A Text Book Of Indian Administration

A TEXTBOOK

OF

INDIAN ADMINISTRATION

BY

M. R. PALANDE, M.A.

K. T. TelanoGold Medallist ; Sir William Wedderburn
Scholar; Professor of History and Economics, M. T. B.

College, Surat

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OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS

1934

First published 1926
Second revised edition 1929
Third ediiio?i 1931
Fourth revised edition 1933
Fifth edition 1931

PRINTED in INltiA

A.T THE DIOCESAN PRESS, MA.DRAS— 1934—C1385

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

I have attempted in the following pages to describe
the growth of British administration in India from the
days of the East India Company to the present times.
The book .is mainly intended for Intermediate Arts
Students of Bombay University and I hope it will prove
interesting also to the general reader. It had to be
brought out in difficult circumstances. After the
manuscript was handed over to the Aryabhushan Pre'ss
in Poona, a disastrous fire reduced, along with many
other valuable things, the printed matter to ashes, with
the result that printing had to -be done hurriedly again
and the book brought out within less than a fortnight’s
time. But for the willing and cordial help rendered to
me by my friends, Mr. H. P. Dcsai, M.A., of the Bombay
Chronicle and Prof. Y. D. Joshi of Surat, and by the
management of the Bombay Chronicle Press, the book
would not have seen the light of day so soon. I am
therefore extremely thankful to them.

■ -I must also express my sense of gratitude to Prof.
?. A. Wadia for kindly going through a large part of the
manuscript and for making valuable suggestions.

Surat, 1926 .

M. R. PALANDE

CONTENTS

Chap. Page:

PART I—INTRODUCTORY

L Early History; 1600-1757 ... ... 3

II. Later Developments; 1757-1857 ... 16

PART II—INDIAN ADMINISTRATION IN ENGLAND,

OR THE 4 HOME * GOVERNMENT

III. The Secretary of State ... ... 43

IV. The India Council and the High Commis¬

sioner for India ... ... 54

V. Relaxation of Parliamentary Control ... 63

VI. Interest of Parliament in Indian Affairs ... 70

PART III—THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

VII. The Central Executive ... ... 79

VIII# The Central Legislature ... ... 107

IX. The Relation of the Executive to the

Legislature ... ... ... 155

PART IV—THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS

X. The Growth and Formation of Provinces... 163
. XI. The Relation between the Central and Pro¬

vincial Governments, or The Growth of

Provincial Autonomy

... 180

XII.

The Provincial Executive

... 209

XIII.

The Provincial Legislature ...

... 241

XIV.

The Relation of the Executive

to the

Legislature

... 259

Contents

V1U

Chap.

PART V-GENERAL

Page -

XV.

^fvi.

XVII.

XVIII.

XIX.

AJuAAit

yyt

XXII.

Sub-Divisions of the Province ancl their

Administration...

*

... 265

Local Self-Government

... 271

Judicial Administration in

India

... 279

Land Revenue

*«*

... 301

The Public Services

• »•

'... 314

Education

# • *

... 328

Famine Relief

ft v m

... 334

Railways and Irrigation

ft ■ ft

... 339

PART VI—ENACTMENTS AND STATUTES

XXIII. From 1600 to 1858 ... ... 347

XXIV. From 1859 to 1919 ... ...364

PART VII—THE SIMON COMMISSION REPORT,

THE ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE, AND
THE WHITE PAPER

XXV. The Simon Commission Report ... 373

XXVI. The Round Table Conference ancl the

Premier's Declaration ... 389

XXVII. A Summary of the Important Proposals

made in the White Paper of March 1933 396

PART I

INTRODUCTORY

Chat. • Page

I. Eaki^y History ; 1600-1757

1. The Rise of the East India Company and

its Early Charters ... ... 3

2. The Constitution of the East India

Company ... ... ... 8

3. The Factories and Presidencies ... 12

II. Later Developments; 1757-1857

1, The Company’s Wars in Bengal ... 16

2. Diwani and Clive’s Double Government 19

3. Parliamentary Inquiries and Enactments 26

4. Parliamentary Control over Indian Affairs 32

)

v/JiWl.f; ! : j ,i ,;

CHAPTER I

Early History ; 1600-1757

1. The Rise of the East India Company and

its Early Charters

Three

Periods—The
First Period

The, history of the development of British power

in India, as has been; pointed out by Sir
C. P. Ilbert, may be regularly, divided into
three " periods. During the first period,
which begins with the grant of Elizabeth’s
Charter in 1600, the East India Company were
primarily a trading corporation enjoying important
mercantile privileges and holding sundry factories on
or near the coast in India for the conduct of their trade.
They had to exist on sufferance so far as the native
powers were concerned and were in rivalry with the
merchants of other European nations like Holland and
France. . With the acquisition of certain districts in
Bengal in 1760, and finally with the acquisition of
the Diwani in 1765 the first period in the history of
the growth of the Company’s power terminates.
The Diwani practically conferred upon the Company
rights of territorial sovereignty and created new prob¬
lems and difficulties which had to.be solved by their
authorities.

The second period begins from 1765 and extends up
to the final abolition of the Company in
1858, when responsibility for the govern¬
ment, of India was directly assumed by the
Crown of England- . During this period- the . Company

The Second
Period

4 Indian Administration

acquire and consolidate territory after territory till their
sovereignty spreads practically to the whole of India.
This is a period during which they gradually lose their
mercantile privileges and functions and share their
territorial sovereignty in diminishing proportions with
the Crown. The Parliament of England 1 saw occasion to
interfere directly, in the affairs of the Company after the
undertaking of territorial government by them. The first
instance of such direct interference occurred in 1773,
when Parliament passed the Regulating Act for the gootl
administration of the Company. This period has been
described as a .period of Double Government. The East
India Company were the immediate authority entrusted
with the administration of the country and the Parliament
of Britain continued to exercise its superior control and
supervision over their affairs. The various Acts which
were passed by Parliament to regulate and reform the
affairs of the Company are instances of such supervision:

Th$ third and last period began in 1858 when the
Crown of Britain directly assumed the
responsibility of the governance of India.
The intermediate agency of the Company
was abolished. As Ilbert says, the first period is clearly
a period of Charters. The second period is marked by
Acts of Parliament passed at almost regular intervals of
twenty years. The third period commences with th&
Government of India Act of 1858, which declared that*
India was thenceforward to be governed by and in the !
name of Her Majesty the Queen of England.

The first Charter of the East India Company was
granted in 1600 on the last day of the,
1 year. It empowered the -Company to ;
assemble in any convenient place and
there' hold court and * make,' ordain, and constitute 1

The Third
Period

Elizabeth's

Charter

Early History

55

reasonable laWs and constitutions, orders or ordinances
for the good ! government of the Company, of all factors'
and officers and for the advancement of traffic and trade
The direction of the affairs of the Company: was vested in
a Governor to be elected annually by the members, and in
twenty-four committees, each consisting of an individual,'
also ahnUally' elected: The total' number of members
who \rere originally incorporated in the Company was-
217. f Further admissions could 1 be madie from among thfe

sons of the original members or apprentices and factors
specially selected. L

The 1 total capital subscribed is stated to have been]
^68,373'. There v^as no reference to * the joint-stock-
principle and apparently there was equal voting power for'
all-members irrespective of their contributions. ’The

Company then ‘came under the 1 class of Regulated
Companies. The members were subject to certain commdri

regulations and had some common privileges but each’
traded oh his own capital and for each separate voyage/
A group of subscribers would organize a voyage and
accounts were wound up on the return of the ships sent!
out, profits or losses being distributed among the
organizers, i The earlier expeditions were mot directed tb
India but to the Spice Islands. The third voyage, arranged
in 1608, was intended to include India. r -“l .

In 1609 James I renewed the Charter of Elizabeth* Ih !

■' 1615 the power 6f issuing commissions to*

Charters of officers , empowering them to inflict punish-

tKe Stuart ^ q

^ ments for non-capital offences and\ -to

no i proclaim martial law was given to the

Company. The Company’s monopoly soon began ,to
excite jealousy and encroachments upon their privileges
began ,to be made by an. association started by j? Sm
W. Courten who obtained from Charles I an independent,

6 Indian Administration

license to trade in the Bast.; It was not till 1657 that this
rival: association .was united with the East India Company
nhder the Charter, issued by Cromwell.

In 1661 Charles II issued a Charter similar to the one
issued by Cromwell. It legally recognized the principle
of joint stock though it had been followed in practice
since 1612. The, Company were also given the, right of
coining money and jurisdiction over English subjects in
the East. The Charter of 1669 granted Bombay to the
East India Company for an annual rent of 'j£10. By
Charters issued in 1677 and 1683 the Company's
privileges were further extepded. James IPs Charter
of 1687 empowered the establishment pf Municipal
Corporations by the Company.

During 1683-5 the question, whether the Company's
monopoly granted by Royal Charter without,
the consent of Parliament was legal, was
discussed in connexion with the case of the
East India Company v . Sandys. The point
was argued before the Privy Council and the
legality of the monopoly was upheld. The same question
was again raised in 1691 and the same verdict was given.
Parliament, however, passed in 1693 the famous resolu¬
tion that all subjects had an equal right to trade in the
East Indies and that, as Lord Macaulay has amplified,
the whole legislature alone could give any person or
society ah exclusive privilege. The constitutional point
was thus finally settled, though, in practice, the Com¬
pany’s Agents paid no heed to the resolution of
Parliament and kept the eastern trade closed to all but
themselves.

; By the Charters of 1693-4 changes were made in the
constitution of the Company, One vote was given to
each holder of ^1,000 stock, but not more than ten

Parliament
and the
(Company’s
Monopoly

Charters of
1693-4

w

A New
Company and
Go dolphin’s
Award

Early History V 7

votes could: be possessed by one . man. The' Governor:

•and the Deputy Governor must be holders -
of ^4,000 stdck, and a Committee of ;£l,€00i
stock. The Governor’s and Deputy Gover-i
nor’s tenure was rnot to be more than two years. In 1698
the qualification for a vote was reduced to ^500 stock,
and that for a Committee raised to £2fi00. . vi

In the meanwhile, a new company had been started in
1688 by the rivals of the old one and after its

, i ,

incorporation it began to make inroads upon
the monopoly of the old Company as
Parliament had declared monopolies to be
illegal unless granted by it. Attempts in
the direction of a compromise between the old and the
new companies were made but without much success.
In 1698 the first Parliamentary measure was taken to
regulate Indian trade and commerce, when the General*
Society was incorporated as a Regulated Company and;
most of the subscribers of this body as a joint-stock:
company. These were steps in the direction of facilitating:
a compromise or a coalition between the old and the new
companies. It was, however, not until 1708 that the final)
cbalition was effected under what is known asGodolphin’si
Award, by which the: old Company’s Charters were
surrendered and all their powers and privileges were
transferred to the new company under the name of * The
United Company of Merchants of: England Trading ‘to
the East lndies’. .

In 1726, in supersession of the existing courts, Mayor’s*

Courts were established in municipal towns'
Later Charter* ]y[ a( ^ raSj Bombay and Calcutta. Byf

Charters granted in 1730 and 1744 the exclusive privileges,
granted to the United.Company were extended for further
terxnsV Advance of Joans to the State at a low rate of

8 Indian Administration

interest was the price exacted for the ■ extension of
privileges* Stringent provisions were, passed against
interlopers. An Act of 1754 laid down regulations for the
Indian forces. of the Company in order that they should
be .adequately strengthened.- The Charters of 1757-8
allowed the Company any booty or territory which they
might have acquired in their struggles with native powers;

2, The Constitution of the East India

Company

There were two olasses into which the members of
■ ' ; the Company were divided. The one and

larger class was known as the Court of
ropne or* Proprietors and consisted of all persons

who held any amount of stock of the East India Company.
Till the/passing of Pitt’s India Act, the proprietors, as
being the body consisting of all shareholders who jointly
owned- the Company, were the final authority in the
administrative organization of the Company. ; Their
sanction was required for every important measure that-
may have been recommended by the Directors. Legis¬
lative power was. entirely held by them. They .passed all
regulations and .declared the amount of the dividend.
Pour meetings of the Court of Proprietors had to be held
regularly during the year, extraordinary meetings being
summoned when necessary. * . .<

< The proprietors were not persons acquainted with or
experienced in the active management of the business of
the Company. They; were not the Company’s executive.
They were interested more in the dividends that they
hoped to receive on the capital they had invested than in
the actual vicissitudes of the Company’s complex opera- 1
tions. It was believed that this detachment engendered:
in them a sense of irresponsibility and persistent

Early History. - l9

tendency to demand increase of dividends year after year
to the detriment of the general financial interests of the
Company.

Attempts were made to regulate the voting powers of
the proprietors from time to time, by fixing the possession
of a certain minimum amount of stock as the necessarv

tta

qualification for entitling a proprietor to have a vote.
Such, restricting proposals were made with a view -to
avoid irresponsibility and to guarantee that the voter who
gave his vote or made any proposal did not do it out of
mere frivolity or merriment. Hence the Act of 1784
rendered this body impotent by depriving it of the power
that it formerly possessed, the power of revising and
sanctioning the actions of the Directors. The proprietors
thereafter continued only to receive whatever dividend was
allotted to them, till the expiry of the Company. They
ceased to have any influence as political or administrative
factors in the Company’s affairs after the year 1784.

The Court of Directors was the other and the more
important body in the constitution of the

Director^ 1 °* ^ ast Company. Originally, in • the

Charter of Elizabeth, power was given to

the proprietors or members to elect annually from among
themselves twenty-four committees each consisting of a
single individual. The twenty-four committees or indivi¬
duals were, in fact, in sole practical charge of the affairs
of the Company and formed the executive machinery and

directing brain. , *

It would appear that according to the original Charter
every member, without reference to the
quantity of stock he held, was liable to
o t e irec- e ] ecte( j to the committees. Election to

the committees or, which is the same thing,
to the Directorate, soon came to be made dependent upon

tors

' 10 Indian Auhniniiiratim

the amount: of monetary interest that the individual
■desirous of.being elected had in the business of the Com¬
pany. Thusthe Act of 1689 fixed the possession of .£2,000
:stock as a necessary qualification for seeking election to
the Directorate. The number of Directors continued to
be twenty-four till 1854, when they were reduced to
eighteen, of whom six were to be nominated by the Crown.
.Formerly they were annually elected by the Court of
Proprietors, but by the Regulating Act their tenure was
increased to four years, a quarter of their number being
annually re-elected.

The Directors divided themselves into various commit¬
tees so as to facilitate the disposal of their complex work
by the introduction of the principle of division of labour.
To each such committee were given important charges
like those of political and military matters or finances or
revenue or judicial and legislative matters. There were
for instance, the; Committee of Correspondence, the
Committee of Lawsuits, the Committee of Treasury, the
Committee of Accounts, of Warehouses, etc. After the
submission of all questions to < the respective committees
.which had different jurisdictions,! and after investigation
and report had been made by the committees on them,
they were finally put before the whole Court of Directors
for formal sanction. Pitt’s India Act constituted a Com¬
mittee of Secrecy of 1 three members elected by the Direc¬
tors .from among themselves to carry on secret corres¬
pondence, orders, etc. between England and India.

The Directors had large; patronage in their hands,
Their practically every appointment in India being

‘Patronage made hy them. Nomination to the Governor-

General’s post, however, necessarily re-
, quirted, the sanction; ofithe t r Home .Government, as also to
thq.posts'of, the Governor, and the. Gqmmander-in-Chief.

# y f

Early History ^

The various‘ Acts that were passed between l!

1853 left almost untouched this large patronage £1
was the privilege of the Directors to enjoy.. It wasia
lucrative privilege, the annual value of each share of such
patronage divided among the twentyrfour Directors and
the Governor and the Deputy-Governor being calculated
£ at £15,000..

The Directors were the persons that:made.the Com-
. pany. They managed, the trade, kept the
Their accounts and issued orders to the servants

Powers

in India, dictating to them the part that they
should play in the tangled political situation of India in
which they had to work. Their consent was necessary for
the declaration of war or ratification oLpeace.. In short,
every important matter of administration and, all lines of
policy to be adopted by the, Com pany were discussedand
disposed of by the” combined council of . the Directorate.
The highest official in India, the Governor-General, had
to carry out their mandates and often, in cases of difference
between the absentee masters and the servants on the
spot, occasions arose for the servants to tender resignation
of their* officeson account of the. uncompromising and
Unsympathetic attitude, of . the Board of Directors. A
huge mass of correspondence containing numberless
dispatches, drafts, orders,, minutes! and <communiqu£s
passed to and fro between India and England and was the
means by 1 which the Difectors exercised their superior

^■•authority? \ V*' ■<' ■ • • r.

Even after the creation of the Board of .Control, though

. «

some of the powers of the Directors were diminished,
the importance of this body in the constitution of
the Company did not completely disappear. Only, in
pursuance: of the policy of progressive tightening up p£
the Crown’s and Parliament’s control over, the Indian

1 L2

Indian, Administration

[constitution, the Directors were given a somewhat sub¬
ordinate position compared with the supreme indepen¬
dence that was formerly enjoyedby them. ,

The third agency in the constitution of the Company
• to which reference must be made was the

« ovemor Q overnor an( j the Deputy-Governor. The

Elizabethan Charter had authorized the annual election
of a Governor by the members from among themselves.
There were,no restrictions in the beginning .as to the
hind, of person who could stand for. election. Th?
Charter of 1693-4, however, laid down that the Gover¬

nor and the Deputy-Governor must have stock of
;£4,QQ0. ..

; The Governor was, of course, the chief executive official
bf the Company and must have been entrusted with the

(duty of seeing that all the wheels of the machinery of the
Company’s government were moving smoothly • and
Unclogged. He does' not, however, appear td have
enjoyed any very special power more than the Directors,
though he had a larger share in the patronage. The
dovetailing of the various parts of the huge organization
of the East India Company must have been, however, no
mean task and the efficient and easy dispatch of the mass
of details incidental to such an institution must have
required some ability and skill. ,: ,

3- The Factories and Presidencies

The Company had to employ their own Agents to
'tt, ' J ’ • . collect throughout the country the: different

articles of export from India. These- goods,
as also those that arrived; Jin; India in ships, sailing from
abroad, had to be properly arranged and..stocked^ Special
Chouses wore / erected) ^ for the purpose j so were
'counting-houses hear thern. Theses together with the

Their

different

Centres

Early History 13

offices of the Agents and the apartments for the business
of the place, constituted what was called a factory of. the
Company. During the days of disorder that prevailed
after the death of Aurangzeb it became habitual for the
Company to fortify these stations of trade and maintain in
them contingents of professional soldiers.

It was not till 1612 that Thomas Aldworthe was
successful in establishing a permanent
British factory, the first of its kind, in
Surat, on the west coast of India, the earlier
attempts to do it having proved futile.
During the course of the next few years subordinate
agencies were set up in Ahmedabad, Godhra, Cambay,
Burhanpiir, Ajmer, and Agra. Factories were founded
at Masulipatam and Pettapoli about 1616. In 1640 Fort
St. George was built on a piece of land secured from a
Hindu Raja. That is modern Madras. It was raised to
the rank of a Presidency in 1653. The important factory
at Hooghly was established in 1651. Dacca and' Patna
soon followed. In 1686 the Company’s Agents and
Council quitted the factory at Hooghly for political
reasons and retired to Sutanati or modem Calcutta which
became a recognized British centre after 1690, in which
year Job Charnock 'definitely founded the capital of
India \ Bombay was transferred by Charles II to the
East India Company in 1668.

The three important factories of Bombay, Madras
and Calcutta soon came to be described as
Presidencies. Each of them was presided
■ over i by a President 'or Governor and

Council, both appointed by commission of the Company.
The number of Councillors generally; varied between nine
and twelve. They were superior ;Civil Servants and
ordinarily seniority was the Only!'test Of promotion.' ■ The

The

Presidencies

14 Indian Administration

Governor and Council jointly possessed all administrative
power. Members of Council were not prevented from
holding subordinate functions. Very often therefore they
distributed all the most lucrative offices among them¬
selves. * '

The Governor or President exercised control over the
Company's servants residing in the factory.
I he „ He had to maintain discipline amoi^g the

younger members. < Fines were imposed
for breaches of rules or misconduct such as drunkenness,
dicing, brawling or insubordination.' The life in a
factory corresponded to life in a club with a common
mess, common prayers and common residence. Great
dignity and importance attached to the President's office.
He was usually appointed from England and received a
salary of ^500 per annum*

Below him were four or five Councillors who were

senior merchants in the service. Still lower

Lower* 0 ” ° f status were tke descending grades of
Officials merchants, factors and writers. Salaries for

each grade were fixed, and promotion from
one to another usually came by seniority. Besides the
regular establishment there was a host of brokers hanging
about the Company's residence* They were important
persons. Through them alone could be conducted all the
vast trade which it was the ambition of the East India

Company to develop. The factories soon acquired the
character and status of * quasi-colonies
1 The business transacted *by the Company's officials in
’ India was purely commercial. The exports

Article* of from England, the chief articles of which

Import Trade ^ rere lead, quicksilver, woollen

1 ■ - ■ * \ clothed and hardware, are stated to have

stock! at about ^60,915 in 1708 and at about ^92,281 twenty

Early History 15

years later. The chief imports into England from India
consisted of calicoes and other woollen manufactures, raw
silk, diamonds, tea, porcelain, pepper, drags, etc. Their
average value during 1708-30 has been calculated at
^758,042 or thereabouts.

CHAPTER II

the Mogul
Empire

Later Developments; 1757-1857

1. The Company's Wars in Bengal

During the reign of Aurangzeb * which exhibited the

premonitory signs that heralded the break-
Disruption of U p 0 f ^j ie Mogul Empire' the Company's

factories on the west coast were harassed by
Shivaji (1664 and 1670) who also threatened
Madras in 1677, Shaista Khan, the Viceroy of Bengal,
oppressed the factories in that province also. The Court
of Directors, dominated by the aggressive Sir Joshua
Child, determined about 1686 to abandon their traditional
policy of peaceful commerce and to go in for active
reprisals. They proclaimed their intention of establishing
a polity of civil and military power—a 4 large, well-
grounded, sure English dominion in India for all time to
come'. Judged by the immediate results achieved these
declarations appear ridiculously pedantic and in the nature
of brave dreams.

The days of disintegration following Aurangaeb's
death, the rise of numerous independent
potentates with conflicting interests, the
complete attenuation of the central sovereign
authority in Delhi, constant rivalry with other ambitious
European traders, like the French, were circumstances
which helped the Company to get themselves involved in
wars and diplomatic negotiations with native princes.
The War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years'
War in which England and France fought on opposite

European

Influences

Later Developments 17)

sides, were utilized by the English and French factors in
India as reasons for fighting against each other. In 1744
began the Carnatic Wars which ended in 1763. After-
suffering reverses in the earlier stages, the British power
ultimately emerged triumphant. The profound schemes;
of Dupleix, Clive’s defence of Arcot, the contest with
Lally, the battle of Wandiwash, are events famous in the*
struggle. The material gain to the English Company*
was the acquisition of territorial sovereignty over the
Northern* Gircars in 1760. French influence was corn*
pletely destroyed. ■ :

Events were moving fast also in Bengal. During the
prosperous rule of distinguished Viceroys
The Battle of Uke Murshid Kuli Khan and Ali Vardi Khan

P1&S86V

comparatively peaceful relations were main¬
tained between the European settlers and traders and
representatives ! of the Muslim power.. Cassimbazar;
Dacca, Patna and Malda were the centres of British trade
and British factories. With the accession 6f Siraj-ud-daula
to the office of Nabob or Viceroy, quarrels and recrimina¬
tions commenced- They culminated in the tragedy of the
Black Hole 3 and its retribution, the battle of Plassey, in
which the Nabob sustained a disastrous defeat involving;
loss of power and, later on, of life. Henceforth the
Nabobs pf Bengal became mere instruments in the.hands
of the Company who made and unmade them according to*

i *, •

their convenience. ' ./

I In 1757 Mir Jafar grafted to the\ Company an area of
*882 square miles known as the Twenty-Four Parganas,
The Company were recognized as the zemindar f of this*
area paying an annual revenue of Rs. 2,22,958 ;to the

■ / , . * * 1

x The occurrence of the tragedy of the Black Hole has been
vehemently disputed'by certain eminent Indian writers in recent
years* • • • • - •

The Ceded
Districts

18 Indian Administration

Nabob or Nazim* This: has been described as the first

territorial acquisition ;of the: Company in
Bengal. The Nabobs had been humbled
and though sovereignty dc jure rested with
them and with the Emperor, the Company were the real
masters of the situation. In 1760 Mir Kasim who
displaced Mir Jafar conferred upon the Company the Dis¬
tricts of Burdwan, Midnapore and Chittagong, covering
over 8,000 square miles. That was the price of his
elevation to the Nabobship. The grant was confirmed by
the Emperor in 1765.

The areas acquired in 1757 and 1760 are known as the
Ceded Districts as distinguished from the Diwani land.
In the case of the Ceded Districts all revenue belonged to
the Company in their capacity as zemindar after the
agreed dues to the State were paid. With Diwani lands it
was otherwise.^ Here the Emperor was the master of the
revenues and the Company were merely entrusted with j
the duty of collection and administration. In .their own
zemindari area the Company established their own collect¬
ing and administrative agency. In discharging their
duties as Diwan various experiments were tried, including
what is known as the Double Government of Lord Clive
set up in 1765. .. <«

The battle of Buxar fought in 1764 was even more

The BattI significant than the battle of Plassey, The
of Buxar ° latter was a successful skirmish against a

mere Viceroy of - a province. Buxar on the
other hand was a struggle against the titular head of the
phantom of a mighty empire, assisted by his powerful
subordinates like the Vazir of Oudh and the Nabob of
Bengal. The Company’s victory oyer Shah Alam raised

' * * - 1 > i ■ * • '* ■ i . , , , • ’ *

them to a .status of pre-eminence and a degree of power
which they had never attained before. There was every

%

i

Three

Separate

Treaties

Later Developments' 19'

temptation to exploit to the fullest extent the advantages-
proffered by the unique occasion.

* >

2. Diwani and Clive’s Double Government

k

As the victors in the battle of Buxar the Company were in
a position to dictate their own terms of peace
to the enemies whom it had so completely
crippled. Each of the powers, the Vazir of
Oudh, the Nabob of Bengal and the Emperor

*

Shah Alam, who had combined in an endeavour to destroy
the Company’s growing authority, was dealt with sepa¬
rately in three different treaties that were made with thenu
Their new status and relation to the East India'Company
were clearly defined. It will be seen that the same
degree of severity was not shown to every one of them.

The Company had no desire at this moment to deal
drastically with the Vazir ^f Oudh even.
Treaty with though he had been defeated by them. The

only action that they took against him was
to deprive him of the two districts of Korrab
and Allahabad. Even these districts, snatched out of his
possessions, were not retained by the Company in theft-
hands for their own benefit. They were handed over to-
the Emperor Shah Alam who, theoretically speaking,
could claim sovereign rights over them. Thus the Vazir’s-
discomfiture in the battle of Buxar did not bring about his
total ruin. He was merely put' to the loss of two of his-
districts and an amount of money by way of indemnity.

The Nabob of Bengal stood in a different position.

The battle of Buxar was not his * first
offence The Company had come into con¬
tact with him much earlier and that contact
had culminated into a collision on the field
of Plassey. For over six years after the Nabob’s*

the Vazir of
Oudh

Treaty with
the Nabob of
Bengal

20 Indian: Adminhtration

$igual defeat in that engagement he had been held
.almost in political bondage and siibordination to the
Company.

Thus even before the battle of Buxar a deputy or
assistant to the Nabob, called Naib Subba or Naib Nazim,
came to be appointed under the orders of the East India
Company. Though nominally a subordinate, he was
intended to exercise considerable restraint on the actions
of the Nabob. In fact, if not in,theory, he was the main
active force which regulated the administration of the
province. It was through his agency that the Company
could easily influence and interfere with the affairs of the
provincial government.

,.<.The audacity of the Nabob in rising once more against

the East India Company and in joining in
Political the inglorious struggle at Buxar was pun-

^Nabob ° f ished by his political extinction. The

Company did not, indeed, take the extreme
•step of abolishing the Nabobship altogether. The office
was, maintained but no real power or importance remained
associated with it any longer. The Nabobs were hence-
forward reduced to the insignificant status of powerless
political pensioners.

; It was stipulated in January 1765 that the Nabob
7 4 should ‘make over the management of the

The l^izamat s U bedari,with every advantage arising from

signed by him ^ *° the Company, by whom an annual

pension of 50 lakhs, subject to the. manage*
ment of; their nominees ’ was to be allowed to him. ■ The
duties of the Nizamat, that is, of maintaining peace and
•order in the, province, were resigned by the Nabob to
the Company under this agreement., The responsibility
fori s providing ; ah; adequate safeguard against internal
lawlessness and; encroachmentsi on civic rights and

Later Developments, 21

liberties now passed, on from the Nabob to. the East India

Company* , L) v-

; The Company selected Mohammad Reza Khan for

appointment to the office of Naib Subba. The powers of

the Viceroy of Bengal were practically enjoyed by this

man though the Nabob continued to exist in name: And

as the Naib Subba had now become entirely the creature

of the* Company, that body could effectively control all

administration from behind the curtain whenever it

desired to do so. '

‘Negotiations with the Emperor Shah Alam were

conducted with greater delicacy. He was

Treaty with n0 {- treated merely as a fallen and van-
the Emperor . ,

quished foe. Great consideration , was shown

to him on account of the exalted status and dignity
which, had been associated with his name. It was
agreed that he should receive annually 26 lakhs of
rupees out of the revenues of Bengal. He was further
assigned the provinces of Korrah and Allahabad out of
the dominions of the Vazir of Oudh. In return he was
induced to issue under his royal insignia the firman of the
Diwani which conferred upon the Company the right of
collection and administration of the revenues of Bengal,
Bihar and Orissa, and the right of administering civil
justice in those provinces. This momentous event took
place in 17t}5, It is necessary to understand clearly the im¬
plications of.this new acquisition secured by the Company.

: , In.Muslim polity the Governor or Viceroy of a province

was known as the Subedar or Nabob-i-
Nazim. He represented the Emperor in all
matters civil or military. Sometimes Deputy
Governors or Naib Nazims were appointed to function for
the Nazim who might be otherwise engaged. Ti'he office
of Diwaui was created by Ajsbar in 1579. ‘ The Diwan

the Office
ofc Diwan

22 I?idia?i Administration

was the finance minister of the province, responsible for
the collection of the revenue, the expenditure of Govern¬
ment money and the dispensation of civil justice.* He
was not entirely subordinate to the Nazim and his
appointment was made by the Emperor himself. How¬
ever, in the province the Nazim had precedence and
predominance as the head. Gradually Diwans began to
grow in importance. The posts of the Nazim, who -looked
after general administration, and of the Diwan, who
looked after finances, came to be combined in one person
as in the case of Murshid Kuli Khan in 1713. The duality
of the two offices disappeared and with it also the check
of one upon the other. The succession to the office
became hereditary in the absence of effective control from
the Emperors of Delhi.

In August 1765 Clive revived the theoretical right of
the Emperor to nominate a Diwan and the

fetreT on the office was con f erred not upon an individual
Company but upon an institution, namely the East

India Company. A distinct and exalted
status was thus acquired by that body in the official
hierarchy of the Mogul Court. It legalized their wielding
of political power. The Company henceforth would not
appear as mere mercenary foreign intruders. They were
deliberately invested with the task of revenue collection
of three extensive provinces like Bengal, Bihar and Orissa,
and with the administration of civil justice in them. One
month after the Emperor’s firman Was issued, the
Nizam or Nabob gave his recognition to the new Diwan,
It will be seen from this description that two separate
contracts helped in establishing the de facto sovereignty
of the East India Company in the province of Bengal
after 1765. * .

(a) The earlier one was the treaty Signed by the

Later Developments

23

Nabob of Bengal after his humiliating surrender in the

How the

Company’s

Sovereignty

battle of Buxar. By that agreement the
Nabob was completely deprived of his
Nizamat responsibilities and powers. They

was estab
lished in
Bengal

were taken over by the Company them¬
selves on their own shoulders.

The Nizamat powers imposed the duty

of maintaining an adequate police force for the security

of life and property and enforcement of the law. They

also included the obligation of maintaining efficient
magisterial courts with wide jurisdiction in all kinds of

criminal cases.

-The way in which the Company began to exercise their
newly acquired Nizamat powers was simple. They
appointed their own nominee to hold the office of the
Naib Nazim or Naib Subba and through him controlled all
the lower officials. He was the chief instrument of their
sovereign authority. The criminal administration of the
province,of Bengal was thus easily transferred into, the
Company-s hands.

(6) The other contract was made with the Emperor
in August 1765. By this agreement, the rights of Diwani
over the province of Bengal were conferred upon the
Company, Henceforward it became the duty of that
body to make proper arrangements, for the collection of
land revenue in the province. It had also to maintain
efficient civil courts with wide jurisdiction, for the trial of
all cases in which rights of property and inheritance were
concerned. The civil administration of the province of
Bengal was thus deliberately transferred into the Com¬
pany’s hands. ; ' ,

, Once the Diwani was accepted, the problem was how
the duties imposed by that office, could be,i successfully
discharged* On this matter iagain hard Clive held strong

24 Indian Administration

views. He was convinced that the Company were not
The Diffi- yet in a position to accept the de facto sover-
cuity of ad- eignty in its entirety. Their officers were
ministering not numerically large enough to fill all the
Diwani higher administrative positions. The major¬

ity of them were traders and merchants not adequately
educated and certainly not specialized either by learning
or by experience in the art of governance. Nor were
they distinguished by a reputation for strong moral fibre
which would resist the temptation of self-aggrandizement
The people who were to be governed were so different in
language, laws, culture and general traditions.

Lord Clive therefore thought it not only prudent but
„ necessary that the old indigenous machinery

Clive's

Double of government which had existed for
Government centuries and with which the people were

thoroughly acquainted, should be retained as
before though it was how to function under new masters.
He adopted the plan of retaining all old offices and even
all old officers and entrusting to them their usual duties.
The Nabobs office was maintained though lie had no
power whatever; Following the old practice a Naib
Diwan was appointed. The choice fell upon Mohammad
Reza Khan who had been already selected to be the Naib
Nazim imposed upon the Nabob. Under the Naib
Diwan there was the usual descending gradation of
native officers. • '

What therefore happened was this. The rights of the
collection of revenue and administration of
civil justice were legally acquired by the
Company. However, it was not thought
possible or advisable for that body to exercise those
powers diteotly. The old administrative structure, at the
head oif which stood the Naib Diwan, was ' maintained as

How it
worked

Later Developments 25

itu.was. The English did not begin the collection of
revenues; they rather began to see that they were collect¬
ed. The old mode of collection was left undisturbed.
All the complex principles and details of land revenue
collection were to be observed as before. The change
was at the top. There it was no longer the Nabob but
the Company. To this body were now transferred all the
revenues of . the provinces. This dual character of the
system proposed by Lord Clive led to its description by
historians as the Double Government.

Clive’s plan, though probably inevitable, was none the
- ; less, disastrous, particularly because the
It* D j satftroil# lv /Ni Zama t power of the Nabob, that is, the

Results , . m i -

power of maintaining peace and order and
administering criminal justice had already been under¬
mined. The Nabob could no longer function as a
corrective to the Diwan, The Company, who had
usurped the functions of the Nabob, satisfied themselves
by conveniently imagining that the appointment of ‘ a
Naib Subba was equivalent to providing an adequate and
proper administration.: The Naib Subba, who was a
creature of the East India Company, could not afford to
displease his masters by taking judicial steps against
English officers even when they were guilty of a breach
of the law. The guardian of the public peace and justice,
/on account of his impotence, was parodied into a dismal
' engine of oppression. , :

Mohammad Rem Khan protested to the Calcutta
Committee that ‘English gentlemen and
Power their gumasthas trade in linen,, mustard

^ rce<i seed, tobacco, oil, rice,* hernp, wheat, in

Responsibility s ^ ort kinds of grain and other commodi¬
ties. They force their purchase money bn
the ryots. ■ They do not pay customs duty ta the Sircar

26 Indian Administration

but are guilty of all manner of seditious and injurious
j acts. They ruin everybody and reduce the villages to a
/ state of desolation '. Verelst, Sykes, Becher and other
contemporaries condemned in the severest terms the
despotic actions of the Company's merchants who had
lost all fear of control and responsibility. Nobody dared
to exercise any authority against their lawlessness* The
Indian agents employed by them arrogated to themselves
a position of superiority, overawed the Nabob and his
officers and converted tribunals of justice into instruments
of cruelty. The Naib Diwan and his associates could
appropriate treasures without being detected. So far as
the protection of the subject was concerned all govern¬
ment was dissolved.

The disastrous consequences of Clive’s Double Govern¬
ment made it necessary that some other method of
government should be devised. In fact, during the next
few years, a number of short-lived experiments were
tried for reforming the administrative system* Some
details about them have been given in the chapter on
Land Revenue in Part V of this book. It may be only
stated here that all authorities are agreed in considering
| i this period to be the darkest in the annals of the East
\ India Company's rule in India.

3. Parliamentary Inquiries and Enactments

Parliament's attention naturally came to be directed
towards India after the momentous events
which changed the Company's status in this

their Wealth unex P ecte< ^ and unprecedented manner.

Stirred by the exhilarating circumstances,

the proprietors began to claim a larger dividend in
spite of the Company’s bad finances. Officials in the
service of the Company returned home laden with huge;

Later Developments 27

fortunes. They farther took the liberty of gratifying
their sense of vanity by making a tangible display of their
enviable but ill-acquired opulence. Reports of Parliament¬
ary Committees appointed after 1769 made the calculation
that from 1757 to 1766 the Bast India Company’s
servants received as presents from the people of Bengal a
sum of not less than £2,169,665. Clive also got a separate
jagir, the capitalized value of which would have worked
out at about .£600,000. In addition to this sum an
amount of *£3,770,833 had been paid as * compensation
for losses incurred Every servant was also engaged
in private trade on his own account and, by an abuse of
the privileges granted to the Company, extorted large
amounts from the poor customers.

Considerable repugnance was excited by the spectacle
of these English ‘ Nabobs \ Their wealth was generally

believed to have been amassed by barbarous
Their Parha- and disreputable methods and to be tainted

with tyrannical corruption. Lovers of liberty
like Burke made spirited attacks upon the
immoral system which could produce such unscrupulous
specimens of administrators. William Pitt described the
* rapacity, plunder and extortion ’ of the officers as being
‘ shocking to the feelings of humanity and disgraceful to
the national character \ The question began to agitate
the English public as to whether a trading corporation
should be allowed to have territorial sovereignty at all. <
j Parliament therefore appointed a Committee in 1766 to

inquire into all these matters and make a
Parliament- report on the state of the Company’s revenues

and other affairs. In the following year,
1767, Parliament passed five Acts. These
checked the proprietors from taking dividends larger than
ten per cent and compelled the Company to pay £400,000

mentary

Critics

ary Inquiry
and Action

of the Com¬
pany

28 Indian Administration

a year to the-Treasury for two years, in return for a jpe*>
mission to retain their territorial sovereignty. The c6ft- ;
tract was renewed for a further term of five years in 1769,
the Company undertaking to make the stipulated annual
payments in return for the permission to retain their
possessions.

The assumption, however, on which stich an ar¬
rangement was based, that the Company's
Bad Finance, finances were extremely prosperous, was

thoroughly groundless. While the servant*
of the Company were amassing colossal'
fortunes, the Company themselves were advancing rapidly
towards bankruptcy. Their ‘ debts ’ amounted to about'
^6,000,000. They maintained a large standing army:
Their political expenses continued to be heavy. Hycler
All’s victory in the Carnatic in 1769 and the disastrous'
famine in the north in 1770 precipitated the crisis. The
Directors approached Lord North begging for a loan from
Government, which alone could save the Company.

’, In 1772 Parliament appointed a Committee with instruc-
; tions to hold a secret inquiry into the affairs of the Com¬
pany. The Company’s request for pecuniary assistance
' came before Parliament in 1773 and Lord North’s Govern¬
ment proposal extensive alterations in the system of the
government of the Company’s'. Indian possessions. Two
Acts were passed by Parliament. By one, a loan of
/l,400,000 at four per cent was granted to thfe Company
on whose power of declaring dividends some restrictions
were also imposed. They were obliged to submit their
accounts every half year to the Treasury*

1/ The second Act of this year is the famous Regulating 1
fAct, the provisions of which have been separately dis¬
cussed elsewherej' This is the first Parliamentary enact-.
nient which tried to modify the? Company’s administration.;

Later Developments 29

in India. The era of Charters now gives place to the erat

of Parliamentary Acts. Henceforth a series

The Regulat- Q £ statutes were pagsec j usually each at an
ing Act . . . .

interval of twenty years, 'when the time

came for the renewal of the Company’s Charter. On each
such occasion the authority of the Crown and Parliament
was tightened and the Company themselves were ulti¬
mately transformed from a trading corporation into an
administrative agency. ‘ -I

The Amending Act of 17 81 settled some of the dis L
puted questions, particularly that about the :
Pitt's India jurisdiction- of the Supreme Court establish-

Ct ed under the Regulating Act of 1773. It

was, however, Pitt’s India Act of 1784 which' placed the
Company in direct and permanent subordination to a
body representing the British Government.. It created
a Board of six Commissioners for the affairs of India';
popularly known as the Board of Controls The Boarcl
was to consist of the Chancellor and one of the Secre¬
taries ot State and four Privy Councillors nominated by
the Crown to hold office during its pleasure; but it was'
never intended that high officers like the Chancellor or
the Secretary of State should take any active part. The
Commissioners were unpaid and had no patronage*
They were empowered to superintend* direct and control
all Acts regarding the civil and military administration
of the Company’s . possessions in India. They were
given access to and control over all papers, minutes,
dispatches, orders, etc. The Directors had to pay obe¬
dience to : the Board* which might disapprove or modify
the dispatches of the Directors. The Court of Proprietors
lost its 1 chief governing power. It could 'hot revoke or!
modify the proceedings of the Court of Directors. '. "I
The; importance df Pitt’s measure therefore, lies in its;

ov Indian Administration

creation of a separate Department of State in England

Importance of un ^ er tiie 0 ® c * a * s tyl® of * The Commis-
the Measure sioners for the Affairs of India \ whose

special function was to control the Court of
Directors. One of the Commissioners was appointed
President, having a casting vote in matters of difference.
He later on came to be popularly known as the President
of the Board of Control and practically exercised all the
power vested in the Board and acquired a position of
supremacy, a Committee of Secrecy of not thore than
three members was to be formed out of the Directors.
Secret orders to India dispatched by the Board were to be
transmitted by this body. The Act thus inaugurated what
is described as Double Government in the Indian admin¬
istration, The Company's officers continued to be in
actual charge of the management, while the representa¬
tives of Parliament, sitting in a separate body, controlled
all important matters of policy and detail from day today.

By the Act of 1793, the two junior members of the
Board of Control were no longer required to be Privy
Councillors. Provision was also made for payment of
salaries to the members and staff of the Board out of

Indian revenues.

Measures of some importance were passed between
1793 and 1813 but they need not be described here.

The Act of 1813 was preceded by a searching inquiry

The Act * nto fr^ian affairs. Wellesley's vigorous

•of 1813 policy had affected the finances of the Com¬
pany and a Parliamentary Committee sat
for four years from 1808 onwards to make inquiries. In
1812 it issued the famous Fifth Report which is stated by
Ubert to be still a standard, authority on the question of
Indian land tenures and on the judicial and police arrange¬
ments of the time-. Napoleon had closed the European

The Act
of 1833

Later Developments 31

ports and British trade demanded admission to Asiatic
ports. The Company fought hard to retain their privi¬
lege and put forth various arguments against the opening
of the doors of the east to all and sundry. Their opposi¬
tion was, however, ignored and the proposals submitted
by the Government were embodied in thirteen resolutions,
on which was based the later Act. Parliament's inter¬
ference now covered not only the internal administration
of Indian affairs but it reduced the Company's trade
monopoly itself, confining it to the article of tea in their
trade with India. Parliament's undisputed sovereignty and
discretion to introduce any alterations in the Company's
constitution or privileges were once more demonstrated.
Twenty years later, careful inquiries were again insti¬
tuted when the time came for the renewal of
the Company's Charter. The Company were
now compelled to close their commercial
business and they ceased to be a mercantile corporation.
They were indeed given a further lease of life for twenty
years, but they became henceforth strictly an administra¬
tive machine, conducted by the Directors and controlled
by the Board of Control as representing Parliament.

The Act of 1853 renewed the Charter of the Company
but not for a definite number of years. The
Indian dominions were to remain in the
hands of the Company in trust for the Crown
until Parliament should otherwise direct. The number
of Directors was also reduced from twenty-four to eighteen
out of which six were to be appointed by the Crown. '
Finally the Mutiny of 1857 gave the death-blow to’ the
existence of the East India. Company. The
Act for the Better Government of Indisi
enacted that India should be governed by
and in the name of the Queen, and vested in the Queen all

The Act
of 1853

The Act
of 1858

32 Indian Administration

powers and territories that had belonged to the East India
Company. A Secretary of State with ' Council was
appointed to transact the affairs of India in England.

4, Parliamentary Control over Indian Affairs

. It will be clear from this short survey of the growth of

, the East India Company's political organi-
•fckm tU " zat * 0IX » consequent upon the territorial
•Company expansion of their power in India, that the

Company in the nature of the circumstances
had two different sets of officials to transact their business,
one in India and the other in England. England was
the country of the Company's/domicile. From it were
derived all, their power and privileges. The chief control¬
ling and directing authority of the Company's affairs
resided in England and functioned from there. The
Company being originally a commercial corporation, their
constitution was modelled on the lines of such a body.

It is interesting to understand how the Parliament of
England exercised its sovereign control over
the affairs of the Company so as to modify
their Indian policy in general during the
period under survey, 1600 to 1857. It is evident that
occasions for interference did not arise frequently in the
earlier years when the Company were more or less a purely
commercial corporation. The business of the Company
during these years had not reached that intricate character
which it acquired during the later years of the Com¬
pany’s development. The Company were the creation
of the English: monarch who had endowed them with
,a legal, existence through .fhe, .instrumentality of a Royal
Charter.

.Very definite conditions as to the privileges, the consti¬
tution and the powers of the i Company were mentioned

Parliamentary

Control

Later Developments 33

in these documents, and any transgression of the limits

and restrictions imposed upon the Company

of Charters 1118 waS t0 to ttie Penalty of the

dissolution of the whole body. In the

technical sense of the term, the East India Company were

at no time sovereign. Their powers and privileges, even

when great and undefined, were all derivative. And

whenever circumstances in India made it necessary to hold

new powers, request for the grant o£ such powers had to

be made to* the Ci;own which would then be pleased to

incorporate them in a new Charter that it might confer. ;

Thus successive monarchs made additions to the
powers and privileges of the Company in
New Powers response to changing environment and on

the^harters an a PP ea * ^ rom the Directors. Such meat

sures appeared with great frequency and
sometimes at short intervals during the century and a half
following the grant of the original Charter of 1600. The
increase in powers was often accompanied by detailed
regulation about some section of the administration. The
establishment of some sort of judicial system for the trial
of civil and criminal cases, the establishment of Municipal
Corporations in the important cities in the Company’s
dominions in India, and the constant alteration and deter¬
mination of the franchise for entitling a person to be a
proprietor having a vote, or to be a Director, or a
Governor of the Company, were matters which were'
regulated by the conditions of the Charters.

It will be seen, therefore, that though the authority of
the Crown was not directly exercised over the affairs of
the Company, to whom certain rights of sovereignty were;
delegated as a privilege to be enjoyed under certain res¬
trictions, the fact that the delegation depended entirely
upon, the will of the reigning monarch, who might or
2

Sanction for
Charters

34 Indian Administration

might not grant it, put a restraint upon the actions of the
Company and the freedom of their existence. They did
not therefore enjoy, legally speaking, any perfect immu¬
nity from the molestation of superior control.

The control of the Crown did not, however, necessarily
mean the control of Parliament. The battle
Parliament’s f or c j v i c rights and liberty which the citizens

of England successfully fought with their
monarchs during the period of the Stuarts
had been giving only a faint indication of its impending
arrival when Elizabeth granted the Charter which incor¬
porated the East India Company in 1600. At the time of
the Revolution of 1688 and even earlier, the right of the
monarchs to grant a monopoly through the instrument of
a Royal Charter was hotly disputed and was, in the end,
emphatically denied. The resolution of Parliament in
1693, to which a reference has already been made, declar¬
ing the equal right of all subjects to trade in the east was
a reply to the legal claim made on behalf of the benefi¬
ciaries of the Royal Charters. With this definite shifting
of the centre of political gravity from the King to Parlia¬
ment and the acknowledgement of Parliament’s undisputed
claim, the Charters which were the fotmdations and the
props of institutions like the East India Company began
to be issued with the consent and in the name of
Parliament. For the monarchs were substituted the
people. The source of authority was changed, though the
form in which power was delegated and control was
exercised, remained the same.

With the growing complication in the Company's Indian
affairs arising out of their entanglement in the disturbed
politics of the land, and with the assumption by the Com¬
pany of the dc facto, if not de jure, territorial sovereignty of
the vast area comprised by the provinces of Bengal, Bihar

ii. Parliament-

Later Developments 35

and Orissa, the nature of Parliamentary control had to be
adjusted to suit the requirements of the new situation.
The question had to be decided whether a commercial
corporation could be at all permitted to exercise territorial
sovereignty; whether such influence would be beneficial
to the people over whom it was exercised or by whom it
was exercised. The constitutional maxim that no subject
can acquire sovereign rights except for the Crown also
made it obligatory that Parliament should investigate
very critically the operations of an institution which had
plunged themselves into a political and military tangle.
From the acceptance of the Diwani in 1765 and on¬
wards, members of Parliament grew more
_ curious about Indian affairs and their leaders

ary Commit-

tees felt a greater responsibility in respect of

Parliament’s supervision over the Company’s
administration. The most usual method of exercising
this supervision was the appointment of Parliamentary
Committees to conduct a detailed investigation into Indian
affairs from time to time. Investigations of this kind
preceded the Regulating Act, the Act of 1813, the Act
of 1833, and so on. Sometimes the enquiry was held
secretly and every endeavour was made to thrash out all
details and thoroughly understand the circumstances of
the Company’s management and rule. Voluminous
documents were later on published recording the evidence
collected by such Committees.

On receiving the Reports the ministry in charge in

England embodied such of their recommend-

m. Parliament- at £ onS as were acceptable to it, in definite
.ary Enact-

ments proposals for an Act and put the Act before

Parliament for discussion and sanction.
Between 1773 and 1858 a number of such Acts modify¬
ing, altering and regulating the administration of the

*

36 Indian Administration

Company’s Indian dominions were passed by Parlia¬
ment. The time for the consideration of the Indian
question invariably arose when the legal period tor the
currency of the Charter, on which the very existence of
the Company depended, was about to terminate. From
1773 to 1853 at an interval of every twenty years,
Parliament had necessarily to legislate on Indian matters.
At such times it took the opportunity of reviewing the
whole situation and adjusting its legislation to the needs
of the administration. Even during the intervals it took
the initiative in introducing measures affecting India in
order to correct any defects which required urgent atten¬
tion. Thus the Amending Act of 1781 was passed only
seven years after the Regulating Act, and Pitt’s India Act
only three years after the Act of 1781. The Acts went into
the details of the administration and circumscribed the
freedom of the Company in the management of their in¬
ternal affairs, to the extent to which these had to be carried
on in accordance with the prescribed Parliamentary rules.

But the most effective instrument by which the Home
Government exercised its supreme control
over the Company’s affairs, over and above
the appointment of Parliamentary Commit¬
tees and the enacting of laws, was the creation of a
regular Parliamentary agency which worked as a normal
department of Government for the day-to-day supervision
and guidance of the Company’s affairs both in India and
in England. Committees of investigation and Acts of
Parliament came sporadically with intervals of years.
Their control, therefore, could not have the continuity
that is secured by a permanent department. Steps were
taken to institute such a standing superintending authority
by Pitt’s India Act of 1784.

The Board of six Commissioners which came later on

iv. The Board
of Control

Its Powers

Later Developments 37

to be known as the Board of Control was nothing less

. than the super-imposition upon the officials
of the Company of a board of masters, who
were empowered * to superintend, direct and control all
acts regarding the civil and military government of Indian
territories’. They were given access to all papers, dis¬
patches and documents. The Directors of the Company
had ‘to pay obedience to, and had to be bound by the
orders of the Board, which might modify any communica¬
tions or dispatches issued by them’.

It will be seen at once that the formation of an
authority with such vast superior powers inevitably
degraded the officers of the Company to a subordinate
position. They lost their power, independence and initia¬
tive. A Committee of secrecy of thre.e, formed from
among the Directors was alone entrusted with the exam¬
ination and dispatch of important political and military
documents. The degradation of the Directorate body as
a whole was -therefore considerable. The six Commis¬
sioners were to be named by the Crown.

The President was almost always a member of the
Cabinet and the appointment soon came to>

of the Board ^e reco ^ Illze ^ to a P a *ty appointment.

The President went out of office and came

into Office according to the fortunes of his political party.
In course of time the number of members of the
Board was reduced to one. He continued, however, to
be known as the President. Provision had been made
since 1793 for the payment of the salaries of the members
out of Indian revenues.

The President of the Board had enormous influence
over the administration. He was the representative of
Parliament and its constitutional adviser on questions
connected with India. With the support of that august

38 Indian Administration

body behind him, he could make and unmake important
decisions regarding the Indian Government. The fear
that he might deprive the Directors of their lucrative
patronage by persuading Parliament to abolish it tended
to make the Directors subservient to his will.

Private discussions between the Chairman of: the
Directors and the President of the Board soon became
a normal preliminary to the disposal of the vast amount
of correspondence that passed in ship-loads between
England and India. The practice also gradually arose
of private communications between the President of the
Board on the one hand and important officials in India
like the Governor-General and Governors on the other*
By this unofficial means the President's opinion on
particular questions and the general trend of his thought
could be ascertained before any action was taken in

India.

The system of Government which was thus inaugu-

Double

Government

rated by the Act of 1784 has been described
by writers on Indian constitution as
Double Government. As the President had

Cabinet status and as his office had no fixed tenure but

changed with his party, Parliament was able, if it so
intended, to exercise a more complete and direct control
over Indian administration, because of the complete re¬

sponsibility

of the British Cabinet to the British Parlia¬

ment and the consequent responsibility of the President of

the Board to the members of that body.

It is true, however, that as his salary was paid out of
the Indian exchequer, there was no occasion on which
Parliament would have the necessity to consider the
Indian question. It was not so with the other mem¬
bers of the Cabinet and departments controlled by
them. Discussion necessarily arose on matters in their

Late? Developments 39'

departments when, at the beginning: of the year, demands
were made for salaries, and other expenses.

In short, Charters, Enactments, Committees of Inquiry
and the Board of Control were the instruments by which
the Government of England exercised its control over and
supervised the administration of the East India Company’s
territorial possessions in India.

PART II

IN DIAN ADMINISTRATION IN
ENGLAND OR THE ‘ HOME ’

GOVERNMENT

%

Chap, * Page

III. The Secretary of State ... ... 43

IV. The India Council and the High Commis¬

sioner for India ... ... ... 54

V. Relaxation of Parliamentary Control

1. Establishment of Conventions ... 63

2. The Fiscal Autonomy Convention ... 66

3. Criticism of the Method of Conventions... 68

VI. Interest of Parliament in Indian
Affairs

1. Before the Reforms ... ... 70

2. After the Reforms ... ... 73

The Act
of 1858

The High Commissioner 55

to be still more undesirable. Hence it was considered
necessary to create a new body to take the place of the
old Directors and the body so created was known as the
India Council.

' The India Council was instituted for the first time by

the Government of India Act of 1858. It
consisted of fifteen members of whom eight
were appointed by the Crown and seven
elected by the Directors of the East India Company.
The majority of them were persons who had served or
resided in India for at least ten years and had not left
India more than ten years before their appointment. At
least nine members were required to possess these
qualifications. The power of filling vacancies of Crown
appointments was vested in the Crown and of filling other
vacancies in the Council itself. The members were to
hold office during good behaviour but were debarred from
becoming members of Parliament and might be removed
from office on an address of both the Houses of
Parliament. Their salary was fixed at ^1,200 per year.
The Council was charged with the duty of conducting,
under the direction of the Secretary of State, the
business transacted in the United Kingdom in relation
to the Government of India and the correspondence
with India. The Secretary of State was to be the
President of the Council with power to overrule
in cases of difference of opinion and with power
to send dispatches to India, without reference to
the Council, in matters which might be regarded as
urgent and secret. Weekly meetings were held for
the disposal of business. Some of the patronage of the
Directors was vested in the Secretary of State in Council.

Changes were made in the constitution of the Council
from time to time. Thus the Government of India Act

56 ^ Indian Administration

of 1869 vested in the Secretary of State the right of filling

vacancies in the Council; it also reduced

Changes u to ^ ae * erm tenure from 4 during good

X909 ReSUP ° behaviour* to a definite period of ten years.

At the same time special power was given

to the Secretary of State to reappoint old members for

a further period of five years for special reasons of public

advantage. In 1889 the Secretary of State was allowed

to abstain from filling vacancies in the Council till its

number was reduced from fifteen to ten. The Act of

*

1907 fixed the number of members at not less than ten
and not more than fourteen and reduced the term of
office from ten to seven years. The salary of a member
was reduced from ^1,200 to ^1,000 per 'annum. From
this year, two Indians were included in the Council as
members, one of them being the late Sir K. G. Gupta.
The Act of 1919 introduced further important changes.

/Under that Act (i) The Council of India is to
The Changer cons j s t of not less than eight and not more

the Ae^of ^ ^ an twelve members as the Secretary of
1919 State might from time to time determine.

The right of filling a vacancy remains as*
before with the Secretary of State. Half the number of
the members must be persons who have served or resided
in India for at least ten years and have not last left its-
shores more than five years before the date of their
appointment, (ii) The term of office is to be five instead
of seven years as before. The shortening of this period
is calculated to ensure a continuous flow of fresh experi¬
ence from India and also to relieve the Indian members
of the necessity of spending a long period of seven years
away from their homes in a foreign country. The
Secretary of State’s power of reappointing a member for
a further term of five years, the reasons for which he

The High Commis$io?ier 57

has to place before Parliament, is retained; otherwise
no member of the Council is capable of being* nominated
again to that.body. Any member is of course at liberty
to resign his membership and any member may be
removed from office by His Majesty on an address from
the Houses of Parliament, (iii) The annual salary is
put down at ^1,200 for each,member, those domiciled in
India at the time of their appointment receiving in addi¬
tion an annual subsistence allowance of ^600. The
salaries and allowances may be paid either out of the
revenues of India or out of moneys voted by Parliament,
(iv) The Indian element in the Council is increased from
two to three members, (v) All the agency work of the
Secretary of State in Council is henceforth to be
transferred to a High Commissioner for India. A good
deal of the Council’s work is therefore decreased,
(vi) The concurrence of a majority of votes at a meeting
of the Council is required for' the following purposes:
(a) grants or appropriations of any part of the revenues
of India, which means practically expenditure of Indian
revenue; ( b) making of contracts for the purposes of
the Government of India Act 1919; and ( c ) making of
rules and regulations for the Services in order to
fix the conditions of their employment and their
position.

The Council of course cannot initiate any expenditure.
It is,further provided that 1 the revenues of India shall be
applied for the purposes of the Government of India
alone’. After the Reforms, the Council’s control over

i

expenditure on transferred subjects is almost wholly
withdrawn. Nor is the consent of the Council required
for ‘ votable 9 expenditure on the reserved side. Even in
the non-votable items of provincial finance, though its
control in theory is unrestricted, in practice a wide

58 Indian Administration

delegation of powers is made to authorities in India. A
large portion of the expenditure of the Central Govern¬
ment is non-votable and the Council’s sanction is
therefore extensively required in the case of the Central

finances.

The Council works by the system of committees; its

Methods of
Transacting
Business

members are divided into various groups and
to each such group, known as a Committee,,
is allotted the task of transacting business,
in one or more departments. For example

there are different committees for finance, public works,
revenue, political, military, and legal matters, stores, etc.,
corresponding to a similar division of departments in the
Viceroy’s Executive Council. Each department has a
Secretary of its own selected by the Secretary of State.
All correspondence and proposals connected with the
different branches of the administration are referred to
the respective committees by the Secretary of the
Department before being finally laid before the Secretary
of State in Council.

The Committee does all the preliminary work of
investigation and consideration of the pros and cons of
proposals referred to it. The decision of the Committee
is sent on to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State who
then refers the matter to the Secretary of State. The
latter either allows the former to issue orders or issues
them himself, or, if the matter is important, orders the
question to be put before a full meeting of the Council
for final disposal. It is the usual practice to hold full
meetings of the Council every month.

The nomination of members to the Council is exclu¬
sively a privilege of the Secretary of State. The method
of its working has crystallized into a routine, the most
prominent part of which is the formation of committees

The High Commissio?ier 59

and distribution of departments of Government among
them so as to suit the convenience of administration. It
was this dilatory routine which Mr. Montagu condemned
as cumbrous and as designed to prevent efficiency, in his
famous speech in Parliament in 1917.

Many Indian politicians, including the late Mr. Gokhale, ^
\y ! have been of opinion that the India Council
serves no useful purpose. It is feared that,
more often than not, the Council serves as a
reactionary drag on the progressive impulse of a Secretary
of State, consisting as it does of retired members of the
Indian Civil Service whose notions have been incurably
hardened into a crust under the burning skies of India.

Criticism of
the Council

Prominent Indian politicians have therefore demanded
the total abolition of the Council. The Crewe Committee
appointed in 1919 to consider plans for the reorganization
of the India Office were also of the same opinion. The
‘ Montford * (Montagu-Chelmsford) Report, however, was
not in favour of total abolition. The writers of the
Report and the Joint Parliamentary Committee believed
that, at least for some time to come, the advice of men of
Indian experience would be indispensable to the Secretary
of State and it was therefore wise to retain a body which
had all the advantage of tradition and authority.
Accordingly their recommendation was that the
Council be continued, but they proposed important
modifications in its constitution and adjustments in the

method of its working. a .

It will be easily realized that the Council as a political

factor, stands comparatively in the background under the
dominant influence and importance of the Secretary of
State. This official, with his elevated status of a Cabinet
Minister and large powers, completely overshadows the
existence of the Council. Nor are its powers very real.

t

60 Indian Administration

Indian public opinion, particularly after the advent of the
Reforms, looks upon the continuance of this body not
only as a superfluity involving economic waste and
administrative dilatoriness but as a positive incongruity
which cannot fit in with the principle of popular
responsibility. It cannot be described either as a
legislative, or as an executive or as a judicial body.
Neither can it be considered as an effective restraint
upon the actions of the Secretary of State. It has.
the distinction of being an advisory council whose advice
may or may not be sought and if sought, may or may not
be accepted by the high official for whom it is intended
to serve as a guide. It exists at the expense of India.
And with a larger grant of autonomy to the Government
of India its total abolition would alone appear to be the
greatest measure of its reform.

Confusion is often made between the India Office and
the India Council. The India Office com¬
prises all the establishment of the Secretary
of State. Sir Malcolm Seton states that the
present establishment of the India Office is 320. The
India Office is the Secretariat of the India Council and the
Secretary of State. It keeps the administrative machinery
moving. The India Council on the other hand is a small
group of advisers whose numbers are prescribed and
whose functions are defined by law. Its members-
do not form a bureaucracy.

An important step involving a transfer of power from
the Secretary of State in Council to the
The Indian Government of India was taken by the Act

of 1919 when it made provision for the
appointment of a High Commissioner for
India in the United Kingdom, and for his pay, pension,
powers and duties. To this officer was entrusted all the

The India
Office

High

Commissioner

The High Commissioner 61

agency and commercial business which had been tran¬
sacted till then by the Secretary of State in Council for
the Government of India. The High Commissioner was¬
te be entirely a servant and an agent of the Government,
of India and controllable by them. His salary and that
of his establishment were paid out of Indian revenues.
Similar officers are appointed by the colonies to transact
their commercial business in England. They are made
amenable to the orders which they receive from their
masters at«home. India was denied the privilege of
having her own High Commissioner till the inauguration
of the Reforms.

The combination of the office of the Secretary of State

who is constitutionally the superior of the
Why he was Q overnTnen ^. 0 f i n( ii a and that of the agent

created

of the Government of India in their com¬
mercial transactions, like the purchase of stores, was-
clearly not a desirable combination. It was calculated to*
give rise to suspicions from which the Secretary of State
ought to be kept perfectly immune. Business of millions
of pounds sterling is transacted every year in England on
behalf of the Government of India and naturally the most
scientific and economic method that ought to be followed
by the Indian nation, as by any individual, is the time-
honoured commercial usage of buying in the cheapest
market and selling in the dearest. The Secretary of
State, not being subordinate to the Government of India
was not answerable to them for his actions, and criticisms*
have been persistently made that preference was given to*
British goods at higher prices when the same quality could
be purchased outside Britain at cheaper rates. Such a.
preference was disastrous to the economic interests of
India.

The separation of political from agency function.

6,2 Indian Administration

performed by the Secretary of State, the appointment of a
High Commissioner, and the transference to the High
Commissioner, an officer paid by India and amenable to
the orders of the Government of India, was expected to
remove the cause of such criticisms and the ground for
unhealthy suspicions. To what extent the expectations
have been realized and the economic interest of India
really protected even after the creation of a high-salaried
High Commissioner, is a matter which stands concealed
in the darkness of official pigeon-holes and confidential
portfolios. Occasional criticisms in the press and the
Legislature and the mysterious resignation of the first
Indian to be appointed to the office of High Commis¬
sioner are, however, factors which are not calculated to
inspire any very optimistic enthusiasm in the Indian
mind about the practical success of the novel step.
Theoretically, at least, it is true that in this respect India
has now been brought into line with the status and
privileges of other self-governing dominions.

CHAPTER V

Relaxation of Parliamentary Control
1. Establishment of Conventions

The position of the Secretary of State and the nature-

„ • and degree of Parliamentary control exer-

The Secretary , .

of State’s cised over the Indian administration after
Responsibility the Reforms is the next important point for
to Parliament is consideration. It might be stated at once
undimmished that no statutory modification of the rela¬
tions of the Secretary of State with the Government of
India has been effected under the Act of 1919, in the
direction of allowing larger autonomy to the Central
and Provincial Governments. It has been emphatically
declared that the Secretary of State’s responsibility to*
Parliament for the governance of India continues unabated
as before. The preamble of the A ct o f 1919 clearly
affirms that the responsibility for~ the Welfare and
1 advancement of the Indian people lies on Parliament and
that that body alone can determine the time and manner
of each constitutional advance that India may be allowed
to make.

There cannot be therefore any division of responsibility
for the development of self-governing institutions in
India. The Secretary of State who is the agent of
Parliament practically retains all the powers of supervision
and control after the Reforms that he enjoyed before the*
Reforms. The degree of the delegation of his power that
he might make to the Government of India and the
Provincial Government is determined by the factor of his.

The Need for
Relaxation
of Parlia¬
mentary
Control

64 hidian Administration

complete responsibility to Parliament. Section 131 of the
Government of India Act clearly provides that nothing: in
the Act shall derogate from any powers of the Secretary
of State. Therefore his authority, constitutionally speak¬
ing, stands unimpaired and no action taken by him can
divest him of the ultimate control that is vested in him.

On the other hand the maintenance of such a control in
all its rigidity is thoroughly incompatible
with the declared intentions of Parliament
about the development of responsible
institutions in India. The two cannot be
properly assimilated. Either there can be
Parliamentary control, or control exercised by the Indian
Legislature. The latter is connoted in the conception
of responsibility. Parliament must therefore be pre¬
pared to set certain limits to its own powers of control
if self-government is not to be a mere shadow. The
Montford Report recommended' that in respect of all
matters in which responsibility is entrusted to representa¬
tive bodies in India, Parliament must be prepared to forgo
the exercise of its own power and that this process must
continue, pari passu } with the development of responsible
government in the provinces and eventually in the central
administration. The deliberate introduction of dyarchy
with its transferred subjects and popular ministers
removable by the vote of the Legislature could not accord
with the Secretary of State’s undiminished exercise of all

i

his former veto. The complete devolution of authority
by the Secretary of State to the Government of India and
by the latter to the Provincial Governments is the
■essential condition precedent to the establishment of self-
governing institutions.

. Hence though no alteration was made in the letter of
■the law—such an alteration, implying a restraint upon*

New Conven¬
tion defined

Transferred

Subjects

Relaxation of Parliamentary Control 65

the sovereign authority of Parliament being regarded

as inconsistent- with English constitutional
practice—an attempt was made to define
certain customs and conventions which
could be followed by the Secretary of State with great
scrupulousness and which would bring about in practice
the necessary relaxation of the Secretary of State’s
control.

Two cases have here to be distinguished. The
transferred subjects are avowedly ministerial
subjects and Parliament has delegated
powers in connexion with them to Provincial
Legislatures which were purposely democratized and made
representative in order to enable them to function properly
in their new role. The retention of active Parliamentary
control over these matters was therefore an obvious
incongruity and impossibility. A statutory rule made
under the Act therefore prescribes that in respect of such
matters the power of the Secretary of State to super¬
intend and to control will be limited to achieve only the
object of safeguarding the administration of central
subjects, and of deciding matters in dispute between two
provinces.

The position of the central and reserved subjects is
different. In these matters, legally speaking,
Reserved*** ^ ultimate responsibility lies on Parliament
Subjects and no statutory relaxation of the Secretary

of State’s control is therefore thought
possible. All the same, if the spirit of the Reforms is to
concede as much freedom as possible to the people of
India and if the first instalment of 19 19 is admittedly a
prelude to further successions of such instalments finally
leading to complete Dominion Self-Government, the
maintenance of the 'Secretary of State’s control in its
3

66 Indian Administration

undiminished entirety even in the central and reserved
departments is out of accord.

The Montford Report suggested that in these subjects
also there should be such delegation of financial and
administrative authority as would leave the Government
of India free and enable them to leave the Provincial
Government free, to work with the expedition that is
desirable. Parliament, it was thought, must be prepared
to accept that discretion is given in respect of certain
matters to the Government of India, and for that reason
to be satisfied that in these matters the Secretary
of State is not prepared to intet*fere with what has been
settled in India. The Joint Parliamentary Committee
recommended the establishment of a constitutional con¬
vention that, in matters of purely Indian interest where
the Government and the Legislatures of India are in
agreement, the Secretary of State should be called upon
to intervene only in exceptional circumstances.

2. The Fiscal Autonomy Convention

The Committee instanced one special case for non-inter¬
ference. The belief, they said, was widespread among
Indians that India's fiscal policy was dictated from White¬
hall and in the interest of the trade of Great Britain. The
entertainment of such a widespread belief was held to be
clearly undesirable in the mutual interests of the two
countries. The Committee therefore suggested that a
satisfactory solution of the problem could be guaranteed
by the grant of liberty to the Government of India to
devise the tariff policy which seemed to them best fitted
to. India's need, taking India to be an integral portion of
the British Empire.

The Veto of the Crown or the powers of Parliament
were not, indeed, to be limited by law. Such a limitation is

Relaxation of Parliamentary Control

67

believed to be repugnant to the spirit of the British Con¬
stitution. Yet it was felt that a certain degree of fiscaland
political autonomy could, be conceded to India by the
adoption of a suitable convention which would have, in
practice, the same force and effect as a statute itself.

It was therefore particularly recommended that in fiscal
matters concerning India whenever the Indian Govern¬
ment and the Indian Legislature are in agreement, the
Secretary of State should not ordinarily interfere even if
he differs from the view that has been accepted in India.
His intervention should be limited to safeguarding the
international obligations of the Empire or any fiscal
arrangement within the Empire to which His Majesty’s
Government is a party. This recommendation of the
Committee was generally followed.

The majority of the Muddiman Committee reported that
they noticed with pleasure that an important
precedent in conformity with this re¬
commendation had been already established
in regard to fiscal matters. Within two
years of the introduction of the Reforms Mr. Montagu,
from the official chair of the Secretary of State, declared
to a deputation of Lancashire merchants his inability to
interfere in the matter of the Indian cotton excise and
import duties which had been modified as a result of
certain financial measures taken by the Government of
India with the full concurrence of their Legislatures, in
order to balance their budget. The majority report
confirmed the attitude taken by the Joint Select Com¬
mittee and approved of the adoption of the policy of
precedents as a measure of sufficient potency. More
recently, Mr, Wedgwood Benn, Secretary of State foe
India in the Labour Government, has also emphatically
endorsed the fiscal convention and declared that the

Mr. i
Montagu’s
Action

Indian Administration

British Government is committed to the policy of
non-interference whenever, in fiscal matters, the legislature
and the executive in this country are in complete accord.,

3: Criticism of the Method of Conventions

Its Unsatisfac¬
tory Basis

The minority of the Muddiman Committee ventured to
doubt whether such conventions would be of
any permanent value or could effectively
put a stop to the powers of control, particu¬
larly when it was realized that it was extremely difficult to
define the expression ‘ purely Indian interests Bearing:
in mind the constitution then, the minority did not feel
justified in building much hope on such conventions. The
Indian public would be disposed to endorse emphatically
this scepticism of the minority and would like much better
to get the autonomy of their Governments based on
foundations more solid than those which were likely to
degenerate into mere personal idiosyncrasies of the
Secretaries or caprices of party forces in a democracy.
Even constitutional superstitions need not be inviolable.

Agreement between the Government and the Legis¬
lature is the most vital part in the working
Legislatures suc k conventions. It seems obvious that

Elected 5 special emphasis is laid on the view of the

Legislature because it is taken to indicate
the trend of Indian public opinion in general. But even
after the Reforms, neither the Council 'of State nor the
Legislative Assembly, nor any of the provincial legisla¬
tures is composed exclusively of elected representatives.
They contain a fairly large proportion of officials whose

votes are directly commanded by Government and of
nominated non-officials whose votes can be appreciably
influenced by the official whips.

If fiscal and political autonomy, even as established by

Relaxation oi Parliamentary Control 69*

conventions, is to be real, it appears essential that

whenever highly controversial issues come
Member* ^ U P before legislature for its decision,,
should not vote official and nominated non-official members-

ought to be directed to abstain from voting..
That was the contention put forward by prominent,
members of the Legislative Assembly a couple of years
ago when the question of giving preferential treataent to-
British textiles came up before it for discussion and final
action. Ho'wever, Government has not seen its way to*
accept this interpretation of the new position.

There is a further reason why, from the Indian point of
view, the method of convention is bound to-
prove illusory and inane in actual practice.
The Government of India is a foreign
irresponsible bureaucracy. The legislature
on the other hand contains a large elected
element which is in the majority and whose ambition it is.
to end bureaucratic rule. There is thus a fundamental
incompatibility between the two. Mutual agreement and
harmony is not likely to be a normal characteristic of their
relation. And as that essential condition precedent is-
likely to be fulfilled very rarely in Indian polity, occa¬
sions for the convention to operate and for the autonomy
it implies to be a live experience will be inevitably top-
few.

Government
and LegU»
lature will
rarely agree

CHAPTER VI

hiterest of Parliament hi Indian Affairs

T. Before the Reforms

The Secretary of State is a servant and agent of Parlia¬
ment. He receives his mandates from that 4 body and is
answerable to it for all acts done by him in his official
capacity. It is now necessary to describe the manner in
which the supreme sovereign body exercises control over
its servant and through him over the Government of India
( and their people.

Reference has already been made to the appointment

The Days of
Burke, Fox,
Sheridan and
other Liberals

of Parliamentary Committees of Secrecy
and the inevitable occasions of the renewals
of the Company's Charter which afforded
opportunities for Parliament to put itself in
touch with Indian affairs. Under the dual

.administration of the Company and the Crown such
occasions were more frequent. Members of Parliament
and leaders of public opinion like Burke and Fox took an
extremely keen interest in Indian affairs, particularly
when they witnessed the pageants of the * Indian Nabobs'
returning from India, swollen with wealth, and utilizing
their ill-gotten means to advance their political ambitions.
A profound sense of injured justice and injured national
prestige pervaded the minds of some of the liberal states¬
men at the spectacle of the unholy riches that strutted
before their eyes. To some, the phenomenon was not
merely an offence to national vanity in the shape of loss
of prestige, nor only an appeal to the sacred instinct of

Interest of Parliament in bidia 71

righteous indignation at the sacrifice of justice and morality
to the monsters of tyranny and corruption. It was the
rousing of the instinct of national self-preservation. They
scented a serious danger to the moral existence of the
State when its citizens began to be polluted by degrada¬
tion and corruption.

An unthinking superciliousness and an autocratic
defiance on the part of the English ministers had just
been severely chastised by the successful secession of
an awakened and oppressed people, who now form the
United States of America. And therefore an extraordi¬
narily keen and active interest was displayed by noble-
minded and far-sighted statesmen in the operations
of a commercial body which was perceptibly passing
into the arena of politics. The prolonged trial of
Warren Hastings and the animated and sustained
interest that it aroused in the members of Parliament

V.

and in tile country generally was probably a climax of
the degree of Parliamentary attention paid to the Indian
question during the last half of the eighteenth century.

With the institution of the Board of Control and the

. ' creation thereby of an active agency with

After Pitt's

India Act ^ P° wers superintendence and control

over the actions of the Company's officials*
the necessity for members of Parliament individually to
interest themselves in the Indian question, can be said to
have diminished. The President of the Board was a
Cabinet Minister and as such had:the confidence of Parlia¬
ment, which naturally was inclined to regard India's,
destiny as being safe in his hands. As his salary and
that of his establishment were charged to Indian revenues,,
there was no routine occasion every year to discuss the
Indian question as arising out of the demand for grants.
Nor were members of Parliament, nor the people of

72 Indian Administration

England generally, very enthusiastic about the destinies
of an unknown far-off foreign land, completely different in
its outlook upon life and in its material condition from
their own.

From the time of the end of Hastings* trial, British
interest in Indian matters began to wane. However, du¬
ring the period of the continuance of Double Government,
occasions arose at least once in twenty years when mem¬
bers of Parliament were confronted with the demand for
granting a further lease of life to the Company, whose
Charter of existence was about to come to a close. Some
interest had perforce to be taken and new conditions were
generally imposed on every such occasion so as to restrict
the powers and privileges of the Company. These Charter
Acts and the investigations of the Committees of Secrecy
which preceded them, were therefore potent instruments
in awakening the indifferent Member of Parliament to the
•existence of the East India Company and the importance
of controlling their affairs.

The abolition of the Company altogether in 1858 and
the assumption by Her Majesty of direct
responsibility for the governance of India
did not help to improve the situation. In fact, the new
condition almost gave rise to the paradox that since the
proclamation of direct Parliamentary control over Indian
affairs Parliament ceased to take any active interest in
them. The appointment of the Secretary of State and
the India Council did not excite any larger amount of
attention. The annual debates on the revenues of India
and the presentation by the Secretary of a Report on the
Moral and Material Progress of India caused absolutely
no sensation and members tried to save themselves
from the calamity of listening to the document and
discussions by taking refuge in more attractive adjoining

After 1858

Interest of Parliame?ii in hidia 73

chambers. These debates were purely academic discus¬
sions conducted after the events had happened.

The indifference of Parliament to Indian questions is
notorious; the ignorance of an ordinary member about
the conditions in India or about the history and
geography of India is as appalling as it is ludicrous.
The Montagu-Chelmsford Report had to admit that the
discussion on Indian matters in Parliament is often out
of date and ill-informed, that it tends to be confined to a
little knot of members and to stereotyped topics and that
it is rarely followed by a decision. To end such an
undesirable state of things and to revive the languishing
interest of Parliament, in Indian matters, the report
made certain recommendations which were later on
incorporated in the Act.

2. After the Reforms

Henceforth it was laid down that the salary of the

The Secretary
of State's \
Salary

Secretary of State and his Under-Secretary
and expenses of his department should be
paid out of moneys provided by Parliament
and not, as before, out of the revenues of

India. Such a change was long overdue and was both
just and necessary. It was invidious to place the salary
of the Indian Secretary on the Indian exchequer. He
was meant to be the agent of the Crown and Parliament,
wholly their servant, and responsible to them. It was
therefore unjust to saddle the Indian exchequer with* the
expenses of his establishment or of himself. The Secre¬
tary for the Colonies, an officer analogous to the Indian
Secretary, was not paid out of the revenues of the
colonies but out of moneys provided by Parliament. No
wonder therefore that Indian politicians were always
opposed to such an unfair arrangement.

74

Indian Adm in istra tion

In addition to removing: an old grievance, the new
change was calculated to help in directing the attention of
Parliament to Indian matters more frequently—at least
once a year, when demands were made upon its purse to
maintain the Secretary of State and his establishment.
Motions for reductions could then be a normal form of
criticsim and debate as it was in other matters of the

budget. This occasion might also be taken to get from
the Secretary of State explanation on all .points on
which the members were curious to know a good deal.

Another method by which the Montford Report and
the Joint Select Committee proposed to

Committee of keep Parliament in close touch with
both Houses Indian affairs, particularly after the momen¬
tous changes introduced in the political
structure of India as a result of the Reforms, was
the appointment of a Standing Committee of both the
Houses of Parliament to discuss and study Indian ques¬
tions. It was to have no statutory functions but was to
have a purely * consultative and advisory status \ * It
would exercise its powers by informing itself from time
to time upon Indian questions and reporting to the House
before the annual debate on Indian estimate.’ The

Secretary of State would appear before it to answer
questions and supply information about the exercise of
his veto and control. Thus by means of interrogations
and requisitions for papers, the members of the Commit¬
tee would keep themselves informed on Indian questions.
Indian bills also might be referred to such a Committee.

The result of this plan would be the growth in Parlia¬
ment of a body of men who would take a continuous and
well-informed interest in Indian questions and the
publication of whose reports would enable the House of
Commons to focus, its attention on matters of importance.

Interest of Parlia??ient in India 75

The Joint Select Committee.also recommended that.all
the rules and regulations framed under the Reforms Act
which would have to go for sanction to the Secretary of
State should be given over to. the consideration of the
Standing Committee.

It might be added that the expectations entertained from
the establishment of this body do not appear to have been
much realized in practice. Evidently, the device of a.
Joint Parliamentary Committee, consisting of a few
individuals who might be taking some interest in
Indian matters, cannot be more than a feeble endeavour
to rouse the whole of Parliament to a sense of its duty
towards India.

The last instrument to compel Parliament's attention
to Indian affairs was the provision of the
Royal . _ Government of India Act that after the

Commissions

expiry of a period of ten years after its
passing, a Royal Commission should be appointed to
investigate the working of the system of Government,
the growth of education and the development of repre¬
sentative institutions and to report upon the desirability
and extent of the establishment of responsible Govern¬
ment. 1 Such periodical Commissions, it was believed,
would automatically divert the attention of Parliament
to India's constitutional progress and would engender
among its members a more intense spirit of inquiry into
the Indian problem.

Periodical occasions like these were provided till the
abolition of the Company by the necessity of the revival of
the Charter at the end of a stipulated period which was
usually one of twenty years. Decennial investigations and

^■The Simon Commission were appointed in 1927 in accord¬
ance with this clause. A summary of their recommendations
will be found elsewhere.

76 Indian Administration

revisions like those recommended by the Montford Report
and accepted in the Act can certainly be expected to focus,
for the time being, Parliament’s deliberation and interest
upon India. That such an interest will be continuous and
sustained and sufficiently voluminous is an opinion which
is not warranted by the nature of the remedy and can be
justified only by an extremely sanguine expectation.

PART III

THE

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

Chap. . Page

VII. The Central Executive

1. The Governor-General ... ... 79

2. The Central Executive Council ... 95

VIII. The Central Legislature

1. Some General Information Concerning:

Legislatures ... ... ... 107

(а) Importance of the Legislature in

Modern Constitutions... ... 107

(б) The Functions of a Legislature ... 108

(c) Franchise and Electorates ... 112

( d ) The Bicameral System of Legislature 119

2. The Growth of the Central Legislature... 121

3. The Council of State ... ... 132

4. The Legislative Assembly ... 139

5. Procedure of Work in the Central

Legislature ... ... ... 146

6. Conflicts between the two Chambers ... 151

■ IX. The Relation of the Executive to
the Legislature

1. No Principle of Responsibility ... 155

2. Indirect Influence of the Legislature ... 157

CHAPTER VII

The Central Executive

1. The Governor-General

As the East India Company were originally started as a

m

commercial corporation with the object of
No Governor- carrying on trade in eastern waters, it was

^ 0^1773 n0t * oun ^ necessar y t0 provide for the

appointment of any big territorial official

like the Governor-General. From the year of their founda¬
tion till about the middle of the eighteenth century the
commercial character of the Company was strictly main¬
tained. Their territorial possessions during the period
were limited to small areas on the western and eastern

coasts of India on which their factories and warehouses
were situated and which they had purchased or leased out
from Indian proprietors. These possessions were neces¬
sary accidents of their trade. They had no political
character whatever. Bombay on the west coast and
Calcutta and Madras on the east coast were their chief
trading centres. The responsible commercial officials of
the Company had their headquarters in these cities. As
the business of the Company prospered-, their administra¬
tion had to be systematized.

The Charter Act of 1661 allowed the appointment of a
Governor or President in each of the trading centres. He
was assisted by a Council consisting of from twelve to
sixteen subordinate officials who were chosen to constitute

4

the Council according to seniority. The authority of the
Governors or Presidents-in-Council spread over their

80 Indian Administration

respective zones, that is to say, over the Company's
western, eastern and north-eastern possessions in India.
The three Presidencies of Bombay, Madras and Bengal
were independent of each other and had an equal status.
All of them, however, were subordinate to the Company’s,
Directorate in London and had to carry out orders and
mandates dispatched by them. The Company’s business
was simple and of a purely commercial character. There
was therefore no special necessity to appoint a superior
official on the spot in India to co-ordinate and control the
affairs of the three Presidencies.

Circumstances however, were gradually changing.

A gteat transfer scene in the drama of
The Changing T nc jj an history was being played out. The
nvironment ma g n i£ cen t Mogul Empire, the structure

of which was just being completed by the greatest of
Mogul imperial architects when the East India Company
were granted their Charter of inception, had passed its
allotted span of life,, Its chapter of existence was being
closed. Its dissolution, which practically began after the
death of Aurangzeb, the last, great Mogul: Emperor,
created a confusion. A great scramble for power con¬
vulsed the whole of the land. With the disruption of a
strong central power like the Mogul Emperors of Delhi*
anarchical elements began to get the upper hand in a
large part of the country. To a certain extent, security
of life and property was diminished.

The factories and trade of the East India Company
required to be protected from the depredations of
aggressors. The impotence of the Delhi authorities and
the consequent necessity felt by the Company to make
.endeavours for self-preservation were circumstances
congenial to, the more militant element in the Company’s
officers. An ostensible justification for self-defence could

The Central Executive

81

now be pleaded for their forward attitude. The Company’s -
factories were fortified into fortresses. They began to
enlist a regular and trained army. They thus obtained,
by force of circumstances, an opportunity to undertake
functions and responsibilities which essentially belong to a.
political power.

Once in the whirl of the administrative breakdown

The Company
acquire
Political
Power

which marks Indian history after the death of
Aurangzeb, the Company's policy had to be
susceptible and elastic enough to meet all
circumstances. An aggressive attitude had
to be assumed at times as the best method

of self-defence. Gradually it was revealed by experience
that the Company might well throw themselves as com¬
petitors into the field of the general scramble, and with
good chances of success. The dash of Clive broke away
the film of whatever had remained of the former hesitation,
and caution. With the battle of Plassey and Clive's acqui¬
sition of the Diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and with,
the victory of Sir Eyre Coote at Wandiwash, the Com¬
pany ceased to be a purely commercial body. They
entered the arena of politics. They fought wars, under¬
took to weave diplomatic webs, acquired large territories
and assumed full responsibility for their governance. They
had practically initiated the experiment of empire-build¬
ing in India and . the management of their affairs had
.to respond to all the implications of this novel and.curious

complex of ambition and inevitability.

The gradual but very real transition from a commercial
into a political body is indicated by the

Unity of

Control

needed

necessity felt by Parliament to interfere
in their internal affairs. The Company's-
administration had to be so modified as

to provide properly for the fulfilment of the new

Indian Administration

responsibilities of sovereignty taken upon themselves by
the Company. A unity of control and a uniformity of
policy in all their territorial domains were considered to
be absolutely essential. The old independence of the
■three Presidencies, with their narrow insular outlook and
their common subordination to a distant Directorate, had
to give place to a greater degree of solidarity and co¬
ordination, and subjection to the control of one man
or body of men on the spot in India, in order to
■ensure strength and safety for the parts as well as the

wfyole.

/The Regulating Act of 1773 gave the impulse towards
"*■' unification by making the Governor of

The Bengal the Governor-General of Bengal,

■Regulating; w i 10 w jth his Council was given power to

superintend and control the government
and management of the three Presidencies of Madras,
Bombay and Bengal,

Henceforth it was not lawful for the Governments of

the minor Presidencies ‘to make any orders for com¬
mencing hostilities or declaring or making war or for
■negotiating or concluding any treaty, without the previous
consent of the Governor-General and Council ’ except in
circumstances of imminent necessity. Intelligence of all
transactions in the provinces relating to the government,
revenues or interests of the Company was to be duti¬
fully and constantly transmitted to the Governor-General.

The establishment of such a central authority was
. an innovation. The provinces or Presidencies had not
been accustomed to the direct control of a superior ip the
past and it took some time before the unfamiliar could be
•properly assimilated. In spite of the provision of the
Regulating Act, the Provincial Governments continued
to take important decisive steps which involved the

Pitt’s India
Act

The Central Executive . 83

Company in the currents and cross-currents of contempo¬
rary Indian polity without any reference to or sanction
from the Governor-General. This defiant insubordina¬
tion of theirs, which was not relieved by any inherent
successful wisdom either, plunged Warren Hastings into
embarrassments and complications from which he could
not easily get out. It is said by his supporters that he
had to expiate many sins which were not of his-
committal but of the unruly and unwise Provincial
Presidents.

This unsatisfactory state of things, which gave an air
of unreality to a definite and deliberate
provision of an Act of Parliament, could
not continue long. A special clause was
inserted in Pitt’s India Act to emphasize and enlarge the
Governor-General’s supreme power and control over the
minor Presidencies in all matters of war and peace and
administration. After this Act and during the adminis¬
tration of strong-willed rulers like Cornwallis and

Wellesley this defective state of things completely
disappeared. Henceforth the Govemor-General-in-

Council of Bengal came to be acknowledged as the head
of all the Company’s dominions and administration in
India.

. With the practical completion of the conquest of the

Indian continent the designation of the
Governor-General of Bengal became a
misnomer. It was therefore changed to

Governor-General of India by the Charter Act of 1833.
The Govetnor-General-in-Coundl was vested with the
‘ superintendence, direction, and the control of the whole-
civil and military Government’ in India. He continued,
to administer directly the Presidency of Bengal.

The Act of 1854 relieved the Governor-General of this

The Act
of 1833

'The Act
of 1854

84 Indian Administration

last burden which was transferred to the newly created

office of the Lieutenant-Governor of
Bengal. The same Act also empowered
the Governor-General-in-Council, with the
sanction of the Home authorities to 4 take by proclama¬
tion under his immediate authority and management any
part of the territories for the time being in possession of
or under the Government of the East India Company ’
and then give all necessary orders for its administration.
The mode in which this power was exercised in practice
was by the appointment of officials called Chief Commis¬
sioners. To these officials the Governor-General dele¬
gated such powers as could be delegated. In this way
were established Chief Commissionerships for Assam,
Burma, the Central Provinces, etc. Technically speaking,
territories under the administration of the Chief Commis¬
sioners were under the immediate authority and manage¬
ment of the Governoi:-General-in-Coancil. This measure
had become necessary on account of the ever-increasing
additions to British dominion and the consequent neces¬
sity to make suitable arrangement for their administration.

On the abolition of the East India Company after the
cataclysm of the Indian Mutiny in 1857, the
Government of India was directly taken
over by the English Crown and Parliament.
In announcing the assumption of the Government of India
by the Crown of England in the famous Proclamation of
1858, Queen Victoria referred to Lord Canning,
Governor-General designate, as the first Viceroy and
•Governor-General. Strictly speaking the word 4 Viceroy'
is unknown to any of the statutory enactments and
therefore to the letter of the constitution. Nevertheless
it is freely used in practice. It describes the new
-exalted status which the Governor-General acquired,

After 1858
—Viceroy

His Appoint¬
ment, Status
and Non-party
Character

The Central Executive 85

when, in addition to being the head of the Indian
administration, he also began to represent and personify
the Crown, in the inevitable absence of the latter from
its possessions. All this high position continues to be
enjoyed by him to the present day.

The Governor-General is appointed by His Majesty,
generally on the advice of the Prime
Minister. Usually the choice falls on a
gentleman of good social status and influence
who has played some part in British politics
and attained to some degree of importance
therein and who is regarded as one of the party leaders.
The office however is essentially a non-party office. The
Governors-General do not change with a change in the
ministry of England. Lord Reading, for instance,
served under three different ministries. Continuity of
executive Government is thereby ensured. Many of the
Governors-General had already made their mark as
distinguished persons in British politics before they
embarked upon the duties of the office of Governor-
General. Almost invariably their selection is made
from the British aristocracy. They are expected to be
men possessing a wide comprehension and a robust
freshness of outlook, which qualities are generally lacking
in officials of life-long service.

Their tenure of office is not fixed by law, but custom
has fixed it at five years and the custom has

Tenure and ^ een as scrupulously observed as if it were

Leave of

Absence the * aw itself. By the Leave of Absence

Act of 1924 the Secretary of State in
Council may grant to the Governor-General leave of
absence for urgent reasons of public interest or of health
or of private affairs. The period of such leave is not to
exceed four months and it is not to be granted more than

His Functions
and Powers
in relation
to his
Executive
Council

86 Indian Administration

once during his tenure of office. Suitable leave-allowances
are provided for under the rules made by the Secretary of
State.

The duties and the powers of the Governor-General
are numerous and varied. The Governor-
General is the head of the Indian adminis¬
tration and the highest official in the land,
and together with his Executive Council
is entrusted with the task of maintaining
peace, order and good government in India.
He presides over the Executive Council, and has power
to nominate a Vice-President from among the members
to preside in his absence. He has power to make
rules and regulations for conducting the meetings of
the Executive Council. He distributes work among its
different members. In case of an equality of votes in
the Council on a particular question, he can give a
casting vote. He exercises general supervision over the
work of the Executive Councillors and can get himself
acquainted with the details of departmental administra¬
tion either directly from the members or from their
immediate subordinates, the Secretaries. These officers,
curiously enough, enjoy a unique and anomalous consti¬
tutional position. They have a direct access to and
communication with the Viceroy over the heads of their
immediate superiors.

Matters of importance are submitted by a member for

»

the opinion of the Viceroy, and if the member and the
Viceroy are agreed in their opinion, the matter is finally
disposed of in the light of that opinion. The Viceroy
can take and almost always does take some department,'
for example the Foreign Department, under his own
direct charge like any other member.

Besides, in making appointments to the Executive

The Central Executive 87

Council, his opinion and influence count for a great deal
and his recommendations in the matter are generally
accepted by the higher authorities. The power of appoint¬
ing Lieutenant-Governors and Chief Commissioners was
deliberately left to him after the abolition of the East
India Company. After the Reforms also, he has the
power of appointing governors of provinces other than
Bombay, Madras and Bengal. A large amount of impor¬
tant patronage is thus left in his hands, a fact which may
not tend to create that degree of independence in his
Executive Council which is found to exist in the British
Cabinet.

.. Members of the British Cabinet are not life-long
bureaucratic servants. They have their own independent
professions and vocations and in a sense are administrative
amateurs. They find a place in the Cabinet because they

are the leaders of Parliament, and, in the last
His Dominant instance, of the nation. The membership of
Position m the Indian Executive Council on the other

Executive

Council hand is the prize which comes at the end

of continuous and prolonged bureaucratic
service. Its acquisition is the fulfilment of a life-long
ambition. Its grant is demonstrative of the acknowledge¬
ment of administrative talent, of appreciation of efficiency.
Thus, in the very fundamentals of its outlook, the Indian
Executive Council differs from the British Cabinet. The

Cabinet is bound to be more independent-minded and
less susceptible to superior control.

The Governor-General of India can indeed be techni¬

cally described to be only one among several members of
the Executive Council, having a casting vote only in case
of a tie; and, except on the extraordinary and rare
occasions when he chooses to exercise his emergency
powers, he might give the impression of being only first

Power of
Overriding
the Executive
Council

88 Indian Administration

among equals. However, the President of the Executive
Council combines in his person also the Governor-General
and Viceroy, and the ramifications of this combination
are extremely formidable. The head of the executive
administration in India enjoys greater executive and
directing and controlling power than the executive head'
of Bintish administration, the Prime Minister.

Ordinarily every measure brought before the Execu¬
tive Council requires the assent of the
majority of the members in order to be
passed. It may be that the Viceroy on
occasions finds himself outvoted. Normally
he submits to the wishes of the majority*
The sad experience of Warren Hastings with some of his
hostile and obstructive colleagues in the Executive
Council, and the dangerous consequences of the clogging
of the Government wheel due to this internal conflict
compelled Lord Cornwallis to be wiser. Before he
accepted the offer of Governor-Generalship, he made a
demand, and the Home authorities consented to it, that
the Governor-General be vested with an extraordinary
power to overrule even the majority of his colleagues
when the Governor-General is convinced of the futility
and harmful nature of the majority’s opinion.

This power has been ever since in the armoury of the
Viceroy, It is indeed very rarely used. Since 1786 it
has been used only once, in 1879, by Lord Lytton to
reduce the cotton duties; but its mere presence there is
enough to chasten any particular petulance on the part of
the Executive Council. In a constitution like Britain’s
the contingency of an internal conflict in the executive
itself would witness the centre of dispute shifted from the
Cabinet to Parliament and finally to the nation. No
provision is therefore necessary for the grant of any

His Powers
in relation
to the
Legislature

The Central Executive %

extraordinary power to either one or the other of the
disputants.

The Governor-General has considerable powers with
reference to the Legislature. Up to the
Reforms of 1919 he was the ex-officio
president of s ""the Imperial Legislative
Council. Since the Reforms he has ceased
to have this privilege ; still his powers over
the Legislature are many. He has the right of address¬
ing both the legislative chambers; he summons them;
he prorogues them; he dissolves them after their tenure
is over, or even earlier if he thinks fit to do so; he can
extend the period of their tenure in special circumstances.
He appoints a date and a place to hold fresh elections;
also a date and a place for holding sessions of either
chamber.

No measure affecting subjects like the public debt or
public revenues of India, religious rites and usages of
British subjects, discipline of the army, foreign relations,
provincial subjects and provincial laws, can be introduced
in any of the legislative bodies without his previous
assent. He can stop the proceedings of any of the
chambers on any bill, clause or amendment, if he feels
that the discussion is likely to affect the safety and tran¬
quillity of the raj. He can send bills back for reconsidera¬
tion by the Legislature. His assent is required for all
bills passed by the Legislature before they can have the
force of law. This is true not only of central but also of
local or provincial legislation. He can require certain
bills falling within the provincial sphere to be reserved
for his consideration and he can reserve any bill for the
consideration of His Majesty-in-Council when he himself
neither gives nor withholds his assent.

In addition to these more or less routine powers which

90 Indian Administration

the head of an administration must possess, an exceptional

overriding veto against the decision of the
Certification Legislature has been bestowed upon the

Governor-General of India by the Act of 1919. This
new weapon has been forged on the anvil of the Reforms.
It corresponds to a similar veto that is possessed by the
Governor-General against the majority of his Executive
Council. * Where either chamber refuses leave to intro¬
duce or fails to pass in a form recommended by the
Governor-General any bill, the Governor-General may
certify that the passage of the bill is essential for the
safety, tranquillity, or interests of British India,* and
thereupon, even if the legislative chambers refuse to
pass such bills, they can become Acts by the mere
signature of the Governor-General.

The extraordinary constitutional anomaly which
enables a single head of the administration
to be in a position to defy with impunity a
clear and responsible expression of popular
opinion as reflected in an elected Legislature
is repugnant to the spirit of democratic
polity. Its deliberate creation under the Act of 1919 only
indicates the transitional character of even the reformed
constitution of India and the spirit of conservative caution
which was guiding its framers and architects.

Government can either be responsible and removable or
irresponsible and irremovable. The, Montford Report, in
its dislike for either of these forms in its entirety as being
unsuitable for India, tried to combine the two inherently in¬
congruous systems into a working project. It recommend¬
ed an increase in the Legislature’s members and gave
them a far more representative and democratic character.
On these enlarged and popularly elected bodies were con¬
ferred larger powers, including the important power of

Transitional
Nature of the
New

Constitution

The Central Executive

91

voting a part of the budget and therefore supplying a
portion of the resources, of the State. Yet the Executive,
which for the discharge of, its responsibility had to look up
to and depend upon the Legislature, was allowed to
continue to be thoroughly irremovable.

Thus even after the Reforms the Indian executive
continues to be responsible only to the extra-territorial
sovereignty of an absentee Parliament which functions in
a distant country. But the Legislature has been given
the power ‘to endeavour to suffocate the executive to
•a small extent by refusing a fraction of the supplies
and by refusing sanction to any legislative measure
deemed essential by it. It must inevitably follow,
in the severe logic of such an imperfect and impure con¬
stitution, that the executive, in order to discharge its re¬
sponsibilities to Parliament, should be in a position to
assert itself.

In any serious conflict between the two vital parts
of Government, there is bound to arise a complete dead¬
lock, and the work of Government is bound to come to
a standstill, unless either the one or the other is allowed
to override its opponent for the time being, or the quarrel
is referred to the arbitrament of a third superior party.
The Britishers preponderating bias in favour of the estab¬
lished executive authority in India is manifested in the
proposal to grant this overriding veto, and the power to
end any such unenviable and disreputable impasse, to the
Governor-General of India.

The new power has been described as certification. It

The power
must be
rarely used

amounts to a constitutional right of over¬
ruling a part or the whole of the Legislature.
It is meant to be a real power and not a
mere dead letter or a mere ornamental

possession. Yet its promiscuous and constant exercise

92 Indian Administration

cannot but be fraught with serious danger to the constitu¬
tion and cannot fail to prove irritating to Indian thought
and exciting to Indian sentiment Extraordinary privi¬
leges like those of certification are fundamentally incom¬
patible with the principle and practice of political
responsibility. A democratic appearance alone is not
enough; the reality of popular control is infinitely more
important.

The element of progress manifested in the enlargement
of the Indian Legislature and in some fractional additions
to its powers and functions is vitiated by the special crea¬
tion of a retrograde instrument which is avowedly intended
to be utilized as an antidote against democratic way¬
wardness. The experience of the past ten years-—during
which recourse was taken by the Viceroy to the device of
certification on several occasions, as in the case of the
Princes’ Protection Bill, the doubling of the salt-tax, the
Finance Bill of 1924 and in the restoration of several cuts
made in the budget items by the Legislative Assembly-
does not justify its description as an essentially extra¬
ordinary measure. It appears to have been interpreted
as a normal instrument of Government which can be freely
used from day to day. Under such conditions it becomes
inevitable that even the' reformed ’ form of the constitution
has a mere outward semblance of democratic Government.
It comes to be a mere shadow and not the substance of
political responsibility.

If the ultimate goal of the British policy in India is the
grant of full responsible government at an early date and
if the present is distinctly a transitional period and a pre¬
lude to the final achievement, great restraint must be
scrupulously exercised in making use of extraordinary
powers, if their existence is necessary at all. What may
accord with the strict letter of the law may yet violate the

The Central Executive 93*

spirit of the constitution. It seems indispensable that
the freedom of judgement and discretion enjoyed
by a single individual, the Governor or the Governor-
General, in the wielding of the weapon of certification,
should be definitely circumscribed, if the power is to be’
retained at all.

Besides these powers, the Governor-General was given.

by the Act of 1861, and continues to have to
Ordinances present day in cases of emergency,.

power to make and promulgate ordinances for the peace
and good government of British India or any part thereof.
An ordinance so made shall have the force of law as much
as if it were an Act passed by the Indian Legislature, for
a period of six months. An ordinance is thus a legislative-
measure partaking of the character of an Act but emerging
from the head of the Executive in his executive role. Such-
a power is of course intended to be rarely used. Generally,,
when the Legislature is not in session and an emergency
arises suddenly which requires the adoption of immediate
remedial measures, the possession of this power is*
extremely convenient and beneficial.

During the War, for instance, frequent use was made
of this power by the Government of India in the course of
the vicissitudes of their currency and exchange policy.
More recently recourse was taken by Lord Reading to the
method of issuing ordinances in announcing the suspen¬
sion of cotton excise duties. Lord Irwin recently
promulgated an ordinance embodying the Public Safety
Bill which could not come up for discussion before the
Legislature. During the last two years on account of the
extraordinary situation created by the Civil Disobedience
Movement the power of issuing ordinances has been exer¬
cised to an unprecedented extent. The temporary
duration of this extraordinary power, that is its continuance

His Powers
as Viceroy

94 Indian Administration

for a period of only six months at a stretch, is supposed to
be its greatest corrective.

The Governor-General of India is not only the head of
the administration of the land. Over and
above that, he also personifies in himself
the British sovereign and represents his
master in the unavoidable absence of the latter from the
land of his governance. He therefore enjoys all the
dignity and prestige and special privileges which the
sovereign himself would enjoy if he chose to stay
in India. He has the prerogative of mercy and pardon.
On behalf of his sovereign he receives homage from
Indian Princes and other mandatory powers. To them
he symbolizes the Crown and the unlimited sovereignty
of the Crown.. The recent .emphatic declarations of Lord
Reading in his communications to the Nizam are signifi¬
cant of the same point. He represents His Majesty
in liis dealings with foreign princes. All the gran¬
deur and paraphernalia of royalty attach to him as his
master’s deputy. A sense of sublimated detachment that
pervades the environment of kingship also pervades to a
certain extent the environment of the accredited vice¬
regent of the kingship.

That the cumulative influence of this lofty official upon
the administration of India is bound to be
His great immense would appear almost to be a self¬
influence evident proposition. His high social status

onmo ^

Administration an< ^ ran ^> his aristocratic connexions, occa¬
sionally his political influence as an active
party leader, are circumstances which give him an initial
lift in comparison with his would-be colleagues in the
•bureaucracy in India. His large powers, ordinary and
extraordinary, as the head of the administration, his exalted
.status as the direct representative of the sovereign, the

The Central Executive 95-

large and lucrative patronage in his possession and the
premium that is naturally enjoyed by the freshness and
comprehension that are attributed to him as an intelligent
outsider, are factors which give him a supreme eminence
in the state. A heavy responsibility is believed to
devolve upon him in maintaining the safety of the
British raj.

The combination of all these formidable circumstances-
raises the Governor-General of India head and shoul¬
ders above-other subordinate officials in the land. If
he is endowed with a master mind and an assertive
temperament, his view’s can colour every department of
administration; if he happens to be a man of convic¬
tions and capacity, his personality is bound to per¬
meate all important matters of policy and detail that
come to be disposed of by any one of his colleagues in.
the Executive Council individually or by all of them
collectively.

The Prime Minister of England presiding over the
British Cabinet appears to be'only first among equals, a
leader of his peers, the difference between him and his
colleagues being created and tolerated only for the
exigencies of smooth constitutional working. The Viceroy
of India has the appearance more of a superior than of an
equal; constitutionally speaking, the distance between,
him and his colleagues is far greater and much more
fundamental than that between the Prime Minister and his-
colleagues in the Cabinet. .

2. The Central Executive Council

Before the unification of the three provinces of Bengal,,
Madras and Bombay under one central
Historical authority, affairs in each of them were

managed by a Governor or President with the assistance-

96 Indian Administration

oi a Council of the senior merchants of the Company.
Endeavours at administrative centralization began with

the passing of the Regulating Act. This

The Regulat¬
ing Act

measure vested the control of the Com¬
pany's affairs in India in the hands of the
Governor-General and a Council of four persons. The
first Governor-General was nominated in the Act
itself. The origin of the Governor-General's Executive
'Council thus goes back to the year 1774. The number
of Councillors was to be four. Their term of office was
definitely stated to be five years. The whole civil and
military government of the Presidency of Bengal, in-
• eluding Bihar and Orissa, was vested in the Governor-
General-in-Council, who was bound by the votes of the
majority of those present at the meeting, the Governor-
General having a casting vote in case of an equal
•division of opinion.

The unfortunate conflicts between Warren Hastings
and his antagonistic colleagues in the
Council were accentuated by the inherent
imperfection of the Council's constitution.
Therefore it had to be modified in the light of the
•experience of the first Governor-General. A clause was
inserted in Pitt's India Act to the effect that as soon as
the office of any one of the Councillors was, for any
reason, rendered vacant, the vacancy should not be filled
and the number of the Governor-General's Council should
be reduced from four to three, an odd number being
preferred to an even number for the more convenient use
of the casting vote.

In 1786, on a demand being made to that effect by
Lord Cornwallis before 1 he accepted office, the Governor-
<reneral was given power to override even the majority
■of his Council on extraordinary occasions when he felt

Pitt’s India
Act

The Act
of 1833

The Central Executive 97

the use of this power justified in the interests of peace,
tranquillity and good government in India.

The charter of 1793 once more affirmed that the whole
civil and military government of the Presidency of
Bengal and * the ordering, management and government
of all territorial acquisitions and revenues of the
Company 9 were vested in the Governor-General and
three Councillors. If the Commander-in-Chief was
distinct from the person of the Governor-General, he
might be specially authorized by the Court of Directors
to be a member of the Council.

Further changes and detailed regulations were intro¬
duced by the : Charter Act of 1833. The
number of ordinary members was increased
to four. Three of these were to be appointed
by the Directors from among the servants of the Com¬
pany who had at least ten years of service to their credit;
if a man in the military service was chosen, he was not
to hold any command during the continuance of his office
as Councillor. The fourth ordinary member was to be
appointed by the Directors, with the approval 'of the
President of the Board, from amongst persons who were
not servants of the Company. This member was not
entitled to sit or vote in the Council except when the
Council was considering the making of laws and regula¬
tions. The Commander-in-Chief, whenever the Governor-
General himself was not holding the office, could also be
appointed by the Directors as an extraordinary member
of the Council, having rank and precedence after the
Governor-General.

. By the Charter Act of 1853 was repealed the provision
of the Act of 1833, that the fourth member (that is the law
member) was entitled to attend and vote only in meetings
in which laws and regulations were discussed. The law.

4

98 Indian Administfation

The Act
of 1861

member became a full member attending all meetings and
voting on all questions considered in any meeting.

The Indian Councils Act o£ 1861 increased the number
of ordinary members from four to five.
Three of them were to be appointed by the
Secretary of State in Council, and must
have served at least for ten years in India under the Crown
or the Company. The remaining two, one of whom was
required to be a Barrister of England or Ireland or an
Advocate of Scotland of not less than five years’ standing
were to be appointed by Her Majesty under the Royal
Sign Manual. It was lawful for the Secretary of State to
nominate the Commander-in-Chief as an extraordinary

member.

Further modifications were introduced in 1874.
Power was given to Her Majesty to increase the number
of ordinary members from five to six by appointing a
sixth member under her Royal Sign Manual. The newly
appointed member was to have charge of the Public
Works Department. The clause which specifically
mentioned the Department that was given to him was
repealed in 1904.

The Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 introduced an in¬
novation. There was nothing in the law to prohibit the
appointment of qualified Indians to the Councils and Lord
Morley in consonance with the new spirit in which he had
enlarged the Legislative Councils and tried to associate
Indians in the administration, caused executive action to-
be taken to include one Indian in the Executive Council.
Since 1909, therefore, the Governor-General’s Executive
Council has invariably contained at least one Indian.
The first to be so appointed was Lord Sinha.

The composition of the Council before the Reforms
Act and as provided by the Government of India Con-

The Act
of 1915

The Central Executive 99

soliciting: Act of 1915 stood as follows. The Connell

consisted of ordinary and extraordinary mem¬
bers if any. The number of ordinary mem¬
bers was five or, if His Majesty so desired,
six. Three at least of the ordinary members must, at the
time of their appointment, have served the Crown in India
for a period of not less than ten years and one must be a
Barrister of England or Ireland or an Advocate of Scotland
of not less than ten years’ standing. If any officer in
military service was chosen to fill the post of Councillor,
he was not to hold any command during such service.
All the ordinary members were appointed by His Majesty
under the Royal Sign Manual. The Secretary of State
could nominate the Commander-in-Chief to be an extra¬
ordinary member. If the Council assembled in any
province the Governor of the province could be an extra¬
ordinary member.

Finally, the Act of 1919 introduced a few changes. The
limit on the number of members of the
Executive Council was removed. Indian
High Court pleaders of ten years’ standing
were qualified to be admitted. Governors of Provinces
ceased to be allowed to sit as extraordinary members
when meetings of the Council were held in their territory.
All members, in any number that His Majesty might think
proper, were to be appointed by His Majesty by warrant.
Three of them must have served in India for at least
ten years. One must be a Barrister of England or Ire¬
land or an Advocate of Scotland or a pleader of an Indian
High Court of not less than ten years’ standing. As for
the qualifications of the remaining members, rules might
be made under the Act to determine and define them.

Provision was also made to enable the Viceroy to
appoint Council Secretaries from among the non-official

The Act')
of 1919 ;

100 Indian Admmistration

members of the Legislative Assembly or the Council of
State to assist the Executive Councillors in their work.
The object was to give opportunities to the non-official
members to get themselves trained in official business
and to realize the practical difficulties of the administra¬
tion. The salaries of the Secretaries were to be
determined by the Legislature and they were to hold
office during the Viceroy’s pleasure. However, this

recommendatory clause has not been acted upon and no
Council Secretary has been appointed till now:

Steps were taken to introduce a larger Indian element
in the Council. A practice was introduced in 1921 to
increase the number of Indian members from one to
three and it has since continued. Of the three Indian
members one is generally expected to be a Mohammedan.
The Viceroy’s Executive Council at the present moment
consists of eight members including the Viceroy and the
Commander-in-Chief who is an extraordinary member.

In the Governor-General-in-Council are vested the
superintendence, direction and control of
Functions t he c i v j] an d military government of India,
and Powers su ijj ec t to the orders of the Secretary of

State. Every Local Government, subject to the clauses
of the Government of India Act, has to obey the orders
of the Governor-General-in-Council and has to keep him
constantly and diligently informed of all matters of
importance in its administration. Subject to restric¬
tions imposed by the Secretary of State in Council, the

Governor-General-in-Council is empowered ‘ to purchase
and sell and mortgage property, to borrow money, and
to execute assurances for the purposes’. The same
authority can, with the previous sanction of His Majesty,
constitute a new province under a Governor or Deputy-
Governor or Lieutenant-Governor; can declare any tract

The Central Executive

101

to be * backward ’ and make special arrangements for
its administration; cap. create Executive Councils for
Governors’ provinces and determine the number and
qualifications of their members; can, by notification, take
any part of British India under the immediate authority
and management of the Governor-General-in-Council and
can alter the boundaries of provinces. It can also-
constitute local Legislatures for Governors’ or Com*
missioners’ provinces. It can alter the local limits of the
jurisdiction “of Indian High Courts ; can appoint additional
judges to the High Court for a period not exceeding
two years and appoint a judge to act as Chief Justice
when a vacancy occurs and till the vacancy is perma¬
nently filled up. The Governor-General-in-Council may
not declare war or commence hostilities or enter into a
treaty without the express order of the Secretary of
State.

In any emergencies when hostilities have been already
commenced or preparations for them have been already
actually made against the British Government in India, he
can declare war and immediately send intimation to the
Secretary of State. The Govemor-General-in-Council
has, by delegation, powers of making treaties and
arrangements with Asiatic States, of the exercise of
jurisdiction and other powers in foreign territory and of
acquiring and ceding property. He also enjoys such
powers, prerogatives, privileges, and immunities apper¬
taining to the Crown as are £ appropriate to the case and
consistent with the system of law in force in India

The tenure of office of a member of the Executive

Tenure and
Leave

Council has been fixed by a well-established
custom to be five years. By the Leave of
Absence Act .of 1924, the Governor-General-

in-Council may grant to any member leave of absence for

Method of
Working

102 Indian Admmistratio?i

urgent reasons of health or private affairs. Such leave
cannot exceed four months and cannot be granted more
than once during his tenure of office. Suitable leave
allowances have been provided for under rules made by
the Secretary of State in Council.

Originally the Executive Council of the Governor-
General ‘ worked together as a board and
decided all questions by a majority of
votes*. There was no systematic distribu¬
tion of work among its members. Every question that
came up for the disposal of the Governor-General-in-Coun-
cil was disposed of by the Council as a whole, sitting
collectively. There was no division of labour, no alloca¬
tion of departments to individual members. This sort
of working in a mass entailed an enormous delay and
began to prove increasingly difficult as the nature of
the Government functions began to get more and more
complex and their scope began to get wider and wider.
The appointment of special members for Law and
Finance in 1833 and 1861 respectively was an acknow¬
ledgement of the unworkable nature of collective Coun¬
cil work. Lord Canning abandoned the system
altogether and carried to a logical conclusion the
principle that was initiated in 1833.

He distributed the ordinary work of the departments
among the members and laid down that
only the more important cases were to
be referred to the Governor-General or dealt with
collectively. This is what is known as the portfolio
system which continues to exist to the present day. Under
the working of this system, each member, in regard to
his own department or departments, has the final voice
in ordinary departmental matters. He is councillor
and administrator together. Any subject of special

Portfolios

The Present
Portfolios

The Central Executive 103

importance or one in which it is proposed to overrule the
views of a Provincial Government must be referred to
the Viceroy; so also matters which originate in one
department but also affect other departments. The mem¬
bers generally meet in council once a week and discuss
questions which the Viceroy desires to put before them or
which an overruled member might desire to be discussed
by the Council. In any difference of opinion, the decision
of the majority ordinarily prevails, the Viceroy having
an overriding veto in exceptional circumstances.

At the present day the portfolios in the Executive
Council are distributed as under :

(i) Viceroy—Foreign and Political De¬
partments.

(ii) Commander-in-Chief—Army and Defence.

(iii) Home Member—General supervision over mat¬
ters affecting the Indian Civil Service, Internal.,
Politics, Jails, Police, Law and Justice.

(iv) Finance Member—Finance.

(v) Member for the Railway, Commerce and Eccle¬
siastical Departments.

(vi) Law Member—the Legislative Department.

(vii) Member for the Departments of Education,
Health and Lands.

(viii) Member for Industries and Labour.

Immediately subordinate to the member in charge is
the officer known as Secretary. He is in
charge of the departmental office. His
position corresponds, as the Decentraliza¬
tion Commission has pointed out, to that of a. Perma¬
nent Under-Secretary of State in the United Kingdom.
There is however this difference. In India, the Secre¬
tary is allowed to be present at the meetings of the
Executive Council to furnish any detailed information

The

Secretaries

104 Indian Administration

that might be required regarding his own department.
Besides, he is required to attend on the Viceroy
usually once a week and to discuss with him all matters
of importance arising in his department. He has the
right of bringing to the Viceroy’s special notice any
case in which he considers the concurrence of the Vice¬
roy with the member’s action or proposal is necessary.
His tenure of office is usually three years.

Thus the constitutional position enjoyed by him is
unique. He is a subordinate, having the special privilege
of direct access to the superior of his immediate superior.
He can create a prepossession in the mind of the Viceroy
about any matter in his department without the know¬
ledge of the member in charge. The system is a remnant
of the old days when it was considered desirable to
keep a check over the actions and the departmental in¬
dependence of the Executive Councillors. The Gover¬
nor-General as the head of the administration was there¬
fore empowered to be directly in touch with department¬
al working through the Secretaries. Indian public
opinion is inclined to condemn this sort of constitutional
anomaly as likely to encourage mistrust and misunder¬
standing, particularly after the admission of Indians to
the Executive Council.

It would be clear to a student of constitution that the
English Minister differs essentially from
The Constitu- a M etn b er 0 £ t h e Indian Executive Council.

tional Position

The former is a politician first and an
administrative officer afterwards. Indeed he comes to
be the latter because he has been the former. English
Ministers are not lifelong bureaucratic servants. Persons
in the service of Government are deliberately precluded
from taking seats in Parliament and therefore in the
Cabinet. Things are different in India. A few Indian

The Central Executive

public men might find a place in the Council]

105

public men might find a place in the CouncilMf chosen ^
to fill the appointments by the Viceroy. But o&i
lifted up from the most successful servants in the""Sd-
ministration. Elevation to the Executive Council and

enjoyment of the fine prospects that it offers are among
the principal attractions to those Britishers who intend
to seek a career in India.

The initiative and independence that would characterize
a body like, the British Cabinet which inhibits bureaucratic
officials from becoming its members are naturally absent
among the Executive Council as a whole in India. Nor
can all its members possess that diffused sense of equality
which permeates the relations of the English Ministers
with their chief, the Prime Minister. The important
patronage in the hands of the Governor-General is not a
negligible factor in this connexion. There are still higher
rungs in the official ladder than an Executive Councillor-
ship, which may indeed lead to them. Therefore, in
boldness, as in wider comprehension, the British Cabinet
is bound to compare more favourably than the Indian
Council, with its tendency to be more subdued in outlook
and spirit.

Much of course depends upon the head. He is a
stranger to the land which he is sent out to rule. He
sets out to work with a bureaucracy which has crystallized
traditions of its own and has acquired a reputation for
itself. It supplies the expert knowledge about men and
things in India, obtained after prolonged years of service
on the spot. The claims of such a body to be recognized
as an authoritative and correct guide may not be lightly
disregarded tut even positively admitted by common¬
place mediocrity. At such times, it is not the Viceroy
but the Council which really rules. However, to a
Viceroy endowed with a distinct individuality and vigour

106 Indian Administration

•of will, the constitutional atmosphere of the Council
would appear to be congenial to the development of his
personal influence and the acceptance of his lead in all
ma tters of policy and detail. The assistance of the
Executive Council is indispensable to the Viceroy in
all circumstances. It maintains the continuity of
administration. And except under abnormal circum¬
stances no Viceroy would think of exercising his extra¬
ordinary prerogatives in order to override the declared
opinion of the Executive Council. As J. S. Mill said,
the advisers attached to a powerful and self-willed man
ought not to be put under conditions which would reduce
them to a cypher.

CHAPTER VIII

The Central Legislature

1. Some General Information Concerning

Legislatures

( a ) IMPORTANCE OF THE LEGISLATURE IN
MODERN CONSTITUTIONS

In all important western countries the legislature has

now acquired a peculiar importance*

The

Legislature
controls the
Executive

Originally, it was predominantly, if not
purely, a law-making body. Its function
was to pass measures which required the
force of legality. The business that it

transacted pertained primarily to bills and Acts. From
this position of comparative simplicity the legislature has
now evolved into a body which exercises general control

over the administration.

The principle and practice of political responsibility
move round the pivot of the legislature’s supreme
dominance over the executive. The powers and func¬
tions of the legislature are the touchstone which
assesses the degree of popular control that obtains in a
constitution. Modern legislatures are not only law T -
making bodies; they make laws; they vote grants of the
necessary money ; they practically appoint the ministers,
direct, control and modify their policy, and in case of a
disagreement, even dismiss them. The daily routine of
departmental management is not, indeed, looked after by
them, but the general line of administrative action and
the general principles pervading the policy of the State

108 Mian Administration

are all inspired and dictated by tlisir opinions and views.
In other words, an all-sided control of the State vests
in the legislature m a form of government which is
described by constitutional writers as responsible. The
English Cabinet, for instance, is the product of Parlia¬
ment and completely amenable to it.

This unique importance that has progressively come to
be attached to the legislature in modem days
Structure t j ie na tural consequence of the changed

Legislature character of the structure of legislative

chambers. They are now elected bodies
largely reflecting popular opinion and therefore carrying
with them the invincible prestige of being the accredited
mouthpieces of the whole nation. To judge of the
progress in democratization and responsibility of any
form of polity is to find out the extent and the reality of
the legislature’s predominance over the executive. The
more complete the subordination of the executive, the
greater is the advance in the direction of responsibility.
Legislatures in India whether in the Central Government
or in the provinces have to be judged henceforth by this
criterion.

(p) THE FUNCTIONS OF A LEGISLATURE

A legislature’s functions and powers can be divided
into different parts. For instance they can
i* legislative k e described separately as referring to

legislation or to administration or to finance. The mean*
ing of the first of these is clear on the surface. No
measure can obtain the force of legality unless it is passed
by the legislature. Everything that is incorporated into
the law of the land and obedience to which is compelled
from the citizens, has to receive its sanction before it can
be so incorporated and enforced. Unless otherwise

The Central Legislature 109

provided, no bill which is not voted by the legislature
can have application in a court of law.

The control over administration is exercised in various
ways: (i) by moving resolutions, (ii) by
nl0V i n g votes of censure, (iii) by moving
adjournments, and (iv) by asking questions
and supplementary questions to elicit information about
departmental details.

. (i) On any matter of public importance the legislature

might express a clear opinion after having
Resolutions discussed its issues thoroughly. This

expression of opinion is in the form of a recommendation
to the Government. It has no binding legal force. It is
not a law and has not to pass through the elaborate
procedure to which every bill is subjected before its final
consummation into an Act. Yet the expression of opinion
has a clear value of its own. It makes an unambiguous
and emphatic declaration of the views of the elected
representatives of the people. It therefore serves as an
indicator which records the strength and the direction of
popular opinion. A clear indication of the popular will
cannot be ignored by any executive Government having a
■sense of responsibility. It serves to guide correctly, if not
to control rigidly, any steps that may be contemplated by
the executive authority.

(ii) A vote of censure is a most direct way of express¬
ing disapproval and of exactly locating the
agency which it is desired to condemn.
In a purely responsible administration
occasions for votes of censure are rare, for, before
matters come to that pass, numerous indications are
given of the existing displeasure and they are immedi¬
ately understood. This right is of particular use in
those forms of government where the executive cannot be

Vote of
Censure

110 Indian Administration

removed from office by the legislature. A direct and
emphatic condemnation of the actions of irresponsible
officials is likely to serve as a moral restraint upon them.

(iii) Adjournment motions are intended to point the

Adjournments ^tention the bouse and the Government

to any extraordinary happening involving
public weal or interest that might take place during the
actual session of the council or that may have taken place
only a short time prior to the meeting of the session.
Any member may beg leave to move that the regular
business on the agenda be temporarily suspended and
that the house do discuss the extraordinary occurrence,
provided the president allows the motion. He may not
do so in case he feels that the matter, for the discussion
of which a temporary suspension of the regular agenda is
requisitioned, is not of sufficient importance to justify
the suspension. Motions for adjournment save the dis¬
cussions of the chamber on prominent and burning topics
of the day from being stale and more or less artificial.

(iv) The power of asking questions and supplementary

Interpellation questions extremely valuable. It serves

to throw important sidelight on the adminis¬
tration by enabling members to elicit information regard¬
ing routine departmental management. It is useful in
exposing to publicity any unjust or tyrannical abuse of
the freedom of judgment and discretion that has neces¬
sarily to be allowed to the executive. Any member of
the legislature can put a question on a matter of public
interest, subject to its disallowance by the president and
if the answer given proves unsatisfactory, either the
member who puts the question originally, or any other
curious or dissatisfied member may put further supple¬
mentary questions. This at times almost approximates
to a regular cross-examination. Details which are too

The Central Legislature 111

trivial to be discussed in the form of resolutions and
which are too important to be completely ignored can be
brought for public criticism through the exercise of the
power of interpellation.

Publicity is the greatest check and the greatest correc¬
tive to the waywardness of all normal Governments.
Publicity is of still greater value when the form of
government is an irresponsible bureaucracy. Resolutions.

adjournments, votes of censure, questions and supple-
*

mentary questions are instruments of publicity and so
long as the composition of the Government has not
become abnormally mechanical and unhuman, the fear of
public criticism and public exposure is bound to prove a
very salutary restraint upon actions that might be taken
by Government officials.

The last and most important power that a legislature

can enjoy is control over the purse. The
mi . Financial g reat constitutional struggle in England

throughout the Stuart period, and even earlier, centred
round the disputed question whether the King could levy
taxes without the consent of the people and spend them
as he liked, irrespective of the wishes of Parliament. The
most glorious achievement of the popular party in the
struggle was the emphatic and decisive establishment of
the principle that the money which the King’s authority
wanted to collect from the people by way of taxation must
be voted by the representatives of the people assembled
in Parliament. Parliament also decided the manner of its
collection and the direction of its expenditure. The
essence of democracy lies, among other things, in this
sort of undisputed control over the purse that is exercised
by the people through their chosen representatives. * The
real power of any legislature is to be measured by the
(degree of the monetary powers it enjoys. The English

112 Indian Administration j

Parliament—or more correctly the House of Commons— '
is the sole authority for and the solo custodian of the
finances of the Government of England. The executive
can get only as much money as is voted by Parliament
and has to spend it on those purposes only for which it is
specifically voted. Finances are to the State what life-
breatli is to the body and in responsible forms of govern¬
ment entire control over them is vested in the legislature.

(c) FRANCHISE ANI) ELECTORATES

Democracies in modern days are representative. A
direct democracy is a physical impossibility,
Modem . apart from other considerations of its advan-

ereRepre'en. tages or disadvantages. In a representative
tativc government, the affairs of the State are

entrusted to a few people chosen by the
citizens. In an ideal state of things, every citizen, unless
positively disqualified, has the right of voting in the
election of such persons. The smaller the number of
disqualifications and the larger the number of persons
.who are authorized to give their vote, the more
representative becomes the character of the Government.

The right of giving a vote is described, in political
science, as the franchise. Persons to whom the right of
franchise is given are described as the electorate or the
constituency. The electorate is not identical with the
total body of the citizens. It contains only those persons

who are allowed to take part, indirectly, in the administra¬
tion of the land.

What sort of persons should be excluded from the

Disqualifies- en i°y ment o£ this P oliti <-'al Privilege ? On
tions' the “^wer to this crucial question depends

the degree of the democratic character of
a democracy.. Certain disqualifications are obvious.

The Centred Legislature 11 3 .

Children and young boys are not, for instance, in a posi¬
tion, intellectually speaking, to understand the problem of
government and to exercise the franchise. Lunatics and
madmen come in the same category. Criminal offenders
who have been convicted by a court of law for crimes,
against society cannot evidently be permitted to have
any share in the formation of the Government. The
same viewpoint holds good in the case of bankrupts.
Even in countries where there is universal franchise-

'I

these disqualifications are accepted as necessary and
desirable.

Most of the representative Governments in the past had.

Adult

Suffrage

more restrictions than these on the exercise
of the franchise. Women, for example,
were disqualified on account of their sex.

even if they possessed the other necessary qualifications.

Poor persons, labourers, wage-earners were also regarded.

1

as unfit to possess the right of giving a vote. Ownership

of a certain minimum amount of property or income has

been almost an invariable qualification to entitle persons-
to have the vote. The trend of modern times is to

reduce the amount to as low a figure as possible
so as to include in the electorate the largest number of
citizens.

Some of the western countries have abolished property
qualification altogether. They have conferred the right of
vote on all citizens, men and women, who have reached a
certain age, and who are not debarred otherwise, as for
instance on grounds of lunacy, treason, bankruptcy, etc,.
Conditions in India may be different, but the. Indian
electorate is to be judged from the same point of view.
The Nehru Report had advocated the introduction of
adult suffrage.

It would be pertinent to describe here the different kinds-

General

Electorates

114 Indian Administration

*

■of electorates that exist in India at the present day. They

Electorate* are maiuly based 011 qualifications either of
inlndir C * Property or community or special interests.

Residence is also an important factor.

A genera] electorate is one in which no account is taken

General die race or community of the voter. The

Electorates electoral law prescribes certain property

and other qualifications and all citizens,
irrespective of caste, creed and religion, who possess
them, are entitled to get a vote. Residence in a definite
territorial area, which defines the geographical limits of
the electorate, is of course considered essential.

In India, the nearest approach to a general electorate is
found in the non-Mohammedan Constituency.
Non-Moham* consists of all enfranchised persons, other
medwCoDsh- Mohammedans, in any electoral area. It

may thus be composed of Hindus, Parsees,
Jews, Christians and others, all placed together in one
■collection, provided the conditions about the franchise are
■properly satisfied.

The concept of a communal electorate is different.

Here the very first condition which is

Electorate* essential to entitle a person to acquire a vote

is that he must belong to a particular com¬
munity. Being a member of that community he must
■further satisfy the conditions of the franchise as they may
■have been fixed by the electoral law. Persons not
belonging to that community are entirely excluded from
■the electorate.

medan Consti¬
tuency

Communal

'Electorates

In India, communal electorates have been conceded to
•the Mohammedans throughout the land, to the Sikhs in the
Punjab and to the Europeans in important cities and
plantations. The voters who vote in these constituencies
-and the candidates who contest these seats must belong to

The Central Legislature 115-

the Mohammedan, Sikh and European communities respec¬
tively. Others can neither vote nor stand for election in

these electorates.

It is possible to devise an electorate which is a

compromise between the general and com-

Mixed Electo- muna ] principles and combines both of

rate* with them. That is known as the system of

Reserved

Seats mixed electorates with reservations of seats

for particular communities. In such a.

*

system it is not necessary that the voters or electors
must belong to a particular religion or race. The electo¬
rate contains names of all those who possess the requisite
franchise. It is a miscellaneous mass of different creeds

and communities. But it is also laid down that out of the

total number of seats which have to be filled by election
a .certain number must be held by members of a particular

race.

An illustration will make the point clear. Suppose a
territorial constituency has been assigned three seats in
the legislature. It may be prescribed that at least one of
these three seats must be held by a Mussalman though the
electors are composed of both Mussalmans and non-
Mussalmans.

It may happen that in the results of the election the
first three candidates, who poll the largest number of votes
in consecutive order, are all non-Mussalmans. In that
case the third of such candidates is not declared to be
elected; but a Mussalman candidate, who may stand
much lower in rank in the numerical order but who is the
first Mussalman standing immediately next to the second
of the above is declared successful.

On the other hand, it may also happen that in the
results of the election the first three candidates, who poll
the largest number of votes in consecutive order, are all

116 Indian Administration

Mussulmans. The election of every one of them is, in
that case, considered to be perfectly valid. In addition to
the one seat reserved for them, they are thus enabled to
capture the remaining one or both.

In a communal electorate the candidate has to win the
•confidence of only the members of his community. In a
mixed electorate with reservation of seats, he has to look
for votes even outside his community and endeavour to be
popular with all-

in India, the concession of the privilege of reservation
of seats for their own community has been granted to the
Maratha caste in the Bombay Deccan in elections to the
Bombay Legislative Council. The Nehru Report advo¬
cated the extension of the same system throughout the
whole country in place of the present communal electo¬
rates. A considerable body of enlightened public opinion
also supports the same view in the interests of a consoli¬

dated Indian Nationalism.

Besides these types there is another type known as
4 special constituencies \ These are intend-

Electoratc* ec ^ to represent certain special interests in

the country in their own right and inde¬
pendently. The landed aristocracy of the country, the
trade and commerce of the country, educational institu¬
tions like universities, are all special interests which
have to be properly safeguarded and which are given
special recognition as entities useful and beneficial to
the State. They are therefore very often formed into
constituencies by themselves. Such a constituency consists
of all persons who are united by the tie of common
interest, irrespective of community or race. They are
thus different from communal constituencies.

In India several universities have been given the right
of sending their own representatives to the legislature.

The Central Legislature 117

Similarly, European Chambers of Commerce, Indian
Merchants' Chambers and Bureaus, Mill-owners' Associa¬
tions, Sardars and Inamdars have been created into
constituencies by themselves. Every person who is a
recognized constituent of these bodies can vote in
elections which are held for the return of their represen¬
tatives.

Communal electorates were first introduced in India in
1909 as the most effective, convenient and
Comm l satisfactory means of protecting the interests

Electorates of minorities - 0ne of the greatest imperfec-
are created tions and Angers of democracy is the possibi¬
lity of its degenerating into a mere tyrannical
rule of the majority over the minority and the suppression
of the latter. This danger is considered to be more
probable and more acute in a country like India where the
minority is demarcated and distinguished from the majority
not only on social or political questions but on grounds
of difference in religion and historical antipathy. These
considerations, it is said, make it necessary to provide
some safeguards against the possible danger, and the one
which appeared to be the most satisfactory and convenient
to Lord Morley in 1909 was the splitting up of the general
Indian electorate into two or more parts on the principle
pf race. To such exclusively racial electorates was given
the right of sending representatives from amongst
themselves. They were generally formed according to
the numerical proportion of the race to the total population
in a specified area.

That communal electorates have a tendency to em¬
phasize and perpetuate the existing racial and religious
differences, and that they are subversive of a sense of
c ompreh ensive nationality based on t he community of

political interest would be readily

even a

118 Indian Administration

casual and superficial observer. By putting a deliberate.

premium upon communality they positively
Thdr discourage any tendency to fusion of the

Effect® 0118 fissile predilections of the different commu¬
nities, and engender a narrower and selfish
angleof vision. However, communal electorates areTTn"
accomplished fact in Indian polity and it is extremely
difficult to undo what has been done. They have acquired
the strength of a vested interest. The minority is reluctant
to part with a privilege which has been in its possession.
It will be a long time before other more scientific and less
objectionable devices to protect the interest of the
minority are suggested and the latter is persuaded to
accept them.

All persons born in the State are not automatically
given the right of voting even under the
RoU EIect ° ral system of adult franchise. And when
° the latter is not in operation, certain

property, and other qualifications are prescribed by law
to determine the right of voting. A list is made,
for a specific territorial area, of all persons who pos¬
sess those qualifications and are therefore entitled to
exercise their vote. This list is called the ‘Electoral
Roll \

A preliminary and tentative edition of the electoral
roll is published by the Government and kept open for
public inspection for a stated period of time. It may
happen that names of persons who, by their possession
of the requisite qualifications are entitled to get a vote,
have not been included in the electoral roll through over¬
sight or mistake. Such omissions can be brought to
the notice of the Collector or other authorized official
and rectified by him. A revised and final edition of
the electoral roll is then published and only such persons

The Central Legislature 1*®9

whose names are included therein are allowed to vote
at the time of election.

(d) THE BICAMERAL SYSTEM OF LEGISLATURE

In the bicameral system, the legislature is composed of
two separate chambers. One of them is

e pp®* known as the Upper House or the Second

House and the t

Lower House Chamber, and the other is known as the

. Lower House or Chamber. The electorates
of the two Houses are not the same. Their powers,
functions and political status are not identical. They are
formed to fulfill different purposes and embody different
ideas.

The higher chamber is intended mainly to represent the
vested interests and the wealth of the land. It consists of
the members of the historical aristocracy, big landowners,
wealthy merchants and other propertied persons. A little
sprinkling of a few intellectuals and public workers is also
usually added to it. On the other hand, the lower chamber
is more democratic in character. It is expected to contain
even the poorer element in the community and therefore
the franchise for its election is deliberately kept low.

Because the lower chamber is more representative and
democratic in its structure it is usually
The Lower invested with greater political power and

Laxter Powers contro1 * It: is considered only fair and

natural that the body which reflects in a very
great measure the nation’s will should possess the
dominant authority in the state. For this very reason the
English House of Commons is empowered to make and
unmake the executive government in that country and to
dictate to it.

The upper chamber represents only the privileged few
who form the higher strata of society. Its members are

ISO Indian Administration

Chamber is
Intended to
Amend and
Revise

not expected to be in the closest touch with the demos,
The Upper or t0 8' ive expression to its cherished ambi¬
tions and patiently borne sorrows. They
are therefore precluded from exercising
any effective control over money matters
either on the income or on the expenditure
side. Even in subjects other than finance the tendency
of modern days is to look upon the second chamber as a
brake and as a restraint on the impulsiveness of demo¬
cracy. It is entrusted with the duty of amendment and
revision. It is empowered to compel reconsideration of a
measure which may have been passed by the lower
chamber merely in a fit of frenzy. However, it is not
intended that a body which represents only the aristocracy
and the oligarchy of the land should be permitted to
make of itself a permanent hindrance to an all-sided
national progress as visualized by the large majority of
citizens who are electors*

Political thinkers are not agreed on the question as to
whether two legislative chambers are neces¬
sary or desirable in a unitary state at all.
There are not a few who hold the heterodox
opinion that a second chamber is an unwan¬
ted superfluity and a nuisance. They feel
that its existence involves an unnecessary reduplication
of governmental work and consequently an enormous
waste of time, energy and money. To such critics it
appears that the alleged indispensability of the second
chamber is not based on rational conviction but on pre¬
judices engendered by the superstition of constitutional
orthodoxy.

The frame-work of Indian polity has been unitary since
the Regulating Act. Even the Reforms did not make
it federal. However the Act of 1919 introduced the

Controversy
about the
Need for a
Second
Chamber

■ The Central Legislature 121

bicameral system in the Central Legislature of India by

the creation of the Legislative Assembly
Its Introduc an d the Council of State. It may be con-

ceded for the sake of argument that the
dangers of an upper chamber are not likely to become
really serious in a free nation. But its blind imitation
in a subject country may prove perilous to national
advance towards autonomy.

The Indian Government has not yet been made
responsible to the Indian people. Conditions in this
land are not therefore similar to those that obtain in a self-

governing dominion or a sovereign state. In the psycho¬
logical and material environment of a conquered race the
existence of an oligarchical legislative house may prove
ruinous to political progress. It may detract from the
growth of national solidarity.

2. The Growth of the Central Legislature

As the Montford Report has pointed out, the germ of

The Charter
of Elizabeth

the legislative powers of the Government
of India lies embedded in Elizabeth's
Charter which established the East India

Company in the year 1600. By one of the clauses of this
Charter the Company were permitted to 4 make, ordain
and constitute such and so many reasonable laws, consti¬
tutions, orders and ordinances as shall seem necessary
and convenient for the government of the same Company
and for the better advancement of their trade*. They

might also impose such pains, penalties, and punishments
as might seem necessary or convenient for the observa¬
tion of these laws and ordinances. The only precaution
that was expected to be taken was that their laws must be
reasonable.

Sir Courtenay Ilbert has pointed out that this power

122

Indian Admmistration

was similar to the power of making by-laws that is enjoyed
by any ordinary municipal or commercial corporation.
The ‘laws 1 must have been, in the nature of things,
only regulations for the guidance of the Company’s
servants and officers, factors and apprentices. No copy
is known to exist of any c laws ’ made under the first
Charter or the early subsequent Charters. The East
India Company were only a commercial corporation and
only so much power must have been required and
exercised by them as was necessary to keep the trading
affairs of the Company properly and efficiently going.
No political significance attaches therefore to the regula¬
tions that might have been issued by them from time to
time.

The power of making rules and regulations given in

Subsequent

Charters

the original Charter was renewed and
occasionally augmented in the later Char¬
ters whenever circumstances demanded

any addition to them. The Charter of 1726, granted by
George I, invested in the Governors-in-Council in the

Presidencies the ‘ power to make, constitute and ordain

by-laws, rules and ordinances for the good government

and regulation of the several corporations thereby created
and of the inhabitants of the several towns, places and
factories \

After the

After the
grant of
Diwani

grant of. the Diwani in 1765, the Company
obtained legal recognition and status as the
accredited political agents of the Emperors
of Delhi, Consistently with this status
they had to discharge certain functions

avowedly political and administrative in character such as

the management of revenue and judicial business. This

was another source of legislative power now available to*
the Company. They inherited all the power that had

The Central Legislature 123

belonged to important Viceroys under the Mogul rule.
In the task of the disposal of administrative business that
had now devolved upon them, the Company’s officers
in Bengal like Warren Hastings had to make rules
and set up courts of law and to see that proper order
was evolved and governmental organization formed.
The Diwani was not a charter granted by Parliament
or by the King of England. Power obtained under
it was obtained from the ghost of a great authority
and a great name whose glory had now completely
faded.

It was not till the middle of the eighteenth century,
after the battles of Plassey, Wandiwash and Buxar,
that any territorial responsibility was directly assumed
by the Company. With the acquisition and gradual
expansion of this responsibility, the need began to
be growingly felt that the Company should make
proper arrangements for the regulated governance of the
territories they had acquired. The gradual transition
of the Company from a purely commercial to a politico-
commercial body made it necessary that, for the proper
discharge of their new r duties, there should be new
and specifically recognized additional powers conferred
upon them.

The Regulating Act of 1773 created a Governor-

General to control the Company’s dominions
TheRegulat- * n j n( ^ a> To ^n S controlling authority,

mg Act

namely the Governor-General of Bengal-
in-Council, was given * power to make rules, regulations
and ordinances for the good order and civil government
of the Company’s settlements in Bengal’. Curiously
•enough, these had to be registered in and approved of by
the Supreme Court.

The Amending Act of 1781 tried to make the issues

124 Indian Administration

clear and remove obstacles in the working of the Regu¬
lating; Act. It also definitely empowered the Governor-
General of Bengal-in'-Council to frame regulations
from time to time for Provincial Courts and Councils.
Copies of these had to be sent to and approved of by the
Directors. It was no longer necessary to register the
Governor-General-in-Council’s rules and regulations in
the Supreme Court and get them approved of by that
body. This is the beginning of those complex legis¬
lative powers which are today enjoyed by the Central
Legislature.

The Act of 1797 expressly sanctioned the exercise of a
local power of legislation in Bengal. It also directed that
all regulations of the Governor-General-in-Council affect¬
ing the rights, persons or property of the natives should
be registered in the judicial department, formed into a
regular code and be printed and published in all the
country languages. The Act of 1807 gave to the
Governors-in-Council in Madras and Bombay the same
power of making regulations as was enjoyed by the
Governor-General-in-Council in Bengal. Between 1807
and 1833 all the three Councils continued to make regula¬
tions and issue ordinances and add to the volume and
complexity of the legal system. Legislative power was
thus vested in and exercisable by the executive Govern¬
ments in the three Presidencies,

In 1833 an important innovation was introduced. The

The Act
of 1833

Governor-General’s Executive Council was
increased by the addition of a fourth ordi¬
nary member who was not to be one of the

Company’s servants and who was not entitled to act as a

member except for legislative purposes. Further, the

Governor-General-in-Council was exclusively vested with

the legislative power, and the Provincial Governments

The Central Legislature 125 :

were entirely deprived of it. They were allowed only to*
submit drafts of laws which they desired to get passed
for their respective areas. The Governor-General-in
Council could make laws and regulations for repealing
and altering any existing measure, for all persons, places-
and things, for servants of the Company and for native
officers and soldiers in the employ of the Company.
Laws made by the Governor-General were liable to be-
vetoed by the Court of Directors or the Board of Control.
The supreme prerogative of the Crown was of course left
unaffected. A comprehensive consolidation and codifica¬
tion of Indian laws was also contemplated. The Indian.
Law Commission were appointed and they issued
the Indian Penal Code. Passing of legislation by
Councils specially formed for the purpose thus began,
from the year 1833. Henceforth ‘ Regulations 9 give-
place to e Actsa change in name which is signi¬
ficant of the change in the character of the source of the-
legislation.

The legislative member was made an ordinary member
by the Charter Act of 1853. The Executive
Council was enlarged for legislative pur¬
poses by the addition of the Chief Justice of*
Bengal, a puisne judge and four servants of the Company
of not less than twenty years’ standing, nominated by the-
Governments of each of the provinces of Bengal, Madras,.,
Bombay and the North-West Province. In all, for legis¬
lative purposes, there were to be twelve members-
including the Governor-General, Commander-in-Chief and
four ordinary members. The Legislative Council thus-
constituted was intended for purely legislative work. It.
must be noted that the Legislative Council as such had no
separate existence. As Strachey points out, there was.
only one Council known to the law. That was the-

The Act
of 1853

.126 I?idia?i Administration

.Executive Council. Additional members were invited to
join when it met for legislative purposes.

A new phase was opened in 1858. The Mutiny had
come and gone. The East India Company were abolish¬
ed and with them the Double Government introduced
by Pitt's India Act of 1784. The Crown and Parliament
directly undertook the responsibility of the Indian
Government.

After the task of the conquest of India was completed
and the Company’s administration settled
down into a peaceful routine, and the mili¬
tary outlook of administration was no longer
necessary to be emphasized, attention was
naturally directed to a certain extent towards the problems
of a peaceful government. On the abolition of the
Company and the transference of government to the
Crown, a new phase was opened. The ideal of British
administration in India was proclaimed to be the develop¬
ment and cultural and material advance of the people of
India. The conquering power declared that it looked
upon its conquest as a sacred trust, involving the tremen¬
dous responsibility of educating and generally uplifting
the huge masses of population that by curious coincidence
of circumstances came under its rule. The declared

After the
Conquest was
Complete

intention was to set up a peaceful, progressive, liberal
sort of administration which would more closely associate
the conquered classes with the conquerors and impart to
them administrative and political training. The history
and progress of the Indian Legislatures synchronize with
the history of the progressive stabilization of the British
power in India.

By the Act of 1861, for purposes of legislation the
-Governor-General nominated not less than six and not
“more than twelve additional members who took office for

The Central Legislature 127

two years. Of these additional members not less than

half were to be non-officials. The Legis--
The Act lature established by the Act of 1853 ‘ had
of 1861 modelled its procedure on that of Parliament,

and had shown an inconvenient degree of inquisitiveness
and independence’. The Act of 1861 expressly limited
the function of the Council to legislation only.. It could
not entertain any other interrogative or deliberative
motion. Measures relating to the public revenues of
India or public debt, religion, military and naval matters,
foreign relations, were not to be introduced without the
Governor-General’s previous sanction. To every Act
passed by the Council the Governor-General’s consent
was necessary. The legislative powers of the Governor-
General-in-Council were declared to extend to ‘ making
laws and regulations for repealing, amending or altering;
any laws or regulations ’ already existing, and to ‘ making
laws and regulations for all persons, whether British, or
native, foreigners or others, and for all courts of justice,
and for all places and things within the Indian territory,,
and for all servants of the Government of India within
the dominions of Princes and States in alliance with Her

Majesty ’.

The powers of legislation taken away from the
Provincial Governments by the Act of 1833 were re¬
stored to them. No line of demarcation was specifically
drawn between the central and provincial subjects. The
• previous sanction of the Governor-General was made
necessary for certain legislation by the local Legislatures-
and all Acts passed by them required the subsequent
assent of the Governor-General and the Secretary of

State.

The Act also empowered the Governor-General
to establish, by proclamation, Legislative Councils-

' The Act
of 1892

128 Indian Administratio?i

for Bengal, the North-West Province and the Punjab.
They were established respectively in 1862, 1886 and
1898.

The Act of 1870 enabled the Governor-General to
legislate in a summary manner for the less advanced
parts of India by proclaiming certain areas as coming
under this Act and then making the necessary regulations
for their government through the Governor or other
administrative officer who might be in charge.

The Indian Councils Act of 1892 increased the number
of members of the Legislative Councils,
introduced changes in the system of nomi¬
nation and granted some relaxation in the
rigidity of their procedure. The Governor-General’s
Legislative Council was now to consist of not less than
ten and not more than sixteen additional nominated
members. The minimum number of non-official members
was increased to ten instead of the old proportion of one
half of those nominated. Of these ten, five were to be
nominated on the recommendations of the Calcutta
■Chamber of Commerce and non-official members of the
^Legislative Councils of Bengal, Madras, Bombay and the
North-West Province. Thus there was to be an increase
in the total number of members and in the proportion
-of non-official to official members, A modification was
made of the system of nomination in such a way as to
introduce the principle of election tentatively in practice.
To this enlarged Legislature were given greater powers.
"The annual financial statement or the budget had hence¬
forth to be regularly placed before the Legislature and
members were allowed to discuss it generally, and express
their opinion on it as a whole. However, power was
not given to move any resolution or divide tfie Council
-on any matter concerned with the budget. Asking of

The Act
of 1909

The Central Legislature 129

questions was authorized by this Act. The powei^
of putting supplementary questions was however not
conceded.

The Act of 1909 was an important step in Indian com-
stitutional history. That year saw the
introduction of what are known as the
Morley-Minto Reforms. India had passed',
through a big wave of nationalistic agitation and some ,o£
her prominent political leaders were incarcerated. An
insistent demand for the recognition of Indian public
opinion as the controlling factor in Indian administration
was sought to be met by the Indian Councils Act of 1909.;
The most important clauses of this measure referred to
the improvement of the Legislature. The size of the
Councils was materially enlarged, the maximum number
of members of the Governor-General's Legislature being'
raised from sixteen to sixty. They were to be partly
elected, partly nominated. An official majority was, hOw^
ever, deliberately maintained in the Central Legislature,?
only twenty-seven out of the additional sixty members'
being elected, and the remaining thirty-three together,
with the eight ex-officio members being nominated by*
Government. The principle of election which was
only indirectly accepted in 1892 was now openly and
explicitly introduced. The powers and functions of the
Council were increased. The budget could be discussed
very generally under the law of 1892. Henceforth reso¬
lutions could be moved upon any of its items and the
Council could be divided upon them. Resolutions upon
matters of general public importance might also be.
proposed and discussed and a division on them was.
allowed to take place. Certain subjects could not be
discussed by the Council at all. Any resolution could be
disallowed by the Governor-General who acted ex-officio
5

130 Indian Administration

as the president of the Council. Further, the right
of interpellation was extended by allowing the member
who put the original question to ask a supplementary
question.

All these reforms introduced by the Act of 1909,
though in themselves marking a distinct

'ItReTonli step * n advance » absolutely nothing
bility 8POnSI " t0 w * th tlie iD-broduetion of respon¬
sible government. Lord Morley’s clear
disclaimer about any intention of introducing parlia¬
mentary government in India is famous. There was
no question of subordinating the executive to the Legis¬
lature even to a slight extent. However, there was
a distinct endeavour to associate the latter with the
former more closely than before. Opinions expressed
by the elected members of the Legislature were ex¬
pected to indicate clearly the direction of the current
of popular opinion and Government, if they so pleased,
might modify their policy to accommodate themselves
to the popular viewpoint. The Montford Report clearly
states that the Councils were more effective than they ’
knew.

The exact measure of such indirect influence cannot be
assessed. That it might have been to a certain extent
real may not be denied ; nor can it be combated, on the
other hand, that such an influence was bound to be ex¬
tremely uncertain, if not illusory, and that its effectiveness
in whatever small degree, was rather dependent upon the
courtesy it could evoke than upon the exercise of a self-
assertive right. Still, the Reforms were welcomed by
some of the contemporary politicians as marking a definite
step in advance in the history of India’s constitutional
development.

Five years after the Indian Councils Act of 1909,

I/.

The Central Legislature 131

extraordinary circumstances arose in the world. The

deluge of War swept away time-honoured

institutions and tremendously affected the

moral and material condition of all im¬
portant countries. India, in common with other
countries, came under the influence of the new forces.
The momentous pronouncement of 20 August 1917,
which declared the grant of responsible government
as the final goal of British policy in India, the visit

of the Secretary of State to India and the passing of

the Government of India Act on the lines of the
recommendations made in the Montagu-Chelmsford
Report, are instances of this influence on the politics
of India. The new Act was passed in 1919 and came into
force from 1921.

The Act
of 1919

The problem that was sought to be tackled by the
Montford Report and also by the Govern-
The Begin- ment of India Act was a complicated one.
mn8r .?*,!* es The continuance in its unmitigated and

unregenerate form of a purely bureaucratic
and paternal administration, completely irresponsible to
the Legislature, was inconsistent with the announcement
of 1917 and generally with the spirit of the times.
On the other hand, the grant of full Dominion Status at
one stroke was regarded as simply suicidal and fraught
with the gravest danger. Out of the two extremes
a via media was sought to be explored by the Reforms.
A beginning in responsible government was to be
made under proper safeguards. The most suitable field
for making the experiment was considered to be the
province.

The Central Government was to be left out so far as the

introduction of responsibility in any degree was concerned.
However, the Central Legislature was to be considerably

132 Indian Administration

enlarged and democratized and larger powers were to
be granted to it, so that the net practical, if not legal,
result of these altered circumstances would be in the
direction of making the Government of India more
susceptible to popular opinion. With this end in view,
the whole of the Central Legislature was thoroughly
overhauled. For the first time, a bicameral system was

4

introduced, following the invariable practice of most of
the important. western countries. The old Supreme
Legislative Council was now replaced by two bodies,
one, the Legislative Assembly and the other, the Council
of State.

3. The Council of State

The Council of State in India corresponds to the upper
chambers of other countries. The total
Constitution num b e r of its members is 60. Out of these,

33 are elected by the different constituencies and 27 are
nominated by Government. Of the nominated members,
not more than 20 are to be officials.

The Council of State is a part of the Central Legis¬
lature and its electorate is comprised within the territorial
l imi ts of the whole of British India. Elections are not
.however held on a general ticket throughout the area.
The existing political divisions are taken as units, and
.seats are assigned to them approximately in proportion
.to their population, to their territorial extent and
■.SO on. The total elected number of thirty-three is thus
distributed among the various provinces which are
.taken as electoral. units. A similar distribution also
takes place of nominated seats.

v 1 The great diversity of political and economic conditions
.in the various provinces makes a uniform franchise

ior a chamber of the Central Legislature almost an

\

The Central Legislature 133

impossibility. The franchise for the Council of State

therefore is different in the different
Franchise provinces. The variation is, of course,

intended only to equalize the conditions of the franchise
as far as possible by taking into account the particular
economic or political situation of each province and
correcting and modifying the franchise in the light
of those conditions. This body is intended to serve
the purpose of an upper and revising chamber and
therefore to consist of persons who have large vested
interest in the land. They are expected to be con¬
servative enough to stand above the radical freaks of
a demos. The qualifications are therefore so contrived
as to ensure that the majority of the members will belong
to the richest strata of society, a small number being
allowed for intellectuals.

In the Presidency of Bombay (i) persons who pay
an income-tax on an annual income of not less than
Rs. 30,000, (ii) persons who are owners of land, the land
revenue dues of which are not less than Rs. 2,000 per
year, (iii) persons who are Sardars or Talukdars or
Dumaldars or Inamdars and recognized as such by
Government, are entitled to have a vote. The object and
the effect of this high franchise are clear. It excludes any
one who is not very wealthy or who is not a scion of an
aristocratic family. The intellectual element is supplied
by the further provisions that (iv) all persons who have
been once President or Vice-President of a Municipality,

(v) President or Vice-President of a District Local Board,

(vi) persons who have been members of the Senate or
fellows of a University, (vii) persons who had been once
members of any legislative body in India, (viii) persons
who enjoy the distinction of the title of Mahamaho-
padhyaya or Shamsul-ul-Ulema, have also a right to

134 Indian Administration

vote. These provisions have made it possible for
comparatively poor persons to contest the seats of the
Council if they have to their credit some public work and
influence as demonstrated by their possessing any of
these qualifications.

In the elections of 1925 the total electorate for the
Council of State numbered 32,126 of which Burma contri¬
buted no less than 15,555. If representatives from Burma
are excluded, the remaining thirty-two members of the
Council of State are elected by only 17,000 voters spread
over the whole of British India.

With the exception of this small intellectual and to a
certain extent democratic element, the Council of State has
a predominantly oligarchical character. It therefore pos¬
sesses all the characteristics that are the

chicaMBod^^" features of oligarchy. It is

y conservative in its very elemental forma¬
tion. It is always suspicious of progress. Its outlook is
generally extremely narrow. Representing as it does the
vested interests in the state, it is inclined to be very much
self-centred and self-protecting. Not being returned by
an extensive electorate it has a tendency to be exclusive
in its outlook and to be left unaffected by the currents of
popular opinion. The small elected majority of five is not
calculated to lessen the consequences of the oligarchical
nature of the body. The tenure of the Council of State is
five years.

For any legislature the position and status of the pre¬
sident are matters of important considera-
President tion an( j p r i v ji e g e , j n the case of the old

Supreme Legislative Council the Governor-General was
the ex-officio president. In the new dispensation of the
Reforms this privilege has been taken away from the
Governor-General. For the Council of State the president

Functions and

The Central Legislature 135

is to be nominated by the Governor-General and from the
time of its inception till very recently he has been in¬
variably an official. At present, however, a non-official
has been selected to hold that office. In this respect the
Council of State is denied the privilege of electing its own
president, a privilege which has been enjoyed by the
Legislative Assembly.

A reference has already been made to the different
kinds of powers which a legislative cham-
_ ber can possess. The Council of State has

Powers.

i. Legislative ^ een given full legislative powers. Every

bill which has to be passed into an Act must
receive its assent. Any member, official or non-official,
may introduce a bill for the consideration of the House
which may or may not pass it. No measure can be in¬
corporated into the law of the land unless the Council
of State has given its sanction to it. It enjoys in this
respect the same powers as are enjoyed by the Legislative
Assembly.

It can exercise control over the administration by mov¬
ing resolutions or adjournments or votes of
censure, or by putting questions and supple¬
mentary questions. Fifteen days’ notice is
required for a resolution. The Governor-General can
disallow any resolution if he feels it necessary to do so
in public interest. Motions for adjournment must refer
to definite matters of urgent public importance and of
recent occurrence. Questions and supplementary ques¬
tions to elicit information on points in the routine of
administration can be put by members to the executive
officials. On matters affecting relations of the Govern¬
ment with foreign States or Indian Princes or on those
matters which are sub judice no questions can be asked
and no resolutions can be moved. The president can

ii. Adminis¬
trative

136 Indian Admini$tratio?i

disallow a question or supplementary question. He can
also disallow a motion for adjournment.

Lastly, the financial powers of the Council of State

have to be understood. The Council of
in. Financial g tate j s avowedly a body of elders, oligar¬
chical in character and serving as an upper chamber. It
has only a remote acquaintance with the beatings of the
popular pulse and only a remote affinity with popular
sentiments and desires. The second chambers in western
countries do not enjoy the same thorough control over
the nation's purse as the lower chambers possess. They
are regarded as inherently unfitted to exercise this power
because of their vested interests, because of their narrow
representative character and because of the general
conservative—if not stagnant—outlook that pervades all
their thoughts and acts. The House of Lords in England
for instance, cannot initiate any money bill, and after the
legislation of 1911 cannot claim equal rights with the
lower chamber in financial affairs; it has been disarmed
of its privilege of persistently opposing and obstructing
the passage of the Finance Bill after it has been passed
more than once by the lower body, the Commons.

Following this sound constitutional precedent, the Indian
upper chamber is denied certain privileges in financial
matters which are exclusively granted to the lower
chamber. The budget is to be presented to both bodies
on the same day. Both of them can discuss it thoroughly,
but the voting of particular grants demanded by the heads
of various departments is a special duty and privilege of
the Assembly. They are not submitted to the Council of
State after they are voted upon by the Assembly. The
latter body is in this respect supreme, subject to the
certifying veto of the Governor-General.

After the voting of grants, ways and means of revenue

The Central Legislature 137

have to be considered. Money has to be found for the
expenditure that is voted and all proposals for taxation
are embodied in a bill known as the Finance Bill. This
bill has to be passed by the Assembly and is then sent
up to the Council of State for its assent like any other
legislative bill. The Council may pass the bill as it
is or introduce amendments which must be accept¬
able to the originating chamber. In a deadlock the
Governor-General’s extraordinary powers can be exer¬
cised for preserving the proper conduct of the adminis¬
tration.

The Council of State’s financial powers are therefore
as under. The budget is presented to it at the same
time as the Assembly. It has the right of having a general
discussion on the budget and generally on the financial
policy of the State. Its legislative powers being co-ordi¬
nate with those of the Assembly, the Finance Bill, which
contains all proposals of taxation, has to be submitted
for its assent and can be modified or even rejected by
it. The power which the Council of State does not
possess is that of voting supplies or grants, demands
for which are made by heads of the various depart¬
ments separately. That is the exclusive privilege of
the Assembly.

It might be interesting to note that the Council was
originally intended to be a predominantly Government
body containing a clear official majority, so that any
measure required by Government could be easily passed.
The Joint Parliamentary Committee however discounte¬
nanced such a proposal as reactionary and discor¬
dant with the spirit of the Reforms. An endeavour
was then made to constitute a real second chamber
corresponding to similar bodies in other countries. The
elected non-official majority, though definitely introduced

138 Indian Admbmtration

was made extremely small, and the franchise was pitched
so high as to ensure an essentially plutocratic character
for its major portion.

The experience of the working of the Council during
the last twelve years has revealed and
Criticism of confirmed the existence of the usual anta-

dTstat© 1101 & on * sm an< ^ c * eava £ e "between the viewpoints

of a democratic chamber and those of an
oligarchical house, A cent per cent increase in the salt-
tax which was proposed in the budget by the Finance
Member and which was vehemently opposed by the
Legislative Assembly was approved of by the Council of
State. Nor could the Assembly's antagonism to the
Princes’ Protection Bill find any support in the Council of
State. In fact, a constitutional crisis in the real sense of
the word has not yet occurred at all, On crucial occa¬
sions of conflict between the democratic Assembly and
the bureaucratic Government, the oligarchical Council of
State has till now invariably thrown itself on the side of
the Government. With its help and by the exercise of
his power of certification the Governor-General has been
able to obtain whatever he has wanted.

Even in free countries, a congregation of vested
interests is always extremely sensitive and nervous about
the progressive democratic impulse, and is opposed
to it. In the environment of a conquered country like
India the instinct of self-preservation gets immensely
strengthened and naturally induces a course of intense
caution on the part of the aristocratic class. Critics of
the Council of State have every reason to deprecate
the formation and constitution of a body which is
inevitably drawn into an alliance with the bureau¬
cracy as against the declared wishes of the popular
chamber.

The Central Legislature 139

Statement showing the composition of the Council of State
as it stood when the Simon Commission reported 1

Province

Government of India

Madras

Bombay

Bengal

United Provinces
Punjab

Bihar and Orissa
C. P. and Berar
Assam ...
Burma

N.-W. F. Province

Total

Nominated

Elected

W a

.3

£3 *2 ctf a ci

o ^na Bra
• I a) 01 Q)

a S * 2 -S
o « o « ^

a iz la o5 z Jw

73 ft
g - c

g a 2

a ® a

. a g-a -a

a o u o J3

o o rj o O

11

(inclu¬

ding

presi¬

dent)

1

1

1

1

1

1

• i » • • *

1 ...

1 1
4 4

«l« f» • i

4. The Legislative Assembly

The lower and more democratic chamber in the Indian
Legislature is known as the Indian Legis-
Constitution j a ^ ve Assembly. This body consists of a

total of 144 members of which 103 are elected and 41
nominated. Of the latter not more than 25 are to be

1 Report, vol. I, p. 167. 9

2 One of these is nominated as the result of an election held in
Berar.

3 At alternate general elections there are three non-Moham-
medan seats for Bihar and Orissa and only one Mohammedan seat
for the Punjab,

4 The distribution of nominated seats may be varied at the discre¬
tion of the Govern or-General but the officials cannot exceed twenty.

140 Indian Administration

officials. It is thus evident that both in its size and in the
larger proportion of elected to nominated members the
Assembly is distinguished from the Council of State.
The total number of its members is distributed among
the various provinces according to their population
and importance. The existing political divisions of the
territory of India are accepted as the units for its election;
and as it is a body larger and more democratic than the
Council of State and possesses a wider electorate, the
political sub-divisions of the province are further taken as
units for the distribution of seats and for election, unlike
the Council of State for which, in the non-Mohammedan
constituency, the province as a whole is the unit. Thus
the number of elected members representing the presi¬
dency of Bombay in the Assembly is 16 out of its elected
total of 103. These are elected from constituencies, the
territorial extent of which corresponds to the Commis¬
sioner’s Divisions or in the urban constituency of the
City of Bombay, to the extent of the city.

There cannot be, literally speaking, a uniform franchise
for the Assembly throughout India. It
Franchise varies in the different provinces according

to local conditions, an attempt being made to establish
similar real conditions in all the provinces. In the
presidency of Bombay, (i) all persons who pay income-tax;
(ii) all persons who pay an annual land revenue in an
amount not less than Rs. 37-8 in the Upper Sind Frontier,
Panch Mahal and Ratnagiri Districts and not less than
Rs. 75 in the rest of* the Presidency, have been given
the franchise for the Assembly. It will be seen that
this franchise is much wider than that for the Council
of State and narrower than that for the Bombay Legis¬
lative Council. Members possessing a wider outlook,
and elected from a wider electorate are required to

The Central Legislature 14l

discuss all-India questions; yet the franchise cannot b^
too high if a largely democratic and representative char¬
acter is to be maintained. The Assembly must combine
in itself the characteristics of being a well-proportioned
all-India body, and also a predominantly democratic body,
unlike the oligarchical Council of State.

The total electorate for the Legislative Assembly
numbered 11,28,331 in 1926. Thus its 105 members are
returned by less than twelve lakhs of voters in British India s
the total population of which is nearly twenty-five crores.
The tenure of the Legislative Assembly is three years.

It was provided in the Act that the first president of
the Assembly would be a non-official
President member of Parliamentary experience nomi-

nated by the Governor-General to hold office for the first
four years. As has been stated already, the president of
the Indian Legislature before the Reforms was the
Governor-General ex-officio. The president of the
Council of State is a nominated member, and had been
unofficial almost till now. The Assembly has been given'
the privilege of electing its own president from amongst
its members after the Reforms. On the expiration of the
first four years, during which the affairs of the Assembly
were to be guided by an experienced and well-informed'
parliamentarian and during which conventions and tradi¬
tions could be set up by him, the right of election was to,
be exercised and thenceforth the chair of the president
was to be adorned by one on whom the choice- of the
Assembly fell. Sir F. Whyte was the first nominated
president. Mr. V. J. Patel was the first elected president
and he was re-elected for a second term of office.

The election of its own Speaker has been an important
and time-honoured privilege of the House of Commons*
The historical evolution of this office is interesting;

142 Indian Administration

From being: the spokesman and leader of his colleagues

and a channel of communication between
of thl office tliem and tlie monarch, the Speaker has now
of President come to be a non-party dignitary vested with

all the intricate functions and powers that
are necessary to guide the deliberations of a democratic
legislative chamber. Constitutionally the Speaker’s or
President’s position carries great responsibilities with it.
He presides over the meetings of the body and can adjourn
them. He maintains order at the time of discussion, gives
his rulings on disputed points of procedure and has to
dispose systematically of the business on the agenda. He
maintains the dignity of the House by properly controlling
members in the use of their language; he has to protect
carefully the privileges of the House from any outside en¬
croachment. He admits questions and grants permission
to move adjournments. In case of an equality of votes
the president can give his casting vote on either side.
In short, to have its own elected president is one of the
most cherished and one of the most useful privileges
enjoyed by a legislature.

That privilege has been conceded to the Legislative
Assembly by the Act of 1919. A deputy-president has
been allowed to be elected from the beginning to preside
in the absence of the president. The salaries of both the
president and deputy-president are voted by the Assembly.
Both cease to hold office when they cease to be members
of the Assembly and may be removed from office by a
vote of the Assembly and with the concurrence of the
Governor-General.

The powers and functions of the Assembly are to be
considered in the light of the classification that has been
given already. The legislative powers of this body are
co-ordinate with the powers of the Council of State*

The Central Legislature 143

No bill can be deemed to have been passed into an
Powers and Act havin £ force of legality unless it is

functions—
Legislative
and Adminis
trative

Financial

Powers

passed by both bodies and has received the
Governor-General's assent. All legislation
must therefore pass through the Assembly.
It can also move resolutions, votes of
censure, motions of adjournment and any of its members
can put questions and supplementary questions in the
same manner as the members of the Council of State. It
can thus effectively establish its supervising authority and
critical control over departmental administration and
unmistakably indicate its political predilections.

The Assembly has, however, a wider power in the
domain of finance than that possessed by
the Council of State. The budget has of
course to be presented to this body by the
Finance Member as he used to submit it to its predeces¬
sors in pre-Reform days. It can also carry on a general
discussion of the budget and of the financial policy of
Government as before. But now it does not stop with
moving resolutions and dividing the Council on them, as it
did between 1909 and the introduction of the Reforms of
1919. For the first time in Indian constitutional history,
power is given to the Legislature to vote the grants de¬
manded in the budget. This has to be clearly understood.

The position after 1909 was peculiar. In the first
place, the Supreme Legislative Council
Pre-Reform contained a clear official majority, so that
Penod any amounts of money that the Government

wanted could be easily got by them by issuing an, execu¬
tive mandate concerning the manner in which official
members should vote. And even if an official majority
had not existed, matters would not have been much better,
for the power that was conceded to the Legislature in

After the
Reforms

144 Indian A dm in isiration

regard to the budget amounted only to the liberty of ex¬
pressing a definite opinion on a particular item if allowed
to do so- This expression of opinion was not binding
upon the government. It had not the authority of law.

. On the other hand, the power of voting supplies,

partially granted under the Reforms, is a
different thing. It has been already explain¬
ed that complete control over the country’s
finance is one of the essential conditions of Parliamentary
government. It has not been introduced in even a slight
measure in the central administration of India, Yet an
endeavour is made to create some shadow of Parliamentary
government by conceding to the Legislature the privilege
of voting a part of the total supplies required by the
Government of India. The money required for certain
items cannot be spent unless it is voted by the Assembly
or is permitted to be spent by the certification of the
Governor-General.

The proposals of the Government for the appropriation
of revenues and moneys are divided into
two parts, votable and non-votable. Grants
coming under the latter head are not put for
the Assembly’s vote, nor they can be discussed by the
Legislature unless the Governor-General otherwise directs.
Some very important subjects are included in this group.
Interest and sinking fund charges, salaries and pensions
of persons appointed with the approval of His Majesty or
the Secretary of State, salaries of Chief Commissioners,
expenditure under the heads, ecclesiastical, political and
defence, are all subjects which are non-votable. They
cover about eighty-five per cent of the total expenditure.

Proposals for the appropriation of revenues in subjects
qther than these specified ones are submitted to the vote
of the Assembly in the form of demands for grants- The

Non-votable

Items

Votable

Items

The Central Legislature 145

Assembly may assent to or reduce or refuse a grant.

Grants that have been thus reduced or
rejected cannot be obtained unless the
Governor-General feels that they are
absolutely necessary for the discharge of his responsi¬
bilities towards Parliament and restores them by his
power of certification. The Joint Parliamentary Com¬
mittee made it clear that the power of certification was
intended to be real, inasmuch as voting of the budget,
was not accompanied by any degree of political respon¬
sibility and the Governor-General-in-Council continued
to be solely responsible to Parliament for peace, order
and good government in India.

With the creation of an Assembly containing a large
elected non-official majority and possessing a reasonably
representative character because of its election on a demo¬
cratic franchise, and with the partial grant to this body of
the power of voting supplies demanded by Government
officials, it is no wonder that the centre of political im¬
portance in the constitution of India has now definitely
shifted to the Indian Legislative Assembly. The Council
of State does not enjoy the privilege of voting grants..
It can only approve of and discuss the Finance Bill.

Besides, the Assembly has power to appoint a standing
Finance Committee, (i) to scrutinize propo¬
sals for new votable expenditure, (ii) to sanc¬
tion allotments out of lump sum grants, (iii>
to suggest retrenchment and economy in expenditure and,
(iv) generally to assist the Finance Department by ad¬
vising on such cases as may be referred to it. The Com¬
mittee consists of ten members elected by the Assembly
with a chairman nominated by the Governor-General.

At the commencement of each financial year there
is also constituted a Committee on Public Accounts*

Finance

Committee

Committee
on Public
Accounts

146 Indian Administration

consisting: of not more than twelve members of whom not

less than two-thirds are elected by the non¬
official members of the Assembly. The
Finance Member is the chairman having a
casting vote in case of an equality of votes.
The Committee has to scrutinize the audit and appropri¬
ation accounts of the Govemor-General-in-Council and
satisfy itself that the money voted by the Assembly has
been spent within the scope of the demand granted by
the Assembly. It has also to bring to the notice of the
Assembly every reappropriation from one grant to
•another, every reappropriation within a grant, and all
such expenditure as is desired by the Finance Depart¬
ment to be brought to the notice of the Assembly.

S. Procedure of Work in the Central Legislature

Sammons for meetings.—The time and place for the meet¬
ing of the Central Legislature are fixed by the Governor-
General. A summons to attend the session is issued to
each member by the Secretary of the Legislative Chamber.

Oath and President's Election.—If a legislature is meeting
for the first time after new elections, its members are first
of all called upon to take the Oath. Immediately there¬
after they proceed to elect their President and after he
is elected, to elect their Vice-President. Both these
elections are not considered to be finally valid unless
they have been approved of by the Governor-General.

At the commencement of each session the president
must nominate from among the members a panel of not
snore than four chairmen.

In the absence of the President, the Vice-President
presides. If both are absent they can request any one of
;the panel of chairmen to preside over the meeting.

Allotment of Days for Business.—The Governor-General

The Central Legislature 147 '

allots definite days for the transaction of non-official
business. On other days only official business can be
transacted unless the Government otherwise directs.

A list of business or agenda is despatched to each
member before the commencement of the session.

Qaorum.—Twenty-five members form the quorum for
a meeting of the Legislative Assembly and fifteen
members for that of the Council of State.

Questions.—The first hour of each meeting is devoted
to the answering of questions. For each question not
less than ten clear days’ notice is required ordinarily-
The president has power to disallow a question if in his
opinion it constitutes an abuse of the member’s right.

Any member may put a supplementary question for the-
purpose of elucidating any matter of fact regarding which
an answer has been given. Even such questions can be
disallowed by the President.

Resolutions.—A member who wishes to move a reso¬
lution must ordinarily give fifteen clear days’ notice..
The resolution must pertain to a subject of general public'
interest and may be disallowed by the Governor-General.
Amendments can be moved by any member to a re¬
solution. Non-official resolutions can be taken only on
days allotted for non-official business. Their order of
priority is determined by ballot.

Adjournment Motions.—Leave to make such a motion
for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent
public importance must be asked immediately after-
questions , are answered. If more than thirty members
rise in its support the President intimates that it will be¬
taken up for discussion at 4 o’clock in the afternoon. The-
debate must terminate at 6 o’clock and thereafter no¬
question in respect of that motion shall be put.

Legislation.—Generally, a month’s notice is required.

148 Indian Administration

for leave to introduce a bill. Every bill is required to
pass through the following stages.

(a) A member who wants to move a bill must first
seek leave of the Chamber to introduce it. In doing so
he may make a brief explanatory statement. An opposing
member is also allowed to make a few remarks to explain
his position. Then without further debate the question is
put and if the majority of members are in favour of leave
being granted, the mover forthwith introduces the bill.

However, the Governor-General may order the publica¬
tion of a bill in the Gazette although no motion has been
made for leave to introduce it. In that case such a
motion is not necessary and if the bill is afterwards intro¬
duced it is not necessary to publish it again.

(&) After a bill is introduced it is published in the
Government Gazette.

(t) After a bill is introduced and published, the member
in charge moves that the bill be read for the first time.
Only the general principles of the bill are discussed on
this occasion. Discussion on details is not permitted.

(d) After the first reading is passed, any one of the
following motions may be made :

(i) that the bill be read a second time ;

(ii) that the bill be referred to a Select Committee ,*

and

(iii) that the bill be published for eliciting public
opinion.

If (iii) is accepted, the bill may be referred to a Select
Committee after public opinion has been elicited.

The Select Committee may hear the necessary evidence
and usually has to submit its report, with dissenting
minutes, if any, within two months. The Report and
the minutes are published in the Gazette and also
■circulated among members. It is then presented- to the

The Central Legislature 149

legislature by the member in charge of the bill with a
brief explanatory speech.

(e) After the Select Committee's Report is presented,
the mover proposes that the bill be read a second time.
If this motion is agreed to by the majority the president
has to submit the bill clause by clause separately for the
vote of the body. Any member can move an amendment
to the clause with seven clear days' notice. Votes are
first taken on the amendments and then on the clauses as
they originally stood or as they have been amended.

(/) After the second reading is finished the mover
proposes that the bill be read for the third time. Only
verbal amendments are allowed on this occasion and no
notice is required for them.

Every bill is required to be passed three times in three
readings as described above,

A bill passed by one Chamber must be sent. to the
other Chamber and there it has to pass through the same
procedure.

After the bill has been passed by both the Chambers it
goes to the Governor-General for his assent. Only after
that assent is given the bill finally becomes law.

Budget.—The budget has to pass through the following

stages :

(а) It must be presented to the legislature on such day
as the Governor-General appoints. A copy of it along
with detailed estimates must be despatched to each
member at least seven days prior to the first of the days
allotted for the general discussion of the budget.

No discussion of the budget can take place on the day
on which it is presented.

(б) After the budget is presented,, the legislative body
is at liberty to discuss the budget as a whole. The
Governor-General allots a definite number of days for

ISO Indian Administration

this purpose. This is the opportunity for members to
criticize the general scheme and policy of the Govern¬
ment and the main principles of administration. No
motion is allowed at this stage and details are generally
excluded from the discussion. The Finance Member
has a general right of reply at the end.

(c) After general discussion, the voting of demands for
grants is undertaken. Not more than fifteen days are
allotted for this purpose and not more than two can be
taken tig by the discussion of any one demand.

On the last of the allotted days for the voting of grants
the president must stop all discussion at 5 o'clock in the
evening and forthwith put every outstanding demand to
the vote of the Chamber.

A separate demand for grant is ordinarily made for
each department of Government.

The Legislature can reduce or omit but not increase the
amount demanded in a grant.

Table showing the chief sources of revenue and the main items of
expenditure of the Central Government 1
(Budget figures for 1929-30 in crores of rupees)

* Simon Commission Report, vol. I, p, 358*

Revenue

Customs

... 51‘22

Income-tax

... 16*60

Salt

... 6*35

Opium (net)

... 2*35

Railways (net)

... 6*25

Currency and Mint

... 3*06

Other receipts

... 5*56

Total

... 91-39

Expenditure

Defence (net) ... 55*10

Debt Charges (net) ... 12*14

Civil Administration ... 12*67
Loss on Posts and Tele¬
graphs and Irrigation. 0*33
Other Expenditure (in¬
cluding pensions and
cost of revenue collec¬
tions) ... 11*15

Total 91*39

Remedies to
end them

152 Indian Administration

avert the conflict or to end it when it comes. For
example :

(i) When a bill is introduced in either chamber and
before it is referred to a Select Committee
of the House in the second reading, the
originating chamber may request, by a

resolution, the other chamber to nominate some of its
members on the Select Committee, so that, while the
bill is on the anvil and passing through a searching
consideration at the hands of the Committee, members
o£ the other chamber are invited to take part in the
discussion and give an expression of their views so as
to enable the bill to be modified in the light of their
opinion. In this way future opposition may be
anticipated and a probable conflict may be averted if the
motion to appoint a Joint Committee is accepted by both

Houses. On such Joint Select Committee
an equal number of members from both
the Houses will sit; its chairman will be
elected by itself and will have only one vote, and in case
the votes are equal, the question will be decided in
the negative. The time and place of the meeting will
be fixed by the president of the Council of State,

(ii) When there is a difference of opinion between the
chambers, they may agree to a Joint
Conference where each chamber will be
represented by an equal number of mem¬
bers. The procedure of the conference will be deter¬
mined by itslef. The time and place of its meeting will
be fixed by the president of the Council, An amicable
settlement may be arrived at as a result of the discussions
in the Conference and the deadlock may be ended.

(iii) As a last resort, if the chambers are in a state of
pronounced mutual disagreement, when a bill as passed

Joint Select
Committee

Joint

Conference

The Cental Legislature 153

by the one is not approved of by the other and when
the latter’s amendments and alterations are not accept¬
able to the originating: chamber, this last body may
report the fact of the disagreement to the Governor-
General or allow the bill to lapse. In case intimation
of the difference is given to the Governor-General, he

may convene a joint sitting of both the
Joint Sitting chambers by notification in the Gazette.

The president of the Council of State shall .. pre**
side and its procedure shall apply. The members
present at a joint sitting * may deliberate and shall
vote together upon the bill as last proposed by
the originating chamber and on the amendments
in dispute’. The majority of the votes of the total
number of members present shall prevail and the bill
as passed by the majority, with whatever amendments
may have been accepted, will be taken as if it had
been duly passed by both tbe chambers. It is plain
that in a joint sitting the Assembly will naturally be at
an advantage on account of its larger numbers.

A slightly complicated state of things arises in

connexion with the question of conflict when,
Certification in to the will of the chambers, a

third force, the will of the Governor-General comes into
operation. In the cases above discussed the Governor-
General was taken to be an impartial disinterested
spectator. But occasions may arise—they have arisen
in recent times—-when in the conflict of opinion between
the two chambers the Governor-General may, take a
keen interest and may cast in the weight of his authority
on one side. He can then end the conflict by the use of
the extraordinary constitutional weapons that are provi¬
ded for him. The expedient of a joint sitting proves
useless for his purposes if his difference is with the

154 Indian Administration

Assembly, as that body would command in the joint
sitting a majority of votes. When, therefore, the dis¬
agreement between the chambers is complicated by the
disagreement of the Governor-General with either of
them, it has happened in practice that the process of
certification has been utilized for the removal of such
a deadlock.

A concrete case will illustrate the point. The Princes’
Protection Bill and the clause doubling the salt-tax in
the Finance Bill of 3924 were disallowed by the
Legislative Assembly. The Governor-General was
interested in the passing of these measures. They were
therefore sent up to the Council of State with the
Governor-General*s recommendation about the form ’ in
which they should be passed and were passed by that
body. Thus there arose occasions of conflict between
the Assembly and the Council, with the Governor-
General interested in getting particular measures passed
in spite of the opposition of the Assembly. When the
bills as passed by the Council of State were not accepted
by the Assembly, the Governor-General exercised his
certifying power, gave his assent to them and the
measures were taken to be legally passed. Apart from
the usual constitutional provision of a Joint Select
Committee or a Joint Conference or a Joint Sitting, the
Governor-GeneraPs extraordinary executive authority
has thus indirectly tended to serve the same purpose on
certain occasions, when the Governor-General himself has
been a party in the conflict and has espoused a particular
cause.

CHAPTER IX

The Relation of the Executive to the Legislature

1. No Principle of Responsibility

It has been explained already how a proper under¬
standing of the relation between the

The Executive execu ti ve and legislative parts of a

ought to be

Subordinate couatry’s administration is indispensable

for estimating the reality of its democratic
character. In a country like England with Parliamentary
institutions, the subordination of the executive to the
legislature is complete. And as the final goal of British
policy in India has been announced to be the progressive
realization of responsible government and the development
of Parliamentary institutions, when the goal is achieved
in practice, the subordination of the Indian executive to
the Indian Legislature will also be complete. An attempt
has to be made to view in a proper perspective the
relations between the two parts as they exist in the present
avowedly transitional period.

No consideration could have of course been given to
this problem before the completion of the Indian
conquest and the settling down into peaceful routine of
its administration. In the beginning of British rule,
Legislatures as separate bodies did not exist at all.
And when they were introduced and as they were pro¬
gressively developed during the latter portion of the
nineteenth century, gradual additions were made to their
powers. Still, the thoroughly irresponsible character of
the executive administration was fully maintained.

Even at the time of the Councils Act of 1909 the

before the
Reforms

156 Indian Administration

intention of even indirectly initiating something akin to

Parliamentary government was expressly
The Position disowned. There was no question of the

executive being controlled by the Legis¬
lature. The latter at the most could indulge
in declamatory rhetoric which very often ‘ fell on deaf
ears and beat its head against stone walls’, as Sir
Sttrendranath Banerji would have said. The enlargement
of the Councils was simply due to a desire for the greater
association of Indians in the administration. There was
no impulse of any progressive political principle behind
it. The bureaucracy was responsible only to itself and
in the last resort to the distant Secretary of State and the
languid British Parliament.

The Act of 1919 has introduced many important
changes in other directions, but so far as
the strictly legal position is concerned, it
has left entirely unaffected and unchanged
the old relations between the executive
and legislative parts of Government. In strict theory,
the Governor-General-in-Council continues even after the
Reforms to be as autocratic as he was before. Neither
he nor his colleagues are called upon to resign even after
a regular vote of censure is passed upon them by the
Legislature. Their salaries and rules of service are
beyond the reach of the people’s representatives. They
may not accept any recommendation made to them by
the Legislature. Their responsibility is only to the
British Parliament and they hold office during the pleasure
of the Sovereign. The extraordinary legislative veto
that is now given to the Governor-General, other¬
wise known as the power of certification, is intended
to prove as a corrective to any persistent obstruction on
the part of the Legislature. In short, the citadel of

The Position
after the
Reforms

The new
Status and
Powers of the
Legislature

Relation of Executive to Legislature 157

bureaucratic authority, so far as the Central Government
in India is concerned, continues to be as strongly fortified
as before according to the strict letter of the constitution.

2. Indirect Influence of the Legislature

This is, however, a purely theoretical position. Matters.

are likely to differ somewhat in practice,
particularly since the reforms of 1919.
With Legislatures deliberately enlarged and
democratized ; with an elected non-official
majority purposely created in them; with
larger financial and deliberative powers advisedly conceded
to them; and with the Viceroy’s power of certification
avowedly declared to be extraordinary; the indirect but
none the less real influence of popular opinion as
expressed in the Legislature may not be entirely
insignificant. The Legislature cannot dismiss Executive
Members but can certainly dismiss requests made by them
for various grants necessary to keep some of the wheels
of the machinery going. The refusal of such requests
and the rejection or reduction of any of the demanded
grants may indeed provoke a Viceregal resort to the
extraordinary weapon of certification. That power may
also be invoked for any other similarly rejected legislative
measure. But unless certification ceases to be regarded
and used as an extraordinary weapon and is invested with
the routine familiarity that attaches to all normal instru¬
ments of Government, administration by certification will
be regarded as uncommon and abnormal.

Public opinion as focused through representative
legislative chambers carries a peculiar

Importance of we ig^ with it. It is the most disciplined

Public Opinion „ „ ,■ . - ml _•

and chastened expression of a self-conscious.

public will. ■ A mobilized and concentrated force of this.

158 Indian Adm i n is t rat ion

type cannot be treated with the dilettante defiance of an
unthinking autocrat* Such a defiance would prove
nothing less than suicidal. No normal Government can
subsist on pure negation. No Government with a human,
moral basis and composition can be bolstered up by props
which have a tendency to press down those very moral
and human elements which are the essence of its vitality.
Legally, the Government of India are entirely independent
of their legislature* In practice, on the other hand, they
have to be thin-skinned enough to be automatically
susceptible to popular opinion to a certain extent at least
and generally to abide by its wish. Sir Malcolm Hailey,
speaking some time back in the Legislative Assembly,
was giving a description of the actual state of affairs when
he described the Government of India as having become,
after the Reforms, responsive if not responsible to popular
opinion, and its actions as having become indicative if not
reflective of the popular viewpoint.

An incessant use of the privilege of interpellation, of
the power of moving resolutions and
PubTcity ° adjournments, of discussing the budget and

voting a part of it, and of the power of
sanctioning all legislative measures; in short, an incessant
use of the searchlight of publicity and critical investiga¬
tion, is believed to go a long way in the direction of
strengthening the hands of the Legislature and making it
the centre of political influence. The executive Govern¬
ment has to gravitate towards this centre, perceptibly or
imperceptibly. The elastic adjustment of its actions to
accord with the surrounding political atmosphere may be
•dissembled by the garb of diplomacy ; yet a consolidated,
sober and responsible popular will is a force which can be
discarded only on occasions of the utmost gravity when an
administrative breakdown appears inevitable.

Relation oi Executive to Legislature 159 *

The degree of the indirect influence of the Legislature

Uncertain
Nature of
Indirect
Control

upon the actions of the Executive cannot be
exactly estimated or evaluated. A reference
has already been made to the statement
in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report before
the introduction of the Reforms that such

influence was very real. It may be that on some occa¬
sions the popular view as expressed in the Legislature is-
respected and action taken in accordance with it. After
the Reforms, the Legislatures have ceased to be mere
mock bodies; they have a good deal of representative
character and somewhat larger powers. And, therefore,
unless either the executive Government has become a
thoroughly unmoral, inhuman and lifeless machine, a
mere abstraction of power and efficiency, or unless extra¬
ordinary vetoes like certification are domesticated into
the normality of executive powers, the imperceptible
influence of the Legislature over the executive is a (actor
which cannot be completely ignored.

The experience of the past ten years does not justify
any strong hope about the practical success of such an
indirect constitutional restraint. On more than one
occasion, the views of the Assembly have been dis¬
regarded. Proposals vetoed by it have been restored.
Grants refused by it have been reinstated. Resolutions*
passed by it have been neglected. The precarious nature
of a power which is allowed only on sufferance and the
existence of which is made dependent upon the frailty
of a generous caprice has been amply demonstrated
during the last few years. Indian public opinion
demands the subordination of the executive to the Legis¬
lature as a matter exercised as of right and not merely
allowed as an ambiguous privilege. And even if the
quality .and the reality of the Legislature's indirect

f

160 Indian Adm inistra tio?i

influence be asserted and proved to be great, the fact of
its uncertainty and its allowance by mere courtesy
detract to a great extent from its utility and value.

Composition of the Legislative Assembly as it stood when
the Simon Commission reported 1 2 3

Nomi¬

nated

Elected

Province

Government of India...

14

5 s

• * •

a <a a

• • *

* a *

a * a

a a a

19

Madras

* • a

2

IM

10

3

* * •

1

1

18

Bombay ...

a 4 •

2

1

7

4

• a a

2

1

2

19

Bengal

• *a

2

2

6

6

a a a

3

1

1

21

United Provinces

1

2

8

6

a a a

1

1

a a a

19

Punjab

• • •

1

2

3

6

2

• • •

1

a a a

15

Bihar and Orissa

• ■ *

1

1

8

3

a a a

» a a

1

a a a

14

C. P. and Berar

• • •

1

1"

3

1

a * a

a a a

1

a a •

7

Assam

« a *

1

aa a

2

1

a a a

1

a a a

a a a

5

Burma

* a •

1

• a *

3 4

# • •

a a a

1

a a a

■ a a

5

Delhi

m a •

* * i

l 4

• at

a a •

• • a

a a a

a a a

1

Aj mer-Merwara

a * a

n

• • *

1*

a m •

a • a

MU

# *a

a a a

1

N.-W. P. Province

■ a m

B

■ra

• * a

a a a

* m m

a • *

a a a

a a a

1

Total

• a *

26

15

52

30

2

9

7

4

1145

1 Report, vol. I, p. 168.

2 Nominated to represent the Associated Chambers of Com¬
merce, Indian Christians, Labour Interests, the Anglo-Indian com¬
munity and the Depressed Classes. The distribution of nominated
non-officials may be varied by the Governor-General at his discre¬
tion. The official membership of twenty-sis: is a fixed number
though its distribution can be varied by the Governor-General.

3 Nominated as the result of an election held in Berar which
technically is not British territory.

4 These five seats are filled by non-communal constituencies.

PART IV

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

Chap.

Page

X.

The

Growth

and Formation of

Provinces

... ... ... 163

XI.

The

Relation

Between the Central

and Provincial Governments or the
Growth qf Provincial Autonomy

The Pre-Reform Period

... iso

(a) Central Control over

Provincial

Administration

... 181

{b) Central Control over

Provincial

Legislation

... 185

( c ) Central Control over

Provincial

Finance

... 188

After the Reforms

... 198

(a) Demarcation of Central and Provincial

Spheres

... 199

(b) Relaxation of Administrative Control 201

(c) Relaxation of Financial Control ... 203

(d) Relaxation of Legislative Control ... 206

XII. The Provincial Executive

1. The Governor ... ... .. 209

2. The Executive Council ... ... 215

3. The Ministers ... ... ... 219

4. Dyarchy and its Working ... ... 225

6

!

Chav. Pace

XIII. The Provincial Legislature

L The Growth of Provincial Legislatures... 241

2. The Bombay Legislative Council ... 252

3. Procedure of work in the Bombay

Legislative Council ... ... 257

XIV. The Relation of the Executive to the

Legislature

1. In Transferred Departments ... 259

2. In Reserved Departments... ... 260

CHAPTER X

The Growth and Formatio?i of Provinces

Historical

The evolution of a mighty and extensive empire from
very small and unostentatious beginnings is
the pervading striking spectacle unfolded
by the pages of Indian history during nearly three
quarters of the century following the battle of Plassey.
In the moral, material and intellectual exhaustion which
seems to have prostrated the energies and vitality of
India, province after province capitulated before the might
of the foreigner and the last gasp of the dying; nation
was breathed in 1857 when a desperate though
feeble attempt to regain what was lost ended in a total
collapse. . '

The conquest of India by the British race was at once
a continuous and a sporadic process. The
continuity lay in the idea; the absence of
symmetry and system was due to the varied
and unequal nature of the opposition which

tr

was offered to the conqueror and which had to. be
thoroughly overcome before the conqueror’s authority
was finally established. There are clear, well-marked
periods during which the work of expansion was
carried out. Periods of incessant and aggressive acti¬
vity always alternate with periods of comparative stag¬
nation and quiet. Such spells of inaction, indeed,
seem to have curiously combined in themselves the
elements of both cause and effect, the latter so far
as natural relaxation inevitably follows an era of
feverish energy and the former in so far. as an

The Nature
of the Indian
Conquest

Work of a
Century

164 Indian Administration

accumulated and undisturbed spell of peace works as a
restorative and further invigorates the tendency to action.

Beginning with Bengal which practically became a
British possession after the grant of the
Diwani in 1765, the power of England
had spread practically to the whole of
India by 1857. Bengal and the Carnatic were being
simultaneously acquired during the time of Lord Clive.
With the fall of Tippu Sultan and the decline and fall of
the Maratha power in 1818 the whole of south India,
and almost the whole of central India bordering on its
eastern side over the British possession of Bihar, that is
almost the whole of the land with the exception of two
countries on the western borderland, came under the
suzerainty of the new masters. Sind followed in 1839;
the Punjab came next in 1852, and finally in 1857 came
"the defeat of the forlorn and futile endeavour of des¬
perate impotence. The history of this chequered period
is filled by the glamour of the exploits of a Clive, of
a Wellesley, a Hastings, and a Dalhousie, as also
by the restraining influence of a Shore, a Minto or a
Bentinck. The larger and longer the conquest, the
more complicated and responsible became the task of
preserving in good order the huge and incongruous
acquisition.

The fundamental fact must be borne in mind that
nearly a century was required to achieve
the glory of conquering the whole of India.
As a consequence, that symmetry of
arrangement and naturalness of division
which might be expected to follow from a
comprehension of completeness are conspicuous by their
absence in the polity that was being evolved during 1 a
period which was partly a period of conquest and partly a

No Scientific
.Principle in
the Formation

i

of Provinces

Growth and Formation oi Provinces 165

period of peace. To take an instance in practical life : it
was not as if an extensive and open piece of ground was
being systematically developed and a mansion, planned
with careful attention to all detail, was being erected
upon it. It was rather like the purchase of a site first
and the gradual acquisition of adjoining sites afterwards.
That a continent like India could not be treated as a
coherent whole in itself was an obvious proposition. For
the convenience of administration it had to be divided into

various provinces So as to ensure division and clear
demarcation of responsibility and to avoid fatal confusion
in management. The principles underlying the formation
of such sub-divisions in a vast country are various.
Generally, it would be more natural for political divisions
to follow cultural or linguistic divisions, so that the
different entities united by ties of a common language and
culture would form independent groups of their own.

No such deliberate scientific principle of division

Provinces not
Homogeneous

underlies the formation of provinces in
India. The basis of division is neither
ethnological nor linguistic nor cultural.

The one factor that influenced and necessitated the division

was administrative convenience. And hence some of the

Indian provinces have become heterogeneous conglomera¬
tions with a great variety of languages and society. The
Bombay Presidency which consists of four or five distinct
cultural groups, Sind, Kathiawar, Gujarat, Maharashtra
and the Kamatak, is a case in point. Sind, which was
conquered in 1839, that is before the conquest of the
Punjab, could not be allowed to remain dangling by
itself. It was therefore merely attached to the British
province geographically nearest to it. Many of the
provinces were carved out of new acquisitions, and
administrative convenience being the sole underlying aim

166 Indian Administration

of the division, the spectacle of homogeneous units being
split up into divisions and their solidarity dissipated by
their inclusion in two different provinces is not uncommon.
The Kamatalc, Maharashtra and Berar are pertinent
instances. Some of the Indian provinces are therefore
mere patchwork, mere congregations of different groups
which among themselves have not that inherent affinity
which results from common characteristics and common
possessions and which is extremely essential for common
development.

Originally, settlements of the East India Company

were established in the three coastal towns

Governors of 0 £ Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, and so
Factories

long as the Company's business was strictly
commercial, it was not neccessary to appoint any big
political officer for the administration of the factories.
The first mention of the power of appointing Governors
and other high officers over their fortresses is made in
the Charter that was granted in 1661 during the reign of
Charles II. The Governor, along with a few senior
servants of the Company formed what was known as the
Council. The President of the Council and the Governor
were one and the same person. Madras, Bengal and
Bombay each had its own Governor and Council and
each ultimately came to be known as a Presidency,
as being the jurisdiction of the President-in-Council.
There was no authority on the spot in India which was
superior to all the three or to any one of them. Their
powers and status were co-ordinate. All of them were
controlled directly from England by the East India
Company.

It is clear that the chief business of the officials in India
was to negotiate for special privileges and concessions for
their trade, to safeguard the interests of their merchants

Growth and Formation oi Provinces 167

and traders and actually to supervise their commercial
• transactions. They had no political mission.

were purely * Sometimes, indeed, their help was sought
Commercial by the reigning monarch for the suppression

of his enemies; sometimes they came into
conflict with the reigning monarchs over questions of
disputed privileges which the Company claimed but which
the monarch declined to recognize. Intricate and pro¬
longed conflicts between Aurangzeb and the East India
Company’s factories,.particularly on the Bengal coast, are
recorded. Occasions were not wanting, either, when the
aged and unbending Emperor coquetted with the English
merchants and sailors in order to induce them to co¬
operate with him in achieving the one mission of his later
life, the extinction of the Hindu power of the.Marathas.

On the whole, however, till the death of Aurangzeb in
1707, and till the liberation of the floods of fermentation
that streamed over the land for half a century and more,
the East India Company’s officers were almost entirely
officers in a business concern. Their field of activity was
limited to the area of the seaports. They had political
power or jurisdiction only over their own servants and
only to that extent to which its possession was absolutely
essential for conducting the affairs of the factory. Thus
the Governor and Council of each factory were empowered
to judge their servants and subjects in all causes. They
were also given power to declare war or peace with any
‘ heathen ’ nation in Asia or America, or to declare martial
law in their factories. The Governor was to exercise all
powers of a Captain-General of the Army. In short, the
Governor-in-Council was vested with those administrative
powers only which were necessary to maintain the exis¬
tence of the Company and to keep their activity going.

• With the gradual transformation of the Company from

168 Indian Administration

a commercial into a political body, the nature of. the

. duties of the Governor and his Council,

Acceptance

of Political as a ^ S0 extent and character of

Responsibility their jurisdiction and power, necessarily
by the underwent a change. They were involved

Company struggles between the native princes.

The unsettled condition of Indian politics and the
administrative breakdown in a large part of the country,
consequent upon the destruction of the central power in
Delhi, affected the position of the East India Company,,
and strengthened the conviction of some of their officers
on the spot in India that a strong attitude alone could
■ save the interests of the Company. The game that was
being played by Lord Clive, and the active interference
of the East India Company in the tangled skein of Indian
politics, were indications of the change that was coming
over the outlook and the attitude of the Company’s Indian

managers.

The battles of Plassey and Wandiwash were only
fortunate culminations of this earlier spirit of fretful-,
ness. The acceptance of the Diwani after a complete
victory in the battle of Buxar was a systematic and con¬
firmed acknowledgement of sovereign responsibility for
the provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. British
authority had also in the meantime been established
over the southern province of the Karnatic. Thus after
1757 and till the passing of the Regulating Act in
1774, the Governors and the Councils of the three Presi¬
dencies had to watch with vigilance the ruffled course of
politics in their respective spheres and to guard against
any impending onslaught upon the new supremacy that
they had acquired both in north and in south India.

As has already been stated, the Governors were all
independent of each other. There was no authority in

Growth and Formation of Provinces 169

India which could control any or all of them. And there¬
fore every Governor looked to orders from
Independence ki s superiors abroad who were separated

Provincial from the actual scene of operations by a
Governments distance not less than 6,000 miles. So long

as the Company’s business was purely
commercial and so long as no further political or military
complications were introduced, the Governor’s duties were
comparatively simple and did not involve any very great
risks, either financial or political. Control from distant
England did not prove inadequate. Matters stood
differently when a change came over the Company. The
keeping of regular standing armies, the fighting of regular
battles, negotiations of treaties of peace, were no parts of
the business of trade. The establishment of territorial
sovereignty over a vast area, with all the responsibility
of governance that it involved, urgently necessitated a
reorganization of the whole system of the Company’s
Indian management. Whether in Bengal, Bombay, or
Madras, the Company’s and the local interests were
the same.

This consciousness of the oneness of the Company,
wherever its actual field of operation might
be, and the susceptibility of any one of its
parts to the needs and dangers of the others',
had to be far more intensely strengthened
when the comparatively easy business of commerce was
being and had been exchanged for the difficult business of
statecraft. A unity of command and control throughout
the Company’s dominions in India, and uniformity of
guidance were found indispensable for proper governance
and safety. The independence of the Governors and the
capricious originality in design and action which every one
of them might enthusiastically try to evince, were not

Need for
Unity of
Control

170 Indian Adminislration

calculated to benefit the administration. The system was
found to be mischievous. Madras or Bombay might not
prove very susceptible to the demands and difficulties
of distant Bengal and the unseemly spectacle might be
witnessed of distant provinces putting a premium upon
distance and assuming an attitude of culpable indifference
when any one of them, far away, was in danger. Consi¬
derations of this kind dictated the change that was
introduced by the Regulating Act in 1773, amongst
the many of others that were also inaugurated by it.

One of the clauses of this Act clearly, laid down that
the Governor of Bengal was to be supreme

bag Act U ^ over ot ^ er Governors. In war and

peace and also in other important adminis¬
trative matters the minor Governors were enjoined to obey
the Governor-General of Bengal-in-Council. The title of
Governor-General was given to the Governor of Bengal.
The very fact that he was designated Governor-General of
Bengal and not of India is indicative of the absence of
any wide ambition on the part of the Company’s pro¬
prietors to include the whole length and breadth of India
under their supreme control. The office of Governor-
General was a new creation but the person who filled the
office was not new. The Governor of Bengal himself
became the Governor-General. The duties of the two
offices were combined in one person. Direct executive
responsibility for the province of Bengal proper was not
separated from the duties of the Governor-General. Thus
one and the same person was required to. perform
extremely complicated and heavy duties, disposal of

local problems and imperial dictation being both left
to him.

With the creation of the office of Governor-General and
the definite declaration of the' supremacy of Bengal. over

Centralization

Growth and Formation of Provinces 171

the other Presidencies, the -Governors of the latter were

automatically reduced in status and were

% * *

thrown comparatively into the background,

_ •» % _

They could no longer assume an air of independence.
Their pretensions to equality with the Governor-General
completely disappeared. Indeed, as has already been
described, this reduction in status and loss of power was
not easily digested by the provincial Governors immediate¬
ly after the passing of the Regulating Act. They defied
the relevant clause of the Act and took certain steps oii
their own initiative without even consulting their
newly created head, and put him at times into em¬
barrassing situations. Such insubordination, however,
could only be temporary. Masterful personalities at the
head could not brook their defiance and matters were soon
settled, as they were intended to be settled by the Act.

Pitt's India Act of 1784 once more emphasized the
control of the Governor-General-in-Gouncil
over the other Presidencies. In fact, this
control was enlarged so as to include
clearly all matters connected with war, peace, revenues,
army, etc. This measure also laid down that each
Presidency .was to have a Governor and three Coun¬
cillors including the Commander-in-Chief. The Gover¬
nors and the Councillors were to be appointed by the
Court of Directors and could only be removed either by
the Crown or by the Directors. From this time onwards,
therefore, each Presidency had a form of government
analogous to that of the Central Government.-- There
was a person at the head and he was assisted by a few
councillors. The Governor-General-in-Council exercised
powers of superintendence and general control in all
important matters concerning the provinces.

The Charter of 1793 extended to the Governors of

Pitt's
India Act

172 Indian Administration

Madras and Bombay the power of overriding their

Councils in case of a difference of opinion

dF*l79;T rter between them and their Councils, and when

they felt that the peace, safety or good

government in the province would be endangered by the
attitude taken by their Councils. Such a power had
already been conceded to the Governor-General when
Lord Cornwallis, wiser by the experience of Warren
Hastings, specially stipulated for it in 1786. It was
thought better to concede a similar extraordinary power
to provincial heads also, to enable them to discharge
their duties properly. The Governor’s extraordinary
veto against the Executive Council thus dates from the
year 1793.

. In 1807 the Governors and Councils of Madras and
Bombay were given the same power of issuing regula¬
tions that had been enjoyed by the Governor-General-in-
Council since the Regulating Act. The Provincial
Government did not need henceforth always to depend
upon the Central Government to get any legislative
measuie, beneficial for the province, placed on the statute
book. The Charter of 1813 gave to the .Provincial
Governments the power of taxation. The power had
many limitations, but even then its deliberate graft was
significant, as showing the Central Government’s
appreciation of the importance of Provincial Governments
and the necessity and desirability of granting them freedom
generally in local affairs.

The Charter Act of 1833. tended in the direction of cen-
The Act tralization. It expressly declared that the
of 1833 Governor-General of Bengal should be

henceforth designated the Governor-General
of India. The old designation had become an anachronism
after the political events and military conquests which

Growth a?id Formatioyi of Provinces 173

took place subsequent to the passing of the Regulating
Act. This Act also deprived the Provincial Governments,
of any right of law-making. That power was exclusively
vested in the Govern or-General-in-Council. The Provin¬
cial Governments had merely to submit drafts if they,
wished any law to be passed for themselves. The
appointment of a special Law Member to the Governor-.
General s Executive Council and the need for a compre¬
hensive consolidation and codification of the existing law
were responsible for this restriction imposed upon the
Provincial Governments. Already there were five
different bodies of law in operation in India, and it
was thought better to secure uniformity by pre¬
venting Provincial Governments from having their own
codes.

This Act also proposed to divide the overgrown Presi-

Appointment dency of Bengal into ^ provinces, one
of Lieutenant- with headquarters at Fort William and the
Governors other at Agra. This step had been long

and Chief overdue, thanks to the unscientific and spas-

Commis- modic manner in which provinces were.’
sioners formed in India. . Every piece of territory

that was acquired after the Diwani and that was contiguous
to t^H possessions obtained under the arrangements of
the Diwani was simply added on to them. The ludicrous
nature of this easy allocation of new acquisitions will be-
clear when it is understood that in 1833, when the Charter
Act was being passed, the Presidency of Bengal included
in its territorial and political jurisdiction the present
provinces of Bengal, Bihar, Benares, Agra, Orissa, Assam
and. a large portion of territory now included in the
United Provinces. It was physically impossible for ’a
frail mortal to function as an active 1 and efficient
day-to-day administrator of this vast tract, to supervise

174 - Indian Administration

its affairs and at the same time to bear the responsibility*
of formulating a comprehensive imperial policy and of
superintending provincial administrations. The Charter
Act proposed to reduce this unbearable burden and make
matters more convenient by dividing the whole tract
into two provinces and giving them in charge of two
separate Governors. But the arrangement never worked
out in practice and the clause of the Act remained a dead
letter.

However, the Governor-General was empowered in

The N.-W.
Province
or U. P.

1836 to create a Lieutenant-Governorship
for the North-West Province. This province
later on came to be rechristened the United
Provinces of Agra and Oudh in 1902 and

is still known by that name. The appointment of a

Lieutenant-Governor relieved the great pressure of work

upon the Governor-General.

The Charter Act of 1853 authorized the appointment of

Bengal and
Punjab

-a separate Governor of Bengal, and till he
was appointed it authorized the Directors
and the Board to nominate a Lieutenant-

Governor for the province. . Such a Lieutenant-Governor
was appointed in. 1854, the appointment of a Governor
being postponed till the year 1912. ..The Gov^nor-
General ."of 'India was relieved of direct executive
responsibilty for the administration of any province and
could now devote his undivided attention to fulfilling his
duties as supervising and controlling central power.
The Charter also gave authority to the Directors either to
constitute one-new province with* a* Governor and Council,
or to appoint a Lieutenant-Governor. Accordingly a
Lieutenant-Governor for the Punjab was created in 1859,
No new Governor was appointed. /

Oudh, which was annexed in 1856-and put under.-the-

Growth and Formation of Provinces 175

authority of a Chief Commissioner, was merged in the
North-West Province in 1877.

By an Act of 1854 the Governor-General-in-Council,
with the sanction of the Directors and the
C. P., Burma, Board, could take by proclamation under his
Assam and immediate authority and management any

Province* part of the territories in possession of the

Company and then give orders for its
administration. The mode in which this power was used
was by the appointment of Chief Commissioners to whom
the Governor-General delegated the necessary powers.
Chief Commissioners were accordingly appointed for the
Central Provinces in 1861 and Lower Burma in 1862.
Berar, taken over from the Nizam in 1903, was linked
with the Central Provinces. On the conquest of Upper
Burma and on its addition to the province of Lower

Burma in 1886, a Lieutenant-Governor was appointed
to administer them in place of the old Chief Commis¬
sioner. Assam had been annexed to Bengal in 1826

and was formed into a separate Chief Commissioner-
ship in 1874. In the partition of Bengal in 1905,
Assam, together with the eastern half of Bengal,
was converted into one Lieutenant-Governorship.
When the partition was annulled in 1912, Assam
once more became a Chief Commissionership. The
North-West Frontier Province was formed in 1901 by
detaching the frontier districts from the Punjab. Delhi
was created into a separate province under a Chief
Commissioner when it was made the capital in 1911.

The Government of India were empowered by the Act
of 1854 to define the limits of the various provinces. The
Act further expressly vested in the Govefnor-General-ih-
Council all residuary authority not given to the local
Governments. The additions to the British territory

J

176 Indian Administration

made by Lord Dalhousie and the urgent necessity of
splitting up the tremendously overgrown province of
Bengal at last goaded the home authorities to take steps
which would authorize the formation of new provinces
and help in the systematization of their management.

Henceforth three different types of provinces are visible.

The first type included the old Presidencies
Tliree Types Governors’ Provinces, the second included

provinces under Lieutenant-Governors and
the third those under Chief Commissioners. The first
.type naturally enjoyed a higher status as being the more
ancient and as being in the enjoyment of some special
.privileges. After the abolition of the East India Company,
the power of appointing Governors of the Presidencies
was vested in His Majesty acting on the advice of the
Secretary of State. The Lieutenant-Governors and Chief
Commissioners were appointed on the recommendation of
the Governor-General. The Governors had also the
privilege of being in direct correspondence with the
Secretary of State, it being only necessary for them to
.send copies of such communications to the Governor-
General. Lieutenant-Governors and Chief Commissioners
on the other hand had a comparatively lower status,
particularly the Chief Commissioners, who were mere
delegates of the Governor-General in respect of the
necessary powers of administration that were granted to
them. . One more distinction has to be noted. The
Governors’ provinces necessarily possessed Executive
Councils. It was not so with either Lieutenant-Governors’
or Chief Commissioners’ provinces.

The Reforms Act of 1919 has entirely done away with
.this distinction and aiT"provinces are now declared to
be Governors’ Provinces. However, the old difference
in the authority which makes the appointments remains.

Growth and Formation of Provinces V77

Governors of the three old Presidencies continue as

before to be nominated from England
Changes on faQ advice of the Secretary of State,

made by the They are persons outside the Indian Civil

Service and have often been prominent
party leaders or Parliamentarians. They have naturally a.
higher status. All the other Governors are nominated,
on the recommendation of the Governor-General and are
usually men who have put in a successful and long
period of service in India. These are prize posts for
the ambitious and capable members of the bureaucracy
and they are generally left in the gift of the chief
authority on the spot, namely the Governor-General. Such,
provinces cannot have, therefore, the status of the old
Presidencies. The Act of 1858 expressly gave the Gover¬
nor-General the right of appointing Lieutenant-Governors.

Another distinction in the provinces was introduced.

when the practice was initiated of adminis¬
tering newly conquered territories like
Assam, the Punjab, Saugar, etc., not under-
the laws and regulations in force in the old
provinces like. Bengal and Bihar, but under-
instructions issued by the Govemor-General-in-Council.

Regulation
and Non-
Regulation
Province*

Such provinces came to be known as Non-Regulation.
Provinces as distinguished from the old Regulation.
Provinces of. Madras, Bengal and Bombay. In

the Non-Regulation Provinces great discretion was.
allowed to officers and the administration was conduct¬
ed in accordance with simpler codes, modified,
to suit the circumstances of each special case.
However, in course of time, the distinction practi¬
cally disappeared and, just before the introduction,
of the Reforms, was almost non-existent except,
for some difference in the terminology of officers..

178 Indian Admmisiratio?i

In the Non-Regulation Provinces, for instance, the
Collector was designated the Deputy-Commissioner
.and the Deputy-Collector was known as the Extra-
Assistant Commissioner. After the Reforms, all pro¬
vinces were raised to the dignity of Governors' Provinces
and therefore the distinction has altogether disappeared.

Table showing the area and population of the different provinces in

India according to the Census of 1921

• w

J3 Q

O M-l ~

Name of the
province

5°g

S'U a)
c3 cfi

Population in millions

£ » =

Total

popula-

Hindus

Muslims

Others

tion

FA K. 1

/Bombay 1 ...

195 ;

28-9

22-7

4*8

1*4

Madras 1 ...

153

47*8

41*1

3*2

3*5

5 a

ICO JMI >»

Bengal 1

82

47*6

20*8

25*5

1*3

ef ® £

CS

United Pro-

5 4J, CS

"*3 5— 3 J

r* e4_fi o J

vinces 2 ...
Punjab 2 ...

112

137

46*5

25*1

39-5

8*8

6-7

12-8

0*3

3*5

1 tiding: Ij
tribal
'itory wit
vincial t

Bihar and
Orissa 2 ...
Central Pro-

112

38*0

31*6

3-7

2-7

vinces 2 ...

131

16*0

13*1

0*6

2*3

c c 5

Assam 2

61

8*0

4*4

2-2

1*4

•t—« -*-»

Burma 2

234

13-2

0-5

0*5

12*2

North-West Frontier
Province 3

Delhi, Ajmer, Coorg

39

5-1

0*2

2*1

2-8

and Andamans ...

8

1*2

0*8

0*3

0*1

India

(including

all States, etc.) ...

1,805

318*9

216-7

68*7

33*5

1 Presidencies tinder Governors who are not members of the
Indian Civil Service.

2 Governors’ Provinces where Governors are members of the
Indian Civil Service.

3 Under Chief Commissioners appointed by the Viceroy.

Growth and Formation of Provinces 179 ;

The Indian Councils Act of 1861 restored the power of:

Growth of
Provincial
Legislatures

legislation to Bombay and Madras, the
power which had been taken away in 1833.
The Councils of the Governors were-
expanded for legislative purposes by the

addition of more members. However, no clear line of

demarcation was drawn between central and provincial
subjects. The Central Government imposed certain
restrictions upon the legislative powers of the provinces.
A detailed reference to them is made elsewhere.

This short account of the various stages in the
establishment of the provinces and in the growth of their
powers will suffice to give to the reader a clear idea of
the various factors that modified the formation of

provinces. A further detailed working of provincial
government has now to be studied.

CHAPTER XI

The Relation between the Central and Provmcial
Governments or the Growth of Provincial

Autonomy

1. The Pre-Reform Period

■The Government of India have all along been and

continue to be today a unitary Govern-
Government meat. The division of the territory under
of India are a their jurisdiction is intended only to, serve
Unitary administrative convenience. The provinces

Government are tfrg m ere creations of the Government
of India. Their number can be reduced or increased,
their boundaries altered, and the arrangements for their
governance modified and varied by the Government of
India. Provinces in India have no federal inviolability
or status of independence. Even the Montford Report
emphatically stated that the changes that were contem¬
plated by its joint authors had nothing to do with a
federalizing process. Their business was one of devolu¬
tion. The local Governments were in fact to continue
to be agents of the Government of India even after the
Reforms recommended by them. According to the
Report, * the last chance of making a federation of
.British India was in .1774 when Bombay and Madras
had rights to surrender. The provinces have now
no innate powers of their own and therefore have
nothing to surrender in foedus. The Government of
India must give and the Provincial Governments must
receive.’ The future map of India may indeed present

Growth of Provincial Autonomy 181

the external semblance of a great confederation com¬
posed of various smaller self-governing units. But that
will only be a delusive appearance; it will not be the
reality of a federation, as long as the theory of India’s
being a unitary state continues to hold the field.

The bonds that connect the Government of India with
the Provincial Governments can best be studied under
three heads: (a) Administration; (b) Legislation ; and
( c ) Finance. Control is exercised on all the three counts
and it would conduce to clearness of exposition if each
of the heads were considered separately. The point
to be remembered in connexion with all the heads is the
conception of the Government of India as one indivisible
whole with entire responsibility to the Parliament of
England for the proper discharge of their allotted task.

The Montagu-'Chdmsford Report has pointed out that
the administrative control exercised by the
(a) Central Government of India over the provinces is
Control oyer too g enera i and extensive to admit of any

Administration analysis. ‘ The Government of India have

regarded themselves in the past as distinctly
charged with the duty of framing policy and inspiring
reforms for the whole of India.’ They were responsible to
Parliament for the administration of the whole country.
Before the Regulating Act of 1774 the three Presidencies
which formed the Indian dominion of the Company were
mutually independent and directly subordinate to the
Home authorities of the Company.

... The process of centralization, which resulted in and is

evidenced by the subordination of two of
V"*?** the Presidencies to one, commenced from
in * ° the time of Warren Hastings’ assumption of

the office of Governor-General under the new Regulating
Act. For some time the control of the central authority

182 Indian Administration

over the provinces was more or less nominal. The
aggressive and unwise policy of the Bombay and Madras
Governments involved the Governor-General in political
.and financial difficulties. The geographical isolation of
the provinces, which were separated from the seat of the
central authority by a wedge of independent territory,
helped in the attenuation of the power of the Central
Government over them. It was only when the task of
conquest was completed and contiguous boundaries
connected the central authority’s dominion with that of
the provinces that the latter came under effective central
control. Lord Wellesley declared that ‘ all measures
relating to the general defence and protection of India,
to the levying of war or making of peace, to the general
administration of revenue of all Presidencies, and, finally,
to every point affecting the general interests, whether
civil, military or political, of the Company’s possessions,
form the exclusive duties arising out of the superintending
powers of the Governor-Gen eral-in-Council

All the newly acquired provinces were supposed to
cpme under the direct authority of the Govemor-General-
in-Council. He exercised it by delegating the necessary
functions to subordinate officers . like Lieutenant-
Governors and Chief Commissioners, specially appointed
by him to administer them for him. The Presidency of
Bengal, which was originally in the direct charge of
the Govemor-General-in-Council, was entrusted to a
Lieutenant-Governor in 1854 and since then there has been
no big territory directly administered by the Government
of India*. They,have; become a supervising and guiding
authority over the administration of the entire country
without any immediate territorial jurisdiction.

Naturally some functions of government were and have
been kept entirely in its own hands by the Central

Central

Subjects

Control over

Provincial

Subjects

Growth of Provincial Autonomy 383

Government, consistently with the responsibility for

the government of the whole country which
was left on its shoulders. Questions like
those of defence, of diplomatic dealings
with frontier countries and foreign nations, of political
relations with the Native States, were kept as their own
distinct charge by the Government of India. Tariff, cur¬
rency and exchange, the post office, railways, and similar
other heads of all-India concern were also kept as an
undivided charge by the central authority.

On the other hand, authority over and responsibility for
the remaining heads were shared with the
Provincial Governments in a varying mea¬
sure. In the case of such departments the
Government of India functioned, not as a
first-hand initiating authority, but as a revising and appel¬
late power. For example the Home Department of the
Government of India supervised the administration in the
provinces in subjects of law and justice, police, jails,
internal politics, medical service, the Indian Civil Service
in the provinces, etc. The Revenue Member supervised
similar administration in the subjects of land revenue,
surveys, forests, agriculture, etc., and the Finance Member
that in opium, stamps, income-tax, etc. In all these
departments the primary jurisdiction. belonged to the
Provincial Government, but the Government of India could
interfere unquestioned, either on their own initiative or in
their appellate capacity. The degree of this interference
and control would obviously vary with the circumstances
of each case.

In many respects India is one single undivided country
and in these respects a uniformity of administration is
extremely desirable. In questions like the .development
of trade, industry and science, the tendency has been

184 Indian Administration

definitely

Uniform

Action

Necessary

provinces.

towards the formulation of a uniform policy,
even a uniform administration. In cases
like these the tendency to concentration
is inevitable. It combats any unhealthy
divergence in the conditions of the various
It avoids dissipation of energy and money

in dispersed efforts that cannot in fact stand alone. It
must also be. remembered that the main Services which
carry out the mandate of the Provincial Governments
are recruited by the Secretary of State antj their terms of
service are fixed by him. So that on many questions con¬
cerning them the Provincial Governments cannot interfere
at all.

. There is one more force which indirectly helped the

process of centralization. The Government
of India thought it necessary to exercise
control over the provinces from above, to
infuse in them the fresh vigour and enlight¬
enment that comes f roni a detached judgement of a problem
of administration. The authority on the spot, with its
excessive attention to detail and its saturation in the
colour of its immediate surroundings, may not always be
able to form a proper judgement and take a bold stand.
The Government of India, standing apart from, and above
mere details, can make a comprehensive survey of the
whole problem and enunciate and enforce fresh principles.
Their superior authority was believed to prove a beneficial
corrective to the narrow-visioned concentration on detail
which the Montagu-Chelmsford Report has pointed out as
being the penalty of absorption in the task of day-to-day

Central
Control as a
Corrective

administration.

; The responsibility of the Secretary of State to Parlia¬
ment and the consciousness that to that body they were
accountable for the peace and good government of the

(b) Central
Control over
Provincial
Legislation

Growth of Provincial Auio7iomy 185

whole of the laud, actuated the Government of India
to exercise close supervisory control over the provinces
and to maintain a high standard of public and personal
morals. In the absence of popular control, their control
from above had a good restraining effect.

(b) Legislation: The power of making regulations was
extended to the Presidencies by the Charter
of 1807. However, with the gradual
tightening up of the control of the central
authority, the importance of this power was
gradually diminished. In 1833 all legislative
power belonging to the Presidencies was taken away and
the Govemor-General-in-Councirs laws were made binding
upon the whole of the land, including the provinces. This
gave an extensive jurisdiction to the central law-making
authority which henceforth began to make laws even for
the provinces. To the latter was restored the right of
independent legislation in 1861. Still, the Government
of India’s legislative authority continued concurrently to
extend to the whole of India as before. In local matters,
indeed, freedom began to be allowed to the provinces to
pass their own legislation. Yet, in the theory of the
constitution, till the Reforms of 1919, the Legislative
Councils were only enlargements of the executive Govern¬
ment for purposes of law-making. Legislative power
residing m them as distinct from the executive Provincial
Governments was not recognized. The Provincial Legisla¬
tures, therefore, did not possess any genuine independence.

Subject to certain restrictions, local Legislatures in the
provinces were allowed to make laws for the
peace and good government of the provinces.
The Central Legislature-could not efficiently
cater for the needs of distant provinces.
Therefore it delegated its function, subject to its superior

Delegation of

Powers to the
Provinces

186 Indian Administration

control, to Provincial Legislatures. Local Councils
were not allowed to amend any Act of Parliament or
to repeal or alter without previous sanction any Act
of the Governor-General's Legislative Council. Pre¬
vious sanction of the Governor-General was necessary
to consider any law affecting religious usages of any
class of British subjects in India or the regulation of
patents and copyrights or the relations of the Government
with Princes of Indian States. These restrictions would
not appear to be stringent. Yet in practice they limited
the freedom and discretion of Provincial Governments
to a great extent.

As the Montford Report has pointed out, most of the
Many Laws Provincial Legislatures were very young
were already institutions and a great part of the field which
passed by the would have been otherwise covered by them
Central had been already filled by the Governor-

Legislature General's Legislative Council, which of
course was the elder body and always possessed concur¬
rent legislative power for the whole of India. Compara¬
tively fewer things were therefore left to the discretion
and disposal of the newer bodies. Besides, the necessity
and the desirability of having a uniform policy in impor¬
tant matters induced the Central Legislature to take compre¬
hensive action in them for the country as a whole. For
instance, the Penal and Procedure Codes and the Evidence
Act; laws for prisons; laws about marriage, minors,
succession; civil laws regulating contracts, trusts,
transfer of property, easements, arbitration, etc.; busi¬
ness laws for patents, trade marks, weights and measures,
insurance, insolvency; laws for forests, mines, factories,
wireless, electricity ; labour laws about breach of contract,
emigration, apprentices, etc.; legislation about public
health, poisons, leprosy, lunacy, epidemics; laws about

Growth of Provincial Autonomy 187

religious endowments, charitable societies, plays, and
cinematographs, motor vehicles, ancient monuments and
treasure troves—on all this miscellaneous mass,legislation
was passed by the Government of India. Laws were also
passed by them on subjects essentially their own, like
military and marine, foreign relations, currency and
finance, customs, and tariff, etc.

Legislation on the subjects in the miscellaneous list
given above could have been undertaken by the pro¬
vinces. There are precedents in western countries to
show that legislation in these subjects may not neces¬
sarily have the uniformity that accompanies, centralized
control. Still, it was considered that on. the whole such
uniformity would conduce to greater national benefit.
The Government of India therefore undertook legisla¬
tion themselves and laid down the principles of policy
and administration in all of them.. This directly reduced
the scope of action and legislation of the Provincial
Governments.

Over and above these circumstances, .the cumulative
effect of which was greater control exercised
Previous ^ by the Central over Provincial Governments

the S of S * n mat ^ ers legislation, there was another
and G.-G. factor of considerable importance and effect;

The previous sanction of the Government of
India and the Secretary of State was declared necessary
for all projects of provincial legislation before their intro¬
duction. Even private bills could be brought under the
operation of this executive control by the fact that leave
for introducing the bill had to be given by the Councils
As in many of the Councils the Provincial Governments
could, if they chose, successfully oppose the granting of
such permission, the Government of India, by executive
direction, could compel the Provincial Government to

188 . Indian Administration

oppose such a measure. Moreover, in the case of all
private bills which affected revenues, the sanction of the
Government of India to their introduction was necessary.
The assent of the Governor-General to all provincial
legislation after it had been passed by the Provincial
Legislatures w.as also necessary. The necessity of the
previous sanction of the Government of India to the very
introduction of legislative projects effectively curtailed
provincial initiative and scope of independent action.
The Decentralization Commission came to the conclusion

-that a substantial measure of legislative devolution was
necessary in the interest of the administration of subjects
of local importance.

( c ) Finance : The East India Company were a com¬
mercial corporation and their accounts were

(c) Central ^ on commercial principles. This was
Control over *

Provincial the foundation for the policy of centralized
Finance — finance even after the commercial character

(i) Centralize- 0 f the East India Company had disappeared
tion ' and they had definitely assumed political

responsibility. Full control over the revenues of the
whole of India was retained by the Central Government
in its own hands, in theory at least. All sources of income
and all the amounts of such income, collected in any part of
British India, were credited to the Government of India’s
treasury. Revenues from all parts of the country converg¬
ed into one reservoir and from this reservoir money flowed
back in large or small driblets to serve the diverse needs
of the administration, including expenditure of the pro¬
vinces. It is obvious, therefore, that the provinces in this
instance were mere managing agents for the Government
of India. The sources of taxation, the amount of
taxation, the manner of collection and the authority for
expenditure were all dictated from headquarters. Tte

Growth of Provincial Autonomy 189 *

Provincial Governments had simply to do as they were
asked. They had no interest in the collection of taxes.
As the executive agents of the Government of India they
mechanically carried out their superiors’ mandates.

The Government of India distributed money among the

various provinces to enable them to fulfil

Distribution of the obligations delegated to them for the

money among: conven j ence 0 f administration. The princi-
the Provinces

pie of such a distribution was not to*
proportion the amount of the grant to the amount of
income yielded by the province. The needs of the
province were generally considered and the grant was.
fixed at a figure approximately commensurate with
the needs. Such a wholesale centralization, in an ex¬
tensive country like India, imposed an extremely heavy
burden of financial administration upon the Government,
of India.

General Strachey pointed out how the distribution of
the public income degenerated into a scramble, and how*
very often, that province which was aggressive and loud,
in its protestation got what it wanted and not the one
which was more needy but less vocal and agitative. Local,
economy brought no local advantage, as all surplus
accumulated at the Government of India. Therefore the
incentive to avoid waste was completely absent. Local
growth of income and larger realization of money from
local taxation could not serve as a means to improve-
local conditions, as all money collected, from whatever
source and place, was directed to the treasury of the
Goverriment of India. In the absence of any stimulus
to the development of local revenue, the general interest
in the improvement of the public income was brought
down to the lowest level.

After thecompletion of the conquest of India tod

190 Indian Adminisiratio?i

with the end of the Mutiny, the military bias of the

administration gradually disappeared. The

Nation-- 1870 1 financial responsibilities assumed by the

Government of India were extremely
difficult to discharge. The unwieldy centralized system
did not confer the benefit either of greater economy or
of greater efficiency. It only caused embarrassment
to the Government of India and created just grievances
among the provinces. * The Provincial Governments
were allowed no discretion in sanctioning fresh charges.
If it became necessary, to spend ^20 on a road between
two local markets, to rebuild a stable that had tumbled
down or entertain a menial servant on 10s. a month the
-matter had. to be formally reported for the orders of the
’Government of India.’

Lord Mayo’s Government made the first attempt at
decentralization. Larger financial power

Scheme^ 0 * an d responsibility were delegated to the

Provincial Governments. Certain depart¬
ments like police, jails, education, medical sciences,
hospitals, sanitation, registration, printing, roads and
communications, civil buildings, were given for manage¬
ment to the provinces under certain conditions. Depart¬
mental receipts from these heads were allowed to the
provinces and in addition a fixed grant of money totalling
altogether Rs. 4,68,87,110 was annually, assigned to them.
With this income they were to cover the expenses of
management. Discretion was left to the provinces to
obtain a larger revenue by additional taxation and better
management. For the Government of India was retained
income from the remaining sources and the administration
■of the remaining departments.

It must be clearly understood that this process of
•decentralization was not based on any principle of

Growth of Provincial Autonomy 191

federal finance. It was not intended to invest the

provinces with any degree of financial in-
Ffaanc^ 4 dependence. The scheme of provincial

devolution as initiated in 1870 was inspired
only by considerations of administrative convenience and
facility. The Central Government was not voluntarily
abdicating any of its functions but simply transferring
them to subordinate agents in the interest of division of
labour, which led to administrative efficiency. Even in
those subjects, therefore, which were 4 provincialized \
the Governor-Generals superior control and supervision
were expressly maintained. However, in spite of its
various defects and shortcomings, the scheme, on the
whole, realized the aim of its author. It helped to bring
about greater harmony between the Central and Provincial
Governments. It allowed greater freedom and. scope to
the provinces and encouraged them to undertake works
of provincial utility and benefit.

The next step in the direction of devolution was taken

1877 * n the-time of Lord Lytton. To the

departments which were given over to
provincial management in 1870, several new ones were
now added. These included excise, stamps, law and
justice, and some other items varying from province to
province. Instead of making -any corresponding addition
to the earlier fixed grant for meeting the expenditure,
revenues from these departments were allowed to the
provinces. Any surplus above the estimated income
was shared to the extent of half with the Government

of India; the latter also undertook to meet deficits to the
same extent if and when they occurred. This did not.
amount to conferring powers of fresh taxation upon the
provinces but was intended to improve the quality and the
economy of the administration. Contracts on this basis

192 Indian Administration

were formed with each province separately, and they were
to have a duration of five years.

Assam and Burma were backward provinces and were
treated differently. Instead of a fixed allotment, Assam *
was given a share of the land revenue of the province.
Burma was similarly given a share of the land revenue
and also of the income from forests,, and export duty on
rice and salt. The new principle in the settlement of
these two contracts was that, instead of making a fixed
assignment of money to make good the excess of provin¬
cial expenditure over provincial income, a share in the
imperial revenues was granted. The principle adopted,
here was later on extended to other provinces. Sir J,
-Strachey and Lord Lytton were the sponsors of this
change.

Lord Ripon and Major Baring introduced further
lgg2 improvements. Arrangements with the

different provinces needed co-ordination*
The experience of the new arrangement soon began to
indicate that, financially, it had not proved as successful
as it was expected to. When the time came therefore
for renewing the settlements of 1877 some important
modifications were introduced. The original lump grants
made since the time of Lord Mayo were abolished.
Instead, all revenues from certain specified heads, like
civil departmental receipts or civil buildings, were made
over entirely to the provinces. Of the remaining heads
which had been already transferred to the provinces,
■forests and registration were divided almost equally
between the two contracting parties and the deficit that
was still left in the provincial budgets was not made good
by the grant of lump sums but by a fixed share of the
land revenue.

The division of Government departments into three

Growth of Provincial Autonomy 193

groups dates from this time. Heads like defence, foreign

relations, customs, currency, etc. were

Provincial and i m P er ial; heads like land revenue,

Divided Heads registration and forests were divided ;

and some minor heads like civil buildings
and civil departmental receipts were purely provincial.
The Provincial Governments were relieved of any
burden resulting from the occurrence of calamities like
war .and famine, unless the calamities were of an
exceptionally severe character. The contracts of 1882
were quinquennial.

From 1884 a necessary minimum balance had to be
maintained by the Provincial Governments

1897

with the Government of India. The latter
often usurped the balances accumulated by the provinces
with great difficulty, and this caused considerable
embitterment and ill-feeling. However, settlements were
renewed at the end of each five years without any great
change of principle. The position in 1897 was as
follows. Generally speaking the Provincial Government
retained the whole of the receipts from the provincial
rates, courts of law, jails, police, education, medical and
local marine services, minor irrigation works, certain
State railways and major irrigation works, buildings and
roads, stationery, etc- Stamps, assessed taxes, forests
and registration receipts were divided half and half; of
excise and land revenue three quarters were taken by the
Government of India and one quarter was allowed to
the provinces. On the expenditure side, the provinces
had to incur expenditure on most of these heads and
generally had to pay a share in the cost of collecting.
The share was proportional to their receipts from the
various departments.

The settlements being quinquennial, the dread of a
7

194 Indian Administration

revision at the end of the fifth year was a standing

cause of restlessness. It marred the conti-

1904

nuity of provincial administration. Any
contemplation of great projects of development was
utterly impossible. After the cessation of their exchange
trouble, the Government of India were persuaded to
reconsider the question. Lord Curzon’s Government
therefore in 1904 tried to remove the defects of the
existing system. The old division into imperial, divided,
and provincial heads was of course continued, but the
respective shares of the two powers were revised.
Expenditure on purely imperial heads was to be incurred
as before entirely by the Government of India. Ex¬
penditure incurred on the divided heads was to be
divided between the provincial and central adminis¬
tration. The settlements were declared to be quasi¬
permanent and were to be revised only in grossly
unjust or extremely difficult circumstances. The old
uncertainty, the danger of appropriation of the provin¬
cial resources by the Government of India and consequent
absence of any incentive to economy now disappeared.
A greater certainty and freedom were allowed to the
provinces in financial matters. ^

Lord Hardinge’s Government took the final step in the
development of the system. The quasi¬
permanent settlements were declared to be
permanent in 1912. It was laid down that the Provincial
Governments were not to budget for a deficit except
under abnormal conditions. The Government of India
curtailed their intervention in the making of provincial
budgets. The unseemly quinquennial conflicts, which
punctuated the relations of the Government of India with
the provincial administrations up to 1904 and which
had- practically ceased after the introduction of the

Summary of
the Position
before the
Reforms—
Central
Subjects

Provincial

Subjects

Growth of Provincial Autonomy 195

semi-permanent settlements of that year, were now given
a decent burial.

The position, therefore, before the Reforms can be
summed up thus. Subjects of all-India
importance requiring a uniformity of policy
and administration like defence, foreign
relations, customs, posts and telegraphs,
mint, famine relief, railways and irrigation
were declared to be wholly central subjects;
income from them, expenditure on them, and executive
control over them vested exclusively in the Govern¬
ment of India.

The second group of subjects, known as provincial heads,
consisted of a few departments, the revenue
from which and expenditure on which were
wholly the concern of the province. All civil
departmental receipts and those from public works depart¬
ments came under this category. The administration of
the other departments in this group, which included jails
and police, education, medical, printing, roads and
civil buildings, was primarily vested in the provinces;
the Government of India interfered to enunciate
important principles of policy, or to revise and check
actions of the provincial executive if they were wrong or
mischievous.

The last group consisted of what are known as the
divided heads. In it were included subjects
like land revenue, stamps, excise, income-
tax, forests, registration, irrigation,. etc.
Revenues from these sources were divided in a certain
ratio between the Central and Provincial Governments,
the ratio of the share of one to the share of the other
being fixed after a comprehensive deliberation. The
expenditure in these departments was also shared;

Divided

Subjects

196 Indian Administration

and so was administrative control over them. The
provinces took the initiative in local management and
the Government of India retained their general super¬
vision and guiding control. As the Government of
India had a share in the revenue, they had a strong
motive for interfering even in the details of the
administration. They exercised a close supervision
over land revenue settlement and over works in
which expansion and development depended upon capital
outlay.

It is thus easily intelligible, how, apart from the
administrative control directly enjoyed as such by the
Government of India over the Provincial Governments 7
actions, a good deal of indirect but very real administra¬
tive control followed as an inevitable corollary of the
then existing financial organization.

The Government of India retained complete control of

Powe f taxat * on i m P° se d British India. It

Taxation was thought politically inexpedient to allow

any large freedom to the provinces in this
matter as long as the provincial administrations were
irresponsible bureaucracies. Superior control from
above was the only safeguard against unjustifiable or
mistaken actions of these officials. Hence it was
expressly laid down that no province could, without
previous sanction of the Governor-General, consider any
bill or measure affecting the Government of India’s
revenues. Even in those resources which an ingenious
Provincial Government might seek as not coming
within the bounds of this inhibiting clause, the Central
Government could exercise its controlling power by
what were known as 4 instructions * to provincial adminis¬
trations. They required all projects of law to be
approved of by the Secretary of State. A proposal for

t

Growth of Provincial Autonomy 197

provincial taxation would have, therefore, to be naturally
referred for sanction to the Government of India, the
Finance Department of which would analyse it with
cleverness and vigilance. Even the budgets of Provincial
Governments, before their submission to Provincial
Legislatures, had to be submitted in their draft form to
the Central Government, which could introduce any
alterations or additions in them. The subordination
in which the Provincial Governments were held was
thus close and the scope of their action was much
limited.

The provinces were never allowed to borrow on their
own credit in an open money market*

Borrowing They could not pledge their solvency in

order to find effective means of self-expan¬
sion and improvement. It was thought abs olutely unwise,
in larger interests, to concede this power in any
measure to any authority other than that of the Central
Government. The market for loans was believed to be

limited and sensitive, and it was feared that credit was
likely to be impaired by indiscreet ventures. The
Decentralization Commission considered this question
and declined to relax the rigidity of this rule.

Lastly, through the instrumentality of various codes
and instructions, such as the Civil Service
Executive Regulations, Civil Accounts Codes, Public

anTcode** Works Codes, and the like, the Central

Government’s control over the provinces
was immensely strengthened in practice. These codes
imposed definite restraints upon the powers of provincial
administrations to create new appointments or increase
the emoluments of the existing ones. Competitive and
ruinous generosity between the provinces had to be
stopped. A mass of regulations affecting recruitment,

198 Indian Administration

promotion, leave, foreign .service, and so on had arisen
out of this necessity. The control over provincial
expenditure from above exercised with such strictness
and rigidity was intended to make good the lack of
effective popular criticism. In the absence of powerful
local Legislatures, the necessity and the value of such
control were regarded as above dispute.

Thus, in all the three respects of Legislation, Finance
and Administration, the provinces were allowed only a'
small amount of independence and freedom before the
Reforms.

2. After the Reforms

After the Reforms, the state of things changed. The
provinces were regarded as the proper
Introduction domain for constitutional experiments. The

first steps in the introduction of responsi¬
bility were to be taken in them and a*
new standpoint altogether was now introduced in the
consideration of the question. Mr. Montagu visualized
them as autonomous self-governing principalities federat¬
ed by one Central Government. Responsibility in the
provincial administration was incompatible with bureau¬
cratic control from above. The largest possible measure
of independence in legislation, administration and finance
had to be conceded to the provinces in the inevitable
logic of this new angle of vision. This independence
and freedom is connoted in the now familiar expression
4 provincial autonomy’. Indeed there was no idea of
creating a federation; it was expressly disavowed.
However, a large measure of liberty was now to be
extended to the provinces, not only for the administrative
convenience of the Government of India, but in response
to the urgent call for such a liberty in the interests of an

Growth of Provincial Autonomy 199

all-sided provincial development and the growth of self-
governing institutions.

Endeavour was therefore made to demarcate the
(a) Demarca- legislative sphere of the Government of
tion of India from that of the provinces. As far

Central and as possible, each was to be imade indepen-

dent of the other. Their respective spheres
** of action were to be clearly distinguished.

The .old group of divided heads, which had interlocked
their mutual interests, their dual control, and their joint
responsibility, and had engendered a good deal of
bitterness and ill-feeling, were now to be abolished. In
short, the two jurisdictions were to be maintained as
distinct as possible. The central and provincial budgets
were to be separated, the former recording only direct
transactions of the Government of India. The new view¬
point inclined in the direction of the utmost relaxation of
the control of the Government of India over the provinces
in all provincial matters and in the acknowledgement of
the provinces as the only proper centres for effective
popular development.

With the idea of giving effect to this new principle,
inquiries were instituted to explore methods

and Provincial for the bifur cation of central and pro-
Lists vincial functions. As a result of the in¬

quiry and on a discussion of the general
bearings of the question, it was found possible to
prepare two separate lists of administrative subjects,
and to hand over one to the Central and one to the Pro¬
vincial Governments. As far as possible, the lists were
to be mutually exclusive. There was to be the least
possibility for the two authorities to come to clash on
a common ground. The principle of division was of
course the most obvious one, namely the necessity of

200 Indian Administration

a unity of control and uniformity of policy in central sub¬
jects on the one hand, and the desirability of provincial
and local freedom on the other hand.

Questions of all-India importance, like defence and
foreign relations of India, or those like customs, posts,
telegraphs and currency, in which a uniformity of principle
and a sameness of administrative system are of paramount
importance, would naturally lie within the Central
Government’s sphere. On the other hand, in questions
like education and local self-government or agriculture,
diversity of management might be allowed—nay, might
be necessary—on account of the great diversity in local
conditions. Such departments might best be left to be
entirely administered by local administrations. After the
Government of India Act of 1919, the old divided heads
were abolished.

Thus only two distinct lists now remain, the central and
provincial. The central subjects comprise,
Chief Heads among others, the following departments :

U»t» e tW ° defence; external relations; relations with

Native states; railways, shipping and navi¬
gation ; posts and telegraphs; customs; cotton excise
duty; salt-tax ; income-tax; currency and coinage ;
public debt of India; opium; copyright; emigration
and immigration; archaeology; ecclesiastical ; the
Public Services Commission; census and statistics,
etc. The important subjects in the provincial list are
education, local self-government, medical administra¬
tion, public health and sanitation, irrigation, land
revenue, famine relief, agriculture, co-operation, forests,
excise, industries, police and justice, weights and
measures, etc.

The compilation of these separate lists was followed
by consideration of the possibility of relaxation of

Growth of Provincial Autonomy 201

administrative, legislative and financial control over the

provinces. On each of these points definite
(b) Relaxation recommendations were made and were

tiv^ControT 4 acce P te<i as ^natters of constitutional prac¬
tice, if not as the letter of the law.
Regarding the relaxation of administrative control, it
was pointed out that, after the introduction of partial
responsibility in provincial administrations, they would
be naturally divided into two parts, one bureaucratic and
the other popular. In the former part, they would
function as agents of the superior central administration.
In the latter part they would have to be amenable to the
Legislature * s will.

It is laid down that in this popular side of pro-
vincial administration, that is in those

red Object* su ^i ects which are transferred to the

popularly elected ministers, the Central
Government should not ordinarily interfere. Even on
occasions when it is felt that the steps contemplated
by the ministers are likely to prove injudicious and
harmful, the Central Government is enjoined to try
persuasion only and to allow the liberty of com¬
mitting mistakes as the best method of learning wis¬
dom. In all such matters, therefore, interference from
above is strictly limited to those extreme and extraordi¬
nary circumstances in which the interests of the whole
of India are jeopardized or conflicts arise between
province and province. The Government of India have
not abdicated their responsibility for the peace, order
and good government of the land. There is there¬
fore no legal restraint upon their powers of inter¬
ference even in the self-governing half of the provincial
administrations.

A slightly varying convention is recommended for the

202 Indian Admmistration

bureaucratic half of the Provincial Governments, doing

the agency work for the Government
hi Reserved 0 £ j n( jj a- Th e departments represented by

U ,e this portion are known as reserved. Here

no transference of control and management from an
irresponsible executive to a body of responsible ministers
has taken place. It is therefore thought consistent with
constitutional theory that the only safeguard against the
vagaries of an irremovable executive would be its
subordination to a superior power. This latter is
represented .by the Government of India and therefore
they retain in the reserved half a greater power of inter¬
ference than in the transferred half.

All the same, the fact that Provincial Legislatures
are greatly enlarged, the fact that fran¬
chise for them is kept democratically low,
the fact that these very Legislatures
have been thought fit to enjoy the rights
and privileges of political responsibility,
have all tended to give them a unique importance.
As the ultimate aim of British policy is avowedly
the full development of responsible institutions, it
is recommended that the interference of the Govern¬
ment of India even in the reserved half of provincial
administration should be restricted only to cases
of unimpeachable necessity. Particularly when the
Executive and the Legislature in a province are unani¬
mous in their opinion on a certain problem, the Central

i • '

Government's veto should not be ordinarily exercised
at all. Thus a larger measure of liberty is allowed
to the provinces, if not by an alteration of the letter
of the law, by the institution of sound constitutional
conventions.

Similar additions have been made to the financial

When the
Legislature
and Execu¬
tive agree

Growth of Provincial Autonomy 203

powers of the Provincial Governments. In the first

.(c) Relaxation
of Financial
Control

place, the central and provincial budgets
are now entirely separated and the former
embraces only the direct transactions of
the Government of India. Definite sources

of income have now been allocated to the provincial
administrations. Receipts from provincial subjects,
a list of which has been already given, a share in
the growth of the revenue from income-tax collected
in the provinces, proceeds of new taxation which the
Provincial Governments may impose or of the loans
which they may float, balances standing to the credit
of the provinces at the time when the Government of
India Act came into force, are some of these allocated

sources.

The power of borrowing which had never been enjoyed
by the provinces before has now been
Power of conferred upon them. Loans may be

Borrowing

incurred to meet capital expenditure on any
work of a material character, or a project of lasting
public utility, if such an expenditure cannot be met out
of current revenues. They may be incurred for irrigation
purposes or for maintaining famine relief works or
for the repayment or consolidation of earlier loans.
It is laid down that the previous sanction of the
Governor-General-in-Council for all loans floated in

India, and of the Secretary of State for all loans floated
in England, is necessary. These authorities may fix the
amount of the loan, and the conditions on which it is

borrowed.

‘ The power of taxation which was exclusively possessed
■by the Government of India in pre-Reforms days has
now been delegated to the provinces. They can now
impose taxation without the previous sanction of the

204

Indian Administration

Governor-General under the following heads: a tax

Power of
Taxation

on land put to uses other than agricultural;
a tax on succession; a tax on gambling;
a tax on advertisements ; a tax on amuse¬

ments ; a tax on any specified luxury; a registration

fee ; and a stamp duty. The Presidency of Bombay has
exercised this power and introduced the Entertainments

Tax and enchanced the Court Fees.

However, certain restrictions and limitations still
continue to be exercised over provincial

Contributions ex P endlture - The most important of these

was the newly created obligation of what are
known as provincial contributions. In the new dispensa¬
tion of decentralized finance and of a complete separation
of imperial from provincial heads, it was found that the
Central Government could not be self-sufficient. The
resources handed over to it as its own did not suffice for
its expenditure. The only suitable and simple remedy to
make up its deficit was to ask the provinces to make
compulsory annual payments, which would be put as a
first charge upon their revenues. The total amount of
such a deficit was estimated to be ten crores. This sum
was distributed among the provinces according to their
capacity as judged from various standpoints. It was an
extremely difficult and intricate task and a special
committee under the presidency of Lord Meston madA
definite recommendations about the distribution. They
recommended two schedules. One provided for a transi¬
tional period of seven years and suggested definite sums
to be collected from every province in each of the seven
years. This period was regarded as necessary for
equalizing provincial conditions and correcting diversity.
The second schedule gave the permanent and standard
ratio at which each province should be taxed in order to

Growth oi Provincial Autonomy
wipe out the central deficit. The details
below.

Per cent contributions to deficit in seven consecutive years
beginning with the first year of contribution (rounded

off to even halves)

Province

1st year

<D

a

CM

Cti

CD

cn

4 th year

Vi

aS

0

>>

4-1

lo

6th year

7 th year

Madras

354

32*

29*

26*

23

20

17

Bombay

54

7

8

94

10*

12

13

Bengal

64

84

10*

124

15

17

19

United Provinces

244

23*

22*

21

20

19

18

Punjab

18

16*

15

134

12

10*

9

Burma

64

6*

64

64

64

64

6*

Bihar and Orissa

nil

14

3

5

7

8*

10

Central Provinces

2

24

3

3*

4

44

5

Assam

14

1*

2

2

2

2

2*

Total ...

100%

100%

In the financial year 1921-2 contributions were to be
paid to the Governor-General-in-Council by the local
Governments mentioned below according to the follow¬
ing scale:

Name of province
Madras
Bombay
Bengal

United Provinces

Punjab

Burma

Central Provinces and Berar
Assam

Contribution (in lakhs of rupees)

348

56

63
240
175

64
22

Every province has complained against the inequity of
the Meston Award and officials and non-officials have
condemned with equal severity the unwisdom of the

Their

Abolition

206 India?i Administration

contributions. The Reforms Inquiry Committee also

wrote against the arrangements. A revision
of the Meston Settlement, if not its complete
abolition, was unanimously and persist¬
ently demanded by both official and non-official opinion
in the provinces of India. It is gratifying to record that
Sir Basil Blackett, Finance Member, announced in his
budget speech for 1928-9 ‘ the complete and final remission
of provincial contributions \ To the extent of this
remission a larger margin would be left to the provinces
out of which expenditure on nation-building departments
could be incurred.

Steps have been taken also in the direction of legis¬
lative devolution. As has been already
(d) Relaxation no ted, the liberty of legislation that was

ControT^ at * Ve 2 rante< ^ to t ^ ie provinces in. earlier years

could not be utilized to the fullest extent
because the field which would have legitimately fallen to
Provincial Governments had been already covered by
imperial legislation. After the Reforms, it was enunci¬
ated that the previous sanction of the Governor-General
was not necessary for legislation in purely provincial
subjects. However, (i) for all legislation which aims at
repealing or modifying laws passed before 1861, unless
otherwise declared by the Govemor-General-in-Council;
(ii) for all legislation which is likely to affect central <
subjects or foreign relations or the discipline of His
Majesty’s military, naval or air forces; and (iii) for all.
legislation upon provincial subjects which are in whole or
part subject to Indian legislation, the previous sanction
of the Governor-General-in-Council is made obligatory.!
Besides, copies of all Acts which have received the
Governors’ assent have to be sent to the Governor-
General for his assent, and until that is given, an Act.

Growth of Provincial Autonomy 207

does not get legal validity. An Act of the Provincial
Legislature assented to both by the Governor and the
Governor-General can be reserved for the assent of His
Majesty-in-Council. In such cases the Act shall not
have validity until His Majesty’s assent has been notified
by the Governor-General,

The minority report of the Reforms Inquiry Committee

has suggested measures for the enlargement
Criticism of 0 £ i e gi s i a ti V e devolution. The power of veto

Sanction which rests with the Governor-General is

justified as constitutionally indispensable.
It exists in all responsible systems of Government and is
very sparingly used. The obligation of previous sanction
is, however, another matter. The area of the application
3 f this restricting clause should be as much circumscribed
as possible. Liberty ought to be allowed to the provinces
:o legislate without interference on all matters which are
strictly provincial but on which laws have been already
passed by the Central Legislature. The minority recom¬
mended that the spheres of action in regard to legislation
}f the Central and Provincial Governments should be
dearly defined. as is done in Canada or Australia,
following further the Canadian model, the residuary
power should be left with the Central Legislature. The
majority report of the Inquiry Committee has also recom¬
mended that the existing stringency of control of the
Central Government over provincial legislation, arising
Dut of the provision of previous sanction, be modified by
changing the rules.

After the Reforms, therefore, the relations of the
Central to the Provincial Governments have considerably
Itered. The grant of greater autonomy to the provinces
as necessarily meant a diminished control from the top.
k dear demarcation of the spheres of their activity and

208 Indian Administration-

a definite allocation of legislative, administrative and

financial responsibility to the provinces are
The deliberate steps in the direction of their

Beginning emancipation from unnecessary and incon-

of Provincial ^ t restra i n t s imposed upon them by
Autonomy

the central authority. Numbers of such
restrictions have continued, indeed, to exist even after the
Reforms. Attempts are being made and agitation is
being carried on to remove them. The importance of
the Act of 1919, however, consists in the definite
acceptance of the principle of provincial freedom and
independence in order to secure a proper and all-sided
development in an extensive and diversified country like
India.

CHAPTER XII

The Provincial Executive

Historical

1. The Governor

The classification of provinces into those of Governors’,.

Lieutenant-Governors’ and Chief Commis¬
sioners’ has already been referred to.
Before the Reforms, heads of provincial administrations,
were officials holding either the status of a Governor or
a Lieutenant-Governor or a Chief Commissioner. The
first mention of the power to appoint Governors is found
in the Charter of 1661. Since then, these officers continu¬
ed to be appointed to administer the important territorial
acquisitions of the East India Company. The power of
appointing them lay with the Directors. After the
abolition of the Company, they were nominated to hold
office on the recommendation of the Secretary of State,
and Lieutenant-Governors and Chief Commissioners on.
that of the Governor-General.

After the Reforms, all provinces have been elevated to
the status of Governors* Provinces. Now
Apj^mtment there are no Lieutenant-Governors or Chief

Commissioners excepting in the small areas,
like Ajmer-Merwara or Coorg. However the old distinc¬
tion in appointment has remained. The Governors of
Bombay, Madras and Bengal, which are known as presi¬
dencies, are still appointed directly from England. They
are not men who have been previously in service in India
under the Crown. Like the Governor-General, they are
selected from the public life of Britain and several of them,
happen to have been members of Parliament occupying:'

210 Indian Administration

important positions in their respective parties and some¬
times even in the Government. The office of Governor
is, however, considered to be essentially a non-party
office and Governors do not change with a change of
ministry in England.

Governors of all provinces other than the three presi¬
dencies are appointed by the Governor-General though
technically the appointment has to be approved of by His
Majesty. Their selection is made from the senior mem¬
bers of the Civil Service in India. They are thus bureau¬
cratic officials of long standing. The prospect of being
able to rise to the position of a provincial governor is one
of the great attractions to the young English entrant to
the Indian Civil Service.

A Governor’s office is held for five years and he is
allowed to enjoy leave for a maximum period of four
months, once during the period of his tenure.

The Governor is the head of the province. His powers

Hi* Power* an< ^ P r ^ v ^ e 2 es are numerous. He is given
•and Functions; assistance of an Executive Council of
his Relation to which he is, ex-officio, the president. He has
■the Executive the power to nominate a vice-president to
Council preside during his absence. He makes
rules and regulations for the conduct of the business of
the Council and has to distribute the different portfolios
amongst its members. The Governor presides over such
meetings and has a casting vote in case of a tie. The
decision arrived at by the majority is taken as final and
orders are issued in accordance with the decision. The
meetings of the Executive Council are held generally
once a week and all important matters in the various
departments are put before the Council for discussion and
decision by the respective members in charge.

In exceptional cases, however, when the Governor feels

The Provincial Executive 211

that the decision of the majority is not only wrong but
is fraught with grave danger to the interest of the
administration, extraordinary power has been conferred
upon him to override this decision of the majority and
to have his own wishes carried out. & similar extra¬
ordinary power is enjoyed by the Governor-General.
The Charter Act of 1793 extended it to the provincial
Governors.

As in the case of the Governor-General, so in the case-
of the provincial Governors, the Secretaries of the various
departments, though directly subordinate to the member
in charge of their department, are allowed direct access
to the head of the administration. They keep him
informed of all important matters that are being disposed
of by the departmental heads.

Up to the Reforms of 1919 the provincial Governors
were ex-officio presidents of theii Legis-
H l C T tr ° l latures, and enjoyed therefore all the powers

that are enjoyed by the president of a legis¬
lature. The Reforms have done away with
this anomaly of the head of the executive being also the-
head of the Legislature, and, to the extent to which the
president exercises direct control over the actual working
of the Legislature, the Governor has lost his former'
power. Still he retains large powers over the legislative
part of Government. It is the Governor who has the-
power to, summon, prorogue or dissolve the Legislative

over the
Legislature

Council and order fresh elections. He has to give
permission for resolutions to be admitted for discussion,
in the Council, and for bills which private members may
want to move. His assent is necessary to all bills that are
passed by the Legislature.

The Reforms have given to the Governor, as they
have also given to the Governor-General, an extraordinary'

'212 Indian Administration

veto against his Legislature which is described as the

Certification P ower certification. Any grant not

voted by the Legislature or reduced in

amount by it, and which the Governor feels is absolutely
essential for the safe conduct of administrative business,
can be restored by him in his own power, against the
expressed wishes of the Legislature. Any bill proposed
by Government, or any of its clauses, even if thrown out
t>y the Legislature as unnecessary or mischievous, can
T)e certified by the Governor as necessary and can then
immediately get the force of law as much as if it had
"been passed by the Legislature. The possession of
extraordinary vetoes, one against the Executive Council
and the other against the Legislative Council, makes
the constitutional position of the Governor extremely
formidable.

Still further importance has become attached to the

His position H P os ^ on Governor since the

in Dyarchy: vinauguration of the Reforms and the
Tus Relation to Jintroduetion of dyarchy in the Provincial
Transferred Governments. The Governor is instructed
Subjects generally to abide by the wishes of the
Ministers in matters of disagreement between the two, but
in cases in which he sees sufficient cause he may dissent
from them and overrule their actions. Complaints were
made before the Reforms Inquiry Committee by some of the
ex-Ministers that the Governor’s interference and over-
Tuling were found in practice to be excessive. Both the
majority and minority reports of the Committee point out
that the exercise of this power by the Governor is
intended to be strictly exceptional. They refer to the
Joint Parliamentary Committee’s comment that ordinarily
the Governor shall allow the Minister full liberty to work
out his plans even when the Governor thinks them to be

His Financial
Powers

The Provincial Executive 213

mistaken, for ‘ there is no way of learning: excepting
through experience and by the realization of responsi¬
bility’. This generous interpretation of the power given
to the Governor constitutes in their opinion a great check
upon its use and would be more in harmony with the
spirit of the Reforms.

The allocation of the provincial revenues and balances
between the two halves of Government that
are introduced under the dyarchical form, the
reserved half and the transferred half, is
decided at a joint meeting of Members and Ministers.
The amount going to each half is settled after mutual
consultation and understanding between the representa¬
tives of the two sections. It may happen that sometimes
an amicable settlement is found impossible ; that Members
and Ministers simply cannot agree and that therefore
there arises a deadlock in the Executive Government
itself. In such a contingency the Governor of the province
is authorized to make the allocation of funds himself,
irrespective of the agreement or disagreement of Mem¬
bers and Ministers and thus to prevent the machinery
of Government from coming to a standstill through the
starvation of funds. In no province has the necessity
arisen as yet to take recourse to this extraordinary method
of allocation. The Governor is the supreme appellate
authority in all matters of disagreement between the two
groups of his colleagues.

The Government of India Act also expressly lays
down that no proposal for the appropriation of revenues
or other moneys for any purpose shall be made except
on the recommendation of the Governor. This has
meant, in practice, a large financial power to the
Governor.

In fact the Governor’s task and responsibility have

214 Indian Admmistration

been considerably increased in his new role as the medi¬
ator and arbitrator between the two divisions
His position that have been deliberately created in the

between the provincial executive as a measure of reform
two halves in the direction of the introduction of

responsible government. To the Governor
is assigned the power of selecting Ministers from among
the elected members of the Legislative Council. In
making the choice he has to safeguard the efficiency of the
administration and also to secure the Legislature's
support. The constitutional status of the reserved and
transferred halves is mutually incongruous; their methods
of work are different; their problems and responsibilities
are divergent. It is not improbable that, instead of
running together with delicate smoothness, they may clash
with each other and generate friction in the normal
operation of the administrative machine. To the Governor
is left the important task of managing matters in such a
fashion that conflicts as far as possible may not arise at
all, and when they arise, may be settled in a spirit of
perfect harmony and co-operation. He has to maintain
the equipoise between the two warring elements and save
the innovation of dyarchy from being destroyed on the
rocks of differences and disputes.

Details of departmental administration can be supervised
by the Governor. The general broad policy of the
Government in all matters is decided after consultation
with him. The interests of the Services both in the
transferred and in the reserved half have to be carefully
safeguarded by him. In short, the Governor is much more
than a constitutional ruler ; he has very real and all-round
powers in the administration; his personal opinions, his
initiative, his active participation in the daily routine work
of Government influence the policy of the administration

The Provincial Executive 215

and the nature of the various measures that are promul¬
gated under its direction.

In emergencies like the one which arose in Bengal

^ and in the Central Provinces when the

Emergency Swarajists created a deadlock in the
Powers administration by refusing offices them¬

selves and refusing to sanction salaries for
others who might hold them, the Governor is empowered
to take over the transferred departments in his own
charge and to make arrangement for their administration.
The Governors of Bengal and the Central Provinces had
in fact temporarily taken over the control of the transferred
departments in their provinces in pursuance of this power
conferred upon them.

Lastly, the Governor of a province, like the Viceroy,
possesses the prerogative of mercy and

the sTv^Xn pardon > and he represents His Majesty in

his dealings with the Indian States that are
put under the jurisdiction of his authority. The Viceroy
and the Political Department of the Government of IWHa
have retained, however, their general powers of superin¬
tendence and control in such matters and the Governors
have to act in the light of their instructions.

The executive Government in the provinces now con¬
sists of two parts, one constituted by the Executive
Council and the other by the Ministers. It will be
convenient to treat each of these parts separately and
then to discuss their relations.

*

2. The Executive Council

The Provincial Governments were given the assis¬
tance of Executive Councils by the Act of 1784, more
commonly known as Pitt’s India Act. A clause of
this Act specifically stated that a Council consisting of

Historical:
Councils for
Madras and
Bombay

y

216 Indian Administration

three members including the Commander-in-Chief in the

province be created in each province. The
old Presidencies of Madras and Bombay
have each been ruled by a Governor-in-
Council since then. Even before this
enactment the senior members in the
service of the Company formed an advisory body to assist
the Governor in the discharge of his duties. The number
of the members of the Council in Madras and Bombay
was reduced to two in 1833, Later on it was increased
to three and stood at that figure till the introduction of
the Reforms in 1919. After the abolition of the office
of separate Commanders-in-Chief of the provinces, their
places in the Councils were taken by ordinary members.

It must be understood that newly created provinces
did not come under the operation of this
No Council® c i ause i n Pitt's India Act, for they had not

the status of Governors’ Provinces. They
were under the charge of either Lieutenant-
Governors or Chief Commissioners. Thus the North-
Western Province, Assam, the Punjab, and the Central
Provinces had no Executive Councils till the introduction
of the Reforms. . The responsibility of their governance
devolved solely upon the heads of those to whom, in
constitutional theory, necessary powers were delegated
by the Governor-General. The only province which was
not a Governor’s Province and which still had an Executive
Council was the province of Bihar and Orissa, which was
created after the annulling of the partition of Bengal and
the reshuffling of the provincial areas.

After the Re forms, the difference between the status of
the different provinces was abolished and all provinces
were declared to be Governors’ Provinces,* with an
Executive Council in each to assist the Governor. The

for other
Provinces

After the
Reforms

The Provincial Executive 217

North-West Frontier Province and the province of Delhi

were originally excepted from this arrange¬
ment. But in 1932 the North-West
Frontier Province was raised to the status of
a Governor’s province and a modified scheme of dyarchy
was introduced in it. Even this province therefore has
now an enlarged legislature and a responsible minister.
The Montford Reforms brought about the division of
provincial subjects into two groups. One of these, known
as the transferred half, was given over to ministers who
were made responsible to the legislature. The other,
known as the reserved half, was entrusted to the care of
the executive council. This body is not responsible to
the provincial legislature and not removable by it.

The number of Executive Councillors varies in the
different provinces. The major provinces,
that is the older and larger provinces of
Bengal, Madras and Bombay, have now
Councils each consisting of four members. In the
presidency of Bombay, however, on account of financial
pressure and the imperative need for retrenchment, the
number of Executive Councillors has been reduced from
four to two since last year. In the remaining provinces
the Councils usually consist of two members.

It has been laid down in the Act that one of the Coun¬
cillors must be a person who at the time of his appoint¬
ment has been at least for twelve years in the service
of the Crown in India. Usually half the number of the
total members—one in the minor and two in the major
provinces—are selected so as to satisfy this particular
clause of the Act. The others are recruited from among
non-official Indians in pursuance of the policy of the larger
association of Indians in the business of government.

It was during the time of the Morley-Minto Reforms

Present Con
stitution

Method of
Working

218 Indian Administration

that one Indian was admitted into the provincial and the
central Executive Councils. This number has now been
increased to two in the major provinces. Members of the
executive council are technically appointed by His Majesty
under the Royal Sign Manual. In practice the Governor
is bound to exercise considerable influence in the matter
of their appointment. Their tenure of office is five years.

The Councils work on the portfolio system, each mem¬
ber being given definite charge of certain
departments and disposing of ordinary
details in the department by himself in his
authority as the head. Matters of importance and all
points of dispute and all lines of general policy have to be
put before the meeting of the Executive Council over
which the Governor ex-officio presides, or in his absence
the vice-president nominated by him from among the
members. The decision of the majority is binding upon
all, the president giving a casting vote in case of a tie.
Even the Governor has to accept the decision of the
majority, except in those rare cases when he feels that the
peace, tranquillity and good government of the province
are in danger. On such occasions he is empowered to
override the majority. The orders given by the members
individually, by the members in consultation with the
Governor, by the Executive Council as a whole, or in his
■own special prerogative by the Governor, are all pro¬
mulgated as orders of Government. The Governor
makes regulations for the transaction of the business in
the Council.

This part of the Government is entirely responsible to
His Majesty's Government through the
Secretary of State and the Governor-
General. Officials in the Executive Council
are not removable by an adverse vote of the Legislature.

No Responsi¬
bility

The ProviTtcial Executive 219

They are answerable for their actions to the two controlling
authorities from above and are entirely subordinate to
them so far as the maintenance of British interests and
good administration are concerned. Their salaries are
not dependent on the vote of the legislature which has no
power to dismiss them from office.

However, moneys required for the departments
managed by the executive council have to be provided by
the provincial legislature at its discretion in so far as the
votable items of the budget are concerned. All laws
pertaining to reserved subjects have also to be passed by
the legislative council. Thus, in fact, if not in theory, an
attempt is to be made to accommodate the actions of this
portion of the provincial executive to the will of the
elected representatives of the people.

3. The Ministers

The other part of the provincial executive is constituted
by what are known as Ministers. These
I ran l erred officers were newly created after the Re-

forms of 1919, when in fulfilment of the
promise of the gradual introduction of responsible
government, officially given by the Secretary of State in
Parliament on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, an
endeavour was made to introduce the first instalment in
that direction in the provinces, as a beginning. That
part of the Provincial Government which is administered
by the Executive Council, is known as the reserved half.
That which is given over to the management of the
Ministers is known as the transferred half.

This division between transferred and reserved is to be
distinguished from the other division that has also been
inaugurated under the Reforms and has been already
described, that is, the division between central and

220

Indian Administration

provincial subjects. The first distinction is introduced
only in those subjects that are known as provincial. There
is therefore no central subject which can be described as
either reserved or transferred. Dyarchy has not been
introduced in the Central Government and there is a
complete absence of any measure of responsibility in the
departments conducted by the Governor-General and his
Executive Council.

It was thought dangerous, in the present backward
condition of .the Indian electorate, to transfer the whole of
the provincial administration to the representatives of the
people. The successful shouldering of political responsi¬
bility postulates the existence of constitutional traditions
and experience, the absence of which in Indian conditions
was considered to be a serious drawback in the introduc¬
tion of complete responsibility. A compromise was
therefore suggested.

As has been stated before, administrative business in
the provinces has been divided into two
Ministers’ halves by the A ct of 19 19. One half is
Re *? OI !” bl . llty given over for management to the executive
kture gl * council. The other is placed in the hands of

a new kind of officials known as Ministers.
They are to be appointed by the Governor from among

i

the elected members of the legislative council but they are
primarily responsible to the legislature for their adminis¬
tration. Their salary as also funds required for their
departments are voted by the legislative council. On an
adverse vote of that chamber ministers have to tender
resignation of their office. Thus, in this part of govern¬
ment, the supremacy of the legislature over the executive
machinery is clearly recognized.

The number of Ministers is not the same in every
province. Generally, in the major provinces, it is three

Their

Appointment

The Provincial Executive 221

and in the minor provinces it is two. Bombay, Bengal
and Madras have three Ministers each. However, since
1932 the number of Ministers in Bombay has been.
reduced from three to two on account of financial
stringency and the need for reducing the expenditure of
the provincial government.

The power of appointing Ministers is vested in the
Governor. But at the same time their sub¬
ordination to the legislature is definitely
established. It is therefore obvious that the
Governor’s choice cannot be entirely unrestricted and
arbitrary. The persons selected by him to hold the office
of Ministers must have at least some influence with the-
legislature. They must be able to command a not incon¬
siderable portion of its votes. A well-organized political,
party, occupying a majority of seats of the legislative
council will naturally be able to get its own nominees-
appointed to the ministry by the Governor. The possibi¬
lity of the Governor’s power of the selection of Ministers-
degenerating into a mere patronage in his hands will be
extremely remote if members of the legislative council
are sufficiently self-conscious and organized to carry out.
their desires regarding the formation of the Ministry.

There can be no fixity of tenure for ministerial office as
there is for a member of the executive
^g^ nure council. Technically speaking, a Ministers.

term of service may be said to end when the
legislative council itself is dissolved. But if he loses the
confidence of that body even before the date of its dissolu¬
tion, he is bound to resign his post immediately. On the
other hand he may be able to retain his office even for a
second and third term if the legislative . chamber so-
desires.

Originally by the Act of 1919 the same salary was

222 Indian Administration

provided for Ministers as was given to members of the
executive council. However the legislature was em¬
powered to reduce it if it felt inclined to do so. The
legislature has taken action in that direction in several
provinces. In Bombay, for instance, the salary of the
Minister was brought down from Rs. 64,000 per year to
Rs. 48,000 by the first Reformed Council.

It must be admitted, however, that the presence of a

proportion of thirty per cent of nominated
■Effect of the members in the Council—official and non-
Nominated official —is a solid asset in the hands of the

Element

executive. The inevitable assimilation with
•Government members of representatives of special con¬
stituencies like those of landholders on account of financial
interests or of communal constituencies like those of
.Europeans on account of racial affinity raises the propor¬
tion of thirty per cent much higher. It all presents a
•considerable organized force which it becomes convenient
for the Minister to propitiate.

Ministers have, as a matter- of fact, felt encouraged
rather to win the favour of this bloc than to win the
sympathy of a large majority of elected members.
These latter are divided in their opinions ; they represent
•different currents of thought and it becomes very difficult
to bring, such heterogeneous elements under one banner.
On the other hand, a Minister with a small faithful
personal following can be maintained in office in opposi¬
tion to the wishes of a large number of elected members
if he has managed to secure official support.

Responsibility to the legislature thus tends to be
•demoralized into subservience to an irremovable executive.
The Raja of Panagal is reported to have once declared in
the Madras Legislative Council that he was responsible to
the Governor and not to the Council at all! And he was

The Provincial Executive

223

the Chief Minister of the Madras Government for two-
terms in succession.

After the appointment of Ministers to their posts, it

is the duty of the Governor to allocate to-
Distribution of eac k Q £ ^ c fc ar g e 0 f a department or

Portfolios T. i • t.

a group of departments from subjects which
have been declared transferred. This corresponds to-
the assignment of portfolios to the members of the
Executive Council and is absolutely the prerogative of,
the Governor. Each Minister then assumes charge as*
the head of the departments that are consigned to his
care and disposes of departmental details. on his own
authority and responsibility. On the more important
matters he has to consult the Governor and issue an
order, after agreement has been arrived at between his-
own viewpoint and that of the Governor.

The Governor has the right to supersede the Ministers
in matters where the interests of other

overnor s departments are concerned or where certain-
interference

actions of the Ministers are likely to do-
injustice to members of the Imperial Services. There
are regular days fixed by the Governor on which to meet
the Minister and to discuss matters of State with him
before any final decision is arrived at.

As in the case of the reserved, so in the case of the'
transferred departments, just below the
Secretaries Ministers there are Secretaries in their

Governor’s

Interference

respective groups. Officially speaking, they are subordi¬
nate to the Ministers. However, these Secretaries have
direct access to the Governor independently of their
immediate superiors, the Ministers, and it is their duty
to keep the Governor informed of every important,
matter in the transaction of business in their departments.

However, the intention of Parliament being the grant

224 Indian Administration

of responsible government and the ultimate development
■of self-governing institutions, and the appointment of
Ministers responsible to the Legislature being the first
step taken in that direction, the Joint Parliamentary
Committee definitely recommended that the Governor’s
interference in the work of the Ministers should be as
small as possible. It should be strictly limited to those
cases where the Ministers’ actions are likely to cause
.grave injustice or to give rise to an unprecedented and
•difficult situation. They deliberately expressed their
faith in the doctrine of learning wisdom through mistakes
■and hoped that the Ministers’ initiative would be left as
unfettered as possible. Such an interpretation of the
'Governor’s powers alone was consistent with the spirit
•of the Reforms.

Nothing would remain of the responsibility and the
freedom of the Ministers if they were constantly overruled
by the Governor and required to conform to his dictation
and judgement. Under such a constant control the res¬
ponsibility of the Government in the transferred half
would be reduced to a mockery. It would be the very
negation of the fundamentals of a responsible system of
administration. Hence the explanatory comment of the
Joint Parliamentary Committee and a reiteration of the
Joint Parliamentary Committee’s view by both the majority
and the minority reports of the Muddiman Committee.

It is to be understood that the Ministers do not form

Individual
Responsibility
•of the
Ministers

any corporate body as the members of the
Executive Council do. The Ministers do
not form a ministry, a phrase which .will
be explained later on. They do not form
even a Council which regularly meets at

stated intervals, is presided over by a president, for the

transaction of business, in which regular rules of

The Provincial Executive 225

procedure are formed, and decisions of which, taken by
majority, are binding upon all the members including
those in the minority. All important matters in the
reserved departments have to be put for discussion
before the whole Council by the member in charge. The
Governor may preside over the meeting and give his
vote, but the final verdict in the matter will be pro¬
nounced by the majority of the votes of those present.
No such joint meeting is necessary for the disposal of
business in the transferred half. There, not the Govemor-
in-Council, but the Governor acting with his Minister, in
the singular, is the form in which announcements of
orders are made. Each Minister, constitutionally speaking,
is self-sufficient and has nothing to do with his immediate
colleagues. No mutual consultation among the Ministers
is provided by law; there cannot be, therefore, any
binding character to the vote of the majority, even if,
informally, opinions are taken and the views of all the
Ministers are ascertained.

\S

4. Dyarchy and its Working

It will be evident from all that has been said in the
foregoing pages that the Reforms have
Meaning of introduced in the provinces of India a form

Dyarchy

and method of governance which are
unique. Two kinds of officials, having a constitutional
status fundamentally different from each other, have been
harnessed, under the control of the Governor, to carry on
the work of administration. Such a system of government
where the executive is partly responsible to the legislature
and partly to bureaucratic control from above is described,
as * Dyarchy a word which is almost new in political
usage.

The co-existence of two different types of officials in,
8

226 Indian Administration

the same government is intended to be only a temporary

phase. It is the characteristic of the
It is a Transi» fractional period intervening between the
tional Phase past era 0 f com plete irresponsibility and

the coming era of complete responsibility. In the opera¬
tion of a system which consists of such a nicely balanced
and intricate mechanism, difficulties of a formidable nature
may inevitably rise. Some kinds of remedies have to be
provided against them.

The spheres of Ministers and Executive Members are

intended to be sufficiently distinguished

Demarcation f rom eac h other. Each half is held finally
of Two

Spheres responsible and competent to pass any

orders within its own sphere. That is to

say, Ministers cannot interfere in reserved matters, nor

can members interfere in transferred matters. Mutual

friendly consultation may be held between the two halves

and such consultation and expression of opinion might

appreciably influence their mutual policies. That is not

impossible. Legally speaking, however, the complete

independence of each of the two spheres is guaranteed

by the Act. Any dispute about jurisdiction that might*

arise between them, or any other matter of conflict, is

left to be decided by the arbitrament of the Governor

whose decision in such matters is declared to be final.

It has, however, been discovered that the demarcation

of two separate units in the same executive

Overlapping of Q overnmen t cannot be so accurate and
Subjects m the . .

Two Halves precise as to make the two divisions

absolutely watertight compartments. There

has been considerable entanglement between the subjects

of the two halves. Sir K. V. Reddi said that he was

Minister of Agriculture minus Irrigation and minus the

administration of the Agricultural Loans Act. Both the

The Provincial Executive 227

majority and the minority reports of the Muddiman
Committee have discussed this question and both have
come to the same conclusion that a perfect differentiation
which entirely avoids any mutual overlapping of trans¬
ferred and reserved subjects is impossible. The opinion
is endorsed by the Bombay Government and also by
some of the ex-Ministers who had occasion to work out
the reforms under the dyarchical form.

4 All evidence has agreed in pointing out how any
important measure put forward by a member or a
Minister cannot fail to affect, and therefore to involve a
reference to, the authorities in charge of that half from
which the measure has not emanated, but whose interests
are threatened as a result of the reaction of the proposed
measure.’ The minority have emphasized the impossi¬
bility of effecting a clear cut and mutually, exclusive
division of subjects as an inherent defect which vitiates
the whole system of dyarchical government.

It might be repeated once more that, wherever any
ambiguity arises as to the jurisdiction of the reserved
or transferred half, the sole authority to remove the
ambiguity and pronounce the final judgement is the
Governor of the province, to whom all such cases have,
by law, to be referred.

There is only one occasion on which both the reserved
and transferred halves must be called to-

Meetings gather to hold a joint meeting. This is at

the time of preparing the budget. Two differ¬
ent types of officers, with a constitutional position diver¬
gent from each other, and with a difference in the method
of their working, have been thrown together under the
new dispensation. The connecting, the correcting
and the co-ordinating link between them is supposed
to be provided by the presiding officer, the Governor..

Joint Purse

228 Indian Administration

The question was discussed, when the scheme was under
consideration, as to whether the two spheres should have
independent finances, each having its own separate purse
or source of income, and a field for its expansion. The
idea was definitely rejected by the Joint Parliamentary
Committee as being impracticable and even mischievous,
and a similar opinion has been expressed by both the
majority and the minority reports of the Muddiman Com¬
mittee. The latter states that a separate purse would
clearly aggravate the difficulties instead of mitigating
them.

Under a joint purse, all the revenues, collected from
whatever source, belonging to the province
must go to one and the same exchequer.
The collecting and receiving authority being the Provin¬
cial Government, all money is pooled together in one
reservoir. The reserved and the transferred halves have,
by mutual agreement, to decide the shares that will be
spent by each of them. Joint meetings of Members and
Ministers have to be summoned by the Governor to pro¬
vide for each section the sinews of the administration.
Such meetings may at times involve prolonged and
stormy debates, particularly because the points of view
of elected Ministers responsible to. the Legislature, and
of irresponsible executive officials nurtured in bureau¬
cratic traditions, may not always coincide, and bickering
and friction between them may consequently arise. At
times the Ministers 5 demands may amount to the aban¬
doning of a.course of policy, over which may have gather¬
ed a crust of past precedent.

Great self-restraint and a spirit of compromise and
mutual give and take have to be exhibited by both parties
in order to arrive at an amicable settlement. An unbend¬
ing obstinacy on the part of either of them may dash the

The Provincial Executive 229

delicate mechanism of dyarchy to pieces. An immense

premium is therefore put upon the qualities

Spirit of 0 f amity and flexibility for the successful
Compromise J

necessary working of the scheme of a joint purse

as contemplated by the Joint Parliamentary
Committee and as incorporated in the Government of
India Act. Complaints were made before the Reforms
Inquiry Committee by several ex-Ministers that the nation¬
building departments were starved by the arrangement.
The minority report has given figures showing the pro¬
portion of the expenditure over the reserved and trans¬
ferred halves in the provinces of Madras, Bengal, Assam
and Bihar and Orissa for the three years 1921-3, and the
average proportion would appear to work out approxi¬
mately as 65 to 35 between them respectively.

Lastly, it may be stated again, that if the two parts do
not agree and the budget meeting ends in a

Powertoend neither party yielding its ground.

Deadlocks power is left to the Governor to end the

deadlock by allocating funds between the
disputants as he may think fit, irrespective of the claims
made by them. He can thus prevent the administrative
machinery from being clogged and brought to a standstill.
The minority report has pointed out that in regard to
differences arising out of financial matters the Governor's
position as a judge must be extremely delicate and embar¬
rassing. He is ultimately responsible to Parliament for
the administration of the reserved subjects, of which
finance forms a part; therefore the tribunal to which alone
the Minister can appeal is far from satisfactory. The
contingency of such a deadlock has not yet arisen in any
province in India and funds have been divided by mutual
agreement.

We now pass on to a discussion of the statement that

The British
Cabinet is a
Homo geneous
Whole

230 Indian Administration

In Indian provinces there are Ministers but not Ministries.

A large body of evidence tendered before

*- Ut the Muddiman. Committee by several ex-
not mistries •^• n j s £ ers c ] ear iy disclosed the fact that

the administration of the transferred half was not
conducted on the principle of the joint and collective
responsibility of the Ministers to the Legislative Councils.
Joint responsibility is, as the majority report has
pointed out, the essence of the cabinet form of govern¬
ment prevalent in England, and intended to be evolved
in due course of time in the polity of India.

In England the Cabinet is one indivisible whole. All
actions proposed to be taken by the indivi¬
dual Minister are submitted first to the
scrutiny of the Cabinet Members and only
on their approval go out to the world as
proposals emanating from the Ministry.
The Cabinet Ministers have a corporate existence. They
■come into office and go out of office together. At their
head stands one of themselves who is designated the
Prime Minister and who is always a great party leader.
The King of England has to be in communication, not
With individual Ministers, but with the Ministry or the
Cabinet as a whole. The close and intimate ties amongst
the Ministers which tend to make the Cabinet a
thoroughly homogeneous council are dependent to a great
extent on the development of sound party organizations.
On the ground of the absence of any such organizations
in the present state of Indian public life,
D ° 01 some of the provincial Governments have

Responsibility .

in India expressed their scepticism as to the possi¬

bility of the introduction and successful
working of the system of joint responsibility in India.
The Governor deals with the Minister as one individual

The Provincial Executive 231

head of a department, and not with a group having a
cumulative responsibility for the whole mass of the trans¬
ferred departments. The Ministers therefore have only
an individual existence. Their appointment and continu¬
ance in office, and the lines of policy they chalk out for
themselves, are matters which are concerned more with
the personality of the Governor than with a deliberation
between colleagues. They have no leader corresponding
to the Prime Minister of the English Cabinet. They do
not come to office or go out of it as a united body. Nor
do they present a united front to the Governor when
important issues are being disposed of in the transferred
departments.

The intentions of the Joint Select Committee are dear

in this matter. The minority have quoted
The View of \ n their report the view of the Committee
the omt that in the ministerial portion of Govem-

Committee ment the corporate responsibility of the

Ministers should be observed. , Every
case that arises in the transferred departments need
not, of course, require for its disposal the approval
of all the ministers together; such a procedure would
* militate against the expeditious disposal of business
and against the accepted canons of departmental
responsibility*’. But in all cases of importance, they
are emphatically of the opinion that the final decision
should be of one or the other portion of Government as a
whole.

The recommendations of the Joint Parliamentary

The Opinion of
the Muddiznan
Committee

Committee in this direction have not been
carried out. Some of the Governors explain
their inability to do so in the absence of
strong, well-adjusted parties, and in the

present stage of political development in India with a

232 Indian Administration

predominance of the communal sentiment. The majority
of the Muddiman Committee do not subscribe to the view
that the Government of India Act implies that the
Governor should act on the advice of the Minister or
Ministers separately but they incline to the opinion
that the wording of the Instruments of Instructions and
the provisions of the Devolution Rules are faulty and
might be interpreted to enunciate the individual responsi¬
bility of Ministers. They have therefore recommended
that the Rules and the Instruments may be so modified
and recast as to remove all ambiguity and to make it
clear that the ideal to be attained in the transferred
government is the creation of Ministers with a collective
responsibility. The minority do not want to allow the
growth of this vital principle to depend upon the
personal equation of the Governor or the Ministers.
They want the statute itself to be amended so as to
secure the practical achievement of the fundamental
principle.

It is interesting to record, in this connexion, that the

Voluntary
Action of
Ministers

ex-Ministers in the United Provinces,
Mr. Chintamani and Pandit Jagat Narayan,
had prescribed for themselves a course of

conduct consistent with the principle of joint

responsibility and had voluntarily agreed to work in the

manner of the Cabinet. It was in pursuance of this self-
imposed but strictly constitutional restraint that Pandit

Jagat Narayan tendered his resignation of the office of
Minister in sympathy with his colleague, who had differed
from the Governor on an important administrative matter

and had thought it necessary to resign as a protest against
his superior’s overriding of his view. No such voluntary
restriction has been uniformly observed by all Ministers,
several of them have, however, expressed themselves to

The Provincial Executive 233

be unequivocally in favour of the observance of collective
responsibility.

The fact that Ministers are consulted individually, and
that a practice has grown up of the Governor
Power Con- overriding the Minister in case of a difference

centratea in

the Governor opinion, has tended to concentrate all

power in the Governor's hands. The
tendency to regard Ministers as mere advisers of the
Governors, who may or may not accept their advice, is
considered by critics to have been one of the most insidi¬
ous and fatal impediments in the operation of dyarchy.
The refusal of the Governors to regard themselves as
mere constitutional heads, even with regard to transfer¬
red subjects, has resulted in converting the relaxation of
control granted by the Secretary of State into an addition
to the autocratic powers of the irresponsible Governors!
The dyarchical form of administration involving a
bifurcation of the executive part of govern-
Jomt Deli- ment was intended to be only a transitional

Deration or

the two halves sta S e before the ultimate goal of complete

responsible government was achieved. In
itself therefore it has no element of finality. It was meant
to be an experiment and the difficulties that were likely to*
arise in its operation were not entirely unforeseen. Dyar¬
chy was never promulgated as an ideal by itself. It
essentially represented an endeavour to find a compromise-
between two diametrically opposite states—the complete
subordination of the executive to the Legislature on the
one hand, and the thoroughly bureaucratic form of adminis¬
tration with the executive irremovable and irresponsible^
on the other. Dyarchy therefore partakes of all the
imperfections that are associated with a compromise.

The Joint Parliamentary Committee and also Miv
Montagu had clearly visualized the probable difficulties-

234 Indian Admmistratio?i

in the operation of this novel via media % and they took

care to emphasize the desirability of fostering
Wea MOntagU * a deliberation between the

two sections of the mixed executive
Governments which they were proposing to create. The
ultimate responsibility for each step taken was not of
course a matter of doubt. The jurisdiction of each of
the two halves was dearly determined. Actions in'
respect of the reserved or transferred halves were to be
recorded separately by the Executive Council or the
Ministers. Still, members of both halves were recom¬
mended to be given opportunities for mutual consultation
and expression of opinion before the final orders were
passed in any department. The minority of the
Muddiman Committee have quoted an extract from
Mr. Montagu's speech in Parliament while moving the
second reading of the Government of India Bill. Therein
he stated clearly that, if all the reserved departments
were to be transferred one day, the ultimate goal being
the grant of full re sponsible government, it was absolutely
essential that during the transitional period there should
be opportunities for influence and consultation between
members and Ministers.

The effect that has been given to the suggestion for
joint deliberation between the two halves by
to ft Ct VCn the Parliamentary Committee and

Mr. Montagu has varied from province to
province. The Bengal and Madras Governments accepted
the spirit of the recommendations to a great extent. In
other provinces, it has either not been followed at all, or
if followed, not to the extent to which it was contemplated.
The minority of the Muddiman Committee are not opti¬
mistic about the success of the policy of joint deliberation
—even if it is scrupulously resorted to in administrative .

The Provincial Executive 235

practice—without the element of common responsibility*
It may not lead either to efficiency in the administration
or to harmonious relationship between members of the
Executive Council and the Ministers. They regard it as
an inherent defect of the present constitution that the
Government should be divided into halves. Given a
dyarchical form of government, they agree that joint
deliberation has its value.

The position of the Services is another interesting and
intriguing problem under the reformed

oi^the Services const ftuti° n . The appointment, salaries,

dismissals and pensions of members of

the Imperial Services continue as before to be controlled
by the Secretary of State. The Government of India
Act specially charged the Governor to 4 safeguard all the
members of our Services ... in the legitimate exercise
of their functions and in the enjoyment of all recognized
rights and privileges \ This clause has been in practice
interpreted broadly to mean the control of the Governor
in everything relating to the Services—their appoint¬
ments, postings and promotions—in spite of their being
in the transferred departments. The Ministers, under
whom many of the officers of the Services are called
upon to work, have no complete control over their
subordinates and cannot punish them as they will for any
infringement of duty.

There thus arises a curious and unhappy situation*

Causes of
Discontent

The head of the department may settle a.
policy and issue orders; the agency which
has to carry out these orders and the

influence of which is strikingly felt in day-to-day ad¬

ministration, may disagree with the course proposed and

may not carry out the orders with loyalty and enthusiasm*

Such laxity or indiscipline on the part of subordinates not

“Consequences
of the

Introduction
of Responsi¬
bility

230 Indian Administration

being directly punishable by their immediate superior, the
only alternative left to the Minister is to bring such
matters of subordinate interference or indifference to the
notice of the Governor, and to try to. get the guilty
person properly reprimanded* It is obvious that this
harnessing together of a Legislature which cannot
control its servants, and servants who look upon their
position with a feeling of distrust, uncertainty and lack
of enthusiasm, is bound to prove embarrassing to both
parties.

The centre of political gravity has now shifted definitely
from outside India to India itself. The
days of patriarchical government, during
which a large power of shaping the policy
was enjoyed by the Services and a large
measure of the progress of the country
■depended upon their efforts, have now definitely given
piaop, to the days of popular control. The diminution in
the importance and prestige of the Services is the inevi¬
table consequence of the transference of power from the
bureaucracy to the people. The constitution, methods of
recruitment, and control of the Services, as they exist
today, are incompatible with the new democratic situation
and the possibility of its further development.

It is agreed that the complete subordination of the execu¬
tive to the Legislature is the very essence of responsible
government of the cabinet type as it prevails in England.
It is no wonder that under the altered conditions in
TnrHa, there should exist considerable dissatisfaction among
the Services on account of the loss of their power, and
also in the Legislature on account of the restraints and
limitation imposed upon its powers in relation to the
Services. Complaints were made before the Reforms
Inquiry Committee that the members of the permanent

The Provincial Executive

237

Services did not exhibit an adequate spirit of loyalty and
co-operation in carrying out the orders of the Indian
Ministers. However, instances of such apathy or dis¬
obedience are rare, and on the whole the conclusion is
that the relations between the Ministers and the Imperial
Services are cordial and satisfactory.

As the minority report has pointed out, friction

Distinction
between Poli¬
tical and Ad¬
ministrative
Functions

between the Services and their superiors
is bound to arise in the altered circum¬
stances of India as long as the relations of
the Services and the Legislature are not
brought into closer approximation with
those prevailing in England or the Dominions. The old
combination of administrative and political functions in
the Services is discordant with the spirit of the Reforms
and inconsistent with the inauguration of responsibility*
When the Services are divested of their political functions
and are recognized as mere instruments for carrying out
the policy of the Legislature, the criticism that is now
levelled against them will be diverted to the heads of the
responsible Ministers. The latter will not be members
of the public Services, but will combine in themselves
both political and administrative leadership as the
members of the English Cabinet do. In such circum¬
stances alone, can the Services enjoy immunity from
hostile attacks or unfriendly criticism.

That a perfect sense of security and feeling of content¬
ment must be guaranteed to the Services is a proposition
which has been accepted even by the minority report. It
has recommended that proper legislative steps be taken on
the subject so as to put the Services beyond the reach of
the fluctuations of political opinions or influences incidental
to a system of democratic government. But as long as the
old basis of the relation of the Services to the Legislature

238 Indian Administration

is not altered in response to the altered environment, the
present state of affairs will prove an embarrassing ana¬
chronism not in the least likely to induce harmony and
cordiality among executive officials.

The last point to be noted in connexion with the work¬
ing of the dual form of government refers
Control of the t0 control exercised by the Finance

Finance Department over the transferred half.

Department _

The Finance Department is a reserved
department. The Finance Member must be a member of
the Executive Council. The functions of the department
are stated to be to give advice on the financial aspect of
administrative proposals, advice which the Ministers are at
liberty to accept or reject. The evidence of almost all
Ministers and ex-Ministers, however, points to such a
description of the Finance Department’s functions as
being incomplete and theoretical. Not only does the
department examine the financial aspect of the new pro¬
posals, but it also examines the policy of the proposals
and its bearings upon the administration. Such an
examination by an irresponsible department, of the propo¬
sals put forth by Ministers responsible to the Legislature
is open to grave objection. Nor can the Minister reject
with impunity the- advice given by the Finance Depart¬
ment, for it can withhold the needed funds unless and
until the Minister produces the sanction of the Governor
for the expenditure.

Besides, the Finance Member is not in charge of the
Finance Department only. He has also under him
some of the spending departments, and naturally; the
suspicion arises that an unconscious desire to promote
the interests of these departments proves harmful to-
other departments, particularly to nation-building subjects,
that are left to be administered by Ministers. ’ This state

i

5

4

>

n

The Provmcial Executive

239

of things is clearly unsatisfactory and calls for a radical
reform. The appointment of a separate Councillor,
exclusively in charge of finance, will not be a very
helpful alternative, according to the view of the minority,
so long as the Finance Member continues to be a part of
the Governor-in-Council, not responsible to the Legis¬
lature.

The Governor, who is himself responsible to Parlia¬
ment through the Secretary of State and the Governor-
General for the administration of reserved subjects, is
ill-suited to be the supreme appellate authority in all
matters of disagreement between the reserved and the
transferred parts, because his verdicts are likely to be
those of an interested party, if not of a partisan.

A further point which has to be described in connexion

Lack of
Funds

with the subject of finance is the unsatis¬
factory character of what is known as the
Meston Award. All Provincial Govern¬

ments have agreed in criticizing the basis of the
separation of provincial from central finance, though
on different grounds. The state of the Government of
India's finance, on the other hand, was rather alarming.
They had accumulated deficits of 62£ crores of rupees
during the short period of three years from 1920 to 1923,
a period which synchronized exactly with the inaugural
period of the Reforms. The want of funds is a constant
difficulty which has been confronting the Ministers from
the beginning. They were, for that reason, unable to
pursue any policy of progressive development in the
.sphere of administration that was handed over to them.
The majority report discovered, in this financial strin¬
gency, one of the most potent factors which led to the
allegation of unkind critics that the Reforms were a sham.
The allegation, according to them, could not be palpably

240 Indian Administration

refuted on account of the absence of adequate resources for
development and expansion. That a revision of the
Meston Settlement was urgently called for became almost
an axiomatic proposition. However, it has now been
abolished, and the problems created by provincial
contributions have therefore receded into the background
for the present.

CHAPTER XIII

The Provincial Legislature

1. The Growth of Provincial Legislatures

The origin of the legislative power of the provinces

goes back to the year 1807. By an Act

1.833

of that year the Governors and Councils
in Madras and Bombay were given the power of
making regulations, a power similar to that which had
been granted to the Govemor-General-in-Council by the
Regulating Act. From then, the regulations issued
by the Governments of Madras and Bombay had legal
application in their respective jurisdictions, until all
the existing law’ was consolidated into a code, for
the preparation of which orders w r ere given by the
Charter Act of 1833. This Act deprived the Provin¬
cial Governments of their independent law-making power.
They were now asked merely to submit drafts to
the Central Government of whatever legislation they
wanted to be enacted. The Governor-General-in-Council
was declared to be the sole repository of legislative
authority.

But the inconvenience of this sort of centralization was
qbvious. The Governor-Generals Council, in which
members from the Bengal Civil Service predominated,
could not be expected to give sufficient attention to the
problems of distant provinces like Bombay and Madras.
The concentration of legislative business over the vast
area comprised by the then existing three provinces of
Bombay, Madras and Bengal, in a single small Council

242 Indian Administration

was evidently unsatisfactory. The Governments of
Bombay and Madras constantly complained that their
claims and needs were not properly considered.

The Act of 1853 tried to remove the grievance of the
provinces to a certain extent. It allowed

1853

representatives of each of the four Provin¬
cial Governments of Bombay, Bengal, Madras and the
North-West Province to hold seats in the Governor-
General’s Council, which was specially enlarged for the
transaction of legislative business by the nomination of
additional members.

A more liberal step was taken by the Indian Councils
Act of 1861, when to the provinces was

1861

restored the power of legislation which had
been taken away in 1833. The Councils of the Provincial
Governments were expanded for legislative purposes by
the addition of the Advocate-General ex-officio and other
nominated members, not less than four and not more than
eight, at least half of whom were to be non-officials, as
in the case of the Council of the Governor-General. In
accordance with this privilege, special bodies to transact
law-making business were established for Bengal in 1862,
for the North-West Province in 1886, for Burma and the
Punjab in 1897, for Eastern Bengal and Assam in 1905
on its creation as a separate province after the partition
of Bengal by Lord Curzon, and for the Central Pro¬
vinces in 1913.

This concession and freedom granted to Provincial
Governments did not in any degree diminish the sove¬
reignty of the Government of India and the power of their
Legislative Council to enact laws for the whole of the
country. The Act of 1861 expressly declared the
Govemor-Generars law-making power to extend to all
persons and things, excepting certain Parliamentary

The Provincial Legislature 243

enactments and the general authority of Parliament and
the Crown. However, in practice, the Provincial Legis¬
latures were competent to enact laws for the peace and
good government of the provinces, subject to the restrict
tions imposed upon them, and subject to the general
supervising authority exercised by the Central Govern-*
ment.

This measure was soon found to be inadequate. The

The Indian
National Con¬
gress

growth of political consciousness in the
educated classes of the Indian public which
had just passed through a course of western
education and had become familiar with

the democratic idea that characterized some of the west^

ern Governments, was a new factor in the situation.
This national awakening found an organized embodiment
in the Indian National Congress, an institution which
was established in the eighties of the last century. This
body began to hold sessions annually, moving from
place to place, and to agitate for the removal of adminis¬
trative defects and deficiencies. The Congress became
the vehicle for the expression of the new-born ambitions
and aspirations of an awakening nation. It also became
a consolidating force which helped to draw together and
co-ordinate the national movements and tendencies in the

different provinces.

Agitation conducted by the early Indian politicians,
some of whom could be described as the creators of the
Indian National Congress, had the result of clearly exposing
the inadequacy of the Act of 1861 and its incapacity to
enlist popular contentment and support. Hence the pro¬
posal for the Indian Councils Act of 1892. The Under¬
secretary of State, Mr. (the late Lord) Curzon, explained
in Parliament that the object of the new proposal was
to give 4 further opportunities to the non-official and

244 Indian Administration.

native element in Indian society to take part in the work
of government, and in that way to lend official recogni¬
tion to that remarkable development both of political
interest and political capacity that had been visible among
the higher classes of Indian society since the Government
of India was taken over by the Crown in 1858 \

This measure recommended the enlargement of the
Councils by the addition of larger non-

1QQO

official numbers. The method of making
the addition, however, gave rise to a considerable amount
of difference of opinion. There was great opposition to
the democratic principle of direct election being introduced
in the then existing political and social condition of India.
On the other hand, continuance of the conservative
principle of nomination was not calculated to gratify
politically-minded Indian citizens. Ultimately a com¬
promise was arrived at by which the reality of election
was cloaked under the garb of nomination.

A Regulation made under the Act stated that in the
case of corporations like Municipalities and Local Boards,
or associations like those of a University or a Chamber of
Commerce or landholders, it would be convenient and
advantageous for the Governor to consult their wishes in
the matter of the selection of members to represent them,
and to nominate only such men as might be recommended
by their confidence.

Thus the principle of election was indirectly initiated*
Theoretically, members continued as before to be nomi¬
nated by the Governments. In practice, however, the
discretion of the Government in making the selection of
some of the nominated candidates was limited by the
recommendations of recognized bodies and associations*
Such recommendations could not be normally rejected.

Thus the Act of 1892 introduced a double reform; It

The Provincial Legislature 245

enlarged the size of the Legislatures, the number of
additional members to be nominated for legislative pur¬
poses being fixed at eight to twenty for Madras and
Bombay, not more than twenty for Bengal and not more
than fifteen for the United Provinces. It also indirectly
inaugurated the principle of election in the formation
of these bodies.

This measure extended the powers wielded by the
Legislatures. For the first time, they were allowed the
right, subject to certain restrictions, of asking questions
bearing upon actions of the executive Government.
They were also given the power of discussing the annual
financial statement presented by the Finance Member
and making a general criticism of the policy adopted by
the officials of the bureaucracy. This was an advance
over the earlier measure of 1861 which had expressly
confined the Legislatures to strictly legislative business.

Events, however, were moving fast in India. The Act
of 1892 could not cope with the rapidly
changing phenomena in Indian politics.
The wider spread of western education only helped to
intensify the national agitation, which was vigorously
conducted during the first decade of the twentieth century.
Indian political life passed through various interesting
phases and vicissitudes which are yet fresh in the memo¬
ries of living men. The installation of the* Liberal
Ministry in power in England, after an almost complete
ostracism of two decades* roused some hopes for the
successful termination of the great struggle that had
been conducted by politicians in India on the question of
Indian administrative reform. The acceptance by Lord
Morley of the post of Secretary for India was regarded
as a further significant event. In collaboration with Lord
Minto, the Governor-General, he prepared a scheme

246 Indian Administration

and laid it before Parliament for its sanction which was
duly given.

The Morley-Minto Reforms made important modifica¬
tions fin the composition and functions of

Cc^ne'ls Legislatures. In the first

place, the total number of members of
each of the Provincial Councils was considerably in¬
creased, the new figure in some cases being more than
double the figure of 1892. The maximum limit of fifty
additional members was fixed for the larger provinces
and of thirty for the smaller ones. Secondly, the pro*
portion of official to non-official members was modified
so as to bring about a majority of non-official members
in the Provincial Councils.

The difference in the two situations is clear. Official

members have to vote as they are asked to vote officially.
They have not to exercise their individual judgement, but
must act according to the mandate they receive from
above. With nominated non-officials, the case is differ¬
ent. In theory, at least, they may vote as they please, on
the merits of the question. Their opinion is taken to be
more indicative of the popular view than that of officials.

. It must be understood that a non-official majority does
not necessarily mean an elected majority. The non-
officials may be members nominated by the Government
from among persons who are not in the Services. It has
already been seen how, under the Act of 1861, all non¬
official members were nominated and how under the Act

of 1892, the principle of election was indirectly introduced,
particularly in the Provincial Legislatures.

The Act of 1909 openly accepted that principle as one
of the fundamentals of the Reforms scheme. However,
election was not to be direct. It was also proposed to
give separate representation to the important community

The Provincial Legislature 247

of the Mohammedans. The constituencies for the Pro¬
vincial Councils were formed, out of municipalities and
District Boards giving their votes in groups.

These changes in the constitution and composition of
the provincial Councils were accompanied

•pi *

Functions ^y an enlargement of their functions and

Increased powers. The right to hold a general dis¬

cussion of the budget, which had been con¬
ceded in 1892, was further augmented by the right to
move resolutions in a definite form upon matters per¬
taining to the budget, and to divide the Council on them.
The power of expressing opinion in the form of a
definite resolution was not confined only to matters con¬

nected with the budget, but was extended to all questions
of general public importance. Certain subjects were of
course excluded ; for example the army, foreign relations
and other cognate matters were not subjects on which
resolutions could be moved. The Governor’s permission
was necessary for the introduction of a resolution. The
right had thus various limitations imposed upon it.
Lastly, the power of asking questions, which had been
conceded by the Act of 1892, was increased by allowing
the number who originally put the question to put further
supplementary questions if he was dissatisfied with the
reply given by the Government Member. Thus, the
functions and privileges of the Legislatures were to a
certain extent increased.

The Act of 1909 did not even make a suggestion of the

No Intro¬
duction of
Responsi¬
bility

introduction of responsibility. Lord Morley,
while making a speech in Parliament, dis¬
tinctly disclaimed any intention on his part or
on the part of His Majesty’s Government to
treat the reform measures as the beginning

of the development of self-governing institutions. The

248 Indian Administration

newly created Legislatures were neither representative
nor democratic in the wider sense : their constitution did
not accord with a popular form of administration; their
powers were limited; they had not the least effective
control over the Executive; and their existence and
proceedings had an air of unreality in the absence of any
greater power than that of vehement but ineffective criti¬
cism of some Government measures.

Such a defective scheme could not satisfy the aspirations
of the people for Swaraj, a word which was used by the
president of the National Congress in 1906 to describe the
only remedy that he could discover for the solution of
the Indian political problem. The disappointment and
dissatisfaction that were caused by this imperfect measure
grew more and more intense as its futility was realized;
in practical working. A new and absolutely unexpected
factor soon presented itself in the world's history and inter¬
vened, in India as elsewhere, with its modifying influence
in shaping the polity of the land and the general
philosophy of politics and of life.

The exact position of the Provincial Legislatures in their

Constitutional re ^ a ^ on to legislative powers of the
Position of Governor-General can be summarized at this
the Provincial point. As has been stated more than once
Legislatures the provinces in India were mere formations

before the f or administrative convenience. They had
e orms nothing about them of federal independence
and liberty. The provincial Legislatures had therefore
only a limited power and scope for operation. Many
restrictions were imposed upon them to ensure that the
Central Government's control remained intact and was
actively exercised in reality. The theory of the consti¬
tution being that the Government of India were the sole
and final authority having an undivided responsibility Iqx

1'he Provincial Legislative 249

the safety, order and good government of the whole of
the land, an active exercise of their powers was regarded
to be consistent with the spirit of the constitution. If the
Provincial Legislative Councils were to be regarded,
technically, as mere enlargements of the executive
Governments and if the latter, in a unitary state like
India with a patriarchies! administration, were to be
completely subordinate to the mandates issued by the
central authority, the independence enjoyed by the
Provincial Legislative Councils as such was non-existent.
Bearing this constitutional position in mind, it will be
better to describe the various limitations in theory and in
practice, that circumscribed the freedom of the Provincial
Legislatures in pre-Reforms days.

Thus, for instance, they were prohibited from attempt¬
ing to affect an Act of Parliament or from

,, . altering or repealing, without previous

on their „

Powers sanction, any Act of the Governor-General's

Legislative Council or of any Legislature
but themselves. All-India questions like those of the
public debt of India, or customs, or other taxes imposed
by the Central Government, or coinage, currency, posts
and telegraphs, the army and the navy, were thoroughly
excluded from the provincial sphere. Further, the
previous sanction of the Governor-General was made
necessary before the provinces gave consideration to any
measure affecting the religion or the religious rites of
British subjects, the regulation of patents and copyrights,
or the relation of the Government with foreign princes
or Indian States. In course of time, as a result or
executive directions, it was made obligatory upon the
Provincial Governments to submit for the previous
sanction of the Government of India and the Secretary of*
State,*all projects for provincial legislation-before their

250 Indian Administration

introduction in the Councils, and, still further, all Acts of
the local Legislative Councils, after their being passed
and after their receiving assent from the Governors,
had necessarily to receive the assent of the Governor-
General before they could acquire legal application and

validity.

Even in the field which was left legally unfettered for
the legislative competence of the Provincial Councils,
their discretion was restricted in other ways, as the
Montford Report has pointed out. Because most of the
provincial bodies were younger in their existence than
the Central Legislature, a great part of the field that
would otherwise be legitimately regarded as belonging to.
them was already covered over by the enactments of the.
elder body. Apart from subjects like the army, communi¬
cations, finance, etc., which were clearly matters of
imperial importance, the Government of India’s Legislative
Council had passed laws for matters like prisons, jails,
reformatory schools, police, whipping, the personal law
affecting marriage, minors, succession, and matters in
civil law like trusts, specific relief, transfer of property,
patents, trade marks, weights and measures, mines,,
factories, religious endowments, ancient monuments, etc.,
Thus it will be clear that the measure of independence
that was enjoyed by the Provincial Legislatures in practice
was extremely small.

The Indian provinces were not based on the federal

Devolution
of Power
Necessary

model with a recognition of their separate
entity. From the federal point of view, the
control exercised by the Governor-General,
may appear to be excessive. Such central¬

ization left to the local Legislatures a very small amount

of latitude and independence. An effective measure of

devolution was necessary in order to relieve the Provincial

The Provincial Legislature 251

Governments of the large number of restrictions which
impeded their free action. A greater and more genuine
grant of initiative and independence to them had to
precede any scheme of reforms which proposed the
introduction of partial responsibility as a measure of
experiment, to be finally developed into the realization of
the ultimate goal of complete responsible autonomy.
The incorporation of the provincial budgets in that of the
Government of India, and the stringent control exercised
by the latter over the taxation powers of the Provincial
Legislatures completed the tale of their subordination and
subservience. The Provincial Governments were also
required to submit to the previous sanction of the
Government of India and Secretary of State all projects
of legislation before their introduction. This in practice
meant a limitation on the legislative freedom of the
provinces.

The circumstances of the War and the change in ideals
that accompanied it, the Announcement of
August 20, 1917 with all its implications,
the Secretary of Stated visit to this land,
the submission of a report by him in collaboration with
the Viceroy on the future of Indian constitutional develop¬
ment, and the final passing of the Government of India
Act of 1919, are recent events. We are now concerned
only with that portion of the Act which affects the
position of the Provincial Legislatures. Here, as before,
the Reforms have to be understood in two directions,
the constitution of such bodies and their functions*
The provinces being regarded as proper ground for
experimentation in responsible government, it was in¬
dispensable that their Legislatures should be sufficiently
enlarged and democratized and made thoroughly re¬
presentative of the population in the provinces before

After the
Reforms

252 Indian Administration

entrusting to them the duty of controlling the executive

or a part of the executive.

2. The Bombay Legislative Council

The following table, taken from the Simon Commission’s

Report, gives the number of members in
Constitution p rov i nc i a l Council. Not more than

20 per cent of the total members of each council are to be
officials, and at least 70 per cent non-official elected
members. The constituencies, as usual, are divided into
general or non-Mohammedan, communal and special;
also into urban and rural. In the Bombay Presidency,
for instance, there are urban and rural constituencies.
Mohammedan and European constituencies and those of
Landholders, of the University, and of Commerce and
Industry. Of the 111 total statutory minimum number
of members 86 are elected and 25 nominated.

Total strength of Governors’ Legislative Councils as given by the

Simon Commission 1

Province

Statutory

minimum

Elected

Nominated
officials plus
Executive
Councillors

Nominated
non-officials

Actual total

Madras ...

118

98

7 + 4

23

132

Bombay...

111

86

15 + 4

9

114

Bengal ...

125

114

12 + 4

10

140

United Provinces ...

118

100

15+2

6

123

Punjab ...

83

71

13 + 2

8

94

Bihar and Orissa ...

98

76

13 + 2

12

103

Central Provinces ...

70

55

8 + 2

8

73

Assam ...

53

39

5 + 2

7

53

Burma ...

92

*

80

14 + 2

7

103

1 Report, yoI. I, p, 134

The Provincial Legislature

Composition of the Bombay Legislative Council

Elected Members

253

Mohammedan Rural

Members

22

Mohammedan Urban

• *»

... 5

Non-Mohammedan Rural 1 ...

* ••

... , 35

Non-Mohammedan Urban 1 ...

» ••

11

European

« * •

... 2

Landholders

• * •

... 3

Commerce and Industry

7

Bombay University

•• •

1

Nominated Members

86

(i) Officials (including Executive Councillors)

20

(ii) Non-officials

(a) Depressed Classes

f • *

2

(d) Anglo-Indian

• • •

1

(c) Indian Christian...

• ••

1

{d) Labour

• 0 *

... 3

( e) Others (cotton trade)

• • •

1

Total ... 114

*Of the members of the non-Mohammedan constituencies
seven must be Marathas.

254 I?idia?i Administration

The president of the Council was to be a nomi¬
nated non-official for the first four years
The President after the introduction of the Reforms,

and thereafter has been elected by the
Council itself from among its own members. His
election has to be approved of by the Governor. A
deputy-president, to preside in the absence of the
president, has been elected by the Council from the
beginning.

In forming the electorates, the district has been taken
as the unit, having regard to the general

taencies 1 * 1 *" homogeneity of its interests, and the facility

for the preparation of the electoral roll and
organization of electoral machinery tjhat were afforded
by this administrative and territorial area. Large cities
are formed into constituencies by themselves. Special
non-territorial constituencies have been formed for com¬
merce and industry.

The franchise for the Councils has been sufficiently
lowered to include in the list of enfranchised
Franchise persons as large a percentage of the

population as possible. For instance, in
the Presidency of Bombay, the payment of Rs. 3 per
month as house rent in cities—Rs. 5 in Karachi and
Rs. 10 in Bombay—or ownership of a house worth
Rs. 1,500; and in rural areas the payment of Government
dues by way of land revenue to the extent of Rs. 32 per
year—Rs. 16 in Upper Sind Frontier, the Panch Mahal
and Ratnagiri Districts—entitles a man to be enrolled
in the list of the constituency. The enlargement of
the total number of members, a very substantial
elected majority, a sufficiently low franchise, and an
elected president, are all changes in the direction of
progress.

The Provincial Legislature 255

Table showing, province by province, the proportion of electors
to population in the general constituencies 1

Province

Population of the
electoral areas in
1921

Electors male and
female (women

electors shown in
brackets)

Proportion of elec¬
tors to population

Proportion of male
electors to adult
male population

Proportion of fe¬
male electors to
adult female popu¬
lation

I

i

Figures to the nearest
thousand

per

cent

i

per

cent

per

cent

Madras

4,23,19,000

13,65,000

(1,16,000)

3-2

11*6

1*0

Bombay

1,92,92,000

7,59,000

(39,000)

3*9

13*4

0*8

Bengal

4,62,41,000

11,73,000
f8,000)

2*5

9*7

0*3

United Provinces

4,53,76,000

15,89,000

(51,000)

3*5

!

12-4

0*4

Punjab

2,06,75,000

6,97,000

(21,000)

3*4

11*9

0*5

Bihar and Orissa

3,38,20,000

3,73,000

(nil)

1*1

4*6

• • »

Assam

67,35,000

2,50,000
(about 3,000)

3*7

14*2

0*2

Central Provinces
and Berar

1,27,80,000

1,69,000

(nil)

1*3

5*2

Governors* Pro¬
vinces excluding
Burma

22,72,38,000

63,75,000
(2,68,000
in six
provinces)

2-8

10*4

0*6
for six
provinces

The functions of the Council have been enlarged.

They are divided as usual into legislative,
Functions administrative, and financial. The relation

of the Legislature to the two halves of the executive,
the reserved and the transferred, have to be distinctly
understood. It has already been explained that in spite

1 Simon Commission Report , vol. I, p. 191*

256

Indian Administration

of the division in the executive Government consequent
upon the introduction of dyarchy, the province continues
to be regarded as a whole unit in itself. There are no
two separate legislative bodies corresponding to the two
halves of the executive Government. The same Legis¬
lature has to function for both.

(i) Every bill intended to have legal application
within the jurisdiction of the province has
to be passed by the Council whether it
pertains to the one or the other half of the
Government.

Legislative
and Adminis¬
trative

(ii) The control over the administration is exercised
in four ways which have been already explained: (a)
by moving resolutions; the Provincial Council can
discuss any matter of public interest by moving
resolutions on it; permission for moving them has to
be granted by the Governor (some subjects are excluded
from the exercise of this power); (b) by putting questions
and supplementary questions; permission is now given
to any member of the Council, not necessarily the one
who originally put the question, to put a supplementary
question if he is dissatisfied with the reply given by the
Government member; (c) by moving adjournments of
the House when the House is in session on an important
matter of recent occurrence; and (d) by moving votes of
censure in order to express an unambiguous disapproval
of the policy of the Government.

(iii) The budget of the whole provincial administration,

_ ■ reserved and transferred, has to be put to

Financial

the vote of the Council and passed by it.
This is a very important privilege secured to the Legis¬
lature by the Reforms. Formerly there was only the
power of discussing the budget and moving reso¬
lutions : but there was no control over expenditure or

The Provincial Legislature 257

income. Things have changed now. There are, indeed,
in the Provincial as in the Central Government the non-
votable items, expenditure upon which is incurred irres¬
pective of the wishes or votes of the Legislature. None
the less, it cannot be denied that even the partial
grant of the right of voting the budget is an innovation in
the progressive direction. All proposals for taxation and
appropriation are put before the Council and discussed
and sanctioned by it; so are all proposals for public loans.

3. Procedure of Work in the Bombay
Legislative Council

In the matter of summons for meetings, oath of
allegiance, election of the President and Vice-President and
nomination of a panel of four Chairmen, allotment of
days for non-official business, agenda, quorum, questions
and supplementary questions, resolutions and motions of
adjournments, the same procedure is followed as is
followed in the Legislative Assembly (see pages 146-50).

Legislation has also to pass through the same stages
that have been described on pages 148-49, viz. (a) Leave
to introduce a bill, (b) Publication in the Gazette, (c) First
Reading, ( d ) Select Committee, (e) Second Reading
and Voting clause by clause with Amendments thereon,
(/) Third reading. Every bill passed by the Council
has to receive the assent of the Governor and the
Governor-General before it can become law.

The Provincial budget is presented to the Council and
on a subsequent day it is thrown , open for general discus¬
sion. Thereafter voting takes place on demands for
grants. Not more than twelve days are allotted for that
purpose. Here also the same procedure is followed as is
followed in the case of the Legislative Assembly (see
pages 149-50).

9

258 Indian Administration

Table showing the chief sources of revenue and main items of
expenditure of the Government of Bombay
(Budget figures for 1929-30 in crores of rupees)

Revenue

Expenditure

Land Revenue ...

... S - 12

Reserved subjects

Excise .

... 3*89

Land Revenue and Ge-

Stamps .

... 1*77

neral Administration

2*95

Irrigation (net) 1 ...

... 0*70

Police .

1*79

Forests (gross) ...

... 0*73

Jails and Justice

1-00

Other sources

... 3*51

Other reserved expen-

diture (including debt

Total revenue

... 15*72

charges, pensions, etc.)

4-58

Total ...

10-32

wm

Transferred subjects

Education .

2*04

Medical Relief and Pub-

lie Health .

0-91

Civil Works .

1*30

Other transferred ex-

pen diture .

1*43

Total ...

5-68

Total expenditure ..;

16-00

Estimated revenues and expenditure of the different provinces in
crores of rupees according to budgets of 1929-30

Revenue

Expenditure

Madras . 17*56

17*71

Bombay ... ... ... 15*72

16-00

Bengal . 11-85

11*93

United Provinces ... 13*09

12*39

Punjab ... ... ... 12*54

11*49

Burma ..11*55

11*38

Bihar and Orissa ... 5*85

6*12

Central Provinces ... 5*56

5*27

Assam .. 2*84

2*98

Total ... 96-56

Total ... 95-27*

1 Interest on capital outlay has not been deducted.

2 Of this amount, Rs. 37*31 crores were spent on transferred
departments.

CHAPTER XIV

The Relation of the Executive to the Legislature,,

1. In Transferred Departments

It is intended to be a constitutional principle that the

exercise of the multifarious powers of the

Control over Legislative Council in all matters arising out

Transferred

Departments transferred departments shall be abso¬

lutely unfettered. The essence of responsi¬
ble government consists of the complete subordination
of the Executive to the Legislature and the Provincial
Councils have to play the same role with reference to
Ministers as the House of Commons plays-with the British
Cabinet. The Council’s disapproval of the action of the
Minister must be followed by his resignation or the
dissolution of the Council and the election of a new one
on the issue of the disputed point.

■ The state of things, where the Executive enjoys perfect
immunity and security of tenure, and simultaneously
where the Legislature is endowed with powers which
definitely tend to control the Executive, does not exist in
the administration of the transferred heads. Ministers
are elected members of the Legislatures and are responsi¬
ble to it. Their salary is voted by that body and so are all
■sums of money that are necessary for his departments.
Ministers therefore are the servants of the Legislature
and in the last instance, of the constituencies which elect
the Council.

The Governor’s extraordinary veto over the Ministers
■or over the Legislative Council is intended to be used

260 Indian Administration

only in the rare cases where a Minister’s or Legislature’s
action would, in the opinion of the Governor, lead to
disastrous consequences and hamper him in, the fulfilment
of his responsibility towards Parliament. In practice,
therefore, the Council’s control is supreme over the
ministerial half of the Provincial Government in all
matters whether of policy or of detail or of finance.
There must be complete harmony between the Ministers
and the Councillors. They must have the same view¬
point and angle of vision.

2. In Reserved Departments

In the reserved half, on the other hand, the situation

is rather different. It is true that Legisla-

Relationto tf ve an £ financial measures necessary for
the Reserved

the conduct of the reserved departments
have to be passed by the Provincial Legis¬
lature which can also use its power of interpellation and
moving resolutions in those matters. Yet there is a
difference. The Members in charge of the reserved
half, with the Governor at their head, are responsible
ultimately to Parliament through the Secretary of State
and the Governor-General. They are answerable to that
body for their actions in the management of their
trust. This responsibility to an extra-territorial authority
has made it necessary that in case of disagreement
between the Executive Council and the Legislature on
questions relating to the reserved heads, the former
should be given extraordinary power to have its
own way even against the expressed wishes of the
Legislature.

Unlike the Ministers, the Executive Members are not
removable on an adverse vote of the Council; their
salaries are non-votable; their final supervising and

Relation of the Executive to the Legislature 261

controlling agency is not the Legislature in the province*
but the Governor-General-in-Council and the Secretary of
State. Hence if they are kept in a situation in which they
have to depend upon the Legislature for the discharge
of their duties and the performance of their functions*
they must be allowed the right of following their own
ideas in any conflict between themselves and such a
controlling body.

Therefore the Governor, like the Governor-General*
has been given the power of what is now
well-known as certification. By the use of
this power he can enact any necessary piece
of legislation that is not agreed to by the Legislature, or
restore any grant that is rejected by that body. There¬
fore though the budget of even the reserved half is voted
by the Council there is the possibility of the Governor
more frequently resorting to the weapon of certification
for the restoration of rejected grants in this sphere of
Government departments than in the case of the trans¬
ferred ones.

Yet the Legislature’s influence upon the Executive must

prove to be great under such a condition of

Indirect things. A persistent and constant defiance
Influence of

Governor's

Certification

the Legislature

of the Legislature’s opinion by the Executive

would amount to acknowledging the exis¬
tence of an autocratic rigid rule in all its severity and
despotism. Such a calamity is not welcome to constitu¬
tions working under a normal mentality. It proves fatal
to the moral basis of Government. Hence though the
effective legal powers over reserved heads enjoyed by the
Legislature can be described to be but small, the placing
together of a democratically elected and representative
Legislature armed with powers of compliance and refusal*
and of an irresponsible and irremovable Executive working

262 Indian Administration

tinder it, cannot fail to have its own result. The Executive
can effectively differ from the Legislature only through
the instrumentality of what is admittedly an extraordinary
weapon, namely the power of certification. In such
circumstances the indirect control exercised by the
Legislature will be far from insignificant. Questions,
Resolutions, Adjournments, Legislation and Voting the
Budget are important powers possessed by.the Legislative
Councils and their constant use is bound to prove v6ry
beneficial and salutary.

PART V

GENERAL

Chap. Page

XV. Sub-Divisions of the Province and

their Administration ... ... 265

XVI. Local Self-Government

1. Historical ... ... ... 271

2. Functions and Sources of Income ... 275

XVII. Judicial Administration in India

1. Historical ... ... ... 279

2. Present Organization ... ... 286

3. Position of European Subjects ... 294

4. Separation of the Executive from the

Judiciary ... ... ... 296

XVIII. Land Revenue

1. Historical ... ... ... 301

2. Existing Systems of Land Teniire ... 305

XIX. The Public Services

1. Before the Reforms ... ... 314

2. After the Reforms ... ... 319

3. Criticism ... ... ... 324

XX. Education ... ... ... 328

XXI. Famine Relief ... ... ... 334

XXII. Railways and Irrigation ... ... 339

It is t

Division

Province

Indian I
as the a
would I
adminis
area in
authorit
agency
conditic
in the s
pro vine:
commoi
Inter

The Div

Commi.
Bomba.
Bomba*,
at the t
the pro
court ;
of reve
The
provin

CHAPTER XV

Sub-Divisions of the Provmce and their
A dmin istraiion

It is proposed to give here a short description in

outline of the system of administration in

Division of a p rov i nce as apart from the controlling

Province . ^ V, - -

• organization at the headquarters. An

Indian province comprises a vast area, very often as big

as the area of some of the larger countries of Europe* It

would be therefore physically impossible to conduct its

administrative business without further sub-dividing the

area into smaller units and distributing Government

authority amongst smaller officers, with a supervising

agency above. There is a great diversity among the

conditions of the provinces. There is also some variety

in the scheme of decentralization of authority within the

provincial area itself. However the district is the unit

common to all provinces.

Intermediate between the district and the whole province
there may be groups of districts known as
The Division fli v i s i onSj j n charge of officers known as

Commissioners. Such officers, for instance, exist in
Bombay. In most of the provinces, though not in
Bombay, there is what is known as a Board of Revenue
at the headquarters. It is the chief revenue authority of
the province and in its judicial capacity forms an appellate
court in rent cases, and serves to increase the volume
of revenue.

The duties of a Commissioner of a division in a
province like Bombay, where that kind of officer exists*

266 Indian Administration

are those of general superintendence over a group of five

The

Commissioner

or six districts that are grouped together
in the division and also of acting as a court
of appeal in revenue cases. The Com¬

missioner is a senior officer of the Indian Civil Service

and has been described as serving as a post office between
his subordinates, the Collectors, on the one hand, and his
superiors, the Government at the headquarters, on the.

other.

. The district, however, is invariably the unit of
^ - administration in all provinces ahd is there-

The Dl8trict fore of vital importance. In size the district
varies from province to province and even from place
to place in the same province. Its area varies from two
to ten thousand square miles and its population from’
one to three million souls. Its average size is given
as 4,430 miles by the Montford Report. Some of the
bigger districts exceed the population of Switzerland, or
the area and population of * Denmark. The officer in
charge of the district is known as the Collector.

The Collector is the representative of the British

Government in the district which represents
The Collector . concentrated authority of British rule.

i

He has the dual capacity of Collector and Magistrate. As
Collector, he is the head of the revenue organization in the
district.-' As a Magistrate, he exercises general supervision
over the criminal courts and directs the police work. He
can get himself into touch with every inch of territory in the
district through his subordinates, the Mamlatdars and the
village officials. He maintains peace in the district area.

' Collectors and their staff are officers intimately known
to the people coming into constant contact with them
for-a hundred reasons and are the vehicles for conveying
the orders of the Government to. the people at large.

The Province and its" Administration 267:

During a large part of :the year, the Collector has,
to move out to the different villages in his district,
supervising the work of his subordinates and getting;
himself into direct touch with the people and the problems
of administration. He is the eyes, the ears, the .mouth
and the hand of the Central Government within his district,
and serves as its general representative to the remotest
borders of the country.

The organization of the collectorate is 4 so close knit,
so well established, and so thoroughly

Varied Nature
of His Duties

understood that it simultaneously discharges
an immense number of other duties with

f

ease and efficiency. Registration, alteration and partition
of holdings, management of indebted estates, loans to»
agriculturists, settlement of disputes, and above all
famine relief, are..all matters which are dealt with .by
this agency \ The Collector is a 1 strongly individua¬
lized worker in every department of rural economy %
As Sir J. Strachey says, because he is the represen¬
tative of a paternal, not constitutional Government, he
has to perform a large number of functions connected
with a variety of departments like police, jails, municipali¬
ties, roads, education, sanitation, dispensaries, local
taxation, and so on*. ‘He should be a lawyer, an
accountant, a financier, a ready writer of State papers.
He ought also to possess no mean knowledge of agricul¬
ture, political economy and engineering.' He is directed
to keep himself informed and to watch the operation of
everything that passes in the district, 4 The vicissitudes
of trade, the state of currency, the administration of civil
justice, the progress of public works ’ must engage his.
attention as much as protection of .life and property and
maintenance of peace.

The Collector also used to preside over the District.

268 Indian Administration

Board till recently, as the growth of local self-government
in rural areas was not regarded as sufficiently satisfactory
to allow a more popular and democratic constitution of the
Boards. In his capacity as chairman of the Board, the
district officer had occasion to dispose of matters connect¬
ed with subjects like education, dispensaries, sanitation,
country roads, bridges, water supply, drainage, and fairs.
Even after the democratization of Municipalities and Local
Boards, the Collector’s supervisory powers over their
working are immense and they are frequently used.

In short, the Collector of the district is the most
important officer in the bureaucracy of India
because of the first-hand personal knowledge
that he has the opportunity to acquire
about the people and problems of his district. He is
in the closest possible touch with the realities of the
situation. A large measure of local independence and
initiative is enjoyed by him. On his resource, efficiency
and presence of mind depends the smooth course of
administration in the district. Officers trained as
Collectors in the various districts of the Presidency and
who have therefore acquired the most valuable personal
experience and information of the strange and foreign
country with the government of which they are entrusted,
are raised to the offices- of Commissioners and Executive
Councillors and some to those of Provincial Governors.

The capital city of the district is the Collector’s head¬
quarters* Here are stationed the heads
Other Officers an< j. offices of various specialized

•departments which have to function within the area of
the district. Establishments; for irrigation, roads and
'.buildings, agriculture, industries, factories, co-operative
^credit, and medical relief, always exist with their heads in
most of the districts to perform the special functions

Collectors and
Mamlatdars

7 he Province and its Administration 269

assigned to them. The Executive Engineer, the Civil
Surgeon, the District Superintendent of Police, the
Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies, the District
Judge, are all officers who respectively are the heads of
their departments in the territorial jurisdiction of the
district. They are controlled by their own departmental
superiors and not by the Collector. They have been
compared to different sets of strings connecting the
Government with the people. Their policies are influenced
in a varying degree by the district officer. He is always
there in the background 4 to lend his support or, if need be,
to mediate between a specialized service and the people \
The district is further split up into smaller divisions.

These sub-divisions are under «the junior
Deputy officers of the Indian Civil Service or

members of the Provincial Service styled
Deputy-Collectors. The general revenue
and magisterial charge of the sub-division is vested in
the sub-divisional officer, subject to the control of the
Collector. Arrangements within the division vary in the
different provinces. In Bombay, the district is sub¬
divided into talukas, each of which has as its head an
officer known as the Mamlatdar. He is to the taluka
what the Collector is to the district, though in a small
diminutive measure. He has revenue and magisterial
powers and has to supervise the working of the adminis¬
tration within his area. He has also numbers of other
diverse duties. In fact, he is practically the general
administrative officer of the Government in the area given
to his care, namely the taluka.

Lastly, at the basis of the system comes the Indian
village with its organization of great antiquity still finding
a place in the new system with certain necessary modifi¬
cations. The headman is the chief officer in the village

Village

Officials

270 Indian Administration

and is responsible for the collection of revenue and the

maintenance of peace in the village. He has
the assistance of a village accountant whq
has to keep the village accounts, registers
of holdings and, in general, all records of land revenue.'
The village watchman is the rural policeman. Most of
these officers were formerly hereditary and continued to
be so till recently. The tendency, however of modern
times is to. abolish the principle of heredity and substitute
instead a competitive test. The hereditary character of
the kulkami’s or accountant’s post has already disappeared
and perhaps other posts may follow suit.

1

CHAPTER XVI

Local Self-Government

1. Historical

History of
Municipalities

Municipalities and Local Boards in India are the

creations of British rule. The Presidency
towns had municipal government from the
early days of the Company’s Government.
A Municipal Corporation was established in Madras as
far back as 1687. The Charter of 1726 constituted
Mayor’s Courts in Bombay, Madras--and Calcutta. They
were more judicial than administrative bodies. The
Regulating Act indirectly allowed the authority of levying
taxation for local purposes. Several * later statutes
modified the municipal constitutions of the three towns.

■ The' Bombay Municipality was remodelled in 1856 and

again in 1862: By the first Act, the municipality was
composed of the Justices of theJBeace and a salaried
Commissioner, who was givefTentire executive power,
and control of the police. By the other Act two repre¬
sentative bodies were constituted: (i) A Corporation
of sixty-four members of whom one half were elected by
the ratepayers and the rest nominated in equal numbers
by the Justices of the Peace and the Government; (ii) a
'Town Council, composed of twelve members of whom
eight were elected by the Corporation and the rest
nominated by the Government. The Municipal Com¬
missioner retained his executive responsibility. The Town
Council was supreme in matters of finance.

Two Acts of universal application were passed by the

272

Indian Administration

Governor-General*s Legislative Council in 1850 and 1856.
They had reference to municipal government outside the
three Presidency towns. It was not, however, until 1870
that much progress was made. In that year, Lord Mayo’s
Government admitted the necessity of taking steps to
bring local interest and supervision to bear on the manage¬
ment of funds which were devoted to local purposes.

But it is with Lord Ripon’s name that the establishment
, of local self-government in a liberal measure

Reform ° n * is associated - In 1883-4, Acts were passed

which greatly altered the constitutions,
powers and functions of municipal bodies. The elective
system was widely extended, and many towns were
permitted to elect a private citizen as chairman. Arrange¬
ments were also made to increase municipal resources.
Some items of provincial revenue which were capable of
better management under local authorities were transferred
to them, with a proportionate amount of provincial
expenditure incurred for local subjects.

Lord Ripon declared the main object of his reform

Hi* Ob* ct t0 410 a( ^ vance an< ^ promote the political
,ec and popular education of the people and to

induce the best and the most intelligent men in the
community to come forward and take a share in the
management of their own local affairs, and to guide and
train them in the attainment of that important object \ It
was merely carrying out the policy of decentralization
initiated by Lord Mayo with reference to finance.
According to Lord Ripon this was decentralization as
between the Provincial Governments and local bodies.

Local Boards are bodies which look after local affairs
in rural areas. Their establishment is comparatively
recent. No Local Boards existed up to 1870. As a
result of the financial decentralization scheme introduced

Local Self-Government

273

by Lord Mayo in that year, various Acts were passed in

History of
Local Boards

different provinces providing for the levy
of rates, and the constitution of local bodies
to administer the funds raised by them.

Lord Ripon’s Government reorganized the whole system.
Boards were established all over the country. The
lowest administrative unit was to be small enough to
secure local knowledge and interest. The District Boards

looked after the measures that were common to all the

district. The non-official element was to preponderate in
the composition of the Boards and to a certain extent the
principle of election was recognized. The financial
resources and responsibilities of theBoards were increased.
Some portion of provincial revenue and expenditure was
transferred to thercu There was no uniform or general
system of local self-government imposed on all the
provinces by the Government of India. A large discretion
was left to Provincial Governments.

In 1918 the Government of India issued an important

Resolution. It affirmed the necessity of

The Resolu- .

tion of 1918 removing all unnecessary official control

and of distinguishing between the spheres
of action appropriate for the Provincial Government and
the Local Boards. It was proposed to make these bodies
as representative as possible. Unnecessary restrictions
in connexion with taxation, budget, and the sanction of
works were to be removed. A substantial elective

majority both in municipalities and Rural Boards was
recommended. It was also thought desirable to keep the
franchise as low as possible. Chairmen of the Boards,
instead of being nominated by the Government, were
recommended to be elected by the Boards.

Since the introduction of the Reforms, local self-govern¬
ment has become a transferred subject. Almost every

After the
Reforms

274 Indian Administration

Provincial Government has displayed its interest and

zeal for the progress of local institutions.
Acts have been passed in the Punjab pro¬
viding for the creation of Improvement
Trusts and Village Councils. In the United Provinces,
the District Boards Bill was passed in 1922, democratiz¬
ing the Local Boards and increasing their powers of
taxation- Similar measures were taken for municipalities.
The Bihar and Orissa Legislative Council has passed
important Acts having the same effect. So have the
Legislatures in the Central Provinces and Assam. The
Bengal Council passed the Village Self-Government Act
and also other Acts for reconstituting the Calcutta
Municipality and other municipalities in the Presidency.
In Bombay, a bill relating to Local Boards has been
passed by the Legislative Council. It has ‘extended
the franchise, removed the sex-disqualifications and
given increased powers to Local Boards; constituting
in short a very liberal and progressive piece of
legislation . .

The village has been the primary territory unit of
Government organization in India. Ninety

Panchayats 'P er cent ot the Indian population lives in

villages. Through all the vicissitudes of
India’s political life, the village has maintained its exis¬
tence intact. It has served to conserve the vitality of the
Indian nation. The administration in villages was
conducted in ancient .times through what were known as
village panchayats. Recently, endeavours have begun to
be made to revise the withering old system. The.
Municipalities .and Local Boards in India constituted under
British rule have no connexion with the indigenous village
system. They were entirely the creations of a series of
Acts of Legislatures.. The reformed Provincial Councils

Local SeM-Government 275

in' some of the provinces, including Bombay, have passed
Village Panchayats Acts in order to renovate the old
institutions and modify them to suit present conditions.

2. Functions and Sources of Income

The functions of local institutions like Municipalities
and Rural Boards .are divided into two

Obligatory" classes, obligatory and discretionary. In

the former category come the duties of
lighting public streets and places; watering public streets
and places; cleansing public streets and places; removing
noxious vegetation.; extinguishing fires; regulating or
abating offensive or dangerous trades; acquiring and
maintaining places for the disposal of the dead; com
structing, altering and maintaining public streets, markets,
slaughter-houses, drains, privies, washing places, drinking
fountains, tanks, .wells, etc.; obtaining supply of water,
registering births and deaths; public vaccination j ^esta¬
blishing and maintaining public hospitals and dispensaries;
establishing and maintaining primary schools, etc.

Among the discretionary functions may be mentioned
the laying out of public streets ; constructing
Discretionary an( ^ maintaining public parks, gardens,

libraries, museums, lunatic asylums, rest houses, dharm-

}

sates and other public buildings; taking a census;
making- a survey; payment of salaries and other monetary,
charges incidental to the maintenance of any court of a
stipendiary or honorary magistrate; ma i ntaining a farm,
or factory for the disposal of the Sewage, and any other
measure likely to promote public safety, health, conveni¬
ence or education. The functions of Local Boards are, of
course, mainl y concerned with objects of rural importance

and rural necessity.

The enumeration of the above list will make it dear

276 Indian Administration

that Municipalities or Rural Boards are entrusted with

duties which can best be performed by
local bodies. Local self-government is,

Government * n a P rocess of political devolution.

The principle which underlies it involves the
conception of local autonomy. Both in the larger interests
of the State and in the narrower interests of the local area
and its population, the delegation of powers and freedom
to local bodies is considered to be desirable. It secures
efficiency and economy of administration. What is more
important, it has an excellent educative effect, inasmuch
as it supplies a training ground for politicians and public
workers. The consciousness of liberty and the sense
of responsibility and personal interest in the manage¬
ment of administrative affairs are moral influences in
themselves.

. In Bombay, the policy of freeing municipalities from

external control has been carried out to a
The Position ver y g rea t extent. All municipalities now

elect their own presidents; the number of
nominated members is reduced in each case to one-fifth of
the total number. The qualifications for electors are
based on a wide franchise. There are in all 33 city
municipalities and 123 town municipalities in the Presi¬
dency. They appoint Chief Officers, Health Officers,
Engineers and other executive officials. Services of
public utility such as roads, dispensaries, water supply,
sanitation and education are rendered by them.

It will be observed'that District Boards are not called
upon to perform exactly the same duties as municipalities
in cities, though on the whole the nature of the two duties
is the same. The District Board looks after the rural area
of the district; the municipality is concerned with the
urban limits of the city. The needs of the two may be

in Bombay

Local Self-Government

277

slightly different, for instance the maintenance of public
roads for keeping communications between village and
village may be a more onerous duty for a District Board
than the maintenance of streets in the city. Still, after
allowing for the variation in the importance of particular
items, the functions of Municipalities and District Boards

Sources of
Income

are almost the same.

In order to enable them to incur the expenditure that
would be involved in the performance of
their duties, powers of earning an income
by means of taxation and fees must be
allowed to local bodies. Taxes would be levied upon and
fees collected from specific areas demarcated as belonging
to the Municipality or the Local Board. Their jurisdiction
is precisely defined. The kinds of taxes which local
bodies can impose are as follows : (i) A rate on buildings
or lands or both, (ii) a tax on vehicles, (iii) an octroi
duty on goods or animals or both, (iv) a tax on dogs,
(v) a sanitary cess on private latrines, etc., (vi) a water
rate for the water supplied by the Municipality or Local
Board, (vii) a lighting tax, (viii) a tax on pilgrims, (ix) a
tax upon arts, professions, trades, etc., (x) a tax upon
drainage, sewage, conservancy, and so on.

In the case of Local Boards, the most important source
of income is the cess upon land. It is now collected at the
rate of two annas in the rupee along with land revenue.
Most sources of income that are available in a populated

city are not available in rural areas and villages, and
therefore a special source of income has to be devised for
them. The imposition of local rates upon lands for local
purposes is the most satisfactory method of giving income
to the District Boards. The rates are collected by the
same agency which collects land revenue for Govern¬
ment and the District Boards are not required to

278 Indian Administration

spend any large amount of money for the machinery of :

collection.

Below the District Board are Taluka Boards. Tq
them are delegated certain functions which
Taluka Boards are 0 £ importance and interest to the taluka

and which can be best diposed of by them. Below the
Taluka Boards come the village panchayats . whose juris-,
diction is strictly limited to the area of the village. The
important body is, however, the central District Board.
Its constitution is now largely democratized. It contains an
elected non-official majority and elects its own president.
The franchise for its election is low. Representatives o£
Taluka Boards and village panchayats in the district are
given seats in it. By recent legislation in the Bombay,
Presidency, the administration of compulsory primary
education in the district areas is entrusted to the District,
Boards.

The elected and nominated Members of a Municipality >
or a Local Board together form what is
Ge rr l B °^ y known as its General Body. This body

and Executive

Official* elects the President and the Vice-President

and various other Sub-Committees and holds
frequent meetings for the transaction of business. It
passes by-laws, votes expenditure. and raises money by
taxation and loans. It also appoints executive officials
for carrying on actual administration. The Chief Officer*
the Health Officer, the Engineer, the Administrative
Officer of the School Board are all paid servants controlled
by the Municipality or the Local Board.

CHAPTER XVII

Judicial Administration in India
1. Historical

There was no possibility of the East India Company

_ , ~ A possessing large judicial powers during the

Early (charters

earlier half of their existence, when their
mission and objective were purely commercial. The
incorporating Charter of Elizabeth had allowed the
Company to impose pains and penalties in order to exact
observance of the orders that they might issue to their
servants. A proviso was added that the laws- and
punishment must be reasonable. This, of course, was
purely a departmental power for enforcing discipline in
the affairs of a commercial corporation.

‘The Charter of 1661, granted during the period of the
Restoration, empowered the Governor and Council of each
factory to judge the servants and subjects in all causes,
civil and criminal, according to the laws of England. The
Presidency of Madras decided to utilize the power thus
granted, and appointed its Governor and Council to
sit as a High Court for serious cases within its territory.

. In. 1669 when Bombay was granted to the. Company
by the Crown of England, provision was made to form
two Courts of Judicature, the inferior one consisting of a
civil officer assisted by two native officers and having,
limited jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court consisting of
the Deputy-Governor and the Council whose decisions
were final.. It appears that this was a temporary measure.

By a Charter granted by James II in 1687, power was

280 bidian Administration

given to constitute a Municipality at Madras. The
Mayor and the Aldermen were to be the Court of
Record with power to try civil and criminal cases.
Similar institutions were established in Bombay and
Calcutta in 1726. The Mayors and Aldermen, as in the
case of Madras, were to constitute the Mayor’s Courts
with civil jurisdiction, subject to appeal to the Supreme
Court of the Governor or President and Council. In
cases exceeding sums of Rs. 400, the appeal lay to
His Majesty-in-Council.

The Governor and Council were constituted Courts of
Oyer and Terminer for the trial of all offences except
high treason. European settlers in India did not submit
to the indigenous law. It was assumed that they had
brought their own legal system with them. At first, the
tendency of the English was to make their laws public
and to apply them to all those Europeans and Indians who
were residing within the Company’s area in any of the
three Presidencies. But the Charter of 1753 expressly ex¬
cepted from the jurisdiction of the Mayor’s Courts all suits
and actions between native Indians only. Later measures
still further restricted the scope of the English law.

The Regulating Act of 1773 took the important step of
constituting the Supreme Court of Judica-
^ e ^* guIat " ture in Bengal which remained substantially

unchanged up to 1862. It was to consist
of a Chief Justice and four puisne judges, all nominated
by the Crown. It was vested with all sorts of jurisdic¬
tion, civil, criminal, admiralty, ecclesiastical, and so on.
Its jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases extended to
all subjects of the Crown in Bengal and persons in the
service of the Company and any other persons who
agreed in writing to submit themselves to the Court.

The history of the unseemly disputes between the

Judicial Administration i?i India 281

Governor-General and the Supreme Court is well known.
The vague nature of the power of the Court gave rise
to the question as to who was paramount, the Governor-
General or the Court. The • extent of the Court’s
jurisdiction was not clearly defined and it was not known
whether all native inhabitants in the Company’s
dominions were or were not included within it. The
conflict grew so intense that it had to be ended by an
Act of Parliament.

The Amending Act of 1781 declared that the Governor-
General and Council were not to be subject to the
jurisdiction of the Court for acts done in their public
capacity, nor were landowners or farmers or pensioners,
only because they resided in the Company’s territories.
In the case of the citizens of Calcutta, the Hindu and
Mohammedan laws were respectively applicable in the
case of Hindus and Mohammedans, and that of the
defendant party in cases where the plaintiffs and defen¬
dants differed in religion. The civil and religious usages
and customs of the natives were to be observed. The

Provincial Courts, both civil and criminal, were- specially
recognized as established by the Governor-General.

The Mayor’s Courts at Madras and Bombay remained
as they were until 1797 in which year they were super¬
seded by Recorder’s Courts. Finally, Supreme Courts
on the Bengal model were established in Madras and
Bombay in 1800 and 1823 respectively.

There had, of course, existed in India an indigenous

The system
under the
Mohaxn*
medans

system of judicial organization and of the
application of law. The Mohammedan
system of government was based on the
combination of all authority, judicial, fiscal,
and military, in the same hands. The Nabob

was the Viceroy sent by the Delhi Emperor to govern

282 Indian Administration

distant provinces. He had two capacities. As Diwan
he collected revenue and supervised the administration
of civil justice. As Nazim he exercised criminal jurisdic¬
tion and controlled the. police. Below the Nabob, the
zemindar or farmer of revenue, exercised civil and
criminal jurisdiction. There were also special criminal
courts, the highest presided over by the Naib Nazim and
the others by judges who were designated Faujdars.
The criminal law that was applied was exclusively
Mohammedan. The civil law was either Hindu or
Mohammedan as the case might require. The Diwani
transferred to the East India Company the function
of revenue collections and civil justice, the Nizamat
being held as before by the Naib. The officials who
conducted the business in both branches continued to
be native.

With the declaration of the Directors in 1771 of their

intention to stand forth as the Diwan and

Warren take upon themselves the direct manage-

Has tings

ment of revenues, Warren Hastings, the
Governor of Bengal, placed the entire administration of
justice as well as the collection of revenue under the
supervision of English officers.

Over each district was placed a Collector assisted by a
native Diwan. The Collector and Diwan constituted the

court of civil justice called the Diwani Adalat. In each
district was also created a Faujdari Adalat or a criminal
court consisting of a kazi, a mufti and two maul vis with
whom the Collector sat merely to watch the proceedings.

The appeal from the Diwani Adalat lay to the Sadr
Diwani Adalat at Calcutta which was composed of the
Governor and Council assisted by native officers. The
Criminal Appellate Court was. known as the Sadr
Nizamat Adalat. It was composed of a darogha, a mufti.

Judicial Administration in India 283

a kazi and a maulvi, all appointed in the name of the Nazim.
The court was first placed in Calcutta, but was later on
removed to Murshidabad. Regulations for the procedure
of these courts were formed by Warren Hastings and
they are described as being the first attempt at English
legislation in India.

In 1774 judicial business was separated from that of
revenue collection and different officers were appointed
to look after each. Native Amins were appointed for the
administration of civil justice. In 1780, sixteen courts
of Diwani Adalat were created and each was placed
under the charge of a covenanted civilian styled the
Superintendent. In 1781 Parliament expressly gave its
recognition to the Provincial Courts of the Company in
the Amending Act of that year. The Governor-Genera 1-
in-Council was authorized to frame regulations for the
Provincial Courts.

The advent of Lord Cornwallis effected considerable
changes in the judicial administration. The
Cornwallis § a ^ r Nizamat Adalat was re-transferred

from Murshidabad to Calcutta in 1790. It was to consist of
the Governor-General and Council together with the kazi
and two muftis. In 1793 four Courts of Circuit, each com¬
posed of two or three covenanted civilians and assessors
were formed to transact ordinary criminal business.

In the case of civil justice, the separation between the
duties of a Collector and those of a judge was finally
effected. Cornwallis wrote, * Individuals who have been
aggrieved by revenue officers in one capacity can never
hope to obtain redress from them in another.' The purely
judicial powers of the Collector were now vested in the
civil judge. Twenty-six civil judges were appointed in all.

Appeals from the civil judges lay to the four Provincial
Courts of Appeal which were identical with the four Courts

284 Indian Administration

of Circuit entrusted with ordinary criminal jurisdiction,
A further appeal from these lay to the Sadr Diwani
Adalat, that is the court formed by the Governor-General
and Council, The newly created civil judges were also
endowed with magisterial powers and could hold pre¬
liminary inquiries into important criminal cases and
determine unimportant ones.

The two Appellate Courts, the Sadr Diwani and the

Wellesley and
Bentinck

Nizamat Adalat of Calcutta, were re¬
modelled in 1801 during the administration
of Lord Wellesley, Instead of consisting

of the Governor-General and Council they came hence¬

forth to be composed of three or more judges selected
from the covenanted Service. Lord William Bentinck

abolished the Provincial Courts of Appeal which had
grown extremely notorious on account of their dila¬
toriness. In his time also full criminal jurisdiction was
conferred upon civil district judges under the style of
sessions judges and the magisterial authority formerly
exercised by the civil judges was transferred to the Collec¬
tor. This measure has been described as retrograde
in character inasmuch as it went against the principle
of separation of executive and judicial functions.

Inferior courts of civil jurisdiction outside the Presi¬
dency towns had been established by Lord
Lower Courts Q ornwa ^ s# They had a limited jurisdiction.

They were called Courts of Native Commissioners.
Lord William Bentinck in 1831 created a new grade known
as Principal Sadr Amins whose jurisdiction was after¬
wards made unlimited in respect of value. These were
later on transformed into subordinate judges in 1868.
Similar inferior courts of civil jurisdiction within the
Presidency towns, after passing through different
phases, were finally shaped into Small Causes Courts

Judicial Administration in India 285

*

which have continued to function in that form to the
present day.

The Indian High Courts Act of 1861 empowered the
Queen to establish by letters patent High

Courts Act of Courts of Judicature in Calcutta, Madras

and Bombay. The old Supreme Courts and
the Adalat Courts were abolished. Each
High Court was to consist of a Chief Justice and not
more than fifteen judges, of whom not less than one-
third were to be barristers and one-third to be members
of the Indian Civil Service. They were expressly given
superintendence over, and power to frame rules of
practice for, all the courts subject to their appellate
jurisdiction. Power was given to establish a similar
court in the North-West Provinces, which was done in
1866. In the same year, a Chief Court was established
in the Punjab under an Act of the Indian Legislature.

The simplification of law was attempted to be accom¬
plished by the issuing of uniform codes, both civil and
criminal. The former was published in 1859, the latter
in 1860 and the Penal Code in 1861. The Indian
Legislature now regulates the constitutional jurisdiction
of the ordinary civil courts. Between 1865 and 1873
Civil Courts Acts were passed for each of the ten
provinces, establishing a generally uniform system.
The regulations of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1872
have made the constitution of the criminal courts uniform

throughout the country.

The Indian High Courts Act of 1911 raised the

Indian High
Courts Act of

1911

maximum number of judges in a High
Court from fifteen to twenty and gave
power to establish High Courts as need
arose, in any part of India. Power was also

given for the addition of temporary additional judges

286 Indian Administration

*

by the Govemor-General-in-Council. Under powers
obtained under this Act, High Courts have been
established at Patna, Lahore and Rangoon.

After dealing with the history and growth of judicial
organization in India, it is necessary to proceed to a
description of its existing condition.

2. Present Organization

- At the head of the organization in India stand the Indian

High Courts. These are bodies composed

Couru—their Chief Justice and other judges, the

Composition maximum total number in each being fixed

at twenty. They are appointed by His
Majesty. The Govemor-General-in-Council may appoint
additional judges having the same status and powers,
for a period of not more than two years. The judges
must be either barristers of England and Ireland or
advocates of Scotland of not less than five years’
standing, or members of the Indian Civil Service of not
less than ten years’ service, or officials in judicial service
of a grade not less than the grade of a subordinate judge
of at least five years’ service, or pleaders of an Indian
High Court of not less than ten years’ standing. At
least one-third of the total number must be barristers or
advocates, and another third must be Indian Civil
Servants* Every judge shall hold office during His
Majesty’s pleasure.

The jurisdiction of the High Courts: is extremely wid%
comprising as it does both original and
appellate authority, including admiralty
jurisdiction in case of offences committed on.

the high seas. They have all powers in relation to the

• ^

administration of justice, including power to appoint
clerks and other ministerial officers of the court, and power

Their Juris
diction

Their Powers

Judicial Administration in India 287

to make rules for regulating the practices of the court.
They have to superintend the working of all courts
subject to their appellate jurisdiction, and may for that
purpose call for returns or direct the transfer of any case
from one court to another and prescribe the rules of
practice, and proceedings, and forms in which book
entries and accounts shall be kept by them.

The High Courts have both original and appellate
jurisdiction in civil as well as in criminal
matters. They function as original courts
for the Presidency towns in civil cases in which the
amount of money involved exceeds Rs. 2,000 and in
criminal cases when these are committed to them by the
Presidency Magistrates. As appellate courts they hear
appeals both in civil and criminal matters from all places
in the area under their jurisdiction, entertaining appeals
also from their own original sides. The High Court
judges being directly appointed by His Majesty to hold
office during his pleasure, and their salary being fixed
under law, that degree of independence which is required
in the highest tribunal is secured to them to a great
extent.

There is a separate court known as the Court of the
Judicial Commissioner in Sind. The High Court of
Bombay has no jurisdiction over that province. The
Judicial Commissioner’s Court is the highest court of
appeal in the province and is also the District and
Sessions Court of Karachi, Since September 1923
criminal jurisdiction over European British subjects in
Sind is vested in it* as also that in matrimonial suits.

Below the High Court there are subordinate courts for
the disposal of civil and criminal business.
Sessions Courts /p Q spea k 0 f the criminal courts first.

Every province is divided into sessions,—divisions which

288 Indian Administration

are usually identical with the area of the district. For
every such division, the local Government must establish
a Sessions Court and appoint a Sessions Judge or
additional sessions judges. These Sessions Courts
function in their prescribed territorial jurisdiction. They
are competent to try all criminal cases committed to them
and to inflict any punishment authorized by law. Every
sentence of death passed by them is, however, subject to
confirmation by the highest court of criminal appeal in
the province. The Sessions Court is also a court of
appeal against the decision of the magistrates subordinate
to its jurisdiction.

Below the Sessions Court are courts of magistrates.

These are divided into three classes. The
First Class Court has power to pass a
sentence of two years’ rigorous imprison¬
ment and a fine of an amount up to Rs. 1,000.
The Second Class Court can pass a sentence
of six months’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of an
amount up to Rs. 200. The Third Class Court can pass
a sentence of one month’s imprisonment and a fine of up
to Rs. 50. Territorial limits are assigned to the magis¬
trates and a detailed schedule set out showing the grade
of magistrates competent to try various criminal cases.
They have power to commit to Sessions Courts those
cases which are out of their competence.

In each district, the Collector, or the Deputy-Commis¬
sioner in the non-regulation provinces, is
District and appointed District Magistrate and in this

Magisfaates ca P ac ity supervises the work of other

magistrates in the district, He distributes
work among them. In the Presidency towns there are
Presidency Magistrates and in big cities, City Magis¬
trates, to dispose of criminal cases and to commit

Magistrates
—First,
Second and
Third Class

*

Judicial Adm£ni$traiio?i in India

289

the more important ones to the High Court or to the
Sessions.

Provision is also made for the appointment of honorary
magistrates in big towns. Gentlemen of

Magistrates good social status and desirous of doing

public work are usually selected to fill the
.appointments. They always work in a bench. They are
divided into three grades of first, second and third class*
and have the same powers as stipendiary magistrates in
the respective grades.

Trial by jury in criminal cases is one of the most
cherished privileges in a country like
England. It has been acquired after a good
deal of constitutional struggle. To. the
political thinker, the existence of such a privilege may

Jury and
Assessors

or may not appear to be an unqualified guarantee of the
impartial carrying out of justice. To some, it might
positively appear to have large elements of imperfection
which are bound to detract from the scientific and correct
character of the verdicts given. The transaction of com¬
plicated judicial business by avowed amateurs, depending
upon the help of their robust commonsense to discharge
their duties, many not evoke appreciative enthusiasm in the
phlegmatic mind of a critical theorist. But apart from the
theory of the question, a description of the jury system as
introduced in India is interesting.

Trial by jury is the rule in the original criminal cases
before the High Courts. In the mofussil it is not consi¬
dered always possible to empanel an efficient jury. Trials,
therefore, are conducted either with the help of a jury or
with the help of assessors. The difference between jurors
and assessors is well known. The decision of the former
is binding upon the judge who rarely differs from them.
The opinion of the assessors, on the other hand, is not
10

290 Indian Administration

"binding and their advice may or may not be accepted by
the trying judge. Where it appears to the Sessions Judge
that the verdict of the jury is manifestly absurd or per¬
verse, he has the power to disagree with them and refer
the matter to the High Court which has authority to quash
the sentence.

The jury consists of nine persons in trials before the
High Court, and of an uneven number, prescribed by
the local Government, in the mofussil courts. After
the arguments of counsels of both sides and the
putting forth of evidence are finished, the judge
explains the whole case to the jury, dwells upon the pros
and cons of the case, explains the laws under which the
offence is alleged to have been committed, and leaves the
final verdict to the discretion of the members of the jury.
The latter adjourn for some time to deliberate among them¬
selves and give either a unanimous or a majority opinion.
- The inferior civil courts differ in nomenclature and in

other respects in the different provinces,
though the essentials are the same. In
Bengal, Agra and Assam there are three
subordinate civil courts, the District Court,
the Court of the Sub-Judges and the Mun-
In Bombay there are those of the District
Judge and the. Assistant Judge and the First and Second
Glass Sub-Judges. The officer who presides over the
principal court of original civil jurisdiction in each district
‘is known'as the District Judge. He exercises control over
all the subordinate courts within the* district, and assigns
to assistant judges the disposal of such suits as he deems
fit. He has also to arrange for the guardianship of
minors and lunatics and manage their property.- There
Js no limit to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District
Court, in original civil plaints. It also works as an

Subordinate
Civil Courts—
District
Courts

sifFs Court.

Small Causes
Courts

Judicial Administration in India 291

appellate court in cases, which have been disposed of by
the courts of second class subordinate judges. . . .

Below the District Courts there are judges of two
_ . subordinate orders in the Bombay. Presi-

Judges 111 ^ 6 dency. There, are also Small Causes

Courts in important towns,. The first class
subordinate judge can try any civil suit irrespective
of the amount of money involved. He has no appellate
jurisdiction whatever. Appeals from his decision lie
either to the District Courts or the High Court. The
second class subordinate judge has power to try cases in
which the sum of money involved does not exceed
Rs.,5,000. He also has no appellate powers.

. An officer of the rank of first or second class might be

sometimes invested with the summary
powers of a’ Small Causes Court judge;
The jurisdiction of the Small Causes Courts
in the Presidency towns is limited to cases where the
sum involved does not exceed Rs. 2,000, and in other
important cities to cases where it does not exceed Rs. 500^
There is no appeal from decisions of this court except on
points of law and in certain cases which have been
specified. Courts of such summary powers are intended
to facilitate the recovery of small debts.

In Bombay no subordinate. judge could receive. or
register a suit in which any. officer of Government in his
official capacity was a party. The law has been altered
recently. Subordinate judges can now entertain such
plaints. Formerly such cases had to be referred to the
District Courts which alone could entertain them. The
Civil Justice Committee of 1924-5 thought that such a
restriction resulted in congestion of suits against the
Secretary of State or officers of Government, which the
District Judge has no time to take up. Many such suits

A

Judge and the
Sessions
Judge are the
Same Person

292 Indian Administration

are of a minor character and therefore a relaxation of the
restriction is necessary.

Another peculiarity of the Bombay system is the duty
given to District Judges of managing a large number of
estates of minors which are not administered by the
Court of Wards. The routine management is done by
the Deputy-Nazir. In consultation with him the Judge
has to carry out detailed supervision over matters connect¬
ed with the revenue and expenditure of the estates of
the minor and over his general health and upbringing.

It must be noticed that in Bombay the District Judge ;B

^ . presiding in the civil court is also the person t

The District . „ „ . . - . ,

who presides over the criminal or sessions t

court. The two courts and their jurisdiction ;
are different, but the presiding officer over
both is one and the same person. In actual
practice, therefore, the District Courts, and the District
Judges because of the combination of civil and criminal *
functions in their persons, possess extensive powers.
They are courts having powers both original and appellate.
They are courts having both civil and criminal jurisdic¬
tions. Besides, they control all subordinate courts in their
districts and to that extent possess certain administrative
functions. The District Judge’s office is therefore an
office of importance. It is generally filled by members
of the Indian Civil Service. Most of the Assistant
District Judges are junior members belonging to theni
same service. They perform the duties that are assigned !
to them by the District Judge.

Side, by side with the civil court there also exist what
are known as Revenue Courts. They are
presided over by officers who are charged ?
with the duty of settling and collecting the^
land revenue. In questions of assessment and collection* >

7

iS

Revenue

Courts

Judicial Administration in India 293

and in purely fiscal matters, the civil courts are generally
excluded from interfering. They can, however, take
cognizance of all questions pertaining to the title of land,
and of rent suits in some of the provinces, particularly
in Bengal. The Collector constitutes the chief Revenue
Court in a district, and appeal from him lies to the
Divisional Commissioner.

Considerable latitude is allowed in the Indian system
in the matter of appeal. Ordinarily, two-
ppeas appeals are allowed in civil cases and one
appeal in criminal cases. Applications for revision,
may also be made in criminal cases. Appeals against a
decision of a second or third class magistrate lie to-
the District Magistrate or some first class magistrate-
specially empowered by him. Original convictions by
first class magistrates are appealable to the sessions,
judges and the verdicts of the latter are further appeal-
able to the highest criminal court in the province. The
High Court can call for and examine the record of any
proceedings before Subordinate Courts. In civil matters-
also appeal lies from the Subordinate Courts to the
District Courts and from the latter to the High Court.

The highest appellate court that exists for India is.

what is commonly known as the Privy
Council. This Court has no original juris¬
diction and it functions in England. It is-
the court which hears final appeals in important cases
from all parts of the British Empire and is for that reason
looked upon as a common bond which connects the
judicial administration of the various parts of the Empire..
An appeal to this body lies from the decision of the
High Court sitting as an original or appellate court. Iir
civil cases the amount involved in the dispute must be
Rs. 10,000 or upwards and in criminal cases some

The

Privy Council

294 Indian Admhiistratioji

•substantial question of law must be involved in order that
an appeal to the Privy Council may be allowed. The
appeal must lie, not on a point of fact, but on a poiii
of law. Permission must be granted by the High Court
to file an appeal to the Privy Council. ;g

It now remains to discuss two important and interesting
questions pertaining to the judicial administration q|
India. Oiie refers to the privileged position enjoy.ed bj
Europeans in matters of procedure. The other refers to the
principle of separation between the executive and judiciaJ
functions of the Collector and other revenue officials, "to

' ' , ■ •

3. Position of European Subjects 4

Originally, in the earlier years of the East Indfa
*' -■ Company, the only courts which exercised

Early Days of' jtirI S di C ti 0 xi over Europeans resident in
the Company 8 _

R u j e India were the courts in the Presidency

towns.. They were Crown courts as d&
tinguished from Company courts. In fact, before 1833;
it was laid down that no British subject who was not in
the Service of the Company was to reside without
permission at a distance of more than ten miles from thi !

. r

Presidency towns. The abrogation of this restricts \
in 1834 called forth from the Directors an unequivocal ;
acknowledgement of the principle that Indians and Euro¬
peans should be subject to the same judicial control anl
that there could be no equality of protection where justkS
was not equally, and on equal terms, accessible to aflt |
Accordingly, Europeans were made amenable to the 5
civil courts outside the Presidency towns in 1836. TJip |
question of their trial by all the criminal ' courts wads j
raised in 1849 and in 1857 but no definite conclusion
arrived at. European British subjects were tried fb^l
criminal offences only in the Supreme Courts at Jhef

r * *

Judicial Administration in India 295

Presidency towns. With the creation of' High Courts,
in 1861, such trials were referred to them. In 1872 when
Sir J. Stephen was the Law Member, ordinary criminal
courts were empowered to try Europeans, but under a
special form o t procedure which was then framed.

As the Indian Civil Service was thrown open to com¬
petition and as Indians were allowed to
The Ilbert Bill , . ,

Controversy occupy high offices m virtue of their having

passed the test, the question arose as to*
whether they could be prevented from trying European
criminals. In 1883 some Indian civilians reached the
stage when they would be promoted to be District
Magistrates or District Judges. The Government felt
that any restriction on Indians in the matter of trying
European criminals must be abolished. They therefore
introduced what has been since known as the Ilbert
Bill enabling Indian sessions judges and certain Indian
magistrates to exercise jurisdiction over European
British subjects. The bill aroused the most vehement
opposition from European residents in India-. The pro¬
posed equalization of the Indian and the European in the
eyes of the law was so keenly resented and detested by
them that Government had to bend to the fury of the
storm, and in 1884 a compromising measure was passed
which enabled Indian judges and magistrates to try
European criminals and - simultaneously gave to the
^British subject the right to claim a mixed jury, that is, a
jury not less than a half of which consisted of Europeans.

The Racial Distinction Committee, which was appoint-
The Summary e( ^ after the Reforms to go into the whole
of the Racial question, thus, summarized the principal
.Distinction /.distinctions between the trials of. Euro-
Committee , p eans and Indians in Indian courts. •

3 : (i) No British subject could be tried by a second class

/n

11 ii r }J

■i#i

296 Indian Administration

or third class magistrate or by a first class magistrate- wlfif
was not a Justice of the Peace or a District or Presidency
Magistrate or a European British subject. * J

(ii) The jurisdiction of additional and assistant sessiqi

judges was also much restricted. -o

(iii) The sentences that could be passed by a first
class or a District Magistrate and a Court of Sessions
against European British subjects were specially circuit

scribed.

(iv) Europeans were entitled to claim trial by a jury

of which not less than a half, would be Europeans

» - - fr

Americans. e

(v) They enjoyed more extensive Habeas Corptftf

privileges, ..... *

.(vi) They had more appellate rights m criminal cases

than Indians. , .

(vii) The usual terms of security for good behaviour

-might not apply to them if they could be dealt with under
the European Vagrancy Act.

. (viii) The definition of a High Court was not so
in their case.

The recommendations of the Committee were to r#.
move some of these distinctions. The right to daim A
mixed jury, that is one composed of not less than a half
of the nationality of the accused, has now been extended-
to Indians and Europeans alike. '

4. The Separation of the Executive from

the Judiciary

1

if \

f V

The question of the separation of executive
judicial functions has been engaging the attention
T roian politicians for the last half a century. In no
of British India indeed, at the present day, are execOti
and civil judicial functions combined in the same

Criminal
Jurisdiction
of Revenue
Officials

i

Judicial Administration in India 297

The same may be said of important criminal trials also*

The Courts of Sessions and the High Court
which are the superior criminal courts are
now presided over by officers who have no
executive functions. The disputed question
refers to the criminal jurisdiction that is-
still enjoyed by an executive and revenue official like
the Collector or Deputy-Commissioner, who, in addi¬
tion to his civil duties, has also the designation of District
Magistrate. In that capacity he is vested with extensive
judicial authority and a power of control over subordinate
magistrates in the districts. Similar powers are also en¬
joyed by Assistant and Deputy-Collectors and Mamlatdars
of talukas.

The Collector is the officer who is held responsible for
the peace of the district and is the superior of the district
police from the superintendent downwards except in
departmental matters. As a magistrate of the first class-
he can take cognizance of offences and exercise all powers
that are exercised by a magistrate of his grade. He can
hear appeals from the magistrates of the second and
third class. He can also transfer a case from one sub¬
ordinate magistrate to another in his district and can call
for the record of any case disposed of by them and refer
if to the Sessions or High Court. His criminal powers
are therefore wide.

A good deal of criticism has been directed for a long
time against such a concentration of power.
An address embodying a criticism of the
system was presented to the Secretary of
State in 1889 by some distinguished mem¬
bers of the judicial service in India. The
grounds of criticism are various. The union of judicial
and executive functions is considered to violate the first

Arguments
against the
Combination
of the two
Functions

298 Indian’ Administration

principle * of equity. It is pointed out that the very’ natures
of the two duties differ and. require? for their proper
discharge two distinct types of mental equipment and
outlook which cannot be simultaneously possessed by the
same officials.

In the execution of the civil administrative business
assigned to the Collectors they may come into conflict with
individuals or institutions and it would be inexpedient and
unsafe to invest them with judicial powers which could be
utilized against these. That absolute detachment and
•aloofness which is necessary for the impartial carrying out
of justice cannot be possessed by a magistrate who is also
responsible for the peace of the district and who is there¬
fore likely to entertain an unconscious bias in one direction
or the other.

Nor is the control exercised by the Collector^ over
.•subordinate magistrates calculated to secure to them an
.atmosphere of cool impartiality. Sir Henry Cotton, him¬
self a distinguished member of the Indian Civil Service,
declares it to be a matter of universal knowledge that
4 subordinate magistrates whose position and promotion
.are dependent on the District Magistrate cannot, in such
circumstances, discharge their judicial duties with that
•degree of independence which ought to characterize a
court of justice*. Threats like ‘ the sentence is inadequate ;
if this occurs again, I shall report your misconduct to
Government * are quoted in his New India from the
correspondence between a District Magistrate and his
subordinate.

The combination of the two functions engenders a
general distrust about the magistracy and cannot there¬
fore advance the prestige of the Executive. The average
citizen perceives in this unity of offices a danger to his
civic liberty and an opportunity to Government officials

i

Judicial Administration in India 299

for an effective display of vindictiveness. The Public
Services Commission of 1916 readily agreed that the union
of executive and judicial power in the Collector and his
subordinates was theoretically an objectionable anomaly.

The arguments in favour of the continuance of the
system brought forward by its advocates
favour** nt * m ma * n ' ta * n that in India no active public

opinion in favour of the punishment of the
wrongdoer has yet sufficiently developed and it is there¬
fore necessary that the official agency should be endowed
with an authority 4 proportionate to the weakness of the
support which it requires from the community at large \
It is also urged that the speeding up of the machinery of
criminal justice cannot be safely entrusted to the already-
overburdened sessions judges. The advantage of the
present system, it is alleged, lies, not in the- actual
exercise of his powers by the Collector in numerous
cases, for he uses them in comparatively few cases only,
but in his holding them in reserve. To deprive the
Collector of this power would weaken his authority and
influence in the district and would strike a fatal blow to
the peace and order in the country. Arguments like
these are characteristic of the protagonists of the
status quo .

To accuse a whole nation of a dense insensibility to
crime and to credit it with a degree of
indulgence which might result in the acquittal
of hardened criminals is only indicative of the infinite
enthusiasm with which the supporters of the system are
possessed and not of their capacity for a cool and critical
judgement. The plea for the maintenance of prestige is
equally fallacious. Depriving the Collector of magisterial
powers is not identical with diminishing the prestige of
sovereignty. The separation simply implies a division

Criticism

300 lndia?i Administration

of labour. It is not necessary to concentrate all the
attributes and authority of Government in one and the
same person to preserve the prestige of the ruling
power. As the Memorial, already referred to, points
out, the Viceroy need not lose his prestige because he
does not directly exercise the functions of the Collector
and the District Judge. And in the same manner the
Collector need not lose his prestige if his magisterial
powers, the possession of which is apt to lead to
miscarriage of justice and to inspire a feeling of distrust
and suspicion in the administration, are transferred to
another agency serving under the same Government,

To a student of the constitution the separation of
executive from judicial functions appears to be prima
facie necessary. That alone can keep up the equilibrium
between the various aspects of Government and guarantee
perfect liberty and justice to the individual. The raising
of the financial bogey is futile. The scheme of separation
may or may not involve a vast amount of expenditure.
But even if it does, the plea of &n increase in expenditure
cannot be allowed to throttle such a prime and vital
element in democratic polity.

It might be added that in the Presidency towns of
Madras, Calcutta and Bombay, separation has already
been effected, the Presidency Magistrates’ courts being
empowered to exercise the criminal jurisdiction which in
the mofussil is exercised by the Collector. The Collector
in Bombay and other Presidency towns is therefore purely
a collector of revenue, and sooner or later he will function
vonly in that capacity in all parts of the country.

CHAPTER XVIII

Land Revenue

Before the
Company’s
Rule

1, Historical

A tax upon land is one of the oldest forms of taxation.

It was the principal source of income for
Governments in ancient times. The State
claimed a share in the produce of the land.
According to the description given by
Manu, in ancient India the State's share in normal times
varied between one-twelfth and one-sixth of the gross
produce, and sometimes rose even to one-fourth if there
was any exceptional calamity. Generally, it appears, the
revenue was not collected from individuals but from a
whole community which was represented by the headman.

With the advent of the Mohammedan power and its
expansion throughout India, the system of land.revenue
collection underwent a change. Raja Todarmal, the
famous revenue reformer in Akbar's court, regulated the
settlement and collection of the State's shares in the
income from land. He gave orders for the measurement
of land and its classification according to the fertility of
the soil. The Government demand was fixed at one-third
of the gross produce. It could be commuted into a money
payment on the basis of the prices of the previous
nineteen years. The settlements were concluded for a

fixed period, usually ten years.

A number of middlemen and tax-gatherers intervened
between the actual cultivator and the supreme pow*er.
They agreed to pay a lump sum of money for the portion

Zemindars
or Middlemen

302 Indian Administratio?i

of the country allotted to them and were armed with large

powers to make the necessary collections
from the villages. This class of middleman
or farmer of revenue later on developed
into the zemindar class. As long as the central power was
strong, the zemindar was appointed regularly by warrant
which declared his duties and the amounts due from him.
Usually he had to pay nine-tenths of the total collections
and was allowed to retain one-tenth as remuneration for
his labour. Besides, he was allowed some lands free of
revenue for himself.

Originally the office of the zemindar was not hereditary.
With the decline of . the central power, control over the
zemindars slackened. They became more and more
independent and practically established their sovereignty
in the territory under their jurisdiction. Their payments
to the central treasury became irregular. From being
mere servants charged with the duty of collecting revenue y
the zemindars developed into mighty potentates and
assumed the position of independent Rajas.

The East India Company found themselves faced with
this situation when they acquired. the pro¬
vinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. For a
few years after the grant of the Diwani, land
revenue collection was left entirely in the hands of Indian
officials according to the plan of Clive. Two Naib Diwans
stood- at the head of the whole machinery. When this
system broke down in practice, supervisors were appoint¬
ed in 1769. The main functions\of these officers were
to 4 determine the limits of estates held by the zemindars
and the rent which the cultivators ought to pay them \
In 1769 the Directors. had also ordered the appointment
of two Controlling Councils, one at Murshidabad and the
other at Patna, . The system did not work satisfactorily*

The Diwani
and after

Land Revenue 303:

The - .supervisors, were not men of experience nor were
they above corruption. The object with which they were
appointed, namely efficient collection of revenue, was*
not. achieved. In fact supervisors became a nuisance
both to the landlord and ryots and to the Company.
f After the nomination of Warren Hastings to the
Governorship of Bengal in 1772, reforms
Reforms of were introduced in land revenue collection*

Hating, The Conipa.ny had now decided ‘ to stand

' forth as the Diwan \ Warren Hastings

therefore substituted the supervisors by new officers
known as Collectors, who were to receive revenues which
were farmed out for a term of five years. But even
the new officers proved extremely unsatisfactory and
were almost immediately withdrawn. In their places
were appointed ‘ Indian local collectors under the super¬
vision of six Provincial Committees at Calcutta, Patna,
Murshidabad, Burdwan, Dacca and Dinajpur. These
Committees also did not work smoothly and were
abolished in 1781 after investigation and report by a
Commission of three officers appointed by Warren
Hastings. A metropolitan Committee of Revenue was
constituted in their place in Calcutta. Parliament recom¬
mended in the Act of 1784 that an inquiry should be
conducted into the real position of zemindars, talukdars
and jaghirdars under Mogul and Hindu governments and
the amount of revenue they were bound to pay.

Lord Cornwallis arrived in India in 1786 with definite
instructions to carry out the recommenda-
Permanent tion 0 { Parliament. He caused ‘ elaborate

Settlement inquiries to be made and rules were issued

between 1788 and 1790 for a decennial settlement’. At
the same time the introduction of permanent settlement
was strongly pressed and in 1793, the Directors having

Its main
Features

304 Indian Administration

approved of the suggestion, a regulation announcing the
establishment of permanent settlement was issued. Sir
John Shore had conducted the inquiry and come to the
conclusion that the zemindars were the proprietors
of the soil having full rights of inheritance, sale and
mortgage. The Company could not justly deprive them
of these rights. Sir John was in favour of making
the settlement permanent after the agreements of 1789
had run their course. Cornwallis, however, differed and
declared the settlement permanent in 1793.

The main features of the system were that the
zemindars were declared proprietors of the
. areas in their possession, subject to their
payment of the land revenue; that the
assessment then fixed was declared unalterable for ever ;
approximately ten-elevenths of what the zemindars
received in rent from the ryots was to be taken by the
State, the remaining one-eleventh being left to the
zemindar. The percentage of Government claims thus
fixed was very high. For several years there was
widespread default in payment, and lands, the revenue of
which had fallen into arrears, were immediately auctioned
off. Sale laws were very stringent. In twenty-two years
after the permanent settlement one-third or half of the
landed property in Bengal is recorded to have been
transferred by public sale. Gradually, however, prices
rose and the burden of the assessment became lighter
and lighter.

. As several more provinces came under British control,

their assessments were gradually reduced to
Other Systems or £ er< The varying circumstances of

different tracts and areas were taken into account in
introducing at first a tentative system and in allowing it
to be crystallized in the course of time. Different systems

Land Revenue

were thus evolved in Bengal, Madras, Bo
Punjab, Agra and other provinces of India
to the historical and customary practice obtai:
each part.

2. The Existing Systems of Land Tenure

Land revenue settlements in India are usually differen-
tiated in two ways. The status of the

Settlement— P erson ^ rom whom the revenue is actually-
Zemindari demanded forms one basis of division.

When the revenue is ‘ assessed on an.
individual or a community owning an estate and occu¬
pying a position identical with or analogous to that of a
landlord, the assessment is known as zemindari \ The-
individual or the community occupies the position of a.
middleman who does not cultivate the land himself but.
rents it out to farmers and tenants. The income from
land, in which the State claims a share, is the product of
the labour of agriculturists and cultivators. Government,
however, does not hold them responsible for the payment
of its dues. The zemindar in charge of the estate is
held responsible. He therefore collects money from the-
tenants and out of it pays the Government revenue..
There is no direct contact between the authorities of
Government and the cultivators of the land.

When revenue is assessed upon individuals who-
are the actual occupants and cultivators
Ryotwan 0 £ sm2 Hler holdings, the assessment is

known as ryotwari. Here there is no intermediary
like the zemindar between the Government and the
farmers. Revenue is collected by the officials directly
from the tillers of the soil in a large number of instances-
Another basis of division of land revenue settlements
refers to the time for which the settlement is fixed. In.

306 Indian Administration

a province like Bengal the amount of the .share demanded

by Government is fixed for ever. The con-
Permanent tracts made in 1793 between the Govern¬
ment and the landlords permanently fixed the sum to be
paid by the landlord. There is therefore no question of
enhancing the fate or the amount of the Government tax
at any future date; Such a. system is known popularly as
the system of permanent settlement.

Where the amount of the State demand is not fixed in
perpetuity but only for. a definite period,
Temporary either a year or ten years or twenty years

■ or thirty years, at the end of which a revision has to take
; place, the settlements are known as temporary settle¬
ments./ In such cases the share taken by the State may
be increased, or decreased at the end of a stipulated
- number of years.

It must be remembered that the two divisions are not
mutually exclusive. A zemindari settlement might be
permanent or temporary. A ryotwari settlement could
.also be permanent or temporary. Permanence is not
.an invariable attribute of the zemindari settlement nor
would it be correct to suppose that all ryotwari settlements
must be temporary. The zemindari in Bengal is perma-
nent; that in Agra or the Punjab or the Central Provinces
is not so. There is no instance in India of a ryotwari
. settlement which is permanent.

The system in Bengal has been already described.

The system prevailing in Bombay and a
large part of Madras is ryotwari. In the
beginning, attempts were made in Madras to intro¬
duce permanently settled zemindari estates as they
existed in Bengal, but they met with a failure except
.in a few tracts.. After considerable discussion, therefore,
-Sir Thomas Munro introduced the ryotwari system.

Madras

Land Revenue

30 T

The cultivating proprietor is at liberty in this system to*
relinquish his holding.

Most of the territory in the Presidency of Bombay was
0 . acquired after the downfall of the Peshwas

Bombay

in whose time the practice of farming-
revenues was in vogue. The British Government
abolished farming, but its earlier attempts at a regular
settlement did not succeed. A new system was tried in
1835. Soils were divided into nine classes based prima¬
rily upon their depth and quality of texture, and fields-
were assigned to these classes. An assessment rate was-
fixed for each class after careful investigation into the-
possible average yield of its soil, allowing for the uncer¬
tainty of rain and other circumstances on which crops and
prices depended. The rates were then applied to deter¬
mine the amount of land revenue due from a particular
field. The system was empirical but showed extremely
encouraging results. It was soon extended to the whole
Presidency, and to Sind after it was acquired and annexed
to the Bombay Presidency.

The settlement in Benares was declared to be perma-

Agra

nent in 1795. The Directors, however, re¬
fused to sanction a similar measure for the-

province of Agra. The first regular settlement in this part
was completed between the years 1833-49. It was con¬
cluded, wherever possible, with village proprietors under
a zemindari system with joint responsibility. Hereditary
tenants or those who had resided in the same village for
twelve years were given rights of occupancy. The assess¬
ments were fixed at sixty-six per cent of the rental assets.
They were later on reduced to fifty per cent by the
Shaharanpur Rules of 1855. The soils were classified.
and standard rates of rent were fixed for each class.

In Oudh, the talukdars were given full proprietary

'The Punjab

Central

Provinces

308 Indian Administration

rights. They contracted to pay a fixed sum of revenue

for definite tracts of land. In the Punjab,- as
in the North-West Province, there were
found bodies of villagers who claimed descent from a
•common ancestor who had either founded the village or
received a grant of it from some ruling monarch. The
system of village or mahalwari settlement was therefore
.adopted in the Punjab. Its term was fixed at thirty years.

In the Central Provinces, the zemindari system was
introduced in a modified form. Revenues
were farmed out to individuals known as
patels or malguzars in the time of the
Marathas. The villagers, however, were not connected
by ties of blood as the villagers in the Punjab or Agra.
‘The revenue farmers soon acquired a quasi-proprietary
position.' Their claims were allowed by the British
rulers and they were held responsible for the payment of
land revenue. This settlement is known as the malguzari
.settlement. It is liable to periodical revision.

One of the most disputed questions in the Indian land
revenue administration is the desirability or
otherwise of extending the system of
permanent settlement to the whole of India.
The late Mr. R. C. Dutt was an ardent
advocate of such an extension. He wrote
incessantly on the subject and Lord Curzon’s Government
thought it advisable to review his criticism of the
Government policy and to give a reply. Their conclu¬
sions were summarized in a Resolution which was issued
by the Government of India in 1902.

Advantages ar £ umen ts put forth in support of

permanent settlement were :

. (i) That it would be a protection against the ravages
of famines.

•Controversy
about the
^Permanent
Settlement

La?id Revenue 309

• (ii) That the expenses and harassment of the assess¬
ment operations would be avoided.

(iii) That there would be no temptation to abandon

cultivation on the approach of a revision.

(iv) That it would result in an accumulation of

capital which could be ultilized for investment
in industries.

(v) That people could lead a fuller and more con¬

tented life.

(vi) That the immediate loss of revenue would be
more than compensated by the indirect but
certain benefit accruing from the system in
the future.

, Fixity of the State demand would remove any uncer¬
tainty in the mind of the cultivator about the amount that
he would have to part with. There would be no lurking
fear that the investment of his capital and labour in the
improvement of the land might be penalized by Govern¬
ment claiming an increased share just when the improve¬
ments fructified. In short, it was contended that from
the economic and also from the social point of view,
permanent settlement was the most beneficial arrange¬
ment in land revenue administration.

It was stated on the other hand in oppo-

Disad vantages ... , . ,

sition to these points:—

(i) That the evidence of facts did not justify* the

description of permanent settlement as a
protection against famines. Famines had not
been less frequent nor less harmful in perma¬
nently settled areas,

(ii) That it was part of the deliberate policy of

the Government to simplify and cheapen
the proceedings in connexion with settle¬
ments.

310 Indian Administration

(iii) That the policy of long-term settlements was

being encouraged.

(iv) That over-assessment was not proved to be

a cause of the widespread poverty and in¬
debtedness of the agriculturist in India.

(v) That progressive moderation in assessment was

the keynote of the policy of Government.

(vi) That improvements introduced by the cultivators

or the landlords were exempted from assess¬
ment even in temporarily settled areas.

(vii) That the Government had to interfere to safe¬
guard the interest of the tenants from the
tyranny of ruthless landlords.

(viii) That permanent settlements deprived the¬
re venue system of any elasticity which could
facilitate an adjustment to the variations of
seasons and the circumstances of the people.

That settlement of revenue from land in perpetuity
could not be a theoretically sound proposi-

not desirable tlon wou ld be readily admitted by any

student of economics. It is unjust, and

even ridiculous, to tie down the hands of all future gene-’
rations to a particular course of action which appeared
most suitable to the present times. It is extremely
disadvantageous not to allow the State to have a growing
share in the increasing income of the community. Such
an embargo makes it financially impossible for the State
to undertake any big scheme of public welfare in the
light of the most modern conditions. From the point of
view of economic science also, it is absolutely unfair and
crude to allow the unearned increment from land to be
appropriated by a few private individuals. All economic
rent ought to belong to the community, and the State as
the representative of the community is alone entitled to

Revenue
Assessed on
Rent or Net
Income

: LandRevenue- 311

receive it. ; It may be added that the introduction of
permanent settlement in only one province of India
created inequality and subjected the other provinces to.
heavier taxation. . ■

In no- part of India does land revenue now represent a.

portion of the gross produce. In the United
Provinces, the Punjab and the Central Pro¬
vinces, the Government demand is theoreti¬
cally based on an economic rent. It is
assessed on the amount of rent paid by the
tenants to the landlords. In the case of ryot war i provinces
like Madras and Bombay, the assessment is based on the
net produce. The figure of the net income is arrived at
after deducting the expenses of cultivation from the gross
income. Actual calculations might be made to find out
the expenses and the net income in particular fields as is
done in Madras ; or, as is done in Bombay, an empirical
rate may be arrived at for a certain area by taking into
consideration the classification of the soil and the general
economic conditions of the tract. This rate is then
expressed in a sliding scale and applied to different fields
in accordance with their fertility.

Since the Reforms, land revenue has become an entirely

t

provincial subject and is one of the main
sources of income for the Provincial Govern¬
ments. It is, however, not a transferred
subject. The Government of India there¬
fore retains a larger control over its administration,
particularly over the question of modifications in the
methods of settlements. Some of the provinces have
appointed committees to investigate into and make
recommendations for reforming the present system.
Such a committee was appointed, for instance, in
the Bombay Presidency. In fact, a good deal of

Land Revenue
is a Provincial
Subject

312 Indian Administration

interest has been aroused in the subject and discussion
has centred round the question of finding out the most
suitable method of improving the existing conditions.
The recent agitation of peasants in the Bardoli Taluka of
the Bombay Presidency has helped to focus attention on
land revenue reform, particularly in the matter of revision
of settlements.

The Indian Taxation Committee considered the

question from various points of view.
Land Revenue g evera i thinkers have pointed out the

Tax iniquity of the incidence of land taxation as

compared with that of other taxes. It is
suggested that a more proper and just course would be to
approximate the system of land revenue collection to that'
of collecting the income-tax. The question, however,
bristles with difficulties and it is not possible to discuss
it in all its bearings in the present work.

Reference may finally be made to a controversy which
has been going on for a long time but which

cnuc Rent k as now cease< ^ *° have any great impor-
or Tax? tance in practice. Dispute has centred

round the question whether land revenue is
a tax or rent. If it is a rent, the proprietorship of the
State over all the land in the country is by implication
admitted. Those who do not support the doctrine of
State ownership look upon land revenue as a compulsory
payment made to the State just as all other taxes are
compulsory payments.

Indian public opinion has generally taken this view.
The report of the Taxation Committee has quoted a large-
amount of evidence in favour of the contention that land
revenue is a tax and not a rent. Baden-Powell has been
also very guarded in his statement of the position of the
British Government with reference to the Indian land

Land Revenue 313

S5 7 stem. The zemindars have been expressly acknowledg¬
ed as the proprietors in large areas. Even in ryotwari
tracts where the cultivator-owners are supposed to be
tenants of the State, they enjoy all the privileges of
ownership including the right of sale, mortgage and
transfer, subject to their payment of the Government
•dues. As long as these are paid, the ‘ tenants ’ cannot be
dispossessed of their estate by the theoretical owners.
No very great significance therefore attaches to the
practical aspect of the question.

Difference of opinion exists on the question whether
land revenue is a direct tax or an indirect tax. The fact
that it works partly as a tax on income and partly as a tax
‘on things makes it difficult to state exactly whether it is
direct or indirect. However, theoretically at least, the
bias is in favour of describing it as a direct tax.

In the Presidency of Bombay the work of land revenue
collection and administration is entrusted
Land Revenue to Commissioners, Collectors, Deputy-
Admimstra- Collectors, Mamlatdars and Talaties. The

tion in

Bombay Collect orate is an important unit. It

contains on an average about ten talukas.
The. Collector is primarily a revenue officer. There are
separate departments and offices for carrying out survey
and settlement operations. Records of rights are accu¬
rately maintained in every village, giving particulars
about the names of all persons who are holders, occupants,
owners or mortgagees of land, the nature and extent of
the respective interest of such persons, and the rent or
revenue payable by or to any such persons. Settlement
Commissioners and Superintendents and Inspectors of
Land Records are special officers who supervise the
working of this aspect of land revenue administration.

CHAPTER XIX

The Public Se?'vices
1. Before the Reforms

The East India Company had to appoint a large staff
. of merchants, factors and writers in order to

in the Earlier carr y on their commercial business. Power
Days of the of making such appointments and of making
Company’s rules and regulations for the guidance of
Rule servants and officers was given in the?

original Charter of Elizabeth and it was further extended
from time to time. The definite acquisition of political
status by the Company after the grant of the Diwani in
1765 made the question of public services more important
and responsible, ft was not, however, till 1772 that the
Directors decided that the Company should themselves
stand forth as the Diwan and take over the administration
of the ceded provinces into their own hands. Between
1765 and 1772 the administrative work of the Company
was left to be done by the subordinate agency of Indian
officials. After the decision of the Directors was
announced, Warren Hastings appointed European officials-
known as Collectors to supervise the working of revenue
collection and civil judicial business.

It was not till the time of Lord Cornwallis that the
direct administration of all branches of public services was-
placed on a clear and permanent basis. He endeavoured
to * purify ’ the services by excluding Indian officers from
the superior grades and offices. A coliege was soon set
up at Calcutta to impart training in law and oriental

1853

The Public Services 315

languages to the newly recruited junior officers. In 2806
Haileybury College was started. Admission to this
institution was obtained by nomination by the Court of
Directors of the Company and the candidate had to pass a
test examination after passing through a two years’ course
of education. The successful candidates were appointed
to various posts.

At the time of the Charter Act of 1853 the principle of
throwing open the Civil Service to general
competition was accepted and it was further
reaffirmed after the transference of government from the
Company to the Crown. With the growing extent of the
territories of the Company and the increasing complexity
of the obligations of Government, it was found necessary
to nominate persons, technically outside the Company’s
civil service, to fill certain posts which had to be created
.under the exigencies of administration. Such appoint¬
ments were later on validated by an Act of Parliament.

In spite of the removal of disabilities of Indians to
hold any post under the Crown and the
throwing open of the Civil Service to
general competition, only one Indian had successfully
competed for that Service till 1870, and been enrolled in
the Service. In that year an Act was passed which
permitted Indians of proved merit and ability to be
employed in the Civil Service without their passing
through the course in the regular prescribed manner.
Very few appointments were however made under
this Act.

In 1879 rules regarding such selections were re¬
considered. Young men of good family and
social status were to be given special pre¬
ference, provided they possessed the necessary intellectual
qualifications. Even under the revised regulation,

1870

1879

316 Indian Administration

however, the scheme of making direct recruitment to
the covenanted service initiated in 1870 did not prove
successful and Government therefore appointed a Com¬
mission to inquire into the best possible methods of
admitting Indians to higher employment in the public
service. The report of the Commission was submitted
to the Government of India in 1887. It made some
important recommendations.

Following the recommendations of the Commission
1887 — Service was divided into three

Imperial, classes; the Indian Civil Service, the
Provincial, and Provincial and the Subordinate Services.
Subordinate The old terms of covenanted and uncove-.
Grades nanted lost their significance. Important

executive and judicial posts in the provinces were to be
held by members of the Provincial Service. Admission
to it was regulated by rules framed by the local Govern¬
ments and approved by the Government of India. It
was obtained either by nomination or by examination or
by promotion. Offices like those of the Deputy-Collectors
and subordinate judges were to be held by the grade.
The Subordinate Services were to hold minor offices.
They included most of the clerical staff of various
departments. With the attempt at an all-round develop¬
ment of the country, need arose for the appointment of
officers with special training for the handling of technical
subjects, like the Public Works Department, Survey of
India, Agriculture, Posts and Telegraphs, Education*
Police, Salt, etc. These services were also organized
into the three grades of Imperial, Provincial and
Subordinate, according to the control that was exercised
over them by the Government of India or the Provincial
Governments.

Appointments to the Imperial grade in all branches of

The Public Services 317*

the administration are made by the Secretary o£ State,
All the Imperial officers have not to serve under the*
direct orders of the Central Government. Most of them,
after their recruitment, are assigned to different provinces-
and, normally speaking, are not transferred from province
to province though the Government of India may some¬
times issue orders in that direction.

The Royal Commission on Public Services which.

assembled in 1912 and was presided over
ky Lord Islington took a detailed review of
Commission the public services in India and explored:

the possibilities of the employment of
Indians in the superior Services. Owing to the declara¬
tion of the War in 1914 and the preoccupation caused
by its prosecution both to the British and Indian Govern¬
ments, consideration of the recommendations of the
Islington Committee was deferred. In the meanwhile'
the Secretary of State had made the famous Announce¬
ment of August 1917 putting into the forefront the-
contemplated increased association of Indians in every
branch of the administration and the introduction of
responsible government. The War had also immensely
affected the cost of living. These new factors-
had created new circumstances and the recommenda¬
tions of the Islington Committee had become quite
obsolete.

It will be better to summarize the position of the-
Services as it was before the Reforms.
As the Islington Report has pointed out,
the Indian Civil Service has always been,
regarded as the senior of all Services, and
one upon which the responsibility of good
government ultimately rests. Posts of general super¬
vision are filled by its officers, both on the executive and

Position of
the LC.S.
before the
Reforms

;318 Indian Administration

political sides of the administration. A variety of depart-
ments such as land revenue, excise, income-tax, and
stamps, are controlled by them. Supervision over the
working of local self-government and the maintenance
of peace and order are included in their functions.

, Beginning ordinarily with the headship of the district
and passing through the Commissi oner ship of divisions
.and membership of the Executive Council, Indian Civil
Service officials may reach the posts of Lieutenant-
Governors and Chief Commissioners. Similarly they
may rise to the status of High Court judges.

Certain specified posts in the Services had been
reserved for the Indian Civil Service. They were
mentioned in a separate schedule in the Government of
India Act of 1915. With the exception of the Governor-
General, Governors, and some memberships of the Exe¬
cutive Council, practically all places of superior control
were held by them.

As the Montford Report said, the Indian Civil Service
had been in effect much more a Government

They were corporation than purely a Civil Service in
•the Govern- the English sense . The m en in this Service

me are described as having been entitled

not only to administer but also to advise. They are
.habituated to the exercise of responsibility; in emergencies
they have to depend upon their own judgement; a large
stock of practical knowledge is acquired by them. Unlike

the Civil Servant in England, the Civil Servant in India
takes his place in the Legislative and Executive Councils

and assists in the formation of policy. He is not
•controllable by the people of the land but by a distant
paramount power which necessarily has to leave a
.large amount of discretion and initiative to the men on
the spot who are burdened with the responsibility of

The Public Services 319’

preserving and managing the Sovereign’s domains in.
far-away lands.

2. After the Reforms

After the Announcement of 1917, things necessarily
changed. The Montford Report gave its-
Chelmsford consideration to this question. The demand
Report for Indianization was unanimous and.

persistent. The spirit of the new policy
made it indispensable that Indians should be associated
in larger numbers in the various branches of the adminis¬
tration. It was necessary to train them in the art of

government and to make their criticism more sober and
*

practical. The Montford Report definitely stated that
recruitment of a larger proportion of Indians should be-
begun at once. Not that there was to be a wholesale
swamping out of the European element. The authors-
of the report did not look upon such a violent change-
either as desirable or as possible.

In the Indian Civil Service they proposed a proportion.
w j.' . .« of thirty-three per cent to be held bv

Indians, increasing annually by one and a.
half per cent, until the situation was again revised by a
commission. They also recommended that the few
remaining distinctions that were based on race in
admission to the Services should be thoroughly abolished.
It was further suggested that for all the public services-
for which there was- recruitment in England, open tO'
Europeans : and Indians alike, there must be a system of
appointment in India, a definite percentage of the latter-
being fixed. ’ -

* Improvements in the rates of pay and incremental time
scale and greater elasticity in the leave rules and other"

/• H • "

details were - thought absolutely necessary. Lastly, the-

Improved

Prospects

;320 Indian Administration

intention of the authors was declared that any public

servant, whatever the Government under
which he was employed, should be properly
supported and protected in the legitimate
exercise of his functions. To the Government of India or
the Governor-in-Council must be left unimpaired the
power to secure to a Civil Servant any rights and
privileges guaranteed or implied in the conditions of his
appointment.

The friction which a change in the long-established
system was likely to produce was sought
The European to ^ avoided by inducing the habit of

Maintained goodwill and toleration between the

officials and the popular element of the
Government. The experience and continuity supplied by
the former would be, it was imagined, of great value to
the latter. Even in the provinces where dyarchy was
introduced, there was no intention to introduce any
■duality in the Services. No separate hierarchy of
officials was created for the. transferred half, ■ It was
not possible, in the opinion of the authors of the report^
that all Europeans should be purged out of the
Services in the new dispensation inaugurated under the
Reforms.

Their position indeed might be changed. They might
assume the position of skilled consultants,
technical advisers or inspecting and report¬
ing officers. But for the purpose of helping
to make the Indian people self-governing, the continued
presence of English officers was regarded as vital./ The
Indian Civil Service under the new regime would have to
..give up its attitude of silence whenever it was criticized

.and attacked. The Civil Servant, like the politician, but

►

under obvious limitations because ‘of his position as a

ilts Altered
.Position

Provisions of
the Govern¬
ment of India
Act

ft

The Public Services 'S21

Civil Servant, must , explain and persuade and answer
and refute.

The Government of India Act dealt in a separate part
with the Services in India. According to
it, every person in the Civil Service of the
Crown in India holds office during His
Majesty’s pleasure and cannot he dismissed
by any authority subordinate to that which
appointed him. An aggrieved officer has the right to
complain to the Governor. The Secretary of State
regulates the classification of the Civil Service, the
methods of recruitment, and the conditions of Service.
Functions regarding recruitment and control are to be
performed by a Public Services Commission of five
members to be specially appointed. Under-Secretary¬
ships may no longer be exclusively held by the Civil
Service. Similarly the Secretary, Joint Secretary and
Deputy-Secretary in the Education, the Foreign and
Political Departments, and the Secretary and Deputy-
Secretary in the Legislative Department may be non¬
civilians.

The new policy of the Act of 1919 had important
consequences. A feeling of uncertainty and
anxiety was created in the mind of the
Services because they were henceforth likely
to lose their bureaucratic independence and
to be held answerable to the Indian
public as represented through the Legislatures. The
British' element in the new recruitments began to^
dwindle, A committee under the presidency of Lord
MacDowell investigated the causes of the decline and
suggested certain remedies. In order, however, to
solve the problem of the services more definitely, a
comprehensive survey was thought necessary, and a
11

Feeling of
Anxiety
among the
Services

322

Indian Admi?iisiration

sion

commission presided over by Lord Lee was appointed for
that purpose in spite of the opposition of the Indian
Legislature..

To consider the question of the Services in the light of
the altered circumstances of the Reforms,
^ecommenda. the L ee Commission was appointed in 1923,

Lee CommU* * n teeth of the opposition of the
ji on Legislative Assembly which refused to

sanction the money necessary for its
expense, which was ultimately certified by the Viceroy,
The Commission made detailed recommendations, several
of which have been accepted by the Government of India.
The All-India Services serving in the reserved part of
the provincial administrations were to continue to 'be
appointed and controlled by the Secretary of State and
their position was to be safeguarded by legal covenants
enforceable in civil courts and by the Public Services
Commission to whom appeal was to lie against Provincial
or Central Governments. If they were serving in trans¬
ferred departments they could either retain their All-India

status or enter into new contracts with the Provincial
Governments or retire on proportionate pensions. Large
financial concessions to European members of the Services
were granted, the overseas allowances granted to officials
of non-Asiatic domicile being substantially increased in a
certain number of yehrs. Further, this could be remitted
to England at a favourable exchange rate of 2s. to a
rupee when the current rate was only about Is.' 6d.
Besides, European officers and their wives were to receive
four return passages to England and one single passage
for each child during the period of their service. The"
family of an officer who died in the Services was to be,
repatriated at Government expense. : Attendance by
medical'officers of their own race was made available tor

The Public Services 323

members of the Services, at some cost to the State. The
pensions of members . of the Indian. Civil Service who
had attained to the rank of Members of Councils and
Governors of Provinces, were substantially ..enhanced.
The management of the Family Fund for Civil Servants
was to be improved. The additional financial burden that
was involved in giving effect to these recommendations
was in the neighbourhood of one and a quartet crpres
of rupees per year and this money would have to be paid
by the Indian taxpayer.

Concessions to Indian public opinion were made by the
transference to the Ministers of control over.. future
recruits in the transferred part of the administration, and
by provision for a larger degree of Indianization in the
Services. The proportion of fifty, per cent .of the cadre
in the Indian Civil Service was to be reached in a , period
of fifteen years. The report also recommended that the
statutory Public Services Commission contemplated by
the Government of India Act of 1919 should be estab¬
lished without delay. It should consist of five whole-time
members and should be non-political in character. Its
functions should fall into two categories, first that of
recruitment, and secondly that of a quasi-judicial character
with reference to the disciplinary control and protection of
the Services.

Both the majority and minority reports of the Muddi-
man Committee have referred to the

The Reforms
Inquiry Com¬
mittee Report

position of the Services under the actual
working of the Reforms. The majority

t ’

came to the conclusion that the Services

had loyally co-operated with the Ministers and carried

out their orders. The minority quoted an extract from
die dispatch of the Government of the United Provinces
in which it described the spirit and outlook of the

324 I?idia?i Administration

Services as having been completely changed after the
Reforms. The constant criticism to which they were
subjected created a feeling of uncertainty and insecurity
and reduced their keenness and the former personal
interest which they took in the administration when they
shaped policy. In the opinion of the minority, however,
it was an inevitable consequence of the transfer of power
to the Legislature that the Services should be deprived of
their privilege of shaping policy.

The fact that the control of the Services and of their
recruitment did not rest with the local Government or the
Government of India was an anomaly which was bound
to give rise to friction and mutual distrust. The natural
difference between the point of view of the popular
Ministers and that of bureaucratic members of the public
service, and the consciousness of the Minister that his
subordinate could look to a higher power for the enforce¬
ment of his views were, they thought, factors which
vitiated the harmony of working. It was the clear
opinion of the minority that th<^ present system of
recruitment and control of the services was incompatible
with the situation created by the Reforms and the possi¬
bility of its further development. Under responsible
forms there could be only one authority which should
control the Services, namely the Legislature of the land.

3. Criticism

Indian public opinion has viewed the question of the

Exclusion
of Indians

Services with peculiar delicacy. To the
Indian, ofi&cers of the bureaucracy like
Collectors and Commissioners are the

embodiments of the sovereignty of the raj. Till recently,
all -the superior grades of the governing bureaucracy
were almost entirely manned by Europeans who were

The Public Services 325

♦

foreigners to the land. The deliberate exclusion of
Indians, in spite of pompous Acts of Parliament and the
Queen’s Proclamation of 1858, was felt by them as
derogatory to their self-respect and patriotic sentiment.
It was to them a constant and standing reminder of the
degree of degradation to which they had been reduced by
circumstances.

The ostracism that was imposed upon the citizens of
^ the country was in itself sufficiently humi-

Extravagant ij a ^ n g . the injury was further deepened by
scales of ray

the extravagant scale on which remuneration
was paid to the foreign agency of servants from the
revenue of a poor country. The Governor-General of
India stood and still stands unique and unequalled in the
hierarchy of officials of the whole world in point of his
salary and sumptuary allowances. Even the President
of the wealthiest democracy in the world, the United
States of America, and the Prime Minister of the
mightiest empire in history, the British Empire, go down
in comparison with him. Members of the Indian Civil

* s

Service also still stand unique in comparison with their
brethren in other countries. The monetary drain that
results from this top-heavy agency is immense. With the
retiring of officials from the country at the end of a long ,
period of service, all the accumulated volume of adminis¬
trative experience acquired by them also leaves the
shores of the country.

But the evil is not only financial. It is moral. As the
late Mr. Gokhale pointed out, under the

No Scope for ^ a t m osphere of foreign domination, a kind of

I nd m B Admini* _

strative talent dwarfing or stunting of the Indian race

has been going on. The upward impulse,
the healthy ambition to rise to the loftiest heights,
‘which is cherished in an atmosphere of democratic

326 Indian Adininistration

i

freedom is; .being dried up by continued existence in an
environment of. abject inferiority. The administrative
and military talents which have been the glory of the
country’s history in the past are bound to deteriorate
and finally ” disappear owing to sheer disuse. This is
inevitable in the absence of proper opportunities for
their complete or even partial exercise,
v The admiration showered upon the marvellous efficacy
and machine-like systematic working of a bureaucratic
Government might be relished by the conqueror’s instinct
of self-preservation and self-exaltation. It might even
find an. echo in those amongst the conquered community
who can be abstract and objective appreciators of organized
efficiency. Yet achievement in this directionis not the
Only criterion of the success of a hierarchy of officials.

Lord Morley .was led to imagine that 4 our administra¬
tion would be a great deal more popular if

Lord Morleys ^ were a ^ r jf[ e i ess efficient and a trifle
Opinion .

more elastic. Our danger is the creation of

a pure bureaucracy, competent, honourable, faithful,

industrious, but rather mechanical, rather lifeless, perhaps

.rathersoulless \ No administration can be. progressive

or beneficent which, crushes out the self-reliance of a

people and gives no latitude for the realization of their ,

natural aspirations.

Fifty years ago, a .responsible statesman like Lord •
Salisbury could plainly ask, 4 Is there any man who
would have the hardihood to tell me that; it is within the
range of possibility that a man in India should be
appointed Lieutenant-Governor or Chief Commissioner
or Command er-in-Chief or Viceroy without any regard :
whatever to his race? It is well to avoid political ;
, hypocrisy. ... There never was a. country and there J
. never will be one in which the government of foreigners f

The Public Services 327

is really popular. It will be the beginning: of the end of
our Empire when we forget this elementary fact and
entrust greater executive powers in the hands of natives.
Our Governors of provinces, our magistrates of districts
and their principal subordinates ought to be Englishmen
under all circumstances/ However, sentiments like these
are presumed to be out of tune with present-day .imperial!
notions. Therefore they may be taken to have been
automatically discarded in the promise of the grant of
self-government of a responsible type.

#

CHAPTER XX

Education

In. the earlier days of the Company’s rule no serious

attention could be paid to the education
ry istory 0 f the subjects on account of the uncertain

and restless times. Their efforts were confined to the
establishment of a Mohammedan or Sanskrit college of
ifce old type. Warren Hastings and Lord Cornwallis
took steps in this direction. In 1782 Hastings founded
the first college in Bengal to encourage the study of
Arabic and Persian. A similar college was established
in 1791 for the cultivation of Hindu laws, literature,
religion, etc. in Benares.

New influences were, however, soon at work. A
knowledge of English became a means of livelihood for
Indians under the rule of the English speaking people.
A demand arose for facilities in English instruction in
Presidency towns. A struggle was going on between the
old and the new schools. The orientalists wished to
maintain the study of oriental classics in accordance with
methods indigenous to the country. The Anglicists urged
that all instruction should be given through the medium of
the English language and should be in accordance with
modern ideas.

Lord Macaulay was the famous supporter of the Angli¬
cist school. He recorded his opinion in a

Minute separate minute which vigorously expressed

his contempt for oriental learning. His
influence was irresistible. Lord William Bentinck decided
upon the promotion of European lore as the greatest object

Education 339

of British rule. . A Resolution of the Governor-General in
1834 plainly declared for English as against oriental
education. Lord Auckland’s minute in 1839 finally closed
the controversy. Since that time, the value of English
instruction has been recognized and the spread of western
knowledge has been regarded as one of the duties of the
State.

In 1854 the education of the whole people of India was

D*« atchof acce P te ^ as a duty of the State. The Board
1854 * C ° Directors issued their famous dispatch

which is described as the ‘ Charter of
.Education in India’. A number of changes were pro¬
posed : ‘ (i) the constitution of a separate department for
the administration of education; (ii) the institution
of universities in the Presidency towns; (iii) the estab¬
lishment of institutions for training all classes of people ;

(iv) the maintenance of the existing Government Colleges
and High Schools and a further increase of their number;

(v) the establishment of new Middle Schools; (vi) increased
attention to vernacular schools for elementary education;
and (vii) the introduction of a system of grants-in-aid.’
The vernacular was to be the medium of instruction in
lower branches and English in the higher. There was to
be perfect religious toleration. Female education was to
be cordially supported and encouraged by Government.
Sir Charles Wood was mainly responsible for sending this
dispatch.

Another .dispatch was published in 1859. It confirmed

*

the principles of the earlier dispatch, but

1 OCQ

pointed, out that elementary education was
not being properly promoted. The system of grants-
in-aid was not thought desirable or expedient with
reference to primary education, and it was recom¬
mended that Government should provide for such

330 Indian Administration

education more directly through the instrumentality of
its officers. A special cess, upon land for primary edu¬
cation was also recommended for the consideration of
:Government.

Universities were established in Bombay, Madras and
„ Calcutta in 1857, in the Punjab in 1882 and
Universities - n ^ababad in 1887. They were all merely

examining bodies. . The growth, of schools and colleges
proceeded rapidly and by 1882 there were more than two
and a quarter million pupils under instruction in public
bodies. The Commission of 1882. again made useful
recommendations and ad vised-'increased reliance upon
private effort. According to. the principles of Ideal self-
government, municipalities and Local Boards wore given
considerable liberty in the. management of schools. In
1898, a review of the situation was.made and a searching
inquiry followed. A conference of educationists was
convened in Simla in 1901, A Commission to investigate
and report on the working of universities was appointed in
1902. The. Indian Universities Act was passed in 1904 to
give effect to the recommendations of the Commission.

The Act specifically recognized the wider functions of
the universities including instruction of
students and appointment of professors
and lecturers and equipment of la¬
boratories and museums for that ; purpose. Territorial
limits were assigned to each university. Conditions
for the affiliation of colleges were prescribed. -A syste¬
matic inspection of colleges by the university was
established. The term of a Senator’s office was pre¬
scribed to be five years, instead of for life as before.
The number of Senators and Syndics was limited and
a majority , of nominated - members was, created. New
regulations of the : five universities were promulgated* in

The Act
of 1904

. .Education

331

1905-6. They- weie all affiliating universities and any
number of colleges could be affiliated to them. They
soon ceased to be living organisms, since their constitu¬
ent parts—the different .colleges scattered -over the
province—contributed nothing to the common life of the
university.

A Resolution of the Government of India in 1913
recognized the necessity of restricting the area over which
affiliating universities had control. The institution of
teaching and residential universities was recommended.
The strength of communal feeling and the growth of local
and provincial patriotism helped in the development of
the new policy. Patna, Lucknow, Rangoon, Dacca and
Delhi became university centres. So did Benares and

Aligarh. .

The Calcutta University Commission, presided over by
- Sir Michael Sadler, made their voluminous

University ta re P ort ^ 1919. They recommended a
Commission complete reorganization of the system of

higher .education in Bengal. The institu¬
tion of new types of bodies known as Intermediate
Colleges was suggested. To them was to be transferred
secondary * and intermediate education. Most of the
recommendations of the Commission were, however, left
unheeded when, after the Reforms,: the Calcutta. Univer¬
sity was transferred to the Government of Bengal and
action was taken by the latter to modify the affairs of
the university in: 1921. - - — *

Since the Reforms, education has become a tramsfer-
. red subject. It is administered by Ministers
responsible to the Legislature. Great hppes
have been entertained about the accelera¬
tion of the" progress of education under the new
conditions. They, have not been fulfilled for various

After the
Reforms

332 Indian Administration

reasons, chiefly owing to lack of funds. Endeavours are
being made to combat illiteracy by providing for free
-and compulsory education in primary schools. The
Bombay Council has already taken the lead in the matter
by passing the Compulsory Education Act. Other pro¬
vinces are passing similar measures. The general control
■of the university system has now been placed within the
province of the local Governments. Many of them have
passed legislation to modify the constitution of the older
institutions or to create new ones altogether. The
Allahabad University has been reorganized. The Madras
University is also remodelled. New universities have
been established at Nagpur and Agra and agitation for
another in Rajputana is being, carried on.

The Bombay Government was not left entirely un-

Bombay

University

Reform

affected. Recently a special committee
was appointed to suggest measures of
reform. Its report has been published.
It has made various recommendations about

the grouping together of colleges in the city of Bombay
so as to develop a University area. It has recommended
an alteration of the constitution of the University in order
to make it more democratic and elective. Separate
universities for Poona in the first instance and for

Gujarat, Kamatak and Sind in course of time are also
recommended. The question of the determination of
the medium of instruction is left to the universities
themselves. Action upon the report was taken by the
Legislature recently.

The Bombay University Act passed in 1928 has
considerably altered the constitution of the

ConstftuUon University. The Senate, which till then

contained an overwhelmingly large nomi¬
nated majority has now. been given a predominantly

Education 333

elective character. In addition to the Chancellor, the
Vice-Chancellor, the Registrar and some officials of
Government who are ex-officio members, the senate is to
consist of members elected by different constituencies.
Principals of Colleges and University Professors elect
thirteen members; College Professors (including
Principals) elect twenty; Headmasters of schools elect
five. Public associations cr bodies in British India
like municipalities, Indian Merchants* Chambers, Mill-
owners* Associations, District Local Boards, etc. send
another fifteen. Registered graduates of the university
• are allowed to elect twenty-five. Faculties constituted by
the Senate have to elect ten. Lastly, the Legislative
Council of the Governor of Bombay has to send five
representatives, one of whom shall be the member for the
university. The total number of elected members thus
comes to a total of ninety-three. The numbers of those
nominated by the Chancellor is limited to forty.

The executive government of the University is vested
as before in the Syndicate which will now consist of the
Vice-Chancellor, the rector if any, the Director of
Public Instruction, seven persons elected by the Academic
Council from itself and nine persons elected by the
Senate from those of its members who are not principals
Or professors or headmasters. The term of the Syndicate
is three years and of the Senate five years.

A new body called the Academic Council has beeh
created to regulate purely educational matters like
teaching and examinations, courses of study, scholar¬
ships and prizes, etc. It is to contain representatives
of university professors, headmasters and Boards
of Studies in addition to five representatives of the
Senate.

CHAPTER XXI

i

Famine Relief

i-~ ■ ■ , ' >

In a predominantly agricultural country like India the
calamity of famines is not of unusual occurrence. It is
.one of the important duties of Government to avoid
famine s as far. as possible and when they come, to
mitigate the evils which accompany them. The protection
of the country from foreign invaders and the preservation
of peace and order in its internal administration are
factors which remove the artificial causes of famines;
The most frequent cause of famines is, however, the
absence or shortage of rainfall and an inadequate water
supply for the growth of crops. Measures for the
prevention, of .famine have the objective of providing
large stocks of water which can irrigate fields and tracts
even in the absence of rain. ,

. No systematic attempt at regulating and organizing
- . famine relief was made during the earlier

Early History '

years.of the Company’s rule. Disconnected
and * spasmodic efforts were : made to relieve distress
whenever famines actually occurred. After the trans-
ference of government from the Company to the Crown,
the responsibility of providing a proper machinery for
relieving the distress caused by famines fell upon the
Government of India. The great Orissa famine occurred
in 1866- The. principles and methods of relief were still
unsettled and unformed. Therefore a Commission under,

I*.’ * i >• ‘ t . * . * *

the presidentship of Sir George Campbell conducted an
inquiry and made suggestions for the adoption , of. a
humane policy. When rains fell off in 1868 and 1869 in

Famine Relief

335

Raj put ana, the North-West Province and the Punjab,
unprecedented action was taken by Government to relieve
distress and a large expenditure was incurred, A similar
course was taken in 1873 when the province of Bihar was
affected.. But reaction immediately set in. In 1876-8
really great famines burst upon Madras and Bombay, the
North-West Province, Oudh and the Punjab. Relief
proved inadequate and mortality was great Again a
Famine Commission under the presidency of General
Strachey were appointed to investigate and make a
report * •

This Commission gave out their report in 1880. It

formulated, general principles for the proper
The Commis* treatment of famines and also suggested

sion or looU / , '

particular measures of a preventive or
protective character. The obligation imposed upon the
State of.offering means of relief to those in distress was
recognized though it was not to be so administered as to
discourage thrift and self-reliance among the people.
The. Famine Code was framed accordingly. It was put
to a crucial test in the famine of 1896-7. Another

Commission were appointed in 1898 and they fully
vindicated the wisdom of the policy of the earlier Com¬
mission. A severe drought again occurred in 1899 and
the Famine Commission of 1901 were instructed to
inquire into the whole question of famine relief adminis¬
tration.

. -This Commission made detailed recommendations.

The first danger that they pointed put in the
3/® . . practical working of the scheme of relief

Commission

of 1901 was the danger of .unpreparedness. Ex¬

perience had demonstrated the unexpected
nature of most of the famines. It was therefore best to
be always completely prepared to face them. An efficient

336

Indian Administration

system of intelligence, effective programmes of relief
work, reserves of establishments, reserves of tools and
implements were suggested as safeguards. A careful
look-out was to be kept for the regular, premonitory
symptoms of distress. Failure in rainfall, rise in prices,
contraction of private charity, contraction of credit,
increase in crime were described as the warnings of the
approaching calamities. When they at last occurred,
systematic distribution of relief should begin. Test
works should be opened to give employment to able-
bodied people and lists should be prepared of ’disabled
persons entitled to gratuitous relief. Private charity
should be vigorously organized. Suspension of land
revenue should be granted if necessary. The recommeti-
dations of the Commission were accepted and the present
famine relief policy is shaped in that light.

* Before 1878 no special financial provision was made to

Funds, for
Famine Relief

meet the obligations imposed by periodic
recurrence of famines. They were treated
• as extraordinary calamities and expenditure

entailed by them was also regarded as extraordinary.
From 1878 an annual sum of one and a half crores of

rupees was set aside for ‘ famine insurance'. It was to.
be utilized in actual distribution of relief when famines

occurred. In prosperous years, when it was not directly
required for relief, * protective ’ works like railways and
irrigation were constructed out of it. Even f productive*
works which would otherwise necessitate fresh borrowing
were sometimes constructed out of this grant.

Since the Reforms, famine relief has become a liability
upon the Provincial Governments. They are required to
maintain a Famine Insurance Fund by contributing from
their resources a fixed sum of money every year.
Bombay is “required to provide Rs; 63,60,000 annually for

Famine Relief 337

expenditure upon famine relief , and insurance. Out of
the annual contribution, funds can be spent on the con¬
struction of protective irrigation works and on relief
measures when necessary. The balance to the credit of
the fund is regarded as invested with the Central Govern¬
ment which pays interest on it. The annual contributions,
may be suspended when the accumulated total of the fund
is not less than six times the amount of the annual
assignment.

Measures for the relief of famines are different from

measures to prevent them. The extension.
J—-; of the system of railways and the introduc-

Irrigation tion of cliea P an(i rapid means of communi-

Works cation make it possible to equalize the

abundance in one part of the country with
the scarcity in another part. Movement of food-stuffs*
and migration of people become easy under these condi¬
tions. The construction of irrigation schemes which,
provide water, independent of rainfall, is another effective
measure of prevention. The sinking of wells, building
of tanks and canals and accumulation of rain-water in¬

artificial reservoirs are some of the forms of irrigation
works. In a large part of the country extensive projects.
of this type have been already carried out and to that,
extent the horrors of famines are reduced. Expansion
of railways and irrigation works are among the chief
remedies to avert the dangers of. famines.

Improved agriculture is a further , remedy. Special

Improved

Agriculture

measures have been taken to constitute
separate Agricultural Departments, Colleges,
for imparting education in agriculture are

also specially established, as for example in Poona. Ex¬

perimental farms are maintained to demonstrate the

efficacy of improved methods. Endeavours are made to.

338 Indian AdmmisiraHon

improve the quality and the quantity of the yield of the
soil and to make agriculture on the whole, more pros¬
perous-and paying.

The establishment of J separate .. departments for

.industries is another step in the same

Starting of direction. The-creation of industries .will
n us ies offer a variety of occupations to the people
and the burden upon land will thusibe diminished. The
destruction of Indian industries has had the effect of
leaving only one kind of occupation to the Indian labourer.
That- is agriculture. The establishment of different
industries will add to the national income and increase
the staying power of the people. They will then be in
a stronger position to face the disastrous consequences
of famines. The monotony of life will disappear and a

diversification of employments will.be afforded, .

*' All measures taken to relieve agricultural indebtedness

in the long run reduce the acuteness of . the

Indebtedness misery of famines. They make agriculturists

. ... better equipped, to .resist the evil when.it

occurs. ^Advances like takavi, loans enable them to
purchase seeds or implements or cattle, or to sink wells,*
Acts like the Deccan Agriculturists Relief Act. or Gujarat
Talukdars Act are specially passed to help them in their
sad plight of bondage to the money-lender. Co-operative
•credit societies are formed far the same purpose*. The
•cumulative result of these, and similar steps is the infusion
into the agriculturist of a larger degree ot vitality and
sustaining power and a general cheerfulness of outlook.

Relief of
Indebtedness

■occurs.

1 '

CHAPTER XXII

Railways and Irrigation
1. Railways

' 1

Railways were first constructed in India in 1854-

Guarant d ‘ ^ un * n £ Governor-Generalship of Lord
Railway* ' Dalhousie. Different companies were form-
. ed to carry on the work of construction and.
to conduct the administration of railways. The East
Indian, the Great Indian Peninsula, the Bombay Baroda
and Central India, and the South Indian, were some of the-
railway 'companies so started. They were guaranteed a
certain rate of interest by the State and were entrusted
with the management of railways under the supervision
and. control of Government. The latter had power, to*
decide tfi$ standard and details of construction, the rates
and fares to be charged, the expenditure to be incurred,
and so on. Option was also given to. the Government
to purchase tlio lines after twenty-five or fifty years.
Attempts wete. made, later on to secure capital for
railways without the guarantee of interest*
1> " ect „ , They were unsuccessful. For several years-
Railway after 1869 the State itself undertook to spend

Construction ■, . .

by the State the... capital that was required for; starting-
^ . nqw ventures.,. The Indus Valley, Punjab-
Northern, JRajput^na Malwa, and North Bengal, were lines
that were constricted directly by the agency of the State-
between 1869 and 1880, ^ But progress in the construction
of railways was considered to a be slow* The Famine
Commission of 1880 -recommended ,.an , extension; of:

State
Ownership
and Company
Management

340 Indian Administration

railways even by private enterprise. In accordance with
these suggestions the old guarantee system was renewed
and fresh contracts were formed with new companies.
It was thought impossible for the State to go beyond a
particular sum in its annual borrowings. The terms of
the new contracts were, however, much more favourable
to the State. In the case of all the companies, old and
new, the State had reserved the right of terminating the
contracts at the end of a certain period and purchasing
the companies outright by means of annuities.

Many of the companies were purchased by the State
as soon as the period for terminating their
contracts was reached. State ownership
over many of the railways was thus
established. State ownership did not, how¬
ever, mean State management. After the
purchase of the railways, the Government entered into
fresh agreements with the same companies, allowing
them to manage the working of railways on certain
conditions. The new agreements were financially more
favourable to the State. The lines were the property of
the State. It controlled the capital expenditure and the
incurring of fresh loans. It maintained control and super¬
vision over the administration of the railways including
the fixing of rates. Lastly the contracts were terminable
at the option of the Government at specified dates.

There were therefore different types of railways in
India. Some railways were both owned and managed
hy the State. Some were only owned but not managed
•directly by the State. Lastly, there were others which
were neither owned nor managed by the State. This
class has, however, vanished, as the State has exercised
its right of purchasing in all cases.

The Acworth Committee were appointed, after the

The Acworth
Committee:
1920-21

State

Management

* Railways and Irrigation 341

introduction of the Reforms, to investigate the working

of railways and to recommend the .most
suitable policy for their further develop¬
ment. The report of the Committee
was not unanimous. The majority,
including the president, declared unequivocally in favour
of the abolition of the system of company management.
They recommended that the State should undertake the
direct administration of railways as soon as the contracts
with the companies expired. The minority did not favour
direct State management and recommended the formation
of new companies on different conditions.

The Government of India did not accept the majority
report as final, but, as a measure of experi¬
ment, decided to take over the management
of the East Indian and Great Indian
Peninsula Railways, contracts with whom were just due
to expire. The question of deciding the final policy will
be taken up at the end of the five years of State workiiig.
Indian public opinion has generally favoured the idea erf
direct State management. It is believed to be the right
policy from the economic and financial point of view.
State management is also expected to be more susceptible
to the opinion of the people and to provide for their
comforts and conveniences more readily than was the

case with the old companies.

Railways in India have not been financially prosperous
from the beginning. In fact, up to the
Separate beginning of the twentieth century, the State

had to incur expenditure out of the proceeds
of taxation in order to make up the
guaranteed interest. It was only after the year 1900 that
railways became a paying concern and began to yield
an income to the -State. The Acworth Committee

Railway

Budget

342 Indian Administration

recommended that the railway budget should be separated
from the general budget. The prpposal has been accepted
by the Government of India. The railways now pay a
fixed contribution to the State under contracts which are
.made with them for a specified number of years. A re¬
organization of. the Railway Board, appointment of
■Railway Advisory Committees apd the creation of a Rates
Tribunal, are changes which have been introduced recently
in the interest of the better management of railways.

2. Irrigation

Irrigation works are of immense use in an agricultural
country like India, The characteristics of Indian rainfall
have-been described to be * its unequal distribution over
the country, its irregular distribution throughout the sea¬
sons and its liability to failure or serious deficiency \ The
frequency of famines and scarcity is a constant menace to
the peaceful life of the country,. Irrigation works have
•been known in India from ancient days. The construction '
of canals and tanks is recorded as having been undertaken
-by the Hindu Rajas in early times and by the Moham¬
medan moharchs after the establishment of their rule in
India, After the advent of the British Government the
construction of. irrigation works , was commenced, in north
and south India about 1836-7. They proved eminently
successful. Attempts were thenmade to promote Indian
irrigation :by the. agency of private companies. . They

proved financially unsound and .were therefore given up, ,
-■ The continuous occurrence .of famines during the last
Tt "i •* ■ ‘ decade of the. : nineteenth century demon-

n ~ n strated. the inestimable, utility of irrigation

I9pr works. The need for their, further expan- {

• - sion\ began tp be growingly felt. The •;

whole .question, was therefore ..referred to an Irrigation |

Railways and Ir-rigaiion 343

Commission which were appointed in 1901 an&made their
report two years later. They came to theconclusion that
exactly in those parts which were, subject to the calamity
of famines and droughts—the Deccan, Madras and the
Central Provinces—there was no prospect of--irrigation
works proving remunerative, financially speaking. How¬
ever, such works, if constructed, were bound to mitigate
the intensity of famines. The report sketched out a rbugh
programme of works, recommending an expenditure of
nearly ^30,000,000 during.the following twenty years, /

. This report has been the basis of the irrigation policy of
the Government of India. In the Bombay Presidency the
area irrigated by canals increased from 250,000 acres in
1877 to 1,477,000 acres in 1917-A' The Bhandardara. and
Bhatgar store works which have now been completed are
expected to irrigate 450,000 acres annually. The Sukkur
Barrage in Sind will be providing a perennial supply of
water to an area of about 1,850,000 acres which - is at
present inadequately supplied, and to irrigate further over
three millions of acres. It is stated that the total area
irrigated by Government works alone in British India
will soon reach a total of forty million .acres.

Irrigation works in India are divided into different
classes. There may be non-storage works,
Classification perennial canals, inundation canals, or
of Irrigation storage wor ks. There is also another

Works classification based on the financial aspect.

Some works are described as productive, others as
protective, and others still as minor irrigation works.
Productive works are big undertakings which are expected
to yield an amount of income sufficient to cover the
expenses of maintenance and the payment of interest on
capital spent on them. Only such works can be financed
from loans. Protective works are constructed with a

344 Indian Administration

view to guard against the necessity of periodical expen¬
diture to relieve distress in tracts where rainfall is
precarious. They are financed from current revenues,
generally from the annual grant for famine relief.
There is no expectation of direct financial remuneration
*£rom. such works. Minor works include very small works.
They are not very important.

Since the Reforms, Irrigation has become a provincial
subject. Responsibility for constructing and maintaining
irrigation works now devolves upon the local Govern¬
ments. The Presidency of Bombay recently undertook
the construction of huge works in Sind under the famous
Sukkur Barrage scheme. A special loan was floated to
finance the venture, which is expected to cost over twenty'
crores of rupees.

PART VI

ENACTMENTS AND STATUTES

Chap. Page

XXIII. From 1600 to 1858

1. The Charter of Elizabeth, 1600 ... 347

2. The Regulating Act ... ... 350

3. Pitt’s India Act ... 356

4. The Charter Act of 1833 ... ... 358

5. The Act of 1853 ... ... 360

6. The Act of 1858 ... ... 361

XXIV. From 1859 to 1919

1. The Indian Councils Act of 1861 ... 364

2. The Indian Councils Act of 1892 ... 365

3. The Indian Councils Act of 1909 ... 366

4. Changes Introduced by the Government

of India Act of 1919 ... ... 368

The account given hi the following pages is based upon
Sir Courtenay Ilberfs Historical Introduction

CHAPTER XXIII

From 1600 to 1858

1. The Charter of Elizabeth, 1600

I. Circumstances leading to the grant ..of the
Charter.

The closing of Constantinople by the Sultan of Turkey
and the consequent attempts to open up new trade routes
to eastern countries ended in the discovery of the Cape
of‘Good Hope. The nation which led in the develop¬
ment of Indian trade was Portugal. To,that nation was
awarded India when, by the famous Bull of May 1495,
Pope Alexander divided the whole of the ^undiscovered
Christian world between Spain and Portugal. Holland
soon entered the arena as a rival of Spain and sent out
two big organized expeditions to Java by the Cape in
1595 and 1598. English merchants did not like to see all
the eastern trade pass into the hands of foreigners. They
held a meeting at Founder’s Hall, London, under the
presidentship of the Lord Mayor in September 1599, and
resolved to form an association for the purpose of estabr
lishing direct trade with India. The charter was granted
* fifteen months later, in 1600.

II. The constitution of the Company as prescribed'by
the Charter of 1600.

(i) The total number of members who were incorpo¬
rated in the Company was 217.

(ii) Further admissions to membership depended, upon
the candidate’s being either a son, twenty-one years of
age, of an original member; or being an apprentice

348 Indian Administration

or a servant or a factor of the Company ; or simply
being elected to membership by the general body or the
Court. These would be naturally persons who would
offer suitable contributions to the capital of the Com¬
pany.

(iii) A Governor was to be elected annually by the
members. He was to be the chief executive official of the
Company.

.(iv) Twenty-four committees, each consisting of an
individual, were to be annually elected by the members
and the Company’s work was to be distributed among
them; for instance there were separate committees for •
looking after voyages, provision of shipping and mer¬
chandise, sale of merchandise returned, and so on. The
assembly of the committees was called the 4 Court of
Committees ’ to distinguish it from the 4 General Court *
or the general body of members. The twenty-four
committees later on came to be designated the Board of
Directors.

III. Legislative powers of the Company.

(i) The Company might assemble themselves in any

convenient place ‘within our dominions or elsewhere’
and there 4 hold court * and ‘ make, ordain and constitute
such and-so many reasonable laws, constitutions, orders
•and ordinances as to them shall seem necessary for the
-good government of the Company and of all factors,
masters, mariners and other officials and for the advance¬
ment of traffic and trade’. ;

(ii) They might impose pains, penalties and punish- •;

inents for the observation of these ordinances. \

(iii) Their laws and punishments were to be reasonable ;
and not contrary or repugnant to the statutes of

England.

’ ...

- This power was similar to the power of making

Enactments and Statutes 349 1

by-laws exercised in modern days by an ordinary
municipal or commercial corporation. 4 The laws * were
mainly regulations for the guidance of the Company’s
servants and officers. Historically, they are the germs
out of which Anglo-Indian codes have ultimately
developed. No copy of the earlier regulations is known
to exist.

IV. The privileges of the Company.

(i) The chief privilege was the exclusive right of
trading between the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits
of Magellan. The monopoly was to continue for fifteen
years.

(ii) The only restriction on the privilege was that the
Company were not to trade in any country belonging to
a Christian Prince or State which was in alliance with
England, without the permission of the said Prince or
State.

(iii) A command was issued to subjects that violation
of this privilege of the Company was liable to punish¬
ment.

(iv) The Company were allowed to grant licences of
trade to others.

Such monopolies were in accord with the ideas of the
times and justified by circumstances. Modern conditions
of trade did not exist then. There was no universally
acknowledged international law. Competition in trade
meant war. * For the successful prosecution of the
Eastern trade, it was necessary to have an association
powerful enough to negotiate with Native Princes, to
enforce discipline among agents and servants - and. to
drive off European rivals with a strong hand. The
independent trader was, through his weakness, at the
mercy of the foreigner, and through his irresponsibility, a.
source of danger to his countrymen.’ It was only later on

350 Indiari Administration,

that the: monopoly became unbearable wheii it outlived the
■original necessary conditions.

V. The nature of the commercial working of the
Company. .

(i) There is an absence of any reference to the capital
•of the Company in,.the original charter.

(ii) There is no mention of qualification to regulate
the voting power of the members. There appears to
have existed . equal voting power for all members
irrespective of the amounts of their contributions. Any
member appears to have been eligible to be elected to the
committees.

(iii) There was no joint ..stock. The Company came
under the class of Regulated Companies. Members were
subject to certain common restrictions'and had some
common privileges, but each one traded on his own capital
and for every separate voyage. After 1612 all contribu¬
tions were thrown into a joint: stock and the Company
became a joint-stock company.

2. The .Regulating Act : \

I. Clauses which made changes in the constitution of
the Company.

. :(i) The qualifications for a vote in the Court, of
Proprietors was raised from £500 to ^1,000..

(ii) The Directors,.instead of being annually elected as
before, were to hold office for four years, a quarter of the
number being annually re-elected.

IL Clauses relating to. the Government of
Bengal..

(i) For the Government of Bengal, a. Governor
General and four Councillors were appointed. In them
was vested the whole civil and military government of
' tterltaesMieMfft « The., old, system of government by a

Enactments and Statutes 351

President and Council or by Select Committees intro¬
duced by Clive was abolished,; The first Governor*
General and the four Councillors were named in the
Act. Later on the patronage was to be vested in the
Company.

(ii) Their tenure of office was to be five years and they
were not to be removable during the period except by
the King on the representation of the Directors. This
temporary enactment is believed to be the origin of
the. . custom which limits the tenure of important offices
in. India like those of Governor-General, Governors or
Executive Councillors to five years.

(iii) The Governor-General and Council were bound
by 'the votes of the majority of those present at their:
meetings. In the case of an equal division the Governor-
General was to have a casting vote.

In so far as a regular executive machinery was
provided for the province of Bengal by these clauses o£
the Act, there was an improvement over the earlier
situation. However, in practical working, the system
proved disastrous. Out of the four Councillors that
were nominated by the Act, three were antagonistic to
the Governor-General and opposed him in all important
measures. As they formed a majority and as the
decision of the majority was; by law, binding on all, the
Governor-General was subjected to the mortification of
being compelled to carry out the mandates of his;
opponents. Very often, the responsible head of the,
administration was required to do things which he did
not approve of. : His casting vote could not be given
unless there was a tie. Such occasions, were rare as
long as the Council, together .with the Governor-General,,
consisted of five members. Francis was a sworn enemy
of Warren Hastings and" harassed- him with a constant

352 Indian Administration

.and merciless opposition. These unseemly dissensions .
in the executive Government were demoralizing. They
detracted from the efficiency of management and caused
widespread embarrassment and confusion. The Govern
nor-General was placed in a most awkward and
impossible position and bitter recrimination and bicker¬
ing prevailed in the mutual relations of the Company*s
chief officials in Bengal.

III. The Supremacy of the Bengal Presidency over

the other Presidencies was definitely declared. The
Governor-General and Council were given power to
superintend and control the government and management
of the Presidencies of Madras, Bombay and Bencoolen
{in Sumatra). ‘

* This was a wise step. It secured a unity of control *
and a uniformity of policy throughout the growing
territorial possessions of the East India Company in
India. The administration of the different Presidencies
and factories needed co-ordination and the sense of their
"being parts of a coherent whole had to be developed.
The creation in India of a commanding and superior
•authority was therefore a step in the right direction.
However, the provisions of the Act in this respect were
not clear. The Governors of the Presidencies of Madras ;
and Bombay continued to defy the newly-created supreme
authority and to undertake military ventures on their |
own initiative. The war with the Marathas and the war |
with Hyder were the results of the actions of the |
Governments in the Presidencies- They involved the. ;|
Governor-General in financial embarrassment and com- . 1
plicated political responsibility. It was therefore 1
necessary to strengthen the inadequate clause which4
declared the supremacy of the Governor-General. 8

IV. The Governor-General and Council were to obey M

Enactments and Statutes 353

the orders of the Court of Directors and keep them com
stantly informed of all matters relating to the interest of
the Company. The Indian official’s subordination to the
authorities in England was thus clearly emphasized.

V. The Directors were to keep the Treasury informed,
within fourteen days of their receipt of Indian dispatches*
of the civil, military and revenue affairs of the govern¬
ment of the Company.

The control of the British Parliament and its right to
be acquainted with the affairs of a private corporation
were here clearly demonstrated.

VI. A Supreme Court of Judicature was established
in Bengal. It was empowered to exercise civil, criminal,
admiralty and ecclesiastical jurisdiction and to establish
rules of procedure. Its .authority extended to all British
subjects residing in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa under the

4

protection of the Company. It consisted of a Chief
Justice and three other judges.

But, (i) the Governor-General and the Councillors were
exempted from its jurisdiction; (ii) when natives of the
country were concerned, suits and actions could be
* heard by it where the defendant native had agreed to go
to the Supreme Court; (iii) appeals against this Court
could be made to the King-in-Council.

In many respects the Act was defective and obscure.

(i) Which of the two authorities, the Council or the
Court, was. paramount ? How far could the judicial
control executive officials without sapping civil authority-?

(ii) What law was the Court to administer ? 1 Apparently
it. was unregenerate English law, insular, technical,
formless, tempered by the quibbles of judges and
obstinacy of juries and capable of being the instrument
of.a most monstrous injustice when administered in an
atmosphere, different from that in which it had grown

12

354 Indian Administration

up.’ Neither Hindu nor Mohammedan nor any other
indigenous law was applicable by the Court, (iii) What
persons came under the jurisdiction of the Court ? It -
was difficult to define the persons who came under the
class of British subjects. Sir Courtenay Ilbert thinks that
probably it included only European British subjects and
not native inhabitants of India residing in the three
provinces. It was also difficult to define what exactly
constituted employment in the service of the Company.
Could a native landowner farming revenues be described
as a servant ? There was no authority to give rulings in
such doubtful cases.

The Court claimed to have jurisdiction over the whole
native population. The quarrel on this point culminated ,
in the famous Cossijurah case. The Sheriff and his
officers, who were attempting to execute a writ issued by
the Court against a zemindar, were in this case driven
off by sepoys acting under the orders of the Council.
The action of the Council was not disapproved of by the
Directors and practically the Court was defeated on the
point. The Court also claimed the right to try English
and Indian officers of the Company for acts done by them
in their official capacity. On this point it was successful,
against the wishes of the Council to the contrary. The
Supreme Court further declared that it was competent
to try actions against the judicial officers of the Company
for acts done in the execution of their judicial duties.
In the famous Patna case, the Supreme Court gave
judgement in favour of an Indian plaintiff against officers
of the Patna Provincial Council, acting in their judicial
capacity. Hastings tried to remove the friction between
the Supreme Court and the country courts by appointing
•Impey as judge of the court of the Sadr Diwani Adalat.

The original object of establishing an independent'!

Enactments and Statutes 355

Supreme Court for the administration of justice was not
realized in practice. The Court did not prove to be a
protection against the despotic actions of the executive ;
on the contrary, it became itself an instrument of terror¬
ism. Its creators did not realize the dangerous conse¬
quences of the ambiguous character of its jurisdiction
and the indefinite understanding of its relations with the
executive.

A borderland warfare was constantly going on between
the two authorities. Nor did the application of English
law improve matters to any extent. In the first instance,
it was absolutely unknown to the Indian people and was
out of accord with their traditions, customs and history.
Further, the English law, which the Supreme Court was
administering, was itself an impure and unreformed
clumsy mass which could not stand the test either of
commonsense or of ethics. The Amending Act of 1781
settled some of the disputed questions and made the
administration of justice more systematic and less con¬
fused.

VII. The Govemor-General-in-Council was given
power to issue rules, ordinances, and regulations
for the government of the Company’s dominions.
This is the beginning of the law-making power of
the Government of India. The regulations were
to be registered and published in the Supreme
Court.

VIII. Liberal salaries were provided for the Governor-
General, Councillors and judges.

IX. All servants, high and low, were prevented from
taking bribes and presents.

X. No private trade was to be undertaken by the
Company's servants.

The last two clauses were intended to purify the

'356 Indian Administration

administration, officers in which had grown extremely
corrupt and extravagant.

3. Pitt's India Act

• I. (i) A Board of six Commissioners for the affairs
of India, popularly known as the Board of Control, was
established. It consisted of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, one of the Secretaries of State and four other
Privy Councillors appointed by the Crown and holding
office during pleasure.

(ii) They were unpaid and had no patronage.

(iii) They were empowered ‘ to superintend, direct
and control all acts, operations and concerns which relate
to the civil or military government or revenues of the
territorial possessions of the East India Company \ They
were to have access to all papers and instruments of the
Company and could demand copies of all minutes, orders
and dispatches sent or received by the Directors.

(iv) The Directors had to pay obedience to and
to be bound by the orders of the Board. The latter might
disapprove of or modify any of the dispatches.

II. A Committee of Secrecy of not more than three
members was to be formed out of the Directors. Secret
orders to India were to be transmitted by this body.

III. The Court of Proprietors lost its chief governing
faculty. It could no longer revoke or modify the proceed¬
ings of the Court of Directors.

IV. The Governor-General’s Council was reduced
from four to three members including the Commander-in-
Chief.

V. The Presidencies of Madras and Bombay were
to‘have a Governor and three Councillors including the
C ommander-in-Chief.

VI. The Governor-General, Governors of Presidencies,.

Enactments and Statutes 357

Commander-in-Chie£ and Members of Councils were to
be appointed by the Court of Directors. They and any
other officers could be removed from office either by the
Crown or by the Directors.

VII. The control of the Governor-General and
his Council over the Governments of the other
Presidencies was enlarged and extended to all
transactions about war or peace or expenditure of
revenues.

VIII. The Governor-General-in-Council was not
to enter into war or peace. or treaty without the
express authority of the Directors or the Committee of
Secrecy.

IX. All British subjects were declared amenable to
all courts of competent jurisdiction in India or England*
for acts done in Native States.

X. A special Court consisting of three judges, four
Peers and six members of the House of Commons was
constituted for the trial in England of offences committed
in India.

XI. Every practicable retrenchment and reduction in
expenditure over civil and military establishments in
India was to be made.

This measure was based on the principle of placing
the Company in direct and permanent subordination to a
body representing the Parliament of Britain. The Board
of Directors retained their patronage and their power of
revision; but they were subjected to the control of repre¬
sentatives of the British Government. This system has
been described as Double Government by constitutional
writers because the Board of Directors represented a
shareholders’ corporation whose activities were primarily
responsible for the acquisition of a considerable Empire;
and the Board of Control symbolized the sovereignty of

358 Indian Administration

the British State which had' to exercise a beneficent
supervision.

4. The Charter Act Of 1833

I. The Company’s revenues and territories were to
be held for a further period of twenty years but 4 in trust
for Her Majesty and her heirs \

II. The monopoly, of the China trade, and of the tea
trade was taken away.

III. The Company were required to close their com¬
mercial business and wind up. their affairs as quickly as
possible. Their territorial and other debts were charged
to the revenues of India.

IV. The Company retained their administrative and
political powers and- rights of patronage over Indian
appointments.

V. The .Governor-General-in-Council of Bengal was
named Govemor-General-in-Council of India. He was
to be responsible for the government- of the whole
of India.

VI. A fourth ordinary member was to be appointed
to the Council for legislative purposes. He was not to
be chosen from among the Company's servants, (The
first legal member was Lord Macaulay.)

VII. The overgrown Presidency of Bengal was to be
divided into two distinct Presidencies. (But the provision
never came into operation.)

• VIII. Changes were made in the legislative powers
of the Government. At this time there were five
different bodies of law in operation in India: (i) the
statute law introduced by the Charter of George I ,*
(ii) all subsequent English Acts which were expressly
extended to any part of India; (iii) regulations of
the Govemor-General-in-Council; (iv) regulations of

Enactments and Statutes 359

the Madras Council; (v) regulations of the Bombay
Code.

Three leading defects in the existing legal system
were pointed, out to Parliament; (i) the nature of the laws
and regulations; (ii) the ill-defined authority from which
they emanated; (iii) . the anomalous and conflicting
judicatures by which the laws were administered.

The “Act of 1833 introduced the following changes:
(i) The legislative power of the Indian Government was
exclusively vested in the Governor-General-in-Council.
The Provincial Governments were deprived of their
lawmaking power, (ii) The Governor-General-in-Council
was empowered to make laws and regulations; (a) for
repealing or altering any existing measure; (b) for all
persons and all Courts of Justice; (c) for all places and
things and for all servants of the Company; and (d) for
Indian officers and soldiers in the military service of the
Company and for the administration of courts-martial
over them* .. .

The restrictions put on this power were that: (i) the
Act of 1833 was not to be changed in any way, nor also
the laws about some military matters; (ii) the preroga¬
tive and the sovereignty of the Crown and the authority
of Parliament were not to be affected; (iii) the right of
Parliament to legislate for India and to repeal Indian
Acts was expressly maintained; (iv) laws made in India
were subject to disallowance by the Court of Directors
acting under the Board of Control.

IX. A comprehensive consolidation and codification
of Indian laws was contemplated. The Indian Law
Commission were appointed to inquire into the jurisdic¬
tion, powers, and rules of the existing Courts of Justice
and the nature and operation of all laws prevailing in the
country. Their labours resulted in the preparation of the

360 Indian Administration

Indian Penal Code and, indirectly, of the later Code of
Civil and Criminal Procedure.

X. It was declared lawful for any natural subject of
Her Majesty to live in any territory which was under the
government of the Company. No licences were required
for this purpose as before. Lands could also be held
by them. Indians were to be protected from any
insult to their persons or religion by the European
population.

XI. No subject because of his birth, descent, or colour
was precluded from holding office.

XII. Slavery was abolished.

It will be seen that important changes and alterations
were introduced by the Act of 1833 in the constitution of
the East India .Company and the system of Indian
administration. The times were generally times of
reform. The Reform Bill had just been passed in
England. Slavery had just been abolished by the
reformed Parliament. Careful inquiries were made as
usual when the time came for the renewal of the Com¬
pany’s Charter in 1833. Lord William Bentinck had just
finished his peaceful administration. The conquest of
India had been practically completed. There is no
wonder, therefore, that the Act of 1833 brought about
important modifications in the affairs of the Company.

5. The Act of 1853

I. No definite term of years was fixed for the
continuance of the Company.

II. The number of Directors was reduced to eighteen
of whom six were to be appointed by the Crown.

III. The appointment of a separate Governor for
Bengal was authorized. Until he was appointed, the
Directors and the Board of Control might authorize the

Enactments and Statutes 361

appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. He
was appointed in 1854. (No Governor was appointed till
the year 1912.)

IV. Power was given to the Directors either to con¬
stitute one new Presidency with a Governor and Council
or to authorize the appointment of a Lieutenant-
Governor. (One such was appointed for the Punjab in
1859.)

V. The legislative member was made an ordinary
member.

VI. The Council was enlarged for legislative purposes
by the addition of the Chief Justice of Bengal, of a puisne
judge, and four representative members nominated by
Bengal, Madras, Bombay and the North-West Province.
In all, therefore, for legislative purposes, there were
twelve members including the Governor-General, the
Commander-in-Chief, the four ordinary members and the
six additional members.

VII. The sittings of the Legislative Council were
made public and the proceedings were officially
published.

VIII. English Commissioners were appointed to
examine and consider the recommendations of the Indian
Law Commission appointed in 1833.

IX. Patronage was taken away from the Directors.
The Board of Control was empowered to frame rules and
regulations for appointments. The Indian Civil Service
was thrown open to general competition.

6. The Act of 1858

After the Indian Mutiny the system of Double Govern¬
ment received a death-blow.

I. India was to be henceforth governed by and in the
name of the Crown.

362 Indian Administration

■ II. A Secretary ot State was appointed, to whom
were transferred all the powers of the Court of Directors'
and the Board of Control.

III. He was to be assisted by a Council.

(i) It consisted* of fifteen members, of whom eight

were appointed by the Crown and seven elected by the
Directors. - ■ ■ ....

(ii) At least nine of the members must have served in
India- for ten years.

(iii) Vacancies could be filled by the Crown. *

(iv) Its members were precluded from becoming
members of Parliament.

(v) The Secretary of State was to be its President

(vi) He had power to overrule its decisions in case of
difference of opinion.

(vii) The Council had to conduct the business tran¬
sacted in the United Kingdom in relation to the Govern¬
ment of India.

(viii) A permanent establishment was created for the
Secretary of State in Council.

IV. Patronage, which was important, was left to the

Crown and the Secretary of State. The Lieutenant-
Governors could be appointed by the Governor-
General. - . .

*V. New rules were made for the Indian Civil Service

examination, which was thrown open to all.

-VI. The property of the Company was transferred to

the Crown. The expenditure of the revenues of India

was to be controlled by the Secretary of State, and was
«

to be charged with a dividend on the Company’s stock
and with their debts. ...

VII. A special auditor for the accounts of the
Secretary of State was appointed.

VIII. The Board of Control w;as formally abolished. -

Enactments and Statutes 363

IX. The Secretary of State was given a quasi-corpo¬
rate character.

X. All the military and naval forces of the Company
were transferred to the Crown. Their separate local
character was however retained.

All these changes effected by the Act of 1858 were
formally announced in India by the Queen’s Proclamation
of November 1, 1858.

CHAPTER XXIV

From 1859 to 1919

I. The Indian Councils Act op 1861

I. A fifth ordinary member was added to the Governor-
General’s Executive Council. The Commander-in-Chief
could be an extraordinary member.

II. Power was given to the Governor-General to
appoint a President to preside over the Executive Council
in his absence.

III. (i) For legislation, the Council was to be rein¬
forced by additional members, not less than six and not
more than twelve, nominated by the Governor-General
and holding office for two years. Of these, not less than
one-half were to be non-officials.

(ii) The functions of the new body were strictly
limited to legislation. The Council was expressly
forbidden to transact any business like asking questions,
moving resolutions, etc.

(iii) The Governor-Generars assent was required to
every Act passed by the Council.

(iv) The legislative power of the Governor-General-
in-Council was declared to extend to all persons and
things. Certain Parliamentary enactments were, how¬
ever, excepted.

IV. The Governor-General was given power to issue
ordinances in emergencies. They could remain in force
for not more than six months.

V. It had been the practice to administer newly-
acquired territories like Saugor, the Narmada Territories,
Assam, Pegu, the Punjab, etc., not under the laws and

Enactme7iis and Statutes 365

regulations in force in the old provinces of Bengal and
Bihar but under instructions issued by the Govemor-
General-in-Council. Such provinces were known as Non-
Regulation Provinces. The Act of 1861 declared that
all such rules and regulations were perfectly valid*
Doubts were thus expressly removed.

VI. The power of legislation was restored to Bombay
and Madras. (It had been taken away in 1833.)

(i) The Councils of those provinces were expanded
for legislative purposes by the addition of the Advocate-
General and other nominated members, not less than foui*
and not more than eight, at least half of whom were to be
non-officials, as in the case of the Governor-GeneraFs
Council.

(ii) No line of demarcation was drawn between
central and local subjects.

(iii) The previous sanction of the Governor-General
was made necessary in certain cases.

(iv) The assent of the Governor-General was made
necessary, in addition to that of the Governor, for every
Act passed by the Provincial Legislatures.

(v) Their procedure and functions were to be strictly
legislative.

VII. The Governor-General was directed to establish
a Legislative Council for Bengal and was empowered to
establish similar bodies for the North-West Province and
the Punjab.

VIII. Power was also given to constitute new pro¬
vinces, to appoint Lieutenant-Governors to administer
them, and to alter the boundaries of existing proyinces.

2. The Indian Councils Act of 1892

I. The size of the councils was enlarged. The
Governor-General’s Council was henceforth to contain

366 Indian Administration

between 10 and 16 additional members. The Bombay and
Madras Councils were to contain between 8 and 20, that
of the province of Bengal not more than 20, and of the
United Provinces 15 additional members.

, II. The Governor-General-in-Council was empowered
to make rules regulating the conditions under which the
additional members were nominated. The principle of
indirect election was introduced under these rules.
Nominations of some of the non-official members were
made on the recommendations of some recognized bodies
and corporations.

III. Discussion of the annual financial statement as
also the asking of questions but not supplementary
questions on important matters of administration was
authorized. But power was not given to move resolutions
or to divide the Council.

IV. Local Legislatures were enabled, with the
sanction of the Governor-General, to repeal or alter
.Acts of the Governor-General’s Council affecting their
provinces.

3. The Indian Councils Act of 1909

I. The size of the Legislative Councils was materially
enlarged. The maximum number of additional members
for the Governor-General’s Council was raised from 16 to
'’fiO, that for the Bengal, Madras and Bombay Councils from
20 to 50, and for the United Provinces from 15 to 50.

« II. Memberswere to be partly elected and partly
nominated. . The .proportion of elected to nominated
members, was to be fixed by regulations made under the
Act. Nominated members could be either officials or

4 ... 7

non-officials representing certain interests or possessing
special; qualifications.: The elected members were
returned, by constituencies like Municipalities, Local

PART VII

THE SIMON COMMISSION REPORT,
THE ROUND TABLE
CONFERENCE, AND THE
WHITE PAPER

Chap. Page

XXV. The Simon Commission Report ... 373

'XXVI. The Round Table Conference and the

Premier’s Declaration ... ... 389*

XXVII. A Summary of the Important Proposals

made in the White Paper of March 1933... 396-

I. The
posals.

(i) The
contain wit
Constitutio
experience,
demands o
of stages i\
who have t
to fix thei.
present,
of 1919 for
end of ten
Care st
will contai
ments to
actually o
time.

(ii) Con
regard to
including
States are
economic?
extent, cc
an open
the rulin
terms.

(iii) Tl

CHAPTER XXV

The Simon Commission Report

I. The general principles of the constitutional pro¬
posals.

(i) The new constitution should, as far as possible,
contain within itself provision for its own development.
Constitutional progress should be the outcome of practical
experience. It should not result from the arbitrary
demands of a fixed time-table. The length and number
of stages in the journey need not be laid down. Those
who have to work a temporary constitution tend inevitably
to fix their minds upon the future instead of upon the
present. (Thus the provision made in the Reforms Act
of 1919 for the appointment of Royal. Commissions at the
end of ten years is recommended to be abolished.)

Care should be taken to see that the constitution
will contain some elements of elasticity enabling adjust¬
ments to be made in accordance with the conditions
actually obtaining in any given province at a particular
time.

(ii) Constitutional changes in British India must have
regard to the future development of India as a whole,
including the Indian States. British India and Indian
States are closely interwoven, geographically, politically,
economically. Their problems and needs are, to a great
extent, common. The new constitution should provide
an open door, whereby, when it seems good to them,
the ruling Princes may enter on just and equitable
terms.

(iii) The ultimate constitution of India must be federal.

374 Indian Administration

It is only in a federal constitution that units differing so
widely as the British provinces and the Indian States can
be brought together while retaining the internal auto¬
nomy. _

Besides, India is gradually moving from autocracy to
democracy. There is a very definite correspondence
between the dimension of area and population and
the kind of constitution that can be operated success¬
fully. A democracy of nearly 2S0 million people is
unprecedented. If self-government is to be a reality,
it must be applied to political units of a suitable size.
Even the United States is a federation of forty-eight
States.

In a federal structure sufficient elasticity can be obtained
for the union of elements or diverse internal constitution
and of communities at very different stages of develop¬
ment and culture.

The present administrative areas have grown haphazard.
They have not been deliberately formed with a view to
their suitability as self-governing units within a federated
whole. The present provincial boundaries should there¬
fore be reviewed and, if possible, resettled., Burma
■should be separated from India. Each province should
have a unitary Government responsible to a Legislature
elected on an extended franchise.

The British Parliamentary model is not likely to be
the proper model according to which responsible govern¬
ment at the centre for India can be evolved, It must be
sought elsewhere. The Central Government must
become an association of units, formed mainly for the
purpose of performing functions on behalf of all federating
units.

(iv) Adequate Safeguards must be provided in any
scheme of constitutional progress for (a) securing

The Simon Commission Report 375

efficient defence arrangements, (b) maintaining internal
peace and order, and ( c ) guarding the interests of
minorities.

(At present the constitution is unitary. British
India and the Indian States are independent of each
other.)

II. The Governors’ Provinces.

(i) The existing provincial boundaries embrace areas
and peoples of no natural affinity. Re-adjustment and
re-distribution of areas is desirable. The case of the
Oriyya-speaking people, as also of Sind, deserves urgent
consideration. The Government of India should set up
a Boundaries Commission with a neutral Chairman.
This Commission should make detailed inquiries
and work out schemes with a view to seeing how far
agreement about re-arrangement of boundaries is
possible.

(ii) The Executive.—There is a universal demand for
constitutional changes in the existing Provincial Govern¬
ments. A new constitutional framework must be
constructed, into which all provinces can fit but which
will leave enough latitude for adjustment to individual
needs. The present rigid dyarchy either-ranges Ministers
against the reserved half or exposes them to the charge
of being the subservient tools of the bureaucrarcy. The
growth of real responsibility is thereby hindered.

The rigid division of subjects into reserved and trans¬
ferred must therefore disappear. The Provincial Cabinet
should be unitary. Joint responsibility for all its acts and
policies must be accepted by every one of its members.
The Ministry should be responsible to the Legislature

over the whole provincial field.

The Ministers should be chosen by the Governor from
the Legislature. However, he should have the power to

376 Indian Admi?iistratio?i

choose one or more Ministers who are not elected
members of the Legislature. Usually, these would be
experienced officials. They would not have any over¬
riding authority and all decisions would be joint decisions
of the Cabinet.

The Governor’s overriding powers should continue as
they are today. Ordinarily, the work of the Ministry
could be disposed of without the Governor’s being
present.

A Secretary to the Cabinet should be appointed. He
should be a Civil Servant and would be responsible for
keeping the record. He should have direct access to the
Governor, who would be thus kept fully informed of the
course of business.

If there is a change of Ministry, the official Minister
may continue in the new Ministry. That should be left
to the circumstances of each case.

Law and order must be a provincial subject. The
non-transfer of the police would concentrate on the
administration of law and order the hostility of all parts
of the Council. That department should not be there¬
fore an exception to the general rule of provincial
responsibility. In emergencies, the Governor’s extra¬
ordinary power would be available.

. (iii) The Legislature.—The life of the Provincial Legis¬
latures should be extended to five years.

■ The size of the Legislatures should be raised to
between 200 and 250 members. This is necessary in order
to establish contact between a Member of Council and
his constituency.- An extended franchise would mean
an extended electorate. The number of total seats must
be therefore increased.

. Ie- the absence of any agreement between Hindus
and Mohammedans, communal .representation for the

The Simon Commission Report 377

Mohammedans of a province must continue. Sikhs also
must continue to have separate representation.

Non-Brahmins in Madras need no longer have any
reserved seats; the Marathas in Bombay may continue
to have them for some time.

There should be no separate electorates but reserved
seats for the Depressed Classes. The proportion of such

m

seats should be three-quarters of the proportion of the
Depressed Class population to the total population of the
electoral area of a province.

Europeans and Anglo-Indians should retain their
separate electorates. Seats might be reserved for Indian
Christians.

'The present weightage in favour of the Mohammedans
in the different provinces should be maintained.

The official bloc in the Councils should cease to
exist.

Special protection granted to landholders might now be
safely withdrawn.

No special consideration need be shown to women.

The Governor’s power of nomination should be strict¬
ly limited. It might have to be used to secure proper
representation for labour interests.

Indian commerce and industry and the universities
should continue to be separately represented as at
present.

The Provincial, Legislature should have power of
amending its own constitution after ten years. It might
carry a 4 Constitution Resolution! providing for changes
in the number and distribution of constituencies and seats
or in the franchise or in the methods of representation
of particular communities. Two-thirds of the votes of
the Legislature and (as part, of this majority), two-thirds of
the members of any community likely to be affected by

378 Indian Administration

the new proposal should be made obligatory for the
passing of ‘ Constitutional Resolutions \

Ordinary legislative powers of the Council should
remain as they are at present. The Governor’s
extraordinary and overriding powers should be main¬
tained.

The distinction between voted and non-voted heads

*

should continue.

(iv) Franchise.—The present franchise is too limited
for building up representative government. The vote is
an instrument of political education. However, immediate
adult suffrage is impossible. A new Franchise Commit¬
tee should be .set up to frame schemes which would en¬
franchise about ten per cent of the total population. This
would more than treble the existing number of voters
and would make an electorate of about twenty per cent of
the adult population. Female franchise should be ex¬
tended to wives, and widows of twenty-five years of age,
if their husbands have, or had, property qualification
to vote.

■ (v) No recommendation is made with regard to the
establishment of second chambers in the provinces.

III. The North-West Frontier Province.

The responsibility for the administration of this
province cannot be separated from the responsibility for
the peace of and control over the tribal area. Integrity
of India’s boundaries must be secured. However, geo¬
graphical considerations should not prevent the political
advance of this province.

It should be given a Legislative Council of about forty
members with powers of legislation, interpellation, dis¬
cussing resolutions, imposing certain taxes and voting
some portion of the supplies. Its elected and nominated
elements should be about equal. However, executive

The Simon Commission Report 379

responsibility should remain with the, Chief Commis¬
sioner. This province cannot have the same degree of
autonomy which other provinces can have.

It should be represented in the Central Legislature by
four members, one being a Hindu.

IV. The Centre.

(i) The Central ‘Legislature.—In place of the present
Legislative Assembly there should be constituted a
4 Federal Assembly \ Its members should not be directly
elected by constituencies of voters but by Provincial
Legislative Councils by the.method of proportional repre¬
sentation. The persons so elected might be members of
the Provincial Legislature or men and women outside it
who are on the electoral roll of the province.

The Federal Assembly would have a fixed life of five
years. Detailed adjustments could be worked out in case
there is premature dissolution of Provincial Councils. .

Indirect election is proposed because otherwise consti¬
tuencies become unwieldly and of extraordinary size*
Where communications are extremely difficult and popu¬
lation illiterate, it is better to adopt the.method of 1 elec¬
tion by the elected \ Besides, for a federal constitution,
representation of the provinces as such at the centre is
desirable. The Provincial Fund, fed by. certain indirect
taxes, centrally collected, could be better managed if in the
Central Legislature provinces as such were represented.

The method of proportional representation would ade¬
quately protect minorities and would get rid of communal
representation in the Assembly.

The number of members of the Federal Assembly
should be between-250 and 280, that is, approximately one
member per million inhabitants. The. seats should be
distributed among the provinces on a population basis.
The members of the . Governor-General’s Executive

380 Indian Administration

Council should be members ex-officio. In addition, the
Governor-General should have power to nominate not
more than twelve officials.

Vacancies caused by any reason should be filled, in the
case of the representatives of the provinces by the
Governor nominating a person who would, in his opinion,
be suitable.

If the Federal Assembly is thus formed on the
senatorial principle, theoretically there is no need for a
second chamber. However, during a difficult transitional
period the Council of State should be allowed to continue.
It can contain men of distinction, experience and social
status and be a steadying influence. Its present number
and existing powers should be maintained. Each Gover¬
nor’s Province should be represented in the Council by
three members elected by the Provincial Legislature by
the method of proportional representation. Qualifications
for membership should be high. Nominated officials
should not be less then twenty. The life of the Council
should be extended to seven years.

In addition to the usual powers of legislation and
taxation, the Federal Assembly will have the power of
raising additional funds for the Provincial Governments.
An inter-provincial Financial Council should be set up,
consisting of all provincial Ministers of Finance. This
body should take the initiative in proposing new taxes
which would feed the Provincial Fund. The Assembly
then should pass or reject them.

(ii) The Governor-General-in-Council.—Dyarchy at
the centre is impossible. Unity in the central executive
must be preserved at all costs. The Governor-General
must continue to be the actual and active head of the
Government.

Hereafter, the Governor-General should have the

The Simon Commission Report 381

responsibility of selecting and appointing, members of
his Cabinet instead of their being appointed under the
Royal Sign Manual as at present. The Commander-in-
Chief should not be a member of the Executive Council
or of the Legislature. There should be a separate

member as leader of the House.

The practice should be introduced of selecting some
members of the Executive Council from among the
elected representatives sitting in the Federal Assembly
or the Council of State.

But the Executive Council cannot yet be made respon¬
sible to the Legislature.

(iii) Influence of the Legislature on the executive.—
The British model is not the only form of responsible
government. • Other methods could be also devised
to make the executive effectively responsible to the
will of the Legislature. Federalism is the form most
suitable for India. The British system is not an
easy one to imitate. India must develop on lines-
best suited to her conditions. The influence of the
Federal Assembly on the executive is bound to be

great.

(iv) Relations between the centre and the provinces.—
The superintendence, direction and control of the
Governor-General-in-Council over Provincial Govern¬
ments should be exercisable only in the following cases:
(a) safeguarding central subjects ; (b) matters a fleeting
other parts of India; <V> supply of information; (d) raising
of loans; (e) all-India Services; (/) safeguarding Imperia
interests; (g) questions arising with other parts
of the Empire; and (h) implementing international

The present distribution between central and^ pro--
vincial subjects should be continued but the Criminal

382 Indian Administration

Investigation Department should be brought under
greater central control.

V. The defence of India.

For a very long time to come it will be impossible for

the Indian army to dispense with a very considerable

British element, officers and troops. Such an army

*

cannot be transferred to Ministers responsible to the
Legislature. British troops are important—because they
are neutrals—in maintaining internal security. There are
also treaty obligations to Indian Princes.

The army expenditure is at present heavy—fifty-five
crores of rupees. The object of the Indian army is the
defence of the Indian frontiers from external aggression
and maintenance of internal order. The size and the cost
of the present army are considered to be quite necessary
for fulfilling these duties efficiently.

The defence of the frontiers of India is not a matter of

i

purely Indian interest. The whole Empire would be
involved. The North-West Frontier is an international
frontier of first-rate importance from the point of view of
the whole Empire. On India's frontier alone is the
Empire open to any serious threat of attack by land. Its
defence should not be regarded as the function of the Indian
Government in relation with the Indian Legislature, but
rather as the function of the Imperial Government which
may be represented by the Viceroy acting in concert with
the Commander-in-Chief.

The Imperial authorities would undertake the obliga¬
tion of Indian defence in return for continued facilities
for recruitment, areas, transport, etc. There would have
to be also an adjustment in the burden of finance, an
annual total sum being provided by India.

Expenditure consequent on tribal activities which
necessitate war operations should be borne entirely by

The Simon Commissio7i Report 383

India ; in the case of organized attacks by foreign powers,
the financial burden may be spread more widely.

For internal security Imperial troops could be lent on
the express authority of the Governor of a province.

The army budget would not be votable by the Central
Legislature. Its expenditure would be authorized by a
certificate from the Governor-General. However a Com¬
mittee on army afeairs might be formed, on which the
Central Legislature and Indian States would have
representatives. The Committee would discuss and keep
themselves in touch with military questions.

The possibility of the Government of India organi¬
zing, training and equipping certain military and naval
forces of their own, not containing any British element
and paid for by the Indian Government, might be
considered. It would considerably help in the process of
Indianization.

VI. The future of Burma.

The interests of India and Burma are divergent. The
two countries should be immediately separated from
each other. Inquiries should then be made regarding the
future constitution of Burma.

VII. Future relations with the Indian States.

There is really only one India. It is one geographical
whole. All-India problems, whether of war or peace,
are really common to the whole. The Indian States cannot
be ignored in framing a future constitution for the country.
They must be allowed to enter into closer association
with the Central Government. Federation is best suited
for the purpose, though difficulties in its formation are
not few.

A list should be drawn up of matters of common
concern to all, such as tariffs, exchange, currency, bank¬
ing, commerce, opium, salt, railways, posts and telegraphs.

384 Indian Administration

•defence, etc. A standing consultative body should be
created (to be known as the Council for Greater India)
consisting of representatives from British India and Indian
States to discuss and record the results of deliberation on
matters of common concern.

The desire to develop closer association between Indian
States and British India should be recited in the preamble
of the new Act. But there should be no artificijal hasten¬
ing of the process.

VIII. Indian finance ; Mr. Layton’s report.

The masses of the Indian people are extremely poor.
Expenditure on the primary functions of Government
such as defence and maintenance of law and order is
high. Expenditure on social services like education,
health, etc. is far behind western standards and in
many directions almost non-existent. New sources of
revenue must be found if national expenditure is to be
increased.

The existing scheme of financial allocation between the
Central and Provincial Governments is defective because
(i) although the provinces have rapidly expanding needs,
the sources of provincial revenue are almost stationary
while the revenue of the centre is capable of expansion ;
'(ii) it has treated the provinces very unequally; (ii) it
has given practically no power to the provinces to tax
industrial activities.

An analysis of the present central budget shows that
a surplus is likely to emerge gradually as a result of
the growth of revenue, mainly due to an increase in
customs. The size of the surplus will be largely affected
by the extent of the reduction that can be made in the
expenditure on defence which is today a very high
proportion of the central budget.

Any prospective surplus will, however, go compara-

The Simon Commission Report 38 :>

lively a little way towards meeting the needs of the
provinces. The following new sources are therefore
suggested:

(i) Increased yield from income-tax by lowering
exemption limits, steepening graduation, taxation of
income from investments in foreign countries, assessment
of agricultural incomes, etc. The additional yield would
be about four crores.

(ii) National excises on cigarettes, matches, etc. This
might be estimated, to yield about seven to eight crores
in the next ten years.

(iii) Terminal taxes. These might yield about ten
crores.

A complete scheme of allocation should provide for
the distribution of the centrally-collected revenue among
the provinces, in part according to origin and in part
on a population basis. The following particulars are
given :

(a) The duty on imported liquor should be reduced to the
standard luxury rate of thirty per cent and the provinces
should be given the right of imposing further duties in th e
form of excises on such liquors in accordance with their
excise policy,

. ( b ) The revenue from commercial stamps should be
transferred to the centre.

(c) One-half of the proceeds of the income-tax pni
by residents of a province should be assigned to. the
province concerned. Super-tax should remain entirely

central. This.suggestion would give the provinces about

four and a half crores per year.

( d ) In order to adjust taxation between urban an
rural classes, Provincial Governments should have the
•option of levying a surcharge on the income-tax collect
on the incomes of residents in the province. It shou

386 Indian Administration

be limited to one-quarter of the total tax. This might
yield three crores in ten years.

(e) Agricultural incomes should be taxed: and the
proceeds should be assigned to the province of origin:

(/) Provinces should be empowered to levy terminal
taxes.

Or) There should be constituted a Provincial Fund,
fed by specially designated taxes including, (1) excise on
cigarettes, (2) excise on matches, and (3) duty:on salt
when the central budget situation permits. The re¬
sources of the fund should be automatically distributed
to the provinces on a per capita basis.

If all the preceding proposals were carried out, it would
add nearly forty crores to the revenues of the provinces*
by 1940, of which twelve would have been transferred
from the central budget.

The proposal to assist the provinces by means of a
Provincial Fund is essentially a federal idea. The Finance
Ministers of the provinces should form an Inter-Provincial
Council that would meet once a year to consider
proposals in regard to the fund. The Assembly would be
the proper body to vote taxes for the fund and here the
Governor-General should have no right of certification.

An Advisory Loan Council to co-ordinate the loans of
provinces and toj3*£w up standard regulations regarding
loans might be set up.

The claim is made' that representatives of the Indian
States should be consulted on financial policy. Some
sort of machinery for consultation between British India
and the States would be required-

As a result of the above changes there would be four
groups of taxes in Indiri^^jevenue raised and Spent
by the Central Government—-customs, income-tax, ' com¬
mercial stamps, railway profits and profits, from other

The Simon Commission Report 387

central services. In emergencies the Central Government
must have the right to make surcharges on any or all
taxes in groups (iii) and (iv) below; (ii) revenues raised
and spent by the provinces, (iii) taxes collected centrally
but distributed to provinces according to origin (this
would include portions of the income-tax allocated to the
provinces and the tax on agricultural incomes; (iv) all-
India taxes collected centrally but distributed among the
provinces according to population.

IX. The future of the Services.

The. security, Services, that is the Indian Civil Service
and the Indian Police Service should continue to be
recruited by the Secretary of State who should have
‘power to require Provincial Governments to employ
these services in such numbers and in such appointments
as he thinks necessary.

The rate of Indianization recommended by the Lee
Commission should be maintained.

The rights, safeguards and privileges of existing mem¬
bers of all Services should be strictly assured to them.

... Retirement on proportionate pension should remain
open without limit of time to any officer.

The present conditions of recruitment for all-India
Services should be continued. Increased pensions should
be given to those who have risen to be Governors.

Public Service Commissions should be established in
the provinces to recruit Provincial Services. Their
members should be entirely free from political influences.

X. The High Court.

Administration of High Courts should be centralized
and expenses should be borne by central funds.

XI. Relations between the Home and Indian Govern¬
ments.

In the Governors’ Provinces it should no longer be

388 Indian Administration

open to the Secretary of State to issue orders 1 on matters
which are of no concern outside the province itself and
which are transferred to the Ministry.

In the Central Government the principle of responsi¬
bility is not introduced. Hence, the Governor-General
and the Governor-General-in-Council must remain subject
to the orders of the Secretary of State as^at present.

Any extension of the principle of the * fiscal convention'
should only be made with the approval by Resolution of
both Houses of Parliament.

The India Council must be retained but it need not
be as large as it is today. The interval between any
member leaving India and his appointment to the Council
should not be more than one year.

The concurrence of a majority of its members must
continue to be necessary in questions about the Services.
Its control over non-votable expenditure from the revenues
of India should be maintained.

In other respects the Council would be an essentially
advisory body. The Secretary of State would decide at
his discretion the matters about which he would consult it.

The position of the High Commissioner is not affected
by any of the new proposals.

CHAPTER XXVI

The Round Table Conference a?id the
# Premier's Declaration

The Simon Commission had been boycotted by all the
leading political parties in India who considered it a
humiliation that not a single Indian was selected to be a
member of the Commission. The Labour Ministry,
which in the meantime had come into office, therefore
made an important announcement after the publication of
’the Simon Report. It was stated by them that they had
decided to c.onvene a Round Table Conference in London
in' order to give opportunity to Indian political leaders to
participate actively in the discussions about the future
constitutional form of the Government of India. The
Indian National Congress, however, declined to co-operate
with the Conference and boycotted it because the status of
a Dominion was not assured to India in the Ministerial
announcements.

The Conference was to be a preliminary to final legis¬
lative action by the British Parliament. It was composed
of representatives of the three important political parties
in Britain, namely Conservative, Liberal and Labour
and of prominent Indian politicians and Princes who
were nominated by the Viceroy to represent different
Indian interests.

His Majesty the King-Emperor opened the first plenary
session in the second week of November 1930 and the
Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, was later on
voted to the chair. After formal speeches of a general
character were delivered by different delegates, the

390 Indian Administration

Conference resolved itself into several sub-committees and
each committee tried to thrash out a specific problem.
There were thus sub-committees for discussing (i) the
federal structure of the future Indian Government; (ii) the
scheme of provincial autonomy; (iii) the problem of the
minorities ; (iv) the separation of Burma; (v) reforms for
the North-West Frontier Province; «*(vi) franchise;
(vii) defence; (viii) the Services ; and (ix) the separation
of Sind. The reports of these sub-committees were
drafted after extensive deliberations and were then
presented to the Conference as a whole which noted
them one after the other.

In the last plenary session, after reviewing the work of
the Conference, which had deliberated for, nearly ten*
weeks, the Prime Minister read out a declaration which
his colleagues in the Ministry had authorized him to make
on behalf of the British Government. This declaration
embodied the considered view of the Labour leaders
about the changes that were proposed to be introduced
in the Government of India. It is thus an important
document and its main contents are therefore summarized
below.

(i) The responsibility for the Government of India
should be placed upon Legislatures, central and provin¬
cial. with such provisions as might be necessary to
guarantee, during a period of transition, the observance
of certain obligations and to meet other special circum¬
stances ; and also with such guarantees as might be
required by the minorities to protect their political liberties
and rights.

In such statutory safeguards as might. be made for
meeting the needs of the transitional period, it would be
a primary concern of His Majesty's Government to see
that the reserved powers were so framed and exercised

The Round Table Conlerence 391

as not to prejudice the advance of India through the
new constitution to full responsibility for her own
government.

(ii) The Central Government should be a federation
of all India, embracing both the Indian States and
British India in a bi-cameral Legislature. This had
been unanimously agreed to by all parties in the
Conference.

(iii) With a Legislature constituted on a federal basis,
His Majesty’s Government would be prepared to recog¬
nize the principle of responsibility of the executive to the
Legidature in the Central Government.

But the subjects of defence and external affairs would
* be reserved to the Governor-General who would have also
emergency powers to maintain tranquillity and to protect
minorities.

The transfer of financial responsibility would be subject
to such conditions as would insure the fulfilment of the
obligations incurred under the authority of the Secretary
( of State and the maintenance unimpaired of the financial
stability and credit of India* A reserve bank might be
useful in this direction.

Subject to these provisions, the Indian Government
would have full financial responsibility for methods of
raising revenue and for control of expenditure on non-
reserved services.

(iv) The Governors’ Provinces would be constituted on
the basis of full responsibility. Their Ministries would be
taken from the Legislature and would be jointly respon¬
sible to it. The range of provincial subjects would be so
defined as to give them the greatest possible measure of
self-government.

There would be reserved to the Governor that minimum
of special powers which is required in order to secure

392 Indian Administration

the preservation of tranquillity and to guarantee the
rights of the public services and the minorities.

Differences of religion, sect, caste or race would not in
themselves constitute civil disabilities.

(v) At the instance of the British commercial commu¬
nity, the principle was generally agreed to that there
should be no discrimination between the rights of the
British mercantile community, firms and companies
trading in India and the rights of Indian-born subjects
of His Majesty. An appropriate convention to this
effect on the basis of reciprocity should be entered
into.

The existing rights of the European community
in India with regard to criminal trials should be
maintained.

This declaration made by the Prime Minister on behalf
of the Labour Government was broadly and in general
terms assented to by the leaders of the Liberal and
Conservative parties.

After the conclusion of the Conference, a vigorous
effort was made in India to bring about reconciliation
and truce between the Government on the one hand and
the Indian National Congress on the other. Mahatma
Gandhi, the Indian leader, had been carrying on the Civil
Disobedience movement since March 1930, and a large
number of prominent Indian men and women in all parts
of the country had courted arrest and been sentenced to
serve various terns of imprisonment. With a view to
create an atmosphere of goodwill and facilitate peace
negotiations, all the imprisoned leaders were released.
Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, held prolonged conversations
with Mahatma Gandhi and after elaborate discussions, a
settlement satisfactory to both parties was arrived at.
The terms of the agreement were officially published by

The Rou?id Table Conference 393

the Government of India and the Civil Disobedience
movement was called off.

Later on, in its sessions held at Karachi at the end of
March 1931, the National Congress lifted the boycott on
the Round Table Conference. Mahatma Gandhi was
elected as the sole representative of the Congress to attend
the Second Session of the Round Table Conference and
accordingly he proceeded to London in the latter half of
the year 1931.- Leaders of other political parties and
communities also assembled in England for the same
purpose.

Just about this time the Labour Ministry resigned and
Parliament was dissolved. After the elections, the
'National Government was formed containing a predomi¬
natingly large element of Conservative politicians of
Britain. A new Secretary of State for India was
appointed.

The Second Round Table Conference held prolonged
deliberations but no definite and final conclusions of a
practical nature were reached. The different Indian
communities could not arrive at an agreed solution of
their conflicting claims. The minorities demanded special
protection. When the Conference dispersed in London it
was decided to continue its work in India by means of a
Consultative Committee formed out of it and meeting
under the presidency of the Viceroy.

This Conference however appointed small Sub-
Committees to investigate into and report on important
problems arising out of. the proposed Reforms, as, for
example, the problems of Federal Structure, Federal
.Finance, Franchise, etc. These Committees came out to
India and carried on extensive inquiries. Their reports
were then submitted to the Prime Minister and published.

Immediately after the return of Mahatma Gandhi to

394 Indian Administration

India in the beginning of 1932 after the Second Round
Table Conference was finished, there was a revival of the
Civil Disobedience Movement due to a combination of
circumstances. As a result Mahatma Gandhi and other
leaders of the Congress were sent to jail.

Soon after these events, prominent members of the
Consultative Committee, meetings of vtfhich were called
by the Viceroy but which were quite inconclusive,
informed the Viceroy that they could not come to a
mutual agreement about communal claims; and that they
were therefore prepared to leave the settlement of the
question to the arbitration of the Prime Minister whose
decision would be accepted as final.

The Prime Minister accordingly gave his Communaf
Award about the middle of 1932. A few days later
Mahatma Gandhi announced his intention of fasting
unto death as a protest against those proposals in
the Award which referred to the Depressed Classes and
which in his opinion were bound to disrupt Hindu
society. There was naturally a great stir. Hurried
conversations and negotiations were held behind prison
bars and ultimately an agreed solution was arrived at
which was embodied in what has since been known
as the Poona Pact. The Prime Minister agreed to
modify his Award in the light of the modifications
suggested in the Poona Pact and Mahatma Gandhi
broke his fast.

Late in 1932 the Third Round Table Conference was
convened in London. It considered the Reports of
the various Sub-Committees appointed by the Second
Round Table Conference and formulated its own recom¬
mendations. His Majesty’s Government agreed to give
full consideration to the opinions expressed in the
Conference and to present to Parliament, at an early date,

The Round Table Conference 395

their own definite proposals for constitutional reform in
India. The Third Round Table Conference dispersed by
the end of 1932.

At last in the third week of March 1933, the detailed
proposals made by His Majesty’s Government for an
Indian Constitution were published in a White Paper and
some days later both Houses of Parliament were invited
to set up a Joint Select Committee to consider these
proposals in consultation with Indian representatives.
Both the Houses have accepted the suggestion and the
Joint Select Committee has been already set up.

The Committee is expected to record evidence and
exafnine witnesses. It will make a report of its own
conclusions which will be laid before Parliament. It will
then be the duty of His Majesty’s Government to intro¬
duce a Bill embodying their own final plans. A few*
Indian representatives have already left for England to
take part in the work of the Joint Select Committee.

A short summary of the important proposals contained
in the White Paper is given in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XXVII

A Brief Summary of the Importa?it Proposals made
in the White Paper of MarcJ^ 1933

*

Introduction

THE FEDERATION OF INDIA

The proposals made in this Paper are intended to make
clear the principles which His Majesty’s Government have
followed with regard to political reform in India.

The existing Government of India Act will he repealed'
in toto and will be replaced by another Act to be known
,as the Constitution Act.

It is proposed to set up a Federal Legislature, consisting
of elected representatives of British India and of repre¬
sentatives of Indian States to be appointed by their
Rulers. It is also proposed to set up a Federal Executive,
consisting of the Governor-General representing the
Crown, aided and advised by a Council of Ministers, who
will be responsible, subject to certain qualifications, to
the Legislature.

The office of Governor-General will be constituted by
Letters Patent and that document will set out the powers
which he will exercise as the King’s representative. It is
intended that the Viceroy shall, in future, be recognized
as holding a separate office. He will exercise the powers
of the Crown in relation to the States outside the Federal
sphere.

The first step requisite in the transfer from a unitary to
a federal polity is to create provinces with an autonomy
of their own and to assign to them a defined and exclusive

Brief Summary of the White Paper 397

share of the activities of Government. It is proposed
to do so.

Provincial autonomy may have to precede the complete
establishment of the Federation at least by a short period
and provision will be made accordingly.

The transfer of responsibility at the centre will not be
• •

complete. These will be certain Reserved departments
in which the responsibility of the Governor-General will
be to Parliament.

The Federal Legislature will be bi-cameral. The
British Indian seats in the Upper Chamber will be filled
by indirect election by the Provincial Legislatures. The
franchise of the Lower Chamber will, for practical
•purposes, be the existing franchise for the present
Provincial Legislatures.

The Reserved Departments cannot be administered in
complete isolation. A prudent Governor-General will
keep his Counsellors and Ministers in the closest contact.
Joint deliberation among them all will be specially
recommended.

In departments not Reserved, Ministers will be res¬
ponsible to the Legislature. However, a * special
responsibility * would be considered to devolve upon the
Governor-General for certain general purposes and in
fulfilment of it he will have power to act as he will,
notwithstanding his Ministers’ advice.

The proposals relating to responsibility for finance of
the Federation are based on the assumption that before
the first Federal Ministry comes into being, a Reserve
Bank, free from political influence will have to be set up
by Indian legislation and be already successfully operat¬
ing. It would be entrusted with the management of
currency and exchange.

Apart from Reserved departments and ‘ special

398 Indian Administration

i

responsibilities ’ the Governor-General will have certain
specified powers called ‘discretionary', e.g. summoning
legislatures, assenting to bills, etc.

For the proper discharge of his duties the Governor-
General will have power to take action notwithstanding
an adverse vote of the Legislature. Such measures will
be clearly known as the ‘ Governor-General's Acts ’ and
thus the Ministers’ or the Legislative Councillors’ position
would not be compromised.

The budget will be framed by the Finance Minister
in consultation with his colleagues and the Governor-
General. Appropriations for the Reserved departments
will be taken by the latter on his own responsibility. * If
he feels also that the Ministers’ proposals for appropria-’
tions are insufficient to enable him to fulfil his ‘ special
responsibilities’, he will be entitled to append to the
budget statement additional proposals for appropriation
under any head; These will be distinguished as such and
whether they relate to non-votable or votable heads of
expenditure, the legislature will not be invited to vote
upon them.

After the legislature has voted upon those proposals for
appropriation which are submitted to its vote the Governor-
General will be called upon to authenticate them by his
signature. In doing so he will be entitled to include the
additional sums required both in the Reserved and the
non-Reserved side.

The Governor-General will have power of ordinance¬
making both in the Reserved and the non-Reserved heads.

When a complete breakdown of the constitutional
machinery has occurred, the Governor-General or the
Governor will be given plenary authority to assume, all
powers that he deems necessary for the purpose of carry¬
ing on the King’s Government.

Brief Summary of the White Paper 399

Thus,, in short, the Governor-General will have two
kinds of responsibilities—an exclusive responsibility for
Reserved heads and a ‘ special responsibility ’ for
certain defined purposes outside the range of the Reserved
departments and he will, have special powers to fulfil
them notwithstanding the opinion of Ministers or the vote
of the Legislature. Subject to this limitation Ministers
will be responsible to the Legislature.

THE GOVERNORS’ PROVINCES

The Provinces will become autonomous units being
administered by a Governor representing the King, aided
and advised by a Council of Ministers responsible to the
" Legislature of the Province. The Governor will be guided
by the advice of his Ministers unless so to be guided
would be, in his judgement, inconsistent with his * special
responsibilities’. For fulfilling the latter he will be
entitled to act as he deems requisite, notwithstanding the
advice of his Ministers.

There will be no * Reserved departments 9 in the Pro¬
vinces. * Special responsibilities ’ of the Governor will
be almost identical with those of the Governor-General.
Certain additions will be necessary.

Governors will have the power of issuing ordinances.

The Provincial Legislatures will be enlarged and
wholly elected. In Bengal, U.P., and Bihar they will be
bi-cameral. The franchise will be lowered. In all the
Provinces together the electorate would be in the neigh¬
bourhood of 14 per cent, of the total population or some
27 per cent of the adult population,

THE FEDERATION AND THE UNITS

There will be a statutory demarcation between the
legislative competence of the Federal and Provincial

400 Indian Administration

Legislatures respectively. There will be lists of subjects
exclusively Federal, exclusively Provincial and Con¬
current.

Certain matters will be placed outside the competence
altogether of both Federal and Provincial Legislatures*
e.g., the Royal Family, the Army Act, the Air Force* Act,
the Naval Discipline Act and the Constitutional Act
itself.

In certain cases, previous sanction of the Governor-
General or the Governor to the introduction of a Legisla¬
tive measure will be made necessary.

The following Statement gives a general and brief, idea
of the division of powers and resources between the
Federation and the Provinces.

Sources of Revenue

Powers of
Legislation

« Import Duties ; Railways \
and Federal Commer- |
cial Undertakings ; 1
Profits on Coinage and
the Reserve Bank

Exclusively

Federal

Export Duties, Salt, To- '
bacco Excise, other
Excise Duties except )
those on Liquors, Drugs
and Narcotics *

Do.

Allocation of
Revenue

i

Exclusively

Federal

Federal (with power:
to assign a share or
whole to Units)

Terminal Taxes on Goods
and Passengers, certain
Stamp Duties

Land Revenue, Excise, s
Stamps, Forests and the
Miscellaneous Sources
at present enjoyed by
the Provinces J

Provincial, with
power to the Federa-
Do. tion to impose

a Federal Sur-
1 charge

, ’ f .i Vs

, :

, * v, . ;

Exclusively
Provincial?;

r.',. * wlW',' . ,\ m \

l^' 1'• VM-

Brief Summary of the White Paper 401

Sources of taxation not specified in any schedule will
be ordinarily Provincial. Half of the Jute duty must be
assigned to the producing units. The Super-tax. on the
Profits of Companies will be entirely Federal. All legisla¬
tion regarding other, taxes on income except agricultural
income^will be Federal. Receipts from such taxation will
be divided 1 between the Federation and the Governors’
Provinces, a certain percentage being assigned to the
former—the percentage being not less than 25 and more
than 50.

The Federal Legislature will be empowered to impose
surcharges on taxes on income. Their proceeds will
exclusively belong to them. The Provincial Legislatures,
will be empowered to impose surcharges on taxes-
on the personal income of residents in the Province,,
the net proceeds going to the Province. Collection
would be carried out by the Federal agency and the
surcharge would not exceed 12J- per cent of the rates
of taxes.

In the early years the Federation will be allowed to*
retain for itself a block amount out of the proceeds of the
Income-tax distributable to the Provinces.

Certain Provinces would be given subventions from
the Federal revenues.

The 4 Contributions ’ taken by the Crown from some of
the Indian States at present should be transferred, as
long as they are received, to the Federation. However it
is intended to abolish them gradually.

THE JUDICATURE

A Federal Court is essentially needed to interpret
authoritatively the Federal Constitution itself. It is
proposed that this Court should have both Original and

Appellate jurisdiction. *

402 Indian Administration*

The Federal Legislature will also be empowered to set
up a Supreme Court of Appeal if it thinks necessary
to do so.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE’S ADVISERS

The existing India Council is no longer n§cess*ary or
appropriate though a small number of ^advisers will be
necessary to the Secretary of State. These will continue
to be appointed.

THE PUBLIC SERVICES

f)

Recruitment to the Indian Forest Service and. the
Indian Service of Engineers will cease after the new-
Constitution comes into being.

All persons appointed by the Secretary of State in
‘Council, already in service or appointed after the new
constitution commences working, will continue to enjoy
.all rights that they have at present.

The I.C.S., the Indian Police Service and the Eccle¬
siastical Service will continue to be recruited by the
Secretary of State. At the end of five years after the
new Act comes into operation a Statutory inquiry will
.be held into the question of future recruitment to these
-Services.

THE STATUTORY RAILWAY BOARD

%

The actual control of the administration of State rail¬
ways should be placed by the Constitution Act in the
'hands of a statutory body so composed and with such
.powers that it could perform its duties without being
■'Subject to political interference.

A declaration of Fundamental Rights would not be
-incorporated in the Act but it may be included in the

Brief Summary of the White Paper 403
Royal Pronouncement with which the New Constitution
may be inaugurated.

The Proposals

THE FEDERATION

The Federation of India will be a union between the
Governors 1 Provinces and those Indian States whose
Rulers signify their desire to accede to the Federation by
a formal Instrument of Accession. By this Instrument the
Ruler will transfer to the Crown, for the purposes of the
Federation, his powers and jurisdiction in respect of those
matters which he is willing to recognize as Federal
matters.

The Federation will be brought into existence by the
issue of a Proclamation by His Majesty after the latter
has received intimation that the Rulers of States repre¬
senting not less than half the aggregate population of the
Indian States and entitled to not less than half the seats
to be allotted to the States in the Federal Upper Chamber
have signified their desire to accede to the Federation
and after Parliament has prayed for the issue of the
Proclamation.

THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE

The Executive authority will be exercisable, on the
King’s behalf, by a Governor-General to whom an Instru¬
ment of Instructions will be issued. His salary, allow¬
ances and other personal expenses will not be votable by
the Federal Legislature.

The Governor-General will himself direct and control
the- administration of the departments of Defence, External
Affairs and Ecclesiastical Affairs. In the administration
of these Reserved departments he will be assisted by not

404 Indian Administration

more than three Counsellors whose salaries and conditions

of service will be prescribed by Order in Council.

For the administration of the remaining departments
there will be a Council of Ministers who must be members
of the Federal Legislature. The Governor-General will
be enjoined to select such persons to be ministers, as will
be able collectively to command the gonfidence of the
Legislature. The Governor-General may preside "at
meetings of the Council of Ministers and frame rules for
the transaction of business.

The Governor-General will be empowered to appoint a
Financial Adviser to assist him in the discharge of his
4 special responsibility 1 for financial matters. . His
salary will not be subject to the vote of the Legislature tc*
whom he will not be responsible.

*

Apart from his exclusive responsibility for the Reserved
•departments, the Governor-General will be declared to
have a 4 special responsibility ’ in respect of (a) peace or
tranquillity of India, (b) financial stability and credit of
the Federation, (c) interests of minorities, (d) interests of
the Public Services, (e) prevention of commercial dis¬
crimination, (/) protection of the rights of any Indian
State, (g) matters affecting the administration of Reserved
-departments.

In any case in which the Governor-General feels that a
* Special responsibility 7 is imposed on him, he will have
full discretion to act as he thinks fit, subject to the
-direction of the Secretary of State, notwithstanding any
advice tendered by the Council of Ministers.

The Federal Legislature

The Federal Legislature will consist of the King,
represented by the Governor-General and two Chambers,
jthe Council of State and the House of Assembly. The

Brief Summary of the White Paper

former will have a tenure of seven years and
five years.

The Council of State will consist, apart
Governor-General's Counsellors, of not more than
members of whom 150 will be elected from British India
and not more than 100 will be appointed by the Rulers of
States and "not m^re then ten non-officials nominated by

the Governor-General.

The Assembly will consist, apart from the Governor-
General's Counsellors, of not more than 375 members
of whom 250 will be elected from British India and
not more than 125 appointed by Rulers of Indian
States.

’ Money bills must be initiated in the Assembly. No bill
can become law until it has been agreed to by both
the Chambers. In case of disagreement between them
the Governor-General may summon a joint session in
which the view of the majority will prevail.

In order to enable the Governor-General to fulfil his
responsibilities for the Reserved departments and also his
* Special responsibilities' he will be empowered to declare
by message a bill to be essential and if it is not passed by
the two Chambers as required he will be empowered
to enact it as a ‘ Governor-General's ActSuch an Act
will be fully valid and will clearly bear the Govemor-

■t

General's own responsibility.

PROCEDURE WITH REGARD TO FINANCIAL

PROPOSALS

The budget will be presented to both Chambers and the
votable and non-votable items will be clearly distinguished.

. Those additional proposals which pertain to 4 Special
responsibilities ’ of the Governor-General will be stated
separately.,

406 Indian Administration

Proposals for the appropriation of revenues, if they
refer to the following heads of expenditure will not be
submitted to the vote of the Legislature but will be open
for discussion; (i) Interest, Sinking Fund Charges and
Loans Expenditure; (ii) the salary and allowances of the
Governor-General, of Ministers, Governor-General’s

f*

Counsellors, Financial Adviser, Chief c Commissioners,
Governor-Generars personal and secretariat staff and the
staff of the Financial Adviser; (iii) expenditure required
for the Reserved departments or for the discharge of
duties imposed on the Secretary of State ; (iv) salaries and
pensions of Judges of the Federal and Supreme Courts;
(v) expenditure on Excluded Areas and Baluchistan ; r (vi)
salaries and pensions of certain Services.

At the conclusion of the budget proceedings the
Governor-General will authenticate by his signature all
appropriations' which will then be laid before both
Chambers but will not be open for discussion. In the
appropriations so authenticated the Governor-General will
be empowered to include any additional sums which he
regards as necessary for the discharge or any of his
4 Special responsibilities \

EMERGENCY LEGISLATION

The Governor-General will have the power to issue
ordinances for discharging his responsibilities in the
Reserved departments, for fulfilling his ‘ Special res¬
ponsibilities' and also, in consultation with the ministers,
for emergencies in the administration of non-Reserved
Departments.

If a breakdown of the Constitution is threatened, the
Governor-General will be empowered to assume to himself
all such powers vested by law in any Federal authority

Brief Summary of the White Paper 407

as appear to him to be necessary for - effective
government. ' - .

. The Governors’ Provinces

THE PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE

In a "Governor’s Province the executive authority will
be exercisable c*i the King’s behalf by a Governor to
whom will be issued an Instrument of Instructions. His
salary and allowances will not be subject to the vote of
the Legislature.

For the purpose of aiding and advising the Governor
there will be a Council of Ministers who must be members
of the Legislature. The Governor will be enjoined to
select such persons to be Ministers who will collectively
be able to command the confidence of the Legislature.

The Governor may preside at meetings of his Council
of Ministers and frame rules for the transaction of
business.

The Governor will be declared to have a 1 special
responsibility * in respect of (a) peace and tranquillity in
the province; ( bScc) interests of minorities and services; (d)
commercial discrimination; (e) rights of any Indian State;
(/) excluded areas; (g) execution of orders lawfully issued
by the. Governor-General; ( h ) Tribal and Trans-border
areas ; (z) Sukkur Barrage.

In any case in ’which the Governor feels that a 4 special
responsibility ’ is imposed on him, he will have full
discretion to act as he thinks fit, subject to the direction
of the Secretary of State, notwithstanding any advice
tendered by his Ministers.

THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE

For the provinces of Bengal, U. P. and Bihar there will
be a Legislature consisting of the King, represented by

408 Indian Administration

the Governor and of two Chambers to be known as the
Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly. For
the remaining Governors’ Provinces the Legislature is to
consist of the King, represented by the Governor and of
one Chamber to be known as the Legislative Assembly.
The Council will have a tenure of seven and the
Assembly of five years. ^

In order to enable the Governor to fulfill his ‘ special
responsibilities ’ he will be empowered to declare by
message a Bill to be essential and if it is not passed by
the legislature as required he will be empowered to enact
it as ,a ‘Governor’s Act’. Such an Act will be fully
valid and will clearly bear the Governor’s own respon-
sibility.

t

PROCEDURE WITH REGARD TO FINANCIAL

PROPOSALS

The budget will be presented to the Legislature and
votable and non-votable items will be clearly distin¬
guished. Those additional proposals which pertain to the
‘ special responsibilities ’ of the Governor will be stated
separately.

Proposals for appropriation of revenues, if they refer to
the following heads of expenditure will not be submitted to.
the vote of the Legislature but will be open for discussion ;

(i) Interest, Sinking Fund Charges and Loans expenditure;.

(ii) the salary and allowances of Governors, Ministers
and of the Governor’s personal and Secretariat staff;,

(iii) salaries and pensions of High Court and Chief Court
Judges; (iv) expenditure required for the discharge of
duties imposed on the Secretary of State ; (v) salaries and
pensions of, certain services.

At the conclusion of the budget proceedings the

Brief Summary of ihe White Paper 409

Governor will authenticate by his signature all appro¬
priations which will-then be laid before the legislature
but will not be open for discussion. In the appropriations
so authenticated the Governor will be empowered to
include any additional amounts which he regards as
necessary for the discharge of any of his ‘ special

responsibilities \ •

«

EMERGENCY LEGISLATION

*

The Governor will be empowered to issue Ordinances
tor the discharge of his £ Special responsibilities He
will have that power also generally, if the Legislature is
not in session and if the ministers are satisfied that an
emergency exists.

If a breakdown of the Constitution is threatened, the
Governor will be empowered to assume to himself all
such powers vested by law in any provincial authority as
appear to him to be necessary for effective government*

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERATION AND
THE FEDERAL UNITS

The Federal Legislature will have exclusive power to
make laws for the peace and good government of the
Federation with respect to matters set out in Appendix

VI, List I.

The Provincial Legislature will have exclusive power
to make laws for the peace and good government of the
province with respect to matters set out in Appendix VI,

List II.

The Federal Legislature and the Provincial Legis¬
latures will have concurrent powers to make laws with
respect to matters set out in Appendix VI, List III.

The consent of the Governor-General will be requited
*

410 Indian Athninistraiion

to the introduction in the Federal Legislature of . legisla¬
tion which refers to an Act of Parliament or to a
Governor-General’s or Governor’s Act or Ordinance or to
a Reserved subject or to coinage and currency or the
Federal Reserve Bank in relation to its management of
currency and exchange or religion or proceedings* against
European criminals. «

The consent of the Governor-General will also ‘be
required to introduction in the Provincial Legislatures of
measures enumerated above.

The Federal and Provincial Legislatures will have no

power to make laws subjecting in British India any

British subject (including companies, partnerships,

associations, etc.) in respect of taxation, the holding of

property of any kind, the carrying on of any profession,

*

trade, business or occupation or the employment of any
servants or agents or in respect of residence or travel
within the boundaries of the Federation, to any disability
or discrimination based upon his descent, caste, colour or
religion or place of birth.

The Federal and the Provincial Legislatures will have
no power to make laws subjecting any British subject
domiciled in the United Kingdom (including companies,
institutions, etc.) to any disability or discriminate oxi if an
Indian subject of His Majesty or a company, etc. would
not be subject in the United Kingdom to any disability or
discrimination of the same or similar character.

An Act of the Federal or Provincial Legislature
however which, with a view to encouragement of trade or
industry authorizes the payment of grants, bounties or
subsidies out of public funds will not be held to fall
within the terms of the two preceding paras.

It .will be the duty of a Provincial Government so to
exercise its power and authority as to secure that due -

Btief Summary of ihc White Paper 411

effect is given within the province to every Act of the
Federal Legislature which refers to the Province.

It will be the duty of the Ruler of a State to secure
that due effect is given within the territory of the State
to every Act of the Federal Legislature which applies to
that territory.

ALLOCATION OF REVENUES

Revenues derived from sources in respect of which the
Provincial Legislature has exclusive or concurrent power
to make laws will be allocated as provincial revenues.
Revenues derived from sources in respect of which the
Federal Legislature has exclusive power to make laws
will be allocated as Federal Revenues.

The net revenues derived from the following Sources
will be assigned to the Governor’s Provinces: Duties on
property changing hands at death, taxes on mineral rights
and personal capital, terminal taxes on railway, water
and air borne goods and passengers, and stamp duties.

A prescribed percentage, not being less than fifty per
cent and not more than seventy-five per cent of the net
revenue derived from the following sources will be
assigned on a prescribed basis to the Governors 1
Provinces: Taxes on income (other than agricultural
income) except taxes on the income or capital of
companies.

The Federal Legislature will have power to impose
surcharges for federal purposes on taxes on income
(other than agricultural income).

Provision will be made for subvention to certain
Governor’s Provinces‘out of Federal revenues of prescrib¬
ed amounts due for prescribed periods.

The Federal Government will have power to borrow
for any purposes of the Federation upon the security of

412 Indian Administration

the Federal revenues and the Provincial Governments
will have the power to borrow for any provincial purpose
on the security oE provincial revenues but in certain cases
the consent of the Federal Government will be required.

The Judicature

* .

THE FEDERAL COURT*

•

The Federal Court will consist of a Chief Justice and
other Judges appointed by His Majesty. They must
retire after attaining the age of sixty-two years. Their
salaries, pensions and other allowances will be fixed by
order in Council.

* <

Persons who have been judges at least for five years
or who are barristers, advocates or High Court pleaders
of at least fifteen years’ standing are eligible for appoint¬
ment to the Federal Court.

The Federal Court will have exclusive original jurisdic¬
tion in (i) any matter involving the interpretation of the
Constitution Act and (ii) any matter involving interpre¬
tation of any agreement entered into between the
Federation and a Province or a State or between two
Provinces or between a Province and a State.

The Federal Court will have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction from any decision so far as it involves the
interpretation of the Constitution Act.

THE SUPREME COURT

Provision will be made enabling the Federal Legislature
to establish a Supreme Court of Appeal for British India.
The President and Judges of this Court will be appointed
by His Majesty and must retire after attaining the age of
62 years.

The Supreme Court will be a Court of Appeal from the

Brief Summary of the. White Paper 413

High Courts in British India. On the establishment of
this Court a direct appeal from a High Court to His-
Majesty in Council, i.e. the Privy Council, will be barred.
It will be allowed in civil cases only by leave of the
Supreme Court. . In criminal cases no appeal will be
allowed/

THE PROVINCIAL HIGH COURTS

The existing High Courts will be maintained. The-
existing provision which requires that one-third of the
judges of a court must be barristers or advocates and that
one-third must be members of the I.C.S. will be

abrogated.

• *

THE SECRETARY OF STATE’S ADVISERS

The Council of India as at present constituted will cease
to exist. But the Secretary of State will be empowered
to appoint not less than three nor more than six persons-
(of whom two at least must have held office for at least
ten years under the Crown in India) for the purpose of'
advising him. The term of office of such a person will be
five years.

The salary of the advisers will be defrayed from,
monies paid by Parliament.

The Secretary of State will be free to seek their advice
either individually or collectively on any matter. But he
will be bound to consult them and obtain the concurrence
of their majority on questions affecting the Public Sendee-

THE PUBLIC SERVICES

'The rights and privileges of the existing members of
the Services will be maintained.

After the commencement of the Act, the Secretary of
State will make appointments to the Indian Civil Service

414 , Indian Administration

the Indian'Police Service and the Ecclesiastical Depart¬
ment. Their pay, pensions, allowances, discipline, con-
•duct, will be regulated by rules made by the Secretary
•of State. The latter will be also required to make rules
regulating the number and character of, the civil posts
to be held by persons appointed by the Crown* by the
Secretary of State in Council, or by* the Secretary of
State.

At the expiration of five years after the Constitution
Act comes into operation a statutory inquiry will be held
into the question of future recruitment for those services
•except the Foreign department and the Ecclesiastical
department.

The Federal and Provincial Governments will appoint

and determine the conditions of service of all persons in

*

the Federal and Provincial services other than persons
appointed by the Crown, by the Secretary of State in
Council or by the Secretary of State.

Public Service Commission

There will be a Federal Public Service Commission and
a Provincial Public Service Commission for each Province.
But by agreement the same Provincial Commission will
be enabled to serve two or more provinces jointly.

The members of the Federal Public Services Commis¬
sion will be appointed by the Secretary of State who will
also determine their number, tenure of service, pay,
allowances, leave, etc.

The members of the Provincial Commission will be
appointed by the Governor who will determine their
■conditions of service etc.

The emoluments of the members of the Public Service
Commissions will not be subject to the vote of , the
Legislatures.

. 415

Brief Summary of the White Paper

Transitory Provisions

The Constitution Act, though treating the Federation
as a whole, will contain provisions enabling the Provincial
Constitutions for which it provides to be brought into
being, if necessary, before the Constitution as a whole*
comes into’being. ^

APPENDIX I

Composition and Method of Election to the British India
Side of the Federal Council of State

9

136 seats will be filled by election by means of the-
Single transferable vote by the members of the Provincial
Legislatures, the number of seats elected by each being
as follows:

Madras, Bombay, Bengal, U.P., Punjab, .and Bihar r
18 each; C. P. with Berar, 8 ; Assam, N. W. F. Province,.
Sind and Orissa, 5 each.

Ten non-Provincial communal seats will be reserved
in the Council of State, 7 for Europeans, 2 for Indian
Christians, 1 for Anglo-Indians, these seats being filled
by election by members of the Provincial Councils belong¬
ing to the three communities.

APPENDIX II

Federal Assembly—British India Side

The Constituencies will all be provincial excepting
four. Sikhs, Muslims, Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians
and Europeans will vote in Separate Communal constitu¬
encies. Seats, will be reserved for the Depressed Classes
but of the general seats in plural member constituencies.
There will be special constituencies for special interests.

416 *

Indian Administration

Composition of the Federal Assembly — I

British India Side

Number of General, Communal and Special seats
, '!
General—105 (including 19 reserved for

Depressed Classes) . . ;

Sikhs ... ... 6 Commerce and Indus- . j

Muslims ... ... 82 try Special ... 11 1

Indian Christians ... 8 Landholders Special ... . 7 j

Anglo-Indians ... 4 Labour Special ... .10

.Europeans ... 8 -,

Women Special ... 9 Total • ..! 250

Number of Seats by Provinces

*

Madras ... ... 37 Ajmir ... ... 1

Bombay ... ... 30 Baluchistan ... 1

Bengal ... ... 37 C. P. with Berar ... 15

U. P. ... ... 37 Assam ... .... 10

Punjab ... ... 30 Sind ... ... 5

Bihar ... ... 30 Delhi ... ... 2

N.W.F.P. ... 5 Coorg ... ... 1

‘Orissa ... ... 5 Non-Provincial ... 4

APPENDIX III

Provincial Legislative Assemblies

For Mohammedans, Europeans, Sikhs and Anglo-
Indians there will be communal electorate s. Seats will
be reserved for the Depressed Classes out of the General
seats. Special constituencies will be formed for special
interests like commerce, industry, landholders, etc.

417

Brief Summary of the . White Paper

Composition of the Provincial Legislative Assemblies

(Lower Houses ■)

Total Number of Seats in each Province

Madras ...

215

Bombay

... 175

Bengal* •

250

U. P. ...

... 228

Punjab ... * ...

175

Bihar

... 152

C. P. and Berar

112

Assam ...

... 108

N. W. P P.

50

Sind

60

Orissa ...

60

■ • The Bombay Legislative Assembly

■

Number of General, Communal and Special Seats

General—119 (including 15 for the Depressed
# Classes)

Backward Areas ... ... ... 1

Muslim^ (including one woman) ... ... 30

Indian Christians ... ... ... 3

Anglo-Indians ... ... ... 2

Europeans... ... ... ... 3

Commerce and Industry, Mining and Planting
Special ... ... ... ... 7

Landholders Special ... ... ... 2

University Special ... ... ... 1

Labour Special ... ... ... 7

Total ... 175

Provincial Legislative Councils (Upper Champers)

1 Total Number of Seats in each Province , ,

- •

Bengal—65, including 10 nominated by the Governor
U. P.—60, including 9 nominated by the Governor . ■;
Bihar—30, including 5 nominated by the Governor ,

3.4

'h

418 Indian Administration

APPENDICES IV AND V

Voters must have attained the age of 21.

It is intended to include in the Electoral rolls of"
Provincial Assemblies approximately 10 per cent of the-
population of the Depressed Classes (to be .designated
hereafter as the Scheduled Castes). TFor the Federal
House of Assembly this percentage is intended to be 2.

Franchise for the British Indian Seats in the
Federal House of Assembly from the

Presidency of Bombay . .

(1) The existing franchise—rural and urban—fof the
Bombay Legislative Council.

(2) Assessment to income-tax.

(3) Passing the Matriculation or School Leaving
Examination.

(4) Being a retired, pensioned or discharged officer or
soldier of the Regular Forces.

(5) Franchise for Special Constituencies almost as at
present.

Franchise for the Bombay Provincial
Legislative Assembly.

Non-Special Constituencies

(a) Payment of land revenue of Rs, 8 and over.

(&) Payment per year of house rent of Rs. 60 in.
Bombay City, Rs. 30 in Karachi and Rs. 18 in other cities.

(c) Assessment to Income-tax.

(d) Having passed the Matriculation or the School
Leaving Examination.

(e) Being the wife of a person possessing the pro¬
perty qualifications at present entitling to a vote for the-
Provincial Legislative Council.

Brief Summary of the White Paper 419

(/) Being a retired, pensioned or discharged officer
or soldier of the Regular Forces.

(g) In the case of the Scheduled Castes, literacy
and being a village servant are proposed as differential
qualifications. A reduced property qualification will also
be proposed, if necessary, to bring up the percentage of
the enfranchised!^ 10.

For Special Constituencies the franchise will be almost
the same as at present.

* Franchise for th e Provincial Upper Houses

It is intended that the franchise for the Upper House,
in the provinces in which it will be created, shall be based
on a high property qualification and a service in certain
“distinguished offices such as High Court Judge, Minister,
.Executive Councillor, Vice-Chancellor of a University and
so on.

APPENDIX VI

List I—Subjects Exclusively Federal

Defence, Army,. Navy, Air Forces, Cantonment Areas,
Chiefs* Colleges, Benares University, Aligarh University,
Ecclesiastical Affairs, Emigration and Immigration, Rail¬
ways, Maritime Shipping, Posts, Telegraphs, Telephone,
Wireless, Currency, Coinage, Public Debt, Post Office
Savings Banks, Opium, Arms and Ammunition, Copy¬
right, Inventions, Bankruptcy, Customs, Salt, Corporation
Tax, Geological and Botanical Survey of India, Meteoro¬
logy, Census, Income-Tax, Terminal Taxes on goods and
passengers, etc.

List il-Subjects Exclusively Provincial

Local Self-Government, Hospitals, Asylums, Public
J|(^th and ^aptation, Education, Public Works, light
^|||eeder Railways and Tramways, Water Supplies and

, , ’ v*

420 Indian Administration

Drainage, Land Revenue and Tenures, Agriculture*
Co-operation, Forests, Alcoholic Liquors and Drugs*
Administration of Justice, Stamp Duties, Registration,,
Mines, Provincial Industries, Electricity, Gas, Weights,
and Measures, Police, Prisons, Surcharge upon Income*

Tax, the Raising of Provincial Revenue, Poor Relief, etc,.

«»

*

Annexure

SOURCES OF PROVINCIAL INCOME

(1) Revenue from the public domain, lands, buildings*
mines, forests, etc. (2) Revenue from public enterprises,
such as irrigation, electric power, water-supply, markets,
drainage, tolls, etc. (3) Profits from banking and invest¬
ments and loans. (4) Fines and Penalties. (S) Court Fees*
Local Rates and Dues, Registration of vehicles, firearms,,
births and deaths, marriages, documents, etc. (6) Capi¬
tation Taxes. (7) Taxes on land, including death or succes¬
sion duties. (8) Taxes on personal property such as those;
on houses, animals, windows, vehicles, sumptuary taxes,,
taxes on trades, professions and callings. (9) Taxes on
employment. (10) Taxes on alcoholic liquors. (11). Taxes,
on Agricultural incomes. (12) Scamp Duties. (13) Taxes on
entertainments and amusements, betting, gambling,
lotteries. (14) Any other receipts accruing in respect of
subjects administered by the Province.

List III— Concurrent Subjects

Jurisdiction, powers, and authority of all Courts-
(excepting the Federal, the Supreme and Revenue Courts)
with respect to the subjects in this list; Civil Procedure,
Evidence and Oaths, Marriage and Divorce, Adoption*.
Wills, Transfer of Property, Arbitration, Insurance,
Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, Control of News¬
papers and Presses, Mines, Factories, Workmen's Com-

*

Brief Summary of the White Paper 421 r

pensation, Trade Unions, Labour Disputes and Welfare,
Ancient and Historical Monuments, etc.

APPENDIX VII

This Appendix gives in detail the principal existing
rights of officers appointed by the Secretary of State in
Council and those appointed by authority other than,
that. These rights include protection from dismissal by
any authority subordinate to the appointing authority,,
right to be heard in self-defence before dismissal, regula¬
tion of conditions of service, pay and allowances, discipline
and conduct by the Secretary of State in Council, non-
vptability of salaries and pensions, reservation of certain
posts to the I.C.S., personal concurrence of the Governor
to any order affecting emoluments, pensions, censure or
an order of posting, right of complaint to the Governor
against any order of an official superior and right of
appeal to the Secretary of State in Council, etc.

The salaries and pensions of the following persons are-
non-votable.

(a) Persons appointed by or with the approval of
His Majesty or by the Secretary of State in Council
before the commencement of the Constitution Act or by a
Secretary of State thereafter.

( b ) Persons appointed before April 1, 1924 by the-
Governor-General in Council or by a Local Government
to services and posts classified as superior.

(c) Holders in a substantive capacity of posts borne-

on the cadre of the I.C.S.

(d) Members of any Public Service Commission.

APPENDIX VIII

This Appendix gives a detailed list of the Scheduled.
Castes in each Province.