On irritation and insanity : a work, wherein the relations of the physical with the moral conditions of man are established on the basis of physiological medicine

V.

^

ARMY MEDICAL LIBRARY

WASHINGTON
Founded lsao

Section ....

Number .J?__7. jt... Q....G d—

Fobm 1 13c, W. D., S. G. O.
opo 3—10543 (Revised June 13, 1936)

#

,<,,,.! . /„ «,.•"'•

F. J .1MB R D1TJ §S.A II §

w '..'■ /":?

ON IRRITATION AND INSANITY.

A WORK,

WHEREIN THE RELATIONS OF THE PHYSICAL WITH THE MORAL CONDI-
TIONS OF MAN, ARE ESTABLISHED ON THE BASIS
OF PHYSIOLOGICAL MEDICINE.

BY F. J. V. BROUSSAIS,

CHEVALIER OF THE LEGION OF HONOR, PRINCIPAL PHYSICIAN AND PRO-
FESSOR AT THE MILITARY HOSPITAL OF INSTRUCTION AT PARIS, AND
TITULAR MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF MEDICINE, &C.

TRANSLATED

BY THOMAS COOPER, M. D.

president of the south carolina college, in the state of south

Carolina; and professor of chemistry, mineralogy, geology,

and political economy in that institution.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED

TWO TRACTS ON MATERIALISM,

AND

AN OUTLINE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.

BY THOMAS COOPER, M. D.

PR

t TH CAROLINA.
.f S. J. M'MORRIS.

LONDON :
PUBLISHED BY R. HUNTER,

72, ST. PAT'L'S churchyard,

1833.

WL
I? 31

PREPACK

OF THE TRANSLATOK.

The features of what lias been termed Physiological Medicine
in France, and of which Dr. Broussais, Professor of Medicine, at
the Hospital of Val de Grace, is the chief propounder and suppor-
ter, are principally these.

The Body consists of certain organized parts, as the circu-
lating and respiratory apparatus, the thoracic and abdominal
viscera, the muscular apparatus, the secreting and excreting glands,
the osseous structure, &c.

The membranous elements of which these are composed, are
tissues. — They are all of them subservient to the nervous appara-
tus, of which the Encephalon is the centre ot communication.

The tissues of the animal body, appear to be composed chemi-
cally, of fibrine, of gelatin, and of albumen. The muscular parts
are chiefly fibrine ; the skin, the mucous membrane, &c. are chiefly
gelatin ; the nervous apparatus is albuminous. The phosphat
and carbonat of lime composing the bones, do not seem to have
like properties with the other tissues ; but these chemical sub-
substances in the living body have not been fully examined. All
of them, except the bones perhaps, are contractile upon the appli-
cation of certain substances called stimuli: upon this property
(of contractility) depends the motion and action of the organized
parts.

Life is the aggregate of those functions which the several or-
ganic parts of the body perform, on being stimulated into action,
by the natural stimuli of caloric, light, air, atmospheric electricity,
and food, in the usual and regular proportions and degree.

The organic actions excited by these natural stimuli in a heal-
thy body, constitute the normal, regular, healthy functions of the

various parts so stimulated into action ; the aggregate whereof, is
included in the term Life. When the tissues from any cause, arc
more than usually irritable ; or the stimuli applied, are in excess
as to proportion, or from their unusual character, the natural stimu-
lation of the tissues and organs, becomes increased or exalted into
over-excitement or over-stimulation, technically called Irritation.
Stimulation, therefore, is the term appropriated to what produces
regular, usual, normal, healthy action ; Irritation, to a morbid
increase of stimulation ; and, in the language of Rush, may be
termed, morbid action. Irritation has various shades and de-
grees, extending from a very slight excess of stimulation, up to
inflammation, and consequent disorganization of the part affected,
terminating in suppuration or in gangrene.

Irritation, producing abnormal, morbid action, may, according
to the degree and continuance of the irritation, exist in a tissue
or an organ, or a viscus, for a long time : the consequence will be
functional derangement, without manifest organic lesion or des-
truction. After Ion"; continuance, this functional derangement
may assume the character of habit, or may proceed gradually to
sub-inflammation, inflammation, and disorganization.

Contractility, stimulation, irritation, are not entities distinct
from the tissue itself, which is contractile and irritable, or which
is stimulated or irritated : they are words without meaning, if the
meaning do not strictly include the tissue stimulated or irritated :
we know nothing of them, but in connection with the tissue itself,
of which they are properties.

All the tissues are pervaded, more or less, by nervous fibre.

The nervous apparatus, consisting of the encephalon and its
ramifications, and the spinal cord and its ramifications, may be
considered as divided intotwogreat portions — the one serving for
voluntary, and the other for instinctive and automatic functions.
The encephalic apparatus serves for the first, the spinal cord and
its ramifications for the second set of functions.

Sensation, perception, feeling, consciousness, are words denoting
that property or function of the encephalic nervous apparatus by
which we have cognizance of objects extraneous to us, and also of
the visceral affections and wants within us, transmitted to the
encephalic centre by the internal visceral nerves. This propertv

or function of the encephalon is termed Sensibility. It connects
us with the material world extraneous to our bodies, and with the
affections or modifications of our internal organs, destined to in-
stinctive and automatic functions.

Hence we have two sources of sensation, viz. one, the impres-
sions made on the nerves of our senses by external objects; and
another, the impressions made on our internal, visceral nerves,
and thence transmitted to the nervous centre, the encephalon.
The nervous apparatus of voluntarity, is stimulated to action by
these transmissions of impressions from without, and affections
from within us. The influence of the encephalic centre on the
nervous system in various parts of the body, is called Innervation.
The nerves that transmit to the brain information of the internal
visceral affections, are not the same as those that transmit from
the brain, the resulting voluntary motions.

Ail the tissues and organs of the body being instruments of,
and subservient to the nervous apparatus of the encephalon,
whenever any of these are morbidly irritated, or have suffered
lesion, or any other abnormal (morbid) affection, the nerves of the
part become irritated, and act sooner or later upon the encephalic,
as well as on the neighboring nervous apparatus; the nervous
system thus becomes gradually irritated, and assumes abnormal,
morbid action, and what is called disease ensues.

Disease is a word only, not an entity or thing. Like other ab-
stractions, it has been personified. But disease is strictly nothing
else than the disordered action of some injured or irritated tissue,
producing derangement of function; it has no meaning separate
from the tissue actually affected : and the cure of disease, is the
restoring the regular, healthy, normal action of the part, in lieu of
the irregular, abnormal, morbid action which constitutes disease.*

Hence, no man is competent to pronounce on disease, who is.
not well acquainted with the regular, normal, healthy action of

* The leading principles of physiological therapeutics, are : —
Sedatives : including general, and topical bleeding by leeches and cup-
ping : mucilaginous drinks : cold affusions : gentle laxatives and enemata.
The general rule being, to avoid as much as possible, irritating by medi-
caments an internal surface already in a state of irritation.

Revidsives : as epispastics, sinapisms, and sinapial pediluvia, irritating
imsruents, cauteries, and issues.

the part morbidly affected j so that from the symptoms and indi-
cations he can judge of the locality, the kind, and degree of abnor-
mal action. All medicine is therefore founded on an accurate
knowledge of anatomy and physiology, and on these alone. All
else is empirical.

In the ensuing treatise, Dr. J3roussais developes the elements
of the physiological doctrines of stimulation, irritation, inflamma-
tion, and innervation. This is comprised in chapters 1, 3, 4.

He gives a history of medical theories, until the establishment
of the Physiological Doctrine of Irritation in France, chap. 2.

He then proceeds to examine the ontological and psychological
notions, which clerical metaphysics have introduced into physi-
ology : and he shews, that we have no right to assume the exis-
tence of any hypothetical entity to account for those intellectual
phenomena, which so far as our senses are to be trusted, are no
other than the natural, normal functions of the encephalon. That
we have no right to assume or to believe any thing which our sen-
ses external or internal — the only sources and inlets of knowledge
that we possess — arc unable to furnish us with the proof of, that we
know, and can know nothing that our senses are incompetent to
shew us, for we have no other means of information and of knowl-
edge, than our external and internal senses : that all terms used
in medicine, and all words and expressions of abstraction, are
words only, and not things or actual phenomena : that there is no
such entity as disease, either general, or particular, distinct and
separate from the tissue actually affected : that there is no remedy
other than the alteration actually produced in the affected tissue
by the modifier employed for the purpose : that whether any man
living can or cannot explain satisfactorily the rationale of organic
functions intellectual or instinctive, is of no consequence to the
matter of fact, which remains true whether we or any one else
can explain it or not : that the phenomena termed intellectual, arc

Counter Stimulants : as bark, arsenic, and copper in the apyrexia of
periodical irritations; such as intermittent and remittent fevers, and neu-
ralgias. The Southern climate of the United States, seems to require
more bold and decisive practice, than the Northern climate of Paris or
London : hence, to us, the therapeutics of Broussais, Begin, Coster, &c.
appear feeble ; but the principles, founded on the physiology and patholo-
gy of the tissues, are undeniable and universally applicable.

Vll

quite as difficult of explanation by the aid and intervention of a
seperatc soul, as without it: and he deems it sufficient to shew
that these phenomena are really, and in fact, the regular normal
properties and functions of the encephalon, without pretending to
explain how and why, and in what manner these properties and
functions belong to that organ and are developed in it: an ex-
planation to which he readily confesses himself as unequal, as his
opponents are : that the whole difference between them is, that the
phenomena — the facts, being the same, he acknowledges his ina-
bility to explain them,* while his opponents introduce an assum-
ed, hypothetical entity, (the human soul) that explains nothing,
and burthens the system with an additional and needless difficul-
ty. All this occupies chapter 5 ; and the supplement also in reply
to the metaphysical notions of M. Cousin.

In chapter six and seven, he developes the connection between
the nervous system of the human body, and the phenomena of in-
tellect and of instinct.

He then applies the physiological doctrine of irritation to the
disorder called insanity under its various modifications; this oc-
cupies the whole of the second part of the work. Insanity had
long been deemed a mental affection, or disorder of the soul ; it be-
came his business therefore to discard this gratuitously assumed
entity, and to shew that insanity was an affection of the encepha-
lon, and of that alone.

In the latter part of chap. G of the second part of the work, and
in part of chap. 7, (pages 228 et seq. and 247 et seq. of this transla-
lation) he takes occasion to animadvert on the craniological doc-
trines of Dr. Gall j and produces what will be considered as the most
formidable objections hitherto advanced against the system of that
very able man ; without however affecting the great and leading
principles of Gall's theory, or the truth of his observations so far
as they rest on observed facts. The puny sciolists who think
themselves entitled to laugh at Dr. Gall, would do well to peruse
the very honorable testimony to his knowledge and talents, which
Eroussais so readily concedes, while he controverts the imperfec-
tions of Gall's theory in its present state.

" x " Who can explain why gold is yellow and siver white ? or why the
ame poil should feed the potatoc and the poison-vine '-

Vlll

In this volume then, the reader will possess, the most recent
exposition of the physiological doctrines of medicine of the mod-
ern French school, applied fully and distinctly to a specific dis-
ease, and illustrated by the known causes, symptoms, progress
and cure of that disease. He will also possess in this work the
most complete refutation of the metaphysical doctrines of psychol-
ogy, any where extant. In 1787, following the path opened by
Dr. Priestly, I published in England what I thought to be a satis-
factory refutation of those doctrines: circumstances elsewhere
noticed, have since induced me to shew, first that the obnoxious
doctrine of Materialism, is the doctrine actually held and main-
tained in]the christain gospels by the founder of Christianity ; and
also that it is true in itself, both metaphysically and physiologi-
cally. These tracts were drawn up in 1823 and published in Phila-
delphia; I have seen no reply to them yet. I regret, that in this
country and among a people who boast ot their being so enlightened,
and in the middle of the 19th century, I find it expedient to fortify
myself by Mr. Jefferson's coinciding opinions; but so it is: the
value of free discussion is not yet appreciated as it ought to be in
these United States ; and the powerful enmity of the clergy and
their ignorant adherents, is sure to pursue every man who exercis-
es the right of discussing clerical doctrines and clerical claims.
But I think the indications are manifest that their day is gradu-
ally drawing to its close. For the peace and happiness of man-
kind, I sincerely hope it is so.

The book of Hartley "On Man" is so little read among the
medical profession here, and the doctrine of " Association of
Ideas," so little known or attended to, that I have been tempted
to give an outline of that doctrine, connected as it is with all phy-
siological questions.

The volume now offered to the public, will be found to contain
the Elements of physiological metaphysics, the only metaphy-
sics in my opinion worth the attention of a man of common sense.
Those who have studied Hartley, Priestley, Cabanis, Destut Tra-
cy, and Broussais, will know how to estimate the vague and wordy
discussions of the Scotch school.

THOMAS COOPER, M. D.

Columbia, March 1, 1831,

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Preface of the Translator,

" " Author,

ON 1RIUTATION AND INSANITY, page 23

First Part On Irritation considered in its application to health and

disease, 23

Ch. 1. Idea of Irritation, 23

Ch. 2. History or Irritation, 25

Ch. 3. Principles of the Physiological Doctrine, 49

Of the contractility of fibrine, gelatin, and albumen, 55

Ch. 4. On the functions of the nervous system in the phenomena

TERMED INSTINCTIVE AND INTELLECTUAL, 59

Sec. 1 Fungtioas of the nervous apparatus in the adult, 59

Sec. 2 Successive developement of the different functions of
the nervous apparatus from the embryo to the adult state, 63

Sec. 3. Reason of the prerogatives that distinguish man from all
other animals, 72

The Cerebellum not the exclusive seat of the generative power
as Gall imagines, 73-74

Sec. 4. On what depend the final developement of the intellec-
tual and instinctive faculties which accompany the evolution
of puberty", 73

Ch. 5. On the theories advanced concerning the intelleclual

PHENOMENA, 75

Sec 1. How man abstracts himself from himself: basis of the

psychologi al doctrine, 78

Sec. 2. Of the notions entertained b) the psychologists of con-
sciousness: are animals endowed with it ? 82

Sec. 3. If it be possible to make a science out of the mere phe-
nomena of consciousness? Sources of error among the
psychologists in relation to it, 84

Sec. 4. Of the necessity of the senses and consciousness con-
curring to perfect the science of the sentient, thinking man, 92

Sec. 5 Comparison of the hypothesis of the psychologists with
the opinion of the physiologists on the appreciable cause of
intellectual phenomena, 100

Sec. 6. What the objections of the psychologists really amount

to, on final analysis. Solution of the foregoing question, 103

Sec 7. Of the rationalists and modern theologians, 111

Ch. G (by mistake numbered".) Exposition or the relations which

EXIST BETWEEN THE NERVOUS APPARATUS, AND THE PHENOME-
NA OF INSTINCT AND INTELLECT, 117

XXIV

Sec. 1. In what manner cerebral perception furnishes the ma-
terials of all our instinctive, ami intellectual operations, 118

Sec. 2. How the emotions of sensibility become motives of all
our actions, 121

Sec. .3. In what manner observation, offspring of cerebral per-
ception developes our intellectual faculties; and what are
those faculties, 123

Sec 4 How the will and the freedom of the will, connect them-
selves with perception, 125

Sec. 5 How; intellectual perceptions associate themselves with
instinctive emotions; and what constitutes the passions, 128

Sec. 6. Cause of error of the psychologists on the principle of
action in man, 131

Cll. 7. IIOW THE INSTINCTIVE AND INTEELECTUALPHENOMENA, AKE CON-
NECTED with Irritation, 133
On volition and the will p 125 and 145
On nervous excitation considered in itself, 147"

Ch. 8. On the part which excitation acts in the production of

DISEASE, 149

Sec. 1. How the defect of excitation produces abirritative dis-
eases, 150

Sec. 2. How the defect of excitation produces irritative dis-
eases, 154

Sec. 3. How excess of irritation produces diseases of irritation,

and what those diseases are, 158

Sec. 4. Of the changes that take place in the organs in conse-
quence of irritation, 162
ON IRRITATION AND INSANITY : part the sec^n# 181

On Insanity considered in reference to the principles of physio-
logical medicine, and the phenomena of irritation, 181
Ch. 1. On the causes of Insanity, 181
Ch 2. On the incubation of Insanity, 186
Ch. 3. Characters of Insanity, 190

Acute furious mania p 190. Acute mania not furious 192.

Chronic mania general and partial, or monomania, 193

1. Instinctive monomanias, founded on the perversion of instinct
and the wants termed physical ; either complicated with de-
lirium or not, 194

A. Perversion of the want or instinct of self-preservation, or

suicide, 194,

JJ. Perversion of the instinctive want of muscular exercise, or

rest. . 195

C. Perversion of the instinctive want of associating with other
men, 195

D. Perversion of the instinctive want of nutriment, 197

E. Perversion of the instinctive desire of generation, 197
2. Intellectual monomaniacs ; or persons that are such from the

perversion of moral wants, with the predominance of one

idea, or one series of ideas, acquired, 198

A. Monomania founded 011 self-satisfaction, 198

B. Momomania founded on self-dissatisfaction, 200

C. Monomania of gaiety, 201

D. Monomania of melancholy, 201

E. Complex monomania, 202

F. Intellectual monomania without the predominance of inter-
nal emotions, agreeable or painful, 202

Intermittent mania, 205

XXV

Cli. 4. Progress, duration, complication", termination of insanity, 206

Dementia, and general paralysis, 208

Ch. 5. Necroscopy of insane people, 213
Ch. 6. On tiivories of Insanity, ancient and modern, until the in-

TllOUUOTION OP PHYSIOLOGICAL MEDICINE, 216

l)r Gall's opinions examined, 226 to 232
Ch. 7. Theory of Insanity according to the physiological doc-
trine, 233

Dr. Gall's opinions on monomania 8tc. examined, 247 to 254

Ch 8. Prognostic of insanity, 262

Ch. 9. On the treatment of insanity, 273

Supplement : examination of the metaphysics of M. Cousin, 280

FINIS. End of M. Broussais' work, 292

APPENDIX:

BY THOMAS COOP3R, M. D.

Preface to the scripture doctrine of Materialism, 295

Brief account of the scripture doctrine of Materialism, 304

Mr Jefferson's letter thereon, szii
A view of the metaphysical and physiological arguments in favor of

materialism, ^^

Mr. Jefferson's letter thereon, j?®

Outline of the doctrine of the Association of Ideas, o79

FINIS, 408

ERRATA.

Page 29 for Stahl formerly read formally.

37 f' >r effections read affections.

38 for attributing to read adopting.

39 line 9 from the top for -which read in -which.
44 line 9 from the top for 7iothing read any thing.
51 middle of the page for principle read principal.
72 line last, dele if.

95 line 13 from the top, for the senses read your senses ?

117 for ch. VII read ch. VI.

197 for B read D

213 line 16 from the top after symptoms add of.

216 line 16 from the bottom for exercise read exorcise.

230 line 11 from the top for than read that.

250 note for organiologists reaa organologists.

271 for80ofFah read 90.

272 line 11 from the top for vegetable, fccvla, read vegetable -fecuhi:

PHEFACE.

AFTER many vacillations in its course, Medicine has
at length taken th< only road which can lead to truth ; that
is, the observation of the relations of man with external
modifiers ,* ana of the organs of man, one with another.,,
This method now universally prevails in writings, and in
practice, whether it be avowed or not. This is the physio-
logical method ; because it must be followed by tudy.ng
the phc nomena of life, which ;=lone render the bodily organs
thus modifiable. Let us, however, beware of mistake ; it is
not the abstraction, Life, which is to be studied, but the
living organs. If the observer wearies himself with inves-
tigations of properties or forces, considered independently of
those living organs, or the natural bodies which have an
influence over them, he will take much labor indeed, hut he
will fail in his object ; he will know neither organs nor
agents; he will know only the dreams of his imagination;
his head will be filled with illusions. It is thus that the
ancients went astray, as will be seen in this work. The
moderns have not escaped the snare; and the same snare is
even now preparing to be spread in the path of our cotem-
poraries.

Since then, true medical observation is that of the organs
and their modifiers, it is in fact an observation of the body
itself, and can be pursued only by means of the senses :
hence the senses must furnish materials, and it belongs to
the judgment to draw conclusions from them. But here a
difficulty presents its* If ; if the physician draws false con-

* Modificateurs. Whatever acts upon and ox ites any part of the animal
frame, producing any alteration whatever in its antecedent state. — Trans.

elusions, or if he be so unfortunate as to forget the true
source from whence they should proceed, he loses himself,
and deviates into that mistaken road of which we have just
spoken. Such an aberration is the more easy in the present
day, as this false route is sanctioned by some distinguished
men ; by names that command respect and inspire confidence
in the doctrines they advance. It is under the auspices of
these respectable names, some of them dear to France, that
education, by means of the senses, is depreciated, and threaten-
ed with discredit. Do not let us pass over an important dis-
tinction, and a practical truth. If the abstract words, rights,
lawfulness, disinterestedness, elevation of soul, are adapted
to produce actions, praiseworthy, useful to the public good
and to the national glory, it is not the same with the words
vital properties, vital forces, vis medicatrix, specifics, conta-
gion, and others of the same kind, which, in like manner,
paint the abstractions of the human intellect ; for nothing is
more easy than to abuse these expressions ; that is to say, to
impress under their sanction, on the living body, modifications
hurtful to the health of particular men, and injurious to the
good of society. Such a method of philosophising, although
it may succeed in politics or diplomacy, is not always appli-
cable to medicine ; and if it be sufficient in those two sciences,
to abandon ourselves to the sentiment of the beautiful, the
sublime, and the just, without searching very profoundly in
what manner we have arrived at these ideas, it is not so in
medicine, where it becomes necessary to prescribe the regi-
men and treatment of a suffering fellow-creature, or to judge
of questions that relate to the public health. These ques-
tions cannot be resolved by sentiment or inspiration ; the mo-
difying mendicaments prescribed, will not act directly upon
vital /brce, upon nctfwre, upon principle : they do not influence
these abstractions, until after they have acted upon the or-
gans ; and if these last are injured by a blow, the evil which the
abstract idea would have produced, will be in future without

remedy. In politics, on the contrary, the results of the ap-
plication of a false principle may be calculated before the
existence of society is compromitted ; for nations are much
more robust than individuals ; some victims there will be,
but their sufferings will be perceived if the press be re-
spected, and the mass of society may be preserved from
similar evils.

Society then may proceed in the career of improvement,
independently of first principles ; it may be rendered happy
or unhappy in the name of God, of the Prince, or of the
Laws : experience will settle which of these three motives
produce the most durable good, or an evil of most easy cor-
rection. Moreover it is of little consequence in politics,
whether the notion of justice or injustice comes from the
senses, or from some interior revelation. The laws must be
good ; and experience will soon pronounce on their advan-
tages and disadvantages ; these become manifest to the pub-
lic, and every one must at length acknowledge them. It is
not so in medicine, while the evil produced by the circum-
stances that modify and destroy our organs, are attributed
to diseases, as if diseases were separate and real beings ;
and the reason of the mischief is, that empirical medicine
never corrects itself; experience is lost upon it, and it goes
on with a satisfied conscience, sacrificing other victims. A
just conception of disease, therefore, is the first object of
medicine, nor can this be acquired without explaining in
what manner this conception is formed ; that is to say, with-
out probing to the bottom the real meaning of the Avoids
vital properties, vital forces, vital laws, for the purpose of
understanding the words putrid fevers, malignant fevers,
&c. &c.

It is necessary, therefore, that the physician should al-
ways have present to his mind, the substance of the organs,
and that he should never forget that the abstract ideas of the
science he pursues, have come to him by means of the sen-

\u

ses, and that he cannot safely proceed to study man, by
means of any a priori notions.

The object of this book, is to put this truth in a clear
light, and to guard medicine from the dangers that threaten
her by means of a philosophical sect essentially invading. —
Hence the necessity imposed on us, to present to young phy-
sicians liable to be seduced by false systems, a true notion
of Psychology,* which advances toward them with her ban-
ner unfurled, and already anticipates an easy conquest.

Introduced into the path of observation by the ideas of
Des Cartes on method, and by the advice of Bacon — en-
lightened on the nature of the apparatus which we use for
this purpose of observation, by the labors of Locke and of
Condillac, the French proceed zealously and in concert to-
ward the enlargement of every branch of useful knowledge.
To this concert of effort, natural philosophy, chemistry and
natural history, owe the progress which has distinguished
them among ourselves, and which has enabled industry to
soar so high. The turn of medicine has now arrived ; the
study of this branch of science, vague as it has hitherto
been, has assumed more precision, since to the experimen-
tal method of the great Holler, it has added a comparison
of the diseased organs with the symptoms, and the study of
vital properties and forces in pathologic lesions. Professor
Chausier by his excellent delineations, had so well traced
the path to physiological observation, that it seemed impos-
sible to miss it. Pinel had attempted the philosophical anal-
ysis of diseases, and if he did not perfectly succeed in this
great enterprise, he at least struck out some ideas which the
genius of Bichat has happily rendered fruitful of solid con-
clusions for pathology, by a faithful analysis of the tissues
of the human body. We shall make observations in concert

*The doctrine of an immaterial soul, or principle distinct from matter,
but some how or other connected with the human body, and presiding
over its intellectual function?. — Transl.

Ml!

with ihose oi' our predecessors ; we shall profit by the ad-
vice of Condillac and improve our scientific language, while
the profound and judicious Destut de Tracy, will render his
able aid in this difficult undertaking, of which the fulfilment
will alone preserve to mankind that knowledge which he
has been at so much pains to collect ; the wise researches
of Cabanis, have given to our nation a philosophic prepon-
derance, which will insure us from invasion by foreign sects.
The beautiful doctrine of the relation between the physical
and moral qualities of man, belongs to us through Cabanis,
at least as much as it belongs to England ; for Cabanis had
made a step beyond our external senses ; he had noticed the
powerful effect of internal viscera upon our thoughts, which
was not unknown to Epicurus, who furnished, however, no
physiological demonstration of this truth.

These precious investigations have conferred on Physi-
ology and Medicine, the exclusive right of dictating laws to
Ideology, and promise to remove forever, any interference
of the ephemeral systems of philosophical schools, with our
science. We can now hardly venture to believe in any re-
turn of those scholastic subtleties, and those wordy contests
which occasioned such loss of time to our ancestors.

So we thought, but we were wide of the truth. During
the period that was occupied in France in observing the hu-
man frame, with all the precautions necessary to exclude il-
lusion, and give us a just view of its nature, the metaphysi-
cians of Germany and Scotland disfigured the nature of man,
under pretext of rectifying the system of Locke. It was
indeed necessary to rectify that system, but it was on the
data furnished by Cabanis, and not by returning to the no-
tions of antiquity and the recal of the system of Plato.

The French testified some disgust at the obscurity of
Kants' system, which had been to them a frequent subject
of raillery. It then became an object to naturalize it among
us, under the specious pretext of making us acquainted with

XI \

(he first disciple of the great Socrates ; that iirst martyr to
the right of freedom of thinking ; the man whom every one
had agreed to regard as a sage, and almost as divine. Was
not this enough to stimulate the enquiries of our young
men, greedy after every kind of knowledge ? Platonism^
twenty times repulsed from the schools — Platonism which
the French regarded with disdain, and congratulated them-
selves in having escaped its yoke, was offered merely as an
object of literary curiosity. This was the first step taken
toward disengaging us from actual observation of instruc-
tive facts, and replunging us amid the illusions and chi-
meras of Ontology. Natural Philosophy, Natural History
Chemistry, Mathematics, the study of History, at present
truly philosophical, are walls of brass which Kants' Platon-
ism can never subvert. Nevertheless, by favor of surprise
it has made some steps among us, and some breaches in our
ranks. The first object was to attack Cabanis, of far more
consequence than Locke and Condillac. For Cabanis, al-
though by no means free from Ontologism, had this advan-
tage over his predecessors, that he appealed to facts which
any one might verify, instead of confining himself to sys-
tematic speculation : in reflecting on these facts, it is hard-
ly possible not to discover others equally fatal to Ontology.
The Kanto-Platonicians foresaw this ; and without being
fully aware of what might be discovered by the senses in
•observing man, they were desirous of obviating before hand,
ihe results of observation which they could not prevent. —
This is the amount of their present attempt, to place by the
side of actual and sensible observation, and far above it,
some pretended internal observation, which, if we believe
them, is as much higher than the observation of our senses,
as Morality is above Physics, Heaven above the Earth, or
things sacred above profane.

For this purpose, some consecrated words have been cho-
sen, with no small success, as narrow and wide, low and el-

v\

evated, grand and little, and these are skilfully arranged. —
Every thing that depends on the philosophy of the present
day, is low and trifling ; all that flows from Kanto-Platonics
is grand, noble and elevated. They attack our youth with
arms formerly very efficient, with ridicule ; and they hope
that men will fly to their ranks to avoid humiliating impu-
tations.

I know not whether they have yet discovered, that ridicule
changes its object as knowledge progresses, and that words
have not at this day their former influence ; but whether
they have discovered this or not, they have certainly chan-
ged their means of attack. Assuming the tone and language
of religious fanaticism, they do not insinuate, but they loud-
ly proclaim, that no man can be an estimable member of so-
ciety, who does not belong to their party. It needs but lit-
tle for them to condemn to the gibbet, those who are called
Sensualists. Who can be the dupe of their officious zeal
to distinguish such as are wanting in philosophy, and to draw
from their silence a pretended proof of concealed acquies-
cence, or an inconsequence worthy of pity ?

Skilled in multiplying the allurements which they deem
necessary to offer to our astonished youth, they give them-
selves out as eclectics, after having treated every other sys-
tem as exclusive : and they say, or seem to say, " O ye who
aspire to true knowledge, hasten to us, and we will instruct
you in all the doctrines of others, and preserve you from the
misfortune of being seduced by any of them. For know,
that all other philosophers are monomaniacs : raving on
some one idea, and who will soon reduce you to their own
situation." What then is the eclectic philosophy of these
men ? We now know it : they take their stand between
Sensualism and Theology, but on the indispensable condi-
tion of being spiritualists. On this we have but a word to
say ; if they are essentially spiritualists, they are not eclcc-
lics ; they can only judge of other systems as spiritualists.
and they too are governed by one predominant idea:

XV]

They borrow from the sensualists all the facts of sensation,
which they explain after their own fashion, they borrow rev-
elation from the Theologians, but they modify it as they
think fit. They are true reformers of worship, or rather
illurainati who aspire to the universal dominion over con-
science. Exclusives as spiritualists, they amalgamate differ-
ent dogmas, even those that were heretofore held as con-
tradictory. Such is their Eclecticism. It remains to be
known whether its base be solid; and whether they will be
permitted to exercise the right of demonstration and of proof
which they arrogate, and by which they set themselves up
above all theologians who rest upon faith alone. This is a
question which will be investigated in this volume, without
entering into religious discussions ; for we make it a duty to
respect religious belief in a treatise consecrated to Physi-
ology, and the exposition of those facts which the senses are
competent to verify. We do not aspire to the titles either
of dogmatist or eclectic ; it is truth we seek ; and w 7 e seek
it by those means of investigation which our organization
furnishes. He who is in search of important fact, ought to
be indifferent to the appellation which sectaries may bestow
on him.

The pivot on which this eclectic Ontology turns, is powers
(forces,) on which we shall make some observations to ren-
der our subject more comprehensible. The Kanto-Platoni-
cians of France, affect the utmost contempt for matter, and
have no consideration but for the powers that animate it ;
and believe that by this means, they place themselves far
above the observers of facts. We must see if by this puf-
fing up, they are rendered able to rise higher than their op-
ponents.

Let us examine what is meant by force or power. It is
necessary to dwell upon this. What then is it, but the in-
duction drawn by an observer of something which acts upon
or within a body, producing therein some alteration ? The

XV 11

observer is naturally carried on to suppose that the body is
moved by something acting on it, as he himself is accus-
tomed to act in certain cases on certain other bodies : no
doubt there is a tendency to this conclusion. It is impossi-
ble not to admit that we are driven to it by analogy ; that
is to say, we are compelled to judge of what we do not
know, by that which we believe we do know : but it is
here, and precisely here, that the fact stops. The man
whose judgment govern his imagination, restrains himself,
and laments that he is compelled to remain in ignorance of
first causes. For him, the word power, force, is but a
formula ; the sign of a perception which he has received
from some phenomenon, and he makes use of it only to
search for others which his senses may equally seize hold of.
It is not so with a man whose imagination governs his
judgment ; a man of a poetical tendency ; a Platonician,
ancient or modern : equally credulous and presumptuous,
he cannot support the idea of ignorance ; and he passes from
vague conjecture, to the most perfect conviction : he does
more, he hastens to realize his induction ; he personifies it;
lie makes it act as U it were an animated, living being ; in
short, like a man ; then he frames his romance, of which this
induction is the hero ; and he is angry at those who refuse
to pay it homage.

Such is the fanaticism of opinion : it differs in intensity
according to the character of the person in whom it is devel-
oped ; but it is at the bottom always the same. All authors
of this description, whether in medicine, philosophy, or any
other branch of knowledge, may profess toleration, but they
are not capable of it ; they cannot be : they are too much
attached to the fiction which has so agreeably occupied them ;
to their poetic prose, and to the incredible efforts which
useless researches have given rise to ; and looking at the
picture for effect, they cannot support the idea that they
have been occupied by chimerical reveries : they forgive a

XY111

brother romancer, although the portrait of his idol may be
different from theirs ; but they never forgive a strict rea-
soner who pays them no deference, and passes by the temple
of Ontology without bending the knee.

A figurative style suits marvellously the picturesque, and
the fictions in which poetry deals : let it, if you please, be
the style of idyls, or even of the epic ; but it ought not to be
the style of philosophy, which it in no wise suits. Frequent
experience since Plato, has taught us this : hence, young
students cannot understand this figurative philosophy : they
regard it with astonishment, and accuse themselves in secret
of a want of intellect. There are always some, who by
dint of listening, or of reading, succeed in figuring to their
imaginations, some of those fantastic beings which this style
pourtrays ; these, necessarily few in number, adopt the lan-
guage of their teacher, and become violent in proportion as
they were humble admirers of his sublime talent. As soon
as these new adepts become unintelligible to their friends,
and their conviction is carried so far as to make them smile
with pity, and shrug up their shoulders at the names of Locke
and Condillac — so soon as Cabanis is in their eyes nothing
but an Atheist, happy that he escaped the severest punish-
ment — so soon as Voltaire, Rousseau and Montesquieu,
appear to them but sorry philosophers — that the works of
Volney excite their indignation — and that the dryness of
Destut de Tracy revolts them — their education is finished :
they have no longer any occasion to study, or to consult the
monuments of French literary glory, unless to criticise them,
for they can find nothing of instruction in them ; they are
far above these legislators of reflection and of taste : what
they cannot find in the classics of their own school, they arc
sure to find in their own consciousness ; when discarding
the senses, they withdraw within themselves, shut their
eyes, avoid all noise, and listen to their own contemplations.
When they have arrived at this high degree of perfection.

XIX

their features become composed, they assume an expression
of pride, and they feel an inward conviction that their intel-
ligence is infinitely greater than that of the persons who tell
them with some surprise, "I do not understand you."

The moment, however, seems to have arrived, when we
may tear away the veil which renders their masters impene-
trable. We hope in this work to make known the secret of
their apparent superiority ; and the cause of that singular-
stupor which they have produced in the literary world.

It is to physicians that we shall offer the explanation of
these mysteries; for it is their cause that we are now plead-
ing ; it belongs to the medico-physiologists to determine,
what there is really appreciable in the causes of instinctive
and intellectual phenomena. We address ourselves to phy-
sicians, because he who has studied nothing more than the
regular and healthy physiology of the human being, does not
possess facts enough for the solution of these problems. Man
is only half understood, if he is observed only in health :
sickness constitutes part of his moral, as well as of his phy-
sical existence. We must not, therefore, be surprised at the
reveries of an Ontologist, who is a stranger to the physiolo-
gy both of health and of disease ; or who is content with a
superficial knowledge of authors, whom he is unable to com-
prehend. Such is the case with the Kanto-Platonicians,
and nothing is more strange than the pretension which they
set up now-a-days to give laws to our science, especially at
a moment when it is undergoing a stormy revolution, the
nature of which they cannot understand. On all sides they
find discussions of which they know not the true motive ;
truth and error, sincerity and dissimulation, honorable dis-
interestedness, and vile speculation imitating her language,
are afloat, not in the whole medical world, but in the capital
of France — in all the saloons — in all the academies ; and
the Kanto-Platonicians are at a loss to discover their own
tenets: thev know not what medicine is, and yet they dare

XX

calumniate and despise it : they proclaim that the science oi
man, such as they conceive it to be, has alone any preten-
sions to certainty : without having passed even ten years of
their life in studying man as physicians, or knowing him, con-
sidered in his organs, living and dead, they think that the
external observation of the grown man, is sufficient to
explain all the phenomena of the embryo, the infant, the
diseased, the deformed, and the dead, submitted to anatomi-
cal analysis. The first observation is for them the only true
one, because it is theirs; the other is a vain and gross hypo-
thesis, calculated for common understandings. It is of con-
sequence to show them where the truth really lies; in
particular, to make them understand that a victory over a
few deserters, or some speculators, who sacrifice to them a
science which they do not understand, is immeasurably dis-
tant from a victory over medicine.

We will not do so much injustice to the French youth, as
to believe they can be entirely led estray by the bloated
language of the Kanto-Platonicians — the fund of good sense
which distinguishes them, will doubtless preserve them now,
as it has done formerly. But they may be confounded by
the clattering of words which assail their ears on every
side, and the schools of medicine will be surprised to hear,
that this senseless jargon is to be introduced into the midst
of the medical faculty, while so much opposition is to be
made to the fruitful and intelligible doctrine of the Physiolo-
gical School. We shall endeavor to explain this enigma,
and make them feel the dignity of the science they cultivate ;
and we shall prove undoubtedly, to every man who has con-
secrated the most valuable years of his life to anatomical
physiological, and pathological investigations, that the
science which he has so laboriously acquired, neither is nor
ought to be, tributary to metaphysics, from which it can
draw nothing useful ; and that so far from receiving its laws
from this science of words, ought to supply them to meta-

\\1

physics which, like an ungrateful child, despises and denies
its parent.

Following this great truth, we must collect the phenomena
of instinct and intelligence around the excited nervous sys-
tem, and give them an important place among the genera-
ting causes of irritation. We have not hesitated to adopt
as the base of our work, the article Irritation, which we
published in the Encyclopedic progressive, and which the
public has favorably received. But the theory of irritation
will receive in the following pages, a fuller developement
than suited the plan of that work : so that this is in reality
a new treatise on Irritation, which we now offer to our
brethren. Since, of the four forms of Irritation, that of the
nerves is more particularly developed in this book, as its
importance required, and which we have hitherto refused to
insist on, until time had matured our ideas, — we thought we
could do nothing better than add to it by way of proof, a
description of a correspondent malady. We have chosen
Insanity, as being the disorder in which nervous irritation
plays the most important part. This subject suited us better,
as affording new strength to the arguments which we oppose
to the ambitious pretentions of the Psychologists.

In truth, our design in this work is, to unveil that mystery,
under whose protection bad taste threatens to spread itself
over the whole science of man, physical and moral ; to con-
tribute by a new effort, to the progress of physiological
medicine, and to mark the causes which have prevented
that progress from being more rapid ; in fine, to pursue the
science which we love, and to whose glory we have conse-
crated the greater part of our life, from being subjected to a
disgraceful subordination.

It required motives like these, to induce us to interrupt
the third edition of our Examen des doctrines medicates,
which we have already put to press, and are sorry to delay
so long ; but that work shall be resumed with new activity.

ON IRRITATION AND INSANITY.

First Part. — On Irritation considered in its application to
Health and Disease.

Chap. I. — Idea of Irritatiox.

The word Irritation represents to Physicians the action
of irritating substances, or the state of the living parts that
are irritated. We give the name of Irritants, to all those
modifiers of our bodily economy which increase the irrita-
bility, or sensibility of living tissues, and which raise these
phenomena beyond their (normal*) regular degree.

The word Irritation, is applicable to every living body, all
of which are endowed with irritability ; but in medical lan-
guage this word is used to designate the unusual increase of
irritability, or of sensibility, among the higher order of
animals. Our intention is, to consider irritation as applied
to man alone, leaving to others the task of applying it to the
'veterinary art.

To say that a man is capable of irritation, is, no doubt, to
say that he is irritable ; but the irritability, which is the
property of every tissue, is not taken in a pathological, or
morbid sense. We express by this word, the property pos-
sessed by the tissue, of moving on the contact of" a foreign
body, which induces us to say, that a tissue has felt that con-
tact. IIaller confined this property to the muscular fibre :
it is now agreed, that it belongs to every tissue. When a
man is conscious of the motions excited by a foreign body.

".Vonnal : within the usual anil regular limits of the laws of healthy
.% normal what is out of those usual and regular limits from whate-
ver cause.

L m J

which we frequently call a modifier, he is said to have i'eit
the impression ol that body, and we give to the faculty
which he possesses of feeling or perceiving it, the name ot
Sensibility. Sensibility then, belongs to the individual,
(Moi*) and irritability to every fibre of the human body.
A part affected by a foreign body, may be excited to motion
without the individual (Moi) being conscious of it. In this
case, there is nothing but irritability ; but if the individual
(Moi) experiences that kind of modification which induces
the man to say, " I feel, I perceive," there is both irritability
and sensibility. Sensibility, then, is the consequence of ir-
ritability, and not irritability of sensibility : in other words,
we must be irritable, before we are sensible. The embryo
is not yet sensible, it is only irritable : an apoplectic man is
no longer sensible, but he is irritable. We see that irrita-
bility is common to all living beings, from the vegetable to
the man, and that it is constant ; while sensibility is a pro-
perty belonging to certain animals only, and is manifested
only under certain circumstances ; these circumstances are
the existence of a nervous apparatus, furnished with a cen-
tre, to wit, the brain ; there must also be a particular state
or condition of that apparatus, for it is not always in a condi-
tion to give to the animal a consciousness of the motions
which pass within its tissue. The apoplectic man, and the
embryo, are proofs of this.

Some persons have erected into a property, the faculty
which the fibre possesses, of yielding to the impression of a
stimulant, without the animal himself being conscious of it.
They have designated this pretended property, by the
phrase Organic Sensibility, because it is in such manner
inherent in the organs, that it may be observed in them
when separated from the collection ; but as the movement
of the stimulated fibre is the only phenomenon that is seen —
as it is impossible to separate, to insulate the feeling from
the motion — as the word feeling here, has no other meaning
than self-motion — and as by like reasoning, the word feeling
may be applied to inert bodies, since nothing hinders us
from saying, that the ball which is moved, has felt the con-
tact of the ball which is impelled against it. — This organic
sensibility is a superfluous abstraction, which cannot find
entrance into the exact language of philosophical physiology.

*Moi: one's self— that which constitutes me a different being from
every other thing or creature. This seems, among the French metaphy-
sicians, to be the expression for individual consciousness. personal identity.

Tva i

L 25 J

The modifiers which put irritability into action, are called
excitants, or stimulants, and their effect, excitation or
stimulation. Excitation, considered under a general aspect,
separate from the place where it exists, and the modifier
which produced it, is also called excitement. When excita-
tion, or stimulation exceeds the (normal) ordinary bounds,
it puts on the character of irritation, and the agents which
produce this, are called irritants. This is the irritation
which forms the base of the physiological doctrine in medi-
cine ; but prior to considering it pathologically, and before
investigating the part that it plays in the production, the
course and the treatment of diseases, it may be useful to
cast an eye over the eras of medical science, to discover by
what gradations we have at length arrived at the point where
we find ourselves. ■

Chap. II. — History of Irritation.

Hippocrates had no idea of irritation, but he admitted a
consent among the organs, which he attributed to an inter-
nal principle (enormon) which a modern physician has
translated impetumfaciens, (producing an impulse;) by this
occult force, he explained the phenomena of health and dis-
ease. The dogmatists, who followed the father of medicine,
acknowledged a material soul, etherial or igneous, formed of
whatever was most subtile in matter, and they made it pre-
side over every vital action : this material soul held its place
for a long time among the schools, sometimes alone, and
sometimes as subordinate to an immaterial and imperishable
soul, but they had no idea of irritability in the living tissue.

Neither is the theory of Strictum and Laxam of Themi-
son, developed by Thessalus, irritation : it related to the
facility or the difficulty which atoms experienced, in pene-
trating into the cavities appropriated to them ; and the
therapeutics which resulted from these hypothetical specu-
lations, was absurd and without, any relation to the modern
theories of excitement and irritation. They proposed to
open and shut the pores of all bodies which they considered
like the skin, upon which they most frequently experiment-
ed. Hence they set to work by means of frictions ; some-
times executed with substances attractive, sometimes
astringent, repulsive, adstrictive, &c. and they emptied the
body by vomits, by purgatives, and by regimen ; to fill it
again within a certain regulated number of hours or days.
4

L m J

Men who had no idea of anatomy, or of the functions of the
body, conceived that by these practices they could empty all
the channels of the system, expel the old matter, and intro-
duce new, more proper to sustain health, and this they
termed metasyncrasy, or reincorporation ; they flattered
themselves that by this pretended regeneration, they could
give more force, suppleness, and permeability to the living
channels ; correct the excess of constriction or relaxation,
and place them in that middle condition, most favorable to
health and longevity. We see, then, upon what slight foun-
dations it is asserted, that the notion of irritability is found-
ed upon. this system.

Galen developed the elementary and humoral theory of
which the germs were found in the writings attributed to
Hippocrates. He was the father of humoralism — he estab-
lished forces to act upon the elements, earth, water and air,
or pneuma, to convert them into humors, regulate their mix-
tures and their relations to each other, and enable them to
direct the functions of life, and the conservative efforts of
nature in disease. He lost himself in subtleties on almost
every question he-discussed, and had no idea whatever of
animal irritability.

The doctrine of Irritation is not to be sought for in the
oriental application of magic and the Cabala to the art of
healing ; nothing is there to be found but what is degrading
to the human intellect.

The Arabians, who cultivated medicine with so much
ardour before the invasion of the Turks, were mere copyists
or imitators of Galen and the Greeks. They explained all
the phenomena of life by occult forces, which they multi-
plied prodigiously. They were the founders of Materia
Medica, and of Chemistry, but they had no idea of Irritation.
Dissection was interdicted, and experiment was unknown.
They had no anatomy, but that of Aristotle or of Galen, or
of the Physicians of the Alexandrian School. Surely it was
not from these sources, they could derive any just notions
of the vital properties of the human body.

On the revival of letters, some authors, Jerom Fracasto-
rius, for example, spoke of the irritation produced by the
humours on the solids ; but they built up no system on this
vital action. The word Irritation is found among them,
merged and lost amid a deluge of expressions, more or less
faulty, belonging to the elementary and humoral pathology.

i M J

in this author, Irritation is considered in the abstract, and
not as seen in this or that part, or as a state of the body.

During the 16th century, and the universal attack on the
Galenical Theory, a Professor of the Faculty of Montpelier,
Joubert, who first opposed " the dread of a vacuum," made
use of Irritation to explain the phenomena of convulsions,
which he attributed to the reaction of the solids against the
morbific causes. He also attributed the action of medicines
to a species of Irritation, viz. the disagreeable impression
made on the stomach. Still the humoral pathology predo-
minated ; no system was yet founded on the irritability ol
the animal fibre. This, indeed was not even suspected,
though manifest in some of the functions.

The Alchemists, the melters of metals, were for a long
time occupied in discovering specifics and panaceas for the
cure of disorders. Paracelsus their Coryphceus, imagined
a kind of soul attached to the organs and residing in the
stomach. He called it Archceus, and gave to it in charge,
the government of the functions ; but he did not assign to
it Irritation as its prime minister, and irritability played no
part in his absurd system of galimatias. Yet to one of the
votaries of medical chemistry, Van Helmont, we owe the
first notions clearly expressed of Irritation. Van Helmont
admitted the Archceus of Paracelsus, and like him, placed it'
in the stomach. This physician was the first who gave a
just notion of the local cause of Inflammation. He attribu-
ted it to the anger of Archceus, who, offended by the pre-
sence of morbid causes, sent a ferment into the part, which
the Archceus always had at command. This ferment irrita-
ted the tissues, which called upon the blood, and thus became
the immediate cause of inflammation. He exemplified this
by a thorn forced into a sensible part, and thus gave an idea
of the mechanical production of Inflammation. He attribu-
ted also to Inflammation some diseases which, till that time,
had been very differently considered, such as dysentery,
which he placed in the first rank of phlegmasia;, declaring
that it differed from pleurisy, only by the part effected.—
His notion of the manner in which inflammation was produ-
ced occupied the famous article Aiguillon in the Eneyclo-
pedie, which has laid the foundation for the modern works
on the vitality belonging to each of the organs.

But this idea had not all the success which we might have
suspected ; for, from the system of Descartes arose the phy-
siologico-cheraical school of Sylvius, the mechanico-mathe-

! 28 |

matical and animal" school of Stahl, who, for some time
turned aside the physicians from using the theory of ir-
ritation. It is true, that Van Iielraont placed this pheno-
menon in the second rank only, and that his seeds of disease
and his ferment, savored too much of the humoral theories,
and his Archceus manifestly tended to place the soul at the
head of all the physiological phenomena. This author may
then be considered as the principal founder of medical spir-
itualism, but his irritation is too much separated from matter,
to serve as abase for any reasonable theory of the irritability
of living tissues.

Sylvius de le Boe, used the word irritation to give an idea
of the action of acrid humors, which he conceived to arise
from the fermentations, precipitations, and distillations, of
which the human body was the continual seat. To blunt
these acrid humors, he employed methods, more or less
irritating : hence his theory does not rest upon irritability
considered as a fundamental property of the body, and a
source of vital phenomena ; irritation was for him, only
something accessary, frequently very ill applied. We may
say as much of all his followers who, like Floyer, multiplied
their acrimonies, and sought their specifics among the incras-
sating, always joined to irritating medicaments.

In the system of Borelli, one of the founders of the me-
chanical school, irritation plays an important part. — It is by
this means, that the nervous fluid disseminated through the
muscles by the action of the brain, determines their contrac-
tion. Irritation figures also in producing diseases; for the
nervous fluid becomes acrid by the vitious action of glandu-
lar secretion, (although the blood does not participate this
action,) excites fever by irritating the heart. But this
appears to be the sum of their explanations, founded upon
irritability ; for their calculation of the force of the heart,
and the fibres of the stomach — their dissertations on the
effects of trituration — the velocity of the blood — the impulse
of the molecules against the sides of their containing vessels —
the influence which angles and curvatures produce on the
course of fluids, and similar researches to which they always
applied calculation, absorbed the attention of these physi-
cians, and drew them aside from the principal phenomenon.
It was elasticity, considered as a mechanical force, which
formed the fundamental property of the living body, and not
irritability, a word which was employed, not in a literal, but

i 29 j

in a metaphysical sense, to give an idea oi the principle of
action. Hence ail the explanations of this school were me-
chanical, and most of the physicians that belonged to it were
empyrics in Pathology, and mechanicians and calculators in
Physiology. Hence, no doubt, the opinion which prevails
at present among certain practitioners, that mathematical
sciences can render no service to the practice of medicine.

Nevertheless, some physicians, convinced of the insuffi-
ciency of mechanico-mathematical calculations, to explain
the movements of the blood, and the congestions in, and
derangements of the secretory organs, had recourse to irrita-
tion, by means of which the blood is attracted, independently
of the impulsive force of the heart. This irritation was, ac-
cording to them, a vital phenomenon which they did not
place in subjection to ferments, such as those of Van Hel-
mont. Nevertheless, in spite of these flashes of reason over
the physiology of life, irritation was nothing yet but an
accessory phenomenon, not essentially inherent in the ani-
mal fibre, so as to force itself into the explanation of all
Physiological and Pathological appearances. It was from
this cause that the authors who were not mechanicians in
Physiology, were always either humouralists or empyrics,
whenever the causes of the treatment of diseases come in
question.

Stahl formerly denied that the parts of the body were
brought into action by stimulants, and that they contract
themselves under the influence of stimulants : this was de-
nying the fundamental point of the doctrine of irritation.
He acknowledged no active power capable of producing
motion, excepting the soul, which he borrowed from Van
Helmont. It was the soul that perceived impressions ; but
this soul made use of tonicity as the only agent capable of
producing motion, although the notion of making the modi-
fiers of the body act immediately upon an immaterial sub-
stance, without counting any thing of the impression made
upon living matter, and introducing this last solely for the
purpose of producing a reaction of the spiritual being, seems
strange and contradictory ; yet, on studying the system of
this physician, we cannot help perceiving that it was favor-
able to the progress of the theory of irritation. In effect,
it was only necessary to place this phenomenon between the
body impressed and the soul, just as he had placed what he
calls tonicitv between the action of the soul and bodilv

L ^ J

motion, to perceive that irritation presides over the pheno-
mena of health and disease. But the properties of the seve-
ral tissues which compose our organs and other apparatus,
was not sufficiently understood to lead readily to this con-
clusion. Nevertheless they employed the word irritation
to give an idea of the manner in which the soul is effected
by its modifiers. — It is the soul, according to the disciples of
Stahl, which is irritated by the light that strikes upon the
retina ; and it is the soul which determines the closing of
the eyelids and the contraction of the iris. One said
that the soul was irritated by the impression of acrid matter
which affected (not irritated) the nerves, and which excited
fever. Another, Robert Whytt, acknowledged three spe-
cies of muscular motion : one natural, another produced by
nervous influence and voluntary, and a third, involuntary,
produced by direct irritation. But the soul was always
brought forward ;* they always regarded it as the cause of
motion, and to explain the motions which took place in a
separated muscular fibre, they maintained that the soul was
divisible, and that its presence in each portion of a divided
heart, was the cause of the contractions which took place.
They employed the same reasoning to explain the repeti-
tion of the contractions in a heart, torn out of a living animal,
when they ceased to puncture it ; they saw no mean be-
tween Mechanism and Animism, and if the heart did not
move mechanically, it must move by means of the soul ;
they regarded as nothing the inherent irritability of the liv-
ing fibre ; they gave the same explanation of the irritations
applied immediately to the nerves, and more or less pro-
longed after the substraction of the modifiers. This, there-
fore, was not the true theory of irritation. Others, never-
theless, pretended that the will always acted as an irritant
upon the parts ; this was one step more toward the truth,
but the system was not yet generalized ; indeed it could not
be while irritability was separated from the living fibre, and
while tonicity, the substitute of elasticity, was regarded as
the principle property of tissues, and the abstract entity,
irritation, was in this system brought into play, in lieu of
the irritability of living animal matter.

Sauvages was mechanician in Physiology, and empyric

*No man who has glanced at the prevailing Physiology, and the prc-
vading Theology of any period, can doubt but the absurdities of Physiolo-
gy must be ascribed to clerical influence. — -Transl.

L 3i j

in Pathology : he subjected all the mechanical phenomena
of the living body to the soul, and studied diseases by groups
of symptoms, as is seen in his Nosologic Methodique. He
had no just idea of irritation.

The reasonable soul of Stahl became now superceded by
the vital principle. This was only changing the word.
Thus, Casimir Medicus maintained that matter was of itself
incapable of all motion, and that the irritation of tissues
which had forced itself into notice, explained nothing with-
out the intervention of this foundation-principle. Another
author revived the material soul of the ancients, and assign-
ed to it the same functions as the reasonable soul of Stahl.
Each portion of the body was endowed with its peculiar
sentiment and imagination, which was under the general
government of this material soul. There is no assignable
termination to the entities created and interposed between
the immaterial soul and the organic fibres. But this arbi-
trary creation could not resist the progress of physical
sciences. Nothing is seen in these hypotheses, but the.
system of Van Helmont under different colours.

Thcophilus Bordeu admits in each organ a particular
feeling. But he does not erect it into an intellectual
feeling. Each organ being possessed of its own proper life,
has also its own particular internal agents of irritation, which
it draws from the blood, the nerves, &c. This author
brought the glands greatly into play, conferred a principle
of action on the blood, and submitted the whole to the vital
principle, which in truth was not the reasonable soul of
Stahl, nor an etherial or igneous material principle like that
of the ancients. It was something abstract ; the general
result of the particular lives of the respective organs ; but
it was also an active force which directed the mass of par-
ticular and special forces.

Irritation here is only a secondary means. It is not that
force, which reflected from one organ upon the others, com-
municates motion and supports life : it is the general force,
a result of all the particular forces, which feels the wants,
calls in the means of supplying them, disposes the concert
of motions, assimilating, depurating, conservating, repro-
ducing, and directing the phenomena of nutrition. This is
not yet the theory of Irritation. Shall I speak of the
chimerical functions to which this author put the cellular
tissue ? the pains and cachexies pro rood in a - from the vicious

[ 32 ]

action of the different secreting organs, which the vital prin-
ciple had to remedy by laborious efforts of coction, more or
less prolonged, by crises, depurations, &c? It is evident
that the theory of Bordeu, though much superior to those
of his predecessors, is nothing like the true doctrine of irri-
tation.

It carries also with it an impression of Animism. It
seems to give ideas and action to a principle, and to princi-
ples of which no one can form a precise idea. It is so far
good that it unites these principles to particular organs, so
that you cannot think of the one, without contemplating at
the same time the other, and their modifiers. As to the
theory of Coction, and efforts made with irritation, this is a
remains of the Ontology of the Hippocratic Schools.

La Caze, so much thought Oi by some, spoke of irritation ;
but he nearly confined it, in the production of vital motions,
to the tendinous centre of the diaphragm which he consider-
ed as nervous. He wandered so far from the truth, that
we cannot place him among the physicians who contributed
to the progress ol the theory of Irritation.

These errors would not have been committed, if physiolo-
gists had been content to reason on facts well established.
But the mad propensity derived from the ancients of guess-
ing at functions instead of studying them ; and that other
not less erroneous of considering every thing abstractly —
of talking for a long time about functions without noticing
the organs to which they belong — of placing the organs in
a subordinate point of view, and creating some immaterial
being to hover over them, and direct all their movements —
this Ontologic mania was as yet too fashionable to permit
physicians, under the influence of their imagination, to escape
from it. On the other hand, wise men, who had no anatomi-
cal and physiological analysis to resort to, for no one had as
yet established such a branch of knowledge, had no resource
but to empiricism or scepticism. But scepticism prescribes
no formulas, and diseases demand them. There was no
remedy, therefore, in medicine, but empericism and a re-
nunciation of physiological reasoning. Content with a
superficial view of facts, exclaiming with Horace, Pcrmiitc
Divis ceetera.

Barthez, a noted favorer of the vital principle, placed in
subordination to it too many particular forces, and brought
it upon the stage as a kind of intelligent soul: although he

f 33 }

protested to mean no more by this than the cause, whatever
it might be, of vital motions. This author admits also of
humoral charges, founded partly on the theory of the Ga-
lenists, and partly on that of Bordeu ; for he strove as much
as possible to make the different theories agree. He re-
garded irritation as a secondary phenomenon, and did not
make it the base of any regular system of Physiology, or of
Medicine.

Ernest Plainer, in his great work on Anthropology, admits
a nervous spirit, a kind of material soul, which he proposes
as the general instrument of the immaterial soul. The or-
gans pump it out of the atmosphere : it corresponds to the
Pneuma of the old physicians. It is an emanation of the
general soul of the world, and proceeds from the ether. —
This material soul, diversified in each organ, produces therein
sentiment, desire, aversion, and explains all phenomena.
In this explanation irritation acts but very feebly.

Hitherto nothing appears on irritation but what is vague.
Arriving at Francois Glisson, we shall see something more
precise. Without entering into the details of the system
of this philosophical physician, we shall remark, that he
ascribes to each animal fibre, a property which he terms irri-
tability, and of which the results are perception and desire
(appetit). Perception differs from sensation. Perception
precedes the motion which is the effect of irritability, and
is converted into sensation so soon as it reaches the soul.
This perception is natural to the fibres ; the nerves possess
it ; it renders the fibres irritable ; it is the source of natural
movement, which the author distinguishes from sensitive
movement, the result of sensation. The soul having received
a sensation from a natural perception, acts upon this for the
purpose of moving the muscles, without acting immediately
on the muscles. The will put into action by the soul, acts
upon the irritable fibres by means of the nerves, or their
natural perception. Irritability is divided into natural, vital
and animal ; and the humors partake of it. There are vital
spirits also, intermediate between the immaterial soul and
the organs. The sympathies between these two, are explain-
ed by the communication of animal irritability.

In spite of all this Ontology, it is easy to see that the first

theory of Irritation is comprised in Glisson's, and the germs

also of the theory of excitement. To find this, it is only

necessary to take away the immaterial beings which he has

5

I * J

placed between the impression of the excitants and die
movement of the fibre ; and then will remain the irritability
of the fibre, and its result, irritation. Still this irritability is
too general, too vague. It becomes necessary to appreciate
its degree and its function in each tissue. This precision,
however, belongs to a period much nearer to our own. But
we shall see that the first notions of the theory of excitement
must not be refused to Hoffman.

Irritation occupied an important place in the system of
this author, but it did not form the basis, of that system.
The blood contains an etherial fluid which it dispenses to
all parts of the body ; which is secreted in the brain, and
distributed in the nerves. This fluid is the first mover of
life ; it is this which gives irritability to all the tissues ; it
is the intermedium by whose aid the immaterial soul acts
upon the body ; it constitutes of itself a sensitive soul, and
each of its parts has an idea of the mechanism of its whole
organization. It is according to these ideas, that the mate-
rial soul forms a body for its own habitation ; she takes care
of it, she repairs it, &c. &c. We can easily see that the
thinking particles of this sensitive soul, do not differ from
the Monads of Leibnitz.

Is there any question of the movements which are execu-
ted by this sensitive soul ? Hoffman studies and explains
them by Mechanics and Hydraulics. Life consists in the
preservation of this union, through the movement which is
produced by the spirit contained in the blood, and it is this
movement which keeps up the animal heat.

Independently of this movement, Hoffman admits another,
which he regards as fundamental ; that is, the diastole and
systole of the membranes of the brain, or meninges, already
discovered by Pacchioli and Baglivi. It is this new motion
propagated in the dura matter of the spinal marrow, which
forces the nervous fluid into the different parts of the body.
The excess of this motion furnished him with the explana-
tion of convulsions. In general, diseases depend on irregu-
larities in this motion, or in the imperfect mixture of the
humors produced by the faulty action of the spirit, dissemi-
nated through the blood, whose mixture it does not properly
regulate. Excess of this motion produces spasm ; when too
feeble, the result is atony ; while the faults of the mix-
ture engender humoral diseases.

Hence arose a pathology, arbitrary and fantastical. We

I 3o J

see clearly that the physicians of that day, to whatever sect
they belonged, were embarrassed by the obligation they
believed imposed on them, to make room, some how or
other, for an immaterial soul,* and to explain its relations
with every part of the body. Descartes located this soul in
the pineal gland ; others placed it in other parts of the brain ;
but Hoffman, brought up in the school of Van Helmont,
distributed it to every part of the body. The great difficul-
ty to be overcome still remained : that is, the contact of an
immaterial substance with matter. They had long been in
the habit of extricating themselves by means of spirits : that
is, a subtile matter, more or less like ether, from whence
they frequently derived it ; but as these kinds of gasses were
capable of contact, in part with the soul, and in part with
the organs of the body, they had only to explain their ope-
rations, by the Chemistry or Philosophy of the day. Whe-
ther they employed two souls, and two sorts of spirits, or
one, the idea was at bottom the same. Hoffman sometimes
made his soul and his spirits mechanicians, sometimes che-
mists ; at other times they seem to put the molecules into
action according to the blind laws of vegetative life, as if
these molecules had not labored under the eyes of their
immaterial principles, and in some measure under their
hands. His pathology conducted him to stimulants, though
he abused them much less than many others. All this is
very unlike the true theory of Irritation, toward which,
Hoffman had not advanced so far as Plattner.

Hitherto, irritability had been considered confusedly and
always abstractedly. The great Haller, first of all determin-
ed by precise experiments, what tissues were really irritable :
the result with him was, that their property was confined to
the muscular fibre. Of the other tissues, some, like the
nervous, and those which were abundantly furnished with
nerves, were endowed with sensibility only : others, not
the fewest in number, were declared to have neither sensi-
bility nor irritability, but a vis inertias only. The connec-
tion of the nerves, which, according to Haller, produced
nothing but sensibility, served to explain the sympathies, or
the propagation of excitement from the fibres of one part, to
those of another.

This theory was a great step gained ; for it gave consis-
tence to ideas, before that time, too abstracted to fix the

In obligation imposed on them by the clergy. — Th'omsl.

E 36 ]

attention of strict reasoners, and too difficult to convince
them. But it did not furnish a sufficient reason of the phe-
nomena of motion, particularly such as took place in the
numerous tissues to which Haller had refused both irrita-
bility and sensibility, and allowed them only a vis inertiae ;
for what idea can you have of a vis inertiae in a living body ?
The cellular tissue, and the organs, which, according to that
author, are formed out of it, such as the tendons, had no
distinct properties. How then could be explained the union
of these tissues with those that were sensible or irritable ?
Besides the first defect, Haller's system had a second, not
less weighty. Sensibility, that part of the ancient soul, be-
came materialized, when it attached itself to the nervous
tissue, and assumed an heretical character, when taking its
place by the side of the irritability of the muscular fibre.
This, of course, excited grave suspicions among the physi-
ologists and the philosophers. Notwithstanding all the
efforts they made at that time to remedy this very inconve-
nient materialization, and which encroached upon the do-
main of the soul, it has remained even to our day ; and our
spiritual philosophers cannot get rid of this cruel thorn, but
by interposing the soul between the Almighty and their sen-
sibility, just as the ancients interposed spirit, or ether,
between the soul and matter. We shall of course consider
this subject again, by-and-bye.

Nevertheless, the successors of Haller perfected their
theory as far as they were able. One re-established the
irritability of Glisson, and made it the source of all the mo-
tions of the body, dispensed it to every tissue, and assigned
to the nerves alone, the power of exciting, and of putting it
inaction. Some time after, another proved that irritability
was independent of the vital spirits, and belonged originally
to the fibres ; for he demonstrated it in zoophytes and in
plants. Others showed that the essence of the human body,
consisted in the re-union of the forces of its several tissues.
They saw that irritability remained in those parts whose
sensibility had been destroyed by tying, or cutting the
nerve, distributed through them ; they specified the external
agents which excited, diminished, extinguished, or exhaust-
ed it by excess. (Works of the school of Winter.) These
exciters of irritability assumed the name of stimulants, which
they have kept to the present day. Many authors went so
far as to denv the existence of the nervous fluid.

[ 31 J

Many disputes arose concerning the sensibility of differ-
ent parts : some refused to allow it in conformity to the
experiments made on living animals ; they pretended to
judge of it, rather by the pain excited by the inflammation
produced, than by the presence of nerves. They maintain-
ed that contractility is an original property of living matter,
and therefore that every part of the body, without exception,
is endowed with it. This opinion found many supporters.
Thus by degrees the bases of the theory of Irritation were
laid down.

After such facts established, how was it possible to remain
so long adherents, to medical Ontology ; how could every
thing remain in doubt, and how could medicine come down
to our day, without having been able to associate itself de-
finitively with Physiology by the intervention of irritation ?

Peter Anthony Faber, however, gave it a valuable sup-
port. He demonstrated better than any one else, the irrita-
bility of the capillaries, independent of cerebral innervation.
He remarked in frogs, that the blood followed all directions,
sometimes a course retrograde in the small arteries, and
direct in the small veins. Dr. Sarlandiere repeated this
experiment before us, by placing the mesentery of a frog in
the focus of a microscope. We had ascertained that the
molecules of the fluids came from all parts, convergingly
even across the veins, toward the point irritated by the
puncture of a pin, and were there accumulated so as to form
a congestion. At length the molecules of the circumference
were able to disengage themselves, and take an inverse
direction if you establish a new point of inflammation in the
neighborhood of the former. This fact became decisive in
the theory of many inflammatory disorders, and of the effect
of revulsion. Faber had made a very happy application of
this fact to the theory of inflammations. If it was not sa-
tisfactory in his hands when applied to fevers, it was because
he had not viewed these effections as phlegmasia;.

In fact, while fevers were not reduced to a phenomenon
of inflammatory irritation, they remained within the domain
of the vital principle, a kind of immaterial soul, but perisha-
ble — subordinate to the immortal soul, but strictly connected
with it. This foreseeing principle — this interior providence
of Hippocratic origin, all whose doings had a purpose to be
guessed at, reduced the business of a Physician to that of an
Augur or Auruspex, at least in the greater number and most

[ 38 J

prominent of the cases, and especially in those which were
most interesting for the multitude and mobility of the scenes
they presented. How could a series of notions so incom-
plete, for the most part, associate themselves to irritability so
as to become a real science ? Was it not necessary to throw
down this monstrous colossus of specific fevers, so labori-
ously raised by the successive efforts of physicians, from
the very first epoch of civilization ?

This new theory of inflammation, which consisted in
attributing to a local irritation, attractive of the neighboring
fluids, furnished in all cases the means of attacking with
success, the system of Boerhaave, on the obstruction of the
small vessels, by the globules of the blood, as being the
cause of inflammation, and furnished a better foundation for
the therapeutics of disease ; but physicians did not derive
all the advantages of which this theory was capable, for
inflammations were too confined, and systems were afloat
which diminished their number. Ontology was too power-
ful at that day, to permit the full developement of the theory
of irritation, and the physiological doctrine of medicine.

Some established an identity between nervous power
and irritability, and made the soul contribute to all the irrita-
tive movements ; but as it was proved that irritability did
not depend on nervous influence, these notions did not gain
ground. Innervation is for the fibre no more than an exci-
ting cause to put it in action, and which renders irritability
more marked and distinct.

Hence arose the nervous theory, which took its origin at
Edinburgh, and of which Cullen was the father. He dedu-
ced it indeed from the doctrines of Hoffman, who frequently
sought for the cause of disease in the nerves. But Hoffman
made the nerves subordinate to the dura mater : he made
this to act mechanically, so that the causes of disease were
with him mechanical : he admitted also of humoral diseases,
which Cullen rejected, referring every thing to the modifi-
cations of the nerves. Cullen is properly the father of
solidism, although he often wanders. He combined the
notions of Hoffman, with vital forces.

In his theory o{ levers, he sets out from the principle that
all the causes of these affections are debilitating. This
debility exists at the surface ; and the reaction of the vis
medicatrix excites the powers of the body and produces
heat : but the debility at the surface exists during iho whole

I 39 j

progress oi' the fever. The internal coat ot the stomach
partakes of it.

The diminution of energy in the brain, is the first cause
of that in the skin. Spasm succeeds atony, and the mutual
reaction goes on. Hence, Quinquina and other tonics be-
come specifics in these cases.

Cullen attributed inflammation to the irritation of the
sanguineous capillaries. Rbeumatism is a type of this state,
which visceral phlegmasia are passed over. The gout dif-
fers greatly from rheumatism, as being a disease of the
whole system — a nervous debility arising from atony of
digestion. This atony assumes periodicity, in which the
gouty fit arises from congestions taking place at the articu-
lations.

Irritation becomes in this system an important agent, but
almost always a secondary one. This is a bad use to put it
to. The author makes it arise from debility, and in vain we
ask, what is the primitive debility in those disorders which
are more successfully treated by debilitating the patient, than
by exciting him, with a view to give strength ? Irritation is not
in its proper place here, nor is this the doctrine of Irritation.
Cullen, moreover, passes by many diseases. He admits,
against his own principles, of acrid humors, and dwells al-
most always on cure by tonics. It is to Cullen we owe the
tonic therapeutics in fevers, and in those chronic affections
where he always saw relaxation of the stomach. These
notions supported by his disciple Brown, have prevailed in
the European schools even to this day.

The atony which here appears again upon the stage, is the
laxum of Themison, who located it in the vessels. But it
had been already presented under another aspect, for Stahl
had acknowledged the general relaxation of fibre. Hoff-
man rather placed it in the nerves than the vessels. Cul-
len saw it in every tissue. Nature no longer struggles, as
Boerhaave supposed, with a stagnation of the fluids. He
has now to contend according to Cullen, with relaxation con-
verted into spasm. The disciples of Boerhaave at least,
left some energy in their organ of reaction : irritated by the
obstacle which stopt the blood it would otherwise have
pushed forward, the heart redoubled its vigor, and its in-
creased efforts produced inflammation and fever. This an-
cer of the heart, substituted for the anger of the Archaeus,
was in truth gratuitous, but it involved no contradiction.

I 40 j

Not so with the "atonico-spasmodic system of Cullen : the
atony was not confined to the skin and the surface-vessels,
but extended to the stomach and particularly to the brain ;
a thoughtlessness surprising, considering that in this system
the nervous apparatus was the chief organ of life, and the
source of all reaction. For if the brain be in a state of de-
bility, we see not whence that reaction is to come, which
raises up a fever to overcome atony and spasm. If Cullen had
been an animist, one would have supposed he would have
assigned this part to the soul to perform : but he talks of
nothing but nature, life, and matter. In his system, therefore,
we are driven to suppose that the vital principle, something
different from matter, acts upon it and produces reaction.

Still, Cullen rendered great service to medicine, by shew-
ing the true manner in which medicaments act. He has
enabled us to banish specifics, by shewing that medicine acts
only on the nervous system. They act indeed first upon
the stomach, which by its numerous sympathies acts upon
every other part of the body and corrects the tendency to
disease ; which was as much as to say, that they did not act
directly or specifically on the morbid entites, which diseases
were considered to be. It is true, Cullen usually proposed
to increase the tone of the stomach ; but he was not blind
to the relaxing and dissolving properties of emollient medi-
cines, or the vital reaction which rendered astringents and
narcotics irritating. With such principles, we might have
been led in due time to perceive, that therapeutic agents did
nothing but modify the vital properties, and augment or di-
minish the excitation of the organs. He therefore furnish-
ed to the doctrine of irritation, a foundation which subsequent
observers might render more substantial.

James Gregory, a Professor at Edinburgh, and one of the
proposers of the new nervous theory, pretends that every
thing is nervous in the animal economy ; and doubts wheth-
er sedatives directly diminish irritation ; he is inclined to
regard them in the first instance as irritants. This notion
adopted by Brown, and from him to Ravori, has served as
the base of all the disputation on excitement.

Samuel Musgrave, of London, was of the same school.
Every disease even to dropsy, typhus, and contagion, were
affections of the nervous system, and medicines acted only
upon that system.

De la Roche, ( analyse des fonctions du systeme nerveux }

[ 41 ]

professed similar principles. Like Gregory, he established
a distinction between the rapidity and the intensity of ner-
vous phenomena ; the first increases as the latter diminish-
es. Stimulants according to him, increased the rapidity,
tonics the intensity of nervous action. This theory has
gained ground. Even at present a distinction is made be-
tween excitation and tonic action ; but this latter is only a
shade of the former, \v T hich according to the physiological
physicians, is in fact the same.

According to Albert Thaer, fever is nothing else than an
excitement of the nerves of the vital organs ; whence re-
sults an increase of irritability in the heart and arteries. He
repeats after Baglivi, that crudity in fevers is the result of
spasmodic and irregular contraction ; and when the spasm
ceases, a healthy coction succeeds. These expressions are
vague, and the seat of spasm is undetermined ; but we see
clearly that the doctrine of irritation promises to become
the prevailing system. Stcll himself, with all his humoril-
ism, entertained the notion that fever and inflammation were
owing to the augmentation of irritability in the heart and
arteries, and Selle did not hesitate to place the cause of fe-
ver in a particular disposition of the nervous system, which
can only be referred to irritation.

The theory of Schmffer, physician at Ratisbon, is much
nearer what we acknowledge at present in France, although
it differs, as we shall see, in many essential points. Accor-
ding to him, all diseases depend on an unnatural irritation of
the nervous system. Excitement, crudity, coction, are all
nervous. Critical evacuations do not decide upon febrile
diseases ; they are nothing but relaxations produced by the
cessation of spasm. This author pays more attention to ner-
vous affections and irritations, than to pretended acrimonies.
Medicines act upon the nerves of the stomach, and bring
the sympathies into play, by aid of the great intercostal
nerve. Here is, without doubt, an important position ta-
ken, to found thereupon the theory of acute disorders ; but
we want intermediate facts to render it useful. The author
deduces from his theory, the necessity of emetics to shake
the system powerfully, to overcome spasm, to hasten coction,
&c. &c. But to recur to irritation, for the purpose of over-
coming irritation, without having revulsion in view, (that
is to say, without meaning to create a new and counter irri-
tation) and to suppose that irritants have a specific

L ** J

anti-irritative effect, as he supposes after Rasoii, is to
entertain .a false idea of the irritability of the tissues ; for
the proper view of the subject is founded on the knowledge
of the mode of action of internal fluids and external agents
upon the same tissues ; and a just notion of this mode of
action constitutes the true science of medicine.

We find in John Gardiner an excellent application of the
nervous theory of that day. He attributes catarrh, to
a transfer of irritation from the skin to the air passages.
What more precise can be said of the sedative action of
cold ? And why did not the other parts of the theory agree
with this?

Some classifiers have reproduced in our day, a system ex-
plained by Vanderheuvel. This author based it upon the
different aberrations of vital energy; the genera of disease,
rested upon the disorder of the general functions ; and the
species of disease, on the disorder of the special functions.
This gave us diseases arising from excess of general, and
diseases arising from excess of local irritability. The fault
of this system has already been shewn : you cannot separate
the vital properties of the organs from the organs, to make
these properties as distinct entities, preside over organic af-
fections. You must study the lesions of these properties
in the organs themselves that are diseased, and not the le-
sion of the organs in the disease of the properties : these
last are chimerical entities, resulting from medical On-
tology. ( The property of any thing by which it is known
or characterized, is not an independent being, separate from
the thing of which it is a property : it is not a noun substan-
tive but a noun adjective, as a peculiar yellow brilliancy is
the property of gold. It is the thing itself. — Trans.)

All these efforts shew that the attention of physicians was
no longer voluntarily directed to ch'meras, although from
the influence of prevailing prejudices, they were undesign-
edly led in that direction ; but their intent was to rest
upon the phenomena, from whence we derive our notions
of life. These phenomena were known in a great measure
— no one could lose sight of them. It required only a good
and clear method of studying them, which they were yet
far from possessing.

Henceforward the soul of Stahl presides no more over
diseases : vital force, nature, were substituted ; and the
Animists [or Psycbists,) had become Solidists. According

I 4:3 j

lo Vacca Berlinghieri, Professor at Pisa, we ought no lon-
ger to talk about humors. It was necessary to study the so-
lids and the forces that animate them. No more of putre-
faction in the circulating fluids ; this takes place not within
but out of the vessels. The constitution of the atmosphere
alters the humors only by acting on the solids. He admits
a principle of reaction which is the cause of salutary and
morbid changes, and is in fact vital energy ; and medicine
acts by means of the substances prescribed, on this vital
energy. The base of this theory is good ; not so its appli-
cation. Physicians dwelt as yet among important generali-
ties. In spite of themselves they were drawn on to consid-
er the vital principle as some separate abstract being : irri-
tation was not studied in its actual effects on each organ, nor
was the connection traced between the irritability of each
tissue and the irritants actually employed.

Grimaud, Professor at the school at Montpelier, was
among the vitalists, but in a peculiar way. He discovered a
great affinity between nervous diseases and fevers. He ob-
served among the phenomena the principle of reaction.
The heat and cold of fever are equally affections of the
nerves. But the faults of the humors, (the fluids) are not
the result of those of the solids, for the vital principle acts
equally on the fluids. These fluids then have their appro-
priate diseases independent of the solids. This modifica-
tion of the humoral pathology, adopted also by Bordeu, has
always had its partizans. But to adopt a vital principle
which sometimes hovers over the solids, and sometimes over
the fluids, separated from both, is Ontology. (It is Proso-
popeia. — Trans. ) To see morbid entities all ready formed
in the fluids, before the solids are affected by them, is illu-
sion and chimera. The fluids, as we shall see by and by,
may contain a cause of disease resident for sometime within
themselves, but the disease itself does not reside there.
To make the curative modifiers act upon the fluids instead
of the solids, is another illusion supported by no fact. What-
ever part we choose to assign to the living solid in that theo-
ry, we can see nothing that induces us to confound it with the
doctrine of Irritation.

Notwithstanding all the labors of the solidists, they had
not yet extended unity to the different phenomena of the
animal body. Most of the physicians were inclined to sep-
arate as Haller did, nervous energy from muscular irritabili-

t 44 ]

ty, so that the irritation of the nerves was not iike that of
the muscles ; nor had they any idea of the irritability of tis-
sues, which Haller had condemned to" vis inertia?. They
sought to establish this desirable unity, by saying that the
nerves are the base of all the tissues, and that in fact every
theory is reducible to neuvous substance. But this hypo-
thesis could not mislead the anatomists ; and it found itself
at variance with the practitioners, who could not bring them-
selves to see nothing but nervous modification, in the influ-
ence exerted by the causes of disease, and the action of re-
medies. On the other hand, the vital principle was not suf-
ficiently of the nature of matter, to be put in connection with
the agency of external substances : and it was not to be con-
cealed, that in seeking to modify it according to prevailing
theories, the results were not always satisfactory.

The uneasiness which arose from this unpleasant state of
uncertainty, hurried many able men into empiricism, till the
system of John Brown, (Johannes Bruno, as he was often
called — Trans.) long unknown and neglected, began to
spread, and attracted strongly the attention of physicians in
general. Brown had been a disciple of Cullen. He adop-
ted like Cullen the notion that debility was the cause of ma-
ny diseases ; but he did not convert spasm into a distinct
being. He saw but one modification of debility ; and he re-
jected the whole humoral explanation. Brown borrowed
from Cullen the idea that remedies were not specific ; and
he acknowledged but one modification of life in its action on
the organs. He discarded the words " vital principle ;" nor
did he trouble himself in reducing all the functions to ner-
vous phenomena. He seized upon two ideas, excess and
defeat of excitement ; and made these equivalent to excess
and defect of vital force, The hypothesis of strictum and
laxum had been already advanced. Brown connected these
two expressions with his own theory ; so that excess of
excitement, or of vital force was excess of tone, strictum,
while laxum became defect of excitement ?nd vital force.

Brown laid it down as a principle that life is kept up by
excitement ; and to live is nothing but being excited. Thus
far all was just- It is manifest that whatever it be that makes
us live, it is reducible in the eyes of an accurate observer
to those phenomena, which we include under the term life :
these phenomena go on with decreasing effect and seem dis-
posed to wear out, But to make use of this principle, we

I 43 i

must study each part of the body in its relation to the ex-
ternal agents of excitation, and ascertain how the respective
organs mutually excite each other ; and we must attentively
study the effects of internal and external excitants, on each
of the tissues of which the bodily organs are composed.
Brown neglected this : for this manner of studying excita-
tion, is no other than the modern physiological method of the
French school. Let us see then what Brown did, and what
was the cause of his mistakes.

He considered excitation abstractedly ; separately from
the excited organs, and he threw himself by his very first
step among the Ontologists. Then he applied to the organs
his reveries on excitability. He held that excitability, in a
general view of it as a modification of life, is consumed and
worn out by excitement and the action of excitants ; it is
then accumulated by rest, or the absence of excitement.
From this view he deduced many consequences by no means
just. Hence with him, a moderate excitement sustains the
equilibrium of the vital forces, as no person will contest : a
greater degree of excitement produces an increase of
strength, and becomes a source of sthenic disease or disease
from excess of force. A still stronger .excitement exhausts
excitability and produces debility or indirect asthenia. Di-
rect asthenia, is the consequence of defect of excitement.
The more this defect is increased, the greater is the quanti-
ty of excitability accumulated, till it becomes excessive.
Brown formed a regular double scale, representing on one
side, all the degrees of augmentation and excitement by the
action of stimulants to the highest degree, which then be-
came converted into indirect debility or asthenia ; and on
the other side, all the degrees of augmented excitability by
reason of want of stimulus, till direct debility or asthenia
was induced, as far as extreme weakness, terminating in
death.

It cannot but be felt how absurd is a theory which places
the highest degree of excitability at that moment when
excitability itself is about to be extinguished by death.
But this js not the least fault : the great objection is, that it
led the Brunonians on to a most fatal practice. The false
position that the vital force constantly diminishes by a high
degree of excitement, introduced to make room for indirect
debility, led Brown to treat by excitants all those inflamma-
tory affections, which overwhelmed and oppressed muscular

L 46 J

motion. The opinion not less erroneous, that whenever ex-
citants had acted in a less quantity than usual upon the sys-
tem, excitability accumulated was to be consumed and used
up by excitants, compelled him to employ those kinds of
modifiers to all persons who were affected by chronic disor-
ders. Brown placed all excitants on the same line ; ali-
ments and the fluids contained in the vessels, formed the prin-
cipal part : hence it clearly followed, that if persons were
more lean than in their usual state of health, they had not
been sufficiently excited, and therefore they must submit to
excitations. But the physiological doctiine of our day
teaches us, that the greater part of chronic diseases are in-
flammations produced and kept up by excitants, and must be
cured by practice conducted on opposite principles.

Had Brown studied excitement in connection with, and
as it appears in the organs themselves, in lieu of treating it
by personification and abstractedly, he would have avoided
these errors. He would have acknowledged that persons
whose regimen is too exciting, instead of becoming as he
supposed less excitable, are more so, and end by being una-
ble to bear any further excitation. He would have under-
stood that excitability may be augmented in some organs
of the body, while it is diminished in others; for instance,
when persons who have indulged to excess in alcoholic li-
quors, fall into a stupor with violent fever, they are easily
excited at the internal surface of their digestive organs while
their surface is torpid. Had he been convinced of this im-
portant truth, he would not have treated acute disorders by
wine, by bark, and other stimulants of that kind ; and hu-
manity would not have had to deplore the astonishing pro-
gress which his system has made, even within our day.

Had Brown carefully observed persons, enfeebled and
emaciated by diseases of debility, he might have assured
himself that their leanness was owing to their being too ex-
citable, or having been too much excited, and not for want
of it, consequently we could not hope to diminish their ex-
citability by any new excitement. Had he made this re-
mark, w T e should not have seen many physicians in these
days, treat patients, afflicted with chronic diseases, by stimu-
lants, and thus hasten the disorganization of their viscera.

The abstract speculations of this author on excitability,
did not disclose to him the laws of this phenomenon. He
never saw them but in cases where patients already too much

L 41 J

excited were cured by excitants ; but this is to be ascribed
to revulsion ; that is, where there is a change of the local-
ity of excitation, transferred from organs of the first neces-
sity to life, to another set of organs or to tissues of second-
ary importance, which are often sacrificed to preserve the
more essential ones primarily affected. Brown did not per-
ceive that these fortunate crises were so uncommon, r that ift
a great majority of cases the exciting treatment destroys
the principal organs, or produces diseases of debility almost
always incurable.

But Brown was neither a practitioner or an anatomist, nor
in his day w r as the degree of vitality of the several tissues suf-
ficiently known, to render it possible to observe accurately
their excitability, or to obtain a just idea how excitation was
transmitted from one to another ; a system of analytic anat-
omy was wanting ; and a nation was wanting which posses-
sed a Chaussier and a Bichet.

Such is the substance of the famous Brunonian system.
It was not rigorously adopted in the schools of medicine.
Some modified it without changing its basis ; in others it
was made to amalgamate with the humoral theories ; that is,
the treatment was sometimes applied to peccant humors, and
sometimes to excess or defect of vital force. Others adop-
ted a kind of empiricism, wherein Brown's theory indicated
the curative treatment. Each disease was regarded, not as
an affection of this or that organ, but as a group of symp-
toms bearing a certain name, and requiring as a matter of
course, debilitants or tonics. When the patient was visited,
the symptoms were counted and noted, without noting what
organ was affected, and furnished them. To this collection
of symptoms, a name of that disease was given, to which
(hey seemed to have most relation. The name was drawn
from ancient authors ; but as to the treatment, that was
drawn from the Scotch practice. If the disease was of a
sthenic character, according to Brown, debilitants were ex-
hibited : if it appeared to be asthenic, stimulants were pre-
ferred ; and this was most frequently the case.

This method was not always strictly pursued, for none
of these systems had any regular foundation. For instance,
among febrile diseases, somewhere called after the part af-
fected pneumonies, peritonitis, hepatitis ; others after the
state of the patients strength, as adynamic (or typhoid) fe-
ver*', sthenics or asthenics : some were denominated from the

[ -is j

nature of the fluid secreted from the parts affected, as ca-
tarrhal, mucous, bilious fevers ; some from the danger ac-
companying them, as pernicious fevers ; some from the sur-
prise or apprehension they excited in the physician, as ma-
lignant, irregular, or ataxic fevers ; others from certain ac-
cidents accompanying them, as syncopal, painful, nervous,
&c.

The same confusion prevailed as to chronic affections.
Dyspepsies qualified according to the difficulty of digestion ;
hypochondrias named after sensations referred to the region
of the hypochondria from obstructions imperfectly under-
stood ; cutaneous eruptions and scrophulas whose relation
to the stomach and bowels were not well known. In treat-
ing these ailments, sometimes, they would dissipate a con-
gestion without regard to the excitement produced by the
medicines applied ; sometimes they would make a determi-
nation to the skin, without considering the gastric stimula-
tion necessary to produce sweat ; in many cases a virus was
attacked by methods which only injured the stomach ; in
most cases the object was to increase the gastric energy
and the nutrition, without considering that this was a fulness
and a factitious strength communicated to the patient which
concealed the alteration of the principal organs, and render-
ed their ultimate destruction more certain. In fact the ir-
ritability of the organs was misunderstood, and the remedies
were applied to unmeaning denominations, while the mis-
takes committed, were such, as did not teach how to avoid
mistakes hereafter.

This disgusting confusion turned away all the best tal-
ents from medicine, or rendered them empirics. But what
good could be expected from empiricism, while the true
notion of disease Avas so unsettled ? Empiricism pretends
to find a remedy appropriate to the malady, without being
at the trouble of explaining the malady, or how it is modi-
fied by the medicine. But what idea of disease could the
medical knowledge of that day present ? If the explanation
of the disease was rejected, what was it but a group of symp-
toms or a single symptom, such as inappetence or want of
appetite ? But this was sometimes cured by water, some-
times by wine, by purging or by fasting, or by eating more
in quantity, or of food more stimulating than usual. In such
a case what was to be done ? What course was to be fol-
lowed ? If you will not reason, or adopt some theory to

[ 49 )

discover which of these methods you should resort to, noth-
ing remains but to try the one after the other ; and if, un-
luckily, you should first pitch upon that remedy which does
not suit the disease, you will increase the evil, and perhaps
render it incurable. What I say here, concerning defect of
appetite, is applicable to the greater part of other diseases ;
so that physicians were unable to adopt the empyrical
method exclusively. They divided into two great classes ;
the one credulous and superficial, gave themselves up to a
theory, especially if it was fashionable in their own country,
or that some eloquent professor had given it a value from
the chair of an university. The other class, difficult to
be convinced, either from the severity of their judgement
or the natural vaccillation of their intellect, throw them-
selves upon empiricism, or upon an eclectic system of the
most dangerous kind ; and lamented, before men of science,
the uncertainty and impotence of the art of healing. By
dint of enquiry, and a desire to learn every thing relating
to the animal Man, they seem to have arrived at doubt up-
on every thing.

It is easy to see, after this sketch, that medicine was not
a science ; and that excitation, which they had taken so
much pains to understand, had not yet become the base of
any regular system, applicable at once to health, and to dis-
ease. Still there remained no other method of laying thefoun-
dation of a real science ; as every one will see, after we
have stated the principal truths of physiological medicine.

Chapter III.

PRINCIPLES OF THE PHYSIOLOGICAL DOCTRINE,

This is based upon Irritation. We acknowledge with
Brown that life is maintained by excitation alone. But
we must soon abandon this author, for he takes the road of
abstraction, and considers excitement insulated and in itself.
Our object is, to consider it in the organs and tissues affect-
ed, or rather to consider those organs and tissues when ex-
cited. This study supplies a certain number of general
truths, which we propose to state with illustrative examples.

Man cannot live but by means of that excitement or
stimulation, (synonimous expressions) which the circum-
stances or media amid which he lives, exert upon him.
These media are not confined in their action to his skin or
his vision, they penetrate all the natural openings of the
7

1 oO ]

body, which arc themselves sensible organs, with exten-
sive surfaces communicating with the skin. These surfa-
ces which may be regarded as internal senses, occupy the
interior of many viscera, and like the external senses, re-
ceive the stimulations or excitations of foreign bodies. These
surfaces are membranous like the skin, but their structure is
somewhat different. Such is the internal membrane of the
larynx, which penetrates by the trachea and the bronchial
vessels through all the pulmonary vessels ; and the mem-
brane of the pharynx which descends by the oesophagus
and the stomach, and lines the whole intestinal canal to the
anus. These surfaces are incessantly in contact with the
foreign bodies ; the first with the air and the particles it
contains ; the second with the air, the aliments, the bever-
age, and whatever can be introduced by the mouth or by
the anus : of all this, the result is excitation.

. This excitation takes place on the nervous matter distri-
buted through and among these external surfaces, which we
shall call surfaces of relation. This nervous matter being
excited, transmits the excitation to the nervous system ;
and this last, either by means of single nerves, or by its
cerebral center, reflects and distributes it through the web
of all the tissues without excepting the surfaces of relation.
These surfaces then, are placed between two agents of ex-
citation ; 1st, the foreign bodies with which they are in con-
tact, and 2ndly, the influence of the brain. This last we call
Innervation.*

This motion, a disturbance which takes place in the ner-
vous system by being excited or stimulated, keeps up
through life the movements which commenced in the foe-
tus, which is a diminitive mass of living matter. This mass
cannot sustain its life but by the excitement produced in it
by the nutriment conveyed to it. The embryo finds that nu-
triment in the fluids of uterus, which had been already sub-
jected to the action of external modifiers. The fluids al-
ready annualized, are therefore the first excitements, in
quality of being the first sources of nutriment — when the em-
bryon organs become developed to a certain point, they re-

* It is a question at present whether electricity is not the cause of ner-
vous excitation. It is not for us to discuss this question. Admit thai
the nerves are conductors of electricity or any other fluid or form of mat-
ter, the irritation of the organs remains a fact discernible by the senses:
and being established as a fact, may be so taken in treating of the histo-
ry of this science. . .—

(

vj *-»r ..♦ .c jjK£t*n^~

L 51 J

quired the external stimulants of nature. Un being born, the
nutritive fluids contained in the vessels of the infant, would
be quickly exhausted, if not renewed, or else would lose
their stimulating and nutritive properties. But the action
of the heart, the action of the capillary tissues, and by con-
sequence life itself, is kept up by the stimulation of the sur-
faces of relation — the stimulation that takes place in the
nervous apparatus — the impression made by extraneous par-
ticles of various kinds absorbed — and by all these united
excitations, added to those which are occasioned by the
blood, and by the fluids already assimilated.

Here then are three orders of stimulating or exciting
powers, viz. 1st, the bodies exterior to us, producing excite-
ment which converges to the brain as a centre. 2dly, Inner-
vation, or diverging excitement ; being the action of the brain
on the several tissues : 3dly, the stimulations which are
produced by the motion of the fluids assimilated or not as-
similated, in the midst of the solids ; a general excitement
which takes place in all directions. To these three clas-
ses of stimulation, we may add the action of the organs on
each other, either by the intervention of the brain, or imme-
diately by the nervous cords ; a stimulation that takes place
also in all directions. These comprise the principle stimu-
lations of the animal economy.

But they are not all. The fluids in their connection with
each other, and with the solids, are subjected to new combin-
ations, changes of form, and perpetual transmutations. By
the conversion of nutritious substances into fluids peculiar
to the individual, the conversion of chyle into blood, of blood
into various fluids, liquids into solids, and solids into li-
quids. But we may consider all the molecular movements
founded on the affinities peculiar to living bodies, and which
constitute what is called organic chemistry, as so many new-
excitations. In fact, to these is owing the disengagement ot
caloric ; thus disengaged within the tissues it becomes a stim-
ulant of the same kind as external caloric.

To these numerous causes of stimulation, all of them vi-
tal, are added the non vital stimulants, such as attraction
and its modifications, electricity, inorganic chemistry, which
often acts with foreign bodies upon the surface of relation.
These powers tend to assimilate organic to inorganic bo-
dies, and if they do not always succeed, it is because the laws
of life react against them and neutralize their action.

[ o2 J

This reaction itself is no other than an excitation.

It is under the continual influence of these numerous cau-
ses of excitation, that life maintains itself. So necessary
are they, that if they are absent, death ensues. Much has
been written in favor of vital power, the vis conservatrix.
This power is no doubt calculated to excite our admiration,
but we must not attribute too much to it. Man has been
represented as an independent being, free in the midst of
nature which he is destined to rule over. Will you judge
accurately of this pretended independence ? Nothing more
is necessary to bring it very low, but the powers of nature
of heroic activity, Poison, Fire, Volcanic explosion : remove
him for a few minutes from the exciting influence of oxy-
gen and caloric, then call upon him to exert that vis conser-
vatrix which has been so much extolled in diseases of all
descriptions. It assumed all the characters of a physical
agent, but the want of power in this modifier has deprived
it of them. Stop for a short time the operation of these
stimulants ; you have not broken the instruments of this
vital energy, you have taken nothing from it ; you have
only diverted the course of this unknown but material prin-
ciple ; you have suspended it for a few moments, and al-
ready the man is a mass of inanimate matter. Let criti-
cism then attack if it pleases, the fundamental principle of
the physiological doctrine !

We have referred to excitation, the manifestation of all
those phenomena which have been at all times considered
as entering into the idea of life : to wit, the motion of fixed
organic matter disposed in fibres, contractility ; and as a
consequence the motions of the fluids or moveable animal
matter; also the consciousness of these movements, sensi-
bility ; whose modifications include all the intellectual ope-
rations. Upon these phenomena depend all the rest ; as
the production of animal heat, and nutrition, (or the substi-
tution of animalized materials in lieu of other bodies) gene-
ration, &c.

As contractility is the principal instrument of the secon-
dary phenomena of the animal economy, (for the primary
are the molecular affinities) it is very impoitant to settle
the idea of contractility. In our treatise on physiology, we
have defined it, a condensation, a shortening of the animal
fibre : and we have stated that this was not confined to the
muscular fibre, but was participated by all the forms of liv-

1 te ]

ing matter ot' which our bodily organs are composed ; and
maybe reduced to the following : fibrine ; gelatine; and
albumen. But as experiments and even engravings have
been published to shew that muscular fibre experiences no
shortening during its contraction, but a kind of zig-zag fold-
ing which produced no great diminution in its length, it
seems proper, to save our readers some laborious research,
that we should sum up those facts which induce us to make
contractility a general property, and to view it in the light .
now presented. I would be understood however, as not
supposing this explanation necessary to establish the physio-
logical doctrine ; it is indeed superabundant ; and even if
it should be true that muscular contraction produces no di-
minution in the length of the fibre, the basis of that doctrine
w T ould remain unshaken. But to the facts.

The muscles are the agents of motion : for this purpose
they contract, and in contracting they are shortened ; our
eye sight suffices to furnish evidence of this. If we could
bring ourselves to doubt of this shortening in the muscles of
men and of animals attached to a bone, it cannot be denied
in worms and the whole of molluscous animals. In a word
the muscles of every animal not furnished with a bony skel-
eton, shorten so manifestly during motion, that we must be
deprived of eye-sight not to observe it.

It is equally evident in hot blooded as in cold blooded an-
imals, as in the trunk of an elephant ; a simple folding
could not produce the evident diminution of its length.—
How can any one deny the shortening that takes place in
the fibres of the muscular coat of the stomach, the intes-
tines, the bladder, the matrix ? For it is manifest that their
fibres are shorter when empty and when their sides are in
contact, than when distended by foreign bodies within the
cavity.

The shortening of the muscular fibre then, is certain ; nor
can it be deemed hypothetical reasoning to lead off from this
ascertained fact, in explanation of others ; on the contrary
it is a mode of reasoning perfectly legitimate, to argue from
what is known to what is unknown.

If we were tempted to attribute the contraction of the
muscles generally to the nervous tissue, which is distributed
through them in red blooded animals, (an error formerly
adopted and which some may yet incline to adopt ) it may
be answered that the polypi and the other pulpy animals
where this shortening is so manifest to the eye, have no

I 64 J

nervous apparatus. Moreover you may see the contractil-
ity exerted in fibrine separated from the blood, and in some
of the'plants cercalia. Shortening is therefore a property
of the muscles and of fibrine generally. It is a property
dependent on this form of organization in living matter : it is
independent of the nerves. To deny these propositions is
to deny proof positive, for no artificial experiment can invali-
date the manifest facts of nature.

A multitude of agents may bring into play muscular con-
tractility ; but the stimulations communicated by the ner-
vous tissue produces them most efficaciously. This tissue
has a center, the Brain,- and a crowd of expanded fibres,
differently formed, called nerves. The extremeties of these
expansions present themselves on the external or sensitive
surfaces, and the organs of sense ; also on the internal sen-
sitive surfaces forming the internal senses. Moreover, they
are found in all the other organs, but neither so numerous
or so developed. In all these places the nervous extreme-
ties receive stimulations ; these are conducted to the cerebral
center, from whence they are reflected by other nerves, to
the muscles ; the fibrine of these muscles shortens or be-
comes condensed, which is the same thing, and thus deter-
mines the motions necessary to the exercise of the functions.

Some physiologists think that what pervades the nerves
and serves to excite the muscular fibre, is of the nature of
electricity : others reject this explanation, allowing that
electricity may follow the course of the nerves, without pen-
etrating their substance. They admit therefore a particular
fluid running along the fibrils of the nerves. What is cer-
tain, is, that if a current of electricity be passed along the
principal nerve of a limb separated from the body, all the
muscular fibres connected by nervous filaments with the
principal nerve, are excited to contraction. But this fact
does not bear upon the question before us.

The motions that take place by the shortening of the
muscular fibre are those of locomotion which are prodigious-
ly numerous ; those of the voice, of deglutition ; the pro-
gressive motion of the matters thrown into the digestive ca-
nal ; the greater part of those which are subservient to the
exoneration of the body, all the voluntary motions, and to a
certain extent all the involuntary ones which serve to ex-
press our wants, our passions, and some of our most lively
sensations, all the motions which propel the circulating flu-
ids, &c.

[ oo ]

Here then is a prodigious quantity of movements execu-
ted by the fibrine of the body which forms the muscular
fibre, and which depend entirely on its shortening or conden-
sation. Is not this condensation brought about evidently by
the stimulation of the nerves by different agents, which
stimulation is by the nerves transmitted to the iibrine ? The
exaggeration or excess of all these movements, constitutes
one kind of morbid excitation, a species of irritation. But
even if no shortening of the fibre should take place, this ex-
cess will not be less real ; it will have been produced by
the same agents, calculable by the same means ; and will not
less constitute one of the grand classes of disease acknowl-
edged by the physiological doctrine, as we shall soon see.
Let us now pass to another form of animal matter, Gelatin.
This constitutes the greater part of the tissues that are
not muscular ; it is found in all the organs intermixed with
other forms of animal matter. Every where it exhibits con-
tractility, which as in fibrine, is a shortening or conden-
sation. The cellular and areolar tissue which serves to
unite all parts of the body, and is the depositary of fat, is
composed of gelatin. It is shortened when in marasmus it
becomes emptied ; it is condensed, and carries with it the
skin, which becomes wrinkled in proportion as the subject
is young and vigorous. It is sufficient to have dissected a
dead body that is lean and one that is fat, to be satisfied that
the cellular membrane returns upon itself in condensing, and
when dilated, admits of a considerable extension. It brings
back to their former situation not only the skin when ii is
separated from the other organs by corpulence, by serous
effusions, &c. but also all the other serous membranes des-
tined to facilitate the movement of the organs on each oth-
er, and which have changed their situation by tumours either
normal or abnormal, (healty or morbid) as alimentary reple-
tions, pregnancy, serous collections, dropsies, inflammatory
tumors, &c.

The fibrous tissue that serves as the base of the skin, is
gelatinous (the skin itself is gelatin) and every one knows
with what energy it contracts in fear, and several other pas-
sions, which produce that roughness called goose-skin, and
which makes the hair stand erect, (horripilatio.)

The fibrous tissues of the cavernous parts of the body are
formed of gelatin ; and their contractility is so strong under
the influence of cold, of anger, of fear, of shame, &c. that
the penis appears to be drawn in and hardened. This re-

t 5« 1

traction and hardening of the penis, is more observable in
animals of the genus Equus. The vascular system is com-
posed of gelatin, excepting the larger arteries, in which
fibrine appears under a peculiar modification. Can any
thing be more contractile than these sanguineous capillaries,
which return upon themselves almost immediately after hav-
ing been distended by the influx of fluids ? than all those
excretories which ejaculate their fluids, such as the salival
capillaries, the lacbymal, &c. ? all the excretory ducts do
not, like these, spirt out their fluids, but all of them have
force enough to drive out their contents and conduct them
toward the place of their destination. It cannot be said that
this is not a shortening of their fibres ; for it is so, to that de-
gree, that most ol these canals close of themselves, and be-
come obliterated when they cease to act.

But are not we now speaking of that vascular apparatus
destined to the purposes either of the blood, the lymph, or
the secreted fluids which constitutes the greater part of the
viscera ? It will therefore be useless to dwell on the proof,
that contractility, shortening, and condensation of sub-
stance, takes place in these organs, and determines the move-
ment of the fluid columns that pass through them.

It is by nervous influence, innervation, that all these vas-
cular movements are excited, sustained, and accumulated.
Experience permits no doubt on this subject, since every
thing which excites the nerves of a vascular apparatus, eve-
ry thing which exalts its sensibility, calls to it the fluids in
greater quantity, and determines either their accumulation
or their rejection in more than the usual proportion, or their
different transformations and combinations. Stimulation
then, reaches the vascular fibres formed of gelatine essen-
tially contractile, as it does the fibrine of the muscular fibre.
It produces in them, in like manner, condensation followed
by elongation and relaxation. The relations and the alter-
nations of these two movements, explains all the displace-
ments of the columns or masses of fluid which circulate in
all directions across our organs. Why do they not say that
the nerves are the sole agents in all these phenomena, and
that the movement of condensation of a vein or a lymphatic
which diminishes the caliber of the containing vessel to suit
the size of the column of fluid, is a nervous phenomenon
with which gelatin has nothing to do ? This would be just
as reasonable as to say that the muscular fibres are passive
when the muscles contract !

E « ]

Gelatin, moreover, forms ligaments, cartilages, and bones.
This animal matter has not lost its contractility in these
organs, for that property is essential to it; but its effects arc
something entrammelled by the crossing and decussations of
the gelatinous fibres, and sometimes by their combination with
inert matter, as phosphate of lime, which gives solidity to
the bone. It is in this manner that Gelatin is prepared to
answer the purpose of support to the organs, and determine
the form and attitude of the animal.

We come now to the third form of animal matter Albu-
men. We had better study it in the brain, for it is there in
considerable mass, and the eye can decide upon its motions.
But the motion producing condensation is manifest beyond
dispute, when the upper part of the scull is removed. After
every pulsation of the heart, and after every inspiration, the
brain is seen to retreat upon itself after having been raised
up and enlarged. The condensation takes place in the di-
rection of the white fibres, from the circumference to the
centre, and to the base. Moreover, the serous membrane
insinuated between the different folds and surfaces of the
encephalic matter, admits beyond doubt, that an undu-
latory motion continually takes place among the fibres, and
the encephalic mass is in continual agitation. A man who
would doubt this fact, must be devoid of all talent for ob-
servation and induction. We have already stated, and we
repeat, that these encephalic movements are antecedent to
the serous surfaces of the encephalon, and ought to produce
them ; for two gelatinous surfaces in contact, and at rest,
with no intervening motion, would adhere to each other*

Since motions of alternate contraction and relaxation take
place in a mass of albuminous matter, it ought to exist in
each fibre in particular ; nor can we suppose them strangers
to the influence of innervation. No doubt something else
takes place in the interior of nervous tissues ; but we cannot
say how it is connected with these movements, or how it
may contribute to innervation. Still, contractility remains
as a vital property of the nerves ; the envelopes of the ence-
phalon, and the neurilema of the nerves, and the vascular
system of the one and of the other, possess contractility
as gelatinous tissues. The albuminous nervous fibre
possesses this property as Albumen. It is by means
of this important substance that we are connected
with oyvzrn., with calorio. with electricitv, and the oth

[ M 1

imponderable forms of matter ; in fact, with that perpetual
and unknown cause of life, of whose essence we are igno-
rant, and which in excess or defect for a moment, may destroy
us. It is not permitted to us to explain the first acts of what
we term life, because we cannot place under our inspection
the phenomena that constitute us sensible beings ; nor can
we place ourselves above that act by which we contemplate
ourselves for the purpose of contemplating that act ; nor
have the physiological physicians ever held out such a pre-
tension. But every thing which results as a consequence
of the first impulse — every thing which takes place in conse-
quence of the movements of the means and instruments oi
this first impulse, this superior force, ( that is to say, by means
of the two other forms of animal matter, fibrine and gelatin, )
are manifested by the phenomenon of contractility. But
this is of immense extent, as we have proved ; for there is
not a shudder that takes place in a muscular fibre — there
is not an impulse given by a containing vessel — not a resist-
ance by means of ligament, but what is referable to contrac-
tility. It is the unusual, unnatural exaggeration of these
phenomena of contractility that constitutes irritation in the
tissues spoken of. One may easily guess, therefore, how
important it must be to know how to observe it well and
accurately.

In fact, all the spontaneous acts of a man, whether instinc-
tive or voluntary, whose assemblage insure the performance
of the various functions, tend either to preserve him from
the continually imminent causes of destruction, or to satisfy
that feeling of curiosity which impels him to observe and
compare himself with the things which are not himself. All
these acts and their repetitions are the effects of excitement
upon the animal fibre. We do not assert, however, that
these acts are themselves excitement. We assert only that
they manifest themselves to us as the results of excitement.
Certainly the molecular combinations which alter the chemi-
cal properties of the aliments in the digestive canal ; those
which take place in the bile, in the milk, in the urine, forms
of animal matter, not found in the blood; those which at-
tach moveable and circulating matter to fixed and organized
matter ; those which cause the embryo to germinate and to
grow, &c. cannot be reduced to excitation, produced by
foreign bodies. Indeed if the fibre be excitable, it must
^xist in that form which is fitted for excitation. Ff if do so

L w J

exist, it is in consequence of the laws of vital affinity which
has arranged the molecules of which it is composed. The
phenomena of composition then, are in the developement of
each animal, anterior to the phenomena of excitation : these
two phenomena therefore are not the same. This seems to
be plain and simple reasoning : how it can be otherwise re-
garded we know not.

It is not our intention to discuss the first cause of the
molecular affinities which organize a living body, but mere-
ly to give an idea of the phenomena that relate to excitation
m man, considered in his perfect state of organization. We
shall therefore proceed to the fundamental positions of the
physiological doctrine by some developements on sensibility,
and on the part taken by the nervous system in perception
and motion. Thus we shall have treated the subject of vital
properties, as much as is necessary to understand the phe-
nomena of Irritation, the chief object of this first part of our
work.

Chapter IV. — On the functions of the Nervous Sys.-

TEM IN THE PHENOMENA TERMED INSTINCTIVE AND
INTELLECTUAL.

In this chapter I shall examine in three successive sec-
tions : — 1st. The functions of the nervous apparatus in the
adult. 2dly. Their gradual developement from the embryo,
till the man arrives at his full and perfect growth. 3dly.
The reasons of the qualities which distinguish man from
other animals.

Sec. 1st. — Functions of the nervous apparatus in the adult.

The duties of the nerves considered in this state of full
developement, is to propagate stimulation in the animal
economy, and to keep up all the functions by continuing them
under the agents of excitation. This is proved by experi-
ence, independently of any and every system and explanation,
as to the mode of receiving and propagating these stimula-
tions. We know r also, that the result perceptible to our
senses is an augmentation of the phenomena of life, in those
parts to which the stimulation is transmitted, as well as in
those where it first took place. After these preliminaries,
we may proceed at once to discover the functions of the
nervous system, which we shall divide into four stages or
degrees.

1st. Sotting out from the most simple functions of the

[ 60 j

nervous system, Ave observe that the stimulated nerves
transmit those stimulations to a moderate distance. A thorn
may be forced under the nail, without the person feeling it;
nevertheless, the nervous matter which it stimulates, pro-
pagates the stimulation to parts in the neighborhood of the
nerve, or to some nervous substance at a distance, until the
fluids are insensibly attracted to the place, and a considera-
ble congestion is formed at the time when it first becomes
painful. The same circumstances take place in the viscera.
Some foreign body, stopt at a place where the sensibility is
obtuse, attracts to that place the fluids in the neighboring
vessels, proving that the stimulation has been propagated ;
the vessels we know are accompanied by nerves. Let the
same stimulation be located at some part of the mucous
membrane of the thin portion of the intestines, and there
will be an increase of motion, not only in the capillaries of
that membrane, but also in a portion of the corresponding
muscular fibres. Here then, are examples of stimulation
propagated by the nerves to very short distance. We shall
now state the like to greater distances.

2d. The stimulation which we placed in narrow limits in
the digestive canal, has increased ; it calls to that point the
fluids in greater quantity ; it is propagated to the liver, or
the pancreas, and bile is poured out with the pancreatic
juice. The mucous secretion becomes altered at greater
distances ; action is increased in the mesenteric glands. In
a word, there is great disturbance in all the organic func-
tions of the lower belly ; that is, organic sympathies occur
more considerable than in the former case, but without any
sign of the stimulation being propagated beyond the vis-
ceral cavity.

3rd. Worms, which have a nervous apparatus without any
well defined encephalon, and only with a central nerve
more active than the rest, offer an example of this kind.
Stimulation travels on by means of the nerves, which are
not more numerous than the vessels, along the course of the
vessels ; it arrives at the point where these are terminated
by capillaries, or proceeds along that tissue toward the great
nerve, and regulates the nutritive processes. The great
sympathetic nerve serves the purpose of all the functions of
relation, which are very few in an animal destined to creep
onward in a very simple progress. It possesses a vitality not
quite so dull as some animals -who have a nervous svstom

I 61 j

more developed ; but we see clear enough that the nerves
of nutrition have more to do than those of relation. This
degree will be a ladder to get at the succeeding.

4th. Figure to yourself in the abdomen, a shade of stimu-
lation higher than that which we stated just now : it will be
propagated to the heart, to the lungs, to the skin, to the
members, to the different secretory vessels charged with
the duty of depuration ; it will extend even to the brain ; for
such is the human organization, that stimulation originating
at one point of the body, cannot be propagated to a great
number of organs, if it be not considerable enough to reach
the brain. Here begins sensibility in the examples taken
from men ; for here perception first takes place from the
painful sensations of different degrees, felt and referred to
the stimulated viscera, or to the members, or to other re-
gions ol the nervous apparatus, whether internal or external.
Perception having discovered sensibility, we ought, if we
would understand the phenomena, study the different kinds
of nerves that meet at the encephalon to produce it; and
above all, the different states of the brain itself.

It is well known that, " to feel," can only be considered
as a function of the brain ; but if this organ be healthy and
perfectly developed, it will give us feelings or sensations,
that differ according to the nerves that have transmitted to
it the stimulation. Placed between two classes of nerves,
one of which terminates in sensitive expansions at the sur-
face, and the other plunges among the visceral tissues, the
brain receives two kinds of stimulations very different from
each other. If we next examine each of these two classes
of nerves, we shall find secondary differences well worthy
of attention ; and which prove that the brain has something
else to do than to answer the stimulations of the senses vul-
garly admitted by physiologists and metaphysicians. Each
of our external senses is connected with a particular agent,
which, being impressed, gives rise to a sensitive stimula-
tion ; and all of them are susceptible of another kind of
stimulation, when some body, calculated to inflict a wound,
penetrates into the nervous matter of the organ of sense.
(The impression of light on the retina, produces a sensitive
stimulation : a body that lacerates the retina, produces a
very different one. — Trans.)

The internal nerves also present notable differences.
We find among them the genital senses, half external, half

I 62 j

internal, which are located either in the mucous surfaces,
and communicating with several kinds of agents, or in the
erectile tissues, which furnish a very distinct set of percep-
tions. In every internal mucous surface, we may distinguish
a different sense. That which belongs to respiration, and
which extends from the larynx to the bronchia?, and which
varies throughout its course, differs greatly from that which
receives the food, and of which the internal coat of the sto-
mach is the seat. The mucous membrane of the intestines,
from the duodenum to the anus, possesses also a sense exhi-
biting marked differences from the former. So do the senses
of the urinary passages, considered in their shallow cavity
and their entrance ; while the sense of the urethra, excited
sometimes by urine, and sometimes by the spermatic fluid
in men, exhibits differences which multiply in proportion to
the vitality of the internal membrane that lines the cavity.*
Besides the numerous internal senses in their regular and
normal state, we must admit those which morbid causes pro-
duce ; for throughout the whole body, where irritation takes
place, the nervous matter present in the tissues acquires a
new activity, and gives rise continually to new perceptions.
Hence the principal secretory organs, the liver, the pan-
creas, the testicles especially, the heart, the serous mem-
branes that envelope and facilitate the movements of the
principal viscera, the mucular tissue, the cellular, the liga-
ments, aponeuroses, cartilages, and even the bones, become
in some chronic maladies, real internal senses, which trans-
mit to the brain stimulations that rival in distinctness and
intensity those of the regular senses so called. In a great
number of cases also, where a man cannot positively be said
to be diseased, many of our regular internal senses, those
of the digestive organs especially, are so much exalted by
irritation, that their action on the brain is tenfold what it is
in a regular and normal state.

*The five senses, as they are called, seeing, hearing;, tasting-, touching - ,
smelling, are distinguished because the sensations they originate are per-
ceptibly different. The vulgar distinguish these, because the eye, the
car, the mouth, the nose, the fingers, are visible. But every source of a
regular, permanent difference of sensation, is for like reason equally a
sense. What can be more different than the wants that take their origin
in the organs of respiration, and those of digestion, or generation? Is
the eye-sight more different from hearing, than hunger and thirst from
the irritations of the excretory organs oppressed byingesta? Every
tissue that in due and regular performance of its functions gives rise to
sensations always different, is a different sense, physiologically. — Trans!.

i 63 j

Vll the internal senses, moreover, ot' a normal and regu-
lar character, have a distinction analagous to our external
senses. In fact, the brain placed between these two classes
of sense, the external and internal, is so organized, that in
all the external perceptions that relate to the satisfaction of
instinctive wants, and which first develope themselves, it
cannot determine the action, but by means of other simulta-
neous or consecutive perceptions which proceed from the
internal senses. We shall explain this very soon.

Let us state, as a fundamental fact in this question, that
the brain, or rather the whole encephalic mass, is so organ-
ized as to reciprocate with these different sources of stimu-
lation ; that it acquires its full perfection slowly and with
difficulty ; that this degree of perfection corresponds with
the like property of the various sources of stimulation ; and
that it perishes more or less readily as these do. The fol-
lowing observations will explain this.

Sec. 2d. — Successive developement of the different func-
tions of the nervous apparatus, from the embryo to the adult
state.

In the first moment of his existence, man is no more than
a diminutive mass of animal matter. He possesses no dis-
tinct organ. But the molecules of the mass arrange them-
selves according to the laws of an affinity which, we distin-
guish at a distance, so as to form successively the various
animal tissues.

During all this effort of vital chemistry, (vital chrystaliza-
tion.* — Trans.) the nerves and the encephalon have no
occupation ; they become developed, and that is all.

So soon as the tissues are formed, they act ; each has its
duty to perform ; and the nervous commences upon its func-
tion, which is, to put stimulation in motion, and thus to
determine the movements of all the other forms of animal
matter. All subserving the regular transmission of nutritive
matter to its destination, there to be subjected to the affini-
ties of vital chemistry; for it can do nothing more important
than press forward the developement of a human creature.

The nerves then, play the same part in the human em-
bryo, that they perform in worms and other animals of a low
class wherein we first observe them. In the embryo of a

■*Chrystalization is the arrangement of molecules into some determin-
ate form and shape, according to certain laws of attraction or affinitv,
squally unknown in the formation of h ick chrystal or cubic pyrites, as in
ial organization. Trans

L 84 J

lew weeks old, there are as yet no members ; the brain and
nerves, therefore, cannot preside over a heart and vascular
system.

But the limbs, or members, begin to grow and push them-
selves forward like little appendages ; the functions of the
encephalon augment in proportion as the body is developed,
and its mass acquires more volume and energy. The stimu-
lations that travel along the nerves and are reflected by the
brain, can now determine the motions in the members of
the foetus. This is what the mother can tell us about the
third or fourth month of her pregnancy.

Gestation advances : During the rest of its period, the
internal senses destined to respiration, nutrition, and ejec-
tion of superfluous matter, are more elaborated than the
rest, without excepting the external senses. The infant is
born ; the cries it utters on the first impression of the air on
its lungs, announce to us that it is now sensible, and that it
probably has been so for some time before its birth, and that
the movement of its limbs, while imprisoned, was the effect
of some stimulation.

The functions of the nervous system and of its encepha-
lic centre, become much augmented from the moment of
conception. But we must not take for granted that they are
more considerable than the actual observation and ieasona-
ble induction will warrant. A child born without a head,
can neither perceive the want of respiration, or the contact
of the atmosphere, although the sense of touch and the sense
of respiration are developed and capable of receiving stim-
ulations. The cries of an infant just born, arise then from
a reaction in the encephalon, due to these first stimulations
transmitted thither from the lungs. The skin and the bron-
chial vessels are also stimulated in the acephalous child ; but
they run along the nerves in vain, there is no brain to col-
lect and send them back to the respiratory muscles ; there
is no perception or sensation.

The infant is now covered with clothing which preserves
its temperature, and supplies as far as possible the medium
from whence it emerged. The painful stimulation of the
atmosphere ceases, the cries cease, and the infant is quiet,
obeying one natural sense only, that of respiration. But
this state of rest is not destined to continue ; another inter-
nal sense transmits its stimulations to the brain : this is di-
gestion or the first assimilation (hunger.) So <=oon as this

[ 65 j

has spoken, the infant recommences its pries. It is brought
to the breast of the mother ; immediately on contact it di-
rects its face to her's, and all its motions to seize the breast
and to work by suction and by swallowing are executed with
precision.

This second want satisfied, the infant resumes his habitual
calm, which the act of exoneration does- not disturb, until
the deposit of these matters on the linen, and irritation grad-
ually produced by them on the skin, or some new demand
on the stomach, or some extraordinary irritation again awa-
kens him. Physiologists know that the alvine and urinary
ejections do not take place but in concurrence with some
action of the respiratory muscles. It is at least necessary that
these muscles should follow the organs that return upon them-
selves for no vacuum could take place among viscera which
touched each other. These respiratory muscles are under
the control of the encephalon, which acts therefore in this
case, in consequence of stimulations of the internal sense,
belonging to the organs of evacuation, as well as of respi-
ration ; that is to say, without feeling pleasure or pain ; but
pain does accompany the internal gastric sense as well as too
lively a stimulation of the skin. But if some obstacle should be
felt either to respiration or defecation, the innervation of the
bowels or of the urinary passages, or of the respiratory or-
' gans upon the brain, would increase and be felt with more or
less vividness according as the encephalic development is
more perfect.

These first perceptions are instinctive, as are the motions
resulting from them. In the new born infant instinct reigns
alone, but it is very limited. We shall see it increase as
vears increase. But as it may be confounded with intellect,
we must seize the present occasion for distinguishing them.
With the physiologist, it depends on the stimulations of the in-
ternal or external sensitive surfaces, propagated to the brain,
and from thence reflected so as to produce muscular motion ;
which takes place either with pleasant or unpleasant percep-
tions, or without any perception which the observer can dis-
tinguish.

From this time then, we may distinguish two kinds ot re-
action in the brain, which receives stimulations from the
nerves : 1st, reaction unaccompanied with pain or pleasure :
2ndly, reaction with one or other of these. All this, with-
out any manifestation of intellect, and all possible to occur

L ™ J

in every animal possessed of a nervous apparatus. Taking,
care, therefore, not to suppose more than there actually is,
let us pursue our historical developement of the nervous
functions.

The infant grows, his limbs are formed. Two external
senses, which as yet do not appear to have furnished any
perception, begin to modify the cncephalon which is now in
a condition to respond. The infant fixes his eyes on objects,
he follows their motions, and if you turn his back, he turns
round his head to keep his eyes in the direction of the lu-
minous rays which have escaped him : it is an instinct more
perfect that induces him to execute this motion. Moreover
he is attentive to noise ; that is, by a like instinct he moves
farther off, or he approaches as well as he can, or keeps his
body motionless to perceive the impression of the human
voice, or the sound of instruments, &c. These are two new
senses brought into action, and the child that had before on-
ly touch and taste, has now eye sight and hearing.

That acquisition does not seem immediately to produce
any new action : but now it is observed that when his im-
mediate wants are satisfied he no more falls into a sleep, he
begins to observe himself, and aided by the signs of his
nurse he marks the inconvenience of uncleanliness, and
learns to get rid of it. His smiles of pleasure accompany
the satisfaction of his wants, and the caresses of his nurse.
He puts himself now in relation with the beings of his own
kind. He seeks to handle the bodies which he sees, and
tries to imitate the sounds he has heard. A new want has
now arisen, curiosity. The desire of moving, necessarily
accompanies this. The infant exerts his muscles of locomo-
tion not only to bring objects within his reach, but to ap-
proach them, although this is done very often ineffectually.
He is determined to this by an internal impulse purely in-
stinctive, even when he has no object in view, no end to
serve, he bestirs, he agitates himself, he is never at rest un-
less while sleeping, or while some new object rivets his at-
tention and gives it a new direction.

But let us stop a little at this power of calling off the at-
tention from a sensation. It did not exist before. Here
then is a new faculty in the brain which has been developed
with the senses of hearing and seeing. No doubt it is so ;
and this new faculty is nothing more than a greater devel-
opement of instinct, dependant on the augmentation of iho

L 67 ]

eiicephalon, which is not merely enlarged, but begins to be
well marked out in regions where it was heretofore but
roughly sketched. These regions are the different points of
the anterior portion which corresponds to the frontal bone.

In proportion as this part of the brain becomes more dis-
tinct, the expression of the physiognomy is heightened ; the
eyes and even the motions of the muscles of the face, and
the complexion, announce that the child has ideas analogous
to some of our own. For expression is not a being — an en-
tity taking its station in the face, but it is property belonging
to this part of the body, of making known to an observer
that the person observed possesses ideas. The most ex-
pressive physiognomies, disclose nothing to persons of weak
minds.

Here then are the first lineaments of intelligence, which
henceforward are marked. We should have looked for
them in vain in the young child who furnished so many proofs
of sensibility ; I beg the reader not to lose sight of this,
and he will see that sensibility, intelligence, and instinct, are
very different things. In fact, the action of the nerves on
the motions of the heart and vascular system, with which
they are developed, constitutes the first degree of nervous
action : the second is manifested when the brain, stimulated
either by the internal senses, or by the limbs when they are
bent, pressing upon some of the viscera, and in some man-
ner which we may suppose unfavourable to the regular pro-
gress of the animal economy, produce motions in the loco-
motive muscles of the child in the womb. The infant just
born, gives evident proofs of sensibility, but only by the ex-
pression of pain ; and executes also some instinctive actions :
this is the third degree of nervous action. Lastly, the fourth
to which we now come, seems to be prepared by the devel-
opement of agreeable sensations, never perceived until now :
this is the period when intelligence shows itself, by giving
birth to attention, by acts of observation, and by the faculty
which the infant henceforward possesses to put off action
solicited by instinct, and of the first necessity, to execute
others enforced by external impressions.

Still this intelligence is as yet, extremely limited ; and it
would be a great mistake to consider it as equal to that of
the grow up man. The infant as yet, has no ideas but of
material bodies ; nothing proves that he is able to analyse
and abstract their attributes. He seems much more advan-

[ 68 j

ced with respect to the perceptions that human beings like
himself, furnish to him ; for long before he is able by his
gestures to exhibit his intelligence upon colors, solidity, and
the motion of ineit bodies, he distinguishes very plainly
kindness, bad temper, or anger, in the physiognomy of the
persons who approach him. Frequently he cannot bear
without painful feelings and tears, and turning aside his face,
the sight of grown up persons unknown to him : especially
if they have a physiognomy somewhat harsh ; while a good
tempered, or insignificant face, or the sight of an infant like
himself, pfoduces no unpleasant feeling.

The cause of this is evidently, that the developement of
instinct goes on faster than that of intellect : an unpleasant
physiognomy frightens him, as a result of the instinct of self
preservation ; just as he would be frightened if one were
to threaten to throw him down a precipice, or at the sight
of a furious animal, ready to rush upon him. He feels sen-
sations, such as those of hunger and thirst, the want of rest
and motion, heat and cold, and he obeys them without hes-
itations but the inclination to observe, and curiosity always
increasing, soon render him educateable, and show that he
may be accustomed to support without fear, the sight of all
those objects which gave him at first so much uneasiness.

In the mean time, the infant makes progress ; he imitates
the accents of the human voice, and e\ en all the actions of
his fellow creatures : he does more, he shows that he has
not only ideas of the properties of bodies, but also of the
circumstances under which he observes them. When he
lives with well educated people, he remembers the words,
by which they express their opinions of the different scenes
of social life, and he employs them so as to show that he
understands them. We should be tempted then to believe
that his intelligence was perfect ; but how far is it yet from
its final developement ! to prove this, induce him if you can
by means of the words which he understands so well, to en-
ter into some accurate process of reasoning ; and you will
soon see that his attention becomes distracted from the
train of ideas that you would impose upon him, and he fixes
upon some other ideas, more simple, which his memory sub-
stitutes, or on impressions which have been made upon his
senses. This depends upon instinct making more progress
than intellect : the brain of a child, not yet arrived at the
age of puberty, is so organized, that he receives no lively

[ 69 j

pleasure, unless from the impressions oi material objects .
these alone, agitate agreeably his nervous system. To eat
and to drink, to take much exercise, to see new objects, and
satisfy a wandering curiosity ; to put his limbs in action,
which nature orders him to do ; to try his strength, and to
compare it with that of others, not only for the purpose of
exercising it, but to obey the want of that self satisfaction
which shows itself but as yet only in outward actions, such
are the customs imperiously demanded by instinct ; and to
which, youth, not yet arrived at the age of puberty, always
returns, whatever pains you may take to turn him from
them. The pleasures of reflection are as yet unknown to
him, excepting those which he obtains by stratagem, which
he substitutes to strength, whenever he wishes to act upon
one stronger than himself. This kind of pleasure has more
attraction for him than that of kind actions ; unless indeed,
he finds in these, the means of exercising his predominant
faculties ; this would be the case for example, in protecting
a young person weaker than himself, whom he would plague
the instant after. In general, he prefers mischief to doing
good, because by this means he satisfies his vanity, and he
finds in it more excitement, which is necessary to him, at
whatever price. This is the reason that we see him so of-
ten amuse himself by breaking to pieces inanimate objects :
and he finds a double pleasure, founded on the desire of self
satisfaction, to find resistance yield to him, and to excite
the anger of reasonable persons ; this seems to him a victo-
ry that he enjoys deliciously whenever he can escape by
flight from merited punishment. On the same principle of
action, he delights in torturing animals ; and he would en-
joy the same pleasure in torturing individuals of his own
species, if he were not restrained by fear ; for the desire of
self preservation is very strongly marked in him. Com-
passion does sometimes restrain him; but this is a feeling
not much developed at this age in the male sex: we find it
more frequently, and more distinctly marked in young girls.
I know that all the acts of young "people before the age of
puberty, are not distinguished by this depravity : the char-
acter of goodness which marks many persons afterward, be-
gins to appear before the epoch of reason ; but the great
majority are such as I have described ; and the more vigor-
ous young boys are, and the more lively do they feel the
want of expending their force by external motion, the

L ™ j

stronger is their tendency to do wrong : there is scarcely a
child that does not make a bad use of his strength upon oth-
ers who are weaker than himself ; this is his first movement;
but the cries of his victim stop him, when he is not natu-
rally ferocious, until a new Instinctive impulse induces him
to commit the same fault.

To correct these propensities, which reason, and experi-
ence of the unhappy consequences attending them, would
never correct, or correct too late, two methods have been
adopted. The instinct of self preservation is brought into
play by the punishments which terrify the child, and turn
against him the consequences of his bad actions : endeavors
also are used to turn him aside from selfish gratification in
these pernicious indulgences, to render him more suscep-
tible of those pleasures which attend praises obtained by
docility, kindness, goodness, attention to his duties, effects
of study, memory, and intelligence.

This last faculty is put in requisition by anticipation, in
explaining the notion, of good and evil, justice and injustice,
merit and demerit. These are most useful ideas, which are
as yet confused in a child of that age, and applicable at will
to his petty passions, but which are rectified by being pre-
sented accurately drawn out by the labors of philosophers
and sages. We succeed in this task in proportion only to
the developement of those parts of the brain that belong to
intellect.

While we exhaust our unproductive efforts to hasten the
developement of intelligence in the child, and inspire him
with a taste for serious objects, a new function establishes
itself, and nature performs without effort, what art would
have attempted in vain. The organs destined for the pro-
duction of the species become developed, and the encepha-
lon receives an impulse which is calculated to carry it to its
last degree of growth and energy. The young man perceives
a prodigious change in his manner of seeing things. So soon
as he has received the influence of this new sense, a wan-
dering kind of inquietude seizes him ; the eyes of the other
sex excite within him instinctive movements that he feels
with surprise. If we examine the state of his intellect, we
shall find that he has discovered new ideas in words that he
thought he well understood, but had never suspected before ;
he sees relations, bearings and order, whore he before ob-
served only differences, multiplicity, and confusion. Ideas

L <l J

of connection and casuality arise ; lie loves now to draw
inferences which are as easy as they were formerly difficult,
and he becomes suddenly a maker of objections and a rea-
soner. He begins to find pleasure in reflecting on himself,
in observing what he does and what he thinks: he is incli-
ned to compare himself with others in respect of these new
faculties which he feels an interest in studying as they ap-
pear in others ; and if he finds he has any advantage, he is
much more flattered than by any superiority of strength or
address, although he is still more flattered by the latter
quality, than he will be by-and-bye. This is a wonderful
revolution, which would have been quite impossible to all
the common places of wisdom.

The new facility which the youth feels he possesses for
all the operations of intellect, seldom fail to lead him astray.
He seems to think he invents, he creates what he discovers ;
it seems to him that thought goes on quicker in him than
in men in general ; he sees with a kind of disdain the in-
tellectual slowness and circumspection of riper age. He
does not perceive that he is only working upon that multi-
tude of ideas, which, during his long childhood, were in-
culcated with so much pains ; he has not yet had time to
feel that opposition, and experience alone can give him any
just notion of the inconvenience of hasty conclusions, and of
that facility which seems calculated to overcome all obsta-
cles.

As muscular force and the feelings of life and health have
augmented as well as his intellectual faculties, the young man
sees before him an immense prospect ; and the generative
power with which he feels himself abundantly supplied,
adds to his arrogance by multiplying his intellectual enjoy-
ments.

Such is man in the spring-tide of life. The nervous sys-
tem executes from henceforward all the functions which be-
long to it : but the intellectual faculties do not acquire
their full vigor till about the age of thirty ; an epoch when
the increase in growth has developed the whole brain in
every direction to which its fibres can extend. During the
space of time which separates the appearance of the last of
the intellectual faculties from the full developement of the
whole intellect, the judgement goes on toward perfection.
The man having been often deceived by hasty conclusions
from first impressions, that is, having been repeatedly com-

L ™ 1

pelled by the acquisition of new ideas, to correct his first
opinions, becomes gradually sensible of this kind of humili-
ation. The first time he commits these kind of errors, he
hastens to correct them without feeling any thing but pleas-
ure at having learnt some thing new ; but when he sees the
necessity of correction multiply continually, his self-love
becomes alarmed, he becomes angry, and employs cunning
to maintain the authority of his first conclusions : but inter-
nally and privately, he determines to endeavor to spare
himself humiliation or anger, and becomes, as we say, cir-
cumspect.

It is now that his faculties, if they have been properly
cultivated, are carried to their highest perfection. Man is
so favored by nature, that he can enjoy them for a long time,
and procure an amount of happiness, of which other ani-
mals seem to have no idea.

Let us see now to what is it owing that he enjoys all
these advantages.

Sec. 3. Reason of the prerogatives that distinguish man
from all other animals.

We have left the youth in connection with every material
object, animate and inanimate, distinguishing of his own
accord, all their external attributes, and able to discover the
most difficult of their physical properties, even to the cir-
cumstances that may modify them ; but it is only when he
is called upon to observe them, that he remembers wonder-
fully all the signs of his intellectual operations, and acquires
in consequence, ideas of abstraction. But we have noticed
that he exhibits great repugnance to make an application of
these precious signs, to the investigation of those circumstan-
ces which produce a variation in the state of bodies, and to the
comparison of his own intellect, with that of his equals : that is
to say, he dislikes to abandon himself to reasoning and reflec-
tion. In other words, we have seen that he learnt easily, not
only words,but the formula of ratiocination — that he seemed to
understand them, but exhibited no propensity to make others
like them, although placed in favorable circumstances ; and
that an insurmountable force brought back his attention to
some order of ideas far less complicated. We have remark-
ed, that at the same time when he acquired the faculty of
reflection and of reasoning, a new sense manifested itself,
with a new instinctive want. So that there is always the
same law of the developement of man : if he acquires an in-

L ™]

crease of intellectual power, and an increase at die same
time of instinctive faculties. But nature seems to have as-
sociated the perfection of intelligence with the generative
faculty ; so that the young man shall not become transformed
into the father of a family, before he has acquired the strength
and intelligence necessary to provide for all the wants of
his offspring. The exceptions of this rule, though rare,
sufficiently demonstrate its great importance. We see
among male children instances of premature puberty at five
or seven years, for instance, which are accompanied with
the usual grade of intellect of that time of life ; a disgusting
and deplorable spectacle. It is by investigating these kinds
of subjects, that we can obtain a solution of the question that
occupies us. Let them be well examined, and it will be
found, as Dr. Gall has well remarked, that the cerebellum
is more than usually developed, while the anterior part of
the brain, the seat of intelligence, which is always at its full
size at the full period of regular puberty, is not larger than
what belongs to a mere infant. Dr. Gall concludes that the
cerebellum is the special presiding organ of generation ; but
if we consider, 1st. Thatthe heart, the sanguineous system,
the respiratory muscles, those that depend on the will, take
their last growth with the cerebellum, as well as the organs
of generation ; 2dly. That if the testicles are taken away
before puberty, the developement of all those organs, as
well as of the cerebellum, is deficient ; 3dly. That castration,
after the age of puberty, diminishes not merely the cerebel-
lum, but all the muscular apparatus, and the sanguineous
system — we , shall be compelled to allow, 1st. That the
cerebellum is not alone appointed to the use of the instinct
of propagation, but it is equally connected with that increase
of vital energy that produces the full developement of all
the organs ; 2dly. That it is not the sole promoter of these
changes ; 3dly. That the simultaneous developement of the
cerebellum, the sanguineous system, and the external mus-
cles, after that of the testicles or ovaries, is the only con-
stant fact ; but, that usually the brain receives, at the same
time, its last impulse of growth on which the intellectual
faculties depend, more especially those of reflection and in-
duction. This suffices to answer the question before proposed.
Sec. 4. On what depend, the final developement of the
intellectual and instinctive faculties, which accompany the
evolution of \>ubcrty.

in

L 74 J

It seems that the developement of the testicles unci ova-
lies, is brought on by the common process of nutrition,
which always causes the most important organs of existence
in the individual to precede those that are less so ; that
these organs begin to grow and secrete without any prepara-
tory shock ; and that they excite throughout the viscera,
whether by the influence of the nerves distributed through
the organs, or by the re-absorption of the liquor they elabo-
rate, an excess of vitality which pushes on the whole body
toward its last degree of developement. This was nearly
the common opinion, prior to the system of Dr. Gall, who
referred all these charges to the cerebellum. But why
should we impute to it those changes which the cerebellum
alone cannot produce ? Why does it not grow ? Why not
determine the forms of puberty among eunuchs, always ex-
cepting that which relates to the generative act ? Why
does it not preserve these forms among youths at puberty,
whom we submit to castration ? How happens it that it is
itself oppressed after this operation, in common with all the
muscular system ? Will it be said that this cerebellum makes
use of the genital organs as an instrument to react on the
animal economy ? This will admit the influence so long
acknowledged, of the testicles on the sanguiferous system,
the muscles, and even on the brain. It is easier then to
take the facts as they are, and acknowledge that since the
cerebellum is incapable of producing changes in the form, in
the voice, the color, the muscular force, the character, the
inclinations that characterize puberty — these changes are
results of the developement of that part of the genital appa-
ratus, destined to furnish the first materials of the embryo ;
that the cerebellum is thence affected like every other part
of the encephalon, but that its developement is more parti-
cularly connected with the internal functions which preside
over nutrition, and produce the abundance and energy of
the fibre.*

We see that the intellectual, like the instinctive faculties,
are developed along with the nervous system ; that they
result from the insensible ampliation or growth that takes
place in the encephalon and the distributed nervous system,
during the period from the embryo to the adult state ; that
they are in fact, to the physiological observ er, nothing more

*I doubt whether these considerations ore quite sufficient to set aside
Gall's facts.— Transl

than the transmission of nervous encephalic stimulation,
considered under peculiar circumstances. The catenation
of the facts which we have unfolded, proves this ; but to
add to this proof, we shall present the following considera-
tions drawn from the same source, a rigorous observation of
facts.

1 . The quantity of innervation afforded by the instinctive
and intellectual phenomena, being of a higher character, and
connected also with that which causes muscular motion, is
in its degree necessarily a disturber ; it would soon termi-
nate our existence, if it were not interrupted at the end of a
certain time : hence the necessity of sleep, which substi-
tutes another form of innervation for that of wakefulness.
Sleep, when perfect, suspends these two kinds of phenome-
na, although it cannot prevent some of the stronger stimula-
tions of the nerves from reaching the brain, and being from
thence reflected on other nerves. What proves this, is,
that the muscular surfaces of the hollow organs, and the
respiratory muscles, which cannot act regularly, but by
means of the brain, continue their motions, whihmo instinc-
tive act is manifest, and no thought troubles the repose of
sleep.

Dreams do not take place but in imperfect sleep, or at
the beginning and the end of usual sleep. But if you awa-
ken suddenly a profound sleeper somewhat fatigued, in the
midst of his first sleep, he will tell you he had no dream.
Dreams and somnambulism come in aid of our assertion, for
they present a feeble kind of rest wherein many stimulations
reach the brain, and determine that series of thoughts and
acts which always show an incomplete and irregular state of
encephalic innervation. Sometimes the regular instinct
brings in subjection the intellect to which it was subordin-
ate during wakefulness ; sometimes an irregular intellect
provokes instinctive motions which would not otherwise
have taken place, &c. but this innervation is always less
considerable than what takes place in a state of wakefulness.
The fcetus seems to pass through these different shades of
innervation. During the first months its sleep is perfect ;
during the latter months it is often interrupted by percep-
tions which cannot bring into play any thing but instinct in
its most limited phenomena relating to the preservation of
the individual ; nor do they shew themselves, except by
momentary motions produced by pain. These motions are

L ™ J

m fact the first and most simple actions of that class of animals
which are provided with a sensitive apparatus. So similar
are they, that they differ only from those of the polypus, by
their proceeding from a stimulation reflected by an encepha-
lic apparatus. Is it not evident that the first motions of an
embryo are those of zoophytes, and as the embryo grows,
they put on the character of sleepy motions ?

2. Diseases augment, diminish, interrupt, deprave the en-
cephalic innervation in all its relations, instinctive, intellect-
ual, sensitive, and muscular. In many soporific states not
profound, as in coma, lethargy, incomplete apoplexy, there is
a perfect interruption of intellectual innervation, with contin-
uance to a certain point of instinctive innervation, manifest-
ed by the motions of co-ordinate muscles. The patient turns
aside to avoid noise, light, palpitation, &c. In epilepsy and
hysteria, instinct reacts also but irregularly and by convul-
sions. In strong apoplexy, intellect and instinct are both
banished ; but the motions of the heart, and those of the
splanchnic muscular fibres exist co-ordinately (by means of
the encephalon ) with those of the respiratory muscles. In
complete syncope, as well as in asphyxy, the innervation of
the brain is diminished to such a degree, that the respiratory
motions, and those of the heart, become insensible.

Here then, the functions of the encephalon and the nerves,
have been analysed by their diminution through all then-
stages of decrease ; and the adult appears retrograding as
far back as the embryo. In insanity, on the contrary, we
find these functions analysed by their exaltation, not only
according to their degrees, but their differences, as we shall
see in the second part of this work ; until excess of irrita-
tion deprives man of his first and most simple motives of
action, instinct, and will, and reduces him in point of inner-
vation to the state of the embryo, whose limbs are not yet
developed. This is what we are accustomed to observe in
those kinds of insanity which degenerate into complete
fatuity : the man in this case, stript of all motive to external
action, remains motionless ; exhibiting neither appetite nor
desires ; feeling no want, he would permit himself to die of
hunger, and remain motionless in his excretions, if his fel-
low men did not take pity on his condition. Life remains
however, so long as food is introduced into his stomach by
the aid of strangers, while the gastric passages can assimilate

i << j

it, and the interior innervations can distribute it through the
animal economy, and offer to the several tissues the assimi-
lated fluids proper for their nutrition.

It is true then, that the business of the nervous system, is
to transmit the stimulations of one part of the animal econ-
omy to another ; and in performing this duty, five classes
of phenomena appear in the early period of existence. 1st.
The oscillatory movements of the heart and vascular system.
2nd. The contractile motions of the visceral, muscular fibres.
3rd. The motions of the respiratory muscles, always co-
ordinate with these last, and attesting the intervention of
the encephalon. 4th. The motions of these muscles, and
those of the voice, and of locomotion ; in an order, and for a
purpose which we may easily distinguish, but without any
intellectual operation : a phenomenon purely instinctive,
which is itself no more than the expression of our first
wants, arising from the stimulations of the nervous apparatus
of the encephalon. 5th. And finally, the same motions un-
der the directions of intelligence, which sometimes make
them co-ordinate with instinctive suggestions, and sometimes
with desires that take their rise from curiosity.

We see that this last want (curiosity, or the feeling of the
want of observation ) comes in as an addition to all the others :
it shows itself at first, as an instrument to satisfy these other
wants by an instinctive impulse, in proportion as the mother
ceases to provide for them ; and it finishes when the brain
is perfected, by giving birth to all the intellectual operations
which supercede the mother and instinctive motions. These
operations, derived from one source, (curiosity,) seem to
multiply themselves in proportion as the man abandons him-
self to the impulses of this same want. It is also evident,
that the high degree of perfection of those acts which are
suggested by the desire of observation, (curiosity,) is that,
in which intelligence is reflected with most energy upon
itself, exciting to the study of itself, and to cause itself to be
studied by other men ; for it is incontestible, as some philo-
sophers have truly said, that the more a man reflects for the
pleasure of reflecting, the more desirous he is to communi-
cate his ideas : very different in this respect from one who
seeks to satisfy wants of a lower order ; who, if he be
prudent, is secret, and communicates' to others, those
only of his ideas which may aid in the execution of his
purpose.

C 78 ]
Chapter V. — On the theories advanced concerning

THE INTELLECTUAL PHENOMENA.

Having followed man during his growth, and having laid
down the inappreciable advantages he derives from the gra-
dual advance to perfection of his encephalic apparatus, we
are now led to consider the explanation he himself gives of
these advantages. Here, men are divided into two classes:
to wit, those who speak of intellectual faculties without
being acquainted with their organs — and those who speak
of them possessing that knowledge. The first class know
nothing of Irritation ; they must be led to it : for indepen-
dently of the first cause, and the profound respect due to it,
we are compelled by the undeniable evidence of a thousand
facts accurately observed, to refer all the instinctive and in-
tellectual phenomena, to the action of the nervous appara-
tus; and to explain their lesions by the changes which take
place in its excitation ; changes where we see in the first
rank, the phenomena of irritation. To arrive at the demon-
stration of this truth, we shall examine in the seven sections
following. 1. How man came to abstract himself from him-
self, and the foundations of the psychological doctrines.
2. What idea they annex to consciousness, and whether other
animals are endowed with it. 3. Whether it be possible to
form a science of the phenomena of consciousness alone, as
the psychologists pretend : and here we shall expose the
sources of their errors in explaining internal perceptions.
4. How it is that consciousness and the senses aid each
other in constructing a true science of man as a feeling and
thinking being : with an essay on the personified principle
which the psychologists would impose on the nervous sys-
tem. 5. Whether the explanation of the physiologists on the
ascertainable cause of the intellectual phenomena, is an hy-
pothesis like the principle of the psychologists ; and we
shall shew the connections which unite the internal func-
tions, to those of the organs of external relation. 6. To
what it is that on the ultimate analysis, all the objections are
reduced which are urged against the office of the nervous
apparatus in the production of intellectual phenomena. 7.
What we are to think of those philosophers who call them-
selves rationalists, theologians, illuminated, mystic.

Sec. 1. How man abstracts himself from himself: bash
of the psychological doctrine.

In seeking to satisfy his first wants, man enters into the
field of observation : tho remarks he makes serve onlv for

1 79 ]

that purpose. Hy and by the observations of bodies which
he is compelled to examine, becomes of itself a pleasure,
which often leads him aside and makes him forget the ob-
jects of his researches. At length this new pleasure takes
such hold upon him, that he forgets his original object, and
begins to think that he is placed in this world only to con-
template nature and observe himself; and this becomes to
him the most noble and most essential of his occupations.
He goes further : he frames an hypothesis : he divides him-
self into two beings, of which, one which he confesses he
has in common with other animals is the object of his con-
tempt, while the other, which has nothing in common with
blood, flesh, or even the nervous system, rules over the
first, and constitutes more especially, the being Man. Here
follows the mode of proceeding he adopts to arrive at these
ontological assertions.

He takes all the phenomena of intellectual innervation,
more or less mixed up with the instinctive, and applies to
them a word ; which word becomes the mover of the phe-
nomena themselves. He is manifestly led to this erroneous
distinction, by his ignorance of the manner in which the
phenomena are actually produced : this it imports us much
to search to the bottom, partly for the purpose of determin-
ing truly the functions of the nervous system, and partly to
enable us to comprehend the theory of Insanity, which will
engage our attention in the second part of this work.

Judging of himself by bodies of a lower class, and by the
circumstances in which they are placed, man imagines that
his intellectual phenomena are directed by an intelligent
being placed within his brain ; like the tunes of an organ
produced by some musician out of sight. He does not suf-
ficiently reflect, that there can be no comparison between a
human being playing on an instrument, and the cause of in-
tellectual phenomena which take place in that same human
being. He persists nevertheless ; he converts the observa-
tion of these phenomena into a science; and he calls it
Metaphysics.

The anatomist however, comes forward, armed with his
scalpel ; he dissects the dead man ; he make experiments on
some living animal ; he compares it with man in a healthy,
and with man in a diseased state ; he does this in spite of
(he metaphysician who thinks himself dishonoured by such
a comparison. Tho anatomist now shews, that the pretend

L w 3

ed organist which the metaphycian had located in the pineal
gland, or the pons varolii, is nothing else than the whole
connected encephalic apparatus. Some reasoners seise
upon this discovery, and endeavour to show to the meta-
physician, the imposibility of forcing into contact, some-
thing which has none of the properties acknowledged to
belong to the body, with the nervous matter of the ence-
phalon which is a part of the body. This difficulty does not
stop the metaphysian : his imagination produces some inter-
medial entity, some air, or gas, or subtle matter to bring
about this singular connection of a being, that has no pro-
perty in common with matter, and the material substance of
the encephalon. It is urged, that let him do what he will,
his intermediary substance will always be material, and no
reasonable person can bring himself to admit the existence of
a substance, which is not cognizable by any sense he pos-
sesses.

The metaphysician remains unconvinced. He has never
been at the trouble of examining the functions of the nervous
system, so as to be capable of conviction : he hesitates how-
ever. His uncertainty, his concealments, the weakness of
his arguments, destroy his credit with men of science ; and
the opinion begins now to prevail, that as there can be no
real science, except of facts that are certain, and of things
which the senses can take cognizance of, it becomes neces-
sary to bring back metaphysics to objects of sense ; but this
destroys metaphysics as a science, and reduces it to physio-
logical facts, and conclusions of the same kind as those which
we have already propounded.

The science of Man was at this stage, when the metaphy-
sicians who were expected to yield with a good grace to the
class of observers who took their senses as guides to their
researches, rallied, and now placed their ontologic philoso-
phy on the basis of what they called facts of consciousness.

It is on the inspiration of consciousness then, that modern
metaphysicians, discarding that title as savouring too much
of theology, hold the following language as Psychologists.
" No doubt the sciences ought to repose on facts capable of
being observed ; but it is not strictly true that these facts
must be observable by the senses. Here are two kinds of
observation independent of each other : one proper to na-
turalists, the other to philosophers : the first admits the evi-
dence of the senses alone; the other i« founded on intern;']

[ 31 ]

evidence, and the facts thus discovered are facts of eon*
sciousness. They fall not under cognizance of the senses:
nevertheless they are facts, and facts of the utmost cer-
tainty. What can be more sure than to feel pleasure or
pain, to feel ones own existence, to feel that we think or
that we have thought of any thing ; that we will, or that we
have willed any thing ; that we believe one thing, or doubt
about another, &c. But since these two classes of facts are
equally certain to the human being, the history of man is
two fold. It is in vain that the naturalists would base it on
facts cognizable by the senses alone, and the philosophers
on facts of consciousness ; the two classes cannot be con-
founded. Consciousness feels itself, but does not feel the
sensations : the senses perceive nothing but external ob*
jects and impressions, and can neither see, or hear, or touch
what is evident to consciousness. Senses and conscious-
ness have nothing in common, except to be equally in con-
nection with the intelligent principle, which is individual in
its nature, and to which the others administer. If we have
not yet succeeded in reducing philosophy to a science of
certainty, it is because its truths have not been understood.
Hitherto the two classes of facts have been confounded, as
have the two corresponding sciences. The naturalists have
gone astray in treating the facts of consciousness as sensible
facts : the philosopher has been equally mistaken in admit-
ting this method, and affecting to refer to his consciousness,
to decide on sensible facts. Neither of these sciences
ought to borrow from, or concede any thing to the other :
it is high time that each should know his proper boundaries:
and if the physiologist or the naturalist will absolutely treat
on the moral character of man, they must abandon all inves-
tigations that depend on the senses, throw away their scalp-
els and microscopes, and like the philosophers, give them-
selves up to meditation in the absence of all outward im-
pressions, and become solely psychologists."

Thus spake the metaphysicians of the new school : and
the ideologists who w T ere enrolled under the banners of
Locke and Cordillac, by referring all our ideas to the im-
pressions made upon our senses, now found themselves em-
barrassed. They had not foreseen this important objec-
tion; and so soon as the psychologists advanced under
cover of consciousness, the existence of a mover indepen-
dent of all animal substance — while they protested that they

ii

[ 82 J

felt the existence and operation of this mover— that the}
saw it act freely and originally without any other relation to
the external senses than that of a master over his servants —
the ideologists were afraid to contradict it openly. But
when the psycologists came forward, and in the name of
their Sybill pronunced anathemas against all those who
doubted of these truths — when they expressed a contempt
for all those whose intellects were so gross as to refuse their
assent to the evidence of a principle superior in wisdom and
elevation to bodily senses composed of matter, vile, and sub-
ject even to putrefaction — the ideologists who had admitted
this simple principle without doubting but they could amal-
gamate it with their own theory, remained unable to reply ;
with one only exception.* We are now at this point; the
Ideologists are silent, or advance no refutation ; and the
physicians who cultivated physiology reclaim for them-
selves by halfway complaints, the science of intellect which
has been ravished from them, and appropriated to them-
selves by the psychologists, who had never condescended
to study the organs or the functions of the bodily system.
As it is solely on the evidence of consciousness that the
psychologists rely, I proceed to examine what they under-
stand by that word ; and whether it be possible to erect a
real science on this word alone as the basis of it.

Sec. 2. Of the notions entertained by the psychologists of
consciousnsss : are animals endowed ivith it ?

By consciousness they understand that faculty which man
possesses, of observing himself: not of observing external
bodies which he cannot do but by means of the senses ; but
of observing his thoughts ; that he thinks of this or that ;
that he wills or that he does not will ; or that he does or
does not will this or that. This is what I have denomina-
ted in my treatise on physiology by the expression to re-
flect upon one's self. This has no termination ; for in obser-
ving, I feel, I perceive, I am sensible that I observe ; and so
on. This kind of intercranial innervation, distinguishes us
among animals, and places us at the head of them, by the
perfection to which it can be carried in our species. We
cannot admit its existence in any living being unless he can
make us understand that he possesses it, either by his ac-
tions or his discourse. As the foetus, the embryo, the new

*I believe he alludes to Destut Tracy, the friend of Cabanis; the nu ■
thor of the Ideology. — Transl.

t 83. J

born iniant, and all the animals of a lower class, exhibit no
proof of possessing it — as they have no language, and there-
fore cannot say to us, " I feel that I feel ;" nor can they
understand us when we employ this formula — we therefore
do not hesitate to decide that they do not possess the facul-
ty which it expresses. In observing the infant and the pro-
gress of his growth, we seize upon that moment when he
deliberates between several impressions ; it is from that
moment we may conclude that he feels that he feels, and
that he has felt, that is to say, the phenomena of conscious-
ness then manifest themselves in him.

If on the other hand we apply our observation to many
other animals, we observe the same phenomena. In truth,
we see that animals do not confound themselves with any
other body in nature : they receive many impressions : they
hesitate before they act : and they act without any proof to
us that they are determined, except by some one of their
actual and present impressions. The case is the same when
they obey the impulse of a simple recollection ; that is, they
feel at present, that they have felt heretofore impressions
different from what they feel at the present moment by
means of their senses. For instance, a well-educated hunt-
ing dog, who formerly devoured the game, now brings it
without hesitation to his master ; he seems even to applaud
himself for not having given way to his appetite. Such is*
another dog, who although tempted by caresses, and by
food set before him, refuses to stay with the person tempt-
ing him, and returns to a great distance to rejoin his master
whom he has not seen for some days, &c. Such are wolves,
wild dogs, and animals of prey, who though pressed by
hunger, but foreseeing from the presence of the enemy that
there is not time to satisfy their hunger with security, hide
in some place the animal they have seized, after taking the
precaution of killing it, and then run to the defence of
themselves or their young. Such are also dogs and foxes
which hunt in company, one of which pursues the game,
while the other waits for it at its form, to which it never
fails to come back.

A cat weary of always having her young carried away,
determined to put them down in a granary. When the
young ones of this last deportation began to grow up, and
her milk did not suffice for their nourishment, she thought
of transporting them to the kitchen ; the door was shut :

L 84 j

she cried out to get it opened. The door being opened, slit
regained the stairs leading to the granary for the purpose of
finding her young, but they being wild had run away at the
noise of opening the kitchen door. This door was shut
against the cat, who called again, and had the door again
opened. The want of success in this first trial served her
for a lesson : she entered a few paces, carressed the cook,
and put herself in a posture to go out again and regain the
staircase, but turning round every now and then to excite
the curiosity of the woman and induce her to follow that she
might understand the cat's proceedings. The cat succeed-
ed. The cook surprised at this management, followed the
uneasy mother, and found upon the stairs of the granary,
the young ones who again took flight. The cook now com-
prehending the wishes of the old cat, left open the door of
the kitchen, and seemed to pay no attention to what was
going forward. The cat took advantage of the opportunity,
and by calling her kittens to her, introduced them at length
into the kitchen.

All these actions and a thousand others, which we could
add to them,* incontestably prove that animals whose or-
ganization approaches ours to a certain point, have the fac-
ulty of feeling that they feel or perceive, and that they have
felt or perceived different impressions ; and also they have
the faculty of induction, (or deducing conclusions from a
comparison of ideas. )

At length the infant gets hold of the instrument, lan-
guage : he gets at it by the gradual progress of cerebial
developement : he arrives at this point by leaving behind
him the mere animal life, at whose level he was a short time
ago : it is then he understands the meaning of I feel that I
feel, or that he pronounces it himself. It is thus that the
consciousness belonging to man, developed with the slow
and successive progress of the encephalon, finishes by pla-
cing men far above all other animals.

Having now settled the characters of this faculty, let us
see how the psychologists wish to use it as the base of a
particular science.

Sec. 3. If it be possible to make a science out of the
mere phenomena of consciousness ? Sources of error among
the psychologists in relation to it.

* The translator cpuld add fifty of his own knowledge, demonstrative
of thought and reasoning in animals. Transl.

[ 85 ]

They say we must listen to the language ol conscious-
ness ; and for that purpose, collect ourselves in silence and
obscurity, that no sense may be employed : we must ab-
stract ourselves from every body in nature, in short we
must listen to ourselves alone, and think. They affirm se-
riously that when we have been for a long time exercised
in this kind of reverie, we discover an immense perspective,
a new world, crowded with facts of the most admirable
kind, and connected by natural relations, of which the laws
may be discovered ; facts moreover, that have nothing in
common with those presented by the senses ; facts whose
assiduous contemplation, elevates the psychologist far above
his fellow men, without excepting the naturalists and the
physiologists, who are occupied about ideas furnished by
the senses.

Let us then examine what they can find in their con-
sciousness by proceeding in this mode of research. Inde-
pendent of the faculty of feeling that we feel, they find two
other sorts of things : but let us first speak of what is ori-
ginally established in consciousness, and is surely found
there.

The psychologists are sure to meet there, all the viscer-
al sensations that are in correspondence with the brain ;
not merely hunger, thirst, venereal desires, the sensations of
cold, heat, positive pain and pleasure, referred to some part
of the system, but they will have to remark a crowd of other
sensations vague, indeterminate, sometimes producing sad-
ness, sometimes joy, sometimes action, sometimes rest ;
hope at one time, at another despair even to dread of exist-
ence. They will find all these sensations and emotions
without any doubt in their minds concerning the source
from whence they proceed ; for the physiologists or rather
the physicians who have paid most attention to the pheno-
mena of visceral irritation, and the various degrees of insan-
ity and whom they never consult, can alone give them infor-
mation on this point. If they take all these internal sensa-
tions for revelations of the divinity, whom they call con-
sciousness, they may greatly increase their riches of this
description, by following the oriental custom of taking a
dose of opium combined with aromatics. They will then
find themselves like Mahomet, in connection with all that
is most extraordinary in the empyreal heavens. But let
us pass on to the second class of objects, which the psycho-^

t 86 J

Io»isl in Ins reverie cannot fail to discover in this conscious-
ness of his.

He will find the recollection of impressions made upon
his senses ; I do not say that he will see there, images, or
impressions, or ideas considered as entities, but I will say,
that while he is observing, he will perceive sensations* as-
sociated in such manner with bodies that have already im-
pressed the senses for the first time, that these sensations
cannot be renewed without compelling us to think of these
same bodies. Consciousness then, is populated ; first, with
materials produced internally, from the visceral nerves, and
the nervous apparatus of the brain itself. Secondly, with
materials produced by impressions made on the external
senses. Moreover, these materials are associated together,
mixed, confounded, identified in some manner or other ;
and they are so to such a degree as we have shown in our
physiology, that sensations proceeding from the visceral
nerves, forcibly recal the attention to certain trains of ideas,
the offspring of sensations furnished by the external senses ;
nor can these acquire some degree of intensity in conscious-
ness, without giving birth in their turn to visceral sensa-
tions.

Without this combination, man would have no motive to
action ; a circumstance which I shall be compelled to con-
sider by-and-bye : and this combination is the proper func-
tion of the encephalon considered in respect of innerva-
tion, sensitive and intellectual. It is by means of the
impressions made upon the external senses, that the in-
ternal sensations are of any value to the individual. Hun-
ger becomes a determinate sensation only by the pre-
sence of the recollection of some material object proper
to satisfy it : and this value is not the same when the stom-
ach is full as when it is empty : in its normal and its abnor-
mal state : it is reciprocally, by sensations perceived simul-
taneously in the viscera, that those of the senses acquire a
precise character : the sight of the other sex has not the
same value to an infant or a sick person, as it has to the full
grown man, in a state of health. One may say the same

* The French seem not sufficiently aware of Hartley's exposition of the
doctrine of association : including sensations with sensations, sensations
with ideas, sensations with muscular motions, voluntary and automatic ;
ideas with muscular motions ; and all these with desires and emotions ; ami
the very important and most extensive application of this theory to the
phenomena of intellect, instinct, health, and disease. Trans! .

i m ]

oiaii othoi" sensations : for those which do not relate to our
principal wants, as the sight of a triangle, may be connect-
ed with instinctive curiosity. What proves this, is, that
this sensation is of no value to a child, whose instinct of cu-
riosity is not yet developed, and whose brain is as yet im-
perfect ; just like a native idiot, whose brain has not grown
in that portion of it which is assigned to intellectual pheno-
mena : it signifies moreover, more or less to a grown man,
well organized, according as he has exercised more or less,
his faculty of observation, on that train of ideas which the
triangle can recall to memory. But what value does it not
acquire, in awakening that want of self satisfaction, which,
as we have explained in our physiology cannot be excited
to a certain degree of intensity, without developing sensa-
tions referable to the most important viscera ; to the same
viscera which are excited by hunger, by thirst, by the fear
of death, and all the phenomena of instinct ? In a word, let
us do what we will, in abandoning ourselves to meditation,
it is absolutely impossible not to awaken visceral sensations,
and that instinct should not be put in action in concert with
intelligence.

Hence the psychologist, in his reverie, will find nothing
in hisconciousnessbut mixed facts: it is wrongfully, there-
fore, that he pretends to build up with these facts, the edifice
of a particular science, which shall be independent of facts
observed by the senses : it will be impossible for him to
assert, after this inspection of the interior, a single fact which
will not require to be verified by the senses. This is what
we must now undertake to prove, and for that purpose, wo
shall occtipy his own ground.

He asserts, that his internal observation is something cer-
tain ; for there is nothing in the world more certain to him
than to feel that he does feel, and that he has felt. Very
well ; no doubt : we grant all that. It is certain that he
enjoys when he does enjoy, and that he suffers when he
does suffer ; and that he has a perception of the pleasure
and pain which he experiences. Nobody ever dreamt of
contesting with him this certainty, nor the reality upon which
it is founded ; but because it is certain that a psycologist
feels a body to be round and immovable, it does not follow
that the body really is so : it may be square, and seem round
while it is in motion, and if the senses did not interfere to
give the required certainty, the psycologist would remain

L 88 J

all his lite in error relative to the form of this bo<|y, and to
another circumstance very important respecting it. This
example may serve for all the cases of the same nature.
The pretended certainty of high and low, of the immobility
of the earth, and of a diurnal circle drawn around it by the
sun, were formerly facts of consciousness ; every body
believed that he felt within himself the certainty of these
pretended facts, and it has been by the aid of the senses that
their falsehood has been definitively demonstrated.

But the psycologist will say, " you speak of physical facts
of which the first motion came through the senses, but we
have excluded these from the domain of consciousness.
The questions about which we are occupied are those that
relate to the nature of the intelligent principle, the faculties
it possesses, and the morality of its actions. Upon all this,
our consciousness alone can throw light, and cannot deceive
us, while our senses teach us absolutely nothing."

To assure ourselves of this, we ask of the psycologists
what their consciousness reveals to them of every thing ?
Let us begin with the question of the intelligent principle.
We have already said that the ancient metaphysians attribu-
ted it to something independent of the nervous apparatus.
Consciousness has taught our modern psycologists nothing
more. The replies we have made to their predecessors we
may therefore make to them. I shall therefore not repeat
them. But I would ask of these gentlemen, so devoted to
the worship of consciousness, if they really believe that this
faculty is competent of itself and alone, to judge of the
nature of the intelligent principle without the aid of the

senses

At the first blush, it is manifest that we cannot without
absurdity suppose a man well organized, arrived at that
point when he is able to reflect upon himself without having
arrived there through the aid of the senses. What proves
that we cannot make this supposition, is, that those unfortu-
nate persons who are born without sight and hearing, arc
necessarily ideots. In the second place, all men who have
offered opinions on the principle of intelligence, are philo-
sophers who, for a long time before-hand, have exercised
their senses by observation of external objects, and have
been long familiarized with the instruments of language. It
is not, therefore, consciousness alone which speaks through
these men. Noris it consciousness alone that speaks through

L ^ }

the osteologists of our day. Their intelligence works upon
a mass of ideas acquired by the senses. Could any one
doubt this, it would be sufficient to recur to the comparison
which they make of a man directing the operations of some
machine. They never would have had this idea, if then-
senses had not shewn them a man actually at work with a
machine ; nor would they have had the means of proposing
this comparison, if they did not possess the signs of language
acquired only through the senses.

They pretend that they do not mean to suppose a man liv-
ing in the human brain, but something that acts on the human
organs, as a man acts on a machine. To this we answer for
the thousandth time, that their notion of this something, is
not derived from their abstracted meditation on conscious-
ness, but suggested by the scenes of nature that have im-
pressed their senses ; and we defy them to find a single
idea in their psycology which is not copied from some object
or scene in nature. So true is this, that they have not a
single expression which they can apply to their subject
which is not metaphorical, which does not mark all their
conceptions of their science by words that have been inven-
ted to designate natural bodies and their properties, or the
circumstances under which they have been offered to human
observation.

They explain themselves on their principle, by saying
that they mean to designate the unknown cause of intelli-
gence. If they mean only to designate it as unknown, why do
they use for this purpose, words and expressions appropria-
ted to things known ? If they do not know how it differs
from the nervous system, what right have they to assert that
it cannot be the nervous system ? If they can venture to
say of it, that it is not nervous matter — that it is not any
species of composition — that it is something simple — surely
they must have some idea of it. They ascribe to it positive
qualities and negative qualities, and they say they do not
understand it ; or if they choose to describe it, they use for
that purpose an expression drawn from the exercise of the
senses. This expression is deduced from the idea of a man,
and is in truth the greatest honor they can do their principle,
and the least bad ol the arguments they advance in its favor;
for we have in fact ideas of a man directing a machine. But
when they compare it to an ether, we do not see how a gas.
which is a mere inert body, never exhibiting any signs of
I?

[ ao J

intelligence, can perform intellectual operations, or without
performing them itself, can make the nervous system per-
form them. When they insist that their principle is some-
thing necessarily simple, they think they have advanced an
unanswerable argument. Where have they obtained the
notion of a simple thing, compared with something of many
parts, if not by observing natural bodies ? But what idea
can we have of something simple which is not a body, which
nevertheless is so connected with the molecules of nervous
substance, as to produce the phenomena of intelligence ? If
the psycologists had that idea, they ought also to have some
word, some form of expression to transmit it intelligibly to
others. What have they beyond their words or signs of
some material body, to designate that which is not a body ?
What they really have of internal sensation, when they
think strongly upon it, is some desire, some regret, a kind
of anger because they cannot express themselves without
using signs appropriated to bodies, and cannot avoid employ-
ing them, notwithstanding the strangeness of their style.
It is the confused perceptions of all these sensations that
they take as a proof of the existence of their incorporeal
intelligent principle, made known by some a priori revela-
tion. These men live in a constant effort of expression
which, in their discourses, does but substitute one metaphor
to another, and depraves their language, if it have no worse
effect upon their intellect. In truth, their sensations on
this subject are but irritations on the viscera, analogous to
those which govern our instincts. The brain excites them ;
the other viscera return them, and again receive them from
the brain ; and the health of the splanchnic apparatus is not
the better for all this.

It is now our business to ascertain if similar perceptions
which have desire for their basis, prove any thing in the
present question.

I lay it down as a principle, that one desire can prove no
more than another in its kind. If any one possesses the
means of disproving this assertion, let him do so. In mean
time, I shall argue on this assumption. Almost every body
desires riches and power : wise men require a tranquil,
independent life. No one can deduce from these desires,
that those who experience them ought some day or other
to have them gratified. All we know is, that the thing is
possible, because our senses have shewn it : but we do not

I 91 J

know this much of other desires whose gratification have
never been an object of our senses. Many persons, for
instance, would desire to preserve eternally their youth and
vigor; the naturalist, the philosopher, the astronomer, would
desire to know the first mover of all the phenomena which
they study ; almost all men would be glad to know the be-
ginning and the end of bodies, of extension, of space, &c.
Man lives continually in the midst of desires ; but does it
follow that he has the right to have all this knowledge im-
parted to him ? Alas ! an impenetrable veil hides forever
all these mysteries from our eyes, and we have no good rea-
son for pretending to explain one more than another. What
right then has the psycologist to conclude from his desire
of knowing the first cause of the intellectual faculties, that in
fact he ought to know them ? or from his desire of preserv-
ing these faculties when his brain shall be decomposed, that
he has a right to preserve them ? A wise man, reflecting
on the manner of his acquiring his knowledge, soon finds
out that his organization does not permit him to become
acquainted with the cause of his organization. He places this
knowledge among first causes inaccessible to human enquiry,
or if you will, in the sole and general first cause. He sub-
mits, therefore — he represses the desire he entertained at
first, and applies his faculties to the acquisition of useful,
applicable knowledge. From that moment he becomes
exempt from the internal sensations that pester the psycolo-
gist, who complains, no doubt very sincerely, that he ex-
hausts his superfluous efforts to create a language which
may give some notion of his insatiable desires.

Certainly the psycologist affords great room for censure
in placing in the same rank consciousness and the senses ;
and in making them to be presided over by an intelligent
principle, presumed to be simple, from I know not what
comparison with material objects. The only thing certain,
as to internal perceptions, is, that he who experiences them,
experiences them effectually. I have just proved, that
Avhen the consciousness of the psycologist wishes to judge
of itself, it models itself on the bodies which the senses
have introduced to its acquaintance, nor can it abstract its
first cause unless by a similar process. We have now, there-
fore, every reason to believe that it is not capable of judg-
ing of itself from its own resources alone. If it be true, that
in this operation it has stood in need of the senses, it cannot

[ 92 |

be independent of the senses; but above all, it does not
alone furnish to the principle of intelligence ; (which, out
of compliment to the psycologists, I shall personify for a mo-
ment,) it cannot alone furnish, I repeat, facts equally certain
with those furnished by the senses. The senses may un-
doubtedly mislead us as well as consciousness ; still they
alone are able to furnish just ideas of bodies ; but conscious-
ness cannot furnish any other incontestable fact — any fact,
whatever, not resting on the evidence of the senses, except-
ing internal sensation. In other terms, I can affirm that I feel,
that I feel myself feeling and wishing — that I have felt myself
feeling and wishing ; but I can conclude nothing from thence,
on the reality of those things which have been the objects of
my feeling and wishing, unless I have recourse to the senses ;
because it is very possible that I may have been deceived
on the existence or the nature of these objects. I have fur-
nished the proof of this already, by marking and specifying
the mistakes of the ancient physicians. These proofs are
also so abundant in every other branch of knowledge, that
any one can find them without trouble.

Sec. 4. Of the necessity of the senses and consciousness
concurring to perfect the science of the sentient, thinking
man.

The testimony of consciousness then, is not of equal val-
ue with that of the senses. The science drawn from con-
sciousness consists in the following assertion : / am endow-
ed with the faculty of feeling that I feel. Here it ends. If
you would erect a science on such a basis, you must go fur-
ther and interrogate incessantly the senses for facts to be
added to this assertion. If the psychologists presume they
can succeed in any other way, they deceive themselves ; if
they neglect this method they will equally go astray. I
shall furnish them with another proof which may enable
them to understand how dangerous it is to refer always and
solely to internal feeling, or to believe that because any
thing is desired, to be of a certain kind or description, no
pains need be taken to ascertain whether it might not be
something different.

"Man," say the psychologists "feels within himself
something different from his limbs, his flesh, his senses : it
is an internal sentiment that raises him far above all other
animals : man alone submits the whole universe to his ex-
amination : he alone studies and classes bodies and their

L 93 j

properties : he alone proceeds by induction from effects to
causes : he alone raises himself to the contemplation of a
supreme being. But, say they, it is not possible that the
principle which gives these faculties, can be the same with
that which presides over animals. This principle has some-
thing which partakes of the nature of the first cause. As
it rules over the body, it cannot be confounded with the
body ; it must be therefore of a nature superior to the bodi-
ly nervous system ; nor can we conceive it to be decompo-
sed and destroyed, together with that system. All that we
now say, (they add,) we have not learned from the exter-
nal senses. It is our internal sense that inspires us with
these ideas ; nor can we help considering them as reali-
ties."

They can be thus answered. " That you have these
ideas, that you consider them as expressing real things, is
what we cannot pretend to controvert, because this is the
reality of your psychology : but that we ought to have the
same ideas, is what you will never be able to demonstrate ;
and still less, that they represent something real ; and this
it is, that prevents our agreeing with you. You say that
man feels internally all that you have stated. We answer,
yes. The adult man, awake, healthy, having long exerci-
sed his senses, may feel all that : but the embryo, the foe-
tus, the infant, the human being, who is at once blind and
deaf, does not : nor does a man, born an idiot, through de-
fect of developement of the anterior part of the brain, feel
any thing of the kind. Prove to us, that these two last ex-
amples of humanity do not form part of the human species :
if you cannot do this, if you cannot show us, that the hu-
man nature of an embryo, of a blind and deaf man, of an idiot
from birth, is not the same as that of a man of thirty years
of age, well formed and healthy, if you cannot find between
these, any difference but in the developement of their or-
gans, we shall conclude, according to the evidence of our
senses, that the principle of these ideas which you have
stated, does not exist always and among all men, but only
among men placed in certain circumstances. We may go
farther : we will take any of your human beings who pos-
sess these ideas ; and by consequence, the principle that
produces them ; we will follow him in his first sleep ; in
apoplexy ; in asphyxy ; if he should have the misfortune of
falling into it : and after having interrogated him in these

[ 94 J

different circumstances, our conclusion will be, that some-
times he has, and sometimes he has not this principle."
" Oh ! but you say, he has it always, but it is not always in
action ; we shall reply to this by-and-bye ; in the mean
time, come with us to the lunatic hospital ; and there you
may see twenty patients in a state of idiocy, who have had
your principle, and will never have it again. Tell us then,
if you please, if it be still there, in what corner is it hidden,
or how can its activity rest without occupation ?"

Here then is the proof that the psychologists cannot de-
monstrate the continued existence of a principle different
from nervous matter. They are compelled in order to es-
cape this difficulty, to allege that their principle standing
in need of the organs of the body, cannot appear unless
when these organs are in a situation to obey it ; an asser-
tion perfectly gratuitous, and equally absurd ; because it
contains a manifest contradiction : you make use of the ac-
tual existence of the intellectual phenomena, to prove that
the principle, which is not nervous matter, is present to
produce them ; and you make use of the non-existence of
these same phenomena, to prove that it is still there, in the
same place : from its having appeared you conclude it can-
not disappear ; your reason for this is, that you have admit-
ted its presence ; and although we hear you declare that
you do not understand the intimate nature of this principle,
you assume that it is such that it cannot ever quit the brain
while this lives ; even when years may pass without any
marks of its presence (as in the insanity of ideocy) and
death may ensue without the patient having recovered his
reason. You venture still further ; for after deducing your
principle from the intellectual functions of the highest order,
you boldly confer it on the embryo, who does not yet pos-
sess these functions, who has as yet no brain, who consists
of nothing but a mass of vessels and fluids in which the or-
gans are not marked. Have you well reflected on this mass
of hypotheses, each more singular, more chimerical than
the other ?

How comes it that you have thus lost yourself in this laby-
rinth of suppositions ? It is because you have given credit to
this internal sentiment, which says, (if we can trust your
representations) that it is simple, that it is independent of
your organs, that it is not of the same nature with that
which presides over animals, that it has always existed, and

L a* J

will always exibt. What right has this principle to athrni to
you all these things, while alone and without the aid of the
senses, it cannot give you one idea, of the beginning, or the
end, or the interruption of action of the organ by which it
makes itself manifest ? Does your internal sentiment teach
you that you were once an embryo, an infant, and that some
day or other you will die ? If you believed nobody but this
principle, would you not believe that your organs were im-
mortal ? Whence have you taken the notion of this per-
manence without organs of which it speaks as you tell us, if
it be not in the successive impressions of the bodies which
act upon the senses ? Who told you there were animals ex-
isting with some analogies to yourselves, but the senses ?
Whence comes it then that to satisfy your desire of being of
some other nature than the rest of the universe, you believe
your senses, when they tell you that every living body dies,
without the possibility of recovering the phenomena of then-
nervous functions, while you refuse credit to the testimony
of the same senses, when they shew you clear as the day,
that your intellectual phenomena, are also the results of the
action of perishable nervous matter ? How comes it that to
affirm the contrary, to maintain that you can think without
nerves and without brain, you refer to an internal sentiment,
incompetent to judge of space, of time, of matter, or of any
of the substances formed of it ? Above all, how happens it
that the most strange conclusion is every moment advanced,
that although sight proceeds from the eye, hearing from the
ear, and touch from the nervous extremities of the skin,
yet thought proceeds not from the brain ? Is not the evi-
dence the same ? You admit the office of the senses in the
production of ideas which represent the bodies, because you
say you feel the senses act ; yet you deny that reflection is
an operation of the brain, because you cannot see your brain
in action ! Be uniform in your conclusions. Since it is by
your senses that you verify the evidence of your conscious-
ness which tells you that the idea of colour proceeds from
the sense of sight, verify in like manner the pretended evi-
dence of the same faculty, when it seems to tell you that it
is not your brain that thinks or reflects. You do not refer
yourself to your body for the functions of the eye. You
have ascertained them in other persons as well as yourself
by proofs negative, and positive. You have thus convinced
yourself that those who have lost their eyes become blind

L »« J

and lose the sense of colours ; observe other persons there
fore on the question of thinking, and you will soon become
convinced that thought is developed, is altered, impaired,
and destroyed, in proportion as the brain is ; that he who
loses his head, loses the power of thinking, as he who loses
his eye loses the perception of colours.

Were it true, as you repeat incessantly, that you confine
yourselves to the evidence of consciousness in judging of
your sensitive and active faculties, you may object to us,
that we wander from the question : but we have proved to
you that you do not so confine yourselves; that you never
cease to work upon the impressions proceeding from the
senses ; even when the question is concerning the nature
and duration of the principle of your intellectual phenome-
na. Upon what then is founded your psychology ? upon a
false operation of your understanding, upon whose mechan-
ism you have not reflected. You generalise the fact of
thought and of reflection, which you have observed in its
highest degree of perfection in some grown up man, heal-
thy, possessing ail his senses, having exercised them con-
jointly with his understanding during forty or fifty years,
and master also of a perfect language ; you make this fact
an attribute of every man, and you make it also something
independent of the nervous system. Not being able to dis-
cover this attribute in the innumerable cases of exception
which we have so often cited ; you are reduced to supposi-
tions, to sustain its existence in a substance with which it is
agreed it can have no contact; and to explain the frequent
absence of its actual manifestation. Recurring to your sen-
ses, which you unfairly call in as witnesses, to furnish you
with comparisons relating to an object, to which according
to yourselves they cannot be applied, you affirm without
hesitation, that when this attribute does not appear, it is like
<i star obscured by a cloud ; or like a musician placed in an
organ dismounted, and which he can no longer put in opera-
tion ; or like a master whose servants refuse to obey him ;
or like a skilful and active workman, who remains for years
together with his arms folded, in the midst of rough mate-
rials, waiting until they have been prepared for him ; then
working with them for some time, and again resting for a
much longer time ; waiting idly in the midst of an animated
machine, till its destruction shall be complete.

If you ore resolved to sustain the existence of your prin

[ 07 J

cipie, say at once that you feel it : assert it on your own
authority. Those who feel it as you do, will iepeat your
assertions ; do not undertake to prove its existence to those
who do not feel it ; for you cannot get on with them without
reasoning to the phenomena of the senses, and exposing
yourselves to refutation. For the same reason, do not pre-
tend to make a regular science of the facts of consciousness :
they arc neither numerous enough, nor sufficiently connected
with social life, to enable you to succeed. Keep your hypoth-
esis then of an intelligent principle that has nothing to do with
nervous matter, as the secret mover of your own actions.
Such an hypothesis may be useful to certain kinds of intellect.

The psychologists hold in great estimation the faculty of
induction (drawing conclusions from a comparison of facts)
in favour of a principle (not partaking of a nervous nature)
which holds the government of the brain ; but they never
introduce it except to explain intellectual action^

If we believe them, to deduce from sensible phenomenon
the conclusion that it must have a cause ; that it exists for
some purpose ; that some principle of intelligence directs
it; and that it implies some change taken place in the body
wherein it is manifested ; is to have ideas a priori, of some
cause not nervous which moves the nerves, some Cause in
connection with the first cause ; while our senses can give
no information either of the cause, the intent, the promotor
of the phenomena, nor the change which constitutes them.
It is thus, say they, that from one of the phenomena of a
function we deduce all the rest ; and although we cannot
establish them by means of the senses, we are persuaded
they exist, and we make experiments to discover them*

When I read these psychological arguments, I know not
where I am : I seem to' be among men differently organized
from myself; for if I enter into my own feelings and inter-
rogate my consciousness as to the value of this deduction, I
find I can employ it indeed, but as one of the strongest proofs
that our ideas come from our senses only. In fact all in-
ductions are only comparisons. It is because from his most
early years, man is accustomed to see causes produce ef-
fects; it is because he himself becomes in various instances
a cause of effects ; because he is continually led to become
so ; because he feels pleasure in seeing himself obeyed ; in
seein^ inanimate objects yield to his efforts as well as those
(hat are animated ; it is because he alwavs has some inten-
13

L 98 ]

tion, some proposed end in view, when he performs these
acts, of which his fellow men give him perpetually exam-
ples; it is because he sees that he produces changes in the
bodies submitted to his action; in a word, because the in-
tentional modification of every thing that surrounds him, is
almost the whole of his education during life, and he carries
of necessity this modification into all the phenomena of na-
ture — it is from these known circumstances that the induc-
tion is drawn. He is convinced (they tell us) although he
has not seen the causes, nor received the confidence of au-
thors, nor explained the secrets of these transformations.
No doubt : the more ignorant a man is, the more credu-
lous he is ; and having received an education embracing
causality and intention, he is necessarily carried on to judge
of what he does not know, by what he does know : he no
longer loves to doubt ; rather than stop there, he seizes the
first glimpse of probability that strikes him, and becomes as
thoroughly convinced, as if he had verified his belief by the
aid of all his senses. This is his method of proceeding ; it
answers his purpose in intellectual operations on common
things. He does not like therefore to abandon it ; and a
long and laborious education becomes necessary before he
can acquire the courage to doubt, although his credulity
has a thousand times over led him estray. One might com-
pose volumes consisting of the simple enumeration of w«cll
known errors in the sciences depending on facts, which
have been owing to hasty conclusions, and which subse-
quent discoveries have rectified. But without going to
ages past, it suffices to look around us, to collect by thou-
sands, examples of prejudices more or less absurd, in reli-
gion, in politics, in medicine, &c. brought forth by the ope-
ration of induction, or deducing conclusions; that ever ac-
tive unrestrainable propensity which carries man to judgo
of what he does not know, by what he thinks he knows.
This is the chief source of his mistakes. As he can guess at
nothing to any good purpose, he must depend on chance
setting before him facts, before he can escape from errors of
false analogies. Hence his education really depends on
his senses. Oi this, our psychologists furnish an example
worth all the rest. They are so much in the habit of trans-
ferring the known to the unknown, that in place of frankly
acknowledging their ignorance of the nature of intellectual
phenomena, they place a machinist (not nervous) in the

L 99 J

bruin of the human species only, at the risk of being com-
pelled to argue rashly, inconsequently, and ignorantly upon
the object of their investigations, 1st in comparing the living
and active nerves to a machine passive a nd inert ; 2dly in
being able to give no description of this machinist who in-
habits the brain, but what their senses have furnished them
with from the man himself; 3dly in attributing to the nervous
system of animals, exactly the same phenomena that they
attribute in man to some incorporeal intelligence ; as sensa-
tion, memory, volition. These are, I should presume, in-
stances sufficient of those precipitate judgements which the
habitude we have spoken of betray men into.

A great deal more is wanting than some a priori notions,
to indicate beforehand to the physiologists, the end they
ought to pursue, and the experiments they ought to set on
foot to arrive at the full discovery of a function, which is not
yet known but by some of its phenomena. Every physio-
logist is an anatomist ; he examines the organs of the body ;
he sees them act ; having learnt by the exercise of his senses
the action of the first that he examines, he discovers the
mode of action in others; where he does not clearly distin-
guish their uses, he conjectures by analogy enough to lead
him to those experiments of putting them in action, which
may teach what functions they really perform. Have they
not from infancy, data furnished by their senses as to the
use of all the external parts of the body ? How then when
they come to the internal, can they avoid applying the same
rules of judging as to the organs that are concealed ? If they
have not this analogy, they have others : Harvey was led
to suspect the circulation of the blood from remarking the
direction of the valves in the veins. Others had already
drawn the same conclusion from the same fact. But what
does this signify ? The first who made this deduction found
the elements of his theory in nature ; in the shrubs and
branches of trees, in hydraulic machines, &c. There was
no need of any a priori inspiration to conclude that the
valves were destined to prevent the blood from flowing
back, and that as it had clearly passed through these valves
and was again found behind them, it could not arrive there
but by a circular course. This conclusion and the facts and
experiments that suggested it, are not extraordinary, but
the lateness of the period at which observers arrived at
them, is truly so.

L 10 ° J

Let the psychologists shew us one man deprived of his
senses from the moment of birth, or possessed of his senses
but with a very diminutive forehead, and who was able to
deduce these truths : this would be an experiment directly
in point to which we could not avoid giving credit. But so
long as we are able to find in the phenomena observed by
the senses, the models of the phenomena discovered by in-
duction, we shall never be able to find any good reason for
attributing this discovery to consciousness.

Sec. 5. Comparison of the hypothesis of the psychologists,
with the opinion of the physiologists on the appreciable cause
of intellectual phenomena.

Chagrined at being unable to support their non-nervous
principle, otherwise than by hypothesis, some psychologists
have tried to console themselves by maintaining that the
opposite opinion which refers the phenomena of intelligence
to the nervous apparatus, is itself no more than an hypothe-
sis. To maintain this position, they reason as follows :

They distinguish in the phenomena of life, 1st The facts
which are independent of the intelligent and voluntary
principle, and of sensibility. Sdly The facts wherein this prin-
ciple intervenes.

The facts that take place independent of this principle,
are the two great internal classes of nutrition and reproduc-
tion. The facts that depend on this principle, constitute the
third great function of life, that of relation (forming our
relation to and connection with external objects).

According to them, it is one and the same principle which
feels in the phenomena of sensation ; which knows in the
phenomena of perception of external objects ; and which
wills in all cases of voluntary action. Sensation, idea, vo-
lition, are then the integrant elements of all the phenome-
na of relation. These are facts of consciousness which fall
not within the jurisdiction of the senses, are not the objects
of sensible observation, and consequently cannot be learnt,
but must reveal themselves anteriority to all investigation,
to which indeed they are the only motive.

I consider this as the strongest argument which the psy-
chologists have employed to deprive the nervous system of
the phenomena of relation, and to place them under the gui-
dance of a principle, whereof they agree that we can form
no idea : that is to say, to demolish without hope of recon-
structing. I attack this argument with the aids furnished
by common sense.

I 101 J

Nutrition is never independent of the phenomena ol rela-
tion except in the foetus. It is so in that instance, because
nutrition is a consequence of the small portion of the liquid
fecundated. The first nutrition is nothing but the play of
molecular affinities. To this is added, the mechanical im-
pulse given to the blood by the vitality of the heart of the
foetus, and that of the placenta and umbilical vessels. The
means of relation to the external objects commences at
birth, when the brain by means of the external senses per-
ceives the impression of the air, and the breast of the mo-
ther ; but this relation unaccompanied by intelligence, is
but instinctive. By and by, the brain being grown and de-
veloped in company with the organs of sense and the mns-
cles, that is to say, with the instruments of the new func-
tions which it is called upon to perform, the interior phe-
nomena of intelligence, and the acts that mark it, become
the first instruments of nutrition : this is demonstrated, in-
asmuch as the human being existing in a state of complete
imbecility would die of hunger, if the intelligence of some
other human being did not provide for his nutrition. Let
now the psychologists tell us if they can, whether between
the embryo or the infant of a day old, and the man of thirty
years, any other differences can be pointed out in respect
of nutrition, than those which I have stated : and if they
are determined to introduce their non-nervous principle, let
them tell us at what precise epoch it makes its first appear-
ance.

The phenomena of relation, moreover, (connection with
external objects,) are still more essential to the reproduc-
tive function ; for the senses (which I presume are the prin-
ciple means of relation ) are the only means of discovering
the difference of sex, and the only means which can furnish
to the male and female the requisite inclination to inter-
course.

If the psycologists separate from nutrition and reproduc-
tion, every thing that intelligence has to do with these func-
tions, they would not be the functions of vertebrous animals,
but of zoophytes, where nutrition is no more than molecular
affinity, and reproduction an accidental section or separation
of a part. If they pretend to understand by the words nu-
trition and reproduction, nothing but the phenomena of con-
tractility, circulation, absorption, affinities, and changes of
form of animal matter, they will not include instinctive phe-

i 102 J

nomeua. If they are determined to introduce them, I shall
prove to them by referring to what 1 have said on the educa-
tion of "the infant, that intelligence is nothing but instinct
brought to its perfection under certain relations, by the de-
velopement of the encephalon in certain directions easy to be
designated.

Having thus marked the duty of the principle which feels
and which wills in the internal functions, let us examine the
same principle in its external, or functions of relation. Sen-
sation, idea, volition, are, say they, facts of consciousness
which the senses cannot take cognizance of. Let us distin-
guish. Is the question concerning ourselves, or concerning
others ? If the latter, assuredly we have no method of dis-
covering these faculties, but by our senses. Does it relate
to ourselves ? Undoubtedly when we feel, or think, or will,
we do not see ourselves do this. But without the senses,
what can we make of this fact ? What can a man say —
what can he do with this internal sensation of his own, if he
does not compare it with that of other men, of whom he can
have no idea but by means of his senses ? Still more : With
these internal perceptions alone, would he possess any ideas
of any things ? Would he have volition ? Let the deaf and
blind by birth, answer this. Man possesses no intellectual
faculties, but because his internal sensations connect them-
selves with some external object, or some part of his own
body perceptible to his senses, as their determining causes;
to speak of their combined faculties of feeling, of possessing
ideas, and of willing, as of a simple fact, purely internal, is
to speak of what does not exist. Independent of the percep-
tions that have their source in the senses, nothing remains
but a confused feeling of existence. What do I say ? No :
not even that ; for the blind and deaf, are observed to have
a feeling in the skin, which is to them an external one.
They can at least compare the sensations thence arising
with those which the food they take furnishes, and perhaps
the genital sense ; and certainly with that which is furnished
them by the movement of their limbs.*

* Nobody can draw any acknowledgment from these unhappy sub-
jects, of what they feel internally. They are to us like the embryo, or
the molluscar animals. Such is the consequence of the imperfection of
the senses. The imperfection of the anterior part of the brain is nearly
the same. A short time ago, a young girl of twenty years of age was
presentcd'to [different scientific bodies at Paris, who possessed scarcely
ftny forehead,* and no more intellect than a child of six months old, altho'

t 103 J

To aflirin, therefore, that the internal sensation oi' exist-
ence, the idea of external objects, the volition to approach
them, or take hold of them, are in man, phenomena anterior
to all perception arising from the senses, is to affirm what
is not true. For the fact is, that we cannot observe our-
selves without observing at the same time bodies that are
not ourselves: it is astonishing, that in the 19th century
it is necessary to assert over again a truth so ancient. It
follows then, that the notion of an internal perception, of an
idea, of volition, are the results of observation made by the
senses in those who possess senses, and cannot be acquired
by those who have not yet acquired them, without the aid of
sensible observation ; an assertion directly contrary to that
of the psychologists. We may say then, in contradiction to
these authors, that the faculties in question are formed, and
take up their abode in man by the simultaneous exercise of
the brain and the senses : they do not exist, therefore,
anteriorly to sensible observation, are not self-existent, and
have no existence a priori.

Sec. 6. What the objections of the psychologists really
amount to on final analysis. Solution of the foregoing
question.

Although we have proved to the psychologists that the
idea of consciousness itself is derived from the senses, and
therefore we cannot consent to allow it the privilege of
placing itself precedently to all perception, many of them
may yet remain unconvinced. Personal identity, le moi,
myself, takes precedence of all, say they ; for it is the sole
motive of the researches we make to come at the knowledge
of it ; for to speak definitively, if we have never had percep-
tion, we should never have thought of investigating hoir
p>erception arises.

Recollect, gentlemen, the replies already made. I have
proved, I trust, that ideas and volition always imply sensi-
tive perceptions ;* I have shewn that mere internal percep-
tion, of itself, and without sensitive perception, amounts to a
mere fact of sensation which you can do nothing with, and
which renders no service, to your system. Why then do
you persist in deducing from the observation made by myself*

*he had her external senses well developed. It is not enough, therefore.
bo have senses ; there must be a brain proper to make use of the per-
ceptions furnished by the senses.
* Perceptions originating by impressions on the senses. — TransL

[ 104 J 9

on myself, the existence of this same myself anterior to alt
sensitive observation ? There is a play of words in this
case that deceives you ; some ontological enigma which it
may be worth while to unriddle. Does not your obstinacy
depend on your personification of le moi, myself? I think
I have hit the mark. You say to yourselves, " no man ob -
serves unless he be furnished with all the means and appa-
ratus of observation : le moi, the myself which is within a
man, ought to be presumed in that situation." Stop, gentle-
men, take care that your moi (myself) does not come forth
suddenly, a Minerva armed cap a pie : remember what has
just been proved, that the word moi, myself, cannot desig-
nate any thing but a phenomenon which shews itself under
certain given conditions, consisting in — 1st, The existence
of a perfect brain, well grown, and of adult age. 2dly In
the fact of certain stimulations, at first internal, subsequently
external, transmitted to the brain. It is only under these
conditions that le moi, myself, exists at all ; nor can any
myself be compared but with itself. Cease then to judge
of it by false comparisons, and adopt a different idea con-
cerning it.

Your obstinacy may have another source. Teased on the
one hand by the testimony of your senses, which teaches
you that myself disappears so soon as the head is severed
from the body, and compels you to acknowledge that this
myself depends upon the brain ; wearied on the other hand
by useless endeavors to explain how the brain can be the
Seat of this myself, without the latter resolving itself into a
phenomenon of cerebral action — you become resolved to
apply to consciousness for some information respecting the
nature of this myself, that is to say of consciousness ; for how
differs consciousness from le moi, myself? Consciousness,
which has no idea whatever of duration, destruction, repro-
duction, talks to you in its own language. It is nothing but
a sensation inseparable from existence. It answers you,
that myself is an existence independent of all accident. But
this is a contradiction to your senses, and you find yourselves
unable to explain this moi, myself. The doctrine of sensa-
tions is old. Some philosophers of the north, who never
understood it, have discredited it in your eyes, to establish
consciousness on its ruins. This consciousness is of late
date in the history of philosophy ; but it is in fashion : it
inspires you with a sentiment of pride which is dear to you,

[.105 J

and which the senses would deprive you ol", by destroying
the illusions of your internal sensation. All this induces
you to decide, and you determine to say, " since our con-
science refuses to believe that she depends on the brain" —
since the senses, which seem to affirm the contrary, cannot
explain it, we conclude " that itcannot be so, and that it pre-
cedes the brain."

So then you choose to deny a fact because you cannot
explain it ! Think a little where this will carry you. 1 do
not wish to dwell on the consequences that would result.

I use another argument. Having proved that we observe
by means of a brain connected with the senses, and that the
only difficulty is how this is possible, 1 reduce your objec-
tion to this possibility ; and I say, "if we had not the power
of observing ourselves, if to do so were impossible, we should
never seek to do so." This expresses a common truth,
equally applicable to the observation we make by means of
the senses. Thus, " if the faculty of observing others and
ourselves was not formed in us by the developement of our
brain and the exercise of our senses, we should not seek to
observe either ourselves, or any other object in nature."
That is to say, " we observe because we are able to ob-
serve,"

You see your objection is not single : but as the difficul-
ty consists in the impossibility of explaining how and why
the faculty of observation is placed in the nervous substance
of the encephalon, it is no concession made by the natural-
ists, physiologists, and anatomists to your doctrine, that they
acknowledge the existence of facts that the senses cannot
explain, or that they know no more than I do, how and why
man possesses feelings, ideas, and volitions. You are kind
enough to pity this ignorance, and you add " we will teach
you all this. The reason is, that for the production of these
phenomena, and the execution of these functions, man pos-
seses something within, that differs from his own nervous
substance and from that of all other animals, and from every
thing which is the object of sense in the universe. Some-
thing in fact, of which no one can form any other idea, than
that it does not resemble any thing whatever of. which we
are able to form an idea."

We have then at length reached the final question after
so many impediments. The psychologists say, that they
have perceptions, ideas, and volitions, precisely because
U

i I0(i j

they possess lor that purpose something that no other ani-
mal possesses, who like man, has also perceptions, ideas, and
volitions. Then their perceptions, ideas, and volitions,
must be of a different nature from those of other animals.
We have noticed already the recollection and the volition
of the dog, the wolf, the fox, the cat ; we have seen that
they are exhibited in opposition to sensitive impressions,
this implies something within, some internal perception,
consciousness. On the other hand, we have exhibited man,
of imperfect age, and imperfect organization, possessing nei-
ther perception, or volition, and of course ideas neither so
distinct or complete, as we see them in animals. If this
does not depend on the perfection or nonperfection of the
nervous apparatus of these living animals, will these gentle-
men be good enough to inform us on what it does depend ?
Is there not contradiction in ascribing the very same phe-
nomena to nervous substance in animals, and to something
very different in men ? In pretending that the chief source
of motion in animals is the nervous apparatus, which in man
is only an inferior and secondary instrument ? Let us act
honestly. Is there any good reason for assigning to man a
principle which animals do not possess ? There can be no
reason for it, unless man possess intellectual faculties which
other animals do not : for it is not to be denied that the or-
gans which put these faculties in operation, are the same in
men and in other animals, excepting that the organs of man
being more complicated and more perfect, are able to exe-
cute intellectual operations, which those of other animals
cannot. This may be wonderful. But when the animal ex-
ecutes intellectual operations which the human being is not
equal to — as when we compare a full grown well educated
dog to a new born infant, where is the proof of any princi-
ple existing except nervous matter ? Let the psychologists
choose their side. They must place this principle some-
where ; they cannot put it on the road, travelling toward its
destination, nor can they conceal it in the brain and leave
it there in perfect idleness, as they used to do formerly be-
fore they fabricated hypotheses.

On the other hand, the physiologists advance no hypoth-
esis, when setting out from certain known, and acknow-
ledged facts, namely, that sensation, thought, volition, are
developed with and in proportion as the cerebral substance
is developed : diminished and augmented as that substance

L nw 3

is so; disappearing forever when the brain disappear
and shewing themselves connected with the brain as an ef-
fect is with its cause, in every possible case where an animal
possessing a nervous apparatus can be observed — they ad-
vance I say, nothing like hypothesis or supposition, when
they conclude that these faculties are nothing else than the
results of the operations and functions of the brain and ner-
vous system.

It is true, the physiologists have taken the facts from
which they reason from the evidence of their senses, but
they have deduced from these facts no forced, no contradic-
tory conclusions ; while the psychologists who have also
pushed their opposite arguments into the perceptions of
sense, as I have superabundantly shewn, have drawn con-
clusions which no rules of sound logic can justify. This it
will be well to shew them definitely. For this purpose, I
shall concentrate their arguments, which are exactly such
as they employ to prove, that to attribute thought to a ner-
vous apparatus, is an hypothesis far less probable than that
which attributes it to a principle in man, that is not bestow-
ed upon other animals.

1st objection of the psychologists. To attribute to an
organized apparatus the faculty of producing thought, &c. is
to attribute to it what we can never discover in it. We
acknowledge dependence of the phenomena on the appara-
tus ; but as the results of the action of this apparatus, would
be exactly the same if it were no other than a mere instru-
ment, there is no reason why we should not so consider
it, or why we should prefer the hypothesis of our adversa-
ries to our own,

Reply. We discover perfectly in this apparatus the fac-
ulty of producing thought, &c. What we do not pretend to
discover, is the manner how this is produced. This propo-
sition has been already demonstrated.

The dependence of the phenomena on the apparatus, can-
not be explained by means of a separate intelligent cause
having no relation to nervous matter ; this is an hypothesis
merely ; the type or model of this cause no where exists.
We cannot admit that what is in no sense matter or body,
can act upon matter or body. A mere negation cannot act
upon that which is positive.

2nd Objection. Observation can shew us nothing but
material particles arranged in a certain manner. As no

[ 108 J

molecule ol the mass can produce these phenomena, the
physiologists themselves cannot comprehend how the mass,
or arranged assemblage of molecules, can produce them ;
they must therefore recur to supposition and hypothesis.

Organization, therefore, proves no more than any other
word of any other sound.

Reply. It has been proved that the nervous apparatus
in a certain state^ does produce by its action, intellectual
phenomena in animals as well as in man. This then is the
question before us, the fact itself, and not the how and the
why. Hypothesis begins so soon as we go beyond the
matter of fact and offer to comment on it. The physiolo-
gists make no comments ; the psychologists alone keep their
imagination alive.

3d Objection. In machines we have examples of organ-
ized matter put into action by separate intelligent beings.
We have nothing like, nothing equivalent to this in the sup-
posed organization which gives rise to intellectual faculties.
Hypothesis is, therefore, against hypothesis, that of the psy-
chologists is preferable.

Reply. There is no room for comparison between an in-
animate machine, and the living, organized, cerebral appa-
ratus. Moreover, the intelligence which the psychologists
shew us in their machine, is nothing else than the cerebral
apparatus of the man himself who moves and directs it : but
to suppose one cerebral organ within another, would be an
absurdity explaining nothing.

4th Objection. The nerves, the senses, the muscles, be-
ing indispensible to sensation and action, and being no more
than instruments of the brain, without which they can do
nothing, we can have no difficulty in supposing how a brain
also may itself be in the same inactive situation as the senses
and muscles, in respect of that presiding principle of which
it is but the instrument.

Reply. There is no parity in the things compared. Our
senses shew us that nerves and muscles are capable of ac-
tion independently of the brain ; that action, however, can-
not be regulated but by means of the brain ; so as that the
result of these motions afford us an idea of an inciting intel-
ligence. But no sense has ever demonstrated to the psy-
chologists, that the brain was the instrument of any other
agent, than the whole nervous system with which it is con-
nected. The brain and the nerves are successively, and in

I ion j

turns agents and patients ; in this circle there is no point tu
designate a beginning or an end. As to the muscles, they
can only serve as instruments of the brain and nerves, for
the execution of certain acts which the nervous apparatus
was not designed to execute ; although the muscular tissue
is sometimes subject to other influences.

5th Objection. By destroying certain parts of the brain,
in experimenting on living animals, certain actions are de-
stroyed also. Diseases also analyse the human faculties,
abolishing one after another : but no disease has yet de-
stroyed the will. This happens, according to certain psy-
chologists, from the principle of voluntarity being distinct
from the brain. For if the brain itself were the principle
of voluntarity, when you altered the brain you would alter
also the voluntary principle : but no operation, no disease
has produced this effect.

Reply. Let us attend to facts. It is not true that expe-
riments have not destroyed volition. You may suspend
and you may renew it by merely compressing the brain.
Nor is it true that no disease has yet destroyed volition :
all the violent congestions of the brain suppress it ; all vio-
lent inflammations of that organ put an end to volition while
they continue, and by their long duration ; and life may re-
main a long time even after this loss. Moreover, the em-
bryo has no voluntarity, and the embryo we presume par-
takes of the nature of man.

And now what becomes of the railleries of the psycholo-
gists on the supposed hypothesis of the physiologists ?

Seeing that it is demonstrated by reasonings founded on
the known evidence of a man's senses, without which there
can be no knowledge, that the nervous apparatus, consisting
of the encephalon and the nerves distributed to all parts of
the body, is the source of all the phenomena of instinct, of
sensibility, of perception, of volition, in one word, of intel-
ligence — seeing that you cannot impose upon that apparatus
a separate, stronger principle, without introducing by means
of thought, within the brain itself all the scenes of the ma-
terial world, of which the senses alone can furnish any ideas
— the pretensions of the psychologists fall of themselves.
The how, or the first cause, remains equally unknown to
the one disputant and the other. But this circumstance of
being unknown as to the first cause, is no obstacle to re-
searches whose object extends no farther than the pheno-

[ m ]

ineiia, the tacts of the sensible world. That this first cause
should remain unknown, is of no consequence to physiolo-
gists, moralists, publicists, and legislators. As to metaphy-
sicians and psychologists, it is a very different thing. They
cannot, unfortunately, erect a science on the basis of con-
sciousness alone, independent of the influence of the senses,
because all the phenomena of this, their consciousness are
reduced to this single expression, / feel that I feel. Be-
yond this they cannot go, without calling in the aid of the
senses. If they would confine their pretensions to the study
of those relations, which bind man to man, they would en-
list among the moralists and publicists : if they will pretend
to discuss the actual origin of the intellectual faculties, let
them study physiology, anatomy and even pathology, not in
books, but at the bedside of the sick. This last occupation
will teach them far more than all the treatises on ideology.
All the efforts they make to emancipate themselves from
the influence of these branches of knowledge will prove
useless, because without them no one can be acquainted
with the facts necessary to treat the question properly.
Consciousness was their last refuge ; hereafter it will serve
them in no stead ; they cannot with any success oppose so-
phisms and declamations to the facts which we have exhib-
ited. But I shall give them credit for more judgement and
coolness than to choose such weapons.

Sec. 7. Of the rationalists and modern theologians.

Hitherto I have spoken only of psycologists who take into
consideration the evidence of their senses, and who pride
themselves on the strictness of their reasoning. But there
are some who pay no attention to what their organs of sense
report to them. They set out at once from consciousness as
a starting point to arrive at reason : this being once discov-
ered, becomes the oracle of all their philosophy. In the
name of reason, they employ arguments to despoil the ner-
vous apparatus of all its functions. I do not aspire to the
honor of convincing them by reasoning, although they tell
us they are the interpreters of reason. For what can I say
to men who profess the following doctrine. " Reason is that
which places a man in connection with the Deity. It is an
emanation from the Deity. The identical, individual being,
le moi, (myself,) is susceptible of feeling, of willing, of per-
ceiving: he rests upon his volition, and he is connected with

L m J

the visible phenomenal world by his senses ; with the invisi-
ble, substantial, rational world, by his reason."*

They admit, like the psychologists already noticed, the
noilsensible nature of le moi, (the being or principle that
constitutes myself, ) and the characteristic of consciousness
" I feel that I feel ;" but their principal argument for forcing
upon the nervous system a presiding principle, is drawn
from what they advance founded on authority and without
any proof, concerning reason. "Reason, say they, gives us
what experience cannot furnish, to wit, principle, the laws
of man, the laws of nature, and the supreme law. In fact,
laws being necessary and universal, cannot be deduced,
from what is contingent and personal. Reason which teaches
these laws cannot be contingent or personal. These laws
are absolute : reason, therefore, is so also. Nor does she
belong to space or time. She appears to the individual man,
as the preserver of his impersonality. The Deity is the ab-
solute, substantial law. Man raises himself to the Deity by
his reason; but he knows that great Being imperfectly,
because man is limited to space and time."

I have argued with the psychologists, properly so called,
because they profess to reason rigidly. But how shall I
argue with rationalists, who pretend to no strictness in their
deductions, and who scruple not to advance as truths, asser-
tions mysterious and unintelligible, such as that reason, altho'
an impersonal being, belongs to the individual man ? They
speak of man, as if he were of a nature superior to man. I
do not ask them to define the words they use ; they will not
descend so low as to definition and the grammar. They fly
off into some ideal world, from whence they look down
with pity on what passes in this.

Without addressing them, I shall make some remarks on
the language they employ. "Reasonis an emanation from
the Deity." A metaphor in which God is likened to some
planet, or some spring ; and reason to the rays of light or
the streams of water, or some other emanation still more

*Iam not satisfied that I understand this passage. "Laraisonest
ce que met l'liommc en rapport avec l'absolu: cest une emanation de Dieu ;
qui n'est autre chose que cet absolu, ou de cet absolu qui est Dieu. Le moi
est susceptible dc scntir, do vouloir, et de concevoir ; il se pose par s?
volonte, et il est en rapport avee le inondc visible, phenomenal, par ses
sens : et par la raison, avec le monde invisible, rationel, substantiel." I
am persuaded I have given the sense of the passag-e, but I cannot rende."
'absolu* — Transl.

t i*a )

subtile, which Hows from it. Before I can admit that reason
is any thing of this kind, I want to know how they arrive at
the knowledge that reason is really such. They tell me
they acquire this knowledge by their consciousness ; that
Janus which by one of its faces looks at and comprehends
reason speaking in the name of the Deity, and by the other,
puts himself through his senses in relation with a world of
facts and of material things. I ask myself, is not this de-
grading the Deity, to convert him into a body capable of
emitting material emanations ? If, on the other hand, rea-
son is to be regarded like a fluid that flows, which hears
without ears, and speaks without a mouth to consciousness
who has no organs of hearing — is not this mere fancy ?

Let us, however, admit that consciousness, who has no
auditory organs, has heard all that reason has uttered, whom
no one has ever seen ; to whom did consciousness relate
this before the rationalist spake of it ? To herself doubtless,
unless some other being was present, endowed w 7 ith the
faculty of hearing. Be all this as it may, the internal being
who has learnt all these wonders, must have some organs
of speech to enable all this to come to the ears of the pro-
fane, so that these latter may give themselves up to their
respective consciousnesses. I say to their consciousnesses,
for each of them has one of his own. Consciousness is not
one universal being, serving the turn of all mankind ; and
this throws us into the difficulties before noticed. Why has
not the foetus a consciousness ? If it have, why does not con-
sciousness understand it ? Why does not consciousness
speak to it ? If absent, where is she ? If there bean enti-
ty called consciousness, common to all men, why does she
not speak to the embryo, or to persons apoplectic, or afflicted
with asphyxy ?

Let us add, but for ourselves only and without addressing
the rationalists, the following question.

Why is it that consciousness, for the purpose of teaching
these mysteries, is constrained to use language appertain-
ing to the properties of material bodies ? I must suppose
that it is, because like ourselves, these rationalists are com-
pelled to have recourse to objects, which their senses have
made known to them, to enable other men to understand
their thoughts ; and this brings to my mind that we cannot
discourse at all of abstract entities, but by means of attri-
butes belonging to material bodies. Is not reason reduced

t 113 ]

to the same necessity ? do we not say a good, a bad, a just, a
fine, a forcible reason ? Is not time itself qualified by ex-
pressions drawn from the dimensions of bodies ; and can we
figure to ourselves a day, an hour, &c. without including
some material idea of space ? How is it possible that ever
since men spake at all, they have never been able to invent,
for the purpose of conveying an idea of abstract substan-
tives, a single adjective but what represents one of those
qualities or properties which belong to material substances.

Let us ask, (ourselves however) what is the meaning of
all this ? It means that in good truth we are so much the
slaves of our senses, that we are compelled to compare ab-
stract beings to the bodies which our senses have made us
acquainted with. This necessity arises, because these pre-
tended (abstract) substances, are themselves nothing else
than words and signs, by which, during perception, we recall
the manner in which we have been modified ( acted on ) by
the given circumstances. But as our senses are modified
(acted upon) by bodies alone, and in consequence our brain
is so too, we cannot qualify these modifications, unless by
words or signs that recall to our memories either the bodies
themselves or the impressions they have made upon us;
even these impressions are designated by the qualifiers of
material bodies. Thus, we say a lively joy, a great surprise,
&c. A man pronounces the word virtue : the idea does not
instantly occur to us that he considers virtue as some body;
but ask him to join to that substantive word some adjective,
and he will no where find one, unless among the properties
of bodies, or the modifications of his own body : and virtue
always must be great or small, or sweet or austere, or sa-
vage or gentle, and so on. There is no adjective but di-
vine that does not recall some material body : but if man
would apply any qualification to the Deity, he must patch
it ; he cannot avoid using some adjective drawn from a ma-
terial substance ; and those epithets which are most worthy
of the occasion are those which apply to man ; employed by
multiplying supposedly and indefinitely whatever he is or
whatever he does of a more distinguished character ; as
by calling him infinitely great, good, wise, foreseeing, &c.
God may be spoken of also by the qualifications eternal,
universal, immutable, immense, &c. this is the same thing :
eternity is a continuance of sensible duration and immensit y
of sensible space. Meditate as 9trongly and ;j? Ions; as you
15

[ H4 ]

please on these two ideas joined to the negation which seems
to characterise them, and which is nothing but a supposi-
tion like those which we make on so many other questions,
and you will never get beyond some material corporeal idea.
But in thinking much on all the abstract ideas which tend
to determine the first cause, we shall experience a singular
uneasiness : we wish to express this sensation, but we can
no more explain or express it than Ave can some undescriba-
ble morbid states of the body. It is this sensation that
tempts a man to believe he has an idea of something be-
yond sensible objects. It is while he reflects, while he
feels that he feels, that he perceives this sensation : hence
it is, that he confounds it with his consciousness, and makes
them inseparable. But once more, this sensation, in other
respects so diversified, according to the individual, proves
nothing, any more than the sensations of a hypochondriac.
It may seem to some, an inspiration, and determine their be-
lief ; but to those who have studied physiology and patholo-
gy it will be an irritation of the nervous system. This sen-
sation does not occur to every body ; and although very
well marked in many people, it may be dispersed by study
and the observation of nature, whenever it is not brought
on by disease : but it is entitled to our respect, since it is
often a motive to belief and to faith : And now, let us be-
gin again to reason, in tracing the consequences of the fig-
urative language of which I have just given examples.

As the Rationalists make reason act like a body, let us so
consider it ; but in assuming this position, we have a right
to express our astonishment, that they compel it to do things
which no body in whose properties they clothe it, is ac-
customed to do ; or, they give it in succession, capriciously,
the attributes of other bodies, to which they had not assim-
ilated it : or, finally, after having treated it like a body, they
close by telling us it is no such thing, and has nothing in
common with a body.

We cannot then conceive, that the principle which con-
stitutes myself (moi) is of a nature insensible, and yet able
to feel, and to take Its station ; which implies nerves, and an
apparatus for motion ; a reason which imposes laws upon
things and upon men ; an idea taken from a legislator, and
which does not derive them from experience, as legislators
do; a. moi, which places itself as it pleases, and that insinu-
ates, that it might please, not to place itself at all. for if ii

L no j

had not the liberty of doing either the one or the other, ri
would have no volition ; a will, a thing of which no one can
have an idea, but by acting, or seeing another man act, con-
verted into something which is not a man, and which is not
even a part of a man, since it is no part of the nervous sys-
tem, and which, nevertheless, has the character of man ; a
reason which is neither contingent nor personal, although it
belongs to each human person, excepting always those who
have never had the sense of vision, &c. &c. In reading all
this, I cannot take it literally, without supposing it the lan-
guage of idiots ; if I did not know it was not so. Here
then, I am convinced that these writers are well persuaded
that the things they speak of, have not the material attri- ,
butes which they ascribe to them. I feel myself, therefore,
in an unpleasant situation, if called upon to explain how
men, apparently well organised, reasoning correctly upon
every thing unconnected with their doctrine, can adopt, in
respect of that alone, a language of which all the expressions
are false, and of a falsity infinitely diversified, and incapable
of any termination. Without doubt, I could not escape
from this embarrassment, any more than so many wise men
who have preceded me, and who have listened with a kind
of stupefaction to the unintelligible discourses of these fol-
lowers of pure reason, if physiological observation had not
come to my aid. I interrogate physiology then ; which re-
lieves me from an immense load, by showing that the things
that these rationalists would give an account of, and which
they are unable to express, are nothing more than internal
sensations. From henceforward, all is explained ; and I
§ee clearly how it is, that when I converse with them, they
imagine I have not well understood them. It is evident the
cause is, that not having the same internal sensation, I can-
not give the same meaning to words which they do. I un-
derstand these words literally ; because my consciousness
applies to them that meaning which is conventional among
men. The rationalists give them another meaning, by ma-
king them the representatives of internal sensations which
they may feel, but I do not. While we find ourselves in a
situation so different, it is not likely we shall harmonize.

As to the rest, what is there strange in tins, seeing these
gentlemen cannot agree among themselves? And how-
should they agree, when by a tacit convention, each with
himself, it is settled that the expressions they employ shal!

[ 1M J

not designate what they wish to represent ? When they go
so far as to shrug up their shoulders in pity toward those
who affix to their words the usual literal meaning ? How-
ever slightly the internal sensations of adepts differ from
those of the eloquent rationalist who has raised them into
doctrines, there will still be differences of internal sensa-
tion that must engender sects, and sub-sects indefinitely; for
every one will finally perceive during the discussions, that
his interlocutor has not exactly delivered what he himself
endeavors to deliver.

Such are the inconveniences of words employed to de-
signate things which neither have, or can have, any precise
appropriate expression in any language. Hence, I avoid all
discussion with men who have words in their mouth void of
the meaning that usually and properly belongs to them, and
that do not designate the things which they were invented
to express. I know that by a rhetorical figure, we make
words assume a meaning different from their original accept-
ation, and often very successfully ; but, in my opinion, we
ought to distinguish two kinds of metaphor. The first, found-
ed on those resemblances which every one acknowledges ;
the allusion is easily comprehended, and admired in propor-
tion as it relates to important interests. The other class of
metaphors, rest upon analogies, vague, arbitrary, and percept-
ible, by those only who are in the habit of perverting the
natural meaning of words. These last kinds of metaphor,
in use among the rationalists, produce no impression but on
adepts ; and they are so diversified, that the eloquence of
one professor is not that of another ; and they are all equally
unimpressive on men accustomed to severe study and strict
argument.

Let us conclude : Since all the theory of the rationalists
is founded on the revelations of consciousness, we may judge
of them by the facts already stated, and the conclusions
already deduced, in treating of the consciousness of the
psychologists.

We shall not say thus much of the Theologians, illumi-
nated or mystic, who see every thing in God, to whom, in
imagination, they are raised, by separating themselves from
every thing connected with self, and with reasoning. No-
thing of this kind is satisfactory to them, for it is not God.
For them, the supreme good, is out of and beyond this life,
in the bosom of the Deity. Such men do not condescend to

[ 111 j

prove their belief ; they recommend a patient abiding lot
that grace which is always imparted when perseveringly
desired. They are opposed to any use of reason in explain-
ing what they receive by faith, without troubling themselves
whether reason approves or disapproves ; because the prin-
ciple that inspires this belief, is of a far higher nature than
human reason, which is of this world, and participates of the
imperfections of the world in which it takes its rise.

I have given the substance of their doctrine, to shew that
although it may touch, in some points, on that of the ration-
alist, it has not the slightest resemblance to ours. No an-
swer can be given to men who explain nothing, and prove
nothing. I address myself, therefore, to those only who
pretend to use certain explanations against the functions of
the nervous system. But this last doctrine is a religion ;
and all religions are entitled to respect, as are their funda-
mental doctrines of the existence of God, and the immortality
of the soul. Let any one who thinks it right, embrace those
doctrines, whether in consequence of an external revelation
or an internal inspiration, without pretending to found them
on any demonstration which brings the nervous system
upon the carpet. Physiology has nothing to do with this ;
for it does not pretend to prove any thing against that inter-
nal sensation, the parent of all faith, and on which all belief
is founded, that is not susceptible of proof from material
objects. The physiologist enumerates these sensations to
distinguish them from others ; and when the religionists
erect themselves into ideologists, he ought, in replying to
them, to put faith aside, and answer only the arguments
that bear upon the subject. The arguments against the
abstractions which tend to make the functions of the ner-
vous system misunderstood, do not imply any thing like
contempt for, or even doubt of religious convictions, which,
in some persons, are compatible with the interior sentiment
producing them ; and provided he treats belief with respect,
he ought to be permitted the use of all such arguments as
are calculated to serve his own cause.

Chapter VII. Exposition of the relations which

EXIST BETWEEN THE NERVOUS APPARATUS, AND THE PHE-
NOMENA OF INSTINCT AND INTELLECT.

We may, without difficulty, and assuredly without hypo-
thesis, reduce all abstract substances, or entities, to func*

L 1*8 J

tioual phenomena, by shewing that they are no more than
the representative signs of the modifications or varieties in
perception, which every observer remarks in himself. Mo-
difications which sometimes associate with emotions of
pleasure, or of grief, that is with the phenomena of sensi-
bility, and which cannot be considered by our senses any
thing else than modifications of the nervous system. Of
these, we should know nothing, but by means of our senses
for we have no abstract idea of our consciousness, as we
have proved already. But we cannot undertake to treat
this question here, in all its extent. We shall only, there-
fore, explain in this work the means of arriving at that
solution of which we believe it capable : We mean a faithful
exposition of the phenomena of innervation, which consti-
tute the very basis of all our intellectual operations. Our
readers will then be able to judge how near we approach to
Locke, and how far we differ, as well as from Cabanis, and
his illustrious scholar, Destutt de Tracey, whom every one
ought to read and re-read before he ventures to write on
the intellectual faculties. This learned man has not per-
mitted himself to be seduced by the psycological school ;
but it is to be regretted, that he could not observe the animal
man, in the various anomalies of pathology, and study in the
anatomical and physiological ampitheatres, the connection
of organized tissues with the phenomena of instinct and
intelligence. To treat of these questions in their order, we
shall examine in this chapter — 1st How it is that cerebral
perception furnishes the materials of all the instinctive and
intellectual operations. 2dly How the sensible emotions
become motives to our actions of all kinds. 3dly In what
manner observation arising from cerebral perception devel-
opes our intellectual faculties, and what they are. 4thly,
How volition and liberty connect themselves with the same
perception. 5thly How intellectual perceptions associate
themselves with instinctive emotions, and what constitutes
the passions. 6thly What is the cause of error among the
psychologists respecting the principles of action in man.

Sec. 1. In what manner cerebral perception furnishes the
materials of all our instinctive and intellectual operations.

The encephalon considered in a full grown man, enjoying
perfectly all his faculties, is placed between two currents of
stimulation : Those which proceed from the external, and
those which proceed from the internal nerves. Cabams

t HO J

first applied these to ideology, undei the appellation of im-
pressions proceeding from the organs. The stimulations
which theencephalon receives from these two sources, either
are accompanied, or are not so, by consciousness. We have
already*demonstrated, that the last mode was the first in the
regular order of individual developement. We have also pro-
ved that the phenomena of consciousness, after having been
developed, must necessarily experience interruptions, lest
the organs upon which they depend should be over excited.
At present, I have nothing to do but with cerebral stimula-
tions accompanied by consciousness.

Cerebral stimulation, with consciousness, implies, as I
have already said, the perception of some object which
strikes some external sense ; and the perception also, of
one's-self, as perceiving this object. This may be, as eve-
ry one knows, some part of our body capable of affecting
some one of our external senses, as our limbs.

These perceptions have been referred to sensibility ;
which is the source of pleasure or of pain ; emotions that
do not always accompany these phenomena, and therefore
may give rise to objections. But these objections are no-
thing in themselves, for the epithet sensible, is applicable
to every phenomenon of innervation, which is accompanied
by consciousness. But to avoid every thing equivocal, I
shall distinguish as before, 1st, phenomena of innervation
without consciousness. 2dly, phenomena of innervation
with consciousness. These last will divide themselves
naturally into simple perception, instinctive or intellectual
— and perception accompanied by an agreeable or disagree-
able emotion : and I shall refer these different perceptions,
not to particular and distinct properties, appertaining to the
nervous fibre, but as different modes of excitation in the en-
cephalon. These phenomena will be a continuation of the
first mode of this excitement, wherein no one can observe
either perception of self, or* of any other object, or of pleas-
ure, or of pain. Such is nervous action, in the new-formed
embryo, and in asphyxy.

Perception, with consciousness, which necessarily has al-
ways a double object, is either unattended by pleasure or
pain, or complicated with the one or the other of them.
We shall soon see the result ; but before we go any further,
let us forestal an objection, which an imperfect comprehen-
sion of what wo have already said, may give rise to : Bo-

L 120 j

cause perception has always a double object, the necessity
of some single, active principle has been inferred, to per- 1
ceive the one and the other of these objects ; and it is this
same principle which has been distinguished from nervous
matter, and declared to be of necessity, something in itself
single and simple. I repeat, that this principle is nothing
but a supposition ; a mere word ; the result of an induction
employed to explain the quomodo, or manner of perception.
We have only to renounce any inquiry into this quomodo,
of which we know nothing, and which moreover can never
be the same in all creatures possessing a brain — and leave
it among the things unknown, in company with all other
first causes — and this objection will be of no value : indeed
we shall be compelled to this ; for we cannot avoid suppos-
ing for the purpose of this explanation, ideas derived from
those material objects which our senses have made known
to us. It is, therefore, indispensible to confine ourselves to
the recital of those phenomena which manifest perception,
without introducing a perceptive principle ; and I propose,
immediately, to give an example of this. I return to my
object.

The perception of ones self, or the phenomena of le moi, is
always the same ; although this moi may perceive itself in
joy, or in suffering. It is not the same with that of the ob-
ject which the external sense makes known : this percep-
tion becomes diversified, according as the attention remains
longer fixed upon the object itself.

Objects are perceived by what is called the understand-
ing (P Intelligence). I mean to say, that when we per-
ceive them in that state which you call understanding, they
are perceived, 1st, according to the properties of vision,
which presents ideas of colours, forms, dimensions, distance,
motion, or rest, &c. 2dly, according to the properties of
hearing, which furnish ideas more or less similar to the fore-
going, for colours alone are peculiar to vision. 3dly, ac-
cording to the properties of touch, which alone informs us
of the consistence and temperature of bodies ; but which, as
to dimensions, forms, motion, can only give us impressions
more or less similar to those of the two former senses.
4thly and 5thly, according to the properties of smell and
taste.

Such are the perceptions furnished by external objects
which enter as elements among the phenomena of un-

t > 21 J

demanding : but we should be wrong to believe that the
understanding is only composed of these perceptions, and
of some active principle, which sees, judges, and combines
them diversely : this manner of considering the subject,
constitutes an hypothesis : it is ontology, founded like the
systems we have already refuted, upon the supposition of a
principle, of which man, observed by the senses, has
furnished the model. But let us continue the exposition
of facts.

Sec. 2. How the emotions of sensibility become motives
of all our actions.

We have said, that perceptions were either unattended,
or attended, with pleasure and pain: let us examine the
first case.

In observing external objects, if the man has no feeling in
himself, he is inactive ; he has no motive to react. This
situation is uncommon ; but we must admit its existence,
because every one feels that he has sometimes been in that
situation. For the most part then, perception is attended
by pleasant or unpleasant emotions ; sometimes they are so
weak, as hardly to be distinguished from the perception it^
self: sometimes he is immediately struck with their differ-
ence : but almost always he attaches them under the rela-
tions of causality, to the different objects which have affect-
ed hissenses.

Remember, that I have noticed these phenomena without
supposing them executed by any entity called the principle.
I wish to be understood, in advance, that if ever I make use
of that word, I shall employ it only as an abreviated formu-
la in the discussion. The pleasant or unpleasant emotions
which accompany our perceptions, proceed always from a
stimulation of the nervous apparatus of the person perceiv-
ing ; and it will be wrong to distinguish them literally, into
physical, and non-physical : their modes are diversified al-
most infinitely ; and many of these modes have been con-
sidered as particular principles, not of a nervous character,
and called principles of action, or active faculties. But if
you consider the facts alone, these emotions are no other
than the effects of perception, excited by causes internal or
external, and executed in the encephalon : and thus it is,
they are capable of becoming motives to human actions.
They follow also, in regular train, instinctive excitations;
void of the phenomena of intelligence ; such as those which
in

t 122 j

induce motion, in the unborn infant, and excite the action
of sucking even before the child has experienced the breast,
and force it to demand by cries, those things that are ne-
cessary to satisfy its first wants. In other words, the mo-
tives of action, or if you please the locomotive motions of
the foetus, of the newborn infant, of a person in profound
sleep, &c. are stimulations of the encephalon, proceeding
from the two sources already mentioned, but without any
distinct perception or consciousness : the motives of the
adult man, healthy and awake, are the same stimulations,
sometimes with distinct perception or consciousness, and
sometimes without. The difference arises from the nature
of the acts, from habit, from distraction, &c. This will fol-
low from the explanations into which I am about to enter.

When the man feels distinctly an internal want, in conse-
quence of the stimulations transmitted to the brain by the
nerves of the viscera, he observes all external objects in
connection with this want, because the first duty of the
brain is to attend to the wants of instinct. All the objects
which may serve to satisfy the predominant want, cause
profound emotions in the viscera where that want origin-
ates; and these emotions determine the man to execute
those actions that are necessary to satisfy the want. This
proves, very positively, that the brain stimulates the viscera
in a state of want, by means of the perception of those ex-
ternal objects which are calculated to satisfy that want : the
viscera rendered more irritable by this accession of stimu-
lation re-acts more strongly on the brain. No doubt the
perception of all these external objects fit to satisfy the pre-
vailing want, excite the viscera, which respond to the stim-
ulation. But it is quite certain that the viscus, which the
existing want renders most irritable, acts most strongly on
the br\in, after the perception of those objects which are
capable of allaying the want. The proof of all this may be
seen in detail in our physiology.

Man always obeys the emotion which is produced by a
body called for by a visceral want, unless there be some
moral motive to prevent him. In early infancy he always
obeys this emotion ; for at that period, the want of observa-
tion, curiosity, is not yet developed. But in proportion as
he becomes older, and a careful education has developed
this want of observation, (curiosity) he becomes less a slave
to his early wants, as we shall see in treating of volition and

L L23 j

of liberty. For the present, let us trace the rise and forma-
tion of the faculty of observation.

Sec. 3. In what manner observation, offspring of cerebral
perception, developes our intellectual faculties; and what are
those faculties.

When the encephalon becomes no longer tormented by
wants merely instinctive, that is, when man has satisfied his
wants, he applies himself to the observation of external bo-
dies, by an emotion of a different kind from that which those
wants excited. It is not easy to trace the line of original
distinction between these two kinds of emotion, but the ex-
tremes are not difficult to seize.

The instinctive emotions relate to individual preserva-
tion, respiration, hunger, thirst, want of exercise, rest and
sleep, want of exoneration, of generation, and the preserva-
tion of offspring. A lively pleasure attends the satisfac-
tion of these wants ; chagrin and ill temper attends the
obstacles which stand in the way of satisfying them. All
these emotions are excitations of the brain and nerves, with
a perception of sensations more or less vivid in the principal
viscera, the stomach, the heart, the lungs, the sexual or-
gans, and vaguely in the sub-diaphragmatic nervous plexus,
(see my physiology. )

The emotions which have least connection with the in-
stinct of self preservation and reproduction, are those which
are produced by external objects not calculated to satisfy
these wants ; and of which the phenomena are fully declared
in the work already cited.* The man then, when his first
and urgent wants of an instinctive character are satisfied,
has another want that requires to be satisfied, viz. the want
of observation, (curiosity. ) This incites him to observe, to
analyse his perceptions, to compare them, and to remark that
he perceives himself in the act of perceiving : an act essen-
tially inexplicable to us, and which itself constitutes the
whole of his intellectual faculties. f

It is in the exercise of this kind of observation, that what
are called abstract ideas arise, and which constitute the
signs by means of which we represent objects under every
kind of relation. Among these signs, some of them conve-
niently serve to recall one or other of the attributes or pro-

* We have an American translation of this valuable work. — Transl.

f This follows also from Hartley's theory of the association of Ideas.
A book which Cabanis and Broussais would have been the wiser for stu-
dying. — Transl.

L 134 j

perties oi' bodies corresponding to the external senses, such
as colours, consistence, &c. — that is to say, they serve to
place us nearly in the same state of stimulation, as the sensi-
ble appearance of the objects themselves produced. The
others retrace the circumstances in which we have seen or
observed the objects ; as whether they were at rest or in
motion ; whether they affected the senses or the viscera
agreeably or disagreeably ; if they satisfied our wants : if
they cured a disease : if they were dangerous to health or
life, &c. so that there are a great many of those signs, that are
equivalent to many phrases, or even to a long dissertation,
and save much circumlocution : such are the words restora-
tion, fortification, good manners; and in medicine febrifuge,
antispasmodic, and others of like kind, which designate com-
plicated scenes of social life, or which reinstate us momen-
tarily in nearly the same emotion, as when we felt the vis-
ceral stimulations of pain, of pleasure, of joy, of anger, of
hope, &c.

It is by feeling, and by attention to his feelings and per-
ceptions, that man judges. When the judgement he forms,
is as rapid as the perception itself, it is instinctive, or a judge-
ment at first view. If he does not form his judgement until
by aid of memory he has recalled many intuitive judgements,
which are comprised in the formula or representative
signs of other judgements, they are called judgements by de-
duction, or what is vulgarly called reasoning. But the
names are nothing : on final analysis we shall never see any
thing else than the perception of one* s-self perceiving.

If man had not the faculty of recalling perceptions passed,
by means of perceptions present, (association) he would be
incapable of executing all his intellectual operations : he
would resemble an idiot. He could never fix his attention
on any thiwg, if his actual perception were not thus prolong-
ed. This faculty is founded on what has been called The
Association of Ideas; for actual perception could not recall
passed perceptions, whose cause has gone by, nor that of a
third, if something did not connect the perceptions with each
another. In short, Imagination, is but a memory which
reproduces perceptions vividly and abundantly, in such a
manner as to form new combination. But, let us explain
ourselves so as to reduce the figurative expressions of the
ideologists, to the physiology of the nervous system.

I have explained how the different judgements resolve

[ 125 J

themselves into the perception of the perception. Very well.
Memory, then, to whatever extent it proceeds, whether it
has for its object, bodies, or their properties, or their circum-
stances, or emotions, is nothing more than the actual per-
ception of past perceptions, recalled and reproduced. There
is, therefore, but one phenomenon of the understanding ;
that is, perception. What we know positively concerning
it, is — 1st, That it takes place in the brain. 2dly, That it
is an excitation of the substance of the brain. I refuse to
say that it is an effect or result of the excitation of the sub-
stance of the brain. I say, that it is the excitation itself, of
the substance of the brain, in one of its various modes of
being excited. I add, also, that an idea* can be nothing
else. Diseases of the encephalon, prove this in a manner
incontestible ; they furnish direct and positive experience
that the words sensations, perceptions, ideas, cannot repre-
sent to the physiologist any thing but nervous matter, under
some of its modes of excitation. They put these phenomena
on the same line with volition or the will, about which I
shall have something to say.

Sec. 4. How the will, and the freedom of the will, connect
themselves with perception.

If sensations, perceptions, ideas, and volitions, change
with the varieties in the mode of excitation of the nervous
matter of the encephalon, it follows that they must depend
upon it ; for you cannot make them depend upon any other
principle without introducing some hypothesis, founded up-
on an inadmissible comparison : the quomodo, the manner
alone of this causality, how it takes place, is, and must remain,
unknown.

The will, moreover, is one of those phenomena which
have been most insisted upon, to render the brain subordin-

* That a sensation, or impression, on some of the nerves of sense, ex-
ternal or internal, transmitted to the brain ; and its counterpart, an idea,
that is a recollected sensation, are no other than similar motions excited
in the brain, and there felt or perceived, may be considered as the opin-
ions of the most eminent physiologists.

See Haller's Primoe Lineae, § 556, Edinb. 1767.

Bichat. Phys. Res. Dr. Watkins' edit. Philad. 1800, p. 105, prope finem.

Richerand's Phys. Dr. Chapman's edit. 1813, Philad. p. 390, 392 and 400.

Blumenbach's Phys. Dr. Caldwell's edit. PhiJad. 1795, vol. l,p. 195.

Majendie's Phys. Dr. Revere's edit. Baltimore, 1822, p. 102, 103.

Nil unquam fuit in intellectu quod non prius erat in sensu, is an axiom
true at this day, as well as in the days of Aristotle, taking the word sensu
to designate as it ought, the internal asAvell as external senses. — Transf.

I !,'U J

ate iu some principle, or entity,* not nervous. But let ua
quit for an instant the personification of this phenomenon, to
study it, not metaphysically, but physiologically.

In the embryo, and in many diseases, it shares the lot ol
all the other phenomena of intelligence ; it does not exist at
all: this is the first proof, that it emanates from the brain.
It augments and it diminishes in conformity with the excita-
tion of the encephalic substance : this is the second proof,
that it resolves itself into a mode of action of that substance.
The will, as well as perceptions and ideas, is shackled, for-
ced, conquered, obscured, denaturalized, in the strangest
manner, by the stimulations by which the viscera, particu-
larly the digestive and reproductive, under certain states of
excitement, affect the encephalon. This is the third con-
firmation of the two precedent ones. I refer to my treatise
on physiology on this subject. The quomodo, the manner
how, rests at present among the things unknown.

The question of the freedom of the will, is connected
with the will itself. It is asked, are we free, or are we
forced on by something that governs us ?

It is necessary to determine what extension is intended
to be given to this expression, freedom of the will ; for there
are certain kinds of freedom or liberty, which belong to us,
only upon certain conditions. Such are those that relate to
the actions we perform with our respiratory muscles. The
psychologist believes himself at liberty to speak : he is so,
so long only as the want of respiration permits him — if a fit
of the asthma should come upon him, or a violent nausea,
the muscles of the voice are no longer at his disposal. A
pregnant woman believes herself at liberty to walk during
nine months ; but when labor approaches, the muscles of
progression must be otherwise employed in aiding the con-
tractions of the uterus. A man seized upon by the desire
of sleep, has neither the power of walking nor of thinking
at his disposal ; his limbs feel heavy, and his eye-lids close,
in spite of himself ; he can no longer keep his thoughts fixed
upon one object ; it escapes from him ; his ideas become
deranged, and the labor of resistance on the part of his
will, gives rise to a crowd of phantoms, in the midst of which,
he goes to sleep profoundly ; that is, he loses entirely, every
intellectual operation ; so, whenever some excitation be-

*The soul of the metaphysicians, or psychologists; of Stahl ; the Ar-
choeus of Parcelsus and Van Helmont— Transl.

L 1*1 J

\ond what is usual and regular, becomes developed in the
tissues of our viscera, we begin to lose something of this
freedom : first we are deprived of some of our powers of
action, and then of some of our powers of thinking ; we see
this, not only in violent fevers, but also in the chronic phleg-
masia? of those organs which are abundantly supplied with
nerves, and which exert a lively stimulation on the brain.
The same thing is also observed in the idiopathic irritation
of that organ. It cannot do every thing at once. When
the viscera torment it, it loses its aptitude for thought; or
else the irritation which it receives, forces its ideas in a
particular direction, so dependent upon the disease, that this
forced direction of thought increases, diminishes, and re-
turns with the disease. I shall be answered, " Since these
are diseases, they form exceptions." There are no excep-
tion. The diseases, in this case, are no other than modifi-
cations of the organs of thought ; and our word, " freedom,"
is only applicable to certain states of the organ.

But what idea can we have of this freedom of the will,
when the encephalon is not over excited, either sympa-
thetically or idiopathically ? This is a delicate question :
we undoubtedly have the consciousness that we are free.
This consciousness, however, proves nothing, for an ideot
has it also, although he is governed by a morbid irritation.
The fact is, that we always have a motive for action, and
the instinctive wants of self-conservation and re-production,
frequently concur with the internal motive of curiosity
which leads us to remark and observation, in directing our
thoughts and our actions. The weakness of the brain, its
imperfect developement in the part which executes intel-
lectual operations, the habit early contracted of obeying vis-
ceral impressions and impulsions, or in resisting them for the
purpose of acting as our understanding dictates, decide with-
out our knowledge on all our actions, even when we suppose
ourselves most free. Our habits of thinking, which depend
either on the organization of our brain, or on some pre-
dominance of action which chance forces us to give to this
or that region of the cerebral organ, or if you please to this
or that mode of excitation in its fibres, are causes which de-
termine our actions, and therefore our thoughts; and compel
us to execute what habit dictates while we fancy ourselves
at perfect freedom.* Now a nd then, man awakes from this
*Our sensations Rnd their reminiscences, ideas ; all our thoughts, nrr

L 138 j

lethargy ; he sees the tyrants that deprive him of liberty j
he revolts, and determines to make resistance in the most
pressing emergency. In so doing, he obeys sometimes a
religious, sometimes a selfish motive. For instance, for the
sake of saying " I am free," he obeys the wish to enjoy
his own esteem and that of his fellow-men ; a wish not less
imperious than any other whatever, but which cannot take
place, or influence his conduct, if the encephalon be not de-
veloped, and exercised in a certain manner.

Often we resist one instinctive want by another. Thus,
hunger will yield to love, or to parental affection ; the fear
of death often yields to this instinct, or even to self-love ;
and this last gives way to some other passion, &c. In all
these cases the struggle takes place in the encephalon ; and
physiologically it is nothing else than some of the varieties
of excitation.

Such is the real account of freedom of the will (liberum
arbitrium) ; it is a form of expression and nothing more,
designating a certain kind of excitement that takes place in
the brain, inciting to action in the voluntary muscles. In
considering this subject, we must banish the personified, ab-
stract entity, and consider only the facts ; for if this entity
be placed in our consciousness, and we do not submit it to
the verification of our senses, we shall be compelled to admit
on equal footing, the mental freedom of the sick, and of the
ideot, with that of the healthy man of perfect faculties ; for
the ideot also says, " my will is free." This must be the
case unless you admit two kinds of free will, one for the
healthy and one for the insane ; and such a supposition will
conduct us to two kinds of souls, unless we refuse to assign
this incorporeal director to the insane, or suppose it inactive,
a stranger to the phenomena over which it presided yester-
day, and may be called on to preside to-morrow.

Sec. 5. How intellectual perceptions associate themselves
with instinctive emotions ; and what constitutes theimssions.

In all cases where the perceptions termed moral, that is to
say, those that are not connected with our first wants, but

stimulations that take place in the brain, according to fixed laws of the
animal economy and the established properties of that organ. The things
and circumstances that give rise to sensations, ideas and thoughts, are out
of our power. The laws that regulate their occurrence and their effects
upon our brain, are out of our power. The laws that rcmilate the results
of their action upon us, our consequent actions, arc out ot our power.—

E m ]

with curiosity only, do not excite lively emotions, the man
acts but feebly : if he had no other motive he would remain
inactive ; but nature has provided for this. As we proceed
in the career of life, these perceptions become connected
( associated ) by recollections with our first wants which ori-
ginally did not affect them; in course of time there is hardly
an object completely estranged from them. The sight of a
table recalls hunger ; the sight of a cup, thirst. An agree-
able shade recalls a country passed over ; and the recollec-
tion of it, awakens the rural appetite ; the sight of a flower,
or some article proper to make ornamental dress, recalls the
pleasures we have enjoyed with a beloved object. A pre-
cipice recalls the danger we may have run ; weapons, the
combat we may have sustained ; the victory or the defeat
that followed, with all their emotions, &c*

These relations take place by means of the association of
ideas ; and when their effects do not excite hunger or thirst,
or any thing relating to individual conservation or repro-
duction, they at least awaken certain other thoughts founded
on feelings, or emotions ; or they excite us to the contem-
plation of ourselves, attended with a sentiment of approba-
tion or satisfied self-love. Hence it is, that among the poor,
these associations almost always relate to emotions respect-
ing the satisfying of primary wants, or to their children, and
leave always something to be wished for ; while among the
rich, the learned, the poet, the artist, they close in some
object of self-love ; an insatiable passion which disguises
itself in a vast number of shapes, each of an insidious char-
acter, but which we cannot stop to explain in this work.
Among benevolent persons, and among ascetics, the series of
thoughts, excited into action by an object apparently the
most insignificant, are connected with emotions of compas-
sion, or the enjoyment of a heavenly life, or the torments
.of a state of punishment. The philanthropist is conducted
by the same path to that kind of emotion which is peculiar
to him ; and among them all, the idea of resistance or ob-
struction calls up painful emotions connected with fear or
with anger.

These are facts which no person is ignorant of, and I do
not state them for the purpose of giving information to any
body, but to warn those who are strangers to physiology

x All these are clear cases of the association of ideas so admirably ex-
plainer! by Hartley. — Transl.
17

1 130 j

unci pathology, that all these emotions take place in the
same organs, and that none of them are disconnected with
the nervous tissue. The brain, in all these cases, excites
internal nerves; and the nerves which are distributed
through the same viscera from whence proceed the sensa-
tions of hunger, of thirst, the want of respiration, or exon-
eration, are excited together with those viscera ; and some-
times they are excited even more vividly than in the highest
degree of these wants, by the feelings of self-love irritated
or satisfied, by pride, haughtiness, or violence humiliated,
compassion, sorrow, despair, anger, fanaticism, cruelty,
indignation against crime, admiration for virtue, religious
anger, compunction, religious ecstacy, enthusiasm of any
kind ; in a word, by all those emotions which are ranked as
moral, moral sentiments, and principles of action purely intel-
lectual, &c. &c. We may then affirm, after observation made
by means of our senses, on our own bodies and those of
others, that all these associated emotions excited by exter-
nal objects, are, and can be, none other than organic ;* and
that it is not possible to insulate them from the nerves of
which they are modifications, any more than it is possible
to insulate the contraction of a muscle from the fibrine of
which it is a modification.

It is in this character, that the emotions in question are
completely within the jurisdiction of physiology in respect
of their nature, though they may be connected with patho-
logy as to their cause, or with hygienne with respect to
sanitary precautions. They belong also to the moralist, the
publicist, or the legislator from the influence they exert on
social happiness; but to the psychologist they are strangers ;
nor can he usurp any cognizance of them, but through the
hypothetic comparison whose artifice I have already explain-
ed, and which hereafter will serve him in no stead.

All these emotions which resolve themselves into pleas-
ure and pain, constitute the basis of the passions, which are
those durable desires or aversions by which we regulate our
conduct. The term and state called passion, implies two
things : 1st, a series of ideas which occupy us principally,
and by which we regulate all the others : 2dly, emotions
which connect themselves with these ideas, and which are
recalled by, or recall them unceasingly : all to satisfy some
or other of our instinctive wants, or our curiosity, that is.

* This is demonstrated bvHnrilpv. — Trans!

[ im j

the wants created by the feeling of the desire ot' observation.
Without visceral emotions somewhat vivid, man has nothing
but tastes, tendencies, inclinations; but with vivid emotions
he has passions. Two causes destroy or greatly enfeeble
the passions : 1st, one or more series of ideas different from
those which sustain them : that is to say, another system
of conduct dictated by observation and reflection, or impo-
sed by chance or by force. 2dly, The diminution or ces-
sation of those emotions which give rise to the passions in
us ; for example, that of love by a change in the organ
where these emotions are perceived.

The passions of instinctive origin are more difficult to
eradicate in certain conditions of man than the intellectual ;
but it is not so in other conditions. Men whose brains are
well developed, correct or conceal their dominant appetites,
and vice versa. Very often the passions founded on in-
stinct, change their object in consequence of being modified
by the intellect, without ceasing however to be based on
instinct. It is thus that the desire for some one woman
may be converted into a passion for all, or libertinage ; the
passion for certain articles of food or drink, into gluttony or
drunkenness ; or the one and the other of these may put on
the form of epicurism. I will not stop at details : each se-
ries of ideas is accompanied with sensations which become
habits, when we are compelled to act upon them for a long-
time ; and we thus contract factitious tastes which among
men of lively emotions are apt to degenerate into passions.
It is upon this fact, so well known but so seldom reflected
on, that a good education ought in great part to be founded;
but it is not my object to discuss this question : I shall be
content to state it, because it is connected with medicine and
the laws of health ; which ought to be well acquainted with
the nature of man, that they may point out the kind of intel-
lectual and muscular exercise which are fitted for certain
diseased states of the nervous system.

Sec. 7. Cause of the error of the psychologists upon the
principle of action in man.

One may judge on these data, how great is the error of
the psychologists, when they assume as principles of action
independent of the nervous apparatus, any of those emotions
which have their rise in the brain, acting during thought up-
on the nervous system of the viscera. But they notice a
small number only f on which they have not had the pre-

t 132 j

caution to agree) while these assumed principles of action
are really innumerable. They multiply with civilization,
with the progress of the arts, with ornamental literature :
but the real sciences, tend rather to confine their number
than create new varieties. Hence it is, that psychology
which is no science, but a play of the imagination somewhat
like poetry, ceases not and never will cease to multiply
them.

Psychologists may take their course : the observation of
what passes in nature will bring all things to rights. The
kind of stupor which some high-sounding words, pronounced
with emphasis, have produced among the naturalists, who
are employed in the examination of facts — words such as
grandeur of conception, sublimity of view, large, profound,
extended, in opposition to narrow considerations, littleness
of conception, absurdity and what is worse, ridiculous, may
for some time prevent the observers of man from comparing
and concluding. The fear of passing for a man of mean
spirit, is very powerful with some : fears from a very differ-
ent cause have acted upon others ; but all have silently ob-
served and collected the facts which are unknown to the
psychologists ; and some have not been restrained by diffi-
dence or timidity, from the intention of publishing them.
Metaphorical expressions borrowed from material objects,
of which the senses only can give us any idea, are not cal-
culated to serve the purpose of the psychologists in painting
their ontological conceptions. However lofty the eminence
on which these geniuses place themselves to domineer over
the human race — whatever extent they may give to the ho-
rizon which their view can take in from that sublime point
— however profound the abyss placed beneath them —
however long or wide the road traced through the plain
which their sight would pass over — still all this is matter ;
and matter much inferior to that which constitutes the brain
of a man. These figures of speech are not calculated to
raise our nature, to aggrandize our conceptions, or to ena-
ble us to discover objects further than our sight really em-
powers us. The great or the little emotion which the po-
etic psychologist feels in dealing out these pompous images,
proves nothing but the excitation of his own nervous sys-
tem. His consciousness tells him that he experiences em-
otions, and no one has a right to contradict him : but the
proof amounts to nothing but this, and this changes nothing

[ 133 J

m the real nature of the facts. Man is a more noble being
than any other sensible object to which you can compare
him. Employ a metaphor if you please, but you must offer
it for what it is, and you must without anger permit us to
reduce it to what it actually represents, and to what the
senses attest. The fundamental point is to characterise
these facts truly, for after all, we must come to the bottom
of the question. Every expression which when fairly exa-
mined resolves itself into the man himself, under some of the
modifications to which the human system is liable, ought
not to be regarded as relating to a distinct entity, or being
separate from man.

Chapter VII. — How the instinctive and intellectual

PHENOMENA ARE CONNECTED WITH IRRITATION.

To treat this question accurately, we must take the in-
stinctive and intellectual faculties, as they are now reduced
or converted from sepaiate and distinct entities existing in
and by themselves, into phenomena observable by conscious-
ness acting in concert with the senses ; and shew that these
phenomena, are in fact no more than a healthy, normal, and
regular stimulation of the nervose-encephalic apparatus.
When they are thus reduced, or converted, we shall see
clearly how these same phenomena are attached to nervous
irritation ; for this is nothing more than unusual, abnormal
increase of stimulation in the nervous system ; a state, of
which the opposite is abexcitation or defect of stimulation.
This reduction or conversion, can be made without recur-
ring to any hypothesis : and here is the general fact which
we lay down as the foundation whereon to erect our theory
of instinctive and intellectual phenomena, of which we have
already explained the nature.

What we call attention, perception of external objects,
perception of our own thought or consciousness, idea, judge-
ment, reasoning, memory, are not specific faculties, separate
entities inhabiting the brain, put into action by the impres-
sions that proceed from the senses, or by some pretended
internal force independent of them, as has been asserted of
le moi, or of consciousness, and of the memory — they are
no other than varieties of cerebral perception, which we
may observe as facts or phenomena, but which we cannot
venture to explain. Still less are we permitted to adopt
the poetry of metaphysics, and to personify these varieties

[ 134 I

01 modifications, tor the purpose of explaining the superiori-
ty of one over the rest, or the influence they exercise one
over another, as active principles ; for we cannot do this with-
out treating these phenomena as if they were bodies cogni-
zable by the senses, with which in fact they have nothing to
do, for they can resemble nothing but themselves. All this
we have already proved : let us now connect these pheno-
mena still more closely to the nervous system.

The phenomena of perception are double : as to their
origin, they are, 1st, effects of excitation that takes place in
the external senses ; 2dly, effects of excitation that has taken
place in the internal senses, or within the interior of the
tissues. Results of the excitation of the nerves, they are
themselves excitations of the encephalon, reacting on the
same nerves in some manner or other ; and their existence
is of itself full proof of encephalic excitation. The one
makes us acquainted with external objects, the other with
the internal state and affections of the human body : but
for perception, or consciousness to take place, the encepha-
lic apparatus is indispensable in both cases.

It is impossible to conceive (at least in respect to their
origin) that perceptions can be independent of these two
classes of nerves : no facts exist to prove it : whereas their
reproduction by the mere excitation of the encephalon, is a
fact undeniable. Every mode of encephalic excitation that
has existed, may be renewed in the absence of the cause that
first and originally produced it ; and one mode may call up
another; this is memory and the connection f association )
of perceptions : the one and the other may take place un-
der all modes of perception.

Perceptions produced by the excitation of the nerves of
external senses, are more or less clear, and are tied to the
object Avhich determines them. In this point of view they
are called ideas. An idea then, is an excitation in the brain
associated in its origin with a stimulation of some external
sense. Such is the fact : how, this comes to pass, is beyond
human comprehension : still the fact is the same ; and it is
true also, that this excitation in the brain, being there repro-
duced by any cause whatever, different from the original ob-
ject, the idea of this object never fails to arise, and we seem
to see or hear it ; while the mere stimulation of the sensi-
tive organ without the brain to react upon it produces no-
thing. Hypochondria and insanity furnish proofs enough of

the lirst assertion, and the profound sleep ot apoplexy of the
second.

Although the idea cannot be personified, that is, consid-
ered insulated by and in itself, either as an impression made
on the brain, or as an image painted on its substance, or as
an entity of any kind resulting from this personification, yet
it is always characterised to the person perceiving it, as some
material object or as some property of such an object, or as
the mark and sign conventionally substituted for such object
or its properties. This mark or sign, is sometimes in like-
ness of a figure, sometimes of a sound, or less distinctly with
the three other senses : in short, when the objects are ab-
sent, we experience a sort of illusion like the internal repre-
sentation of some simple object, or some scenes which we
have witnessed. This is precisely the proof that the idea*
is nothing more than a stimulation of the brain ; which may
be replaced by the mere excitation of its tissue, in the same
state of stimulation or excitation, which was before occasion-
ed by the object, acting on the senses and by them produced
in the brain. No idea (of any external object) can exist,
but by means of a stimulation made on some external sense.
There is then, in the interior of the brain, a sense corres-
ponding to these kinds of stimulation only ; as there is ex-
ternally a sense corresponding exclusively to certain agents,
essentially and by their nature stimulating, and it is always
according to one and the same law that this is effected.
Hence the impossibility of giving ideas to those in whom this
internal sense is not yet developed ; and hence the difficul-
ty or facility, the clearness or the confusion of ideas, &c.
corresponding to the perfect or imperfect developement of
this internal sense. The perceived impressions produced
on the brain by the stimulated viscera, exciting reaction, are
at first confused : but after some time and in proportion as
life advances, they associate themselves with those per-
ceptions that arise from the senses ; and if they do not pro-
duce ideas peculiar to themselves, they recall by association
those ideas which the senses originate, and which properly
speaking are the only ideas that can arise. Does this dif-
ference proceed from the nerves of the interior, not commu-
nicating directly with the internal sense of ideas, or that the
stimulation they transmit to the encephalon,has no connec-
tion with internal sense ?

*By Idea here lie means what Hartley calls a sensation : vi/. the on-
srinal impression. — Transl.

L »** J

No doubt both causes contribute to this : for on the one
hand every sensible surface, whether internal or external,
has its own peculiar organization ; on the other hand it is
not possible to believe that the stimulations proceeding Irom
the viscera, and which shake so powerfully the encephalic
apparatus, and so imperiously carry with them the will, ap-
proach the cerebral substance at the same point and with the
same delicacy, as those which proceed from the external
senses and which furnish our ideas. The stimulations that
proceed from our external senses and those that proceed from
our internal, differ then in the following particulars. 1st, In
respect of the organization of the nervous expansions which
furnish them. 2dly, With respect to the region of the brain in
which they respectively take place. 3dly, With respect to the
intensity which they possess when they arrive. 4thly , With
respect to the manner in which they agitate the encephalic
mass. We are at a loss for accurate facts on these different
points, but we possess a few data. We know, for instance,
and have longknown, 1st, the portion of the brain where all
the nerves that enter it are inserted. 2dly, That the cen-
tral base of the brain and the whole of the cerebellum are
principally devoted to nutritive and instinctive functions :
comparative anatomy throws much light on this part of phys-
iology as well as on the following, 3dly, that the hemispheres
of the brain constitute that enlargement which is connected
with predominance of intellect. 4thly, That the anterior part
of the brain contributes most powerfully to intellect, and
therefore is the seat of the most delicate portion of our senses
and ideas. The cranioscopists are occupied incessantly in
collecting facts, which tend to particularise the seat of each
series of ideas and each instinctive impulse ; but this labor is
as yet very far from its termination.

What are called appetites are perceptions proceeding
from visceral stimulations, transmitted to the brain, and at-
tended with pleasurable or painful sensations : for the exter-
nal senses alone, afford but few sensations. These emo-
tions constitute instinct : they precede ideas, but never fail
to become associated with them : without this, the appetites
would never be satisfied, though they should stand but in
little need of complicated acts.

The appetites of the psychologists are synonimous with
our instinctive wants: but we prefer the term wants to de-
signate those phenomena, because it applies to the desire"

[ m j

of exoneration, of exercise, of repose, of sleep, of individual
conservation, all of which are on the same line with the ap-
petites of nutrition, reproduction, respiration, heat, cold, &c.
Every man who experiences a want, feels pleasure or pain;
and all artificial pains resolve themselves into wants. Thus
it is that the skin, exposed to superabundant caloric, feels
the want of cold; a wound, a contortion, &c. the want of
ease from pain. But such is the character of wants, that
the viscera partake of them more or less ; that is, we suffer
or we enjoy in the splanchnic apparatus and more especially
near the centre, upon every occasion when we feel a want
well characterised.

So soon as the body which is calculated to satisfy the
want, is in contact with the external senses, the want which
was vague before, becomes now distinct and precise ; the
act is executed by cerebral innervation as we have already
seen, if some moral cause does not oppose it. What I
would particularly remark on this occasion is, the associa-
tion that takes place between the agreeable or disagreeable
perception of the want, with the idea of the body that satis-
fies it. This association may commence at birth, or even
before, by the impressions made on the skin of the foetus,
or by the feeling of uneasiness that accompanies certain at-
titudes of the body, and compels motions to take place in
consequence. Be it as it may, these first ideas are too ob-
tuse, too little compared with others, for consciousness to
notice them afterward. They remain like those of the deaf
and blind by birth, in whom the objects give no knowledge
of their like. But in proportion as the cerebral sense of
ideas becomes enlarged, as the external senses become de-
veloped, and ideas multiply, association becomes extended,
and the emotions that occupy us, finally connected with the
idea of a body, become motives of all those actions whose
end is the satisfaction of instinctive wants, relating either to
self conservation or reproduction.

In time the connection becomes so strong between the
objects that strike the senses and and the emotions that
take their rise in the viscera, that all these emotions recall
sensible ideas and vice versa : but when the internal emo-
tions become too multiplied, the objects of sense are not suf-
ficiently numerous to furnish each of them with an idea.
Hence the same idea becomes associated with several shades
IS

[ 1*8 J

of internal perception, agreeable and disagreeable, that is to
say, with emotions but in a manner very variable, according
to the nature of each.

One would hardly believe that the number of emotions
could surpass those of ideas, buton a little reflection it will be
impossible to doubt this. In the beginning of life, theprepon-
derance is evidently in favor of emotions, as appears from the
multiplied and generally fruitless efforts of the infant, during
all the time that he is endeavoring to acquire the knowledge
of words; that is, to associate his emotions with those ideas of
which persons are teaching him the signs. The adult, heal-
thy and quiet, the peasant, the savage, do not seem to wish
for more expressions than they are acquainted with ; but
let some passion agitate them, they will torment themselves
to express all the shades of it ; they will produce a hundred
times over the same expressions in different combinations ;
till satisfied of the impossibility of expressing all their feel-
ings, they will complain of the poverty of language, that is,
of the small number of ideas known to their fellow-men and
to which they have associated sensible signs. This kind of
embarrassment appears in the letters of lovers, in the works
of all poets, and all writers of impassioned prose. It is this
paucity of ideas that compels them to have recourse to
transpositions of the sense, and to metaphors, of which I
have indicated the conveniences and inconveniences before.
Nevertheless, this is nothing to be compared to the abun-
dance of the metaphysicians ; they surpass in figures of
speech, all lovers, all orators, the most impassioned, and all
poets the most inspired ; not only because, like them,
they would express all their emotions, but because, also,
they are determined to express the why and the wherefore.
A barrier ought to stop them ; I mean, the number of clear,
intelligible ideas. But, hurried away by the passion of dis-
covery, they soon break through ; and whenever they begin
to forget that metaphors are nothing more than forms of
words — whenever they give themselves the license to trans-
form words into things — a new world, as they say them-
selves, opens to their view. In truth, this world to them is
vast, for the objects that fill it, are all the signs of things in
this ; each with twenty significations, different from those
that we assign to them, and with the possibility of receiving
as many more as the caprice of these new creators mav
sec fit.

[ 139 ]

It is b^ no means in the spirit of criticism, but in compli-
ance with reality, that I place all the hypochondriacs, and all
the neuropathies, who border upon insanity, by the side of
the metaphysicians : both classes, in fact, find themselves
under the necessity of torturing the sense of words ; but it
is the metaphysicians only, who voluntarily put themselves
in this situation.

What we call desires, are nothing more than perceptions,
accompanied with pleasure or pain, but which deduce their
origin from stimulations made upon the senses, and the ideas
that thence result.

Desires show themselves while man gives himself up to
the impulse of curiosity, which becomes developed with the
faculty of having ideas. But as the pleasure, or pain of de-
sire, cannot become intense without the brain, of which it is
only one mode of excitation, stimulating the viscera, the
emotions of appetite soon join themselves to desires ; or
rather, the appetites furnish to desires a new degree of ac-
tivity, by adding visceral to cerebral excitation.

Desires have been separated from appetites, because they
have a different origin, and an object more elevated. One
cannot help applauding this distinction, even when applying
it to certain appetites best characterised. However little
mixture there is of desire for intellectual enjoyment with
the appetite for sensual enjoyment, it is well to choose an
expression which draws the curtain over this last idea ; for
it is intelligence that elevates man above animals. It is for
this reason that the modern word gourmandise, is objection-
able. In what grade of civilization would you place a man,
who solicited the hand of a young lady, from parents grave
and sedate, in telling them that he had an appetite for the
attractions of their daughter ? He jnanifests to them the
desire he has of passing his life with her, because he is
charmed with her grace, her intelligence, her good disposi-
tion, &c. We should substitute, as much as possible in our
intercourse, the expression of desire to that of appetite,
which seems rather to place us in the rank of animals, and
has, moreover, an expression in it of selfishness. These
kinds of distinctions are conducive to social order ; but the
physiologist ought not to forget, that while desire implies
no more than a mere wish for intellectual enjoyment, which
the faculty of observation procures for us, it can only con-
sist in slight emotions, and that by consequence whenever

L ^ u J

desires manifest themselves by a forcible expression, there
is something more than simple desire ; there is truly appe-
tite, or rather, physical want, and it is thus that the passions
are formed ; but they commence in two manners, sometimes
by simple desire, to which pppetite joins itself, and some-
times appetite is the occasion of developing the desire.

The desire arising from the instinct of observation, (curi-
osity) according to what we have advanced, ought to belong
to the brain. Appetite always proceeds from an excitation
of some of the other viscera ; but as perception implies that
this excitation is repeated in the brain, one may say, that
desire and appetite have this organ in common, and that
they are excited and sustained by its means.

It is thus that excitation passes and repasses incessantly
from instinct to intellect, and from intellect to instinct. This
is to be sure, speaking figuratively, but I use it to prevent
long explanations. Suppressing however this form of speak-
ing, the following facts will always remain, which the senses
and the consciousness of the observer may simultaneously
verify: 1st, the other viscera stimulated by causes foreign
to the brain, excite this viscus instinctively and intellectu-
ally ; and it reacts upon them. 2dly, the brain, stimulated
intellectually, excites the other viscera instinctively, which
react upon the brain : all with different shades of pain or
pleasure.

It is this reciprocity of influence of instinct upon intellect
and vice versa, which when prolonged, constitute the pas-
sions. We have in fact found there an instinctive want so-
liciting the intellect, which is incessantly labouring to find
out the means of satisfying it. It is so in love, in gourman-
dise, in drunkenness ; passions instinctive in their origin, of
which the indulgence calculated by a subservient intellect,
furnishes so many depraved and degrading taste a and hab-
its. This is indeed the shameful agreement of the flesh and
the spirit, becoming a system of conduct.

It will be attempted in vain to refute this explanation by
urging that there are passions purely intellectual. The
most intellectual are those that have for their origin self love,
or the pleasure a man receives on contemplating himself in
comparison with other men ; a kind of pleasure that he man-
ifestly owes to the remarks excited by his instinctive curi-
osity. Such are pride, ambition, love of power, of riches,
of honors, of academic crowns, of eulogies collected at the

L 14! J

tribunes, of the esteem of honest men, vanity, emulation,
respect of our fellow men, the point of honor, envy, jealousy,
&c., passions where we see nothing but varieties of a com-
mon sentiment or feeling. This sentiment is the want we
experience of self-satisfaction, or the want of those internal
emotions which are agreeable to us, or aversion for those of
an opposite character.

It is true that an attempt has been made to erect the sen-
timents that predominate in our passions, into so many dis-
tinct principles of action, constituting them distinct entities
sui generis, and destined to put man into action : but these
entities have no peculiar privileges over those which we
have already prostrated. The physiologist can see nothing
in an agreeable or painful emotion which serves as a pivot
to the passion, or as the motive to action in man, but some
form of excitation of the nervous system ; and the more
nearly we observe men, the more shall we be convinced, that
these motives owe their power over the will, to the part
acted by the viscera. In fact, self love, when satisfied, oc-
casions joyful emotions ; if wounded, sorrowful ones,
which are soon followed by anger. But these three sensa-
tions, whose origin is in the encephalbn, are constantly fol-
lowed by a stimulation of the visceral nerves, which being
transmitted again instantly to the encephalon, is the secret
power which produces decision and determines our actions.

Sometimes, it may be said, we have as a secret motive,
the prospect of future enjoyment, or the wish to escape
from some imminent pain : but the one idea,* is actually
agreeable, and the other, actually painful ; which in fact
makes the motive the same as in the preceding case, when
you reflect on it physiologically. In whatever manner you
turn the question round, a full investigation will always
produce this alternative, viz : we give way to an instinctive
want, or to an intellectual want : and in those cases where
the latter is sufficiently strong, to prevent our giving way to
the former, it owes this superiority to its producing an exci-
tation in the same viscera, whence the instinctive want ari-
ses ; an excitation of a different nature from its own.

* Broussais uses the word idea ambiguously : sometimes for the per-
ceived impression of an external object ; and sometimes for an internal
sensation. Hartley uses sensation for the first, and idea for the recur-
rence of a similar stimulation by memory or association. Hartley was not
aware of (ho extent of visceral sensations and associations. — TransL

I 142 J

The excitation wherein consists the calculation or inter-
nal debate, always takes place in the encephalon ; every
idea is successively produced ; and that which produces
the strongest visceral agitation determines the act. Hence
it is, that men differ so much in their tastes, their propensi-
ties, their passions, according as they are carried away by
such or such a predominant organic appetite, or that they
give themselves up habitually, to this or that class of emo-
tions. Tastes alter as the state of the viscera alter. Those
of digestion and generation provoke a train of ideas which
it is impossible to repel. The heart and the lungs excite
others. In chronic diseases also, the character changes ; but
in general, we may lay it down as a principle, that the more
the encephalon is developed in those parts assigned as the
seat of intellect, and the more energy a man bestows on
that region of the brain, by the culture of his moral faculties,
the more habitually will he obey the emotions that proceed
from the desire of observation, (curiosity) and the less is he
enslaved by the emotions of conservation and reproduction.
But this culture of the intellect, may bring on a crowd of
artificial passions. By despising instinctive movements,
man abandons himself to spiritualism, and pays no attention
to realities : he reduces himself by fastings and by watch-
ings ; he imposes upon himself painful attitudes ; he tears
his flesh ; and subjects himself to torture to propitiate a di-
vinity of his own creation. In other cases, we see man
braving death, to obey either a secret motive of self love, an
enthusiastic patriotism, filial affection, or some other distinct
passion. He becomes enamoured, sometimes of one form
of government, sometimes of another ; and he does not al-
ways keep himself within proper bounds : he embraces, by
a kind of moral contagion, founded on the emotions which
he experiences, sometimes the part of an orator; sometimes
of a poet, a philosopher, or of an actor ; and he becomes
transported with hatred and with anger, against those who
do not agree with him in opinion. What excites him more
particularly, is the supposed interest of religion, and above
all, the certainty of eternal happiness according to his wish-
es and his habits. It is for this reason that the followers of
Mahomet are the most fanatic of the human race ; and, are
the most disposed to acts of atrocity, to obtain, from the di-
vinity some kind of happiness, of which they have framed
to themselves an idea.

[ 143 ]

All the artificial passions arc fed partly by a certain train
oi ideas, which chance has rendered permanent, and partly
by emotions of the nervous system, pleasant or unpleasant..
These emotions are always the same ; they are those which
our first wants create ; and they are rendered more intense,
when they are left unsatisfied. They are at the service of
all those trains of ideas, which governments succeed in im-
posing upon the multitude, who have not the liberty of culti-
vating their intellects as they please : for wherever there
is liberty of investigation, and liberty of the press, the ob-
servation of nature will, sooner or later, lead men on the
road to truth.

The roads that lead to truth are not chimerical, for they
have as their basis, the organization of man, and the nature
of the objects that summoned him. With freedom of in-
struction, and freedom of the press, no error can long pre-
vail ; for he who has best used his talent for observation,
will necessarily obtain the assent of all persons well organ-
ized. There will be, to be sure, partial obstacles, general-
ly local, arising from literary bodies, from coteries, from per-
sons in public credit, from orators, &c. But what are all
these obstacles, compared to time ? Men, in whom these illu-
sory trains of ideas have acquired too much influence over
their nervous system, to permit them to yield, or who believe
their honor interested to be unbending, will disappear, with-
out intellectual posterity of their own description, while the
cause of liberty and the sciences, continues to progress. In
proportion as this takes place, poetical and oratorical lan-
guage loses its literal signification : they are insensibly re-
duced to a metaphorical jargon, a kind of hieroglyphic,
whose proper interpretation constitutes part of the educa-
tion of youth, in a well governed state ; and this is true lo-
gic. This language has intruded itself among the sciences,
from whence it ought to be banished. Chemistry and Na-
tural Philosophy were the first to execute justice upon it.
Medicine is becoming freed from it, by her connexion with
physiology : general philosophy is still infected with it ; but
we are touching upon the time when it will be gotten rid
of, by giving up the theory of the human intellect to physi-
ology, and by explaining frankly according to the real fact,
the forms of expression it is compelled to employ, instead
of presenting them mysteriously, as so many distinct and
separate beings.

[ 144 j

This question is strongly connected with our subject; i'oi
'he type of intellectual excitation, or the degree of that ex-
citation which least disturbs the nervous system, is that
which corresponds to the truth : in other words, that which
a man ought chiefly to guard against in the exercise of his
intellectual faculties, whether in respect of his health, or the
moral consequences of his actions, are those excitations of
his brain which are determined by the contemplation of, or
the search after illusions.

Among the passions of intellectual origin, one of the most
illusory of them, avarice, occupies a distinguished rank :
the fear of wanting the necessaries of life, seems to consti-
tute the fundamental sentiment of this passion : then comes
a love of money ; the representative sign of all the enjoy-
ments of life ; the desire of amassing it, and the continual
fear of losing it. Sentiments which induce the avaricious
man to commit actions so mean, that their ridiculous char-
acter escapes nobody but the miser himself.

Avarice belongs to the nature of man ; for it is only pru-
dence pushed to excess in the means of providing for the
necessaries of life. There are many kinds of avarice ; as
many as there are of instinctive and intellectual wants. One
man is avaricious of his wine, another of his houses or dogs,
another of his books, his medals, or any source of self grati-
fication. But the avaricious man properly so called, differs
from the rest, in being in a state of intellectual derange-
ment, in such a way that the possession of the sign becomes
of itself a substitute for all the enjoyments which that sign
can procure. Remark too, that it takes a considerable time
for this illusion to become confirmed ; that is, for all other
ideas to be merged in the possession of the sign of wealth.
But while the avaritious man is hurried on by this secret
propensity, and gives himself up without perceiving it to this
species of Ontology, his force decreases ; he feels that the
means of acquiring are about to leave him ; fear, which is the
foundation of avarice, increases daily, and ends by being
carried to its extreme degree. Hence poets and artists
who would represent avarice in excess, always choose as
models, meagre old men, whose appearance gives the idea
of sneaking caution, and apprehension. Although a depress-
ing passion, it has its periods of violent reaction and even
of rage, after which this passion refalls into the habit of fear
which belongs to it, now and then interrupted by bursts of

t 145]

anger. We place it among the disturbing exciters oi the
nervous system, which tend to increase excitement into ir-
ritation.

These researches into the nervous excitations which be-
come motives to our actions, naturally lead us to the will,,
considered also as a nervous excitement tending to irrita-
tion.

What we mean by the ivill, is a mode or manner of ence-
phalic excitation, in consequence of other modes of excite-
ment termed perceptions, and of others also called emotions.
It is characterised to the person who experiences it within
himself by a perception of consciousness, and to a stranger
by muscular motion. What proves that the will is truly a
mode of cerebral excitation is, that 1st, whenever this
cerebral excitation is increased, so is the will. 2dly, When
one is diminished, so is the other. 3dly, Whenever the ex-
citation of the brain, is interrupted or shackled by a quan-
tity of fluid that stops its movements, the will disappears
together with all the modes of perception and emotion be-
longing to cerebral excitation. Nothing then remains but
the instinctive mode of the same excitation in its obscurest
shade, in that which permits nothing but the perception of
the want of breathing, and the reaction of the brain which
transmits innervation to the respiratory muscles. If for the
purpose of objection, any one should connect this perception
and this reaction of the lowest scale of instinct with intellec-
tual perceptions and the will, this would be for us another
reason for seeing nothing in the will but an encephalic ex-
citation. There is no occasion for thus approaching it in
order to embrace this view of the subject ; the facts them-
selves compel it. But we must not make the impossibility
of explaining the fact an objection to the existence of the
fact itself. The labours of many physiologists of the pre-
sent day, tend, with more or less success, to connect with
certain regions of the encephalon, the different modes of
excitation of which I have just spoken ; as well as the fol-
lowing.

Muscular action is always, during life, the effect of the
excitation of nervous matter, upon the fibrine of which the
muscles are composed ; but, as we have already seen, the
encephalon does not always intervene ; it has the direct
government of the motions of the respiratory, locomotive,
and vocal muscles: but it ent^trrniK jndirootlv only, the ac«

10

t 146 ]

tion of the muscles of the viscera, by transmitting excitation
throughout the whole nervous system, and furnishing it to
the nerves belonging to those muscles. Hence it is, that
when it is greatly excited, there is a surplus of contractility
throughout all the muscles of the body ; hence convulsions
in the voluntary muscles; spasm, and convulsive oscilla-
tions in the visceral muscles ; and then the will being over-
powered, is compelled to transmit a surplus of innervation
to the muscles under its command, or else it disappears by
excess of irritation, to give place to a morbid, instinctive ex-
citation of the brain, which determines the motion of these
muscles, either with, or without convulsions. These phe-
nomena may depend on the too active influence of other
viscera upon the brain, without having been excited by the
will ; but very often, also, they show themselves by intel-
lectual stimulation, in the more violent and active passions;
in anger, and at the moment when the will, which has
brought them into play, seems to have most intensity. This
is, as if we should say that the cerebral excitation to which
we give the name of will, disappears by its own excess,
when carried too far ; but it is not alone in this condition :
all the other modes of excitation, considered as intellectual,
become more or less depraved, and annihilated through the
same cause, as we shall see in treating of insanity and its
consequences.

This imports that none of the intellectual faculties can
manifest themselves but within certain limits of cerebral
excitation; beyond those limits, this excitation produces
nothing but delirium, and actions which we are accustomed to
refer to instinctive movements of the most brutal descrip-
tion : below them, the intellectual phenomena of the person
observed diminish in intensity, cease to correspond with
those of the person observing, lose themselves in idiocy,
or become mingled with the most simple instinctive acts,
or disappear, leaving nothing but these behind. This is
what the progress of old age insensibly brings on, if disease
does not produce this state of things prematurely.

Such are the phenomena of nervous action, considered
under almost all its varieties and shades ; nor is it difficult
to bring under the same point of view, those which have not
been particularly designated. It is thus that we ought to
consider nervous action, and not in a general manner, or bv
meeting it into one or more distinct entities, or personified

L 147 J

abstractions. It is in the manner 1 have now indicated, that
moralists, legislators, and physiologists, may determine the
limits which separate their respective occupations. For
myself, whose principle object here, is to lay a solid basis
for the doctrine of irritation, I shall add only a few words
more on the phenomena of nervous excitation, considered in
itself.

On nervous excitation, considered in itself.

What is there of a material nature, that passes into the
nerves, and into the brain, to enable them to execute their
functions, independent of the molecular affinities, which
support the nerves and the brain with all their known pro-
perties ? It is here, as I have already said, that the great
mystery of the economy of life resides ; for the first impul-
sion which puts into action the vital forces, is to be found in
the half liquid animal matter which constitutes the nervous
system, and of which the neurilema of the nerves, the mem-
branes of the encephalon, and the dermoid covering of the
membranes of relation, are nothing more than the vehicles,
or if you please, the vessels and the support. Here it is,
that we are stopped ; here it is, that none of our senses can
penetrate ; it is here, in this albuminous substance, that the
unknown cause of life, of instinct, and of intellect, connects
itself with our system ; but remember, that in the adult,
this connection is effectuated on the membranes of relation,
all of which are sensitive surfaces; and that the most essen-
tial of these relations take place upon the surface of the
mucous membrance. This is a fact of great importance for
the physiological physician, inasmuch as it leads him to con-
clude that the nervous matter which is intermingled, (no one
knows how, ) in these tissues with the sanguineous matter,
is one of the principal means of conservation, and ought, by
consequence, to be considered as one of the principal cau-
ses of disease and of death. When excitation is too vivid
in these seats of internal sensation, especially in the two
great passages of relation constituted of these materials, viz.
the internal bronchial surface, and that of the stomach, one
may distinguish in them a redness accompanied by a greater
warmth than usual, owing to an excitation beyond the nor-
mal limits.

We cannot make observations on excitation in the imper-
ceptible canals of the neurilema, through which it passes
in following the nervous pulp to arrive at the brain from the

[ 148 J

surfaces oi relation, to return to the muscles, and to pa&>
from one of the viscera to another, &c. The motions that
take place in these circumstances, we have not been able to
observe by means of any instrument : it is, however, an ob-
ject well worth pursuing. But if our senses cannot distin-
guish this kind of motion, we are in possession of an anatom-
ical fact that enables us to draw conclusions. When a
nerve has caused considerable pain, and produced many
convulsions during life, when in short it has performed its
functions not in an ordinary but an extraordinary manner,
we find the neurilima injected with blood, or lymph, and
sometimes ossified : aud the nervous ganglions are red and
tumified more than ordinarily in the dead bodies of persons
whose nerves they surround, and which have been for a
long time subject to supernormal innervation. From these
facts, we may conclude, that the inflammation of the nervous
substance properly so called, is accompanied with inflamma-
tion of the sanguineous capillaries and the lymphatics, which
subserve to the nutriment of the neurilema and aid the
functions of the nerve.

The changes produced by excitation are more easy to be
seized in the substance of the encephalon. It is within
the purview of our senses, that this substance reddens, be-
comes injected with blood, and heated in a remarkable man-
ner when it acts with remarkable energy, whether in the
phenomena of thought, or in that kind of innervation on
which muscular action depends. The atrophy which it may
suffer after hypertrophy, is common to all hypertrophies and
evidently produced by excitation, and which confirms rather
than weakens this proposition.

All these facts establish the coincidence between sanguin-
eous and nervous excitation. But we know that alterna-
tions of contraction and relaxation exist in the excitation of
vessels of whatever kind : we may, therefore, assume
that this belongs to all kinds of excitation in the ner-
vous apparatus ; and we may assume this the more safely,
as we know that the nerves and the encephalon can act but
for a short time without the aid of the circulating blood. The
nervous substance, however, possesses an action peculiarly
its own ; what is that action ?

We have already shewn that the encephalon yields and
returns upon itself in the direction of the white fibres : here
then is a powerful datum in favour of an oscillatorv move-

[ *49 j

ineut, when the nervous substance is excited, independent
of the contractility of the vessels and the cellular membra-
neous lamince which penetrate it, surround it, embrace it,
sustain it, and which cannot but oscillate and become agi-
tated with it. We shall find this fact again in the history
of insanity.

Whether any thing else takes place than these contrac-_
tile agitations in the phenomena of nervous excitation ;
whether caloric, electricity, or any other imponderable fluid
modifies or supports life, otherwise than by putting in play
this contractility in the nervous substance, and the fluid
molecules in contact with it, we know not even how to con-
jecture. It is possible that on this earliest stage of life, phe-
nomena of affinities, transformations of the fluid essential to
the nervous substance, if there be any such nervous fluid,
may take place, as does in fact take place in the blood which
traverses it to supply nourishment and means of action : but
it is far wiser to stop than to frame conjectures and hypoth-
eses on this first cause of innervation. Although in the
phenomena of consciousness, nervous excitation perceives
itself acting, it is by no means likely that it can perceive
also its relation with the first governing cause of all things.
This kind of knowledge has not yet been obtained from any
observation of nature, and it is not likely to be obtained from
physiology. We may presume this, 1st, because to the
present day man has never perceived any thing but materi-
al bodies and their properties — bodies which are not him-
self. 2dly, that his perception of bodies is confined to such
as his external senses can take cognizance of. 3dly, be-
cause his perception of his own viscera is confused ; and he
has no ideas of them but such as are formed from the obser-
vations made by his external senses. 4thly, because the
perception of his own thought is reduced to a single fact
which he can neither multiply or fecundate ; for beyond the
assertion, J perceive that I perceive, (or I feel that I feel) he
has not one other assertion to make on the subject, which
does not belong to the perceptions he has received, by the
senses situated on the surface of his body.

Chapter VIII — On the part which excitation acts

IN THE PRODUCTION OF DISEASE.

Having described the phenomena of excitation, such as
we conceive them to be, and such as others ought to con-

[ 150 j

sider them who study by aid of their senses, we are led to
ascertain how this excitation may deviate from its usual and
natural (normal) state and become abnormal or diseased.

Excitation becomes weaker with time, so that life would
cease if new stimulants did not come perpetually to renew
excitation. Hence, beyond doubt, the maladies of debility,
numerous enough, but which Brown and his followers have
singularly exaggerated and multiplied. To indicate the
origin of these maladies, is to put ourselves on the road of
discovery for those of an opposite character.

Sec. 1st. How defect of excitation produces abirritative
diseases.

We have already seen that there are two excitants, w 7 hose
absence would speedily bring on destruction, oxygen for
the lungs, and caloric of temperature or free caloric for the
skin. Recalling what has been explained on nervous exci-
tation, we shall be aware that these two excitants exercise
their first action on the surfaces of relation, and that it is
thence rapidly conducted along the nerves to the brain,
which transmits it by other nerves* throughout the system.
Nor must we lose sight of the introduction of oxygen into
the blood, and perhaps of the penetration and progression of
caloric or some other imponderable substance into the ca-
pillary canals of the nervous system. f With the aid of these

* Every organ of the living body, be it large or small, executes its own
peculiar functions, and not those appropriated to any other organ. Two
distinct functions are never performed by one and the same organ. Each
has its own business and duty. Thus, every stimulation that excites to
muscular action for any purpose whatever, may be termed a motive, or a
volilion. This may originate in the ganglionic system of nerves ; but if
it be not sudden and instinctive, and nevertheless requires the aid o fthe
voluntary muscles, it must be first propogated to the cerebral center.
In every nervous fasciculus communicating with the brain, however small,
there is one nerve destined to indicate the state of the internal viscera,
and transmit to the brain stimulations that take place in the ganglionic
system, and another that transmits from the brain nervous stimulation to
the muscles of voluntary motion to excite them into the required action.
This has been proved by direct experiment, by Bell, and Majendie, and
confirmed by the cases of Mr. Broughion. See Johnson's Med. and
Chir. Review, No. 29, for July, 1787, p. 200, See also the review of
Descot, in the number for Ap. 1827, p. 425. The same opinion is adopt-
ed by M. M. Torres, Manec, Martin, &LC.—Transl.

1 1 find in the number of the Globe, of Ap. 1828, while correcting the
proof this page, that M. Dulrochet has made experiments of which the re-
sult is, that there exists in the living body an inlra-capillary electricity, to
which the movement of the bodily fluids is to be ascribed.

The contact of the liquids electrises the solids, and the organic sensi-
bilitv of the living solids is nothing more than the property of receivinjr

[ 161 ]

recollections, the observer may frame to himself an idea,
of the deficiency which will arise in the sum or amount of

mtra-capilkiry electricity, which is the real agent of the vegetative, or or-
ganic life. These experiments according to M. Dutrochet, will also prove
that the solids and the liquids have one and the same property, to wit : the
capillary electric, which he terms activity ; a word which must take the
place of sensibility, which is consigned exclusively to the psychologists.

During a long time past, organic sensibility has been reduced to irri-
tability of the fibre — its property of contracting under the influence of
stimulants: we have long known that electricity determines muscular
contraction, and it would be easy to suppose that it acts equally on other
forms of animal matter. We have expressed this opinion in the text.
But whether irritability be brought into play by one agent or another, the
question remains the same. The electricity communicated by the fluids
to the solids, must be an electricity modified by the state of life, and not
by the principal agent of the organic life. Suppose it to give an impulse
in the living capillaries, this may be conceived, if we allow at the same
time that it is modified by the state of life, as well as the attraction of
masses, caloric, and the molecular affinities of which %e find traces in
living bodies : for we may presume that no one will attribute to this new
electricity of M. Dutrochet, all the transformations of living matter, the
appropriations of certain molecules to certain tissues, the rejection of
others, the manner, the duration, and the measure of developement of an
the forms of animal matter that compose the living body, &c. Since nei-
ther common chemistry, nor caloric, that excellent excitant of all nature,
can explain the phenomena of vegetative or organic life, it is not likely
that intercapillary electrization will prove more successful. Should the
experiments of M. Dutrochet be confirmed, we can only assert in that
case of electricity what we dare not yet assert of it; that it is now shewn
to figure among the instruments of life, as has long ago been asserted of all
the other natural phenomena observed among living beings. But one
common fact will always remain to all these phenomena ; viz. that nei-
ther one or another of them can be regarded as the regulator of vegetative
or organic life ; for the moment it predominates over the others in a liv-
ing body, life Avill be destroyed. Life is an unknown modification of all
the phenomena of nature which our senses make known to us, and doubt-
less of others also whereof we can have no idea ; it is not one or the
other of these exclusively. Although we cannot say what it is, we can
observe, and arrange in some regular order the appearances it presents,
as we discover them. In this work an attempt has been made to pursue
this method in arranging the phenomena of contractility and innervation,
in order to arrive at the knowledge of irritation ; that is, the disturbances
produced in the animal economy by those agents, which render the phe-
nomena of life more or less strongly marked than they are in their regu-
lar normal state.

As to the complaisance with which certain physicians have lately pro-
posed to abandon sensibility to the psychologists, it is founded no doubt
on the belief they entertain that this phenomenon is still considered as a
property of nervous matter. But the idea first entertained by Vic d' Azir
10 rank it among the functions, has been since fortified by too great a
number of proofs not to be generally adopted, and to leave no hold for the
spiritualists. See also the explanations on this subject in the first chan-
ter, and in the chapter preceding thie.

[ 152 ]

excitation, when these two excitants come to be wanting to
the animal economy, and the difficulty which nutrition will
experience in keeping up all the tissues, and particularly
the nervous, in that state of vigor which the exercise of their
functions require. In fact, the oxygen which the blood ab-
sorbs by means of the lungs, is the cause of the temperature
peculiar to animals, that is to say, furnishes them with calor-
ic internally. But moreover, they require to be excited
externally by free caloric, or at least that the media by
which they are surrounded, have caloric enough not to ab-
sorb too rapidly that portion which the body disengages
while discharging its functions. We may then say, that ex-
citability is only kept up by means of these two agents : that
it languishes so soon as their influence diminishes, and it
becomes extinguished when that influence disappears en-
tirely. Matf in this case dies without having lost any of his
substance ; he has lost nothing but the aptitude of living,
that is the aptitude of being excited. Such are asphyxies
from want of respirable air, from hanging (and drowning)
wherein man loses nothing but oxygen ; but in drowning
he loses also his caloric ; so also in death by excessive cold
of the atmosphere, which depends on the too rapid sub-
straction of caloric without defect of oxygen.

After the deprivation of this double source of excitement,
comes that of the aliments ; but the want of nourishment is
less urgent than the want of caloric ; for a man may accu-
mulate blood and other fluids that may serve the purposes
of nutrition for .a while ; but he cannot thus accumulate
caloric in the solids and the fluids, without danger of life.
At all times the excitation which these aliments and bever-
age exercise on the digestive organs, being among the means
by which excitability is supported, as well as the vital ener-
gy of the human creature during his extra-uterine life, if
their aid fails, changes take place in the animal economy
which lead to disease. To the languor of the vital forces,
is added the uneasiness resulting from the privation of a
necessary stimulant, and irritation joins itself to the diminu-
tion of nutritive materials, to hurry on death accompanied by
dreadful suffering.

The blood and other humors, produced by digestion, are,
as we have seen, the natural excitants of the internal tissues
which these fluids pervade. We may remember that this
excitation is the only one which supports the functions of

[ 153 ]

Uie lcetus, not yet habituated to external stimulants, and this
is enough to shew its importance. The subtraction of
blood and the other humors, like the subtraction of food,
diminishes excitation, and many of the morbid states that
depend upon it. If this subtraction be rapid, nature revolts,
and irritation takes place, as in the diseases produced by
hunger, but in a somewhat different Way. The most hor-
rible convulsions precede the last hour of those who die ot
hemorrhage, if we do not begin by diminishing or destroy-
ing their excitability. It is for the purpose of preventing
these convulsions, that butchers knock down by a blow on
the head, the animals, before they bleed them. The violent
stimulation exercised on the brain, by the viscera, deprived
suddenly of the blood necessary to their functions, seems to
depend on the same general law, viz. that all our wants,
those of addition and repletion, as well as those of exonera-
tion, make their appeal to the encephalon by the phenome-
non of excitation. In other words, not figurative, wherever
nervous matter is in want of its regular normal excitants, it
contracts, if it be living an irregular abnormal mode of exci-
tation, which is propagated along the nervous cords to the
encephalon. In all these cases, death, for want of normal
excitement, is brought on by irregular abnormal excitement ;
and while certain organs are in this state of negative exci-
tation, (abexcitation) such as the limbs, the organs of the
sense, and the viscera of the second rank, the organs of the
first importance expend the remains of their vitality in exag-
gerated innervation. Such is the law, and we ought care-
fully to bear it in mind ; for we find it among the sick, who
are frequently bled, and among those who submit to want of
food, for the sake of conquering an obstinate inflammation.
To be ignorant of this, is to injure the sick, and to prepare
for ignorance and charlatanism, a triumph which they never
fail to abuse.

The slow, but continual subtraction of circulating fluids,
brings on debility and death without reaction. Animals treat-
ed by narcotics, can also support hemorrhage, even to the
extinction of life, without reaction or convulsions.

In general, we may say that the excitations just now stated,
being the only ones indispensable to the support of human
life, nothing but their subtraction can bring on direct lan-
guor and debility. But man is always subject to another
kind of excitement, of which the privation may become ex-
20

[ i&* j

tremely painful : I mean the excitation he receives in hit
external senses, by the view of nature, and the relations he
necessarily bears to all other living beings, especially his fel-
low creatures, during the exercise of his several func-
tions. In fact, as we have already said, it is in seeking
nourishment, in trying to escape the influence of heat and of
cold, in avoiding the causes of destruction that menace him
on all sides, in performing the several acts of reproduction
and conservation of himself and his offspring, that man receives
moral excitations, and converts them into a habit and a want.

The modifications of intellect, though infinitely varied in
their sources and their shades, are resolved, as we have
seen, into an excitation of the nerves and the senses trans-
mitted to the brain, and thence reflected upon all the move-
able tissues of the animal economy. This excitation then,
proceeds and joins others produced by other causes, and mo-
difies them more or less ; that is to say, it influences the dis-
tribution of the fluids, their temperature, their assimilation,
nutrition, muscular motion, &c. &c. Nevertheless, its princi-
pal action is in the nervous system, which contracts a habit
to such a degree, that the want of this excitation produces a
state of languor, which may be the cause of a diseased state
of the system, wherein we always trace the presence of irri-
tation ; and this is the necessary result of that reaction which
the subtraction of excitants produces, in subjects who have
not been previously deprived of irritability. Let us now see
how this subtraction of various stimulants can produce dis-
eases of irritation.

Sec. 2. How the defect of excitation produces irritative
disease.

We have already said that man cannot live but by means
of excitation, but this, whatever be the cause, has a tenden-
cy to become weak after a certain time ; so that life would
inevitably be extinguished, if new stimulations were not ap-
plied continually to renew and keep up excitation. Such is
the general fact, applicable to all excitations. The extinc-
tion of life does not always take place with the same prompt-
itude. That depends on the kind and importance of the
excitants whose absence menaces life. The subtraction
of oxygen produces directly and quickly an extinction of ex-
citability and by consequence of excitation. No reaction
can take place here, because reaction is founded on excita-
bility which cannot be kept up without oxygen : but in a

[ 155 ]

great number of other cases this reaction is displayed, ami
produces diseases of irritation consecutive on sedation* or
secondary, which we did but slightly touch upon in treating
of diseases produced by direct debility.

The subtraction of external caloric when complete and
rapid, produces death like the privation of oxygen accom-
panied by great cold. But if the caloric be subtracted in-
completely and in a moderate degree, and the respiratkn
still remains perfect, excitability is not destroyed but rather
augmented; while reaction developes in the skin, or some
other organ in its neighbourhood, an excitation beyond the
normal degree and which amounts to irritation. Hence
arise the inflammations of the skin, such as chilblains, acute
rheumatisms, colds, and all those phlegmasia? which are the
morbid consequence of cold applied to the external surface
of the body. Remember that the fluids flowing always to
the place where excitation calls for them, having no princi-
pal of action of their own,f abandon the skin when cold has
relaxed its activity, and when return of reaction has pro-
duced any inflammation in the part ; or they accumulate any
where internally where irritation takes place in consequence
of reaction. Cold also produces pain, hemorrhages, aug-
mentations of secretion, effusions of* serosity, &c. which we
cannot refer to any other vital modification than reactive
excitation converted into irritation.

This consequence is forced upon us, because cold acts
only on irritability ; and irritability presides over all the sen-
sations, over all motions of the body, and over all displace-
ments of the fluids.

The subtraction of nutritious food and drink, leaves the
stomach without excitation : but if irritability be not pre-
viously destroyed, and if the cerebral functions can yet ex-
ert themselves, the change produced by this privation of
alimentary excitement in the stomach, is perceived; and
innervation takes place in the stomach and in all the organs

* The want of action from want of excitants and excitations. The
effect of the class of medicines called sedatives. — Trctnsl.

t If they had, they would go where that principle guided them, and not
where nutrition calls for them. They can have no principle of action other
than the affinities which connect their molecules with those of the solids :
but as these affinities can only take place in the narrowest canals, the
fluids forming a mass are soft, and arc directed mechanically by the ac-
tion of the heart and arteries and veins, and by the pressure of the air ;
powers to which it is latterly proposedtoaddjE»(/o. < ?mos' , or inter-capillary
electricitv. foe the last note of the author.

[ 156 j

charged with primary or incipient assimilation; the excita-
tion they experience becomes converted into irritation, the
fluids are summoned thither, and if hunger long continues,
inflammation seizes on the digestive organs, and more or
less on the principal viscera ; while the external parts grow
meagre, and are only animated by sympathetic pains and
convulsions : the man gives way under excess of suffering
to the disorganization of his viscera, long before his fat is ex-
hausted, or the surplus of his circulating fluids consumed,
or any other of the materials which nature seems to have
placed in reserve to supply the defect of nutriment. Hence
you may observe, that the greater the force and the irrita-
bility of the system, the less resistance can the man make
to the imperious demand for food.

The irritation that takes place in the stomach, deprived
of food, is suspected to depend on the continually increasing
progress of animalization, an effect of the chemistry of life,
which begins to operate on the alimentary ingesta in the
stomach, and which finishes by placing in the solids the
animalized molecules. Whether the gastric irritation of
hungry persons depends on this cause, or on the increased
acridity of the digestive juices, on the increase of innerva-
tion from the internal sense of the stomach on the brain, or
on the conjunction of all these causes, still it exists : to a
certain point it is allayed by water. On the other hand,
though the want of water is more intolerable than the want
of solid food, on account of the internal heat that accompanies
thirst, 1 have heard several sailors who had been exposed
to suffering from thirst in the Pacific, say, that they could not
have preserved life, but by consenting to eat, notwithstand-
ing the thirst that afflicted them. They declared that all
their companions who were unable to overcome the repug-
nance to food, died miserably. Hence we may conclude,
that however stimulant alimentary substances may be, as in
this case were biscuit and salt meat, they acted as sedatives
on the gastric membrane over excited by hunger. These
sailors declared that they felt refreshed by the solid nutri-
ment. Still we may conceive that this refreshing sensation
can reach only to a certain degree, and if the want of water
had not ceased, these men would have been reduced to the
inability of swallowing solid food, however strong the de-
sire to take it might be. Perhaps those who fell victims
were already reduced to this inability. Moreover, this

i 15? J

over-excitation, from want of food, may be as easily con-
ceived, as that which arises from want of sleep ; but it is not
easy to explain either the one or the other. It is of the
nature of any viscus that is deprived of its natural modifier,
to stimulate the brain, and provoke it to those acts which
are required to supply the want, and from stimulation to
irritation, the sf»ep is easy. But there is an exception to be
noticed here, relating to very old, very thin, very weak
persons, whose irritability is in great part exhausted. Such
persons, not being able to react, fall a sacrifice in a short
time, by the direct operation of the want of food.

What we have said respecting the death of robust persons,
shows that the want of nourishment is seldom of itself a
cause of death. In fact, by aid of certain drinks, proper to
retard inflammatory action in the digestive organs, a man
may live without solid food, even until he has consumed
the stock of nutriment in reserve distributed through his
body, and till he has reached the last stage of marasmus ;
this continues a long time, when the person is not exposed
to fatiguing exercise. This is a most valuable privilege
for our species in the social state, and that ought to afford
comfort to persons who are prohibited from food on account
of disease, or from any accidental cause.

The other external excitants, to whose action we are
exposed, ought to be regarded as factitious, and are not
absolutely necessary to our existence. They tend only to
keep up the equilibrium, and their subtraction cannot pro-
duce irritation. In fact, independently of all original want,
we assume the habit of being excited in some certain man-
ner, and in some certain organs : we find pleasure in this,
and then a factitious want is created. If the excitations that
these enjoyments give rise to, should be wanting, we feel
restlessness and uneasiness ; the well-marked desire of ex-
periencing our usual stimulations shews itself. This desire
may of itself increase and be exalted into irritation, situated
in the brain and viscera. This irritation is produced by a
moral cause ; but the defect of our habitual excitations may
affect us in another manner. We allude to those cases
where such excitations induce the evacuation of a fluid of
some kind. This fluid being no longer directed to its usual
emunctory, becomes a burthen upon the animal economy, ,
and if nature does not direct it to its regular and normal
course of discharge, such as cutaneous perspiration, urine,

j lot ]

8tc.it excites in the organic tissue an extraordinary irritation
which becomes a real disease.

In our opinion, we may regard these as the chief causes oi
those irritative diseases which depend on defect of excitement.

Let us now proceed to investigate those which are pro-
duced directly by excitation.

Sec. 3. How excess of excitation produces diseases of
irritation, and what those diseases are.

We repeat once more, that excitement will become extin-
guished, if it be not kept up by stimulants. We now add,
that to maintain an equilibrium, it is necessary that new
stimulants should not be applied to the nervous portion of
the several organs, until the excitation of those which have
preceded, has been reduced down to a certain point : This
point is not easy to be determined ; it varies according to
individual constitution, and according to the habitude and
the degree of the excitants or stimulants. If excitation be
too often renewed, if it be always applied, before that which
has preceded it be sufficiently weakened, or if it be provoked
by agents of uncommon activity, it no longer becomes of
itself gradually weaker, until it falls into a regular normal
type ; but it continues ; and although the organ be removed
from the action of the stimulants that have provoked this
new irritation, it exceeds its normal type, and puts on the
character of irritation. In all these cases, excitation travels
on with great rapidity in nervous matter : it is propagated
from one visceral centre to another, always receiving a
fresh impulse at the place most excited : it attracts and ac-
cumulates the fluids in all the tissues where it predominates,
and tends to denaturalize the phenomena of calorification,
secretion, exhalation, and nutrition, as we shall soon see.*

The proofs of this assertion are abundant, and obvious to
all observers. We need only remark some of the most
striking, and which may be referred to the different organic
apparatus. An atmosphere too oxygenated, excites the
lungs more strongly in proportion as they are at the time

*See Examendes doctrines medicales, 1816, p. 439, where the follow-
ing passage may be found under the head physiology of irritations:—
" When a stimulant acts on our organs, the nerves receive the impression.
This irritating impression being received in the nervous system, the
course it takes is this: either it remains there and produces morbid phe-
nomena, neuroses ; or it operates on the sanguineous capillary system,
and determines therein phlegmasia; ; or it operates on the non-sanguine
ous capillaries, secretory or excretory, exhalant or absorbent, and gives
rise to those numberless alterations of which I have before spoken.''

[ 1.30 ] -

more exeiteable, and there produces inflammation. Food
excites the stomach during a certain time : but if by new
supplies of food we are resolved to expose that organ to new
excitements, before the last digestion is sufficiently weaken-
ed, the stomach undergoes an excitement, which is not
weakened in the usual and normal manner, it becomes irri-
tation : at first this is merely nervous, and is dissipated by
the passage of the ingesta, or by other stimulants : but if
this overloading be persevered in, the irritation becomes
sufficiently strong to produce an unnatural accumulation of
fluids.* The lapse of time necessary to produce this over-
excitation, varies according to the more or less stimulating
quality of the meats and drink, and according to the power
in the individual of establishing an equilibrium of normal
excitation : but whether it require a week or several years,
still, over eating and indulgence in intoxicating liquors, is
sure to bring on gastritis more or less nervous, and accom-
panied always by a morbid alteration in the tissues irrita-'
ted. Certain substances exceedingly exciting, such as
strong alcohol, acrid and corrosive poisons, &c. require only
an instant to produce this irritation in the stomach ; in like
manner certain deleterious gases can produce an over ir-
ritation in the respiratory organs, in the twinkling of an eye.
If the natural excitants of our organs of sense, the eyes, the
ears, the nostrils, the mouth, the skin, are too powerful, the
apparatus exposed to their action suffers in consequence ;
but if you suspend the stimulation, the excitation produced
will decrease, and the equilibrium will be soon re-establish-
ed : but if the stimulation be incessantly repeated before
this equilibrium be restored, the sensitive apparatus will be
irritated, will become disordered, and often within a shade
of the disorganization of the part. Those who have long
misused their eyes are in this case. The ear is not irrita-
ted but by sounds extremely loud ; but the nose and the
mouth are often irritated by sternutatories and sialagogues :
as to the skin, any one may verify our statements by using
frictions or topical irritants.

In all intellectual operations, it is the brain that acts. Al-
low it rest after exertion, and you may enjoy with irapunity
the pleasures of study. But if you keep on forcing it,
either by continued study, or by yielding to the movements

* Hence heart-burn, chronic gastric inflammation, or sub-inflammation,
that is. dyspepsia. — TransJ.

L ieo j

of the passions, and compel it to new exertions before- th^
first has settled down to a normal state, the stimulation be-
comes excessive, irritation is produced, and the delicate
medullary tissue of this organ becomes exposed to serious
alterations by the extraordinary afflux of fluids to the part,
and the deviations from the nutritive affinities. This organ
is one in which it is singularly difficult to re-establish the
normal type of its organic action, because it is the boundary
of all the lively stimulations which take place on the sur-
faces of relation, both of the external and internal tissues; it
is no wonder then that the maladies which depend on cere-
bral irritation are so common. Megrims, lunacies, convul-
sions, paralyses, apoplexies, are the chief ; all acknowledg-
ing irritation as their cause, but not always induced by the
irregular exercise of the intellect or affections: the stimula-
tion of the stomach is a frequent source, in consequence of
the sympathy of the organs of thought with those of digestion.

We have been too long ignorant that the heart compelled
to beat with supernormal activity by violent exercise, by
moral affections, and by the inflammations produced by fe-
ver, ends by contracting an irritation which is sufficient to
alter its tissue, and conduct it by hypertrophy, to the state
of aneurism. Intellectual labour pushed too far, passions
violent and more especially long continued, giving no rest
to innervation, or time to return to a normal state, engen-
der every day a state of irritation whose principal seat is in
the nervous apparatus of the three visceral cavities ; for it is
thus (as we shall see) irritation has different predominant
localities, as well as different degrees of intensity. It is
easy to apply to the organs of generation, the secretory or-
gans* and the muscles, the observations we have just made
on the principal visceral apparatus, considered as liable to
the influence of excitants.

This second source of disease, (excess of excitation con-
verted into irritation) is more fruitful than the first (defect
of excitation ) and is indeed the source whence far the great-
er part of our maladies flow. Writers may assert, generally,
that over exercise of our organs fatigues them, and that the
body long exposed to these rough proofs is used up and
worn out. But in saying this they express the result only,
without affording any notion of the physiological changes that
produce it. This process is excitation, and the modifica^
tion of it that destroys us, is in every case irritation.

I 161 J
It is to this irritation wc must refer a crowd of diseases,
which have been attributed to vicious humours, or to virus;
such as scrofula, ring-worms, &c. and those which arise from
the agency of contagion and infection. In fact, how do these
maladies differ from those whose causes we have indicated?
Certainly in the nature of the irritating agent only. In our
most usual irritative affections, the agents are those which
keep up our existence. They are in fault only by being in
excess or in defect. But let them undergo an alteration in
their constituent principles, let them be deteriorated by fer-
mentation, putrefaction, or loaded with foreign deleterious
principles, and we shall see them converted into true poi-
sons: in that case, they are upon the same footing with every
other substance in nature, not destined for our nourishment
or our sustenance, in the regular and usual manner. Nev-
ertheless, what effect have all these poisons but to produce
irregular abnormal excitations, and without requiring re-
peated or prolonged action, to convert them into an irrita-
tion capable of wearing out the nervous power, producing a
collapse, or determining; active congestions in the principal
viscera ? It is said they affect the humours of the body; but
during life this is a chimera. All that can truly be 'said
hereon, is that the humours of the body may serve as vehi-
cles to them during a longer or shorter time : but this virus,
these poisons will produce no disease till they produce an ir-
ritation in the solids. This is proved, inasmuch as the ani-
mal economy may become habituated to such of them as are
not poisonous in a very high degree, or do not corrode the
tissues: for the molecules of these poisons circulate in our
vessels without injury for an indeterminate time without any
renewal of those irritations which their contact heretofore
produced in the solids : such are putrid miasmata of moder-
ate activity, and those of a much more active character, be-
longing to the plague, the yellow fever, the small pox, &c.
As to those poisons whose activity is such, that life is incom-
patible with their presence, they can make no attack but by
irritating the organs and destroying them, as strong acids
and alkalies do when injected into the vessels ; or in causing
by too rapid an excitement a loss in the nervous matter, of
that excitability to which our existence is attached : such
are the gases which exhale from certain burying places, and
whose first inhalation is suddenly fatal. Our opinion is, that
of the known poisons, none of them are dircctlv sedative of
21

[ 163 I

nervous excitability : and we will demonstrate it by some
detailed observations which cannot find a place here, but
which will be decisive. At present we can only give a
bare idea of this. Whenever the most formidable among
the poisons act in a small dose, upon some tissue actively
alive, they over excite that tissue ; this is a fact of expe-
rience. Can we then conclude, that when they kill sudden-
ly, when applied in quantity, that they produce this effect in
any other manner than by rapidly consuming the excitability
of the more delicate tissues ? Of those tissues in our econo-
my which are most vibratory, in those where all the move-
ments of the animal machine commence, of those on which
our existence depends, in a word on the nervous tissues ?
These reflections are made to awaken our curiosity to the
manner in which irritation acts when it once establishes it-
self in our organs. It is to this investigation we are now
proceeding, in order to complete the general history of this
interesting phenomenon.

Sec. 4. Of the changes that take place in the organs , in
consequence of Irritation.

The irritated tissues assume more rapid motions than in
their normal state. They summon to the irritated part, the
fluids, in consequence of the affinity that takes place be-
tween the fluids and the solids, and which is stronger as the
power of life is more intense. They form what are called
diseased vital erections, (erections vitales morbides) which
in their turn produce changes in the mode of existence of
the tissues themselves. The first and chief, is the inflam-
matory state. The irritated part swells, becomes penetrated
with blood, and red : caloric is disengaged more than usual,
and the local temperature is increased. The part is threat-
ened by disorganization ; but as inflammation may assume a
variety of shades, so may the disorganization consequent
upon it. When inflammation has produced an excessive con-
gestion, gangrene or death of the tissue ensues, and putre-
faction takes place before it be detached from the living
parts ; oftener it is suppuration ; at other times is a hard,
red, inflamed place. These three terminations generally
render the part affected unfit for its destined uses; it sepa-
rates entirely, or it becomes soft, dissolves, and the solid
molecules of which it consisted are re-absorbed: that is, are
carried away by the stream of circulation that is perpetuallv
passing through the patt in question, and of course thev dis~

i 163 j

appear Horn the organization. This destruction may be
complete or incomplete ; in the latter case the part that ex-
periences a phlegmonous inflammation, may still perform its
functions.

in certain cases, the inflammation, either in respect of its
duration, or in respect of the organization of the diseased
tissue, loses part of its activity, and becomes chronic. There
are some inflammations, which establish in the parts they at-
tack, a kind of abnormal nutrition, which covers the part
with vegetations : indeed we may say, that before it produ-
ces the destruction of an organ, inflammation always begins.
by determining to that organ a certain degree of hypertro-
phy : but this hypertrophy disappears, whenever the inflam-
mation becomes rapid ; and it never makes a great progress
unless in those inflammations whose moderate intensity al-
lows them to continue a long time.

Inflammation which has not produced disintegration of the
tissues, often causes them in its decline, to contract abnor-
mal adhesions ; and produces deformities in the tissues.
more or less considerable, without having occasioned a real
disorganization. It produces these alterations, by trans-
forming the lymphatic molecules which it has evaporated at
the surface of inflamed tissues, into solids. It is thus that
it consolidates wounds, and establishes durable adhesions
between surfaces that were previously unconnected, or that
rubbed against, or slid over each other. The pleura, the
pericardium, the peritoneum, are the most usual seats of
these adhesions ; but they may be formed in any situation
where two inflamed surfaces come in contact. We take
advantage of this disposition to adhesion in our organs, to
cure some original deformities, such as the hair-lip : it suf-
fices for this purpose, to make the two living surfaces
bloody, by cutting through the lip, setting the edges
free, and then keeping them in contact. The inflammation
that takes place, produces an adhesion which lasts through
life.

It is by means of inflammation, that irritation produces the
most astonishing effects. As yet we have but briefly touch-
ed upon those which take place in the part where inflam-
mation is developed ; by-and-bye, we shall examine the
consequences. Our business at present, is to enquire into
what passes in other organs, in consequence of the inflam-
mation of any one of them.

i 164 ]

Slight inflammations affect that part only where they are
seated, and very often the individual is not sensible of their
presence. A man in a fit of appopievy does not feel the
blister you apply to his skin ; the inflammations excited in
a paralytic limb are seldom felt ; several deep seated inflam-
mations in a part containing few nerves, in a subject of dull
sensibility, run their course without any painful sensation
giving evidence of their presence.

"Pain, accurately speaking, is not among the number of lo-
cal phenomena, that are essential to inflammation. Indeed,
how should it be, for sensibility is a function of the brain ?
Pain, therefore, must be ranked among the extra local phen-
omena which depend on transmitted irritation. The nerves,
agents of all irritative communication, conductors of all stim-
ulation, transmit irritation to the brain when it is violent in
an inflamed part. Hence, pain is the valuable exponent
which completes the diagnosis of inflammation ; and we may
see how important this sign is, when it becomes necessary
to pronounce on inflammation in some hidden organ, where
redness is not visible, where increase of heat, not distinguish-
able by the touch, can only be referred to pain, and where
tumefaction is hard to be ascertained.

But here, the history of inflammation becomes complica-
ted and obscure to a degree, that requires on the part of the
physician efforts of attention, of reasoning, and of induction,
which prevented this phenomenon from being fully under-
stood and appreciated by the ancients. So soon as inflam-
mation or phlegmasia (synonimous expressions) is consid-
erable, whether from its activity, its extent, or from its vio-
lently affecting the brain, this cerebral irritation affects also
a crowd of other organs, which in return transmit to the
brain their own irritations. Hence, proceed a great variety
of painful sensations, and motions more or less unpleasant
and disordered ; the first mover in this tumultuous assem-
blage, inflammation, is often lost sight of by the suffering in-
dividual ; and it has long been overlooked by those whose
business it is to observe what passes, and procure him relief.
What else in fact are those fevers, which for so many-
centuries have been objects of investigation to the physi-
cians, and the perpetual sources of their hypotheses and
controversies, but inflammations misunderstood ? And why
has it been so ? Because irritation transmitted to the brain
by the part inflamed, and re-transmitted from the brain to

i 165 ],

a \ i-ral other tissues, produced stronger sensations than
those which are referred to the original center of inflam-
mation. These secondary irritations are what constitute
the " sympathies" of the inflammatory state. It will be
seen that we do not hesitate to attribute them to the brain ;
and our remarks on those inflammations that are not felt, and
which do not occasion pain at their place of origin, nor sen-
sation in any other part, justify our opinion.

It has been asked how the nerves can be the agents of
sympathy between distant organs supplied with different
nerves ? It has been forgotten by those who ask this ques-
tion, that the brain is the center of all the nerves, and that
it never receives a stimulation without reflecting it not only
to the nerves that transmitted it, but to others.* These re-
flected stimulations, effect each organ according to the na-
ture of its functions, and often originate in them, irritations
more painful than those at the original locality of the inflam-
mation.

This is not only the case in those inflammations which are
sufficiently intense to produce fever, but in many others far
less violent. Thus it is sometimes with the phlegmasia of
the stomach and intestines, which without being themselves
the seat of much pain, occasion distressing head aches, pains
in the back and loins, in the sides of the chest, in the shoul-
ders, weariness in the limbs, or determinations to delirium,
whose cause is mistakenly referred to the head. It is in
consequence of these sympathetic transmissions, by means
of the brain, that deep seated inflammations in the bronchice,
irritate the larynx and produce cough ; that inflammations
in the parenchyma of the lungs, occasion pains in the back
or at the middle of the sternum ; when they occur in the
large intestines, they constitute dysentery, affect the loins
and the thighs, and produce there more pain than at the in-
flamed locality ; in like manner, inflammations of the uterus,
occasion with many women durable pains in the loins and the
groin ; in certain inflammations of the brain, the uneasiness
shews itself principally in the stomach and digestive organs,
or else in certain muscles which become convulsed and par-
alytic; many inflammations of the urinary passages, are
painful only at the extre mity of the urethra ; those of the

* This fact has been demonstrated in the treatise, On physiology appli-
ed to pathology ; and before, in treating of the intellectual and instinct-
ive excitation.

I 166 |

kidneys announce themselves immediately in many cases
by vomitings, and the disengagement of much gas in the
stomach. This confusion docs not take place in external
phlegmasia ; the form, characters, swelling, pain, heat, red-
ness, are all manifest ; the diagnosis of external inflamma-
tions has always been more easy than those that take place
in organs hidden among the visceral cavities ; but for want
of a just notion of these sympathies, physicians and sur-
geons have often mistaken the influence of external inflam-
mations on these organs.

If all internal inflammations shewed themselves by errors
of perception always the same, their diagnosis would not
present any great difficulty ; but the same phlegmasia may
present very different sympathies, while in some cases the
original and local phenomenon, is far more violent than the
secondary results. Hence no doubt the slow march of the
science of medicine : these last mentioned inflammations,
and those of the surface have been assumed as prototypes,
and the others have been misunderstood. Physiological
medicine alone, which brings us acquainted with the vari-
ous functions of the same organ, and teaches us to appre-
ciate the relations that they bear to all the others, can ex-
plain the causes and -the reasons of this apparent confusion.
We cannot enter into the details here.

Among the phenomena which refer themselves to the
transmission of irritation, we must note the alterations that
take place in the colour, and in the secretions of organs more
or less distant from the seat of disease. The most marked
examples of this kind attend inflammatory irritation ; it is
thus that the redness ol the tongue, of the palate, and the
conjunctiva, con esponds to inflammation of the stomach;
that the saliva and mucus of the mouth, are augmented in
gastro-duodenal irritation. Similar changes are brought on
by inflammation in the pancreatic juice and in the bile. It
is always a sympathetic irritation transmitted to the secre-
tory organs, which in lieu of their usual restrained action,
all on a sudden excites in them an augmented action, which
often passes into a morbid state.

All these sympathies, which we shall denominate organ-
ic, cannot take place but through the intervention of the
nerves; but there are two orders of nerves; and those
which play the principal part in these affections of relation,
are the visceral nerves dependent on the a;reat sympathetic,

[ Ml ]

because they preside over the action of the vascular system.
No doubt the cerebral nerves have their part also to per-
form, for they are connected with the first mentioned order
throughout all the viscera ; but it is solely as proceeding
from the nervous system in general, and keeping up an ex-
citation in that system that the cerebral nerves act ; for the
intermedium of cerebral perception which belongs exclu-
sively to the cerebral nerves, is by no means necessary to
organic symptoms. Still it is a fact that the brain can influ-
ence the secretions; thus the idea of meat produces saliva ;
the idea of the infant, whom she suckles can occasion a flow
of milk in a nurse's breast ; anger acts upon the liver ; and
the idea of the act of generation on the testicules. But it
is not probable that the intervention of the encephalon,
should be necessary to organic sympathies, otherwise than
as a cause of general excitement : for irritation pervades the
nerves in all directions, and does not need the aid of the
brain to pass and be propagated through nervous matter.

This has been already clearly shewn in the first section,
of Chap. IV. and we may dispense with the proofs here.

In some cases normal excitement transformed by excess
into irritation, throws out the blood which it attracts to the
part, and produces hemorrhage. The evacuation of the
blood, which forms a conjestion, depends on the organic dis-
position of the part, and on this also, that the exterior pores
are less irritated, or less strong and tenacious, than the inter-
nal capillaries that act upon them. The analogy which ap-
proaches hemorrhage to inflammation, results from identity
of cause, similitude of local phenomena, until the moment
when the blood is expelled, and the facility with which he-
morrhage and inflammation succeed or replace each other,
either in the same or in different tissues. Nevertheless, it
is not every tissue that is susceptible of spontaneous hemorr-
hage, while there is no tissue which may not be the seat of
that kind of irritation which constitutes phlegmasia.

Irritation developed in the living tissue, does not always
alter it so as to produce inflammation. There are cases
wherein the principal effect of irritation is to accumulate at
the place, the lymphatic part of our humors, and to change
the nutrition of the part, in a manner different from the dis-
organizations that inflammation brings on, and which we
have noted already.

This difference arises from the primitive and original dif-

t 168 ]

fereuce of the tissues of which our organs are composed,
and on the mode of action and the shade of irritability which
presides over the life of each tissue. The areolar and lami-
iiar'tissue is present in all our organs, and it shews itseli
among them in various forms : sometimes as small transpa-
rent lamince, more or less relaxed or tightened, and serving
as a means of union between the organs, and between the
different parts of the same organs ; sometimes as fatty tissue,
when it fills large spaces between the organs and the appa-
ratus ; in other cases, condensed and flattened as mem-,
branes, which have always a cellular aspect, corresponding
to the rest of the tissue of the same kind, and a suriace free
and slippery, which corresponds to itself by means of dupli-
catures and foldings, and which is smooth and slippery by
means of the lymphatic vapours by which it is continually
moistened : its use is to facilitate considerable removals, and
diminish the friction that would otherwise be the consequence.

Such arc the tissues of different aspects, but which may
be regarded as modifications of one only ; and which are the
usual seat of the most intense inflammations ; a proposition
which has been developed in our History of Chronic Phleg-
masia. When irritation has displayed itself there with
energy, it attracts much blood to the parts, it swells them
out, expands them where they are not too much condensed,
and produces the phlegmon of which we have already spo-
ken, and which has long been regarded as the type of all
inflammations. But below this first degree of vascular irri-
tation, a crowd of others group themselves, which are not
less worthy of attention. Let us try in few words to give a
clear idea of them.

The first fact that strikes us is, that these same tissues are
susceptible of another degree of irritation, which may itself
be divided into several secondary degrees. Indeed, when
irritation has not conducted these tissues through inflamma-
tion, to suppuration or gangrene ; when it has not termina-
ted by a gradual loss of its activity, and by organizing the
lymph at the surface of inflamed parts, it engorges them with
the same fluids for which, in their normal state, they served
as a depot, and alters the nature of their nutrition in ways
more or less extraordinary : hence, the degenerations that
put on the character of lard, or fat, the fibrous, schirrous,
cncephaloid, &c. These degenerations were formerly as-
cribed to some virus, or specific depravations of the humors;

[ *«9 J

but observations made on their causes, on their progress,
on their relation to other affections, and on their methods of
cure, have demonstrated that they are nothing else but pro-
ducts of irritation. — Seethe "History of Phlegmasia," arti-
cle Peritonitis. Such is the first variety of sub-inflammations,
that are seated in the same tissues, wherein inflammation is
apt to develope itself with the greatest degree of intensity.

The second variety of sub-inflammations, is manifested in
lymphatic ganglions, which are found every where in the
course of the absorbent vessels of a certain size. These
little bodies are composed of blood vessels, nerves, and
lymphatics, united by the areolar tissue ; but it is not well
known, in what manner the different tissues that compose
them are disposed. In all cases, we may observe that irri-
tation takes place in them under the influence of certain
exciting causes, and that it may be augmented into inflam-
mation, which however is not common ; but the ganglions
are often irritated in a manner that makes them swell, and
hardens them with a remarkable augmentation of tempera-
ture, and reduces them at length to a white substance, some-
what like old cheese : this is the second variety of sub*
inflammation.

The areolar tissue, and the ganglionic lymphatic, consti-
tute a part of all our organic apparatus. It is not surprising,
therefore, to find them affected and degenerated in all long
continued irritations of that apparatus. These two first
elements being well understood, let us proceed to such ap-
pearances as belong particularly to these irritations.

And first of all, let us fix our attention on those secretory
organs, whose business it is to elaborate the humours des-
tined to the performance of several functions. Such are
the salivary glands, the liver, the pancreas, the kidneys, the
testicules, the mammary glands, the follicules spread over
all the surfaces of relation, as well external as internal, and
certain glands of a similar nature, such as the amygdoloid,
the prostrate, the lacrymal glands. All these are composed
of a proper secreting tissue, which varies in a small degree,
but which is always reducible, to blood vessels ; to the ves-
sels which eliminate the secreted humor ; to lymphatic
ganglions in the larger ones ; and absorbent vessels in all of
them, to nerves more or fewer; and a cellular tissue, more
or less abundant, more or less relaxed or stretched, and
which serves as a means of union to these various tissues.

[ «™ j

These organs, moreover, offer to our remark the first
mode of organic irritation, inflammation ; which, in its high-
est degree, confuses all these tissues by expanding exces-
sively the cellular tissue, and filling it with blood, accompa-
nied bv heat, pain, and imminent danger of suppuration or
gangrene. But, if we examine all these secreting organs,
when they are not tormented by this rapid action, we shall
find nothing but irritation excited by the same causes that
produce phlegmon, or by the action of several other excit-
ants, and confined in its influence to some of their tissues
in particular. Thus, when a gland slightly hot and swelled,
ceases on a sudden to secrete, or furnishes its fluid in greater
quantity than usual, or presents it more or less altered, dif-
fluent, concrete, odorant, irritant as to the neighboring parts ;
when this fluid, badly elaborated, becomes decomposed,
forming concretions more or less solid, with a feeling of
smarting, weight, lancinating pains, &c. can we avoid con-
cluding that irritation has taken up its abode in that portion
of the glandular apparatus, which is destined to form saliva
in the salivary glands, bile in the liver, urine in the kidneys,
seed in the testicules, fat or transpirable matter in the skin,
mucosity in the internal membranes of the lungs, the gastric
passages, the bladder, &c? At length, after these organs
having, for a long time secreted improperly, begin to swell,
to harden, to become painful, to put on a schirrous appear-
ance, or pass into a cancerous state — instructed by what
passes daily under our eyes, in tissues purely cellular, or
ganglionic, when feebly irritated, we shall at length begin to
think that the tissues which constitute part of our secretory
glands have, in like manner, been affected by irritation.

Thus it has been, that the supposed humoral diseases for-
merly attributed to ferments, to acridities, to virus, such as
salivations, bilious affections, obstructions of the liver con-
nected with chronic gastro-enteritis, obstinate pulmonic
catarrhs, obstructions of the bladder or the rectum, tetters,
involuntary emissions, fluor albus, diabetes, gouty affections,
&c. rank among irritations, or sub-inflammations of the se-
cretory organs, and finally belong to sub-inflammations, either
mixed, lymphatic, cancerous, or tubercular ; when the chro-
nic irritation has continued in the secretory organs, suffi-
ciently long to induce a complete degeneration.

We now begin to study vascular irritation in the more
complicated tissues ; and hereafter, in examining irritation

I m I

in those tissues oi which we have not yet spoken, we shall
be able to find nothing contrary to our preceding remarks,
since the areolar tissue and the membranes formed of it,
constitute the basis of the others. Every where, in fact, in
the organs which remain to be examined, we ought to meet,
1st, in the highest degree, phlegmon, if the areolar tissue,
where the capillary arteries terminate, is free to expand
itself. 2dly, in the lower degrees, and where the areolar
tissue is condensed, compressed, we meet either sub-inflam-
mations the effect of inflammation that has been abortive, or
sub-inflammations primitively and originally such. These
sub-inflammations, whether primitive or secondary, if of
long duration, always produce tumours, lardaceous, ence-
phaloid, schirrous, tuburcular, vegetations, collections of
lymph, or concretions ; in short, when the inflammation
which reigns in these altered tissues, is strongly exasperated,
either by the influence of its own progress, or by causes of
great activity, cancer becomes the last and deadly conse-
quence.

What we have thus summarily and briefly stated, embra-
ces all the inflammations of the locomotive apparatus, known
under the name of rheumatism and gout, when they are
caused by cold, or succeed to visceral irritations. These
are very common diseases, which may be seated either, 1st,
in the muscles, where the phlegmonous type may take place,
from the quantity of free cellular tissue, that separates the
fasciculi of muscle. 2dly, In the aponeuroses and the tendons,
where inflammation so often becomes abortive, and assumes
the character of sub-inflammation. 3dly, In the articulations,
where irritation behaves at first differently, according to the
constitution of the subjects, and according as it makes its
appearance at the interior of the capsules, or in the liga-
ments to which the bones are connected, but where it
always ends by losing itself in various stages of sub-inflam-
mation. 4thly, In the cartilages and bones, which admit the
irritation of soft parts, and which, in their turn, are altered
by becoming soft, by caries, or by necrosis.

The irritations of the same tissues determined by violent
causes, are subject to the same laws. In fact, phlegmons
either acute or chronic, caries, white swelling of the ar-
ticulations, the consequence of wounds or contusions, only
re-produce in the locomotive apparatus the various phenom-
ena of which gout and rheumatism are specimens. The

L 17 ~ -J

phenomena of transmission remain; and experience shows
us that the irritation of the locomotive apparatus may be
transferred to the viscera, and affects them according to
their respective modes of organization.* Finally, we have
to speak of the irritations that are seated in the net vous ap-
paratus or system. We shall divide this apparatus into
three sections: 1st. The first, will comprehend the nervous
extremeties that are lost in the tissues, where they become
confounded with the sanguinary capillaries, and constitute a
part of the organ itself. This portion of the nervous sys-
tem is least understood as to its intimate structure. This it
is which receives the stimulations, and transmits them to the
second portions or the nervous cords. The irritations to
which it submits, are divided with the organs of which it
forms a part ; but it may be more or less affected by them.
2dly, The second section, or the nervous cords, are of two
kinds, viz. the cerebral nerves, which consist, as is said, of
nerves of feeling, and nervesf of motion ; and the splanch-
nic nerves. The nervous cords are sprinkled here and
there at intervals, with swellings or protuberances gelatino-
fibrinous, called ganglions. 3dly, The third section, com-
prehends the cerebral nerves, properly so called, those
of the cerebellum and medulla oblongata, and those of the
spinal marrow, (rachidian) which forms what is called the
cerebro-rachidian apparatus, or internal sensitive nerve.
We are now about to take up the irritations of these three
sections of the nervous system.

The first fact which strikes us, is one that we have al-
ready spoken of several times, to wit, that all the irritations
of a certain intensity, which the first division necessarily
partakes of, are transported by the nerves of the second sec-
tion to the internal sensitive, which constitutes the third ;
and are reflected by the third, back again into the second,
and thence anew to the first. Thus it is, that there are
no lively sensations, no considerable muscular movements,
which do not attest this circle of excitement. So long as
these excitations are proportioned to those of the organs
which admit them, they constitute no malady ; but when
they go beyond this, a nervous affection takes place, a neu-
rosis.

- Juicquidrecipitur,recipitur ad modum recipientis^ is the old school
maxim, of most useful application in a thousand instances.— Transl
tJ o h ,f e J ee ^ S at P rese »t "tile doubt of this, since the experiments of
Mr. Bell, Mr. Broughton, Magendie, &c— Transl

[ m i

The iii sl division of neuroses consists of painful sensa-
tions and convulsive motions, which are excited by some
one of those vascular irritations of which we have spoken,
and which become so predominant, that the patient complains
greatly, and seeks eagerly to be delivered from them. The
cases are, 1st, those of persons who by reason of some wound
or lesion not immediately injuring a nervous cord, expe-
rience great pain, convulsion or tetanus. 2dly, those who
being attacked at first by acute phlegmonous inflammation
in the digestive organs (the continued or essential fevers so
called) soon become affected with delirium or convulsions:
or who being worried by chronic inflammation, either of the
digestive canal, or some other of the viscera, as the uterus,
the heart, the bronchia?, refer it to a crowd of painful sen-
sations, and become affected with irregular motions of the
visceral, the respiratory, and locomotive muscles; this class
comprises hypochondriacs and hysterical patients. The
number is very great ; for in the modern state of civiliza-
tion, few persons arrive at middle age without having con-
tracted a morbid excess of sensibility in some part of the
body. Man is greedy of sensations ; he obtains them only
by excitation, and every organ requires this ; he excites his
stomach more, and more frequently than he ought, especial-
ly by savory food and fermented liquors ; he compels his
heart to beat with unreasonable rapidity, either by the pas-
sions to which he gives himself up, or by painful and irrita-
ting exercise to which he submits ; he worries his sexual
organs to excite in them pleasurable sensations, and seldom
arrives at a due estimate of his powers in this respect, till
he has abused them to the injury of his health. Moreover,
as man, he is exposed to a multitude of causes which tend
to disturb the balance of his excitability. Sometimes* cold
freezes his senses, and paralyses his limbs, which re-assume
their motions only to expose him to violent pain ; to fits of
the rheumatism or the gout, whose intensity increases as he
has voluntarily contributed to the irritations of his stomach:
sometimes he is overwhelmed with the weight of p rinful
affections ; and his sufferings are increased by his own self
reproaches ; or death sometimes snatches from him, the
being that attached him to life. If the reader has not lost
sight of the developements heretofore made on the functions
of the nervous system, he may easily comprehend, that a
man cannot live long in the midst of these terrible attacks,

without irritation hiking up its permanent abode in one or
more of the organs. At first, it is the nervous matter of the
organ which is over excited ; to this succeeds sub-inflam-
mation and inflammation ; while these two modes of irrita-
tion do not disorganise the diseased tissue, the nervous phe-
nomena, that is, the sensations more or less painful, more or
less extraordinary, as well as the contractions and convulsive
tortures of the nervous fibres, are all moveable and curable ;
but when an irregular abnormal nutrition produces different
modes of vascular irritation, and have altered the nature of
the irritated tissues, there is no resource in medicine. The
organs and apparatus of which these tissues form a part,
can no longer live but in an unnatural and vitiated manner.
The nervous matter which forms a part of them, is no longer
in unison with the other regions of the body ; it transmits
to the encephalic centre an excess of excitement, and com-
pels it in consequence to act too strongly upon other nerves;
so that harmony and regularity can no longer reign over the
living economy. The remainder of life is passed in perpet-
ual pain, and in pain strongly diversified as to its type : for
the patient does not only suffer in the diseased organs ; he
refers his uneasy sensations successively to every depart-
ment of sensibility. He connects his painful and unusual
emotions, with all the ideas he has received since he began
to know himself. He wanders, he suffers, and he causes
every body else to suffer who approach him. Such is the
neuropathic.

All these morbid states bear witness, that in perceiving
an irritation, and in determining the voluntary or involuntary
motions which are the results of this perception, the internal
apparatus of sensibility is itself excited to the degree that
constitutes irritation. Once brought to this abnormal diapa-
son, the system may undergo all the consequences of it : that
is to say, its irritation may become phlegmasia, hemorrhage,
or sub-inflammation. It is thus that encephalitis, arachnoi-
ditis, become complicated into what was formerly termed
essential fever; and that melancholy, hypochondriac, and
hysteric patients, become lunatic, epileptic, or struck with
apoplexy. Stich is the secondary irritation of the nervous
system. At first it is neurosis : it then becomes transform-
ed into something more humoural, viz. vascular irritation.*

* There is much vague notion and uncertainty among physicians of the
present day, on inflammations of the serous envelope of the brain, called

[ 1?5 j

The second fact on which we ought to bestow our atten-
tion is, that the nerves (the nervous cords) being in part
formed of the same laminar tissue which we have shown to
be most liable to contract inflammation, the nerves are ex-
posed to the same mode of irritation, which ought to affect
them more or less according as the same tissue which forms
their neurilema, is more or less abundant, more compressed
and condensed. In fact, without speaking of affections that
arise from wounds which may attack the nerves as well as
any other organ, there are other causes which direct and
fix irritation in the nervous branches, and carry them on to
the degree of phlegmasia. The inflammation of the large

the tunica arachhoides. Many observers attribute madness exclusively
to the phlegmasia of that part, as if the substance of the brain could pos-
sibly be a stranger to it. Others think that the pia mater may become
inflamed. Others maintain that madness depends exclusively on the in-
flammation of the grey portion of the medullary substance, which occu-
pies the convex portion of the cerebral hemispheres. It is our opinion,
that irritation in the encephalon cannot increase into inflammation, unless
the blood vessels are also actively influenced. On the other hand, we
cannot conceive that delirium can take place without an excitation of the
white fibres of the encephalon, which evidently constitute its particular
nervous system. From these data, it seems to us that we may assume it
as certain, that inflammation first appears in the pia mater, from whence
it may propagate itself convergingly into the grey and into the white sub-
stance ; and divergingly into the arachnoid membrane, even to the dura
mater and the bone, as is shewn in the ivory sculls of lunatics. It is easy
to conceive that a centre of inflammation, occupying a space more or less
considerable in the vascular sanguineous cap which envelopes the brain,
may propagate itself to the grey substance, and throw into the white med-
ullary substance irritation enough to occasion lunacy. Many things may
be said as to the slight shades of irritation in these same tissues, in the
case where it acts upon the blood vessels in a degree below suppuratory
inflammation — in cases where it resides more especially in the white por-
tion of the brain and its nervous matter — or in this or that region of this
substance ; that is to say, in this or that section of the intercranial ner-
vous apparatus — but of all this Ave must say nothing but what rests on the
basis of facts. We shall speak of this again. But we may observe in
addition here, in relation to the inflammations of the tunica arachnoides,
that inflammation not proceeding from wounds or violent lesions (non
traumatiques) establishes itself in the encephalon in two ways, 1st, Some-
times by means of some moral cause, when the irritation takes place in
the white medullary fibre, and agitates first the inter-cranial nerves under
the types of delirium and convulsions ; and ends by acting on the sangui-
neous capillaries, in which it produces inflammation; 2dly, Irritation
sometimes seated in some other vascular sanguineous tissue, becomes
propagated by organic sympathies in the pia mater and the arachnoid
coat. Do not lunacies and arachnitis proceeding from moral causes, be-
long to the first section ? Do not lunacies proceeding frcrn gastro-enteritis
belonir the second ?

L lW J

nervous cords of the loins, the thighs, the arms, is by no
means uncommon as a consequence of cold, or the suppres-
sion of hemorrhages, or cutaneous or articular inflamma-
tions ; local pains and convulsions (neuralgies) aiise irom
the same cause. These affections may be determined to
any branches of nerves on the exterior of the body, by the
irritation of any nervous cord belonging to them, which may
find itself enveloped by inflamed parts. The inflammation
of the roots of the teeth, by attacking the nerve inserted, is
sufficient to produce neuralgia in different branches of the
fifth pair, and in the facial nerve. Here then is a second
kind of neurosis belonging exclusively to the second section
of the nervous apparatus, and referring itself to inflamma-
tory irritation. We see clearly too, that while it depends
in part on the vascular inflammation of the organs, it is con-
nected also with the internal sensitive or encephalic appa-
ratus; seeing that the perception of pain always implies an
excitation of the encephalic tissue, and that all excitation
may increase into irritation.

This last reflection calls us to the consideration of the
great fact, on which depend neuroses of the third division.
This manifestly relates to the cases where the substance of
the cerebro-rachidian apparatus is excited to the degree of
irritation. This may happen, at first, as a consequence of
the two primary divisions of the nervous state. For delirium,
convulsions, lunacy, which depend on the irritation more or
less intense of the brain and its membranes, may be provo-
ked by picking, tearing, or pinching a nervous cord, far
removed from the head, as well as by acute or chronic
inflammation of the viscera. Let the primitive irritations
of the encephalon then take place, and this section will
comprise all the affections we have recounted, such as deli-
rium, transitory or permanent, intermittent or continued ;
and convulsion ; in so far as these maladies are dependent
on local causes extra cerebral, and brought on by excita-
tions directly applied to the encephalon, as by external
violence ; or in so far also as they are excited in that appa-
ratus by intellectual labor, by moral causes, by sanguineous
plethora, &c. In short, whatever maybe the cause that has
produced irritation in the brain, it may produce also, delirium,
coma, epilepsies, apoplexies, palsies ; all of them signs, indi-
cating that encephalic inflammation has become vascular,
and that it partakes of the inflammatory state : the results

[ 177 J

are, sanguineous engorgement, suppuration, indurations, ex-
travasations of blood and lymph, ulcerations, and other degen-
erations, more or less considerable, such as, schirrous, car-
tilaginous, osseous, &c. depending on some fault of nutrition;
always analagous to what we observe in other tissues, where-
in we have studied the important phenomena of vascular
irritation.

Such is the brief picture of the second class of maladies,
and of-those that depend on irritation, whether secondary or
primary. To these, we must add the affections, which are
the consequences of these two classes: although not primi-
tive, they often present indications which merit a particular
examination.

Thejirst general fact at which we Ought to stop awhile,
is the obstacle to the course of the blood, either partial or
general. The consequence always is, either a debility
which directs the fluids to one point, or an irritation which
excites them to flow thither : such are aneurisms of the
heart and arteries, inflammations of the arteries, phlebitis,
varices and tumors, from whatever cause they may proceed,
and which take place on the course of the principal vessels.
This form of disease cannot be well distinguished, until the
affections of our organs are referred to their true causes ;
hence the old physicians had but a very imperfect compre-
hension of them.

The obstacles to the course of the blood, which are of the
most interest, are those that form in the centre of circula-
tion. Let the obstacle depend on the depression of the
heart, caused by an effusion within the pericardium, or even
pleuritic ; or let it proceed from a distension of the sides of
the heart, with the softening of the parietes ; or let it be
owing to induration, with diminution of volume, without
inflammation of the pericardium ; let the cause of the obsta-
cle be in the one auricle or the other ; let it arise from a
dilation at the crossing of the aorta and vena cava, or from
an inflammatory exudation which has contracted the caliber
of the principle vessels in the vicinity of the heart, by its
concretion ; let it result from the obliteration of the orifices
of the aorta by some fungosity, or some vegetation on the
muscular sides while they preserve their vigor ; or from
some irregular dilatation of the same orifices with a soften-
ing of the fleshy substance of the organ; let there be a
hernia of the ventricules, or a laceration of the columns- :
23

[ 1?8 J

still the fundamental symptoms will always be the same.
Many accessary symptoms may arise belonging to the spe-
cific character of the lesion, but they will be variable as the
irritability is, which ought to be the interpreter of all vital
lesions ; but the three following are never wanting : 1st, diffi-
culty of respiration. 2dly, of locomotion or even impossi-
bility sometimes of moving. 3dly, difficulty or impossibil-
ity of sleeping.

The coincidence of these three orders of symptoms consti-
tute the pathognomonic sign of the central obstacle to the
course of the blood ; and of course indicate a forced stagna-
tion of this fluid in the vessels of the larger viscera, and par-
ticularly in the parenchyma of the lungs. These are also
the symptoms which furnish the fundamental indications, by
throwing light on the probable consequences of the malady,
and which suggest to the physician the necessity of a very
minute investigation to ascertain the specific and peculiar
cause of the obstacle. Moreover, it may be possible that
this cause is but momentaneous, as a spasm of the heart,
such as we see in some fits of convulsive asthma ; for it is
the perseverance only of the sympathies that furnishes proof
of some permanent obstacle to the course of the blood.
(See Commentaries on Pathology.) In short, in all des-
perate cases, it is the same group of symptoms which fur-
nish the only indications which remain to be attended to,
when we desire to alleviate the sufferings of the patient,
and put off as long as possible the last hour. How many
reasons are here for disinterring from the chaos of antiquity
the pathology of those lesions which belonging to the ob-
structed passage of the blood through the double straits of
the thoracic centre, so as to establish the real characters of a
peculiar class of maladies ! a number of symptoms group
themselves around those lesions ; the union of these symp-
toms constitute the character of the disorders in question ;
but this is not exactly the time to enter into details.

The second general effect we inquire about, is the extra-
vasation of the serous fluids, or dropsies. Sometimes they
are occasioned by direct debility owing to exhausted exci-
tability, as at the close of great loss of blood, want of food
watery regimen, humid atmosphere, &c. Sometimes they
arc produced by irritation occasioning an interior exhala-
tion viciously substituted to the purifying serous excretions.
Sometimes these dropsies are indirectly provoked bv these

[ na J

vicious exhalations in consequence of the acute inflammation
which they give rise to. Dropsies then are sometimes pri-
mitive, sometimes and more frequently consecutive ; but in
this latter case they always become for the living subject a
cause of secondary irritation and of suffering ; and constant-
ly present, besides the indications of the disease itself, the
indication also of provoking the evacuation ol the serous fluid
extravacated. Hence we are obliged to make of these
maladies a particular class ; but we have not at present lei-
sure to enter into the details respecting them.

The third and constant effect of diseases of every kind,
is to produce an attack upon the assimilating power of the
system, and to prevent the perfect elaboration of the hu-
mors. Hence arise a number of symptoms, which refer to
cacochymy and scurvy of medical writers. These maladies
are also characterized by the indication of a certain kind of
alimentation ; and for this double reason they deserve to be
treated separately.

Scurvy may be primitive , dependant on food of bad qual-
ity, on an atmosphere cold, wet, dull, unwholesome. One
of its characteristic symptoms ; is defect of contractility of
muscular fibrine, the common source of the languor felt by
the patient, and the feebleness of his locomotion ; another
symptom is extravasation of blood in the skin and sub-cu-
taneous tissue. But it is important here to remark, 1st, that
the internal membrane of the digestive canal, always re-
ceives the first attack, being peculiarly the organ of assim-
ilation. Hence the patient is exposed to chronic phlegma-
sia or to hemorrhage of that canal, including the gums :
2dly, that scorbutic persons are far from being exempt
from phlegmasia? in the other organs, but they incur
them with greater certainty in proportion as they are
exposed to one of the most frequent causes of scurvy, cold
combined with humidity ; 3dly that inflammation shews it-
self in scurvy under two varieties, chronic apyrexy, as in
the gums, and the mucous membrane of the digestive organs,
which is no obstacle to the attack of cold ; and the acute and
feverish scurvy, which may shew itself in all the organs :
constituting the hot scurvy of authors ; wherein the patient
is equally susceptible of intermitting irritations: 4thly that
the tissues of the scorbutic patient, having a less force o
cohesion, and less force of organic affinity than healthy per-
sons, are also more exposed to disorganizations. Hence

[ ISO J

the aneurisms of the heart, and the laceration of the mus-
cles even by moderate exertions, in scorbutic patients
hence the large ecchymoses from slight contusions, and the as-
tonishing rapidity with which inflammation in scorbutics pro-
duces disorganization : 5thly, as there are always two sets
of indications in scurvy, ( a) that owing to vicious assimilation,
which demands fresh food particularly vegetable, a dry at-
mosphere frequently renewed, and light : (b) the indication
furnished by the complicated states of inflammation; which are
treated as in other subjects, but with more caution as to the
loss of blood. For all these reasons, scurvy ought to hold
a separate place in works of pathology.

The fourth general effect which we have to consider, is
the debility consequent on the irritations which we have
thus briefly noted. Weakness is indeed the common result
of all our maladies ; and the indication of restoring strength,
follows always on the process of diminishing it. Every
tissue whose vascular system has been engorged by irritation,
becomes weakened and relaxed after a certain time, and
in proportion as the sum of the general forces has been more
or less diminished. Every nerve whose action has been
exaggerated, loses more or less of its excitability, and
sometimes becomes paralytic. The cerebral nerves in par-
ticular are always palsied, when irritation has disorganized
their point of insertion, whether in the brain or spinal mar-
row. In all these cases the general sum of bodily strength
is always more or less diminished ; and the indication of
stimulating, must always be tempered by that of managing
the excitability of the organs. This is enough to consti-
tute a particular class of diseases.

Such is the general history of irritation, and a foreshorten-
ed painting of the physiological doctrine. No vital pheno-
menon, normal or abnormal, can be taken from its domain :
physicians must chuse between two methods of philosophi-
zing : they must be physiologists and adopt irritability as
their guide ; or they must be empyrics, exposed to a thou-
sand contradictions of theory and practice ; and then they
can draw but few useful conclusions from the observations
they have made. We have frequently treated this question
in the discourses pronounced at the opening of our private
and public courses, and in our Examination of medical doc-
trines: but to render the great importance of this remark
more evident, we shall proceed to consider Insanity (la

t 181 ]

Folie) one of the maladies which have been treated empir-
ically by the old physicians, but which requires more par-
ticularly to be exposed to the lights of rational theory. In
chosing lunacy ( insanity) for the application of the physiologi-
cal principles herein laid down, in preference to any particu-
lar malady, we have a double object; viz, to contribute as
far as possible to the perfection of the therapeutics of this
deplorable disease, which has not yet been fully brought to
the test of our principles professedly ; and also to contii-
bute to the improvement of real knowledge, by the over-
throw of what is called ontology.

ON IRRITATION AND INSANITY.

Part the second. — On Insanity considered in reference
to the principles of Physiological medicine, and the Phe-
nomena of Irritation.

Chapter I. — On the causes of Insanity.

Medically speaking, Insanity is the prolonged cessation
of tbe action of the brain, which in its normal state, is the
regulator of human conduct, and that on which depends
what we call Reason. But before insanity can be imputed,
the patients must be able to exhibit the due functions of
most of the other organs : for we do not consider frensy, or
the situation of many diseased persons attacked with acute
inflammation, as insanity, though they may be deprived of
reason. When this instrument of intellect (the brain) is
depraved, man can no longer resist the blind impulse of in-
stinct, and even instinct is more or less depraved in insanity:
hence arises the possibility of all kinds of aberration in the
discourse and the actions of persons labouring under mental
alienation. The brain or rather the encephalic apparatus,
consisting of the brain properly so called, the cerebellum,
and medulla oblongata, the common center of the nervous
system — the brain I say, is the peculiar organ of instinct
and of intellect ; and these two faculties (as they are called)
alter always with any alteration in the brain. The ence-

[ 182 ]

phalic apparatus cannot be reasonably supposed to obey any
law different Jrora those which regulate the other organs.
Derangements of instinct and of intellect therefore must re-
sult from excess or defect of excitation in the enccphalon.
(See part 1st, Chap. 4th.) An original defect of excita-
tion does not produce a durable depravation of instinct or
of intellect ; insanity therefore must arise only from super
excitation, that is irritation of the enccphalon.

The sources of insanity may be classed like those of other
diseases : they are reducible to the influence of hygienic cau-
ses, and the influence of other diseases on the encephalon.

These causes will allow of the same division as in all
other diseases of irritation,, that is to say, we may consider
them according to the various hygienic influences to which
they belong. At the head of these, we place the percep-
tions (percepta) as the leading sources of mental maladies,
and we shall designate them as moral causes. But we
meet here with two modes of excitation which are purely
physical ; passions too violent, which we rank first as most
influential : and intellectual labour pushed too far. The
passions cause an afflux of blood to the brain, and increase
all the phenomena of innervation. Hence result simulta-
neous excitement of the heart, the lungs, the stomach, the
liver, and the genital-urinary organs ; the whole locomotive
apparatus also participates in this excitement. The passions
are either those of pleasurable or of painful feeling. The
one and the other, in their simple state, violently agitate the
nervous system. But there are moral situations, wherein
men experience in succession and with great rapidity, sen-
sations of pleasure and of pain. Such is the unhappy state,
when the expectations of ambition, of pride, or of self-love,
are frustrated ; this is the state brought on by envy, by jeal-
ousy, and the alternations of hope and despair ; producing
the rudest attacks on reason.

Intellectual labour pushed too far may produce a derange-
ment of ideas, first, by the excitation which implies a long
continued attention and neglect of sleep ; next by the pas-
sionate movements which almost always intermingle, such
as ambition, jealousy, self-love, exalted or depressed. Sor-
row and fear considered as acting each by itself on our organs,
have a sedative effect as it should seem ; because the pulse
is depressed by them, and the locomotive powers are para-
lysed. The sedative effect is not always complete ; there

[ 1* ]

is always a kind of encephalic excitation which accompa-
nies attention, and wc cannot deny that it is one of the
most active. This encephalic vital erection, or this constant
form of innervation, may present the other forms in a
very high degree, of grief, terror and surprise, and occasion
sudden death : but when this case does not occur, a re-ac-
tive innervation takes place, which like the direct excita-
tions of lively passions tends to inflammation.

We never observe insanity from a moral cause manifest
itself in a recent subject, without being accompanied at its
commencement by that sanguine excitation, of which we
shall very soon present a picture.

Children are very seldom susceptible of insanity from
moral causes, because their impressions are not so durable
as those of adults ; but the intensity of impressions may be
a substitute for their durability. Moreover there are some
children who have a premature developement of the ence-
phalon which renders them suceptible of melancholy that
may prove a cause of mental alienation.

We see nothing in the action of other hygienic circum-
stances, or in other physical causes except the excitation of
different organs. We shall place at the head of these, the
excitations of the brain itself in reference to the applicata
and some neighbouring diseases of the encephalon produced
by wounds, bruises of the head, concussions, inflammations
of the hairy scalp in cases of erisipelas from some internal
cause, or erythema from external cause, insolation, inflam-
mation of the parotids, in a word, by all the centers of in-
flammation in the neighbourhood of this organ of thought,
because inflammation may easily be propagated to it.

Next to neighbouring inflammations, we find as most in-
fluential those of the stomach, the duodenum, and the liver,
which may be produced by several hygienic causes, but
which depend for the most part on the ingesta and the per-
cepta. In fact a large proportion of men, contract under the
influence of food too exciting, of poisons, or over exciting
medicaments, chronic gastritis ; which after keeping them
in a state of hypochondria and nervous affections for several
years, often finishes by mental alienation. Others lose their
reason from the same causes in less time. If it be extremely
short, and that the gastritis is acute, the delirium is not
termed insanity ; it arranges itself as frenzy, and febrile de-
lirium. But what is remarkable, is, that moral causes, tho?o

[ 184 ]

which act more immediately on the brain, do not produce
insanity till after they have p u d . ed and kept up for some
time gastric inflammation ; as il the ehcephalon stood in
need, in some people, of the reaction of the viscera to pro-
duce a high state of cerebral irritation. This is the case of
many persons melancholic from nostalgia, from disappointed
love, from loss of fortune, from wounded self-love, &c. who
do not lose their reason till they have suffered long under
gastro-enteritis with symptoms of neuropathy. In fact we
need not be surprised at this, because with many persons,
moral commotions, though received in the brain, produce at
the moment less effect on the organization of that viscus,
than on the heart, the lungs, and the stomach. The brain
never suffers alone, as we have demonstrated in our phys-
iology. Perhaps we may sometime or other arrive at the
proof, at least for the physiologist, that sensation is composed
of a circle of excitation pervading the encephalon and all the
nervous extremities. But a very arduous duty which is
now imposed on us, prevents us from treating this question,
which would be perfectly in its place here.

The excitations of the other viscera, the heart, the lungs,
the larger intestines, the spleen, the kidneys, the bladder,
whatever may be the hygienic causes to which we may at-
tribute their origin, do not disturb the reason; except under
acute inflammation of great intensity : and in this case the
delirium produced is not insanity.

We shall not say as much of the over excitation of the
sexual organs, to which the percepta the ingesta, and even
the applicata contribute, as well as other causes. The
generative viscera, more rich in the nerves of relation than
the organs before mentioned, and not less provided than
they are with branches from the great sympathetic, partake
equally with the stomach (which also abounds in the same
kinds of nerves) the power of exciting vividly the encepha-
lon. Add to this privilege, that also of affecting sympa-
thetically the stomach and all the epigastric nerves with
this over excitement, and you will easily perceive how hys-
terical women, and those afflicted with nymphomany are
liable to become insane. This influence is far less among
men.

In every case irritation acts first sympathetically on the
brain ; and this last more slowly becomes affected idiopa-
thically, without abandoning the organ originally attacked.

[ 135 ]

The last order of physical causes is composed of misplaced
irritation. The irritation of other parts ceasing, the brain
becomes affected. It is not usual for the viscera to furnish
the point of departure for these kinds of metastases : we
see them frequently act on the encephalon; but usually this
happens without their ceasing to be irritated themselves, as
we have before remarked ; they only seem to be less irrita-
ted as the brain becomes more so; but this organ always
sends back to them sufficient of excitation to prevent their
becoming completely cured even if they were disposed so
to be. The external organs, particularly the skin, the
mouths of the mucous membranes, and the articulations, are
the chief parts that irritation quits to attack the viscera ; and
i( the brain be somewhat pre-disposed, it is always severely
affected. Remember, also, that it is almost always in con-
nection with the stomach and the heart that importance is
given to these metastases. Here we may rank all those
insanities that arise from the sudden disappearance of tetters,
erisipelas, hemorrhages, natural or artificial, old ulcerations,
crusty exsudations, sweats, partial, fetid, thick, unusual ;
disappearances that connect themselves with excreta of the
Hygienists, with the retrocession of gout, rheumatism, &c.

The insanity so often supervenient upon child-birth, does
not arise from one organ only ; every organ is in a state of
unusual excitement at that remarkable epocha. All are in
danger of congestion ; and if the necessary evacuations are
interrupted, a slight cause may produce a determination to
the brain, as well as to any other of the visceral apparatus ;
and this determining cause is often a moral one.

As these causes do not always and necessarily produce
insanity, we are compelled to admit a pre-disposition in the
individuals to whom it happens. This pre-disposition can
only depend on excessive irritability of the encephalon, or
on its vitious developement. In fact, when the encephalon
is too irritable, it retains for too long a time the stimulations
it has received, and passes into a state of permanent irritation.
When its irritability is imperfectly developed, or too feeble,
it cannot resist the violent impulse of the passions, or the
excessive vital erections which accompany great efforts of
attention and memory. When this irritability is too strofig-
ly developed, the brain supplies a prodigious facility which
renders intellectual labor very agreeable. In the second
mode of organization, the over excitement proceeds from
24

[ 186 J

weakness of intellect ; in the third, it proceeds from vigor
of intellect, by the abuse we commit of an enjoyment which
has become a want of the first necessity. It is thus, that a
weak stomach is excited by a moderate dose of wine, and a
strong stomach by a four-fold dose ; to which we expose our-
selves more carelessly, in proportion, as we have suffered
less from former excesses. The middle course is the least
subject to great derangements. In medio tutissimus ibis.

Chapter II. — On the incubation of Insanity :* two

FORMS ARE HERETO BE NOTED.

When the encephalon has been over-excited somewhat
permanently, by the passions, and the efforts of attention and
memory, insanity is imminent. It is so, also, when the en-
cephalon is continually stimulated by irradiations which take
their departure from the stomach, over-irritated in both
sexes ; and when the genital organs are in a state of acute
sub -inflammation in the female ; becau.se this state is always
accompanied by a general irritation of the nervous appara-
tus, which renders all the sensations too vivid. Hence pro-
ceed two modes of incubation and explosion of insanity — the
one cerebral — the other not cerebral ; and the one and the
other may be either acute or chronic.

Cerebral incubation of the acute form — the effect of active
causes in a young and irritable subject, is nothing else than
an irritation of the brain, indicated by the heat of the head,
redness of the face and eyes, cephalalgies, vertigoes, and
confusion of ideas. This state may also be the consequence
of acute cerebral inflammation from whatever cause. The
patients feel themselves compelled to contemplate certain
visionary images which beset them : these images combine
together in a manner unusual and monstrous : it is in vain
that reason revolts at them : they press upon the attention
of the sick person, and he feels that they are upon the point
of becoming realities, and depriving him of what is left of
his reason. He experiences, as a secondary symptom, trou-
bles in his digestive organs, great thirst, and either a disin-
clination for food, or an excess of appetite, bitterness in the
mouth, heat in the epigastrium, pulsations, palpitations, and a
sense of stricture about the heart, a stoppage of the breath,
shudderings, startings, want of sleep, indefinable agitations^
sadness or irascibility, ra ge, sudden impulses to do some
* That is, circumstances that, precede and aid its developement.— TYaw.

[ 137 j

wrong act produced by an instinct depraved by irritation ;
impulses which he resists at first, and to which he does not
yield till he has lost his reason.

Chronic cerebral incubation, differs from the former only
in a less degree of intensity. It is often the result of moral
causes that have not acted forcibly, or else it depends on a
less degfee of vigor, of irritability, and of energy of the
sanguinary system. It frequently lasts several months, and
even years. It is more frequently remarked among persons
of a singular and original character, prone to false judgments,
who love privacy and concealment, and have never felt the
want of the effusions and confidences of friendship ; and have
always been suspected of some kind of insanity, though that
word has never been applied to them in its full meaning.
In general, heads like these, that are not in unison with the
common run of mankind, are continually at work as the
common expression is : that is to say, are vividly excited by
causes that produce but little effect on others, and are in a
constant state of irritation, that leads them insensibly on to
insanity. Acute and chronic cerebral incubation, may be
equally the result of somewhat too little, or somewhat too
great a developement of the brain, and the facility or the
difficulty attending intellectual operations. A thousand
circumstances may introduce varieties in the degree of inten-
sity of the causes which solicit the over action of the brain.

In this last incubation, the breaking out of insanity is
repressed frequently by reason, which resists it much longer
than in the preceding. Frequently, also, insanity is present
long before it is distinctly perceived ; for usually the name
of insanity is given to an increase of irritation determined
by some accidental cause which only substitutes an acute or
sub-acute type, to the chronic, habitual state.

Cerebral incubation, may also be a consequence of cere-
bral irritation, which manifests itself in a form different from
insanity. Long continued megrims, repeated attacks of
plethora, apoplectic congestions, incomplete palsies, habitu-
al catalepsies, extasies, epilepsies, constitute so many pre-
disposing and determining causes to insanity. This may
break out sometimes under an acute, sometimes under a
chronic form, according to the strength of the subject ;
sometimes it may appear as dementia, a still more unhappy
condition, of which we shall speak by-and-bye.

Non-cerebral incubation is usually gastric. It 1 elates to

I 188 J

persons who are commonly called hypochondriacs, and some-
times melancholies. To the chronic gastritis which torments
them, may be joined some one of the hereafter mentioned
cerebral pre-dispositions ; and then there exists a double
irritation which tends to weaken the reason. The irritation
is triple, if the genital organs are simultaneously affected,
as we may observe among certain hysteric and nymphomanic
females.

The signs of gastritis here, are such as we see them in
their unconnected state. Acute sense of feeling, or pains
perceived at the epigastrium, or at the bottom of one or both,
the hypochondria, flatulence, alimentary or musty eructa-
tions, slow digestion, constipation, irregular diarrhoeas, red
tongue, and other symptoms of gastro-enteritis; to which must
be added a crowd of sensations, more or less insupportable,
in the head, in the organs of motion, and even inside the
body. All these evils worry the spirits of the patient, dis-
pose him to sadness, to solitude, to continual reflections on
the state of his health, to want of sleep, to the perusal of
books on medicine, to enquiries after secrets and quacks :
the diseased persons persuade themselves that they are
afflicted with all the maladies which they hear spoken of,
a croud of imaginary diseases lay siege to them, and they
are subject, from time to time, to hallucinations. Although
.awake, and in open day, they think they hear voices that
call them, or that they feel some person lay hold of them,
and pull them by the hair, &c. Their dreams are frightful,
and when wide awake, they think they hear and see the ob-
jects that occupied them while asleep.

Hysterical women are at first troubled with a sensation of
heat and acridity in the sexual organs — often, with fluor-
albus ; their menstrual discharges are irregular ; the neck of
the womb is hot ; and if the uterus be lifted up by the finger,
the sense of stifling and globus hystericus is produced ; a
sure proof that hysterics is not purely a cerebral affection,
as some would have it. Venereal desires frequently attend
this situation. — These, when exalted, constitute nymphoma-
ny ; to which may be joined regret for some cherished ob-
ject, and chagrin at not being able to possess the desired
individual.

The phenomena corresponding to chronic inflammation of
the digestive passages, may be, and in fact often are, associ-
ated with the preceding symptoms.

i 189 j

All the individuals who arc a prey to these different acci-
dents, inflammatory and nervous, have a pre-disposition to
insanity. When their state of morbid wakefulness, and their
reveries in that state (hallucination) become the predomi-
nant symptoms, they are more than pre-disposed — they are
in the state of incipient insanity ; that is, where the reason
is hardly able to resist the suggestions of a too active ima-
gination, and is in constant danger of yielding. We should
place in the same line, and consider as already insane, those
who in reasoning correctly, speak with great quickness and
in a hurried manner, with brilliant eyes, the face colored,
the features in motion, gesticulating, agitated, walking with
great quickness, as if they had been excited by wine or by
coffee. Such persons are very irascible — the slightest con-
tradiction suffices to bring on a state of ungovernable anger ;
a symptom which all writers on insanity, notice as the usual
prelude.

All those unfortunate persons, whom long and serious
disappointments, the loss of fortune, injuries against their
self-love, or their honor, who are tortured by remorse, or by
a desire of revisiting their native country, their friends, and
all that is dear to them, render sorrowful, care-worn, solitary,
and keep them in a state of paleness and meagreness, are
connected with that double series of which I have already
drawn the picture.

Infants, before ten years of age, are seldom exposed to
insanity. They have too few ideas, and well formed opin-
ions, to enable us to remark any permanent disorder. Those
who are more advanced in this respect, are more exposed to
it. But if the former have not any intellectual delirium,
they have always as a substitute in their acute diseases, de-
lirium of instinct, if I may so speak : that is to say, depraved
appetites, tastes, and affections, which depend on the same
causes as common delirium.

Women are more pre-disposed to insanity than men, owing
to their greater irritability, and to a less developement of
the encephalon, particularly in those regions which are ap-
propriated to intellectual functions.*

* Not only Broussais, but all modern physiologists, with Gall, consider
it is a fact beyond controversy, that the front part of the encephalon, from
the orifice of one ear, round by the eye-brows, to the other ear, and across
the head, from the orifice of one ear to the other, is the appropriate re-
gion of intellect : the back part of the head, from ear to ear, in both direc-

[ 190 j

\V e may now understand how serious is the danger from
retrocessions of external phlegmasia? ; from excess in liquor ;
from moral affections unattended to ; from impatience ; from
the action of the sun on the head ; from a temperature of
body, suddenly reduced by cold : in all those persons who
are exposed to the various conditions of the system here
enumerated. The result of these may be a sudden exasper-
ation of cerebral irritation, which produces an attack of furi-
ous mania But of these causes, the most powerful are such
as depend on intellectual excitement.

There are cases where insanity shews itself unexpectedly
as the result of very strong moral affections — as an affront
received in public on the part of some great personage, or
from the effect of menstrual suppression ; in short, by any
accidental cause that acts violently on the nervous fibres of
the encephalon, but which have not had time to modify pro-
foundly the vitality of the vascular system, to excite a fe-
verish diathesis, or to bring on any of those forms of incuba-
tion of which we have given a description. They announce
the presence of insanity by extravagance of action that sur-
prise those about them. The organs of digestion are not
much injured at first, and the disease is more nervous and
more exclusively cerebral than in the ordinary cases, al-
though the irritation that produces it, is not perfectly devoid
of inflammation, which never fails to take place in the course
of a few days.

Chapter III. — Characters of Insanity.

Mania shews itself under several forms : it is acute or
chronic — it is general or partial.

Acute mania — mania with agitation.

It is accompanied with fury or without: in the one or the
other case it is general ; and always at the same time in-
stinctive and intellectual.

A. Acute, furious mania, is the highest degree of insanity ;
that which approaches to frenzy. It has been called acute
delirium ; but the highest depree of activity of delirium in
general, is that which arises from acute inflammation of the
brain, but furious mania occupies only the second rank of

tions, is appropriated to instinct, and to ihe passions. The developement
of the parts being the same, there maybe great ditferences among indi
viduals. from more or less irritability of the nervous svstem.— Trans.

t 191 J

active irritation, though susceptible of a long duration — that
is to say, it is sub-acute. It is always the highest degree of
what we call insanity ; all the others are exalted to this
when the patients are strongly excited : at least if they be
not already worn out. Insane persons, in this state, are agi-
tated ; they vociferate ; they are irritated at trifles ; and
even without provocation ; and still more, if they are spoken
to : It is sufficient to converse with them, to excite them to
the highest degree. Their proposals are incoherent ; their
eyes are animated ; their muscular force is prodigious ; they
must always be under restraint, for they are governed by
an inclination to break and destroy every thing they can
seize hold of. They would kill the persons who would ap-
proach them, if these had not obtained the mastery over
them. One of these insane persons, in whom the paroxysm
had broke out suddenly, had already cut the throats of sev-
eral persons, before they could seize and confine him : several
turned their fury against themselves, and stabbed them-
selves, or threw themselves headlong : this is frequently
their first act of delirium. Their pulse is small and concen-
trated, and more or less quick. Sometimes they have
scarcely any acceleration in the pulsations of the heart.
When they have not yet been blooded, we observe a red,
puffy countenance ; the veins swelled ; a hot skin ; a red
tongue ; confused sensibility in the epigastric region ; want
of appetite ; sometimes a yellow tinge about the eyes. Pa-
tients may long remain in this deplorable situation ; without
sleep, without food, without feeling the impression of cold,
vociferating and blaspheming day and night, striving to
break their bondages, and always dangerous, if they succeed
in so doing. It is difficult to conceive how life can be sup-
ported at such an expense of cerebral and muscular innerva-
tion, as that which they are subjected to occasionally, during
two, three, four months, in succession ; and sometimes for a
year. Some of them, far from being weakened by two or
three months of voluntary abstinence, still enjoy a muscular
force, proportionate to the fury which transports them. To
us, this is the most astonishing of all maniacal disorders
from the immense loss of nervous energy, which supposes
a renewal from some source which we cannot point out.
How can we conceive that a meagre female, who takes no
substantial food, can remain for several weeks, half naked,
in the depth of winter, with a feeble impulse of blood to-

[ l»2 ]

ward the skin, a pulse small and concentrated, without
catching cold, or suffering from rheumatism ? This, howe-
ver, is what we observe ; and it can only be attributed to an
increase of nervous energy which we cannot explain in the
first instance. We must not forget that this kind of maniac
always has the head hot, and by consequence, it is to a ner-
voso sanguine excitation of the brain, that they owe their
power of resisting abstinence, cold, and pain. We are sur-
prised, moreover, at the facility with which the contusions
and lacerations which they inflict on themselves, are cuied
without any application ; but when the patients are exhaust-
ed by a prolonged nervous excitation, their wounds and
contusions easily become gangrenous.

The fury of this kind of madmen is always excited by a
persuasion that they are attacked — that they are pursued —
that their life is sought, according to one or more false narra-
tives, or romances that their imagination fabricates without
end ; or from the aspect, the discourse, the menaces, the
gestures, of imaginary beings, corporeal or spiritual, to
whom they address their conversation ; these are illusions,
which are termed hallucinations. Most of the persons who
introduce themselves to these maniacs, are ultimately ranked
among their enemies and persecutors ; and being so, they
seek to destroy them. It would be wrong to suppose the
maniacs entirely deprived of reason ; they talk and act in
many cases, consequently, upon the dreams of their delirious
imagination ; but their reasonings are so rapid, that it is not
easy to follow them. Nevertheless, we are certain, from
their confessions after cure, that their bad actions are not
always the result of reasoning ; but they are committed from
impulses, organic or instinctive, and thoughtless ; but this
vice is more frequent in a species of insanity less impetuous
than what we have described.

B. Acute mania, not furious. After mania, furious and
agitated, we ought to rank another kind, where there is agi-
tation, but without fury. We may remark in this form of
mania, an incoercible propensity to agitation, by walking and
gesticulating, a red face, sparkling eyes, a hot scalp, a pow-
er of resisting hunger and weakness, which indicates an
excess of innervation on the assimilating viscera, and the
muscular apparatus ; a blustering loquacity, always founded
like the preceding one, on the supposition of events that
have never happened, whether gay or sad, or upon the sight

L 193 j

or accents of imaginary beings, to whom they address them-
selves, (hallucinations.) These patients are usually confin-
ed, but not bound, unless fury, and an inclination to destroy,
should accompany the other symptoms, which sometimes
takes place, by the sole effect of an increase of irritation.

The duration of this state is also very variable. These
madmen, like those who are furious, often have a chain of
predominant ideas, not always easily understood ; but like
the former, their ideas wander upon all subjects; and although
they recognize the persons who accost them, they always
judge ill respecting them ; for they associate these persons
with the objects of their delirium ; ascribing to them antece-
dent actions and conversations, to which they are utter
strangers. They have also the mania of being acquainted
with persons they have never seen ; and of placing them as
actors in their imaginary fictions.

Chronic Mania.

It is either general or partial, instinctive or intellectual,
and often both the one and the other simultaneously.

Chronic Mania general. We speak now of insane persons,
habitually delirious on all subjects, without being hurried on
by a vivid agitation, like the preceding. This insanity is
common when madness has already commenced ; but, before
this epocha, the greater part of insane persons are governed
by one predominant idea, or by a series of ideas , but they
can understand reasoning upon most other subjects, when
they are not under the influence of their morbid agitation ;
provided, always, that you do not exact from them much,
or continued attention.

Chronic partial Mania^ or Monomania. Partial mania,
the melancholy of the ancients, and of M. Pinel, the mono-
mania of Dr. Esquirol, is the usual chronic state of maniacs,
both before and after agitation, provided they have not yet
arrived at dementia. Monomania differs according as the
patients are more or less reasonable on subjects foreign to
their habitual delirium, and according to the kind of that
delirium. There are many monomaniacs who cannot keep
up a conversation on any subject, without recurring to their
habitual series of ideas, with which they connect all new
impressions of the senses, although they have perceived
them very distinctly. These occupy a middle rank between
the general maniacs, and the perfect monomaniacs, under
exclusive delirium, which, like the hero of Cervantes, arc
25

t 194 j

reasonable upon every thing not connected with their domi-
nant idea. We shall see if the parallel holds in all points.

The classification of monomanias is difficult, if we would
make it interesting and easy to be remembered. I will en-
deavor to connect them on the one hand, with the faculties
of instinct and intelligence ; and on the other, with sensa-
tions more or less oppressive, as well as with different de-
grees of visceral irritation.

1st. Of instinctive monomanias, founded on the perversion
of instinct, and the ivants termed physical ; either complica-
ted with delirium, or not.

We love or we hate men and things : these feelings may
be perverted, that is, the one may be excited to the prejudice
of the others , and this gives rise to different monomanias.
I shall explain them, following the division of instinctive
wants kid down in my Treatise on Physiology applied to
Pathology, and considered in the first part of that work.

A. Perversion of the want (or instinct) of self-preservation.
Monomany of Suicide. This is sometimes simple with-
out delirium, and consists only in a thoughtless impulse, or
else seemingly at least, on some particular grievance. In
fact this toedium vitce is the result of some insupportable un-
easiness, usually originating in a disordered stomach. But
this viscus is not alone irritated : the heart and lungs are so
also. The irritation is seated in the nervoso-sanguineous
expansions of those organs ; it is sent through all the nerves
of relation ; and it is the innervations of all these tissues on
the brain, which renders existence a grievance, and urges
these unhappy persons to their own destruction. All other
motives are but pretexts. It will be necessary to distinguish
this organic impulse to suicide, from that which depends on
a moral cause producing despair, and from an aberration
purely intellectual. Let us however return.

Another mode of perversion of the same want, creates
imaginary evils. We may observe the first stage, as we
have already remarked, in the hypochondriac incubation of
insanity. The last stage is found in those monomaniacs who
believe themselves attacked by incurable disorders, infec-
tions, or putrefactions ; surrounded by devouring fires ; con-
ceiving that their legs are made of glass or of wood ; that
their head is of metal ; that insects are biting them ; that
snakes gnaw their entails : they believe they are incapable
of walking, because their legs are too weak or too fragile.

1 195 J

&c. &c. All these deliria are founded on the perception of
.some sensation more or less painful, sometimes slight and
referred to the organs or limbs of which they complain.
These sensations, during wakefulness, are framed into a ro-
mance by their perverted imaginations, just as asthmatic
persons while asleep feel a rock pressing its weight upon
their breast, or some monster endeavoring to strangle them.

B. Perversion of the instinctive ivant of muscular exercise,

or of rest.
We have seen how the want of exercise and bodily agita-
tion, may be singularly exalted in furious mania. This affection
may be the predominant phenomenon among certain mono-
maniacs. There are others that cannot bring themselves to
exercise any of their muscles ; and who are kept in silence,
and immovable by some inexpressible internal sensation, not
depending on any cerebral congestion, or any paralysis.
The moral affections also are perverted.

C. Perversion of the instinctive want of associating ivith

other men.

This want is the source of friendship, of kindness, of
compassion. The exaltation of this want produces a deliri-
um, in which the persons affected do not cease to deplore
that they are deprived of the sight of persons dear to them.
They weep, they lament, to obtain their being restored to
them ; but they care nothing about them when they arrive,
and speak of them as absent, although they recognize them
as present, and invent conversations and actions relating to
them altogether imaginary.

From the opposite perversion of this want, result cruelty,
and the inclination to destroy ; an impulse not founded on
reflection, and condemned by the persons subjected to it —
an impulse that tempts them to inflict pain, or even death,
on those whom they love the most. This perversion, and
that of suicide, are often found conjoined. The causes of
these aberrations always belong to an irritation in the tris-
planchnic apparatus, (great sympathetic nerve,) and above
all, in the stomach, (of which the symptoms have been ante-
cedently exposed,) acting upon the brain. This last viscus
may produce a disposition to cruelty, by its original conforma-
tion; but in the morbid state, it is an uneasiness felt through-
out tho whole splanchnic apparatus, including also the brain
itself ; so as to render ideas of murder predominant in spite
of reason. This horrible perversion may be conslHered as

[ 196 j

that ot' suicide (A.) like a species of chronic anger and ha-
tred, sometimes directed against ourselves, and sometimes
against men and things. We have already seen it under a
sub-acute form, in furious mania ; while it is entirely chronic
and devoid of feverish inflammation, in that shade of it which
we are now describing : in fact it may be extremely obsti-
nate, and conceal itself under the appearances of calmness,
gladness, kindness, until the disordered person finds the op-
portunity of executing his dreadful purpose. Look at all the
treatises on insanity, and particularly the great and import-
ant note which Dr. Esquirol, the best of our living authors
on mania, has just added to the translation of Hoffbauer.

In a middle shade of irritation, the monomaniacs who feel
these sentiments of aversion for their tellow-creatures taking
place, condemn them and grieve at them. We find insane
men, and more frequently insane women, who are in despair,
that they cannot love their husbands or wives — their child-
ren — their relations ; and who, on this account, feel them-
selves unworthy to live.

In its lighter degree, this perversion produces moroseness,
impatience, and hatred towards certain persons — a state which
we frequently meet with among children of different ages,
and among many grown up persons, whose ungrateful and
selfish character, skilfully concealed, discovers itself on the
slightest painful affection, and particularly when the diges-
tive apparatus is irritated.

The unhappy persons abandoned to this deplorable inclin-
ation, invent pretexts to justify their atrocities ; sometimes
it is a voice that directs assassination — sometimes it is God
himself : some have believed they had a commission to save
mankind by the baptism of blood ; others pretend to secure
the salvation of their children, and to make angels of them,
by cutting their throats. Their rage is, for the most part,
directed towards objects which are most dear to them ; and
when the murder has been committed, they coldly contem-
plate their victim, or occupy themselves about something
else, according to the kind of delirium which coincides with
their murderous monomania. When they have no other
delirium but the impulse to commit murder, they put them-
selves to death, through despair of having committed it ; or
they go to a magistrate to confess it : there having been
some who, in a state of delirium, have pretended that they
have committed murder upon another, to procure that death

L 1H J

upon the scalVold, which they had not the courage to inflict
upon themselves ; and to find time, in the delays of justice,
to reconcile themselves to their maker. But it is clear, that
in the majority of cases, tkese motives have been suggest-
ed to them, by the horrible state of visceral uneasiness, of
which 1 have spoken ; and which exercises such a prodi-
gious influence over the will.

There is no doubt, also, that certain forms of cerebral
irritation may determine, originally, these two monomanias ;
but even in these cases, the influence of a disordered brain
produces a consequent irritation in the sub-diaphragmatic
nervous apparatus ; for all authors agree in acknowledging
the coincidence of irritation in the digestive passages, with
those monomanias which urge on to murder or suicide.
B. Perversion of the instinctive want of nutriment.

The monomania which incites to the eating of strange
things, sometimes very disgusting, as earth, charcoal, chalk,
worms, insects, dung, &c.

We find the first degree of this monomania among chloritic
patients whose stomach is irritated, and among some men
with gastritis. This desire is almost always accompanied
by delirium in mad houses, but the irritation of the stomach
is not less real. It exists as Boulimia, where the appetite
is morbidly increased, for these foul-feeding maniacs are not
incommoded by ordure, which it gratifies them to devour.

The want of exoneration, which follows the taking of food,
may also be depraved. Several insane persons delight in
dirtying themselves while yielding to this natural want which
is often coincident with the desire to eat their excrements,
or drink their urine, &c.

E. Perversion of the instinctive desire of generation.

Erotic monomania of different kinds. — Some are troubled
with priapism or nymphomania, and all their words and
actions tend only to gratify their depraved appetite — others
fall a prey to a passion quite moral ; such are often women
of a gentle, melancholy character, well educated, who exhi-
bit this shade ef erotism : they are wrapt in contemplation
of the perfections of the cherished object : they think they
see, hear, touch him: they address him with tender expres-
6 i ons — sometimes in a gay tone — at others with tears in their
eyes : they lament continually, and appear dying with grief
at his absence, yet they would treat him coldly if he were

[ 198 ]

presented to them, whether they recognized him or not, for
they might or they might not recollect him. Led away by
the illusory images that occupy them, these insane patients
do not substitute in their imagination , the real persons who
offer themselves to their sight. Sometimes they have the
wish and the intention of doing so, as we shall see further
on, especially when the question is as to the persons who
take care of them ; but the internal storm of their diseased
imagination seems to sweep away all the impressions of their
senses, or associate them with the chimeras of imagination.
All the monomaniacs governed by a series of predominant
ideas, but not exclusive, are in this situation, and resemble
herein the general monomaniacs. I shall, therefore, not
dwell upon these at all, in treating of the monomaniacs of
whom I have yet to speak.

2dly. Intellectual monomaniacs, or persons that are such
from the perversion of moral ivants, with the predominance
of one idea, or one series of ideas acquired.

The desire of observation (curiosity) which manifests
itself among us after the physical wants are satisfied, be-
comes by exercise so powerful as to get the better of some
of those wants. This desire is developed, as we have shewn
in our Physiology, and in the first part of this work, in pro-
portion as the cerebral apparatus dedicated to intellect, be-
comes developed. It is this curiosity that procures for us
all those ideas that we derive from external objects by
means of our external senses ; and it is owing to the
pleasure we experience in observing all the bodies of
nature, and discovering what we deem their natural rela-
tions, or truth, that we become passionately addicted to
intellectual labor. This passion becomes stronger as our
organs of intellect become more developed ; but do what we
will, we shall never be able perfectly to insulate the percep-
tions that arise from instinctive wants from those which
depend on curiosity respecting external objects. Hence it
is, that the original perversion of instinct draws with it
that of intellect, a fact settled in the first section on insanity ;
for the same reason we shall see instinct perverted in the
monomanias of intellectual origin, as a consequence of them.
A. Monomania founded on self-satisfaction.

If the pleasure (a physical sensation) attached to self •
satisfaction, be the prime mover of all our efforts to exalt our
intellectual faculties, the morbid exaltation of this pleasure,

[ 199 ]

ought to constitute the principal monomania of intellectual
origin, the monomania of pride. We observe this among a
great number of those who become insane from excess of
mental labor and study, whether they have been inflated by
success, or discouraged by insurmountable difficulties. But
we extract vanity from many other things than our intellec-
tual riches. Man is proud of his strength, of his youth, of
his health, of his comeliness, of his fortune, of his power, of
his warlike exploits, in a word, of every thing that he finds
in himself comparable with what he sees in others. If man
has not always the pleasure of triumph, he has always the
desire for it ; and he cradles his imagination in the enjoy-
ments he can derive from the castles he builds in the air.
The monomanias are, in fact, nothing but the realizing of
this castle-building : with some, because their self-love has
been satisfied ; and with some, because it has been opposed
and wounded. The first set when they become insane,
only continue to dream of the happiness at which they as-
pire, and to pride themselves on their advantages; the others,
after many obstacles humiliating to their pride, are left to
dream at their ease, after getting rid of their troublesome
reason.

Remark, however, that this delirium of happiness — this
paradise of proud madmen, can only continue until some un-
easy sensations felt in their principal viscera, overturn it.

The varieties of monomania, founded on self-satisfaction,
or moral contentment, are numerous, and they are the most
common. The nature of this delirium is determined by the
opinions imbibed during education, the circumstances con-
tinually under their eyes, &c. These monomanias consist
in believing that they are God, whether of the christians or
the pagans, (no doubt the Mahometan madmen believe
themselves often to be Mahomet,) in considering themselves
as a spirit, an angel, a demon, a genius, a king, an emperor,
a pope, a prince of the blood, a hero, a great nobleman, rich,
opulent, learned ; in believing that they have made great
discoveries, &c. These monomaniacs assume the tone, the
language, the attitude, the gesture of the personages they
represent ; they copy so perfectly the dignity of potentates,
that one would almost believe them elevated to a throne ; a
proof that such persons have profoundly studied, while in
health, the character they assume when in their state of
disorder.

[ 200 ]

At other times the satisfaction of the sentiment of self-
love, is announced by the external signs of vanity. One
adorns himself, and calls for admiration of his elegance ;
others, especially among the women, are eager to dress
themselves, and see the most elegant specimens of attire in
dirty ribbons, and ornaments in every article of wood or
of metal they can lay hold of.

B. Monomania founded on self -dissatisfaction.

We place it here as the opposite to the preceding form.
Those who are seized with this delirium conceive them-
selves to be despised, humiliated, justly prosecuted, culpa-
ble in a high degree, bent down by judicial decisions, and
unworthy to live. If religious ideas have much occupied
them, they apprehend themselves to be objects of divine
wrath, pursued by Satan, or having him dwelling in them,
or that they are plunged into the burning lake. We see
some of them under contortions and howlings of which they
have taken the notion from pictures, books, and sermons,
representing the torments of the damned. This form is
what is termed demonomania. Fanaticism, and the dread
which persons of weak heads experience on seeing the con-
tortions of people who pretend to be possessed, are sufficient
to give rise in them to the same delirium. It is in this way
that demonomania has been seen extensively propaga-
ted and in some sort contagious in the middle ages, particu-
larly among females.

One may easily conceive the conversation held, and the
attitudes assumed by different forms of this kind of insanity,
as the patients are impressed with their supposed suffering
under this or that kind of misfortune. One, fearfully looks
at the enemy or the monster that pursues him ; his eyes are
haggard, his face distorted, his hair upon end ; it is dreadful
to look at him. Another, conceals himself — a third sends
forth groanings — a fourth rests in silence and consternation.
I knew one of these, (a female,) whose whim was to believe
herself ruined, and she was in consequence in the greatest
humiliation ; she would wear rags only ; she would feed
only from porringers of wood with a tin spoon, and keep her
feet naked ; her countenance was sad, tears were in her eyes,
she spoke seldom, unless those who attended her refused
credence to her pretended ruin.

All the monomaniacs of this series, have a strong and per-
manent irritation in the digestive organs, and the signs of it

[ 201 ]

are manifest. But this irritation may be the result of mel-
ancholy ideas.

We have seen ideas acquired through the senses, which
have become accidentally predominant, induce a lesion of
that inward satisfaction or motive, that sustains curiosity.
Let us now proceed to cases of monomania, or other trains
of ideas, become predominant, and exciting either pleasing
or unpleasant feelings, in which the lesions of this want are
not predominant.

C. Monomania of Gaiety.

To the first form belong the monomaniacs who, being
actuated neither by pride or vanity, appear gay, content,
always smiling, always happy, whether it be from a persua-
sion of wealth, of power, or of place ; they think they pro-
duce the good fortune of all who approach them, whether
from their influence with supernatural beings whose protec-
tion affords them all kinds of felicity, or that they believe
themselves already in possession of a spiritual world.
D. Monomania of Melancholy.

In the second rank I place all those melancholy monoma-
niacs, who are devoid, however, of the feeling of humiliation
consequent on wounded self-love ; a circumstance of impor-
tance, because the visceral sensations are not so painful as in
those melancholy deliria attended with feelings of shame
and guilt. All the monomaniacs of this section, believe
themselves persecuted without just cause, ruined, condemn-
ed by what men call justice ; or else they are exposed to
cruel animals, or they are fugitives, abandoned and without
resources ; in short, they are in various ways unhappy,
but always satisfied with themselves. They have not
all these ideas at a time, but one or other adapted to their
particular circumstances, and which occupy them exclusive-
ly. This is the Melancholia of the old physicians, the Lipo-
mania of Dr. Esquirol.

The class of avaricious monomaniacs ranks here ; for they
are under the domination of a series of ideas more melan-
choly than gay. If the avaricious man enjoys, it is only
through a long prospective, or from the contemplation of his
treasure ; but this joy is poisoned by the fear of losing it ;
and this fear becomes the predominant sensation. Having
no self-persuasion of guilt, these insane people never believe
themselves possessed by the Devil, but are able, like St.
Anthonv, to set all his snares and temptations at defiance.
26

[ ads 1

they are always sorrowful, more or less; but not in despair,
like those who are subject to self-reproach, and believe
themselves not worthy to live.

E. Complex Monomania.

A third form of this species of insanity ought to be admit-
ted, for the monomanias founded on a complex series of
ideas, and calculated to excite alternately joy and sorrow,
hope and despair, pride and humiliation, fear, and its reac-
tive movement, anger, &£. These are the series of ideas
that alternately predominate in many circumstances where a
man's life is agitated by what is called ambition, jealousy,
envy, and above all fanaticism, a kind of feeling nourished
by pride, by anger, by envy, and all the most agitating intel-
lectual emotions. They are rather the causes of insanity
than the objects of it ; for the persons afflicted do not retain
them while ill, in a form so complicated as before their mala-
dy. Generally, one fixed idea predominates among these
insane persons, who are neither agitated nor in a state of
dementia, because the morbid state of the encephalon pro-
duces the same series of ideas while it remains in that state ;
and the diseased do not enjoy the aid of reason to repel this
series, or to induce the successive predominance of other
recollections, and to compare them with present impressions.

As this state may exist under various shades, we are
compelled to admit it here under the title of monomania of
a complex character ; that is to say, founded on the predomi-
nance of one series of ideas which gives rise successively
to opposite sensations.

F. Intellectual Monomania, without the predominance of
internal emotions, agreeable or painful.
After the monomanias, where the pleasure or the pain are
of moral, that is to say of intellectual origin, although the
emotions are truly visceral, and act a distinguished part, I
place those where acquired ideas become predominant,
occasion neither pleasure or pain sufficiently marked to
constitute an unhappy complication. These monomanias
are only singularities more or less surprising, which amuse
the spectators rather than afflict them. Of these, are the
persuasions in the patient that he is a dog, a wolf, a cat, or
some other animal, whose cries and allures he imitates ; in
supposing he is transformed into a stone, a bottle, a grain of
mustard seed, &c. These kinds of transformations are in-
numerable : they are sometimes founded on certain changes

L 203 j

in the functions. Thus an insane man, rendered powerless
by masturbation, believes himself transformed into a wo-
man, and wishes to assume the tone and costume of a female,
The legs of glass, the belly of paper, the heads cut off, the
hearts torn out, the supposed bad smell of the body entirely
dissolved, the spirits that haunt him, the wantons that flit
about the madman like flies, the lilliputians that by millions
climb up the legs of one of these persons, who thinks that
at each step he crushes them by dozens ; and other reveries
of the same kind, may depend upon painful sensations, but
are not sufficiently strong to induce us to regard the disease
as of instinctive origin. We find, however, in all these, a
predominant irritation of the brain, which obstinately re-
produces certain ideas at the expense of the recollection of
different ideas, and of actual impressions.

We must place in the same rank, all those madmen who
are incited to perform constantly certain movements, either
of gesture or of progression ; to pronounce obstinately cer-
tain words, or to keep silence for a long time — sometimes
for years , to give themselves up to a certain kind of labor,
whether mechanical or of writiug, whether of describing
plants or animals, of chemistry, astronomy, the drawing of
plans, translating, versifying, &c. &c. These monomanias
are so numerous, that we should be lost in the classification,
if we did not confine ourselves to referring them to some
intellectual lesion, and the predominance of some acquired
ideas, depending on some regular mode of cerebral irritation,
unaccompanied by any great alteration of an intrinsic want
of th£ first order, or by any special want which compels us
to observation and comparison.

As monomanias depend on some mode of cerebral irrita-
tion, when this mode changes, the monomanias change also;
the loquacious madman becomes suddenly taciturn, and vice
versa. To sorrow succeeds gaiety ; to a phrase for a long
time pronounced, some other phrase ; to one attitude, ano-
ther attitude, &c. There is no fixed duration for any of
these forms of mental aberration.

It is in vain that some persons assure us, that there are
monomaniacs who are perfectly reasonable on every thing
except their predominant trains of ideas. They can reason
justly upon questions merely relating to their physical and
common circumstances ; but the most acurate observers
agree, that none of them can sustain a serious conversation

r 204 i

which requires attention and discussion ; or neat by writing
any question of morals or philosophy, general or special,*
without falling at least into false reasonings. This is a fact
we must not forget : there are no perfect Don Quixotes ;
and whatever may be said, he w T ho cannot apply his reason
to a subject so important as his own propei position in socie-
ty, is incapable of reasoning justly upon any question of a
higher order. These monomaniacs, then, are truly madmen ;
as we may be convinced by compelling them to reason : we
see immediately that they become disconcerted, or confus-
ed, or irritated, and show a tendency to general mania : the
least degree of insanity of which they are capable, is that
where their different instinctive wants, such as we have
already detailed, are but little changed ; so that we
can employ these patients in some manual operations that
do not require a sustained attention, or any complicated in-
tellectual combination, such as some mechanic art, garden-
ing, some simple game, music, daily domestic occupation,
&c. provided no great responsibility attaches to them.

We must remember also that in the monomanias that ap-
pear most limited, there is always a perversion of the affec-
tions and feelings that have been most durably, and most
powerfully cherished by the patient ; I mean the love of their
relations. This may be expected ; for these subjects are
not insane, as in the case of general insanity, but because
they are seduced by false perceptions which attract all their
attention, and do not permit them to substitute the real per-
ceptions furnished by the senses, nor the recollection of past
sensible impressions. Hence it is they forget their .rela-
tions, or hate them as persecutors, and the first sign of return-
ing sanity, is the return of those affections of the heart, and
the acknowledgement of those cares to which convalescents
are indebted for their cure.

If we were only to consider those actions which madmen
can commit in consequence of the alteration of their intellec-
tual faculties, we should make a bad classification of their
monomanias. For example, a madman who believed him-
self to be the Emperor of Austria, heard some one call his
physician who wished to impose on him as Emperor of
China : thence forward he believed his doctor came to de-
throne him, and he took the resolution to kill him by sur-
prise, and preserve his own crown. Here is an accidental
* Important in medical jurisprudence. — Trans,

[ 205 ]

assassination not dependent on the monomania oi' murder.
Insane delirious persons may have a thousand such motives
for killing either themselves or others without the monoma-
nia of murder being their ruling propensity. One of them
strikes his friend, thinking he strikes a demon or a monster
who pursues him ; another stabs himself to the heart to
avoid a shameful death on the scaffold which he thinks
waits him, and to save the honor cf his family ; a third sets
his house on fire because he thinks it has become the ren-
dezvous of robbers, &c. &c. Hence arises a necessity to
inquire strictly into the motives of an accused person, not
only to decide on the degree of his culpability, but also to
determine the seat of the malady and the most efficacious
remedy. As the passion which has given rise to the insan-
ity does not always remain predominant after the loss of
reason, so the monomania sometimes changes, and this im-
plies some change in the affections of the different organs
diseased ; but these changes are no more than the variations
and irregularities of a continued malady. It is not so with
the following class.

Intermittent Mania.
Every form of mental affection that we have described,
may become intermittent, re-producing itself periodically,
provided the irritation on which it depends has not altered
the texture of the brain or the viscera of the lower belly ;
it is this that renders insanity intermittent. Many acces-
sions recur several times in the course of the year ; others
only once, and at certain times, as spring, autumn, &c. A
lady has had fits of insanity for three or four months annu-
ally during thirty years, and they have never passed an
interval of six months without re-appearing, though they
have been sometimes retarded for two or three months. A-
ware of the return, she retires to some lunatic asylum where
she is confined during the access of her disorder. During
night she sees the most tragical scenes of the revolution of
which she had been an eye witness ; she sees the execu-
tioners, and as formerly, she is sprinkled with the blood of
the victims ; she is afflicted and cries out with all her force.
Scarcely does day approach, than her delirium changes its
type : it becomes gay, indecent, and even gross. At night
the scences of horror appear again, and soon during the
periodical access of the fit. She holds the same kind of dis-
course, offers the same injuries, apostrophises those who

I 2i)i> J

attend her in the same language, and every symptom is ex-
actly the same at each recurrence of the fit. When that is
over, she becomes reasonable, returns home without losing
the recollection of any thing she has done or said, and en-
joys her reason perfectly till the next return of her disorder.
During the prelude of her last access, in 1827, she received
news of her husband's death, from whom she had long lived
separate. The access of her disorder was stopped ; but in
two months afterwards she was seized as usual.

Chapter IV. — Progress, Duration, Complication*,
Termination of Insanity.

Insanity, like ail other non-specific irritation, has no pro-
gress independent of modifyers, nor any fixed duration, like
the small pox, the measles, &c. It may be cured suddenly
by medical skill — by nature, which re-establishes a func-
tion which has been interrupted, or transforms insanity into
some other bodily affection — by chance, which dissipates it
by means of some lively moral impression. This is very
possible when the inflammatory state is not present, so long
as the substance of the brain is not disorganized ; and this
state maybe of long duration. It may also be indefinitely
prolonged without amelioration, or only with remissions,
and end in madness : this occurs in the greatest number of
cases, when the disease has not been efficaciously combated
at its commencement.

It is, above all, with the progress of insanity which medi-
cine has not arrested in a short time, that I must now be
occupied.

The inflammatory symptoms having been mitigated by
art, the patients continue disordered in their senses, each
after his manner ; that is partially on the same subject, or
when the object and the subject are changed, during a great-
er or less length of time. This time varies considerably.
Some are cured at different epochas during the two first
years, even under the care of physicians who use active
remedies. We have seen reason return after ten or even
twenty years of mental alienation : this proves that the in-
tegrity of the brain may be preserved for a longtime in some
favored subjects. Many other viscera offer the same cause
of remark ; but one is less surprised in those cases than
when a substance so delicate as the brain gives rise to it.
In general, writers on mania (Esquirol) do not count upon a

[ *o? ]

cure alter the second year ; the most ordinary period within
which a cure may be expected is from 50 to 150 days.

When insane patients do not return to their reason, they
fall into that kind of madness which consists in the loss of
intellect ( dementia ) and into general palsy, unless some com-
plicated disease abridges their life ; for they are exposed
to all the maladies that afflict other persons. As they do
not possess the power of resisting cold, except during the
state of insane excitation, and few precautions are taken to
secure them from the effects of it, they often suffer much
from this cause. Hence pleurisies, peripneumonies, and
pericarditis, which may carry them off in a few days : hence,
also, an habitual state of pulmonary congestion, accompanied
by bronchitis, which may have dangerous results : hence
most insane persons become rheumatic or gouty, deprived
of the use of their limbs ; or else these affections suddenly
ceasing, they are replaced by suffocating irritations of the
stomach, the lungs, or the heart. Acute gastro-enteritis and
intermittent fevers, do not spare insane people, and often
depend on the cold damp state of their habitations.* But
of all the accidents to which they are liable, because it is
the most suddenly fatal, is the congestion of blood in the
brain, which kills them suddenly, and occurs often in an at-
tack of epilepsy. Many fall victims to phtisis pulmonaris,
and we shall soon see the reason ; but the greater number
die of chronic entero-colitis ; for the disposition to acute
gastro-enteritis cannot last long. This affection comes on with
diarrhoea, and colicky pains, which plunge the patients into
marasmus, leucoplegmasia, and slight effusions in the perito-
naeum.

Insane people do not arrive at this state of exhaustion
until they have long suffered by chronic affections of the up-
per portion of the digestive canal. Generally they do not
complain much ; but their gastro-duodenitis may usually be
distinguished by the yellow color of the conjunctiva, and
the mucous and bilious state of the tongue, or the tender-
ness of the right hypochondria into which the liver often
pours its fluids ; and by a pain more or less obtuse on press-
ing the epigastrium, or the right or left sides under the ribs.
It is after this state has long continued without preventing
the nourishment of the patient, that diarrhoea appears ;

* In England and this country, all the train of accessary disorders here
enumerated, are obviated by the introduction of heated air. — Trans.

sometimes preceded by an (edema oJ the malleoli, or a slight
fluctuation in the abdomen.

If the insane patients uncured, do not contract any of
these accessory diseases, they may arrive at an advanced
age even while insane ; but they never afibrd instances of
great longevity, for they are in fact diseased ; and those
among them who have long enjoyed a state of good health,
are the only persons who live long. Some have lived in a
state of insanity during thirty years. During this long pe-
riod, many causes influence their delirium, and some ol them
exhibit short lucid intervals. Every thing that irritates
them disorders their ideas, and tends to bring on a state of
agitation, fury, and general delirium, when it is not of itself
continuous. The spring, the autumn, great heat, biting
cold, are the most frequent causes of these exacerbations.
Electricity also excites them much, and threatens to induce
even cerebral congestions, if the patients are plethoric : all
these types of disorder are from the beginning, or become
with time sensible to atmospheric changes. Contradictions,
disputes, earnest discussions, numerous visitors, the sight
of popular meetings much agitated, freedom allowed too ear-
ly, wine, alcoholic liquors, and all the diffusible excitants,
agitate them strongly and impede their cure. Such also is
the case with tonics improperly exhibited, and generally
with all irritating medicaments, which false medical notions
may prescribe, unless in cases of accidental weakness, well
characterized.

Insane persons indulge in solitary excesses which greatly
influence the progress of their disorder, by powerfully stimu-
lating the heart, and determining congestions of blood in the
brain. This cause is one of those which concur in produc-
ing among them aneurism of the heart and epilepsy, one of
the most unfortunate complications that canbefal them.

I have said that dementia and general paralysis were re-
served for insane persons who have neither been cured, nor
cut off by the complications before mentioned. Let us now
see how these affections exhibit themselves, and narrate
the history of mental alienation (dementia) more particular-
ly, that type which constitutes the last form of insanity.
Dementia and General Paralysis.

This is announced by three classes of phenomena, which
correspond to the three great functions of the encephalon :
loss of intellectual faculties ; loss of muscular motion ; loss

[ 209 ]

of the functions of the senses. The first constitutes what
writers on mania have agreed to call Dementia : the second
and third have always been regarded as Paralysis. Hence
We are induced to join the history of mental alienation,
(dementia) which constitutes the last form of insanity, tb
the facts which relate to general paralysis.

The presence ol epilepsy hastens the approach of demen-
tia, which may appear as the immediate consequence of
epilepsy, without any preceding insanity. For insanity has
not the exclusive power of producing dementia, which may
succeed to obstinate head-aches, to long continued intellec-
tual labor, to much watching, great efforts of memory, apo-
plectiform sanguineous congestions, repeated attacks of
the palsy ; we see it come on by degrees among persons
who have remained in a state of hemiplegia, or deprived of
some of their senses after recovery from one or more apo-
plectic attacks. It is equally developed in those who are
palsied in one of their senses, or in some of their muscles,
without having experienced any complete attacks of apo-
plexy or hemiplegia, or who have been subject to that
ldnd of attack without hemiplegia, which authors have
called a sudden plethora of the brain, (coup de sang.) In
short, dementia declares itself in the progress of old age in
persons whose cerebral organization is imperfect, or who
have too much abused that viscus.

We have paid great attention to the dementia of old age j
we have observed it often in those families, particularly,
where the brain has not been very robust, and wherein
insanity has appeared at an age not much advanced.
This is a true chronic irritation of the encephalon, more or
less inflammatory. It is with the irritations of the brain, as
it is Avith that of other organs : among the subjects who arc
born with a pre-disposition to chronic pneumony, gastritis,
or articular inflammations, the more w r eak, the more irritable,
the more stimulated, contract this disorder in their youth,
trhile the more robust and the least irritated, contract
it only in advanced life, and when time has triumphed
over their vital energy. This truth would be a melan-
choly one, if there were not a middle term reserved for
those who know how to use the means of preserving
health (hygienne) so as to withdraw themselves from the
determining causes.

[ 210 J

"Dementia announces itself in various ways, as it is simple
or complicated with insanity, or with general paralysis.
The more simple form is that of old men who are neither
insane or paralytic ; it shews itself by an incoherent loqua-
city, with repetitions that mark the feebleness of memory.
The persons affected, are subject to occasional hallucina-
tions, signs that irritation is at work on disorganizing the
encephalon ; they weep, they laugh, they sing, they invent
stories ; but in other respects appear to be in health.

The dementia of persons already attacked with insanity,
is also recognized by want of memory, by incoherence of
conversation and proposals, and frequently by vacancy of
countenance, and stupid silence. But what is very remark-
able, is, that the moment when they fall into imbecility, and
lose that sombre and haggard look that expressed their
cares, and that pale and worn figure so usual among all of
them, they appear to gain astonishingly as to all their inter-
nal functions ; they become fat, fresh, with color in their
eheeks, and enjoy the best health in the world, while no
disorganization of the stomach or the lungs is opposed to
the healthy progress of nutrition. We see them walk
alone, holding unmeaning discourses with themselves, but
without agitation or fury ; sometimes they are taciturn, look-
ing stupidly at persons who accost them, answering only by
monosyllables to questions put to them, seldom properly,
Unless they relate to their most indispensable wants. Those
who are less affected, make remarkable efforts to connect
their ideas, but when they are compelled to hear and to
answer, and they become impatient at their want of success.
Such, also, is, for the most part, the progress of demen-
tia in persons who have been conducted to this state by
epilepsy. But where it proceeds in company with palsy,
there is an embarrassment of speech as well as of memory.
The persons affected pronounce some syllables with difficul-
ty, they hesitate in talking, and they are at a loss for the
expression they want to use. A difficulty also is seen in
lifting up their legs, which feel heavy and benumbed ; if
they turn their head aside while they walk, they stumble,
and are liable to fall. By degrees the face loses its expres-
sion ; they become indifferent to what passes around them,
and seldom speak. They arrive at last at that degree of
carelessness and stupidity, that we see them remain immov-
able, silent, and sitting or laying down for days together.

[ 311 j

1f general paralysis has proceeded at equal pace with de-
mentia, the patients are at length deprived of the power of
executing any voluntary motion, their foodmust he put into
their mouths, and they must be kept constantly clean. In
this degradation of the functions of external relation, the
motion of the muscles of respiration and deglutition, remain
during life.

Dementia shews itself without any kind of reaction by
the perfect silence and stupidity in persons who have long
beenhemiplegic, or afflicted with chronic gastro-duodenitis.
But a paralysis of one sense only, without being complica-
ted with the loss of muscular action, or the disorganization
of the principle viscera, does not prevent dementia from
producing that loquacity which we have before noted. All
the subjects whom apoplectic attacks have left impotent
and deprived of the use of one side of their body, are those
who pass as iveak-headed ; they become angry, they weep,
they laugh at trifles, although they are in appearance rea-
sonable : this may be considered as the first degree of de-
mentia.

While this form of disease is not yet far advanced, that is,
while it does not yet approach that silent stupidity which
corresponds to its highest grade, it may present complica-
tions or alternations of intellectual excitation, forming a re-
markable contrast with the stupor which usually characterizes
it. Hence we are surprized to hear a man whose want of me-
mory incapacitates him for regular con versation, play at chess,
or perform on an instrument, as well as a reasonable person.
The attacks of excitation seem to come on spontaneously at
irregular periods, without any assignable cause, or at regu-
lar times, as at periods of menstruation ; and the patients
appear to become for some time agitated in the manner that
approaches to curable mania ; but a little attention will pre-
vent the physician from being deceived.

The duration of dementia, is not determined more than
other shades of mental alienation. When it is single, the
brain does not experience much deterioration, for we see
persons of weak intellect who are for years in this unhappy
state ; but the addition of paralysis, renders the prolonga-
tion of the disorder more difficult of cure.

We have already said that general paralysis may break
out with dementia ; but this may either precede or follow at
different intervals. Person? of different ages, but especially

[ «w ]

at the decline of life, alter having undergone great intellec
iual labor, mental troubles, and long continued cephalalgias,
who have had falls or received blows on the head, spine,
breast, or pelvis, experience muscular pains, and difficulty
of walking, as well as of pronouncing certain words, a long
time before they perceive a loss of memory or any approach
of dementia. I cannot stop longer on the details of such
cases, whose progress I have just noted. I shall confine
myself to paralysis considered as a termination of insanity ;
but this paralysis may be precedent or consecutive upon
dementia, although it be more usual to observe these two
affections commence and proceed simultaneously.

When paralysis appears before dementia it is always ac-
cidental, shewing itself as the consequence of violent head
aches, some sanguineous congestion, or some attack of
epilepsy or apoplexy. In these cases it is usually partial,
confined to one side of the body where the muscles cease to
act, or to one of the external senses that no longer gives rise
to perception. Such a partial paralysis accelerates the ap-
proach of dementia much slower than general paralysis.
This last, when it is the result of insanity, always keeps
company with dementia, following the course we have alrea-
dy described.

When insane persons are not suddenly carried off, whe-
ther by violent apoplectic attack before or after the appear-
ance of dementia, or by acute inflammation of the chest or
the lower intestines, they perish miserably : sometimes in
the immobility of dementia — sometimes with gangrenous
eschars of the sacrum or trochanters, or by palsies of the
bladder or rectum, when the affection of the brain is trans-
mitted to the spine — sometimes before this period, by a
chronic affection and disorganization of the lungs and diges-
tive organs, as we have before observed. A great number
go off in pulmonary hectic, from not having been sufficiently
protected against the impression of cold. Those who are
thus cut off, are affected also with a chronic gastro-enteritis,
which puts an end to most of those who do not die of cere-
bral congestion, or of consumption ; it is essential to chronic
irritation of the encephalon to bring on these affections and
disorders of the digestive apparatus. This gastro-enteritis,
always accompanied by affections of the liver, kills the pa-
tient with marasmus, and diarrhoea when the disease extends
to the large intestines; and sometimes in a state of dropsy,

[213 J

which conceals the meagreness of the body, and the con-
sumption of the last stage of life. Insane persons who have
contracted rheumatism and its pains, often perish by aneu-
rism of the heart joined to affections of the other viscera.
This aneurism, the effect of irritation, may moreover exist
independently among the insane, as among other persons.

Chapter V. — Necroscopy of Insane People.

According to some physicians, the post mortem examina-
tion of persons who have died insane, have taught us noth-
ing concerning the seat or the nature of insanity ; but many
others are of a different opinion — they assure us that the
brain always exhibits appearances of disease, of which men-
tal alienation has been the effect. We shall give an account
of the state in which the different organs have actually been
found after death ; and the dissertation which we shall offer
on the value of the symptoms, the diseases on which we
have made our observations in the preceding pages, will aid
us in determining the physiological character of insanity.

We must seek for the alterations that correspond to in-
sanity first in the head. It has been found in the cases of
persons who have died in transports of fury that the cerebral
substance was injected with blood, and of unusual hardness.
As to myself, I have seen in the body of a young man of 18
years of age, the nerves so hardened at the points of inser-
tion in the brain, usually called the origin of the nerves, that
they might easily have passed for small tendons. If such
subjects die of violent apoplexy, we find moreover effusions
of blood at the surfaces, in the cavities, or in the very sub-
stance of the brain.

When madmen have lived long, we find alterations still
more varied ; but authors have not distinguished sufficient-
ly the subjects who have been cut off by accidental death,
prior to the access of dementia or general paralysis, from
those who have undergone all the stages of mental and mus-
cular deterioration. The organic disorders that have seized
upon them, have proceeded from the external to the inter-
nal parts. The inequality of bulk of the two portions of the
head — the thickening or thinning of the scull ; in case of
thickening, sometimes the two bony tablets separated, leav-
ing between them a considerable diploe (cellular tissue);
the scull sometimes compact and smooth like ivory, and

L «" j

-when not so, frequently injected ; when it is thin, it is some-
times hard and sometimes brittle, and even friable ; the
dura mater hardened, thickened, and ossified ; the arachnoid
coat thickened, opaque, sometimes adherent, sometimes
covered with a purulent layer, more or less dense ; the
membrane of the ventricules thickened, purulent, adherent to
the brain ; the pia mater injected with blood and serum ;
sometimes thickened and united to the arachnoid ; we are
principally struck with the adherence of the pia mater to
the surface of the brain ; so much so, that in some subjects
it could not be separated without carrying away some of the
grey substance ; the circumvolutions obliterated and pressed
against each other ; when on the other hand the pia mater
was moist, these circumvolutions were separated, thinned,
and the intervals filled with the lymph that moistened that
membrane. We have seen the substance of the brain shin-
ing, and as if it had imbibed a serosity which rendered it
moist when cut ; sometimes the grey substance has been
harder than usual, which ought to correspond with the more
than ordinary developementof the contiguous vascular mem-
brane, the pia mater. The grey substance has been some-
times hard to be distinguished from the white ; a lively red
tinge has been remarked in cases where the disease has
been not much removed from sudden and acute, and in other
cases a marbled appearance, more or less livid or pale, occu-
pied the periphery of the brain, and almost confounded the
two substances : the substance of the brain is found usually
more dense than that of the cerebellum ; but both the one
and the other unusually softened, especially in those sub-
jects who have been attacked by epilepsy or general para-
lysis ; partial softenings or hardenings of the cerebral
substance appear, which to some observers have seemed
glandular or schirrous ; sometimes suppurations or ulcera-
tions of a cancerous character, appear at the external surface,
or in the cavities of the brain ; bladders filled with hydatids
in the plexus choroides, sometimes hard and almost stony
concretions in the foldings of this membrane and in some
others, and even the pulpy substance itself, where now and
then we find considerable petrifactions, or bony masses,
effusions of blood or serosity accompanying the alterations
in the chronic, as well as in the acute state ; the general
volume of the encephalic mass much less considerable in the
first case than the last. Where general paralysis has occur.

[ 215 ]

red, we have found in the membranes of the spine, the same
kind of lesions as in those of the encephalon ; and sometimes
important alterations in the medullary substance and the
nervous cords.*

The alterations which the other organs present, do not
differ from those which are found in subjects which have
not been attacked by insanity. The insane, as we have
seen, frequently contract chronic inflammations in the organs
of respiration and circulation ; it is not extraordinary, there-
fore, to find among them aneurisms, lungs hardened, ulcer-
ated, or tubercular ; the pleura and the pericardium altered,
or containing an effused liquid. It is more common to find
alterations of the digestive organs, accompany alterations of
the brain : we always discover, therefore, in the abdomen
of madmen, who have passed through all the shades of intel-
lectual degradation, traces of chronic gastro-enteritis, with
degeneration of the liver ; that is to say, we find the inter-
nal membrane of the stomach red, brown, black, thickened,
ulcerated, ecchymosed, rarely thinned, softened, or des-
troyed near the shallow part, unless the gastric symptoms
have acquired the predominance, which we have seen more
than once. We find much more frequently the duodenum
reddish, brown, dilated; its internal membrane thickened,
presenting follicules tumified, degenerated, ulcerated ; the
liver yellow, fat, augmented in bulk, or tough, sometimes
tubercular, schirrous, containing cysts with serous effusions
in the peritoneal cavity. The rest of the digestive canal is
more or less altered in its mucous membrane, according to
the degree of inflammation which it has undergone ; the
internal membrane oi the colon, brown, black, full of small
circumscribed ulcerations, as if made by a punch, especially
among those who have died with diarrhoea. We also find
traces of chronic inflammation in nymphomaniac females ;
but it would be useless to describe all the other disorders
which may possibly be traced in the dead bodies of insane
persons ; for as these patients are exposed to the action of
cold, and of the passions, sources of a thousand evils, it would
be necessary to describe the pathological anatomy of most
of the disorders of the human race.

* I refer to the excellent treatise on Insanity, by Dr. Calmeil, entitled
"On general paralysis in insane persons." (De la paralysie generate
chez les alienes.) Sagacity and indefatigable patience belong to this
observer, who seem? destined to settle this part of pathological anatomy.

t 216 J
Chapter VI. — On theories of Insanity, ancient and

MODERN, UNTIL THE INTRODUCTION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL
MEDICINE.

Now that the more ostensible facts relating to mental
diseases are known to us ? we may proceed to the investiga-
tion of facts less evident, which constitute part of the laws
of physiology, and which may serve to explain the former.
It would be useless to dwell on the absurd opinions respect-
ing insanity which have prevailed during ages of fanaticism
and superstition. In the Catholic persuasion, ignorant
people have always exposed themselves, by an inclination
to ascribe insanity to demoniacal possession , as the pagans
often explained it by being besieged by the furies. But let
us pass over these miserable notions.

From time of old, insanity has been considered as a dis-
ease of the brain ; it has been compared with frenzy; and
ascribed, like that, to inflammation of the brain, and its
meninges. We find all these ideas in Ccelius Aurelianus,
the translator of Soranus, as well as a therapeutic practice
devised to perpetuate them ; such as the application of
leeches, cuppings, and scarifyings to the head, to the nape
of the neck, and to the shoulders ; a cooling regimen, simple
diet, revulsive stimulation upon the skin, &c. It is surpris-
ing, that modern physicians should claim the honor of this
discovery. In truth, other ancients not less famous, such as
Galen and his followers, had drawn off the attention from
the real curative indications, to fix them on humors to be
evacuated, particularly the atrabilious ; but this class of
humors were always supposed to act upon the brain, and
sometimes even to produce inflammation in it, as these
Galenists acknowledged ; but this explanation, admitted
by all the mechanic humoralists, by Boerhaave, Van Swie-
ten, &c. has prevailed even to our day. We have reason
then to be astonished that the moderns have been so slow
in substituting inflammatory lesions of the brain to the vague
humoral lesions of the antient and middle age.

This delay has arisen from their having too much circum-
scribed the phenomena of inflammation. Considering phleg-
mon as the type of this morbid state, and requiring almost
always suppuration to characterize the phlegmasia which do
not terminate in gangrene, they have till now prevented
observers from yielding the testimony of their senses to the
proximate cause of the redness, the swelling, and the sense

[. an j

oi heat which they see in so many instances. Whenever
irritation acting on a secreting organ, increased or denatur-
alized the humor furnished by it, this was regarded as the
cause of the local affection ; and if any other part, however
distant, presented a morbid state at the same time, it was
ascribed to the aberrations of the same humor. Thus it
happens, that the transpiration, the bile, or the mucus un-
der the name of phlegm, have become causes of so many
disorders which were not attributed even to the blood. On
the same principle in later days we have seen that all the
affections of the viscera that succeed to suppurating lesions,
whether simple or ulcerous, are placed to the account of
purulent infection.

The same tendency to generalize a few observations
more or less exact, has shewn itself under different forms
every time that some important discovery has been made.
The circulation and pretended globular form of the particles
of the blood, begat the mechanic, the hydraulic, the hydro-
dynamic theories ; that of the glands, and still later of the
absorbent vessels, gave occasion to attribute all maladies to
lymph, to glandular obstructions, infractions, or inflamma-
tions of the absorbent vessels ; the discovery of muscular
irritability and the labors bestowed on the nervous system,
drew medical attention to that quarter, and almost all our
maladies were then placed to the account either of some
original lesion of that vital energy of which the nerves were
the agents, or of that subtile fluid of which they were the
conductors, or else of the nervous fibrils whose degree of
tension* explained all phenomena to that class of observers
who did not admit of a nervous fluid.

About the same time we saw the archceal abstractions, the
soul material and immaterial, energy or weakness, entities
which were created either as having locality, or as being
independent of all confinement in the organs, become the
regulators of all organic motions. These entities were made
responsible for all kinds of diseases, and all remedies were
addressed to them, but no one all this time, took the trouble
to ascertain the action of these entities on the organs them-
selves.

-Some careless and very superficial readers, have ignorantlv ascribed
to Hartley the opinion that nerves were cords, stretched and vibratino-
like the strings ot a harpsichord, although that great man expressly rfis«

i'lpimc anr such nntinn W/»j?#

claims am- qnch notion. — Tmn*.

f 218 j

Still later, ai>d in times nearer our own, some physicians
felt disgust at these abstractions, and thought to work won-
ders by substituting some new entities to the old. For fear
of repeating antient absurdities, they refused to explain how
the blood, the bile, the phlegm, the lymph, the nerves,
could become the causes of disease ; but they admitted a
causality which served them instead, by recognizing in some
general manner, a sanguineous element, a bilious, a pituitous,
and a nervous.

Among their predecessors, some had attributed certain
maladies to inflammation — others to some saburra (aliment-
ary undigested concretion ) which must be evacuated — others
to an excess of force — others to an excess of weakness in
the stomach — some to putridity of the humors — many, quite
as numerous to malignity, whose cause was ascribed to de-
fect of energy in the vital principle. The new fangled
ontologists reconciled all these disputants by creating for
the same maladies inflammatory elements, saburral or gas-
tric, which were synonimous ; sthenic and asthenic, which
were opponents ; putrid, malign, irregular or ataxic. No-
thing became easier than the diagnosis and the treatment
of diseases with the aid of this legion of entities ; the doc-
tors always agreed, for they created a genius to preside
over each symptom, and the supposed specific remedy,
which was in fact no other than the method prescribed by
the same ancients whose language was rejected, was admit-
ted in the catalogue of the polypharmacopeia destined to
exercise all these hobgoblins.

Thus it was that the consultations of medical juntos were
arranged to the great advantage of Decorum ; for the profane
were no longer witnesses of those scandalous disputes whose
memory has been preserved by Moliere and other satirists.

How then can we be surprised that the ancient idea of
Soranus on the nature of insanity, should have been lost,
and that much pains were required to produce evidence
concerning it ? The elements, the principles, the morbid
Genii, acted on the brain ; this is all they could say ; and
when they were compelled to admit the presence of inflam-
mation, this appearance, so found, was admitted only as
accidental, just as it was asserted to be in the pretended
essential fevers.

Every one knows, that among the theories which I have
brought up to recollection 5 that of nervous energy and vital

f 219 |

energy, has ultimately succeeded more or less. But anim-
ism has always had its partizans : we see even at this day
there are physicians who assert even in print, that madness
is an affection of the immaterial principle, and that it has no
particular seat; but a far greater number maintain that it
depends on morbid elements, without giving any reasonable
or satisfactory explanation of the mode of action of these
entities.

After the explanations of hypothetical theorists, come
those of the followers of anatomical pathology. We may
expect now to find something, if not more reasonable 9 at
least more material, and more intelligible to common un-
derstandings ; we shall soon see if this presumption be well
founded.

We have said that physicians have too much confined the
idea of inflammation by taking phlegmon as the type of it ;
no disorder shows this better than insanity. As it is ex-
tremely rare to meet with pus like that of a phlegmon in
the brain of madmen, nobody thought of inflammation there.
On the other hand, as no one discovered the relation of
cause and effect between the lesions of which we have spo-
ken in the dead body, and mental alienation, there was great
difficulty in materialising this affection. Indeed, with the
usual idea of inflammation, how could it be supposed that
the hardenings, the softenings, the diminutions and inequali-
ties of bulk of the brain and cerebellum, the density, the
opacity, the injection, the adherence of the membranes, the
hardness or softness, the thickness or the tenuity, the con-
sistence, with or without the ivory appearance or the fria-
bility of the bones of the cranium, could be the causes of so
many kinds of delirium, of fury, of convulsions, of prodigious
increase of certain talents, and of the total brutality of the
intellectual faculties ? One might reconcile fury and an
increase of muscular force, with the hardening of the cere-
bral substance, on finding it accompanied by sanguineous
injection, for here was evidence of the first degree of inflam-
mation ; but to confirm this idea, it would be necessary that
all the chronic shades of inflammation, should present traces
of suppuration analogous to that of phlegmon as their type.
But this was scarcely ever seen ; and hence, in our opinion,
all notion of cerebral phlegmasia, as the cause of insanity,
was abandoned. In all cases, therefore, as it became abso-
lute! V necessary to connect the alterations of the brain and

[ 2*0 J

its membranes with insanity, not being able tu view them
as causes, they were converted into effects.

This explanation, absurd as it is, passed amidst a number
of other absurdities, which swarmed in pathology until
1816, when I printed in my Examen de la doctrine medicate
generalement adoptee, a question which I propounded in ray
own lectures, ever since 1814. I asked of my honorable
brethren what they understood by pathological alterations
produced by a disease ; and how they conceived that a dis-
ease could act upon the organs, since, according to the most
philosophical nosographical definitions, a disease is nothing
more than a bundle of symptoms. 1 applied this question
to each disease in particular, and especially to those fevers
denominated essential. In 1821, 1 republished it in my se-
cond Examen. I endeavored to ascertain what idea one
could form of a group of symptoms which tumefied and ob-
structed, hardened, softened, ulcerated, perforated, and
mortified the organs ; and not being able to find in any of
their attributes, an agent capable of such actions, I concluded
without doubt, that physicians had erected the word by
which they meant to designate the disease into an entity,
whether material or immaterial, I could not say ; but at
least endowed with an activity proper to itself, and indepen-
dent of that which belonged to the organs. One of my most
distinguished pupils very happily exploded this idea in his
refutation of a treatise on fevers which was meant to be-
come a classic work. Taking each symptom in particular,
Dr. Roche jocosely enquired of the ontological compiler,
whether the burning heat, the foulness of the mouth, the
thirst, the stupor, the bad breath, the prostration of strength,
circumstances into which, according to the nosologists, the
entity, adynamic or pvtrid fever, ought to resolve itself,
possess the property of softening the internal membrane of
the stomach, of ulcerating and perforating it, and of produc-
ing intro-susception of the intestines.

These pleaders against the essentiality of disease, vigor-
puously sustained, during ten years, by a crowd of intelligent
men, educated in the physiological school, have introduced
an immense revolution in the medical science of France.
But it is with great difficulty indeed, that this revolution
has found its way into the establishments, public and private,
devoted to the treatment of insanity.

Among the chief pf the classic authors now living, who

L 221 j

give the law uu the question now before us, some still con-
tend that the alterations of the brain are the effect of the
disease, which they define by enumerating the symptoms ;
others allow that there does sometimes exist inflammation,
at first acute, but afterwards chronic, but that this is not
always the case ; and that there is a lesion of the vital prin-
ciple anterior to the affection of the tissues ; and that this
lesion prepares and consummates their disorganization.
The first set, seem to have no fears that they shall be asked
by what property the mental wandering, the fury, and other
symptoms, can harden the brain ; nor how stupidity can
cause it to be injected, softened, or reduced to a state of
atrophy. The second class have not dreamed of the diffi-
culty of exhibiting their vital immaterial, or their nervous
entity, in action and disorganizing the brain so as to produce
delirium.

It is well known that the greater part of men of science,
who have their opinions made up, are not apt to change,
especially after they have once published them : we must
expect, therefore, that medical doctrines will advance rather
by the labors of the pupils than by those of the masters ;
and so it has happened, but to a certain point only ; for the
pupils attached to lunatic hospitals have not always been
those of the physiological school ; many of the truths taught
in that school have been applied to insanity, but the most
important have been neglected.

In 1820, Professor Lallemand, as yet a student, advanced
in print that the inflammation of the arachnoid coat, partici-
pated by the pia mater, was a frequent occurrence, and that
it was the principal cause of delirium ; but he did not apply
this observation to insanity. He also said that the inflam-
mation of the cerebral substance could not produce delirium ;
he considered this rather as the cause of convulsions and
partial paralysis ; and with me he referred the softening of
the brain to inflammation.

Among the young physicians who lived with insane pa-
tients, one of them, in 1823, held in opposition to his pro-
fessor, that mental diseases were the results of various
modifications of the meninges and the encephalon : another,
in 1825, taught in a publication, entitled "A new doctrine
of mental diseases," that not only common delirium, but
insanity, consisted usually in a chronic inflammation of the
meninges, but he added an irritation either specific or sym-

i. *** J

pathetic of the brain itself, also as a cause. The lirst of
these, developing the idea he had announced, pretended to
have taugni the medical world that the lesions observed and
described by authors, and which we have enumerated a few
pages back, were the causes, not the effects of insanity, in-
troducing, as he averred, a new method of considering this
disorder. He attributed it sometimes to an original, some-
times to an acquired mal-conformation of the head ; some-
times to a lesion of the meninges, sometimes to a hardening
of the brain, sometimes to a general or partial softening of
that organ, or as the case might be, to any of the organic
alterations I have enumerated , but always insisting that the
engorgement of the vessels of the brain and pia mater was
the most frequent occurrence, and the most frequent cause
also of insanity.

The second of these writers, conceived with many teach-
ers, that insanity might take place as a sympathetic effect of
the lesion of some other organ than the brain. The first of
these authors, in 1826, declared through a third person,
whose opinions coincided with his own, that the gout, dis-
eases of the lungs, and even those of the digestive organs
could not be causes of insanity which were always to be
sought for in the brain.

Here then are some of the physiological doctrines that
stept over the threshold of lunatic hospitals, introduced, not
by masters, but by students. Still, these students did not
perform all that they might, and all that they ought. They
did also what they should not have done, for they boasted
of having discovered a new and fruitful principle as applied
to the theory and practice of mental disorders, to wit, that
the alteration of the brain and its membranes are the causes,
not the effects of this malady. They omitted what they
might have done, for they presented by this assertion,
in spite of all the labors of physiologists, a false idea of the
manner in which the organs thus affected produced the phe-
nomena of mental alienation. The proofs of these two
assertions will become more evident by the exposition I am
about to make of what was taught and printed in the physi-
ological school, before the writings of these two young phy-
sicians appeared.

In my lectures from 1814 forward, I referred all delirium,
whether acute or chronic, to the irritation, original or sym-
pathetic, of the brain ; adding, that this irritation sometimes

[ 22S J

did put on the character of inflammation, but sometimes did
not reach that point ; such was the general idea. Convul-
sions, partial and general loss of sensation and motion,
engorgements, congestions, softenings, effusions, extravasa-
tions of all kinds, whether of the brain or the meninges,
were referred by me to the same cause ; and surprise was
excited to find that apoplexy and mental alienation, were
explained by the same theory as frenzy. Moreover, I per-
suaded strongly all the pupils to search for facts that should
confirm or refute these assertions. It was after he had lis-
tened to all these developements that M. Lallemand put
forth his " Letters on the Encephalon," a work composecrin
great part of observations extracted from the practice of
physicians whom he had followed while a student ; but dis-
posed and commented on in the manner of my " History of
Inflammations. He advanced the proofs of my assertions
on the causes of convulsion and paralysis , and he essayed
to describe with precision the symptoms that corresponded
with each degree of encephalic lesion of which he took cog-
nizance. It must, however, be remarked, that he never
set out from irritation as the starting point in all the mala-
dies he described ; he spake only of inflammation, a thing
well known of old, and brought into vogue in England, in
reference to these disorders, by Dr. Abererombie and oth-
ers. He located, moreover, the cause of delirium in the
inflammation of the arachnoid coat.

The year after, 1821, I printed the opinions that I had
held for seven years before, on the affections of the ence-
phalon, and which had been already published. They con-
formed to what I had already published on other maladies.
In my Examen des doctrines medicates, p. 770, are to be
found the opinions here advanced, viz. that sanguineous
congestions in the brain, serous and hydro-cephalic conges-
tions, arachnitis, apoplexies called nervous, cerebral can-
cers, fungous tumors of the dura-mater, acephalo cysts or
hydatids, tubercules in the brain, osseous tumors on the
internal walls of the cranium, lethargy, epilepsy, and that
softening of the brain that Dr. Abererombie had already
regarded as the effect of encephalitis, are all the results of
one phenomenon variously diversified, Irritation. Let
any one point out, if he can, in any post mortem examina-
tion (autopsie) of persons who have died insane, and which
have been described bv anv author whose works I have ex-

[ &S4 J

auiined, any organic alteration bearing upon the subject,
which is not referable to this cause.

It remained to refer, by name, all these alterations to
insanity ; and this was done in the 123 proposition of the
"Examen," printed in 1821, and which, with the 467 others
that accompany it, is nothing more than an abstract of my
course of physiology and pathology during seven years.
Here is the text of that proposition : " Madness always sup-
poses an irritation of the brain. This irritation may be
continued there for a long time by means of some other in-
flammation, and may disappear with it ; but if it should be
prolonged, it finishes always by being converted into ence-
phalitis parenchymatous or membranous."

This proposition was not a mere glance, hazarded ; it is
the substance of extensive discussion to be found in the
course of a work on the subject of nosography, a new work
on the softening of the encephalon, the two first letters of
Professor Lallemand, and finally in oral dissertations repeat-
ed during seven years in my course of lectures, theoretical
and practical. From these multiplied sources proceeded
the general proposition above stated, in which, to avoid ab-
surdities in language, and dangerous coniradictions in prac-
tice, it is absolutely necessary to adopt irritation as the
original phenomenon, and as connecting almost all the cere-
bral maladies. This proposition had been already announ-
ced in 1808, in the "History of Inflammations," (phlegma-
siae.) I re-produced it in 1816, and applied it to the whole
of pathology; finally, in 1821, it again appeared with pre-
cision as applied to insanity.

It is easy then to judge, that the authors, of whom we
have spoken, have not acted acurately in attributing to
themselves the discovery of " a principle subversive of all
the old theories on mania," for this principle is not a new
one. Nor have they acted acurately in boasting that in
1824 they first established the medical diagnostic as consist-
ing in giving to external phenomena a representative value
of the internal state, or of the lesion of the organ which was
the seat of the disorder. This idea is in fact the parent of
the physiological doctrine : it is this which dictated the his-
tory of inflammations (Histoire de Phegmasice) in 1808, the
first Examen of 1816, and the second of 1821. The com-
plete developement of this same idea has been advanced in
theory, and applied in practice to a great hospital, before

[ 225 j

numerous witnesses in the midst of the capitol of the nation
since 1814 ; that is to say, probably, before these young
men had commenced their medical studies.

In attributing insanity to the alterations which take place
in the encephalon and its dependencies, these authors have
not done all that they might have done : for instance, not
being acquainted with the physiological doctrine, they did
not feel the necessity of irritation to establish a regular sys-
tem of pathology : they surreptitiously seized upon the notion
that the symptoms ought to represent the state of the organs ;
but how, physiologically, this happened, they had no clear
idea ; they never doubted whether it was by irritation, and by
irritation alone, that one organ acted upon another ; and
that this constituted the sympathies. They never suspect-
ed that irritation existed in the organ sympathised with, as
well as in the organ sympathising ; that it is the phenome-
non common both to one and the other ; and that this idea
alone can explain how the organ sympathised with, may be-
come altered and disorganised in imitation of that which
sympathises.

Ignorance of this fact, which they might have understood
had they studied the physiological doctrine, has tempted
them to say that insanity sometimes depends on vitious con-
formation, natural or acquired, of the scull or of the brain,
sometimes on a lesion of the meninges, sometimes on the
hardness of the brain, sometimes on its softness general or
partial, sometimes on other alterations referred to before in
this work, but most commonly to the engorgement of the
vessels of the brain and pia mater. These assertions want
precision, and are embarrassing for readers, because they
do not speak to the understanding. How can we attach de-
lirium directly to lesion which is so various ? Moreover,
insanity exists a long time before all these alterations are
formed ; and the proof is, its intermittent periodicity, and
its sudden cure by some strong moral impression in the midst
of intellectual derangements the most outrageous, or stupid-
ity the most complete. Insanity is not the effect of these
lesions, but of the cause that produces them. But this cause is
not necessarily inflammation, as some authors have pronounc-
ed it to be. This is also proved by the possibility ot sudden
cures by moral causes, even after many years of malady ; a
change incompatible with real inflammation, which would
have produced an alteration in the organs themselves,

2 n

[ 226 j

Moreover, because they have no proper idea of irritation,
certain writers on mania have advanced that insanity could
not be sympathetic, or depend on the influence of another
affection. The reason they assign is, that the seat of a mala-
dy cannot be elsewhere than in the organ whose functions
are deranged ; language vague, enigmatic, and the source
of vain disputes about words.

No doubt ( our physiological physicians will say ) the seat
of mania is always in the brain ; but the brain may be irri-
tated by an organ which is still more irritated than the brain
itself is ; there may be irritation for a long time before there
is inflammation, and before there is disorganization ; and.
this may cease when the brain ceases to be irregularly stim-
ulated by the organ which acts upon it. Thus the breaking
cut of the monthly discharge in females, an hemorrhoidal
flux, a vomiting of blood or other liquid, the application of
leeches to the epigastrium, &c. &c. may dissipate insanity in
the twinkling of an eye, and even forever.

Not to have understood all this — not to have applied the
phenomena of irritation to mania — to have left it under an
uncertain dependence on lesions which it does not imply —
in refusing to explain in what manner these lesions can pro-
duce it — not to have explained the therapeutic practice
indicated by the most common laws of irritation — in other
words, not to have shewn how insanity might be advantage-
ously modified by directing the influence of some organs
upon others — to have entertained but two general views :
one that of placing the exclusive seat of mania in the brain,
without making any attempt to explain sympathetic manias,
and being satisfied with denying their existence — all this
does not amount to a well studied knowledge of a doctrine
whose existence was undoubtedly w r ell known, because the
persons alluded to had borrowed from it ; a doctrine which
comprised all the elements of the problems to be resolved ;
in a word, it is a culpable omission of doing what might have
been done.

An author who ought always to be cited whenever there
is any question in discussion concerning the brain, and who
by his great labors on the functions of the cncephalon, has
acquired permanent claims on the gratitude of mankind, Dr.
Gall, has not stopped at these superficial views, and indis-
criminating explanations : he rejects with disdain the opin-
ion of those w r ho attribute insanitv to the alteration of the

l 227 ]

hones oi the cranium or any other. According to him,
" mechanical and organic derangements are subordinate to
the changes which take place during life ; they are results
only; and the life of some particular part, or of the body
generally, may become extinct without any visible organic
derangement. He adds, that when mania has not been of
long continuance, we find nothing ; but if it has remained
a considerable time, we find in the brain, in the meninges,
and in the cranium, manifest alterations ; such as ossified
vessels, a diminution of one part or the other of the cerebral
substance, osseous depositions on the internal surface of the
cranium, &c. the results of some alteration inappreciable
by our senses, but which has affected that power on which
life and its functions depend."

Dr. Gall was acquainted also with the other alterations
before mentioned, and has explained them in the same man-
ner. Inflammation is not the primary cause of these disor-
ders ; it places them only on the same line with shocks that
the brain receives, with accidental lesions, or some organic
fault in the brain or meninges, some roughness of the inter-
nal part of the cranium, an intellectual contention too long
continued, a project baffled, hope disappointed, an ambition
without bounds, vanity wounded, and other moral causes,
which he refers, like all the rest, to a lesion of life. In other
places of his writings which have appeared subsequent to
the publication of the physiological doctrine in 1816, he re-
marks that the augmentation of the irritability of the brain
is manifest in the antecedent state, and through the first
period of insanity. He does not, therefore, imitate those
who, by a retrogade movement, have abandoned the expla-
nations of Pinel, who for the sake of ranking among the
anatomo-pathologists, consider insanity as nervous in its ori-
gin, and agreed with them in acknowledging no characters
in disease, but such as were manifest on a post mortem in-
spection.

Dr. Gall does not explain the atrophy of the brain at the
close of a prolonged mania of inflammation ; he attributes it
to a lesion of the vital forces. A brain which has long been
injured in the mode which constitutes insanity, is affected
by atrophy just as a sciatic nerve is, which has been long*
affected by pain. Moreover, the brain cannot sink down
and become pressed in all its parts upon itself without being
followed by the scull, unless some effusion should take place

E 228 j

between them. Hence the separation oi the internal table
from the external, which last is less disposed to follow the
retreat of the brain. But this is what arrives in the regular
atrophy of the brain, the result of old age. But there will
be this difference : in an insane person the space occasioned
by the separation of the two bony tablets, instead of being
occupied by a diploid tissue with large cells, which renders
the bone thin in old subjects, it is filled on the contrary by
a dense bony substance which penetrates both tablets, and
renders the scull very thick, dense, and like ivory. This
kind of alteration is so common, that Greding has observed
it in 68 out of 100 furious maniacs, and 22 times out of 30
in idiots.

These remarks of Dr. Gall ought to put the writers
on mania on the right road to truth. I cannot adopt all
the ideas of this scientific observer on the seat of mania ;
but as it is to him we owe the most valuable data, we must
start from thence to go further if possible ; at least we
must try.

Dr. Gall considers insanity as a disease exclusively loca-
ted in the brain ; and the young writers on the subject have
borrowed this idea from him. According to him it is an
affection of the vital force of the brain. The oftener this
occurs, especially at the commencement of the disease, the
greater is the increase of irritability, attended with an in-
creased activity of the circulation, and even with inflamma-
tion. But this inflammation is not the principal agent in the
deterioration of the brain. The author is much more occu-
pied in proving that the seat of insanity is the brain, a fact
which no sensible and well informed observer ever doubted,
than in determining what the physiological character of this
modification of the brain really is. It is the vital lesion of
the brain which induces the atrophy, the thickening, and all
the accessary symptoms that denaturalize it ; but we do not
well see how to attach this vital lesion to some fundamental,
applicable, distinct appearance ; for he speaks only of a
modification in general, of some unknown principle called
life. This is well understood.

Dr. Gall, after placing insanity in the brain, is principally
occupied in determining what region of the brain is affected.
We know that Dr. Gall considers the brain as a double set
of nerves, or pairs of nerves, analagous to those of the exter-
nal senses, but which do not quit the cranium, and whose

number is yet undetermined. That each of these intercia-
nial pairs, is charged with some intellectual tendency or
faculty ; they are called organs, and their situation at the
periphery of the brain, allows of their being more or less
distinguished by means of the osseous bumps or projections
of the external scull ; that the instincts, the aptitudes, the
different degrees and different kinds of intelligence of each
individual, not only of the human, but the brute species, may
be thus indicated ; that the vital modification which consti-
tutes insanity, may sometimes take place in all the organs
at once ; but that it may also, and generally does predomi-
nate, or locate itself, exclusively or successively, in one or
other of them ; so that besides general mania, there may be
as many monomanias as there are different organs in the
brain.

This theory (it is said) enables us to explain, how exces-
sive passions and excessive intellectual efforts, may lead to
insanity. It is particularly to the super activity of some
tendency to which the person adds energy by indulging it, or
by the influence of some predominant faculty which seduces
the inclination by the facility with which it is exercised,
that man loses his reason. Inflammation often appears in
organs too much exercised, a very common symptom in the
access of general mania; or it may be confined to some or-
gan in particular. Hence the possibility of suppuration ;
but although possible, it often does not take place, as when
we observe on opening the head no trace of lesion. But
when the derangements of organization are not produced
by inflammation, which happens in the smaller number of
cases, there is at least that vital lesion which constitutes
insanity."

We may now see in what respect all this is defective.
The learned organologist, ought to be able to say, if there be
not inflammation and suppuration that disorganizes the
brain, it is at least irritation that produces this appearance ;
a modification not only possible in a'l the tissues, and
which in this case acts on the cerebral fibre properly so
called, but on all the other tissues that constitute the
intellectual apparatus ; as the vessels that moisten it, the
membranes that envelope it, and even the osseous case that
incloses it.

Pinel and his followers have explained themselves as
faultily when they could see nothing but a nervous phenome-

C 230 ]

non in insanity ; I prove this by the same argument that I
employ against Dr. Gall. What kind of a nervous lesion is
that, by means whereof the cerebral vessels become en-
gorged ; which produces effusions, phlegmons, adhesions,
thickenings, ossifications ; which can act on the scull so as
to produce the consistence of ivory and the hardness of
enamel ? Nor have we any clear conception of what the
organologist calls vital lesion ; an affection indeterminate,
arbitrary, applicable to every supposed action on the organs,
whatever may be their difference of texture, consistence,
&c. What means have we of representing a neurosis than
can produce all these disorganizations, consistently with
the idea we have always entertained of nervosity ? Pincl
thought he could escape by regarding all these disorders as
complications or coincidences; an illusory subterfuge which
would populate insanity, as well as all the other neurosis
of the same author, with a crowd of morbid elements, inex-
plicable, casual, of which we know not either the diagnosis,
or the treatment.

Without adopting throughout the organology of Dr. Gall,
we arc compelled to agree with him and all the other well
informed physicians who have preceded him, that insanity
is seated in the brain. But we must analyse this express-
ion, it isseatcd in the brain, for it has been strangely abused :
it throws obstacles in the way oi knowledge, and dictates
everyday to more physicians than one, assertions that ex-
perience disavows. What is it among maniacs that is seated
in the brain ? Is it delirium ? No doubt a man will not
rave but in consequence of some malady of the brain. Let
us, however, come to the second question. Why does the
brain experience this aberration ? I would answer, because
its irritability is augmented, or because its contractility is
beyond its normal degree ; because it is over-irritated, or
simply irritated, that I may keep to that sense of the express-
ion which is adopted in the first part of this work.

A third question now arises, which observation and the
practice of the art ought to dictate to all physicians. Why
should the brain be irritated ? Or in the other words, is
the cause of the irritation of the brain seated in that organ,
or in some other ? The physician who decides on the first
and obvious view of the facts, replies, that the cause may
reside solely in the brain, but that it may also be seated in"
some other organ : he judges by those insanities that take

[ *>1 ]

place alter the affection of some other organ, and which are
cured so soon as that affection is dissipated. But Dr. Gall
and his partizans who are at present very numerous, judge
differently. Since delirium cannot exist without an affec-
tion of the brain, the cause must be located there. But they
elude the question, and they must be brought up to it. Let
us address them then. " We do not ask you whether the
brain is affected whenever there is delirium ; this would be
a question as silly as if we were to ask whether the muscles
are affected in a convulsion ; but we ask of you whether
the affection of the brain, may not be so subordinate to that
of another organ', that it may be produced by this last, and
cease when it ceases. You deny this fact, assuring us that
in every case of this nature which you have observed, the
brain has been originally affected ; and you accuse us of
having seen incorrectly, when we attribute the affection of
the brain to that of any other organ. This is bringing us at
once upon the field of observation. Very well ; we repeat
then, that we have seen cases of insanity produced and sus-
tained by another disease ; in other words, the brain has
not been deranged in its action until another organ has been
so before it ; and it has been re-established so soon as that
other organ re-assumed its healthy state. We shall now
explain this dependance of the brain, which appears to you
so incomprehensible ; we shall do so after having taken pre-
cautions against indiscriminate expressions, insinuations,
and the snares of language. Jn fact, the word affection, is
indiscriminate ; the word malady, is somewhat less so ; but
still, too vague to paint the phenomenon which we are
desirous of studying. Affection or malady, which causes
delirium, is a mode of speaking which induces us to ask the
following questions : Affection or malady, in what does it
consist ? Insanity gives us no precise idea, unless in a moral
respect ; that is to say, in connection with mankind ; but
the question now is, concerning the pathological physiology
of the individual. A logician would not understand us if we
asked him whether delirium was seated in the brain ; for,
what is a delirium seated, to a man accustomed to give some
account of the meaning of words ?

Vital lesion, sounds also very physiologically ; but this
mode of speaking has too much the air of an evasion to satisfy
a demandant somewhat scrupulous ; for a man who reasons
will not be able to comprehend what is meant by a lesion ot

[ 232 j

life which precedes, and which causes that of the organs.*
The expressions, affection of the nerves, nervous affections,
seem more to answer the purpose, because they present a
material object modified ; but we know not by whom or
how it is modified ; nevertheless we cannot, without
being satisfied on this point, represent to ourselves a
nervosity capable of producing all those disorders, of
which the heads of insane people present such an astonish-
ing spectacle.

* All that has been urged before in this book, concerning the abstract
principle which certain writers have been desirous of imposing on the
nervous system to produce the phenomena of intelligence, applies to
vital force, as well as to all the particulur forces into which they have
attempted to resolve it. These forces do not fall under the cognizance
of our senses ; they are conclusions from phenomena, and every one mul-
tiplies them at his pleasure. Thence proceed all those forces of contrac-
tion which subdivide themselves into as many species as there are degrees
of contractility, and forms of animal matter endowed with it : thence como
the forces of composition, decomposition, plasticity, vital resistance, con-
densation, expansion, calorification, &c. according to the greater or less
disposition of physiologists to decompose the sensible phenomena ; hence
also the disputes upon the number of vital properties.

Does a question arise concerning life in general ? Some make it the
result of particular lives: others admit an original vital force that produces
it, and among others, this life is divided into two — one for nutrition and
re-production — the other for intellect.

There would be no inconvenience in all this, if after having assumed,
or supposed these vital forces, they would limit themselves lo describe
the phenomena from whence they have been deduced ; they would then
be no more than algebraic signs, to facilitate the labor of research by
abridging the forms of enunciation. But it is not in this way that the
ontologists proceed : real idolators, they prostrate themselves before the
symbolical image that they have constructed of so many pieces ; and they
set it to work as if it Avere a power sui generis. As they have no other
idea excepting those which proceed from their senses — as they have no
models superior to themselves— they always lend all their faculties and all
their intentions to the force which they have thus brought into existence,
and which they cause to act as they act themselves, or as they have seen
others act, for whom they profess admiration and respect. In fact, all the
forces of the physicians ofMontpelier, are little divinities thus construct-
ed, and the great vital force is an intelligence of the first order, whose
model is taken from all that they have seen most grand and extraordinary
among men. This is a continuation of the polytheism of the Greeks":
these are the Fauns, the Satyrs, the Naiads, &c. whom they have invest-
ed, each with its functionary apparatus, and the other is the great Jupiter,
whom they have seated upon his throne in the enccphalon, to preside
over all the phenomena of relation. Such are the motives which compel
us to reject the words vital force, vital lesion, from the strict language of
physiological medicine ; or else to employ them onlv as formula-, fftvimr
their pvocjp meaning wh^n wo o mr ,iov them

[ 233 j

Chapter VII. — Theory of Insanity according to the
Physiological Doctrine.

If we ascend now, to the principles of the physiological
doctrine, as herein before exposed, we shall find something
more satisfactory. It is said in a former part of this work,
that living animal matter, being modified by certain agents,
is capable of exhibiting in a surprising degree, the phenome-
na characteristic of life ; and this is called irritation. Nb-
thing is more clear ; it is said, moreover, that there are four
principal forms of irritation, if we may judge from appear-
ances obvious to the senses, viz : the inflammatory, the
hemorrhagic, the sub-inflammatory, and the nervous ; and
an idea has been given of these phenomena, and of the
organic alterations which correspond to each of these forms,
by noting that the nervous is the principal form which gives
impulse to all the rest. All this is easily conceived, because
it appertains to the modification of living matter, cognizable
by our senses. Let us see then, if we cannot apply these
data to Insanity. Let Us then give an abridged history of
it, in physiological language, for the purpose of trying if we
can be understood, and if we can resolve the question con-
cerning the seat, or the seats of this malady.

Let me now recall one of the fundamental truths of physio-
logical medicine, upon which I have already greatly insist-
ed ; that the brain is placed between two orders of stimula-
tion, those which proceed from the nerves of the external
senses, and those which it receives from the nerves of the
internal viscera. This being stated, the generation of in-
sanity explains itself, by referring the intellectual faculties
to the physiological theory.

The excitants which have been carefully indicated in
the first chapter, having acted with too great energy,
and during too long a time, on the principal organs, which
are all abundantly supplied with nervous matter, the
brain, which is the centre of this matter, assumes a state of
irritation ; innervation becomes excessive, which appears
by an augmentation of sensation and motion ; for it is impos-
sible that the manifestation of a nervous irritation should
appear in any other manner, unless from the very com-
mencement ; irritation should be carried so far, as to destroy
all the phenomena of innervation. There is then an excess
of susceptibility on the part of the brain, ton-aid all the stimu-
30

lations that are natural to it, and primarily to those of the
senses. Moreover, there is an excess of motion in the cir-
culation, and in the action of all the muscles, upon which
the brain innervates, and by which it shows its irrritation.
This portends that the increase, if not of the frequency, at
least of the vivacity of the pulsations of the heart, the
play of the countenance, the unaccustomed mobility of
gesture, and the hurried speech, coincide with an exaggera-
ted moral susceptibility, in manifesting the approaching
danger, or the first actual access of insanity. But these
manifestations may be made in other ways which we ought
to be aware of ; they may depend on the place originally
irritated, and on the degree of irritation, which is itself
subordinate to distant causes, to their prolonged action, to
the susceptibility of the subjects, &c.

In fact, sometimes the original exciting cause depends on
the moral relations between man and man ; or on the sen-
sitive or instinctive relations of man with animals, with
inanimate bodies, or even with the accidents of nature ; the
cause then is nervous , that is to say, it commences by an
excitation of the nerves ; at other times, the original excit-
ing cause depends on the relation of the internal part of our
viscera with the foreign bodies that arrive there ; such as
stimulating aliments and beverage, medicines and poisons ;
and in this second division of etiology, many shades of irri-
tation are possible. It may be that the exciting cause is
calculated to produce an irritation in the stomach, rather
nervous than inflammatory, such as alcoholic liquors, and
certain diffusible aromata : then the irritation propagated to
the brain, is also principally nervous, and more or less ap-
proaching that which depends upon certain moral causes :
we say, rather nervous than inflammatory, because, for a
reason already given, there is no nervous excitation which
does not affect the capillary blood vessels. It is equally
possible that the exciting cause may give rise to an irritation
in the stomach more inflammatory than nervous : in all these
cases, there is almost always a painful sensation in the
brain, which receives the transmission of this double gastric
irritation. The over-susceptibility of the encephalon will
then be accompanied by ill humor, low spirits, fear, anger ;
and the threating, or the actual manifestation of insanity will
be marked by melancholy characters, or by an inclination
to commit some act of violence on himself and on other?.

L ^6 ]

Let us now mark tho possible combinations of thtse two
orders of causes. Let us suppose that the moral causes act
upon a brain, which has already received impressions from
a disordered viscus ; we shall then have a double cause of
insanity, melancholy or furious ; and the habitual ideas, the
opinions, or the belief of the patients will determine the
kind of delirium. Let the physical causes be directed upon
viscera, which, although healthy themselves, are in corres-
pondence with a brain, affected by sombre ideas. In this
case the delirium will necessarily be less melancholy ; let
moral causes of a gay description, such as joy, satisfied self
love, pride triumphant, act upon a brain more cr less stimu-
lated voluptuously by some organ adapted so to modify it,
as the reproductive apparatus, and the result will be a joy-
ous delirium. Let us now suppose differently, and combine
in a thousand different ways, all these stimulations ; let us
add to them, those that are already established in the inter-
cranial nervous apparatus, dedicated to instinct and to intel->
ligence j an apparatus of great importance, as it constitutes
the hemispheres of the brain and the cerebellum ; let us
now figure to ourselves, the nerves, as having been long
busied upon recollections ; that is to say, in modes and man-
ners, that have already previously existed, and this also
implies the over action of some nerves at the expense of
others ; let us combine these recollections differently by
another mode of action, called imagination, which is per-
haps, nothing more than the predominant action of certain
nerves of the same apparatus ; let us associate these recol-
lections, already denaturalized, with the actual impressions
of the senses ; let us conceive that the result of this inter-
nal action is a permanent irritation of the organs of thought,
and that this irritation is augmented by all those which are
accidentally developed in the viscera ; then let us join to all
these the infinite variety arising from individual irritability
and peculiarity of education, and we shall at length compre-
hend why there appear so many shades and so many forms
of maniacal delirium. Nevertheless, we shall not after all
have discovered the first cause, seeing that this cause is the
same with the cause of thought.

Some one, perhaps, will require us in this method of
etiology, to present other facts than those which have been
enumerated ; and whose verification, in other respects easy,
requires the knowledge of a multitude of other diseases, apd

[ 2SS J

the mode of action of many modifiers, medicinal or hygienic
We can do this, by referring to some very common facts.

When we are intensely and vividly occupied, either with
some person, or some thing, we retain the image of it ; we
see it, we hear it, as plainly after it has been taken away
from our senses, as if it were still in immediate connection
with them. A man who interrupts a business that he was
intently occupied upon, for the purpose of taking rest, con-
tinues to think of it, instead of sleeping ; and for the most
part, even sleep cannot interrupt the train of ideas, which is
prolonged in dreams. But while the man does not deviate
from his normal state, distraction ot thought, repose, sleep,
produce a cessation of all these predominant impressions ;
that is to say, they make him unmindful of his pain, they
calm his resentments, and at length re-establish an equili-
brium, and replace him in an aptitude to receive new im-
pressions, and to react upon them with propriety. But ii
the predominant impressions have acquired a very high de-
gree of strength, whether by the unaccustomed activity or
the long cpntinuance of their causes, or by reason of some
predisposition in the person, these impressions are not ef-
faced ; there is an exaggerated and troublesome recollection
of them ; the man cannot abstract himself from them ; and
whether he indulges in them pleasantly, as in the case oi
erotic melancholy, or whether he detests them, as in other
forms of melancholy, he soon discovers that these recollec-
tions draw others with them, which he had no motive vol-
untarily to recal. The patient ( for from henceforward he
must be so considered) suffers that interior movement, that
tyrannic recollection, that forces him to contemplate a crowd
of images that he would gladly drive away ; his inquietude
increases when he perceives, forming within himself, mon-
strous combinations of these images; a kind of intellectual
burthen which has been referred to a faulty imagination,
while all the reason he can employ, hardly suffices to pre-
vent his believing in the reality of these chimeras.

Well, this exuberant activity of the memory, these extra-
vagant combinations of the imagination, amount, with the
physiologist, to nothing more than a too lively, and too per-
tinacious action ; to an irritation of the nervous substance of
the brain, destined to intellectual operations.

But the impressions transmitted by the senses of sight,
hearing, and touch, the stimulations indicative of some bodilv

I Wt j

object, and which so powerfully serve to enrich our intellect,
do not constitute all that can be reproduced as the phenomena
of memory ; there is also, notwithstanding the absence of
any immediate cause, a recollection of sensations, pleasant
and unpleasant, which have been excited afore-time, by the
modification of the nerves of the locomotive apparatus.
The patient not only thinks that he feels an amputated limb,
but he still feels lively pains, of which he can specify the
seat ; a phenomenon of memory, which can only be explain-
ed by some excitement of the brain, renewed in the absence
of its original cause ; a phenomenon decisive of the ques-
tion, whether perceptions and ideas are any thing else than
stimulations of the cerebral substance.

We shall now have to determine, whether the nerves of
the viscera can give rise to perceptions which the memory
is able to recal. Let us first see, what is the influence of
these nerves orfthe brain. The ontologists obstinately re-
fuse to rank them among intellectual phenomena ; but we
shall be able to convince them of their error.

Do not the viscera possess a cerebral nerve, the eighth
pair, which continually transmits the visceral stimula-
tions to the brain ? Do they not also correspond with
the brain, by the communications of the great sympathetic,
with the vertebral nerves ? Is it not by this double com-
munication that those relations take place between the brain
and the viscera, which constitute instinct ? Is it not thus,
also, that the muscular movements take place, necessary for
instinctive actions, of which the principal are, breathing,
vomiting, expulsion of the foetus, &c. To be sure, no one
w r ill suppose that the wants of vomiting, of coughing, of ex-
onerating the intestines, have their original seat in the brain.
It must be admitted, that the nerves transmit to the ence-
phalon the cause of its perceiving those wants that are in-
stinctive. But this cause is a stimulation, for it is nothing
more than the transmission of a visceral excitement occa-
sioned by the presence of the body to be expelled ; and
whenever many of these stimulations are transmitted to the
encephalon, whatever may be the cause that stimulated the
viscera from whence they proceed, the intellectual opera-
tions are greatly influenced, and often are actually prevent-
ed by them. Experience shows us also that the Will resists
them more feebly than it does actual pain, however violent,
'hat proceeds from the nerves, or from the muscles. The

L •» j

;ti// can prevent a man of courage, even when under tor-
ture, from uttering any exclamation, any cry, any groan ; but
it cannot restrain the action of the muscles which assist in
cries and groans, when the want of coughing, of sneezing,
the pains of labor, call upon the encephalon for its co-opera-
tion, by means of that influence which is peculiar to visceral
stimulations. We have seen the reason of this before ; it
is because the mode of action of the brain, which we term
the will, is destroyed by excess of excitation.

As the brain cannot protect itself from the stimulations
every moment sent up from the viscera during a regular
state of the system — as the brain receives laws of action
from the viscera — as its intellectual operations are often
deranged by visceral transmissions, and violently so in all
cases of voluntarity — it is not surprising that an inflammation
of the digestive or the genital organs should produce an
abnormal state of the brain, and provoke a series of ideas
different from those that took place previous to the inflam-
mation. Nor is it necessary that the cerebral irritation
should be exalted into actual inflammation to denaturalize
the trains of ideas ; the effect of stimulating food and alco-
holic liquors, the sperm accumulated in the vesicles and
spermatic tubes, furnish proof of this. For still stronger
reason, the character of our ideas will alter when the diges-
tive and genital viscera habitually over-irritated, incessantly
torment the encephalon by transmitting to its nervous fibres
part of that irritation which preys upon them. I instance
these two sets of apparatus only, because, being the most
nervous, they act the most powerfully on the organs of
thought ; but I might have brought others also into view,
for the higher degrees of irritation in all the viscera act upon
the brain. The subjects of these modifications are not igno-
rant of this; they feel a visceral sensation travelling toward
the brain ; they feel its influence on their intellect, turning
aside their attention from the object on which they would
willingly fix it, and forcing it upon other sensations and ideas.
The hypochondriac, from gastric irritation, feels a sensation
of uneasiness proceeding from his stomach, which compels
him to ascribe a high degree of importance to all his sensa-
tions, as so many sources of unheard of misery, multiplied
and irrepressible : the neuropathic from cardiac irritation,
is astonished to feel himself overwhelmed with terror the
instant his palpitations come on ; or else he feels some spasm

[ 239 J

seize upon his heart and render it immovable : the hysteri-
cal female cannot repress the sense of suffocation which
seizes her, when the globus hystericus moves in her bowels,
and threatens to mount up to the throat ; the hydrophobic
patient cannot conquer his horror of water, nor repel the
melancholy presages or the frightful images which deprive
him of sleep or follow him into his dreams, until excess of
irritation, deprives him of all power of thought, and hurries
him out of life in convulsions. The more irritation there is
* in the stomach and the pharynx, the more his brain is stimu-
lated, until a congestion takes place which abolishes all
intellect. The compliment of all these proofs from facts so
various, is found in the effect of sedatives such as leeches,
which, acting on the organ originally irritated, and not on
the brain, often dispel at once all those symptoms which
mark a secondary irritation of the encephalon.

The mode of action then of any diseased viscus on the
brain, is in all cases reduced to a stimulation. Well, these
stimulations, when they become excessive, continued, im-
portunate, may establish in the encephalon a permanent
mode of irritation which constitutes real insanity , and from
the moment when the encephalic irritation becomes stronger
than the visceral, the scene changes ; for the irritation of
that organ may give predominance to ideas, which for a
long time the intellect did not entertain. But nothing ap-
pears to us to prove that the excess of recollection of visce-
ral sensations is possible: it is this circumstance that enables
us to confirm the assertions of the patients, and to prove the
direct influence of the viscera on the brain. In fact we pro-
duce delirium by placing a stimulant on a membrane of rela-
tion ; we cause it to cease, as well as the imaginary terrors
that accompany it, when we take away the irritation which
that stimulant has produced in the membrane : what more
is wanting ?

It may be alledged against this visceral influence, that
melancholy never becomes established, unless in the case
of an irresolute, pusillanimous character. This cause will
not answer the purpose, for the subject has not always been
neuropathic or visionary, and he may cease to be so : this
constitutes a pre-disposition only ; but there may be insanity
of the imagination in persons of good health. Here then
are two orders of stimulation established fixedly in the
brain, or there is continuous cerebral stimulation perpetu-

[ 240 J

ally heightened by those which are transmitted from irrita-
ted viscera. All these external symptoms of double irritation
exist in the imminent state, and in the first access of insani-
ty ; we have stated them in their proper places.

Instinct becomes depraved even when insanity is in its
origin intellectual, because the brain innervates too strongly
on the viscera, and receives in return reactions of more
than usual strength, and appeals more energetic than in a
moral state. It becomes altered first in its highest operation
in those productive of intellectual phenomena, afterwards *
in the affections. An insane person hates those whom he
formerly loved ; afterward the alteration affects the wants
of the first necessity, as we have seen in the classification of
monomania. A fortiori, instinct ought to become denatur-
alized, when the cerebral irritation that constitutes insanity
has been fomented and determined by visceral irritation.
These cases occur when the disease begins by depraved
appetite, as we see in hypochondriac and chloritic cases^
wherein the digestive passages are alike affected by irrita-
tion. Depravation may also exist in many other instinctive
appetites than those which belong to nutrition, as we have
stated before in our classification of monomanias ; but I
insist at present on the irritation of the gastric passages,
because the painful perceptions that proceed from thence,
have a stronger tendency than others to melancholy, to fear,
to anger, to unhappy forebodings, &c. Hence, in the great
majority of monomaniacs who are suicidal and murderous,
the disorder has commenced by chronic gastro-duodenitis.
All authors refer to these symptoms, even those who are
the strongest advocates for cerebral origin ; even they par-
take with the antients the opinion that to effect a cure it is
necessary to evacuate, if not the black bile, at least the vis-
cous and blackish humors with which the stomach and
intestines are loaded ; as if they would give us to under-
stand that delirium depends on their presence ; a fact which
the cerebrists are not fully persuaded of, because they con-
sider the primitive cause of all insanity to be an alteration
in the vitality of the encephalon.

I will not enquire of the cerebrist, whether he attributes
the formation of this humor to the influence of a diseased
brain, nor what he thinks of the mucous membrane of the
digestive organs, of the liver, or of the pancreas, which are
sources of these humors. I pass on and say that we must

[ 241 ]

here note a very important distinction. There are wicked"
men who, by the effect of their education, (taking the word
in an extended sense) are inclined to murder, or are in the
habit of committing crime ; such persons do not stand in.
need of a strong visceral impulse to commit it. What I have
said, therefore, applies to worthy men whom insanity incites
to murder or to suicide. As to the rest, I am of opinion
that when that inclination is once established by a visceral
cause, it may sometimes remain, even though its original
cause be taken away ; as we see in some madmen who re-
tain this inclination long, conceal it with care, and make use
of all kinds of stratagem to gratify it. But we must not
forget, that what constitutes insanity is the persevering
continuance of cerebral irritation, notwithstanding all the
causes that produced it have ceased to act. While the cause
exists there is passion only ; the cerebral irritation must
become permanent before we can pronounce the man insane.
It is often asked, if a man who reasons well in other re-
spects, but is tormented by an impulse to commit murder,
or suicide, which he thinks on with horror, ought to be con-
sidered as insane ? I do not hesitate to answer in the affirma-
tive ; for reason does not solely consist in drawing a fair
deduction ; it is not given to us solely for the purpose of
doing good ; one of its functions is to prevent us from doing
evil. But he who gives himself up to an impulse which he
condemns, has reasoned very incorrectly, for he has not been
prevented by a foresight of the consequences ; he has rea-
soned ill as to his relations to other persons, or he has not
reasoned upon them at all, which is the same thing : he is
in like case with one who is excited by wine, who appears
to reason justly, but who strikes and breaks every thing
within his reach, for the pleasure of destroying. These
people have not reason, for they cannot resist the impulse
of an instinct depraved by irritation in the polyspjanchnic
nervous apparatus. This monomania has been called rea-
soning, to distinguish it from some others, and because the
aberration is rather in the actions than in the discourse.
But it is always the effect of some secret thought, which the
pretended reason of the diseased person has not been able
to prevent breaking out into action : this denotes either the
absence or the depravation of that faculty ; that is to say, it
denotes the loss of that normal type of cerebral action, which
presides over the conduct of a man. Here the great ques-
31

L 342 ]

tion of medical jurisprudence consists in knowing whether
the tendency to murder is really an effect of a morbid depra-
vation of instinct ; and the physician will always find it
hard to pie-determine, if the person has exhibited no other
proofs of derangement, or if he has not furnished such proofs
by a violent access of delirium immediately after committing
the murder.

The progress of intellectual irritation tending to insanity,
is arrested in its state of incubation (primary gradual devel-
opement) by the habitude of old ideas, or to speak physio-
logically by the habitual nervous motions of the normal
state ; but at length the new mode of stimulation gets the
better of the older one ; another habitude introduces itself
in the intra-cerebral innervation. While it is not yet gene-
ral, and has not yet destroyed the ancient habit, the disease
is monomania only, or mania with lucid intervals. This is
also the case with those insane persons who demand to be
tied, or who advise you to keep at a distance irom them,
when they feel the impulse of committing murder. When
the mode of action of the normal state has been destroyed
by irritation, the patient can no longer judge of his own
situation. This change can only take place from the exces-
sive rapidity of the motions of the over-irritated cerebral
nerves; for we have it in proof that there has been irritation,
and irritation implies an accelerated motion in the living
fibres, whatever be the modification of animal matter that
composes them. Irritation in the fibrine of the muscles, as
in the gelatin of the vessels, has for its predominant char-
acter a hurried precipitated movement of contractility.
Thus, too, it ought to be with the albumen of the white
medullary substance, which is the essentially nervous part
of the brain : it vibrates with precipitation in this case, in
accordance with the gelatin and the fibrin of the cerebral
capillary system, as we have shewn in the former part of
this work ; and whenever these motions are excessively and
preservingly accelerated, the normal type is destroyed, and
insanity is fixed upon the brain. The hyper-normal mo-
tions which constitute insanity, having become a powerful
habit, le moi, personal consciousness, can no longer distin-
guish it from a normal state while the irritation continues.
The unanswerable proof of this assertion, is, that you may
cure insanity while it is recent and after a short incubation,
by destroying nervous irritation of the brain by copious and

[ 343 J

reiterated bleedings. This cure is of the same kind as in
the case of an incipient peripneumony, for their cause is the
same, irritation ; that is to say, that in the two cases, bleed-
ing suffices to cure the disease so long as it suffices to des-
troy irritation. For, let us be honest ; what else is it that
destroys irritation in a man who cannot breathe as
usual, and in one who cannot reason as usual, but a
sanguineous engorgement in the lungs of the one, and in
the brain of the other ? The irritation that produced this
engorgement was kept up by it ; and ceased when the en-
gorgement was taken away ; and the usual functions of
these two organs were re-established at that moment : this
would not have happened if the irritation had been prolong-
ed ; for then a considerable time would have been required
to permit the irritation to wear away gradually, or to re-
move it by revulsive applications. These facts are applica-
ble to all the organs. When experimenters have succeeded
in producing a permanent over-excitement in the intra-
cerebral nervous substance of monkeys or dogs, they may
produce insanities in abundance.

Insanity may be considered as complete when the impres-
sions made on the senses, as the conversations for instance
addressed to patients, are unable to bring back le moi, their
personal consciousness, from its delusion. This is the touch-
stone : for it ascertains that the hyper-normal type of intra-
cerebral movement is too rapid to be suspended. Observe
its progress : at first it is momentaneous only — then it be-
comes prolonged — then it has a tendency to become con-
stant, but the remains of the normal type are still sufficient
to suspend it ; but when these remains are obliterated — in
other words, when the returns of the normal state which
were sufficient to dissipate the torrent of extravagant ideas,
are no longer possible, the voice of a stranger may some-
times produce for a moment the same effect ; when this also
fails, the type of insanity becomes triumphant and complete.

Why should we be surprised at so many forms of deliri-
um ? All our instinctive impulses and all our ideas being
associated with motions of the nervous matter, as effects are
with their causes, may be reproduced by irritation existing
in that matter. This is one of the great maxims of physio-
logical medicine. I have demonstrated in my Physiology
applied to Pathology, and in the first part of this work, a
truth whick it would be well to repeat here, by giving to it,
if possible, a more demonstrative shape.

[ 244 J

This truth is, that there is a reciprocity of influence be
tween many passions, and the visceral irritations excited by
them. For instance, in the same way that fear and surprise
cause palpitations of the heart, the same kind of palpitations
excited by some physical cause, produce the sensations of
fear and surprise. So it is with the stomach : all the moral
affections of a sad and sorrowful character, accompanied
with an inclination towards anger, affect the stomach ; and
when the stomach suffers from any physical cause, sadness
and impatience are the consequences. But there is no organ
where this mutuality of influence is more manifest than in
the organs of generation. You cannot explain the flavor of
metal, of sugar, of pepper, of earth, the sound of clocks, or
that of one metal striking against another, or the noise of a
drum, that enter among the fancies of hypochondriac per-
sons subject to gastritis, unless by a recurrence of some for-
mer encephalic stimulation. These are examples of the
memory of past sensations rendered more vivid in insanity,
as perceptions and ideas likewise are ; nor are they any
thing else than an irritation of the organ. These facts fur-
nish proofs also of that association which takes place by
intellectual exercise, by the continual tendency to express
otir internal emotions, between those emotions and the ideas
we derive from oue senses.* These aberrations of taste, of
smell, of hearing, never occur in the first, and are rare in
£he second stage of infancy : they do not appear till after
puberty, when the brain has received its full developement.f
The longer a man has lived, and the more he has exercised
his faculties of feeling, and of consciousness of feeling, the
more do these illusions become easy and frequent in cases
of prolonged irritation of the nervous substance of the or-
gans of relation and the encephalic apparatus. Stimulated
by an inflamed stomach, the brain vibrates sometimes in the
mode correspondiugto one sensation, sometimes to another.
All this may be verified by the alternate exhibition of irri-
tants and sedatives introduced into that viscus.

It is by virtue of this association of ideas, and of the ima-
ges of bodies with certain motions in the brain, that the

* All these cases of association, have been fully explained by Hartley
in his 1st volume On Man. — Trans.

1 1 doubt if the brain has received its full developement, till the age of
item 45 to 30. In fact there is cause to believe that every portion of th*
hrsnn, Fike a rnuFcl*, increases in size bv exercise —Trans

[ 2*5 J

violent attacks oi' the commencement, and the exaspera-
tions of insanity, in a word what is called the access oi
agitation in maniacs, present a rapid succession of incohe-
rent ideas and hallucinations so strange. These phenomena
indicate that the pairs of intercranial nerves forming the
hemispheres of the brain and cerebellum, are agitated by
motions irritative, rapid, and diversified. In effect each
mode of innervation reproducing the idea of the body with
which that mode was associated, with the emotions it was
accustomed to produce, and all with tints incomparably more
vivid and characterized, and with a rapidity far beyond the
normal degree, we may easily conceive that the words and
actions will present a surprising variety, and with great pre-
cipitation, like what we observe in anger, in slight intoxi-
cation, and in all the violent passions, which are essentially
the same thing as insanity, and differ only in their type by a
less duration. Ira furor brevis est.

It is a constant occurrence, however, in this disorder, that
whenever the irritation is vivid without being painful, with
augmented innervation on the muscles without convulsion,
but rather with an augmentation of their contractile force,
the maniacs have a feeling of superiority, a pride and arro-
gance insupportable, and often a disposition to violence.
The greatest part of such madmen break and destroy what-
ever comes within their reach ; they would kill, if they
could, men and animals, and often from no other motive
than the instinctive want of muscular exercise, the necessi-
ty of expending superabundant vitality, as well as self-love
and self-satistaction, no doubt misplaced in this case ; but
we have already shewn that this internal feeling is suscept-
ible of astonishing aberrations. They are in much the same
situation as young men just entering upon puberty, when
they feel their limbs endowed with a vigor before unfelt ;
but in madmen this exaltation of vital power is far more
characterised.

We have seen, that when maniacs are afflicted with gas-
tric, visceral, and cerebral ailments, their intellectual opera-
tions are directed toward melancholy subjects, and their
education determines the ideas that occupy their attention :
this constitutes a first period of agitation, wherein the pa-
tients are besieged by the most terrifying images, and deliv-
ered up to the most frightful despair. What furious animals,
monsters, robbers, executioners, police officers, or even the

I 246 J

devil pursues them ; hell appears at the side of them, and
they even imagine themselves precipitated into it, and they
imitate the contortions under which the damned are repre-
sented in books and pictures ; these differences are of no
account, it is one and the same phenomenon. The demono-
maniac is in the case of a person asleep, where le moi, (his
consciousness of personal identity,) deprived of the aid of
reason, that is, of the degree of regular normal excitement,
combines different ideas with a slight pectoral oppression,
and thinks he sees his breast occupied by a great black cat,
by a demon who strives to suffocate him, or by some build-
ing that has fallen on and crushed him : he awakes, and the
painful sensation becomes reduced to nothing. It is thus with
the sorrowful maniac ; on some slight uneasiness he builds
a croud of chimeras, more or less lugubrious, to which his
brain becomes habituated, and they remain, although in a
less degree, notwithstanding the disappearance of their
cause. We see here the association of emotions by means
of visceral irritation with ideas furnished by the senses^;
ideas which a recollection unnaturally vivid renders more
intense, and more adapted to react on the emotions which
have called them up. Hence, result those monstruosities by
which the imaginations of insane persons are besieged, and
the excess of anger, of fear, and of despair, that render
them so unhappy.

We should be very wrong to deduce the belief, and the
settled opinions of a man from the series of ideas which
predominates in him during insanity. That insanity which
has not yet reached dementia (or a total loss of reason) is
characterised as much by the exaltation of the memory of
abstract ideas, as by any other alteration intellectual or de-
fective. The most ancient recollections are reproduced ;
and considering the varieties of cerebral irritability, they
may become more apparently present, more influential over
the actual discourse, emotions, appetites, and desires, than
more recent impressions. It is possible, therefore, that
opinions renounced may be recalled ; that by an inverse
movement the more recent may become predominant, or
that a mingling of the one with the other may take place.
Hence it is that physicians, placed over lunatic establish-
ments, have so often observed, the devotee become impious,
the irreligious man a bigot, the avaricious man a prodigal,
the pyrrhonist a sectarian and fanatic, &c. Hence, also, it

t •« ]

is, that the passion, whose excess paved the way to insani-
ty, is not always prolonged during the whole course of this
malady ; and that we frequently see childishness and oddity,
forming the most ridiculous contradictions in the series of
ideas of the greatest number of monomaniacs.

General mania, as we have seen, may be either with or
without agitation, either furious or not so, and with or with-
out increase of muscular force ; that is to say, it has different
degrees of intensity, from that which approaches frenzy,
and which is accompanied by local sanguinary turgescence,
and feverish circulation, to that which seems to be exclu-
sively nervous. The first form of this affection cannot be
of long duration, for inflammation disorganizes the brain in
a short time, if not overcome naturally or artificially. The
second may remain several years, like all irritations of the
nervous substance where the blood is not attracted in too
great abundance, such as neuralgias, chronic and nervous
sciaticas, dependent on an irritation of the sciatic nerve,
lumbagos connected with that bundle of nerves called the
fiorse y s tally &c. &c. ; but the most usual cases are where
partial mania, or monomania, succeed general mania, which
they had formerly preceded.

There are many ways of explaining monomania. That
of Dr. Gall is the easiest and the most plausible. If the
brain be composed of different organs, it is easy to admit on
applying the doctrine of irritation that each organ may be
separately irritated ; which will give us as many monoma-
nias as there are organs constituting the brain : It is to be
regretted that serious objections may be made against an
explanation so convenient. The first is, the difficulty of
circumscribing our tendencies and our faculties, and of re-
ferring them to a number sufficiently small of principal ones,
so as not to exceed the organs of which, according to Dr.
Gall, the encephalon is composed. In fact, what are twen-
ty-eight or thirty organs in comparison of the numerous
inclinations and preferences of our instinct, and the aptitudes
and varieties of our intellect ? If we confine ourselves to
the small number of organs pointed out by the organologist,
we shall be compelled into perpetual subtleties to explain
by the different degrees of developement, and the different
combinations of the organs agreed on, those tendencies and
intellectual faculties which have no appropriate organ. How
can we manage this without falling every moment into some

! 248 ]

hypothesis, for it is impossible to circumscribe exactly the
admitted organs, and to exhibit any central one which com-
municates with all the others and rules over them when
occasion requires ? If Dr. Gall could only show, by dissec-
tion, a determinate number of pairs of nerves in the brain,
and the cerebellum, we might make the attempt to distri-
bute among them all our intellectual capacities, and all our
predominances of affection. But he is far, as yet, from this
degree of anatomical precision ; he confines himself to point-
ing out to us as peculiar organs, some circumvolutions which
make part of a nervous expansion, where nature has traced
no division. It is to this nervous membrane that he confides
all the treasures of intellect, and what is more, all the in-
stinctive phenomena, one excepted, which he reserves for
another expansion, forming nearly one seventh part of the
first. It must be granted that such a division cannot satisfy
an anatomist, to whom it will appear somewhat arbitrary.

We have on our side, says Dr. Gall, observation. But
what are the facts to which he applies it ? To certain bony
eminences, which may not always correspond with the same
bundle of nervous fibres, and which do not always corres-
pond to the predominances of intellect, or the affections.
He applies observation thus to the facts in which the brain
is concerned : as to the cerebellum, he appeals to a co-inci-
dence which I have not always found exact, and which is
probably not the only case of th€ kind. In fact, in dissec-
tions of living animals, there is found great connection be-
tween the cerebellum and the muscular apparatus : the rea-
der may consult what we have said p. 75. Moreover,
besides the erection which is sometimes wanting in inflam-
mations of the cerebellum, there are always in this case
convulsions in the muscles of the spine. Finally, effusions
of blood in the cerebellum produce apoplexy as well as
those in the brain. The experience of Dr. Gall, therefore,
is not exact at all points, nor free from liability to contra-
diction, even among those who have studied his system with
the greatest attention.

An explanation of the shades of intellect and affection
(feelings) by the different modes of action, or of irritability
of the cerebral apparatus, which is the general organ of
instinct and of intelligence, solves many of the difficulties
which the bony protuberances of the scull are inadequate to
account for. First, we are compelled to admit this mode of

L 249 J

explanation in cases such as the following. Dr. Gall him
self instances persons in whom irritation has developed
faculties which previously they did not profess. But this
explains itself much better by an increased degree of activi-
ty in an organ common to many faculties and subordinate to
one principle of action, than by the increase of vital energy
in a special organ which till then was less in size and ener-
gy than all the others ; for we cannot see why this irritation
which may take place elsewhere than in the brain, should
not preserve the preponderance of the other organs, by
exciting them as strongly as that organ which they were
accustomed to retain in a state of inferiority. Nor are these
cases uncommon. We find a multitude of instances, wherein
drunkenness developes inclinations opposite in character to
those of a sober and normal state : so, gastritis denaturalizes
the character to such a degree as to convert brave men into
cowards, and to make patient and quiet men impatient and
captious. In* general, diseases that quicken the circulation
without producing pain and uneasiness, have a tendency to
inspire gaiety, to exalt the intellectual faculties, and produce
the illusions of hope ; while those which depress the circu-
lation, which confine the action of the heart, either by some
specific malady, or by general uneasiness, produce sad and
dull ideas, apprehension, fear, and even despair. The first
class of cases is observed among young men frequently : at
the moment when their teachers praise them most, when
the student redoubles his ardour for study and seems to
surpass himself, then comes on that irritation which is the
precursor of pthisis. The second class of cases is found
among those nervous people who are attacked by chronic
gastritis.

No doubt the organs of every faculty must exist, or the
faculty would notdevelope itself, nor could irritation deprave
it ; without doubt the anterior portion of the cerebral hem-
ispheres, the organs of our moral faculties, co-operate greatly
by the manner in which they modify the stimulations of the
mass when it is fully developed, so as to afford a high de-
gree of intelligence ; but we cannot believe that this faculty
is so attached to any cerebral fasciculus of nerves, that i<
cannot be exercised by any other ; it is not likely that such
a position can ever be proved. There must be a concur-
rence of action among many pails of the internal apparatus,
and even with the extra-cranial nerves, to complete tho
.1?

I ?50 J

impressions that compose a judgment even moderately com-
plex; especially where instinctive emotions bear a part, and
where a strong impulse is given to the will. Every fasicu-
lus must doubtless contribute in its degree ; but why is
not the action of some fasciculi .under certain degrees ot
impulse answerable to the stimulations which incite us to
judge, to love, to hate, in such a manner as to present an
image or a feeling different from those which the same fas-
ciculi commonly produce ? Is it not a fact that an additional
degree of intensity may convert pleasure into pain ? As in
the case of scratching or tickling. It would follow from
Dr. Gall's system, that a cerebral organ would act a differ-
ent part every time that new forces were added to what
ought to be considered as its antagonist organ. Who has
told us that ten vibrations in a given time instead of five,
may not transform an ordinary man into a prodigy, by giv-
ing activity to the memory which furnishes ideas to the
understanding, and which before were tardily supplied ?
Have we not seen a new facility for labor change the tastes
and the habits of men ? May not the opposite effects pro-
ceed from the same cause, as in a man already sufficiently sti-
mulated, whom an additional stimulation in excess throws in
confusion ? Whoever has formed one of a convivial com-
pany of wine drinkers, will know how to judge on this point.
May not an accidental diminution of irritability weaken the
other faculties which were previously furnished with no
greater quantity of action than what was necessary to the due
performance of their functions ? Are not these the kind of
modifications to which we must attribute the sudden devel-
opement of great talents among persons who were considered
as doomed to a humble mediocrity ; and the kind of bastardy
that manifests itself at a certain age, among individuals of
certain families ? A slight affection of gastritis, or hyper-
trophy of the heart, a strong effort of intellect or of memory,
a blow, a fall, suffice to produce improvement or deteriora-
tion in the faculties, in proportion as the result is an increase
or decrease of strength, more or less mobility, an unusual
relaxation, or an engorgement which impedes the contrac-
tility of the albumen of the brain ; all this may take
place without the volume of the brain being sensibly
altered. The alteration in the size of the brain requires
much time, while the changes that take place in the
facility of mental operations, introducing other tastes and

I. 251 j

other propensities, may occur within a period compara-
tively short.*

If the continued excitement of insanity, can relax or sof-
ten, can expand by softening, or condense by indurating the
cerebral mass ; if excess of memory accompanies excess of
action and contractile force ; if the abolition of memory be
the result of defect of mobility, or excess of softness ; if all
the other faculties are in proportion to memory in cases of
insanity, why may not similar modifications take place in
the normal state of the brain ?f Doubtless a certain mass
of brain is necessary to the intellectual faculties ; doubtless
these faculties present varieties corresponding to the pro-
longation of the cerebral fibres in one direction rather than
another ; but these are not the only elements of the differ-
ences of which these faculties are susceptible. Action has
more influence than mass, in producing great differences ;
were it not so, we should not see such prodigious differences,
as we actually witness. The distance which separates one
man from the capacity of the common mass, is by no means
in proportion to the superior developement of his brain ; and
often we find among others who are inferior to him in re-
sources, a greater cerebral mass in those parts on which
the craniologists have made his superiority to depend. How
many men of letters in the time of Voltaire, have had brains
much surpassing in size that of Voltaire, even in those re-
gions of the brain which correspond, according to Dr. Gall,
to those faculties which he possessed so pre-eminently?

Our well considered opinion is, that a certain develope-
ment of the brain, as the organ of intelligence, is necessary
to render a man remarkable for intellectual qualities ; that
the most distinguished faculties correspond, as Dr. Gall's

* All these objections to Gall's system are undoubtedly true ; but the
organiologists will reply, they do not calculate their doctrines on any other
than the usual, normal, healthy developement of the encephalon and its
envelope. The infinite modifications that may result from accident and
disease, they have not attempted to embrace, or to explain. What they
assert applies only to original tendencies, inclinations, propensities, apti-
tudes, and feelings.

There is another objection to craniology. At different stages and pe-
riods of life, our propensities and aptitudes vary ; as in childhood, in youth,
in manhood, in middle age, and in old age : they change also in our pas-
sage through life according to our education, occupation, and society in
all these periods ; but these changes are not indicated by any outward
and visible sign. — Trans.

f Because these modification? imply on abnormal state of the brain. —
Trans.

I 202 j

opinion is, to the developement of the anterior hali ol the
cerebral hemispheres ; such also was the opinion of the an-
cients ; but we think that when the parts have arrived at a
certain volume or bulk, differences arise between men that
depend on other causes than volume or bulk. We believe
that these differences are subordinate to the mode of action,
the greater or less degree of irritability, contractility, per-
manent condensation, suppleness or rigidity of cerebral ner-
vous fibre, and may vary prodigiously ;* that the movements
of moveable animal matter, the movements of ponderable
matter, the movements of that, I know not ivhai, which per-
vades the nervous fibre, stand as causes of many differences ;
that the stimulations transmitted by our external, and by our
internal senses, the manner in which intellect re-acts under
various circumstances on the one and on the other, so modify
our faculties continually, that it is not possible to find any
constant invariable relation between this aptitude, this pro-
pensity, this osseous protuberance of the cranium, that may
be assigned as permanently corresponding.

Such are the reasons that compel us to refrain from class-
ing monomanias, as Dr. Gall does, by cranial protuberances;
but this does not prevent us from ascribing very high merit
to the labors of that excellent and indefatigable observer.
The foundation of his system is solid ; we regard him as one
of those who has most clearly comprehended the functions
of the nervous system, and we are indignant at the levity
and ingratitude with which his labors have been treated by
men whose pretensions do not exceed one of his auditors,
and who are indebted to him for every thing reasonable
they are able to advance concerning the functions of the
brain. We accuse this learned man of defects which do not
relate to the basis of his doctrine ; that basis consists in a
reference of every phenomenon instinctive and intellectual
to the action of the encephalic apparatus; but we think he
has made that apparatus too independent, and that some
of his opinions are arbitrary.: the amount of our objections
is, 1st, that he confines propensities and faculties within
certain nervous fibres, as if these propensities and faculties
were separate beings, which we have shewn is an erroneous
notion in our objections to the psychologists ; 2dly, that he
does not admit a concurrence of the whole apparatus for

* Gall acknowledges, that the mass being the same, the power is as the
energy of action. — T>~ans.

[ 25J j

each intellectual phenomenon, and that he establishes arbi-
trarily an ontological republic in the encephalon ; 3dly, that
he makes his organ, act one upon the other, without the aid
of this concurrence, although he has no regulating organ ; a
defect of which he has been accused, and to which he has
given no reply ; 4thly, that he has not admitted that a dif-
ference in vital action may establish great differences in
propensities and faculties ; 5thly, that he has not put in its
proper place the prodigious influence of the digestive visce-
ra and the digestive apparatus on the encephalon ; 6thly,
that he maintains that the prominences on the surface of the
scull, are positive and invariable indices^ and present a just
measure of the affective and intellectual predominances.
Nevertheless, and in spite of this last objection, we do not
contest the greater part of his observations on the influence
of the developement of certain regions of the encephalon
on our properties and faculties : we blame him only for as-
cribing that influence to mass alone.*

* Gall has shewn, as many others have shewn before him, that the en-
cephalon is a mass consisting of the organs of intellect, and of the feelings,
emotions, and passions ; 2dly, that the intellectual phenomena, and all
intellectual aptitude depend on the anterior part of the hemispheres of the
brain; that the feelings, emotions, passions, and propensities, depend on
the posterior portion of the encephalon; 3dly, that other circumstances
being equal, the intellectual aptitudes, and the affective propensities de-
pend on bulk or volume of the corresponding portion of the encephalic
mass ; 4thly, that generally, though not always, the bony envelope or the
scull, is determined in external appearance by the developement of the
encephalon internally in contact with it ; but that disease and old age may
sometimes occasion an alteration of the encephalic mass without altering
the external surface of the cranium, if there be no continued cerebral atro-
phy ; 5thly, bulk, however, is not the sole exponent of aptitude, propen-
sities, faculties, or qualities : for their energy may depend, also, on energy
of vital action, of irritability, contractility, mobility, and somewhat more
than usual or normal excitement. This is not sufficiently urged by Gall,
hut all modern craniologists are aware of these conditions ; Gthly, that
perception or feeling, and all intellectual and affective phenomena, are
mere functions of the nervous apparatus: just as contraction on the ap-
plication of a stimulus, is a function of muscular fibre in an animal, and
of vegetable fibre in the Mimosa, the Dionoea, the Berberry, and other
vegetables; 7thly, that the brain is a double organ, consisting of pairs •
8thly, that every portion of the brain and nervous system, is destined to
its own peculiar duty — its own functions — and cannot perform the duty
or function of any other different portion : we cannot see with the auditory
or hear with the optic nerve ; Dthly, that whether any cranial protuber-
ance be the exponent of any intellectual aptitude, or affective propensitv
cannot be known by any a priori considerations, or by any anatomical
dissections, but by actual observation and experience only, in human and
other animals : and depends on the proof by induction, and careful obser-

i 254 ]

Conclusion respecting the Theory of Insanity.

The comparison of the post mortem examinations with
the symptoms, throws light enough on the subject of in-
sanity to enable us to advance a physiological theory of this
disorder.

From the commencement of this article, I have declared
insanity to be one of the results of irritation ; the history of
its causes , of its mode of action ; the physiognomy and pro-
gress of its symptoms ; every thing in short, during the life
of the patient, tends to confirm my assertion. The altera-
tions in the dead body confirm it as to the acute state, for
we find the cerebrftl substance hardened, and intermingled
with red globules in a proportion far exceeding its normal
state ; and the cerebral substance appears hard pressed
against the internal osseous parietes, and flattened as if it
had undergone a species of hypertrophy. These alterations
correspond to an epoch of the disorder when there is a co-
incidence of great contractile force and sanguine congestion.

The chronic state offers no contradictory appearance ; for
the injection and opacity of the membranes, shew evident
traces of irritation in the blood vessels. On the other hand,
if the atrophy of the chronic state has replaced the hyper-

vation of individual cases and instances ; lOthly, he has also shown ana-
tomically, that the texture of the brain is fibrous.

Whether all the coincidences of protuberance on the one hand, and of
aptitudes and propensities on the other, are well founded and fully estab-
lished by Gall — or Avhether his divisions of faculties and feelings be cor-
rect in point of number or arrangement — are circumstances that may
reasonably be doubted, without denying the fundamental positions of his
system. That many of them are just, is highly probable from the num-
ber of intelligent converts he has made to his doctrine ; and all the mis-
takes herein will probably be corrected by more numerous and more
accurate observations hereafter. Craniology is yet in its infancy. All
the British craniologists affect to talk of the soul, as if they firmly believ-
ed the encephalon to be a mere organ of some hypothetical, distinct, and
separate ontological entity, cognizable by none of the human senses,
called the soul. This I am bound in charity to consider as a convenient
assumption of the orthodox and fashionable costume of the day, which
the interest, the ignorance, and the tremendous power of the priesthood,
has hitherto compelled them to wear. It is high time to lay it aside, and
to set science free from the fetters which the clergy have imposed on it.
Gall, indeed, enters not into the psychological question, confining himself
simply to the functions, as matters of fact and observation. Hoiv the
functions are performed, in a man, an elephant, a gnat, an oyster, an oak
tree, or a blade of grass, are questions equally difficult, which, in all pro-
bability, human knowledge will never be able to solve ; but the organs
and their functions will, nevertheless, remain matters of fact. — Trims.

L loo J

trophy of the acute state — if softness has succeeded to hard-
ness ; if hardness, when it existed, has sometimes presented
traces of morbid induration, I can see nothing in all this but
the faithful execution of the common laws of all inflamma-
tions and sub-inflammations of the organs. Often, while
undergoing atrophy, the brain of madmen has preserved its
solidity without apparent disorganization ; a certain proof
that the reduction was not an effect of absorbing any serous
or purulent humor, but a sustained contractility of the whole
encephalic mass ; that is to say, of a strong and durable
irritation. In other circumstances, the presence of a true
pus has left no doubt on the existence of an inflammatory
movement of that kind that we term legitimate. In all cases
of the atrophy of the brain, the scull shrinks, and the pro-
tuberances become levelled on its surface, the countenance
loses its expression by the progress of dementia ; but at the
same time the bones have been found thick, eburneous,
injected with blood, or much worn and friable. In these
changes, who can see any thing but the imperious law de-
veloped in our Physiology, that the containing sides are as
the organs they contain, if no other body be interposed ?
The brain becomes condensed, the scull therefore must con-
tract. The internal tablet at first followed the viscus, and
withdrew from the external one ; but this last at length had
to follow, and the external protuberances became oblitera-
ted. Dr. Gall has asserted the same thing without referring
to irritation, which he had not sufficiently considered. These
cerebral changes were attributed by him to disease, to the
alteration in vital energy. But this is not saying enough ;
this is an assertion too vague for our era. The eburneous
hypertrophy of the cranium must be attributed exclusively
to the propagation of irritation, from the interior to the
exterior ; and as to friability and thinness of the scull, they
are observed among men who have grown old in a state of
dementia ; and they rank among the atrophies which suc-
ceed to the hypertrophies of over-irritation.

The inequality of bulk of the two hemispheres, seems to
have been matter of surprise to some observers ; but what
is there so surprising in this, in a double organ ? Did we
ever find the two halves of such organs, diseased and disor-
ganized equally ? Does not this inequality take place in all
our symmetrical organs at the expense of regularity of form,
when we have lived to an advanced age ? This depends.

[ 2b(i J

beyond doubt, from our being incapable of stimulation
equally in every part of those organs.

I shall return to post mortem dissections, by stating that
effusions, infiltrations, by datidsin the membranes, general
induration with or without sanguineous injection, with or
without hypertrophy or atrophy, as well as the effusions and
ecchymoses in the cerebral substance, and the marbled
spots that have been observed in it ; the partial petrifactions
and softenings, arterial and membranous ossifications, and
the ivory state of the brain with injection, its thinness and
its friability, are the effects-of irritation. All these appear-
ances prove, that irritation (before inflammation has con-
founded and broken down every thing) acts as a sub-inflam-
mation, and disorganizes each tissue in the manner adapted
to the animal matter of which it is formed, and its particular
temperament.

The alteration of the mucous membrane, and of the diges-
tive canal, and that of the liver, which necessarily accompa-
nies the former, may have appeared antecedently to insanity,
and may have been accelerated during its continuance by
some cause or other, so as to become itself a cause of death;
but what is certain, is, that a prolonged irritation of the
encephalon cannot fail to produce an irritation of the diges-
tive organs and of the liver, frequently accompanied by
dropsy. As to the phlegmasia that we find marks of in the
chest and the locomotive apparatus, they are accidental, and
need not stop our course of remark.

Here then is the substantial part of the question. Let us
now endeavor, by the aid of induction, to deduce from these
facts, others less evident, which will help us to account for
the former ; and for this purpose it will suffice to resume
our details.

The first effect of irritation in that portion of the cerebral
substance which presides over the intellectual phenomena is
an excess of memory and of imagination, which is but a mode
of memory. When this excess goes on increasing, sleep
diminishes or becomes almost like wakefulness. The exu-
berant intercranial activity recalls old impressions and com-
bines them in Avays new to the consciousness of the indivi-
dual. He sees, he feels arising within him this new trouble,
and he is deceived also by hallucinations of which the cause
seems exterior to him, while it is in fact nothing but cerebral
irritation. He shudders when he reflects that he has almost

[ ft* ]

given credence to chimeras, and to strange associations of an
exalted imagination.* He deplores his situation while he
feels them forming and remaining in spite of himself, and
even at the moment when he is most anxious to be delivered
from them. Thus much we have said already : let us ad-
vance another step.

That which hinders him from believing all this, is the re-
mains of the moral action of the encephalon ; but the abnor-
mal action at length prevails ; and from that moment, rea-
son, which was attached to the normal mode of action,
existing no longer, consciousness becomes deceptious, and
the will is depraved, because it no longer obeys the indi-
vidual consciousness of the normal state. In fact, conscious-
ness and identity are so depraved in complete insanity, that
the patient no longer feels his proper relations to his fellow
creatures. It is not the identity of health, which the insane
observer finds within himself, but it is a false identity, a
false consciousness operating on ideas dissimilar and uncon-
nected, or similar and consequent, but founded on false prin-
ciples. Such are the indications of the highest degree of
the general malady.

When insane persons of this description preserve the re^
collection of what they have said or done, we may believe
that their individual consciousness is only oppressed, not
destroyed ; but this is not the case when the agitation be-
comes extreme : they cannot recollect what they have said
or done too precipitately; they resemble men drunk, or
transported with rage, and they quickly forget what they
have said or done. Such also is the case with frenetic
madmen. Self reflection, and by consequence the recol-
lection of what he has been intellectually, is wanting to a
man when his mental operations exceed a certain degree of
precipitation. The memory of the access of insanity being
frequently deceptive as to many scenes of their delirium,
does not furnish any proof that they preserve their con-
sciousness of individuality.

*Docs not all this pruvc incontestably that sensations and ideas are

- nothing more than motions in the brain, felt or perceived ? Yet, with a

flippancy equalled only hy his ignorance of all intellectual physiology, did

a reviewer in the Edinburgh Review for October, 180G, p. 15! », almost

laiiffh butright at the absurdity of such a supposition : as fully proved aj

■ aoyphysiologicaliactcaribc. — Ttana.

33

I * i

When an insane person, recovered, relates what he has
done, and declares that he has been deceived by fallse im-
ages of things; when he proves that his conclusions frtfm
the facts which seemed real to him, were properly dedu-
ced ; in a word, while he preserves the remembrance of
the fit, we may believe that he preserves his feeling, of
identity, but that his consciousness has been cheated by
false images, the result of cerebral irritation. But when he
is alternately reasonable and insane, or reasonable on one
point and insane on another, without any possibility of disa-
busing him, what, in this case, are we to think of his identi-
ty (moi) and his consciousness? Is it enough to induce us
to believe that a monomaniac is reasonable, that he can
judge accurately of the temperature or the shape of a body ?
Can we conclude that he possesses a consciousness of his iden-
tity (de son moi) because he gives proper answers in rela-
tion to his wants? Suppose we grant thus far, where is
his reason, and his self consciousness, when he declares
that he is a dog, an owl, a bottle, a leathern jug, a mile
stone, a grain of mustard, &c. ? Will it be said he has a
double moi, a double consciousness, the one for just ideas^.
the other for false ones ? In the case, for instance, of a pa-
tient who believes himself to be some animal, we may in
strictness allow him the identity of a dog or an owl, but what
are we to do with the identity of a mile stone, or a bottle ?
If we refuse him the double identity, the double conscious-
ness, will it be pretended that he possesses only the con-
sciousness of a normal state obscured by disease ? Two re-
plies may be made to this :

1st. We may allow a consciousness oppressed by disease
to one who furnishes occasional proofs of reason ; but can
we make the same allowance to one who for many years has
furnished no such proof? Where is the identity, the con-
sciousness of a man in a state of dementia, who, after having
long lived in a state completely brutish, dies without having
afforded any proof that he has retained his reason ? Some
there are who have recovered it at the last moment, but
whither had it retired during so long an absence ? The
malady had repressed it, may be the reply : well ; I pro--
ceed then to the second answer.

2d. In advancing that identity (lc moi) and conscious-
ness have been repressed by the malady, let us know dis-
tinctly what the malady is. "We mav conceive of it as of a?

i m j

Being oj determined figure, which compresses or oppresses,
another Being equally marked and determined, called moi,
myself, or else another Being of the same nature, called
consciousness. How then are we to represent this moi,
this consciousness, and this malady, so as to assert any thing
reasonable concerning them? I shall not push this discus-
sion further, contenting myself with a reference to the first
part of this work ; but we may conclude from what has been
advanced, that if we would avoid ontology, we must not as-
sert generally and absolutely that an insane man preserves
or has lost his reason, that he preserves or has lost his con-
sciousness of identity (de son moi,) that the feeling of iden-
tity is oppressed under the weight of a malad}*, and that its
tendency is to re-establish itself, as takes place after cure,
and sometimes at the last moment of life ; that if it does not
appear, it exists nevertheless, since it is a simple substance.,
indestructible, &c. Metaphorical language like this, teaches
nothing, and only prolongs the reign of illusion, and adds
strength to fanaticism. We must speak simply matter of
fact.: we may say that a madman sometimes has reason and
sometimes not ; that he sometimes has, and sometimes has
not self consciousness; that when he is cured he recovers
his reason, and that he may sometimes possess it a short
time before death, but that he often dies without ever re-
covering it ; that the cause of these differences lies in the
words reason, self-consciousness, which in fact express no-
thing but the action of the nervous substance of the enceph-
alon, an action iiable to change so long as life remains. To
this w$ must add that as the patient neither enjoys the facul-
ty of reason constantly, nor always correctly, he has no regu-
lar normal relation to other men.

As to the explanation of this moral state so variable, we
ought to say, that after having received light from the cau-
ses of this disorder, from its progress, and from post mortem
examinations, that when the brain is vividly irritated, the
insane person has neither reason or consciousness; that
when the irritation is moderate, he has both ; but when
great irritation again takes place they disappear, as in sleep,
or if you prefer it in apoplexy. When reason appears
again for a few moments, just before death, it is in conse-
quence of the ceasing of the morbid excess of irritation
in a brain not yet completely disorganized, and this is
the last part which irritation performs in all cases ofde-

[ m j

Jiriuui, and this is all we can say of this last moment of
life's duration.

As to madmen who are convalescent, and whose malady
returns after conversations too exciting, or liberty given to
them prematurely, we may properly say, that the exercise
of their reason and their consciousness, as well as the appli-
cation of the one and the other to the actual impressions of
their senses, are so many cerebral stimulations, which, when
converted into cerebral irritations, banish reason, conscious-
ness, and identity, (moi) or if you please, the normal type
of encephalic action, on which these intellectual properties
depend. When reason is not present, as in madmen under
general insanity, this normal type does not exist ; when
loason appears but by intervals, and when it disappears on
the slightest irritation, there is no regular assurance of the
possession of this normal type, but it has existed ; it is lost
therefore ; but in the native idiot who has never possessed
it, he cannot have lost it. Such are the grounds and rea-
sons which have induced me to adopt the definition of in-
sanity, which I have already given.

Let us add, for the purpose of giving additional force to
ihese truths, and connecting them still more strictly with
physiology, that in chronic irritation the contractile force is
cot destroyed while memory remains unaltered ; for the
weakening of this faculty is the first indication of the dimi-
nution of this force, but the morbid habit, after some time,
renders it incurable, when it is not so rendered by disorgan-
ization ; that the whole mass of the brain is disordered more
or less even in monomanias, which, under this view oi .he
fact, are not to be regarded as partial affections of the bi
We rely for proof on the fact, that monomaniacs are intel-
lectually weak in all respects ; that they change their ob-
ject ; and on the fact that anatomical pathology has not yet
settled a coincidence of an alteration of any part of (he en-
cephalic mass, with any specific form of delirium ; and be-
cause dementia, when it takes place in monomaniacs, is ne-
ver confined to subjects affected with partial delirium ; be-
cause it is always general, and begins by a weakness of
memory, whatever may have been the kind of delirium, and
even when there is no other encephalic lesion than a dimi-
nution of muscular force.

We assert also that if you observe persons insane with
dementia play at draughts, or music, it is because the de-

L 261 j

uientia is not )cl complete. Indeed the diminution ot
contractility is not perceptible at first, but by a diminution
of the most complicated intellectual operations, sjich as a
judgment requiring the bringing together of a great number
of perceptions ; for this reason, the memoiy of complicated
abstract ideas, and judgments of deduction, are first weak-
ened and first lost; but it takes more time to destroy those
ideas which belong to simple combinations, and actions
which approach to the character ol instincts.*

Dementia analyses, to a certain degree, our faculties by the
successive manner in which it destroys them. When the
intellectual portion of the faculties, or the mode of cerebral
action on which they depend no longer exists, the weak-
minded patients abandon themselves to instinctive actions,
the most gross and disgusting; and often the most opposite
to their normal propensities : this proves the depravation of
instinct ; but if they continue to live for some time, demen-
tia deprives them even of instinct and volition, and reduces
them to a state below the zoophyte, or even the vegetable ;f
an observation of great value to the physiologist, since it
shews him to what point the nervous system becomes ne-
cessary to the functions of animals in whom it is much de-
veloped, and particularly in man. J Physiological physicians
may also make much use of this fact, to confirm what we

* Perhaps it will be objected that draughts require considerable com-
binations: the best players I have seen were sots.

f See before p. 393, for a deplorable picture of the last stage of those
weak-minded patients, who, by aid of accidental circumstances, live on.
until the natural turn of their cerebral affection cuts them off".

$ We are not ignorant that many animals, zoophytes, &c. observe and
.seize their prey without possessing a nervous system. The reason is.
that in these animals the nervous matter intermingled with the other
forme of animal matter, suffices to the small number of actions which they
have to perform. The medium in which they live abundantly supplies
them with nourishment, and the irritability of their fibres affords them
the means of seizing their prey. But in proportion as the necessary acts
of alimentation and reproduction multiply and become more complicated,
the nervous matter becomes separated from the other tissues, more
abundant, and exercises more influence over the functions. Finally,
among men it is thus to such a degree that life itself cannot be maintain-
ed but by innervation, and what is more, without sensitive phenomena.—
;.'i»//ior.)

This is an ingenious supposition as to the physiological source of the
slight degree of voluntarily perceptible in zoophytic animals, but it is
supposition only. — Trans.

[ 26B j

bave already timed of the part performed by the entopha-
Ion and its dependencies in the numerous morbid sympathies
■which our predecessors would not undertake to explain.

Chapter VIII. — Prognostic or JwsAsraxY-

The prognostic of insanity is deduced from its causes,
the constitution of the subjects, the mode oX its first access,
its progress, and its complications.

Insanity, from accidental causes, always presents more
favourable chances of cure than that which arises from some
innate disposition, and wherein accidental modificationshav.e
only acted as determining causes. Among these last, moral
circumstances are the most formidable, especially when they
have been long in action. But when a long series of menial
grievance has been complicated with a chronic affection of
the digestive passages, the cure is always more difficult,
because the two kinds of stimulation mutually act upon and
keep each other in action. Such is the case of persons who
have long lived in habits of intoxication ; it is even supposed
that they may transmit thispre-disposition to their children,
but I consider this as a conjecture hazarded. It is more
frequently the case that a bad conformation of the brain,
disposes men to insanity and to gluttony ; and it is thispre-
disposition that is transmitted from father to son.

Insanity arising from purely physical causes, as the sup-
pression of a flux, the repression of exanthematous eruption,
&c. yields for the most part, to judicious treatment ; more-
over, there is neither complication, or hereditary source, or
moral or physical causes of insanity of which we have not
given a detail. The most difficult cases, are those where
insanity succeeds to an illness which has affected the cere-
bral organization, such as epilepsy, palsy, apoplexy, &c. : in
this case dementia is not long in appearing.

When insanity makes its access, impetuously in a fresh
subject, we are much less uneasy as to its result, than when
it announces itself by a want of memory, a difficulty in pro-
nouncing certain words or syllables, and by some transient
illusions which the patient himself perceives, and by an effort
of attention is able to avoid.

These indications which generally occur after some efforts
of mental exertion prolonged, after mental uneasiness, and
pains accompanied with weakness in the muscles of the back

und extremities,, often with trembling and convulsive shud-
dering, announce that the contractility of the brain is al-
ready exhausted by irritation, and that the patient will soon
fall into mental alienation and general paralysis, whatever
may be the cause of his present enjoymentof health. This
form of access is more common in old age than earlier : if to
this be joined a disposition to loquacity , hallucination, a gaiety
without adequate cause, and incoherent proposals, we may
expect the mental alienation of old age, properly fo called.

When a robust patient becomes insane by complete in-
sensibility, resting immoveable, with his eyes void of ex-
pression, refusing to eat or drink, we cannot but attribute
this to a sanguineous congestion in the brain ; and this,
whether the person affected has no ideas, or has them so
confusedly that he feels no motive for action, or that some
predominant idea absorbs all his attention, or is of such a
nature as to hinder him from walking or taking nourishment ;
as for example, if he believes that he shall break to pieces
if he walks, or that it is all over with him if he speaks, &c.
In each of these cases the disorder is not desperate. Fre-
quently the calm state of stupidity, is the forerunner of some
violent fit. In other cases more rare, insanity continues
under this form, but the patients are sorrowful, they shed
tears, and believe themselves lost or ruined. We judge of
the probable issue of the disease, by estimating the strength
of these symptoms.

That insanity which persons who have become melancholy
by love or any other cause, have concealed for a long time,
but which now and then betrays itself, may break out with
violence : and if the subject be yet robust, we may have
reasonable hopes of cure. But if the disorder be recognized
only by loss of memory, and other signs already noticed, we
may conjecture that the long strife which the patient has
undergone with his disorder, has worn out the contracti-
lity of the brain, or that some disorganization has taken
place there, and dementia may be expected.

The more robust the subjects are, the less reason is there
to expect dangerous occurrences, if there be only conges-
tion or acute inflammation of the brain, which may be redu-
ced by blood letting ; but we have every thing to fear where
the patients are weak and sickly, of a solt fibre, and in whom
moral affections are apt to produce violent effects : such per-
sons are subject to relapses, and frequently fall into imbecility.

[ 264 J

The prognostic data, drawn from th&progros&of insanity
are perfectly in harmony with the preceding. General
mania with inflammatory symptoms, accompanied also with
great agitation, gives us hopes for a long time, even when
the patient listens to no reason, seems always occupied by
chimeras, and readily becomes furious. We have seen this
cured even after many years, as we have said before. Hence,
although no cure should take place within the first half year,
the usual period of hope, we may, nevertheless, have hopes
for one or two years, or even longer; for such instances
have occurred even after ten or twenty years of mental
alienation. Partial mania or monomania, is often more ob-
stinate, because it is often more chronic : it is more particu-
larly to be feared when the ideas which sieze hold of the
patients, are of an irritating description, or hinder them from
taking nourishment, or speedily exhaust the vitality of their
nervous system : these cases are still more formidable, if
accompanied by an inveterate gastro- enteritis. In this rank
we may place religious delirium, such as when the insane
person believes himself possessed with the devil or plunged
into hell. This demonomania is one of the most formidable
when accompanied by marks of violent despair, when wc
see the patient with haggard eyes, a face hideously distort-
ed, the hair standing on end, and refusing all the care wc
wish to bestow on him. But when he becomes familiarized
with the devil, or believes himself to be an evil spirit, when
he laughs and appears unconcerned, the prognostic is no
longer drawn from the kind of delirium, but from its com-
plications, the strength of the patient, and the state of the
memory.

In truth, it is the memory and the attention, that furnish
the principal grounds ot prognostic in insanity, when the
disease is already in an advanced state. While memory
exists, and the patient does not fall into stupidity and unhap-
piness, while he is able to give attention to what is said to
him, we need not renounce hope; whether he connects your
conversation with his chimerical ideas, or answers with pro-
priety, and does not appear to wander except on the accus-
tomed subject of his disorder.

So soon as memory begins to weaken among insane peo-
ple, and the power of attention is destroyed, they find them-
selves, as wc have said before, delivered from the cares
which their exalted imagination had created, and which

t 268 ] "

proved an obstacle to their taking nourishment. From that
period, assimilation takes place more easily, and they arc no
longer affected by chronic phlegmasia? of the digestive canal ;
the}- fatten, they acquire color and freshness of complexion,
but without any expression. If, therefore, wo do not ob-
serve this amelioration of the nutritive functions, it is a bad
symptom, and we must satisfy ourselves which organ it is,
whose irritation can keep up meagreness, want of color, &c.
This super-nutrition, which is commonly remarked in
dementia, is not "without its inconvenience ; it often pre-
pares the way to returns of agitation with inflammatory
symptoms, during which memory is absent ; it is therefore
no presage of cure. This super-nutrition also causes epilepsy
and formidable apoplexy. At other times these madmen
live long in this state, fat and voracious ; but they always
end by general palsy, by irritation, by engorgement, and by
chronic phlegmasia? of the digestive organs and the liver.
The marks, therefore, of this consequent gastro-enteritis,
should be considered as lamentable; they presage engorge-
ment of the liver, icteritis, dropsy, and diarrhoea, which
bring on the death of these patients. Many succumb under
gangrenous eschars and their consequences.

The frequent returns of agitation, even with inflammatory
symptoms in an insane person going onward toward demen-
tia, are by no means proofs that his disorder is curable : we
had better refer ourselves to the memory and attention.
We have said that these exasperations are generally more
common in extreme cold, and very hot weather, and at the
seasons of equinox, than at other times ; but all accidental
excitements, moral or physical, may bring them on, though
they are more to be dreaded when they appear without
provocation. These accesses are of good augury in a mad-
man, whose malady has broken out with torpidity ; for it is
a general law in pathology, that a reactive movement neuro-
sanguineous, shews itself at the moment when congestions
disappear. All we could wish is, that these reactions should
not last more than a few days ; but they are unpleasant symp-
toms in madmen who are in a convalescent state ; for thev
arc proofs of a return of cerebral irritation which induces
new fits of delirium.

Intermittent insanity, gives us at first some hope when
the patients exactly conform to the prophylactic, directions
of their physician ; but when this insanity is inveterate it is
31

L 2M j

difficult of cure. There are periodical irritations that pro-
duce delirium, as there are some that bring on the epileptic
congestion. The longer they have lasted, the more likely
is their recurrence. Intermittent irritation of the encepha-
lic apparatus ends as in all other viscera, by establishing
itself continually ; and when it has put on this form, demen-
tia, that fatal stage, is not far off, if it have not already
appeared.

On the same principles we are to form our judgment con-
cerning relapses which do not assume periodicity. Each
attack producing some new injury to the brain, we may
expect as many obstacles to the cure of the disorder, as there
have been relapses. For the most part, partial insanity,
tends to become general ; and all general insanity tends
toward dementia and general paralysis. Our judgment, as
to the approach of this fatal termination, must be drawn from
the state of the memory, and muscular motion.

Of all the possible complications in mania, the worst are
epilepsy, chronic phlogosis of the digestive canal, and chro-
nic pnoumony.

The first of these is nearly allied to insanity ; it frequently
precedes and determines it — at other times, it arrives as a
complication at a period more advanced. Solitary pleasures
to which the insane are so addicted, are often the determin-
ing cause. But, mania being an irritation of the brain, what
is there surprising that it should increase occasionally, and
determine that kind of cerebral congestion which brings on
fits of epilepsy? In every case, epilepsy makes the patient
liable to the hazard of formidable attacks of apoplexy ; and
even when this last does not occur, it hastens the approach
of dementia and of palsy, general or partial.

The phlogosis of the digestive canal, may at first produce
either want of appetite, or voracity ; sometimes jaundice
and ascites ; it commonly finishes its career in the large
intestines, and kills the patient by diarrhoea. All these
Complications are fatal, when they attack an insane person
already for a long time in the chronic stage, or worn out in
a short time by furious madness, and an agitation that no
remedy can appease.

Chronic pneumonia causes the ulcerations, and the pul-
monary pthises, which we remark among insane persons,
succeeding often to repeated bronchitis, or catarrhs, which
they tfre'Ttnabre to avoid v. hen incurables for, being disgust-

ing, dirty, ungrateful, ill-dispositioned, and even dangero^
these unhappy persons are deprived of all those minute-
attentions which might prevent the consequences of rheums
and irritating coughs to which they are subject. Frequently,
when first remarked, chronic pneumania has already made
so much progress, that the aid of medicine is unavailing.

When insane persons have long suffered rheumatic and
gouty pains, which the cold and damp of their apartments
render them subject to, we ought to be on the watch, lest
these irritations should penetrate within, and disorganize
the heart, under the forms of pericarditis or aneurism, anfi
the lungs under the type of chronic pleurisy, or pthisis pnl-
monalis. It would be much out of place, on such an occa-
sion, to attribute to them a peculiar vigor for resisting cold,,
which insane persons never possess but during the period
of excitation.

The same causes, and others, expose them to intermit-
tent fevers, and to acute plcgmasioe of the larger viscera;
disorders always dangerous to them, because the chronic
irritation of the brain may in consequence become acute, and
carry them off with symptoms of what have been improperly
called cerebral fevers, putrid, ataxic, or malignant fevers.

If we judge ol the possible recovery of insane patients,
by the proportion of cures published in the different treatises
on mania, we shall find that in the best regulated establish-
ments, from one fourth to one third are cured. If we seek
after the data in reference to age, we shall remark, that
from the age of ten to twenty years, more than half the pa-
tients are cured ; from twenty to thirty, not so many ; from
thirty to forty, still fewer ; from forty to fifty, not more than
a third ; from fifty to sixty, somewhat less ; from sixty to
seventy, not more than one in seven. Women are more
easily cured than men. Let us hope that the improvements
due to physiological medicine, so manifest in other disorders,
will be apparent also in this. I may add that I am in pos-
session of a sufficient number of facts to justify this cheering
expectation.

Chapter IX. — On the Treatment of Insanity.

Ancient practice brought against insanity nothing but
bleedings, and drastic purgings, chiefly with hellebore ; they
used also the cold bath, and particularly bathing by sur-
prise, which consisted in plunging thepatfentin cold water.

[ 3fiS J

then taking him out, and repeating this process several
rimes. Some earlier authors pushed this violent remedy
so far as to keep the patient sub-merged till he had repeated
the psalm miserere. Their intent was to produce effect by
the fear of death. When these remedies failed, they had
recourse to shutting up and exclusion. For many ages a
madman was considered as so incurable that it was regarded
as a very fortunate circumstance, if a few instances of reco-
very could be cited.

In the middle ages, those times of fanaticism and igno-
rance, demonomaniacs were common; but they were deliv-
ered over rather to the priest who exorcised them, than to
the physician. The pretended cure of some money seek-
ing rogues, brought the clerical treatment into vogue to
the detriment of medicine, which made no progress in this
disorder.

The decline of fanaticism in Europe, did not contribute to
ameliorate the condition of insane patients. When exor-
cism was laid aside, they were still ill-treated, loaded with
chains, and beaten like culprits. It was not medicine that
prescribed these cruelties ; but medicine, from want of
knowledge, was not always guiltless. Furious madness,
and the agitations of the first access, were attacked by bleed-
ings, by drastics, by cold bathings, cold affusions, and
applications to the head ; but if success was not the speedy
result, the patient was released from the doctor, and deliv-
ered over to keepers, themselves not watched, who were irri-
tated against the patient for the most trifling causes, and who
inflicted on them cruel punishments. There are still luna-
tic hospitals in many of the great cities of Eurepe, where
stripes still constitute apart of the treatment.

Such was the condition of insane persons in France, (that
is to say, copious bleedings, drastic purges, cold affusions on
the head, baths of surprise, confinement and exclusion,)
Avhen Pixel became a physician to the hospital Bicetre.
His goodness of heart revolted at the ill treatment of insane
patients, and at the abandonment to which they were con-
signed when the first means of cure had failed.

He composed a treatise, constituting his high and most
worthy claim to public applause, wherein he called the at-
tention of observers to this species of malady too much neg-
lected : he shewed that, by treating insane people with
more humanity — by preventing in them, by means of kind

I «w I

and soothing expressions, ihc feelings oi' distraction, hu-
miliation, shame and despair, feelings that always arise on the
first glimpse of returning reason — by saving them, also, from
the violent treatment of drastics, of blows, and the dread of
cold bathings, which shook their nerves, already weakened
by excessive bleedings — by reserving the cold affusions as a
means of correction in certain cases — and by gentle treat-
ment generally, he produced a greater number of cures than
had usually taken place. Two leading ideas were observa-
ble in his work : to connect the maniacal ideas, hitherto
confused and unintelligible both to physicians and philoso-
phers, w r iththe intellectual and affective faculties recognized
by Locke and Condillac ; and to regulate the treatment accor-
ding to the views of hippocratic expectation, founded on the
periodical efforts of nature, and the production, more or less
regular, of crisis. These novel views, developed with a
tone of conviction, and with the enthusiastic energy of en-
lightened philosophy, produced a great effect in the learned
world. Insanity became on all sides an object of attention ;
facts w r ere sedulously collected ; insane persons became ob-
jects of great interest to physicians, who soon communicated
the impulse to persons in authority. The lot of madmen
became ameliorated ; and if Pinel himself did not make
great progress in the medical treatment of this disorder, he
had at least the satisfaction, before he died, of contemplating
the happy effects of the impulse he had given to public
opinion.

What I have said on the divisions of which insanity is
susceptible, in reference to its physical and moral relations,
■will dispense with the necessity of discussing the opinions
of M. Pinel, on the analysis of the faculties of the under-
standing, as deduced from the various kinds of insanity. I
shall, therefore, confine myself to the treatment of this disor-
der, which I consider as at present too inactive. No doubt
it is better to abandon insane people to the influence of re-
gimen, than to wear out their strength by enormous bleed-
ings, to torment them by the dashing of cold water and the
dread of immersion, or to inflame their digestive organs by
violent cathartics. But is there no middle way between
these torments, and the inertness of hippocratic practice ?
I think there is ; and I am now about to relate my own ex-
perience, and that of some of my friends who have applied
the precepts of physiological medicine to insanity.

[ 370 ]

First, let us fix the indications.

Insanity is an irritation. To combat it, we have two
kinds of modifiers, sedative, and counter irritants; also, and
more usually called revulsives. If we assume here, as we
ought, the disease at its first access, and in its highest grade,
we shall see it accompanied by inflammatory symptoms ;
we shall have to light with encephalitis. We must resort
therefore to bleedings, abstinence, emollient drinks, and the
application of cold. There has been too much declamation
against abundant bleedings, since Pinel and his school have
been so sparing of the blood of insane patients. Hence,
they never relate a case of sudden cure ; while the physio-
logical physicians may cite many cases where bleeding, and
especially leeches applied during 3, 4, or 5 successive days>
have removed a commencing insanity, as we remove a com-
mencing pneumonia, or gastro-enteritis, and restored the
patient at once to his reason. There already existed facts
that would point to thio practice, but it was necessary to
choose the good and reject the bad. In the time of Despor-
tes the average period of treating curable insanity was 150
days. In 1822, at the Bicetre* it was 130 days for men,
and at the Salpetriere 145 days for women. Instead of
being astonished at the happy results obtained by the meth-
od of practice of Desportes, and attributing the reverses to
the debility of the patients, it would have been more just to
ascribe them to the agitation produced by cold water, to ill
treatment, and the consequent feeling of despair, and to the
irritation of drastics administered without regard to the sus-
ceptibility of the digestive organs : it would have been pos-
sible to hit upon a proper middle course, and to have corn-
batted the cerebral irritation during the first days of its ap-
pearance by bleedings proportioned to the strength of the
patients, instead of permitting them to remain in a state of
delirious agitation, that the disorder might run through all
its periods.

Copious bleeding's are not always without danger in deli-
rium attended by convulsive agitation. I have seen in the
old practice, men attacked with acute febrile delirium, and
convulsive trembling, after excess in alcoholic beverage,
die suddenly a few hours after bleeding. I have collected
already five or six cases of this kind, where death has oc-

h, * Lunatic Hospitals at Paris. Broussais is attached to the Hospital
of theVal de Grace, which is not a Lunatic establishment — Trait*.

E m j

curred very shortly in the practice of the iate M. Corvisart,
who did not adopt the system or the denominations of his
colleague Pinel. He did not call them ataxic (irregular)
fevers, but malignant fevers, He saw in the delirious state
and the redness of the eyes, signs of an inflammation of the
brain, complicated with essential fever ; and before exhibit-
ing camphor, kino, and ardent spirits against the malignant
symptoms ( for he prescribed these also ) he opposed a bleed-
ing in the feet to the inflammation, and his patients often
died in a day's time.

The same check may occur in mania: one of our col-
leagues, Dr. Pressat, who owed his astonishing success to
his anti-phlogistic treatment, made a judicious remark re-
specting it. This enlightened physician deemed it. proper
to give calming beverage to subjects seized suddenly with
furious mania after an indulgence in spirituous liquors, and
to let the pulse rise again, during some days before he ven-
tured on blood letting. The more you bleed these sort of
madmen, the more furious they become, and fall at length
into a mortal collapse. This remark deserves the more at-
tention as it comes from a practitioner, who has frequently
removed the early stage of insanity by general and local
bleedings, just as incipient pleurisies and gastro-enterites of
an acute type are cut short by like means.

After bleeding from the large vessels, come the capillary
bleedings. Leeches and cuppings on the passage of the
jugular, and on the head after shaving, at the base of the
scull, on the occiput, and in all those places where more
than usual heat is felt, or wheie the patient feels pain, and
even in places where the skin is too sensible, in the nape of
the neck, and between the shoulders after the manner of
Ccelius Aurelianus, are all means of considerable efficacy.
They must be employed as long as the strength of the pa-
tient can support them in all recent cases, and even in exa-
cerbations ; joining to these means others that are accessary.

The principal are, warmth applied to the lower extremi-
ties by means of the half-bath of 25 or 26 degrees (80 of
Fahr. ) while warm water is poured gently on the head and
near to it. This is bathing by affusion ; a practice not less
useful in this case than in acute cerebral inflammations ; but
it must be patiently persevered in.

If inflammation of the stomach be conjoined with nianiac-
al delirium, it must be attacked without loss of time. If it

[ *M ]

have preceded and determined insanity, after general bleed-
ing we must apply leeches repeatedly to the epigastrium,
before, and even concomitantly with their application to the
head.

If insanity does not yield to these means, seconded by ab-
stinence, cool beverage, such as orgeat, gum water, lemon ■
ade, &c. the patient becomes calm to a certain point, and is
usually seized with a strong appetite, which it would be
dangerous fully to indulge, and equally so to enjoin a rigor-
ous abstinence. The diet therefore must be vegetable, fc-
cula, leguminous, vegetables, and fruits. Milk may perhaps
be allowed, but animal food must be deferred.

It is at this period, after the decline of the violent symp-
toms, that the patients dread cold, which during the exalta-
tion of the disorder they braved. As some of them have
died by the sole influence of cold, precautions must be ta-
ken to prevent this mishap. This is a remark of Pinel.

The most pressing symptoms having been calmed by this
antiphlogistic treatment, the causes of the disease must be
enquired into for the purpose of deducing curative indica-
tions. Suppression of habitual hemorrhage requires a re-
establishment of a flux which has become necessary to the
equilibrium of the functions. We may succeed in this, when
the larger viscera have not received any formidable injury,
by dissipating their irritations, and recalling the usual flux by
leeches applied at or near to its former locality at the periods
when it usually appeared. Repelled exanthemata and invete-
rate discharges, demand the application of issues, cauteries,or
setons ; or at least, the employ of vesicating ointments, and
emplastic applications, as rubifaciants to the skin, or to ex-
cite pustulous eruptions.

Purgatives are sometimes useful ; but they are not to be
used until by general or local blood-lettings the stomach and
intestines are put into a state to support, without inconveni-
ence, the action of drugs destined to promote alvine evacua-
tions ; nor can we insist on these means as absolutely
necessary. We must not forget that the employment of
violent purgatives is the result of a false theory, rather than
of experience, and they have been kept in vogue by a success
ill interpreted. Some of them, such as hellebore, have
been reputed hydragogues, and as the brain was considered
as a cold organ, obstructed by pituitous humors, it was
deemed a happy thought to draw these humors to the lower

I 273 ]

intestines, and thence expel them. Some cures [the effect
of a happy revulsion) have rendered this a deep rooted
prejudice, which has continued to our own day. Physi-
cians no longer employ drastic purgatives in cases of insanity ;
they are content with mild cathartics when such evacua-
tions are required. For our part, we do not approve of this
practice, or of the use of emetics; gastro-intestinal inita-
tions in lunatics are to be appeased by local bleedings, and
to be prevented by a severe regimen. It is always hurtful
to make the digestive canal the centre of an habitual flux.
The embarrassment which physicians experience, has in-
duced them to employ emetics in large doses, as a contra-
stimulant, on the theory of Rasori. The experiments which
have been already instituted on this plan, have been such
that the practice has been dropped.

Diffusible antispasmodics, opium, musk, and all the class
of fetid medicines, have had but little success in mania.
Opium, above all, is dreaded, because it tends to produce
sanguineous congestions in the brain ; but after sufficient
bleeding, it may be given to certain subjects to lessen the
excess of nervous debility. Dr. Pressat thus uses it advan-
tageously in his establishment near the Barriere de la Trone ;
I have also used it successfully in private practice, after
blood-letting has been pushed as far as was prudent, when-
ever nervous mobility and convulsive tendencies formed the
predominant symptoms. Among the substitutes for opium 7
the extract of hyoscyamus niger (jusquiame) may be used,
but the belladona is too irritant on the brain to be trusted.

Digitalis has not produced in my experience, any success
worthy of notice. At present, practitioners resort to the
hydrocyanic or prussic acid, in acute encephalitis. It is not
a medicine to be relied on, and it must be exhibited with
great circumspection on account of its deleterious properties.

Quinquina has been tried in periodical mania ; some cures
are due to it, but it is not a certain medicine. In such cases,
the better practice is to remove the causes of disorder, to
recur to sanguineous evacuations at the approach of the pe-
riod of relapse, and then to apply revulsives on the external
surface by the different methods we have spoken of, or by
those which we mean to recommend.

After medicine, come the hygienic means of restoring
health, at the head of which we ought to place the moral
treatment. The first article of this treatment is confine-
35

L *™ J

meat, it is necessary, at first, to separate the patient from
the persons with whom he has been accustomed to live. If
he lives in the midst of his family, he is always more im-
perious and difficult to manage ; his violence is at its height
by the resistance he experiences, and if he finds that he is
obeyed, his arrogance becomes insupportable. These two
extremes only exasperate the irritation of the brain, and
render the cure more difficult. Moreover, a prompt and
decisive repression is necessary to calm the violence of the
access, and this cannot be effected conveniently, but by and
among strangers. A feeble resistance to them exasperates
maniacs. But a force manifestly superior, calmly employed,
and founded on justice and reason, produces an instant
effect, and greatly diminishes the violence of the cerebral
innervation. In spite of the illusions that seize hold of their
attention, in spite of the powerful reasons that they think
they have to treat all the world with haughtiness, and to do
as much injury as possible, the greater part of madmen, have
not entirely lost all sense of justice. Some remains of the
normal type of cerebral action appear from time to time,
and allows them to perceive what is unbecoming or blamea-
ble in their conduct; and if it is always at a proper time and
occasion that they are seized, shut up, and confined in a
strait waistcoat, far from being exasperated, they are calm-
ed by it. On the other hand, if they are so much deranged
as to be insensible to what is proper for them, there is no
risk ran in resorting to these methods, taking due care
tha* they are not hurt or wounded. These means of re-
pression, which the wise Pinel substituted for stripes and
chains, with which madmen had been loaded, are almost the
only means now adopted in France, and it is observed that
violent madness is less frequent and more conquerable than
aforetime. The affusion of cold water on the head, is the
only harsh means now resorted to. The patients are made
acquainted with it in the outset, and it is used as a bugbear
to repress their violence, and deter them from bad actions.
Madmen resemble those profligates of 14 or 16 years of age,
who are pushed on to improper conduct by some secret in-
stinct : although they know they do wrong, and in private
condemn themselves for doing so, they constantly tend to
the practice by a pleasure more seducing than any other.
Their enjoyment is founded on the chagrin and anger of
others, and it is characterized externally by an ironical

L »* 3

smile ; it is malice. In every instance we observe a de-
gradation of the feeling of self-respect accompanying imbe-
cility of reason. This state, in young boys, proceeds from
an imperfect developement of the encephalon, but in mad-
men it is the effect of irritation. Both of them have a brain
too excitable, and want the typeW reason ; but they differ
essentially in this, that in the healthy boy, the irritability of
the encephalon is normal, and tends to diminution as the
region that presides over intellectual operations acquires
gradually a predominance ; while, among insane persons,
the irritability is morbid, and tends to deprave the organs
of intellect, as well as of instinct. Neither the one or the
other are in a stationary state ; but nothing more is neces-
sary in the boy, than to favor the actual progress of organi-
zation, while in the other, it is necessary to repress it.*

When the agitation ceases, the time for repression is over,
but not so the time for reclusion. The~patient must be
watched, and it will soon be discovered whether he may
prudently be released from confinement. Particular atten-
tion must be paid to those who are afflicted with the mania
of murder or suicide, for this propensity is apt to be renewed
after long interruptions, and these maniacs know how to
dissimulate to inspire confidence and obtain the liberty ne-
cessary to execute their projects. Their coolness in this
respect is surprising. As gastritis frequently brings on
these atrocious inclinations, the physician should remove
every trace of it. A cautery, or issue, placed under one or
other of the hypochondria, may contribute to destroy these
obstinate irritations. A seton in the nape of the neck, after
sufficient bleeding, will also be useful where the insanity
has become chronic, for the purpose of preventing those
encephalic alterations which are apt to bring on dementia
and general palsy. Pinel introduced the custom of classing
the patients, and of keeping one class separate from another.
His worthy successor, Dr. Esquirol, followed his example.
The first division is that of the sexes : there should be also
a division for furious madmen to whom a strait waistcoat is
necessary, that they may be confined by bandages to a bed
or a couch, constructed for the purpose. 2dly, a division
for madmen, not dangerous, but agitated ; these may be

*Consult the Traite de Manie of Pinel ; the large Dictionary of Medi-
cal Sciences, the Dictionary of Medicine, in 1$ vols. (French,) and thr
work of Jlof barter.

[ 276 J

merely shut up. 3Jly, a division for those affected by
mental imbecility and alienation, ( dementia, ) including those
who are dirty and paralytic, and to be governed as children.
4thly, a division for insanity, complicated with accidental
maladies, as pneumonies and intermittent fevers. Sthly,
one for convalescents and quiet patients, who may be allow-
ed to walk in the garden, and who return to their apart-
ments of their own accord. Distinctions are necessary
among these, for among them will be found monomaniacs ;
and if you permit those who are insane upon the same topic
to associate, they will excite each other either by applaud-
ing or contradicting, and they may pass to a state of exalta-
tion or violent anger that retards their cure.

But as to the rest, we do not often remark this occurrence.
Insane people are egoists, and avoid each other ; each is so
much occupied with his own chimera, that he pays little
attention to his companions in misfortune. One will walk
with quick step, conducted by imaginary beings which he
sees around him ; another retires into a corner to contem-
plate at leisure, the fantastic objects of his imagination, and
converse with them at his ease ; a third sits silent and
immovable, seemingly absorbed in profound meditation,
although he often thinks on nothing, as Dr. Esquirol has well
said, in the picture he has drawn of a lunatic hospital. (See
Dictionary of Medical Sciences. ) All of them are in a state
of defiance as to the rest, they mutually despise each other,
and each thinks himself the only reasonable being among
them ; for they all know that they are in a house for luna-
tics, but they regard it, as to themselves, as an injustice,
and that it is by the contrivance of their enemies, or their
relations, that they are detained. We must not, however,
conclude from thence, that their remaining in such a place
is an obstacle to their cure, or a reason of disgust to their
families. Insane people pay too little attention to insane
people to be unfavorably impressed on this score ; and if
they were at home, they would act in the same manner
toward their relations and friends ; for the circumstances of
retention or reclusion, which they must submit to, would be
sufficient to excite their resentment ; they would be equally
enraged against the tyranny of their relations, and the diso-
bedience of their inferiors ; their haughtiness would be
humiliated by the resistance, or by the commanding tone of
iheir domestics, &c. The quality of insanity is to deprave

i *tt J

the affections us well as the understanding, and experience
proves that when they return to their senses, insane people
retain no animosity against those who caused them to be
confined.

So long as insane people do not lose their memory and
attention, they quit their disordered series of ideas when
they are questioned, and reply properly to the questions
put, during some time longer or shorter. The persons thus
circumstanced are not to be regarded as hopeless. Putting
aside all the personified abstractions, called faculties or
principles, and all merely ontological considerations, that
we may dwell only on the facts observable, we find that a
person becomes insane because his brain is over-excited.
Of course, the first indication is to calm that organ by all
the means that experience dictates. When this first indi-
cation has been fulfilled, attentive observation teaches us,
that although the brain has been over-excited, yet it may
be possible to put the man's thoughts in the usual and nor-
mal course by impressions to be made on his senses. We
remark, that by operating on these impressions the under-
standing becomes normal, but when it is exercised on recol-
lections it becomes abnormal. In other words, we observe
that by impressions on the senses, reasonable ideas are ex-
cited, but when ideas are excited by recollection, they are
not reasonable. The indication, therefore, is to act, as much
as possible, by means of sensible impressions ; and as little
as possible, by means of recollected ideas. This amounts to
a removal of excitation, and a counter-excitation, a real re-
vulsion, physical and moral ; still it operates in the ence-
phalic nervous apparatus, too near to the locality excited,
and may, therefore, lose his character of revulsion and coun-
ter-excitation, and become a direct and hurtful mode of
excitation, for endeavoring to divert the patient from his
predominant ideas, they may become thus excited even to
a state of violence. It is for this reason that we should
give preference to muscular exercises, which are calculated
to fix the attention of convalescents. Games that exercise
the body, and gardening, have been much vaunted for this
purpose. Gymnastics ought to occupy a chief place, and
every lunatic asylum ought to be provided with the ma-
chines invented and brought to perfection by Col. Amoros.
We may find in these employments a double revulsion ; one
which excites a series of ideas of a very different class from

I s?8 ]

those which connect themselves with that kind oi* innerva-
tion which aids the operations of the intellect, of the memo-
ry, and of the imagination ; one which directs innervation
toward muscular exertion ; hence, this last is a revulsion
which acts more at a distance from the locality of morbid
irritation than any which could be obtained by exciting the
senses.

As to discussions tending to prove to the insane that they
are in error, we should abstain from them still more than
from the bad practice of cherishing their chimera for the
purpose of obtaining their good opinion. The first course
of conduct irritates them at once; this is the direct irritation
of which we have just now spoken : the second practice
would finish in the same way, if we were to continue it too
long. Our concessions to them should be momentary, and
only to lead them to bodily exertion, and to divert the mor-
bid course of their ideas. It is always dangerous to de-
ceive them, for they discover and do not easily forgive it ;
this discourages them, irritates them, and prevents that calm
state of the nerves so necessary to their cure.

All physicians who have contemplated insane people near-
ly, agree that the first and surest hopes of cure are founded
on the return of natural affections. The more the confined
patient exclaims against persons formerly dear to him, and
the more he misinterprets the cares of his physicians and
keepers, the moreJie complains (if it be ivithout reason,)
of injustice and bad treatment, the less confidence can we
have in the return of his reason. The same conclusion fol-
lows if he does not disapprove of his own conduct while
insane; for the first movement of reason is to acknowledge
his insanity and lament his extravagances, of which he sel-
dom loses the recollection, but on the contrary will relate
them in full detail, excepting those parts of his conduct
which took place under the greatest degree of agitation,
for the reason assigned before in pages 486 — 265.

From the moment when the patients can no longer sus-
tain a reasonable conversation, when their attention relaxes
in listening to you, when they regard you with a silly look,
when they fall again into their various chimeras and incohe-
rences, or begin again with certain automatic movements,
which they have been accustomed to indulge in, when they
interrupt you, and when all this takes place in spite of the
efforts which they seem to make to restrain themselves, to

L MS j

hear, and to comprehend what is said, you may conclude that
the memory is enfeebled, that dementia has commenced,
and the disease is incurable. But before we decide peremp-
torily, we must recollect that an inability to think, and the
most perfect stupidity may be the result of a temporary
congestion. An insane person, therefore, must not be
classed with patients under dementia, till he has passed
through all the grades of the disorder. But if after be has
exhibited proofs of excessive moral irritability, indicated
externally by paleness, meagerness and wrinkles, he subse-
quently loses memory and attention, puts on a calm counte-
nance, fattens and looks fresh, dementia has surely taken
place, physical and moral revulsions can do no more than
keep him under good nourishment and prevent cerebral
congestions. But if beside all this, speech should become
difficult, and his walk tottering, general palsy is imminent,
and all expectation from any form of revulsion is over. Still
more hopeless will the case be, if the patient has had seve-
ral incomplete apoplexies, if he has been epileptic, if he
has lost the use of one of his senses, or any of his muscles.

In such cases we are limited to precautions merely hygi-
enic ; to all the means of cleanliness, and the prevention
of those accidents to which such persons are subject. For
example, an excess of sanguification may expose them to
apoplexy, and bleeding or leeching may be necessary to pre-
vent it. We must judge of the necessity of resorting to
these means by the color in the face, and an increased tor-
pidity of muscular movement, a greater disposition to som-
nolency, to stuttering, attended by fulness of the pulse, &c.
After a bleeding, the patient seems reanimated, his power of
walking returns, and even slight mental attention, this gives
rise to hope in persons not accustomed to the disorder, but
hope soon vanishes.

It is also possible that a gastro-duodenitis, on engorgement
of the liver, or a difficulty of stercoration, may require the
application of leeches to the epigastrium, to the hypochon-
dria, or the use of a cathartic, but it will be dangerous to
render the call for them habitual.

Accessary disorders do not require peculiarity of treat-
ment among the insane, but it is of prime importance to
prevent these complications by guarding against cold, by
woollen clothing, by preventing a practice common among
them of undressing themselves, by watching over the clean-

L 280 ]

line-fs of their cells, taking care that moisture is not stagnant
in them, and by warming their apartments to prevent this
during the winter, by chimneys so disposed that the fire is
out of their reach.

Sometimes it becomes necessary to feed patients under
dementia, by introducing victuals into the mouth to prevent
their dying of hunger, and to clean them frequently in the
day to get rid of their filth; but beds and chairs may be con-
trived that will prevent their dirtying themselves.

Sometimes also it is necessary to contrive beds so that the
half paralytic patients may not fall out on the floor, and
perish with cold, or contract some dangerous disorder. —
None of these petty precautions ought to be neglected, for
they prevent complications which too often abridge the lives
of these unfortunate persons.

SUPPLEMENT.

This work was just finished when the "History of Phi-
losophy, during the \Wi century," by M. Damiron, appear-
ed and the "Lessons" of M. Cousin were put to press.
Although superabundant information is to be found in the
"Treatise on Irritation" to furnish a reply to what these
authors have advanced in favor of a separate principle add-
ed to the nervous system, we have thought it right to insist
in this supplement on the two important points, which acord-
ing to them, constitute the vital questions of philosophy:
the one is the argument of Hume ; the other, the elements
of reason, established by M. Cousin, in his 4th lesson of
8th May, 1818.

Hume asserts that what is actually and substantially set-
tled in a sensible phenomenon does not include the rela-
tion of an effect to its cause ; that this sensible phenome-
non presents to us only an accidental coincidence and
connection ; hence, according to the Ontological School, it
necessarily results, that as the whole human race find this
relation of cause and effect in every phenomenon which is

t 281 ]

an object of their senses, they can only make this discovery
by their mind or understanding. For example, there are
two balls on a billiard table, the one in motion, the other at
rest ; the first strikes the second, which moves. They pre-
tend that the mere sense of sight cannot give us the idea
that the first ball in motion is the cause of the other's
moving; inasmuch as this causality is an induction of rea-
soning, not an object of sight or of touch. They use the
same reasoning as to all the phenomena of nature, which
they have deduced from the phenomena of art. Thus,
there are alterations of rain and of fair weather, of heat and
of cold ; there are earthquakes, hot springs, plants and ani-
mals, that present to the observer different functions, &c.
We have no sooner seen these phenomena than we are per-
suaded that each has its separate cause, its design, its
means, &c. although neither cause, or design, or means,
strikes our senses.

We have proved in page 97 of this work, that these de-
ductions of causality as to the phenomena of nature, are only
comparisons suggested by induction of numerous analagous
facts. But the question here is, as to induction itself,* which
is attempted to be made a phenomenon independent of the
nervous system. The reason assigned is, that induction is
not a fact of sight", of hearing, of touch, of taste, of smell.
Well, gentlemen, who ever said it was? If the inductions
you bring forward, and which constitute your reasoning and
mine in the present discussion, arc not made by the senses,
they are made by the brain, as will appear from the devel-
opement of the nervous system, and the arguments stated in
page 97 et seq. of this work. The objection then is re-
duced to this, the fact of induction differs from the fact of
perceiving a body. No doubt it does ; for induction is the
result, the sequence of perception ; it is manifested after
perception and in consequence of perception. But the brain
is as necessary in the one case as it is in the other ; all the
difference is, that perception occurs more easily and more
frequently than induction. It belongs to observation after-
wards to make us acquainted with the causes of these differ-
ences so far as they can be known.

* Broussaia uses induction here and afterwards, in the English sense of
deduction. In English, we deduce, or infer a consequence from the in-
duction of a number of particular instances : this is proof by induction.
mo»n:' to infer, to deduce.— Trans,

36

[ 28* J

They say that induction, the equality oi' two quantities,
for instance, as when we say that two on one side are equal
to two on the other, is a relation not cognizable by the sen-
ses, from which it escapes to the imagination, for it is in-
visible, and has no concrete existence. No doubt ; but if
we make the same affirmation concerning a simple percep-
tion, we may do it just as easily. The perception of white
and black, like round and square, are things neither visible
or tangible or concrete ; the external body itself which
gives rise to these perceptions, and our own bodies and
sensible organs which concur in furnishing them, alone pos-
sess these qualities. The ontologists agree, that we have
ideas of bodies only because we have organs of sense ;
why then do they not agree that we have induction
only because we have a brain ? Proof enough of this
they may find in this work. They do not acknowledge
because they do not see it. They ought therefore to deny
that the perception of a color is made by means of the brain,
for without a brain the eye can give us no sensation of co-
lor. Nor can we see any thing more of the perception of
black and white, than we do of the phenomenon of induc-
tion. But observations made by the senses on other per-
sons after having made them on ourselves, teach us, that the
perception of white, and the induction that it differs from
black, are equally operations of the brain. But as we have
shewn in the course of this work, the psychologists commit
the mistake of judging concerning man by their own inter-
nal feeling, instead of giving themselves the trouble of veri-
fying their conclusions by the proof of sensations.

After having inferred from the functions of the nervous
system, inaccurately observed, the existence of some stran-
ger principle within this nervous system, the ontological
physiologists confide to this principle every thing that their
ignorance of the facts that compose the history of man, does
not enable them to explain. Having thus separated thought
from the nervous system, they personify it ; they make
it act like a being ; they entrust it with certitude, proof,
reality ; they treat it as if it were all and all in man. Then,
they imagine another entity with another name, of which
thought itself is but the evidence and the expression. Such
are the hypothetical metaphorsoses about which they have
oo dread or hesitation; all that relates to the moral* phe-

* This word includes thought, understanding 1 , volition, affections, pas-
sions. &c. not merely morality in the English sesse of moral.— Trtms

[ 263 }

nomena, is treated in conformity to this basis of their sys-
tem.

We now address them: you are the dupes of intellectual
phenomena. Ypu take the word that recalls them to your
memory, for the facts themselves which it designates. We
have already proved this to you, by the history of the facts
and of the instruments that produce them. We shall now
furnish another mode of proof. You say, it is the soul
( l'Esprit ) which is not nervous matter, it is this soul that per-
ceives, feels, reasons, foresees, &c. We say, it is the ner-
vous system itself that that does all this. You answer,
how can the nervous system do this ? We reply, we know
not ; we do not seek to know ; for we have ascertained and
acknowledged, that it is impossible to be explained by us.
You, are astonished at our resignation, and you add, we
know; it is because the soul is within the nervous matter.
Very well, (say we) shew us, then, how it goes to work.
You then take up the subject and you make this soul of yours
which is not matter, act exactly as a man would do who is
matter : that is, you repeat, as if it were an explanation,
every thing concerning the human functions, which we are,
to the full, as well acquainted with as you are. In truth,
whatever trouble you give yourselves to make of the soul
acting, something different from the man acting, the identi-
ty is perfect. It is a man of imagination that you locate in
the brain, us we have shewn in the present work ; and you
compel this imaginary man of your own creation, who, as
you say, has nothing in common with the material man, but
who in fact differs only in name — you make this, your man,
do from the very beginning every thing which the material
man does. I know not whether you perceive this substitu-
tion ; but to take away the marks of resemblance, you at-
tribute actions to your man which the common material man
cannot perform. Sometimes you make him act like an ani-
mal, sometimes like a plant, sometimes like some material
body inert, or imponderable. When you want some more
elevated being, some genius intermediate between God and
man, you accumulate on him every thing that seems to you
astonishing, or singular, in facts that can or cannot be ex-
plained ; and full of lively emotion, you prostrate yourself
before this prodigy. Words do not suffice to your enthu-
siasm, for you are heated by the contemplation of your idol,
and you give birth in yourselves to a real passion.

[ 284 J

Thus you act : and you think you go further then we do ;
and that is true. You do go farther in hypothesis, and on
the ideal road you travel. If, now, we should disengage
from your pompous descriptions of Being, every thing w hich
belongs to the bodies we are acquainted with — if we reduce
your gratuitous multiplication of qualities to those which
admit of proof — it will appear manifestly that you have either
asserted nothing of youi pretended separate principle differ-
ent from what is true of the nervous system, and which has
not been said of man himself; or else, what you have assort-
ed beyond this, being unsusceptible of proof, can only be
considered as hypothetical and imaginary, if it ought not to
be considered as absurd. We may safely conclude that
you have advanced nothing certain as to the rationale, the
how of perception, reasoning, willing ; nor is this how (the
mode and manner in which they are produced and arise)
any more known to you than to us. Let us therefore pro-
ceed to the second point proposed to be discussed in this
supplement.

M. Cousin attempts to give perfection to the categories of
Aristotle and Kant, to establish the elements of reason
which is the principle of motion of his philosophy. The
perfection thus needed, proves in the outset that in the on-
tological schools, reason is not necessarily a single phenom-
enon, observable by the senses, and whereon ail the world
is agreed, but that it is some factitious entitity that varies
according to the inclination of philosophers. M. Cousin
will object, that his reason is that which his consciousness
reveals to him. But we have already proved in this work,
that consciousness is nothingbut the result of perceptions fur-
nished by the senses, external and internal. We have acquired
the right, therefore, of submitting the categories of the French
philosopher to the experience of our senses ; that is to say,
to enquire whether the perceptions of the senses are in fact
the organ of these elements, and how these elements can pro-
ceed from such perceptions. We shall be brief, not to swell
this volume, especially as we may sately refer to the body
of the work.

The elements of M. Cousin are : 1st, In relation to
number, unity and multiplicity. These are ideas resulting
from the actions of the senses upon the brain, and the reac-
tion of the brain after the influence of the senses ; and the
comparisons made of numbers with each other, are deduc-

L *86 J

tions [inductions) which, like all other deductions possible,
are also mere facts of cerebral action. The how, the man-
ner in which all this comes to pass must remain unknown.*

2d, In relation to space : it is determinate or bound-
ed : or it is indeterminate or absolute. The idea of space
bounded, is a production of sensitive perception. The idea
of space unbounded does not exist as a simple idea.
We can see in it nothing but an hypothetic deduction attest-
ing our ignorance and our routine.

3d, In relation to existence; the quality, absolute or
relative. Our senses give us no information of relative ex-
istence. Absolute existence is an hypothetical deduction
which we cannot discuss without entering into romance.

4th, in relation to time : it is determinate or it is ab-
solute, which is the same as eternity. Our idea of time pro-
ceeds from the succession of impressions made on our sen-
ses, and we compare it always to a line traced in space, that
is to say we materialize it in spite of ourselves. As to the
rest, not having any sensitive idea of the precise duration of
successive impressions which compose what we call time,
we cannot speak of it except hypothetic-ally. Hence, when
we say, that things have always existed, or will always exist,

-x- \y- e b C g our readers not to forget that the point of difference be-
tween the physiologists and spiritualists is placed here and nowhere else.
The following is a summary of our mode of treating this question: we have
proved by facts, that all the phenomena, instinctive and intellectual, are acts
of irritability of the nervous system, but we have refused any explanation
Juno this is brought about — (of the rationale of this hidden process :) we
distinguish essentially the fact of the production of thought by means o*
the brain, from the explanation of this fact; while the spiritualists deduce
the impossibility of the fact itself from the impossibility of explaining it:
and they place within the brain an entity, a being, for the sole purpose of
furnishing this explanation. We reply to them, this being, this entity, is
an hypothesis : ami here rests the whole question. It is treated at full
length in the first part of this work, and all the answers which follow
serve but to recall 'the demonstrations we have already given. 1st, That
the opinions of the physiologists is an expression of undeniable facts. 2d,
That the opinion of the spritualists rest upon an hypothesis. — Auth.

This reasoning of M. Broussais appears to me conclusive. Life is the
conjoint result of the functions performed by the various irritable parts
of a vegetable, or of an animal : the word itself is the name we apply to
designate the phenomena collectively, of growth, nutrition, assimilation,
reproduction, &c. which are the results and consequences of the natural,
normal action of the organs whereof a vegetable or an animal is com-
posed. Who can tell the modus operandi of these organs ? Who can
* satisfactorily explain how, in what precise manner, these organs act ?
Bat is *his a reason for denying the reality of what we call life ?— Trans.

L 2 ^ J

or that they have had a beginning or that they will have an
end, we say that which admits of no proof. We speak
on two hypotheses; of which the hist is founded on our im-
possibility of conceiving nothing or noiv entity, and as we
have no example of non-entity, we think fit to deny it. The
second hypothesis is founded on this, that we judge of the
commencement of the universe from the commencement of
some budy in this universe, without reflecting that all we
see or know consists of transformations of bodies from one
form of existence to another.*

5th, in relation to forms ; they are finite, determinate,
limited, measurable : but they have a principle ivhich is nei-
ther limited, finite, or measurable. The ideas of form are
derived from our sensitive perceptions. That of their prin-
ciple is a deduction that enters into first causes. The author
has said nothing of colors, of consistencies, of temperatures ;
but they are on the same line with forms, although we at-
tribute them to bodies different from those where we think
we perceive them. All these words recall perceptions
which we receive at the same time with the perception of
the bodies themselves which struck our senses; perceptions
which we have separated from each other, because the same
bodies have moved us in different ways. But if we insu-
late (separate) these perceptions from the bodies, they are
no other than modifications of ourselves ; nor can we, with-
out hypothesis, attribute to them an existence different from
the bodies in which we perceived them, and different also
from our nervous system, the seat of the perceptions.

6th, In relation to motion ; we conceive it bounded^
secondary, and relative ; or absolute, and as the first cause,
The idea of action is complex. It embraces a crowd of phe-
nomena, which we comprehend completely or imperfectly
as they are distant from, or near to the first cause. But in
the preceding categories, we feel a tendency in us to judge
of the unknown by the known. It is thus, (that is to say,
by hypothetic induction and not otherwise) that we form an
idea of the absolute (l'absolu) or first cause: nor can we
say any thing intelligibly but in consequence of following this
process. A wise man, therefore, abstains from all disscussion
as to the nature of the first cause.

* When we ascribe to a word any meaning other than some matter of
fact cognizable by the senses — some object of perception — have we any
authority for so doing? — Tram.

7th, In relation to all the phenomena that take
place within and without us. We have ideas of the
manifestation or appearance, and of something which is not
that ; that something, is the being within us : and thus ice
distinguish appearance and reality. This proposition is
dreadfully vague. We may well say that our senses do
sometimes deceive us as to certain bodies, but we cannot
assert generally that the bodies that strike our senses, are
nothing but illusory appearances ; for this would make scep-
tics of ourselves, and deprive us of the right of discussing the
question. What do these philosophers mean by a being
distinguished from its sensible appearance ? To abstract
being from its appearance, is in this case (if we understand
it) the same thing as to abstract from matter its powers or
its original power. Abstraction here is only applied to ex-
istence, instead of being applied to motion and the various
changes and forms of matter. Moreover, having been fur-
nished by our senses with no idea of a production ex nihilo,
we can only speak of it by means of false comparisons ; if
the question afterwards should be raised of that which is,
considered in its production, we can know no more of this
than what strikes our senses. Bodies are in a state of per-
petual metamorphosis, striking our senses under different and
successive forms, and they exist as multiform. This is all
we know, for this is all the information that our senses com-
municate. If hereafter we speak of some fixed and perma-
nent being, who pre-exists and presides over all the charge-
able and moveable bodies, as we can have no direct knowl-
edge of such a being by means of our senses, we can only
conceive of him through a process of comparative deduc-
tion ; that is, we have the sentiment only ; we cannot discuss
any thing about him, except hypothetically.*

8th, In relation to Thought, our reason it is said con-
ceives of relatives in reference to this, to that, and even to

* Being 1 , abstracted from some distinct individually existing being, cog-
nizable by some or other of my senses, is a non-entity, not a thing, but a
word only. Again: I see a rose: it is not in my eye or in my brain.
Nothing is certain to me about it when I reflect on this and all the parts
of human knowledge connected with the question, but a motion of some
kind excited in my brain which I perceive, and designate by the word
rose. There are no objects of real and actual knowledge but our percep-
tions; their similarities, differences, comparisons, and the results of these
are perceptions also — They are motions in the brain perceived ; and when
they differ, we recognize them and their differences by the different
names we associate with them for that purpose. But the rnode of account

[ 2S8 ]

what may not exist ; moreover it conceives the principle of
thought which 2>cisscs into all thoughts without stopping in
any. Thought, being a mode of action of the brain, its ap-
preciable principle can only be the irritable substance of the
brain, put into action by excitements made on our senses,
and its inappreciable principle, a first cause. It is meta-
phorically and by some faulty comparison only, nothing being
analagous to thought, that this principle can be abstracted,
and made to pass successively- through several thoughts.

9th, In relation to the moral, world, ive perceive the
beautiful and the good ; and we refer to them by an invinci-
ble tendency the categories of finite and infinite : that which
assumes the form of imperfect and perfect, of ideal beauty
and real beauty, of holiness in its unsullied purity. The
expressions moral world, are figurative. They can only
represent human thoughts, that is to say, brains acting in a
certain manner by virtue of their irritability, and as we find
herein, perceptions proceeding from the viscera as well as
from our external senses, these expressions ought to recall
the whole nervous apparatus in action under the influence
of all the modifiers in nature. So considered, man has per-
ceptions more or less agreeable by the general sensation of
pleasure connected with them, more or less favourable to
the exercise of his conservative functions, and to those of
reproduction and of observation ; more or less proper to
satisfy the want he experiences of self-contentment, and
still agreeable under the two last classes of relation. The
qualities of beautiful and of good, are first ascribed to
bodies, then to the perceptions they excite, and at length to
a factitious entity substituted in lieu of them. Then comes
the habitude of hypothetic comparisons, which tempt men
to multiply the qualities which from henceforward they
have personified, just as they multiply space and time ; both
of these intellectual operations, are really one and the same.
Well, it is this hypothetical multiplication, that compels him
to find out that what he deemed infinite, is really finite, and
what he imagined perfect, to be really imperfect. This it is
w r hich gives him abstract ideas of holiness, and of purity
unsullied ; for he cannot believe that the cause of thore
ing for these perceptions, by the existence of bodies or tilings external
to us, and which act upon our senses and excite these perceptions, is as
much a part of the essential facts belonging to the animal man and his an-
imal frame and constitution, as the perceptions themselves. We cannol
if we would, help accounting for them hi this manner Trans.

[ ^9 1

emotions of respect and veneration, can reside in beings not
much his superiors. He resembles a lover who makes a
divinity of his mistress, his self-love insinuating that a mere
mortal is not capable of inspiring such a passion. But the
ontologist goes farther, for he forms beings of all sorts, with
qualities incorporeal, hypothetically multiplied ad infinitum,
solely from the vivid excitement of his nervous system.

Such also is the origin of the moral ideas opposed to the
class already mentioned. I mean those of ugliness, wick-
edness, impurity, profanity. They are at first suggested by
the painful sensations he perceives during the exercise of
his functions, and by the obstacles he finds to their accom-
plishment. Like the foregoing, they ought to represent
nothing but perceptions in connection with the bodies that
produced them ; but when personified by some first hypo-
thesis, man multiplies them by a second as he has done with
the foregoing class, and he arrives at extreme ugliness, hor-
rible, abominable, execrable, until the excess of his internal
emotion is such, that he can find no corresponding expres-
sion. But it is to be noted that the sorrowful emotions mul-
tiply themselves far more than the agreeable ; and these last
by their excess, convert themselves into sorrows, when they
do not occasion the loss of all sentiment. Nature enforce?
obedience by pleasure and by sorrow, but of these two min-
isters of her commands, the last is incomparably the most
powerful and the most occupied. This is the reason that
religious sects in their promises for the future, have been so
lavish of torments for criminals, and so sparing of enjoys
ments for the good.

We find in these physiological considerations, the explan-
ation of the violence of fanatics, and the atrocious refine-
ments of punishment invented for regicide and sacrilege.

In truth, the more men accustom themselves to hypothesis,
the more exaltation do they experience in all their interior
emotions : a first hypothetical multiplication of the qualities
they attribute to the creature of their imagination, produ-
ced, a twentieth, a hundredth, and the emotions increase in
the same proportion, for they are the causes of this hypo-
thetical multiplication . But as agreeable emotions are much
more limited in extent and duration than sorrowful ones the
passions founded on sorrow and upon anger, are raised high-
er than those of a joyful and happy character. After indul-
ging: during a short period of youth in the pleasures of love,
37

L 390 j

and' we all know how far hypothesis contributes her share
in this respect ; after having indulged in the pleasures of the
table ; in the pleasures arising from a search after novelty ;
in the pleasures of self-love, &c. a man feels new desires
arise within him. He has not lost his relish for former en-
joyments, but they do not fill up every instant of his time,
for the illusions that prolonged the pleasures of love, of the
table, of objects and sights of novelty, and the petty suc-
cesses by which his vanity was flattered, are all necessarily
dissipated by the inevitable effect of repetition. A remainder of
activity there will be, to be employed, and it may take one or
some of several directions. If unfortunately it be directed to-
ward hypothetical investigations concerning first causes, a
man will arrive almost of necessity, at intolerance, and even
fanaticism and ferocity. He is led on to this by the contra-
dictions to which he is exposed from those who think diffe-
rently from himself on the same subjects. He arrives at this
also, in defence of Kings and Governments, as well as of
Gods : for this is the result of the same original abstraction,
the same hypothetical multiplication which governs the met-
amorphoses of all his complex ideas. Here is the first step
taken, but when once the emotions connected with wounded
self-love, and the anger that reacts in consequence of them,
are strongly developed among the principal men of a nation,
by the influence of multiplied hypotheses, these emotions
transmit and propagate themselves among the mass of the
people by the laws of imitation, and thus it is that ferocity
becomes a popular feeling. The history of all nations, of
whom even the most gentle have at least sacrificed human
victims to their Gods, furnish proofs in superabundance. —
We have even now under our eyes other proofs of the same
kind, which it is useless to cite. We shall only add that the
hateful and cruel passions are always in direct proportion to
the irritability of the nervous system and by consequence
of the encephalon ; we see the cause of this sufficiently ;
and it is the same that explains to us why it is that the in-
habitants of the south have always shewn themselves more
ferocious and more fanatical than those of the north.

To fulfil definitively the object which we proposed to
ourselves in this supplement, we shall infer from all the facts
and all the reasonings presented in this work, 1st, that the
explanations of the psychologists are romances which offer
to us nothing new : 2dly, that they have no means ot giving

i 091 ]

to us the explanations they promise : 3rdly, that they are
the dupes of words which they employ for the purpose of
discussing things that are incomprehensible : 4thly, that the
physiologists are the only class who are able to speak au-
thoritatively concerning the origin of human ideas and hu-
man knowledge : 5thly, that men who are strangers to the
science of animal organization, ought to confine themselves
to the study of the instinctive and intellectual phenomena,
in connection with the customs and manners of social life in
all its different varieties.

Moreover this subject is quite extensive enough to occupy
the whole life of a studious man, and interesting enough to
inspire him with enthusiasm. One may write the history
of philosophy as one may write the history of mankind,
without presupposing any thing as to the manner how the
human faculties which we must bring upon the scene, have
been developed. All the abstract signs of language may
be employed as formulae recalling certain scenes of life, and
certain modifications of thought, without our being compel-
led to personify these signs intentionally. A man may de-
velope very extensive views of relation, embrace a vast col-
lection of facts, display apian magnificently conceived, and
communicate solid instruction to his auditors or his readers,
without maintaining any a priori hypothesis concerning hu-
man knowledge. The high interests, the powerful motives,
the attractive images, will not be wanting in consequence
of the want of such an hypothesis. Nor will any thing be
lost on the score of elevation of sentiment ; for on the one
hand the respect for the Supreme Being will not be weak-
ened ; divinity gains nothing by being cloathed in the attri-
butes of humanity ; on the contrary, it must appear to be
degraded by such a travestie in the eyes of every real phi-
losopher, and sooner or later the people will inevitably dis-
cover the artifice. On the other hands there are in man,
motives sufficiently powerful to lead him to what is good,
just and sublime, and these motives are real, while those
with which he is supplied by certain theological philosophers,
will fall some day or other into discredit because they are in
fact, not real, but hypothetical. The question here is not
as to personal interest duly calculated, nor of pleasure, as
a motive to our actions, but of something more true and
more worthy the part we are assigned to fill in this universe.
All the principles of benevolence, charity, devotedness, and

[ 2»2 J

of heroism the most sublime, are to^be found in that in stun-
of affection which impels us toward our fellow creatures —
in the necessity for our own self-esteem— and in that most
delightful of all pleasures which we experience when we feel
that we confer happiness on others. These principles are
within us ; they are independent of all opinion which we
may have learned or deduced as to the first cause ; they be-
long to us as the result of the organization of our cerebral
nervous system, and they are developed with it ; but they
are found also side by side with motives that incite us to ac-
tions that are blameable. Hence then, in lieu of construct-
ing hypotheses as to their first cause, or of personifying
instincts, an artifice which bad men discover and employ to
justify their misdeeds, let us attach ourselves to the de velope-
ment of the germs of public and private happiness, by a sys-
tem of education founded on justice, on probity, on greatness
of soul, on devotion to the happiness of mankind and the
good of society ; in a word let us cherish the habit of doing-
good; in this there is no deception, no hypothesis, no
sophism, that a bad man can pervert in favour of his own
bad tendencies.

Paris, 11th May, 1828.

FINIS.

APPENDIX.

BY

THOMAS.COOPER, M. D

PREFACE*

One main intention of Dr. Broussais in the preceeding
treatise, is to rescue the theory of Insanity from the suppo-
sition that it is an affection of the mind or soul ; an entity
hypothetically assumed, to account for the intellectual phe-
nomena exhibited by the nervous system of the human body;
whether in the exercise of its natural normal functions while
in health, or in their aberrations from a natural, normal state
when that system is acting under morbid irritation. Insanity,
according to Broussais, is a disease not of the mind, but of
the body ; and its seat is in the encephalon. Hence it be-
came necessary for him to shew the total want of reasona-
ble evidence attending the hypothesis of a soul, separate and
distinct in its existence from the body, though by some
means and in some manner supposed to be united with it so
as to produce by that conjunction, the intellectual phenome-
na, which constitutes the science of Idiology. The follow-
ing tracts pursuing the same general train of reasoning, and
having the same object, were written and published by me
several years before the appearance of Broussais' work, and
are here subjoined in confirmation of the physiological
opinions he has adopted. This is not a mere metaphysical
discussion ; it is far more important to physiology, and the
theory and practice of medicine, than to metaphysics.

In the year 1787, (44 years ago,) I published in England
the first volume of Tracts, ethical, theological and
political ; Warrington printed. Among these tracts was
one containing a view and defence of the doctrine of Mate-
rialism, first read at the Manchester Literary and Philosophi-
cal Society ; the same in all essential respects with that
here presented, and which last, is in fact, abridged from my
early publication. The edition of those Tracts was well
received, and soon sold off; but owing to other avocations
I never re-published or continued them.

In the year 1822, a clamour was raised in this State, ( South
Carolina,) among some well meaning but not well informed

I' UK 1' At E.

people, against the heterodox opinions which it was suppo-
sed I entertained ; as if it were not allowable in republican
America, for any man to entertain any opinions which on
due consideration he conscientiously believed to be well
founded. This vague and general accusation preferred to
the Legislature by two Grand Juries from a distant part of
the State, instigated by some of the Clergy, was referred to
a Committee of tha House of Representatives, who report-
ed in substance, that whatever opinions I was presumed to
entertain now, were known before I was appointed to the
Presidency of the College, and being deduced from the
Christian Scriptures, ought to form no objection to me at
this time. The report was adopted and the Committee dis-
charged.

In (he recklessness of accusation at that time, it was as-
serted in some of the newspapers of this State, that Mr.
Jefferson had been compelled to procure my dismissal from
the honorable situation to which I had been appointed in
the Virginia University, (the-joint professorships of Chem-
istry and Law. ) It became proper for me, therefore, to be
prepared to shew, if necessary, that my opinions on the sub-
ject alluded to, were neither inconsistent with the Christian
doctrines of the New Testament, or with sound philosophy.
In the year 1823, I drew up the tracts here published, and
sent them to Philadelphia, as the place most likely to afford
their confirmation or confutation ; and I published them
anonymously, that they might stand or fall by the intrinsic
merit or demerit of the arguments employed.

I adopted this course also, from a disinclination to publish
any thing of a theological character in this State. I have
from the time I came here, to the present moment, consci-
entiously abstained from the expression of any theological
opinion whatever, before or in the presence of any student
of this College : my deliberate advice and direction having
always been, and now is, that they ought to adopt and pro-
fess the religious creed of their parents, till the laws of the
land shall set them free from parental control. It will be
time enough then for them to investigate these subjects, if
they shall be inclined to do so. Young as they are, and
Avhile students, they have not the preliminary requisites to
do so fully, finally, and beneficially. For this reason, I shall
send the present translation of Broussais to a distance, nor
"ball I publish it in South Carolina.

PREFACE.

I cannot help thinking it a great disgrace to the country,
that any objection should be made to the publication and
free discussion of any opinion whatever ; for I know of no
means of settling truth on a firm basis, but the perfect free-
dom allowed to every body of presenting to the public eve-
ry view that can be taken of a controverted doctrine. —
Surely we cannot see the clearer for allowing one of our
eyes to be closed, or be the wiser for looking at one side
only of a disputed question and obstinately refusing to con-
sider any other. When the gentlemen of the clerical pro-
fession shew such morbid irritability at the discussion of
metaphysical or theological doctrines which they would fain
persuade us are too sacred to be disputed, they give rise by
so doing, to the strong suspicion, that they themselves are
not fully persuaded, that the doctrines they inculcate are
clear of all doubt, and liable to no overthrow. Else why
this irritation when some orthodox tenet is modestly doubted :
Why not confute their opponents instead of abusing them,
and exhibit to the world their own superiority by the mild-
ness and calmness of their conduct and manner, and the
temperate force of their arguments ? .

But I fear this is not to be expected from men whoYegard
a doubt of their doctrines as an attack upon themselves. A
Priesthood, claiming to be a separate and a sacred order of
men, hired and paid to teach and to preach certain doctrines
and opinions, and adopting this mode of life as a trade— -a
profession — as the sure road to comfort and consideration,^
not to affluence, and strictly imbued with the esprit de corps,
the corporation spirit of the clerical order, cannot be expect-
ed to come into the field of argument, without a strong bias
in favour of the tenets by which they obtain their living, or
without irritation and anger against those who in any man-
ner oppose their influence over the people. If truth inter-
feres with their interest, they can hardly be expected to look
at it but with a jealous eye. This will happen even to wise,
learned, and well disposed men, as many of them really are,
when thus placed and situated : and the objection lays, not
against the individual, but the order to which he belongs,
and the trade by which he gets his living ; often forced upon
him by circumstances over which he has had little Or no

control.

Hence has arisen the mischievous interference ot the
Cler»y in Astronomy, Geolosv, Zoologv. Physiology, and
38

PREFACE.

Medicine ; and the check constantly pressing upon the friends
of truth, who would willingly discuss all the questions con-
nected with these branches of knowledge, fully, freely, and
fairly. Bigotry is a continual spy upon science, and restrains
that perfect freedom of discussion which the cause of truth
and the good of the public absolutely requires upon every
contested question.

As to the doctrine of Materialism, I run no risk in pro-
phecying that twenty years hence, it will be the prevailing
doctrine among Physiologists and Physicians, not only in
Europe but in this country. The views of the question taken
by Priestley, Cabanis, Gall, Lawrence, and Broussais, I con-
sider as pregnant with arguments impossible to be confuted :
if they can be successfully opposed, it is high time the at-
tempt should be made by the advocates of ancient opinions.
Men of science begin now to revolt at the fetters which
their clerical guides would willingly fix upon them ; and
something more is required by public opinion, than outcries
of heterodoxy and infidelity, and dread lest the enormous
influence of the clergy should be exposed to danger. By
whatever opprobious terms truth may be designated, those
gentlemen may rely on it, that error is no longer sacred, and
if they wish to preserve a reasonable influence among men
of sense, they must resort more to argument and less to
abuse.

Being in the habit of transmitting to Mr. Jefferson my
publications, I sent him the two tracts that follow : and I
think my readers will not be displeased to peruse his opinion
respecting them which I have accordingly subjoined.

T. C.

TJIE

SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE

or

&1FlftQilIbIiSlHI<>

BY THOMAS COOPERj M, D.

PRfiJTlfr AND SOLD BY A. SHALL-
PHILADELPHIA.

1833.

PREFACE.

There are two doctrines of a religious nature, that seem to have
a direct bearing on the welfare of society ; because they are deem-
ed to furnish a sanction and incitement to moral conduct.

The belief in an all-wise, good, and powerful Being, who super-
intends the moral government of the universe ; and the belief in a
state of future existence after the death of the body, wherein every
human creature shall be punished or rewarded according to his
good or bad conduct and habits, during the present life.

Whether man will be punished or rewarded by means of a soul,
or as in this life by means of his living body, seems to me to be a
point of no practical consequence. The sanction — the incitement*
consists in his"persuasion of the reality of the punishment and of
the reward ; whether it be by the one means, or by the other.--
Accordingly, there are good and wise men in abundance— -pious
and learned christians, who are of the one opinion and of the
other : nor ought any good man to believe that his neighbour is
the worse for adopting either.

Circumstances, unnecessary to be detailed, have induced me to
draw up my own opinions on the subject, and the arguments on
which I rely to prove that Christ and his Apostles were Material-
ists, a point about which I entertain no doubt j but the reader will
judge for himself; I have no right to judge for him, or he for me.

A BRIEF ACCOUNT OP THJB

SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF

MATERIALISM,

Two opinions are entertained respecting thought, intelligence,
and the phenomena termed mental, or intellectual. One is, that
they are to be ascribed to a being distinct from the body, having
no property in common with matter (immaterial, spiritual,) inca-
pable of corruption like the matter of our bodies, and in conse-
quence thereof, immortal. This being, naturally distinct from the
body, is the human soul ; united to the body during its life, set
free from the body at death, and without whose union with the
body, there would be nothing like thought, volition, or action. As
the soul alone can act and suffer, this opinion of its separate exis-
tence has been considered as essentially connected with the chris^
tian doctrine of a future state. Such is the prevailing opinion
adopted by almost all the clergy ; and by them inculcated as an
article of faith, essential to Christianity.

The other opinion is, that all the phenomena termed mental or
intellectual, are to be ascribed, not to any soul, distinct or sepa-
rate from the body, but to the properties which God Almighty has
been pleased to connect with the human frame — with the human
system of organised matter. So that thought, volition, action, are
the results of the circumstances to which God has been pleased
that man, as an organised being, should be exposed, during his
continuance in this life. It is also said, that there are manifest
appearances of thought, volition, and, consequently action, in
brute animals ; inferior greatly in complication and perfection to
those that are observed in man, but not different in kind. The
organization of brute animals being in many essential respects in-
ferior to that of man.

According to the first doctrine, man is a compound animal
consisting of a soul immaterial, immortal, invisible, and of a body
such as we see : This is Immaterialim. According to the se-
cond doctrine, man is nota compound animal, but consists nierely
ofthe parts and their properties, which are visible and apparent,
and which can be made known to us by our senses : This is Ma-
terialism. According to the first doctrine, when the body dies
the soul survives; according to the second doctrine, when the
body dies the whole man dies.

t 304 J

The present inquiry is, which of these two doctrines is most
conformable to Christianity, as delivered to us in the four Gos-
pels that furnish the details of the life, death, an9 precepts of Jesus
Christ. If it shall appear on the balance of evidence, that Jesus
Christ supported in precept and in practice, the one opinion or
the other, then is it a christian duty to embrace that opinion which
has received his sanction.

I propose to shew, that the opinion denominated Materialism
is — and that the opinion denominated Immaterialism, is not con-
sistent with Christianity.

It will be prudent at the outset to settle the ques 1 ion —

What is Christian! i y "

The Christianity of the Romish church, is one thing : of the
Greek church, another. The Christianity of an Athanasian, of a
Sabellian, of an Arian, of a Socinian, of a Priestleyan, are all dif-
ferent : the variances relate to essential points. The Christianity
of Calvin and the synod of Dort, was one thing : the Christianity of
James Harmens (Arminius) was another. The Christianity of
George Whitfield, like the thirty-nine articles of the church of
England, admits the doctrine of election and reprobation ;. and
Whitfield held the final perseverance of the saints. The Chris-
tianity of John Wesley, and of the present church of England,
from the bench and in the pulpit, excludes both the one and the
other. The opinion of a Trinitarian appears to an Unitarian to be
Polytheism and idolatry. The opinion of an Unitarian seems to
a Trinitarian, little, if any thing, short of blasphemy.

To a rigid Calvinist, mere morality, and the slightest value or
efficacy allowed to good works, is setting up the works of the law
over the precepts of the Gospel, and the pretensions of good con-
duct and benevolent actions over faitli in Christ, and redeeming
grace. To a Calvinist, all good works proceeding merely from
the voluntary disposition, the kind affections, the due regard for
character, and sense of social duty in a person not yet called
through grace, and justified in Jesus, "doubtless (in the language
of the thirty -nine articles) have in them the nature of sin." While
to a man who professes to be governed in his conduct by a sense
of moral rectitude, of obedience to the laws, and respect for his
own standing in society among thp good and the wise with whom
he lives, the Calvinistic decision of the quinquarticular controver-
sy, or the five points, as they are called — the doctrine of final
perseverance, election and reprobation, independent of moral
conduct — and the efficacy of a death-bed repentance — assume
the character of temptations and provocatives to all manner of
crime, and are subversive (where they really operate) of all the
bonds of civil and domestic society. That a life of crime may be
fully expiated by a few minutes of repentance, may be Calvin's
religion, but it is not a tenrt that society ousjht to encourage.

[ 305 ]

Amid these dissonances of opinion, where arc the genuine doc-
trines of Christianity to be found ? In the Bible ? Alas ! all sects
and all parties appeal indiscriminately to the Bible. Each con-
stitutes himself sole authorised interpreter for, and infallible judge
of his neighbor ; and sets up the paling of exclusive salvation
within the narrow limits of his own creed. I have searched so
much, so long, so ardently, so anxiously, to arrive at truth on these
subjects, that I am sensibly alive to all the difficulties that sur-
round it; to the dangers of discussing it ; and the certain punish-
ment that awaits every man, who opposes predominant opinions^
Hence, I do not pretend that my opinions are true : I can only
say that I believe they are. Hence, I have full charity for all
seekers after truth who differ from me in opinion. Let them hold
their opinions ; they have as much a right to them as I have to
mine : their belief is as obligatory on them, as mine on me. But
I hope I ask not too much, if I require, that the toleration shall
be mutual. Whatever my own opinions may be, they have been
the result of laborious inquiry — they have never conduced to my
interest, but far otherwise — I have never taken them up as a
trade — I have no motive of interest to adopt or avow them — I do
not get my living by professing them. In saying this, I blame not
those who do, but it manifestly furnishes a drawback from their
authority. It renders them biassed and incompetent witnesses,
according to the rules of every court of justice in every civilized
community. Hence I object to the interference, and much more
to the decision of men, who being hired and paid to propagate
certain opinions, will of course maintain the doctrines by which
they live and thrive. The motto of a hired and paid priesthood,
is in all ages and in all countries the same : " Great is Diana of
the Ephesians ;" and the worldly-minded among them will hoot
out of society, if they can, all those who interfere with their trade.
I know many worthy men of the clerical order, to whom this will
not apply ; men whose sound learning, good sense, and kind dis-
positions make them estimable exceptions to a general rule. But
the general rule is as I have stated it ; and my reader knows it is
so. If I state this strongly, it is because I have felt it deeply*
Suppose an architect, a painter, a physician, called upon in a
court of justice to give his professional opinion upon a profession-
al point in litigation: suppose it should appear on the cross-exam-
ination, that he was hired and paid for giving currency to the
opinions he had advanced before the court — would the jury be-
lieve him ? would the court allow any weight to his testimony ?
But the clergy consider this objection almost as blasphemy: for
they have always, and every where, arrogated exclusive privile-
ges that their fellow-citizens dare not claim. In answering the
question " what is Christianity?" 1 presume not, therefore, to do
more than submit to the reader my own opinion, with the reasons
on which it is founded; leaving him to judge of the one and of
39

[ 30G ]

the other. Requesting only, that until he can discover a probable
and reasonable motive why I, a layman, should embrace opinion*
so unpopular, unless it be the truth of them according to the lights
I possess, he will impute to me error of the understanding only;
and to this I shall willingly submit. It is with great reluctance I
engage in this controversy, but the events of my neighborhood
have rendered it a measure of defence.

I lay it down as a known and acknowledged rule of evidence,
that in ascertaining any fact, we are to require and resort to the
highest and best evidence that the nature of the case will admit.
We are not allowed to proceed upon hearsay testimony, where
the original witness can be produced; — we must not produce a
copy of a deed, when the deed itselfis at our command; — we must
not aver against a record; — we must not bring the fleeting re-
collection of verbal assertion, in opposition to declarations delibe-
rately written and acknowledged; — and so on.

I lay down also as known and acknowledged rules of evidence:

That we cannot contradict or modify superior evidence by in-
ferior: it" the testimony of B depend upon the evidence of A, it can
neither add to nor detract from the value of A's evidence.

That we need not resort to inferior evidence, if the superior be
adequate to our purposes.

That we are to rest our fact and all our conclusions from it on
the best evidence that can be produced to establish it, and no other.

That if the evidence thus admitted be clear in the main, and
ambiguous in some parts, we are to construe the parts that seem
ambiguous,in conformity with the main object and intention about
which there is no ambiguity.

Lastly, That Christianity being intended for all mankind, must
necessarily consist of few propositions, and those plain and intelli-
gible to any man of common learning and common understanding.

And now to the application.

Christianity is to be found in the doctrines and facts promul-
gated in the New Testament.

The New Testament consists of the doctrines and facts of
Christ's ministry contained in the four Gospels; and of the doc-
trines,and facts related of the apostles, after his resurrection.

The doctrines and facts relating to Christ himself, as delivered
to us by the four evangelists, are the highest and best evidence we
possess of what Christianity is.

1. Because Jesus Christ was the founder of Christianity. It
rests upon what he said and did.

2. Because all Christians acknowledge that Jesus Christ could
not be deceived. He was not fallible like common men.

3. Because his apostles, deriving all their knowledge from him,
can neither add to, or diminish the authority ot his doctrines.

Hence, I hold that no comments, apostolic or other, upon the
doctrines of Jesus; are in themselves obligatory on his disciples.

[ 307 j

I rest exclusively on the best evidence the nature of the case will
admit, — on what Jesus Christ said and did; — and I seek for Chris-
tianity in the four evangelists, and in them only. A Christian is
bound by all the precepts and doctrines of Christ Jesus: he ac-
knowledges no other master and needs no other teacher.

The reader is acquainted with the four Gospels of the evange-
lists; appealing then to the reader, I say, that the only doctrines
of Christianity plainly and clearly delivered by Christ himself,
and which his apostles were enjoined on to propagate, are these:

1. The doctrine of one God; God the father, as the only object
of adoration, and as the only creator, preserver, and moral gover-
nor of the universe; in opposition to the absurd notions of polythe-
ism prevalent all over the world when Christ appeared.

2. The resurrection from the dead, and a state of future re-
wards and punishments distributed according to the past conduct,
habits and dispositions of the dead person, who shall for this pur-
pose be called up before the judgment seat at the great day.

This doctrine is rendered necessary to complete the plan of the
moral government of the universe; and to rectify the apparent ine-
qualities of good and evil in the present life by the distributive
justice of a future state of existence. This doctrine was not pre-
valent among the learned of the heathen world; and it renders
Christianity of unspeakable value to a Christian, because it puts a
doctrine of the very highest importance and of the most salutary
influence upon Christian foundations, resting upon evidence no
where to be found but in the Christian scriptures.

3. That, Jesus was a person sent of God, divinely commissioned
to teach these most salutary doctrines, to confirm them by miracles
while living, and by his own predicted resurrection after death:
and he did so.

Thus far all sects and orders of Christians agree: and I d;>fy the
reader to shew me any other opinion delivered in the four Gospels,
in which Christians do so agree. Surely those doctrines, which large
portions of good, and wise, and pious, and learned men differ
about, after eighteen centuries of laborious discussion, may well be
considered as dubious. Do they agree in the nature and character
of Christ himself, whether he was equal with the father or^nferi-
or> — co-eternal, or of subsequent production? Are the doctrines
of transubstantiation, of the immaculate conception, of original
sin, of election and reprobation, of vicarious suffering, clearly and
explicitly taught in language plain and free from the figurative
ambiguity of eastern metaphor? Are any of the five points so la-
boriously and abstrusely handled at the synod of Doit, clearly and
explicitly laid down in the holy Gospels? No! they are not. It
is notorious, that they are at this day, as in former days, disputed
in every part of Christendom, by learned and grave men. As I
consider the christian dispensation intended for the benefit of no
part of mankind exclusively, but introduced for the present and

308 ]

etetyiaL welfare ohthe poor, the meek, the unlettered, at ie.ist a>
much as for the learned and the wise — 1 cannot consider any doc-
trine essential to Christianity, that is not clear and intelligible to
an unlearned man of common understanding. Hence, I throw
out of the catalogue of Christian doctrines all those abstruse points
that occupy the pens of learned theologians of the present day.
What! shall a doctrine be deemed essential, that has been a sub-
ject of controversy for near two thousand years and not yet set-
tled? What! shall a doctrine be deemed essential, which none
but learned men are capable of discussing? God forbid. Jesus
Christ loved little children, he comforted the poor in spirit and
the broken hearted, he honored the widow's mite: Would he mock
his followers with doctrines too abstruse for the comprehension of
the great mass of mankind, — of the very class he was accustomed
to address?

Moreover I consider no tenet as essential, that does not bear di-
rectly on our moral conduct; that does not make us better men;
that does not furnish a motive and a sanction to abstain from evil
and do good; that does not tend to make each member of society
more valuable to each other. The doctrines of one Supreme God,
the moral governor ot the universe and a state of future rewards
and punishments in another life according to our conduct and ac-
quired habits in the present, have manifestly this good tendency.
To Christians, there is no sufficient evidence of a future state, out
of the Christian Scriptures, and independent of Jesus Christ, who
brought life and immortality to light. The Christian therefore
rests upon the Gospel facts with peculiar satisfaction. But what
direct bearing on morality can we find in such questions — as
whether the three persons in the Trinity be three separate per-
sons, distinct intelligent agents, or three modes wherein the Su-
preme Being exhibits his power and character; — whether the gen-
eration of the son be eternal or not; — whether the holy ghost be a
person or an attribute; — whether the holy ghost proceeded from
the father only or from the father and the son; — whether the son
be omoousion or omoiousiun (of the same or of similar substance)
with tkp father; — whether all mankind deserve to be consigned to
eternaTtorments because Eve tempted Adam to eat the forbidden
fruit; — whether we arc to bear the pains and penalties of our own
misconduct, or whether Christ bore them for us;* — whether the
terms of redemption are availing for the benefit of all men, or for

*Dr. Magee, of Trinity College, Dublin, has published a thick octavo
in defence of the orthodox doctrine of vicarious suffering and atonement,
crowded with learned references and quotations. If such a book be ne-
cessary to prove the doctrine, then the Scriptures are insufficient for the
purpose, and the doctrine is not worth the pains taken with it. Besides,
can a doctrine be essential, which after near two thousand years of dis-
cussion, requires at this day learned volumes to establish it ? The modern

[ 309 J

the benefit of the elect only; — whether the elect were chosen be-
cause God foreknew how they would act, or whether their actions
are guided and determined by God's predetermination; — whether,
in the quaint phraseolgy of Gale, God predetermined man's voli-
tion or gave only his "predeterminate concurse to the entitative
act?" — whether a saint may fall from grace not only foully but
finally; — whether good actions, performed before a sinner be call-
ed through saving grace to repentance, have in them the nature of
sin, &c. &c. I ask, is the great cause of morality furthered by
these questions?

I acknowledge therefore no disputations or disputable Christi-
anity. I know nothing beyond the points I have mentioned as es-
sential to the belief of a Christian. I see that all sects acknowl-
edge these doctrines so far as they are here laid down; and as I
know of no other theological opinion undisputed among Christians,
I adhere to these and these only.

If then it be asked, is Christ equal with God, or coeval with
God, or inferior to him in power, was his generation from eter-
nity or in time; is he an object of adoration equally with the fath-
er; is he omoousion or omoiousion? I cannot tell: none of these
points seem to be settled by an uniform series of plain and uncon-
victing texts that leave no room for hesitation. I content myself
therefore with what is plain, clear and indisputable. Jesus Christ
was divinely commissioned for the duties lie fulfilled on earth, or
he could not have worked miracles in proof of his doctrine. I un- '
derstand thus far; and there I stop. Well, but the resurrection
from the dead: this is not so plain as to be free from doubts and
difficulties even to a materialist. What kind of a body is it that
will rise? The corrupted and corruptible mass of matter thrown
into the grave? or some body more fit for the enjoyment of immor-
tality? To all this I reply, that Jesus Christ having preached the
resurrection of the body, 1 take it as he preached it. If I cannot
explain all the difficulties that attend this opinion and resolve all
the curious questions that can be raised on it, I am content. A
Christian is content to believe Jesus Christ on his own terms, and
after his own fashion, and no other. Had all these curious ques-
tions required explanation, he would have given it: if rfe has not
given it, we need it not. Such is my notion of Christianity. If I
think that others believe too much, and if they think that I believe
too little, I cannot help it. By the use we have made of the lights
that have been afforded us, must we stand or fall; and may God

doctrine of atonement and vicarious suffering- succeeded after and in place
of the Roman Catholic doctrine of indigencies.

Moreover, no doctrine can be essential, of winch the clergy would pro-
hibit the discussion ; nor is it likely that an opinion is well founded, when
they denounce those who controvert it. Like other men, they are timid
whenever their cause is weak ; and when they want to scare away dis-
cussion, it is a sure sign that they dread it.

i 310 J

forgive, as I hope and believe he will, the involuntary errors, on
the one side and the other, of those who seek after truth.

I shall now attempt to shew, that
The Scripture Doctrine of the Resurrection, is what is

nov/ called Materialism: and that it is inconsistent with

the notion of a Separate, Immaterial, and Immortal Soul.

The plainest account of the resurrection seems to be that deliv-
ered by Jesus Christ in the 5th chap, of John, 24, &c. " Verily,
verily I say unto you, he that heareth my word and believeth on
him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into
condemnation, but is passed from death unto life. Verily, verily
I say unto you, that the hour is coming and now is, when the dead
shall hear the voice of the son of God, and they that hear shall
live. For as the father hath life in himself, so has he given to the
son to have life in himself; and hath given him authority to execute
judgment also, because he is the 6on of man. Marvel not at this,
for the hour cometh in the which all that are in the graves shall
hear his voice, and come forth; they that have done good to the re-
surrection of life, and they that have done evil to the resurrection
of damnation" (condemnation.)

The resurreetion of the Gospels, whether of Christ or others, is
always spoken of as a resurrection of the dead Luke xxiv. 46.
"Thus it behoved Christ to suffer and to rise from the dead on the
third day." John xx. 9. That he must rise from the dead; and so
on. I need not multiply passages on this point, which cannot be
disputed.

But on the modern hypothesis of an immaterial soul, that sur-
vives the body and never dies — which is to be the future object of
reward and punishment — the resurrection of the dead is not mere-
ly an absurdity, but a falsehood.

Again, if this supposed seat of thought, intelligence, volition,
of all the passions and affections, do really exist, as is supposed,
then is a resurrection useless and unnecessary. That being needs
not be revived from the dead, which never dies.

An immaterialist — a deist, needs not this manifestation of
divine justice first revealed by Jesus Christ. Our body (they may
say) is the passive instrument of the soul which is confined to it
during this life ; it is meant to serve the purposes of this life only:
when the body dies, then is our nobler and most essential part set
at liberty ; and exerts its powers, free and untrammelled by the
fleshy load to which it was conjoined. As it is of itself, and es-
sentially immaterial and immortal, no future resurrection is neces-
sary to its future existence.

These are the fair and inevitable conclusions from what it
pleases the priesthood to call orthodoxy.

Again : If it were true that the human being consisted of a ma-
terial body incapable of thought, volition, feeling, intelligence —

f 311 ]

and of an immaterial and immortal soul conjoined to it during life,
and set free from it at death — and if this were one of the essen-
tial doctrines of the Christian religion, then would the declara-
tions of Jesus Christ to this purpose, have heen plain, unambiguous,
and explicit: but we have no such description of human nature
laid down by Christ ; he has no where adopted or declared this
opinion; he has no where described us as consisting of an immor-
tal soul conjoined to a mortal body, or inculcated any thing like
it is an article of faith ; he has uniformly declared, that the resur-
rection he preached, was the resurrection, not of the compound
creature man, consisting of body and soul — not of the human
soul which is described as immortal — but of the human body,
which died and was buried. I hope the expressions of Jesus Christ
will be accepted as good authority for what is Christianity on this
point; 1 have no better to offer.

I repeat, that when Jesus Christ talks of the resurrection of the.
dead, it must be the resurrection of that which is liable to death ;
and it cannot mean the resurrection of that which is not liable to
death, but being immortal, never dies. Matt. xxii. 23. Mark
xii. 18. Luke xx. 33. The Sadducees put to him a question of
matrimony under the Jewish law ; they asked, " therefore, in the
resurrection, whose wife shall she be of the seven." Here was a
fair opportunity for Jesus Christ to have explained the modern
doctrine of immaterialism,and to have shewn that the institution
of marriage was a corporeal rite, and had reference to the body
only, and that the marriage of two immaterial souls, was an ab-
surdity and an impossibility. But he gives no hint whatever of
the soul ; only that, at the resurrection of the dead, there is nei-
ther marrying or giving in marriage.

Luke xxiv. 46. And he said unto them, thus it is written, and
thus it behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead on the
third day.

John xx. 9. For as yet they knew not the Scriptures, that he
must rise again from the dead.

John ii. 21. But he spake of the temple of his body.

When Jesus had risen, the women who went to search for his
body, found it not in the sepulchre ; for the body had risen from
the dead. Luke xxiv. G. Why seek ye the living among the
dead ? He is not here, but is risen.

When Christ died upon the cross, many bodies of saints that
slept, arose. Matt, xxvii. 52. Is it not strange, that in none of
these passages relating to the resurrection from the dead, have wc
any reference to the soul ?

Again : The resurrection from the dead promised by Jesus,
was exemplified by his own death, burial, and resurrectioi, such
as was his resurrection, such will be ours; or he died to no pur-
pose. If his personal exemplification of the resurrection from the
dead, to which he appealed, was different in its kind and nature.

[ 312 ]

from thai which mankind are to undergo, it becomes no longer a
type, an exemplification, and a proof of our resurrection. He
arose expressly, after predicting that he would do so, to make
manifest and illustrate by fact, the doctrine he had been preach-
ing. Let us then consider the Scripture account of Christ's own
resurrection.

John xx. 24. But Thomas, (one of the twelve,) called Didymus,
was not with them when Jesus come. The other disciples said
"unto him, we have seen the Lord : but he said unto them, except
I shall sec in his hands the print of the nails, and put my fingers
into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will
not believe. And after eight days again, the disciples were with-
in, and Thomas with them. Then came Jesus, the doors being
shut, and stood in the midst, and said, peace be unto you. Then
saith he to Thomas, reach hither thy finger and behold my hands ;
and reach hither thy hand and thrust it into my side; and be not
faithless, but believing. And Thomas answered and saith unto
him, my Lord and my God ! Jesus saith unto him, Thomas, be-
cause thou hast seen me, thou hast believed ; blessed are they who
have not seen me, and yet have believed.

Other circumstances are mentioned by Luke xxiv. 38. in giving
an account of Jesus appearing to his disciples after his resurrec-
tion. " And he said unto them, why are ye troubled, and why do
thoughts arise in your hearts. Behold my hands and my feet, that
it is I, myself: Handle me and see ; for a spirit hath not flesh and
bones, as ye see me have. And when he had thus spoken, he
shewed them his hands and his feet. And while they believed
not for joy, but wondered, he said unto them, have ve here any
meat ? And they gave him a piece of broiled fish and a honey-
comb, and he took it, and did eat before them." See the parallel
passages, Matt, xxviii. Mark xvi. Luke xxiv. 39.

This is the only account the Scriptures give us of the great and
important proof, and manifestation of the resurrection of the dead,
produced by Christ himself, as an example of that future miracu-
lous destination of the human kind.

If the belief in the separate existence of a soul, which dies not
with the body, and its liability to reward and punishment at the
great day, be an article of Clmstianity, was not this the proper, the
last, the only occasion to explain it ?

Is there one word of the human soul in this account?

And when Christ appeals to his disciples, and describes what
constitutes himself; does he not appeal to his visible, tangible body,
and to that only ; does he mention or allude to the soul ?

Does this account furnish a proof of any resurrection, but the
resurrection of the body and the body only ?

Does not Christ in effect negative the existence of any sepa-
rate soul, when exhibiting his bodv, he savs, here, " this is I,
myself?"

t 313 ]

Is any one required to believe in the existence of a separate
soul, when it is no more noticed on this solemn occasion, than it
it did not exist at all ?

And why is it nut noticed ? Because it does not exist. Would
such an occasion of explaining and inculcating the doctrine, have
been passed by ?

Again: Matt, xxvii. 53. "And the graves were opened, and
many bodies of saints that slept arose, and came out of their graves
after his resurrection, and went into the holy city, and appeared
onto many.*' This is again a type and an exemplar of man's re-
surrection : but not one word of the soul.

How is it, some may ask that this corrupt, mortal, and putrefy-
ing body, can be the object of the resurrection, and inherit immor-
tality ? I answer, that in Luke xx. 36, Christ says, " the dead who
are raised shall die no more." Of course some change will take
place after the resurrection to fit them for immortality. What
change, or how it is to be effected ; as Christ has not explained,
neither do I; and with the promise as he has made it, a christian
should be content.

The only passage in the Gospels from which the existence of a
scperate and immortal soul can apparently be inferred, is Matt. x.
28, which in the translation runs thus: "Fear not them which kill
the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him,
which is" able to destroy both soul and body in hell." To this I
reply, that the word here translated soul, (a) is translated in
very many other places indiscriminately, life and soul. Meaning
always the life of the body, and never exclusively the soul. Thus,
a little way before in Matt.Vi. 25, it is translated life: " to take no
thought for your life." To the same purpose, Luke xii, 22. So in
Marie iii. 4. " To save life or to kill." So in Luke xii. 23, " the
life more than raiment." Matt. vi. 25. Matt. x. 39. Matt. xvi. 25.
Mark viii. 36, 37, and in upwards of twenty passages more. In
all these passages, the word translated indiscriminately soul and
life, is one and the same word. So in Rev. xvi. 3, and every living
«*0ul died in the sea.

The meaning of the passages therefore, is, that Christ who wa$
appointed to teach and to preach the resurrection unto life, says,
",fear not them who can kill the body, but him who can annihilate
life itself, and destroy all your hopes of resurrection and a future
existence."

I know not any other passage in the Gospels that can be plausi-
bly dragged in aid of the immaterial hypothesis; and I will venture
to say, there is not one passage in the bible, so strong in favour of
that opinion, as the passage I have just considered: which is mani-
festly a translation, made by men whose heads were full of the
doctrines of a soul, and made with a view to that very opinion.

Again: The following passages all tend to shew that there shall
be no resurrection whatever, but as a miraculous interposition of

(a) i!--/ 1 (pstiche). i0

[ 311 J

God Almighty, through Jesus Christ, who shall call the dead from
their graves, at his own appointed time; until when there shall be
no day of judgment: and or" course that without the promise of the
Christian resurrection, the dead would forever remain dead. This
is utterly inconsistent with the notion of the most essential and
active part of man, immortal in itself, subsisting in a state of supe-
rior intelligence and activity, when freed from the burthen and
clog of the human body. When freed from the prison of the body,
why, by miraculous interposition, raise up the body to imprison it
again? Matt. xiii. 50 — 49. Matt. xvi. 9,7. Matt. xix. 28. Matt.
xxiv. 31. Matt. xxv. 31, 32. Mark xiii. 26, 27. John vi. 40,44,
54. John xvi. 22. I could add many more passages from the Acts
and Epistles, but I purposely confine myself to the Evangelists.

So far as plain fact, universal experience, and the declarations
of the scriptures will bear us out, there is no pleasure, and no suf-
fering independent of the animated body, either in this life, or in
the life to come. Animation ceases when the body dies; and it
will be restored when the'body is called up from the grave at the
great day in conformity with the promises made to us in the Gos-
pels of Christ. "Without those promises, confined to the human
race — as a beast dieth, so dieth man; without further hope of sen-
tient existence. At least, the arguments for a future state, are
barely probable, independent of the Gospel, and Christ's example.
So that to a materialist, the value of a Christian Gospel is un-
speakable; to an immaterialist, it is superfluous and even con-
tradictory.

One other argument I will urge, that seems to me to have great
weight. The Jews were divided into two sects; the Sadducees
who taught that there would be no resurrection, and the Pharri-
sees,whoheldthat there would be one. Theinculpations and invec-
tives of Christ, against the Pharisees are vehement, and frequent.
Not so against the Sadducees. Among the various conversations
and disputes he had with the Sadducees on the subject of a resur-
rection from the dead, he not only never makes any use of the ar-
gument, from the immaterial and immortal nature of the human
soul, but he never introduces it at all — not a word is to be found
on the subject: its existence is not hinted at.

After this, can it be said, that the separate existence of an im-
mortal soul is the doctrine of Christ? I am lost in utter astonish-
ment at the presumptuous hardihood that can state this doctrine
as an essential article of the Christian faith! at the impudent in-
tolerance that can cry down a man's character and standing in so-
ciety — can interdict him like the banished of old, from fire, water,
and shelter — because examining Scripture for himself, he cannot
conscientiously accept as divine truth, the metaphysical reveries of
Calvinistic theology!

The doctrine of a future state, stands on a much firmer basis,
eft 1h* .supposition of the resurrection of the body, and the body

L W6 i

only, than on the resurrection of the soul, (if indeed tins last be
not* as I take it to be, a manifest contradiction in terms.) The be-
ing whom it shall please God, through Jesus Christ to raise from
the dead — from the grave — will be the object of future rewards and
punishments in another life, for its deeds, or misdeeds, transacted
in this life. I know of no christian materialist who denies this, and
I believe it is considered a doctrine probable, but not certain, inde-
pendent of Scripture, from considerations connected with the mo-
ral government of the universe but rendered certain by the Chris-
tian Scriptures only. To an immaterialist, the Scripture doctrine
of the resurrection'is superfluous; for his man is essentially im-
mortal in his immortal soul! To a materialist, it is every thing;
for it contains the only sure and certain proof of a resurrection,
that is to be found within the compass of human knowledge.

Aud here I take my stand. I hold it useless to urge any further
argument. It would* be anticlimax in ratiocination. That which
is°Bot Jesus Christ's Christianity is not my Christianity. The
opinions of the apostles, of the fathers of the church, of grave and
learned divines, can add no force to Gospel authority. You can-
not fortify stronger evidence by weaker. If you say it may ex-
plain or illustrate what is dubious, I deny that any of the essen-
tial articles of Christianity, that I have stated, are dubious. You
may dispute as much as you please about the human soul, which is
not once mentioned in the Gospels, but you cannot deny the resur-
rection of the body. You may dispute about the nature and grade
of Christ's character, but you cannot as a christian dispute his di-
vine mission. I require no other proof that any doctrine is unes-
sential to Christianity, than that it is dubious. Jesus Christ does
not require us on pain of eternal damnation to believe on doubtful
evidence; although the priesthood does. Could the unlettered au-
dience present at the sermon on the mount, have understood a
sentence of the Assembly's Catechism?

The sum and substance of my argument is this:

(a) All that is essential to Christianity is contained in the four
Gospels that give us an account of what Jesus taught and did; who
certainly would omit nothing essential to his own plan. The doc-
trine of an immaterial, immortal soul is no where to be found pro-
mulgated, explained, or hinted at, in any part of the four Gospels,
except in one solitary text where the ambiguity arises from the
translation.

(b) The resurrection every where spoken of is the resurrection
of the dead, — the resurrection of the body, not of the soul.

(c) This avoiding any notice of the doctrine in question, is the
more extraordinary, as frequent opportunities and occasions occur-
red, that seem to have required, if this doctrine were true, that it
should be enforced and explained.

(d) This doctrine of a separate immortal soul, renders unneces-
sary any miraculous interposition to produce the resurrection of

t 316 |

ihe dead, for the purpose of future reward and punishment; mas
much as the soul never dies. It may therefore be a very good te-
net for a Deist, but not for a Christian.

(e) This doctrine of an immaterial immortal soul is to the doc-
trine of the resurrection, a positive and unequivocal denial ; for
there can be no resurrection of that which never dies.

(f) The example and illustration presented to us by Christ's
own resurrection, is a resurrection of the body only : not a syllabic
is said about the soul.

Here ends my argument: but for the sake of those who have, a
higher opinion of human comments on the doctrines of Christ than
I have, I add the following brief observations, tending to shew,

1. That the doctrine of materialism is the doctrine of the
apostles.

2. That the doctrine of materialism was the doctrine of the
fathers of the Christian church, during four hundred years, until
the time of St. Augustine.

3. That it is yet considered as a dubious point in the church
of England among the dignitaries eminent for learning in that
church.

4. That the. doctrine of a separate soul has given rise to great
errorsand deplorable abuses.

If I should find it necessary (which I hope will not be the case)
to come out again on this subject, I will treat these, points more at
large : at present, my object is condensation and brevity.

Let us now see ivhat the Apostles say.

Acts xxiii. 6. Paul cried out, Of the hope and resurrection of
the deadnml called in question. Jets xxiv. 15. That there shall
be a resurrection of the dead both of the just and unjust. 2 Cor.
i. 9. But we had the sentence of death in ourselves, that we should
not trust in ourselves, but in God who raiseth the dead. If any
declaration can be adverse to the existence of a separate soul, this
is. 2 Cor. iv. 10. Always bearing about in the body the dying of
the Lord Jesus, that the life also of Jesus might be made manifest
in our body. v. 14. Knowing that he which raised up the Lord
Jesus shall raise us up also by Jesus. This implies similarity in
the general resurrection of the human race, and that of our Lord.
So in 1 Pet. i. 3 — 5. Messed be God, which according to his
abundant mercy hath begotten us again unto a lively hope by the
resurrection of Jesus from the dead, to an inheritance incorrupti-
ble and undefined, that fadeth not away. Horn. iv. 17. God who
quickeneth the dead, and calleth those things that be not, as
though they were. 1 Cor. xv. 42. So also is the resurrection of the
dead. It is sown in corruption — it is raised in incorruption. What
died? The Soul? No: the body died. What then is raised ? The
Soul ? No : that which died, the body. When the body being raised
from the dead, is endowed with incorruptibility, to fit it for its new
■state of being, it still remains the same body, only no longer sub

I 311 ]

ject to death. .St. Paul calls the body thus changed a heavenh
body, a spiritual body: still it is the body ; in all essential re-
spects, the very body that died ; for no other is ever spoken of.
2 Cor. v. 10. (a) For we must all appear before the judgment
scat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his
body, according to that he hath done whether good or bad. The
literal and true version of tins passage is "may receive bodily,*'
(ta dia ton somatos.) Hence, it is the body that is to receive reward
or punishment, according to what the body hath deserved while
alive. Not a word of a soul. Kphes. v. 23. Christ is the saviour of
the body. Philip iii. 21. Who shall change our vile body (vile
as being mortal and corruptible) and fashion it Uke unto his glo-
rious bod j. Not a word of the soul : all relates to the body.

I have looked into the original Greek of all the passages trans-
lated soul, from Acts to Revelations, inclusive, and 1 find the word
is psache. In most of these passages, it necessarily means
life, and in all of them it is reasonably translated life; except, as
some may think, in 1 Thess. v. 23, "That your whole spirit, and
soul, and body may be preserved blameless unto the coming of
our Lord."

The general meaning of the word here translated spirit, when
applied to a man, is disposition, inclination : thus,

Matt. xxvi. 41. The spirit truly is willing, but the flesh is weak.
That is, they have desire to keep awake, but they are overcome
with fatigue.

Luke viii. 55, Her spirit came again, and she arose straightway.
That is, her life.

John iv. 23. Shall worship the father in spirit and in truth.
That is, in reality, with willingness and unfeignedly.

John xi. 33. He groaned in spirit : John xiii. 21. He was trou-
bled in spirit.

Frequently it is put for beings intermediate between men and
angels and that only appear occasionally, that being a popular
opinion of the day : as when the disciples said he hath seen a spirit
or an angel, — the Sadducees say there is no angel or spirit, — and
the spirit said unto Philip, go near and join, &c.

It is sometimes put for the power and operation of God.

So the word translated soul, is far more frequently translated
life, which is its true meaning.

Hence, the meaning would be, God preserve your disposition,
your life, and your body to the time of his coming. That is, I hope
you will not change your character or quit this life till the coming
of our Lord Jesus ; which some of the apostles mistakenly expect-
ed to be very soon. But holding myself bound by the highest
authority, I am bound by that only. Nor is the main doctrine of
Christ in the Gospels to be shaken by a few figurative or pleonas-
tic forms of expression among his disciples. The question is not,

(n) ret hoc ra <?o^xl<&>.

I 318 j

is there am text in the Bible that seems to countenance the notion
of a soul, (for the Bible was translated by persons who took thai
doctrine for granted ;) — the question is, what is the general tenor
of the doctrine on the subject laid down by Jesus Christ : does//r,
countenance it r The apostles wrote and spoke very figuratively,
and frequently in conformity and allusion to the previous notions
of those they were addressing. To establish the doctrine of a soul
as a Christian doctrine, do not refer me to a few texts that seem to
countenance it; you must shew it me plainly, clearly, and un-
doubtedly laid down, explained, and urged by Christ himself : and
that I am sure cannot be done from the Evangelists. All else is
evidence so inferior, as to have little weight on the question.

All persons conversant with the Scripture, know, that the vari-
ous and discordant tenets of metaphysical Christianity are found-
ed, asserted, and denied on the license of figurative expression
used by the apostles, and principally St. Paul. In this war of
words I desire to take no part, and I therefore appeal exclusively
to the Gospels.

Of the Opinions of the Ancient Fathers.

I am not yet possessed of the means of examining and referring
to the original works of the fathers, as they are called. I must
therefore be content with referring to some summary. Suchan one
Dr. Priestley has given; but I am aware his authority may be ob-
jected to. Lewis Ellis Dupin, and Lardner have not attended to
this subject as a separate question, and Lardner's quotations are-
very partial. The only author of repute who has examined all the
writings of the Christian fathers with this view, is Beausobre, in
his history of Manicheism; an author universally regarded as
among the fairest and best qualified of modern days. He too is
cited by Priestley, by Rees, and others.

To avoid all reasonable objection, I referred to the article Im-
materialism in the larger French Encyclopedic, manifestly written
by one who is not a materialist. I translate briefly from that ar-
ticle ; stating however, that his representation will coincide with
that of M. Beausobre.

" Some moderns suspect that as Athanagoras admitted a spirit,
in the formation of the universe, he was acquainted with spiritu-
ality, and did not admit a corporeal Deity, like almost all the other
philosophers. But by the word spirit (pneumaj the Greek and
Romans equally understood a subtile matter, extremely dilated,
intelligent indeed, but extended, and consisting of parts. In effect,
how can they believe that the Greek philosophers had any idea of
a substance purely spiritual, when it is clear that all primitive fa-
thers of the church made even God Almighty corporeal ; and their
doctrine was perpetuated in the Greek church even to later times,
and was never renounced by the Roman church till the time of
St. Augustine," (about six hundred years after Christ.)

[ 319 ]

The author of the article proceeds, by means of quotations from
their works, to shew that the following fathers were materialists,
viz j Origen, whom Jerom reproaches for his notion that God
himself was material ; Tertullian, who wrote a book De Anima
expressly to prove the mortality and materiality of the human
soul ; Arnobius ; St. Justin ; Tatian ; St. Clement of Alexandria ;
Lactantius ; St. Hilarius ; St. Gregory Nazianzenus ; St. Gregory
Nyssenus ; St. Ambrose ; Cassian ; and finally John of Thessalo-
nica, who, at the Seventh Council, pronounced it as an opinion
traditionally delivered by St. Athanasius, St. Basil, and St. Me-
thodius, that neither angels, demons, nor human souls were -dis-
engaged from matter. The writer forgot Melito, bishop of Sardis ;
but here is a list quite long enough. It proves nothing except
that in the early ages of the Christian church, and for near six
hundred years, Materialism was not heresy, but quite otherwise.
Indeed St. Austin says, that he himself was for a long time of this
opinion ; owing to his difficulty of conceiving the pure spirituality
of God himself — Are these metaphysics of any use or value to a
Christian, on the one side or the o her. I consider them as vain
speculations, unproductive of practical benefit.

The Apostles' Creed of uncertain composition, but ancient, re-
quires us to hold as an essential article of the Christian faith,
what, the resurrection of the soul. No, " the resurrection of the
body, and the life everlasting." Amen.

That the doctrine of the non-existence of a separate
immaterial soul, distinct from the human body, and dis-
joined from it at death, is a doctrine published and
avowed by dignitaries of the church of england.

I apply this to the well meaning, but not well instructed por-
tion of my fellow citizens. I am not about to prove my point by
an appeal to the bench of bishops. But I say, that doctrine is not
Atheism, Deism, or Infidelity, which some of the bench of bishops
avow, which others doubt about, and which none complain of as
heretical or dangerous.

I)v. Edmund Law* Arch Deacon of Carlisle, Master of Pe-
ter's College in the University of Cambridge, (a seminary for
finishing the education of young men,) wrote a treatise on the na-
ture and end of death. To the third edition of this work, now be-
fore me, published in 1775, he added an appendix on the meaning
of the original words translated soul and sph'it in the holy Scrip-
tures ; shewing that no part of the bible gave countenance to the
doctrine of a separate soul, or of an intermediate state of being
between death and judgment. He refers to Bishop Sherlock, the
Rev. Mr» Taylor of Norwich, and Mr. Hallet, in the following pas-
sage closing that appendix.
Father of the late Lord EUenborough, Chief Justice of the King's Bench.

C &o J

Extract from the Appendix to Considerations on the Theory of
Religion. By Edmund Law, n. r>. Archdeacon of Carlisle, and
Master of St. Peter's College, Cambridge, third edition, 1755 —
with an appendix concerning the use of the word SOUL in Hohj
Scripture, and the state of death there described.

" The intent of this appendix, containing an examination of all
the meanings that the words translated SOUL, in the Old or New
Testament, appears to have, is to shew that the doctrine of a se-
parate, immaterial, immortal soul, is not a Christian doctrine: that
it is not fairly deducible from the Christian Scriptures; and is
contrary to their general tenor." Dr. Law, after this summary,
goes on to say, page 398, " This may serve for a specimen of such
texts as are usually alleged on the other side of the question j (viz.
by the Immaterialists,) all which will, I believe, appear, even from
these short remarks upon them, to be either quite foreign to the
point, or purely figurative ; or lastly, capable of a clear and easy
solution on the principles above-mentioned. Nor can such ever
fairly be opposed to the constant obvious tenor of the sacred wri-
tings, and that number of plain express passages already cited."
page 400. — Give me leave, says Dr. Law, to subjoin the sentiments
of a very pious and worthy person, eminently skilled in Scripture
language, the Rev.Mr. Taylor of Norwich, who is pleased to write
as follows: " 1 have perused your papers, &c. They comprehend
two points, one upon the nature of the human soul or spirit, so far
as revelation give us any light ; the other concerning the state to
which death reduces ns. From the collection of Scriptures under
the first of these points, I think it appears, that no man can prove
from Scripture, that the human soul is a principle which lives,
and acts, and thinks, independent of the body. Whatever the
metaphysical nature, essence, or substance of the soul may be,
(which is altogether unknown to us,) it is demonstratively certain
that its existence, both in the manner and duration of it, must be
wholly dependent on the will and pleasure of God. God must
appoint its connection with, and dependence on any other sub-
stance, both in its operations, powers, and duration. All argu-
ments, therefore, for the natural immortality of the soul, taken
from the nature of its substance or essence, as if it must exist and
act separate from the body, because it is of such a substance, &c,
arc manifestly vain. If indeed we do find any thing in the
faculties and operations of the mind to which we arc con-
scious, that doth shew it is the will of God, we should exist
in a future state, those arguments will stand good. But wc
can never prove that the soul of man is of such a nature that
it can and must exist, live, think, act, and enjoy, &c, separate
from, and independent of the body. All our present experience
shows the contrary. The operations of the mind depend con-
stantly and invariably upon the state of the body, of the brain in
particular. If some dying persons have a lively use of their raw

[ 321 1

tienal faculties to the very last, it is because death has invaded
some other part, and the brain remains sound and vigorous. But
what is the sense of REVEL ATION ? You have given a noble
collection of texts, that shew it very clearly. The subject yields
many practical remarks, and the warmest and strongest incite-
ments <<> piety."

After this extract from Mr. Taylor's letter, Dr. Law closes his
appendix in these words : " But it might look like begging the
question, should I draw out all these in form, together with the
consequences of this doctrine in regard to either Papist or Deist,
till the doctrine itself, so long decryed by the one, and so often
disgraced by the other, shall appear free from the prejudices at-
tending it, and be at last understood to have a fair foundation in
Scripture, by which we Protestants profess to be determined: and
when we have duly examined them, may possibly discern that the
natural immortality of the human mind, is neither necessarily
connected with, nor to a Christian any proper proof of a future
state of rewards and punishments.'' 9

After this, Dr. Law was raised to the See of Carlisle.

Dr. Watson, Bishop of Landaflf, published a collection of tracts
for the use of young clergymen. The following is an extract from
his Preface.

Extract from a preface to a collection of Theological Tracts,in
six volumes. By Richard Watson, d. d. Bishop of Landaff, and
Begins Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge,
1785. Dedicated to the Queen.

Page 14, 15. — " Want of genuine moderation towards those
who differ from us in religious opinions, seems to be the most
unaccountable thing in the world. Any man who has any reli-
gion at all, feels within himself stronger motives to judge right,
than you can possibly suggest to him ; and if he judges wrong,
what is that to you r To his own master he standeth or falleth :
his wrong judgment, if it affect his own salvation, cannot affect
yours! For, in the words of Tertullian, nee alii ohest aut prodest
alterius religio. Still you will probably rejoin, there must be
many truths in the Christian religion, concerning which no one
ought to hesitate, inasmuch as without a belief in them, he cannot
be reputed a Christian — reputed! by whom? by Jesus Christ his
Lord and God, or by you ? Rash expositors of points of doubtful
disputation; intolerent fabricators of metaphysical creeds, and
incongruous systems of Theology! Do you undertake to measure
the extent of any man's understanding except your own ; to esti-
mate the strength and origin of his habits ot thinking ; to appre*
ciate his merit or demerit in the use of the talent that God has
given him, so unerringly, as to pronounce that the belief of this or
that doctrine is necessary to his salvation?"

Page 16 — "But there are subjects on which the academic <K
41

[ 322 J

rum epoche (a) may be admitted, I apprehend, without injuring tin
foundations of our religion. Such are the questions which relate
to the power of evil spirits to suspend the laws of nature, or to
actuate the minds of men ; to the materiality or immateriality of
the human soul ; to the state of the dead before the general resur-
rection ; the resurrection of the same body ; the duration of future
punishments ; and many others of the same kind"

That the Doctrine of a separate Soul, has given rise to
errors and abuses.

The vulgar notion of apparitions — the worship of Saints — the
doctrine of purgatory until the day of judgment — prayers for the
dead, &c. — Had the opinion been credited, that when the man
dies, he will remain dead till it shall please God at the great day to
reanimate him, none of these opinions could have prevailed, nor
could any of the abuses founded on them, have existed.

I omit the many difficulties attending this opinion, as — how is
an immaterial and immortal soul corporeally propagated ; when
did it begin to exist ; how will you account for the undeniable
marks of memory, intelligence, and volition, in dogs and other
brute animals; have they souls also; how can the soul act upon
matter if it have no property in common with matter; how does
the soul differ from the life of the body; can you account for the
life of a blade of grass by mere matter and motion, any more than
the life or intellect of a human being; do not vegetable and animal
life depend on organization ; what real evidence can be had of a
being, which is in no respect the object of any sense we possess,
only known by metaphysical conjecture, as an hypothesis to account
for thought, &c. ?

To all this, the Immaterialists say, that no mode or combination
of matter and motion can produce thought: and this being impos-
sible, there is an end of the question. But we see life connected
with, and arising from a modification of matter and motion, as in
vegetables ; what is life? We see life, sensation, thought, voli-
tion, arising from a combination of matter and motion, as in ele-
phants, dogs, horses, &c. ; if phenomena, exactly the same in kind,
require a soul in the animal man, so they do when observed in an
inferior degree, in inferior animals ; where will you stop ? Will
you assign a soul to an opossum or an oyster? To a mite or a flea?
All this peremptory dictation of what can be or cannot be, with
our limited knowledge, appears to me dreadful arrogance !

I call then upon my opponent, and I ask him,
From what source of knowledge is it, that you who know noth-
ing about matter, but some of its properties, and nothing of its
essence — that you, who gaining knowledge by your senses' only,
cannot possibly know any thing of sp irit which is not cognizable

(a) Ymoyji.

[ 323 ]

by the senses — presume to limit the omnipotence of the Almighty
and declare that he is not able to endow matter with the properties
of thought?

Worm as you are, is Almighty power to be confined within the
outline of your metaphysical creed ? Are you possessed of infinite
intelligence, and entitled to say to the creator of the universe, thus
far shalt thou go and no further ?

Away with your arrogance, and your intolerance — with your
cruel interdictions and denunciations; and permit a fellow crea-
ture to be humble with impunity, though you disdain to be so!

APPENDIX ON THE CLERGY,

Civil society is intended to promote the mutual happiness of
the members of it, while they live together here on earth. It does
not extend to a future state of existence, which will take place
under such regulations as the Almighty may think fit to appoint.

Religion embraces all the motives to good conduct here, and all
the means ot happiness hereafter. Civil society, therefore, has
nothing to do with religion, but as it tends to mutual happiness
while we live together here on earth. Hence, that religion which
makes a man the best citizen, is the best religion for society. A
religion that makes a man cruel, persecuting, and intolerant, is a
bad religion for society; and the teachers and preachers of any re-
ligion whatever, who are so, are bad men and bad citizens, wheth-
er their opinions be true or false. I wish some one would un-
dertake to shew how public morals are promoted by the doctrines
of death-bed repentance, election, and reprobation, and the final
salvation of backsliding saints.

The wise men who framed the American constitutions, well
knew the truth could only be discovered, and placed on a firm ba-
sis, by permitting free discussion on every subject. If an opinion
be erroneous, it requires discussion, that its errors may be expos-
ed: if it be true, it will gain adherents in proportion as it is exam-
ined. Is an opinion so manifestly wrong that every man must see
it is so ? It can do no harm. Is it so plausible as to be likely to
deceive mankind by its semblance to truth. The more need, then,
of open and free discussion to expose fully the fallacy of it.

Moreover, as the American legislators well knew the infirmities
of human nature, and that no set of men had any pretensions to in-
fallibility, they put all opinions upon the same footing as to each
other, and left truth to prevail by its own force and intrinsic evi-
dence. In no other country is the wise toleration established by
law, so complete as in this. But in no country whatever, is a
spirit of persecution for mere opinions, more prevalent than in the
United States of America. It is a country most tolerant in theo-
ry, and most bi«otted in practice. The laws control no man'*

L 324 j

opinions ; they control his conduct only. They guarantee lie
dom of conscience, of profession, and of discussion to every creed
and form of worship; the frame rs of tlicm, well knowing that the
result of conflicting opinion and open discussion, can only be
truth ; and that no opinion deserves to be protected, which cannot
protect itself.

But the clergy of this country, I hope not of all sects, the Calvin-
istic clergy chiefly, are united in persecuting every man who calls
in question any of their metaphysical opinions, or who hints at
their views of ambition and aggrandizement. They dare not ac-
tually stab him or burn him: but they raise the out-cry of mad
dog ; they villify him ; they give him nick names ; they hoot at him
as infidel, deist, atheist; they set the ignorant upon him to abuse
his person, character, and conduct; they treat him with open re-
vilings ; they urge him with clandestine falsehoods, and they in-
terdict him as far as possible from all intercourse with society.
Then it is they exult, when their secret lies have blasted his char-
acter, and their open denunciations have blasted his prospects in
society. There are individual exceptions to this picture; but it is
faithful as a representation of the body. I know and have felt
their unprovoked hostility, and their rancorous combinations.
Cowardly and cruel, their machinations are private, and their en-
mity unforgiving. "What earthly reason can a man have to dread
discussion, but that his opinion will not bear it? What makes
men cruel, but their cowardice? Calvin procured Servetus to be
burnt to death. Whom did Jesus Christ burn? Yet has that
gloomy murderer of Geneva more zealots devoted to his intole-
rant creed in the United States, than in any other part of the globe.
Why? because it is a fit instrument in the hands of the clergy, in
proportion as it is intolerant and unintelligible. Weak minds
have a vast opinion of the knowledge of those who pretend to be
familiar with truths that appear so mysterious. It is in the fetters
of mystery that the priesthood binds and bends the spirit and the
consciences of their ignorant hearers. The religion of the Gospel
is too plain and simple for their purposes ; hence their ardent ef-
forts to establish their own mysterious creed. In what country
has it been, that the priesthood as a body have not been cruel, and
persecuting, dreading contradiction, hating discussion, and hold-
ing every doubter as a concealed enemy? They are so here.

Fellow citizens — The Presbyterians of these States, the Con-
gregationalists, the Seceders, and in some places the Baptists,
dragging after them the timid Episcopalians, have combined, and
for many years have been steadily prosecuting the following
schemes, with a perseverance and devotedness worthy of abetter
cause.

They are steadily aiming at a Church Establishment ; at an
alliance between church and state ; so as to bring the civil power
in aid of their own plans of aggrandisement.

[ 325 ]

They are steadily aiming in their pamphlets and their preach-
ings, to establish the religious obligation of paying TYTHES of
all you possess ; in strong hopes of procuring this system to be es-
tablished also by law. This will render them not only wealthy,
but independent of their congregations, whom they consider as by
right dependent upon them ; assuming openly the character of
God's vicegerents, and branding all opposition to their ambitious
designs as blasphemy. They are steadily aiming to obtain the
entire control of every seminary of Education, throughout the
United States; claiming the exclusive superintendence of them,
as a matter of right. This is done with a view of infusing into
the minds of the rising generation, an implicit reverence for
the priesthood, and an attachment to the views and interests of
the priesthood.

They look with a jealous eye at every scientific discussion ;
prohibiting, so far as they dare, all investigations that do not har-
monise with their own theological creed. Their interference has
been recent and violent, with respect to physiological, zoological,
and geological discussions. No printer, no editor of a scientific
journal, dare insert an article in favor of any opinion which the
clergy have pronounced heterodox. Fanaticism has completely
clipped the wings of science in this country. They have organ-
ized a stupendous scheme of raising a pecuniary fund, to uphold
their pretensions, by picking the pockets of the people under some
or under all of the following pretences.

The educating of pious young men (as they are called) to the
ministry. That is, taking those who ought to be tillers of the
ground, and hiring them, by a theological education, as slaves for
life to the propogation of those tenets, by which the interest and
the views of these sects are best promoted. After having been
thus educated, apparently at the expense of these sectarians, and
really by means of the funds extracted from the folly, the indo-
lence, the timidity, or the good nature of the public, they hold
themselves bound to the doctrines and interests of their precep-
tors, and become the standing army of the church militant. The
establishment of missionary societies, to furnish the East Indians,
the American Indians, the Australasians, and the Africans, with
parsons, who can neither speak the language of their hearers, or
make themselves understood. The subscribers to these institu-
tions, seldom or never look after the sums they subscribe, which
are under the absolute control of these manufacturers of missiona-
ries; whose object is not missionaries, so much as men devoted to
their interest, when they shall come out in' favor of a church es-
tablishment and tythes.

Societies to make ministers of individual congregations trus-
tees for life of these missionary societies; and of course, to have
a voice in disposing of the sums thus elicited from the people's
pockets. What the missionaries are, and how they live when

L 326 J

they can get the means, 1 hope some one will shew by exhibiting
the style ofluxury of the Serampoor missionaries.

Prayer Meeting Societies, which, by means of the weak and
credulous females who attend them, furnish the priests with a sure
source of influence and information over the domestic concerns of
every family.

Female benevolent and missionary societies ; female mite socie-
ties; for no sum is too small for their acceptance; Juvenile socie-
ties of children, who are cajoled out of their 6 cent and 12 cent
pieces ; cheated out of their ginger-bread money, to give to insti-
tutions of which they hardly know the name. No sum is too small
for acceptance, and no plan too mean to acquire it. Missionary
fields of corn, wheat and potatoes ; missionary hog societies ; mis-
sionary rag-bag societies, and missionary scrap societies. All
means of scraping together money, the most trifling and con-
temptible, are employed by these men : not individually, but cor-
porately, and en masse.

But their most profitable concern, is that of becoming authors,
printers, and booksellers. Composing, praising, recommending
religious tracts, sermons, and almanacs. The Bible society, in-
terfering with the regular printing trade, cannot have less than
8150,000 engaged, which brings a good interest to the persons
who conduct it.

Such are the means of satisfying the craving for Money, Money,
Money, employed by this ambitious, avaricious and crafty set of
men. In all other respects, they are more devoid of useful knowl-
edge than any other class of persons in the community. But
they act in concert : they have thrown their fetters over the minds
of the people — they have cowed the spirit of the community — the
literary classes are compelled to succumb to them — they look
forward to the day when they shall govern the Union in their own
manner, and in mean time, take good care to plunge their hands
deep in the pockets of those whom they can flatter or freighter!
into acquiescence and submission.

If the people do not keep the CLERGY under .control, they
will bring the people into abject slavery, and keep them there. In
every nation upon earth, they have done so; what should change
their character here ? It is in the year 1822, that the clergy of
Austria have persuaded the monarch over 40 millions of people
to say, " I want no men of science, I want only obedient subjects.
I want no education among my subjects, but what is given by the
priesthood." Look at the priesthood in Fiance, Spain, Italy,
Mexico, even in England : is not their general character one and
the same? Already has the religious arrogance of this order ot
men, tempted them to assume the character of God's immediate
agents and vicegerants — placed at an immense distance from the
herd ot inferior beings who compose their congregations. Look
at New York and Philadelphia papers, for instance. " By divine

Permission, on such a day the Rev. Mr. A. will perform divine sev«
vice at such a place." Latterly (that is, within a few months)
this style of annunciation has not been so frequent; but for a
twelvemonth it was quite the fashion.

In what part of the New Testament has Christ said, you cannot
approach the Father but through the agency of men divinely com-
missioned from among you for the purpose, and well paid for their
services ? lias he not said, where two or three are gathered to-
gether in my name, there am I in the midst of you ? And yet
these men scruple not to declare that any religious exhortation
by a layman, any usurpation of the functions usually performed by
a hired and paid priest, is not only improper and indefensible, but
a SIN ! and Dr. Jishbel Green, of Princeton, has recently denoun-
ced such persons as presumptuous and sinful intruders on the
rights of the priesthood ! They claim it as a right to be exclu-
sively hired, and well paid ; and we patiently submit to it ! as if
the God of Love, the kind Father and preserver of the human race,
were a gloomy, haughty tyrant, not to be approached but through
the intervention of these arrogant ministers of state, who take good
care to be remunerated for their intercession.

I have no objection to a ministry appointed as a convenient and
expedient class of men, that the religious business of a district may
be conducted decently and in order; but upon no other ground.
And although 1 should prefer well educated and liberal men for
this purpose, I see no reason for giving them an exclusive prefer-
ence. In the purest times of Christianity, the elders of the church
transacted the religious business of it. Did Jesus Christ choose
his disciples whom he nominated to preachthe Gospel, from among
the learned and the wise ? Mankind are pestered with the rights
of the friesthood ! rights ! what rights ? who pays them, who sup-
ports them ? who enables these drones in the'hive, to fatten on
the labours of the industrious bee ? who seem to glory in being
ignorant of all useful knowledge, and skilled only in the quarrel-
some questions and senseless jargon of metaphysical divinity.

It is the idleness, the pride, the aristocracy of rank and wealth,
that has rendered a priesthood necessary. People are too indo-
lent or too timid to pray for themselves, and they hire a priest to
pray for them ! Then too, their ears must be tickled by eloquent
discourses ; as if religion needed eloquence to enforce it ! surely
all this is not neeessarily and essentially religion ! Fellow citi-
zens, you aid these impostors to cheat you, by making them neces-
sary to you. Let them know they are your servants ; that they
are not as they claim to be, your masters; let them know that
you hire them and you pay them ; and they will not be a whit the
less pious for being more humble.

These views of the subject are well worth your consideration.
The priesthood in every age, in every country, forbid discussion,
frown down all investigation ; they require, like other tyrants.

I 328 ]

passive obedience and non-resistance* They denounce every man
who opposes their views : not merely their spiritual, but their
temporal views. Their intent here, as elsewhere, is to fetter your
minds first, and your bodies afterwards; and finally, to command
your pockets.

It is high time to warn the people, that their liberties are in
danger; that they are about to be undermined by a crafty, perse-
vering, insidious foe in the imposing garb of a heavenly friend.
It is high time to call upon the honest citizens of this yet free
country, and to sound the watch word

Blow ye the trumpet in Zion!

To Dr. Thomas Cooper.

Montecello, Dkc. 11, 1823.
Dear Sir :

I duly received your favor of the 23d ult. as also the two pamphlets
you were so kind as to send me. That on the tariff, I observed, was soon
re-printed in Ritchie's Enquirer. I was only sorry he did not postpone it
to the meeting of Congress, when it would have got into the hands of all
the members, and could not fail to have great effect, perhaps a decisive
one. It is really an extraordinary proposition that the agricultural, mer-
cantile and navigating classes should be taxed to maintain that of manu-
factures.

That the doctrine of Materialism was that of Jesus himself, was a new
idea to me. Yet it is proved unquestionably. We all know it was that of
some of the early Fathers. I hope the physiological part will follow ; in
spite of the prevailing fanaticism, reason will make its way. I confess
that its reign at present is appalling. General education is the true rem-
edy, and that most happily is now generally encouraged. The story you
mention as gotten up by your opponents, of my having advised the Trus-
tees of our University to turn you out as Professor, is quite in their style
of bare-faced mendacity. They find it so easy to obliterate the reason of
mankind, that they think they may enterprise safely on his memory also :
for it was the winter before the last only, that our annual report to the
Legislature, printed in the newspapers, stated the precise ground on which
we relinquished your engagement with our Central College. And, if my
memory does not deceive me, it was on your own proposition, that the
time of our setting into operation being postponed indefinitely, it was im-
portant to you not to loose an opportunity of fixing yourself permanently i
and that they should father on me too, the motion for this dismission, than
whom no man living cherishes a higher estimation of your worth, talents
and information. But so the world goes. Man is fed with fables thrtragh

[ 329 ]

Hfe, leaves it in the belief that he has known something of what has been
passing, when in truth he has known nothing but what has passed under
his own eye. And who are the great deceivers ? Those who solemnly
pretend to be the depositories of the sacred truths of God himself! I will
not believe that the liberality of the State to which you are rendering
services of science which no other man in the Union is quilifiedto render
it, will suffer you to be in danger from a set of conjurers.

I note what you say of Mr. Finch; but the moment of our Commence-
ment is as indefinite as it ever was. Affectionately and respectfully,

Yours,

TH. JEFFERSON.

Mr. Jefferson was not aware that Materialism is the real doc-
trines of Jesus Christ, until I sent him the preceding tract : See
his letter to W. Short, April 13, 1820, in the 4th volume of his
correspondence, p. 320. "But while this syllabus is meant to place
the character of Jesus in its true light as no imposter himself , but
a great reformer of the Hebrew code of religion, it is not to be un-
derstood that lam with him in all his doctrines. I am a Materi-
alist ; he takes the side of Spiritualism," &c. &c. See also his
letter toMr.J, Adams, Aug. 15, 1820, same volume, p. 331, 332.

" When once we quit the basis of sensation, all is in the
wind. To talk of immaterial existence is to talk of nothings.
To say that the human Sold, Jlngels, God, are immaterial, is to sayt
they are nothings, or that there is no God, no Jlngels, no Soul. I
cannot reason otherwise. But I believe lam supported in my creed
of Materialism by the Lockes, the Tracys, the Stewarts. At
what age of the Christian Church this heresy of Immaterialism,
or masked Atheism crept in, I do not exactly know ;* but a
heresy it certainly is. Jesus taught nothing of it. He said, in-
deed, God is a spirit, but he has not defined what spirit is, nor has
he said it is not matter, &c. See also letter to J. Adams, April
11, 1823— p. 364.

The syllabus, he mentions in his letter to W. Short, was a brief
view of the character, &c. summary of the doctrines, theological
and moral, of Jesus Christ, taken from his own expressions. It
was first sent, I believe, to Dr. Rush. It is worthy of notice, how
careful he was that it should not get abroad among the public,
owing to the rancorous hatred with which he was pursued durino-
a great part of his most useful life by the clergy. It is melancholy
to think that such a man should have reason to fear the publication
of snch a work, in this enlightened country ! Pudet hose appro-
bria nobis et did potuisse, et non potuisse refelli !

* At tho Council of Nice, A. D. 324.
42

A

VIEW OF THE
METAPHYSICAL AND PHYSIOLOGICAL

ARGUMENTS

IN TAVOR OF

MATERIALISM,

FIRST PUBLISHED AT WARRINGTON, ENGLAND, IN
1781.

BY THOMAS COOPER, M. D.

Uoiqcrov & cuiO^v ', $0$ tf o<pQu\poi<riv ibscQcci
Kv $rj (poccc '/jxi ote<r<rov.

Grant us day light and fair play. — Homer's III p. 646.

RE-PUBLISHED WITH SOME ALTERATIONS,

AND SOLD BY A. SMALL,

PHILADELPHIA.

1823.

THESE PAGES
ARE RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
TO THE MEDICAL GENTLEMEN OF THE
UNITED STATES,
AS THE MOST COMPETENT JUDGES OF THE ARGU-
MENTS CONTAINED IN THEM.

ON THE SOUL.

The argument in favor of the separate existence of an im-
material SOUL JOINED WITH AND PLACED IN THE HUMAN BODY,
IS AS FOLLOWS.

Man consists of a body, which, when living, exhibits a peculiar
organization, and certain phenomena connected with it, termed
intellectual ; such as perception, memory, thinking or reasoning,
and willing or determing. When the body ceases to live, it be-
comes decomposed into carbon, azote, hydrogen, oxygen, phospho-
rus, and lime ; and perhaps another substance or two : all of them
similar to what we find in the inanimate material bodies around
us. We differ from them, so far as we can judge by our senses, in
no way, but in possessing a peculiar organization which those
bodies have not. But as no configuration or disposition of the
particles of which our bodies are composed, can amount to an)
thing more than varieties of position — varieties of matter and mo-
tion, we have no reason to ascribe perception, memory, thought, or
will, to any form of matter and motion, however varied. From
matter and motion, nothing but matter and motion can result.
The phenomena of intellect are too dissimilar to allow us to con-
sider them as the result of, or as varieties of matter and motion.
We must, therefore, recur to some other principle as the source
of intellect; and that cannot be the body. It must be some-
thing different from mere matter and motion, something im-
material, something that has no relation to matter : that something,
be it a separate being, or a separate principle, is the Soul. Will
any arrangement of carbon, azote, hydrogen and oygen, produce
a syllogism ? Having no relation to matter, being essentially im-
material, this source of intellect is not, like matter, liable to de-
composition and decay : it is therefore immortal : it dies not when
the body dies. It puts a future state therefore, out of doubt, for it
lives when the body is no more.

Such are the views generally taken of this question by those
who believe in the separate existence of an immaterial Soul as the
cause and origin of all the phenomena termed mental or intellec-
tual. With them, it is absurd to ascribe the sublime fictions ot
poetry, or the sublimer disquisitions of Newton and La Place, to
a mere arrrangement of assimilated particles of the grossest kind ;
possessing, before their entrance into the body, and when thrown

[ 33G I

by the exhalent vessels out of it, nothing approaching the nature
of intellect under any of its denominations.

In the present view of the subject, all arguments of a theological
nature are excluded. They can be considered apart : and they
are to the full as difficult of solution, as the arguments deduced
from natural phenomena ; and are productive of as much practical
discrepancy.

The Immaterialists of modern days are led on still further.
They say that the tendency to organization itself, and all the re-
sults of that tendency, must have been originally imparted and
communicated to inert matter, which could not have assumed this
tendency by any effort of its own. That organization, lite, and
the properties connected with life, as feeding, digestion, assimila-
tion, excretion, &c. as well as the phenomena termed intellectual,
cannot arise from any known property of matter as such ; and
therefore must have been originally impressed by that Being to
whom all creation is to be ascribed. That the phenomena termed
intellectual, are clearly distinguishable from the other phenomena
of living organized matter— they are peculiar to the human spe-
cies—not to be accounted tor from the common properties of
organization or life, and are therefore owing to a separate and
distinct communication from the author of our common existence.
That not being ascribable to any form of organization, or to be
reo-arded as the result of it, they must of necessity be ascribed to
some separate being of a different and superior nature from mat-
ter ; destined during the present life to act by means of the bodily
organs This separate being is the Soul. It is granted that we
are not to argue from the possibility of any thing, to its actual
existence, (a posse ad esse non valet consequent™,) but when the
phenomena cannot be explained by any known properties of or-
ganized or unorganized matter, we are of necessity driven to
something else than— something beside matter— something which
is not matter, to explain appearances that are not material.

I do not know how to state better, more fairly, or more forcibly,
the views taken of this question by the writers who contend tor
the separate existence of the Soul, as a being perfectly immaterial,
and by consequence incorruptible and immortal.
ON THE OTHER HAND,

The Materialists, who ascribe all the phenomena termed intel-
lectual, to the body; and consider them as the properties of organ-
ized matter, the result of that organization— reason as follows :

Their arguments may be considered, as 1. Metaphysical, and 2.
Physiological.

To begin with the first class.

1. The only reason we have for asserting in any case that one
thing is the property of another, is the certainty or universality
with which we always find them accompanying each other. Thus,
v.e say gold is ductile, becsuse wc have always found gold, when

f 331 ]

pure to be so. We assert that manure will nourish a plant — that
muscular fibres are irritable — that the nerves are the instruments
of sensation, &c. for the same reason. Let the reader sit down,
and describe a mineral by its characters, and he will have no doubt
of the truth of this assertion.

Moreover, finding by experience that every thing we see has
some cause of its existence, we are induced to ascribe the constant
concomitance of a substance and any of its properties, to some ne-
cessary connexion between them. Hence, therefore, certainty and
universality of concomitance is the. sole ground of asserting or
supposing a necessary connexion between two phenomena. And
we cannot help believing that like consequences will invariably
follow like antecedents under like circumstances. For thus we
reason : if two circumstances, or things, always present themselves
to our observation accompanying each other — the one always pre-
ceding, the other always following — there must be some reason in
the nature of things why it should be so.

There is a necessary connexion between such a structure as the
nervous system in animals, and the property of sensation, or as it
is often called, Perception*— -the property of feeling, of being
conscious of impressions made upon our senses. For there is pre-
cisely the same reason for making this assertion, as there can be
for any other the most incontestable; namely, the certainty and
universality wherewith (in a healthy state of the system) we ob-
serve perception and the nervous system accompany each other.
The seat of perception, so far as we know from the facts of anatomy
and physiology, is situated at the internal sentient extremity of
the nerve impressed. But be it there or elsewhere, as it manifest-
ly belongs to the nervous system, that is sufficient for the purpose.
It must be somewhere. Let the reader, according to his best
judgment from known facts, place it where he thinks fit, and it
will equally serve the purposes of my argument. Perception, sen-
sation, feeling, consciousness of impressions, (lor all these terms
have been used synonymously ; I prefer the first,) is a property ot
the nervous apparatus belonging to animal bodies in health and
life. When the sentient extremities of a nerve are excited or
impressed, perception is the certain instantaneous result, as surely
as the peculiar weight, color, ductility, and affinities of gold are
the result of gold, when obtained pure. These properties are inse-
parable. You must define gold by them : in like manner, you must
define the properties of the nervous system by perception — sensa-
tion.

I consider this argument as conclusive ; unless it can be shewn
how perception results necessarily from something distinct from,
and independent of the nervous system; or that, w-hether this can

*The French writers call it conscience, consciousness. The English

■ ' 43

[ 33$ J

be shewn or not, the assertion that perception does so result, im
plies a contradiction, and therefore is at all events inadmissible.
As to the how— the mode and manner in which perception results
from the stimulations of the nervous system — how or why it is, as
we see it to be, a function of the brain — no one can pretend to
shew or to explain ; any more than we can shew or explain how an
immaterial soul can act on a material body without having one
property in common with it. In the first case we feel in ourselves,
and we know by observing others, that perception, feeling, or con-
sciousness is a function of that visible organ ; but of the existence
of a separate soul, we know nothing but by conjecture. We know
that irritability and contractility are properties of the mus-
cular fibre, but beyond the mere fact of its being thus, we know
nothing. Can we explain the life and growth of a blade of grass ?
That certainty and universality of concomitance is the sole
ground for asserting a necessary connexion between two phenom-
ena, or that the one is the result of the other, is so true, that if this
be false, no argument from induction can possibly be true : for all
proofs from induction imply the truth of this. And as no direct
contradiction has ever been attempted to be shewn in the assertion
that perception is the result of organization — as the matter of
fact, so far as our senses can judge, is plainly so — anclas no im-
materialist has ever yet pretended to account how perception re-
sults from an immaterial rather than a material substance — there
is nothing more requisite to prove that perception is really and
truly the result of our organization. The argument then stands
thus: Certainty and universality of concomitance between two or
more phenomena, are the only direct reasons we have, for assert-
ing or supposing a necessary connexion between them. The pro-
perty of perception and a sound state of the nervous system un-
der excitation, are certainly and universally concomitant. There-
fore, this concomitance furnishes the only direct reason we have
for asserting a necessary connexion between perception and the
nervous system. But this reason is the same that we have for as-
serting a necessary connexion between any other phenomena
whatever. Therefore, we have the same reason for asserting a
necessary connexion between the property of perception and a
sound state of the nervous system, as for asserting the same thing
of any other phenomena whatever. It will be understood of
course, that the nervous system must be excited, before the ex-
citement can be perceived; and whether we adopt Hume's phra-
seology, or that of Dr. T.Brown in his Treatise on Cause and Ef-
fect, the argument will be exactly the same. In all cases, where
the necessaryconnection between two phenomena is such, that the
one is denominated a. property, and the other the subject of which
the first is a property, the property is universally deemed to result
necessarily from the nature or essence of the subject to which it
^plnno; a . But as perception must be a propertv of something :

[ 339 ]

and as it is uniformly connected with a sound state of the ner-
tous system, perception is a property of that system, and results
necessarily from the nature or essence thereof.

Such is the proper and direct proof of the doctrine of Material-
ism; which, so far as I am acquainted with the controversy, re-
mains unanswered. But this doctrine will receive additional
support, if the opposite doctrine of Immaterialism can be shewn
impossible or improbable. I shall endeavour to do both.
Of the Impossibility of the Existence of an Immaterial, Indiscerp-
tible, Immortal Soul.

2.— (a) The Soul hath all the properties of matter and no oth-
er : or it hath some properties in common with matter, and some
that matter hath not : or it hath no property in common with
matter.

In the first case.it is matter, and nothing else.

In the second case, it is partially material.

In the third case, it is in no respeet of degree material This
the last case is the only one of the alternatives that the hypothesis
of Immaterialism can consistently maintain : for in so far as the
soul is material, it will be discerptible, mortal, and corruptible,
as matter is.

(&) But let the Soul have no property in common with matter.
Then I say : Nothing can act upon another but by means of some
common property. Of this we have not only all the proof that in-
duction of known and acknowledged cases can furnish, but that ad-
ditional proof also which arises from the impossibility of conceiv-
ing how the opposite proposition can be true. You cannot erect
the Colisceum at Rome by playing Haydn's Rondeau. You can-
not impel a ray of light by the mace of a billiard table, and so on.
This proposition is every where admitted, or assumed in treatises
on natural philosophy.

But by the proposition, the Soul hath no property in common
with matter. Whereas by the universal acknowledgement of Im-
materialists, the Soul acts upon and by means of the material bo-
dy : but it is a contradiction to suppose that the Soul can and can-
not, does and does not, act upon the material body: and therefore,
the hypothesis involving this contradiction must fall to the ground.

3. (a) Whatever we know, we know by means of its properties,
nor do we, in any case, know certainly any thing but these. Gold
is heavy, yellow, ductile, soluble in aqua regia, &c. Suppose gold
deprived for an instant of all these properties — what remains,
would it be gold ? If it have other properties, it is another sub-
stance ; if it have no properties remaining, it is nothing; for noth-
ing is that which hath no properties. Hence, if any thing lose all
its properties, it becomes nothing; it looses its existence.

(b) Now the existence of the soul is inferred like the existence
of every thing else, from its supposed properties, which are the in

[ 34U j

tellectuul phenomena of the human being, perception, memory,
judgment, volition. But in all cases of perfect sleep — of the
operation of a strong narcotic — of apoplexy — of swooning — of
drowning where the vital powers are not extinguished — of the ef-
fects of a violent blow on the back of the head — and all other lei-
pothymic affections — there is neither perception, memory, judg-
ment or volition ; that is, all the properties of the Soul are gone,
are extinguished ; therefore the Soul itself looses its existence for
the time ; all evidences and traces of its existence are lost; pro
hac vice, therefore, and during the continuance of these derange-
ments of the nervous system, the Soul is dead, for all its proper-
ties are actually extinguished. The Soul, therefore, is not immor-
tal, and of consequence it is not immaterial.

(c) This disappearance of all intellectual phenomena in conse-
quence of the derangement of the nervous apparatus of the human
system, is easily accounted for, if they be considered (as the Ma-
terialists consider them) no other than phenomena dependent up-
on the nervous system in its usual state of excitement by impres-
sions ab extra, or motions dependent on the sensitive surfaces of
the internal vicera, and on association originating ab intra. On
this view of the subject, all is natural and explicable. Butif these
intellectual phenomena are the evidences and properties of a sepa-
rate immaterial being (the Soul) then comes the insuperable diffi-
culty — where is the subject itself when all its properties, all evi-
dences of its existence are annihilated ; though but for a day or an
hour. A materialist can easily account for returning animation
by renewed excitement from the unsuspended action of the func-
tions of organic life.

4. No laws of reasoning will free us from the bondage imposed
by matters of fact. It is impossible to deny that all these intellec-
tual phenomena, these peculiar properties of an immaterial Soul,
these only evidences of its existence, are also properties of the bo-
dy: for where there is no nervous apparatus, as in vegetables,
they never appear ; nor do they appear in the embryo or the infant,
till the encephalon is developed ; where the nervous system is de-
ranged by violence, or by disease, or by medicine, these phenomena
are also deranged, and even disappear ; when the body dies and the
nervous system with it, all these phenomena cease, and arc irrevoca-
bly gone ; we never possess after death, so far as our senses can
inform us, the slightest evidence of the existence of any remaining
being, which, connected with the body during life, is separated
from it at death. This may be asserted, but there is not one soli-
tary fact to prove it : when the body dies, no more perception, no
more memory, no more volition. So far as we can see, these die
with the body, and exhibit no proof of their subsequent existence.
These phenomena, are phenomena then of the body : if they beal-

'^Feelingr, Sensation, Consciousness, are the synonymous terms. T. C

[ 341 ]

>>o phenomena of the Soul, then is the Soul also, like the body, ma-
terial ; for it has properties in common.

(b) If it be said the .Soul may exist after the body is dead and
decomposed, I reply, the soul may also not exist : one supposition
i9 as good as the other. Remember, it is not allowable in fan-
argument to take for granted the existence of a thing, merely be-
cause it may possibly exist. If you assert its existence, you must
prove your assertion. Jlffirmantis estprobare. A posse ad esse, non
valet consequentia.

(c) If anyone shall say these properties are only suspended for
the time, I would desire him to examine what idea he annexes to
this suspension; whether it be any thing more or less than they
are made not to exist for the time. Either no more is meant, or it
is plainly opposed to matter of fact. Moreover if more be meant,
it may easily be proved to involve the archetypal existence of ab-
stract ideas ; to approach to the Platonic absurdities modified by
the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz, which, I apprehend, will
not be considered as defensible at this day. It can also be shewn that
such ulterior meaning will contradict the maxim impossibile est
idem esse et non esse. It will involve the grammatical absurdity
of making a noun adjective stand by itself.

(d) If any one shall say farther, " These mental phenomena are
not constituent parts, but acts of the soul, and evidences of its ex-
istence; so that the soul may continue to exist when it no longer
continues to act, or to act in this manner — that it does not follow
that a man's power of working is annihilated because he has lost the
tools or instruments with which he has usually worked."— I re-
ply : 1. That whenever the evidences of the existence of a thing
arise from the nature and structure of the thing itself, they
are synonymous with its properties. Such are the phenom-
ena of thinking with respect to the Soul: they are confes-
sedly of its very essence. I cannot give a plainer illustra-
tion than I have already given ; let my reader, if he be a
mineralogist, sit down and describe a mineral ; and then let
hiin suppose all his characters annihilated. 2. As these intel-
lectual phenomena are all the evidences we have of the SouPs
existence, when these are destroyed or extinguished, so is the con-
clusion drawn from them. When all the evidences of the exis-
tence of life fail, no one scruples to say that life itself is gone.
3. The instruments with which a man usually works, are only a
smalt part of, not all the evidences of his power of working.
Were he to lose his senses, and his hands, and his powers of voli-
tion, and of voluntary motion, which are also conjoint evidences
of his power of working, every one would say he had lost that pow-
er; that is, it no longer existed. 4. It is equally legitimate to
assert of gold, for instance, that what are termed its essential and
characteristic properties are nothing more than acts and evidences
of the existence of the substance gold, which may continue to ex-

[ 342 j

ist, notwithstanding it no longer continues to exhibit any of those
phenomena which are termed its properties, but are in fact only
temporary evidences of its existence. Would any reasonable
man acknowledge the justness of such an argument? 5. If this
conclusion a posse ad esse — a potentiaad actum — from the remot-
est of all possibilities of existence, be allowed — then can anything
whatever be prove;! to exist in despite of all proof to the contra-
ry. Would not a physician regard that man as a lunatic, who was
seriously to say of a putrid dead body before them; "to be sure,
none of the actions which are the evidences of life are exhibited
at present, but life may exist notwithstanding?"

5. — (a) All relative terms imply the existence of their corre-
lates: a man cannot be a father without having a child, a husband
without a wife, &c. Hence when either of two relatives cease to
exist, the other does so likewise.

(b) All those ideas which make up our idea of the Soul, or in
other words, all those properties from whence we infer its existence,
are relative; their correlates are ideas. Thus, there can be no
perception without ideas to be perceived; no recollection without
ideas to be remembered ; no judgment without ideas to be com-
pared; no volition without ideas of the object on which it is ex-
erted.

(c) Locke has shewn that we have no innate ideas ; that all
our ideas are ideas of sensation or reflection ; and that the ideas
of reflection are no other than the operations of the mind on our
ideas of sensation : that is, all our ideas proceed from, and arc
founded on the impressions made upon our senses. The doctrine
of the ancient school was the same, nil unquam fuit in intellectu,
quod non prius erat in sensu, including the internal as well as the
external senses; which is not the less true for being -acknowledged
as true by the wisest men of antiquity.* I am aware of the "fa-

* That the bett informed of modern writers hold the same doctrine ,
and that the whole phenomena termed mental are merely excitations of
the nervous system perceived, I assert, on the authority of Cabanis, of
Bichat, of Bluinenbach, of Rieherand, of Majendie ; as well as Hartley,
Darwin, Priestley, and Lawrence. The elementary works of Bichat,
Rieherand, Blumenbacb, and Magendie, being usually read in all our
medical schools, I subjoin the references.

See Bichat, Phys. Res. (Dr. Watkins' Edit 1809. Philad.) p. 105, prope
finem. Rieherand, (Dr. Chapman's Edit 1813, Philad.) p. 390—392 and
p. 400. Blumenbach, (Dr. Caldwell's Edit. 1795, Philad.) p. 195 of Vol.
1. Magendie, (Dr. Revere's Edit. Baltim. 1822,) p. 102, 103.. Brous-
sais' sur l'irrit. et la Folie, p. 448.

The reader will find that the best informed and most approved elemen-
tary writers on physiology adopt the Latin axiom in the text, verbatim,
or in substance. So Haller, Phys. § 556, describes a sensation as an af-
fection of the brain perceived. Primae Lineae, Edmb. 1767.

No man is qualified to write on metaphysics and the phenomena of in-

I 343 j

culties of the mind," the numberless brood of the Scotch meta-
physicians. I cannot and will not condescend to reply to the
dreadful nonsense on this subject assumed as true by Dr. Reid
and Dr. Beattie, or to the shallow sophisms of Dr. Gregory, or the
prolix pages of inanity of Dr. Dugald Stewart, or the ignorant
hardihood of assertion of Dr Barclay in his late inquiry. We are
all before the public, and I am content. In the mean time, let the
reader ask himself, how he could acquire ideas of vision without
the eye and its apparatus — of odour without the nostrils — of
taste without the papillae on the tongue and palate, &c. Let him
say what ideas a man could have, all whose senses were entirely
wanting. This is enough.

In tact, people begin to doubt whether a man can by any possi-
bility, receive satisfactory evidence of the existence of any thing
whatever, not cognizable by any of the human senses.

(rf) But if all our ideas proceed from impressions made on our
senses, as these are entirely corporeal, we never could have at-
tained ideas without the body; that is, there would have been
none of the phenomena of perception, recollection, judgment, or
volition without the body: that is, there would have been none of
those phenomena of thinking from whence we deduce the existence
of the Soul — none of the properties of the Soul, without the body:
in other words, there would have been no Soul without the body.
So that the commencement of the existence of the Soul depends
on the commencement of the existence of the body. Such is mat-
ter of fact.

(e) But the Immaterialists say, the Soul is distinct from and
independent of the body as to its existence : hence, it is both de-
pendent and independent of the body: that is, it does not exist,
for contradictions cannot co-exist.

tellect, who is not well versed in physiology, a branch of knowledge in
which the Scotch school of metaphysicians arc sadly deficient.

I would not willingly include Dr. T. Brown in this tirade against his
superficial and dogmatic predecessors. I agree with him, that power and
causation arc words only, and inseparable from the real and actual antece-
dents and consequents to which they relate : and that our belief of the in-
variable attendence of like consequents on like antecedents, under like
circumstances, is rather intuitive than a process of reasoning. I much
fear, however, he has not succeeded in obviating the difficulty of Hume's
argument against miracles ; for all that writer's argument applies to the
introduction of new antecedents, the permanent character of the usual
and natural course of phenomena; and the difficulty of establishing this
introduction by testimony which remains just as before. Dr. Brown has
substituted one form of defence for another, but he has not substantially
altered the state of the case. Brown, however, is acleai sighted and able
metaphysician, but of the Scotch school ^whose characteristic is, a dread-
ful ignorance of all physiological facts. T. C.

[ 344 ]

The Immortality, a parte ante, of the Soul being null, let us ex*
amine its Immortality a parte post.

6. (a) all impressions made on our senses can be traced up to
the internal sentient extremity of the nerve impressed, and no
further.

(b) When an impression has been made on our senses by means
of external objects, we have the property of perceiving the effects
of that impression at a distance of time, and after the original im-
pression has ceased. This is memory and recollection. Hence,
although all our ideas have been caused by impressions made on
our senses originally, we may lose one or two of our senses, and
yet remember the ideas which are the effect of the impressions
formerly made on them.

(c) But ideas can no more be remembered without the nervous
system, than they could have been caused originally without the
senses. All this is plain matter of fact.

(d) At death, however, not only all our senses are destroyed,
(the only sources of original ideas) but the nervous system itself
is destroyed, which is the sine qua non to the existence of ideas
already caused. At dqath, therefore, all our ideas of every kind
are destroyed.

(e) But there can be none of the properties of the Soul without
ideas: for these are relates and correlates; and if all the proper-
ties of the Soul are destroyed, the Soul itself is destroyed.

(/) Therefore, whatever may be the case during the life of the
body, the Soul did not exist previous thereto, and is destroyed
when that is destroyed.

(g) And when it is considered that many circumstances during
the life of the body may totally destroy for a time all the proper-
ties of the Soul, the little of existence that remains is hardly worth
contending for.

(h) But when it is further considered, that the natural immor-
tality of the Soul is supposed a necessary consequence of its im-
materiality, it will be a necessary consequence that this imma-
terial soul does not exist at all.

6. If the Soul exist at all, it must exist somewhere, for it is im-
possible to frame to one's self an idea of any thing existing which
exists no where, and yet whose operations are limited as to space.

(b) But if the Soul exist somewhere, by the terms it occupies
space; and therefore is extended; and therefore has figure or
shape, in common with matter.

(c) Moreover by the supposition of every Immatcrialist (except
Malbranche, Leibnitz, and Berkley) the Soul acts upon the body;
that is upon matter. That is, it attracts and repels, and is at-
tracted and repelled ; for there is no conceivable affection of mat-
ter, but what is founded upon, and reducible to, attraction and re-

[ 345 ]

pulsion. It it be attracted and repelled, its re-action must be at-
traction and repulsion. This implies solidity.

(d) The Soul then possesses extension, figure, solidity, attrac-
tion, repulsion. But these comprise all the properties by which
matter is characterized, and the Soul therefore, whatever else it
be, is a material being.

(e) But it cannot be both material and immaterial at the same
time, and therefore it does not exist.

7. Those truths which we derive from the evidence of our sen-
ses, carefully observed and sufficiently repeated, are more weighty
than such as are mere deductions of reason and argument. If
I feel that by beating a large stone with my fist I shall hurt
my knuckles, I cannot doubt of that after a sufficient number
of trials. If I find that a large quantity of strong wine will
render me intoxicated, I cannot disbelieve the result of expe-
rience. I see that the mental phenomena arc in fact connect-
ed with the organization of the human body, by means of the ner-
vous apparatus which is a part of it. I know by observation and
experience, that if you destroy that part of the nervous system
which supplies any one of the organs of sense, as the optic nerve
of the eye, the organs of that sense no longer supply me with the
same feelings as before. All this is matter of fact, ascertainable in
the same way that we ascertain the effect of a bottle of Madeira ;
by the use of our senses. About all this we can no more doubt,
than about our existence. But what evidence can we possibly
have of the existence of the Soul. It is not cognizable by any of
our senses — by any of the common inlets of knowledge — it is, by the
hypothesis, immaterial, it hath no relation to matter. By the very
nature of it, we can have no sensible proof of its existence. It is
an hypothesis, a supposed being, introduced to account for appear-
ances manifestly connected with our bodily organs, which so far
as we know, cannot take place without them, whether there be a
soul or not. This connexion we see, hear, feel, and know to exist,
though we do not exactly know how to trace it. But the Soul has
no existence for our senses — it is a being whose existence is as-
sumed because the present state of knowledge does not enable us
(perhaps) to account for the precise mode of connexion between
intelligence and our nervous system. I shall by and by shew,
that we arc ju6t as much at a loss to account for the growth of a
blade of grass, or the life of a tree, as for the reasoning of an
animal.

But let the reader reflect for a moment, and ask himself if this
hypothetical introduction of an immaterial soul to solve the diffi-
culties that our inevitable ignorance produces, be not a manifest
breach of the acknowledged axiom, a posse ad esse non valet con-
sequentia? A mere refuge for present ignorance of a connexion
^•hich future knowledge may or may not unravel.

A THSPr.Y explains unknown facts by the laws and properties of
44

146 ]

known facts. Newton applied the cause which makes a stone fall
to the earth to the tendency of the planets toward the sun. Here
was nothing new assumed to aid the reasoning. Had he said that
as it was impossible to explain the tendency of the planets toward
the sun, by any properties of the planets or the sun, and therefore
it must be owing to some angel whose duty it was to impel the
planets in their proper direction, this would have been hypothe-
sis : just like our notions of the Soul to account for the phenome-
na of the body.

So that we not only have no direct and satisfactory evidence of
the existence of the Soul, and from the presumed nature of it never
can have, but the clear, direct, undeniable evidence of our senses
is all the other w ay.

Is it not singular, moreover, that we cannot talk about this im-
material soul, its existence, its properties, its mode of action, but
in language suggested by and borrowed from the bodily senses?
Can we think or speak of immaterial beings in any other words or
expressions than those which our senses have suggested to us, and
which belong to our corporeal senses alone?

"I see" (says Mr. Hallet, in his discourses) "a man move, and
hear him speak for some years. From his speech, I certainly in-
fer that he thinks as I do. I see, then, that a man is a being who
thinks and acts. After some time, the man falls down in my
sight, grows cold and stiff- He speaks and acts no more. As the
only reason I had to believe that he did think, was his motion and
speech, so now that they cease, I have lost the only way I had of
proving that he had the power of thought. Upon this sudden
death, the one visible thing, the one man, is greatly changed.
Whence could I infer that the same he consists of tw r o parts, and
that the inward part continues to Jive and think, and flies away
from the body, while the outward part ceases to live and mover
It looks as if the whole man was gone, and that all his powers
cease at the same time. So far as I can discern, his motion and
thought die together.

" The powers of thought, speech, and motion equally depend on
the body, and run the same fate in case of men's declining old
age. When a man dies through old age, I see his powers of
motion and thought decay and die together, and each of them by
degrees :* the moment he ceases to move and breathe, he appears
to cease to think too.

" When I am left to mere reason, it seems to me, that my power
of thought depends as much on my body, as my power of sight and
hearing. Icouldnotthinkininfancy. My powers of thought, of sight,
and of feelingare equally liable to be obstructed by the body. A blow
on the head has deprived a man of thought, who could yet see, and
feel, and move. So that naturally the power of thinking seems to

* TJte reader will recollect Gil Bias' Archbishop of Toledo

i 341 ;,

belong as much to -the body, as any power of men whatsoevei
Naturally there appears no more reason to suppose a man can
think out of the body than that he can hear sounds or feel cold out
of the body.'*

If this be the case (which cannot be denied) — if there neither
be in fact, nor from the nature of the thing ever can be, any direct
evidence for the existence of an immaterial, distinct, inde-
pendent soul — still further, if all the direct and positive evi-
dence that there can be of any thing whatever, all that the present,
case can in the nature of it admit, is against the existence of such
a soul — how strong, how absolutely irrefragable, how evident ought
that reasoning to be, by which its existence is inferred ! Even
the possibility of its being fairly and honestly disputed, is a strong-
presumption against its conclusiveness. Who can fairly and hon-
estly dispute the dependence of thought on the body ?

8. I apprehend all the phenomena termed mental or intellectu-
al, are explicable as phenomena of the body. Hartley, and Des-
tut Tracey, the one in his first volume on Man, and the other. in.
his Ideologic, have done it to my satisfaction. I cannot enter in-
to their reasonings; they must speak for themselves. The public
by and by will give to these authors that fair play which the or-
thodoxy of the moment will not concede to them.

9. We have not the slightest proof of any kind, that ideas can
arise or can exist independently of corporeal organization. W r e
have never known them so to exist. Weknow not, norhave we from
facts the slightest reason to believe that they can. But the Soul
itself has been invented to account for them. They are (by those
who believe in a separate Soul) considered as essential to that
being — the peculiar property and result of the Soul's operations.
But where is the proof that ideas can exist in the Soul without the
body? W r here is thought when- the body dies? Where was
thought before the body began to exist ? De non apparentibus et
non e.vistentibus eadem est ratio. All assertions are equally true
concerning that which doth not exist, and that of whose existence
there is no evidence.

Such are the arguments of an abstract and metaphysical nature,
on which I ground my opinion that an immaterial, immortal Soul,
separate from the body, does not and cannot exist : and it appears
to me, from what has' been said, that there is the same proof for
the truth of the doctrine of Materialism, as that gold is heavy, ink
black, water fluid, or any other indubitable assertion. Also, that
there is the same proof that the opposite doctrine cannot he true,
as that contradictory assertions cannot be both true.

I come now to a class of arguments that assume a physiological
rather than a metaphysical character. But before 1 enter upon
this branch of the subject, I beg leave to state some physiological
propositions relating to the animal system, that bear upon the
subject in question.

[ 348

ihe objects around u-, have been conveniently classed into tin
mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms. The particles of the
bodies whereof each kind of substance is composed, have peculiar
active properties; by which they arrange themselves, when free
from the obstacle of pressure by foreign bodies, into some peculiar
form.

The particles of a mineral substance, when they have full time
and room to arrange themselves according to their respective pro-
pensities, assume certain figures, usually prismatic ; of which the
number of sides, and size of the angles, are determined within
certain limits by the chemical constitution of the mineral in ques-
tion. Hence, the determination of mineralogical species, has
within these twenty years, been made to rest on the form of a
crystal, particularly by all the mineralogists of the French school.
The general fact is indubitable; but the limitations and tlie precise
relations between chemical composition and the figure of the min-
eral nucleus, have not yet been accurately determined.

Minerals increase in size by the crystallization of adventitious
particles round a crystallized nucleus,'producing secondary forms ;
but they do not devour, decompose, digest, assimilate, secrete,
excrete, grow, and propagate. They do not seem to have any
property to which the term life can fairly be applied, or to suffer
any thing like what we call death; although it is impossible to
doubt that they are endowed with active properties.* Like all
other substances, they are liable to chemical decomposition, and
consequent disintegration. They are utterly devoid of sensation
and volition ; and have no apparatus connecting them with sur-
rounding bodies.

Vegetables are substances that have a peculiar organization or
arrangement of solid, tubular, cellular, and fluid parts: by means
of which they feed, digest, assimilate, secrete, excrete, grow, and
propagate their kind. They die of violence, of disease, of old age.
They are not locomotive, being fixed by their roots. No nervous
apparatus has hitherto been discovered in them; but certain of
their fibres are irritable and contractile. Having no nervous ap-
paratus, they have no perception (sensation) or volition ; they do
not think. No vegetable has hitherto been clearly ascertained to
appear, but as the offspring of a former vegetable : and though, by
process of assimilation, inorganic aed lifeless matter is converted
into organic and living matter, the vegetable life (so far as wc
know) must pre-exist. The chief use of vegetables seems to be
the furnishing of food for animals, and partially preparing lifeless
and inorganic matter to become sentient and capable of pain and
pleasure. With the exception of less than one part by weight in
a thousand, vegetables are resolvable into carbon, hydrogen, oxy-

•• Crystallization, chemical affinity, polarity of light, electrical, and
-.otic attractions and repulsions, are all active properties. T. C.

:m j

seti, with a »mall portion of nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorus,
The earths found in them do not seem to be essential to then-
composition.

jJnimals are substances that have a peculiar organization or ar-
rangement of solid, tubular, cellular, and fluid parts ; by means
whereof, they devour, digest, assimilate, grow, secrete, excrete and
propagate. They die of violence, of disease, of old age. When
dead, they are decomposed into azote or nitrogen, carbon, hydro-
gen, oxygen, lime, and phosphorus. They are locomotive. They
have a muscular apparatus for that purpose ; and they have a ner-
vous apparatus for the purposes of sensation and volition, by which
they are connected with surrounding objects, animate and inani-
mate. By assimilation, they convert inorganic and lifeless into
organic, living, and sentient matter.* It has not yet been clearly
shewn, that any animal has arisen unless as successor to some
similar animal, his immediate progenitor. The nisus forma-
tivus of Blumenbach, the theories of Darwin, and La Marck, arc
not impossible, but have as yet few converts. The doctrine of
equivocal generation seems to have the weight of fact against it.
TheZoophytic animals, the animalcules infusoria;, the worms and
other parasites that prey on the internal parts of living animals,
form difficulties, but perhaps no exceptions ; just as the vegetable
.•{florescences, the mosses, the confervse, and other minute vegeta-
tions do in Phytology.

Every vertebrous animal has (a) an organic system destined to
support the mere life of the animal, and which is analogous to the
organic system of a vegetable: (b) a mus:ular system destined in
part for internal action, in part for locomotion ; (c) a nervous sys-
tem, in part subservient peculiarly to sensation and volition, and
our relations to other beings.

The involuntary muscles possess, by means of secretion suppli-
ed by the organic system and the nervous apparatus appropriated
to it, a power of contraction, or of becoming thicker and shorter,
on the application of stimulus. Stimulus may be either the natu-
ral stimulus of the nervous system, or of the blood, or it may be
artificial. The actions of the involuntary muscles go on, without
being felt or perceived. The voluntary muscles are stimulated
naturally by that portion of the nervous system which is appropria-
ted to sensation and volition, viz, by the brain and cerebral in-
nervation : one part or fibre of a nervous fasciculus transmitting
innervation to, and another from the brain. Galvanic processes
have to a certain degree been found a substitute for the nervous
stimulus of the muscles, voluntary and involuntary.

It has been ascertained, that the muscular power resides in the
muscles, and is a property of the muscular fibre, and is distinct

* How this is done, we know not, and perhaps never shall know. But
is a fact because we cannot explain it. T. C.

j JjU I

from the nervous power which ,acts merely as one or" the stimuli
to muscular irritability. Muscular irritability and contractility
may exist in a separated muscle. It lias been ascertained that the
nervous power destined to the purposes ofinvoluntary, insentient,
organic life, is distinct from the nervous power destined to the
purposes of sensation and volition; for each can be shewn sepa-
rate from the other. It has been made highly probable, that the
first mentioned portion of the nervous system is confined to the
medulla oblongata and the ganglionic plexuses: the latter and
more important portion, to the brain as its centre.

I am aware of my friend Dr. Ferriar's collection of cases in the
Manchester transactions, in a letter to myself; of Sir Everard
Home's collection of cases in the Philosophical Transactions; and
of many other cases not included in the papers of these gentle-
men, where lesions of the brain have occurred without much appa-
rentinjury to intellect. No physiologist regards them as weighing
a feather against the supposition of the brain being the centre of
the nervous system appropriated to sensation and volition : for we
do not yet know, by experiment, what portions of the brain are
exclusively so ; nor is a general fact established by induction of
innumerable particulars, to be set aside, on account of a few appa-
rent anomalies of difficult explanation. The theory comprises
those parts of the brain that are essential to sensation and voli-
tion ; and not the more bulky mass which appears merely as a
subservient envelope. The experiments of Sir Everard Home on
the connexion of memory with the cortical substance, and the more
important " Researches" of M. Flourens, promise to throw light
on this difficult subject, which only requires patient and pursued
investigation. Some internal sentient extremity there must be
to each main branch of the nerves of the senses. In relation to
the present inquiry, place it where you please, or where the best
settled facts point out.

The above views that I have taken of the mineral, vegetable,
and animal economy, I offer to the reader not as any deductions of
theory, but as expressions of separated and ascertained fact, which
a well read modern physiologist will hardly venture to gainsay,
under the limitations I have used in stating them. 1 refer to
Bichut, Richerand, Magendie, Dr. Wilson Philips, Sir Everard
Home, and the Physical Researches of M. Flourens in p. 299 of
vol. xx. of Ann. de Chim.

I proceed to my second class of arguments.
1. The propensity of the minute particles of quartz to unite
together in a six-sided prism terminated by six-sided pyramids —
of the z-irconite to assume a tetrahedral prism terminated by tetra-
hedral pyramids — of the diamond and garnet to appear as dodeca-
hedrons— of pyrites as a cube — of carbonate of lime as a rhomboid,
&c. &c. so that their particles seek out an union with adjacent
particles, not indiscriminate and promiscuous, but in the peculiar

,1 j

manner proper to form these figures — is either a property of the
material particles themselves, or it is owing to some separate be-
ing or principle who impresses on the particles the necessary force
in the necessary direction on each occasion. No one hitherto,
however, has thought of asrribingthis propensity but to some pro-
perty belonging and essential to the particles themselves.

The arrangement of the nutritious matter taken in by a vege-
table, in the peculiar form which that vegetable affects, and by
which it is characterized, has usually been attributed to the effect
of vegetable life as connected with vegetable organization. No
one hitherto has advanced the hypothesis of a vegetable soul —
distinct from the plant, but regulating and governing it — a being
superior to, and surviving, the vegetable. Yet there is no more
difficulty in supposing perception a property of a nervous system,
or christallization of a mineral system. We see them all, like
other properties, intimately and essentially connected, as antece-
dents and consequents, with the subject to which they are refer-
red ; and we refer them accordingly, as in all other cases of simi-
lar connexion. How is life of any kind the result of mere matter
and motion ? Yet the fact is undeniable. Does it not exist by
stimulation ?

We see in the human frame a nervous apparatus that is essen-
tially connected with sensation and volition, and from which these
properties arise — that serves no other purpose than to give birth
to them — we see them in infancy in a state approaching to non-
entity ; forming gradually and slowly; growing with the growth
of the being to which they belong, and improving by degrees —
we see the"m vary in kind and intensity according to our educa-
tion and the nature of the society in which we are thrown — we
see them dependent for almost all their characters on the manner
in which that part of, the nervous system is excited ab extra; so'
that a man born and educated in Constantinople will have one set
of impressions and associations, one habit of sensation and voli-
tion, and a man with a similar arrangement of nervous apparatus
born and educated among the Quakers at Philadelphia will have
another. All this is the result of generating causes extraneous to
system — owing to specific peculiarities of excitement that causes
the nervous apparatus to act in this manner rather than in that,
and to assume different habits. I say, we see all this to be in eve-
ry case, undeniable matter of fact. How then can we deny sensa-
tion and volition to be the result of the stimulated nervous sys-
tem ? There is the same connexion of phenomena, the same uni-
form result of that connexion, presenting no more difficulty in the
case of sensation and volition, than in the case of glandular secre-
tion ; or animal heat; or muscular motion ; or sanguification; or
the secretion of resin in the pine, and sugar in the maple from the.
same introsuscepted fluid. All the processes are equally inexpli-
rable from any d priori arrangement of matter and motion known

L 342 ]

to us ; all of them stand in equal need for explanation of an iui
material principle ; for although we see clearly that these are the
phenomena of an organized matter in each case, yet in no case can
we explain the rationale by any of the known properties of other
inorganized matter. Hence according to the psychological doc-
trines, we must resort to some distinct and superadded being; to
the anima intellectualis ; the anima sensitiva, and the anima vi-
talis of the ancients — or to the seperate faculties of the Scotch
school of metaphysics, a species of entities most accomodating,
ready for all work, and always in waiting — or to some being of
analogous existence to the immaterial Soul of the orthodox. ,For
I assert, and appeal to matter of fact, that,

There is exactly the same evidence that sensatiou or perception,
and volition, are properties of the nervous apparatus of the human
system, that there is of contractility being a property of muscular
fibre, or sight the property of the eye.

On the truth of this proposition, I should (were it necessary) be
willing to rest the controversy. In the one case and the other,
constant concomitance is the sole foundation for ascribing neces-
sary connexion. If it b%» sufficient in any one of the cases, it is
sufficient in all. It is not necessary that we should be able to ex-
plain the quomodo : it is enough that our senses, under careful ob-
servation, assure us of the fact. Future facts and the future im-
provement of the human intellect may enable our posterity to do
that which our more imperfect knowledge will not enable us to
accomplish : just as the present generation are able to explain
what remained an enigma to their forefathers.

2. I have said above, that our perception, volition, and in fact
our other intellectual faculties, begin from nothing in infancy,
grow with our growth, improve with our experience, vary with
our education, and differ, not merely as to the nervous systems
excited, but in consequence of the habitual difference in the stimu-
li applied. Suppose the original intellect of two infants exactly
the same; educate the one among the thieves of broad St. Giles
in London, and the other among the best class of Philadelphian
Quakers, would their intellect be the same at one and twenty ?
But is the soul thus mouldable and changeable ? Is the Soul in-
fantile as well as the body?

3. If the intellectual phenomena depended entirely on the soul,
then we should be unable to produce, annihilate, alter, or modifv
them by any mere mode of action operating merely on the bodv.
But

Our ideas are frequently produced and commonly modified by
the internal state of our bodily organs, particularly of the internal
viscera — and by the state and condition of our organic life: hence
the phenomena of dreaming, of delirium, and the hallucinations of
hypochondria; and the alterations produced in our sensations
anq ideas by our state of internal health., Our ideas also are pro-

r 353 ]

duced and modified by substances exhibited to us acting medicin-
ally ; as by wine, by opium, by cantliarides, &c. But as Judge
Cooper has said in his Medical Jurisprudence, how can you ex-
hibit a dose of glauber salts to the Soul?

If then sensations, ideas, reasonings, and volitions are produc-
ed, modified or extinguished, by the condition of the involuntary
parts ot our organic system — by disease — by medicine: if they be
(as we know they are) greatly under the command of the physi-
cian who acts only on the body — are not these effects thus pro-
duced by means of the body, bodily effects ? What has the Soul
to do with them ? Are not these effects, however, the only evi
dences of the Soul's existence — the essential, incommunicable
properties of the Soul, according to the Immaterialists ? Yet are
they manifestly produced on the body; and so far as we can see,
on the body alone, by means of material stimuli calculated to act
solely on the body?

If it be said, the body is no more than the instrument of the
Soul, which can only act according to the condition of that body
with which it is connected, and when the body is altered, the in-
tellectual phenomena which it is calculated to exhibit, are altered
also — then it follows, from the evidences of what takes place, that
the very nature of the Soul is altered by altering the condition of
the body, and the Soul therefore is under the control of accident,
of disease, of medicine, and may be just what a physician chooses to
make it. For if a physician can control the intellectual phenome-
na of sensation, memory, judgment, and volition, (as he can)
then are all the essential properties of the Soul itself subject to the
articles of the Materia Medica, and slaves of the Pharmaco-
peia,

4. I have already said, that no phenomena of mere matter and
motion — no principle of mechanical or chemical philosophy can
account for the phenomena of life and stimulus — for digestion,
assimilation, secretion, reproduction. These are just as difficult
as sensation, memory, or volition: the interposition of an imma-
terial Soul is as necessary to vegetable life, as to the human fa-
culties, if this be denied, shew me where and by whom they
have been explained, or explain them if you can*

5. I appeal to any physician accustomed to cases of insanity ;
and I ask whether all the intellectual appearances in that disease
are not manifestly the result of the morbid state of the bodily or-
gans? Is not this the case from the most violent symptoms of
mania, to that almost imperceptible obliquity, from which in some
degree or other, hardly any of us are free ? In fact, such as is the
?tate of our system, such arc the mental phenomena wc exhibit ;
the latter arc the result of the former. Can you put a male mind
into a female body, or vice versa ? Let a parent decide this ques-
tion; he will answer at once, No. Can you put an old head on
voting shoulders ? No.

15

[ 354 ]

If a morbid intellect be the result of a morbid state of the en-
cephalon, then is a sane intellect the result of a sane state, for
like reason : and the intellect is what the encephalon is.

6. But there are no mental phenomena exhibited by the human
species that are not also exhibited by the brute species. The
difference is concomitant with difference of organization. The
superiority cf the human being arises from his larger, more ex-
panded, and more perfect cerebralapparatus ; from his erect posi-
tion ; from the skill with which he can use his hands ; and from
the faculty of speeeh. These give rise to the manipulations of
art, and to the preservation and propagation of knowledge. For
want of these, one generation of brutes is little wiser than the
preceding. There is with them no means of accumulating
knowledge.

When a dog has lost his master, does he not seek him at the
places his master has been accustomed to frequent? I know by
oft repeated facts in my own case, that he does. Does not this
imply memory, ratiocination, volition ? So many volumes of in-
stances of the sagacity of animals, particularly of the canine spe-
cies, have been collected, and instances are so familiar, that I would
not condescend to argue with a man who would have hardihood
cucugh to deny it. All these are intellectual phenomena of the
same kind with such as we exhibit ; the difference is in complica-
tion and degree only. They are evidences therefore of an imma-
terial, immortal, distinct Soul, producing them. What say you.
to the immortal Soul of an opossum or an oyster ?

I see no possibility of denying the facts, or avoiding the con-
clusions ; and I leave the difficulty to be overcome by those who
choose voluntarily to encounter it.

Finally, I say, that the phenomena termed mental, have been so
well explained by Hartley, Cabanis, and Destut Tracey, that no
man conversant with their writings, can hesitate to allow this. I
say it is not possible for a fair man, conversant with physiology, to
deny, that a sensation from recent impression, and an idea from
recollection, are motions in the brain (or common sensory) per-
ceived. As all our intellectual phenomena consist of sensations
or ideas, which are the materials and substrata of memory, judg-
ment, and volition, all of them consist in motions communicated
to the corporeal nervous system — to the common sensory ; wheth-
er by external impression, by association, or by internal sympa-
thetic action, (innervation.) They are, therefore, corporeal phe-
nomena, and no more. Destut Tracey has shewn this so clearly,
and so well explained the phenomena of memory, judgment, de-
sire, volition, as mere names given to various states and condi-
tions of our brain, that I do not expect any refutation will or can
be given to the view of the subject he has taken. Orthodox On-
tology is in the scat of authority now, but truth will prevail al
last.

E 355 j

In speaking of the brain as the common sensory, 1 speak ac-
cording to the language of physiologists of repute, who seem not
to be shaken by the anomalous cases to the contrary. Ferriars
collection is good for little, because his authorities are sometimes
deficient in accuracy of observation, and sometimes in credibility.
Neurology in his day, was very deficient, and still more so in the
days of the authors he relies on. But whether the internal senti-
ent extremities of the sensorial nerves terminate in the brain or
elsewhere, is of no moment whatever to the argument; they must
terminate somewhere ; and where they do terminate, is, for my
purpose equivalent to the brain ; and this word may be used for
the sensorium, wherever that may be.

In arranging the preceding arguments, facts are repeated ; but
the point of view in which they are placed, authorizes me as I have
thought, to distribute them under distinct heads.

I know the obloquy to which Mr. Lawrence, the surgeon, has
been exposed, in consequence of his having advanced the opinion
of the materiality of the Soul, or rather the singleness of human
nature as consisting of the organized body only; but the obloquy
that results from clerical persecution, popular bigotry, and pro-
fessional jealousy, cannot detract from the reasoning of a man on
all hands confessed to be among the most able and best informed
anatomists and physiologists of the day. I give, therefore, the fol-
lowing extract copied with some few omissions and unimportant
alterations from his lecture on the Functions of the Brain. Mr.
Lawrence's book has been widely disseminated in England; but
it is comparatively unknown in the United States ; for not one
bookseller in the Union is hardy enough to publish it ! * Such is
the state of the press in this country of boasted freedom, and such
the tyranny exercised by the orthodox clergy over the minds of
the people ! A tyranny that I have a right to exclaim against, be-
cause I feel it, and have felt it.

" There would be little inducement to compare together the
various animal structures, to follow any apparatus through the
whole animal series, unless the structure were a measure and cri-
terion of the function. Just in the same proportion as organiza-
tion is reduced, life is reduced: exactly as the organic parts are di-
minished in number and simplified, the vital phenomenabecome few-
er and more simple; and each function ends when the respective or-
gan ceases. This is true throughout zoology : there is no exception in
behalf of any vital manifestations.

" The same kind of facts, the same reasoning, the same sort of
evidence altogether, which shew digestion to be the function of the
alimentary canal, motion to be the function of the muscles, the va-
rious secretions of their respective glands — prove that sensation,
perception, memory, judgment, reasoning, thought, in a word^all

:: " It has been published since. T. C.

J 356 j

the manifestations called mental or intellectual, are the animal
{"unctions of their- appropriate organic apparatus, the central or-
gan of the nervous system. No difficulty or obscurity attends
the latter case, which does not equally affect all the former instan-
ces : no kind of evidence connects the living process with the
material instruments in the one, which does not apply just as
clearly and forcibly to the other.

" Shall I be told that thought is inconsistent with matter ; that
we cannot conceive how medullary substance can perceive, re-
member, judge, reason ? I acknowledge we are entirely ignorant
how the parts of the brain accomplish these purposes; we know
only the fact : we are equally ignorant how the liver secretes bile,
how the muscles contract, or how any other living purpose is
effected : and so we are how heavy bodies are attracted to the
earth, how iron is drawn to the magnet, or how two salts decom-
pose each other. Experience is, in all these cases, our sole, if not
sufficient instructress,and the constant conjunction of phenomena,
as exhibited in her lessons, is the sole ground for affirming a ne-
cessary connexion between them. If we go beyond this, and come
to inquire the manner how — and attempt to discover the mechan-
ism by which these things are effected, we shall find every thing
around us equally mysterious, equally incomprehensible : from
the stone which falls to the earth, to the comet traversing the hea-
vens — from the thread attracted by amber or sealing wax, to the
revolutions of planets in their orbits — from the formation of a mite
in cheese, or a maggot in putrid flesh, to the production of a New-
ton or a Franklin.

" In opposition to these views, it has been contended, that
thought is not an act of the brain, but of an immaterial substance,
residing in, or connected with it. This large and curious structure,
which, in the human subject, receives one-fifth of all the blood
sent out from the heart; which is so delicately and peculiarly
organized, so nicely enveloped in successive membranes, and se-
curely lodged in a solid bony case, is by this supposition left
almost without an office : being barely allowed to be capable of
sensation. It has, indeed, under this hypothesis, the easiest lot in
the animal economy ; it is better fed, clothed, and lodged, than
any other part, and has less to do. But its office ('only one remove
from a sinecure,) is not a very honorable one: it is a kind of por-
ter, instructed to open the door, and introduce new comers to the
master of the house, who takes on himself the entire charge of re-
ceiving, entertaining, and employing them.

" Let us survey the natural history of the human mind — its rise,
progress, various fates, and decay — and then judge whether these
accord best with the hypothesis of an immaterial agent, or with
the plain dictates of common sense, and the obvious analogy of
every other organ and function, throughout the boundless extent
of living beings.

[ Sot ]

"But you must bring to this physiological question, a sincere

and earnest love of truth : dismissing from your minds all the pre-
judices and alarms which have been so industriously connected
with it. lfyou enter on this inquiry in the spirit of the bigot and
the partisan — suffering a cloud of fears and hopes, desires and
aversions, to hang round your understandings, you will never dis-
cern objects clearly ; their colors, shapes, and dimensions, will be
confused, distorted, and obscured by the intellectual mist. Our
business is to inquire what is true, not which is the finest theory—
not what will supply the best topics of pretty composition and
elegant declamation addressed to the prejudices, passions, and
ignorance of our hearers. We need not fear the result of inves-
tigation : reason and free inquiry are the only effectual antidotes
of error. Give them full scope, and they will uphold the truth, by
bringing false opinions, and all the spurious offspring of ignorance,
prejudice, and self-interest, before their severe tribunal, and sub-
jecting them to the test of close examination. Error alone needs
artificial support ; truth can stand by itself.

" Sir Everard Home, with the assistance of Mr. Bauer and his
microscope, has shewn us a man eight days old, from the time of
conception ; about as broad and a little longer than a pin's head.
He satisfied himself that the brain of this homunculus was discerni-
ble. Could the immaterial mind have been connected with it at
this time? Or was the tenement too small even for so etherial a
lodger? Even at the full period of utero-gestation, it is still diffi-
cult to trace any vestiges of mind ; and the believers in its sepa-
rate existence have left us quite in the dark on the precise time
when they suppose this union of soul and body to take place.
Some endeavor to account for the entire absence of mental pheno-
mena at the time of birth by the senses and brain not having been
i/et called into action, by the impressions of external objects. The
senses and brain begin to be exercised as soon as the child is born;
and a faint glimmering of mind is dimly perceived in the course
of the first months of existence ; but it is as weak and infantile as
the body.

" As the senses acquire their powers, and the cerebral mass
becomes firmer, the mind gradually strengthens, advances slowly
with the body through childhood to puberty, and becomes adult
when the development of the frame is complete ; it is, moreover,
male and female, according to the sex of the body. ('The propen-
sities, the modes of thinking and acting, are manifestly influenced
by sex.J In the perfect period of organization, the mind is seen
in the plenitude of its powers ; but this state of full vigor is short
in duration, both for the intellect and the corporeal fabric. The
wear and tear of the latter is evidenced in its mental movements:
with the decline of organization the mind decays; it becomes de-
crepit with the body ; and both the one and the other are, at the
same moment, extinguished by death.

L 35* j

" NY hat can we inter from this succession of phenomena? The
existence and action of a principle entirely distinct from the body ?
Or a close analogy to the history of all other organs and functions?

"The number and kind of the intellectual phenomena in differ-
ent animals, appear to correspond closely to the degree of devel-
opement of the brain. The mind ('mental or intellectual faculties^
of the Negro, Hottentot, Calmuck, and Carib, is inferior to -that of
the European ; and their organization also is less perfect. The
large cranium and high forehead of the ourang-outang lift him
above his brother monkeys ; but the development of his cerebral
hemispheres, and his mental manifestations, are both equally below
those of the Negro. The gradation of organization and of mind
passes through the monkey, dog, elephant, horse, to other quadru-
peds : thence to birds, reptiles, and fishes; and so on to the low-
est links of the animal chain.*

" In ascending these steps of one ladder, following in regular
succession at equal intervals, where shall we find the boundary of
unassisted organization? Where place the beginning of the im-
material principle called in aid ? In that view which assimilates
the functions of the brain to those of other organic parts, this case
has no difficulty. As the structure of the brain is more exquisite,
perfect, and complex, its functions ought to be proportionally so.
It is no slight proof of the doctrine now enforced, that the fact is
actually thus : that the mental powers of brutes, so far as we can
see, are proportional to their organization.

" We cannot deny to animals all participation in rational en
dowments, without shutting our eyes to the most obvious facts; to
indications of reasoning which the unprejudiced observation of
mankind has not failed to recognize and appreciate. Without
adverting to the well known instances of comparison, judgment,
and sagacity in the elephant, the dog, and many other animals, let
us read the character drawn by Humboldt, of the South-American
mules : ' When the mules feel themselves in danger, they stop,
turning their heads to the right and to the left. The motion ol
Iheir ears seems to indicate that they reflect on the decision they
ought to take. Their resolution is slow, but always just, if it be
free ; that is to say, if it be not crossed or hastened by the impru-
dence of the traveller. It is on the frightful roads of the Andes,
during journies of six or seven months, across mountains furrowed
by torrents, that the intelligence of horses and beasts of burthen
displays itself in an astonishing manner. Thus the mountaineers
are heard to say, *I will not give you the mule whose step is the
easiest, but him who reasons best.' 5 Pers. Narr. 111. If the

* This is well illustrated, so far as the facial angle is concerned, in the
plate at the beginning of Mr. White of Manchester's Essay on the Grada-
tions of Man. His plate is taken from Camper and Blumenbach. Law-
rence's plates also are from the same sources. T. C,

[ 359 ]

intellectual phenomena of man require an immaterial principle
superadded to the brain, we must equally concede it to those more
rational animals which exhibit manifestations differing from some
of the human only in degree. If we grant it to these, we cannot
refuse it to the nest in order, and so on in succession to the whole
series; to the oyster, the sea anemone, the polype, the microsco-
pic animalcules. Is any one prepared to admit the existence of
immaterial principles in all these cases? If not, he must equally
reject it in man.

" It is admitted that an ideot with a mal-formed brain, has no
mind : that the sagacious dog, and half reasonable elephant do not
require any thing to be superadded to their brains : it is admitted
that a dog or elephant excels inferior animals, in consequence of
possessinga more perfect cerebral structure ; it is strongly suspect-
ed that a Newton and a Shakspeare excelled other mortals only
by a more ample developement of the anterior cerebral lobes ; by
having an extra inch of brain in the right place;* yet the Imma-
terialists will not concede the obvious corollary ofall these admis-
sions, viz. that the mind ol man is merely that more perfect exhibi-
tion of mental phenomena which the more complete development
of the brain would lead us to expect; but they still perplex us with
the gratuitous difficulty of their immaterial hypothesis. Thought,
it is positively and dogmatically asserted, cannot be an act of mat-
ter. Yet no feeling, no thought, no intellectual operation, has
ever been "seen but in conjunction with a brain; and living matter
is acknowledged by most persons to be capable of what makes the
nearest possible approach to thinking. The strongest advocate
for Immaterialism seeks no further than the body for his explana-
tion of all the vital processes of muscular contraction, nutrition,
secretion, &c. operations quite as different from any affection of
inorganic substance, as reasoning or thought : he will even allow
the brain to be capable of sensation.

" Who knows the capabilities of matter so perfectly, as to be
able to say, that it can see, hear, smell, taste, and feel, but cannot
possibly reflect, imagine, judge ? Who has appreciated them so
exactly, as to be able to decide that it can execute the mental func-
tions of a dog, an elephant, or an ourang-outang, but cannot per-
form those of a Negro or a Hottentot ? To say of a thing known
only by negative properties, that is, an immaterial substance, which
is neither evidenced by any direct testimony, nor by any indirect
proof from its effects, that it does exist and can think, is quite con-

* I do not think with, Mr. Lawrence, that the mere size of the brain is
alone sufficient to account for difference of intellect: the greater or less
irritability of the whole nervous system— the aptness of the nervous sys-
tem to admit associations— the facility with which ideas of former impres-
sions arc called up by association — the greater permanence and more
extensive associations of particular classes of impressions and ideas, &c
&c. are probably powerful sources of difference. T. C

[ 3(i0 ]

sistent in those who deny thought to animal structures, where wu
see it going on every day !

"If the mental processes do not constitute the function of the
brain, what is its office? In animals which possess only a small
part of the human cerebral structure, sensation exists, and in ma-
ny cases is more acute than in man : what employment shall we
find for all that man possesses over and above this portion — for
the large and prodigiously developed human hemispheres ? Are
we to believe that these serve only to round the figure of the or-
gan, or to fill the cranium ?

" It is necessary for you to form clear opinions on this subject,
as it has a direct and immediate reference to an important branch
of pathology. They who consider the mental operations as acts of
an immaterial being, and thus disconnect the sound state of the
mind from organization, act very consistently in disjoining insani-
ty also from corporeal structure, and in representing it as a dis-
ease not of the brain, but of the mind for Soul.,) Thus we come
to a disease of an immaterial being ! for which, suitably enough,
moral treatment has been recommended.

"I firmly believe, on the contrary, that the various forms of in-
sanity — all the affections comprehended under the general term,
mental derangement — are no other than evidences of cerebral af-
fections. They are disordered manifestations of those organs
who se healthy action produces the phenomena called mental ;
they are, in short, symptoms of a diseased brain. These symp-
toms have the same relation to the brain, as vomiting, indigestion,
heart burn, to the stomach; cough, asthma, to the lungs; or any
other deranged functions to their correspondent organs.

"If the bilary secretion be increased, diminished, suspended, or
altered, we have no hesitation in referring it to changes in the con-
dition of the liver as the immediate cause of the phenomena. We
explain the state of respiration, whether slow, hurried, impeded
by cough, spasm, &c. by the various conditions of the lungs and
other parts concerned in breathing. These explanations are
deemed perfectly satisfactory.

" What should we think of a person who told us that the organs
had nothing to do with the business : that cholera, jaundice, hepa-
titis, are diseases of an immaterial hepatic being; that asthma,
cough, consumption, are affections of a subtle pulmonary matter;
or that, in each case, the disorder is not in the bodily organs, but
in a vital principle? If such a statement should be deemed too
absurd for any serious comment in the derangements of the liver,
lungs, and other organic parts, how can it be received in the
brain ?

" The very persons who use this language of diseases of the
mind, speak and reason correctly respecting the other affections
of the brain. When it is compressed by a piece of bone, or by ef
fused blood or serum, and when all intellectual phenomena are

[ 361 J

more or less completely suspended, they do not say that the mind
is squeezed — that the immaterial principle suffers pressure. For
the ravings of delirium and frenzy, the excitation and subsequent
stupor of intoxication, they find an adequate explanation in the
state of the cerebral circulation, without fancying that the mind is
delirious, mad, or drunk. In these cases, the seat of the disease,
the cause of the symptoms, is too obvious to escape notice. In
many forms of insanity, the affection of the cerebral organization
is less strongly marked, slower in its progress, but generally very
recognisable, and abundantly sufficient to explain the diseased
manifestations; — to afford a material organic cause for the phe-
nomena — for the augmented or diminished energy, or the altered
nature of the various feelings and intellectual faculties.

" I have examined, after death, the heads of many insane per-
sons, and have hardly seen a single brain which did not exhibit
obvious marks of disease. In recent cases, loaded vessels, in-
creased serous secretions : in all instances of longer duration, un-
equivocal signs of present or past increased action ; blood vessels
apparently more numerous, membranes thickened and opaque;
depositions of coagulable lymph forming adhesions or adventitious
membranes ; watery effusions; even abscesses. Add to this, that
the insane often become paralytic, or are cut off by apoplexy*

" Sometimes, indeed, the mental phenomena are disturbed with-
out any visible deviation from the healthy structure of the brain;
as digestion or biliary secretion maybe impaired or altered, with-
out any recognisable change of structure in the stomach or liver.
The brain, like other parts of this complicated machine, may be
diseased sympathetically ;* and we see it recover. Thus we find
the brain, like, like other parts, subject to what is called function-
al disorder; but although we cannot absolutely demonstrate the
fact, we no more doubt that the material cause of the symptoms
or external signs of disease is in this organ, than we do that im-
paired biliary secretion has its source in the liver, or faulty diges-
tion in the stomach. The brain does not often come under the
inspection of the anatomist in such cases of functional disorder 5

* As in puerperal cases. To this reasoning of Lawrence, I would add,
that diseased brain may depend on the connexion between the brain, the
stomach, and bowels. Thus, we see diseased digestion and morbid ac-
tion of the intestines produce hypocondria and melancholy ; such is often
the case from worms. Drunkenness affects the brain by means of the
btomach, and prussic acid kills by destroying the functions of the ner-
vous system. The as yet untraced connexion of all the parts of that sys-
tem, by means of which, when one part is disordered, a distant part be-
comes disordered also, is physiologically termed sympathy. Thereby in-
tending that the connexion is as yet only known by its effects, and not
anatomically shewn.

Dr. Haslam's publications on insanity corroborate strongly all Law-
rence's reasoning. T C.
46

[ 362 J

l>ut I am convinced from my own experience, that very tew heads
of persons dying deranged will be examined after death, without
shewing diseased structure, or evident signs of increased vascular
activity. The effect of medical treatment completely corrobo-
rates these views. Indeed they who talk of, and believe in, dis-
eases of the mind, are too wise to put their trust in mental reme-
dies. Arguments, syllogisms, discourses, sermons, have never yet
restored any patient ; the moral pharmacopeia is quite inefficient;
and no real benefit can be conferred without vigorous medical
treatment, which is as efficacious in these affections as in the dis-
eases of other organs.*

" In thus drawing your attention to the physiology of the brain,
I have been influenced not merely by the intrinsic interest and
importance of the subject, but by a wish to exemplify the aid which
human and comparative anatomy and physiology are capable of
affording each other ; and to shew how the data furnished by both,
tend to illustrate pathology. I have purposely avoided noticing
those considerations of the tendency of certain physiological doc-
trines which have sometimes been industriously mixed up with
these disquisitions. In defence of a weak cause, and in failure of
direct arguments, appeals to the passions and prejudices have
been indulged ; attempts have been made to fix public odium on
the maintainers of this or that opinion ; and direct charges of bad
motives and injurious consequences, have been reinforced by all
the arts of misrepresentation, insinuation, and innuendo.

" To discover truth, and to represent it in the clearest and
most intelligible manner, seem to me the only proper objects of
physiological, or indeed any other inquiries. Free discussion is
the surest way not only to disclose and strengthen what is true,
but to detect and expose what is fallacious. Let us not then pay
so bad a compliment to truth, as to use in its defence foul blows
and unlawful weapons. Its adversaries, if it have any, will be
despatched soon enough, without the aid of the stiletto or the
bowl. The argument against the expediency of divulging an opin-
ion, although it be true, from the possibility of its being perverted,
has been so much hackneyed, so often employed in the last resort
by the defenders of all established abuses, that every one who is
conversant with the controversy, rejects it immediately, as the
sure mark of a bad cause — as the last refuge of retreating error."

So far Mr. Lawrence. Lectures on Phvsiology, Zoology, and
the Natural History of Man. 8vo. London, 1819. Pages 105 —
115. I have already assigned my reasons for making this ex-
tract so long.

* Moral medicine can only act by introducing and exciting new trains
of ideas and of thought: but these are affections of the brain in fact ; and
are therefore medicines operating directly on that organ. All ideas of
whatever kind, are motions excited in the brain, and there felt or perceiv
ed, T. I

The following extract 1'rom Mr. Sawrey's edition of Dr. Mai
-hall's Morbid Anatomy of the Brain, London, 1815, p. 209, will
express my notion of the functions of the brain and nerves very
well, except that he has omitted the sympathetic action of the ner-
vous system of excited or depressed states of the parts destined
to internal organic life, when different from their usual and natu-
ral states. A morbid excitement or derangement of any viscus
will affect the state of the nerves belonging to it, and by sympa-
thy (that is innervation) with them, the general nervous system.
Hence, the state of the brain, and the ideas that arise in it, will be
more or less modified by the state of the organic and internal ap-
paratus destined to keep up life. Hence dreams from indigestion.
Hence hypochondria from morbid action of stomach and bowels.
Hence, the associations will, to a certain degree, be modified by,
and depend on the internal state of the body, as well as on exter-
nal impressions; and the sensations arising from external impres-
sion will, to a certain degree, vary with the general health or dis-
ease. Hence sensations, ideas, and associations may arise from
the state of the internal organs, and are not exclusively dependent
on external impression.

The following extract from Dr. Andrew Marshall will shew the
generally received doctrine relating to the functions and proper-
ties of the nerves, the brain, aud the nervous system; and prove
that my views of the subject are the same with that of all well in-
formed physiologists of the present day :— •

Observations on the functions of the Brain and Nerves, p. 209.
"The primary functions of the brain and nerves consist in their
rendering us conscious of the existence and properties of sur-
rounding objects: and while in this world, of the existence and
properties of ourselves. For although things exist with all their
properties independent of us, and therefore when a man perishes,
not the smallest particle of surrounding nature is annihilated, or
in the least unhinged by his dissolution, yet it is by our possess-
ing brain nerves, that the independent existence and properties
of surrounding objects come home to our perceptions. Matter of
the same form with that of the human body (except the brain and
nerves) might exist and be animated, but without these organs, it
would be unconscious of its present existence, or of the properties
and various conditions of surrounding nature.

"Living systems destitute of brain shew no signs of their being
impressed with any feeling or consciousness. The polypus, ac-
cording to the observations of Haller and others, has no brain or
nerves: accordingly it appears to perform the motions requisite
to its preservation by a necessity of which it seems to be uncon-
scious. Vegetables also are living systems, but having no brain
they appear°lestitute of sense. They take in, assimilate, and ap-
ply nourishment, perform secretions, generate and separate heat,
preserve their own substance from putrefaction, perform motions

[ 364 j

j 11 consequence of irritations, and produce prolific seed. But all
these actions seem to be performed from blind necessity, and with-
out any sort of intelligent consciousness.

"But in living systems furnished with a brain and nerves, so
long as they are entire, and in the condition which health gives
and requires, the animal remains sensible of the existence ot sur-
rounding nature, or susceptible of that consciousness ; but when
injury is done to the brain, the consciousness of the impressions
resulting from the contact of external matter (of which kind are
both light and air) is, according to the degree of injury, perverted,
suspended, or extinguished. Yet injuries inflicted on other organs
of the body, in no wise affect the sense, unless when they syrnpto-
matically involve the brain. The same comparison, leading to
the same conclusion, may be made in respect to the diseases of
the brain and other parts.

"It must be admitted, that in order to produce peculiar sensa-
tions, there must be the health and entire structure of the nerves
in connexion with the brain. For to destroy the extremities of
nerves, destroys the peculiar sensations which these nerves exhi-
bit while remaining sound. If the retina be injured or destroyed,
vision is impaired or lost ; if the ultimate distribution of the olfac-
tory nerves be destroyed, there is no more smell.

"Although light should be properly refracted, yet if it should
fall on the optic nerve before it expands into retina, it would not
occasion any vision ; nor would odours, if conveyed to the olfacto-
ry nerves within the scull, probably, give occasion to smell ; nor
is it probable that sapid substances would excite a sense of taste,
if applied to any part of the nerves of taste other than the nervous
papillse of the tongue.

" But necessary as the extremities of the nerves are to the pro-
duction of peculiar sensations, they cannot be reckoned sentient:
for if their connexion with the brain be interrupted by compres-
sion, no peculiar sensation arises from impression on the extremi-
ties ; but if the compression be removed, the power of giving the
peculiar sensation returns. Yet though the compression of the
nerves interrupts or destroys the peculiar sensations usually re-
ferred to their extremities, a sense of feeling in different modes,
subsists between the part compressed and the brain : so that the
power of contributing to a certain degree of sense, which would
be lost between the ligature and the extremities, survives between
the seat of the injury and the brain. The sort of feeling so re-
maining is sometimes a sense of obscure touch, sometimes a sense
of pricking or a sense of pain.

" We therefore conclude that there is no manner of sensibility
in nerves but in connexion with the brain. That the power by
which we see, hear, feel, &c. is a power of the brain, the nerves
being only a conditio sine qua non of particular sensations refer-
red to nervous extremities, and the brain being rather the efficient

[ 365 j

cause of these sensations, and giving susceptibility to a certain
degree at least to that portion of nerve left connected with it : —
may it be added, that independent of any conditional impression
on the nerves, the brain itself, from impressions immediately on
itself, is sentient ; for let any set of nerves whatever be destroy-
ed, or let no particular impression, whatever, be made on the
nerves, a sense of head-ache, vertigo, noise, colors, &c. may be,
and often is produced by disease.*

" The sphere of cerebral power exerted in conjunction with, or
in consequence of impressions made on the nerves, is great. By
the brain being affected through the medium of the eyes, we are
made acquainted with the color, figure, magnitude, and motion of
external things placed at a greater or less distance from us. 1 his
is the sense of seeing : an inlet to human knowledge, at once ne-
cessary to preservation, and to open a view of the striking and
beautiful phenomena of nature.

" The existence, degree of distance, hardness, and several other
interesting qualities of objects placed at a distance, seen or unseen,
come home to our perceptions, through tremors of the air affect-
ing the brain through the ear. This is the sense of hearing; by
which we are warned of unseen danger, perceive operations of
nature though unseen, and comprehend the signs or words em-
ployed by our fellow creatures to express their sensations and
passions.

" The qualities of sapid substances, which we are interested in
perceiving, their sweetness, acidity, bitterness, saltness, and aro-
matic nature, are perceived, when these qualities, through the
medium of the tongue, excite the proper sensations in the brain.
This is the sense of taste. The qualities suggested by taste, con-
stitute a sort of index of the salutary, innocent, or pernicious
nature of substances presented as food, rather than point out the
actual composition of these substances. This sense seems given
chiefly with a view to the preservation of the animal ; for by it,
man is induced to take in wholesome food, and to avoid improper
and hurtful food : the former being in general agreeable, and the
latter, disagreeable, at least to a taste not corrupted by luxury.
It is a common, yet curious observation, that the same nerves
which are susceptible of impressions from sapid substances, are
also nerves of touch ; so that a substance in the mouth, is both
tasted and felt; its superficial qualities of hardness, smoothness,

* The experiments of Sir Everard Home and M. Fleurens shew this.
Moreover, as I have observed before in this tract, the organic functions,
which in a healthy state go on without producing sensation, in a diseased
state, or in a state of great excitement, do produce sensation, by affect-
in^ generally the whole nervous apparatus. In a state of over healthy
excitement, (if I may so express myself,) dreams are sometimes more in-
tensely vivid than their analogous waking sensations. So, deranged
stomach and bowels, and worms, may produce hypochondria, idiocy, and
even mania. T. C.

[ 366 J

&c. being also perceh ed. This conjunction of both senses, seems
requisite in the tongue, since a substance taken into the mouth,
may be as hurtful from its superficial qualities, as its roughness,
angles, edges, &.c. is from its acrid, saline, or putrid qualities.

" The nourishment and refreshment of the body, are farther as-
sisted by our being enabled to perceive certain qualities of sapid
substances before we take them into the mouth. This is done by
volatile particles of the substances affecting the internal parts of
the nose, and through these the brain. Thus, the sense of smell-
ing is auxiliary to taste, as it admonishes us of the quality of sapid
substances, before we use them too freely ; as it induces us to
take in proper food, which is generally of a pleasant smell, if it
smells at all ; and as it keeps us from unwholesome food, which is
generally of a disagreeable odour. Odours are the object of this
sense; and different odours aifecting the brain through the nose,
produce different sensations of smell, as either pungent, sweet,
or putrid, &c. These suggest in some degree, what may be ex-
pected from swallowing or applying the substance ; but express
nothing concerning its internal structure or composition. Air is
the vehicle of odour.

" To assist vision, and to make amends for its defects, there is a
consciousness implanted in us of the contact of external things.*
The nerves that receive the impression from which this conscious-
ness results, are almost universally present in the body: and it'
they remain every where free and connected, in a healthy state,
with an entire and healthy brain, the contact of external things,
and internal changes, are perceivable in almost every part of the
body. Several modes of feeling may be marked : 1st. by the con-
tact of external things with the extremities of the ne"rves of feel-
ing, we acquire a perception of the hardness, softness, roughness,
smoothness, heat, cold, figure, magnitude, pressure, and weight of
whatevei is within our reach. This is the sense of touch, proper-
ly so called; the most correct and extensive of all the senses,
subservient to self-preservation, and supplying man with exact and
enlarged conceptions of what takes place in nature.

"2dly. Certain parts of the body occasionally fall into a state
which gives rise to a particular mode of feeling, followed by cer-

* That is, we feel them when they approach us near enough to give
rise to this sensation. There is no consciousness different from feeling
or perception. When the retina is excited by the light of a candle, and
the motion is propagated along the optic nerve to its extremity within the
brain, I feel, I perceive, I am conscious, of the impression. We cannot
be conscious of the actual contact of the bodies, because no particles of
matter are in absolute contact. They recede without solution of continu-
ity by heat, they contract by cold. A ray of light impinging on alooking
glass, is reflected, as Sir Isaac Newton has shewn, at the 127th part of
an inch previous to contact. All this is well illustrated by the diagram
nf Father'Boscovich. T.C.

[ 367 J

tain propensities. These give occasion to actions, which being-
exerted relieve the propensity. Thus a certain languid state ot
the circulation through the lungs, gives a peculiar uneasy sensa-
tion that produces yawning. A sense of irritation in the nose
gives rise to sneezing ; a sense of irritation about the glottis to
coughing ; a sense cf tickling of the skin to laughter, &c. Some
of these peculiar modes of sensation have names, and some have
not. Like other sensations, they admit of no definition. Their
final intention is evident.since they tend to throw oflfthe offending
cause that produces them.

"3dly. Certain parts of the body are constantly in a healthy
state, peculiarly susceptible of impression ; such as the glands
penis, and some other parts ; the final cause whereof, is also evi-
dent.

"4thly. All the parts of the body, supplied with nerves, arc
susceptible of impression which gives occasion to sense of pain.
The impression here arises from whatever hurts, destroys, or
forms disease ; and the sense excited by it, makes us take pains
to avoid injury, and get rid of disease. 13y-the-byel taking man
as he is, and admitting the laws of nature at present established,
to be wise and good, pain is not an evil, but the result of a wise
and benificent providence ; since it tends to preserve our exist-
ence more unerringly and directly than any other mode of sense
with which we are endowed. The exciting cause of pain is the
impression of injurv or disease : the efficient cause, the connexion
of the part so injured or disordered with the brain; and the final
cause, the preservation of the animal. These are some of the
modes of feeling : each of the other senses is also a genus, under
which are included various modes of the sensation referred to the
organ.

" When we compare the different senses together, two or three
observations occur to us ; one is, that the first four senses take
place only when certain due degrees of impression are made on
the extremities of the nerves distributed to that organ. If the im-
pression be too slight, no peculiar sense arises; if it exceed in
measure, instead of the sense of seeing, hearing, &c. there is mere-
ly a sense of pain. Thus, the first four senses, when their organs
are injured, agree with the sense of feeling. Another observation
is, that as the sense of feeling arises from impressions made in
those parts of the bod}', so it is more difficult to destroy than the
other senses. When the extremities of the nerves of the other
senses are destroyed, peculiar sensations connected with them,
also cease: but the remaining body of nerves retains a sense of
feeling: and the extremities of the nerves appropriated to feeling-
only, being destroyed, the extremities of the portion left, resume
the peculiar susceptibility of the original extremities : tiius, ui the
case of W. Scott, whose penis was carried off by a gun-shot, the
stump of it, which was even with the skin of the pubis, resumed

[ 368 ]

the peculiar sensibility of the glans penis: also the cicatrix of
sores in other parts of the body, becomes susceptible to impres-
sions of touch.

" But extensive as the sphere of sensation is, and how much
soever of the universe, it unfolds to human comprehension, the
powers of the brain are not confined to mere sensation. The brain
is likewise the corporeal organ, whose health and entire structure
are necessarily connected with all intellectual powers, all inter-
nal senses, and all the passions.

" Memory depends on the brain. After living but a few weeks
in the world, exposed to the contact of surrounding things, and to
light reflected from their surfaces, we cannot avoid recognizing
sensations, as being mere repetitions of similar impressions from
the same forms of matter. We recognize the similar sensations,
and feel within ourselves, that formerly we were affected exactly
in a similar manner by the impression on the organ of sense.
This recognizing of sensations and belief of their being repetitions,
happens by the same physical necessity with which tlie first sen-
sations of the kind we ever had, arose from the original and first
impressions. We cannot but taste, when sapid substances are
applied to the tongue ; nor can we pass by the consciousness, that
there is a repetition when the same taste is renewed. This is the
simplest form of memory : it occurs in an infant a month old,
when it begins to recognize its nurse. After living longer, con-
tinually affected with the true sense and impressions of external
things, and after being masters of more certain experience, we
naturally improve upon the simple memory of a single sensation,
and acquire gradually a power of recalling a train of sensations,
in the order and circumstances in which they were originally per-
ceived. They are recalled with a belief that they were formerly
impressed upon us, by objects which do not now affect us. This
is memory in greater perfection. A faculty which, spiritual as it
may seem, is seldom exerted, but when it sets off' from the vantage
ground of some assembling, contrary, or otherwise related actual
sensation of a present object.*

"Judgment is another power naturally founded in sensation.
For to compare two sensations together, to glide insensibly into a
belief that they are compatible, or incompatible in the same sub-
ject, are as necessary consequencesof having formed thesensation,
as the sensations were the consequences of the brains havingbeen
affected by the impression. Thus, if you present a red rose, to a

* Hume, in his Essay on the Connexion and Association of Ideas, and
Lord Kame in his Elements of Criticism, (Chaper on Ideas occurring in
a train) have seen the same facts and reasoned in the same way. But
Dr. Hartley has treated the subject so plainly, and yet so profoundly, that
he has, in my opinion, exhausted it : the objections of modern sciolists to
that qreat man notwithstanding. T. C.

[ 369'"]

child who never has seen one before, but who has seen a white
rose.it lias immediately the complete sensation of a red rose: and
it it can speak it will express a judgment and belief that it is a
red rose. This is the birth of judgment.

" The power of reasoning in like manner grows out of sensa-
tion. For, let a youth after some experience of the properties of
things, be supposed master of two distinct independent percep-
tions, but not to have experience enough to incline him to a belief,
that they are naturally and properly compatible in the same ob-
ject, what resource has he ? If the determination interests him,
he naturally and immediately recollects a known third percep-
tion, with which one of the two sensations is known from experi-
ence to agree : and with this third recollected perception, he is
insensibly drawn to compare the other perception.

" Let it be inquired, will the eating of the berries of the deadly
nightshade kill me ? I run back to some conception allied to the
question ; as that these berries poisoned one of my neighbors. I
know that I am of the same nature with that neighbor; so that as
the berries poisoned him, and I am of the same nature with him,
I conclude, as a matter of experience, that they will kill me.

" In the same manner might we trace fancy ; the power of ab^
stvaction ; and the power ot classing things, to their origin from
actual sensation ;* but that is at present declined. I would only
remark, that all intellectual powers whatever, depend as much on
the brain for their e.xertion, as simple sensation does : for living
systems furnished with no brain, discover as little reason, &c. as
they do sense : and injuries done to the brain of the nature of
those enumerated above, while they hurt or suspend sense, hurt,
suspend, or pervert the powers of memory, reason, judgment, &c.
Nay, in some injuries and diseases of the brain, the powers of in-
tellect are more deranged than those of pure sensation. Maniacs,
in whom it has been proved, that the brain is topically affected,
and probably always in fault, are often exact in particular sensa-
tions, but err widely in judgment and reasoning. A sufferer too
under the operation of the trepan, is found sometimes possessing
feeling, but erring in reason ; and refers the whole operation, and

all that is said and done, to some other person,!

* * * # * *• a

" All the internal senses also depend on the brain, and on the
perceptions which we cannot help receiving, as we live under the
continual contact and impression of external things. These are
naturally stems, from which the various additional senses called
internal, branch off". We cannot hear sounds agreeable in com-

* Destut Tracey has done this. — T. C.

f I have omitted here a disquisition of about a page and a half on the
nature of our sense of beauty ; which did not appear to me necessary to
the chain of reasoning. . T. C.

Yi

L 3?° ]

bi nation, without a sense of harmony. We cannot see the form

of regularity of parts, ami the color "of most flowers, without be-
lieving them to be beautiful : nor understand the signs by which
our fellow creatures express or betray their feelings, without a
belief, that they in return comprehend our signs : nor witness
their actions without approving some of them, and blaming others.
This is the physical birth of the senses called internal, which
seem to be peculiar to man : and they also depend on the brain.
For not to dwell on other instances, if the most delicate and
chaste female be seized with a phrenitis, she loses her habitual
sense of delicacy : and if injury or disease in the brain induces
mania, the maniac ceases to feel the obligations of morality.

" The distinction of sense into external and internal, does not
go to discriminate the two sets of sense; for they are equally in-
ternal and external. Nothing farther can be understood than
that the one set of internal senses is excited when external
things affect the organs of sense: but the other does not immedi-
ately require the impression of external things to produce them.

" Lastly, all the passions and appetites depend on the brain, for
their corporeal organ. Objects whose properties come home to us
through the primary sensations, do not leave us in a state of in-
difference. The primary perceptions give birth to senses called
internal; and the internal senses to appetites, passions and vo-
litions. These depend upon the brain : not only because they
grow out of sense, which depends on that organ, but because when
the brain is injured or diseased, it is found equally or more se-
verely to alter, pervert, or extinguish passions and appetites.

" In phrenitis, no alteration is more remarkable than alteration
and disorder in the passions. This will appear from an unusual
apprehension of imaginary evils, an unusual anxiety about friends,
and unusual hatred againstenemies. I once saw a phrentic patient
with Dr. Pitcairn, some of his senses were lost; taste in particu-
lar. But his regard for his wife was expressed in a tempest of
passion; it was the rage of love: at other times he had the most
delicate, yet groundless jealousy. Maniacs in the exacerbation of
their complaints, are preternaturally irasicible or furious; they go
into fits of devotion with a fervour and religious awe, of which
sound reason is hardly susceptible.

" There is a remarkable peculiarity in the state of the brain,
observed as a law of the animal economy, which is, that the exer-
tion is subjected to a periodical suspension more or less complete,
called sleep. It is a complete suspension of the power of the
five senses, and of the action of the voluntary muscles ; for in sound
sleep, particular sensations do not occur, nor are the powers
which grow out of sensations exerted. But, in unquiet nights,
though no actual sensation occurs, no immediate impression on
any organ of a peculiar sense being perceived, the powers of
memory, fancy, reason, and judgment, with various internal sen-

t 371 |

ses and passions, arc diffidently cxei ted. They proceed in an
unusual way, not for want df reason, but from want of actual sen-
sations to correct wrong judgments and to direct all these pow-
ers according to the reality of things.*

" The effect of sleep is to restore the power of the brain and nerves.

* The brain, as the chief seat of the nervous apparatus, is liable to be
affected by impressions made by external objects on the senses — by any
preternatural or morbid state of the organ itself— by any sympathetic af-
fection with the internal organs or vicera— and by the state in which it is
put by the various associations of past impressions. Hence when mor-
bidly excited, as in the lower states of phrenitis, apoplexy, or gout, sensa-
tions arise both sleeping and waking, that would not occur in its common
state ; the impressions and associations are altered and modified, and all
intellectual processes are correspondently deranged. Why ? Becauso
according to the acknowledged axioms of the schools, the character of
the recipient determines the mode of reception of the thing received :
quicquid recipitur, recipilur ad madam recipientis. Hence Mr. Owen of
Lanark is right in supposing that man is the creature of the circumstances
in which he is placed. Suppose four human beings with organs similar-
ly constituted in all respects at ten years of age, one bred up among the
Brachmins of Hindostan, one as a Mussulman at Constantinople, one
among the straitest sect of Calvinistic Seceders, and one among the Sa-
vans of Paris : it is manifest, the impressions and associations to which the
nervous systems of these beings would be respectively exposed from the
age often to the age of fifty would be extremely different: their intellec-
tual powers would be different, and the effect of motives and of evidence
upon them, would be as various as their various educations. For I sub-
mit the following reasoning as unanswerable. The brain (place the seat
of sensation wherever you please) is subject to the laws of the animal
economy : it is passive in receiving impressions : the state of the brain is
modified by the impressions it receives : the state of its associations of
impressions with ideas, of ideas with ideas, depends upon the actual state
of the brain, however produced : all the intellectual powers consist of, and
depend on, the associations of ideas (that is, of associated motions excit-
ed or occurring in the seat of sensation:) hence all intellectual powers
and processes, whether in potentia or in aetu, arc dependent on the state
of the brain or seat of sensation ; and therefore on the circumstances
which have produced this involuntary state of the organ, whatever those
circumstances may have been. But let us take for granted a Soul.
Then if the brain can thus modify the Soul, and the Soul thus modify the
brain, are not both the one and the other material — subject to the laws of
organic matter ? What then do you gain by introducing this creature of
metaphysical fancy — this hypothesis which adds no force, and removes no
difficulty ? Which must act upon matter, and be actrd on by matter, to
make its existence evident ? Which those who believe in it, acknowl-
edge to be a mere ens rahonis? Which has never been seen, felt,
heard, or understood ? Which is not cognizable by any human inlet of
knowledge ? Whose introductions and pretensions can be well traced
to the power it affords the clergy over the conduct and belief of their
fellow creatures? And which can derive no countenance from the words
or actions of Christ or his Apostles, or the general belief of the Christian
world for at loa*r four centuries after Christ ? T ('

[ 3rl J

Independent of the sealing up of actual sensation, the muscular
parts in themselves require periodical suspension or abatement of
their energy. Long continued actual sensations, strong sensations
lasting but for a short time, suffering of moderate pain for a long
time, or intense pain for a short time, much thinking, pursuing a
long train of abstract reasoning, great exertions of memory, &c.
gradually blunt the powers of the brain and nerves, and a cessa-
tion of actual sensation occurs : and, if in this insensible state, oth-
er powers of the brain be exerted, their exertion is less fatiguing
than when we are awake, because in sleep, their exertion is not
fixed or regulated by attention, which is one of the most fatiguing
powers of the brain. In like manner, long continued muscular
action of the voluntary muscles, induces a sort of inability in them,
and in sleep their energy is restored. On avvaking after a due
length of time spent in sleep, all the powers of the brain, and the
energy of the muscles are restored in a proper degree.

"1 cannot quit this part of the subject witiiout observing that
all the powers proved to belong to the brain, are equally peculiar
in their nature. To be conscious of the figure of a circle, or the
colour of a flower, is as refined and wonderful a power as reason-
ing is. And though these powers to the vulgar belief are a neces-
sary consequence of an impression on the organ of sense, they
have as little resemblance to such impressions, as reasoning in an
abstract manner has.*

"There arc yet two other questions, which seem necessary to
be considered. First, whether the brain properly so called, and
the cerebellum, medulla spinalis, &c. possess equal sentient pow-
ers?! No doubt can remain that they do, when we consider that

* This passage seems to allude favorably to Berkely's hypothesis. In
fact, the external world is an hypothesis to account for our sensations ;
but an hypothesis to which we are irresistibly driven by the laws of the
animal economy, which compel us to resort to it. . Doubtless, as our au-
thor says, there is as much difficulty involved in the fact of sensation or
perception, as in any process of reasoning. They are both processes de-
pending on the properties of the bodily organ employed in them : proper-
ties, which we can no more explain than we can explain the cause of
life, electricity, or gravitation. These are all properties belonging to the
substance with which we rind them connected. In like manner, percep-
tion or sensation, thought, volition, &c. are properties of the substances
with which Ave find them connected. If the latter require a Soul to ex-
plain them, so do the former ; no good reason exists in one case, that
does not in the other. If gravitation be an essential property of any giv-
en mass or matter, so is perception and thought of the nervous apparatus
of the human being ; and for the like reason in both cases, viz : we see
them constantly accompanying each other. T. C.

f Further experiments are necessary to determine this. Those of
Sir Everard Home and M. Fleurens, if followed up, would assuredly
throw light on the functions peculiar to the various parts of this organ.

T. C.

373 J

injuries or disease in whichever of these integrant, portions ot the
whole mass they happen, equally occasion stupor and insensibility,
or are accompanied with violent exertions or' the muscular pow-
ers. 15ut the muscular disorder is most obvious, when those parts
are affected which give origin to nerves, that supply the involun-
tary muscles. Also, injuries or disease prove equally fatal, wheth-
er in the brain, cerebellum, medulla oblongata, or medulla spina-
lis. A man is killed by being shot through the head. The fier-
cest bull is instantly killed by thrusting a knife through between
the first vetebra, and the posterior edge of the foramen magnum
oecipitisinto the beginning of the medulla spinalis. 1 An elephant
is killed in the same manner. Robert Walker, a soldier, was
killed by a shot through the cauda equina. Lastly, the equal sen-
tient power of these different portions is evinced, by their giving
origin to nerves of particular organs of sense. The brain gives
nerves to the nose and eyes; the cerebellum to the skin, muscles
of the face, the tongue and the teeth. The medulla oblongata
gives nerves to the ear; the medulla spinalis to the muscles and
skin of most of the body.

" The second question is, whether the whole substance of the
brain, cerebellum, be equally sentient? The nerves proceed
from the medullary, not the cineritious part. This continuity of
substance, compared with the effects of tying, dividing, or destroy-
ing nerves, rendersit probable, that it is principally the medullary
parts of the brain, which are the origin of the power ascribed to it.t
The medullary substance of all the portions form one continuous
mass, is apparently fibrous, the fibres being incredibly minute,:;:
convolved in regular intricacy, apparently without beginning,and
ending no where but in the extremities of the nerves. The two
hemispheres of the brain communicate by transverse medullary
bands, and by the union of their crura ; while the medullary crura
of cerebellum, blend with the medullary crura of cerebrum, &c.

« In the next place, in Haller's experiments on living animals,

-This experiment of Vesalius, Dr. W. Hunter used to cxhibi' to his
class on a jackass. It is the Spanish mode of killing-, not only at their bull
li edits, but among their butchers ; and it is doubtless a humane one. T. C.
°f There are some facts of lesions of the brain, that have not yet been
explained. Many are collected on dubious authority by Dr. Ferriar, in
his letter to Th. Cooper, Esq. in the fourth volnme of the Manchester
Transactions : and many on better authority by Sir Everard Home.
Anatomists and physiologists, however, agree in considering these anom-
alies as not militating against the general position. Future experiments
may well explain them. We are in the infancy of medullary physiology

t Gall & Spurzheim's anatomical exhibitions of the structure of the
brain I apprehend, have settled the fibrous nature of the medullary sub-
stance, in the way nearly as Marshall has stated it. The other parts of
their craniology are not yet so clear. T. C.

[ 374 |

instituted to determine the different degree of sensibility of dift'er-
cnt parts of the body, it .appeared that the victim of his inquiry,
manifested most evident signs of pain, and fell into most violent
convulsions, when the medullary substance of the brain was
pierced or broken down : but that these symptoms were less con-
siderable when the injury was confined to (he cineritous sub-
stance." Accidental injuries seem also to hurt or disorder sense,
according as they extend their effects to the medullary substance.
A blow on the upper part of the head, does not stun so suddenly,
as a blow near the base of the scull ; the cineritious substance
abounding in the upper part ; the medullary being exterior in the
basis of the encephalum.

" If judgment may be formed from one or two cases, a fracture
with depression of the osfrontis, causes less stupor than a fracture
with depression of the parietal bones — the anterior lobes of the
brain being supported on the orbitar processes of the frontal
bones : but the middle part of the hemispheres gravitating on the
whole medullary substance below, the compression must extend
its influence to the whole. These opinions are strengthened by
the case of a soldier, who recovered alter being shot through the
fore part of the cranium ; and from another in whom a piece ot
the barrel of a gun, was beaten into the fissura magna sylvii, where
it remained two days without any violent symptoms, being lodged
chiefly in the cineritious substance.

" From these circumstances, it is concluded, that the medulla-
ry substance at the origin of the nerves, is principally concerned
in the functions ascribed to the brain ; and if it would throw great-
er light on the subject to determine the seat of the soul, we would
allege that the whole medullary substance is that seatt

" So much we have advanced respecting the precise functions
of the brain. It is established we hope, beyond all doubt, that the
brain so far as a corporeal organ is concerned, gives sensation,
intellect, volition, appetite, and passion. Beyond these, its pow-
ers seem not to extend as we shall endeavor to shew. By the
brain, man is rendered speculative and capable of understanding

*I refer to Sir Everard Home's experiments before 4 alluded to. — T. C.

f He says well, if it would throw greater light on the subject. What
light can be thrown on the functions of the brain, by the supposition of
its connexion with a being totally and essentially dissimilar in its nature,
and having no common property with the matter of which the brain is
composed;'' But if the seat of the Soul be in the medullary substance,
then has the Soul all the properties of matter, and is material. For having
relation to, and occupying space, and space too of a determinate form,
then has the Soul solidity, extension, and figure : and as the Soul is placed
there to act upon the brain, she has the common properties of all matter,
attraction and repulsion, into which all action upon matter (by common
consent) can be resolved. " T. (',

L 375 ]

and at the same time inclined to action : and is thus fitted tor the
place he holds in the system of nature."

" It is unnecessary, we presume, to guard the account given, by
subjoining that when we call the brain the sole organ of sensation,
and of all the powers superadded to sensation, we only mean the
sole corporeal organ. For reason and the testimony of God de-
clare, that in man there is an immaterial substance, which has a
share in perception, thinking, and reasoning, &c. — a mind united
Avith the brain. But an inquiry into ihe human Soul, is not with-
in the design of this paper. In this account of the brain, no men-
tion is made of the Soul, because it is only the corporeal organ of
the powers explained, that we are considering. That there is a
soul within us, as well as an omnipotent spirit, that fills, sustains,
and actuates the universe, I firmly believe. No less do I believe
so from reason, than from the sacred monuments of divine inspi-
ration. But it is to be observed, that in this state of our existence,
no act of die mind, can be, or ever is exerted, without a corres-
ponding condition of power in the brain. Brain and Soul, though
it is unknown to us, how they are united, are joint agents in this
world. The power and health of the former, in every exercise of
sense, judgment, memory, passion, &c. is indispensably necessary,
and equally so with the presence of the mind. Besides, the brain,
and not the Soul, is the proper object of medical or surgical treat-
ment. Had we introduced the mind into our discussion, we must
have thrown the brain into the back ground ; or have encumbered
the narration, with a constant coupling of brain and mind."t-p. 244.
Thus far, Dr. Marshall, on the functions of the brain and nerves.
It is manifest that he, like Dr. Rush, and many others, was a mate-
rialist; but was restrained by popular prejudice, from bringing
the whole truth into open day. I cannot blame him. Who can
see the obloquy connected with the character of Mr. Lawrence,

* Here ends the physiology of this sensible writer ; to all of which (sub-
ject to the limitations which I have expressed in these notes) I subscribe,
as an excellent compendium of that branch of Metaphysics called Ideolo-
gy ; and beyond all comparison conveying that real knowledge which
Dr. Dugald Stewart, with his metaphysical predecessors of the same
school at his heels, was so grossly deficientin. More is to be learntfrom
this summary of Dr. Marshall, of genuine physiological metaphysics, than
from all the pages of inanity of the writers so much in vogue among those
who read without thinking. A man who will separate metaphysics from
physiology, is not to be reasoned with. T. C.

1 1 consider all that follows of Dr. Marshall from the end of this para-
graph, as a sacrifice on the altar of prudence to popular prejudice. Law-
rence is cried down for refusing to pay this homage to the priesthood ; and
most disgraceful it is to Aberndhy to have encouraged this hue and cry of
ignorance and bigotry against a fellow professor, in practical knowledge
of his profession at least his equal, and in professional reading so decided-
ly his superior. T. C.

[ 376 ]

notwithstanding his eminent learning, industry, and professional
skill and knowledge, without excusing the writers, who shelter
themselves from the veilings of the bigots, set on by priests whose
interest it is to cry out, " Great is Diana of the Kphesians ?" If
the present clerical combinations in which all sects join, however
discordant on other subjects, should succeed to bring on again the
night of ignorance, (which I much tear will be the case,) the advo-
cates of truth, must rest contented with having deserved the suc-
cess thev could not obtain.

TH: JEFFERSON TO DR. COOPER.

I received, a day or two ago, a small pamphlet on Materialism, without
any indication from what quarter it came : but I knew there was but one
person in the United States capable of writing it, and therefore am at no
loss to whom to address my thanks for it and assurances of my high es-
teem and respect.

Monticello, March 29, 1824.

FINIS.

OUTLINE

OF THE

ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.

BY THOMAS COOPER, M. D*

ON THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.

So little attention has been paid of late days to that profound
and important book, Hartley's observations on man, first published
in two vols. 8vo. 1749, that I am tempted to state some of the
leading facts relating to the Association of Ideas, so well explain-
ed in that treatise. Dr. Jos. Priestley brought this work into no-
tice among his followers ; and the Zoonomia of Dr. Darwin is main-
ly founded on the doctrines of Hartley, Brown, and Girtanner.
The doctrine of association has received also much attention in
the writings of Condillac ; but I do not find that Hartley's book is
noticed by any of the modern French ideologists or physiologists,
Cabanis, Destut Tracey, Richerand, Majendie, Adelon or Brous-
sais : but there seems to be almost as much neglect and ignorance
among the French physiologists of what the English have done, as
there is of what the French have done, among the English.

The following brief sketch will by no means supercede the ne-
cessity which I consider every well informed physiologist and
ideologist to be under, of perusing with attention the first volume
of Hartley's work ; to which, notwithstanding its hypothetical su-
perfluities, hardly know any book in the language superior, in pro-
found and accurate reasoning, and extent of application. Priest-
ley abridged it ; but the book itself is so condensed in matter and
manner, that it should be read as Hartley wrote it. His theory of
vibrations first suggested by Sir Isaac Newton, misconceived and
misrepresented by superficial readers, may be true or not true ;
I incline to agree to it; but the facts relating to the extensive as-
sociation of sensations with sensations, of sensations with ideas,
of ideas with ideas, and of both with muscular and other corpore-
al motions both antomatic and voluntary, instinctive and intellec-
tual, healthy and diseased, are perfectly undeniable: they are not
• theory, but fact.

The association of ideas was first noticed by Mr. Gay in a dis-
sertation prefixed to King's Origin of Evil, and afterwards by Mr.
Locke in his Treatise on the Human Understanding, book II. di.
S3. Hartley's book is noticed by the Scotch metaphysicians in
the superficial and flippant manner that might be expected from
persons who cither could not or would not take the pains of un-

[ 380 j

derstanding it. But Messrs. Reid, Oswald, Beattie, Dugatd
Stewart, and Thomas Brown, have had their day. They are fa-
vorites with the clergy, for they are of the orthodox school of ide-
ology; they are ontologists and psychologists; they offend no
popular prejudices; they run counter to no clerical doctries ; they
express due horror at the tendencies of heterodox metaphysics ;
their style of writing is for the most part good, frequently marked
by elegance and taste; while the dogmatism that pervades their
pages of inanity is well calculated to impose upon the numerous
class of readers who are content to read without thinking. But
the progress of accurate physiology, has destroyed them : the
thinking part of the public which ultimately gives the tone to the
much larger part that does not think, is wearied with toiling
through pages after pages of figurative words and phrases without
distinct meaning, and calls aloud for facts in the matter, and pre-
cision in the language. I was induced to draw up the following
sketch originally, from perusing the elements of criticism of Dr.
Blair and Lord Kame, during my course of lectures on this sub-
ject, in the college over which I preside ; and from observing how
much more satisfactorily the principles they attempt to developc
might have been explained and illustrated, had they known any
thing of the doctrine of the Association of Ideas. Thus, all the
confusion and obscurity in Lord Kame's account of ideas occur-
ring in a train, and connected with preceding ideas — his labour-
ed and not very clear explanation of what he calls ideal pres-
ence — of emotions, passions, sympathies and sympathetic emotions
—of emotions similar to each other — of emotions connected witli
music — and many others, rank among the plainest cases of asso-
ciation. Dr. Jos. Priestley was aware of the influence of this doc-
trine on these subjects, and has noticed its application in his
"Lectures on Oratory and Criticism" which have added nothing
else to Blair and Karnes. Although aware of its utility, he has
made but little use in his lectures of this doctrine compared with
its manifest extent of application, for want as I conjecture of suffi-
cient acquaintance with physiology.

In stating the following outline of the "Association of Ideas,*' I
do not profess to advance any theory either of my own, or of oth-
ers. I state plain, well known, undeniable facts; familiar to eve-
ry physiologist who has overturned his attention to the catenation
of stimulations and motions in the nervous fibre, but utterly dis-
regarded by the tribe of metaphysical logomachists, who never
dream that the phenomena of the body, are of any use in explain-
ing or accounting for the phenomena of mind. This class of wri-
ters, are content to decry an opinion, if its tendency, immediate or
remote, be what the clergy call heterodox, and dangerous; as all
opinions are, whose tendency is to lesson the influence of that or-
der of men, or expose the management by which they hold the igno-
rant in subjection. What is orthodoxy, and what is heterodoxy ?

I 381 |

said Lord Sandwich in a debate upon the corporation and test acts.
Orthodoxy my lord, said JJishop Warburton, is my doxy ; hetero-
doxy is another man's doxy. It is high time to discard the en-
quiry, what is the tendency of an opinion, and substitute in lieu of
it, the question, what is the fact and the truth? these can never
have a bad tendency ; though the bigots who imprisoned Galileo,
and discarded Lawrence and Macartney, thought otherwise.
What is the motto of truth ? Give us day light and fair play.

The outline of the doctrine of the Association of Ideas, then, is
as follows:

When an impression, or stimulation, is applied to any sentient
extremity, it is propagated by some kind of motion along the
course ot the nerve to the brain. The motion thus propagated
along the course of the nerve toward the brain, has been subject
to the following suppositions :

1st. That it is a vibratory motion — an oscillation ot the body
or cord of the nerve. But this is not the ..opinion of Sir Isaac
Newton, or Dr. Hartley, or of any author of note with whom I am
acquainted ; though it has ignorantly been imputed to Hartley :
and it is unlikely in itself, since the nerves are nothing like the
stretched cords of a harpsichord : they are comparatively soft
bodies imbedded in soft bodies.

2dly. That the minute particles of which the nerves are com-
posed, are put into a vibratory motion which is propagated along
the whole substance of the nerve in the same way. This seems
to have been Hartley's opinion. It may be so, but we have no
sufficient proof to establish the existence of this kind of motion in
the nerve. He calls in aid Sir Isaac Newton's Ether ; but that is
hypothesis.
* Sdly. The nerves have been supposed to secrete a very subtle
fluid, which is the subject of these successive impulses or vibra-
tions ; but this fluid has never been shewn, or its nature ascertain-
ed, or its mode of receiving and communicating impressions, in
any satisfactory manner explained.

4thly. It is rendered probable, (but by no means certain) that
the galvanic fluid is the agent on this occasion : from the electric
powers of the torpedo, gymnotus electricus, silurus electricus —
from the experiments on digestion, and respiration by Dr. Wilson
Philips, Dutrochet, and others — and from the observations of M.
LeGallois. But this opinion is yet an opinion only, founded, so
far as it goes, more distinctly upon facts than the others, but by
no means ascertained.

Yet, as the table can make no impression on the medullary sub-
stance of which my brain is composed, but by some medium of
communicated motion, it is absolutely certain, that the motion ot
some thin 0, or other moved on this occasion, must of necessity take
place. There can be no motion but of something moved. By the
brain, I mean those portions of medullary substance so called, that

382 j ■

the facta observed point outas including the scat of intellect: the
cerebrum, or fore part of the brain — the cerebellum, or hind pan.
and the medulla oblongata : altogether, forming the encephalon.
The brain (as is said) appears from observations on the foetus, to
be gradually formed by elongation of the spinal marrow. The
nerves are for the most part in pairs, and the brain also is for the
most part duplicate, as Gall and Spurzheim have observed. As
yet, no apparatus has been traced, by means wher.eof the electrical
or the galvanic fluid is secreted, or accumulated in land animals,
as it is in the fishes before mentioned. When the motion, whate-
ver it be that takes place, is in some way or other communicated
from the sentient extremity of the finger, for instance, to the me-
dullary substance of the brain, (as above explained) it is there felt,
or as the now adopted phrase is, perceived. Every sensation,
therefore, is essentially, a motion in the brain perceived.
This is so true, that it is expressly acknowledged and taught by
all the late physiologists of repute ; and may be found distinctly
stated in Richerand and Majendie, the two latest and most ap-
proved elementary authors in use among us ; and I consider it
as demonstrated by Dr. Darwin in his Zoonomia, Sect. 3, and
elsewhere. The motion thus communicated — how and by what
means is it felt or perceived ? There are two opinions on this
subject principally agitated, to which a third may be added.

1st. From the great difficulty of conceiving how perception,
thought, and intellect, can arise from any particular arrangement
or disposition of parts which are previously devoid of all these
qualities, and consist merely of inert, unfeeling, unconscious mat-
ter — philosophers, especially divines, have been strongly led to
the hypothesis of a being, or principle, distinct from the body,
having no quality in common with it, immaterial, not dependent
upon it or dying with it, but surviving it, and supernaturally ad-
ded to our system ot organized matter; by which union, we are
enabled to exhibit the phenomena of intellect. This immaterial
being, or principle, is the Soul. According to this opinion, the
motions that take place in our nervous system, are perceived or
felt by the soul, and become the subjects of its operations ; all the
phenomena termed mental or intellectual, proceeding essentially
from the faculties of the soul as a distinct being; and from this
conjunction of soul and body, they become developed and appa-
rent in the compound being called man; in whom the body is
perishable and destructible — the soid, imperishable, indestructible
and immortal. This has been for many ages the prevailing opin-
ion among men of learning and reflection. It is the opinion of a
very large majority of the divines of our day; to them, a very
convenient and lucrative one; it is the common opinion among
writers on metaphysics also, particularly in Scotland. This is
the opinion taught as true in every university and collegiate semi-
nary in England, on the continent of Europe, and in our country.

[ 383 J

It has, therefore, the decided suffrage of modern authority in its
favor ; but it has been artificially kept up, and at present is'fast
losing ground.

2dly. Another class of philosophers, chiefly in England and
France, are of opinion that all the mental or intellectual phenome-
na can be explained from the properties of the organized body,
without the intervention of any distinct immaterial principle, such
as the soul is described to be, provided the property of perception
or feeling, be allowed to belong to, or arise from our organization,
as the fact appears at least to be. They say, that life and percep-
tion, are as much the result of our peculiar organization, as any
one property is the result of any system whatever. They say,
that there is no foundation, but constant concomitance, on which
we can build an} r case of necessary connection, whatever, or as-
sert in any case, that one thing is" the property of another: that
the phenomena termed mental, must be considered as arising from,
appertainingto, and as essential properties of animal organization;
because they have never been observed, unless in conjunction
with a corporeal organized system — are always found to accom-
pany it ; to grow with its growth, to be of a higher perfection as
the organization of the animal is more perfect; to depend on the
healthy state of the nervous system ; to become disordered by
nervous disease or derangement ; to decline as the body and its
organization declines ; to grow old with the body ; and to cease
to be, when the body dies. They assert, that there is no evidence
whatever, for the existence of the faculties of the soul, or any of
them, but what arises within, and depends on the body. That it
is plainly impossible for our material senses and organs to be im-
pressed by, or have any idea of, a being that has no one property
of matter. That all the difference between man and other ani-
mals, in point of intellect, is in proportion to their difference in
point of organization. That the phenomena termed mental, are
as really exercised by other animals, as by man ; but in degrees
greatly inferior, from the very great inferiority of organization in
other animals: and that they are in all cases reducible to corpo-
real affections. Moreover, they assert as matter of indisputable
fact, that compound bodies exhibit properties and results altoge-
ther different from the properties of the component parts.

This opinion prevails among many anatomists and physicians
in England and France; and among the followers of the religious
tenets of Dr. Priestley. A very serious objection has been urged
to this doctrine, that it deprives us of the arguments for a future
state of existence drawn from the natural immortality of the soul,
To this, the Priestleyans reply, that a christian is not affected by this
objection ; inasmuch as the resurrection clearly taught in the'New
Testament, is the resurrection (not of the soul) but of the body.
That this tenet is adopted as an article of faith in the Apostle^
creed, which only recognizes the resurrection of the body. That

[ 38*j

the scripturejanguage gives no encouragement to the existence of
a distinct, immaterial, naturally immortal principle called the
soul. That this is in fact acknowledged by learned divines and
dignitaries of the English Episcopal Church, by Tillotson and
Sherlock— by Watson, Bishop of Landaflf, who states it as ,'an
unsettled question, and by Law, Bishop of Carlisle, who
openly denies that the Old or the New Testament countenances
this doctrine of a soul. To all which, I have nothing to say :
those who really believe so, have a right to believe so; those who
believe otherwise, have a right to believe otherwise : we may
judge for ourselves, but not for them.

3dly. Another opinion respecting intellectual phenomena,
including^perception, is, that they are indeed phenomena of or-
ganized matter, but as we know of no kind of matter capable of
organizing itself into an animal form, unless in consequence of
animal life, previously communicated by means of parentage, we
have no authority for asserting that it actually is, or in any case
can be so. They who hold this opinion, deny the doctrine of
equivocal generation, or of life being the result of any form of
organized matter to which it did not previously belong: and they
will not admit that the few dubious instances suggested by Dr.
Darwin, Mr. Baillie, and M. La Marck, or the nisus formations of
Professor Blumenbach, or the late microscopic discoveries, are
sufficient to establish a doctrine, contradicted by all the plain and
distinct cases with which we are acquainted, and which manifest-
ly points to a living principle, previously existing, imparted in all
known instances, vegetable as well as animal, whose origin we can
only refer to the Almighty Creator, who endowed us with it. I
feel strongly the difficulties of this subject. But this is a ques-
tion that I see no means, in the present state of our knowledge, of
settling to universal satisfaction.

Dr. Hartley thought the soul was some very fine etherial substance
added to the body, and that survived it. But this unsupported
opinion does not advarfte us one step. If it have the properties of
matter, or any of them, it is so far matter ; if not, the old question
recurs, how can one thing act upon another, withoutany common
property ? This notion has been revived lately by Abernethy.

Having thus disposed, as well as I can, of all the prelimi-
nary questions that beset me in my progress, I proceed to
state, the outline of the facts relating to the organized animal
man, that arrange themselves under the law oFthe association of
ideas. In'all our inquiries as to the phenomena of mind, we
should endeavor (as I think) to ascertain, how many of them are
explicable from the mere phenomena of the body; and call in the
hypothesis of a superadded principle of intellect then only when
the known properties of organized matter, will explain no more,
^o far as I can yet see, every intellectual fact, by whatever form
of phrase or figurative expression it may be described, is no othor

f 385 ]

than the usual normal function, or mode of action of the organ
called the brain : some motion in, and modification of, the cere-
bral or encephalic viscus. Thought, judgment, reason, reflection,
the will, the understanding, the memory, &c. are words only, not
distinct beings, or entities: they designate particular states,
affections, or functions of the cerebral mass; that is, certain mo-
tions that take place in it, of which we are conscious, as the
French say — which we feel, or perceive, as the English say. The
propensity to fiction, of the modern metaphysicians, have clothed
these words with a separate existence, and personified them. But
this poetry of metaphysics — this prosopopeia of orthodoxy, is not
reasoning.

An additional question however, occurs ; when these motions
along the course of the nerves reach the brain, is there in that or-
gan any common sensorium — any seat of perception located in
some peculiar part of the brain ? It has been a prevailing opinion
that there is such a spot. Sir Isaac Newton and Dr. Hartley
adopted it ; so does Broussais. I know of no proof that vvill estab-
lish such a locality. That the motions communicated by the or-
gans of the several senses respectively, do in fact modify each
other, when associated synchronously or by short intervals of suc-
cession, appears to be matter of fact beyond the reacb of denial ;
but whether this be owing to their uniting at or near some termi-
nal point in the brain, we have no means of ascertaining. I
therefore use the term brain, to signify that portion of the nervous
system, within the scull, and a small part of the spine, wherein
the motions propogated from the sentient extremities of the
nerves external or internal finally cease; and from whence,
the motions propagated to the voluntary muscles, commence*,
This may be for aught I know, a particular spot, in the medul-
lary substance of the brain as 1 have defined it (cerebrum, cere-
bellum and medulla oblongata) but I do not know that it is,
from any anatomical or physiological fact as yet ascertained. Dr.
Darwin's opinions make it pervade the whole nervous system, his
sensorial power being co-extensive with nervous ramifications.

Injuries have been done to various parts of the brain, without
inducing an expected injury in the same propertion, either to life
or intellect. Many of these cases, have been collected (not quite
on satisfactory authority) by Dr. Feriar, and many upon somewhat
better authority by Sir Everard Home. Whether it has been ow-
ing to the more insignificant character of the part injured, or to
the double character of the cerebral organs, or to the distinct func-
tions of each part of the brain, that no more mental injury has
accrued in the cases referred to, is not yet sufficiently known.
The general fact, well established, is, that when the brain is in-
jured, the intellect is injured also. The major part of apoplectic,
lunatic and maniacal cases may be cited in Full proof of this
Marshall, \bennethv and Abercromby furnish, them in abundance

Id

[ Sbii ]

Having now traced the progress of sensations caused by exter-
nal objects, from the sentient extremity of a nerve up to the brain,
I have to notice the impressions that may be made on the brain
by means of the internal state of the body, operating on that or-
gan ; and which formerly have not received so much consideration
as I think they are entitled to. Broussais terms this kind of ner-
vous sympathy, innervation.

Nerves proceed both from the brain and spinal marrow to sup-
ply the heart, stomach, liver, intestines, and other parts whose
functions while in a healthy state, go on instinctively, automatical-
ly, and unperceived by us; exciting no sensation accompanying
their actions. But as the nerves that supply these parts, are ex-
tensively connected with the whole nervous system, any variation
from an usual or healthy state of these or any of these viceral
portions of the body, will affect the state of the brain and of the
whole nervous system. Thus lunacy and ideocy may be produced
by excessive hysterics; by worms in the intestines; melancholy in
form of disease, by an irregular state of the bowels and vice ver-
sa; mania by stimulating liquors, or narcotic vegetables; and the
general state of uneasiness felt, when we have some unascertain-
ed internal complaint, is undoubtedly owing to a series of morbid
motions that take place in the viscera, transmitted to the brain, to
which from their occurring but now and then, we have given no
regular appellation ; nor have we any means of referring to their
exact internal locality.* All our sensations and ideas, depend
conjointly upon the objects that excite them, and the state of the
organ in which the excitement takes place. So that if the state
of the nervous system of one man differs from that of another, the
same exciting causes, will not produce exactly the same internal
motions and associations; but these will be modified not only by
the great variety of synchronous associated circumstances, but also
according to age, sex, original constitution, previous habits, visce-
ral affections and the general state of health and disease. These
considerations will well explain the different points of view, in
which the same subjects appear to different persons; and furnish-

* As the whole nervous system of organic life, is connected directly
with the brain, by means of the spinal marrow, there can be no difficulty
in referring those actions called sympathetic to this connection. As
when the brain is partially paralysed by alcoholic potations taken into
the stomach, or paralysed unto death by a strong dose of prussic acid, or
when tetanus is produced by a wound with a rusty nail, &c. In this last
case for instance, the nervous power over the muscles of voluntarity, is
affected ; and therefore the source of the complaint must of necessity be
in nervous communication; what Broussais calls innervation. In the
case of the sympathetic action of medicines as it has been called, it is
ascertained, that many of the cases have depended on absorption, and
others on nervous communication, as no one could doubt who had read,
Mr. TTrodir's essay on the operation of poison?.

1 3S7 ]

ea an adequate cause of many ot the differences in intellect and
inclination. For the old metaphysical adage is literally true
quicquid recipitur, vecipituv admodum recipientis. All those in-
ternal operations of our system which in the ordinary state of per-
fect health are not perceived, become sources of sensation when
they recede from a healthy state; as a non-sentient surface be-
comes painful in a state of inflammation. Hence the source of in-
cubus or the night-mare from indigestion, and of dreams generally,
■which are motions in the brain similar to such as have been excit-
ed by external objects, and are then perceived under irregular
associations in consequence of the half-wakefulness of imperfect
sleep. They occur with little or no connection, because the unea-
sy state of the internal organs which causes them, has few or no
associations to furnish such a connection ; and therefore the law
of association to be explained by and by, operates but partially
and imperfectly : and in this partial and imperfect association, the
strangeness of our dreams consists.

The same law of nervous communicated motion, takes place in
our internal vicera, as in other parts of the body. Thus, in the
late experiments of Mr. Brodie, Dr. Wilson Philips, and others, if
the eighth pair of nerves, or the sympathetic be cut or intercepted,
the functions of the stomach, lungs, and the generation of animal
heat, are affected also; and the parts are paralysed.

I now go on to state a few of the general laws of association, as
mere matters of fact, and physical observation ; referring to Hart-
ley and Darwin for details.

By a sensation is here meant a motion excited by some external
object, at the sentient extremity of a nerve and thence propagated
along the course of the nerve up to the brain, and there felt or per-
ceived. Or, it may also be, a motion internally excited, in a
nerve within the body, in consequence of some unusual or diseas-
ed action in the part supplied by that nerve; and this motion is
propagated along the course of the nerve up to the brain : as peri-
odical hunger, want of exoneration, generation, &c. as the pain of
gout in the toe, the stomach or kidnies ; of colic in the intestines ;
the pain down the thigh in renal inflammation ; or under the shoul-
der in affections of the liver, and innumerable others.

By an idea is here meant a motion in the brain, similar in kind
and in locality to a precedent sensation, and by means of which,
the sensation is recollected. Ideas are the immediate objects of
recollection and memory. An idea therefore is the representative
of a previous sensation, morbid or healthy — external or internal.
The first time a child sees u peach, it is a sensation ; when at some
subsequent time the peach is remembered, it is an idea. That it
is a cerebral motion see Darwin Zoon. sec. 3.

Proposition 1. Any set of sensations A, B, C, &c. being associ-
ated with each other a sufficient number of times, obtain such a
power over their corresponding ideas a, b, c, &c. that any of the

1! 3ss j

sensations , A for instance) when impressed alone, shall be ableiu
excite b, e, &c. the ideas of the rest.

Suppose we are reading together in the same book at the same
table; and that the cat jumping on the table and walking over the
book, prevents our reading. If a twelvemonth hence you meet
me, the sensations of my person will call up the ideas of the table,
ot the place and situation, of the cat, and of the book ; i. e. they
will be remembered. In what precise manner the mingled motions
of these sensations, should excite a correspondent modification in
that cerebral motion to which we give the name of ide;i, I cannot
undertake to explain. It rests among the very many matters of
fact, indubitable but inexplicable. But common experience es-
tablishes the fact, as resulting from a general law of our nature.
So, the name, the odour, the taste of a peach, to a person eating it
in the dark, and who has seen and tasted them at other times, will
suggest the form and colour of a peach; that is, its visible idea,
and vice versa.

Prop.2. If the sensations occur only in a certain order of suc-
cession, the power they have of calling up ideas, will be exerted
only in the order in which the original associations were made. If
\, B, C,D,E,F, occur in that order, C will suggest d, e, f, but not
a, b. We can say the Lord's prayer : which of us can say it
backward ?

Prop. 3. Simple ideas will run into complex ones by associa-
tion.

Let A, B, C, D be frequently associated together in all varie-
ties of combination, then will a, b, c, d recur so instantaneously
and mechanically, as to form not a succession of ideas, but one
mingled and complex idea. Let the size, the shape, the colour,
the down, the odour, the flavour of a peach, be frequently associa-
ted with the name ; as is the case in fact: then will the name sug-
gest all the other ideas so mingled, as to form what we call the ab-
stract idea of a peach : in which mingled and complex idea, those
individual ideas which are most prominent and characteristic, will
usually occur, and the others gradually be dropt and become evan-
escent or nearly so. It is in this manner that what we call ab-
stract ideas begin to be formed, as I think : to which for the conve-
nience of writing and speaking we annex written and oral names,
as virtue, vice, beauty, &c. which have of themselves no real exis-
tence, and are mere inventions of language, to aid our reasoning
or researches.

Dr. Darwin illustrates the modification of cerebral motions in
consequence of association, thus. You are desired to write the
word man. You write it without thinking of the up-strokes and
down-strokes necessary to form each seperate letter, or the diffi-
culty you experienced in this respect, when you first were taught
to write ; it occurs now, as one simple operation, never analysed.
Yet when you consider the great variety of muscular motions of

I 389 j

the hand ami oi the eye, associated and catenated to enable you
to perform this operation, there is nothing more difficult and "ab-
struse in the most complex case of* the association of ideas. The
one and the other are equally matters of undeniable fact.

Where an idea is very complex, the combination may overpower
the particular parts ; just as in well made punch, we do not recog-
nize the acid, the sugar, the spirit, or the lemon flavour particu-
larly, they are all merged in the combination. So, the seven pri-
mary colours of the solar spectrum, moving connectedly and
simultaneously with great rapidity, excite the sensation we call
white. So in language the whole can be analysed into about 30
simple sounds, which are lost in the complexity of their almost in-
numerable combinations.

In complex ideas, first the visible, next the audible idea, appears
to have most power in suggesting; the others. Horace remarks
tins : segnnis irritant amnios demissa per aures, quam qua? sunt
oculis subjecta Jidelibus.

Prop. 4. Language is cither written or oral : it is the most fa-
miliar instance we possess of the association of ideas. The moth-
er shews the child a peach ; she repeats over and over, " this is a
peach;" till the oral sound and the sensation of the peach itself, be-
come so completely associated, that one suggests the other. It is
the same in written language ; wherein we first learn to associate
oral sounds with written or printed letters, and that so frequently,
that the suggestion of the one from the presence of the other,
is instantaneous and complete. Hence, in reading a description,
the words almost place the things themselves by association before
the mind's eye. This is Lord Kame's ideal presence. Suppose I
read a description of a Boa Constrictor or Anaconda, crushing a
tyger. I have from pictures and descriptions of serpents and ty-
gers a tolerably correct idea of them though I may never have seen
either the one animal or the other. The ideas thus excited there-
fore by the verbal description, form what Lord Kame not inapt-
ly terms ideal presence; an ideal representation, excited and
suggested by the associations connected with the written descrip-
tion.

In the same way, sensations and ideas are suggested by looks,
by tones, and by gestures ; for looks, tones, and gestures, are the
natural marks of strong emotions. Hence the superiority of dra-
matic representation to mere perusal ; more associations are
brought into play, and the ideas are more vividly excited. Looks,
tones and gestures, like metaphors and other figures of speech, are
more common in the early ages of society, because the poverty of
a nascent language, requires their aid.

Prop. 5. When pain is associated with any sensation, it adds
o-reatly to its vividness. It is upon this principle, that the ancient
back-country practice is founded, of flogging a son, at each corner
of a tract of land which he is destined to inherit, to enable him to

i 390 ]

remember the boundaries more accurately. And this is consen
taneous both to theory and to fact, however rude the custom may
be. The same reasoning will apply to the association of pleasure.
These two last propositions will explain all Lord Kame's diffi-
culties respecting sympathetic emotions, and emotions and pas-
sions generally ■■ thus it' words, looks, tones, and gestures be (as
they are) associated with emotions and passions, then are emotions
and passions associated with words, looks, tones and gestures ;and
the one calls up the other. This needs no illustration to those
who have seen the representation of a ballet at the French or Eng-
lish opera house, or who recollects the story of Cicero and the
actor Roscius.

Prop. 6. In sensations and ideas, the cerebraL^notion commu-
nicated by the excited nerves, may be so gentle as to be nearly
imperceptible ; or so moderate as merely to excite slight atten-
tion ; or so vivid as to be pleasurable; or so intense as to be painful.
This constitutes the foundation of Lord Kame's distinction be-
tween emotions and passions.

Prop. 7. The force and vividness of ideas, depend chiefly on
the following circumstances, (not excluding others of minor influ-
ence) : on the original excitability of the nervous system : on the
vividness of the original sensation : on the quantity of sensorial
power, as Darwin calls it, or of accumulated excitability, as Brown
calls it, that is accumulated in the system at the time: on the
force and vividness of the associated ideas, which explain to us
the use of appropriate figurative language, and the effects of tones
and gestures. Sometimes in a state of general morbid febrile
irritation, the accumulation of sensorial power in the brain, not
consumed by muscular action, produces a vividness of sensation
and perception, that greatly increases for a time the mental capa-
city ; and when in much excess, or too long continued, produces
the hallucinations of the various kinds of lunacy. That is, when
usual and natural stimulation and excitation are increased so as
to become morbid irritation.

Prop. 8. In considering the effect of words, Dr. Hartley's ar-
rangement of them seems useful.

"Words that have ideas only, and no definitions. tFhite. Sweet.
Words that have descriptions, or definitions only, and no ideas.

Monagynia. Axiom. Radius.
Words that have descriptions, or definitions and ideas. Jl Peach,

Jin Isosceles Triangle.
"Words that have neither. The, To, and Of.

It is manifest, that thegreatest effect is produced by the former
class, in the fine arts that constitute tiie objects of criticism.

It may well be doubted, if words that do not express a matter
of fact cognizable by our senses, have any meaning whatever.
We have no other source of knowledge but our sensations — sen-
sations excited in the encephalon, either by objects external to us.,

[ -oi j

or by our internal wants, and visceral affections. What meaning
can be ascribed to soul, angel, devil, spirit, &c. — supposed enti-
ties, not cognizable by our material senses, or any of them ?
Abracadabra, maybe substituted for any or all of them. What
evidence can we receive of a being who cannot be seen, heard,
touched, or felt, and who is no object discernible by taste or smell?
What can a word mean, which means nothing that we can receive
any proof of — which does not exist for any of our inlets of know-
ledge ?

Prop. 9. Mr. Hume, in his section on the association of ideas,
(vol. 2,) arranges all the general and abstract sources of associa-
tion under contiguity of time or place — resemblance — and causa-
tion. An habitual attention chiefly to the first set of associations,
forms the historian : to the second, the poet and dramatist : to the
third, the statesman and reasoner.

Prop. 10. It is probable, from what we observe, that the pleas-
ures of sensation are more numerous, and upon the whole overba-
lance the pains of sensation. This, however, is frequently matter
of accident, of health, or disease. But in intellectual pleasures
and pains — those that depend on our ideas, and their combina-
tions, and which are greatly in the power of our volition, the
balance of pleasurable feeling in well educated persons, is mani-
festly considerable ; and in the usual duration of life, it amounts
to a quantity far exceeding our usual calculations. It should
seem, therefore, to furnish a strong argument for study, and intel-
lectual employments, which greatly increase in number and
intensity all the ideal pleasurable associations. ■ Moreover, the
pleasures and pains dependent on the external senses, being for
the most part local, have a greater tendency to destroy the body,
than the intellectual pleasures and pains, which are not so much
calculated to affect any organ in particular ; and rather produce
moderate exercise in the medullary substance, than any violent
and destructive motion.

Prop.11. The imperfect memory and judgment in children,
and the dotage of old persons, may be explained from the imper-
fect, and abnormal associations that take place owing to the
imperfection and deterioration of the encephalic apparatus.
Hence the propensity of children to falsehood, without being con-
scious of the fault: and of old age, toforgetfulnessand repetition.
Prop. 12. The imperfect, irregular, and incoherent intellect of
ideots, lunatics, and maniacs, is manifestly dependent on the
irregular associations that take place in the encephalic apparatus,
owing to the irritated and morbid state of that portion of the ner-
vous svstem. Thus, also, may be explained the morbid associa-
tions, from a disordered state of the stomach and intestines, how-
ever originating ; for the morbid irritations of the viscera arc
transmitted by innervation to the cerebral centre, and produce
morbid excitement (irritation) in that vi?cu<=.

[ 3dZ \

Of Muscular Motion. Prop. 13. The motions of an animal
body, are either instinctive, (that is, automatic) or voluntary, or
associated. In the first case they are not attended by any sensa-
tion : as the motion of the heart and arteries, the motion of the
lungs and diaphragm, the puistaltic motion of the bowels, &c.

The voluntary motions depend on that state of the brain, which
we call volition. It is necessary, therefore, to examine in what
volition consists; and what is that affection of the brain that ac-
companies or constitutes volition. I say, accompanies or consti-
tutes, because the expression adopted, will depend on the theory
adopted to account for the phenomena of perception. A psycho-
logist would say accompanies : I prefer the latter form of ex-
pression.

Of Desire and Volition. Prop. 14. A child who has tasted a
peach, so as to know what it is, sees a peach on a table out of his
reach ; what takes place ? First, he has a sensation of the visible
form of the peach, by the rays of light that passing into his eye,
strike on the retinous expansion of the optic nerve; the motion
there excited, is propagated along the optic nerve to its other
extremity in the brain, and there it is perceived, forming the visi-
ble sensation of the peach. But as the child has tasted peaches,
the visible sensation excites by association the idea of the taste of
the peach, and this is accompanied by a desire to obtain and to eat
the peach which he sees before him. This state of the brain, which,
when felt, we call desire,\sa.s real, and as really existent in that or-
gan, as the visible sensation, or the associated idea of the taste of the
peach; equally. and concomitantly felt. It always accompanies
and forms part of the sensation of hunger. That desire, when
it excites an effort to reach the peach, (cerebral innervation) is
volition, and the consequent motion is voluntary. All these states
of the brain, are felt or perceived equally as existing together,
and arising from the same cause ; but being perceptibly distin-
guishable from each other, we give different names to them. If
the child have eaten as many peaches before hand as he could eat,
the state of the brain called desire will not be excited ; the stom-
ach will notinncrvateupon the brain, or call for its aid, and voli-
tion and voluntary motion will not accompany it. This shews,
that it is a mere corporeal feeling, dependent on the state of the
bodily organs. Is not hunger always so ? and is not desire and
volition absent or present in such a case, according as hunger is
absent or present? Do we make an exertion to take food, if our
appetite be already satisfied ?

Again : my father desired me to meet him at home at a certain
hour: as the hour approaches, the ideas of my promise, of my
father, of home, are excited by association ; I feel the desire to
obey him, and I get up to meet him accordingto the appointment.
Here, desire, volition, and voluntary motion, are associated with
the recollected ideas of past sensations. All those feeling's arc

[ 393 ]

simultaneous, or nearly so; they arc connected ; they are felt or
perceived in the same manner, and referred (if referred at all) to
the same source, the same organ, the same place of feeling. The
voluntary motion would not have taken place, if the desire had
not existed : the desire is one of the circumstances attendant on,
and belonging to, the sensation of the peach, or the idea of my
father, and the promise made to him.

Dr. Darwin observes, (Sect. XI. 2 2,) that all our emotions and
passions have their origin in sensation and volition. Pride, hope,
joy, are the names of particular pleasurable sensations ; shame,
despair, sorrow, of painful ones. Love, ambition, avarice, are the
names of particular desires: Hatred, disgust, fear, anxiety, of
particular aversions. The passion of anger includes the pain
from a recent injury, and the hatred to the adversary who occa-
sioned it. Compassion is the pain we feel at the sight of misery,
with the desire of relieving it.

All these, in whatever viscus they originate, are ultimately re-
ducible to motions in the cerebral organs, there felt and perceived,
and which arise from various complications of sensations and
ideas into which the emotion and passion can be analysed. Take
Love, for instance. A young man is frequently in company with
a young woman, whose manners, looks, and tones, affect him with
pleasurable sensations, and sensations of respect for her charac-
ter and conduct; to these are joined the belief, or the strong
hope, that he himself stands in a similar situation with respect to
her sentiments toward him. All these are sensations and ideas,
affording no difficulty in the analysis. They are clearly of the
same nature as all other sensations and ideas, that being associa-
ted together by simultaneous or successive occurrence, modify the
affection of the brain where perception takes place, just like any
other complex set of associations. When to these are joined the
natural sensation of sexual desire, founded on the internal state
of our corporeal system, the whole sensation thus complex is called
love, which is nothing more than strong feelings of friendship
toward a person of another sex, accompanied by sexual desire.
Nor is there any thing more difficult in the analysis of this complex
sensation or idea, (for it is the one or the other, depending upon
the presence or absence of the object,) than in the complex sen-
sation of the book now before me ; which is made up of the size,
the form of the type, the proportion of margin, the color of the
paper, the marbling or gilding of the leaves, the kind of binding,
the gilt ornaments of the binding, and the peculiarity of the letter-
ing ; all of which are also at this moment associated with the
paragraph I am now writing.

Moreover, in the complex sensation called love, is it not clear

that the want, paralysis, or organic lesion of corporeal organs may

preventits occurrence? Can it not be rendered more vivid by

sexual abstinence, or even bv aphrodisiacs, as well as by the asso-

50

L 394 ]

clations of amatory description ? And when the mere animal
sensation is thus rendered more vivid, is not the associated intel-
lectual part of this passion rendered more vivid also ?

Desire and volition, therefore, are not merely similar to, but
actually are sensations and ideas. States of the brain felt or per-
ceived, exciting to the muscular action called for by the existing
want. Aversion is only another form of desire, it is the desire to
avoid. Desire simply, is the desire to obtain. In a sensation,
the commencement is at the extremity of the nerve farthest from
the brain, and it terminates in the brain. In a volition the com-
mencement is in the brain, and it terminates in the muscular
organ of voluntary motion.

I consider, and I state all this, as well known, incontrovertible
fact — such as no physiologist will scruple to admit at once; and
quite independent of any hypothesis relating to the cause, the
seat, or the source of perception ; whether it be a cerebral func-
tion arising from our system of animal organization, as some
think, or belong to a separate being, (the soul) as others think.

Prop. 15. Hence, we see in what way automatic and voluntary
motions, may be associated with sensations, ideas, desires, and
volitions. It maybe of use to dwell a little more on this part of
the subject. First in a state of health.

They may be associated with sensations, as when we cut our
meat, pour out our wine, move from one room to another; when a
lady sings and plays at the same time ; when we dance to the sound
of music keeping time, &c. With ideas, as when a lady plays on
the pianoforte a tune she remembers only ; when we go to a book-
sellers for a book we stand in need of; when we ring the bell for
a servant, &c. &c. The cases are so numerous and of such con-
stant occurrence, that it is needless to enumerate them. With
desires and volitions, as in the way described in proposition 12.
These are in fact the preceding causes of all voluntary motions.
So in a state of disease, when 1 turn to get rid of pain, it is a motion
associated with (sensations); when I ask, if my physician become:
with (ideas) ; when I call for drink, if a thirst, with (desires.)

Many, perhaps most of our voluntary motions, were at first
automatic. A child shuts his hand, or moves his foot, from the
mere effect of muscular irritability, when touched. The motion of
grasping with intention, or of walking, or running, or dancing, or
climbing, are all learnt by degrees, and are voluntary.

Automatic motions, are either aboriginal and performed uncon-
sciously, as the motion of the heart and arteries ; or, they are gen-
erated from the incessant repetition of voluntary motion. A
child totters and staggers, and exerts a voluntary effort at every
step he takes while learning to walk — so does a young man or
woman in learning the step of dancing — so in associating the
notes of a pianoforte, with the notes of a music book. By and by,
frequent repetition enables them to perform these motions uncon-

I 395 J

aciously, mechanically, anil without effort; and thus they become
automatic in their character. The same observations apply to
reading and writing, to talking, and in fact to all our voluntary
motions.* Automatic (involuntary) motions, are also generated
by a diseased state of the nervous system, as in the tremulence of
palsy, and the agitations of of St. Vitus's dance. Such also is the
shaking fit of a common ague, which assumes periodicity, which
must be broken to effect a cure. Such are the convulsions of
epilepsy, the cramp in the leg, tears of pain, of pity, of anger, of
laughter; the contortion of pain or of revenge; and many others
noticed among catenated motions of disease, by Dr. Darwin. But
the most striking cases of the association of motions with ideas,
occur in the derangement of lunacy and mania; in which disor-
ders, no enlightened practice can be pursued without a skilful
application of the theory of the mutual associations of sensations
and ideas, with muscular motions, healthy or disordered. Dr.

* Hence we may account for the neglect of grown persons of the stu-
dies they were compelled to undertake when young. Thus, when a
young lady is made to learn music, and attains skill enough to play over a
common concerto after practicing half a dozen times; by that time she
probably marries, and is no longer forced to perform, what requires an
effort in the performance. She leaves off her music, and her piano forte
becomes a mere piece of furniture in the drawing room. But if she has
been compelled to practice until all the voluntary motions for a long time
attended with effort, become automatic, the inducements to practice re-
main, and the associations of exertion and painful effort are superceded:
in this case she practices through life. Until this state of automatic mo-
tion be attained, all previous labor is thrown away.

In like manner, a boy is sent to learn Latin and Greek, and he continues
at it during all the period of painful effort in acquiring it, and he quits
school, or college, before the period of exertion has past. Then he joy-
fully throws away his Homer, Virgil and Horace, determined to plague
himself with them no more. All his previous acquirement — all the time
employed in it — all the painful effort in getting his tasks, are thrown
away ; and in three years his classical literature has evaporated forever.
Had he continued till words, phrases, and idioms, were so associated with
their exact meaning, that the recurrence of the one from the other should
happen without effort and without pain, his classical knowledge would be
a daily amusement of inestimable value ; it would form his taste in every
subsequent study, and intermingle with abundant benefit in every future
literary or scientific pursuit. It was thus that Leibnitz & Newton,
Hooke & Ray, Linnaeus & Bergman, Hoffman & Haller, and North,
Burke, Fox, and Pitt, were formed. Accurate and profound classical
knowledge was the foundation of the edifice, literary, scientific, or politi-
cal. This will never happen with us, till the upper classes of college
youths shall be compelled to translate into correct Latin, a page from
some English author, and compose at least ten Latin verses, twice or
thrice a week. To have our youth well educated among those who can
afford to be so, the entrance to college should not be permitted before
17, and the scholastic (classical and mathematical) preliminary requisites
should be high, and rigidly exacted.

[ 39G J

Darwin, whose principles arc borrowed originally from Dr. Hart-
ley, and the elements of medicine of Dr. Brown, has certainly
shewn the very extensive application of the whole doctrine of
association to an enlightened theory of medicine ; and has pre-
sented numerous facts of direct application to the principles here
stated. His Zoonomia is the work of a very powerful mind.

From all these facts, then, it appears that by the common laws
of our animal structure, long observed and well ascertained by
professional observers.

Sensations, may be, and in instances innumerable actually are
associated with other sensations, with ideas, with volitions, and
with muscular motions voluntary, secondarily automatic, and in-
stinctive or primarily automatic ; not only in health but also in
disease. Instances are, a tune played accompanying a tune sung —
a tune played from memory — when I walk out to visit a friend.
"This last is an instance of voluntary motion also — the first is a se-
condarily automatic motion, when the fingers move unconsciously
over the keys of a harpsichord — other instances may be imagined
accompanying the peristaltic, motion of the bowels.

Cases of automatic and involuntary motions accompanying sen-
sations and ideas are also — the paleness and clammy sweat of
fear, the flush of anger, the agitated motions of great joy, the ex-
clamations of grief, &c. &c.

Ideas, desires and volitions may be also mutually associated,
and with all the varieties of muscular motions : of which the above
cases, and others similar easily imagined, furnish examples. Also
with words, looks, tones and gestures.

•Motions originally automatic and involuntary, as the motions of
a child's limb unconsciously moved by muscular irritability excited
by any stimulus, may become voluntary, when it is necessary that
they should be associated with desires and volitions. So by an
association with a particular time of the day, we may convert an
automatic peristaltic motion, into a voluntary one, as Mr. Locke,
and physicians generally recommend to be done.

Motions originally voluntary, may by very frequent repetition
become secondarily automatic ; as is the case in writing, reading,
playing on an instrument, &c. &c.

Motions of health may be associated with motions of disease
and vice versa j the treatise of Dr. Darwin, and of the physicians
who give an account of nervous and sympathetic actions, contain
abundant instances. Mania, melancholia, lunacy and ideocy —
the delirium of fevers, &c. include strong examples.

All sensations, are motions propagated from the sentient ex-
tremity of a nerve along the nerve, to the brain, and there felt or
perceived.

All Ideas are similar motions, arising in the brain either from
association, or trom some accidental state of that organ, or of the
nervous system generally.

I 39- i

All volitions exist as states of the brain, associated with, and
forming part of the sensations and ideas to which they respec-
tively belong; from whence the motion is propagated to the mus-
cle of voluntary action, by cerebral innervation.

We know not positively, whether the instrument of motion, or
that substance in which the motion takes place, be the particles of
the nerve — an unknown secreted nervous fluid — or a secreted gal-
vanic fluid. It is rendered probable, that the galvanic fluid, will
to a certain degree supply the place of nervous communication.
But no theory can yet be framed on this subject.

There is no reason to suppose, that emotions, passions, desires,
aversions, volitions, are any ot er than motions that take place in
the organ of the brain, and are there felt or perceived : inasmuch
as they can all be analysed into sensations and ideas, and their
concomitant perceptions, which are undoubtedly cerebral motions
and nothing; more.

It is not known, whether perception, or feeling.be a property of
organization in those animals that have a nervous system— or
whether it belong essentially to life, or that property of organized
beings which enables them to feed, to digest, to grow, to assimi-
late and renew, and to perform the motions usually denominated
living functions— whether that life owe its existence to the organi-
zation with which it is connected, or to the gift originally of our
Creator; in which case, organization will be a property or result
of life previously imparted, and not life a property or result of or-
ganization — or whether perception or feeling be not ascribable to
some distinct immaterial being connected with the body at the
command of the Creator; the prevailing opinion, to which meta-
physical philosophers seem to be driven, from the difficulty of
conceiving, how any mere modification of unthinking matter, can
become thinking matter. A difficulty which undoubtedly lessons
as our knowledge increases. But the existence of a fact may and
very often indeed is indubitable, although we cannot explain how
or why it is so. Such are the general outlines of the doctrine of
association.

The following are examples of the way in which some of the
principal mental phenomena can be explained by it.

Of memory. Prop. 16. Memory is the term applied to the re-
currence of ideas representing past sensations. These ideas re-
cur in consequence of being in some manner associated with ideas
aiready present to us; unless in those accidental cases of sleep
or disease, when the internal state of the body, gives rise to auto-
matic involuntary motions and affections in the brain similar to
ideas that have already existed there. But these exceptions are
few, and do not disturb the general remark : so that I consider the
doctrine laid down by Lord Kame that ideas always occur in a
train, as true. The idea <>f my father suggests the idea of my
mother, &c. &c. The idea of a peach, suggests the last peach I

L ^9» j

eat, the place, the circumstances, &c. It is clear from the- com-
monest observation of matter of fact, that this is the train in which
ideas recur: this recurrence is memory. What other cause can
be assigned for the presence of a new idea, but such as is here
suggested ? It cannot arise without a cause. Let the reader try
and assign any other. That which is clearly and undeniably true
in a very great number of instances constituting all that we are ac-
quainted with, must be taken by us as true in all instances; ac-
cording to the common and known rule of philosophizing. Mem-
ory then is no more than a case under the general law of associa-
tion of ideas.

Recollection: this is the term employed when there is an effort
of volition to call up ideas by means of association. When the
desire of recollecting is excited, all the motions that take place
in the brain are stronger and more vivid, and more associations
are thus excited than would otherwise take place. Still, it is by
means of associations only with the ideas already present, that
others are called up. Let any one make the experiment, and as-
certain for himself whether it be in his power to recall any idea
but bv means of some other idea associated with it : he will find
on trial that he has no other means. Recollection therefore, is also
a case of association. It is greatly impaired by the effect of stim-
ulating liquors taken into the stomach, on the brain. The cases
of delirium tremens, and mania a potu, are decisive proofs, not
merely of the cerebral motions being disturbed and deranged by
the internal state of the body, but also of new motions generated,
that put on the forms belonging to anger, terror, apparitions of
strange persons and figures, that have no existence but in the dis-
ordered motions induced by the stimulus of liquor on the nerves
of the stomach, communicating morbid action to the brain. The
same passions, emotions, and unreal images are frequently atten-
dant on mania, on hypochondria, and other forms of cerebral de-
rangement, owing to the general affection of the nervous system
induced by a greater or less degree of irritation and consequent
morbid action of the viscera, or some of them ; (see a very curious
illustration in Sir W.Scott's Demonology, p 28, of insanity recall-
ed by association.) Such also is the case of those hallucinations
that attend the delirium of fever. No physician whatever, doubts,
but that he has it in his power to change and alter the state of the
body, by food and by medicine, and that he can alter the existing
trains of ideas (i. e. cerebral motions) induce new ones, excite
emotions, passions, desires and volitions, that would not exist but
in consequence of his operations. Let any phvsician^rellect for
a moment on the stimulating powers of opium, hyocyamus, datura,
lytta, alcohol, &c. and he will acknowledge that all the derange-
ments of mania are artificially in his power to produce, while the
depleting, sedative, and contra-stimulent medicines equally ope-
rate when the same disorders from whatever cause, happen to

[ 399 J

arise. Intellectual phenomena, feelings painful and pleasurable,
desires, volitions, memory, thought, hallucinations, &c. thus within
the power of medicine and regimen, what else are they than cor-
poreal phenomena ?

Of Judgment. Prop. 17. This takes place when we compare
two ideas or two sets of ideas together for the purpose of ascertain-
ing their agreement or disagreement. Thus, when I determine
that Alexander is the same person who was the conqueror of Da-
rius, or that prohibitory and protecting duties are inexpedient, I
pass a judgment on the comparison of these sets of ideas. Their
resemblance or disagreement is equally an object of perception
with the ideas themselves ; it is a cerebral affection like them.
When I see an apple and a musket ball on the table, is not their
dissimilarity as plain, as visible, as sensible, as the things them-
selves ? Judgment therefore is like sensations and ideas, an ex-
citement, a stimulation, a motion in the brain perceived. For the
differences of those motions, are equally real and equally cerebral
affections as the motions themselves. When I feel or perceive
that difference, what is it but an affection of the brain that I feel or
perceive ? What other meaning do you give to difference ? or to
sameness ?

Of Thought. Prop. 18. To think or to reflect, is to exercise re-
collection and judgment. No other elements are contained in
what we call thinking. What recollection and judgment are, such
is thought therefore.

Of the Will. Prop. 19. The will is that state of the brain, at-
tendant upon vivid sensations or ideas, concomitant with desires
and aversions, and that excites us to action ; it is as real as the
sensations or ideas, and as really corporeal. For instance, that
sensation called hunger does not arise, when the stomach is com-
pletely satisfied, and therefore it depends on the state of the bodi-
ly organs. I see before me on the table, a piece of roast beef, a
knife, fork and plate : if my stomach needs food, the sensation ac-
companying these visible images, will be associated with hunger : if
the stomach be satisfied it will not. If it be accompanied by hun-
ger, the desire, wish, will or volition to eat, and the consequent mo-
tions to cany that volition intoeftect, will take place not otherwise.
Tha tdesire, therefore, is a state of the brain dependant on the ex-
cited state of the bodily organs that act by transmitted excitement,
that is, by innervation, on the encephalon. It is a peculiar state
of the brain associated with a peculiar state of the stomach. All
desires and aversions, wishes and volitions when analysed will in
like manner be found nothing more than modifications of cerebral
motion arising from the circumstances that excited the motions
themselves.

Of the Moral Sense. Conscience. Prop. 20. This has long been
considered as an innate faculty of the mind or soul, given to us for
our moral guidance, and by whose dictates, our conduct is to be

[ 400 ]

governed. When, this was implanted — lion- its distates are mad<
known to us — ovwhyxi is not uniform with all men in all places —
the proposers of this notion, do not explain.

Let us see how far it is, or is not a corporeal affection.

What is morality ? That course of conduct in individuals, which
upon the whole is best calculated to promote the happiness of so-
ciety. It relates in all its parts to society; for there is no rule of
moralCconduct applicable to an individual perfectly insulated —
entirely unconnected with all other living beings.

Children have no idea of right or wrong, or truth or falsehood,
or of the obligation men are under to pursue the one and avoid
the other, till they are taught it with great pains by their "parents
first; then by their tutors, then gradually from their companions,
from the laws of the community, from conversation of respectable
people, and from books. These, are the sources of the moral sense.
Every body who is conversant with very young children, knows
that they have no notion of the difference between truth and false-
hood till they are taught it:* that they beat their attendants and
the animals they play with, till they are with great labor taught
that it is wrong to do so, and punished for doing it. In like man-
ner, they are taught with no small pains, all the habits of cleanli-
ness necessary to their comfort and this takes the incessant assi-
duity of some* years : nor would they make any progress in this
knowledge, if it were not for occasional interposition of praise
when they do as they are bid, and still more efficaciously to asso-
ciate pain with the actions they are taught to avoid. Is it in this
manner the moral sense is formed originally; and during child-
hood it extends only to our domestic relations. The young folks
are then sent to school, where the same pains are taken to teach

* Sir 4 W alter Scott in his history of Demonology makes the following
remarks p. 185. The melancholy truth, that " the human heart is deceit-
ful above all things, and desperately wicked," is by nothing proved so
strongly as by the imperfect sense displayed by children of the sanctity
of moral truth. Both the gentlemen, and the mass of the people, as they
advance in years, learn to despise and avoid falsehood ; the former out of
pride, and from a remaining feeling derived from the days of chivalry
that the character of a liar is a deadly stain on their honour ; the other,
from some general reflection upon the necessity of preserving a charac-
ter for integrity in the course of life, and a sense of the truth of the com-
mon adage, that " honesty is the best policy." But these are acquired
habits of thinking. The child lias no natural love of truth, as is experi-
enced by all who have the least acquaintance with early youth. If they
are charged with a fault, while they can hardly speak, the first words they
stammer forth, are a falsehood to excuse it. Nor is this all ; the tempta-
tion of attracting attention, the pleasure of enjoying importance, the
desire to escape from an unpleasing task, or accomplish a holiday, will at
anytime overcome the sentiment of truth, so weak is it within them.

If there be any innate moral sense — any naturally implanted and con-
stitutional feeling of the obligation of morality independent of all instruc-

t 4M 1

them the duty of learning their lessons, of paving obedience td

their teachers, of abstaining from lying, cheating and quarrelling,
and they learn much also by their intercourse with other children
at school, and feel on all hands that punishment usually follows
what they are taught to consider as misconduct. The same course,
is pursued in greater schools, and at college, and an incessant
and severe course of discipline is found absolutely necessary to
confirm in them while young, those habits which will render them
useful members of society when grown up; and eradicate the pro-
pensities which if indulged would render them objects of dislike
and distrust to their fellow citizens. But even on leaving the
seminaries of education, moral habits thus incessantly inculcated,
are seldom so steadily formed, as to overcome the violence of
youthful passions ; and many years of intercourse with the better
part of society, are necessary, before a man's moral character is
so fixed as to be implicitly relied on. Nay, even in civilized so-
ciety, the theory of morality is so far vague, that in some points it
is different in different countries, and the laws that regulate it,
have no common standard in every civilized nation; and even in
the same nation they greatly vary in every century ; they are call-
ed forth and enacted by unforseen circumstances, and as it seems
to me, they are improving. Assuredly the manners and customs
throughout Europe are far better now, than they were two centu-
ries ago; and the standard of morality is higher on the scale.
Why ? Because experience gradually teaches us, what rules of
conduct society ought for its own sake to insist on,

Morality thusaccompanyingin all itsstagesthegradual formation
ofideas.and the gradual developementolkuowledgeby instruction,
and which varies accordingto the existingstate of knowledge in eve-
ry age and every country, and everyindividual,cannotbethe result
of any innate imparted faculty perfect from the beginning. If we
learn this morality from our instructors and our books, after long
discipline, as we learn languages and the mathematics, why seek

tion, it will be found more pure, and unmixed in children, not yet spoiled
by commerce with a selfish world.

If there be any moral precept more universally binding than another,
it is the duty of abstaining from falsehood and telling truth. But how dif-
ferent are the facts from the theory !

Indeed the supposed moral sense, is one of the numerous ontological
reveries of the Scotch school of metaphysics; whose personifications of*
-words, have peopled the realms of imagination with beings innumera-
ble—misty, shadowy forms invisible, inaudible, intangible, unintelligible !
No wonder these men of words treat physiological metaphysics with such
contempt ! Dugald Stewart dismisses Hartley in a page or two ; and the
Wise man who drew up the article metaphysics for Brewster's Edinburgh
Encyclopedia, gravely assures his rcaders"(p 93) that " Priestly is unwor-
thy of notice as a metaphysician !" I dare say Messrs. Reid, Oswald,
and Beattie, thought so too. All this iS natural : quicqmd recipit'ur, inci-
pitur ad modum recipients.
51

[ 402 J

but tor any other source of moral acquirement? Let us be con-
tent with the causes which are true in themselves, and which suf-
fice to explain the phenomena. I know of nothing approaching to
satisfactory proof of any innate moral sense. It is one of the
dreams of ontologists and metaphysicians.

Prop. 21. Of the conversion of selfish into social and benevolent
affections. All the associations of children are selfish : they arc
taught kindness toward others, by the incessant precepts, and the
example of their parents and friends: they are praised and often
rewarded for kind actions done to each other, and in all ways en-
couraged so to act toward every body, and they are reprimanded
when they act otherwise. The kind feelings gradually asssociated
with their parents, relations and friends, incite them to do what
they think will please, and produce approbation. From thence
forward, in all situations in life, they find that it is of advantage
to themselves, and pleasurable also, to contribute to the happiness
of others: that this course and conduct begets kindness and re-
spect towards themselves, and that the language of kind feelings,
is the language of civilized society. This is still more encouraged
when they marry and have children, who are continual objects for
the exercise of the benevolent affections. In proportion, also, as
they take a common interest in the welfare of the community to
which they belong, they are tempted to sacrifice their own interest
to the interest of society : in this way patriotism takes its rise and
its growth; which, though frequently simulated, is also frequently
genuine. By these means a habit is generated by many people,
of doing good to their fellow creatures, as a matter of pleasure to
themselves, in all cases where the dictates of common prudence
do not absolutely forbid it. This habit, by associating pleasura-
ble ideas with kind offices, contributes greatly to the happiness of
men in cultivated society ; and even the outward forms, and the
tones of kindness, generally assumed among the upper ranks of
society, having pleasurable feelings associated with them, add
much to the mutual satisfaction that good company feel toward
each other, even when they know that these forms and tones of
perfect civility, mean little, as to real generosity, or even good will.

Prop. 22. Of the fine arts and criticism. From what has been
said above, and seeing that all our intellectual pleasures and pains,
that is, the pleasures and pains connected with our sensations,
ideas, emotions, passions and desires, depend on associations, it
should seem that the verbal or written representations intended
toexcite them, should follow the usually observed course of asso-
ciation that takes place in the circumstances themselves ; and
that their correctness in this respect will form the natural feature
of the description, and the aberration will be a fault. Hence,
also, those figures, epithets, and mental pictures, displayed by the
art of the composer, should consist of those associated circum-
»nmrf> that most vividlv pvcite th<*. requited id^as and feelings.

i 403 J

This seems to be the general rule, but applicable to all the detail
wc una in the writers on criticism.

Prop. 23. Of the Intellectual faculties of brute animals. They
differ from the human species, in the acuteness of the facial angle :
in the comparative smallness of the brain: in having few or no
articulate sounds: in being incapable from the structure of their
organs, to invent or use the mechanism of language : in possessing
fewer means of acquiring ideas by eye-sight, and by that portion
of feeling that depends on the skin: in being incapable of writing:
in being incapable of inventing or using tools and instruments of
art : in being incapable of improvement in knowledge by means
of the knowledge of a former generation, which they have no
means of accumulating or transmitting : by the continued atten-
tion necessary to supply their animal wants, which many men arc
free from. Hence their intellectual ideas, pleasures and pains
are few indeed compared to those of man j while their automatic
or instinctive motions and sensations, may be on this account more
perfect.

These circumstances, consisting of, or dependent upon, the
difference of organization, are quite sufficient, as it seems to mt\
to account for their intellectual inferiority. Let us examine what
mental phenomena they do in fact exhibit — And first, they have
the same system of animal parts, that men have; and they have
a similar nervous apparatus. Experiments on vertebral animals,
shew that the cutting, tying, or otherwise compressing the nerves,
has the same effect on them that it has on the human species; and
therefore we are justified in referring their sensations and ideas
to the same general organic mechanism. The very many cases
cited and referred to in Bingley's Animal Biography, and in the
2nd vol.ofBronson's Select Views, shew that brute animals may be
taught as we teach children : they are operated on by the same
associations, and the same motives of pleasure and of pain. It
we wish to deter a young child, or a young dog, from making a
dirt improperly, do we not in both cases associate pain with the
circumstance, as well as the threats of language, tone, and gesture,
that we think them likely to understand ? How is a boy taught
his lesson, or a setting dog, or a setting pig, like. Mr. Toomer's,
prevented from running in on a covy of partridges, but by the
associations of punishment ? and of encouragement by praise and
reward when they do well? Is there any other mode of instruct-
ing dancing dogs, dancing bears, or learned pigs ? They have,
therefore, sensations, ideas, and associations of these with volun-
tary motions. They have volition therefore. Do they reason ?
Do they form a judgment from circumstances, and act according-
ly ? Let us enquire. Is it not a known fact of dogs and cats,
that they will steal victuals when they suppose themselves unob-
served ? Does a cat jump upon the table to steal meat, when the
table is surrounded with company ? And will she not do so when

[ 404 ]

no one is in the room r A^'lio has not seen this? When a bird
intices a snake* away from the nest of her voting, is not this rea-
soning? When a dog, having lost his master, goes in succession
to his usual places of resort to find him, (as has happened fifty
times to me) what intellectual process is this if it be not reason-
ing ? Do not the young dogs of a pack rely on the experience of
the old ones? "When wolves hunt deer, by arranging themselves
so as effectually to prevent the escape of their prey, by driving
them to a river previously guarded by other wolves, which hun-
ters well know to be a practice among them — when crows or
geese appoint a watchman for the flock, to give notice of the
approach of strangers, what is this but reasoning? So when
a dog, unable to eat all the food in his possession, buries it
as I have often seen, is not this reasoning ? " A dog is fre-
quently lost and finds his way home. His perception is exer-
ted on every object around him: his memory or recollection is
shewn by his perceiving that he is not at home and endeavoring to
go there : his judgment, or ratiocination, by discovering his way
home, and chusing this street rather than that: his volition, by
going home rather than not gomg home. These, and similar facts,
are so strong, that some writers, as Locke, have been reduced to
place the differentia of a man and a brute, in this, that the former is,
and the latter is not capable of framing general or abstract ideas."
"Dogs generally come when they are called, whoever calls
them : at least they attend to the voice and seem to consider
whether they should come or not. I presume it will not be de-
nied that when a dog is called, he attributes the voice if it be not
his owner's. voice, to some other man. Now suppose a stranger
calls a dog by his name in a voice different from his master's
voice, and the dog runs toward the place whence the sound pro-
ceeds, will anyone assert the dog has not the idea of some man in
this case, who calls him, when by the very terms of the supposition
he cannot have an idea of any particular man, since the voice is a
stranger's ? If so, then are dogs capable of framing general or ab-
stract ideas." (Cooper's tracts.) So, if a noise at the door, ac-
companied by the voices of strange persons should be heard by a
dog kept to guard the house, and he barks, has he particular or
abstract ideas, when he neither knows or sees the persons?

These facts, establish with me the positions, that brutes have
the power of exhibiting mental phenomena of like kind with those
of the human species but inferior in degree, ami far fewer in num-
ber and variety — that they are therefore nearly devoid of intel-
lectual pleasures and pains, ol which a dog appears to enjoy more
than any other animal — that their automatic motions, and some
organs of sense, are sometimes in higher perfection than in man —
that they have not the means of accumulating, or communicating
acquired knowledge, or of improving their intellectual faculties un-
less in xei'y low degrees — and that all this is dependant, on the

E 405 J

very groat and manifest inferiority of their corporeal organization,
which does not furnish the apparatus for the purpose.

Hence it has been argued with some plausibility, that as there
is no evidence whatever for the existence of a human soul but
what is furnished by <he human body — as all the faculties of the
soul as they have been called, are resolveable into states of the
body, phenomena of the nervous system — as brute animals exhibit
phenomena exactly of the same kind, though not equally curious
or complicated — there is as much reason for attributing an inferi-
or immaterial immortal soul to brutes as there is to man; for its
existence is deduced from the same class of phenomena in both
cases. But where shall we draw the line ? Are we prepared to
admit the soul of a mosquito or an oyster?

It is quite manifest, however, as I apprehend, that no medical
education can be complete that does not embrace an accurate
view of the association of ideas ; so as to point out the path along
which we may trace if diligently pursued, those associations of
cerebral and muscular motions that depend on the state of health
and disease, particularly the associations connected with the mor-
bid states of internal vicera; whose actions when healthy are in-
stinctive, automatic, unperceived, and have no perceptible effect
on cerebral motions. As in the various forms of lunacy. So as
"to point out also the varieties of association, and the modifications
of our modes of thinking and acting owing to the various causes
arising from temperament and from sex. Hysteria will furnish
cases.

So as to point out also the various catenations of motions, volun-
tary and automatic that are modified by health or disease, as no-
ticed by Darwin; pursuing his train of reasoning on this subject.
This seems to me to lead to the source of periodicity in disease.
On all these subjects, the 1st vol. of Hartley on Men, Darwin's
Zoonomia, and the admirable work of Dr. Cabanis, Rapport de
Physique avec le moral de l'homme, should be studied. Dr.
Rush's lectures contain much interesting fact, manifestly accumu-
lated with this view, and managed very guardedly, but with great
force and talent, as well as with great popular interest. The
medical school of Philadelphia has indeed profound reason to re-
gret the loss of this truly great man. It is well known to others
as it is to me, that the hypothesis of a soul to account for mental
phenomena, was rejected by Dr. Rush.

It is quite manifest, that no metaphysical enquiries into the
phenomena termed mental, amount to any thing more than the
wordy war of disputants ignorant of facts, unless those enquiries
be first pursued by ascertaining how much can be explained by
the known phenomena and acknowledged properties of our cor-
poreal system before we introduce an hypothesis for the purpose.
1 have no hesitation in saying, that no good physiologist, as every
phvsician is or ought to be, can peruse a metaphysical treatise uf

i m j

the clerical schoul ol antient or modern times from St. Austin tu
Dr. Copplestone, without disgust. I do not deny great talent or
great acuteness to such men, as Hobbes, Bramhall, Clarke, Jack-
son, Collins, Edwards, Tucker, Copplestone, Brown, &c. but they
do not begin from the foundation, they do not state distinctly what
are the corporeal phenomena that bear upon the subject — how far
they will go in the explanation of the facts and where they stop.
They are not aware that the functions of an organized part, are
the essential properties of that organ; arising from, and depend-
ing on, and essentially belonging to it. They are manifestly la-
bouring under utter ignorance of the most material facts that bear
upon the subject : and therefore when they are right, they are right
by chance. The knowledge of the present day will not rest satis-
fied with reiterated and obstinate assertion resting upon half infor-
mation ; nor will logomachy pass current for physiology.

It is evident from the preceeding slight sketch of the Associa-
tion of Ideas, which I hope will incite to, and not supersede the
perusal of Hartley's work, and Darwin,

That, it consists of an enumeration of facts, occurring among
the tissues of which our bodies are composed, depending upon the
laws of animal organization.

That, we know not how or in what manner associations of cere-
bral and muscular motions arise, any more than we know how di-
gestion assimilation, secretion, &c. are performed. The gradu-
al accumulation and comparison of observed phenomena by
our posterity may possibly give a further insight into these secret
operations of nature, or they may not. The facts however remain
facts, and will so remain, whether we or our posterity can explain
them or not.

That, the Association of Ideas, explains satisfactorily in what
way we acquire knowledge, by the association of looks, tones, ges-
tures, words, and phrases with natural objects of all kinds, with in-
tellectual functions of the nervous system, and with corporeal
emotions, passions and other phenomena. Also,

In what way properties common to many objects give origin to
abstract terms, which are then used to express the bundle of real
properties wrapt up in their meaning; and are used to abridge rea-
soning; as the letters of a mathematical proposition, or the posi-
tive and negative signs in Algebra.

That, whereas in Algebra and the mathematics, the precise val-
ue of the signs used are always fixed and strictly adhered to, so
that no defect in the chain of reasoning can arise from an aberra-
tion, the abstract terms that confuse the modern logomachies in
ideology, ontology, psychology and the other branches of meta-
physics, have not been so fixed, and are not so strictly employed ;
so that one writer means one thing by a phrase used, as idea for
instance, another writer another; nor have any of the metaphysi-
cians so traced tp its origin and strictly defined and emploved the

E -w< J

abstract terms he makes use of, as to avoid this universal source ot
inaccuracy and confusion. This arises from their personifying
abstract ideas, which are words only, not things — from their using
expressions including anatomical and physiological facts, without
being sufficiently acquainted with anotomy and physiology. As
an instance of the opposite and praise-worthy practice, I refer to
the preceeding work of Broussais Stir I'Irritatioti et la Folie.

That, the doctrine of the association of ideas explains fully,
plainly, and satisfactorily, the real origin and formation of those
ideas and habits, called the moral sense, conscience, natural sense
of right and wrong, &c; and shews, conclusively, that these are
gradually formed during the progress of our education, our studies,
and our intercourse with the world ; and are not, as the Scotch
school, after Pere Buffier, would teach us, instinctive in the human
race. For if so, this instinct would be alike every where. Hence
we have a clue to the real meaning, of the terms, moral obligation,
right, wrong, virtue, vice, duty, &c. by tracing distinctly the class
of actions to which these words have been applied and associated,
viz. those actions and rules of conduct which it is the interest of
men in society to enforce toward each other, and by the operation
of laws, and the force ot public opinion, to make each individual
of the community find his own permanent interest in conforming
to them. That in all matters of taste, of painting, sculpture, ar-
chitecture, literary composition, oratory, poetry, criticism, the
foundation rule is, to discover what are the natural and usual
associations calculated to produce the effect intended. For if the
composer varies from these, he offends the rule of good taste in
proportion. I have already cited that very amusing specimen of
correct and natural taste in the use of the association of ideas, by
Shakspeare, in Dame Quickly's enumeration to Dr. John Falstaft",
in the 2d part of Henry 4th, act 2d, scene 1st.

Upon this doctrine can be explained, the natural connection/of
looks, tones, gestures in the drama and in oratory, particularly in
the mime or ballet. To this may be referred all sound criticism,
as to trope, metaphor, allegory, simile, and all kind of embellish-
ment in literature and the arts. The whole art of landscape gar-
dening, depends on the principles furnished by this department
of physiology ; teaching us the necessity of harmony in all our
o-roupings and fictions, and warning us from all the incongruous
and inconsistent imagery into which poets and painters are so apt
to fall, of mixing under the same association, things possible and
impossible, natural and artificial, sacred and profane, and the other
innumerable offences against natural propriety, and historical
costume, which I have no room to notice.

I might proceed now to treat separately some other results of a
due consideration of the phenomena in question : as of liberty and
necessity. But this question will have no difficulty to those who
nave read Broussais, and my note on the subject in the tract on

[ -108 j

Materialism. Those who desire a confutation of what is ignorant-
]y called the "freedom of the will," may be referred to 1 Hartley
on Man, p. 500: to Anthony Collins' tract on Liberty and Neces-
sity : to the small discourse of Hobbes on the same subject, in his
Tripos: to Priestly, on Liberty and 'Necessity ; and the writings
of Jonathan Edwards, of New England. But to a physiologist, all
this reading will be superfluous.

How, by what organic mechanism this association and catena-
tion of sensations, ideas, volitions, and cerebral motions with each
other takes place — what is the immediate rationale of the process —
who can tell ? I do not pretend to afford any explanation of tins,
or indeed of any other of the nervous phenomena. Still the facts
will be facts, whether they be explained or not. The combina-
tions of matter and motion that we can put together, will no more
explain the life of a plant than the volition of a man; but in nei-
ther the one case or the other do we actually see any thing else,
nor have we the slightest evidence that any thing else is concern-
ed. To say that it is impossible that matter and motion should
produce the timid shrinking of a sensitive plant, or the retreat of
a child from a disagreeable object, is, to say the least, a very pre-
sumptuous limitation of the powers of nature within the limits
prescribed by our own ignorance.

FLY IS.

J>

%