture) called Strategy. The word Strategy
simply means " the conduct of an Army."

It is clear that, even in its simplest state such a body of men
will require accumulations of food especially designed to maintain
it in beinn. Under modern conditions it will require accumu-
lations of many other things beside food. Modern missile
weapons (the rifle and the gun) cannot be used, save with special
missiles designed for each particular type of weapon. A modern
Army is further a mass of machines (guns, rifles, telegraphic
and telephonic apparatus, aeroplanes, dirigibles, etc.) ail of which
will be in constant need of repair and maintenance.

More Ann any older and similar force, it will reqxu're repeated
supplies of clothing, horses, medicine, accoutrement. Of all
these things, great stores must be got together; the stock of

2»

August 22, 1914

LAND AND WATEE

euch stores in any one place is called a Depot or Magadne, and the
place where the Magazines are accumulated is called a base.

It is obvious that a Base of this kind is not easily or quickly
moved. It is fixed ; or af least only to be transferred at a vast
expense of time and men. But it is equally obvious that an
Army is useful in proportion to the freedom of choice you have
in moving it.

An Army goes forward from its base towards the place in
which it thinks it can beat meet the Army opposing it, and as it
goes forward, it must be continually supplied with ammunition,
repairs and food. If it were not so supplied, it could not fight
more than a very short time, nor could its members even remain
alive ; they would stan-e. This line, which it rolls out behind
an Army in movement, connecting it with its base ; which grows
longer and longer as it advances, and which is a prime necessity
of its being is called its Lines of Communication, or, more shortly,

PLATSl H

Ei k

Arh

its Communications. The simplest elements of all Strategy
then, may be represented in such a conventional plan as Plan I.

Where A-B is the Army, C its commimicationa and D its
base.

It is the very first thing to remember, when we are considering
the position of any Army, its chances of success or of defeat,
or, in military history the causes of either, that an Army is
thus necessarily tied by its Communications to some vitally
important Base of Supply. An army must not be compared to a
swimmer moving at will through the water. It is better compared
to a diver who is supplied with air through a tube and will perish
(][uickly if that line be cut. It is not an island, it is a peninsula ;
it is not an isolated or detached thing, it is a fruit upon a stalk,
w hich is gathered and consumed if the stalk be severed.

In practice, of course, these simple elements are infinitely
complicated and diversified. For instance, as an army advances
and its direction is determined by circumstances, advanced bases
are thrown out. Again, a line of Communication that has become
too tortuous can be straightened by short cuts, after the army
has advanced ; and again, Communications may be continually
subject to interruption even by the enemy, and yet, if such
interruptions are not too prolonged, may remain intact for the
purpose they have to serve. But the general elements are
what I have described and condition all warfare.

Before we go further, it is as well to establish a certain
number of consequences following upon this triple arrangement
of fighting force, communications and base ; they are seven m
number.

(1). Communications are maintained more easily and at
a less expense of energy and of men in inverse proportion to
their length. The longer they are, the more difficult they are to
keep intact and to keep working smoothly. After a certain
extension, the difficulty increases very rapidly indeed. Wo
all know in practice how true this is of any long sequence of
human activity. In a procession, for instance, the (Ufficulties
of keeping a time-table increase very greatly with the length
of the column,

(2). It is therefore important to have communications as
direct as possible from the fighting body to the base — that is,
perpendicular to the fighting front — and the advantage of this is
mcreascd when we consider the vulnerability of Communications,
for : —

(3). Communications, even in friendly country, must be
guarded against secret attack ; and in hostile country or in the
neighbourhood of the enemy, from open attack. On which
account : —

(4) Communications take up a great number of men in the
guarding of them, and, therefore, as an army advances it grows
weaker and weaker in the field, not only from a natural wastage
through disease and wounds, but also because it half to spare
more and more men to guard its Conununications. Napoleon's
Campaign in 1812 afiurds the chief example of this.

(5) Communications are not only the channel by wliich &a
army is fed with its necessaries for living and fighting, they are
also, and the same, channel by which an army rids itself ol
encumbrances, of its wounded, etc. They are largely the channel

D- {] \
[} d /

PLAN

A B

■CU -CZliZZI-CZ]

up and down which orders and information are conveyed. There-
fore, with this " backwards and forwards " business they are
liable to clog; and if they clog the army is lost. Therefore,
again : <■->

(G) It is urgent that a wide front should be served by many
parallel lines of communication. If (as in Plan VI.) the broad
front A — B must have all its Communications passing through
the narrow issue at C, it is in peril. It is free if it has separate
lines for each corps (Y, Y, Y, Y) leading but to separate bases
A, A. A).

(7) Though an Army cannot live or fight for more than a
very short time detached from its Communications, it can
drop one line of Communications and, as the phrase goes,
" Pick up " another. Thus in Plan II., if a General in the
position A — B wants to get to E and is afraid that in so doing
he will unduly lengthen or will be in peril of being cut ofi from
his line of Communications along C to D, he will not be afraid to
march upon E so long as E is not too far oS, and so long as he
knows that E is in touch by another line of Commimications F
with another base at G. A force cut oC from its Communications
is Siiid to be " in the air." Bliicher's march to Wavre after Ligny
is an example of thus picking up an alternative line of
Communications.

So much for Communications and the way in which an Army
is bound by them.

The next element to consider in the conduct of an Army is
the space which it occupies, and the efiect of space upon its
progress.

A great body of men depending upon instruments, many of
them delicate, many of them cumbersome, all — food included —

dependent upon wheeled trafiic
or boats, must use some con-
venient avenue of advance ; a
railway, a hard road, or, in the
case of heavier supplies, a river
or canal. But such avenues of
advance are invariably narrow
compared with their length.
They are mere lines or thin
ribbons. A great body of men
must, therefore, advance in
columns. That is, in groups
which are very long in propor-
tion to their width. But these
bodies must also, when they
come to fight. Deploy, that is,
spread out from column into
line (Deploy is but the French
for " unfold ") otherwise they
could not meet the enemy with
their full force. If the body
A— B (Plan III.) desires to
defend itself against or attack
the enemy's body C — D, it must
get its guns and its rifles to
bear upon C — D, and it can
only do that by getting them
out of the long marching column
formation A — B into the new
formation E — F.
Now, it is evident that this Deployment will take longer and
be more cumbersome in proportion as the line A — B was extended.
Therefore, the commander of an Army Corps, let us say, will try
to advance in as many short, parallel columns as possible, subject

E PLAN IV

r-.

. A D

I I

L.J

czz] nz2

>^. A'

CZZI lZZI

3»

LAND AND WATEH

August 2^, 191 i

alwavB to the difficulty of keeping to many such parallel columns,
all abreast one of the other. It is obvious an army marching
thus (Plan IV.) can deploy into the position E— F more rapidly
and easily than one marching thus (Plan V.). A General will
therefore prefer, if he can get it, a country in which there are
numerous more or less parallel roads, railways, and opportunities
for water carriage leading more or less side by side towards the
eitendod front where ho thinks he will have to deploy, and in

• ■

■ '\
I I*

L.J V
\
'•1 \

PLAN V

:'7

L.«

::i.

HID cm c

J cm

i i-v;-

• ;/ /

• i'

tountry, such as mountains and forests, where such roads are few,
advance is hampered. On open and populated plains, where
such roads are many, it can be swift.

It is a further consequence of this state of things that a largo
body is, in proportion to its size, compelled to try to act over a
wide stretch of country. So long as it is confined to a narrow
issue it is cramped and can only present a small part of its forces
to the enemy, and unless an Army Corps, say, has half a county
to work over it is at a heavy disadvantage. (AV'e shall see later
of what importance this principle is in the present campaign in
connection with the narrow issue between Liege and the Dutch
frontier.)

A body compelled to move in one long column and unable
from natural obstacles of wood or marsh, or mountain, to deploy,

PLAN VI

13 said to be passing through a Aefh. When it comes to more
open country where it can spread out it is said to debouch.

All this applies to the mo\-ing and the keeping in existence
of any army in the field ; even when it is not in touch with, aroused
by, or in conflict against another army. And this part of
•trategy which concerns the mere moving of a great body of

PLAN 'vn

D- fl

armed men is essential to final success because the health,
numbers, and disposition of the force when it comes to fight will
all depend upon how far such obvious conditions have been
considered and obsers'ed.

III.— THE TASK OF AN ARMY.

The task of an Army is the task of reducing an opposing
Army to mihtary impotence. That is, an Army must try to
render the enemy opposed to it unable or less able to continue its
activities as an Army.

Their are two main ways in which this can be accomplished :

(A) You can destroy the cohesion of the enemy's force and
turn him from a united and organised whole into a broken mass
incapable of combined action.

(B) You can cut ofiF the enemy's force from its sources
of supply, and so compel it to the alternative of starving to death
(with its weapons useless in its hands from lack of missiles), or
of surrendering itself prisoner, and giving up those weapons into
your hands.

I will take these two methods in their order.
(A) When one Army defeats another by breaking its cohesion
this is accomplished (save in the case of partial envelopment,

leading to panic), by piercing tlie
line of that Army in one or more
places. It is evident that when
the enemy's line is pierced you
Vw >\ have reduced his force — origin-

pi M ally comparable in numbers to

I r *S your own — to two armies each

U B no more than half your own.

Y'ou have further o\erwhelmed
at one point a considerable
number of his troops, killed
many, scattered more, and dis-
organised the rest in the neigh-
bourhood of the point where your
shock succeeded. You have,
again, completelv put an end ff>
his unit}- of command ; so that
even the remnants of his Army
cannot co-operate against you.
The enemy's line thus pierced is
defeated more or less com-
pletely according to the degree
in which you have reduced
his forces from an organised
condition to chaos.

An attack of this kind is
called A direct Frontal AtfacJ:.
An historical example of a battle
attempted to be won in this
fashion (but missed) is Napoleon's
attack on Wellington's line at
Waterloo, or again Napoleon's
attack upon the Russian line at
Borodino.

It is evident that superiority
in numbers is here as in every
other case the deciding factor.
It means that, while you A — B
can oppose to your enemy C — D
equal numbers at every point
in his line, and so engage and
" hold " him, you are free further
to mass at some point K — of your
own choosing — larger numbers
than those opposite at that point ; and these numbers can direct
against the point opposed to them a superior volume of fire and
a greater weight of men. (Plan VII.) This superior volume or
weight should break liis line. When this direct effort of one line
against another takes place, the scheme is often called " a
farallel battle."

But superiority of numbers, where this is at all consideraLle,
J3 better and more commonly utilised in the second form of
attempting victory, which shall be next described.

(B) This second form consists in flanking movements, which
have for their ultimate object Envelofment.

Let A— B, C— D, (Plan VIII.), be two armies drawn up in '
hue opposed one to the other and approximatelv equal in
numbers. Add to A— B some considerable body E— F, either
connected with the original line thus (see Plan IX.) or coming
up from elsewhere in aid of A— B, thus (see Plan X.). This
extra body, whether belonging to the orignal line A— B (as in
the first of these two sketches), or coming up from elsewhere in
aid of that line (as in the second sketch), threatens bv its move-
ment what is called the Flank, that is, the side of C— D. It
comes, fully deployed (that is, using its maximum offensive
power) just on that part of C— D's arrangement which is least ablo

D- I

August 2.2,

1914

LAND AND WATER

to defend itself. For the line C— D lias nothing to oppose to this
flanking movement but the few men near its extreme end.

Observe that, in order to meet this threat u-Jtatever C— D
doea will weaken him. Supposing that when he sees the pro-
longation of C— D's line at E— F, he stretches his o^s-n hne out
to face that prolongation, then he makes
his hne tlunner and leaves it in peril of
being pierced by superior forces opposed
to it at every point.

Suppose he turns round two of
hia sub-divisions M, M to face and
hold off the flanking movement, as in
Plan XL, then he leaves the other
four sub-divisions N — 0, N, 00, faced
by superior forces {nx) which may pierce
them or overwhelm them.

As a fact, what usually happens
when a flanking movement has been
executed with sufficient promptitude is
tliat it begins to turn into Envelopment.
That is, the inferior force C — D bending
back first on one wing M, M, to avoid
attack from one side, leaves itself inferior
as against the original force A — B opposed
to it. That original force then begins a
flanking movement on the other wing
before which its inferior enemy again
bends back (0, 0), and by that time the
communications of 0— D are in danger
of being cut. (Plan XII.)

If they are cut and the envelopment
is complete, you get a result such as that
of Sedan, in which the enveloped Army being no longer able
to receive food or missiles, is compeUcd to surrender. Some-
times, before the process is complete, you get a result Uke that
of Waterloo, where the Army threatened with envelopment
breaks under the strain, loses all unity and cohesion, and is
routed ; that is, turned from an organised unity into a chaos.

It is evident that in all these cases the presence of superior
numbers is, other things being equal, the decisive factor. It has
been well said that the art of Strategy consists in getting two
men to a place where only one man is ready to meet them.

But it does not follow by any means that of two national
armies that which is the larger is certain to succeed.

What is meant by the aphorism is that wherever a particular
battle or general action is fought, wherever, as another term goes,
things are brought to a Decision, superiority of numbers on that
particular field at that particular moment, is the chief deciding
factor. Thus, Napoleon in the Campaign of 1814 fought against
superior total numbers ; but he kept the various bodies of his
enemies separated, and attempted to be, and often was, their
superior in each particular engagement.

Now it is in connection with this truth, that not superiority
in the total numbers ultimately available, but the superiority

p L. A N rs.

PLANVSi

[}

D-

t«NE5 OF C0MMUNICATfO^f

fci- 1 ..^j. ..1. ;> .. i

in the ntimbers present on the decisive spot and at tlie decisive
tnoment decide an action, that we can best appreciate the meaning
in war of the Ohotade ; and of Fortification, which is (in most of
its uses) no more than a particular case of the Obstach. .

When we talk of an Obstacle — a river, forest, marsh, or hilly
country— presented to the strategical advance or offensive of au

army, we do not connote by that term what is connoted by i»
in civil affairs. We are not considering the mere difhculty of
passing it. For the unhampered army of a civilised people can

PLANT X

l.\T*t^ tf COMMUNICATION

.. > .«■! I !■■; ni >

D-
D-

[}

r-a

pass any such obstacle if sufficient time be allowed it. Wlut
we connote by it is the Factor of Delay.

Here (Plan XIII.) is a river A — B. Two forces, E the lesser.

cb cb ^^

nD- -

LINES CP COfAMuNtCATiON L-" m

and F the greater, are in presence. A third force G is coming
np to effect its junction with £. If it succeeds in doing so the
combined force G-J-E will be greater than its enemy F. The

P LAN xn

M H

HNE5 OF COM MUHICATIOM
. ^J

'.v^

river A — B is an Obstacle. It is an Obstacle in favour of E, wlio
is on the defensive, and against F, who is on the offensive. But
its only value to E is in its power of dclayivrj F while G comes up.
If there were no G to come up and help E the river could not

LAND AND WATEE

August 22, 1914

iavc the wcatei force. Sooncx oi ater tie superior force F.
holdifl- E by an egual force, could detach a free portion of lii3
men and tLrow a brid-e over the nver. fhe handicap whicOi
the rivor V— B lajs upon F is solely a handicap of delay while U
is comina up. The river is not eomcthing behind which E can
defend himself indefinitely. It is something introducing the
factor of <i«ie to the advantage of what is, m one particular
place and time, the weaker party. .. , u

\ ^ood delcnsive posllion, that is, a natural formation (sucU
u a crest of rolling land with a long open space before it) from
which the most effective fire can be delivered upon an assault,
is but a particular case of an obstacle. A position artificially
forti.'ied, all lorti/icalion, is but an obstacle rendered by human
4rt particularly difficult to pass. Given sufficient time any

= 51

^ B

fortification can be reduced— if only by famine ; but fortification
introduces, for the benefit of thoie holding it, the clement of

delay.

A considerable space finnishcd, or fumishable, with lodgings
for men and horses and with storehouses for ammunition and
food and so fortified that it is defensible upon every side is
termed a fortress, or, on the largest scale, an entrenched camp.

And here a modern element of the utmost interest in the
present campaign appears.

The great range of modern heavy artillery involved a
corresponding increase in the fortified circle that a complete
enclosed defensive position would have to be surrounded by.
To create a fortress under such conditions a wide ring of forts,
each isolated and each designed to defend itself alone, was
designed. Such a ring would be anything from six to ten miles
across, and anything from twenty to tliirty miles round or more.
The French constructed many such after their disasters of forty
odd years ago, notably the great chain or barrier of fortresses
Bclfort, Epinal, Tout, and Verdun, on the Eastern frontier.

When it was first thought that Belgian neutrality was in
danger yamur and Liege were added to continue the line. To
some extent, and at wider intervals, the Germans copied this
plan. But two schools arose with two opposite doctrines upon
this liitherto xmtried system.

The one school, largely German, would have it that witJi a
fufficieHt sacrifice of men, some one^or more — of the forts on the
ring could be " rushed," and the system broken.

The other (mainly French) thought that such " rushing "
was impossible. That, with a sufficient army to hold the spaces
between the forts, the stores, etc., within the ring were safe for
months, and that even with a small force the forts themselves
could be held (though the ring might be pierced in the inteiTals)
and would continue to bar any continuous supply.

Supposing the second school to be right and such forts to
be capable of long resistance, then a modern ring fortress would
tirve the following purposes : —

(1) To delay, till its forts were reduced, the passage of
fiipplies past it or in its neighbourhood, whether by road or,
much niore important, by railway. Thus such a ring protecting
a junction of lines or covering one main line of supply is of great
importance.

(2) When it was supported by other neighbouring fortresses
and was strongly garrisoned, to prevent an Army passing between
it and the next fortress.

(3) To serve as a refuge within which a force no longer
strong enough to hold the field could still maintain itself and
detain a "rcater number of the enemy before it.

(4) lo act as the " pivot " upon which a turning movement
could revolve. If (Plan XIV.) I want to move that end of
my force A — B, marked as M to threaten the flank of my enemy
C— D, I may not be quite superior enough in numbers to do so
without leaving a dangerous gap at X. But if at X I have a
foitress F baning tlio pafsage for some tv/cnty miles, I can use
that fortress as a " pivot " for my projected movement. It ^ull
also supply me, or at least supplement my supply.

("j) To threaten the flank of an Army which desires to
pass it.

If in the accompanying El-etch (see Plan XV.) the area
A B C is that commanded by the guns of a ring fortress, and if

this ring fortress contains a large boJy of armed rnen with thoii
munitions ; then another army of the enemy's trying to pass by
it along the line D — E will bo exposed to a two- fold peril. It
may be caught in the act of marching, when an army is unable to
defend itself, or, having marched by, the communications which
it unrolls behind it will be in danger of being cut at any moment,
for the large force within the fortified area ABC can come out
and attack the comparatively weak and highly extended forces
which defend a lino of communications. Tliis junction in a
fortress is greatly exposed when not one fortress but two, joined
by a line of forts, presents a large concentration behind that line
as in the line 9 — P.

So obvious is that that there is never any question of passing
a fortress containing a considerable garrison without first
" Masking " it. To Mask a fortress is to leave over against it,
and between it and the line of march of your own forces an Aimj
(as at G — H) large enough to check any sally which the Army
contained within the fortress might make against your
communications.

With this we nearly exhaust the terms technical to this
kind of news, and the comprehension of them. There remain to
be mentioned certain other terms requiiing a brief mention : —
All those operations which are subsequent to the general
movements of an army and are concerned with its immediate
fate when it is at grips with the enemy, are called Tactical
Operations as distinguished from strategical. They are so called
because they take place after the opposing forces have come
in touch with one another or, to use the common term, are
In Contact.

A number of other terms arc too familiar to need more than
a mention. We speak of the Defensive when we mean the
expenditure of energy in the resisting of an attack and of
the Offensive when wc mean the expenditirre of energy in the
delivering of it. Wellington, for instance, fought a defensive
action at Waterloo because ail the earlier part of that day
and much the prcater pnit of it was taken up in prevent-
ing the French from
P I «. ri O" piercing his lino until

Blucher should come
up in flank and threaten
them with envelopment.
We say that a
General has the Initia-
tive or is " taking the
initiative " not precisely
when he is on this
Offensive (though the
two things usually go
together), but when ho
is in a position to choose
his point of effort and whtn his opponent is only in a positon
to meet such a movement after, and as soon as he has dis-
covered it.

There is in connection with military news not only the difficulty
of following military terms, but a certain confusion resulting
from the way in which modern news is at once haphazard, far
too quickly delivered, and deliberately and wisely stai-ved by
military censorship. I cannot do better in order to explain how
I, at least, should read this news, and how in my comments I
shall try to piece it together, than put down in a list certain
rules which occur to me :

Rule /.—This rule is, not to believe things physically
impossible. Thus in one week we have had such statements as
the presence of a German force upon the River Aisne in France,
a Brigade (of 6,000 men) suffering a loss of 30,000 men (in front
of Mulhouse), and French Cavalry East of Liege a week before
there were any French troops near Namur.

Rule //.—Pay attention only to reports which deal with
definite results. Words like "havoc," "rout," "disorder,"
usually mean very little in military news. On the other hand
a precise account of a number of guns taken, of places actually
occupied, of the number of prisoners, etc., is information upon
which you can base an estimate.

Rule ///.—Always believe the enemy's reports to be more
ac^curate and sober than those from your own side. Thus,
Berlin let us know through Holland that Lie'^e

when

had fallen, the phrase was misleading and false, but verbal
accuracy could be pleaded for it, for though Liege the fortress
had not fallen, German troops Lad got into Liege the town.
On the other hand, the statement that 25,000 Germans had been
hit in the first assault was manifestly an impossible exagger-
ation. J r oo

Rule /F.— Rememler that observers nearly always over-
Aitiller'' ''^''^ "^ ^""'^ "^"^ ^'"' P^i'^'^'^l'^rly i^ *!»« c^sc of

Rule F.— Follow, upon a large scale map, every movement
01 wliich you hear, and compare the scheme of those movements
Irom day to day, noting the Lature of the arm and the supposed

August 22,

1914

LAND AND WATER

THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRB BELLOC.

THESE notes upon tho operations taking place oa the
Continent are written upon the evening of Wednes-
day. They are corrected or amplified according
to the news received in London upon Thursday
morning up to noon. Thej are in the hands of
the public on Friday morning.

It is impossible to avoid in the chronicle which they attempt
to establish that gap between the Thursday noon and the Friday
mominjr which printing demands. Tlie same criiicism applies
to the deductions made from such news as has been received in
London.

It is the object of these comments, and of the deductions
from news received which they will contain, to explain, as much
as is in the writer's power, the natnre of the operations on land.
In order to do this, it is first necessary to get some idea of the
process of events in the Western theatre of war since the first
days of mobilisation.

I say " In the Western theatre of war " because operations
in any way decisive of the result have not yet taken place in the
Eastern theatre of tho war upon the Eastern and Southern
frontiers of the Germanic allies, unless we are to accept the now
detailed accounts of an Austrian reverse at the hands of the
Servians at Shabat.

In the Western field, upon the other hand, operations
which will bo of weight in the final decision, and others which
have begim to define the probable direction of the opposed
armies, have already taken place.

In thus attempting to establish the succession of events
which have led up to the present situation in the Western field
of tho war, we must exclude what is merely political and con-
sider only what is military.

Upon Saturday, August 1st, the French Government gave
the first open orders for mobilisation. What previous steps it
may have taken in preparation of the general mobilisation we
do not know. But, at any rate, the life of the country was
quite normal up to and including this Saturday, August 1st,
and certainly nothing in the shape of genei-al mobilisation had
yet taken place. The fuQ operation of mobilisation only began
in France upon Sunday, August 2nd.

What the corresponding steps may have been npon the
German side wo do not know. Germany had already declared
martial law, and she may have begun her mobilisation — in part,
at least, and particularly in the North — before France did. Au
examination of tho first operations makes this still more probable,
but we have no positive information upon the point.

PlxnAd

Mw.f. >ckf

The process of fuU mobilisation in both countries is at least
12 and like to be in practice more nearly 14 days : using the
phrase " full mobilisation " to mean not the bringing up of the
troops to the field of action, but the putting of them all upon
a war footing. How many days must elapse before the
mobilised armies could begin to undertake their jirincipal
actions would depend upon the field in which those operations
would take place ; certainly, fifteen or sixteen days is not tco
much to allow, seeing that the strict theoretical minimum (which
was bound to be exceeded) was at least eleven days.

Tho French mobilisation proceeded with quite unexpected
smoothness ; a state of affairs most fortunate for the French,
which was due to political factors with which we are not here
concerned. The results of its accurate working will be later
pointed out.

Meanwhile, upon that same Sunday, August 2nd, the
German Covering Troops from Treves had violated the neutral
tcn-itory of Luxembourg, entering that independent State by

several bridges, particularly by Ihoso of Wasserbillig aad
Remich.

At 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day the German
^liuister in Brussels presented an ultimatum to the Belgian
Government demanding unopposed passage for German Troops
through Belgian territory, in otlier words, demanding the aid
of Belgium against France. Twelve hours were given for the
reply, that is, until 7 a.m. of the following Monday morning.
The Belgian Ministry met and discussed the position in the
small hours of Monday, and somewhere about 4 o'clock returned
a negative answer to the German demand. They determined to
resist the violation of Belgian territory.

Upon Monday, August Si-d, therefore, the German troops
crossed the frontier between Germany and Belgium ; the troops

Pii.^-U

'"S-

D .J-IulK»-tf">w

£ii|m-%

first effecting this violation of neutrality being those of tha
Vllth Germany Army Corps coming from the region of
Aix-la-Chapelle. Tliese troops were not nearly as numerous as
has been represented. They could not have been fully mobilised
troops, but only the covering troops of the region. The task set
them was to force immediately the fortress of Liege.

Lot me describe this task.

The fortress of Lidge is a modem ring fortress : that is, it
consists of an area roughly circular, about, or rather less than
ten miles in diameter, protected by a ring of forts (twelve in
number) surrounding the great industrial town of Liege. The
River Mouse nms right through Liege and through the middle
of the ring. One of the main railways of Europe runs through
the same circle and leads from the chief German bases of
supply in the North to the Belgian Plain ; other railways also
come in and effect their junction with this main line within the
circle of the Forts. This ring of forts lies quite close to the
German frontier — a day's march at the most away ; at tho
nearest point, less than a day's march. Further, there is here
but a very narrow passage between Li^ge and the neutral Dutch
border round Maestricht. The Germans, though prepared to
violate the neutrality of Belgium, were determined not to violate
the neutrality of Holland for political reasons that have nothing
to do with these notes. Therefore until the Liege ring of forts
were in their hands : (1) They could only use road trafiic to
supply their advance into Belgium. (2) They could only use
even road traffic over one very narrow belt, between the range of
the Eastern forts of Li6ge and the Dutch border.

To the North of the Li(?ge ring of forts, then, there was no
entry into Belgium save by a very narrow gut between the
eitrerao range of the forts and the Dutch frontier. Eight
aeros3 this gap of five miles or less was the obstacle of the
Mouse, having but one bridge, that of Yiso, a little town lying
on the right bank of the Meuse, that is, the bank towards
Germany. Upon the south side of Liege was difficult, high,
and barren country consisting of upland woods and heaths
through which the progress of supplies would bo difficult, and
further supplies coming that way would have to crosa
tho Meuse higher up to reach the Belgian Plains. (See Plan A.)

7«

LAND AND WATER

August 22, 101 4

T^ow it was the plan of the German General Staff— a plan
^Lioh thcT ba^ f^^^^l-'y divulged to the whole world, as is
Thdr ciSm-^o turn the whole of the Freuoh frontier from

the North. . . , • t>i«^ t*

They designed to pursue the operation shown m Flan a.
The fortified French Frontier running from Verdun to
to Belfort they thought too strong to be forced^ ^..ul
Verdun runs northward and eastward to the Channel the
frontier between France and Belgium. The Germans proposed

PLAN. C

r/>et3

Jri^u CI

Mulha'jiert

AltKirch

Bcljorr

with a sufficient force to " hold" the French upon their fortified
frontier between Verdun and Belfort. They proposed upon a
line A — B to keep the French there in check. Meanwhile
they proposed using the fortress of Sfetz (at M) as a pivot
round which to swing great masses E — F upon their right,
some through the difficult Ardennes countiy south of the
Meuse, but the greater part through the Belgian Plain [north
of the Meuse. They proposed to appear very early in the
operations — in quite the first days of the war— orer the
unfortified Belgian frontier of France along the line G — H, aod
this operation, this swinging round of their forces, thrcatenin!*
to envelop the French by the French left flank, they proposed
to execute according to the following necessary conditions :

(1) Since it is impossible to execute a flanking or
enveloping movement unless you have superior numbers, and
since the Germans had not superior numbers to the French,
if the total of the national forces be eonsiJerod, and trained
men alone be counted, they proposed to Lave superior forces
ioT (lie moment, and in thai particular field, by mobilising
secretly some days before the French, and by appearing
suddenly upon the position E— F (a) before the French were
gathered in their fuU numbers ; (b) while the French were
guarding their frontier along C— D ; (c) with covering troops
only, to be rapidly followed by their fully mobilised main army,

(2) This flanking movement pivoting upon the fortress of
Mctz and proceeding partly through the very difficult country
of the Ardennes, mainly through the Belgian Plain (with its
ample supplies, innumerable roads, easy open country, and
exceptional milrago of railways and furniture of rolling stock),
they would effect without any check or delay, because Belgium
would be too weak to resist, and would allow them to violate
her neutrality. As for the two great fortresses of Liege and
Namur, they would, if defended, confuse the whole plan, but
tuis discounted neutrality of Belgium forbade the idea that they
would bo defended.

(3) By the time the German flanking movement had ^ot
^ the position E— F the direct march upon Paris was open to^it
This threat would so frighten the French along their main
positions npon the Eastern frontier at C—D that they would
cither disarrange all their previous plans and begin hurryin^
Northward to save Paris (and so leave themselves open to be
a so turned by the left wing of the Germans from the South
along the anew hue (1)) ; or they would sacrifice Paris, in which
casa the flanking movomcut would close upon them, disturb
tlieir mobilisation before it was completed, and throw them
into irrecoverable chaos; or at the least drive them southward
and compel a surrender.

When it was perceived that the Belgians would, most
unexpectedly, interfere with the plan by refusing condition 2,
the order was given to inish the ring of forts at Liege.

AVe have seen that one school, especially favoured in Ger-
many, believed that your ring fortress could always be broken
by the rusliing of particular forts. With a sufficient sacrifice
of men and conducted upon a sufficient scale one fort at least,
or two, could be swamped, and the ring would be broken. From
the night of that Monday, August 3rd, until the afternoon of
the Wednesday, August 5th, this bold attempt was made and
continued — especially during the hours of darkness.

I desire to eliminate, as much as possible, from these com-
ments all political considerations. But it is impossible not to
pause in admiration of the military effort here made. Men in
fairly close formation (the density has probably been exag-
gerated) sacrificed themselves in assault after assault upon that
section of the ring which looks towards Germany. They were
but the men of the covering troops of the Seventh German
Army Corps ; they canno^^^ have been heavily supported. They
had no siege artillery behind them as yet. The effort was hope-
less because the theory was wrong ; but the courage and the
discipline presented to that task must have been quite
exceptional.

In the mid-afternoon of this Wednesday, August 5tb,
the whole ring held as strongly as when it was first attacked.
The Germans were, therefore, exactly forty-eight hours behind
their time-table.

Upon the Thursday, August Gth, the forts were still holding
out, but the covering troops of two more Army Corps had been
brought up from the south and south-east against them, and
cither before or after darkness fell upon that day the insufficient
garrison of Liege found it impossible at once to hold the forts
and to cover all the intcrvab between tliem.

It must be remembered that Lifige requires for its full
defence 50,000 trained men, and that the Belgian service was
largely composed of Militia, and could not send two-thirds of
that number at so short a notioo to the defence of the place.
The holding of the intervals, therefore, broke down ; and.
though the forts were still intact, bodies of German troops
penetrated in the darkness between those two forts which look
to the south-east and cowards the German frontier.

When the morning of Friday, August 7th, dawned, it was
discovered that a considerable force of Germans had got into the
ring, and were established in the town of Liege itself.

The situation was paradoxical. Liege in the military sense
of that name had not fallen ; Litjge in the civilian sense had.
The ring of forts, not one of which had been captured, could
still prevent supplies passing through the roads and railways
commanded by the forts. Therefore, no advance through the

plakt 'j>

@ANT\w£PP

^ ^ "- > (!)c

NAMUR.
DIN ANT' (J

Belgian ring was any more possible than it had been before the
•jerman entry. Lie^e, the military fortress— which only means
the ring of forts— still blocked the way. But Liege, the great
industrial city, was held by German soldiers. So far as mere
strategy was concerned, and apart from all moral effect, Liege
the fortress was nearly as strong as ever. Nearly, but not
quite, for the forts were now no longer co-ordinated by ono
central command, and it was now possible to assault them,
eachindividually, upon every side.

On this day, Friday, August 7th, the German Commander
asked for an armistice, partly, no doubt, for purposes of parley.

It was refused.

On this same day, Friday, August 7th, appeared at the
very other end of the field of war the first signs of a movement
that was to have a profound effect (the future will show it>
upon all succeeding operations.

8«

August

1914

LAND AND WATEE

TLe careiul student of foreign affairs •will rememLer liow,
fifteen years ago, in a famous trial at Renues, there came out
unexpei.todly tlie fact that the French General Staff intended
to idopt tlio offensive in Alsace.

Now oa this Friday, August 7th, the small advance
guard of the French — a brigade, to be accurate — with some
cavalry and certain supports of artillery took, just before sunset,
the town of Altkirch. Upon the next day, Saturday, August 8th,
this little force, or at least the mounted portion of it,
rod* on into Mulhcus».

The effect of this raid (for it was no more) was to rouse
the Alsatian people to the conception of their deliverance. It
was (as so many things will be in this war) political rather than
strategic ; but, as we shall see in a moment, it was not done
haphazard j there was strategy behind it.

On the next day, Sunday, August 9th, the Fourteenth Army
Corps of the Germans, composed of the men of Baden, advanced
against this dai-ing French Brigade and against the division of
which they formed a part and drove them out of Mulhouse
again, but did not proceed so far as to recover Alkirch.

From that moment, let it be noted, the French troops had
established themselves in the Southern extremity of the Alsatian
Plain — that is, in the beginnings of a flanking movement
against the extreme German left. They had done this (Plan C)
upon the extreme Southern end of the 300-mile sti-atcgie front.
They were to do more.

By Monday, August the 10th, the next day, it is time to
turn to the other extremity of the long line of operations
and to consider how the German Commanders proposed to treat
the unexpected situation created on the Belgian Plains by the
check they had received from the resistance of the forts at
Li^ge.

Tt is now quite clear what they did. They could not, as
they had originally intended, push forward great masses of men
across the plains north of the Meuse. They did not yet
command the railways by which alone they could supply those
masses ; but what they could at least do was to push forward
rivalry with emergency rations and with orders to live as best
tiiey could upon the country. To send forward a cloud of
ciwalry thus was not a useless or merely theatrical operation ;
it protected the slower advance of the infantry, which could ba
made cither when the LiSge forts fell or whenever, more slowly,
s'lpplics could ba pushed up by road over pontoon bridges
thrown over the Meuse, down river and up river, out of roach
of the LiSge forts. This ill-provided but mobile body of
cavalry, with a little artillery, machine guns, and a few support-
ing infantry, did as m Plan D.

It was oa Monday, August 10th, along the line A-B in
(he Flan D. By Wednesday, August 12th it was along
the Hue C-D, and was checked in a hot action in front
of Haelea by the Belgians. Before the end of the week,
tliat is, before Sunday, the 16th, it was already along the line
E-P and menacing Brussels. Meanwhile, quite a large body of
cavalry with considerable infantry supports had tried oa Satur-
day to pass the Meuse at Dinant, and had failed before tba
French artillery defence at that point.

Sj far we heard nothing in this country of what was
going on behind this successful Cavalry advance of the Germans,
and we could not judge how much, if at all, the big masses of
I lie Army were backing it up. Monday, the 17th, and Tues-
day, the I8th, this screen of Cavalry pressed no further forward ;
apparently, therefore, it was wiiting for the mass of troojjs
which it was designed to shelter to come up — but that hypo-
thesis I will discuss a little later. We leave the advanced
Gorman Cavalry with their few Infantry supports and their
horse artillery and machine guns on this advance line upon
Tuesday hst, the 18th, and return to the southern extremity
where the offensive was the other way and the French were
proposing to push in the German left.

We have seen that on Sunday, August 9th, the French
advance guard had been driven out of Mulhouse. But that
week-end the French were making good their positions upon the
crest and in the passes of the Vosges Mountains. Although we
heard little about it in this country it was clear that, now their
mobilisation was complete, the French in considerable force —
perhaps altogether three Army Corj)s — meant to push against
the German left in Alsace and to try and roll it up. They knew
then, what wo know now, that Germany had no equal forces to
oppose to this push.

1 he fighting to secure the Passes of the Vosges (Saalcs,
Sle. Marie, Bonhomme) went on for five days ; the Passes were
£e:urcd and the Valleys leading down on to the Alsatian Plain
were held in force. It was the second step toivards the turning
of the German left, of which the reconnaissance upon Altkirch
and Mulhouse before mobilisation was completed had been the

fiiSt.

All the German commanders could do against superior
forces in this Alsatian field of war they did. They could not
stop the superior numbers of the French from pouring over the
mountains on to the Plain of the Bhine; but they ordered the

considerable number of their troops which are round and in
Metz to check the French advance by threatening its rear and
by acting on the western side of the Vosges Mountains in the
open Lorraine country.

Already upon Tuesday, August 11th, the Gcnnans conducted
a raid into France, about one day's march in extent, along the
arrow maiked (1) in the Plan "C," and the next day, and
the day after that, another raid along the arrow marked (2). The
first of these blows was directed towards Spincourt, the others
towards La Garde and Blamont. If this German effort had
boea maintained and pushed further forward it is evident that

• ERUSSEL3

plan.k\

VERD'JN

• TOUL, ^^1

tPlNAL

•felRASEClRO

CJ'.e PtVS MAPCH

BF.LFORT

ML'LHOOSE

leo

the Fi-cnch positions in the Vosges Mountains would have been
untenable. They would have been threatened from the rear
and would have had to retire out of Alsace. But the Gorman
effort could not be maintained. Both these raids were beaten
back by the superior French forces in this region, and by
Sunday, the 16th, the French securely lield the frontier round
Avricourt and thus protected the rear of their columns pushing
over the Vosges.

Oa the next day, Monday, the 17th, the French had filled
and completely held all the mountain valleys which lead down
from the crests of the Vosges on to the Alsatian Plain. Upon
Tuesday, the 13th, they achieved a stroka^of capital importance.
They got astraddle of the main railway line uniting Metz and
Strassburg by occupying the town and region of Saarbourg,
and their general situation on this part of the front was as in
Plan F.

It was now clear that a very strong French offensive upon
the extreme left of the field of operations — that is, against the
weak South of the German line — was seriously intended by the
French. They were strongly posted just between the two gixat
fortresses of Strasbui^ and Metz. They held, at Saarbourg, the
main railway junction of that line. They threatened to
advance further north immediately, and to threaten all the
southern communications of the Gorman army. It was almost
equally clear upon co-ordinating all the news relating to that
Tuesday evening, the 18th, that at the other extremity of the
field, upon the German right in the Belgian Plain, a serious,
though belated offensive, was contemplated against the Franco-
Belgian left.

(By this time the whole of the English Allied Force had
been landed, and was presumably arrived at its allotted post).

If we pause to sum up the situation as it was revealed to be
upon Tuesday night and Wednesday morning of this week in
the telegrams which reached London upon the Wednesday
evening, it runs as follows : —

The strategicivl front of the Germans upon which the whole
of the operations had begun, and upon which at any tncmeut

LAND AND WATEB

August 22, 1914

tlui fir«t Uows of die Buifl .laock miglit be felt, stretclied in »
tbe aj«t ,. T.i .7.„,..T towards the west and concave towards

the Last from a poiai ^^.^^^ ^^ German troops

iS^AiTtSL ulntoa point 10 .des south and east
T^^ iLTp in Alsace We had not ewct information as to
wL^"tbUL"o^T- across tl. Ardennes country between
I ^.d R. but we can be prettT certain that . ran much
t the dotted line does o« plan K.. because .t would 1^
foUv to bt-ud it too much forward in front of that lin«
aii an equal weidues. to leave it too far back. ^\o como to
^rtain k^owled-e of it again just south of Longwj, where
S had S contact with the French troops and aga.n south
of Mctz and in a line leading from south of Met z up round bj
the north of Saarbourg to points on the east side of the \ osges.
where the mountain valleys open on to the plain of AUace.

The Allies lie immediately in front of this hueand Fesumably
everywhere in contact with it, or were nearly m contact Tha
public information we have is sufficient to tel us that couUct
Ls actually been established on the Belgian plain (^^J_ J^'t of
course, for 'some days past), on the Mouse between ^amur and
the French frontier, in the open country between Lcnswy and
Verdun, and, most important of all, right along a line stretching
from iust south of Metz to Mulhouse.

Now, such a situation as this obviously and necessarily
connotes a few clear issues. Exactly where the German forces
are chiefly massed-and where, therefore, the first German
offensive will come-we can only guess. We can be certain
that the main concentration is in the north of this prolonged
line, because the south of it has already partly yielded.

The first thing we notice is that a general German oflensive,
which is too commonly taken for granted, is not yet the neces-
sary result of the situation. It is true that everywhere from
the' Meuse, and along the Mease, and down as far as Verdun at
least (It would be more accurate to say as far as Toul). the
French, up to this moment, are standing upon the defensive.

FLAM A/.

certiin that in the southern field and over nearly tie who.a
extent of it (up to the point where that field is covered by the
fortress of Metz) the French have massed so many men as t»
be able to deliver a vigorous offensive, which they intend to

It is equally certain that there is not as yet in the southern
field a German force sufficiently strong to meet this offensive

and beat it back. „ . . ^ * i. i i i

If, therefore, a German ofTensire is anywhere to be looted
fa'- it must either be in the northern or in the central field.

' In one of these— that is, either on the Belgian plains north
of the lower Mouse or to the south of that river, an attack ia

e Etc I AH fl.A.lf^

It teems to be no part of their plan to do anytliiug but
hold the enemy between those points and all along that line.
But to the south of that line, along the whole field of the forti-
fied frontier south of Toul, the French have evidently begun a
vigourous offensive, and that offensive is no longer merely the
work of covering troops — it is clearly the beginning of a move-
ment in force.

Now, circumstances «tjch as these may bo resolved into a
few simple element!.

(1) There is a northern field of operations, tha eitreme
left of the allied line, the extreme right of the Gorman. This
field of operations is the densely populated and well provisioned
Belgian plain north of the River Meuse and of the Eiver
Sambre.

(2) There is a centre, most of which runs through th?
barren, difficult, sparsely inhabited, and ill-supplied district of
the Ardcnn»8.

(3) There is a southern field of operations (tbe
French right, the German left), which runs through well-
populated, fertile, and provlsoned land, from Southern
Luxembourg to southern Alsace. But this southern field (the
French right wing, the German left), is subdivided into a
northern portion next the centre, which is the basin of Lorraine,
and a southern portion which is the plain of Alsace; bel^Tecn
these two subdivisions lies the very difficult country of the
Vosges. This difficult country does not separate the two
portions of the southern part of the field into two entirely
distinct portions, for the Vosgcs sink gradually as they go north-
ward until they merge with the rolling country characteristic of
Lorraine: but those mountains, the Vosgcs, are a sufficient
obstacle wherever thoy correspond with the French frontier, to
determine at once, when we have news of action ia their
neighbourhood, which of the two forces upon either side of
thein is acting upon the defensive.

Of these three fields of operations, which together make
up the whole field of the war to tbo west of Germany, it b

(■).

Plan O,

-r M«uj«

foico must be dolirercd by the German armies if thoy are to
escape disaster. And in this second alternative, the central
attack, there are two possibilities. The concentration of the
Germans to the north-centre, through the Ardennes. The
concentration of the Germans to the south-centre near, and
north of, Metz.

Well, in trying to determine whether the German plan would
be to attack in strength, towards the north, or to attack in
strength upon ono of the two regions of the centre, and, if so,
which ono, we are met by this very difficult dilemma.

On the one hand the original German plan was undoubtedly
to deliver the first, and, as it was hoped, overwhelming offensive
stroke by way of the extreme north, across the Belgian plain.
Thev intended to be across the French frontier to thj north of
the Mouse in very considerable force, probably five, certainly
over three. Army corps, before the French mobilization was even
complete. All this has been described above. The turning
columns of this great flanking movement should have been upon
French soil between Lille and Mezieres more than a week ago.
We all know how that plan, the essential of which waa its
rapidity and surprise, was checked, delayed, and confused in its
development through the defence of Liege. By the evening of
Monday, August 17th, only the cavalry screen and its few
supports had reached the line turning north of Namur.

But though there was delay, it did not follow that the plan
should be abandoned. The turning movement was now too
late to be executed as against an inferior foe. But when a
General Staff has worked out all the plans for a main advance
along one piece of country, it is extremely difficult for it to

Comm"a.cdr.O«l

P/4a f>

ch.%ngo its line of advance, even though unforeseen accidents
reader the use of that line perilous.

To abandon your detailed plans, which had prepared ona
line of advance for the mass of your troops, and to compose
another set of plans for another line, at high pressure and with
the shortest possible delay, involves such a choico of results as
we are continuallj- meeting in everyday life.

Knowing what everyone knows of the Prussian character,
the highly methodical, very stiff and inelastic work, immensely
detailed and correspondingly strong and brittle, which is the
Prussian tradition in the.se things, it seems impossible that a
main line of advance, once determined upon, can be abandoned
in the midst of the first great decisive effort.

10*

August

0 0

1914

LAND AND WATEB

From all tliis one ■wro'iM cont'.udo that the cliir^f blow
against the Freuch defciisive is still iutenJal to bo delivered
across the Belgian plains and on into the flat country of North-
East France.

But it is here that the dilemma conies in, for while it is
almost inconceivable that such a body of men as the Prussian
General Staff vroald, or oould, change a general plan before
even t! o first main shock was delivered, it is almost equally
imposs ble to soe how that general plan can bo inaiutaiued.

Ci iisidcr first what cvidouce we have of its failure, and
secondly, the sheer physical necessity of changing it, wiih which
the enemy would appear to be confronted.

(a) A s to evidence, wo know that until Monday night or
thereabouts all the advance through the Be'giau plain had been
the advance of a screen of cavalry. But hero there was some-
tliing abnormal — namely, no news of the presence of large
bodies if troops other than cavalry, even for two or three days'
march 1 ehind this screen.

No!e that the news from the front in Belgium has been
fairly full ; perhaps a little too full. Note, what is m'.;re import-
ant than all in this connection, that, while time was essential to
the operation, and rapidity its most necessary charactcrisiic, you
have a whole week occupied in the covering or pushing forward
by little more than twenty miles of this fan of cavahy, and that
wbon, as has occasionally happened, the points on the fan have
been ]'Ushed back, no considerable supports have been discovered
behind it.

(b). Tlie other things we know which lead us to doubt, by
surmise rather than by direct evidence, the continuation of the
original plan, are : (1) The known fact that the forts at Liege
were intact until at least the night of Wednesday, August 19th ;
(2) the fact that the forts of Liege command the junction of
the main railways by which suppHes could reach a large body
in the Belgian plain north of the Mouse; (3) that to supply that
body from the south of the Meuse across temporary bridges and
across the bridge of Huy (which apposirs to be in German hands)
would seem impossible without a good line of railway to depend
upon.

The Meuse between Liege anl Namur in the Plan L,
with its single permanent bridge at Huy, with a gap of less
tlian 20 miles between (he furthest point dominated by the
western forls of Lii'ge and the furthest point dominated by
the eastern forts of Liege, is a considerable obstacle to supply
even when such supply is not opposed. Supply could not come
by the main raihvay, which is seen marked running along the
kdt or northern bank of the Mouse, because that railway is
commanded by the forts of Liege. Were there a railway
I ut:ning along the southern bank, or near it, and then leading
to the German bases of supply, out of range of the forts uf Liege
to tlie south (as along the imaginary dotted line A — B), then
certainly tlu'ee, possibly five, Army Corps could have Ijcen kept
supplied, though they were to the north of the river. For short
road journeys across the bridge at Hny and across the other
temprary bridges (as at O, P, Q., etc.) would have put little
strain upon the organisation of that supply. But there is no
auch railway.

Further, the whole of this country, the Ardennes, which
stretches south of the Meuse, has it communications riinning
along derp valleys and precij)itous ravines which lie north and
souih; traverse communication east and west, even by road, is
difiicult and slow.

The alternative line of supply for any considerable body of
invaders upon the Belgium plain would lie, of course, by the
main line running through Lii'ge and following the left or
noi thci-n bank of the Meuse. This main lijie directly taps the
Geriuan bases of supply in the llhine Valley, has ample accommo-
dation (being one of the great European arteries) and is in
every way fitted for the operation,

Tkcre is no douht at all that the use of this line was at once
esscalial to the plan of the German General Staff, and taken for
granted by that Staff. There is hardly less doulit that any
proper forwarding of supply on to the Belgium plain from the
bases in the Rhine Valley, until that line ia clear, will be
impossible.

Here, then, you have the crux in guessing whether or no
the main German effort could still be made over the Belgian
plain to the north of the river. On the one hand, it is almost
impossible to change your general line of advance; on the other
hand, it seems equally impossible to maintain under eiisting
conditions the supply necessary to such an advance. But, sum
up everything, especially considering the known existing
Concentration to the north and the bad conditions of the
centre, and one can but b«lieve that, against fearful odds, the
original Prussian plan will still be finally attempted, and the
effort to Ijreak through made over the Belgian plain, the
northern field.

In the central field there is a fairly broad avenue of opera-
tions in the southern half from before the fortress of Metz up
to and beyoud Longwy. The country, though hilly, is full of
good roads, well populated, and serred by great main lines. In

the north of the central field, in the Ardennes from Namur to
Longwy, the country is difficult, ravined, wooded, ill-provided
with transverse roads and railways. It would seem, therefore,
that if the blow is to be delivered in the central field, the main
German mass must be organised to strike in the southern part
of that field.

It is true that in the case of the Belgian attempt the
march would present a flank to the fortress of Namur; but
Verdun lias to the south of it a fortified lino ruuning all the
way to Toul, generally known as the Cotes de Meuse (which I
have indicated in the sketch by little crosses), and behind this
there is room for a rapid French concentration northward
against and upon the flank of anyone attempting to break
through above "Vei'dun. There is no such lino running south
from Namur, only the natural strength of the difiicult Ardennes
country.

One may sum up the elements of the whole situation as it
appeared in the news of yesterday — that is, as it was in the field
upon Wednesday, by the use of the accompanying diagram :

There is a strategical front consisting in three main sections
which lie slightly convex and facing the west : the three main
sections, A B to the north, C D in the centre, and E F to the
south. A B is the body in the Belgian plain, 0 D, the body
between the Meuse and the Moselle, E — P, the body between the
Moselle and the Rhino.

Of these, the central portion C— D naturally subdivides
itself into two, a portion C Q corresponding to the difficult
Ardennes country, and a portion Q D corresponding to the
easier LoiTaine and southern Luxembourg country ; while the
southern section E — E is again naturally subdivided into that
part which lies in the Lorraine basin E R, and that part which
lies in the mountains and the plain of Alsace E — F.

In front of this line you have the corresponding line of the
French and their Allies, G — H, marked black. [See Plan O].
Somewhere behind the German Line from A to well past E,
but not quite as far as F, there is concentrated a force larger
than elsewhere, whose business it is to strike such a blow on
G — H as will break that line. It may be at S, in the Belgian
plain ; it may be at T, in the Ardennes ; it may be
at U, in southern Luxembourg and northern Lorraine. It
is certainly not further down, .nor anywhere between U and
the Rhine.

The chances of its being at S. depend upon the diffi.culty of
abandoning an original plan, for at S. the concentration was
undoubtedly originally intended, and the blow to be struck
along the arrow marked (1) ; but against this is the difficulty of
keeping supplied across the Meuse and the impossibility of
providing it through Liege until the forts of Liege are
taken, 'llie chances of its being behind T. depend upon
the fact that in front of T. there is no fortified line;
it is an open gap. But, on •: the other hand, such a
blow along arrow (2) would have to be given ajainsl naturally
strong defensive positions, and to be delivered jrom badly
supplied and badly communicated country. The chances of
its being at U, and of the blow being delivered ah. ng the arrow
marked (3), depends upon the good communications and the
ease of advance in this direction, but they have against them the
fact that such a blow would have to be struck with the fortress
of Verdun on its Hank and beyond Verdun the wall of forts
from Verdun to Toul, behind which the French masses could
come up securely.

Now at one of those three points at least a German mass
must break through if the whole German forces are to escape
disaster, for to the south they are already being pressed back by
a turning movement of the French vigorously pursued across
the Vosges along the line of the arrow (•!■). If the centre anil
the north of the German line can bo held by the French while
this turning of the weak German south succeeds, the general
communications of the whole German forces across the Rhine
would be daily more and more imperilled, and the German
annics would at last be compelled to abandon all attempt at
breaking through the line before them upon the north ; they
would have to mass southward against this French advance in
force from Alsace-Lorraine, and to fight it with the risk, if they
were pushed back on their left, of finding their communications
with their bases of supply to the east imperilled.

To sum up, what seems the chance of the immediate future
is an attempt to break the allied line north of the ilouse-Samlu
line and across the Belgium plain. If it succeeds, the pressure
on the German armies from the south will at once cease and all
French effort will be concentrated to save the north. If it fails,
the French advance on the Genuan left flank from Alsace-
Lorraine will decide the campaign.

That conjecture, at least, seems to repose on better grounds
than any other : but a mere conjecture it remains until wo have
news of the main German advance to decide our judgment.

It need hardly be added that if this main German attack is
delivered, as I have presumed, through Belgium, then how many
men, and what men, may be in Antwerp on its flank will be one
decisive factor in the result.

!!•

LAND AND WATER

August 22, 1914

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

IT is now possible to discoTcr with Bome reasonable
accuracy what were the German plans for the naval
side of the ^ar-plans which have been hopelessly
wrcckea in the Mediterranean by Italy a refusal to
co-operate with the AusU-iaus. The schetne there was
thit the combined Italian and Austrian Fleets, rein-
lotLci bv tha Ooehen, should move against the French, the bulk
of whose fleet is based on Toulon.

A dance at the map (in this and m all other diagrams the
sizes of the squares correspond to the approximate fighting
vah^ of the various squadrons) will show that half the Mec i-
terranean would at once have bctn behind the allies, and the
French in marked inferiority. . , ^ , , . ,, , ^^

Taking the unit of the original Dreadnought as worth W,
the approximate relative figures of the available Mediterranean
forces— thips available for fleet action— under the German plan
were as follows :

Austria . .
Oermaa..

169

France
Britisli

130
43

173

This gives a slight superiority to the Triple Entente, but it
has to be remembered that in the firet place Germany expected
us to remain neutral, and, in the second place, it involved that
our Mediterranean ships would immediately return to Homo
waters. Never for one moment did Germany imagine that our
Mediterranean Squadron was anything but a temporary blufi.
The Goehen was detached to the Mediterranean and kept there
in that sure and certain hope.

What Germany planned for was _.
TVhat sho actually had was

109 to 130
79 to 173

Which explains why the Goihen ran for the safety of the
Dardanelles directly she "had secured such mild glory as was to
bo cbtainsd by the bombardment of an inoffensive and in-
nocuous Algerian town. The programme an-angod for her was
the capture of prizes, what time Italy and Austria did the work
i-equired to bottle up the French in Toulon and Bizerta.
However, as Admiral Wiren said about the last days at Port
Arthur, •' Things did not come off quite as expected."

All the same, however, the Go^n could easily have fought
with the certainty of taking a British battle cruiser to the
bottom with her. Her tactics were not "blue water school"
but " blue funk school," and the moral effect on the German

For the Goehen was the show
ing in her was "for war."

Navy is likely to be serious. For 1
ship of the German Navy. Every tbi _
In her, for at least eighteen months was demonstrated the
difference between the " iueflicient B.nfish Navy" and the
" business-like efficiency of the German Fleet." It was the
stock subject; and it was so realistic that all of us who saw
her thoroughly believed the latter. As for the German Navv,
it swallowed both the ideas tit tolo. It was taught to despise in
a quiet way the British Navy. This was not arrogance but
carefully calculated policy.

And — the Goefcen did what, had she been a British warship,
her captain would have been shot for ! Eank cowardice is tha
only explanation of her captain's action, despite all the allow-
auecs wo can make for the upsetting of everything by the
discovcrv that Italy declined to sacrifice herself for the War
Lord's dream of "Der Tagg." Or if not rank cowardice,
ordinarv corumon sense — which iu war comes to about the
same thing !

I have devoted a good deal of space to this matter of the
Goehen — more space than it may seem to warrant. But,
personally, I believe that it is the real Trafalgar of the War.
Big battles we may have, and if so they will make headlines
beside which the story of the runaway Goehen will appear quite
a trivial side issue. Very likely. The war will very possibly
bo long and strenuous as generally supposed, but the star of the
German Navy set for ever what time the Goehen turned and fled
for the safety of the Dardanelles.

Years ago the experts used to write that the history of the
world would be settled in the Mediterranean. For the last ten
years we have laughed at that. And now, in an utterly unex-
pected way. Time has proved them right. The crack ship
of the German Navy in the Mediterranean funked the
British cruisers. The moral effect of this is bound to be abso-
lutely unlimitable. Whether the Goehen becomes the Turkish
Mitylev.e, whether she remains interned, whether presently she
comes out again, matters nothing. The Chino-Japanese W'ar
result was settled when the Tchc Yuen ran away from Captain
Togo of the Kanhra at Asan. Yalu was merely a sequel. And
so the flight of the Goehen has settled the result of future
battles.

That the French should have penetrated the Adriatic at
the earliest possible moment was, of course, obvious ; but that
they should have done so so quickly augurs well for their
efficiency. A month or two ago any homo prophet would have
described it as highly improbable. The fact, however, is that

SITUATION IN THE BALTIC AT TIIE START OF THE WAR.

For obviou, r«,on, tbe position of the British Fleet i, no. shown. Proponloaat. sl«, of the Fleet « unlfor,.

•s in the other maps.

12*

August 22,

1914

LAND AND WATER

tie Frencli Fleet just at the present time is citrcmeljr efficient
—another of those points which the Germans have overlooked.
The French camaraderie between officers and men has bcea
described by competent independent witnesses as " beyond
belief." Little wonder, therefore, that no boggling occurred in
the rush for the Adriatic, though we may accept stories of nayal
battles with judicious scepticism.

Austria had nothing out except some small cruisers
iiperating against Montenegro, and the circumstance that the
Aspern was sunt merely goes to indicate that the French
irrivcd before they were expected.

calculations). Against these the Second Squadron and Eeserre
Squadron, value 66, appear to have been sent. This Second
Squadron consists of pre-Dreadnoughts, of no immediate value
in the North Sea. It was possibly reinforced by some Dread-
noughts sent through the Kiel Canal ; indeed, there is some
reason to suspect that the bulk of the German Fleet is at present
based on Kiel and not at Wilhelmshaven.

The reported battle and defeat of the Eussian Baltic
Squadron lacks confirmation. It is doubtful whether tho ships
have left Libau, as there would bo no object in facing certain
defeat, and Eussia has everything to gain by delay, because one,

DIAGRAM SHOWING THE CONDITION OF THINGS I.N THE MEDITERRANEAN, AS CALCULATED

IN THE GERMAN WAR PL.\N,

The tinted cection (hows the anticipated bases of attack.

Austria had nothing to gain by risking her battle fleet
against heavy odds — here as everywhere else in the war there is
a species of 6tale-mat« with battle fleets. Nowhere do they face
each other in anything like equal strength — everywhere tho
moral effect of the larger force paralyses the lesser.

It is improbable that the French will go any considerable
distance up the Adriatic. To keep the Austrians in ensures the
safety of all Mediterranean trade; to attempt a close blockade
would be to run serious risk of torpedo attack without any
prospect of gain worth the adventure. As things are, if too
much pressure is felt, torpedo attacks are likely to be attempted.

if not two, of her new Dreadnoughts are very shortly to be
available as a reinforcement. Meanwhile the Baltic must be a
German lake, with the Eussian trade more or less completely
stopped and German trade probably proceeding without
hindrance.

Once the Eussiaus can utilise two of their new Dreadnoughts
their approximate fighting strength would be 55, and a move
against the Germans may be expected. Such a move would
have a most useful effect, not only from the consequent
■weakening of the main German Fleet in order to reinforce their
division in the Baltic, but also in its demands upon the Gcrmau

,.3 ^

p^ SERVIAN

^.^ AuLGARtA

l-ii_i-.»«*(.TA«

ALGERIA r 5Ea jA^s^-—

'-' ' '■■(/

.«

I*-'\-'-^— 2;^

THE SITUATION IN TUB MEDITERRANEAN AS GERMANY FOUND IT.

The tinted section shows the Triple Alllanoe actual bases. The ecnrse of the i|noniInoas flight of The Pride of the German Fleet
is shown in a dotted line. For such conduct • British OBicer would have been court-martialled and shot.

since, though the Austrians have only eighteen destroyers, they
are known to be extremely efficient.

Bui it is even chances whether Austria will not presently
change sides. Of the sentiment in her army I cannot speak
with authority, but I do know that the feeling in her navy is
distinctly pro-British. The close friendship between the British
and Austrian navies is a very long-standing affair indeed, and
it may ba taken as certain that Austria will not throw away
anything that she can avoid against tha British Navy in order
to satisfy the German Kaiser in his role of War Lord.

Turning to nearer home we come first of all to the Baltic.

Tho total Russianforee has anutmost paper value of 33 (here
as elsewhere I am using the figures used in German official

destroyer flotilla. This flotilla consists of about 150 boats, and
something like one-third of this forc« would have to be
withdrawn from the North Sea in order to meet the Eussian
advance.

Indeed, as Eussia has some eighty destroyers, the demand
might well be heavier. It will thus be seen that the main
German Fleet is not in a position to operate against us at any-
thing like full strength, and it is by no means improbable that
the bulk of the fleet will be used against the Russians in the
Baltic, because it is there that the " greatest danger " threatens.
There is nothing to entice the German Dreadnoughts into major
operations in the North Sea, as nothing short of a decisive
victory over the British Fleet could materially affect the situa-

13»

LAND AND WATEB

August 22, 1914

tion. Eathcr, we naj look for a continuance of the present
■tate of «ir;iiis. The German foUcy is clearly to attempt to
wtafcen the British force l>r submarine attack anJ by mines.

Ifow far «he Germans Lare gone in for indiscriinmate
mine- laving we Lare no means of ascertaining, though personally
I do not think they did anything of the sort. The mines which
sunk the Amjihio'n were laid under the impression that the
British Eireditionary Force would sail from the Thames Estuary
or Harwich. It is not desirable to say anything about the trans-
port of that force, except that the German calculations concerning
it were not successful.

The war has already been a war of surprises, and chief
among these is the eitremely small inconvenience caused to
British merchant shipping. It is reasonable to expect that such
commerce-destroyers as Germany may have on the high seas will
automatically die a natural death from waut of coal unless they
are allowed to supply themselves by tho " coal sufficient to reach
the nearest Gennan harbour " subterfuge. Even so, their power
for niiscLiof has apparently been greatly exaggerated in the past.
We most of us seemed to have failed to realise how very rigid
the trade routes are. To do any mischief at all a privateer must
get on the trade route, where she is sure to meet cruisers looking
for her— cruisers in wireless communication with the proposed
victims of the corsair.

The capture of a merchant ship is an operation requiring
time for its performance — time enough for a defending cruiser
to come up, if anywhere near. In addition, there is the problem
as to what is to to be done with prizes when captured, owing to
the virtual impossibility of getting them into a German harbour.

Many people have anticipated that the German battle cruisers
will sooner or later attempt to rush for the trade routes. Of
course, they may do it ; but, if so, they will be veiy ill-advised,
and there will not be the least occasion for the public to be
perturbed. It is moderately certain that, if they do manage to
get out, they will never get back again ; and even getting out is
not likely to be easy.

The general indications are that for the present the "War
on the water will continue tineventfullT until circumstances
force the Kaiser to send his entire fleet to sea as a forlorn hope,
in much the same way that circumstances more or less com-
pelled Napoleon to order Villeneuvo to leave harbour in the
Trafalgar campaign.

The official Germm war plan, however, is for the fleet to
remain safe behind the impregnable fortifications which stud the
whole of the German coast in hopes that the British battleships
will come off the coast and allow themselves to be thinned down
by submarine and destroyer attacks.

If and when the rush does come, it is more likely to be via
the Channel than in the more obvious Scapa Flow direction.
It would be a rush of desperation with the object of doing
as much damage as possible. However, it is inadvisable to
speculate in details.

DIARY OF THE WEEK

DAY BY DAY.
FRIDAY, AUGUST Mth.

The French War Ministry officially announced that the
French troops which entered Belgium by Chaileroi are
in touch with the Belgian Army.

The situation at Lit^ge remained the same, all the forts
were intact, and the troops in excellent spirits.

Tho Secretary of State for the Colonics was informed by
the Governor of Nyasaland that on Thursday morning
the Nyasaland Government armed steamer Guendolen
seized the German Government armed steamer Yon
Wissmann at Sphinx Haven on the eastern shore of
Lake Nyasa. The guns and engines were removed
from the Von Wissmann and her crew taken prisoners.

SATURDAY, AUGUST 15th.

lie Tsar addressed to the Polish populations of Russia,
Germany, and Austria a proclamation promising to
restore to Poland her territorial integrity with complete
autonomy and guarantees for religious liberty and the
use of the Polish language. A great battle took place
in and around Dinant, on the river Meuse. The action
lasted from six in the morning till six in the evening,
when the Germans liad been driven about nine milea
Eouth to a point between Givet and Eochefort. AH
the forts at Lii'gc reported to be still intact.

SUNDAY, AUGUST 16ih.

Ultimatum delivered by Japan to Germany demanding
the withdrawal of her vessels of war from the Far East
and to deliver on a date not later than September 13th
to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition

cr compen-^ation, the entire leased tenitory of Kiao-
chau, with a view to tho eventual restoration of the
same to China. Gennany given till noon on Sunday
next to send her reply. The Japanese ultimatum to
Germany was regarded in America as the gravest
development of the war. Viscount Chinda, the Japanese
Ambassador, informed the United States Government
that every American neutral interest would be safe-
guarded. Japan's promise to restore Kiaochau to
China regarded by the United States as satisfactory.
MONDAY, AUGUST 17th.

The Press Bureau announced that the Expeditionary
Force, as detailed for foreign service, has been safely
landed on French soil. Tho embarkation, trans-
portation, and disembarkation of men and stores
were alike carried through vrith the greatest possible
precision and without a single casualty. Mr. F. E.
Smith, who made this announcement, stated, " Lord
Kitchener wishes mo to add that he and the country
are under the greatest obligation to the Press for the
loyalty with which all references to the movements of
the Expeditionary Force in this country and on their
landing have been suppressed."

Licutcnant-General Sir James Grierson died while
travelling in the train. General Grierson had been
designated to command the Third Corps of tho Expe-
ditionary Force. By his death the Army has lost one of
its best leaders. General Grierson was fifty-five years
of age, and joined the Royal Artillery in 1877. In
1914 he was appointed Director of Military Operations
at the War Office, and afterwards commanded the
First Division at Aldershot. In recent years he had
greatly distinguished himself at manoeuvres. He was
a brilliant linguist, and was a qualified interpreter in
French, German, Eussian, and Spanish.

The Belgian Government transferred from Brussels to
Antwerp, and adequate measures taken to assure the
defence of Brussels and to protect it from a sm'prise
attack.

The Press Bureau announced that the French troops, in
the course of a rapid advance along the Valley of
Schirmeck, secured a thousand prisoners.

The French Fleet in the Mediterranean made a sweep up
the Adriatic as far as Cattaro, and a small Austrian
cruiser of the Aspem type was fired on and sunk.
TUESDAY, AUGUST 18th.

It was announced that the King had approved the
appointment of General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien to
command of an Army Corps of the British Expeditionary
Force, in succession to the late General Grierson.

The Press Bureau issued the following statement : " Some
desultory fighting has taken place during the day
between the British patrolling squadrons and flotillas
and German reconnoitreing cruisers. No losses are
reported or claimed. A certain liveliness is apparent
in tho Southern area of the North Sea.

The French captured the greater part of the Valleys
of the Vosges on the slopes of Alsace, from which the
French Army will soon reach tho plain.
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 19th.

Reported that the Germans had entered Tirlemont early
on Tuesday afternoon, and that a fierce battle was
taking place between the Belgian and German troops
along an extended front.

From official sources in Berlin came the news that
Germany will not consent to evacuate Kiaochau, or
to agree to Japan's other demands. The capture of
Kiaochau, it was declared, would have no more effect
on the war than the taking of Togoland.
THURSDAY, AUGUST 20th.

Reported that the Servians had gained a decisive
victory over the Austrians near Shabatz. Three
Austrian regiments were practically wiped out.

The Russian forces came into collision with First German
Army Corps near Stallu-Ptinen, defeating the enemy
and capturing eight guns, twelve caissons, and two
maxims.

Despatches received suggest that the German advance
in Belgium, North of the Meuse, has begun. The Liege
forts still hold out. An official statement was received
from Brussels to the effect that severe fighting had
begun along the whole front from Bale to Diest.
Latest despatches announced the evacuation of
Jlcchlin by tho Allied troops on the Belgian fighting
front, and a threatened attack on Brussels by the
German forces. In the eastern war area the Russian
Anay_ was reported to have vigorously assumed the
offensive.

14,*

August 22, 1914

LAND AND WATEB

A TOPOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO THE

WAR ZONE.

By E. CHARLES VIVIAN.

Aerschot. — A village midway between Loiivain and
Diest. on the main road connecting these two points.

AnUvari or Bar- — So called from its position opposite
the Italian Bari, is a town eighteen miles north-west from
Scutari, near the Adriatic coast, and surrounded by dense
forests of olive trees. The population is mainly Albanian, and
amounts to about 1,600. The harbour wiU accommodate only
vessels of L'ght draught, but is well-protected. Antivari is
about twenty miles distant from the Austrian frontier, and
forms the most important harbour on the Montenegrin coast.

Belgrade. — Capital of Servia, with a population of
over 00,000, is the most important town in Servia, and one of
the most important in the Balkan peninsula. It is situated at
the confluence of the great rivers Save and Danube, on a trian-
gular ridge, of which the southern side slopes up by way of the
Avala HHI to the Shumadiya mountains of central Servia. At
the northern end of the city, on a chalk ridge 200 feet above the
river level, is situated the citadel, and just opposite this the
Hungarian town of Zimony stands on the other bank of the
Danube. The position of Belgrade has always been considered
one of great strategical importance, more especially as regards
an advance against Hungarian territory. It is not of such great
importance for an advance from Hungary to Servia, as its garrison
can fall back on the hills toward which the city slopes from the
river, and thus can command a succession of strong positions.
From Roman times onward the citadel of Belgrade has been
garrisoned, and, previous to the Servian Government's authority,
it was held by a Turkish garrison. Belgrade is said to have
known more battles under its walls than any other fortress in
Europe. It was delivered to the Servians by Turkey in 1866.

Brussels- — The capital of Belgium and of the Belgian
province of Brabant, lies in the valley of the river Senno, which
river, flowing through the city, is enclosed by an immense arch.
In old times Brussels was strongly fortified, but at the present
time it has little in the way of artificial defences ; its chief military
station is the suburb of Etterbeek, where is accommodation for
a large force of cavalry and artillery, together with a miUtary
school and shooting ground. The Charleroi and Willebrocck
canals meet in Brussels, and railway lines radiate from the city
to Ostend, Antwerp, Amsterdam, Bale, Paris, Lille, and, in times
of peace, to Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Vienna. The population
of the communes comprised in the Government of Brussels is
well over half a million.

Cattaro. — Capital of the Government of the same name
in Dalmatia, on the Austrian Adriatic coast. It is situated at
the head of a winding gulf, of which the shores are hilly and
strongly fortified. The garrison of Cattaro in normal times is
about 1,500 men, and the total population of the town is about
6,000, mainly Slav, with a German minority. Cattaro lies quite
near the Montenegrin frontier, and, although well protected
against attack from the sea by its system of forts, is liable to
attack from superior heights on the Montenegrin side of the
border, whence such fire can be brought to bear on the town
and garrison as to make the position practically untenable. It
is connected by road with Cettinjc, the capital of Montenegro,
and by steamer service with Trieste.

Chateau Salias. — A small town on the river Seille,
in German Lorraine, twenty -five miles south-east from Metz.
It is a railway junction for the Metz, Nancy, and Saargemund
lines of railway, and takes its name from a salt works in the
neighbourhood.

Chaudfontaine- — The fort of Chaudfontaine forms one
of the most important points in the defence of Liege from the
south-east. The village of the same name, in the vicinity of the
fort, is situated on the Licge-Verviers lino of rail, at about six
miles distance from Liege.

Colmar. — A German town in the territory of Alsace-
Lorraine, forty miles south south-west from Strasbourg by the
iStrasbourg-Baie Une of rail. It is an important centre of trade
for upper Alsace, and has a population upwards of 40,000. It
is connected by rail with Mulhauscn, Strasbourg, Halstatt,
Miinster, and Freiberg, and forms an important junction of the
strategic railways of the German frontier system.

Corroy Le Grand. — A village of the province of
Brabant, about five miles south-east of the forts of Wavre.

Delle- — A frontier town in French Alsace, situated on
the railway from Belfort to St. Ursanne. Although situated on
the Swiss frontier, Delle is the point of junction for two main
loads from German Alsace.

Diest. — A fortified town in the Belgian province of
Brabant, thirty-eight miles south-east of Antwerp, with which
it is connected by rail, on the Antwerp-Maestricht line. Also
connected by rail with Brussels via Louvain. The population
is over 8,000, and the fortifications are of only secondary
importance.

Eydtkuhnen. — The German frontier station on the
line of rail from Konigsberg in Germany to Vilna in Western
Russia. The corresponding station on the Russian side of the
frontier is Wirballen.

Hasselt. — The capital of the Belgian province of Limburg,
forty -seven miles east of Brussels, and at an important junction of
railway lines by which it is connected with Dutch and Belgian
centres. The population is about 15,000. Hasselt is situated in
wooded hilly country about midway between Diest and Maastricht
on the Dutch frontier.

Huy. — A town about midway between Liege and Namur,
on the river Meuse and the Liege-Namur railway. Its
principal industries are the extraction of coal and the manufacture
of firearms, and it is a centre of considerable importance, standing
in wooded, hilly country.

Ktao-Chau. — This important Chinese port was seized
in November, 1897, by the German Fleet, nominally in repara-
tion for the murder by the Chinese of two German
missionaries in the province of Shantung. The result was the
leasing by the Chinese of the port and 117 square miles of territory
on either side to Germany for a period of ninety-nine j'ears,
together with a further protected area. Large sums have been
spent by Germany in the construction of a breakwater and the
dredging of the harbour, and, since the expulsion of the Russians
from Port Arthur, China and Japan have viewed with disapproval
the existence of a fortified German port on the Chinese coast. The
terms of the Japanese ultimatum of the 17th inst. provide for the
delivery, " on a date not later than September 15th, to the
Imperial Japanese Goverment, without condition or compensation,
the entire leased territory of Kiao-Chau, with a view to the
eventual restoration of the same to China."

Kiel Canal. — Known also as the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal,
is fifty-one miles in length, and connects the mouth of the Elbe
with Kiel Bay at the western extremity of the Baltic. It is so
constructed that vessels of the largest size can maintain a speed
of ten miles an hour throughout its entire length, and is so defended
that it is absolutely unassailable from the sea at either end. The
object of its construction was to double the fighting value of the
German Navy, for any attacking fleet would have to maintain
a blockade at the western end of the canal, and also would ha'ce
to blockade the entrance to the Baltic, north of Denmark, in
order to confine the German Fleet from the North Sea, while
a third naval force would be necessary to prevent the German
Fleet from taking action in the Baltic itself. The canal traverses
the province of Holstein from west to cast, and at its eastern
end is situated the naval base of Kiel, on Kiel harbour, where
suflicicnt accommodation is available for the whole of the German
Fleet. There is no doubt that the canal, which was finished only
a few months ago, adds enormously to the striking value of the
German Navy, but it is generally considered, with the short
experience afforded of its usefulness by the present war, that its
value has been rather overrated.

Liege. — Situated at the confluence of the Meuse and
the Ourthe, Liege is one of the principal Belgian centres of
industry, being engaged largely in the production of coal and the
manufacture of small arms, of which latter it produces more than
a million pieces annually. Metal-smelting, tools, electrical
machines, and railway material are also important products,
while Litge is the centre of several important industrial locahtiea.
The principal lines of communication are the Meuse and a canal
which runs from Liege to Maastricht, while the railways run to
Namur, Brussels, Hasselt, and Limbourg, to Maastricht, and to

LAND AND WATER

August 22, 19U

Aix-la-Chapelle-the last-named line taa been destroyed since
ihe outbreak of the war. The Meuse. which flows through the
city, is upwards of 500 feet wide at this P?i"\»°f „^!i^'''=lK
rix bridses. The population of the city is about 200,000 The
ring of forts which surrounds the city, although constructed
in the latter half of last century, is of great strength, ana
provided with thoroughly up-to-date armament. In historic
times UiRO has already undergone six sieges; one of these was
conducted by the English Marlborough in 1702, when t^e "tadel
was taken by storm from the French garrison ; in 17 JJ tne
French inflicted heavy defeat on the Austnans here, ihe Jort
of the Chartreuse and the "Citadel" command the town
effectively from both banks of the river, and these, together with
the remaining forts of the ring that encircles the town, render
this one of the strongest positions in Western Europe.

Longuyon.-An important railway junction in the
extreme north of the department of Meurthe et Moselle, ine
jiezieres-Thionville and Luxembourg-Nancy lines crosa here.
It is about twelve miles from the German frontier.

Longwy.— A fortified town in the arrondissement
of Briey, department of Meurthe et Moselle, sixty-three miles
west-north-west of Nancy, and situated on a plateau commanding
the Chiors, a tributary of the Meuse, and also commanding the
Luxembourg road, the fortress is about 400 feet above the
level of the surrounding country, and is strengthened by outlying
fortifications. In times of peace the garrison is maintained at
a strength of about 5,000, of which about one-fifth are cavaby.
The present population is about 10,000, and the chief industries
are iron and st«el mining and smelting. The town is situated
on the railway line from Longuyon to Arlon, and for the past
300 years has been a fortified centre.

Louvain.— An important manufacturing town twenty-
eight miles east of Brussels, in the Belgian province of Brabant.
It°is connected by rail with Bmssels, Liege, and Malines, and
other important centres, and has a population of nearly 50,000.
The town is laid out in rectangular fashion, and is traversed by
the small river Dyle. Its town hall is considered one of the
finest specimens of arcliitectural art on the Continent.

Luxembourg. — The Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg is a
neutral and independent State, bounded east and north-cast
by Prussia, south by Alsace-Lorraine, and west by the Belgian
province of Luxembourg. It is governed by a hereditary grand
duke and a House of Representatives consisting of forty-five
members, and the total population of the duchy is about 250,000.
The State possesses valuable iron mines, and is traversed by
about 300 miles of railways. It consists for the most part of
wooded, hilly country, especially in the Ardennes or western
region, and from a strategic point of view is exceedingly difficult
country. As a statfl whose neutrality has been guaranteed,
Luxembourg possesses no important fortifications.

M&estricht or Maastricht.— The capita,l of the
Dutch province of Limburg, situated nineteen miles by rail
north-north-east of Li^ge on the Dutch State railway from
Maastricht to Aken. The population of the town is about
40,000, and its chief trade is in paper and firearms. It is built
round the junction of the Geer and Maas rivers, and is practically
on the border between Belgium and Holland.

Messina. — The city of Messina, which was destroyed
by the most disastrous earthquake of modern times, was a
strongly fortified and flourishing city at the north-east corner
of the island of Sicily, with an excellent harbour opening on the
Straits of Messina. These straits, in which the Godien and
Breslau sheltered for a time from the British and French fleets,
are waters neutral to Italy, and are under five miles in width
between the Sicilian coast and the mainland of Italy. The
straits run in a north to south direction, from Reggio, on the
Italian mainland, to Point di Faro, at the extreme eastern corner
of Sicily.

Metz. — A first-class fortress guarding the German
frontier in Lorraine, of which it is the German capital. It is
situated on the river Moselle, ninety-nine miles north-west of
Strasbourg by rail, and lOJ miles east from the French frontier.
The principal fortifications consist of a ring of modern forts,
encircling the town at a distance of from two to three miles from
it, and the garrison, made up of Bavarians, Prussians, and
Saxons, ia about 22,000 in times of peace — a number that would
be enormously augmented on a war footing. The population of
the town is about 60,000, and its industries are of little importance.
It shares with Strasbourg the distinction of being the most
important German fortified station on the Alsace-Lorraine
frontier.

Mulhauscn.— A German town in the Upper Alsace
district, twenty-one miles north-west from Bale and the Swiss
bolder by rail. It has a population of about 00,000, and ranks

as the centre of the cotton industry of Alsace. Its importance
as a railway junction is considerable, and it is connected by rail
with Bale, Thann, Belfort, Colmar, and Strasbourg, and Mulheina
and Freiburg.

Munsfer- — -A town of German Upper Alsace, sixteen
miles west-south-west of Colmar by rail, and at the foot of the
Vosges mountains. Its population is about 6,500.

Namur. — Capital of the Belgian province of the same
name, thirty-seven miles south-east of Brussels, with which
it is connected by rail. It is situated in wooded and moun-
ainous country, on the left bank of the river Meuse, and ia
connected by rail with Liege, Paris, Rheims, and Luxembourg,
as well as with Brussels. The population is about 35,000, and
the town ia defended by fortifications on the surrounding
heights. It is even more strongly protected than Liege, and ia
well garrisoned and diflicult to invest, on account of the nature
of the surrounding country.

Nish. — The second most important town in Servia,
situated on the left bank of the Nishava, a tributary of the livei
Morava. It forms a junction for the important roads of the
Balkan Peninsula, and is the point at which the Vienna-
Constantinople and Vienna-Salonica railway lines divide. The
hills surrounding the town arc fortified by earthworks, and Nish
is always the seat of a strong garrison, being considered of great
strategical importance. It is one of the most prosperous towns
in Servia, and has a population of nearly 23,000.

Novo Radomsk- — A railway station in Russian Poland,
on the Warsaw-Tchenstochow line, about thirty-five miles from
the Gennan frontier.

Pola. — The chief naval base and arsenal of Austria-
Hungary, situated near the southern point of the peninsula of
Istria, on the Gulf of Venice. From the village of Fasana,
which overlooks the Fasana Channel, to the Brionian Islands, a
system of fortifications protects the harbour and port of Pola,
which is in normal times occupied by a garrison of about 8,000
men. The total population is about 45,000. Pola forms the
southern terminus of a railway extending from Trieste, with a
branch to Rovigno, a small port on the Istrian Peninsula.

Rechicourt. — Village and railway station on the
Luneville-Saarbourg line of rail. It is situated just on the
German side of the frontier.

Saarburg. — A" manufacturing town in German Lorraine,
about twelve miles from the French frontier. The population ia
about 4,000,

Sanaa. — A river flowing to the Vistula from the east
and forming the extreme northern boundary between Austrian
and Russian Poland. The actual frontier line includes the north
bank of the river, which is also knov.n as the " San."

Sieradz- — A station on the Warsaw-Kalisch line of rail,
situated in Russian Poland about twenty-two miles from the
German frontier.

Sopshider- — A strong mountain position on the bank
of the river Save, in Servia, about ten miles south fi-om Belgrade.

Tirlemoat. — A village about ten miles east of Brussels
on the main road to Liege, and directly north of Namur.

Verdun. — A town and first-class fortress in the depart-
ment of the Meuse, France, situated at the junction of the Scdan-
Toul and Rheims-Conflans railway lines. The detached forts
surrounding Verdun form a circle of about twenty-five miles
circumference, and are placed both on the right and left banks
of the Meuse, and connected by defence works with the forts
of Ton]. Verdun ranlcs as the most strongly defended town
of eastern France, and has a civilian population of about 14,000.

Vosges. — A department of France on the eastern frontier,
adjoining Upper and Lower Alsace of Geimany, traversed by
the rivers Meurthe and Jloselle, and bounded on the east by
the Vosges Mountains, which form the frontier line between
France and Germany practically from the Swiss border in the
south to the latitude of Strasbourg in the north, where they bend
north-eastward into the territory of Lorraine and the Bavarian
Palatinate. Forming as they do a natural frontier line, the
Vosges crests are of great strategic importance, and occupation
of them is absolutely necessary to a force desiring to dominate
either the department of Vosges on the west or the territory
of Alsace-Lorraine on the east.

V/arcmmc. — The first point of importance westward
from Liege on the Liege-Louvain road. Situated about ten
miles west of Liege, on the railway from Liege to Antwerp and
Brussels.

Wavre. — An important fortified point on the road between
Antwerp and Brussels, about ten miles south of Antwerp. It
is situated slightly to the east of the main line connecting the
two cities, and its two forts form protection for the importani
town of Mechlin against an advance from the north.

16*

August 29, 1914

LAND AND WATER

AffTWtRP

-LIECe

KAMOR,

MCNS ■:', _

UllE «0OUAI .[^

CAM9RA1* •UCATE/U

\ L'JXEMBOyRC

snweooj

G E R M

i!C*U'.S

P- A

NATIONAL FtoNTStRS

O 10 20 30 40 so

too

Sce/e cf Miles

piFFi CULT COUNTRY-
(T) TiSe Ardennes.

@TheVosgss.

THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

THE NEWS vvitli wliich the English public is confronted this week from the seat of war
is at once exceedingly serious and largely indeterminate, at least it is undetennined at the
moment of writing.
It is serious because it clearly points to a reversal all along the line of the plans
fomied by the Allies. Against the French offensive in Alsace-Lon-aine to the south, a
German counter-offensive has succeeded. In the north, against the German offensive, the counter-
offensive of the Allies has failed.

Such news, in spite of its gravity, remains indeterminate, because there has not (Thursday
noon) yet reached London or Paiis any news to show that the check to the counter-offensive in
the north, or to the offensive in the south, has resulted in any clear diminution of military power
in the forces of either combatant. There has been as yet no decision.

With so much said by way of preliminary, we will turn to the details of the ncAvs, and I would
remark that in foUo^ving these details, apart from the few sketches and diagi-ams that illustrate
particular points, a reference to the outline set above this article will always be useful. It gives in
the simplest form the field of operations upon the French frontier, with its fortresses, its main lines
of defence, and the ai'eas of difficult and ea.sy country for the passage of troops.

On Wednesday last, August 19th, the world was in doubt upon what will be the main question of
all this WOT in its earlier stages : to wit, where the main forces of the two opposmg gi-oups of armies
were to be found.

This doubt extended in some degree (as events have proved) to the General Officers in command
of those groups.

This doubt did not begin to be solved for the general public in France and England until the
morning of last Sunday, August 23rd. It was not fuUy solved until there came the very gi-ave news
of the following day, Monday, August 24th, as to the retirements in portions of the front which
the accompanying sketch will make plain.

'OSTEND

.— ••'

iBRUSSELS

.J^

LIEGE

^jf^Jl

4 \

LUXEMBURG

•

;/NAMUR ^

\ A

3^--'

ife

^.-^^

VERDUM

too

MULHAU3EN
BELFORT '•^^

JOOJ^IZ^ES

LAND AND WATER

August 29, 1914

TVlien the nc-w"! of that Sundav and tliat ^roiidaj had been received in London and Pans, it was
evident at once where the enemy had his main forces, and where the forces opposed to lumjiad proved
inferior to his own. The consequences of " ' " '

*ii:...,. o„,i nr. nnimlK- pniisiflpriihlft advantage sraineu uv mt^ v.ciinau i^uivui.^.

determines success

that inferiorit\- were a very serious set-back for the cause
the AliieT alid^an"equaiiy considerable advantage gained" by the Gprman po^vers
Enough was said hist week to show that, other things being equal, A^•llat

or faihire in war is the element of numbers. r .i .1 . c . ■ ,

Now because there were at critical points on two sections of the theatre of operations a larger
number of the enemy than had been allowed for, that enemy has obtained the advantage which we
must clearlv undershmd if we are to appreciate the gravity of the moment. The two sections of the
whole theatre of war, the two fields in critical points of which these advantages had, by Tuesday last,
been gained by the Germans are (1) that marked A— A upon the accompanying sketch, being that i)art of
Lorraine Avhich lies between the Yosges and the foiiress of Metz ; (2) that marked B— B on the
s:ime' sketch being all that country lying in front of and round the angle formed by the junction
of the Sambrc and the Meuse l{iver.s. , ,^ , , -,-^. «,

The German advance, the falling back of the Allies, was m each case over a belt of from 12 to 21
miles in width, in each case occupied some few days, and in each case has been due to the presence,
on one particular front of the Allies, of numbers superior to those that were expected — though in the
second field, that of the Sambrc and the Meuse, another clement besides that of numbers entered into
the calculations, to wit, the factor of Namur.

I will take these two fields of Gemian success and of Erench and Allied failure in their order.

1, THE GERMAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE IN LORRAINE.

A French force, tlie position and size of which are not matter for public comment, but the
movements and command of which have been communicated to the public by the French Government.
liad for some days been undertaking a strong offensive moA-ement across the frontier of the annexed
provinces, Alsace-Lorraine.

It Avill be seen in the accompanying sketch that this frontier, running from in front of Metz doAvn
to Belfort, is divided into tAvo sections by the Yosges Mountains, along the crest of which it

runs for some little Avay. The French offen-

MtTZ lFort!f!edJ

LOB-RAINE

SAARBURC

NANCY
(OpenTomO

theDooon

STRASSSUftC
(Fortified)

Bridge Head
/.Bridge Heatf

0 12 5

Scale of Average Marching d3y$i

sive, undertaken Avith considerable forces, Avas
in the direction of the an-ows marked " passes " :
that is, it included the passage of the Vosgcs
Mountains by the capture of the passes
across them. It included an adA'ance upon,
and, as events turned out, the recapture of,
the open town of IMulhouse ; it included the
occupation of that high culminating mass at
the northern end of the Yosges knoAATi as the
Donon ; and it included a forward movement
across the ojjen country in betAveen Metz and
the "S'osges, particularly the capture and the
holding of Saarbourg, a railway junction the
occupation of Avhich cuts direct communication
between Metz and Strasbourg.

In all this vigorous offensive effort, the
combined Anuy Corps forming the army of
Alsace - Lon-aine under General Pau had,
up to and including the day of Wednesday',
August 19tli (that is, Wednesday of last
Aveek) been successful. The object of this
move was threefold :

(1.) First, and least important, it had a political object. The two million population of Alsace-
LoiTaine being for the most pai-t unfriendly to the Gennans, and the memory of their annexation
l)eing veiy bitter to the French, the presence of French troops upon their soil was calculated to be an
element of confusion for Germany and of moral advantage to the spirit of the French people at the
inception of the campaign.

(2.) Secondly, and far more imporfant, it had for its object the putting of pressure upon the
extreme Gemian left, so that the enemy's forces might be drawn down in that direction and Aveakencd
in their mam attempt, Avhich was likely to be in the north. At the same time, a successful campaign
in Alsace-Lon-aine, proceeding from south to north, would gradually close one bridge-head after
another across the Ehine, and cut the communications between 'the south Gennan depots and stores
and the German armies in the field.

(3.) Tliirdly and most important, it would so engage German attention upon the front Metz-
fctrasbourg as to divert or delay any effort along the front Mctz-Longwy.

The importance of this third point a little consideration will explain. The Allies occupying, as
they did, positions in the north between Lille and Longwy, if the Germans had struck in between
Metz and Long^^7, they would not only have taken the line of the Allies in the rear and have
tlu-eatened it With envelopment, but they Avould in particular have cut off Avhat is technically called
a mlient. A mhent, in this connection, means a position occupied bv troops such that it is thrust
out like a horn from some general line. It is evident that in the line Lillc-Longwy, the allied
forces upon the Sambre and the Meuse from ^lons through Namur to Mezieres (in the sketch opposite)
Avere such a salient in the general allied line. . li ^

2»

August 29, 1914

LAND AND WATER

STRASBURC

ULLE

MONS

loncwy metz
mezTeres j^ «

VERDUN

^•MULHOUSE

lOO

-.J —

Sca/e of Miles

■J —

300

—J

Now. if a salient is taken m reverse the effect is the more disastrous, from the fact that in a
salient so many of the men are at a distance from and nnahle to get back to the rear .xhere their
communications are threatened. To cut off an enemy occupying^ salient angle thus is a more
complete operation than the mei;e turnmg of a line. One great historic example of'such a peril is that
in which the French stood a ittle before the battle of Tourcoing. They wei thrown out in exactly
tins way on a projecting angle, and the Duke of York di-ew up his plan of battle with the object of
cutting them off along the base of the salient angle. x- r j t ut

I said last week why it seemed unlikely tlfat the principal Gei-man effort would be made from
vt ll l?r?l "°^^f/^- ^.^'^ ^ 7^ff«^t would have to be made right in fi-ont of the fortress of
\erdun. ^ut though i\x<, prmapal German effort would, as I thought, probably be made in the
Belgian field to the noi-tli and against the Allied line from Mons^ to Nammf yet it miobt be

+1 . ^T'<1 ^T "" ^'^T''^ f ?"•*''' ''}?''^ ^•^^•^^- ^^^^'^ ^«"^^ ^"&^g« ^U ^^^ attention of the enemy on
the Metz-htrasbourg line and brmg all the troops he had to spare" in the south at N.N., you would

T nn^r % ^T ^^"^^'7,^^' &««d or bad, prevent him fim going from M.. betwee/Metz and
Longwy H the direction of the an-ow, and you would to that extent be saving your northeiii positions
between Lille and Long^vy from anxiety. ° "' position!,

thp liti^A}!!f,\1°^l!i''''' ^""^ *^l! ''T^ i!''^^, ^"^ ^^'"'^^'° •" Alsace-Lon-alne. ultimat^^ly threatening
the hne Metz-Sti-asbourg, was attempted by the French, let us see why and how far it failed

th. .?Tl° 11 V-TPf,' '"^ ^\ P^^"' ^^ ^^-'^^^ *^^« success was considerable, especially in
aII f w7 r i,'?i^^r'i ^^'^^P'-^^^ i^ «^e Vosges was taken, that at Saale , that at^Ste
Mane, and that called the Bonhomme fmihcr south, being the most important. The gmit mountain

In 7w ir '^'" '"^TttT '^f!. ^^F' ^^°^« «^ i^^^^oriX and caUed the Donon^^i. Tcu^"
fl?p%r "'"' "P.i*' ^^' ^"^^ °^ *^? ?^,^^*^ ^* ^^•^•' ^^"^^ ^^^ ^'^ ^ <^o«^plete success. He drove
M.n? rr fT''*^.7''''rrT*'^ Mulhouse.and took twenty-four guns and many priso ers
^itw.'! f 7 ^A *^' ""'"'h *,^^* '' ^ ^^-^^^ ^^ ^'^^••b^^^g ^"d Metz, the left wing of this a ™y

^:X^:r;^^C:!^o^'''''' '' — ^«%^ot across the Metz-Strfsbourgrailwa];

.nn.,•ii'^fTt P^Ff '^® movement into Alsace and Lorraine had the effect of brin-in- a very
X 1 !' f ^"^^ '^ !^' '"/"^y ^^'^ '^^^^ ^^^ ™««* it- How many we do not yet know! "l doulft
"pont elX^^^^^^^^ .P''^ ""« ^-™- /ounter-offensiie was concenti-rd

upon the ^^esteln part of tins particular field, that is, upon the left of General Pan's army, betNveen
Met. and the mountains. It threw back the inferioV French forces opposed to it, recfoss^d the

frontier, and by Sunday, August 23rd, it had bent back
the whole of that French left wing to such a positi(m as is
indicated in the following sketch. The French were only
holdmg the line of the Kiver Meurthe, nor everywhere holding
that. The Germans were in Luncville. The troops on the
Donon and in the Pass at Saales had had to retire Avith the
general French retirement lest they should be left isolated.
The passes on the southeni part of the mountains, hoAvever,
Avere still held by the French, and their troops still dominated
the upper plain of Alsace, the to^vn of Mulhouse, and the left
bank of the Ehine at this part.

The Gei-man success to the west of the mountains, when
they pushed the French back on to the line of the Meurtlie
and beyond it, did not only consist in compelling the inferior

LAND AND WATER

August -29, 1914

Frencli forces before them to retire, but included the captm-e of many guns and prisoners ; the Gei-man
clairn in tliis respect being fifty guns and 10,000 men taken, while the French Government affii-m— as
is indeed probable under sucli circumstances— that the figures are exaggerated.

' To sum ui) there was, on the extreme left of the general field of operations (300 miles long), a
verv distinct German success achieved between Metz and the Vosges Mountains, which had the effect
of driving the French back across the frontier from twelve to twenty miles south of the furthest
positions they had reached in Lomine. The success was accompanied by the capture of many guns
and men and involved the loss of the northern part of the Vosges Mountains with their passes,
though not as yet of the southern pai-t nor of the plain of Upper Alsace beyond. Pressure was
removed fi-om the south of the German line, and the communications of Alsace-Lorraine with South
Germany, were, after this success, seciu-e. , , , ^ , , ^ r „ ^,

On the other hand, the bringing of such large German forces— perhaps a quarter of all the
German anny— so far south, made impossible any taking in reverse of the Allies in the northern
field, that is upon the Belgian frontier, for the moment.

So much for what haj)pened in Lorraine and in the south between Wednesday, August 19th,
when the French offensive was still successful, and Monday, the 24th, when the left wing of that
offensive found itself pressed back upon the Meurthc by the German counter-offensive. This Gemian
success was followed by the evacuation two days later of all Alsace by the French, and the abandon-
ment by them of all the passes of the Vosges. From the dotted line which they occupied 10 days ago

^y^

Saarbcurg

^ ^MULHAOSE

roui.

---■'--• Pos/Y/on on Auy. f9
"<• 4- + Pos it/on on Au^. 25

T/ie Frontier

Scale of milcs

SAef-ch s/jow/ngr territory /osf-'
6y /^renc/> onSout^errf^snc/ofthe
i//ie ietyveen A ug. /9 aftef A uq. 35

they have been forced back to the line showTi by crosses. Nancy — an open town — was still
intact, but the Germans are everywhere across the frontier. They further claimed the capture of
many field pieces abandoned in the Vosges mountains.

The French ha\'ing retired to the line of the Mem-the in French Lon-aine, some miles within
the frontier, and their right having retired to the frontier itself in front of Belfort and along the crest
of the southern Vosges, they remained in this position upon the defensive throughout the Monday and
up to Tuesday morning. Last Tuesday, however, a general attack was delivered by the enemy
along the whole of the French front in this region. It was repelled. Since then we have had no
further news from the southern extreme of the frontier, save one message, which indicates that
fighting for the moment had ceased, and announcing considerable losses to the enemy in his retu-emcnt
of three days ago.

It is certain that by this time every available man is being di-afted towards the principal field of
operations m the north, and that the French in the south wiU remain entirely upon the defensive.

Much more important in the final event will be the measure of success attending this other
German effort m the nortbern field of the theatre of wai- upon the Franco-Belgian frontier, and to that
I wiU next turn. "

2. THE MAIN GERMAN FLANKING MOVEMENT THROUGH BELGIUM.

_ By that sanie Wednesday, August 19th, Wednesday of last week, it was apparent that the
mam German effort was going to be made through the Belgian plain, which lies north of the

n JIl T .^ J'"''- ^Y\^}\ "^T '^""'^ ^™"^'^ ^' "^^'^^ l»^^-« ^^••^«. «« ^ve saw last week.

jMobabe, because that was undoubtedly the original plan of the Gei-man General Staff when they

fvinn -^''f} if, ^-'^ ^'1^'''"' '™'^^'^ ''^ ^^'''' ^^«"«"^- ^"-l ^11«^ the passage of the
hoW .i.r?f l"'""^ f^l T"^'^;!^ ^'""''''^ undi.sturbed. The unexpected resistance of Liege,
.llTn.v" l".i 7 ■ '^ \^T^)L''l^, ''•S''^'"^* it' 1^^^^ ^^i^turbed and delayed this plan, as we
; off. nnt in . f 1 '' '""r^ -^^ ^^^^^^^ to change a line of advance once detennined and
Std brlLt i^fl aT''' "^'nt ^« •''-^•^^^' it was still probable that the original plan
vould be followed, iollowed it was. The siege artillery had come up and silenced the forts

4»

August 29, 101 i LAND AX D WATER

of Licgo, and much tlie largest body of the total German forces beyond the Ilhiue in tlie west
•was massed to the north of the Meuso. A sufficient supply was accumulated for this great effort,
and it is probable that -when an accurate history of the Avar is available we shall find that not
less than seven, and perliaps eight, Army Corps out of a total of ceiiainly less than twent}-, were
massed thus nortli of the Meuse upon the extreme left wing of the Allies for the great flanking
movement round their line by the north.

The last stand that could be made by the Belgian Army to these immensely superior forces
\\as niade on that same Wednesday, a day's march east of Brassels, and after it the Belgians
retired behind the guns of Antweii^, leaving Brussels open to the advance. In the late morning
of the morrow, Thursday, August 20th, the Thui-sday of last v.eek, the heads of the German
columns appeared before the capital of Belgium, which had been left open to admit them without
resistance. From about half-past two o'clock of that day, throughout the whole of the remainder of
that day, the German commanders organised a military parade, the object of which, though confined
to what is called " moral effect," was military and defensible. They marched through Brussels one of
their Army Corps specially picked for the job because it was quite fresh. They had specially accouta-ed
it, given it a good rest, put into it for a veneer a few of the units that had been in the earlier fighting,
and bidden it prepare for the show as for a review. These 40,000 men they passed throiigh the city,
accompanied by music, and by every adjunct which cotdd impress the civilian spectator — even to the
stiff parade step which is characteristic of the Prussian di-ill.

Now it is here advisable, after the somewhat ill-timed ridicule which was pom-ed upon this
manifestation, to explain what is meant by moral effect in warfare, and why a commander will, under
some conditions, wisely employ it.

WHAT IS "MORAL EFFECT"?

Strictly speaking, all operations of -war depend for their success upon moral effect, with the
exception of that operation in which a hostile force is completely' surrounded and may be exterminated.

In ever}' other case you obtain your success over your enemy — or at any rate over the survivors
among yoirr enemy — by reducing them into a condition of mind in which their opposition is ineffective.
Tlie whole discussion between closer and more open fonnations : between the power of modern fortifi-
cations to withstand modem siege artillery, and the opposite theory : between the sur\'ivor and non-
survivor and shock tactics for cavahy — all these depend ultimately upon one's judgment of " moral
effect."

But there is evidently a difference in degree. No one can doubt the overwhelming result of a
double flank movement enveloping an inferior force. To depend upon such a movement as that for
success is to depend upon something like a certitude in human psj-chology. At the other end of the
line you get the story of the Chinese troops that tenufied the enemy by making faces and imitating the
cries of wild beasts.

There is a whole category of actions in warfare which are of doubtful use because they lie
• beyond the line after Avhich the psychological effect is weak. Such actions are specially said to
have no true strategic but only a " moral " effect.

For instance, th'e proclamation of the Duke of Branswick threatening Paris with destruction
before the invasion of Fi-ance in 1792, is rightly regarded by historians as a blunder. Its moral effect,
if any, was to strengthen the French moral. Again, Napoleon's entry into Moscow was effected at an
enormous expense of men, after an advance far too prolonged, and the corresponding moral effect of
holding the capital in such a country as Russia was in no way worth the expense of time, men, and
energ}' which it cost.

Now what we have to seize in the present campaign is that the German Government and tho
Gennan military commanders have carefully estimated tmd intend to apply this factor of " moral effect "
apart from direct action in the field, up to a certain point and in certain paiiicular ways, for which we
must be prepai-ed. I do not say that their estimate is just : I should even imagine that they will
exaggerate this factor. But what I do say is that their action here, as in every other matter, will be
detailed and calculated ; and it will be very foolish on the part of those who are their opponents to
imagine that any piece of parade, severity, or demonstration has been imdertaken by the German
commanders at i-andom, or without their having seen, just as clearly as we see it, the vain side of
such accessories to war.

By mai'ching through Brussels, for instance, the Gennan commanders added a fuU day's fatigue
and a full day's delay to at least one body of their troops, and perhaps to as manj' more. The choice
of a fresh Army Corps was a patent thing which deceived nobody into thinking that the troops which
liad recently been fighting were those fresh troops whom the populace of Brussels gazed upon. The
breaking into parade step made no careful observer believe that those who indulged in it were on that
account the more fomiidable in battle ; nor did the playing of brazen instraments, and the rest.

None the less, the decision of the German commanders to make this demonstration was not, as too
many have imagined, a piece of empty theatricalism. Its effect was calculated beforehand, and that
effect has been in part attained. No one reading the press hostile to Germany on the morrow of last
Thursday, when the news was known, can have doubted that this piece of parade did in some degree —
l)erhaps in a less degree than the German commanders had hoped — affect the spirit of their opponents.

It is exactly the same with the much graver policy of torture and murder. The German troops
have here direct orders from their superiors and a clear object before them.

They expect to be operating in hostile country — at any rate they have good hopes of being in hostile
country duriug all the earlier, and perhaps more critical, phases of the campaign. If they meet with
resistance upon the part of the civilian population (though that only consists of women, elderly men,
and children), their difficulties will be enormously increased.

LAXD AND WATER

August 29, 1914

Since these elderly men, women, and cliildren bave, in the nature of things, no kind of
or'^anization, the terror inspired by the fate of individuals may be expected to coav all the rest.
Therefore, orders will be strictly observed to adopt any means of spreading such terror Avheuever there
is so much as a suspicion of resistance upon the part of the civilian population, and on this account we
must be prepared for not only the summary shooting of elderly men and youths who have been canglit
u ith arms in their hands, but also of any who have been suspected. Again, Avhenever there is a
suspicion against the population of any place, we must expect the putting to death of elderly men and
women, and even children, the destruction of property upon all sides, the burning of homes.

I do not say that this is wise upon the part of the Germaas. Personally, I think that in so
acting they ai'e handicapping themselves politically, and probably, in the later phases of the campaign,
inilitarily as well. But tlie point to remember is that these actions are calculated actions. In
Ik'lgiuni, for instance, there is no doubt that the absence of all civilian resistance after the first few
days has encouraged the German commanders in the belief that these methods are of immediate
military value. 'J'hey will be pursued in France as in Belgium, and, should a force land in
England, in England as in France. AVc must be jweparcd for it.

Tlie same rule a])plies to the ransoming of towns. Here it is not the town into which terror has
to be struck, but the financial poAver of the enemy. Take, for instance, the case of the Belgian towns
and provinces in the last few days. A total of about £10,000,000 has been exacted. England and
France at once granted this sum to Belgium, which is as much as saying that Germany, by her
successful occupation of Belgium, has fined her principal oj^ponents already £10,000,000, and inspired
in the minds of those who have no country in particular and whose principal object is cosmopolitan
iinance, the dread of fui-ther loss. Genuany knows how powerful these men are, and relies upon their
indii-ect suppoii.

THE THREAT TO THE SEA COAST.

Filially, there is the vciy powerful moral effect upon which Germany is certainly countino-, and
for which we must in this country be specially prepared : l//e ocmpaHon of the sea coast. There is
nothing to prevent com])aratively small detached bodies of the German armies, especially strong in
cavaliy, from occupying Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais, and ultimately Boulogne, ccccejd a decision in'^the
valley of the Meuse adverse to German amis. If the Germans are successful in the valley of the
2\Ieuse they will cei-tainly occupy the ports of the Straits of Dover.

We may tell ourselves, and tell ourselves truly, all manner of concrete, solid, and consoling things
concerning such an occupation :— That the Fleet can always master any particular section of coast to
which it directs its attention ; that there are no vessels of war in these ports ; that if is just as easy
to fly over to England from the Avestem part of the Belgian plain as from the sea coast; that no
mine-layer could get out of these ports without observation from the fleet; that British com-
JHunications over sea with the British forces and their Allies could be maintained further to the
west, &c., &c. It is still true that the presence of German troops upon the further side of the Straits
ot Dover would profoundly affect the state of mind of the Allies. It would be of a " moral effect "
ajiparently disproportionate to the effort required. Whether it will really be disproportionate or no
(^nly the event can show; but at any rate it will be attempted— unless the series of actions upon the
.Meuse goes adversely to the Gennan anns. And we shall be veiy unwise indeed unless we prepare
ourselves for the news of such an occupation of the sea coast

i.n,.i.f T "7 ''*"™ *?-,w T'^'^^'f''''' ^^ *^'" '•'^^ ^^ ^^*^«^« t^^* l^ave taken place, and at the
moment of wntmg are still takmg jjlace, in the Meuse vaUey.

THE CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS ON THE MEUSE AND SAMBRE.

throu^I'sm'''' opei-ations upon the Thui-sday of last week, when the Gemans were marching

ntotfie ftS on of H n I ^' ' ^.f ^T,' '^ *'^' "^^"^"^^ ^^ ''^''^ ^^^' «^'^* «^« «»'«* G^ei-man sheU fell
pmtiW the IW Sambre; and it is from this moment that the general

b!^bs '"'' '^""'^ *^" ^"^^^^^ ^™^^« «^ *1^« B^lgi'^^^ Pl«"^ and the AiSenucs

note thS V'She' wV.''™ J"?? p^ *^'' ^"''^"^^ "^^P P^^^^^^^^'^ ^* «^« ^^^^^ ^^ these comments, he will
note that m the northern field of operations the Eiver Meuse timis a sharp corner at the town of

Namur ; after having run roughly from
north to south it begins to run roughly
from east to west. At this corner tliere
comes into the INIeuse the Eiver Sambre
Avhicli, running from east to west, con-
tinues the line of the Lower Meuse.
North of this line lies, of course, that
Belgian plain of which mention is made
so frequently in all descriptions of the
campaign. South of that line is to be
found rough wooded countiy, deejjly
ravined, and called the Ardennes. It is
rougher and wilder to the east and to the
south, and falls into cultiAatable land as
one goes westward and northward, the
Sambre itself coming from sources in almost
flat country and only running through
hilly countiy as it approaches Namur.

litet

'^eUfCMATCAU

•£UX£M0O/>O

SCAL£ OF Ml Lea

August 29, 1914 LAXD AND WATER

Xow, -ttlicn it was evident that the Germans would make their principal attempt throut^h the
Belgian plain, the Allies occupied a line passing through Lille, Mens, along the Sambre bv Charloroi
to Namur. That was a clear necessity, but they also massed some very large nu]nl)ers on a line
bending back along the Upper Meuse from Kamur soutln\-ard. The English contingent lay about
Mons. It was the French Eiftli Army, largely comjwsed of troops from Algiers, that lay along the
Sambre from above Charleroi to as far as Kamur. Namur itself appears to have been somewhat
insufficiently held by a Belgian contingent. Behind were the largo French forces continued up the
valley of the Meuse.

So much we know because it has been made public property by the authorities. Something more
we know from official telegrams and from private accounts that have been printed in the press of Paris
and London. But there still remains a much greater part to conjecture.
Let us fii-st deal with what we know.

The GeiTuan attack came in full force uj^on the line of the Sambre, and there, of course, greatly
outnumbered the defender.s. It chief objective was not the extreme of the line to the west,
as might be expected of German tactics and a desire to outflank, but in a direct attack, the
bridges at and near Charleroi. This attack was maintained throughout Saturday and through
the first 2>art of Sunday without result. The English contingent held its gi-ound on the left
near Mons against forces which seem to have been superior to it by approximately 20 per cent.
The French along the Sambre, particularly pressed for the possession of the bridge at Charleroi,
lost and recovered, again lost and again recovered that passage. "VVhUe this was proceeding the
hu-ger French forces along the Upper Meuse were proposing to pass east^-ard tlu'ough the
Ardennes country. Had they succeeded in pressing far eastward through this difficult and highly
defensible land of forests and deep ravines, they would have threatened more and more with
every mile of their advance the communications and the supply of the Gemian armies in the
Belgian plain, for that communication and those supplies largely come by road across the Meuse
between Namur and Liege. Further, such an advance would have separated the northern German
army fi-om the southern portion, which was operating from Luxembourg.

One hypothesis of what followed upon and after the Sunday is the following :
It is obvious that this advance eastward through the Ardennes would pivot round the fortress
of Namur. The advance along the aiTOW marked (1) in the above sketch woidd march the
furthest ; next that along the arrow marked (2), and last along the Meuse itself, depending
upon the success of the two more southern columns, that along the an-ow marked (3). AVliilo,
so long as the line on the Sambre was held, this turning movement roimd the Ardennes by
the east was in no fear for its rear.

Such is one hypothesis upon the nature of the counter-offensive designed by the Allies against the
vigorous German offensive undertaken from the Belgian plain.

That counter-offensive — according to this conjecture — broke down ; and this breakdoAvn is the
gravest news of all that has yet reached us from the seat of war.

The ad\4ccs received and published in London and Paris up to and including the news of last
"Wednesday morning pointed, indeed, to no decisive residt. They did not indicate that the one
opponent had as yet appreciably diminished the miUtary power of the other ; but they did strongly
suggest that the counter-offensive designed by the Allies against the German advance had failed, and
they made it seem exceedingly improbable that any immediate attempt to restore it would be attempted.
Tlie failure appears to have depended upon two isolated events — a check in the southernmost
French effort, marked (1) upon the above sketch, and, much more important, the fall of Namur : at
least, the fall of the eastern forts and the consequent loss of the bridge-heads over the two rivers
Sambre and Meuse at the critical point where these rivers meet.

If Namur had stiU held as a pivot upon which the turning movement could depend, the fact that
the southernmost French column was aiTCsted in the neighbourhood of Neuchateau might not
liave had very permanent results. The second column to the north coming up on the flank of
the German armies from Luxembourg might, indeed, have reversed that result ; and in any case,
the occupation of even a part of the Ardennes countiy by French troops would have menaced
the supply of their opponents upon the Belgian plain.

But when (or if) Namur went, the hinge upon which all that arm was swinging went with
it, and not only would the French turning movement eastward through the Ardennes become
impossible, but it would become equally unpossible to hold the valley of the Sambre.

All this, I repeat, is pure conjecture. It is based upon the supposition that the news of
Namur came at the critical moment and that on receipt of it only was the retreat from the Sambre
determined upon. The fuller accounts that will reach us later will show whether this hypothesis
is sound or no.

The way in which Namur was essential to the whole plan will be easily appreciated when

we consider that the ring of forts protected the junction of
the two rivers and of the bridges whereby they might
simultaneously be crossed.

Observe the effect of tliis. In the accompanying diagram
you have the complex obstacle A. A. A., consisting of a
main river and its tributar}-, which obstacle is presented both
to M. advancing upon it and to N., who is preparing to meet
him and to take a coimter offensive against him. A fortress,
X, X, X, X, held by N.^s men, contains and protects the two
opportunities, bridges (B.B.), whereby the obstacle can be
surmounted. N. can move at his choice across the obstacle by

LAND AND WATER

August 29, 1914

these bridges, unaer protection of the foi-trcss, and appear in forec where he chooses He could appear
in W attacking along line (1) or along line (2) at Ins choice. 'Ihe various parts oflus enemy M arc
sepiu-ated and delayed by the obstacle : /le
bridge-heads which surmount that obstacle

'"""But suppose the fortress X. X. X. X to fall, and the conditions are exactly reversed. Then it is
M that has the brid-es : it is M that is no longer suftcring from the obstacle, and it is N who is
M that tue DiKi e^ ^^^^.^^ .^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ o£ ^i^e obstacle up to and

(2)
not. So long as the fortress holds, N commands the

nt that'obstacie in his favour, Avhile leaving it still a cause of delay to his

is
restricted by it. Fm-ther, tlie Ime wincn ^y i^ auming a.w.,g ^^.^^.. of the obstacle up to

.cr upon the fortress is turned by the fallmg of the fortress into the hands of M. M can pour

rcposiu^

over ou to N's flank.

holding is no longer an

obstacle to him, because he

• LiLLt

.^\^^

©V

0 ® © /'

©V
©^

^^MititJita

over uu lu x-i s ua^^. The obstacle which N IS ^. , -, r„ , , . -,. , ,

Ijossosses the bridge for crossing it ; and N will be rolled up unless he falls kick immediately

M bein- here the German attack, N the allied defence along the Sambre X, X, X the fortress of

Nanuir prote'cting the brtdges across the junction of the Sambre and the Meuse (which together form

the triple obstacle in question), with Namur in German hands, the position of the AUies defendnig the

Sambre becomes impo.ssible. The Mies have to faU back, and at the same time the counter-offensive

to the east across the Meuse through the Ardennes can no longer be pui-sued.

The total result under this hypothesis is that from holding the positions (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) on the

accompanying sketch, the Allies had by last Monday evening
to fall back upon positions roughly represented by (2) (2) (2)
(2) (2). Here, hoAvever, conjecture becomes necessarily vaguer
and less well based, because we shall not precisely know (and
even for those who know, it would be a duty to be silent)
Avhere the icliole defensive line against the next German
advance will lie. We shall not know this untH the ncAvs of its
retention, or the failure to retain it, reaches us. It is even
possible that a large French force is still free to act and to
take the counter-offensive — we do not knoAV.

It is however already evident that the full plan of the
Allied General Staff involves what is called a " refusing " of
their left ; that is a bending back of their left wing from the
general line. This left Aving was lying upon Wednesday last
along the line Cambrai — Le Cateau. This extreme portion
Avas held by the English contingent. That of com-se leaves

the whole of the north-east open to a Gennan advance, but at the same time it leaves the flank of

that advance open to attack from the south if that unknoAvn factor, the French masses upon the right,

can come up in time and in sufficient numbers. This is indeed the whole object of refusing a Aving —

you do it when your enemy is trying to turn you if you think that you have enough men to strike uj)

at his flank dm-ing the tm-ning moAement.

Our infoi-mation, then, 24 hours before this appears in print, is no more than the foUoAving : the

Allied line has retired from its original positions (1) (1) (1) by very heavy marches for three days to (3)

(3) upon its extreme left. It has fallen back

from the neighbourhood of Mons to the

neighbourhood of Cambrai. The task of the

heaviest marcliing has fallen upon the English

contingent, which is extended between

Cambrai and Le Cateau. To the right, any-

Avhere within the triangle, ABC, are the

main French masses, certainly 10 Army Corps

in number, perhaps already more. What they

liaA-e in front of them Ave do not knoAV : they

cei-tainly had superior numbers in the fighting

of last Sunday; the ncAv arrivals from the

.south may aheady haA'e redi-essed the balance.

Meanwhile, there is of course nothing to pre-

A'cnt the German cavalry from Avorking round

by the left in raids if they think it AviU be of

useful moral effect to do so, and some of that

cavalry has already appeared near Lille and

near Douai, and even further upon French

territory.

THE NATURE OF THE FALL OF NAMUR.

It is again a matter of coujectm-e, but of conjecture most vital to the fortunes of the whole of our
campaign, what exactly happened at Namur. For, if Namur was sufficiently held and was taken — or
at least, certain of its forts Avero taken — so quickly only under the effect of shell fire, it must mean
that the whole theory under Avhich ring fortresses Avere built, and upon which the Allied plan Avas
based, is eiToneous ; it must mean that the German theory is sound and the French theory is unsound
in the matter of fortification ; it must mean that your rmg fortress can be carried in a comparatively
short time, if not by a rush, then under the effect of siege artillery.

^ Now, putting together all the very slight evidence Avhichhad reached this country by the morning
of llmrsday last, it is Iry no means certain that so graA'e a conclusion can be drawn. The eastern
forts of Namur appear to have been silenced late upon Saturday, or early upon Sunday, the toAvn to
have been occupied in the course of Sunday, and certain of the Avestern forts to be still holding out iu

.NAMUa

ME2IEI)ES

SKETCH SHOWIKQ KETIKEMEKT OF ALLIED TKOOPS FEOM THEIB
rOSlTIOIf OF LAST WEEK,

(1) (1) to their present position (3) (3), of which the portion hetween
Cambrai and Le Cateau is published, while that representing the main
French Body to the riglit is not cortain, but lies somewhere within the-
space marked with a query.

August 29, 1914 LAND AND WATER

the evoniug of Unit day. At least tliis view of the matter is established by two converging pieces of
evidence, the one from German, the other from French sources. Again, by the Sunday evening tlie
retreat from the Sambre was in full swing and tbo Allied cannon were in front of Phillipeville back
several hours' marching from the Sambre. We hear of a very small garrison in Naraur, and that
garrison Belgian — 3,000 is the almost incredibly small tigure given. We are fm-ther told that the
most eastern of the forts round Namur, that furthest advanced down the Meuse, was silenced almost
inmiediately ; and more than that we are not told. Now we can be perfectly cei-tain from the experience
at Poi-t Arthur, that the immediate silencing of a modern fort by mere shell fire is quite abnonnal, as
we know by the experience of both Er-lung-shan fort at Poii Ai-thur and of Fleron fort and others at
Liege that it is impossible (also under nonnal circumstances) to nish it. More than that we do not
know. But it will require very strong evidence indeed to prove that modern foi-tification is subject,
Avhen it is properly defended, to immediate disaster of this sort. If it is, not only Namur,
but Toul and Verdun — and not only Toul and ^^erdun,' but ^Metz and Sti-asbom-g — are in the
fcame boat.

AU this reading, from sjiarse and unco-ordinated ncAvs of what has happened during this week
npon the Sambre and ^Meuse, is based upon the hypothesis that Namur did fall as was announced, and
that the Anglo-French line did retire from one to two days' march behind the line Mons-Namur, which
is roughly the line of the Sambre.

But there is a further element in the combination which had not been accounted for by Wednesday
night last. Much more important in number, and even in comjjosition, than the French forces upon
Sambre, were the French masses to the South of that river, which were destined to operate in the
Ardennes.

A\''e have seen that of these gi-eat bodies, one was checked in front of Nenf chateau by the Gemian
forces proceeding from southern Belgian Luxembourg ; but until we have news of those masses as a
whole we cannot determine the result of the conflict upon the north-eastern fi-outier. Even though
we know that the troops holding the line of the Sambre fell back, their ultimate fortune, their
immediate future task, and the 'chances of a decision one way or the other, would still depend upon
the positions taken up by these masses to the south of the Sambre line, and the action upon which
they might be directed. The most probable conjecture is that we shall find them, when the veil is
lifted again, extending the line of the others towaixls "the south. We remain — late upon Wednesday
night — in necessary ignorance of their position and theii* movements.

One or two things which may exi)lain the postponement of a decision appears through the very
meagre information to hand. It is evident, for instance, that the mass of the German attack was
directed against the Sambre line, and had there a great superiority in numbers over the defensive. It
is further evident, since men cannot be in two places at once, that there is a correspondingly weak
body oi:)posite the Middle ileuse, where the French forces should be strongest. But, on the other
liand, we know that in this country of the Middle !Meuse, and to the east of it, are the best defensive
positions for a force weaker than its opponents, and Avooded country in which the superiority of the
French field gun is largely lost.

Another thing that comes through from the telegram is that the Germans have used in this gi-eat
effort the very best of their troops. Not only numbers, quahty also has been demanded for this
EU2)reme effort. Tlie guard was there.

Finally we know that, up to the last telegrams received, the enemy's movement had, as a tui-ning
movement, failed. The Gennan offensive had not yet threatened the Allied line in flank. If or
■when the concentrated German mass in the north now passing the Sambre could achieve a decisive
result, the general Allied line along the French frontier would be turned. If this, its extreme
northern portion, was either pierced or enveloped, the success of what is known to be the German
strategy in this campaign would be sealed. We know that the enemy wiU make every effort to
achieve that end.

At one moment, when the news of the fall of Namur came in upon Monday morning (the general
public had it early in the afternoon of that day), it looked as though the Allied flank was broken or
cut. The later telegrams, extending over more than two full days, though they tell us little, do not
confinu that ; while the position in which the guns of the retreat were di-aA\'n up, according to the
" Times " coiTespondent upon Sunday night, point to the falling back of the line as a whole, not
to its having been pierced. AVe may be quite confident that up to the tune this last telegi-am was sent
the line was intact.

It should further be remarked that the direction of the full Prussian advance npon Charleroi
makes us suspend our judgment as to a further attempt at outflanking by the west. You cannot
outflank indefinitely, unless you have indefinitely superior numbers ; and, though the numbers which
the enemy has here massed against the extreme of the Allied line are superior to what is in front of
them, they are not so greatly superior, apparently, as to pennit of an immediate further extension
westward beyond what they have already achieved. Were that so, their effort would not have been
against Charleroi, but to the west of Mons. They Avould only have attempted to hold the French
forces upon the line of the Sambre while they brought their greatest pressure to bear upon the western
extreme of the line against and beyond the English left.

AVe may sum up and say that, until further news is received, there is no evidence of a decisive
result here ujwu tlie Franco-Belgian frontier, but only of a retirement on the part of the Allies, A\ith
a corresponding advance on the part of the Germans.

Meanwhile, what is most probable is an attempt of the Gennans to turn the Allied line round
Cambrai. Whether that operation can be successfully carried out or not will depend almost entirely
upon the unknown factor — the numbers the French haAC gathered within striking distance south and
cast of Le Cateau.

• 9*

LAND AND WATER

August 29, 1914

THE OPERATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE.

• i. • „^,.„M.o1,^n^;..n nf tlic camnaio-Q upon tlic eastern frontiers of

'^•,;£'^:^:\^S^:^S^e^ .^^ac. ». e.p..ea i„ t,.o accompanying slcotoh.

I DAYS

SMRCH

1 'in 1 100

nMEHEL

arra occupied ftv

„,,^ TOU3H R^C2. LANSV^ASE, RELlOION,

^ANO CULTUHS

TO 3ERUN
QJ MILES

Sketch showing the approximate frontier between Polish and German nationalities, frontier of Pi-ovince of East Prussia now ia
Eussian handij and of the fortified lino of the Vistula which bars the advance on Berlin.

It was upon Saturday last, tlie 22nd, that the first wave of the Eussian advance won what may be
C'llled without exaf'geration, a decisive success in the neighhoui-hood of the town of Gumknnen, about
twentV-five miles from the frontier : the "first wave," because it is in the nature of the mobilizatiou
•UTau«^craents of Eussia that three successive bodies shaU follow westward across the frontier, and it
was the first of these, amounting to perhaps somewhat less than 200,000 men, which won the action

at Gumbinnen. ,.,■,, -, nn nnn xi

The forces over which this success was achieved were estimated at some 100,000 men, or three
Anny Corps, with perhaps certain divisions of cavahy. The advance was followed up to Insterberg,
some fifteen miles further along the main railway, by which line the invasion is proceeding.

Wo must remember, in all that we hear of the fighting in this eastern theatre of the Avar, that the
great mass of the men opposed to the Eussians are taken from that half -trained or untrained reserve
which is a feature of the Pnissian military system. They are not expected to do as well as the
reo-ularly trained troops. ^Vhat they are expected to do in this part of the German dominions is to
imjwse delay upon the enemy, and little more.

At any rate, the success of last Saturday obviously isolates, as a glance at the map wiU show, the
town of Tilsit. But there is more than this. Apart from this advance directly westward across the
frontier by the Eussians (which has for its base the towTi of Vilna), there was moving up in flank from
AVai-saw another Eussian force which marched upon Allenstein, and this advance in flank determined
the precipitate retreat of the German forces, and may be said without exaggeration to have given, by
the evening of Sunday, all East Prussia east of the line Konigsberg- Allenstein into Eussian hands.
TwentA'-four hours later it was abeady evident that one portion of the rapidly retreating Prussian
forces would tlirow itself into Konigsberg, and already, at the time of writing, all retreat to the south
out of Konigsberg is cut off. The other portion of the defeated German army has, as reported above,
fallen back upon Osterode, abandoning in its rapid retreat a certain number of field guns and vcliicles,
and losing also a certain proportion of prisoners, presumably stragglers from so rapid a retirement.

"We do Avell to remember in all this that we have only heard so far the victor's story.
there can be no doubt, to sum up the general result, that the province of East Prussia is
dominated as a whole by the Eussian forces, which have invaded it from the south and the
at the same moment. Tilsit is certainly isolated and Konigsberg probably already isolated also,
belt just east of the boundaiy of the province — including Allenstein itself — was still in German hands
last Wednesday, but the forces occupjing it were in retreat.

IMeanwhile it is well to warn the reader in the west of Europe that we should not too hastily
assume for the Eussian advance a rate comparable to the advance of successful invading armies
in the west, and further that we do not really know the rate of the possible or probable Eussiau
advance until the line of the Vistula is snccessfidli/ negotiated.

As to the first of these pomts, the rapidity of advance in this part of Eastern Eui-opc is
checked by the comparative ranty of good hard roads— a Aveek's rain turns most of these tracks
into a morass— the fact that the south of the Province of East Pnissia is a mass of small meres
with marshes l^ing about them, and the fact that behind the Eussian advance is an insuflicicnt
niiUvay system ; that is, a sparse series of lines, a net-work with very Avide meshes, Avhich AviU
not supply an advancing amiy as the A\estern railways of Europe could do.

The line of the A'istula is of the first importance. It is, roughlv speaking, the line Thorn—
Graudenz— Danzig ; both Thorn and Danzig are obstacles of the first class, and the line as a
whole is not Aveakly held.

But
noAV
ea.st
A

10«

August 29, 1914 LAND AND WATEE

If or when tlie line of tlie Vistula is passetl, we may regard the Evisslan advance as beginning
seriously to threaten and inconmiodo the (jerman powers : not before. And avc must remember that
it is just when the Vistula is crossed that Austrian pressure from the south may become serious
for the Eussians.

The total lengih of this first field of the Eussian invasion, from the nearest point upon the ^''istula
to the corresponduig nearest point upon the eastern fi-ontier of Prussia, is no less than 130 miles : that
is the distance the invader must cover before he begins to exercise any real pressiire, and even then
he will not exercise it until he has masked or isolated the Vistula fortresses.

If or when the Vistida is passed, the invaders A\ill find themselves not only in territory every
mile of advance through '\vliich will more and more grievously incommode Prussia politically, but
actually within 200 miles of Berlin itself.

Fm-ther, when the line of the Vistula is crossed, the front of the Eussian advance to the north
will be abreast of any further advance attempted from the western districts of Eussian Poland : as, for
instance, an advance directly upon the Polish town of Posen (to give it its Grerman name) so long
ojjpressed by Prussian domination.

It will be seen from all this that with the best of luck the Eussians will not begin to exercise just
yet an effective pressm-e in this field, and it caanot he too often rejieated tluit thoii(/h the elemoit of
time is a factor in evety campaign, and is a factor ofjJeculiar importance in this campaign, that there
are yet several loeeTcs in which the Prussians are free to operate in the west before ther/ need he
realli/ anxious ahout the attack falliny upon them from the east.

Ahnost as important as the probable movement of the Eussian armies and the rate of their
advance is the distribution of the population through which that advance will take place ; for it is
cei-tain now that the Polish population will favour the Eussian advance at the expense of Prussia. It
is exceedingly important to seize the racial realities underlying the artificial political frontiers in this
district. They will explain a great deal of what is to come.

It will be seen upon the sketch map jjrinted opposite that the conquest of East Prussia is the con-
quest of a sort of bastion of Germanism out and beyond Poland, and that, as the Eussian advance
approaches the Vistula, it enters what is, for the purposes of its march, friendly territory. It will
fuiiher be seen to what a gi-eat distance westward stretches this solid gi-oup of Polish population, upon
whose moi-al suppoii the invader can rel}-. It is true that the younger men have aU been taken to serve
unwiUingly mider the Prussian flag, but it remains equally true that m all the ambient business of
information and in eveiy other form of succour, whatever of the populace remams in all that wide flat
land wiU be a force adverse to the Gemianic powers, and, for the moment at least, sympathetic with the
invader. Nor wiU that feeling anywhere be stronger than in the town of Posen itself, should the
invader reach it, for nowhere is the subten-anean conflict between the Slav and the Genuan more bitter,
and nowhere has the former security of Prussia aflirmed itself with gi'eater harshness. >

A DIARY OF THE WAR.

SYNOPSIS. British cruisers. A fierce battle still continued before Licg«>.

ivw. 23rs. Italy declared her neutrality.

Auatro- Hungarian ultimatum to Servia. Augcst 7th.

July 25th. ^''® tierman cruiser Gnrhrn, with her escort the Brcslnii, left

King Peter of Servia'a appeal to Russia. Me-ssiiia. Germans outside Liege as,ked for a twenty-four

J 27th hours' arniirtice to collect their killed and wounded. AiTiiietice

Sir Edward Grey proposed a London Conference between Ficrich, J 8 •

German, Italian, and Great Britain's Ambassadors. AccrST Bth . , , ,, , , , ,,..„

T ■ TSWn rrench troops invaded Alsace and reached Alulhausen after a

JCLV <*>Tn. _ .11 p. • eharp en'rafrenieiit, in which the Germans were routed with the

Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia. bavonet. Lord Kitchener issued a circular asking for 100,000

JcLY 29th. mt'ii.

A partial Huesian mobilisation, confined to the Arniv Corps on \rGrsT 9th

t^e border, of Austria-Hungary, w^s signed """ rej'^Pt of * Oiie of the cruiser squadrons of the Main Fleet was attacked by

the news of tho bombardment «f Belgrade. English block <.,,^,,„ .ubmarinek The enemy's submarine, U15, was sunk

Exchange closed. English Bank Kate, 8 per cent, b^. H.M.S. Birmingham.

AccrsT 1st. ArcrsT 10th

General Russian mobilisation ordered German niobilisation ■^France' declared war on Auelria-Hungary. Liige forts still

ordered by tmtjeror. Germany declared war on Kua and untakeii. Germans advanced on NlmLr. The new Press

followed up this declaration by immediat^lv invading the u^..^^^ established by the Government for the issue of official

Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, the neutral State between trance ^^ar news on"ncd

and Germany. King George made a final effort for peace, , .

dispatching a direct personal telegram to the Tsar, offering ,1, ^,'' , , r, i , , , . , ^ , „ „ ,

mediation. Before it could reach St. Petersburg Gennaiiy •^'',« Oothrn and Brrslau took refuge in the Dardanelles. England

declared war. declared war againet Austria.

ArccsT 2nd ArcrsT 12th.

Germany 6 ultimatum to Belgium. Ooeljen and Bredau purchased by Turkey. Bombardment of

, ° Liege forts resumed.

AcccsT 3rd. Auor<!T ISrir

Sir Edward Grey stated British policy and revealed G'ennany's -T., ,?' ,, , t. i ,• . ,, ^ ■• , , .

amazing offer, in the event of our neglecting our obligations "''J? l^?ar addressed a Proclamation to the Polish populations of

to Ffancc. Mobilisation of the Army. Ultimatum to Germany Kuesia Germany, and Austria, promising to restore to Poland

after Belgian appeal to England. German and French complete autonoiny and guarantees for religious liberty and

Ambassadors left Paris and Berlin. ^'>« "«« °^ "'« I^^l'^'i language.

Augcst 4th. August 16ih.

Germany rejected ultimatum. English Government took over Japanese ultimatum to Germany demanding the withdrawal of

control of raihvaye. War dedared between England and her vessels of war from the Far East.

Germany. August 17th.

Vice-.Xdmiral Sir John Jellicoe appointed to command of the The British Expeditionary Force safely landed in France. Death

Home Fleets, with the acting rank of admiral. of Lieut. -General Sir James Grierson.

August Sth. The Belgian Government transferred from Brussels to Antwerp.

Lord Kitchener appointed .Secretary of State for War. H.M.P. August 18th.

AmpUiim struck a mine and foundered. }llany Gciiiiau General Sir II. Smith-Dorrien appointed to command of an Army

ships seized. Corps of the British Expeditionary Force, in euccession to the

Arcrsr 6th. 'ato (jeiieral Grierson.

ir.iiise of Commons, in five minutes, passed a vote of credit for '^*'"e desultory fighting took plac« in the North Sea.

£100,000,000, and sanctioned an increase of the Army by August 20te.

500,000 men. State control of food prices. Tlie G'erman battle The Servians gained a decisive victory over the Ausliians near

cruiser Ooebcn and her escort driven into Messina by two tfhabatz.

11*

LAND AND WATER

August 29, 1914

DAY BY DAY.

FRID.VY, AUGUST 21st.

The German forces entered Brussels and were met by the
Buigomaster, who informed them that Brussels was an
open and undefended city.

SATURDAY, AUGUST 22nd.

The Servian Press Bureau announced that the Servian
Amiy had won a great victory on the Urina. The
Au.'itVian losses were very heavy.
The French War OfRco frankly adnuttod that the
French reverse in Lorraine was more serious than was
tliought at fii-st, but officially denied the ridiculous and
exaggerated accounts sent abroad by the WolfE Bureau.

SUNDAY. AUGUST 23rd.

Since no reply was received to her ultimatum of Augast
loth, Japan declared war on Germany. In oilicial
Jap.inese circles it is considered that it will take three
months to reduce the garrison at Tsingtao. They arc
fullv provisioned for eight months. The Russian
General Staff announced that the Russian Army had
gained an important victory near Gumbenuen against
a force of 160,000 Germans.

The Germans are reported to Lave suffered enormous
losses.

MONDAY. AUGUST 24th.

It was announced that Namur had fallen.

The British forces were engaged all day on Sunday
and after dark with the enemy in the neighbourhood of
Mons, and held their ground.

The British troops were opposed by two German Army
Corps and two Cavalry Divisions. The British
casualties were not heavy, but the enemy suffered very
heavily.

Luneville was occupied by the Germans.

The British Commander-in-Chief, China, reported that
on Saturday afternoon the destroyer Kennet, whilst
chasing a German destroyer, S90, approached too close
to the battery at Tsing-tau and sustained the following
casualties — Three killed and seven wounded.

The Kennet was not materially damaged.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 25th.

Mr. Asquith announced in the House of Commons that
the Government had heard from Sir John French that
the withdrawal already announced of his troops to their
new position had been successfully effected. They
were pressed hard by the enemy, who were, however,
shaken off.

The Field-Marshal provisionally estimated the casualties
at something over 2,000.

Lord Kitchener, speaking in the House of Lords, said : —

" The Expeditionary Force has taken the field on the
French north-west frontier, and has advanced to the
neighbourhood of Mons, in Belgium. Our troops have
already been for thirty-six hours in contact with a
superior force of German invaders.

'■ During that time they have maintained the traditions
of British soldiers, and have behaved with the utmost
gallantry."

Lord Kitchener telegraphed to Sir John French'as follows :

" Congratulate troops on their splendid work. AVe arc
all proud of them."

A telegram received by the Foreign Office reported that a
ZeppeUn airship passed over Antwerp on Monday
night. Six shrapnel bombs were dropped. Sluch
damage was done to property, and twelve lives were
lost.

Such a bombardment constitutes a violation of Article
26 of the fourth Hague Convention.

WEDNESDAY. AUGUST 26th.
Situation xmchanged.

THURSDAY. AUGUST 27tb.

Mr. Churchill announced in the House that the German

armed merchantman Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse had

been sunk by H.M.S. Highflyer on the West African

coast.
This was the ship which had been tr^■ing to arrest traflic

between this country and the Cape. It was one of

the very few German armed ships which had been able

to get to sea.
The 8un-ivors were landed before the vessel was sunk

The losses on H.M.S. Ilighfli/er were one man killed and

five slightly mjured.
A strong force of British marines has been sent to Ostend

and has occupied the town without opposition.

PRODUCTION OF FOOD.

The Hoard of Agriculture and Fisheries have received from theif
Cousultalive Committee the following recommendations, which must
in all cases be dependent upon (1) local conditions, and (2) the circum-
stances of the individual holding. The Agricultural Consultative
Committee are of opinion that, jn the e.xisting circumstances agricul-
turists should do all in their power to secure that the supply of home-
produced foodstuffs may bo in excess of the normal. In this respect
the requirements of the future with regard both to cropping and to tho
maintenance of the fullest complement of live stock that holdings can
usefully carry, must be carefully borne in mind.

1. The acreage under wheat should bo largely increased wherever
practicable. In this direction it should not be forgotten that on clea.n
land, and by the aid of suitable artificial manure, good crops of wheat
can be obtained in successive years. Attention is drawn to sect. 26
of the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1908, which permits anj system of
croppmg subject to the holding being protected from deterioration.

2. Where wheat cannot be grown, the sowing of winter oats, v. inter
barley, and rye might be substituted. These crops ripen early, and
allow" the labour on harvest to be distributed evenly.

3. The cabbage crop is also one to be considered where land can
be spared. It provides a considerable weight of food suitable for
ciriier human or animal consumption.

4. There is much land of a certain class now under grass which
would probably pay for breaking up. If this land is scheduled as
arable in the farm agreement, the tenant has the option of ploughing
it up. If it is scheduled as grass the Agricultural Consultative Com-
mittee suggest co-operation between owner and occupier as to tlia
advisability of breaking np certain fields in view of the national ques-
tion of increasing home-grown foodstuffs.

5.. Where a surplus of grass or clover exists ensilage might ba
made. Particulars of the best methods can be obtained from tha
Board of Agriculture Leaflet No. 9.

6. The slaughter of immature or breeding stock of every descrip-
tion should be avoided. Where circumstances permit the total head
of live stock should be increased, particularly animals such as pigs,
^^hich multiply quickly.

Ewe lambs might with advantage be put to the ram towards the end
of tlie year.

7. While there should be no diminution in tho numbers of live
stock kept, the strictest economy (subject to proper conditioning) and
foresight with regard to feeding is advocated.

The cheapest efficient forms of food should be used, and no waste,
spaces capable of producing food for animals should be allowed. Nn
recommendation is attempted as to the exact description of the food-
stuffs to be grown, as this must depend upon the special circumstances
of each case, of which generally the individual farmer will be the best
judge; if in doubt, he can obtain advice gratis from tho recognised
Agricultural College in his " Province," or from the County Agricul-
tural Organiser. But the following crops among others are worthy
of consideration : Trifolium, vetches, rye for spring feeding, and
Italian rye grass. By adopting such measures the more valuable fooda
would, so far as possible, be freed for human consumption.

The composition of the Consultative Committee is as follows. Tho
Riglit Hon. Sir Ailwvn Fellowes, K.C.B. (Chairman), Mr. Charles
Bathurst, JI.P., Mr. Charles Bidwell, Mr. H. Trustam Eve, Mr. S. W.
Farmer, Mr. C. B. Fisher, Mr. E. N. Nunnelev, Mr. Francis H.
Padwick, Mr. G. Scoby, Mr. G. C. Smyth-Uichards, Mr. Richard
S'.''atton. the Hon. Edvrard Strutt, Mr. Christopher Turaor, Messrs.
A. Goddard ahd C. B. Marshall, joint secretaries.

THE YEAR'S CROPS.

TiiE Board of Agriculture and Fisheries have expedited the tabula-
tion of the agriculture returns collected in June last, and are now abla
tn estimate, subject to final revision, the acreage of certain crops, and
the number of live stock in England and Wales this year. On the
basis of the reports received from their Crop Heportei-s, the Board are
able to make an estimate of the total production of the following
crops :

1914.
Quarters.

1913.
Quarters.

Increase + or Decrease —

Quarters.

Per Cent.

Wheat

7,320,000
0,140,000
0,100,000
1,080,000
433,000

Tons.
2,880,000

6,642,000

0,323,000

9,379,000

915,000

422,000

Tons.
2,895.000

+ 678,000
-183,000
-279,000
+ 165,000
+ 13,000

Tons.
- 15,000

-HO

Barley

- 3

Oats

- 3

3eaiis

■H8

Pea^!

-^ 3

Potatoes

- i

The wheat crop is not only 10 per cent. larger than in 1913, but
is well above the average of the last ton years. The crop of beans is
the largest since 1907, while that of potatoes is only slightly below
that of last year, which was the largest on reccrd.

UxDET*. its statutory constitution tho Road Board las availabia
a considerable sum, at present over £1,000,000, to provide work upon
the roads at such times as these. The Roads Improvement Associa-
tion, in view of the disorganisation of industry consequent on the war,
is compiling as rapidly as possible, for submission to the local authori-
ties and the Government Departments, a series of suggestions for road
improvements in various areas upon which this unemployed labour
could be most usefully utilised. The various provincial branches of
the Roads Improvement Association have been asked to send in lists
for their respective districts. Readers not in touch with any of tha
<R.I.A. branches who would like to submit proposals should" address
communications to the General Secretary of the Association, Mr.
Wall.ice E. Riche, 15, Dartmouth-street, Westminster, London, S.W.
Details' sliould be forwarded of trunk and important roads that need
widening, strengthening, and re-surfacing where the minimum amount
of land is required, or whore it can be acquired without much difficulty.

12*

August 29, 1914

LAND AND WATER

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

ueClTiMAXE m:nelayinc

i«

THE MINE QUESTION.

IT is not possible, nor -would it bo desirable, to record
naval incidents on day-by-day lines. The first
official report is necessarily brief, and when a mors
extended one appears it usually puts tilings in a mora
or less totally different light.

The sinking of the Amplilon is a case in point.
The fuller official report should go far to reassure public opinion
on the subject of mines, which, since the Fctro-pavlovsk was
blown up instantaneously at Port Arthur in the Kusso-
Japanese War, have been regarded by the public as " appal-
lingly, etc., etc., etc., deadly."

In one sense what the public thinks does not matter. In
another sense it matters a very great deal, for public appre-
hensions are certain to be communicated to relatives in the
Fleet, wherein everyone day
and night knows that a mine
may be struck. The best logic
for that is Farragut's " Damn
the torpedoes."

This, attitude, however,
will become difficult to pre-
serve if men are constantly
receiving letters from their
nearest and dearest about
" those diabolic mines ! " Ps}'-
chology is everything in naval
warfare, and " nerves " are
easily communicated if the
process goes on long enough.
Far too much about " the
mine danger " has appeared in
print.

As a matter of fact the
mine is merely potentially
dangierous. The l^etropav-
lovs/c was not sunk in a
moment by a mine, but be-
cause that particular mine
exploded her main magazines.
That did the mischief. Simi-
larly, the Amphion would
probably have still been afloat had she hit the mine anywhere
except where she did hit it. Even so, she remained afloat for
a, considerable time, and the loss of life dii-ectly due to the
mine seems to have been small.

The Russo-Japanese War was prolific in mines, both sides
having ships hit. I chanced to have many personal friends
in both fleets, and after the war " experiences " were, naturally
enough, very get-at-able.

Of the Japanese ships which hit mines the Hatiute took
some two hours to sink, and no lives were lost. The Russians
aver that she sank in three minutes, like the I'etropavlovsJc
did, but that in no way corresponds with the narratives of her
crew.

The Tashlma kept afloat for many hours, and foundered
dowly while being towed home rather too fast a day later.

The Asahi was hit by two mines, which both glanced off,
and exploded without doing any more barm than wetting
everybody.

The Shihhhiina hit one mine which did not explode.

Tlie MUcasa hit nothing.

That is the true story of the most dramatic mine incident
in the world's history — the entire Japanese battle fleet steam-
ing unconsciously into a mine field.

On the Russian side the refropavlovslc was, of course, as
stated, blown to pieces immediately by the explosion of her
magazines; but the cruiser Baijan, when she hit a mine, merely
had one compartment filled, and steamed into harbour at .a
reduced speed.

Those aro in each case bits of information, from those
•who had been in the ships mentioned ; and — since blockade
nines have not been made materially more deadly in the
interim — these details should serve to remove the impression
that a mine is necessarily any worso than a torpedo or big
-shell. Tiie only really terrible thing about its menace is that
it (like the submarine) is unseen attack.

For the rest, it may be added that mines may play a most
useful part in the British blockade, since it is far easier for us
*o secure results by mining a definite area which miist ba

-i.e..

passed than for the Germans to accomplish things on thai
'■ dropping by chance " principle.

There is one matter which I have omitted in the fore-
going, and that is the part played by the mine-sweepers-
fiinall vessels fitted for removing mines laid by the enemy.

The tremendous importance of this last is that, wlaether
or no the British fleet lays mines, the German fleet dares not
move out without sweeping its way. Sweeping is not the
kind of thing which can be done at battle-cruiser speed. It
is to be done easily enough, but' it takes time. And time is
everything, for it allows due notice to be given of every move
of the enemy; in other words, it renders an evasive surprise
(humanly speaking) impossible.

Meanwhile, several neutral mei-chant ships have been
sunk by mines, and an Admiralty notification issued to tha

effect that the Germans have

HOSTILf
NAVAL BASE

SENSELESS MlNELAYtNC

mined trade routes well out
in the North Sea. This is a
violation of International
Law. Also a senseless pro-
ceeding, as it is devoid of any
militai-y utility. In the
North Sea neutral ships are
the chief victims; in the
Adriatic the Austrians have
lost a torpedo boat and a fine
liner by their own mines !

The only real ttie of mines
is:

(1) To "contain" a
hgstile Fleet.

(2) To prevent hostile
movements along an antici-
pated route.

As regards the first, the
British Fleet was at sea and in
jwsition long before Germany
could attempt the opera-
tion. As for the second — ■
as mentioned last week — the
Amph'wn was sunk because
she chanced to run into a
legitimate German anticipation of the movements of our
Expeditionary Force.

The mines dropped on trade routes out at soa come in
neither category. They simply indicate that those in control
of German mine-layers are animated by the " Goehen spirit."
which, being translated into plain English, .is " only hit
where there is no risk of being hit back,"

TRADE AND NAVAL WARFARE.

An event of the utmost importance is now in process of
taking place without most of those immediately concei-ncd
realising that the Fleet has anything to do with' the matter.
I refer to the organised attempt which has recently been
initiated — the attempt to capture and hold all the German
trade markets. It is a remarkable illustration of the ti'uth
of the old proverb, " Trade follows the flag."

All the same, however, there is a certain situation to bo
faced. We have swept and— unless the unexpected occurs —
we shall go on sweeping German commerce from the seas.
This means the automatic capture of all German markets — a.
prospect of unexampled prosperity for the British Empire at
the expense of Germany.

Germany cannot protect her trade. We can protect ours.
Tlie deduction to neutral merchants is obvious.

Herein, however, lies the danger. Germany has nothing
more to lose, but she has everything to gain. If she can get
even a portion of her trade under the American flag, the
proverbial coach and horses through an Act of Parliament
will save her from utter trade disintegration.

In such case we can only press our advantage at the expense
of America. Germany may have her own dreams about
destroying America once she can succeed in destroying her
European rivals. But no American is likely to dream that
particular dream. And so there is always the risk that iu
American diplomacy present advantage may bulk larger than
future possibilities, especially since the recent Japanese action.
Whatever Japan's intentions may be, they aro bound to be

13*

LAND AND AV^ATEE

August 29, 1014

foUowctl with apprehension on the part of the United States,
to i\honi our Oriental ally is a mciiaco in the saino way that
Germany has been a menace to us for many ycais past —
i.e., owing to tho pressure of ciix-uinstanccs.

So far as Japan is conccnied, her quarrel with Germany
is terribly genuine. A victoi-y for Germany would mean
BOHiethiiig infinitely worse than tho Eussian menace in tlie
past^ The t^cmis of peace in tho German scheme of things
include the handing over of Saigon and lloug Kong, possibly
vi Vladivostok also.

In 1899, soon after Russia had taken Port Arthur, I had
it from the Tsar's own lips, '• We only took Port Arthur to
ket-p the Germans out of it. We have no quarrel with Japan,
LuL we do not trust Germany."

Germany made up for tilings by " lea.sing " Kiao-Chau.
Russia and Japan subsequently went to war, and Port Arthur
is now Japanese. But aiter the war, when Russia r.nd Japan
comj>ared notes, they found German infiiicnce behind all tlio
trouble, just as surely as when all England was shouting about
the Dogger Bank affair, tho British Navy was watching, not
the Russians, but the Germans.

These details may not seem exactly germane to tho present

state of alfairs, but actually

they are very much so. Ger-

iiuny had her own schemes of

a Japanese alliance. Its temis

were probably about as reli-
able as tho alliance offered to

Belgium, but that is a side

issue. On tJie principle of

Timto Danarot <lona fercutti',

Japan has joined the Triple

Entente.

The final issue now rests

with America. Will the

United States sacrifice her

trade interests to honour and

the fight ajiinst Germany's

bid to rule the entire world ?

Or will America in 1914 do

what she, at Napoleon's bid-
ding, did in 1812 ? From the

Kaiser's point of view she will.
The hour is not yet, and

further discussion of it can he

reserved for a more convenient

season. 1 content myself here

with indicating the possibili-
ties which lie on tho water.

American public opinion we

are sure of ; but since Japan

lias entered into tho World

War we should not placo

too much dependence on

Americaji bosses. Already Carnegie, of free library fame, has

made a better apology for tho Kaiser's action than anything

ever issued in Berlin. "

The fact is that this is the first war of modern times in

which trade issues have been predominant. Great merchant

navies have gi-own up in the st«am era. They have grown up in

profound peace. True, there have been wars, but this genera-

irifi'o' "^A "w"" M Z""'^}^ ""y appreciable commerce was

THE NORTH SEA.
About the North Sea it is impossible to write fully. It is
£0 very easy to give away something in perfect innocence. So
far as I am concerned, I do not propose to deal with anything
save week-old official reports, nor any too fully even with these.
Readers must understand that in a life and death struggle like
tho present, restraint may be necessary, even where °ofiicial
reports are concerned.

So I confine myself to stating that the German submarine
U 15 has gone below to stay there; that the pretty uuofEcial
stories since published are bunkum pure and simple, and
finally (hat the Germana aro trying something which they are
unlikely to pull o£F.

Everything written about this war gets to Germany
within an hour or so, and it would be sheer idiocy to satisfy
natural public curiosity any further just ab present.

Tho only other thing that I can add is that the Gcnnan
submarines' service has been unexpectedly bold and darin".
Our authorities credited it with lacing that, and— well,
" things did not happen as expected " — by Germany.

Presently, as many of the Gennans as aro not Goelcns will
come again to " a certain place." Tlicy will go below and stay

there till the Judgment Day.
That is nearly all that is to be
said about the mattez'.

There is nothing to add,
except that when tlie German
authorities read this they will
think it a bit of glorious bluff.
" Righto." (German ofF.cera
commanding submarines,
please note.)

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

The Austrian battleship
Zrinyi has now been officially
sunk so many times by a single
French shell that I am con-
strained to imagine that the
report may be true. Other-
wise I should have been
entirely sceptical — mainly
along the argument that there
is no conceivable reason wliy
she should have been out to
get hit. In this war of sur-
prises, however, one never
knows.

Otherwise, there is nothing
to e.xpect in the Adriatic
but a strict Franco-British
blockade to tho Austriaiis,
varied with a few torpedo
attacks. Battle fleet actions
are excessively improbable for reasons stated last week. There
may be one — but only absolute lunacy can dictate it.

THE FAR EAST.

Japan's action so far as the Far East is concenicd docs not
materially alter things. One way and anoVher we alone are
superior to anything of the Gei-man Navy in the Far East, but
we have no troops for the nccessaiy military assault. Kiao-
Chau will fall eventually, but it is likely to prove a second

^»..f I fl ^J^^" "^"'^ *''^ ^^^'"^ '^"^ Stripes is the only ^°it Arthur, even if (like the Russians at Port Arthur)
rilTf, I f f n- "^ account, and even it is not likely to remain imported guns have been reckoned as existing. According to
.Ww^iVk ^ ^^fi"^.^ I"^ ^''"S- The rulers of the sea will "7 information the place is not really very strong— anywav.

i 1 ,, ''®"»&frf°t8 very long. The rulers of the sea
control the world's trade

dirovHer^jTn ?T"'' ^'^^'f''-^^^^ '° the past, we might
at h7eS^ nf "^^ '' "\''"^' ^°"^' ^"t we should do^so
^„ ii I .P^^ ^. •'"'■ '"^"' ^^''"se Germany would sive us
so much trouble that all trade would pass to the U.S 1^
It may so pass; but only if Germany be able to dispute

fV,,^.,, A ■ "TT!*^ '« e^-en conceivable that one or two

sS n1o":E/r"'"""f^ ^^ ^'' ^°-« the Unitl
theth^nrtlte^maritso^^ '' ''' ^"^-^^'' "^ °^

in th:r Ktis:^-; tn's^so.r'srne^"'^ ^^',%°"^ ^"^"'"^
Eooner— the USA \^i}} ^«™- sooner or later— probably

The KaSe?', b^, ^'"7 ^"^ ^^"f"^ °" ^'^^ ^^m« question. ^

is possible of^.epetit on today Far ^ ^^^ °^^ ^T^ ^S«
on President Wi son than th«^R f I ^^''^^'" '''"^^ ''^P"'''
any idea of. ^^^ ^'^^"^^ """^ '" ^hc street has

At present evei7thing seems at
tvar IS not a subject for headlines.
BO dull and interestino-.

my information the place is not really very strong — anyway,
nothing like reported. And so tho Japanese wilf either get
it within a week, or else besiege it much as wc besieged Sevas-
topol jn the Crimean War for many weary months.
• ■'^^''iT'-liiug depends on whether the officer commanding
isCoeben or otherwise. If ho be sufficiently otherwise, Kiao"
Chau may yet remain German at tho end of tho war. This
possibility at least should not be forgotten.

For the rest, it may be as well to remember that Admiral
Kuroi (who commanded the naval land battery which sunk
the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur) is somewhere in the Pacific
with the A.^(rma and A:um(r. He is a very old friend of mine,
and I do not want to puff him unduly. But— if tho betting
Jrateruity has turned from horses to ships— I will give thenx
tlie tip that it IS a two to one that Kuroi is not the central
figure in tho Far East operations. If the Germans at sea
evade him- all right. If they meet his two cruisers-God
help them !

set fair." Commerce
It is purely nautical, and

SITUATION

little

IN THE ATLANTIC.

_ery little is really known about this. It would appear
that German commerce destroyers are being too harried by
British ennsers to do much mischief. This situation should
continue till the coi-sairs die out automatically. There is,

W»

August 29, 1914

LAND AND WATER

however, a very great risk that what with secret bases and
making the most of " within the meaning of the Act " in
International Law, many corsairs will live beyond the other-
wise natural terms of their existence.

The trouble will not last. The corsairs, sooner or later,
will disappear or cease to fly the German flag ((( la Goehen), but
we must be prepared to expect losses in the interim. Every
weak neutrjd ailords a potential German base, and the
difference between the old-time pirate and a. German 'cor-
sair " is likely to grow finer and finer.

Luck may save us; otherwise we must be prcioared for
temporai-y losses in the Atlantic.

Reports of actions there should be accepted with caution.
The German naval cruisers about are very fast, and nothing
short of the direst necessity would induce tliem to fight. This
avoidance of action is not Goehen-, but correct naval strategy.
It will be well if we all remember it. There are many good
men who command German cruisers. They will not Goehen
till forced to it.

Atlantic reports are meagre, and unoflicial at that. But
in so far as they indicate anything, they do indicate that the
captain of the Goehen is not fit to black the boots of the
German captains in the Atlantic. " Honour to whom honour
is due " — even though he be an enemy. Our immediate job
is to scupper the efficient enemy afloat on the high seas. After
that, it will be quite time enough to talk about the German
ships hanging about in harbour.

The Germans on the high seas are sportsmen, and should
be treated as such. Their ultimate fate is certain as anything
can bo. Sooner or later wo shall get them.

Just at the present moment it probably sounds silly to
suggest that the fate of the world depends on that " sporting
instinct " which for untold years the Nonconformist conscience
has told us leads straight to damnation and hell.

I cannot add the proofs. I can assert that I am not .a
"sporting prophet," but that is all. I have never followed
"sport" suificiently well to say more; but so far as I can
calculate the Germans have nautically very much backed the
wrong horse.

When you size things up exactly, " war is sport in war
time and contrariwise sport is war in peace time." The transi-
tion is by no means so great as some would suppose. This is
where we have the Germans.

Ajs placed here and self-censored, it probably sounds a
trifle incoherent.

A month hence I may add some explanation. To-day, I
dafe not;. I can merely go in for the tiresome reiteration
that-— so far as the Navy is coucerned^the Germans have
" backed the wrong horse."

It sounds like bluff and " swank " to say that " Der Tag "
is far more likely to end at the bottom of the North Sea than
on the shores of England ! But so it is. Some of it depends
on the land defences of Lord-knows-where being prepared.

I cannot go into details (God grant that they never
come!); but so far as these lines concern oi'dinary British
people, I want them to be prepared for learning one day that
a dozen or so of our Dreadnoughts have been sunk.

The thing to do in such case is to remember that there is
a good supply of other British Dreadnoughts to take the place
of any who go under.

The German Navy long ago gave up serious reckoning as to
its battle chances against the British Fleet. To-day it no
longer trusts to guns or torpedoes, submarines, or to aircraft,
but to "common or garden" ■panic. It seeks to create that
panic. The Germans will continue to lie in harbour till tha
dark days of winter come along. Then .

Well, none of us are quite certain about that " then," or
that " Der Tag " (query Dor Nicht). Personally, I am not
of opinion that German sailors who have been left lying for
mouths in port saying " Der Tag " to each other are any niovcj
likely to prove up to the mark than did Villeneuve's men when,
an odd hundred years ago, they went out to meet Nelson's war-
worn people at Trafalgar.

As stated last week, and as I shall state every week here-
after, the captain of the Goehen, when he fuukcd things,
sacrificed every German hope on the sea.

Till then, wo believed a good deal of their bluff. Now
not a man in the Fleet believes it.

We have got the moral scoop, and the most important
duty of the Fleet at the present time is tc hold it. People can
calculate as they will about " tons of pi'ojectilcs per minute,"
but things of this sort have no real v>ar meaning. Hence :

(1) The Goehen ran away.

(2) The Germans not fitted with white feathers will try at
all costs to make up her deficiency.

The result (with any luck whatever) will be a foregone
conclusion.

No doubt there are fights to come — the German captains
will put in the best they can ; but, as I prophesied last week,
the cowardice of the Goehen has settled the ultimate result of
the war on the water.

FINAL NOTE.

The general situation at the time of writing remains abso-
lutley unchanged from what was described last week, except
that the German advance towards Ostend probably indicates
that an attempt to land a, small raiding force in this country
is in contemplation. The Germans have apparently no
prospect whatever of getting over any considerable body of
men, but we may at any time look for the unexpected an-ival
of a " forlorn hope," consisting of from 500 to 1,000 men, which
will be landed at the most unexpected point, not with the
object of accomplishing anything vital, but for the sake cf
moral effect.

If such an attempt be made, the probable landing (let us
hope) is at the bottom of the North Sea.; but, failing that,
anywhere — that is to .say, Seaton in Devonshire, or Aberystwith
in Wales, are just as likely to be objectives as those places along
the East Coast which are awaiting a possible German invasion.

The situation in the Baltic is apparently unchanged. It
would seem that the Germans are keeping up a very distant
and cautious blockade of tlie Russian coast, and that the
Russians are waiting unmoved until some of the Gangoot class
are ready for sea.

A TOPOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO THE

WAR ZONE.

By E. CHARLES VIVIAN.

Aix-la-Chapelle. — Known in German as Aachen.
A town and watering place of Western Pnissia, situated between
the Meuse and the Rhine in the Rhine province, forty-four miles
west south-west from Cologne, on the line of railway fiom
Cclojne to Liege. Although situated in German territorj', Aix
is practically the point of junction of the German, Belgian, and
Dutch frontiers, and is a town of considerable importance, with
a population of nearly 1.50,000. Its thermal baths are widely
celebrated, and it is one of the great customs stations of Western
Germany. Two treaties of peace have been signed here — the
first in iC68, the second in 1748.

Alsace-Lorraine. — A German impenal territory,
embracing the former French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine,
and styled in German Eisass-Lothringen. It extends
from the Luxembourg border on the north to Switzerland in the
south, and is bounded on the east by the Palatinate of Bavaria,
and on the west by the French frontier, as defined on the conclu-
sion of peace in 1871. The total population of the territory
• is upwards of two millions, and its chief towns are Strasbourg
(capital of the territory), Metz, Mulhausen, Colmar, Hagenau,

and Saargemund. The railways total upwards of 1,300 miles,
and the territory is of great fertility, being chiefly devoted to
agricultural pursuits. The Government is vested in a Governor-
General, appointed by the German Emperor. The Vosges
mountains form a natural frontier defence practically from the
Swiss boundary to the latitude of Strasbourg, on the western
side, and the Rhine valley, in the east of the territory, forms
another line of great natural strength. Good roads and
a system of canals afford means of communication, in
addition to the railways of the territory. The Rhine valley in
Alsace is the more fertile portion of the whole, Lorraine lying
almost entirely on the high plateau reaching from the Moselle
to the Saar, and being devoted in great measure to coal, iron
and salt mining. The line of German fortifications stretches
from Altkirch in the south to Thionville in the north, and i.^
connected by a strategic railway linking up all the principal
fortified points.

Antwerp. — Capital of the Belgian province of the same
name, situated about fifty miles from the sea and twenty-five
miles north of Brussels by rail, on the right bank of the River

15*

LAND AND AVATER

August 29, 1014

Scheldt. It is one of the chief European port, oyer sixty
Sippi lines having their headquarters here and the quay
^'Snodation extends nearly tl^ree mdes alon|the Ja^k .f the
river The total population is about 400,000. Ant\eip is
Surrounded by a ring of forts of modern design, the strongest
reTing that toward the cast and south, where eight forts
laeed at regular intervals, le-.s than a mile distant from each
!, her, defend the eity. In addition to the regular ring of defences
the forts dc AVavrc and de Waelhem. in the south-east, and Fort
de Schooten, in the north-east, form outpost defences On the
«e.ct forts St. Marie, St. PhiUppe, ,^6 Zwj-"drecht, and do
Cruybeke, defend the approaches to the Scheldt, which has to
be crossed before the city can be reached from this direction.

Charleroi -A town of nearly 25,000 inhabitants, and
the centre of the iron industry of southern Belgium. It was
fortified up to 18f)8, when its fortifications were converted into
promenades. It is situated on the main hne from Mons to
Vamur about half-way between the two towns, and is about
fifty ni'ilcs directly south of Brussels, and roughly twenty-hve
miles from the French frontier.

Elbe— One of the most important rivers of central
F.uropc which, after leaving the Bohemian-Saxon frontier, turns
north-west, passing through Dresden to the North German plain,
(lowing by way of Torgau, JIagdeburg, and Hamburg, beyond
whichit divides into the north or Hamburg Elbe, and the south
or Harburg Elbe, surrounding the island of Wilhclmsburg and
several smaller islets. Beyond the islands the two rivers join
again at Blankenese, forming a stream of four to nine miles in
width to Cuxhaven, where the river empties into the Nortli Sea.
From Hamburg to the sea the bed of the river has been dredged
to a depth wliich will admit vessels of 26 feet draught, and the
total navigable length from the mouth is 52.5 miles. Between
Cuxhaven and Freiburg the Kiel Canal has its western outlet
to the Elbe at Brunsbiittel. From Freiburg outward to the sea
the banks of the river are strongly fortified, and the defences,
together with the fortifications on the island of Heligoland, off
the mouth of the river, render the river and canal practically
impregnable to attack from the sea.

Galicia. — An Austrian tenitory with a population of
about 7 J millions, of whom the great majority are Poles and
Ruthenians. It is virtually a self-governing province of the
Austrian Empire, and, occupying the northern part of Austrian
territory, borders on Russian Poland and Russia itself, the
frontier being defined for a great distance in the west of the
province by the river Vistula and the Sanna or San. The chief
towns of Galicia are Lemberg, Tarnow, Jaroslaw, Tarnopol,
Brody, and Sanok, while the chief town of Western Galicia is
Cracow, an important railway centre near the Russian and
German frontiers. Railways cross the Russian frontier from
Brody to Dubno in the east, and from Cracow to Czcnstochowa
and Kielce in the west of the province.

Heligoland. — Belonging to the Frisian group of islands,
and situated 23 miles north-west from the mouth of the
Elbe, Heligoland was ceded to Germany by Great Britain in
1890, and has since been made one of the principal defences
of the Elbe mouth and the western exit from the Kiel Canal.
It forms one of the strategic bases of the German fleet, and
possesses a harbour, the Duneninsel, in which the largest vessels
can coal in safety. The population of the island is, in normal
times about 2,500, and it ranks as a fashionable North German
watering place. The island is little over a mile in length, but
in its area are to be found some of the strongest and best equipped
forts in existence. It is reckoned as part of the province of
Schleswig-Holstein — at present.

Insterburg.— An important town about fifty-five miles
cast of Koenigsburg, in East Prussia. From Insterburg five
railways branch to Koenigsburg, Memel, Thorn, and Lyck in
Germany, and Kovno in Western Russia. It is the chief town of
a circle in the government district of Gumbinnen, and is situated
at the point where the Inster and Angerap rivers join to form the
Pregel. It is an active agricultural and manufacturing town,
with a population of about 20,000, including a garrison, in normal
times, of about 3,000.

Lille.— A town and important raOway centre of northern
t ranee, about 155 miles north of Paris by rail, and about ten
rules from the Belgian frontier. It is the capital of the d^part-
iiient of Nord, and is situated 'on the low plain of the River
Deule. a tributary of the Scheldt. Canals afioid communica-
tion both with Pans and Belgium, and railwavs extend from
Lille to Calais, Ghent, Brussels, and Paris, while the town is
also an important point on the railway which follows the
northern frontier from Dunkirk to Longuvon. It is one of the
most important manufacturing towns on the northern frontier •
Ks population IS upwards of 200,000, mainly devoted to flax-
ppmning and kindred industries, while it is also the site of a
otate tobacco factory.

Luncvillc.— Chief town of an arrondissement in
the department of Meurthe et Moselle, seventeen miles south-
cast of Nanc)-, and 240 miles cast of Paris on the Paris-Strasbourg
hne of railway, and also on the Epinal-Naucy line. In times of
peace it is one of the most important French cavalry stations,
and is fortified, being an outpost point of the Nancy-Belfoit
line of frontier defences, and about ten miles distant from the
German frontier. The district round about is mainly agri-
cultural, but the town itself is a centre for several manufacturing
industries. Its population is about 25,000.

Mechlin. — Also " Malines," of which the more popular
name is a corruption. A Belgian city on the River Dyle, and
an important railway junction about midway between Antv,-ei"p
and Brussels, with lines extending in practically every direction,
as well as a number of main roads connecting with all the important
points of north-western Belgium. It contaiiLS extensive railway
workshops connected with the Belgian State railways, and has a
population of about G0,000.

Mons. — Situated about forty miles west of Namur, and
about 140 miles from Paris. It is the centre of the chief coal-
mining district of Belgium, and is an important railway junction,
being the point at which two lines branch to Paris from the nortii.
The eastern, or more direct hue, is via Maubcuge, and is 155 miles
to Paris, while the western route, via Douai and Arras, is 176
miles. Mons is situated on a liill and has been fortified for the
past six centuries ; it is connected by rail with Charleroi, thirty-
five miles distant, and with Brussels, about forty-five miles away.

Nancy. — Chief town of the French department of
Meurthe et Moselle, and up to 1871 the capital of the French
province of Lorraine. The population, which is upwards of
1 10,000, has doubled in the last thirty years owing to the number
of people who have cros.'sed over from German Lorraine in order
to be under French rule. Nancy is the headquarters of the
20th Army Coi-ps, and is situated about fifteen miles from the
German frontier, on the Paris-Strasbourg railway and also on
the Mezicres-Nancy-Epinal strategic line of frontier railway.
It is strongly fortified, and is of considerable importance among
the frontier defences of France in the south-east. The Maine-
Rhine Canal flows by the town, and adds to its facilities for
transport.

Oertelburg. — An important railway junction in East
PrUiSsia, being the point where the railway running west fiom
Lyck divides for Allcnstein and Neidenburg. It is about twenty
miles north of the Pohsh frontier.

Sambre. — A river of Northern France and Southern
Belgium, rising in the valley which lies between the towns of
Maubeuge and Guise in the north of France (department Nord).
It flows north-cast by the town of Maubeuge, after which it turns
more directly east, crosses the Belgian frontier, and continues a
fairly straight course to Charleroi, whence it flows by many
curves and convolutions to Namur, where it joins the River Meuse,
which, later on, becomes the Maas in Dutch teiritoiy.

Strasbourg. — Gennan capital of the territory of
Alsace-Lorraine, and a first-class fortress, standing t>\:o miles
from the left bank of the Rhine, and about ninetj^ miles north of
Bale. Its normal garrison amounts to 15,000 men, and it is the
headquarters of the 15th German Anny Corps, while the fortifi-
cations have been enormously strengthened since the war of
1870-71, and brought up to date and fitted with guns of the
most modern and powerfid type. Its population is over 150,000.
Railways connect it with Metz, Nancy, Bale, and all the principal
German garrison stations, the lines towards German}' being
constructed with a view to reinforcing the Strasbourg garrison
to any extent that may be required.

Thorembais. — The name of two Belgian villages, situated
about two miles apart in the province of Brabant, on the road
from Tirlemont to Gembloux. The more eastern of the two,
about nine miles from Gembloux, is the larger and more important.

Valenciennes. — Situated on the right bank of the
River Scheldt, about 157 miles north of Paris oa the Pari.s-
Brussels railway, at the point where the Schonclle and Scheldt
join. It is the centre of an extensive and rich coalfield, and is
largely engaged in iron and steel industries. Its population is
upwards of 25,000. It is connected by rail with Lille and
Maubeuge, as well as with various other centres, and is one of the
most important towns of the depai-tment of Nord. The Belgian
frontier is about eight miles distant from the town. The lace for
which Valenciennes used to be famed is but little made here uo\\".

Willcnburg. — A German village, about fourteen miles
north of the Polish frontier, and an important point on the
strategic railway of East Prussia.

"The War by Land." by Hilaire Belloc, "The War by Water,"
by F. T. Jane, the Diary o{ the War, and the series lorminfi a
Topographical Guide, commenced in the issue of Land and Water
dated Au^ 22nd, which can be obtained through any newsa^ient.

IC*

Soptombcr 5, 1914

LAND AND WATER

*OSTEND

Dunkirk:

CALAIS

' BOULOGNE

ARRAS

CAMSRAr

BAPAUME
^ABBEVILLE

^S^ CHARLERQi

NAMUR

LE(£ATEAU CHIMAY <

'ERONNE CUiSt-

LA FERE

O 5 10 15 20 15

1 I t I I f

SCALE OF MiLES

m PARIS

THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOG.

AT the moment this article was first written — some thii'ty-six hours before it could he iu the
hands of the public — the situation at the front in the western field of the war was more
difficult to grasp, and one's judgment upon it was more dependent upon mere conjecture,
than had been the case in any previous phase of the operations. The ne^\■s was more meagre
than it had yet been, and, while meagre, was made the more useless by occasional very vivid and
very ignorant descriptions of warfare, written by correspondents who had iu mind, not our
iufonnation, but a momentary nervous effect and a corresponding profit for their proprietors.

Nevertheless, it was possible upon that, Wednesday, evening to arrive at a general judgment
of the situation, or at any rate of the positions ; and one which did not include too mucli
doubtful matter. The news of Thursday corroborated those conclusions.

If the reader will look at the sketch outline which is set at the head of this article he will perceive
that there is no mark made upon it for the position of the opposing troops or for the frontiers
existing before the war between the different governments, French, Gcnnan, and Belgian. Both these
omissions are deliberately made, because I desire to show by a series of reasoned steps what has
happened — and only then, by diagrams, to show how the Allied line fell back.

I will therefore beg the reader to follow the very elementary exposition I shall now undertake
with the aid of the few lines and points marked upon this sketch map. It only concerns the northern
front between Verdun and Paris, because it is upon this front that the issue of the first phase of our
westera war will be decided in the next few days. What is happening south of Verdun is of littia
consequence to the great issue north and west of that fortress — it is of the less consequence since the
repelling of the Crown Prince's amay, which was attempting to pierce the line of the Meuse north of
Verdun.

It will be rememl>ered that from the Friday evening, August 21, to the Sunday evening,
August 23, the Allied line was massed upon the River Meuse above Naraur, and also along the line 6f
the Sambre, and .so on to Mons. Tliis long cordon of men from a little west of Mons to Nainiir itself
passed through Charleroi. It consisted upon the left (that is in the neighbourhood of Mons) of
somewhat less than 80,000 British troops. The remaining two-thirds of the line running up along

LAND AND WATER

Scptcuiltor 5, 1914

ihe rJ<'ht tlirou-'h Cluiiloiol ami along the lower Sauibre to Naiuur (where the Samhre falls into
the Uexi-^o) was" held I)y the -jth Freueh Army, induainn; Al<>;-eruui troops. There were, i^erhaps,
ui)on the whole of tliis line live army cor])s, iucliuling the two of the l^^nglish contuigent ; there may
have been six, hut the lesser number is the more proba])le. It was against this line, from Moiis
to Namui-, tliat the A\hole v.eight of the Gennan shock was delivered. AVlicther eight or
whether ten Army Coi'ps attacked we do not know, Ijut \\e are certain froni tlie nature of the
lighting that the otl'eusive (us was to be expected) came on in much larger numbers than the defensive

The Am-lo-French line from IShms to Namnr stood the sliock thoroughly during those two days.
The wei'dit (>l" tliis attack came against the centre, upon Churlcroi ; it was tliere delivered a' once with,
the intention of breaking tlie line of the Sandn-c and also of securing the passage of the river. That
attjK'k, tliouirh the line swayed backwards and forwards across tlic Sambre at this point, failed in its
junuediate object. The Allied line was not broken by the (urman aswiult.

At 2 o'clock, however, of that siimc Sunday, August .:2ord, about the foi-tieth horn- of the struggle,
iJie eastern forts whicli defend Namnr down the Meuse valley v.ere silenced by the siege howitzer fire
of tlic Oennans; and tln-ough a gap of about seven miles so opened, the Gennans entered the town and
tlicnceforward commanded the bridges over the two rivers. 1'hey Avere not pei-haps in full command
ii those bridges till about •") o'clock in the afternoon, but tlic fact that they would be in command of
them was known to the Erench commanders not long after 2 o'clock, when these eastern forts

weix! silenced.

As I e.\])laiu(Hl in my notes of last Meek, it Avas the fall of Namnr Avith its bridge-heads Avhieli
clianged the whole aspect of the campaign. Until that moment a counter-offensive through the
j\rdennes Avas the French g-ame, after it a purely defensi\e strategy was imposed. The Allied line
l)etween ]\rons and Namur, Avhich the Germans had tried to l)reak and had failed to break, now had to
fall back because the fortress protecting its right \vas gone. The Fi-ench round Charleroi, getting the
news first, began to letire on the Sunday e\ening, and the English to their left immediately afterwards
in the darkness Ix'twecn Sunday and Monday. 1 illustrate tliis by the aecom2)an3-ing diagrams, because.

TKF ENGLISH

MONS

CHARLEROI

NAMUR

TO Mt

BKITCK SHOWrsO KOW THS rALL (IV yxUVV. IN THE I:.\BLT AFTEEXOON OP SUNDAY, AUGUST 2aEP, IX VOL'
liKirKEirtNT OF THE WIIOI.B AI.I.IVD LINE, PROCKEDIXO TBOM lilGlIT TO LEFT, AND NOT UNDERTAKEN ON J
WIIKKB WAS TlIK ENGLISH CONTIN'iK.NT, TILL DABKNESS HAD JALLKN.

VKD AN I3I3IF.DIATB
ItK KXTKEKE LEFT,

though the matter Avas described last week, it not only bears reiteration, hut needs it. The fall of
Namur has changed, prolonged, and, perhaps, made more decisive the Avhole European War.

The i rench counter-offensive through the Ardennes to the east of the Meuse, pivoting on
JNamur, and uitcndcd to thrust up against the German communications in Eclgium, could no longer
pivot on ^ainur, because Namur was gone. It had also to fall back. The Allied troops which had
held ti.e line of the Sambre, prolonged from Namur to Mons, fell back, heavily pressed by the enemy,
to the po.sition Candn-ai-Le Cateau-Mezlcres. There were, as a fact, troops beyond Cambrai toAvards
Arras ; and there Avere, of course, many troops protecting the line of the Upper :srcuse between
Mezicres and Verdun. ^^

. ,-^\"'V^\'i" J;*^ ""^'^''^ fro"'' *1'<^ "liip at the head of these comments, that the English contingent
Which had held tlie country round about Mons had not fallen directly back, but backwards a»d to the
/.y/; at the ^alnc• tune. Hie retreat was diagonal. For the line Cambrai-Lc Catcau is not directly
bchnid the hue :Mons-Charleroi, but at an oblique thereto.

1..„. ir -r"^" ?^ f^''' 'f * '^"'■'"•" ^^'"^ ''■^^'^l^ «f ^^>«<^ ^"cti-cat meant, of course, that the march was
longei tlum ,t would havebeen if it had been a direct falling back. It Avas immensely arduous, kept
up moie <>\ Irss <l:iy and iiigld, and involving heavy losses in men who could not kerp up and men Avho

Septem1)er 5, 1914

LAND AND WATER

■were wountlcd as the operation proceeded. It ■v\-ill be found, -when the detailed history of the war is
written, that cei-tain units must have covered not less than 1 5 miles a day diu-ing the whole of that
ten-ible business. And the English contingent thus falling back from Mons to the line Cambrai-Le
Cateau accomplished with success as difhcult a task as is ever set to men in the prosecution of a war.
They accomplished it successfully.

The pressui-e of the Geraians upon the retreating foi-ce was kept up through the astonishingly rapid
advance made by those enemies — a rapidity upon which I shall comment later in this article in a different
connection.

The Cambrai-Le Cateau-Mezieres line was reached, and the AUied troops re-fonned thereon,
upon Tuesday night, August 25th.

Upon the Wednesday, August 20th, the superior German forces to the north which had pui-sucd
thus heavily during the retreat, attacked v ith the bulk of their forces (and the best of their forces) to
the west ; that is, they attacked the Cambrai-Le Cateau section, the left section, of the Allied lino,
■s\ ith peculiar vigour and in numbers dra\\Ti thither for the pui'pose of an immediate and decisive blow,
comparable to that unsuccessfully delivered three days before at Charleroi.

Tlicy did this because it was now their object, not to break through the line, but to outflank it, and
to get round it by the west : to bend back and come round on to the rear of its left extreme. It 'W'as
on this account that they attacked the western extreme of the line. The double arrow means that in

the first engagement, that on August 22 nd
and 23i-d, the main German assault was hurled
at the centre of the Hue : that m the second
engagement, on the 2Gth, it was huiIed at the
Avestern extreme in the hope of turning the
whole line. At this western extreme were the
English.

This project the English contingent which
held that left extreme defeated. They were
not outflanked : they were not pierced ; but
they fell back still further to a line repre-
senting about one more day's march behind,
that is to the south and Avest of the line
Cambrai-Le Cateau.

Upon the Tliursday, the 27th of August
the Allied hne as a whole ran from Meziferes
westward, but no longer through Le Cateau to
Cambrai with some sUght prolongation towards
An-as. It was bent back and ran fi'om
of St. Qucntin, to strike the Upper Somme

CA»/BRAI

Mt2iE:RE.S

DUGSAX 8HO-WTirO THlt DIBECTIOM OF TH» MAIN ATTACK (a)
ON THI 6ATUBDAT AMD SITNSAT, ATTGUST 22lID AKD 23BD, 0:T
TRZ CZSTBB or THB ALLIED LIXS AT CRASLESOI, IN AN ATTEUFT
TO PIBBCa IT ; (b) on THI WEDXESDAT, AUGUST 20tII, ON THB
XXTBEKITT Of THB ALLEBO LIN> (WHESa TEX ENGLISH CON-
TINGENT BTOOD) in an ATTEMPT TO ENVELOP IT.

]\[ezi^res, south of Hii-son, south of Guise, just north
above and to the east of Amiens.

At that moment— a moment not exactly identical all along the line, but con*esponding roughly to
the afternoon of last Thursday, August 27th — there begins a two-fold development of the campaign
which would, had the Allied fine failed, have made of the following few days the critical days in the
first phase of the western war.

Tliis two-fold development was as follows : —

Fii-st, the rapid Grcrraan advance was checked for the moment, and with it (for the moment) the
everlasting Gorman routine of advancing to outflank with their superior numbers towards the west, or
left, of the Allied line.

Secondly, in the checking of this, in the taking of the shock, the Allied line fluctuated in a curious
and oven dangerous manner. It was so bent that no one could at first tell, from the fragmentary
reports reaching us, either whether it would probably break, or whether there was a breaking point
in the enemy's line, or where in either case the strain would come. But though the twisting of
the line did not yet afford any ground for judging the future, we could, by putting together the
reports that had so far i-eached us, see what the curve of flexion had been, and what the serpentine
front then held would appear to be. We could also judge the perU.

Remember that no connected news of the whole operations had been communicated for three
days, either by the French or the English censorship, and that therefore the conjectures remained
only conjectures ; but they were based upon the reports of eye-witnesses in the Press, and upon the
putting together of those reports.

What would seem to have happened by that day, Saturday last, the 29th, was something
like tills, going from right to left, from east to west, along the line :

From Vei-dun to Mezi^res, along all the upper valley of the Meuse, attempts to cross that river
undertaken by the army commanded by the Pnissian Crown Prince and the troops from Wurtemburg
had been resisted. The line appears to have been held between Verdun and Mezieres.

So much for Section I.

In the section just to the left, or west, of this — Section II. — j'ou had a strong pressure of the
enemy making for Rcthel and the line of the Aisne. I take it to be certain that the enemy was south
of Mezieres, and we know from official despatches that he was pressing in all the neighbourhood of
boigny.

Immediately to the left (or west) again, in Section III., there was a successful counter-offensive of
the French. That counter-offensive may quite possibly not have been maintained. It may have got
" 'fore-side," and have had to retire. But there are such definite accounts of the pushing of the
Hanoverian 10th Army Coi-ps and the Pnissian Guards towai-ds Guise, that tiiey cannot be neglected.

LAND A K D W A T E U

September 5, 1914

From the next section agaia to the west, or left, Pootion IV, which was that hold by the British
contingent supported bj Frcncli troops, the line bent back again to the south. There had been
announced, for forty-eight hours past, strong German pressure towards the ring of forts round La Fere,
and unless I misread the exceedingly interesting account given in a London morning paper on
Wednesday, and relating presumedly to Saturday and Sunday, the line was then bent back beyond
St. Quentin, which is the toAvn there described as having been abandoned. There were, even at that
date, English soldiers as far back as Koyon, though it does not follow that the fighting had got as far
soutli as that, for Koyon may have been no more than the headquarters of the resistance at this
indented portion of the line.

In the fifth section, still more to the west and the left, we had the defensive line of the Allies
facing along the line of the Somme from Ham to Perrone and up as far as, and perhaps, a little behind,
the tovni of Bapaume ; the cannonade on this extreme left being heard from YiUers on the other side
of the Somme.

Putting all these together, wc are now in a position to establish the defensive line which the
Allies were holding against the Prussian advance at the end of last week. How far they had
succeeded in holding, whether they had not even taken the counter-offensive, no kind of inforraatir-.n
had reached London.

That line, tlien — the sinuous line held by the Allies during last week-end — the accompanying
sketch describes. Its first section still held the Upper Meuse. Its second was bent back behind
Soigny, and perhaps already to the Aisne. Its third, on the contrary, was pressed out towards Hii'soa

AMIENS •<(f'' • ^ ,
VILLERS

SCALE OF MILES

SKETCH SnOWIXO EOUGlrLT THK FKOBABLS Di;ii:y31V3 LIXI OF LAST TCESDAT (oX THX LAST TELEOKA5I3 EKCEIVED BT

wed>:esdAt NionT),

and Guise. Its fourtli was deeply indented towards La Fere and ISToyon. Its fifth went right up
again and held the enemy from near Bapaume, through Peronne to Ham.

It will be immediately apparent from such a conclusion that two main offensive efforts were
being made by the Germans to break the Allied line, and that the attempt to outflank it only Avas for
the moment abandoned. These two efforts correspond to the two indentations in the line, one in front
of Ecthel, the other in front of Noyon. If both and each of these sections could hold against the
pressure directed against them, the line would remain intact, thongh it should still further retire. If
either were forced, the line would be pierced and the first phase of the war decided in favour of the
enemy. That Avas the jjeril six daj's ago.

The indentation pointing towards Noyon corresponds to the valley of the Oise, and is the shortest
road of approach to Paris. It was upon this notch presumably that the Aveiglit of the assault fell.

Certain corollaries attach to these conclusions. Thus it is evident that from this week-end the
main communications between Paris and London, which run through Boulogne and Amiens, Avere so
gravely threatened that travel along them had to be abandoned, Avhile the supply of the English
contingent had also in future to come from further west along the coast.

It is again evident that the threat on the Oise valley, the deep indentation of the line
before Noyon, meant tv/o things. It meant, first, that the extensive left of the Allied line Avas in
danger of being cut off, and therefore the numerical inferiority of the Allies — alreadj- jjronounced—
Avould be gravely emphasised, and that the Allies Avould have suffered their first defeat in the field.
It meant, secondly, that, CA-en if the Allies' left should succeed in retiring and escaping such a
disaster, the advance of tlie German extreme right upon Paris AA'ould be the next step. Such an advance
would not mean that the French Army in the field had accepted an adverse decision. It w^ould
still be in being and still be able to continue the struggle indefinitely. It Avould not run the risk
of shutting up any considerable portion of its total forces behind the forts of Paris. It Avould
reserve itself for continued free action upon the flank, and (if possible) upon the communications
of the enemy as ho advanced upon the capital. To advance u])on the capital would be, for the
enemy, nothing but a stroke of moral effect. "Wliat moral effect means in war, how it may lead
men to wasteful energy, Avhcn and in ' '

Avhat degree it

may be of value, I discussed last Aveek.

September 5, 1914

la:n"d and water

But it is not to be believed that a Gennau Array cotild resist tbe temptation, if ihe
oppoi-tunity offers, of a niarcb upon Paris, strategically useless as such a mai-ch would be. It is
hardly any more to be believed that a modem French Army, engaged in this wai' upon the
stupendous task of saving the culture of Christendom from dissolution, and historic France from final
disaster, wonld hesitate to sacrifice the capital, and to presen'e the sti-ategic advantage such a saciifice
■would involve. In plain English, the German advance is now in contact with the outer defences
of Paris. This means that we must expect' as a possibility, or a probability of the immediate
future, a falling back of the whole defensive line from Verdun to Paris through, or perhaps south of,
the Eeims Camp, abandoning La Fere, and rougldy following the A^alley of the lower Marne. That
advance shoulil, before these lines appear, have reached the outer ring of forts in front of Paris.
Though the foi-ts will be dcfende<l, I do not believe that a French armed force of any size will allow
its'.li to be detached and contained within that entrenched camp.

Suuu^us laze stM held IcLSf rr. .

BAPAUMf «^x

yXUiS^ *%

<sncl

^BRDUN

PARIS

,. I. .

no
-J

SCA LE

MILES

SKtiCU OV TUB TWO LIXE3 OV THK Al.i;.I£D BKTIKEUKXT IX THE COCRSS 01' THi5 L.'.SX SIX DAYS, AND] OF THB HXE THAT WILL
ritOBAELY BE HELD- AVirEM OB IT TEB ALLIES BEPOSB THCIB LIFT OK PAEI8.

I conceive that the next phase ^vill consist in a withdrawal of the Allied Army in the field, its
left based on the resistance of the forts round Paris — short or long — its main object a prolongation of
the struggle with the enemy draivn further and further in, and with the army preserved intact to take
a counter offensive, however belated, at last. Strategically, the Germans should mask Paris, and not
waste time, space, and men in a diversion towards that particular area of ground. The moral effect of
then* entry into Paris is ah-eady discounted. WLether their dramatic instinct can be conquered
by their strategical reasoning in this matter remains to be seen. They know, as strategists, that their
one and only business is to put the Allied Army out of action, not to enjoy the baiTen effect of an
occupation. It will be a waste in any case. How much of a waste only the length of the resistance
can show. Perhaps they will not so waste their remaining energy. We cannot tell till the event.
"Whether their brains will master their appetite we shall know in a very few days,

CERTAIN SUBSIDIARY POINTS.

There are many matters in connection with this rapid German advance, the check received eight
days ago, its resumed heavy pressure upon two points, the sinuous line of advance thus hammered out,
and the present advance on Paris, while subsidiary to the main issue, are of poignant interest to the
people of this country.

Tlie first, of course, is the nature of the casualties suffered by the English contingent, their
proportion and their meaning.

With regard to these the following points should be noticed :

(1) The total casualties, when they are known, will considerably exceed 6,000, the first figure
given. Over 5,000 have already been received for rather less than three-foui-ths and rather more than
two-thirds of the British forces engaged.

(2) Whenever a force re/ires fighting before another force wliich ackances fighting and which
presses upon the retirement of its opponent, much the gi-eatcr numl^er of casualties of the retiring force
must bo marked " missing." This distressing word docs not mean that the men are lost, still less that
they are killed ; it does not mean tliat they are wounded in so rapid a retirement. Men who cannot

LAND AND AVATER September 5, 1914

kocp up anIlIi a pressed marcli fall out aucl are taken prisoner. The losses count to the full iii a
iiiilitiuT sense ; thej are complete losses to the effectives of the fighting force ; but they do not spell
death or even wounds nccess;arily ; their numbers are in excess of the total number of killed and
A\oimded.

(3) The descriptions given of a force in retreat (descriptions which never ought to be given unless
fuU ncAvs from the ^var is permitted) are utterly misleading to the civilian mind, and confuse it.
They veil from it the true iiature of that operation. A retreat is disheartening, it is jiainful, and all
the rest of it ; but in mere strategy it is an operation like any other. It only differs from an advance
in this— that jou abandon to the enemy that wastage from your organisation which you A\oidd, in
an advance, send back out of the way and well cared for to your base.

There are certain simple mottoes in the reading of warfare, whether historical or contemporary,
which everybody should have before him as immutable guides to judgment. They may almost be
reduced to three. At any rate, three such epigrams arc the basis of all sound judgment in the matter,
and the cure for all panic.

I will put them thus and emphasize them by italics : — •

(1) Any armed force adcances or retires in columns. Itft/hfs deployed in a line.

(.2) Until an army has been rendered materially tceaker in numbers or equipment to its opponent, fio
decision lias been reached : that is, there has been no victory and no defeat.

(3) Save in the excejyiional case of an army caught in column before it can dejiloy, there is no render-
ing of an army materially weaker, still less is there any destruction of an armed force, until its deployed line
is either («) turned, or {b) pierced.

The army of the Allies, though it repose, as it may repose before these lines aj^pear, on an
invested Paris, though it retire south from an occupied Paris, is not, to the houi* of my "WTitiug this,
turued or pierced. It is in full being.

THE EASTERN FIELD OF WAR.

•ALLENSTEIW-- Q ^

BERLINo t fJ^?^^^ '" — ' 'c^ ^

WARSAW

•lublin

St A,

O lOO 200

I 1 I

SCALE OF MILES

^'•ajV -, LEMBERG'

SKITCH OP THE FIELD OF OPEEATIOXS IN THB EAST, BETWEEN THE EU3SIA.N, AKD THE AUSTKO-iltTN-OAISIAX A^.•D GKliJIAN AEMIES.

I said last week, and it will have to be said frequently in the coui-se of comment.s upon these
campaigns, that to deijond upon immediate pressure exercised by the liussian armies upon the Germanic
powers, and particularly upon Berlin, is to depend upon a vain thing.

The pressure cannot come — I am willing to wager that it A\iil not come — before the close of
October. And it cannot be an immediate pret^sure from the very nature of the operations to which
Hussian Armies in the eastern field of A\ar are condemned. This is due to three quite evident
factors : (1) the great distances involved, (.2) the paucity of communications to the east of the Eussian

Sejjtember 5, 1914

LAND AND WATER

4r-

— .

AlCKOWS SKOWIXa COMPAEATITB lENaTH OF ADTAXCi :

(a) foe EtrsSIAN3 IX EAST PRUSSIA UPON BEKLIX.

(b) foe RUBSLVXS BEFOr.E POSES UPON BERLIN".

frontier and to some extent in the belt immediately west of it, (3) tlie presence of considerable opposing
forces.

As to (1) : I tliink the most striking vr&j of showing to the eye of the reader what tliis depen-
dence iipon " the Eussian steam roller " means, is to put before him the following diagi'am. It is
absurdly simple, but I think it is effective. Here are three arrows. The first (a) represents the

advance which a Eussian Army must make from its
extreme starting point to Berlin : even if it were as
rapid in its advance (which is impossible) and as
successful (which it has not hitherto been) as the
Gei-man forces in the west. Tlie second arrow (i)
represents the distance which the Eussian armies
would still have to cover after they had masked or
taken the frontier fortresses, thoroughly invaded the
heart of Prassian territory, and had passed the town
of Posen — an advance which could not be made xmtil
the Austrian menace upon theii- flank had been
destroyed. The third broader arrow (c) represents
upon the same scale the distance at the present
moment separating the Prussian Army (with its
Austrian auxiliaries) from Pai'is. I think the contrast
is sufficiently striking.

But it is already evident that the Eussian
advance wUl be neither unchecked nor particularly
rapid. Two things have happened this week, the one certainly fortunate to Eussia, the other certainly
unfortunate, which give one the right to speak in this fashion.

The unfortunate thing is a heavj^ defeat suffered by the forces which have been invading East
Prussia. This defeat appears to have taken place in front of Osterode. We have the German official
account (and German official accounts have hitherfo been singularly accurate) which speaks of 30,000
prisoners and of a total defeat. We have the Eussian admission of a check, and we have the further
admission of great numbers ha\iug been brought up against two ai'my corps which were caught in
isolation. We ought not to attach undue importance even to an action of this kind, which would have
been decisive in any of the smaller wars of the past ; but it is a very important thing. It will be
retrieved ; and it will be retrieved by numbers, as also by the intense determination of the Eussian
people. But, for the moment, it makes progress towards the line of the Vistula, Danzig, Graudenz,
Thorn, impossible, and the Eussian sweep through Eastern Prussia towards the lower Vistula has
been held up.

Tlie second piece of news, fortunate rather than unfortunate to Eussia, though not yet conclusive,
equally proves with Avhat deliberation the western advance must be undertaken. It is upon a larger
scale than the check received to the north of Eussian Poland in East Prussia, and the field in which it
Las taken place is Gahcia — that is, the northern belt of the Austrian dominions between the Carpathians
and the Eussian border, and the southern part of that western projecting lump of Prussia which
corresponds to Eussian Poland. Here an Austrian advance had been proceeding during the week, not
without successes that might be called victories, towards Lublin, and attended by a peculiar success at
Kielce. Tliis advance appeai-s to have been checked by the Eussians and to be heavily tlireatened at
this moment by a counter-offensive directed against the town of Lemberg to the south. We have now
authoritative news that this counter-offensive was entirely successful. Thus the main Austrian
attack upon Eussia has failed, and its momentum has been checked and broken. Therefore, after due
delay for re-organisation and for coming up westward, the Eussian masses wiU be free to cross the
extreme western boundary of Eussian Poland, and begin their march upon the line of the Oder.
But not till some time hence.

But the process, even though unchecked for the future, must necessarily be a slow one. Until the
line of the Oder is reached, there is no threat to Berlin, let alone any heavy pressure which could make
Prussia retire her men from the Western theatre of war. And in general, I repeat what I have said
before in these notes : I think there T\'ill not be, under the most favourable circumstances, any anxiety
in the Western field for what is going on in the East until after the middle of October. If the
circumstances are not favourable, but are unfavourable, then there will be no such pressure for months.
For, after October, the few roads wiU be difficult and the approach of winter wiU handicap all advance.

If anyone has placed reliance on the extraordinary telegrams which announce the retirement of men
from the Western field of war to help in the Eastern, he may be content to forego that consolation.
The Prussians (and Austrians) to the west of the Ehine will use every man they can in that Western
theatre of war for many weeks to come. The train-loads seen going eastward through Belgium are
either train -loads of wounded evacuated towards the base, or men being moved from one part of the
Western field to another. Men drafted to the East they most certainly are not.

I will conclude by some appreciation of what, I think, has been in everybody's mind duiiug the
past week — the success of certain German theories, the coming true of many German prophecies, and
the acliievement of tasks which Germany had openly proposed to herself. But I will suggest not only
the success of Germany in these matters, but also the modifications of that success, which I now append.
We are, at this stage of the war, at last able to appreciate more or less in their right
proportion certain facts which were conjectural and doubtful during the first weeks ; and before
we proceed to our weekly summary and reading of what has happened to date in the two fields of
operations, the Western and the Eastern, it would be well to enumerate those facts and to grasp
them for the purposes of our further judgment.

LAND AND WATEK September 5, 1914

1. THE FACTOR OF NUMBERS.

As was pointed out in ilic first of tlicpc articles, other things being equal, the deciding factor in
a campaign is the factor of mnnbcrs- not necessarily of numbers as a Avhole, but of numbers at the
decisive place and time.

Now the first fact dominating all the others is this : The attack of the Gcnnan and Austrian
Empires upon France has been made in far larger numbers than was expected by the French and tlicir
Allies. That is the simple explanation of all that has hapjiencd hitheiio in the ^Vest.

If we go by the elementary metliod of counting the adult males subject to the HohenzoUerns and
the Ilapsburgs and contrasting them with the adult males citizens of the French Eepublic, we got a
disproportion of roughly 13 to 4. It is, as a fact, rather more than 12 to rather less than 4 : it is
almost exactly 121 to 30 : it is an overwhelming disproportion.

I repeat : in military aft'aii-s, other things being equal, the deciding factor is numbers. It was so
in the great eft'oi-t of the French Ilevolution. It was so in 1870. Those " other things " are nearly
equal in the great modern conscript armies : training, equijjment, and the rest. Numbers should
decide.

If, then, the proportion of more than three to one had held, the result in the Western theatre of
war would have been a foregone conclusion. It should not have taken three weeks. But there were,
of course, a great number of most important qualifications to so crude a contrast. These modifications
may be roughly but accm-ately summarised under fi.ve heads, which I place in order of their importance
from least to most :

(1) Not all, nor nearly all, of the adult male population of the two central Empires is
trained to arms. This is of less and less value to the French as every day of the war passes,
for the untrained men are being with CA'cry day digested more and more thoroughly into the
trained mass.

(2) One of the two Germanic monarchies, the Ilapsburgs, had to deal with a heterogeneous
population, much of Avhich was ill disposed to the German spirit and to government by Gennan sjjeakiug
men. Therefore, the numbers which Austria could lend to Germany for action against France, though
large, was, in any case, A'cry much less than the mass of her forces. And this heterogeneous
character of the llapsbui-g dominions further weakened Austria in a matter Avhich was the match that
lighted the whole Avar — the Slavs, upon her southern boundary, Avho had escaped her control, and whom
she had foolishly proposed to govern against their AviUs ; the Sernans.

(;3) The French Army discovered, Avhen the crisis came, two influences in its favour- — the Belgian
resistance and the English alliance. The unexpected and very valuable resistance of the Belgians who,
thougli not possessed of an army trained on the same lines as the great conscript annies, though able
to put immediately into the field but a very small jjrojjortion of then,- total adult males, and those, in
part, militia, determined a delay of at least tweh-e days in the jilans of the German General Staff. It
is not exaggerated but sober language to say that the sacrifice of Belgium promises the redemption of
Europe. It Avill not count less but more as time goes on.

Far more important, in the military sense, Avas the final decision of the British Government to
sujiport the French. That decision effected two things. It gave to France a small but veiy valuable
accretion of troops, six per cent, of all forces, not quite ten per cent, to the total of the first line, bufc
more than 10 per cent, of the total in the area wliere the chief bloAV fell, and the British contmgeut
thus afforded Avas not only of most excellent military character, but, what is OA^en more valuable,
rmder-estinuited by the Germans. Few things a^re Avorth more in Avar than an under-estimate on the
pait of your enemy, cither of the numbers or of the quality of the troops he is going to meet at any
particular point.

Of fui-ther and still greater importance to the French Avas the opening of the sea to them by tlic
British Fleet. So long as the sea remains open to the one group of enemies and closed to the other,
so long there is necessarily a sloAvly increasing strain ujjon the one and a permanent source of suj^ply
ojxm to the otlier.

(4) The plan of attack long designed and openly described by the German Powers Avas one in
Avliich CAxrything had to be done at once and in the first stages of the campaign. There A^as no
ari-angcment in fortification or in strategy for dela}'. There Avill prove to be little arrangement for
retu'cment.

It will be asked Avliy this last feature can be counted as a modification of the enormous numerical
preponderance against the French. The ansAvcr is that though it does not affect that preponderance at
the beginning of the Avar, though, on the contrary, it is actually due to the presence of such a
preponderance -the rush sj'stem Avas only designed because those Avho designed it counted on superior
numbers — yet if it is checked it modifies the value of numbers in tv/o Avays. First, the checks, partial
iuid temporary though they be, involve enormous losses quite out of proportion to the losses of the
defence ; second, they bring the front of the defence more and more parallel to the German lines of
communication. That is, until the defending line is outflanked or pierced the offeu-ive opposed to it
goes on into a more and more perilous position Avitli a les ■ and less chance, u/iless it succeeds, of securing
its line of supj^l}- against a counter attack.

(5) Finally, the most important modification, Aviiich everybody has noticed, is that in the long
run the immense numbers of Eussia will begin to tell. Wlien or if they are telling Avitli all their
i'oi-ce, the numerical preponderance Avhich was so enonnous at the beginning of the campaign Avill
gi-adually turn to its opposite. The German PoAvers AviU be putting not a little more than 12 men
i'.gainst somcAvhat less than 4 men, but a little more than 12 (even if they had had no losses) to a good
deal over 10 or 17. Already, from the presence of Eussian armies over the Eastern frontiers, the
l)ropoiiion of German and Austrian troops to French Avest of the Khine can hardly be more than
7 to 1, and is jjcrha^js by this liine as low as 0 to 4. Aivl the groat main business of the AUics is,

September 5, 1914 L AN D A N D W A T E R

by furtlier English contingents, by perpetual wearing down of tbe enemy, by compelling liim to
expend men on his communications, to make the proportion 4 to 4 at last — and then to take the
counter offensive.

These things being so, it is obvious that the one outstanding thing in the present situation is the
l)Ower of the defending line to hold. It may fall back. In falling back it may expose to every kind
of suffering the French districts that are abandoned. It cannot but, in so falling back, affect in some
degree the state of mind of the defenders. But it remains mathematically true that so long as that
Hue holds, and so long as it is neither pierced nor tm-ned, (1) there has been no decision, (2) every day
that passes is in favour of the Allies.

2. THE SUCCESS OF GERMAN THEORY.

The second outstanding fact which the progress of the war has hithei'to revealed is the success of
certain peculiarly German theories now that they have been pnt to the test of practice, tliough it is
important for us to measure the exact amount of that success, and not to exaggerate it.

Among the theories characteristically Gennan, and propounded without actual warfare to prove
or disprove them during the last generation, were, in particular, the three theories —

(1) That modern fortification would fall at once to a combination of heavy bombardment by siege
artillery and determined rushes thrown upon it, at great expense of life, by the infantr}^ of the enemy.

(2) That men very slightly trained, or even untrained, coidd be incorporated into and digested by
a trained force in large proportions, and rapidly, during the course of a campaign.

(3) That attacks in masses, and in fairly close formation, could be earned out with all
the ad\'antage of weight and numbers they connote, and could be carried out because discipline
coidd be pushed to such a point that even the enormous losses involved would not check the
advance.

Now, in regard to these three main points of Gennan theory, we must clearly seize this fact :
The war has proved them to be, upon the whole, sound. Or put it this Avay : if you were a determined
opponent of all these theories (and I have written against them strongly myself) then the war, so far,
will have proved a disappointment to you, and you will be constrained by intellectual candour to
admit error.

But if you put yourself at the other standpoint, and stand in the shoes of the man who believed
in those theories whole-heartedly, and who based his certitude of final victoiy upon then- complete
reliability, then it is quite another stor}'. For while the German theories produced diu-ing peace, and
as yet untested by experience, have been vindicated against their opponents, they have not been
completely vindicated by any means ; and the extent to which their full success was necessary to the
German scheme is essential to our estimate of the chances of victoiy or defeat.

For instance, it is perfectly true that modem fortification has yielded to heavy siege artillery, and
perhaps to a combination of that with rushes of infantry ; but it has not been the sudden affair that
was expected by the Germans, save in the case of Namur. The forts of Liege held out apparently for
4 or 5 days after the heavy siege artillery was trained upon them j the fort of ManonviUiers, an isolated
work upon the eastern frontier, resisted for ten days at the least, and perhaps twelve. It is as Avell,
by the -way, in this connection, not to take too seriously the stories of some mysterioiTS Gemian
howitzer which nobody knew to exist. All wars produce marvellous rumours of that kind, and nearly
ail such rumoui-s are nonsense. There is no limit to the size of your siege gun or shell, save the limit
of mobility, in every sense of that word, including rapidity of fire. But it is possible that the numbers
and the mobility of the large Gennan howitzers were underestimated.

We find then that, in this department of German theoiy the Germans were much more right than
their critics, but were not altogether right, and the whole question is how thoroughly they had to be
right for their general plan to be successful.

As to the second theory, we have not yet been able to test it. The use of large proportions of
untrained or half trained reserves broke down badly in East Prussia at the beginning of the Eussian
advance, but there is no sign of any breakdown in the "West, where perhaps a more moderate
proportion of the untrained reserve was incorporated. It is probable that we shall find, Avhen the
detailed history of the war comes to be written, that the incorporation of these untrained ma.sses was,
as in the case of the other theories, more successful than the critics of the Germans had imagined, but
less successful than the Germans themselves believed it would be. It is probable, for instance, that
checks (as that before Antwei"p the other day) occur wherever the proportion of untrained men is more
than a certain minimum, and it is probable that the effect of these elements would be felt in any
retirement undertaken, at least in the earlier days of the war. For instance, you will find the rout
after Gurabinnen probably explained by this featui-e.

Finally, in the matter of close fonnation and the weight of numbers in advancing against an
enemy's position, the results have far exceeded what the critics of the German theory put fon^"ard,
diif, by all accounts, the effort is exceptional, unique, and incapable of repetition. It is not a normal
process of war, such as the Germans expected to establish to their o^vn ad\'antage. It is not, as was
the charge of the column under Napoleon, an operation to be repeated by veterans indefinitely ; it is
a thing subject to peculiar strain, the men having passed througli which cannot be used in such a
strain repeatedly.

Tlus last point, if it be established, is of the first importance to the future fortunes of the
campaign, for it must mean that the losses in the effort to break the Allied line, which efforts have
filled the last ten days, have been altogether out of proportion to the masses emplojed.

It is impossible to guess at those losses, but it is possible to establish a minimum and a maximum.
They may have been over 200,000 ; they can hai-dly have been under 150,000, counting every form o£
loss from death to lameness.

LAND AND WATER

September 5, li}14

3. THE UNEXPECTED RAPIDITY OF ADVANCE.

MONS

The rate of tlic Gcnuan advanoc, to vvliicli allusion has been made elscAvhurc, is tlie tliird lesson we
haAC to leani from the openinf^ pliascs of the Avar.

It Avas CA'ideiit from the tirst mention of the general Gorman plan (and it has been openly talked
of by no one more than the Germans for more tlian ten years past) that this plan demanded not only
surprise, nor only superior numbers, nor eAen only the added success that AA-as promised against
fortifications, but also a i)0Aver of exceediugly rajjid advance ; for a bloAv is not a knock-out bloAv unless
it is a SAvift bloAV.

NoAV, in this, as in the other mattei's I am here examining, the German theory has justified itself
in the main, but, here again, not as completely as full and immediate success demanded ; fui-ther, the
success is subject to a most important qualification Avith Avhich I shall deal in a moment.

Wlion the French fell back from the line of the Sambre after the fall of Namui-, the pressure
exercised upon the retreat by the German forces Avas never relaxed during the Avhole of three full da\s
and r:ights. It Avas a mai'vellous jjicce of organisation and of effective military Avill.

The ncAv line taken up by the Allies made an angle with the old line, and at the same time Avas
more extended to the West than the old line. "J'lie conA^ersion Avas roughly from tlie line A — B on
the accompanying sketch, held till Simday night, the 23rd of August (12 days ago), through the dotted

line E — F reached on Tuesday night (ten da3\s
ago) to the line C — D held on Wednesday
night and Thursday morning a week ago ; and
because there was this angle between the old
f)-ont and the ncAV, and because the new front
extended more to the West than the old front
had done, the heaviest of the marching fell,
as we have seen, to the western part of the
line ; that is, upon the English contingent ;
Avhich is represented in my sketch by the thick
part of the lines.

But the remarkable thing about even that
Avestcrn extremity is that the Gennans were
able] to keep up their pressure throughout the
Avhole of so rapid a retreat. It AAas the true
pressure of an army ; it was not merely cavalry
keeping in touch, nor advance bodies feeling
the Avay for the main columns. When the
fighting Avas fiercest upon Wednesday, the Allied
line had stUl in front of it — after 26 to 30 miles
of retreat — as heaAy a body of attack as
it had had upon the Sunday before upon
in some places 12 to 15 miles a day for those

MAMUR*

to 15 20 23
' ' ■ '

SCALE OF MILE5

SKETCH SHOWIXO NATCEK AND EXTENT OF THE KAPID AT.LILD
HETIREMENT AND GEKMAN AOiVAXCE, AUO. 23EB-l'(iXH.

mnrrrr THE ALLIED LINE.

■ ■iiiiM IHB ENGLISH CONTIXCLNT.

POSITION ON EVENING 0>'

THJ! IXTERMEDIATB
THE 29th.

the Sambre. The German advance had aA'eragcd
tAvo and a half days.

I repeat, the character of this advance, carried out by such an cnoniious body of men without a
liitch, is unique. It Avould be fast going for a AveU-organised army approaching a distant goal undis-
tm-bcd. For an army actually fighting as it advanced, and fighting against so equal a resistance, and
moving in such unprecedented numbers, it is amazmg.

But after saying so much, we must again qualify our admission of the German achievement by
certain considerations which greatly modify its value to its authors.

It is noAV apparent that these very rapid strategical moves upon the part of the Germans are of a
piece Avith the corresponding tactical policy of a rush, dense and rapid, which, if it fails, involves a
considerable period of recuperation to foUoAv. The three days of Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesda}^
from ten days to a week ago, saAv this very rapid rush from the line A — B to the line C — D. Tlie
four days folloAving saAv hardly any advance at all ; and, so far as can be gathered from the veiy con-
fused, fragmentary, and hitherto quite incomplete telegrams received this AA'eek, the three folloAving
diiys (Sundaj'-, Monday, and Tuesday last)— making six days in all— also saAV very little advance.

In other words, this rapidity, Avliich it Avould be folly not to admire and pedantic not to be
astonished at, is a i-apidity essentially local and essentially restricted to efforts isolated in tunc. It is
n<jt lilve the rapidity Avhich marked the great advance of the Grand Army upon Uhn, or any other of
the rapid general ad\ances of history. It is not even a rapidity con-esponding to the marches which
shut up the French Ai-my in Sedan 44 years ago. It is a rapidity essentially not continuous. This is
notto say that it fails to achieve its purpose— far from that : so far this strategical rash and halt has
achieved its immediate purpose— but it has not achieved its end. The Germans have plenty of time
before them, measured by the rate of their first ad\ ance. TTie time is more restricted if it be measured
by the rate of their advance plus the first halt Avhich succeeded it. It is more restricted still if Ave
consider another factor, to which I Avill noAv turn.

That factor is what I may caU " the expense of rapidity."
^ There are two principles upon which any great effort may be based in any form of human activity.
You may strain to inci-ease the productivity of your capital and spend only the income of it, or yoa
may spend tlie capihil itself. You may be aiming at creating an extra force which shall be ahvays in
e\isk':i.?e and alwajs dependable, or you may be aiming at an effect which is necessarily rctitricted to a
shoit time because the achievement of it wears away your very means of achievement.

10*

September 5, 1914

LAND AND ^Y A T E B

^OAv It IS clearly evKlent m the present eampaJgn that this astonishm- and admmable rapklitr
achieved by the advancing body of German forces in the north is an expenditure of cap tS ?t i^
rapidity aeyured at mr expense .vh ch limits it strictly to a eertain not very prolonged penod and
condemns it as certainly to exhaustion, unless a decision is readied within quite the fost weehs of

Of many proofs of this, one is suilicient. The rapid extension we.tAvard and southward of the
German advance has been effected by the bringing along westward perpetually ofTcrmen.nd
brmguig them up behind the front that has last bo.n fighting. The tli ng has resSed a w' ve
which breaks m bias upon a sandy beach. When its efi'oi-t is%pent, wheif there is no moiJ -eh
material wherewih to extend the line, the advance is checked. I do not mean by thirthat the
.waying backward and for W of the line of contact, which has gone on for now six^days since e
f.r..t check given to this rapid German advance, is a .situation in favour of the Allies and Lahist the
Gennans: whether it is for us or against us can only be determined bv the resiJt and bv .
discovery, at the close of the struggle. ^that our line is pie^rced or theiS A f I mean'f that sotrij
the mere element of rapidity is eoncemed, this halt to which the Gennans were con LS be ween

"Jsrs tn: ita^h ''^''^ -^^^ ''--^ ^^^^^^ ^^-^-^^^ 30-september d proves 'f ;s

^- THE PERFECTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT

rf Ilii" ^ '""^rir '""^^''^ 1"" ^''' qualification than any other of the German successes, the success
of the German mtehgence system or to use an old-fashioned word, the sueccess of the German Tpv
A eiy tew people m this country W the least idea either of the perfection of the Z s ^£m

K. fl l''=":f"\*^'.?"»^^,* ^'^^■"P^ ^^-^^ ^"-1"^' ^^ «^" it« «^"^o^t incredible ex ent ^ The

l\ench themselves though they had ample cause for suspicion and a national memoVS should
liave Mt thenr m bttle doubt upon the matter, were divided (before the war) in theTr Sn ent of tWs

o.etl^^^l:;^l-^^

jet suspected its extent and its exact organisation. Conversely the German GX™fnf J

^^^:^i:^^^^; izl- '''^'' -^- '' ^^ow£d^^"^i^:=^es;;^

Jw oTnnW t?o '' '"^rS*" some modification, a modification paraUel to those whTch w lite be n

able to apply to every other fonn of German success we have examined. It is this • that the XnW

of tune IS agamst it. A perfected intelligence .system, the use of a greS We of spTes 1^^^

hroughout Europe and admirably co-ordinated, is of supreme importance^t the be 'iiiin? S ad

IS the converse achievement of keeping from one's enemies knowledge of one's ownTofemen^s ind
materid. But it is. on the face of it. an advantage which suffers rapid atti-ition i^thrZ^ess of a
campaign. Fighting has not long proceeded before the enemy upon whom 5" AaveS Ws

at jou havefouiid out. and has also begun to discover and ti destroy your iiitelH^nec syX
AMthm Ills lines Fightmg has not long proceeded before the enemy from whonryo°u have leS
knoujedge of certam points of your material and organisation discovers them by yorversuccesset ^
.v.t.! ''a ^?%^^ depend upon this consideration for the beUttling^of a good Sfe;ee
sA-stem. A good mtelligence system gives immense initial advantages, and initial "Xant^les often
dcermino a campaign. But my point is that the advai.tage /. essentfally an inith/aitntage° alone

A DIARY OF THE WAR.

SYNOPSIS.

Jew 23iiD.

Auetro-llungaiian ullimutuni to Servia.

JvLx 2Sth.

King Peter of Scrvia's appeal to Russia.

Jcti 27th.

Sir Edwaid Grey proposed a London Ccnfertiice tet^vceu Fiei.ch.
Uerman, Italian, and Great Britain's Ambassador*.

I JrLr 28iH.

Austriallungary declared war on Servia.

I Jvtt 29th.

A partial Ruesian mobilisation, confined to the Army Corps on
tie borders of Austria-Rung^ry, ,n,is Killed on receipt of
IMe news of tU bombardment of Belgrade. Eiielish Stock
Exchange dosed. English Bank Rate, 8 per cent.

iJlVOCST 1st.

^ZT^ I'^u""^." '"^'^'"^'■on ordered. German molilieation
ordered by Emperor. Gcnnany dcclarc^d war on Russia and
loilowed up this declaration by immediately invadino^ ll,o
brand Duchy of Luxemburg', the neutral .<-tato between France
and Ooniuiiy. Kinn; George made a final effort for peace.
•Ij^^patchmg a direct personal telegram to the Tsar, offerin-i
ij:<dialion. Ecfore it could reach St. retcrsbnra Germany
Otclarcd war.

ArcusT 2kd.

Germany's ultimatum to Belgium.
AlcrsT 3rd.

^'^ J^''r"d Grey stated British policy and revealed Germany,
amazms offer in the event of our neglecting our oblK^i'
toFrancft Mobilisation of the Army. Ultimf turn t^ Sany
after Belgian appeal to England. German and IWh
Ambassadors left Paris and Ecrfin. i^rencii

AccrsT 4iH.

Germaiiy rejected ultimatum. English Government took over
Ge"rmany°' """"•*^- '^^" ^''""''^ ''^'--■> ^^"eland "and

^Hom« KWf ^''■■i°Il" •^"'J^''"'' »PP"i"t«d to command of the
Home J leets, with the acting rank of admiral.

AvcrsT Gth.

Lord Kitchener appointed Secretary of State for War
Amphton struck a mine and fomidered. Manv
ehipe seized. "xan;,

H.M.S.
German

Accr«T 6th.

S^n^Sr'^'' ^I"} sanctioned an iTicrease of the Army by

cnii^ T?;J*^'Vr''"^ "^ f°°^ P"*^-^"- Tl.e German b^atlle
a iscr C«e/xn and her eoro.t driven into Messina by two

f.± i/!'""*,"^ '^ fi'^'«^,.b.^Ule stiU continued before Liege.
Italy declared her neutrality. -^"^fa"-

11*

LAND AND WATER

September 5, 1914

T!i9 German cmiser Coeben, with her escort the Breslau, left
Mcsiina. Germans outside Liege nJid for a twenty-four
liQurs' armistice to collect their kiUcd and wounded. Amiietics
refused by Belgians.

AdOUst Gth.

French troops invaded Alsace and reached Mulhausen after a
sharp engagement, in which the Germans were routed with the
bayouct. Lord Kitchener issued a circular asking for 100,000
men,

AcQtJST 9th.

One of the crmser squadrons of the Main Fleet was attacked by
German eubmarines. The enemy's submariiio, U15, was sunk
by H.M.S. JSirmingJtam.
AnousT 10th.

Fiance declared war on Austria-Hungary. Li^ge forts still
untaken. O'erman.? advanced en \amnr. The new Picsu
Bureau established by the Government for the issue of official
war news opened.

AcGCii 11th.

Ine Gochcn and Breslau took refuge in tlie Dardanelles. England
declared war againel Austria,

AncTJsr 12th.

Goeben and Breslau purchased by Turkey. Bombardment of
Liege forts resumed.

AroDST ISth.

The Taar addressed a Proclamation to the Polish populations of
Kufisia, Germany, and Aus.tria, promising t-i restore to Poland
comidete autonomy and guarantees for religious liberty and
the use of the Polish language.

AvsrsT 15rH.

Japanese ultimatum to Germany demanding the withdrawal of
her vessels of war from the Far East.

AvGCST I7th.

The Britifih E.xpeditionary Force safely landlod in France. Death

of Lieut.-General Sir Jam^es Griersoii.
Tlie Belgian Government transfen'ed from Brussels to Antwerp.

Aug r ST 18th.

General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien appoirited to command of an Ai-my
Corps of the British Expeditionaiy Force, in succession to tha
late General Grierson.
Some desnltory fighting took placo in the North Sea.

AcarsT 20th.

The Servians gained a decisive victory over the Austrians near
iShabatz.

Aucusi 21st.

The German forces entered Brussels.

AUCCST 22.ND.

Scrvia announces that their army had won a great victory on the
Drina. The Austrian losses v>'ere very heavy.

AtTGUST 23ed.

Japan declared war on Germany. The Russian army gained an
important viclory near Gumbenneu against a force of 160,000
Germans.

AiJGDST 24th.

It was announced that Namur had fallen.

The British forces were engaged all day on Sunday and after

dark in the neighbourhood of Mons, arid held their ground.
Luneville was occupied by the Germans.

August 27rn.

Mr. Churchai announced in the House that the Germ.an armed
merchantman Kaiser Wilhelm der Crosse had beexi sunk by
H.M.S. HighPyer on the West African coast.

A strong force of British marines has been sent to Ostend ajid
has occupied the town without opposition.

DAY BY DAY.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 28th.

Early in the morning a concerted operation was

attempted against the Germans in the Heligoland Biglit.
The First Light Cruiser Squadron sank the Mahu,

receiving only very slight damage. The First Battle.

Cruiser Squadron sank one cruiser, Koln class, and

another cruiser disappeared in the mist, heavily on fire

and in a sinking condition.

All the German cruisers which engaged were thus disposed
of.

Tvro German destroyers were sunk and many damaged.
The total British casualties amounted to sixty-nine
hilled and wounded.

Lord Kitchener announced in t'le House of Lords that
" The Government have decided that our Army in
France shall be increased by two divisions and a
cavalry division, besides other troops from India. The

; first division of these troop, is now on its wav."

SATURDAY, AUGUST 29th.

No official news.

SUNDAY, AUGUST 30th.

The following statement summarises that communicated
by the Secretary of State for AYar : —

Although the official dispatches from Sir John French on
the recent battles ha\'e not yet been received it L-j
possible now to state in general outline what the
British share in the recent operations has been.

There has, in efiect, been a four days' battle — on
August 23rd, 24th, 25th, and 2Gth. During the whole
of this period the British troops, in conformity with the
general movement of the French armies, were occupied
in resisting and checking the German advance and
in withdrawing to the new lines of defence.

The battle began at Mons on Sunday, during which day
and part of the night the German attack, which was
Btubbomlj' pressed and repeated, was completely checked
on the British front.

On Monday, the 24th, the Germans made vigorous
efforts in superior numbers to prevent the safe
withrdawal of the British Army and to drive it into the
fortress of Maubeuge. This effort was frustrated by
the steadiness and skill mth which the British retire-
ment was conducted.

The British retirement proceeded on the 25th with con-
tinuous fighting, though not on the scale of the previous
two days, and by the night of the 25th the British
Army occupied the hne Cambrai-Landrecies-le-Cateau.

It had been intended to resume the retirement at day-
break on the 26th, but the German attack, in which no
less than five Corps were engaged, was so close and
fierce that it was not possible to carry out this intention
until the afternoon.

The battle on this day, August 26th, was of the most
severe and desperate character. The troops ofiercd a
superb and most stubborn resistance to the tremendou.s
odds with which they were confronted, and at length
extricated themselves in good order, though with serious
losses and under the heaviest artillery fire.

No guns were taken by the enemy except those the horses
of which were all killed, or_which were shattered by high
explosive shells.

Sir John French estimates that during the whole of these
operations, from the 23rd to the 26th inclusive, his losses
amount to 5,000 or 6,000 men. On the other hand the
losses suffered by the Germans in their attacks across
the open, and through their dense formation, are out of
.nil proportion to those which we have sufiered.

Since the 26th, apart from cavalry fighting, the Briti.sh
Army has not been molested. Reinforcements
amounting to double the loss sufiered have already
joined.

MONDAY. AUGUST 31st.

At one point in the centre of the Allied line the
French troops succeeded in beating the enemy back as
far as Guise.

The Queen of the Belgians and her three children
arrived in England.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 1st.

The Russians met with a check in East Prussia, but
were successful in minor engagements in GaUcia.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 2nd.

Continuous fighting was in progress along almost the
whole hne of battle. The British Cavalry engaged,
with distinction, the Cavalry of the ene.my, pushed
them back, and captured ten gims. The French
Army continued the offensive and gained ground in
the Lorraine region. The Russian Army have com-
pletely routed four Austrian Army Corps near Lemberg,
inflicting enormous losses and capturing 150 guns.

Most timely and appropriate is the production of a volume entitled
Tfar and Alien Enemies, wliich has been written bv Mr. Arthur Pago,
and published by Messrs. Stevens and Sons, of "Chancery Lane, at
five shillings. The book gives full information a.bout the laws affecting
the definition of alien enemies, their state and property on land, their
state and property at sea, the rules of contraband of war, the right of
alien enemies to contract or trade, and the way in which war affects
partotcrships or companies in which alien eiiemies are concerned.
Written by a barrister-at-law who is thoroughly conversant with this
branch of legal work, the book is a clear guide to the law on the
Kubject, and will doubtless be found of great use by all who are in any
way affected commercially and directly by the present colossal struggl*
between the nations.

12*

September 5, 1914

LAND AND WATER

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

THE NORTH SEA.

K tlio Uioiuiug of August 2Sth there occurred
certain operations which were hailed hy the daily
Press as a "great naval victoiy " which is, ofi
course, au incorrect t-erm to employ for what
after all was merely a " minor operation " of war.
The mere fact that the German official report
conceals nothing indicates that the vanquished so i-egard it;
and in naval warfare it is always tht opinion of the vanquinhcd
uhich matters most. Had the Gcrnian Admiralty issued an
incorrect report, our advantage would have been greater. Bub
of this later on. Let us fji-st review what happened in detail,
and then proceed to draw conclusions.

Heligoland is a small island some 46 miles from Cuxhavcn,
which guards the entrance to the Kiel Canal, and in or near
which the German High Seas Fleet was probably lying at the
same time. It is also about equidistant from the naval arsenal
at Wilhelmshaven. Lying as it docs at the apex of a triangle

The first act of the drama was a species of prologue. We
learn from the official report that British submarines have for
the last three weeks been in the habit of cruising in what ia
known aa " outside the enemy's front door." It is the first
time in history that submarines have been used as scouts;
hitherto they have always been regarded as sharpshooters and
agents of destruction generally, their unique pobsibilitics in
the way of inshore observation having apparently escaped
attention. Those who knew of the intention to use submarines
in the scout capacity have ever been, careful to ignore the
subject.

The Germans — so far as we can surmise — were ignorant
of the submarine scouts. They doubtless kept a very sharp
look-out for submarine attack; but not being attacked con-
sidered the coast as clear- — a legitimate assumption on the part
of any Fleet which regards the submarine from the conveu-
tioual standpoint.

For reasons which — since nothing about the niEtter has

jSt = Approximate scene of
t/i£ engagement

i -^f/mmm^^mmm:- - ^^mmmmm

between these two impoi-tant points, Heligoland is a vital out-
post in the German scheme of coast defence. Enormous sums
have been expended on fortifying it, and in the conitructiou
of a harbour proof against toi-pedo attack.

The utmost secrecy has always been observed about Heligo-
land, but it was obviously always intended to be the advanced
base of the Gonnan light squadrons and Rub;narines, behind
VNliich the battle fleet could move with impunity between Kiel
and Wilhelmshaven, via Brunsbruttcl and Cuxhaven.

The exact constitution of the attacking British force has
not been stated, nor for various rca.son.s is it likely to be stated
for some time to come. We arc simply told of " strong forces "
of destroyers (under Commodore Tyi-whitt) supported by light
cniisers (uudc;r Commodore Goodenough) and battle cniisers
(|under Rear-Adniirals Boatty, Moore, and Christian), acting
in conjunction with submarines (Commodoio Kcy.s). From
tlie Navy List thci names of most of the priudpal ships em-
ployed can bo conjectured ; but such conjectures may not ;kccs-
«arily he correct, ."iiv mor.-, than that the official acx- -^ut
aeceisari.y gives all tho story.

appeared in the public Prcas at tho time of writing — need not
be more specilically referred to, there were grounds to believe
that a German torpedo squadron would be creeping out some-
time on or about August 27tJi.

It came; light cruiscis and a number of destroyers, prob-
ably two divisions of twelve each, as the Gennans generally
woi-ii in groups of that number, with a cruiser at the head of
eatli. The third German cruiser, Ariadne, was old and
slo-.v. She was not in commission before the mobilisation
of the fleet, and it is improbable that she was leading a
destroyer division. It is more likely that she was an ordinaiy
look-out ship.

Accounts, other than the official report, are necessarily
vague and conflicting. In m.itters of this sort personal iir.pits-
sioiis i;o for veiy little, save from the psychological standpoint.
The ordinary participant sees little or nothing of tho game
save in his own immodiat© vicinity, and he i? generally too
much occuj)icd to see very much even theri>. His feeling^i art\
tiieicforo, inore valuable evidence than his viHicu or £i:j;;)cscd
vision.

13*

LAND AND WATER

September 5, 1914

Venice V^iTj^s:^"^"^

^•5'^^,

^CATTARO ( Torpedo base )

General line of
Franco-British
blockade

Psychologically — and deducting fifty per cent, from all
etories for " literary licence " on the part of journalistic tran-
scribers, we axrive at the pleasing conviction that our men took
the matter very much as they took similar operations in peace
manoeuvres. This is a valuable psychological asset.

The officdal report — entirely on the material side — is wisely
none too explicit. It, however, gives us all that we really need
to know.

It is an old a^age of naval warfare that the only effective
defence against torpedo attack ia what is known as " stopping
the earths." To look for the enemy at night on the sea ia
equivalent to seeking for the proverbial needle in a bundle of
hny. The only effective way of catching the enemy is to be
■' outside the door " to catch him either starting out or return-
ing. To catch him starting is difficult; ho is likely to be far
too wary to be caught coming out. The scientific method is to
let him go out, see to it that his chances of doing mischief
when out are small, and intarcept him on his return ! And
this is exactly what Admiral Beatty did.

Led by the Arethusa, our destroyers got in and lay in
\^ait somewhere off the north-west of Heligoland. Here in
due course they were found by — or rather tJici/ found — the
Germans coming back. In the action which ensued it would
appear that two German cruisers (probably Mainz and
Aj-;adne) engaged the Arethvsa with a certain amount of
success, at a range of " about 3,000 yards," which suggests an
early morning action.

Neither of the Germans carried anything heavier than the
41, whereas the Arcthusa had a couple of 6 inch available.
All the same, however, the Germans had ten 4 13 bearing
s.gainst the two 6 inch and three 4 inch of the Arethusa.
According to our official report one of the Germans was badly
damaged by a lucky shell (6 inch we can safely presume).
This v;as to be expected ; but the off chances were all German.

The damaged Germaji then withdrew, but her place was
presently taken by another cruiser, and the Arethusa (as was
to be expected) was somewhat badly knocked about. It is
probable that at and about this early part of Act Two the
Germans expected to sink or capture her.

Meanwhile all the destroyers on either side were in action.
The result of any such action was a foregone conclusion.
German destroyers are " torpedo boat^ " first, and " gun ships "
afterwards. British destroyers approximately average half
the German torpedo armament and double the German gun
power.

The German destroyers put up a fight against heavy odds,
and then scattered and escaped. One (or two) were sunk.
The rest are officially assumed to have been "well punished."
This assumption is pi-obably correct; but the outstanding
result is that they got away. How much stomach they may
have loft for further fighting remains to be seen. Personally,
I incline to the opinion that it will not be long before they are
heard of again.

Prom here onward it is very difficult, if not quite im-
possible, to reconcile the two official accounts. The British
account, so far as it reveals anything, suggests that the German
cruisers persistently attacked the Arethusa, and that she was
in a verj- tight place when the British battle cruisers arrived
on the scene and saved her.

The German official account, however, reads as quite a
different story. It implies that, so far from seeking to com-
plete the destruction of the Arethusa, the German cruisers
were driven off by her and the destroyers. " Went in a
westerly direction " can only have one possible meaning.
AVest is directly away from Heligolalid j it spells running out
to sea in h&pes of getting back later on. It is curious that in
doscribing the Second Act each side shciild (between the lines)
suggest that it had rather the worst of the encounter! Of
course, this is the general impression always left by confused
fighting. From which we may take it that the fighting was
very confused indeed, and that the fall of the curtain on
Act Two was that each side imagined the other to be t-op-
woight.

This is not a popular interpretation by any manner of
means; but so far as I can piece things together from the data
available it is the bed-rock truth of the matter.

Act Three is far simpler. Whether, as they believe, the
Germaas were in flight; whether, as we imagine, the Germans

Soi)teml)er 5, 1914

LAND AND WATEE

wera seeking to complete the deetructaon, the nest st-age of the
drama is one and the same thing.

It is fairly clear that the Gci-man cruiser Mainz was sunk
by our light cimiser squadron; It is far more abundantly
clear that our battle cruiser squadron performed the same
office for the Koln and Ariadne. All three of these German
light cruisers have now ceased to exist.

In addition, the Germans admit to the loss of th? destroynr
V 187. They do nob mention the actual loss of any other
destioyel:. Personally, I think that only one was actually
sunk, and that our " two sunk " is due to two conflicting
accoi:nts of the sinking of the V 187.

It is the ea.siesb possible mistake to make in war. There
is not the remotest reason to believe that the Germans, having
ofiicially admitted more serious lo.sscs, would risk concealing
tha loss of a further inferior vessel.

I put the rcsu't of the battle as follows : —

BRITISH.

GERMAN.

Susx. yil.

Ariadne (li-ht cruiser).

Koln (light cruiser).

Maim (light cruisar).

y 187 (destroyei).

Bu'LY Damaged.

Arethusa (light cruiser).

SO.

L'lurel {destroyer).

r Liberty (destroyed.

PaU\C£0.

, iVil

10 to 20 destroyers (probably 10

only).

All of which spells a British victory clearly enough, but it
does not spell anything to which tho epithet of " great " should
i be applied, because its material ©fiect ou the naval war cannot
ba other than subsidiary.

In the matter of details : our light cruisers are of appro.xi-
niately the same speed as the German ones, but our battle
cruisers are considerably faster. To this probably is due the
fact that the other two German cruisers were accounted for.
aihey could, of course, neither fight nor run away fi-om thu
lAon and her sisters. Incidentally, the fact that our light
i cruiser squadi'on waa undamaged further suggests that the
Gennans were running from tlicm.

According to the first ofllcial report— the second one is silent
' — at some time during the proceedings the battle crui.<;ers were
" attacked by submarines and floating mines." There is a
v.ngueness in this phrase. It may mean either that the big
j.!iips nearly ran on to a mine field, or that tho surpiiicd
German cruisers dropped mjues in the hopes that the enemy
vnuld run on to them — a very old device. If it were this
"latter, then probably the Germans will have to do a great
deal of mine sweeping ere they can safely venture out again.

It is difficult to believe that the submarine attack and
the "floating mine attack" on our battle cruiser squadron
took place at the same time or place, except in so far as tho
submarines may have — by showing themselves — manoeuvred to
drive or lure the British Fleet on to a mine field.

The apparent impotence of the German submarines, which
did no harm, is not a matter on which to lay much stress. The
fact that they were on the spot at the psychological moment
indicates that the Gennan submarines are efficient. That their
efforts were unsuccessful comes in the chapter of accident.

We have now to consider the psychological side of the
matter. Had the German cruisers tamely surrendered to our
battle cruisers, it would merely have been bowing to the
inevitable. From things as they happened we can therefore
tii-aw the inference that tho morale of the German Navy on
August 28th was still quite good, despite the deteriorating
influences of being more or less shut in.

The vessels which went out must have gone out knowing
that theirs waa a dangerous mission. It ia easy to surmise
their particular objective, and they must have known that
that would be suspected by the British Fleet. But probably
.it the moment when they were surprised thoy were congratu-
l.abing themselves on being safely back in their own watere,
having met neither good fortune nor bad.

Now comes in an interesting problem. The presence of
British battle cruisers with the light squadron indicates that
the possibility that the German jjattle cruisers would como
tut to support tlie German light squadron was allowed for,
find likely enough it was thought or hoped that tho Gennau
High Sea Fleet would follow.

No big German ship intervened. They may all have
been too far away to do so. But that attributes lack of
prescience to the enemy — ever a dangerous thing to do when
one is endeavouring to estimate hostile intentions.

Rather, in my opinion, tlio German heavy ships kept out
of tho way as part of a deliberate plan. A trap was to b3
suspected. Kotliing was to be gn.ined by coming out. whereas
asorlio wn.^ bound to mcnn fresh losses. Hcncs, a-i I read it,
the immobility of the High Sea Fleet. If this reading ba
corroet. it gop's to indicate tho correctness of mv assumption
in the first of these articles— that the High Sea Fleet intends

playing a waiting game, and will only come out before " dsr
Tag" under pressure of home circumstances. Such ho,tit>
ciixr.mstances ha,d obviously not arisen by August 28th.

It Admiral Beatty sought to draw the Main Fleet, hu
opcr.Ttion, brilliantly conceived and executed though it was,
was to that extent a failure, or rather will be so regarded hi/
the Germans.

Hence the inappropriateness of that term "Great Naval
Victory " in which our ]?ress has so freely indulged. To adopt
a chessboard simile, we have had a success; but that success
13 merely the capture of a pavrn. It brings us matorial'v
nearer to checkmate, but a series of several such captures will
be needed before checkmate is arrived at.

Since the Guehen affair — especially since it has transpired
that this battle cruiser and the Bredau ran away together
from the small British cruiser Gloucester, little more powerful
than the Breslav — there has been a tendency on the part of
the public to despise the German Fleet. We have all of us
perhaps forgotten that the truth about the affaire Goehen has
jjroLably been sedulously concealed so far from the German
Navy. At any rate, the affair of Heligoland seems to indi-
cate that we shall have to wait awhile before reaping the
moral benefit of the Goehen incident.

Or it may be that, having realised the deceit of the
policy under which they were educated to despise the British
Navy, German sailors (possibly ever less credulous than their
leaders imagined) have risen to the occasion, and are seeking
to prove themselves. However things may stand, even from
the bare official reports (I place no reliance whatever on
published personal narratives), it is abundantly clear that off
Heligoland the German Navy did acquit itself well against
overwhelming odds, and that we shall do best to esteem our
enemies accordingly.

For the rest, the most pleasing feature of the action off
Heligoland is that our Admirals obviously take nothing for
granted, any more than Nelson and hia compeers did in the
great wars of a hundred years ago. " One Englishman is
worth three Frenchmen" w.ia taught to raw recruits; but our
Admiralty wisely saw to it that their forces were ever two to
one ;it tho crucial point!

In concluding this sui-vey of the Heligoland affair, it ii
necessary to draw attention to the curious story (voucherl for
by the official Press Bureau) that when the German cruisers
sank, and their survivors were being rescued, German officers
were observed shooting their own men.

Unofficial stories to the effect that German prisoners
assert that they had been given to imderstand that if captured
they would be put to death by the British with great barbarity
may bo dismissed as a fiction, probably iuventied this side of
the North Sea. Even if told it on the other side, it is very
unlikely that the most unsophisticated German sailor would
really have believed it; it ia certain that no German officer
did or does. So the " to save them from a worse fate " story
can go by the board at once.

The shooting incident would never have appeared in an
official report unless it were absolutely authenticated. It did
take place, and the explanation, as I read it, is this: "Dei-
Tag " (which we used to believe was merely a British scare-
monger's fancy) was a very real thing indeed to the officers of
the German Navy.

We have probably even now no conception aa to what it
meant to those who treated our Fleet so handsomely at Kiel
only a few short weeks ago.

In the past I liave known German naval officers fairly
well. At any rate, well enough to know that they would never
lose their heads in any circumstances sufficiently badly to
shoot their own fellow sufferers without some very good and
valid reason.

That reason is not to be supplied over the circumstanco
tliat small cruisera were sunk by the battle cruiser squadron.
The obvious ia necessarily the obvious.

We must, therefore, seek further back for the cause of
this cxtraordinaiy incident. It is probably to be found in tho
vague happenings of Act Two. I take it that in one or more
of the German cruisers under fire from our destroyers and
light cru'sers panic occurred. Or, if there were no actual
par..-c, there was shooting so wild that it amounted to the
samo thing. Game to the last, the German officers spent their
last moments in avenging themselves upon those who they
cre.iited with being responsible for the failure of "Der T.t^''
as tliey had realised it.

In a general way, this action is probably regarded a.?
insensate and insane. It may be so, but I view it in quite
nnother light. To my mind it indicates that, whatever the
German bluejacket may be, his officers are of the highest
possible metal. We will do well to revJrence and respect thcui
as enemies worthy of our steel.

Officially, Germany has admitted a defeat in tho affair of
Heligoland. But v,-e shall be wise to realise that at sea wo ara
fighting against men who arc inspired by a spirit which it is

i:'

LAND AND AVATER

September 5, 1914

impossible not to rpspecfc, When ttg cousicicr tlio God en
fiasco, I am by no means sure th.it, despite the losses sus-
tained, tio Heligoland affair may not be a Germaa moiMl
gucccss.

The more we appreciate matters from tliis point of view,
tLe better fo-r our ultiiBatc success.

ON THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

The most important event during the past -week has been
the sinking by H.M.S. High flyer, off tho West Coast of Africa,
w the armed German liner Kahcr Wilhel-n tier Grossr. As
tho lUijhfli/cr sustained some casualties, the liner evidently
put up a fight of some sort. That she was brought to book is
a matter for sincei^e congratulation. She was capable of a
speed of 23 knots. It is doubtful whether the Hlijlifli/er at
the present time is good for more than about 20. and the other
British ships on tho station are slower still. At any rate, the
liner was far the swifter, and the fact that she was brought to
book comeg ia the chapter of luck.

The career of the KaUer WUlidm der Grosse was some^
v.hat mysterious. ^Yhen war broke out she was at New York,
v.liere rightly or wrongly the Germans have long been sus-
pc<:ted of having a secret store of gvms and aminunitiou
icpresented as "spare parts."

The liner left New York, and for eleven days nothing
whatever was heard of her. Then off the African coast sho
flopped the Castle liner Gallcian, asked for news of H.M.S.
Carnarvon, arrested two passengers, but did no more. A little
'later she stopped another Castle liner, but r.gain made no
attempt at capture. On the other hand, she ordered the
wireless to bo thrown overboard. Her next meeting was witli
the Ilighflijer.

One explanation of the mystery is that this commeirce-
destroyer which destroyed no commerce had been ordered to
reserve herself for some special purpose Another pMsible
solution is that she was so flurried with the possibilities of
meeting British cruisers that siie did not dare risk standing by
to capture a prize. Yet another, that having found herself on
t he scene of operations, she realised the impossibility of doing
jiiiything with a prize, and so trusted to damaging trade by
terrorising. This last seems to mo the most probable explana-
tion.

Elsewhere on the high seas the process of clc-aring them of
hostile merchant shipping continues. It is an example of what
?ilahan has called '' the silent pressure of Sea Power." It is
far less drama^tic than the fighting side of naval operations,
but it was none tho less useful on that account. Also, whereas
fighting entails expenditure, elimination of the enemy's trade
represents a substantial profit both for the immediate present
and for the future also.

In this connection, however, I would once more draw
attention to what I mentioned last week: tho danger that
German diplomacy may drag the United States into tlie
quarrel and on to the German side. An official note from tho
British Government to the U.S. Government on tho subject c.f
German liners interned in U.S. ports brings the matter ono
step forward. The American Press and the American people
are splendid in the m.atter of realising what we are fighting for.
But " business is business."

Mr. Churchill spoke nothing but the bald truth when he
told tho United States, " If we go under it will be your turn
next." On that particular point I have ali-eady elaborated.
It is waste of space to reiterate. But here lies a very real
danger jKiinfc.

Wednesday brought us an official Brazilian announcement
to the eiffcct that the German cruiser Dresden had sunk a
British merchant ship off the Brazilian coasts. The Dresden-
noi-mally belongs to the ci-uiser division of t!io High Sea Fleet
(i.e., German " Home Fleet "). It would look as though sho
harLwme secret base in or nea.r Brazilian watei*9. Her coal
supply is nominally sufficient for 5,500 miles at slow speed ;
it actually suffices for hardly a thousand miles at full speed
or standing by for full speed, as a commerce destroyer ni.u.'jt
do — that is to saj-, three, or at the outside, four days' steaming.
Even making all allowances for her having lain by a good deal,
slie must have had to co;il at least twice since v>'ar was declared.

THE FAR EAST.

Japanese operations against Kiao-Chau liave comriicnccd.
The whole of the Gcnnan squadron, v.hich consists of the
armoured ci-uiscrs Scharnhnrst and Gneineneii/, the sm.'.U
cruisers Emden, Leiysi:, and yiirnberff, four gunbata, and two
destroyers, together with the old Austrian cruiser Eei'serin.
J'/iiubeth, is understood to be blockaded inside the harbour. It
v.-ill probably lie their inactive till such time as the Japanese
have established hov;itzer batteries for its destruction. AVe
may depend upon it that they will attack it as they attacked
the Port Arthur Fleet in the Russo-Japanese War.

Kiao-Chau is believed to be very strongly fortified. The
garrison, 5,000 strong, has made every preparation for a siege
and bombardmenti — all buildings likely to be useful as maxka
for Japanese gunnei'S having been dc-stroyed. So ailso have
tho Chinese villages inside the territory. The place is said
to be provisioned for eight luonlhs, but this is probably a very
generous estimate.

Tlie financial conditions of Japan are likely to influence
largely the plan of campaign, that is to say, it is probable that
the naval part of the operations will be entrusted to the
ordinary " active fleet," which is ample to deal with aal con-
tingencies. The place is, of course, certain to be taken ; con-
sequently Japan can well afford to proceed economically.

Tho operations of British warships ia Far Eastern waters
will necessarily bo of an undramatic, but none the less useful
nature. German trade with China has been very considerable,
i'.ud a. great deal of useful spadework will be done by " shov.ing
the flag " in all Chinese harbours. The Chinese are an
unimaginative people, and the mere cessation of German
imports will not of itself give us the markets as schemed for
by the Government. The Chinese will have to be impres.sed
v/ith object lessons in the shape of continually seeing British
warships and having the disappearance of Gennan ones pointed
out to them.

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

The situation here, up to the time of writing, continues
normal. The Austrian Fleet remains effectually shut in while
the French are bombarding Cattaro, which is one of the several
Austrian naval stations in the Adriatic. The indications are
that the majority of these stations will eventually be reduced.
The Austrian battle fleet is hopeilessly inferior to the Anglo-
French blockading force. It is probably cruising near Lissa,
but common prudence wUl prevent it from engaging in a fleet
action unless compelled.

Such action could in no way affect the present general
situation in the Adriatic. Torpedo attaclcs will come along
(later, but at present the Anglo-French forces are at least 200
miles from the main Austrian base at Pola, and so too far
away for a concerted effort to promise much if any success.

The probability of immediate hostilities between Turkey
and Greece may profoundly affect the Mediterranean situation.
At the present moment tlie Goehen and Breslau are Turkish,
but once war is declared German crews for them axe likely
enough to materialise from somewhere.

The possibility of this will necessitate a certain weakening
of the Adriatic blockade, and this may tempt tho Austrian
fleet to come out to try conclusions with the Anglo-French
force.

THE BALTIC.

Baltic operations are somewhat obscure. As mentioned
last week, it is probable that the Eussians ai-e moi-e or less
waiting and that the Germans are more or less blockading.
The " Russian battleship driven ashore " of earlier reports is
now almost certainly to be identified with the German light
cruiser Magdeburg, which is officially admitted to have gone
ashore and subsequently to have been blown up.

Of the various official and non-oiTicial tales of this inci-
dent, I am most inclined to believe the story that sho got
aground by pm-o accident, and was subsequently found and
blown up by the Russian cruisers. There is nothing to indi-
cate tliat any actual battle on a considerable scale ever took
place. We have to remember that Russian trade interests
are comparatively trivial, and that nautically Russia has eveiy-
thing to gain by delaying major operations till some of the
Gangoots ai'e ready for sea.

It is an open secret now that Russia knew that this war
was coming, but that she did not expect the Kaiser to strike
for another two years. Consequently sho did not accelerate
her new ship constniction, w-isely considering that her first
task was to train tha necessary crews, without which mere
ships ai'o useless.

When the Russiaji fleet does go into action the men who
man it will be something very different from those who perished
at Tsushima. So long as Germany has a numerical superiority
she can keep the Russian Navy at bay in the Baltic; but I
question whether the Germans would have much chance
against an equal Russian force. The Russian Navy is now
trained along Franco-British lines — that is to say, officers and
men have cultivated the eeimeradcrie of the French Navy while
they have imitated tho British in playing football together.
It is things of this sox-t that count altogether beyond " paper
calculations."

On the water, the Germans appear to have regarded the
Russians as a negligible factor or thereabouts. We may yet
see them very seriously undeceived on this point. There is
a very wide gulf between the Grigorovitch Navy of to-day
and the Rodjcstvensky Navy of ton years ago.

16*

Soptoraljor 5, 1914

LAND AND WATER

As for the Marfdehurn, slio was one of the latest German
crniscrs, nominally cir^'^i'c^i to strain at 25 knots, but capable
of something up to 30 knoiji at a spurt. Her armament was
Blight — twelve 4"l-incli guns, but she had a belt of 3J inches,
and so was fairly immuna (any way on paper) against attacks
from others of her kind. She is correspondingly a decided
Icsa to the Gerny\n Xavy; for all that the Ex'ssians have
nothing available in the same cla^s with her. Such Ru«ian
cruisers as are avjiilable are considerably more powerful, but
abo a great deal slower.

The consVit of tho Mapdi'hurf] was the Munch en, of about
tl'.e same g:"n power, but somewhat slower and unarnioured.

In the division presumably employed in the Baltic are thra«
other light cruisers — Augshiirri, Siutfyarl, and Danz'i'j.

Of these the first is nominally nearly as fast as the Magdi'-
hurg, but rumour haa it. that her turbines have been damaged.
The other two little ships are comparatively old.

The net result of Baltic operations to date is that tha
really effective German scouting force is reduced about one-
third, and that apart fi'om. this there have been no losses on
cither side, saving the few Russian lighthouses which the
Germans have wantonly destroyed. The value of this parti-
cular operation is the cost of tho rounds \yhich the Gei-mans
Lave fii-ed.

A TOPOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO THE

WAR ZONE.

By E. CHARLES VIVIAN.

Allenstcin. — An important railway jimction on the
/last Prussian strategic railways, upward of fifty miles nortli-
v.-est of the Russian frontier, and about midway between
Gumbinaen and Thorn. It is connected with both these points
by rail, and is also on the hue from Oertelburg to Maricnburg
and Dantzic.

Belfcrt. — The territory of Belfort, at present about
twenty-eight miles in length by thirteen in breadth, is all that
is left to France by the Treaty of 1871 out of the former Depart-
ment of Haut Rhin, and comprises less than si.x of the former
thirty cantons of which the Department was made up. It is
bounded north-east and east by German Alsace, south-east and
south by Switzerland, north by the Vosges Department, and
west and south-west by the Departments of Haute-Saonc and
Doubs. The chief town of the Department, also named Belfort,
b 275 miles south-cast from Paris, on the railways Paris to Bale
and Lyons to Strasbourg. The population of the town is neaily
35,000. Its fortifications have been greatly strengthened sijKC
the war of 1870-71, and the town is now oue of the strongest
frontier defences on the French side. The chief fortificatif)i\ \a
the citadel, in front of which Ls placed a colossal figure, " Tlic
Lion of Belfort," by Bartholdi, erected to commemorate the
brave defence of the town by the French in 1870-71. Situated
as it is among the wooded hills of the Vosges range, Belfort i.s
of great natural strength, and this, together with the Frencli
ftirtifications, renders it an almost impregnable position to attack
from the German side.

Chambery. — Capital of the Department of Savoie,
situated between the upper valleys of the Rhone and the Isfre
rivers. Population about 22,000. It is about fifty miles distant
from tho Italian frontier, on the Paris-Lyons-Turin line of
railway.

Diewze. — A railway station in German Lorraine, on the
Saargemund-Avricourt hue of rail. It is about ten miles from
the French frontier, and about five miles north-east of Marsal.

Gumbinnen. — The chief town of a Government district
of the same name in East Prussia, situated on an affluent of the
River Pregel, on the railway from Eydtkuhnen to Koenigsburrr,
SMid about twenty-two miles west-south-west from the Russian
fionticr. The population, including a small garrison, is estimated
at about 12,000, and the town is engaged in various industries,
of which the chief are iron-founding and the manufacture of
ajjricultural machinerj-.

Jodoigne. — A small town about seven miles south of
Ti.lomont, in the province of Brabant, Belgium. It is a station
oil the Namur-Tirlemont line of rail.

Johannisburg. — Situated on the strategic railway from
Lycl: to Allenstein. in East Prussia, on the south of the Spieding
Lake, and about fifteen miles north of the Polish frontier.

Maubsvge. — A first-class French fortress town about
five miles south of the Belgian frontier and eleven or twelve miles
fiouth of Mons. It is the point at which the main line from Paris
to Belgium branches for Brussels and Liege, and is the site of a
hir^e arsenal. It is about midway between Valenciennes and
Thiiin.

Phiiippeville. — A town of Southern Belgium about ten
riilos from Givet, on the French frontier, and almost midway
Lefween Givet and C'harleroi. It is situated in wooded country,
and is connected by railway v.ith Charleroi and Charlcville on
the French side of the frijntier.

Poscn. — A Prussian province with aa area about equal to
that of Belgiiun, bounded on the north by the province of Pru-^sia,
on the east by Russian Poland, on the south by Silesia, and oa
the west by Brandenburg. The population is upwards of 1,900,000,
the majority of whom are Poles, with a minority of about a third
of the population Germans. Posen, the capital city of tha
province, is situated at the confluence of the A^'arthe and Cybina
rivers, 150 miles east of Berlin ; it is a first-class fortress of great
strategic importance, consisting of an inner citadel and an outer
line of twelve main forts encircling the city. The main town ii
on the west bank of the Warthe river, and the eastern or Polish
part of the town is regarded as the poor district b}'^ the superior
Germans of the west city. The total population is about 70,0(K),
including a greater percentage of Jews than in any other German
centre, and in normal times there is a garrison of about 8,000 men.
The town is on the main Berlin-Thorn-Petersburg lijie of mil,
end is also connected by direct Uncs with Stettin and with Breslau,
from which latter town it is about ninety miles distant in a direct
northerly direction. In the north, and especially in the north-cast
of the province, the cotmtry is dotted with small lakes and ponds,
and these are interspersed with large tracts of fen and marshland.
In addition to the railway facihties which exist throughout the
province, numerous canals and navigable rivers afford means of
curamuuication between the principal trading centres.

St. Amand. — An important railway junction situated in
the line of forti.lcations extending from Lille to Maubeuge, in
Northern France. It is on the left bank of the River Escaut, a
tributary of tlie Scheldt, and is a junction for no less than sit
lines of rail, which connect it with practically all the maiu Belgian
lines, and with Lille, Douai, Valenciennes, and Paris.

Soldau. — Situated about ten miles inside the Ccrninn
frontier, on the railway line from Warsaw to Danti:ic on t!ie
Baltic coast. This line is crossed at Soldau by the strato^iic
railway from Oertelburg to Thorn. Definite occupation of Sold;ai
end command of its railway junction threatens all the railway
comiiiunieatious of East Prussia.

Thora. — A town and first-clasa fortress in the province of
East Prussia, situated on the right bank of the Vistula river, about
ten miles from the Russian frontier, ninety-two miles south of
Dantzic. It is a point of considerable strategic importance, and
has ranked as a first-class fortress since 1878. The population
is about 25,000, of whom two-fifths are Poles, and the to^sTi has a
considerable trade in grain and timber as well as a certain amount
of manufacturing activity. The Vistula, navigable at this point,
provides means of communication with Dantzic and with inter-
vening towns toward the north, and Thorn is also connected by
rail with Posen and Allenstein by means of the strategic railway
of the eastern frontier, and with Warsaw to the cast, and Berlin
to the west by direct lines.

Wilhelmshaven. — The principal German naval station
and port on the North Sea, sixty miles north-west from Bremen.
The harbour has an extent of about 200 acres and a depth of
27 feet, this bein'j known as the " new harbour,'' and connected
with various repairing and equipment docks and with the outer
harbour. There is also a special torpedo harbour, together with
three dry docks and a shipbuilding basin— altogether AVilhelms-
haven is admirably equipped for the production and shelter of
every class of battleship and naval war craft, is protected fully
against any attack by sea, being situated on the western sido
of Jade, or Jahde, Bay, and defended by the Elbe fortificationa
and the HeUgoland defeuccs.

17«

LAND AND AVATER

September 5, 1914

ROME OR CARTHAGE?

NEVER since the Romans dreed tlie di'cad decree " Delenda est Carthago " lias such an
avowal been made to the Avorld as is revealed in the book of General Ericdrich Von Bernliardi,
"Germany and the Next War," written as far back as 1911. The destruction of the British
as a world -empire and their replacement by the Gennans is the leit motif.

Every citizen of the British Empire should read the book. Quotations, however copious, are inadequate.
Tlie work has small literary craft, its arguments and technique are clumsy, but its theme is temble.

Bernhardi continually stultifies his own arguments. He explains at length that Germany is
surrounded by crafty and jealous enemies, aU eager for a favourable opportunity to declare A\-ar. Later he
points out, equally strongly, that Germany must go to war at all costs for the pui-pose of accjuiring colonies
either from Portugal, Belgimn, France, or England. The \\Titer is careful not to include South America, as
it is obvious that friendship with the United States must be couiied.

Having explained to his own satisfaction, and, no doubt, to that of the German people, that the English
are incapable of colonising as it should be done by a cultured and enlightened race, and emphasised how that
this great work is solely the prerogative of the races of Central Europe, he completely knocks the bottom
out of argument when he says —

" The political and national development of the Gei-man people has always, so far back as German
histoiy extends, been hampered and liindercd by the hereditary defects of its character — that is, by the
particulai'ism of the individual races and States, the theoretic dogmatism of the parties, tlie incapacity to
sacrifice personal interests for great national objects from want of patriotism and of political common sense,
often, also, by the pettiness of the prevailing ideas. Even to-day it is painful to see how the forces of the
Gennan nation, which are so restricted and confined in their activities abroad, are wasted in fruitless quarrels
among themselves."

Mr. Edward Arnold did his countrymen a service by publishing a cheap edition, which can now be
obtained everywhere. It is an antidote to British apathy. Our recruits and volunteers should cany it in
their knapsacks to learn from it the details of the work before them. [Editor Land and Water.]

THE TEUTON UiNVEILED.

Our paxks contain groups of men drilling in liliaJd cr
plain clothes (whilst unifonrua are being made), but they are
not a tithe of those who should become our effectives. Our
business folk havei failed to grasp the situation; they try to
conduct business as vsual rather than conduct it by the aid
of women to fill the places of men.

The feeling is too prevalent that paying is equal to
fighting, and that those who pay have done their duty. The
public appear to be soothing themselves with thoughts about
our Army being abroad fighting, our Navy protecting our
shores from invasion, our race from the colonies sending
lighting men, and whilst those lay down their lives the
" Steam Roller " of Russia is coming to flatten out the
Germans, so that all the patriotic work left for our people at
homo is to " capture Germany's trade."

Further from the capital we glean a livelier impression cf
alertness. Tho Scotch are pouring recruits into the wa.r depots
in relatively greater numbers than the English ; even in Ireland
tho able^-bodied man is under arms, or aching to find a rifla
to carrj'. In northern and middle England the martial spirit
is aroused ; they only think war ! Canada, Australia, South
Africa, and India are arming, and yet the War Office of Grea;b
Britain has only just got its first 100,000 men.

Yet southern England breeds no slackers, they only want)
to be aroused. They do not know the war game, they do nob
luiderstand its gravity. They for so long hava only had to
fight against trade competition that battb rivajlry ia strange
to them; they havo been at peace so long and tho Teuton seems
so friendly, that they do not see what has been prepared for
tlicra or what they ai'e " up against." They are strange to the
inward spirit of tho militai-y Germanic race and its belief in a
God-ordained mission to conquer the world and impose a
domination upon the other " weaker " races peopling the
Earth.

To present in tabloid form some of the doctrines of the
Germanic religion of conquest the text book of Germany's
military spirit must bo drawn upon. It is called "Germany
and the Next War." The author appeais to be a Gei-man
patriot, soldier, diplomat, preacher, prophet, and standard
bearer.

The first of his prophecies has pr-oved true. War has
come, and with it the spirit of vengeance, ferocity, and detei-
niiuation. This is what he calmly prophe.?ies as the harvest to
bo reaped from the seed Germany sowed. In the opening
chapter of his book the song is sung of tho Soldicr-Priest-
Projjliet. It is of the splendour of war, the Divino minion
of those who wage it, and the glorious paiailise of tho happy
wp trior. To understand Bernhardi and imbibe his spirit we
quote his "words :l

THE SONG OF THE SWORD.

War ifl a hiolosical necessity of the first importance, a regu-
lative elen'.civt in the life of maiildnd which cannot bo dispensed
.with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow, which

excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all reaJ
civilisation. " War is the father of all things."

Strong, healthy, and flourishing nation* increase in numbers.
From a given moment they require a continual expansion of their
frontiers, they require new territoiY for the acoommodatiou of
their surplus population. Since almost every part of tho globe is
inhabited, new territory most, as a rule, be obtained at the cost
of its possessors — ^that is to eay, by conquert, which thus becomea
a law of necessity.

*•••■•

Might is at once the supreme right, and th« dispute as to
what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war. War givea
a biologically just decision, since its decisions rest on the very
natiu'e of things. . . .

• *•«»•

The efforts directed towards the abolition of war most not
only be termed foolish, but absolutely immoral, and must be stigma-
tised as unworthy of tho human race. To what does the whole
question amount? It is proposed to deprive men of the right and
tho possibility to «acriiice tihair highest material possessions, their
physical life, for ideals, and thus to realise the highest mor;il
unselfishness. It is proposed to obviate the great quarrels between
naltions and States by Courts of Arbitration — that is, by arrange-
ments. A one-sided, restricted, formal law is to be established
in the place of the decisions of history. The weaS nalion is to
have the same rig^ht to live as the powerful and vigorous nation.
The whole idea represents a presmnptuoua encroachment on the
natural laws of development, which can only load to the most
disastrous consequences for humanity generally. . . . Tha
incvitflibleness, the idealism, and the blessing of war, as an indis-
pensable and stimulating law of developmcut, muet be repeatedly
emphasised. . . .

Bernhardi discusses the past of tho Germanic States In
Europe during tho Napoleonic Wars to point out the danger
of neutrality v.licn the world is on fire.

According to all human calculation, the participation of Pru.«si»
in the war of 1805 would have given the Allies a decisive
superiority. The adherence to neutnility led -to the crash of 1805,
and would have meant the fin.nl overthrow of Prussia as a State
had not the moral qualities still extsted thcrs which Frederick the
Great had ingrained on her by his wars.

Among all political sins, tho sin of feebleness is the most
contemptible ; it is the political sin against the Holy Ghost.
[Treitsohke.]

In the opinion of the Teuton Germany is tho, "pre-
dominant partner " in the Germanic family and in the Triple
Alliance.

The internal disruption of the Triple Alliance, as shown
t'early by the action of Italy towards Turkey, threatens to bring
tiie crisis quickly to a Ivead. The period which destiny has allotted
us for conceJit rating our forces and preparing ourselves for the
deadly struggle may soon be prssed.

While the aspiring Great Powers of the Far East cannot at
present directly influence our policy, Turkey — tho predominant
Power of tho Near East — is of paramount importance to us. She
is our natural ally ; it is emphatioally our interest to keep in close
touch with her. The wisest course would havo been to havo mads
her earlier a member of the Triple AUfenoe, and so to havo pre-
vented the Turco-Italian war, which threatens to change the whole
political situation, to our disadvantage. Turkej would gain in two

18*

September 5. 1914

LAND AXD WATER

ways : £be oarorcs her position both against Russia and agaiiiet
England— the two States, that is, with whose hostility w« have
to reckon. Turkey, .also, is the only Power which can threaten
England's position in Egypt, and thus menace the Bhort sea route
and the laud communications to India. We ouglit to spare uo
ea/jrifices to eecm-e this counti-y as au ally for the eventuality of a
war with England or Russia. Turkey'e interests arc ours. It is
also to the obvious advantage of Italy that Turkey maintain her
oomniaudiiig position on t!ie Bosp.horus and at the Dardanelles,
tliat this important key should not be transfiirtd to the keeping
of foreigners, and belong to Ruteia or England.

• •*•••

We have to count more on Japanese hostility than Japanese
friendship. . . . The apparently peaceful state of things must
not deceive us; we are facing a hidden, but Jione the less formid-
able, crisis — perhaps the most momentous crisis in the history of
the German nation.

Wo have fought in the la-st great wars for our national union
and our position among the Powers of Europe; wo now must
decide whether we wish to develop into and maintain a ]Vorld
Kmj'irr, and procure for Geiinan spirit niul Gemian ideas that
lit recognition which hac been hitherto withheld from them.

Save afl regards Japan, the further the Prophet has
(]«parte<i from his own coiiutry the less true have been his
prognostications. The distant fields on to wliich he cast his
vielon were gi-ecn, hut not as verdant as General Bernhardi,
v.ho appears to have taken as true the leaflets used in our
domestic political strife where any and all sides pi'edicted the
vce to come from our English-speaking cousins across the sea,
from our brotlicrs in Canada, Austi-ailia, Xew Zealand, South
Africa; from India, Egj'pt, and all other parts and depen-
dencies of our Empii-e, if this, that, or the other political
nrstrum were not swallowed or rejected. He believes, or
wishes his readers to believe, that the United States of America
are anxiously waiting the pyschological moment to blot our
Empire out for ever- -our great colonies and dependencies were
Jooking for the moment when they could shake themselves free
from England's detestable gi"asp, India to drive the last of our
r.Tce into the ocean and thus be free, Tuikey to take Egypt
back into its empty crop and there digest her people at leisure.
And when all these moments came about the day of Germany
would arrive to shatter the British Empire to pieces and on
the dust build up her own. Pity he was too soon for Mr.
'■ Odell " of the Constitutional Club. The Kaiser's spy system
had not then comc> up to date. -

DOUBT ! THE BEGINNING OF WISDOM.

\\ ith all Bornhardi's enthusiasm and prophetic ardour
bis military instinct warned him that there were difficulties
ahead. Tliese he sets out with a frankness equalling his
•pprcciatiou of the goal to which Germany means to march :

Spain Alone of the renvaining European Powers has any inde-
pendent importance. She has developed a certain- a»tagoii"isni to
rronce by her Mi^rccco policy, and may, therefore, become even-
tually a factor in German policy. The pe'tty States, on the contrary,
form no independent centres of gravity, but may, in event of war,
prove to pos-scss a by no means negligible importance : the small
Balkan States for Austria and Tuikey; Denmark, Holland,
Belgium, and Switzerland, and eventually Sweden, for Germany.

Switzerland and Belgium count »s neutral 'The former was
declared neutral at the Congres* of Vienna on November 20th,
1815, under the collective guarantee of the signatory Powers;
Belgium, in the Treaties of London of November l&th, 1831, and of
April 19th, 1839, on the part of the five Great Powers, the Xether-
landA. and Belgium itself.

If we look at these conditions aa a whole, it appears that on
the continent of Europe the power of the Central European Triple
.\lliancc and that of the States united against it by alliance and
agreement balance each other, provided that Italy belongs to the
leaj;ue. If we take into calculation the imponderabilia, whose
wfight can only be guessed at, the scale is inclined slightly in
favour of the Triple Alliance. On the other hand, England indis-
putably rules the sea. In consequence of her crushing naval
superiority when allied with France, and of the geographical condi-
tions, she may cause the greatert damage to Germany by cutting
off hrr maxitime trade. There is also a not inconsiderable army
available for a continental war. When all considerations aje taken
into account, our opponents have a, political superiority not to be
underestimated. If France succeeds in strengthening her army by
large colonial levies and a strong English landing force, this
superiority would lie asserted on land a!so. If Italy i-eally with-
draws from thejfriplo Alliance, very distinctly superior forces will
be united against Gennany and Austria,

Under these conditions the position of Germany is extra-
ordinarily ditiicuJt.

• • ■ • • « •

An iiit«n£ive Aolonial policy is for us especially an absolute
necessity,

A highly interesting examination follows of the political
complications of the European Powers. Bernhardi docs not
permit himself to harbour delusions. Although he had pre-
viously set forth the position of Belgium as neutral, he now
more minutely di.«cusscs her position, foreshadowing her
cntxiring into a combination opposed to the Germanic alliance,
and the Germanic view of the right to violate her neutrality.

COMPLICATIONS TO BR CONSIDERED.

We niuKt endeavour to obtain in lliis syttem our mer!te<I
petition at the h^nd of a fedrrnlion c,f Certrsil Europr.-.n St.^^•y,
ai:d thus rcduco the i.iMginary Euifvpean equili'oriiini, in one Wiy

or tJie other, to its true value, ajid correspondingly to increase our
own power.

A f;u>ther question, suggested by the present political position,
is whether all the political treaties which were concluded at the
beginning of the last century nnder quite other conditions — in fact,
under a different conception of what constitutes a State — can, or
ought to be, permanently observed. When Belgium was pro-
claimed neutral, lio one contemplated that she would lay clainr to
a large and valuable region of Africa. It may well Be asked
whether the acquisition of such tenitor-y is not if/so facto a breach
of neutrality, for a State from which — ^theoretically at least — all
danger of war has been removed has no right to enter into political
competition with the other States. This argument is the more
justifiable because it may safely be assumed that, in event of a
war of Germany against France and England, the two last-men-
tioned States would try to unite tlieir forces in Belgium. Lastly,
the neutrality of the Congo State' must be termed more thiiii
problematic, since Belgium claims the right to cede or sell it to a
non-neutral country. The conception of permanent ueutranty is
entirely contrary to the essential nature of the State, which cair
only attain its highest moral aims in coniiK:tition with other States.
Its complete development presupposes such competition.

Again, the principle that no State can ever interfere in the
internal affairs of another State is repugnant to the highest rights
of the State. This principle is, of course, very variously inter-
preted, and powerful States have never refrained from a liigh-
haudtd interference in the internal afi'airs of smaller ones.

THE RUSSIAN STEAM-ROLLER.

If we now turn our attention to the East, in order to forecast
Russia's probable behaviour, we must begin by admitting that,
from a Russian standpoint, a war in the West holds out better
prospects of success than a renewed war with Japan, and possibly
with China. The Empire of the Czar finds in the W'est powerful
allies, who are impatiently waiting to jcin <li an attack on
Germany. The geographical conditions and means of conununi-
cation there allow a far more rapid and systematic development of
power than in Manchuria. Public opinion, in which liatred of
Germany is as persistent as ever, would be in favour of such a
war, and a victoi-y over Germany and Austria would not only
open the road to Constantinople, but would greatly improve the
political and economic influence of Russia in Western Europe.
Such a success would afford a splendid compensation for the defeats
in Asia, and would offer advantages such as never could be expected
on the far-distant Eastern frontiers of the Empire.

Should Russia, then, after weighing the.se chances, launch out
into an offensive war in the West, the struggle would probably
assume a quite different chai'acter from that, for example, of a,
Fr.anco-German war. Russia, owing to her vast extent, is in the
first place secure against complete subjugation. In case of defeat
her centre of gravity is not shifted. A Russian war can hardly
ever, thocefore, become a struggle for political existeneej anil
cause th.nt straining of every nerve which such a stmggle entails.
» • » » • •

We cannot count on seeing a great commander .at our head;
a sPioiiil Frtdeiiik Ihu Oicat will hardly .appear.

We cannot blink the faot that we have to deal with immense
milit.ai'y difficulties, if we are to attain our own political' ends
or repel successfully the attack of our opponents.

GERMANY'S DOORS-OPEN AND SHUT.

In the first pface, the geographical configuration and position
of our counti-y are very mifavourable. Our open easteni frontier
offers no opportunity for continued defence, and Berlin, the centre
of the Government and administration, lies in dangerons proximity
to it. Our western frontier, in itself strong, can be easily turned
on the north through Belgium and Holland. No natural obstacle,
no strong fortress, is there to oppose a hostile invasion, and
neutrality is only a paper bulwark. So in the south, the barrier
of the Rhine can easily bo turned through Switzerland. There,
of course, the character of the country offers considerable diffi-
culties, and if the Swiss defend themselves resolutely, it might not
be easy to brealc down their resistance. Their army is no despicable
factor of strength, and if they were attacked in their mountains
>hey would fight as they did at Sempach and Murten.

The natural approaches from the North Sea to th<- Baltic,
the Sound, and the Great Belt, are commanded by foi'eign guns,
and can easily fall a prey to our enemies.

_ The narrow coast with which we face to the North Sea forms
m itself a strong front, but can easily be taken in the rear through
Holland. England is planted before our coasts in such a manner
that our entire oversea commerce can be easily blocked. In the
south and south-cast alone are we secured by Austria from direct
invasion. Otherwise we are encircled by our enemies. We may
have to face attacks on three sides. This circumstance compels ii's
to fight on the inner lines, and so presents certain advantages; but
it is also fraught with dangers, if our opponents understand how to
act on a correct and consistent plan.

ISOLATION.

If we look at our general political position, we cannot conceal
the fact that we stand isolated, and cannot expect support from
.anyone in carrying out our positive political plans. England,
France, .and Russia have a common interest in brealting down our
power. This interest will sooner or later be asserted by arms. It
is not therefore the interest of any nation to increase Germ.any's
power. If we wish to attain an extension of our power, as" is
natural in our pofition, we must win it by the sword against vastly
superior foes.

Such a war— for us more than for any other nation— mnst
be a war for our political and national existence. This must be
so, for our opponents can only attain their political aims by almost
aiuiihilating us by land and by sea.

We must therefdie prepare not only for a short war, but for
a^ protracted campaigii. We miift be .armed in order to complete
tne overthrow of our enemies, should the vii lory is:* ours; ami, if
worited. to continue to defend ourselves in the very heart of our
countiy until suceeiis at last is won.

ir.»

LAND AND WATER

Septemljer 5, 1914

In Iha view of the dan^jera and the oircumstance that we are
not fctroiig enough to entertain any idea of provoking a battle, the
qucjition remains, What are the means of defenaive naval strategy
to secure protection from a superior and well-prepared enemy, and
gradually to become its maatcr?

The plan might be foi-med of aritidpatiing the enemy by a
sudden attack, inetead of waiting passively for him t-o attack fust,
and of opening the war as the Japaneee did before Port Arthur.
In this way the English fleet might be badly damaged at the out-
set of the real hostilities, its superiority might be leesened, and
the beginning of the effective blockade delayed at leaat for a short
time. It is not unthinkable that cuoh an attempt will be made.
Such an undertaking, however, doe* not •eem to me to promise
anv great success.

• •••••

The war against the English commerce must none the less be
boldly and energetically prosecuted, and should start unexpectedly.
The prizes which f:iU into our hands must be remorselessly
destrweil, since it will usually be impossible, owing to tlie groat
Englis'h superiority and the few bases we have abroad, to bring
them back in safelv without e.xposiiig our vessels to great risks.

It would be necessary to take further steps to secure the
importation from abroad of supplies necessary to us, since our own
communications will be oompletely cut off by the English. The
simiplest and cheapest way wojdd be if we obtained foreign goods
through Holland or perhaps neutral Belgium; and could export
some part of ouF own products through the great Dirtch and
Flemish harbours. New commercial routes might be discovered
through Denmark. Our owm oversea commerce would remain
suspended, but such meosnrei tronld prevent an absolute stagna-
tion of trade.

It is, however, very unlikely that England would tolerate such
communications through nentral territory, since in that way the
effect of her war on our trade would be much reduced. The
attempt to block these trade routes would approximate to a breach
of neutrality, and the States in question would have to face the
momeutoufi question, whether they would conform to England's
win, and thus incur Gennany's enmity, or would prefer that
adhesion to the Gennao Empire which geography dictates. They
would have the choice between a naval war with England and a
Continental war with their German neighbonrs^two possibilities,
each of which contains great dangers. That England would pay
much attention to the neutrality of weaker neighbours when such
» stake was at issue is hardly credible.

GERMANY, WHEN THE SEA HATH SPOKEN.

Yot after a month's war only four unaimed merchajit ships
under the British flag hav9 been " remorselessly destroyed,'
plus a boat line-fishing in Icelandic waters,

A country like the German Empire depends on an extensive
foreign trade in order to find work and food for its growing
population.

Let us imagine the endless misery which a protracted stoppage
or definite destruction of oiu: oversea trade woidd bring upon the
whole nation, and in particular on the masses of the industrial
classes who live on our export trade.

• **•••

Complicated and grave questions, military as well as political,
are thus raised by an Anglo-German war. Our trade would in any
case suffer greatly, for sea communications could be cut off on every
side. Let us assume that France and Russia seal our land frontiers,
then the only trade route left open to us is through Switzerland
and Austria — a condition of affairs which would aggraA'ate diffi-
culties at home, and Should stimulate us to carry on the war with
increased vigour. In any ca£e, when war threatens w^e must lose
no time an preparing a road on which we can imjKjrt the most
essential foodstuffs and raw materials, and also export, if only in
small quantities, the surplus of our industrial products. Such
measures' caiinot be made on (Ke i^ur of the moment. They must
be etalHirated in peace time, and a definite department of the
Government must be responsible for these prepaxations.

Those suggestions indicate the preliminary measures to be
adopted by us in the eventuality of a war with England. We
should at first carry on a defensive war, and would therefore have
to reckon on a blockade of our coasts, if we succeed in repelling
the probable English attack.

Such a blockade can be carried out in two ways. England
can blockade closely our North Sea coaSl, and at the same time
bar the Danish atraits, so as to cut oS communications with our
lialtic ports; or ehe can seal up on the one side the Channel
between England and tlie Continent, on the other side the open
sea between the north of Scotland and Norway, on the Peterhead-
Ekersund line, and thus cripple our oversea commerce and also
control the Belgo-Dutch, Danish, and Swedish shipping.

We must fight the French fleet, so to speak, on land — i.i»., we
must defeat France so decisively that she woidd be compelled to
renounce her alliance with England and withdraw her fleet to save
herself from total destruction. Just as in 1870-71 we marched to
the shores of the Atlantic, so this time again we must resolve on
an absolute conqnest, in order to capture the Frendh naval ports
and destroy the French naval depots. It would be a war to the
knife with France, one which would, if victorious, annihilate once
for all the French position as a Great Power.

• ••••»

Who, then, can doubt that Germany has set herself the
task of ruling the world ?

Since war broke out Germans have burnt Belgian libraries,
univei-sities and churches, shot priests and doctors, destr-03'ed
public monuments and hospitals. Their Emperor's instructions
vrere to act like the Goths witJi Alaric, and by " ruthlessly
destroying" the population to strike such terror into man,
woman, and child that nono might dare to raise their eyes

whilst his destroyers passed. We know why Gemei'al Bemhardi
endoi-ses and quotes from Treitschke's " Politic."

" God will see to it," says Treitschke, " that war always
recurs as a drastic medicine for the human race ! "

His Calho'lic allies from Austria and Bavaria secure this
crumb of comfort ::

The dogmatiHtt of Protestant orthodoxy and the Jesuitic ten-
■ dencica of ultramontanism of the Catholics must be surmounted
before any common religious movement can be contemplated. But
no German statesman can disregard tliis aspect of affairs, nor must
he ever forget that the greatness of our nation is rooted exclusively
on Protestiuitism. Legally and socially, all denominations enjoy
equal rights, but the German State must never renounce the
leadership in the domain of free spiritual development. To do so
would mean loss of prestige.

The late Professor Cramb (lecturer on Modern History,
Queen's College, London), with his German education and wide
knowledge of German history, literature, and thotight, here
confirms Bemhardi. He declares that Germany's part in the
future is

to resume that creative roh in religion which the whole Teutonic
race abandoned fourteen ceutmies ago. Judaea aud Galilee cast
their dreary spell over Greece and P.ome when Greece and Rome
were already sinking into decreptitude .and the creative power in
tliera was exhausted, when weaiiness and bitterness wakened with
their greatest spirits at day and sank to sleep again with them
at night. Bat Judaea and Galilee struck Germany in the splendour
and heroism of her prime. Germany and the whole Teutomc people
in the fifth century made the great error. They conquered Itonie,
but, dazzled by Rome's authority, they adopted the religion and
the culture of the vanquished. Germany's own deep religious
instinct, her native genius for religion, manifested in her creative
success, was arrested, stunted, thwarted. But, having onc»
adopted the new faith, she strove to live that faith, and for more
than thirty generations she has struggled and wrestled to see with
eyes that were not her eyes to worship a God that w|as not her
God, to live with a world vision that was not her vision, and to
•trive for a heaven that was not her heaven.

Very consoling for the Rhine Provinces and South Ger-
many, apparently ! Germany, if victorious, will not confiuo its
directive powers to the ways of Nations, but will invade the
realms of God and produce a new and universal religion !
What a portentous concept ! There is foetus in the womb of
destiny which, if not destroyed, promises to grow into a
monster. The new Germany seeks to tumble down old ideals,
shatter old faiths, destroy human liberty, set us a spurious
Napolfipnism, and force ns to bow before a shrine from whence
the spirit has departed. Such is the new '' Protestantism " on
which tlie greatness of the German Empire ia to be exclusivehj
rooted. Its gospel, however, is not to be fouaid in Luther, nor
is it even original — it has been taken without acknowledge-
ment fi'om the " Decline and Fall," and is but a pale reflex of
the pigments used by Gibbon.

Professor Cramb suggests that the new cult is already an
established creed in Germany, for he proclaims:

la Europe, I say, this conflict between Christ and Napoleon
for the maetery over the minds of men is the mo£it sigmficant
Bpiritual phenomenon of the twentieth centurj-.

More than the Europe of 1800 and 1301, which saw in the
viator of Marengo the Mohammed of a new era, the enunciator of
a new faith, young Germany, the Germany of to-day, iu the
writings of Treitschke and of the followers of Treitsddce, studies
Napoieonism, illumining politics with an austere and uplifting
grandeur. In the writings of Nietzsche and of the followers of
Nietzsche they study the same Napoieonism, transforming the
principles of everyday life, breathing a new spirit into ethics,
transfiguring the tedious, halt-hypocritical morauty of an earlier
generation.

The baleful fires of Louvain University are but lit from
the torch with which Khalif Omar fired the Librai-y of Alex-
andrian—the philosophies of Paynim and Teuton touch a
common periphery.

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September 13, 1914

LAND AND WATEK

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— I

THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOQ

THE EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR.

I PRO POSE in my notes of this week to begin
with an examination of the Eastern field of the
war. Because here tilings have been brought
to at least a local decision.

From the very beginning of this vast series of
European campaigns it has rightly been taken for
granted that a factor of time was involved peculiar to
this universal war.

In aU wars the factor of time is a positive
detciTninant. That is, it is a factor the neglect of
which makes nonsense of all the rest, and the under-
standing of which is essential to the understanding of
all the rest. But in this war, more than in any other
which I can call to mind, the factor of time is
emphasised with extreme simplicity and absolute
effect.

To repeat what has been said upon all sides (and
more than once in these pages), the forces of the two
Germanic Powers, threatened from the West and from
the East, find themselves superior to the AVestern, at
the mo.st equal to the Eastern, enemy. By an acci-
dent, happy for the Germanic powers, the Eastern

enemy cannot enter the field until long after the
Western enemy. Therefore it is the whole business
of the Germanic forces so tlireatened to destroy the
menace from the West before the menace from the
East comes into play.

The Western enemy of the GeiTnanic Powers is
the French Army, which, with its six per cent, con-
tingent of English and its unexpected and fortunate
addition in strength received through the resistance
of the Belgian Militia and Trained Regulars, stands
to the Germanic Powers in the proportion of rathei*
more than 1 to rather less than 3. The Eastern
enemy is the Russian Army, which is superior in
mere number to the Armies of the two Gei-manic
Powers combined.

Let me show first in more detail than has
hitherto been attempted in these pages why the
pressure exercised by the Russian Army will be felt
later than is generally imagined.

That Russia would mobilise more slowly than
France has been amply appreciated. There was here
an element of delay amounting to a fortnight or three
weeks.

!•

LAND AND WATEE

September 12, 1914

That Tiussia -n-oukl, once mobilised and once
advancing, be unable to bring that jjressure to bear
during the first A\ceks of the war was less generally
ajjpreciated.

AVhen the critic measures the minimnm distance
between some point of the Eussian frontier and the
Prussian capital of Berlin he is struck by the short-
ness of the line between the one and the other.

That point upon the Eussian frontier nearest to
Berlin is to be foimd at Pyzdrj, where the river Warta
leaves the territory- of Eussian Poland to enter the
territory of Prussian Poland, and from this point to
Berlin itself is almost exactly 282 kilometres, or
between 173 and ISO miles.

If, therefore, the problem were merely one of a
Eussian advance from that point upon the Eussian
frontier to the capital of Prussia the factor of time
• woidd not be of the striking importance it is. The
advance required in order to strike at the Prussian
capital would not be half as much again as the advance
required to strike from the German frontier in the
West at the French ca2)ital.

But the jn'oblem cannot be stated upon these
lines, and to envisage it so is quite to misunderstand
the elements of the Eastern Campaign.

There are two things which prevent so simjjle a
plan as a direct advance on Berlin from the extreme
of Eussian Poland.

(1) It so hai>pens that the two Germanic Powers

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"^"^Si,

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"^' C A L I C I A \

PLAN- SHOWIXa HOW THE CONFIGURATION OF THE WESTEBX
EUSSIAN FRONTIEB EENDEKS NECESSARY TUB TOTAL SUBJUGATIOX
OF AUSTRIA AND EAST PRUSSIA, IN ORDER TO SECURE THK
I'LANKS OF THE ABJIT, BEFORE THE DHIECT MARCH ON BERLIN
IS BEGUN,

lie (by the configuration of the Eussian frontier on
the west) upon the flank of any such advance
towards Berlin. Were the Eussian Armies merely
to go straight before them in an advance upon
the Prussian capital they Avoidd leave behind them
unbeaten upon theii* right in A, as upon the left in B,
to the North and to the South, great bodies A Prussian
and B Austrian, which, by marching, the one South,
the other North, along such lines as (1) and (2) into
Eussian Poland, would fall upon the communications
of sucli a Eussian advance and destroy it. Therefore
those who draw up the genei-al Eussian plan must first
allow for the holding of German territory as far as the
line C — D on the North — Avhich is the line of the
Lower Vistula — and for the holding of Austrian
territory up to the line E — F, that is the whole of

Galicia, before an advance upon Berlin can be under-
taken. It is not until the advancing Eussian columns
are, roughly, abreast along the whole line North and
South from Danzig to Cracow that a direct East and
West march upon the heart of GeiTnauy could begin.

(2) It so happens that the Northern of these two
flanking fields (to wit, the provinces of East and West
Prus.*ia uj) to the line of the Vistula, between Thorn
and Danzig) is composed for the most part of country
])ariicularly defensible, a mass of marsh and lake ill-
provided with communications. Furthei-, the ultimate
boundary of all this, the line of the Vistula itself, is
artificially defended by strong works, especially at
Danzig and at Thoni, its two extremities. In other
words, just where the Eussians had to meet their most
formidable human opposition, that of the Prussian
military organisation, they also had to meet the most
formidable natural conditions.

On the other hand there is a form of advance
which Eussia can undertake against Germany and
which will bring pressure to bear upon Gemiany long
before any direct march upon Berlin has begun. If
Eussia occupies Galicia thoroughly and in this region
thoroughly defeats the mass of the Austrian forces :
if she then proceeds Westward and by North down
the Valley of the Oder, she will be striking immediately
at the Easternmost of the great industrial regions of
the German Empire, and will thus be bringing
immediate i)ressiu-e to bear upon the whole German
social system.

That first great industrial region is Silesia : All
that U])per Valley of the Oder of which Breslau is
the capital.

Now it is probable from the nature of the recent
Eussian successes (with which I shall next deal) that
Silesia -will be struck before the line of the Lower
Oder is reached ; and when the Silesian Plain, with its
dense population, its flourishing industries, and the
open road it affords into Saxony (another wealthy
industrial region) is reached by the Eussian armies,
anxiety will for the first time be seriously felt by the
Gei-man Commanders in France.

But how long will it be before even Silesia, let
alone the line of the Lower Oder or Berlin itself, can
be thus threatened ?

In order to answer that question we have to con-
sider the measure of the Eussian success in Galicia and
the distances involved by an advance after this success.

The Eussian success in Galicia has, at the moment M
of writing, ever}' appearance of being decisive, and it '
would seem as though the progress of the Eussian
invasion would now be continued almost unchecked
until Silesia itself was reached and the pressm-e upon
Germany begun.

For the first time since the opening of the cam- M
paigns in Western and Eastern Europe one is able to
give here a consecutive account of a decisive action.
Indeed, this is the first decisive action that has taken
place at all since the opening of the Campaign. AVe
haA-e, further, more detailed accounts of what took
place than we have hitherto had of anything that
has happened in the Western theatre of war.

To begin at the beginning.

While a rapid and, as it has turned out, prema-
ture Eussian advance was taking place through East
Prussia, to the north of that great projection upon
the map ANhicli is made by Eussian Poland, the
Austrians to the south of that same projection had
invaded Eussian Poland with equal rapidity and
success.

Before we go further it is important to remember
here what the jjolitical object of the two Gei-maaic

September 12, 1914

LAND AND WATER

powers, acting iiuder the direction of Berlin, has been
in risking the chances of this tremendous war.

That object is briefly to reduce Prance to such a
position in Europe that she will in future count
among the second-rate States, her anny Imiited at
the will of her conqueror ; and this is to be done
not by annexing any territory, but by crushing
military victories followed by crushing financial
indemnities, and a continuously crushing economic
treaty enforced perhaps by garrisons. Eussia is
merely to be checked ; to be pi-evented from invading
Germany or Austria, and, above all, to be prevented
from exercismg such pressure as shall compel the
Germans to return too early from their task of
crushing the French, before that task is accomplished.
Finally, against England the detennination is to
achieve so thorough a victory as shall (1) prevent
England from ever becoming a military State.
(2) To compel England to impoverish herself at
Germany's expense and to share with Germany her
present control of Colonial areas, of dependent civUisa-
tious, and of sea-borne trade. In general, England is
in this plan to be a still commercial and still pro.sperous
State — for it is not thought possible to prevent this —
but a State constrained to admit the pretensions of a
greater rival from which she will always ultimately
have to receive her orders in Colonial and commercial
policy throughout the world. It is believed in
Germany that a sudden attack upon the British fleet
delivered at a chosen moment of calm, and perhaps
at the end of the dark, very heavily supported by
aircraft, and striking at the inner blockading line,
will at least so cripple that line as to leave the
North Sea, already mined in regions known to the
enemy, fi-ee at least for a raid. It is believed that
such a raid would paralyse any British effort abroad.

Now in the prosecution of this general plan it is
evident that there can be no thought of " conquering"
Russia. « The thing is flatly impossible. It will be
much truer to describe the German conception as an
ultimate understanding between Russia and the
Germanic Powers for the control of the world.

Translated into military tenns, therefore, the
policy of the Germanic Powers is, upon their western
frontiers to destroy all French offensive power rapidly,
to confuse and harry England by some raid ; upon
their eastern frontier to prove to the Russian General
Staff its inability to invade Germany or Austria.

The German General Staff (and the Austrian
forces at its disposal) are to show the Russian General
Staff that attempt after attempt to invade the territory
of the Hohenzoliems or the Hapsburgs is doomed to
fail until at last the Russian General Staff shall give
tip tlie game.

The recent success of Prussia against the two
Eussiiin army corps near Osterode is an exact model of
■what the German General Staff have planned through-
out this war to tjike place upon their eastern frontiers.

It is this attitude of Berlin (and, therefore, of
Austria, too) towards what the Germans describe as
the " Slav peril " which gives to the great victory at
Lemberg its exceptional immediate importance and
may give to that action a capital and determinant
effect upon the whole war. For it is the exact
opposite of what Berlin hoped for and expected from
the Austrians.

They hoped for a " blocking " effect — the defeat
of a Russian army not followed by victorious pursuit
and profound invasion, but by similar successive
defeats of further Russian annies as they advanced.
Wliat they have received is the destruction of one of
the two Austrian frontier forces which should have

imposed that " blocking " effect upon the cnejny, and,
at the moment of writing, the immediate peril of
destruction to the other.

The story of the Austrian disaster is as follows : —

Two Austi-ian Annies were organised upon the

noi-them slopes of the Carpathians, facing north-ea,st,

across Galicia, and it was from GaHcia into the Polish

Government of Lublin that the advance was directed.

BRCST

UlSlIN

%.V^"

Fronttir

HAircz

riEST POSITION OF TH« TTVO ACSTKIAN ARMUJS PEBTIOUS TO
THB ADVAXCB.

Thefrst Austrian Army (I.) reposed its right upon the
Vistula, at the place where this stream forms a frontier
between Galicia and Russian Poland. Its right
stretched to the town of Tomazov, its left was on the
Vistula itself at Sandomir, its supplies were drawn
from Przemysl. TTie front along which it was thus
di-awn up was about eighty miles in length, and it
will give some idea of the magnitude of these eastern
operations (Avhich the distance of the field tends to
dwarf in our western eyes) that this one Austrian
front was more than the whole front recently occnpied
by the German Army in France, between Amiens and
the Belffian frontier.

This first Army then (I.), the exact composition
and magnitude of which we cannot yet determine, but
which can hardly have numbered less than five, and
may have numbered seven, Army Corps, with their
full reserves and independent cavalry, or anything
from 300,000 to 400,000 men, advanced directly north
by east upon the town of Lublin, much at the same
time as the German Army in the west was advancing
across the Belgian frontier upon the line Le Cateau-
Cambrai — that is about ten days ago. They estab-
lished contact with the Russian forces in this region
upon a Hne passing through the town of Krasnik,
some fifteen miles within the frontier, and rather less
than thii-ty from Lublin itself. Wlien they had thus
established contact they completed, against the
Russians opposed to them, operations which they
claimed in their official report of the action as a
complete victory — a victory including the capture of
many guns and of many prisoners.

Now when a victory is thus claimed without any
proof of the enemy's line having been turned or
pierced, it nearly always means that the side claiming
it has succeeded in merely continuing its advance ; the
guns taken are the guns abandoned in the enemy's
retreat ; the men captured are the stragglers and the
much more numerous wounded which the enemy's
retreat leaves in the hands of the advancing army.
Indeed, the official Austrian description which spoke
of tlie Russians as hastily retiring towards the Valley
of the Bug could only coiTespond to some such
movement, and, in general, the Austrian forces in this
field had met their opponents a couple of days' march
before Lublin in a line passing through Krasnik and,
in a series of actions which take their common name

«•

LAND AND W A T E E

September 12, 1914

from the town of Ki-asnik, had forced those ojiponents
back without enveloping or breaking them.

Actions of this sort repeated in the eastern
theatre of the war were exactly what the General Staff
at Berlin had planned and desu-ed. Their repetition
would ultimately prove to the llussians the
impossibility of invading Hapsburg or Ilohenzollern
territory in force.

But as it so happened, the whole effect of this
success Avas first negatived and then completely ruined
by what took place immediately to the east.

This main advanced Austrian body which was
marching upon Lublin and which we call Austrian
Army No. I. had to the east of it, that is upon its
right flank, another force which we will call Austrian
Anny No. II. This Austrian Army No. II. was
drawn up upon a line the left of which reposed upon
Ivamionka and the right of which extended, roughly,
south and eastward from that town down to Halicz.

This Austrian Army No. II. was presumably at
first no larger than Austrian Army No. I. which was
making the main advance upon Lublin ; for the second
Amiy was only thus extended tipon the flank of the
first to protect tlie first army from being turned and to
cover fi-om attack the communications, and those depots
lying in the fortified town of Lemberg, for Army
No. II., and for Army No. I. in the fortified town of
Przemysl.

NoAV this flanking force, Army No. II., evidently
came upagainst somethingmuchbiggerthanitexpected.
It had to be rapidly reinforced to meet the Russian
bodies which it discovered upon its front, and the action
to which it was compelled became, against the will of
the Austrian commanders, much more imj)ortant
than that other action in which Army No. I. had
been engaged near Krasnik.

Tliese reinforcements were so rapid, and so
numerous that when the shock came more than six
Austrian Army Corps were in line in this second
Austrian Anny between Kamionka and Halicz.
They were the 3rd, the 7th, the 11th, the 12th, the
13th, and the 14th, with five Divisions of Cavalry
and some unknown contingent of the Last Reserves,
tlie Landsturm.

It is especially to be noted that this great con-
centration of men amounted to something like a third
of all those Austria-Hungary can put into the field.
If we add to it Ai-my No. I. upon its left much
more than half, perhajjs two-thirds, of the total
Austrian forces were present upon this Galician
front. The Russian Anny marching to meet
this Anny No. II. of the Austrians lay at first
with its left upon the railroad at Dubno, its
right bejond Luzk. It crossed the frontier on
August 20th, the day when the Germans were
marching through Brussels; it pushed back the
Austrian outposts very slowly ; indeed, its advance
appears to have been heavily contested. It was
not until Tuesday, September 1st, ten daj-s ago, that
the full mass of the Austrian Ai-my No. II. felt the
shock.

The Russian attack lasted apparently over forty-
eight hours, and upon the third day (just at tlie
moment when the German advance in France had
come to the neighbourhood of Paris) the Austrian
forces of Army No. II. broke and partially dissolved.

It was not a victory like Sedan in Avhich an army
is surrounded and wholly destroyed. But it was a
victory of the j^artial type in which the cohesion of
the enemy's force as a whole, and therefore its military
value, is so largely impaired as to destroy all its power
for the immediate future and most of its power

throughout the Campaign. Very nearly one-third of
the men here drawn up to meet the Russians fell into
the hands of the enemy, as did 200 of theii- guns, and
the decisive natiu'e of the result is still better proved
by the abandonment of Lemberg.

The situation by September 5th, last Satiu'day,
was that of the accompanying sketch, with one

SEMANOIR

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.AUSTRIAHS ^ \ <\

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BKCOND POSITION Or THB AnSTEIAN AEMUtS ATTltB THS BATTLB
OF LEUBXBO.

Austrian army (I.) successful in the North and
trying to break a Russian force before it in the
neighbourhood of Lublin-Cholm, while the other
army (II.) had broken before a larger Russian force
in front of Lemberg and had abandoned that town
to the enemy.

ImmetGately after this Russian success in front
of Lemberg it became clear that this defeat of Austrian
Army No. II., complete as it was, or rather becaiise
it was so complete, was no more than the beginning
of the business.

It is obvious from the sketch that for the
Russians sO to destroy Austrian Army No. II. was
equivalent to their putting themselves immediately
upon the flank of Austrian Army No. I. ; and the great
Russian force which had put out of action one-third
of the military power of Austria in front of Lemberg
was now in a position to attack the second third of
that military power — the fraction which I have called
the Austrian Army No. I. — in flank. It could
threaten its communications with Przemysl, its base.

Here a very curious situation seems to have
ai'isen. Au.strian Anny No. I., threatened in flank
by the enemy after the defeat of Austrian Army
No. II., should have retreated as fast as it coidd to
save itself from being turned. The first reports
received were to the effect that it had so retreated.
But later reports told a different story, and what seems
to have happened after is that Austrian Army No. I.
instead of falling back made a desperate attempt to
get round the rear of the successfid Russian force
upon its right in the direction A — B. In that
attempt it is said so far to have failed. It is even
said to have lost 5,000 prisoners, and to have had the
10th Army Corps cut up in the attempt. It is
obvious that a daring stroke of this sort is paid for in
proportion to its daring.

Austrian Army No. I. therefore was compelled to
retreat, and, at the time of writing this (Wednesday
evening), the Russians already claimed a partial
victory over its right wing. The retreat of the
first Austrian Anny cannot have taken place on
Przemysl, for that line was threatened by the Russian
advance from Lemberg. The retreat miist be well
to the west, towards Cracow, and the Russian
message is to the effect that this Austrian Army
No. I. thus in retreat was caught in flank and
severely pressed. How thorough that defeat has

SeptMuber 13, 1914

LAND AND WATER

been we cannot teU until further details come in ;
but it is evident tbat the first Austrian Army was
in a position to suffer defeat, and ahnost equally
evident that it would not have escaped from its
position without at least some very heavy loss.
Things may even be worse for the remaining
Austrian Army ; we do not yet know. But at the
moment of writing it is not yet cut off.

The question now arises, what use the Russians
can make of this victory, if it is complete : that
is, if the first Au.strian Army is broken up as the
second was, and if the advance through Galicia into
Silesia remains unchecked.

The first thing that strikes one is the great way
that the Annies have to travel. It is nearly a month's
mai'ching fi-om the district of Lemberg to the German
frontier ; but against this delay in time there are two
things to be said : First, it is evident from the map
that once Galicia was clear of opposition, forces in
Russian Poland gathered at Wai-saw or between that
centre and the German frontier could, if they were in
sufficient numbers, come down upon Silesia, before the
main Russian Army, now in the neighbom-hood of
Lemberg, could come up. It is an improbable because
a dangerous policy. The Russians thus advancing
as a detached body in front of theu- main body
might have to meet forces superior to then* own
and suffer just what their companions have suffered
in East Prussia. It is more probable that the
pressure upon Silesia (if the Russian victory is
indeed complete, and if, as seems probable, the line
of advance undertaken wiU be westward through
Galicia) wiU not begin until at least a month has
passed.

The second consideration, however, is more pract-
ical. It is this. The wealthy industrial district for
which the word " Silesia" stands is not confined to the
Gennan province whose capital is Brcslau. It extends
into Austrian and even into Russian territory ; and the
disturbance caused to the society of the enemy by his

presence in territories which can be held to ransom,
and the social life of which is important to the whole
Germanic aUiance, wiU begin before the German
frontier is crossed.

But before we leave this first division of this
week's comments, the eastern theatre of the war, some-
thing must be said of the effect produced by the
German victories in East Pnissia.

The extent of the check there received by the
Russian Armies has not, perhaps, been fully appre-
ciated by the public of this country.

The German official report first claimed 30,000
prisoners — later, more than double that number.
Accurate as these official reports usually are, one is
disinclined to accept the very large second estimate ;
or, at least, one is inclined to suggest that its pro-
duction immediately after the Lemberg disaster was
too much of a coincidence.

It is only a conjecture made for what it is worth,
but the conjecture may be risked that of some five
Russian Army Corps present in East Prussia, two
got pushed fm-ther ahead than was safe and were
caught. That they were completely sun-ounded and
destroyed there is no evidence. That then.' fighting
value for the immediate future was destroyed is
probable. But a conjecture it remains, and more
than a conjecture it will not be until we have some
full account of the reverse here suffered by our
AUies.

It woidd be possible for the main Russian Army
in Galicia to march on into Silesia before this check
was set right by the occupation of East Prussia in
force. But it would not bo possible to begin a
general advance upon Berlin, or upon the centre of
Gennany, while large and victorious German forces
still stood upon the lower Vistula. And all this line
of argument reinforces one's conclusion that it is
unwise to expect the effect of the Russian pressure
in the East to be felt in the west until several weeks
have passed.

THE WESTERN FIELD.

tCALC Of MiCti

CON/IPIECNC

RHEIM3

•VALMY tSi^'^
K»V\», Cm, ^

HALONS

In the western field of the war, that is in ojierations. We can only say that the 2)roblera
Northern France, we are approaching very rapidly presents itself in a certain form ; we cannot yet say
the most critical moment in the first phase of the how that problem will be solved.

«•

LAND AND WATER

September 12, 1914

The foi-m in wliicli this problem presents itself
has been so clearly put in the general Press, that the
repetition of it here may seem tedious to the reader.
I will, nevertheless, repeat its main elements, because,
simple as they are, they must be fully grasped if the
future of this campaign is to be understood.

At the end of last week it seemed as though an
investment of, or at least an attack upon, the ITorthern
and Eastern sections of the fortifications of Paris was
intended by the German commanders. They had
successfully advanced with amazing rapidity from the
Belgian frontier to the gates of the French cai)ital.
Tlicrc was not anyone following and commenting
ujion the military history of the campaign who did
not hope (if his heart was with the Allies) that this
task would be undertaken by the invaders — or who
did not di'ead it if his symj^athies were with the
Germans.

It is almost self-evident that to undertake a task
of such magnitude as the attack upon the Northern
and Eastern forts alone in a perimeter of over 100
miles, and that in the presence of an unbeaten army,
would be to imperil the Avhole future of the German
forces of invasion. But it was suggested in these
comments —

(1) Tliat the overwhelming advance upon Paris
would never have been made unless Paris had been its
true objective.

(2) That the moral importance of entering Paris,
both positive in its effect upon the German nation
and negative in its effect upon the Allies, Avould
hardly permit the Gennan commanders to give up the
prey, even temporaril3^

As a matter of fact, the right wing — that is the
extreme western extremity — of the Gennan invading
line was, upon Saturday and Sunday last, deliberately
halted. The forces opposed to it at the moment (in
the neighbourhood of Creil) were certainly not suffi-
cient to have compelled this halt, or to have imposed it
upon a reluctant enemy. The change of plan, though
certainly made at the last moment, was deliberately
chosen and as deliberately acted upon by those who
were responsible for the German movements as a
whole. And the change of plan was this. Of the
forces which had marched, one overlapping the other,
until the German army of invasion was stretched over
the whole of northern France from the neighbourhood
of Paris at Ci'eil in the west to Verdun in the east,
the extreme western ones turned suddenly at right
angles to their previous course and began marching
south and east in the directions indicated in the sketch
below by the arrows.

^^„I.C«»

O 3 lO 15 10 a5

•XUt>f»

I ' I Afipcrtut pcsUloivand'iiTec&mcJ V^ArOLy on S*pt "i^
^mm . • ' - > • • i<iftS^

'=FF>

DUU r^Arciy, '

EKETCH SHOWINO THB -n-BEEL OF THE GEF.JIAN EIGHT TVIKO,
OB ISX ABJIY, BETWEEN SEPTEMBEE 3kD AXD SEPTKMBKE 5TH.

Paris was left neglected upon the right ; and
while the remainder of the Gennan line was advancing

southward (each body directly towards the front of
the position it occupied) these western units alone
(conventionally known here as the First German
Army) turned partly away from, but in the main per-
pendicular to, the original direction which they had
hitherto strictly and rapidly followed from Mons and
Charleroi towards the French capital.

Why did they do this ? What had happened ?

The answer to such questions can only be found
in one of two alternatives.

Either {a) the whole German advance upon Paris
Avas not intended as a fundamental part of the campaign,
but was in the nature of a feint ; or, {b) the German
advance had on its western extreme come ujj against
a surprise ; had met forces unexpectedly strong, had
come up against an unsuspected reserve maintained
by the French deliberately during all the retreat,
and maintained at the cost of weakening the defensive
line which retired so precipitately (but remained
unbroken) during that retreat.

There is indeed a third possibility, which has only
to be named to be rejected. As it has been suggested
in some quarters I will not leave it unnoticed.

This tlm-d conjectui-e is that the cessation of the
Gennan advance upon Paris was due to an exhaustion
of that advance m numbers and in energy. There are
many reasons why this conjecture may be safely
rejected.

It is evident that the advance was planned in
great detail, and with a full organisation of its daily
effort and its reserves of strength.

It is equally evident that the check, had it been
due to this cause, would have taken the fonn of an
increasing exhaustion long before Paris was reached,
and of that exhaustion there has been no sign.

Fm-ther, the extreme German right wing, which
was thus suddenly turned perpendicular to its original
direction, has been so turning in these last few days,
with full energy ; it is still defending itself vigorously
against what are obviously superior numbers. It has,
as I write, taken a strong counter offensive upon the
Ourcq. While the deliberate choice of a new and, at
first sight, puzzling direction towards the east and
south (while Paris lay to the west) is still further
evidence of a change of plan very different in character
from mere bewilderment, or from any confusion due
to some miscalculation by the German commanders of
their remaming energy. M

Nothing can explain this unexpected wheel but
the necessity of a new plan, and that necessity arising
from the discovery, behind and in the neighbourhood
of Paris, of a large French reserve force of wdiose
existence, oi% at any rate, of whose numbers, the
enemy were hitherto ignorant.

\Vliat is that new plan which has thus been
suddenly adopted by the Germans, Avhen they dis-
covered this unexpected weight of men on their right,
and what are its chances of success ?

While the German advance on Paris was taking
place, the various bodies of the German Line between
the Meuse and Paris were occupied in attempting to
outflank the Allied line which was retreating before
them. In any one day of the advance, after the line
of the Sambre was abandoned, the position was always
somewhat after the fashion of this diagram. The Allied
line being held by bodies A B C D of the enemy,
opposed to its own bodies F G H K, fresh bodies,
draA\Ti from the superior numbers of the Germans,
kept coming round, as at E, to envelop the Allied line
if possible. This attempt to envelop was only
avoided day after day by the continued rapid, but
luckily orderly, retreat of the Allies upon positions to

e»

Sqjtember 12, 1914

LAND AND WATER

-<^ T T T T

r -.

L I

i •\

I. »

L .^

V i

M N O P

the rear, as at M N 0, etc. Day after day the
superior numbers of the invaders permitted them to
extend beyond the western extreme of the Allies and
coiTCspondingly forced the Allies to retreat. They
were happy to be able to retreat — even at so great an
expense in guns, munitions, and men — and to escape
encirclement and annihilation. For such encirclement
and annihilation German strateg}^ presupposes, and in
superior numbers — acting rapidly and lavishly spent-
all that over- simple strategy depends.

An effort undertaken at such an enormous
expense of energy with so clear an object, cannot for
a moment be regarded as intended to dupe its enemy.
The immense cost in numbers alone by Mhich the
(xennans hoped to purchase an immediate success,
proves that this success — an envelopment — was really
attempted, and attempted in a fashion easily recog-
nisable. The extraordinary pace at which the
manoeuvre was forced jwints to exactly the same
conclusion.

Suddenly, when the Allied line had been pushed
back so far that its left rejwse upon Paris, its right
upon Verdun, the German scheme changed in one
day — September 4th. The attempted envelopment
ceases. Quite a new mananivi-e, the attempt to break
the Allied line, succeeds to it.

Not only does this attempt to break the Allied
line take the place of the earlier attempt at envelop-
ment, but the breaking of that line has suddenly
become an immediate neces.sity for the invaders.
Their main game has failed. They have not got
round their inferior enemy. He ■will now never be
suiTounded, and the master-idea of the German Staff
has missed its goal. But if they succeed in pushing
back the French lines or breaking their centre the
Germans have at least saved themselves, and possibly
destroyed a large body of their opjwnents ; if they
fail in this last attempt not to turn but to break the
French lines there is nothing open to them but retreat.

Why is this?

Upon the accomj)anying diagram which, though
giving only the barest elements of the position, is
di-awn to scale, the necessity under which the Gcrma,ns
now are of breaking tlie Allied line or retreating
wiU be clear.

From positions near Meaux, twenty-five miles
east of the forts of Paris, the Gferman armies which
had hitherto been achieving the immensely rapid
invasion of northern France, after the check, extended
in a great convex arc to "S^erdun.

They were fed, as to projectiles and everything
else, by lines of communication coming from Belgium
and Luxembourg in the direction of the arrows (1) — (1).
Their right wing at M., Meaux, having come up against
unexpectedly large reserves (there gathered to await
them by the French) was bent back. It has had to
turn back eastward. On their left is the great fortress
of Verdun, which is stiU holding out ; another great
fortress to the south is Toiil, and between these two
a chain of forts at a a a is, if not impassable, at least
only to be j^assed at an immense expense in men and
at some considerable expense in time.

But south of Toul, and covering the gap between
that fortress and the fortress of Epinal, sundry French
forces at L.L.L. (which may be called the French
ai-my of Lon-aiue) are confronted by further Gennan
forces, K.lv.Iv., stretched along the frontier between
France and Gennan^* in this region.

Now observe that if the considerable numerical
superiority of the French near M. permits them there
to march round, and push back, the German right
wing, the existing communications (1) (1) of the main
German armies in the north are at once threatened.
Should this considerable body of the Allies in the
neighbourhood of M. continue the pressure which it
has been exercising during the last four days, the
German forces between Verdun and Paris, if they
cannot break through to the south, would have no
choice but to retreat. The initiative wiU have passed
from them to their enemies, and it is even possible
tliat, unless the retreat is conducted as precipitately as
was the advance, their supplies might be cut and they
might suffer disaster.

But if the Germans break the centre of the French
line towards the east, say at some such point as V.
(which stands roughly for Vitry-le-Fran9ois) or even
if, without breaking it, they push it back to such a
line as the positions W. W. W. (corresponding roughly
to a line passing through Troyes), then the Gennans,

ScU. .f M.I

DiAoaAic saoimro thb likbs or thj two aruibs o:f and aiteb seftsusszi 'Vro.

?•

LAND AND WATER

September 12, 1914

thouo-li pressed in upon their right at ]M will have
achieved thcii" immediate object.
For:—

(a) Tliey will liave compelled the Frencli
bodies at L. L. either to retreat precipitately
through the gap of Nancy between Toul and
E^)inal, or to be caught in reverse and
annihilated :

{/j) They will have permitted their own
army in Lorraine (K K K) to pass through
the gap of Nancy and to join up in a direct
forward march with what had hitherto been
their northern annies cut off from them by the
projecting fortress of Verdun.

(c) More important still, they will have
wiped out the strategical factor of the fortified
frontier line Verdun — Toul, and Epinal—
BeHort. For once the Germans are behind
that line, that line might as well not exist ;
and the garrisons within the fortresses can be
picked up at their leisure.

(d) Fbially, and most important of all, the
Germans {if tlieij achieve this pushing back or
breaking of the French line in the neighbour-
hood of V.) will pick lip communications
(2), (2), (2) far preferable to the onlg ones
they now have along (1), (1). The former
(2), (2), (2), are what they have always wished
to have, but have been debarred from by the
baiTier of the fortified frontier. They are lines
leading directly and shortly to their great
depots on the upper llliine and in Lorraine,
well served with rolling stock, numerous, and
parallel. Quite another matter from the long,
crowded and insufficient lines (1), (1), through
the intensely hostile ten-itory of Belgium.
Here along (2), (2), is a mass of railways — no
less than six main lines, coming straight
across the Ehine — to feed the invading army ;
and the threat to their existing lines at
(1), (1), even if the Frencli pressure around
the Gremian right at M continues and develops
to the North, will have become negligible,
because the German line will have new and far
better sei-vice of supply from Ahace-Lon-aine.

This should make it clear that everything
depends in the next few days upon Avhether the
Germans can (1) break through, or even (2) seriously
push back the eastern part of the Allied line, that is
the French troops stretched from liaK-Avay between
Paris and Verdun to Verdun itself.

In the first case, supposing the Germans break
through in the neighbourhood of Vitr}', all that is
caught to the east of the point, including the French
troops in Lorraine at (L), (L), (L), woidd be doomed.

In the second case, supposing they do not break
the French line but merely cause it to retire, though no
decision would have been arrived at (always supposing
that the troops in Lorraine had time to retreat rapidly
through the gap and join their felloAVS beyond) and
though the German forces would still find an intact
and unbroken anny in front of them, yet the invaders
would have managed to establish themselves in a
stronger position than before. The difficult and few
Belgian lines of communication (1), (1), would have
lost theii' importance. No turning movement against
their north would then threaten their supplies, for
their supplies would then come directly from the east,
and they would have established new, much more
numerous, much stronger, and much shorter lines of
supply coming straight from dii-ectly over the Ehine
behind them.

One may illustrate the three possible results
which the situation ajipears to present in the three
following diagrams.

In the fii'st, where it is supposed that the

B^RIS

H^-

vitby'le
francois

SKETCH SHOWINO KBSCLT

n THB ALLIED LIKE IS

NEITUKB PRESSED

NOR PIERCED.

BACK

Belfort
Gennan forces in the north between Verdun and
Paris have failed to pierce the Allied Hue, they will
have no choice but to retire along their existing lines
of communication (1) — (1), in the direction marked
by the arrows. They will be in danger of being cut
off from their fellows, K K, in Lorraine ; they will
be in danger of seeing their only communications
through Belgium and the north (1) (1) cut by the
advance of the superior Allied forces along A B.

In the second supposition, haAiug broken the

BKICTCH SHOWING EBStrLT
IF ALLIED LINE IS PIERCED.

EELFORT

Allied line at V, they would have cut off the French
army in LoiTaine, L L L, and could confidently
expect its destniction. At the same time, they would
feel no more anxiety about then' old abandoned com-
munications along (1) — (1), for they would dej)cnd,.
when the French army in Lorraine had gone, upon
the new and better communications along (2) — (2).
Frotn that moment onwards the German forces icould be,
for the first time, in a definite position of superiority-
over the Allies in the Western field of the icar.

Tlie thu'd possibility is that of the Allied line^

PARIS ^ \

TOUL

SKETCH SHOWING RESULT

IF THE ALLIED LINE IS

PUSHED BACK,

^^'

u^^:

v^^"-

.\i^

^EPiNAL
EELFORT

pushed back into such a position as W W W, joined
by the troops from Lon-aine and not broken, nor

September 13, 1914

LAND AND WATER

having in any part suffered disaster, but bencefor-
Avard faced by a Gemian army standing nortli and
south, based upon new and better communications
coming directly from the east in (2) — (2), having
turned the fortified frontier Verdun-Belfort and
eliminated it as an obstacle.

It will be seen from all this that every effort
AviU be made by the Allies dming these critical days
to maintain a combination of two main elements in
their strength, (1) the resistance of the concave line,
especially where it is most threatened which is in the
sag at V. (Vitry le Francois) : (2) the prosecution of
the enveloping movement against the Gei-man right
wing at M.- — the region of Meaux — Avhere there is so
far a definite numerical superiority on the side of the
Allies, though the Allies are stiU inferior in numbers
to the total of the German line.

If both these factors combined are maintained
— that is, if the pressure at M goes on and the
resistance at V holds-^there is success. If the
resisting line breaks at V or elsewhere there is
disaster. Even if it is only pushed back there is,
for the moment, failure.

Such are the comparatively simple elements of
this most critical moment in the fii'st part of so vast a
movement of men. Such are the three inconceivable
issues of these grave days.

THE CRITICAL POINTS IN DETAIL.

It is not without interest to consider in some
detail the ground over which both these critical parts
of the Allied forces, the enveloping people at M and
the resisting people at V, are moving.

The field in which pressure is being brought upon
the German right and turning it back from Paris, is
the lower valley of the Mame. A sketch of this field
is here appended. The Marne is a river which flows

twenty miles N. by E. of the outermost Paris forts)
there flow into the Mai*ne from opposite sides two
tributaries.

The one from the noi-th bears the name of the
Oiircq; that from the south the name of the Grand
Morin. The latter is known as the Grand Morin,
or the Great florin, to distinguish it from another
tributary coming in fm-ther to the east and known
as the little Morin, or Petit Morin. It is in the
angle formed by the Grand Morin and the Ourcq
that the German right wing, recently in touch
with the fortifications of Paris, was caught on.
September 4th, 5th, and 6th, when the presence of an
unexpected French reserve force in and about Paris
was first appreciated by the enemy. The German
right Aving or 1st Army Avas thus caught by superior
forces, among which was the British contingent, which
contingent lay at first along the Grand Morin four days
ago, was ah-eady across the Petit Morin by Tuesday,
and is now across the Marne in its advance against the
German retreat. It has upon its right the 5th
French Army ; while upon the Ourcq is the larger
body known as the 6th French Army, which has
behind it those reserves recently called up from Paiis
and from the west of that town.

It is evident that while the Germans in their
retirement before these superior numbers wUl delay
the advance of every opposing unit as much as
possible, they_}vill, or should, show peculiar energy in
resisting the north-western side of the angle, the
French advance across the line of the Ourcq. For as
this advance proceeds the German troops stUl lingering
or hampered in the north (whence they have come)
are in danger of being cut off, and the cavalry of the
French resei-ve and other bodies which it can spare
from its superior numbers, tend perpetually to approach
the line A. B., by Avliich the German right wing or

into the Seine just above Paris having come in a 1st Army originally advanced and by which it still

great bend across the Champagne country. If we fix receives its supjjlies.

our attention uj)on the town of Meaux, we shall see Upon the pressure that can be exercised in this

that in the neighbourhood of that town (which is some field of the war very largely depends the success of the

LAND AND WATER

September 12, 1914

combined manoeuvre upon wliich the Allies are now
couccntrated, and which, if it is imposed upon the
(iennan invasion, will compel that invasion to retreat.
The other field in Avhich the Allies are concerned
is the equallv important one stretching in a gi-eat
concave tlu-ough Yitry-le-Frangois^to the fortified line
between Verdun and Toul. Here the conditions are
as follows : — ■

«\o

>'-

Lvekd*^

• VAU-V

8 i « j>

,<^ O „',V.L-< c.

• «eVlCNf Al.« VACWti

• AA-^hOUC

SKETCH SHOWISO THE CRITICAL SECTION OF THE FBENCH LIXH

NEAR VITET-LE-rEANfOIS WHEN THE MAIN OEBIIAN ATTACK

FALLS.

The eastern side of this field, that lying towards
the Meuse and the fortified line Verdun — Toul, is
country both hilly and thickly wooded. It is a
country not only of deep ravines and considerable
forests, but of pastm-e lands, often fairly " close " and
" blind " — cut up by hedges and full of spinneys and
copses as well as woods. To the north stretches the
long low ridge of the Argonne, a lump of clay, crossed
by five or six main roads, but only two railways. The
main German effort to break the French Ime must be
made to the west of this wooded, ravined, and difficult
country, for to the west of it lie plains, at first very
open and bare ; and even farther east there is easy
i-olling ploughed and heath, country with wide
horizons; such as is suitable to the manoeuvring of
gi-eat forces.

It is across this open country — the plains which
take their name from the town of Chalons on the
Mame, and the great wheat district that lies to the
south and east of those plains — that the main (aerman
effort to pierce the French line, now in progress, is
directed. Its centre of effort is agamst Vitry.

In this critical effort, upon the success or failure
of which will so largely turn the fate of France, the
armies of the Crown Pi-ince of Prussia and of
Wm-temberg, the 10th Corps and the Guard are
traversing country which has been throughout all
recorded history the battlefield of the Gauls.

It is the first time, I think, in history that the
parallel eastern obstacles which cover France have
been thus turned, or that an invader has been approach-
ing from the north, but, save for this anomaly, history
here repeats itself in an astonishing fashion.

It must have been about the 4th of September,
Friday last, that once more men from Brandenburg
saw before them south of the gi-eat camp at Chalons
the half-starved rolling plain of the Champagne-
Pouilleuse, uttei'ly bare save for dwarf lines of newly-
planted firs. And as they looked over that mournful
country, which is like a tumbled sea of hillocks and
rounded dips with the duU, low line of Ai-gonue
crossing the eastern horizon, one crest and roll over
Avhich they marched bore the tomb of Kellerman, and
v,'as the lonely position of Valmy. Whatever column
it was that crossed this field, some man among them
as he crossed the hish road rested for a moment where

young Goethe rested, and if he glanced back during a
halt, may have wondered, as Goethe wondered, whether
he were not at the begmning of a new world.

But there is more than this. In that same lost
and barren region of the huge Catalaunian Plain,
coming along the Eoman Eoad, wluch skirts the
Cctmp of Chalons and is the main avenue of advance
southward, by Suippes, some column passed imme-
diately beneath the ramparts of that amazing thing
which is still called the Camp of Attila. It is a huge
oval bank, reminding one in its shape of those modern
tracks (such as Brooklands) where petrol races are
rmi, and also in its size— for it is many hundred yard.-<
in length. But it is piled much higher than the
banks of these modern racing tracks, and in its bulk
and isolation it is the most impressive thing a man
may see in the whole com-se of Eui-opean travel. This
Camp, tradition affirms, was the fortification wherein
the Huns secm-ed themselves before they marched
some two days fiu-ther south, and were broken to
pieces at last by the discipline of the Eoman people,
and by that power there is in the Latin blood to digest
and to bring into useful service the barbarians.

Even as I write these lines upon the Wednesday
of the week I do not know, for there is no immediate
news in England, whether this effort of the invader
upon the French centre at Vitry has succeeded. But
I know that he is marching over sacred ground where
there rise against hun the influences of the dead.
Not so far away, a day's march behind the defending
line, is the house that nourished Danton. If that line
is pierced the invader may burn the house, stiU
standing, where Joan of Arc was born.

Such, then, is the nature of the ground and such
the position of the opposing forces at the most critical
point of all in this campaign. Should the extreme
French right fall past Eevigny-aux-Vaches and
approach Bar le Due, it will be high time for the
French Army in Lorraine at L L L to retire.

And here one cannot biit digi-ess to consider the
arresting of the German offensive which has been
achieved so far by the troops covering the open
country between Nancy and the Vosges.

Indeed, one of the chief puzzles of this great war,
with its astonishing armour of concealment, is the
position and the implied success in their resistance of
the forces that cover this bit of open ground.

I have seen in more than one telegram the phrase
" Fortifications of Nancy." In pai-ticular we were
told in one despatch three days ago that the German
Emperor was with the troops that were " attacking
the fortifications of Nancy." But the phrase has no
meaning. Nancy is an open town. There are a few
field works in front of it wliich could have no effect
save to delay for a very short time any detennined
advance upon the city. There is only one permanent
work East of the Nancy line, and that is the Fort of
Manon\-illers, which fell (apparently) after a bombard-
ment of some twelve days, and has been in the hands
of the enemy for over a week. For the rest the
defence of Nancy and of all that gap depends entirely
upon an army in the field. That army cannot be
of any great size. It is only composed of just
what can be spared to cover the gap between
Toul and Epinal, but it has so far a2>parently fulfilled
its task. It will be of interest to discover, Avhon news
can be given us, whether the Germans have pm-sued,
in the case of Nancy, their hitherto constant practice
of bombarding open towns. There is no town ia
France that would be more \Tilnerable to an argument
of that sort and there is none where greater destruction
could be caused by such a breach of civilised traditions.

10»

Sei)tcmber 1.0, 1914

LAND AXD WATER

Its cliai-actcr as tlie capital still of a proviace and but
recently of a kingdom, its immense "wealth, its
remarkable triumphs of architecture, and its com-
mercial character all lend themselves to this conclusion,
and make it a fit subject for the experiment. On the
other hand no such bombardment would have any
effect upon the disposition of the armies in the field,
and the jjosition of Nancy mU be held or abandoned
in the present temper of the French exactly as thougli
it were a few fields of baiTen ground. For the whole
mind of the nation is bent upon a strategic task, and
not even an entry into Paris woidd have disturbed
that mind from its immediate object, which is not the
saving of beauty or wealth, but a final victory.

THE EFFECT OF THE SIEGE GUNS.

The mention of sucli a bombardment, whicli
may even now be taking place, leads me to return
to a matter of whicli I have spoken already in these
comments (last week, I tbink, and the week before) —
tbe power of resistance opposable by the Frencli
fortresses to the German claim that modern forti-
fication wUl always break down, and speedily, under
tlic effect of modem siege ai-tillery.

Namur was an exceptional case, for we see more
and more, as the details come in, that Namur was not
in a posture for defence. Had it held out but a
few days, the French counter-offensive through the
Ai*denues would, probably, have succeeded ; the line
of the Sambre could certainly have been held.
Namur fell with an unexpected rapidity, and one
which will presumably not be repeated ; but it is none
the less apparent that the German claim is largely
successf id in practice, and that the new siege artillery
dominates the old system of fortification.

If that is the case, as it would appear to be : if the
modern ring fortress, though it may have resisting
power for weeks, has not resisting power for months
— and, perhaps, has only resisting power for days —
the sti-ategy of the Allies will have to consider how
far, in any future development, the resistance of any
modem fortification can be relied upon.

At the present moment, for instance, the whole
of this great line of the Allies is reposing ultimately
upon Verdun and upon Paris. It is true that against
I'aris no attempt has been made, nor does it appear as
yet that heavy siege girns have been brought up
against Verdun. But it may well be that in some
future development of the campaign — and perhaps no
distant development — the vidue of fortified positions
as a pivot, still more as a refuge to armies in being,
will disappear. We must expect to hd'ar of their
fall under any detennined effort directed against
tliem, and it is unfortunately true that as yet a siege
artillery of coiTcsponding force to be brought against
the enemy's positions, when these in theii" turn are
attacked, may be lacking.

There is nothing impossible, or even secret, in
the construction of such large pieces as the Germans
have brought forward; but it takes time. Their siipply
to the Allies is a task to which, without any doubt,
the attention of at least two of the three Allied
Powers has already been turned. It is one which they
wdl not be al)le to solve before a date distant by many
months from the present. One might put it so bluntly
as to say that it looks as though the Germanic Powers
would be able to rely upon the pennanent fortifications
they have established more than the Allied Powers
can rely upon theirs, because the Allies cannot have
for many months such howitzers to use against pre-
pared fortresses as Prussia already commands to the
number of perhaps half a hundred.

Meanwhile, it remains true that the ultunate fate
of this, as of all campaigns, depends, not npon arti-
ficial works, which introduce no more than the element
of delay, but upon the success or failure of armies in
the field.

THE NATURE OF THE NEWS
RECEIVED.

Now that we shall probably receive fuller news
from the seat of war than has been either advisable
or possible during the past month, it may be worth
while to consider certain points about that news and
the way in which we should judge it.

The first thing to be gi-asped is that the reports
reaching us are bound to be for some time to come, as
they have been in the immediate past, appai'eutly self-
contradictory.

There are four soiu'ces from which Ave receive
information, and the motives and the methods of
their authors are very different.

There is first of all the report of the journalist
sent out by his proprietor in search of the pictm-esque
and the vivid : sometimes such a source of information
is acquainted with the elements of militaiy affairs,
more often he is not. At any rate the descriptions he
sends cannot be of value to the comprehension of the
campaign as a whole nor are they intended to be.
Occasionally in such descriptions you get a phrase
Avhich suppUes you with some truth to what has really
happened in a particular place on a particular day, but
as a rule they tell you nothing of the general move-
ment, the fortunes of which alone concern the fate of
the country.

Next there are the stories from individuals, par-
ticularly from private soldiers, which present the very
high local interest, but must be put in the same category
as the last, so far as general comprehension is concemed.

Thirdly, there are the despatches proceeding from
officers in the field and occasionally communicated to
the public by their Governments. This source of
information is of course of the highest value, but it is
always somewhat belated. It will be of capital interest
when the history of the war comes to be wi'itten, but
for following the campaign while it is in progress this
source of infonnation comes as a rule too late.

Finally, there are the official digests or short
communiques issued by the various Governments, om*
OAvn, our AUies, and our enemies.

This last som'ces is the only secure foundation on
which one can build a knowledge of the campaign as
it goes on, and it is important to appreciate what the
qualities of these communiques are. In the first place
they are accm-ate so far as they go, and this is just as
true of the enemies' communiques as of ours. The
public is apt to be confused upon this point, because
every rmnom*, falsehood or exaggeration proceeding
from enemy sources is lumped together with or
without that distinction of origin.

I can recall ni> official German communique
which, so far as it went, was not accurate. On the
other hand, the newspaper comment in Gemiany and
the stories sent by the Gennan financial press are
often ludicrous and impossible.

But the second point about these official com-
muniques, whether from enemies or from friends, is
that they invariably suppress news which is unfavour-
able to their own side. For instance, the Gennan
communiques said nothing about that decisive action
in front of Lemberg which must necessarily influence
the whole of the Avar, and in the same Avay Ave have
learned from the enemy of more than one reverse Avhieli
neither oui- Allies' despatches nor our OAvn told us of.

11*

LAND AND WATER

September 12, 1914

Upon the whole the commimiqucs of the Allied
Go\'cruments arc less reserved in this way than those
of the Germanic Governments. For instance, one
could learn from the French communiques of the
]-etii'ement of the 1 5tli Anny Corps in Lorraine before
the Crown Prince of Bavaria's army three weeks ago,
but even when reverse is admitted it is put in such
terms that it is minimised.

The object of any Government in acting thus
is clear. It is twofold. It desires to maintain the
spirits of its public and of its army, and it desires to
keep from the enemy too full a knowledge of what
his success may have been. For even a successful
enemy, unless he has managed to suiTOund, remains
largely ignorant of the damage he has inflicted.
Thei'e is a thii'd character attaching to these
communiques which I have not seen noticed in the
j)ublic press and which is yet of supreme importance ;
it is the fact that a great numljer of them are
necessarily translations and that translation is the
mcst difficult of all literaiy arts. I cannot judge of
how far the translations from the Gennan have been
accurate : for instance I do not know whether the
jihrase about the Englisli being encircled ten days ago
was a true rendering of the German or not. But I
can judge the translations from French into English
and from English into French which have been appear-
ing in the press of the two countries duiing the
campaign, and I discover from these exercises at once
the importance and the great difficulty of rendering
any message, especially a terse one, into a foreign
tongue.

Thus, about a week ago, I came upon this phrase
in the English press, translating a French communique :
" Om' line has nowhere been really jiierced," In com-
mon with eveiyone who read that sentence I four.d it
exceedingly alarming, but when I got my French
l^aper I found that the original phrase was not " really
pierced " but " E6eUement entamee." Now this
word " entamee " does not mean pierced at all.
It means damaged, bitten into, pitted. For
instance, when you talk of a weapon being
" entam6 " it does not mean that there is a hole
through it, it means that the rust has pitted the
steel. Generally, the word signifies a hurt done
to the surface of anytliing and so grave as not to be
immediately reparable. "VV^hat the French Govern-
ment's despatch conveyed in the original was the idea
that the line had been severely tested at more than
one point but had everpvhere recovered itself. There
Avas no thought of piercinff in the writer's mind when
he wrote that sentence.

That is only one instance, for every day I come
across somethmg more or less of the same kind ; and
I think it worth mentioning in days like these
when such meagi-e and huriied news so powerfully
moves public opinion. I cannot but believe that
there will be misunderstanding not onl}- in the public
mind, but on the field, unless the difficulties of that
most subtle and at the same time stubborn task, the
transvaluation of language, are appreciated at their
true value. For educated Europe has gone back, not
forward, in tliis during the last fifty years.
(Copyright 1914. All rights, including American rights, resorred).

A DIARY OF THE WAR.

SYNOPSIS.

August 18th.— General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien appointed to com-
mand of an Army Corps of the British Expeditionary Force, in
succession to the late General Grierson.

August 20th. — The Servians gained a decisive victory over the
Austrians near fchabatz.

August 21st. — The German forces entered Brussels.

August 22.\d. — Servia announces tliat their army h.nd won a great
victory on the Drina. The Austrian losses were very heavy. "^

August 23nD. — Japan declared war on Germany. The Russian
army gained an important victory near Gumbenuen against a force of
160,000 tiermans.

August 24th. — It was announced that Namur had fallen.

The British forces were engaged all day on Sunday and after dark
in the neighbourhood of Mons, and held their ground. Luneville was
occupied by the Germans.

August 27th.— Mr. Churchill announced in the House that the
German armed merchantman Kaiser W'ilhelm der Grosse had been
sunk by H.M.S. HighflyeT on the West Africa Coast.

A strong force of British marines has been sent to Ostend and
has occupied the town without opposition.

August 28th. — ^A concerted operation was attempted against the
Germans in the Heligoland Bight.

The First Light Cruiser Squadron sank the Mainz. The First
Battle Cruiser Squadron sank one cruiser, Koln class, and another
cruiser disappeared in the mist, heavily on fire, and in a sinking
condition.

Two German destroyers were sunk and many damaged. The total
British casualties amounted to sixty-nine killed and wounded.

Lord Kitchener announced that " The Government have decided
that our Array in France shall be increased by two divisions and a
cavalry division, besides other troops from India."

August 31st. — At one point in the centre of the Allied line tha
French troops succeeded in beating the enemy back as far as Guise.

September 1st. — The Russians met with a check in East Prussia,
but were successful in minor engagements in Galicia.

September 2n-d. — Continuous fighting was in progress along almost
the whole line of battle. The British Cavalry engaged, with distinc-
tion, the Cavalry of the enemy, pushed them back, and captured ten
guns. The French Army gained ground in the Lorraine region. The
Russian Army completely routed four Austrian Army Corps near
Lemberg, capturing 150 guns.

September 3rd. — The French Government moved to Bordeaux.

September 4th. — The Russian Army under General Ruzsky, .cap-
tured Lemberg, and the Army of General Brussiloff took Halicz.

September 5™. — The form.il alli.ance of England. Fiance, and
Russia was signed in London by the representatives of the three
Governments concerned, binding each nation to conclude peace, or
discuss terms of peace, only in conjunction with its Allies.

DAY BY DAY.

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 6th.

The British .\rmy was reported south of the Mame, and in
line with the French forces on the right and left. The Iate.st
information about the enemy stated that they were neglecting
Paris and marcliing in a south-easterly direction towards tha
Marne and towards the left and centre of the French line.

The 1st German Army was located to be between La Ferte-
sous-Jouarre and Essises VofEort. The 2nd German Army, after
taking Eheims, advanced to Chateau-Tliieny and to the east
of that place. The 4th German Army was reported on tlie west
of the Argonne, between Suippes and Vilie-sur-Tourbe. All
these points were reached by the Germans on September 3rd.

The 7th German Army has been repulsed by a French
Corps near D'Einville. It would, therefore, appear tliat the
enveloping movement upon the Anglo-French left flank has beea
abandoned by the Germans, either becau.se it is no longer
practicable to continue such a great extension or because tha
alternative of a direct attack upon the allied line is preferred.

It was announced that the scout-crui.ser Pathfinder foimdereJ
on Saturday afternoon after running upon a mine.
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 7th.

General Joffres' plans were being steadily carried out. Tha
Allied forces acted on the ofFensive and were successful in checking
and forcing back in a north-easterly direction the German forcea
opposed to them.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 8th.

The general position continued satisfactory. The Allies
gained ground on the left wing along the line of the Ourcq and
the Petit Morin river. Here the British troops drove the enemy
back ten miles. Further to the right, from Vitry-le-Francois
to Sermaise-les-Bains the enemy was pressed back in the direction
of Rheims. In the ■s'icinity of Luneville an attempt by the
Germans to advance was repulsed. As to the Russian
operations in Gahcia, the offensive continued. Forty guns wera
captured at Mikolaioff and the Austrians retired hurriedly.
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9th.

On the \$it iviag all the German attempts to break through
■our troops, who were on the right bank of the Ourcq failed.
The EngHsh Army crossed the Marne, and the enemy retired
about twenty-five miles.

l-2«

September 12, 1914

LAND AND WATER

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

THE NORTH SEA.

TOWARDS the end of last week tlie Press Bureau
reported that a number of damaged German
destroyers were at Kiel, and that others had sunk
outside the Canal. Speculations as to some
further action were rife. Some surmised an
affray with tho Russians in the North Sea, but
it is far more probably a belated Gorman sequel to the Heligo-
land affair.

Wilhelmshaven — -as the map indicates — is far nearer to
Heligoland than Kiel. On the other hand, Kiel is no great
distance away, and, as 'Wilhelmshaven is an active base for
destroyer divisions, it is probable that the authorities con-
sidered it inadvisable to allow fresh and untried forces to
contemplate what had happened to the division to which
V 187 belonged. The boats which escaped must have been
ten'ibly mauled.

In this connection we have to remember that tho bulk
of the German crews are, relative to our own men, compara^
lively raw, and also necessarily unfortified by those traditions
of past warfare which are so valuable an asset to the British
Navy.

We have further to remember how sedulously the men of
the German Navy have been taught to despise the British and
British gunnery. Psychology, therefore, becomes a matter of
extreme importance.

Another instance of the influence of psychology on the
German scheme of things is to be found in last Friday's night
raid on the British trawlers in the Nortli Sea — a pei-fectly
useless operation from the military point of view, unless, of
course, it was infiuonced by the idea that tho fifteen trawlers
captured can be used for further indiscriminate mine laying,
their crews being terrorised into concealing the presence of
German combatants on board them.

This is a point of view worthy of consideration. If there
is one thing moi-e certain than another, it is that German war-
ships did not risk the danger of going out for the mere
" glory " of capturing some inoffensive British fishermen. So
the above is one explanation of that " German naval victory "
over which our Press has since made so merry.

Another, and I am inclined to think a truer, explanation
is that the nwve was a purely psj'chological one. As students

of history (even if not from per-

PSYCHOLOGY sonal experience) the German

AND ACTION. authorities cannot be unaware of

the deadly effects of inaction on a

fleet bottled up in harboui-. Just as later on it was deemed

*>'

MAP TO ILLUSTBATB THI DOCKYARDS AND PRINCIPAL PRIVATB

riBus AT wuosa tabds oamaoed oeruan warships can Bll

BSPAISBO.

advisable not to allow the outposts to see the effecta of British
gunnery on tho Heligoland destroyers, so it had been desirable
to demonstrate, by producing the spoils of victoiy, that
Crormany " rules the waves " in the North Sea. In attempting
to assess any operation we have to put ourselves in the enemy's

place, to ask ourselves Low wa would act if compelled to do
our best with an inferior force, untried, without traditions,
deliberately educated on false ideals as to superiority, and
with the pusillanimit}' of the capture of the Goeben to live
down. " Prove something at all costs " is the only possible
move.

And so we are very ill-advised to make merry about
German victories (probably on the Dogger Bank) over British
fishermen. Rather we should remember that the capture of
a bathing machine from an East Coast watering place might
well be a most valuable moral asset to the German Fleet. To
the inferior naval power the most trival gain has a real v.ilue.

GLRMAM

AUPHION SPrtDT PATWFlNOEt

BRITISH

diagram to ILLDSTRATK THE EKSPECTIVJt LOSSES IN TH»

NORTH SEA IN TERMS OF APPROXIMATE FIQHTINO VALUE TO

SEPTEMBER 7tH (oXE MONTH's WARFARE).

One is bound to confess that tlje German Commander-in-Chief
of the High Sea Fleet has made no errors to date.

More : I am of opinion that — thanks to the additional
circumstance that we have since lost the Speedy and rath-
finder by mines in quick succession
THE EFFECT — those responsible for the

OF MINES. destinies of the German High Sea

Fleet are neither disheartened nor
dissatisfied with the present situation.

They have, it is true, lost three small cruisers and a
destroyer, plus an unknown number of other destroyers
damaged. Against this, however, they can place the fact that
their mines have destroyed three British warships, and some-
thing approaching a reign of terror is in process of being
created in the North Sea. This, of course, is exactly according
to the plan of campaign.

Results have not in any case come up to full expectations,
but here, at least, Germany is in a position to play a waiting
game. We shall do well to remember this and to keep
on remembering it. The appended diagram indicates that so
far Germany has lost more than she has gained so far as
materiel is concerned. But I am by no means sure that in
her opinion " honours easy " is not the prevailing conviction.

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

The item of chief interest so far this week is that Admiral
Sir Berkeley Milne should have relinquished his command
and a French Admiral taken his place in command of the
Anglo-French force.

It is desirable to slate the reason. The British admiral
was the senior, while the French Admiral de Lapeyere had by
far the biggest number of ships under his own command. The
Austrian Navy is France's especial affair, and so as a matter
of international courtesy matters have been placed in his
hands, and tho senior British admiral has come home. A
senior officer cannot serve under a junior one.

There was no other solution of the problem. Everywhere
near home tho British Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Jellicoe,
controls things ; in the Mediterranean France is supreme. The
weak point of allied Fleets is two leaders and the consequent
divergence of ideas. Admiral Milne is sacrificed to a principle.
It is a valuable principle, so no more is to be said. For good
or ill the Allies must be one and undivided. Thus, and thus
only, is victory to be assured.

The Goeben is still " interned " in Turkish waters, and has
nominally passed into the Turkish Navy. But her own crew
are apparently still aboard her, and the possibilities of what this
battle cruiser can do, using the Dai'danelles as a base, are
immense.

Just at present Turkey is adopting a peaceful policy,
but there is no telling how long that policy will endure. In
any case the Turks are notoriously easy to " manage," so that
the prospect of the Goeben's reappearance has to be calculated
for in the general plan.

The appended sketch map indicates the value of the
Dardanelles as a base, the possibilities of dodging about around

13*

LA]!?D AND WATER

September 12, 1914

the islands being immense. Also, should Turkey bo at
Germany's disposal, lying in wait for the Goeben outside the
Dardanelles would not nocessai-ily be of any avail, as coal is
to bo obtained at various points along the coast of Asia Minor.
The principal of these are mai-kcd ou the map, but there are
at least a dozen other harboui-s -which could be " arranged
for," and all of them well inside International Law.

ON THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

The situation this week is best described as " Business as
usual." Certain German cruisers are still at large, but they

KAP TO INDICATK THK POSSIBILITY OF THE "GOEBEN IX THH

LEVAKT, AND TII» DIPFICUITIES OF CATCHIXO HKB SHOULD

SHI lUEIiaE.

are apparently acting without any coherent plan, and their
fcstinction is merely a matter of time.

Material damage done by them is trivial, while the moral
damage on which a "guerre de course" must necessarily
depend appears to be entirely non-existent.

It should bo generally realised that the duty of the British
Navy is not so much the actual catching of commerce
destroyers aa rendering them impotent. To da.te this has been
done. British overseas trade is just as safe at present as it
was in the times of peace. The chances of German intercep-
tion are considerably less than the chances of ruuniug into a
drifting iceberg. In this matter the plans of the German
Naval Staff have gone hopelessly " agley."

For the last week no captures of moment have been
recorded. German trade, except via Holland, is practically
wiped off the seas.

In this connection the position of Holland is likely to
become a problem in the early future. Germany is dependent

on oversea ^imports of foodstuffs
THE POSITION almost as much as we aie. Her

OF HOLLAND. indiscriminate mine-laying has at

least had sufiicient method in it
not to interfere with Dutch Trade. The profits to HoUand
are probably very great indeed— hence the pro-German atti-
tude of the Dutch.

The Dutch Navy is of no groat account, but it is still
ample enough to have a potential danger where its small
craft are concerned. An ultimatum to Holland would, how-
ever, materially lessen the task of the British Navy; and
sooner or later some such action scorns bound to occur. It
is impossible that Holland shall indefinitely continue to
.act the " beJievoleut neutral " to Germany. At the present
moment Holland is (indirectly) Germany's overseas food
centre.

By the " silent pressure of Sea Power " our Nav}' can
starve Germany into sun-eiider without regard to whatever
happens in the Land Campaign, to which we are attaching
just at present an undue importance.

For an army to act, it must he fed. The Gei-maa
" machine " is fed through Holland. If this war is to be
brought to a speedy conclusion, we must declare war against
all the neutrals who at present keep Germany in food supplies.
If they care to keep their ships in harbour, it will be prob-
ably a very benevolent war; there is no quarrel outside the
food question. But — we must starve Germany into surrender.

People generally regard this as a military war, with the
Navy just playing round, picking up the scraps which fall

from the Kaiser's table. They
THE IMPORTANCE are wrong. On the British Navy,
OF FOOD SUPPLY. and on that alone, the ultimate
issue depends. Given an absolutely
free hand, the British Navy would star\'6 Germany into sur-
render inside a month, though Germans ruled in Paris and
beat aJl the Russians back from Berlin. Psychology
counts for much. Overwhelming the enemy by waves of
soldiers counts for as much, or more. But — food supply
is a larger target still. A soldier cannot fight on an empty
belly.

The ti-oublc is that we do not realise our " Sea Power."
AVe have not advanced an inch sinco a hundred years ago.
We have still no conception of what a Navy (given a free
hand) could accomplish ; for all that most of us are ready to
subscribe to the theoi-y that " Waterloo was won at Trafalgar,"
eleven yeai-s before.

I have tried to think of a diagram which will explain
how a British warship several thousand miles away can
materially affect the local situation. I cannot produce that
diagram. It is too complicated.

But I can assert my conviction that, whatever may happen
on land (in front of the footlights), the real issues depend
upon the British Navy (not shown on the stage). Come to
think of it, stage effects are produced on somewhat similar
lines. The " man behind " controls results. In tliis particu-
lar World War- the " man behind " is the British Navy. If
the British Navy has a free hand to stop German oversea food
supplies, the inevitable result is " Exit Germany."

THE FAR EAST.

The Japanese investment of Kiao-Chau is proceeding
slowly. The whole of the sea approaches have been heavily
mined, and there is nothing inherently improbable in the
report that the Japanese Fleet has already removed about
1,200 mines. This work will probably continue for some time
to come. Various adjacent islands have been occupied^
mainly as look-out stations against further German efforts in
the mine-laying directions. Japan is never likely to forgctf
her ten-ible experiences with mines in the war with Russia
ten years ago.

In the course of this week's operations she has lost one
destro3'er, wrecked by going ashore^-a very cheap sacrifice so
far to the mines around Kiao-Chau.

THE WAR BY AIR.

By FRED T. JANE.

SO FAR we have heard a good deal less than we
expected about aerial warfare. To be sure, the
Press has destroyed more Zeppelins than GenWny
ever possessed, and it has now created a German air
fleet of "82" destined to bombard Paris from
above. Details of this sort are, however, not
germane to serious facts.

Turning to facts, there is good reason to suppose that
Germany's sudden embarkation on war was by no means
entirely unconnected with her aerial position, and a belief in
the proverb, " Who rules the air, will rule the world." At the

outbreak of war the approximate aerial forces available were
as follows :

German Fbench Russian British

Battle Airships ... 15 I

Scouting Airships... 10 14 3 2 {

Aeroplanes— About equal either side.

The Germans had two other battle airships in an advanced
condition, and these two are by now probably completed. All
Powers had airships building, both large and small. Austria
possessed nothing at the moment, but one Zeppelin building

14*

September 12, 1914

LAND AND. WATER

•was fairly advanced. Every Power liad a few small airships
of no war utility, which I have omitted from the above list.

In the matter of aeroplanes Germany had a lead in
efficiency and numbers over any other individual power. The
Germans and Austrians between them about balanced the
Triple Entente in actual efficient strength.

Since good aeroplanes can be built in six weeks or less, it
is obvious that exact figures mean nothing where they are
concerned. The question resolves itself into the number of
jjilots, who take at least six months to train.

With airships, on the other hand, exact figures go for a
great deal. It takes a good year to construct a large airship,

and a very considerable time to

AIRSHIPS AND THEIR turn out merely a small one.

BUILDING. That is why we can discount

stories of scores of German airships

built since the end of last July.

We may now briefly consider what has actually happened.
A Zeppelin has dropped bombs on Antwerp; but, generally
speaking, no real offensive capacity has yet been indicated.
The scouting work done has probably been fairl}' good, but
inferior to similar work done by aeroplanes, as a Zeppelin is
a fairly easy target.

This has necessitated caution. The number of Zeppelins
destroyed to date is three for certain — I doubt if it is more.
The French appear to have lost one dirigible, name unknown.
Our own dirigibles have not been near any fighting so far as
is known, but have rendered invaluable scouting service in
connection with the Expeditionaiy Force. This sums up the
airship situation to date.

We may now turn to the aeroplanes. These appear to
have been extremely useful in locating troops, guns, kc. A

considerable number on either side

AEROPLANES AND have been brought down by rifle

RIFLE FIRE. fire. This is due to the fact that

in order to make cflective obr-erva-

tiou a comparatively low altitude is essential. Also all troops

appear to have adopted the sanio method of rifle attack — a
steady fire on a spot some distance ahead. Every aero-
plane destroyed seems to have run iato such a shower of
bullets.

Unless the pilot be hit the chances of an aeroplane being
injured by rifle fire are very small. Descriptions are usually
so vague that it is difficult to suggest exact percentages ; 1 ut
at a rough approximation it looks as though at least half tie

BATTLE AIRSHIP

■ AEROPLANE'

DIAQBA^ TO ILLUSTBATJt TH« APP20XI3LVTK TAEOKT OFFEESD

BI TAEI0U3 CLASSES OP AIRCEAFT. THS POTENTIAL DAMAQK

BI B0:JIB is, it should BB noted, in ABOUT THI SAMH

PBOPOBTION.

aeroplane casualties have been, brought about by hasty and ill-
considered movements on the part of pilots endeavouring to
get out of the bullet zone. Possibly thx'ee-quarters are to be
attributed to this cause. The killing of a single soldier in
ordinary land fighting is calculated to require some thousands
of bullets; it can certainly need no less to hit an aeroplane
pilot, despite the fact that he has ii9 cover unless he chances
to be in a bullet-proof machine.

In conclusion, although comparatively little has so far
been heard of the aerial ai-m, we may expect any day to hear
of further develojimenta.

A TOPOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO THE

WAR ZONE.

By E. CHARLES VIVIAN.

Arys. — A town in East Prussia, on the Speiding Lake,
about twenty miles west of Lyck, and on the Lyck-Rothfliess
iine of rail.

Audun-le-Roman. — Situated on tlie railway between
Thionville and Louguyon, a httle o^•er a mile within the French
frontier.

Bojan. — Situated within sight of the Roumanian frontier,
in the Austrian province of Bukovina. It is about four miles
from the Russian frontier, and is on the hne of rail from
Tchernovitz to Moghilev and Odessa.

Chalons-sur-Marne- — The chief town of the Depart-
ment of Marne, in France, population about 22,000. It is 107
miles east of Paris by rail, and is situated on the Marne Canal.
It is in time of peace the headquarters of the Cth Army Corps,
and is a miUtary training station of considerable importance.

Champenoux. — Situated about seven miles north-east
of Xancy, and about four miles from the Gennan frontier. It is
slightly south of the strategic railway from Toul to Vic.

Compeigne. — A thickly-wooded district about twenty
.miles west of Soi-ssons and fifteen miles north-east of Senlis.
It is about thirty-six miles north-north-east of Paris.

Dantzic. — Dantzic, or Danzig, is situated at the south-
western extremity of the gulf of Dantzic, on the Baltic Sea, and
is a strongly fortified port of the province of AVest Prussia, of wliich
it is the capital. The main city is built on the left bank of the
River Vistula, from two to three miles from its mouth, and 254
mile."! north-east of Berhn. The fortifications include ramparts
And ba.stions, and means for flooding the .surrounding country in
case of attack ; a large garrison is maintained in the town, even
in times of peace, and the total population is over 100,000. The
Mottlau, a small tributary of the Vistula, traverses the main town,
whicii contains a harbour ; most of the port trade, hoWever, is
done through the Neufahrwasser harbour, which gives directly
on to the gulf of Dantzic. The principal railway lines are those
connecting the town with Berlin to the south-west, with Stettin,
more directly west, and with Koenigsburg at the eastern extremity

of the Gulf of Dantzic. The manufacture of arms and artillery
is largely carried on here, and there is also a naval building
yard and depot, and a marine station. The imports by sea amount
annually to about £3,000,000, and the sea-borne exports to a
similar figure ; the principal exports are grain and timber, and the
chief imports coal, pctroleimi, and fish from the Baltic ports.

Dyle. — A river of central Belgium, tributary to the Netlie,
which in turn flows into the Scheldt. The Dyle passes through
Louvain and Mechlin.

Fere Champenoise. — -^n important jjiuction of roads
east of Paris, and about midway between Chalons and
Coulommiers, about twenty-four miles west-south-west of
Chalons. It is also a station on the Rheims-Esternay line
of rail.

Florenviile. — A town of Belgian Luxembourg, situated
on the left bank of the river Semois. It is adjacent to the French
frontier, and is about fifteen miles east from Sedan.

miles north-west of
Strasbourg-Bale railway.

Gebweiler. — Situated fifteen
Mulhausen, on a branch of the
Population, about 13,000.

Goldapp. — The point of junction for the Insterburg-Lyck
and Stalluponen-Rastenburg strategic railway lines in East
Prussia. It is situated about twelve miles west of the Russian
frontier in the Government of Gumbiunen, and is a town of
considerable importance.

Gorodok. — A village about eighteen miles east of the
Austiian frontier, situated in the Russian Government of Podolia,
near the Lemberg-Odessa line of rail.

Hal. — A town in Belgium, situated on the River Sambre,
about nine miles south of Brussels, at the point of junction of the
Bru.s.sels-Mons and BrusseLs-Tournay railways. It is about
twenty-five miles north-west of Charleroi.

Kibarty. — The frontier village, on the Russian side, ol
one of the Berlin-Petersburg lines of rail.

LAND AND AVATER

September 12, 1914

Kuzmin. — Situated about tivelve miles east of the frontier
station of Satanoif, on the river Smotrycz, in the Russian
Government of Podolia. It is a village of little normal
importance.

Mame River. — Rises in the department of Haute
Marne, in eastern France, among the hills to the south of the
department, and floiivs with an average north-west direction to
Vitry, in the department of Marne. Thence it gradually bends
westward to Epernay and Dormans, afterward entering the
department of Seine-et-3Iarne and bending slightly to the south
to join the Seine about five miles south of Paris. Chateau
Thierry, Meaux, and Lagny are the principal towns on tlie river
in the present theatre of war in France. The Mame forms one
of the principal arteries by wliich goods are transported to
Paris from the east in normal times.

Meaux. — Cliief town of arrondissement, in the department
of Scinc-et-Marne, about twenty-seven miles east-north-east
of Paris. Its population is about 13,000, and it is the site of an
important wool market in normal times. It is situated on the
river Mame, and on the Paris-Rheims line of rail.

Mlawa. — A station in Russian Poland on the Warsaw-
Deutsch Eylau line of rail, and about ten miles from the German
frontier. It is the first station on the Russian side of the frontier.

Morhange. — In German, Morchingen, a town in
German Lorraine, near the junction of the Metz-Strasbourg
and Nancy-Saargemund lines of rail, about ten miles north of
Marsal.

Mondnirail- — Situated about fifteen miles north-north-
west of Sezanne, on the Paris-Esternay line of rail, and at the
junction of main roads lynning north-west and south-west to
La Ferte Gaucher and La Fertersous-Jouarre.

Morfagne, — A tributary of the Meurthe, flowing between
Luneville and Nancy.

Neidenburg. — A station on the strategic frontier railway
of East Prussia, situated between the junctions of Soldau and
Oertelburg, and about six miles north of the Polish frontier.

Nikolaief, or Mikolaiew. — A strongly fortified centre
in Austrian Galicia, a short distance north of the River
Dneister, and about three miles east of the railway from Lemberg
to Stryj or Stryi. It is about twenty-four miles directly south
of Lemberg, and is of considerable strategic importance.

OIkusch. — A railway station in Russian Poland, about
ei.x miles from tlie Austrian frontier. It is on the Kielce-Benazin
line of rail, which runs parallel with the frontier at this point.

Ourcq, River. — A small northern tributary of the Mame,
flowing west from the eastern boimdary of the department
of Aisne to La Ferte Milton, whence it turns due south, flowing
by Mareuil and Lizy-sur-Ourcq and joining the Marne about
four miles south of the last-named town.

Rawa Russka. — Situated about thirty-two miles north-
north-west of Lemberg, in Austrian Galicia, and about fourteen
miles from the frontier of Russian Poland. It is an important
railway junction, as the Jaroslav-Sokal and Lemberg-Belzac
lines cross here.

Rheims, or Reims. — A town in the north of the depart-
ment of Marne, ninety-seven miles north-east from Paris by
rail, with a population of about 110,000. It is the most important
centre of the woollen trade in France, and is also one of the
principal centres of the champagne industry, employing upwards
of 20,(XX) hands in this business. In peace time it is the head-
qiiarters of a large garrison, and is considered a fortified town.
Five railways radiate from the town to Paris, Esternay, Chalons
Mezieres, and Laon, and Rheims ranks as one of the principal
cities of northern France.

Schoppinitz. — A village near the eastern extremity of
Silesia, in eastern • Prussia, situated on the Przemsza river,
near the point where the German, Austrian, and Russian Empires
join.

Sezanne. — About sixty miles east of Paris, on the main
Paris to Chalons road. It is an important railway junction
as the Paris-Chalons and Rheims-Troyes lines of rail cross here.

Tchernovifz. — Capital of Bukovina, an Austrian
province, lying to the south-east of Galicia. Tchernovitz is
situated on the banks of the Pruth river, and is a thriving town
of about 87,000 inhabitants. It is only a few miles from the
Russian frontier, and is near the junction of the railway lines from
Odessa and Bukharcst to Lemberg.

Thionvillc. — In German, Diedenhofen, is a fortified
town of German Lorraine, twenty-two miles north from Metz
by rail, with a population of about 11,000. It is an important
railway junction, witli four lines branching to Luxembourg,
Mezieres, Metz, and Saargemund, and is about ten miles distant
from the French frontier.

Tilsit. — A town of East Prussia, on the River Nicmen
and on the Insterburg-Memel line of rail. It is sixty miles north-
east of Koenigsburg and about twelve miles from the Russian
frontier, and is the capital of Prussian Lithuania. The population
is about 24,000. Tilsit is the scene of the signing of the treaty
between Napoleon and the Emperor Alexander in 1807, con-
cluding a peace which represented the total humiliation of Prussia.
Its manufactures, and trade in timber and northern commerce,
are considerable.

Toul. — Chief town of an arrondissement in the depart-
ment of Meurthe et Moselle, fourteen miles west of Nancy,
on the Paris-Strasbourg line of rail, and also on the Marne-
Rhine Canal. It is an artillery station of considerable magnitude,
and is protected by an echelon of forts of great strength ; these
are stationed on the summits of hills surrounding the town ;
and Fort St. Alichel, the highest, is at an elevation of 1,400 feet.
From 1874 onward attention has been devoted to strengthening
the positions round Toul, and it is now one of the principal
points of defence inside the French eastern frontier, being con-
nected with Verdun by forts in commanding positions. The
population of the town, apart from the garrison, is about 10,000.

Vilvorde. — Or Yilvoorden, a station on the railway
from Mechlin to Brussels, almost midway between the two,
situated on the right bank of the River Sonne.

Vitry-le-Francois. — An important road and railway
junction about twenty miles south of Chalons, in the department
of Mame, and chief town of an arrondissement. It is on the main
line from Paris to Strasbourg, while the line from Chalons to
Troyes also passes through here, and it is also the point of
junction for the Mame-Rhine and Haut-Marne canals. Cement
works, iron founding, and agricultural trades comprise the
chief industries, and the population is about 9,000.

Vladimir-Volynsk. — In southern Russia, about twenty
miles north of the frontier of Austrian Galicia, on the main road
from Warsaw to Dubno. It is a district town in the government
of Volhynia, and is thirty-four miles S.W. of the south-western
railway station of Kovel. Its population is estimated at about
10,000, and it is a great Jewish centre, three-quarters of the
inhabitants being Jews.

OPPORTUNE PUBLICATIONS.

Admiral Mahan, of the United States Navy, contributes to tha
curreat issue of The Academy an article on " Sea Power and the
Present War," which we commend to the notice of our readers.
American neutrality is playing a larger part in the war than most
people realise, and Admiral Mahan's article, embodying to a certain
extent the American point of view, is as opportune as it is interesting.

Among the trades that have suffered as a result of the war, that
of publishing takes very nearly first place, but here and there a book
dealing with one or other aspect of the present situation stands out as
noteworthy and commands attention. Such a work is issued by Messrs.
George Allen and Fisher Unwin, and is entitled " The Foundations of
Strategy," written by Capt. H. M. Jolmstone, R.E. It is, as the
author remarks, quite impossible to compress the art of strategy into
the compass of a book, but it is possible to indicate the foundations
of strategy, and that is what has been done in the volume under
consideration. The chapters on mobility, intelligence, training and
its influence on strategy, the influence of fortresses, and "turning a
flank," will be found not only relevant to the present campaign now
being v/aged by our own men, but will also be of extreme use to young
ofiicers who have to make a real study of this most interesting subject,
and the book as a whole is well worthy of serious consideration by those
who have to know the art of war from a practical point of view. At
the same time, the book is not too technical ; it is so written as to make
an appeal to the general reader, and anyone who peruses its pages
carefully will find at the end that he has a far more correct view of
the operations at present in progress than could be gained by endless
study of the reports of " our special correspondent " or " our military
critic." We commend the work as not only opportune, but really
useful. The price of the volume is 5s. net.

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BACK COPIES of "LAXD AKD WATER," containing the
series of Articles by HILAIEE BELLOC, "THE WAR BT
LAND"; and FEED. T. J.\:SIE, "THE WAR BY WATER,"
tof?cthcr with a valu.ible reference, "THE TOPOGRAPHICAL
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1C»

Seijt*^iiiTxM- 19, 1914

LAND AND WATER

THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOG.

THF WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR.

WH KN these notes of last week were
written it was already evident that
the extreme (and lar<^est) bodies of
tin- (lennan invasion — those near Paris
had already unexjx'etedly found
themselves in the j)resenee of a larj^e reserve
aeeumulated by the French eommanders Ix'hiiid
J'aris. 'J'hey had thus Wfore them siiperior numbers
and must retire.

It was tluMi evident that the only ehanee the
rScrmans had of relievlujj^ or ne<rativin<^ this pn-ssure
U])on theii' extreme right near Paris was to break
tluough s(»mewher<' ujxtn the long line between Paris
and the foitiKed line \'erdun — Tonl. This French
line (with its iJritish contingent towards the left of
it) ran in a great curve behind — that is, south of—
I'rovins, La Fere ('hamj)enoise, Sommesous, V^itry-le-
Fraucois, and Jievigny. It was f\n-ther evident that
the chief (lenuiiu ])rcssme in the attempt to break
the French line would fall somewhere in the neigh-
lM>m-ho(Kl of Vitry-le-Francois. Whether the Germans
w«uld succeed in this (u- whether they would be com-
pelled to a general retreat was still doubtful.

Since writing thus last week, events have proved
that the (icruian elfort to break through was doomed.
The alternative to such success ujiou their jiart, a

general retirement, was therefore undeitakcn, and
that retirement proceeded throughout Friday, 8atui--
day, and Sun<lay, until, u])on Monday last, tlu;
(icrmans were holding a line jwi'idlel with, and north
of, the Kiver Aisne, and occupying cei-tain heights
which piss above and along the liver Suippe, a
tributary of the Aisne The Allied bodies following
the (Jevmaus in this retreat passed from near
l^iris, through Meaux and Soissons; from Provius,
through Montmirail and Chateau Thierry ; fn^m
Sezanne, through Epernay ; from Vitry-le-Francois,
through Chalons towards IMieims ; and, on the extrenu;
right, from I'evigny up to the southern i^ih^e <jf tlu;
Forest of Argonne, near Ste. Menehould. The whole
of this vast movement of rapid retirement upon the
part of the German forces, and of equally i-apid
advance upon the part of their pursuers, Avill be known
to history under the general title of The Hxtilv. of

THE M.4RNK.

Before understanding an3-thing in detail it is
necessary to understand it in general, and the general
scheme of what ha])pened in the course of last week,
that is, of the sudden retirement of the (Jeruian
right wing from in front of I'aris, with all the
vast eonserpiences that have folhnved upon that
retirement, may be put into the shajK^ of a fairly
simple diagram.

LAND AND WATER

September 19. 1914

TTuNvevor wo munl>or them tlicre Averc in the luain
tlim- <,M-eat (loriuan lUiissos, (1), (;.'), and (;5) advancing;
into France from the north, and pushincf back on to
tlie b"ne A'crdini — Paris the French line with its
]{ritisli coutini^cnt. Tliis French line one may rono-hly
represent, not in size but in jMisition, by the band
A —15 Itctwecn the fortified line A'erduu - 'Lonl (N'— T)

September 9th roughly represented by this sketcli, iu

^
^"^^S

^
^

PARIS

:?? ^^ \

UlAIB-VM Ol' Tim KLKMKNT.-i Ol' THK inAXCO-GERMAX J-OSITIONS
OS SKl'lKMBKK (>!H HKFOllK TlIK OKltMAN KKTltKAT.

and Paris (P) in wiiich. l)oHi as to ])roportionate size
and as to position the Jlritisli contingent is represented
bv the shaded ]»ortioii. AVitliiu and to the east of
I'aris the Fivucli comniaudcrs had kept back a large
reserve, represented by the s(]iiare l)lock X. 'i'hat Avas
the ])osition on September ;5rd and Itli, when the
lary-est of the (iernian armies, No. 1., was at the gates
ot till' French ca])ital. The commander of this large
(u-rnian army (!) got wind for the first time of the
existence of this large reserAc in these two days. He
thereupon attempted with great lx>Ulness not to retreat
hut to turn suddenly at right angles to the direction
he had hitherto been ])ursuing, join up witii Army
No. .■2 along the line C — D, and in conjunction witii
that Army, and with Army No. 3 break through
the .Vllied line and cut it into tw(». In this attempt
to march right acrc>ss the front of the French left and
the Hritish contingent, along the line C — D, which was
too hold, he was caught ; and he had to retire the way
he had come, while tlu- men of the great reserve at X
were jxuiring through and round Paris after him
along V] \'\ and the British contingent was jxninding
up heiiind him.

Tliat is the whole story which explains the
cliange iu the camj)aign, and it is the only story which
explains it.

15ut once so considerable a change had been
effected in tlie position of Army (1), the ])osition of
Army (..) and of Army {'^) was at once gravely
<-oin])romi.sed. ]n.stead of the three main German
mas.ses forming a continuous line, two-thirds of them
were now threatened in flank, and the retirement of
Army No. (1) u])on their right compelled them to
retire also ; mass Nf). (.'2) having to go back somewhat
more ])recipitately than mass No. {'■)). Thus the entire
( rcrman advance was converted into a full German
retreat, and from being originally in such a ])osition as
is indicated in the following sketch (where the black is

SliCOXI) POSITION (SKITKMBER ih'H TO IOtIi), WHBS THK OKUMAX

KIUllT HAD BEUUN TO KKTKEAT, SUOWINO IS(JI,\TlOS Of OKT.MAN

CENTliE AM> LEJr'T.

Avliich their centre and eastern portions at A and iJ
stand for a moment in an exceedingly dangerous, isolated
])osition. From this position they could oidy exti'icate
themselves by retiring in their turn and taking up a
united line again Avith the army that had retired from
Paris, so that by the Sunday morning the whole
German line was in retreat towanls a defensive ])ositiou
along the Ai.sne (60 miles from Paris) after the fashion
indicated upon the sketch below.

PARIS

^©v

^•

X^'

KtSERVE

SKI-IKMBKE GtH. — IlKST POSITION, KKFOKK THE KETltE AT C»' THE
OKUMAN l-.KJHT.

(rerman and the white the Allies), which Avas the
jKtsitiou on September ord and 4th, the (rerman
armies wei'C compelled to pass through a stage upon

TIIIKU POSITIOX (SEPTEMBER liTH'), WHEN" THK WHOLE OEEMAN
I.I.NE WAS IN CONCEllTKD KETUEAT TO ITS PKEPARKU POSITION
* ON THE AI.SNE.

Now to this general scheme of the retirement,
which was thus forced upon the nuiss of the German
forces, must be added one in\portant modification.
There was present iu the field not only the three main
masses (1), (i). and (3), but a 1th body ( f) whi(^h
had come round not from the north but from Luxcm-
l>o\irg under the Crown Prince, and had already begun
to bombard Verdun. Should Verdun fall, and the line
of forts connecting it Avith Toul, yet a ')t\\ body (5j
Avould be present upon the fUmk of the French line,
imperilling its adA'ance and checking the retreat of the
other three German bodies.

The task before the French, therefore, was not
merely the simple one of following up a general
German retreat. It could not depend upon the
continuance of that retreat saA'e by hokling, until it
had driA'cn the (icrinau line past it, the fortress of
A'erdun, and that fortress, as avc know from the
experience this Avar has given of the lessened resisting
])ower of fortification against modern siege artillery,
was in grave peril.

So much for the general scheme, the sudden
retreat of the first German mass on the left before the
French lteser\e, the subsequent retirement of the two
other CJerman masses to the east of this, and the peril
of Verdun.

I Avill now take each of these in detail and first
describe \Ahat took place Avhen the Western (ierman
Army tried to march across the Anglo-French front,
failed in that bold attempt, and Avas compelled to
retire Aeiy rapidly toAvards the north-east. These
<>])erations, the first part of the General Pattle of the
JMarue, mav l)e called T/ic Bafilc of Mcaur (tir the
J}attle of the Ourcq).

Next T shall describe in detail the ground over
Avhich the German centre retired, and the French
centre advanced through the plateau of Sezanne and

September 19, 1914

LAND ANT) WATEE

Wm ^\ ^

SKETCH KUOWINO THE rOSlTIOXS OF THE FOUliTlI GKBMAN

GBOCr (4) UXUKK THE CROWN I'RIXCB IS FBONT OF VEKDUN,

AXD OF THK OEKMAN ARMT (5) IN LORRAINE.

the mai-hilies of St. Goiid, next the retreat of the
(lennau k^ft from Vitry over the flat country of
Cliampagne, and lastly the neighbourhood of Verdun
and the nature of the peril to that foi-tress.

THE BATTLE OF MEAUX

(or of The Ourcq).

Tlie field of operations which we are alx)ut to
' follow under the general title of the Battle of Meaux
(the original action which turned the tide of the cam-
paign), runs from Paris on the west to the sources of
the Petit florin upon the east, from the Seine and the
town of Nogent upon the south to the Eiver Aisne
and the town of Soissons upon the north.

At some time upon Wednesday, September iind
(and the anniversixry of Sedan), or possibly as late as
Thursday, September 3ixl, the first German Ai'my,
under General vonlOuclc, numbering perhaps 200,000
men, perhaps somewhat more, was still facing Paris,
and advancing towards that town from the neighbour-
liood of Creil, Compicgne, and Senlis. It then got
Avind of a veiy large reserve which had secretly lx?en
gathered by the French commanders within and behind
the fortifications of Paiis, and this news altered all its
an-angements.

At this moment the command of Von Kluck
roughly occupied the |X)sitions marked on the map by
■ the shaded portions A A.

SCMt of ZS MILLS

I'LAN SllOWIXfl THR POHITION OF THK OERMAN EKIHT WIXO

(abmt I ndkr VON kluck) on kepteubkr 3rd.

It had ill front of it three forces which (until
the reserve behind Paris could come up) were still
inferior in numljcrs to itself. These three forces
were : —

(1) That line of the French forces on the
extreme left whicli the French call their 0th Army.

(2) The Jh'itish ooutingent wliich had just gone
soutii of the ^fanie, l)lowiiig up the bridge of Lagny
b('hi7id it in its retreat, and which had m front of it
the forest of Crccy.

(3) That Frencli 'iuvw, known as the oth French
Army, which lay to tlie light again, probably along
the Seine.

The general, Von Kluck, in command of tlie
(Jerman Army at A A, finding himself threatened liy
this unexpected reser\-e in front of him, which had been
hidden by the fortified zone of Paris, and which had
been gathered there by the French commanders wdth
the object of thus turning the tide, determined in this
difHcult situation to act as follows :

He proposed to march right away across the
]\[arne and across the river called the Grand Morin,
in the direction of the arrow B B, and in two days'
march to have joined and concentrated up against the
(ierman armies to the cast of him, which then, with
his forces added, could have pierced the Allied line
somewhere along the middle Seine — say, beyond
Xogeut.

It will be apparent that, finding thus unexpectedly
in front of him forces which, when they had all joined,
would be superior to his own, Von Kluck had no
clioice but either to retreat the way he had come (and
so leave the other German armies to the east of him
isolated and exjwsed upon their western flank) or to
decide as he did, and to march along the line B B to
join them.

But observe that this march along the line B B
was one of those hazardous operations which every
elementary text -book uix>n strategy (and, for that
matter, all his-torical experience as well) defines to be
the most dangerous of all. lie proposed to march
right along his enemy .h front. He risked doing so
iH'cause he under-estimated the power remaining to
the French and British contingents upon that front of
tiiking the comiter-offensive after the severe experience
of their recent retreat from the Belgian frontier.

He was aware, however, that this big reserve
behind Paris would, while he was hurrying south-
eastward, come up along such lines as C C and 1) 1)
and gradually reinforce the line of his enemies. He
was consequently concerned (r/) for certain German
detachments which lay isolated to the north, notably
in the direction of Compiegne, and [li) for his com-
munications, which lay rouglily along the Ime E E.

He therefore left a very strong body upon the
l)lateau which runs west of the Biver Ourcq, and
particularly large forces around the villages of
JVnchard and Bregy. "With the rest of his anny he
undertook that perilous advance in front of his enemy's
lines which he, or his superiors, prefen-ed to the
confession of failure involved in a retirement.

Upon Saturday, September 5tli, the columns of this
first Gennan Army, Von Kluck 's, the largest German
Army in the field, crossed the Marne at Trilport, La
Ferte Sous-Jouaire, and just l)elow Chateau Thierry.
The French 5th Army fell back before this advance ;
and on Sunday, the fith, the remainder of the Germans,
with the exception of the large rearguaixl which had
Ix-en left to keep off the increasing French pressure
along the Ourcq, had pushed right down through
Coulommiers to the neighlwurhood of l^rov'ins. Its
cavalry patrols had even reached the Seine in the
neighbourhood of Nogent.

The situation then upon the Sunday night may
be summai'ised in the following maj).

It was in that night, the night between Sunday
and Monday, the Gth and 7th September, that the
counter-offensive began. The French 5th Army
attacked with the bayonet and recovered some little
ground north of the Seine, and by daylight on Monday
both the 5th French Army and the British contingent
advanced northward against the enemy. The British

LAND AND WATEE

September 19, 1914

I'OSITIOX Of vox KI,UCK S ABSIT ON SU.NDVT XlCIIIf,
SKPTKSIBKR GtH.

foiig-lit tlioii- way tliroiii^li aiul Ijoyond the Forest of
Creey and tlirougli Couloiiiniier.s; The oth rrencli
Army beyond them to the east attacked La Fertc
(xaiK'her and Esternay and this southern part of the
Allied line crossed the Grand Morin Ifiver and
approaclied the next defensible line held by tbe
Gennans, the Petit !Moriii.

On Tuesday, the ath, the British contingent and
the jth Freneb Army continued to advance and pushed
the German line right over tbe Petit Morin on to the
JMarne, after capturing Montmirail.

On tbe Wednesday, the 9th, these two bodies,
tbe British contingent and the French 5tb Army,
continued to pusb the Germans back. Tbe Britisb
crossed the Mame, mainly in tbe neigbboxu-bood of
La Fertc-s.-Jouarre, in .spite of very sharp resistance
at that jjoint, while tbe Freneb 5tb Army, wbich, by
the nature of tbe local topography bad to swing
fni-tber round and cover uiore distance to reacb tbe
Mame, put in a day and a half of forced marching,
and arrived upon that liver upon the Thursday, the
10th, betweeii Chateau Tbien-y and Dormans.

On Tbur.sday, the 10th, therefore, so far as the
.southcra forces were concerned, they bad pushed tbe
Gennans everywbere right back to and over the Mame,
their sweep pivoting, as it were, upon tbe neighbour-
hood of Meaux.

But meamvhile, dui-ing those same three days,
tbe German rearguard stretched along tbe plateau to
tbe west of tbe Ourctj was putting up a very fine
defence against tbe increashg pressure it had to meet,
an increamii/ pressure because wbat bad been tbe (Jtb
Freneb Army Avas now very largely reinforced, and
with every hour more and more reinforced from the
reserve behind and in l^iris, tbe presence of wbicb has
tnrned the campaign.

The Freneb lost very heavily during this
ligbting, especially round Begy and Penchard. It
was mainly an artillery action. They finally
succeeded in forcing tbe line of tbe Ourcq (wbicb is
here a deep ravine between two plateaux upon either
.side), and when tbat was done, tbe position of tbe
Crerman first Army being tbat suggested in the
following map, it had no choice but to retreat as
rapidly as it could towards tbe north-east, along the
aiTows A A A., and .so reacb tbe next defensive
position about thirty-five miles away along the Aisne.
This, CJeneral von Kluck's great command, wbicb,
during the retreat of tbe Allies, bad advanced directly
upon Paris with such Avonderful organization,
speed, and success, now did with organization
and s])eed hardly less worthy of adniiration.
It is true that, as is alwa^-s the case in a retire-
ment, null especially in a rapid retirement, much
mateiiu!, and uianv baiting and wounded men were

left behind to fall into tbe bands of tbe advancing
enemj'. But tbe i)roportion of prisoners, guns, and
material lost was not at all largo compared witb tbe
very great force concerned. There would seem to
haA'e been picked up in tbe first two days of tliis
retirement, Thursday, tbe lOtb, and Friday, tbe Uth,
somewhat over .'20 guns, many wagons of course, and
about G,000 stragglers and wounded.

By Saturday morning, tbe 1 2tb, tbe reti-eat ba<l
reached tbe line of tbe ^'esle where it falls into the
Aisne, and so down tbe Aisne to the town of Soissons,
and tbe advanced cavalry of tbe Allies could observe
the rapidly retiring enemy from the high, steep ridge
Avliicb lies just to tbe south of those rivers.

During Sunday, tbe first check was administered
to tbe pm-suit by the German forces Avbicb Avas now
taking uj) its defensive position along and to the
north of tbe line of tbe Aisne.

By ^londay tbe German retreat bad thoroughly
established itself in the new defensive position nortli
of the Aisne and to tbe east along tbe Suippe. It

li^^mU^, " 'DORMANT

ScclLc of Miles

SKKTCir SHOWING THE lORCINQ OF THE MARNE AND THK OJJRCCj

BT THK ALLIES ON SEPTEMBER 9tH TO IOTH, AND THE RKTKEAT

OF VON KLUCK ON TO THE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS NORTH OF THK

AISNE AND VESLE.

was a general concentration of nearly tbe whole
German Army — not only of Von Kluck's retreat,
but of the other retreating bodies to tbe east of bim
wbicb bad come up tbrougb Champagne and joined,
each in its place, along this defensive line from
Soissons eastward. On tbat day tbe Germans
turned on their j^ursuers, and began tbe great
defensive action wbich is still in doubt at tbe
moment in wbicb I write tliese lines. Tbe other
])arts of this general concentration concern my next
section, the retreat of tbe Germans in tbe centre,
and their pursuit by tbe French (tbe 4tb and ;h-d
Freneb Armies) o\er the central Mame and towards
Pheims.

THE GERMAN RETREAT FROM

SEZANNE.

The story of tbe retreat undertaken by the
second of the great German masses, that immediately
to tbe east or left of Yon Kluck's larger army, can be
told in far less space. It concerns those bodies wbicb
lay east of Montmirail and west of tbe escarpment
from wbicb tbe plateau of Sezanne looks doA\m upon
the great plain of Champagne.

It would seem tbat the German forces here
engaged belonged in the main to tbe command of
von J^nelow. They probably included the Cruard.
But details of this sort are imimportant in tbe under-
standing of a movement ; tbe names and numbers of

Septanbor 19, 1914

LAND AND WATER

corps are ouly of value in such an understanding if
they enable u« to keep a continuous picturc in mind.

The main ])oint to seize is that the second of the
great German masses liolding the line against the
Allies Ix'tween I'aris and the Toul — Verdun line was

RHEIMS

ri.AIC SROWINO THU GKKMAN MXF OF RFTKKAT TO rEKPARrD
POSITION' NOKTH Of RHKIKS.

oprating u}X)n what is called the Plateau of Sezjinne,
and lay next upon the left of and to the east of von
Kluck's army. This second of the great (Jennau
masses stood firm in front of the high ixjad that leads
from Jja Ferc Champenoise, through Sezanne to
Esteniay. It extended beyond that high i-oad at the
moment of the furthest German advance towards the
south.

Tlie Gernuin forces \ij)on and Ixnond this i-oad
had behind them an interesting and difficult ])iece of
country, called the Manhen of Saul Gonil, which are
the sources of the river called the Petit Morin. These
marshes are in process of reclamation, but thev are
not yet entii"ely reclaimed ; and, even in a dry summer
like this, they present .some slight obstacle to an anny
that should be lieavily pressed or in too desj)erate
a retreat. They are formed by the presence in a
calcareous soil of a clay basin which holds the water,
and by the fashion in which the heights around leave
a great Hat, in which the waters can gather, Init wliich
is pinched at its western issue, where the river runs
out near St. Prix between two opposing hills.

Through these marshes of St. Gond the Petit
IMorin nnis in the shape of a canalised drain or ditch,
into whi<-li tlie other ditches of the reclamation scheme
fall.

These marshes are about ten miles long : at their
narrowest less than a mile, at their broadest over two
miles broad. They are crossed by no less than four
eoiintry roa<ls, branching, two fi'om Broussy, two fi-om
Hiinnes ; and al)ove and l)el()w these country roads go
the great high roads northwards on either side of the
marsh— one through St. Prix to Ei)ei-na3% ujwn the
iMaiTie, and the other through Morains to Mareuil
upon tlie Marne. At E}X'rnay and at Mareuil are
hridgos, and tlie second road — that to Mareuil — runs
svery where just upon and below that escarpment
whereby the plateau of Sezamie falls on to the plain
of Champagne.

I have said that in a hurried retreat very heavily
pres.sed Ijy tlio enemy these marshes of St. Gond
niight- ])rove an awkward obstacle, even in a dry
summer, and even though they are ei-ossed by five
roads ; lor a lai'ge force would be strictly confined to
those roads and would I>e upon defiles, that is, confined
to long aTid narrow columns, while it was crossing the

marshes. But it is evident that there was no such
heavy jn-essure upon this retreat of the German second
group. All the energy to be spent in those days by
the Allies Mas being exorcised upon the army of von
Ivluck immediately to the west. WivAi happened was
that when the anny of von Kluck was driven out of
Moutmirail and all the points to the west thereof,
this second German mass, lying upon the plateau and
along the high road through Seziinne and Estcrnay
had to fall back because its western or i-ight flank was
isolated. It probably fell biick in the night between
the 9th arid 10th September. It continued itsreti-eat
(followed by the 4th French Army) over the ]\[arne
at Epernay and the neighbourhood, marching l)y the
two great roads to the east and to the west of the
marsh, and probabU' somewhat relieved the j^rcssure
on its columns by using the i-oatb? across the marsh
as ^vell. It made for Rheims and, in common with
all the other German forces, took up by the Sunday
night (September 13th) that main defensive line
north of Rheims which I shall describe when I
summarize all these movements.

It is possible that this re';reat, which the French
closely followed, was the scene of that capture of guns

/:^^<'^

VITRV

'^none

SKFrCH SHOV.IXG TIIK DEFENSIVE I'OSITIOX ON WHICH THl
UKKMANS KETIBKll.

of which we have had brief notice by telegram, but it
is more likely that this capture took place im^re to the
east, in the retreat of the thuxl German mass which I
shall next descinbe.

While I am upon this jx)int it is worth explain-
ing that the capture of co/fs artiUerif does not mean
tlie capture of the arlillen/ of a corps. The Press
Bureau made a highly exaggerated estimate when they
tiilked of IGO guns; thu-ty-six will turn out to ha
nearer the mark. The corps artillery consists only of
tho.se guns which are at the disposal of the corps as a
whole and not attached to divisions. It is but a
fraction, ^•arying according to organisation, of the
whole artillery attached to a corps d'armee.

THE GERMAN RETREAT ACROSS
CHAMPAGNE FROM THE LINE
LA FERE CHAMPENOISE— VITRY
— REVIGNY.

Most important, and most lasting in its effects,
of all the various co-oixlinated German retirements
last week was the retirement of the third great mass
of troojjs, which had pushed furthest to the south and
which, having come i-ight across the great plain of
Champagne, was holdingSommesous,Vitry-lc-Fraiicois,
the railway line and the high road between them, and

LAND AND WATER

SeptemlxT 19, Htl4

••••..

^ O

venouN

REVIGNY

SEZANNE

SKETCH SHOWING THE tiEmlAX IIXE OF EETREAT
lUOJt LA lEKK CHAJll'EXOISK — VITKT — UEVIGNT.

had entronched a defensive Hue aloiio: the River Saulx,
aud further along the River Oi-nain (its tributar}-) as
far as RevisruA".

The interest of this great German advance on Vitry
had lain in the fact that it passed over the most open
country of all, had reached further south than the
rest, and was the front upon -which, if anywhere, the
Allied line was likely to he pierced.

I have descrii)ed how an escarpment runs from
Sezanne northward toAvards Eperna}- npon the Marne,
along and be3-ond -which escarpment -v\ent the I'eti'eat
of the second great body of the (iennans, tliat which
retreated from Sezanne and Esternay across the
marshes to Epernay, Rheims, and the defensive
line beyond. From thi.s escarpment one looks
down eastward njion a gi-eat rolling plain of bare
land, dotted here and there with regular plantations,
which plain is the Plain of Champagne. Upon the
eastern side of this plain rises hilly and wooded
countrj', at the gate of A\hich stands Revigny, and
the principal grou})s of Avoods in which are called the
Wood of Belnoue, and to the north of it the great
forest of the Argonne. Between that escarpment of
Sezanne on the Avest and this Avooded country of
Ai-gonne on the east, you have an open chalky land, not
imlike Salisbury Plain in manj" ])arts of it, but better
serA-ed Avith roads and fairh' served Avith r.iihvays, in-
cluding one great trunk line ; provided also Avith great
accumulations of provisions in such towns as Chalons,
its capital, Vitry, La Fere Champenoise, Rheims.

Here, upon the .slightly concave lino running
from Sezanne, south of Vitry, to RcAigny, lay, as Ave
saAv last Aveek, the crisis of this first phase of the
campaign. Here it was that the Cieneral commanding
the German Corps at A'itry urged his troops (in an
Order Avhich fell into French hands after his precipitate
retreat) that upon their poAver to ad\ance in the next
fcAV days Avould depend the Avhole German scheme.
We now knoAV that this advance did not take place,
that, on the contrary, the Gennans retreated from this
line betAveen La Fere Ciiampenoise-Sommcsous-
Vitry-Rovigny, as they retreated fn>m the line Sezanne-
Esternay, and for the same reasons. AVhen A^on Kluck
was .so unexpectedly pushed back on the extreme Avest
by the adA'cnt of the reserve which had been secretly
accumidated under Paris, the Avhole German line, sec-
tion by section, had to give Avay, fron-i Paris (Avhere the
pressm-e began) right aAvay to "the forest of Argonne.

As is always the case in such a retirement— as
Avas the case for instance in our own retirement from
the Sambre nearly a month ago — the extreme of
the line furthest from the part that retires first
receives the last news and is the last to retire. This

extreme section has always therefore to retire Avith
greater ])i-eci]>itation and under more difficult circum-
stances than its neighbours. And the German bodies
occupying this Champagne country between the escarj)-
ment and the A\oods, an open gap of roughly 50 miles,
unaA'oidably fell back hurriedly aud a little late. Thei r
retreat began on September Kith. 'I'liey aban-
doned Vitry le Francois in jjarticular under extrenu-
jiressure, leaving in that headquarters toAvn many of
tlieir papers and much of tiieir baggage. What tlie
whole of this body may have lost in the way of guns
aud waggons we do ]iot kuow, but they fell back, as
did all tJie others, to the north, marching across
"Champagne through the end of that Thursday, the
Avhole of the Friday (lltli) and the Saturday (1 2tli)
until on the Sunday they also too': up their jilace in
the excellent defensive line Avhich the German coni-
mandei-s had indicated noiih oi Rheims. it was a
hurried but a fine piece ol' work. Thei-e lies, isolated
on the escarpment of the Plateau that bounds the
Plain of Champagne iipon the Avest, a single hill called
" Mont Aime " though Avhy beloscd, or if beloved, i
cannot tell. From that lonely height a man can look
eastward overall the Champagne like a sea and discover
its endless rolling fields hww and emjity before him
and its streams of roads. On this height I could
Avish to have stood last Friday in the south -
Avesterly gale Avatching the long lines threading north-
ward across the flats and knoAving that these Avere the
columns of tlie invaders in i-etreat.

So much, then, for the retirement northward and
eastward of the three great German lx)dies between
September Uth— 10th and September 1:3th— 14th :
that is, bytween the night and the early mormng of
Wednesday and Thursday of last Aveek, and the night
and early morning of Sunday and Monday last.

By the time the retreat Avas OAcr, the (Jennan
line — the retirement of Avhose three great sections had
been accomplished with singular success, and Avith
astonishing ra2)idity — Avas drawn^up npon a d(;fensi\ e
position in which it prepared to give battle. '^Phat
battle is being despei*ately fought at the moment in
Avhich these lines are written, Wednesday afternoon,
and has already occupied the two preceding days.

My next task Avill l)e to describe the defensiNc
])Osition which has thus been adopted by the enemy,
and to conjecture at his motiA'es for standing AAhere he
does to resist the further advance of the Allied line.

I would beg the reader to folloAv this .section
A\ ith particular care, for it concerns a croAA'ning act in
this AA-ar. The Germans have studied, and fallen
back upon one of the best defensive positions in
Western Europe and are there conducting the Battlk

OF THE AlSNK AND SuiPl'K.

THE GERMAN DEFENSIVE POSITION.

S To«w Of AntiMS "'" 'io^'*^.

THE GKllMAN DEFENSIVE TOSITION, FROM LA.ST MOSUAT TO LAST
VEDXE.SDAT, SEPT'EMBER 14tII TO IGTH. THE BRITISH CON-
TINQENT ATTACKED FROM SOISSONS ON THE LEFT TO NEAR
CRAONNE ON THE RIGHT. TO THEIR LEFT ITP TO THE FOREST

1)E l'aIOI.E was THE FRENCH CtH ARMY ; TO THEIR RIGHT THM

fi:knch oth armt. the whole line herk shown is
between fiftv and sixty milks lonu.

Soi)t.nubev 19, 1911

LAND AND WATEU

Tliis |)Or:itioii wliicli the German anuies (with the
exception of that of the Crown Prince, isolated beyond
Argonne iijwn the extreme left) took up upon last
Sunday night and Monday morning is naturally
divided into two quite different sections. The first, or
eastern, section runs from a wood called " The forest
of the Eagle," or " de L'Aigle," just north of
Compiegne to the large village of Craoune, a distance
of about 30 miles.

This first half of the CJerman position, the
western half, is everywhere parallel to the river Aisne
and it follows the first ridge to the north of that
river, a ridgre in which the sliort northern tributaries
(which are no more than brooks) take their rise. This
line of heights is nowhere more tlian five miles from
the river, and nowhere less than three, ft is a good
deal cut up along its front by ru\ines, for the iiortheru
brooks tributary to the Aisne run in rather deep little
trenches with steep sides. It is an even ])lateau,
more or less, exactly following the valley of liraisne
below, and only broken by these short lateral clefts
which gi-eatly aid its defence by their steepness as
also l)y their wooded slopes.

The second, or eastern limb of the position
oros-ses the river Aisne near to and just south of
Neuchatel and then runs along a low, flat ridge
admii-ably fonned for artillery and parallel to the
course of the river Suippe. This ridge runs, as does
the Suip2)e, below it in a great curve north-west and
north of the town of Kheims. This second or eastern
section of the German defensive liue is of a length
>\hich we cannot discover from the telegrams. If it is
])roperly linked up with the Crown Prince's army on
tlve east it is not less tlian forty mih's long, for that is
about the distance from Neuchatel to the Argonne
across the great plain of Champagne. If it is not
properly linked up with the Crown Prince's army
on the east (a very unlikely chance I), then there
i.s a gap somewhere about jVfonthois of which the
French will certainly take advantage ; and in that
ca.se this eastern luie is only as hnig as the first, or
about ^JO miles long.

Yon have, then, the (jerman armies taking up
this defensive line, certainly 60 — more probably over
70 — miles in length, and awaiting the assault of
the Allies.

// mud be rememhcrcd Ihal the enemy s aiiiiies
(ire intact, that they have lost little in prisoners or guns
— nothing comparafjle to what the Allies lost in their
rapid retreat from the Belgian frontier— and that
they are still in numbers certainly equal to their
opponents and probaMy superior.

Now of what nature is this defensive jwsitiou
which the Germans have taken uj)?

Tlie very first thing a student notes about it is that
it has Iwen carefully thought out. It is not a chance
position taken up haphazard or under the stress of
some too rapid retreat which has at last been given
breathing space. It is a line upon which, in case
of retreat, tlie German commandei's had detennined
to stand, and it is the line on which they can best
stand between Paris and the Meuse. It has been
studied thoroughly by spies during peace, and it is
very good.

Consider first the character of the heights held
l)etween Craonne and the Forest of the Eagle (or
<le I'Aigle). Tliey are everywhere xmifonn, save
in the ravines of Morsain. The open ridge rarely
rises to more than 300 feet alx)ve the river; it
only falls to less than 200 ft. above the river upon
its western edge towards tiie forest, and this fall is
c very svhere gradual. 'I'he line of the plateau is every-

where fairly even. It is, as I have said, cut up on it;?
front by the ravines through which the northern
tributary brooks of the Aisn > fall ; and the^se ravines
are steep and wooded. But though such a disposition
of the land a little interferes with the homogeneity
and evenness of the defence, it is much more of an
obstacle to the attack. It is here from Soissons along
the Aisne for about ;20 miles that the British
contingent is at work.

So much for the western section of the German
line along the Aisne. But the eastern section of the
line, which runs from Craonne across to the woods of
the Argonne in a flat curve across the plains of Cham-
pagne, is even better suited to defence.

It is a line of low woodland on a crest ujwn
which a wide shelf of plough land falls down to
the shallow depression in which runs the white and
muddy water of the Suippe river, a tributary of
the Aisne. The slope in front of this ridge of
wood is quite bare, .save for a few artificial plantations.
It consi.sts, as I have said, of huge stretches of plough
land, now stubble ; and from this almost uniform line
of slight elevations it sinks southward and eastward
down to the Suippe in a perfect natural glacis. On
the furtlier or southern side of the river rises a
corresponding but longer slope of perfectly bare and
open land which can be swept in all its breadth by
artillery on the opposing ridge. This line north of
the Suippe, commanding a glacis before it and
dominating a slight and long rise beyond the water,
is perfect, and that is the eastern section of the
Gennan line.

The two sections of the line, therefore, that from
Compiegne to Craonne, and that along the Suippe in
the north Champagne country are each in different
ways exactly suited for defence. I repeat, it was no
haphazard which made the (Jerman retirement halt
precisely along this series of jjositions. It was a 2>hiu
known and studied.

The interest of the action now engaged on this
excellent line has many aspects, but the first is
the question whether the German annies intend a
counter-offensive, or rather intend to cover the
ix'tiremcnt of their convoys across the Meuse ?

Evei'ything in war must be conjecture iu the
shape of alternatives. Tlie best and surest comr
inander himself in the field does not know from day
to day what the hazard of war will bring. He does
not know (if it brings victory) exactly what form the
victory will take, nor how it can best be used : he is
ignorant of it until it Ims come about. He does not
know (if it brings defeat) how that defeat will come
or how it may best be retrieved.

It is not possible, therefore, to say that the
]X)sition taken up by the Germans does not mean u
counter-offensive in the near future. It is impossible
to say this for the simple reason that, even if the
(rerman commandei's do not intend it upon this
Wednesday (when I am writmg the present lines),
they may have an opportunity for intending it (and
may therefore take it up) by the time these lines are
on the machines upon Thm-sday.

But on the balance of jn'obabilities it would seem
that they rather intend to cover a retirement over the
Upper Aisne, and later over the Meuse or into Belgium,
than to attempt an immediate counter-offensive. Their
forces upon the left or east, tho.se of the Crown Prince
and those of the German armies in Lorraine, are
cei-tainly moving northward and eastward — that is,
retiring. Further, the oj)portunities for a counter-
offensive are weak along the line which they have
taken uji. It is essentially a line difficult of assault

?•

LAND AND \\^\ T E R

Soptoml.rr It), ]i)14

but not easy to move fonvaril from ; particularly upon
what would 1)C the v.orkint;- wiiit;- of a new advance,
that pari* of the line which lies between Craunne
and the V^iUey of the Oise beyond Soissous.

Another interest of the Uernian ])osition is
■whether it is in peril uj)on either of its win<fs. In
other words, Avhether the Germans can be manoeuvred
out of it hy a French movement ariMind their west —
beyond Com])iei,Mie, or round their east- — between the
main army and the Crown Prince's. In the latter
ease there would be disaster. Jt would mean the
separation of the German force, as a whole, into two,
and the ])iercing (jf its centre by a French advance
directed due north, alont;: the valley of the l^j)per
Aisne. The disaster would not necessarily be
immediate. But the separation would mean the end
of all offence in France and the begiuninjif of a
defensive war on (lerman-Belgian soil. If the French
get between the Crcjwn Prince on the Meuse and the
main defensive German line north of Plieims, that
■ini'.sl follow. For though both sections of the retreat
would reunite towards the Phine, they would have
lost the initiative for good.

But sueli a gaj) between the Crown Prince's
Army and the main defensive line presupposes negli-
gence or inalnlity on the part of the enemy. It
presupposes that liis forces here are not linked up with
the forces of the Crown Prince, though far round the
noiih of Argonne ; and to presup])ose negligence or
inability in an enemy who lias conducted so masterly
a defence and so rapid and inexpensive a retreat is
surely foolish. We cannot presuppose without better
evidence any chance of the Fivnch working round by
the east through such a gap.

The other question, whether the Allies may not
be able to work round the left or loest of the German
line is mucli more open. It is possible that they here
IiaAC further troops. It is probable that they have
the use in a rather roundabout way of hitherto
undamaged railwaj's. It is certain that nothing is
held by the enemy in any force, if even by patrols
(which I doul)t) west of the Oise river, and it is
therefore conceivable that a Fi-eneb manoeuvre round
by the west may be attempted and jjossibly that it
may succeed. The Germans have large bodies of their
Cavalry here posted to watch and prevent it. But
even so, when the Allied line does overlap the western
German flank, w even l>efore it does, while it merely
threatens, tlie German line, having got its convoys
away eastward and having built its bridges across the
two rivers Aisne and Meuse, can retii-e in order and
intact.

One truth must l)e borne in mind in these critical
days. It is the truth to which these notes are always
recurring. So long as the army of either opponent
remains in no marked inferiority to the other that
opponent will not remain permanently upon the '
defensive. Even if the, Gennan army does not
attempt a counter-offensive from its present positions
(tlie least likely of the two alternatives), even if it
continues its retirement north and east, it none the
less awaits, and has somewhere ])repared for, a counter-
offensive later on ; and the retirement, so long as it is
carried out in good order, means nothing one way or
the other to the ultimate issue of the campaign ///////
one or other of the combatants has forced his opp(nient
to a Incision, and lias, in that JJeeision, achieved his
purpose of largely weakening in numbers, or destroy-
ing in cohesion, the organised force resisting him.

'J'he main (Jerman line, then, is .standing upon the
defensive from about the middle of the Argoime,
roujul to the north of Rheims and alouij the Aisne.

It is composed of the concentration of tlic three main
(Jerman bodies, the iirst and largest body under
Von Kluck from in front of J*aris, the second
from in fi-ont of Sezanne, the third from *in front
of N'itry. So far as the telegrams Avhich had
reached London by Wednesday afternoon inform us,
this (German concentration on the defensive lino
was still very actively maintaining its defensive at that
moment ; it Mas \ igorously counter-attacking the
offensive Allied line, and everywhere holding its own.
if it had not new reinforcement (as was ]>i-ol)al)le^, it
had at least received new muniti(ms, and, if it were
only fighting to cover a retirement of convoys, it was
givin<>; those convovs everv leisure to retire.

But the defensive line occupied by the Germans
north of Pheims and along the Aisne does not
exhaust the field. There is a fourth body west of
the jVIeuse, and east of the Argonne, a somewhat
isolated body, which is of peculiar imjjortauce to the
fortmies of this cam])aign. The ])osition and chances
of this fourth body I will attempt, from the ver^' few
indications we have received, to describe. That
fourth body is, as we have seen, the army of the
Crown Prince, formerly in fi-ont and to the west and
south of Verdun ; to-day to the noi-th of that town.

THE CROWN PRINCE'S ARMY.

SCMC or HILCS

KKKTCII SHOWING THE VEBDUX-TODL LINK AND rOSITION OF THB
CKOWN I'BINCe's ABMV BEFORE THE GERMAN KETKKAT BEGAN.

AV'e have continually seen in these notes how a
fortified Hue, nmning from the great f(jrtress of
Verdun to the great fortress of Toul, bars the move-
ment of an invading army from the cast upon Paris,
and how in particular it prevents the use of lines of
communication into France from the great depots in
Alsace-Lorraine; for one of the main railways passes
under the guns of Verdun, two others converge under
the guns of Tonl, and the railway connecting the two
fortresses is everywhere under the guns of the forts
that unite them in a line along the valley of the
Meuse. Wi} have further seen that in this war (so
far) the (ierman claim to reduce modern fortitication
quickly by modern howitzer fire has been very largely
successful. It was almost immediately sv;ccessful at
Liege, wholly successful at Namur, and successful
after about a week or nine days at !Maubeuge.

If Verdun had fallen, or if the line of forts
between Verdun and Toul has been pierced, the cam-
])aign would ha\e changed altogether in aspect. The
(Jerjuans woidd no longer have had to feel nervous, as
they now do, about their long communications througli
Belgium : they would have had immediate short

September 19, 1911

L A K 1> AND \V A T E U

coiiiiminioations open t]iroii<i-li Alsacc-Lorraiiio. Tlie
Fivucli forces alonii^ the Moselle and the ]\Leurtlie
■would have been imperilled and perhaps cut off. The
French line from the Argoniie to I'aris would haxe
been taken in Hank by the existing (Jerman forces in
Lorraine, which forces, reinforced from the (fermau
centre, might have been strong enough to roll up the
French line AACst of the Argonne.

As- a fact, Verdvm, Toul, and the line Ijetween
them, held. Uut it Avas the particular mission of the
Crown Prince's army to reduce one of the two for-
tresses, ^'erdun or Toul, or better, because more
economic, to break some\\here the chain of foiis
l)etween the two strongholds. AVith that object, the
Crown Prince took up his headquarters at St. Menehould
just at the western gate of the Argonne (so as to be in
touch with the main German armies in Champagne)
and began to operate with his separate army against
the Toul-Veixluu line.

Jt is imix)rtant to note that this army was sejmrate,
and not a true portion of the general German line.
That general line ended at Eevigny, on the edge of tho.se
woods wliich bound the Champagne ])lain to the ea.st.
Tlie Crown Prince was acting almost independenth-
of this general German line (the extremity of which
Liy south of him), though no doubt he was keeping in
touch with it. His function was not to help to break
the Allied line in Champagne, or even on the edge of
Champagne, but to do the ])ai'ticular and local work
of isolating Verdun, by breaking the line of foi-ts
between Verdun and Toul. Then, presumably, he
would proceed to the reducing of A'erdun itself. As
1 have .said, the value of the Crown Prince's task,
should it be achievetl, lay in the fact that it would
eliminate the barrier protecting the flank of the
long French line from Tonl — Verdun to Paris and
would 02)en new, good, and rj/ei/c short lines of
communication for the invaders from their depots
in western Germany : a relief as welcome as water
to a thirsty man.

We have no indications as yet to tell us precisely
when all those dispositions had been taken which made
it possible for the Crown Prince to begin his attack m\
the Toul — Veixlun line of forts which blocked the
e:usy communications from Gennany.

His araiy appeare to have been somewhat Ijelated
and never very fortunate. Perhaps he interfered.
It was twice thrown over the Meuse in its first
attempts to cross a fortnight ago, and, even after the
genei-al French retirement in front of the general
(Jerman advance to the west left the Meuse open, the
Crown Prince's anny (with which we should, ])erhaps,
include that of Wurtemburg) advanced with difficulty
tlirough the wooded and hilly country to the west
and north of \'erdun.

At last (and, it would seem, not earlier than a
week ago) it was in a jwsition to begin operations.

It jx>ssessed, we may be certain, the 11 -inch
howitzers with which hitherto all the serious siege
work has been conducted (of these I will speak agpdiu
in a moment), and there could have been no more
<lifficulty in getting them down by rail and by road
to the middle MeiLse valley than there was in getting
them in front of Maubouge. It was only a question
of another day or two's travel. But it would seem
that the fortifications of the eastern frontier were
more thoroiighly held than those of Maubeuge. At
any rate, they have been more successful. The first,
and, as matters tuinied out, the only, attack was
delivered on the work at Troyon, and the selection
of this point was as wise and as thoroughly thought
out as lias been every paii of the German scheme —

until some unexpected accident has come to Impose
new di.spositions upon the German commanders.

Troyon was chosen because if it fell Verdun
would be isolated from Toul, the line would be
broken, and the frontier open to the invaders. It is
true that no line of railway here crosses the Meuse,
nor even any principal road, but with Troyon capturetl,
the victors would be astraddle of the line between
A'erduu and Toul, they would have cut the road and the
railwa}' between the two places and, much more
im])ortant, they woidd have cut the line of forts
Ijctween the two places. Troyon Avas well chosen
because it commanded the Avide.st gap in that line of
forts coming between what is called the Fort of Parodies
and the Fort of Genicourt. If Troyon had been taken
the German forces just to the east could have advanced
from their rail-head at Thiaucoux-t by Vigneulles to
cross the ISIeuse \mder the captured work (there is a
road all the way, though it is not one of the principal
roads), and this advance would have been free fi'om
disturbance by the garrison of Verdun on the one
hand and the garrison of Toul on the other. Further,
Troyon is, of all the Avorks along the Meuse, perhaps
the stronjjest, and A'et (under the circumstances of
this campaign) the most vulnerable !

I'his paradox is due to the fact that these forts
along the Meuse between Verdun and Toul have been
built for an expected assault, not through violated
neutral territory, but from the legitimate and existing
Franco-German frontier. Troyon is admirably situated
to Avith.stand an attack from the east. It is not
similarly well situated to Avithstand an attack in
reverse from the Avest. It is dominated by the
heights above Woimbley on the edge of the »voods

CaniMU.- CiaeS

TlUf'

xno/x

VILLACS-

O fOOO 7000
» 1 1

4000

SOOO

6000

RoJLgres iaEicffLisK Yujrds

SKETCH .SHOWS THE VULSERABILITT OF FOET TROYON' TO -VTTACff
IROM 'IHE WEST.

of Avhich there are positions GO ft. above the Avorks
of Troyon : and it is doubtless upon this escarpment
to the west of the Meuse that the German howitzers
Aven; emplaced.

Troyon M'as relieved by the necessity under
Avhich the Crown Prince found himself of retiring
when the third great German body —that stretching
from Peronne past Frerc and A'itry through Cham-
pagne to llevigny — had it.self retired past the edge
of Argonne and' hud left bt. Menehould behind
uusupi)orted.

L A N 1) A X D W A T E R

Soptoinbi^r 19, 1914

Tlic aceompanyiiig tliagram should make the point

One long da^'s March.

clear. M. is St. Mrneliould : V. is Vordun : Tr, is
Troyon : T. is Toul : K. is Kevigny : V. at tlio foot of
the map is Vitry. AVhen tlie German body A — B has

retired (as it did retire between September lOtli and
l:}tli) to the position C — D, it is evident that an army
in the position E — F commanded from M. is isohited
from its fellows and mnst retire northward to the
position (} — IT. The French by September 12th had,
in their advance, already reached the line M — N, and
there Avas a moment when it looked as though the
Crown Prince's army, delayed either by its heavy
artillery, or by neglect, might be caught l)y the
French advance before it could get away. At the
present moment, so far as advices have hithertt)
reached London (on the afternoon of AVednesday), the
Cro\\ni J'rince's army is no longer in such danger. It
has withdrawn to positions coiTCsponding to G — H on
the diagram, and is free to cross the Meuse out of
reach of the garrison of Verdun. It will, of course, if
that " bunching " takes ])lace upon the Meuse Avhich
Tuider one alternative must take place, add to the
difficulties of the crossing of that river : but it is diffi-
cult to see how tlu^ Crown Prince's army can now be
in real danger, unless the French kept locked up in
Verdun a much larger number of men than is
generally .supposed. And even then, this addition to
the French armies in the field coidd do little more than
press the pursuit. It has no opportunity to surround.
Having thus dealt in some detail with the fortunes
of the retiring German line during its week of retreat,
and with the comparatively isolated body of the CroAvn
Pi"ince, Ave must turn, in order to complete the Avhole
picture, to certain operations Avhich Avere being under-
taken in Belgium at the same time.

THE OPERATIONS IN BELGIUM.

DUNKIRK »

Scale, ct Mdes

LONCWY V*

10*

Sppt.Miilx'i- 19, lUll

L A X D A X D AV A T E 11

'riicse operations, wliicli \vore tal<iiiii- \i\mv <iii tlio
Belgian Plain while all the above was happening in
Fran(X>, thongli in )io way decisive last week, nor even
as yet affecting the result, ai'e well worth our notice.

It was apparent upon September 8th that tlie
able but hazardous attempt oE the great German Army
under Kluek to get ])ast the unexpected large forces
in front of him bad failed. He Avas still heavily
defending the line of the Ourcq, but he was being-
pressed in from the south and be must reti-eat. Tlie
news was presumably conveyed at once to Antwer]),
and on the !)th the Belgian Army, which the fortiti-
eations of that town maintained intact, resumed
operations. Those operations were continued through-
out the i)tli, the lOtb, and the 11th of the month,
that is, the AVednesday, the Thursday, and the Friday
of last week, and dru-ing those days they took the
form of a great sortie of the Ix'leaguered garrison of
Antwerp towards the south, the Clennans in the
Xoi-th of B(>lgivnn falling back before this adxance.
On Saturday, the 12th, Gennau reinforcements had
come uj) from the South of Belgium in sutficient
numbers to check the Belgian movement. On Sunday
la.st, September 13tb, the Belgians retired again
behind the guns of Antwerp.

Jjct us see, fii-st, Avbat wastbe nature of those five-
day operations ; secondl}, what was their object ; and,
thirdly, how far that object was achieved.

The nature of the operations was as follows : —
The Belgian troops, issuing out of Antwerp, worked
round to the south and east, driving the Germans out
of Aerschot, and ultimately, by the Wednesday night
or the Thursday moniing, lying along a line from
Malines to ]jouvain. Fi-oni Malines to Louvain
runs a canal. The Belgian line lay just to the
ttist of that canal, and there was actually some
fighting within the ruins of Louvain itself, ^lore
than this, cei-tain patrols of cavalry, and, ])erliaps,
small bodies of infantry as well, had got round
to the railway line between Louvain and Brussels,
cutting the same near the station of Coi-tenberg,
which is almost exactly between the two towns,
but slightly nearer Louvain. The line seems to
have lx?en cut somewhere between the two X's which
1 have marked upon the sketch.

^leanwhile, during the whole of that Tuesday,
"Wednesday, and Thursday the Germans were hun-ying
up reinforcements from the south. On the Saturda\-,
they took the counter-offensive, and the Belgian line
retreated northward, again pivoting upon ^falines ;
on the Sunday moniing or tbe Saturday CAening they
repassed and evacuated Aerschot (the inhabitants of
Avbich they put Ix'hind their lines to .saA'c them from
tlic outrages Avhich Avould folloAv), and by Sunday
evening they Avere shut up again behind the
gnus <jf Antwei-p.

The Avhole of this little manoeuvre, therefore
(little only on account of tbe A'ast scale of the present
Avars — for the numbers engaged cannot have been far
short of 40, 000 men), Avas acted upon an irregular
field (marked upon the sketch as a shaded area) the
longest measurement of Avhich is less than thirty miles.

NoAv what Avas its object ? Its object A\as two-
fohl. First to harass tbe line of (ierman communica-
tion through Belgium, and, secondly, to draw back
again towards the iiorth certain of the reinforcements,
small as they Avere, Avhich the Germans Avere sending
flown to stiffen their retiring line in France and
probably, as I have said, to guard their extreme right
from <'nvel(ipnicnt.

We should be e([iially in error if Ave regarded this
little sortie from Antwerp, ending so shortly after its

first eft'ort in a retirement, as either presenting a
serious mciKice to the Gernian coniiiivinications or as
futile. It did not ])resent ;•. serious menace to the
German communication.s for the moment, but it 25ut a
fear into the German commanders for the safety of
those eommunicatiijus, and a fear that will less
constantly be I'eneAved.

The object of such an operati(m as this is to
make the enemy just at the moment when he is most
bcAvildered in the crush of a retreat tiirough too
narrow an issue, feel insecure creiyfrl/ere. The object
is not to cut his communications — [there is, unfortu-
nately, nothing like the strength in Belgium to do
that, and a teri-ible pity it is : a couple of extra Army
Coi'ps put into Antwerp at the beginning of the war
Avould have decided it in its jjresent phase !] — but only
to harass its communications. The object is to prevent
the commanders of the German retirement from being
able to say to themselves : — " My lines of supply
through ]}elgium are, noAv that I liaA'e burnt and
harried and killed civilians, as safe as my lines of
supply through Luxemburg, and I can count upon
them absolutely."

X'^oAv this harassing of tbe Germans in Belgium
happens to be of particular value in the present cam-
paign, because everything goes to .show that the
German commanders risked their Avbole strength in
the advance on Paris and left their communications
through lielgiuni guarded less strongly than has CAcr
been the case Avith any other army advancing through
bostile teiritory. They haA^e already SA^acuated Ter-
monde (after destroying it) and liaA-e only threatened
Ghent. They baAC delibenxtely refused to occupy the
sea coast at Ostend and Dunkirk, Avliicli they bad
ample opportunity of doing. They liaA'e put upon
those connnunications their A'Ciy last reserA'es in quite
insufficient numbers, relying upon tAAO things for their
security : the establishment of a terror along those
lines, and the absence of a highly trained army, Avitb
its full complement of all arms, in Antwerp.

In other Avords, they ba\'e run tbis great risk of
leaving the root of their communications ill-guarded,
relying upon the ten-or created by the murder of
ciA'ilians and priests and tbe burning of A'illages and
cburchi's t<j make uj) for a lack of troops. X^oav this
jjolicy of terror has been successful only up to a certain
point. 'J'he repetition day after day of ncAV outrages
proves that. The inferior troops of tbe last (}erman
reseiTC left in Belgium are not AvboUy secin-e from the
vengeance <jf those Avbose country they have raraged
as n<3 European country A\'as raAaged before in modern
times, and Avbose tt'rritory they first guaranteed to be
neutral and then invaded. And Avhile their security
is thus shaken it must be equally evident to them
that they have mider-estimated the offensive power of
the untrained and half-trained forces added to the
regular forces upon their flank in Antwerp.

I'hat is precisely tbe effect Avhicli sorties of this
kind have ; they distract.

The Belgians onl^' got as far as the line Brussels
— -Louvain, and they only did that at a great expense
of energy and imder the necessity of an innnediate
retreat. But they compelled the Avithdrawing of
(Jerman forces from tbe .south. They checked to
some extent the dribble of the rennxining reinforce-
ments into France, and, most important of all, they
rendered the Avholly insufficient guardians of the
German communications in Jk'lgium uncertain Avhether
the next blow A\-ould not be more serious.

On the other hand we must not exaggerate the
effects which a sortie such as this has had, and here I
Avould be.' the reader to look at the scheme of tbe

LAND AND W A T E R

Beptombor 19, 191-

German ooininunioations tliro\ii,'li Bol>(uim and Luxem-
Imrjj into Franco as they ajjpear upon tlu' sketcli map
:it the l\eail of this section, anil also in the diai^rani
upon tlie acconipan\ ins,' sketch.

LOUVAIN

'J'he (Jennau Armies in tlie field occupied hist
week-end, at the moment when their retirement was in
full swing, an area in Northern France whicli may be
diagramniatically represented by the shaded area
A — ]J— C — D. Supplies of food and of ammunition
could, as long as Vei-dun (at B) and Toul (at C) held
out, and the line of forts B — C between them, only
I'cach this ai'ea through the line A — B. Now to reach
this line A — B you had, of course, a very great number
of excellent roads, but ammunition in large quantities,
esjiecially for artillery, demands in modem times the con-
trol of railroads as well : and of railroads there were but
two main lines upon which the (ferman armies during
their gi-eat advance could depend for supply. The one
was the main line L — N— ]\[ — F, which is the great
Em-opean line between Paris and Berlin, and in
which L stands for Liege, N for Namur, Ikl for
jVtaubeuge, and F for La Fere. The other Avas the
ifreat line throiiarh Luxemburtj, X ; Lonowv, Y ;
and Alezicres, Z. In the retreat from Paris the
French 0th Amny has so out-flanked the tJerman
1st Army that it can no longer dejX'nd ujwn tlic main
line of supply from M to F, the extremity oi the
Gennan line being pushed back east of the line ISI — F.
fiut there are plenty of railways between M and Z,
which I have indicated by dotted lines, and there is
also one between N and Z. So long as Liege, Namur,
and ^laubeuge are in German hands, these subsidiary
lines branching south from Alaubenge imd Namur
can continue to feed the army, and the pressure upon
them is relieved also by a side line from (r (Crivet)
running through Marienbourg at K. What import-
ance the Germans attach to this connecting line is
proved b}- their nervous destruction of iMarienbourg
the other day. It is (me of the now too many points
in Belgium where their policy has been to establish
a mere terror.

So long, then, as the first groat line of communi-
cations ]j — M — F is held by the Germans np to and
beyond ]\1 they can feed their armies through their
original main line, and pressiu-e upon it is further
relieved by a subsidiary lino running from L (Liege)
through Louvain and Jirus.sels to Mons, where a
branch connects again with Maubouije. It was this

subsidiary line which the Belgians ju.st managed to
reach, and for a moment to cut during their operations
of lust week. '^I'hey did not get near the main line
L — M, but they did make the defenders of it anxious.

As for the second great line of su2)ply X — Y — Z
running through Jjuxemburg, Lungwy, and Meziere.s
it is perfectly safe, even while A'erdun holds out ; for
it is beyond the striking distance of that fortress, and
there are no French forces to the south sufiicient to
menace it for some time to come. Should \'erdun
fall, there would be o])en another new line of the
utmost importance to the fJernmns. It is a line
coming straight from their dej^ots at Metz (the line
which I have marked upon the sketch S — T) and with
the breakdown of the Verdun-Toul barrier (B — C)
further lines, as I explained last week, will ])rovide
ample and short communication from Germany and
the Bhine bases through Alsr.c. '-Lorraine.

From all the above it will be evident that so long-
as the two main lines L — M, X — Z and the subsidiary
branch lines are open to the Genuans they can be
fully supplied, and they would but strengthen them-
sel\es in their retreat by shortening their lines of
coniuBinication. If the French forces could (which is
imlikely) get round on to the subsidiary lines south of
]\[ in the direction of the arrow marked upon the
sketch, the (icrmans would <mly have (so long as
Yerdun holds out) one railway line to depend u])on
and woidd be in a very diflicult position. But failing
this, a continued Jielgian menace to the line L- -M
gravely incommodes them, and if it were really cut
they would be in as difficult a position as though the
French had got round in the direction of the arrow.
That, as briefly as one can put it, is the menace to tlie
German communications from the north to-da\', and
the exjjlanation of these and subsequent Belgian
operations from Antwerp.

SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONS
IN THE WEST.

The whole of the above may now be summarized
as follows :

^"^ t. Aix-U-Ox^mi

otJTLixixa Roncini.T thk rnK.SF..VT position ix thk westki-.:*

The German line which upon September Itli
occupied the positions (1) (1) (1) and was within a
nuirch of Paris, with the Crown IMnce's army I',
trying to break through the A"erduu-Toid l)arrier at
Ti'oyon, now occiq)ies the positions (2) (2) (2) from
near Compiegne, along the Aisne, round north of
liheims to the Argonne, while the Crown Prince's
army at P has retired to Q. 'Inhere has been a general
German retirement jiivoting on the Argonne and
amounting at its maximxim to 00 miles. From a line
convex against the centre of France it is now a liue
concave near the Belarian frontier.

12«

Soptembcr 10, 191i

LAND AND W A T E R

Tliis line is only jn-^t in toueli, if in touch at all,
"with its old main line uf communications between
Compiognc and Maubeuge ; but it still has its subsi-
diary line of communications (S) (S) (S) dependant on
the upper part of this old main line above Maubeuge,
and it has a second Ihie of connnunications through
Miziens, Longwy, and Luxemburg.

The def(Misive positions -whioh it occupies along
the Aisne and Suippe rivers {2) (.O) (.O), are hardly of
a sort that can be pierced. They may be turned
round the western end at AV^., or, far less probably,
round the eastern end at E. The Gemians may
intend a counter-offensive from this ridge (2) (2) (2),
but more probably they are holding it in order to
protect the retirement of their convoys across the
Aisne and the jVIeuse behind them. Such a retire-
ment, if it takes place, with its wings at W. and E.
intact, can be effected in good order, Avith the German
army unbrcjkea and as strong as ever it was prepared
to take the counter-offensive when it so chooses, when
it is thoroughly restored and remunitioned, and
reposing jjerhaps ujwn the great fortress of Metz.
But such a retirement if it is hampered by movements
in Hank by the enemy round W. or even round E.
may have to cross the rivers on too narrow a front, in
which case its lines of convoys, artillery, waggons, and
marclung men would be caught in the defiles of
the bridges, and it would ])robably suffer heavy loss.

Meanwhile, everyone shoidd repeat to himself that
fundamental doctrine which was so continually insisted
upon in these notes before the French took the
counter-offensive :

0/ lirn oj)po7iciif!t i/i anus, one has not ilefeated the
other until he has hioii(/ht that other to a Decision. A
Decision is not avhieced until the army of one of the
two opponents is pierced or encelojted.

The (iennan army has been neither pierced nor
enveloped. It is to-<lay what it was three weeks ago.
It has lost far less in projwrtion than the Allies have
lost ; and if, though it be the less probable alternative,
it again takes the offensive after holding the ridge
(2) (2) (2), only, that would be an opei-ation cpiite
consonant to the hist<ny and nature of war.

On the other hand, if the Allies are in sufficient
numl)ers or possess sufficiently rapid means of
moving troojjs round the western extremity of the
line (2) (2) (2), then the (iei'man retirement may be
rendered difficult indeed, and jjerhaps disastrous.

I wiU conclude this part with some mention of
three points which are now clearer than they were
earlier in the war — a point concerning the prisoners, a
point concerning the German siege ai'tillery, and a
2)oint concerning the supply of munitions.

THE PRISONERS.

There is a factor in the issues of this war which
will ha considerable even if large fractions of the
Gennan forces should be enveloped and suiTender in
the course of it, and which \\\\\ be much more
important if successes of this kind do not take place.
This factor is the factor of the prisoners now in
Gennan hands.

The official list issued by the Gennan Govern-
ment bears every mark of accuracy. In the case of
the Jii'itish contingent the numbers are surprisingly
low, less than half the total of " missing." It may
be hoj)('d that these indicate the presence among the
" missing" of many who will later find their regiments
again. But at any rate, judged by this test, which
is a fair one, the ( ierman figures are not above the mark.
We must remember that in a retreat, and almost
in projxjrtion to the rapidity of that retreat, the

retiring bod\- automatically ]<jses great numbers of
men. So slight a thing as a blister on a man's foot
means, in a rapid retirement, a big chance of his
capture'. Nearly all wounded fall into the hands of
the enemy, as do that large proportion of men in a
conscript army — men only just called up from
sedentary occupations of all kinds — who fall out in a
pressed march.

It is, by the way, one of the most remarkable
things about the first four days of this rapid retirement
of the first German army and part of the second upon
the line Soissous — Kheims, that it seems as yet to have
lost so few men. AVe have not yet the full tale, but
in the first four da\s the records sent in did not
account for 7,000 prisoners, even adding to the
official figures the unofficial accoimts of surrenders.

AVell, the figures of French prisoners in Germany
on this same list come to nearly 1,700 officers and
nearly 87,000 men. And this does not include the
prisoners from Alaidjeuge, in the fall of which the
Germans clauued the very large total of 40,000
prisoners.

In this last item there ))robably is exaggeration.
Many of the older men in !^Iaubeuge will have been
pressed into the work of defending the city, and the
estimate must have been a very rough one taken in
the excitement of success. But even if vou halve it,
it brings the total number of French prisoners for
Germany at the present moment to well over 100,000.

I repeat, if considerable bodies of the Germans
now in retreat are ultimately rounded up, if there are

•jeneral surrenders due to the

cutting

off of com-

munications and the barring of the line of retirement,
we shall soon have an equal batch of prisoners to set
against this very large nujnber. It is conceivable,
though improbable, that an exchange might take place.
But if no such disasters overtake the Germans for some
time to come, there will be a big jDreponderance of
this asset upon the German side. Put the matter as
gently as you like, but acknowledge that the Prussian
theory of war will regard these men as hostages : that
is at once the strength and the weakness of what is
called the " Frederician tradition," and the conclusion
is that the Allies must wholly disregard all threats
and all bargains connected with this great body of
prisoners. It is certainly the French policy to dis-
regard that very grave sentimental w^eapon in the
hands of the enemy. AVe may presume that the
policy will be carried through in spite of everything,
but we must be prepared for very bitter sacrifice unless
corresponding numbers of the enemy fall into our
hands.

THE GERMAN SIEGE ARTILLERY.

The telegrams, however confused, sensational, and
occasionally absurd, which we receive in regard to
Gennan siege work can, if we compare them one with
another, give us some information as to the measure
of success obtained by the enemy in this direction.

It is, in the first place, quite clear that the real
work that has been done against fortifications so far has
been done by the German 11 -inch howitzer. Now
this gun is nothing abnormal or new. It corre-
sponds to the French howitzer which, if my memory
sen'es me aright, is a 275 mm., or thereabouts: a
calibre differing by less than one thirtieth from the
German. If I am not mistaken there is in the
British service a corresponding gvm of about nine-
tenths of the French calibre, or rather less, and about
nine-elevenths of the (jermau. In other words, all the
great Powers possess a gun of this type. The only
difference between them is the difference you always-.

13*

LAKl) AND WATER

Septeialx-i- i9, 1914

got in tlio otoniiil coinpromiso hotween mobility and
■weight. One Power tliiuks that a /v////(V lighter gun is
worth while on account of its greater iiiohility.
Another Power risks a slight loss of mobility for the
sake of a raihcr heavier gun.

It is true that the shells dropped by these
howitzers have produced more effect ou fortification
than was expected. It is not true that they have
always, and will neces.sarily always, jjroduce a wholly
uncalculated effect. The heaviest artillery in a modern
fortress will always outrange them, and though the
howitzer can hide — that, coupled witli searching
trenches, is the whole purpose of its high-angle lire —
yet, in most cases, only good a?rial observation could
direct its tire sufHcientl}' accurately from any distance to
make its effect immediately decisive. It is probable or
certain that we .shall see not only fortresses u])on this
side of the frontier, but fortresses upon the other side,
yield to howitzer fire more rapidly than had been ex-
pected by those who theorised in jieace time upon these
machines ; but it is not true that we shall see miracles.
It is certain that wlien the history of their bombard-
ment comes to be written, we shall find that Namur
and even Maubeuge A\ere not as heavily gunned as
they might have been, or were not sufficiently provided
with trained men or adequately defended. It is a
matter upon which we nui.st hold our judgment in
suspense, because we ha\e not yet full data upon it ;
but it would seem that the big 420mm. howitzer
(17 inches or rather less) has hitherto done nothing
off rails and very little on rails. There is no reason
Avhy you should not make a liowitzer as big as the
Shot Towei', save the loss in mobility ; and hitherto
the consensus of opinion has been that at somewhere
less than a foot you had arrived at the maxim\im
calibre wbicli could be combined with any real mobility
for this type of weapon.

THE QUESTION OF MUNITIONS.

One of the mo.st interesting hints we had froni
the telegrams during Yon Kluck's retreat upon the
Aisne was the apparent dearth of ammunition from
which that General and his command suffered. This
would seem to have been particularly the case with
his artillery. The action fought along the right
bank of the Ourcq n]X)n September 7th, Sth, and 0th
was, m the main, an artillery duel of peculiar violence,
and it would seem as though, Avhen the retreat was
undertaken upon the 10th, throughout that day, as
also throughout the 11th and \i^\, the retiring
German forces were short of shells.

Now we know that they were also, durmg those
days, ju.st out of touch with their main line of com-
munications by rail, which main line runs along the
Oise valley by Noyon and Comj^icgne and Creil ; and
the incident suggests what commonsense would also
teach one : the capital importance in a modern cam-
paign of multiplying railway communication Iceland
one to one's base, ])articularly for the su])ply of
projectiles to gims in the field.

Modem quick-firing artiller\- can dispose of
something like ten times as much ammimition in the
sjime time as could the guns of twent}' years ago. It
could, at a maximum rate of firing, dispose of far
more ; but in practice it can and does di.spose of it, if
the artillery duel l)e severe, at this enormous rate.

One of the vital questions, therefore, that Avill
l)robably crop up in the course of the present campaign
will be this question of the exhaustion of artillery
sup2^1ies. It is probable that the story of General
Pan having captured an ammunition column upon his
left (and the German right) during or just before the

battle of Meaux may bo accurate ; but apart from
this, it was the temporary loss of the railway which
presumal)ly made all the difference ; and, perhaps, not
a little of the manoeu\Ting which is going on at the
])resent moment upon the western extremity of the
CJerman defensive line has for its intention not only
the outllankiug of that extremity, but the denial to
that present defensive German line of the main railway
which here runs direct fi-om the Jielgian depots
through Noyon to Compiegne.

THE EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR.

In the east<>rn theatre of Avar the decisive result
of hist week, Avhen the Ilussian armies overwhelmed
the second Austrian Anny by Lembei-g, has not up to
the moment of writing (Wednesday afternoon) been
followed u]) by a corres2X)ndingly decisive blow, such
as was proniised us, against the first Austrian Army.

It will be remembered that the second Austrian
Army, which had been drawn up between Kamionka
and Halicz, was after several days' fighting forced
back upon Lemberg and broken to pieces. The
victorious Eussians in this part of the field then .stood
right upon the flank (.)f the first Austrian Army, largely
reinforced by their Gennan allies, and having their
right at Tomaszov exposed to the Russian attack. So
far as can Ije gathered from the rather confused
accounts which have reached us in the west, the
Russians did damage this first Au.strian Army on its
flank at 'i'omaszov, but they did not roll it up, and
their general attempt, upon failing to do this, consi-sted
in a manceuvre to get round its left wing near the
Vistula and force it backwards.

The latest telegrams received point to some
measure of success in this manoeuvre ; but that
mananivre, Ije it remembered, is not a decisive one.
the first Austrian Army is not enveloped ; it is
only being pushed back. The Russians have crossed
the lower part of the River San, apparently at the
])oint and in the direction indicated by the arrow in
the accompanying maj). They have by their own

. Russian Poland
G A'tit-C I A •Kxmoria.

^c^< f Mi let

account already got astride of the railway between
Cracow and the strong fortress of Przemysl (though
it seems diificult to understand how they can have
got .so far in so short a time) ; they have — again
according to the official account— secured the position
of Gorodok; and they certainly have reached Mosiska.
If you draw a line through these places, with a
hy2)othetical point for the place in which they shall
have CTit the railway from Cracow to Przemysl, you
will see that the Russian jwsitions form a half-circle
round the Austrian Anny, which is falling back
everywhere upon Przemysl. How far this success
has been continuous and thorough, only the future can
show. If even a half-circle can be draM'u from the
mountains to the mountains, enclosing the first
Austrian Army round and in Przemysl, with the
main railway pass over the Carpathians behind
it held by the Russians at Lu.sko, there should
at least be a decisive result against this fir.st

►SepteiukT 1!,), 1914

L A N I) AND A7 A T E R

ann\-, as tlicro Avas nearly .1 fortuii>-lit ago
agaiust tlu' isecoiul. JJut tliat docisiuu has not yet
been reached, and until it has been reached we
cannot even approximately guess at the date Avlien
pressure can begin to be exercised in Silesia. The
advance through Silesia northwards, past Breslau
towards Posen and Berlin is (whatever the success in
Gdicia) dependant upon a corresponding success in
East Prussia ; and for the moment East I'russia is no
longer in the hands of I'ussian armies but has been
recovered by German ones. I do not mean that
severe pressure could not be exercised u])on Silesia hy
the llussians even while and though Germans holding
East Prussia should threaten and even iuA-ade the
northern frontier of Iviissian Ptjlaud. That frontier is
too far off to interfere with the communications of the
llussian army moving upon Breslau. But T do mean
that before a general ad\ance eastward can take place,
before you can get past Posen and directly on the
road to Berlin, you mu.st have yoiu- northern flank
secure ; and that flank will not ho secure so long as
large and undefeated German amiies occupy East and

Berlih- •

Russian. Potand.

^y^teAii . ''"'I...

AVest Prussia, and in general the country beyond the
A'istula and the great fortresses u])on that river —
Thorn and Dantzig. ]iefore Kussia holds the line
Dantzig-Thorn she may hold Silesia. But until she
holds the line Dantzig-Thorn she cannot advance
upon Berlin.

CORRESPONDENCE.

We have received a communication from a firm of
.solicitors regarding a review which appeared in our issue of the
5 th inst.

We take the earliest opportunity of publishing this letter
together with our reply.

28, Budge Kow, Cannon Street, E.G.
September Ht.h, 1914.

Dear Sirs,— The Committee of the Constitutional Club have
called the attention of Mr. Edward Seymour Odcll to the
number of your paper isauod on the 5th inst., from which the
following is an extract :

' Pity he was too soon for Mr. ' Odell ' of the Constitu-
tional Club. The Kaiser's spy system had not then come up
to date."

In view of the grave implications contained in this
passage, the Committee state it is necessai-y for Mr. Odell to
vindicate* himself publicly if he wishes to remain a member
of the Club.

Mr. Edward Seymour Odell is the only member of the
Club named Odell, and we ai-e instructed by him to invite
you to give any explanation you think fit, and to require you
to furnish us with the name of the writer of the article, to
publish a full and complete apology, and to make reasonable
pecuniary compensation for the grave injury done to him by
the paragraph in question.

Mr. Edward Sieymour Odcll instructs us to sjiy that he is
the eon of Mr. Frederick Odill, formerly a member of tlie
London Stock Exchange, that ha was born at Highbury,
educated in London, and has all his business life been con-
nected with the London Stock Exchange. Mr. Odell does not
.speak German, and is in no way conne<;t«d with Gennany.

This matter is of great and immediate importance to Mr.
Odell, and he must take steps at once to clear himself from
tlie imputations cast upon him. We have therefore to say
that unless a satisfactory answer to this letter is received by
twelve o'clock to-morrow legal proceedings will be taken.

This letter is sent to you by hand.

Yours fiiithfully,

' (Signed) Whites k Co.

To the Proprietors and Publisher of L.VND and Water,
Central House, Kingsway, W.C.

September 15th 14.
Messrs. Whites & Co.,

28, Budgo Row, Cannon Street, E.C.

Dear 'Sirs, — Referi'ing lo your letter of the Hth inst.,
we are .surprised to learn that any English gentleman should
suppose our remark was aimed at him. We printed the nama
" Odell " in inverted commas so as to convey that a German
spy had as,sumed the disguise of a loyal subject. We regret
to learn tliat a genuine member of the Constitutional Club
has been thereby pained.

The writer of the review heard of a German spy masquera-
ding under that name, and that the Kaiser's devices involved
visits to the club. Nothing was further from our thought
than that a British member of the club could feel aggrieved,
and we intended no oflcnce or imputation against a fellow-

countryman, much less one conuectod with the London Stock
Exchange.

The fraud on Mr. E. S. Odell has laid him cpen to regret-
table annoyance. He and evei-y Briton will admit that in war
time a journalist's duty requires the exposure of the enemy's
inroads on our hospitality.

We shall print this correspondence in our next issue, feel-
ing sure Mr. E. 8. Odell will see that a Press jealous of the
nation's interest is one of our potent safeguards in time of
A^ar. Yours faithfully,

(Signed) A. Douglas Farmer,

Secretary.
The County Gentleman Publishing Company, Ltd.

KHAKI EQUIPMENT.

When- about two years ago the War Oftice issued orclera to the
offpct tliat all officers were to wear khaki shirts, Messrs. Robinson and
Cleaver, with their usual enterprise, immediately made large quantities
of these shirts to the regulation sealed pattern, and sent samples
to all regiments stationed in England, so that when the demand first
arose with the outbreak of war the firm wa? inundated with orders from
all over the country. Owing to their large stocks on hand they were
.able to cope with the sudden demand satisfactorily, and notwithstanding
the tremendous demand for khaki at the present time, Messrs. Robinson
and Cleaver, owing to their foresight in this matter, are in the fortunate
position of being able to supply for a considerable time to come tha
regulation sealed pattern khaki'shirt in the reliable quality for which
the firm has so high a. reputation.

In the matter of socks for marcliing— a detail of equipment of
which the importance cannot be over-estimated — Messrs. Robinson and
(Jleaver have devoted much time and care to the production of a
thoroughly satisfactory article, and this is supplied in plain undj-ed
wool, and also in Lovat and heather shades. Red Cross requirements
are fully met by the supplies in stock, while members of officers'
training corps and young officers joining the Service cannot do better
than go to Messrs. Robinson and Cleaver for their outfits, which, while
perfect in every detail, are moderate in price. Complete service kits,
either to measure or ready for immediate wear, form one of the
present specialities of the firm.

WONDERFUL WAR PICTURES AT THE SCALA THEATRE.

All liondon is flocking to see the war pictures at the Scala Theatre,
and the greatest credit is due to the management for the enterprise
which tliey are showing in obtaining from the various battlefields in
different parts of Europe films for the kinomatograph, by means of
which we are able, here in England, to watch the actual incidents
and phases of the fighting in the world's war. In many cases the
intrepid operators, in imminent peril of their lives, have taken their
cameras right into the firing lines, and the resulting films are thrilling
in the extreme. A particular feature at the Scala Theatre are the
numerous films shown in the actual colours by the kinema-
colour process, which shows up the contrasting uniforms with splendid
effect. A film (also in colouri taken in Kiel Harbour before the war,
in which a Zeppelin is seen flying over the German b.ittleships, is among
the miiiy of which the spectator is bound to retain a vivid recollection.
Ther? are several naval films, and all are capital. An excellent band
and a demonstrator, who explains from the stage the successive items,
add to the general enjoyment. Jn fad, all readers of Land and Wnfrr
can be cordially recommended to pay a visit to the Scala, and to take
their families also.

The .Toint Secretaries of the N'ational Relief Fund have informed
us that their Subscription Sub-Cuniniittee has heard of a good many
cases in which use has been made of its name, or of the names of those
connected with it, with the object of se<-uriiig support for appeals
which are quite unauthorised. Our readers may be assured that any
e-ttravagant or grotesque appeals emanate from persons who hava
neither the authori-sation nor the suj)poil of this committee.

LAND AND WATER

September 19, 1914

ANIMAL DEFENCE SOCIETIES AND
HORSES IN WARFARE.

By ROY HORNIMAN.

BEFORE dealing with llic actual issue which I am
anxious to bring to the public notice, aud which is
suggested by the phrase at the head of this article,
it is necessary to state a few preliminary facts.
The part played by the horse soldier in the
present and recent wars has entirely falsified the
prediction put forward at the time when artillery was being
revolutionised that cavalry would become less and less im-
portant. Its importance has, on the contrary, grown side by
hide with the astonishing development of gunnery of all kinds.
The exigencies of artillery and transport demand a greater
supply of horses than ever before. With the growth of
mechanical transport for purposes of civil life, and for more
than one other reason which will be fairly obvious, the ques-
tion of a supply of horses available for service in time of war
has become acute. There is, in fact, great danger of a shortage.
That this is felt to be the case was shown by the feverish
activity with which foreign agents were occupied in buying
up all the hoi-ses obtainable in the United Kingdom for some
years before the present crisis. In Ireland the writer was told
"that the vast majority of these buyers were Germans and
Austrians, as the English military authorities declined to pay
the prices asked. We allowed the supply of our best horses
lo be seriously interfered with to the advantage of our present
opponents.

It thus becomes obvious, without reference at the moment
to the humane side of the question, that any laxity in our
Army veterinary arrangements, either at the front or on any
uther line of defence, constitutes a serious economic defect.

That these veterinary arrangements are totally inadequate
no one will deny who is acquainted with the true state of
j.ftairs, or who has read Sir Edward Ward's statement on the
.subject. A cavalry officer, wounded and returned home, states
that he lost three chargers which had been slightly wounded
because there were no facilities for removing them to a base
hospital, of which there are all too few. He adds that he
never saw a veterinary officer. This is not surprising ; it was
years before the work of the Red Cross was recognised and
placed on a proper basis.

Before I arrive at the main reason of my article, I should
like it to be clearly understood that such animal defence
societies as I am connected with are not unreasonable senti-
mentalists on the question of the use of horses in war.

It is clear to them that there can bo no injustice in using
horses to fight in defence of a country in which the practical
standard of the treatment of animals is the highest in the
world. Those agonies which humans endure for their enfran-
chisement they may clearly ask horses to share when the
interests of the latter are also at stake. I would the reason
for animal suffering were always so well grounded.

From this, it follows, however, that by all rules of honour
and gi-atitude we are bound to protect them by some such
organisations as the Red Cross, which has become an economic
necessity and a humane duty. Hundreds of thousands of
pounds will be saved and a great amount of agony and suffer-
ing mitigated and prevented. A beginning has been made.
Certain^ animal defence societies are anxious to place all their
forces at the disposal of the Government, both in the interests
of the country and those of the animals.

The Blue Cross Fund of Our Dumb Friends' League came
into existence at the time of the Balkan War, when it was
able to send £500 to Lady Lowther, the wife of our Ambas-
sador at Constantinople, for the use of army horses. W^hen
the present war began it at once set to work.

The committee of the Blue Cross Fund does not expect
miracles. The proper care of wounded horses in warfare, and
especially the removal and proper nursing of those engaged on
the field of battle, is a comparatively new idea. Indeed, the
whole attitude towards animal life has evolved enormously,
and in this respect Britons lead the van.

To begin with, there is a very important point to be
settled, a point wliitli must bo settled by international con-
vention before any society can work efficiently on the battle-
field. Certain nations which do not share the advanced views
of this country would see no di.Terence between the saving
of g-uns and the saving of horses. With them horses
are munitions of war. nc.thing more. The recognition of
the Blue Cross will be a long and troublesome business.

This generation may not see it. But the uccefisary spade
work leading to- this end becomes difficult in the face of
recent action taken by the Royal Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty of Animals. Before the war was many days old
the R.S.P.C.A. issued the following circular:

HORSES ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

Ill view of the great dosii-e of a large body of the piiV>lic Ihiit
spM'ial steps shoiild be taken to aiiic'lior.ite the condition of liorsea
on the biitllefield, the t'uuncil of the K.S.l'.C.A. announce that the
Jlilitary Authorities have publicly 8tat<;d that v) piifote, auxiltnri/, or
i-iiluntprr retcriimri/ corps jur dextioi/iin/ woiiiidul lioif<:>i vill he
Mowed to enter the sphere of fiostilitie^, and that no vohiufiiri/
ooiiftniiee u> the way of giipitlyinij bandnfjex, medicines, etc., is required.
The Army Veterinary Department of the War Office is iu sole charge
of this work, and has provided special inttrunienti for the killing of
wounded animals by Veterinary OtIic«rs of their own largely increased
staff, and by all soldiors of and above the rank of .sergeant. Further,
the Army Veterinary Corps has provided for a chain of hospitals for
the ti-eatment of those animals th.at can be cured. All funds for
animals available at this time will be required for the protection of
those, unfit for military requirements, left in thi.-> country to do the
e.xtra strenuous work which will inevitably devolve upon them.

By means of circulars, newspaper advertisements, and
posters, tlte above statement was disseminated broadcast; the
last paragraph definitely implies that no horses under Army
control will be allowed to receive voluntary help of any kind.

This is absolutely contrary to facts.

I ask the R.S.P.C.A. to publish the facsimile of the War
Office document, wherein it publicly makes the statement
attributed to it.

The truth of the matter is that Army veterinary officers
are, as they must do, unless they wish to be grossly inhumane,
accepting help in every direction. A more kindly set of men
do not exist, and it is grotesque to suppose that they are
flying in the face of headquarter instructions. Many of Our
Dumb Friends' League ambulances have been refitted and are
in use by the military, and medical comforts have been sujjplied
at request in large quantities. Anybody reading the state-
ment quoted would naturally come to the conclusion that
societies or individuals collecting money for the purpose of
assisting Army horses were doing so without the least chance
of succeeding iu their object.

Ijideed, as a result of the circular, imputations of bad faith
against Our Dumb Friends' League have not been wanting,
and to show that I have not strained its implication or its
effect on the public mind, subscribers have, in some instances,
asked for their money back. I am happy to say that on being
informed of the true state of tlie case they have returned their
subscriptions to the fund. The circular thus resolved itself
into an attack on those societies which had once again been
compelled by the policy of .lennyn-street to undertake a work
which the R.S.P.C.A. might have initiated years ago.

I assert most unequivocally that, although the R.S.P.C.A.
has been founded ninety years, although it is by far the richest
of all animal defence societies, it has beyond argument left
nearly every new departure in animal defence to those societies
which have come into being. There should never have been
any need for the existence of the Canine Defence Society, the
Equine Defence Society, the Bird Society, the Animal Defence
Society, and Our Dumb Friends' League, with its seven societies
in one. Those who doubt this should read the courteous but
scathing indictment by Mr. Stephen Coleridge in the Fort-
iiir/hfh/ Eerii'ir oi April, 1914.

In conclusion, the public will be glad to hear that Anny
horses may be lielped in spite of the published circular referred
to above. The work of the Blue Cross Fund grows steadily.
We have a balance of £1,200, and subscriptions and large gifts
of stores are coming iu daily. W'e shall hope, when we have
.shown that we can be useful in the sphere open to us. to
establish, under the supervision of the military authorities,
ba.'^^c hospitals at the front.

Wmi recruiting headquarters at the Hotel Cecil, a private complete
b.ittalion is being formed of 1,300 strong, hardy, sporting gentlemen up
to 45 years of age. The hattalion has been accepted by Lord
I'CitcheKer, and affords an opijortunity for men wishing to serve of
joining under congenial conditions. Application can be made person-
ally at the Hotel Cecil- recruiting ofluo between the hours of 10 a.m.
and 6 p.m.. or by writing and sending name, address, age, height,
weight, and mcdiciil certificate to the Oflicer in Command, Recruiting
Ollice, Hotel Cecil, .Strand, Lo.ndon.

16"

September 19, 1914

LAND AND WATER

TO 11,I,U«TKVTK APl-EOXIMATKLV THE NKUTRAI, COASTS AND INI^ND COMMUNICATIONS BY WHICH I-001>S AND KAW MATERIALS CAX B«
OCT IXTO OEBXMtV AND AC8TBIA. THE DOTTEB LINES BKPKKSKNT THK API-BOX IMATJ! KXTKKT Ol DRLOEKY AKEA.

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

THE NORTH SEA.

A T the time of writing the past week lias been

/^L uneventful so far as any lighting is concerned.

/ ^ A sweep has been made so far as the Heligo-

/ ^k land Bight, but no hostile warships wei'e sighted.

-A- .^- The sweep must not be regarded as inefTec-

tive on that account, for it must have had a

considerable moral value as indicating to the Germans that we

are both ready and willing to attack.

By order of the Admiralty (which has secured all the
more willing obedience from issuing its directions in the form
of a polite " request ") all light.s along the coa.st have been
greatly reduced; and in certain places the lighthouses have
been left unlit. To this latter circumstance has been attri-
buted the loss of the armed liner Oceanlr, of 17,274 gross
tonnage and 21 knot speed. She )s alleged to have been
wrecked, but no official details arc forthcoming. Unofficial
stories range from her having gone full-speed a'^horo on an
unlit coast to having been submarinc<l and beached.

The losses of trawlers and neutrals by Nortli Sea mines
indicates a pleasing diminution, which may be attributed
partly to the circumstance that Admiralty advice as to courses
to be followed is now more strictly observed, and to the
untiring efforts of the mine sweepers.

Special regulations have been promulgated, and came
into force on Monday, as to vessels entering the Thames. These
must now all call at the Tongue Iiglit«hip or at (he Margate,
Deal, or Dover liglit;;liips, and txakc on board a licensed pilot.
Outgoing vessels liave to take instructions as to tiie exact
course to be followed. Tliis. of course, means that mines have
been or are about to be laiil in certain places as a precaution

against Germans seeking to lay mines under the British or
a neutral flag.

Some remarks of mine last week on the subject of Holland
appear to have been misunderstood by one or two readers,
who fail to realise thati the Dutch will presently be in
the same invidious position as the Danes were in the
Napoleonic wars. Behind Holland is Germany— a long-
dreaded power which has suddenly become very polite, for
Dutch ports offer useful facilities for food supply. If the
Dutch fleet is wanted, Gennany will no more hesitate to seize
it and use Dutch harbours as a war base against us than she
hesitated to use Belgian territory as a base again.st France.

The immediate result would be double work for our Noa-th
Sea patrols. Against this is to be put the utility of Holland
as a convenient neutral through whom German supplies can
be obtained. Just at present these two circumstances more or
less balance each other for oiilieir side, but this balance can
only be maintained so long as the Germans do not obtain control
of French harbours. Tlie value of Holland as a source of food
import to Germany would then decline appreciably, while the
value of taking possession of Dutch harbours and Dutch
torpedo craft would rise correspondingly.

On the other hand, supposing the Germans to be beaten
back and contained at bay in their own country, the question of
whether we can afford to allow them to be fed through Holland
will assuredly rise as a problem of naval strategy. The' business
of the Fleet is to fight the enemy's fleet if it comes out, and
if it will not come out to put on sufficient economic pressure
to compel a sort'c or surrender.

Wo know that already, on account of the blockade, some
1500 idle ships lie at Hamburg, that food prices in Germany
are very high, and that the scarcity of raw material has led

17*

LAND AND WATEH

September 19, 1914

to niucli uuoniploymcnt— a general condition vhicli is already
characterised by tlio German Socialist newspaper I orwarts
as •• The Internal Danger."

On tbo olLer haJid. Dutch imports have risen very con-
»iderably, and the effect of tlic British Navy is to that extent
discredited. Sooner or later Holland will have to make her
neutrality definite, or else take sides. The .sheer brutality
with which Germany treated Belgium is thus e.vplained. The
awful fate of Belgium was a broad hint to Holland. Thus tho
Dutch arc placetl between tho millstones — Gei-nian military
force close by, and British naval force acting over perhaps a
hundred miles away. Holland, like Belgium, will presently
have to make her decision between present loss and future
gain.

An ofTicial German report admits the loss of the Htln,
sunk by a submarine. She is, however, no great loss as a
tighting unit, being rather infenor to our Spxdi/.

An unofficial report says that the PnUifiiuhr was sunk
not by a mine, but by a submarine, and that that submarine
was subsequently found and sunk. If this story be true, ib
indicates considerable daring on the part of the German sub-
marino sci"vice, for it must have entailed a long above-water
cruise, tlic distance which German subnjarines can travel
under water being very small, probably an endurance of not
more Uian fifty miles all told. If a submarine did deliver the
attack, there is every probability that the story of her sub-
sequent destruction is correct.

THE BALTIC.

A NUMBEn of vague rumours when pieced together suggest
that the greater part of the German Fleet is, or has been,
operati^ng in the Baltic, the older ships acting in the Aaland
direction, and tho Dreadnoughts, if any, cruising off Kiel
mainly with the object of keeping their crews fit.

In the great Napoleonic Wars this ' taking exercise out-
side the backdoor " was not possible to any blockaded fleet.
It is a very considerable asset to the Germans, and one which
most of us have hitherto rather overlooked. It, of course, has
not tho same hardening effect as actual war service, but there
will necessarily be a vast difference between this "keeping
the sea." and lying idle in harbour.

The " right thing " for an inferior fleet is naturally some^
■what limited. Humanly speaking, it should never amount to
veiy much. But tho naval situation as I read it is that the
German High Sea Fleet still continues to make no mistakes
and to wait patiently in tho hopes of our making some.
Admiral Ingenholt is not to be lured out by the best of our
devices. Our respect for him as a capable opponent should
rise, not fall, accordingly.

At the time of going to press there is a belated official
Gorman report, dated Monday, to the effect that the Baltic
squadron, " which consists of twenty-nine units," has fifteen
vessels in action. It probably refers to some destroyer or light
cruiser action.

THE FAR EAST, Etc.

Herbertsiioe in Neu Pommern (formerly New Britain),
which was ceded to Germany in 1S85, was attacked and cap-

now far too .strong to offer any chances of successful intern-
ment in some Chinese harbour. The objective, if any, would
probably bo Chce-foo.

C^fiO

^^^^^'''"

mH^

CEKMAN POSSESSION W^
BRITISH WB

NKU rOMMERN AND ADJACKNT GKUMAN' I'OSSKSSIOXS,

tured by an Australian Naval force on the 11th and 1 2th.
The captuix is of importance, as it entailed the possession of
a^ German wireless station, which might have been useful to
any predatoiy cruiser making those waters.

At Kiao-Chau the principal operations seem to ciiisist
in German efforts to lay fresh mines,. and Japanese counter-
efforts to prevent. Stories of the blockaded cruisers
endeavouring to break out can be dismissed as possible ratlicr
than probable. The blockading Japanese force must bo by

ARTHUR (Japanese)

KIAO CHAU

<Cerman)

TLAN SHOWING THE SllUATION JN THE FAR EAST.

ON THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

Last .Saturday brought the news of the capture of the
Hamburg-American liner Brthania, 7548 tons, oft' Jamaica, into
which port she was brought, with some 400 prisoners, mostly
belonging to the crew of the late armouretl liner, Koixer
Wilhelin der Grosse, which was sunk by the lliylifli/er. The
captui'e of various lesser ships was also reported, the total
to date being 190.

Meanwhile, several German crui.sers arc still afloat, but
their interference with British trade has been trivial. German
miscalculations in connection with copimerce warfare have
been very considerable indeed ; for all the harm that has been
done we might just as well be at peace.

*0u the German side, however, matters are becoming acute.
Various imiportant liners are held up at New York, where they
are being! maintained in idleness at vary heavy expense.
Rumour has it that these ships have now received orders to
attempt a rush home. Rumour has probably anticipated
actual orders, but such ordei^s will no doubt eventually bo
given. The projected sale to the United States of these big
fast liners has fallen through, so they are lying at New York,
unsaleable, earning nothing, and costing their usual upkec)i.
Wealthy as arc the Hamburg-American Line and the Nord-
Deutscher Lloyd, a continuation of this state of affairs must
bring them face to face with bankruptcy.

If they can get the ships back there is a good prospect of
.sale to the Germany Navy. Hence the attempt to run homo
is fairly certain to occur at some time.

Success is another matter. The Channel is impossible.
The only possible successful route is round the North of Scot-
land. To slip through hero and so into the Baltic offers some
prospect of success on a dai-k night-, but the outlook for the
Germans is none too rosy, unless, of course, some co-incident
fleet action be taken.

This course, however, is improbable, as the consequent
risk would be altogether out of proportion to the possible gain.

It would seem that, humanly speaking, the " silent
pressure of Sea Power " is such that it is immaterial what the
great German shipping lines do. Their choice is little but
to try to discover which is the lesser of two evils.

GERMANS— ROSE-COLOURED.

Mn. William Heinemann h.is issued a two-shilling edition of
F. W. Wile's book, Men Around the Kaiser, whicli gives a fairly
faithful picture of the leading men of Germany — as they api)o,nvcd to
English eyes before the great awakening of last month. 'The volume is
frankly eulogistic; with Louvain and Dinant still in mind, we are but
little inclined to agree with the author's views f.n, say, the Crown
Prince or Bothniannllollweg. liernstorff, again, is painted in very
glowing colours as "peculiarly at home in the American environment,"
and it is not until we conic on the sketches of Reinhardt and .Strauss,
and their like, that we are inclined to agreement with the estimates
of these men as given here. Uiographically, the book is of little value,
and its personal appeal is weakened by the estimation in wliieli these
men arc held at tlie present time; as a race, we EnglLsh are naturally a
little biassed against the "men around the Kaiser," to say nothing of
the Kaiser himself, at present. The chief value of the book lies in its
])ower to sliow us what fools we were to believe— as the author believed
when he wrote it — that the Germans are a civilised and peaceful people.

18*

♦September 19, 1914

LAND AND WATER

THE WAR BY AIR.

By FRED T. JANE.

THE cud of last week brought us alarm iug rumours
of a German Zopi)eliii invasion of England cin
Calais, preceded by a bombardment of Dover
fioni across the Channel by monster guns. The
guns we can dismiss; the suitable gun is not yet
built. As for the Zeppelins, sheds for them, are
not available at Calais, and a Zeppelin without a shed is a
very harmless sort of thing. It is like the crawling wasp of
the autumn, in full possession of its sting, but not in a position
to use it e.xcept in special circumstances.

Very wisely, however, the responsible authorities did not
take tlic threat as an idle one. A naval airship was ordered
to cruise over London, and at the same time a request, of the
nature of a command, was issued as to the extinction of all
jironiincnt sky sights and similar leading lights.

All ot which is to the good. The '' aci'ial menace " to us
.so far exists merely as '' newspaper yarns " or "' speculations
of f.Tnatics." All ot which is very good in its way, but it does
not nullify the possibilities of such attack. As I mentioned
l:!st week, Germany's air superiority is probably regarded by
lier as her trump cai'd. It is probably also a card to be held
back and not played till the psychological moment.

The new type aerial searchlight now in full use is likely
to make surprise attacks exceedingly difficult, and also every
]>hu-o that matters is by now well supplied with anti-aerial
guns. Tlieie is consequently not the least occasion to panic.
But .-'11 the same the danger is rail. Germany in the air is
just about in the same relation to us (or more so) as we are to
Germany on the water, and it is idle to imagine that in her
own time Germany will not use or attempt to use her
supoiiority.

\Vc have no occasion to fear her aeroplanes. Even ftom
the shores of Fr.Tuco they cannot well act from a French base;
and tvcn if they did, the damage that they could do is more
or less trivial. Ze])pclins, however, arc quite another affair.
Once a base is established in France, London's danger will be
.•icnte. It may come to-morrow, or not till next week or the
week after, or later still. But the danger is there, and it
should not be ignored.

Germany in her own lime will seek to panic us. She
iiopcd to do so with the commerce attack. This operation did
not come off. The attempt left our traders cold. North Sea
mines have l)cen little more successful. The third vial is
liktly to eomc from^he air. If so. it will rest with the people
of London not to acce))t the Kaiser as the instrument of the
Almighty. Thoy will have to accept things with philosophical
calm no easy task.

It is inadvisable to discuss what ways and means we may
have of meeting this possible aerial attack. For that matter
no one knows for certain what will happen when aeroplanes
attack .Tirships. We arc far too prone to seek the analogy of
torpctlo craft attacking battleships. The analogy is easy; but
it may be absolutely delusive. For all we know the positions
may be reversed entirely.

In any case it is idle to speculate too freely as to what
an aeroplane can accomplish against a Zeppelin. It can cer-
taiidy in the liist resort ram her and destroy a gas bag — with
luck, two gas bags. But the average Zeppelin has seventeen
bag«, and what are two among so many? At any rate, and

in order to minimise possible future panic, it should be remem-
bered that — according to German calculation* — a Zeppelin
can take a great deal of punishment without suffering much
for it vriiil she hud achieved her ohjeef.

This, of course, is identical with the theory about;
destroyers charging a battleship. According to the theory the
battleship will very probably inflict deadly wounds on an
attacking destroyer, but these wounds will not take effect
until the destroyer has managed to achieve her especial pur-
pose. Rightly or wrongly, Germaji aerial ideas run along
similar linos. It is held that a Zeppelin cannot bs destroyed
without a_t^ime interval. In that time interval she should
have been able to do her work. It is along these lines, it.
may be noted, that German regiments are handled — without
regard to the ultimate loss so long as the initial object is
achieved.

Hence the danger. The public in London and other large
cities can only defend themselves by implicit obedience to all
orders as to the display of lights, and by keeping calm what-
ever happens. The actual damage to be effected oven by a
Zeppelin is comparatively small; the main object aimed at
is " moral effect."

General French has now issued a report of the Boyal
Flying Corps, which emphasises the fact that in actual air
fighting five German aeroplanes have been destroyed.

The report, with the expression ' lired at constantly I y
both friend and foe," draws attention to oils of the dangers
to which our airmen are exposed. At the present time there
is with aircraft no such thing as the "obviously British" or
"obviously German" which obtains on the sea. All aero-
planes are pretty much alike (indeed, the Germans have some
of British make, and we some of German make), and although
they are marked on the underside, it is rarely possible to see
those marks under war conditions. " Shoot first and inquire
afterwards " is about the only workable order where aeroplanes
are concerned.

It is persistently rejKirted that we, the French, and the
Belgians, are adopting arrows for use against troops. The
arrows are so designed that they will spread in falling, and
it is cjilculaled that a bunch of 400 (the regulation supply)
would~do more mischief than bombs, since dropped from' a
height they would pierce men like bullets.

Bombs from aeroplanes have so far achieved very littlu
— real utility work consists in scouting, directing fire, "and in
fighting any of the enemy similarly 'engaged. This last i*
certainly more effectually done by actual coufiict in the air
than by rifle fire directed from below, both as regards greater
certainty (^f result, and also becausa the thousands of bullets
discharged into the air must all fall again someuhere. No
casualties whatever have so far been reported from this cansc,
but circumstances in which a friendly force might sustain
heavy casualties from returning bullets is great. The
theory that a bullet shot upwards burns itself up in the
air like a meteorite is iiiadmissable. All such bullets
must fall some^vherc, and if several thousand chanced to
fall on a friendly regiment, there would be little of that
regiment left.

The only proper place in which to meet aerial attack is
in the air.

A TOPOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO THE

WAR ZONE.

By E. CHARLES VIVIAN.

Bar-le-Duc or Bar-sur-Ornain. — The principal
town of tlie department of Mouse, France, .situated on the river
Ojnain, a tributary of the Mtjuse. It is in the immediate vicinity
of the Marno-Rliine canal, and is a station on the Paris-Strasbourg
line of rail, b!>ing alsD connected by rail with the fortress town
of Verdun. Its ji'ipiilation is about 17,()(KI. The town was
founded by Frederiik the First, Duke of Lorraine, in the tenth
century, and in nK'di*val times was strongly fortified. A few
traces of the old fortificatiou.s, which were dismantled by

Louis XIV. in 1670, still remain, and Bar-Ie-Duc of the present
day is an educational centre with considerable trade in wool,
wood, and wine.

Bielgoray or Bilgoray. — A small town of the
jirovince of Lublin, in I'vussian Poland, about seventv-fivc
kilometres south of the town of Lublin. It is about five
kilometres distant from the frontier of Austrian Galicia. and about
five kilometres distant from the river Taucw, a tributary of
the San,

19*

LAND AND WATEli

September 19, 19 U

Chalcau-Thierry. — Cliiof town of an aiTonflisscmcDt
in UiQ (I(])ii:;!:!'jnt v( Aisnc, Fraiioo, .sit\iatcd on tlio liglit Ijank
o{ (ho rivci- Manio, nn<l (•(iiine<teJ with a stibuib on tlic left
Ijaiik of the liver liy a st<>iie bridge for road traffic. The town
is jrenerally stated to liave been named from the ruins of an old
casth- on the top of a iiil! near the (own, whicii ruins are supi)osed
fo have been a castle built by Charles Martel for Thierry IV.
It has l)een eajitured by both Enjulish and Spanish and pillaf;ed
in mediseval times, and has .suffered pillajie on more than one
oceasiim, while during (he campaign of 181-1 the town was
completely wix'ckcd, and Napoleon obtained a victory o\ cr the
Kussii-l'russian forces in the neighbouihood. The jiresent
]M>pulation of (he town is about 7,(HK>, and it lias direct rail
lommuiiication with Pari.s, Chalon.s, Hheims, and I^aon.

Oorraans. — Situated on the Paris-('halon.s line of rail,
in the west of the department of Marne, and oii the left bank
of the river .\Ianie. It is in a hilly di.stri<t, and is on the direct
Rh<>ims to Paris road.

Haringhe. — A ]?elgian village in the province of East
Flanders, about two miles south of Kousbrugge, and juactically
on the Krench frontier.

La-Ferte-Sous-Jouarre. — A t-own in tlie north-ea.st
of the <lcpartinent of Seine-et-Marne, France, .situated on the
river Marne, and at the junction of the Paris-Chalons and Paris-
Troycs lines of rail. It is the site of extensive stone <]uairies,
and is a town of considerable importance.

Laoa.-The chief town of the department of .\isne, .situated
eighty-seven miles north-east of Pans, on the main line of rail
from Paris to Belgiu'Si. The Paiis-Mczieres and Paris-Le Cateau
lines also branch from Tiaon, and there is a line from Laon to
Kl'.einis. I.aoii is considered "' the strategic key of the whole
region coinjnLsed between the Aisiic and the nortliern frontier,"
and is s\irniunde(l by a ring of defences about five miles distant
from the town, in addition to a central citadeL The population
of the town is about Ifi.OOO, exclusive of the normal ganison,
which, as Laon ranks as a first-class military post, is considerable, j

Lotzen. — .^ town in East Prussia, about thirty-five miles
from the Russian frontier. It is situated on the Mauer Tvake,
under cover of the guns of the fortress Feste Boyen. It is a
Riation <m the railway from Lyck to the Baltic fortress of
Koenigsberg.

Lublin.— Capital of a province of the same name in
Russian Poland, and one of tiie chief centres of .south-western
Kiissia, with a population of over GO,(XX). It is about forty-five
miles from the frontier of Austrian (Jalicia, and is an importjint
railway centre. The lines Warsaw-Bucharest and A\'ar,saw-
Kkaterineslav branch here, and there is also a line from l.iubliu
to Kadziu and Ostrow in the north of Poland.

Lyck. — -^ station on the East German strategic railway,
situateil about twenty miles south of Margrabova. Four lines
branch hence to Prostken on the Russian frontier, to Johannesburg,
U) IJossel, and to Goldapp in East Prussia. Lyck itself is a
fortified jiost of some importance.

Mancra /. — -^ village of western or French Lorraine
on the western slope of the Vosges Mountains, situated near the
St. IJie terminus of the strategic railway lunuing east to Fraize
after branching off from the main St. Die-Bruyere line.

Marchiennes. — A Belgian town on the River Sambre,
about two miles west of Charlcroi, in the coalmining district of
southern Belgium. The population is about 19,0<)(), and the
t<)wn is situated on the Maubeuge-Charleroi line.

Soissons. — A city in tJie department of Ai.snc, France,
forming a fortified post on the left bank of the river Aisne whcm
this stream is joined by the ('rise. It is on the Paris-Laon line of
rail, and is about si.\ty-five miles north-east of Paris. Its
l)oj)ulation is about 12,(»()0. and its cathedral of Notre Dame
St tJervais and St Prolais, dating from the twelfth century, is
one of the principal e.\aiiij>les of early French ecclesiastical
architecture. The history of Soissons dates back to Rdtnaii
occupation in France, and the town j)layed a jnoniinoiit part in
the wars between England and France during the middle ages,
while the town was captui'ed and recaptured by the Allies tmh
the French during the cani])aign of 1811. Jn the war of 187u
Sois,sons capitulated to the tJerinans after a bonibardmcnt lasting
three day.s. It is at the present time an important railttiiy
centre, as the Aniiens-Rhcinis line crosses the Paris-Laon
railway here.

WAR PUBLICATIOiNS.

.SVn. I.iniil, anil Air Shnle)/!/, luy .Sit George .\.-itoii, K.C.H., is (i
volimie iiiteiuli-d, as the Hiithor aniioiiTKCR on the title page, tn "{{iv»
li.s a iiHtioiirtl strategy, a iintiuiiiil taitiis." It, is Iw^ed uii lertiiKs
cMivcied liy tlio aiitlior at the t'ainberley Staff (Uilloge, ;iii<l ihaU
priiicip.illy with hiiid stratei:y. sinh siilijeets aF con<i'ntratiun and disjxr-
liidii. liiu's (if comiiiuiiit-itioii, fnrtihiatiiiii. and (oast defeiiie beiiij; (rar-
licularly well represeiUtd. In tlie matter of air waifaix', the aiilli(ir7i( ats
of reeeiit dtv;!lo|ifiients, the use of aerii|jlane.s and iiirshi],.". eonilwt,
between airrvaft, and the nt^e of ;}iniiilt in gaining infoimalion. 'J'he
book is undeniably te( hiiieal : at the same time the stn(Jy of (-trategy
involves a masn of interettiiij; histoiieaj nnitter, and, wh.ile the .luthoi ha«

iii»oi*r» ,1 iiiiiM.'* oi iiiiert-Mioi; niM<nu.(i nciiitf, and, wi'.ue me ainn(?i- na«
been (arefnl to k<ep the i)ra<tieal side of hip subject in view throngliont
his work, he has at the .s^iiiie lime made l]i.s snt)joi't an intcr(>s(iny iriie,
and lias refrained from writing over the head of the avera!;>^ man.
Primaiily valuable as a te.xt b(Kjk for the uav.il t,nd militaiy otliiei.
the book is to be recommended at tlio present tin>e as a work of prtat
interest to the great majority who desire to approa( h the problems (.f
ilie present eampaign with some miliiiiry knowledge. We would siig^*''-'.
in view of the great nimitier of young officers now j'-iining the serviees,
that a cheaper form than tlte present half-guinea edition of the werk
would have been desirable, and tru.st that the pnbti.«bers, Messrs. .lohii
Murray, have under eoiisideration sonn- n.ieans of supplying to hi'tm fiili^.
military and mivai applicants a slightly cheaper edition.

SxNr critieiHii of war topics forms a tVatnv:' of current i.isnes of
Thf Acfiili/iii/. The present week's issue contains an explanation if
the mnch-di.seii.ssed report in a rreent Sunday edition ol the Tinufy
and a iiumlKr of other well-informed and interesting war articUs.

In our review of t'apt. .lolmson's book. Thr fmiiii/iitiimx i-f
Sfratfr/t/, which appeared in last weeks issue of Lunil iw<l Wnlt^r. the
jiublisliers of the book were wrimgly styled " Me-ssrs. tieorge Allen ti
Fisher I'nwin." The correct style of tin firm. w)iieh h:!." no ronneiti.Di
with that of .Mr. T. Fisher Unwin. is " .Messrs. (leorge .\llen i^ Vnwiif,
Wd."

Few men are belter (jualificd to judge of lievnh.irdi's (hilms amJ
a.«:.serti(.ns than Professor (.'ramb. wh(»Ke book, ',''■//:, /t/,*/ tini^ Kn4jUttiiJ.
consisting of a series of lectur<>s given at Queen's College. Harley-stieel,
has been published by John Murray. In this little half <ro-.vii volume
is shown the real rea.son of German antagoni.sm to F.ngland; it is made
clear that the hostility among edncitcd (.Sermans is due to "the f;.ct
that this Kmpire appears to them the maiji. or even the sole, obstacle
to the atlainment of a great national ideal, for which thi'V are 1 (iniiil
to lal>our, and, if need l>e, to contend." Profess. )r (ramb. .■:s ;i.
professor of niodern histoiy, speaks with authority, and at the s;iiii«
time he speaks with .scrupulous fairness; Ilia lectures form a weighty
indictment of JJernhardi and the doctrine which for forty years lii;s
dominated Germany. The book is one that ought to be read by every
thoughtful student of the present war and its causes, and Lord Roberts'
wish, that it shonld be read by "everyone who wishes to understand
the present crisis," is one that we thoroiighly endor.se.

Amos'; tlie wfll-known employers who are holding out indneenn nt«
to their staffs to respond to the call to anna, Messrs. .fames Carter k
Co., of Riiyiies Park, S.W., the well-known seedsmen, are not only
keeping positions open, but paying half wages to all members of tliiir
staff who are accepted for service. No distinction lietwi>en married l^r
unm.irried is made, as -Messrs. .James Carter & Co. realise the lattir
have dependents also.

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Addrcfi ill full ^

20"

September 26, 1914

LAND AND WATEE

THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

THE WAR IN THE WEST.

THE whole meaning of the Western M'ar at
the present moment is this :
That the Germans have retreated up
to, and are defending, an admirable defen-
sive line about half-way between Paris and the
frontier ; that they have held this line, with varying
fortunes, for twelve days ; that this state of affah-s
cannot be indefinitely continued ; and, finally, that the
chances of its breaking down are, at the moment I
write this (Wednesday) evening, against the encm}'.
Either {A) they will find themselves strong enough to
(i) at the best for themselves to break the French
line at its centre, Rheims ; (2) at least to press back
the Allied line, which has for these ten days been
attempting to dislodge them ; or (B) they will yield
to the increasing pressure upon their western flank
and will begin a retirement, which wiU be first under-
taken from the plateau Craonne-Noyon, and will later
extend to the whole line.

Of these two alternatives (B) is the more likely.

That is the whole gist of the war in the Western
field.

Our business, therefore, if we wish to understand
wliat is going on, is first to summarise again the three
great movements which led the Germans to their
present position ; next to grasp the nature and exact
situation of the defensive 80-mile line upon which

the Germans have taken their stand; and, lastly,
through a detailed examination of this line by sections,
to sum up their varying fortunes along it.

When we have these elements in hand we shall
understand the gi'eat battle which has occupied the
Allied troops since the 13th of this month ; we shall
be able to consider its tendency, and, perhaps, to
guess at its end.

The summary of the operations which led up to
the present position is as folloAvs :

The Germans, bringing in through Belgium a
little more than double the number of troops which
the Fi-ench commanders had thought them able to
bring by this route, met and forced back the Allied
forces, not half their own, which had been drawn up
to meet them along the River Sambre. The strengtb
of a defensive attitude would have prevented what
followed had Namur, on the right of the French
defensive line, stood. But as Namur fell in the first
day's shock (Sunday, August 23i-d), the whole line
along the Sambre (including the British contingent,
which stretched up past Mons) was compelled on that
night and the following Monday to an exceedingly
rajjid and very hard pressed retirement.

This retirement, accompanied by very heavy
losses upon the part of the Allies, was pursued by the
overwhelming German numbers with the utmost
rapidity. The whole advance upon the one side and

LAND AND WATER

September 2G, 1914

retirement upon tLe other pivoted upon the neigh-
hourhood of Verdun ; while the Western extremity of
the German line, where Avas massed the largest body
Df men (like the swelled end of a club), made straight
for Paris.

This tidal movement lasted ten days, from
August 24th to September 2nd-3rd. At the end of
it, m the early part of the first week of September,
from "Wednesday, September 2nd (the anniversary of
Sedan), to Friday, September 4th, the main German
mass in the west stood in touch with the fortifica-
tions of Paris, and the complete success of the German
plan seemed assured.

This western extremity of the German line where
the largest single ma.'is of troojis Avas gathered under
the command of Von Kluck (it is generally known as
the 1 st German Amiy) was apparently about to attack
the outer works of Paris. It had come south of Senlis
and Creil, through the woods of Chantilly and Erme-
nonville, and had come out upon the great open plain
which stretches for a day's march to the noiili-east of
the capital, within a mile or two of an extreme range
from the forts. It had met the most extended
batteries of the defence.

At this moment, after the middle of the first week
of September, ended the first phase. The invasion
had pressed in a great bow south of Revigny in the
very woods of Argonne, south of Vitry, south of
Sommesous, south of Sezanne — right up to this
plain just north-east of Paris. Everything was
ready for the final blow.

Tlie immediate business of the Germans was to
break the Allied line where it sagged most, near Vitry,
to drive half of it eastward against the German armies
in Lorraine ; the other half of it beyond or into Paris —
the investment of which capital would then have been
undertaken.

Just then it was discovered, probably by the aii-men
of A^on Kluck's army, that the French commanders
had accumulated, behind the screen of the Paris
fortified zone, a very much larger reserve than the
Gei-mans had allowed for. For this had Joffre
weakened his main line, or rather refused to strengthen
it as it fell back. On this secret hoard had the French
relied for turning the tide. There was a moment's
hesitation upon the part of Von Kluck whether to
retire from this menace by the way he had come or to
march rapidly across the numerically inferior troops
in front of him (before this French reserve could come
up) and so to join and help the two gi-eat CJennan
masses on his left, from Sezanne to ^''itry, in breakiuw
the French central line.

He decided for the latter and bolder course.
With the end of that week, the 5th and Cth of
September, he was undertaking this flank march.

His boldness was disastrous to the whole German
plan. The numerically inferior forces, along the face

of which he marched, included the British contingent.
-^.'4-1. 4.1, « «ii. ri K A •! t I.. , * '

and Charleroi. Perhaps he thought them exhausted.
Far from it, they immediately took the counter-
offensive (backed by this Paris reserve coming up in
greater and greater nximbers from behind and from
within the fortifications of Paris), stopped the whole
of the German movement, and began to assume the
initiative.

During all that week-end A^on Kluck fought
desperately along the Ourcq to save his com-
munications. He handled the matter .so well that he
did save them, but he was compelled to a precipitate

retreat, the British and the French 5th Aj-my
pressing him back over the Marne between
Meaux and Chateau Thierry, while the French
Gth Army, and its reinforcements from the reserve,
crossed the Oiu-cq . The fighting in this quarter during
all the week-end and the beginning of the next or
second week of September, from Sunday, the Cth, to
Wednesday, the 9th, was exceedingly lieaAy, and will
be known to history as the Battle of Meaux.

It was not until Thursday, September 10th, that
a true result was reached, and that Von Kluck's
general retreat began.

This retreat was handled so well that In the next
two and a half days it had covered the whole distance
to the river Aisne and the neighbourhood of Soissons,
some of the German regiments being compelled to
marches of over twenty miles a day, and none to
marches of less than fifteen. Von Kluck's retreat
was not only raj^id but Avas also so strongly conducted
that his losses in prisoners and captured guns were, in
comparison with his great numbers, insignificant. At
the end of the week, on Satiu'day, September 12th, he
Avas upon the Aisne and about to take up those
defensive positions to the north of that river Avhich
had evidently been most carefully examined and
chosen before the Avar broke out, and upon which so
desperate a resistance has been offered during the last
ten days.

A'^on Kluck's retreat over these forty miles and
more of country involved, of course, a coiTCsponding
retreat upon the part of the two great German masses
lying successively to his left, betAveen his OAvn Anny
and Verdun ; and Avhile he Avas taking up his defensive
position upon the Aisne before Soissons t/ie>/ fell back
through the Plain of Champagne until they were in
line Avith him along the continuation of that defensive
position ; Avhich continuation runs north of Eheims
and along the river Suippe to the forest of Argonne.
By Sunday, September 13tli, the Avhole mass of the
German forces — much more than a million men — Avas
standing at bay along the line marked upon the general
map at the head of this, Avhich line extends fi-om the
Argonne, past Eheims and Soissons, to the river Oise
at a point between Noyon and Compiegne.

Thus ended the second jihase of the Western
campaign — a general German retreat across the river
Marne, pressed everywhere by the ad\'ancing Allies,
probably to be knoAvn in history as the Battle of the
Marne.

The third phase opened upon Monday,
September 14th, and is still in progress. It consists
in a vast defensive action undertaken by the Germans
all along this line of 80 miles and more which they
occupy from the Oise to the Argonne ; a chosen and
prepared defensiA-e position, Avliich is among the
strongest and the best in AVestern Europe. The
nature of that position and of the action dependent
upon it, the points in Avliich it has been pressed back,
the points upon Avhich the Germans haA^e foimd it
possible to adA-ance, their chances of success and
failure are the main object of our study in this AA'eek's
notes, and must next be described in detail.

THE DEFENSIVE POSITION.

The original defensiA-e position taken up by the
Germans, Avhen on Sunday, September 13th, they
turned after their retreat to face their pursuers is here
seen to run in a fairly even line east and west
from- the Forest of Argonne to the Oise EiA'er,
along a line of heights varying in character from
east to Avest. The main position is marked in a
broken line.

September 20, 1914

LAND AND WATER

(f^E STERN

EASTEn/J LIMB

Contour Lines si ISO Fete,
*-•—•"•— OrigintI Utin De/iniin CtriTiM fiuif/cn^

Tt.±iS SUWABISINa TUI FIYI SECTIONS OF THX aSBlU^ POSITION.

Tlie first general characteristic in tliis sketch of
tlic great defensive position which will strike the
observer is that it consists essentially of two limbs.

(1) The plateau running from Ci"aonne all along
the north of the river Aisne past the town of Soissons
to the Oise.

(2) A long low ridge, or rather swell, which goes
in a great curve fi-om the Aisne at BeiTj-au-Bac to
the neighbourhood -oi the Forest of Argonne, all
round, and behind, and then to the east of, the town
vi Eheims.

It will further be convenient, for reasons that
will appear in a moment, to divide the whole line
where it is to be examined in detail into five sections ;
numbered from west to east, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 ; 1,
2, 3, being the sections of the first or western limb ;
4 and 5 of the eastern or second limb.

The first or western limb (which may also be
called the Soissons half), is a rather liigh tableland
wliich has been cut by the erosion of a number of
brooks into a series of separate platforms. All of these
platforms or buttresses join up to the North wth one
running level of land. The whole distinct may be
regarded as a sort of flat-topped embankment rising
everywhere above the north bank of the river Aisne
along its lower reaches, from its emergence above the
Plams of Champagne until its junction with the Oise.
But it is an embankment the sides of wliich have
been deeply scored by erosion ; ravines have been
cut out of it on its southern edge by the series of
brooks which ran from tlie summit down to the Aisne.

This " embankment," or plateau, falls very
gradually from east to west. It is over 450 feet
above the river on the west, above Craonne, where
two conspicuous summits mark its culminating points.
Within five miles of the Oise, at and above Lombray,
it is no more than 300 feet above that river. Its
toti'J length from the village of Craonne to Pontoise
on the Oise, in tlie neighbourhood of Noyon, is, as the
crow flics, fifty-eight kilometres, or very nearly thirty-
seven miles.

And here we must begin that five-fold division of
the whole line which best suits an analysis of the
present operations. Of that five-fold division, Z/iree
divisions belong to the AVestern limb we are now
discussing. Against this Soissons, or western half of
the defensive line held by the Germans, you have
op(?ratiiig : —

(fi) Upon the loft, between Soissons and the Oise,
and up along the Oiae towards Noyon, the Ctli French

army, with all those reserves it has to strengthen it.
These bodies ai"e slowly but continuously pressing
forward with the object of getting round the German
right, in connection with that attempt to harass, and
perhaps to break, those German main communications,
the full plan of which I shall deal M'ith on a later
page.

(i) From Soissons, eastward and to the right, as
far as some such point as Pont d'Arcy, you have,
agains-t the centre of the hills, the British contingent
operating — resisting fierce counter-attacks launched by
the Germans, slowly proceeding against strong pressure
to force the heights in front of them, and, having
reached the summit of the jjlateau, to press the
Germans down the northern slope beyond it.

(r) To the right, or east, again, from the
neighbourhood of Pont d'Arcy to where the Plains of
Champagne begin, beyond Craonne, and on over the
flats to the neighbourhood of BeiTy-au-Bac, you have
the 5th French army engaged in a similar attempt
upon the rather higher hills in front of them.

So much for the first or western limb of the
defensive line, the operations against wliich I must
describe more thoroughly in a moment, premising
meanwhile that in this division of the whole position
into two " limbs " or halves, the region between
Craonne and Berry au Bac must be regai-ded as mixed,
and as, in a fashion, belonging to both. For while it
belongs to the eastern plains by its open character
(flat, without a bank), it belongs to the western
Soissons half in so far as it lies north of the Aisne.

(2) As to the second eastern limb of this long
position, wliich may also be called the " Rheims "
limb, it runs from the point of Berry au Bac to the
Argonne through very different country. It follows
the course of the River Suippe, and the backbone
of it is that swell which I described last week,
and which I have alluded to again this week, rising
northward and eastward from the water of the Suippe,
crowned generally with plantations, and stretching
tlirough the tumbled rough lumps of bare plough
land before Ville-sur-Tourbes until it reposes upon
the Argonne. All this eastern limb of the great
defensive position stretches through bare hedgeless
fields cut by orderly spinneys. It lies low along the
horizon. It differs Avholly from the wooded ravined
and somewhat bold heights of the western limb
between Craonne and the Oise.

This slight swell running beyond the Suippes is,
as I have said, the backbone of the second limb of the

8«

LAND AND WATER

September 2G, 1914

Geman dofenslve l.ere ; 1»ut that defensive has not
fouiKl itself compelled by the pressure m front of it to

remain so far back. «. • ii

The Gennans have found themselves sufliciently
strong immediately in front of Hheims to retrace their
steps and to advance weU across the Suippe and to
heights that now threaten the gi-eat town itself.

The positions occupied by the Germans after the first
week's efforts, successes, and failui-es is represented by
the dotted line which in its sinuosity with its recesses
and salients marks the progress of the Allies and the
correspondiBg points where the German counter-offen-
sive of the Germans has succeeded and the Allies
have fallen back.

NO YON

/ I

LCRAONNI,

66 MiUs

THE DOTTED LINE, INDIC.^TINO THE PRESENT APPROXIMATE POSITION OF THE QEKMAN ARMIE.<!, SHOWS HOW THE TURNINO MOVEMKNT
BOUND KOTON WILL COMPEL A OENKKAL GERMAN BETIBEMKNT FROM THE ILATEAU OF SOISSONS.

We shall not understand the whole of these
operations — which may prove decisive, so far at least
as the first part of the great campaign in France is
concerned — unless we grasp the fact that the Germans
in the course of the past week attempted, and were
partiaUy successful in, a strong counter-offensive in
this region, which they themselves describe as their
" centre."

I shall have occasion with this " Eheims "
limb of the defensive German line (as in the case of
the first, or Soissons, limb) to discuss the matter in
more detail lat«r ; but for the moment I would beg
the reader to note the two groups of heights which
stand well south of the Suippe and close in the
neighbourhood of Eheims. The one, called the
height of Brimont, is marked A upon the sketch at
the head of this ; the other, the heights of Nogent
and Pompelle, stand right down to the Yesle, and are
marked B and C.

The German counter-offensive in this region was
so successful during the days Thursday, the 1 7th, and
Friday, the 18th of September, that it advanced thus
near to Eheims, put up heavy artillery on these
heights, and at the end of the movement (by the
Saturday, the 19th) was in a position gravely to
imperil the monuments of the town, to bombard it, and
to make the position of the French within and to
south of it exceedingly difficult to hold.

This successful counter-offensive of the Germans
just round Eheims was not continued throughout the
Avhole length of this second limb. When one gets
further east on to the Upper Suippe Valley (it is
hardl}- a valley but rather a very shallow depression in
the naked plain of Champagne) the French offensive
was in these same days successful in its turn and
pushed back the Germans from the line Souain-
Le-Mesnil-le-Hurlus-Massiges, which they had taken
up, and threatening a certain railway which, when we
come to details, we shall see to be of great importance
to the whole German position. In this advance the
French captured a battalion.

We may sum up and say that by the end of the
third week in September, Sunday, the 20th, after this
undecided defensive action of the Gennans had been
maintained for a full week, the general result can be
tabulated in the diagram of elements printed below : —
llie first even line upon which the German
defensive relied at the beginning of these operations
is represented in this diagram by a double black line.

I have already made mention of one railway, that
behind Souain. Before proceeding to the details of
all this great defensive action between the Argonne
and the Oise, I will say a word upon the German
railway communications as a whole, for upon an
understanding of these depends the whole of our com-
prehension of the German chances of success and of
the German peril.

THE COMMUNICATIONS.

It is evidently of the first importance to notice
exactly what the communications are behind the
German defensive lines, and to know where they lie,
and to consider their length, if we are to judge the
situation correctly ; for upon a threat to those com-
munications will depend the success of the Allies and
the ousting of the Germans from their positions
between the Oise and the Argonne.

Of roads there are any number; good roads,
along which considerable rainy weather might impede
ti-affic, but all of which are open to the use of an
ai-my. So far as road traffic is concerned, the whole
district between the Oise and the Meusc may be
treated as one field, with ample opportunity, even for
so large a force as the German invading ai-my, to
supply itself or to retreat. All that we have to
remember about their numerous roads is the bridges
over the main rivers, and these, if the retreat be
ordei-ly, are fairly replaced by pontoons.

But with railway facilities it is otherwise. There
are only two lines which ultimately lead to the great
bases of the Germans — to the depots, the stores, and
the manufactories and arsenals in Germany, from
which the Army is fed and munitioned.

The first of these two lines, that upon which the
whole original plan depended, is the main European
trunk line which taps Cologne and its district, and
passes through Aix-la-Chapelle, Liege, Namur, and so
down the valley of the Oise to Paris. I have marked
it A, A, A.

The second line, which I have marked B, B, B,
connects with Gennany by a more southern route.
Save for these two lines. A, A, A and B, B, B, no
railway leads from the enemy's front in France to
his stores in Gemiany.

This second line is less strong than the Belgian,
but still is necessary. It runs in a peculiar fashion.
It taps the Treves-Coblenz region and after going
through Luxemburg (at which nominally iadependcut

September 26, 1914

LAND AND WATEB

€♦ COLOCNg

'VOVOj

6t;sicNX

^METZ

♦t»<#H>ll|IHIHl
o
t

TH« TWO MAIN OEEMAN LINES OF COHMTTNICATIOK,

town and behind it the Germans have done every-
thing in the vray of platforms, uccumvdation of
rolling stock, doubling of lines, &c., to facilitate
their advance), the continuation of railway supply
to the present German front — while Verdun still
stands — is compelled to follow a very devious route
which -we must carefully note to understand the
future of the campaign. Should Verdun fall, or
should the line of forts between Verdun and Toul be
pierced, a whole set of new, short and excellently
provided communications would be opened (as I
remarked last week) to the Germans. But meanwhile
this line of theirs through Luxemburg is their only
second line beyond that main one through Belgium.

Now this second line is over long and twisted.
It cannot go through Verdun, so it has to run
through Montmedy, down the Meuse as far as
Mczieres. There is no opportunity for turn-
ing back south to feed the army until Mczieres
is reached. There is a light railway crossing the
Forest of Mazarin and the Eiver Bar, and so uniting
the main railway from Eheims to the frontier with
the main railway upon the Meuse. But there can be
no continuous traffic along it, both on account of the
difference of gauge and on account of the very small
rolling stock of this light railway. Supply must
therefore come right up to Mczieres and then
l^ainfully down again to Eheims, past Bethel.

Upon these two main railway lines — the chief
one down the valley of the Oise, from Belgium
through Namur, Le Cateau, St. Quentin, Noyon ;
the secondary one fi'om Luxemburg to Mczieres and
then back from Mezifcres through Bethel to Eheims
— the existence of the German army (and in par-
ticular of its heavy artillery !) depends. A great
number of cross lines — especially tlie main line from
Tergnier Junction to Eheims and the very valuable
cross line from Busigny Junction to Ilkson — relieve
the pressure on the main lines. But for the supply
of German material to the armies and for the

converse evacuation of wounded and wastage home
only these two vtain lines exist.

The cutting of the line along the Oise, even so
low down as St. Quentin or Tergnier itself, would be
a disastrous thing for the German army if it had not
before that moment succeeded in piercing some part
of the French line. The other secondaiy main line
Luxemburg-Mezi^res-Eheims is not as yet ap-
proached anywhere by an Allied force, but being
tortuous and long, it is therefore, if or when it is
approached, more vulnerable. Now the whole peril
of the present position of the Germans lies in the
threat extended by a French advance from Amiens
upon St. Quentin, and by the French advance from
the south upon Noyon against the main Oise line.
And all the anxiety for the Crown Prince's anuy is
due to the fear for the Luxemburg-Mezieres line.
Eailway communications dominate the issue.

One point will at once occiu- to the reader, and
that is, how far a railway, cut at its main bridges
at least by the retreating Allies, can still be used by
the Germans who have followed the Allied retreat ?

Of the conditions of the railways now behind the
Gennan position we know nothing. But even if at
certain points the time has been too short to provide
temporary bridges sufficient to carry rolling stock, the
interruption at such points does not prevent the
general use of the system. Unless b}' some accident
(which has certainly not taken place in so rapid and
unexpected a retirement) the whole rolling stock of
one section isolated between two cut bridges were
lacking, and unless such a section were innocent of
locomotives, the whole system can be used by the
invaders ; and the only delay in the use of it is in the
ti'ans-shipment of munitions wherever a permanent
breach in the line still exists.

I will now take, section by section, the attack
upon the German defensive position, with its various
results, adverse and favourable, since the Aisne' waa
reached upon Sunday, September 13th.

LAND AND WATEK Scptemljer 2G, 1914

FIRST OR EXTREME WESTERN SECTION.

LASSICNY

) r- on, Souti, .. /\

'••• - ^^ •' • y"' Sase or jrcateau.

iMORSAjN

tse of Ptjotec
SiBNOUVRdN ,

CX)MPEICNE

=....••-* STCHRISTGPHE .; ' ,•••.
^VIC'—-— -"•-■•.- -'' •' ••

SOISSONS

The first section is that lying between Soissons
and the line of the Oise between Noyon and Compiogne
to the west.

This section is somewhat over twenty miles in
length. The crossing of the Aisnc and the following
up of the Oise in llank of the Gennans Avas here
entrusted, as we have seen, to the 6th French Army.

Sunday and Monday, September 13th-14th, were
the two days devoted to the crossing of the river
which, difficult though it was, could only be the
prelude to the real struggle beyond.

The GeiTnan defensive line does not consist in
the Eiver Aisne, but in the plateau beyond that
stream to the north. As will be seen from the
sketch, the general base of that plateau is exceedingly
irregular, for it is deeply ravined ; but a continuous
central ridge is its main defensive feature. The
po lilts at which the river was crossed in foi'ce by the
6tii Army were Vic and Pontnoy, where pontoons
were tlu'own across under a heavy fire from the gun
positions upon the advancing outlines of the plateau,
which fall in steep slopes down from the north to the
Aisne. By Tuesday morning the French troops had
taken these first buttresses of the plateau, that is,
they had pushed back the German line from the edges
of the slopes above the river. They marched, fighting,
through St. Christophe and occupied Nouvron and
Autrcches and the deejjish valley of Morsain. The
Gcnnans still maintained a number of guns, pushed
forward upon the high flats between Autrcches and
the centre ridge, and it was the intention of the
French command in this district to push forward
sufiiciently to cut off these guns. But the attempt
failed.

In the night between the Tuesday and the
Wednesday a determined counter-offensive imdertaken
by the Gennans from the district round about
lfam2:)col di-ove the French back nearly to the river,

and Autrcches in particular Avas abandoned. All that
Wednesday night the searchlights played upon the
trenches the French had dug nearer the stream and
the shelling of these trenches by the Germans was
continuous. Upon Thursday, however, September 1 7th,
the value of the considerable reserves which the
French (in spite of their heavy work and in sj)ite of
what they were doing further west upon the Oise)
still keep, was apparent. These forces were brought
across the river, the German covmter-offensive was
checked in the forenoon of that Thursday, and the
whole German line here was pushed right back to
Nampcel itself and beyond. In other words it was
jiushed i-ight on to the principal ridge of the plateau.
But further north it could not for the moment be
pushed. It stood firm. And from this, the crest of
the whole defensive position at its western end, the
heavy guns were still playing on Sunday the 20th
upon the Valley of the Aisne below.

In this partially successful operation some six
hundred prisoners and a number of machine guns were
taken.

But meanwhile other Fi-ench forces had been
slowly working up the valley of the Oise in the west
and so menacing the flank of the Gennan position. It
needs no elaboration of description to show that this
turning movement would, if it were successful, comj^el
the abandonment of at least all this part of the plateau
and ridge above the Aisne by the Germans : for they
would be menaced in rear. News of such a success
had not reached London by Wednesday night, but a
steady if slow advance was being made in this direction.

What has been said above with regard to the
German communications will sufficiently indicate the
purpose and value of such an advance. Unfortunately,
there is nothing to tell us exactly what its extent may
be up to and including Sunday September SOth. But
we may take it that those reaches of the Oise above

September 26, 1914

LAND AND WATER

Noyon, Avhere the com-se of tlie x-iver turns from north
and south to east and west had not been reached, for
if they had the German line would have been enveloped.
Its commanders would retii-e before that ! We are
also, of course, and righth% left in complete ignorance
of the strength with which this movement is being
attempted.

But, thi-ee or four days ago, the French had in
this movement abeady reached Lassigny and had
occupied the heights to the east of that village. The
news of that occupation means (1) that the Germans
still possess their main line of communications and
coukl still use the railway down the Oise valley as far
as Noyon ; (2) tliat the French had enough men to
.spare in this quarter for a contuiued advance within a
day's march of the river and of the railway line up
northward and round the right German wing.

Meanwhile, much further to the north and fonn-

ing no part of the general French defensive line, the
communications round St. Quentin were being held by
the Germans against a French force of unknowa
magnitude, which was advancing upon them from
Amiens. Peronne had alreadj' been abandoned, and the
shock between the advancing army (wliich might here
so seriously menace the very existence of the German
defensive line to the south) and the German troops
defending St. Quentin was upon the point of being
joined : but at the moment of -wTiting this, upon the
Wednesday evening of the week, no news of contact
being yet established in the neighbourhood of St.
Quentin has reached London.

It is not probable that in face of such pressure on
their western side and nearly behind them the Germans
can hold the plateau above the Aisne. We shall
almost certainly hear of a French advance here and of
a German retii-ement.

SECT. IL— THE CENTRAL SECTION OF THE WESTERN OR SOISSONS LEVEL.

•^""'^••. '-

sr^^. .•■•■■:■• — >'.

SOISSONS,

..• \ c>.;-..^ ...... rtt'' ...■•••:•-■ '■■■•^r. :■::::?■ rm.

CRAONNB

PONT
ARCY

To BERRY
AU BAC

12 3 4

1.1 I I

SCALE OF MILES.

i Ridge oF the Plateau 6' Main Defensive Line.
First German Gun Positions.

This section is entrusted to the British con-
tingent ami runs eastward along the Aisne for nearly
twenty miles from Soissons past the Pont d'Ai-cy.
The crossing of the Aisne seems to have been a matter
of gi-eater difficulty here than with the French lower
down, but was effected during the same Sunday and
Monday at Missy to Chivres, at Conde, and further
ea.st, unfortunately at very great expense. The
Guards were heavily engaged in and near the wood of
Soupir on the Monday, and it seems possible that the
last detachments were not got across until the
Tuesday, September 15th. Once, however, that river
was bridged and crossed an advance comparable to
that undertaken by the French to the west was con-
ducted by the British contingent. The British troops
took the .slopes opposed to them, and occupied in
particular Vassogne and Vendresse on the same day
(Thursday 17th) that the French to the west had
throttTi back the Gennan defensive on to the central
ridge. It is to be presumed that a corresponding lino
was held by the British westward from Vendresse
through the line of villages halfway up the slopes.
This section, where the British advance liad been made
on to the hills, suffered from coimter attacks by
night exactly as the Fi-ench .section had suffered
between the Tuesday and the Wednesday, but the
Briti.sh held their own firmly, and counter attacks
do not appear to have succeeded in making them
lose ground at any moment, or in pushing them back

towards the river. Here, as in the first or western
section, the main German defensive had been thrust
back on to the highest point of the ridge, but there
it was during Sunday last, September 20th, still
maintained. It even held the critical neck of Braye.
It can hai-dly continue in that position. The flanking
movement up the Oise, as it compels the GeiTnans
west of Soissons to retire, will compel a retirement
before the British contingent also. AVhile the British
contingent had avoided being forced back during the
violent counter-offensive assaults of the Germans
during these days they had also captured some 200
prisoners and, like the French to the west, a few
machine guns. But what was more important, a
certain number of pieces fi'om the heavy German
artillery which had hitherto overlooked the Valley of
the Aisne, were isolated by this advance and fell into
the hands of the British.

THIRD OR RIGHT WESTERN SECTION.

The third or right western section of the German
defensive position concerns a much smaller section of
country than the two others to the left of it, but a
very important one.

The plateau which forms the whole of the
western limb of the general German defensive line
here ends in the bold headland of Craonne. Thi.s
headland has not only exceedingly steep sides but
also stands so well up above the Plain to the east

7»

LAND AND WATEE

September 2G, 1914

tliat it is one of the most notable features m the land-
seape fmm the phxin of Eheims. and has been noticed
bv every tmvoUer who lias come into Elieims from
Laon The villa-e of Craonne, from which this head-
Lmd takes its name, stands up on the southern slope,
not quite at the top, which top is flat, and forms the
eastward culmination of the whole plateau. I here
was directed against this imjjoi-tant knot ot liili
country about Thm-sday and Friday last the whole
weight of the French 5th Anny, but what exact
measure of success it obtained is exceedingly ditticult
to discover. The fighting reached up to the plateau
itself, and a number of prisoners from the 11 th and
12tli German Anny Corps were taken ; but it is hardly
likely that Craonne village was peraianently held by
Sunday. If it had been, the fact would have been
mentioned in the French communique. It seems
more likely that here, as elsewhere, the effort of the
Allies swung up to the foot of the slopes and partially
occupied them, but had not yet carried the heights.
When, or if, a retu-ement from the plateau begins,
Craonne wiU go with the rest ; but the position is too
valuable to be abandoned so long as the last chance of
piercing through Kheims remains to the Germans.

SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONS
UPON THE WESTERN HALF OF
THE DEFENSIVE LINE.

By Sunday, September 20th, then, the general
position in the Western half of the German geneml
position — that is, the hilly part between Craonne and
the River Oise — was as follows :

The Germans everywhere stUl held the highest
point of the plateau from Craonne right away to the
heights behind Nampcel that overlook the Oise. Tlie
Fi-ench and EngHsh held the ramparts of this plateau,
that is the first projections which stand out like
peninsula) from the central ridge and are separated by
the brook-valleys which run down from that ridge to
the Aisne. The Gei-man position on the ridge was
held by heavy artillery against which the AUies were
bringing an increasing number of heavy guns, which
heavy artillery had in the first days of the week done
great execution agiiinst the Allies ; had not compelled
it anywhere to retire permanently, had gi-avely
damaged the open towni of Soissons, but was gradually
relaxing its fire as the heavy guns of the Allies came
up. Meanwhile, a Fi"ench body of unknown magni-
tude was working up beyond the Oise to the North,
round the right wing of the Gemians, but had not
yet occupied Noyon, nor turned that right wing,
though it was already beyond Lassigny and had
occupied the heights to the cast of that village.

THE SECOND EASTERN, OR

"RHEIMS," LIMB OF THE GERMAN

DEFENSIVE POSITION.

I have said that the backbone of all the eastern
limb of the Gemian defensive position from where that
position cros.sed the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac to the
Argonne was an even swell of land running to the
north and east of the river Suippe, and this was
apparently the position taken up and held in the first
days when the great Gennan retreat across Champagne
came to a standstill and was brought into line with
Von Kluck's retreat from Meaux to the Aisne. That
is, we must regard the main Gennan line as standing
from Beny-au-Bac and following the Suippe to
Souain, and thence eastward through Le Mesnil,
Massiges, and Ville-siu*-Tourbc to the Argonne.

This first line is most rationally divided at Bazancourt
because, although such a point cuts it in two very
unequal portions as to length, yet these two portions
balance each other in importance, and each has a
character of its own.

(1) The portion between Craonne — Berry-au-Bac
and liazancourt lies directly north of E, and, as it
were, threatens the great city of Eheims. Ehcims,
politically from its wealth and size, strategically from
its accumulated stores and the fact that it is a junction
of five railway lines and seven main roads, was
essential to any successful counter-offensive the
Germans might attempt to push home.

(2) The second section, on the other hand, from
Bazancourt to the Argonne runs through very deserted
country of no political importance, and contains but
one, though that an important, strategical feature.
This strategical feature is the side line of railway
which starts from the junction with the main Eheuns-
Eethel-Mezicres line at Bazancourt and is prolonged
to the other side of the Argonne. This railway was
obviously of the first value to the German Army when
it undertook the counter-offensive and began to move
south, for it runs parallel to the line this advance
would take, and can serve the whole of it with
ammunition and food. On the other hand, this
railway is not prolonged eastward across the Meuso,
and does not help du-ectly to feed the main German
armies from their depots in Lorraine, or through the
Belgian lines.

SECTION IV.— THE FIRST, OR LEFT,
PORTION OF THE EASTERN LIMB.

What happened here in the week since the
Germans took up tlieu' general defensive line on the
Sunday before last (September 18th) is a strong and
partially successful counter-offensive undertaken by
the Germans, with the object of recapturing the city
of Eheims, and, at the same time, of breaking the
French line. It is in connection with this partially
successful counter-offensive that there took place in
the latter part of the week, upon the Saturday and
the Sunday, the 19th and the 20th, the bombardment
of the town of Eheims, in which grievous damage
to the cathedral was inflicted by shell fire.

Of aU the five sections of the defensive position,
this fourth section in the centre is the most critical
to the Allies, as the first on the western wing is the
most critical to the Germans. We have seen how,
when, in the first section, the German right is tiu-ned,
the whole Gennan defensive position must be lost ;
but, as against this, the Germans have made a very
violent effort to break the French in this fom-th, or
central, section ; that is, in the field round Eheims.
They have here secured so considerable an advance
that they actually occupy at the moment of waiting a
dangerous salient, and not only have they secured this
advance, but they have established positions upon the
heights east and north of Eheims, whence they have
been able (especially from the east) to bombard
the citj-.

The original defensive position as I described it
last week is that swell of laud running from the Aisne
eastward parallel to and north of the Suippe Eiver, a
muddy little stream. But more than a week ago
the Gennans were able to get well to the south of
this, up to a second defensive position nearer Eheims
and lying upon the further side of the Suippe and on
the edge of the plain on the further side of which
Ehcims stands. They did more. They took the
heights of Brimont, an isolated hiU to the north of

September 26, 1914

LAND AND WATER

i^psie^

^t^R-

"^^0

!£'•

O 1 S 3 -f S

Aaziges aflOOOycuxis
I H 3 4^ S

1^ VILLAGE OF
'NOCENT L'ABESSE

Scale of l^cCes

/>■

mw^

'''V

VER2ENAY

VII

SKETCH 8BOWIXO TUB UIIOHTS BOUND BHKIUS AND THE POINTS OF MAIN GERMAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE.

tlie city at a range of about 9000 yards, while on the
east they penetrated so far that they were able to
establish themselves upon the more important group
of hills, also isolated in the plain, which take their
name from the village of Nogent I'Abbesse. Brimont
was retaken by the French in part, but lost again.
Kogent I'Abbesse hill was not retaken, but a lower
S])»ir to the south called Pompelle was seized by the
French at the week-end, and is apparently still held
by them, though it is a difficult place to hold against
anybo<ly that has the higher hill to the north. From
these two groups of heights, Brimont at very long
r.iuge, Nogent I'Abbesse hill at no more than
7000 yards, the city has been bombarded for many
days. But so far this bombardment has not had the
effect of weakening the French centre. Sooner or
later the French will have brought up heavy artillery
of their owti to that high position called " the mountain
of liheims," particularly to the gun position above
Verzenay, where, though at veiy long range, batteries
upon the hiU of Nogent can be reached. Whether
they hold the other gi-oup of hills to the west of
Elieiins above Pouillon we have not as yet been told.
But if or Avhen they do, those hills dominate the
heights of Brimont at a comparatively short range
and should make them imtenable to the enemy.

While this ai-tillery action from the heights of
Brimont and of Nogent TAbbesse is going on against
Eheims and the French troops in it and around it,
Avith the object of there breakuig the French centre, a
more violent assault, consisting in successive infantry
attacks, has l)een taking place throiighout that part of
the same field which lies between Craonuc and Berry-
au-Bac. The reason tliat a specially active counter-
offensive has been xmdertaken here by the Germans in

assistance of and parallel with the attack on Eheims
close by is that this point out of all the line is best
suited for an attempt at breaking the French containing
forces. (1) It is an open plain. (2) It is veiy near
the place where the AUies join — always a weak point
in a mixed line. (3) It is very near the exact
geographical centre of the whole defensive position —
which is, of course, the ideal point at which to break
any line, because the largest fraction remaining after
such a brea«h is a minimum. (4) Finally, the place
must be used for the counter-offensive, or it would
become itself the most dangerous field for a French
offensive. If the Germans here relied entirely upon
the defensive, they would be holding the only part of
the whole line whi9h has no ridge or crest from which
they can dominate the advance of an enemy. It is
the only serious gap in all the 80 miles.

But this attempt to break the French line by
German infantry assault between Craonne and Berry-
au-Bac has hitherto not been any more ^ccessf ul than
the coiTCsponding attempt to break it by shell lire
round the city of Eheims itself.

Moreover, the Germans are here heavily handi-
capped by the presence behind the field of Eheims of
the deeply ravined and wooded hills which run from
Pouillon all the way to the Aisne and on the south by
the mountain of Eheims. They are attacking men
who have strong positions on which to retire.

Vigoi'ous as the Gennan counter-offensive witli
Eheims for its centre has been, and partially
successful as it has been, it is threatened not only by
the gi-eat turning movement near Noyon, but also by a
German retirement and a French iidvance further to
the east in the 5th section of the line between Bazan-
court and the Argonnc, which menaces the other wing.

LAND AND WATER

September 26, 1914

SECTION v.— THE FIELD TO THE
EAST OF RHEIMS.

This fifth, or easternmost, section of the long
defensive line between the Oise and the Argonne is of
importance proportionate to the numbers whicli the
French can spai-e in their advance across it.

It foi-ms the left of that imited defensive position
which the enemy has taken up all across Champagne
and the Soissons country. It is a wing, and if by
any chance the French could here break through, they
would turn the position as thoroughly, and with more
complete results, than if it were tm-ned upon the west,
though the success of a tm-ning movement by the
west along the Oise is much the more likely
happening.

This eastern effort, if it were fully successful,
would cut off the main German amiy from the Crown
Prince's army upon the Meuse, and from the anny of
Lorraine beyond the Meuse.

But men cannot be everywhere at once, and, as
the great reserve was accumulated behind Paris, it is
almost certainly up the valley of the Oise that the
weight of the French turning movement is being
delivered, and should succeed. But even though the
French should fail to pierce the German line here,
they may succeed in pushing it back so much as to
alter very materially the future of the campaign.

In order to appreciate how this may be, I will
ask the reader to look at the few lines and names
marked upon the sketch above.

It will be seen that a lateral i-aih'oad mns
roughly east and west behind the German line in this
part of the field ; the German defensive position held a
week ago, Souain-Le Mesnil-Les Hurlus-Massiges-
Ville-sur-Tourbe, stretching along this line right to
the Argonne. The railway of which I speak, running
through St. Miu-tin, Sommepy, and Manre, feeds the
whole of this line. That railway, fm-ther, goes on
through a sort of pass in the Argonne, where a main
road also crosses and where there is a clearing of the
woods (known as the Gap of Grand Pre), and though
this railway does not stretch as far as the Meuse, it
does connect up at its railhead with the Crown
Prince's Army. That Gap of Grand Pre (famous in
the lievolutionaiy Wars as one of the passes through
which the Prussians forced the Argonne before their
defeat at Valmy) is exceedingly important to the
whole scheme of the Gemian armies, as the following
diagram of the elements involved v,i\\ show.

The Crown Prince was investing A''erdun in the
position A B. The French advance of a fortnight
ago compelled him to give up this investment and to go
down the Meuse to the position C D. Now it is at
that position, C D, that the railway of which we are
speaking here links up the main German Armies on
the great defensive position which runs acrosss the

Champagne country and along the Aisne to the Oise.
This railway, therefore, though not a main line of
communication and only joining the main line at
Bazancourt, is of great importance to the Cro\\Ti
Prince's present position. TJpon the holding of it
depends the command of the power to cross and to
retreat by the middle Meuse below the fortified zone
of Verdun. If the main German Army should fall
back behind that railway, and if the French defensive
in the direction of the arrows should be able to obtain
possession of the line or be able to cut it, the Crown
Prince would have to fall back further to the north in
the direction F ; he would lose much of the Meuse : the
remaining positions through which a retreat could be
accomplished would be correspondingly cramped ; and,
perhaps most important of all, the army in Lorraine,
which is stiU in touch with him at M.N.O., would be
separated by a big gap from him and from the rest.

Well, in this attempt to get hold of the railway
which leads from Bazancourt through the pass of
Grand Pre, the French have three main roads by which
to advance. Each of these I have marked upon the
sketch at the beginning of this section. You have
the road leading north through St. Martin, the road

BAZANCOURT '^'V > J'?;-.'

a/u.nnvwwni C/Sf 0» CHAHD PRE -:.y.;J

% «>minim«<«»««<«« »>in»«nmn t-.-.'v-;

\tasc Vling of jAainGteman \ gxfjj, ^ii
Army in Champagne "©"z^.

PLAN SHOWINS TH£ IMPOETAJJCK OF GAP OF QBAND PKB
TO THB GERMAN SClIliME,

leading north through Sommepy, and the road leading
north through Manre.

Of the French fortunes upon the first of these
roads we have heard nothing ; and it is to be jircsumed
that the advance along this has not been pushed very
far, for it lies within the range of those heights of
Nogent I'Abbesse to the west which we know the
Germans to be occupying, and from which they have
bombarded Eheims.

But the French progress along the other two roads
has been considerable. On Sunday they were in
Souain, and on Monday they took Le Mesnil and
Massiges. They were, therefore, by Tuesday morning
in possession of what had been, three days before, the
advanced German defensive, and within half a day's
march of the railway line, which is their ultimate
object. If they cross that railway line (with the
important results I have suggested) we shall know it
by the mention of their presence in Sommepy and
Manre, and possibly in St. Mai-tin as well.

THE ACTIONS TO THE EAST OF
ARGONNE.

As to what is going on to the east of Argonne
we know very little. The numbers here involved are
not very great, and the whole work here is subsidiary
to the great main conflict taking place to the west of
Argonne and between that forest and the Oise. But
information reached this country last Wednesday that
during the first days of the week there had beea

10«

September 2G, 1914

LAND AND WATEE

FLAM SROWIKO THB POSITION lAST OF THB ABGOXNU.

another attempt to pierce the fortified line between
Verdun and Toul, with all the consequences that
Avoiild attach to such a German success : the
Kudden provision of shorter communications, the
taking of the French advance through Champagne
in reverse, etc.

The attack on the fort of Troyon was made this
time not from the western side of the Meuse (as was
that of a fortnight ago when the Crown Prince was
still holding on) but from the east. The forts along
the Meuse here (of which the principal are the works
of Jenicourt, Troyon, and Camp des Eomaius with an
outlying fort at Liouville) stand upon the isolated
summits of a bare crest which overlooks the trench
through which the Meuse runs. To the east of this
crest lies a Avide belt of hilly and wooded country
falling at last rather shai-ply into the basin of the
^Moselle. From the plains of that basin and against
the line of these hills and woods a serious GeiTnan
attemi)t Avould seem to have been made against, or
rather towai-ds, that work of Troyon which is the
central and most impoi-tant work of the barrier series,
and the advantage to the enemy of taking which I
described last week.

The headquarters of the German Army during
this attack were at Thiaucourt. A difficult region of
wood and lake to the south protected it from the
attack of the French forces round Toul and Nancy
lurtlier south still ; and the Gemian assault was made
from all along the line running through Trosauvaux
and Vigneulles, to Hcudicourt ; that is, it proceeded
everywhere from the lAixin at tlie base of the hills up
the first wooded slopes. The French report that it
■was everywhere repelled.

SUMMARY OF THE WHOLE
DEFENSIVE POSITION.

If we now put together these five sections of the
line which the Gennans ai*e holding against the Allies
from the Oise to the Ai'gonne and examine the matter
as a whole, what we see is what we might haA'^e
exjjected from the routine imposed both by tradition
and by national necessity upon French and upon
German strategy.

You have here in the main lines and on a some-
what reduced scale a repetition of the position of three
weeks ago, just before the Battle of the Mai-ne.

Save that the Germans are technically upon the
defensive instead of just having ceased an offensive
movement, and save for the fact that the line as a
whole is straighter than was the line between Pai'is
and Vei-dun three weeks ago, the main features are
repetitions of the features we then noticed in the
struggle between the two forces.

For there is (a) a detennined attempt upon the
part of the Germans to break through the centre, in
the former case at Vitry, in this case at Elieims ;
(b) a resi.stance offei'ed at this centre by the French
coupled with an attempt to work round the two
German wings ; this attempt being weakest and
pressed with least men on the French right or eastern
extremity of the line, and strongest and pressed with
most men on the French left or western extremity of
the line ; (c) the use of a reserve by the French is
also apparent. It is not an unexpected or hidden
reserve like that which did so much to decide the
retirement of Von Kluck from Paris. We know that
the reserve is acting against the German right and

11»

LAND AND WATER

September 26, 1914

tlircatenintr the main German commnnications. But
tSa resen-e upon the si.e and direction of winch
a wise silence is presei-ved. All we know of this
fresh French Army at this moment is that it took
Peroune lust Saturday and is now advancing on

St. Quentin. , ., i -.i

Should the Germans break through, either
between Cnionne and Berry an Bac, or between Berry
an Bac and Bazancourt— that is, in the immediate
iiei<'hbourhood of Eheims— it is obvious that such a
coiSiter-offensive woidd mean a great and decisive
success for the enemy. But in our attempt to judge
the future we can but note that such a success has
not been approached. For ten days every effort has
been concentrated by the enemy upon the central
portion of tlie line to achieve that success. If the
centre of Eheims continues to be successfully held by
the French, there remain the two turning move-
ments : the operations upon the wings.

I have said when speaking of the sections m
detail that the advance along the west of the Argonne,
if it shaU pass and cross and hold the railway Imc
from Bazancourt to Grand Pre, will have important
results. It will compel the CroAvn Prince's Anny
upon the Meuse to go northwards ; it will narroAv the
gate through which a German retreat could be
effected ; it may even withdraw pressure from the
French troops in Lon-aine. But an advance on this
eastern side of the line would only be decisive if it
■were made in very great force and could count upon
ultimately holding the German lines of communication
here. Now these go directly north from Eheims to
Mezieres through Bethel, and are far from even a
successful advance of the French in the east. More-
over, of a decisive aocumulation of numbers upon the
east, or French right, there has been no sign. The
chief operation is upon the French left and along the
valley of the Oise. It is here that, of the three possi-
bilities which the general position suggests, the most
probable of all must be looked for. It should be hg the
turning movement here round Noyon that the Germans
should be compelled to abandon the Soissons plateau.

As we have seen, the main line of communication
by which the greater part of German stores and
artillery munitions comes is that which runs directly
from the Belgian frontier down the valley of the Oise.
After the fall of Maubeuge that line was open through-
out, save of course where such bridges as the British
contingent and the French 5th Army had destroyed
in their retreat from Mons have been replaced by
pontoon bridges and trestle bridges which cannot bear
the weight of a train. But, at any rate for the most
part, this line can be used and is being used by the
Germans. Conversely, if that line be cut pemianently
and held by the Allied troops, retreat is imjjosed upon
the Germans, and if that retreat were then delayed it
would be converted into disaster.

Supposing, therefore, that the French centre is not
pierced, everything would seem to turn upon the
success of the French troops which we know to be
operating in the Oise valley near Noyon and pushing
up northward there, and the appearance in sufficiently
large numbers of other troops before St. Quentin,
coming we may jjresume from the direction of Amiens.
There is a French Army there — marching, as I have
said, from Peronne since kst Saturday. Upon what
it does, and upon what the other forces further to the
south round Noyon can do, mainly depends the issue
of this general action : whether it shall be decisive of
the first phase of the war in the w-est or no.

It is just at this point, wheti one is summing up
the whole position, that there comes in an element

which, from the present onwards, will be of
increasing importance: I mean what the French
call the moral — the mental attitude w^hich is closely
bound up with the physical condition of an army.

AVhenever two forces approximately equal meet,
and whenever neither has succeeded in outmanoeuvring
or tricking the other, the spirit turns the scale. _ Tha.t
supreme clement is not of decisive importance in the
first days of a campaign, unless the campaign was
be"-un with the opposing forces in very different states
of mind— the one despondent, the other confident.

Here there was no such difference ajiparent
between French and Germans. Neither party out-
marched the other : neither party showed during the
first throe weeks of heavy fighting (from the Sunday
when the Germans were successful on the Sambre to
the Sunday Avlien they took up the defensive position
on the Aisne) any lack of confidence or any doubt of
success. The German Army of invasion, as a whole,
like its commanders, were still confident of ultimate
victory : so were the French and the British con-
tingent which stood with the French.

Now, it is an unwise thing, in the examination
of any human activity, but particularly in following a
campaign, to force a judgment of the future beyond
the limits of very cautious conjecture. But it does
seem as though, in this element of moral, time was at
last working against the invasion.

The counter-offensive has, indeed, been very
vigorously taken by the Germans over and over again.
Tliey have not slackened their heavy and accui-ate
artUleiy Avork ; they have lost no conspicuous number
of prisoners in these operations as a whole. But their
position is not one in which an army nourished upon
the tradition and led by the aims cf the Prussian
sendee can feel its former confidence. To begin with,
the initiative has passed to the Allied side. Next,
the threat of a decision is against the Germans. If
the position on the plateau above Soissons is tiu-ned
it must be abandoned. That it may be turned is now
an obvious and increasing peril. If, being turned,
the plateau is not abandoned with sufficient celerity,
it must be abandoned at a cost which may vary
from heavy losses of materiel to disaster.

It must further be remembered that the initial
efforts imposed upon the greater part of the German
forces, especially those towards the west of the line
(which is precisely the point where the Allied efforts
are now concentrated), were particularly designed for
an immediate success. The enormous expenditure of
energy demanded of these men presupposed the rapid
reaping of a reward. True, there was little sign
of exhaustion in the retreat after the Battle of
Meaux upon the Aisne. But a defensive which is
threatened upon its wings, and after many days has
failed in every attempt at a counter-offensive, is of its
nature a weakening thing. The spiritual factor
which is ultimately the decider of all warfare — where
the material factors are more or less equal — favours
the Allies.

THE EASTERN FIELD CJP WAR.

In the Eastern theatre of war there is no news
of moment this week, save the occupation by the
Eussian Army of Jaroslav.

We cannot predicate anything decisi\'e of the
position in Galicia, nor conjecture even upon the
broadest lines a date when a victorious Eussian army
might appear in Silesia, until we have more definite
news of what is really happening to the Austrian
forces with their German reinforcements now upon
the defensive along the San.

18*

September 26, 1914

LAND AND WATER

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

ON THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

THE week, or, rather, the week's news, has been
marked by a recrudescence of Gorman corsaii-s —
ships which undoubtedly have secret bases in
which they have probably been hiding.
Of these the most dangerous and mysterious
is the 24-knot Emden, which was at Kiao-Chau
just before the war broke out.

On Sept. 10th, nothing having been seen or heard of her
in the six weeks' interval, accompanied by the Marlcomannia,
of 3335 tons, used as a collier, she suddenly appeared in the
Bay of Bengal, where, between Sept. 10th and 14th, she cap-
tured six British merchant ships. Of these she sank five and
sent the remaining vessel into Calcutta with the crews. At
some later date she was reported from Rangoon having made

ever, seeking her bases is likely to approximate to the search
for a needle in a bundle of ha^'.

There are at least ten ways by which she can return to
the Pacific. There are at leaat two neutral property owners —
Dutch and American— on whom she can call for coal to take
her to the nearest German port, and both these have scattered
possessions. There are groups of islands in each case. There
are scores of sheltered places in which she can coal from colliei-s
or other vessels sent for the purpose. We can be perfectly
certain that in this matter of supplies everything has been
carefully prearranged.

Sooner or later we shall intercept and destroy the Enulen,
but till then she has serious possibilities, as, for example, the
stoppage of all outward trade from Calcutta.

The stories of the captured who were landed at Calcutta

I^aXxal or available

for coaling ^^

\ German HH

\ Hostile. I I

CAROLINE ISLANDS

8ISMARK
ARCHIPELAGO

NEW POMMERN

MAP TO ISDICATK THB BXTREMa DIFFICULTY OF CATCUIKQ TIIK " KJIDEN " IN THB EAST INDIAN AKClIIPELAaO. THE DOTS ONLY INDICATE

TUB rEINCITAL ISLANDS— TH«K» ARS MANY OTHEBg. THR ARROWS INDICATE ONLY HEB CHIEF POSSIBLE WAYS OF RETURN TO HEB SECRET

BASES. THE DIFFICULTIES OF INTERCEPTION ARE CORRKSPONDINQLY OBTIOUS, EVEN IF NEUTRALS BE lONORED.

furthei- captures. The loss incurred by her fii-st raid is esti-
mated at something like £300,000. On Tuesday last she again
made herself unpleasantly notorious, by dropping nine shells
into Madras, and doing damage to the value of £100,000.

The attack on Neu Pommern in tlie Bismarck Archipelago
began on Sept. 11th. It is probable that the Emden had been
using the Bismarck Archipelago as a base, and being kept
■au courant from the Neu Pommern wireless station, started
out on her marauding career just before our attack developed,
a. career which may easily run into a million pounds before she
is accounted for.

The total we can bring against her of vessels of equal
3peed or thereabouts is : —

East Inrlja Scina'lron

China Squadron ...
Ditto

Australian Fleet ...
Ditto
Ditto

Dartmouth

Newcastle
Yarmouth

Australia

Melbourne

Sydney

Of course, if we knew her exact baso, or oven her exact
wascs, interception would bo VC17 easy. Unfortunately, how-

foi-m instructive reading. They agree that the German shoot-
ing was not very good, and mention the marked courtesy with
which they were treated. This courtesy was also remarked on
by victims of the Kaiser Wilhelm dcr Grosse. It is in curious
contrast to the behaviour of the German army towards non-
combatants, and is suggestive in some of its details — as, for
example, the giving up of cabins — of special orders.

Another circumstance is that the German officers were
under the impression that Paris was invested and that several
British Dreadnoughts had been sunk in tho North Sea. From
this distinctly German intelligence it would seem that they are
in wireless touch with Germany — possibly they are directed
from headquarters at Berlin. In the old days a commerce
raider roamed the seas ignorant of happenings and perforco
acting blindly and independently. Now, by means of wireless,
co-operation on a genei-al plan is possible, and there are indica-
tions that some kind of plan is now in operation, which cer-
tainly was not the case at the beginning of the war.

More or less contemporaneously with the Emden's career
of destruction two other German corsairs have appeared. In
eacli case the date was the same — Sept. I'lth.

Of these tlio first is the 231-knot KonirgKhcrfl (query
Nurnherg or Leijiiiff), also from Kiao-Chau. Shortly before

18»

LAND AND WATER

September 26, 1914

•war ■was declared tho Eoningslerg docs not appear to have
been in commission anywhere.

This cruiser happened into Zanzibar, where she found our
old third class cruiser I'egMus, of the Cape Station, lying by
in the open roadstead sweeping boiler tubes. The German
iu-nied with a broadside of five 40 calibre 4.1's, opened fire on
the J'fyafiis, which could only reply with a bi'oadside of four
old 27-calibre 4-inch of shoi-t range and high trajectory.

The Gcnnau cruiser, according to our official accounts,
killed twenty-five of tho crew of the Pegasus and wounded
ilfty-two out of a total of 234. There are also ten missing.
If tho Gei-man cruiser had any sense at all, her con-esponding
loss was absolutely nothing. She had merely to steam to and
fro at long range and fire at a stationary target which could
not reach her with replies.

The I'egasiis is reported as having been beached- — she
jn-obably drifted ashore a blazing wreck. The German cruiser
was last seen steaming south.

So far as we are immediately concerned, this means that
simultaneously with the Emden's performances in the Bay of
Bengal we have to look for a. German cruiser on the Cape of
Good Hope station, where we have nothing regularly stationed
capable of catching a 23i-knot cruiser.

Out of which we may expect to hear of German activities
in that direction.

The third incident is that, also on Sept. 14th, the British
amicd liner Cannanla encountered the German armed liner
Cap Trafalgar (or her sister, the Berlin) off the East Coast of
South America. This battle between two enormous liners is
certainly the most curious conflict of modem times. Their
very bulk protected them against the small guns with which
they were each armed in this " battle of haystacks."

At the end of one and three-quarter hours' firing the
Berlin (or Cap Trafalgar) capsized and sank. Her return fire
killed nine men in the Carman ia, seriously wounded five, and
slightly wounded twenty-one. The survivors of the German
ship, whose losses are not known, were picked up by a collier
from which she had been coaling.

The British losses indicate that tho battle must have been
engaged furiously on both sides, but that our shooting was
much the better.

This is the second German armed liner to be disposed of.
Both were caught coaiing — apparently the only chanco of
bringing them into action. The mission of a commerce
destroyer is not to fight if she can possibly help it; even a
victoiy may impair her utility. The problem of adequate
repression of corsairs is tlaus considerably amplified.

From the public point of view the circumstance that the
British Navy has so far only eliminated two of the commerce
raidei-s may seem to suggest a certain inadequateness. Such a
view, however, is entirely incorrect. Tho Gemian raiders
appear to be kept supplied with coal from vessels which may
be lying anywhere. These come out us required and coal the
raider at sea or in any convenient bay. The exact problem
before our Navy is best to be expressed popularly by getting
•someone secretly to select a certain letter on this page and for
the reader then to endeavour to discover what particular word
that letter is in. Just a little something can be done along tJie
line of probable words to be selected, but veiy little. Blind
chance must of necessity be the predominant factor.

Elsewhere, yet again on Sept. 14th, an attempt was made
to blow up H.M.S. Dwarf in the Cameroon River. Tho
attempt failed. Two days later the Dwarf was rammed by a
German merchant ship, but she was only slightly damaged,
while the Gemian ship was driven ashore with some consider-
able loss. The incident has, of course, no bearing on the
general issues of the war, but it sci-vcs to illustrate the tenacity
with which the Germans are conducting operations, and also
that they are by no means unfruitful in ' dodges."

THE NORTH SEA.

From further details to hand it appears that our sub-
marine E9 (Lieut.-Com. Jlorton) succeedetl in toi-pedoing the
German cruiser Ilela within six miles of the German coast.
The Ilela, it may be stated at once, was no material
loss to the German Navy. She was a vca-y old tub armed
-with four 15| pounders. Reconstructed and rcboilercd in
1910, she was possibly capable of some 21 knots, although 18
knots is the most ever ofiicially recorded of her. Beside her
our old Speedy (mined by Germans) was a moro efficient fights
ing unit, albeit though of less than half the size.

Physically, then, the Ilela was no loss whatever to Ger-
many. Psychologically the submarining of a German Dread-
nought in the North Sea would have been of less value to u.?.

Up till now the Gemians have generally regarded our
blockade as something up by Scapa Flow and tho Orkneys in
the North Sea and behind the Straits of Dover in the South.

The submarining of the Ilela has now taught them that
our effective blockade commences inside their " front door,''
that IS to say, well inside the impregnable fortifications oi

Heligoland. According Eo calculations, Gorman ships insida
the Heligoland area might come and go as they listed. British
vubmarine E9 has now indicated to them that this is a mis-
taken calculation on their part, and it is difficult to overesti-
mate the impoi-tance of this. We do not know the exact,
location of the High Sea Fleet, but it is probably not at its base
at Wilhelmshaven. If it be at Cuxhaven, or in tJie Canal, it
is .vii-tually blockaded there and cut off from its base by our
submarines. Whether our submarines are thei'e or not their
presence will have to be assumed. It might be claimed by
some that the High Sea Fleet is " bottled in."

Personally, howevei-, I do not incline to this opinion.
When all is said and done, a submarine is not a vessel which
can stay under water for more than a limited time. For
that reason modei-n makes of submarines are now all ai-mcd
with guns, as a protection against any gunned enemy waiting
till they come to the surface.

We must not, thei-efore, expect miracles out of our .sub-
marines which form the inshore blockades Rather we may
expect that if and when the Germans come out at the
" selected moment " for " Der Tag," they will have to precede

HAMBURG

THE DOTTED LINE BKPRESENTS ASSUMED INTEKIOB GEEMAN

DEFENCE LINE. THK BLACK BABS EEPEESENT WHAT GEEMANT

HAS TO LOOK FOE ON ACCOUNT OP TUB ENTEEPKISB OF ir.M.

SUBMARINE e9.

the movement by a considei-able force of armed submarines and
destroyers.

With submarines the "machine force" is absent. All
depends on individual initiative.

I have no exact knowledge of tho German submarine
service, but I can pretend to some fair knowledge of the
German Navy generally. On the strength of that knowledge
I confess to blank surprise that the U15 managed to get wheio
she was when she was sunk by the Birmingham, or that any
subiaarine should have sunk the ratJtfinder where she did.

I am inclined to regard these boats as having been com-
manded by exceptionally able officers. There probably remain
one or two otliei-s equally able with whom sooner or later we
shall come into contact. But — so far as my knowledge can
take me — tlicre is nothing in the German Navy's ordinary
routine suitable for the peculiar morale required of an effective
submarine. To explain, a submai-ine to be -effective must
essentially be — for want of a better word — " democratic."
The old " master and man " idea is utterly unworkable in a
.submarine. The " ego " of the officers and that alone counts
for anything.

On Tuesday afternoon it was officially announced that the
A hovlcir had been submarined at a spot not stated, but presum-
ably off the Dutch coast, as survivors were landed at Yuminden
and Amsterdam. Her sister ships, the Hogue and Cressy stood
by her, and presently shared tho same fate. Thus already
have we heard of those " other Gei-man submarine officers "
of whom I had written above before this news came to hand.

As fighting units none of the three lost cruisers were of
any particular value. They were verging on the obsolete.
Originally designed for 21 knots, some fifteen years ago, they
were capable of little more than 17 knots at the time of their

September 26, 1914

LAND AND WATER

loss. Other particulars are: Displacement, 12,00 tons; arma-
ment, two 9-2, 40 cal., twelve 6 inch, and some lesser guns. They
had a 6-inch armour belt. Their chief value to us waa that
there was nothing in the German Navy exactly equivalent
to tliem. Of the German armoured cruisers — excluding battle
cruisers — only the modem Blucher could engage them with
any prospect of success. On that account they had a value
in exc«ss of their ordinaiy fighting value.

The real significanco of the incident is that Germany is
steadily pursuing her policy of seeking to destroy our
superiority by slow degrees with submarine and mine attack;
and it is idle to disguise that so far the policy has proved
successful. She has now inflicted on us far heavier losses than
we have on her. She has also demonstrated to her own satis-
faction that the North Sea is by no means a " British lake."

All the sam3, however, losses of this kind must bo
expected, as I mentioned some three weeks ago. In Germany
the incident will probably be hailed as a species of Trafalgar.
The inference will be drawn that the Cressies might have been
Dreadnoughts, and that the three lost might well have been
a dozen.

Actually, however, it is greatly to be questioned whether
the moral effect of the three Cressies being sunk counter-
balances the sinking of the useless little Hela inside Germany's
" front door." There is not the same psychological result.

The successful att%ck on the Cressies proves determina-
tion. It indicates that at least three German submarines
are to some extent capable of the peculiar effort necessary to
submarine success. But it does not prove them capable of
the arduous duties which our submarines are performing; the
torpedoing of warships comes under the head of light and
inspiriting duties. Also it is yet to be proved whether or
no the German submarines were acting on " information
received," a point which will have to be determined at an
early date.

THE BALTIC.

Last week's war and rumours of wars in the Baltic have
now resolved themselves into a fairly reasonable story of two
German divisions engaging each other by mistakes. I am
afraid we cannot put it down to " nerves," as it is an easily
made error, as manoeuvres have shown before now. It has

Busslan Aurora

Germam

DAY SILHOUETPE.

f^' ^ V*;^^

long been a canon of warfare to fire at any approaching torpedo
cratt unless they make the private signal.

Torpedo craft approaching a supposed enemy cannot,
however, do this without drawing attention to themselves and
so depriving themselves of the most valuable factor of sui-prise.
The ship attacked cannot
possibly aiford to risk delay by
."•ignalling — she must open fire
instantly. Once fire is opened
tliere is small prospect of the
error being discovered till
much mischief has been done
on eitlier side.

The Germans are pecu-
liarly liable to make this error,
because the silhouettes of
German and Russian ships aro
extremely alike in many cases.
A large number of Russian destroyers are Gei-man built
or of German design, and exactly like German destroyers,
while the three-funnelled cruisers on either side are none
too easily differentiated even in the daytime. Regarded
as silhouettes, the difference is clear enough on inspec-
tion, but the little details which wo do not show at
night cannot be recognised. The appended illustration will
elucidate my point. The Adalbert class at night may well bo
taken for the Russian Aurora class, the Boon or Karlsruhe
classes for the Russian Bof/ali/r class, and any four-funnelled
German for one of the four-funnelled Russians.

These Russians are exactly the ships which might have
heen expected to be met.

The story of what really happened, of how much mischief,
if any, was done, will, of coui-se, bo unobtainable till the war
is over. That tiio incident occurred seems, however, to bo

beyond all doubt, on account of the German official statement!
refen-ed to last week that " fifteen out of twenty-nine units of
the Baltic Fleet were engaged in action." Whether the fifteen
were fighting the other fourteen, or merely fighting among
themselves, wo cannot tell. But as there is a Russian official
report to the effect that nothing is known of the alleged battle,
wo may take it for certain that the German Baltic Fleet is at
present suffering from self-inflicted injuries which aro probably
more serious than has been allowed to transpire.

It is possible — though, perhaps, not very probable — that
this particular internal error will give the Russian Fleet somo
material advantage in the Baltic.

Following upon this news we have had unofficial details of
battles between Russian and German ships. On these I placo
no weight whatever. There have possibly been a few
skirmishes, but it is abundantly clear that the exact game
which the Germans are playing against us at the front door
is being played against them by the Russians at their back
doors. Neither operation lends itself to commemoration on
Dibdin lines — for all that Dibdin was inspired by very little
more occasionally. But we shall do well to appreciate the help
which the Russian Fleet is giving us. If the Germans issue
from their front door the Russians may be at their back door
vciy quickly.

They cannot capture heavily fortified bases like Kiel.
They cannot achieve various other impossible hypotheses. But
they can undoubtedly in such circumstances do much to trans-
form the Baltic from a German futo a " Russian lake."

Once the Russian Dreadnoughts are fit to take the seas the
Russian menace to Germany is going to be of a quite serious
nature. So serious, indeed, that it is quite on the cards that
our fleet will never obtain the satisfaction of a fleet action.
The old German battleships now ser\'ing in the Baltic are no
matcli for the Russian Dreadnoughts — German Dreadnoughts
will have to be detached to meet them or a blockade in the
Baltic accepted.

The situation, as I read it, is that (pending some bad mis-
take) Germany must hold such Baltic trade as she has at all
hazards. This is the more important in that the Dutch Govern-
ment has now given unequivocal signs of absolute neutrality. It
has cut off those supplies which up till now have rendered our
naval blockade in a minor note so far as food supplies are con-
cerned. Henceforward, Hol-
land has ceased to bo a German
supply port. It remains for us
now to convince Denmark and
Scandinavia that it is undesir-
able to play the part of tlie too
benevolent neutral.

It cannot be too strongly

emphasised that if contiguous

neutrals all remain strictly

neutral, the British Navy can

and will stai-ve Germany into

an early surrender quite apart

from the land battles in France, or whatever they may produce.

Holland has adopted the sensible course — ^strict neutrality

and a trust in the Triple Entente — a trust that will be suitably

protected. To Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, it now remains

to do the same.

PVinz Adalbert

a German PrinziAdallserti

NIGHT SILHOUETTE.

So far as the Danes are concerned, memories of Schleswig-
Holstein probably suffice already. In case of a victory for tho
Allies, Denmark can ask and obtain her price for honourable
neutrality. On the other hand, Sweden to a large extent, and
Norway to a lesser one, have in the past been somewhat afi'aid
of Russia, and inclined to regai'd Germany as a set-off.

A possible sweeping victory for the Russians cannot bo
regai-ded with any particular joy for Sweden, with memories
behind her of the loss of Finland. However, Scandinavian
traffic is overseas, and supplies fid Scandinavia are not likely
to reduce appreciably the economic pressure which the British
blockade in the North Sea is putting on Germany.

At a largely attended meeting of tlie Jockey Club, h«ld at Derby
Hou.'K', it was uiianiniously agreed by th^ members present that
it was desirable that lacing sliould be coutinucd, when practicable, at
Newmarket and elsewhere.

15*

LAND AND WATEE

September 26, 1914

THE WAR BY AIR.

By FRED T. JANE.

IT NOW seems abundantly established that at the front
British aviators have secured a considerable moral
ascendancy over the Germ.m ones. This circum-
stance is all the more interesting owing to the fact that
German machines, if not better than oum m all
respects, are fully equal to them, and generally faster.
The 100 h.p. Mercedes engine, with which most of them are
fitted, is probably the best aerial engine in the world. In any
case, our ascendancy has not been caused by the machine, but

by the man. . . , . ™,

Even here, however, a curious circumstance arises, llie
bulk of the best records have beea made in Germany, and,
putting aside national prejudices, one is constrained to admit
that the average Gcnuan aviator is the more skilful pilot of
the two. There are exceptions, of course— for example, so far
as J can ascertain, Gennany has no pilot equal to our Captain
Longcroft. But in mattd'S of this sort it is the average which
counts, and the better average in the matter of pure technique
is in favour of Gennany.

How comes it, then, that the ascendancy is ours? Well,
so far as I can gather, it is what is vulgarly known as " a

matter of guts " a, ■■,

Piecing together all that one can glean from official
iTports, general Press items and private conespondence, the
net result is as follows :

The German aviator's psychological attitude on going into
aerial action is —

" I'll kill you, once I get half a chance."
The British aviator, on the other hand, mentally replies :

" Blotg yovr chances. You may or may not kill me, but
I am going to kill you."

This particular mental attitude is one which the German
mind cannot attune itself.

The German aerial pilots are sportsmen right enough up
to a certain point. But they are not mentally constituted to
stand against the — to them — " unsportsmanlike " conduct of
British aviators. From the German point of view— as I read
it — reckless " exchange of pieces " is one of those things best
left alone. It is not done on land or water, therefore, it is
improper in the air.

Our fighting aviators — thank God — think otherwise.
Victor and vanquished to die together is too tough a proposi-
tion for most of the enemy. And so, when a German pilot
meets a British one in the air, he ia mostly concerned about
getting back to somewhere where recognised militai-y war game
rules obtain.

There are no " rules of the game " for the air. There is
not a pilot in the British air service prepared to conform to
land conventions. Our pilots just go out " to kill the enemy."
The result is that they generally do kill him, unless his superior
speed allows him to escape.

" Victory or death " has been laughed at often enough as a
music-hall phrase; but ita practical application has certainly
put the fear of God into German aviators.

A curious war incident is tliat while motoring somewhere
in France Commander Samson, R.N. (of the British Naval Air
Service), met some Uhlans, and scooped the lot without loss to
us. The German Press Bureau will probably presently explain
that the motor-car was armoured, and the chances uneven.
That is as it may be. But the fact remains that our five
flying men, against five Uhlans, secured an easy victory.

A rumour is current to the effect tliat German aircraft are
short of petrol. This is by no means improbable. England
just at present is the easiest market for those who supply petrol
from overseas, and our aerial demands on motor spirit must
liavo been very materially increa.sed of late. There is — or at
any rate recently was — danger in proceeding to Dutch or
Danish ports owing to the indiscriminate laying of mines by
the Germans in the North Sea. Consequently those who snil
the seas with petrol take no unnecessary risks in proceeding
to those neutral ports which are now Germany's supply
harbours.

It will certainly be poetic justice if by this mine laying the
Germans have made a petrol famine for themselves. It is
extraordinary that the German machine — so absolutely perfect
in many ways — should break down over side issues which
should easily havo been detected as dangers at the outset. To
be sure, a proverb to the effect that war cannot be made by
machinery dates from the Pcloponnesian War of ovei- 2,000
years ago. Here, as elsewhere, the German plans appear to

have been absolutely complete save for one thing — that the
human element was not taken into account.

We shall be well advised, however, not to build too much
on Germany's present aerial inactivity being entirely duo to a
shortage of petrol. Germany must, in any case, have enormous
resei'vee which she does not wish to touch till necessary. There
is probably a bad shortage of nonnal petrol supplies — but just
as probably, that is all.

Rather I am inclined to attribute the present marked
diminution in German aeroplane activity to stomachic troubles
produced by the " I'm going to kill you whatever happens "
tactics of our warlike aviatorSk

Zeppelin alarms still continue to reach us via Holland.
We have had circumstantial tales of a mine layer convoyed by
a Zeppelin. Zeppelins, which take at least nine months to build,
are being turned out at the rate of one»a week. The necessary
sheds for them (whiclj are at least as large as Rheims Cathe-
dral) are presumably being produced at the same rate ! Aero-
planes, we are told, are being turned out at the rate of seventy
a week ; for all that the utmost normal capacity of the entire
German aeroplane industry is between half to one-third of that
amount. And over 10,000 Germans have volunteered for the
air fleet.

No doubt intentions exist. But the best of intentions
cannot make even moderately efficient pilots inside six months.
Now, according to the official statement of the Federation
Aeronautiqne Internationale, the number of pilots qualified
and still alive up to the end of March, 1914 — ^since when no
learners are likely to have acquired enough knowledge to count
for vei-y much — is as follows :

German ... 699 Bkitish ... 694

Austrian ... 148 Fbbnch ... 1,272

Belgian ... 84

847 KussiA.v ... 215

2,265

These figures are very approximate, because in every case
the certificates obtained include a certain number of men who
merely secured their certificates and then gave up flying. Also
there are many military fliers who, for one reason and
another, have not troubled about aero clubs. But, putting one
thing with another, the trained aeroplane flyers of the Triple
Entente are, roughly, two to one against the German
combination.

Six months hence, if they train in the meanwhile, the odd
9,000 of the German volunteei-s will become dangerous, if
machines can be found for them, and if they are prepared to
face British methods in aerial warfai'e. Otherwise they are
unlikely to affect the situation.

A big proportion of these 10,000 aerial volunteers will
probably quickly arrive at the efficiency required to drop bombs
from dirigibles on defenceless towns. But I do not think that
any raw material — -especially German raw material — is going
to be of value for any fighting in the air.

Also there is the question of Zeppelin sheds. On account
of pressure of other matter I have not space this week to illus-
trate where the Germans, &c., sheds are in relation to this
country — and attacks on it. Next week this map will be given.
Meanwhile, it is well to remember that it takes something like
a year to build a Zeppelin shed, and that to pull it down and
re-erect it elsewhere can hardly be accomplished inside two or
three months. Also, that German tenure of French and
Belgian soil is still somewhat " uncertain."

"rm! reissue of the book On War, by Claus-ewitz, the founder,
practically, of modern German strategy, by Messrs. Kegan, Paul, and
Co., Ltd., at the present time, is paiticularly appropriate, and the
guinea set of three volumes gives .appropriate fonn to a work of intense
interest for its own sake, aa well as the interest attaching to the book
in view of the present European situation. Writing before 1840,
Clausewitz is regarded as the Darwin of modem strategy, his one
defect being a failure to comprehend tlie Napoleonic ideal of initiative.
His theoiy that the defensive is the etrongest form of strategy has
been abandoned perforce by the German strategists of modem times,
for the only hope of Gei-many in war lay in the offensive ; yet there
can be no doubt that Clausewitz was right in his coJidusions. Clauee-
witz worked always on the idea of the survival of the fittest, and
since his doctrine did not admit that the fittest for survival was always
the best in an ethical sense, ho stands as the founder of modern
German ruthlessness. His work, .however, is reasoned and sincere; it
ftands for all time as the great ninetcentK-oentury analysis of the life
history of nations, and, while not a book for tho light reader, is of
pcmianenit value to the student seriously incUned. As a military text-
book, Clausewitz's On War de too well known to need recommendation.

16*

October 3, 1914

LAND AND WATER

MONi

CMtSRAt

/f SO 3S

SccLle of M^iles

THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

KOTE.— THW UESSAQE HAS BEEN' 8CDM:tTED TO THE ritBSS DUEEAr, WHICH DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE PUBLICATION AS CENSORED

AND TAKES NO KESPONSIBIilTr FOK THE COEBBCTNESS OP THE STATEMENT.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIKKMENTS OF THE PEERS BUREAU, TUB POSITIONS OP TROOPS ON PLANS ILLUSTRATINO THIS

ASTICLE ItUST ONLY BE fiEOARDED AS APPROXIMATE, AND NO DEFINITE STRENGTH AT ANT POINT IS INDICATED.

THE WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR.

THE interest of the war tlii.s week in the
west tmns, as it has done for now a fort-
night past, npon the holding of the main
line from the Argonne to the Oisc, and
the turning of the opposed German lines
there round by our left and the German right. To
that situation we are accustomed, and its slow progress
varies only in certain details later to be discussed.

But there has also entered into this western field
since last week a new development which may prove
to be of great importance and whicli is at any rate of
great interest ; and that is the German advance across
the Upper Mouse between Verdun and Toul.

Our survey of the operations in the west for this
week, therefore, is concerned with a general scheme
corresponding to the diagram opposite, where the
main dark line B, C, and the shorter lines
A, B, C, D, represent the German forces from in front
of St. Mihiel at D, round to the north of Verdun at
C, thence right across Chainpagne to the neighbour-
hood of No3'on at B, and thence back to the north
again past St. Quentin at A.

Opposite to and in contact with this fonnution
everywhere you have the Allied line E, F, G, H.

For a fortnight past the Geratians on the defensive
along B, C, have resisted the pressure of the Allies
along P, G, and have in their turn failed in the
counter-offensive attempts to break the Allied line
F, G, opposite them. During the last ten days of
that fortnight a turning movement has been bringing
an increasing pressure against their right wing, and

the French force E, F, has, with varying fortunes of
advance and retreat, been, on the whole, pressing back
very slowly the opposing German forces A, B. If or

LAND AND WATER

October 3, 1914

wlipn tliat pressure passes a certain limit, if or when
A B is jn-essea back through a suftitieut angle by the
advance of E F, the whole (iernian main line B C
would be so ini]5erilled that it would at the worst ilud
itself involved in disaster, and at the best compelled
to retire ; for its main communications are only pro-
tecte<l by this right wing A B.

But meanwhile exactly the same thing is being
attempted the other way round at the further or
eastern end of the line, and here the enemy from
C D is aj)parently trying to press back the French at
Cr H, and get behind their line and compel them
to retirement as an alternative to disaster.

There is no need to consider in detail this week
the oix'rations repoi-ted upon the main front between
the Oise and the Argonne. I'he notes of last week
give in sufficient detail the various sections of this
line : the ridge between Craonne and Noyon ; the
great rolling plain country north of Eheims and
stretching on to Argonne. And in those notes it
Mas sufficiently shown tliat neither had the German
defen.sive yet been considerably pushed back, nor the
Allied offensive appreciably ad\'anced.

village of Nogent I'Abbesse. The Prussian Guard here
attacked with peculiar violence, but their counter-
offensive was repelled by the French. There is no
indication that the hills of Xogent I'Abbesse were at
any moment occupied by French troops, but it is
evident that there Avas a desperate attempt made to
break the French line at this central point, and that
it failed.

Further to the east, again, that line of railway of
which I spoke last week between IJazancourt and the
Pass of Grand Pre over the Argonne, and the approach
to which by the French marked so important an
advance ten days ago, was saved last Friday by a
Gennan counter-advance before which, according to
the official French com w unique, the French troops gave
ground at first. They later recovered the belt that
had been lost, but no more. Following the French
official communique of AVeducsday, September 30th,
very slight changes on this main front may be
expresssd in the following sketch, where the dark
line shows the Allies' front on Tuesday last, and the
dotted line its position a week earlier. They are
almost identical.

SKJ;TCH SUOniSQ the VKUY SLWIIT CHAXOES EFrSCTED ON THK MAIN FUONT DURING THE PAST WEEK.

The

liere is this week nothing to tell but the
continuation of that tale— save that there has been
some appreciable advance upon the western end of the
long line in the hills above the Aisne. For instance,
a very heavy battery of German guns just above
Coude was sdenced by French and English fire on
Saturday last; and at the moment of m-iting a
telegram from Paris affirms that the quarries of
Autrechcs, the galleries of which have sensed for one
of the strongest positions against Soissons, are in i\\(t
hands of the French. But Craonne was still held,
wlien that mes.sage eame through, by the Geimans ;
and the advance, such as it was, upon these hills of
the Aisne, was not as yet definitive in any way The
plateau was not yet carried.

In the second part of the line, the foiiy miles
that run belnnd Phenns and in front of the Piver
buippe towards the Argonne, veiy desperate counter-
attacks were reported, of which the official French
commumqu, of last Sunday states that they had
tTo?oKS •'"'!,'^ '^""^' ^T""'^'''^ ^^-^th the deteinnina-
o thf ; oi"'^''n' ^"'"* 1^^'ttle before the beginning
1-ustln t .no" f T T^ y^^^^^ violent fighting
jnst to the east of the lump of hills connected wHh the

We may take it, then, that at the moment
of writing, and so far as the official statements
cany us, the deadlock between the region of Noyon
and the Argonne continues. Each line is held by
the other.

With the turning movement upon the west, slow
as it has been in its progress, there has been progress,
but of a chequered kind. It has been interrupted by
a counter-offensive, only checked during the last
three days.

Ten days ago in the official news upon which the
last notes were based the French were at Lassigny — -
or rather had reached the heights to the east of that
town towards Noyon. Three days later — that is, a
week ago — they were here met by superior forces,
before which they gave ground. But this retirement
Avas compensated for by work further north. Here
the French, having taken Peronne much at the same
tune as they entered Lassigny, held it against a very
fierce counter-offensive, abandoned it again, and in
the first days of this week retook it. In this renewed
advance the official report tells of guns and prisoners
captured ui)on the failure of a \-enewed German
counter-offensive ; but from the same source we leam

October 3, 1914

liAND AND AVATER

tCAMBRAI

'^^

jAfiZes

SOISSONS

German line protecting the Oise Communications
rrcnclt line attacking same about Tuesday last

POSITIONS ON THa WttST, ILICSTBATINO THB CAFTUBl 0»
rSBONNB AKD ATTACK ON I^SSION'T.

from it that line whicli feeds Laon and then goes
south itself. It is this line hy which munitions are
brought along the German front after they have come
by the main German railway line of communication
down the Oise.

Unfortunately Tergnier lies in a bay or recess
of the general line which the Germans are holding at
this 25oint to defend their communications ; and it
will probably be reached later than other more salient
points iipon that line, such as Noyon itself, or St.
Quentin. The holding of the main line and of the
Oise north of Tergnier would be of great effect — even
of decisive effect — for it woidd compel a general
German retirement back north from the defensive
position now held to the south along tlie Aisne. But
the capture of Tergnier, where all the roads, rail-
ways, and waterways cross and branch, would be even
more than decisive : it would be vital.

(Pa.ssage deleted by Censor.)

that the extreme point of German occupation on
Tuesday last came as far as Chaulucs.

(Passage deleted by Censor.)

The nature and value of this turning movement
round by the German right, upon which all eyes are
now fixed, is best apparent when we remember that
the line of the Oise and the railway following it is
the main artery of supply by which the whole main
German defensive position along the Aisne and across
Champagne lives.

In the notes of more than one student of this
campaign it has been remarked that, even if the
enemy abandons St. Quentin and Noyon and crosses
the Oise, he will find upon the further eastern or left
bank another series of positions of wooded hills which
lie should be able to maintain at great length. But
those who put forward this hypothesis, though it
proves them to have followed tlie map, forget that the
whole strength of the German defensive position
dej^cnds upon its heavy ai-tillery. The munition of
that heavy artillery, and, for that matter, the retirement
of it, makes the chief line of railway up to Belgium a
necessity, and therefore, if the enemy loses the line
of the Oise, down which that railway nins, he avUI
have lost everything. On that very account, the
lighting for the line of the Oise has been the fierce
and hardly contested thing we have been reading of
for more than ten days past. The Germans know
that upon holding it the life of their army depends ;
the French know that upon their reaching it victory
for them depends.

If the reader will look at the above map he will
niito the junction of Tergnier. It is a point of very
high strategic importance, and that for several reasons.
In the first place, it is the junction not only between
two main lines, but also between two systems, each
with it.s separate organisation — the i-ailway company
called the Nord and the railway company called the
Est. Next, becau.se it has work.shops and repairing
sheds, and is in every way (so far as the French
retreat left it intact) a depot for railway material.
Lastly, because there runs southward and eastward

Tliere is another featm-e in the main German
communications at this point which has been a good
deal neglected in the Press of both countries, and is
well woi-th examining. This is the canal running
along the valley of the Oise and connecting it with
quite the upper reaches of the Somme near St. Quentin,
and further prolonged so as to connnect the Oise with
the Aisne. The branch from the Oise to the Aisne is
undoubtedly supplying the German line on the
plateau of Soissons. We know by the experience
of the battle of Meaux that the barges upon the canals
have been very largely used by the enemy for the
transport of ammunition. Further, a canal in a flat
country Avill probably have been subjected to less
damage during the retreat when the Allied armies
Averc falling back from Mons over this country than
a railway. To carry the line of the Oise would be
not only to cany the main line communication with
Belgimn and with the bases in Germany : it would
also be to carry the canal communication, and to cut
two arteries at once.

THE NEW GERMAN OFFENSIVE
ON THE MEUSE.

So much then for the turning movement round
by the West of the main German defensive position
and of its progress to the present date.

But as I have already said, there is a new
element before us in the success the Gennans have
had during this week at the other end of the whole of
this theatre of war, when they silenced certain forts
in the centre of the chain between Toul and Verdun,
and here began crossing the Meuse.

Before I deal with that eastern movement in any
detail, however, it will be well to point out how it
stands relatively to the western turning movement by
which the French are threatening the Germans along
the Oise.

The Gennan advance across the Meuse (as shown
in diagram on the following page) after breaking the
Toul-Verdun line would obviously involve, if it were
pressed far enough and with siiJBicient strength, a
rapid and general retirement of the French and
English line between the Oise and tlio Meuse : for
it would come in behmd the right wing of that line.
But it would not be of such vital ill- con sequence to
the Allies, however successful it should prove to be.

LAND AND WATEE

OctoLcr 3, 1914

,VERDUW

German Lin*
Allied Vxn*

Mew German
Offensive

ri.AX saowixa nkw okrman ofkknsive i.\" thk east, against

THK LIXB VEKUUX-TODL.

as would tlic success of the turning' movement round
by the Oise be vital in its ill-consequence to the
tJermans. In the regrettable necessity of retiring
the wliole eastern or right end of the main
Allied line before the serious threat of a German
advance across the U]>pcr Meuse, the French
and their Allies would lose much countrj^ which
the enemy would ravage; they would suffer a
dispiriting check after the general sxiccess of the
last three weeks ; they would be retreating where
they had hoped confidently to advance. The tide
Avhich had seemed to set in with a strong flood would
have appeared to ebb again. But nothing essential
would have gone. No line of communication serving
the Allies would have been cut, and though new and
much better lines of communication for the Germans
would have been opened, a success of this kind could
not }K>ssibly be decisive. The corresponding success
of the Allies upon the west wing, upon the other
hand, would be necessarily decisive. Supposing the
nivUkely and bizan-e coincidence of a successful
German advance in force across the Upper Meuse,
coming at the same time with a successful French
advance reaching to the Upper Oise, ihe farmer would
have no decisive effect upon the direction of the
campaign. The latter woidd compel an immediate
and rapid evacuation by the German Army of all
positions in France.

Important, therefore, as this German demonstra-
tion upon the Upper Meuse to the east is, if it is
Ijeing made in force, we must not lose sight of the
fact that it is secondary only in importance compared
with the primary and capital business of that fighting
in front of Noyon and St. Quentin, where the German
Army is defending its verj existence, and the Allies
attempting no less than the decision of the campaign.
With this warning we can turn to examination in
greater detail of the new German movement which
tlireatens the extreme French right.

During the last few days, then, the enemy has
advanced from the east against the Toul- Verdun line,
the ban-ier of forts on the Upper Meuse, and has
pierced it.

The district as a whole can be best appreciated by
some such sketch map as that on the following page.

The River Meuse nms in a trench a little north
of north-east; on either side of this trench rise
wooded heights, funning upon the east a plateau,
knoATO as the Heights of the Meuse. This plateau
falls sharply on its eastern side on to the plain called
"the Woeuvre Country." In the midst of this
stands Thiaucourt, the headquar-tcrs of the late
German advance to the river. The heights of the
Meuse have opposite them, beyond tlie river, a
distnct ncariy comsponding and about the same
iieight with themsehes, also falling steeply down
some 300 feet upon the tiench through which the

]\Icuse runs. This stretch of the river is protected
as follows :

It has been made into a barrier first by the great
forti-osses of Verdun and Toul to the north and to
the south, and next by a chain of works dominating
the river vallev, the larger of which are called in order
from north to south : Genicourt, Troyon, Parodies,
Camp des Eomains, Liouville, and Girouville. Two
towns of some size stand upon the river between
Verdun and Toul ; these are St. Mihiel and Com-
mercy, of which St. Mihiel is the most central, lying
almost exactly half-way between Verdun and Toul.

The German advance first got a footing on the
plateau at the salient height of Hatton-Chatel, and
then advanced to St. Mihiel, Avhere the river was
crossed after the guns within the w'ork at Les
Parodies and the work at Camp des Eomains had
been silenced.

"With St. Mihiel and its bridge thus in possession
of the enemy, the French line ran as the dotted line
does u2-)on the map. Its formation has been officially
communicated through the French Government to the
Press, and may therefore be printed here.

(Passage deleted by Censor.)

It will be seen from the above and from
the map on the foUoAving page that the total
effect of the new German offensi\'e in this region
so far has been to occiipy a projection or salient,
the base of which is the dotted line marking
the old French front of more than a week ago, the
outer boundary of which passes tlu'ough Apremont
round to the west of the Avork of Parodies, and then
to a jioint betAveen Sj)ada village and the Fort of
Troyon. This salient giA-es the Germans their cross-
ing over the Meuse. It is liere that they have driven
a breach through the barrier Toul- Verdun.

In order to seize the nature and importance of
the ncAvly undertaken German operations upon the
Ujiper !Meuse Ave have to consider four points.

(«) First and most important, the object Avith
A\hicli this new offensiA-e has been under-
taken on the part of the enemy.
(/j) The numbers iiiA'olA'ed.
(c) The distances iuA^olved and the disposition
of the advancing troops, French and
Gei-man, so far as those dispositions are
made knoAvn by the official dispatches Avliidi
may be examined and exiilained Avithout
indiscretion.
(d) The actual results achieved by the
Germans during the past Aveek in this
effort of theirs to cross the Meuse as giA^en
us b}^ these same dispatches.
It Avill be seen that of these four points the last
two are concerned Avith established facts and can be
dealt Avith accurately AA'hile the first two are matters
our conjectures on Avhich Avill depend upon our judg-
ment as well as upon official record, and that judgment
cannot be final.

Yet it is in the first tw^o points — and particularly
in the first— that the whole interest of the matter lies.
For our one concern in this very grave subject is
the purpose the German commanders had in mind and
their power Avhen they at last attacked the Toul-
\''erdun line to achicA-e that purpose.

NoAV, whatcA-er their purpose be their power to
to achieA-e it Avill depend upon numbers ; as, indeed,
other things being equal, does everything in Avar.

4,»

October 3, 1914

LAND AND WATEE

,d of crown Pnncasfforce

)«

.TRES'*^^

%
Ct

I '^*^^\ >H0f /% \h^tton>>hattonville

^ *^ -T^C^^^A ^ . CtVICNEULLES O

I /tfj-'sPADA V •. V n

?j ^K •VILLAGE % •. 4.up.m.....o, .1

->E

SP%.

>n'' •village ^ •. ," -I

/ %- ^ ...^HEUDICOURT Vi

*THIAUCOURT
German H.Q.

PONT A MOUSSON.*

i^' WORK

'S) COMMENT

■i J^ e!'. WORK OF *

"(f"'^ ■«. C^. WORK OF

\ %® \ WORK OF ^
\ *<^x^ \XGIROUVILLE

. Scale of Milss

FortiFied Zones
within Limits of
Protection of ^-^-^^

Larger Permanent Works X'
Fores and Redoubts

The French Line

aSXKtAA MAP SHOWINO THI WKSK's OPXBATIONS ON THI TOtJL-TKBOW Lnta WITH TBI CBOSSIMO AT 8T, UIHIBL,

But we neither know their purpose nor the numbers
at their command for the achievement of that purpose,
nor the forces opposed to them to baulk them of tliat
purjwse. We can only in these matters depend upon
conjecture and deduction from facts communicated by
the French and Enghsh commanders for official
publication.

AVe can, however, say with certitude that, while
we do not know the purpose of the enemy in thus
advaiicing to, and wedging a crossing over, the Upper

Meuse, that purpose must be to achieve one of two
objects. We can even say (as is so often the case in
the history of war) that in their prosecution of the
one object they may be led on to attempt the second,
or that in their failure to attemjit the one may be
involved in a still more important failure concerning
the other.

Tliese two objects are (1) a feint, which is a dis-
traction of the Allies not seriously intended to be
pressed home, but valuable because it rnay make them

LAND AND WATER

OctoLcr 3, 1014

witluhiiw forces tLcy really need elsewhere, (2) a
serious effort to turu the Allied right and establish
those new short and convenient lines of comnuiniea-
tion direct to (.Jern\any through !Motz and Strasburg
which would gi'catly increase the strength of the
Oernian Anny.

In other words, ci titer the Germans are licre
attenij)ting no more than to turn off the attention of the
Allies from the Oise, to malvc them nervous about their
extreme eastern Hank, and to make them withdraw
men from the west (where the chief jjeril to tlic
(Jennan Army now lies) ; or, they are intending -
with larger masses than we had supposed to be present
— a very serious operation : ])ushing in between Toul
and Verdun, taking or maskivig these fortresses, and
so threatening tlie rear of the French line between
Rheims and Argonne that it will be compelled to fall
back. With it will then fall back, as rapidly, and perhaps
with disaster, the troops on the Upper Moselle — that is,
in the region of Nancy and facing the Vosges.

It is further evident, as I have said, that the
success of the lesser object might very well lead to
the prosecution of the niore serious one.

Though the thing was begun as a feint in order
to distract the Allies and to make them withdraw
men from the west, yet if it went through successfully
it might assume such importance that it woidd be
worth the Gennan while to bring men round to this
eastern point upon the Meuse, to push forward
threatening the rear of the Allies, and to make the
whole of the French line now in Champagne between
Eheims and the Argonne fall right back, dragging
with it all the troops now in the Moselle valley south
of and beyond Toul.

The elements of the business should be clear
from the following diagram :

Here you have the Allied line A— B, with the
German line in contact with it E— F. These stretch
from east to west right across from the Eiver Oise to
the forest of Argonne. To the right or east of these
two Imesyou have a German force G— H of unknown
size prqKjsmg to get through the parallel opposed
by ^ eixlun— V and Toul— T and the forts XXX
between them. It is evident that if this German
lorce (:r— H could get to M before the Allied line had
turned back to save itself, that German force G— H
woidd have turned the Allied line and would have
brought its right wing to disaster. If, therefore
Cr— H is m suilicient force to go fonvard and if he
has not 111 front of him at K— L French forces
sutticicnt to stop him, he can at the most destroy the
right wmg of the Allies, and, at the least, compel it to
laU back from A— B where it now lies to .say A— O

>r -J?"i '^ *l'^ ,-^"^'"^ ^"'^ ^'^""^^^ f'^" back on to
M-N It would leave the remaining French armies,
A— V, wJiicli arc Avatching the region of Toul— T,

and Nancy — N, and the Upper Moselle Valley — Z,
separated from their fellows and doomed. Therefore,
to avoid disaster these armies also, V — Q, would have
to fall back to some such position as S — T, and tho
general result would be, after a German success of this
kind, not only that the whole mass of the French Army,
east of Eheims at least, would have been thrust right
away from the frontier and have suffered all the
consequences of a ra])id retreat, but also that the
Germans would, after their success, be able to use the
new great lines of communication, X X — Y Y, which
had hitherto been blocked to them from the fact that
their two chief railAvays, from Metz the one, from
Strasburg the other, run through Verdun — V and
Toul — T respectively.

^Ve may sum up this first point, then, our
conjecture as to the object of the German move, by
saying that it is either a movement in force designed
to threaten the right rear of the general French line,
to isolate and force back the French armies on the
Upper ]\Ioselle and to establish new and much better
lines of communication from the German bases to
the German armies in the field; or it is a feint,
undertaken as yet with no sufficient force, intended
only to distract the French commanders so that
they shall withdraw troops from the west where
the existing German communications are in peril.
But we may add that if the insufficient force.'*
used merely for a feint have rapid and unexpected
success, it may bo worth the German while to
reinforce them and turn tho feint into a serious
effort.

Such being the only jwssible alternatives, the
only po.ssible two objects the Germans have in making
their new- move, let us next consider what forces they
can use to achieve either the one object or the other.
If their purjiose be only a feint, a comparatively
small force would be sufficient. One-tenth of tlieip
total effectives in line between Alsace and Picardy
would do the business— say six divisions or a little
more. With these they could maintain the defensive
which they have so carefully prepared in the difficult
Vosges country ; and they could fend off dm-ing the
days in which the feint was in progress, even if no
longer, attacks from the garrisons of Verdun and of
Toul down from the north and up from the south
of their forward western movement.

The reduction of the forts ujion the jMeuse
—the opening of a breach through the barrier does,
not affect this discussion — it would have had
to be done anyhow, whether for a feint or for a.
serious effort.

It was not a question of numbers, but of the
power of the big howitzers against modern fortifi-
cation ; and the piercing of the line by the silencing^
of the forts, though a necessary preliminary to the
success of such a feint, is not in itself equivalent to
the success even of that feint, let alone of a serious
blow. It may be compared to the forcing of a door in.
a wall when you have some unknown number of
opponents on the other side of the door after it is
forced, and two bodies of o]iponeiits to the right and
to the left of the door to threaten your men as they
go through. You have opened the door as a ruse io
distract or really intending to go through— but you
nave done no more.

If, therefore, the Germans have not collected
Here any considerable mass of men (" considerable "
as the_ word may be used in the i>resent gi<nintie
campaign— for forces that would have been o-reat
armies in the past are to-day but fractions of the
millions engaged), if, I say the Germans have not

October 3, 1914

LAND AND WATER

accumulated a considerable mass of men at tliis point
(at least eight, better ten divisions), a feint their
effort was intended to be and a feint it will remain ;
and the French commanders, if they can be certain
that the numbers here are not very large, will not
reinforce them from the centre or the west, the
resistiince to be opposed to the German on the Meuse ;
they will not weaken their line elsewhere ; they will
continue to stake everything upon the big turning
movement against the Upper Oise. Under tliat
liypothesis the new German offensive on the Meuse,
however alanning, will not be decisive.

But if, in the other alternative, the Germans
have really accumulated large masses here, even if they
liave enough reserves to make their feint first a
dangerous feint and from that an advance in force, then
the new move may be of the utmost importance to the
future of the war. The door has been opened. With
sufficient troops to mask Verdun and Toul upon either
side of that now open door, a large force could appear
in a very short time so near to the rear of the right
wing of the main French line as to compel it to fall
back, or, if it did not fall back rapidly enough, to
involve it in disaster.

And in order to see how this is we must turn to
the third point, the distances involved and the
dispositions of the troops so far as they are known.

Nearly half of that is the width of the forest district
of Argonne and the hilly country to the east of the
Argonne again, and half-way to the Meuse is still
heavily wooded. The road and the railway line from
Verdun to Ste. Menehould through the j^ass of Les
Islettes (where a Norfolk squire helped to v/in the
battle of \'almy) are held by the French, to the north
of whom, running from Varennes to the big bend of the
Meuse near Forges, lies the Crown Prince's army. It will
be seen from the map that the left of this Army where it
touches the Meuse is just out of range, and no more,
to the noi-th of the northennost forts of Verdun.

Now the line through which the new German
offensive, whether a feint or more seriously intended,
had to pass — ^the fortified line Verdun-Toul — is, in
its greatest length from its northernmost extremity on
these same northern forts of Verdun to its southern-
most extremity in the southernmost forts of Toul,
well over 45 miles in extent. While the space
between the two nearest points in the circle of forts
round Toul and the cii-cle of forts round Verdun is
well over 30 miles and neai-er 35. Finally, a third
measurement of the elements of this problem, the
distance from the central point in this Verdun-Toul
line, St. Mihiel, and a point right behind the right
wing of the main French line such as Eevigny, is more
than 25 but less than 30 miles.

^«^^^^^

Pass of

^axuiPre

•VI !^^ Vi

C7»

STf MENEHOUL

""4

0".

^rs^'-^^\

V>^

a^o^V^

■^^^y^BAR LE OUC

.ST MIHIEL

•^^

x$^ "^"^v D^^<=^ Railway
ajcui CenijralRlujx/^,

The gieat body of the Allied line which lies
across the country of Champagne terminates and
reposes towards the east upon the forest of Argonne,
the upper course of the River Aisne, and the railway
running parallel to these upper reaches in the neigh-
bourhood of Ville-sur-Tourbes. From this terminus
or extreme right wing of the French main line, which
is opposed to tiie gi-eat defensive German position that
has been held by the enemy for the last fortnight, you
have to the outer works of Verdun a distance of some-
what more than twenty miles — ^two days' marches.

Let us put these distances together and see what
they mean in time. With the Gennans in possession
of a crossing of the Meu.se between Verdun and Toul,
and about half Avay between those two fortresses, at
St. Mihiel, the door to their advance upon the rear of
the main French line in Champagne is open at a point
more than a day's march from Toul upon the south
and more than a day's march, rather nearer two days*
march, from Verdun upon the north. Tlrte German
columns advancing westward, therefore, across the
Meuse at St. Mihiel need feai- no sudden or unexpected

7»

LAND AND WATEE

October 3, 1914

attack from the one fortress or the other. If they
Lave sufticiont forces they should be able to mask the
gsirrisiiiis of both those stronglioMs without fear of
interruption to their cohiinns passing across the
^fcuse between them.

i^cxt, unless the forces opposed to them upon
tlic Meuse are strong enougli to arrest this westward
march, it is but two days' advance from a German
crossing of the Meuse in force near St. ^Mihiel to the
appearance of the German columns at Ecvigny,
directly in the rear of the French line. A similar
niunbcr of days would bring the Crown Prince's Army
down round or through the Argonne until it Avas at
Ste. Meuehould, and abreast of the companion force
which had come across the Meuse from St. ilihiel to
Eevigny.

We sum up and find that any decisive German
success upon the western or left bank of the ^leuse

There is the whole matter of this new German
offensive movement upon the Upper ^Nleuse. If it is
seriously intended, if it is being prosecuted with large
forces, and if no correspondingly large French forces
are present to arrest it after the crossing of the Mouse
and the forcing of the fortified line Toid- Verdun, all
these consequences AviU follow. But if it is only a
feint nndei-takeu with insuflicient forces, and if the
French commanders disregard the distraction attempted
here, the decisive Held of the canii)aign will still be, not
that of the Upper Meuse, but that A\here the heaviest
ilghtijig is now j^roceeding between St. Quentin and
Peronne for the possession of the Oisc Valley with its
railway line and canals.

Lastly, we may easily establish how much has
actually been done in this region of the Upper Meuse.
To folloAv this 1 will ask tlie reader to look at this
sketch.

•;::;•■'

■X.

'•. FOR-, OF TROYON
^; f- : •••••

VILLAGE OF-.'--. •;

W0IM3EY .••

BATTERIES OF LES „.^.'

re
u

VILLAGE OF APREMONT

SCALE. Of MILES

r.AK SHOW^O .K..US OK XH. ^r.....rosr KOW n... BT -n,. OKKM..S.S OVK„ THK M..S. .. s.. m:h.k..

\r,-S T k"*'"\P^'"* '' *^'« neighbourhood of St.
Mihiel. half-way between Verdun and Toul, would
mean a threatenn^g of the Allied line in Cham]™
^af,co day,^jra,e to cscap, cnnl no more. In X;
A\orcls, it would mean an immediate retirement of that

^^Xf""^ f^' ^ — I-"'ii"g retirement of he
m2i vT ^>>"g'-«"»^l Nancy and upon the Upper
Moselle Valley south of Toul.-" The whole French
me would be bent backwards behind Bar-le Due "nd
he upper valley of the Ornain. Verdun and Toul
vojdd be mvested. and when, or if they fell, he new

i^"il";'T — '--tions fL. GeL^an;

enemy ^^"^'^^-^«"-«'"« ^vould be opened by the

Die nature of the crossing which the Germans
have obtanied over the Eiyer Meuse at St. Mihiel can
here be grasped in some detail.

They hold a bridge-head, or teto-de-pont, and, sa
long as they hold it, they command a bridge in what
was formerly the unbroken barrier between Verdun
and iou . But they do not possess this entry with-
out drawbacks in their position. There are two roads
leading across the hill country between the Meuse
and the plain of Woeuvre. There is no railway,
lie rad-head is more than a day's march away at
ihiacourt. Of these two roads, the main road passing
through Apremont is in the hands of the French, for
the iYencli, coming up from the garrison of Toid on

8»

October 3, 1914

LAND AND WATER

the south, have pushed as far as Apremont and
occupied it. Tliey are confined so far to the use
of the smaller side road whicli goes romid tlu-ougli
Spada ami VigneuUos. It is along the line of this
side road that they have been operating the "whole
time from their headquarters and rail-head at Thiau-
court. They took the heights, as we shall see, at
Hatton Chatel, hut the French troops coming south
from A^erdun have got past the level of the Fort of
Troyon, just as those coming up from Toul have got
j)ast the Fort of LiouviUe and up to Apremont. The
enemy, therefore, has but a very narrow entr}',
threatened on both sides, and he cannot use it save
with very considerable forces protecting his flanks.

The Fort " Camp des Ivomains," enfilading the
River Meuse all above St. Mihiel town and bridge,
fell into the hands of the enemy, so did the work of
Les Faroehes opposite. It was the fall of these works
which gave them their bridge head and their crossing
at St. ^lihiel; but a week has passed, and they have
not attempted to enlarge the breach either southwards
towards Toul or northwards towards Yerdun. It is
very narrow — not eight miles ; while its one line of
supply, the side road from Spada and Vigneulles, is
continually thi-eatened from the north.

It was about eight days ago that the Germans
began to bombard the permiuient works round
St. ilihiel. By last week-end they had silenced
these two pennanent works, Parochcs and the Camp
des Romains, proving once more the accuracy of the
German forecast that modem howitzer fire would
dominate modern fortification.

The Meuse was cro.ssed bv the Gennans at
St. Mihiel at the week-end. But after ,this crossing
there Avas no advance. None (apparently) for days !
An action took place upon the left bank which forced
the invaders back towards the stream. They were
not compelled to recross the Meuse, but their advance
was checked. Since then there has been nothing to
show us whether a great movement were intended
or no.

The whole thing is of a piece with what the
war has shown us elsewhere, to wit, that modem
permanent works have not the resisting power which
was expected of them, but that troops in the open
upon the defensive have a greater resisting power
than was expected of them. The whole of last
Sunday the movement still remained hung up,
perhaps on accoimt of losses, perhaps because the
( Jerman advance was not in great force after all. The
whole of the Monday it still remained hung up ; the
lack of movement being asci'ibed upon that day to a
dense fog which covered the Woeuvre couutr3^ Tlie
whole of Tuesday it remained hung up. I write this
on Wednesday evening, and of AV^ednesday we have
no news.

^leanwlule, one indication that the German
advance was not as yet being conducted in gi-eater
force was afforded by the news that the garrison of
'I'oul had been able" to get north against the flank of
that advance as far as Beaumont. This point had
been reached by the columns marching north from
Toul very shortly after the moment when the first
crossing of the Meuse by the Germans at St. Alihiel
was effected. If the French have been able to maintain
those positions at Beaumont they seriously threaten
the sujjply of the Geraian columns crossing at St.
Mihiel. There is another indication in the same
sense : The troops acting from Verdun and marching
south advanced in the com'se of Sunday and Monday.
How far they advanced an official French coinmnniqm
Las told us. They reached the work at Troyon, and

that work stands. Coupled with the advance of the
Toul garrison to the north, this corresponding move-
ment from Verdun southwards points to the presence
of suiallcr rather than greater numbers in the German
advance upon St. Mihiel and across the Meuse there.

On the other hand, we must note that, whether for
jmrposcs of distraction and of making the French
command take the thing too seriously, or as a piece of
real news, the German Government has put into the
German Press strong statements to the effect that
this German advance across the Meuse at St. Mihiel
is being made in force and may prove decisive.

So much at the moment of writing (Wednesday
is all we know upon this important and
jjcrhaps critical development of the campaign.

The line of forts, hitherto a wall, between Toul
and Verdun is broken. The enemy may or may not
intend to use that advantage seriously. They may
or may not be able. But the hole is there.

AVith this I conclude the review of o^jerations in
the western field of war. One very important develop-
ment in that field, the siege of Antwerp, has opened
as these lines go to press, but this operation has not
at the moment of writing proceeded far enough to
pcnnit of any useful summary of its progi-ess being
made this week.

THE OPERATIONS IN THE EAST.

evening)

^>»

(OANZjq'

aneSLAu ■> -^

^U S TR^1^*.>,,. RE

tiiarcliinq -C* IV i. *

AVliat has happened in the eastern theatre of
war this Aveek may be put into two sentences. The
German invasion of Russia is still at a deadlock ujjon
the Niemen. The Russian invasion of GaHcia is still
)uoving westAvard towards CracoAV, and still at the
pace to which we liaA'e noAV groAvn accustomed dmnng
the Avhole month of September. It is a slow but a
regular advance, Avhich it has been said here more
than once cannot be of effect in exercising " pressure "
on industriiU Germany before, at earliest, the third
Aveek of October.

But the interest of the position in the eastern
theatre of Avar does not consist in these expected and,
as it Avero, regular developments.- It consists in this
much lai-ger question : which of two great and widely

»•

LAND AND WATEE

October 3, 1914

BcpanvU^ battlefields will aetemine tbe immediate
future of tlie campaign m Poland ^

I say Poland, because we must never forget that
ihe country where all this fighting is go'ng on. from
e Baltic to the Carpathians, though hitherto artifi-
cially divided under the rule of Gennany, Eussia, and
lustria, is reaUy one country w^th an intense and
Uving national soul. This soul it is largely tie
pun^se of our Allies to release, arid certainly the
pmpose of the Prussian Power to maintain in

subjoction.^^^^ to the two battlefields. There is one
northern one upon the Frontiers of East Prussia,
another southern one in Galicia. . i i

Uiwn the north the German armies have invaded
Pussia They have crossed the Pussian frontier in
the Government of Suwalki, and have approached the
line of the Niemen. They have attempted and
hitherto failed to force this line at the jwrnt of
Druskiuiki, somewhat below Grodno. A little above
this point, the Pussian forces which are defending the
line of the Niemen and opposing the invasion, cros.s
the river and extend through the forest district of
AuoTistoff. almost to the Prussian frontier. All this
is, by the way, the theatre of the first ojierations m
Napoleon's great campaign of 1812.

Now this considerable but hithei-to not decisive
German pressure against the Russian armies in the
nortb, this invasion of Eussian temtory, and this
struggle for the crossing of a Eussian river, would,
if it^stood alone, be comparable to the struggle in the
western theatre of war for the line of the Upper
Meuse and of the Aisne. More, we should be
considering a German ofEensive possessed of the
initiative ; and though we should not in the case of
Eussia presuppose the German objective to be either
a mai-ch upon the Eussian capital, or any other
serious form of invasion, yet we should not be
discounting the chances of a Eussian retreat. It is
the Germans who are advancing here as they were
until recently in the West.

But the great difference between the eastern
theatre of war and the western, is that this Niemen
battlefield is balanced by a very different state of
affairs between 200 and 300 miles off to the south
in Galicia. To continue the parallel with the
west: the whole thing is as though, while our
enemies were fighting to force the Aisne and the
Upper Meuse, we had driven another body of them
])ack through Lombardy and were approaching
Milan, which was for them a point of capital
importance — a point where our " pressure " upon
them and the anxiety they would feel for their safety
would become acut«.

For the Eussian armies Avhich have invaded the
Austrian Empii-e so successfully in Galicia are now
not only proceeding at a regular rate (including all
that they carry or mask by the way) of about eight
miles in a day, but are pointing directly at that first part
of the German territory upon which they can exercise
severe pressure when they reach it — the rich industrial
district of Silesia, with its chief centre and fortress
at Breslau.

The Eussian detachments sent across the Car-
pathians towards the Hungarian plain are but flanking
bodies. The march of the mass of the Eussian Annies
is this field is directly along the main railv.ay line from
Lemberg (which wiis carried exactly a month ago)
through Jaroslav to Cracow. The Eiissians have
already isolated and contained Przemysl. Their van
has reached Dembitza, sixty miles we.st of Jaroslav.
They arc well within a fortnight of Cracow unless

a retarding action is fought against them by the
retreating Austro-Prussian forces. They are suih-
ciently niunerous to mask Cracow as they have masked
Przemysl and this done, if their advance contmues at
it present rate, the "pressure" of which w-e have
heard so much, the " pressure " which Eussia has to
exercise upon the German Empire will begin For
the head of the invading troops will be in the industrial
]n-ovince of Silesia, le\7ing ransom and doing all those
things which incline one's enemy to peace.

"Now it is a principle universal in strategics that
vou must not get " off-side." That is, you must not
be so far beyond your general line that your enemy,
or a portion of his forces, can get upon your communi-
cations behind the too forward position which you
occupy. Even a salient in a line is dangerous if it is
too pronounced. To put it simply, a body which has
got in front of its fellows is in danger of being cut off.
That, by the way, is what happened to the two
Eussian Ai-my Corps in East Prussia a month ago,
when they were cut up by the Gennans round
Tannenbei^.

In conformity with this principle, it was a sound
deduction to presume that there would be no serious
advance through Silesia until East Prussia was cleared
of any large German forces, until, that is, the fortified
line Thorn — Dantzig on the lower Vistula was passed
by the Eussian armies invading by the north, as theii-
fellows were in^'ading by the south.

This principle would stUl hold if the Germans in
East Prassia had remained upon the defensive ; but
with the present paradoxical situation this principle
does not hold. The Prussian forces advancing upon
the Niemen are very far from being abreast of their
defeated fellow^s and AUies in the south. Each
advance may be regarded as being "off-side." The
Eussians advancing and attacking in Galicia are
far ahead of the Eussian defence and retreat on to
the Niemen. The Germans advancing on the Niemen
are far ahead of the Austro-German retreat in Galicia.
Two considerations, however, enable us to make
something of this topsy-turvy double plan of campaign.
The first is the distance between the two main fields
of battle in this eastern theatre of war ; the second is
the comparative size of the forces involved.

The gi-eat distance of the fighting on the Niemen
from the fighting in Galicia renders the operations
independent of each other, at least for many weeks.
There is no threat from the north upon the Eussian
communications in the south, in spite of the Gei-man
advance in the north. There is no threat from the
south upon the German communications in the north,
in spite of the Eussian advance in the south. lu
other words, tbe paradox of a German force content
to advance on the right of a great field while its fellows
and allies are in full retreat on tbe left of the same is
tolerable for some little time because' that field is so
vast that many days would be required before success
or failure at one extremity could be felt at the other.

It remains true that o?ie of these two advances —
either the German in the north or the Eussian in the
south — will ultimately compel even a distant enemy
to retrace his steps. Sooner or later the German
advance from East Prussia, if it is continued, will
compel the southern Eussian armies in Galicia to halt
and retu-e, or the advance of the Eussian annies in
Galicia wiU compel the advance of the German armies
upon the Niemen to halt and retire.

And it is here that the factor of numbers comes
in. The operations in the south — that is, in Galicia —
have been so decisive and so continuous as from this
cause alone to give them a preponderance over the

October 3, 1914

LAND AND WATER

operations in the north, in East Prussia, and the basin
ol" the Niemen. But apart from tliis, the numbers of
the Jiussian advance in the south are so givat that
Avitliout a doubt, if it is continued, it will be the
deciding factor in all the eastern theatre of the war.

In other words, granted tliat the advance in Galicia
continues at its present rate, and granted tluit tlic

Prussian success in approaeliing the Niemen is con-
tinued by a crossing of that river, it is the former
oj^eration that will check the latter. It is the Russian
progress upon Silesia that, under such conditions,
Avould necessarily recall the Prussian forces now
operating in the north against the line of the
Niemen.

A DIARY OF THE WAR.

SYNOPSIS.

August 24th. — It was amiouncoU lliat Xamur had fallen.

The British forces were engaged all day on .Sunday and alter dark
in the neighbourhood of Mon.s, and held their ground. Lunuville was
occupied by the Germans.

August 27th. — Mr. Chun-hill announced in the House that the
German armed merchantman Koifr Wll/ielm ilcr Grosse had been
sunk by H.M.S. Uighflycr on the West Africa Coast.

August 28™. — A concerted operation was attempted against the
Germans in the Heligoland J5ight.

The Kir.st Light Cruiser .Squadron sank the Mainz. The First
Cattlo Cruiser Squadron sank one cruiser, Kola clas.s, and another
cruiser disappeared in the mist, heavily on fire, and in a, sinking
condition.

Two German destroyers were sunk and many damaged. The total
British casualties amounted to sixty-nine killed and wounded.

Lord Kitchener announced that "The Government have decided
that our Army in France shall be increased by two divisions and a
cavalry division, besides other troops from India."

Septoiber 1st. — The Russians met with .1 check in East Prussia,
but were successful in minor engagements in Galicia.

SEPTEiiBCR 2xD. — Continuous fighting was in progress along almost
the whole line of battle. The British ("avalry engaged, with distinc-
tion, the Cavalry of the enemy, pushed them back, and captured ten
guns. The French Army gained ground in the Lorraine region. The
Ilussian Army completely routed four Austrian Army Corps near
I.>emberg, capturing 150 guns.

Septembeb 3bd. — The French Government moved to Bordeaux.

September 4th.' — The Russian Army under General Rnzsky, cap-
tured Lemberg, and the Army of General Brussiloff took Halicz.

StrrEMBER 5th. — The formal alliance of England, France, and
Russia was signed in London by the reprasentutives of the three
Governments concerned, binding each nation to conclude peace, or
discuss terms of peace, only in conjunction with its Allies.

.Scptember 6th. — It was announced that the Rcout-cnii.ser Poth-
finder foundered on Saturday afternoon aft«r running upon u mine.

September 7in. — General Joffres' plans were being steadily carried
out. The Allied forces acted on the offensive and were successful in
checking and forcing back in a north-easterly direction the German
forces opposed to them.

.Seitbmber 8th. — The Allies gained ground on the left wing along
the line of the Ourcq and the Petit Morin river. Here the British
troops drove the enemy back ten miles. Further to the right, from
Vitry-le-Francois to Sermaise-les-Baing the enemy was pressed back
iu the direction of Rheinis.

StrixMBER 9rH. — The English Army crossed the Marne, and the
enemy retired about twenty-five miles.

Seitember IItic. — Our Ist Army Corps captured twelve Maxim
j^nns and some prisoners, and our 2nd Army Corps took 550 prisoners
and a battery.

Seitember 13th. — On the left wing the enemy continued his retreat-
ing movement. The Belgian Army puohed forward a vigorous offensive
to the south of Lierre.

SErrE.vr^EB 14j"H. — All day the enemy stubbornly disputed the
passage of the Aisnc by our troops, but nearly all the crossings were
secured by «un:;et. On our right and left the French trooiie were
confronted with a similar task, in v.liich they were succeesful.

SF!TEM=En 15th. — Tho Allied troops occupied Rheims. Six
hundred prisoners and' twelve guns were captured by the Corps on
the ri^ht of the Briti^ih.

September 16ih.- Submarine E9, Lieutenant-Commander Max
Kennedy Horton, returned safely after having torpedoed the German
cruiser llela, six miles south of Heligoland.

Seitember 19th. — The Russian army sei/.ed th« fortified positions
of Sieniawa and Sanibor.

Seitember 20ih. — Bheiins Cathedral was wantonly bombarded, and
nothing is left but the four bare walls.

The British auxiliary cruiser Cnrmanin, Captain N'oel Grant, Royal
Kavy, sank the Cap Tiajulgar off the east coast of South Anieriia.
'I'lie action lasted one hour and forty-five minutes, when the German
ship capsized and sunk, her survivors being rescued by an empty
collier.

Sr.rTEUBEB 22xD. — H.M. ships AbovHr, Ilo/jue, and Crr:>Ky were
sntik by submarines in the North Sea. Tho AhoiAir was toniedoed,
and whilst the Hague and the Cresfi/ had closed and were standing
by to save the crew, they were al^o torpedoed.

SF.rTKMBEn 23rd.— Briti.sh aeroplanes of the Kaval wing delivered
•n attack on the Zeppelin sheds at IJiissrIdorf and Flight Lieutenant
Collet dripped thrc-e bombs on a Zeppelin shed, approaching wjtliiu
400 feet.

DAY BY DAY.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 25th.

The Gcniian liglit wing was strengtlipned by the transfer of
Army Corps both from tlic centre of their Hue and from their left
in Lorraine and the A'osges. This force concentrated near
St. Quentin, was attacked by the French operating between the
Soinme and the Oise. A general and very vigorous action took
place in this quarter. Along the line of the Aisne there was
little change in the general position.

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 26th.

There was much activity on the part of the enemy all along
the line. Some heavy counter-attacks were repulsed, and
considerable loss was inflicted on tlie enemy.

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 27th.

On Our Left Wing.— Between the Oise and the Somme
and to the north of the Somme, the battle continued along a very
extensive front with perceptible progress on our part. From tho
Oi.se to Rheims the Germans at several places made very furious
attack.?, some carried to the point of the bayonet, but all repulsed.
The lines of the French and tferman trenches were in many places
only a few hundred yards apart.

In the Centre.— From Rheims to Souain the Prussian
Guard attempted, but without succe,ss, a vigorous offensive
movement, and were thrown back in the nciglibourhood of Berra
and Nogent I'Abbcsse. From Souain to the Argonne the enemy
gained some advantage in the course of their attacks yesterday
morning between the road from Somme-Py and Chalons-sur-
Marne and the railway line from Sainte-Menehould to Vouziers.
By the evening our troops regained the ground they had lost.
Between the Argonne and the Meu.se there was nothing new to
report. In the south of the Woeuvre the Germans occupied a line
which passed through St. Mihiel and the north-west of Pont-a-
Moussom.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 28th.

There was no change in the general situation. Comparative
calm reigned on part of the front. Nevertheless at certain points,
notably between the Aisne and the Argonne, the enemy made
furtiier violent attacks which were repulsed.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29th,

There was practically no change in the situation. The
Allied left had some very heavy fighting, but they well held
their own.

SPORTSMAN'S BATTALION.

The Sportsman's Battalion is a corps for gentlemen up to
forty-five years of age, and only those exceptionally fit and
accustomed to outdoor sport are accepted. It is the only corps
in England for which tlie age limit has been specially extended
by the authorities, and has been sanctioned by Lord Kitchener,
who has expressed his thanks for the offer of its services.
Directly its full complement has been reached and passed by
the authorities it becomes a unit of the regular Army. The Chief
Recniiting Oflicer is E. Cuncliffe-Owen, and the recruiting
station is the Indian Room, Hotel Cecil, London, applicants
being seen from ten in the morning imtil six in the evening.
Recniiting officers have also visited various provincial centres.

The corps is an infantry one, the training will be the ordinary
infantry training— its length dependent, of course, on tho
recruits' proficiency — and the medical examination the ordinary
Army examination. Pa3-ment at Army rates. Payment by the
recruit for his equipment is optional.

Among applicants are :— Victor Hughes Hallett (Raymond
Carew), a well-known sporting writer; Sylvester Stannard,
ll.B.S. ; Sydney Smith, brother of Mr. F. E. Smith ; Mr. John
Chaileton, of Ludlow, owner of a pack of hounds ; and Mr.
Itupert Tattcrsall. The corps is announced as for gentlemen
up to forty -five years of age accustomed to sport. It must not
be suppo.sed for a moment that money is a bar to the recruit ;
all suitable apphcants are welcome, and there are no compulsory
expenses.

11*

LAND AND WATER

October 3, 1914

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

, bai^)

L.^2>

^ VCATTAROC Torpedo base)

General line of
Franco-British
blocVade

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

IT appears that Cattaro, an important Austrian torpedo
base, is now being %'igorously attacked by the Franco-
British Fleet. Three Austrian battleships are said to be
inside the harbour. It may be so : but they will pro-
bably turn out to be old coast defence ships at the best.

We arc also told of further losses to Austrian torpedo craft
blown up by their own mines. These stories may be true : but
they bear a suspicious resemblance to events of some weeks ago.

The Austrians have made such an extraordinary muddle on
land that it is always possible that they have done something of
the same kind at sea. On the other hand, the Austrian Navy
was of known efficiency in the ordinary way.

It has no prospects whatever of accomplishing anything,
and I am strongly inclined to believe that (except perhaps a few
old vessels of no fighting value) it is all safely inside the defences
of Pola, and wUl remain there, trusting to luck that the conclu-
sion of hostilities will see it as a force of some kind of poten-
tiality. In matters of this sort we must not. accept what we
w^ould Like to see, but what is the obvious thing to do.

Now, it would be obviou.^ly ridiculous for the Austrian; to
split themselves into three Lsolated divisions, as they have been
reported as having done. It would simply be asking for the
ultimate destruction of one or perhaps all three of the divisions.

It is infinitely more probable that they have accepted the
inevitable and adopted the only wise course of refusing to be
drawn into action.

It is probable that Cattaro will ultimately be reduced.
Since Lissa has already been occupied, it will form a convenient
base for the blockade of the Adriatic. But beyond that we

should not expect too much. If a superior fleet prevents over-
seas supplies and destroys trade it has accomplished the main
purpose for which a fleet exists. Here, as elsewhere, the public
woidd do well to remember that point.

Indeed, it may be questioned whether (supposing the
fortifications to be as important as reported) operations against
Cattaro were necessary or advisable, exceft in so far as tha
provision of a handy base may have been a prime necessity.
Naval warfare only accidentally consists of " Isushimas " : the
real work is far better expressed in that Mahad phrase, " Tha
silent pressure of Sea Power."

Battles come under the head of clumsy necessities. The real
measure of success in naval operations is the stultifying of any
eflorts on the part of the enemy. Good chess players do not go
in for a reckless exchange of pieces in the hopes that sonicthing
may result therefrom. They play for the definite object of
checkmate. The main rules of naval warfare are singularly
analogous to the rules of chess.

ON THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

On September 22nd the German cruiser Emden appeared
off Madras at 9 p.m., and her first two shots succeeded in
firing some of the petroleum tanks of the Burma Oil Company.
These tanks are fully exposed in the open roadstead, but at
the same time the Emden made such remarkably good shooting,
seeing it was night, that it seems clear that she must have been
in possession of very accurate knowledge as to the exact location
of the tanks.

The exact damage done was not very great — roughly, about
£20,000. Probably doing damage was not so much the prima

12*

October 3, 1914

LAND AXD WATER

fibjoctive as " moral effect " on the population of Ijulia. Anglo-
Indians tell me that tliey think that the Emden's performances
in this direction are, they surmise, already very considerable,
and that unless she is speedily brought to book they will be
greater still.

There is every reason to believe that this is what the Gennans
are trying to do. " Shake confidence in the British Raj " is
much more probably the order than '' Destroy British trade by
every means in your power."

The Emden, of course, will ultimately be captured or
destroyed. This may easily happen before these lines are in
print, especially as she can now no longer retreat safely to German
New Guinea or the Bismarck Archipelago.

The Australian forces have now virtually captured the
whole of these German possessions, although the number of
men engaged compared to the area occupied is such that con-
siderable bays for replenishing supplies may yet be available.

For the rest, it may be conceded that if the captain of the
Enulen lives through he will certainly have earned special
promotion for having conducted matters against us along the best
possible scientific lines. His ship is undoubtedly being well
handled, and it will do us no harm to remember that here, as
elsewhere, the Germans have made no bad mistakes, since the
initial error of the Goeben.

H\V TO IKDICATS THI PLACES WUERI THIS OEBMAN CJiUISEBS

HATB OPEBATED.
KA — EABLSBUHK, KO — K0N108BBE0, K.W. — KAISER WILHELJI DER
GR088E, D — DRESDEN, E — EMDEN (tHII KAI.SER WILHELM DER
OROSSE'S effort off ICELAND WAS UERELT A FISUINQ BOAT).

This should not be taken to imply that we have made
mistakes, but it should certainly be taken as implying that
the task being accomplished by our Navy is a very considerable
one ; that we have certain weak points, that the Germans have
Jihown themselves singularly cognisant of these, and that the
British public must not expect bricks to be made without straw.
' There is now every reason to believe that the apparent
incoherence of the German commerce war in the early days was
part of a settled and clever scheme — intended to lull us into a
false sense of security.

But as the just issued official list, corrected to September 23rd,
only reports a total bag of twelve ships of about 59,000 tons
between August 6th and September 18th, and at least six raiders
were employed, it is abundantly clear that — although only two
corsairs (both armed Uners) have been disposed of — the British
Navy has certainly cried " Check " to most of the German
jnoves. This is the utmost that we can reasonably expect
outside the chapter of luck and accident.

The list of captures is somewhat interesting. It is :—

Emd'^n 6 ships totally 20,443 tons.

Dresden 2 „ „ 29,988 „

Kalier Wilhelm dtr Qroue ., 2 „ „ 2,458 „

Konigsherg ,. . . . , I „ „ C,800 „

KarUruht ., .. . . I „ „ 4,650 „

Cap Trafalgar. . ,. .. 0 „ „ 0 „

The Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse had also a fishing boat of
227 tons to lier credit account. The total number of fishing
l)oat8 destroyed by warships in and around the North Sea ia
twenty-three.

The same report gives the total bag by mines as eight Briti.sh,
five Danes, one Swede, and one Norwegian. That is to say,
taking proportions into account, the bulk of the damage has been
•done to neutral merchant .shipping. Only the Dutch have been
fortunate enough to sustain no loss.

The Emden hfis reappeared and sunk four Britisli merchant
«hips valued at apj roximately £2(iO,()()0. This e.\2)]oit, however,
does not materially ail'cct the main situation.

THE BALTIC.

Reports from various sources, which on the face of them
appear to be quite authentic, have been received to the effect
that the Russian armoured cruiser Bayan has sunk a German
cruiser and two German torpedo boats which she encountered
mine-laying in the Baltic. The story of the cruiser is improbable,
and it is far more likely that the sunken ship is one of the special
mine-layers, Albatross or Nautilus, which displace somewhere
around 2,000 tons and arc capable of from twenty to twenty -one
knots speed. These boats carry 400 mines each. Or it may
have been the old fifteen-knot PelUcan, which is the third regular
mine-layer of the German Navy.

Pending some further official German report on the matter,
it may be wiser to accept the whole story with a certain amount
of caution. Generally speaking, German reports have been
quite as correct as our own, or any of those issued by our Allies.
The story of the two German divisions engaging each other
which I commented on last week has not been officially reported
in Germany, but that omission is merely human nature. Their
official story of the Heligoland affair was quite accurate, and it
is vouched for by the circumstance that they admit a heavier
loss than we had claimed in our own official report.

Con.sequently, we had best take the German official as true.
The probable real happening is that the Bayan sank one mine-
layer and two nondescripts which were with her. This much
we can take between the lines of the somewhat vague German
official statement.

Everything done by Germany to date has been absolutely
according to plans and the losses sustained have been relatively
sUght, probably less than the Germans had anticipated. In the
Baltic Russia is playing against Germany a practically similar
game to that which the Germans are playing against us in the
North Sea. Germany appears to be keeping open her
Scandinavian trade, which just now is of immense importance
to her.

In another month or so a fresh situation will arrive, because
the ice will be beginning to form. At present, so far as has
been reported, Libau is the Russian naval base. Libau ^is an
ice-free harbour, but, on the other hand, its fortifications are weak,
and it is doubtful whether the Russians will risk being blockaded
in it. It is by no means improbable that they will shortly retire
on Kronstadt, where — according to the usual peace programme —
they would be frozen in.

In this connection everything depends upon how soon
the battleships of the Gangoot class can be got ready for sea.
Not only are these vessels altogether superior in fighting value
to the German reserve vessels which are operating in the Baltic,
but each of them is — by a remarkable stroke of Russian
Admiralty prescience — fitted with an ice-breaker bow. Conse-
quently, if the Russians retire on Kronstadt, it by no means
follows that they will be demobilised there, as the Germans
may be inclined to calculate.

I am by no means sure that of the two menaces from which
the German Fleet suffers, the British Fleet in the North Sea
and the Russian Fleet in the Baltic, the Russian may not be
the greater menace of the two, once the new ships are ready.
The " reason why " is as follows :

From the general position we can gather that the German
Admiralty in its plans has made full allowance for the British
blockade, and all that it has accomplished. But it is by no
means so clear that they made sufficient allowance for the factor
of the Russian Fleet, and its possible influence on their trade
with Sweden. The Press campaign which the German agents
are carrying on in Sweden is confirmation of this theory. Sweden,
as I mentioned last week, is in the unfortunate position of having
long and grave suspicions of Russia and her designs, and to that
extent she was thrown into the arms of Germany. She by now
is fully aware of the German attitude to weak neutrals which
may be convenient to her. All the same, however, it is extremely
improbable that in any circumstances Sweden will take sides.
If she did, her conflicting interests would probably incline her
to Germany, against whom she has no past grievance and against
whom she has no frontier. We have to remember that every
patriotic Swede cherishes against Russia on account of Finland,
much the same kind of feeling that every patriotic Dane has
against Germany on account of Schleswig-Holstein.

THE NORTH SEA.

Reading bet«-een the lines, the Admiralty preface to the
reports of the surviving commanding officers of the three
submarined Crcssies is to the effect that no dictates of humanity
should be allowed to interfere with the military duties of warships
This is quite right. To blame the Germans for taking advantage
of the fact is foolish — " war is war."

On the other hand, the official reports of the commanding
officers make it abundantly clear that the Ahonhir was generally
considered to have struck a mine, and that no submarine danger
was apprehended.

13»

LAND AND WATER

October 3, 1914

The resultant out of everything published or not published
is that " Run for it " is the "only safe answer to a submarine
attack. This, of counso, is analogous to the answer to the fire-
ships in the old davs. So the "' new danger ' is not so very new
after all.

The German story that U9 alone was responsible for the
whole business of sinking the Crcssies may be dismissed at once
a.s absurd. 6'9 has only three torpedo tubes, and the 250-ton
submarine able to reload her tubes in a submerged condition has
yet to be invented. There were certainly two German sub-
marines engaged — more probably from three to six, that is to
say, two divisions, for submarines work in tlirees.

L'9 and her sisters carry two tubes forward and one aft.
This after tube is a species of reserve one, and in a general way
would not be made use of. The class is not big enough to do
much in the way of carrying spare torpedoes, and it requires
a good deal of imagination to picture any of them reloading tubes
while under water in action even if they did.

Now, we know that at least six torpedoes were "fired, of
wliich five hit and one missed. That is the number of torpedoes
Bcen, and that suggests at least three boats wliich fired two
torpedoes each, as it makes no allowance for unseen torpedoes
which missed.

\yhy the Germans persistently assert that UO alone did the
n'>ischief b somewhat of a mj'stery. The most reasonable
explanation is that UO did most of the work, and that thev are
seeking to create the impression that one German submariue is
worth three British sliips. The idea that L'9 was the sole
survivor of a division is more pleasurable than pi-obable. And
since German reports spoke of " hopes " of U9 returning safely,
it would look as though the other boats had got back, but that
the t9 is missing. Only the Cressij appears to have fired at
anything, and she only two or three shots, with moderate
uncertainty as to the result.

An mcident of some importance is the story fairly general
amongst the survivors of a mysterious trawler which was about
at the time, and which one of our cruisers was reported to have
fire.] \t and sunk. The suggestion is that this trawler was
directing operations under the guise of being a surreptitious mine-
layer. If so, the ruse was certainly a clever one — though it is
hardly one which is likely to be repeated with success.

The only other additional light thi-own on the disaster from
the official narratives is the pleasing absence of panic in the
British cruisers, although they were manned by scratch crews
which had not long been together. This is a point of considerable
importance, as although the Germans rely on their submarines
to reduce our materiel, they must be reiving to a still greater
extent on creating a moi-al effect on the personnel.

The well authenticated circumstance of the singing of " It's a
long, long way to Tipperary," and the jesting response to the
rffect, ' It certainly is if you have to swim there," is a clear
indication that this German success had no psychological effect
v,-hatever on our Navv.

The definite Admiralty order to the effect that in future no
big ships are to be risked for life-saving is the surest safeguard
against any similar " regrettable incident " in the future.

Meanwhile, it may stiU pertinently be asked, " How did the
Oennans come to be on the spot to intercept our cruisers " ?

I mentioned this point last week, and I repeat it now. The
odds against submarmes, cruising aimlessly, blundering into
anything, are very smaU indeed. It is of the utmost importance
to ascertain the German system of information.

THE DUTCH PROBLEM. f

When first I raised the question of Holland in these Notes
1 did so as a subsidiary subject, and in connection with the
circumstance that if the German Army can be suppHed m erseas

via Holland, the starving-out blockade of our Navy must
necessarily be handicapped, and the war prolonged accordingly;
Last week we heard that the Dutch Government had issuefl
orders as regards transit of food stuffs. These orders allow of
everything which we can reasonably expect. But, according to
details furnished by several correspondents — who give fipfures
to prove their points — there is reason to query whether the sairt'e
control is exercised over other contraband. For instance, h,
very large quantity of dynamite recently went to Holland.
It was certified by the Dutch firm to which it was consigned
that it was required to blow up buildings in the fire zone of
frontier fortresses ! One cannot help suspecting that some
superfluous tons will find their way to combatants who may be
short of the explosive in question.

In some quarters there is a fear that too great an insistence
on our rights, too strict a demand for clear neutrality, might
involve us in war with Holland just at the time when the South
African Dutch have come splendidly into line with the Empire.

It seems to be overlooked that — no matter what German
influences may be at work in Dutch Court circles— nothing save
insanity would induce Holland to declare war against us. It
would simply be throwing away'all her East Indian possessions,
with which she does a trade of about £53,000,000 a year. The
mouth of the Rhine is not worth that to her. Nor is any " scrap
of paper " which Germany may have given her,

THE FAR EAST.

Operations against Kiao-Chau (Tsing-tau) continue to
proceed with deliberation — the only proceedings of much interest
being aerial ones, which are of the bomb-dropping order on both
sides. No particular results have been recorded.

KIAU CHAU (T£ING-TAu).

The .Japanese must now be fairly close on the doomed
stronghold, as the German ships in the harbour have been firin<r
on their troops. The Kiao-Chau operations are unlikely to go
down to history as a second siege of Port Arthur— the nearest
historical analogy is the seige of Wei-hai-wei in the Chino- Japanese
War. Here the Japanese closed round the shore defences in
dehberato and methodical fashion, and then, at the selected
monient, delivered a famous and successful torpedo attack on
the Chinese warships, which they had previously shelled from
the shore.

THE WAR BY AIR.

By FRED T. JANE.

ZThnW *^'?*-'.'*"u' 1° ^ '"""^ s^«I° continue.
The latest exploit has bcen the dropping of further
bombs on Ostend, and (from aero|lane.s5 on
certam Belgian villages. The damage doni was
, „ . ., t"y'a . but a certain amount of alarm was cau^e,l

I" te'llrrt "" '"^'^ P"^'" ."^J^^^'- at oTtend appears
hJD VI u ^[""^ ",P ^"^ ammunition train, which, however
had already left when the attack was made however,

^hJnV ^T'^ "° particular reason to believe the theory that
where Zeppelms are concerned (the same can hardly be slid foi

aeroplanes) deliberate and indiscriminate bomb droppin" on
non-combatants is intended. This conclusion we can arrive at
irom a description of unexploded Zeppelin bombs which have
been found. They are stated to be 4 feet long by about 8 inches
m diameter, with picric as the explosive. Were the terrorising
wn„n r P°P'^^t'?n ^he object, something far less expensive
woS t '^if "^ f ^''^^'- '^^^ ^^^^"'i ■^"'1 «tl^" authorities
Z.fih r '^'"P'oJ'e'l m seeking to ascertain how and in what
way the Germans learned of the existence of the ammunitioa

ilUilli

October 3, 1914

LAND AND WATER

■ ZeppelixLh'heds
* Tiieordiaarjr sheds too small,
/or ZeppelizLS

MAP TO INDICATE QEBMAN DIBIQIBLE SHEDS.

THE OEDIXAKT SHEDS TOO 8MALI. FOl ZEPPELINS AEE OF SMALL IMPORTANCE AND ABE DESIOXED FOB SHELTERIN'O '■' PARSETALS," ETC.,
AlItCEAn THAT CAN BE DEFLATED ANfmiBBB, AND DO NOT DEPEND ON SHEDS FOE THEIB EFFECTIVE EXISTENCE. THSIOLLOWINO STATIONS

UAVE SINCE BEEN ADDED : FUHLSBUTTEL, SCHWIDSBMtJHL, MANZELL.

Stories of Zeppelins being prepared for coming aerial raids
on the fleet still continue ; and, judging from correspondence
wliich I receive, there is a certain amount of public uneasiness
as to bow Zeppelins can be met.

The Russians have now on view at Petrograd " the remains
of a Zeppelin," which is said to have been brouglit down by rifle
shot ; but if this be correct, it was a piece of luck which we can
hardly expect to see repeated.

Something con.siderablc can, of course, be done by firc-
flhell from aerial guns, and a naval fleet occupies so large an area
that the ordinary guns of some ships are likely to reach a Zeppelin,
unless she is fly^ig at a height which would reduce the chances
of bomb success to an infinitesimal fraction. The chances of
correct aim in dropping on moving ships is small at the best even
for low altitudes. And the amount of damage to be done to a
big ship by bombs is probably not very great.

There is no doubt, however, that the most serious answer
and menace to Zeppelins is from the air, whether by way of
aeroplanes towing grapnels over the envelopes or propellers,
dropping inflammatory bombs, or, better, bj' incidents such as that
■which recently occurred at Diisseldorf.

" Diisseldorf " represents the best possible form of
defensive attack, because, deprived of its shed, a Zeppelin is
useless. Unfortunately, Germany has an enormous number of
sheds (thirty all told) as the accompanying map indicates ;
etill, the majority are not out of reach of a determined attack,
8uch as that delivered by the Naval Flying Corp, on Diisseldorf.

Here, by a bold drop to an altitude of only 400 feet, Fliglit
Lieut. C'ollett succeeded in dropping three incendiary bombs on
the Zeppelin shed there, owned by the " Delag " Company.

According to German statements, " a few windows were
broken, but otherwise no damage was done." This may be true,
or it may not ! We have no means of ascertaining the damage,
and the Germans, aware of that, would naturally conceal it.
We may hope that the shed was fired, and that, as reported from
Switzerland, there was a Zeppelin inside it at the time. But
this is probably too good to be true.

Tlie importance of the matter, however, is that our aviators
Lave succeeded in steering themselves to the required spot.
This must be very evident to the Germans ; also that, having
found one spot, we shall presently find others. We may
confidently expect early repetitions of the Diisseldorf incident,
and — since the attack on Diisseldorf was undertaken by a naval

airman — satisfy ourselves that the Navy is taking as few ri.sks a>
possible in connection with German threats as to what their
Zeppelins will accomplish against our Dreadnoughts.

Later news of aerial warfare consists of some very circum-
stantial non-official stories as to another Zeppelin brought down
by Russian gim fire. As remarked a week or two ago, more
Zeppelins than Germany ever built have already been destroyed
on paper ! The story alluded to may be a re-hash of the
Zeppelin taken to Petrograd. On the other hand, the details
about its being injured by two shots and brought down by a
third are far more suggestive of a Parseval as the victim.

7/ a shell does chance to burst inside it — a not very likely
contingency — it would certainly be "all up " with any non-
rigid dirigible. But the odds against any such contingency are
heavy. A couple of holes in the dirigible is the best that any
non-special gun firing at one and hitting it can normally expect.
Now the entry hole in a gas bag is not going to do much, for
hydrogen does not escape downwards. Consequently, ouly the
exit hole matters. Out of that exit hole the hydrogen will
assuredly escape, but it will take its time in escaping.

A variant of the story described three motors as having been
hit, and finally a hit on the fourth. Putting aside the fact that
no Zeppelin has more than three motors, the story is technically
absurd. The more reasonable hypothesis is that a non-rigid was
brought down owing to the leakage caused by three holes in her.
Also the number of captured reported (eight) is the crew of a
Parseval. A Zeppelin carries about thirty men as crew. The
probability is that everything in the airship line is described as
" Zeppelin " — this word being used as a generic term. Occa-
rionally it appears to be a news generic for aeroplanes also !

Incidentally, this vague idea as to what a Zeppelin is appeals
to be shared by quite a number of people who should know better.
For example, a correspondent tells me of an engineer friend of
his who asserts that he could build a Zeppelin shed (something
approaching Charing Cross Station in dimensions in six weeks,
and piUl it down and re-erect it in one week ! This would be a
fair record for an ordinary aeroplane hangar.

The Zeppelin danger is real enough, as it is, v/ithout need of
the accompaniment of any unreasoning panic.

The latest available list of German dirigible sheds is given
on the plan above. Unless otherwise stated, the above are
military sheds. All private ones capable of holding Zeppelins
are subsidised.

]5*

LAND AND AVATEE

October 3, 1914

CORRESPONDENCE.

EiiKlciuere, Ascot, Berks.

September 10, 19H.

To the Editor of Land and Water.

Sib -Tho result of my appeal to sportsmen who are
,n.blo to take the field to give the use of their race glasses
fiekl glasses, or stalking glasses to our non-eon>ni.ssioned
offimlundc; orders for the front, has been most gratifying.

In the fii^t three days afU>r tho issuo of the appeal over
2,000 glasses were received. These glasses are being dis-
tributed as rapidly as possible <^»'°"g .t^-^^s""", ^°^"X ,h,
officers destined for active service. I should iko to Uko tho
on'ortunUy of conveying their sincere gratitude to the owners
who have given them the use of their glasses.

Most of the glasses received have been of the best modem
patterns, and it is easy to realise how valuable they will
^ovc in the field. Those who do not possess field glasses, and
tlij desire to assist, should send cheques to the Secretary,
NationaJ Service League, 72, Viclona^stieet, London, b.N\ .
All glasses should also be sent to this address.

It will be my pleasure to send a personal letter of thanks
to those who in this way contribute to the safety and welfare
of our splendid soldiers.

Every effort will be made to restore the glasses at the con-
clusion of the war. In all cases an index number is stamped
upon the glasses, and a record of their disposal registered at
tho offices of tho National Service League.

Yours very truly,

Egberts, F.M.

WAR PUBLICATIONS.

AlcoNO works of fiction peculiarly applicable to tho ■present time
must be reckoned Walter Blocm's The Iron Year, recently publisdied
by Messrs. John Lane. It is wortliy of note that this book ran through
twenty editions in Germany shortly after its first publication, though
most people are not likely to take as a recommendation the fact that
the I^iser read it alond to tho members of his family circle. It is,
however, a well-told and extremely topical story of the year 1870,
and the personal interest is supplied by the lovo of a French officer
for a Gennan girl. Tho work bears the stamp of reality, and tlio
book is interesting as a study of the first struggle between the two
nations from a fairly miprejuaiced point of view.

A VERV useful little pocket book for junior ofHcers on service
ffas been issued by The World' i Work, of Bedford Street, Strand, at
t!ie price* of half a crown. The book is novel in form, being linked
at the back after the manner of loose-leaf pocket books, in order to

«ave wear on the back of the cover, and pages and cover alike are
waterproofed. Contents include an English-French-Gei-n.an vocabulary
of most necessary phrases, notes on reconnaissance and map reading
field engineering; field messages, and practically aU the points tliat
»rn ronbtantlv croppinR up in the course of field operations. Light,
"andytc"thoro.fghl/ serviceable, the little book fs one that every
junior officer might with advantage add to his outiit.

If Ecruhardi showed us the doctrine by means of which Germany
hopes to domin.-ite the world, so, just as surelv, Franz Beyerling, in
his book Jena or Sedan/ shows us tho material with which Ccrmany
is to accomplish its ambition. Bernhardi is the enthusiast, recognising
difficulties, but believing in tho power of the nation to overcome all
difficultieo and its riglit to make the attempt for world-power;
Beverlin-' is the critic, a German writing from a German viewiMint,
and telling of things as he £e<.3 them— as they are. His story con-
cerns only the life of a German garrison; it embodies no hinh-l:own
phrases, no attempt at the expression of a creed or » belief; it is a
iimple recital of fact, and as such is a terrible indictment of the
German army. He tells how, though the world has aclvanced
immeasurably in the past four decades, the German army has advanced
not one step; it is still tho wooden machine of Great Fredericks time,
and so simply is this shown that the force of the lesson is doubled.
For those who would learn tho real causes contributing to German
errors as a military power, this story, with its wonderful i-eahsm
and absence of all attempt at dramatic effect, is a convincing handbook
We recommend it to all students of the war and the fighting values of
tho armies taking part therein. Messrs. Heinemann have done well in '
issuin" a two-shilluig edition of this remarkable book at tho present

""^Messes. Kegan, Paui., and Co. have recently reissued von dcr
Goltz's Conduct of War in one half-guinea volume. While prof essing to
bo only a summary of "the various ways of manipulating troops of which
use can be made in war," it is a manual of instruoUon for tJie conduct
of war as well as a. work of considerable historical value. We recom-
mend it to all who make a serious study of operations in tho field
of the present c.impadgn, as well as to those who deeire to read miliUry
history intelligeutlv. It« author was no theorist, but, as a lieutenant-
general, with practical war experience, was able to base his etatements
on work actually accomplislied as well as on the experience of former
commanders. Together with the work of Clausewitz, published by the
same firm, this mu&t rank among the most important booke of the
season. ~ .

The autumn show of the National Rose Society having been
abandoned for this year, the Council of tho Society, at a recent mect-
inK unanimously decided to send a donation of fifty gumeas to the

^ Relief Fund which is being raised by the Society's Hoyal Patroness,

' Queen Alexandra.

The militarv authorities are purch-asing large quantities of farm
and market garden produce for the use of H.M. troops throughout
the country. For the purpose of facilitating supply and of preventing,
as far as possible, a scarcity of produce arising in one district \vhile
there is a surplus in another, farmers are urged to assist the \\ar
Office by staXing the quantity of produce they have to sell at fair
market price.

SPORTSMAN'S BATTALION

(Sanctioned by LORD KITCHENER).

SPBCIALr NOTICE.

Applicants who have already enrolled will please report at the Hotel Cecil, Indian
Room, Embankment entrance, for War Office Medical Examination and attestation as
follows : — Applicants from London and Suburbs, October 6th, from 9 a.m. ; Applicants
from Provinces, October 9th, from 9 a.m.

THERE ARE STILL A FEW VACANCIES FOR THE RIGHT MEN.
Apply at once :— Chief Recruiting Officer, Indian Room, Hotel Cecil. Hours 10 to 6.

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16*

October 10, 1014

LAND AND WATER

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^fiwvvvh"c. . ^^ ■^>' VJ XV »■

THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOG.

THE EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR.

N the Ea,steru theutro of war we are upon the
eve of events which will ijrofoundly affect the
future of the whole European straggle. It
may even be true to say that at the moincut
of writing we are in the midst of those events,
tirst chapter of what will soon be a complete
Btory has apparently been closed in the Northern part
of the Eastern Hi'ld between the Niomen and the
I'rontier of Ea.st ]*russia. Meanwhile the much more

important chapters that have stDl to be unrolled upon
the Upper Vistula, in the Southern department of
this same Eastern field, have not yet reached any
conclusion.

It will be remembered from what was said in
these columns last week, that these scries of operations
in Poland were remarkable from the fact tliat they
included two quite separate batth^fields. We must
still use that term "battlefields," for though the
actions extend OA^cr a front nowadays of anything

LAND AND AVATER

OctoLcr 10, 1914

from r)0 io IJO miles, yet tlio o.ssonlials wliieli cli:s-
tiii<,'iiish a battle and a field of battle fi-om a cam])ai{j:ii
a!id the "theatre" iu which that campaign takes
place still distinguish the very extensive lines along
which to-day a decision is ivaehed. You have the
two fronts, the contact of one with the other, the
coho>ion of either party, the attempt of the one
cilluT to break or t«> envelop the other. And the
whole action is tactical, not stntteglcal.

U.sing then the term " battlefield," greatly
extended as it has become iu time and space, tor the
.scenes of these ])ro(ractcd modern actions you have,
1 siy. in the J'jastcrn theatre of war two distinct
iiattlelields wheivin it is sought by either party to
reach a decision n])on the soil of Poland. These two
liiittleJields are indejKMident of one another, 'i'hey
aiv occupied on the (jcnnanic side by two separate
cohesive bodies.

(1) The bwly which has been struggling to
obtain possession of the Upj)cr Niemeu and the
crossings thereof between (Irodno and Xovno.

(2) The botly which is concerned to arrest nnd if
po.ssible to thrust back the great ]'u.ssian Army,
wliich, since its victory at Jjemberg lias been pressing
westward through (lalicia towanls Silesia.

It will Ik? remembered that it was remarked in
ihe.se notes last week that the Southern of the two
fields was the more imjxn-tant.

When you have two separate actions of this sort
going on, one well in front of the othei-, tlie ultimate
<lecision Avhich will affect the fortunes of both is most
likely to arise in that field wliich contains the larger
total number of combatants. If you have a situatmu
such as that presented in the accompanying diagram,
where an action is going on between black and white,
A I{ and C~]) with

success of G — II against E — F Avill ultimately
threaten the commnnicatious of A — B. In other
words, when two actions like these are being fought
out, not abreast of one another on one line, but criss-
cross, one of the two will be the master action con-
trolling in the long run the results of the other. It
must nearly always be the larger of the two sets of
bodies iiivolved Avhich so conti-ols the action of the
smaller set. Supposing A — B to be successful against
0— D, A— B will none the less ultimately have to
turn back if G — H lias been successful against the
much larger body of A— B's fellows at E — F.

The elements contained in this diagram are
precisely those governing the general operations in
the Eastern theatre of war. It will be apparent that

A C

CommuniccLbons
E G

B D

F H

Co,

^nitnumca.tions

«J

in the Northern battlefield you had in front of the
iNiemen a successful advancing (Jerman bodv, A 1]
pressmg npon u defending Bussian bodv, C 1)'
Wilde down south near the Upper A'istula Vou ha.-l i
Jnuch larger body, G-~-H, advancing against corre-
spondingly large Germanic forces, E F." T'he result
of the action, E-F, (J-H, would ultimately control
the movements of the action A— B C— D For
however successful A-B might be in the ' north.'
y* n and L-F w-ere really deciding the issue of the
ar in the whole of the Eastern theatre. 7'/.^ ^^ere
the principal forces engaged. If F F wins for
instance and pushes tf-T-Il back, the success of
A-ii becoines of comparatively small importance.
11 b— H wins he will be threatening by his larr^e
numbers the communications of the smaller body
A— K and compelling its retreat.

All this is supposing that' A -^B in the north
continues to advance, but, as a fact, this smaller
Geman army winch has been attacking the Bnssians
on the Niemen, and advancing to cross that river,
a. failed and i.s^ now in retreat. Meanwhile, the
mu h larger Austro-Germany Army which is .,r,.

as L Sr'^'f f?r'^ ^'^'^*" tlie Upper \-istula
J'as not yet reached that decision-aud upon the

October 10, 101-4

LAND AND WATER

resvilt of its action, favoxtrable or disastrous to Aiistria
and Gcrmauy, wiU turn tlic Urst phase of the war in
tlie East. Moreover, if the action is really decisive, it
will violently react npon the campaign in France.

lief ore taking these two fields of battle in detail,
I would insist on this last point, upon the very giave
effect npon the war as a Avhole that the first decisive
results in Poland must necessarily have. It is agreed
that the " pressure " which Eussia may be able to
bring upon Geniiany will be of capital effect upon the

the eastern " pressure " upon Germany upon which
the west so eagerly counts.

Now, it is because a decision one way or the other
appears to be imminent that the operations in Polaud
at this moment have resumed their interest for us.

Having said so much let me turn to the two
battlefields in detail.

THE ACTIONS IN THE VALLEY OF

THE NIEMEN.

^MAB^^MPOL

^\ ^5UWALKl

HI !

► RATCHKl / \_^

5 ao so 4-0 so

. \W" SCALE OF Miles.

'^•f cTTTrr? Meres, often Surrounded by Marsh.

Principal Roads.

The Suwalki Causeway throuch the Marsh.

campaign in the AVest. The date at which this
" pressure ' might begin was very foolishly advanced,
and too many organs of public opinion, in tliis coimtry
especially, wrote, at the opening of the Avar, as though
Berlin were to be menaced in a few days. It was
impossible, unless the rules of arithmetic were to be
suspended, for any such "pressure" to be felt before
the third week in Octolx?r, even supjxwing the
maximum success conceivable on the paii of the
Kussians, and the collapse of their opponents. As a
matter of fact, it is already apparent that the
" pressure " will come in any case later tlian this
most favourable date. Fuiiher, it is equally apparent
that the first " pressure " which our common enemies
could Jx> put under by the Russians would be applied not
in the heart of the German Empire, nor at its capital,
but in Silesia, hecause Silesia is the nearest populous
and wealthy pi-ovince exposed to a Russian advance.

Now, a decision reached within the next few
days or in the next Aveek or two by the Russiaus over
the Germans m the eastern theatre of war would
mean the beginiung <jf that " pressure " upon Silesia,
an advance along the valley of the Oder, the turning
of the Eastern fortresses of Prussia in Poland, notably
Posen and Thoni, and the way opn to a niarch ujwn
industrial Saxony and the capital itself.

Conversely, the success of the Gennans, shoxild
they aiTcst the Russian march through Galieia, and
still more should they thrust back the Russians in
that field, woxild mean the indefinite postponement of

On tlio above skeleton map the reader will
discover the size and to some extent the natm-e of the
field of operations in. Northern Poland. It must first
be observed that the artificial frontier Iwtwecn the
Russian Emjnre and East Pnissia, which here cuts
through Northern Poland, has long been crossed by
the advancing German forees, and that these have
been advancing directly \\\>o\\ the Niemen with the
object of crossing that stream.

Tlie Niemen is the great natural ob.stacle to any
invasion of Russia from the west ; at least if such an
invasion take place upon the northern part of her
Avesteni frontier. When Napoleon was occupied in
re-erecting Poland as a nationality, he had imposed
upon the Russians the Niemen as a frontier between
Russia and Poland, though, as a matter of fact, the
Polish nation extends its territory far to the east of
that river. It Avas across the Niemen that Napoleon
marched his great force in June, 1S12, and one
might almost say that the Niemen Avas to the
fortunes of Russia in history what the Meuse is
France. To obtain possession
its crossing places, then, Avas

the fortunes of
this river and

to
of

the object of the Gennan advance in this quarter.
All the country between the East Prussuin frontier
and the Niemen (a matter of over "jO miles even at
the narroAvest point lx?twcen the two lines in this
region) is a mass of Avatcr and wood and marsh. Some
few of the lakes I have set down in the sketch map,
but the total number appearing upon jiny detailed map

3»

LAND AND WATER

October 10, 1914

is verv mncli hrgor and tlio wliole sclicme of tlieiu and
tlK-ir MUToundin-,^ nnu^lios and forests very mucli nmv
con.i.licatcHl. .But even from so elementary a sketcli
on- ran see that the few roads avaUable to an army m
its advanee upon the Niemon are here of eapital im])or-
tanee Every one of them (and particularly the
raasrwav hv whidi the main adv:uice wis made from
fcJuvvalki' to' Seluv) is a series of ftV///<'.y : tliat is ot
iJaees where an annv eannot march upon any but a
verv narrow front :* a jdaee wlieir the echimus are
(•(.i.'lined to one road only and eannot spread ont npou

tidier side. . ^ , • i ,

It was on SeptemVr 2:W-d. that is, a fortiii-rlit
ajro, the AVtnluesday before hist, tliat the Ifussian
(ieiieral Ivemienkampl', retivatiuo; from before the
(lorman advance, j,'ot his hist troops over tlie Nicmen
and waited the ajiproach of the enemy to tliat river.
'I'he jioint at which they pro]tosed to cross, or at !oast
the cliiet of the .several points, was Drusskeniki. 'I'liey
liad ;divadv thrown their i)ontoons acro.ss uli<-u the
fuiiiiter-oflensive ui)on the part of thcliussians bejtcan.
'.I'lie opening of it was no more than the shelling of the
Ciennan pontoon bridges as the Prussians were
crossing them n])on the Friday, the 2.')th, and the
next phase after the success of this check given to the
invadei-s was a violent artillery duel between the
mas.s«l guns of either army tiring from positions
facing each othci; across tlie river, in the hope that
their artillery had suflicieutly dominated the enemy's,
the fJermans began their jweparations for a second
crossing. This second attempt Avas made at the end
(tf the day ; before night it had failed as tlie first had.
I'l-om this check at Drusskeniki the Germans fell
back upon what has been thronghont all the inter-
vening days a retreat, sometimes so pressed as to
involve local disasters. l»y ^Tonday, September 2Sth,
after four dajs of this retreat, the rearguard of the
(lernian i-etirement was at Seiny, which means that
the main body had been covering quite fifteen miles
a day. The whole business in its rapidity and rever.se
was not uulikethe general retreat which we call in the
AVest the battle of Marne. The retreat was also of
ooni*s(i being carried out along the whole front, not
only in the centre with tlie main columns through
Seiny, but up North as far as ^lariampoland Southward
as far as Augustowo. There are no railways in this belt
l)etween tbe Niemen and the G erman frontier. The four
(icmvan Army Corps which, according to the Freneli
Official Communique, were involved, could not there-
fore receive rapid reinforcement oxen if such rein-
forcement could be spared either from the Southern
lield or from elsewhere. Two days later, therefore, by
Thursday, Octok-r 1st, the mass of the Clerman forces
fell back upon a line JMariainpol-Suwalki- Augustowo,
the retreat of the central ])ortion wliicli had to follow
the causeway through the mar.slies from Seiiiy to
Suwaiki being particularly painful and expensive. ' The
i{iis.sians advancing from the line SImno-Sereje-Lipny
on the centre drove the German centre right down
this narrow defile.

The decision in this extended action was reached,
however, not in the centre, but, as seems necessary
nowadays in any extended and lengthy modern
action, upon one of the wings. The operative wing
here was,^ of course, the Southern one, the Russian
left and German right. For to get round this wing
was to cut the Germans off from, or at least to
endanger, their communications with tlieir own
eountrv. There is, Jiowever on this A\ing a great
mass of wood as well as of lake country, known as
the Forests of Augustowo. It is nearly a we:k's
march across by its few soft and sodden roails.

the principal impediment to tlic general
movement, but apparently upon the Thursday,

This Avas

Russian movement, but appan

October 1st, the obstacle A\as surmonntod, or turned,

and Augustowo was occu])ied, the Russian advance

then proceeding to Ifatcbki, wliicb was also taken at

the jwint of the bayonet, and it seemed as though tho

German retreat in "this direction would have to proceed

not by the way the CJeniian advance had come, but

northward and separate from the retreat of another

grouj) of Cierman forces whose action I will now

describe.

This subsidiary grou]) in the advanee on the
Niemen had undertaken to protect the right fltink
of the advanee, the investment of the fortress of
Osowiecs.

This separate operation upon the Southern or
right ilauk of the general German advance upon the
Niemen came a little behind the central main part of
that advance. AVe have seen that the attempt to
cross tlie Niemen at Drns.skeniki belonged to
September .2.jth. It was not until the morrow that
the attack upon the forts of O.sowiecs began. The
bombardment of tliose forts continued apparently for
no more than two days. Indeed, the retreat of tl e
centre from Niemen miist have involved hasty orders
from the German beadquarters to the troops on
the extreme right in front of the fortress, and
these began their retreat toAvards Prussia again.
In this retreat they had the advantage of a railway
which their fellows in the main bodies to the North
had not. But it was just as heavily pressed as the
retirement of the main bodies of tbe North. The
Russian cavalry were in Grajewo witb the lirst of
the month, and" on tbe next day, Friday the 2nd, they
wei-e over the frontier.

All tlie.sc operations, therefore, in Northern
Poland and in the vallej's of the Bobr and the Niemen
(to which the Russians have given the name of the
"Battle of Augustowo," Avhich wei-e fouglit over a
front of more than a hundred miles and which oceu]»ied
altogether more than ten days) have resulted in the
retirement of the four invading German Army Corps
back over their own frontier, audit is probable that at
the moment of Avriting, thongb fighting is still going
on just west of Suwaiki, all tbe German forces have
been withdi-awn from that part of Northern Poland
which lies over the artificial frontier between tho
Russian Empire and East Prussia.

THE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN
POLAND UPON THE UPPER
VISTULA.

It Avill be seen from Avhat has just been .said that
the Russian success in Northern Poland is locally
decisive, not that we have any account of great captures
of men or material, but that the German object de-
liberately undertaken has not been reacbed and the
German plan has failed. But this failnre, as Ave have
seen, only concerns four Army Corps.

The operations in Southern Poland, Avbicb have
not yet come to a decision and in Avhicb the two main
forces have not yet even thoroughly taken contact,
must be Avatcbed Avith far greater interest and will
have far more effect iipon the campaign as a Avliole.

In order to grasp tbe Avay in wbich this great
action is being ajiproacbed, the Avay in Avhicli tlio
opposing forces are manoeuvring for position, and the
nature of the ground over Avhicb the shock Avill take
])hice, Ave must master the veiy simple elements of tho
iield, remembering that the forces that Avill join battle
in the field, and that bave perb.aps already done

October 10, 1914

LAND AND WATER

something toAvards achieving a decision at the moment
of ■writing, are nearly four times as numerous in
southern Pohmd as they are in that northern field
■\\hich we have just been examining. We have, it is
presumed in the official notices, fifteen or sixteen
army corps, Austrian and German, drawn up to check,
and if possible to throw back, the Eussian advance
through south and central Poland.

The general story of what has preceded the
coming great action in the Galician field may be
rapidly recalled.

would take. They might elect to mass the whole
Austro-German force (now presumably under one
Prussian Commander-in-Chief) at a point where the
three Empu'es meet, and there to await the Eussian
shock, abandoning Cracow. At first, when it was
discovered that entrenchments had been made just
inside Eussian Poland, upon the line Kaliscz-Wielun-
Czenstochowa, it was believed that some such plan was
intended. A line of troops would stand upon the
defensive to protect the river flank from being tiu'ned,
and the big action would come behind, or to the west.

• "«'^^

■6

POSITION or TH» AUSTBIAN ABIinES IJT OAMCIA, AND THB LINB OF OIBMAN BEINTOBCSKE^TT FBOM TUB WEST.

Eather more than a mouth ago, just as Yon
Jvluck was approaching Paris, the Eussians broke up
one of the t\\o great Austrian armies opposed to them
in Southern Poland. They broke up the army round
Lemberg, Ai-my 2, whereupon Army 1, immediately to
the north of this, fell back. The Eussians advanced
after securing Lemberg and its many munitions and
their very numerous prisoners — some 60,000 — and
their considerable captures in guns and material;
they isolated Przemysl, occupied the Passes of the
Carpathians behind that fortress, took Jaroslav,
reached Debitza last week, and pro])Osed to advance
the remaining week's march upon Cracow. Part of
the defeated Austrian Ai-my No. 2 got itself shut
np in Przemj'sl, but tlie remainder, together with
Army No. 1, fell back before the Eussian advance,
crossing the San river and the plains behind it, and
making fur the Upper Vistula and for the neigh-
bourhood of Cracow, perpetuaU}* retiring rapidly and
avoiding a decision. Should the fortress of Cracow
be liiasked and passed by the Eussians, Silesia would
be open to Eussian attack aud a new phase of the
campaign Avould begin with the invasion of the
German Empire.

^Meanwhile, large German bodies were being
organised and sent eastward to help the Austrians in
this .southern field, to check the Eussian advance and
to save Silesia from the invasion that tln-eatencd it.
For some time it was uncertain what form this
German advance in reinforcement of the Austrians

of Cracow. But what the Gennans have done in the
last week shows that they and their Allies have no
intention of fighting so far west, but rather propo.se
to meet the enemy upon the line of the Upper Vistula
below Cracow. Their troops have been located upon
the line Pietrokow-Stopnitza, coming right down to
the left bank of the Vistula at a point just north of
Tamow, and the whole series of bodies along this line
is moving southward.

Such a disposition obviously calls a halt to the
Eussian westerly advance along the main railway
tlirough Galicia towards Cracow and Silesia. They
had isolated Przemysl and taken the passes through
the Carpathians, behind that fortress, nearly a fort-
night ago. They had come up to a line ]mssing from
Dukla through Krasuow to the main Lemberg-Cracow
railway line ten days ago. Their vanguard had
already reached and ptissed Debitza and was approach-
ing Tamow when the nature of this German move was
apparent. This move they must now face by looking
no longer westward nor advancing further along the
main railway towards Cracow and SUesia, but north-
wards and westwards towards across the upper reflches
of the river A^istula, in the neighbourhood of which
the shock will come. They will have the advantage
in this shock of a main railway, that from Lemberg to
Cracow, immediately in the rear of their line, where
the Austro-German forces will have one rather
further back in the main line to Kielce, which is also
the trunk line through Warsaw to

Pctrograd

LAND AND WATER

October 10, 1914

THl SOCTHEnN OE MAIN FIELD OF ACTION IN TUB EASTEEN AnEA OF WAR.

from Vienna. Of dli-ect railway communication the
Oennans and Austrians will have only one artery,
that coming from Silesia ; for the railway reaching
Czenstochowa from Gennany is only a light line,
irui-thcr the gauge of the Kielce Eailway is the
Jlussian gauge, different from that of the rest of
Europe. The Gennans have axles and wheels suited
to this gauge and applicable to their o\™ rolling
fctock, but in what quantity and whether upon the
spot or no we cannot tell. (I have marked upon the
map the jwints Zombkovice Junction and Wielce
Junction where the breach of gauge occurs). The
(jcrmans have the worst roads for supply behind
tlieni, the roads to the south of the Vistula
being good macadamised roads and those to the
north mainly un-macadamised tracks. The country
to the north of the Vistula through which, pre-
sumably, the Austro-German advance will come, is
open enough, though hilly in the neighbourhood of
the liver, and gets more wooded as one goes north-
ward to the Kielce railway line. ITie country to the
south of the Vistula, as I have marked it, is consider-
ably w-ooded, and, upon the right flank of the southern
orGahcian Russian force, is one great, almost unbroken
lorest m the angle between the Vistvda and the San.

Apart from the Russian army in Galicia, which
lias advanced from Lemberg since its victory there
a new anny is coming up through Central Poland]
and tl)c Russian forces, tli<»ugh massed mainly to the
south, yet extend up through Kielce and beyond,
everywhere approachmg contact with the Austro-
German line m front and to the west of them •
which line would seem to run from Pietrokow to
fetopmtza and is extending to the south

:-t'Jiere are in brief, the tactical elements of the
licld m which this great decision is to be chaUengcd.

But what precise form the battle line will take
when the shock comes we cannot tell. StiU less can
we conjecture the issue.

THE OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN
THEATRE OF WAR.

^'"^%^-

ttto^'

atloas

•^
/

nv J

ARMENTIERES
ARRAS ^f J

soissoNs «"*;\ .^

RHEIMS ^4^*;,

"■Til

O 10 2S SO
«-J 1 L_

Scale of Miles

lOO

'^ERDUN
X^STMIHIEL

TOUL

VII

GENERAL MAP OP OPERATIOXa IN THi WESTERN AREA.

In the Western theatic of war there is very
little that is new in Trance. The new thing in

Odober 10, 1914

LAND AND WATER

Belfjiuin is the active pursuit of the Siege of Antwerp
by the enemy.

In France, two districts claim oiir attention —
the one upon the extreme East wing, round about
A''erdun, and the Toul — Verdun fortified line, and
iVi'gonne, where a German offensive has for the
moment failed ; the other — the decisive point — the
oxtreme Western wing. West of the Oise and North
of the Sommc, of which we are as yet told very
little indeed, but where a series of violent actions, the
decision in which may come at any moment, are
l;eing fought from Eoye right up to the Belgian
frontier.

To take these in thcu* order—

THE OPERATIONS BETWEEN
ARGONNE AND LORRAINE.

'. , ^KIONTFAUCON

ST? • 0\

M£NEHOULD\

VBRDUN

'oermoht]^

METZ

P^ ^THIAUCOURT

STMIHIEL
W «TOUL

«5»

lA^iles

Vi!

The operations in the field which comprises
the Argonne, Verdun, St. Mihiel, and the Woeuvre
will have no meaning for us until we can grasp
some general object the enemy has in mind.
They can hardly be desultory and disconnected
actions, as at first sight they appear to Ije ; that
is not the way of any soldier, least of all of German
soldiers.

In my notes of a week ago I jwinted out the
difficulty of det^'rmining the motive of the enemy in
ostablishing a bridge head over the Meuso at St.
Mihiel. If he was not able or did not intend to
advance in force through this gap in the Toiil — Verdun
line of foi-tifications, why was he at the pains of
occuj)ying a dangerous salient and of reducing two
strong permanent works and of attempting, under
heavy loss (and faihng), to establish himself upon the
other side of the river ? The Germans having opened
that door have not used it. I said that if they were
not intending an advance in force through this door
they had opened — if they had not men enough in that
region to mask Toid and Verdun and at the same
time to ponr a large force straight on to Eevigny —
then they could only be attempting a diversion,
and the whole thing must be regarded as a feint,
undertaken in the hopes of relie\ang the increasing
pressure on their west wing out beyond the Oise.
IJut there is anothor possibility which would also
account for those attacks which take place on the
west side of the Meuse with such regularity and with
equal regularity fail, and that third possibility is the
hope or the intention of investing Verdun. It may
well be that the German General Staff, Avhich has had

to change its major plans already twice, and must have
to change details in those plans continually, have
more than once detennined that the fall of the great
frontier fortress line was essential to their success and
more than once hesitated before the task in view of
the heavy reinforcement reqmred upon the right wing
beyond the Oise. Hesitation and fluctuation of this
sort would account for nearly all that has happened.
The idea that Verdun must be invested, the beginning
of that task, its abandonment imder pressure from the
"west, then its being taken up again will account for
most or all of what has hajipened in this region. It
accounts for the attack on the fort at Troyon to the
south of Verdun before the Gennan retreat began.
Indeed in those days — the second week of September —
the investment of Verdim was openly put forward as an
objective in the German official communiques. The
Cro^Ti Prince's Anny, which was in-incipally occupied
in tliis task and which had its headquarters at Ste.
Menehould, was compelled to fall back as far as
Varennes in the genend retreat of the German line
imposed by Von Kluck's peril : the retirement which
goes by the name of the Battle of the M;u-ne. But
after the Crown Prince's Army had thus retreated the
counter offensive was attempted several times, and
both these counter attacks undertaken by the Crown
Prince from the sides of the Argonne down south on
to the French positions west of Verdun, and the
subsequent advance from Thiaucom-t on to the
Lleuse at St. Mihiel, were presumably combined
actions having for their common object the isolation
of Verdun.

The last of these numerous strokes to fail has
been that of the Crown Prince on Saturday and
Sunday last and of this the sketch map below gives
the details.

^ Woods r^cal/e<^
La ^Grun'e^

MONT FAU CON

VARENNES

To VERDUN

Sr^ MENEHOULD ^"fslftt^" CLERMONT.

% «*'

^
^

"^^

While an unsuccessful attempt was being made to
force the Meuse at St. Mihiel and so isolate Verdun
from the east, the Crown Pi-ince's Army acting from
Montfaucon and the open region North of Varennea

LAND AND AVATEE

October 10, 1914

maae a actomibed effort to push Lack the ii-cnch 1 no
AV.^st of VerJun aud to isohito the fortress upou that
side T'lcsc same forces of the enemy had ab-eady
nioi-c thau once tried to force that line in the ncij^h-
hourhood of Clcnnont. or rather, in the open couii ry
bctwvon Ch-nuont and Varcnnes. But they had failed
in each such attempt, although they had pushed then-
outposts beyond Varcnnes itself and, until this week,
had permanently occupied that town. Iheir attack
oi last Saturday was made in another direction, it was
masked by the woods of Argonne from which tliey
de1)ouched upon the western .side turning tlunicc
.southwai-ds and aiming at Ste. Mcnehould. Ihe >Vood
of r..a Gi-urie, through whiih this march was under-
taken, lies to the north of the main road tliat crosses the
\r"ouue from Vareunes to Vieuue by way of the little
l)lacc called La 1 larazee. In dry weather it is possible to
bring gnus and train through this wood (a clay soil) even
without the use of the great high road between Varennes
and Vicnue, aud, if an advance in force were detenuined
on, the railway round the Pa.ss of Grandprc would be
of gi-eat service. ^Vo have been given no account of
the action, nothing more than the bai-e .statement in
the Official Communique that in the result the wdiolc of
the Oennan force which has taken the offensive was
thrust back behind the Ime of the main road, and that
should mean that Varennes has again fallen into
French hands. It also means quite certainly that
for the moment the attempt to invest Yerdmi is
abandoned.

Meanwhile, at the other end of this field, the
gan-ison of Toul, which has thrust out an effort north-
w ai-d during the last week, is holding the southern
edge of the Eupt do Mad. Of coui-se, if it could
cross that valley (which is the line by which Thiau-
eourt, the Gennan headquarters here, is fed, and
along which its railway runs), or if it even seriously
threatened that line, ijie troops at St. Mihiel would
have to faU back. We are not told what is passing
in that neighbourhood in sufficient detail to judgti
whether St. Miliiel can be held much longer, but if
the advance from the south upon the Eupt de Mad,
slow as it is, continues, it is certain that the advanced
German body on the Meuse must retii'e.

THE WESTERN FRONT.

With regai'd to the western front, there neither
is anythuig communicated which materially modifies
the situation of last week nor if any such knowledge
had reached one would it be advisable to discuss it
publicly, because it is evident that upou this front the
decision of the campaign hangs. The general line is
public property. The belt, for the possession of which
the struggle rages, is that of the district round Eoye,
of the great open fields between .ybert and Combles,
and furth(!r north the neighbourhood of Arras. "Wliat
fortunes that struggle w ill have we do not yet know,
it hangs even and it is largely veiled. Certain main
facts about it are public property, as that the enemy
has heavily reinforced the central and southern part
of that Hue between the Oise and the Somme ; at least
two Bavarian anny corps hitherto elsewhere have
appeared Iwforc Eoj'c. He expects further to rein-
force it with the troops he hoi>es to be able to spare
from Belgium after the success of his present oix^ra-
tions there. Against this special effort the Germans
arc making in the line protecting their communications
and their wc^t or right fiauk the Allies are, of course,
)naking corresponding efforts, but of the nature of
these nothing must be s;ud.

One thing the general reader will do well to
appreciate when, or before, the curtain lifts, and the

result of the great struggle is known, and that is tho
length of this new line which, beginning in skinnishes
round Noyon, has developed nearly uj) to the Belgian
frontier. It is no less thau 70 miles ; nearly a week's
march. One main railway line feeds the German effort
hero. It is also their main line of communication in
the whole front between Noyon and the Argonne. Tho
Allies opposed to them are fed by a whole system of
railways and the sea behind that system, and thi.^
stubborn defence of the Gennan communications and
this momentous attack upon them is the first of tho
great railway wars of the modern era. The railways
are here the chief strategic factor upon our side, just
as the /•a///rfl_j' behind the German line

(Passage deleted by Censor.)

These two things, the gix^at extension of the line
and the fact that railways are the core of modern
movements in the field, at least in highly develoijctl
countries, must have this effect upon our judgment :
that we must never consider a great modern flanking
movement of this kind as presenting the element of
surprise. There arc conditions under which it might,
by good luck, possess that invaluable element, but
those conditions must be very rare. As a rule, the
moving of such great masses of men over suck
great distances and by a method of communication,
every yai-d of which is necessarily known to tho
enemj^ and none of which can be shifted or exchanged,^
a method of communication tied Avith peculiar immo-
bility to certain directions, makes everywhere against
the possibility of surprise. That element of surpriso
still exists in modern war. It was very evident when
the Gennans accumulated so unexpected a mass of
men to the north of the Meuse before their attack
upon the Sambre at the end of August. But it will
hardly be found in the great flank movements whereby
eveiy modem army will attempt to defeat an enemy
that is fairly its equal in numbers, material, and con-
dition of mind. It is worth pointing out that in
every theatre of the war, not only here in France, but
yestei"day before the Niemen and to-moiTOw ujwn
the Vistula, this feature has or will appear. To break
a modern line if it be properly held is, as against an
equal enemy, so difficult, or perhaps so nearly impos-
sible, that the effort will necessarily be to " claw
round." On the Niemen the trick was done when the
superior Eussian forces got thi-ough the woods of
Augustowo and can-ied that town, and something of
the sort wiU presumably be found to decide each ono
of these enormous battles until the campaign is con-
cluded. The exception was the lengthy action which
goes by the name of the Battle of Lemberg, when the
Second Austrian Anny was defeated more than a
month ago by the Eussiaus. There the line broke,
but the case was exceptional, for the opposed forces,
even if equal in numbers, w^erc in no way equal in
homogeneity and determination.

[Posdscrijjf. — Since writing the above the French
official message of this Tuesday evening (when these
notes arc made up for Press) has come in and informs
us that large masses of cavalry acting as a screen
for new forces of artilleiy and infantry behind them
have appeared in the neighbourhood of Lille and
Armentieres. The position of these places upon the
slight sketch at the head of this section and the
relation they bear to the general line should.

8»

October 10, 1914

LxVXD AND WATER

siiificioutly show the ijiipoitancc of tliis news. It
mcaus that whether by the releasiug ol" men rroin the
gan-isons iu Belgium, or from the anival of new
contingents, or from transference from the east, the
enemy proposes to bring fiu-thcr forces ujjon the ilank
of the existing French line, that is upon if not behind
its western extreme. It is he who is attempting to
lengthen still further the extension of this great new
front which during the last fortnight has crept up
from Noyon northwards until it has now reached the
Belgian frontier.

What fortunes the move may have we cannot
tell for at least two days.

AVe learn from the same communication and
from one previous to it that there has again been
some slight advance in the centre or rather in the
loft centre over the trenches that have defended the
crest of the plateau above Soissons and towards
(Jraonne. In this local success the French acknow-
ledge the aid of the British contingents. But there
has been no serious development or change along the
old main front between the Oise and the Argonne.

THE SIEGE OF ANTWERP.

have the ring of " old forts," the original works by
Avhich the modem city was defended. Strictly speaking,
the scheme is not a ring but three-quarters of a circle
reposing upon the Scheldt, most of the country
behind or to the west of which is not available for
siege operations because it can be flooded, and
because the last portion of it is foreign territory
and Dutch.

Finally, a third set of defences, at an average of
about ten to fifteen thousand yards from the centre
of the city, consisting in a chain of modern forts,
completes the scheme.

It is against the southern sector of these outer
forts that the Gennan howitzer fire has been directed
during the last few days. The attack began last
Tuesday moi-ning upon the works of AVaelhem and
Wavrc St. Catherine. Next day it was extended to
the work at LieiTC. Upon Thursday evening these
works were still replying, but upon the Friday a
breach in the outer ring was so far effected that the
besieging army was able to reach the line of the Biver
Nethe behind it.

Here appeared, and is still appearing, what has
become a characteristic of all efforts against permanent

)'AJ.errc
^ Fort

Wavre*Ste
Catlxenne

"Rande of 10.000yds.

tLA.N- BUOWIKO THE J OKTlFICiTIOXS ROCKD AXTWJCKr.

There are many reasons why speculation upon
the course of the last great Gorman oj)ei'ation, the
Siege of Antwerp, shoidd be prudently restricted.
But it is impossible to give a summary of the news
this week without saying something of this most
important development. It will be sufficient if we
confine ourselves to the official communiques and note
their bearing upon the situation.

llie City of Antwerp is protected by three groups
of works. First, immediately round its densely-
inliabited portion the old continuous dit<.'h or eiiceinte.
This rampart, though it has no relation to modem
fortification, prevents something which has happened
to all the other brailment rings in the north, and
which would not have happened to them had they
also possessed a ditch and rampart. I mean the
introduction of small Ixxlies of the euomy between
the outer forts into the heart of a place.

Next, outside the suburbs and at ranges vaiymg
from aOOO to 4000 yards to the heart of the city, you

works in this w^ar, and what will be just as apparent
when we come to attack Geraian permanent works in
our turn. It is one of the chief lessons of the
campaign. Howitzer fire dominates regular fortifica-
tion far more than was imagined before the war broke
out, but on the other hand the resisting power of
infantry and field artillery behind any defensive line
is far greater than was expected. It is exactly what
you had in the attack upon the Mouse the other day
in front of St. Mihieh The permanent works fell. or
were silenced by heavy howitzer fire in a little over
two days' engagement, but the defence of the infantry
upon the other side of the stream rendered useless
this achievement, and, though a breach had been driven
through a line of rogukr fortification, progress could
not be made beyond that line. The Belgian Amiy has
Ijeen able to maintain itself Ijehind the Nethe and the
Dyle ever since the first attack was made. The
official communique which tells us that the German
shells wei-e falling as far as Contich also tells us that

»•

LAND AND AVATEE

October 10, 1914

the enemy faUed repeatedly ia his attempt to throw

i)ontoons across the river „VU..I- r.n

' ITie hst news, which is as late as 7 o clocl. on
Tuesday evenin-, when these notes are put into their
final form, tells us that this resistance was st.l
effectively m^iintained and that the garrison of
Antwerp had imposed three full days of immobility

upon the enemy. i i. +i „

It is obvious that here, as throughout the
campaign, time is a very important factor for the
(lennans. They hope by this operation against
Vntwerp. if or when it is successful, to effect two
thin^ : to release great masses of troops, perhaps not
of the best, but hitherto held to their lines of
communication throuj^h Belgium, which ^vere always
throatcaed by a sortie from the Antwerp garrison,
such as took plac3 two weeks ago ; secondly, thoy
propose to occupy the whole of Bslgian territory witli
the fall of its last political centre.

But all this is so obvious that it hardly needs

recital. ,■■,■,

What is less obvious is the calculation which has
made the enemy nndertake this operation so late in
the day. That he should have delayed upon it
during the first rush one can understand, but that he
should have postponed it until the foui'th week of the
Battle of the Aisne, that is, while his communications
had been in some .jeopardy for quite twenty days, is
remarkable. I sugger^, though it is only a suggestion,
that the explanation of so tardy an action is to be
found in two things. First, that the siege train is

limited.

We all know that it takes a long time to

make great howitzers, and the total number that caa
be brouf'ht against fortification restricts attacks of this
kind. ''Nothing was done against Verdun until
Maubeuge had fallen.

The other thing I suggest is, if the conjecture has
anything in it, of real importance, for it will affect the
whole development of the campaign.

I suggest that G-ermany had never envisaged the
resistance^ of Belgium. She did envisage the resist-
ance of the Belgian town of Namur because she
thought that this point would be so vital to the
French that they would seize it and try to hold it.
She did envisage, of course, the reduction of the
French strongholds, and, necessarily, of Maubougo,
which lay right upon her proposed line of invasion
and commanded its railway.

Now, when a German plan is made, it has the merit
of being thought out thoroughly ; it has the demerit
of not being clastic, of not allowing for the unfore-
seen. The places which Germany thought she Avould
have to deal with she not only studied, but weakened
by long and very closely calculated acts of treachery.
They Avere full of spies (as England is at the present
moment) ; all their best emplacements for heavy guns
were, if not prepared beforehand (as was the case at
Maubeuge) upon property which had been conveyed
to German owners by stealth, yet calculated and the
opportunities for making them known. I suggest
that in the case of Antwerp this peculiar method of
preparing war, which is one of the chief surprises
of the present campaign, was neglected, and to this
neglect we owe the delay.

NOTK— THIS ABTIOU HAS BEEX eOBMITTia) TO THE PRESS BOBKAC, WHICH DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE PUBLICATION AS CBNSOBBD
AKD TAKES KO BESPONSIBILITY FOB THE CORRECTNESS OP THE STATEMENTS.

Df ACCOEDAKO WITH THE KEQUIRBMENT3 OP THE PRESS BUBKAIT, THE POSITIONS OP TROOPS ON PLANS ILLITSTRATING THIS
ARTICLE MUST ONLY BE REGARDED AS APPROXIMATE, AND KO DEFINITE STRENGTH AT ANT POINT IS INDICATED.

A TOPOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO THE

WAR ZONE.

By E. CHARLES VIVIAN.

Cracow. — The Becond city of Austrian Gallcia, and one
of the strongest of Galician fortress towns, being equal to
Przemsyl in this latter respect. The population of the town is
about 100,000, mainly Polish, with about 25 per cent, of Jewish
stock and 7 per cent. German. The industries of the town are
unimportant as regards manufactures, but there is a large trade
in local agricultural produce. Cracow is situated about ten
miles south of the frontier dividing Galicia from Eussian Poland,
and is ne.xt only to Lemberg in importance among Galician
rentresof trade. It is a railway junction of some magnitude, lines
branching hence north-west to Breslau and Silesia,[south-west of
Vienna and Austrian centres, and east to Tamow "and Lemberg.
Cracow has always ranked as a great educational centre for the
Pohsh race, and in its university the Polish language has been
exclusively used since 1870 ; while its academy of science, founded
in 1872, is the principal in.stitution of its kind in Galicia.

Javorow.— Situated fifteen miles cast of Jaroslav, and the
terminus of a line of rail running east to Lemberg. It is about
equidistant from Lemberg, Jaroslav, and Przemsyl.

„ Vistula, River.— The principal river of Poland, and
the cradle of the Polish nationality," has a total length of
«20 miles, with a drainage area of over 70,000 square "miles.
It rises m the Beskides Hills, in Galicia, at a height of 3,675 feet
nhwe sea-level, and is formed of the junction of the Black and
>\ bite Vistulas ; in its extreme upper course its direction is north
cast through an elevated valley between the Beskides and the
^andomierz heights, and here it separates Russian Poland from
(.alicia, while by the time it reaches Cracow it has acquired
Burli .1 volume as to be nearly 100 vards in width. At
/;anwichvost it enters Russian Poland, and receives the San

as its tributary, turiiing due north, and traversing a valley lying
below the level of the Polish plateau. This valley is bordered
by limestone crags, and is about ten miles in width. From
JiLsefow the river turns slightly to the west of north, and attains
a width of 1,000 yards at normal times ; though the banks
are dammed up by the inhabitants of the surrounding coimtry,
floods in the Carpathians sometimes cause the river to break its
banks, when it inundates hundreds of square miles in the plain.^
of Opolic and Kozienic, the waters sometimes reaching over 100
miles from the river bed. The nature of the coimtry below
Warsaw is such that the river frequently changes its bed, so much
80 that towns which used to stand on the left bank of the
river are now on its right bank. It enters Prussia near the fortress
town of Thorn, and, forcing a way through the Baltic ridge,
turns north-east and enters the Baltic Sea by way of the Frische
Hail at Dantzic. It is navigable for small boats and rafts
practically as far as Cracow, and, at a cost of 1,000,000 sterling,
lias been deepened and dredged near its mouth by the Prussian
Government, with a view to increasing the value and availability
of Dantzic as a port. An artificial channel has been constructed
from Rothebude, twelve and a half miles up the river, to its mouth,
and the minimum depth of this is six feet. The river has an
extremely violent current during the rainy autumn season,
and is practically imbridgable in its lower reaches at this time.
General commercial navigation is maintained from the mouth
of the river up to its junction with the Wieprz, and for this
distance the Vistula is regarded as the chief commercial artery
of Poland. Its chief tributaries on the right bank are the San,
the Wieprz, and the Bug ; on the left bank, the Nida and the
Pilica. The principal towns on the Vistula are Cracow,
Sandomierz, Warsaw, Plock, Thorn, and Dantzic.

10*.

October 10, 1914

LAND AND WATER

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

CKAJIT or turn FACIIIC, INDICATINO TBC UtKA OF TRB OFKOATIONS OF THB OSBKAN CHINA. BqtIADltOS, 01° WUICK SOUE GUU'S

RATI APFKABIO OVV THI rUI ISLANDS.

KOTE.— THIS Ar.TICLE HAS BKE.V SUBMITTBD TO TH« FBE8S BUBKAC, 'VnBlCH DOES NOT OBJICT TO THB rPBLICATION AS CEXsORED
AXD TAKSS NO B£SF0>'SIB1LIXT FOB TEB COESKCTNJtSS OV TUB EXAT£1IEXTS.

THE FAR EAST.

TIIK situation Lere is somewhat complicated by the
fact tliat the Scharnhorst and Gneiscnau, which
were supposed to be blockaded in Kiao-Chau,
appear to have got out before the Anglo-Japanese
blockade was completed. They have been reported
loose in the Pacific.

To date their exploits have not gone further than the destruc-
tion of the old French gunboat Zdec — which was disarmed as
useless— and the bombardment of an unfortified town in the
Fiji Islands. Neither exploit is glorious, but it counts.

Since these two ships have escaped, we may take it that all
the swift cruisers have done the same thing, and that the present
Ccmian fleet loose in the Pacific is as follows : —

SdiarHlwnl, 11,000 ton!. Guns, 8 8-2', G C. Speed 22i-23

lets. Belt, G inches.
GntUtnau, 11,600 tons. Cuns, 8 8-2' G C'

Belt, 6 inches.
Ltipzig, 3,250 tons. Guns, 10 41'. Speed, 23 kts.
Xunibcrg, 3,4.'i0 tons. Guns, 10 i\' Speed, 231 kts.
Emdcn, 3,000 tons. Guns, 10 41'. Speed, 24i kt«.

Of these we already know all about the Emden. As for the
others, the Scharnhorst went badly aground three or four years

8 8-2', G C'. Speed

Speed 221-23 kts.

ago, and thereafter failed to steam at any decent speed. TLo
Gneisenau also was never quite a success. But the odds (on
which wo must calculate) are that both ships have eijice beeu
brought to efficiency.

(Passage deleted by Censor.)

As for the lesser German cruisers, the fighting value of these
is trivial. But they have to be caught.

The mystery is where they have all been hiding, and why
they have been hidden so long. The secret bases must be more
numerous than we thought. These bases can hardly be on tho
mainland anywhere, for, if so, some of them must have beeu
heard of.

Coahng at sea is possible enough, A whole fleet once coaled
in mid-Atlantic twenty years ago. Consequently it is by no
means unlikely that the German raiders do not always use lonely
islands as bases, but have certain fixed rendezvous on the high seas
where they can always meet colliers and other supply ships.

11»

LAND AND \YATEE

October 10, 1914

This is simple enough, as outside the trade routes the whole
S „ b rfor less L'uainhabited desert Presently, of course,
their bottoms will foul, bnt that will hardly be yet. .

The "German Fleet" inside Kiao-Chau probably consists of
most of the other ships of their China squadron. These are

(or were) : — „• r x

Four cunboats-////s, Jaguar, Tiger, Luchs
Three river gunboats— Tsuir/iau, Vatefland, OUer.
Two destroyers— TaA-« and S 90.

One miscellaneous— Tifanio. t.j<< iw^, „

Of these the Tsingtau is that much paragraphed sold-for-a
dollar " Bunboat. One of the destroyers has been fik-prc-
sumably by land fire from the Japanese, which has also put the
Ittif more "or less out of action. . . , , ,

The Kaiser is understood to have ordered the gamson to bold
out to the Lwt. It may obey instructions and do so. But the
difference between that and imiiirdiato stirrender only exists in
terms of useless sacrifice of life. It is unlikely to delay the fall
of Kiao-Chau by more than a few days.

CO;

'^M,

**c,. .

' K I AU ,'
C H A U .'

BAY ;

HWANG
TAU BAY

)

HAI

',C.EVELYN

KIAU CUAU (tSINQ-TAd).

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

Official news from the Adriatic is mostly unimportant, and
in all cases very stale. Unofficial news carries us very little
further except that Italy appears to be the only sufferer from
Austrian mines, and Austria has had to compensate heavily.
The only other sufierers have been Austrian warships and
merchant vessels. On a rough calculation Austria to date must
be something like 500 per cent, out of pocket over her mining
investment.

To the time of writing the only thing of real importance
achieved by the Allies in the Adriatic is the capture of Lissa.
This advanced base being secured, Cattaro can well be. left alone
80 far as naval operations are concerned. A blockade is quite
as effective and a great deal cheaper than a bombardment.

Elsewhere the Dardanelles question has obtruded itself.
The Turks temporarily closed th« Dardanelles because vessels
of the Anglo-French Fleet stopped and searched ingoing traffic.
This Turkish protest is unlikely to have the remotest effect on the
Allies' strategy. So long as the Goeben and Breslau retain their
crews on board them, so long will it be necessary to make certain
of their destruction should they emerge from their place of
presumed internment, and to intercept supplies to them.

In the press of more exciting matter it is not properly recognised
what a nuisance the Goeben business is, nor how difficult it is to
deal with. It is the old story of Punica fides. Germany has
certainly achieved one advantage in this war. She has given
us reason to believe that given a weak and complacent neutral
no ordinary laws of war will count with her. And we are paying
for tliis by ships diverted from the Adriatic operations. This,
come to think of it, is a strategical gain for Germany. It is, to be
sure, along similar lines to the tactics of Ananias in the past,
but for the present it serves. I cannot help thinking that
matters could be simplified were the Allied Fleet to make it
clearly public that, in the event of the Goeben and Breslau re-
appearing these ships wiU be regarded as pirates and no quarter
whatever will be extended to their crews. Then, should they
emerge and presently intern themselves again in some Turkish
harbour, no awkward questions about neutrality could be raised.
A pirate has no legal status.

It is abundantly clear that Germany has not complied with
international law in the matter of the internment of these two
ships. It 13 equally clear that unless international law is to become
a dead letter something must be done to assert the necessity of
observing it. •'

In the distorted perspective in which we necessarily see naval
events just as they happen, this matter of the Goeben and Breslau
appears as a quite minor matter. But if one truism more than
another can be accepted as Gospel for the present war it is the
old proverb, " It is the little things that count."_

The centre of Mediterranean interest is not in the Adriatic,
where the Allies are bound to accomplish more or less as they
list, but outside the Dardanelles and the possibilities of a re-
incarnation of the Goeben and Breslau. Of itself the menace ia
of no great account. But it has some decided value as " the
menace that waits."

THE NORTH SEA.

The Admiralty notification that mines have been laid in a
certain area in the North Sea— I have roughly indicated the area
bv a diagram (see next page), because latitudes and longitudes
convey little to the non-technical reader — is the immediate answer
to the submarining of the three Cressys.

The mine field will considerably hamper future German
submarine movements, especially those of such submarines as
may happen to be out and which will know nothing of the danger
awaiting their return unless warned by those " observation
stations " which the Germans are supposed to have established
on our East Coasts.

The weak point of a mine field is that " roads through it "
must necessarily exist, and these can of course be observed,
either directly as our submarines observed them inside the Bight
of Heligoland or by the misuse of neutral fishing craft. On this
account alone the closing of all British harbours on the East
Coast to alien fishing craft or craft so registered is a very wise
measure, while the public notification of the mine field will
render pretty clear the status of any fishing craft found prowling
about the prohibited area no matter what flag it may chance
to be flying.

German submarines can still emerge from the Heligoland
direction, but they will have to come along a more or less well-
defined route, where there is just enough vagueness in the
Admiralty statement to leave it not quite clear whether other
mined areas than those mentioned do not exist.

Out of all this we can take it that, so far as the British Navy
is concerned, the mine is taken to be the answer (or one of the
answers) to the submarine. A submarine travelling on the
surface has a fair chance of crossing a mine field without much
risk, but a submarine on the surface is no particular danger to
anyone. She is easily to be aimihilated by destroyers and torpedo
boats if detected, and detection is not very difficult.

In connection with this matter attention may be drawn to
the circumstance that German official reports of submarine
movements have frequentlj' referred to " ten-day cruises."

Now, by simple arithmetic we can easily calculate that there
are few if any German submarines capable of ten-day cruises
unaided, allow as we will for lying by on the surface at night.
The utmost radius of any tiling up to U 24 is " on paper " 2,000
miles on the surface. Supposing surface cruising for only twelve
hours out of the twenty-four, this works out about eight days
at ten knots, without taking into account fuel expended in
re-charging accumulators for under-water work.

Of course it is possible for a boat to lie below water with
no machinery working, and so far as machinery and fuel supply
is concerned to carry this on fairly indefinitely, so long as she
can keep on renewing at intervals her air supply. Nothing very
definite is known as to what the fresh air supply method in
German boats consists of. but in any case it is not a matter
to be arranged for in a few minutes.

Apart from this machinery question there is the human
element to consider, and, altogether, I for one refuse to believe
tliat any German submarine can manage to be self-supporting
for ten days under war conditions. Assuredly these ten-day
submarines must have floating bases of some sort, bases which can
liardly have proceeded out of the Heligoland Bight, imless they
were established at least nine weeks ago.

We have got to face the circumstance that Germany is not
basing her efforts against us from her own shores. Slie has
probably been particularly careful so to arrange matters that no
neutral is either involved or suspected. Bttt bases of some kind
must exist.

It is none too soon that we have virtually closed North Sea
traffic except to vessels conducted by our own pilots. We
perhaps ought to have done it the instant that the Ainpkion
was lost, without regard to neutral susceptibilities. No honest
neutral can possibly object to the precautions which wo have
taken. As indicated last week all neutrals, save the Dutch,
have suffered badly from the German system of indiscriminate
mine-laying. The only possible answer was to lay mines every-
where where the Germans have not done so, but apparently
mean to lay them.

It is, of course, the duty of the British Navy to " smash the
enemy." But a liigher and more important duty still is to see

12»

October 10, 1914

LAND AND WATER

to it lliat tlic enemy 13 rendered impotent. Tlie unfortunate
thiuf! is that cuilte a cousiderable section of tLc public is of
opiuion that '" the Js'avy is doing uothinp; " on account of the
fact that it has done its woik so well that tlie main CJerman
I'lcet prefers to keep out of danger. AV'ill the public which
demands an impossible Trafalgar be good enough to realise
that for years the German view of things has publicly been stated
and restated ad r.auseum : " JCo matter what the circumstances,
the plain duty of the German Fleet is to attack. Only in the
attack can victory reside."

This attack has not been delivered. It is unlikely to be
tlclivci-od until economic pressure forces it. But why not ?

A good tliousand jears ago the all-powerlul Athenian Navy
met its doom because the Democracy put in its oar wrongly. On
the people of England to-day it depends that the sauic old
mistake is not repeated with the same terrible result.

If the man in the street can be persuaded to crab the Navy
and to insist on its " doing sometliing," Germany is going to win.
If, on the other hand, the man in tiie street will merely remain
indifferent and " trust the Navy," Germany's chances sink to .•:ero.

Thus and in such way the twentieth-centiuy Trafalgar lias
to be fought by the public, and the only weapon is blind onti-
dence in the British Kavy. Blind confidence be it noted. It
may take some doinu'. but it has to be done.

,^*

■^^H

-^;tt^>"^

» NOTIFlEp

British Mines

= Area Germans Have
Presumably Mined ;
With Passages.

ON THE HIGH SEAS
GENERALLY.

Sinii>ly because tlie British Navy is too much in the way.
The Higli Sea Fleet has no prospects whatever of ad\-antage
by coming out. In consequence it remains inactive.

To adopt the chess simile, which I have used before — it is
" in check." The ultimate result may be " checkmate," or it
may be merely '' stale mate " (for which the Germans are playing).
But why expect tliat Admiral .rcllicoe shoidd go in for a reckless
<'.\'chaDge of piee^js which at the be»t could merely provide head-
liii'-s for the daily press ?

Or to i)ut it another way, would any card j)layer as fourth
liand with the four of diamonds in his hand play his ace to take
the three ? Germany's game and Germany's hope is that the
British public, looking for a Trafalgar, will demand the ace to
be ])ut down.

1 have insisted till all readers must be more or less tired of it
that t\u: main elements of this war are psychological. I am
afraid, however, that I must continue to insist on the point.
In the strongest possible fasliion I wish to impress that Germany's
game is based on the expectation that presently the British nation
will demand that the Navy "does something," trusting to luck
that the things really accomplished by it, being inconspicuous,
will not count.

A Trafalgar won by " the man in the street'" is an unthink-
able thing along all the lines of past history. But the past is
the past. The present war is along hitherto unknown lines.
To .say that it is being fought in the streets cf London .sounds
hyperbole ad ahsiirdum. Yet it is something like the situation.

First place is naturally claimed by
t!ie Einden, which, as briefly mentioned
last week, has now added five to her
previous bag of si.t in the Bay of Bengal,
and has probably added more since.
As expected, after shelUng Madras she
made for Pondichcrry, where, for no
apparent reason, she anchored on Sep-
tember 2Ith. She, however, presently
made off without doing anything, where-
ffom we qjjay assume that she was intent
on combining a hasty sweeping of boiler
tubes with such moral effect as was to
be obtained by anchoring only little
more than a mile away from CJovernment
House.

The Emden steamed away leaving
Pondicherry unharmed ; but the result of
her commerce raiding has since come in.
She has now eleven ships to her credit.
But— well, eleven is not much out of four
thousand. To equal the privateers of
Nelson's days the Emden and her consorts
must multiply all their captures by
something like thirty. And when, if
ever, they have done it, the fact
will still remain that a destruction of
10 per cent, in the old Great War
of an odd hundred years ago did not
destroy British commerce. The 90 pec
cent, left carried on quite merrily.
The 99 per cent, left over to-day
are hardly likely to worry more than
their predecessors of the last Great
Wat. Losses can be created — they are
bound to be created. But no matter
how long tlie German corsairs may
remain adoat, there is no question of
their accomplishing any damage that
really matters.

Another predatory cruiser has now
turned up on the East Coast of America,
and it is also now reported that the
remaining cruisers at Kiao Chau have
broken loose. This information is doubt-
ful, liut, be the cruisers many or few,
the damage that they can do is strictly limited and their
ultimate fate is certain.

Of far more moment is it to record that the Cameroons
in West Africa have now fallen into our hands, and that the
Ciimberl-and, stationed in those parts, has captured eight German
merchant ships and a German gunboat.

Germany's cruisers (the Emden especially) are putting up a
verj- good fight. They are acting from cleverly preairanged
bases, and most of them have so far cleverly evaded iuter-
ceptioa by our defending cruisers. But there is nothing to
suggest that this state of affairs can be maintained for more than
a limited time. It may take weeks or it may take months, but
.oooner or later every German commerce raider will meet lier
fate. Before that occurs considerable damage will no doubt
be done, but the ultimate failure of the commerce war and the
probabilitv that it will eventually cost as much or more to
Germany than the damage inflicted on us is self-evident.

The Germans do not appear to be greatly perturbed by the
loss of trade which we have caused tliem. At any rate they
profe.s3 not to be, and in matters of this sort it is never wise
to assume that the enemy is merely bluffing. They must cer-
tainly have calculated that the Britisli Fleet would destroy
their over-seas tiade and capture ail tlieir over-.seas possessions.
The latter was unavoidable; the former they have minimised
so far as possible by laying up their merchant ships. An instruc-
tive article in the Time's of October ."rd quotes from Herr Heineken,
head of the Nord Deutscher Llovd, the view that all Germany

18»

LAND AND WATER

October 10, 1914

!>« tn frar is a reduction of divitlends duiin? the ^yar, and antki-
i^iln that o4c the war is over ovcr-sca trade wJl be reamed as
K Thev do not believe in the permanent capture by us of

^'^r^.irS^:iion a series of remarkable ani.losvvhicln^cr.^
«PtK.arcd in The Engineer took a somewhat sTmilar view, that
h'^to S, it was vc^ elearly proved, chapter and verse, t ha
"nk^ Tir traders Ydopt Gonnan '-|hods-a"d -pp y ^^
customers want without regard to whether it is the best thiii^
oT them and take to the metric system for all transaetions with
countries usinj; it-our capture of German markets will be

^^ThM am iLd, is much more important than any sueeesses
pro or con in the eonnncrce war now inocccding on the hagh seas.

It is advisable to remember that our cruisers on the
Indian Station have been busy sceiuR to >t that Indian troops
KCt to the front without let or hindrance. This they have done,
!;nd discounted the Emden's efforts to that extent. Had she
m.-ina2ed to intercept a single transport, it would, so far as
rr.aterial effect is concerned, have counted a great deal more
tl:nn the sinking of even a hundred British merchant ships
Morally the Emden has done extremely well, but she has laded
tn inUrjere with the transport of ludian troops to France.^ blic
b«« won with the pennies, but lost witli the pounds. It is the
2)ounds that count most.

GENERAL SURVEY.

On land something like a " stale mate " seems to exist . On
the water the position is not materially different. This kind of
situation cannot, however, go on indefinitely.

My reading of the whole situation, at the time of going to
press, is that on land we have secured a mild advantage, but that

on tlie water a similar mild advantage rests with the enemy. His
predatory cruisers are now remarkably well handled, and, unless
luck be with us, we must be prepared for heavy losses before the
corsairs are accounted for. Tliey come from the unknown, they
inflict damage, then they vanish into the unknown.

The object, of course, is to create panic in our overseas trail c.
This so far they have failed to accomplish. But the attempt is
none the less serious on that account.

In everything it is now abundantly clear that Gennan strategy
is to face the British Navy with the virtually impossible, and
tnist to it that a noii-tcchnical democracy, finding the impossible
unachieved, will compel a " show " naval policy instead of a
certain one.

The only possible comment is that the German strategy i«
exccEsively clever, and, given a few more Emdens, it may succeed.
The precise German target is the underwriters of liloyd's.

On land the war is being waged by indiscriminate slaughtci-.
On the water finer issues are at stake. The Germans have dis-
carded all ideas of direct money-making by captures ; eveiythiiig
is concentrated on the creation of a trade panic by losses inflicted
on us.

This particular campaign is deliberate and well calculated. 1
view it with grave misgivings. The Germans have tricked us into
believing that we hold the unquestioned mastery of the seas.
Now, any number of their cruisers are contesting it on Alabama
' lines. In their doing of it they have scored a goal against us.
It is folly to minimise that goal. They have far too many agents
in our midst ready to cry, '" Go up to Ramoth-Gilead and prosper."
The problem before our guardian cruisers is a very heavy one.
It is practically seeking for the needle in a bundle of hay. And
it is imperatively necessary to find that needle !

We shall find it ; but the naval work entailed is enormous.

THE WAR BY AIR.

By FRED T. JANE.

KOTB.— THIS ABTICLE HAS BKBS SUBMITTED TO THE THESS BUEEAP, WHICH DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE rfBLlCATIOS AS CENSOEED
AND TAKIIS SO BESPONSIBILITT I'OH TUK COBBECTNE8S Oi' THE STATESIE.VTK.

AERIAIi news this week is somewhat chaotic. It
mostly consists on the German side of vague
bomb dropping— chiefly from dirigibles. The
general result has been the expenditure of the
maximum of bombs with the minimum of effect.
So far as can be gathered, the Germans, having found it well
nigh impossible to hit any particular desired object, have given
up this particular aspect of the air campaign, and are now
seeking to create a reign of terror by indiscriminate bombs
dropped anywhere where habitations exist.

My reading of this circumstance is that the Gennans have
found that they had over-calculated as to their " aerial menace,"
and that they have subsequently panicked more or less. Nothing
worth mention can possibly be achieved against non-combatants.
The more that Gennan aircraft attack these the greater we can
put down their failure at.

For the rest, British aeroplanes continue to make German
acrophme enterprise undesirable. The " shortage of petrol "
f.t«ry is being repeated with variations of a quite realistic nature,
but every indication is to the effect that we have secured the
command of the air and that " petrol shortage " is merely a
convenient excuse.

There is a fair amoimt of evidence that we have taken on the
air as part of our heritage. For example, the official report of
the replacement of a propeller blade in mid-air by some of the
crew of one of our dirigibles— name not disclosed. It docs not
mean anything very special, but it does spell efficiency.

Germany's great air effort is yet to come. But to misquote
an old Armada statement of Drake's, " We have singed the
Kaiser's moustache," and if and when the German aerial Ai-mada
docs appear we can rest fairiy confident that Wilhem II. of
(icrmany will fare little better than Philip 11. of Spain did in 1588.
It is interesting to note that exactly the same elements are
present. On the German side we have the same vague threats,
the same vague stories of invincibility ; the same vague appeal
to the Deity. On our side we have the same casual confidence,
the same individual confidence, the same conviction that we
are mostly faced with bluff.

Personally, I think that there will be the same sequel. But,
sooner or later, I do think that the air invasion will come, and
we will be very ill-advised to treat it as an empty threat. Foot-
ball has replaced bowls as a popular .sport. Let us go on playing
football (} la Drake at bowls. But let us take Gemany's con-
t«mplated aerial Armada as serintisty as our Elizabethan ancestors
took the Great Armada of Philip of Spain.

This Armada will not sail till it is very numerous and till
certainty of success seems clear on paper. To put the fear of
God into the civil population will, of course, be the principal
objective ; no very real damage is likely to be achieved. Moral
effect will be everything.

The trial before us is probably no light one. London may well
have to suffer several chapters of the " Book of the Revelation."
AVe have no airships to meet a determined German airship attack.
On our aeroplanes and on our aeroplanes only will victory
depend. It is of the utmost importance that all concerned are
ready to meet this German aerial Ai-mada in the same spirit as our
Elizabethan ancestors faced a similar crisis.

After we have faced it and beaten it will be quite time enough
to make songs about it.

Perhaps the most interesting aerial exploit of the week is
the circumstance that an Italian aeroplane has succeeded in
locating several Austrian mines. No similar success has been
recorded in our own latitudes, nor can we hope too much that
it will be. Our home waters are far more turbid and far less
smooth than the placid Adriatic.

All the same, however, this matter is of the greatest
significance. Once aeroplanes can be tangibly employed
to detect things under water, a great step will have been
made towards defeating submarine warfare whether fixed or
mobile.

For the rest, it would appear that our aero])lanes employed
in the land warfare are using bombs more freely than at fir.st,
and that they are well in advance of the Germans in this par-
ticular phase of aerial warfare.

Loss and damage from the air is likely enough to befall us
sooner or later, but all the indications are that we hold the
upper hand.

Given that isolated hostile successes count for nothing what-
ever. So far as can be gauged, serious aerial warfare is bound to
mean heavy losses on either side, with victory only to the side
which aggregates best, possibly only to the side which has any-
thing left over after a definite clash.

The air is still a quite novel battlefield. But in so far as
the results of the present war can teach us anything, they teach
that the human cloraent is the determinating factor even more
in the air than on the water or under the water.

In the past we have been told ad nauseam that war to-day is
a " matter of machinery." Everything seems to indicate that
with the very latest appliances the human clement counts for
more and more.

14»

October 10. 1914

LAND AND AVATEB

A DIARY OF THE WAR.

SYNOPSIS.

Auccsr 38D.— Sir Edward Grey stated I?riti«Ii policy :ind revealed
Germany's amaziiij; offer, in the event of our neglecting our oliligations
to I'Vance. Mobilisation of tlifl Army. Ultimatum to Clonnany.
Clermiiii and freiich Ambassadors loft I'aris and JJerlin.

AiH.usr 4th. — Germany rejected England's uUir.iatutn. luiglisli
Cjo'.erument took over control of railways. War declared between
England and Germany.

August 5ih.— Lord Kitchener appointed .'lecretary of iState for
AVur. H.M.S. Ampliioii struck u niTiie and foundered.

Aunr-ST 6in. — Ifousc of Commoni?, in five minutes, pas.«ed a vote of
cr-.-tlit for £100,000,000, and sanctioned an increase of the Army by
60t;,000 men. Slate control of food prices.

AvccST 8i-H.— Lord Kitchener i.ssued a circular .Tsldng for 100,000

vas -sunk hv II. M.S.

Aucrsr 9rH.— The enemy's submarine, UlS,
Jiirnihig/iain.

ArcrsT lOrH. — France declared war on Austria-Hungary. Germans
Jidviinced on Namnr. The new Tress IJureau established by the
Government for the issue of official war news.

Arcusr 11th. — England declared war against Austria.

Auf;r3T 15th. — The T.sar addressed a Troclamation to the Toli.sh
populations of Russia, Germany, and Austria, promising to restore to
I'oland complete autoiinniy and guarantees fur religious liberty and
the use of the Polish hing'uage.

AtiorsT 16Tn.— Japanese ultimatum to Germany demanding the
withdrawal of lier vessels of war from the Far Ea.^*!.'

August 17th. — The British E.tpeditionai-y I'orce safely landed in
J- ranee.

The lielgian Government transferred from Brussels to Antwerp.

AufiU.ST ISth.- General .^'ir If. Rmilli IVaricn appointed to com-
mand of an Arni,v Gorps of the Briti.sh Expeditionary Eorce, in
•iiccession to the late General Gricrson.

August 20rH. — The Servians gained a decisive victory over the
Ausiriana near i!'liabatz.

Auuu?T 21sT.— The German forces entered Brussels.
August 22.N-n. — Servia announces that their army had won a great
viclorj- on the Orina. The Austrian losses were very heavy.

August 23rd. — Japan declared war on Germany. The Russian
army gained an important victory near Guml-orneu against u force of
160,000 Germans.

August 24ni.— It wa.s announced that Namur had fallen.

The British forces were engaged all day on .Sunday and alter dark
in the neighbourhood of Moua, and held their ground. Luueville was
occupied by the Germans.

August 27i-h. — Mr. Churchill announced in the House that the
German armed merchantman Kuhcr Wilhehn der (lioftf had been
sunk by H.JI.8. IJiijhflyrT on the West Africa (.'oa.sl.

August 28rH. — A concerted operation was attempted against the
•Germans in the Heligoland I'lght.

'J'he Eirst I-ight t'ruiser Squadr.m sank the Mnin:. The Fir^t
Jialtle (;ruis€r t^cpiadrou sank one cruiser, Koln class, and another
•cruii'er disappeared in the mist, heavily on fire, and in a sinking
cuiuiition.

Two German destroyers were sunk and many damaged. The total
British casualties amounted to «i.\ty-nine killed and wounded.

Lord Kitchener announced that " The Government have decided
■that our Army in France shall be increased by two divisions and 3
ovalry division, besides other troops from India."

f Ki'TEMBER IsT.— The Russians met witji a check in Eaft Prussia,
but were successful in minor engagements in Galicia.

S'Ki'rKMBER 2.\n. — Cimtinuous fighting was in progress ahing almost
the whole line of battle. The British Cavalry engjiged, with distinc-
tion, the Cavalry of the enemy, pushed them back, and captured ten
guns. Tlie French Army gained ground in the Lorraine region. The
Russian Army completely routed four Austrian Army Corps near
Lember-;, capturing 150 gims,

•"^ttTKMBER 3rd. —The French Ciovernment moved to Bordeaux.
Sm'TKVbp.r 4rH. — The Russian Army under General Ruzsky. cap-
tured Lemberg, and the Army of General Brussiloff took Halicz.

StKreMBER Stu. — The formal alliance of England, France, and
IJns.-iia was signed in lyondon by the representatives of the three
(J'lvernmenis concerned, binding each nation to conclude peace, or
discti*! terms of peace, only in conjunction with its Allies.

^KrxKMBKR 6th.— It Was announced that the scout-cruiser Patli-
findi-T foundered on Saturday afternoon after running upon a mine.

St.ncMBKR 7iH. — Gen<"ral Jolfres' plans were l)eing steadily carried
out. The Allied forces acted on the offensive and were snccessful in
clucking and forcing back in a north-easterly direction the German
forcvs opposed to them.

Sr.ritMBF.n 8i-u. 'Vhc Allies gained ground on the left wing along
the line of the Oureq and the Petit Morin river. Here the Britisli
troop? drove the <-nemy back ten miles. Further to the right, from
A'itry Ic-Krancois to Sermaise-Ies-Baing the enemy wag pressed back
ill the direction of Kheims.

HfciTKMBER 9iH.— The English Army crossed the Marne, and the
enemy retired about twenty-five miles.

.SwrKMBKii llii!.— Our Ist Army Corp.? captured twelve Maxim
guru and some piisoncrji, and our 2nd Army Corps took 550 prisoners
and a balttry.

Slpikmbkb 13th. — On the left wing the enemy continued his retreat-
ing movement. The Belgian .\rmy punlied forward a vigorous offensive
to tha south of Licrrc.

SiiprRMai-.r. 14ia. — All day the enemy etubbornly disputed th»
passage of the Aisne by our troops, but nearly all the croseing.! wer«
secured by sunset. On our right and left the French troojw vera
confronted with a similar task, in which they were successful.

SfrTEMaER 15rit. — The Allied traopa occupied Rheiras. .Six
hundred prisoner.^ and twelve guns were captured by the Corps on
tlio right of tlie iiritish.

NoTEVBER 16rH.- Submarine E9, Lieutcn.Tnt-Commrnidcr Ma.x
Kennedy Horton, returned safely after having torpedoed tiie Gerniati
cruiser llda, six miles south of Heligoland.

SurreMBER 19™. — The Russian army sei/.ed the fortified po-iitions
of Sicniawa and Sambor.

Sbitembf.r 20th. — ^Rheims Cathedral was wantonly bombarded, and
nothing is left but the four bare walls.

The British auxiliary cniiser Cnrmania, Captain Xoel Ciianl, Royal
Navy, sank the Cap Trafalgar off the east coa.st of South America.
'J'he action lasted one hour and forty-five nrinutes, when the German
ship capsized and sunk, her survivors being rescued by an empty

colli'!!'.

Septe.mkkr 22.SD.— H.M. ships Ahotil-ir, llorjue, and Cressi/ were
sunk by submarines in the North Sea. The Aboulcir was torpedoed,
and whilst tha Uogue and the Cress;/ had closed and were standing
by to save the crew, they were also torpedoed.

SBro:.\iBEB 23Rn. — -British aeroplanes of the Naval wini; delivered
an attack on the Zeppelin sheds at Diisseldorf and Flight l.iouten.'iiit
Collet dropped three bombs on a Zeppelin shed, approaching v.ithin
400 feet.

Septkmber 25th. — The German right wing v.a.'^ strengthened l>y
tl'P transfer of .\rmy Coi-ps both from tlio centre of their line and from
their left in Lorraine and the Vosges. Along the line of the Aisuo there
was little change in the general posiiion.

September 26th.— There was much activity on the part of the
enemy all alon" the line. Some heavy counter-attacks were repulsed,
and ( onsid^rable loss was inflicted on "the enemy.

SErTF.MBKR 27th.— Between the Oise and the Somme and to the
north of tlio Somme, the battle continued along a very extensive front
Nvith perceptible progress on our part. By tlie evening our
troops regained the ground they had lost. Between the Argoniie and
tlie Mcuse there was nothing" new to report. In the south of th-^
Wocuvro the Germans occupied a line which passed through St. Mihiel
and the north-west of Pont-a-Moussom.

Seitember 28tii.- At certain points, notably between the Aisne
and the Argoime, the enemy made further violent attacks, wliich were
repulsed.

SEFreMBER 29ih. — There was praotically no change in the situation.
The Allied left had some very heavy fighting, but they well held their
own.

DAY BY DAY.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 1st.

Tlie Allifd lino iiio\ cJ forward to the north of the Somme and
in the Soiitlicrn Woeuvie, the district to the east of Verdun. Tiia
ariiv'iil of the Indian Kxpeditionary Force at Marseilles was
annoiinof'l.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 2nd.

On the left wing the baltlo continued very fiercely, particu-
laily in the neighbourhood of I'oye. On the Meuse the Cicrman'i
attempted to throw a bridge acrcss the river near 8t. Mihiel, but
it was destroyed. On the remainder of the front everything was
(juiet. The Secretary of the Admiralty communicated tlu^
following : " The (lerman policy of mine-laying combined with
their submarine activitie.?, makes it necessary on military grotmils
for the Admiralty to adopt counter-measures. His Majcst3's
fiovern7ncnt have, therefore, authorised a mine-laying policy
in certain areas and a .system of mine-fields has been established
and is being developed upon a considerable scale.

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 4th.

On OTir left wing the battle was in full progress in the Arras
r.-'^ion. Progress was made in the Soissons region, where the
enemy's trenches were taken. On almost all the remainder
of the front the lull continued. A German anny, four corps
strong, established between the frontier of East Prussia and the
Niemen, has had its left wing thrown back on Mariampol and
Sinvalki.

MONDAY, OCTOBER Sth.

On our left wing to the north of the Oise the battle continued
with great violence. At certain points wo liad to yield ground.
Oa the remainder of the front there was no change. In Ru.ssia,
after a battle which lasted ten daj'S, the German army which
was operating between the front of East Prussia and the Nieman
was beaten all along the line and retreated, abandoning a
considerable quantity of material.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 6th.

Tlie situation remains "in statu quo."
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 7tli.

It was reported tliat a Gorman destroyer had been sunk by a
British submarine off the German coast. The authorities at
Antwerp announced the probability of bombardment of the city.

LAND AND WATER

October 10, 1914

CORRESPONDENCE.

BtcKiNtiHJAi Palace,

Octuber 5tli, 191-1.

Oq August Gth I appealed to tlie nation to asr-ist mc in
J » Nadoaa) Fund to prevent and alleviate military and
cm! diiftRas ariMiig in conse(inence of the War. To-day, after
the lapae of exactly two months, I am happy to say that the
Fund W reached the splendid total of £3,000,000. 1 wish to
uke ihia opportunity of thanking once more the many thousands
of fioncrou.s subsciibera who have helped me to achieve this

^rand result. , •■ • ■ i • ^t t- i

I have delegated the responsibility of adnunisteriDg the 1' unU
to the libjccutive Committee, which I have appointed on the
udvice of the Prime Minister, and I count upon the Committee
to .-vc that assistance in emergency cases is adequate and given
with as httle delay as circumstauees {jerniit. I trust that the
portion of the Fund which is to be applied in relief of civil distress
laav, as far as pcssible. How into productive channels, such as
assis'tiuR schemes for male and female employment and perhaps
industrial training, for it is as repugnant to me as it must be to
tlic recipients that assistance should be distributed only in the
form of doles. What men most want is work, and what the
youns! people need is training.

The sum which has already been raised is magnificent, and I
MB confident that the generous British public will continue to
tlo their utmost to alleviate the distress which war inevitably
Liings in its train. EDWARD,

COLONIAL INFANTRY.

\Vk are requested to state that the High Comniissioucrs
of Canada, Australia, and South Africa view with favour the
formation of the Colonial Infantry Battalion which has been
authorised by the War Office, and is now proceeding at tho
White City, Shepherd's Bush entrance.

Tho High Commissioners will co-operate as far as possible,
and advLso all those men who have at present, or have had,
association with the Overseas Dominions and Colonies, and
who have not already enlisted elsewhere, to apply for eurol-
uienb iu this Battalion of Colonial Infanti-y.

Applications in person or by writing should be made to
Colonel Arthur du Cros, M.P.

WAR PUBLICATIONS.

TnE Sporttiig Time.' maintains its rpputation for "liveness," and
forois a welcome relief fiom eternal disquisitions on the fate of Von
Kluilt and the situation on tho Niemen. Th« cartoon of the week is
(siKvially clevor, and at the present time the "Pink 'Uu " forms an
sdmirabty witty addition to the smoking-room table list, combining
g*uunie smortiieiis with a thorough review of racing matters.

TnB Tathr has organised a Games Bureau to supply indoor games
t>f every description to the various institutions where our soldiers and
Kiilors arc being restored to health. All games should be addressed
to Mrs Hugh Spottiswooda (Hon. Superintendent), Tathr Games
Kureau, Oreai New-street, London, K.C., who will distribute them on
a. regular plan to the various hospitals and other places where the
wonudea are lying. A» packages eenb should have the name and
udUrcgs of the donor clearly written on the outside of each package.

The current number of the Asiatic neriew. devoted especially to
features connected with the war, gives particular prominence to our
i'Jit.eru .Ulies, special articles by Lieut. -Col. Yate on " The Pritish
Army m Europe ' aud "The Mighty Voice of India" being well
v.(.rthy of attention, while Slarmaduke Pickthall also contributes a
Kurvey of " Turkey in Kurope," aud D. N. 8ingh deals with " The
iMdmn Pmw ami the War." The situation in the eastern area of
conflict is reviewed by E. Charles Vivian in an article entitled " The

Opening of tho East-crn Campaign," and altogether tho number is one
of great interest from a topical as well as an Asiatic point of view.

Osr of tho latest additions to the ranks of British publications,
Colour, is showing what can be done in tho way of capturing German
trade by adopting the method of production long pursued iu the case of
Juijcnd, tho famous Munich paper, and other continental publications.
The third number of Colour, recently to baud, contains reproductions
in (;olour of the work of famous British and other artists; Brangwyn
and Augustus John have been well represented in its pages, and Orpeu's
name is^another that may be meutioued in connection with this excellent
production, while the style of stoiy and article in tho paper is ou
■A level with its illustrations. Up to the present Colour is the best
thing that has been done iu the way of shilling monthly production.

The issue of The. Acndemij for tho current week is especially
interesting. Its principal feature is an " Open Letter " to Lord Robert.*,
in which the lessons of the present campaign are neatly enforced, an<l
the work of the veteran soldier is emphasised in its connection with
our present specially-i'ocruited army. A good article entitled " The
-Vmateur Strategist," bjr E. Charles Vivian, points out the pitfalls
that await criticism of military affairs without the necessary knowledge,
and " The Belgian Refugees " throws much light on the organisation
of the relief of our influx of visitors. T-ivo of the reviews are of
excellent topical value, " Britain's Sure Shield " treating of the work
of the Navy, and " Armies and their Secrets " dealing with the German
and Russian forces. It must be admitted that The Academy gives us
tliis week a remarkably fine number.

Armi/ Drill Made Easy, a sixpenny manual issued by the Temple
Tress, has been written and illustrated by the staff of T/ie hcgimeiit.
the well-known " soldier's pai>er " ; unlike any oUicr publication, official
or unofficial, this has bech specially written to meet the present need for
concentrated active service training. Every word matters to the
officers and men now in the ranks. The drill explained is only the drill
necessary in war training. Mere parade " frillings " have been cut out
under the practical supervision of the editorial staff, who know from
actual experience the specialised kind of training needed to fit a man
for active service as quickly as possible. Army Drill Made Easy
should be of the greatest assistance both to recruits aud to tha
ex-N.C.O., who, rejoining the forces, finds his knowledge a triile rusty.
A useful addition to the book is the Army A.B.C., iu which a great
number of Army terms are explained.

Of particular interest at the present time is the official history of
the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, issued by Messrs George Allen and
Unwin in one large volume at a guinea. The various campaigns of the
war are described by military officers who actually took part, and the
book counts as an authoritative record of tho strategy and tactics in
every field of the operations. Of especial interest is the account of
Bonrbaki's ill-fated operations, and the section devoted to the study
of the campaign conducted over the present field of action. Jlost of
tho work is written from an extremely German point of view, but
although the successes of German arms are emphasised, and the unfit-
ness of Napoleon's armies in the field is brought well to the front, this
bias is not permitted to obtrude to an extent which interferes with the
correctness of tho narrative. Though we may resent the pro-German
attitude, we must also bear in mind that France of 1870 was a very
different country from Republican France of to-day, and the etncture.s
passed in this volume were fully justified by the events of the time.
Tlie book is historical and authoritative, and must be coimted as a
work of permanent value.

The Board of Agriculture and Fisheries recommend any farmer who
is experiencing difficulty in obtaining farm hands to apply to the local
Labour Exchange, the address of which can be obtained at any
post office. The labour exchanges are making special efforts to furnish
farmers with the names of suitable men and women who have had
previous experience in farm work, and all applicants will be inter-
viewed and passed by a faimcr of standing before they are put into
communication with those who are in need of theuj.

H.M. Qt;EBM Maki's Royal Naval Hospital at Southend will be
opened shortly for the reception of wounded seamen and marines from
the Navy. One of its cliief needs will be an efficient supply of
sweaters and jerseys for tho use of the men returning to duty after
having been restored to health. Cricketers, football players, and
rowing men do not need to be told of the inestimable value of a sweater
for warding off chill. To these patients such a gift would be a
veritable godsend, seeing that the winter is approaching and the cold
in the North Sea will be intense for men on destroyers and other
craft doing patrol duty.

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16»

October 17, 1914

LAND AND WATEE

THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

NOTE. — THIS ABTICLB HAS BEES SCBMITTEB TO TUB TRESS BUREAU, WHICH DOES KOT OBJECT TO THE POELICATICN AS CEXSO:iaD
AND TAKE3 NO KESPONSlBILITYv FOB THB COREKCT.N'KSS OF THE STATEMENTS.

nr ACOOBDANCa with tub EEQUIREMKXTS of THK TKESS bureau, THB POSITIONS OF TROOPS OX PLANS lUrSXKATIXO THIS
ARTICLE MUST ONLY BB KKOARSED AS APPROXIMATE, AND KO DEFINITE BTRKNQTH AT ANT POINT IS INDICATED.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND
PROSPECTS AT THIS MOMENT.

THIS week is the critical week in the first
phase of the European War.
Contact is established upon the
Vistula, the lines in France have reached
their maximum of extension, the
Germanic powers (not their opponents) have put the
last recruits and the last reserves into the field.
From this week we must expect — from this week
onward — some decision.

It is the moment for taking stock not only of
tlie strategical position in which the opposing forces
now find themselves tlu'oughout Europe, but also of
the main movements which have led to these
positions, and of the main strategical results which
may or should proceed from those positions. And in
connection with this task of " taking stock " we wiU
do well to note in passing certain novel conditions of
warfare — such as the weakness of the fortress — ■
emerging from the two months of struggle. For, it
is upon our appreciation of these novel conditions
that the soundness of our judgment for the futm*e
will largely depend.

In appreciating the situation as a whole, we
have two things to consider which appear everywhere
in human effort. They are the material and the
moral elements in that effort.

To take first the mat^^rial : — Here is an outline map
showing in the roughest possible fashion the two gi'eat
material factors in the present situation. These ai*e :

(2) The opportunities of supply and of communi-
cation open to either party.

Opportunities of supply for petrol, for horses, for
copper, and the rest, and, what is less imi^ortant to
tlie Germanic Powers, for food, I have marked with
aiTows; and the numerous arrows which I have indi-
cated for England, for France, and for Eussia signify,
of course, the perfectly open field of supply in such
things which these three Allies have behind them.
Russia has behind her an indefinitely large supply
coming over her Plains from the East, whether of
horses or of petrol, of copper, of nitrates, or of almost
any other necessary. France and England have an
equally immeasurable field behind them for the pro-
vision of such supply afforded them by the ocean, so
long as the ocean is kept open by the superiority of
the British Fleet.

The opportunities for this external supply which
is partially afforded thi-ough neutral countries to the
Germanic centi-al Powers I have marked by broken
arrows. I have marked it thus differently because
the supply is doubtful, and with increasing difficulty
obtained. For instance, there may be some limited
and difficult supply of petrol to be obtained in this
fashion by the Germanic Powers, through occasional
cargoes coming by Norway ; but the only direct supply
(so long as that is continued) would be from Roumania.

In the same way the main communications by
which each body of Allies moves or can move its men
and material I have indicated by lines of dots,
but these, of course are, in the case of the sea, almost

..^'f^-

(1) The position of the opposing lines (of as numerous as the ports are, while a whole gridu-on
which the Germanic are in thick blaci' and tlie of railways behind the "Western field of war supplies
AUies in open white). the Western front of the Allies in France. These

LAND AND WATEE

October 17, 1914

main lines, therefore, are only to be taken as a very
incomplete and elementary iudication of the tull
opportunities of communication which the AUies
enjoy. The corresponding main communications ot
the German Powers I have marked in full lines.

Even from such an elementary sketch certain
main features emerge. In the first place the Germanic
Powers are seen to possess one prune advantage
coupled with one prime disadvautiige.

Tlie prime advantage is that they stand united
in place and time, as also, largely, in spirit. They
are each well served, moreover, by railway communi-
cations j)ennitting them to pass troops and guns from
west to east and east to west continually.

Now the prime material disadvantage which the
Germanic Powers, our enemies, suffer is not remotely
connected with this advantage of theirs. This dis-
advantage is a more or less complete blockade.

The Germanic Powers can pass troops and guns
from frontier to frontier speedily. AVhy ? Because
they are inland powers holding the centre of Europe,
the one the Baltic Plain, the other the Valley of the
Danube. And both the Baltic Plain and the "^'alley
of the Danube nm east and west. For the mountain
ranges which might mterfere with communication do
not run across these main lines, but parallel to them.
But this same fact that our enemies are in the midst
of Europe makes possible their more or less complete
blockade by sea, which in its turn is due to the
superiority of the British Fleet.

"When we say that it is to the advantage of the
Germanic powers to be thus packed together, with
main communications running east and west, \^ e mean
something like what is meant in smaller fields of
strategy by the term " interior lines."

For instance, supposing Russia, with her great
numbers, could send troops and guns to Belgium in
three or four days, it would be obviously of immense
advantage to the Allies in the Western field of war.
But Russia cannot do this. Such an expedition
would mean thousands upon thousands of miles of
steam, weeks upon weeks of time, and an impossible
calculation of organised detail. Germany, on the
other hand, can send a large body of troops from the
Russian field of operations to the Belgian field of
operations in a less number of days than the number
of mouths that would be required for bringing a
Russian body to the West. And this power of acting
upon interior lines of communication has a further
important advantage : you can use youi- knowledge
of the two combined fields. Eastern and Western,
immcdiaieli/. A big Russian success or failm-e upon
the Vistula is felt aud acted upon immediately in the
shape of reinforcements or withdrawal of Germanic
troops to or fi-ora the Eastern and from or to
the Western field. A double campaign is "felt"
more faithfully and acutely by the people sitting in
the middle tlian it can be by the people poundiiu' at
the two outside edges. The knowledge of what is
going on at a circumference can be more thorouohly
co-ordinated from a centre than from a periphery.
Ihe Allies have mdeed to-day the telegraph, which
eliminates what would have been an almost insujieraljle
difliculty a hundred years ago ; but co-ordination by
telegi-ara with people whom you cannot meet and see
at every few days' interval is another thing from
co-ordination by personal interview between com-
manders or thch- envoys none of whom arc twenty-
Hours from your centre. ^
Serious, however, as these material advantages are
to the central Powers, they arc certainly outvvei<rhod
especially xu the later phase of the goaeril cmpS m!

by the corresponding disadvantages ; for the blockade
of certain prime materials, even where it is not
absolute, is a most serious thing for a modem
belligerent and a particularly serious thing for that
belligerent if he is a Prussian.

All war connotes a lavish expenditure of most
things usually husbande'l, from human life to horse
flesh. But Prussian war particularly depends upon
the power of this lavish expenditure. The whole
spirit of Prussian warfare is to win at once, and the
whole weakness for Prussia lies in the inability of the
Prussian commander, text-book or professor, to tell
you what is to be done in case of a pi'ogi-essive defeat.
The successes of Prussia in this war have been
successes due to immediate and expensive attack, of
heavy artillery against fortification, of close formation
in overwhelming numbers in the field, and of forced
rapid marching. I do not belittle this spirit. It is
one of the two only ways of winning. AVhat I am
pointing out is that it involves a lavish, a spendthrift,
expenditure of everything in the sweep forward to
succeed once and for all.

So there we have two important things pointing
to the necessity of very rapid immediate supply if
Prussia and her Ally are to win. First, that all war
involves this enormous consumption as in a matter of
life and death. Secondly, that in pai-ticular Prussian
war demands it.

But there is a third element favouring blockade
to-day. Modern war demands such expenditure in a
peculiar degi'ee, because modem war deals with the
maximum numbers of men, horses, material, fuel, and
all the rest of it : it mobilises a whole nation.

There is yet a fourth factor advantaging the
blockaders and disadvantaging the blockaded in
modern war, and that is the peculiar nature of certain
indispensable materials for modern war.

It so happens that modern war requires for its
conduct a whole category of materials such as petrol,
copper and certain of the chemicals necessary to the
production of high explosives, which materials are
not miiversally discovered, are mostly extra-European
in origin, and depend for their introduction to Central
Europe mainly upon sea-borne commerce.

Consider, for instance, the position of tl;e
Germanic Powers in the matter of petrol. AVithout
petrol you cannot fly, and without jictrol your tran-
sport— at least in Western Europe — is grievously
hampered. Well, the main supplies of petrol come
from Asia, from America, from the Russian Cauca-
sian region, from Roumania, and from Galicia. Of
aU these fields the Roumanian alone is, in theory at
least (of what is actually happening I saj^ nothing),
open readily to supply the Germanic Powers. And even
if this field were as open practically as it is in the
theory of international law, a Russian ad\'ance
southward over the Hungarian Plain would intercept
it, and has already partially intercepted it.

Imagine the positions reversed, and the import-
ance of this factor of disadvantage will appear.
Supposing the main sources of petrol in the Avorld lay
within Austria-Hungary and the German Empire,
see what an advantage our enemies would then
possess ! As it is that ad\'antage is exactly, or
nearly exacth' transferred to the British and their
AUies.

Having said so much on the material advantages
and disadvantages of the position occupied at this
moment by the Germanic Powers in the centre of
Europe, let us turn to the moral account and strike
a balance. It is important to do so, because upon
the moral factor ever^'thing ultimately depends — •

October 17, 1914

LAND A¥D AVATER

thongh tliis factor is much more tlifficult to appreciate
tlian is the material, and can never be appreciated so
exactly.

First of all ^^■e have the factor of homogeneity :
icliich of Ihe ftco bodies of opponents is morallj the most
united, the Allies or the llapshirfj-Hohenzollerns ?

There is here a very subtle problem.

The Allies consist in three great national groups,
to which must be added the two smaller nations of
Ik-lgium and Servia. Now as regards each of these
groups, the national feeling is absolute and unanimous.
Every single Frenchman, every single Belgian, every
single Eussian, every single Servian is determined
upon the French, the Russian, the Servian, and what
is now the Belgian object of the Avar. One may even
justh' .say that (with the exception of certain German
populations in the Russian Baltic) these populations
which are not in s}'mpathy with the central govern-
ments of Russia and England, but which are subject
to til em, are far more in sympathy with tlie anti-
Gennan policy of Russia and England than with any
other ])ai-t of Russian or British policy. For instance,
the chief doubtful element of all, the Poles, are, as a
nation, far more inclined to-day to support Russian
than Prussian arms. The Allies have then that
essential moral element in strategy : a common
purpose really inspiring them.

On the other hand, the Germanic Powers are
handicapped by the fact that only the German
speaking core, and not quite all of that, is
enthusiastic for their cause. The Magyars are
cciiainly in sympathy, but they are dispai-ate. They
are occupied (or have been until the present war) in
the government and even the oppi-ession of aliens.
Millions of Roumanians, and millions of Catholic
Slavs who are not of the Magj-ar temper and who do
not desire any Austro-Hungaiian success, are subject
to them. The Austrian-German is somewhat at issue
with the Catholic Slav of Bohemia, violently at issue
■with the small ItaUan-speaking population in the
south on the Adriatic. That brave, intelligent, and
intensely vital Italian body is a highly important
factor for disniption and peril to the Hapsburgs at
the present moment.

There is a sufficient measure of orthodox Serbs
in the south-east to be another source of peril ; and
though the Austrian-Pole is not averse from Austria,
Polish feeling must be taken as a whole, and it has
been permanently alienated from the Germanic claim
by the political incapacity of Prussia. For Prussia
cainiot govern.

Belgium, which Germany proposes to adminis-
trate (we may look at any moment for a policy of
annexation, that is — even without formal decree — for
the establishment of Geinnan Courts, as of German
currency, and for the official German re-naming of

Belgian topography), is less reducible to the German
claims than any area in Europe, great or small.
Alsace-Lorraine is enemy's country to the Gennans,
though it talks the German tongue ; and all Prussian
Poland — that is, everything more than one hundred
miles east of BerUn, and everything more than thirty
miles from the Baltic Sea — is still more bitterly anti-
German.

If, upon the immediately preceding map, you
mark with a thick black line the fi-ontier of the area
occupied by our enemies at this moment and mark
off with hatching the area occupied by populations dis-
affected to those who occupy their temtory with anus,
you wiU find no such areas among the Allies and a
very large proportion of such areas within the ten-itory
for the moment administrated by our enemies.

Yet another modification must, however, be
alloAved before we have any complete view of the
sjiiritual factors the strategist must consider.

Though the Gennan powers are thus handicapped
by whole regions which are either actively hostile or
doubtful in their allegiance, they have this advantage
— that where they are united they are completely
united. What the war may bring forth in the long
run we can none of us tell, but we may make quite
certain that at the present moment, and for a long
time to come, that which is Gennan in the Germanic
effort .stands as one man. The Allies — Russia,
England, and France — may be equally detennined upon
one object ; but the German resistance is one thing.

The Russians coming over the boundaiy of East
Prussia, the threat of a French advance upon, say,
Treves, each violently affect and almost in the same degi'ee
a man of education living in Leipsic. But to hear
that the Germans were recently occupying the govern-
ment of Suwalki makes no Englishman's blood boil.
Few Russians would feel it intolerable that the
Germans should have been in An*as. The stay of
some hours which the Germans made in AiTas (where,
by the way, they failed to bum the MSS., upon which
the Life of St. Patrick is based, but seem to have
destroyed St. Waast) means to a Frenchman some-
thing veiy different from what it can mean to any
Englishman. Tliirty shells di'opped upon Westminster
Abbey and leaving it a ruin would mean to an
Englishman something quite different from the burning
of Rheims. To most Frenchmen it would mean
nothing at all.

That is the moral strategical disadvantage in all
alliances, that every alliance is " weak at the seams,"
but this alliance suffers from the weakness less
perhaps than any alliance in the past has suffered
from similar divergences.

I cannot complete this brief survey of the general
situation (so far as material and moral forces are
concerned) without recalling (1) on the material side
the factor of numbers ; (2) on the moral side the
factor of claim.

(1) In the material factor of numbers there is a
very simple formula, which anyone may use like a
rule of thumb, to remember what the situation is. Of
trained men in the first Hne (that is, the young annies
with their full complements of all amis and nothing
improvised) you may put down the Geraianic Powers
at 110; the French at 40; the British — in the first
phase at 3 ; the Russians at, say, 25, growing rapidly
through 30 to 50.

In the phase immediately succeeding, allowing
for similar losses on all sides, you get, with the
Germanic Powers still at 110, the new British forces
swelling from three up to anything you like — say
twenty or even twenty-five. If the Avar Avere A-ery

»•

LAND AND WATER

October 17, 1914

mnch proloiitrcd tlmt fisfuro miglit be increased
indetinik'ly. Tlie iiussian thirty or fifty increases to
100, to 150, and, at a pinch, to 250. The French
forty cannot increase. It Avas, at the beginning of
the war, at its maximum.

(2) As to the moral factor of claim, no one, even
a student considering mere strategics, can neglect it.
The Prussians chiim rule, the Allies freedom. It is
true that the (rermanic Powers, and particularly the
modern tlonnan Empire, are fighting for their life ; but
then so is everybody else — except, possibly, Eussia ;
and even Russia would cea.se to be liussia without her
family of kindred states. But there is this indisput-
able difference between the fight for life of the Allies
and the fight for life of their enemy : that the enemy
is claiming as part of his fight for life something
which no European will ever accept. No Western
Eurojiean, at least, has ever accepted contentedly, or
ever will accept -without ceaseless revolt, an alien
government. The conception that he would do so is
the great strategic miscalculation modern Prussia
made a generation ago. She is too stupid to learn.

It is, in truth, a strategic miscalculation and one
has a right to allude to it in a strategic commentary,
for there is one gi*eat principle underlying all
strategics, which is this : " 'f/ic anccess of a campaign
can only be iiieanitred in terms of its jjoUiical object."

For instance; Napoleon succeeded in 1790-97
because his object was to clear the Austrians out of
the Lombai-d Plain. If his object had been to turn
the men of the Lombard Plain into Mahommedans
the campaign would have been an infinitely more
difficult task and he would have failed.

Here is an impoi-tant concrete note upon what I
mean. Germany by her action in Belgium has not,
as a plain matter of fact, saved any appreciable
number of men upon her communications. Those
communications are not 103 miles in length. She
thought by one miscalculation that they would run
through Belgium, as they do through Luxemburg, in
territory free from peril. She has produced a state of
affaire in which those few miles require a larger
gan-ison than they w^ould have required had she done
no more than civilised Europeans in the past have
done, to wit, executed those who broke the laws of
war and spared the rest. IMy judgment in this will
be disputed. I believe it to be sound.

THE "BLOCK" OR DEADLOCK.

Thei-e is the foundation, moral and material, uoon
which the situation now rests. Let us next turn to
the present strategical position and what led up to it.

The first characteristic of that strategical position
IS a "block" or deadlock upon the East as upon the
West; which block has lasted, roughly speaking, for
a month. o ^ i &>

The second characteristic of the position is that
the block IS maintained well exterior to anything vital
m the Orermanic powers.

Upon the west it is almost entirely external to
their boundaries ; only Upper Alsace, and a fraction of
that, IS m the hands of the French

r.li.?*'^"'f '''*/*^ '' ^"'•^"^^ «<>; «% Eastern
Calcua and a few mi es of Ea.st Prussia is in the hands

o thtV^'"'"'' '^^ ^^^* ^^^^^"*i ^« "^ ^^' I'-^d^
or the trermans.

Innt ?f^rTir ^•'''^ t"^' ^^^' ^^^«^ propositions are,
look at the following diagram

tb. }^r'' *^'' •^''•"^ ^^ ^^^"^ P°«it^«^« occupied by
S! P'^:!!! ^"""''' '" *''^ "'^'^ to-day (TuesdaV
October 13th)-represented by a full line. C'on paS

DOTTED LINES KEPRSSKNT POSITIONS ON SEPTEMBER 13tH.
FULL LINKS REPRESENT POSITIONS ON OCTOBER 13tH.

it with the similar position occupied a calendar month
ago, upon September 13th — represented by a dotted
line — and sec how slight has been the change.
There has, it is true, been an extension northward,
due to the successive attempts of France and Germany
to outflank each other, but, so far as the advance of
the one party or of the other is concerned, hardly any
such advance has taken place.

Turn to the same question in the east, and though
the deadlock is not there so striking, it is remarkable
enough. Here you have the Austro-German front a

DOTTED LINES REPRESENT POSITIONS ON SEPTEMBER 13th.
FDLL LINKS REPRESENT POSITIONS ON OCTOBER 13tH.

month ago in dotted lines, and in a fuU line what
appears to be the Austro-German front to-day.

As to the way in which these blocked fronts
keep the Allies at arm's length to the east and the
west of Germanic territory, the reader can under-
stand it best by looking at the following rouo-h diao-ram.

In this sketch, the German-speaking area (1), in so
far as it corresponds with the feeling in favour of our
enemies, is marked with deep hatching. The area
in favour of our enemies (3), but not German-speaking
as a whole, is marked with another hatching; the
boundaries of tenitoiy occupied by the Gorman and
tlie Austrian Empires in arms is marked ■v\ith a broad
black line. Finally, the hatching (2) represents

*•

October 17, 1914

LAND AND WATEE

1. GERMAN SPEAKINO AXD IIOEALLT ATTACHED.

2. aSSKAli SPIAXINO OUT OV 6TMPATHT.

3. KON-OBEMAN SPEAKINO BUT IN STMPATHT.

4. THB WHITK POETION "VTITHIS BLACK BOUNDAEIES

BKPBESZNTS BACKS KEITHZR OIBMAN SPEAKINO NOB IN
STMPATHT. BLACK LINKS BEPBSSBNT BOUNDAUIKS OV

TKHBITOBT NOW OCCDPIKD BT OBEMANIC FOECKS.

the areas within this broad black line which are
German-speakinq^ but opposed to the war and not
morally attached to the German-speaking core. All
the rest — not German either in speech or sympathy
— a larger area, is left white. It is apparent at
a glance how the war is still being pushed well back
from what is, for our enemies, their own soil. We shall
not be bringing pressure upon that soil, we shall not
have turned them from invaders into beleagured men,
— nationally speaking, they are still far from it — until
we have got them back somewhere on to the deeply
hatched central area.

Now, what are the conditions, both expected and
unexpected, which have led to this " block " or dead-
lock of .opposing lines, east and west, external to the
Germanic core we are fighting ; and what are the
prospects of the future, or rather, what alternative
jirospects do those conditions promise ?

The " block " to east and to west, in so far as it
represents a failure in the general German plan, is a
failure due to the breakdown of what may be vulgarly
called " the strategy of rush."

In a minor degree this " strategy of rush " failed
also on the side of the AUies when the French had to
give up their premature attempt upon Alsace-
Lon-aine, and suffered a heavy defeat (in the last
thii-d of August) south of Metz. In the eastern field
it failed still more conspicuously when the qtiite
unexpectedly rapid Russian advance into East Prussia
broke so disastrously at the same time before
Tannenberg.

But these failures in the " rush strategy " of the
Allies were but of slight effect upon the general
conduct of the war compared with the failure in the
" rush strategy " of the Germanic powers.

For the Allies never intended to " rush " the
campaign as a whole. The French preliminary work
in Alsace-Lorraine was that of an advance guard.
The Russian work in East Prussia was equally
detached from the general aggregation of later Russian
forces ten times as numerous. The French, when
they failed in their preliminary clutch at Lorraine,
had an army corps cut up and lost the strength of
perhaps a division, a,«t well as over fifty guns. The
Russians, in their preliminary clutch at East Prussia,
had a couple of army corps cut up and lost perhaps
30,000 men, perhaps 50,000, perhaps more, to the
enemy. But as regards the vast national anuies and
the general national plan, neither of the two Allies
came out perceptibly the weaker from these mischances.

On the other hand, the failure of the German
" rush strategy " determined the whole first phase of
the war, and for this reason — that, in the German
case, the " rush strategy " was not experimental initial
work with heavy reserves behind it. It was something
fundamental in the whole German scheme upon which
this war was designed, and involved all the German
power.

There are in any form of contested human
efforts — a speculative adventuring in commerce, a
prize fight, a race, or a war — two alternative avenues
to success. By the first you concenti-ate effort upon
immediate mastery over your enemy. You keep little
reserve. You risk all. If you win you win not only
thoroughly, but at an expense less probably in
material and certainly less in time than in the alter-
native method — which is tliis': — To maintain an
ample reserve, to expect your enemy, to hold him and
to master him at last, and slowly, by your power of
perpetually bringing up fresh strength.

In a race, for instance, it is the contrast between a
man who sprints and a man who starts slow but
counts on his staying power ; in a wrestling match it
is the conti'ast between a man who lavishly spends his
energy in the first bout as against a man who merely
resists until the third or fourth. And in modern war
it is the prime contrast between the two great schools
of strategy that dominate modern war. Not that
each school is not attached to a vigorous offensive,
but that the one risks initial weakness for the advan-
tage of a strong reserve, the other risks the upsetting
of all its plans for the advantage of immediate success
to be achieved by all its force available in the field.

It need hardly be added that neither in war nor
in any other form of contest is the one method
demonstrably superior to the other. Histoiy is as full
of success in either case as of disaster, and the whole
choice in a modern war in Europe depends upon the
calculation of modern European conditions.

Germany deliberately decided for the first of
these two methods. She was to bring her all into the
field at once. So was Austria. Her best armies were
to advance upon the west, to overwhelm the numeri-
cally inferior French forces before the full weight of
Russia could come into play. Upon the east her
Austrian Ally was to march immediately and boldly
into Russian Poland, strike across the Vistula by the
Krasnik road for Lublin (as along the arrow) and get
right on the main Russian railway and communications
in the valley of the Bug.

.<^t/

^Z-lCtA

lEMBERO ;

Russia would return. But meanwhile she had
been held by this rapid Austrian advance — this up-

LAND AND WATEE

October 17, 1914

setting of licr coiiimnniciilions — wliile France was
bcin(» settloil.

In tlie case of tlie wcstcm lialf of this plan
Ocnnany liad two first-rate i)icccs of riglit jutlginont
njion lior siJo. She claimed tliat modern howitzer fire
would dominate modern fortification, and she ])i-ovcd
right. She claimed, in other words, that the French
reliance upon stronghokls would betray them in the
field of t'tiiir. She claimed that the fortresses of the
!Meuso would impose no appreciable delay. Further,
she calculated that she could put (by the e.\cellence of
her organisation, and considering that the strain would
bo but a momentary one) the vast majority of her
forces noith of the Meusc in lielgimn and maintain
them suj)plied through the narrow gap of Jjicge
for the few days necessary to an invasion of France.
Once they shoidd have broken through thus they

VII

would have other commmiications open to them
through Luxembourg and Treves, and the pressure
would be relieved.

Here again they were perfectly right. They
had brought against the AlUed anny on the Sarabre
torccs far larger than any commander or critic
outsHle trermany had thought possible.

Again, the advance on Paris was as rapid as
human physical effort and human intelligence com-
bmed cou d make it. Few finer things liave been
done m the Instovy of war than that ^m^;Z
advance. »

dajs o September the "rush" strategy Berlin had
planned was triumphant. Then (about the an i
ersary of Sedan) m the first week of September c e
the failure in both theatres of war

In the eastern theatre the Austro-Huncrarim
a ly had pushed his main army right up into J us •
^f^'^ -^^'"-'^l everything before hiuT had q ito
.Heated the troops he had foimd at Krasnik and^ 5

S'£ "^o cV"''"- ^"t "^^ Russian Ibi!
sinon iiad proved more rapid and smooth tlnn

<^orman calculations admitted. TheforcosT?,!
brmirrlif Jn*,^ j-i.„ /?_ii , ,, V -^"^ loices Kussia

stlfj^'^^^f ™ 'S,-'"*- W been Z
J iiioMng upon Lublin was compelled to

retire beyond the San and up the Upper Vistula
Valley.

Meanwhile in France tlie policy of a larcre
reserve had vindicated itself, and the fresh masses
deliberately kept out of the field during the great
retreat from Mons and Charleroi appeared from behind
the screen of Paris and compelled Von Kluck's retreat.
From that moment in either tlieatre of war,
eastern or western, the strategy of " rush " failed.

But precisely at that moment of failm-e came in
another element to produce the " block " or deadlock
which marked the rest of the month of September and
the first days of October. Another modern element
(which the British service could, perhaps, after the
experience of South Africa, expect better than any
other in Europe) modified what at first looked like the
progressive defeat of the Germanic allies. This
element was the formidable resisting power of
entrenched infantry, backed by heavy guns. It was
in the western field of war that this new element was
particularly observable. Upon one of the best lono-
defensive positions discoverable in Europe from the
Argonne to Noyon the German army held its own
day after day.

Yet another new element appeared. Your
turning movement, the essence of which is that it
should be unexpected (in the absence of heavy
numerical superiority) proved no longer possible in
modern war. To bring up great forces by railway
was a matter not of hours but of days; and the
movement could be observed almost suflaciently by
old-fashioned methods of intelligence — cavalry, spies,
prisoners— its discovery could be made even more
certain by the use of air-craft. Finally, the only
roads by which the work could be done, the railroads,
limited to precise and known lines the methods of its'
advance.

Under all these conditions the attempt to turn the
German line by its right north of Noyon failed. Every
new French body brought up to extend that turninc^
movement was met and checked by the arri\-al of
a corresponding German body, drawn, as the Allied
body had them drawn, from the centre and the east.
Uritil after the extension of the line northward to the
Belgian frontier at the end of September the turnino-
movement as such may be said to have definitely
tailed. It had proved to be nothing but an extension
ot the block already established.

Something of the same sort appears to have
gone on m the eastern field of war, though there
certain modifications appeared. Germany lent aid to
the Austro-Hungarian forces; between them the
resistance to the Kussian advance proved stronger and
stronger, ^and the progi-ess of the Russian hosts
through Gahcia grew less and less pronounced, until
witli the first days of October things were at a
standstill m southern Poland. Meanwhile in
northern Poland the very same phenomenon Avas
repeated on a small scale as had taken place in
1 ranee upon a gigantic one.

A rapid German advance to the Niemen failed
turned back, was pressed to a certain line of defence
partly behind and partly in front of the frontier of the
German Empire, and there, for the moment, at least,
established a stalemate.

,.n ( ^r^^' ?''" ^'''^^ '"'"^ stationary grip so unex-
pectedly prolonged in either theatre of the gi-eat war
ends its first phase.

Under what conditions does the second phase

eiistic ? What kind of fighting are we to expect in
the immediate future ? ^

October 17, 1914

LAND AND WATER

To forecast a single development in war is
impossible, but to state necessary alternatives is
possible enough.

Now, among aU tlie theoretical possibilities of
the situation, among all the ways in Avhich the block
may break up to our advantage or disadvantage, two
are very much the most likely — (a) in the west the
alternatives lie with far greater probability between
the Allies hvcaMng the Geninan main communications
and the Germans iarning the main Allied line ; {Jj) in
the cast — that is, in the Vistula — the alternatives
obviously lie between an action, however prolonged,
which will ultimately release German troops for the
■west or will ultimately call for German reinforcement
from the west eastward. No great action upon the
Vistula — with wet weather coming on and cold, with
very poor roads, and hardly any railways — can be a
draw. It may be prolonged but it will not be a draw.
You will certainl}' have the initiative passing to the
one side or to the other of the hosts that face each
other to-day in southern Poland.

Obsers'c the consequences. If the pressure upon
Germany here ceases, or is relieved, German brought
back forces returning to the west may pass through
the gate on the Meuse that is still open at St. IVlihiel
and may so force back the whole right of the Allied
line and open those shorter communications with
Germany which I have alluded to so often in these
columns. If, on the contrary, pressui-e on Germany
and south Poland increases, Silesia is in danger and a
withdrawal of troops from the western field, the
maintenance of a mere defensive in that field, will be
imperative to our enemies even if they have gained
successes hitherto against the Allies in France.

The whole position may simply be put thus : —

Tlie Germans having failed to break the Allied
line in their attacks in the western front in Prance at
Arras, at Albert, and at Eoye, have a better chance of
turning it by bringing down their reinforcements
(following on the fall of Antwerp) upon the flank of
the Allies, that is, between LUle and the sea. Already
their cavalry are threatening such a move. Already
they are in Lille.

The Allies, on their side, have no opportunity of
turning a German line, which now extends right up to
the Dutch frontier, and may, at any moment it
chooses, touch the sea. But they may break it ; and an
ob\ious place for their efforts is in the neighbourhood
of the Franco-Belgian frontier.

[Meanwhile, whichever of the forces in north-
eastern France now in movement has the better of
the other, what happens in southern Poland will be
the final and decisive thing. For if there is here an
action which releases existing and victorious German
forces, those forces can in a few days appear where
they -ttdU in the western field, and particularly
through the gate of St. Mihiel, which is being ke^jt
open at a great effort. But if the Russians are
victorious in south Poland, then, no matter what
happens in France, the menace overhanging Silesia
will be of such weight that the Germans will certainly
turn to a defensive in the west, and will use eveiy
man they can spare for the defence of the valley of
the Oder.

Upon the upper part of that valley lie the wealth,
the mines, half the indu.strial life of modern Gennany.
To threaten this with destruction is like threatening
the destruction of Lancashire and the West Eiding.

In the lower part of that valley lie the pro-
jjerties of the very class, the Prussian military caste,
■which is at the heart of this war, and whose claims to
over-ride the public law of Europe, and to destroy the

lesser nations, is the spiritual motive maintaining the
whole of this disastrous business.

The elements of the problem are, therefore : —

(1) The efEect of the fall of Antwerp, the number
and quality of the troops thus released ;

(2) The ajDjjearance of these and other reinforce-
ments upon the Western-German front between the
Belgian frontier and Noyon ;

(3) The way in which the gate at St. Mihiel is
being kept open by the Germans ; and

(4) The positions in south Poland, with their
chances of victory and defeat, upon which, more than
upon any other factor, the future would appear to
turn.

Each of these four main elements has, in the last
few days, developed wdth great rapidity, and I
jjropose, in conclusion, to examine each.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
FALL OF ANTWERP.

When the Gennan effort was first opened against
Antwerp it was certain that the fortress must fall, nor
was it very difficult to set limits within which that
fall must come.

One of the three or four very great conclusions,
hitherto disputed, now established by this war, is the
conclusion that modem howitzer fire dominates modern
permanent works — at least, the modern permanent
works of the type which all the great ring fortresses
had. After the fall of the fort Camp des Eomains
and the consequent German occupation of St. Mihiel
just below, it was no longer possible for anyone to
believe that Liege, Namur, Maubeuge, and the rest
had each suffered on account of some peculiar local
circumstance.

We can even give a time-table. Manonvilliers,
a very strong isolated work, fell (seven or eight weeks
ago) after not less than seven and not more than
eleven days' bombardment ; the last of the Liege forts
after seven ; the last of the Namur forts after two or
three ; the last of the Maubeuge defences after eight.
Troyon successfully resisted for five days, and was
then relicA'cd. Camp des Eomains appears to have
succumbed to two or three days of the same form of
attack.

The weapon, therefore, by which Antwerp was
accounted for was simply the 8-inch and perhaps also
the 11 -inch howitzer.

The forts of the south-eastern section (Waelhem,
Wavre St. Catherine, Lierre) were silenced in more
than forty-eight and less than sixty hours. A short
chance of resistance lay in the mobile defence of the
garrison, especially along the line of the Nethe. But
the numerical superiority of the enemy over the
rcmaininor jramson enabled him to cross after a
three days' resistance. Then the howitzers were
further brought up to bombard the city itself, and
there was no particular military reason why it should
continue to hold out. The value of a garrison
numerically inferior to an investing enemy lies in the
fact that behind fortifications it can employ and divert
from other fields the more numerous forces opposed
to it. When the fortification has gone, and it can no
longer serve this purpo.se, its only proper place is
the open field. The garrison of Antwerp withdrew
somewhat late, but more than half seem to have
re-established contact by the western road with their
fellows and with the Allies near the sea coast.

Now there are two points in connection with
these events. The first is only of academic interest

LAND AND WATER

October 17, 1914

to-dav It is whether the garrison romamed too long
witliin the walls of Antwei-p, and whether, therefore,
the small drafts of the Allies sent in to counsel and
aid such prolonged resistance were justified m their
aiTival and in that prolongation. There is no doubt
of the object: the object was to see whether the
German forces in front of Antwerp could not be held
until the Allies had done the trick further south and
had pierced into the German lines east of Lille. At
any rate Antwerp fell before that success w^is
achieved (for it is not even yet achieved), and the
delay therefore proved not an advantage but a hurt.
Instead of the garrison getting away in good condition,
for use in the field, when the first breach had been
made in the fortifications, only a portion got away ;
another smaller portion— but over 20,000 men— are
prisoners of war ; not, indeed, in the hands of the
enemy, but interned in Holland. These include a
certain number of Englishm en . It is evident that every
liour's delay, as the Germans advanced northward
towai-ds the city, naiTOwed the belt between the Gemian
lines and the Dutch frontier. For Antv.erp lies
squeezed up along that frontier. And along that belt
the retreat had to be conducted. That belt was
naiTOwed so much when Antwerp fell that pai-t of the
evacuating garrison, including 2,000 British, would
not or could not risk the defile and took refuge in
Holland.

But the second point is not of academic interest,
but is still of poignant and practical interest, and that
second point concerns the immediate value of this
act to the Germans. This is threefold.

(a) What number of troops has the fall of

Antwerp released for the use of the
enemy.

(b) Of what quality are these troops.

used.

(a) As to the numbers actually released by the
fall of Antwerp.

We have first of all the two guesses and the
biassed statement.

The biassed statement talks of 200,000 men.
Now we may dismiss that immediately. The care-
fully organised Prussian system of influencing opinion
includes fantastic stories spread through Copenhagen
and Eome, as well as the reasonable stuff from
Amsterdam and the really sober and accurate official
communiques. This German talk of 200,000 men
released by the fall of Antwerp belongs to the first
and worst category. The two guesses are the French
estimate of 60,000, and a local estimate (on the
sources of which I need not dwell) of 45,000.

I conceive the French estimate to be the nearest
to the ti-uth. More than 45,000, of whatever kind
of troops, the Germans must have had in the face of
the resistance they had to meet upon the Nethe,
and of the probable (though, as it turned out, not the
actual) ta^k before them in the occupation of a city
which, with its suburbs, counts nearer three-quarters
of a million than half-a-million in numbers. But
since we may be absolutely certain that in an action
where their artillery was sure to succeed and uud(?r
such active menace to their communications through
northein France, the Germans would not waste a
single man before Antwerp, we need not put the
numbers at over 00,000.

Nor are all those 00,000 released. A certain
number— not large— will be required to police
Antwerp itself and to occupy the neighbourhood. A
much larger number are accounted for by the necessity
of facing the line of troops parallel with the soa-coast,

Belgian, English, and French, from north and south of
Ostend onwards. Say that 40,000 men are released
from directly in front of Ant;vcrp and you have
probably an exaggerated statement. ISIoreover, the
same act releases for the field a much larger number
of Bclo-ian troops, who can give and have given a
very good account of themselves against an equal
number of the German reserves.

We may sum up and say that the direct result,
the full amount of extra troops free for Gcrnum work
from before Antwerp, is not the significant point in
the matter. Call it a division and not two divisions
and you will not be far out. TF/tat is far more
important is the effect of the fall of Aidicerp in
releasinrj men now used a!oji(/ the communications
between TAege and the French frontier, and the tlminff
of the fall of Antwerp for the arrival in France of new
German trooj^s.

So long as the Belgian Army lay within AntAverp
it potentially threatened tlie main line of German
communications through Belgium. Headers of these
columns will remember the raid upon the railway-
between Louvain and Brussels some three or four
weeks ago. Now the getting rid of this threat
means (1) the release of men kept, on account of the
threat, on the main line, Liege — Namur— Hirson ;
(2) the pov/cr of moving forward into France new
troops.

Let us take these points in order. Wliat release
of men Avill be effected from the main line through
Belgium by the withdrawal of the Antwerp menace ?
Nothing very great.

Of two things, one. Either this astonishing nCAV
Prussian doctrine (that murder and fire arc tolerable
to the Eui-opean conscience for the purpose of securing
communications through hostile country) has been
successful, or it has not. Either the railway line
from Liege to Hirson wanted its regular com])lcment
of men a mile (and a division could have held it
anyhow), or it did not. Li cither case the fall of
Antwerp onlij releases the force that was ]}>'(: i^iouslj/
masking Antwerp. It does not release any consider-
able force kept upon the main line of communications
to the south. There is no more mere terror than before.

But here comes in the second point. The
Germans quite certainly attacked Antwerp at this

late moment in order to be free to move through

Belgium on to tlie Allied flank new troops Avhich,
till this moment, they had not ready. AVhat are those
troops ?

It is certain that Germany is about to bring
through Belgium agaiust the Allies in France very
considerable new forces. Of what they avIU consist
we can only guess. They cannot come in great force
until there has been some decision in the east ; they
may be the better trained of the new conscripts ; they
may be yet further bodies tentatively and perilously
withdrawn from the left and the centre of the long
German line in Franco. But though the bringing of
those forces upon the flank of the Allied line, that is
u}X)n the Fi'anco-Belglan frontier at Lille, and to the
west thereof, is the most probable event of the near
future, and though the fall of Antwerp will facilitate
the movement, I do not sec whence the enemy can very
seriously increase his value (not his numbers) In this
field. The German Government has undoubtedly
called up all its boys and old men. Unlike the French,
it will keep no reserves, but stakes all on now. Equally
undoubtedly it is now ready to put into the field in
France some new trained and probably mixed force :
it would not attack Antwerp till that w^as ready. But
of what value will that force be ?

e»

October 17, 1914

LAND xi N D WATER

As to the troops that will be actually released
from before Antwerp we have definite evidence. They
are not troops of the first line. They are reserves,
and for the most part reserves of the second class.
Upon this all evidence agi-ees. German witnesses are
silent ; and Belgian, English, and French witnesses
who have been able to test the matter in action are in
no doubt. As to what new troops may be coming
over common sense can guide us. The fall of Antwerp
docs not send against the flank of the Allied line
young, new and fully trained troops. It can send
new troops ; it can send young troops ; it can send
old reservists. But it will not and cannot send first-class
material. It will send men of the latest hardly tramed
le\ies and of the oldest and Avorse reserves — many of
tlicm also but partially trained. It cannot do what
it did two weeks ago at Eoye and at Arras.

The fall of Antwerp will release, it must be
remembered, a large siege train ; but that large siege
train has been in existence all these weeks since the
fall of Maubeuge ; and the immediate work before the
German army is not a new siege, but the release of its
main communications between Noyon and Belgium
from peril.

Now there are two ways in which this release may
be effected. The Allied line which runs up opposed
to the west front of the enemy from the corner
where the Aisue joins the Oise up to and beyond the
J^elgiau frontier, may be pierced or it may be turned.
And the last question we have to ask about this new
body of men which the fall of Antwerp will, directly
and indirectly, let loose upon our flank from the Franco-
Belgian frontier around Lille, is the direction in which
this body wiU be launched. If the Germans still
think they can break the AUied line they will send
these reinforcing bodies of theirs east of Lille, and
down to the An-as district, where they have ah-eady
tried to break the line and failed, or to the Eoye district
further south, where they have also tried to break
it and failed. If, as is more probable, they propose
to outflank and to turn the Allied line, then they will
launch their new forces upon the district westward of
Lille, that is, between Lille and the sea. We shall see
which they do, but it seems probable at this moment
of writing, the afternoon of Tuesday, Oct. 13th, that
they should attempt the latter adventure.

In order to see why this should be, let us briefly
consider what the fortunes of this West front have
been during the last month and are to-day.

II.
THE WEST FRONT, ROYE— ARRAS.

Briefly, the situation uj^on the west front, which
makes one believe that the new German reinforce-
ment will rather attempt to outflank us by LiUe than
to cut us further south is as follows :

Tlie line held by the enemy east and west, right
across Clia-.npagne, from Noyon to the Argonne, was,
5is we have seen, capable of envelopment. Its right,
or western flank up north of Noyon towards the
Belgian frontier, was exposed. But since the
numbers were nearly equal on both sides, and since
a modem turning movement involves the use of great
numbei-s and of railways, and can be watched from
the air as well as iu older fashion, the attempt of
the French to creep northward and outflank was
continually met by further Gennan reinforcement,
which credit northward and tried in its turn to
outflank the French, until the line went clawing up
northward with each attempt of the one party to get
roimd the other, so that within three weeks it had
btretclied about seventy miles and was touching on

the Belgian frontier. Neither party being able to
outflank the otl er, an attempt was made upon either
side to outflank the opponeut's line on this west
front. The progressive extension of the two
antagonists passed up through Eoye, through Albert,
through Arras, and at last to a point about ten miles
south of Lille.

It must be particularly noted that in this attempt
the Germans had a numerical superiority. They
outnumbered and still outnumber the Allies. They
brought up great masses from their centre and their
left. They matle three attempts to break the French
line, each of which had a considerable measure of
success, and each of which failed. One was the
attempt round the town of Eoye, the other to the
north again round the town of Albert, the third and
last round about the town of Ai-ras to the north again.

^ attack

Attack to cut

♦»i .frRMENTIERES

, ,-COMBLES
»i.?tf''^--,.//,FEROK«E

STQUENTiM

noyon

COMflEGKE

THE ALTEBNATIVB USK OF GERMAN KKINFORCEMSNTS EITHKR TO

CUT OR TO OUTFLANK TDB ALLIED LINE,

In this diagram I have roughly suggested
these three " bulges " which the Gennans pushed out
without succeeding in breaking the French line.

Every one of these bulges (or " salients ") has
been thrown back again. Eoye is reoccupied by the
French, who are now also either attacking or occupying
Lassigny. They have long ago got back Albert.
They are far to the east of AiTas, which they re!»ok
last week.

III.

THE GATE AT ST. MIHIEL.

Tliere is no need, in connection with the third
element in this week's critical situation, to reproduce
at length the description given on the past of the
"open door" at St. Mihiel on th*e Upper Meuse.
Two diagrams will suffice to recall it to the reader's
recollection. The first diagram shows why the

LAND AND WATER

October 17, 1914

oponin- of this door at St. Mil.icl (npon the Upper
Xu^) while it has not yd become importuut. m.gixt
at any moment become important

Here you have the German Ime A-B from the
Bel-ian frontier of France to Novon B-C from
Noyou to the neiglibourhood of Verdun, faml by the
Allied line. Verdun and Toul are two strong for-
tresses with a wall or baiTier of forts between them
On the wrong side of that wall, to the east of that
wall, is a German force M : on the r.ght side o that
wall, to the west, is a French force ]S_ : at b hall way
between Verdun and Toul, is St. Mdiiel-a town right
on the barrier of forts, protected by two of these
forts, and standing on the Kiver Meuse, which is the
obstacle those forts protect. A couple of w-eeks ago
the Germans quite unexi)ectedly attacked and reduced
the two forts (Paroches and Camp des Eomains) com-
manding St. Mihiel town, and in an attempt to cross
the river (which now turns out to hare been a feint)
they were thrown back by the French force opposite

them at N. , , . • . w /

But here comes in the important point : Ihoiir/li-
Ihe attempted crossing at St. Mi/dcl was but a feint and
did not succeed {for the Allies tcilli drew none of their
troops and weakened no part of their line under that
menace) the gap in the line of forts, the occupation of
ihe town of St. Mihiel, and the power that occupation
pees of crossing the river lohcnecer sufficient forces come
vp, is still jealously retained by the Germans.

J^^

'Radius oCaction j
from VerJunJ

^'^

5 g PI Of. Mihiel •-H«mw»««»«**«''

'Sailwo)! to Metz

,^y^premont

'Radius of action ^
from. Tool

xrv

Now this is surely of capital importance. Here
in Diagi-ara XIV. yow. may see the importance which
Gemiany attaches to the crossing. Her forces
occupy, and have occupied for now so many days,
a position apparently perilous and quite al^normal in
war. She has thrust a wedge in between the radius
of action of the fortress of Toul and the radius of
action of the fortress of Verdun. She keeps that
gap open as a sort of roadway, very narrow, but just
wide enough for her purpose. All the efforts of the
French to advance from Toul on to the valley where
the railway leads from Metz to Thiaucourt — which
valley is called the Rupt du Mad— she concentrates
forces to repel and succeeds in repelling. She similarly
repels all efforts on the part of the garrison of 'N'erduu
to get south and to close the issue from the northern
side. She anxiously and successfully maintains her
railhead at Thiaucourt, which is the end of rapid
communication from Metz, and which, through Metz,
communicates with all central Germany behmd Metz
and with all the great depots of the middle PJiine.
I hough she makes no further effort to-day to cross
the Meuse at St. Mihiel, she yet holds tenaciou.sly to
St. Mihiel town and bridge, and is not driven from it.

I suggest that Germany is here keepiiio- open a
door ; and that in the expectation of victories in tlie
east of Europe and of consequent reinforcements she
means to hold that door open untU she can, through

success in Poland, pour troops through the gap and
take the Allied line in reverse— supposing she has not
up to that moment been able to relieve the pressure
upon the west or right flank of the German armies in
France. If she is not acting with some such object,
ultirnately involving the investment of Verdun or of
Toul, the re-establishment of communications through
Alsace-Lorraine, and the pouring of great masses
through which shall force back or take in reverse the
eastern end of the Allied line, then her action is
meaningless. And meaningless action is not the
Prussian way in war.

But such action as the bringing up of large new
hordes through the St. Mihiel "door" presupposes
the release of great numbers from the eastern theatre
of war. It is upon the result of the fighting iu
Poland that all ultimately turns.

IV.
THE MAIN ISSUE IN POLAND.

j>RVSSIA

. ./ CKACowGA LLC I A JsKV,, Si

•^.-•'"

'PRzetin'SL
AUSTRO 'HUNGARIAN EMPIRE

Let us turn, then, to what we may justly conceive
to be the most important theatre of all, the basin of
the Middle and Upper Vistula.

It is necessary in time of modern war that news
officially permitted to the public should be cut do^vn
to \evy simple and terse cx2:)ression. But an inevitable
consequence attaching to this necessity is a mis-
apprehension of the enemy's strength in any particular
held. Until things becrin to o^o ill we tend to under-
estimate his strength ; and when things go ill, to
over-estimate it. And this simply because in the
lack of sufficient bases for judgment the emotions
of hope or fear take the place of calculation.

If a full story of what has happened in southern
Poland during the last ten days were pennitted, the
public would be alarmed ; but they would be unduly
alarmed.

Briefly, there has been a veiy considerable set-back
of the tide, if we are merely considering the ebb and
flow of the line. The liussian forces, which had beeu
advancing almost uninterruptedly through Galicia,
iirst discovered that very considerable German re-
inforcements had come up to strengthen the Austrian
armies, and next that they could effect no proper
concentration upon their own side if the Galician
army were to continue its western march. The
adcanced jyarties (only) of the Russian forces therefore
have fallen back from just in front of the line
Pietrokow-Kielce-Stopnitza-Tarnow — upon which line

10*

October 17, 1914

LAND AND WATER

Tnuoh the largest number of their effectives were
npon the left, between Tarnow up to and just across
the Vistula — to tlie line of the Vistula itself, and that
retirement is one of about sixty miles. It has been a
duly organised retreat, made for the purpose of
concentration, and averaging about ten miles a day.

Lest there should be a misapprehension as to the
nature of this retirement and as to its gravity, it is
mo.st important to appreciate that we are dealing with
the concentration of at least two Russian armies. The
Russian army which I have marked in dots upon this
sketch map as A — the same which had been going
forward so successfully through Galicia and towards
Cracow — was well ahead of the Russian army which I
have marked B, and which was concentrating east of
tlie Vistula at the same moment that the army A was
advancing through Galicia in front of it. The Russian
forees wliicli less than a fortnight ago faced the
.advancing Germans along the line Stopnitza-Kielce-
Pietrokow were advanced forces thrown forward in
front of the main Russian body upon and beyond the
Vistula. In other words, while the advanced Russian
bodies on the north of the line were falling back
towards the Vistula, other bodies from the east were
coming up to reinforce them.

Rut note that this necessity for a concentration
upon the Vistula south of Warsaw, in face of the
unexpectedly strong German advance, compelled the
body A to fall back very much further east. It had
to get behind the River San if it was to be in line with
the main body to the north, and in getting behind the
River Han, A had also to give up the investment of
Przemvsl.

At the moment of writing, Tuesday evening,
what you .seem to have in this all impoi-tant theatre
of the war is a situation made up of the following
elements : —

{a) Ru.ssian for<^ of unknown amount but very
lai^e — certainly over 1,500,000 men —
hold the line of the River Vistula from
Ivangoi-od to Sandomir, and thence
southwards, holding the line of the
River San up to the neighbom-hood of
Jaroslav. There are further Russian
forces to the south, but I am concerned
with the immediate battle line alone.
(6) An Austro-Genuan force of unknown
amount, but presumably approximately
equal or a little less, has advanced in
the last ten days from the line
Peti'okovv — Tarnow to this same line
of the Vistula and the San. The
German reinforcements are on the
north, or left; the concentrated Austnan
forces, both those intact and those
fonned from the remnants of the army
defeated at Leinberg, form the south or
right of the allied line.
(c) The Russian retirement behind the Vistula
and the San has not been the result of
any check in the field, still less of any
defeat. It is quite evidently due to the
fact tlmt the most rapid concentration
of the Russian forces now in southern
Poland with the reinforcements coming
from the east, is best effected by a
retirement of the first to meet the
advance of the second. It is equally
evident that tlic Russian commanders
fcave deliberately taken up the defensive
behind or upon the Vistula and the
San.

{d) In connection with the retirement of the
one army and tlie advance of the other,
there have happened a number of those
incidents Avhich always mark a retire-
ment before the enemy. The advancing
enemy picks up stragglers, bogged guns,
and so forth ; and the retiring army
loses them . All that is quite unimportant
to the ultimate issue, except in the case
of a disorganised movement. The chief
point (no doubt exaggerated) which the
Germans can make in this connection is
the picking up of 2,000 men, wounded
and otherA\ase, in the neighbourliood
of Grojec.
(<•) This concentration upon tiie Vistula and
the San has partly relieved Przemysl.
At least, it has apparently disengaged
the western section of the invest-
ment.
It is probable that at the moment of writing full
contact has already been taken from north to south
and that the struggle is engaged. And upon that
struggle, as I have pointed out several times in these
comments, much more will depend than the fate of
Polish territory and of the eastern campaign. For if
or when the Russian forces behind the Vistula and the
San pass from the defensive to the offensive, and if or
when tlie allied Gerlnanic forces before them begin to
retire, the threat upon Silesia is at hand. In propor-
tion to the completeness of such a victory the
" pressure " upon the .allied powers, and particularly
upon the German empire, would be severe. Silesia
would be in peril, and the western march of the
Russians would be resumed.

If, upon the contrary, the Russian forces are in
part disorganised by a German victory, or even held,
then will come the opportunity for Germany to bring
both German and Austrian troops westward and to
attempt a final decision of the campaign in France.
For among other things that the war has shown is the
organisation whereby the Prussians can with unex-
pected rapidity transfer troops from west to east along
their parallel lines of communication.

I sum up and say that upon these operations which
have the Middle and Upper Vistula for their theatre
depends, more than upon any other, the immediate
future of the campaign.

THE OPERATIONS IN NORTH
POLAND.

Tlie great importance of the coming action in soutli
Poland belittles what has happened in the north of
that country. But in view of the rather violent
denouncing by Berlin of the Russian official com-
muniqu6s, it is as well that we should be clear as to
what has happened. To be thus clear wiU serve the
double purpose of making us understand one import-
ant detail of the war, and also (what is perhaps of
more value) it will enable us to test the value of the
German official communique under defeat. It may
well be that this piece of psychology will be really
useful to us in the near future. Hithei"to, the
German official communiques have been models of
exactitude. They have suppressed unpleasant truths,
but they have not as a rule told direct untruths, nor
have tliey shown any sign of " nerves." But, as I
tliink I can show, the Gennan off.cial communique
dealing with the mosi recent operations in North
Poland is both disingenuous and full of " Hcrves."

11"

LAND AND WATEE

October 17, 1914

That official commnnique tells us that the
Eussiuu victories before Suwalki aud Augustowo are
" mvcntions " ; that no attempt was made to besiege
tlio fortress of Osowiecs ; that the Germans never
intended anyhow to occupy the province of Su^^■alk^ ;
mid tliat the Russians do not tell the tnith because
they did not in their earlier official communiques
describe the defeat of Tannenberg.

It is well to pay particulai- attention to this
German message, because it is the first of all the
(iei-man official messages to adopt this tone of false-
hood, exaggeration, and compbint. The plain facts
about the campaign between the East Prussian
frontier and the River Nieraen I told last week.
They are known to all students of this war throughout
Euro])e by this time, and they are simple and decisive.

Rrieily, four or five German army corps advanced
across the German frontier upon a front of anything
between eighty and one hundred miles. An attempt
was made to cross the Niemen at Drusskiniki, while at
the same time a siege train was brought up to bombard
the forts of Osowiecs. The German attempt to cross
tiie Xiemen was beaten back, the mass of the German

O r-'^rt Mmtt. often Surrouiiicd b}- ^U^«h■

. - Principal Re Ai*

Th( Suwilki CiaMmy threugfi th« fAMh.,

to'ghoono

force retired upon Mariampol-Suwalki- Augustowo. In
doing this the pressure upon Osowiecs was relieved,

and incidentally some of the big German howitzers
were abandoned. The Russians coming through the
Forests of Augustowo occupied that town, and, along
the railway to the south, they advanced from Osowiecs
right over the Pmssian frontier. The Prussians in
their retreat left in Russian hands about 10,000
prisoners and about 40 guns. Nearly all their forces
arc now back over the Prussian frontier, while Russian
forces are occupying Lyck and Margrabowa, where the
German Emperor has an establishment. Further, it
is a matter of history that the German forces while
they occupied the Government of Suwalki exercised
administrative authority and treated it as their own.

The whole thing is nothing very enormous. It
is not upon the scale of the fighting in France or the
lighting upon the Vistula in southern Poland. But
to say that it does not represent a Russian victory is
nonsense. To say that no attempt was made to take
Osowiecs is even worse nonsense. A commander who-
should have tried to cross the Niemen without dealing
with Osowiecs would have been even more incom-
petent than Napoleon's own brother in the same field
of war a hundred years ago — and that is saying a
ofood deal. While as for the Russians not mentioning
in their official communiques in any detail the defeat
of Tannenberg, the simple reply is that in none of
the official communiques of this war does the defeated
party give details or the earliest information. Both
the Austrian and the German official communiques
left us in complete ignorance of the overwhelming
Russian victory at Lemberg.

I repeat, the point is important because we shall
jjerhaps have need in the near futm-e to understand
the psychology of official German news under circum-
stances adverse to Germany.

Here we must leave the eastern field, and with
it this week's examination of the war. The event in
that eastern field is stiil undecided. Until it is
decided the very critical moment through which the
war is again passing — its third crisis — cannot be
further analysed.

WAR PUBLICATIONS.

Thb current issue of the Academy is one of exceptional interest,
containing as it does a translation of matter by that great theoriser,
Bemhardi, which has not been previously publish^ in English.
Bemhardi has more or less deservedly come in for very adverse criticism
of late, but as an exponent of the Prussian theory as to the method of
waging war ho stands alone. Nietzsche and the re'st pointed the way of
blood and iron, outlined the ideals of the (Jermanic races, but it remained
for Bernhardi to detait the means by which these ideals w«i-e to be
translated into practical terms. It may be remembered that the
Acadtmy secured the British rights of Admiral Mahan's article on sea-
power a few weeks ago ; the present securing of fresh Bernhardi matter
u yet another instance of the enterprise characterising the present
management of our contemporarj-.

11^1.'?'^",?' ^^"T^ clever drawings is comprised in the recently
publuhed booklet, KuHut and the German Blumierbxiss, with verses
by H. Robertson Murray, and Charles Grave as the artist. The
dream of the superman, as interpreted in Germany, is pictured with
ruthless irony, and there is in the last two pages of "Ihe booklet a very
good forecast of German awakening.

Tire list of works on the period and personalitv of Napoleon is
probably one of the longest list, in literature. A recent addition is
i\apolfo„ at n orl; translated from the French of Colonel Vatliee and
S?'^° * mmute study of Napoleon's methods in his various 'c.-.m-
foifmo,rFr,nT",*"f ^^^ ^'""P^g'^ ?f 1806. The author, one of the
IZ r^l *l t strategists and tacticians of the present day, sets
methods otw^Jr "''* by careful examination of the Napoleonic
I^.Y^u,f "',"/"' ^l"' ^^"^ "f the German staff in 1870, it is
rt o™"""'""*-'"''2 °' ^'^ '°^ "^'' "t tl^« P^'^'^t dav. Even s
not malSi^W Z'f.T.,'"'? ^°'''^ ^'""^ ^ie advance of science has
V^ch"4 iW^rv i, ml^ m'^'^^f principles of warfare, and Colonel

ti>s^r^s m^crn'in"taSnSTe'"anTn .1°^«--'^3: -}t"l>"tS.ns

are reproduced, amongst them being some fine examples of the work
of Sir Jolm Tenniel, John Leech, and Linley Sambourne, as well as
the well-known present-day Punch cartoonists. In the opening cartoon,
which is to-day of special interest in view c^ recent events, " King
Punch presenteth Prussia v/ith the Order of 'St. Gibbet'" for
tearing up the " scrap of paper " in which Prussia pledged herself to
respect the integrity of Denmark.

In this time that is sirrely the forging of a new a^e in tha
history of humanity, such a book as J. Comyns Cair's" Coasting
Bohemia is matter for congratulation to the author and to Messrs
Macmillan and Co., the publishers. For the writer tells intimately
and well of the great ones of the Victorian age; he writes of tha
true Bohemia, of Burne-Jones, Eossetti, Forde Madox Browie, and
all the pre-Raphaelites, while other of his pages concern such names as
those of Du Maurier. Dickens, and Meredith. Yet again he talks of
"&JX in Tragedy," "the English School of Painting," Henrv Irving,
and other themes pertaining to the time before mediocrity and a peace
that was apparently permanent had cramped the arts. It is a book of
great names and great subjects, and, as for its construction, it may
be said that there is dignity as well as interest for the reader— th»
book 13 literature, in the best sense of the word.

' f-'i"'^^*'" par* of the paper we draw attention to the necessity for
thoroughly reliable waterproof garments and accessories in the 'ideal
service kit. It is worthy of note, in this connection, that Messrs.
Anderson, Anderson, and Anderson are makers of the sealed regulation
pattern waterproof, and that the name of the firm is a guarantee of th«
highest quality.

In the event of readers experiencing difficulty or dfliv in
obtaining copies of Land and Wateh from their newsacrents" the
proprietors wi 1 be glad to be advised of same. Copies can be
immediately obtained on application to the oificoa of the County
Gentleman PuUishing Company, Ltd., Central House, Kings-
way, w.C. (see subscription form on page 16*).

12*

October 17, 1914

LAND AND WATEE

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

NOTE. — THIS AETICLB HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO TH3 PKESS BOaBAU, WHICH DOES NOT OBJECT TO THH PUBLICA.TIOK AS CIN30RBD
AND TAEBS NO BBSPONSIBILITT FOB TEC! COBBECTNBSS OF THB STATBUBNTS.

msM

THE NORTH SEA.

THE principal event of last week was the sinking,
oS Schiermounikvog, of the German destroyer
S 126 by the British submarine E 9, the same
boat which sank the Hela.
The Germans now appear to have raised some
query about the incident having happened inside Dutch
territorial waters. This is absurd, as no submarine could
act inside territorial waters owing to the depth being too little.

So far as can be gathered <S 126 — which was a boat of 487 tons
and 28 knot speed, laid down ten years ago — was patrolling
across the mouth of the Ems. She was torpedoed forward and
sank in three minutes.

The significance of the incident is two-fold. In the first
place — as the map indicates^.S 126 was torpedoed virtually
inside " the front door " and the moral eSect of this following
on the loss of the Hda cannot but be considerable. At the
present time the importance of any successful submarine attack
lies rather with the locality in which it takes place than with the
actual value of the bag. For example, suppose a German battle
cruiser to be submarined while attempting to enter Harwich
harbour, the loss would be heavy but it
would not come under the head of " un-
expected." Therefore, it would have no
particular moral effect on the enemy. On
the other hand, an unexpected loss is
bound to influence nerves.

In the second place — and the moral
effect of this on the Germans is bound
to be great — a destroyer is in the ordin-
ary way immune from torpedo attack as
a torpedo will pass underneath her.
Consequently, the torpedo which sank
S 126 was clearly deliberately " set " for
a depth suitable to hit a destroyer. This
means that all patrol work by destroyers
will be nervy work in future ; they will
at once realise that we have marked
them down for destruction, and draw
tiieir own conclusions as to the why and
wherefore.

Out of which the pressure on the
German Fleet will become greater than it
already is.

ANTWERP.

The Germans state that Antwerp
will be valuable to them for the attack
on England, but imlesa this means that
they intend to ignore the neutrality of
Holland it is an idle proposition. The
Scheldt is a neutral river.

Supposing the neutrality of Holland
to be violated by them, there will still
be the circumstance that all shipping at Antwerp has been
destroyed, and such as can be got there by canal or by
land transit is inconsiderable. Old torpedo boats and the
lesser-sized submarines could possibly be transported as the
Russians transported them across Siberia ten years ago ; but a
naval base cannot be improvised, and the Dutch Fleet,
which is specially designed for inshore work, would probably
soon make short work of any German naval force in the
Scheldt.

Consequently, it is unlikely that, for the present at any rate,
the Germans intend to violate Dutch neutrality, and we may
take it that statements about what they mean to do from Antwerp
ire merely bluff intended to produce a " moral effect " on us.

THE LOST CRUISERS.

The Ne7o York Herald " through the kindness of the German
Admiralty " has been permitted to publish the personal narrative
of Kapitan Lieut. Weddingcn of U 9, and how he sank the
three Cressies sini^Ie-handed. It is an interesting story, made-
all the more realistic by its compliments to our sailors. But,
technically, it is absurd. The V 9 does not carry any spare
torpedoes, and she has only three tubes. Four is less than the
six known to have been fired ; but the four specifically mentioned

as fired is still one too many. We may, I think, safely take it
that at least one German submarine went under.

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

There are (at the moment of writing) no fresh developments,
nor do any seem likely, in the Adriatic just at present.

In the black Sea, on the other hand, quite another state of
affairs prevails.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet is reported to have put to
sea, presumably in an effort to make certain that the Goeben
and Breslau do not become German again in the Black Sea.

The Goeben is individually more than twice as powerful
and a very great deal faster than any battleship in the Russian
Euxine Fleet. Should she emerge nothing but blockading a
fleet very close to Constantinople could effect anything against
her. Her possibilities are as serious as they are enormous.

Of the Russian battleships only three — pre-Dreadnoughts
all — possess any modem fighting value, and it is probable that
the Goeben could outrange all of them easily, since all are mounted
with big guns of a now antique model.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that there

•{'Approximate spot where 3 126 was submarined.

CUABT TO ILLDSTBATB THB SUBUABINIKO OF OBBILAM T. B. D. S 126 BT BRITISH &UBKABINB

is understood to be a secret treaty between Turkey and Roumania,
so that should the Goeben emerge asa belligerent Turk she could
look to find a possible base in a Roumanian harbour. The
attitude of Turkey is, therefore, of international importance ;
and the flight of the Goeben may yet turn out to have been a
clever piece of high strategy.

THE BALTIC.

Here, again, nothing of much moment ia taking place.
Presumably the Germans have established a blockade, but
since this must accord with Russian plans and anticipations
it can hardly be considered as a German advantage. The Russian
official reports deny that a single Russian ship has been lost,
and there is every reason to deem this correct.

Incidentally, the Russian Admiral is that Von Essen, who —
as captain of the Novik — was one of the two or three Russian
officers who earned glory in the Russo-Japanese War debacle.

The other, once Captain Wiren of the Bayan, is now
Commander-in-Chief at Kronstadt. As for the still one other —
Admiral Grigorovitch — what he has done for the Russian Navy
is too well-known to need comment. The Germans have nothing
to put against this trio of men who have been through the mill.
It is unfortunate for our national pride (though it is really a

13*

LAND AND WATER

October 17, 1914

admiral will be Yillcncuvc, not Nelson.

THE FAR EAST.

The advance upon Kiao-Chau continues. Thcio is reason to
believe hatXhe Lman warships in the harbour w.U presently
fill victims to land attacks from the Japanese, who ba^e the
iSulbinxperience of two previous wars to bruig on results of
this nature.

THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

At the moment of writing the German predatory criiiscrs
are taking a rest. This, presumably, means that by easy stage
?h'v aro^ proceeding to fresh huntmg grounds, whence a
; rudescenee of attack may be expected. To /he "^f" .°
known corsairs the light cruiser Leipug (twenty-three Knots)

in a great many minor places our consular service is represented
by any handy foreign resident. In peace time this system
(common to all countries) is economical ; but war is indicating
its disadvantages. A neutral cannot possibly be expected to
throw the same energy into the business as a Britisher. I ain
inclined to fancy that one immediate result of this war will
be a very considerable change in our consular service, unless
" Britain for the British " is to remain a mere empty chat-

Tlie Admiralty has just issued an official statement ia
connection with the duel between the Carmania, and the Cap
Trajalrjar. The outstanding feature of the report is that we
ajtpcar to have aimed steadily at the waterliuc of the enemy,
whereas the enemy aimed at the Carmania s upperworks. This
is a reproduction of what used to take place in the Great War of
a hundred years ago.

Unfortunately, we are still without data as to whether the
high aim of the Gei-mans was merely bad gunnery or whether
it was of deliberate intent. Probably it was the former.

EH Belgian.
Dutch.

WrcNo^^

./!^y^3.

THK EiVtK SCHELDT.

must now be added. Her original port was Kiao-Chnu, but her
last heard of " stamping ground " was ofi the west coast of
South America, where she has made two captures— one of these
worth about £120,000.

Vigilance on the part of British consuls all over the world
m detecting suspicious supply craft and warning our cruisers
is the surest method of capturing German corsairs. Unfortunately

THE WAR IN THE AIR.

In the bombardment of Antwerp the Geraians are
reported to have employed six Zeppelins. As explained in
previous articles anything German which is lighter than air
is for public purposes a " Zeppelin," so for " Zeppelin " we
had better read " dirigible airship."

Now the Germans started this war with sixteen big rigid
airships built or completing and six others in course of
construction. At the very outside they had nine Parsevals or
inferior non-rigid imitations. This gives a maximum total
of twenty-five all told- Of these we know that three have been
dcstroyetl for certain, probably double that number. We
shall not be far wrong if we put the total of available and effec-
tive airships at somewhere about eighteen to twenty. Secret
Zeppelins are as impossible as secret Dreadnoughts— they are too
big to try to hide.

At least as many dirigibles will be required on the Russian
fi-ontier as on the western side. From which we can calculate
that the number of dirigibles of all kinds available for service
against Antwerp would have been between six and nine.

We had better assume the latter number; because fragile
craft like dirigibles are never likely to be able to materialise
in full strength at any selected moment.

Two more raids have been made by our aeroplanes on the
German airship sheds at Cologne and Dusseldorf. No success
seems to have attended the Cologne attempt, but the flame seen
issuing from the Dusseldorf shed is clear proof that there is
certainly one Zeppelin which will never fly again, also probably
one shed that will no longer be of any use.

FIELD ENTRENCHMENTS AND THEIR

DEFENCE.

By COL. F. N. MAUDE, G.B., late R.E.

SPEAKING with an experience of many years, there is
nothing so dillicult to teach in peace time as the
construction and " siting " of field entrenclmienls.
Men very soon get tired of lifting earth, with
unaccustomed back muscles and blistered hands, on
some disused patch of uninteresting land — all that can be
spared them for the purpose. The whole idea of digging
a pit and squatting in it to shoot seems so childishly simple
that in a very short time the interest slackens, and unless you
are lucky enough to have the assistance of war-experienced
sergeants and .subalterns, the whole business becomes tedious
and subvereive of discipline in the highest degree.

This last remark may require elucidation for civilian readers,
OS the connection is not at first obvious ; but, in reality, it is verv
simple. Men come back from trenchwork thoroughly stiff
and sore, with an appalling thirst on them. The canteen ia a
confortable resort, and though dmnkenness is now almost
extinct, yet the eonplc of extra glasses of beer and the next
morning's muscular stiffness, not to mention the blistered hand.-^,
bring them back to work in just that condition of nervous
imtabriity which renders friction with authority nearly
inevitable. Someone or other loses his temper, a eouple of
men are marched back to the guardroom, and a settled gloom
tlescends on the trenches. Every little shift or evasion is

practised to save the sore hands and aching muscles, unless you
have with you some of the above-mentioned assistants, to cheer
the men up and interest them with bits of practical experience.

Fortunately, during the last few years there have been many
such men in the regular army, and nothing struck me so much
when watching the Infantry Pioneer classes at Chatham as the
greatly increased interest in their work which all ranks showed,
as compared with my experience as instnictor in earlier years,
and reports from the front show how much we are profiting
from this altered state of things almost daily. If instruction in
fieldworks had not become a living reality, had it remained
in the " before the war " condition, matters on the Marne might
have taken a very different course.

The real difficulty of this class of instruction, and I write
for the benefit of the very many officers fresh to the work in the
New Armies, lies in the absolute simplicity of the fundamental
ideas and the extreme difficulty of reconciling all the conflicting
tendencies contained in these ideas. The bedrock principle
all through the practice of warfare is " to kill your man first
before he can kill you " ; clearly, when he is dead he can do you no
further damage. But, to begin with, you do not always know
where he is, or how he intends to attack you ; so you dig a hole to
get cover from both sight and bullets, and wait for him to
commence operations or, at the best, to give himself away.

14*

October 17, 1014

Now we get to the first difficulty. The closer you can get
your eye to the ground level, the safer and more invisible you
become.

The ideal trench, which is only a hole laterally extended,
would, therefore, be something like this. The earth dug out

LAND AND WATER

Fig III

Fi2. I,

beinT; thrown away behind down a convenient slope or otherwise
distributed so as to be quite invisible, a very difficult condition
to satisfy. Still, heaped up bracken or heather, transplanted
turnip tops, etc., will suffice to hide the firer's head almost
completely, and his body has the whole thickness of the hill
as protection against the bullets.

But now you have practically sacrificed your best chance
of killing the enemy first — admittedly the best defence in
principle — for ground is seldom absolutely level, and any bush,
stone, or even a homely cabbage may intervene to break your
line of sight, and even in a trench you cannot move sideways
to clear it, for there are other men alongside of j'ou who want a
clear field of view just as badly, and they will not give way.
So from the very first j'our personal interest begins to clash
with your neiglibours, and you are up against the first lesson of
co-ordinated action, viz., the necessity of self sacrifice for the good
of the community which runs through all warlilce action from
start to finish, and invariably, in the long run, brings Victory
to the Race in which this instinct of self-sacrifice rules higher than
the instinct of self-preservation.

Again, even if no obstacles of the above nature intervene,
one seldom, in Northern Europe, finds groimd sloping uniformly
towards the enemy. Generally, the section of the hill-sides on
which we are now fighting, and shall continue to fight for a long
time to come has tliis section, viz. : Convex towards the enemy.

Line of Fire

Fig IL

and clearly, if you bring your eyes down to ground level at A,
an enemy at B, perhaps only twenty yards away, will be quite
invisible, and if he rushes forward you have no second chance
to stop him. Again and again positions have been lost because
this elementary fact has been forgotten by men trying to solve
other problems to which I shall hereafter allude.

The common-sense solution of the difficulty will obviously
be to use a profile shewn in Fig. III. This, at least, extends
the field of fire very considerably. But it introduces at once
new complications for it is practically impossible to hide the
fresh earth of this higher breastwork, it takes, generally, longer
to make and does not give equal protection.

Now it happens that the prevailing section of the ground
in South Africa was almost invariably concave towards the
enemy: Hence a man in a trench at the top of a slope
could see indefinitely out to his front, a fact of which the Boers
at once took every advantage, and we, as usual in South Africa,
quite rightly at once copied their example. But when we came
back to England and began teaching the deep Boer trench
as applicable to the very different circumstances, we blundered
mto a very bad hole indeed. Fifty years ago we had gone to the
other extreme. Our teaching staff for the Army when I joined
had all learnt their work practically before Sebastopol, where the
rock cropped up close to the surface, the slopes generally convex,
and as a consequence they had taught us to rely more on the type
of trench in Fig. IV., precisely as their successors after South
Africa taught Fig. I., and what we now have to do is to avoid
both extremes, except where suitable conditions prevail, and
generally to choose the best working compromise between them
on each occasion.probably something like Fig. III. above.fitted out,
of course, with head cover and so forth as I shall explain here-
after. For the moment all I want to make clear is the essential
compromise between fire power and cover which has to be made
in every case, and to suggest to the many men under training
or waiting for appointment how much they can facilitate
their own progress in the future by bearing this simple
"duahty" in mind and going out into the country and training
their eyes to appreciate the points involved in obtaining a
workable compromise between the two.

Fi3. IV.

To dwellers in London, I recommend a walk over Wimbledon
Common, dipping down towards Kingston and across Richmond
Park. For those who can spare time to go farther, I suggest a
walk over the North Downs, or any chalk country in the
neighbourhood. Our troops are fighting principally in chalk
districts now, and as I continue these letters I shaU call attention
to the different characteristics in the countries we shall have to
traverse. I will only now add that, whereas in the chalk downs,
one is constantly driven to the use of the type in Fig. IV. ; in the
Eifel — a volcanic district I expect many of our troops will
traverse — the concave type of ground prevails, and Fig. I. wiU find
its appUcation.

A DIARY OF THE WAR.

SYNOPSIS.

July 23bo. — Auatro-Hungarian uUimatum to S*rvia.

July 25th. — living Peter of .Sorvia's appeal to Russia.

Jc'.T 27th.— ^''ir Edward Grey proposed a London Conference
between French, German, Italian, and Great Britain's Ambassadors.

July 23i-h. — Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia.

July 29i-h. — A partial Russian mobilisation was signed on receipt
of the news of the bombardment of' Belgrade. English Stock E.xchange
closed. English Bank Rate, 8 per cent.

AucuST 1st. — Goneral Rus.'iian mobilisation ordered. Corm?.n
mobilisation ordered by Emperor. Germany declared v/ar on Riissia
and followed up this declaration by invading the Grand Duchy of
l.uxemburg.

August 2.vd. — Germany's ultimatum to Belgium.

AufjuST 3rd.— Sir Edward Grey stated British policy and revealed
Germany's amazing offer, in tlie event of our neglecting our obligations
to France. Mobilisilion of the Army. Ultimatu.ni to Germany.
German and French Ambassadors loft Paris and Berlin.

AuciusT 4Tn. — Germany rejected England's ultimatum. English
Government took over control of railways. War declared between
England and Germany.

August Si-h. — Lord Kitchener appointed Secretary of State for
War. H.M.S. Amphion struck a mine and foundered.

August 6rH. — House of Commons, in five minutes, passed a vote of
credit for £100,000,000, and sanctioned an increase of the Army by
590,000 men. State control of food prices.

Auousr SiB. — Lord Kitchener issued a circular asking for 100,000
men.

August 9th. — The enemy's submarine, XJ15, was sunk by ILM.S.
Dirminglifim.

Aucr.ST lOni. — France declared war on Austria-Hungary. Germans
advanced on Namnr. The n?w Press Bureau established by tha
Government for the issue of official war nev.s.

August 11th. — England declared war against Austria.

August ISth. — The Tsar addressed a Proclamation to the Polish
populations of Russia, Germany, and Austria, promising to restore to
Poland complete autonomy and guarantees for religious liberty and
the use of the Polish langii^se.

LAND AND WATER

October 17, 1914

ArcrsT Ifinr.-Japanes. ultimatom to Germany demanding the
wiih.Irawal of her vessels of war from the tar Last.

trsx 17«-The British Expeditionary Force safely landed in

*'""The Belgian Government transferred from BruEseU to Ant^rerp.

ArrrsT 18th -General Sir H. SmithDornen appointed to com-
mand of L^ycTrp. of the British E.xped,t.onary Force, m
■uccession to the late General Gricrson.

Adgost 2(>rH.-The Servians g^iued a dec.s.ve victory over the
Austrians near ^^habatz.

AUGCST 2l3r."The German forces entered Brussels.

AcorsT 22ND.-.Scrvia announces that their army had ^on a grejt
victory on the Drina. The Austrian losses were very heavy.

aL^-st 25nD.- Japan decbred war on Germany. . The Eu.s.an
.rmy gained an importSint victo^- near Gumbenneo against a foico of
leC.UCO Germans. _ , , , „

AcccsT 24ra.-It was annoimced tiiat Namur had faUen.

KvcvT 27TU.-Mr. Churchill announced in,">« H°"*°i ^ vi^^
Geno;^ amed merchantman Kaiser VMclm der Grosu had been
•uuk by H.M.S. Highflyer on the West Africa Coast.

Adoust 28TH.-A concerted operation was attempted against the
Germans in the Heligoland Bight.

The First Light Cruiser Squadron sank the Ma<m. The tirsl
Battlo Cru^^r Squadron sank oi.e cruiser, Koln class, and another
Sr diMppeared in the mist, heavily on fire, and in a sinking

""''two German destroyer, were sunk and many diraaged. The total
British casualties amounted to sixty-nine killed and wounded.

Lord Kitchener announced tliat " The Government have decided
that our Army in France shall be increased bv two divisions and a
cavalry division, besides other troops from India.

SBrKMBEK 2-VB.-The British Cavalry engaged, with distinc-
tion, the Cavalry of the enemy, pushed them back, and captured ten
goni The Bussian Army completely routed four Austrian Army Corps
near Lemberg, capturing 150 guns.

Sepikmbeb 3rd.— The French Government moved to Bordeaux.

Skttembeb 4-™.— The Russian Army under General Ruzsky, cap-
tured Lemberg, and the Army of General Brassiloff took Halicz.

pErroiBER 5rH.— The formal alliance of England, France, and
Russia was signed in London by the representatives of the three
Governments concerned, binding each nation to conclude peace, or
discuss terms of peace, only in conjunction with its Allies.

SBriEStBSR 6rH.— It was announced that the scout-cruiser Path-
fndtT foundered on Saturday afternoon after running upon a mine.

Settembeb 9rH.— The English Army crossed the Mame, and the
enemy retired about twenty-five miles.

Shtembee IItic— Our Ist Army Corps captured twelve Maxim
guns and some prisonera, and our 2nd Army Corps took 350 prisoners
and a battery.

Septembeb 13th.— On the left wing the enemy continued his retreat-
ing movement. The Belgian Army pushed forward a vigorous offensive
to the south of Lierre.

SEPTBMaEB 14Ta.— All day the enemy etubbornly disputed the
passage of the Aisne by our troops, but nearly all the croserngs were
secured by sunset.

Sr.PTO'.sEB 15th.— The Allied troopB occupied Rheims. Six
hundred prisoners and twelve guns were captured by the Corps on
the right of the British.

SKPTEMBtB 16th.— Submarine E9, Lieutenant-Commander Max
Kennedy Horton, returned safely after having torpedoed the German
cruiser Hda, six miles south of Heligoland.

Skttembeb 20th. — Rheims Cathedral was bombarded.

The British auxiliary cruiser Carmaiiia, Captain Noel Grant, Royal
Navy, sank the Cap Trafalgar off the east coast of South America.

Septeubeb 22kd. — H.M. ships Abouhir, Uogue, and Cressy were
conk by submarines in the North Sea.

September 23rd. — British aeroplanes of the Naval wing delivered
an attack on the Zeppelin sheds at IHsseldorf .

Settember 26Tn. — There was much activity on the part of the
enemy all along the line. Some heavy counter-attacks were repulsed,
and 0(Hisid«rable loss was inflicted on the enemy.

Skftembeb 28th. — ^At certain points, notably between the Aisne
and the Axgonne, the enemy made further violent attacks, which were
repulsed.

September 29th. — There was practically no change in the situation.
The Allied left had some very heavy fighting, but they well held their

October 1st.— The arrival of the Indian Expeditionary Force at
Marseilles was announced.

OcTOBEB 2xD. His Majesty's Government have authorised a mine-
laving policy in certain areas and a system of mine-fields has been
established and is being developed upon a considerable scale.

OcTOBKB Sth.— In Russia, after a battle which lasted ten days,
the Gei-man army which was operating between the front of East
Prussia and the Niemen was beaten all along the line and retreated,
abanaoning a considerable quantity of material.

OcTOBEB 7in.— Submarine E 9 (Lieutenant-Commander Max K.
Horton) returned safely after having torpedoed and sunk a German
torpedo-boat destroyer off the Ems river.

DAY BY DAY.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER Sth.

In the Northern region of our left wing the enemy made no
progress anywhere. They fell back in several places, particularly
to the north of Arras. The operations of the two cavalry forces
developed almost to the North Sea.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 9th.

On our left wing the opposing cavalry forces still operated
to the north of LLUe and of La Bassee, and the battle proceeded
along a hne passing through the districts of Lens, Arras, Braysur-
Somme, Chanlues, Roye, and Lassigny. Sharp fighting took
place in the Eoye region, where during the last two days 1,600
prisoners were taken. The British naval airmen carried out
another successful raid on the Zeppelin sheds at Dusseldorf.
They destroyed a Zeppelin. The bombardment of Antwerp
continued.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 10th.

The AVar Office announced that Antwerp was evacuated

yesterday.

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 11th.

The Secretary of the Admiralty announced that in the
retreat westward of the Anglo-Belgian forces, some 2,000 British
Naval Marines and 3,000 Belgians were cut oS by the Germans
and compelled to retire into Dutch territory, where they had
to lay down their arms. The German cavalry, which had seized
certain crossing points on the Lys to the east of Aire, were driven
ofi and retired into the neighbourhood of Armentidres. Two
German aeroplanes flew over Paris and dropped twenty
bombs in various places. It was announced that King Carol
of Roumania died yesterday.

MONDAY, OCTOBER 12th.

Six bombs were dropped on Paris by a German airman.
The Russian cruiser Pallada was sank in the Baltic on Sunday
by a German submarine.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 13th.

The town of Lille was occupied by a German army corps.

Between Arra.s and Albert we made marked progress.
In the cfentre we also made progress in the neighbourhood of
Beriy-au-Bac.

The Austrian army corps which were beaten in Galicia
tried to reform twenty -five miles west of Przomysl.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 14th.

It was announced that the Belgian Government had removed
from Ostend to Havre.

The Belgian field army, with King Albert still at its head,
was also in Northern Fiance.

It was officially announced from Petrograd that two German
submarines were sunk in the attack in the Baltic, by which the
Russians lost the cruiser Palladia.

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16*

October 24, 1914

LAND AKD WATEB

THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOG.

THE MAIN ACTION ON THE VISTULA.

THE AUics, as we shall see in a later part of
these notes, have in the last week pushed
forward a strong wedge into Belgium,
threatening and, perhaps, rendering lioj^e-
less a German advance along the sea coast to the Straits
of Do\'er. The}' hare gained gi-ound to the south of
Lille and of An-as, and have advanced fm-ther towards
their goal, the main line of German communications
into France. A fresh and violent German couuter-

stUl turns upon the results of that yet greater action
engaged at this moment upon the Vistula Eiver. If it
go against the Germans, no temporary success can save
them ill the west. If it go against the Eussians, nothing
the iVllies do in the we.><t can prevent the arrival there
of strong reinforcements for their German enemies.

It will be important for our judgment of this
vast action on the Vistula and for following the future
chances of the war in this field to appreciate the
elements of the ground over which it is being fought.

i;MP/i?^

KALISCH'f

NEWGEORCIEVSK

JVANGOROO
^)rNEW ALEXANDRIA

SANDOMIR

'•-.

PRZEMYSL

V^.

attack near Chaulnes has been thrown back. Every- The Eiver Vistula, rising in the Carpathians,

thing in tlie west points to some considerable runs in a great bend eastward, then northward, till it

modification in the near future of the deadlock there, falls into the Baltic near Dantzig. On its very mid-

But it remains true that the campaign as a whole course stands the modem Polish capital of Warsaw.

LAND AND WATEE

October 21, 1914

The battle is joined upon aU its central reaches from
WarsaAv southward and on along the San to the

Carpathians. , . . 4.

The Vistula first tumbles as a mountain ton-ent
through the foothUls of the Carpathians, then
(lowing east and west past the gi-eat fortress and
ancient PoUsh capital of Cracow it begms to trend
north, and reaches, in about two hundred miles,
the Uttle town of Sandomir. In all the lower part
of this first division it forms the artificial frontier
between Austria and the Kussian Empire, though, of
course, both banks are really Polish, and the whole
territory of Wai-saw and Cracow is but the ancient
sacred south, the later centre and heart of an undying

Poland. . T • ^

The province lying to the south of this artificial
Austro-Eussian frontier and stretching up to the crest
of the Carpathians is called Galicia. To the north of
this frontier and to the east of the equally artificial
frontier between the Eussian and the German Empires
lies the western part of Eussian Poland v.ith its five
main Governments of Kielce, Eadom, Petrokow,
Warsaw, and Kalisch.

About four and a half miles below the isolated
castle-hill of Sandomir comes in from the south and
east the main tributary called the San, upon the
upper waters of which, also in the foothills of the
Carpathians, stands the great fortress of Przemysl.

After the two rivers have joined, the Vistida
runs north through a trench commanded upon either
side by hills, fii'st fairly high, then gradually falling.
It turns a rather sharp bend after tbe issue from
these hills at the place now called " New Alexandria "
and there enters the plains which run almost un-
interruptedly to the Baltic. Twenty miles further it
passes the fortified point now called Ivangorod, which
town (it will be important to remember this in the
development of the battle) lies on the eastern or right
bank of the stream. Thence another sixty miles of
course now trending westward brings it to Warsaw
upon the left bank, and somewhat lower down to the
fortress of New Georgievsk, beyond which it does not
concern us in the matter of this battle.

In all this stretch of tbe river between Sandomir
and Warsaw the Vistula, everywhere broad and fairly
deep, is of course increasiug in depth and breadth.
It is already a large river below Ivangorod, three
to four hundred yards across at Sandomii-, quite six
hundi-ed at Wai-saw. It is navigable even in dry-
seasons all the way, and all the way there is no ford.
At this moment the water is high and the current con-
siderable. N6te, for further consideration in the
action, the tributjiry known as the Pilica, having the
town of Warka upon its north or left bank; it is, as we
shall see, of high strategical importance. Note
further the town of Grojec, the junction of seven roads
and a point which gives to whoever holds it, a choice
m his avenues of approach from the west and from
Germany to Warsaw and to the Lower Eiver.

After a continuous German advance through
Western Poland and as continuous a Eussian retire-
nient before it, the invaders reached the neighbourhood
of Warsaw upon the north and touched the Vistula
itself m all its middle course from Ivano-orod to
southward ; while southward again, the Austrians, after
their long retreat, turned and advanced abreast of
their Allies through Western Galicia tiU they reached
tlie San. •'

At the end of all this—about a week ago -the
wliolo Eussian force had concentrated (meeting its
contmual reinforcement from the east) upon positions
wliich ran fi-om near Warsaw upon the north. aU alono-

the east bank of the middle Vistula, then along and up
the east bank of the San to the batteries emplaced
before Przemysl and so to the Carpatliian Mountains.

This great position — the Eussian retention of,
retreat beyond, or advance from, which bistory will
probably call the Battle of the Vistula — is fully as
long as the corresponding great position in the west,
that is more than 250 but less than 300 miles. As
in the west, two nearly equal forces, each in the neigh-
bourhood of two million men, are struggling each to
break or turn the opposing line. Again, as in the
west, that line has been thrust back by the Germanic
powers iipon the territory of Germany's enemies. As
in the west, the main direction of the fronts runs from
north-west to south-east. There is a remarkable
parallelism between the two great conflicts, 800 miles
apart, upon whose co-relative fates the future of
Europe should depend. But when this parallelism of
certain main elements — some of them accidental — has
been noted, the comparison fails.

In the first place, the line of battle along the
Vistula is one of extreme topographical simplicity — as
contrasted with that in the west, which depends now
upon a range of mountains like the Vosges, now upon a
forest like the Argonne, now upon a small river like
the lower Aisne, now again upon an entrenched but
open plain like the Champagne. The Polish position
is simply the line of the Middle Vistula between
Warsaw and Sandomir, or, more accurately, between
Warsaw and the mouth of the San ; it is then con-
tinued up the San nearly to its source in front of
Przemysl, and so across the foot hiUs to the Car-
pathian Mountains.

No more elementary strategic thesis could be
conceived. The Eussians are holding the line of the
San and the middle Vistula ; it is the business of the
Austrians and Germans to j)ierce them upon that line,
or at the least to bold them there in check and to forbid
their further advance. It is the business of the
Eussians to hold the continuous line of the two rivers
and by turning or breaking the Germanic forces facing
them to compel them to retire.

There is another contrast in the nature of the line.
All the western rivers concerned in the present actions
in France and Belgium are comparatively narrow and
slow ; everywhere bridged, and when the bridges are
destroyed easily to be bridged again by the engineers
of either army. Often they are fordable. But the
Vistula is everywhere deep and broad and swift and,
save at two points — TFarsaw and Ivangorod, unbridged.
The San, save in quite its upper part, is an equally
simple and absolute obstacle though better bridged.

Again there is a great contrast between tha
eastern and tbe western fields in the matter of railway
and road communications.

There is here of course the main point that
whereas in the west the railways are very numerous
and hard macadamised roads universal and serving
eveiy^ four or five miles of country, such roads are
rare in Poland and railways rarer still. But there
is more.

The Vistula, tbe one main artery of the country,
is not even served as are all the great rivers of
AVestern Eui-ope by a railway line parallel to itself.
There is, indeed, such a railway line from Warsaw
past Ivangorod to New Alexandria, but beyond that
point the railway trends o£E eastward to Lublin, and
between that point and Sandomir there is no railway
following either bank of the river. There is no
direct and continuous facility for the supply of
ammunition and food by rail to the millions lined
up on the opposing sides of the stream.

October 24, 1914

LAND AND WATEE

Such facilities are only to be found in two very
simjjle groups.

There is from the east and to siipply the
Eussians that line Avhich comes from Kieli up to
Lublin. There is from the west and to supply the
Germans the branch line with its rail head at
Ostroviecs — a good deal nearer the river than Lublin.

In the last section of the Ime, along the San,
the Austrians have excellent railway supply up
from the main line at Jaroslav, and through Debitza
junction, with the railway exactly serving aU their
bank of the San. While the Eussians have nothing
north of the main line from Kielf and Lemberg,
wliich serves their positions in front of Przemysl.

We see, therefore, that the Austro-German line

<>^^'

RcmAustrun
aw German
Base J of Supply

LUBUN

west of the Vistula and the San has its best railway
supply just opposite the points where the Eussiau railway
supply on the other bank is lacking. The Germans are
better served on the Middle Vistula from Ostroviecs
than the Eussians can be from Lublin. They are
admirably served all along the lower San where the
Eussians are not served at all. On the other hand,
between the Eadom — Ivangorod line and Warsaw,
there is nothing along the west bank to supply the
Germans while the Eussians have an excellent line
parallel to the river along their eastern bank between
Wai-saw and Ivangorod fed by lateral lines from the
East. The point is of great importance because the
heavy artillery upon which, as we now know, the
Germans principally depend, is useless without a
sufficient railway supply, and the general scheme of
the railways leads one to believe that the principal
effoi-t of the Germans will be made at the points where
this railway system serves them, that is in the middle of
the line, while the Eussians should be strongest — for
advance, at least — to the north, their right. The
difference of gauge should not hamper the Germans
very much, for they have provided for it by preparing
axles measured to the Eussian gauge and convertible.
A worse handicap is the attitude of the Polish
population, which will do everything to interfere with
German supply along the extended lines of com-
munication between the German frontier and the
Vistula. Those lines of communication are nowhere
less than 150 miles long, and the method of teiTor
which has lieen introduced into Western Europe by the
Prussians in densely populated and wealthy regions,
and has there in the main failed, will be of even less
service in the open country of Western Poland with

its dispersed population and its few and not valuable
buildings. When the history of the war comes to be
written, it will probably be found that one important
element working against German victory has been
the hatred every Pole has come to feel for the
Prussian name, a hatred due to the incapacity of the
Prussian to govern and to his crude persecution of
such Poles as have the misfortune to suffer German
rule.

In the paucity of railways, the next important
factors of communication are the weather and the
roads.

The weather we can only estimate by the
averages of many yeai's ; but it is worthy of remark
that the rainfall in Southern Poland is by no meaus
at its heaviest in the autumn. The heaviest rainfall
in this region is in the summer : and this is particularly
true of the southern pait of the field near the
Carpathian mountains. June will have from tkree
to four inches of rain, while October sometimes has as
little as half an inch. It happens to have been
raining heavily during the last week over the northern
part at least of the field of battle, but the weather
would be altogether exceptional in this region if it
were to remain wet for a long time on end in the
early autumn. If then the roads were numerous and
good, the factor of tlie weather would be inconsiderable
as against an advance. But the roads north of Galicia
for tlie most part are — in Western and Eussian
Poland — ^impassable to heavy traffic after a little rain
at this season ; and the sort of traffic involved by the
passage of an army, particularly the movement of
heavy field guns and field howitzere, cuts them up
altogether. The soil in all the middle part is heavy,
the roads, though possessed of culverts and bridges
over streams, are rarely macadamised and, in general,
an attempt to advance with the sort of train necessary
to what we now know to be the German methods will
be very heavily handicapped indeed ; for though the
normal rainfall is slight the soil does not diy as it did
earlier in the year.

Tlie advent of winter is capricious, the coming of
hard frost differs by more than a month from year to
year, and it would be quite an exceptional year i£ this
facility for transport, such as it is, was felt before the
middle of November. It is true, of course, that all
this tells just as much in theory against a Eussian
counter-offensive as against the German advance.
But there is this difference between the two.

(fl) That the Germans depend much, more for

their power to hold a position upon their

heavy artillery, and that the direct contact

which this arm keeps off tells against the

German as compared with the Eussian

soldier : using the term " direct contact " for

aU short-range field operations from the

field-gun to the bayonet.

{6) When an advance is difficult the hostility of

a population makes much more difference

than when you have good roads and plenty

of railways, and the population in Eussian

Poland at least, and especially immediately

beyond the present German advance, is, for

the most part, exceedingly hostile.

Further, there can be no doubt that the Eussians

have the advantage in horses, at any rate in the quality

of endm*ance in their horses, and that is one of the

prime factors in transport everywhere, but particularly

in a country only partly developed, especially when

the roads are heavy.

The Battle of the Vistula is marked then (in
contrast to the struggle in France, whose issue is so

LAND AND WATER

October 24, 1914

largely dependent on it) by a much simpler scheme
C\hl paucity of the communications, tbc natural
strength of the defensive line, and the simple (and
inadequate) distribution of its niilway system.

Ijut there is this one last contrast between the
Western and the Eastern positions, more important
than all the rest: the Eastern position-the struggle
in Poland— lends itself to a decision much more
obviously than does the Western conflict m rrance.
In other words, though a deadlock is a possibility
(and has, indeed, obviously been envisaged by the
tJerman General Staff as a conclusion not wholly
unfavourable to their cause), yet it is far more prob-
able that one or other of the two opponents will
establish a decisive superiority after the first few days

of fighting. . ■< 1 • 1

This probability (it is no more) is a capital aid
to our judgment of the campaign. It means that
the thesis which has been always maintained m these
comments— that the result in Poland would be the
prime factor in the general result of the whole cam-
paign throughout Europe — still holds.

But why does one say that the Eastern position
lends itself to a rapid decision more than does the
Western ?

Because {a) there is room for outflanking ; (d) one
party at least can count upon a continual arrival of
reserves ; (c) either line, if broken or turned, lacks for
a long distance to the rear any prepared defensive
positions : either pai-ty, if compelled to retirement,
would be compelled to a long and disastrous
retirement.

(a) That the first point is true — as to room for
outflanking — is evident from the very nature
of the position upon the map. It ends
near Warsaw ; that is, only at the begin-
ning of the vast plain which stretches
thence to the Baltic. True, that plain is
cut by a whole belt of marsh and lake on
the boundaries of East Prussia, the northern
boundary of Eussian Poland. But there
is ample room between for a turning move-
ment round Warsaw to be undertaken by
whichever party shall have so decided a
numerical superiority as to permit of such
an action.
Of any considerable turning movement upon the
other flank, the southern, which is the extreme right
of the Austro-German line and the extreme left of
the Eussian, there can be no question ; for here the
extremity of either line reposes upon the " tangle of
the Carpatliians."

{b) The knowledge that Eussia can, at not too
remote a date, count upon the arrival of
increasing numbers must urge the Germanic
Powers to attempt a decision before those
reinforcements arrive. At any rate, even if
a full result cannot be hoped for, the advent
of these new bodies (though they should
not have the value of the first line) must
prompt the enemies of Eussia to strike a
heavy blow at the Eussian army before it
is further strengthened.
(c) There is not afforded by nature any good
defensive position parallel to the line' of the
Vistula and the San for a long way on
either side. If the Eussians be compelled
to fall back, the rivers behind them provide
doubtful positions. If. it is the Germans
who fall back, thoy have indeed prepared a
line within the immediate proximity of their
own frontier, but, as yet, nothing very

serious in between. We shall see, if they

have to go back to the line of Kielce-

Petrokow whether they have sufficiently

entrenched i/ia( ; but even if they have, it

wQl be as open to outflanking upon the part

of the Eussians, as is the present German

line along the rivers. Further, the difllcul-

ties of communication would prevent rapidity

in retirement, and though that handicaps the

pursuer as well, it handicaps him less, for it

does not gravely affect his cavalry and light

artillery.

We may sum up and say, first, that a decision is

to be expected upon this field probably before there is

any final result in the west, and that, according to the

nature of this decision (according to whether it is

adverse to the German cause or not) we shall either

(1) see the western German line in France retreating

in despaii- of receiving reinforcements from the east ;

or (2) see sucb reinforcements arrive in great numbers,

and the campaign in France enter upon a new and

very different phase.

This is by no means certain, it is only conjecture.
It is always possible that a decision might be reached
in France and Belgium before the first undecided
actions upon the Vistula and tbe San had begun to
show wliich way the tide was flowing. But it is far
the more probable event that an appreciable result in
Poland wiU in a short time release men for the west,
or, in the absence of such reinforcements, compel the
Gei-man Ime in the w^est to retire. That is why it is
the business of all of us to keep our eyes fixed upon
this unfamiliar eastern field.

So much being said, it is further evident that for
tbe Germans to acbieve a decision in their favour they
must pierce the line before them. Conversely it is ,
evident that the Eussians must attempt to turn by the
northern flank (the only available one) the position of
their enemies upon the further bank of the two
streams. The Germans do indeed attach a great
importance to the possession of Warsaw upon their
extreme northern flank. It would give them a bridge
across the Vistula (there is but one other — at Ivan-
gorod), and it would give them depots, a great accession
of that moral position to whicb they attacli so great a
political value (even at this advanced stage of the
campaign) and last, and most important, the great
town with its fortifications at Memlin (New
Georgievsk) just below Warsaw, which would cover
and protect the Gei-man left from Eussian assault and
from Eussian tui-ning movements even for some time
after the perpetually growing additions to Eussian
strength begin to be felt.

While, then, the (rermans must naturally attempt
to take and hold Warsaw they could not themselves
attempt a turning movement there, and to get behind
the Eussian line in the Vistula, because, pst, they
are not in sufllcient numbers even now to do so, and
secondly because those numbers of theirs are diminish-
ing, in proportion to the enemy's, with every day that
passes. The principal Austro-German effort must,
therefore, be to cross the rivers Vistula or San at
certaiii points, there to break the Eussian line, destroy
its cohersion and its unity of command, and leave it
for a long time to come permanently inferior to its
opponents. Such a result would leave Germany free
to transfer numbers of troops to the Western theatre
of Avar, even though she would still be condemned
to preserving a very large force in Sou.tliern Poland.

On the side of the Eussians it is equally obvious
that their attempt must be a turning movement
round by the north — by Warsaw. They know tliat

October 24, 1914

LAND AND WATER

this is largely a campaign of exhaustion. They know
that the enemy has rendered his own commmiications
insecure by a false policy of cruelty with the peasants.
They know that he has in his retirement but few
roads and railways to depend upon — roads and
railways which would be hopelessly clogged in any
pressed retirement.

The Germans have massed (they themselves say
it) not less than five anny corps in front of Warsaw
— a third of all they have upon the Vistula. They
advanced at first to within half a day's march of the
city. But the Russians gradually affirmed, theii*
superiority at this point, at any rate in the first days
of the struggle. The fui-thest point of German
advance before the Russian counter-offensive was here •
reached, perhaps, last Wednesday night. Thm-sday
things lay doubtfid. By Saturday and Sunday, if
we are to trust the official Russian commimique, the
superiority of the Russians upon this wing had
definitely established itself, and the Austro-German
line was already in some peril of being turned from
the north.

Meanwhile, very strong and at first partially
successful, attempts to force the line of the rivers and
thus to break the Russian cohesion were continuing
in the middle of the vast field and to the south of it.
How far these have been or will be repelled we cannot
yet say, but apparently they have not to this date
made any considerable prog^-ess, though some foothold
may have been obtained upon the right bank.

How difficult such a crossing must be and how
strong the position is as a defensive one a more
particular examination of the line will prove.

The whole position fi'om the Carpathians to the
neighbourhood of Warsaw falls into three rather clearly
marked divisions, unless, indeed, we add a fourth
for the billy country round Przemysl and the
mountains at the back of it. At any rate,
immediately to the north of this first short mountain
sector you have the course of the River San up to the
point where it falls into the Vistula ; one may give
to this line, say, from the main Ghlician railway
northward, a distance of over sixty miles. The upper
part of the San River is fordable. The fords
naturally get less frequent as one goes down stream ;
all the lower part is even naiigable. Further, a main
railway line leads up to and feeds this southern wing
of the enemy, and a branch line, leading northwai-d
along the left bank of the San from Jaroslav, acts as
a main avenue of supply, an opportunity for concen-
tration of troops upon any chosen point of it. If the
best troops, the strictest organisation, and, above
all, the strongest ai-tUleiy were to be discovered in this
region, one might predict an attempted forcing of the
line here rather than further north. The obstacle is
less formidable, the communications are much more
perfect. Bit it is precisely here that you have no
more than the recomposed fragments of the defeated
or second Austrian aimy and the first, which though
not hitherto defeated has suffered from weeks of
retreat under considerable loss and at some expense
to its organisation.

It must further be remembered that a crossing of
the water and a breaking of the line so far south as
even the middle San, if the pri?icipal operation were
here undertaken, would not be decisive, as a breach
effected nearer the centre would be. It is a universal
truth in every form of attack, strategical or tactical,
by land or by sea, that, other things being equal,
a line is more effectively broken in proportion as the
stroke comes nearer its middle ; for thus is the largest
of the two fragments at least still small. But tlie

doctrine pai-ticularly holds in this case, because the
main Russian communications lie far to the north
of any threatened point upon the San. There will be
attempts to cross the San ; one vigorous one has
ah-eady been made near Nikso — just below the first
bridge upon the junction of the San with the Vistula.
Some measure of success was claimed by Austria
(but unofficially, I think) for this attempt.

The main effort, however, to break the Russian
line wUl hardly be undertaken in this section upon
the San ; it will fall in the middle section between
the town which the Russians now call Ivangorod
(a site known in Polish histoiy as Demblin) and
the little, ancient, and once strong borough of
Sandomir, which lies but a few miles above the
junction of the Vistula and the San.

Tliere are several reasons why the main attack
should be delivered in this central of the three sections.
Here, to begin with, you come immediately upon the
main communications of the Russians after piercing
their line : or at least their main communications as
a united army. Get through there, and you throw the
northern half of their line back on to the main road
and railway Warsaw-Brest, and the southern half of
their line back upon the other railway Lemberg-Eaef .
Fm-ther you bring to bear (upon whichever of the
separated halves you choose) the whole weight of the
invading advance through Poland upon the breach
so made.

Again, this section is tackled by the most
efficient portion of the Allied Germanic Powers, the
German troops ; it is presumably better supplied with
heavy artillery, under the action of which alone could
the crossing of a deep, broad, and rapid stream be
attempted.

These reasons alone should be sufficient foa-
expecting the main attack to be delivered in the
section Ivangorod- Sandomir, the second or central
section of the line. But there are further reasons.

This is the portion of the Russian line which is
least well backed by railway communication. There
is here no railway along the eastern bank. But on
the western bank, where the Germans lie, the main
line through Radom'up to Warsaw throws out an
extension towards the Vistula, the railhead of which
is at Ostrowiecs, a depot central to any attempt upon
this portion of the stream. There is no other railhead
equally well situated for a concentration anyv^^here
between Sandomir and Wai-saw. (See Map II.)

To the north of Ivangorod crossing is more
difficult ; apai-t from its being too far from the centre,
you have considerable belts of marsh along the stream,
a crumbling bank, and this usually steep and a matter
of from 50-100 feet in places above the nonnal
water level. It is true that the country through
which this central section (Sandomir-Ivangorod)
passes is hiUy, the hills becoming bolder (especially
upon the left bank) the more one goes southward and
upstream. The Great Plain does not begin until
after New Alexandria (wliich is the Russian name
for the site more congenially known in Polish history
as the Palace of Palawy). But this hiUy country is
not so confused or broken as seriously to intercept an
advance, and there is firmer opportunity for landing
upon the right or eastern bank, and less opportunity
for the concentration of the enemy.

"What is more, two considerable obstacles
separate any effort undertaken against the line
Vistula-San below Ivangorod or above Sandomir from
any effort undertaken in the central portion
between the two towns. The first and least of these
obstacles is the great belt of forest 50 miles by at

«•

LAND AND WATER

October 24, 1914

lca.t 20, which lies roughly triangular a couple of
days' nm-ch south of Eadoni. This, though travei-s-
ablc of course by two or three good roads may be
regai-dcd as the southern boundary of tlie belt over
which the Germans must advance towards tlie cross-
ing of the central Vistuk. It cuts off for an
advancing body the columns working north ot
Sandomii- from those working south To the north
is the very serious obstacle of the Pahca. bhould a
l^issian turning movement by the north be even
partially successful, then the obstacle of the Palica
would afford delay for the withdrawal westward ot
such Gorman troops as might have already passed
successfully to the further bank of the Vistula between
New Alexandria and Sandomir. But an attempt to
i)ut the main Gorman force over the river north of
that obstacle would speU disaster ^/thc Gei-man left
in the ncighom-hood of AVarsaw were senously
menaced ; still more if it were timied. The Palica
with its marshes would hem in the reti-eating army.
There would hardly be time to -\Aithdraw the advanced
bodies that might have approached or even crossed
tlie A'^istula ; and there is no natural obstacle between
AVarsaw and the Palica to fend off the Eussians
approachhig from the north to cut the communi-
cations of the bodies that had just crossed or were
just crossing.

It is evident that the German.s, while their
numbers may not be sufficient so much as to threaten
a turning movement here against the Eussians, would,
by only liohUng AVarsaw, make their advance across
the central Vistula (should they succeed in crossing
the stream) secure. They must of course not only
hold AVai-saw : they must also mask, attack, or in a
paradoxical way repose upon the enemy's fortress of
Novo Georgievsk (the true name of which is the old
Polish name of Memlin). They must mask also the
secondary fortress of Ivangorod. But containing the
garrisons of these two, without fuiihor advance
east and west there, if they cross the Vistula
further south at some central point between
Ivangorod and Sandomir, and if they there break
the Eussian line, such a breach, while AVarsaw
was held, would decide the action as a whole. All
this means that an attack upon and an occupation
of AVarsaw and with it the holding of the line
AVai*saw-Ivangorod while a crossing is eft'ected some-
where further up above Ivangorod is the obvious
GciTuan plan.

AVlien we look then at the three sections (1) the
San, (2) the Vistula between Sandomir and Ivangorod
and (3) the Vistula from Ivangorod down to AVarsaw,
we see, as I have said, that the central one of these
is the most favourable for the chief attempt of the
Austro-Gcrraan allies at crossing the river ; and we
know that, as a fact, the attempt has been made
(with what hnal success or ill-success we do not yet
know) at one particular point especially chosen therein,
the jwint near Jozefow.

In order to undei-stand why this pai-ticular spot
was chosen the following sketch map may be of
intorest. The A'istula happens at this point to be
narrower than it is at any place cither above or below.
It is even nan-ower than at Sandomir. Above, there
are marshes ; bclo\v, islands and the entry of a tribu-
tary which balks an advance.

That the Vistula is here con-espondingly deeper
does not affect the problem, because it is not, in any
case, fordable. That it runs more swiftly is an adverse
consideration for the Germans attempting to cross it ;
but this exti-a cm-rent is not sufficient to outweio-h
the great advantages of a passage which can be "-aiiied

more rapidly (if it is gained at all) than at any other
point for many days march above and below.

Nor is this the only advantage of the crossing
place of Jozefow. It is the nearest point (by road) upon
the Vistula from the railhead at Osowiec. Further,
there are two roads leading from that railhead to the
head of the river bank opposite Jozefow. The one
goes north of a belt of wood at this point, the other
south of it ; and the total distance from the railhead
to the right bank is but twenty miles as the crow
flies — less than thirty by either road.

The Eussians upon the opposing bank have no
svicli advantage. Their railway is fully half as much
a^ain, even as the crow flies, behind them ; and they
have but one road to it — though a longer road
down the river leads to New Alexandi-ia and a more
distant point upon the same railway.

If, as is reported, the German attempt at crossing
the A^'istula opposite Jozefow has failed, the check to
the invaders, though not decisive, is heavy. No
equally good opportunity is to be found for breaking
the middle of the Eussian line.

Upon the San, of course, there are numerous
opportunities of crossing. That river is not more
than 150 yards broad in its lower courses, it narrows
rapidly as one approaches the mountains, the bridges
across it and roads leading to these bridges are
numerous, the opportunities for gun positions to
defend the crossings are, in such hilly country, also
numerous. But it must not be forgotten that the
effect ujion the Eussian line here would be but
partial. It would be a blow delivered too near the end
of the line, which can hardly be turned, as it reposes
upon the mountains ; and the nearer one is to this
extreme end of the line the better are the Eussians
supplied by the great railway from Lemberg and Kieff.

Again, below New Alexandria and between
Ivangorod and AVarsaw, the opportunities for
crossing grow rarer and rarer as one goes down-
stream. The river broadens out, is marshy upon
one bank or the other (sometimes upon both), and is
not served, upon the German or western side, by the
railway.

There is one last point of considerable strategic
importance to be watched, and that is the junction
of the two rivei's, Vistula and San. This point is not
of great impoi-tance to the attackers at the present
moment, for there is no particular reason why the
Austro-Germans should try to cross near here more
than at any other place. But if the tide of the
battle turns, and a Eussian pursuit of a German
retirement begins ; if the main Austro-German line
is turned round its AVarsaw flank and has to retreat
from the rivers, the7i this river junction will become
of the very gi-eatest importance to the Eussians.

6»

October 24, 1914

LAND AND WATER

Z^^

■fioaici

exaggerated. Seat ^
widtlt averaged
ZAWlcmsr) j350Ca 400cfds.

,^ ^^

^>"

^^.•^

TbDebh

icez.

-Q

.Vlu«

5.x

.i«

.0 "^^

About iO Miles

To Jarosiav cznct
iBcLse round, by
DeSiuca.

SKETCH or JUHCTION OF SAN ASD VISTULA BITBBS.

Why? Because if they cross here in any force
they will be driving a wedge between the Germans
in the north and the Austrians in the south; they
wiU be, to use a metaphor, " enfilading " the line
of the Upper Vistula; they will be upon the north
side of an obstacle which separates the main Austrian
armies in Galicia (to the south of that obstacle)
from their allies in Western Poland ; they will have
but to defend the northern banks of the Upper
Vistula to separate the two allies. And we may
confidently expect, if a Russian advance begins, a
particularly strong effort to seize this junction of
the two streams and to obtain a bridgehead at that
point. Of course there is no existing bridge ; the
"tcte de pont " the Russians would fight for here
would mean the possession and defence of a point
upon the left or western bank to which soldiers could
be ferried over, or to which they might cross by a
pontoon bridge.

So much for the attempts of the Austro-Germans
to force the Russian defensive line behind the
Vistula and the San (probably somewhere in its
centre), and for the Russian counter-offensive if
such an attempt faUs.

But the main Russian effort will not consist in
merely awaiting the Austro-Germans. It will consist
in attempting to turn their north flank near Warsaw.
The Germans know this, and to reach Warsaw, hold
it, and prevent such a turning movement is essential
to their success.

To hold New Georgfievsk is essential to t^'e
Geniian plan, for it is the northern fortress, the
extremity of the line. Nor should we be blind to the
undoubted fact that political considerations (perhaps
to an undue extent but not always unwisely) weigh
upon the German commanders. The capture, or
rather the occupation, of Warsaw would have a
great effect throughout all Eastern Europe, and a
corresponding effect in Germany and Austria. It
is for this reason that the greatest mass of the
Gennan troops is not concentrated for the moment
— was not concentrated a week ago — opposite any
one crossing place of the Vistula, such as Josefdw,
but was concentrated for an advance upon Warsaw.
Grojec, commanding the junction of so many roads,
as we have seen, and the very ante-chamber of
Warsaw, was seized more tlian a foi'tnight ago in the
Gennan advance. A week later tlie advanced

cavalry bodies of the Prussians were almost within
sight of the city — ^not a day's march away.

Bat the same considerations which have made
the occupation of Warsaw a prime object in the
German advance, have made the repulse of the
Germans in this part of the field essential to Russian
success. The political importance of saving Warsaw
from even a temporary German occupation must have
hiid its weight with the Russians ; but much more
than that, with any sane commander, must be the
all-importance of turning the German left in this
region. If no effort were ultimately to be
undertaken against one of the two wings, of what
purpose would be the occupation of this immensely
long and purely defensive position along the Vistula
and the San ? And if no flanking action were to be
attempted upon either of the two wings, what use
would it be to the Russians to count, perhaps imme-
diately, certainly with every week of the future, upon
increasing numbers superior to their foes ?

We may take it as certain that the Russian plan
has for its principal business the turning of this
German flank in the north. Of a corresponding
movement in the Carpathians there can as yet be no
question. And it is true to say that all the chance of
a decision in favour of our Allies turns upon the
success of this pushing back of the Germans from
before Warsaw, eastward and southward. With
every mile that the Germans are compelled to " refuse
their left," to bend back their line, before AVarsaw,
their chance of a successful offensive across the
Vistula further south — and indeed their chance of
deciding the whole action in their favour at aU — gets
less and less.

By the Russian account, up to the news which
had reached London at the time of writing this,
the Germans had in their advance on Warsaw
succeeded up to about the morning of last Thursday,
October 15th. With the 16th the tide turned, and
on the 17th and 18th, Saturday and Sunday last,
according to the Russian version, the German left,
strong as it was, was here pushed back right to the
line Grojec-Skienewice — a matter of twenty miles at
one end of the bend and thii-ty at the other.

The whole battle at this stage stood somewhat
as this sketch map shows, with the attempted German

x^zw Georalcvsk

Cmcow

'Przetnysl

crossing of the Vistula at Josef ow, on arrow (1), and
the attempted Russian turning of the Gennan lines
before Warsaw on an-ow (2). Neither effort is yet
decided, and there we must leave it.

LAND AND WATEB

October 24, 1914

THE WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR.

In the Western Theatre of War the week has
seen (up to the moment of writing) one fresh and
one belatod piece of news.

Nothing notewortliy save in the extreme north
and on the extreme south— near the North Sea and

in the Vosgcs.

Upon the old main front between the Oise and
thf Argonne there have been but slight movements.
It is obvious that the forces on both si(liir must have
been very lai-gcly depleted for the sak6 of reinforcing
the great effort the AlUes have been making upon the
west up to the Belgian frontier, and the violent
counter-offensive attacks which the Germans have
directed against that line. None the less, in some
points there has been a rather noticeable flexion of the
line. Thus, all the advanced trenches bf the Gennans
above the Aisne has been taken; half of the crest
of the plateau north of Soissons is already reached
by the Allies, but not Craonne nor the Noyon end
of it.

Below Craoime, again, between that high promon-
tory hill and Eheims, and in the neighbourhood of
Berry-au-Bac, there has been some advance, and a part
at least of the Nogent Hills to the east of Eheims are
lield ; but whether the whole lump has been occupied
by the French or not neither French nor Gennan
communique's indicated.

But on the Belgian frontier near the Nortb Sea
and down in the Vosges there are two points of
interest: One belated piece of news, as I have said,
and one notable change.

The notable change concerns the situation in the
Franco-Belgian frontier. The belated news concerns
the recapture by the French of the Southern Vosges
overlooking Upper Alsace. I will take these in tlieu*
order.

A. — Thh Belgian Frontier.

It is important, if we are to understand the
French and English official communiques which deal
with the all-important left wing or northern extreme
of the Allied Hne, and with the assault that is presum-
ably to be delivered upon it by the enemy, that we
should grasp the nature of the ground. The Allied
line ran originally nearly north and south from the
district just east of Arras to the sea near Ostend. We
may note that the entire stretch of these two fronts,
from the An-as district to the North Sea, is not far
from eighty miles. Nearly the whole of this line
traverses a plain, most of which is dead level. The
exception is in a range of slight heights running in
a dwindling crescent south of Ypres. From Lens
northward to above Armentieres you are in the coal
district — a mass of dirty lanes and a gridiron of rail-
ways and canals. But from the north of this to the
sea the complexity of such countiy ceases, and is
replaced, especially as the sea-coast is approached, by
numerous very slow watercourses, both canalised and
natural. Almost every field has its wet ditch. Of
communications it is not worth speaking, for both
good, hard roads and railways are so numerous that
transport is possible for almost any numbers that
might be concentrated for the shock in this region.
It is worth noting, however, that neither side has one
long natural defensive line upon which to fall back in
cise it is pressed by the other. On the side of the
Allies there is, if they were, unfortunately, compelled
to pivot far round eastward, the line of heights all the
way down south from Cape Gris-nez. Tliat is three
days' march behind their present positions in the

middle, and a week's march behind their extreme
positions on the seacoast. There is no defensive
position immediately behind the Allied line as it is
now held. With the Germans this defect is
still more strikingly apparent. There are no
heights whatsoever behind them, and nearly all
the watercourses run across their Ime, and not
parallel with it. Entrenchment, modern entrench-
ment, is apparently an artifical line anywhere pro-
ducible : we have yet to see whether it can " hold " an
advance where no natural aid is given it and where
time has been lacking. If it is against the Germans
that the balance of pressure is felt this next week
they must fall back thoroughly, uncovering Lille, and
depending at the best upon the line of the Scheldt, con-
tinued perhaps by the canal which runs from the Scheldt
to the neighboui-hood of Eecloo ; but the prospect of
any long stand across that line of country is not favour-
able. A retreat, if it were imposed upon them, would
be a retreat which would uncover not only Lille but
Douai, and would come perilously near to their main
line of communications behind Valenciennes.

This is as much as to say that the Gennans
count upon ceiiain advance. It is not an exaggeration
to affirm that such a line as Lille-Ostend would not be
held by any force that did not count upon an
immediate advance. Difficult and cut up as the
countiy is, there is no very great extent of wood.
There is a group of detached woods both east and
west of Ypres and one considerable forest north of
Ypres and in front of llouUers, and there are numerous
scattered woods south of Bruges for over a bolt
twenty miles by seven or eight miles. But there is
nowhere continuous wood in such quantity as to check
an advance upon either side, or to screen any large
movements — so far as these can be screened from
aeroplanes. The only defiles— that is the only places
where troops would be compelled to narrow issues
during a retreat and where congestion of transport
and all similar difficulties might happen, are, of course,
in a country of this sort, through bridges. But these
bridges are so numerous, and the streams to be crossed
so sluggish, for the most part so naiTow, and all so
easily dealt with by pontoons or trestle work, that a
retirement would not be anywhere subject upon either
side to difficulties fi'om this cause.

As has necessarily been the case throughout the
whole of this western campaign, taking place as it has
over territory where the Germans and the French
have in various aspects struggled against each other
for two thousand years, this last extreme northern
field which has been reached by the extension of the
Allied line, and which bids fair to be the principal
scene of the next heavy work, is filled with the
historical memories of former actions. The British
force stands right in the country traversed by the
Duke of York on his march to the siege of Dunkirk
in 1793. The Germans at Wei-wicq used and com-
manded the bridge by which the Austrians, crossing
too late, lost the Battle of Tourcoing in the next
year. Fontenoy is but a few miles behind their
positions at Lille ; Oudenarde but a few miles behind
their positions at Courtrai. Immediately behind the
Allied line Hondschoote marks the first considerable
victory of the French Eevolution in its life-and-death
struggle of the Terror.

It is clearly evident (and this is of first-rate
importance) that the Germans are here upon the
Franco-Belgian frontier attempting a divided thing.

I say that our knowledge of this diversion in
their aims — which knowledge is now certainly acquired
— is of capital importance. And for this reason.

8»

October 24, 1914

LAND AND WATER

Tliiit no more impoiiant test of possessing the
initiative — of " pinning " your enemy and providing
against unexpected action upon his part — can be
looked for than the discovery of his trying to do two
things at once.

When the Gemians had the initiative — during
that amazingly rapid and well-ordered march of theirs
upon Palis — no subsidiary thing was attempted. All
was on one idea. But to-day, after they have been held
in the western field for six weeks, a plain diversity of
object, already slightly apparent on more than one
point of the long line of battle, has now quite cleaiiy
presented itself in the north.

The German commanders have been tempted (1)
to break the Allied line anywhere between Lille and
Noyon : that was not only a principal and legitimate
object, but one in which they have often nearly
succeeded, and one consonant with their general
scheme ; (2) to move along the sea-coast and occupy
successively Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne : to
command the Straits of Dover.

Now such a double scheme would have a plain
strategical meaning in the case of an enemy strong
enough by his advance to push back the whole of the
Allied forces in this quarter. If he had so great a
superiority of numbers that he could be certain of
advancing from the line Lille-Valenciennes on to
Arras, and at the same time of advancing from the
line LiUe-Ostend to the line St. Omer-Boulogne, then

no^tH sea-

the double operation would really be a single opera-
tion ; and an Allied force attempting to hang on for
a short time to, say, Menin, would at the very begin-
ning of such an advance occupy a dangerous salient
fi-om which it would have to retire. It would be
swept back en masse.

But it is fairly evident that Prussia commands
no such overwhelming force either in quality or in
quantity in this region. It is the Allies who have
gone forward. It is they who have taken successively
Estaires, Anncntieres, Frelinghien. It is they who
have made progress in front of Arras. It is they who
liave pushed even as far as Eoullers. And it is self-
evident that not both of the plans thus undertaken by
the German commanders can now be achieved.

I am not saying that they have not une-xpected
reserves which may yet make good some advance
of theirs south of Lille, as along the arrow (1).
I am not saying that they have not the power —
tliough it seems very doubtful — to advaxice if they
choose to undei-tako that dangerous enterprise along
the arrow (2) along the sea-coast. But, I do say
that they cannot undertake both objects, and that
then- objects are here clearly divided.

Now, to divide your force is to put both parts in
peril. And in this case the two parts in no way
co-operate. They cannot bring down south from
arrow (2) any aid in flank of arrow (1) — unless they
have an overwhelming number. The country between
is solidly, successfully and progressively occupied by
the Allies. StiU less can they bring up to the north
aid to arrow (2) from arrow (1). That would
be suicide ; for it would be the exposure of
their main communications -with France behind
Valenciennes.

There is no doubt at all that the two efforts are
separated. Difficult and usually rash as it is to say :
" This knowm situation necessarily produces that known
future result," it is a fair estimate of the present
position upon the Franco-Belgian frontier that not
both of these two separate efforts can succeed ; ^nd
the chances ai-e more than even that neither of them
will succeed.

If this is so, it may well be asked for what
reason this effort along the sea-coast was imdertaken
by the Germans at all ? One might begin the series
of questions by asking of what strategical use was the
occupation of Antwerp? Here there is one reply
quite satisfactoiy : " Antwei-p was occupied in order
to remove any considerable threat against the main
communications through Belgium, because the
moment had come for moving certain German rein-
forcements— perhaps not very large nor of very good
quality — through Belgium into France." Even so
the answer does not cover the field. Antwerp could
perfectly well have been masked, and was faii-ly
efficiently masked for more than a month. But any-
how, let it go at that. You get something of an
answer to the strategical question "Why did the
enemy occupy Antwerp ? " It cost the Germans very
little in men, and we must also remember that it
raised the spuits of the civilians behind, which spirit,
though an indeterminate factor, is not one entirely
to be despised — especially in a coimtry which has
been taught to expect continuous victory and which
can boast that the gi'eat war has been hitherto con-
ducted beyond its own frontiers.

But when one proceeds to ask the further
strategical question " Why was Ghent occupied ? "
one gets an answer less satisfactory. Some reply:
" It was occupied in order to cut off the retreat of
the Belgian forces from Antwerp along the sea-coast."
I say this answer is still less satisfactory than the
answer to the occupation of Antwerp, because the
German commanders must have known that the
Belgian ai-my would escape them. They cannot even
have thought it a very close thing.

It is not, by the way, one of the least achieve-
ments of the last few days in a strategical sense, that
this considerable force should have been safely with-
drawn. Nor is it, paradoxical though it sounds, a
discouragement to know that the 20,000 of them who
were lost by crossing the Dutch frontier, were only
lost through a blunder and not by the German pressm-e
from the south.

Even let it be admitted that the occupation of
Ghent had some strategical meaning, when we come
to the last question, " Wliy were Bruges and Ostend
occupied ? " no good strategical answer is available at
all. The thing was political. While the great sweep
on Paris was taking place the coast could have been
occupied by small German forces at any moment. It
was not then thought worth while. Now tha,t that
sweep has failed, the occupation of the coast in the
hope of some moral effect upon England has been
undertaken. The answer is not strategically sufficient.

LAND AND WATEB

October 24, 1914

•Roulers

•5tOmer •—• \

€5

•Antwerp

•Ghent

o s lo IS 30 as -^

Miles

rLAH SHOWdO DAKQUB Ot aSBUA.H ADTANOB A-LONO THH COAST TO THEIE MAIN tIN» OF COMlTtnflCATIOjrS.

Nothing but a similar answer can be given to the
proposal to go on westward along tbe coast to tbe
Straits of Dover in the face of such large forces of
the Allies pushed forward eastward and below as far
as Menin and EouUers. To pursue the advance by
the level road along the sands to Dunkirk, to Calais,
and ultimately across the Grisnez bills to Boulogne
with this big enemy-force on their left flank is
impossible to the Germans. It is a march which
simply cannot be undertaken until the Allies are
pushed back from that flank. And to attempt it at
all can only mean that the occupation of the coast
immediately opposite Great Britain has in the eyes of
the German Government (not of the German General
Staff) some particular political value. Of strategical
value it has none.

The occupation of Lille, and the vigorous
defence of the German positions south of Lille and in
front of Douai (where the French have already
reached the trenches), has a very real strategical
meamng, as have had aU the German efforts upon
this hue from between Douai and Airas right dowTi
south to the comer of the j^d line of the Aisne near
Compiegne. The strategical meaning of it is the
defence of the main German Kne of communications,
and even a pushing back of the Allies from these,
until the Germans shall feel perfectly secure. But
the isolated German thrust along the mai-itime belt
IS a wa^te of effort until or unless very much larc^er
torces than anything hitherto brought to bear by the
enemy should appear. MeanwhUe, the advance of the
wedge thrust by the Allies between these t\vo German
efforts, east and west of Lille, continues

It may be of service here to gire in some detaU
a sketch map of the district in which tliis double
effort IS being made by the enemy, and to describe tlie
fortunes of the fight during the last few days in
detail; for quite probably in this field something

decisive will be achieved by the one opponent or tha
other in the next few days.

noULLERS

COURT!>AI

CECLOO

In possession oF Allies
before the ^movement.

Further BeJt occupied by
Allies since movement began.

The change of dispositions as we have learnt
them from the official communiques of the French,
the English, and the Germans upon this decisive area,
the Franco-Belgian frontier, during the last few days,
are as follows : —

Following upon the full of Antwerp it was
generally expected that there would come a German-.

10*

October 24, 1914

LAND AND WATER

advance — in Avliat numbers, of com-se, we could not
discover. The Allied forces were prepared to meet
that advance wherever the stroke might fall, and, if
necessary, to take the counter-ofEensive. The Belgian
Army which had evacuated Antwerp marched round
in proximity to the frontier, untU it had effected its
junction with the French forces along the sea-coast,
the advanced guard remaining at Nieuport and the
mass extended westward towards Dunkhk, throiigh
Fumes. South of this came the Allied forces holding
all the comitry southward down to the neighbour-
hood of Arras.

Up to this moment, the furthest point to which
the Gei-man cavalry had penetrated in its great
advance as a screen, rather less than a fortnight ago,
was the front Hazebrouck-Cassel ; Hazebrouck in the
plain, Cassel on its splendid single, Roman, hill. From
this Hazebrouck-Cassel line the German cavalry had
been pushed back in the first encounters. The main
German advance (in what full numbers we do not yet
know — and we shall never be able to do more than
guess, though its composilioji wiU gradually appear
through prisoners and other sources of information)
appeared last Tliursday in the almost simultaneous
occupation of Ostend and LUle. The momentum, so
to speak, of this German push was not exhausted by
the seizure of these points. The ultimate front — the
extreme westward and east of the enemy here —
was a line occupied a week ago from in front of
AiTas, through or near Lens, in front of La Basseo,
by Merville, to the heights (base, confused and
insignificant) known to the inhabitants as the Hills
of the Cat (the Monts du Chat) ; whence, by the way,
a valiant body of volunteers marched just too late
to be of any use at the Battle of Tourcoing a hundred
yeai's ago. In the local patois, which is Flemish,
men call it " The Catsberg."

From these heights the German line bent back
slightly, but well west of the Ypres Canal, througli
Dixmude, to the sea. Ostend lay behind this line, and
was occupied as a matter of course.

At this moment it was not certain whether the
Germans would attempt to attack along the sea- coast
or to renew their violent efforts between Lille and
Douai against Arras ; or even whether they would not
attempt both things together.

Meanwhile, against so long a line which might
for all we knew be insufficiently held (from in front of
and below Arras to the sea-coast near Ostend is, as I
have said, a round 80 miles), the Allies pushed
vigorously forward, and the effect of that advance
was to strike a great wedge in between the northern
coastal forces of the Germans and their forces in and
to the south of Lille. As this advance proceeded it
looked more and more as though the big GeiTnan
cavalry movement of the week before had been not
80 much a screen in front of a really large advance
of German reinforcements, as a blind — perhaps an
effort to get the Allies to put too many men up north
along the sea and so to weaken the front by An-as :
perhaps the other way round : to make more progress
along the coast by threatening Lille and the country
south thereof.

At any rate the Allied forces, depending largely
upon the excellence of cavalry work, puslied
eastward. On Friday last the French, who had
already taken Estaires, were at Laventie, and the
Allies had seized the isolated group of these hills
named after the Cat. They had not yet reached
Ypres or Armenticres. But by Saturday they were
right up again.st Armenticres, in Ypres, and already
making a bend in the German line. On the Monday

after the capture of Fromelles, there was a general
advance in this region from Laventie, on to Armen-
ticres, which was captui-ed and occupied ; advanced
guards also captured the town of Frelinghen. Twenty-
four hours later more advanced bodies of the Allies had
reached Menin, and a spear-head of the Allied forces
(how composed we do not know) was in Roiillcrs.

Now if the Germans on the sea-coast had fallen
back before this steady and rapid push of the Allies
north of LiUe, we should have less to record. But the
interesting thing is that in spite of this big wedge
driven in between the coast and the manufacturing
region south of the Eiver Lys, the Germans have
clung to the coast and were still attempting, as late
as last Monday, to force a way eastward along it.
They were checked by a mixed foi-ce in which the
Belgians had the good fortune to take some revenge.
This force was posted along the only strong north-
and-south defensive position in this flat and sandy
district — the canalised course of the Yser, which
waterway is also known as the " Canal of Ypres to
the Sea." This watercourse comes out at Nieuijort,
running by Dixmude, and appears hithei-to to have
checked any fm-ther German advance along the coast
towards Dunkirk.

Meanwhile, any such advance would now, as I
have said, be very much in peril fi-om the occupation
by the Allies of all the country to the south of it ;
and until or if that country is cleared by the Germans
and the Allies pushed back from it (of which there is
as yet no sign), it is not credible that the offensive
undertaken by the enemy along the coast of the
North Sea towards the Straits of Dover can be
continued.

It is equally true that if the advance from Menin
should reach Comirai the German position at Lille
will no longer be possible.

The whole story of these days is one of a fairly
rapid and distinctly successfid pressure exercised upon
the enemy, pushing him back across a belt 10 or 12
miles wide in the neighbourhood of Ai-ras, 30 miles
wide in the broadest part of the wedge between Haze-
brouck and RouUers. But much more important than
the mere advance is the fact that, if it can be con-
tinued, it will mean a gradual envelopment of what
lies to the soulh of it, and must surely ah-eady mean
the retirement of the hazardous Grerman advance to
the north of it along the sea coast.

B. — The News from Alsace.

The second item, the belated piece of French
official news as regards Alsace, is interesting
chiefly in this : That it is the first indication
we have had for many weeks of any improvement
in the situation there. It was generally taken for
granted that, with the exception of Belfort and its
garrison (and perhaps a few miles of the plain
east of Belfort) all Alsace had been abandoned to
the enemy since the French disaster at the end
of August in front of Metz. Indeed, we had heard
no more than occasional accounts of a German
offensive in front of St. Di6, which offensive
had been time and again repulsed. But it was
generally believed that during the whole of this
period the crests of the Vosgcs and their passes,
from that mountain in the south called the Ballon
d'Alsace right up to the northern height of the
Donon, had been occupied by the enemy, who had
also seized the French, or western, slope of those
mountains. It now appears that all the southern
passes have — after what struggles we are not told —
come again into French hands, and that the eastern

11*

lAND AND WATEE

October 24, 1014

V£RDUN

-^eo- ^ "^ J^eraqe doff's marcliiiig

keptopeit
/LTieaf/oi-ts

PLAIU of
LORHAINE

.w,,.

<^^

TOUL

- FreJuJt Front
according tv last
Conzmimiqim

^f=f^= Occupied
by French since last
Conuniuiique' a£Oit,

t/te Vbsges

EPINAL

''.u

^''.,>

■v^ +

im ::?

Fortisiedi
Zone o£
BELFORT

MOLHAUSEN

Gap ofBelfort
Betwreen. Swiss
mocmtains and
the Vosges

or Alsatian slope (A the Vosges is held up to a point
abreast of Colmar.

The forces hitherto engaged on this extreme
right of the great line of positions through France
have been (comparatively) so small during the last
few weeks that the strategic value of an advanccv
or retirement in this district is not great. But the
news does at least mean this — that if a big turning
movement is attempted on tlds right wing of the
French at any time — as by the release of troops
from the East after some German success upon the
Vistula — that turning movement will not imme-
diately approach, or without warning, the gap of
Belfort. It means that the attack, should it come,
is more likely to come through Lorraine and upon
that " open door " of which I have spoken so
often in these notes upon the Meuse at St. Miliiel.
But it is no longer certain that this open door

is as open as it was three weeks ago. St. Mihiel,
indeed, is stiU occupied, but such slight change
as there has been in the situation has been to
the advantage of the French. They way now hold
Camp des Eomains. They are back over the
Meuse, quite near St. Mihiel. The news is very
scanty, but a little startling. It speaks of the
destruction of a battery of heavy German guns and of a
recrossing of the river — of action close to the St.Mihiel
point. But of a cutting off of the Grerman advanced
post patiently w^iiting there, it says nothing. Had
the French occupied the whole of the Eupt du Mad,
had the advances northward from Toul and south-
ward from Verdun met, the German door into France
at St. Mihiel would have been shut agam. It has
not been shut; but the corridor leading to it has
been maintained naiTOw, and has, perhaps, been made
a little narrower. We must wait for more news.

NOTE. — THIS kXtVSLt HAS BEEN BtrBMITTED TO THB PRESS BtTEEAU, WHICH DOES KOT OBJECT TO THE PUBLICATION AS CENSOBSS
AND TAKES NO EESPONSIBILITT FOB THE OOREBCTNK38 OP THB STATEMENTS.

Ur ACCOBDANCB WITH THE BJCQUIKKKENTa OP THB PRESS BUEEATJ, THB POSITIONS OP TROOPS ON PLANS ILLXJSTRATINO THIS
AJSTICLU MUST ONLI BB EEQARDBD AS APPBOXIMATB, AND NO DBPINSTK STKDNOTH AT ANT POINT IS INDICATED.

12»

October 24, 1914

LAND AND WATER

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

NOTE. — THIS ABTICLB HAS BEEX SUBMITTBD TO THB PEESS BUREAU, WHICH DOES NOT OBJECT TO THa PtTBLIOATIOS AS CEXSOBIB

AND TAKES KO RESPOXSIBILITT FOB THE COKEEOTNESS OF THE STATEMENTS.

L.y-V'^

THa BALTIC ABSA OP CONFLICT SHOWIKQ THB MOST IMPORTANT FORTIFIED POINTS.

THE SUBMARINE MENAGE.

yA T the moment of writing the German week's bag —

/^k by submarines — is one Russian armoured cruiser

/ ^k and one old British protected cruiser. It works

/ ^ out at two of something for nothing ! And it is

idle to deny that a species of submarine panic is

spreading.

The actual asset remains small. To dat« no German

submarine has achieved anything whatever likely in the

remotest degree to ailect final issues. But — the Germans have

secured enough " moral effect " to make everything else seem

possible. Many of us envisage them, out of tho way, lying in

harbour till such time as they have sunk by submarines enough

of our Navy to make a fleet action a " toss up," or else odds in

Germany's favour.

So far they have — except in the case of the Pallada—
merely submarined ships which " don't matter." But we may
take it that they will pursue this policy steadily until they have
sunk various capital ships of ours which do matter very much.

And it is just about hero that German calculations seem
likely to go astray.

Supposing that they attain their object; supposing that they
sink some of our Dreadnoughts until battle fleet equality or
an advantage therein is obtained ? The German fleet may then
come out at the "selected moment." But — and it is a very
big " but " indeed — it chances that we have more than twice
as many submarines as they have, and, as I described in a
recent article, submarines manned on thosd democratic lines
which alone can bo relied on for ultimate success in this kind
of warfare. Whatever risks we may have run, their risks will
be twice as great.

That, however, is oveilookod. German agents in this
country have made a strong but so far only partially successful
effort to raise a submarine panic. It cannot be too clearly
understood that it is not the loss of ships and men on which
the enemy relies so much as " the panic." It is in tho chapter
of accidents that not long before the war Admiral Sir Percy
Scott, in a letter, and Sir A. Conan Doyle, in a story, should
have invested the submarine with a very high potentiality. Of
thcee entirely extraneous circumstances capital is already
being made.

Presently more capital will be made, because it is reason-
ably certain that, sooner or later, the German submarines will
secure some of our Dreadnoughts. The first Dreadnought
secured we may be certain of seeing the " panic " sequel worked
to the uttermost.

Now, this is one of those few troubles which are best met
half way. As I suggested some weeks ago, the loss of a dozen
Dreadnoughts by submarines is among the things that are
■possible. We should meet it by thinking of it as a ■probable
event. The more we anticipate it the better, for by so doing
wo shall keep our heads.

To date, the losses due to submaiines have been propor-
tionately far less than people imagine. For example, here is
a list of all losses which have taken place in what may be called
" submarinable waters " : —

Allies.

GeRUAKS AND AnSTUT.lNS.

Submarines

Pathfinder

Cressy

Eogne

Aboukir

Hawke

PaUada

Hela
S 126

Mines

Amphion
Speedy

t.b.l9 (Austrian, Accidental)

Gunfire

K. Luise (minelayer)

Zenta

U 15

V 187

Magdeburg

Koln

Mainz

Ariadna

S 115

S 117

S 118

S 119

18»

LAND AND WATEE

October 24, 1914

Now if we Bxaniine tie Usb, we find that, at the time of
wntSL'. ihZl W ouly been ^ successful submaxme aOacka
Tn s^^ty^ven day, of warfaxe. Of these six succcssfU
att^l3 two were delivered by u«. Consequently o«rlos.
works out at approximately one succcesful attack against
us every nineteen days. There have been six gunnery ailairs
in the same period, resulting in the loss of twice as many units,
80 to date the submarine (counting in units) has boon only
hnJf aa effective as the gun. As yet, therefore, there i3 no
occasion for alarm, the more so aa there is reason t^ believe
(hat the Russians sank some of their submarine attackera.

In any case, the submarine is neither invulnerable nor
invincible. The difficulty with it is mainly that it is a now
arm— this is the first time that it has been effectively fci-ied m
warfare. Means of defence have therefore to be invented, for
only in actual warfare can the necessary experience be gained.
Of iteelf a submarine is a specica of intelligent floating
mine, its speed and visual ability both of a low order. The
real danger lies in the German habit of using a trawler mother
ship flying a neutral flag. Each German success has been thus
secured — the trawler acting as the brain.

Obviously, tlien, the first thing necessary is to deiyiso ways
and means of dealing with the brain.

That is to bo done either by restricting the liberty of trawlers
to fish or cruise in submarinable waters, or else by utilising
trawlers for the examination service. Further, it is probably
not beyond the wit of man to devise some means of transform-
ing small steamers into some kind of submarine destroyer.
Take the harpooning of Nature's submarine — the whale— for
example. And, finally, we should be well within our rights
if we gave it clearly to be understood that the crews of all
vessels assisting enemy submarines under the neutral flag
would be hanged as pirates. The percentage of men who will
face in cold blood the chance of being hanged is small.

THE NORTH SEA.

The process of destroying the British Fleet by " attrition "
has decidedly failed in its object during the last we^ On
the Gorman side tlie bag is one old cruiser, the Hawke; on our
side four German destroyers, old, but still useful.

None of these losses affect the main issue, save in k> far
as the principle explained by Bemhardi is concerned. Our
numerical superiority in the various classes of ships varies, but
it can bo roughly generalised at from 33 per cenb. to 50 per
cent.

This makes no allowance for ships on foreign service, or
for what the Germans have to detach to operate against the

Generalised Broadly, the situation is approximately
follows: —

Typo.

British.

German.

Bnlisb Surplus.

" Dreadnonghta "

Fre-XJreadnoaghti

Cruisers

Light Cruisera ..^

Torpedo Graf*

40
49
72
200
84

30
15
30
209
30

34
36
61
64

In every case the ships concerned are of widely varying
fighting value in each class. But where numbers are at stake
the fighting valuea of units are apt to coalesce in the general
total. Taking an arbitrary 100 against seventy, it is obvious
that if the lesser Power destroys ten of the cnoniy with a loss
to itself of seven, it has made no progress whatever. The
situation remains unaffected ; the superiority of three has no
meaning. And since the Germans are actually up against a
proposition which is nearor 100 to forty (even at a moderate
computation), it is easy to see that even an apparent gain
would represent an actual loss.

The following is a list of losses in the North Sea and
Baltic to date. These two areas cannot act in combination so
far as the Allies are concomed; but so far as the Germans are
concerned they are more or less one and the same thing : —

asm.

Loet by Allies.

Lost by Germans.

Cniisors >.■■■■

4
2
1
0
0

T^ichfc Cruiaera •■■

Torpedo Craft

Submarines

I to 4

Total of all sorts

13 to 10

PLAM SHOWIKO BOBKUM, OriT WHICH TH« OIEKAN DBSTBOTBES WEEK

Russians in the Baltic. Nor does it take into account the
considerable force of small craft which the French maintain
in the Channel. In calculations of this kind, it is always
bettor to allow a margin. The sui-plua given is therefore our
minimum superiority, and the German total, correspondingly
represents a maximum.

Space does not permit of giving the whole sum in exact
percentages— nor would there bo any particular advantage in
giving it. In matters of this sort broad generalities aro the
things that count

Now, working in units this means that it has cost the
Germans about double value for every unit which they have
destroyed. Translated into terms of abUity to afford it in
units this works out at something like sixpence expended for
every penny gained. Translated into terma of fighting value it
only works out at something like it costing twopence to make
a penny against adversaries which have a shilling available for
every German sixpence. " Attrition "
is haj-dly to be achieved on these lines.

Turning to the two latest actions;
little of much moment is to be extracted
from either. The Eawke was an old
cruiser launched in 1891, in the days
when the torpedo counted for very little.
She displaced 7,350 tons. She was
armed with two ancient 9'2'3, and ten.
equally ancient 6 inch. Her palmiest
speed was 19'5 knots.

The destroyer action is in a
different category. It must ho left to
others to decide whether Mr. Churcliill
was quite " happy " in his ratrdestroyiug
simile. But whether he were or
whether he were not, this particular
action cornea under that head.

So far as can be ascertained, the
four old German destroyers, S 115, 117,
118, and 119, sunk by the light cruisor
Undaunted, and the t.b.d. Lancr,
Lennox, Legion, and Loyal, were patrol-
ling off Borkum. They were boats
designed for the destruction cf battle-
ships by toi-pedoes, without the least
regard to conflict with others of their
kind. To continue the Churchill simile,
they were rata which crept out of thc-ir
hole and found a man with a shot gun
waiting for them.
Directly they saw tho Undaunted they must have known
that the game was up. To my mind, the disquieting feature
of the matter ia that they did not surrender right off, but
instead put up a fight with their popguns against over-
whelming odds.

The Undaunted, in common with the rest of her class,
carries a couple of 6-inch guns. These guns mean death and
deetruction on the first hit, whereas an old German destroyer
might fire at an Undaunted for a whole day without daniaging

her anything to speak of.

14*

October 24, 1914

LAND AND WATEE

I may be wrong, but I am of opinion that we should take
very careful note of this affair off the Dutch coast. It indicates
that the Germans have a tenacity fully equal to our own.
They are playing for the Empire of the Seas, and they axe
playing to win. The odds against them are stupendous, but
they do not recognise these odds.

The guns available on cither side were as follows : —

Bmtish.
Two C-in. (lOO-pdrs.)
Fif ecn 4-iii. (31-i)dro.)

Germans.
Twelve 4-i>dra.

Little wonder that our losses only amounted to five
wounded I

A curious feature of the action is that it is stated to have
occupied over an hour altogether. This probably included
from the first shot fired in the chase to the sinking of the last
enemy destroyer. Shooting from a destroyer at high speed is,
however, always very difficult.

Sufiicient data are not available to form a connected story
of what happened. We cannot rely much on the Dutch eye-
witness who " knew the ships were destroyers because they had
four funnels." None of the British boats engaged have moro
than three funnels, while all the Germans had but two. His
other observations were probably equally at fault.

The precise tactics, however, matter little. Of far more
moment is the circumstance that the enemy was annihilated
without appreciable loss. He had not a dog's chance — and
that is the correct strat-egy of war. On each occasion that we
have met the enemy this has happened.

THE BALTIC.

News from the Baltic is still somewhat vague — for some
reason or other no coherent official German report is available.

The Kiel Canal has been closed to merchant shipping; this
probably to curtail information as to where the High Sea
Fleet is.

There are rumours of a German Fleet cruising near the
Aland Islands, but it may possibly turn out that they are
Russians.

The Incident of most moment is the official Russian state-
ment that on October 10th the Admiral Mal-aroff, whila
•earching a suspicious fishing vessel flying the Dutch flag, was
unsuccessfully attacked by submarines. On the following day
her sist-er cruisers, the Bayan and Pallada, were again attacked,
the latter being hit and sunk with all her crew. The Pallada

was a modem armoured cruiser of 7,773 tons, armed with
two 8-inch, eight 6-inch, and a 7-inch belt. Har speed was
about 21 knots. She is the first modem ship (save the litt.lo
Awphion) to be lost in the present war. A feature of the
design of this type is a very complete series of unpierced
bulkheads of great solidity. Theoretically, she waa unsinkable
by one torpedo. Either, therefore, she was hit by two or
more, or she happened to be struck in a magazine.

In this connection German torpedoes appear to be mora
violent in thedr action than do ours. A special new secret
explosive has consequently been euspect-ed, but evidence as to
this is yet inconclusive — there is a great element of luck in
where a torpedo hai^pens to bib.

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

There is no change to record. The bombardment of
Cattaro continues. Photographs which have been publish'j'l
suggest that only old ships are actively engaged — which is also
both reasonable and probable. It seems improbable that any-
thing on a par with the German " 17-inch howitzers " on land
is being attempted by thi ships; there is no reason why it
should bo.

The usual Austrian destroyer is reported unofficially as
"sunk," also an Austrian submarine. Stories of this kind
are best accepted with caution. Indications generally are thai
the Austrians are remaining in harbour.

THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

At the moment of writing all German corsairs have dis-
appeared. One or two* vessels supposed to be their auziliary
colliers have been captured or detained, and this may partly
account for the recent lack of activity. More probably, how-
ever, it is part of the general plan of campaign designed to
lull us into a temporary security. Possibly, however, our
cruisers are too active to make commerce warfare alluring.

In any casa, nothing has so far happened to render neces-
sary any consideration of the adoption of convoy, with ita
attendant inconvenience and expense.

THE FAR EAST.

The old Japanese cruiser TaJmchiho has been sunk by m
mine. Aa a fighting unit she was quite obsolete. Operatiooa
otherwise continue much as usual.

FIELD ENTRENCHMENTS AND THEIR

DEFENCE.

By COL F. N. MAUDE, G.B., late R.E.

IN my previous article I gave rough illustrations of very
simple sections of trenches, leaving out all dimensions,
and I did this for a reason I shall now explain.
Nothing in my experience dbheartens the would-be
student of these matters more than the diagrams in
text books, marked minutely 4 feet 3 inches, 5 feet
6 inches, and so forth, many dozens of them, all of which
he is told he must commit to memory for examination
purposes.

The whole thing seems so unpractical to him. If a man
wants breast-high cover when buUets are flying, or are likely
to fly, he will dig till he gets it, without bothering at all about
inches. But even in war bulleta are not always flying; in
peace, naturally, they never are, and it is essentially in peace
that all instructional work has to be done. There will be
lots of it in the new armies for the next six months. Hence
these dimensions have to be fixed, because in peace what the
whole squad wants \a to get back early to their dinners, and
unless you lay down distinct and definite dimensions of depth,
■width and task recjuirod from each man (which must be
adhered to) the instructor has no irrefutable argument at
hand with which to check shirkers. As many of my readers
•will probably be instructors in a very short time, I recom-
mend these hints particularly to their attention.

Moreover, where places have to be entrenched against time
it is absolutely nec€S.sary to have some clear idea as to the
amount of earth a man can throw out in a given time, before
any reliable scheme for a whole position can be evolved. If
the general gives his subordinates eight, twelve, or forty-eight
hours to prepare a position, he must at Ic.nst be able to judge
how much work he can reasonably expect to find done upon ifc

in the time, since his whole plan and distribution of troops
must depend the duration of the defence which an allotted
number of men can make in it.

Generally, after a long peaces the tendency is to underrate
very materially the amount of work that can be done, with
the result that works are not attempted at all for fear they
should not be finished in time, or far more men than would
suffice are allotted to their defence whose services, as a mobile
reserve, may be badly needed elsewhere.

I remember an old Crimean instructor telling us that the
best guide as to what a man could dig out under fire was to
back the champion man of one company against the champion
of another to get out 100 cubic feet for drinks, and then note
the result. I remember also one such competition in which
the two men almost tied in one quarter of the time which the
book allowed for the job. These are hints not to be found
in official textbooks, but they will be exceedingly useful none
tJie less.

The next point is of importance to all ranks alike, wheither
they have to dig trenches, or defend them, or both. It has
been brought our very clearly in " Eye-witness's " last letter
from Headquarters in France. The writer is himself an
engineer officer, and the point raised is one around which a
great conflict has raged for many years.

Gonorally, everybody at first thinks that the greater the
range at which he can see his enemy the better tJie chance
of shooting him down before he is readied by the enemy. lb
seems such plain commonsense that if a man must spend tliirty
minutes under fire in trying to get at you, you will have thirty
times more chances of hitting him than if the distance ia so
short that he can cover it in only one.

16»

LAND AND WATER

October 24, 1941

Cnrionsly, however, the exact converse ia the case, aa
Plan I. will show. . .

Let the distance be 3000 yards, taking thirty inmut«s
roupfaly to cover. Now, at 3000 yards long-range infantry
fire haa never yet stopped a decent battery from unlimbering
and opening firo, and never will.

The enem/s infantry comes over the brow of the hill in
iuccessive lines, and your men begin shooting, thus disclosing
their position by the graae of their bullets.

It was argued by many of us long before the war begaoi
tha.t to place trenches on the top of a long slope was simply
to court destruction at the hands of the gunners, who can
always outrango infantry. We argued that a man could
always shoot straighter from a rest than when standing up
froru the shoulder. Therefore, the essence of a good defence
lay in so tracing tho trenches that the guns could not get at
them from a distance, thus compelling the infantiy to attack
without their support. Thus, as shown in Flan II., B.'s guna

Batteries promptly appear near the top of the hill, not
necessarily on it, and in three minutes or so a rain of
shrapnel begins to burst over your heads, smoke, dust, and
bullets fill tho air, and it ceases to be possible for men to see
the approaching enemy, much less aii« at him, for the bullets
corao so thick that every square foot of vulnerable surface,
meoa's heads, and shoulders, must be hit threo or four times
a minute. At last, when the enemy's infantry is about 300
to 600 yard* off, according to the slope of the ground, his

Plan L

now cannot come forward down the slope towards A. w.iUiout
being crushed by A.'s artillery, which can shell the wood full
of B.'s infantry as it pleases, ajid if B.'s infantry try to break
out of tlie wood down the hill, A.'s unshaken infantiy can
pump out magazine fire enough in a minuto to wipe out every
living thing among theam. This is exactly what we Lave now
loarnt to do in practice on the Aisno.

Of course, the enemy's aeroplanes may locate A.'s
trenches, but unless the guruaem can see where the aero-

300 Ojd&-

guns hav* to cease their fire in order to avoid hitting their
own men in the back, an experience no men will stand. But
by that time the defenders have been so reduced in numbers
and so harassed by shells generally, that they firo high and
wild, and can no longer stop the enemy's final rush. That is,
and always has been, the mechanism of every successful
attack, but hitherto, in actual practice, no army has seen that
in the modem breech-loader they possess the one
which can defeat this design.

weapon

Plan II.

plane's sngnaJ bomb drops their fire is not likely to ba
vary accurate, and, after all, you must take some chances
in war.

When, therefore, in the near future any of my readers may
find themselves in a trench halfway up a slope, or close to
a wood, at first sight the worst kind of place he can imagine,
let him take heart, for the choice of such a position only shows
that his leaders know their work and have full conildeaico in
his shooting.

THE WAR AND THE FILM.
L«tesl pieturet at the Scala Theatre.

-=,Tf^!l! ^°, ^u °.°* '«.' •**" *•'• beautiful colour picture, of the
war at the bcala Theatre will do weU to take an early opportunity of
doing «o^ for there ut certainly no entertainment of equal interest
I^lo!.^ "■ ^"^^^ "' '•'° P"=*^°* ">"«• The latest additions to the

!Simf^o„ In^"^ f "'''^°' ^"'^ """^ P"^'»" "?«. »~ full of
^ .^t ^' ^ "° 'i°°v V^^ ''"■^'■y of » >'"*. -"bile the arBt part
?h, »il^.'^^'""'^'' '^^'^\'^?«^' in varied detail the different unitf of
I^v W^a n "*^* figl'fng force, of Russia, France, Germany,
^It^XFrT'^- ^^'t^^l^-d, the United States, and Japan
^n.„ . f ; I' "^ gorgeou* colouring and of dramatic incident which
Sd J1 h-^- ^'T "•? «>=°"«=tiou of the spectator, and which miy.
IS mu'h th=S^"^""^ "gain and again with undiminished zest. Amo^i
IfriSnal, hf f "?<«^^^°'l»>y. It is difficult to particularise, but thf
fl^ n^! T „*!"?""'" "P'"^'. °f th« foaming sunlit waters in some of
the naval pictures is a veritable triumph fSr the kinemacolour Droce,«

enLnw the Xrof Vh • ^^''"o"* 'tenis being skilfully chosen to
WAR PUBLICATIONS.

Se BritUh Armv All^<?^ moment « ho ie not?-in the v,.clfare of
we ilritisn Army. All the variou. units that go to make up the com-

plete army are carefully dealt v^ith. The chapter on the " New Army "
will be read with considerable appreciation.

Although not specifically stated, it is not difficult to imagine that
both these books are from the pen of the same author, and the French
Army jrnm Within explains the various branclie» in detail. The
chapter dealing with the great garrison towns of France is of particular
interest.

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16*

October 31, 1914

LAND AND WATEE

THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

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THE FIELD IN FLANDERS.

Tuesday afternoon, October 27t/i, 1914.

I WISH this week to concentrate upon that
large business — ^largest as it serves the Allies
though large it serves the enemy — which
is acting in Flanders as I -vvi-ite.

Perpetually in the course of this great
campaign, and especially during its course in the
West, we have had a situation which looked like a
decision ; and yet that situation has not matured.

We have had movements that not only might
have resulted in very definite success to one side or
the other, but which seemed necessarily to point to
such immediate restJts.

I do not mean that we have had situations
which could make one certain of victory or defeat
for one party ; I mean that we have had situations
which promised as alternatives some consideral)le
success on one side or the other — just as you may
say of a big speculation that either the man will
make a fortune or will lose one. From what )'ou
know of the state of tlie market he will be made or
broken. But at any rate he will not come out with
a s?nall loss or gain.

Now the principal characteristic of the campaign
up to the present moment — that which seems to
differentiate it from every other great campaign
of the past, and a characteristic probably pro-
ceeding from the whoUy novel conditions of modem
universal conscript armies and modem machines — is
that these critical situations have never developed
beyond a certain limit. They have never matured.
They have never led to a decision.

Upon the analogy of the immediate past of the
war it would therefore be unwise to say that the
present situation in Flanders points to an approaching
decision. Nevertheless one is tempted to say that,
•what with (1) the violence of the struggle, (2) the
largo reinforcements involved (especially upon the
German side), (3) the concentration of all main
interest on to tliis one point — the state of affairs does
look more like a decision than anything we have had
before.

It does look as though a continuation of stalemate
on this end of the Franco-Belgian frontier Avas
liardly possible. There is no doubt that the enemy
has here concentrated new forces which, though they
certainly do not exhaust his reserves, prove him to
be making a gambling effort. Prisoners are captured,
troops are noted upon the march, which make this
certain. He has masses of first-rate material in
Flaudci-s. But he is, among other better troops,
using bo3'^s much younger and men much older than
the Allies choose to put into the field at this stage ;
and the whole of his action duiing the la.st ten days,
both in the northern pai-t, the neighbourhood of the
sea-coast, and in the southern between LiUe and
La Bassee, proves that he is depending upon superior
numbers in this region acquired at some expense of
quality. He is, therefore, fighting, not in expectation

of falhng back on a defensive position, but to win
or lose.

Armeatieres ,®- — ■''
La. Bassee^l

JO 20 30 40 /<?

Miles

We may make perfectly certain that, both across
the canal between Ypres and the sea and in the region
of La Bassee west of Lille, far to the south, where the
enemy is making his greatest efforts, he has for the
moment got a numerical superiority, and we may
make equally certain that he has acquired that
superiority at a quite extraordinarily heavy expense of
men. Only the event can show whether he is wise or
unwise in making this extraordinary effort, but, at any
rate, if he proves unwise (that is, if the effort fails) he
cannot, after it has failed, fall back toith the same
security toith which the first-class troops of Kluck fell
back in their admirable retreat from Paris.

Now let us estimate the elements which may
lead us to expect in this field success or failure upon
either side.

The first of these elements is one which I have
insisted upon before now in connection with this
fighting, and which is particularly evident in the crisis
of the hust few days. It is the separation of objectives
which, I do not say the German commanders, but
certainly the German Government, has imposed upon
the German forces. Someone, clearly, has presented
an advance along the coast from Ostend towards
Calais as one of the objects to be obtained by the
German army. As clearly some other person lias
proposed another effort (and very vigorously maintained
it) south and west of the town of Lille. The two
may be co-ordinated by some agreement; they do
not come from one head.

Now see what this duplication of objective means.

From the little town of La Bassee to the sea at
Nicuport (which line is the general frontier of the

!•

LAND AND WATER

October 31, 1914

Allied resistance) is a distance, as the crow flics, of not
less than 45 miles ; following the sinuosities of
the line, as it actually is, the front must mean
sometliing a good deal over 60 miles.

Very large forces striking an expectant, defending,
but inferior body deployed along such a fi-ont might
attack everywhere in the general effort to roll back
that defensive, or, rather, to push it back. Such lines
fully deployed one against tlie other, -without speciid
points of concentration, we had at the beginning of
the war. But even such a shock, fuUy developed
along a whole week's march of country, will almost
certainly have to turn at last into an attempt to
outflank.

In a struggle of a line of ten against a line often
tliere is not likely to be a decision unless two of the
ten rush at one point to get through, or turn round
by one side to catch the opponent in flank.

You do not tear a hole in your opponent's line
by striking it everywhere with equal force. To tear a
hole j'ou must concentrate upon some supposedly weak
link in the chain. If you do not choose to attack in
this method, in other >\ords, if you do not choose to
try to tear a hole through his line, the only other
thing you can do is to get round him — to hold him on
Lis line while you claw round him with unexpected
men to the right or the left.

Now, in this case, there can be no question of
" clawing round," that is, of outflanking, because the
effort is being made at the end of a long and tenacious
line which reposes on the sea, and then stretches
away indefinitely southwards. So there is no question
of the Germans outflanking by the German left, that
is to the south of Lille. The other end of the line—
the far northern end on the German right — reposing
on the sea, there is no outflanking there ; for throuo-h
the sea no troops can march.

In other words, what the Germans must do if they
are to succeed, and the only thing they can possibli/
do, is to tear a hole.

But when you want to tear a hole through a line
you naturally put all the strength you have upon
one supposedly weak spot. You must of course have
troops all along the line to "hold" yoiu- enemy, but
you mass a " bolt " of men on some one comparatively
narrow front, and you launch it at that point where
you thmk the opposing line, from the pressure of bad
OT few forces on difficult ground, can be broken.
Napoleon, for instance, at Waterloo, in each of his
gi-eat efforts to break the Allied Hue tried first one
place and then another. He tore at Wellington's
eft centre w^h his gi-eat battery; at that left centre
he launched Erlon. At the end of the day he launched
the Guard at the nght centre. But what would
historians have said of him if he had launched part of
the Guard a he nght centre and another part at the
left centre at the same time ?

hrve hadtTrv\'r? f '* ^' ^?' ^""^ ^«^W
ii..ve had to try to find some explanation other than

"eintwl/f ^;.'^^^---. ^n^ the German W
an^pffi '* •'' P°^««««i"g «>o tradition, doctrine
and efficiency in practice which we kno^ we are

Z^r^rfJLf -- explanation' f:;tS

poured through in great numbers and very rapidly,
they would probably cut off that great body of their
enemies which fills up the remaining fifty mile line
between Lille and the sea. But even if they failed to
cut off that northern group, with its hundreds of
thousands of men, even if they failed to take them
prisoners and destroy them as a military force, they
would, even in case of that incomplete success,
compel this advanced northern portion to fall back
very quickly. They would " uncover," as the phrase
goes, all the sea-coast well past Dunkirk to the
neighboui-hood of Calais. To win in the Lille region
by using there, at the La Bas.see point, all the men
they have free, would be, in itself, to win Calais.

The thing is elementary. If I have here a
line A — B reposing upon the sea, and C — D my
opponent breaks me by massing superior numbers in
a " bolt " at E, then the portion E — B will have to

Sea

■ D §

D I

D "

AC^r. o -1 . ouiut; f.xDianation

divergence of objective : this attack of the encmv
not along the coast alone or in front of Lme alone
(four days off), but at t,oth these distant points S

eucvess. If their success was overwhelming, and they

faU back as fast as it can into some such position as

"T^M^^ P^^'' ^~^ ^^^ only escape the extreme'
probability of capture by pelting away backwards
towards some such line as H— G. The' chances are,
indeed, of course heavily against A— E being able
to get away at all after the whole line A— B is broken
at L. When a line is broken it usually suffers
disaster m one of its two halves and sometimes in
bo.h. But at the very best, and in any case, the only
chance of safety for this northern half would be to
tali back and " uncover " all that district H— A abn^
the sea-coast which the line A— E had hitherto
protected. Even if the enemy Avith his " bolt" had
not broken the line A-B at E, but had pushed it in,
the same would be true. An ugly push into a line,
waich only nearly breaks it. compels the retreat of
one half or the other above or below the bulcre ;
because, if the line should break, one half or the other
womd certainly be in peril of disaster.

Isow all tills is as much as to say that, while we

thus dividing their forces, that object is hard to find.

boo^t/r .^'*^"Pfi ^I i« ^^^> E is the neighbour-
hood of LiUe and the point of La Bassee.

f 1,. n '™''''^ ^^7*^ il^ox^gU that the heaviest " bolt "
snot at L only, because success tliere would, as a

2»

OctoT)er 31. 1914

LAND AND WATER

necessary conseqtience, involve the abandonment of
the sea-coast between Nieuport and Calais. Wliy,
ihcn, has tliis divereion of forces taken place ? Why
have the Gemians struck, not only west of Lille
a^inst La Bassee — where success would automatically
have uncovered the sea-coast — but also along that sea-
coast itself ?

The answer must be political. Tliere is no other
answer. Someone in control of German affairs has
said : " If we can occupy the sea-coast quicMi/ we shall
have a certain political effect which we much desire,
and which an ult imate success f ui-ther south wiU not
subserve." Someone else, more militaiy, has said: "I
regret tliis waste of men upon a political object.
Our only chance of breaking the enemy's line is to go
for the main point west of Lille. I insist upon
having, at any rate, great masses of men for that main
point (the neighbourhood of Lille). Use what you
think you can spare to the noiih." Whereupon a
compromise has been effected between the poHtician
and the soldier. The former first took large reinforce-
ments for his attempt along the coast ; the latter had
reinforcements, also large, not as large as he could
have wished, for his efliort in front of Lille. But as
the politician is master, the attack along the sea-coast
has used up most of the men, and is attracting to
itself, by its very lack of success, more and more
forces from the south.

The effect of this division of power has been to
leave a lar^e body of the Allies well advanced between
both attacks, threatening at Ypres and to the east of
Ypres, the flank of each Gennan push. All those
strong bodies in the neighboui'hood of Ypres and to
the east of that town, occupying country nearly up to
Roullers, threaten the southern German advance by
Lille somewhat and threaten the sea-coast advance
very gravely indeed.

Fot instance, the French have been pushing
eastward from Armentiferes for three days consecutively.
They certainly would not have been able to do that if
the whole of the German attack had fallen upon La
Bassee. But the mass of that attack had been deflected,
by divided counsels, to the north and along the sea.

Now what was the Gennan political object in
this iiuach along the sea-coast ? To that a simple
and true answer can be given. The object was to
frighten England ; to advance, as some German
pohtical authority believed, another step in the
process of weakening the Alliance. Such political
ebjects are not without military value where one is
certain of one's psychology. The great siege of Paris
in '70-'71 was almost entirely political, and the
Germans rightly judged that the fall of Paris would
be the end of the war. They therefore risked a gi-eat
deal with that one political object in view, and they
were right. But it Is an extraordinary misconception
of the moral condition in this country to think that
the occupation oE the French coast up to Cape Grisnez
would appi-eciably affect either the Alliance or the
domestic balance of the English people.

This political move had, indeed, also some strategic
value : though quite out of proportion to the strategic
loss it involved.

But first let us note another political object
■which may have been held in view by the enemy, and
that is the complete holding of Belgian soil.

The power to say that they were technically the
masters of all that had once been Belgium may have
attracted some German statesman or Prince. At any
rate neither this nor any larger object was worth the
diversion of such masses of men from tho critical
point by Lille. It is that diversion which puzzles

every critic and student of the campaign in its present
phase. It only puzzles him if he forgets how often
the most urgent militaiy considerations have been
sacrificed in the clash between the politician and the
soldier.

But let us consider in detail how a man possessed
of political power might, if he had power to force this
false plan on the staff, bring forward military ai-guments
for thus dividing the Gennan anny and attempting
the Calais march.

THE STRATEGICAL PROBLEM OF
THE STRAITS.

I have said that it is clear that someone in
authority over the Germans has suggested as an
imperative necessity of the moment an advance by
Dunkhk to Calais, and the occupation of the French
shore of the Straits of Dover. I have further said that
a soldier, not a politician, wovdd have urged the
massing of aU forces for a blow that should break the
Allied line — not turn it on the coast.

For it is the business of soldiers to decide cam-
paigns, while it is the business of politicians to
estimate the psychology of those whom they happen
to govern as subjects, or as foreigners to oppose.

But the advance along the sea-coast to, let us
say, some point north of Boulogne, the occupation of
the maritime end of that range of hills which bounds
the Artois country, and runs into the sea at Cape
Grisnez, at the narrowest point of the Straits, the
possession of Dtmkirk and of Calais, and of the cliffs
that look at England from the west of Calais (whence
is the shortest ai-tillery trajectory across the narrow
seas toward Britain), has certain strategical objects.
The politician who shall have ordered this move did
not act, and could not only have acted, with a vague
intention of disturbing the English temper. There
are already between Ypres and the mouth of the Yser
perhaps 10,000 German dead, perhaps CO, 000 German
casualties; and the purely militaiy value of such
a move must have been weighed — even though it were
undertaken against the highest military advice — before
it was begun.

^Vliat is that military value ?

I will summarise what is to be said for and
against the march upon Calais ; or, to be more accurate,
the march upon the heights of Grisnez — for these
are the true strategical objective.

1. Of the Allies in the west Great Britain alone
is, theoretically at least, inexhaustible. Slow as the
training of new levies must be ; difficult as is the
finding of officers and even of instructors for them ;
untried as must be their cadres or framework (the
officers and non-commissioned officers which hold an
ai'my t<^ether, as the honeycomb of solid metal holds
the paste of an accumulator plate) ; diverse as the
elements of British recruitment necessarily are (Colonial,
Asiatic, and the rest) : it remains true that in a pro-
longed war the power of Great Britain to provide
mere nmnbers should be, in comparison with the
Germanic peoples, inexhaustible.

Now, to create such a state of mind among the
British, and paiiicularly m their politicians, as would
detain upon these shores reinforcements otherwise
destined for France and Belgium would have an
obvious strategic value.

This I think the principal, and certainly the
most legitimate, of the conclusions drawn by what-
ever minds conceived tliis quite novel move of the
Gennan mai-ch upon tho Straits of Dover. It is
believed that operations of a certain kind (to be
described in a moment), undertaken upon the French

LAND AND WATER

October 31, 1914

(a)

(5)

pliore of tlie Straits, would incline the judgment of
Kntjlislimcn and their political directors to keep
fjreat bodies at home and thus to check the supply of
reinforcenients from Britain to France. That supply
Avould be interfered with, or would cease. I'he naval
aid afforded by Britain to IVance would also be
impaired.

2. It is believed by no inconsiderable body of
German critics, that an invasion of this country could
be arranged from the coast of I'landers and Pontliieu
(that is from the ports of Dunkirk and Calais, and so
round the heiglits of Grisnez Cape to Boulogne) in a
fashion more direct and secure than from further
north. The arguments in favour of this theory must
be summarised in a separate category of their own as
follows : —

Heavy artillery could command the major
part of the width of the Straits of Dover,
perhaps three-quarters. Once let it be
known that shells could be accuratelv
dropped at a given range (and the range of
a ship in fine weather can be found from
secure positions on land to a few yards) over
the most part of the Straits, and the traffic
through them, the communications between
the North Sea and the Channel, the main
traffic fi-om the world to the Port of London
would be half strangled.
Under protection of such heavy artillery
mines could be laid, and this mine-field,
with passages through it known only to the
enemy, would approach very near to the
shores of this island. The mine-field could
be pushed forward xxnder cover of any
difficult weather or of darkness. Once it
Avas laid the last dash to be made over
the very few miles beyond what could be
mined would perhaps be negligible.
The element of distance is exceedingly
important in connection with transports.
AVhether you are going to be a day at sea
or an hour may make in the tonnage required
by you a difference of doubling or halving it.
So much tonnage which will take horses and
guns and men for a sea journey of a day
or two would take certainly twice as many
men and horses and guns and perhaps
three times as many for a journey of only
an hour or two. Therefore, to secure the
short passage is to double or treble
capacity to carry.

The short passage once secured could be (it
is argued, not proved), at least intermit-
tently maintained for the further passage
over ^ to England of supply. An ex-
pedition which had fought off and partially
crippled an opposing fleet through the wide
northern part of the North Sea would still
have to take with it all its munitions and all
its provisions for a raid. But one which
had secured the passage of the narrow seas
at their narrowest point might depend upon
at least intermittent replenishment from tlie
further shore. The invading force would not
be burdened with the necessity of having
to bring with it the supply for many weeks"
(e) Inat guardianship of the German shore by a
British blockading fleet which is possible
in the Bight of Heligoland (where the
re-entrant angle of the coast confines an
enemy and gives to the blockader the
shortest segment to watch outside the gulf)

(c)

(d)

your

is, in the case of the nan-ow seas, reversed.
Here the bend is the other way; it goes
outward. Outside the Bight of Heligoland
the British sailors watch the mouth of a
purse. On the bulging and shallow lines of
the shore from tlie Scheldt to Boulogne
they would be like men dodging round
outside an enclosure : a park wall. To
watch what was going on all the way from
Boulogne to the Scheldt would, like any
other similar task, be a task heavy in
proportion to the thickness of the weather
or the darkness of the night, but it would
also be a task dividing the existing UrifisJi
naval force ; weakening it in the north.
Upon this truth depends the last and
perhaps the most important point.
(/) The possession of the Straits of Dover on
the French side would give the enemy tJie
choice of dej) art tire.
It is an elementary point in all strategics that
if you are about to take the offensive, your prime
factor towards success is a doubt in the mind of the
enemy as to the point from which you will attack.
Now, so long as the transports lined up in the Ems
Eiver, and their convoy in the shape of German
ships both in that river and in and beyond the Kiel
Canal and in the harbours adjacent thereto, repre-
sented the certain, kno'-.NTi, and onl)/ opportunity for a
raid upon this countr}', this " choice of departure "
did not exist for the Germans nor has this doubt dwelt
in the mind of our commanders.

The sole point of departure was knovra. The
great disturbing factor which is imperative for
the strategist to introduce into his opponent's mind,
perplexity as to the next move, was absent. But
let it be conjectural from which of several possible
points (the Scheldt, the ports of Flanders, Calais) the
attack may come, and from which of two distinct
fields (the Bight of Heligoland and the shore of the
Netherlands) the attack may come, and that all-
important element of doubt has at last been presented
to Great Britain by the Germans just as it was pre-
sented by them to the French before they huiled
themselves on to the Sambre. I think that this con-
sideration weighed as heavily as any other with those
German rulers who determined upon the Calais march.
But now let us briefly consider what there is to
b2 said against that mai'ch as a strategical proposition.
{n) In the first place, the command of the Straits
by heavy artillery is not complete. If the
Straits were 10 miles instead of 20 across,
it would be a very different matter. But
it so happens that at this jimcture of the
world's affairs the erosion of the centuries
has produced a gap of 20 miles between
Britain and the Continent, while the pro-
gress of artillery has produced an effective

(^)

range of much less than 20 miles.

Next, let it be noted that there is not sufficient
transport on the French and Netherland
shores for a raid. They may have enough
in Antwerp — but I doubt it. They have
not a tenth enough, even if aU the shipping
were left undamaged in Calais and Dunku-k ;
and they cannot get transports down from
the German ports to these new ports should
they occupy them : whether the Calais
march should succeed or not I shall discuss
later.
Anyhow this lack of transport would seem to me
settle the matter, and to determine what I have

*•

October 31, 1914

LAND AND WATEB

maintained in these columns before, and am particu-
larly maintaining this week — that the Calais march is
not well thought out : that the desire in undertaking
it with such violence was rather to frighten than to
hui-t. But the German rulers should hare remem-
bered that we have arrived at a stage in the war in
Avhich men calculate their risks closely and can not be
distui'bed in their objects by any rhetoric or by
any wandering desire or apprehension. It is to
be hoped that there lias been some such vanity
in expectation upon the German side. Such
things have happened often to men disappointed of
victory.

(c) The next point is a little more doubtful, for
national action m this country is not — even
in wai'-time — subordinate to mditar}' neces-
sities. It is rather dependent upon the
orders of a few rich men. But I will make
my point for what it is worth.
Even supposing that the narrow seas were
occupied upon the French shore by the enemy, the
chances for and against invasion woidd still in a
military sense depend, not upon what we did in this
country, but upon what we did on the Continent.
Though Encrland herself were threatened, the defence
of England would still be centred — if mililary con-
siderations alone had weight — in a vigorous effort to
push back the enemy into Belgium and through
Belgium into Genaoany.

Now England would be physically able, if
morally her head were kept, and the mere military
problem alone were considered, to send reinforcements
as casUy as ever ; even after the French shore M'ere
in the enemy's hands. The very few more hours
required to pass men across lower down the Channel
would be the only strictly strategic disadvantage
imposed on Great Britain and her Allies by a German
occupation of Calais and the heights of Grisnez.
It is true that submarines could come do^vn the coast
and make of Calais or of Dunkirk a new base, but not
a base appreciably advantageous over Ostend or the
mouth of the Scheldt. The same watch which is kept
for submarines in the Channel now could be kept
then, and would, probably, be as successful then as,
u]X)n the whole, it is now.

But when I say that the true defence of
Great Britain should the French coast near Calais
be occupied is still the sending of reinforcements
to France, that mvolves some consideration of the
strategical problem from the Continental point of
view.

How docs tliis sea-coast march, the advance on
Calais, look from the point of view of strategics upon
the Continent ?

From that point of view it is wholly imfavour-
able to the Gei-mans, and that is why I do not believe
that any soldier, imdeterred by civilian (or, as we caU
them, political) considerations, ever proposed it. Note
the disadvantages of tliis march as a militiiry move-
ment, quite apart fi-om its supposed psychological
effect upon the temper of the British and of their
Government.

(a) It is no way to outflank the French line.
To be more accurate, you cannot outflank
the French line, for it reposes upon the
sea; and to waste masses of troops in
merely pushing back the end of a line when
you ought to be using tlicm to tear a hole
somewhere in the line, is exactly like tiying
to get rid of a young tree by bending
back the top of it instead of cutting its
stem.

(5) The march is exposed ia its most essential
line to fire fi-om the sea. It is not only
harassed by that fire, it is subject to
enormous losses by that fire ; and, what is
still more important, the one great road —
the coast road — by which it must move its
heaviest transport (for there is no other) is
particularly open to this form of attack.

(c) The ground is abominable. It is a mass of
small brackish watercourses, hedged fields,
dykes, brick waUs. And the nearer you get
to the coast the more you get treacherous
sand as well. Further (and this is not to
be despised), there is trouble about the supply
of good water.

{d) But more important by far than any other
consideration is this : the maixh along the
sea-coast is undertaken — every mile of it as
it goes forward — with a greater and a
greater perU to communications.

Here I must, with the reader's leave, introduce
yet another diagram dealing with this very familiar

ground. You have upon the coast going from west
to east the points Calais, Dunkirk, Nieuport, Ostend,
representing a line of about fifty mUes ; and you have
stretching down southward from Nieuport, also some
fifty miles, the front which is marked upon this
sketch by a shading to the east of it, which shading
gives you roughly the territory now occupied by the
German forces.

Next, note that the whole weight of the German
attack is centred upon two lines of advance — A, the
line along the sea-coast, and B, the line (at least four
or five days' march away) south of Lille. Further
note that, as things have turned out, much the bigger
effort is being made along A. Supposing the attack
at A does succeed in getting as far as Calais, and that
to their occupation of the hatched area the Germans
add the dotted area. They wiU then (I am putting
the matter purely hj'pothetically, for such a strategic
position would in its ultimate form be impossible)
have their communications — their columns of convoy
and provisions, then* evacuation of woimded, and all
the rest of it — along some such line as C — ^D, a line
threatened along its whole flank. That, I say, is an
impossible position. It is true that a very great force
coming like this round the bulk of enemy forces to the
south of it, coming north of the compact mass of the
Allied troops who now are so far eastward as to be
well beyond the line Ai-mentiercs — Yprcs, can in
their turn threaten those Allied advanced positions
and cause the troops in them to retire. But the

&•

LAND AND WATER

October 31, 1914

after Dixmude following the contours of a stream which

ithasAvidened. The original Ysernver itself or httle

Yser " is now but a small stream lying to the west ot tins

badly to the souui .u.u. .. y^^^ -- ^ eanal ; but the word " Yser " is often used for the canal,

Gennan attack, that west of Lil e, f J!^^^ 7?^ " even by local people, because the canal has become the

"l"o,l «fill further in, then the Allied hne m fiont ^^^^^^^^ /^Z ^^.^^^i^ {^j^ ^f ,,^tcr in the neighbourhood.

It is nowhere very deep ; there are even places
where it is just fordable. It will be seen that about
four miles north of Dixmude and about six miles
south- cast of Nieuport the canal makes a big bend

Germans advancing on Cdais --/"^ -npoljl-
li Ypres and ArmcntiiiTS Wd l>a 0 0 fa bac

„omerof ^ithi a^F-^tly), but the Oerman
Smce beyond it ^ exJiimely slow and -^^
It would seem a mathematical certainty that
a successful German advance along the sea-coast
towards Calais was impossible until or if the German
iad by sheer weight, along the main fron befo e
Ypi^s Ld before Armenticres, pushed back the great
bodv of the Allies which occupy that sahcnt.

^Eemember that nearly all this is llat country ;
that the main roads lead north and south not east
and west; that the same is true of the main
railways, steam ti-amway lines and even main water,
courses. In a word, every ai-tificial advantage for
takin- the sea coast in flank exists, none for
defending the flank of an advance along it, and 1
do not see how it is possible to occupy that coast
until you have first made certain that the whole
country to the south is clear of your enemy. Of such
a clearance there is not even a beginning to-day.

There is the strategic argument for and against
the German march on Calais, put as simply as the
present writer can put it; and I repeat what I said
at the beginning of this passage ; it is not a soldier s
move, it is a politician's move. There are, without
doubt, at the German Headquarters to-day, men stdl
protesting against its bcmg attempted at all, and
still asking for remforcemcnts to be sent south of
Lille, where a real decision is still conceivably
possible. Moreover, it seems ti-ue at this moment of
writuig (Tuesday evening) that the Gennan push
along the sea coast has been too expensive; that
exhaustion is already upon it, and its opponents may
at any moment advance and reverse the whole move-
ment.

THE COUNTRY BETWEEN THE YSER
CANAL AND CALAIS.

But apai-t from this presumption that a confusion
in their objective and too great an expenditure of men
has compromised this advance, the ground between
Yser and Calais is bad for advance in general and
contains in particular a first rate line to hold in front
of Calais. Let us consider the nature of this ground.

The study in some detail of this portion of the
field will repay the reader, though it be spared from
attack. It is perhaps the most important piece of
ground wc have yet had to deal with ; for it is that
upon the occupation of which the enemy are gambling
veiy high and the occupation of which is directly
intended to the luu-t of this country. Fhst of all let
us consider the lino which sufficed for ten days'
defence — the line of the River Yser, or rather of the
canal lateral to it, which talces most of its water and
which is the most considerable ditch in this region.
The canal runs from Ypres to Nicuport.

From the tovm Ypres to the sea at Nieuport is
nearly twenty-one miles. It is almost exactly twenty
miles from the Cloth Hall at Ypres to the railway
station at Nieuport. But the town of Nieuport itself
lies somev\-hat inland and the mouth of the canal is
more than a mile beyond the to\\Ti to the north. All
the w-ay from Ypres to the sea runs this canal,
artificial and often straight, so far as Dixmude, and

eastward. This bend is the most obvious point upon
Avhich the Germans could concentrate for a crossing.
They had of course to be attacking everywhere along
that line m order to occupy their enemies and to
attack other passages of the Avater, but the reach
Avhich bends thus eastward in a loop Avas their_ prime
opportunity. The principle, as shown in the
diagi-am opposite, is quite clear. If an obstacle
0 O 0 has to be crossed by a force A in the
direction of the aiTOW against a force B, A
AviU naturally choose some part in the line of the
obstacle where he can most easily beat B off from the
other side. Now it is obA-ious that Avherever there is
a re-entrant 'angle towards A, m the line of the
obstacle, there A has his best opportunity for crossing ;
because he can, from cither side of the re-entrant (at C
and C) converge fire upon the force Avhich B has sent
into the bend to prevent the A's crossing. The forces
of B inside the bend are in a much Avorse position
than the forces of B at C and C on the outside of it ;
B's fire is dispersed outAvards ; A\hile the fire from C
and C converges inwards. It is therefore al.vays at a
point of this kind that the chief crossing of an obstacle
is attempted. There seem to have been two such
attempts, the first unsuccessful, the second successful.
The Germans coming by the road.s from St. Petei-'s
Chapel tried to rush both the bridges, the one in
front of St. George's and the other m front of
Schoobakke, Avhile a much larger force came up from

6»

October 31, 1914

LAND AND WATER

south of St. Peter's by night and succeeded in getting
across the re-entrant angle or loop of the canal we
have just been discussing.

The estimate of the Germans who got over at
vai'ious places, and pai-ticulai"Iy inside the bend of the
loop, in the darkness of Satui'day, is not more than
5,000 men; of those 5,000 hardly any got back.
They were either killed or taken wounded and un-
wounded. But on the next day, the Sunday — at
what hour we have not yet been told — the water was
forced again, and a permanent footing established by

the Germans upon the western bank. Thirty-six
houivs passed, and the advantage produced no fruit.
It is more probable that the effect was exhaustive and
that the defensive holds it own in spite of this cross-
ing, expecting to take the counter-offensive at
any moment. Still it is wise, in judging aay
strategical problem in action, to consider all possible
developments.

Supposing that the line of the canal is forced,
and that the AUios evacuate Dixmude and Nieuport,
will the next defensible line be one that covers
Calais ? What does the nature of tlie ground
offer for defence between the Yser and that line?
What chance of retardation in a successful enemy's
advance ?

As to the first question, what line beyond the
Yser Canal defends Calais ? There is between this
frontier country and Calais one first rate line, and
only one. It is the line of the River Aa carried
on by the Canal to St. Omer (and from St.
Omer, south-east again, out of the map, towards
Bethune). This line between St. Omer and the sea is
strong not only in one straight line of water running
without re-entrants and fairly broad for the whole
20 miles between St. Omer and the coast, but it is
further strong in being covered, through all the
lower or sea coast and Calais part of it, by a network
half dried marshes and draining ditches, which make a
belt miles wide upon either side ; while immediately
in its centre, where the River Aa leaves a gap before the
line of the St. Omer canal begins, where the wet country
is therefore at its narrowest, you have a conspicuous
group of heights which afford excellent defensive
positions all round the village of Watten. This
position is far stronger than anything which the
Germans have had in force in Flanders. It thoroughly
covers Calais ; but there is no corresponding position
covering Dunkirk.

'Dhcmude

Ostcnd

^RouJler^

Dylced MarsAjss

ShOtmr

2jO 30

7»

LAND AND WATER

October 31, 1914

The real strength of all that country between the
Tsor canal and Dunkirk is the mass of small water-
ways and the nature of the soH. The Duke of York
failed before Dunkiik in 1793 principally from these
two obstacles. The great niai-sh south of Dunku-k
called the Two " Moers," great and little, is mdced
nearly drained by this time ; but gi-eat parts of it can be
flooded. IVther, if it were mtended (which I doubt)
tliat troops should in the event of retreat stand along
the small canal that inins from Loo to Funics, they
woidd have, between them and the Yser, seven or eight
miles of extremely difficult country which is cut up by
a perfect labyruith of waterways.

I think one may sura up and say that an advance
along the sea coast, even if the Germans should be
able to make it by bringing up unexpectedly large
numbei-s, would be a painfully slow business. It is
not country the full difficulty of which you grasp by
the map, though the map tells you something ; nor is
it country, which, surveying it under conditions of peace,
you can report on easily for conditions of war; and time
andagain under the conditions of war it has disappointed
those who would occupy it. Most of it is as " blind "
as any country in the world. The more eastward you
get the more difficult your advance becomes with the
increase of small waterways in aU directions, and,
though it is a soil too light to impede an advance
after rain, it is one in which, especially towards the
coast, transport sticks thi'ough the peculiarly
treacherous nature of the sand. There is only one
really good road, that along the sea coast behind the
gand hills, called "dunes," and this road is com-
manded from the sea.

But all this is only a supposition in a more or
less abstract strategical problem. Before any step of

droops, the offensive will pass to the Allies : with the
offensive the initiative : the counter-stroke.

No more can be said. But on this battle very
much depends the immediate futui-e of the war, and it
has all the marks of a violent effort which, when it is
exhausted, does not fail stubbornly, but suddenly
and aU together.

THE NEWS FROM THE ARGONNE.

The obscure fights which take place all along the
old line from the Meuse and Moselle to the Oise, right
across north-eastern France, merit more attention
than they receive from the public. It is natural that
the vast struggle upon the line to the west of all this
between the Oise and the sea, and particularly the
conflict (perhaps decisive) going on in Flanders at this
moment, should absorb the gaze of Europe. But all
that old series of positions, 100 miles long, in which
Germans looking south face Frenchmen looking
north, have this interest, that they show in what
fashion the German line is being " held " — that is,
pinned.

When the history of the war comes to be
written, not the least of its lessons will prove to be
the power of resistance which modern small arms
and entrenchment give — even to a short service
conscript army, with its masses of nearly civilian
reserves.

As an example of this poAver, consider the state
of affairs in the Argonne. We have evidence of what
happened there, fragmentary indeed, but stretching
over almost eveiy day of the last six weeks ; and in aU
those six weeks there has been no retirement upon
either side /or more than four miles!

'- Co ^■

-Sl^..,

VIENHE
VILLE

FORGES*

CMWF<: -f^'" •MALANCOURT
ENNES ,-^-'9 .

v/ood/ r,

<^HARNy

"'%.

Miles.

RegcorL of the Arg^ontie

VII

the Calais march can be undertaken the initiative
niust be assumed by the Germans— their huge
offensive between Ypres and the sea must succeed.
It has not yet succeeded; it seems, at the moment
ot WTiting, to be drooping, and as it droops, or if it

Here you have a sketch of the very small district
where one may study in detail the kind of thing that
is going on along all this chain of entrenched
positions.

The main Argonne Forest— -a clay ridge about

8»

October 31. 1914

LAND AND WATER

300 ft. above tlie plain, and densely wooded — is cut
into tlu-ee sections : that soutli of the Grand Pre Pass,
with its road and railway ; that soutli of the Vienne-
Vareunes road ; and that south of the Ste. Menehould-
Clermont road.

Now Avhcn the whole German line was forced
back (by numbers smaller than its own) in what is
called " The Battle of the Marne," the Crown Prince,
who had had his headquarters at Ste. Menehould,
moved them rapidly back to Montfaucon. The line
which the Germans held, after September 14, in front
of these new headquarters ran north of Forges (where
it reposed upon the Mouse just out of range of the
Charny forts, that are part of the fortifications of
Verdun, and there run along the Ridge of Charny).
From this point noi-th of Forges, the line passed in
front of Malancourt ; then in front of Varennes ; then
in front of the road from Varennes to Vienne, and so
proceeded across Champagne to the hills and gun
positions in front of Rheims and to the lower Aisne
and Soissons.

That was more than six weeks ago ; and all
the efforts on both sides dui'ing those six weeks,
though there has been constant lighting and ceaseless
"watching for an opportunity to gain any yard that
could be gained, has not, I say, altered that line by
four miles either way.

The first move was a French attack, which
carried Varennes and the town of Vienne. The next
move was a German counter attack which attempted
to seize Vienne, failed in doing so, but succeeded in

Varennes- Vienne road ; they were beaten back from
the western part of it, but kept the eastern. Last
week they advanced from the eastern part of this line
in front of Varennes into the woods called the Bois
de Chalade — which ai'e the woods through which
Dreuet rode to intercept the flight of Louis XVIth
and Marie Antoinette. The Germans blundered in
this attack and lost very heavily, but the French
could not force their way north into Varennes. Mean-
while Vauquois close by was held by the French,
though the German line was still in front of Malan-
court. All the southern part of the woods between
that village and Varennes was held by the French.
Finally this week, four days ago, a French advance
captured Sezon-Melzicourt.

From this biief summary may be judged the
extraordinarily close grip of two modem entrenched
lines. For a month and a half you have two
opposing army corps (that is supposed to be about the
strength of either party just to the west of Verdun)
doing no more than hold the one the other, and
each counting it a success if at any point he can
advance by less than the range of a field piece.

Meanwhile, in that more interesting because more
critical point, the gate the Germans have opened and
kept open at St. Mihiel, this very slow shifting of the
line has greater significance, for the corridor held
by the Gei-mans here is so nan-ow that the least
restriction of it puts their positions on the Meuse in
St. Mihiel in peril. One may see in this sketch map

The valley of the little river

how the thing lies

JL-

MILES

THfAUCOURT .

PONT A M0US50N

^fURt'i

RAMBUCOURT

COMME.RCY

^_^ Approximate Franco-

' * German Front.

3ZI

capturing Varennes. Later again, in about the Mad — a tributary of the Moselle just above Metz —
fourth week of the operations, the Germans made a is that up which the railway comes from Metz as far
sharp move to recover if they could the whole of the as Thiaucourt. This valley is almost a ravine with its

»•

LAND AND WATER

October 31, 1914

stocp banks, and bears the name which aU such c efte
have in western Lorraine— the word " Eupt which
means the " breach " or " break " of the Mad. It is con-
tinued above the rail-head to the high plateau country
iust underneath the extraordinarily reguhir bne of
J XI ._ ™; i.nirriifa Mllrvl "The Hills of the

coveruig

heights called " The Hills of

further
Alcuse.

Bevond this again going westward is the deep
trench o"f the Mouse in which St. Mihiel lies. From
Thiaucourt the shortest road to St. Mihiel is up
alontr the north edge of the valley, then through Wom-
A-iUe^and so straight through the Hills of the Meuse to
St. Miliiel. There is an alternative, lower, longer and
on the whole better road, from Thiaucourt to the mam
Comracrcy-Pont-a-Mousson road, between Flircy and
Eambucourt, whence a branch road goes through
Apremont to St. Mihiel.

To appreciate how narrow the German " corridor
has here become, it is enough to point out that Apremont
—in the south road— was taken and held by the French
weeks ago, lost, retaken ag;iin, and is now lield. One
may take the line of the road all the way from Pont-
a-Mousson to St. Mihiel and say that all except the
last three or four miles of it between Apremont and
St. Mihiel marks what the French hold/rom the south ;
that is, what is held by the garrison of Toul and by
the forces that are operatuig northward from that
fortress. On the north the corresponding garrison of
Verdun and the forces operating from it southwards
have got within long range of the other road from
St. Mihiel tlirough Nonsard and Woinville to
Thiaucourt. The French official communique (of
Tuesday) proves that even taking that long range of
hea-\y guns at an extreme the Germans hardly hold
eight miles at the mouth of the funnel : not five miles
at the extremity of the funnel where they touch the
Meuse at St. JVIihiel itself. The situation here is
extraordinary, cannot be accidental in the German
plan, must be intended at least for some future move.
Meanwliile the whole thing is just like the fighting in
the Argonne, an example of the exceedingly close grips
that fairly equal forces can maintain nowadays with
the rifle, the machine gun, and the spade. Nor can
anj'thing unlock such a grip save very considerable
reinforcement at some one point.

THE EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR.

On the Vistula what has happened is this :

(1) First, and much the most important point,
the German plan of holdmg the Eussian forces (pre-
sumably along the line of the Vistula Eiver itseK), of
crossing that river, of occupying Warsaw at one end of
the Kne, Przemysl and the upper reaches of the San at
the other end, and by the success of such an offensive
movement of pushing offthe Eussian pressure, hasfailed.

The Eussian pressure upon Germany and Austria
has not indeed begun or nearly begun. It is a long
cry from the checking of the German plan to an
invasion of German territory. But at any rate the
Gei-man plan in its entirety has certainly failed. The
occupation of Warsaw was absolutely essential to it,
and so far from occupyhig Warsaw, the strong German
force of some five amiy corps advancing upon that
town has been beaten right back, even a point so far
west as Lodz is out of Gonnan occupation, and pretty
well all the country north of the Pilica is now in
Eussian hands. Our first point is, then, that the
holding of the slow Eussian advance so that Germany
should be free to send large reinforcements to the west
has proved impossible.

(2) But tlie Austro-German line as a whole has
not faUen back. The attempt is still maintained to

LODZ

IVAKGOaOO

J02EF0W

^sx,,^?""";,,,, -."/llij.

#--^^-^"^

"""' 'Ih ..

«'"••;:"■' %. ^.^rr:- -"''-y"".

■|\M

vns

THil MAIN POSITION IN THE EAST.

push the Eussians eastward at the southern end of
their position : the attack goes on below Sandomir,
along the San, and before Przemysl.

It is a thing worth noting in these great modern
actions that the new scale upon which they are fought
has put an end to some of the unquestioned rules of
older warfare. In an action upon a front even of
eight miles or ten, to be outflanked meant that your
whole body fell back if it could. But in an action — •
or, rather, a series of actions — upon a front of over
two hundred miles, you have much more time to
consider whether it is really necessary for all your
forces to fall back or no when you are outflanked.

Here is the Austro-German line all along tha
Vistula threatening Warsaw and Novo Georgievsk
on the north, and vigorously attacking Przemysl
upon the south. Its northern extremity is badly
beaten in front of Warsaw and the whole of its loft
outflanked. Between the Pilica Eiver and Warsaw
it is turned right back and thrust even bej'^ond Lodz.
The attempt of the Germans to cross the Vistula at
Ivangorod is also beaten. They make no real footing
at the crossing of Jozefdw, and the Eussians in their
turn cross in force at Solec. It is evident that the
whole original Austro-German line A — B — C has
been bent back on its left, A B, to a position D B.
That is an attitude which would have meant, in tha
older warfare, the retirement of the remainder, B C.
Because in the older warfare the people who had
outflanked you could be dowm upon your centre and
behind it in an hour or two. But to-day you have
days to decide in, and of that retirement from the
Vistula — of the GeiTnan retirement from the Upper
Vistula at least between Jozefow and Sandomir—
there is as yet no sufiicicnt indication.

Eemember that from B to C is a very long week's
marching. It is an immense distance : and remember
further that an advance on the south whereby the
Germanic allies crossing the San or the Upper
Vistula near Sandomir should push the Eussians well

10«

OctoW 31, 1914

LAND AND WATEE

back in tliis region, would straighten the line again
and compensate in some degree for the bending back
of it in the north.

In other words, it is worth while in these very
long and extended modem actions for your centre
and untlu'eatened wing to try, even through some
days, to retrieve the misfortunes of your defeated
wing.

That the Gennanic allies have at some points
upon the Upper Vistula near Sandomu* and upon the
river San crossed these two streams, I take to be
indubitable. Wliat we do not know is how far they
have really established themselves upon the eastern
bank. The chances are that though the Austriaus
and certain of the Germans have crossed the San and
the Upper Vistula, the movement here has not been
anything like as decisive against the Russians as has
the Russian movement against the Germans in the
north. And one's evidence for this is that the official
communiques of the Austriaus and the Germans do
not speak of any real success upon the right of their
line (they are of course perfectly silent as to their
reverses on the left), while the Russian communiques,
though admitting vigorous attack upon the line of
the two rivers, admit no serious reverse south of
Jozefow. Meanwhile there is a somewhat detailed
report of Austriaus recrossing the stream below
Saudomu", proving that it was crossed a few days ago
iind also suggesting that now the whole of the Vistula
(though not yet the San) is being slowly given up by
the Germanic allies.

It is indeed certain that a very heavy effort is
being pushed forward by the Austrians near Przemysl.
It is not true that this fortress is completely disengaged.
It is true that all the western sectors have been dis-
engaged for nearly a fortnight. Further Ave must
note that very great and partially successful efforts
have been made by the Austrians to clear the passes
of the Carpathians, not only in front of Przemysl, but
far to the oast of that ]X)int.

What is not tenable is the conjecture that any
Austrian movement on this south end of the line will
really turn the Russians and threaten them. That
could only be done by a gi'eat numerical superiority.
It is not possible that Austria should discover that
numerical superiority either now or later.

We may sum up and say that the opeititions
upon the Vistula and upon the San are on the whole
in our favour, and that they have (what is all-import-
ant to the West) prevented the Gennans from releasing
any considerable body from the East for operations
in Flanders or in LoiTaine.

But there are stiU two questions of great mterest
to be asked with regard to tliis field. The first is,
with what rapidity can the Russian " pressure " in
Gei-many be applied ? The second is, upon what
line will the German retirement fall if the present
Russian advance is maintained ?

As to the first of these questions, the early
stages of the war in the east, the known operations
of the two opponents, the nature of the country over
which these actions are fought, and the type of
German advance which the war in the west has
already acquainted us with, furnish a sufficient
answer. It is the same that has been insisted upon
in these notes from the very beginning ; a warning
not to expect the Russian " pressure " upon the
German foi-ces in the east to be rapid — tliough it
may be, before it is ended, overwhelming. The nature
of the actions fought and to be fought, the t3rpe of
communications in Westei'n Poland, the fact that all
the armies of the Germanic Allies are in being there

and do not seem to have lost really heavUy in recent
operations (how many guns, for instance?) the
indeterminate climate between the mud of autumn
and the frost of winter, the very distances involved —
all point to a movement of advance on the part of
the Russians which will only be slow during the next
few weeks.

As to the second question, where a long German
resistance is likely to be offered to such an advance, it
would seem that the line of the River Warta affords
the best opportunity for this. That river does not,
indeed, present a regular and parallel front to the
German frontier, but the front it docs present is, as
the accompanying sketch map will show, a sufficient

DANTZIC

" CR>»COW

TEa LIKB or THB WXBTA.

protection to the German frontier to make it an
obvious line for the Germans to hold. There is a
gap of more or less open country between Koto and
the fortress of Thorn, a gap about 50 miles wide,
wliich would want particular attention, but which
would be defensible with entrenchments. Southward,
the hilly country where the three Empires meet,
should be a sufficient defence for even a sparse body
of troops to continue the line ; and it may well be
found that if the Russians push back the whole
Austro - German line westward, after these first
successes of theirs, the line of the Warta, continued
tlu'ough the hiUs and on in front of Cracow, will
be the holding point attempted by the enemy against
our eastern AUy.

It must be remembered that the German
Government attaches the greatest importance —
military as well as political — to keeping operations
off Germanic sod. It is probable that every effort
will be made, if the German army in the east is really
forced back, to hold this line of the Warta and to
continue the Gennan administration of the Polish
province of Kalisz. This would have the advantage
of preventing communications between the Russian
Poles and those oppressed by Germany to the west,
of keeping the war off German soil, and of producing
— though much nearer her own territory than

11»

LAND AND WATER

October 31, 1914

Germany originallj designed— the "deadlock" or
" stalemate " to which her policy still looks forward
in the east as in the west.

The real argument against Germany's being able
to produce that deadlock is the numbers that llussia
will now in continually increasing volume bring
forward. Eussia, it must be remembered, is in this
field what we should be in the western field if we
coidd (which, alas! we cannot) put forward every
month another batch of, say, 200,000.

Germany did for six weeks produce a deadlock in
France between the North Sea and the Vosges. She
hoped to produce a deadlock upon the Vistula, and to
liold that eastern line while she scut reinforcements
back west, and broke down the deadlock there in her
favour. She has not been able to do that ; but we, on
our side, have not the extra numbers which would be

so useful at this moment to pour in against the
western deadlock, especially in Flanders. Now,
liussiii has those numbers, and it is perhaps upon those
numbers in the next two months, more than upon any
other element in the general problem, that we had
best rely. In other words, it seems as though the
campaign as a whole turned, from the point of view
of the Allies, upon their power to hold the Germans
in the west, while trusting to Kussian numbers to
push on, though slowly, in the east.

From the German point of view it seems as
though, while awaiting and dreading this increase of
Russian numerical strength, a desperate attempt to
prevent reinforcement from England, and a threat
upon, or even a blow at, England itself, was the
immediate necessity. Such a blow, from Calais at
least, is not promising.

THE PICCADILLY RIFLE RANGE

Is a happy inspiration in these piping times, not of peace, but
ol war. Just now London is populated with fighting men,
many of them naval and military officers waiting for their
marching orders. To the majority of these it will be welcome
news that the spare hours can be pleasantly and profitably
occupied by keeping up their rifle practice. At 67b, Shaftesbury
Avenue, they will find in the spacious basement, some quarter
of an acre in extent, a fine rifle range with a dozen targets and
all modem fittings. The committee of management are all
military men, and all visitors connected with the two services
are made honorary members. For the novice there are two
sergeant instructors, one of whom is an ex-sergeant of the Eoyal
Fusiliers. A minor diversion is a well-equipped skittle alley, one
of the finest in London. Ladies desirous of handling a rifle are
also welcome.

WAR PUBLICATIONS.

_ The November nnmber of Colour, the new shilling monthly, fully
maintains the standard »et by its preceding numbers, both in the quality
of the reproductions of artists' work and in the literary contributions.
As already noted, Colour is the only British publication that attempts
the reproduction of the work of modern artists in their original
colouring, and it is doing for British, and to a certain extent for foreign
•rt, in England what the Mcrcure de France did for French literature
in France. It takes an easy first place among artistic publications in
this country, and is of considerable literary value as well.

A new map of N.E. France, Belgium, and the Rhine ha« just
been issued by the Edinburgh Geographical Institute (John
l^artholomcw and Co.), pnce 2b. on paper, Ss. on cloth. The map,
which i« on a specially large scale— 16 miles to the inch— ehows rail-
ways, foHresses, mam, secondary, and other roads, with the distances
between road junctions marked. Heights are given in metrca with
thejT eqmvaient in English feet.

Mr n. O. Wells' new book, Tht Wife, of Sir Isaac Barman, shows
it. author in yet another light. It is detailed and intimate, as are
^ the works of this author, and it is hardly necessary to say that
It u interesting, for whatever a " Wells' " book may be, it is always

!.°.^. !?^' J"' '" "?'* "*,7 " »9™th'ng that not even tke most rabid
censor of public morals could possibly ban, something that may be read
by ;^1, a concession, it appears, to the libraries. To say that the book is
TL th? wi"^ I' '"4r*„«^''''-"g °f '''« 1"7; a" for its plot, there is none.
A, for tt, ?n^jiff^*"' novel-none, tU is, in the ^nventional sense
o„M«i ■ 2 '; "• "^"^^end It without fear that the censor will
pablUherl " " ^"^^^ ^^'" MacmUlan and Co. .rl the

•™ ^*7 «*!^ '"""^ *''* rc''^'"g pnWic of England and America are
tfTes^^l^y^'fl'lL'^r ofj'^f-'""'' HagazinX and the ma ority o?
M^„^P\'"^' ^J^^\'<^ .'» »al<e the acquaintance of Mr S 8
Ky 'at iS; 'i,^i;,,'<"'<'*«:^P%.i«»t published by Mr. John

^i=: ;L^d°diin?fori' tt^^^e^'^.:i.T^^::^:t

M.C!ra*-"""°°' «^''.''"''>l"S the m^^r.L that boarsKame Mr
s'e^r on nerrM'""rJt'°S- ,"'? ^ol< deals with such men a,
of Kturf an/'J; rtl''''' '",'' °'^"'' °^ ">«' ^''"^- t>>e groat ones
"n t m worT; «? J^ \^, ""'^^^^ "*'"""« ^y "" ^^° "« Interested
produced ^^' '""*'^ ""'"• «■«* *-^o ""^y '" ^^<=^ they are

•' tin^'-vT^f^' ^•^'S*,, Allen and Unwin have just included in their
Tap^n np to ThY time"!''' it emphasii, the offensive strategy o

and execution, is yet so clearly written that it is of extrem* interest
to the normai reader, and forms a valuable addition to existing liters
ture on the Napoleonic period.

Messrs. John Lane have just re-issued, in a shilling edition, lAf*
in a Garrison Town, the translation of ex-Lieutenant Bilse's book which
caused a national scandal in Germany, ajid earned for its author a
court martial and subsequent imprisonment. In its recital of the
defects of the military system, the book is comparable with Eeyerling's
Jtna or Sedan, though, of course, the latter was written by a master
of literature, while Bilse'e book is merely the work of a military officer.
Still, Bilse's book bears the impress of reality, and aifords a good view
of the uiider-workings of the German military machine.

Modern Pig-Stiching, just published by MezBrs. Macmillan,
and written by Major A. E. Wardrop, of the R.H.A., is a volume of
interest not only to those familiar with this form of sport, but to all
interested in mounted sports Chapters by Colonel J. Vaughan,
Lieutenant-Colonel F. W. Caton- Jones, M. M. Crawford, and Captain
H. E. Medlicott are included in the work, which includes the history
of the sport, the natural history of pig, the training of horses for the
sport, the actual riding and hunting, and details of clubs and cups.
It is, on the whole, a veritable encyclopEedia of the sport, and is
written in good hunting style, so that the pages are as interesting aa
they are instructive. It is a book to read for its own sake, apart from
its value as regards the sport, and deserves a wide circulation among
all interested in mounted work as ■well aa among those who by circum-
stance and locality are able to make quarry of pig.

Mb. Muuray has just published Dr. Stuart Eeid's Life of the Firtt
Duhe of Marlborough and of Sarah, his Famous Duchess. No work of
personal or military biography could be more timely than this, which
reminds readers of the great achievements of British soldiers on a
battleground adjacent to that on which they are now winning new
and imperishable honours. The work has an introduction by tha
present Duke of Marlborough.

A valuable map has just been issued by George Philip and Son,
Ltd., and forms an admirable guide to the theatre of the war in tha
west. The scale is ten miles to one inch, whilst inset round are nine
important sections enlarged to the scale of three miles to ona inch.
Unlike so many war maps, it has been specially drawn from foreign
ordnance sheets and Continental staff maps under the supervision of
a military expert. An index accompanies the map, which contains
5,500 names. The price (on paper) is 2s. 6d., but we strongly recom-
mend it, both for appearance and permanency, mounted on cloth — •
either to fold, or with a roller to hang — at 63.

THE NEW NOTE.

Thr new £1 note will shortly bo in the hands of the public, and
is a great improvement on the first issue. The notes have been pro-
duced on specially prepared paper of special watermark de.«ign, and
of the strength and thickness of the Bank of England notes. The intro-
duction into the watermark of the Hose, Crown, Thistle, and Daffodil
(the Emblem of Wales) will be observed.

The notes (size 6 inches by 3| inches) are being printed in black
by Thomas De Le Rue and Co., Limited, from plates engraved by the
same firm from a design supplied by Mr. Eves.

The outstanding features of the design are the King's Head en-
circled in a garter, aaound which the inscription as appearing on the gold
coinage is reproduced, the whole being surmounted by a crown. On
the top right-hand side of the note the emblem of the lesser Georga
and Dragon appears, encircled by a similar garter, on which the Royal
motto is engraved, tha latter also surmounted by a crown.

AJtogcthej', the note is both from a utilitarian and an artistic
point of view an immense improvement on the previous issue.

O.v Wednesdays Mr. Charies Frohman will present "The Littla
Minister at mitinles, commencing at 2.30, whilst the evening per-
lormance on that date will be discontinued. Matinics Thursdays an<
batnrdays as usual.

For those who find it necessary in this war time to seek an
economical food there is the new production, Plasmon oat cocoa, put
on tho market by International Plasmon, Ltd. Both the company and
t le goods are British. It is claimed that Plasmon oat cocoa provides
the most nourishment at least coat. Tha flavour is lika that of tha
linost drinking chocolate.

12*

October 31, 1914

LAKD AND WATER

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

NOTE. — THIS AETICLB HAS BEIN STJBinTTBD TO THB PRSSS BUEBAU, WHICH DOBS NOT OBJBCT TO THa PtJBLIOATION AS CTNSOBIB
AKD TAKES NO ES3P0XSIBILITT FOB THB CORRECTNESS OF THl STATEMKNTS.

lOMiles

li^rMw^iii ifsf SFathontline
'^//•DIXMUDE 2FaihoinUnje

MAP TO IbLXrSTSATS OPIBATIONS OT AND ATTACKS ON INSHOEB SQUADBON OFF OSTBND. TH« SBADKD POETION SHOWS THB TWO-FATHOM

ABSA AND THI DOTTED LINKS THB FITE-FATHOU,

IN THE aSair known as " The Battle of the Coast " the
German Army has clearly had an uncommonly bad
time at the handa of our inshore gunboats. In this
connection it is curious that these boats were built
originally for Brazil for use in the Amazon, but for some
obscure reason the Brazilians tried to get out of taking them
over. They were hesitating when this war came along, else
the boats had left for Brazil. The boats have now shown them-
selves of incalculable worth to us and incidentally proved how
correct Lord Charles Beresford was, when, some years ago, he
agitated for an " inshore squadron." There is every reason to
believe that the entire military situation at the sea-end of the land
campaign was entirely governed by the fire of the inshore
Bqnadron which, owing to its light draught, was able to creep
into waters normally inaccessible to warships.

These Ihrce boats — renamed Uumher, Mersey, and Severn — •
displace about 1,200 tons with a draught of 8J feet. Their
principal armament is two 6-inch forward and a couple of 4.7
mch Howitzers aft. It is these howitzers which rendered the
German positions untenable, and incidentally proved that —
v.hatcvcT may happen inland — no Power which does not command
the sea can accomplish anything on the sea coast. Hence the
persistent efforts of the German submarines to attack. At the
time of writing no success has attended these efforts, nor is
much success to be expected.

In the first place to torpedo a vessel drawing only 8J feet
needs considerable skill, in tlio second place, no submarine can
roancpuvro in a couple of fathoms or less. Submerged and in
lighting trim a submarine needs nearly as much water as a
Dreadnought. If operating within the five fathom line she runs
grave risks of running into the mud and remaining there ; or
else she must work more or less awash and chance the fate
which has already befallen one German in these operations — ■
beiiig rammed by a destroyer.

This destruction of a submarine by our torpedo-boat destroyer
Badger, following closely upon the loss of our J53 under more
or less similar conditions would seem to indicate that on both
sides the " menace of the submarine " is no longer what it was.
As I indicated last week, " every bane has its antidote," and there
is now very fair reason to believe that this war will see the
submarine relegated to a position of less importance than it
occupied before the outbreak of hostilities. The difiiculty
of combating the submarine has lain in the fact that it is a new
weapon, equal — shall we say — to the introduction of some
equivalent to the card " joker " on to the chess board.

As yet, of course, matters are merely in the transition stage,
but detailed information which has become available during
the past week, seems to demonstrate very clearly that both
against swift moving big ships and against light draught inshore
squadrons the submarine is, relatively speaking, rather impotent.
This, curiously enough, was the conclusion theoretically arrived
at by the Germans some years ago, when they refused to build
submarines at all, and on account of which they have compara-
tively few to-day.

INVASION PROJECTS.

Neutral reports continue to arrive as to the German
" pontoons " for invasion. They are now represented as very
large submarines designed to carry invading soldiers.

I am inclined to attach the fullest credence to this latest
story of the pontoons — absurd though the idea may at first sight
appear. It is an absolute bringing to date of Napoleon's " flat-
bottomed boats." There is nothing at all impracticable in an
unarmed submarine capable of carrying a hundred men or so for a
short trip.

To build enough sufficient to carry an invading army or even
a big raiding force is impracticable. But it is practicable to
land by submarine a hundred men — motor bicyclists probably—

13»

LAND AND WATER

October 31, 1914

hm «n.l thorc. or anmchcrc, with orders to do as much destruction
and kidltir as possible. . i « ii. •

1 should not care to bet on the ultimate pro.pccts of the.r
access other than psychologically; but 1 do think that thera
"every possibUity cither of the attempt being made, or of the
8ubmarinV transports being used as a menace just as Napoleon
used those " Hat bottoms," designed to ro^y across in a calm
when the British warships were helpless.

In the old days this policy led us into a vast expenditure
on MarteUo towers and the retaining in England of thousands
of troops which else had been sent to the Continent. Ihc German
Generai StaS has studied history.

THE BALTIC.

There is no news whatever from the Baltic, in which a
Bpccies of stalemate seems to obtain. The Russians appear to
be employing against the Germans exactly the same tactics as
the Germ'ans are using against us, and the Germans are at a
loose end accordingly. .

This Russian action (or rather, inaction) is probably ol tar
more value to us than we vet realise. So long as the Russians
adhere to their present policy so long wiU it be impossible for
the Germans to attempt an attack on us— or on some of us—

in full force. ,, , . ••, j

To attack with less than full force would be suicide pure and
simple. One way and another it still looks as though the Russian
main fleet lying inside the harbour at Libau is the real controlling
agencv. It is probably no exaggeration (wild as it may seem
to-day) to say that the key of the whole situation lies m the
Baltic and with the Russian fleet. It sounds like incoherent
prophecy ; but if anyone considers the question carefully, it must
be obvious that if Germany concentrates against us she must
leave the bulk of her sea coast (mostly Baltic) undefended
against an unbeaten Russian force.

Her coastline in our direction is small and heavily defended.
In the Baltic it is large and very lightly defended.

In the present state of affairs it is no more safe for Germany
to abandon the Baltic than it would bo for us to desert the North
Sea. Unless Germany is prepared to take abnormal risks she
dare not attack us in force so long as the Russians are a " fleet
in being " in the Baltic. Hence the presence of German warships
in the Aaland Islands.

It is dan;;crous to prophecy where Germany is concerned,
but strategically she must defeat the Russian main fleet in the
Baltic before attempting anything serious in the Xorth Sea.

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

The Adriatic continues to be the theatre of vague mmour
and little fact to go on. So far as can be gathered, recent events
have been very slightly in Austria's favour to date of writing
[October 26th). We hear of submarines which have moved
against the Franco-British force oft Cattaro ; the retreat of that
force and the sinking of two or more submarines. Little
or nothing is officially confirmed, and I am inclined to fancy
that in the matter of the sunk submarines it is a case of " the
wish being the father to the thought." A submarine stands
very little chance of injury by gunfire from a big ship.

The retirement is probable. It is certainly logical. There
ia no hurry about Cattaro ; no object in risking anj'thing. The
Austrians Lave but eleven submarines all told, and some of
these are not really effective. Six ia nearer the number in the
fighting line. The Allies can easily afford to delay matters for
a month if necessary till these six are destroyed, as they are
bound to be if they have to continue an unsupported campaign.
Once more I would insist that as the weapon of the weaker power
the submarine is merely a temporary weapon. It is really the
Kcajpon of the slroiu/er power, and no matter what losses wo
may suffer, I, for one, am absolutely convinced that long before the
war is over this fact will be demonstrated. The stronger power
has always a numerical superiority in every hind of arm ; and the
real or problematical advantage of any given weapon is discounted
accordingly. Austrian submarines may delay the fate of Cattaro,
but that is the utmost which they can effect.

THE NORTH SE.\.

Ecliittd official reports of the Heligoland affair of August
2Sth have now been issued. They add little to what we already
knew, or had surmised. That little, however, is very important.

At the time of the affair I stated in these notes that in
"Act II" we believed that we were getting the worst of it.
This is very apparent from Admiral Beatty'a report.

For the rest, the feature of prime importance is the persistent
reference to a " large four funnelled cruiser." This ship was
Bubsequently reported sunk and what not ; hat none of the ships
cjKialhj reported by either side a3 sur.h had four junnch. From
which we must assumo that cither the liwn or Yorck was out—
m any case that the Germans were out in strength— possibly
their battle-cruisers uwro not far off and thcii lattlo fleet no
Ver/ great distance jwaj.

It now seems absolutely established that the Germans
were in stronger force than was to have been anticipated in
the ordinary way, and that the entire issue rested upon the
fact that Admiral Beatty took risks and chanced everything
to support our light division, and that on this and thb alone
our success rests. ,

^ii9e

rCUTLj

^^^

.Aretliusa. cmdL

O BRITISH

TO ILLCSTEATH VERT AP1T.0XIMATEI<T TITB TOSITION Olf AFFAIBS
IN THB EAELIEB STAGES OF THB BIQUT OF HELIGOLAND BATTLH.

A brief summary of all the official reports pieced together
ia as follows : — ■

About seven a.m. some of our destroyers, led by the
Arethusa, sighted and chased a German torpedo-boat destroyer.
An hour later our division founi that it had been led into a trap,
and had rather a bad time from German cruisers — the Arethusa
being the target of a very superior force. Coincident with this,
our first flotilla hammered an entirely different German division,
and sank one German (F 187).

Subsequently, all our torpedo-boat destroyers and the
Arethusa seem to have joined up and nothing in particular
happened until eleven a.m., when the Germans appeared in
superior force — the position being roughly that they had got
far the better of the affair. So tar as I can read thinjis — their

DioaraiTL IT

" <-/ '

att Lisht c^

British. T.B-D. ajtcLAretkiLsa.

British.
Light .
Cruisers \

I Oecinajx scibiiuaiiiijes ,

k— ... ....

.*...*.• — .*.«

BriXLsli Battle Cruisers

□ BRITISH

GERMAN

TO ILLUSTBATH THB APPEOXIIIATH POSmo:sS WTIEX, BUT FOB

ADIUSAL BEAl-nr'a ADVANCB THttO0QH THE SirBMARINES, THB

BKITISH rOECH WOULD HATH BEEN ANNnTILATED.

armoured cruisers entered into the fray, and absolute defeat
was assumed to be our portion.

Our position at tliat lime appears to have been very near
" defeat accepted." On the other hand, the Gcrmsns having
lost F 187 and having been hammered more than we- were aware
of, were ignorant of the advantage which they had secured, and

Ii»

October 31.

1914

LAND AND WATER

consequently they did not press their attack as quickly as they
Bliould have.

This enabled us to reinforce ; and there followed a m&lee in
which each side considered itself " vantage out." On the whole,
I think that the Germans were really " vantage in." At any
rate, that seems to have been Admiral Beatty's reading of the
situation. " --<

Be that as it may, at eleven-thirty Admiral Beatty brought
in his battle cruisers at 28 knots. He ran great risks from
submarines ; but he annihilated all that was left of the first
German line, and saved the day.

I am inclined to credit this first German Hue with having
taken annihilation in order to cover the retreat of the second,
end of possibly the third and perhaps even the fourth (battle
fleet) line behind.

In acting as he did Admiral Beatty turned what should
have been a British defeat into a British victory, or rather a
Bcmi- victory, for it now seems abundantly clear that the Germans
were quite ready for us off Heligoland on August 28th.

The situation as I read it is that the Germans were ready
for us, that they had prepared an overwhelming reception
for the Ardhusa and her consorts, that they had won, and that
everything was with them when suddenly Admiral Beatty
charged out of the mist with his battle cruisers.

The exact German plans we shall probably never know,
things of this sort are never unfolded till their interest is merely
a matter of " ancient history."

But, in a way, I am afraid that the Germans will — as I
suggested at the time — translate the Heligoland aSair into a
moral victory for themselves. It is like this : Their presence was
Buch that our battle cruisers had to come in earlier than was
intended. As a result of this their battle cruisers went back
to the Kiel Canal and so did not get annihilated as we had
probably arranged, and hoped for.

If we desire to keep our perspective clear we must view
things always from the enemy's standpoint as well as from our
own. Well, we sank four units of the enemy's light stuff, but
we got no " heavy stuff." And where psychology is concerned
psychology is all that really matters.

To describe the Heligoland affair as a German victory —
their loss four units, our loss none — sounds very ridiculous.
But psychologically I am afraid that it is nearer the truth.
The " rats " that matter evaded the trap.

Our popular Press feeds us on apparent results. Such
results are admirable for the music hall stage. But from the
naval war standard, the fact remains that if Admiral Beatty
had not taken abnormal risks, we should have been badly beaten
in the Bight of Heligoland on August 28th last.

My reading of the matter is : We tried a very smart thing.
Wo were trapped and failed. Admiral Beatty came to the

rescue and transformed defeat into victory by taking atrocious
risks. And he saved us by the skin of the teeth.

The task before us ia no light one. Not only are we faced
against men able to fight quite as well as we can ; but we are
also faced by an admiral who has his side of the business very
much in hand. The British Navy ia up against the biggest
proposition that it ever has had to face. I hope and I think that
it will win through. But the fight is going to be a very hard
one ; and the bombast of the daily Press about the " skulking
fleet " etc., etc., is very ill-timed.

THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

During the period since these notes last appeared the Emien
and KarhruJie have both been heard of once more — the latter
having succeeded in capturing several colliers, and so rendered
herself independent of German Admiralty arrangements for her
coal supply.

As the Karlsruhe has sunk some of the captured colliers, we
know that she has enough at disposal to last her for a prac-
tically indefinite period. AVith armed guards on board, these
colliers are by now probably distributed all over the ocean
outside the trade routes, their recapture being a matter of blind
chance of several thousand to one against, for now there are no
clues whatever.

In connection with clues, it seems to have escaped notice that
German corsairs seldom, if ever, inter j ere with merchant ships fitted
U'ilh icireless.

Although we have had stories of the crews of ships captured
being allowed only a quarter of an hour to get off, what with over-
hauling and what not, it is very doubtful whether from first to last —
that is to say, from the beginning of the chase to getting clear away
— the operation of capturing can take much less than six hours.

A defending cruiser does not and cannot steam about at
full speed all the time, but we can safely allow her to be abla
to cover from 100 to 125 miles in six hours, so that attacks on
any wireless fitted ship would be attended with some considerable
risk, seeing that about seventy cruisers are engaged in the corsair
hunt, and necessarily mostly along the trade routes. A con-
spicuous installation is therefore quite possibly a valuable defence
against a form of commerce attack so cleverly conceived that
it may well continue for months.

In view of the Karlsruhe's captures it may become necessary
to make colliers travel in convoy. A recently issued Admiralty
statement places our High Seas losses at 1 per cent. This is not
high. It is, however, quite high enough ; also, unless we can cut
off the hostile fuel supply, it is bound to rise.

The corsairs cannot, of course, go on indefinitely. Foul
bottoms and machinery defects must sooner or later take effect.
But they will not do so for many months. Hence the gravity
of the problem and the need of every conceivable " reply ."^

ACCURATE SHOOTING.

By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B., late R.E.

It is impossible to pass
over the anniversary of
Agincourt without drawing
a lesson for immediate appli-
cation from the extraordinary
accuracy of shooting attained
by our ancestors in those
days. Our archers carried
about thirty arrows, and
never seem to have run out
of them, though they often
killed and wounded up to ten
men a piece in a single action.
We carry upwards of 120
rounds and more, but even
the beat of our recent practice
in France falls very far behind
the standard of those days.
Yet the operation of aiming
over sights is really simpler
than getting an alignment for
an arrow drawn up to the ear
• — and the range at which the
archers practised, 200 to 600
yards, was not so much below
modem individual practice as a layman might suppose. Sir
Pialph Payne Gallwey is the chief authority on these subjects.

and, referring to Turkish archery, he gives instances of ranges
of over 1,000 yards attained by Turkish archers as late as the
eighteenth century — indeed, some of the shots he cites were made
before the Royal Toxophilite Society by the Turkish Ambassador
here in England some seventy years ago.

Now the reason why the archers shot so much straighter
stares one in the face, if one considers the man, bow, and arrow
as part of a single mechanical whole, the one bracing up the
other, and in turn being braced by it.

The initial sketch explains the idea : —

In order to draw the arrow to the car, the left arm has to
thrust against the bow with all its strength. The tension of the
cord acting through the bow compels the arm to become a
rigid strut in which no shaking is possible. A man may be
excited, or blown with running, it does not matter, for the
moment he draws the arrow towards the ear his arm becomes
locked into position, and any tendency to shake is mechanically
suppressed.

In shooting with a gun no action of this kind arises, we have
never looked upon gun and man as an inseparable unit, but
always as two distinct parts, exercising no mutually controlling
effect upon one another at all.

In the old days, the gun or musket kicked like a young
horse, and, unless the firer pressed the butt well into the shoulder
he was apt to suffer very severely. But the more you try to
press the rifle home to the shoulder the more unsteady as a
support does the left forcaiTn become ; also after excitement o»

15*

LAND AND WATEE

October 31, 1914

• 1 ♦ .T.rflon it bccomM quite impossible to get ateady
"^ ^^h L yi MVtluS aTevcn a mediate range. Evcyono
T ^Llv^r sSed game, particularly in mountain countries.

^JiScV ^c She accepted attitude of a .sportaman. ox soldier,

Fia 1.

there appeared to be nothing to choose between the two systems,
and as a few days afterwards I was ofiered the opportunity of
oreanising the army of the new Chinese Repubhc, where I could
have as much active service conditions as I might reqmre,
I dropped the subject for the time. Unfortunately, my
opportunity in China never materialised, but other matters
claimed all my time, and it is only within the last few days, in
comparing the extraordincry parallelism which is noticeable
in the way our modem tactics in France are evolvmg with the
old practice of our Norman ancestors, that its immediate impor-
tance came into my mind. _ j • i u *

It is now too late to expect official inquiry and trial, but
the matter is so simple and practical, than anyone in the ranks
of the new army or any commanding officer can satisfy himseli
forthwith. He has only to copy the position in the accompanying
sketch to apply the practice at once, and once he catches the idea,
everyone will immediately copy him. , • • t-u

Its importance can hardly be exaggerated, for it is the
fact that in war bullets almost invariably fly too high or too
low— men generally pick up the line, but the elevation bothers
them— and now that oar rifles give a practically flat trajectory
for 800 yards, or nearly so, if once that tendency to vertical
jump, due to the mechanically false support the left arm gives

BKXTCH 07 lUir

WITH RIFLI AT

TBI TViSSSHT AM

OFFICIALLT

AUTHOBISKD.

?l??iK=nTf(«"

was about the most unscientific and unmeehanical idea in the
world, and, moreover, that with modern sporting or military
rifles there was no longer the slightest reason for it, for the
recoil is perfectly controllable.

So I tried as an experiment grasping the sling of my rifle
firmly in the left hand, extending the arm to its full extent and
then leaving my trigger finger fi-ee, pulling with my right hand
against the left as if I was straining a bow. The result was
quite startling. The left arm now having become a rigid strut
all tendency to wobble vanished, and I found I could pump out
lead with an accuracy as regards vertical error that I had not
imagined possible.

Subsequently, I tried the experiment with some of my
volunteers, and the results astounded us all ; in a few rounds
they had caught up the trick, and after running and doubling
about till their bauds were quite jumpy they made shooting
which would have won any field-firing cup in the kingdom.

Unfortunately, I failed altogether to get the authorities
at Hythe to give the idea a fair trial in my presence. Instead of
trying two teams against each other under the closest approxima-
tion to battlefield conditions practicable, they insisted on trying
a man whom I had not instructed against some of their crack
marksmen at deliberate target practice on a dead calm day.
Ai CO such a day anybody could make a whole possible score.

THa posrrioN ov

riBSBNT WITH
UCFT ASM KIOID,
A» BTJOOISTED BT

~\«Ha wxrrsB.

to the rifle, is'eliminated, our fire'would sweep the ground like s
very scythe of death — there could be no escape from it.

In an attack resolutely pushed home, men must fire standing,
there is no time to lie down, and, anyhow, men with their blood
thoroughly roused and out to kill, don't think of themselves.
Even the Boers, the coolest and most skilful takers of cover in
the world, almost invariably stood up to receive a rush. Men
don't like to die lying down, it is not in the racial strain.

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NoTcmber 7, 1914

LAKD AND WATEB

THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOG.

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OPERATIONS IN POLAND.

Tuesday afternoon, November Zrd, 1914.

i I

THM XASTXBN FIZLD OF WAB,

WITH the great battle line in the East of
Europe the readers o£ these notes are
already sufficiently familiar. Its main
theatre is the basin of the River Vistula ;
its extent, though broken, a matter of nearly 400
miles ; and the territory over which the struggle is
taking place is that of Poland.

That struggle still consists, as it has consisted for
now over eight weeks, in two groups of very different
importance. The main group, A-B-C, involves some-
thing not far short of four millions of men, or at any
rate over three and a half millions, and the theatre of
their action is the Middle Vistula and the course of the
River San. The second gi'oup, in which, all told, less
than a million and perhajxs not more than half a
miUion are as yet engaged, is the group D, which
is at issue upon the frontier bctw-een East Prussia and
the Russian Empu'e, a week's march west of the
River Niemen.

While the whole line thus divides itself into two
main bodies of very unequal size, the hirger body,
A-B-C, should again be divided, for reasons which
will presently appear, into two limbs, A-B and B-C,

the first consisting in the defence by the Russians of,
and the retreat by the Germans fi-om, the Middle"
Vistula ; the second, the fighting along and across the
River San.

Further, we must add in a separate and distant
comer of the whole field, in that little Austrian pro-
vince kno^vn as Bukovina, to the eastward of Galicia,
a distinct Austrian effort, which includes the approach
to and perhaps the occupation of the town of
CzemoTvitz.

The most notable feature is this general line,
especially in its present disposition, is the separation
between the group acting in the north at I), and
the group acting in the south from A to C ; and before
proceeding to the main actions upon the Vistula and
the San, we should do well to note the nature of the
fighting uj)on the frontier of East Prussia, for it con-
veys an important political lesson upon the nature of
this great European war.

(A.>— THE FIGHTING UPON TPIE
EAST PRUSSIAN FRONTIER.

In spite of the need in which, as Ave shall see later,
the Austro-Gennan forces stand in the soutli
of reinforcement, a strong German body is kept
isolated upon the frontier betv\^een East Prussia
and the Russian Empire, just in front of the line
Suwalki-Augustowo. It wiU be remembered that
these German armies, after their considerable success
at Tannenburg in the early part of September,
following upon the Russian invasion of East Prassia,
advanced rapidly and in some force towards the line of
the River Niemen. It will f ui-ther be remembered how
they tried to cross this river and failed, were pursued to
the frontier, beaten by the Russians in the Battle of
Aug^istowo, and compelled to give up the siege of
Osowiec, which they had undertaken. There was
even for a moment a certain penetration of East
Prussia by the Russian columns; and it was not
until the German forces had rallied that this Russian
counter-advance was checked. Since that moment
(now nearly a month ago) the two enemies have faced
each^^other almost exactly upon the frontier itself.
How closely the frontier corresponds with this
"block" the sketch map on the top of the next
page will show. It concerns but a small though
the more important southern part of the general
line in this region. So far as can be judged
from the official descriptions iipon both sides, the
forces stand very much as they are given in this
map. The railway junction at Lyck, which was for
a moment threatened by the Russians, is again in
Gennan hands; a large Russian force defends the
village of Bakalarshewo, holding a strong position
upon a bluff between two of thejakes that mark this
region. Heavy German efforts to force this position
have failed. The line goes down southward in a
cordon almost exactly corresponding to tlie frontier,
though the Russian forces are often slightly across it,
especially in the neighbourhood of Lake Rayrod.
Finally, the Russian forces are astraddle of the main

LAND AND WATEE

Kovember 7, 1914

/'•s/

^ MARGI^ABOWd

^[Jfj^BAKAlJMSBFVO

\ r^ SCWAL/a

o
w

^•^^ Ra/g^ovod

Miles

czi Russians

mm AastrO'GermasLS

THB KAST PBUSSIAN FBONTIIB ABEA.

railway which runs towards Lyck from the fortress of
Oso-wiecs, and so into the heart of Prussia.

Why do we find such a disposition so far east-
ward and to the north of the South Polish field,
in which Germany has need of eveiy man she can
spare ?

The question needs an answer the more from the
fact that a fidl retreat of the Gennans in the south
from Eussian Poland must inevitably, sooner or later,
involve the retirement of the smaller German forces
from East Prussia. Not only must it inevitably
involve their retirement, but as Bussia continues to
call up its reserves of men (very much larger than
those at the disposal of Germany) there is a certitude
that this German force, if it remains upon the Eussian
frontier in front of Lyck and Magrabowa, will be
taken in reverse and wUl be in danger of isolation.
It is true that a movement thus coming from the
south over the Eussian frontier into East Pi-ussia
directly is hampered by the long region of lakes
which lies along that frontier, and of marshes, the
defiles between which are all strongly held and
fortified. But long before the Vistula is reached this
region ends ; the Eussians can cross in force into West
Prussia, and a German force thus isolated on the
eastern frontier would be in grave pcril.

This does not mean that we should look to the
isolation and destruction of such a force. What it
means is that the moment the peril begins to threaten
that force will have to retire. Why then does it
remain fixed at such a distance from the retirement of
its much more numerous brethren ? There is no such
Eussian force in front of it as could join the main
Eussian forces southward with much effect. It dis-
poses of every facility for getting round to reinforce
the main German bodies in the soiith. Yet it not
only remains in force upon this frontier, but in
sufficient force to attemjjt the counter-offensive. It
has indeed made that attenij)t with violence during
the last few days.

The answer to that question is a political one,
and in that answer we may discover much that wUl
explain the next phases of this war in the West as
well as in the East.

It is of solid and serious advantage to the
Germans — an advantage which perhaps they ex-
aggerate but which is of very high moral value — that
the war has hitherto been fought off German soil.
What it means for a war to be fought upon the
enemy's soU, France and Belgium well know. And
for a few moments Germany knew it, when the
Eussian ii-ruption into East Prussia, though pursued
but for a few miles, involved £20,000,000 worth
of material damage, and was sufficient to throw
such alarm into Berlin as produced the heavy reiu-
foi"cements of two months ago, and the German victory
at Tannenburg. That the enemy's armies, though
only occupying a corner of France, can yet hold and
ruin that comer, is something; and the whole tone of
the English people at this moment depends upon the
fact that English soU is as yet inviolate. The
voluntary system depends upon that, and a hundred
other things.

But even more important than the effect upon
the enemy of fighting ujoon his soil, is the effect upon
the German population of the Geri)ian armies being
able to maintain this boast. It is the whole German
theory of this war, that it must be fought with every
available man and gun and horse in this, its first
phase ; that if victory is not now assured it wiU never
be recovered. To procure that effort — which, as we
know by the new levies attacking us in Flanders, is
far more than the ordinary effort of a full mobilisation;
it is the staking of a whole nation upon the cast — the
immunity of German soil is essential. Nor can we
yet judge of what a revolution there will be in the
moral condition of Gennany when it is Gennan towns
that burn and are destroyed, German civilians that
are shot in batches for spying or for informing the
enemy, or even as hostages, and German goods that
are sequestrated to the advantage of the invader.
Meanwhile, we may be certain that this political
consideration will fetter German strategy more and
more as the campaign proceeds.

Now, it is to maintain German soil immune that this
" siegework " is being mainfained at the known cost of
ultimate peril upon the frontier between East Prussia
and Eussia. The labyrinth of lakes and marshes
helps the effort ; but even if it were open country and
needing far more troops, that effort would still be
maintained. And it is worth prophesying that the
retirem^ent from the East Prussian frontier wUl not
come until the very last moment, when its peril of
being cut off is extreme, perhaps not even then.

We may prepare to hear, then, of an immovable
situation all along this front, until the main German
bodies in Southern Poland have retreated much
further than they have already done.

B.— THE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN
POLAND.

I have said that the operations in Southern
Poland should be divided for purposes of analysis into
two limbs ; A — B, the limb wliich is concerned with
the middle Vistula, and in wliich the Germans are
retreating from that stream, pursued by the Eussians,
and B — C, the limb along the Eiver San.

Of these two the first is by far the most important.
Upon it will ultimatel}'- depend, for reasons which I
shall jiroceed to show, the fate of the Avliole campaign
in the East. The Austro-German object in that
campaign, so far as the main operations \ipoa the

NoveraW 7, 1914

LAND AND WATEB

Vistula and the San were concerned, may be re-
membered. It was the object of the Germanic allies,
the Austrian half of which had abeady been badly
mishandled by the Kussians in Galicia and pushed
back half-way between Przemysl and Crakow (see
Map 1), to get back again to the line of the San in
the south, continued by the middle Vistula to the
north, to cross these streams, and to establish them-
selves firmly in a defensive offensive upon the further
bank. Tlie capture of AVarsaw, on the extreme north
of this effort, the relief of Przemysl, on the extreme
south, would protect the two ends of the advance.
Later Lemberg would be retaken, and, though the
allies would not propose to penetrate deeply into the
Eussian plain — with the vnnter coming on, with its
poverty of communications and with the great length
of the line of supply from Germany which such
further penetration would involve — ^yet it was essential
to their plan that the line of the middle Vistula and
the San should be firmly held, and that there the
Russians should be indefinitely checked, in spite of
their increasing numbers — making of Russian Poland,
as it were, a larger Belgium. While the Russians
were thus held in the East, a definite victory might
be expected in the West, to which further reinforce-
ments could be sent when it was apparent that the
defensive line held by the Germans and Austi'ians
beyond the Vistula was secure.

Li pursuance of this plan very large reinforce-
ments were provided in aid of the defeated Austrian
armies, and tliese reinforcements came, not into
Galicia, but, leaving the reoccupation of that field to
the reconstructed Austrian bodies, the Germans, to the
number of some 800,000 men or rather more, with
Austrian reinforcements upon their riglit along the

southern frontier of Russian Poland, advanced right
across that province towards the line of the Vistula
between Sandomir and Warsaw. Before this advance
the Russians retreated, concentrating beyond the
Vistula upon reinforcements reaching them from the
east. No effort was made to prevent this German
and Austrian advance up to the Vistula itself, and a
corresponding Russian retirement to take place in the
south through Galicia up to the line of the San.
Przemysl was still partially invested by the Russians,
but onl}'- partially. The western sector of its peri-
meter was open to the Austrian advance. When the
shock came, the most important pai-t of this whole
line, the part along the middle Vistula, stood very
much as the dotted line upon the accompanying map.
It had everywhere touched the stream, and was
prepared to cross it at the points indicated by the
arrows. It was equally prepared to occupy Warsaw,
upon which essential northern point of support more
than a quarter of the Austro-German line upon the
Vistula was marching.

Though the Russians allowed the enemy to
reach the Vistula everywhere above Warsaw, and to
attempt the crossing, they took the counter-offensive
at exactly the right moment in front of Warsaw
itself, and began driving this wing of the Germans
back westward along the main radroad. Their
success in this field we know. From extreme
positions within six or seven miles of the Polish
capital, the Germans were beaten back at the rate of
nearly ten mdes a day for three days, until rather
more than a week ago they were on the line Skieraie-
wice-Rawa-New Misslo-Radom, and so to the river ;
the defeat in front of Warsaw involving the abandon-
ment of all attempts to pursue the crossing of the

LAND AND WATER

November 7, 1914

stream, altliongli sucli crossings had been actually
accomiilished in more tlian one i)lace.

Since this throwing hack of the line in the first
Russian successes, the Russian pursuit has been
methodical and continuous. It is ridiculous to use
the word " rout " of the German retreat, which has
been orderly, and in which everything essential
has been sa^ed, which apparently has lost no very
large body in prisoners compared with its siae, and
which still maintains a perfectly intact formation.
But though it is an orderly retreat, it is a retreat
none the less, and one wdiich renders more and more
certain as it proceeds the fate of the campaign in
the East.

It is here that the importance of the fighting
iipon, aiid afterwards west of, the middle Vistula
appears, and the subordination of the efEort further
cast along the San to this main effort of the Austro-
Germans. For, as the Austro-Germans fall back
westward and south-westward, it becomes clear that
the eastern effort cannot be prolonged. The line is
still intact, and beyond Sandomir is continued up the
San Valley ; but all the noi-th-western portion of it is
bending backwards and further back towards the
south, and the prolongation of such a strain upon the
main forces of the enemy by the Eussians must
involve the withdrawal of the Austrian forces opera-
tine: further south to the east. If these were to
maintain their positions (they can hardly hope to
advance — and even advance would be of no value) the
line would ultimately find itself bent into a bow from
Cracow, along the Vistula, and then up the San. It
would not even be covering Silesia — the keeping of
the Eussians out of which, much more than the
keeping of them out of Galicia, is the prime object
of tlie German Empire in this field. One may put
the matter diagramatically thus ; —

If the shaded portion S represents Silesia, then
the Russian pressure has already bent back the
northern portion of the Austro-German line and
is bending it back further still. From "W X P
("Warsaw, Sandomir — at X — Pi-zemysl), which w^as
occupied nearly three weeks ago, the Austro-German
line is bent back to L X P (Lodz, Sandomir, Przemysl).
Should it be bent back to C X P (Cracow, Sandomir,
Przemysl) Silesia w^ould be uncovered, and any Russian
success between X and P (the Russians can throw
their perpetually arriving reinforcements where they
choose) would be not only the r«in of Silesia but of

the whole Austro-German line. It seems certain
therefore that such a line as A B, falling back again
to A D, will be the result of the Russian pressure.
But in order to maintain such a line the Austrian
eastern advances in Galicia, now holding X P, will
have to fall back first to B, and then to D.

It is therefore upon this continual advance of the
Russians from the middle Vistula south-westward, and
the as continual retreat of the Germans and Austrians
before them in this region, that the fate of the
campaign depends ; for it involves with it an idtimate
retirement from the San and from East Galicia as well.

How far this retirement has proceeded at the
moment of writing (Tuesday evening) the Russian
official news informs us. The main German bodies
are out of Lodz, though we have no news as yet that
this town is occupied by the cavahy of the Russian
pursuit. Piotrokow is apparently entii-ely abandoned
by the enemy, and already occupied by the Russian
advanced cavalry. So is Opocsno. So is Osowiecs,
and apparently even Opatow, though here there has
been strong resistance. Sandomir is stiU the pivot of
this great retreat.

The whole thing singularly resembles the corres-
ponding German failure in the West, generally called
the Battle of the Marne — with Lodz to stand for
Soissons and Sandomir for the pivot at Verdun. But
there is this difference : that the marching wing or
exti'eme of the retreating enemy's line has had to go
more than double the distance it had to go in France,
and, much more important, with the inability of the
enemy so far to make a stand. For there is this great
difference between the German retreat through
Russian Poland from in front of Warsaw and the
German retreat through north-east France from in
front of Palis — that the pursuers greatly outnumber
the 2)ui-sued, and that the numbers of the pm-suers are
increasing every day. "VVlien von Kluck turned back
from in front of Paris on the discovery of Joffre's
reserves, he carried with him indeed the whole
Gemian line as far as Verdun. It all had to fall back.
But the troops that pressed it back ^through Chateau
Thierry and Vitry v»'ere less in number than tha
troops they were pursuing. It was possible for the
majority that was retreating to spare men for the
preparation of a position, to rally there, and to begin
a prolonged resistance. A corresponding resistance
has not yet taken place in Poland, and it is the whole
object of this methodical Russian pursuit, compara-
tively small as its results in men and material captui-ed
have yet been, to prevent such a resistance. Only the
futm-e will show whether it has been found possible
to prevent it or no.

Meanwhile an exceedingly important point, upon
which judgment must be held in suspense, is, whether
i7i this pursuit the Russians have managed to divide those
tvhom they are pursuing into two separate bodies. ^Ji
they have, a very great deal has been accom^jlished.
Certain unofficial telegi'ams maintain that they have
done so ; but I cannot, from a study of the map, see
that the trick has really been done, ^^^lat that
separation w^ould mean, and how it might be effected,
may be grasped from the next diagram.

Here is an army in two portions, A and B,
retreatmg in front of another army, also divided into
two portions, E and F. It has right across its retreat
an obstacle M N, which separates its two portions
A and B. It has further two great avenues of com-
munication along which its retreat is facilitated,
(1) and (la), both leading to C. But from (1) a
secondary avenue of communication (2) diverges
towards K. A — ^B is divided by the natural obstacle

November 7, 1914

LAND AND WATEE

M N into two portions, and so for tliat matter is tlie
victorious pursuer E — F. But tliis obstacle comes to
an end at M. Now, if botli portions of A — B — the
A portion and the B portion — stick to the two main
lines of retreat (1) and (la) and are able to get back
behind M to the level of the dotted line Gr H L, they
wiU join hands again, and from that point onwards
tlie two avenues of retreat converging towards C will
serve them jointly. If, on the other hand, the A
portion tends to slip off after reaching II along the
secondary avenue of retreat too, towards K, and to
take up a position such as that at Q, and to continue
its retreat thence toward K, while B pursues its
original following of the main avenue of retreat, and
stands at P marching towards C, Q will get more and
more separated fi-om the southern portion P as the
retreat proceeds. The more the retreat proceeds the
wider the gap wiU get, until at last the pursuers E F
wiU be able to step in between through the gap,
and the position will be like that in the following

diagram with Q and P finally broken asunder by
E F, which can deal with each of them in detad.
E F would have done sti-ategicaUy what is done
tactically in a battle when you break your enemy's
line.

It wiU be asked why should the A portion of
the retreating enemy be so foolish as to go along the
secondary line (la) until it gets to Q and is thus
separated from its southern portion B, which has got
to P. The answer is that it may either have been
shepherded or edged outwards by the superior mobility
and cleverness of E pursuing it, and have been got
away north before it reached the end of the obstacle :
or that a political desire to protect some piece of
tcrritojy, such as the shaded portion S may have lured
A away from his companion B in the middle of the

retreat when both bodies were approaching the erifl of
the obstacle that separated them. Only reasons of
this soi-t, strategic or political, could compel A to be
so foolish as to remain out of touch with B one
moment longer than the obstacle M N kept him so
separate.

Now, apply this diagram to the sketch map
No. 3. The two separated retreating bodies A and B
are the Germans north and south of the marshy lower
course of the Eiver Pilica, which is the obstacle M N.
A is the Germans lying to the north of that marshy
stream and just beaten back fi'om the line Warsaw-
up-Vistula — mouth of Pilica to the line. Skierniewice
— New Misslo. B is the Germans who have retreated
from the Vistula to a line passing through Eadom south
of the Pilica : that is the position of rather more than
a week ago. The Pilica ceases to be a serious obstacle
at about the point marked M on this same sketch
map 3. The two great avenues of retreat (1) and (La)
are the main railway lines from Eadom to Cracow
and from Warsaw to Cracow. The subsidiary diverg-
ent avenue of retreat is the railway line branching off
from the first through Lodz to Kalisz. The shaded
area S, the defence of which might lure the retreat
into dividing into two bodies, is Silesia. Another
lure which might tempt the northern part of the
German line to go directly westward while the rest
went southward, would be the opportunity of defend-
ing the line of the Eiver Warta, on which a good deal
of labour in entrenching has already been spent. It
is therefore quite on the cards that the German retreat
might get split into two bodies such as are repre-
sented by the dotted bodies X and Y on map 3.
These bodies would, of course, liy to keep in touch
with each other; but it would be the object of
the Eussian pursuit, as the angle between them
approached breaking point, to push in and separate
them.

Now certain unofiicial telegrams from the
Eussians claim that they, in their pursuit, have
virtually done this, and that while one body is
inevitably pinned to the two great railway lines
that go south-west towards Galicia and Cracow,
the other is already depending upon the line

going due west to Kalisz and

by the
to Berlin.

shortest

There

communique the

of the enemy

is " of enormous

road into German Poland, and so
is even in the official Eussian
vague phrase that the retreat
north and south of the Pilica
importance."

But, I repeat, we have not yet any evidence
that the separation of the retreating Austro-
German body into two has really taken place ; and
such a separation would be so disastrous, it would be
so much the object of the German commanders to
prevent it at any expense, that we ought not to
believe it has taken place until the very best of proof
has been offered us. Of that as yet we have none.
IVhat we do know is that the German retreat from
the Vistula, following upon the German retreat in front
of Warsaw, is quite definite and final, and that the
Germans will not retrieve it. They may entrench
again and fight a whole defensive position as they
have done in the west ; but they have lost their first
objective, and have been foiled in their original plan
of campaign. They can no longer reinforce the
West from the East without suffering what
they most dread — the presence of the enemy upon
their own sod. As that enemy continually increases
in numbers, his presence upon their soil may yet be
afflicting them before the fuU winter sets in a month,
hence.

&•

LAND AND WATEE

November 7, 1914

(G).— THE OPERATIONS UPON THE

SAN.

30 iO So .60 TO

A weeks fair nuzrchiri^ or
70 aUics

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'^<7A '" "is o^

LEMBERO
®

MeanwliUe, as I Lave said, ttis main, defeat of
the Germans upon the middle Vistula will ultimately
involve the retreat of the Austrians of the southern
or second limb upon the San. What these Austrian
forces to the south of the main Vistula line have
accomplished is not inconsiderable. They have
rallied ; they have cleared Hungary of the small
cavalry forces which had penetrated across the Car-
pathians ; they claim to have partially relieved
Przemysl, and they have certainly come down the
eastern slopes of the Carpathians through the foot-
hills to the plain. They are stiU fighting, however,
in those mountains, even as far back as Turka, which
is in the heart of the hills ; and their detached bodies
are not further north at the most than Sambor and
Stryj. It is not possible that any large turning move-
ment should take place on this extreme southern flank
of the Eusssian line. The Eussian reinforcement there
is, compared with the Austrian reinforcement, inex-
haustible, and the Eussians have Lembcrg as their
base from which to hold up any such effort. But, until
the Vistula was lost, the co-ordinate attempt to force the
San while the Vistula itseK was being crossed, looked
promising, and that would at least have had the effect
of completely relieving Przemysl. The news from the
valley of the San is very meagre, but such as it is it
is worth noting that it connotes no successful Austrian
crossing of the stream. We have one Eussian tele-
gram and one Austrian one. The Eussian telegram
teUs us that a successful effort was made by the
Eussian troops over the river at Nisco — the point, it
will be remembered from past notes, about which the
first bridges cross the San. The Austrian telegram
tells us that the Austrian troops successfully repelled
an attack on Leheisk — a town which, like every other
in Galicia, has its name spelt in three separate ways
— I adopt that of the telegram. Now the significant
thing about both these telegrams is that Nisco is on
the left or Austrian bank of the San, while Leheisk is
not only on the left bank but at some distance in
from the stream. In other words, the line of the
river is at the moment of writing being firmly held
by the Eussians and dominated by them, and there
has been no crossmg of that stream of any moment
by the enemy, or, if there has been, such a crossing
has been made good again by the Eussians.

The general result, then, of the operations in the
Eastern field to date are in favour of our Allies, from
the " block " that holds up the detached and now
dangerously isolated Prussian forces in the north,
thi-ough the great German retreat from the Vistula,
to the hitherto successful holding of the Austrian
effort upon the San.

THE BATTLE IN FLANDERS.

Roads

Double \ix^ raliwags
Single line ratUvaijf
5 » 15

Up to the end of last week the main interest of
the great battle in Flanders — apart from the stupend-
ous fact that on the issue hung the fates of the
German antnies in the west— as they do still — was
the division of the German effort into a northern and
a southern struggle. The southern effort consisted in
the attempt to push south-westward of Lille and to
break the Allied line in front of La Bassee. The
northern one consisted in the attempt to break, or at
least to roll back, the extreme of the Allied line
where it reposed upon the sea. Of these two efforts
the first, that in front of La Bassee, was slowly and
partially successful, in so far as a certain indentation
was there made in the general line vvfhich the Allies
were holding from the sea right away south to
Compiegne. More than that the German push at this
point did not achieve, and chief among the causes of
its failure was the division of forces consequent upon
that second effort in the north, which has completely
failed. For this second effort, which may be called
— though somewhat ironically — " The March on
Calais " (undoubtedly based upon political rather
than strategic considerations) has failed at an
incredible cost of human lives, of which loss by
far the gi'eater part has fallen, of course, upon the
defeated party. The mass of the German reinforce-
ments were brought up against the twelve miles front
between Dixmude and the sea. The canalised river
Yser between Nieuport and Dixmude was crossed at
last by the Germans, but v/ith no greater result than
to see the bodies already over the bridge swamped by
the opening of the sluices, and unable to advance

6»

November 7, 1914

LAND AKD WATER

beyond tbe railway which runs fi'om Nieupoi-t through
Earascapelle and Pervyse to Dixmude. Even had the
violent effoi-t made upon this front Buccecded, the
German pursuit of the Allies through the wet country
eastward to Dunkirk would have been an appallingly
diihcult business ; and behind that again, in front of
Calais, the Allies had, as we saw last week, the best
defensive position of all that coast, the line of the
river Aa, prolonged by the canal to Saint Omer.

At any rate, this effort has certainly and finally
failed. That in front of La Bassee is stiU being
vigorously but fruitlessly continued (with no appre-
ciable fui'ther advance at this moment of writing,
Tuesday evening) towards Bethune. Nor are the
Germans yet in possession of Lens, the other railway
centre of that neighboui-hood, which it is essential for
them to occupy if LiUe is to be of any value to them.

But the new struggle (which bids fair to be as
intense as that, now abandoned, along the sea-coast or
*' Calais " route) is directed towards the position of
Yprcs.

To obtain possession of that point is the business
the Gei-man commanders have set for themselves as
an alternative to the possession of that sea route
which has proved impossible.

This attack upon Ypres is not an attack upon a
junction or " nodal point " of importance to supply. A
single line of raihvay does indeed lead west from Ypres
to Hazebrouck, wliile, of course, lines run from Ypres
to the south and Lille, to the east and Brussels, to the
north and the sea at Nieuport, but none of these are
essential to a German advance westward, as Calais and
Boulogne. Ypres is not, as Hazebrouck is, for
instance, or even as Bethune, a " nodal " point where
a mass of communications essential to the enemy for
his project of invasion join. The reason why Ypres
is being attacked is not, either, that it is a depot.
The reason is that Ypres is the heart of a dangerous
" salient " or wedge thrust into the territory occupied
by Gemian armies, which salient was neglected during
the German attack upon the Yser to the north.

If the reader will glance at this diagram he wiU

LA BASSEE

see what that salient meant and stiU means to the
enemy.

Wlien the furious offensive in FLindors succeeded
to the furious attacks lower down the line — especially
before Arras — ^which had been successfully beaten off,
the country already occupied by the German
forces might be represented by the horizontal
shading " A."

As the concentration of the superior German
numbers, due to exceptional reinforcement, proceeded
on this front the Allies retired from EouUers. Lille
was occupied by a German army corps, the Allies
retired several miles, and the next line to be held by
them should logically have been Nieuport-Dixmude-
Ypres-Lille-Ai-mentieres, which line the Gennans
would again have proceeded to attack at various
places, notably in the Calais march on the front
Nieuport-Dixmude and south of LiUe.

I say "logically" meaning, supposing for each
party the offensive in superior numbers and inferior
numbers on the defensive, had acted with reason. But
the Germans did not act with reason. They divided
their forces. And in this waste of their effort, the
too violent, xmsuccessful and immensely expensive
attack on the front Nieuport-Dixmude they were
compelled to take men from their centre. This left
an opportunity for the Allies to press forward in
front of Ypres, with the result that at the end of a
fortnight's incredibly violent attempt of the Gennans,
with their superior numbers, to seize the strip along
the sea-coast, and in face of their failure in that
attempt, they found themselves in the presence of a
great wedge thrust forward by the Allies in fi'ont of
Ypres into the country they held. All that they
occupied of the new belt was that represented by the
diagram shading " B " in the sketch, and it is then
apparent what a wedge Ypres commands. Now that
the Calais attempt is abandoned, the reduction of this
salient or wedge in front of Ypres has been undertaken
by the German commanders. Pressure brought there
will, it is hoped, relieve the attack below Lille from
the resistance in front of it ; for if the German line
can be pushed forward to Ypres itself, and can include
Annentieres on the south, there wiU be no further
danger from the north flank to the Gennan effort at
La Bassee, and all available forces can be brought
forward by the enemy on to that point. To reduce
the Ypres salient, therefore, is the chief business of
the Germa,ns at this moment, and the action they
have developed with that object, regarded as a part
of the whole battle of Flanders, may be called " The
Battle of Ypres."

It is a singularly belated effort. For in that
failure of the last fortnight between Dixmude and
Nieuport, Germany has tliro'WTi away in killed,
wounded, and prisoners, at the very least, the
equivalent of a whole army corps.

Should the Germans be successful and reduce the
Ypres salient, nothing very enormous will have been
done by them, but their line will at least have been
straightened out ; the dangerous wedge pushed into it
in front of Ypres will have been thrust back.

To appreciate the nature of the work round
Ypres, the accompanying detailed sketch may be of
value. Ypres is the centre of a great half circle of
positions, with a radius of, roughly, six miles, all of
which positions are, at the moment of writing, in the
hands of the Allies, and all of which are, at the
moment of writing, or have been immediately before,
the subject of very violent attack from the enemy.

When I say mthin a radius of six miles, I am
giving an extreme measurement; some of the points
most seriously attacked are barely four miles from the
Cloth Hall, v/hich is the centre of Ypres to^vn.

LAND AND WATEB

November 7, 1914

Bixschotte is one srach town, and north of it the
flooded countiy forbids German action. Poelcapelle
is another such town ; Paschendaele is another ;

tCPERINGHE

v. -A

•aAlIXJUL"

Bcccalaere another ; Zenwode another ; Hollebeke
another, and Messines the hist of this series. Beyond
the ideal north-and-south line which unites Bixschotte,
Ypres, and Messines — that is, to the west of such an
ideal line — there are no German forces. Of the
villages mentioned a little above, Paschendaele is
the most eastern point of the salient which it is
the German business to reduce and flatten back on
to Ypres.

The main German effort in the pui'suance of this
task (the effort on to which they have put their best
troops and no resei-ves) has come from the south.
There lies here a belt of wooded land. The wood is
not continuous. It consists in a number of separate
plantations and parks, many private houses and
gardens, which often join, or nearly join. Special
effort has been made by the enemy upon the three
points Zenwode, Hollebeke, and Messines which are
on the line of these woods and slight rises. These
three villages were all at one moment — last Friday or
Saturday — in the possession of the enemy, and it v,-as
at this moment pcrliaps that Ypres was most gravely
threatened.

Whether Zenwode is recovered or not at the
moment of wi'iting we have no information, but
Hollebeke was retaken two days ago. The fate of
Messines appears to have been tbis. It was first taken
at the bayonet, largely, we are told, through the efforts
of a Territorial unit — the London Scottish — who suffered
very heavily and very gloriously. It was next partially
lost, and appears to have been during the course of
Monday a scene of fierce struggle. For the final nev.s
on Sunday from both sides — Gennan and French —
give us that impression, the French telling us that
"' part of the village " is occupied by the enemy, the
Germans claiming the capture of the Aillage.

It is obvious from the map that the line which
the Allies will make for, as the first outpost of an
advance from Ypres when the counter-offensive shall
be taken against the enemy, is the line of the Eiver
Lys. So far that nan-ow, sluggish and winding
stream, between Messines and Lille, is in German
hands.

There is, therefore, a double importance attacliing
to this struggle for Ypres, and for the projection into

the enemy's positions held by the Allies all round the
east of Ypres. A German success will pave the way,
if it is not achieved at too great an expense of men,
for pressing more heavily than ever the attack upon
the critical point of La Bassee. But if the Allies
maintain a successful advance, the occupation of Ldle
by the enemy will be near its end, and of course, as a
consequence, a retirement of the Germans from all
the La Bassee country, and the end of this very
critical struggle.

For the issue, we can, at the moment of writing
(Tuesday evening) only wait. We s])all have in this
struggle exactly what we had between Dixmude and
Nieuport ; the enemy bringing up much larger
numbers than the defensive at the moment commands,
numbers composed in part of first-rate material, in
part of the new levies which are formed of material
less and less excellent as the slaughter proceeds.
There will be a much lai'gcr loss on the side of this
determined attack than on the side of the defence,
and if the attack be thrust back that factor of final
victory upon which the whole French strategy of
reserve is counting — the exhaustion of the enemy —
will come into the field of Europe as a whole, and
bring the campaigns, not only in the west but in the
east, into quite another phase.

What this factor of exhaustion may be at the
present stage of the war I will attempt to estimate
U2)on a later page ; meanwhile there is little more to
be said of the campaign in France.

There has been a little j^rogress in the Vosges,
and the passes into Alsace are now commanded by the
French. In the old line of trenches of the Aisne,
where forces very much thinned face each other across
the slopes of the chalky hills on the right bank of
that river, there has been a sharp little German
success carrying a local advance almost down to the
stream near Vailly, while the French have got
almost abreast of Noyon to the west, and are occupy-
ing or standing immediately in front of Trecy-le-Val.
Both matters are so far too small to be w^orthy of
special comment or illustration. Neither is the dead-
lock in the Argonne appreciably advanced upon either
side at the moment of ^viiting. It is still through the
Wood of the Storks (La Grurie) that the German attack
on the French troops takes place north of the Verdun
road, and it is still fi'om the Wood of La Chalade,
south of it, that corresponding French counter-attacks
arc made. There is one last point that is worthy of
attention and of a brief analysis, and this is the
menace to the Egyptian frontier if, as seems now
certain, Turkey shall come into the game.

THE EGYPTIAN MARCH.

An attack delivered from Syria against Egypt
depends upon two obvious factors— the desert and the
Suez Canal. Unless transports are ready to convey
troops and munitions across the MediteiTanean, unless
their troops and munitions have been long prepared
and unless the eastern ^MediteiTanean is at the same
time empty of French and English men-of-war, there
is only the land route. The ability or inability of the
enemy to traverse the desert and to overcome the
obstacle of the Suez Canal sum up the whole
business.

It is perhaps the canal which should be first
remarked. It is a continuous obstacle from sea to sea
of a minimum breadth comjjarable to a broad inland
river such as the Lower Mouse ; everywhere deep, of
course, equally of course nowhere bridged and nowhere
affected by a strong cun-ent. The problem of crossing^

November 7, 1914

LAND AND WATER

'SO

— I

'«Gaza

1- .;■ ..:..„„„ ..,„.>iaaf4

Y"<snt3ra «, *

^ »

S'^-^/^l^jAiyun Musa

AKABA

it, therefore, is the commonplace problem of crossing,
vinder the protection of one's artillery, a broad but
sluggish unfordable stream over pontoon bridges.
Unless superior artOlery is present upon one's own
bank to dominate the artillery of the enemy, such a
crossing cannot be effected. If it is present the cross-
ing can be effected. The problem is further simplified
from the facts that there are no heights or gun
positions upon either side. It is simply a question of
having the larger guns, better served, and, under their
protection, effecting a crossing. If the proposed in-
vasion has not that superiority the obstacle is absolute ;
if it has, the obstacle is clearly negotiable. Save
for one other important and quite exceptional
factor.

The Suez Canal — tinlike an inland water-way —
is accessible to ships carrying heavy guns. That is
where it differs from your broad river to which it is
the parallel. Similarly it is bridgeable, as an inland
river rarely is, from the presence of large ships within
it ; for ships can be slung across it.

Much more important however, than the obstacle
which is the strategic frontier of Egypt is the Desert
across which all land approach to that country must
be made. This desei-t is the Isthmus and Peninsula
called after the group of mountains which contains,
towards the south of the Peninsula, the traditional
peak of Sinai. The high mountains, I say, lie in the
Peninsular portion of this bit of land, between the
Gulf of Akaba and the Gulf of Suez. The northern,
or continental portion, though crossed (especially at
the north-east) by ranges of hills is not mountainous.

The whole region is however desert. There is
hardly any water. Such water as there is confines all
travel to two tracks and to two tracks only, and the
supply of water is, nowadays, very limited upon each.

These two tracks are the Sea Boad — which is that
taken by all the gi'eat historical invaders of Syi'ia
from Egypt, and of Egypt from Syria — and the lladj
or Pilff rim's Road from Suez to Akaba, which was the
road followed by the Mohammedan pilgrims (especially

in the old days before steam traffic came to change
the conditions of the pilgrimage) on their way from
Egypt to Mecca. The northern or sea road after
going down the coast of Palestine through country
increasingly dry, crosses the conventional frontier
of modern Egypt at Rafa and is already under
desert conditions at El Arish. From El Arish
to the town of El Kantara or The Bridge, is a
matter of over 100 miles. It suffers as a road
of invasion towards Egypt from two disabilities.
First, the earlier or eastern part of the march is
exposed to fire from the sea.

The second difficulty is, of course, the difficulty
attaching to all this district — the difficulty of water.
It is much more than a day's march, it is over 30
miles, from El Arish to the next supply of water —
by which distance all danger from the sea has dis-
appeared, as the road is by this time protected by
wide shoal lagoons which stretch between it and the
Mediterranean. This water (found in a single well
with no great depth of water) is at the point of El
Maza ; another equally long stretch — far more than a
day's rharching — takes one to a much better supply
of water at Bir-el-Abd. A long day's march further
west again is Katieh ; and from this point the
chief difficulties of the desert march are overcome.
There is a sufficient supply of water at Katieh not only
in existing wells, but obtainable by digging. The
remaining march to El Kantara is indeed much more
than a day's going : but the supply of water obtain-
able at Kateih and the presence, once the Suez Canal is
reached, of the fresh water from the Nile Canal along-
side of it, disposes of the main difficulty. If a force
can reach Katieh it can reach the Canal. The fresh
water supply at El Kantara, however, is controllable
by those who possess the further bank of the Canal.
And indeed in all this problem of the march thi-ougli
desert on to Egypt one has to consider the fact that
the obstacle, when one reaches it, is still passing
through desert land. A force not too large might
supply itself with water at the various points (Napoleon
did so with a force indeed much smaller than should
be required for any operation against Egypt to-day,
but he was going the other way into Syria, and in his
time the obstacle of the Canal did not exist). But
such a force, though it had managed to cross the
desert, if it should fail at the obstacle for any
appreciable time would find the difficulty of continued
water supply insuperable.

The march on Egypt by this route is, therefore,
if feasible at all, a matter for a comparatively small
force, especially so long as that force finds the sea
under the control of its enemies.

The southern route from Akaba to Suez, though
everywhere perfectly good going, is very much worse
provided with water. Opposite Akaba, from the
palm gi-ove of Tabah, after a sharp climb for some
2,000 feet, you are on a flat hard plateau running
directly in the direction of Suez betvv^een low bills,
and the Pilgrim's Road is marked faMy clearly
upon this hard plateau.

At what is very nearly the central point between
Akaba and Suez you get the fu-st reserve of water.
A modern force upon the march would not reach that
reserve until the end of the third day at the very
earliest. There are cisterns to hold a great pro^asion
of water ; whether these are, or now can be, kept filled
I can find no authority to tell me. The remainder of
the way to Suez there is but one point of Avater, the
Well of Moses, " Ayun Mousa," a short march
before Suez. It is evident that this second marching
route is much harder than the first, and I believe that

»•

T-

LAND AND WATER

November 7, 1914

historically no great force has ever taken it, though
there may have been Arab movements of which I am
ignorant ; but the Eoman, the Egyptian of Pagan
times, the Assyrian, the Greek, and the Frenchman
have all chosen the sea route.

In aU this analysis of the difficulty in approach-
ing Egypt fi-om Syria (and the Akaba route has
become the more difficult as I vnite from the now
reported destruction of the Akaba stores and fort by
a JJritish man-of-war), it must be remembered that
rapid modern transport would, for small numbers,
have no such problems to face such as I have
mentioned. On either route right up to the neigh-
bourliood of the canal petrol traffic could move at will,
and cany such armament as petrol will carry within

a day for light rehicles, within forty-eight hours for
heavy ones. But petrol vehicles, save in very great
numbers, though they may seize important points
ahead of an army, will not convey an ai-my.

I win conclude my notes this week by a thorough
examination of a subject on which I have not yet
touched, or touched but superficially, and which is yet
of prime importance to the judgment of the campaign.
I mean, the factor of rjcastage. At what rate is the
enemy losing men ? The reply to such a question is of
vital consequence to the future — for other things being
equal, numbers are the deciding factor in war, and to
disarm your op^jonent — no matter how — in greater
numbers than he disarms you is the tdtunate end of
strategy.

ESTIMATE OF WASTAGE.

This factor of wastage has three important
healings upon one's judgment of a militaiy situation.

First, a comparison between the wastage of one
side and the other gives us a record of relative strength
at various moments in the campaign. It is the only
way of establishing such a record. We know at the
beginning of a campaign how the numbers stand.
We can only judge by some estimate of comparative
wastage how they continue to stand as the campaign
progresses.

Secondly, the rate of wastage of both parties
combined give one some power to judge the approach
of exhaustion. Such figures are, though but a vague
indication, yet some indication as to the maximum
possible length of a campaign, or at any rate its
maximum possible length on the scale to which it was
planned and begun. After a certain proportion of
waste upon both sides, though the campaign may
drift on, it will not be what it was in its first fury.

Thirdly, the proportion of wastage (and this is
the most important point) is also an indication of
success or failure according to the type of campaign or
action which is being fought. For instance, any one
taking the losses by wounds, death, and capture of
Napoleon's advance into Kussia in 1812, and con-
trasting it with the coiTesponding wastage upon the
Ilussian side, would have had little in the mere
figures to guide him as to the probable result of the
whole movement. But when those figures were made
alive by a consideration of the nature of the cam-
paign, when one remembered the steaddy increasing
numerical strength of the Eussians, the immense and
as steadily increasing length of communications upon
which the French depended, the bad roads, the late-
ness of the season, &c., then one could compare.
One could say that if the wastage had been nearly
equal upon both sides, that was for the French a very
bad omen indeed.

Take a converse case : The immense wastage of
the Gennan armies in 1870-71. No one marking those
figures with any judgment would have thought the case
of Gennany any the worse, at any rate up to November,
1870. She was attacking to win at once. She was
undergoing a veiy heavy strain with that direct
2)ur])ose. She had undertaken many very severe
marches. She was fighting late in the year. She
had, after the fii'st few weeks, no regulars against
her. While she was fighting regulars she had
sacrificed men without counting because she thought
or know that the blow could be driven home at once.
But if the French had succeeded, as they so nearly

did, in pinning the Gennan effort in the late winter,
then the later figures of German wastage would have
been very significant indeed.

Bearing these three points in mind as to the way
in which wastage is an indication as to the trend of a
campaign, let us try to get at approximate figures.

Our basis for such a calculation is very crude and
insufficient. We have to guide us nothing but the
official Prussian lists of killed, wounded, and missing,
tlie official German statements of the prisoners they
hold, a rough — and now old — unofficial estimate of
the German prisoners in France, British ofiicial and
unofficial statements of loss in the British contingent,
some knowledge of the type of fighting upon each
side — and, for the rest, nothing but the apphcation
of common-sense to all these fragments. Never-
theless such an application will lead to appreciable
results.

Let us begin with the Gennan account of their
own wastage. The lists of which we have hitherto
had notice in this country (1) apply to Prussian losses
alone and (2) cany us no fiu-ther than the middle of
September.

These lists give 36,000 killed, 160,000 wounded,
and 55,000 missing.

To correct these official figures with regard to
Prussia we have no counter check save the unofficial
French estimate of 65,000 German prisoners in France
somewhat earlier in September. This one check,
however, is not without its value, for it corroborates,
roughly, the Prussian figures of missing. For the
difference may well be German reticence in counting
as certainly missing many who may yet (it is hoped)
appear, and captives not notified at the moment their
lists were made. But though we have no counter
statistics with which to check these Prussian lists, we
can apply to them a general criticism wluch should
enable us to arrive at tolerably accurate inferior and
superior limits.

For the principles of this criticism let us first
remember that it is the characteristic of German
official statements in this war at once to suppress news
which the German Government happens to think
weakening to its cause, and to be singularly accurate
in the news it does publish.

It is very important, in this connection, that we
should not confu.se the various types of information
furnished by German agency to the world. There
is plenty of German falsehood, some of it fantastic.
But the falsehood is calculated and organised. There
are, as it were, zones of information. The Germau

10*

ITovember 7, 1914

LAND AND WATEE

Goverament permits and encourages tlie publication,
in German provincial newspapers, of cliildisli stories
against the Allies, and of equally cliildisli prophecies
of inevitahle German victories. It presents for the
consumption of neutral countries something quite
different, not fantastic stories but special pleading.
America is fuU of this, so is Scandinavia. Finally,
it issues, for the effect it may have upon minute and
careful criticism in Europe (such, for instance, as that
of the General Staffs of the Allies) figures the known
reliability of which will earn respect.

The calculated truth-telling and lying of the
Prussian Government may be compared at this
moment to that of a man who is rigidly accurate with
his bank book, keeps a quantity of his transactions from
passing through the bank, puts forward through hired
lawyers a totally false view of his fortune in some law
case in which he is involved, and finally permits and
even fosters ridiculous popular legends which make
him out ten times as rich as he is. If one were deal-
ing with the evidence of such a man's wealth one
would respect the accuracy of the counterfoils in his
cheque book, though one would doubt the rest of his
reports for various reasons and in various degrees.

The official cmmuniques of statistics are of the
exact category. One may take it, therefore, as accurate
that the Prussian Government was {for the Prussian
forces alone) able to note 30,000 dead by the middle
of September.

But the Prussian male population is only just
over sixty per cent, of the total male population of
the German Empire. It contains, with the capital, a
slightly larger proportion of men for various reasons
exempted. Call it but sixty per cent, for military
purposes and you are within the truth. So to get
statistics for the German armies as a whole we must
add to any Prussian statistics two-thirds as much
again — forty to every sixty or sixty- six per cent.
Therefore we must add to this 36,000 dead another
24,0C0 and say that official information up to the
middle of September accounted for 60,000 German
dead. There is our first item in the process of
calculation.

160,000 Prussian wounded would, in the same
proportions, give us just on 207,000 for the total
number known upon that date as being wounded in
the whole German Army. But here we must make
oar first reservation as to the accuracy of the Prussian
figures. The proportion of wounded to killed is
altogether too low. 60,000 dead is to 207,000 would
give one man killed out of less than 5^ hit, to be
accurate, one out of 5 45. We know from numerous
accounts, as well as from accurate statistics (though
these apply only to portions or samples of the whole),
that the proportion of dead upon the side of the
Allies is in heavy lists more like one in eight, and in
light lists one in fifteen in this war. It is indeed but
rare that a particular list brings it up to as high as
one in eight ; and indeed, judging upon the analogy
of other modern war, one in ten is quite high enough
a proportion, taking a campaign as a whole. The
proportion of dead to all casualties by wounds and
deaths included in the Prussian lists therefore, at
1 in 5 '15, a great deal too low. There are, of course,
many particular cases of desperate attack in which
you — very rarely — reach such proportions. It is
further true that the Prussian method of attack lends
itself to a high proportion. But allowing for all this,
the proportion is altogether out of reason. In other
wordij, tJiere must have been, at the date mentioned,
the middle of September, knowledge of a great many
more than 207,000 wounded in the German armies.

We should probably be still within the mark if we
doubled that figm-e : we are quite safe if we add just
over 50 per cent, to it and make it one in eight.

This does not mean that the Prussian statistics
are fantastic or even false. It simply means that
tl>cy have only chosen to count as wounded those who
wei"e very seriously wounded, those, for instance, who
had no prospect at all of ever appearing again in the
field and that they did not choose to swell their
lists with any less serious cases. Such a method of
presenting casualties is arguable. But we who are
trying to get at a just estimate of the total wastage at
this one moment, and who are not handicapped by any
desire to keep the enemy in good heart, must consider
all casualties, and, I repeat, the adding of just over
half to the admitted proportion of wounded, the allow-
ing of at least eight men hit more or less grievously
for one of the eight to be killed is an estimate well
within the probable truth. Such a low estimate
gives us 60,000 killed and just less than half a million
Germans killed and wounded — 480,000 — mentioned
to date at the middle of September.

In the case of the third category, that of the
missing, we are on surer ground. The numbers there
are more nearly accurate. They have but one doubt-
ful factor in them and that is due to the reluctance of
those responsible for soldiers to admit the units are
really lost until there is no further doubt. But
against this must be set the militaiy habit of estimating
the number of one's missing men immediately after an
action, although stragglers coming in, wounded picked
up, &c., may later reduce that number.

To be well within the mark let us add no more
than ten per cent, to the lists of missing, that is, let
us suppose that the reluctance of subordinates to admit
losses of this sort in their commands would have made
no greater difference than adding 5,000 to the Prussian
figures of 55,000. That would give us 60,000 missing
Prussians, or 100,000 missing men for the whole
German Army. And such an estimate is very fairly
corroborated by comparing it with the French
unofficial statements, somewhat earlier in date, of
05,000 unwounded German prisoners ; for, in the first
place, among the Germans merely marked missing
there must have been a number of wounded abandoned
wherever a Prussian force fell back, and, in the second
place, men marked as missing in the campaign often
fad to appear in the statistics of either army. They
are lost for good. They represent desei-tions,
people killed but not marked as killed, &c. For
instance, behind the Prussian lines after the great
retreat in the early part of September, Picardy and
the edges of Normandy were full of half-starved little
groups of Germans that had lost their units — especially
cavalry — and that often took to brigandage as a
desperate resource, and very many of whom were
summarily shot by the French. Next we must admit
a certain number — not yet lai-ge — of captures by the
Russians.

Put all this together — your 100,000 missing,
your close on 500,000 wounded and dead — and you get
in round figures more than 000,000 men for the killed,
wounded, and missing of all the German forces by the
middle of September.

But before we leave that particular patch of
figures we may note yet another consideration which
is of great value to our estimate. The figures of
loss given by an army, however accurate, are always
for a particular date below the real total losses.
For to the list of a given day there are always
additions to come in, and this is particularly seen
when you are dealing with mdlions over two widely

11*

LAND AND WATER

November 7, 1914

separated theatres of wars, eacli many thousand square
miles in extent. It takes some time for the reports
of units to come to the Staffs and be first roughly
co-ordinated. The further news which reaches sub-
ordinate commanders extends the first lists. If a
man is asked for his losses twenty -foui- hours after an
action, he will invaiiably send in a smaller amount
than the total amount turns out to be after lengthy
and complete examination. It is true that these
Prussian lists are not issued until long after the dates
to which they refer, so that there is plenty of time for
adding further figures, but it is still true that supple-
mentary lists continue to be issued throughout a
campaign, and that the 000,000 which v/e have here
got are therefore certainly less than a quite complete
account of losses to the exact middle of September
would come to. They are less, tliat is, than the total
nunbcr of men killed, woimded, taken prisoners, or
lost up to the date of the 1 5th of September. The
last few days before that date are sm-e to represent
incomplete returns. But to this consideration must
be added another fact — that the date happens to bo of
peculiar significance.

Those few days just before the Ihth of September,
the last days of the account in which most omissions are
necessarily made, happen precisely to corrcspiond with
the great German Retreat called the Battle of the Marne.
Some of the worst punishment which the German
army ever received on East or West falls upon those
very days with regard to which the official statistics are
likely to be in any case below the mark. What
difference this may make we cannot tell. But let us
again put a very small estimate for the sake of safety
and say no more than ten per cent. Even that brings
us up to 060,000.

We may sum up and say that in the case of the
official German statistics coupled with what is
certainly known of modem war and of normal
proportion of death to woimds, you have by the
middle of September more than 600,000 but less than
800,000 men hit or taken prisoners upon the German
side.

Next let us turn to the losses to be presumed
since that date; after that to the presumption of
losses by sickness in various forms. Only when some
such full calculation is completed shall we be in a
j)Osition to draw a general conclusion as to the
position of the German forces and their chance,
so far as numerical strength alone is concerned, for
the future.

We have seen that more than 660,000 and
presumably less than 800,000 men are to be counted
as wastage from the German forces in killed, wounded
and missing up to the end of the I'ctreat from Paris
to the Aisne in the West, and up to the victorious
advance of the four or five German Anny Corps from
East Prussia over the Eussian frontier at the same
moment.

What proportion to these losses do subsequent
losses bear ?

We are now in the fiirst week of November.
Seven weeks have elapsed since the totals just com-
jmted were arrived at. But these totals account for
less than four weeks of active warfare. There was no
heavy and serious fighting in the field until the third
week in August, when the big losses began with the
Battle of Metz (August 19-21) and the Battle of the
Sambre (August 22-24).

If, therefore, the fighting had been of the same
character all tlu-ough, we should have to multiply
these first estimates — our 660,000 to 800,000 — by
nearly three to get the total of the present time ; since

the first estimates refer to little more than three full
weeks of the heavy fighting, and we are ending the
eleventh week of active waiiare now.

It is common knowledge, however, that the
fighting has not been of a piece throughout. To the
veiy heavy work of the rapid German advance on
Paris, with sharj) losses in infantry and no losses in
prisoners, followed by the equally heavy work of the
retreat to the Aisne, vkdth its considerable losses m
prisoners and large losses in dead and wounded of aU
arms (a higher proportion, perhajjs, in the Artillery),
there succeeded, after this middle of September, a long
deadlock in which the only fields subject to heavy loss
were those fought in defence of the German com-
mimications to the west of the Eiver Oise, and north
and south of the Upper Somme.

There was loss, of course, the whole time along
the line of trenches from Noyon to the Argonne ; and
there was rather greater loss beyond the Argonne and
in the open country where the garrisons of Verdun
and Toid were in contact with the anny of Metz.
TTiere was also a good deal of sharp work in the
Vosges. But all tliis kind of fighting meant losses on
a different scale from those which had been incurred
dm-ing the advance on Paris and the few days of the
main retreat, wliile even the heavier fighting up along
the west front in defence of the German communica-
tions was upon another scale from the original
conflicts.

It is exceedingly difficidt to estimate, even in the
roughest manner, what pi'opoiiion we should allow for
the German losses between the middle of September
and the end of the first thii'd of October when the
great battle of Flanders opened. It is a period almost
as long as the first period. We should be safe enough,
considering the repeated and dense German attacks, if
we put it down at about 50 per cent., but we are at
any rate perfectly safe and well within the mark if we
put it down at rather more than a third, say 250,000
on 660,000 or 300,000 on 800,000. "Wlien we consider
that this same period saw the retreat of the Germans
from the line of the Niemen and their very considerable
losses in the battle of Augustowo as well as their
bad quarter of an hour on the causeway of Suwalki,
the loss of their heavy guns by Osowiecs and then-
failure in an attempt to cross the Niemen at Dmss-
kiniki (the attempt and failure to cross a broad
stream under fii-e is always an extremely expensive
operation) we may be perfectly certain that this
estimate of just over an extra thii-d is well below
the mark, although of course the Gennan forces in
East Prussia were not a quarter of those in the
Western field.

Let us add then for the period between
September 15 and October 10 from 250,000 to
300,000 to the total losses already computed, and you
already have at the opening of the battle of Flanders
a total of certainly not less than 910,000, nor probably
more than 1,100,000.

Now the battle of Flanders has by every account
been altogether more prodigid of German fighting
men than an^'ihing that has gone before. It has
already lasted three weeks. We are just at the
beginning of the fourth week from its opening, from
the opening that is of the severe phase which
distinguishes the struggle on the Franco-Belgian
frontier from the prolonged flanking movements which
have preceded it. The full despatches from the
General Officer in command of the British contingent,
the oflicial French communiques, the Belgian private
letters received at home, and the public corre-
spondence in the newspapers, all are unanimous

12*

November 7, 1914

LAND AND WATEB

in the couclusion that tlie losses on the German
side have been on a scale far greater and the
effort correspondingly more intense than anything
that has been seen before in this war. It is true tliat
the front upon which the fighting has occurred is little
more than fifty miles, but the main forces massed
there must account for neai-ly half the whole German
forces immediately deploj-ed for action along the
"Western Trout. Of the total number of prisoners
taken we know nothing, save one French estimate of
one week, and even that estimate only refers to the
interning -within France of un wounded prisoners taken
some days before. If we multiply that estimate by
three w^e get 25,000 prisoners taken upon this front.
Scale that down to 20,000. Estimate the killed and
wounded in such a struggle by the known results in
the Belgian contingent opposed to it, and by the
partly known and partly presumed rate of loss in
certain British and French contingents opposed to it.
Eemember that the fight consisted in a perpetual and
reckless offensive on the part of the enemy — and you
■will not get a total of less than 150,000 men hit and
missing in this field alone. History (if it can ever get
accurate information of such things — which is
doubtful) will probably find that 200,000 was
nearer. Meanwhile the regular wastage has been
going on at the old rate along the rest of the
line. Diminish that rate because the line has
been thinned to bring up masses for fighting in
Flanders and you must still allow 100,000 "casualties
at least, counting every form of such for more than
three wrecks over nearly 200 miles front and with
continual fighting.

Here again I think that estimate w^ould be too
low by far, but at any rate you have upon the whole
■\V"estern line dm-ing the battle in Flanders at the very
least another quarter of a million.

Meanwhile, you are having your regular wastage
in East Pj-ussia, and in the German defeat upon the
Vistula, with its rapid though orderly retreat, its
necessary loss in stragglers and parties cut oft', as well
as its loss in killed and wounded, certainly not less
than 150,000 men. Prisoners will be a small part of
that total in Poland as yet. They are almost certainly
not a third of it, and probably not a quarter of it, but
the German reinforcements sent into Poland to help
Austria were not far short of a million men, and
iinother third of a million had been fighting con-
tinuously on the borders of East Prussia. I am allow-
ing, remember, for over three w^eeks of action, of
which a fortnight upon the middle Vistula has been
one of defeat and retreat, only 12 per cent, of
losses, and I think it wiU be conceded that such
an estimate is quite certainly below the truth. Add
then, your 150,000 here to the quarter of a million
in the West: that makes 850,000; add this to the
totals of 910,000 minimum to 1,100,000 maximum
previously obtained, and you get at the very least, and
on the most favourable calculation, over a million and
a quarter of Germans hit or caught in the progress of
the whole campaign to date. Sluch more probably
the true figures go well above a million and a half,
but that they are more than a million and a quarter
we can afiirm with absolute certitude.

I know that the figui-e looks startlingly large,
but the various steps by which it is arrived at are
not, I think, open to criticism. It would be easy by
a little manipulation of figures to make out very much
larger totals. I have attempted, on the contrary, to
fix the lowest conceivable minimum, and I an-ive at
something certainly larger than a million and a
quarter for the strict German losses in the field.

But to the losses of men caught or hit you have
always to add losses from sickness, which term in
military history signifies not only actual illness but
the results of fatigue, accidents which prevent a man's
mai-ching, and even the proportion, such as it may
be, of men foot-sore at any one moment and unable
to keep up with their units.

The estimate of an enemy's losses under this
heading are exceedingly difficult to arrive at, for throe
reasons. First, the factors of such loss are quite in-
determinate (they range from a few stragglers to the
myriad victims of an epidemic) ; secondly, that a
proportion of sick are always coming back on to the
strength ; and, thirdly, that the curve of such losses
varies in the most surprising manner with {a) the
length of a campaign; {h) the climatic conditions
under which it is fought ; (c) the quality of troops
upon which you have to fall back ; [d) management.

One sometimes hears it laid down as a sort of
rough rule that for one man hit or caught you must
count another man off the strength from sickness.
But that rule of thunib would never do in an estimate
of a particular campaign such as we are now trying
to arrive at. It may work in all campaigns on the
average. It would be wildly exaggerated of, say, the
Sadowa Campaign, and as wildly an underestimate,
for, say, 1812. The campaign began in the very best
of weather (in the West at least). That weather was
prolonged to a quite exceptional date. We have had
no rumours of any serious epidemic in the enemy's
ranks, and such an accident is still quite unlikely.
Losses from fatigue, from over-marching, and the
rest of it would vary very much with the different
phases of the campaign. There must have been a
great deal of it during the rapid advance on Paris.
Hardly any of it during the deadlock ; little in the
German service, at least, upon the Eastern front of the
war. Again, a considerable amount of transport,
even of men, nowadays is mechanical. There must
have been towards the end of the work on the
trenches a good deal of loss from ordinary causes of
sickness and fatigue; but with a few exceptional
crises to interrupt its general excellence the supply of
food and clothing to the enemy at the front has been
constant and regular. I propose — it is purely
empirical, but it has the advantage of being an
underestimate — to cut severely the old rule of thumb
and to add only 35 per cent, for these causes instead
of 100 per cent. ; and that although the active part
of the war has ah-eady been going on for nearly
three months. Eemember, that to add only 35 per
cent, is to pursue the method that has been pm-sued
throughout these notes ; it has been well within the
mark. Even so, you get little less than one million
and three-quarters of men in wastage to the enemy
at this moment. It is quite certainly much more,
but it is even more certainly no less.

To that figure, just over one million and three-
quarters, then, let us pin our first conclusion,
These losses have almost up to the, present day — up
to within the last two toecks or so— fallen in the main
upon the trained troops of the enemy, and with particular
severity zipon his body of oncers.

The German Empire had, counting lunatics, bed-
ridden men, cripples, old men over 80, and boya
between 17 and 20, 17,000,000 males available in four
categories. A quarter were the trained men of useful
fighting age, 21 to 45 — four-and-a-quaiier million ; a
quarter — another four-and-a-quarter million— the men
of the same age left untrained or but partially trained,
never having formed part of the regular army or
having done their fidl two years — most of them

13*

LAND AND WATEE

November 7, 1914

because it is not the German system to take every
available man, but rather to pick and choose and to
leave a large untrained or half-trained reserve to be
digested into the army in the course of a war, but
very many because they were physically unfit far service.
The remaining two quarters — or eight and a half
million — stand for the boys who are not -eally fit to
bear arms, but who can at a pinch be called upon,
even from the age of 16 (as Napoleon called upon
such classes in his last desperation), and for elderly,
old, and very old laen. Nor should it be forgotten
that to keep a nation going at all in wartime, you
cannot reckon less than a number varying with varying
circumstances, but in the case of G-ermany at least
one million men — neither boys nor too old.

Well, this loss of nearly one-and-three-quarter
millions (at the very least) which has already fallen for
the most part upon the two first quarters, the trained
army, and the equal untrained mass behind it — has
fallen most heavily on the first and best. It comes
to more than a fifth of all the two possible categones
combined i more than a fifth of those who can ever
make real soldiers, and of these more than a quarter
of the fii-st line.

Tliere is the chief military feature of the
struggle at the present moment. In a service
peculiarly dependent upon cadres certainly a third of
the oiBcers have by tltis time disappeared. It
sounds like a violent statement, but the lists are
there to prove it.

It Avill probably be found when fuller records are
available that much more than a third have already
gone. Of the best troops called up for the first
effort one-fourth have certainly gone and probably
more. Of all troops, trained and untrained, so far
incorporated by Germany one-fourth have gone, for

has quite certainly not yet summoned in any
seven million men since the
war — it is doubtful if she has
Of all available material for anything
approaching a true army a quarter has ah-eady gone.

At this point my calculation ceases. It must
as yet be enough to suggest that upon analogy dra^vn
from known cases of loss in pai-ticulax actions, every
man can, by such methods as I have used above, come
to his estimate of the corresponding wastage upon our
side, and, for the whole of both fields, he wiU find
that estimate a reassuring contrast.

she

shape more than
beginning of the
summoned six

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

NOTE. — THIS AETICLB HAS BJ'.EN SOEMITTED TO THB PRESS BCKHAIT, 'wniCH DOES NOT OBJECT TO TUB PBELIOATION AS CENSOMD
AND TAKES KO BESrOSSIElUTr rOB THa COKEECTNESS OF THE 6TATSJ)dE:\XS.

THE NORTH SEA.

THE discovery of a German mine field of unlmown
extent twenty miles north of Tory Island
(Donegal, Ireland) is a serious matter. The mines
must have been placed there quite recently or
Bomething would have been sunk by them long ago.

Now, it is impossible that any German mine-layer can
have reached the spot under its own colours. Therefore, a
neutral flag and probably a neutral vessel was employed. Now
Khere did that vessel saU from ?

Mines are not things that are easily shipped without observa-
tion, and they occupy quite a lot of space. Of course, they can
be hidden under a screen of harmless cargo, but none the less there
must be some very carefully organised scheme.

The question certainly arises as to whether these mines have
not been stored in hannless looking cases somewhere in our own
territory in anticipation of Der Tag, and the question is how
many more are lying " in bond " awaiting use \ It would be
quite consonant with German thoroughness.

Some years ago — though for obvious reasons the fact did
not appear in the Press — a cache of arms was discovered on the
East Coast, and a systematic search unearthed others at various
unexpected places. If arms and explosives were imported well
beforehand, why not mines ?

Another point in connection with the Tory Island mine
field is that it is very improbable that the mines are anchored.
Anchored or not, they will presently break adrift and so are
liable to bo met with anywhofo around those parts, a danger
to friend and foe alUce.

The net result of all this is that sooner or later — probably
Booner — considerable restrictions will have to be placed on all
neutral shipping in or near British waters.* There are certain
objections to imposing a systematic search, but the formation
of regular convoys could hardly be resented by any innocent
neutral, for any delay would be more than compensated for by
the risk avoided.

As for our warships, the risks which they run from this
kind of warfare is immense, and it also comes under the head
of things which cannot be provided for, except by the institution

*Siua.r) llioso lines were written the Admiralty have Jm]X)sed certain
nstrictioss, — Eo.

of a very strict convoy system for all neutrals using waters
anywhere contiguous to our coasts.

Next in importance to the discovery of the Tory Island
mine field is that on October 31st the old cruiaei Hermes was
submarined in the Straits of Dover.

It has been loiown for some time that one or more German
submarines have been hanging about in the Channel, and every
eCort has been made against our squadron oS Ostend.

The disquieting part of the affair is how and in what way
the German submarines manage to maintain themselves without
visible means of support.

In " the Battle of the Coast " matters generally remain as
heretofore. V/e learn from an ofEcial statement that the old
battleship Venerable is engaged in the bombardment. She
carries 12-inch guns, and the effect of these on the German
trenches must be something very terrible. One of the famous
C'erman howitzers is said to have been destroyed by well-aimed
fire from the 6-inch in one of our gunboats. Now that 12-inch
guns have been imported, the German situation anywhere neai
the coast must be distinctly unpleasant.

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

Tuekey's entry into the war has been no surprise — the
Goeben and Brcslau subterfuge prepared us for it long ago. A
fortnight ago I suggested that the flight of the Goeben before our
little Gloucester might turn out, after all, to be an item of high
strategy. In the Mediterranean itself the Goeben had no chance ;
in the Black Sea, if properly handled, she will neutralise or destroy
the whole Russian Black Sea Fleet.

From the German point of view, immediate assets — beyond
the bombardment of unfortified towns are not likely to be very
great. Whatever the Turco-German Fleet may accomplish
in the Black Sea it is abundantly clear that in some way or other
Russia wiU reach Constantinople and hold it.

When the world war is over, it is well on the cards that
Russia and Greece may dispute as to who shall hold Byzantium,
and Prussia may already be reckoning on some Phoenix resurrec-
tion of the German Empire over that evcut._ But, so far as
Turkey is concerned, it is the end of the Turks in Europe.

This, however, is neither here nor there at present. Tho
central point is that thus early in the naval game the enemy

November 7, 1914

LAND AND WATER

fihould have been compelled to play his trump card. It is the
first real confession of defeat tliafc we have had.

It will probably be many a " Louvain " for many undefended
villages on the shores of the Black Sea. Only submarines,
destroj'ers and luck, especially luck, can avail the Russians here.
For a while at least, thanks to the Goehen, Turkey will pull
chestnuts out of tlio fire for Germany in the Euxine. But it is
certainly going to be at the expense of the Ottoman Empire,
as the Turks'will presently learn. They have given Constantinople
to their hereditary foes ; and every island in the Levant will
presently be Greek.

And in dragging Turkey into the fray Germany has probably
hit herself the hardest blow.

These things will not be apparent at first. We may
probably look for a rising in Egypt ere long — followed by a corre-
sponding rising in Tripoli against the Italians. The net result
will be a forcing of Italy into the camp of the Allies. But these
are land and side issues. The main point is that up till now
the Russian Black Sea Fleet has been " out of the war," because
it was confined to the Black Sea by treaty. Now all is changed.

As a fighting machine the Turkish Navy is quite worthless.
The Black Sea issue entirely depends upon the Goehen, which
is probably equal in actual fighting value to the entire Russian
Euxine Fleet, unless it first disables her by torpedo attack.
But if the Goehen sank every Russian ship in the Black Sea
it would not affect main naval operations in the least, and its
effects on the military situation would be more inconclusive
still. The Goehen cannot get out through the Dardanelles
without facing a fighting force of the Allies more than able to
cope with her. Her utmost capacity is a certain amount of
wanton destruction in the Black Sea, for which ultimately
Germany wiU have to pay heavily. And, further, there will
arise the question as to whether both she and the Breslau are
not now of pirate status, and outside all that International Law
which they have so flagrantly ignored.

The bombardment of Cattaro continues, and, so far as
can be gathered from the meagre reports which come in, it is
being slowly destroyed. On sea as on land it looks as though
all old ideas about fixed defences must be modified ; before this
war Lj over even Heligoland itself may be bombarded into
insignificance. At any rate, it is within the region of possibilities,

THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

Last week's recrudescence of corsairs ia marked by the
temporary retirement of the Karlsruhe and the reappearance
of the Einden, which on October 28th suddenly appeared at
Penang with a dummy fourth funnel and flying (according to
Russian accounts) the Japanese flag (according to the French
report) a Russian flag. This divergence of opinion is instructive,
since by no 'possibility can the Russian and Japanese flags be
mistaken for each other.

We can, therefore, reconstruct with some accuracy what
probably happened. The Emden approached the Russian
cruiser Jemtchug under the Japanese flag and possibly actually
torpedoed the cruiser under it. Being in some way possessed
of the information that the French destroyer Mousqueton was
also at Penang, she then hoisted the Russian ensign, probably
hoping to escape in the confusion, or at any rate to obtain
advantage out of the MousquelorC s expected hesitation.

The whole afiair is mysterious, because it is a fixed canon of
corsair warfare never to fight if fight can possibly be avoided,
as a very little damage may materially impair any future work.

The JcmtcJmg was not a powerful ship, but she had a broadside
of four 47 against 'the Emden' s five 4 inch. She was hampered
by being at anchor and also by being surprised, but, even so, the
Emden took enormous risks for no apparent object, since one
pursuer more or less could make no difference.

Consequently, we are forced to one of two conclusions.
Either Kapitan von Mullcr has got swelled head and is bent on
being in the limelight at all costs, or else, as seems more probable,
he is nearing the end [of his tether, and now only intent on
damaging as many warships as possible before going under.
We know that the Emden has had to sacrifice two of her colliers —
the Marhomania and the Grreek steamer Pontoporus — recently,
in order to save herself, and from this we may presume that her
" communications " have very possibly been cut altogether.
It is well v/ithin the bounds of probability that she will be next
heard of as interned in some neutral port — by preference
Siamese.

Another thing which must hamper the Emden is that her
ammunition must be growing short, and her favourite trick
of using the British or other Allied flag is becoming well known.
The quarry is therefore a great deal more shy than heretofore.

The Emden has now tv/enty-one merchant ships and two
warships to her credit, but the indications are that her days are
numbered. In any case, it is clear that the great German
Bchtme of commerce warfare has signally failed and that one
way and another the cost of it all to Germany has probably

been greater than the loss inflicted on ufl. In one way especially
has it been a signal failure — it has completely failed to create
a British commercial p.anic. Thoretically ere this we should all
have been on short commons with food at famine prices.

It is ironical that this German failure must be in great part
due to Prince Louis of Battenberg having urged the early mobi-
lisation of the British Fleet and so prevented many corsairs
from materialising. It is curious that thelEinden's abandonment
of the corsair game should coincide with the retirement of
" L.B." (as the Navy has always called him) from his post of
First Sea Lord on account of a public agitation directed on tha
fact that as a baby he was a German !

THE FAR EAST.

So far as can be gathered the clouds are closing round
Kjao Chau. The sea bombardment appears to be conducted
mainly by British warships, while the Japanese land batteries
are doing much damage. The German gunboats inside appear
to get sunk by slow degrees, but whether they do or do not it
is unlikely to aSect the main issue, Kiao Chau is doomed to
extinction.

MATTERS GENERALLY.

DuRiNO the last week or so the destroyer has receded
considerably from her pre-war status. The affair oS the Dutch
Coast, the sinking of the Mousqueton at Penang, all go to indicate
that 6-inch and even 4-inch guns are far more deadly against
destroyers than was anticipated. Like the submarine, the
destroyer also seems doomed to illustrate the old saying about
the impotence of the lightweight boxer before the heavyweight.

All of which is still in the embryo stage. We cannot yet
say for certain that the " Dreadnought policy " is proved
correct. But, whatever happens, it has so far shown itself
not to be wrong, despite things done by submarines.

AN IMPORTANT WAR MAP.

Ona of the most useful of war maps yet published ia the large
relief ma,p of the central European area issued by Messrs. George
Philip at six guineas. It forms a faithful representation of the con-
figuration of Europe — western and central Europe, that is— and gives a
clearer idea than can be obtained in any other way of the difficulties
that face the Allies in the Rhine Valley, the region of the Argonne,
and the Ardennes country — these as instances. The nature of the
country over which the Russian troops are also advancing is clearly
ehown, and altogether the map is an education as regards the difli-
culties attendant on the conduct of this war. It is a publication that
should be found in every club, at every war lecture, and in every
country house in which an interest is taken in the progress of the war.

WAR KIT.

Inspection of the materials and methods of Messrs. White, tailors,
of 10, Blenheim Street, W., demonstrates that the firm has made special
study of the needs of officers proceeding to the war area, and ia
prepared to give the ultimate of value in conjunction with detailed
personal attention to each customer. The prices are extremely reason,
able, for a cash svatem obviates bad debts and gives opportunity for
smaller profits than are required m the case of credit firms. There is
an overcoat of rainproof frieze which merits special attention, and
another thing worthy of note is the " British warm " coat of military
pattern— an ideal garment for winter campaigning. These are but
iiistances ; the firm is making a speciality of military kit, but equally
good value is given in the matter of civilian attire, and the work of the
firm as a whole is well worthy of recommendation.

Charing Cross Hospital appeals for funds to equip five wards for
the wounded soldiers. The sum required is £3,000. The five newly
renovated wa/rds were reopened at the end of last year, and their use
by our soldiers and sailors will in no way interfere with the rights ot
the civil population. Cheques crossed should be made payable to tna
Appeal Secretary, Charing Cross Hos.pital.

Terms of Subscription to
"THE COUNTY GENTLEMAN

AND

LAND AND WATER"

(ESTABLISHED 18G2).

AT HOME— Twelve Months - - - £1 8 0

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The above raUs incluHe all Special Numbers and Poslage.

BACK COPIES of "LAND AND WATER," containing the
series of Articles by HILAIRE BELLOC, "THE WAR BY
LAND": and FRED. T. JANE, "THE WAR BY WATER,"
to-ether with a valuable reference, "THE TOPOGRAPHICAL
GUIDE," can be obtained through any Newsagent, or on
appUcation to the Offices of " LAND AND WATER," Ckntbal

HOUSB, KlNOSWAT, W'.C.

!§•

LAND AND WATER

November 7, 1914

THE ENEMY'S TRENCHES.

By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B., late R.E.

FROM the course the war is taking, it seema most
probable that our attention during the next few
months will be directed to getting the Germans
out of their trenches rather than to digging ourselves
in. Now, the best way of getting them out — to
use an Irishism — is never to give them a chance of making any
trenches to get into.

This seems a counsel of perfection, but it is an idea that has
lain at the base of all ofiensive strategy ever since the days of
Napoleon. His immediate predecessors knew all about field
entrenchments and used them on what, in proportion to thrir
Dumbers, was an even greater scale than their descendants in the
present war. Even in Marlborough's time the French and
Austrians faced one another in fortified lines stretching right
across from the marshes in Flanders to the Rhine at a point a
little east of the town of Weissenburg, and the lines in those days
were far more difficult to assault than now, because they were
of much bigger sections, more deliberately traced, and there was
then no artillery in existence capable of blowing their parapets
and breastworks to pieces.

But Napoleon sacrificed everything to speed of manoeuvre —
marchiBg his men so much farther and faster than his enemy, that
the latter found his lines taken up on one day, completely out-
flanked by the nest morning, and in sheer desperation dropped
the game of entrenching altogether, and tried to meet his enemy
by counter-manoeuvring. Incidentally, I may add, both sides
practically dropped spying altogether as a game hardly worth
the candle.

It seems to me that if the Germans had followed Napoleon's
ideal and spent all the money they had on increasing the mobility
of their troops by all modem appliances, instead of squandering
their resources on " black marias," spies, concrete foundations,
and so forth, they would have come much nearer to success than
they have been throughout this campaign, and presently when
we have begun to shift them out of their trenches, the skill of our
men in repairing roads, devising means even to do without them,
may prove of the utmost value in bringing the campaign to a
more speedy conclusion.

I would suggest to intending inventors that they might
well concentrate on some sort of steel barge or scow which
could reduce its own weight by blowing cut compressed
air on exactly the same principle as an ordinary rocket.

f^ T^fotbr and.

( Air Compressors

^"-^1 I

^ I 1m I ■■■■»■ I ■ mL 1 i-^a^ai*— ■

1 T

y^cu

S) cable Bottom.

Compressed aic chcunbers

Something of this description, the whole resting on rollers, the
axles of which could be raised and lowered by an ordinary
eccentric axle, such as is still in use on the old garrison gun
carriage for running the gun back by hand. Our &h. torpedoes
carry compressed air at 1,000 lb. to the square inch, and it is
astonishing what a lifting power air at this pressure will develop.

Meanwhile, we have got to shift the enemy out of his
trenches first ; and for the moment, thanks to the extraordinary
manner in which we have learnt to utilise the ground, as described
in my last article but one, we seem to have got back into the old
difiSculty which beset our ancesters in the old days when " they
swore terribly in Flanders." They, aa I have said above, had
no artillery power adequate to shift their enemy's breastworks.
We have learnt to get so close up to our enemy that neither ha
nor we can utilise our artillery power either to cover or to attack
each other's works, for you cannot drop high explosive shells
when the trenches are only a coui)le of hundred of yards apart
without endangering both defenders and assailants alike. It is
now a frontal duel between rifles and machine guns on either
side, and neither is adapted for dropping bullets into trenches at
Buch short ranges.

For the moment we have no accepted means of achieving
this end, and must make out by shifts and expedients improvised
on the spot.

It is in these circumstances that intelligent men of any rank
can make their mark. People are only too eager to jump at a
cunning device in such predicaments.

It seems to me that it would be well within the scope of any
man with a workshop training to recreate the old-fashioned
catapult for throv^dng packets or bombs of high explosives out of
improvised material to be found at almost any railway station,
garage, or even a wheelwright's.

Here is the idea :

^Projectile

Radiet wheel

WocdeiL bed plat^

A stout carriage spring with a cup attachment, fixed at A,
is bent down by a wheel and ratchet, and held by a trigger of the
simplest design. Such a contraption would easily throw a
twenty pound weight three or four hundred yards, or for any
distance that might be needed, using more or less compression, and
a shower of such bombs, before a rush with the bayonet, would
maJce all the diiJerence in its chances of success.

Or an adaptation of the old "sap roller" might be
improvised out of one of the big bobbins or reels used for electric
piping, so often seen about the street, and certain to be found
in any of the manufacturing towns about the frontier.

Bulletproof dialn,
or wire from tke
neax'cst coaZ-mine;
crevea telegraph

'Explosive

You place the explosives inside with an electric fuse and
field cable. Wind enough wire or chain around it to make it
bullet proof, then taking the wire from the fuse, wind it outside,
but between the chains, so as to minimise the risk of getting it
cut by a bullet, and let the whole thing roll down hiO upon the
enemy, paying out the electric cable as it goes, and firing it with
the service dynamo exploder just as it lobs into the enemy's
trenches. One hundred pound charge fired in this way would
create a most disconcerting explosion.

If the ground is level or slopes gently upward, another ropa
wound round it from above, down, and round thus, would maka
it run up hill when pulled upon, as in the well-known experiment
of making a bobbin of cotton run away from you by pulling the
thread towards you.

THB DIRECTION OP MOTION Or TEH BOBBIN.

I merely throw out these suggestions to induce the young
men joining the New Armies to think, for these things must bo
done on the spot. There is no time for Headquarters to go into
them, and settle on sealed patterns. The whole essence of this
kind of warfare is to " get there " without asking questions or
waiting for formal authority. If a man makes a blunder, of
course he must take the consequences, as in any other walk of
life, but " initiative " is nowadays treasured as a most precious
possession, and in siege work it has always found its best chance.

16«

November 14, 1914

LAND AND WATER

THE WAR BY LAND,

By HILAIRE BELLOG.

KOTE.— THIS AETICLB HAS EKEN ECBMriTED TO THE PRESS BUREAU, WHICH DOES NOT OBJECT TO THB njBLlCATIOK AS CKK80EW>
AND TAJOeS NO KESPONSIBILITY FOB THE COEEECTNKSS OF THE BTATKllKXTS.

IM ACCOKDAKCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE TRESS EUREAC, THB POSITIONS OF TBOCPS OX PLASS liLnSTRATINO THIS
AEIICLK MUST OKLY EJC EEGAREED AS APPEOXIJIATE, AND NO DEFINITE STRENGTH AT ANT POINT IS INDICATED.

"PRESSURE."

WHEN nations conflict in war they bring
armies one against the other, and the
first object of strategy for each army
is to disarm, in as high a degree as
possible, the other.
But there is a second, subsidiary object alwa3's
present in warfai-e between civilised nations, wliich
indii-ectly leads to the same result, and that object is
tlie putting of a political and economic " pressiu'e "
upon the enemy.

For instance: The German attack in 1870 was
directed upon Paris, and rightly : not because Paris
was an arm}'-, but because with Paris taken French
resistance was almost bound to cease.

Now there is in modern Germany no centre
corresponding to Pjiris, and thereforc no coi-re-
sponding political objective.

But look for a moment at the accomjianying
sketch.

^^ Main Industrial Regions
-.>•«* Frontier of German Empire
A A Western German Battle Line
BB Eastern

Germany is a nation which has chosen in our
cvra generation to induslrialisc itseK ; that is, to
convert the main part of its energies from agriculture
to capitalistic modern manufacture by machinery,
notably of metal goods.

There has accompanied this phenomenon what
always accompanies it : the nation's reposing upon an
urban poj^ulation of lower physique than of old ;
its dependence for all information upon a centralised
Press in the hands of a few capitalists ; a va-st
proletarian mass, impotent to organise itself or to
act with civic initiative — and an absolute physical
necessity of kecking the machinery going.

If an industrialised country be suddenly con-
demned to use its agricultural resources alone, it is
wounded to death.

In an extreme case, like that of England, it will
not even be able to feed itself with the first and most
necessary forms of food. It wiU not have enough
hread to keep aHve. Germany is not yet in this case ;
yet it suffers in the second degree, which is, that a
blow at its industrial districts deprives the mass of its
population of their common habit of life and cuts all
the channels whereby, within their experience, liveli-
hood can be maintained. You may feed the towns,
if industry decays, so long as you stQl have (as Germany
has) a remaining sufficient agricultural population.
But even the mere feeding of them would require
suddenly organised, vastly competent, entu-ely cen-
tralised control — and the destruction, of course, of all
the old bonds of property and credit. Food would have
to be taken by force and distributed by officials — to
perform the task fully would certainly be too hard,
even for the most humanly perfect organisation. The
striking at the industrial districts would hamstrijig
the whole nation in the matter of food distribution
alone : e.g., Belgium (in spite of vast emigration and
small size) to-day.

But there is more than this. The industrial
districts collect the cm-rency (and its control) in great
depots. Outside them, only the capital and the main
seaports have great depots of controlled currency.

Again, the industrial districts provide the opinion,
spontaneous or manufactui-ed, upon which the govern-
ment of such countries reposes.

Again, the industrial districts make a mass of
things which the nation has learnt to regard as neces-
saries, and which, in some cases, are necessaries —
especially to the conduct of a campaign. They make
the rails and the locomotives and the wagons, the
internal-combustion engines, the electrical apparatus,
the corn mills, the spinning and weaving machinery,
and at certain few spots in them you find concentrated
the only available plant for making the guns and
explosives.

Now it so happens that the German Empire has its
two main industrial districts precisely in those regions
which the first shock of an invasion icill strike. Eoughly
speaking, you have (1) the Westphalian and Western
group — extending into LoiTaine — and (2) the Silesian
Eastern group. There is much intermediary; but
those two districts are the two nerve-centres, the dual
poles, of modern industrial Germany.

Defending Westphalia you have, when the tide
shall turn against the Germans in the West and tlie
deadlock there shall break, successive lines of defenct-^
natural and artificial. It may be suggested that a
first obvious line, for instance, is through and defend,
ing Antwerp, then Bnissels, to Namur, and so up the
Mouse. Another and shorter could run througV
and in front of Liege along the Belgian Aisne and

LAND AND WATEE

November 14, 1914

across the Luxembourg liiglilands down to the Upper
Moselle. Another, but longer cue, would be the
Ehiue. Before this last one is reached one outlier of
the western industrial field, that in Lorraine, would
be lost. But at any rate, from the very beghming of
the setback, something upon which modern Germany
immediately depends for existence, moral and physical,
is in peril. The ruin of AVestphalia \vould mean a
hundred times more in this war than the occupation
of Berlin ; and it is possible that the near future will
see Berlin occupied and yet the war not at its
conclusion.

But if this "pressure" threatens abead}' upon
the West, far more does it threaten upon the East.
Silesia is actually adjacent to, coterminous with, the
enemy's frontier. The thickest knot of manufactories
lies just on that point ^^here the three Empires meet ;
not a day's march from, nor half a day's march from,
the frontier of Eussian Poland, but actually on that
fi'ontier. And behind this most vulnerable belt lies
belt after belt back on to the mountains, making uji
the whole industrial region of the Upper Oder valley.

It is true that a blow at Silesia would not be the
game thing as a blow at AVestphalia. To take but
one point ; armament is manufactured wholly in the
western field. There only is found the plant required.
Krupp is in the AVest, and so is Erhard and Sehnier
(who, by the way, make not only for Genuany, but for
Austria, and forge gun-barrels for Krupp as well).
The (rerman output of heavy guns, the plant for which
is about equal to that of France and England combined,
proceeds from, and can only proceed from, this vulner-
able centre in the West. The French centres of such
production are very far removed from the advance of
armies : The English ones are defended by the sea
and by the Fleet.

To sum up : defeating the German armies in the
field, disarming them, is indeed the principal business of
the Allied strategy ; but a secondary and allied object is
the destruction of the maimfacturing provinces. And
these centres are not in the heart of Germany, but on
its borders, so far as this war is concerned. The two
German battle-lines in East and West are drawn up to
cover as long as may be — and are already perilously
close to ! — the vital parts.

This, coupled with the importance to the German
Government of keeping the war off German soil, gives
all its meaning in particular to the present Eussian
advance and to the Eastern campaign.

As the Eussian advance, right up to the Silesian
frontiers, has been the featm-e of the past week, and
as the Eastern field of war is still (as I IiaA-e constantly
insisted in these notes) the determining field of the
war, I will deal first again this week with the opera-
tions in Poland.

11.

THE OPERATIONS IN POLAND.

Three things are required for an appreciation of
the operations in Poland dm-ing the last week. First,
some dear conception of the rate and positions of the
Eussian advance. Secondly, the nature and extent of
the Austro-German reverse. Thirdly, some estimate
of the chances the Germans have of entrenching and
standing ujwn this side of their frontier.

As to the first of these points, we have accurate
information, and that information concerns, as through-
out this Eastern campaign, two main fields of war : A,
the East Prussian frontier, and B, the basin of the
Vistula ; while the latter is naturally subdivided iuto
the Eussian effort in front of AYarsaw and on the
middle A'istula (B-1) where it has principally to

NOOMIR

'^-•^. FRONTIER.

THK BATTLE FRONT IN THE KASTKEK AREA.

meet German troops ; and (B-2) the Eussian effort
in front of Randomir and on the Eiver San, where it
has principally to meet Austrian troops.

THE OPERATIONS IN EAST PRUSSIA.

^,^'^'^'^_^!^^^itbMzn

^^^

Suwatki
S.BakiUrjlifiia'iJ

Scute^Mitts

As to the first of these, the East Prussian
frontier :

The struggle between the comparatively small
bodies engaged (comparatively small in relation to
such a war as this : they are larger than anything
that Napoleon met in any one field before 1812) is
still almost coincident with the frontier between the
two nations, and the reason of this coincidence I
explained last week. It lies in the all-important
political necessity under which the Prussians are of
keeping the war as long as possible off German soil.
Both the Eussian communiques, though they only
give one side of the story, and the map (which is
more impartial), show some slight retrocession in the
German defensive line. When Bakalarshewo was

Novemljcr 14, 1914

la:nd and water

taken by the Russians at tlic beginning of last week,
that point, still in Russian soil, marked but a slight
advance. But since then the frontier has been crossed
in front of the frontier station of Wirballen, and the
Russian advance guards have reached Stalluponen. It
is quite a short distance — ^less than a day's march — ■
and we have yet to see how far it can be followed up.
But it is significant for two reasons. Eirst, because the
German comuiuniques have for some weeks j^ast insisted
upon the Russian attempt to take AVirballen with its en-
trenched positions, and upon the Russian failure in this
attempt on the German left flank. Secondly, because the
advance is along that main line of railway Avhich also
marked the first abortive Russian invasion at the
beginning of the war. Another two days' march on
is Gumbinnen on the same line, about 25 miles
from the frontier. Yet another two .days' march
forward is lusterburg — and all that country is not
Polish, but distinctively German. We have yet to
see how far the advance along this main line of
railway can continue, but every mile of it tunis the
general German line on this frontier, and goes through
the more open country north of the lakes, avoiding
that danger of marsh and fortified defiles in which
the Russians suffered their great defeat of the end
of August and early September. All along the rest
of this frontier there appear to be but little changes.
There is the usual pressure and counter-pressure in
front of Lyck, but no indication of any permanent
foothold here upon Gemian soil. The same is true
of the neighbourhood of Biidla, and of the cavalry
movement to the north of illawa along the second
of the two railway lines which cut the south frontier
of East Prussia.

As to the short phrase about the forest of
Rominten contained in the Russian communique of
last Monday, it does indicate cavalry raids, perhaps,
into the hunting grounds of the German Emperor,
but as yet no occupation. In general, one may say
that all along the horseshoe of this frontier there is
now such pressm-e on the Germans that they are
slowly receding — but very slowly.

THE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE
MAIN AUSTRO - GERMAN FORGES
IN THE BASIN OF THE VISTULA

AND THE SAN.

WARSAW

S^tidoww^

PR2fMra

.CO ^Miv_5

'V%^

Miles

Upon the main operations on a much larger
Bca1o in South Poland we have equally detailed infor-
mation. The Russian advance lias throughout the
week been consistent and rapid ; the cavahy following

up the German retirement closely, and the prolonged
Austrian resistance upon the San having now definitely
broken down. There seems even a probability that a
wedge may have been driven not, indeed, into the two
halves of the main Austro-German force A — A (as at
D), retiring upon the Vistula westward through
Russian Poland — a hi-eaeh which was thought possible
la.st week (I said at the time we had no real evidence of
it), but at C between these forces, as a whole, and the
purely Austrian group in Galicia. For while thcmas3
of the retreating invaders is pressed along the lines
marked A — A on the above map, the Austrian bodies,
which have hung on rather too long to the line of the
San, are evidently behind or Eastward of the line of
that retreat, in a position more like B — B, and
advance bodies of the Russian pursuit have already
reached C. Whether the Austrian bodies at B — B,
which ai-e falling back from the San, will be cut off —
or any part of them — we cannot yet tell. They have
the Carpathians behind them with roads and railways for
crossing those mountains ; but they have only a few
such opportunities for crossing through what will be, for
such considerable forces, narrow and congested defiles.
If they attempt to pursue the course which plain
strategy demands, to retire upon Cracow, and try to
keep in line with the main Austro-German body A — A
north of the Vistula, then their extreme Eastern
contingents will have a very hard task set them to fall
back with sufficient rapidity. The main Galician
railway from Lemberg to Cracow is not available for
this Eastern part of the Austrian host, and it is
difiicult to see how it can escape being cut off if it
now, so late, attempts a Westward retirement upon
Cracow. It looks as though the chances were for the
follov/ing situation to develop : —

For one extreme of the line B — B (the Western
and Northern extreme) to fall back Westward, in
touch with A — A, stand at Cracow and take part in
the coming general battle which the Germans must
deliver if they are to save Silesia ; while the other
extreme, the Eastern and Southern one, will get back
as best it can Southward across the Carpathians. In
war never prophesy ; but that seems the more likely
of the various developments open to the situation ; the
division (at last !) of one of the enemy's lines and a
full breach therein driven through Western Galicia.

Having said so much let us consider in rather
more detail the operations against, and the retirement
•of, the main Austro-German body through Russian
Poland towards the German frontier.

B (1)

THE OPERATIONS TOWARDS THE
FRONTIER BETWEEN RUSSIAN-
POLAND AND SILESIA.

Wlienthe German invaders were defeated in front
of Warsaw three weeks ago, their line, which was
attempting to cross the middle Vistula at the points
marked A A A A on the following map, was obviously
turned, and they had to begin to fall back. The Austro-
German forces thus fallin-g back pivoted at first upon
Sandomir. Their colleagues, indeed, beyond the Vistula
and along the River San, hung on to that line of offence,
but ///."^retreated (to the number of at least 800,000
and perhaps a million) in a great sweep tovrards the AVest.
The marching wing of this swinging line successively
abandoned Skienicwice and Lodz, and the country to
the North of Lodz. A week ago the middle of that
wing v/as still falling back from and evacuating
Sdunskowola, relying everywhere for its retreat upon
the main railway which passes through Kalisz and

LAND AND WATEE

November 14, 1914

THORN)^,;..^^^^

J'OSENjfe/f

C-

^ ^^

r^-A

^.WARSAW

x:^

iZdunskawola ■

RodoiR

XS^

Railways i » i >

r*~y^

''<*,

2i^*r^^

^^--^^ — ^CRACOW

60 enters Gemian territorv. The extreme north of 1

this line touched the Warta near Kolo. The south
of it passed througli Czestochowa, and was thence
continued to the neighbourhood of Cracow.

The southern part of the whole line thus falling
back similarly relied upon a line of railway, that
running from Ivano^orod throuarh Eadom and Kielce
to the placewhere the three Empires meet. The extreme
south-eastern end of it stiU hung on to Sandomir.
Apparently the order for the Austrian and German
forces to retii-e as a whole from the Vistula and the
San together was either not suggested, or not given, or
if given, not obeyed ; and the enemy was still clinging
to Sandomir at the junction of the two rivers on the
same day (November 3rd) which saw his expulsion
from Kielce (at which place he lost a certain number
of prisoners and machine guns).

It was precisely because he had hung on to
Sandomir so long that the capture of this place by
the Russians became of such great importance.

It is evident from the sketch map above that
after Sandomir was taken last Tuesday v;eek the
southernmost bodies of the Austro-Gerraan forces in
the neighbourhood of Sandomir had all to cross the
Vistula southwai-d in the direction of the arrows
C C C, with the exception of some small portion
that may have been able to retire directly south-
westward in the direction of the arrow B ; while the
main part of this southern group near Kielce u.sed
the railway for their retirement. The liussian cavalry
pushed forward and, on November 6th, last Friday,
had crossed the Eiver Nida, and the next day,
Saturday, the Eiver Nidi.sca, 10 miles further on. On
that da}- the Austro-Germau line north of the-Vistula

lad been pushed back to some such front as is
indicated upon the map by the line of dashes,
stretching from the neighbourhood of Ploeschen to the
positions in front of Cracow, and was presumably
continued somewhat south of the Vistula in tiie
direction I have indicated by an interrogation mark.
The whole Austro-German reti-eat was now back upon
an averagre more than a hundred miles from the
line of the Vistula, which it had attemped to force
three weeks before.

But it had left, dangerously far to the eastward,
along the Hirer San, the remainder of the Austrian
forces irhich should have l-ej)* in line with this retreat.
V/ith the effect of that too prolonged delay upon the
San I will deal in a moment. But before leaving
this maia subject of the German retreat from the
Vistula we have to ask ourselves, first, how far the
Austro-German force has suffered in this retreat, and,
secondly, where this retreat is likely to end and a
German stand to be made against the Eussian
tide, with the chances of success that stand may
have.

As to the first of these questions : The answer
must be that the German retreat has been orderly
and apparently inexpensive. What losses it has
involved in killed and wounded we do not know, but
there is no Eussian account of any considerable
capture here of prisoners or of guns. It is, as might
be expected, the southern part of the general retirement
— where the Austrian were the princii^al contingents —
tliat has suffered most heavily. But even tliere the
losses of the enemy, chiefly in front of Kielce — which
was defended apparently too long — were insignificant
compared with their total forces.

Kovember 14, 1914

LAND AND WATEB

We may sum up and say tliat the German retreat
ilirougli Eussian Poland, from the middle Vistula — ■
Warsaw — Sandomir, has been conducted by the enemy
in perfect order and with success.

When we ask ourselves the second question,
where the stand will we made — and a stand must be
made if industrial Silesia is not to be immediately
invaded — we are, of course, on more doubtful ground,
and we can only put the matter hypothetically and in
the shape of alternatives.

At first it was taken for granted that the Germans
would stand, where they had entrenched, on the line of
the Eiver Waiia, carrying the entrenchments from
Kolo northward to the Vistula at the fortress of Thorn
by a series of ditches across country. We know from
our experience in the West that it is the German habit
in this war to send back forces behind a retirement to
prepare a position, and there at the end of the retire-
ment to stand. This is what they did upon the Aisne
after their retreat had fallen back from the line Paris-
Verdun to its present line. But there are certain
factors in this case which might modify such a
scheme.

In the first place there is no series of heights
dominating the Warta (in its middle part at least) as
there is a series dominating the course of the Aisne.
In the second place the conditions of soil and of season
are not so favourable as they were in northern France
two months ago. The trenches along the Aisne and
across Champagne were made through chalky soil.
A gi-eat part of western Poland is marshy. In the
third place — and this is much the most important point
— the Germans have before them in western Poland
an enemy already superior in numbers and growing
more numerous with every week.

That last is really the capital difference of all.
"^Vhat the Germans could do in Champagne against
numbers which were still inferior to their own, they
cannot hope to do in Poland against superior forces.
To stand on the Warta — which they stiU may do,
but which seems increasingly unlikely^ — -would mean
the holding of a very long line any part of which (and
particularly the part noi-th of Kolo) might be pierced
by detenuined Pussian effort.

Next let us note that there is no railway facility
just behind the Wai-ta. There is only one transverse
iine leadmg to Kalisch, whereas there is a strategic
i-aUway running all along behind and parallel to the
frontier from the fortress of Posen, to the point
where the three Empires meet. This line could
feed all the frontier position. Now heavy artillery
needs a railway for its constant and prolonged
supply. Further, this frontier is from the point
marked D upon the map to the point marked E,
a river (the Eiver Prosna). What oppoi-tunities it
offers for defence I do not know, for I have neither
seen it nor read any work upon it, but it is at any rate
a continuous water-course suggesting a line of defence.
And I now cannot but believe that the most likely
jjlace for the Germans to make a stand will rather be
near, or upon, their own political frontier than along
the Eiver Warta.

There is further evidence of this in the fact that
though the Germans tell us that the Eussian cavalry
attempting to cross the Warta at Kolo was thrown
back across the stream, yet hvo days later the Eussian
official communique tells us that a body of their cavalry
was another forty miles on raiding across the German
frontier as far as the railway station of Plocschen,
Avliich is situated upon that very strategic railway,
just behind and along the frontier, to which reference
has been made.

That a stand will be made somewhere in thia
neighbourhood — if not along the Warta, then at any
rate somewhere near the frontier — is, as I have
repeated, a certainty ; because it is absolutely essential
to the Prussian scheme to save Silesia.

I have already poiuted out how Prussian strategy
will inevitably be fettered in the later phases of this
campaign by the political necessity of keeping the war,
if possible, off German soil. The moment you interfere
with the purely strategic elements of a problem by
any political consideration, to that extent you weaken
yourself. But the Genuan Government has here no
choice. After the behaviour of the German armies in
the West the reprisals that would inevitably begin
upon an occupation of German soil by an enemy would
have a quite incalculable effect upon the temper of the
nation, and the rich industrial district of Silesia would
offer opportunities as great for the exercising of this
" pressure " as any part of the Empire.

There would be less anxiety at first for the non-
German districts to the north. Posen and all its
province are Polish; and it is almost certain that,
what with the strength of the fortress of Posen itself
and with the all-importance of keeping the Eussians
out of Silesia, a great battle must be fought to cover
that district even at the risk of abandoning the provinces
of Posen to the north.

It is on this account that we should be very chary
of accepting stories about the immediate intention of
the Germans to despatch men to the Western field of
war from the East. If they weaken their Eastern
frontier and if Silesia is invaded nothing that happens
in the West can compensate them for the effects that
will immediately follow. Let it be further remem-
bered that if Silesia is once invaded, the line of the
Oder (a shallow stream in any case) is turned, and the
Oder runs so far westward that in its lower reaches it
is but four days' march from Berlin. It is true to
say that the German defensive plan has never allowed
for the turning from the South of the Eastern defen-
sive river lines of Germany, and it is now precisely
from the South that these lines are in danger of

being turned.

B (2)

THE OPERATIONS UPON THE SAN.

rJAROSLAV

CRACOW
O 20 40 60 100 ^"''^"<^ V

-Miles

W.9.

"i^M'',

Meanwhile, as we have seen, the remaining
Austrian operations in the valley of the San have
great importance because it seems certain that the
enemy here has hung on too long.

In the above sketch map the position wiU be
apparent. The Austrians made a very vigorous
effoi't to caiTy the line of the San, to relieve Przemysl,
and to advance upon Lemberg. It was their counter-

LAND AND WATER

November 14, 1914

offensive following upon their defeats in the beginning
of September ; and that eonnter-offensive was made
possible by the withdrawal of Russian forces north-
wai-d to meet the great main German attack upon the
middle Vistula. At first it looked as though this
effort ujwu the San was going to be successful. It
had (supposing the German plan had come off, sup})os-
ing Warsaw had been taken and the middle Vistula
held) a high strategic value. The forcing of the line
of the San, the relief of Przemysl, and the threatening
of Lemberg would obviously have tuinod the Russian
south end or left ; and this Russian left was at first
weak from the withdrawal northward of the forces I
have named.

But Russian reinforcements were perpetually com-
ing u]) upon the San from the interior, and at the same
time the German effort upon the Vistula broke down.
The moment it broke down it was strategically necessary
for the Austrian forces that had been trying to cross
the San (and had in some jjlaces succeeded), and
had also successfully pushed forward across the
Carpathians along the arrows A — A towards Lemberg,
to fall back at once into line with the Austro-German
retreat to the north. For some reason or other this
retirement was not effected ; at any rate it was not
effected with sufficient rapidity. There were Austrians
still at Jaroslav and roughly along the line B — ^B at a
moment when the Russian advance beyond the Vistula
had already reached the line C — C, which is that of
the River Nidisca. It is here that the capital
importance of the capture of Sandomir by the Russians
last Tuesday week is apparent. It gave them a chance
of cutting off a portion at least of tiie Austrian forces.
The now lai'gely increased Russian bodies on the San
made good their crossings at Nisko and Rudnik and
before Leheisk. By last Sunday they had got into
Jaroslav, and it is fairly certain that they have already
completely reinvested Przemysl. Their main line in
Galicia was on Monday last less than 100 miles from
Cracow and their cavaliy in Russian Poland less than
30 jniles from that fortress.

Further, there has been on this front a real
success in the way of harrying the Austrian retreat.
The official communique gives 12,000 jDrisoners taken
along the San and, though apparently no guns, a
certain number of maxims.

I should here perhaps explain to the reader why
I have not counted either, in describing the retreat of
the Austro-Germans from the Vistula as orderly,
Eeuter's report of nearly 10,000 men taken prisoners by
the Russians, with forty guns, or the report from Rome
of 200 guns taken on the San with 25,000 prisoners.
My reason is, not that these accounts may not
be true or based upon truth, but simply that they are
no part of the official communiques. News received
from any other source than the official communiques
must, for the pm-poses of an accurate judgment, be
closely checked. Sometimes it vividly illustrates some
hypothesis upon which there are other converging
lines of proof ; sometimes, by some accident, it betrays
a useful and unexpected bit of knowledge. But mere
rumours of losses like these should always be looked
at with reserve and compared with the declarations of
the General Staff. And all that we have from the
Russian General Staff at the moment of writing is
the announcement of 12,000 Austrian prisoners ui)on
the San, with no mention of field pieces or howitzers.

German forces there are strictly on the defensive;
the Russian forces are evidently increasing, and the
frontier has been just crossed at the point where the
main international line cuts it.

(B) The main operations in the South have gone
steadily in favour of the Russians, and while there
has been, apparently, no cutting of the chief German
line north of the Vistula, it is possible that certain
of the Au.strian forces in Galicia will be cut off from
that chief line.

Meanwhile [B (1)] the main Austro-German force,
which has been retreating through Russian-Poland,
will be compelled immediately to give battle, probably
well behind the line of the Warta and nearer the
line of the frontier, on peril of losing Silesia. This
main enony force in Poland is still intact and has
retreated with success, though with rapidity.

But [B (2)] the corresponding Austrian effort
along tlie San, which was the prolongation of tlie line
through Russian-Poland, has also failed, with less
order in its retreat. ]\Iany prisoners have been lost ;
and there seems a probability of this body being cut
oft" from the main body in Russian-Poland beyond
the Vistula, or at the least of the eastern portion
being cut off unless it can escape across the
Carpathians, in which case it will still be divided
from the main body.

So much for the campaign in the Eastern field,
which is still the decisive one in the campaign. The
Western operations, though more vitally near to-
om-selves, have, for the moment, less interest, and
ma}^ be more briefly told.

in.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST.

We may sum up and say that so far as the

operations in the Eastern field of war are concerned : —

(A) The East Prussian frontier is still held ; the

ombexrtzyde A

Tfwurout
fDixmiide

HouleTV

itsifAendaek

GReluvelt
'illebelie

9
ROUBAIX0
mULLE

^Za'Bassee Q

VOUAI

ARRAS <

VII

JS^vcmber 14, 1914

LAND AND WATEE

The campaign in the West has proved tiirough-
out all the last few days so complete a deadlock that
there is verv little more that can be usefully said upon
it at the moment of writing this, Tuesdiiy evening.
But it may be of service to recall the general features
of the Allied line between Arras and the North Sea,
and to show where the main effort is now falling.

In the foregoing map that line is approximately
given. It runs from in front of Nieuport, cuts the
Yser Canal, recrosses it again in fi'ont of Dixmude,
makes a bulge round Ypres, with another bulge round
Armentiferes, and then suffers a cousiderable and
significant sag between La Bassee and Bethune.

It has sufficiently been explained in these notes
that to capture the whole north coast of France, to
uncover Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, and to be the master
of the Straits opposite Dover, a successful "bolt " di-iven
through the point C at La Bassee would have had all
the effect required. The Allied forces to the north of
that point woidd hardly have escaped if the Germans
had broken the line between La Bassee and Bethune,
Such a success would further have put immediately
into German hands the two junctions of Hazebrouck
and Bethune (X — X) from which no fewer than four

lines of railway were available for the advance up(m

the sea-coast to Dunkirk, to Calais, and to Boulogne
itself. "\Ve have further seen in these notes how,
instead of concenti'ating aU their strength upon this
" bolt " at La Bass6e, a furious attempt, lasting for
nearly a fortnight, inviting defeat and finally
suffermg such defeat, was made by the Gei-mans uj^oa
the front between Dixmude and Nieu^jort at A. Tl»e
line of the Yser Canal was ultimately forced by the
Gennans, at an expense in killed and wounded of tlie
equivalent at least of an army corps ; but they could
do nothing upon the further side, and were flooded
out. This attempt has now been abandoned.

But even so, the enemy has not concentrated,
as one would think he should have, upon La
Bassee. He has again divided his forces, and main-
taining very considerable strength at La Bassee,
he ^has poured masses of men against the Ypres
salient at B.

He has somewhat piished in this salient, but he
has not quite flattened it out. By last advices
received, he was not in Ypres, though he was shelling
it, and the Allied forces still successfully contained
the attack.

LAND AND WATEE

Noven»"bcr 14, 1914

Tlie nearest point wliicli the enemy seems to have
seized in this converging attack upon Ypres is ihe
little village in the belt of woods marked upon the
accompanying map of tlic neighbourhood of Ypres,
Klein Zillcbeke. But from this village he has been
driven out again. The line, roughly speaking,
is now one with a radius of about 4 miles fi'om
Ypres, and the battle still presents the successive
features with which we are so familiar upon this
front — of a violent attack by the enemy in numbers
greatly superior to the local defences, of his initial
success over a belt of from 5 to 3 miles, and then of the
pinning of him — after losses anything between two
and three times our own. Not that the Allied losses
in this field have not been exceedingly heavy — all the
official communiques insist upon that. But, from the
nature of the attack and from the vast accumulation of
force which the enemy made for it, we can be quite
certain that his loss was far superior to ours.

Beyond the approximate trace of the allied line
contained in these notes, there is nothing to be said
upon the Western field of war at the moment of
writing — save that the great concentration of men
which the enemy were reported to be making for a
fuiiher attack in Flanders has apparently been halted
by news from the eastern field of war.

There has been so much wild talk about the
movement of men from east to west and from west to
cast by the Germans that one hesitates to believe any
of it ; but in this case, not only is the evidence fairly
good, or at any rate voluminous, but there is for once
a probability in favour of what is alleged.

It is ])erfectly possible and even probable that,
"when the Kussian pressure was found to be moie
severe than had been anticip<ated, and when,
apparently, it was no longer thought possible to
hold the line of the Warta, the Germans felt a real
danger in that field menacing the two cardinal points
of their military policy — the keeping of the war off
German soil and the saving of the industrial districts.
And it is, therefore, credible that a movement of
troojos from west to east, a change in the plan of
bringing overwhelming forces to the west (a plan
made only a Aveek ago), has taken place ; in which
case we have yet another confirmation of the general
truth that the deciding factor of the whole European
campaign is still to be found in Poland.

I would conclude with two notes on subjects
equally important to a just estimate of the camj)aign.
The fii-st is the question of German supply and of the
effect on it of British sea-power, the second the German
statement of our losses by caj^ture.

THE QUESTION OF GERMAN
SUPPLY.

It is obvious that the chief effect of British sea-
power in tliis war and its chief advantage to the Allies
has been the virtual blockade it has established against
the enemy. That blockade is not absolute, because
there are neutral countries through which, though
with difliculty, the encmj' can receive supplies. But
Avhen the amount of these supplies becomes abnormal —
that is wlicn the neutral country is importing obviously
far more than it can possibly want for itself — suspicion
on the part of the blockaders is sufliciently strong to
warrant very strict search, and even to interfere with
such supply. It is this conclusion, for instance, which
has led to the closing of the North Sea.

On the other hand, no sea blockade is of eff\^ct in
preventing tJie export of military necessities from
jidjaccut neutral countries into the enemy's territory,

when these products are to be discovered in the
neutral countries themselves.

Let us consider what it is that Germany most
needs m the way of foreign supply, and discover how
far the blockade affects her.

There are obviously two great categories into
which supply from abroad will fall: (1) material
directly required for war, (2) material only indirectly
necessary for a nation at war.

I. — Under (1) we have: —

(a) Copper.

(b) Petrol.

(d) Certain chemicals necessary for
the manufacture of high ex-
plosives— notably nitrates.

(e) A certain proportion of food and
of fabrics for the feeding and
clothing of the troops.

(f) Horses.

Now of these six, only three, (b) (c) and (f), are
appreciably affected by the blockade. The chemicals
(d), which the enemy needs for his high explosives, the
nitrates, he can obtain from the great works in Norway
(German owned), and from his own works. Nitrogen
is universal.

And here by the way it is worth remarking that
the talk about the Germans having some special new
explosive, more powerful than that of the French, is
gi'eat nonsense. If anything the French explo.sives
have a superiority, and this is worth remembering
when we consider that most of the work done against
permanent fortifications by the Germans has not been
done with howitzers over Sin. calibre, and the largest
of those which have done any prolonged and effective
work have been the llin. But to return to supply.

The small amount of copper («) required for
shells can probably continue to be smuggled in. It
is true that the total amount available from ore in the
enemy's o\vn teiTitory and in adjacent neutral countries
(such as Sweden) is not 15 per cent, of the normal
supply necessary to German industry, but it is ample
for the mere manufacture of those bands which
are a necessity to projectiles used in modern rifled
cannon.

Food and fabric Gemaany can certainly discover
— or rather, Germany and Austria combined — so long
as German territory itself is intact. That last phrase
is of course essential.

But with {d) petrol, (/) horses, and (c) rubber,
the case is different. Let us take them separately.

The supply of //orses for German armament
depended to some extent upon perpetual purchase in
France and the British Isles — notably Ireland.
Nothing is wasted more la\'ishly in war than horse-
flesh. Nothing can replace horseflesh for traction,
however much competent critics may quarrel as to the
role of cavalry. Petrol will replace traction upon
good roads, but you cannot handle an anny, and
esjjecially its lighter artillery, without a constant
supply of horses. Nor will the most convinced critic
of modern cavalry deny its role altogether, especially
in the later stages of the war. Now it is true that, of
the two Allies, Austria can provide some reserve of
horses, but not enough. Gei-many certainly cannot.
Eussia will not ; France and England will not ; nor
\s ill they be imported. The Germans happen to have
been particularly lavish in their expenditure of horse-
flesh in the first months of the war; and it is as
certain as anything can be that the shortage in horses
is already felt, and will very soon be severely felt»
by the enemy.

25'ovember 14, 1914

LAND AND WATER

The question of (5) petrol is much more compli-
cated. In the first place, large stocks have already
been accumulated through import by way of neutral
countries. Tn the second place, there is a supply within
the enemy's territory, from the middle Carpathians —
what are called the Galician oil-iields. It is probable
that at the moment of writing, a part of these are
already occupied by the Eussian invasion ; but they
are not yet all occupied. Further, there is a supply
from Romnania, the lirms importing the petrol from
this district being in German hands ; and as the supply
lies in the southern pai-t of the frontier between
Hungary and Itoumania, it should be long before
Eussian action could cut it off. Of the political
accidents which may restrict this supply in the future,
or may already ha\'e restricted it, I say nothing. I
take the thing at its worst and conclude that the enemy
still luis a supply from the Galician field (though now
restricted) and a full supply from the Eoumanian field.
But even so, the shortage of petrol is already felt by the
enemy. There are various indications of this ; some
public, such as the sudden and rather desperafe
expedients used for foreign import ; some private, not
to be published, and in my opinion even more cori-
c'lusive. It must be remembered that, especially in
the western field of war, the Germans have been utterly
spendthrift of this necessity. To use it regardless of
the future was all of a piece with that original claim
or plan which envisaged an overv/helming, successful
and immediate blow against France before autumn
had arrived.

But there is a material, benzol, a by-product of
coke and of the smelting work in Germany Avhich,
though not always with the same type of engine,
could in part rejjlace petrol. The inexhaustible
mining industry of Germany w^ould provide it.
Unless, however, coal is to be used for this purpose
alone, there is a restriction in the supply through the
shutting down of so much of the metal industry. In
August only 30 per cent, of the normal smelting was
going on in the German Empire. To-day it must be
very much less.

One may sum up and say that of petrol, and
even of a substitute for petrol, there is alieady a
shortage, and that before next April, at the \etj latest
—on condition that the blockade can be maintained
strictly to that date— the shoi-tage will be so severely
felt as to affect the whole operation of the war.

Now as to (c) rubber. Here there is necessarily
a shoi-tage of a peculiarly dangerous sort. Eubber
does not keep. The wastage is enormous, especially
(I) through the climatic conditions of winter (2)
through the increasinor badness of the roads as the
campaign proceeds ; and the shortage is akeady very
severely felt. No rubber will reach the enemy
territory so long as the British blockade is maintained.
There is, of course, a large supply in the control of the
Dutch, from their colonies (as there is of oil), but the
normal imjiorts and exports of a neutral are easily
measured. Of all necessities in modern war this
one of rubber is that which will perhaps be first and
most seriously curtailed, and it is that lack which
tlie enemy will first severely feel.

2.— Now for the second category, the materials
which only indirectly subserve an ai-my. They fall
into two categories : («) the material which directly
supports a population — its food, clothing, building
material, &c. ; {b) the material which is necessary to
the continued industry of an industrial country and
lacking which you create a gi-eat strain of unemploy-
ment. As to the first : —

(a) The enemy's population can feed itself : of
that there is little doubt. Tiie existing stocks are
sufficient for a year's supply, and, though the areas of
supi^ly coidd be occupied by the enemy, the population,
even urban, inhabiting those areas, will .still be fed.

The same is not quite so true of fabrics, for
fabrics are confined to the industrial regions of the
AVest and of the East, and it is precisely these that
will feel the first shock of invasion, as we have seen in
discussing the threat to Silesia. But we may fairly
say that economic pressure will hardly come upon the
enemy in the form of any severe restriction of his food
or clothing, and his material for housing is of course
ample.

[b) But when we come to materials necessary to
his industry it is another matter. Here you have a
whole host of things besides those which are directly
useful as material to an armed force. And of those
which are also useful to an armed force, many are
necessary to industry as well. Take, for example, copper.
For an ounce of this that you may need in the army,
you want a gi-eat deal more than a pound for the vast
electrical industry of Germany. Further note that
this electrical industry is largely centred in the capital,
Berlin, upon the temper of which so very much depends.
It is true that Germany has within her own territory
vast stores of iron and of coal : but, for the rest, the
mass of her industry is supported, as is that of all
industrialised Europe, on imports of material from
over sea ; aiid when those imports fail Germany, her
manufactories shiit down. Note that this factor of
" unemployment " is modified first by the fact that
the great bulk of those employed will be used as
soldiers, and secondly by the fact that it is not in any
absolute economic sense necessari/, even to an industrial
nation at war, that it should continue to be industrially
producing, unless^ indeed, it can only get its food
(as we do) by exporting tlie manufactured material.
Germany can live, though hardly, without exporting
manufactured material to pay for food.

But though there is no absolute necessity in pure
economic theory for Germany to fail through unem-
ployment, there is something pretty well amounting
to a necessity. AVhen the older men and the lads and
the women are thrown out of employment, it is, as
has been seen, a tremendous piece of staff-work in an
industrial countiy to organise their food and clothing
and housing during a campaign. It is too big a piece
of work to be practicable. And the pressm-e which the
blockade will produce in this fashion is perhaps an
even more inijjortant thing than the pressm-e it wiU
produce upon the supply of the armies.

THE GERMAN STATISTICS OF OUR
LOSSES IN PRISONERS.

I gave last week an analysis estimating the
minimum of what seemed to be the total losses to
date of the Germanic Powers. I said at the same time
that an estimate of the corresponding losses upon the
Allied side was not advisable in public interest, but
that anyone who chose to use similar methods for
making a comparison of his own in private would not
be discouraged by the result.

As the Germans have since then given official
lists of the total number oi prisoners ^\\oxa. they claim
to be present in Germany, taken from the Allied
forces, one element in the problem is public property,
and I will, with my readers' leave, closely analyse
these figures. They have for us a two-fold importance.
Fu-st, tliey enable us to gauge something of the state
of mind of official Germany ; secondly, they will be
useful to us (especially a little later on) in the contrast

9»

LAND AND WATER

Novembor 14, 1914

that may Lave to l>e finally establlslied between our
losses and those of the enemy.

Here I would again empliasize what I emphasized
List week — ^the chajacter of official Grci-man news.
The giving of such news is not more controlled by
common moials than is any other part of Prussian
effort in this war. It is based upon a calculation
of the effect to be produced upon the enem3\ It is
part of sucb a calculation that exact figures in
matters which the General Staffs of the foreign
army can check for themselves will have great moral
effect. It is thought, with justice, that if a certain
type of official German news, communicated by the
German Government, corresponds to Avhat the
General Staffs opposing Germany already know,
then such other statements as the German Govern-
ment may choose to make later for jmrposes of
deception will probably be credited also by the
General Staffs of the Allies. It is a perfectlj- simple
method and a very good one ; and according to this
idea v/e might expect the official lists of prisoners
taken from the Allies to correspond fairly accurately
to the estimate the Allies are themselves able to make
of their own " missing."

But there are two certain considerations which
tempt the Germans to exaggerate in this j^articular.
The total number of missing, with which any General
Staff is supplied with regard to its own side, is always
more than the real number of mere prisoners. There
are whole categories of missing that do not correspond
to prisoners at all ; undiscovered wounded and dead ;
stragglers who rejoin, and, in some cases, of troops
upon the frontiers, desertion. This last category is,
however, a very small one indeed on the Allied side,
liecause the Allied troops do not include unwilling
recruits as the German troops do. Further, it is of
great importance to the German Government to be
able to emphasize and if need be to exaggerate the
number of the prisoners v.-hom it holds. Everything
must be done in these critical weeks to maintain the
belief of the German population at home that victory
can yet be achieved. This population is able to
watch the great numbers coming into the prisoners'
camps ; it is not able to distinguish between true
prisoners of war and others, and therefore an exag-
geration of those numbers is both possible, and upon
the whole worth the while of the German Staff. To
some extent they weaken their moral lever of accuracy
in the eyes of the enemy, but they more than gain
that loss by their raising of civilian spirits in Germany
itself.

All this is as much as to say that unlike the
statistics of German dead (but like the statistics of
Gennan wounded), the official German statistics of
prisoners are likely to be not so mucb fantastic as
manipulated.

Now to put more precisely what I mean let me
begin the analysis of these figures.

We are told that on November 1st, the French
prisoners in German hands amounted to 191,756 ; the
Eussian prisoners to 191,900; the Belgian prisoners
to 35,444; and the British prisoners to 16,147.

The first thing we note about those figures is a
very large increase indeed over the numbers given
not much more than three weeks ago. llie Belgian
increase, indeed, is not remarkable. But the French
figures are increased by thii-tj' per cent. ; the Russian
figures by about twenty per cent. ; the British figures
are nearly doubled.

This increase should be carefully noted. Some-
thing corresponding to it happened after the German
victory at Tannenberg over the Russians. At first a

certain figure was given. Then news reached the
West of the gi-eat Russian victory at Lcmberg and
the Austrian prisoners captured (to the total number
of about 60,000) in that disaster. Immediately after-
wai'ds the German figures for the prisoners at Tannen -
berg Avere reissued at more than double their original
amount.

I do not suggest that the German authorities
simjjly said, " AVe must publish a larger number of
prisoners ; just set down double the original amount."
Nothing so enthusiastically simple would occur to the
careful calculators, who are considering not only the
figures before them, but the effect those figures -will
have upon Europe and the power the enemy has of
checking them. What I suggest is rather that some-
one in authority says :

" Ifow many prisoners did you take at Tannen-
berg?"

He is answered : " About thirtv thousand, sir."

The person in authority then says : " Surely there
is likely to be a considerable number picked up during
the pursuit of which we have not j-et heard? "

And then he is answered : " Certainly."

Whereupon, in the most honest way in the world,
it is an'ived at that one may fairl}' add another twenty
thousand without fear of facts ultimat^lv lielvincj one.
The Russians have probably far more than that number
missing, &c., &c.

Then the person in authority says : " You have,
of course, counted all the wounded ? "

And he is answered : " No, sir, we did not count
all the wounded and none of those who have since
died of wounds."

But the person in authority says that these
figures have their importance because the enemy can
hardlj" distinguish, save in a few individual cases,
between the dead and wounded whom he has left
behind and the unwounded prisoners. So in all fairness
one can clap on another twenty thousand, and at the
end of 'the process a figure is made out much mora
satisfactory than the_ first figure.

In exactly the same way the estimate of total
prisoners — ^not after a particular action the effect of
which it is desired to emphasise, but in the Avholo
coui'se of the campaign — can be swelled by every
conceivable method which the captor regards as legiti-
mate for the purpose of affecting his foes adversely
and raising the spirits of his fi-iends. He will includa
every kind of enemy he has laid his hands upon ; the
gi'ievously wounded with the unwounded ; civilians
taken away into captivity, according to the remarkable
method developed by the Germans since the first
battles in Belgium ; enemy civilians detained under
suspicion, and so forth. In other words, the totals
win be swelled, not to figures which manifestly war
against the truth, but to the highest possible limits
Avhicli any meaning of the word " jirisoner " will
admit.

Now in order to discover how far this method
has been pursued we have certain tests which can be
applied. Let us take the number of French prisoners
and deal with that as a jjarticular case. The Germans
announce 191,756 ; that is, not quite double, but more
than seventy per cent, over, the number of German
prisoners said to be held in France. To this com-
parison I will return later, but for the moment I beg
the reader to fix his attention ujwn that figure, 191,756.
They have suddenly increased their holding of French
prisoners by a third since their declar»!:ion of some
weeks ago.

But in the interval tliey have been careful to give
us accounts of prisoners picked up in actions where*

10»

ITovem'ber 14, 1914

LAND AND WATER

tliey can legitimately claim small local successes, as
for instance at Vailly the other day. Now the total
of these small captures, though all wounded arc
certainly included and prohably a good many civilians
a^ well, does not amount to anything like the
difference between tlie old figures and the new. It
does not amount to a quarter of the difference. It is
true that the perpetual swaying hack and forth over a
few hundred yards of the long line from the Vosges
to the sea gives perpetual opportunities for the picking
up of wounded whenever there is an advance by the
Germans, and before their next corresponding and
inevitable retirement. The same opportunities, of
course, occur to the French, who bag certain
numbers of the enemy, wounded and un^vounded, in a
similar fashion when they on their side manage to
make a short advance followed later by a corresponding
retirement.

But these driblets do not, at the most, coupled
with the larger captures already mentioned, account in
the last three or four weeks for half the total of this
sudden German increase.

It is manifest, therefore, that some great effort
has been made to swell the figures to the greatest
possible amount credible by tlie opposing General
Staff. It is no good asking the French General
Staff to believe in miracles ; to give in a
fantastic figure would be merely to defeat the
object the Gennans have in view. But it is exactly
what the German authorities would do to give
the very largest number which the most credulous
Frenchman with any available figures before him
could be got to believe ; and it is my first point that
the numbers conceivably taken in the field during the
interval between the date of the first statistics issued
and that of these last statistics come to much less than
the increase in the German figures of French prisoners
between the two.

"We have a second criterion by which to test the
validity of their figures. Of these 191,756 nominal
French prisoners only 3,138 are officers. That is to
say, of every sixty men taken prisoner (according to
tliis definition of the word " prisoner ") only one man
is of commissioned rank.

Now I admit that the proportion of officers killed
is always rather higher than the propoiiion of men
killed, and that therefore in picking up the enemy's
wounded after an advance you will probably find more
men wounded than officers wounded lying on the
ground. And this is particularly true of the French
and English services where the officer leads in a fashion
which makes him very conspicuous. But still, so
enormous a disproportion as one out of sixty is
exceedingly suspicious.

Let us contrast it with the figures given of
British prisoners. The British officer is not more
inclined to surrender than the French, nor is his posi-
tion during a sharp advance less conspicuous. Yet, of
a total of British prisoners given as 16,147, 417 are
officers. That makes not one in sixty, but one in 38.
And one in 38, by the way, is just about a
reasonable proportion. One would expect that there
would be rather more tlian thirty private soldiers
and non-commissioned officers taken, wounded and
unwounded, for each commissioned officer, but rather
less than forty. If the proportion fell to below thirty
one would conclude that the men were not being
properly led ; but above forty it gets very suspicious
and begins to look as tliongh men Avere being counted
as pi'isoners v.ho were not soldiers at all.

Eememjjcr that it is more difficult to manipulate
ijgurcs about officers than about inen ; their social

position is conspicuous ; the number of them that are
missing is very carefully noted upon the enemy's
side ; any considerable exaggeration would at once
betray itself.

We have already, then, the following facts : —

(1) The French prisoners claimed by Gennany

show a proportion of one officer to about
sixty men.

(2) The English prisoners claimed by Germany

show about one officer to thirty-eight men.
We know perfectly well, as I have said, that the
British officer does not surrender with greater facility
than the French, and, what is more, the British have
not lost, as the French have, whole garrisons and
whole bodies of men in fortified positions where the
loss of officers taken prisoners is strictly in proportion
to their numbers on the establishment.

We begin to see at once tliat the numbers of
private French prisoners claimed by Germany has
something ill-jn-oportioned and exaggerated about it.
As we cannot easily believe, knowing the Prussian
temperament and the object of these figures, that they
are merely fantastic, we must conclude some category
is included among the French prisoners which could
not be included among the English prisoners. What
such category is there ? Obviously the civilian
population. There is no British civilian population
available on the Continent to swell the German
statistics save perhaps a handful of Englishmen of
military age present in Germany, but there is a very
large French population which can be pressed into
the service of these remarkable figures. In other
words there is a considerable body of Frenchmen
unfit for service or use on railways, etc., which
the Germans may carry into Germany and count
as prisoners although they are not and have not
been soldiers.

In order to test the value of such a hypothesis
let us take a third criterion, the figure of Belgian
prisoners.

Here we have no less than 35,444 in prisoners
claimed by the Germans, but of these only 417 are
officers !

This is frankly monstrous. It is one officer to
more than 84 men. We are asked to believe that the
Belgian army is quite different from all other forces in
the world; that its officers belong to some fanatical caste
that wiU always prefer death to surrender, even after
capitulation, while its rank and file surrender eagerly
and upon every possible occasion. That is tomfoolery.
The facts are perfectly well known, and are sufficient
to account for this extraordinary disproportion. Bel-
gium, even more than Northern France, has been the
prey of that singular system v/hereby the Prussian
commanders seize as prisoners those whom they will
of the male civilian population. I do not say that in
so doing the Germans are not playing to win. I do
not say that then' action is, in a military sense, useless.
When they mop up the men who are necessary in a
country, even during the hardest strain of war, to
keep the machine going^the miners, the men ii>.
arms factories, the railway men, etc. — they are doing
what certainly subserves the cause of their victory.
But to call these men " prisoners of war " in any
ordinary sense is nonsense. And by the fact that
they are called prisoners of war we must test the
figures before us.

I sum up, therefore, and I say that : —
(1) Admitting that the German authorities do
not publish in this type of communicated official
statistic uun-oly fantastic ilgures, but rather strain the
meaning of words, and,

11«

LAND AND WATER

November 14, 1914

(2) Admitting that the British officer does not,
as the Avhole world knows he does not, sui-render with
facility, and,

(3) Giving the British standard as the highest to
be accepted (and it is surely a very high one), we may
proceed to estimate the true prisoners of war, that is,
the soldiers wounded and imwounded now in German
hands from the Western field.

A multiple by which we find fi-om the number of
officers the total number of prisoners is, in the case of
the British, 38. For the sake of round numbers, and
in order not to make our conclusion more cheerful
than we can help, let us say for the French not 38 but
40, and see what we get. There are, of French officers
wounded and unwounded in German hands, 3,138.
Multiply that by 40 and you get 125,520 French
prisoners in Germany, wounded and unwounded. If
you think that figm'e too low, add a margin to save
all possible contingencies, and call it 150,000. It
certainly is 7ioi 150,000, but we will call it that.
Contrast with that figiu-e about 100,000 Gennan
prisoners captured in the Western field, none of whom
are in hospital (for the hospital figures ai'e not
included by the French or the English), and you will
perceive that the balance of prisoners upon the two
sides is something very different from that which the
first German figures might lead one to suppose and
were intended to lead one to suppose.

Remember, fm-ther, that the taking of prisoners
from the Allies in the Western field was particularly
a feature of the earlier part of the war when Belgium
was broken, and when the French suffered their
heavy defeat in front of Metz; when Maubeuge
with from 25,000 to 40,000 troops, mainly territonals,

was taken, and when the British contingent and the
French Fifth Army suffered the terrible retreat from
Mons and the Sambre. Remember that since the
retreat of Von Kluck, though the invader has still
been in superior numbers, his counter-offensive jjer-
petually engaged, has as perpetually been repulsed —
and you will come to the conclusion that the supposed
balance against us very nearly cancels out.

Of the numbers of Russian prisoners and of the
con-esponding German and German- Austrian prisonei-s
in Russian hands I say nothing, because the elements
on which to form a judgment are lacking. We know
that the Russians suffered heavily at Tannenberg.
We know that since the date of that battle the
advantage has steadily been with our Allies. But
they have given us no statistics of their captures,
save in the Austrian field of war, nor have they told
us the number of the wounded picked up in the course
of a general advance, not even the numbers wounded
and unwounded which have fallen into their hands
since their great success before Warsaw of now three
weeks ago. But if we may judge on the analogy
of the Western field, if we remember that civilians from
Russian-Poland will have been seized and sent into
Germany and counted just as they have been comman-
deered and counted from Belgium and Northern France,
we may perhaps come to the same conclusion about tlie
figures in the Eastern field of war as we have with
regard to the figures in the Western field of war.
And we may justly conclude that so far, in matters
of mere numbers of armed and whole prisoners to be
deducted from either force, the balance strikes fairly
even. The least advance into German ten'itory will
make it strike heavily, and increasingly heavily, against
the enemy.

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

KOTE. — THIS ABTICLK HAS BEES BUBMITTKD TO THS PRESS BUEEAU, WHICH DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE PUBLICATION AS CENSOBED
AXD TAKES NO ESSPONSIBILITT FOE THE COKEECT.VESS OP THE STATEMENTS.

THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

"^OWARDS tlie end of last week a German Squadron
from the China Station — consisting of the
Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Leipzig, and Nurnberg — •
arrived oS the coast of Chile and was reported from
Valparaiso.

I mentioned last week that the taking of the oSensive by
the Einden in sinking the Jemtchug and Mousgmeton indicated
that our strategy of intercepting their supplies and " stopping
earths" was apparently having effect. The circumstance that
the Scharnhorst group saw fit to keep together suggests the same
thing again. For corsair work four ships together are no more
oifettive than one ; and anything in the nature of battle — except
as a last extremity — is madness, because very little damage ma}--
render the corsair useless for her own particular work, even though
the battle in which she engages ends in her success.

Therefore, we are reasonably entitled to assume that our
pressure was such that the Scharnhorst group was compelled to
abandon its original function.

Ihe rest is mystery pure and simple. The German Admiral
Spee reported that he had met and engaged off Coronel on Sundar,
Xovember 1st, Admiral Cradock, that he had sunk the Monmouth,
set the Good Hope on fire, while the Glasgow and Otranto (aimed
liner) managed to escape. All that he actually claimed as sunk
was the Monmouth, and that his own injuries were slight.

The British Admiralty first of all issued a statement to the
effect that it v.-as unable to accept the German report as accurate,
because tke Canopus, which had been sent to reinforce Admiral

Cradock, was not mentioned ; also that only three German ships
came into Valparaiso after the action.

So far, so good. But then the British Admiralty issued a
further report to the effect that it had now received " trust-
worthy information " that the Good Hoj)e (flagship) had been
sunk : plus a very clear intimation that the Monmouth also had
gone under. Both accounts agreed that tlieGlasgoiv was liltle
damaged, and it was definitely stated by our authorities that
neither the Otranto nor Canopus was engaged. Also for the
Nurnberg the Dresden was substituted. Furthermore, there
were reports of a warship ashore. This was looked for by a
Chilean vessel, which found nothing. Also the Cliilians failed to
find any wreckage or signs of any battle other than that the three
Germans which put into Valparaiso appeared to have been ia
action.

The next stage of the mystery is that telegrams were widelv
reported in Portsmouth to have been received from the Good
Hope — all of them to the effect that she was " unhurt."
_ Beyond that absolute silence so far as official reports from
either side arc concerned. We have, however, fairly full non-
official details collected by American correspondents from the
crews of the German ships which put into Valparaiso.

The substance of these various narratives pieced together
is — as I read it — somewhat as follows : —

The Monmouth, Glasgow, and Otranto were met with off tho
Chilian coast by the German squadron, in a gale. They wero
presumably waiting for the Good Hope; as about then she arrived,
and succeeded in joining up with them at the cost of the Germans
securing the inshore positiou — themselves more or less invisible

12»

November 14, 1914

LAND AND WATER

against the coast, while the British ships were silliouetted ac;ainst
the simset. Both squadrons then steamed south, gradually
approaching each other. The Germans fired at long range and
missed. The Good Hope did not reply till the range was about
G,000 yards (rou>(hly 3.| land miles).

The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau (incidentally the ScharnJiorst
has for years held the Germ.an gunnery record) concentrated
first on the Good Hope, and then having disabled her, on the
Monmouth.

Both the range and the weather conditions were such that
the affair v.as necessarily one of big guns.

The forces engaged were as follows: —

Britisii.

Good Hope 2 0-2, IG Gin.

Honmonth 14 G-iti.

Cia-tgow 2 Gin, 10 1-in.

Ceumax.

Scharnliorsl 8 8-2, 6 Gin.

Gneisenau 8 8'2, C Gin.

Lcipz>!f 10 41-in.

Ntirnberg 10 4-1-in.

The respective broadsides work out as follows : —

BBHisa. German.

2 9-2 12 8-2

19 Gin. 0 Gin.

5 l-iii. 10 4-in.

Which makes twei',ty-six British against twenty-eight German
guns. Translated into approximate terms of relative value,
whereby (very roughly) each 1 in = 1, each 6 in. = 2, each 8.2 =
4, and each 9.2 = 5, we get a paper value of about fifty -three
British to seventy G rjian.

But this paper value is absolutely worthless for comparative
purpcscs, because owing to the weather conditions only upper
deck guns could be fought.

Consequently the effective broadsides work out as follows : —

British.

Big ..

Medium

Small

9-2 in.

Gin.

4-in.

German.
12 8-2ia.
None.
10 4-in.

SL-v inch guns, however, are practically useless over 4,000
yards, and 4, .500 is understood to have been the smallest range.
So, only the big guns really counted. The Monmo'ith probably
merely represented a target. Whether she did or did not, the
relative real fighting values were approximately forty-eight
German to ten British, or if we take it in weight of metal per
broadside, really eSective at the range, 2,904 lb. German to
760 lb. British — say, 4 to 1 instead of about 5 to 1.

Therefore, even assuming equal skill at gunnery, the result
was a foregone conclusion. As thinj^s were, however, it was
the crack gunnery squadron of the German Navy against British
ships manned mostly by reservists. The odds against Admiral
Cradock can, therefore, in a perfectly sober estimate, be put at
10 to 1 at least ; and for once in a way the headlines of the half-
penny press about " fearful odds " are literally true !

Pending further information it is undesirable to inquire as
to v/hy Admiral Cradock " asked for trouble." My own surmise
is that he did not ask ; that the Germans caught him, not he the
Germans, and that questions as to " Why was the Canopus
absent ? " are ill-timed.

The Germans have obtained a very material victory — it is
folly to deny it. They have obtained it by precisely the same
means which we employed in the Bight of Heligoland— by
irresistible odds. Elsewhere in this article I have suggested that
just as the moral victory of Heligoland was German, so here in
this Chilian affair the ultimate moral result may be in oiir favour.

Hitherto we have always had the crushing superiority which
long ago Admiral Sir Cloudesley Shovcll described as the only
reaf recipe for victory. In the "affair off Chile the tables were
turned. Our officers and men proved themselves every whit as
game — and perhaps a little more so — than did the Germans in
the Bight of Heligoland affair.

I do not wish to elaborate my peculiar views unduly, so here
for the present I will leave the matter, save to reiterate my
opinion that the battle of Coronel will ultimately prove to have
been a result in our favour.

Modern warfare is essentially a matter of moral effect. It
has nothing to do with the sinking of ships, but only with the
way in which men fight in those ships. That is the essence of
" new conditions."

THE NORTH SEA.

On November the 3rd a German squadron made a raid into
the North Sea.

Shots were fired off Yarmouth and Lowestoft, amied
apparently at nothing in particular— at any rate, no damage
was done to anything or anybody by this " bombardment of the
coast defences."

In the course of these operations the British gunboat Halcyon
was discovered and a hundred rounds fired at her. Only two
hits were registered, and the damage done by these v.as trivial.
From which, seeing that the Halcyon was at anchor v/e can in the
first place deduce very bad shooting, and in the second place
gather that presumably only small guns wore fired at her.

The Halcyon was able to call up assistance, but the Germans
did not wait for any action. They retreated, dropping mines
astern, and our submarine D5, striking one, was destroyed.

In Germany this raid has been received with extraordinary
enthusiasm, altogether out of importance with the results. As
to why the raid was made, there is some obscurity. Considerable
risks were run both in coming and returning, and in connection
with the return the armoured cruiser Yorck was lost.

According to the German official statement the Yorrk
accidentally struck a German mine at the mouth of the Jahde,
but there is a suspicion that the mines were laid by us or that she
was submarined. Probably, however, the German official
statement is correct"; they would hardly attribute to their own
mismanagement anything which could be put down to the enemy.

Be that all as it may, however, the Yorck has been suidc with
the loss of about half her crew, and the loss is more serious than
the intrinsic value of the ship as a fighting unit. As a unit she
was somewhat superior to our MoMiiouth, though of slightly loss
displacement. Her armament was 4 8.2, 10 G inch as against the
14 6 inch of the Monmouth. The armour in both cases was the
same — 4 inches. Both were of about equal date, but beyond
that differed radically ; the YorcJi being gunned at the expcn.se
of speed (she could barely do 21 knots), while the Monmouth was
given speed (23 to 24 knots) at the expense of guns.

Where the blow falls heaviest on Germany is that she has
lost another cruiser out of a fleet already badly depleted by the
detaching of several of these vessek for commerce warfare and
the losses inflicted by our ships at Heligoland. A fleet without

MAP TO INDICATB THB APPBOIIMATB AREA OF THB NORTH SBA
KOW PROHIBITED BT THE ADMIRALTT.

sufficient cruisers is more or less blind, and it is also in heavy
danger from destroyer attack. Consequently we could well do
with many more German " raids "—provided they reproduced
the one in question.

Thus, for the German loss. We ha\-e now to consider the
German gain. The only material advantage that I can see is
that they have learned something of our defensive arrangements
and sunk one of our submarines. But as this v.'as purely a
matter of chance, they can no more claim it as a result secured
than we can put in a similar claim for the Yorck. The damage
done to the Halcyon is trivial ; for that matter, had they sunk her
it would have been no advantage worth mention.

Matters, therefore, are reduced to the moral advantage.
Here the Ciermans believe that they have scored heavily ; but
between belief and fact there is occasionally a great gulf fixed.
As a matter of fact— except in so far as it may cheer up their
own men— this raid appears to me as a bad moral defeat for the
Germans, and that quite outside the loss of the Yorck.

Their moral loss is three-fold. In the first place, the raid
entirely failed to create any panic, which was obviously what it
was primarily intended to accomplish.

13«

LAND AND WATER

NovcmLer 14, 1914

In the second place, in order to make the demonstration
the Gennans had to negotiate a mine field of ours. This they
did without the least difficulty, conclusive proofs that they knew
the exact road through the mine field, knowledge which could
only have been arrived at surreptitiously. Forewarned is
forearmed ! In demonstrating to us that they do know, they
have struck themselves a far heavier blow than the loss of the
Yorck.

Thirdly, there are certain important psychological features
cf the raid which are of the utmost moral importance. The two
per cent, of hits against the Halcyon was extremely bad
gunnery as compared with all the German gunnery, good, bad,
or indifferent, which we have so far experienced. Now,
erceptionally bad gunnery in war time invariably spells one thing —
the " rattles." The gunners in the great raid destined to put
terror into the heart of England, were obviously in a good deal
of terror them.selves.

We must be careful how we take it as a view of the morale
of the German Navy as a whole. But we can take it that the
difference between the enemy we met at Heligoland and the men
who " raided " our East Coast is so great that something has
probably happened in the interim.

Probabl}' it means that the effect of enforced inaction is
making itself felt just as it made itself felt on the enemy confined
to harbour in the days of the Great War a hundred odd years ago.
We know enough of German gunnery and German averages to be
quite certain that a mere two per cent, of hits against a stationary
target must have a meaning.

There is, of course, the possibility that the bad shooting was
deliberately planned, but I cannot imagine this likely. The
sinking of any British warship whatever, right off the English
coast, would have been an asset of high moral value to Gennany.
Nor can one conceive of any expected advantage from such
pretended bad shooting.

I may seem to have written a great deal about an incident
which has generally been passed over as trivial ; but when the war
is finished, and the books are opened, I am strongly of opinion
that this seemingly farcical German raid on the East Coast will
turn out to have been of considerable value to us.

I understand from correspondence received that I have
achieved a certain amount of unpopularity because I suggested
that the Heligoland affair instead of being — as popularly
claimed — a " Great British victory " was reaDy a moral victory
for Germany. That view I still hold. Along precisely the same
lines I think that the German East Coast Raid is a " British
victory " of the utmost importance — something beside which
Admiral Cradock's defeat off the Coast of Chile sinks into
complete insignificance. We cannot (if we want to know where
we really are) consider the new naval warfare along the lines of
the old. Everything is altered.

For the public to attune itself to the new conditions is
naturally bound to take time. For a thousand years we have
been trained to think in terms of losses — of ships sunk and men
destroyed. The new warfare, however, is something utterly
different.

Of course, if the German High Sea Fleet did come out and
give battle to our Dreadnoughts — victory would be victory.
But even so, there would not necessarily be a moral Trafalgar on
cither side. The whole matter is too complex to be put into
ordinary words. Only in the crudest possible way can I attempt
to explain the (to most readers) abnormal view I take of things.
So far as I can do so — it is something like this.

In the old days you killed the enemy or else he killed you.
Who killed best was the victor. But under the new conditions
which have arisen some new condition has been brought into
being. The thing done in one place may directly cause a strong
reaction elsewhere. For example, Spec's defeat of Cradock may
put a terrible stiffening into a British crew faced with odds in some
quite other part of the world. In the old days events in one
quarter remained unknown in another — now nous avons change
tout cela. Every combatant in the naval field knows almost at
once everything that happens elsewhere and takes it according to
his calibre.

• I have, I fear, inadequately expressed my meaning and
failed to explain logically my theory that victory may really
be defeat, and defeat victory in modem conditions. Words fail.
But for myself I am absolutely convinced that, despite all this
jubilation in Berlin, the two worst disasters sustained by Germany
are the famous raid against our East Coast and the defeat of
Admiral Cradock off the coast of Chile.

To assert a thing of this sort is giving hostages to fortune
■with a vengeance. However, I do assert it.

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

Accounts from here are at present too chaotic to count for
much. It is apparently established that the German-led Turks
have sunk the Prut, a Russian mine-layer of 5,000 tons odd.
They have also probably sunk one Russian destroyer (the Turkish
Btory runs to four), and since November 3rd one of the Dardanelles

forts has been persistently bombarded with the usual result — i.e.,
the absolute usclessness of fixed defences under modern conditions.

For the rest, Turkey's action appears to have relieved the
pressure on Cattaro, but only to a temporary degree. It will
not save Cattaro.

The temporary result is that the Austrians were enabled to
reoccupy Lissa and rc-erect the wireless there. This has now been
destroyed once more by the Allies.

Meanwhile, the British cruiser Minerva has made her
presence felt at Akaba on the Syrian Coast. On the importance
of Akaba I need not dilate ; Mr. Belloc explained it amply in his
last week's notes. Therefrom the assumption is permissible that
Sea Power has already negatived the expected Turkish advance
on Eigypt by the only reasonably feasible route.

It may safely be prophecied that Constantinople will be in
the hands of the Allies long before any Turkish soldier reaches
the Suez Canal and takes on the problem of crossing it in face of
a hostile fleet.

Mr. Belloc has indicated the land difficulties which face a
Turkish invasion. But these difficulties are as notliing compared
to the naval obstacle.' The Turks have not a dog's chance of
crossing the Suez Canal. Half a dozen British ships of no actual
fighting value whatever are ample to make it absolutely
impossible, unless the Germans manage to scuttle something at
a lock or the equivalent thereof. Even so, however, crossing an
army in the face of Sea Power seems an impossible proposition.
Think it out as one will, it is not possible to envisage Turkish
troops passing the Suez Canal.

THE FAR EAST.

The somewhat unexpectedly early capture of Kiao-Chau
has an importance altogether outside and beyond the intrinsic
value of this ex-German outpost.

In the first place it releases a number of ships, both Japanese
and British for the extremely difficult task of finding and destroy-
ing the enemy's supply ships and colliers. This — as I have
explained in previous articles — is a task of infinitely greater
magnitude than the general public has any conception of. But
it is the only way.

Actual search for the corsairs themselves is blind man's
bluff in a twenty acre field : the correct reply (which we are
making) is " stopping earths." For this neither speed not power
matter much — the great thing is numbers ; and an efficient
consular service, which unfortunately wo do not possess. In
this direction, at least, we are paying heavily for our past peace
economies, an alien custodian of our interests — no matter how
honest — cannot be expected to worrj- himself unduly as to
information about hostile movements.

However, this is the soit of difficulty which can be overcome
by numbers, hence the importance of the fall of Kiao-Chau.

The second asset is merely moral and psychological, and
due mostly, if not entuely, to one of those incoiisidered telegrams
which so appeal to the Kaiser. A moment or so of consideration
would have convinced him that Kiao-Chau was bound to be
captured. Yet he had the folly to make it known broadcast
that the loss of Kiao-Chau would be considered as worse than the
fall of Berlin. The German Press Censors did, for as long as
possible, suppress the news ; but it was bound to leak out, and
its moral effect will be all the heavier accordingly. The
exaggerated and melodramatic value placed on Kiao-Chau will
utterly negative the enormous psychological result which might
otherwise have been produced by the German naval victory off
the coast of Chile. In the ordinary way the two things might
have balanced. As things are, the Kaiser by that particular
Kiao-Chau telegram, has made our loss intangible, and his own
very tangible indeed !

Details are a steady bombardment and ultimate bayonet
charges ; but things of this sort do not matter. What does
matter is that the Kaiser was foolish enough to send a certain
telegram to the Kiao-Chau Commander.

Earl Roberts lias advised ns of the result of his appeal for gl.isses
for non-commissioned officers in the field. Up to the present ho has
received over 14,000 pairs of field an.d stalking glasses. Field-Marslial
Sir John French slates that the latter, as weU as field glasses, aro
found to be most useful. Many people who had none forwarded
cheques, which were utilised for tho purchase oi suitable glasses. A
large number of these very useful additions to equipment are still
wanted, and sliould be forwarded to the National Sorvice League, 72,
Victoria-street, London, S.W. In tho absence of glasses, cheques
would be much appreciated.

Mr. T. Fisher Unwin has just published From the Trenches —
LoMvain to the Aisne, the first account of an eye v.'itness of the first
phases of the great war in the western area. Tho work is vivid and
realistic ; it docs not pretend to stratogio value or historical detail. The
author, Mr. Geoffrey Young, relates the things ho saw and the impres-
sions he gathered out of the days that immediately followed the out-
break of hostilities, and his story is a very dramatic and interesting
one.

14*

INoreinter 14, 1914

LAND AND WATER

SHIFTING THE ENEMY.

SOME FURTHER EXPEDIENTS FOR MODERN TRENCH WARFARE.

By COL. F. N. MAUDE, G.B., late R.E.

SEE from tlie reports of many Belgian correspondents
that our friend the enemy is preparing quite gigantic
positions entrenched and hollowed out in a manner
quite new in field warfare. They are reported as
stretching south from Brussels across the field of
Waterloo for miles, and behind them are yet other lines of
defence, supported by the reconstructed works of Liege and
Namur, and continuing along the courses of several rivers
running in deeply eroded channels from the high plateaux
of Luxemburg.

In fact, wherever we turn we are bound to encounter months
of this new kind of abbreviated siege warfare, in which all kinds
of shifts and expedients will have to be tried.

I gave some ideas on this subject in my last article, and
will now continue the list, endeavouring to profit by the mistakes
of our adversary.

The Germans seem to have gone " big howitzer mad " ;
setting aside the quite sensible use of weapons of exceptional
power to deal with such steel and concrete targets as the Liege
and Namur and Antwerp defences, they appear to have
imagined that the moral effect of a shell increases quite

nowadays, be done by wireless transmission, but this is hardly aa
yet within the scope of practical politics. The Congreve rocket
was simply the ordinary rocket of Crystal Palace displays
especially adapted for war purposes. It answered exceeding!}''
well as far as it went, and in the old days in China and up pirate
rivers in the East it was frequently used with great succes.<i
for setting fire to villages from boats too small and light to
carry mortars or guns. But there the idea ended, and it has
often struck me that it might, nowadays, be most successfully
revived by combining the idea of rocket propulsion with some
kind of elementary machine on rollers and steering it by cablo
from the trenches, at any rate, for relatively short distances.

There would, moreover, be a kind oE poetic justice about
its revival ; for, in fact, without the electric attachments it in
about the earliest kind of self-propelling vehicle ever devised,
and was the invention of an old German inventor about 15i5,
who pubUshed a weird book on fireworks and fire machine."?,
with Ulustrations, I think, at Nuremberg. We have the book or a
later edition of it in the library of the Royal United Service
Institution.

My idea would, therefore, work out something like this : —

Langridge Explosive Asbestos ' t r
te. old bolts.] charge I packing K^^^^er

niits etc.

¥ixed fin rudder

enormously in proportion to the " big bang " it makes, and for
this end have burdened their field armies with a number of big
howitzers which have been many times more powerful than
the targets they have recently found have required.

It may be that the big bang " idea is correct. I feel pretty
sure that as against the Germans it would prove so, but I submit
that it is sheer foohshness to drop " Black Marias " on the
ground with such high velocities that the bang only ensues
after the shell has buried itself 10 feet deep, and its man-killing
power is thus enormously diminished by the smothering efEect
of the surrounding earth' It blows out a big hole convenient
enough for burying dead horses in, but beyond this its useful
eSect is comparative!}' limited.

Our answer should be the propulsion of a shell bigger, much
bigger, containing a weight of explosives under conditions which
would ensure its bursting on the ground level at the right time
and place, and without the disadvantage of requiring tv/cnty-six
traction engines to use it. Also, it must be efficient at very
short ranges if desirable.

The solution I find in a combination of an old naval device,
much tried and to.^ted, some forty years ago, by the experts of
H.M.S. Vernon — the naval torpedo school at Portsmouth, and
a revival of the old Congreve war rocket idea which was
abandoned, to my mind very prematurely, about the same
date, when ail attention was focussod on the development of
artillery.

The Vemon idea was simple and was intended for blov.-ing
up harbour booms, caissons, and so forth ; very much the same
sort of work as we now require on land.

It consisted of an old ste.-.m pinnace heavily freighted
with explosive,=i, v/Iiich was set going with a head of steam
sufficient to ta;:e it well up to its target, and steered by a
light electric cable from a parent ship following some consider-
iible distance behind. Of course, in theory, the steering could.

A heavy iron cylinder with knife-edge bow in front, mounted
on broad rollers, and weighing a couple of tons, woulS contain a
rocket in an inside case, packed round with asbestos, in front of
which wet gun-cotton would be packed, as much as desired, until
the second cylinder was full, and then round the second cylinder
the empty space would be filled with bolts and nuts or any other
old " langridge " to furnish a sufficient supply of man-killing
fragments.

The cylinder would have a sufficient preponderance aft to
ensure that a fin keel should bite well into the ground when
moving. On second thoughts I would dispense with steering-
gear altogether, as the vehicle has only to go straight, but keep
the electric firing cable so as to ensure detonation exactly at the
right time.

As for the calculations required, they are well within the
scope of any youngster from any of our modern universities.

We all know that rocket composition consists of charcoal,
sulphur, and saltpetre, mixed together, which when set alight
burn at a certain temperature — about 3,000° F. if I remember
rightly — and give ofE so-and-so many cubic feet of gas which
expands in proportion to the heat evolved.

Having determined the weight of your machine, sa}' about
2 tons — and the rolling friction to be overcome — any man
fresh from the workshops can work out the amount of power
required to diive it at a given velocity — about 50 feet a second
would suffice.

Imagine this crashing through wire entanglements, etc.,
and then bursting exactly over one of the modern deep dug-
outs the gimners find it so difficult if not impos.sible to attain.
If I know my Germans, and I think I do, I will wager they
will be a good deal more disconcerted than ever our lads have
been by any " Black Maria " of theirs, and we shall not need
twenty-six traction engines to haul our machine either — we
can extemporise all the heavy material in the nearest workshop.

I6»

LAND AND WATER

November 14, 1914

CORRESPONDENCE.

Sir, — I am a very interested reader of your paper, and
jparticularly those articles dealing on the military, na\al, and
aeronautical situation as developed in this great war iji which
this country is embarked.

We have read a great deal about the Zeppelins that are
being built, and that are in existence, and i» the pages of j-our
paper we have gathered that the number of these is limited,
and that their construction is very slow, while as they are useless
without their sheds, the time that is taken in constructing
these must also be taken into account.

I think that I am not mistaken in saying that the shortest
time in which these sheds could be erected was seven months,
and that a Zeppelin could not be turned, out in less than nine
months. This on the authority of your expert.

In this morning's paper I read that Zeppelins are being
turned out " every three weeks, which represents a record time
of 500 hours per airship."

The discrepancy is so great that one wonders which state-
ment is correct, for it would seem not impossible to approximately,
at any rate, arrive at the probable time involved. .*.,

With regard to the sheds, I recently saw at the Pavilion
Cinematograph, Marble Arch, sheds in course of erection,
in which ready-made girders are erected and covered with
sheatliing, apparently a very expeditious way of arriving at
results.

In Doctor Karl Graces' book entitled, " The Secrets of the
Gei-man War Office," he has a great deal to say about Zeppelins,
that the Germans have discovered a metal much lighter than
aluminium for the making of the girders, and a gas very much
lighter than hydrogen, so that their buoyancy and lifting capacity
is enormously increased, while he speaks of tlie latest Zeppelins
being able to carry a crew of twenty-five men, as well as over
7 tons of explosives if needed. He speaks further of their sphere
of action being up to, 1,400 kilometres, and that they have been
known to stay out ninety-six hours.

There arc statements made in the book that tend to discredit
bim, however, for he speaks of Zeppelins being capable of rising
to a height of 10,000 feet, while aeroplanes that are generally
supposed to be our arm of defence against these aircraft cannot
exceed 6,000 feet.

As we have been told very frequently of heights of over
10,000 feet being attained by aeroplanes, heights indeed up to
25,000 feet at which the record is supposed to stand, and I have
never seen a height of over 6,000 feet mentioned in connection
with Zeppelins, I am led to wonder whether the other etatements
quoted in this letter are equally inaccurate.

That we ha^■e heard little about Zeppelins in actual warfare
thus far leads one to hope that they have not been found as
efficient as had been hoped by the enemy, but if your expert could
answer the statements made in Doctor Graves' book, as also
the length of time taken in the building of these craft, it would
be of much interest to the public and might reassure them from
a meance which is much dreaded by many.

If you could find time to take up this subject in your valued
paper, I feel sure that it would be of interest to many of your
readers. Chaeles I. Thomson.

GERMAN LOSSES.

To the Editor of Land and Water.

Sir,— It may interest your readers to learn that the losses
estimated by Mr. Belloc are fully admitted by some of the Gennan
War Office officials. My Dutch correspondent has recently
been m Berhn, and has intimate acquaintance with the War
Department there. He writes me that up to the last week in

October the German losses were admittedly fully 2,000,000 !
He estimates the total number of Germans engaged in the war
from the beginning at nearly 7,000,000. The Germans claim to
be able to provide another 3,000,000 men !

Yours faithfully,

. , Arthur Kitson.

National Liberal Club, November 9 th

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BACK COPIES of "LANT) AKD WATEE," contaJniiK^ tho
series of Articles by HILAIEE BELLOC, "THE "WAEBY
LAND"; and FEED. T. JANE, "THE WAE BY WATEK,"
tosetlicr with a valuable reference, "THE TOPOGEAPHICAL
GUIDE," can be obtained throngh any Newsagent, or on
application to the Offices of " LAND AND WATEE," Cestral
House, Kinoswat, W.C.

BUCKINGHAM PALACE.

„ , , Oc^tober 15tli, 1914.

J? oar many weeks wo liavo all been greatly couccnied for the
welfare of the sailors and soldiers who are so gaUantly fightinf? our
battles by sea and laud. Our first consideration has been to meet
their more pressing needs, and I have delayed making known a wisK
that has lung been in my heart for fear of cncroachmg on other funds,
the claims of which liavo been more urgent.

I want you aU now to help me to send a Christmas present from
tlic whole nation to every sailor aHoat and every soldier at the front.
On Christmas Eve, when, like the shepherds of old, they keep their
watch douMess their thoughts will turn to home and to tlie loved
ones left beumd, and perhaps, too, they will recall tlw days when, as
children tlioniselves, they were wont to hang out their stockings,
wondering what the morrow had in store.

I am sure that we should all be th« happier to feel that we had
heljjed to send our little token of love and sympathy on Christmas
morning, something that would bo useful ajid of permanent value, and
the making of which may be the means of providing employment in
trades adversely affected by tho war. Could there bo anything mom
likely to hearten them in their struggle than a present received
straight from home on Christmas Day ?
Please, will ycu help me?

JL-VRY.
To H.R.IL THE PRINCESS JL1RY,

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, LONDON.
I be^ to enclose £ «. d. as a donation to your Royal

Highness s Fund.

Name.

Address.

WAR PUBLICATIONS.

The manual published by the Temple Press in sixpenny form on
How to use a Rifle and Ptstol has already run through two editions,
and a third edition has now been issued in revised and considerably
enlarged form. There is a valuable addition of matter on such subjects
as trajectory, aiming practice, and common errors of shooting, with
the ways of correcting and avoiding them. Written in simple, nn-
technical language, the manual forms one of tlie best guid.-s to practical
rifla shooting on the market, being written throughout by a military
man fully conversant with his subject.

The first translation into English of Treitsclihe : His Life and
1! orl:s has been published at 7s. 6d. by Messrs. Jarrold and Allen &
Un^^^n. Various extracts from the doetrine preached by Treitschko
have made tlieir appearance, bnt now for the first time "it is possible
for such as are not conversant with the Geiman language to ascertain
tho views of the historian-professor-war-advocate. It may be added
that the .book is a revelation as to the German view point, as evident
in one of its most learned and distinguished men, who endorses " blood
and iron " as a cardinal necessity to tho welfare of his country.

_ Jl'essrs. Hodder and Stoughton have added to their two-shilling
series of war books The German Spy System from Within, by " ex-
Intelligence Officer," who deals with the practical work of tlie spy
system, and exhibits a commendable avoidance of melodramatic story
tS'lhn". Th« book is circum.stantial, and is based throughout on
pi'ovable evidence; the chapter on agents provocateurs and the German
influence on Syndicalism ia especially valuable, and the book as a whole
IS one well wortliy of perusal.

The official German point of view as regards war is admirably, if
rather too briefly, stated in Germany's War Maifla, which condenses the
litterances of the Kai.ser, the Crown Prince, Bulow, Bernhardi, von der
Cioltz, and oUjer.s. Tlie object of the book is to show that Germany,
ca re;3ieseuted by its chief men, is utterly permeated with the doctrine
cf the necessity of war to tho development of a nation, and the
argument is well enforced out of German mouths.

LOOKING BACKWARDS.

Readers of the special articles appearing in this Journal
on " The World's War by Land and Water " will doubtless
wish to retain in correct rotation these remarkable series
of articles by HILAIRE BELLOC and FRED T. JANE.
We have, therefore, prepared special cloth binders to hold
the first thirteen numbers, at a cost cf Is, 6d. each.

Or \ve \vill supply the thirteen numbers complete, in the
binder, for 6s. 6d.

Ovvins to the big demand for back numbers already

received we have had to reprint some of the earlier

numbers. Same can now be supplied at 6d. per copy.

Order now from your Newsagent, Bookstall, or direct
from the Publishers,

"LAND AND WATEE,"

CENTRAL HOUSE, KINGSWAY. LONDON.

16*

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