A Report
to THE
Montana
Legislature
Performance Audit
The Help America
Vote Act and Related
Elections Issues
The Office of the
Secretary of State
August 2007
Legislative Audit
Division
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Legislative Audit
Committee
Representatives
Bill Beck
Bill Glaser
Betsy Hands
Hal Jacobson
Mike Phillips
John Sinrud
Senators
Joe Balyeat, Vice Chair
Greg Barkus
Steve Gallus
Dave Lewis
Lynda Moss
Mitch Tropila
Audit Staff
Performance
Angus Maciver
Information System
Nate Tobin
Fraud Hotline
Help eliminate fraud,
waste, and abuse in
state government. Call
the Fraud Hotline at:
(Statewide)
1-800-222-4446
(in Helena)
444-4446
Performance Audits
Performance audits conducted by the Legislative Audit Division
are designed to assess state government operations. From the audit
worl<, a determination is made as to whether agencies and programs
are accomplishing their purposes, and whether they can do so
with greater efficiency and economy. The audit work is conducted
in accordance with audit standards set forth by the United States
Government Accountability Office.
Members of the performance audit staff hold degrees in disciplines
appropriate to the audit process. Areas of expertise include business
and public administration, mathematics, statistics, economics,
political science, criminal justice, computer science, education, and
biology.
Performance audits are performed at the request of the Legislative
Audit Committee which is a bicameral and bipartisan standing
committee of the Montana Legislature. The committee consists
of six members of the Senate and six members of the House of
Representatives.
Direct comments or inquiries to:
Legislative Audit Division
Room 160, State Capitol
PO Box 201705
Helena MT 59620-1705
(406) 444-3122
Additionally, many reports can be found in electronic format at:
http://leg.mt.gov/css/audit
LEGISLATIVE AUDIT DIVISION
Scott A. Seacat, Legislative Auditor
Tori Hunthausen,
Chief Deputy Legislative Auditor
Deputy Legislative Auditors:
James Gillett
Angie Grove
August 2007
The Legislative Audit Committee
of the Montana State Legislature:
This is our performance audit of implementation of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
and related elections issues. Findings and recommendations address a wide range of issues
relating to the administration of elections in Montana, including the state's new voter
registration system, voter identification requirements, polling place information displays,
new late registration procedures, voting systems requirements, absentee voting, provisional
voting, voting accessibility for people with disabilities, and the state's provision of funding
for HAVA and other election reform efforts.
We wish to express our appreciation to the staff of the Secretary of State's office and
county election officials for their cooperation and assistance during the audit.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Scott A. Seacat
Scott A. Seacat
Legislative Auditor
Room 160 • State Capitol Building • PO Box 201705 • Helena, MT • 59620-1705
Phone (406) 444-3122 • FAX (406) 444-9784 • E-Mail lad@mt.gov
Table of Contents
Figures and Tables v
Elected, Appointed and Administrative Officials vi
Report Summary S-l
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Introduction
HAVA in Montana
HAVA Requirements
Changes Mandated Under HAVA
Funding for HAVA Requirements 2
Audit Approach 3
Audit Scope and Objectives 3
Audit Methodologies 4
Report Organization 5
CHAPTER II - STATEWIDE VOTER REGISTRATION SYSTEM 7
Introduction 7
Montana's Statewide Voter Registration System 7
Audit Risks Associated with SVRS 7
SVRS Data Integrity 8
Deceased Individuals and Incarcerated Felons Eligible to Vote 8
Voters with Duplicate Records 9
Inaccuracies Identified in SVRS Date of Birth Records 9
Problems with Ineligible and Duplicated Voters Linked to Unique Identifiers 10
Inconsistencies in County Procedures for Purging SVRS Records 10
Secretary of State Should Actively Manage SVRS 11
System Access 11
Excessive Access to SVRS Voter Records 11
Secretary of State's Office Should Enforce System Access Policies 12
County IT Security 12
Inconsistent Implementation of SVRS Security 13
Survey Results Confirmed Security Weaknesses 13
Secretary of State Should Support County IT Security 14
System Maintenance 15
SOS System Maintenance Procedures 15
System Outages Affected Elections Administrations 16
Secretary of State's Office Should Revise Service Agreements for SVRS 16
CHAPTER III - VOTER IDENTIFICATION AND INFORMATION 17
Introduction 17
HAVA Changes in Registration Procedures 17
Assessment of Montana's Voter Identification Procedures 18
County Election Officials Survey Responses 18
2006 General Election Observations 19
Introduction of ID Requirements has been Largely Successful 20
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Inconsistencies in Use of Polling Place Elector ID Forms 20
Elections Guidance Should Emphasize Alternative Identification Options 20
Voter Information Requirements 21
Election Day Observations and Survey Results 21
Secretary of State Should Address Inconsistencies in Voter Information 23
CHAPTER IV - LATE REGISTRATION 25
Introduction 25
Late Registration and HAVA 25
Late Registration Data 25
Election Day Registrations 25
Late Registration Impact on County Voter Turnout 26
County Election Officials Input on Late Registration 27
Election Officials Foresee Further Issues with Late Registration 28
Validity of Election Day Registrations 28
Secretary of State Developed Reconciliation Procedures for Late Registrants 28
Fraud Risk for Late Registrations is Elevated but Remains Low 29
Improved Planning for Late Registration is Necessary 29
Election Officials Not Prepared for Additional Registration Activity 29
Secretary of State's Office Should Lead Efforts to Manage Late Registration 30
Election Day Registration in Other States 30
Increase in Election Day Registrations May Require Further Legislation 31
CHAPTER V - VOTING SYSTEMS 33
Introduction
HAVA Voting Systems Requirements
Replacement of Obsolete Voting Systems 34
Montana has Implemented HAVA Voting Systems Replacement 34
Changes in County Voting Systems 34
Analysis of Residual Voting Data 36
Voting Systems and the Residual Vote in 2006 37
Secretary of State Precinct Counter Purchase Program 39
Potential Impacts of Voting Systems on Montana Elections 39
Two-Tier Structure for Vote Counting Exists in Montana 39
Common Standard for Voting Systems 40
Survey Results Support Precinct Count Benefits 41
Financial Concerns Prevent Counties from Adopting New Voting Systems 42
Secretary of State's Office Should Plan Transition to Common Standard for Voting
Systems 42
Voting Systems Error Testing 43
Montana Statute Establishes Voting System Testing Standards 43
Testing Procedures Do Not Ensure Statewide Coverage 44
CHAPTER VI - PROVISIONAL AND ABSENTEE VOTING 45
Introduction 45
Provisional Voting 45
Provisional Voting Data for Montana Elections 45
3D
Ill
Election Observations and Survey Results 46
Provisional Voting is Working Well in Montana 47
Absentee Voting 47
Absentee Voting Data 48
2006 General Elections Observations 48
Survey Results Reveal Inconsistencies in Absentee Voting Procedures 49
Vulnerabilities Exist with Absentee Voting in Montana 51
Addressing Inconsistencies in Absentee Voting Procedures 51
Secretary of State Should Lead Efforts to Standardize Absentee Voting 51
CHAPTER VII - POLLING PLACE ACCESSIBILITY 53
Introduction 53
Audit Work Relating to Accessibility 53
Polling Place Accessibility 53
Trends in Accessibility Status 54
November 2006 General Elections Observations 55
HAVA Accessibility Grant Program 55
Survey Responses Relating to Accessibility Grants 56
Ongoing Management of Accessibility Issues Required at the State Level 56
Automark Assisted Voting Machines 57
Purchase and Deployment of Automarks 57
Functionality and Security Testing 58
Automark Observations for 2006 General Election 58
Survey Responses Relating to Automarks 59
Improvements Needed in Operation of Automark Systems 60
Automark Technology is Innovative, but has Weaknesses 61
Familiarity Should Remedy Some Problems 61
SOS Should Provide Specific Written Instructions on Automark Use 61
CHAPTER VIII - FUNDING ELECTION REFORM 63
Introduction 63
Funding and the Future of Elections in Montana 63
HAVA Budgets and Expenditures 63
Survey Results Relating to HAVA Funding 65
County Election Officials Assessment of Future Needs 65
Viability of Montana's Elections Funding Structure 67
Funding Sources and Assignment of Responsibility for Elections Reforms are Unclear
67
Best Practices Emphasize Long-Term Perspectives and Shared Responsibility 67
Montana's Experiences are not Consistent with Best Practices 67
Secretary of State's Office Should Begin Exploring Funding Options 68
APPENDIX A - AUDIT APPROACH 71
Audit Scope 71
Audit Methodologies 71
Statutory References 71
Agency Interviews and Observations 71
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Review of Agency Documents and Records 72
Statewide Voter Registration System 72
Automark Voting System Testing 72
Election Day Observations 73
County Election Officials Survey, Interviews and Observations 73
Review of Elections Returns and other Data 73
Information from Federal Agencies, Other States, and Other Sources 73
OFFICE RESPONSE B-l
The Office of the Secretary of State B-3
Figures and Tables
Figures
Figure 1 Statewide Voter Registration System 7
Figure 2 Election Day Late Registration Activity by County 28
Figure 3 Montana County Voting Systems by Type and Sub-Type 36
Figure 4 Residual Voting Trends by Voting System 38
Figure 5 Polling Place Accessibility Status 54
Figure 6 Survey Responses Relating to Anticipated Future Expenditures 66
Tables
Table 1 Montana HAVA Grant Awards and Expenditures 3
Table 2 Survey Responses Relating to SVRS Purge Procedures 10
Table 3 Survey Responses Relating to County IT Security 14
Table 4 Survey Responses Relating to Voter Identification Requirements 18
Table 5 Voter Experiences with Identification Procedures 19
Table 6 Survey Responses Relating to Voter Information Requirements 22
Table 7 Survey Responses Relating to Late Registration 27
Table 8 Election Day Registrations in Other States 30
Table 9 Residual Vote Trend in Montana Federal Elections 37
Table 10 Survey Responses Relating to Voting Systems Changes 41
Table 11 Provisional Voting Data 46
Table 12 Montana Absentee Voting Data 48
Table 13 Survey Responses Relating to Absentee Voting 50
Table 14 Election Day Automark Use and Operation 59
Table 15 Survey Responses Relating to Automark Systems 60
Table 16 HAVA Expenditures versus Budgets 64
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Elected, Appointed and Administrative Officials
The Office of the Secretary of
State
Brad Johnson, Secretary of State
Ralph Peck, Chief Deputy Secretary of State
Duane Winslow, Interim Elections Deputy
Janice Doggett, Chief Legal Counsel
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Report Summary
The Help America Vote Act and Related Elections Issues
Election reform efforts have had a significant impact on voting in Montana; state
and county election officials can make further improvements to promote equity and
effective administration in elections.
Audit Findings
The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) and other election reform efforts have been underway
in Montana since 2002. The Legislative Audit Committee prioritized a performance audit
of HAVA and related elections issues. Audit work included testing of the new statewide
voter registration system (SVRS) developed by the Secretary of State's (SOS) office. We
identified concerns with data integrity, including failure to remove ineligible deceased
and felon voters from the rolls, and problems with unique identifier numbers. Review of
SVRS access and security procedures also identified areas where the SOS office could
tighten security and provide better assistance to counties. Review of system maintenance
procedures identified weaknesses, which caused SVRS to experience outages on several
occasions prior to the 2006 elections (Chapter II).
MT HAVA Budget
HAVA Activity
Budget
(millions)
Voting Accessibility
15.7
SVRS
$5.3
Education & Training
$2.1
Voting Systems
$1.9
Future Contingency/Interest
$2.1
SOS Administration
$0.3
Total
$17.4
Source: Compiled by the Legislative
Audit Division from SOS office records
In relation to new voter identification
requirements,auditworkshowedimprovements
are necessary in the use of alternative ID
options in polling places. We also identified
concerns with the lack of legally-mandated
voter information in polling places across the
state (Chapter III). We addressed the effects
of new late registration provisions and found a
lack of planning contributed to problems with
late registrants during the 2006 elections. The
SOS office may have to prepare for further
changes as late registration could become
more widespread in the future (Chapter IV).
HAVA made changes in voting systems, including prohibition of some voting equipment.
Review of Montana voting systems changes shows some votes still have a better chance
being counted depending on location (Chapter V). Recent election reform efforts have also
included introduction of provisional voting and the expansion of absentee voting (Chapter
VI). Although provisional voting has been introduced without any problems, we identified
concerns with disparities in the treatment of absentee ballots.
Voting accessibility for people with disabilities was a major focus of HAVA. Audit work
shows Montana has made progress in making polling places more accessible. Further
improvements in this area should be targeted to address remaining accessibility problems.
HAVA also mandated provision of accessible voting systems in each polling place. Montana
purchased and distributed accessible Automark voting systems, which we found were subject
to a high rate of operational error during the November 2006 elections (Chapter VII).
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Montana Legislative Audit Division
The final chapter of this report addresses funding requirements for HAVA and other
election reform efforts. Recent changes in elections administration will require long-term
funding and some reassessment of the balance of responsibility between state and county
governments. Our review of election funding issues identified opportunities for a thorough
review of current funding structures.
Audit Recommendations
All audit recommendations are addressed to the SOS office and generally address
improvements in internal policies and procedures, training provision for election workers,
coordination/standardization between different counties, and the adoption of a more long-
term management approach for certain elections issues.
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION AND
BACKGROUND
Introduction
The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) was passed by Congress in 2002, largely in
response to issues with the 2000 presidential elections. HAVA was developed to remedy
these issues by imposing uniform standards on state administration of elections. These
developments emphasized the fact that apparently minor errors and inconsistencies in
elections administration can have far-reaching consequences. The principle that every vote
is counted on an equal basis is fundamental to the integrity of the democratic process. This
principle was also demonstrated by an example from Montana's own electoral process. In
the 2004 elections, effective control of the Montana House of Representatives was decided
by a single vote. A decision by the Montana Supreme Court in the case of a disputed result
in a house district rested on only one ballot.
HAVA in Montana
Montana elections are administered by county Clerk and Recorders or Election
Administrators. The state's chief election officer is the Secretary of State (SOS), whose
office is responsible for implementing state elections laws, providing support to county
election officials, and officially certifying election results. The SOS and many local election
officials also have additional duties unrelated to elections. Montana's implementation of
HAVA has been ongoing since 2002 and has involved both the SOS office and local election
officials. HAVA election reform has involved changes in state statutes and administrative
rules, establishing new election functions, competencies and procedures, training elections
workers in new election duties, purchasing new elections equipment, and investing in new
information and other systems resources.
HAVA Requirements
HAVA has also led to an important shift in the balance between federal, state and local
government authority over elections procedures. Traditionally, elections have been
administered by county governments with minimal direction from above. Supporters
of HAVA election reforms contended this decentralization of authority has contributed
to wide variations in who gets to vote and how voting is conducted. HAVA aims for a
greater degree of uniformity in elections procedures, with the end result being greater
participation and less discrimination in the electoral process. HAVA attempts to achieve
this by establishing common standards for elections enforced at the federal level and
implemented by state and local governments.
Changes Mandated Under HAVA
HAVA requires states make various changes in elections procedures and imposes deadlines
for state compliance with these changes. From the state and local perspective, the most
important provisions of HAVA are those mandating specific changes in election laws or
procedures, which are summarized as follows:
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Statewide voter registration system - states are required to establish and
maintain a uniform, official, centralized, interactive, computerized statewide
voter registration list. The system is to be maintained at the state level and
contain all voter registration records for all jurisdictions.
Voter registration and identification - states are required to ensure individuals
registering to vote provide verification of their identity using driver's licenses,
social security numbers or some other valid form of identification.
♦
Voter information - states are required to ensure all polling places contained
information for voters addressing voting instructions and voting rights.
♦ Replacement of voting machines - states are required to replace all punch card
and lever voting machines, which had been linked to errors and inaccuracies
during the 2000 elections.
♦ Voting systems standards - states are required to make changes in voting
systems. These changes include allowing voters to check ballot accuracy and
request replacement ballots, notifying voters of errors on ballots, enforcing a
manual audit capacity for voting systems, establishing minimum error rates for
voting equipment, and defining what constitutes a valid vote.
♦ Provisional voting - states are required to establish the right to a provisional
ballot for individuals claiming legal registration. Additional requirements
involved developing procedures to handle and verify provisional ballots, and
inform voters of the status of these ballots.
♦ Absentee voting - H AVA requires states to identify a single point of contact for
absentee voting for military personnel and overseas citizens and compile data on
absentee voting.
♦ Polling place and voting system accessibility - HAVA provides funding to
help make polling places accessible to people with disabilities. Voting system
standards also include a requirement that each polling place contain voting
equipment accessible to people with disabilities.
♦ HAVA administration and funding - states are required to compile and submit
state plans addressing compliance with HAVA. Various provisions within HAVA
allocate and appropriate funding for different activities mandated under the act.
Funding for HAVA Requirements
Congress appropriated almost $3 billion to fund HAVA election reforms in the states.
Funding was generally allocated based on state populations and polling places. The
following table shows Montana's HAVA funding allocation and actual expenditures by
fiscal year.
Table 1
Montana HAVA Grant Awards and Expenditures
Fiscal Year 2003 Through Fiscal Year 2007
Fiscal Year
Grant Awards*
Expenditures
2003
$5,003,440
$17,199
2004
$4,199,620
$1,440529
2005
$139,346
$2,358,582
2006
$7,828,250
$8,234,299
2007
$175,666
$1,700316
Total
$17,361,482
$13,750,926
Funds Remaining
$3,610,556
Montana has received around $17.3
million to fund HAVA-related activities.
The state established a federal special
revenue account within the SOS office to
account for the funding. To date, HAVA
expenditures have totaled approximately
$13.7 million, leaving around $3.6 million
in remaining funding for future activities.
The majority of these expenditures were
made between the 2004 and 2006 general
elections when most of the federal HAVA
deadlines came into force.
States were permitted significant latitude
in how they implemented HAVA and
how funding was allocated between
different activities. Montana's funding
priorities are outlined in the Montana
State HAVA plan, which was released
in 2003 and amended in 2005. Montana's HAVA state plan was developed by the SOS
office in collaboration with a broad range of groups, officials and individuals involved
with elections administration Roughly two thirds of Montana's proposed expenditures
were for costs relating to polling place and voting accessibility for people with disabilities
(34 percent), and development of the statewide voter registration system (32 percent). Aside
from these two large expenditure areas, around 11 percent of funds were budgeted for the
purchase of new voting systems equipment for counties, and 13 percent was allocated to
various education, outreach and training activities for the voting public and for election
officials and poll workers. Remaining funds were allocated to administrative expenditures
in the SOS office (2 percent) and future contingencies and ongoing maintenance costs
(8 percent).
* Including interest and other earnings.
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from
SABHRS records.
Audit Approach
The Legislative Audit Committee prioritized a performance audit of HAVA and related
elections administration issues. We conducted an initial assessment of risks related to
these issues prior to the implementation of HAVA, and recommended a performance audit
be postponed until major changes in elections procedures were implemented by SOS and
counties.
Audit Scope and Objectives
Audit scope was determined primarily through reference to the specific provisions of HAVA
affecting the administration of elections in Montana. In addition to HAVA provisions, we
also expanded audit scope to include other recent changes in Montana's elections laws.
These additional changes have included the introduction of late registration (including
registration on Election Day), and the expansion in availability of absentee voting. Although
these other changes are not directly related to HAVA, they were a significant issue during
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Montana Legislative Audit Division
the last election cycle and have affected implementation of HAVA provisions. Our scope
was established to focus specifically on the last two general election cycles (2004 and
2006), but some trend analysis also includes prior election cycles.
Audit objectives were based on information and input gathered during audit planning
work. In general, our objectives addressed the efficiency and effectiveness of elections
administration through the Secretary of State's office and whether the office had taken
the necessary steps to ensure effective implementation of various election reforms at
the county level. Specifically, we developed objectives to address the following areas of
elections reform:
♦ Security and stability of the statewide voter registration system.
♦ Implementation status of new voter identification and information requirements.
♦ Assessment of the impacts of late registration.
♦ Changes in county voting systems and equipment.
♦ Provisional and absentee voting.
♦ Accessibility for individuals with disabilities.
♦ Funding requirements for HAVA and other election reform efforts.
Audit Methodologies
To address our audit objectives, we developed various methodologies including the
following:
♦ 2006 General Election observations - audit staff conducted polling place
observations during the November 2006 General Elections. Observations were
conducted in 86 different polling places in 30 Montana counties. Audit staff
observed over 1,300 voters and these observations were used as a statistical
sample for a variety of election procedure attributes.
♦ Analysis of statewide voter registration system (SVRS) data - under our
first audit objective, information systems auditors conducted extensive testing
and analysis of SVRS functionality and security features. SVRS data was also
used extensively in analysis of the attributes of Montana's voting population and
trends in voting behaviors.
♦ Survey of county election officials - we developed an online survey to obtain
input from Montana's county election officials. The survey was sent to election
officials in all 56 counties and over 80 percent responded to the survey to provide
input on their experiences in implementing HAVA and elections administration
in general.
In addition, audit work was conducted in many areas addressing specific aspects of HAVA
or other elections laws. Appendix A of this report provides a full discussion of audit scope,
objectives and methodologies.
Report Organization
The remainder of this report is organized in chapters addressing specific functional aspects
of elections administration. For each of these functional areas, we provide conclusions
and recommendations relating to the implementation status of various changes in
elections administration, the extent of compliance with HAVA (where applicable), and the
effectiveness of the controls put in place by the SOS office. Specifically, we address the
following areas:
♦ Chapter II - Statewide Voter Registration System
♦ Chapter III - Voter Identification and Information
♦ Chapter IV - Late Registration
♦ Chapter V - Voting Systems
♦ Chapter VI - Provisional and Absentee Voting
♦ Chapter VII - Polling Place Accessibility
♦ Chapter VIII - Funding Election Reform
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CHAPTER II - STATEWIDE VOTER
REGISTRATION SYSTEM
Introduction
The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) was enacted to improve the fairness and accuracy of
elections through reform of elections administration and maintenance of voter information.
As part of these reforms, HAVA requires states develop a central uniform voter database.
Montana's Statewide Voter Registration System
In order to comply with HAVA, the Secretary of State's (SOS) office implemented the
Statewide Voter Registration System (SVRS) in August of 2005. The Montana SVRS is a
voter registration database where all voter records for the state of Montana are to be held.
Another function of the SVRS is to serve as an interface for county election officials to
enter, update, and delete voter information, as well as identifying potential ineligible voter
records to be removed from the active voter list. The SVRS has controls in place to identify
the records of voters who are deceased, incarcerated felons, and underage, as well as voters
who have duplicate records.
The SVRS is a centralized application system used by all counties to access all Montana
voter records. When an individual registers to vote at a county Clerk and Recorder's office,
their information is entered and stored in the SVRS. The following figure illustrates SVRS
functionality.
Figure 1
Statewide Voter Registration System
State of Montana Gateway
Internal Network - State of Montana
Clerk & Recorder
Desktop
Citrix Gateway -
Where outside users enter
the state network through the Internet
■'II
□□□□ ODD
::»::
■■■■ ■■■
1
:::■£::
Application Server- Oracle Server-
Stores the SVRS Application Stores the SVRS database
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from information obtained from the Secetary of State's
Office and the Department of Administration.
Audit Risks Associated with SVRS
Although the SVRS can serve as a useful tool for central storage and uniform administration
of voter records, it also holds extremely valuable information. Access to SVRS data by
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unauthorized individuals could result in manipulation of voter data, or identity theft.
Considering the risk involved with the SVRS, we conducted audit work over the security
of the system and the integrity of voter data, including:
♦ Assessment of data integrity (accuracy and completeness of voter information).
♦ Review of SVRS user access.
♦ Evaluation of security procedures for SVRS desktops at the county level.
♦ Evaluation of the effectiveness of system maintenance procedures.
SVRS Data Integ rity
The SVRS is comprised of data for every registered voter, including name, date of birth,
address, voting history, and a unique identifier (driver's license number or last four digits
Social Security Number). SVRS data is used by counties to ensure only eligible voters
can participate in the electoral process. HAVA specifies any SVRS system a state chooses
to implement must have tools to remove ineligible voters, including duplicate entries,
deceased voters, and incarcerated felons. Voter records in the SVRS are matched against
databases from the Department of Corrections (DOC), the Department of Public Health
and Human Services (DPHHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to identify ineligible
voter records. When the SVRS identifies an ineligible voter, it is the responsibility of
county election officials to remove these voters from the active voter registry in the SVRS.
For this matching process to work, it is important that voter record data is complete and
accurate. Specifically, each voter record requires a unique identifier to ensure a successful
match with one of the other state databases and with other records in the system.
Deceased Individuals and Incarcerated Felons Eligible to Vote
We conducted audit work to determine if the SVRS is effective in removing deceased and
incarcerated felons using a computer assisted audit tool to compare voter records with
data from the DOC and DPHHS databases. Our analysis identified exceptions including
223 eligible voters who were considered incarcerated felons and 36 eligible voters who are
deceased. Further analysis showed these numbers were not accurate because the data from
the DOC and DPHHS was outdated. The felon data had not been updated since August of
2006, nearly three months prior to the last general election and the deceased data had not
been updated since November of 2005, a year prior to the last general election.
We notified the SOS office its data was not current. According to the SOS office, the staff
members who were most familiar with SVRS operations left the office without documenting
instructions on how the system data is updated. As a result, the SOS office was relying
heavily on the system vendor to maintain and operate the SVRS and did not obtain a
complete understanding of SVRS functionality. This resulted in felon and deceased voter
data not being updated. In February and March of 2007, the office had updated the DPHHS
and DOC data. Once data was current, we re-analyzed the voter data. Our results still
showed 57 incarcerated felons and 37 deceased individuals eligible to vote. Based on this,
the potential exists that a deceased voter record could be used to vote, but our testing did
not identify evidence showing deceased individuals or incarcerated felons had voted.
Voters with Duplicate Records
County election officials can utilize the SVRS to identify duplicate records. When a new
voter is entered into the system, the SVRS returns a notification showing whether the new
voter may already have a record. This notification also provides a confidence rating based on
the amount of voter information matching between the new record and an existing record.
The confidence rating is based on the voter's name, date of birth, and driver's license or last
four digits of Social Security Number (SSN). If all identifiers are matched, the SVRS will
return a 100 confidence rating meaning the likelihood of a duplicate is high. If only some
of the identifiers match, confidence ratings of 90, 80, or 70 are returned. County election
official review potential duplicates to determine if there is a match and update the records
accordingly. We tested SVRS data to determine if this process is working to ensure voters
do not have multiple records.
Testing for duplicate voter records involved analyzing SVRS voter data by comparing
records sharing common identifiers. Our testing showed 78 voters have active duplicate
voter records in the SVRS. No evidence was found indicating these individuals voted more
than once in any election. However, it is important to note that we only included results
producing the highest confidence rating. Additional comparisons returned other potential
duplicate records, but they did not produce a high enough confidence rating to conclude the
duplicate records belonged to a single voter. Regardless, the potential exists an individual
could submit multiple votes in a single election.
Inaccuracies Identified in SVRS Date of Birth Records
Review of SVRS data also identified numerous examples of active voter records with
apparently inaccurate date of birth entries. Date of birth is one of the unique identifiers
used to distinguish voters and is also necessary to identify whether an individual is old
enough to vote. Our review of SVRS data identified the following anomalies in date of
birth records:
♦ SVRS shows 37 active voters whose date of birth indicates they are less than 18
years old and should, therefore, be designated as inactive in the system.
♦ The system contains records for approximately 480 voters whose dates of birth
are incorrectly formatted (for example, many of these incorrect records show
birth dates in the first century A.D.).
♦ SVRS records for around 1,960 active voters show the individuals are more than
120 years old.
SVRS controls prevent election officials from entering incorrect/ineligible dates in the
date of birth field, so these inaccuracies must be attributable to merging of legacy records
from previous systems. For some of these legacy records, a date of birth would not have
been required or was not collected. However, these records have not been updated and
remain in the system associated with active registered voters.
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Problems with Ineligible and Duplicated
Voters Linked to Unique Identifiers
County election officials and SOS have controls in place to identify and deactivate
ineligible voter records, deceased voter records, incarcerated felon records, and duplicate
records. However, these controls are not being used by counties on a consistent basis. In
order for these controls to work, each voter record must have a unique identifier such as a
driver's license number or SSN. The identifiers are required to match voter records against
records from the DPHHS and DOC databases. These identifiers are also needed to provide
a high confidence rating when the system identifies potential duplicates. The SVRS has
edits requiring all new voter records to have a unique identifier. However, all voter records
created prior to the implementation of the SVRS were imported directly into the system
and bypassed this control. As a result, 242,465 active voters do not have a unique identifier.
There are also currently no procedures in place to update this information.
Inconsistencies in County Procedures for Purging SVRS Records
We asked county election officials several survey questions relating to procedures for
purging (removing) ineligible or duplicated voters from the SVRS. The following table
summarizes responses to selected questions.
Table 2
Survey Responses Relating to SVRS Purge Procedures
Question
Response Options
Response
Percentage
What method or
methods do you
use to identify and
remove deceased
voters from the
voter registration
list?
Failure to respond to registration notices
7%
Contact from family member or direct knowledge
64%
Use SVRS interface with state records (DPHHS)
31%
Review of local newspapers for death notices
76%
Reports or information from other county
government offices
71%
Other
24%
What method or
methods do you
use to identify
and remove
incarcerated felons
from the voter
registration list?
Use SVRS interface with state criminal records
22%
Review of local newspapers/media for court reports
of felony convictions
8%
Reports or information from county attorney's office
or local police departments
56%
Other
42%
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from survey data collected from county
election officials.
11
The SVRS provides the SOS a consistent and centralized tool for identifying and removing
deceased and incarcerated felon voter records. However, the survey results show a minority
are using the SVRS to assist them in removing deceased and incarcerated felons. The
results also demonstrate a wide variety of methods are being used throughout the different
counties to accomplish this task. From county to county, how effectively ineligible records
are being purged can vary. Based on our audit findings, and the existence of a number
active voter records that should have been purged, there are clearly weaknesses with the
inconsistent and varied procedures in place.
Secretary of State Should Actively Manage SVRS
Since the state now has a centralized voter registration system in place, centralized
management should be implemented to maintain it. The SOS should take a more active
management role, and should help facilitate the following:
♦ Each county should use the SVRS as a primary method of identifying deceased,
incarcerated felon, and duplicate voter records.
♦ Each county must ensure all voter records are complete, accurate, and include a
unique identifier so the system can effectively identify ineligible voters and limit
the potential for fraud and error.
♦ Policy should be developed to provide the counties with guidelines on how to
implement SVRS ineligible voter checks and how to manage and update voter
information within their county.
Recommendation # 1
We recommend the Secretary of State's office work with counties to develop
a statewide data integrity improvement plan addressing the updating and
maintenance of voter information and uniform implementation of SVRS
controls throughout the state.
System Access
To access the SVRS, an individual is required to have an authorized user account with a
unique state issuedID andpassword. These accounts are createdby SOS office administrators
and at the county level. It is the administrator's responsibility to limit the level of access an
individual has by assigning different privileges based on job responsibilities.
Excessive Access to SVRS Voter Records
We used a computer assisted auditing tool to analyze SVRS user data to ensure only
authorized users with acceptable privileges are able to access SVRS data. Our analysis
returned the following results:
♦ County administrative access should only be assigned to Clerk and Recorders
and county election administrators. Our analysis returned 57 county admin
accounts belonging to users who are not county election administrators. This
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results in users who do not have the proper authority being able to create
additional user accounts. This increases the possibility of unauthorized access
to SVRS data.
♦ SOS Elections Bureau staff have been granted system access allowing them to
assign administrative privileges used to change or add voter information. The
ability to change and update local voter information should only reside with
county staff.
♦ Two third-party vendors and one former employee have access allowing them
to change, remove, or add voter information (SOS has since deactivated these
accounts.
♦ Twenty-five accounts exist without a state assigned ID and seventy-five
accounts had been assigned an ID but to a generic name. Generic accounts do
not maintain any individual responsibility. If an individual removed or changed
voter information, there would be no accountability because the account cannot
be traced back to a specific individual).
Secretary of State's Office Should Enforce System Access Policies
The SOS currently reviews the SVRS access list on a biannual basis for accounts no longer
being used. However, they do not have procedures to review or analyze the access list for
individuals with excessive access or individuals who should have no access. There is also no
policy or procedure in place to ensure all users can be identified to hold them accountable
in the event they remove, change, or add voter information without authorization.
Recommendation #2
We recommend the Secretary of State's office improve controls over
SVRS access by:
A. Developing procedures to comprehensively review access to the SVRS to
ensure authorized individuals have access appropriate to their job duties;
AND
B. Working with counties to develop policies and procedures to ensure system
users can be uniquely identified.
County IT Security
The SVRS is accessed using desktop computers connected to the Internet at county
election offices across the state. The SOS office maintains it is the responsibility of each
county to provide security over the desktops used to access the SVRS. However, many of
the counties do not have IT professionals on staff, or rely on a third-party vendor to supply
IT support for their networks and desktops. As a result, the level of security from county to
county is inconsistent. Audit work was conducted in three different counties to determine
what levels of security are being implemented to SVRS desktops at the counties. We also
surveyed county election officials regarding what type of IT support they have in place and
how they are securing their desktops.
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Inconsistent Implementation of SVRS Security
To test the security levels on the SVRS desktops, we developed a checklist based on
security requirements outlined in state policy and potential security threats identified
by the Department of Administration. The checklist included testing addressing remote
connectivity (third-party access to desktops), physical access (protection from unauthorized
public access), outdated software (operating systems no longer supported by vendors or
systems not current with important security updates and patches), anti-virus (presence of
current anti-virus software), surf-controls exemption (blocking dangerous or unnecessary
websites), and default accounts and local administrative accounts (Windows operating
systems come with default guest and admin accounts, which are well known and can be
exploited).
We visited the county election offices in three different counties. At each location, we
tested two machines commonly used to access the SVRS system. As a result of our testing,
we identified appropriate controls functioning in the following areas:
♦ All counties were supporting their operating systems.
♦ All counties had current anti-virus.
♦
All counties had a surf-control filter to prevent users from accessing dangerous
sites on the Internet.
We also identified several areas where county desktop security procedures could be
improved, which are listed as follows:
♦ All counties had security vulnerabilities as a result of missing patches.
♦ One county was configured to allow remote connectivity.
♦ One county had a desktop physically available to the public.
♦ All counties still had default user accounts active on the SVRS desktops.
♦ All counties configured their desktops to lock after 10 to 15 minutes of inactivity,
but this function was disabled in two counties.
Survey Results Confirmed Security Weaknesses
Security vulnerabilities are most likely more prevalent in counties not having acceptable
levels of IT support. We conducted a survey of county election officials, which included
various questions about county IT security issues. Responses for selected survey questions
are included in the following table.
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Montana Legislative Audit Division
Table 3
Survey Responses Relating to County IT Security
Question
Response Options
Response
Percentage
Who is responsible for computer
security and maintenance for your
county?
Full-time IT staff
36%
Part-time IT staff
2%
Other county employee
29%
Private contractor
26%
Other
7%
How often does your county
perform updates or install patches
for computer operating systems
or security software?
Daily
24%
Weekly
24%
Monthly
9%
Every few months
12%
Annually
2%
Don't Know
29%
How would you rate the
information and advice provided
by the Secretary of State's
office and/or the system vendor
regarding IT system security for
running SVRS?
Excellent
10%
Good
22%
OK
45%
Poor
10%
Did not receive information
13%
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from survey data collected from county
election officials.
Based on survey results, there is a wide disparity in how counties are securing SVRS
desktops. In terms of updating and patching their desktop operating systems, 48 percent
of counties perform this task at least on a weekly basis. However, 14 percent of counties
represent they do not even perform this task on a monthly basis and 29 percent state they
cannot identify if or when this process occurs. Security patches are designed to resolve
vulnerabilities in operating system that could be exploited by an outside threat such as a
hacker or a virus. Since the SVRS is centralized, if one county has not sufficiently secured
their desktops, this could affect the operations of all counties. Another concern is some of
the counties may not have a proper understanding of how to secure their SVRS desktops.
Survey results show 29 percent rely on non-IT personnel to handle maintenance and
security their computers. An additional 13 percent stated they have received no assistance
from the SOS office.
Secretary of State Should Support County IT Security
Audit work shows there is no consistent level of security implemented by the counties. The
SVRS is a centralized system and all of the counties rely on it. If one desktop is exploited,
15
voter data throughout the state could be jeopardized. The office has developed a help desk
including an audit function designed to identify security threats at the county level and
provide assistance to resolve those threats.
To assist counties in developing a more consistent approach to securing their SVRS desktops,
the SOS office should establish guidelines detailing desktop security requirements to be
uniformly implemented by all counties. Using the help desk function, the SOS would have
a mechanism to assist counties that may not have adequate IT support in meeting these
designated security requirements. Included in the help desk the SOS could also implement
an audit function where random reviews of county SVRS desktop security is performed to
ensure the counties are meeting security requirements. If the help desk identifies security
weaknesses at a specific county, that function could be used to provide assistance in
strengthening IT security.
Recommendation #3
We recommend the Secretary of State's office assist counties in
implementing effective desktop security procedures by:
A. Developing SVRS desktop security procedures at the county level; AND
B. Providing counties with desktop security advice and guidance through the
SVRS help desk; AND
C. Implementing an audit process to identify security weaknesses at the county
level.
System Maintenance
Throughout the lifecycle of an IT system, upgrades, regular maintenance, and improvements
will be required. In order to implement a change in a complex system, it is important
to have a change management procedure in place to ensure a system change does not
negatively impact operations. A change management process is always an important part
of maintaining the SVRS, but in the few weeks leading up to an election, it is especially
important. Due to the high number of voters registering during this time period, the SVRS
needs to remain available at all times. The SOS office has issued instructions to counties
on how to register voters in the event of a system outage. However, to further minimize
any risk that voters could be discouraged from registering or voting, an effective change
control process must be in place to ensure the SVRS is always available. If an outage
does occur, a backup system should be implemented to provide alternative access to the
system.
SOS System Maintenance Procedures
According to SOS IT management, when a change is made to the system, a process is in
place to ensure the changes do not hinder SVRS operations. If county election officials
identify a problem with the operation of the SVRS, they can submit a request to the system
vendor. The vendor will provide the SOS office with the request for change to the system for
approval. If approved, the vendor will update and test the SVRS with the requested change.
Once the vendor determines the change is working as intended and has not negatively
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affected the SVRS, they provide the SOS office with the updated system. The updated
system is then sent to the Information Technology Services Division (ITSD) where further
testing involving county users is conducted. If the county users approve of the change and
verify the SVRS is working as expected, the system will be put into full service.
System Outages Affected Elections Administrations
Audit work identified exceptions to this change control process resulting in extended outages
to the SVRS around Election Day. On October 16, 2006, the SVRS system experienced
an outage for four hours, leaving county election staff unable to register voters during
that time period. We found this outage was due to a configuration change to a network
component critical to the SVRS. The SVRS was not tested following the configuration
change. When put back into production, the new configuration prevented counties from
accessing SVRS. The SVRS has a back-up system that is to be activated during situations
like this to prevent an outage. The back-up system was never implemented due to a
miscommunication between the SOS office and ITSD as to when the back-up activation
should occur.
On November 7, 2006, Election Day, another outage occurred. This outage could have
been prevented by ITSD installing a network patch released in August 2006, but the patch
was never installed. As with the previous outage, ITSD also did not implement the backup
system. This outage likely affected some of the hundreds of voters waiting in line at county
courthouses around the state. In our survey of county election officials we asked several
questions relating to system outages on or around the 2006 General Elections. Around
64 percent of county election officials reported these outages had a negative impact on
their operations.
Secretary of State's Office Should Revise Service Agreements for SVRS
The office and ITSD currently have a service level agreement (SLA) detailing what is
expected from each entity. The current SLA does not identify how a change control process
should be implemented. The SLA does not specify when, how, and by whom the backup
system should be implemented. Without the existence of clear language identifying roles
and duties, miscommunication has occurred between the office and ITSD, which resulted
in system outages.
Recommendation #4
We recommend the Secretary of State's office revise the current service
level agreement with the Information Technology Services Division to
include specific assignment of responsibilities and procedures relating
to the SVRS change control process and implementation of the back-up
system.
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CHAPTER III - VOTER IDENTIFICATION AND
INFORMATION
Introduction
Among the most visible results of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) have been new state
requirements that voters provide identification (ID) during registration and voting. New
voter ID requirements are linked to the establishment of the statewide voter registration
system (SVRS) discussed in the previous chapter. New voter ID standards are necessary
under HAVA to ensure statewide voter registration systems function correctly and do not
allow duplication of voter records.
HAVA also sets new standards for the availability of information for voters within polling
places. The Act places certain responsibilities on voters regarding identification and
registration, but also seeks to improve the level of information available to them within
polling places. Specifically, HAVA requires all polling places contain publicly posted
information including sample ballots, election dates and polling hours, voting instructions,
voting rights, and federal and state elections laws.
We conducted audit work to assess the impacts of the new voter identification requirements
on polling for the 2006 General Election. We also conducted work addressing the
availability of voter information within polling places. Findings and recommendations
relating to these two areas are summarized in the following sections.
HAVA Changes in Registration Procedures
Specific HAVA provisions for voter identification include the following requirements:
♦ Registration applications for federal elections must include a driver's license
number or the last four digits of a Social Security Number (SSN). For applicants
with neither number, a unique identifier number generated through the statewide
registration list can be used. States are required to ensure the statewide
registration list provides a means of verifying the identification numbers
provided by applicants.
♦ First-time voters and voters who register by mail must present one of the
following forms of ID when voting in person or by mail if they did not do so
when registering to vote:
• A current and valid photo identification; or
• Copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck,
or other government document showing the voter's name and address.
♦ Voters who cannot present the required forms of ID are given an alternative
voting option of casting a provisional ballot.
♦ HAVA establishes standardized language to be used in mail voter registration
forms containing questions regarding US citizenship and the applicant's age.
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Montana Legislative Audit Division
Montana law was revised in 2003 to incorporate changes in voter ID requirements
mandated under HAVA. Montana's election laws conform with HAVA because they
impose ID requirements on all voters, regardless of whether they are voting for the first
time or they registered by mail or in person. As explained in the Montana state HAVA
plan, ID requirements were applied universally in order to avoid the additional burden on
poll workers of distinguishing between first-time voters, mail-in registrants and transfer
voters.
Assessment of Montana's Voter Identification Procedures
All electors voting in person at Montana polling places must now present valid ID before
receiving a ballot. Montana law also allows for use of either a photo ID or another form
of ID that shows the voter's name and address. Statute establishes the right of voters to
receive a provisional ballot if they are unable to provide an acceptable form of ID. We
conducted audit work in various areas to determine how well Montana's new voter ID
requirements are working. The following sections outline analysis and findings from
survey responses from county election officials, and observations conducted during the
2006 General Election.
County Election Officials Survey Responses
We asked Montana's county election officials several questions about how new ID
requirements impacted election administration. The following table summarizes responses
to selected questions.
Table 4
Survey Responses Relating to Voter Identification Requirements
Question
Response Options
Response Percentage
Did the Secretary of State's office
provide you with clear guidance
on new voter ID requirements?
Yes
93%
No
7%
Do you think Montana's voter ID
requirements are too strict or not
strict enough?
Too strict
10%
About Right
80%
Not strict enough
10%
In your experience have the new
ID requirements prevented or
discouraged otherwise eligible
people from registering to vote?
Yes
12%
No
81%
Don't Know
7%
In your experience have the new
ID requirements been important
in deterring or preventing
electoral fraud?
Yes
44%
No
21%
Don't Know
35%
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from survey data collected from county
election officials.
19
Survey responses revealed several notable features regarding the views of county elections
officials on voter ID requirements:
♦ Over 90 percent of respondents agreed that the SOS office had provided clear
guidance on the ID issue. State officials devoted considerable time and effort
to public education and election worker training on ID requirements, and these
efforts appear to have contributed to a greater level of understanding among
county election officials.
♦ Eighty percent of respondents said the new requirements have been set at about
the right level, minorities of respondents thought ID requirements were either
too strict or not strict enough. This result probably reflects Montana's neutral
approach to the ID issue and the decision to apply ID requirements to all voters,
but not opt for strict photo ID-only standards.
♦ County election officials do not believe ID requirements have deterred eligible
voters from registering, but they are less sure if the new requirements have
affected electoral fraud. County officials with large numbers of voters tended
to be more convinced that new ID requirements had affected electoral fraud.
Conversely, county officials with small numbers of voters were more concerned
about the potential for ID requirements to discourage eligible voters from
registering.
2006 General Election Observations
Audit staff conducted polling place observations during the November 2006 General
Election and included review of the process followed by poll workers in checking
registration and identification information prior to issuing ballots. Observational data was
gathered to show whether poll workers were verifying voter ID, and what actions were
taken in cases where the voter was unable to produce the ID. The following table shows
sample attribute values for the different voting outcomes we observed. The projected
values for number of voters were calculated based on statistical analysis of sample data at
a confidence level of 90 percent (the numeric values represent the mean estimate within a
high low/range).
Table 5
Voter Experiences with Identification Procedures
2006 General Election
Identification Procedure Outcome
Sample Attribute
Percentage
Projected Number
of Voters
Failure to Verify ID
0.43%
1,768
No ID - Voter Leaves Polling Place
0.57%
2,343
No ID - Voter Uses Polling Place Elector ID Form
1.14%
4,686
No ID - Voter Uses Provisional Ballot
0.21%
863
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from Election Day voter observation data.
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Introduction of ID Requirements has been Largely Successful
The experience of the 2006 General Election suggests the introduction of voter ID
requirements in Montana has been mostly successful and has not resulted in widespread
problems. Montana has taken a balanced approach to ID requirements, which applies the
same standards to all voters, but also allows for both photo and document-type ID to be
used. As evidenced by Election Day observations, Montana's voter ID requirements have
generally been applied in a consistent manner across the state. One area of inconsistency
appears to be the use of the polling place elector ID form.
Conclusion
The introduction of new voter identification requirements in Montana has
been largely successful, but some inconsistencies remain in the use of
polling place elector ID forms.
Inconsistencies in Use of Polling Place Elector ID Forms
Observations also showed that there were variations in how voters without ID were treated
in polling places. We can estimate that around 7,900 or slightly fewer than 2 percent of
voters in the 2006 general elections were not able to produce a required form of ID when
casting a ballot. HAVA and Montana law allow voters unable to produce ID at the polling
place to use alternative means through either completing a polling place elector ID form,
or casting a provisional ballot.
Our voter observations indicate some voters were unable to present ID when they arrived
to vote and chose to leave the polling place. In some of these cases it was likely the voter
was able to retrieve required ID from a vehicle or lived/worked nearby and was able to
return with ID. For these voters, returning with ID was probably an easier option, but for
some other voters this may have been an inconvenience that could have been avoided by
using the polling place elector ID form. Our observations indicate poll workers were not
applying alternative ID options uniformly for all voters. These kinds of inconsistencies
could lead to some voters being turned-away from the polls unnecessarily and, possibly,
being unable to cast an otherwise eligible vote.
Elections Guidance Should Emphasize
Alternative Identification Options
Because of the potential impacts of the new HAVA ID requirements, the SOS office
conducted extensive training and public education efforts aimed at providing information
for poll workers and the voting public. The increased emphasis on HAVA ID requirements
may have led some poll workers to overlook the alternative ID options available to legally
registered voters or those claiming to be registered.
The Secretary of State's office should revise poll worker training materials and provide
appropriate guidance to county election officials to re-emphasize the availability of
alternative ID options. The successful introduction of ID requirements for Montana
elections means there is a lower risk that providing information on ID alternatives will
21
cause confusion among poll workers or voters. The SOS office could work collaboratively
with counties to identify where further training, assistance or guidance could be provided
to further improve the use of alternative ID options. By continuing to emphasize the
availability of alternative ID options, election officials can better ensure equal treatment
for all voters.
Recommendation #5
We recommend the Secretary of State's office continue to review and
revise training materials and other elections guidance to emphasize the
availability of polling place elector ID forms and work with counties to
ensure effective implementation.
Voter Information Requirements
HAVA mandates the provision and public posting of different types of information for
voters within polling places. The act specifies the following information be posted in
polling places:
♦ Sample version of the ballot that will be used for the election.
♦ Information regarding the date of the election and the hours during which polling
places will be open.
♦ Instructions on how to vote, including how to cast a vote and how to cast a
provisional ballot.
♦ Instructions for mail-in registrants and first-time voters.
♦ General information on voting rights under federal and state laws, including
information on the right to cast a provisional ballot and instructions on how to
contact the appropriate officials if these rights have been violated.
♦ General information on federal and state laws regarding prohibitions on acts of
fraud and misrepresentation.
Election Day Observations and Survey Results
Audit staff conducted Election Day observations during the 2006 General Election.
Observations were conducted in 86 different polling places in 30 counties. These
observations included assessment of the availability of HAVA-mandated voter information
within polling places. The following summarizes results from our observations of
information displayed in polling places:
♦ 84 percent displayed sample ballots used in the election.
♦ 21 percent displayed election dates and polling place opening/closing times.
♦ 43 percent displayed instructions for first-time or mail-in registrants.
♦ 74 percent displayed information on how to vote and provisional voting
procedures.
♦ 53 percent displayed general information on voting rights and elections laws.
♦ 6 percent displayed information on complaints procedures and contacting
elections officials.
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Montana Legislative Audit Division
Our Election Day observations indicate widespread disparities in the types of voter
information being made available in the state's polling places. The most consistency was
seen with sample ballots, which were available in nearly 85 percent of polling places, and
general voting procedures (including provisional voting), which were available in around
three quarters of poling places. For most of the other main information categories outlined
in HAVA, less than half of polling places were in compliance with legal requirements.
Of particular concern was the fact that only six percent of polling places publicly posted
information on contacting election officials with complaints about violations of voting
rights.
Concerns highlighted in our observational data were generally confirmed by responses to
our survey of county election officials. Responses to selected questions regarding polling
place information postings are included in the following table.
Table 6
Survey Responses Relating to Voter Information Requirements
Question
Response Options
Response
Percentage
Did you receive
informational posters and
flyers for use in polling
places from the Secretary of
State's office addressing any
of the following information?
How to cast a vote
35%
How to cast a provisional ballot
38%
ID requirements for all voters
100%
Information on voting rights and election laws
60%
According to your
instructions to poll workers
what kinds of voter
information are supposed
to be displayed in different
areas of polling places?
Sample ballot
98%
Date of election and polling place hours
67%
How to cast a ballot and vote provisionally
83%
Instructions for mail-in/first-time registrants
31%
Information on voting rights and election laws
79%
State elections complaints procedures
40%
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from survey data collected from county election officials.
As shown, when asked whether they had received polling place informational posters from
the SOS office, county election officials responded consistently for only one category (voter
ID requirements). For the other types of information referenced in the survey question,
significant proportions of counties reported receiving no information posters or flyers from
the SOS office. Similar responses were seen in relation to the instructions counties gave
to poll workers regarding voter information displays within polling places, which showed
little consistency between different counties. Documents provided by the SOS office show
counties should have received directives detailing the types of informational posters to
be posted in polling places. However, results from the field show this guidance was either
misinterpreted or ignored in some circumstances.
23
Secretary of State Should Address
Inconsistencies in Voter Information
Observation and survey response data clearly shows significant disparities in the level of
information provided to voters in polling places across the state. These disparities have
the potential to result in some voters being deprived of information that would assist them
in casting valid votes or effectively pursuing their rights under federal and state elections
laws. Under HAVA requirements each polling place in the state should be displaying a
prescribed minimum amount of information for voters. Coordinating separate provision
of this information among Montana's 56 counties could present difficulties and may not
ensure the required level of consistency. As an alternative, the SOS office and counties could
develop a uniform and standardized voter information display. By working collaboratively
with counties to develop informational displays, the SOS office may be able to help local
jurisdictions achieve greater levels of compliance with HAVA requirements. Ultimately,
this should be in the best interests of both state and county election officials and could
further their shared goals of providing voters with the best and most comprehensive
information available on voting procedures and voting rights. This voter information
display should be developed with a uniform format and include, at a minimum, the HAVA-
mandated information requirements.
Recommendation #6
We recommend the Secretary of State's office collaborate with counties
to develop, produce and distribute a uniform voter information display for
use in all Montana's polling places.
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25
CHAPTER IV - LATE REGISTRATION
Introduction
The 2006 elections featured extensive changes made under the Help America Vote Act
(HAVA), but were also the first time election officials dealt with other changes in elections
laws. Foremost amongst these changes was the introduction of late registration. State
elections laws were revised during the 2005 legislative session to allow voters to register
or change registration details in the 30 days leading up to and including Election Day.
Previously, voters wishing to change their records or unregistered individuals would be
ineligible to vote unless they registered 30 days in advance of Election Day. Throughout
this chapter we use the term 'late registration' to refer generically to all registration
actions for both new and transfer registrants (although there is a distinction between the
registration status of new and transfer registrants, the impact of late registration is the
same in both cases, i.e. the ability to register and vote where this would previously not have
been possible).
Late Registration and HAVA
Late registration was not mandated under HAVA and is not a requirement imposed by the
federal government. However, late registration many complement some of the changes
made under HAVA, many of which were designed to remove obstacles to registration and
voting. Another reason for addressing late registration in relation to HAVA election reform
is the impact seen in the 2006 General Election. Considerable numbers of voters took
advantage of late registration and this introduced an important new dynamic in the days
leading up to and including Election Day. The decision to expand audit scope to include
late registration was based on audit observations, interviews and data analysis pointing to
this issue as a significant feature of recent election reform efforts.
Late Registration Data
Data showing the numbers of voters taking advantage of late registration is available from
the statewide voter registration system (SVRS) and also from surveys conducted by the
Secretary of State's (SOS) office. SVRS data identified registered voters who were registered
or had their registration details updated during the late registration period. Late registration
began on October 11, 2006 and ran through Election Day (November 7th). For the middle
two weeks of October registrations ran at an average of 100 - 150 daily across the state.
In the final week of October registrations increased to an average of 200 per day. On the
Monday before Election Day counties processed around 560 registrations. In total, 3,965
voters registered or changed registration details in the period up to November 6, 2006.
Election Day Registrations
On Election Day itself, counties experienced increased numbers of late registrants. Data
supplied by the SOS office shows around 4,350 people were either registered or changed
their registration details on Election Day (this represents 52 percent of all late registration
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activity). We used this data to determine what proportion of statewide late registration
activity occurred in different counties. The following figure shows the proportion of
statewide Election Day registrations for each county (shading) and also includes the actual
number of county late registrants (numeric values).
Figure 2
Election Day Late Registration Activity by County
November 7, 2006
Percentage of Statewide
Election Day Registrations
Total Election Day Registrations = 4,351
< 0.7 %
0.8 % - 2.0 %
2.1 % - 4.2 %
4.3 % - 7.5 %
7.6% -14.5%
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from Secretary of State's office records.
One-third of Election Day registrations were concentrated in three counties (Missoula,
Yellowstone and Gallatin). The numbers of Election Day registrations tended to
vary according to the number of registered voters, so late registration activities were
concentrated in counties containing more densely populated urban areas. Analyzing the
number of Election Day registrations as a proportion of all registration activity shows the
state's larger urban counties experienced the highest workload levels on Election Day as a
result of late registration.
Late Registration Impact on County Voter Turnout
Combined SVRS and SOS office data shows approximately 8,295 individuals registered or
changed registration details during the late registration period (up to and including Election
27
Day). At the statewide level, the inclusion of these additional eligible voters for the 2006
elections probably resulted in an increase in turnout of approximately 1.3 percent (from
62 percent to 63.3 percent). This calculation assumes that approximately 3,965 voters who
registered prior to Election Day actually cast a ballot.
At the county level, the impact on turnout resulting from late registration shows some
degree of variability. Impacts on voter turnout resulting from late registration appear to
have been distributed fairly evenly across the state. The highest turnout effects were mainly
seen in smaller rural counties, but there were some exceptions to this. Overall, analysis of
county voter turnout tends to support the view that late registration has had a significant
impact across the state and has not been limited to those counties where Election Day
registration activity was actually highest.
County Election Officials Input on Late Registration
We included various questions relating to late registration in our survey of county election
officials. These questions addressed the planning and support available for late registration
and how implementation affected county elections administration. The following table
contains response data for two questions relating to late registration.
Table 7
Survey Responses Relating to Late Registration
Question
Response Options
Response
Percentage
How would you describe the guidance
or advice provided by the Secretary
of State's office relating to late
registration?
Excellent
0%
Good
22%
OK
37%
Poor
22%
Very Poor
20%
Please indicate whether late
registration and Election Day
registrations had any impact on
administration of elections in the
following areas.
County staff unable to address questions from
precinct election judges
78%
Additional unanticipated costs for staff and
other resources
73%
Long delays registering voters
58%
Expansion in the number of registered voters in
the county
48%
Other
30%
Higher occurrence of electoral fraud or other
irregularities
18%
Decrease in provisional votes cast in precincts
10%
Increase in the number of voters from groups
with low rates of electoral participation
10%
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from survey data collected from county election officials.
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Responses indicate some level of dissatisfaction with the efforts of the SOS office to plan
and implement changes in the registration process. Twenty-two percent of county election
officials gave the SOS office a positive assessment in relation to the guidance and advice
provided on late registration. County election officials identified their inability to deal with
questions and inquiries from precinct poll workers as being the most common problem
with late registration. The second most common problem identified was additional and
unanticipated costs for staff and other resources used as a result of late registration. Survey
returns show around 10 counties were required to keep courthouse polling places open late
to accommodate late registrants. Additionally, elections staff dealing with late registrants
would have been unavailable for some required duties, such as supervising and assisting
absentee counting boards and preparing for collection and tabulation of election results.
Election Officials Foresee Further Issues with Late Registration
Survey questions on late registration also addressed whether counties anticipated further
problems and whether late registration could impact the number of polling places available.
For future election cycles, around 75 percent of county election officials said they
anticipated further problems resulting from late registration. This suggests county officials
do not attribute the problems experienced in 2006 to unfamiliarity with late registration
procedures. Around half of respondents indicated they expected to close or consolidate
polling places as a result of the need to provide extra resources for late registration.
Validity of Election Day Registrations
One frequently cited concern relating to Election Day registrations is the potential for the
practice to increase the prevalence of electoral fraud. This concern results from the fact
that voters transferring between different jurisdictions could use late registration to create
a new registration record and vote more than once. Late registration allows voters who
have an existing registration record to change their registration details if they move in or
between counties or change their name. Potentially, this would allow a voter to go into a
county election office on Election Day, request a transfer of registration, cast a ballot, and
then travel to the precinct polling place they were originally registered in and cast a second
ballot. To prevent this situation from occurring, election administrators are instructed
to differentiate between late registrants with no existing registration record and those
transferring from another jurisdiction or precinct. Late transfer registrants vote provisional
ballots and these are only counted once the county can verify (after the close of polls), that
they did not cast a precinct ballot under their previous registration record.
Over the late registration period, slightly less than one quarter of registrations involved
updating registration records for transfer registrants. On Election Day, only 15 percent
of registration activities involved updating existing records. For the 2006 elections, this
would mean around 650 transfer registrants out of 4,350 late registrants should have been
considered higher-risk registrations and received provisional ballots.
Secretary of State Developed Reconciliation
Procedures for Late Registrants
The SOS office issued election advisories to all Montana counties both prior to Election
Day and following the close of polls regarding reconciliation procedures for late transfer
registrants. These instructions outlined procedures counties should follow to ensure late
29
transfer registrants could not have more than one ballot counted. Procedures involved
counties unsealing precinct registers to check whether or not an individual had cast a
precinct ballot under their original registration record. If this had occurred, election
officials were instructed not to count the ballot cast under the late transfer registration.
Testing of SVRS records for duplicate voting did not identify any instances of late transfer
registrants voting more than once. SVRS testing did return several records showing
voters with multiple voting attempts during the 2006 General Election, but only one of
these voters appeared to be a late transfer registrant. For this individual, county controls
appeared to have functioned correctly as only one of two requested absentee ballots was
actually counted.
Fraud Risk for Late Registrations is Elevated but Remains Low
Provided election officials follow correct procedures, there is no reason why voters would
have a better chance of committing electoral fraud by adding or updating a registration
record in the 30 days prior to an election. There is a possibility that late registration activity
raises the overall level of confusion for election officials, which could contribute to an
increased chance of errors occurring in the process. However, while this should be a matter
of concern for election officials, there is no indication of widespread voter fraud problems
with late registration. It does, however, indicate the continuing need for additional scrutiny
of late registrations generally and late transfer registrants in particular.
Improved Planning for Late Registration is Necessary
The introduction of late registration in Montana increased voter participation, but
this success has not come without a price. Late registration has imposed additional
administrative burdens, the majority of which have fallen on county election officials.
Although late registration was used across the state, some counties experienced significant
problems with the additional workload involved. The additional administrative burden of
late registration also involves extra safeguards to prevent electoral fraud, which may be
linked to the added confusion late registrants can introduce in the hectic days leading up
to and including Election Day.
Election Officials Not Prepared for Additional Registration Activity
Observations and documented reports from the 2006 elections indicated some counties
experienced problems with the numbers of voters registering on Election Day and were not
prepared for the workload this involved. This lack or preparedness was also evident at the
state level, where there seemed to be some surprise among election officials that Election
Day registration was used by so many voters. Some of this may be traced to the original
legislation authorizing late registration and Election Day registration. Late registration was
introduced in Montana during the 2005 legislative session under Senate Bill (SB) 302. The
fiscal note attached to SB 302 does not identify any significant local government impacts
resulting from the introduction of late registration and did not identify any fiscal impact
associated with extending the registration period.
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Secretary of State's Office Should Lead Efforts
to Manage Late Registration
Several changes could be considered, which may help counties in their administration
of late registration. Our survey of county election officials provided some indication of
where the SOS office could make some relatively simple changes in the way it provides
information on late registration. County officials identified better public information
regarding registration prior to Election Day as one way of helping counties deal with late
registration. SOS could prioritize public information efforts in future election cycles to
emphasize the convenience of registering prior to Election Day. Although the SOS office
cannot use HAVA funding to support public education efforts relating to late registration,
the office has a prominent public role leading up to Election Day and could use the
many opportunities available to them to communicate information on late registration
procedures to the general public. Regular training for county election officials and their
staffs should also continue to focus on late registration activity as an area of elevated
risk and emphasize the procedures counties need to follow to guard against duplicative or
fraudulent registrations.
Recommendation #7
We recommend the Secretary of State's office lead efforts to mitigate the
effects of late registration by:
A. Focusing public education on registering prior to Election Day; AND
B. Emphasizing late registration procedures and anti-fraud controls in training
for county elections officials.
Election Day Registration in Other States
Information compiled by election study groups indicates six other states currently offer
Election Day registration as an option. The other states offering Election Day registration
are mainly smaller and more rural than
average (Minnesota, Wyoming, New
Hampshire, Idaho, Maine and Wisconsin).
The following table summarizes information
on Election Day registration activities in four
other states and Montana for the 2006 General
Election:
Comparison with Election Day registrations
in four other states shows Montana's
registration activity for the 2006 elections
was significantly lower. This comparative
data also raises the question of whether
Montana can expect to see significant
increases in Election Day registrations in the
future. Several factors need to be taken into
Table 8
Election Day Registrations in Other States
2006 General Elections
State
Number of
Election Day
Registrations
Percentage
of
Registered
Voters
Idaho
54,531
7.1%
Minnesota
292,168
9.4%
New Hampshiree
25,796
3.0%
Wisconsin
393,391
12.8%
Montana
4,351
0.7%
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from
state Secretary of State official election records.
31
account regarding comparisons between Election Day registration activities in Montana
and other states:
♦ Montana has only been allowing Election Day registration for one election cycle
(2006). Some other states have been offering this option for 10 years or more and
this has likely contributed to a growing familiarity among voters and, possibly, a
growing reliance on Election Day registration. The comparatively low percentage
of registered voters in Montana using the option could, therefore, be related to a
lack of familiarity and could increase in future election cycles.
♦ Some other states using Election Day registration currently close the registration
process 10 to 30 days prior to polling. If late registration is not an option prior to
Election Day, the number of Election Day registrants may be artificially boosted.
In Montana, voters could register right through the late registration period up to
Election Day, so fewer voters would have needed to register on Election Day
itself.
♦ Election Day registration in other states is available in polling places, rather
than being restricted to county election offices as is the case in Montana. The
widespread availability of the option in locations close to voters' residences is
probably part of the explanation for higher levels of Election Day registrations
in other states.
It is difficult to predict whether Election Day registration in Montana is likely to result in
more voters using this option, but based on experiences of other states it seems reasonable
to assume this may be the case. Because Election Day registration in Montana is restricted
to county election offices, and voter registration levels are already high it may be unlikely
that the levels of activity seen in some other states will be repeated. However, it should
be expected that there will be increases over the current levels of activity as more voters
become aware of the option. Even if Montana's Election Day registration activity only
reaches the minimum level seen in other states, this could mean up to 20,000 voters being
processed at county election offices in future cycles.
Any overall increases in late registration volumes or changes in the composition of the late
registrant population could be problematic for election administrators. Given the problems
evident during the 2006 election cycle, there is a potential for further issues to arise if
late registration volumes increase. The experience of other states suggests several courses
of action may have to be considered, depending on trends observed over the next few
election cycles. These would include rolling-back late registration to some point prior to
Election Day, addressing the resource and other needs of counties to help them manage
late registration procedures better, or moving to a precinct-based process.
Increase in Election Day Registrations May
Require Further Legislation
The SOS office can play an important role in monitoring trends in late registration, helping
counties manage the administration of this process, and, where necessary, pursuing
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statutory or other changes to address any future issues. In the event of continuing problems
with county administration of late registrants, the SOS office could consider the need for
rolling-back the late registration period to some point prior to Election Day. This option
would relieve some of the stress on county election officials produced by dealing with both
registration and voting on Election Day itself. Another option could involve the SOS office
working with counties to examine late registration procedures and identify areas where
improvements could be made. Addressing the need for investments or administrative
improvements could allow counties to continue providing late registration on Election
Day without any negative effects on regular voting activities. A third option could involve
addressing the need to move towards a precinct-based system of late registration. This
option would only be applicable where there is a significant increase in late registration
volumes that could not be efficiently or effectively processed in county election offices.
As used in some other states, precinct-based late registration would focus activities in
polling places, leaving county election officials with more time to administer regular
voting activities.
Recommendation #8
We recommend the Secretary of State's office monitor ongoing trends in
late registration to determine the impacts on elections administration and,
if needed, mitigate future impacts by:
A. Rolling-back the late registration period to some point prior to Election Day;
OR
B. Providing additional resources or guidance to maintain current levels of
effort in counties; OR
C. Expanding late registration to a precinct-based procedure.
33
CHAPTER V - VOTING SYSTEMS
Introduction
A voting system is denned in Montana statute as "any machine, device, technology, or
equipment used to automatically record, tabulate, or process the vote of an elector cast on
a paper or non-paper ballot." The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) defines voting systems
in a similar manner to include any equipment used to define ballots, cast and count votes,
report and display results, and maintain and produce audit trail information for elections.
Poor functionality, unacceptable and inconsistent error rates, and technological obsolescence
in voting systems equipment was one of the major driving forces behind HAVA election
reform efforts. In addition to mandating the replacement of several different types of voting
systems equipment, HAVA also contains provisions designed to ensure a greater level of
uniformity in the way voting systems are operated.
HAVA Voting Systems Requirements
HAVA mandates several changes in voting systems, which are summarized as follows:
♦ Replacement of punch card and lever voting machines - HAVA requires
states using punch card or lever voting machines replace this type of equipment.
HAVA established a payment program for states using these types of equipment.
State and/or local election officials were allowed to choose which type of voting
systems equipment to use instead of the obsolete punch card and lever systems.
♦ Ballot verification - voting systems should allow voters to verify their vote
is valid and will be counted. Voters should be allowed to check their ballot for
errors and request a replacement ballot if they make a mistake. HAVA also
requires voting systems have the ability to identify over-votes (voting for more
than one candidate for a single office). However, states using systems which do
not allow for identification of over-votes can substitute public education efforts
rather than upgrade systems.
♦ Error rates - state voting systems must comply with standard error rates
established by the Federal Election Commission.
♦ Audit capacity - the system must produce a permanent paper record, which can
be used in an audit capacity in the event of a recount.
♦ Accessibility for individuals with disabilities - every precinct should have at
least one voting machine accessible for individuals with disabilities (see Chapter
VII addressing voting accessibility issues).
♦ Alternative language accessibility - the system should provide alternative
language accessibility as required under the Voting Rights Act.
♦ Uniform definition of what constitutes a vote - states are required to establish
uniform and nondiscriminatory standards defining what constitutes a valid vote
and what will be counted as a vote for each category of voting system used in
the state.
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Montana's voting systems already met several of these requirements (for example, all voting
systems use paper ballots and therefore already meet the audit capacity requirement). Other
requirements were met through recent changes in state law (for example, Montana statute
was revised to provide a uniform definition of what constitutes a valid vote). For other
voting systems requirements, we conducted specific testing and analysis to determine the
implementation status of these HAVA mandates in Montana. This chapter includes audit
findings and recommendations relating to the following aspects of voting systems:
♦ Replacement of obsolete voting systems.
♦ Changes in Montana voting systems to allow for ballot verification by voters.
♦ Assessment of error testing procedures for voting systems.
Replacement of Obsolete Voting Systems
At a minimum, HAVA requires states to replace obsolete voting systems technologies
where they were still being used. The Act targets those types of voting machines with
higher than normal error rates and which have been associated with poor performance.
Replacement of the worst voting systems with more reliable equipment was a first step in
ensuring some level of uniformity existed between states.
Prior to or coinciding with passage of HAVA, the majority of Montana counties already
used either optical scan or hand count voting systems. Both these methods were and still
are permissible under the terms of the Act and there is no requirement for the state to
replace these systems. Six Montana counties were using punch card systems, which did
require action under HAVA.
Montana has Implemented HAVA Voting Systems Replacement
Montana was required to ensure voting systems used in these six counties were replaced
prior to January 1, 2004. To effect these changes, the 58th Legislature passed House Bill 87,
which revised statute to prohibit the use of punch card voting systems within the state. Under
the terms of Montana's state HAVA plan, the Secretary of State's (SOS) office worked with
counties to ensure punch card systems were replaced. Subsequent amendments to the state
plan indicated the SOS office assisted five counties in the purchase of optical scan systems
(the remaining county had already replaced the punch card system and was reimbursed).
Conclusion
The Secretary of State's office and county election officials have ensured
obsolete voting systems have been replaced in accordance with the terms
of the Help America Vote Act.
Changes in County Voting Systems
Voting system changes mandated under HAVA have resulted in further progress towards
modernizing and upgrading elections equipment being used in many states. Changes in
voting systems have been occurring over the past two decades as more states have adapted
35
new technologies to allow for greater polling place efficiency and faster vote tabulation.
Since the early 1980s there has been a steady movement away from mechanical systems
such as lever and punch card machines and traditional hand count or paper ballots. These
legacy technologies are increasingly being replaced by either optical scan or electronic
systems.
With the changes in voting systems mandated under HAVA, Montana has achieved a greater
level of uniformity in the types of processes and equipment used in elections. However,
there are still important differences between the voting systems currently in use. In terms
of voting systems, the state now supports three main types, discussed as follows:
♦ Hand Count - the hand count voting system is also often referred to as the
paper ballot system. This system does not use any type of automation to count or
tabulate ballots. Voters mark traditional paper ballots, which are deposited and
then collected for centralized counting.
♦ Central Count Optical Scan - the optical scan system relies on electro-
mechanical technology to scan pre-formatted and standardized paper ballots.
The optical scan machine counts a vote when a voter fills-in the oval with a
pencil to indicate a preference. The central count variant of this technology uses
a single point of collection for all ballots within a county (usually the county
courthouse). All ballots are scanned and counted after the close of polling.
These systems cannot, however, be used to alert a voter to a voting error, as
the scanning takes place centrally following the close of polls and not in the
precinct.
♦ Precinct Count Optical Scan - this variant of the optical scan system uses the
same technology as the central count, but counties deploy multiple scanning
units to different precincts. Voters also use standardized ballots, but they deposit
the ballot in a scanner within the precinct. The advantage of this system is that
the precinct counter can detect voter errors and alert the voter before they leave
the polls, thus allowing electors the opportunity to correct mistakes.
Twelve Montana counties use hand counts of traditional paper ballots. Nineteen counties
use central count optical scan systems and twenty-five counties are now using the precinct
count optical scan systems. County voting systems are shown in the following figure.
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Figure 3
Montana County Voting Systems by Type and Sub-Type
November 2006 General Election
County Voting System
Hand Count
J Central Count
I Precinct Count
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from Secretary of State's office records.
The most common errors in the voting process are voting for more than one candidate
for a single office (over-vote), and neglecting to make any vote for a given race (under-
vote). Either over or under-votes can be conscious choices on the part of voters. However,
both over and under-votes can also occur because of systemic error, i.e. problems with
voting systems (as demonstrated in Florida in the 2000 elections and problems with punch
card voting machines). The most common method of quantifying voting system errors
is known as the residual vote. The residual vote is the combined total of votes that were
not counted (both over and under-votes), and is calculated as the difference between the
number of voters casting ballots in an election and the actual number of votes received by
candidates.
Analysis of Residual Voting Data
Residual vote trends in Montana elections were analyzed using data compiled by the SOS
office for statewide elections since 1992. For statewide races and federal contests between
1992 and 2006 the rate of residual voting shows some degree of volatility. However, the
37
interesting feature of this data is the decline in the residual vote for the 2006 general
elections, where only 1.15 percent of all votes cast were uncounted. This trend is illustrated
for federal elections in the following table.
Table 9
Residual Vote Trend in Montana Federal Elections
1992 through 2006 Election Cycles
Election Year
United States Senate
United States House
Residual Votes
Residual %
Residual Votes
Residual %
1992
~
13,829
3.31%
1994
9,068
2.52%
7,322
2.04%
1996
9,742
2.33%
12,806
3.07%
1998
~
7,182
2.12%
2000
6,315
1.51%
7,395
1.77%
2002
13,735
4.04%
8,951
2.63%
2004
~
11,866
2.60%
2006
4,556
1.11%
4,936
1.20%
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from Secretary of State's office records.
The most obvious potential cause of the reduction in the residual vote for the 2006 elections
was the competitiveness of the U.S. Senate race in this year. This race was carried with
a relatively narrow margin of victory, indicating a highly competitive race that likely
drew more committed voters to the polls and where there would be a reduced incidence
of under-voting. Analysis of the residual vote percentages and other variables for federal
and other statewide elections shows that although the competitiveness of an election is an
important factor in reducing the residual vote, it is not the sole determinant. Another way
of demonstrating this is to look at the 2006 U.S. House race, which was less competitive
(the margin of victory in this race was over 80,000 votes or nearly 20 percent of the total).
If the margin of victory accurately mirrored the residual vote, we should have seen an
increased residual vote in the House race. However, the house residual vote also saw a
dramatic decline in 2006, suggesting that other factors were important.
Voting Systems and the Residual Vote in 2006
There are many factors that could have affected the residual vote in 2006. In relation to
HAVA, the two most important factors were changes in voting systems and the public
education and voter information efforts conducted by SOS and local election officials. To
determine whether voting systems played a role, we analyzed county residual vote levels.
This approach allows us to distinguish between counties that use different types of voting
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Montana Legislative Audit Division
systems (hand count, central count optical scan, or precinct count optical scan systems).
The following figure shows the average residual vote rate by county according to the voting
system they used in the 2006 elections.
Figure 4
Residual Voting Trends by Voting System
9%
8%
7%
3
| 6%
3 5%
■D
"«
£ *-
3%
2%
4^\
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Election Year
Residual Vote Attribute
Hand Count
Central Count
Precinct Count
Residual Vote Rate 1992-2004
2.87 %
2.59 %
2.93 %
Residual Vote Rate 2006
2.17 %
1.36%
1.18%
Reduction in Residual Votes for
2006
24%
47%
60%
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from Secretary
of State's office records.
As shown, both the central count and precinct count optical scan counties experienced
greater reductions in residual votes as compared with counties using hand counts. Counties
using precinct counters also experienced greater reductions in residual votes when
compared with counties using the central count optical scan system. These results lend
credence to some academic studies of voting systems at the national level, which suggest
precinct counters are more effective at reducing residual votes when compared with the
central count system. More generally, the ability of the precinct counter system to actually
identify voting errors prior to casting the ballot intuitively suggests there should be some
associated reduction in the number of voting errors.
Changes in election administration resulting from HAVA included the introduction of
new precinct voting equipment and high profile efforts by election officials to educate
the voting public about voting error and their ability to request replacement ballots. In
combination, it is reasonable to suggest these changes did impact the level of residual
voting in the state. While it may not be possible to determine how much influence changes
39
in equipment/technology had as opposed to the public education efforts, there is evidence
in county election returns suggesting voting systems changes resulted in reduced number
of residual voters and a clearer expression of voter intent.
Conclusion
Voter education efforts and voting systems changes introduced under
HAVA contributed to a reduction in residual votes and a clearer expression
of voter intent for the 2006 federal elections.
Secretary of State Precinct Counter Purchase Program
Montana elected to use some of the federal HAVA funding allocation to encourage
purchase of precinct counter optical scan systems. This purchase program involved a 50:50
funding match for counties that wanted to purchase precinct counter technology. The use
of HAVA funding to encourage the move to precinct counter technology has promoted the
use of these systems, but has also resulted in another difference between voters in different
counties. The Montana electorate is now almost evenly divided by the ability of voters to
receive a timely alert if they make a voting error (either by under or over-voting).
Potential Impacts of Voting Systems on Montana Elections
Due to the variance in observed residual vote levels for counties using different types of
election equipment, there could be some impact on elections as a result of differences in
voting systems. For the 2006 federal elections, results for the United States Senate and
House races were recalculated to determine whether voting systems differences could
have impacted the results. In both cases, the type of voting systems being used by counties
would not have affected the actual result of these races. Given the potential for voting
systems variations to impact residual voting levels, we also analyzed margins of victory for
Montana legislative elections. Results from the 2006 Montana House of Representatives
show that results in three house districts could have been impacted by differences in voting
systems.
It should be emphasized that there is no evidence changes in voting systems would have
produced a different result in any legislative races. However, the fact that voters in these
races were participating using voting systems which are different from those used in some
other counties highlights an important disparity. Essentially, the chances of having your
voting intent accurately expressed vary depending on which county the ballot is cast in.
Voters residing in counties using precinct count voting systems have a slightly better
chance of having their voting intent accurately expressed.
Two-Tier Structure for Vote Counting Exists in Montana
Disparities between county voting systems have always existed, as have the impacts of
differences in the residual voting levels attributable to these systems. HAVA succeeded
in prohibiting lever and punch card voting systems, but the availability of HAVA funds
for precinct counter purchases has meant a continuation of what amounts to a two-tier
structure for voting system in the state. This disparity has produced inequities between
voters in different counties. These inequities are significant to the electoral process
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Montana Legislative Audit Division
regardless of whether any specific degree of variation can be assigned to residual voting
levels for different voting systems. Currently, around half of Montana's 650,000 voters
cast ballots using systems that can identify errors and allow the opportunity to change the
ballot. The other half are not afforded this opportunity and, therefore, have an increased
chance their intent will not be clearly expressed at the polls.
Common Standard for Voting Systems
Under HAVA, states are required to prohibit use of some voting equipment and adopt voting
systems that allowed voters to identify and correct errors on their ballots. Montana has met
the first part of this HAVA requirement, through replacement of obsolete systems. As a
paper ballot state, Montana was allowed to meet the second requirement through a public
education campaign on identification and correction of ballot errors. Public education
efforts could, therefore be used as a substitute for the controls provided by precinct count
and similar systems. For the Montana counties that did not participate in the precinct
counter purchase program, public education efforts were the sole means of complying with
these HAVA requirements.
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Survey Results Support Precinct Count Benefits
We asked county officials to provide input on changes in voting systems resulting from
HAVA, including the efficacy of public education efforts and precinct counter purchases.
Results for selected questions are included in the following table.
Table 10
Survey Responses Relating to Voting Systems Changes
Question
Response Options
Response
Percentage
Do you think public
education efforts have
resulted in lower rates of
under and over-voting and
other voting errors?
Substantially lower rates of error
0%
Slightly lower rates of error
5%
No significant effect on error rates
54%
Probably increased error rates
5%
Don't Know
36%
In your experience has the
introduction of precinct
counting equipment helped
to reduce the number of
over and under-votes cast
in elections?
Yes - substantial reduction in voting errors
32%
Yes - slight reductions in voting errors
32%
About the same
21%
No - increase in voting errors
10%
Don't Know
5%
In your experience has the
introduction of precinct
counting equipment made
administration of elections
more efficient?
Yes
84%
No
16%
Don't Know
0%
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from survey data collected from county election officials.
For those counties using hand counts and central counts, the SOS office was required
to meet HAVA provisions relating to voting errors by conducting public education/voter
outreach efforts. Survey responses show county election officials were generally neutral
regarding these efforts and do not think there has been a significant impact on error rates.
Election officials in counties using precinct counter voting systems were more certain
regarding the impact of these systems on reducing voter errors. Around two thirds of
respondents said precinct counters reduced voter errors either significantly (32 percent)
or slightly (32 percent). Twenty-one percent of respondents saw no change in voter error
and ten percent thought errors may have increased. A larger majority of respondents
supported the view that precinct counter equipment has improved the efficiency of election
administration (84 percent).
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Financial Concerns Prevent Counties from
Adopting New Voting Systems
Survey responses also show the biggest concern for counties that did not make the change
to precinct counting was the lack of county financial support for the additional expenses
involved in buying the precinct count equipment. Nearly three-quarters of respondents
(73 percent) indicated a cost/benefit analysis did not support the additional expense and half
said there was no county funding available to match the HAVA funds. Survey responses
appear to indicate that the transition to precinct counter voting systems will likely remain
incomplete where barriers exist at the local level.
Secretary of State's Office Should Plan Transition
to Common Standard for Voting Systems
Montana has not moved towards a common standard for voting systems and has instead
relied on an approach where counties could choose to participate in a program to upgrade
equipment. The SOS office used available HAVA funding to provide a match for county
investments in new technology, but the program was based on voluntary participation
and was always going to be reliant on the availability of local funding. The result of this
approach is a variety of different standards for voting systems. The efforts of state and
local election officials to educate the voting public regarding voting errors should not be
overlooked and have probably had some impact on reducing residual votes, but it is not
clear whether these activities can or will be conducted on a long-term basis.
The SOS office has both a unique perspective on the state's electoral process and a unique
responsibility under state law for ensuring a degree of uniformity between counties. The
office is also responsible for effectively implementing federal elections laws, including
HAVA. The issue of disparities in voting systems demands a uniform response and a
coordinated approach, which only the SOS office can provide. Applying common standards
to county voting systems will ensure all votes have an equal chance of being counted
regardless of where they are cast.
Transitioning to a common standard for voting systems will involve a long-term
commitment, whereas HAVA set short-term deadlines and paid limited attention to
future needs. The SOS office should begin developing a long-term approach to actively
managing the assessment and deployment of new voting technologies. The office should
begin by prioritizing availability of remaining HAVA funds for the purposes of assisting
counties in purchases of precinct counter equipment. Approximately $850,000 in HAVA
grant funding has already been expended for precinct counter purchases. We estimate an
additional $790,000 in matching grants for counties would be required to provide precinct
counting capabilities in all polling places. Matched by counties at the current 50:50 ratio,
this would mean total additional investments of approximately $1.57 million. Ultimately,
counties retain the right to determine whether to make these investments and some local
government will prefer to defer decisions pending further developments in voting systems
technology. However, we believe the SOS office should continue to actively assist those
counties wishing to transition to systems offering better degrees of accuracy.
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Establishing a level playing field for voting systems is accomplished in part through the
Montana state HAVA plan, which budgeted funds for precinct counter purchases. The SOS
office can continue to pursue a common technological standard in voting systems as a
strategic priority by establishing goals and objectives relative to the replacement of legacy
voting systems and the introduction of next generation systems. This could involve setting
targets for reducing the numbers of counties using systems with significantly different
capabilities and assessing progress towards these goals. Another consideration could be
the need to establish defined timeframes for technical obsolescence of particular systems.
For example, advances in electronic voting systems may mean optical scan systems will
be technically obsolescent within 10 years and no further purchases should be considered
after a defined period of time. Given the importance and complexity of these issues, it may
also be appropriate for the SOS office to seek further legislative guidance relative to voting
systems.
Recommendation #9
We recommend the Secretary of State's office continue its efforts to
transition Montana counties to a common standard for voting systems
by:
A. Prioritizing availability of remaining HAVA funds for upgrading county voting
systems equipment; AND
B. Establishing a common technological standard for voting systems as a
strategic priority for the office; AND
C. Determining the need for further legislative guidance relative to voting
systems.
Voting Systems Error Testing
Both the growing variety and technological sophistication of voting systems pose
challenges for election administrators. Unlike some other states, however, Montana has
not moved towards adoption of paperless electronic voting systems. These systems have
been subject to intense scrutiny regarding their security and reliability, and the ability
to audit results and test for errors. Although Montana has so far avoided many of these
problems, vote counting in many counties still relies on the accuracy of different types of
voting equipment.
Montana Statute Establishes Voting System Testing Standards
HAVA established requirements for minimum error rates for voting systems and Montana
elections laws also outline testing requirements for equipment. These statutory standards
highlight the fact that regular testing of voting systems components is an essential feature
of any well-maintained electoral process. Section 13-17-212, MCA, requires the SOS office
ensure at least 10 percent of the state's voting systems are tested and certified each calendar
year.
Review of SOS office voting system testing procedures showed the office developed and
implemented procedures for calendar year 2006. These procedures involved obtaining
and reviewing testing and certification documents submitted by four different counties.
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Counties submitted signed certifications showing testing was performed on various types
of voting equipment, including Automark assisted voting machines and optical scan
precinct counter and central counter ballot scanners/tabulators.
Testing Procedures Do Not Ensure Statewide Coverage
State law requires the SOS office ensure at least 10 percent of the state's voting systems
have been randomly tested and certified on an annual basis. SOS has addressed this
requirement by developing a process for randomly reviewing testing and certification
documents from counties. The SOS office has interpreted statutory guidance to mean
testing of the totality of the state's voting systems, rather than testing applicable to each
type of different system. This approach provides a good level of testing coverage, but may
exclude some less common types of systems from testing or result in some systems not
meeting the 10 percent threshold.
To properly test functionality for the state's voting systems, the SOS office should develop
procedures based on the sub-populations of different types of systems used around the
state (this would include Automarks, M-100 Precinct Counters, M-650 Central Counters
and other types of central count tabulators).
Recommendation #10
We recommend the Secretary of State's office revise voting system testing
procedures to ensure all the different types of elections equipment used
in the state are included in the office's random testing procedures.
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CHAPTER VI - PROVISIONAL AND
ABSENTEE VOTING
Introduction
Civic participation has traditionally been a guiding principle of the electoral process. The
process of traveling to and casting a ballot in a local polling place along with other voters
registered in the precinct is a shared experience for all citizens. While there are many
benefits in this shared civic experience, there have also been recent attempts to introduce
flexibility and choice in the traditional polling place voting model. The Help America Vote
Act (HAVA) requires all states provide provisional voting, which provides voters a fail-safe
voting method if there is some kind of problem with their registration status. HAVA also
contains provisions designed to facilitate absentee voting for certain voters, contributing
to efforts to make voting available outside of the local precinct polling place.
Both provisional and absentee voting are designed to make the process easier, more
accessible to more voters and, ultimately, to increase participation. Montana elections
laws have been revised in recent years to introduce the concept of provisional voting and
to widen the availability of absentee voting. Changes relating to provisional voting were
introduced to comply with HAVA requirements, but expanded availability of absentee
voting is unrelated to the act. Montana has joined other states in allowing 'no excuse'
absentee voting and has seen a substantial increase in absentee ballots. As is the case with
late registration, changes in absentee voting procedures have introduced an important new
dynamic to Montana elections and were addressed in our review of HAVA.
Provisional Voting
HAVA established provisional voting to allow individuals claiming to be legally registered
to cast a provisional ballot. Provisional voting can be used in a variety of circumstances
where there is some question regarding the registration status of a voter (for example, a
voter claiming to be registered whose name does not appear on the register can cast a
provisional ballot). Provisional ballots are segregated from regular ballots and are only
counted where the registration status of the individual can be positively verified following
the close of polls. HAVA also requires states to provide a means for individuals who cast
provisional ballots to ascertain whether the vote has been counted. HAVA specifies a free
access system must be available for this process.
Provisional Voting Data for Montana Elections
Provisional voting was introduced for the 2004 General Election in Montana. The Secretary
of State's office submits information on provisional voting to the federal government
following each federal election in the state. The following table shows the number of
provisional votes received and counted for the 2004 and 2006 general elections.
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Table 11
Provisional Voting Data
2004 and 2006 Federal Elections
Election Year
2004
2006
Provisional Votes Cast
623
2,242
Provisional Vote Rate
0.1%
0.55%
Provisional Votes Counted
378
2,133
Provisional Vote Count Rate
51%
95%
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division
from Secretary of State's office and Election
Assistance Commission records.
There was a significant increase in the number of provisional votes cast between the
2004 and 2006 elections. Not only has the provisional voting rate increased, the count rate
for provisional ballots has also increased from 51 percent to 95 percent. These changes in
provisional voting data are likely linked to three developments seen in the 2006 elections:
♦ Absentee voting - there was a large increase in the number of absentee voters in
2006 and a corresponding increase in the number of absentee voters attempting
to vote in polling places (see sections below). A proportion of the increase
in provisional voting was likely generated by absentee voters being issued
provisional ballots in polling places, pending determination of the status of their
absentee ballots.
♦ Late registration - around 4,000 voters registered or changed registration
details on Election Day as a result of the introduction of late registration (see
Chapter IV). Some of these voters may have been provisionally registered,
contributing to the increased number of provisional ballots issued. In addition,
the availability of late registration at election administrator's offices likely
decreased the number of unregistered individuals voting in precincts using
provisional ballots. In 2004, these provisional ballots for unregistered voter
would have been rejected, contributing to the lower count rate as compared with
2006.
♦ Late poll closure - more than 10 counties reported keeping polls open after 8 p.m.
on Election Day to deal with late registration voters at election administrator's
offices. These voters were issued provisional ballots as required under HAVA
and this likely contributed to the increase in provisional ballots issued.
Election Observations and Survey Results
Observations of voting during the 2006 General Election by audit staff did not identify any
specific issues with provisional ballots. Observational data indicated use of provisional
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ballots in polling places was limited, provisional ballots were generally being issued in
appropriate circumstances, and the majority of poll workers had a good knowledge of
provisional voting procedures.
The generally positive picture of provisional voting provided by our Election Day
observations was confirmed in survey responses from county election officials.
Approximately 60 percent of county election officials have a positive view (rated as good
or excellent), of the efforts of the Secretary of State's (SOS) office to provide information
and advice on provisional voting. Survey responses also show the majority of county
election officials believe there is some level of awareness among voters in relation to
provisional ballots. In relation to provisional ballot issuance, survey responses were
almost completely uniform regarding the issuance of either a regular or provisional ballot
in different circumstances. This suggests there is a good level of understanding among
county officials regarding the appropriate use of provisional ballots. Most of the counties
also provided voters with multiple means of contacting election administrators regarding
their provisional ballots. In nearly all cases, counties appear to have taken actions which
allow for a free access system to provisional ballot information for voters.
Provisional Voting is Working Well in Montana
Review of voting data, elections observations and survey of county elections officials
suggest there have been no significant problems with the introduction of HAVA provisional
voting requirements in Montana. The relatively low incidence of this type of voting has
probably contributed to the lack of concerns over its use, as has a good level of uniformity
among election administrators regarding provisional voting requirements. The number of
provisional votes cast in 2006 elections increased substantially over the previous election
cycle, but there was a corresponding increase in the rate at which these provisional votes
were verified and counted.
Conclusion
The provisional voting requirements of the Help America Vote Act have
been successfully introduced in Montana and appear to be functioning as
intended.
Absentee Voting
Changes in Montana's absentee voting provisions date to the late 1990s when certain
restrictions on voting absentee were lifted. Montana joined other states in introducing 'no
excuse' absentee voting that allows any voter to request an absentee ballot regardless of
whether they have a justification for not voting in a polling place. These changes are often
viewed as a means of addressing declining participation by making it easier for people
to cast votes outside of the normal polling place procedures. Subsequently, Montana also
changed state law to establish permanent absentee voting, which allows a voter to elect to
receive an absentee ballot for every election without specifically requesting the absentee
option for each electoral event.
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Although not directly related to HAVA, moves towards an expansion of absentee voting
have been informed, at least in part, by the motives driving federal elections reform;
namely, attempts to increase voting accessibility and participation. Absentee voting has
grown significantly in popularity over the past few election cycles and has also, become a
significant factor in any analysis of election reform efforts linked to HAVA.
Absentee Voting Data
HAVA mandates collection and reporting of absentee ballot data by all election jurisdictions
for each federal election cycle. As a result, there is good information available for the last
two federal elections (2004 and 2006), but prior to these years data for absentee ballots
requested, received and counted are harder to find. Absentee ballot data was collected for
the 2000, 2004, and 2006 elections and is shown in the following table.
Table 12
Montana Absentee Voting Data
2000, 2004 and 2006 Elections
Election
Year
Absentee Votes
Counted
Polling Place
Votes Counted
Absentee
Percentage
Absentee
Ballot Count
Rate
2000
64,723
356,193
15%
NA
2004
99,430
356,666
22%
95%
2006
119,894
291,167
29%
92%
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from Secretary of State's office and Election Assistance
Commission records.
As shown, there has been a significant increase in absentee voting between 2000 and 2006.
In the 2006 elections nearly one third of the electorate voted absentee, rather than casting
a ballot in a polling place. The number of absentee voters has nearly doubled since 2000
and as a result absentee voting procedures now constitute a significantly more important
feature of Montana's elections process than was previously the case.
Absentee ballots show a drop-off rate in terms of the number of ballots requested
(equivalent to turnout), the number received (ballots cast), and the number counted (actual
votes). For the state as a whole, there has been a decline in the absentee ballot count rate
(proportion of requested ballots that are actually counted) between the 2004 and 2006
elections. Basically, this means fewer electors requesting absentee ballots are actually
returning them and having them counted.
2006 General Elections Observations
Observations of the 2006 General Election by audit staff included assessment of the
numbers of absentee voters visiting polling places on Election Day in an attempt to cast
polling place ballots. Our observations showed around 5,000 absentee voters went to
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polling places on Election Day rather than mailing/delivering an absentee ballot. Of this
total, approximately 60 percent (roughly 3,000 voters) did not have an absentee ballot,
either because they had claimed not to have received one in the mail or ever signed up for
an absentee, or because they had misplaced, spoiled or destroyed their original absentee
ballot. The remaining 40 percent (around 2,000) brought their absentee ballots with them
to the polling place.
For those absentee voters with no ballot there appeared to be a good level of uniformity
in polling place procedures. Our observations indicated these individuals were either
provided with a provisional ballot to vote, or poll workers made an effort to determine
whether an absentee ballot had been received before making a decision on issuing a ballot.
Ideally, all voters marked as absentee should be required to cast a provisional ballot, which
can be segregated and verified at a later point to ensure double-voting does not occur. Our
observations indicate this may not have occurred in every circumstance, but all indications
suggest poll workers were following the correct procedures and issuing provisional
ballots.
Less uniformity was observed in how poll workers processed absentee voters arriving at a
polling place with their original ballot. Around 43 percent of these voters were informed
they could not vote the ballot in the precinct and were instructed to go to the county election
administrator's office to vote their ballot. Remaining voters were permitted to cast their
ballot in the precinct (it appeared most were allowed to deposit the ballot in the regular
manner). From our observations, there did not appear to be anything distinguishing these
absentee voters, other than the fact they attempted to vote in different polling places. Where
some voters are allowed the option of voting in the precinct, while others are prevented
from doing so, there is a risk that some ballots may not have been counted.
Survey Results Reveal Inconsistencies in Absentee Voting Procedures
We asked county election officials several questions relating to absentee voting. The survey
included questions relating to the instructions county election officials provided poll
workers on dealing with absentee voters in polling places. Survey responses for selected
questions are summarized in the following table.
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Table 13
Survey Responses Relating to Absentee Voting
Question
Response Options
Response
Percentage
What instructions
did you give to chief
election judges
regarding absentee
voters who had not
received ballots?
Send voter to county chief election administrator's office
10%
Allow the voter to vote a provisional ballot in the precinct
65%
Allow the voter to vote a regular ballot in the precinct
5%
Call election administrator to determine status of ballot
20%
What instructions
did you give to chief
election judges
regarding absentee
voters who had lost or
spoiled their absentee
ballot?
Send voter to chief election administrator's office
7%
Allow the voter to vote a provisional ballot in the precinct
63%
Allow the voter to vote a regular ballot in the precinct
10%
Call election administrator to determine status of ballot
15%
Other
5%
What instructions
did you give to chief
election judges
regarding absentee
voters who came to
polling places with
their absentee ballot
and wanted to vote it
in the precinct?
Send voter to county chief election administrator's office
7%
Accept the absentee ballot as a regular ballot
45%
Accept the absentee ballot as a provisional ballot
14%
Destroy the original ballot and vote a regular ballot
10%
Accept absentee ballot, but separate from regular ballots
14%
Call election administrator to determine status of ballot
5%
Other
5%
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from survey data collected from county election officials.
Survey responses show disparities in how county election officials are understanding and/
or implementing elections laws in relation to absentee voters. For all three scenarios
presented to the county officials, there are significant differences in how different counties
have been instructing poll workers relative to absentee voters. Responses showed very
little uniformity in how poll workers had been instructed to deal with different situations,
suggesting there is considerable risk voters in different counties will receive different
treatment at the polls and experience different outcomes in terms of the voting process.
Survey responses also showed differences between counties in terms of the types of
information they provided in mailings to absentee voters. Significant numbers of counties
did not include information on over-voting (38 percent) or ballot replacement (24 percent)
in information included with absentee ballots. One of the concerns with the expansion
of absentee voting is the reduced opportunities voters may have to access information
regarding their voting rights. As defined under HAVA, state voting systems need to ensure
voters have information on over-voting and their right to request replacement ballots in
the event of a voting error. HAVA does not distinguish between the application of these
standards to absentee voting and polling place voting, suggesting absentee voters need to
51
have access to the same information. The fact that a quarter of Montana's counties do not
provide information on over-voting and ballot replacement for absentee voters is therefore
problematic.
Vulnerabilities Exist with Absentee Voting in Montana
The increased popularity of absentee voting over the last few election cycles highlights this
issue as a new area of vulnerability for elections administrators. With nearly one-third of the
electorate requesting absentee ballots for the 2006 elections, this voting process should be
subject to a greater level of scrutiny. Furthermore, the fact that absentee voting takes place
outside of the normal oversight mechanisms applied during polling place voting should be
recognized as a risk factor for electoral fraud. The findings of the National Commission
on Federal Election Reform, which formed a significant part of the final HAVA legislation,
identify absentee voting as the "most likely opportunity" for election fraud.
Conclusion
Increased levels of absentee voting and inconsistencies in absentee
ballot procedures constitute an area of vulnerability for the administration
of elections in Montana.
Addressing Inconsistencies in Absentee Voting Procedures
The decline in the return rate for absentee ballots noted in our data analysis could suggest
the beginnings of problems with the correct issuance and processing of absentee ballots.
Montana still compares well with national averages for absentee ballot counting, but left
unchecked inconsistencies in absentee voting procedures could result in further declines in
the count rate for absentee ballots. It should be possible to ensure a more uniform approach
to processing absentee voters in polling places. Inconsistencies in processing of absentee
votes result in unequal treatment of different voters and, potentially, reduced levels of
participation and more uncounted ballots. Addressing these inconsistencies could ensure
greater equity in how absentee voters are processed in different circumstances.
Secretary of State Should Lead Efforts to Standardize Absentee Voting
The SOS office has an important role to play in establishing a more standardized and
uniform approach to these issues and communicating with county election officials
regarding absentee voting. Concerns with absentee voting may not have been adequately
addressed because this was one area of elections administration that was left relatively
untouched by HAVA. Public education and poll worker training efforts have focused on new
developments in elections administration directly relating to HAVA. Meanwhile, absentee
voting has become an increasingly popular option among voters, but has not received a
corresponding amount of scrutiny. The SOS office could remedy this situation by revising
ongoing public education and poll worker training to emphasize correct procedures for
handling absentee ballots in polling places. In addition, the SOS office should continue
working with county election officials to ensure absentee voting communications meet
common standards and contain sufficient information.
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An additional area for consideration is the lack of clear guidance available in statute
regarding the treatment of absentee ballots not delivered to county election offices. There
is currently a presumption in statute that absentee ballots will be delivered to the county
election office, so little guidance exists for situations where an absentee ballot is delivered
to another location (for example, a precinct polling place). The SOS office should consider
the need for further statutory clarification in this area.
Recommendation #11
We recommend the Secretary of State's office work with counties to
address inconsistencies in the administration of absentee voting by:
A. Revising public education and training efforts to provide increased emphasis
on the absentee voting process; AND
B. Reviewing county absentee voting communications to determine where
required voter information could be standardized further; AND
C. Where necessary, seeking statutory revisions to clarify treatment of absentee
ballots received in different circumstances.
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CHAPTER VII - POLLING PLACE
ACCESSIBILITY
Introduction
For the 2004 elections, 120 million Americans cast ballots in over 115,000 different polling
places around the country. A wide variety of buildings and locations serve as polling
places. Montana currently has around 550 polling places, including schools, county and
state government offices and buildings, churches, places of business, retirement homes,
community halls, libraries, and even private residences. The importance of the physical
accessibility of buildings and voting equipment is often underestimated in debates over
participation in the electoral process. The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) addressed
several issues relating to the physical condition of polling places. HAVA provisions relating
to polling places primarily addressed making facilities and equipment more accessible for
people with disabilities.
HAVA provisions relating to polling places were designed to mitigate barriers to voting
imposed by the physical condition of buildings, and the quality of facilities and equipment
provided for voters. HAVA provided funding to states for upgrading buildings used as
polling places to allow for better access for people with disabilities. The Act also requires
every state to ensure each polling place is equipped with a voting system accessible to
people with disabilities.
Audit Work Relating to Accessibility
Audit work addressed two issues relating to accessibility. Findings and recommendations
for the following areas are included in subsequent sections of this chapter:
♦ HAVA-funded upgrades made to polling places to improve accessibility for
people with disabilities.
♦ Deployment and operation of Automark assisted voting technologies for people
with disabilities.
Polling Place Accessibility
Although HAVA provided additional funding for states to ensure polling places are
accessible for people with disabilities, the Act did not radically alter federal requirements in
this area. HAVA encourages states to work towards making polling places more accessible,
but stops short of imposing additional requirements. States still retain significant control
over the establishment of accessibility standards for polling places. Montana has legislated
to establish legal standards for polling place accessibility, including the requirement that
all new polling places (those established after 2005) meet the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) accessibility requirements. All existing polling places are required to meet
less stringent standards for accessibility. Importantly, Montana law also provides a means
of permanently or semi-permanently exempting some polling places from accessibility
standards.
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Trends in Accessibility Status
State election officials have been required to collect data on polling place accessibility since
the mid-1980s as required under the federal Voting Accessibility Act. This information is
compiled by counties following a self-assessment procedure conducted at polling places
prior to each election. Montana statute establishes various designations for the degree of
accessibility for polling places. The primary categories are:
♦ Accessible (polling places meets accessibility standards).
♦ Inaccessible (polling place does not meet accessibility standards).
♦ Rural (polling place serves less than 200 registered electors and has been
exempted from accessibility standards).
Additionally, statute establishes an 'Exempt' designation for polling places that are
inaccessible, but for which no easy replacement location can be found within the precinct.
The following chart illustrates the trend in accessibility status for Montana polling places
between the 1992 and 2006 elections.
Figure 5
Polling Place Accessibility Status
1992 and 2006 Elections
1992
2006
□ Accessible □ Useable ■ Inaccessible □ Rural □ Exempt
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from Secretary of State's office records.
Between 1992 and 2006 there has been an improvement in polling place accessibility
for people with disabilities. According to SOS office data, accessible polling places now
constitute 70 percent of the total, compared with around half in 1992. The number of
polling places classified as either inaccessible or as inaccessible but useable has declined
to 16 and 11 percent respectively. The proportion of polling places classified as either rural
or exempt has remained essentially unchanged, suggesting there are a limited number
of polling facilities that will likely continue to function without meeting accessibility
requirements.
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November 2006 General Elections Observations
Observations conducted by audit staff during the November 2006 General Election included
review of various accessibility factors for polling places visited. Overall, our polling
observations showed around 40 percent of the facilities we visited during the November
2006 elections provided unimpeded access to voting for an individual with a severe physical
disability (such as use of a wheelchair). For around 20 percent of the polling places visited,
we observed significant access issues that would normally be considered problematic for
an individual with moderate to severe physical disability or visual impairment. For this
20 percent of polling places, it is reasonable to assume that the access to the polling place
constitute a barrier to voting for individuals with disabilities. Our observations show a
slightly higher rate of inaccessible polling places as compared with information collected
by the Secretary of State's office. However, it is likely that at least some of this difference
is attributable to interpretation of the 'technically inaccessible, but useable' designation
previously used in assessment of polling place accessibility by election officials.
HAVA Accessibility Grant Program
Montana's HAVA funding included $2 million to provide for improvements in polling
place accessibility. SOS entered into a contract with a non-profit advocacy organization to
administer a grant program for use by counties making improvements to their facilities.
The grant process involves submission of applications from counties. Proposed projects and
costs are assessed before approving the grant or requesting further information. Grants are
limited to $5,000 per polling place and are distributed on a first-come, first-served basis.
Counties must provide a 25 percent financial or in-kind match to receive funding.
The accessibility grant program has committed around $809,000 of the original $2 million
to projects which are either underway or pending approval. Further analysis of data
from the accessibility grant program did identify some concerns with the method used
to distribute and account for the funding. Grant applications were made on a voluntary
basis and there was no requirement for counties to participate. As a result, some counties
have not participated yet and some counties have not applied for as much grant funding
as they may need. Three specific issues were identified from the application information
submitted to date:
♦ 5 of the 10 non-participating counties have existing polling places classified as
either inaccessible or technically inaccessible, but useable. These polling places
would benefit from improvements to accessibility features, but the county has
not made any application for available funding.
♦ 16 of the 46 participating counties have applied for grants for fewer polling places
than may be necessary. Records show these 16 counties have a combined total of
54 polling places classified as inaccessible, but have only made applications for
improvements to a combined total of 18 facilities.
♦ It was unclear what methods were being used to verify completion of work or
assess the quality of accessibility improvements made by counties. Submission
of a completion notice by counties has required, but agreements between the
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SOS office and the contractor did not specify a methodology for inspecting or
verifying completion of funded activities. The SOS office has recently made
changes addressing this concern.
The accessibility grant program has not been administered on the basis of need and has
relied on the voluntary participation of counties. County election officials need to be able
to provide match funding for accessibility projects and may also face difficulties upgrading
facilities where the building owners do not want work to be performed. However, it is
not clear from the information provided on the accepted and pending grants whether any
determination has been made regarding unmet needs in specific counties.
Survey Responses Relating to Accessibility Grants
Survey responses showed the majority of county election officials were satisfied with the
information and guidance they received regarding the accessibility grants program. These
results also show there is probably a considerable amount of further work that will be
required to ensure polling places are fully accessible for people with disabilities. Forty-
three percent of county election officials said funding available for making improvements
has not been sufficient to complete all the necessary work on polling places. A similar
proportion of county election officials also said they will require further advice and
assistance in making polling places accessible.
Conclusion
Montana has made good progress in accessibility of polling places.
Continuing distribution ofHAVA grant funds could be prioritized to address
unmet needs in counties.
Ongoing Management of Accessibility
Issues Required at the State Level
The decentralized and cooperative approach taken by the SOS office to the distribution of
HAVA accessibility funding has been beneficial to the ultimate goal of improving access for
people with disabilities. Using a non-profit advocacy organization as grant administrator
provides valuable expertise on accessibility issues, which may otherwise not have been
available to the SOS office. The grant-based approach also ensured counties would be
involved in the decision-making process and additional resources would be available
through local match funding.
We believe the SOS office could improve on the efforts made to date by focusing more on
an active management role in accessibility issues in the future. In the short-to medium-
term, the office could work with the contractor and county election officials to ensure
remaining grant funding is distributed based on unmet needs in certain counties. It will
also be necessary to conduct some level of follow-up review to ensure grant-funded work
completed to date meets quality standards. In the longer-term, the office will need to
continue prioritizing the need to remove remaining barriers to accessibility. As discussed
above, only a small minority of polling places are likely to be permanently categorized as
inaccessible. For the remaining polling places currently classified as inaccessible, the SOS
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office should work with counties to establish reasonable expectations regarding eventual
improvements or, where necessary, alternative locations. The SOS office has indicated
they have already begun work on these changes.
Recommendation #12
We recommend the Secretary of State's office continue addressing polling
place accessibility issues by:
A. Working to identify unmet needs and prioritize allocation of remaining
funding based on these needs; AND
B. Establishing long-term goals for reducing the number of remaining
inaccessible polling places through upgrade or replacement.
Automar k Assisted Voting Machines
HAVA requires each state's voting system be accessible for people with disabilities and
for the blind and visually impaired. The Act also specifically requires that states meet
this requirement by using at least one voting system in each polling place that allows the
required level of accessibility. In Montana's case this was achieved through the purchase
of the Automark voting system. Montana elections laws were revised in 2005 to include
specific references to assisted voting technologies such as Automark.
Purchase and Deployment of Automarks
HAVA does not allow states to meet voting system accessibility compliance standards
through any means other than the actual provision of equipment in every polling place.
There is no waiver process and no polling places are exempted from the requirement,
regardless of size or other factors. The SOS office was responsible for the purchase and initial
deployment of Automarks. Automarks were provided for every polling place at no initial
cost to counties. The SOS office worked with the disabilities community as well as other
organizations in the process of selecting the Automark system. Due to the specifications of
the system and availability of vendors, the SOS office entered into a sole source purchase
agreement to provide the system. The terms of the contract are summarized as follows:
♦ 725 Automarks were purchased at a unit cost of $5,000 for a total equipment cost
of $3,625 million.
♦ Software and other applications used to operate the Automarks were included in
the contract at a price of $28,000.
♦ The contract provided for systems support and service including project
management, training and Election Day technical services at a cost of
$288,200.
♦ Installation, shipping and handling charges of $101,500.
The total expenditures involved for purchase, installation, testing, training and
maintenance of the Automark system through the 2006 general election were $4,042,700.
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These costs were met directly through the HAVA grant and were not allocated to counties.
Funding system operations and maintenance in future election cycles will be a county
responsibility.
Functionality and Security Testing
To perform some basic functionality and security testing, we obtained an Automark
system being used as a demonstration model by the SOS office. The system was tested for
basic functionality and to determine whether it was secure from inappropriate access and
tampering.
Automark Functionality - to use the Automark, the voter enters a regular
paper ballot into a slot on the front of the device. The Automark scans (reads)
the ballot to determine if it is the correct ballot for the precinct. Different races
and ballot initiatives appear on a screen in consecutive order. The voter can vote
for each measure by touching the screen or using a key pad. Once one measure
has been voted on, the voter clicks a next arrow and a new measure will appear.
The voter has the option to return to previous measures at any point. Once the
voter has completed the process, the Automark displays all their choices and
asks them to review their votes. If everything is correct, the voter will notify the
Automark, and the votes will be printed on the ballot and returned to the voter.
It is then the responsibility of the voter to submit the ballot to the ballot box.
Security Testing - audit staff performed various tests on the demonstration
model to determine whether the system was vulnerable to tampering or other
misuse that could affect how votes were cast or counted. Overall, we found the
Automark presents a relatively low risk for misuse or fraud. Primarily, this is
because the Automark system does not use internal memory to store or transmit
votes. The system merely allows a voter to use an electronic interface to mark
a paper ballot, which is then deposited for counting in the normal manner. The
only way ballot information could be manipulated would be to change data
stored on the device's flash memory card. Testing shows the system is equipped
to prevent unauthorized access of the stored ballot choices. The primary system
weaknesses of Automark appear to be related to the ability to disable the device
or physically access the flash memory device (see section below on securing the
Automark during polling).
Automark Observations for 2006 General Election
Election Day observations by audit staff included assessment of Automark deployment
and usage. Information and data gathered on Election Day included observations of voters
requesting to use Automark machines, and questions for chief election judges regarding
use of the systems and any technical problems. We used this information to estimate the
number of voters using the new systems and to compile information on the deployment
and operation of the systems by counties. Election Day observations for Automark systems
are summarized in the following table.
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Table 14
Election Day Automark Use and Operation
November 2006 General Election
Election Day Automark Observations
Voters Requesting Automark Use
2,343
Polling Places Reporting Automark Use
40%
Polling Places With No Functioning Automark
8%
Polling Places Reporting Automark Technical Problems
36%
System Operation Keys Left in Machine
34%
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from Election Day poll observation data.
Observational data from the 2006, General Election highlights three issues relating to the
deployment and operation of the Automark systems:
Use of Automarks -usage levels for the Automark system were relatively low. Our estimates
show that the system was used by around 2,300 voters throughout the state and that use
was only reported in 40 percent of polling places. Automark is a new technology and usage
rates probably suffered due to a lack of awareness or familiarity with the system.
Operational and technical problems - our observations indicated widespread technical
problems with the Automark systems. We estimate that around 45 polling places (8 percent)
did not have a functioning Automark available, either because poll workers did not setup
the device or because it malfunctioned and was shutdown. Additionally, 36 percent of the
polling places we visited reported technical problems with the operation of the systems.
The most common technical problems reported during our observations related to the
system's ballot printing mechanisms.
System operation keys - around one third of the systems we observed on Election Day
were being used with the system operation keys still in the machine and accessible to voters.
Automarks have an operational key to turn the system on/off, and also have a separate
barrel-type key to access the system memory card. Leaving either of these keys in the
machine allows anybody within the polling place to disable the device, either by shutting it
down or removing or tampering with the ballot information stored on the memory card.
Survey Responses Relating to Automarks
Our survey of county election officials contained a section devoted to the deployment and
operation of the Automark systems. Various questions were asked in order to determine
whether county election officials were satisfied with the processes used to deploy the
systems, what kind of training they provided for poll workers, and their operational
experiences with the Automarks. The following table summarizes survey responses for
selected questions.
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Table 15
Survey Responses Relating to Automark Systems
Question
Response Options
Response
Percentage
Did the Secretary of State's office provide
you and your staff with sufficient training
and technical guidance relating to the
operation of the Automark?
Yes
81%
No
19%
Did any of your polling places
experience any of the following
technical problems with the
Automarks?
Failure to start
18%
Unable to read test ballot
21%
Incomplete or inaccurate ballot
data
8%
Ballot scanning problems
42%
Ballot printing problems
76%
Paper ballot jamming
71%
Incorrect marking of ballot
26%
Unexplained shutdown or power
failure
18%
Other
16%
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from survey data collected from county election
officials.
The highlighted survey results show county election officials were satisfied with the level
of training and guidance they received from the SOS office in relation to the Automarks.
Over 80 percent thought the SOS office provided sufficient training and technical guidance.
However, large numbers of counties also reported technical difficulties with the Automark
devices on Election Day. Survey responses relating to technical problems show the most
common faults reported with Automarks were related to the paper ballot printing/marking
system functions. Problems with ballots scanning incorrectly, printing incorrectly
or jamming in the print mechanism were the most common faults. Observational data
from polling places also indicated many printing problems were caused by poll workers
neglecting to remove the perforated tabs from ballots. Fortunately, there appeared to be
relatively low incidence of system malfunctions of a more serious nature, such as incorrect
ballot data displays or incorrect ballot marking.
Improvements Needed in Operation of Automark Systems
The introduction of new voting technology is always going to be a matter of concern and
a cause of some errors at the polls. A lack of familiarity with a new technology on the part
of poll workers and the voting public can lead to problems with the successful operation
of new systems. The deployment of the Automark system for the 2006 election cycle is
illustrative of this general point. In some senses, it was inevitable this new system would
run into problems in its first real test at the polls.
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Automark Technology is Innovative, but has Weaknesses
Problems with the operation of Automarks should not overshadow the fact that this is an
innovative technology that has allowed voters with disabilities and visually impaired voters
to exercise their democratic rights in an independent manner. Prior to the introduction of
assisted voting technologies, people with disabilities faced significant barriers to voting in
an independent manner that assured their right to privacy.
The Automark system does, however, have certain inherent weaknesses and counties
will likely face continuing difficulties with its operation. Because Montana law requires
a paper ballot be used in all elections, the Automark system must be equipped with the
functionality and features to allow for a paper ballot to be scanned and printed. By necessity
this involves mechanical parts that would otherwise be missing from a direct recording
electronic device, which stores and transmits voter preference through internal memory.
The need to manually feed, scan and print a paper ballot means the Automark has moving
mechanical parts that will jam, stick or otherwise fail at inconvenient times.
Conclusion
Widespread operational problems with the Automark system should be
addressed to ensure successful future use of this innovative technology.
Familiarity Should Remedy Some Problems
Inherent weaknesses with the Automark system were probably exacerbated during the
2006 elections by a lack of familiarity with the equipment among poll workers. Documents
provided by SOS and survey responses from county election officials indicate there was
sufficient and relevant training provided for poll workers regarding the Automark. This
training and guidance was available in several different forms. One area of weakness with
the information supplied to front-line poll workers could be the fact that the instructions
provided with each Automark were on CD and were probably not available within polling
places where they could have been useful in remedying some simple operational errors.
More exposure to use of the Automark, familiarity with system operations and increased
trust in newer voting technologies should help to remedy some of the problems seen in this
election cycle. It should also be expected that as the system becomes a more accepted and
recognized feature in polling places, there could be some increase in the levels of use seen
during the 2006 elections.
SOS Should Provide Specific Written Instructions on Automark Use
Although responsibility for Automark system operations and maintenance now rests solely
with county election officials, there is still a role for the SOS office providing guidance on
system operations. Specifically, the current version of the Election Judges Handbook could
be updated to include a brief Automark installation and troubleshooting guide. Provision
of Automark is a requirement of HAVA and, therefore, is a legal responsibility county
election officials must bear in future elections. Continuing widespread problems with
the operation of the system must be remedied if counties are to avoid exposure to legal
challenges by or on the behalf of voters with disabilities.
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Recommendation #13
We recommend the Secretary of State's office update the Election Judges
Handbook to include specific written instructions on installation and
operation of Automark voting systems during polling.
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CHAPTER VIM - FUNDING ELECTION
REFORM
Introduction
The last few election cycles in Montana have seen some of the most significant changes
in voting procedures in a generation. In addition to the Help America Vote Act (HAVA),
election officials have been required to implement further changes in elections laws, such
as late registration and expanded absentee voting. HAVA has fundamentally altered the
state's electoral process and its effects will be noticeable for many years. The original
federal legislation imposed deadlines on states, which basically envisioned a two to three
year implementation period for the changes outlined in HAVA. Our review of the impacts
in Montana resulting from HAVA suggests this timeframe was generally unrealistic. In
reality, state and county election officials will be dealing with the effects of HAVA for
many years.
Funding and the Future of Elections in Montana
In addition to imposing new costs for elections administration, HAVA has also re-balanced
authority and responsibilities between state and county election officials. The Act has
created new responsibilities for states, some of which must be met by the chief elections
officer, rather than local election officials. The extent to which changes in funding needs
and operational responsibilities have been recognized in Montana is the subject of this
final chapter.
The following sections outline information relating to future funding requirements for
HAVA in Montana and include discussion of the following:
♦ Secretary of State's (SOS) office budgets and expenditures for HAVA-related
activities.
♦ Input from county election officials regarding HAVA funding requirements.
♦ Continuing viability of Montana's elections funding structures.
HAVA Budgets and Expenditures
To date, the SOS office has expended approximately 80 percent of the original HAVA
federal grant. As anticipated in the original state HAVA plan, the largest expenditures
have been made in two areas; polling place and voting system accessibility (including the
purchase of the Automark systems), and the statewide voter registration system (SVRS).
The following table shows budgeted expenditures, expenditures to date, and remaining
budget amounts for the main HAVA activity categories included in the state plan.
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Table 16
HAVA Expenditures versus Budgets
Through May, 2007
HAVA Budget Category
Budgeted
Expenditures
Expenditures
to Date *
Remaining
Budget
Polling Place/Voting Accessibility
$5,660,000
$5,126,133
$533,867
Statewide Voter Registration
System
5,303,593
5,339,183
Voting Systems
1,840,887
977,323
863,564
Education & Training
2,113,223
1,551,983
561,240
Administration
332,296
328,295
4,001
Future Contingency **
2,111,483
-
2,111,483
Total
$17,361,482
$13,322,917
$4,038,565
* Expenditures reported by the Secretary of State's office by HAVA budget category do not equal total expenditures
reported in SABHRS as included in Chapter I of this report.
"Future contingency includes ongoing SVRS maintenance costs.
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from SABHRS and Secretary of State's office records.
As shown, unexpended funds remain in most of the main budget categories, with the
exception of SVRS development. Specific issues relating to each budget category are
discussed as follows:
Accessibility -total expenditures associated with purchase and deployment of the Automark
systems should total around $4 million, once the vendor contract is closed. Remaining
budgets and expenses are associated with accessibility grants and related outreach efforts.
The SOS office has stated responsibility for future Automark maintenance and operations
will be a county responsibility. Any remaining funding currently assigned to accessibility
improvements could be used to provide further physical improvements to polling places,
to conduct more outreach among the disabilities community, or could be reassigned as
necessary to other activities.
SVRS - systems development work appears to be largely complete and the SOS office has
already decided to handle support tasks internally, rather than relying on a vendor contract.
SVRS development has been completed mostly in line with budgetary expectations, but
the SOS office will need to meet continuing resource demands in this area associated with
ongoing system maintenance and training.
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Voting Systems - expenditures to date include approximately $885,000 for county precinct
counter purchases. Potentially, this leaves over $850,000 in funding available for further
improvements in county voting systems.
Education & Training - the SOS office has conducted extensive public education and poll
worker training efforts using HAVA funding. Expenditures to date leave around $560,000
in available funding, much of which will probably be depleted through the next election
cycle. SOS office education and training efforts have generally been well-received and
their importance has been highlighted in several sections of this report. It is unclear what
further efforts the SOS office may have to undertake in this area.
Administration - the SOS office has expended most of the funds available for
administrative purposes, i.e. purely administrative tasks carried out by SOS office staff,
which are unrelated to any specific aspect budgeted in other areas.
Future Contingency - the original state plan budgeted around $1.3 million for future
needs and unanticipated costs associated with HAVA implementation. Additionally, the
HAVA federal special revenue fund has earned around $750,000 in interest since fiscal
year 2003. During the 2007 legislative session, interest earnings on the HAVA account
were appropriated to the SOS office for use in helping counties complete implementation
of the act.
Survey Results Relating to HAVA Funding
We asked county election officials a series of questions relating to HAVA funding
requirements. In relation to the funding available for implementing the Act, the majority
of respondents thought Montana's HAVA funding allocation was insufficient (56 percent).
Given the widespread criticism of HAVA as an under-funded mandate, it is unsurprising
county election officials did not think sufficient funding was allocated. The majority of
respondents also thought the funding was distributed between counties on an equitable
basis (64 percent).
One of the survey questions asked whether county election officials thought HAVA
funding for specific activities was set at the right level. Results showed that for most of
the main budgeted HAVA activities, counties were satisfied the funding amounts were
appropriate. There was only one area where responses showed less consistency and this
related to funding for election official and poll worker training. Around 45 percent of
respondents said too little funding was dedicated towards training for election officials and
poll workers.
County Election Officials Assessment of Future Needs
We also asked county election officials whether they anticipated future expenditures in
certain areas relating to HAVA (these included polling place accessibility, Automark
maintenance, voter education/outreach, poll worker training, SVRS support, and hiring
additional elections staff). Respondents were asked to indicate what level of anticipated
costs they faced. Only one county responding to our survey indicated they expected no
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Montana Legislative Audit Division
additional costs in any of the areas in question. All the rest of our respondents said they
expected some level of future costs associated with HAVA. Results for specific areas are
shown in the following figure.
Figure 6
Survey Responses Relating to Anticipated Future Expenditures
Automark
Poll WorkerTraining
SVRS
Extra Staff
Accessibility Upgrades
Voter Education
~7~
I
As
ZZ1
~Z1
Assessment of Future County Expenditures
□ None □Minimal DSome ■ Substantial
Source: Compiled by the Legislative Audit Division from survey data collected from county election officials.
Maintenance of the Automark voting system is clearly regarded by county election officials
as being the most likely HAVA activity to result in further expenditures in the future.
Counties will need to pay for regular maintenance of the Automark devices, purchase
supplies and spare parts, and absorb additional costs associated with deploying and
operating the machines for each federal election. Other areas anticipated to involve
significant future expenditures for counties are poll worker training and SVRS support.
HAVA has increased the complexity of elections and poll workers are required to be
conversant in an increasingly large number of fairly complex procedures. County officials
obviously foresee increased time and effort being necessary if poll worker training is to
keep up with the demands of modern elections. In terms of SVRS operations, counties
have probably benefited to some degree from being able to use a centralized system without
paying for their own dedicated proprietary software applications. However, SVRS
operations do require the active involvement of counties and there are likely to be ongoing
costs for meeting security requirements and training staff in SVRS functionality.
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Viability of Montana's Elections Funding Structure
While it may be difficult to determine exactly how much added costs have resulted from
HAVA, it is reasonable to assume that the Act has had the effect of making elections more
complex and more expensive. Under Montana's current method for funding elections,
ongoing costs associated with HAVA will be largely the responsibility of counties. The
remaining HAVA funding allocated to Montana could provide some ongoing support for
counties, but this is unlikely to last much beyond the next two election cycles. At the state
level, the SOS office will have to continue funding operation and maintenance of the SVRS
and find additional resources to meet the expanded oversight and reporting roles implicitly
assigned under HAVA. Again, funding available through the original HAVA grant will be
short-lived.
Funding Sources and Assignment of Responsibility
for Elections Reforms are Unclear
Currently, it is not clear whether there has been sufficient analysis of or preparation for
meeting HAVA and other elections reform efforts over the long term. County election
officials have identified different areas where they expect to incur additional costs in
implementation of HAVA provisions. In addition, the introduction of other elections
reforms has resulted in additional costs, which must be met through county elections
budgets. The SOS office has also assumed new responsibilities under HAVA, including the
operation and maintenance of the statewide voter registration system.
Best Practices Emphasize Long-Term
Perspectives and Shared Responsibility
Prior to the introduction of HAVA, the National Commission on Federal Election Reform
highlighted the probability that elections reforms would likely result in a 30 to 40 percent
increase in spending on elections administration nationwide. The commission also
highlighted several principles in relation to allocation of costs for elections reforms. These
principles included the necessity of calculating funding requirements on a long-term
basis and of state governments assuming more responsibility for elections administration
relative to counties.
The Government Accountability Office also released a report prior to the introduction of
HAVA addressing preparation for broad-based elections reform. This report was addressed
to Congress and provided an analytical framework for assessing the merits of competing
proposals for elections reform. One of the main elements of criteria identified by GAO
was the affordability and sustainability of proposed election reforms. Specifically, the
criteria relating to costs emphasized the need for an accurate assessment of initial outlays,
evaluation of the long-term cost impacts, and assignment of responsibility between
different levels of government (federal, state, and local).
Montana's Experiences are not Consistent with Best Practices
The long-term approach to funding of elections reform in Montana is not consistent with
best management practices established at the national level. As a result, it is not clear
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whether the impacts of HAVA and other elections reforms can be effectively mitigated
over the long-term. At the state level, the SOS office has been assigned a more expansive
role in elections administration, but no long-term funding source has been identified to
ensure sufficient resources are devoted to critical activities, such as maintenance of the
SVRS, oversight and reporting of enforcement of voting rights, or handling complaints.
Within the SOS office, elections activities are funded through the main business services
account, a small proportion of which is actually sourced from activities related to elections
(candidate filing fees and sales of voter registration lists). The office requested increases in
fees during the 2006 Legislative session, but this request was not successful. The office's
responsibilities relative to elections are increasing, but there has been no corresponding
change in the fee structure for the office's main proprietary fund and no alternative
dedicated funding source has been identified.
For county governments, election reform efforts have imposed significant additional
administrative costs. For example, continuing maintenance and support for the Automark
voting system could result in counties incurring collective costs of up to $165,000 annually
over the life-cycle of the technology. Although some of these costs should have been offset by
savings in areas of responsibility assumed by the state (SVRS), there are other areas where
assessment of the division of responsibilities and resource needs has been insufficient or
non-existent. An example of this would be the late registration, which was introduced with
no apparent consideration of the likely financial impacts on county election administrators.
Where significant changes in elections procedures are made without proper consideration
of both initial outlays and long-term cost implications, there can be no assurance the intent
of legislation will be effectively implemented.
Secretary of State's Office Should Begin Exploring Funding Options
The original Montana HAVA state plan was released in 2003 and outlined the state's
proposed methods of implementing the act and allocating funding for various activities.
The plan was amended in 2005 to include budget revisions, but the majority of HAVA-
related changes had not been completed at this point. We believe the completion of the
first full election cycle with all HAVA-requirements in place provides a good opportunity
for the SOS office to revisit budgetary priorities and address the broader issue of funding
elections reform. The SOS office has taken some steps to address the funding needs of
counties through appropriation of HAVA interest earnings for this purpose, but at this
point there does not appear to be a clear plan for distribution of this funding in different
areas.
Montana statute assigns responsibility for funding elections administration almost solely
to county governments. Statutory designation of responsibility for elections administration
and costs reflects previous practices, where a very limited role was reserved for the
Secretary of State's office. Introduction of HAVA has rebalanced election administration
responsibilities assigned to state and county governments, but the need for corresponding
changes in statutory responsibility have not been addressed.
Electoral processes are constantly adapting as society and technology change. As the
state's chief election officer, the Secretary of State has a responsibility to ensure this
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process of change is well-managed. The SOS office should, therefore, begin addressing the
need for a thorough review of funding requirements for elections activities following the
depletion of HAVA funds. This review should also encompass an assessment of the fiscal
responsibilities being placed on counties by future changes in election laws, and the long-
term viability of current funding sources for elections administration.
Recommendation #14
We recommend the Secretary of State's office take steps to address the
future funding of elections by:
A. Updating the state HAVA plan to include any necessary changes in the
allocation and distribution of remaining HAVA funding; AND
B. Identifying whether counties can meet the ongoing implementation costs of
elections reform efforts following depletion of HAVA grant funding; AND
C. Where necessary, seeking legislative changes to accurately reflect division
of responsibility for elections funding and provide a viable basis for long
term implementation of HAVA and other electionsreforms^
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APPENDIX A - AUDIT APPROACH
Audit Scope
Audit scope was developed to address provisions of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
being implemented by state and local governments. Responsibility for implementation
of some HAVA provisions rest with federal agencies and were not included within the
scope of our audit. Audit scope was also expanded to address recent changes in Montana
elections laws, which are being implemented independently of HAVA provisions. This
scope expansion included changes in registration procedures extending the period during
which voters are able to register to vote prior to Election Day (known as late registration),
and changes in absentee voting procedures made over the past three election cycles.
Developing audit scope to specifically address HAVA provisions and selected additional
changes in elections law effectively excluded many activities conducted by state and county
election officials before, during and after elections. Audit scope excluded county activities
relating to the identification, organization and staffing of polling places; compilation,
printing, distribution and collection of ballots and other elections supplies and equipment;
and vote counting and tabulation of election results. At the state level, activities within the
Secretary of State's (SOS) office excluded from scope related to procedures for qualifying
candidates and ballot initiatives; and the office's role in conducting a statewide canvas and
certifying election results.
Audit Methodolog ies
Audit methodologies were developed to address the objectives noted in Chapter I of this
report. The following sections summarize audit methodologies conducted in various
areas.
Statutory References
Federal and state statutes, regulations and rules relevant to implementation of HAVA were
reviewed to identify applicable guidance and compliance standards for administration of
elections in Montana. Federal statutes included those codified under the Help America
Vote Act of 2002, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (with subsequent amendments), and the
Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984. Montana elections laws
were also reviewed along with bills introduced during the past three legislative sessions
relating to implementation of HAVA and other recent election reform efforts. Montana
administrative rules relating to elections administration were also obtained and reviewed.
Agency Interviews and Observations
We conducted interviews with members of staff within the SOS office responsible for
elections administration. We also interviewed staff members responsible for maintenance
of the statewide voter registration system (SVRS) and other information technology
applications necessary for support of elections activities. Interviews with agency personnel
were conducted both before and after the November 2006 general elections. Audit staff
also conducted observations of activities within the SOS office. These observations
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included SOS office training and informational events relevant to elections administration.
Audit staff were also present within the SOS office during the November 2006 elections
to observe the activities of staff and interaction between state and county election officials
and the general public.
Review of Agency Documents and Records
Documents and records within the SOS office relating to the planning and implementation
of HAVA in Montana were reviewed. Reviewed documents included those relating to the
development of the Montana HAVA State Plan, subsequent amendments to the plan, and
ongoing communications with county election officials and others regarding implementation
of specific HAVA provisions. We also reviewed financial and budget information for the
federal HAVA grant, including SABHRS revenue and expenditure reports and internal
budgetary records maintained by the SOS office. A wide variety of other documents and
records relating to other aspects of elections administration were also reviewed, these
included contracts and agreements with contractors and vendors, complaints information,
SVRS technical documentation, training guides, and other information distributed by the
SOS office to county elections officials and the general public.
Statewide Voter Registration System
Testing and analysis of the statewide voter registration system (SVRS) involved review
of SOS office and county operation and maintenance of the system. We tested access
and security procedures in place at state and county levels to ensure appropriate levels of
access were assigned and the system secured from unauthorized access. Audit staff visited
three different counties to test security settings for desktop computers and networks used
to access SVRS. We reviewed incident reports and other documents relating to outages
experienced by SVRS staff in the period prior to the November 2006 elections. We also
interviewed staff within the SOS office and within the Information Technology Services
Division of the Department of Administration with responsibility for system operations
and with knowledge of circumstances relating to these outages. Testing the integrity of
the data within SVRS involved accessing the system database using a computer-assisted
auditing tool to extract and analyze records for registered voters. SVRS data was queried
to determine whether state and federal statutory compliance standards were being met
relative to the eligibility of registered voter records. Specific compliance standards included
voter age, deceased status of voters, felony conviction status of voters, and duplication of
voter records.
Automark Voting System Testing
We conducted limited testing of the new Automark voting system to assess functionality
and security performance. We also obtained and reviewed documents relating to the
Automark system, including the purchase order and contract between the SOS office and
the system vendor, technical manuals and user guides, and general background information
relating to security testing procedures for assisted voting technologies. Audit staff obtained
a demonstration model Automark from the SOS office and performed testing to assess
functionality and system security. Security testing involved evaluation of the system's
physical security properties and accessing the flash memory device used to store ballot and
other operational data for the system.
73
Election Day Observations
Audit staff conducted observations of polling place procedures during the November 2006
General Elections. Observations were conducted in 30 counties and 86 different polling
places. Audit observations involved documentation of the physical condition of polling
places, availability of certain voting equipment, and processing procedures for members
of the public wishing to cast a ballot (including identification and registration verification,
and ballot issuance). Observations were conducted throughout the course of regular voting
hours and we observed a total of 1,323 individual voters. Observation data documented
for these voters was used as a statistical sample of statewide voting behavior and was used
to project attribute values for the statewide population of voters visiting polling places
on Election Day. Observations in polling places also included brief interviews with chief
election judges regarding changes in elections procedures resulting from HAVA. Audit
staff were also present within the SOS office on Election Day to observe procedures.
County Election Officials Survey, Interviews and Observations
We solicited input from county election officials at various stages throughout audit work.
The primary means of obtaining county input was through an online survey distributed to
all county election officials. This survey contained questions addressing implementation
of HAVA provisions and other changes in elections procedures. 46 county election officials
participated in the survey for a response rate of 86 percent. Survey responses included
demographic data, which allowed for stratified analysis of responses based on county size
and other characteristics. We also conducted interviews with individual county election
officials relating to both general and specific issues addressed under our audit objectives.
Audit staff also attended two meetings of the Montana Association of Clerk and Recorders
to discuss progress with audit work and solicit input on various elections issues.
Review of Elections Returns and other Data
Several audit objectives included methodologies involving obtaining and analyzing election
results/returns and other voting data for the November 2006 General Election and previous
election cycles. Election results and other voting data were generally obtained directly from
the SOS office official canvas of election returns or from the federal Election Assistance
Commission. The types of data used in these analyses included voter registration status,
voter turnout, the numbers of votes cast and counted in specific electoral races, and the
proportions of voters using different voting methods (absentee and provisional voting).
Voting data was used in our analysis of voting systems to calculate residual vote levels
in counties. Residual votes were calculated based on comparisons between voter turnout
and the actual number of votes cast for candidates for federal and statewide office in every
election between 1992 and 2006. We also used voting data in our analysis of trends in
absentee and provisional voting, and in analysis of the effects of the introduction of late
registration for the 2006 elections.
Information from Federal Agencies, Other States, and Other Sources
As part of both audit planning and fieldwork stages, we reviewed various reports, studies
and informational sources from federal agencies, other states, and other organizations or
groups involved in election reform issues. These information sources were used to help
07P-02
74
Montana Legislative Audit Division
develop audit scope and objectives, to identify specific methodologies used during the
course of audit work, and to provide background information or data relevant to different
elections issues. These sources included the federal Elections Assistance Commission, the
National Commission on Federal Election Reform, the Government Accountability Office,
the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National Association of Secretaries of
State, and the National Association of County Recorders, Election Officials and Clerks. We
also reviewed information and reports from a range of different elections and voting rights
issue groups and other interested parties, election equipment and voting systems vendors,
academic studies of elections and voter behavior, and newspaper and other local media
reports on election reform efforts and the effects of these changes on voting in Montana.
The Office of the
Secretary of State
Office Response
B-3
RECEIVED
Office of the Secretary of State
AUG 1 2007
State of Montana
LEGISLATIVE AUDIT DIV.
State Capitoe building
Brad Johnson I'O Box 202801
Secretary of State ijM Hf.i.ena, MT 59620-2801
August 10,2007
Mr. Scott Seacat
Legislative Auditor
Legislative Audit Division
P.O. Box 201705
Helena, MT 59620-1705
Dear Mr. Seacat:
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the performance audit of Montana's
compliance with the Help America Vote Act and election-related issues. The audit pointed out a
number of successes that highlight Montana's tradition of excellent elections.
The audit also includes fourteen recommendations for areas where the Secretary of
State's office can work with county governments to even further improve our elections. Our
response to each of those is below.
Recommendation #1: Work with counties to develop a statewide data integrity improvement
plan addressing the updating and maintenance of voter information and uniform
implementation throughout the state.
Concur. This office will issue guidance to county election officials reminding them to
use SVRS as a primary - but not exclusive - means of identifying deceased voters, incarcerated
felons, and duplicate voter records. We will develop a plan for dealing with the problem of
unique identifiers and legacy registrations. And we will develop guidelines on ineligible voter
checks and updating voter information.
Recommendation #2: Improve office controls over SVRS access by: A. Developing procedures
to comprehensively review access to the SVRS to ensure authorized individuals have access
appropriate to their job duties. B. Working with counties to develop policies and procedures to
ensure system users can be uniquely identified.
Concur. This office has made staff changes and altered staff responsibilities to provide
for better SVRS oversight. We will review all SVRS accounts for appropriateness of access level.
We will issue guidance to counties on individual user accountability for SVRS desktops.
Recommendation #3: Assist counties in implementing effective desktop security procedures by:
A. Developing SVRS desktop security procedures at the county level. B. Providing counties with
Telephone: (406) 4-14-203 [ • Fax: (406)444-3976 * http://www.sos.mt.gov
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Mr. Scott Seacat
Page 2
August 10,2007
desktop security advice and guidance through the SVRS help desk. C. Implementing an audit
process to identify security weaknesses at the county level.
Concur. While we have no jurisdiction at this time to enforce on county property, we
will issue an election directive on SVRS desktop security procedures consistent with the Interim
Security Policy and Interim Security Architecture issued by the state Chief Information Officer.
The help desk has already begun providing advice and guidance on the subject. And we will
use the pre-existing help desk audit function in a way that leads to identification of any further
county-level security weaknesses.
Recommendation #4: Revise the current service level agreement with the Information
Technology Services Division to include specific assignment of responsibilities and procedures
relating to the SVRS change control process and implementation of the backup system.
Concur. This office sent a draft revision to the service level agreement to ITSD on
August 1 0, and we are awaiting a response.
Recommendation #5: Continue to review and revise training materials and other elections
guidance to emphasize the availability of polling place elector ID forms and work with
counties to ensure effective representation.
Concur: We will continue to work with counties to emphasize the availability of the
polling place elector ID form - an award-winning process developed in this office that
complements and exceeds the requirements of HAVA. Facts about the polling place elector ID
form will be included in the uniform display referenced in recommendation #6.
Recommendation #6: Collaborate with counties to develop, produce and distribute a uniform
voter information display for use in all Montana's polling places.
Concur: We will continue to work with counties to produce another poster for
distribution to counties containing all HAVA-mandated voter information - and some
additional information, such as the availability of the polling place elector ID form.
Recommendation #7: Lead efforts to mitigate the effects of late registration by: A. Focusing
public education on registering prior to Election Day. B. Emphasizing late registration
procedures and anti- fraud controls in training for county elections officials.
Concur: This office already focuses intense public education efforts on voter registration
before the late registration period. We will continue to work with counties to increase those
efforts. We will continue to distribute education and training materials for county election
officials and make those materials available in individual visits with the Secretary, regional
training sessions, or one-on-one training sessions.
Recommendation #8: Monitor ongoing trends in late registration to determine the impacts on
elections administration and, if needed, mitigate future impacts by: A. Rolling-back the late
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Mr. Scott Seacat
Page 3
August 10,2007
registration period to some point prior to Election Day orB. Providing additional resources or
guidance to maintain current levels of effort in counties or C. Expanding late registration to a
precinct-based procedure.
Concur: This office has already investigated some of these options, and will study which
of them will be needed to mitigate future impacts. Although the relationship between late
registration usage levels in other states and Montana's relatively low usage is tenuous, we will
continue monitoring usage levels here and determining what other options may be needed to
mitigate the impact.
Recommendation #9: Continue efforts to transition Montana counties to a common standard
for voting systems by: A. Prioritizing availability of remaining HA VA funds for upgrading
county voting systems equipment. B. Establishing a common technological standard for voting
systems as a strategic priority for the office. C. Determining the need for further legislative
guidance relative to voting systems.
Concur: This office will review priorities for remaining HAVA funds and amend the
HAVA plan as needed to reflect the priority of upgrading voting systems. A common
technological standard for voting systems using precinct counting machines is not possible so
long as Montana maintains both polling place and absentee voting options. If necessary, we
will seek legislation or other guidance from the legislature.
Recommendation #10: Revise voting system testing procedures to ensure all the different types
of elections equipment used in the state are included in the office's random testing procedures.
Concur. Although our current random testing system meets the requirements of statute,
there may be a benefit to be gained from exceeding them. We will develop a process to
randomly test at least ten percent of different types of voting systems.
Recommendation #11: Work with counties to address inconsistencies in the administration of
absentee voting bv: A. Revising public education and training efforts to provide increased
emphasis on the absentee voting process. B. Reviewing the county absentee voting
communications to determine where required voter information could be standardized further.
C. Where necessary, seeking statutory revisions to clarify treatment of absentee ballots received
in different circumstances.
Concur. We will request that counties supply information about their communications
with absentee voters so that we can find areas where further standardization is possible. We
will use that information to prepare such revisions as are necessary to our public education
efforts and our training efforts concerning absentee voting. We will study the necessity for
legislative clarification on the subject of where absentee ballots can be returned. If necessary,
we will work with counties to seek that legislation.
Recommendation #12: Continue addressing polling place accessibility issues by: A. Working to
identify unmet needs and prioritize allocation of remaining funding based on these needs. B.
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Mr. Scott Seacat
Page 4
August 10,2007
Establishing long-term goals for reducing the number of remaining inaccessible polling places
through upgrade or replacement.
Concur. We will continue to work with counties to set a goal of reducing even further
the number of inaccessible polling places. We will ask counties to provide information
regarding possible improvements to accessibility in polling places, and we will continue to
work with counties to prioritize funding based on that information.
Recommendation #13: Update the Election Judges handbook to include specific written
instructions on installation of Automark voting systems during polling.
Concur. In addition to the Automark training and materials already provided, we will
include specific Automark instructions in the Election Judge's Handbook.
Recommendation #14: Take steps to address the future funding of elections by: A. Updating the
state HA VA plan to include any necessary changes in the allocation and distribution of
remaining HA VA funding. B. Identifying whether counties can meet the ongoing
implementation costs of elections reform efforts following depletion of HA VA grant funding. C.
Where necessary, seeking legislative changes to accurately reflect division of responsibility for
elections funding and provide a viable basis for long-term implementation of HA VA and other
elections reforms.
Concur. We will ask counties to provide information on their ability to meet ongoing
implementation costs of HAVA. As we have previously, we will continue to work with counties
to amend the HAVA plan as needed to reflect necessary changes in allocation of remaining
funding. Based on our analysis of the information provided by counties, we will continue to
work with counties to determine whether it is necessary for this office to seek legislation on the
subject of elections funding.
I would like to thank the staff of the legislative audit division for their professionalism and
cooperation during this audit.
BRAD JOHNSON
Secretary of State
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